Establishing a ‘Cultural Base’? The Creation of the Fulbright Program in Portugal

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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with the cultural and educational relations between the United States and Portugal during the Cold War. It is built upon the premise that cultural policies and cultural relations between states are a fundamental part of international relations. History of International Relations, therefore, should overcome an analysis based only upon political and diplomatic dimensions to address what can also be referred to as ‘cultural diplomacy’. The Cold War period, because of its historical features, is particularly relevant to the study of processes of cultural diplomacy and some authors even consider it as the ‘golden age’ of cultural diplomacy.1

INTRODUCTION

The history of international relations between Portugal and the United States shows us that in the early years of the Cold War there was a gradual integration of Portugal within the US sphere of influence in Western Europe. From a political and military point of view, this integration was confirmed by several bilateral agreements between the two nations, giving the Americans base rights in the islands of the Azores, by Portugal’s participation in the Marshall Plan and by the invitation to be a founding member of NATO, in 1949. It is questionable, however, whether this political and economic process of integration had parallel on the cultural level. After all, for the Portuguese regime, led by Oliveira Salazar since 1932, and for a society like the Portuguese, predominantly rural, conservative, and catholic, the United States seemed to represent, as George Kennan once wrote, the ‘immorality’ of Hollywood and the ‘materialism’ of Wall Street. American cultural hegemony, therefore, was never a reality in Portugal in the early years of the Cold War.2

Within this political context, and based on original sources from Portuguese archives, this paper represents a first approach to educational exchanges between Portugal and the United States in the early years of the Cold War, examining the evolution from the first reluctant contacts and exchanges in the late 1940s until the signature of a Fulbright agreement and the creation of the Portuguese–American Cultural Commission in 1960. In the end, we try to evaluate the significance of educational exchanges for the larger history of US–Portugal relations in the Cold War period.
Portugal and the United States during the Cold War

The history of Portuguese–American cultural relations during the Cold War has not been written yet. A good starting point for this endeavor may be an assessment of the prejudice and disdain of Oliveira Salazar, the leader of the Portuguese government from 1932 until 1968, for the United States and for the cultural and ‘civilizational’ principles this country stood for, in the eyes of the Portuguese dictator. The United States, Salazar wrote in November 1943, have a ‘lack of knowledge’ of European ‘businesses and problems: very wealthy […] very young, they do not feel our needs, and cannot not have the same political views’. For the Americans, everything was ‘simpler, straightforward, less formal’, with no regard for ‘our mental requirement of logic’ and ‘scruples of juridical positions’, without the ‘delicacy’ and ‘flexibility’ that characterized ‘European intellect’. Salazar’s position was not much different from other European leaders of that time, reflecting the idea that US culture, specially ‘high culture’ was somehow ‘inferior’ to European standards. From a cultural point of view, the major influence in Portuguese cultural and intellectual circles, in the early years of the Cold War was France, Germany or the United Kingdom.

From a political point of view, however, the most salient development in US–Portuguese relations during the last period of World War II and in the early years of the Cold War was the integration of Portugal in what can be called the American sphere of influence. A neutral country during World War II, Portugal gradually perceived that an alliance with the United States, the belonging, more or less explicit, to the American sphere of influence was essential for the maintenance of the regime and the colonial empire after the war. This process of rapprochement with the United States was not linear and faced strong resistance within the regime and especially from Oliveira Salazar himself. The Portuguese leader always looked with suspicion to what he thought were the imperialist ambitions of America in Europe, Africa and the world in general. He continued to imagine a post-war international order in which the United Kingdom would remain as the dominant power and Euro-African links would allow Western Europe to remain a pillar in the international system. The rise of the United States to a hegemonic position was a scenario that worried Salazar because it would mean the preponderance of a democratic power with a markedly anti-colonialist discourse. Sooner or later, he suspected, these principles would come into confrontation with the type of regime in Portugal and with the maintenance of the Portuguese colonial empire.

The integration of Portugal into the Western bloc was largely facilitated by the importance of the military base the United States utilized in the Azores since World War II. In the immediate post-war period, the Azores continued to play a key role in US–Portuguese relations and to function as a vehicle for the integration of Portugal in the new international order that emerged with the Cold War. The existence of an American base in the islands was one of the vertices of the new American plan to create a vast system of naval and air bases scattered all over the globe. Accordingly, after negotiations, that were always difficult and prolonged, Portugal and the United States signed several agreements renewing the American presence in the Azores: in 1946, 1948 and 1951. On the other hand, this process also took place at an economic level. In this context, it is essential to consider the participation of Portugal in the Marshall Plan, for which it was officially invited in July 1947. Portugal accepted the invitation, seen as a way to offset Soviet veto over its participation in the UN and also as a way to avoid international
isolation of the regime. Initially, however, Portuguese authorities rejected the American financial aid, considering the country did not need to be a part of the ‘queue of those hungry for dollars’. Accordingly, Portugal only came within the ERP in 1948 when it faced serious financial and economic challenges. In 1949, the Portuguese government accepted $625 million in aid via the program.7

