Problematising internal security: Crime, community and social exclusion

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Abstract: This article examines the problematisation of crime, crime prevention and security in contemporary security policy programmes using three Finnish internal security programmes and theory-based content analysis. The study is based on the theory (the perspective) of an analytics of government. The findings highlight the central meaning of social exclusion and community as security practices wherein social exclusion is seen as a threat to security and a risk for crime. Indeed, community-based crime prevention plays a central role in the programmes along with the worry about serious crimes and the high level of homicides. A fluid governing policy without crime and accidents is the implicit goal of these programmes.

Subjects: Crime and Crime Prevention; Crime Control; Sociology & Social Policy

Keywords: crime prevention; security practices; fear; social exclusion; community

1. Introduction

Future generations will look back on our era as a time when one system of policing ended and another took its place (Bayley & Shearing, 1996, p. 585).

Security can be interpreted in multiple ways. This difference is evident when one tries to offer a precise account of internal security. In Europe, for instance, issues of internal security can refer to economic and financial crises, terrorism, organised crime, poverty, natural and man-made disasters, cybercrime and EU border security. Further, Europeans regard internal security as being linked to...
external security and events. (Special Eurobarometer 371, 2011, pp. 8–9). Thus, maintaining law and order is closely connected to the definition of internal security and its function of every sovereign nation (Hinarejos, 2011, p. 249).

Much has been written on security and crime, and the two have a natural connection, especially when speaking of internal security. However, security is not an unquestionable good. Several studies indicate the ambivalent meaning of the concepts of crime and security (e.g. Ericson, 2007; Neocleous, 2000, 2008; Neocleous & Rigakos, 2011; Zedner, 2003a, 2003b, 2007, 2009). Security, particularly when taking the viewpoint of criminology and crime prevention, has been analysed broadly by Lucia Zedner. In addition to criminology and its connection to actual crime prevention, Zedner addresses the problems of policing in general. Neocleous (2008) has studied the concept of security more widely in different situations and also in the construction of the social order built by police power. He asks if we can consider security as a political undertaking, using technology to reorder the social world (ibid.). Ericson (2007) also has discussed the complex association between crime and security in the prevailing political climate and argues that neoliberal political culture is obsessed with uncertainty. His analysis of national and domestic security helps us understand why internal security is so high an issue on the political agenda in Western countries.

Crawford (2013) and Lutterbeck (2005) have made security, as it relates to crime, more intelligible and recognisable on the European level. Further still, Lutterbeck (ibid.) notes that internal and external security are integrated elements in Western Europe. According to Lutterbeck (ibid.), traditional, state-based, domestic security threats have now lost much of their relevance. Neocleous and Rigakos (2011, p. 18) claim that security creates both internal domestic and external foreign threats, thereby generating the fear and division that too often underpin any raison d’etat. They also urge that the greatest tyranny prompted by the need for security is its insistence on the construction of the excluded “Other” (ibid.).

In Finland, the Ministry of the Interior administers internal security. According to the Ministry, there has been a problematic lack of security planning in the area of internal security that has extended across all administrative sectors since the beginning of the 2000s (MI 2004, Description). Coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior and accepted by the State Council, three internal security programmes have since been launched since that time: “A Safer Community” (ASC, MI 44/2004, 2004); “Safety First” (SF, MI 25/2008, 2008); and “A Safer Tomorrow” (AST, MI 40/2012, 2012). Each of these programmes notes a different kind of criminality as now being the most significant threat to internal security.

There have also been investigations of the Finnish internal security programmes. Pajuja (2007) assessed the first internal security programme from different points of view, criticising it for its scattered treatment of crime issues. In an article in the journal, Lakimies, Lindstedt (2007) considered the state of security a basic right and also as an argument for limiting other basic rights to increase state control. Virta (2013) examined the Finnish internal security programmes briefly in her article on urban security. All Finnish internal security programmes include pre-emptive measures to prevent violent extremism (e.g. MI 40/2012, 2012, p. 11), and Virta’s (2008) research on the prevention of radicalism addressed that issue as a new challenge to policing. This paper, however, does not choose to advance that discussion. Jukka Törrönen and Timo Korander (Törrönen & Korander, 2005) also have discussed the different strategies of crime prevention and local security plans. These are based on ASC (2004), the first internal security programme; however, there are no considerable differences between the second and third programmes in terms of their strategies.

