INTRODUCTION

“If you are a Hungarian, your basic state of mind is the feeling of betrayal.” (Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary, to an interviewer of the Austrian Kleine Zeitung, May 2019)

What Mr. Orbán offers “is little more than the same authoritarian nationalism practiced by thugs and charlatans throughout the 20th century – including Hungary’s pro-Nazi world War II regime…. Mr. Orbán has excluded himself from the democratic West; he and his government should be treated accordingly.” Washington Post, Editorial, August 26, 2014.

The emergence in the past few years of populist, anti-liberal political movements in a number of countries presents an important challenge for psychologists (Albright, 2018; Pinker, 2018). While millions of would-be migrants see Western liberal democracies as their best hope for a better future, many voters in the very same countries are now turning their backs on their successful and well-tried political model. The rise of populism occurred in both highly developed Western...
countries (e.g., USA, Britain, France, and Austria) and in nations with weak democratic traditions (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and Russia). This paper explores the role of psychological factors, such as collective narcissism, in the rise of populism in Hungary. Hungary is now arguably the most "populist" and illiberal nation within the EU (Garton Ash, 2019) and the first member state in the history of the EU to be categorized as not a democracy (Freedom House, 2020). Specifically, we seek to explain how endemic feelings of betrayal and inferiority as reflected in the quote above by Mr. Orbán can lead to the spread of authoritarian nationalism and populism as identified in the second quote above.

1.1 | Collective narcissism

The mental representations of nations or cultures have long been of interest to social psychologists, going back to Wundt’s work on “Voelkerspsychologie” (Allport, 1924; Forgas, 1980; Wundt, 1911). We also know that human beings have a strong propensity to believe in various shared collective fictions, and almost any symbolic narrative can influence political behavior (Harari, 2014; Hobsbawm, 1992; Koestler, 1959).

In particular, the universal need for positive group identity may predispose voters to succumb to populist government propaganda (Albright, 2018). Recent work suggests that collective narcissism, defined as a belief that one’s own group is exceptional and entitled to privileged treatment, but that it is not sufficiently recognized by others, lies at the core of many populist beliefs (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019; Golec de Zavala & Lantos, 2020). We can see collective narcissism in this light: as yet another shared fictional narrative extolling the unappreciated virtues of the threatened in-group, and thus, satisfying deep-seated need for positive group identity.

Historically, narcissism is a psychoanalytic concept that applied to individuals. The possibility that narcissistic beliefs may be applied to entire groups was first entertained by Adorno (1997) and Fromm (1964/2010). Unlike earlier formulations, the contemporary understanding of collective narcissism makes no assumptions about pathological intrapsychic processes. Instead, collective narcissism is understood as a set of interrelated social psychological beliefs about the in-group that mirror the way individual narcissists think about themselves vis-à-vis others, emphasizing unrecognized greatness. Recent empirical work successfully differentiate[d this psychological concept from other in-group attitudes, including nationalism, patriotism, in-group glorification, in-group attachment, and in-group satisfaction (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). However, the relationship between collective narcissism and conservatism remains unclear (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, 2019).

Collective narcissism can also be empirically measured using the Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), featuring items adapted from psychological measures of individual narcissism to a group level. As Golec de Zavala et al. (2019) suggest, just “as people can demand special recognition and privilege for themselves (as individual narcissists do), they can claim the same for the groups they belong to (as collective narcissists do). …the intergroup consequences of collective narcissism often parallel the interpersonal consequences of individual narcissism: hostility, exaggerated reactions to negative feedback and criticism, or lack of empathy” (p. 38). Collective narcissism has been a common feature of fascist ideologies: in the 1930’s, Germans, Italians, and Japanese all believed in their innate racial and cultural superiority and deserv[ingness (Albright, 2018). Collective narcissism is also characteristic of various Jihadist movements, who see their sacred religion and culture as inherently superior to others (Ginges, 2015; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009).

Collective narcissism is also closely related to Tajfel’s work on in-group favoritism in the minimal group experiments (Tajfel & Forgas, 2000). According to this view, spontaneous intergroup discrimination is driven by the universal need for positive self-worth, achieved through maximizing positive in-group distinctiveness. This view is supported by findings showing that people often prefer to maximize in-group/out-group differences rather than simply maximizing in-group rewards (Crocker & Park, 2004; Emmons, 1987; Tajfel & Forgas, 2000). Indeed, collective narcissism mediates the relationship between low self-esteem and out-group’ derogation (Golec de Zavala et al., 2020).

There is recent evidence showing that collective narcissism is related to the endorsement of populist beliefs in a number of countries. In countries like the United States and Britain, collective narcissism may be triggered by perceived threats to group identity by some radical leftist policies such as political correctness and identity politics (Myers, 2019; Putnam et al., 2018). In a representative national survey in the United States, those who scored high on collective narcissism had more favorable views of Donald Trump and were more likely to vote for him (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018). Collective narcissism was also related to a growing belief in conspiracy theories during Trump’s campaign (Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018). Voters who felt that the status of their reference group and the standing of their nation was challenged were especially responsive to slogans like “America First” and “Make America great again.”

Here, we also looked at relative deprivation, the perception that one’s own group is disadvantaged compared to others, as a factor in populist attitudes (Pettigrew, 2017; Runciman, 1966). We compared its effects to those of collective narcissism on predicting the support for populist parties. Populist leaders often use narratives of relative deprivation to create a sense of grievance (Mols & Jetten, 2016). Emphasis on relative deprivation, in turn, appears linked to an increase in collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Marchlewksa et al., 2017).

