Share and Disperse: How to Resist Against Aggregator Compromises in Sensor Networks

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Abstract—A common approach to overcome the limited nature of sensor networks is to aggregate data at intermediate nodes. A challenging issue in this context is to guarantee end-to-end security mainly because sensor networks are extremely vulnerable to node compromises. In order to secure data aggregation, in this paper we propose three schemes that rely on multipath routing. The first one guarantees data confidentiality through secret sharing, while the second and third ones provide data availability through information dispersal. Based on qualitative analysis and implementation, we show that, by applying these schemes, a sensor network can achieve data confidentiality, authenticity, and protection against denial of service attacks even in the presence of multiple compromised nodes.

I. INTRODUCTION

Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are computer networks dedicated to monitoring physical conditions with the help of sensor nodes [1]. They support a wide range of applications including environmental and wild-life monitoring, building security and home automation, traffic flow measurement, medical care, and military operations.

In many applications of WSN, data may be sensitive to external events that are not expected to happen under normal operation of the network. In particular, data confidentiality and availability are important characteristics the network should be able to assure. Guaranteeing such characteristics is a tough task, especially when the sensor nodes are composed of inexpensive devices with limited hardware capabilities.\textsuperscript{1} In this case, where providing tamper resistance is almost impractical, compromising a node is an easy and attractive option for attackers.

The limited nature of sensor nodes opens up possibilities for multiple vectors of attack. Provided that radio communication is expensive in terms of energy consumption, it is very important to reduce the communication overhead.\textsuperscript{2} An interesting approach to achieve such an objective is to perform data aggregation, where relaying nodes exploit the distributed nature of the network and perform in-network processing. Guaranteeing security in aggregation schemes is particularly challenging because node compromises in such a scenario are doubly problematic, both in terms data confidentiality (eavesdropping) and availability (denial of service). Indeed, by compromising an aggregator node\textsuperscript{3} the attacker would endanger all of the readings that are part of the aggregate the node is in charge of.

Several researchers have already studied the problem of securing data aggregation. Mykletun et al. [3] suggest using ciphers for which some arithmetical operations over ciphertexts have some arithmetical signification on the cleartext. While this technique allows for some security, a compromised node may still stop aggregating and forwarding data. Even worse, tampering and replay attacks cannot be detected with such a solution. Przydatek et al. [4] propose a number of techniques to ensure the integrity of the aggregated data for some aggregation functions. Although integrity can be satisfactorily assured, the proposed schemes are difficult to implement and provide neither confidentiality nor protection against denial of service (DoS) attacks. Hu and Evans [5] propose a scheme that provides authentication and integrity which is secure even when some nodes are compromised, however it fails in the case where two consecutive aggregators are compromised. Furthermore, this scheme neither addresses confidentiality nor availability. Wagner [6] studies the inherent security of some aggregation functions. But he only considers the level of impact a compromised sensor may have on the final result. His work concerns the security of aggregation functions, not the aggregation security itself.

In this paper, we do not address data integrity as an explicit issue. Instead, we focus on confidentiality and availability, which we believe still lack efficient solutions. To this end, we propose, analyze, and evaluate three new schemes, namely (a) Secret Multipath Aggregation (SMA), (b) Dispersed Multipath Aggregation (DMA), and (c) Authenticated Dispersed Multipath Aggregation (A-DMA). The main idea behind our three approaches is to exploit using multiple paths toward the sink. In fact, a sensor may split a handful of its readings into \(n\) separate messages such that \(t\) messages are needed to reconstruct the readings. By sending messages along disjoint

\textsuperscript{1}It is important to note that sensors in WSN are not necessarily limited in resources, although most problems become particularly challenging in such a case.

\textsuperscript{2}Transmitting 1KB at a distance of 100 meters costs as much as executing 3 million instructions with a general purpose processor [2].

\textsuperscript{3}That is, capturing an aggregator node and having access to its internal state and cryptographic material. The attacker may therefore turn an authorized node into a malicious one.
paths, a sensor ensures that intermediate nodes do not have complete knowledge of the sensed data. In such a scenario, Sma guarantees confidentiality by applying the concept of secret sharing [7]. DMA and its authenticated version, A-DMA, address availability by dispersing information over different paths [8]. Although they have been recognized in many research areas (e.g., parallel computing, distributed storage, databases, and ad hoc networking), surprisingly neither secret sharing nor information dispersal have been applied to the context of wireless sensor networks nor to the specific problem of data aggregation.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe the security and network assumptions considered in the paper. In Section III we introduce our proposed schemes. In Section IV we analyze their security levels. In Section V we provide further investigation on the three schemes and compares them to other approaches. Finally, in Section VI we conclude the paper and present some open issues.

