Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC)

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This article aims to examine the link between self-identity and foreign policy, particularly focusing on how a state’s self-identity is built and sustained through policy. The article will rely on a combination of Lebow’s conception of state identity with Holsti’s idea of National Role Conception as a conceptual framework. Furthermore, this combined approach will utilize key foreign policy makers’ statements and official documents, as well as process tracing of international developmental policy discourse in its analysis. Using Indonesian development assistance policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) as a case study, this article finds that Indonesia self-identifies as a middle power country with strong affiliation towards developing countries as a result of national role conception processes. This self-identity in turn is built and sustained through SSTC development assistance policy, due to the suitability of role obligations as a middle power country with the values carried by the act of providing development assistance, as well as the deeply rooted historical dynamics of SSTC development policy with developing country status.

Keywords: identity; role; development assistance; SSTC; Indonesia

Introduction
The recent decades saw a transformation of the global development assistance practices that Woods (2008) termed as a silent revolution, marked by the emergence of developing countries as development donors and the gradual shifts of developed countries’ dominant roles in that aspect. In this changing landscape, Indonesia has positioned itself in the group of emerging donors by bringing forward SSTC approaches in its development assistance policy that is set to be executed by Indonesia’s novel development aid agency, officially known as Indonesian AID or INDOAID. Interestingly, this policy is often justified using the parlance related to identities, such as historical narrative and Indonesia’s role within the international community as shown by official documents as well as statements by key policymakers (National Coordination Team of SSTC, 2016). Looking at the latter phenomenon, this article suggests that identity and policy are linked together by constructivist logic, namely that identity is built and sustained through the enactment of a relevant policy. To do so, this article bridges together the concept of self-identity from International Relations with role-theory from Foreign Policy Analysis. This approach will enable us to understand the formation of state identity and the processes
that link specific policy to that identity. This article asserts that how states perceive its identity affects the role it seeks to occupy in international society, thereby leading to the enactment of a policy that corresponds to that role. To illustrate the argument, analysis of Indonesia’s SSTC policy presents a good opportunity to develop and explore the role of policy in the state’s self-identity.

Previously, several studies have been conducted in regards to the motives behind the SSTC policy of various developing countries and whether identity plays a role in that aspect. First, a study by Six (2009) identified the motives of Chinese and Indian SSTC policies in Africa. Six found that Chinese SSTC policy was guided by an interest-based Third World solidarity, in which an emphasis on material-self interest was followed by normative concepts introducing an alternate profile in international relations. India on the other hand, clearly displayed a preference in moral Politik in its policy to strengthen the image of a responsible international power. Another study done by Santander & Alonso (2017) found a strong identity motive behind the SSTC policies of Brazil, Venezuela, and Chile such as projecting domestically created images abroad and perception of a country’s capability and experiences.

Lastly, a study with a particular focus on Indonesia’s SSTC policy was conducted by Winanti & Alavian (2019), which traced the development of Indonesia’s SSTC policy throughout the years. Winanti & Alavian found a shift of emphasis to material interest in the most recent form of the policy. However, it was also concluded that there was a convergence of material and normative interest in the narrative of the policy. In this regard, previous studies have pointed out two motives behind SSTC policy, namely material and normative that could be differentiated. However, following the finding of motivational convergence by Winanti & Alavian, this article attempts to reframe the approach of SSTC policy motives as a combination of both material and normative interest as represented by the concept of identity. Furthermore, this approach has the potential to open up a further constructivist insight to be applied within the study of foreign policy, particularly in the motives of foreign aid policy.

The article offers the following contributions to the current studies of International Relations, particularly in the subjects of identity and foreign policy. First, the article aims to explain that identity and foreign policy are linked together through the logic of role enactment. Moreover, the enactment of the role provides legitimacy to the state’s identity claims and in turn sustains the image of self-identity. Secondly, by analyzing Indonesia’s novel SSTC policy, the article contributes to the studies of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Namely, the article seeks to give an empirical elaboration on the emergence of Indonesia’s self-identity that affects its conduct on the foreign policy, shown by the enactment of development assistance policy through the SSTC scheme.

Methodology

This article uses interpretive and qualitative approaches to answer the research questions. The supporting data will be secondary by nature and taken from desk research of literary sources such as books, journal articles, official documents, online websites, as well as
key foreign policymakers statements through text quotations or YouTube video quotations. In this regard, quotations from YouTube videos are important since there has been an increasing number of official government statements being recorded and put online. Thus, it allows more data to be utilized for this research, particularly in the aspect of policymakers’ role conception. Generally, the data used in this article is organized in the following lines: the data on Indonesia’s material capability is presented to explain Indonesia’s identity specifically in the aspect of the relationship to bodies. The data concerning national history on the other hand is used to explain historical narrative as another aspect of Indonesia’s identity. Key foreign policymaker statements are used to explain the process of Indonesia’s national role conception. Lastly, the data relating to the development of development assistance policy is used to demonstrate the existence of an international structure that influences the course of Indonesian development assistance policy.

Conceptual Framework

Identity is one of the focuses of constructivism. Identity is generally understood as images of individuality and distinctiveness of (‘selfhood’) held and projected by an actor (Jepperson, et al., 1996, p. 59). In the context of states, identity is a set of dominant ideas and images that defines state and shape state’s action in international politics (McCourt, 2011, p. 1604). Furthermore, constructivism contends that identity generates an actor’s interests and actions (Jepperson, et al., 1996, p. 60). Thus, a state will always bring its identity to interaction to decide what is its interests are and how those interests can be achieved (Wendt, 1992, p. 398). Identity also creates a boundary that differentiates ‘self’ from ‘other’, thus forms the norms that regulate actions appropriate to the boundary in question (Bozdaglioglu, 2003, p. 23).