Finally, in this process of reluctant but gradual integration of Portugal into the Western community, we should mention Portuguese participation in NATO. Portugal was invited to participate in the Atlantic Alliance because of the strategic value of the Azores.8 The Azores military base was defined by the Secretary General of NATO, in 1950, as ‘the most important contribution which Portugal could make to NATO defense’.9 Like the Marshall Plan, NATO was an excellent opportunity for the international integration of Portugal and for its alignment with the West in the bipolar scenario that characterized the Cold War. Therefore, in 4 April 1949 Portugal signed the Treaty of Washington, becoming a founding member of NATO. Two years later, in 1951, Portugal and the United States would sign two key agreements that regulated the bilateral relations between the two countries for the following decades. The first agreement, signed in January 1951, was a ‘Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement’, similar to the agreements signed between the United States and other members of NATO, under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.10 The second one, signed in September 1951, was a ‘Defense Agreement between the United States and Portugal respecting Use of Facilities in the Azores’. This agreement formally granted the United States the use of the Azores base ‘in case of war in which they are involved during the life of the North Atlantic Treaty’. In times of peace, however, the United States were only allowed to remain in the Azores for a period of five years.11 The Portuguese government wanted to avoid a permanent US military presence in Portuguese territory and it was able to impose negotiations every five years for the renewal of authorization in times of peace. Thus, American troops were only authorized to remain in the Azores until September 1956 and the agreement had to be renegotiated and eventually renewed in 1957, allowing the United States to remain for another five years.

Educational exchanges in the early Cold War

It was within this context of US–Portugal relations during the Cold War period that educational exchanges between the two countries began to took place. US cultural diplomacy programs, however, had a slow start in the early Cold War. In the five years that followed the end of World War II, as historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht wrote, ‘Washington had very little interest in cultural matters in Europe’. The Truman administration did not have a consensual vision on the utility of cultural diplomacy and many American policymakers were ‘skeptical about whether the promotion of American values and culture abroad was appropriate at all’.12

Nevertheless, several important initiatives were launched in the post-war years, including the Fulbright program. In 1946, President Truman signed the Fulbright Act that would allow, in the following years, the development of educational exchanges between the United States and other countries. The original bill had been introduced by Senator William Fulbright (D-AR) with the declared goal of ‘promotion of international good will through the exchange of students in the fields of education, culture and science’.13 The Fulbright program has already been identified as one of the most important tools in the
Cold War battle for the hearts and minds\textsuperscript{14} and as a favorite way ‘the government can communicate with target foreign audiences’.\textsuperscript{15}

Two years later, in 1948, the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act (Public Law 80-402), also known as the \textit{Smith-Mundt Act}, was even more significant, authorizing the American government ‘to conduct international information, education, and cultural exchange activities on a worldwide, long-term scale’ in order ‘to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries’.\textsuperscript{16}

Despite these two programs, in the early years of the Cold War, the United States did not have a clearly defined strategy to project its own cultural values and to promote educational exchanges with Western European countries. Portugal, despite its political and strategical importance, was certainly not one of the primary destinations of American cultural diplomacy. Being a dictatorship and a single party regime, with a deep and entrenched anti-communist discourse and practice, Washington did not believe Portugal would become a significant theatre of the ‘cultural battles’ of the Cold War or the target of any specific soviet propaganda program. Therefore, Portugal was not part of the initial Fulbright program. Educational exchanges between the two countries were managed by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, initially called Division of Cultural Relations.\textsuperscript{17}

The exclusion of Portugal from the Fulbright program was also related to the way the program was financed. Since its creation, the Fulbright program was funded by the sale of a vast quantity of war surplus material that was scattered around the world, especially in Europe and in the Pacific region. Its geography, therefore, ‘was determined by the post-war distribution of surplus material’ that made the United Kingdom and France its major beneficiaries in Europe. As a neutral country during World War II, Portugal did not have any American surplus material in its territory and this was another reason why it was left out of the Fulbright program.\textsuperscript{18}

On the other hand, the Portuguese government, as seen above, was not very interested in promoting cultural and education exchanges with the United States. The dominant cultural reference in Portugal was French culture. Therefore, educational exchanges between the United States and Portugal only existed through isolated initiatives of students and professors and they generally faced many obstacles.

Among these obstacles, the most paramount and difficult to overcome was the nature of the Portuguese regime. Salazar’s regime looked with suspicion to foreigners who wanted to visit the country\textsuperscript{19} and a formal authorization from the Portuguese political police (the PVDE) was mandatory and very difficult to obtain. In August 1945, an American student, Julia Bramlage, wanted to spend an Academic year at the University of Coimbra to improve her knowledge of Portuguese language. When she visited the Portuguese consulate in San Francisco she realized that she needed a special authorization from the Portuguese political police to apply for a Visa that would allow her to travel to Portugal. Julia Bramlage made the request for that authorization and paid for it by herself. The Portuguese consul informed her that the authorization would take between a week and a month to be ready and that it would be necessary that someone she knew could ‘follow the process in Lisbon’. The lack of reply from Portuguese authorities in Lisbon eventually prevented Bramlage to travel to Portugal in that academic year.\textsuperscript{20} In December 1945, the case was brought to the attention of the Portuguese Embassy in the United States by
Manoel Cardozo, professor at The Catholic University of America. Cardozo suggested that the Portuguese government should authorize the Portuguese Embassy in the United States or even the consulate services to process Visa requests by students who wanted to travel to Portugal, without consulting Lisbon to obtain the necessary license.21

The Portuguese ambassador in Washington, João Bianchi, referred the matter to Lisbon, specifically to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, reporting the difficulties the student had found from the Portuguese immigration authorities and how she had decided to postpone her trip to Portugal for next year. The Ambassador suggested that if the Portuguese government was, ‘as I presume’, really interested in ‘promoting cultural exchanges’ by having American students attending Portuguese universities, it ‘should perhaps consider how to simplify their enrollments and other necessary steps’. For Bianchi, the House of Portugal in New York ‘could be the means for implementing’ this simplification, as long as it ‘received the appropriate directives’. In late February 1946, the Minister of Foreign Affairs decided to pursue this matter, sending the case to the Ministry of Education and suggesting that ‘if there is interest to intensify cultural exchanges with the United States’ the government should promote ‘the simplification of formalities necessary to the frequency of our universities for international students’.22

