The Impact of Financial (De-)Regulation on Current Account Balances

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Abstract

Both global imbalances and financial market (de-)regulation feature prominently among the potential causes of the global financial crisis, but they have been largely discussed separately. In this paper, we take a different angle and investigate the relationship between financial market regulation and current account balances, an area for which limited empirical evidence exists. We use a panel of countries over the period 1980-2010 and employ a novel empirical approach which allows to simultaneously account for model uncertainty, current account persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. We find robust evidence that financial market regulations affect current account balances and that different aspects of these regulations can have opposing effects on the current account. In particular we find that easing bank entry barriers is negatively associated with the current account balance. In contrast, bank privatization and securities market deregulation tend to raise current account balances. Our results also highlight the importance to control for persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. Once we control for these factors, we find robust evidence for a wide range of current account theories in contrast to previous studies accounting for model uncertainty.

JEL-Code: C110, F320, F410, G280.

Keywords: current account, financial markets, financial regulation, Bayesian Model Averaging, model uncertainty.

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1 Introduction

The role of current account imbalances in the global financial crisis and more recently in the euro area sovereign debt crisis is widely debated (e.g. Obstfeld, 2012; Chinn, 2013; Chen et al., 2012). Some authors go as far as seeing global imbalances prior to the crisis as the main cause of the crisis (e.g. Portes, 2009; King, 2009), while others take a more nuanced view and suggest that the root causes of the global current account imbalances and the financial crisis coincide (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2010).1 One such potential root cause is financial deregulation. Several authors have pointed to a link between financial deregulation and the crisis (e.g. Stiglitz, 2010; Keys et al. 2010), but the relationship between financial deregulation and current account imbalances has received little attention to date. Our main contribution in this paper is to take a step towards filling this gap by providing a thorough empirical analysis. Better understanding the link between financial regulation and the current account can help inform the current policy discussions both on the design of more robust regulatory frameworks of domestic and international financial markets and on how to better monitor and prevent global or regional imbalances.2,3

To empirically investigate this link our approach builds on and contributes to the large literature estimating reduced form equations and including a wide range of potential current account determinants suggested by the theoretical and empirical literature (for early influential contribution see Debelle and Faruquee, 1996; Calderón et al., 2002; Chinn and Prasad, 2003). Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a,b) have recently criticized this standard empirical approach for ignoring the issue of model uncertainty given the large number of potential current account determinants and hence empirical models. They show that different economic and statistical criteria yield different models and no ‘true’ model appears to exist which can easily be labeled as superior to all others. They further demonstrate that model uncertainty is generally too large to draw any firm conclusions even about the sign of the coefficients. In order to address these challenges, Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a) use Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) techniques to account for model and parameter uncertainty. BMA allows examining a large number of potential models, weighting each one according to a fitness criterion, and providing a probability distribution for each coefficient estimate.

1Current account imbalances are not necessarily ”bad” as they can reflect the optimal allocation of capital across time and space. However, they can also be symptoms of underlying domestic distortions, such as deficient financial market regulation, and spillover effects, for example arising from a sudden stop in deficit countries, can suggest a role for multilateral surveillance (Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti, 2012).

2Examples of efforts to better monitor imbalances are the recent establishment of the G-20 Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) and the EU’s Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP).

3While global imbalances have narrowed after the crisis, a substantial part of the reduction is likely due to cyclical factors, as demand has contracted more in deficit countries than in surplus countries. Once cyclical conditions normalise global imbalances are likely to widen again (e.g. OECD, 2013).
In this paper, we also use BMA techniques but extend the approach in Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a) by considering a dynamic panel data setting and allowing for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity correlated with the regressors (e.g. Moral-Benito, 2012). By using a dynamic panel we allow for persistence in current account estimations, which is supported both from a theoretical standpoint, e.g. through habit formation in the consumption/saving behaviour (Bussiere et al., 2004; Gruber, 2004), as well as empirically (e.g. Bussiere et al., 2004; Calderón et al., 2002; Arezki and Hasanov, 2009).

Our findings suggest that extending Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a) in this way has important implications. First, we find decisive evidence of persistence with the lagged dependent variable being one of the most robustly related current account determinants. Second, once we allow for dynamics and unobserved heterogeneity, we find robust evidence for a wide range of proposed current account theories. For example, we find strong evidence of a positive effect from fiscal balances on current accounts as well as proxies for demographics, stages of development, natural resource abundance and institutional quality. This contrasts with the findings in Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a), who only find the net foreign asset position and the oil balance as robust current account determinants with an economically significant effect.

We pay particular attention the the relationship between financial (de-)regulation and the current account. This relationship is theoretically, ambiguous. On the one hand, traditionally financial deregulation has been viewed to deepen financial markets, reduce transaction costs and facilitate risk management. This may encourage saving (e.g. Edwards, 1996; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973), and hence tends to raise the current account balance. On the other hand, financial deregulation may relax liquidity constraints, which could reduce the need for precautionary saving (Mendoza et al., 2009) and could fuel credit driven consumption and investment growth, and hence reduce the current account balance (Ferrero, 2012; Borio and Disyatat, 2011). Which of these two effects dominates is therefore an empirical question.

Our results suggest that financial (de-)regulation is a robust determinant of the current account even after controlling for a wide range of competing theories and that the direction of the effect may depend on the particular area of deregulation. In particular, we find that the removal of bank entry barriers is negatively associated with the current account, consistent with the liquidity constraints view of financial deregulation. In contrast, we find that deregulating securities markets and privatizing banks tends to raise the current account balance. Hence, these aspects of deregulation seem to be more closely related to the saving enhancing view of financial deregulation, for example through a greater supply of and more sophisticated saving products. Our results therefore highlight the need to take a more nuanced view on financial deregulation, as different aspects can affect the current account in opposite ways.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the potential determinants of current account with special emphasis on financial regulation. Section 3 outlines the econometric methodology that combines BMA with a correlated-random-effects panel estimator. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.

2 Potential determinants of current account balances

2.1 Financial development and regulation

Financial (de-)regulation can affect the current account through the impact on saving and investment decisions.

The impact of financial (de-)regulation on investment is rather uncontroversial: by enhancing financial market development, financial deregulation is associated with higher investment (e.g. Levine, 2005). For example, Caballero et al. (2008) argue that underdeveloped financial markets led to a shortage of financial assets and hence investment opportunities in East Asia. This increased the demand for financial assets in the United States leading to capital outflows and current account surpluses in Asia. Similarly, inefficient financial intermediaries could drive a wedge between financial and capital returns to investment due to monitoring or transaction costs and lead to capital flowing from capital scarce to capital abundant countries (Boyd and Smith, 1992; Ju and Wei, 2010).

The effect of financial (de-)regulation on saving is theoretically ambiguous. The early literature has stressed the role of higher real interest rates following financial liberalization to mobilize savings (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Apart from interest rate effects, financial deregulation could more broadly improve saving opportunities by reducing transaction costs, facilitating risk management, improving risk-return trade-offs and offering a wider range of saving instruments. Edwards (1996) provides empirical support for a positive effect on savings. However, financial deregulation also involves easing liquidity constraints of households and (small) firms. This could reduce the need for precautionary saving (Mendoza et al., 2009) and increase consumption of previously liquidity constraint private agents (Bayoumi, 1993; Jappelli and Pagano, 1994; Bandiera et al., 2000). Given the ambiguous effect of financial regulation on saving, its impact on the current account is also ambiguous.

The literature linking financial regulation to the current account is still thin. Ferrero (2012) and Borio and Disyatat (2011) argue that financial deregulation prior to the crisis eased borrowing constraints which contributed to credit and asset price booms and the build-up of global imbalances. Along these lines, Lanau and Wieladek (2012) - to our knowledge the only other study to have empirically investigated the link between financial (de-)regulation and the current account - set up
an intertemporal current account model in which financial regulation influences the share of liquidity constraint agents. They empirically test their theory with a VAR model and find that deregulation increases the size and persistence of the current account response to a net output shock. While not their main focus, Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a) and Kerdrain et al. (2010) include an index of financial regulation among a wide range of other current account determinants but do not find a significant correlation.