Identity is often differentiated between corporate identity and social identity. According to Wendt, corporate identity refers to an intrinsic quality that shapes an actor’s individuality (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). Social identity on the other hand is understood as “a set of meanings that an actor attributes to itself using the perspective of another” (Wendt, 1994, p. 385).

Early thinkers such as Wendt views that identity emerges from social interaction, which underscores the inability of an actor to understand its own identity without referring to its interaction with another (Wendt, 1992, pp. 397-398). This view proves problematic since it sidelines the state’s internal dynamics in the formation of its identity before the said interaction took place. From this point of view, domestic sources such as social, political, and historical beliefs of society can be considered as factors that shape a state’s identity (Hopf, 2002). These domestic political and cultural contexts then become a point of reference for individuals that represent the state to put meanings into objects, phenomenon, and actions that is relevant with the formulation of foreign policy (Weldes, 1996, p. 280). This logic creates a perspective of identity as a self-identity, which is the self-definition of actor understanding towards the role it occupies in a social situation that motivates behavior appropriate with self-conception (Astrom & Rise, 2007, p. 225).
This understanding of self-identity can be summarized with the national identity approaches of Richard Lebow. According to him, identity is based on four elements which are role, affiliations, relationship to bodies, and historical narrative (Lebow, 2016, p. 3). The role is associated with the state’s behavior in a particular circumstance or order. Affiliation is seen as a strong attachment of a state with other international actors such as other states, groups of states, and international organizations. Relationship to bodies in this regard is an emotional attachment of the state to its geographical spaces as well as its national citizens. Lastly, a historical narrative is a collective narrative about the past, including both ethnic-based and national-based narratives.

At this point, three reasons highlight the suitability of Lebow’s approaches with the concept of self-identity elaborated above. First, Lebow’s concept of identity includes two types of Wendt’s identities: corporate identity in the forms of historical narrative and relationship to bodies; and social identity that corresponds to the state’s role and affiliations. Secondly, in the aspect of identity formation, Lebow also incorporates domestic elements into corporate identity, while also underscores the external aspects through social identity. Lastly, national identity links identity with foreign policy through Role theory (Lebow, 2016, p. 73).

Role theory assumes that the state’s behavior as an actor in the international community corresponds to the role assumed by the state (Chafetz, et al., 1996, p. 732). In this context, the role is defined as a set of expectations regarding the appropriateness of actor behavior in a given situation (Hewitt, 1997, pp. 59-63). In terms of identity, the role is a part of the country’s social identity (Aggestam, 2006). In other words, the role has the function of shaping the state’s social identity as an actor within the international community. As part of social identity, the role provides the actor with a reference point or frame of reference to interpret existing social situations and expectations of behavior following the social situations (Nabers, 2011, p. 83). In this situation, the role serves as a link between identity and state action in the form of foreign policy (McCourt, 2011).

The state’s role is formed through a process known as national role conception. This process was first defined by Holsti as:

“the policy makers’ own definitions of the general kind of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their “image” of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment” (Holsti, 1970, pp. 245-246).

In short, the role conception can also be understood as follows:

“an individual’s understanding of the state’s identity–his or her sense of what the nation naturally stands for and how high it naturally stands in comparison to others in the international arena” (Hymans, 2006, p. 19).

Based on national role conception, individual policymakers occupy an important position in shaping the state’s role. The focus
on individual policymakers is justified by the tendency for policymakers from one country to have similar role conceptions (Wish, 1980, pp. 549-550). This phenomenon is possible because policymakers participate in articulating a vision of the state’s role in international relations that originates from the cultural context of the state in question (Hudson, 1999, p. 769). In the concept of identity, this cultural context can be understood as corporate identity. Apart of based on domestic elements or corporate identity, national role conception too must also respond to the dynamics of the international structure as a foundation of foreign policy (Breuning, 2011, p. 24). The relationship between these various elements can be seen in the following figure.

**Figure 1.** Relationship between identity, structure, national role conception, and foreign policy.

The role is categorized into two parts, generalized role (meta-role) and auxiliary role (Bengtsson & Elgström, 2011, p. 114) (Thies & Sari, 2018, p. 403). A generalized role is a salient role, thus can be seen across contexts, and consists of a set of supporting roles that are shown in a specific issue scope. Auxiliary role on the other hand is demonstrated through a tertiary role that is foreign policy specific. Thus, the state’s role manifests into foreign policy at first instance through a generalized role, which branches into an auxiliary role before finally transforms into foreign policy action through a tertiary role.

The arguments given in this article are presented in two parts. The first part explains the formation of Indonesia’s self-identity as a middle power with strong affiliations towards developing countries. The formation of Indonesia’s self-identity is elaborated through the emergence of Indonesia’s identity that arises out of its relationship to bodies and historical narratives. This personal identity in turn is referred to by foreign policymakers in the process of national role conception. With the strengthening of its political and economic stability, Indonesia’s national role conception consolidated towards middle power with strong affiliations to developing countries.