II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

In the following, we describe the problems, goals, and assumptions addressed in this paper. The section is composed of three parts: (a) security aspects, (b) network assumptions, and (c) node assumptions.

A. Security goals and threats

The goal of this paper is to provide aggregation schemes that are resilient to node compromises. That is, a compromised node alone should not be able to eavesdrop, tamper, or forbid other nodes from accessing data. This paper assumes that resistance against these attacks in the absence of node compromise is ensured by link-level mechanisms [9], [10].

Even a single compromised aggregator node presents a serious threat to a sensor network’s security. Therefore, some schemes must be designed to ensure reasonable security in the presence of compromised aggregator nodes. Ideally, one would like the network security to degrade gracefully with the number of compromised nodes. By security, in this article we mean resistance against the following attacks: eavesdropping, data tampering, packet injection, and denial of service. Other attacks are out of the scope of this paper.

Eavesdropping. Eavesdropping occurs when an attacker compromises an aggregator node and listens to the traffic that goes through it without altering its behavior. Since an aggregator node processes various pieces of data from several nodes in the network, it does not only leak information about a specific compromised node, but from a group of nodes.

Data tampering and packet injection. A compromised node may alter packets that go through it. It may also inject false messages. Since an aggregate message embeds information from several sensor nodes, it is more interesting for an attacker to tamper with such messages than simple sensor readings. An attacker that controls the meaning of the malicious messages it sends may heavily impact the final result computed by the sink.

An attacker that does not control the meaning of the malicious messages (for example, if these messages are expected to be encrypted with a key unknown to the attacker) still can do some harm. It may send meaningless garbage values and thus render the network unusable – this is also a form of DoS attack. Finally, a particular type of packet injection consists of replay attacks, where a malicious node eavesdrops some packets in order to re-send them later.

Denial of service. A compromised node may stop aggregating and forwarding data. Doing so, it forbids the data sink from getting information about several nodes in the network. If the node still exchanges routing messages despite its unfair behavior, that problem may be difficult to solve. The compromised aggregator may in this way render the network unusable. Smarter attacks also involve dropping messages randomly. It is also difficult to detect when an attacker sends garbage messages. Finally, it is interesting to note that such attacks do not necessarily involve a high cost or extended skills. For example, a basic DoS attack may consist of simply physically breaking the device.

B. Network assumptions

We assume that each sensor disposes of multiple paths toward the sink and has link-level encryption capabilities. A node can then split a flow into several distinct sub-flows and send each one of them securely toward the sink. Due to encryption, a node cannot eavesdrop a sub-flow unless it belongs to the path for this flow.

In order to get multiple paths to the data sink, a solution is to use a multipath routing protocol or disperse several sinks geographically and communicate using fast and secure links. Ganesan et al. [11] study the establishment of multiple paths in sensor networks and Dulman et al. [12] explore the relationship between the amount of traffic and reliability. Note that schemes described in this paper require disjoint multipaths to enforce optimal security. Non-disjoint multipaths may be used, but optimal security cannot be guaranteed.

We also assume that the underlying routing protocol is secure. In particular, attention must be paid to spoofing and Sybil attacks [13]. Roughly speaking, this means that a node should not be able to impersonate another node or to pretend to be two distinct nodes. This should not be a problem however if the link-level encryption keys are distinct amongst the nodes.

C. Node computational/memory assumptions

We assume that nodes have very limited computation, memory and storage capabilities. This makes many cryptographic algorithms and protocols impractical, if not impossible to use. The proposed schemes were designed to work under such constraints.

We implemented our schemes using the typical Crossbow MICAz mote [14]. It uses an Atmel ATmega128L micro-chip (8-bit CPU at 8 MHz) with 4 Kbytes of RAM and 128 Kbytes of flash memory to store code and pre-computed program data. Its energy is provided by two AA batteries (∼3V). It communicates using a 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4 RF transceiver.
III. Resisting against Aggregator Compromises: Proposed Schemes

Preliminaries. In this section we present three schemes to achieve secure aggregation in sensor networks: Secret Multipath Aggregation (SMA), Dispersed Multipath Aggregation (DMA), and Authenticated Dispersed Multipath Aggregation (A-DMA). Each of these schemes has its own specific characteristics. SMA offers strong confidentiality at the cost of some communication overhead. DMA is optimal with respect to radio communications but provides a little bit lower level of confidentiality. A-DMA adds authentication to DMA also at the cost of a slight overhead. All these properties are quantified and analyzed in sections [4] and [5].

