CHAPTER 3

Migration to Finland and the Nordic Nations

This chapter provides a brief review of historical migration to Finland, discusses the legal aspects of migrating to Finland and the rights of immigrants and refugees, current trends in migration to and from Finland, and analyses how other Nordic nations (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden specifically) have responded to the refugee crisis.

HISTORICAL MIGRATION TO FINLAND

Prior to independence from Russia in 1917, Finland was largely influenced economically and politically by Stockholm (Sweden) and St Petersburg (Russia). Both Sweden and Russia had ruled over the Finns, first Sweden before 1800, and then Russia up until the Communist Revolution in 1917. Prior to 1917, population movement was mainly in the form of emigration to Russia and the Americas. Emigration to Russia offered labour opportunities for highly educated Finns and attracted priests to serve a growing Lutheran church, particularly during a prolonged famine in the 1860s (Engman, 1978).

The balance of migration in Finland shifted from emigration to immigration in the 1980s (Heikkilä & Peltonen, 2002). The largest waves of emigration from Finland took place at the turn of the twentieth century when roughly 350,000 Finns left for the US and in the 1950s, when roughly 500,000 emigrated to Sweden (Martikainen, 2013). Immigration
to Finland was much more noticeable starting in the 1980s when the historically small population of foreign-born citizens double by the end of the decade (Heikkilä & Peltonen, 2002).

Immigrant groups to Finland predominantly fall into three categories. The first category includes professionals and their families from Western societies (what Martikainen defines as: Europeans, excluding the former Soviet Union and Turkey); those from the Americas (excluding Cuba), Oceania, Israel, Japan, and South Africa (Martikainen, 2013, p. 4), make up 27% of all foreign-born residents according to Martikainen (2013). The second category includes individuals from Eastern Bloc countries and the former Soviet Union. This group represents 41% of all foreign-born residents in Finland, a quarter of which are of Ingrian decent (seventeenth-century émigrés to the St Petersburg area) (Heikkilä & Peltonen, 2002). The third category includes individuals from Africa and Asia, specifically from Somalia, Iraq, Thailand, and China. This group represents 30% of all foreign-born residents. Roughly a third of these individuals entered Finland under refugee or asylum seeker status (Martikainen, 2013).

While half of all immigrants to Finland reside in the national capital (Helsinki) and the surrounding region, larger population centres throughout the country have a disproportionate amount of immigrant residents (Martikainen, 2013). Immigrant representation in rural areas is generally lower. However, small municipalities have taken a proportion of the country’s immigrant population as part of Finland’s integration policy to spread out the incoming immigrants into smaller population centres (Heikkilä & Peltonen, 2002).

Unemployment among foreign-born individuals is markedly higher than among native Finns. Contributing factors to these unemployment levels have been identified in part as a lack of Finnish language skills and Finnish employers under estimating the work experience of foreigners (Wall, 2019). Aside from foreign workers generally being paid lower wages (Wall, 2019), foreign training and foreign degrees are not highly valued, though officially recognised, often requiring highly trained and credential workers to be retrained to fulfil Finnish conditions (Odom, 2020). Immigrants are most often recruited for low-wage, low-skill jobs (Heikkilä & Peltonen, 2002). Finnish employment authorities cite employers’ prejudices caused by unidentified fears, language skills, and how the immigrant jobseekers’ customs factor into their chance of employability (Odom,
The Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers (Laki Maahanmuuttajien Kotouttamisesta ja Turvapaikanhakijoiden Vastaanotosta) was ratified into law on 1 May 1999 and has since seen numerous amendments. The intent of the act was to give immigrants more freedom when making life plans and served to promote equality and freedom of choice to help individuals become more productive in Finnish society. The law protects the rights of immigrants to preserve their own cultures and languages while supporting integrating into Finnish society (Act of the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers, 493/1999/2005) (Table 3.1), while promoting multiculturalism and kerbing racism among the population of the host country (Heikkilä & Peltonen, 2002). Amendments to this law regarding the reception and protection of refugees and asylum seekers as well as assistance and protective measures for victims of human trafficking were added in 2006.

Table 3.1 Section 7 Measures and services promoting and supporting integration (1215/2005)

(1) In order to promote and support integration, employment offices and municipalities may:

a. Provide guidance, advisory services, and information services;
b. Provide information about Finnish society and how it functions;
c. Provide Finnish or Swedish language teaching;
d. Provide adult skills training and take appropriate labour market policy measures;
e. Provide instruction in reading and writing and teaching to augment basic education;
f. Provide interpretation services;
g. Take measures and provide services to promote equality in all its forms;
h. Take measures and provide services to meet the special needs of immigrant minors;
i. Take measures and provide services for special-needs groups;
j. Take other measures and provide services that encourage immigrants to acquire for themselves the skills and knowledge needed in society.

(2) The best interests of the child shall be considered in provision of all the measures and services referred to above.

2020). The employment authorities also noted that in circumstances where a foreign individual is recruited for their experience and skills, their employment is incumbent upon Finnish language skills and cultural factors (Wall, 2019).
LEGAL ASPECTS OF MIGRATING TO FINLAND AND THE RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN FINLAND

In Finland, the flow of migration has steadily increased from the 1990s and it has been forecasted to remain stable.\(^1\) In 2018, there were 258,000 foreign citizens living in Finland. If we do not only consider foreign citizenship as a sole determining variable, there were more than 400,000 people with foreign backgrounds living in Finland 2018 (Kazi, Kaihovaara & Alitolppa-Niitamo, 2019; Statistics Finland, 2020a, 2020b). People migrate to Finland for various reasons. Two of the largest reasons are EU citizens and their families moving for employment and individuals from outside of the EU moving to Finland due to family ties in Finland. The third and fourth reasons individuals migrate to Finland are for study purposes and then for humanitarian reasons (Kazi, Alitolppa-Niitamo, & Kaihovaara, 2019). Thus, the main reasons for entering the country are not refugee based. Moreover, the two biggest foreign national groups in Finland in 2018 were from two neighbouring countries, Estonia and the Russian Federation (Statistics Finland, 2020a).