The second part accounts for the connection between Indonesia’s identity and its foreign policy. In this part, the policy of development assistance is taken as a practice that marks the auxiliary role of the middle power as a good international citizen. The contributions of Indonesia in SSTC are highlighted, particularly from the inception during the Afro-Asia Conference of 1955 to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement – Centre for SSTC in 1995. Lastly, the explanation on how identity affects the dynamics of Indonesia’s SSTC policy is presented as a relevant foreign policy strategy for middle power with strong affiliations towards the developing country.

The findings are summarized in the conclusion, which contends that Indonesia’s self-identity drives the enactment of development assistance policy through the SSTC scheme. This act highlights two related
justifications: first being the role as a good international citizen and middle power; secondly, Indonesia’s strong affiliations to fellow developing countries. Examining its formation, Indonesia’s role and affiliations are a byproduct of national role conception processes, done by foreign policymakers using Indonesia’s physical and historic qualities as a reference. Furthermore, these findings put the identity approach as a middle way that bridges material and normative approaches together.

**Indonesia’s Identity and Role Conception**

Relationship to bodies is one of the sources of Indonesia’s corporate identity. Generally, relationship to bodies includes material capability that state possesses and specifies state’s behavior in the international order. In this context, the relationship to bodies is represented by geographical space, resource and economic wealth, as well as the size of the population. From the geographical point of view, Indonesia is mainly seen to have a strategic value that President Soekarno termed as a cross-position (kreuzposition) since “[it] situated on cross-position between two continents and two oceans” (Simatumpang & Matondang, 1989, p. 60). Besides having a strategic value, Indonesia’s territorial spaces have an area of 1.9 million km², placing it as the largest country in Southeast Asia and the fourteenth largest in the world.

In terms of resources and economy, Indonesia has great potential. In the first aspect, Indonesia is the world’s largest exporter of various mining and plantation products such as coal, processed tin, and nickel as well as palm oil, rubber, and coffee (Dutu, 2015). On the economic aspect, Indonesia is one of the largest economies in the world with the potential for rapid growth. The Indonesian economy is ranked the 16th largest in the world using GDP calculations (World Bank, 2019). Furthermore, Indonesia in 2050 is projected to become the fourth-largest economy in the world after China, India, and the United States (PwC, 2017). The last aspect of the relationship to bodies is the population size of Indonesia. In 2019, Indonesia’s population will reach 270 million (World Bank, 2019). This figure places Indonesia in the ranking of the fourth largest country in the world by population.

The historical narrative is also an important reference for the formation of Indonesia’s identity. This reference is specifically directed to two historical periods, namely the ancient heyday of the Srivijaya and Majapahit eras, as well as the national revolution period 1945-1949 (Smith, 2000) (Leifer, 1986). The formation of a modern Indonesian identity that refers to ancient glory can be traced to Soekarno’s defense speech in 1930, which compared the triumph of Indonesian kingdoms in the past with the darkness under Dutch colonialism (Soekarno, 1970, p. 29). This thinking was further developed by Muhammad Yamin who introduced the concept of Sriwijaya and Majapahit as the first and second national states, the precursor to modern Indonesia as the third national state (Yamin, 1954).

Beside the image of ancient glory are the experiences during the national revolution 1945-1949. In this context, Indonesia’s 1945 proclamation of independence had to be defended through a bitter and expensive physical and political struggle before it was
officially recognized (Leifer, 1986, p. 37). This situation was driven by the Dutch’s efforts to restore Indonesia’s status as a colony, supported by the United States and other major powers. Even though in the end this support was withdrawn, Western powers backing of the Dutch has formed a perception of antipathy towards western countries which are seen as having the same interests as the colonial state (Sukma, 1995, p. 307). This perception in subsequent developments became more entrenched, partly due to the issue of West Irian and the involvement of the West in various regional rebellions. In the end, this perception gave rise to a strong anti-colonialism tendency and manifested itself in vigilance against western powers and solidarity with fellow colonized countries in Asia and Africa.

**Formative Era of Indonesia’s National Role Conception**

Indonesia’s national role conception can be seen for the first time in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution which stated Indonesia’s role to realize world order based on independence, peace, and social justice as one of the national government’s goals. The emergence of this conception is a consequence of the perceptions of policymakers towards the reality of the international system and the condition of Indonesia in general. In the first instance, independence, peace, and social justice were chosen as a form of opposition colonialism which was seen by policymakers as an integral part of the international order (Weinstein, 1976, p. 50). On the other hand, the principle of peace reflects Indonesia’s position as a postcolonial state, relatively weak and vulnerable (Hatta, 1946, p. 7). Under these conditions, world peace became the main prerequisite for Indonesia to rehabilitate its national economic conditions (Hatta, 1953). Commitment to peace through the principle of neutrality also allows Indonesia to receive assistance from any country or bloc (Hatta, 1958, pp. 480-481).

The conception of Indonesia’s international role in the following years was adapted to the context of the Cold War into the principle of free and active foreign policy which was coined by Hatta through his speech in 1948. In this speech, Hatta underlined the need for Indonesia to take an independent stand in the conflict between the two superpowers: the USSR and the United States (Noer, 2018, p. 123). This principle was later clarified in the statement of Prime Minister Wilopo in 1952. In the independent or independent aspect, this principle is stated as:

“[T]he government’s foreign policy will be carried out in an independent manner, ... namely within the international sphere that confronts two blocs - namely the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc, the Republic of Indonesia has decided to adopt an independent policy in the sense that:

a) do not permanently take sides by promising oneself to one of the two opposing blocs;

b) does not promise to permanently abstain or be neutral in any incident that may arise from the two-bloc feud.”

