Abstract—Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge, i.e., indirect calls through function pointers and virtual calls. Protecting the backward edge is left to stack canaries, which are easily bypassed through information leaks. Shadow Stacks are a fully precise mechanism for protecting backwards edges, and should be deployed with CFI mitigations.

We present a comprehensive analysis of all possible shadow stack mechanisms along three axes: performance, compatibility, and security. For performance comparisons we use SPEC CPU2006, while security and compatibility are qualitatively analyzed. Based on our study, we renew calls for a shadow stack design that leverages a dedicated register, resulting in low performance overhead, and minimal memory overhead, but sacrifices compatibility. We present case studies of our implementation of such a design, Shadowsmar, on Phoronix and Apache to demonstrate the feasibility of dedicating a general purpose register to a security monitor on modern architectures, and Shadowsmar’s deployability. Our comprehensive analysis, including detailed case studies for our novel design, allows compiler designers and practitioners to select the correct shadow stack design for different usage scenarios.

Shadow stacks belong to the class of defense mechanisms that require metadata about the program’s state to enforce their defense policies. Protecting this metadata for deployed mitigations requires in-process isolation of a segment of the virtual address space. Prior work on defenses in this class has relied on information hiding to protect metadata. We show that stronger guarantees are possible by repurposing two new Intel x86 extensions for memory protection (MPX), and page table control (MPK). Building on our isolation efforts with MPX and MPK, we present the design requirements for a dedicated hardware mechanism to support intra-process memory isolation, and discuss how such a mechanism can empower the next wave of highly precise software security mitigations that rely on partially isolated information in a process.

I. INTRODUCTION

Arbitrary code execution exploits give an attacker fine-grained control over a system. Such exploits leverage software bugs to corrupt code pointers to hijack the control-flow of an application. Code pointers can be divided into two categories: backward edge, i.e., return addresses or forward edge pointers, such as function pointers or virtual table pointers. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) [1], [2] protects forward edges, and is being deployed by Google [3] to protect Chrome and Android, and Microsoft [4] to protect Windows 10 and Edge. CFI assumes that backward edges are protected. However, stack canaries [5] and safe stacks [6], [7] are the strongest backward edge protections available in mainline compilers, and both are easily bypassed by information leaks.

Control-flow hijacking attacks that target backward edges [8], [9], [10], e.g., Return Oriented Programming (ROP) [10], [11], [12], are a significant problem in practice, and will only increase in frequency. In the last year, Google’s Project Zero has published exploits against Android libraries, trusted execution environments, and Windows device drivers [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]. These exploits use arbitrary write primitives to overwrite return addresses, leading to privilege escalation in the form of arbitrary execution in user space or root privileges. The widespread adoption of CFI increases the difficulty for attacks on forward edge code pointers. Consequently, attackers will increasingly focus on the easier target, backward edges.

C / C++ applications are fundamentally vulnerable to ROP style attacks for two reasons: (i) the languages provide neither memory nor type safety, and (ii) the implementation of the call-return abstraction relies on storing values in writeable memory. In the absence of memory or type safety, an attacker may corrupt any memory location that is writeable. Consider, for the sake of exposition, x86_64 machine code where the call-return abstraction is implemented by pushing the address of the next instruction in the caller function, i.e., the return address, onto the stack; the callee function then pops this address off the stack and sets the instruction pointer to that value to perform a return. As C / C++ are memory unsafe, attackers may modify return addresses on the stack to arbitrary values and perform code-reuse attacks such as ROP.

Mitigating ROP attacks requires guaranteeing the integrity of the return address used to reset the instruction pointer after a function executes. There are four principle attempts to do this: (i) stack canaries, (ii) back edge CFI, (iii) safe stacks, and (iv) shadow stacks. Stack Canaries [5] protect against sequential overwrites of a return address through, e.g., buffer overflows by inserting a magic value onto the stack after the return address, which is then checked before returns. However, canaries are not effective against arbitrary writes where, e.g., an attacker controls a pointer and can precisely overwrite memory. CFI computes a valid set of targets for indirect control-flow transfers, for returns this means any potential call site of the function. As shown by Control-Flow Bending [18], this is too imprecise to prevent control-flow hijacking attacks in the general case. Safe Stacks [6] move potentially unsafe stack variables to a separate stack, thereby protecting return addresses. However, Safe Stacks offer limited compatibility with unprotected code, so are unlikely to be deployed.

Shadow stacks [19], [20], [21], [22] enforce stack integrity, protecting against stack pivot attacks and overwriting return addresses. Shadow stacks store the return address in a separate, isolated region of memory that is not accessible by the attacker. Upon returning, the integrity of the program return address...
is checked against the protected copy on the shadow stack. By protecting return addresses, shadow stacks enforce a one-to-one mapping between calls and returns, thereby preventing ROP. Two shadow stack designs have been proposed: compact shadow stacks [20], which rely on a separate shadow stack pointer, and parallel shadow stacks [19], which place the shadow stack at a constant offset to the original stack. These existing shadow stack designs suffer from a combination of poor performance — greater than the 5% threshold suggested by [22] and far more than the 2% of LLVM-CFI, high memory overhead, and difficulty supporting C and C++ programming paradigms such as multi-threading and exception handling.

To improve the state of shadow stack design, we conduct a detailed survey of the design space. Our design study includes two novel designs for modern platforms that rely on a dedicated register for performance. While a 2002 technical report [7] initially proposed leveraging a dedicated general purpose register, we believe that such designs deserve renewed attention on 64 bit architectures. In total, our survey considers five shadow stack mechanisms. We fully explore the trade-offs of these designs in terms of performance, compatibility, and security. We consider the impact of high level design decisions on runtime, memory overhead, and support for threading, stack unwinding, and unprotected code. For the performance comparison we use SPEC CPU2006 as the standard benchmark, with qualitative arguments based on design for features like threading that are not exercised by SPEC CPU2006. For security, we note that the best shadow stack design approach, instrumenting function prologues and epilogues, results in a time of check to time of use (TOCTTOU) window on x86. The TOCTTOU window requires impeccable timing to be exploitable [23], and we discuss design approaches to avoid it. Further, we propose novel optimizations for comparing the shadow and stack return addresses, improving the performance of all shadow stack schemes by 25%. As LLVM [24] is in the process of developing a shadow stack implementation [25], the time is ripe for such a design survey and optimizations to maximize impact.