In 2015, when 32,476 asylum seekers entered the country, Finland was not prepared for the flow. Albeit, in 2015, Finland’s share of all the asylum seekers (more than a million) in the EU was well under 3%. Two-thirds of the flow originated from Iraq even though migrants arrived from more than 100 countries. During the “rush hour”, three weeks in autumn 2015, around 10,000 asylum seekers entered the country and over 200 reception centres were quickly established. After the flow of 2015, the rules and regulations of granting asylum were changed and becoming a refugee was made much more difficult.

*Quota Refugees and Asylum Seekers*

According to Finnish Immigration Service (Migri), refugees come to Finland either as quota refugees or as asylum seekers. Quota refugees are selected from refugee camps with the help of the UNCHR. The UNCHR determines which individuals need the most assistance and are in the most danger. Thereafter, Migri and Finnish municipalities and/or Centres for

\(^1\)While writing this book, the impact of Covid-19 on migration to Finland, as with the rest of the European Union, remains uncertain.
Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (ELY Centres), as well as the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, select the quota refugees. The quota refugees admitted to Finland receive refugee status and a residence permit. After they have made their journey to Finland, they are placed in selected municipalities (Finnish Immigration Service, 2020; Suomen pakolaisapua, 2020). Asylum seekers are persons who enter the country and flee persecution in their home countries. Asylum cannot be sought via letters or technologically mediated means, the person seeking asylum needs to physically enter the country. Finland is committed to providing international protection for those in need, that is, refugee status or subsidiary protection.

The latter (subsidiary protection) can be applied if the criteria for granting asylum are not met. Subsidiary protection can be granted if the applicant:

- is threatened by a serious danger, other than persecution, on the basis of which asylum may be granted. Grounds for receiving subsidiary protection may include the threat of death penalty or torture. Serious personal danger arising from an armed conflict would be another reason of this kind. (Ministry of the Interior of Finland, 2020)

**Immigrants’ Rights and Legal Liability**

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is responsible for immigrants’ welfare and health. Immigrants’ rights to social benefits and health care are dependent on their residence permit. If an immigrant has permanent residency, they have the rights to services no matter their nationality, but only if they have permanent residency. However, essential means of subsistence and emergency medical treatment is provided to all immigrants in need (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health of Finland, 2020). Social (financial) assistance to individuals is decided on a case-by-case basis and normally provided for a month at a time (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health of Finland, 2020). Every immigrant’s situation is evaluated separately, and generalisation of individuals’ rights and benefits is not possible. The social welfare system in Finland is generally good as Finland is a Nordic welfare state and the country tries to look after those within its borders.

However, if an immigrant commits a serious crime, Migri can make a decision to refuse entry or to deport an immigrant whenever the Finnish
law permits it. However, if an asylum seeker has grounds for refugee status, the person cannot be denied asylum even if they have committed a serious crime. A residence permit granted for subsidiary protection can be denied if a person is guilty of a crime. Even if a person has committed a serious crime, they cannot be removed from the country if they could be facing face a death sentence, torture, persecution, or other treatment violating human dignities in their home country. If asylum seekers are guilty of crimes, have no grants for asylum or refugee status, and their home country is safe, they will receive a negative decision. If the person is granted asylum or cannot safely return home, they will receive a temporary residence permit for a year at time (Finnish Immigration Service, 2015).

CURRENT TRENDS IN MIGRATION TO AND FROM FINLAND

The Inflow and Outflow of Migration in Finland

The flow of asylum seekers has been steady since 2000. Finland has received 1500–6000 applicants each year, aside from in 2015, when the refugee crisis hit the EU the hardest. In that particular year, Finland received a record-breaking number of asylum-seeking applications, more than 32,000 (Ministry of the Interior Finland, 2019). With the rapid growth in asylum applications in Finland, and throughout the EU, came stricter inner border controls. The stricter border controls might help explain the recent drop in the number of asylum applications since 2018 in particular. In addition, the number of reception centres in Finland has decreased. In September 2019, Finland had 38 centres for families and adults, and the plans were to decrease this number by the end of the year. Migri estimated that Finland received 2200 first/initial applications in 2019, the equivalent number was 2400 in 2018 (YLE, 2019).

From the beginning of 2015 until end of May 2019, Finland has received more than 54,000 applications and given decisions on more than 49,000 asylum applications. Of these decisions, nearly half were negative. Almost 80%, were men and nearly 60% were aged 18–34. The citizenship of the applicants was diverse, with the overwhelming majority of applicants coming from Iraq (nearly 60%), with the remaining applicants coming from Afghanistan (18%), Somalia (7%), Syria (5%), Iran (3%), the Russian Federation (3%), Albania (2%), Eritrea (2%), Nigeria (1%), and Turkey (1%) (Finnish Immigration Service, 2019a, 2019b). An average
applicant was a young male from the Middle East. Moreover, even though there have been more male applicants than female applicants, statistics show that males were rejected only slightly more often than female applicants.

The flow of migration in Finland is more of an inflow than an outflow. The country continues to receive migration gains as more people immigrate to than emigrate from the country. In 2015, in-migration statistics show a nearly 30,000-person gain, with out-migration of nearly 16,000, leading to net migration of almost 14,000 persons. Net migration increased from 2015 to 2016 to 4000 persons and decreased from 2016 to 2017 to 2000 persons. The flow of net migration furthermore decreased to almost 3000 persons from 2017 to 2018 (Official Statistics of Finland, 2019a). Statistics indicate that after the impact of the start of the refugee crisis (2015–2016), Finland’s migration gain decreased, even though the inflow continues to overcome the outflow.