The 2016 Brexit referendum was also marked by a number of narcissistic themes such as feelings that the EU was undermining the political status and autonomy of Britain. A recent study found that collective narcissism, social dominance orientation, and right-wing authoritarianism all predicted xenophobia and the Brexit vote (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017). Collective narcissism was most directly related to concerns over the image of the national group, its purity, grandiosity, and uniqueness. A similar pattern has also been observed in
Poland, where collective narcissism was a significant predictor of the support for the right-wing populist party of Jaroslaw Kacynski in the presidential elections (Marchlewksa et al., 2017). Can collective narcissism also play a role in Hungary's spectacular recent turn to populism and illiberalism? We shall turn to this question next.

1.2 | The rise of populism in Hungary

Hungary today is no longer a democratic country, and is the only EU member country classified as only partially free by Freedom House (2019, 2020; Wallen, 2018). Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party established a de facto one-party state euphemistically called the “System of National Cooperation.” Democratic institutions and the usual checks and balances have been eliminated, a new electoral law perpetuates one-party power, and extended direct party control to the media, the judiciary, and most state institutions (Garton Ash, 2019; Wallen, 2018). Hungary has fallen from the 23rd to the 87th place on the international list of press freedom—below Sierra Leone (Majtényi, 2019; Scheppkele, 2013). In a widely criticized recent move Orbán obtained unlimited power to rule by decree allegedly in order to deal with the COVID-19 emergency. In its 2020 report, Freedom House classified Hungary as a “hybrid regime” and as the first nondemocratic EU country, recording the most dramatic decline of any country assessed.

In an infamous speech on July 26, 2014, Mr. Orbán declared that Hungary is turning its back on liberal democracy and wants to model itself on autocratic Eastern states such as China, Turkey, and Russia, because liberal values today incorporate corruption, sex, and violence (Orbán, 2014). As Timothy Garton Ash concluded in the Guardian, Mr. Orbán “has demolished liberal democracy in his country over the last decade... he has used EU taxpayers’ money to consolidate his illiberal regime... The state administration favours Orbán cronies and family members with government contracts, punishes independent media owners and NGO or opposition supporters with arbitrary tax investigations, uses state resources for Fidesz election propaganda... Fidesz has effectively demolished the independence of the judiciary, as documented in an extensive report by Judith Sargentini for the European Parliament. Reports by Transparency International and the European commission have found that in about 50% of public procurement procedures there was only one tender, and the procedures are corrupt” (Garton Ash, 2019). Orbán's childhood friend, until 2010 a gas fitter with no business experience, is now the second richest man in Hungary, and his son-in-law was found by Olaf, the EU's anti-corruption agency to be engaged in organized crime in stealing EU funds (Magyar, 2016).

Yet, Hungarian voters returned this government to power three times. The unrelenting government propaganda appealing to collective narcissistic beliefs played a crucial role in legitimizing this process (Albright, 2018; see also Figure 1). We hypothesize that the
carefully fueled sense of nationalism, grievance, and collective narcissism provided a crucial component of Orbán’s electoral success.

1.3 | The historical roots of collective narcissism

Unlike in some Western countries where collective narcissism may be the product of perceived attacks on a group’s image by authoritarian leftist policies, political correctness, and identity politics (Myers, 2019), in Hungary it is historical traumas that provide the most fertile source of collective narcissism. For the last five hundred years, foreign occupation, unsuccessful revolutions, and military defeats characterize Hungarian history, producing a romantic vision of nationalism (Bibó, 1991; László & Fülöp, 2010; Lendvai, 2004). The guiding hallmarks of the Enlightenment, such as humanism, individualism, liberalism, and the growth of an autonomous and independent bourgeoisie largely bypassed Hungary (Bibó, 1986; Lendvai, 2012). This traumatic history produced narratives that indicate a deep sense of grievance and a collective narcissistic sense of national identity, as confirmed by numerous surveys (Forgas et al., 2014; Inotai, 2007; Kelemen, 2010; Lendvai, 2004).

Hungarians live in a mental world that is characterized by pessimism, grievance, and a close-minded cognitive style (Keller, 2010), supported by a poorly elaborated understanding of the causal forces that shaped their nation’s history (László, 2014). These feelings are also reflected in the Hungarian national anthem focusing on suffering, victimhood, despair, complaint, and injustice, in contrast with the upbeat and optimistic national anthems of neighboring countries (Csepeli, 2018). Hungarians also score low on just world beliefs (Dolinski, 1996; Sallay & Krotos, 2004), and report lower perceived justice and trust (Kelemen, 2010). While many Western countries over-justify their political systems (Jost, 2019; Jost & Banaji, 1994), Hungarians showed the opposite trend, system derogation (Kelemen et al., 2014; Szilágyi & Kelemen, 2019). Despite this all-encompassing pessimism, there persists a grandiose and narcissistic self-image (Forgas et al., 2014), also identified by Bibó (1991), László (2014), and Lendvai (2004). In one recent survey, 67% of upper-middle class Hungarians were satisfied with the autocratic regime, and many also evaluated positively the earlier dictatorial communist regime (Szilágyi & Kelemen, 2019). This marked inconsistency between the generally negative and pessimistic political attitudes expressed, on the one hand, and the unreasonably positive evaluation of the nation, on the other hand, illustrates a pattern that is indicative of the presence of collective narcissistic attitudes. Indications of collective narcissism appear not only in surveys, but can also be empirically documented in the kind of linguistic narratives Hungarians use to describe themselves and their history, as we shall see next.