Beyond the design of the shadow stacks, we analyze the options for guaranteeing their integrity, including existing software solutions and two new ISA extensions. Unlike CFI, which relies on immutable metadata stored on read-only pages, shadow stacks, and other security mechanisms, require mutable metadata that must be integrity protected. Integrity protection is accomplished by isolating an area of the address space within a process, preventing attackers from modifying it. We discuss the limitations of existing hardware mechanisms for intra-process isolation, and propose a new primitive better suited for use by software security mechanisms.

Based on our design study, we propose Shadesmar, a new compact shadow stack mechanism that leverages a dedicated register for the shadow stack pointer and our optimizations for comparing the program and shadow return addresses. We present case studies of Shadesmar on Phoronix and Apache to highlight its practicality and thoroughly evaluate it. We provide a detailed discussion of the trade-offs between the different shadow stacks along the axes of performance, security, and compatibility. We hope that our thorough evaluation will lead to the adoption and deployment of shadow stacks in practice, closing a significant loop-hole in modern software’s protection against code-reuse attacks. Shadesmar, along with ports of all prior shadow stack techniques to LLVM-7.0.0 is available at https://github.com/HexHive/ShadowStack, to aid deployment of shadow stacks.

We present the following contributions: (i) Comprehensive evaluation of the shadow stack design space along the axes of performance, compatibility, and security; (ii) Performance evaluation of each shadow stack design, including sources of overhead, and our optimizations for x86; (iii) Comparative study of new ISA features that can be used to create integrity protected memory regions for any runtime mitigation, and a proposal for an intra-process isolation mechanism; (iv) Shadesmar a register-based compact performant, secure, and deployable shadow stack scheme and its evaluation.

II. BACKGROUND

To enable security analysis of shadow stacks, we first establish our attacker model. Using this attacker model, we then discuss common attacks on the stack, e.g.,ROP, which overwrite return addresses for interested readers. Knowledgeable readers may wish to move directly to our discussion of the shadow stack design space in Section III.

A. Attacker Model

As is standard for defenses that aim to mitigate exploits, e.g., CFI and Shadow Stacks, rather than the underlying corruptions, e.g., memory or type safety, we assume an attacker with arbitrary memory read and write primitives. The attacker uses these arbitrary reads and writes to inject her payload, and then corrupts a code pointer to hijack the program’s execution, executing her payload and exploiting the application. The adversary is constrained only by standard defenses: DEP [26] and ASLR [27]. We disable stack canaries [5] as they are strictly weaker than Shadow Stacks.

For the final step of the attack, corrupting a code pointer, we assume that the attacker only targets backward edges, i.e., return addresses of functions. Protection for forward edges is an orthogonal problem, covered by defenses such as CFI [11]. [2]. Attacking forward edge control flow is therefore out of scope for this paper. Also out of scope are data-only attacks, i.e., attacks that do not corrupt code pointers.

B. Attacks on the Stack

Attacks against stack integrity began with Aleph One’s seminal work on stack smashing [8]. To this day, control-flow information on the stack remains an active battle ground in software security [22]. Code reuse attacks such as ROP and Stack Pivots are the latest iteration of this threat.

ROP [10] is a style of code-reuse attack that hijacks application control flow by overwriting return addresses on the stack. When the function returns, control is redirected to the attacker’s chosen address. Absent any hardening, return addresses on the
Stack pivoting is just a payload delivery variant of ROP. For any shadow stack mechanism to be adopted in practice, it must be highly performant, compatible with existing code, and provide meaningful security. We analyze the performance of each shadow stack mechanism that we identify in terms of runtime, memory, and code size overhead qualitatively in this section, and quantitatively in our evaluation. Compatibility for shadow stacks means supporting C and C++ paradigms such as multi-threading and stack unwinding, as well as interfacing correctly with unprotected code. Security is dictated both by how a shadow stack mechanism validates the return address, and by any orthogonal technique the mechanism uses to guarantee the integrity of the shadow stack. See Section V for details on such integrity mechanisms.

Shadow stack mechanisms are defined by how they map from the program stack to the shadow stack, illustrated in Figure 2. This includes the type of mapping, as well as how the mapping is encoded in the protected binary. We analyze three such mechanisms using the two types of shadow stack identified by the literature: compact [20] and parallel [19]. For compact shadow stacks we identify three ways to encode the mapping in the binary, and two such ways for parallel shadow stacks. Each of these mechanisms has unique performance and compatibility characteristics. All shadow stack mechanisms must adopt a policy on validating the return address. Traditionally, this has been to compare the shadow and program return addresses and only proceed if they match. We examine the security impact of utilizing the shadow return address without a comparison and find it increases performance without impacting security.

A. Shadow Stack Mechanisms

Direct mappings schemes for parallel shadow stacks use the location of the return address on the program stack to directly find the corresponding entry on the shadow stack. The parallel shadow stack is as large as the program stack, and a simple offset maps from the program stack to the shadow stack. Consequently, the direct mapping trades memory overhead – twice the stack memory usage, for performance – a very simple shadow stack look up.

Indirect mapping schemes for compact shadow stacks maintain a shadow stack pointer, equivalent to the stack pointer used for the program stack. The shadow stack pointer points to the last entry on the shadow stack, exactly as the stack pointer does for the program stack. Maintaining a shadow stack pointer allows a compact shadow stack to allocate significantly less memory, as only room for the return address is required, instead of duplicating the program stack. Therefore, indirect mappings trade performance overhead – from using the shadow stack pointer, for reduced memory overhead – by only requiring a compact shadow stack.

In addition to the performance versus memory overhead trade-off, parallel and compact shadow stacks have different compatibility implications. If calls and returns were always perfectly matched, there would be no difference. However, the setjmp / longjmp functionality of C, which allows jumping multiple stack frames back up the stack, and the equivalent stack unwinding capability used by C++ for exception handling, both break the assumption of perfectly matched calls and returns. The direct shadow stack paradigm naturally handles these, as C / C++ adjust the stack accordingly, and then it uses the adjusted stack to find the appropriate shadow stack entry. The indirect shadow stack scheme on the other hand must know how many stack frames the program stack has been unwound to appropriately adjust its shadow stack pointer. Consequently, stack unwinding leads to additional overhead for indirect shadow stack mapping schemes, while having no effect on direct mapping schemes.
For each shadow stack mapping scheme, there are multiple possible mechanisms with different implications for performance and compatibility. In particular, we introduce the use of a register for the shadow stack pointer for compact shadow stacks, or the offset for parallel shadow stacks. Now that all 64 bit architectures have at least 16 general purpose registers, it is possible to dedicate a general purpose register to the shadow stack mechanism, unlike in 2001 when the original shadow stack proposal was made [20] and only eight general purpose registers were available on x86. We find that using a dedicated register allows compact shadow stack mappings to be as performant as parallel shadow stacks, and allows parallel shadow stacks to increase their compatibility with multi-threading while also being more secure.