**Work-Related Migration**

In the future, Finland will be in need of work-related migration. The population is not growing enough to meet the demands of the society. The baby boomers (population born right after the Second World War [WW2]) are now retiring and the country has declining migration. In addition, population demographics show more deaths than births. The number of deaths has decreased from the previous years and the birth rate has sharply declined (Official Statistics of Finland, 2019b, 2019c). For these reasons, it is important for Finland to look attractive in the eyes of skilled migrants looking for opportunities abroad. The country is in need of a competent workforce and there is naturally international competition—Finland might not be the first choice for every applicant. A good example of skilled migration (one of many) is two migrant-based Vietnamese students who moved to Finland some years ago and in 2017 created a start-up company, shoe business, that is based on utilising coffee waste as a raw material for their water-resistant Rens shoes (Pietarila, 2019). Therefore, it is important to provide and enable more innovative thinking and business opportunities for migrants, as the country needs economic growth.

The society can influence how attractive the country looks for possible skilled migrants. In addition, media influence the ways citizens perceive migrants. Media’s representations of migrants matter, as they affect the
ways migrants are seen, treated, and discussed in the public discourse (Pöyhtäri, 2014). For example, Pöyhtäri (2014) concluded that Finnish magazines have four different articulations of immigration and ethnic diversity: they can be seen as a threat, as a utility, as victims, or as objects of celebration. Especially alarming were findings concerning trade union magazines. In trade union magazines, foreign construction workers were seen as a threat. In a more recent study (Kuusisto & Tuominen, 2019), findings show how legacy media’s representations of young refugees reassert victim and threat discourses. Representations of migrants are especially powerful in the social media era, as media actors and social media users, jointly guiding the public discussion that can either support or hinder democracy (Nikunen & Pantti, 2018).

There are ongoing projects that aim to integrate refugees into Finnish society and currently, for example, The Finnish Refugee Council runs such projects. The Council is Finland’s largest expert organisation focusing on refugee and migration issues, and its operation is funded by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the EU, different foundations and funds, and individual and corporate donors (Finnish Refugee Council, 2019). Studies also show the Council’s work has integrative influences on refugees (see, e.g. Kosonen et al., 2019). However, some concerns arise when the nature of the work is discussed. Some refugees entering the country have high levels of education but insufficient Finnish-language skills and lack of recognisable certification, which hinder their work opportunities (Kosonen et al., 2019; RICE, 2013). Often the work available for refugees is in less prestigious fields, for example, cleaning positions. Occasionally, even for those positions, the lack of language skills is a major impediment. One field that has especially been problematic is the building trade. In many cases, non-native workers have been paid less than native workers, which has led to situation in which employers are trying to pay less for all workers (Ali-Hokka, 2017). These examples have led the government to take various steps. For example, a public register of Tax Numbers site was created in 2014. Construction companies are now obligated to report monthly on their employees and construction sites for tax authorities (Eskanen, 2014; VERO, 2019). This way it is harder to use black market workers and underpay workers. Similar policies and procedures have risen in the field of hospitality, but actions have yet to be taken at the time of writing this book. Research has also shown (see, e.g. Croucher, Aalto, Hirvonen, & Sommier, 2013) that native Finns perceive economic threats from the refugees. Refugees are perceived to take money from tax-paying Finns,
but at the same time, they are seen fit to work in less prestigious fields of work.

**Immigration Politics**

If immigrants and refugees are segregated and seen only fit to work in less attractive fields of work, in the long term, such beliefs could lead to a segregated and unequal society where Finns form the upper social class (Croucher et al., 2013). When looking at the political atmosphere in Finland, the segregation of society sounds ominous. The Finns Party (formerly known as the Finns Party), a populist radical right political party, has managed to maintain its significant influence in Finland. In the parliamentary elections of 2019, it was the second largest party, only by 0.2% behind the winner of the elections, The Social Democratic Party of Finland. This kind of political movement proposes a challenge for liberal ideology in Finnish society. The Finns Party politics are often against immigration and foreigners. Hatakka (2020) asserted immigration scepticism is a core element of the Finns Party collective identity and image. Other Finnish political parties besides the Finns Party also share some critical views towards migration, though all other parties would keep the yearly numbers of quota refugees untouched (750–1050 in recent years) or increase the amount (Heikura & Selander, 2018).

Some changes have occurred in the Finns Party politics in recent years. During 2017, 20 more moderate MPs of the party resigned and formed a new party, the Blue Reform (Nurmi, 2019). In the 2019 Finnish parliamentary elections, the newly formed party did not succeed. The Blue Reform was unable to maintain any positions in the parliament (Official Statistics of Finland, 2019d). In 2017, the leader of the Finns Party changed. Jussi Halla-aho became the party leader as the former leader Timo Soini stepped down after leading the party for 20 years (Nurmi, 2019). After Halla-aho’s election, the Finns Party politics have been increasingly opposed to immigration. In addition, Halla-aho increasingly shares his thoughts on social media and outside mainstream media, as many European right-wing populists do. Therefore, it is easier to post unfavourable questions and highlight self-importance (Heikura & Selander, 2018; Varjus, 2019). The indications of his strict thoughts concerning immigration have been present since his earlier years in politics. Halla-aho wrote a popular blog, and in 2008, some followers of the blog separated the popular comment section into an online portal called
Homma-forum (Hannula, 2011). The forum is a platform for anti-immigration discussions. Also, social media platforms provide a space for uncivil discussions. Due to lack of moderation in many online platforms, racist conversations may flow in Finnish media’s Facebook pages (Lauk, Salonen, & Koski, 2019).

As pre-moderation of these third-party platforms is not technically available, at least not yet, they are harder to control, which means conflicting conversations can have an output to wider societal conversations. Also, right-wing site MV-lehti (“WTF-magazine”), the most popular Finnish counter-media website, has an influence spreading anti-immigration ideology. Research has also shown the ideology of MV-lehti is greatly emphasised by the Finns Party as its party members have expressed high trust towards the counter-media site (Koivula, Saarinen, & Koiranen, 2016).