On other hand, the active principle is elaborated as follows:
“[T]he government’s independent policy is positive in the sense that if a problem involving two blocks arises ... the Republic of Indonesia will continue to base its policy on its free action by relying on:

a) the view of the aim and purpose of being a sincere, loyal and serious member of the United Nations;

b) ...

Given its aims and intentions as a member of the United Nations, the Republic of Indonesia will support all efforts within the framework of the United Nations to eliminate or reduce tensions between the two blocs to prevent the possibility of a large-scale conflict that could trigger a Third World War” (Hatta, 1953, p. 447).

Although the active principle is formulated with reference to the United Nations, it should be underlined that Indonesia’s active principle is articulated based on independence in action. In this context, Hatta stated:

“The government believes that the stance we ought to take is that we do not become objects in international political struggles, but that we must remain as a subject who has the right to determine our own policy” (Hatta, 1953, p. 446).

Through the statement above, Hatta conceptualized Indonesia as a third power that stood outside the Cold War feud (Noer, 2018, p. 124). This conception is contextualized specifically with Indonesia’s material capabilities, including geographic location, size of area, and population and results in perceptions of policymakers about the importance of Indonesia’s role in the international political arena (Suryadinata, 1995, p. 7). In this case, Hatta argued that “[with] the wealth of natural resources and a large population automatically places Indonesia as an important factor in the world political arena” (Hatta, 1958, p. 1)

This view of Indonesia’s important position in the international order was increasingly shown during the reign of Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo. Under his leadership, Indonesia joined the Colombo Powers which affirmed their position as ‘representatives of the new Asian power’ who stood outside the political bloc but remained active in international relations (Ewing, 2019, p. 1). In that capacity, Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo initiated a broader meeting between African and Asian nations (Abdulgani, 1980, p. 13). This idea was successfully realized in the Asian-African Conference (KAA) held in Bandung in 1955. As a consequence, this

1 Colombo Powers was a participant of the Colombo Conference which was held on 28 April 1954 to 2 May 1954 in Sri Lanka. The conference was attended by Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Burma, India and Pakistan. This conference did not discuss specific issues, but instead discussed issues related to common interests such as the Indochina conflict and recognition of the People’s Republic of China.
success strengthened Indonesia’s image as a leading country (Leifer, 1986, p. 56) among Indonesia’s foreign policymakers.

Fueled by this success, Indonesia’s foreign policy under President Soekarno was characterized by further ambitions to make Indonesia a true leader among other postcolonial countries (Leifer, 1986, p. 82). Under President Soekarno, Indonesia became one of the five countries that initiated the Conference for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 (Suryadinata, 1995, p. 173), and also became the founding country of the G-77 in 1964. Furthermore, President Soekarno pioneered a novel view of the international order characterized by “conflict between emerging powers (NEFOS)... and old dominant forces (OLDEFOs)” rather than conflicts between ideologies (Leifer, 1986, p. 85). Indonesia in this case was categorized as a NEFOS (Leifer, 1986, p. 86). As an effort to affiliate Indonesia into NEFOS, President Soekarno initiated the holding of the Conference of The New Emerging Forces (CONEFO), a United Nations opposition organization based in Jakarta (Modelski, 1963, pp. 1-31). In addition, President Soekarno also proclaimed the Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis (Redfern, 2010) as a revolutionary bloc in Asia.

Indonesia as Middle Power

The revolutionary fervor of Indonesian foreign policy gradually fades away with the withering of the Old Order. This was stated by General Suharto in his speech to the MPRS in 1966:

“To create solidarity between nations in this world in general and Asia and Africa in particular, arrogant attitude, conspicuous Indonesian leadership, posing as pioneers, champion and so on have been abandoned and replaced by more reasonable approaches based on equal standing and mutual respect” (Leifer, 1986, p. 171).

While the flamboyant foreign policy was rejected, perceptions of Indonesia’s prominence were still deeply rooted among Indonesian foreign policymakers (Leifer, 1986, p. 162). However, this perception will be put aside for a moment in the context of stabilization of political and economic situations, as stated in President Soeharto’s statement in 1969: “[W]e can only play an effective [international] role if we have a great national power” (Leifer, 1986, p. 163).

This effective role only began to materialize after the re-election of President Soeharto in 1983 and was also supported by Indonesia’s political and economic stability. At this point, Indonesia’s foreign policymakers began to conceptualize Indonesia’s role as a middle power. This view was first coined by CSIS researchers in 1985, who stated that Indonesia should behave like a middle power (Suryadinata, 1995, p. 8). Furthermore, this

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2 CSIS (Centre for Strategic and International Studies) is a think-tank that was founded in 1971 and focuses on raising issues surrounding public policy in Indonesia. During the New Order, this institution was known to have close links with policy makers, especially from ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) such as Benny Moerdani and Ali Moertopo.
role as an influential and prominent middle power is seen as a natural thing for Indonesia given its position as the largest country in Southeast Asia (Djiwandono, 1985, pp. 450-451). This view can also be seen in Minister Ali Alatas’ 1988 speech regarding a new direction for Indonesia’s foreign policy:

“The political consolidation and economic progress that Indonesia has achieved through national development have enabled us to not only play a participatory role.

As the initiator and host of the KAA and also the initiator of the NAM; as a member of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, OPEC, ASEAN, Group of 77, the Conference of Disarmament as well as other international organizations; as a major producer of raw materials, Indonesia has a noteworthy and potential position among third world countries. Therefore, if we play the role of pioneers, as has been proven in our process of struggle for independence and North-South negotiations, the world will accept our role as something natural. This is expected of us too” (Alatas, 1988).