1.4 | Collective narcissism in national narratives

In an important empirical project László (2014; László & Ehmann, 2014) and his colleagues pioneered the use of quantitative text analysis of schoolbooks, literary works, and everyday conversations to explore the mental world of Hungarians. Several studies found an overwhelming tendency for Hungarians to describe themselves as passive, and outgroups as agentic and dominant in producing historical events, indicating a prevalent victim mentality and the inadequate cognitive elaboration of historical traumas (László, 2014; László et al., 2010). The emotional reactions expressed in verbal narratives show that sadness and hope were the two emotions that most distinguished Hungarians from other nations (László & Fülöp, 2010). These results reflect a “vulnerable Hungarian national identity and a long-term adoption of the collective victim role... The emotional and cognitive organization of the Hungarian national identity as it is expressed in historical narratives shows a deep attachment to the glorious past and a relatively low level of cognitive and emotional elaboration of the twentieth century and earlier traumas... suggesting that this historical trajectory is not the most favorable ground to build an emotionally stable identity” (László & Ehmann, 2014, pp. 216–217).

Despite the perceived lack of agency and negative emotionality, average self-evaluations of Hungarians were paradoxically and consistently most positive, again consistent with a narcissistic mindset. The inflated evaluations of their nation absolved Hungary of blame for aversive events they were responsible for (such as the deportation of Hungarian Jews during WWII, lost wars, etc.). Based on his extensive research, László (2014) concludes that “The emotional and cognitive organisation of Hungarian national identity is profoundly tied to... a distant glorious past and a subsequent series of defeats and losses... the characteristic emotions of the Hungarian national identity are fear, sadness, disappointment, enthusiasm and hope... Hungarians’ sense of agency is very low” (p. 95). Hungarians’ emotional landscape also “includes inflated self-evaluations accompanied by the degradation of outgroups” (p. 96), a pattern consistent with collective narcissism.

1.5 | Collective narcissistic propaganda

Autocratic regimes regularly use propaganda to appeal to a sense of grievance and collective narcissism, and this is also the case in Hungary (Albright, 2018). Narratives emphasizing collective victimhood, nostalgia, and narcissism may function as protective psychological devices, maintaining positive group identity by emphasizing moral superiority and victimhood (László, 2014). Well-documented recent Hungarian state propaganda campaigns extoll citizens to “send a message to Brussels,” “demand more respect for Hungarians,” and “don’t allow Juncker and Soros have the last laugh” (see Figure 1; see also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AJTSP6kg8Hs). More recent Hungarian state propaganda claims that Hungary (actually one of the more secular countries in the region) is now a bastion defending Christian values against the twin onslaughts of Muslim migration, and godless western liberalism as exemplified by the EU (Hungarian Government Information, 2019; Tharoor, 2018).
A complementary propaganda strategy is the promotion of fake stories about unrecognized Hungarian greatness, with "historians" suggesting that Hungarian civilization preceded the Egyptians, Hungarians invented writing, and much else besides. For example, many Hungarian localities now proudly display locality names in runic writing (claimed to be a Hungarian invention) that the majority of people cannot actually read (Figure 1).

1.6 | The present studies

As this introduction indicates, there is reason to assume that collective narcissism indeed plays an important role in Hungary’s recent turn toward autocracy. Although both survey research and narrative analyses suggest a collective narcissistic mindset, no previous study showed a direct empirical relationship between collective narcissism and voting behavior in Hungary. The studies reported here are the first to establish such a link.

Study 1 was conducted in 2017, during a time when governmental anti-EU messages were highly prevalent across television commercials and infamous billboards distributed across the country. We examined whether collective narcissism predicts conservatism, voting for the populist Fidesz party, and negative attitudes toward the EU. We also assessed positivity toward the national in-group and controlled for it during the analyses. Finally, we assessed attitudes toward a neutral out-group, the United Kingdom, as a control condition. Study 2 was conducted in March of 2018, just prior to the national elections of April 8, 2018. During this campaign, the Fidesz party used xenophobic anti-migration propaganda across all platforms of the media. We thus also included a measure asking participants to indicate their subjective relative deprivation in relation to immigrants living in Hungary and controlled for it across the analyses. We also assessed political conservatism, voting for Fidesz in 2014, and plans to vote for Fidesz in 2018 to replicate the analyses conducted in Study 1.

We hypothesized that collective narcissism predicts populist attitudes (i.e., in Hungary, negative attitudes toward the EU), political conservatism, voting for Fidesz in 2014, and the intention to vote for Fidesz in 2018. Further, we sought to assess the relationship between collective narcissism, conservatism, and populism, following some prior evidence that collective narcissism and conservatism may independently predict populist attitudes such as support for Trump (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018).

Ethical approval was granted by the Ethics Committee of Goldsmiths, University of London.

2 | STUDY 1

2.1 | Method

2.1.1 | Participants

A total of 287 participants who identified as Hungarian nationals completed the online survey. We excluded three participants who were not Hungarian citizens. The final sample consisted of 284 participants, 200 females and 84 males. Their age range was between 18 and 72 ($M = 33.12$, $SD = 12.39$). Participants were recruited through the social media platforms of Mindset Pszichológia, a Hungarian psychology center. Participants were told that the aim of the survey is to find out more about collective narcissism, but were not aware of any specific predictions. Data collection ceased on a predetermined date.

In order to determine the necessary sample size required for Studies 1 and 2, we searched the literature for correlation coefficients reported between collective narcissism and the support of populistic political parties and voting decisions: with support for Brexit in the United Kingdom: $r_g = .50$, $r_f = .37$ (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017, Studies 1 and 2) and $r_f = .47$ (Marchlewksa et al., 2017, Study 2); support for Donald Trump in the USA: $r_f = .28$ (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018) and $r_f = .29$ (Marchlewksa et al., 2017, Study 3); and support for the ultraconservative Law and Justice party, $r_f = .24$, and their leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, $r_f = .18$ (Marchlewksa et al., 2017, Study 1) in Poland. Out of these values, we used the most conservative correlation coefficient of $r_f = .18$ to conduct an a priori sample size calculation using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007, 2009). The analysis suggested a necessary sample size of 202 participants to achieve the power of .80.