A summary of our shadow stack mechanisms and their trade-offs for each design is shown in Table I. Each row in the table represents a shadow stack mechanism that we evaluate. The table reports qualitative differences between them, we refer to the evaluation in Section VII-A for quantitative measurements.

1) Parallel Shadow Stack Mechanisms: Parallel shadow stack mechanisms effectively use the stack pointer as the shadow stack pointer. The existing mechanism [19] places shadow stack entries at a constant offset from the program stack. This is very efficient, requiring no extra registers or memory access, and no instrumentation to maintain the shadow stack pointer. This performance benefit is offset by higher memory overhead, compatibility problems, and lower security. All parallel shadow stacks suffer from higher memory overhead, as they fundamentally require the program stack to be duplicated. The compatibility concerns arise from requiring a constant offset, which is limited to 32 bits for immediate operands in x86, from the program to the shadow stack from all threads, severely constraining the address space layout for programs with many threads, such as browsers. Hard-coding the offset in the binary is also a security hazard, as recovering the offset leaks the address of the shadow stack to adversaries.

To mitigate the compatibility and security concerns, we propose a new parallel shadow stack mechanism. Our parallel shadow stack mechanism encodes the offset in a dedicated register, see Figure 3, allowing the offset to the shadow stack to be determined at runtime. Further, the offset may vary from thread to thread as registers are thread local, and the offset can be set when the thread is created. This register is only updated once, when the offset is determined for the thread, and therefore adds no per function call overhead (unlike shadow stack pointers for compact shadow stacks).

2) Compact Shadow Stack Mechanisms: For compact shadow stack mechanisms, the key question is where to store the shadow stack pointer. This decision will not impact the memory overhead of the implementation, but does have performance and compatibility ramifications. The shadow stack pointer will be dereferenced twice in every function: once in the prologue to push the correct return address, and once in the epilogue to pop the shadow return address. Consequently, the speed of accessing the shadow stack pointer is critical for the performance of shadow stacks that are indirectly mapped.

There are three locations to store a variable: in memory, in a segment, or in a register. We discuss and evaluate the performance and compatibility trade-offs of all three, and x86 code for each is shown in Figure 4.

Using a memory location, e.g., a global variable is the simplest solution, and we present it as a straw man. Accessing memory is orders of magnitude slower than accessing a value stored in a register. Even with caching, this effect is noticeable, see Figure 7. This slow down is aggravated by the need for an additional move instruction to load the location of the global variable into a register to access it – x86 does not
support 64 bit immediate values. Further, changing memory access patterns can affect cache behavior, with unpredictable effects on the program’s performance. An additional problem for this scheme is that the memory must be thread local to support multi-threaded programs. Consequently, a scheme that has better performance characteristics and is inherently thread local is desirable.

Segment registers, used by existing shadow stack mechanisms [20] to store the location of the shadow stack base, are an architectural feature left over from when physical memory was larger than the virtual address space. Segment registers are faster to access than memory, and are inherently thread local. Consequently, they improve performance significantly over using a memory location to store the shadow stack pointer, while also improving compatibility by supporting multi-threading. We point the segment register at the base of the shadow stack, and store the shadow stack pointer there. Accessing the shadow stack is thus double indirect, through the segment register and then the shadow stack pointer.

The earliest approach of a shadow stack scheme with a dedicated register we know of is a 2002 technical report [7] that focuses on x86_32. We rejuvenate this idea for 64 bit architectures as general purpose registers provide the fastest possible option for storing the shadow stack pointer. Compared to x86_32, the x86_64 architecture defines twice as many general purpose registers. The disadvantage of using a general purpose register is that one register must be reserved for the shadow stack pointer, reducing the number of registers available to the compiler’s register allocation pass, and thereby increasing register pressure. Increased register pressure can reduce performance if it leads to additional register spills to the stack. Despite this potential overhead, our evaluation finds that this is the fastest shadow stack encoding, see Figure 7.

B. Return Address Validation

Shadow stack mechanisms can ensure a valid return address in two ways: by either comparing the program and shadow return addresses, or by using the shadow return address. Comparing the shadow and program return addresses detects corruptions of the program return address immediately, and can halt execution. Immediate detection is useful during testing and debugging as it helps isolate the bug. In deployment, however, preventing control-flow hijacking attacks only requires that the corrupt program return address not be used. Checking the program return address is equivalent to a low entropy stack canary, possibly detecting sequential buffer overflows. Consequently, the shadow stack mechanism can simply use the return address on the shadow stack. Doing so fully mitigates control-flow hijacking attacks as the attacker controlled return address is not used and avoids the overhead of comparing the return addresses. Either policy provides the same security: an attacker cannot control the target address of a function return.

IV. SHADOW STACK IMPLEMENTATIONS

Each of the shadow stack mechanisms we evaluate is implemented as a backend compiler pass in LLVM [24] 7.0.0, and shares some common implementation details. In particular, each shadow stack mechanism must instrument calls and returns to update its shadow stack and validate the return address before using it to transfer control. We show that the best way to accomplish this is to instrument function prologues and epilogues. Our implementations further include a small runtime library to set up the shadow stacks, and support stack unwinding for compact shadow stack schemes. Additionally, we introduce novel peep hole optimizations for x86 epilogues.
A. Instrumented Locations

Shadow stack mechanisms can instrument function calls either at the location of the call instruction or in the function prologue on the callee side. This instrumentation is responsible for pushing the return address to the shadow stack, and updating the shadow stack pointer for compact shadow stacks. Returns must be instrumented to pop from the shadow stack and validate the program return address in the function epilogue before the control-flow transfer to mitigate control-flow hijacking attacks. Code that can unwind stack frames, such as `longjmp` and C++’s exception handling mechanism, which uses `libunwind`, must also be instrumented to maintain the shadow stack pointer for compact shadow stacks. Failing to handle stack unwinding correctly can lead to false positives as the shadow and program stack are out of sync.

