Women’s employment transitions: The influence of her, his, and joint gender ideologies

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Abstract

BACKGROUND
Research suggests that women’s employment decisions are influenced by not only their own gender ideologies but also their partners’. This paper is the first study examining the role of a couple’s joint gender ideology on the female partner’s employment transitions, specifically her work hours and employment breaks.

OBJECTIVE
The authors seek to advance research on the effects of gender ideologies on paid work transitions conceptually, arguing that a couple’s (dis)agreement on gender ideologies may be important.

METHODS
The authors use data from the German panel study Labour Market and Social Security (PASS) and logistic regression models estimating the probability of reducing work hours or taking an employment break between two successive panel waves.

RESULTS
Women’s gender ideologies impact their likelihood of reducing work hours and taking an employment break. The more egalitarian women are, the less likely they are to reduce their labor market participation. The male partner’s gender ideology initially appears irrelevant. However, when considering the couple as a unit, the authors find a couple effect of joint ideology: Women are more likely to reduce their work hours when both partners believe in gender essentialism as opposed to other couple-ideology constellations. For women’s employment breaks, findings also point to a couple-ideology effect, though with less statistical certainty.

CONCLUSIONS
The couple perspective shows that his gender ideology matters only in relation to hers.

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Introducing the couple perspective reveals that individual ideology measures provide a skewed picture of how gender ideologies actually work in couples to influence the gender division of paid work.

1. Introduction

Over the past 70 years, the industrialized countries have seen massive increases in women’s employment, rising homogamy, and declining gender differences in paid and unpaid work (Anxo et al. 2011; Blossfeld et al. 2015; Van Bavel, Schwartz, and Esteve 2018). In light of these trends, work-family scholars expected couple relationships to become more gender egalitarian over time, with women and men sharing paid market and unpaid family work more equally, a development referred to as the “gender revolution” (see Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015 for a review). In recent years, the gender revolution appears to have stalled in a number of countries, including Australia, the United States, and countries in Western and Northern Europe (DeRose et al. 2019; Dieckhoff et al. 2016; England 2010; England, Levine, and Mishel 2020). Women continue to adapt their paid work to changing family needs and end up performing the majority of unpaid reproductive work, whereas men prioritize paid work.

Gender ideologies are seen as an important driver of this process. We define gender ideologies as “individuals’ levels of support for a division of paid work and family responsibilities that is based on the belief in gendered separate spheres” (Davis and Greenstein 2009: 87). Even though women nowadays participate in what were once “male” spheres, there is a strong belief in gender essentialism, understood as “the notion that men and women are innately and fundamentally different in interests and skills” (England 2010: 150). In contrast, egalitarian ideologies reflect a belief in joint spheres of paid and unpaid work for women and men. Recent research has documented that the spread of egalitarian ideologies has come to a halt and that gender egalitarian and essentialist ideologies now co-occur in the United States, Germany, and many other developed countries around the world (Grunow, Begall, and Buchler 2018; Ebner, Kühhirt, and Lersch 2020; Knight and Brinton 2017; Scarborough, Sin, and Risman 2019). This research suggests that although large groups within society may hold egalitarian gender ideologies, an equally large or, depending on the country or region, an even larger group may hold gender ideologies mixing egalitarian and traditional ideas about men’s and women’s roles and capabilities, in line with gender essentialism. This finding has reinforced interest in gender ideologies and their impact on gender divisions of work.
Scholars have argued that women may not decide about their involvement in paid work independently of their partners (Khoudja and Fleischmann 2018; Levy and Bühlmann 2016; Uunk and Lersch 2020). We contribute to this research both conceptually and empirically. We suggest that the partners’ (dis)agreement on gender ideologies may matter more for women’s employment transitions than partners’ individual ideologies. This is because if partners agree with each other, their respective gender ideologies are reinforced and provide a clear course of action, whereas if partners disagree, they need to negotiate their individual positions and find some kind of compromise (Nitsche and Grunow 2018). Partners’ joint gender ideologies may thus help explain discrepancies in the empirical literature regarding the impact of women’s and their partners’ ideologies on women’s employment transitions.

We assess our proposition empirically by using German longitudinal panel data, the PASS data set, which enables couple analyses. First, we assess whether the individual gender ideologies of women and their partners matter for predicting women’s work hour reductions and employment breaks. Second, we investigate whether women in couples in which both partners jointly believe in gender essentialism are more likely to reduce their work hours or take a break from work compared to couples in which both partners hold more egalitarian ideologies or couples that have discordant gender ideologies.

2. Theoretical framing

Gender ideologies have been argued to vary because of different individual experiences and interests (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). According to this perspective, women and men who have positive experiences with egalitarian divisions of paid and unpaid work, and those who would expect to benefit from egalitarian divisions, should hold egalitarian ideologies and seek to keep women’s engagement in paid work stable, in spite of rising family demands. In contrast, gender essentialist ideologies arise if individuals have ambiguous experiences with egalitarian divisions of work or expect not to benefit from them. In the latter case, a woman’s work hour reductions and employment breaks may be strategies to cope with unequal divisions of unpaid work, either because the male partner does not participate in unpaid work or because she herself considers unpaid work her primary domain and responsibility.

2.1 Doing and undoing gender

Women’s work hour reductions and employment breaks are also part of women’s gender display (West and Zimmerman 1987). According to this perspective, the work that
women perform and the priorities they set regarding paid and unpaid work reflect whether they see themselves (and are recognized by others) as fulfilled, in light of dominant gender norms. Although women’s employment has become normative and thus no threat to contemporary (self-)conceptions of femaleness, women are still expected to prioritize their family over paid work, especially when they have children (Berk 1985; Grunow and Evertsson 2016). Young women thus enter couple relationships as earners, in line with social expectations, but over time, as they become mothers, they may experience internal and external pressure to lower their engagement in paid work to take primary responsibility for family demands. Such adaptations of employment may be a form of “doing gender.”

Scholars have noted, however, that women (and men) can also “undo gender” by not acting in line with social expectations (Deutsch 2007; Lindemann 2018; Lorber 2000; Risman 2009). We argue that this is why gender ideologies help explain variation in whether and how much women adapt their paid work to changing family needs (Grunow and Evertsson 2016; Khoudja and Fleischmann 2018). The option to undo gender lies in individuals’ capacity to reflect upon (internalized) social expectations and develop alternative plans, such as hiring cleaners, care workers, and nannies; eating meals out; or bargaining with the male partner to perform more family work. Women holding egalitarian gender ideologies may be more likely to prioritize their own working time, and find alternative solutions to changing family demands, than women believing in gender essentialism.

**Hypothesis 1:** Women’s own gender ideologies will have an impact on their likelihood of decreasing their working time or taking an employment break. The less egalitarian women are, the more likely they will be to reduce work hours or take an employment break.

From a gender display perspective, a decrease in paid working time or an employment break would alter a woman’s gender display not only vis-à-vis herself but also vis-à-vis her partner (Khoudja and Fleischmann 2018). Hence the male partner may influence the woman’s decision to decrease work hours or to take an employment break. Partners holding egalitarian ideologies will be more supportive of shielding women’s paid working time than partners believing in gender essentialism.

**Hypothesis 2:** The woman’s likelihood of reducing work hours or taking an employment break will be influenced by her partner’s gender ideologies. The less egalitarian the partner’s gender ideologies, the more likely she will be to reduce work hours or take an employment break.
2.2 Couple perspective

So far, research concerning the effect of women’s and their partners’ gender ideologies on a woman’s likelihood of adapting her working time is scarce. We argue that research has also neglected the fact that couples do not operate as two separate individuals with separate opinions and plans (as suggested in Hypotheses 1 and 2) but as a unit. For example, it has been argued that couples negotiate their division of paid and unpaid work using both monetary and nonmonetary forms of bargaining (Carlson and Hans 2017; Evertsson 2014; Lundberg and Pollak 1996; Nitsche and Grunow 2018). Outcomes perceived as fair are positively associated with family formation, for example (Köppen and Trappe 2019). Hence the couple perspective may be important to understanding women’s employment transitions as well.