The empirical studies above use an aggregate index of financial reform based on Abiad et al. (2010). We also employ this index but instead focus on the disaggregated components to allow for a more nuanced analysis. In particular, we use the following items: i) credit controls and excessively high reserve requirements; ii) bank entry barriers; iii) privatisation of the banking sector; iv) prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector and v) securities market regulation. Our empirical results below show that this more nuanced analysis provides important new insights as different aspects of financial regulation can have opposing effects on the current account.

In contrast to financial regulation, the broader concept of financial development has received wider attention as an explanation for the build-up of global imbalances prior to the crisis. In particular, the "saving glut" hypothesis (Bernanke, 2005; Clarida 2005) states that underdeveloped financial markets, especially in China and other emerging Asian economies, have contributed to excess savings, for example because of a higher need for precautionary savings or a lack of investment opportunities. These excess savings flew to the highly developed US financial market. According to this view, greater financial development may contribute to receding global imbalances. Empirically, the saving glut hypothesis hence implies a negative correlation between measures of financial development and the current account.

Evidence supporting the saving glut hypothesis is at best mixed. Chinn and Ito (2007, 2008a) find that financial development, proxied with the private credit-to-GDP-ratio, leads to higher savings for countries with underdeveloped institutions and closed financial markets including key East Asian countries contrary to the saving glut hypothesis. Only in countries with highly developed legal systems and open financial markets are financial development and current accounts negatively correlated. Gruber and Kamin (2007) do not find a significant correlation between financial development and the current account. Using a wider range of indicators to investigate different aspects of financial development, Gruber and Kamin (2009) find a significant negative correlation between the growth of stock market capitalization and the current account in their full sample. When they restrict their sample to industrialized countries they find weak evidence that the private credit-to-GDP-ratio is negatively correlated with the current account but the level of stock market capitalization and stock market turnover are positively correlated with the current account. Ito and Chinn (2009) find that measures of the size of financial markets (private credit and stock market capitalization) have a
negative effect on the current account in industrialized countries, but the opposite is more often the case in developing countries.

We contribute to this literature by focussing on financial (de-)regulation, which is an important determinant of financial development. In addition, we believe that this focus has at least two advantages. First, standard indicators of financial development, such as credit to the private sector, are likely to be endogenous to saving and investment decisions and hence the current account. Regulatory settings are less likely to suffer from endogeneity, though not fully independent of wider economic conditions. Second, as regulations are under the control of policy makers, our results bear direct policy implications. In our empirical analysis we nevertheless also include measures of financial development to control for aspects of financial market development that are unrelated to regulatory settings (see Table A1).

2.2 Other factors

Besides financial markets characteristics a large range of determinants have been suggested in the literature. In the following, we only briefly revisit some theoretical considerations underlying these factors. A more comprehensive discussion of the theories can be found for example in Chinn and Prasad (2003). Table A1 summarizes the specific variables included in our empirical analysis.

Initial net foreign asset position. A higher initial net asset position is associated with positive investment income flows which improve the current account. On the other hand a highly indebted country may have to eventually improve its current account position to preserve solvency. Hence the theoretically expected sign is ambiguous. However, the vast majority of empirical studies find a positive link.

Demographic factors influence mainly the saving behaviour of an economy. The life-cycle hypothesis for instance suggests that savings are accumulated during the working age while younger and older age cohorts generally dissave. Thus a country with a high old and/or young age dependency ratio should generally be expected to save relatively less.

Oil dependency. Higher oil prices improve the current account balance of oil exporters while they reduce the balance of oil importers. The oil trade balance is generally included in regressions to allow the effect of oil prices to differ across countries and the sign is expected to be positive.

Fiscal policy. In the absence of full Ricardian equivalence, i.e. when changes in private and public saving do not fully offset each other, higher budget deficits reduce overall domestic saving and thus the current account balance.

Stages of economic development. Countries with low income are expected to run current account deficits due to low saving and high investment growth during the convergence process to
higher income per capita levels. Thus the relationship between relative income and the current account should be positive. To allow for non-linearities, a squared term is frequently included in the regressions with a theoretically ambiguous sign. The effect of GDP growth on saving is ambiguous and depends inter alia on whether the associated increase in income is perceived as temporary or permanent and the degree of consumption smoothing of economic agents. Higher growth rates resulting from productivity gains may also raise expected asset returns leading to higher investment. Most empirical studies find a negative link between GDP growth and the current account.

**Trade.** Trade openness is commonly used in the literature as a proxy for barriers to trade and may be correlated with other attributes that make a country attractive to foreign capital. The majority of empirical studies find a positive link. In addition, changes in terms of trade may affect saving if the shock is perceived to be transitory. In this case consumption-smoothing households would adjust their saving in response to the transitory change in real income.

**Institutional and regulatory quality.** Improving the quality of the legal and regulatory system should in general boost investment and thus lead to a reduction in the current account balance.\(^4\) We also include a measure of labour market regulations with a theoretically ambiguous sign on savings and investment and hence the current account (Kerdrain et al., 2010).\(^5\)

**Dummy variables.** An Asian crisis dummy is frequently included to reflect that Asian countries may have permanently increased their saving rate to insure themselves against future external shocks since the financial crisis in 1997/98. Furthermore, a financial center dummy is included as economies that serve as hubs for international financial flows have tended to run substantial current account surpluses and net creditor positions.

### 3 Empirical Approach

#### 3.1 Data

We consider a balanced dataset including 31 countries over the time period 1980-2010. An important limitation of our approach is that the large number of variables investigated and the requirement of a balanced panel substantially reduces the number of countries included. To investigate if this smaller sample influences the results, we begin our empirical estimation by replicating the baseline results in Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a), who use a similar methodology but employ a substantially larger

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\(^4\) Weak institutions may lower risk-adjusted returns to capital in developing countries and has been evoked as one explanation for capital flowing "uphill" (Alfaro et al., 2008).

\(^5\) As more stringent job protection reduces the probability of job loss, but also lengthens the expected unemployment spell after dismissal, the impact on precautionary savings is ambiguous. Stricter employment protection may raise total operating cost and hence discourage investment but could also induce firms to substitute capital for labour.
and unbalanced panel of 77 countries. Since the results remain basically unaltered, we think that our sample selection is not a major cause of concern.

In line with the literature, most variables are expressed as deviations from a weighted average of foreign trading partners, since the current account balance of one country is not only affected by domestic determinants but also by developments in the rest of the world. Further in line with previous approaches, we use 10-year non-overlapping averages of the annual observations in the baseline to filter out cyclical movements and focus on medium-term developments. Given our sample, the use of 10-year periods guarantees the availability of 3 time-series observations per country. In the robustness section we also allow for different temporal aggregation windows.

3.2 Econometric specification
The general dynamic current account model typically considered in the literature is given by (e.g. Ca’ Zorzi et al., 2012a):\(^6\)

\[
CA_{it} = \alpha CA_{it-1} + x_{it}' \beta + \eta_i + \epsilon_{it}
\]  

(1)

where subscripts \(i\) and \(t\) denote country and time, \(CA_{it}\) refers to the current account balance as a share of GDP, and \(x_{it}\) is a \(k \times 1\) vector of current account determinants.\(^7\) \(\eta_i\) captures time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the country level potentially correlated with the \(x\) regressors, and \(\epsilon_{it}\) represents the serially uncorrelated transitory component of the error term.\(^8\) Finally, \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) refer to a scalar and a \(k \times 1\) vector of unknown coefficients respectively. Section 3.4 and Appendix A.1 provide more details on this specification and our identification strategy, respectively.

3.3 Model uncertainty
Model uncertainty hampers consensus on the current account determinants to be included in the \(x\) vector. Intuitively, model uncertainty acknowledges that competing economic theories or models exist to explain the same phenomenon without consensus about the ‘true’ model. Ignoring such model uncertainty can result in biased parameter estimates, overconfident (too narrow) standard errors and misleading inference and predictions (Draper, 1995). The most popular alternative for

\(^6\)We assume that the first lag of the dependent variable is enough to capture the current account dynamics, given that we consider data at 5- and 10-year intervals.

\(^7\)Given our estimation approach, regressors without time variation can also be embeded in the \(x\) vector (see Appendix A.1 for more details).

