Privacy-Preserving and Outsourced Multi-User $k$-Means Clustering

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Abstract—Many techniques for privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) have been investigated over the past decade. Often, the entities involved in the data mining process are end-users or organizations with limited computing and storage resources. As a result, such entities may want to refrain from participating in the PPDM process. To overcome this issue and to take many other benefits of cloud computing, outsourcing PPDM tasks to the cloud environment has recently gained special attention. We consider the scenario where $n$ entities outsource their databases (in encrypted format) to the cloud and ask the cloud to perform the clustering task on their combined data in a privacy-preserving manner. We term such a process as privacy-preserving and outsourced distributed clustering (PPODC). In this paper, we propose a novel and efficient solution to the PPODC problem based on $k$-means clustering algorithm. The main novelty of our solution lies in avoiding the secure division operations required in computing cluster centers altogether through an efficient transformation technique. Our solution builds the clusters securely in an iterative fashion and returns the final cluster centers to all entities when a pre-determined termination condition holds. The proposed solution protects data confidentiality of all the participating entities under the standard semi-honest model. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to discuss and propose a comprehensive solution to the PPODC problem that incurs negligible cost on the participating entities. We theoretically estimate both the computation and communication costs of the proposed protocol and also demonstrate its practical value through experiments on a real dataset.

I. INTRODUCTION

Clustering is one of the commonly used tasks in various data mining applications. Briefly, clustering [1]–[3] is the unsupervised classification of data items (or feature vectors) into groups (or clusters) such that similar data items reside in the same group. It has immense importance in various fields, including information retrieval [4], machine learning [5], pattern recognition [6], image analysis [7], and text mining [8]. Some real-life applications related to clustering include categorizing results returned by a search engine in response to a user’s query, grouping persons into categories based on their DNA information, etc.

In general, if the data involved in clustering belongs to a single entity (hereafter referred to as a user), then it can be done in a trivial fashion. However, in some cases, multiple users, such as companies, governmental agencies, and health care organizations, each holding a dataset, may want to collaboratively perform clustering task on their combined data and share the clustering results. Due to privacy concerns, users may not be willing to share their data with the other users and thus the distributed clustering task should be done in a privacy-preserving manner. This problem, referred to as privacy-preserving distributed clustering (PPDC), can be best explained by the following example:

- Consider two health agencies (e.g., the U.S. CDC and the public health agency of Canada) each holding a dataset containing the disease patterns and clinical outcomes of their patients. Since both the agencies have their own data collecting methods, suppose that they want to cluster their combined datasets and identify interesting clusters that would enable directions for better disease control mechanisms. However, due to government regulations and the sensitive nature of the data, they may not be willing to share their data with one another. Therefore, they have to collaboratively perform the clustering task on their joint datasets in a privacy-preserving manner. Once the clustering process is done, they can exchange necessary information (after proper sanitization) if needed.

The existing PPDC methods (e.g., [9]–[12]) incur significant cost (computation, communication and storage) on the participating users and thus they are not suitable if the users do not have sufficient resources to perform the clustering task. This problem becomes even more serious when dealing with big data. To address these issues, it is more attractive for the users to outsource their data as well as the clustering task to the cloud. However, the cloud cannot be fully trusted by the users in protecting their data. Thus, to ensure data confidentiality, users can encrypt their databases locally (using a common public key) and then outsource them to the cloud. Then, the goal is for the cloud to perform clustering over the aggregated encrypted data. We refer to the above process as privacy-preserving and outsourced distributed clustering (PPODC).

Note that, a direct application of clustering algorithm locally by each party is of no use since global evolution of clusters [9] should be taken into account.
It is worth noting that if all the encrypted data resides on a single cloud, then the only way through which the cloud can perform the clustering task (assuming that users do not participate in the clustering process), without ever decrypting the data, is when the data is encrypted using fully homomorphic encryption schemes (e.g., [20], [21]). However, recent results [14] show that fully homomorphic encryption schemes are very expensive and their usage in practical applications are decades away. Hence, we believe that at least two cloud service providers are required to solve the PPODC problem.