This article is a critical investigation of the problematisation of crime, crime prevention and security in these three internal security programmes. It differs from the Finnish studies above in certain respects. This research focused on some taken-for-granted features in thinking on (internal) security and ways to promote it. Indeed, one can argue that security and crime prevention are (also) political concepts that can be used to shape, order and monitor individuals, classes and even the State as a whole.
2. Problematic (internal) security and the government

The concept of security is not monolithic; it is always open to interpretation. Therefore, no one group should have a monopoly on the investigation of the concept. This focus also applies to internal security; if too many groups actively seek to engage in security work, it is logical that it is also important to research security by applying those different points of view.

Security is connected to “the good things” in life and to practically all that is rationally worth achieving. It is often taken for granted that security is a benefit. However, it is not possible to say that merely unambiguously. First, one must ask whose security one is talking about. Internal security is mainly assessed from the viewpoint of the State—it is an issue of the Ministry of the Interior. Further, the State’s perspective of security can differ from that of its citizens, and governmental security may even seem to clash with non-governmental security. (see Freedman, 2006, p. 11). The government may “play the security card” to restrain criticism, control discussion or attempt to sideline individuals or groups that regard an issue as political rather than merely an issue of security. Thus, internal security is directed by the State, and as such, it can become an opportunity for government to direct human conduct—in other words, conduct people's conduct in such a way as to govern them in the State’s own best interest. (Dean, 1999; Neocleous, 2000, p. 10–13). According to Dean (1999, p. 11), government can be defined in the context of Foucauldian governmentality as simply “the conduct of conduct”.

Michel Foucault formulated the concept of governmentality in the latter part of the 1970s (Foucault, 2007, pp. 87–134). Governmentality is a neologism that means “concerning government” (Senellart 2007). Indeed it is “how we think about governing others and ourselves in a wide variety contexts” and “with the different mentalities of government”. Thinking in this instance does not mean having an individual consciousness; rather, it refers to the beliefs and opinions in which we are immersed. It is a collective activity. (Dean, 1999, p. 16, 209). Further, governmentality does not mean a grand and systematic theory, but rather it focuses its attention on the diverse ways in which we may actually govern the conduct of others and ourselves—wherein all will be governed “for their own good”. Populations emerge as entities to be examined by the expertise of economists, sociologists and demographers, and citizens as self-governing individuals, whose capacities and also potentials have to be taken into account and optimised. (O’Malley, 2009, pp. 2–3). Foucault stresses that governing people is not, for instance, a way to force people to do what the governors want. Better still, it should include guidance or counselling and also communicate the more positive forms of self-conduct (Foucault & Blasius, 1993, pp. 203–204; Helén, 2004, pp. 208–209).

Following Foucault, several social scientists have pushed the research of governmentality forward. Nikolas Rose, one of these developers, formulated “government” as

- - that zone of thought and action comprising all more or less systematized ways of thinking about and acting upon the conduct of persons, the capacities of populations and the disposition of things in order to achieve certain objectives (Rose, 2000, p. 142).

According to Lemke (2012, p. 20), government is systematised, regulated and reflects the modes of power that go beyond the spontaneous exercise of power over others and accepts a specific form of reasoning that defines the objective of any action and the adequate means to achieve that objective. In any analysis of government, we are concerned about how government happens. We talk here about an analytics of government that is interested in all the endeavours that shape, guide or direct the conduct of others and the ways in which we are urged to govern ourselves. (Rose, 1999, p. 3; Dean, 1999, p. 11, 21). Internal security programmes are offered as a kind of joint venture for both citizens and officials. However, they are still prepared and launched by the public administration, which makes the programmes proper in terms of directing the “conduct of conduct” in actual practice.
The apparatuses of security are the essential technical instruments of governmentality (Foucault, 2007, p. 108). Foucault identifies the totality of the concrete processes of life in any population that becomes the target of a “technology" of security. Technology of security refers to “an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole with regard to its internal dangers" and seeks to prevent the dangers that result from the existence of a population as a biological entity. (Foucault, 2003, p. 249; Lemke, 2011, p. 37; Lemke, 2012, p. 42). In the context of any analytics of government, security is seen as a helpmate to the juridical and administrative apparatus of the State so as to promote health, education, the social welfare systems and the national economy (Dean, 1999, p. 20).