\(^8\)Note that time dummies are not included because explanatory variables are in deviations from weighted averages of foreign trading partners, which already accounts for time-specific shocks from the rest of the world affecting current account developments.
addressing model uncertainty implies a departure from conditioning on a particular model and instead calculating quantities of interest by averaging across different models. BMA allows examining a large number of models, weighting each model according to a fitness criterion, and providing a probability distribution for each coefficient estimate.

Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a) analyse the issue of model uncertainty for the case of current account determinants and show that even adopting a transparent approach, different economic and statistical criteria would yield different models. They conclude that there appears to be no ‘true’ model, i.e. a particular choice of variables to include in $x$, which can be easily be labelled as superior to all others. Therefore, Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a) consider the BMA methodology combined with a simplified version of equation (1) in which neither dynamics nor unobserved heterogeneity are included in the empirical model (i.e. $\eta_i = 0$ $\forall i$ and $\alpha = 0$).

In this paper, we extend the Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a) approach by combining the BMA methodology with a suitable panel estimator that accommodates both persistence and unobserved heterogeneity (see section 3.4 below). Regarding the choice of prior assumptions within the BMA framework, we follow Raftery (1995) and consider the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) approximation to the marginal likelihood, which works particularly well if we specify the unit information prior (UIP) on the parameter space; turning to the model space, we consider the uniform model prior. Eicher et al. (2011) demonstrate that even though the choice of the appropriate prior structure crucially depends on the particular dataset considered, the UIP together with the uniform model prior is generally superior in terms of predictive performance to a range of alternative priors suggested in the literature.9 Moral-Benito (2014) provides a recent overview of BMA and its use in economic applications.

Finally, we also extend the Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a) approach by considering a larger set of potential current account determinants (i.e. larger $k$) in forming the model space.

3.4 Dynamics and unobserved heterogeneity

As discussed above, Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a) focus on the static version of equation (1) within the BMA setting; thus, the authors implicitly assume that current account dynamics are absent beyond the 10-year frequency. In contrast, we allow for persistence in current accounts beyond 10-year periods and find that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is “statistically significant” according to the Bayesian robustness check used in this paper.

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9Another important choice in BMA concerns the selection of a sampling algorithm over the model space. As the number of models increases exponentially with the number of regressors, evaluation of the sum in equation (??) quickly becomes infeasible and sampling algorithms are needed. In this paper, we follow Fernandez et al. (2001) and use the MC3 algorithm for exploring the model space.
Turning to the issue of unobserved heterogeneity, several papers in the literature argue against the use of country-specific effects ($\eta_i$) on the grounds that this approach ignores the between-country variation, which represents most of the variation in current accounts and their determinants (e.g. Chinn and Prasad, 2003; Ca’ Zorzi et al., 2012a). While this is true if one considers the standard fixed-effects OLS estimator, the correlated-random-effects estimator employed here exploits both within- and between-country variation, and it also allows including country-specific effects. Indeed, the use of between-country variation by this estimator also allows investigating the effect on current accounts of structural variables with little (or no) variation over time in a panel setting with country-specific effects. In Appendix A.1 we provide more details on this estimator.

All in all, we allow for persistence in current account dynamics beyond the 10-year window, and we also accommodate unobserved country-specific heterogeneity in current account developments. We argue that ignoring persistence and/or unobserved heterogeneity would result in biased estimates of the effects of interest.\textsuperscript{10}

Crucially, the correlated-random-effects estimator described in Appendix A.1 is a maximum likelihood estimator; the availability of such a likelihood function allows us to combine the aforementioned estimator with BMA in order to address uncertainty in the selection of the variables to include in the $x$ vector.

As a final remark, we acknowledge an important limitation of the dynamic panel estimator considered in this paper. While it allows us to accommodate regressors’ endogeneity with respect to the permanent component of the error term (i.e. the country-specific effects), it is based on the assumption that the right-hand-side variables are exogenous with respect to transitory shocks; hence, feedback from current account developments to the regressors is not allowed. For instance, persistent current account deficits driven by a booming economy might exert pressures on regulators to relax regulations; given our identification strategy, we implicitly rule out this possibility. Despite its relevance, this issue is typically neglected in the literature mainly due to the lack of readily available instrumental variables (Chinn and Prasad, 2003). The reason is that it is difficult to find a set of variables related to the current account determinants but not directly related to the current account. Moreover, lagged levels of the regressors are only weak instruments for their first differences given the persistence of most aggregate variables. Therefore, we see the issue of reverse causality in this setting as a challenging topic for future research.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10}We are aware that the inclusion of the lagged current account as well as country-specific effects in the empirical model might be a controversial issue when estimating current account benchmarks or “norms” (IMF, 2013). However, our focus here is on estimating the effects of the determinants of current accounts which may be biased if we ignored persistence and/or unobserved heterogeneity.

\textsuperscript{11}Moreover, given our use of 5- and 10-year intervals, the small time series dimension of our panel precludes us from estimating country-specific coefficients, which also represents a limitation.
4 Empirical findings

4.1 Reduced set of regressors

As our empirical approach builds on Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a), we begin our empirical investigation by analysing whether the smaller number of countries in our dataset compared to theirs substantially drives our results. In particular, following Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a), we estimate the static versions of equation 1 using the BMA methodology with the same set of 14 regressors without accounting for country-specific effects (see Table 1).

The first column of Table 1 (and of all subsequent tables) reports the posterior inclusion probability (PIP) of each variable. To judge the effectiveness of a regressor in explaining the current account, the interpretation of the results follows a rule of thumb proposed by Jeffreys (1961) and refined by Kass and Raftery (1995). According to this rule, the evidence of a regressor having an effect is weak, positive, strong, or decisive if the posterior inclusion probabilities lie between 50-75%, 75%-95%, 95%-99% or are greater than 99%, respectively.

Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 (and of all subsequent tables) present the mean and standard deviation (s.d.) of the coefficients’ BMA posterior distributions.\footnote{The mean and standard deviations are conditional of the variable being included in a model; however, unconditional versions of these moments can be easily recovered.} While the exact distribution of the ratio of BMA posterior mean to posterior s.d. reported in column (4) is not known, several interpretations of this ratio are available in the literature. Raftery (1995) suggested that for a variable to be considered as effective the ratio of mean/s.d. (in absolute value) must exceed 1, which from a frequentist viewpoint implies that the regressor improves the power of the regression. Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008) are more stringent and consider a threshold value of the mean/s.d. ratio of 1.3, which approximately corresponds to a 90% confidence interval in frequentist approaches. Finally, Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) set this threshold at 2 since they argue that having a mean/s.d. ratio of 2 in absolute value indicates an approximate 95% Bayesian coverage region that excludes zero.

Overall, the results reported in Table 1 are very similar to Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a, Table 3). In particular, the initial net foreign asset position and the oil balance are the most robust determinants of current accounts. Both have posterior inclusion probabilities (PIP) higher than 95%, which, according to Kass and Raftery (1995), represents decisive evidence of an effect on current account fluctuations. Moreover, the ratios of mean/s.d. are larger than 2, which confirms the statistical significance of the estimated effects. In addition, the coefficient estimate on the NFA of 0.036 is almost identical to the one in Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a).\footnote{While Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a) use 12-year intervals, we use 10-year intervals to ensure the availability of 3 time series observations per country given our sample period.} However, we find a somewhat larger
coefficient on the oil balance (0.3 versus their range of 0.13-0.16). Furthermore, we find evidence of a positive effect of the fiscal balance. Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a) report a robust effect of the fiscal balance only for smaller temporal aggregation windows of 1 and 4 years. Given the similarity of our results compared to Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a), we conclude that the differences in the set of countries included in our sample do not substantially drive our findings.

4.2 Extended set of regressors

We now turn to our extended set of regressors. In particular, we add variables that proxy for financial market regulations. In addition, we include variables that pertain to financial market development, trade openness, terms of trade effects, institutional quality as well as a financial centre dummy. With 28 variables, the number of potential models now rises to almost 270 million.

We first consider the same static specification without unobserved heterogeneity as Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012a). Most importantly, we find first evidence that financial market regulations may impact the current account (Table 2). In particular, easing bank entry barriers and the current account are negatively correlated.