Basics. All the three proposed schemes use the same basic principle: a sensor node splits its readings into several shares and sends these shares over distinct paths. Each share makes its way to the data sink. During forwarding, a share may be processed by aggregator nodes. Once the sink has gathered enough shares for a given set of readings, it can then reconstruct this specific set of readings. However, a share alone is not intelligible to an intermediate node. Figure [1] depicts this.

Tolerance to losses. The way shares are constructed depends on the scheme (e.g., SMA’s encode only one reading per share while both DMA and A-DMA encode multiple readings per share). The number of shares transmitted and the number of shares required for reconstructions are not necessarily equal, which means that the system tolerates some losses during forwarding.

Security implications. The abovementioned properties yield two interesting security implications. First, an attacker must compromise many nodes to be able to reconstruct readings. This ensures confidentiality. Second, malicious nodes that stop forwarding shares have limited impact on the system, since another subset of shares may be used to reconstruct readings. This ensures protection against DoS attacks.

Homomorphism. A key point of these schemes is their homomorphic properties, i.e., the ability for aggregator nodes to perform computations on shares despite their unknown meaning. Say nodes $i$ and $j$ sense $r_i$ and $r_j$. An aggregator node may add up two shares from $i$ and $j$, which gives a corresponding share $r_i + r_j$. This holds for several aggregation functions on the shared secret, such as sum, mean, variance, and count [3, 6].

A. Scheme 1: Secret Multipath Aggregation (SMA)

SMA applies secret sharing to create shares, which is a common approach when dealing with security under the contingency of node compromise.

Share creation. Assume a node $i$ may use $p$ distinct paths to reach the sink, $t-1$ ($1 \leq t \leq p$) of which may be compromised (i.e., a node must have at least $t$ shares to reconstruct the reading). Upon reading a value $r_i$, sensor node $i$ chooses a random $t-1$ degree polynomial $P_i(x)$ such that $P_i(0) = r_i$. One may construct such a polynomial by randomly choosing $a_{i,k}, \forall k \in [1, t-1]$ and using $P_i(x) = r_i + a_{1,1}x + a_{1,2}x^2 + \ldots + a_{1,t-1}x^{t-1}$. This is a simple and practical operation. Each of the $p$ shares is then composed of the values $P_i(q)$ ($1 \leq q \leq p$). Node $i$ sends then a message containing $P_i(q)$ along every path $q$.

Reconstruction. In order to recover $r_i$, one must first recover $P_i$ using polynomial interpolation and then compute $r_i = P_i(0)$. This operation requires at least $t$ distinct shares. There is an infinity of $t-1$ degree polynomials that pass through $t-1$ points. Thus, $t-1$ compromised nodes cannot guess anything about $P_i$ and $r_i$. Also, the sink may tolerate up to $p - t$ non-responding nodes and still be able to recover $r_i$. Therefore, this scheme provides some confidentiality and robustness against denial of service attacks even in the presence of a few compromised nodes.

Data aggregation. Assume an aggregator node along a path $q$ must fuse the readings of $i$ and $j$, namely $r_i = P_i(0)$ and $r_j = P_j(0)$. Being on path $q$, the only data it receives is $P_i(q)$ and $P_j(q)$. It forwards $P_i(q) + P_j(q) = (P_i + P_j)(q)$. The same operation is performed on the other shares of these nodes over the different paths. By receiving $t$ samples, the sink may then recover $P_i + P_j$ and then $(P_i + P_j)(0) = r_i + r_j$. The result also holds for multiplication and scalar division.

Discussion. Due to the inherent property of secret sharing, SMA offers very strong confidentiality. An attacker that has not gathered at least $t$ shares cannot guess anything about the sensor readings. The confidentiality assured by SMA is obtained at the cost of some overhead in data transmission and therefore energy consumption. Upon sensing an event, $p$ messages need to be sent, each one of them being of the same size as the original reading. This is the main reason for which two other schemes (DMA and A-DMA) are proposed.

This is a well-known result of secret sharing that can be shown easily using information theory.
B. Scheme 2: Dispersed Multipath Aggregation (DMA)

Information dispersal is a common technique used to introduce redundancy and protection against Byzantine failures. Like secret sharing, it consists of a scheme that makes \( p \) shares out of a particular data, such that \( t \) of them are needed to reconstruct the data. Unlike secret sharing, a data block of length \( t \) is split into \( t \) pieces of length 1.\(^5\)

**Share creation.** Each sensor is pre-loaded with the same \( t \times p \) matrix \( A = \{a_{i,q}\} \). \( A \) should be chosen in such a way that every combination of \( t \) columns should form an invertible \( t \times t \) matrix. When sensing events, a sensor \( i \) accumulates its readings into an internal buffer of length \( t \), considered as a vector \( R_i = [ r_{i,1} \ r_{i,2} \ldots \ r_{i,t} ] \). This forms a block of readings. Once the buffer is full, the node is ready to compute \( p \) different shares of length 1 to send along the paths. These shares are the different elements of \( M = R_iA \), where element \( m_{i,q} \) of \( M \) is given by