Numerous scholars have suggested that we are increasingly being governed by different security projects, and some of these indeed create new fields of governance (Valverde, 2011, pp. 3–4). However, security is a non-juridical concept that also refers to social relations (cf. Lemke, 2012, p. 49).

The Keynesian form of the Western welfare state system, i.e. “from the cradle to the grave", came under attack during the last decades of the twentieth century, and as a result, the whole welfare system underwent a transformation. Security was theoretically possible within the nation state when the welfare state was a way of managing the risks to the population and a way to govern society (Dean, 2007, 56–57). The relationship between the people and the State has now taken a different form. More than before, people are expected to promote the individual and the national well-being, as if it were their own personal responsibility and enterprise. It also seems that a range of new techniques, for example, the technologies of community and the concept of risk, have emerged, seeking to govern these autonomous actors. (O’Malley, 2009, p. 5; Rose, 1999, pp. 139, 142, 188–191, 1996, pp. 327–328) More and more issues are now collected and displayed under the title of security or as a risk to security. Examples are those people who are morally and culturally cut off from mainstream society. This proliferation also has a social dimension. It can feed into the arguments about the existence of an “underclass" or a special group of people who are “socially excluded" and thus a threat to security. These “socially excluded" individuals are perceived to be the product of “pathological" institutions—home and school—that have failed to socialise and inculcate proper responsibility in young people. (see Crawford, 1998, p. 105). However, as Zedner (2003a, p. 176) explains, “security, like risk, is a capacious concept, perilously capable of meaning all things to all comers". Against this background, this discussion seeks to discover how security is problematised in these three programmes, especially regarding crime and its correlate, namely: the prevention of crime.

3. Research material, research questions and methodology

The research material is the three internal security programmes launched by the Finnish Government and overseen by the Ministry of the Interior. The research method used is a qualitative, theory-based content analysis, typical of content analysis that forms categories of content for further content elaboration. This theory (or better, this perspective) in the background is the analytics of government. According to the theory of government, which means “conduct of conduct", this effort seeks to discover the kind of methods actually used to shape and regulate human conduct.

This paper asks what kind of things, phenomena or people are seen to threaten (internal) security, especially concerning crime and criminology. How are these problems and challenges solved? When analysing the texts, I pay critical attention to questions and situations that are seen problematic in any way and assess the offered solutions heuristically, but in a theory-based manner, thus considering what is viewed as important, which attitudes include a solution and why a particular attitude may be the best option. It is also important to take into consideration the proposal being examined (e.g. one from the police or other officials), what the possible motives are and the potential outcomes.

First, the research material was coded based on issues common in all three programmes concerning crime and security. Afterwards, the groups were connected to depict the same kind or the same idea regarding security for five groups. These groups were: (1) security as a concept in the internal security programmes; (2) challenges of internal security; and (3) violent criminality; (these three
groups were joined together under the basic features and challenges of internal security); (4) the multilateralisation of actors (this group employs the vocabulary of community); and (5) social exclusion, an internal security issue. After dividing the text into three “umbrella groups” (i) basic features and challengers of internal security, (ii) the multilateralisation of actors and (iii) social exclusion as a problem for internal security so that the relevant security discourse is a part of one of these groups, a textual analysis of the content of the material was undertaken.

The central purpose of these programmes’ texts was to be constitutive in several ways. This text may, for instance, contribute to reproducing and transforming society (see Fairclough, 1992, p. 65). Thus, it is possible to approach these internal security programmes from the perspective that they actually do have a strategic goal—a better society.

4. Basic features and the challengers of internal security

Security is a controversial concept. Security can mean political power, which includes the possibility of using coercion to maintain social order against both internal and external threats. On the other hand, security may mean protecting individuals and communities against violence, the misuse of power and other threatening behaviours (Luckham & Kirk, 2013, p. 1). Security has also moved from its earlier, more narrow concept, that centred on questions of military and territory, to the broader idea, human idea of security. The semantic field of security action has thus been diffused perceptibly in just a short time. (e.g. Neocleous, 2000; see Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998).