Turning to the other variables, we now find stronger evidence for the fiscal balance, population growth and the Asian crisis dummy, compared to results reported in Table 1, all with the theoretically expected sign. In contrast, the evidence for an effect of the NFA now vanishes. Of the additional variables, we find some weak evidence that credit growth and the current account are negatively correlated, and the theoretically expected positive sign for the financial center dummy.

Next, we allow for country-specific unobserved heterogeneity by including country fixed effects (Table 3). Compared to Table 2, a range of important differences emerge, which illustrates the importance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and indicates that ignoring such unobserved effects could result in misleading conclusions. We again find evidence that bank entry and the current account are correlated. The PIP now drops to below 75%, but the ratio of posterior mean to standard deviation remains above 2, indicating that the estimated effect is statistically significant.

Interestingly, we now find a larger number of robust current account determinants. In particular we find evidence of the stages of development hypothesis with relative income and its squared term with PIP above 99%. We also find robust evidence of a negative association between private credit to GDP ratio and the current account. In addition we find evidence of demographic factors robustly related to the current account, with the theoretically predicted negative sign on the old age.
dependency ratio. Furthermore higher institutional quality as proxied by civil liberties is associated with lower current account balances (note that the coding of the variable is inverted). We also find a positive correlation between trade openness and the current account, in line with most empirical studies. In contrast, the dummy variables (Asian crisis and financial center) loose their significance.

Finally, Table 4 presents the results from our preferred dynamic specification with country-specific effects. The dynamic specification is strongly supported by the data as we find decisive evidence of persistence in the current account series with a PIP of the lagged dependent variable of 1. The posterior mean of 0.354 implies that following a shock to the current account, 65% of the deviation of the current account from its equilibrium value is corrected over 10 years. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is smaller than in previous studies (e.g. Chinn and Prasad, 2003; Bussiere et al., 2004, Arezki and Hasanov, 2009), which, however, use higher frequency data (annual or 4-year averages). Our results suggest that persistence remains important even at the lower frequency (10-year) current account dynamics considered here.

Once we additionally account for persistence, a larger number of variables related to financial regulations become significant. We again find strong evidence that easier bank entry is associated with lower current accounts. Moreover, we now also find that bank privatization and securities markets deregulation are robust determinants of the current account. However, in contrast to easing bank access, the coefficients on these variables are positive. This suggests that different aspects of financial regulation might have opposite effects on the current account. Finally, we find that two variables relating to credit market regulations appear to be robustly related to the current account when assessed in terms of their PIP. However both of these variables have very low mean/s.d. ratios (below one), indicating that we cannot conclude the sign of this relation because of model uncertainty.

Turning to the other variables, we now find even stronger evidence (in terms of PIP) for the relevance of virtually all theories suggested by the literature. The large majority of the variables also have the expected sign. Exceptions are the young age dependency ratio, the Asian crisis dummy and the financial sector dummy which have counterintuitive signs.14 An interesting case is the NFA. While the large majority of empirical studies have found a positive impact on current accounts, we conclude that the direction is uncertain once we take model uncertainty seriously, as indicated by the posterior mean to standard deviation ratio of less than one. This result suggests that the lagged

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14 Kerdrain et al. (2010) and Kumhof et al. (2012) also find a significant positive effect of the young age dependency ratio on the current account in a sample of developed countries. A possible explanation of this finding could be that medium-aged households increase their saving rate in response to anticipated future education expenses of their offspring.
NFA variable in studies using a static equation may capture some of the persistence effect. Once persistence is appropriately accounted for, the sign becomes ambiguous.

One variable that has received considerable attention in the literature is the fiscal balance. Our preferred specification confirms its robust relationship with current account balances and suggests that over the medium term (10 years) a 1% increase in the budget balance increases current account by 0.4%. In the long-term the effect increases to about 0.65%. These estimates are somewhat larger than found in the previous literature which range from 0.1 to 0.5 (e.g. Bussiere et al, 2004; Chin and Ito, 2007, 2009; Gruber and Kamin 2007, 2009).

4.3 Goodness of fit

Figures 1-3 show the average actual current account realizations (red dots) compared to the predicted current accounts and their associated 95% confidence intervals (blue bars) based on our BMA results for each country and the time periods 1980-1990, 1990-2000 and 2000-2010. In particular, for each estimated model within the BMA approach we compute the predicted current accounts for each country-period; then, we compute the weighted median and 5% and 95% percentiles from the overall distribution of model-specific predicted current accounts.

Figures 1-3 indicate that our preferred specification accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and persistence can explain fairly well the observed current account developments. This specification also seems to provide a better fit than alternative specifications without unobserved heterogeneity and/or persistence, with the differences particularly pronounced for the period 2000-2010 in Figure 3. We acknowledge that this finding is somewhat unsatisfying because unobserved heterogeneity and the lagged current account provide little information on the drivers of current accounts. However, as our results highlight, omitting these two factors from the empirical model would result in biased estimates and give a misleading picture of the drivers of current account balances.

4.4 Robustness

In this section we report robustness analysis with respect to different priors specifications and different temporal aggregation windows.

The choice of prior distribution specifications is always contentious in Bayesian analysis. Ley and Steel (2009) show that differences in BMA approaches can arise from different priors on the prior inclusion probability of each regressor. In our baseline specification we have used a prior

\[ \frac{\beta}{(1 - a)} \]

\[ \text{The long-term effect is calculated according to the following formula } \frac{\beta}{(1-a)}. \]
inclusion probability of 50% for each variable ($\xi = 0.50$).\footnote{This prior implies that each model is equally likely a priory, i.e., the prior model probability is $1/2^k$ for all models where $k$ is the number of variables considered.} Table 5 displays the posterior inclusion probabilities for different prior inclusion probabilities. The table shows that our results are overall robust to variations in the prior inclusion probability. Only when we choose a very low prior inclusion probability of $\xi = 0.17$ for each regressor, the posterior inclusion probability of bank entry barriers and privatization of the banking sector falls below the 50% threshold. However, the PIP of bank entry barriers remains above the prior inclusion probability, indicating that the inclusion of these variables in current account models is supported by the data.

In Table 6, we explore a different prior structure for the model space. In particular, we consider the dilution priors introduced by George (1999) in order to account for potential collinearity of the regressors. Essentially, the dilution priors downweight models with many collinear regressors by pre-multiplying the prior model probability by the determinant of the correlation matrix of the regressors included in this model.\footnote{Note that this determinant is equal to 1 when the regressors are orthogonal and 0 when they are collinear.} While the PIPs of some variables are reduced, the BMA results reported in Table 6 broadly confirm the robustness of our main findings to multicollinearity concerns.

As a final robustness check, we investigate different temporal aggregation windows. In our baseline specification we have used a temporal aggregation window of $m = 10$. Several other studies have used shorter aggregation windows (e.g. Prasad and Chinn, 2003; Chinn and Ito, 2007, 2009). Thus, Table 7 reports results for the case of $m = 5$. The results are again broadly similar to our baseline results. However, the PIP of bank entry barriers drops below 50% and the posterior mean standard deviation ratio of bank privatization falls below 2. This finding suggests that financial regulations exhibit a stronger impact on the current account over the longer term. In terms of the other variables, we find that the coefficient of the budget balance is now smaller and closer to estimates in the previous literature. Finally, the lagged dependent variable is again highly significant and precisely estimated.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Variable & PIP & BMA Result \\
\hline
Bank entry barriers & & \\
Privatization of banking sector & & \\
Budget balance & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Robustness of Financial Regulations to Multicollinearity}
\end{table}

\section{4.5 Discussion}
Our results overall suggest a robust correlation between financial (de-)regulation and the current account. More interestingly, the results suggest that different aspects of financial (de-)regulation may affect the current account in opposite directions. In this section we provide some discussion of the results.

In particular, we find that easing bank entry negatively affects the current account. In light of our discussion in section 2.1, the result suggests that this aspect of financial (de-)regulation may mainly

[Tables 5,6,7 here]
affect the current account through its impact on liquidity constraints. For example, easier entry by foreign banks should facilitate lending across borders and hence access to foreign funds. Moreover, by stimulating competition, easier bank entry may encourage risk taking, which could prompt banks to lend to previously liquidity constraint higher risk clients such as lower-income households and small firms.