In life-course research, the couple perspective has been captured analytically by the concept of “linked lives” (Elder 1978; Levy and Bühlmann 2016). The concept is considered a key factor in life-course gendering. It emphasizes partners’ increasing structural and internal mutual dependence on each other, especially when they have children (Levy and Bühlmann 2016). This process makes it unlikely that partners will act independently, unless they are willing to break up the union. For instance, partner characteristics reflecting mutual dependence have been found to influence fertility (Osiewalska 2018; Nitsche et al. 2018). Hence partners consider and alter their characteristics in the process while reconciling their work and family lives (Nitsche and Grunow 2016).

Reconciliation requires both partners to respond to each other’s expectations and actions over time and to find joint solutions to life events. How partners find solutions to changing work and care needs, and how cooperative they are, depends, we argue, on the couple’s (dis)agreement on gender ideologies.

Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of doing gender and thus reducing paid work hours or taking an employment break will be highest for women in couples in which both partners share gender essentialist ideologies.

This expectation is based on the assumption that partners will mutually reinforce their expectations toward each other. Women’s work time reductions and employment breaks reflect traditional gender display only under the condition that men’s involvement in paid work remains stable or increases. Only in this constellation does the couple’s division of paid work become more traditional, in line with gender essentialist views. In contrast, if the woman reduces her work time or takes an employment break and her partner does the same, the woman’s employment transition does not signal traditional gender display but a joint strategy in which both, man and woman, spend less time working and more time caring. Indeed, German family policies enable and support such
joint adaptations, such as the sharing of paid parental leave (Eurofound 2015; Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010). It is thus necessary to distinguish analytically between women reducing their work time or taking an employment break jointly with their partners, and women adopting their working time while partners’ work hours remain unchanged.3

According to economic theories, women tend to decrease their work hours or take employment breaks, and men do not, because of couples’ efficient specialization (Becker 1981) and/or bargaining outcomes determined by the male partner’s comparative earnings advantage (Lundberg and Pollak 1996). According to both arguments, men are more likely to keep their employment stable or increase working hours because they are the more productive earners, not because of gender ideologies. We thus assess whether our third hypothesis holds after controlling for partners’ relative earnings.

3. State of research

3.1 Findings regarding women’s own gender ideologies

Research provides clear evidence that women’s own gender ideologies and preferences matter for their labor force participation (Charles 2011; Hakim 2000). Egalitarian-minded women tend to work more continuously and for more hours per week than women holding gender essentialist views, the latter being more likely to decrease their work hours or exit employment temporarily when family demands increase (Buchler 2019; Carriero and Tudesco 2018; Cunningham 2008; Khoudja and Fleischmann 2018; Khoudja and Platt 2018; Stam, Verbakel, and de Graaf 2014; Van der Lippe et al. 2011). Support for the economic theories of resource bargaining and specialization has been mixed for Germany (Grunow and Evertsson 2016; Kühhirt 2012; Schober 2013), with limited research investigating how relative economic resources relate to gender ideologies (Kühhirt 2012).

3.2 Findings regarding both partners’ individual gender ideologies

Research investigating the impact of both partners’ gender ideologies for women’s employment transitions is scarce. As reviewed in Khoudja and Fleischmann (2018), male partners holding traditional/essentialist gender ideologies tend to spend less time in

3 Unfortunately, the number of couples adjusting their work time or taking an employment break jointly is very low in our data (86 cases). We thus focus our analysis on couples in which the male partner’s involvement in paid work remains stable or increases.
unpaid work, which implies a greater burden of unpaid work for the female partner and thus less time for paid work. This study found that essentialist gender ideologies among women and their partners (measured in terms of negative attitudes toward working women) were associated with women’s labor force exits but not with women’s changes in work hours (ibid). Uunk and Lersch (2019) provided evidence, based on data from the British Household Panel Survey of 1991–2007, that women’s employment was strongly associated with their own and their partners’ gender ideologies. Research on migrant couples in the United Kingdom (Lersch 2016) and the Netherlands (Khoudja and Fleischmann 2017) provides further evidence that the male partner’s gender ideology impacts the female partner’s employment transitions in the destination countries.

3.3 Research conceptualizing partner’s joint gender ideologies

The research discussed so far treats a male and female partner’s ideologies as if they worked independently of one another. However, both theory and research suggest that this isolated view on partners’ individual ideologies may be misleading, since couples negotiate and reconcile their division of labor (Evertsson 2014; Greenstein 1996; Lundberg and Pollak 1996; Nitsche and Grunow 2018). To the best of our knowledge, the importance of joint gender ideologies has not yet been established in research on women’s employment transitions. However, there is a small and growing body of research regarding the effect of joint gender ideologies on the division of unpaid work. Greenstein (1996) assessed the impact of couples’ gender ideologies on housework by considering both partners’ gender ideologies. His findings, based on US data, demonstrated that the impact of one partner’s egalitarian ideology got stronger when the other partner held a similar ideology. Whereas this modeling strategy enables researchers to address the couple as a unit with more or less consistent gender ideologies, it does not speak to the question of whether it matters who holds the more egalitarian ideologies, the male or female partner, in cases of disagreement. Aassve, Fuochi, Mencarini, and Mendola (2015) assessed the association between gender ideologies, housework, and fertility for Bulgarian, Czech, French, Hungarian, and Lithuanian couples. They created a composite measure of couples’ gender ideology and division of labor to predict fertility and concluded that both egalitarian ideologies and equal divisions of work were needed to have a positive effect on fertility (Aassve et al. 2015). Whereas their measure addresses the couple as a unit, it does not consider partners’ potential disagreement on gender ideologies. Aassve et al. (2015) also did not study women’s employment changes as a dependent variable. Nitsche and Grunow (2018) assessed the impact of couples’ (dis)agreement regarding gender ideologies on care work for a sample of German parents. They found that child care divisions were most equal among couples in which both
partners shared egalitarian gender ideologies. In couples with mismatching gender ideologies, the partners’ relative income mediated the father’s share of child care (ibid).

Taken together, most research to date considers employment effects of women’s and men’s gender ideologies as separate forces. A few studies consider effects of couple’s joint ideologies, but none of these has assessed effects of joint ideologies on women’s employment transitions. This research gap and the hypotheses formulated in relation to women’s, their partners’, and couples’ joint gender ideologies are addressed empirically in the following sections.

4. Data

We test our hypotheses using the German panel Labour Market and Social Security (PASS). Data access is provided via a scientific use file supplied by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). PASS is a yearly panel survey that consists of a sample of more than 10,000 individuals and their households. It is representative of the general population but includes an overrepresentation of low-income households, which we control for in our analyses (see Trappmann et al. 2019).4 In each wave, PASS collects detailed information on the surveyed households and household members aged 15 years or older, who each are interviewed separately. PASS is very well suited to address our research questions because it includes detailed information on household context and the employment behavior and individual characteristics of the interviewed household members, enabling couple analyses. In addition, PASS is the only German general population panel survey that includes questions on both partners’ gender ideologies at regular intervals. We use waves 1–12 of PASS, collected between 2007 and 2018; four specific gender ideology items were included in waves 1, 2, 5, 8, and 11. Our sample is restricted to partnered respondents aged 15 years or older (excluding students and pensioners). Homosexual couple households were too few to be meaningfully included in the analyses and have been omitted (n = 20).