This lack of interest and initiative in receiving foreign students was visible not only at the government level, but also in Portuguese universities and other educational institutions, that were not prepared to receive foreign students and lacked specialized personnel to deal with the issue. In January 1950, the School of Inter-American Affairs at the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque complained about the difficulties in establishing contacts with the Universities of Lisbon and Coimbra. John F. Gallo wrote to the Portuguese Embassy in Washington, mentioning the existence of several students at that university who were specializing in Portuguese language and in History of Portugal. These students were ‘very interested’ in spending a school year in a Portuguese University, such as Lisbon or Coimbra. However, ‘letters sent for several months for the above named institutions were not answered’. For this reason, the University of New Mexico requested the Embassy information regarding the ‘possibility of these students attend some higher education institutions in Portugal’. Specifically it was requested ‘information about admission requirements and, if possible [...] catalogs or other printed materials that can clarify this issue’.23

A few days later, the new Portuguese ambassador in the United States, Pedro Teotonio Pereira, referred this matter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, drawing his attention to ‘the fact that some students from the University of New Mexico who wrote to the Universities of Coimbra and Lisbon did not receive a reply to their letters’. This was not the ‘first time that such cases are referred to the Embassy’. As the ambassador explained, this was a sensitive question ‘because professors and students from American schools – whose information services are generally remarkable – do not understand that the same does not happen with educational institutions in other countries, especially when it comes to universities with great tradition and reputation abroad’. The ambassador drew attention to this matter ‘in the certainty that something can be done to prevent the repetition of cases like this that do not prestige us in the eyes of Americans’. The decision of the Minister, written in the letter, recommended sending the whole process to the Directorate General of Higher Education, ‘asking to enable us to respond to the Embassy, to whose fair repairs we ask your attention’.24
The American Embassy in Lisbon and the role of the cultural attaché

In the early 1950s, the intensity of cultural and educational exchanges between Portugal and the United States began to grow. This situation reflected the growing globalization of the Cold War and, in bilateral terms, the stabilization of political and military relations provided by the bilateral agreements of 1951. In 1950, the Department of State had prepared a ‘Policy Statement’ on Portugal and defined as the four major objectives of American policy towards Portugal: ‘to maintain and improve existing cordial relations... to ensure continuation and development of the facilities now granted to us in the Azores... to encourage Portuguese participation in efforts to achieve economic, political, and military integration in western Europe and coordination in North Atlantic area... to aid in the economic and strategic development of Portugal’s large African possessions’.\(^{25}\)

These closer political and economic relations were matched on the cultural level by the appointment of a new cultural attaché to the US Embassy in Lisbon, in March 1951, just two months after the signing of the ‘Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement’ between Portugal and the United States. Leroy Benoit had a PhD from Harvard University and was a former member of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services). In 1951, according to his own words, the State Department had picked him from Johns Hopkins University ‘to exercise for four years, the post of cultural attaché at the US Embassy in Lisbon’. His action was undoubtedly instrumental in developing the cultural diplomacy of the United States in Portugal.\(^{26}\) As historian Peter Arndt pointed out, even during World War II the Division of Cultural Relations, from the Department of State, was already ‘recruiting university intellectuals for the field and area scholars moved into numerous embassies’ based on the principle that ‘sophisticated field representation was indispensable’. These ‘cultural diplomats’ were the ‘intellectual nerve centers and pump primers for enticing university scholars and students, intellectuals and educators into bilateral dialogue’, something that was much needed in Lisbon, from the US point of view. In many instances, just like in Lisbon, the ‘cultural officer’ would remain ‘attached’ to the Embassy, even if he was not an official diplomat.\(^{27}\)

In an interview to the Portuguese newspaper República, in May 1953, Leroy Benoit described the activities undertaken his first two years in Lisbon:

the cultural exchange of students and professors that I have been promoting between Portugal and the United States with scholarships; the number of conferences that I made in the country that hosts me and the numerous visits to the United States that I promoted, with expenses paid by the US Government, of high Portuguese officials, occupying posts of command and with civil influence in industry, commerce, education, science, and arts, in order to observe and study the life, services, institutions, working methods in the United States, to learn practical and useful lessons, perhaps applicable to Portugal.\(^{28}\)

In 1952, he claimed, two professors and a high official from the Ministry of Education had gone to the United States for a six months period, ‘with scholarships [...] transport and accommodation paid, with round trips offered’. They had visited Texas, Indiana and New York. As for students, thirteen had travelled to the United States, covering diversified areas, such as arts, sciences and literature, ‘with scholarships for ten months in the amount of $1,600 on average, including accommodation, food and a certain amount for daily personal expenses’. For 1953 it was expected that fifteen Portuguese students visited the United States ‘with similar scholarships’, as well as ‘several professors’. On the other hand,
in 1952, ‘several American professors with scholarships’ had come to Portugal to research in Portuguese archives. One of them was a professor of ‘agricultural sciences’ that had moved to the ‘Agricultural Regents Schools of Santarem, Evora and Coimbra’. In 1953, he assured, ‘another US agricultural technician will come to Portugal, to continue the work started last year’. 29

The Fulbright program in Portugal

Although the numbers presented by Leroy Benoit marked a significant departure from the previous period, it was not until the late 1950s that the United States and Portugal began negotiations for the development of the Fulbright program in Portugal. Recent historiography claimed that the last years of this decade witnessed a period of intense transatlantic cultural relations and this was certainly the case of US–Portugal relations. 30

In April 1957, the US Embassy in Lisbon proposed to the Portuguese government the signature of an exchange agreement. The US government, ‘by its exclusive initiative, was willing to celebrate a cultural agreement with our country, remaining fully responsible for the funding’ 31. The US government proposed the creation of a binational ‘Commission for Educational Exchange’ to administer the program in Portugal, similar to the commissions that already existed in other countries.