This statement was later concluded by Alatas by stating “this is the moment for Indonesia to play a more active and assertive role which also corresponds with our national interests” (Suryadinata, 1995, p. 177).

This point marks the beginning of the consolidation of Indonesia’s specific role as a middle power. Middle-power countries are defined in this sense as those that are “in terms of strength, capacity, and influence at the middle level and demonstrate the ability to promote or hinder global governance and governance” (Jordaan, 2003, p. 165). In terms of behavior, a middle power country is characterized by three aspects that are part of the concept of middle power qualities. The first quality of a middle power is a commitment to universal values such as human rights, multilateralism, and international law (Souter, 2016, p. 795). This commitment is often associated with the aspiration for moral superiority. The second quality is a commitment to multilateralism, which is the strategy of the middle power countries to increase their bargaining power and legitimacy relative to the major powers (Thies & Sari, 2018, p. 401). Lastly, middle powers are characterized by their tendency to maintain a degree of autonomy over the major powers. However, this autonomy is still influenced by the major power countries which determine and limit the behavior of middle power countries (Holbraad, 1984).

The three qualities above are translated into the language of role theory by categorizing the three into supporting roles of the general role as a middle power, namely: good international citizen, supporter of multilateralism, and supporter of the international order (Thies & Sari, 2018, p. 404). For the auxiliary roles, these three roles are further translated into tertiary roles that are specific to context and policy. These tertiary roles include peacekeepers and mediators as part of good international citizens; consensus builders and regional leaders as a part of being a supporter of multilateralism; as well as economic collaborators in the role as a...
supporter of the international order. However, it must be understood that the role of the middle power always follows the context and dynamics of the international system (Cox, 1989, p. 825). Thus, there will be variations in the roles that the middle power assumes depending on their role conception (Karim, 2018, p. 350).

After the fall of the New Order, it took at least five years of recovery for Indonesia to be an active actor on the international stage once more. This coincided with the end of President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s tenure, during which Indonesia hosted the 2003 ASEAN Summit which was seen as an event to “strengthen Indonesia’s role, commitment and leadership in ASEAN” (Weatherbee, 2005, p. 150). President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who took the next term of presidency, also demonstrated efforts to strengthen Indonesia’s international role (Karim, 2018, p. 352). In this context, President Yudhoyono stated that his foreign policy would seek to make Indonesia an “outward-oriented country, eager to establish regional and international order, and to make its voice heard” (Mitton, 2005). In terms of role, President Yudhoyono conceptualized Indonesia as a “peacemaker, trust builder, problem solver, and bridge-builder” (Yudhoyono, 2005).

The consolidation of Indonesia’s role as a middle power commenced again during President Yudhoyono’s second term. In terms of Indonesia’s role, President Yudhoyono expanded it to include: norm-setters; consensus builders; peacekeepers; bridge builders; and representatives of developing countries (Yudhoyono, 2012). The aspiration to take on these various roles can be seen through Indonesia’s contributions to three international organizations, namely ASEAN, the United Nations, and the G20 (Fitriani, 2015, p. 73). Within ASEAN, Indonesia is actively encouraging the democratization process of Myanmar and bridging differences between member countries on the issue of the South China Sea dispute. At the United Nations, Indonesia’s role was exhibited, among others, through Indonesia’s membership as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2007-2008 period, the host of UN Climate Change Conference in 2007, and the appointment of President Yudhoyono as vice chairman of the UN high-level panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Finally, in the G20, President Yudhoyono has never been absent to attend the organization’s summit since 2008, by posing Indonesia as a representative for Southeast Asia and developing countries (Fitriani, 2015, p. 76).

Indonesia’s active foreign policy has been generally maintained during the Presidency of Joko Widodo, even though his leadership tends to focus more on domestic issues. As shown in various diplomatic initiatives, including holding the 60th KAA Commemoration in 2015; chairmanship in the Indian Ocean Rim Association multilateral forum in 2015-2017; Saudi Arabia - Iran mediation efforts in 2016; and the delivery of humanitarian aid in the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar (Rosyidin, 2017, p. 176). Under President Widodo, strengthening the role as a middle power became part of Indonesia’s foreign policy direction for the first time. This can be looked at in the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi, who mentioned Indonesia as a middle power
country noting its population size, the form of government, and membership in the G20 (Kemlu, 2015). In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Plan also included the strengthening of the middle power role as a director of Indonesia’s foreign policy (Kemlu, 2015, p. 48).

**Middle Power and Development Assistance**

Development assistance is broadly defined as the practice of providing resources from one country to another or international organizations and non-governmental organizations to improve the standard of living of people in aid recipient countries (Lancaster, 2007, p. 1). This practice is one of the main issues in the sphere of contemporary international political economy. Hans Morgenthau notes development assistance as “a real innovation in foreign policy practices brought about by the modern era” (1962, p. 301). This innovation was initiated by the United States through the Marshall Plan which was aimed at restoring the economic conditions of countries that were devastated after the Second World War.