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
    m_{i,1} & m_{i,2} & \ldots & m_{i,p} \\
    r_{i,1} & r_{i,2} & \ldots & r_{i,t}
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
    a_{1,1} & \cdots & a_{1,p} \\
    \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
    a_{t,1} & \cdots & a_{t,p}
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

That is:

\[
m_{i,q} = r_{i,1}a_{1,q} + r_{i,2}a_{2,q} + \ldots + r_{i,t}a_{t,q}.
\]

**Reconstruction.** When the sink receives \( t \) shares, it is in position of reconstructing the data. Assuming it receives \( M_i = [m_{i,q_{1}} \ m_{i,q_{2}} \ldots \ m_{i,q_{t}}] \), readings are obtained by resolving:

\[
\begin{align*}
    r_{i,1}a_{1,q_{1}} + r_{i,2}a_{2,q_{1}} + \ldots + r_{i,t}a_{t,q_{1}} &= m_{i,q_{1}} \\
    r_{i,1}a_{1,q_{2}} + r_{i,2}a_{2,q_{2}} + \ldots + r_{i,t}a_{t,q_{2}} &= m_{i,q_{2}} \\
    \vdots & \vdots \\
    r_{i,1}a_{1,q_{t}} + r_{i,2}a_{2,q_{t}} + \ldots + r_{i,t}a_{t,q_{t}} &= m_{i,q_{t}}
\end{align*}
\]

(3)

This may be done using a simple Gauss elimination method or by inverting the matrix constituted of the different \( q_{1}, \ldots, q_{t} \) columns of \( A \). If the matrix \( A \) is randomly chosen, no known methods exist to reconstruct parts of the original data from \( t-1 \) samples, although some correlation between the various \( r_{i,q} \) may be deduced.

**Data aggregation.** This scheme has homomorphic properties similar to secret sharing. Given messages \( m_{i,q} \) and \( m_{j,q} \) sent by nodes \( i \) and \( j \) on path \( q \), an aggregator node computes \( m_{i,q} + m_{j,q} \).

Since one has:

\[
m_{i,q} + m_{j,q} = \sum_{k=1}^{t} (r_{i,k} + r_{j,k})a_{k,q},
\]

then, upon reception of at least \( t \) such messages, the sink can reconstitute every \( r_{i,k} + r_{j,k} \) in a way similar to the system shown in Eq. (3):

\[
\begin{align*}
    (r_{i,1} + r_{j,1})a_{1,q_{1}} + \ldots + (r_{i,t} + r_{j,t})a_{t,q_{1}} &= m_{i,q_{1}} + m_{j,q_{1}} \\
    (r_{i,1} + r_{j,1})a_{1,q_{2}} + \ldots + (r_{i,t} + r_{j,t})a_{t,q_{2}} &= m_{i,q_{2}} + m_{j,q_{2}} \\
    \vdots & \vdots \\
    (r_{i,1} + r_{j,1})a_{1,q_{t}} + \ldots + (r_{i,t} + r_{j,t})a_{t,q_{t}} &= m_{i,q_{t}} + m_{j,q_{t}}
\end{align*}
\]

(5)

**Discussion.** This scheme is space efficient, i.e., reconstructing \( t \) readings requires only \( t \) shares of the same size. Using more shares \( (p > t) \) allows however for protection against DoS attacks.

Although the scheme is more efficient in terms of overhead than SMA, one must keep in mind that this scheme offers a weaker confidentiality than SMA. Compromising nodes allows an attacker to get some information about readings, even though partial readings cannot be reconstructed. This provides however sufficient confidentiality for sensor networks. One may therefore use this scheme to ensure loose confidentiality and resistance to node failures or DoS attacks. Note that no heavy computations need to be performed; only the sink has to solve the system of equations.

C. Scheme 3: Authenticated Dispersed Multipath Aggregation (A-DMA)

SMA and DMA as presented previously do not ensure protection from replay attacks nor data authenticity. A malicious attacker may eavesdrop a sensor node and then send the messages it listened to later. A malicious aggregator can also send garbage bits instead of the result of an expected computation and remain unnoticed. Of course, the sink may detect such an attack by performing two reconstructions with different sets of shares and notice the results are different. But still it cannot decide which of the results is correct.