The US initiative regarding the Fulbright agreement with Portugal was part of a second wave of bilateral Fulbright agreements that took place in the late 1950s. These new agreements were made possible due to the new financial provisions of the program. In 1954, US Congress had approved a provision dealing with ‘surplus agricultural commodity sales abroad’. This provision ‘enabled exchanges to continue in some countries where surplus property […] proceeds were exhausted. It also allowed extending exchanges in the mid 1950s to additional countries […] where there had been no binational agreements’. 32 In the following years, as Richard Arndt pointed out, new Fulbright agreements were signed with countries like Portugal, Cyprus, Malaysia, Afghanistan, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia, among others. 33

It should also be noted that this American offer came at a delicate period of Portuguese–American relations. With the end of the European colonial empires and the globalization of the Cold War, the United States was changing its African policy and its position regarding European colonialism. Portugal, one of the remaining colonial powers, resented this new US attitude since 1954, when the Eisenhower administration refused to make a public statement condemning the actions of the Indian Government in the Portuguese enclaves in India. 34 For the first time since World War II, Portugal was faced with the reluctance of the United States to support its colonial policy and the Portuguese government immediately suspended negotiations for the renewal of the Azores agreement (which would end in December 1956) until the Eisenhower administration approved the so-called Dulles–Cunha memorandum, in 1955. This memorandum recognized the existence of ‘Portuguese provinces’ – instead of colonies – in Asia. The subtle distinction was crucial for the Portuguese, who claimed they did not have an empire or any colonies in Africa or Asia, but instead ‘overseas provinces’ with the same constitutional status as the ‘continental provinces’. 35

Nevertheless, the Portuguese government delayed negotiations on the Azores as much as it could. In the last day of 1956, US Ambassador Bonbright met personally with Oliveira Salazar and was faced with a proposal for a one-year extension. He replied the American
government had every reason to be concerned with the situation in the Azores and it was not ‘prepared to go ahead now, on the basis of a one year prolongation’. Salazar said that part of the delay had been ‘purely fortuitous’, but he recognized that a ‘series of events’ had caused the Portuguese government to reflect on the ‘desirability’ of a new agreement. The Portuguese leader told the Ambassador he was ‘disturbed about the directions which American foreign policy is taking’. The Ambassador observed that the American government believed the Azores base should be considered separately and ‘on its merits’ because it was a matter ‘involving our mutual defense and it was a contribution which both countries were able to make as members of the NATO alliance’. Salazar replied that Portugal had interests ‘scattered in Africa and Asia’, and wanted to be sure that American policies were not ‘prejudicial to those interests’. He argued that the Americans ‘could not expect Portugal to make concessions to the United States in the Azores’ if their policies ‘should result in harm’ to Portugal in other parts of the globe. Salazar reiterated the offer for an additional year of permanence in the Azores and the American Ambassador accepted, although he expressed his ‘personal disappointment’ as well as that of his government.36

Negotiations for the renewal of the Azores base continued throughout 1957 and it was in this delicate political context that, in April 1957, the American Embassy proposed the celebration of the Fulbright agreement with Portugal. This initiative certainly is a clear example of the role of cultural relations and the importance of cultural diplomacy, since it helped to improve the climate between the two countries. The new agreement on the Azores would be signed a few months later, in November 1957, allowing for the continuation of the existing conditions until 31 December 1962.37 The two governments also signed several ‘Technical Agreements’, by which the United States agreed to ‘modernize the existing equipment’ of the Portuguese Armed Forces, with special relevance to the Portuguese Air Force. The United States would provide in the near future five C-54 aircraft, and one squadron of F-86F jet fighters, ‘plus the necessary equipment and training of personnel to man the squadron’. After the five year period the United States would also guarantee ‘four more C-54s’ and ‘fuel, spare parts, etc., for all aircraft indicated above’.38

After receiving the initial American proposal for a Fulbright agreement, in April 1957, the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a first recommendation about the intended agreement and the bureaucratic process it needed to follow. There was nothing to ‘oppose regarding the objectives expressed in the agreement project’. Nevertheless, due to the ‘nature of the issues’ at stake, other departments within the Portuguese government should be consulted, such as the Ministries of Education, Finances and Economy. Given the political implications of the agreement, the leader of the Government, Oliveira Salazar, should also be consulted.39

In this initial phase of consultations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was above all concerned with the financial aspects of the proposed agreement and wanted to know how much the American government was willing to spend, each year, on the Portuguese Fulbright program. Similarly to what it had done with other countries, the United States intended to finance the Fulbright program in Portugal through the ‘Agricultural Commodities Agreement’ it had signed with Portugal in May 1956.40 This agreement established that the money originated by the sale of agricultural commodities could be used by the United States to promote ‘international activities of cultural and educational exchange’.41 The money the United States was planning to spend in Portugal was part of the total
amount of 3.7 million dollars mentioned in the item ‘International Exchange Program’ of the 1956 agreement. \(42\) After the clarification of these aspects, the ministry of Finances issued, in August 1957, a statement saying that it had ‘nothing to oppose’ to the proposal for a cultural agreement between the United States and Portugal. \(43\)