2.1.2 | Measures and procedure

We created the survey using Qualtrics software. After agreeing to an informed consent form, participants responded to basic demographic questions. They next indicated their responses on the following scales, presented in the following order.

Collective narcissism was assessed using the 5-item Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, e.g., “I will not be satisfied until the Hungarian nation obtains respect it deserves”; $α = .82$, $M = 2.24; SD = .99$). Participants indicated their responses on a scale of 1 = completely disagree to 6 = completely agree.

Attitudes toward the national in-group (in-group positivity) and the EU were measured with a slider task. In this task, participants were presented with five sliders in a randomized order, labeled with HU to represent Hungary, the national in-group ($M = 69.12$, $SD = 23.84$), EU, to represent the European Union ($M = 71.40$, $SD = 22.09$), UK, to represent a control national out-group (United Kingdom; $M = 66.01$, $SD = 20.49$), AA, as a letter pair that has a meaning (Alcoholics Anonymous; $M = 55.45$, $SD = 20.42$), but is unrelated to nations, and BV, as a letter pair that does not convey any meaning ($M = 45.85$, $SD = 21.30$). The meaning of the letter pairs was not explicitly stated. Participants were instructed to look at each of these stimuli and place the slider anywhere between 0 (negative emotions) and 100 (positive emotions) indicating the emotions they feel when seeing them.

Analyses related to the control UK letter pair are analyzed in the Supplementary Materials. These analyses revealed that in-group positivity predicted positive, while conservatism predicted negative...
attitudes toward the United Kingdom. Collective narcissism was not a significant predictor of U.K. attitudes. The final two letter pairs (AA and BV) were included as filler items and are not analyzed here.

Support for Fidesz was assessed in two questions. Participants were asked to indicate whether they voted for Viktor Orbán in the 2014 elections. The response options were yes (n = 47, dummy coded 1); no (n = 147, dummy coded 0); I did not vote (n = 69); I prefer not to answer (n = 21). The next question asked participants to indicate whether they plan to vote for Viktor Orbán during the 2018 elections. The response options were yes (n = 28, dummy coded 1); no (n = 212, dummy coded 0); I prefer not to answer (n = 44).

Only participants indicating a clear voting preference were included in the analyses assessing Fidesz support and the point-biserial correlations, excluding those who did not to respond or did not vote. Not responding or not voting may be due to multiple factors, making this response category difficult to interpret in any analysis (see Berinsky, 2004).

Political conservatism was assessed on a scale of 1 = liberal to 6 = conservative (M = 2.81, SD = 1.24).

The procedure was concluded with a brief debriefing task.

2.2 | Results

The data set and corresponding syntax are available via OSF (https://osf.io/867jx/).

2.2.1 | Correlations

Correlations between collective narcissism, political conservatism, in-group positivity, and attitudes toward the EU are presented in Table 1. As expected, collective narcissism was related to political conservatism, in-group positivity, and negative attitudes toward the EU. Political conservatism was further related to in-group positivity and negative attitudes toward the EU. In-group positivity and positive EU attitudes were also positively related to each other.

We next examined the point-biserial correlations between collective narcissism and Fidesz support, including only respondents who indicated a voting preference. The results showed the predicted significant positive correlation between collective narcissism and voting for Orbán in the previous, 2014 election, \( r_{pb} = .21, p = .004, \) as well as intending to vote for Orbán in the forthcoming, 2018 election \( r_{pb} = .32, p < .001. \)

2.2.2 | Regression analyses

We ran two multiple linear regression analyses to explore whether collective narcissism predicts political conservatism and attitudes toward the EU, while controlling for in-group positivity, age, and gender. We controlled for age and gender due to previous research indicating a relationship between these variables and conservative and populist political ideologies (e.g., Cornelis et al., 2009; Harteveld et al., 2015). Omitting these covariates resulted in the same pattern of results (see Supplementary Materials).

The first regression predicted conservatism, with collective narcissism, in-group positivity, age, and gender as predictors. The results indicate that collective narcissism and ingroup positivity independently predicted conservatism (Table 2). Age and gender further predicted conservatism independent of collective narcissism and ingroup positivity, with results indicating that older participants and males were more likely to hold conservative beliefs, in line with previous findings (e.g., Cornelis et al., 2009; Harteveld et al., 2015).

In the second regression analysis, attitudes toward the EU were predicted by collective narcissism, ingroup positivity, age, and gender. Collective narcissism significantly predicted more negative EU attitudes, and ingroup positivity was related to positive EU attitudes. In Step 2, when conservatism was added it also became an independent predictor of negative EU attitudes, while the previous patterns remained unchanged (Table 2).

We next looked at participants who indicated their voting behavior in the 2014 elections. We ran a two-step binomial logistic regression with voting as the outcome variable. In Step 1, predictors were collective narcissism, ingroup positivity, age, and gender. Deleting age and gender as covariates yielded the same pattern of results (see Supplementary Materials). Collective narcissism and ingroup positivity both independently predicted Fidesz support in the 2014 elections (Table 3). In Step 2, conservatism was added and it became the only significant predictor of Fidesz support.

In a second two-step binomial logistic regression Fidesz support in the 2018 election was the outcome variable. In Step 1, collective narcissism, ingroup positivity, age, and gender were the predictors. Deleting age and gender as covariates yielded the same pattern of results (see Supplementary Materials). Only collective narcissism was a significant predictor of Fidesz support (Table 3). In Step 2, we also included conservatism. Both collective narcissism and conservatism predicted Fidesz support independently.