In contrast, we find a robust positive correlation between the current account and both securities market deregulation and bank privatisation. These findings are consistent with the view that financial market deregulation may spur savings (e.g. Edwards, 1996; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973) and hence tends to improve the current account. One possible channel is that measures, such as tax incentives, to develop (government and corporate) bond, equity and derivative markets raise both the demand and the supply of more sophisticated saving products, which help facilitate risk management and mobilise savings. Similarly, bank privatisation may spur innovation of banking products, which may also channel more savings into the financial system. At the same time, securities market deregulation and/or bank privatisation may also increase the supply of borrowing products or decrease borrowing costs. Moreover, privatised banks may be more inclined to lend to households compared to state-owned banks, which are often discouraged to lend to this sector. Both channels should ease borrowing constraints. However, our results suggest that on net the saving enhancing effect of these types of deregulations dominates.

A potential caveat to our findings is that our employed indicators of financial regulation are rather crude, measuring deregulation on scale from 0-3. For example, the securities market deregulation indicator may not sufficiently differentiate between benign measures to increase the liquidity of bond and equity markets, and the type of deregulations that have accelerated the process of securitization and emergence of highly sophisticated financial products, such as credit default options and asset backed securities. Securitization has sharply reduced borrowing costs and may have reduced the incentives of financial intermediaries to carefully screen borrowers (Keys et al., 2010), which led to excessive borrowing and deteriorating current accounts in several countries prior to the global financial crisis. More research is clearly needed to better understand the exact channels through which different aspects of financial deregulation may affect saving, investment and the current account.

Finally, the effect of financial deregulation on the current account may depend on country circumstances. For example, the effect may differ between debtor and creditor countries, between countries with open or closed capital accounts, or may depend on development of the legal system (e.g. Chinn and Ito, 2007). One simple way to investigate such effects would be to introduce interaction effects between financial regulation variables other variables. Alternatively one could analyse the relationship across different sub-samples of countries. Unfortunately, our small country sample does not allow for this type of analysis and we leave it to future research.
5 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between financial market regulations and the current account balance, an area for which limited empirical evidence exists. We use a panel of countries over the period 1980-2010 and employ a novel empirical approach which allows us to simultaneously address model uncertainty, current account persistence and country-specific unobserved heterogeneity.

We find that financial market regulations are robust current account determinants even after accounting for a wide range of competing theories. Moreover, our results imply that different aspects of financial market regulations can have opposing effects on the current account, highlighting the need to take a nuanced view of financial deregulation. In particular, we find that easing bank entry barriers leads to a deterioration of the current account balance, consistent with the view of financial deregulation that financial deregulation eases liquidity constraints. In contrast, bank privatization and deregulations of securities market have a positive impact on the current account, in line with the saving enhancing view of financial deregulation.

Our results also highlight the importance to control for persistence and unobserved heterogeneity in current account estimations. Once we control for these factors, we find robust evidence for a wide range of variables related to different current account theories. For example we find strong evidence of a positive effect from fiscal balances on current accounts as well as proxies for demographics, stages of development, natural resource abundance and institutional quality. This contrasts with the findings in previous BMA exercises which account for model uncertainty but neglect persistence and unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. Ca’ Zorzi et al., 2012a).

We believe that our results improve the understanding of the link between financial regulations and current account balances by identifying robust correlations. Nevertheless, more research is clearly needed to understand the channels through which particular aspects of financial regulation affect the current account. In addition, our results do not readily lend themselves to normative evaluations of current account imbalances in the spirit of the (new) External Balance Assessment (EBA) methodology of the IMF (IMF, 2013). Normative evaluations of whether current account imbalances are excessive require assessing deviations of policies from desirable or appropriate levels. Judging the appropriateness of financial market regulatory settings is still an area of intense debate, which involves weighing efficiency consideratons against financial stability concerns, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
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| Theory                     | Variable                        | PIP   | Posterior Mean | Posterior Std. | P. Mean / P. Std. |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------|-------|---------------|----------------|-------------------|
|                           | Initial NFA                     | 0.984 | 0.036         | 0.010          | 3.636             |
| Oil dependency            | Oil balance                     | 0.976 | 0.296         | 0.090          | 3.299             |
| Trade integration         | Openness                        | 0.189 | 0.012         | 0.011          | 1.121             |
| Fiscal policy             | Fiscal balance                  | 0.801 | 0.326         | 0.123          | 2.644             |
| Economic development      | Relative income                 | 0.161 | 0.005         | 0.008          | 0.603             |
|                           | Relative income squared         | 0.148 | 0.000         | 0.000          | 0.000             |
|                           | Economic growth                 | 0.260 | 0.348         | 0.244          | 1.425             |
|                           | Investment                      | 0.148 | -0.103        | 0.125          | -0.828            |
| Demographics              | Population growth               | 0.511 | -2.234        | 1.233          | -1.812            |
|                           | Dependency ratio (old)          | 0.234 | -0.169        | 0.144          | -1.167            |
|                           | Dependency ratio (young)        | 0.214 | 0.072         | 0.072          | 0.997             |
| Institutional quality     | Civil liberties                 | 0.153 | 0.359         | 0.438          | 0.819             |
| Dummies                   | Asian crisis dummy              | 0.449 | 2.888         | 1.467          | 1.968             |
| Financial development     | Financial integration           | 0.120 | -0.001        | 0.003          | -0.440            |

*Note:* This table presents the results of applying the BMA pooled and static approach as in Ca’Zorzi et al. (2012) to the reduced set of regressors with $m = 10$ and trade-based weights.
| Theory                | Variable                        | PIP  | Posterior Mean | Posterior Std. | P. Mean / P. Std. |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------|------|----------------|----------------|------------------|
| Initial NFA           |                                 | 0.147| 0.010          | 0.011          | 0.895            |
| Oil dependency        | Oil balance                     | 0.998| 0.327          | 0.082          | 3.984            |
| Trade integration     | Openness                        | 0.122| 0.000          | 0.012          | 0.024            |
|                       | Trade regulations               | 0.219| -0.631         | 0.519          | -1.215           |
|                       | Terms of trade growth           | 0.117| 0.073          | 0.172          | 0.422            |
| Fiscal policy         | Fiscal balance                  | 0.979| 0.396          | 0.116          | 3.410            |
| Economic development  | Relative income                 | 0.147| -0.003         | 0.008          | -0.447           |
|                       | Relative income squared         | 0.135| 0.000          | 0.000          | 0.000            |
|                       | Economic growth                 | 0.175| 0.254          | 0.268          | 0.947            |
|                       | Investment                      | 0.169| -0.107         | 0.105          | -1.023           |
| Demographics          | Population growth               | 0.702| -1.939         | 0.864          | -2.244           |
|                       | Dependency ratio (old)          | 0.173| -0.094         | 0.139          | -0.674           |
|                       | Dependency ratio (young)        | 0.144| 0.008          | 0.069          | 0.120            |
| Institutional quality | Civil liberties                 | 0.320| 0.624          | 0.398          | 1.569            |
|                       | Legal system and property rights| 0.169| 0.386          | 0.411          | 0.940            |
|                       | Labour market regulations       | 0.107| -0.101         | 0.302          | -0.333           |
| Dummies               | Asian crisis dummy              | 0.776| 3.302          | 1.304          | 2.532            |
|                       | Financial centre                | 0.999| 5.367          | 1.138          | 4.716            |
| Financial development | Financial integration           | 0.103| -0.001         | 0.002          | -0.278           |
|                       | Capital account openness        | 0.144| 0.310          | 0.481          | 0.640            |
|                       | Private credit to GDP           | 0.137| 0.788          | 0.998          | 0.790            |
|                       | Growth of private credit to GDP | 0.622| -0.145         | 0.064          | -2.268           |
| Financial regulation  | Credit controls                 | 0.112| -0.162         | 0.573          | -0.282           |
|                       | Bank entry barriers             | 0.872| -1.658         | 0.585          | -2.836           |
|                       | Privatization of banking sector | 0.247| 0.570          | 0.420          | 1.355            |
|                       | Securities market development   | 0.183| 0.875          | 0.796          | 1.100            |
|                       | Banking sector supervision      | 0.130| -0.195         | 0.590          | -0.330           |
|                       | Credit market regulations       | 0.110| 0.017          | 0.330          | 0.052            |