During the Cold War, the policy of providing development assistance as a practice of international relations expanded, both in terms of the donor country and the recipient country. This can be attributed to the views of providing development assistance to fulfill the role of a rich and developed country towards a poorer and less developed country (Lancaster, 2007, pp. 215-218). This view was also expressed by President Nixon in a speech to the United States Congress in 1969 which discussed the provision of development assistance as a foreign policy:

“There is a moral quality in this nation that will not permit us to close our eyes to the want in this world. . . . We have shown the world that a great nation must also be a good nation. We are doing what is right to do.” (Nixon, 1969)

In this logic, it can be inferred that the policy of providing development assistance is closely related to the fulfillment of a good international citizen role (Jordaan, 2003, p. 11). In this context, the role of being a good international citizen can be understood through a commitment to universal values such as human rights, international law, and multilateralism (Souter, 2016). These universal values can also be expanded to include economic development, peace, and solidarity which are often found in the justifications behind the policy of providing development assistance (Abbondaza, 2020, p. 10). However, this does not mean that countries that act as good international citizens will base their actions entirely on altruism, but also on instrumentalism to fulfill their interests (Murray, 2013, pp. 92-93). Thus, the role of being a good international citizen incorporates a foreign policy based on values and interests and thus represents a middle ground between realism and idealism (Thies & Sari, 2018, p. 400).

Conceptually, the role of a good international citizen is in turn associated with the role of a middle power as an auxiliary role that establishes the general role. This approach is attributed to the basic conceptual similarities between the two, where the role of being a good international citizen represents a qualitative connotation - normative and behavioral aspects, of the role of a middle
power (Abbondaza, 2020, p. 5). A similar vein can also be located in the discussion of international relations theorists, who stated that the role of being a good international citizen is the key to middle power behavior (Cooper, et al., 1993, p. 19). Furthermore, the role of being a good international citizen leads to a classic role as a middle power (Lightfoot, 2006), because the role in question helps define middle power diplomacy and enhances the global reputation of a middle power country (Youde & Slagter, 2013).

Indonesia and Development Assistance

Apart from being a recipient, Indonesia also plays a role as a provider of development assistance through SSTC. In this context, the holding of the KAA along with Indonesia’s important role in it marks the starting point of the SSTC initiative both in the global order and in Indonesia’s foreign policy. This was stated in the KAA’s final communiqué which contained an agreement of participating countries to provide mutual technical assistance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Indonesia, 1955). This commitment to South-South cooperation in the KAA was then continued at the NAM Conference in 1961 which became a joint initiative of President Soekarno and the heads of state of Egypt, Yugoslavia, Ghana, and India (Suryadinata, 1995, p. 173) Apart from these two landmark participation, Indonesia’s involvement as one of the pioneers of the G-77 in 1964 (Kornas KSST, 2017, p. 18), as well as the formation of UNDP in 1969 (Winanti & Alvian, 2019, p. 5) also participated denoting Indonesia’s track record within SSTC.

The next important landmark for Indonesia in SSTC occurred when Indonesia became chairman of the NAM during 1992-1995. During this period of chairmanship, Indonesia together with Brunei Darussalam succeeded in initiating the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement Center for South-South Technical Cooperation (NAM-CSSTC) in 1995 (CEACoS, 2010, p. 53). The formation of this body is aimed at strengthening the Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) scheme which was previously established by the G-77. In a larger perspective, Indonesia’s initiative was motivated by the desire to create new directions for NAM in the post-Cold War world order. This goal is then achieved by making economic issues such as economic backwardness the focus of the NAM (Suryadinata, 1995, p. 177). In addition, the focus of NAM on economic issues also opens space for Indonesia to play a more decisive role in the organization, referring to the success of Indonesia’s national development in creating economic progress and political consolidation (Alatas, 1988, p. 15). In other words, the formation of NAM-CSSTC can be seen as Indonesia’s effort to reinforce its important role in the global order.

Experiencing a setback following regime change in 1998, Indonesia’s involvement in SSTC rose again in 2005 (CEACoS, 2010). This was demonstrated when Indonesia and South Africa initiated an initiative called the New Asia-African Strategic Partnership in the 50th anniversary of the KAA (CEACoS, 2010, p. 66). In this document, the formation of technical assistance and capacity-building programs is included in a joint ministerial statement under the section on economic
cooperation (NAASP, 2005). The significance of SSTC for Indonesian foreign policy was also demonstrated through the establishment of the Directorate for Technical Cooperation within the institutional structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2006 to increase the active role of cooperation between Indonesia and develop countries (CEACoS, 2010, p. 67).

The period of Indonesia’s increasing role was accompanied by significant changes in the development policy architecture at the global level. In this context, the landscape of development aid is experiencing a proliferation of donors from emerging powers such as China and India (Nurshafira, 2019, p. 53). This change was reflected in the approval of the Accra Action Agenda at the ministerial meeting of the High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness 3 in 2008 organized by the OECD and the World Bank and attended by donor institutions and donor-recipient countries. The Accra Agenda for Action contains three main points in development assistance policies: ownership by recipient countries; expansion of partnerships; and openness (OECD, 2008). The second point, in this case, has an important position because it contains explicit recognition of the important role of middle-income countries and the South-South Cooperation scheme in supporting global development (HLF 3, 2008, p. 4) (Tortora, 2011, p. 2). Thus, the SSTC provided by developing countries is also given the same importance as the development assistance provided by the OECD through Official Development Aid (ODA).