The elegant solution for instrumenting calls is to place the protection in the function prologue. In this way, the function is protected, not particular call sites. The compiler does not have to distinguish between calls to protected and unprotected functions as it would if call sites were instrumented instead. The distinction must be made if call sites are instrumented to keep the shadow stack in sync for compact shadow stack where calls and returns must be perfectly matched. Instrumenting function prologues and epilogues maintains this symmetry naturally, as each will be executed for every function call. On x86, instrumenting the function prologues results in a one-instruction wide Time Of Check To Time Of Use (TOCTTOU) opportunity due to architectural limitations. The call instruction pushes the return address to the stack where it may be modified by an attacker before it is picked up by the prologue in the called function. Architectures, such as ARM, where the address of the called function is stored in a register, do not have this limitation.

While the TOCTTOU window exists, given the extremely precise timing required, we do not believe this potential weakness to be readily exploitable. Any such attack would rely on accurately timing the victim process, and manipulating the OS scheduler to pause the victim’s execution precisely between the call and mov instruction. After the call instruction pushes the return address onto the stack, it remains in the cache and the mov instruction can immediately use the value, resulting in a minimal window of only a few cycles. Microsoft researchers proposed and redacted Return Flow Guard (RFG) as it was vulnerable to TOCTTOU windows in the prologue and epilogue. The Microsoft red team discovered a viable attack against their proposed epilogue, targeting epilogues of leaf functions [23]. Our proposed mechanism halves the attack window as we jump to the verified address, but do not fully mitigate the TOCTTOU window. Intel Control Enforcement Technology (CET) [30] introduces a shadow stack based on hardware and compiler support. This extension, when available, will mitigate the TOCTTOU window on x86 and simplify the required instrumentation.

It is also possible to mitigate this vulnerability by using `rsp` as the shadow stack pointer. However, doing so comes with significant side effects, see Section VI. Alternatively, resolving the TOCTTOU window requires instrumenting call sites to pass the return address in a register, e.g., `r9` which is currently used for the sixth function argument, changing the ABI. However, this creates compatibility problems, as protected functions called from unprotected code would need to read the return address from the stack. Such a scheme thus requires whole program analysis, and reduces compatibility with unprotected code. For users in highly sensitive environments that are concerned about sophisticated adversaries this may be a worthwhile trade-off.

Our prologue and epilogue rely on the stack pointer to find the return address, and are therefore agnostic to optimizations that delete the stack frame base pointer. Once our epilogue has popped the return address, we do not read it again from memory, thereby preventing TOCTTOU attacks that modify the return address in memory between the time it is read for the shadow stack check and the time it is used by the return instruction. One consequence of this is that ret instructions become `pop` and `jmp` instructions. This single transformation accounts for approximately half of the shadow stack overhead, see Figure 8. Hardware solutions that avoid this overhead are discussed in Section VI.

Stack unwinding mechanisms such as `longjmp` and C++ exceptions require additional instrumentation for compact shadow stacks. Parallel shadow stacks are unaffected as they do not require adjustment to track stack frames, i.e., they do not maintain a shadow stack pointer. For compact shadow stacks, we must be able to unwind to the correct point on

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```
(a) Fault Epilogue
pop r10
; r11 holds shadow RA
xor r11, r10
popcnt r11, r11
shl r11, 48
or r11, r10
faults if r11 != 0
jmp r11