To apply transition analyses, we selected couples who were interviewed in waves 1, 2, 5, 8, or 11 and the respective consecutive wave, t0 and t1 (n = 9,029). Due to differences in the measurement of some key variables (e.g., labor income) we excluded the respective information provided in wave 1. Of the remaining 7,383 pairs of observations, we select those 2,820 where both partners were employed (including self-employment but excluding marginal employment), at the first of the two points in time (t0). In line with our conceptual framework, we restrict our analyses to women’s

4 Data are available as a scientific use file from the Research Data Centre of the German Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research: https://fdz.iab.de/en/FDZ_Individual_Data/PASS.aspx.
employment transitions, as men rarely adapt employment for family reasons (Kühnhirt 2012). Consequently, our case numbers would be too low to model men’s voluntary employment transitions.

5. Methods and operationalization

The dependent variables were constructed based on the change in labor market participation between the two consecutive waves (t0 and t1). A reduction in work hours was recorded when the female partner reduced her regular work hours by five hours or more per week between t0 and t1. A labor market break was recorded when she was not in employment in t1. Women whose partners simultaneously reduced their work hours or exited employment were excluded from the analyses (86 cases), as such transitions do not necessarily reflect a shift toward separate spheres. Women’s transitions from employment to nonemployment from t0 to t1 might not necessarily reflect a voluntary decision but could in some cases be due to involuntary unemployment or health restrictions. To account for potentially involuntary employment breaks, we control for subjective health in t0 in the models. In addition, we ran further analyses in which we excluded women who were not employed in t1 and were registered as unemployed and actively searching for a job (n = 25; see appendix, Table A-3).

Four items measuring gender ideologies are included in PASS, rated on a four-point scale: 1. Strongly agree, 2. Somewhat agree, 3. Somewhat disagree, and 4. Strongly disagree:

a) A woman should be ready to reduce her work hours to spend more time with her family.
b) It is rather nice to have a job, but what most women want is a home and family.
c) A working mother can have an equally warm relationship with her children as a stay-at-home mother.
d) It is a husband’s duty to earn money, the wife’s duty to take care of home and family.

The current state of research suggests that gender ideologies are multidimensional and should not simply be summed up in a score without testing which dimensions are reflected in the gender ideology variables measured (Grunow, Begall, and Buchler 2018; 5 Unfortunately, the number of couples lowering their work time or taking an employment break jointly is too low in our data to be investigated separately in our models.

6 Further analyses also include a control for change in subjective health between t0 and t1, which does not alter our substantive findings (see appendix, Table A-4).
Knight and Brinton 2017). We thus conducted a factor analysis and a measurement model for the latent construct, based on the four items and the full sample of couples with two consecutive observations (n = 9,029). The measurement model and explorative factor analysis indicated one latent dimension of gender ideologies that is best measured when excluding item c), with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.71. The variable values of the index range from −0.97 to 0.69, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.42. Higher values indicate more egalitarian gender ideologies. This operationalization is used to measure women’s own and the male partner’s own gender ideologies.

In a second step, we measured the matching or mismatching of gender ideologies of both partners. For this we first constructed a sum score of items a), b), and d) with values ranging from 3 to 12 and grouped the women in three categories: essentialist (3–6), moderately egalitarian (7–9), and egalitarian (10–12). Then we compared a woman’s sum score to the sum score of her partner. If the man’s value did not differ from the woman’s by more than two points, gender ideologies were categorized as matching. Couples with mismatching ideologies – those whose sum scores differed by three or more points – were grouped into two categories, depending on whether her ideologies were more egalitarian or more essentialist than his. A similar logic has been suggested by Nitsche and Grunow (2018), who classified partners’ ideology differences by two points or more on a five-point scale as a mismatch. In line with current research, we measure gender ideologies at t0 (Khoudja and Fleischmann 2018). Our analytic sample consists of 8.5% of couples matching essentialist, 40.1% matching moderately egalitarian, and 27.0% matching egalitarian ideologies. (See Table 1 for descriptive sample statistics.) In 11.5% of couples, the woman is more essentialist than the man, and in 9.8% she is more egalitarian. The majority of couples thus agree regarding gender ideologies.

We performed robustness checks of our operationalization of a couple (mis)match in gender ideology by constructing various alternative measures using the gender ideology factor score. In these operationalizations, we varied the categorization of women’s ideologies as essentialist, moderately egalitarian, and egalitarian, as well as the distance between the woman’s and the man’s ideology score, which we use to assume a mismatch of their ideologies. For both aspects, we used the mean and multiples of the standard deviation (see appendix, Tables A-1 and A-2). The findings of the robustness checks are discussed in the next section.7

7 In addition, we conducted a placebo test of our conceptual claim regarding the impact of couple (dis)agreement on gender ideologies by including information on partners’ (dis)agreement regarding the statement “I would rather spend money immediately than save it for a later date.” We included these couple (dis)agreement variables in addition to and instead of our gender ideology variables (see appendix, Table A-5). The test results suggest that our gender ideology argument withstands the placebo test. In particular, the likelihood ratio test shows that including our gender ideology (dis)agreement variables improves the overall model fit, whereas including couples’ (dis)agreement on spending versus saving money does not.
One important covariate to be considered is the partners’ relative earnings. Relative earnings were measured as the ratio of her to his gross monthly income from employment. This variable takes on the value 1 if both partners earn the same. It is lower than 1 if he earns more and is higher than 1 if she earns more. We also account for a possible nonlinear effect of relative earnings by including its squared term. Further covariates that served as control variables were region (eastern or western Germany), whether the woman had a migration background, her age, her education/qualification based on the CASMIN classification, and her health status to control for involuntary, health-related employment adaptations. On the household level, the number of children in the household, the change in the number of children from t0 to t1, and the employment status of both partners were included in the models. In addition, we controlled for the survey year (wave) to capture changes in labor market conditions and receipt of welfare benefits to account for the oversampling of low-income households in the data set. All time-varying covariates are measured at t0.

To examine the determinants of changes in partnered women’s labor market participation, we estimated logistic regression models. Logistic regression models provide a simple but informative test of our proposition of joint gender ideology effects and have been used in previous longitudinal research investigating the effects of women’s and their partners’ gender ideologies (Khoudja and Fleischmann 2018). This way, our findings can be compared to earlier research. In addition, our modeling strategy enables us to use the longitudinal data structure efficiently, given the limited number of couples and employment transitions available. Selection models and fixed-effects regressions would provide a stronger causal test of our theoretical propositions, though at the expense of efficient data use and descriptive depth (Eberl and Collischon 2020). To account for the fact that there can be more than one observation per woman or couple, an individual-specific random effect is included in the estimation.

6. Results

The final sample comprises 2,734 women, of whom 7.6% reduced their work hours between t0 and t1 and 4.9% took an employment break (see Table 1). These percentages

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8 Education comprises three categories: low educated (elementary education without a basic vocational qualification or less: CASMIN 1a, 1b), medium educated (basic vocational qualification, intermediate general qualification, or general maturity certificate without vocational qualification: CASMIN 1c, 2a, 2b, 2c_gen), and highly educated (general maturity certificate and vocational qualification or tertiary education: CASMIN 2c_voc, 3a, 3b).

9 Employment breaks include the two-month mandatory maternity leave. Since more than 90% of mothers claim parental leave following maternity leave, the likelihood of misclassifying mothers’ employment interruptions as voluntary (parental leave) while they are indeed mandatory (maternity leave) is very small.
are quite substantial, given that almost half of the women in our sample were already working part-time at t0 and we consider employment transitions between two subsequent years.