Note: This table presents the results of applying the BMA pooled and static approach as in Ca’Zorzi et al. (2012) to the extended set of regressors with $m = 10$ and trade-based weights.
| Theory                  | Variable                                      | PIP    | Posterior Mean | Posterior Std. | P. Mean / P. Std. |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------|----------------|----------------|-------------------|
| Initial NFA            |                                               | 0.522  | -0.008         | 0.013          | -0.623           |
| Oil dependency         | Oil balance                                   | 1.000  | 0.909          | 0.244          | 3.729            |
| Trade integration      | Openness                                      | 0.995  | 0.127          | 0.030          | 4.262            |
|                        | Trade regulations                             | 0.396  | -0.370         | 0.703          | -0.526           |
|                        | Terms of trade growth                         | 0.904  | 0.243          | 0.188          | 1.295            |
| Fiscal policy          | Fiscal balance                                | 0.862  | 0.325          | 0.174          | 1.668            |
| Economic development   | Relative income                               | 0.991  | 0.553          | 0.150          | 3.684            |
|                        | Relative income squared                       | 0.992  | -0.003         | 0.001          | -4.000           |
|                        | Economic growth                               | 0.712  | -0.935         | 0.390          | -2.401           |
|                        | Investment                                    | 0.644  | -0.301         | 0.133          | -2.275           |
| Demographics           | Population growth                             | 0.206  | -1.694         | 1.661          | -1.020           |
|                        | Dependency ratio (old)                        | 0.973  | -0.672         | 0.217          | -3.096           |
|                        | Dependency ratio (young)                      | 0.583  | 0.289          | 0.152          | 1.898            |
| Institutional quality  | Civil liberties                               | 0.840  | 2.066          | 0.871          | 2.373            |
|                        | Legal system and property rights              | 0.168  | 0.182          | 0.755          | 0.241            |
|                        | Labour market regulations                     | 0.281  | -0.892         | 0.595          | -1.499           |
| Dummies                | Asian crisis dummy                            | 0.208  | -1.002         | 2.097          | -0.478           |
|                        | Financial centre                             | 0.645  | 5.313          | 2.142          | 2.480            |
| Financial development  | Financial integration                         | 0.655  | -0.006         | 0.003          | -2.440           |
|                        | Capital account openness                      | 0.288  | -0.763         | 0.672          | -1.137           |
|                        | Private credit to GDP                         | 0.973  | -5.135         | 1.690          | -3.039           |
|                        | Growth of private credit to GDP               | 0.202  | -0.048         | 0.060          | -0.794           |
| Financial regulation   | Credit controls                               | 0.185  | 0.043          | 0.871          | 0.049            |
|                        | Bank entry barriers                           | 0.715  | -1.839         | 0.806          | -2.281           |
|                        | Privatization of banking sector               | 0.140  | 0.741          | 0.647          | 1.144            |
|                        | Securities market development                 | 0.387  | 1.463          | 1.207          | 1.212            |
|                        | Banking sector supervision                    | 0.358  | 0.595          | 0.716          | 0.832            |
|                        | Credit market regulations                     | 0.251  | 0.130          | 0.420          | 0.309            |

*Note:* This table presents the results of applying the BMA static approach with country-specific effects (unobserved heterogeneity) to the extended set of regressors with $m = 10$ and trade-based weights.
### Table 4: BMA results under dynamic specification with unobserved heterogeneity

| Theory                  | Variable                          | PIP          | Posterior Mean | Posterior Std. | P. Mean / P. Std. |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|
|                         | Lagged current account            | 1.000        | 0.354          | 0.198          | 1.794            |
|                         | Initial NFA                       | 0.867        | -0.009         | 0.012          | -0.758           |
| Oil dependency          | Oil balance                       | 1.000        | 1.079          | 0.241          | 4.475            |
| Trade integration       | Openness                          | 1.000        | 0.143          | 0.031          | 4.613            |
|                         | Trade regulations                 | 0.116        | -1.091         | 0.746          | -1.462           |
|                         | Terms of trade growth             | 0.051        | 0.193          | 0.182          | 1.062            |
| Fiscal policy           | Fiscal balance                    | 1.000        | 0.425          | 0.154          | 2.761            |
| Economic development    | Relative income                   | 1.000        | 0.599          | 0.138          | 4.334            |
|                         | Relative income squared           | 1.000        | -0.003         | 0.001          | -4.833           |
|                         | Economic growth                   | 0.971        | -0.844         | 0.370          | -2.282           |
|                         | Investment                        | 0.270        | -0.250         | 0.141          | -1.769           |
| Demographics            | Population growth                 | 0.957        | -1.944         | 1.410          | -1.378           |
|                         | Dependency ratio (old)            | 0.979        | -0.580         | 0.193          | -2.998           |
|                         | Dependency ratio (young)          | 0.940        | 0.430          | 0.141          | 3.048            |
| Institutional quality   | Civil liberties                   | 0.961        | 1.598          | 0.800          | 1.998            |
|                         | Legal system and property rights  | 0.292        | -0.048         | 0.656          | -0.073           |
|                         | Labour market regulations         | 1.000        | -1.044         | 0.551          | -1.894           |
| Dummies                 | Asian crisis dummy                | 0.801        | -3.218         | 1.911          | -1.684           |
|                         | Financial centre                  | 1.000        | -6.406         | 1.117          | -5.735           |
| Financial development   | Financial integration             | 1.000        | -0.004         | 0.003          | -1.556           |
|                         | Capital account openness          | 0.985        | -1.278         | 0.650          | -1.966           |
|                         | Private credit to GDP             | 0.989        | -5.261         | 1.526          | -3.448           |
|                         | Growth of private credit to GDP   | 0.074        | -0.053         | 0.059          | -0.887           |
| Financial regulation    | Credit controls                   | 0.983        | 0.208          | 0.811          | 0.256            |
|                         | Bank entry barriers               | 0.930        | -1.676         | 0.713          | -2.350           |
|                         | Privatization of banking sector   | 0.872        | 1.335          | 0.580          | 2.302            |
|                         | Securities market development     | 0.884        | 1.340          | 1.043          | 1.286            |
|                         | Banking sector supervision        | 0.065        | 0.339          | 0.701          | 0.483            |
|                         | Credit market regulations         | 1.000        | 0.214          | 0.390          | 0.549            |

**Note:** This table presents the results of applying the BMA dynamic approach with country-specific effects (unobserved heterogeneity) to the extended set of regressors with \( m = 10 \) and trade-based weights.
Table 5: BMA results under dynamic specification with unobserved heterogeneity - Robustness (I)

| Theory                          | Variable                                | PIPs under different prior inclusion probabilities |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
|                                 |                                         | $\xi = 0.17$ | $\xi = 0.34$ | $\xi = 0.50$ | $\xi = 0.69$ | $\xi = 0.86$ |
|                                 | Lagged current account                  | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        |
|                                 | Initial NFA                             | 0.246        | 0.714        | 0.867        | 0.948        | 0.978        |
| Oil dependency                  | Oil balance                             | 0.989        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        |
| Trade integration               | Openness                                | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        |
|                                | Trade regulations                       | 0.043        | 0.075        | 0.116        | 0.196        | 0.319        |
|                                | Terms of trade growth                   | 0.189        | 0.080        | 0.051        | 0.058        | 0.103        |
| Fiscal policy                   | Fiscal balance                          | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        |
| Economic development            | Relative income                         | 0.999        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        |
|                                | Relative income squared                 | 0.992        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        |
|                                | Economic growth                         | 0.447        | 0.901        | 0.971        | 0.996        | 1.000        |
|                                | Investment                              | 0.343        | 0.259        | 0.270        | 0.312        | 0.435        |
| Demographics                    | Population growth                       | 0.654        | 0.903        | 0.957        | 0.984        | 0.993        |
|                                | Dependency ratio (old)                  | 0.791        | 0.946        | 0.979        | 0.991        | 0.998        |
|                                | Dependency ratio (young)                | 0.798        | 0.907        | 0.940        | 0.969        | 0.987        |
| Institutional quality           | Civil liberties                         | 0.951        | 0.932        | 0.961        | 0.983        | 0.993        |
|                                | Legal system and property rights        | 0.450        | 0.355        | 0.292        | 0.310        | 0.425        |
|                                | Labour market regulations               | 0.997        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        |
| Dummies                         | Asian crisis dummy                     | 0.327        | 0.705        | 0.801        | 0.858        | 0.882        |
|                                | Financial centre                       | 0.996        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        |
| Financial development           | Financial integration                   | 0.997        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        |
|                                | Capital account openness               | 0.448        | 0.930        | 0.985        | 0.998        | 1.000        |
|                                | Private credit to GDP                  | 0.945        | 0.987        | 0.989        | 0.993        | 0.998        |
|                                | Growth of private credit to GDP        | 0.044        | 0.052        | 0.074        | 0.123        | 0.203        |
| Financial regulation           | Credit controls                        | 0.749        | 0.947        | 0.983        | 0.997        | 0.999        |
|                                | Bank entry barriers                    | 0.375        | 0.817        | 0.930        | 0.978        | 0.992        |
|                                | Privatization of banking sector        | 0.155        | 0.714        | 0.872        | 0.953        | 0.988        |
|                                | Securities market development          | 0.789        | 0.818        | 0.884        | 0.945        | 0.979        |
|                                | Banking sector supervision             | 0.048        | 0.045        | 0.065        | 0.104        | 0.196        |
|                                | Credit market regulations              | 0.996        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        | 1.000        |