(b) LBP Epilogue
pop r10
; r11 holds shadow RA
popcnt r11, r10
popcnt r11, r11
; will fault if r11 != 0
mov r11b, [Last_Byte_of_Page+r11]
jmp r10
```

Fig. 5: Shadow Stack Epilogue Optimizations
the shadow stack as well. Simply matching return addresses does not suffice for this, as the same return address can show up multiple times in the call stack due to, e.g., recursive calls. To deal with this, our compact shadow stack implementations also push the stack pointer, i.e., rsp. The stack pointer and return address uniquely identify the stack frame to unwind to, allowing our mechanisms to support stack unwinding.

For the shadow stack mechanisms that use a register to encode the shadow stack mapping, ensuring compatibility with unprotected code constrains our selection of register. A callee saved register must be used, so that any unprotected code that is called will restore the shadow stack pointer, but only if it is clobbered, which helps performance. Our implementations use r15 in practice. An alternative would be to use rsp as the shadow stack pointer, and r15 as the stack pointer. The ramifications of such an implementation are considered in [Section VI]

B. Runtime Support

Our runtime library is responsible for allocating the shadow stack, and hooking setjmp and longjmp. We add a new function in the pre_init array that initializes the shadow stack for the main program thread. This function also initializes the shadow stack pointer for compact shadow stack mappings. In particular, for segment encodings it invokes the system call to assign the shadow stack to the segment register. Setjmp and longjmp are redirected to versions that are aware of our shadow stacks. These patched versions required less than 20 lines of assembly to modify.

For compact shadow stack mappings to support multi-threading and libunwind, we preload a small support library. It intercepts calls to pthread_create and pthread_exit to set up and tear down shadow stacks for additional threads. We use a patched version of libunwind, to which we added 20 lines of code for compatibility with our shadow stacks. These changes are minimal, and easily deployable by having, e.g., two version of the library on the system and a compiler flag to chose which one is linked in. If shadow stacks are universally used to harden libraries, no such additional support would be required. Consequently, we believe compact shadow stacks are readily deployable.

C. Shadow Stack Epilogue Optimizations

Traditionally, shadow stacks have relied on compare instructions to validate the shadow return address and program return address are equivalent. However, the compare and jump paradigm is relatively expensive, potentially leading to pipeline stalls even with branch prediction. Consequently, as an optimization, we explore two different methods to optimize this validation. Our optimizations rely on the insight that a full comparison is not required, only an equality test.

To replace the compare instruction of traditional shadow stack epilogues, we propose an xor of the program return address and shadow return address. This will result in 0 bits anywhere the two are identical, and 1s elsewhere. x86 has an instruction, popcnt, that returns the number of bits set to 1. Consequently, if the popcnt of the xor of the program return address and shadow return address is 0, then the two are equivalent.

We leverage the memory management unit (MMU) to compare the popcnt to zero as a side effect by creating a protection fault. We propose two different ways to do so: fault and last byte in page (LBP), see the code in Figure 5. For fault, we note that the maximum value of the popcnt is 64, therefore fitting in six bits. By shifting this value left 48 and or'ing it into the return address, we create a general purpose fault for a non-canonical address form if its value is not zero, by setting one of the high order 16 bits to one in user space. This scheme abuses the fact that the high order 16 bits are currently unused, and may break if those bits are utilized in future processors. Alternately, the LBP scheme creates two pages in memory, the first of which is mapped read write, the second of which has no permissions. We then attempt to read from the first page at the address of the last valid byte, plus the popcnt value. If the popcnt value is zero, we read the last byte of the valid page, otherwise we read from the guard page, causing the MPU to return a fault. The trade-off between the two is that the fault scheme requires serialization in the processor, while the LBP scheme requires a memory access and the MMU. We show the performance of both schemes in Figure 9.

V. HARDWARE INTEGRITY MECHANISMS

Once a shadow stack design has been chosen, the shadow stack mechanism must guarantee the integrity of the shadow stack. How to guarantee the integrity of a protected region of memory is a problem faced not only by shadow stacks, but also by all mitigations that rely on writable runtime metadata. Integrity guarantees are best provided by hardware solutions, though software solutions exist and are covered here. Hardware solutions offer greater security and performance than software solutions, and can be as generic. Hardware solutions for integrity protecting part of the address space within a process should be evaluated on two metrics: their performance, and the number of supported concurrent code regions.

Existing hardware mechanisms take two different approaches to encoding access privileges to provide integrity protection: (i) MPK which encodes access privileges in each thread’s register file, providing per thread (thread centric) integrity, and (ii) MPX which encodes access in the individual instructions, so that access privileges are the same across all threads and depend only on the executed instruction (code centric). Note that thread centric solutions require additional instructions to change the register file, consequently, code centric solutions are (potentially) more performant as they operate in a single step, checking an instruction’s permissions, instead of first toggling bits in the register file and then checking permissions. For code centric mechanisms, the ability to execute the instruction grants the necessary permissions while for thread centric mechanisms, the state of the register file determines the policy.
Assuming code integrity and a control-flow hijacking defense such as CFI, we prefer code centric solutions for their potential performance and flexibility. Unfortunately, no existing code centric solution is fully satisfactory in that they have excessive code size increases, lack performance, and are not as flexible as required, i.e., split memory into only two regions. Consequently, we call for a new ISA extension that is hardware-based for performance, supports multiple secure regions to be general purpose (e.g., to support multiple concurrent security monitors, each with its own protected region), and requires minimal code changes. Such an extension would support many different security policies, as opposed to past proposals for policy specific extensions [30], [7], [31]. We show how our proposed mechanism is a code centric adaptation of the state of the art thread centric mechanism, and thus is fully practical.

A. Thread Centric Solutions

Thread centric solutions operate by changing the permissions on the pages of the protected memory region. Adding write permissions elevates the thread’s privileges, thereby creating a privileged region that is able to modify the protected memory region, i.e., the shadow stack. Removing the write permissions ends the privileged region. The traditional mechanism for doing this is the mprotect system call. Using mprotect is prohibitively expensive as it not only requires a context switch into the kernel, but a full page table walk to change the permissions on the indicated pages. In addition, mprotect enables write capabilities for all concurrent threads and not just for the thread writing the privileged data.

As a hardware-enforced isolation mechanism, segment registers used to provide privilege-based isolation for x86, where the segmentation register served to give an instruction access privileges to the protected region. For 64 bit architectures however, x86 no longer enforces the isolation property while still providing the segmentation registers.

A new Intel ISA extension, Memory Protection Keys (MPK) aims to address this by providing a single, unprivileged instruction that can change page access permissions on a per-thread basis. MPK repurposes four unused bits in the page table to assign one of sixteen keys to each page, and adds a per-thread 32-bit register that, for each key, stores if reads or writes are disabled. The new wrpkru instruction writes to this new register, selectively disabling reads or writes for pages with a given key. This approach elegantly solves the TOCTTOU problem of mprotect and allows per-thread protected regions.