2.2.3 | Post hoc mediation analyses

We conducted exploratory post hoc analyses to examine whether the relationship between collective narcissism and support for the Fidesz
### TABLE 2  Results of the multiple linear regression analyses conducted in Study 1 (N = 284)

| Outcome        | Predictor          | Step 1 |       |       | Step 2 |       |       |
|----------------|--------------------|--------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
|                |                    |        | B     | SE B  | β     | 95% CI| B     | SE B  | β     | 95% CI |
| Conservatism   | Constant           | 1.45***| .36   | –     | [.73, 2.16] | – | – | – | – |
|                | Collective narcissism| .22**  | .08   | .18   | [.07,.37] | – | – | – | – |
|                | Ingroup positivity | .01*** | .003  | .20   | [0.004,.02] | – | – | – | – |
|                | Age                | .01*   | .003  | .12   | [.001,.02] | – | – | – | – |
|                | Gender             | -.32*  | .16   | -.12  | [-.63, -.01] | – | – | – | – |
|                | R²                 | .11    |       |       |        |       |       |
| Attitudes EU   | Constant           | 68.78***| 6.56  | –     | [55.87, 81.68] | 81.96 | 6.08***| – | [69.99, 93.93] |
|                | Collective narcissism| -6.37***| 1.32  | -.29  | [-8.98, -3.77] | -4.60 | 1.21***| -2.1 | [-6.97, -2.23] |
|                | Ingroup positivity | .20*** | .05   | .21   | [0.09, 0.31] | .27 | .05***| .29 | [.18, .37] |
|                | Age                | .07    | .11   | .04   | [-.13, .28] | .14 | .10 | .08 | [−.05,.33] |
|                | Gender             | 1.37   | 2.76  | .03   | [-4.07, 6.81] | -1.52 | 2.50 | -.03 | [-6.44, 3.40] |
|                | Conservatism       | -       | -     | -     | - | -.797 | .96***| -45 | [-9.87, -6.07] |
|                | R²                 | .11    |       |       |        | R² =.29, ΔR² =.18***| | | | |

**Note:** Gender was coded 0 for males, 1 for females.

**Abbreviation:** EU, European Union.

***p ≤ .001; **p ≤ .01; *p < .05.
party may occur indirectly, via conservatism. Research suggests that collective narcissistic beliefs may increase under certain circumstances, such as following information regarding the ingroup’s prolonged relative deprivation (Marchlewska et al., 2017). Similarly, contextual factors may lead to an increase in conservative attitudes (e.g., a global financial crisis; Milojev et al., 2015), whereas the support for populist values shows a growing global trend in recent years (Bornschier, 2017). These analyses explored whether it may then be plausible to anticipate that an increase in collective narcissistic beliefs leads to an increase in conservative attitudes, and that way indirectly to populist support. The analyses (presented in Supplementary Materials) revealed a significant indirect effect both with regards to past voting behavior and future voting intentions. These results may provide an explanation for why the effects of collective narcissism on past voting behavior faded out after accounting for conservatism in the model.

### 2.3 | Discussion

As predicted, collective narcissism was a significant predictor of conservatism, consistent with prior findings documenting such a link (e.g., Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). Collective narcissism also significantly predicted negative attitudes toward the EU. This reflects the incessant anti-EU rhetoric propaganda promoted by the populist Fidesz party in Hungary. At the time of data collection, giant billboards plastered throughout Hungary featured messages such as “Brussels must be stopped” or “Let’s send a message to Brussels.” Such messages promote hypersensitivity to out-group’ threat, a key feature of collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019; Golec de Zavala & Lantos, 2020). Conservatism also emerged as a significant independent predictor of negative EU attitudes.

As predicted, collective narcissism significantly predicted support of the Fidesz party in 2014 and 2018, as also found elsewhere (e.g., Donald Trump in the USA; Jaroslaw Kaczynski in Poland; Marchlewska et al., 2017). However, when we added conservatism, the effects of collective narcissism disappeared in one analysis, but remained significant in the second, indicating the need for further exploration of this relationship in Study 2. It appears that when conservatism is also measured, the effects of collective narcissism on political populism are markedly reduced. Post hoc analyses suggest that collective narcissism may indirectly affect populist support, via an increase in conservatism. Experimental or longitudinal testing of this prediction is necessary to confirm the results, yet, our analyses provide preliminary indications of the effect. We aimed to replicate these findings in Study 2.

### Table 3: Results of the binomial logistic regression analyses conducted in Study 1

| Outcome                  | Predictor         | Step 1                  | Step 2                  |
|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                          |                   | B          | SE B       | OR          | B          | SE B       | OR          |
|                          |                   | 95% CI for OR |           | 95% CI for OR |           |
| Voting in 2014 (N = 194) | Constant          | −3.82*** | .94        | .02**       | −5.87*** | 1.16       | .003**      |
|                          | Collective narcissism | .41*      | .17        | 1.51[1.08, 2.12] | .33       | .20        | 1.39[.94, 2.04] |
|                          | Ingroup positivity | .02*      | .01        | 1.02[1.00, 1.04] | .01       | .01        | 1.01[.99, 1.03] |
|                          | Age               | .01       | .25        | 1.01[.98, 1.03] | −.002     | .02        | 1.00[.97, 1.03] |
|                          | Gender            | .24       | .36        | 1.27[.58, 2.78] | .76       | .46        | 2.13[.87, 5.26] |
|                          | Conservatism      | −         | −          | −           | .90***    | .18        | 2.45[1.73, 3.46] |
|                          |                   | R² = .07 (Cox & Snell), .11 (Nagelkerke) | R² = .22 (Cox & Snell), .33 (Nagelkerke) |
| Voting in 2018 (N = 240) | Constant          | −6.17*** | 1.22       | .002**      | −8.99*** | 1.60       | <.001**     |
|                          | CN                | .87***    | .21        | 2.38[1.57, 3.61] | .97***    | .25        | 2.64[1.62, 4.28] |
|                          | Ingroup positivity | .02       | .01        | 1.02[.995, 1.04] | .01       | .01        | 1.01[.99, 1.03] |
|                          | Age               | .02       | .02        | 1.02[.99, 1.06] | .02       | .02        | 1.02[.98, 1.05] |
|                          | Gender            | .01       | .46        | 1.01[.41, 2.51] | .27       | .50        | 1.31[.50, 3.48] |
|                          | Conservatism      | −         | −          | −           | .96***    | .21        | 2.61[1.73, 3.93] |
|                          |                   | R² = .11 (Cox & Snell), .20 (Nagelkerke) | R² = .20 (Cox & Snell), .38 (Nagelkerke) |
|                          |                   | Model χ²(4) = 26.48*** | Model χ²(5) = 52.29*** |

Note: Gender was coded 0 for males, 1 for females. Abbreviation: OR, odds ratio.