The contents and goal of internal security are made clear in a sentence that is found to be similar in all three versions of the Finnish internal security programmes. Internal security in them is defined in ASC, SF and AST (MI 44/2004, 2004, p. 14; MI 25/2008, 2008, p. 6 and MI 40/2012, 2012, p. 8) as:

...a state of society where everyone can enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the rule of law and a safe society without the fear or insecurity caused by crime, disruptions, accidents or any other phenomena in Finnish society or the increasingly globalised world at large.

The goal in the first two programmes is to make Finland “the safest country” in Europe until year 2015. In the most recent programme, AST (2012), that goal year is not stated.

A common cause for alarm in all of these programmes is violent criminality, an issue that receives the most attention in the programmes if one considers that the programmer includes different kinds of violent crimes, such as assaults, violence in close relationships and cases of random violence. Around 140–150 homicides per year were committed in Finland at the beginning of the 2000s, actually per capita twice or even three times as many as committed in other European Union countries on average. There is no surprise, therefore, that these programmes are concerned about the amount of violent criminality in Finland, especially homicides. Both the majority of suspects and their victims in these cases are characterised as intoxicated abusers and thus socially excluded. This view matches the stated opinion that social exclusion is the biggest (SF 2008), or the major (ASC 2004 and AST 2012), challenge to internal security. (MI 44/2004, 2004; MI 25/2008, 2008; MI 40/2012, 2012).

A special cause of concern is domestic violence. More than 90% of domestic violence targets women (MI 25/2008, 2008, p. 37). Hence, it is logical that violence against women is on the agenda. The position of the victim is central, but at the same time, bringing the perpetrator to justice is also emphasised. Collecting and exchanging information between authorities from both the victim and the perpetrator are also emphasised. (MI 44/2004, 2004, pp. 28–30). This view suggests that intervention into the victim and the perpetrator’s way of life are both seen important. Also, this view implicitly means that they are citizens whose way of life needs both surveillance and correction.
Certain differences between programmes were also found. The focus in the first security programme (ASC 2004) is on the prevention of “classical” crimes (e.g. crimes against property), fighting against drugs, decreasing recidivism and combating terrorism. In the second (SF 2008) and third (AST 2012) programmes, there are new emphasises compared to the first (ASC 2004) programme, for instance, issues concerning illegal immigration and illegal extremist activities, violent radicalisation (SF 2008 and AST 2012), ensuring security in public spaces, improving security at educational institutions and improving safety for the elderly (especially AST 2012). These programmes seem to have been updated, as new problems appeared. For example, immigration has become a more common phenomenon in Finland. The security of educational institutions refers clearly to the recent serious school shootings. It does seem that more and more different kinds of harm are now being viewed through security glasses. As a consequence, there is some saturation of society with security where appealing to security becomes more and more often a valid argument for government and society to accept.

The ways used for combating security problems have common features in the programmes, for instance, the pre-emptive measures. A pre-emptive solution is emphasised in every programme—even tautologically, as one can see in these three quotes: “One must prepare for the future developments in preventing advance threats and challenges that may affect our internal security” (MI 44/2004, 2004, p. 17); “Internal security development can be favourably influenced by anticipating future trends and by proactively addressing them” (MI 25/2008, 2008, p. 6); “The police engage in preventive action to support other authorities in the prevention of violence” (MI 40/2012, 2012, p. 55).

The most essential contribution of the police is obvious in this textual formation, and the idea of having internal security programmes is visible when statements made in the internal security programmes and by the National Community Policing Strategy (2010) are compared. For instance:

As far as the prevention of crime and violations of law and order are concerned, the police are charged to work in cooperation with other authorities, NGOs, the private sector, citizens and groups of citizens - -. The meaning of pre-emptive actions due to crimes, disturbances and accidents is developing. - - Pre-emptive action is central in maintaining people’s sense of security (National Community Policing Strategy, 2010, 5).

Further, the internal security programmes are now incentives and models for local security planning by arranging these internal security programmes on a local level (MI 25/2008, 2008, p. 23): “The police must play the central role and steer this work (National Community Policing Strategy, 2010, p. 6).

Two facts are thus quite evident. First, the dominant way of thinking about the prevention of crime is a pre-emptive activity, and secondly, the police do have a central role in these programmes and also in their local applications. The possibility of crime is increasingly being paid attention to by them. (National Community Policing Strategy, 2010, p. 5). Crime risk and the fear of it have become the most important basis of police involvement (also) in Finnish governance. Hence, safety and security do not mean as much a reaction to crime or the punishment of perpetrators after the fact; rather, it is based on the prejudgement of the possibility of a crime. The aim of security then is to reduce the opportunities for crime—for example, by making an object difficult to steal or by increasing surveillance.