The assembly to enforce privileged code regions using MPK is shown in Figure 6. Note that the wrpkru instructions requires edx and ecx to be set to 0. Intel did not disclose why the two registers are required to be 0, it may be for future extension of the wrpkru instruction to allow a full API to be developed. The System V calling convention, used by Linux, uses these registers to pass the third and fourth arguments to a function respectively. Consequently, for functions which take more than two arguments, it is necessary to preserve the original values of these registers, which is accomplished by moving their values to caller save registers, and then restoring them after the wrpkru instruction. Surprisingly, this scheme is slower than MPX which must instrument almost every memory write in the program, see Figure 10 for full results.

B. Code Centric Solutions

The most common code centric solution is information hiding, where a pointer to the protected region gives any instruction access privileges. Information hiding is attractive because it adds no additional overhead; however, it is the weakest option as the many attacks against ASLR and other information hiding schemes attest [33], [34], [35], [36], [37]. Zieris and Horsch [38] present a detailed study of these attacks against shadow stacks, including proposed mitigations. Nonetheless, given the history of successful attacks against randomization defenses, we consider information hiding to provide minimal security for the shadow stack, and recommend against it.

Software Fault Isolation (SFI) [39], [40], [41] is a secure software solution for isolating intra-process address regions. Even the best SFI implementations [39] still have 7% overhead just for the isolation, significantly more than is acceptable in total for a deployed security monitor. Additionally, the x86 ISA supports an address override prefix that limits addressable memory to 32 bits. This can be used to crudely separate the program’s address space in a 4GB region for the process to access, leaving all other memory for the security monitor. 4GB of memory is insufficient for many modern applications however. Consequently, a more flexible hardware mechanism is required.

The Intel ISA extension Memory Protection Extension (MPX) provides a hardware mechanism that can be used to implement segmentation [42] in a flexible manner. MPX provides a bounds checking mechanism, with four new 128 bit registers to store the bounds, and two new primitives to perform the upper and lower bounds checks. MPX segmentation schemes divide writes into two categories, those that are privileged to write into the protected region, and all others. All non-

Fig. 6: MPK Page Permission Toggling

| Instruction | Description |
|-------------|-------------|
| mov eax, 0  | Read Only (enable write disable bit for shadow stack) |
| xor ecx, ecx| :protection is off, write to shadow stack |
| wrpkru      | :Write (disable all MPKs) |
| mov eax, 8  | Read Only (enable write disable bit for shadow stack) |
| xor ecx, ecx| Read Only (enable write disable bit for shadow stack) |
| xor edx, edx| Read Write (disable all MPKs) |
| wrpkru      | Read Only (enable write disable bit for shadow stack) |
privileged writes in the code are instrumented with a bounds check to ensure that they do not touch the privileged region. In essence, unprivileged writes are restricted to an “array” of memory that consists of all unprotected regions. This approach is surprisingly performant, see Figure 10.

C. Privileged Move

Intel’s MPK comes closest of all existing hardware mechanisms to meeting our requirements—it is a hardware based mechanism so should be performant, and supports 16 code regions within a process. However, while faster than rewriting page tables, MPK is still too expensive to execute for every function call, see Figure 10. Further, security monitors do not require a thread centric protection scheme. Rather, a code centric scheme with a single privileged move instruction would suffice. This instruction could take a one byte immediate specifying the region of memory it is allowed to write to. Unprivileged moves would be limited by default to the unprotected code region, allowing minimal changes. Privileged moves which encode their access permissions should be faster than toggling a thread control register as MPK does. Further, its implementation should be largely similar, relying on the same four bits in the page table that MPK does, and with the same checks. The difference being that instead of referencing a thread local state for permissions, the permissions would be encoded in the instruction proper.

Such a privileged move instruction makes entire class of security policies that rely on runtime metadata practical. Currently, protecting metadata at runtime is the bottleneck for many of these policies, covering areas as diverse as type safety [43], use after free protection [44], and partial memory safety for function pointers [6]. This hardware primitive would allow for the creation of flexible security policies in software that can change and adapt, such as shadow stacks. With the availability of such a primitive, the policies would be secure in practice, and make them deployable in adversarial environments, instead of only being useful for testing as they cannot withstand direct attacks.

Protection schemes that rely on new ISA extensions are unlikely to be immediately adopted by the wider community. However, analyzing them can show which hardware schemes are useful, hopefully paving the way for eventual broad deployment as happened with the DEP and the NX bit.

VI. DISCUSSION

Orthogonal to the main design, optimization, and protection points above there are interesting details around dealing with unprotected code, existing compiler optimizations with ramifications for shadow stacks, and forthcoming hardware extensions that we include here for completeness.

Unprotected Code. Unprotected code weakens the guarantees of shadow stack schemes, as they cannot prevent a control-flow hijacking attack in the unprotected region. Both parallel and compact shadow stack can be fully compatible with unprotected code regions. Parallel shadow stacks are completely oblivious to unprotected code as they do not require a shadow stack pointer. Compact shadow stack schemes fully support unprotected code as long as the shadow stack pointer is not clobbered. In particular, the register implementation of the compact shadow stack scheme is exposed to this. The register implementation can handle calls into unprotected code that return directly to protected code, as the register used is callee saved and thus restored before protected code runs again. However, if the unprotected region calls into protected code due to, e.g., a call back function to a sorting routine, the shadow stack pointer may have been clobbered causing the call back function to fail. Preventing this requires modifying the linker so that it is aware of whether modules have been compiled with shadow stacks or not. If not, the linker could add wrapper functions for calls across the protection boundary that save the shadow stack pointer. With such a linker, compact register stacks are fully compatible with unprotected code. We leave such engineering issues as future work.

Tail Call Optimizations. Tail calls allow call return pairs to be omitted by the compiler, when, for example, a function returns the value of another function call, or for recursive calls. In these cases, the same program return address can be used for the tail called function. However, new stack frames are required for the case where the call being optimized is the last instruction in an arbitrary function. The optimization simply saves instructions by omitting a call return pair by jumping directly to the callee, which can then use one return to exit itself and the caller. As a function can be both tail called and called normally, the full function prologue is executed even when the function has been tail called. To keep the shadow stack in sync, we execute the normal shadow stack epilogue before tail calls, though we omit the jump through the return address in these cases. Consequently, fault epilogues fall back to LBP for tail calls, as there is no jmp to modify.

Mobile Architectures. Beyond x86, ARM is in wide use for mobile and embedded devices. ARM uses the link register to store the return address for the current function, only pushing the return address to the stack when additional functions are called. Consequently, shadow stacks can instrument function prologues without a potential TOCTTOU window. Our analysis of the design space applies to other architectures while our epilogue optimizations are x86 specific because of the popcnt instruction. Of course, this instruction can be replaced with shift and or instructions. We leave the evaluation of an ARM implementation as future work.