Table 2 presents Models 1a–d (work hours) and Table 3 presents Models 2a–d (employment break), with unstandardized B values and p-values. Models 1a and 2a show that women’s own gender ideologies were associated (p < .05) with a reduction in work hours and taking an employment break, even after controlling for important sociodemographic characteristics. The gender ideology coefficient in Models 1a and 2a indicates that the more egalitarian the women, the less likely they were to reduce or interrupt paid work, confirming our first hypothesis.

In Models 1b and 2b we tested whether male partners’ gender ideology was associated with women’s labor market transitions (Hypothesis 2). For both dependent variables there was no effect, and the model fit statistics (AIC) do not indicate an improvement in the model when including this variable. We thus do not find support for our second hypothesis.

The results of Models 1c and 2c lend support to the expectation that both partners’ gender ideologies do not operate independently of each other. As hypothesized, the likelihood of reducing paid work hours and experiencing an employment break was highest for women in couples in which both partners shared gender essentialist ideologies in t0 (Hypothesis 3). These couples showed a higher probability of reducing their work hours or not being employed at t1 compared to couples with matching moderately egalitarian ideologies. We also found that women who held a more essentialist view than their partners were more likely to take an employment break in t1. The other combinations of partners’ gender ideologies did not differ in their probabilities of employment transitions from couples with matching moderately egalitarian gender ideologies.

The robustness checks for the reduction of work hours (see Table A-1 in the appendix) show that this result is robust for the different operationalizations (Models 2–7) as long as the category of the woman’s moderately egalitarian ideology is not too broad (Models 8–10). For employment breaks there is more variation: The effects of both partners’ essentialist ideologies and the woman’s ideology being more essentialist than her partner’s are comparable to Table 2 as long as the distance between both partners’ ideologies is larger (at 1.5 standard deviations; see Models 4 and 7 in Table A-2 in the appendix). These findings are not altered if we exclude women who have experienced an employment break and reported being registered as unemployed and actively searching for a job in t1 (see Table A-3 in the appendix).

When including partners’ ideology without women’s ideology, there is also no association with women’s employment transitions.
In a last step, we checked whether our results regarding the importance of women’s own and couples’ joint gender ideologies hold when controlling for the partners’ relative earnings. Models 1d and 2d include a control for the ratio of both partners’ gross monthly earnings. The findings for Model 1d indicate nonlinearity; the main effect indicates that a woman’s probability of reducing her work hours initially declines as her income share increases. It starts increasing again when her income share is very high. The coefficients of the joint gender ideologies remained largely unchanged in this model. For Model 2d (employment break), the p-values for the relative resources coefficients and the joint ideologies are a little higher, but the results point in the same direction. In sum, Hypothesis 3 holds for women’s work hour reductions and also, but with less statistical certainty, for employment breaks.

The findings for the control variables are not central to our argumentation and will only be briefly summarized here, as the coefficients remained mostly stable across model specifications (a–d). The most important sociodemographic covariate was a change in the number of children in the household, indicating that the birth of a child was a major reason for women to adapt paid work to changing family needs. When the number of children increased between two panel waves, women were more likely to both reduce work hours and take an employment break. Turning first to Table 2, Models 1a–d (work hour reductions), women who were employed part-time already at t0 were less likely to further reduce work hours compared to women working full-time. The partner’s employment hours did not alter this association. For Table 3, Models 2a–d (employment breaks), in contrast, we found a positive effect of women’s part-time work. Women working part-time may already have a lower attachment to the labor market than their full-time working peers.

Women in eastern Germany were found to be less likely to reduce their work hours than their western German peers. This finding corresponds with the greater prevalence of full-time employment for women in the eastern part of Germany and is associated with eastern women’s greater contribution to household income (see Model 1d). For the employment break model, we did not find east–west differences. Women’s subjective health status is strongly associated with employment breaks (Table 3). Women reporting poor health are more likely to experience an employment break than those in better health. This indicates that we were able to control for health-related employment interruptions. Most other controls were not associated with a reduction of or an exit from employment, indicating that our sample is quite homogeneous and likely preselected on sociodemographic characteristics. Further analyses showed that our gender ideology measures did not absorb any of the sociodemographic effects (results available upon request).
### Table 1: Sample statistics

| Category                                                                 | N   | %   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|
| **Dependent variables**                                                 |     |     |
| She reduces working hours                                              |     |     |
| Yes                                                                     | 208 |  7.61 |
| No                                                                      | 2392| 87.49 |
| She takes time out from employment                                      |     |     |
| Yes                                                                     | 134 |  4.90 |
| No                                                                      | 2392| 87.49 |
| **Employment state t0**                                                 |     |     |
| Full-time employment (30+ hours/week)                                  | 1456| 53.26 |
| Part-time employment (~30 hours/week)                                  | 1278| 46.74 |
| **Employment state t1**                                                 |     |     |
| Full-time employment (30+ hours/week)                                  | 1429| 52.27 |
| Part-time employment (~30 hours/week)                                  | 1171| 42.83 |
| Marginal employment                                                    | 20  |  0.73 |
| Unemployed                                                              | 30  |  1.00 |
| Thereof: actively searching for a job                                   | 25  |  0.91 |
| Parental/maternity leave                                                | 42  |  1.54 |
| In training                                                             | 8   |  0.29 |
| Housewife                                                               | 21  |  0.77 |
| Other                                                                   | 8   |  0.29 |
| Missing                                                                 | 5   |  0.18 |
| **Covariates t0**                                                       |     |     |
| Matching of gender ideologies                                           |     |     |
| Both essentialist (matching)                                            | 233 |  8.52 |
| Both moderately egalitarian (matching)                                  | 1095| 40.05 |
| Both egalitarian (matching)                                             | 738 | 26.99 |
| She more essentialist (mismatching)                                    | 315 | 11.52 |
| She more egalitarian (mismatching)                                     | 267 |  9.77 |
| Missing                                                                 | 86  |  3.15 |
| Children in the household                                              |     |     |
| None                                                                    | 999 | 36.54 |
| 1                                                                       | 801 | 29.30 |
| 2                                                                       | 720 | 26.34 |
| 3 or more                                                               | 212 |  7.75 |
| Missing                                                                 |  2  |  0.07 |
| Change in the number of children in the household                       |     |     |
| No change                                                               | 2475| 90.53 |
| More children                                                           | 110 |  4.02 |
| Fewer children                                                          | 146 |  5.34 |
| Missing                                                                 |  3  |  0.11 |
Table 1: (Continued)

| Employment status of couple, her/his | N   | %    |
|-------------------------------------|-----|------|
| Both full-time                      | 1348| 49.31|
| Part-time/full-time                 | 1211| 44.29|
| Full-time/part-time                 | 108 | 3.95 |
| Both part-time                      | 67  | 2.45 |

| Region                              | N   | %    |
|-------------------------------------|-----|------|
| West Germany                        | 1952| 71.4 |
| East Germany                        | 782 | 28.6 |

| Education/qualification             | N   | %    |
|-------------------------------------|-----|------|
| Low                                 | 120 | 4.39 |
| Medium                              | 1518| 55.52|
| High                                | 1091| 39.9 |
| Missing                             | 5   | 0.18 |

| Migration background                | N   | %    |
|-------------------------------------|-----|------|
| None                                | 2277| 83.28|
| 1st generation                      | 258 | 9.44 |
| 2nd generation                      | 154 | 5.63 |
| Missing                             | 45  | 1.65 |

| Age                                 | N   | %    |
|-------------------------------------|-----|------|
| Under 25 years                      | 44  | 1.61 |
| 25–34 years                         | 464 | 16.97|
| 35–44 years                         | 827 | 30.25|
| 45–54 years                         | 1047| 38.3 |
| 55 years or older                   | 352 | 12.87|