***p < .001; **p < .01.
3 | STUDY 2

3.1 | Method

3.1.1 | Participants

A total of 271 participants completed the online survey. Six participants who were not solely Hungarian citizens or were underage were excluded resulting in a final sample of 265 participants, 204 females and 61 males. Their age range was between 18 and 92 (M = 29.69, SD = 12.33). Participants were again recruited through the social media platforms of Mindset Pszichológia, a Hungarian psychology center. Participants were told that the aim of the survey is to find out more about collective narcissism, but were not aware of any specific predictions. In return for their time, participants were entered in a prize draw for tickets to psychology-related events organized by Mindset Pszichológia. Data collection ceased on a predetermined date.

3.1.2 | Measures and procedure

We created the survey using Qualtrics software. After agreeing to an informed consent form, participants responded to basic demographic questions. They next indicated their responses on the following scales, presented in the following order.

Collective narcissism was assessed as in Study 1 (α = .73, M = 2.64; SD = .93).

Relative deprivation was assessed with the item “Over the past five years the economic situation of those similar to me in Hungary has been ___ than that of immigrants living Hungary,” where participants had to fill in the blank with options ranging from 1 = much better to 5 = much worse (M = 2.17, SD = .90).

Support for populism was assessed across two questions. Participants were asked to indicate whether they voted for the Fidesz party in 2014 on response options yes (n = 40, dummy coded 1); no (n = 115, dummy coded 0); I did not vote (n = 82); I prefer not to answer (n = 28). Participants were then asked to indicate whether they plan to vote for the Fidesz party during the 2018 elections using the response options yes (n = 31, dummy coded 1); no (n = 176, dummy coded 0); I prefer not to answer (n = 58). As in Study 1, we excluded participants who reported either not voting or not wanting to respond (Berinsky, 2004).

Political conservatism was assessed on a scale of 1 = liberal to 6 = conservative (M = 2.77, SD = 1.15). Finally, participants received a short debriefing.

3.2 | Results

3.2.1 | Correlations

We again observed positive significant correlations between collective narcissism and conservatism, and between conservatism and self-reported relative deprivation. There was a marginally significant positive relationship between collective narcissism and self-reported relative deprivation (Table 4).

We next examined the point-biserial correlations between collective narcissism and Fidesz support, including only respondents who indicated a voting preference. The results indicate a significant positive correlation between collective narcissism and voting for Fidesz in 2014, \( r_{pb} = .18, p = .03 \). We also found a significant positive correlation between collective narcissism and the intention to vote for Fidesz in 2018, \( r_{pb} = .20, p = .004 \).

3.2.2 | Regression analyses

We ran three sets of regression analyses evaluating the predictors of conservatism, Fidesz support in 2014, and in 2018. Based on some prior evidence we controlled for age and gender in these analyses, (e.g., Cornelis et al., 2009; Harteveld et al., 2015). The results were not affected by removing these covariates (see the Supplementary Materials). We additionally controlled for perceived relative deprivation across the analyses (Marchlewksa et al., 2017).

In a linear regression analysis, collective narcissism and relative deprivation independently predicted conservatism (Table 5).

Next, two binomial logistic regression analyses predicting Fidesz support in 2014 and in 2018 were performed, including only respondents who declared a clear voting preference.

Fidesz support in 2014, in Step 1, was predicted only by collective narcissism, with age, gender, and relative deprivation having no significant effect (Table 6). In Step 2, we added conservatism as an additional predictor, and it became the only significant predictor of Fidesz support.

Fidesz support in 2018, in Step 1, was again significantly predicted by collective narcissism, but not by age, gender, or relative deprivation (Table 6). In Step 2, when conservatism was added, it became the only significant predictor of Fidesz support.

3.2.3 | Post hoc mediation analyses

As in Study 1, we conducted exploratory post hoc analyses investigating whether collective narcissism may indirectly lead to populist
support via increased conservatism. Two mediation models, looking at past voting behavior and future voting intentions as the outcomes, support this prediction. The analyses are presented in the Supplementary Materials.

**3.3 | Discussion**

Study 2 found support for the hypotheses that collective narcissism predicts conservatism and Fidesz support in the 2014 and 2018 national elections. These effects were not influenced by age, gender, or relative deprivation. Study 2 was conducted shortly before the 2018 national elections, when the Fidesz propaganda highlighted the threat posed by immigrants. While perceived relative deprivation emerged as an independent predictor of conservatism, it did not significantly predict support for the populist Fidesz party.