Therefore, the belief is that although nothing has happened yet, something could happen. The goal and the ambition of these programmes are: control the future and offer a promise of “happiness for a life to which nothing happens” (Castel, 1991, p. 289). Confidence in these reactive measures has been increasingly substituted with measures that aim to preclude all negative phenomena long before they actually happen. The possibility of crime or violence is more emphasised, and
preparedness for crime happening may make a situation seem more threatening even when nothing criminal has yet happened:

The police receive reports of persons causing a fear of violence in bystanders. In some of these cases, the person in question has powerful fantasies about violence, along with other problems. The challenge is to identify individuals who can fairly be assessed as being at high risk of turning their fantasies into real life acts of violence. (MI 40/2012, 2012, p. 43).

Garland (2001, p. 184) discusses the idea of emergent criminology, the so-called supposed criminology of “the dangerous other”. This kind of criminology dramatises crime, depicting it as almost a catastrophe and then framing it with a social defence. Criminals are “dangerous others”; they threaten our safety and they have no empathy. However, there is perhaps no act that is causing harm to others, and threats alone of course cannot lead to a person being found guilty (Ericson, 2007, p. 157). People do not face crime, but rather they face the threat of crime. They do not seek freedom from crime, but rather they seek freedom from the fear of crime (Dubber, 2001, 848). One may then justifiably ask whether the problematics of supposed criminality have changed into the problematic of a self-consuming fear of crime.

5. Multilateralisation of security actors
The internal security programmes also make clear that the responsibility for security has shifted from State actors—for example, the military and the police—to a wider diversity of actors, such as municipalities, NGOs, companies and even individual citizens (see Vande Walle & Bisschop, 2012, p. 213). The role of NGOs and residents (i.e. individual citizens) is stressed in every one of the programmes, as in:

‘In the future, we will need greater extensive cooperation between officials, collectives and residents to be able to unite power resources, knowledge and rights and to prevent deliberate threats’ (MI 44/2004, 2004, p. 81);

‘NGOs have an important role in strengthening internal security locally, regionally and nationally’ (MI 25/2008, 2008, p. 24); and

‘Resident security and the amenity of residential area will be improved via the introduction of a neighbourhood team or neighbourhood help system’ (MI 40/2012, 2012, p. 27).

It is notable also that the role of community and a sense of community are also thus emphasised as:

‘In the future we will need more than today wide cooperation between officials, communities and residents - -’ (MI 44/2004, 2004, p. 81);

‘Community support will be increased by boosting cooperation between the authorities and NGOs - -’ (MI 25/2008, 2008, p. 17); or

‘Involving residents in efforts to improve the security and the amenity of the areas in which they live will enhance their sense of participation - - doing this together boosts a sense of community too’ (MI 40/2012, 2012, p. 26).

The vocabulary of the programmes also includes expressions like “village activity”, “new locality”, “allowing residents to participate in security efforts”, having “a sense of community and participation” and so on. All these expressions hint at the idea of community and also what that community should be like to prevent crime.

That kind of evolution is a field with a specific interpretation. The administration of individuals was organised using “the social” as late as the 1970s (during the period of the welfare state). The role of
government involved developing a distinctive circuit of interdependence between social security and political security and it was misleading to view the social and the state antagonistically. The social thus became “the field of governmental security considered in its widest sense”. (Gordon, 1991, 35).

When the old certainties of “the welfare state” came under attack during the last quarter of 1900s (Rose, 1996, p. 327), community and the sense of community entered the vocabularies of the authorities who tried to bind individuals to certain values and definite commitments. Some researchers even speak about a shift then from society to the community as the primary object of rule (Herbert-Cheshire & Higgins, 2004, p. 290). Community indicates that something is shared, and in any discourse, the community is considered positive and worth aspiring to as a common solution for all who live and work in the middle of cultural, ethical and religious pluralism. Under the idea of community, ethical guidelines then have a certain direction. An individual is now a moral subject with responsibilities and obligations to the community and also to himself/herself concerning health, happiness, wealth or security. (O’Malley, 1992; Rose, 1996) Community expresses positive sentiments and fosters empathy rather than fear and makes people feel they are a part of something bigger (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997, 71). Thus, communities are no longer only the antidotes for loneliness and isolation, as was the case in the context of the welfare state.