**Authentication.** There exist techniques for verifiable secret sharing but they are currently impractical for sensor networks. For this reason, we focus on an authentication solution for DMA. We propose to replace the last reading of \( R_i \) with an element that includes sequence information and depends upon a secret shared among \( i \) and the sink. Let us assume \( R_i = [r_{i,1} \ldots r_{i,t-1} \ h(k_i, s) \] \), where \( h(\cdot) \) is a secure hash function modeled as a random oracle [15], \( k_i \) is a secret key between \( i \) and the sink, and \( s \) is a sequence number.

**Reconstruction.** After the reconstruction of \( \sum R_i \), the sink just needs to verify whether its last element is equal to \( \sum h(k_i, s) \). If not, then an aggregator node is cheating and the sink has to use another subset of messages to reconstruct \( \sum R_i \). This is not to be considered as a strict integrity check because the authentication value \( h(k_i, s) \) does not gather information from the readings \( r_{i,k} \). Therefore, an attacker that has compromised \( t \) nodes might be able to reconstruct \( h(k_i, s) \) and tamper with the data without being noticed. But using information from \( r_{i,k} \) in the authentication value is not possible because the sink does not know every \( r_{i,k} \)
only reconstructs $\sum r_{i,k}$. One may notice that the use of $s$ as a simple integrity check could be sufficient in practice. However, we opted to use a secret key $k_i$ and a hash function to make authentication values less predictable. This not only complicates the action of tampering with the data but it also seems to ensure a higher level of security in practice. By using such a solution, one would lose however the space efficiency of the scheme: reconstructing $t-1$ readings would imply using $t$ shares instead of $t-1$. In order to minimize that overhead a solution is to have blocks that contains more readings (by increasing $t$). If this results in having more shares than the number of paths available, one should use a large $t$ and send multiple shares on each path.

D. Summary and discussion

SMA splits each reading into a given number of shares and sends then one share per path. DMA accumulates several readings in an internal buffer before dispersing it into several shares. It sends one share per path. A-DMA accumulates several readings in an internal buffer, then inserts an authentication value into the buffer and disperses it into several shares, possibly more than the number of available paths.

Each of these schemes has some advantages and drawbacks. Some of them are global to all schemes, whereas some others are specific. First, all techniques provide resilience to unintentional failures and DoS attacks. Second, all techniques hide (a varying amount of) data from aggregator nodes, so that it is not possible for a few compromised nodes to reconstitute the sensed data, at least completely.

SMA provides full confidentiality, i.e., no information leaks from secret shares in the sense of information theory, unless at least $t$ of them are gathered, in which case the security collapses completely. This strong security is obtained however at the cost of duplicating each reading once per path. On the other hand, both DMA and A-DMA are space efficient, although each share leaks information about the readings. However, no existing techniques are known to reconstruct, even partially, sensor readings from $t-1$ shares.

IV. Security analysis

We first recall that proper lower-level mechanisms can protect a network in the absence of node compromises [16]. Protection from eavesdropping may be achieved with link-level encryption. Data tampering and packet injection are also inefficient when facing link-level authentication and encryption. Some physical-layer schemes and routing protocols may get around denial of service. But none of these techniques can protect the network from compromised nodes.

Security analysis in our case must be done with respect to the number of node compromises. Each scheme disperses sensed data along multiple paths. Most of the time, compromising a unique node is not sufficient for an attack to succeed: there is a threshold that defines the minimum number of nodes an attacker need to compromise in order to succeed in attacking. Three fundamental questions are:

1) How many compromised nodes does an attacker need at best to eavesdrop successfully and break confidentiality for a given scheme? Also, which nodes should be attacked?
2) What is the minimal number of nodes an attacker need to compromise to inject false data into the network? Which nodes should be chosen?
3) How many nodes need to be compromised at best in order for an attacker to succeed in a DoS attack?

It is important to underline that an attacker might not have the choice of which nodes to compromise. In practice, if $n$ nodes need to be compromised for an attack to succeed, the attacker may not have access to all of these $n$ nodes. Also, if the attacker does not have full knowledge of the topology, it may also be difficult to guess the interesting nodes to compromise. It may be a requirement that an attacker needs to compromise more nodes than the theoretical threshold.

In the following analysis, we assume without loss of generality that only one share is sent per path.

A. Eavesdropping

In this section we analyze the resilience the proposed schemes offer to node compromise when facing eavesdropping attacks (cf., Section II-A).

From the schemes, it appears that at least $t$ nodes are required to be compromised in order for a node to recover data. However, there are some subtleties. First, such a consideration holds for SMA because it does not leak any information until all of the $t$ shares are gathered. This is not the case for schemes based on information dispersal. Second, nothing guarantees that choosing $t$ nodes from distinct paths allows an attacker reconstructing some shares. Below we give explanations for these two phenomena.