The ministry of Education, on its turn, decided to send the process to the ‘Institute for Higher Culture’, the Portuguese governmental agency responsible, among other things, for international educational exchanges. The director of this institute was Cabral de Moncada, a conservative Law Professor at University of Coimbra known for his pro-German position during World War II and defined by historian Luís Torgal as a ‘cultural germanophile’. \(44\) Moncada expressed strong reservations regarding the American proposal. On a memorandum dated 8 September 1957, he admitted the agreement was of ‘great utility for us’. The Institute for Higher Culture would have ‘considerably enlarged its possibilities for total or partial funding of fellows and scholars in the United States, with great relief for its normal fund allocation for scientific research and cultural expansion’. Furthermore, this could be ‘an excellent tool for promoting Portuguese culture’ in the United States. \(45\)

However, Moncada added, it seemed like the project had been conceived with a total ‘lack of knowledge’ of how Portuguese ‘cultural institutions’ were organized. He was particularly upset because the projected agreement did not preview any kind of ‘collaboration or understanding’ between the new ‘Commission for Educational Exchange’ and the Institute for Higher Culture or any other Portuguese cultural institution. Moreover, the funds allocated for American citizens who wanted to study in Portugal were far more substantial than the funds promised for Portuguese citizens who want to pursue their studies in the United States. Finally, according to Moncada, the projected Commission for Educational Exchange, responsible for the management of the program and with its headquarters in Lisbon, looked much more like an ‘independent cultural institution, almost like an autonomous American Institute’ than a ‘simple administrative organism, charged with the management of certain funds allocated by the government of the United States’. \(46\)

According to this view, the Director of the Portuguese Institute for Higher Culture proposed further negotiations between the two governments in order to address several issues. First of all, it was necessary to stress the need for collaboration between the new ‘Commission for Educational Exchange’ and existing Portuguese cultural institutions, particularly the Institute for Higher Culture. Moncada suggested that the final version of the agreement should determine that the Commission would conceive and execute all its programs with collaboration of the Institute for Higher Culture, specially when they involve exchange of students, professors or researchers between Portugal and the United States. \(47\)

This collaboration could be better obtained with changes in the proposed ‘Board of Directors’. According to the initial project, the Commission would have two presidents: an honorary President (the US Ambassador in Lisbon) and an ‘effective’ President, to be nominated by the US Ambassador. Both of them would have a vote in the Board of Directors. This arrangement, Moncada protested, would turn the Commission more into an ‘American institution’ than into an ‘international or Portuguese–American’ institution. He proposed that the ‘effective’ President should be designated alternatively by each government and that the honorary President should not have the right to vote. \(48\)

Another point stressed by Moncada was the need for a more balanced distribution of funds between American and Portuguese students, putting an end to the different
treatment received by American fellows in Portugal and Portuguese fellow in the United States. According to Moncada, under the proposed deal, Portuguese students would only get payment of their travel, while American students in Portugal would obtain full funding for ‘travel, tuitions, accommodation and other expenses related to their academic activities’. Moncada believed that if this clause of the agreement was not modified ‘we would risk having [...] our schools full of rich Americans and [...] only a few poor Portuguese in America’.49

These complaints stressed by Moncada were not uncommon. Since its origins the Fulbright program was characterized by the ‘asymmetry’ in the relationship between the United States and the partner countries. As historian Sam Lebovic stresses, ‘from the negotiations of exchange treaties, to the selection of board representatives and exchange visitors, asymmetries of power undercut claims to mutual exchange’. According to this author, the Fulbright program was indeed a ‘project for the political transmission of American culture abroad’ and this was the reason why the State Department was responsible for negotiations with other governments. There were official recommendations for an ‘American and educational flavor’ of the binational boards responsible for the administration of the Fulbright program in each country. This meant American ‘negotiators were instructed to achieve American majorities on the foundation boards and to keep them free from foreign educational control’.50 Even in the cases where ‘a foreign government, usually European, was able to secure half the votes on the board, they remained unequal partners’ because ‘the Chairman of these Boards, with a casting vote and ability to appoint other members, was always American. Second, the decisions and budget of the board would be subject to review by the State Department.51 The problem of funding Portuguese students in the US was also part of a broader issue. Since the beginning of the Fulbright program there was the problem of funds for foreign fellows: ‘dollars had to be found to pay costs incurred in the United States’, because the Fulbright funds would only provide for ‘international travel’.52

With the agreement on the Azores completed in late 1957, conversations between the two governments regarding the Fulbright program began in April 1958. When the members of the Portuguese government met with the American officers, they presented to them the issues that had been raised by the several Ministries involved and also the objections raised by Cabral Moncada. The US representatives clarified some technical aspects of the proposed agreement. A financial report of the Fulbright program should be made every year and sent to the Secretary of State and to the Portuguese government. The total amount to be spent in the program depended on the amount of money in foreign currency generated from the sale of American agricultural surplus. Therefore, if there was more money available, conditions for Portuguese students could also be improved53.