Intel Control Enforcement Technology. Intel has released a preview document for a proposed new ISA extension called Control Enforcement Technology (CET) [50]. CET provides hardware support for shadow stacks, and checks on forward edge indirect control-flow transfers. CET modifies call instructions to push the return address to a hardware protected shadow stack as well as the program stack, and return instructions to compare the program and shadow return addresses, raising a fault if they are not equal. While this technology has great promise, no release date has been made public so it is unclear when / if it will become available. In the meantime, software solutions for hardening programs are
required. Orthogonally, other architectures and legacy systems equally require protection.

Tagged Architectures. Recently, there has been renewed interest in tagged architectures [45, 46], in which the hardware associates a “tag” with each byte in memory that encodes a security policy. Tags can be used to, for example, allow call instructions exclusive rights to write to certain memory areas, preventing return addresses from being overwritten [47]. More generally, such architectures can readily be leveraged for in-process virtual address isolation, by assigning access permissions to each instruction in the code section, and each byte in memory. Such architectures are still in development however, and likely years from widespread deployment.

RSP as Shadow Stack Pointer. Using rSP as the stack pointer instead of r15 for compact register based shadow stacks would have two benefits: (i) improved performance, as shown in Figure 8, half the overhead of shadow stack comes from replacing return with pop; jmp; and (ii) using rSP would remove the TOCTTOU window as call instructions would directly push the return address onto the shadow stack. However, such a design has fairly radical compatibility implications. It would remove push and pop from the instruction set, as these implicitly use rSP. Furthermore, a linker modification to detect unmodified code and provide wrappers for changing the stack pointer to the expected semantics, i.e., pointing rSP back at the normal stack while preserving the value of the shadow stack pointer, would be mandatory. Other interesting engineering challenges include (i) support for inline assembly, (ii) rewriting threading and standard libraries to support the two stacks, (iii) kernel support for process creation, signal delivery, and argument passing (which implicitly uses the rSP register), and (iv) the stack initialization code that switches rSP to point to the new shadow stack. A clean field implementation would leverage kernel support but would require rather serious changes to the threading and standard libraries as well as the kernel ABI.

128 Bit Returns. The System V ABI specifies what registers are callee saved. Our epilogues must preserve these registers, and of course the return address in rAX. Additionally, 128 bit wide returns are possible under the ABI and used by LLVM in practice. These further use rDX for the extra 64 bits of the return value, removing it from the pool of registers that our epilogue can use for its computation.

Assembly Files. Our shadow stack mechanisms treat assembly files as unprotected code, and do not add instrumentation. Consequently, they are allowed to use r15 even for the register-based shadow stack encoding. Extending support to assembly files, including refactoring to remove uses of r15 is left as an engineering challenge in future work.

VII. EVALUATION

We evaluate the five different shadow stack implementations from Table 1 and we examine the impact of our proposed epilogue optimizations. Orthogonally, we evaluate the cost of providing deterministic integrity protection for the shadow stack. Based on this evaluation, we recommend a shadow stack mechanism, Shadesmar, for broad use. To show Shadesmar’s practicality, we present two deployability case studies: Phoronix and the Apache web server. The Phoronix benchmarks are common use cases for widely used, real-world applications, and Apache is the most popular web server. All of our evaluation is done on an Intel(R) Xeon(R) Bronze 3106 CPU at 1.7GHz, with 48GB memory, running Debian-9.3.0. This was the first machine that supported MPK in 2017 when this work began, and is used for all experiments for consistency. Our results do not change on Skylake 3.0GHz desktops with 16GB of memory running Ubuntu 16.04, which were also used during development. We compile software at O2 and for SPEC CPU2006 we use the default configuration with three reportable runs on the ref dataset.

A. Shadow Stack Evaluation

For each of the five different shadow stack designs, we first evaluate their performance on SPEC CPU2006. For the existing shadow stack designs identified in Section III, we reimplemented them on LLVM 7.0.0 to control for performance effects from compiler improvements. For these experiments, we used the traditional cmp-based epilogue, and information hiding to protect the shadow stack. The results are in Figure 7. Note that the parallel shadow stack constant offset implementation and the compact shadow stack register implementation are within measurement noise of each other at 5.78% overhead and 5.33% respectively. This removes the performance justification for parallel shadow stack’s greater memory use, if a dedicated register is used for the shadow stack pointer. The register based parallel shadow stack scheme, needed for compatibility as per Section III-A, has 7.10% overhead, noticeably more than the constant offset version. Consequently, the performance case for compact shadow is even more compelling when equally compatible designs are considered. The compact and parallel shadow stacks have effectively the same code size impact as well, 15.57% and 14.88% respectively. Consequently, we recommend compact shadow stacks.

Figure 9 shows the overheads for the compact shadow stack register implementation with our different epilogue optimizations. The traditional cmp-based epilogue has 5.33% overhead, 25% more than our optimized epilogues at 4.31% for the fault epilogue, and 4.44% for the LBP epilogue. Further, the cmp epilogue has significant outliers on perlbench, povray, and Xalanck. Consequently, we believe our epilogue optimizations are highly effective as they not only reduce overhead but also reduce its variation. As the fault-based epilogue is faster (albeit marginally) and does not require additional changes to the address space (LBP introduces guard pages), we recommend it for vulnerability discovery settings, e.g., software testing and fuzzing. Using the shadow return address without any comparison as discussed in Section III-B results in 3.65% overhead, and is our recommendation for deployment.

We break down the sources of overhead within the compact shadow stack register implementation in Figure 8. Changing the ret instruction to a pop; jmp sequence has 1.97%
overhead (the overhead is likely due to the loss of the CPU's return value prediction). Maintaining the shadow stack but leaving the normal return instruction has 1.85% overhead. If the epilogue jumps through the shadow stack return address, there is 3.65% overhead, effectively the sum of the return instruction transformation and maintaining the shadow stack, as expected. Our experiment highlights an opportunity for architectural improvement: moving the return stack buffer to the shadow stack would recover most of the overhead and, due to the compact design and fixed layout of the shadow stack, could simplify the management of that buffer and possibly improve performance.

Our last experiment on SPEC CPU2006 evaluates the overhead of our three different shadow stack integrity mechanisms. For these experiments, we used a compact shadow stack with the register implementation and the fault-based epilogue. The results are in Figure 10. As expected, the information hiding scheme is the fastest with 4.31% overhead. The MPX-based, code centric, isolation scheme was the next fastest with 12.12% overhead on average. The MPK thread centric,
isolation scheme had 61.18% overhead. Our finding is in line with Erim [48] which finds that adding a permission switch to the shadow stack pointer to bypass Shadesmar. Shadesmar exclusively keeps the shadow stack pointer in a register, making leaking the location of the shadow stack extremely difficult. Nonetheless, from a security perspective, information hiding is fundamentally broken as discussed in Section V-B.

We recommend it only because of the resistance to deploying any protection mechanism with greater than 5% overhead [22].

To demonstrate the usefulness of Shadesmar for real software, we run benchmarks from the Phoronix test suite for typical desktop user experiences, and benchmark the throughput of the Apache webserver. For all case studies, Shadesmar has minimal performance impact while greatly increasing security by removing backward edge control-flow transfers from the attack surface. In particular, this shows that on modern 64 bit architectures with 16 general purpose registers, dedicating one general purpose register to a security mechanism is acceptable in practice.