| Wave                                | N   | %    |
|-------------------------------------|-----|------|
| Wave 2                              | 506 | 18.51|
| Wave 5                              | 803 | 29.37|
| Wave 8                              | 712 | 26.04|
| Wave 11                             | 713 | 26.08|

| UB-II-receipt                      | N   | %    |
|-------------------------------------|-----|------|
| Yes                                 | 50  | 1.83 |
| No                                  | 2683| 98.13|
| Missing                             | 1   | 0.04 |

| Subjective health status            | N   | %    |
|-------------------------------------|-----|------|
| Very good                           | 332 | 12.14|
| Good                                | 1081| 39.54|
| Satisfactory                        | 842 | 30.80|
| Not good                            | 389 | 14.23|
| Bad                                 | 90  | 3.29 |

| N                                   | N   | Mean | Std. dev. |
|-------------------------------------|-----|------|-----------|
| Gender ideology                     | 2733| 0.13 | 0.37      |
| Gender ideology partner             | 2733| 0.17 | 0.44      |
| Difference in gender ideologies     | 2733| -0.04| 0.42      |
| Ratio of partners' monthly gross income | 2539| 0.77 | 0.61      |

Source: PASS waves 2–12; IAB.PASS-SUF0618.de.en.v1.
Table 2: Summary of logistic regression analysis for the probability to reduce working hours

| Model                                      | 1a         | 1b         | 1c         | 1d         |
|--------------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Gender ideology                            | -0.504     | -0.526     | [0.047]    | [0.055]    |
| Gender ideology partner                    | 0.050      |            | [0.829]    |            |
| Matching of gender ideologies (ref.: both moderately egalitarian) |            |            |            |            |
| Both essentialist                          |            |            |            |            |
| Both egalitarian                           |            |            |            |            |
| She more essentialist                      |            |            |            |            |
| She more egalitarian                      |            |            |            |            |
| Children in the household (ref.: none)    |            |            |            |            |
| 1                                          | 0.240      | 0.240      | 0.263      | 0.243      |
|                                           | [0.272]    | [0.271]    | [0.229]    | [0.269]    |
| 2                                          | 0.489      | 0.493      | 0.484      | 0.446      |
|                                           | [0.046]    | [0.045]    | [0.050]    | [0.072]    |
| 3 or more                                  | 0.360      | 0.362      | 0.354      | 0.299      |
|                                           | [0.331]    | [0.327]    | [0.339]    | [0.423]    |
| Change in the number of children in the household (ref.: no change) |            |            |            |            |
| More children                              | 1.577      | 1.580      | 1.537      | 1.526      |
|                                           | [0.000]    | [0.000]    | [0.000]    | [0.000]    |
| Fewer children                             | -0.330     | -0.328     | -0.351     | -0.292     |
|                                           | [0.471]    | [0.474]    | [0.444]    | [0.423]    |
| Employment status of couple, her/his (ref.: both full-time) |            |            |            |            |
| Part-time/full-time                        | -1.674     | -1.674     | -1.677     | -1.893     |
|                                           | [0.000]    | [0.000]    | [0.000]    | [0.000]    |
| Full-time/part-time                        | -0.072     | -0.073     | -0.119     | -0.367     |
|                                           | [0.861]    | [0.860]    | [0.772]    | [0.424]    |
| Both part-time                             | -1.393     | -1.396     | -1.469     | -1.628     |
|                                           | [0.068]    | [0.068]    | [0.056]    | [0.036]    |
| Region (ref.: West Germany)                |            |            |            |            |
| East Germany                               | -0.395     | -0.400     | -0.415     | -0.351     |
|                                           | [0.042]    | [0.041]    | [0.033]    | [0.073]    |
| Education/qualification (ref.: medium)     |            |            |            |            |
| Low                                        | -0.121     | -0.123     | -0.181     | -0.136     |
|                                           | [0.801]    | [0.798]    | [0.706]    | [0.775]    |
| High                                       | 0.144      | 0.137      | 0.134      | 0.145      |
|                                           | [0.425]    | [0.456]    | [0.462]    | [0.425]    |
| Migration background (ref.: none)          |            |            |            |            |
| 1st generation                             | -0.532     | -0.523     | -0.563     | -0.481     |
|                                           | [0.120]    | [0.130]    | [0.102]    | [0.159]    |
| 2nd generation                             | 0.372      | 0.373      | 0.381      | 0.367      |
|                                           | [0.256]    | [0.254]    | [0.245]    | [0.260]    |
Table 2:  (Continued)

| Model | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d |
|-------|----|----|----|----|
| Age (ref.: 25–34 years) | | | | |
| Under 25 years | –0.552 | –0.554 | –0.472 | –0.596 |
|  | [0.409] | [0.407] | [0.478] | [0.391] |
| 35–44 years | –0.343 | –0.346 | –0.359 | –0.364 |
|  | [0.168] | [0.165] | [0.151] | [0.146] |
| 45–54 years | –0.390 | –0.390 | –0.407 | –0.442 |
|  | [0.106] | [0.105] | [0.092] | [0.068] |
| 55 years or older | –0.079 | –0.079 | –0.107 | –0.128 |
|  | [0.788] | [0.789] | [0.716] | [0.664] |
| Ratio of partner’s income | –1.099 | | | |
|  | [0.007] | | | |
| Ratio of partner’s income, squared | 0.315 | | | |
|  | [0.002] | | | |
| Subjective health status (ref.: good) | | | | |
| Very good | –0.585 | –0.584 | –0.619 | –0.638 |
|  | [0.076] | [0.076] | [0.060] | [0.052] |
| Satisfactory | –0.025 | –0.026 | –0.039 | –0.019 |
|  | [0.900] | [0.896] | [0.846] | [0.925] |
| Not good | 0.142 | 0.141 | 0.132 | 0.131 |
|  | [0.566] | [0.567] | [0.593] | [0.596] |
| Bad | 0.249 | 0.253 | 0.223 | 0.222 |
|  | [0.582] | [0.576] | [0.621] | [0.628] |
| Constant | –2.842 | –2.840 | –3.042 | –2.398 |
|  | [0.000] | [0.000] | [0.000] | [0.000] |
| /lnsig2u | –1.358 | –1.377 | –1.413 | –1.608 |
|  | [0.461] | [0.464] | [0.474] | [0.490] |
| N | 2295 | 2295 | 2295 | 2295 |
| N (groups) | 1465 | 1465 | 1465 | 1465 |
| Log likelihood | –555.956 | –555.933 | –552.911 | –548.310 |
| Chi² | 91.454 | 91.610 | 93.542 | 99.474 |
| AIC | 1167.912 | 1169.865 | 1167.823 | 1162.619 |
| BIC | 1328.590 | 1336.282 | 1345.716 | 1351.989 |