The American diplomats also replied to Moncada’s objections, explaining that Portuguese students going to the United States under this program would have their tickets paid in Portuguese currency (escudos), but not their living expenses in the United States, because that could not be paid in Portuguese currency. On the other hand, the US officers rejected Moncada’s suggestion that the Board of Directors could be presided by an American and a Portuguese member, alternating every other year. The United States was simply following a procedure that was similar to all other Fulbright agreements. As far as the collaboration with the Institute for Higher Culture, the Americans suggested that the Portuguese members of the Board could be indicated by the Institute.54
These replies were transmitted to Moncada in August 1958. He did not answer until late October 1958, with another lengthy Memorandum. Moncada considered that the justifications presented by the American Embassy did not reply to his main objections. The Fulbright Commission to be created in Lisbon would have a ‘unilateral’ flavor, much more than a ‘bilateral’ one. There would also be an ‘enormous difference’ between the ‘possibilities of Americans in Portugal’ and the possibilities of ‘Portuguese in the United States’. Moncada stressed that, ‘without a minimum of equality of conditions between the American fellows in Portugal and the Portuguese fellows in America’, not even the presence of four Portuguese members in the ‘Board of Directors’, ‘always presided by two American presidents’, would avoid the existence of a ‘truly American cultural base in our territory’ instead of a ‘Portuguese-American international cultural center’. Nevertheless, even under the present conditions, Moncada admitted that the projected agreement would undoubtedly bring great ‘advantages’ to the Portuguese–American cultural exchanges.55

In November 1958, the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied and commented on Moncada’s report. Portuguese diplomacy was naturally more interested in achieving the agreement and did not share the ‘nationalistic’ position of Moncada. In the opinion of Almeida Coutinho, the ‘total expenses’ of the program are assured by the ‘American treasure’ and the unilateral, rather than bilateral, character of the agreement was a ‘natural consequence of that circumstance’. Those were the conditions, and the Portuguese government should now simply decide if, under these circumstances ‘the agreement is favorable to Portugal’ and if it was willing to sign it. Coutinho reminded that ‘the Americans had signed numerous similar agreements with other countries and are not willing to change conditions already approved by the Congress’.56

While these discussions were taking place, the US signed a similar agreement with Spain with the declared goal of furthering ‘mutual understanding between the peoples of Spain and the United States through a wider exchange of knowledge and professional skills’.57 Two months later, in February 1959, the final version of the agreement was sent to the Ministry of Education by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saying there was no time for further negotiations.58 The signature of the agreement with Spain, in 16 November 1958, certainly contributed to expediting this matter in Portugal. In the delicate Iberian political balance, the Portuguese government wanted to avoid the appearance of being left behind by the United States.

**Conclusion**

The Fulbright agreement between Portugal and the United States would be signed by both governments on 19 March 1960. Its major goal was to develop an educational exchange program between the two countries. Portugal was the thirty-seventh country in the world to sign a Fulbright agreement with the United States. The exchange of students and professors would be directed by the newly created ‘Luso-American Cultural Commission’, also known as the Fulbright Commission, composed by eight members, with equal number of Americans and Portuguese and having the US ambassador in Lisbon as honorary President.59

The Fulbright agreement between Portugal and the United States marked the beginning of a new phase in terms of cultural relations between the two countries and of US cultural diplomacy in Portugal. Educational, cultural and scientific exchanges were no
longer the result of individual initiatives, as they were in the beginning of the Cold War, or of the activity of the US Embassy in Lisbon. The activities of the Fulbright Commission started in June 1960, after the appointment of an ‘Executive Secretary’.60

The first year of activity of the LACC and the Fulbright program in Portugal was evidently experimental. Nevertheless, three Portuguese university professors and four college students went to the United States. During this year, there was also a US ‘specialist’ placed at the Faculdade de Letras of Lisbon University. Moreover, the Fulbright Program also allowed Fulbright students and scholars in other European countries to travel to Lisbon and this happened in six instances.61 In the academic year 1961–1962, the Fulbright Commission gave scholarships to nine Portuguese students, in areas that ranged from Civil Engineering to Medicine, from Social Sciences to Music. In October 1961, a group of six American Fulbright students arrived in Lisbon to attend courses of Portuguese Culture at Faculdade de Letras of Lisbon University. These students received an ‘orientation course’ with the participation of distinguished Portuguese scholars, such as Virgínia Rau, Maria de Lourdes Belchior, Lindley Cintra and Jacinto do Prado Coelho.62

Portuguese–American cultural and educational relations had reached a new level in the early 1960s. This was the result of the Fulbright agreement and of the negotiations that had been conducted since 1957. As mentioned above, the American proposal had come at crucial moment of US–Portuguese relations in the context of the Cold War and it certainly had an impact in these bilateral relations, helping to improve the climate between the countries and to pave the way for the signature of the 1957 agreement on the Azores. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that in this case cultural diplomacy had a significant impact in terms of the larger history of US–Portugal relations during the Cold War period.

In the early 1960s, however, other developments would compromise this situation. A few months after the signature of the Fulbright agreement, the first anti-colonial incidents took place in Angola, in February 1961. With the new Kennedy administration, Portugal would face, for the first time since World War II, outright opposition from the United States to its colonial policy. In March 1961, President Kennedy administration decided to vote in favor of a United Nations Security Council resolution calling on the Portuguese government to ‘urgently’ introduce ‘measures and reforms in Angola’.63 The resolution was not approved, but the favorable vote of the US delegation would mark the beginning of the most serious crisis in Portuguese-American relations during the Cold War.64

Notes

1. William Glade, ‘Issues in the Genesis and Organization of Cultural Diplomacy: A Brief Critical History’ in The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society (Winter 2010), vol. 39, issue 4, 242. For cultural diplomacy during the Cold War see Jessica Gienow-Hecht, ‘Culture and the Cold War in Europe’ in Leffler, Melvyn & Westad, Odd Arne, The Cambridge History of the Cold War Vol. i, (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 398–419; Akira Iriye, ‘Culture and International History’ in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (ed), Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort Of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy In The Twentieth Century (Virginia: Potomac Books, 2005).