Community and our sense of it have developed a more technical meaning, namely: a “problematisation” and seeking of solutions using that framework. In practice, as we see in these internal security programmes, people are mobilised through these kinds of technologies, which operate through forming allegiances and communicating the responsibilities of citizens. The private sector, citizens and NGO groups are now encouraged to play a more active role in the delivery of programmes for regeneration and fulfilling the “common good”. The indirect mechanisms of rule, government at a distance, instrumentalize the individual capacity for self-government and self-regulation. The top-down approach has largely replaced any emphasis on the rights and responsibilities of individual citizens to promote society’s moral and ethical codes of behaviour.

When taking part in this collective “good”, according to the internal security programmes, the individual must prove his/her capability for responsible liberty and autonomy. If an individual is not part of any collective, he/she perhaps is not capable of caring for him/herself; furthermore, and worse still, that person may be part of some “anti-community” (a gang member, a graffiti artist, etc) that is seen as a threat to the public order and its security. (see Rose, 1999, p. 259). These people are seen as having a lack of the proper sense of community opposed to those who are willingly taking on societal responsibilities (Delanty, 1997).

In Finland, an early example of the appearance of this kind of thinking was the crime prevention programme called “Working Together for a Safer Society”, launched by the Ministry of Justice in 1999. Even the name of this programme brings to mind a situation where people responsibly work together to solve issues, which were earlier thought to be only the duty of officials. Also, these internal security programmes try to exploit two resources that are offered and defined as the given virtues of citizenship, namely: individual responsibility and a sense of community.

In addition, according to the Police Act, to maintain the desire security, “the police work in cooperation with other authorities and with local residents and organisations” (Police Act (493/1995)). Also, “the police work in cooperation with other public authorities and with communities and residents in order to maintain security - -”. (Police Act (872/2011)). As O’Malley (1996, p. 201) stated, there is a language of “working together against crime” and having a “partnership with police” that indeed signals changes in the relationship between the expertise of the police and the freedom of the public.

6. Social exclusion seen as a problem of internal security
All three internal security programmes (ASC, MI 44/2004, 2004; SF, MI 25/2008, 2008 and AST, MI 40/2012, 2012) stress that social exclusion is an issue that arouses concern among the authorities.
It is named and identified as the main or key threat to internal security. Such social exclusion is also connected to criminality and a generally imperfect capability to control one’s life:

The number of the socially excluded due to unemployment, poverty, inequality, insufficient integration of foreigners, illnesses or substance abuse and the number of those who get outside society, may increase. Falling into a criminal way of life is still mostly a part of the development of social exclusion. (MI 44/2004, 2004, p. 17). society, may increase. Falling into a criminal way of life is still mostly a part of the development of social exclusion. (MI 44/2004, 2004, p. 17).

Social exclusion is the biggest threat to internal security. Unemployment and other income problems such as over-indebtedness increase income differences between individuals, contributing to poverty and the risk of exclusion. (MI 25/2008, 2008, p. 7).

Social exclusion is one of the key factors underlying security issues. Exclusion often involves substance abuse. Excessive substance use in combination with other factors promoting exclusion may accelerate and exacerbate an individual’s loss of control of life and his or her falling outside may accelerate and exacerbate an individual’s loss of control of life and his or her falling outside and society at large too. (MI 40/2012, 2012, p. 12).

A lot of description and discussion is presented on social exclusion without any clear or precise definition given for the actual concept. However, depicting the connection between security and social exclusion is important, but yet it feels quite surprising. The question is precisely: How should we understand this defined connection?