In this paper, we propose a new and efficient solution to the PPODC problem based on the standard $k$-means clustering algorithm [15], [16] by utilizing two cloud service providers (say Amazon and Google) which together form a federated cloud environment. Our proposed solution protects data confidentiality of all the participating users at all times. We emphasize that the concept of federated clouds is becoming increasingly popular and is also identified as one of the ten High Priority Requirements for U.S. cloud adoption in the NIST U.S. Government Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap [17]. Therefore, we believe that developing privacy-preserving solutions under federated cloud environment will become increasingly important in the near future.

### A. System Model and Problem Definition

In our problem setting, we consider $n$ users denoted by $U_1, \ldots, U_n$. Suppose user $U_i$ holds a database $T_i$ with $m_i$ data records and $l$ attributes, for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Consider a scenario where the $n$ users want to outsource their databases as well as the $k$-means clustering process on their combined databases to a cloud environment. In our system model, we consider two different entities: (i) the users and (ii) the cloud service providers. We assume that the users choose two cloud service providers $C_1$ and $C_2$ (say Amazon and Google) to perform the clustering task on their combined data.

In this paper, we explicitly assume that $C_1$ and $C_2$ are semi-honest [18] and they do not collude. After proper service level agreements with the users, $C_2$ generates a public-secret key pair $(pk, sk)$ based on the Paillier cryptosystem [19] and broadcasts $pk$ to all users and $C_1$. A more robust setting would be for $C_1$ and $C_2$ to jointly generate the public key $pk$ based on the threshold Paillier cryptosystem (e.g., [20], [21]) such that the corresponding secret key $sk$ is obliviously split between the two clouds. Under this case, the secret key $sk$ is unknown to both clouds and only (random) shares of it are revealed to $C_1$ and $C_2$. For simplicity, we consider the former asymmetric setting where $C_2$ generates $(pk, sk)$ in the rest of this paper. However, our proposed protocol can be easily extended to the above threshold setting without affecting the underlying privacy guarantees.

Given the above system architecture, we assume that user $U_i$ encrypts $T_i$ attribute-wise using $pk$ and outsources the encrypted database to $C_1$. Another way to outsource the data is that users can split each attribute value in their database into two random shares and outsource the shares separately to each cloud (see Section V-B for more details). A detailed information flow between different entities in our system model is shown in Figure 1. Having outsourced the data, the main goal of a PPODC protocol is to enable $C_1$ and $C_2$ to perform $k$-means clustering over the combined encrypted databases in a privacy-preserving manner. More formally, we can define a PPODC protocol as follows:

$$\text{PPODC}((T_1, \ldots, T_n), \beta) \rightarrow (S_1, \ldots, S_n)$$

where $\beta$ is a pre-defined threshold value agreed upon by all parties. Since $k$-means is an iterative method, we use the value of $\beta$ to check whether the termination condition holds in each iteration. A more detailed explanation about the usage of $\beta$ is given in Sections III and V. $S_i$ denotes the output received by user $U_i$. Depending on the users’ requirements, $S_i$ can be the global cluster centers and/or the final cluster IDs corresponding to the data records of $U_i$. In this paper, we consider the former case under which $S_i$’s are the same for all users (however, our protocol can be easily modified to handle the latter case). In general, a PPODC protocol should meet the following requirements:

- **Data Confidentiality**: The contents of $U_i$’s database $T_i$ should never be revealed to other users, $C_1$ and $C_2$.
- **Accuracy**: The output received by each party (i.e., $S_i$’s ) should be the same as in the standard $k$-means algorithm.
- **No Participation of Users**: Since the very purpose of outsourcing is to shift the users’ load towards the cloud environment, a desirable requirement for any outsourced task is that the computations should be totally performed in the cloud. In particular to PPODC, the total clustering process should be done by the cloud service providers. This will enable the users who do not have enough resources to participate in the clustering task to still get the desired results without compromising privacy.