1) DMA and A-DMA information leakage: According to information theory, due to the space efficiency of information dispersal and since all of the $p$ shares play a completely symmetrical role, each share contains exactly $\frac{1}{p}$ of the readings. Therefore, each share leaks some information and is then a source of information for an attacker. No known methods are known, however, to reconstruct parts of the readings from a subset of less than $t$ shares.

2) Possibility of data reconstruction with $t$ compromised paths: For the reconstruction operation to work properly, share aggregates should contain contributions from the same nodes. However, shares propagate on different paths, and among these paths the aggregator nodes receive contributions from various probably different nodes. This makes eavesdropping attacks difficult to implement.

Here is an example. Suppose that $t = 2$ and an attacker has succeeded in compromising two nodes $i$ and $j$ on two distinct paths. If the shares gathered by $i$ contain contributions from, say, nodes $k$ and $l$ and shares gathered by $j$ contain only contributions from node $k$, then any reconstruction will be impossible, though the attacker has compromised two distinct paths. If shares gathered by $j$ had contained contributions from
both nodes $k$ and $l$ then the reconstruction would have been possible.

B. Data tampering and packet injection

In this section we analyze the resilience the proposed schemes offer to node compromises when facing data tampering and packet injections (cf., Section II-A).

It is clear that an attacker that has compromised less than $t$ aggregator nodes has no effective control over the meaning of the data it injects into the network. Even if the attacker manages to compromise $t$ nodes, nothing guarantees that the sink would use the shares of all those $t$ nodes to perform a reconstruction (it may use shares from uncompromised paths). One can also imagine a scenario where an attacker succeeds in compromising one or several nodes on each possible path. Still in this case, the attacker may not be able to control the meaning of the injected/tampered data for the reason described in II-A.

Finally, since A-DMA provides an authentication check, an attacker that is not capable of reconstructing some readings (and therefore the authentication value for each sequence) has little chance of being able to fool the sink with tampered data. This because (a) the attacker does not know the expected authentication values and (b) it will be extremely difficult for the attacker to inject a share that would modify the readings but not the authentication value after reconstruction.

Even without authentication, the sink may notice that some data have been tampered if multiple reconstructions with different subsets of shares give different outputs. In this case, however, it cannot tell if there is a valid subset of shares for reconstruction.

An attacker that cannot control the meaning of tampered data can at best try to perform some kind of denial of service attack. That is, it may try to tamper with enough messages to make reconstruction impossible. In this case the security parameters will behave as described in the following.

C. Denial of service attacks

In this section we analyze the resilience of the proposed schemes when facing denial of service attacks (cf., Section II-A).

There are two kinds of DoS attacks: those where attackers stop emitting data (let us call it no-data DoS attacks) and those where they send garbage data (let us call it garbage-data DoS attacks). Garbage-data DoS attacks are more difficult to handle. In the absence of data authentication, an attacker needs only to compromise one path and send some garbage data on it. In this case, the sink has multiple possible outputs for reconstruction but cannot tell which ones are valid. In the presence of data authentication, garbage-data DoS attacks are indistinguishable from no-data DoS attacks — invalid reconstructions are rejected as if the wrong share had never arrived.

No-data and garbage-data DoS attacks in the presence of authentication need to prevent the sink from gathering $t$ valid shares. Therefore, an attacker needs to compromise at least $p - t + 1$ distinct paths, i.e., in the worst case, $p - t + 1$ nodes.

If the attacker does not know the routing topology, it cannot do anything but compromise random nodes. Therefore, it will probably have to compromise more than $p - t + 1$ nodes.

Let $t_c$ and $t_d$ be, respectively, the minimum number of compromised nodes required to eavesdrop communications and the minimum number of compromised nodes required to succeed in a DoS attack. From previous sections, $t_c = t$ and $t_d = p - t + 1$. Note that the higher $t_c$, the lower $t_d$. One can make a tradeoff by choosing $\frac{t_c}{p} \approx \frac{p - t_c}{p}$. Any higher values would give better resistance to eavesdropping whereas any lower values will give better resistance to DoS attacks. Making a relevant choice is not easy when $p$ is small (e.g., $p = 3$).

Table I summarizes the lower bounds on the number of compromised nodes one needs to succeed under the different attacks described above.

V. Further investigation

In this section we first present some other approaches and compare them with our schemes concerning both communication overhead and resistance to attacks. We then present the implementation details and some simulation results about the performance of our schemes.