In everyday life, there is always an assumption that the truth of matters and events is reflected by the way we speak. Then again, the truthfulness of actual knowledge is thought to be determined and defined as a social process in which truthfulness is not associated with events, but rather constructed through language. (Juhila, 1993, p. 152). It is, therefore, possible to name some of the factors that determine how the truth as we know it is composed and defined in terms of social exclusion and our connections to it. Those who draw up these propositions are high-ranking officials and authorities from different ministries. When making judgements and drawing up such documentation, these individuals use statistical data. Often, according to this data, social exclusion and criminality have a mutual correlation. Further, the manner of presentation in such citations as those herein firmly suggests that this connection is causal, even though that correlation naturally does not imply a precise causation (see Alkula, Pöntinen, & Ylöstalo, 1994, pp. 166–167). In addition, Aaltonen, Kivivuori, and Martikainen (2011, p. 178) confirmed in their own quantitative study on the connection between social determinants and criminality that, for instance, in spite of the so-called defined correlation, that, the connection between criminality and low-grade education—thought be one risk factor for social exclusion—is more complicated that one might first infer.

Moreover, the connection between social exclusion and criminality then becomes constructed as a presumed fact via politically reinforcing documents. All three internal security programmes are indeed accepted by the Finnish Government. For its part, the government is part of the Finnish democratic system; thus, the offered viewpoint becomes official, whatever we may think of it. One way of thinking about the connection between criminality and social exclusion extends further from these internal security programmes into local security plans that then become the local application of the principals and statements derived from the Ministry of the Interior. However, this presented conception must also be considered as a political question. The final outcome of this political consideration affects how crime and social exclusion and the connection between them are presented as a problem. The definition of social exclusion also remains very narrow and imperfect in the citations above. For instance, poverty, illness, inequality, unemployment and disability are cited as the sound reasons for social exclusion. Their disparities remain hidden, however, because in the citations
herein, only the difference between them and those individuals who are not socially excluded is expressed fully.

Social exclusion is also an otherwise indefinite, even vague, concept. In these internal security programmes, those who create the estimates always consider themselves to be better informed about the situation and thus locate themselves at the centre of the thinking, thus excluding certain individuals who are then socially excluded from the centrality (cf. Helne, 2002, pp. 24–25). An example is Myrskylä’s (2012) interpretation of the socially excluded and their numbers:

According to a report published in 2012, the number of socially excluded young people has increased only slightly in recent years. In 2010, there were 51 300 young people aged 15–29 who were considered socially excluded. Of these, some 32 500 form the hard-core of the socially excluded. They are absent from every statistical analysis, and no one knows where they are and what they are doing. (MI 40/2012, 2012, p. 13).

In his analysis, Myrskylä (2012) classifies the socially excluded as those young men and women who exist outside the studies or the labour market and have not obtained any other education except for comprehensive school. Myrskylä (ibid) admits that social exclusion is indeed a broad phenomenon that covers a wide range of physical and mental problems, from having mentally fallen outside the normal practices of society to having different substance dependences and/or committing various kinds of crimes. A common feature of the socially excluded is thought by many to be their dependency. Further, the socially excluded are depicted as only a problematic group of people who seem to evade responsibilities towards society, instead of using their capacity to study and work and carry out the ordinary duties of citizens. (Rose, 1999, pp. 254–256).

7. Findings and discussion

These three security programmes that were studied describe an understanding by officials of the contemporary problems related to security in the area of crime. The objective is naturally to reduce crime in the future. The impression of the “good” that arises from these different security programmes and their undertakings, however, is not harmonious. One important goal of the programmes is the freedom from fear and threats, as in, for instance, “the purpose of local safety planning is to improve safety by reducing the number of crimes and increasing a sense of security” (MI 25/2008, 2008, p. 23) or by “identifying threats of serious violence and maintaining preparedness for situations where people are threatened” (MI 40/2012, 2012, p. 19). That kind of goal is restated several times in each of these programmes. However, according to Zedner (2003b), the consciousness of crimes accumulates and so the anxiety due to the possibility of crime will also inevitably increase. Thus, certain efforts to influence citizens to be prepared in advance for the possibility of crime have their own drawbacks.

The fear of becoming a victim of crime is planted in people’s minds, even though that subject is not discussed. In general, one might say that increasing preparedness for crime or at least raising the awareness of the possibility of crime is difficult or impossible to achieve without also increasing the fear of crime at the same time. (Zedner, 2003b, p. 164). According to Lemke (2012, p. 50), fear has a segregatory function. It divides society into particular and separate homogeneous groups, wherein the difference between endangered and dangerous as applied to individuals comes into play. Indeed, Furedi (2002, p. 32) argues that it is not crime that makes the world insecure, but rather the fear of crime happening.