In certain cases, the user’s data (encrypted using his/her own secret key) may have already been stored in a cloud (either $C_1$ or different cloud) and he/she want to use this data, along
with the data from other users, in the clustering task. In the case of the data being stored on a different cloud (say $C_3$), the user has to first download and decrypt the data and re-encrypt it under $pk$ and send the resulting database to $C_1$. This might incur heavy cost on the user side, especially if the data is large. However, we can address this issue using the proxy re-encryption techniques (e.g., [22], [23]) as follows. (i) $C_3$ can directly send the encrypted data of the user to $C_1$, (ii) the user sends a proxy-re-encryption key corresponding to his/her secret key and $pk$ to $C_1$, and (iii) $C_1$ transforms the encrypted data under the user’s public key domain into the domain of $pk$ without ever decrypting it using the proxy re-encryption key. For ease of presentation, we do not consider the above case in the rest of the paper. Instead, we simply assume that all users hold their respective databases which they can encrypt under $pk$ and outsource them to $C_1$.

B. Main Contributions

The problem of privacy-preserving clustering over encrypted data in an outsourced environment was addressed only recently [24]. However, the existing method is proposed under a single user setting. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing work that addresses the PPODC problem (i.e., under the multi-user setting). In this paper, we propose an efficient and novel PPODC protocol that can enable a group of users to outsource their encrypted data as well as the $k$-means clustering task completely to a federated cloud environment and ours is the first work along this direction. The main contributions of this work are four-fold:

- We propose new transformations and develop an order-preserving Euclidean distance function that enables the proposed PPODC protocol to securely assign the data records to the closest clusters, a crucial step in each iteration of the $k$-means clustering algorithm. Also, we propose a novel transformation for the termination condition that enables the PPODC protocol to securely evaluate the termination condition over encrypted data.
- The proposed solution satisfies all the desirable properties of PPODC mentioned in the previous sub-section. That is, it protects the confidentiality of each user’s data at all times and outputs the correct result. Also, once the user’s data is outsourced to the cloud, the user does not need to participate in any computations of the clustering task.
- We show that the proposed protocol is secure under the standard semi-honest model [18]. Also, we theoretically analyze the complexities of the proposed protocol.
- We demonstrate the practical applicability of our solution through extensive experiments using a real-world dataset.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the existing related work. Section III presents some definitions and properties related to $k$-means clustering algorithm and the Paillier cryptosystem as a background. Section IV presents our new transformation techniques. Section V discusses our proposed PPODC solution in detail. Also, within this section, we analyze the security guarantees and complexities of our solution. Section VI presents our experimental results on a real-world dataset under different parameter settings. Finally, we conclude the paper along with the scope for future research in Section VII.

II. RELATED WORK

A. Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM)

Our work is closely related to the field of privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) [25], [26]. Several techniques have been proposed for the clustering task under the PPDM model (e.g., [9]–[12]). However, we stress that our problem setting is somewhat different from the PPDM model. On one hand, under PPDM, each user owns a piece of dataset (typically a vertically or horizontally partitioned dataset) and the goal is for them to collaboratively perform the clustering task on the combined data in a privacy-preserving manner. On the other hand, our work is motivated by the cloud computing model where users can outsource their encrypted databases to a federated cloud environment. Under our problem setting, the federated cloud performs the clustering task over encrypted data and the users do not participate in any of the underlying computations. As a result, existing PPDM techniques for the clustering task are not applicable to the PPODC problem.

Only recently, researchers have started to focus on the clustering task in an outsourced environment (e.g., [24], [27]). The work by Liu et al. [24] is perhaps the most recent work along this direction. However, their solution has the following limitations: (i) it assumes that there is only a single user who wants to perform the clustering task on his/her own data and (ii) the user is required to execute certain intermediate computations and thus he/she needs to be part of the clustering process. Unlike the work in [24], our solution is proposed under the multi-user setting and the users can completely outsource the computations of the clustering task to a federated cloud environment in a privacy-preserving manner.

B. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)

A straightforward way to solve the PPODC problem is for the users to encrypt their data using a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme, e.g., [13], and outsource the encrypted data to a cloud. Here the secret key should be known only to the users (or shared among them). Since FHE allows one to perform arbitrary computations over encrypted data without decrypting the data, the cloud can perform the clustering task over encrypted data and return the encrypted clustering results to the users who can decrypt them. Though the FHE schemes enable arbitrary searches or operations over encrypted data, such techniques are very expensive and their usage in practical applications is decades away. For example, it was shown in [14] that even for weak security parameters one “bootstrapping” operation of a homomorphic operation would take at least 30 seconds on a high performance machine.