The Implementation SSTC as a Means to Strengthen Indonesia’s Self-identity

The implementation of SSTC by Indonesia can be traced through Jakarta Commitment that was signed by Indonesia with donor countries. In general, the document confirms the equality of donor countries with Indonesia as a recipient country in setting the direction of existing development assistance. In addition, the Jakarta Commitment also contains clauses from the Indonesian government to strengthen processes and institutions that facilitate SSTC with development partner countries to support this step (Government of Indonesia, 2009, p. 3). Implicitly, the document also refers to Indonesia’s participation in the G20 which underlines Indonesia’s important role in contemporary global political economy architecture, as well as the Accra Agenda for Action which provides space for Indonesia, which is a middle-income country, to be actively involved as a donor of international development assistance. Indonesia’s commitment to the implementation of SSTC, in this case, is again shown through the 2010-2014 RPJMN, which alludes to Indonesia’s position in SSTC as a strategic position referring to Indonesia’s various involvement in the SSTC scheme and also it’s potential (Presiden RI, 2010, p. 1139). Furthermore, the increase in SSTC is included in the RPJMN as the target of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

This commitment was included in the 2015-2019 RPJMN that noted Indonesia’s involvement in SSTC as part of the framework to increase Indonesia’s role in global and regional cooperation (Presiden Republik Indonesia, 2015, p. 98). This is highlighted in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plan 2015-2019. In this document, Indonesia’s SSTC program is linked to two aspects: Indonesia’s position as
a middle-income country in particular (Kemlu, 2015, p. 18); and Indonesia as a middle power in international relations in general (Kemlu, 2015, p. 48). The idea of South-South Cooperation was also included in President Widodo’s first presidential program known as Nawacita. In this program, there is a special emphasis on the role of Indonesia as one of the countries providing South-South Cooperation (Sekretariat Nasional Joko Widodo, 2014).

The affirmation of commitment to SSTC by the government, in this case, was followed by real implementation with the inauguration of the International Agency for International Development or Indonesian AID at the end of 2019 (Yasmin, 2019). INDOAID itself has at least been planned since 2017 starting with a budget of Rp. 1 Trillion in the 2018 State Budget as an international aid fund (Pemerintah Indonesia, 2017, p. 38). This budget in the following year is set at Rp. 2 Trillion in the 2019 State Budget, and the 2020 State Budget is set at Rp. 1 Trillion (Pemerintah Indonesia, 2018, p. 37) (Pemerintah Indonesia, 2019, p. 38). The budgeting for the last two APBNs has been under the International Development Cooperation Fund (LDKPI), so that until 2020, INDOAID has received funds of Rp. 4 Trillion. Although it is only projected to be fully operational in 2021, there are seven countries confirmed to receive INDOAID grants in 2019, namely: Tuvalu, Nauru, Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Kiribati in the Pacific region; and Myanmar and the Philippines in Southeast Asia (Hasan, 2019). Furthermore, this development assistance program will be realized in the form of SSTC, and in addition, to focus on the development sector, it will also focus on good governance and the economy.

Indonesia’s step in forming the INDOAID program is seen by many as something that is needed by Indonesia as one of the influential countries in the world. This idea was expressed several times at the INDOAID inauguration ceremony (YouTube, 2019). On this occasion, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi stated that “Indonesia AID ... can strengthen Indonesia’s contribution and role in the international world”. In response to this statement, Minister of Finance Sri Mulyani added that “[T]his institution ... will ... presents Indonesia as the world’s major country ...”. More specifically, Vice President Jusuf Kalla referred to Indonesia’s position as “[A] member of the G20 ... to help each other with countries in need”. Vice President Jusuf Kalla ended by saying “[I]t’s enough for us to ask for help, it’s time for us to do the giving hand diplomacy ...”. On a different occasion, Vice President Jusuf Kalla concerning the development aid policy said that one of the reasons for the formation of INDOAID was that so “[W]e don’t always ask for help ... we also gallantly [give] ... thus gives us value in this world ... (YouTube, 2019).

Through the explanation above, the emergence of Indonesia as a donor country cannot be separated from its role and affiliation as part of Indonesia’s identity. The role of a middle power country in the policy-making process can be seen in several aspects. First, the focus on SSTC began to re-emerge under President Yudhoyono (CEACoS, 2010). As previously explained, President Yudhoyono has a foreign policy vision that places Indonesia, among others, as a peacekeeper; trust builder; Fixers; and representatives of developing countries
(Yudhoyono, 2005) which implicitly emphasized Indonesia’s role as a middle power. The focus on SSTC on the other hand can be seen through the initiatives signed under his leadership including the NAASP and the Paris Declaration in 2005, the Accra Action Agenda and the Doha Conference in 2008; and the Jakarta Commitment in 2009 (CEACoS, 2010, p. 68).

Under President Widodo, the link between their role as a middle power and SSTC policy became increasingly clear. This connection was shown when in 2015, the middle power countries and SSTC were included in the RPMJN and the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of the direction of Indonesia’s foreign policy. In the first aspect, the 2015-2019 RPJMN includes Indonesia’s involvement in SSTC as part of the framework to increase Indonesia’s role in global and regional cooperation (Presiden Republik Indonesia, 2015, p. 98). Referring to this point, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plan in 2015 includes increasing SSTC as one of the strategies to fulfill policy direction 3, namely increasing the role and influence of Indonesia as a middle power (Kemlu, 2015, p. 50). In other words, fulfilling Indonesia’s role as a middle power can be done through the implementation of SSTC.