A. Comparison to other approaches

The common insecure approach regarding data aggregation is to have one unique tree that spans every node. Each one of the tree’s internal nodes aggregates data from its children before forwarding them to its parent. With one message per node, this is the most communication-efficient technique despite the complete lack of security. This aggregation method is referred to as ‘simple tree’ hereafter. With no overhead, one can use special encryption techniques that provide some confidentiality and still allow for aggregation to be performed [3]. One can also add different authentication mechanisms, but at the cost of larger messages [5]. Table II summarizes the features of all these schemes. As one can see, multipath aggregation schemes provide more protection against node compromises.

Compared to SMA, DMA and A-DMA increase the delay between the time readings are done and the time they are reported to the sink. This is because a sensor node must temporarily fill an internal buffer with its readings before sending them to the sink. As an example, a sensor node that

| Bound | Comments |
|-------|----------|
| Eavesdropping | $t$ | Compromised shares must have the same contributing nodes. |
| Tampering* | $t$ | Compromised shares must have the same contributing nodes. |
| DoS attack | $p - t + 1$ | 1 for garbage-data DoS attacks with SMA or DMA. |

* Only tampering where the attacker controls the meaning of its falsifications is considered.
performs DMA and sends data every \( m \) minutes will send its messages with an interval of \( t \times m \) minutes. The first message of the sequence must wait for other readings to fill the \( t \)-length buffer before the information is dispersed and sent towards the sink.

B. Communication overhead

A share has the same size as a unique sensor reading; therefore, a message in such a scheme is not larger than a message generated by the simple tree approach.

We define communication overhead as the ratio given by additional messages sent by a node compared to the simple tree scheme.

1) SMA : A sensor node sends \( p \) messages each time it does a reading. It would send one with the simple tree scheme. Therefore, the overhead of the SMA scheme is \( p - 1 \) per reading.

2) DMA : A sensor node with the DMA scheme sends \( p \) messages each time it does \( t \) readings. With simple tree, it would send \( t \) messages. Thus, the overhead of DMA is \( \frac{p - t}{t} \) per reading. Note that the overhead is null when \( p = t \). This corresponds to the situation where all the shares are needed to reconstruct readings. This is a consequence of DMA’s space efficiency: when there is no data redundancy, there is no overhead. Furthermore, this means that there is no protection against DoS attacks. More generally, DMA’s overhead is solely due to data redundancy. Choosing the amount of redundancy, that is, the ratio \( \alpha = \frac{p}{t} \) fully determines the scheme’s overhead.

3) A-DMA : A sensor node with the A-DMA scheme sends \( p \) messages each time it does \( t - 1 \) readings. With a simple tree scheme, it would send \( t - 1 \) messages. Therefore the overhead of the DMA scheme is \( \frac{p - t + 1}{t} \) per reading. The minimal overhead is obtained for the minimal value of \( p \), that is \( p = t \). As with the DMA scheme, this corresponds to the situation where all the shares are needed to reconstruct readings.

Choosing large values of \( t \) helps reducing the overhead. One may choose \( p = at \) for a given \( \alpha \geq 1 \). This would ensure that at least \( t(\alpha - 1) \) nodes could be compromised and still remain robust to DoS attacks. The overhead then becomes \( \frac{p - t + 1}{t} = \frac{\alpha - 1 + 1/t}{1 - 1/t} \). This means that the larger \( t \), the closer the overhead to \( \alpha - 1 \) (overhead for the DMA scheme).

Summary. SMA generates the highest overhead, but DMA and A-DMA’s can be fairly reasonable depending on the chosen parameters. A trade-off must be made between the desired amount of data redundancy and the desired communication efficiency. DMA is space efficient, which means that no overhead occurs when there is no redundancy. A-DMA is almost space efficient. On the other hand, despite its higher overhead, SMA may also be of interest. It provides very strong confidentiality and may be used in energy-unconstrained sensor networks.

C. Implementation

In this section we detail the implementation of the three proposed aggregation schemes as well as a number of practical results. These implementations should be seen as proof-of-concept for the feasibility of the proposed schemes, not as complete turn-key solutions.

1) Setup: Custom implementations of SMA, DMA, and A-DMA have been developed for Crossbow MICAz motes (see Section [17]). The operations are performed over customizable prime integer fields \( GF(p) \) and we used multi-precision computation routines from TinyECC [17], which are based on RSAREF [18]. The source codes of the implementations can be downloaded from [http://www-rp.lip6.fr/~claveiro/secure-aggreg/]

For the sake of simplicity and in order to isolate our results from any bias introduced by the routing layer, we used optimized static multipath routing. This layer uses the default TinyOS link layer, which is not secure enough with regard to the assumptions taken in this paper. However, thanks to TinyOS modular design, one may write and use his own layers for routing and secure-link establishment without being intrusive.