Finnish society reflects multiple attitudes towards migration. The officials are creating co-operation and integration between immigrants and natives, even though political parties pursue their own agendas. Fears and prejudice towards non-natives are reflected on social media and counter-media platforms, and at the same time, the legacy media is covering news events that reflect positive and negative perceptions of immigrants and refugees. The current media landscape and its actors shape society’s attitudes towards migration and affect the ways societal discussion is conducted in Finnish society.

**Analyses of How Other Nordic Nations Have Responded to the Refugee Crisis**

The history and patterns of migration in the Nordic region are as varied as the nations themselves. None of the Nordic countries (Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland) have a well-established colonial history, compared to other European empires: English, French, or Dutch, for example. However, these nations did benefit economically, politically, and culturally, from their colonialist neighbours (Keskinen, Skaptadóttir, & Toivanen, 2019). Early migration (prior to the seventeenth century) was mainly of an explorer/discoverer nature, evidenced by the Danes settlement of Greenland and the Norwegian settlement of Iceland, for example. Migration in the eighteenth century was largely a result of necessary labour, for example, the movement of Germans (expert in mining) to
Sweden. In the nineteenth century, Finland saw the migration of Jews, Tatars, and Chinese to its borders while under Russian control. Migration in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries across the entire Nordic region was, and continues to be, economically and politically driven.

According to the State of the Nordic Region (2018), since 2000, the population in the Nordic countries grew by 2.3 million with roughly 70% of this growth from net immigration. Immigration to the Nordic regions, particularly after the addition of the European Union member states and the influx of asylum seekers and refugees from the mid-2000s through the mid-2010s, saw a population increase of nearly 3 million (Heleniak, 2018). Emigration from the Nordic region (2.5 million) and the average birth/death rate have not kept pace with immigration. While the reasons for immigration have remained largely unchanged (work/economic opportunities, familial connections, education, and refugee status) over time, the percentage of refugee and asylum seekers has drastically increased during this time period. In Sweden alone, new arrivals with refugee status or seeking asylum rose from 13% in 2008 to 47% by 2016 (Heleniak, 2018), a natural reflection of the European refugee crisis. As of 2018, Sweden had a higher proportion of foreign-born residents than the US, a nation with a long history of being known as a destination for immigrants (Heleniak, 2018). Based on information gathered from residency permit applications, the largest portion of immigrants to the Nordic regions are typically aged 25–35 years, representing significant potential to the workforce in each host country.

Migration, unattributed to population growth, within the Nordic region is largely based on an economy of human capital whereby younger, educated members of the population are moving towards larger cities (Pekkala, 2003). In turn, rural areas are experiencing a reduction in human capital and falling or static population numbers. However, migrant workers ameliorate these decreases and restore the workforce (Heleniak, 2018). Pekkala (2003) cited numerous factors which affect the costs and benefits of internal migration including but not limited to job prospects, education level, labour market status, age, gender, relationship status, and home ownership.

The stereotypical archetype of the welfare state often attributed to the Nordic countries was borne of a nationalist resurgence after the Second World War. The model of the welfare state was developed out of a desire to lower inequality and raise living standards, while maintaining strong fiscal solvency and ensuring every member of society benefitted from these
gains. This structure fitted well to the Nordic society of the day, with little societal hierarchy and wide-spread transparency in government, resulting in a populous with a high level of trust in each other and their leaders. The model, as it was established, required citizens to be active in their contribution to society in return for the benefits made available to them. Actively participating in a democratic society positively contributes to one’s perceived quality of life, enriches their culture and social capital, and promotes a general feeling that no one is excluded from society. This system works well among smaller national populations found in the Nordic countries. The robustness and balance of the system ensure there are enough healthy, employed people to ensure a financial safety net and stability for those sick, unemployed, or studying.

These countries are founded on the principles that a healthy and well-educated society will be successful. To that end, education and healthcare in these countries are accessible to all, and national governance is guided by employers and unions to look after as many people as possible. In this system, the government takes steps to remove risks associated with business ventures and scientific and technological innovations, allowing the space to create and explore free of the threat of financial ruin. A major test of the welfare state model came under pressure after the Global Financial crisis in 2009. Additional tests of the welfare state model have come with the recent influx of unemployed migrants, rising unemployment amount of young adults, as well as the continual growth of an ageing population. These factors result in higher costs for welfare, health, and education. Coupled with small population size and low natural population growth, these factors limit economic growth and competition both in the domestic and in the international market.

What follows is a brief review of the migration situation in three Nordic nations: Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. Each of these nations has gone through different, yet comparable immigration experiences to those of Finland.

**Norway**

Like its Nordic neighbours, Norway was not always a destination for immigrants. Between 1825 and 1945, roughly 850,000 Norwegians emigrated to foreign countries. Prior to Norway gaining independence from Sweden in 1905, a majority of emigration from Norway was temporary, mostly for purposes of labour, with some of the population returning to
resettle. The population through the 1970s remained stable with a white Christian majority. The only noticeable movement of people after WW2 and the 1960s was a result of the common labour market shared among the Nordic countries (Cooper, 2005).

The first migrants came in the late 1960s as a result of a rapidly growing Norwegian economy. The Norwegian government accepted many labour migrants from Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia. While their stay in country was meant to be temporary, they remained, and were later joined by their families through their status of candidacy for familial reunification as well as other refugees and migrants. While the actual number of accepted refugees from 1960 to 1970 was less than 300, and net migration between 1966 and 1970 was less than 1000, the perceived threat of migration mismanagement in Europe and an uncontrolled flow of immigrants caused the Norwegian government to enact a strict immigration policy in 1975. Through the late 1970s and early 1980s, global political conflicts shifted the cause of immigration from that of a response for labour and family reunification to that of asylum seeker and refugee admissions.