Not only related to the role as a middle power but SSTC policy is also related to Indonesia’s role as a good international citizen. In general, this can be seen through linking the role of a donor country with its position as a middle-income country (Kemlu, 2015, p. 18). Through the trend towards aid effectiveness, today’s position as a middle-income country is seen as having a role in overcoming global development issues. This idea was first raised in the Paris Declaration in 2005, which recognized the contribution and centrality of middle-income countries as providers of development assistance and SSTC as a policy approach (OECD, 2005, p. 18). In the Indonesian context, this situation can also be seen in the Jakarta Commitment, which states the need for Indonesia as a middle-income country to contribute to improving the architecture of international development assistance for both low-income and fellow middle-income countries (Government of Indonesia, 2009, p. 1).

As an example, this role fulfillment is shown through the flagship programs of Indonesia’s SSTC, one of which being good governance and peacebuilding programs (National Coordination Team of SSTC, 2014, p. 10). Good governance and peacebuilding programs are further specified into issues such as democracy, rule and law, and peacekeeping. In general, these issues form the universal values that Indonesia as a good international citizen commits itself to. In particular, this flagship activity alludes to Indonesia’s identity as the third-largest democracy and also its experience in handling transition process that is relatively successful (National Coordination Team of SSTC, 2014, p. 32). Besides democracy, Indonesia’s SSTC activities under the umbrella of good governance and peacebuilding also include issues such as human rights and women empowerment.

Furthermore, it should be noted that fulfilling the role as a good international citizen is included in the Indonesian constitution so that the policy of providing development assistance is also seen as part of realizing peace and social welfare which is the mandate of the
This view was emphasized by Vice President Jusuf Kalla in his 2015 address to the UN General Assembly:

“[I]n narrowing global disparities, we should encourage and support the strengthening of South-South cooperation. In this context, Indonesia will establish the Asian African Centre ... aimed at revitalizing the partnership between Asian and African countries to promote peace and prosperity” (UN, 2015).

Referring to Indonesia’s eagerness to contribute to the international community, Vice President Kalla also reiterates his views at the UN General Assembly in 2016 by stating:

“[F]or Indonesia, SSTC is our way to support development in the least developed and developing countries ... Indonesia has always desired to contribute to global partnership, global peace and security, and global prosperity” (UN, 2017).

This role was emphasized by Vice President Kalla again in his speech before the UN General Assembly in 2018:

“As part of our global leadership and responsibility, Indonesia has taken concrete steps to implement its commitments ... through SSTC ... We will soon launch the Indonesia Aid for Development program to reinforce the delivery of our international assistance” (UN, 2018).

Apart from its role, Indonesia’s affiliation to developing countries also plays a role in the policy of development assistance allocation through the SSTC scheme. This is shown through the inclusion of the historical context of international cooperation as one of the main considerations behind Indonesia’s position as an important actor in SSTC (Kornas KSST, 2016, p. 13). The historical context of this international cooperation refers to Indonesia’s formative involvement in the development of SSTC as a practice, which was shown through its active role in the KAA in 1955, the NAM Conference in 1961, the Buenos Aires Plan of Action in 1978 (Muhibat, 2016, p. 119). The NAM Conference in 1961 in particular became the starting point for the development of the principles of solidarity and cooperation which became the basis of SSTC (CSIS, 2014, p. 18). Fulfillment of the principle of solidarity in turn also becomes one of the themes underlying the implementation of SSTC itself (Muhibat, 2016, p. 126).

Furthermore, SSTC also represents a policy approach to provide development assistance that is more accommodating to developing countries. In this respect, SSTC is distinguished from traditional North-South cooperation through positive qualities including horizontality and equality; demand-driven; not binding; and uphold mutual benefits and reciprocity (Nurshafira, 2019, p. 51). In other words, SSTC in principle does not have an interventionist tendency like traditional North-South cooperation. This in turn becomes important because SSTC has a position as a diplomatic instrument in Indonesia’s foreign policy (Kemlu, 2015, p. 19). Thus, it can be concluded that the implementation of SSTC that is more accommodating to developing countries is an important instrument for Indonesian diplomacy directed at fellow developing countries within or outside the region.
Conclusion

Indonesia’s policy of providing development assistance that is implemented through the SSTC scheme cannot be separated from Indonesia’s identity. In this capacity, the policy of providing international development assistance has a role to strengthen the identity that encompasses Indonesia’s role and affiliation. This self-identity in the form of roles and affiliations was then strengthened by the adoption of a policy of providing international development assistance by Indonesia through SSTC. In terms of role, the adoption of this policy reflects the fulfillment of the role of a good international citizen. By referring to the dynamics of similar policies carried out by other countries, this role can be seen as an auxiliary role that helps shape the main role as a middle power country. Thus, the implementation of this policy is closely related to fulfilling Indonesia’s role as a middle power country which is also supported by official documents and statements. On the other hand, Indonesia’s affiliation with developing countries is also the basis for selecting SSTC as a policy scheme for providing international development assistance. This can be seen through the long dynamic between Indonesia and SSTC which is influenced by its corporate identity as a developing country, both ideally from historical and material narratives through relationship to bodies. Lastly, it should be admitted that Indonesia’s SSTC policy goal to strengthen Indonesia’s identity has not been fully achieved. From an ideational point of view, this is due to the lack of an ideational narrative given to the policy. This perhaps is connected to the fact that Indonesia’s SSTC policy has not been publicized enough, both to a domestic or international audience. Thus, to fully grasp the potentials of the policy in realizing Indonesia’s identity among the international community, an effort to reinforce policy narrative should also be carried out following the improvement in the policy infrastructure and resources.

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