**Phoronix.** We run ten benchmarks from Phoronix with workloads including databases, audio encoding, data compression, chess, protein sequencing, and their version of Apache. These workloads are representative of common workloads for user space computation. The results are in Table II. The only benchmark with high overhead is sqlite. Our primary source of overhead is instrumenting calls and returns, however sqlite has the same frequency of function calls as other benchmarks. After further analysis, we attribute the performance difference to code layout changes (affecting the instruction cache) and increased register pressure.

For eight of the ten benchmarks, the overhead is less than 2%; for five benchmarks overhead is within 1%; and it is within measurement noise of zero for two benchmarks. Consequently, we believe that Shadesmar is performant enough to be deployed in desktop computing environments, and that users would not notice any slow down.

**Apache.** To evaluate Shadesmar in server settings, we benchmarked the throughput of Apache with Shadesmar instrumentation. For this experiment, we used two different files, a 70KB HTML file and a 1.4MB image file, representative of the average size of webpages in 2016 [49]. The experiment was run on localhost to minimize measurement noise from network effects. Throughput was measured over five minutes using the standard ab tool. Note that the overhead on information hiding to protect the shadow stack — is the best candidate for adoption by mainline compilers based on our initial experiments with SPEC CPU2006. Consequently, we present a more in depth evaluation of Shadesmar here, on real world applications of interest to potential users of shadow stacks. Note that information hiding still significantly raises the bar for attackers by requiring an information leak, and a write to a region of memory with only one pointer into it (the shadow stack pointer) to bypass Shadesmar. Shadesmar exclusively keeps the shadow stack pointer in a register, making leaking the location of the shadow stack extremely difficult. Nonetheless, from a security perspective, information hiding is fundamentally broken as discussed in Section V-B.

We believe that Shadesmar— a compact, register based shadow stack that directly uses the shadow RA, and relies...

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### Table II: Phoronix Benchmark Results

| Benchmark | Overhead | Deviation |
|-----------|----------|-----------|
| sqlite    | 8.94%    | 0.22%     |
| flac      | 1.19%    | 0.85%     |
| MP3       | 1.47%    | 0.28%     |
| wavpack   | 0.35%    | 0.15%     |
| crafty    | 0.84%    | 0.15%     |
| hmmer     | 0.28%    | 0.42%     |
| LZMA      | 0.84%    | 0.29%     |
| apache    | -2.05%   | 0.40%     |
| minion-graceful | 1.18% | 0.16% |
| minion-quasigroup | 3.39% | 0.13% |

**TABLE III: Apache Throughput Reduction**

| File Size  | Simultaneous Connections |
|------------|--------------------------|
| 70K - HTML | 6.21% 0.63% -0.40%       |
| 1.4M - Image | 1.13% 0.45% -0.31%     |

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Fig. 9: Epilogue Micro-Optimizations

Fig. 10: Integrity Protection Overhead
drops with the number of connections, and file size, and is non-existent for eight concurrent connections, as shown in Table III. This demonstrates that Shadesmar has no impact on the performance of I/O bound applications like servers.

VIII. RELATED WORK

Prior work on code-reuse attacks and defenses has focused on three major areas: (i) offensive papers that seek to fully evaluate the potential of code-reuse attacks, (ii) CFI defense mechanisms for mitigating forward edge attacks, and (iii) shadow stacks for mitigating backward edge attacks.

Code-Reuse Attack Surface. Code-reuse attacks as an attack vector began with the original ROP attack [10]. Since then, the research community has worked to fully understand the scope of this attack vector. Follow on work established that any indirect control-flow transfer could be used for code-reuse attacks, not just returns [12]. [50]. JIT-ROP [29] showed how just in time compiled code, like JavaScript, can be abused for code-reuse attacks. Counterfeit Object Oriented Programming (COOP) [51] specialized code reuse attacks for C++ programs, while PIROP [28] shows how to perform ROP in the face of ASLR. Control Jujutsu [52]. Control-Flow Bending [18]. and Block-Oriented Programming [53] showed that CFI defenses cannot prevent code-reuse attacks in general. Newton [54] provides a framework for analyzing code-reuse defenses’ security. Side channels are a powerful primitive to attack existing code reuse defenses, e.g., by widening TOCTTOU windows [55] or by carefully monitoring reads/writes [56].

Control-Flow Integrity. CFI [1] mitigates forward edge code-reuse attacks. CFI mechanisms work by using static analysis to create an over approximation of the control-flow graph (CFG), and then enforce at runtime that all transitions must be within the statically computed CFG. After the initial proposal, follow on research has removed the need for whole program analysis [57], [58], and specialized CFI to use additional information in C++ programs when protecting virtual calls [59], [60]. To improve the precision of the CFG construction underlying CFI, more advanced static analysis techniques have been proposed [61]. Alternately, dynamic analysis-based approaches that leverage execution history [62], or analyze execution history on a separate core [63] significantly increase the precision of CFI, and thereby the security it provides. See Burow et al. [2] for a survey of CFI techniques.

Alternatives to CFI for forward edge protection have been proposed. Code Pointer Integrity (CPI) [6] isolates and protects code pointers, thereby keeping them from being corrupted. CPI included a proposal for Safe Stacks which rely on a precise escape analysis for stack variables, and other inter-procedural analysis to divide the stack into two new stacks: a safe stack with the return address, and variables that cannot be accessed through pointers, and an unsafe stack. Safe stacks have significant compatibility problems, particularly with unprotected code and without full program analysis the conservative analysis ends up allocating a large number of unsafe stack frames, resulting in unnecessary overhead. CFIXX [42] provides object type integrity by protecting the virtual table pointers of C++ objects, thereby precisely protecting virtual dispatch.

Shadow Stacks. Prior work is split between binary translation solutions [64], [65], [21], [66], [67], [68], [69], and compiler-based solutions [20], [19], [71], [72], [73]. The binary solutions employ binary rewriting to add trampolines to the shadow stack instrumentation, and may enforce additional policies such as CFI, or utilize Intel’s Process Trace (PT) feature and an additional core to analyze the process trace [70]. Compiler-based solutions come in three flavors: those that only attempt to prevent stack pivots [71], [72], an attempt to remove all ROP gadgets from the binary [73], and finally full shadow stacks [20], [19], which offer the strongest security. Shadesmar builds on full shadow stacks and introduces a dedicated shadow stack register to improve performance for compact shadow stacks, and compatibility by fully supporting stack unwinding. We also introduce hardware mechanisms to integrity protect the shadow stack.

IX. CONCLUSION

With the increasing deployment of CFI to protect against forward-edge attacks, backward-edge defenses are required to fully mitigate control-flow hijacking attacks. We conduct a qualitative and quantitative study of the design space of shadow stacks along performance, compatibility, and security dimensions. Based on this study, we believe that Shadesmar, a register-based compact shadow stack that is compatible with all required C/C++ paradigms, should be deployed. We provide implementations of all known shadow stack schemes, in addition to Shadesmar, in LLVM 7.0.0 to aid the deployment of shadow stacks. Our case studies on Apache, where we had no performance impact for real work loads, and Phoronix where we had less than 2% overhead for 8 of the 10 benchmarks show the feasibility of using a dedicated general purpose register for shadow stacks. Orthogonally, we show that currently no existing hardware mechanism is usable in practice for intra-process address space isolation, and propose a new code-centric mechanism to fit this need for general security monitors that require mutable metadata. Our design study of shadow stack demonstrates that they have low performance and memory overhead, support all required C/C++ paradigms, and fill an important security gap left by deployed CFI mechanisms against control-flow hijacking. The source code of our prototype implementations are available at https://github.com/HexHive/ShadowStack

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We thank our shepherd Anders Fogh and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. This research was supported by ONR awards N00014-17-1-2513, by CNS-1801601, and a gift from Intel corporation. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of our sponsors.
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