During the refugee crisis of 2015–2016, European nations saw over 1 million asylum seeker applications. The registration and tracking systems in many European countries were overwhelmed by these extraordinarily high numbers, forcing countries to reinstate border controls not seen since the original Schengen Agreement in 1990. As a non-EU member state, but well entrenched in European politics and policies, Norway is in a unique position to maintain more autonomy and national control over their immigration policies, though there is some obligation to follow other European immigration policies (Brekke & Staver, 2018).

Norway’s geographical location plays a significant role in its resultant number of migrants. On the other hand, Italy’s location, relatively closer to the centre of conflict, made it the first destination for North African migrants, like Turkey was the first destination for migrants from the Middle East. For Norway, the far-northern border with Russia was inundated with a high number of migrant arrivals with over 5000 persons crossing the border in only a few weeks.

While Norway is romanticised by many for its high quality of life and happiness, it does have a dark history of exclusion that its government is addressing. In 1977, the government forcibly sterilised members of its own Romani minority population. The Norwegian government in 2000 apologised for the forced sterilisation (Norway Apologises for Abuses of
Gypsies, 2000). Along with its historical abuse of its Romani population, the government has a dark past regarding its indigenous population, the Sami people. There is a history of land seizures, a policy of fornorsking or Norweginisation (assimilation) (Alsbury, 2017). Fornorsking included removing Sami from their homes, placing them in boarding schools, and teaching them Norwegian at the expense of the Sami language (Gignac, 2016; Minority Rights Group, 2020). It is critical to mention fornorsking at this point to illuminate the assimilationist undercurrents in Norwegian society, past and present. While the society/culture is in general more and more open to foreigners and supportive of the welfare state, to survive in Norway, as with other Nordic states discussed below, one must assimilate (or integrate extensively).

Denmark

Like Norway, Denmark experienced a period of economic growth during the mid-1960s resulting in a need for foreign labour, particularly in industry. Employers were permitted to invite foreign workers to the country. Similar to Norway, these first migrant workers came from Pakistan, the former Yugoslavia, and Turkey. The original plan was for these workers to stay in Denmark only temporarily, and by the end of 1970s, their numbers were approximately 20,000.

The oil crisis at the end of 1973 was the first time in over a decade that Denmark experienced unemployment. This caused the government to enact an immediate stop to all labour immigration from outside the European Economic Community. As these were labour migrants, the idea of political asylum seekers and refugees was not part of the political conversation in the early 1970s. The government viewed these populations sceptically, fearing that mass immigration would result in significant wage reductions and high costs associated with the social assistance offered to these new arrivals.

In the late 1970s, mayors of smaller Danish towns began to raise issues about a lack of integration between migrant workers and Danes, citing the proclivity for these migrants to create a separate and parallel society. Pressure from these mayors moved the government to begin talks about developing guidelines for residence and work rights among migrants. The results were clearer rules on residency permits with special consideration for humanitarian cases, changing deportations or expulsions from
Denmark to an administrative procedure rather than a police matter, and the establishment of a court of appeal for all cases.

This new Aliens Act of 1983 granted the right to asylum as long as the person’s case on asylum or familial reunification was already underway. Additionally, refugees under the United Nation (UN) Convention of Refugees and de facto refugees, whose circumstances were such that they could not go back to their country of origin, were granted equal status. Lastly, foreign residency permit holders were allowed to apply for family reunification, with additional affordances beyond children and spouses, to include parents and distant relatives. This was one of the most liberal immigrant acts in Europe at the time. Naturally, the number of applicants increased, and in 1986, the same Minister of Justice (Erik Ninn-Hansen) proposed fundamental restrictions to the law. These changes removed the rights to asylum to de facto refugees; it permitted deportation of asylum seekers if their country of origin had not signed the UN convention on refugees and placed the financial burden of repatriation on transport companies rather than the state should they not fulfil the conditions required to apply for asylum.

What caused this turn from the traditional Nordic convention of egalitarianism and open-mindedness? Moore (2010) described how as immigration grew, these new arrivals started to fill the lower socioeconomic rungs of society now left behind by the expanding success of the welfare state. The Danish (and Norwegian) public experienced growing concern with this population. This was further heightened in the mid-1980s when the type of migrant shifted from that of temporary labour to asylum seeker and refugee. Increased unemployment (approximately 9%) between 1980 and 1990 may explain the rise in anti-immigrant sentiment rather than explicit xenophobia.

As the need for foreign labour dipped, Danish society’s acceptance of these migrants also fell. A noticeable change in “othering” the immigrants can be seen in the words used to describe this population. Once described as gaestearbejdere (guest workers), labour migrants in Denmark had begun being referred to as fremmdearbejdere (foreign workers). Immigrant rights groups pressured the government to lessen the impact of the psychological and social exclusion connoted in these terms by promoting the use of the word invandrer (immigrant), but this was only accepted by governmental agencies. Further “othering” of these migrants began to appear more regularly in tabloids, depicting them as abusing the welfare system and burdening society.
Denmark did not have significant numbers of irregular migrants enter its borders from 2014 to 2018, particularly when compared to other EU nations; the nation took measures to protect itself from the refugee crisis. In December 2015, the Danish government passed a law that allowed authorities to confiscate the equivalent of 400 euros worth of cash/valuables from asylum seekers to pay for the cost of their stay. Items of sentimental value were exempt (Danish Police Refuse to Seize Refugee Jewelry and Cash, 2015). This law was never acted on. However, the controversial nature of the law demonstrates how Denmark and its government responded to the growth in irregular migration. From 2015 to 2018, more than 28,000 individuals applied for asylum in Denmark, with the overwhelming majority being rejected. Along with more than 28,000 migrants applying for asylum, in 2015 alone, more than 28,000 irregular migrants entered Denmark, prompting the government to close rail and road links with Germany (Eddy, 2015). The closing of Denmark’s borders, even temporarily, demonstrates once again how it was a common reaction to migrants during the refugee crisis.