Note: This table presents the PIPs resulting from the approach in Table 4 but considering different prior inclusion probabilities. In particular $\xi$ is the prior inclusion probability for each regressor; $\xi = 0.50$ refers to the uniform model priors considered in the baseline case, which implies that each model is equally probable a priori.
### Table 6: BMA results under dynamic specification with unobserved heterogeneity - Robustness (II)

| Theory                          | Variable                        | PIP  | Posterior Mean | Posterior Std | P. Mean / P. Std. |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|------|----------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Lagged current account          | 1.000                           | 0.357| 0.212          | 1.689          |
| Initial NFA                     | 0.719                           | -0.010| 0.012          | -0.826         |
| Oil dependency                  | Oil balance                     | 1.000| 1.037          | 0.261          | 3.980             |
| Trade integration               | Openness                        | 1.000| 0.139          | 0.032          | 4.309             |
|                                  | Trade regulations               | 0.073| -1.070         | 0.813          | -1.317            |
|                                  | Terms of trade growth           | 0.124| 0.257          | 0.183          | 1.403             |
| Fiscal policy                   | Fiscal balance                  | 1.000| 0.408          | 0.166          | 2.466             |
| Economic development            | Relative income                 | 1.000| 0.578          | 0.149          | 3.874             |
|                                  | Relative income squared         | 1.000| -0.003         | 0.001          | -4.362            |
|                                  | Economic growth                 | 0.871| -0.799         | 0.410          | -1.949            |
|                                  | Investment                      | 0.326| -0.267         | 0.146          | -1.833            |
| Demographics                    | Population growth               | 0.865| -1.792         | 1.528          | -1.172            |
|                                  | Dependency ratio (old)          | 0.904| -0.578         | 0.203          | -2.845            |
|                                  | Dependency ratio (young)        | 0.828| 0.414          | 0.145          | 2.853             |
| Institutional quality           | Civil liberties                 | 0.915| 1.684          | 0.856          | 1.967             |
|                                  | Legal system and property rights| 0.315| 0.035          | 0.673          | 0.052             |
|                                  | Labour market regulations       | 1.000| -0.993         | 0.588          | -1.690            |
| Dummies                         | Asian crisis dummy              | 0.718| -2.994         | 2.004          | -1.494            |
|                                  | Financial centre                | 1.000| -6.306         | 1.179          | -5.349            |
| Financial development           | Financial integration           | 1.000| -0.005         | 0.003          | -1.582            |
|                                  | Capital account openness        | 0.883| -1.237         | 0.687          | -1.800            |
|                                  | Private credit to GDP           | 0.971| -4.995         | 1.665          | -3.000            |
|                                  | Growth of private credit to GDP | 0.093| -0.061         | 0.063          | -0.971            |
| Financial regulation            | Credit controls                 | 0.921| 0.073          | 0.854          | 0.085             |
|                                  | Bank entry barriers             | 0.823| -1.714         | 0.746          | -2.299            |
|                                  | Privatization of banking sector | 0.699| 1.308          | 0.613          | 2.132             |
|                                  | Securities market development   | 0.761| 1.154          | 1.159          | 0.996             |
|                                  | Banking sector supervision      | 0.074| 0.451          | 0.737          | 0.612             |
|                                  | Credit market regulations       | 1.000| 0.172          | 0.412          | 0.418             |

**Note:** This table presents the PIPs resulting from the approach in Table 4 but considering different prior inclusion probabilities. In particular, we consider the dilution priors discussed in George (1999) in order to account for possible multicollinearity between the different regressors.
Table 7: BMA results under dynamic specification with unobserved heterogeneity - Robustness (III)

| Theory          | Variable                  | PIP  | Posterior Mean | Posterior Std. | P. Mean / P. Std. |
|-----------------|---------------------------|------|----------------|----------------|-------------------|
| Lagged current account | 1.000                     | 0.261 | 0.078          | 3.367           |
| Initial NFA    | 0.071                     | 0.007 | 0.010          | 0.740           |
| Oil dependency | Oil balance               | 1.000 | 0.663          | 0.126           | 5.274             |
| Trade integration | Openness                | 1.000 | 0.093          | 0.017           | 5.447             |
|                 | Trade regulations         | 0.059 | 0.336          | 0.357           | 0.941             |
|                 | Terms of trade growth     | 0.752 | 0.213          | 0.075           | 2.826             |
| Fiscal policy  | Fiscal balance            | 0.998 | 0.187          | 0.086           | 2.171             |
| Economic development | Relative income     | 1.000 | 0.470          | 0.093           | 5.028             |
|                 | Relative income squared   | 1.000 | -0.002         | 0.000           | -5.500            |
|                 | Economic growth           | 0.054 | 0.006          | 0.167           | 0.035             |
|                 | Investment                | 1.000 | -0.401         | 0.077           | -5.196            |
| Demographics   | Population growth         | 0.691 | -1.288         | 0.585           | -2.203            |
|                 | Dependency ratio (old)    | 0.995 | -0.455         | 0.113           | -4.021            |
|                 | Dependency ratio (young)  | 0.977 | 0.261          | 0.075           | 3.475             |
| Institutional quality | Civil liberties  | 0.979 | 1.218          | 0.426           | 2.856             |
|                 | Legal system and property rights | 0.990 | -0.565         | 0.297           | -1.899            |
|                 | Labour market regulations | 0.127 | -0.461         | 0.351           | -1.315            |
| Dummies         | Asian crisis dummy        | 0.994 | 1.441          | 1.172           | 1.229             |
|                 | Financial centre          | 0.996 | -1.757         | 0.563           | -3.120            |
| Financial development | Financial integration     | 0.145 | -0.002         | 0.002           | -1.600            |
|                 | Capital account openness  | 0.269 | -0.545         | 0.349           | -1.560            |
|                 | Private credit to GDP     | 0.995 | -3.201         | 1.050           | -3.049            |
|                 | Growth of private credit to GDP | 0.666 | -0.059         | 0.026           | -2.316            |
| Financial regulation | Credit controls  | 0.851 | -0.182         | 0.384           | -0.473            |
|                 | Bank entry barriers       | 0.160 | -0.641         | 0.423           | -1.515            |
|                 | Privatization of banking sector | 0.901 | 0.081          | 0.354           | 0.230             |
|                 | Securities market development | 0.966 | 1.280          | 0.542           | 2.363             |
|                 | Banking sector supervision | 0.078 | 0.403          | 0.419           | 0.962             |
|                 | Credit market regulations | 0.977 | 0.170          | 0.197           | 0.861             |

Note: This table presents the results resulting from the approach in Table 4 but considering a different temporal aggregation window (i.e. $m = 5$ instead of $m = 10$).
Figure 1: Goodness of fit — 1980-1990