III. PRELIMINARIES

In this section, we first introduce definitions related to cluster centers and computation of Euclidean distance between a data record and given cluster. Then, we briefly discuss the
steps involved in the traditional $k$-means clustering algorithm. Finally, we review upon the properties of the threshold Paillier cryptosystem that is adopted in this paper.

A. Cluster Center

**Definition 1:** Let $c = \{t_1, \ldots, t_h\}$ be a cluster where $t_1, \ldots, t_h$ are data records with $l$ attributes. Then, the center of cluster $c$ is defined as a vector $\mu_c$ given by [12]:

$$\mu_c[s] = \frac{t_1[s] + \cdots + t_h[s]}{|c|},$$

where $t_i[s]$ denotes the $s^{th}$ attribute value of $t_i$ and $\lambda_c[s]$ denotes the sum of $s^{th}$ attribute values of all the data records in cluster $c$, for $1 \leq i \leq h$. Also, $|c|$ denotes the number of data records in $c$.

In the above definition, the $s^{th}$ attribute value in $\mu_c$ is equivalent to the mean of the $s^{th}$ attribute values of all the data records in cluster $c$. Note that, if the cluster contains a single data record, then the cluster center is the same as the corresponding data record.

**Example 1:** Let $c$ be a cluster with three data records $\{t_1, t_2, t_3\}$. Without loss of generality, suppose the data records are given as below (assuming $l = 5$):

$$t_1 = \{0, 2, 1, 0, 3\}, \quad t_2 = \{1, 1, 3, 4, 2\}, \quad t_3 = \{0, 1, 0, 2, 0\}$$

Then, the center of cluster $c$, based on Definition 1, is given by $\mu_c[1] = 0.333, \mu_c[2] = 1.333, \mu_c[3] = 1.333, \mu_c[4] = 2, \mu_c[5] = 1.666$.

B. Computation of Euclidean Distance between $t_i$ and $c$

We now discuss how to compute the similarity score between a given data record $t_i$ and a cluster $c$. In general, the similarity score between any two objects can be computed using one of the standard similarity metrics, such as Euclidean distance, Cosine similarity, and Jaccard coefficient. In this paper, we use the Euclidean distance as the underlying similarity metric since the standard $k$-means algorithm is based on this metric [12], [24].

**Definition 2:** For any given data record $t_i$ and cluster $c$, let $\mu_c$ denote the cluster center of $c$ (as per Definition 1). Then, the Euclidean distance between $t_i$ and $c$ is given as

$$||t_i - c|| = \sqrt{\sum_{s=1}^{l} (t_i[s] - \mu_c[s])^2} = \sqrt{\sum_{s=1}^{l} \left(\frac{t_i[s] - \lambda_c[s]}{|c|}\right)^2}$$

**Example 2:** Suppose $t_i$ and $\mu_c$ are as given below.

$$t_i = \{0, 1, 1, 3, 2\}, \quad \mu_c = \{0.333, 1.333, 1.333, 2, 1.666\}$$

Then, the Euclidean distance between $t_i$ and $c$, based on Definition 2, is $||t_i - c|| = 1.201$.

In a similar manner, the Euclidean distance between any two given clusters $c$ and $c'$ can be computed using their respective cluster centers. More specifically, $||c - c'||$ is given as

$$\sqrt{\sum_{s=1}^{l} (\mu_c[s] - \mu_{c'}[s])^2} = \sqrt{\sum_{s=1}^{l} \left(\frac{\lambda_c[s]}{|c|} - \frac{\lambda_{c'}[s]}{|c'|}\right)^2}$$

where $\mu_c$ and $\mu_{c'}$ denote the cluster centers of $c$ and $c'$, respectively. Also, $|c|$ and $|c'|$ denote the number of data records in $c$ and $c'$, respectively.