Sweden

Migration to Sweden began during the Middle Ages with the arrival of merchant trading communities. The growing iron industry ushered in migrants from Wallonia in the late 1600s to teach ironmongery along with French artists (1700s), Jews (1700s), and other intellectuals. Italian migrants (1800s) started to arrive as the growing popularity of brick buildings required additional bricklayers and craftsmen to keep up with demand and Scots when the brewing industry began. The most significant migrant event in Swedish history was the mass emigration between 1850 and 1930 of 1.5 million people, escaping religious persecution and poverty, to the US and Australia, hoping to make a better life for themselves (Sweden and Migration, 2020). The great emigration peaked in 1887 with more than 50,000 people leaving Sweden, mostly to the US. This was eclipsed in 2011 when 51,000 emigrated mostly to other European countries, with a few going to the US and China.

WWI and immigration restrictions stemmed the flow of emigrants from Sweden to the US. After WW2, like the rest of the Nordic countries, Sweden turned from a country of emigrants to a destination for immigrants. During WW2, the first immigrants were refugees from the European continent, mainly Germany and the Baltic region (Cordenius,
Many of these refugees returned home after the war, with the remaining majority from the Baltic states. In the 1950s and 1960s, as in the rest of the Nordic countries, labour migrants were the main source of immigration to Sweden (Byström, 2014). Most of these labour migrants came from Italy, Turkey, Greece, and the former Yugoslavia.

This increased immigration resulted in the Swedish government calling to regulate immigration in the 1960s, with the formation of the Swedish Immigration Board in 1969. Now, those coming to Sweden would need to show proof of guaranteed employment and housing (Cerna, 2009). Permission to immigrate to the country would only be granted if a labour market assessment and the labour market parties showed a need for the labourer. If there was an unemployed Swedish national able to perform the job, almost certainly no residence permit would be granted. These regulations did not apply to those from other Nordic countries, refugees, or those wanting to reunite with family members. The result was a reduction in non-Nordic immigration labour, an increase in the immigration of family members from non-Nordic countries, and the intermittent acceptance of refugees from different political/war events internationally (Cordenius, 2018).

The 1980s saw a rise of asylum seekers from around the world as turmoil in the Middle East, the horn of Africa, the Balkans, and Eastern Bloc countries (particularly after the USSR collapsed). This was a stress on the Swedish authorities to allow these people (most escaping poverty and dismal living conditions, rather than persecution) into the country. The 1990s marked the end of the Cold War but saw a rise of the collapse of Yugoslavia. This was the largest migration of people in Europe since WW2—Sweden welcomed around 100,000 Bosnia refugees from Yugoslavia and 3600 Kosovo Albanians from Macedonia. Additionally, EU political changes in the early 2000s made sweeping changes in the way people moved around Europe. The development of the Schengen Area originally created open borders for 13 countries, allowing more EU citizens to move about and work in different countries for any period of time. The migrant crisis of 2015–2016 saw Sweden go from having some of the most liberal immigration laws in Europe to the bare minimum instituted by the EU. Sweden resumed temporary border controls aimed at reducing the amount of asylum seekers—in 2015 alone more than 160,000 people applied for asylum, with more than 50,000 of those coming from Syria (Swedish Migration Agency, 2020).
As with many other EU nations, Sweden experienced a rapid influx in asylum applications from 2015 to 2019. In 2015, for example, more than 160,000 individuals lodged an asylum application for Sweden (162,000 kom till Sverige – 500 fick job, 2016). Due to the rapid increase in asylum applications, and in irregular migrant arrival in Sweden in 2015–2016, the Swedish government enacted a series of temporary border controls/closures (Migrant crisis: Sweden operator cancels trains on bridge link, 2015). By mid-2016, the Swedish government had begun to cut public services to subsidise the cost of the growing refugee crisis (Gummesson, 2015). While the Swedish government, and people were in general supportive of migration in principle, the sudden increase in numbers, coupled with an overall lack of education among most new migrants led to trepidation and fear towards migrants (Garcia, 2017; Larsson, 2017).

REFERENCES

Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers (493/1999). Helsinki: Ministry of the Interior Finland. Retrieved from http://www.resettlement.eu/sites/icmc/files/1999_Act%20on%20the%20Integration%20of%20Immigrants%20and%20Reception%20of%20Asylum%20Seekers.pdf

Ali-Hokka, A. (2017, September 23). Nyt selittävät suomalaismaalarit: Tämän vuoksi uzbekki tekee työt. YLE. Retrieved from https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9622271

Alsbury, N. J. (2017, July 24). Is life in Norway as happy as it’s cracked up to be? The Conversation. Retrieved from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/norway-migrant-quality-not-quantity

Brekke, J., & Staver, A. (2018). The renationalisation of migration policies in times of crisis: the case of Norway. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44, 2163–2181. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1433026

Byström, M. (2014). When the state stepped into the arena: The Swedish welfare state, refugees and immigrants 1930s–50s. Journal of Contemporary History, 49, 599–621. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220094145282459

Cerna, L. (2009). Changes in Swedish labour immigration police: A slight revolution? Working Paper. Oxford: University of Oxford. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46470667_Changes_in_Swedish_Labour_Immigration_Policy_A_Slight_Revolution

Cooper, B. (2005, May 1). Norway: Migrant quality, not quantity. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/norway-migrant-quality-not-quantity
Cordenius, M. (2018, October 10). Sweden, land of migrants. *New York Times*. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/opinion/sweden-land-of-migrants.html

Croucher, S. M., Aalto, J., Hirvonen, S., & Sommier, M. (2013). Integrated threat and intergroup contact: An analysis of Muslim immigration to Finland. *Human Communication, 16*(2), 109–120. Retrieved from http://www.uab.edu/Communicationstudies/humancommunication/02_06_13_Croucher.pdf