PANEL A: Static specification without unobserved heterogeneity

PANEL B: Static specification with unobserved heterogeneity

PANEL C: Dynamic specification with unobserved heterogeneity

This Figure presents the predicted CAs and their corresponding 95% confidence bands (blue bars) for the period 1980-1990 together with the observed CAs (red dots). See section 4.3 for more details.
This Figure presents the predicted CAs and their corresponding 95% confidence bands (blue bars) for the period 1990-2000 together with the observed CAs (red dots). See section 4.3 for more details.
This Figure presents the predicted CAs and their corresponding 95% confidence bands (blue bars) for the period 2000-2010 together with the observed CAs (red dots). See section 4.3 for more details.
| Theory                        | Variable                        | Description                                          | Source                        |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Dependent variable           | Current account balance         | Current account balance in % of GDP                  | IMF WEO Sept. 2011            |
| Initial net foreign assets   | Net foreign assets              | Net foreign assets in % of GDP at the beginning of the 5-year period | Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) |
| Oil dependency               | Oil balance                     | Oil trade balance in % of GDP                        | IMF WEO Sept. 2011            |
| Trade integration            | Trade openness                  | Sum of exports and imports in % of GDP               | IMF WEO Sept. 2011            |
| Trade regulations            | Coded from 0 (restricted) to 10 (free) | Real GDP in % of GDP weighted average | Gwartney et al. (2011) |
| Terms of trade growth        | Growth of goods and services terms of trade index | IMF WEO Sept. 2011 |
| Fiscal policy                | Budget balance                  | General government net lending/borrowing in % of GDP | IMF WEO Sept. 2011            |
| Economic development         | Relative income                 | Real GDP in per capita in % of GDP weighted average | IMF WEO Sept. 2011            |
| Economic growth              | Real GDP growth                 | IMF WEO Sept. 2011                                  |
| Investment                   | Gross fixed investment as a share of GDP | IMF WEO Sept. 2011 |
| Demographics                 | Population growth               | Growth of total population difference               | IMF WEO Sept. 2011            |
| Old age dependency           | Ratio of population over 65 in total population aged 15-64 | WDI |
| Young age dependency         | Ratio of population under 15 in total population aged 15-64 | WDI |
| Institutional quality        | Civil Liberties                 | Coded from 1 (free) to 7 (not free)                  | Freedom House                 |
| Legal system and property rights | Coded from 0 (restricted) to 10 (free) | IMF WEO Sept. 2011 |
| Labour market regulations    | Coded from 0 (restricted) to 10 (free) | Gwartney et al. (2011) |
| Dummies                      | Asian crisis                    | Dummy for Asian economies after the crisis           | Lee et al (2008)              |
| Financial development        | Financial centre                | Dummy for Belgium, Hong Kong, Netherlands, Switzerland | Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) |
| Financial integration        | Sum of assets and liabilities in % of GDP | Chinn and Ito (2008b) |
| Capital account openness     | Index that ranges from -1.84 (closed) to 2.48 (open) | Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009) |
| Private credit to GDP        | Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions in % of GDP | Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009) |
| Growth of private credit to GDP | Growth of private credit to GDP | Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009) |
| Financial regulation         | Credit controls                 | Coded from 0 (fully repressed) to 3 (fully liberalised) | Abiad et al. (2010) |
| Bank entry barriers          | Coded from 0 (fully repressed) to 3 (fully liberalised) | Abiad et al. (2010) |
| Privatization of banking sector | Coded from 0 (fully repressed) to 3 (fully liberalised) | Abiad et al. (2010) |
| Securities market development | Coded from 0 (fully repressed) to 3 (fully liberalised) | Abiad et al. (2010) |
| Banking sector supervision   | Coded from 0 (not regulated) to 3 (highly regulated) | Abiad et al. (2010) |
| Credit market regulations    | Coded from 0 (restricted) to 10 (free) | Gwartney et al. (2011) |

Note: All variables except for the current account, net foreign asset position, oil balance and growth in terms of trade enter the regressions in deviations from a trade weighted cross-country mean.
A Appendices

A.1 The Correlated-Random-Effects Estimator

As argued by Chinn and Prasad (2003), given the within groups transformation required by fixed effects OLS, one cannot exploit the information contained in regressors without (or with little) variation over time. For instance, some structural variables may affect current account developments and have no variation over time given our sample period. In this Appendix, we present a correlated-random-effects estimator that exploits both between- and within-variation in our panel data; Moreover, given the Bayesian spirit of the BMA approach, we consider a maximum likelihood estimator in the spirit of Balestra and Nerlove (1966) as outlined in Arellano (2003).

Given the model in equation (1), one can assume:

\[
\begin{align*}
\epsilon_{it} & \sim N(0, \sigma^2_t) \\
\eta_i & \sim N(\varphi \bar{CA}_i + \delta \bar{x}_i, \sigma^2_\eta)
\end{align*}
\]

where \(x_i = (x_{i0}, x_{i1}, ..., x_{iT})'\) is a \(T \times 1\) vector, \(\bar{x}_i\) is the time-series mean of \(x\) for individual \(i\) \((\bar{x}_i = (1/T) \sum_{t=1}^T x_{it})\). Note that (A2) allows for correlation between the country-specific effects and the right-hand-side variables in the model. Also, (A1) implies strict exogeneity of the lagged dependent variable. We recognize this represents a drawback of our approach, but we think it is not critical in our context since the magnitude of the \(\alpha\) coefficient is not of central interest for understanding the most robust determinants of current account developments.\(^{19}\) In order to relax this assumption, one alternative is to consider the Alvarez and Arellano (2003) correlated-random-effects estimator as in Moral-Benito (2012); however, its lack of closed-form solutions would preclude us from considering a large set of candidate determinants of current accounts (note that within the BMA setting the number of models to be estimated increases exponentially with the total number of candidate regressors considered).

Under assumptions (A1)-(A2) above we can write the model in (1) as (see e.g. Mundlak, 1978):

\[
CA_{it} = w_{it}' \theta + \lambda_i + \epsilon_{it}
\]

where \(w_{it} = (CA_{it} - \bar{CA}_i, x_{it} - \bar{x}_i, \bar{CA}_i, \bar{x}_i)'\), \(\lambda_i = \eta_i - \varphi \bar{CA}_i - \delta \bar{x}_i\), and \(\theta = (\alpha, \beta, \varphi + \alpha, \delta + \beta)\).

\(^{18}\)We consider the means over time in the spirit of Mundlak (1978) instead of the full vector of time-series observations à la Chamberlain to avoid the proliferation of coefficients.

\(^{19}\)On the other hand, while this represents a strong assumption in the case of the lagged dependent variable, it is also a concern for the case of the remaining right-hand-side variables; however, the literature typically assumes exogeneity of the potential CA determinants (see e.g. Chinn and Prasad, 2003; Ca’Zorzi et al., 2012a).
Thus, the resulting likelihood function can be written as (see e.g. Arellano, 2003):

\[
\log f(CA_i|w_i) \propto -\frac{N}{2} \log \sigma^2_{\epsilon} - \frac{1}{2\sigma^2_{\epsilon}} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (CA_i - \bar{w}_i \theta)^2 - \frac{N(T-1)}{2} \log \sigma^2_T - \frac{1}{2\sigma^2_T} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (CA_i^* - \alpha CA_{i(-1)}^* - x_{i}^* \beta)'(CA_i^* - \alpha CA_{i(-1)}^* - x_{i}^* \beta)
\]

(3)

where \( \sigma^2_{\epsilon} = \sigma^2 + \frac{\sigma^2_T}{T} \). Moreover, \( CA_i^* \), \( CA_{i(-1)}^* \) and \( x_{i}^* \) denote orthogonal deviations of \( CA_i \), \( CA_{i(-1)} \) and \( x_i \) respectively.

Note that the log likelihood function in (3) can be decomposed as the sum of the between and within log likelihoods. Therefore, between variation across countries in our sample is exploited for the estimation of the parameters together with within-time variation for a given country as it is the case in the traditional OLS fixed effects estimator. Note also that regressors without time variation can also be embedded in the original \( x \) vector.\(^{20}\)

\(^{20}\)In such case, we would have a new vector of regressors \( z_{it} = (x_{it}, f_i)' \), and only the time varying regressors would enter the within component of the log likelihood through \( x_{i}^* \).