Source: PASS waves 2–12: IAB.PASS-SUF0618.de.en.v1.
Note: p-values in brackets. Further control variables are survey year and receipt of welfare benefits.
Table 3: Summary of logistic regression analysis for the probability for an employment break

| Model                                      | 2a            | 2b            | 2c            | 2d            |
|--------------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Gender ideology                            | -0.816        | -0.751        | -0.135        |               |
| Gender ideology partner                    |               |               |               |               |
| Gender ideology partner                    |               |               |               |               |
| Gender ideology partner                    |               |               |               |               |
| Matching of gender Ideologies (ref.: both moderately egalitarian) | 0.699 [0.034] | 0.639 [0.057] |               |               |
| Both essentialist                          | -0.180 [0.556] | -0.128 [0.679] |               |               |
| Both egalitarian                          |               |               |               |               |
| She more essentialist                      | 0.679 [0.031] | 0.652 [0.039] |               |               |
| She more egalitarian                      | 0.281 [0.441] | 0.307 [0.403] |               |               |
| Children in the household (ref.: none)     |               |               |               |               |
| 1                                          | 0.079 [0.785] | 0.078 [0.787] | 0.078 [0.785] | 0.029 [0.919] |
| 2                                          | -0.081 [0.798] | -0.085 [0.789] | -0.105 [0.741] | -0.178 [0.582] |
| 3 or more                                  | -0.372 [0.446] | -0.381 [0.438] | -0.392 [0.423] | -0.485 [0.329] |
| Change in the number of children in the household (ref.: no change) |               |               |               |               |
| More children                              | 2.906 [0.000] | 2.921 [0.000] | 2.858 [0.000] | 2.885 [0.000] |
| Fewer children                             | -0.877 [0.239] | -0.882 [0.238] | -0.838 [0.260] | -0.802 [0.282] |
| Employment status of couple, her/his (ref.: both full-time) |               |               |               |               |
| Part-time/full-time                        | 0.622 [0.014] | 0.625 [0.014] | 0.664 [0.008] | 0.385 [0.168] |
| Full-time/part-time                        | 0.151 [0.820] | 0.154 [0.818] | 0.134 [0.842] | 0.412 [0.549] |
| Both part-time                             | -0.476 [0.653] | -0.472 [0.656] | -0.536 [0.613] | -0.498 [0.642] |
| Region (ref.: West Germany)                |               |               |               |               |
| East Germany                               | -0.050 [0.851] | -0.041 [0.876] | -0.086 [0.746] | 0.001 [0.998] |
| Education/qualification (ref.: medium)     |               |               |               |               |
| Low                                        | 0.680 [0.101] | 0.686 [0.100] | 0.680 [0.100] | 0.683 [0.104] |
| High                                       | -0.064 [0.784] | -0.050 [0.839] | -0.091 [0.699] | -0.045 [0.850] |
| Migration background (ref.: none)          |               |               |               |               |
| 1st generation                             | 0.630 [0.040] | 0.605 [0.054] | 0.702 [0.022] | 0.748 [0.016] |
| 2nd generation                             | -1.029 [0.175] | -1.044 [0.171] | -0.982 [0.193] | -0.993 [0.192] |
7. Discussion and conclusions

This paper has examined the impact of women’s and their partners’ gender ideology on women’s paid work hours and employment breaks. Current research indicates that the gender ideologies of women and their partners are important in understanding variation in women’s work hours and employment continuity (Khoudja and Fleischmann 2018). Going beyond this research, we emphasized the couple perspective of linked lives for investigating women’s employment transitions and, consequently, the importance of couples’ (dis)agreement on gender ideologies. Empirically, we investigated the effect of women’s, their partners’, and couples’ joint gender ideologies on women’s employment
transitions. We tested three hypotheses, combining theoretical arguments from the doing/undoing gender and linked-lives literature, to account for our claim that women’s employment transitions may be influenced by the couple context – i.e., partners’ matching or mismatching gender ideologies.

Our findings support our first hypothesis, whereby less egalitarian women are more likely to reduce their work hours or take an employment break. We did not find support for our second hypothesis – that a woman’s likelihood of reducing work hours or taking an employment break is influenced by her partner’s gender ideologies. However, we found some support for our third hypothesis, suggesting that women’s likelihood of doing gender and thus reducing work hours is highest for women in couples in which both partners share gender essentialist ideologies. The male partner’s gender ideology did not matter in its own right, but how the male and female partners matched in terms of their gender ideologies was important. In particular, we found that women in couples with matching essentialist gender ideologies were more likely to lower their work hours. These findings are robust against different operationalizations of the ideology (mis)match among couples. For employment breaks, our findings are more susceptible to our operationalization of couple (mis)match, as our robustness checks have shown. Nevertheless, they also point in the hypothesized direction, suggesting that gender essentialist couples support each other in reaching a division of labor that comes closer to their ideals.

Our findings tie in with previous research that emphasized the importance of taking into account not only women’s own gender ideologies but also their partners’ when examining their employment transitions. Going beyond previous research, our findings suggest that in addition to women’s own ideologies, a couple’s (dis)agreement on gender ideologies is more relevant for women’s employment transitions than the male partner’s gender ideology alone. Further research should investigate this aspect more systematically by using different data sets from different countries or time periods. These would contain different distributions regarding men’s and women’s gender ideologies. The partner effect reported in previous research may be a result of the distribution of couples’ gender ideology matches.

Our findings also speak to current research investigating the effect of women’s, their partners’, and couples’ joint gender ideologies on shared housework and child care. Our findings corroborate the argument that the stalling gender revolution is rooted, at least in part, in gender ideologies (England 2010). Gender ideologies are, however, shaped in institutional contexts that promote or discourage certain ways of earning and caring. Researchers thus need to be careful not to interpret the influence of gender ideologies only in light of individual and couples’ preferences. In part, these ideologies reflect institutional structures and internalized societal expectations (Levy and Bühlmann 2016).
Even though we were able to address our substantive propositions with the data at hand, a couple of aspects could not be studied due to data limitations. This study relies on partners’ self-reported measures of gender ideology, which may suffer from social desirability bias. Consequently, our estimates regarding the effects of gender ideologies on actual behavior provide a conservative test of our hypotheses. We were able to analyze the employment transitions of women in couple households from one wave to the next, separately looking at work time reductions and employment breaks. For the latter, it would have been ideal to further distinguish between involuntary employment breaks due to unemployment and employment breaks for accommodating family demands, such as parental leave. Thus there remains a risk of misclassifying an involuntary employment break as voluntary (in our main models) and vice versa (in our robustness analyses). However, since we control for health status and economic fluctuation, and because our results hold when excluding women registered as unemployed and actively looking for a job in the second observation, the substantive conclusions should hold. Our analyses are further restricted by low case numbers. This is why we could not study the employment transitions of male partners or couples who decided to jointly decrease work hours. Because our data capture couples at various stages of their relationships, we cannot say much about self-selection into and out of couple relationships or into parenthood based on gender ideology. We have tried to deal with endogeneity between the dependent and independent variables by focusing on couples in which the woman and her partner were working at t0. It would require a much larger data set that follows couples from the beginning of their relationships onward to fully disentangle the complex interplay between gender ideology, family formation, and employment transitions. We were further unable to consider the male partner’s role in a woman’s employment transitions more fully in our models due to data restrictions. In particular, we would have liked to control for his involvement in unpaid work at home. Research suggests that mothers whose partners contribute to unpaid family work are more likely to both have another child and to work full-time (Fanelli and Profeta 2019).