C. Single Party $k$-Means Clustering

Consider a user $U$ who wants to apply the $k$-means clustering algorithm [15], [16] on his/her own database of $m$ records, denoted by $\{t_1, \ldots, t_m\}$. Here we assume that $U$ wants to compute $k$ cluster centers, denoted by $\mu_{c_1}, \ldots, \mu_{c_k}$, as the output. However, other desired values, such as the final cluster IDs assigned to each data record can also be part of the output. Since $k$-means clustering is an iterative algorithm, $U$ has to input a threshold value to decide when to stop the algorithm (termination condition). Without loss of generality, let $\beta$ denote the threshold value. Throughout this paper, we assume that the initial set of $k$ clusters are chosen at random (referred to as the Initialization step). Note that other techniques exist for choosing the initial clusters [12]. However, since the goal of this paper is not to investigate which initialization technique is better, we simply assume that they are selected at random.

The main steps involved in the traditional (single party) $k$-means clustering task [15], [16], using the Euclidean distance as the similarity metric, are given in Algorithm 1. Apart from the initialization step, the algorithm involves three main stages: (i) Assignment, (ii) Update and (iii) Termination. First of all, during the initialization step, $k$ data records are selected at random and assigned as the initial clusters $c_1, \ldots, c_k$ with their centers (or mean vectors) denoted by $\mu_{c_1}, \ldots, \mu_{c_k}$, respectively. In the assignment stage, for each data record $t_i$, the algorithm computes the Euclidean distance between $t_i$ and each cluster $c_j$, for $1 \leq j \leq k$. Then, the algorithm identifies the cluster corresponding to the minimum distance as the closest cluster to $t_i$ (say $c_h$) and assigns $t_i$ to a new cluster $c'_h$, where $h \in [1, k]$. In the update stage, the algorithm computes the centers of the new clusters, denoted by $\mu'_{c_1}, \ldots, \mu'_{c_k}$. Finally, in the termination stage, the algorithm verifies whether a pre-defined termination condition holds. More specifically, the algorithm checks whether the sum of the squared Euclidean distances between the current and newly computed clusters is less than or equal to the threshold value $\beta$. If the termination condition holds, then the algorithm halts and returns the new cluster centers as the final output. Otherwise, the algorithm continues to the next iteration with the new clusters as input.

D. The Paillier Cryptosystem

In this paper, we assume that the second cloud service provider $C_2$ generates a public-secret key pair $(pk, sk)$ based on the widely used Paillier cryptosystem [19] which consists of an additively homomorphic and probabilistic encryption scheme. Without loss of generality, let $E_{pk}(\cdot)$ and $D_{sk}(\cdot)$ denote the encryption and decryption functions under Paillier cryptosystem and $N$ denote the RSA modulus (or a part of the public key $pk$). We emphasize that the Paillier cryptosystem exhibits the following properties [19]:

$$\sqrt{\sum_{s=1}^{l} (\mu_c[s] - \mu_{c'}[s])^2} = \sqrt{\sum_{s=1}^{l} \left(\frac{\lambda_c[s]}{|c|} - \frac{\lambda_{c'}[s]}{|c'|}\right)^2}$$
**Algorithm 1** k-means\(\{t_1, \ldots, t_m\}, \beta \rightarrow \{\mu_{c_1}, \ldots, \mu_{c_k}\}\)

**Require:** User \(U\) with \(m\) data records \(\{t_1, \ldots, t_m\}\) and \(\beta\)

**Initialization:** Select \(k\) data records at random and assign them as initial clusters \(c_1, \ldots, c_k\) with respective cluster centers as \(\mu_{c_1}, \ldots, \mu_{c_k}\)

1. for \(j = 1\) to \(k\) do
   2. \(c'_j \leftarrow \emptyset\)
   3. \(\mu_{c'_j} \leftarrow \{\}\)
   4. \(\text{sum} \leftarrow 0\)
   5. end for

   **(Assignment Stage)**

6. for \(i = 1\) to \(m\) do
   7. for \(j = 1\) to \(k\) do
      8. Compute \(|t_i - c_j|\)
   9. end for
10. Add \(t_i\) to cluster \(c'_k\) such that \(|t_i - c_k|\) is the minimum, for \(1 \leq h \leq k\)
11. end for