Once compiled, many parameters impact memory occupancy. Let us consider the size of a \( GF(p) \) integer or the information dispersal \( A \) matrix size. Figure 2 presents the memory footprints for some typical parameters. SMA’s footprint is rather good whatever integer field is used (about the half of a MICAz’s RAM, for instance). DMA and A-DMA’s footprints are very sensitive to the size of the information dispersal \( A \) matrix. This matrix determines the maximum number of shares \( p \) and threshold \( t \) of DMA and A-DMA schemes. For given \( p \) and \( t \) parameters one needs a \( t \times p \) matrix. Some big values, such as \( 16 \times 16 \) matrices with 64 bits integers do not fit into a MICAz mote. Other values are however fairly reasonable with respect to memory occupancy.

The time required for the nodes to perform operations such as share creation and aggregation is negligible and has never been an issue during tests.

The aggregation processes work as follows. Nodes sense some data at regular intervals and push shares toward the sink using a sequence number. An aggregator node only aggregates shares having the same sequence number. When an aggregator node receives a share, it stores the share in a buffer and waits for other shares with the same sequence number. If other shares arrive, the node aggregates them and keeps waiting until...
a new share with a higher sequence number arrives or a timer goes off.

2) Experiments: We performed both real experiments and simulations using the implementation described above. Experiments were done at small scale (six nodes and three-path topologies) to test the practicality of the schemes. In order to stress the implementation, we performed simulations using TOSSIM. TOSSIM is a sensor network simulator that compiles directly from TinyOS code and simulates the TinyOS network stack at the bit level. This has the advantage of perfectly modeling the behavior of the implementation.

We measured the number of messages for different parameters and schemes of the implementations. We used five random topologies of forty nodes with one hour of simulation time. These topologies use sink-rooted node-disjoint trees to perform multipath routing. Two topologies have four paths, the others have respectively three, six, and eight paths. Note that the number of paths does not impact on the measured number of sent messages, which is solely influenced by parameters $p$ and $t$. When there are more shares than available paths, some paths carry multiple shares. When there are more paths than available shares, some paths are unused. Figure 3 represents the total number of sent messages among the five topologies with respect to simulation time. We compare this number with the number of messages for the simple tree scheme with the previously described aggregation technique.

We can observe some predictable properties of the schemes. As previously analyzed, SMA’s overhead is the highest one, depending solely on the $p$ parameter. Therefore, SMA roughly needs $p$ additional messages compared to the simple tree scheme. We can also see that the overhead of information dispersal based schemes depends on $\alpha = \frac{pt}{t}$. It is not a surprise that A-DMA and DMA exhibit similar performance, with DMA having a slightly better overhead. Overheads are however a bit higher than computed in section V-B. As an example, A-DMA with $p = 12$ and $t = 8$ has an overhead of 1 instead of the predicted 0.7. Also, A-DMA with $p = t = 12$ exhibit a small overhead of 0.25 instead of about 0.1. This is due to the practical considerations that make implementations miss some aggregation opportunities.

D. Cost vs. Security

Security necessarily implies a cost with regard to some metric. Some schemes generates overhead in terms of communications, others in terms of CPU consumption, etc. What is important to define is a solution that leads to the required level of security at the cost at an acceptable overhead. In this way, our proposals are very promising. Indeed, by using the proposed schemes, a network tolerates multiple compromises without jeopardizing confidentiality, authenticity, and availability. Thus, the overheads generated by SMA, DMA, and A-DMA are acceptable. Furthermore, one can customize the overhead by adjusting the different parameters of the schemes. Depending on the amount of resources allocated to security, one may trade-off some security for some communication efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS

In this paper we proposed three schemes to secure data aggregation using multipath routing. They are based on secret sharing and information dispersal. In the proposed schemes, sensors split their readings into several shares and distribute them among several disjoint paths. Upon reception of a minimum number of shares, the sink can reconstruct the aggregated value.

Depending on the scheme and its parameters, these techniques provide varying levels of resistance to DoS attacks, eavesdropping, and data tampering. By using secret multipath aggregation, one can guarantee that a subset of compromised paths cannot reveal/leak any information about the readings. This is at the cost of some overhead. By using dispersed multipath aggregation, one has an optimal overhead but achieves lower levels of confidentiality. Depending on the application or scenario, one approach offers more advantages over the other.

To the best of our knowledge, the three proposed schemes are the first to address node compromises for aggregation schemes in sensor networks using multiple paths. Future work concerning these schemes includes modeling the security parameters’ statistical behavior under the contingency of random node compromises. It is also possible to generalize and apply these schemes to contexts other than sensor networks.

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