The most surprising discovery found by this review of the internal security programmes is the central meaning that is given to social exclusion as threat to internal security, although there are differences between the programmes on this issue. In ASC (2004), the first programme, social exclusion is seen as some kind of an accident that befalls the individual as a result of numerous factors. In SF (2008), the problem of social exclusion is expressed categorically; social exclusion is named as
the most serious threat to internal security. In addition, social exclusion herein is connected to a
deficit of control that individuals have over their own lives. This attitude is also seen in AST 2012),
where the criteria for social exclusion are defined as not taking part in a working life and getting an
education.

There has thus been a shift in our conception of normality, and people outside this normality are
seen as being socially excluded and viewed through the short-sighted glasses of security and
Otherness. They are seen as but a threat, a risk to internal security, the community, the general
public—indeed the normal people. (see Rose, 1999, p. 263). As Dean (1999, p. 167) suggests, such a
vocabulary of risk recodes the earlier language of stratification, disadvantages and marginalisation.
Individuals now seen as socially excluded become “the usual suspects” who need constant surveil-

lance and control due to their lack of personal capacity, self-power and responsibility. The problem
then is how to govern them, how to contend with the risk they bring to the rest of society who are
not socially excluded, but not so much how to cure or reform them, so they can join the ranks of the
accepted. (Rose, 1996, p. 349; Rose, 1999, p. 260).

Every programme expressed this connection between social exclusion and criminality. One can
also identify an emergent division between active citizens and the disadvantaged (or socially ex-
cluded) groups. The latter require an intervention for risk management. Socially excluded people
have no voice in the debates or the descriptions of internal security. The image of this socially ex-
cluded heterogeneous group of people as only a concern to society is formed mostly from an admin-
istrative—technical and social—welfarist point of view, where various needed intentions, projects
and strategies concerning these people are presented and acted upon using these programmes as
a rationale.

The discourse of community has a central meaning in these programmes. Problematisation in
terms of community is a method used for binding questions of security to administrative rules and
orders and thus protection. The public sector of administration is now involved in networks and part-
nerships with private and voluntary sectors (O'Toole & Burdess, 2004, p. 434). New modes of partici-
pation and the engagement of residents may of course reactivate self-motivation, personal
responsibility and individual commitments. Indeed, the image of “contractual” community assumes
responsibility for its own security. (Rose, 1996, pp. 331–335; cf. O'Malley, 1992).

It is important to remember that these internal security programmes were launched by the State.
State-centric security and the security offered by the State, however, are a double-edged sword. One
has reason to be cautious because security under the leadership of the State will have a weakening
effect on the basic rights of the individual’s freedoms that the state should not contravene (exclud-
ing of course certain exceptional circumstances, such as war (Tuori, 1999; Waldron, 2003). This as-
pect of security is omitted in the programmes. Implicitly, the matter is referred to only by the phrase:
“People here trust institutions and other people to a high degree” (e.g. MI 40/2012, 2012, p. 12). This
comment can, however, inculcate the thinking of citizens instead of depicting the real state of cur-
rent and actual affairs. This view is, I think, a problematic lack and indeed the potential danger found
lurking in these internal security programmes.

8. Conclusions
The internal security programmes examined emphasise the citizens’ opportunity to enjoy the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the rule of law as a direct manifestation of a safe society. However, the
regulative role of the State in formulating and launching these programmes suggests that the most
important position in the programmes regarding security is the stable state of society. That desired
state means the maintenance of a fluent administration. The same moral values (e.g. work and edu-
cation) of communities and those of individual citizens are highlighted. People who are not able to
share these values, as stated, however, are named as those who are socially excluded and thus seen
as threats to internal security and stability of all of society.
The work of improving security does not only bring safety and security; it may also bring anxiety and fear. To avoid this risk, even this outcome, it is important to debate the proper balance between possible threats and any stand taken to advance those threats. More rational consideration is needed. Instead of merely looking at the ultimate goals, there is good reason to focus on the processes used to achieve those goals. Hardly any attention is paid to social costs when prejudging the risk of crime and the pursuit of security. A pre-emptive stance towards the possibility of crime does not increase confidence because the constitutional assumption of innocence is ignored—everyone is under suspicion. We cannot know now what consequences this position and belief will have sadly for the future. (Furedi, 2002, p. 66; Opitz, 2011, p. 109; Zedner, 2003a).

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