   **(Update Stage)**

12. for \(j = 1\) to \(k\) do
13. Compute cluster center for \(c'_j\) and assign it to \(\mu_{c'_j}\)
14. end for

   **(Termination Stage - Compare the old clusters \((c'_j's)\) with new clusters \((c''_j's)\) and check whether they are close enough)**

15. \(\text{sum} \leftarrow \sum_{j=1}^{k} |c_j - c'_j|^2\)
16. if \(\text{sum} \leq \beta\) then
17. Return \(\{\mu_{c'_1}, \ldots, \mu_{c'_k}\}\)
18. else
19. for \(j = 1\) to \(k\) do
20. \(c_j \leftarrow c'_j\)
21. \(\mu_{c'_j} \leftarrow \mu_{c'_j}\)
22. end for
23. Go to Step 6
24. end if

- For any \(a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_N\), the encryption scheme is additively homomorphic: \(E_{pk}(a) \ast E_{pk}(b) \mod N^2 = E_{pk}(a + b \mod N)\). Due to this addition property, the encryption scheme also satisfies the multiplication property \(E_{pk}(a)^u \mod N^2 = E_{pk}(a \ast u \mod N)\), where \(u \in \mathbb{Z}_N\).

- The encryption scheme is semantically secure [28]. That is, given a set of ciphertexts, a computationally bounded adversary cannot deduce any information regarding the corresponding plaintexts in polynomial time.

For ease of presentation, we omit the term \(\mod N^2\) from homomorphic operations in the rest of the paper. Also, as mentioned in Section [A] our proposed protocol can be easily extended to the threshold Paillier setting [20] under which \(sk\) is obliviously generated and shared between \(C_1\) and \(C_2\) [21].

**IV. THE PROPOSED TRANSFORMATIONS**

It is important to note that cluster centers (denoted by \(\mu_c\) for a cluster \(c\)) are represented as vectors and the entries in the vectors can be fractional values. Since the encryption schemes typically support integer values, we should somehow transform the entries of the cluster centers into integer values without affecting their utility in the \(k\)-means clustering process. Along this direction, we first define scaling factors for clusters and then discuss a novel order-preserving Euclidean distance function operating over integers. Also, we discuss how to transform the termination condition in the \(k\)-means clustering algorithm with fractional values into an integer-valued one.

**Definition 3:** Consider the cluster \(c_i\) whose center is denoted by \(\mu_{c_i}\) (based on Definition [1]). We know that \(\mu_{c_i}\) is a vector and each entry can be a fractional value with denominator \(|c_j|\), for \(1 \leq i \leq k\). We define the scaling factor for a cluster \(c_i\), denoted by \(\alpha_i\), as below:

\[
\alpha_i = \prod_{j=1}^{k} \left| \frac{c_j}{c_i} \right| \quad (3)
\]

Also, we define \(\alpha = \prod_{j=1}^{k} |c_j|\) as the global scaling factor.

**A. Order-Preserving Euclidean Distance (OPED)**

In the assignment stage of \(k\)-means clustering, the first step is to compute the Euclidean distance between a data record \(t_i\) and each cluster \(c_j\), denoted by \(|t_i - c_j|\) = \[\sqrt{\sum_{s=1}^{l} (t_i[s] - \frac{\lambda_{c_j}[s]}{|c_j|})^2}\]. It is clear that \(|t_i - c_j|\) involves fractional values \(\frac{\lambda_{c_j}[s]}{|c_j|}\). In order to compute the encrypted value of \(|t_i - c_j|\), we need to avoid such fractional values without affecting the relative ordering among the \(k\) Euclidean distances \(|t_i - c_1|, \ldots, |t_i - c_k|\), where \(c_1, \ldots, c_k\) denote \(k\) clusters. Note that since \(t_i\) has to be assigned to the nearest cluster, it is important to preserve the relative ordering among the computed \(k\) Euclidean distances. For this purpose, we propose a novel order-preserving Euclidean distance function which works on only integer values.