2. Luís Nuno Rodrigues, No Coração do Atlântico. Os Estados Unidos e os Açores (1939–1948) (Lisboa: Prefácio, 2005), 19–20.

3. Works on Portuguese–American relations during the Cold War have focused mostly on the political and diplomatic dimension of that relation. Among others, Fernanda Rollo, Portugal e a
Reconstrução Económica do Pós-Guerra. O Plano Marshall e a economia portuguesa dos anos 50 (Lisboa: Instituto Diplomático, 2007); Daniel Marcos, ‘Uma relação conturbada: os americanos nos Açores e a questão colonial portuguesa nos anos 50’ in Pedro A. Oliveira e M. Inácia Rezola (org.), O Longo Curso. Estudos de homenagem a José Medeiros Ferreira (Lisboa: Tinta da China), 387–410; Luís N. Rodrigues, Kennedy-Salazar: a Crise de Uma Aliança. As Relações Luso-Americanas entre 1961 e 1963 (Lisboa: Editorial Notícias, 2002); Luís Nuno Rodrigues, ‘O crepúsculo da era Salazar: os Estados Unidos e a ascensão de Marcelo Caetano’ in José V. Serrão, Magda Pinheiro e Maria de Fátima Sá (org.), Desenvolvimento Económico e Mudança Social. Portugal nos últimos dois séculos (Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2009), 563–80; Tiago Moreira de Sá, Os Estados Unidos da América e a Democracia Portuguesa (1974–1976) (Lisboa: Instituto Diplomático, 2009).

4. Memorandum of Conversation between Oliveira Salazar and Henry Norweb, 12 January 1944. Historical-Diplomatic Archive (AHD), Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AW, Folder 123.

5. On Portuguese–American relations during World War II see Rodrigues, Coração do Atlântico.

6. See Luís Nuno Rodrigues, ‘Crossroads of the Atlantic: Portugal, The Azores and The Atlantic Community (1943–57)’ in Valerie Aubourg, Gérard Bossuat e Gilles Scott-Smith (eds.), European Community, Atlantic Community? (Paris: Editions Soleb, 2008), 456–67.

7. See Fernanda Rollo, Portugal e o Plano Marshall. Da rejeição à solicitação da ajuda financeira norte-americana (1947–1952) (Lisboa: Editorial Estampa, 1994), 294–5.

8. Nuno Severiano Teixeira, ‘Da Neutralidade ao Alinhamento: Portugal na Fundação do Pacto do Atlântico’, Análise Social, xxviii (1993), 64–5.

9. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), vol. iii (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 305.

10. Acordo de Auxílio Mútuo para a Defesa entre Portugal e os Estados Unidos da América (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1953); Torre do Tombo National Archives, Lisbon, Oliveira Salazar Archive (AOS), CO/NE-30, Folder 4.

11. Acordo de Defesa entre Portugal e os Estados Unidos da América (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1953), 3–5.

12. Gienow-Hecht, Jessica, ‘Culture and the Cold War in Europe’, in Leffler, Melvyn & Westad, Odd Arne, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. i, (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 407.

13. On the origins of the Fulbright program see Sam Lebovic, ‘From War Junk to Educational Exchange: The World War II Origins of the Fulbright Program and the Foundations of American Cultural Globalism, 1945–1950’, Diplomatic History, xxxvii (2013), 280–312. Quotes from 286–7. Historian Arnold Toynbee has pointed out that ‘along with the Marshall Plan, the Fulbright Program is one of the really generous and imaginative things that have been done in the world since World War II’. Quoted by Ralph Vogel, ‘The making of the Fulbright Program’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, cdxci, (1987), 13. See also Arthur Power Dudden and Russell Dynes (eds.), The Fulbright Experience 1946–1986: Encounters and Transformations (New Brunswick, NJ, 1986). There are already some case studies of the implementation of the Fulbright Program, such as Alice Garner & Diane Kirby, ‘“Never a Machine for Propaganda”? The Australian-American Fulbright Program and Australia’s Cold War’, Australian Historical Studies, xliv (2013), 117–33; Caroline Matano Yang, ‘Multiple Cost Sharing: The Japan Experience’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, cdxci (1987), 85–91; Giles Scott-Smith, “The Fulbright Program in the Netherlands: An Example of Science Diplomacy”, in Jeroen van Dongen (ed.), Cold War Science and the Transatlantic Circulation of Knowledge (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 128–54.

14. Garner and Kirby, ‘Never a Machine’, 132.

15. Molly Bettie, ‘Ambassadors unaware: The Fulbright Program and American public diplomacy’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, xiii (2015), 361. See also Giles Scott-Smith, ‘Exchange Programs and Public Diplomacy’, in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (editors), Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (London: Routledge 2009), 51.

16. Kevin Mulcahy, ‘Cultural Diplomacy and the Exchange Programs: 1938–1978’, Journal of Arts Management, Law & Society, xxix, 17.