In spite of these limitations, we are confident to conclude that both women’s own gender ideologies and those of the couple jointly are important determinants of women’s employment transitions. Further research investigating how couple dynamics influence the gender division of labor is needed.
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### Appendix

**Table A-1: Robustness: Logistic regression analysis for the probability to reduce working hours – by definition of gender ideology (mis)match**

| Classification of her ideology (essentialist, moderately egalitarian, egalitarian) | Sum-score: essentialist (3–6), moderate egalitarian (7–9) and egalitarian (10–12) | Factor-score: essentialist <mean−0.5std.dev., egalitarian >mean+0.5std.dev. | Factor-score: essentialist <mean−1std.dev., egalitarian >mean+1std.dev. | Factor-score: essentialist <mean−1.5std.dev., egalitarian >mean+1.5std.dev. |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Classification of mismatch (difference between her and his ideology)** | **Model** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| **Difference >2 Points of the sum-score** | Matching of Gender Ideologies (ref.: both moderately egalitarian) | Both essentialist | 0.968 | 0.990 | 1.087 | 1.068 | 0.990 | 0.714 | 0.457 | 0.649 | 0.115 | 0.626 |
| | | Both egalitarian | 0.069 | 0.276 | 0.358 | 0.359 | 0.276 | 0.215 | 0.151 | 0.194 | 0.159 | 0.246 |
| | | She more essentialist | 0.365 | 0.069 | 0.138 | 0.490 | 0.069 | 0.151 | 0.446 | -0.050 | -0.040 | 0.341 |
| | | She more egalitarian | 0.050 | -0.165 | 0.060 | 0.121 | -0.165 | 0.073 | 0.073 | -0.289 | -0.122 | -0.032 |
| | | Statistics | N | 2295 | 2295 | 2295 | 2295 | 2295 | 2295 | 2295 | 2295 | 2295 |
| | | | N_g | 1465 | 1465 | 1465 | 1465 | 1465 | 1465 | 1465 | 1465 | 1465 |
| | | | chi2 | -552.911 | -552.594 | -554.327 | -550.591 | -552.594 | -555.674 | -555.652 | -556.123 | -557.58 | -556.191 |
| | | | AIC | 1167.823 | 1167.187 | 1170.654 | 1163.182 | 1167.187 | 1173.349 | 1173.304 | 1174.245 | 1177.16 | 1174.383 |
| | | | BIC | 1345.716 | 1345.08 | 1348.547 | 1341.075 | 1345.08 | 1351.242 | 1351.197 | 1352.138 | 1355.053 | 1352.276 |

*Source: PASS waves 2–12; IAB.PASS-SUF0618.de.en.v1. p-values in brackets.*

*Note: Models include all control variables discussed in the paper.*
Table A-2: Robustness: Logistic regression analysis for the probability of an employment break – by definition of gender ideology (mis)match

| Classification of her ideology (essentialist, moderately egalitarian, egalitarian) | Sum-score: essentialist (3–6), moderate egalitarian (7–9) and egalitarian (10–12) | Factor-score: essentialist <mean–0.5std.dev., egalitarian >mean+0.5std.dev. | Factor-score: essentialist <mean–1std.dev., egalitarian >mean+1std.dev. | Factor-score: essentialist <mean–1.5std.dev., egalitarian >mean+1.5std.dev. |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Difference >2 Points of the sum-score | Difference >0.5 std.dev. of the factor score | Difference >1 std.dev. of the factor score | Difference >1.5 std.dev. of the factor score | Difference >1 std.dev. of the factor score | Difference >0.5 std.dev. of the factor score | Difference >1.5 std.dev. of the factor score |
| Model 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Matching of Gender Ideologies (ref.: both moderately egalitarian) | | | | | | | | | |
| Both essentialist | 0.699 | 0.441 | 0.528 | 0.739 | 0.441 | 0.220 | 0.739 | 0.452 | 0.532 | 0.625 |
| Both egalitarian | 0.180 | 0.189 | –0.023 | 0.022 | 0.189 | –0.640 | –0.319 | –0.215 | 0.005 | –0.257 |
| She more essentialist | 0.679 | 0.438 | 0.331 | 0.926 | 0.438 | 0.166 | 1.035 | 0.368 | 0.300 | 0.835 |
| She more egalitarian | 0.281 | –0.086 | 0.064 | 0.590 | –0.086 | –0.106 | 0.689 | –0.156 | 0.032 | 0.497 |
| Statistics | | | | | | | | | |
| N | 2235 | 2235 | 2235 | 2235 | 2235 | 2235 | 2235 | 2235 | 2235 | 2235 |
| N_g | 1463 | 1463 | 1463 | 1463 | 1463 | 1463 | 1463 | 1463 | 1463 | 1463 |
| ll | –379.047 | –381.819 | –382.591 | –381.494 | –381.819 | –381.803 | –382.809 | –382.809 | –382.809 | –382.809 |
| chi2 | 63.647 | 160.231 | 159.643 | 64.679 | 160.231 | 59.832 | 58.945 | 62.922 | 156.511 | 63.614 |
| aic | 820.094 | 825.838 | 827.181 | 816.989 | 825.638 | 825.609 | 812.199 | 826.006 | 827.619 | 819.7 |
| bic | 997.166 | 1002.71 | 1004.253 | 994.061 | 1002.71 | 1002.681 | 989.27 | 1003.078 | 1004.691 | 996.772 |

Source: PASS waves 2–12; IAB.PASS-SUF0618.de.en.v1. p-values in brackets.
Note: Models include all control variables discussed in the paper.
Table A-3: Robustness: Logistic regression analysis for the probability for an employment break – by definition of gender ideology mismatch and excluding those being unemployed and actively searching for a job in

| Classification of her ideology (essentialist, moderately egalitarian, egalitarian) | Sum-score: essentialist (3–6), moderate egalitarian (7–9) and egalitarian (10–12) | Factor-score: essentialist <mean–0.5std.dev., egalitarian >mean+0.5std.dev. | Factor-score: essentialist <mean–1std.dev., egalitarian >mean+1std.dev. | Factor-score: essentialist <mean–1.5std.dev., egalitarian >mean+1.5std.dev. |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Model | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Matching of Gender Ideologies (ref.: both moderately egalitarian) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Both essentialist | 0.723 | 0.290 | 0.584 | 0.781 | 0.290 | 0.572 | 0.977 | 0.350 | 0.340 | 0.550 |
| Both egalitarian | −0.543 | −0.065 | −0.179 | −0.182 | −0.065 | −0.719 | −0.465 | −0.938 | −0.682 | −0.942 |
| She more essentialist | 0.748 | 0.453 | 0.446 | 1.080 | 0.453 | 0.401 | 1.283 | 0.395 | 0.352 | 0.963 |
| She more egalitarian | 0.264 | −0.187 | 0.138 | 0.736 | −0.187 | 0.088 | 0.922 | −0.238 | 0.043 | 0.616 |

Statistics

| N | N_g | ll | chi2 | aic | bic |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2214 | 1451 | −317.422 | 40.172 | 694.844 | 865.920 |
| 2214 | 1451 | −321.416 | 39.726 | 702.833 | 873.910 |
| 2214 | 1451 | −317.535 | 37.872 | 693.574 | 874.147 |
| 2214 | 1451 | −316.787 | 44.378 | 702.833 | 864.650 |
| 2214 | 1451 | −321.416 | 39.726 | 703.071 | 873.910 |
| 2214 | 1451 | −320.192 | 40.089 | 701.506 | 872.582 |
| 2214 | 1451 | −313.009 | 39.236 | 703.345 | 874.422 |
| 2214 | 1451 | −320.753 | 40.120 | 701.672 | 874.334 |
| 2214 | 1451 | −317.629 | 44.492 | 703.235 | 866.334 |

Source: PASS waves 2–12; IAB.PASS-SUF0618.de.en.v1. p-values in brackets.