We define the order-preserving Euclidean distance (OPED) function between a data record \(t_i\) and a cluster \(c_j\) as follows:

\[
\text{OPED}(t_i, c_j) = \sqrt{\sum_{s=1}^{l} \left( \alpha * t_i[s] - \alpha_j * \lambda_{c_j}[s] \right)^2} \quad (4)
\]

where \(\alpha\) and \(\alpha_j\) denote the global and \(c_j\)'s scaling factors, respectively. Observe that all the terms in the above equation are integer values. Moreover, following from Definition [3] we
can rewrite the above equation as:

\[
\text{OPED}(t_i, c_j) = \sqrt{\sum_{s=1}^{t} \left( \frac{\alpha \cdot t_i[s]}{c_j} - \frac{\alpha}{|c_j|} \cdot \lambda_{c_j}[s] \right)^2} \\
= \sqrt{\alpha^2 \cdot \left( \sum_{s=1}^{t} \frac{t_i[s]}{|c_j|} - \lambda_{c_j}[s] \right)^2} \\
= \alpha \cdot \sqrt{\left( \sum_{s=1}^{t} \frac{t_i[s]}{|c_j|} - \lambda_{c_j}[s] \right)^2} \\
= \alpha \cdot \|t_i - c_j\|
\]

Since \(\alpha\) remains constant for any given set of \(k\) clusters (in a particular iteration), we claim that the above OPED function preserves the relative ordering among cluster centers for any given data record. More specifically, given a data record \(t_i\) and two clusters \(c_j\) and \(c_j'\), if \(\|t_i - c_j\| \geq \|t_i - c_j'\|\), then it is guaranteed that \(\text{OPED}(t_i, c_j) \geq \text{OPED}(t_i, c_j')\), for \(1 \leq j, j' \leq k\) and \(j \neq j'\).

**B. Transformation of the Termination Condition**

In the \(k\)-means clustering process (see Algorithm 1), the termination condition is given by:

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{k} \|c_j - c_j'\|^2 \leq \beta
\]  

(5)

where \(c_1, \ldots, c_k\) and \(c_1', \ldots, c_k'\) denote the current and new set of clusters in an iteration, respectively. Remember that \(\|c_j - c_j'\| = \sqrt{\sum_{s=1}^{t} \left( \frac{\lambda_{c_j}[s]}{|c_j|} - \frac{\lambda_{c_j'}[s]}{|c_j'|} \right)^2}\) and clearly it consists of fractional values. In order to evaluate this condition over encryption, we first need to transform the above termination condition so that all the components are integers. To achieve this, we use the following approach. We define a constant scaling factor (denoted by \(f\)) for the termination condition in such a way that by multiplying Equation 5 with \(f^2\), we can cancel all the denominator values. More specifically, we define the scaling factor for the termination condition as \(f = \prod_{j=1}^{k} |c_j| \cdot |c_j'|\). Also, we define the scaling factor for the cluster pair \((c_j, c_j')\) as \(f_j = \frac{f}{|c_j| \cdot |c_j'|} = \prod_{i=1}^{l} |c_i| \cdot |c_i'|\). Then we define the new termination condition as follows:

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{k} \sum_{s=1}^{l} \left( |c_j'| \cdot f_j \cdot \lambda_{c_j}[s] - |c_j| \cdot f_j \cdot \lambda_{c_j'}[s] \right)^2 \leq f^2 \cdot \beta
\]

(6)

Observe that the above equation consists of only integer values. Now we need to show that evaluating the above equation is the same as evaluating Equation 5. First, we divide the above equation by \(f^2\) on both sides of the inequality. Note that since \(f^2\) remains constant in a given iteration, multiplication of Equation 6 by \(f^2\) has no effect on the inequality. Precisely, Equation 6 can be rewritten as:

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{k} \sum_{s=1}^{l} \left( \left( |c_j'| \cdot f_j \cdot \lambda_{c_j}[s] - |c_j| \cdot f_j \cdot \lambda_{c_j'}[s] \right)^2 \right) \leq \beta
\]

Given this, the left-hand side of the above equation can be expanded as follows:

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{k} \sum_{s=1}^{l} \left( \left( |c_j'| \cdot \lambda_{c_j}[s] - |c_j| \cdot \lambda_{c_j'}[s] \right)^2 \right) \leq \beta
\]

Based on the above discussions, it is clear that evaluating the inequality \(\sum_{j=1}^{k} \|c_j - c_j'\|^2 \leq \beta\) is the same as evaluating Equation 6. Hence, in our proposed PPODC protocol, we consider Equation 6 as the termination condition of \(k\)-means clustering and evaluate it in a privacy-preserving manner.