We observed a similar effect on populist voting preferences to those reported in Study 1 when investigating the predictors of past voting behavior; once conservatism was added to the model, collective narcissism no longer predicted Fidesz support (past voting behavior or future voting intention) significantly. Post hoc analyses further suggest that the effect of collective narcissism on the support for populist government is mediated by conservatism. In other words, as in previous analysis, conservatism again emerged as a key determinant on whether collective narcissism does or does not predict populist support. However, it should be noted that the

### Table 5 Results of the multiple linear regression analysis conducted in Study 2 (N = 265)

| Outcome       | Predictor     | B     | SE B | β   | 95% CI          |
|---------------|---------------|-------|------|-----|-----------------|
| Conservatism  | Constant      | 1.44*** | .33  | –   | [0.78, 2.10]    |
|               | Collective narcissism | .37*** | .07  | .30 | [0.23, 0.51]    |
|               | Relative deprivation | .21**  | .01  | .16 | [0.06, 0.35]    |
|               | Age           | .003   | .01  | .03 | [−.01, 0.01]    |
|               | Gender        | −.22   | .16  | −.08 | [−.53, 0.09]    |
|               | R²            | .14    |      |     |                 |

Note: Gender was coded 0 for males, 1 for females. ***p < .001; **p < .01.

| Step 1 | Step 2 |
|--------|--------|
| B      | SE B   | OR    | 95% CI for OR | B     | SE B | OR    | 95% CI for OR |
| Voting in 2014 (N = 155) | | | | | | | |
| Constant | −2.88** | 1.00 | .06 | – | −4.08*** | 1.16 | .02 | – |
| Collective narcissism | .46*     | .30  | 1.59 | [1.07, 2.35] | .18  | .22  | 1.20 | [0.77, 1.86] |
| Relative deprivation | .29     | .22  | 1.33 | [0.87, 2.03] | .13  | .23  | 1.14 | [0.73, 1.79] |
| Age | −.02 | .02  | .99 | [0.96, 1.02] | −.02 | .02  | .98 | [0.95, 1.01] |
| Gender | .52 | .49  | 1.68 | [0.65, 4.35] | .82  | .53  | 2.26 | [0.80, 6.40] |
| Conservatism | −     | −    | −   | −   | .81*** | .20  | 2.25 | [1.51, 3.33] |
| | R² = .06 (Cox & Snell), .09 (Nagelkerke) | R² = .17 (Cox & Snell), .25 (Nagelkerke) |
| Model | χ²(4) = 9.70* | Model | χ²(5) = 28.49*** |

Voting in 2018 (N = 207)

| Constant | −3.86*** | 1.08 | .02 | – | −6.10*** | 1.38 | .002 | – |
| Collective narcissism | .58** | .21  | 1.79 | [1.20, 2.68] | .22  | .24  | 1.25 | [0.77, 2.00] |
| Relative deprivation | −.02 | .22  | .98 | [0.63, 1.52] | −.22 | .26  | .80 | [0.48, 1.34] |
| Age | −.001 | .02  | 1.00 | [0.97, 1.03] | −.003 | .02  | 1.00 | [0.96, 1.04] |
| Gender | .71 | .55  | 2.03 | [0.69, 5.91] | 1.21* | .63  | 3.34 | [0.97, 11.53] |
| Conservatism | −     | −    | −   | −   | 1.07*** | .21  | 2.92 | [1.93, 4.44] |
| | R² = .05 (Cox & Snell), .08 (Nagelkerke) | R² = .19 (Cox & Snell), .32 (Nagelkerke) |
| Model | χ²(4) = 9.95* | Model | χ²(5) = 42.31*** |

Note: Gender was coded 0 for males, 1 for females. Abbreviation: OR, odds ratio. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p = .06.
mediation analyses presented here were exploratory and the data correlational.

These analyses were successful in replicating the findings observed in Study 1. This is the first time that the complex relationship between collective narcissism, conservatism, and support for populist parties was empirically explored. The replication of these results across two independent samples is a crucial indicator of the reliability of the observed effects.

4 | GENERAL DISCUSSION

These two studies provide convergent evidence supporting our hypothesis that collective narcissism plays an important, but not independent role in explaining support for the current populist autocratic regime in Hungary. In addition to predicting voting intentions for Orbán’s illiberal regime, collective narcissism was also closely related to conservatism and negative attitudes toward supranational entities such as the EU. These findings are also broadly consistent with studies assessing the relationship between collective narcissism and support for populism in other countries such as the USA (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018), the United Kingdom (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017), and Poland (Marchlewksa et al., 2017).

We also found that conservatism influenced the effects of collective narcissism on predicting populist support in several of our analyses. Once added as a covariate to three out of the four models investigating the variables predicting support of the populist government, the independent effects of collective narcissism faded out. It may be the case that conservatism is simply a stronger predictor of political behavior, as it reflects an explicitly political attitude. Collective narcissism has been shown to significantly predict political behavior (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala et al., 2019), yet, it may reflect more strongly on beliefs about the ingroup than explicitly political attitudes. Its effects in predicting voting behavior may fade out once conservatism is accounted for due to the positive correlation between these variables.

In an exploratory manner, we tested a post hoc prediction to provide an alternative explanation to these findings. We found that the effects of collective narcissism on predicting populist support may occur indirectly, via increased conservatism. Only one prior study looked at both collective narcissism and conservatism as predictors of populist support for Trump, finding both to be independent predictors (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018). We observed that conservatism mediated the effects of collective narcissism on Fidesz support in four independent analyses. Collective narcissistic beliefs, conservative attitudes, and populist support are all subject to change under various circumstances (Bornscher, 2017; Marchlewksa et al., 2017; Milojev et al., 2015). We thus propose that as collective narcissism increases (e.g., following prolonged exposures to government propaganda targeting collective narcissistic hypersensitivity), political ideologies may become more extreme as well (either more conservative or liberal depending on the ingroup and political environment in question). Such more extreme political attitudes may in turn indirectly account for the increase in (right- or left-wing) populist support. Our results support this theorizing. Yet, it should be noted that the analyses presented here are preliminary and the data is correlational. To gain a confirmation of these results, they should be replicated using experimental or longitudinal research designs.