17. Mulcahy, ‘Cultural Diplomacy’, 14.
18. Lebovic, ‘War Junk’, 281–9.
19. Susana Chalante, ‘O discurso do Estado salazarista perante o “indesejável” (1933–1939)’, Análise Social, xlvii (2011), 41–63.
20. Letter from Julia A. Bramlage to Manoel Cardozo, 3 September 1945. AHD, RNP, 2nd Floor, A. 59, m. 311.
21. Letter from Manoel da Silveira Cardozo to the Portuguese Embassy in Washington, 31 December 1945. AHD, RNP, 2nd Floor, A. 59, m. 311.
22. Letter from ‘Direcção-Geral dos Negócios Políticos e da Administração Interna’ to the Chief of Staff of the Minister of National Education, 27 February 1946. AHD, RNP, 2nd Floor, A. 59, m. 311.
23. Letter from John F. Gallo, School of Inter-American Affairs, to the Portuguese Embassy in Washington, 17 January 1950, AHD, RNP, 2nd Floor, A. 59, m. 311.
24. Letter from the Portuguese Ambassador in Washington to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 30 January 1950. AHD, RNP, 2nd Floor, A. 59, m. 311.
25. ‘Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State’, 20 October 1950. FRUS, 1950, vol. iii (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 1540–8.
26. República, 24 May 1953, in AHD, RNP, 2nd Floor, A. 59, m. 340.
27. Arndt, American Cultural Diplomacy, 123–5. At the end of 1943 there were ‘cultural officers in U.S. embassies’ appointed by the Division of Cultural Relations in 22 different countries, 20 of them in Latin American, one in Spain and one in Turkey. At the end of 1945, ‘eight more appointments had been made: two in the Middle East (Syria and Egypt) and six in Europe (Belgium, France, Greece, Holland, Italy, and Portugal)’. Mulcahy, ‘Cultural Diplomacy’, 14.
28. República, 24 May 1953, in AHD, RNP, 2nd Floor, A. 59, m. 340.
29. República, 24 May 1953, in AHD, RNP, 2nd Floor, A. 59, m. 340.
30. Among others: Nancy Jachec, ‘Transatlantic Cultural Politics in the late 1950s: the Leaders and Specialists Grant Program’, Art History, xxvi (2003), 533–55.
31. Letter from Pinto de Lemos, Chief of Staff of the Minister of National Education, June 18, 1957. AHD, CLT, M. 68, Process 81.0.
32. Vogel, ‘The Making of’, 14.
33. Arndt, American Cultural Diplomacy, 342.
34. In 1954, the Indian Union isolated the land-locked Portuguese enclaves of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, prohibiting the passage through its territory of any Portuguese authorities and military forces, weapons or ammunition destined for these enclaves. See Luís N. Rodrigues, ‘The United States and Portuguese Decolonization’, Portuguese Studies, xxix (2013), 166.
35. Rodrigues, ‘The United States’, 167.
36. FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. xxvii, 468–9.
37. United States Treaties, vol. viii, Part 2, 1957, 2353–4.
38. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, State Department Central Files, 1960-3, Box 1818, 753b.56311/11-961.
39. Draft agreement between the government of the United States and the government of Portugal regarding the funding of certain education exchange programs. Service Information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1957. AHD, CLT, M. 68, Process 81.0.
40. ‘Agricultural Commodities Agreement between Portugal and the United States of America under Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act’. See AHD, CLT, M. 68, Process 81.0, handwritten note from Direction of Political Affairs, 18 July 1957.
41. Information from the Bureau of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 July 1957. AHD, CLT, M. 68, Process 81.0. The total funding was 3 million and 700 thousand dollars. This agreement resulted in the contract signed in 4 September 1957. Letter from the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Finances to the Director of Political and Internal Affairs, 15 July 1957. AHD, CLT, M. 68, Process 81.0.
42. Letter from the Bureau of Political Affairs to the General Director of Public Finances, 27 July 1957. AHD, CLT, M. 68, Process 81.0.
43. Letter from the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Finances to the Director of Political and Internal Affairs, 23 August 1957. AHD, CLT, M. 68, Process 81.0.
44. See Luís Reis Torgal, *Estados novos, estado novo: ensaios de história política e cultural* (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2009), vol. ii, 513–4; and also Chorão, Luís Bigotte ‘Moncada, Luís Cabral de’, in *Dicionário de História de Portugal*, vol. viii, (Lisboa: Figueirinhas, 1999), 512–3.
45. Memorandum from Luiz Cabral de Moncada, 8 September 1957. AHD, CLT, M. 68, Process 81.0.
46. Memorandum from Moncada.
47. Memorandum from Moncada.
48. Memorandum from Moncada.
49. Memorandum from Moncada.
50. Lebovic, ‘War Junk’, 283–99. The last quote is from historian Frank Ninkovich.
51. Lebovic, ‘War Junk’, 299–300.
52. Vogel, ‘The making of’, 13.
53. Memorandum of Conversation between António de Lucena, Almeida Coutinho, Xantaki and Teal, May 23, 1958. AHD, CLT, M. 68, Process 81.0.
54. Memorandum António de Lucena.
55. Memorandum from Moncada.
56. Memorandum from Almeida Coutinho, 1958. AHD, CLT, M. 68, Process 81.0.
57. Letter from the Portuguese Embassy in Washington to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 5, 1958. AHD, CLT, M. 68, Process 81.0.
58. Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Education, February 21, 1959. AHD, CLT, M. 68, Process 81.0.
59. *Programa Fulbright. Comissão Cultural Luso-Americana*, n. 1, June 1961, p. 1. AHD, CLT, M. 68, Process 81.0.
60. 1641.
61. *Programa Fulbright*, n.1, 2–3.
62. *Programa Fulbright. Comissão Cultural Luso-Americana*, n. 2, February 1962, 2–3. AHD, CLT, M. 68, Process 81.0.
63. *Department of State Bulletin*, 3 April 1961, 499.
64. See Rodrigues, *Kennedy-Salazar*.

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