Danish Police Refuse to Seize Refugee Jewelry and Cash. (2015, December 22). *DW*. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/danish-police-refuse-to-seize-refugee-jewelry-and-cash/a-18934564

Eddy, M. (2015, September 9). Migrant tide bringing out Europe’s best and worst. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/world/europe/migrants-refugee-tensions-in-europe.html

Engman, M. (1978). Migration from Finland to Russia during the nineteenth century. *Scandinavian Journal of History, 3*(1–4), 155–177. https://doi.org/10.1080/03468757808578934

Eskanen, J. (2014, May 26). Lakimuutos tehostaa kulunvalvontaa rakennustyömailla: “Nyt yritysten on aika herätä”. *YLE*. Retrieved from https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-7263648

Finnish Immigration Service. (2015). Criminals will be removed from the country when permitted by law. Retrieved from https://migri.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/rikolliset-poistetaan-maasta-aina-kun-laki-sallii

Finnish Immigration Service. (2019a). Statistics: Asylum applications 1/2015–5/2019. Retrieved from: https://tilastot.migri.fi/index.html?fbclid=IwAR1ZudEgedtvxe7hmkcicyOU8rCFpEJPZASbrQMiyhWeBBMUnnuz9AahoU#applications/23330/49?l=en&start=540

Finnish Immigration Service. (2019b). Statistics: Asylum decisions 1/2015–5/2019. Retrieved from: https://tilastot.migri.fi/index.html?fbclid=IwAR1ZudEgedtvxe7hmkcicyOU8rCFpEJP-ZASbrQMiyhWeBBMUnnuz9AahoU#decisions/23330/49?l=en&start=540

Finnish Immigration Service. (2020). How are quota refugees selected. Retrieved from https://migri.fi/en/how-are-quota-refugees-selected-

Finnish Refugee Council. (2019). About us. Retrieved from https://pakolaisapu.fi/en/about-us/

Garcia, I. (2017, July 19). Få lågutbildade nyanlända vill studera. *Sverige Radio*. Retrieved from https://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=6738611

Gignac, J. (2016, September 14). Sami blood addresses the assimilation of indigenous children in Scandinavia. *The Globe and Mail*. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/awards-and-festivals/tiff/sami-blood-shines-spotlight-on-assimilation-of-indigenous-children-in-scandinavia/article31892290/
Gummesson, J. (2015, October 27). Internnt mejl visar: Nya besparingar krävs. Svenska Dagbladet. Retrieved from https://www.svd.se/internt-mejl-visar-nya-besparingar-kravs/om/flykten-till-europa

Hannula, M. (2011). Maassa maan tavalla: Maahanmuuttokritiikin lyhyt historia. Keuruu, Finland: Otava.

Hatakka, N. (2020). Expose, debunk, ridicule, resist! Networked civic monitoring of populist radical right online action in Finland. Information, Communication & Society, 23, 1311–1326. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X2019.2019.1566392

Heikkilä, E., & Peltonen, S. (2002). Immigrants and integration in Finland. Siirtolaisuusinstituutti. Helsinki: Institute of Migration.

Heikura, P., & Selander, M. (2018, August 1). Miten Jussi Halla-ahon ja Timo Soinin puheenjohtaja retorijkstra eroavat toisistaan? YLE. Retrieved from https://areena.yle.fi/1-4456993

Heleniak, T. (2018). From migrants to workers: International migration trends in the Nordic nations. Stockholm: Nordic Council of Ministers.

Kazi, V., Alitolppa-Niitamo, A., & Kaihovaara, A. (2019). Kotoutumisen kokonaiskatsaus 2019: Tutkimusartikkeleita kotoutumisesta. Helsinki: Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö.

Kazi, V., Kaihovaara, A., & Alitolppa-Niitamo, A. (2019). Kotoutumisen kokonaiskatsaus 2019: Indikaattoritietoa kotoutumisesta. Helsinki: Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö.

Keskinen, S., Skaptadóttir, U. D., & Toivanen, M. (2019). Narrations of homogeneity, waning welfare states, and the politics of solidarity. In S. Keskinen, U. D. Skaptadóttir, & M. Toivanen (Eds.), Undoing homogeneity in the Nordic region: Migration, difference, and the politics of solidarity. Oxon, UK: Routledge.

Koivula, A., Saarinen, A., & Koiranen, I. (2016, December 21). Lähes kolmasosa perussuomalaisista luottaa MV-lehteen. Suomen kuvalehti, 21 December. Retrieved November 13, 2019, from https://suomenkuvalehti.fi/jutut/kotimaa/lahes-kolmasosa-perussuomalaisista-luottaa-mv-lehteen/

Kosonen, R., Saari, E., Aalto, S., Heponiemi, T., Jauhiainen, S., Kankaanpää, R., Palander, J., Pöllänen, P., Steel, T., & Yijälä, A. (2019). Maahanmuuttaja osalliseksi ja työhön: Policy Brief. Suomen Akatemia. Retrieved from https://www.aka.fi/globalassets/33stn/materiaaleja/politiikkasuositukset/19_03_maahanmuuttajat_tyohon_ja_osalliseksi.pdf

Kuusisto, A.-K., & Tuominen, J. (2019). Epäilyä ja myötätuntoa: Yksin tulleet alaikäiset turvapaikanhakijat Aamulehdessä, Helsingin Sanomissa ja Ylen verkkouutisissa 2014–2016. Media & Viestintä, 42(3), 187–212.

Larsson, J. (2017, September 12). Personal på Migrationsverket utsätts för hot under asylprocessen. Svt Nyheter. Retrieved from https://www.svt.se/nyheter/lokal/stockholm/anstallda-pa-migrationsverket-hotas-ofta
Lauk, E., Salonen, M., & Koski, A. (2019). Luotettavuutta ja sitoutuneisuutta valvristamassa – sanomalehtien Facebook-sivut yleisösuhteen lujittajina. Jyväskylä, Finland: Media-Alan Tutkimussäätiö.