4.1 | Theoretical and practical significance

The recent rise of populist, illiberal movements represents a challenge to widely shared beliefs about the superiority of Western liberal democracy (Albright, 2018; Pinker, 2018). In seeking an explanation for this puzzling phenomenon, we must try to understand the mental representations of voters who are attracted to populist, nationalist ideologies. Both the study of history (Hobsbawm, 1992), and the psychological experiments pioneered by Tajfel on intergroup discrimination suggest that the need for positive group identity is a major motivating force in human affairs (Tajfel & Forgas, 2000). Our studies show that challenged group identity often leads to feelings of collective narcissism, which, when embedded in a conservative ideology, provide an important component of the support for populist regimes. Countries such as Hungary suffered from a traumatic past that provides few reasons for citizens to derive genuine positive identity and distinctiveness from their flawed history. Centuries of oppression produced a pessimistic victim mentality, and the ideology and mental habits of robust individualism have not had a chance to establish themselves.

These two studies were the first to empirically demonstrate the effects of collective narcissism on the support for populist politics in Hungary, a country that progressed further along the road toward autocracy and illiberalism than any other country within the EU, and what is sometimes described as a “mafia state” (Garton Ash, 2019; The Economist, 2019; Magyar, 2016). Unlike populist movements elsewhere, Hungary’s Fidesz regime has now succeeded in winning three consecutive elections, so understanding the mindset of voters who consciously endorse autocracy is of considerable importance.

The empirical data we report are perhaps best interpreted as consistent with the analysis of Hungary’s traumatic history, as well as survey research of political attitudes and political narratives we discuss in the introduction. A deeply challenged and traumatic history, pessimistic attitudes, and negative narratives all confirm a streak of collective narcissism in the way many Hungarians see themselves and their place in the world. Victim mentality, lack of agency, negative emotions combined with unrealistically positive self-evaluation and a fundamentally conservative outlook amount to a propensity to endorse a collective narcissistic mindset that eventually produces voting preferences for an illiberal regime (Bibó, 1991; Kelemen, 2010; László, 2014; Lendvai, 2012).

The role of manipulative government propaganda in exploiting collective narcissism cannot be overestimated. The cultivation of a collective sense of national grievance and victimhood paired with a collective narcissistic overevaluation of the ingroup has been a recurring
propaganda strategy used by populist leaders such as Mussolini, Hitler, Putin, Erdogan, and Orbán to generate political legitimacy (Albright, 2018). Conservative propaganda themes such as claims that Hungary is fighting a life-and-death struggle for recognition, defending Christianity, and resisting colonization by the EU and international conspirators may seem farfetched, but they do serve to potentiate the deep sense of collective narcissism experienced by significant portions of the Hungarian electorate (Kelemen, 2010; László, 2014). Our first study was conducted in 2017, when Fidesz propaganda distributed across the country openly attacked the EU, with messages such as “Let’s send a message to Brussels: Hungarians deserve more respect!” (see also Figure 1). Study 2 was carried out at a time when blatantly xenophobic propaganda was employed across all media against immigrants. In this climate, it is not surprising that collective narcissism was related to perceptions of self-reported relative deprivation.

It should be noted that the processes we described throughout this manuscript are not all unique to Hungary. In particular, the link between national collective narcissism and receptivity to populist ideology are observable in a number of other countries as well (e.g., Poland, United Kingdom, and USA; Marchlewksa et al., 2017). The historical traumas we reflect on throughout this manuscript are just one of several possible sources of collective narcissism, which may not apply universally to other countries. Nevertheless, the consequences of collective narcissism seem universal, and thus, the present findings may be indicative of collective narcissistic behavior in different national contexts as well.

4.2 | Limitations

The present studies, although yielding impressively convergent results, also suffer from some limitations. The samples are unlikely to be representative of all Hungarian voters. There are considerable differences in the proportion of the samples who indicated supporting Fidesz and those who did not, which also lowers the statistical power of our analyses. Fidesz won the Hungarian national elections shortly before (2014) and after (2018) our data collection with the majority votes, and this is not reflected in our data. However, as our respondents were recruited from the privileged group of active web users, we might assume that less well-educated voters might actually show an even stronger link between collective narcissism and political behavior, a prediction worthy of further examination (Pinkier, 2018). It would be desirable to replicate our results in a nationally representative sample.

Examining participants who decided not to respond to questions about party preferences and those who decided not to vote may yield further interesting insights. Pooling such participants into a single category would result in a heterogeneous and confounded sample likely to lead to uninterpretable conclusions (Berinsky, 2004). Future studies might probe more deeply the reasons why respondents fail to reveal their party preferences. One possible reason worthy of analysis is the deeply polarized and intolerant political atmosphere in countries like Hungary. Collecting further data about demographics factors, such as income or education, and personality would also help to more firmly establish our findings.

5 | CONCLUSION

This paper reports the first empirical evidence indicating that collective narcissism is a significant, albeit perhaps indirect predictor of populist attitudes in Hungary, the most illiberal country within the EU. We found that conservatism influences the effects of collective narcissism, an important finding in understanding how mental representations shape political attitudes. As Plato noted more than 2000 years ago, one of the greatest dangers for democracy is that ordinary people are all too easily swayed by the emotional and deceptive rhetoric of ambitious politicians. Evolutionary psychological research on the fundamental characteristics of human cognition now confirms that humans are indeed highly predisposed to embrace fictitious symbolic belief systems as a means of enhancing group cohesion and coordination (Harari, 2014; von Hippel, 2018). We believe that collective narcissism is a promising construct in our quest to fully understand the psychological variables responsible for the recent historical rise of populist and illiberal political movements worldwide. We hope that this paper will help to stimulate further interest in this fascinating and as yet incompletely understood phenomenon.

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The authors disclose no conflict of interest.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data sets and corresponding syntaxes are available via OSF (https://osf.io/867jx/).

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