Note: Models include all control variables discussed in the paper.
### Table A-4: Robustness: Summary of logistic regression analysis for the probability for an employment break, including change in health status

| Model | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d |
|-------|----|----|----|----|
| Gender ideology | –0.816 | –0.749 | | |
| Gender ideology partner | –0.140 | | | |
| Matching of Gender Ideologies (ref.: both moderately egalitarian) | | | | |
| Both essentialist | 0.715 | 0.658 | | |
| Both egalitarian | –0.173 | –0.120 | | |
| She more essentialist | 0.672 | 0.651 | | |
| She more egalitarian | 0.284 | 0.312 | | |
| Children in the household (ref.: none) | | | | |
| 1 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.084 | 0.037 |
| 2 | –0.066 | –0.069 | –0.091 | –0.163 |
| 3 or more | –0.378 | –0.386 | –0.394 | –0.488 |
| Change in the number of children in the household (ref.: no change) | | | | |
| More children | 2.924 | 2.941 | 2.867 | 2.904 |
| Fewer children | –0.884 | –0.889 | –0.846 | –0.811 |
| Employment status of couple her/his (ref.: both full-time) | | | | |
| Part-time/full-time | 0.621 | 0.624 | 0.685 | 0.386 |
| Full-time/part-time | 0.153 | 0.155 | 0.132 | 0.420 |
| Both part-time | –0.445 | –0.440 | –0.500 | –0.468 |
| Region (Ref.: West Germany) | | | | |
| East Germany | –0.051 | –0.042 | –0.089 | –0.006 |
| Education/Qualification (ref.: medium) | | | | |
| Low | 0.652 | 0.658 | 0.652 | 0.657 |
| High | –0.062 | –0.047 | –0.089 | –0.046 |
| Migration background (ref.: none) | | | | |
| 1st Generation | 0.642 | 0.615 | 0.711 | 0.762 |
| 2nd Generation | –1.007 | –1.022 | –0.957 | –0.974 |
### Table A-4: (Continued)

| Model | 1a       | 1b       | 1c       | 1d       |
|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Age (ref.: 25–34 y.) | | | | |
| Under 25 y. | -0.532   | -0.523   | -0.432   | -0.344   |
|          | [0.421]  | [0.432]  | [0.509]  | [0.604]  |
| 35–44 y. | -0.562   | -0.556   | -0.613   | -0.612   |
|          | [0.055]  | [0.059]  | [0.036]  | [0.039]  |
| 45–54 y. | -0.871   | -0.869   | -0.907   | -0.906   |
|          | [0.003]  | [0.004]  | [0.002]  | [0.002]  |
| 55 y. or older | -0.755   | -0.759   | -0.815   | -0.779   |
|          | [0.066]  | [0.066]  | [0.047]  | [0.060]  |
| Ratio of partners' income | | | | -0.915   |
|          |          |          |          | [0.131]  |
| Ratio of partners' income, squared | | | | 0.094    |
|          |          |          |          | [0.633]  |
| Subjective health status (ref.: good) | | | | |
| Very good | 0.481    | 0.485    | 0.451    | 0.434    |
|          | [0.192]  | [0.190]  | [0.220]  | [0.246]  |
| Satisfactory | 0.531    | 0.536    | 0.522    | 0.542    |
|          | [0.069]  | [0.067]  | [0.073]  | [0.063]  |
| Not good | 1.061    | 1.068    | 1.034    | 1.037    |
|          | [0.004]  | [0.004]  | [0.004]  | [0.004]  |
| Bad | 1.368    | 1.364    | 1.289    | 1.289    |
|          | [0.010]  | [0.011]  | [0.015]  | [0.016]  |
| Change in subjective health status (ref.: no change) | | | | |
| Strong decline | 0.369    | 0.381    | 0.312    | 0.321    |
|          | [0.416]  | [0.402]  | [0.493]  | [0.487]  |
| Moderate decline | 0.319    | 0.319    | 0.330    | 0.310    |
|          | [0.269]  | [0.271]  | [0.250]  | [0.287]  |
| Moderate increase | 0.125    | 0.128    | 0.129    | 0.130    |
|          | [0.666]  | [0.660]  | [0.656]  | [0.656]  |
| Strong increase | 0.159    | 0.161    | 0.197    | 0.251    |
|          | [0.710]  | [0.709]  | [0.645]  | [0.561]  |
| Constant | -3.462   | -3.487   | -3.599   | -2.978   |
|          | [0.000]  | [0.000]  | [0.000]  | [0.000]  |
| /lnsig2u | -1.316   | -1.151   | -1.577   | -1.238   |
|          | 0.755    | 0.750    | 0.768    | 0.736    |
| N | 2235    | 2235    | 2235    | 2235    |
| N (Groups) | 1463   | 1463   | 1463   | 1463   |
| Log likelihood | -379.526 | -379.395 | -378.288 | -374.948 |
| Chi² | 60.512   | 59.835   | 62.967   | 63.873   |
| AIC | 823.052  | 824.79   | 826.576  | 823.896  |
| BIC | 1005.836 | 1013.286 | 1026.496 | 1035.24  |

*Source: PASS waves 2–12; IAB.PASS-SUF0618.de.en.v1. p-values in brackets. Further control variables are survey year, receipt of welfare benefits.*

*Note: Models include all control variables discussed in the paper.*
Table A-5: Placebo test: Summary of logistic regression analysis for the probability of reducing working hours or taking an employment break including, attitudes on finances

| Model | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 2a | 2b | 2c | 2d |
|-------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Reduce working hours | | | | | | | | |
| | 1.703 | 1.668 | 0.936 | 0.887 | | | | |
| Matching of gender ideologies (ref.: both moderately egalitarian) | | | | | | | | |
| Both essentialist | 0.099 | 0.098 | –0.463 | –0.443 | | | | |
| | [0.728] | [0.732] | [0.311] | [0.333] | | | | |
| Both egalitarian | 0.497 | 0.474 | 1.011 | 1.007 | | | | |
| | [0.178] | [0.200] | [0.015] | [0.016] | | | | |
| She more essentialist | 0.073 | 0.076 | 0.409 | 0.396 | | | | |
| | [0.860] | [0.856] | [0.408] | [0.426] | | | | |
| Matching of financial attitudes (I would rather spend money immediately than save it for a later date; ref.: both 3 mostly does not apply) | | | | | | | | |
| Both, applies fully or mostly | –0.176 | –0.188 | 0.599 | 0.629 | | | | |
| | [0.634] | [0.613] | [0.155] | [0.126] | | | | |
| Both, does not apply at all | –0.042 | –0.018 | –0.195 | –0.138 | | | | |
| | [0.880] | [0.947] | [0.637] | [0.734] | | | | |
| Applies more for her | –0.356 | –0.372 | 0.561 | 0.582 | | | | |
| | [0.629] | [0.605] | [0.426] | [0.407] | | | | |
| Applies more for him | –0.939 | –1.040 | –0.912 | –1.084 | | | | |
| | [0.132] | [0.097] | [0.291] | [0.215] | | | | |
| Statistics | | | | | | | | |
| N | 1218 | 1218 | 1218 | 1218 | 1089 | 1089 | 1089 | 1089 |
| N (Groups) | 939 | 939 | 939 | 939 | 860 | 860 | 860 | 860 |
| Log likelihood | –367.77 | –360.31 | –358.82 | –365.91 | –183.26 | –177.50 | –175.09 | –180.44 |
| Chi² | 37.80 | 41.84 | 42.55 | 38.75 | 89.79 | 92.70 | 94.58 | 92.32 |
| AIC | 773.53 | 766.62 | 771.64 | 777.82 | 402.53 | 399.00 | 402.18 | 404.89 |
| BIC | 870.53 | 884.03 | 909.47 | 895.24 | 492.40 | 508.84 | 532.00 | 514.73 |
| LLR-Test | 14.92 | 3.96 | 3.71 | 11.53 | 6.02 | 5.64 |
| Chi²((1−α)>0.9) | 7.78 | 7.78 | 7.78 | 7.78 | 7.78 | 7.78 |
| Chi²((1−α)>0.95) | 9.49 | 9.49 | 9.49 | 9.49 | 9.49 | 9.49 |
| df | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Compared to model | 1a | 1b | 1a | 2a | 2b | 2a |

Source: PASS waves 8 and 11; IAB.PASS-SUF0618.de.en.v1; p-values in brackets.
Note: Models include all control variables discussed in the paper.