Martikainen, T. (Ed.). (2013). Religion, migration, settlement: Reflections on post-1990 immigration to Finland. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill NV.

Migrant Crisis: Sweden Operator Cancels Trains on Bridge Link. (2015, December 22). BBC Online. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35159183

Ministry of Social Affairs and Health of Finland. (2020). Immigrants’ social security, welfare and health. Retrieved from https://stm.fi/en/participation-immigrants

Ministry of the Interior Finland. (2019). Refugees flee persecution in their home countries. Retrieved from https://intermin.fi/en/areas-of-expertise/migration/refugees-and-asylum-seekers

Ministry of the Interior of Finland. (2020). Refugees and asylum seekers. Retrieved from https://intermin.fi/en/areas-of-expertise/migration/refugees-and-asylum-seekers

Minority Rights Group. (2020). Norway – Sami. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/awards-and-festivals/tiff/sami-blood-shines-spotlight-on-assimilation-of-indigenous-children-in-scandinavia/article31892290/

Moore, H. F. (2010). Immigration in Denmark and Norway, protecting culture or protecting rights? Scandinavian Studies, 82, 355–364.

Nikunen, K., & Pantti, M. (2018). Tapaus Ku Klux Klan: affektiivinen julkisuus, moraaliset tunteet ja tahmaiset kuvat. In M. Maasilta & K. Nikunen (Eds.), Pakolaisuus, tunteet ja media (pp. 71–91). Tampere, Finland: Vastapaino.

Norway Apologises for Abuse of Gypsies. (2000, December 9). The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/dec/09/2

Nurmi, L. (2019, November 28). Jussi Halla-aho otti taksi ajavan kaupunginvaltuutetun hampaisiinsa – liitti ”Husu” Husseinin kohteluun raiskausuuhtisen. Iltalehti. Retrieved from https://www.iltalehti.fi/politiikka/a/5d438ede-5a07-4e2e-a6de-9cca0d6be5df

Odom, M. B. (2020, January 22). Report: Finland trails Nordics in employing immigrant women. Yle. Retrieved from https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/report_finland_trails_nordics_in_employing_immigrant_women/11170260

Official Statistics of Finland. (2019a). Official Statistics of Finland (OSF): Migration [e-publication]. Retrieved from http://www.stat.fi/til/muutl/2018/muutl_2018_2019-06-17_tie_001_en.html

Official Statistics of Finland. (2019b). Official Statistics of Finland (OSF): Births [e-publication]. Retrieved from http://www.stat.fi/til/synt/2018/synt_2018_2019-04-26_tie_001_en.html
Official Statistics of Finland. (2019c). Official Statistics of Finland (OSF): Deaths [e-publication]. Retrieved from http://www.stat.fi/til/kuol/2018/kuol_2018_2019-04-26_tie_001_en.html

Official Statistics of Finland. (2019d). Official Statistics of Finland (OSF): Parliamentary elections [e-publication]. Retrieved from http://www.stat.fi/til/evaa/2019/evaa_2019_2019-04-24_tie_001_en.html

Pekkala, S. (2003). Migration flows in Finland: Regional differences in migration determinants and migrant types. *International Regional Science Review, 26*, 466–482. https://doi.org/10.1177/0160017603259861

Pietarila, P. (2019, June 6). Ekolenkkareita tekevää startup sai tukeen Suomen nimekkäimmät bisnesenkelit: ”Kahvikenkä on vasta ensimmäinen tuotteemme”. *Marmai.fi*. Retrieved from http://marmai.fi/uutiset/ekolenkkareita-tekeva-startup-sai-tukeen-suomen-nimekkaimmat-bisnesenkelit-kahvikenka-on-vasta-ensimmainen-tuotteemme/4081d4d3-67b9-48f4-a7ad-e3a53f9487c

Pöytäri, R. (2014). *Immigration and ethnic diversity in Finnish and Dutch magazines. Articulations of subject positions and symbolic communities*. Tampere, Finland: Tampere University Press.

Refugee Integration Capacity and Evaluation (RICE). (2013). A NEW BEGINNING – Refugee integration in Europe. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/52403d389.pdf

Statistics Finland. (2020a). Foreign citizens. Retrieved from https://www.tilastokeskus.fi/tup/maahanmuutto/maahanmuuttajat-vaestossa/ulkomaankansalaiset_en.html#tab1483972171375_1

Statistics Finland. (2020b). Immigrants in the population. Retrieved from https://www.tilastokeskus.fi/tup/maahanmuutto/maahanmuuttajat-vaestossa_en.html

Suomen pakolaisapua. (2020). Retrieved from https://pakolaisapu.fi/pakolaisuus-suomessa/#

Sweden and Migration. (2020). Retrieved from https://sweden.se/migration/

Swedish Migration Agency. (2020). Information. Retrieved from https://www.migrationsverket.se/English/Startpage.html

Varjus, S. (2019, October 9). Kommentti: Halla-aho hävitti Soinin muistonkin. *Ilta-Sanomat*. Retrieved from https://www.is.fi/politiikka/art-2000006158789.html

VERO. (2019). Public register of Tax Numbers site. Retrieved from https://www.vero.fi/en/e-file/public-register-of-tax-numbers/

Wall, D. (2019, February 11). “I’m broken, depressed”: Foreigners struggle to find work in Finland. *Yle*. Retrieved from https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/im_broken_depressed_foreigners_struggle_to_find_work_in_finland/10641139

YLE. (2019, September 9). Turvapaikanhakijoita tulee Suomeen yhä vähemmän – hakemusten määrä voi jäädä tänä vuonna vuosikymmenen pienimmäksi. Retrieved from https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10980670