**V. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION**

In this section, we first discuss a set of privacy-preserving primitives. Then, we present our novel PPODC protocol that utilizes the above transformation techniques and the privacy-preserving primitives as building blocks.

As mentioned in Section II-A in this paper we consider two semi-honest and non-colluding cloud service providers \(C_1\) and \(C_2\) under the Paillier cryptosystem [19]. More specifically, \(C_2\) generates a pair of public-secret key pair \((pk, sk)\) based on the Paillier’s scheme such that \(sk\) is kept private whereas the corresponding public key \(pk\) is broadcasted.

**A. Privacy-Preserving Primitives**

We discuss a set of privacy-preserving primitives under the above two-party (i.e., \(C_1\) and \(C_2\)) computation model. 

- **Secure Multiplication (SMP):** Given that \(C_1\) holds \(\{E_{pk}(a), E_{pk}(b)\}\) and \(C_2\) holds \(sk\), where \((a, b)\) is unknown to both \(C_1\) and \(C_2\), the goal of the SMP protocol is to compute \(E_{pk}(a \cdot b)\). During the execution of SMP, no information regarding the contents of \(a\) and \(b\) is revealed to \(C_1\) and \(C_2\).

- **Secure Squared Euclidean Distance (SSED):** In this protocol, \(C_1\) holds two encrypted vectors \(E_{pk}(X) = \{E_{pk}(x[1]), \ldots, E_{pk}(x[l])\}\) and \(E_{pk}(Y) = \{E_{pk}(y[1]), \ldots, E_{pk}(y[l])\}\). The goal of SSED is to compute the encryption of the squared Euclidean distance between \(X\) and \(Y\). Specifically, the output is \(E_{pk}(\|X - Y\|)^2\). The SSED protocol should reveal neither the contents of \(X\) and \(Y\) nor the Euclidean distance between them to \(C_1\) and \(C_2\).
Several solutions have been proposed for most of the above privacy-preserving primitives. Recently, Yousef et al. [29] discussed efficient implementations for SMP and SSED. Also, an efficient solution to SLSB was proposed in [30]. In the rest of this paper, SMP and SSED refer to the implementations given in [29]. Similarly, by SLSB, we refer to the implementation given in [30]. We now propose efficient implementations to SSEDop, SC, SMIN, and SMINp.

1) The SSEDop Protocol: We discuss a novel solution to the SSEDop problem using the SMP and SSED protocols as sub-routines. The main steps involved in the proposed SSEDop protocol are highlighted in Algorithm 3. We assume that $C_1$ holds $\langle E_{pk}(c_1), \ldots, E_{pk}(c_k) \rangle$ and $C_2$ holds $sk$, where $c_1, \ldots, c_k$ denote $k$ clusters and $E_{pk}(c_a) = \langle E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_a}), E_{pk}(\langle c_a \rangle) \rangle$. Note that $E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_a}) = \langle E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_a}[1]), \ldots, E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_a}[l]) \rangle$. The goal of SSEDop is to securely compute $E_{pk}(\langle \text{OPED}(t_i, c_h) \rangle^2)$ for a given input $E_{pk}(t_i)$ and $E_{pk}(c_h)$, where $1 \leq h \leq k$.

To start with, $C_1$ and $C_2$ securely compute the scaling factor for cluster $c_h$ (in encrypted format based on Equation 5 using the extended secure multiplication protocol, denoted by SMP$\rightarrow$1, that takes $k-1$ encrypted inputs and multiplies them (within encryption). Specifically, they jointly compute $b_h = \text{SMP}_{k-1}(\tau_h)$, where $\tau_h = \cup_{j=1}^{k} (E_{pk}(\langle c_j \rangle)$. The important observation here is that $b_h = E_{pk}(\prod_{j=1}^{k} \lambda_{c_j} \gamma_{c_j}) = E_{pk}(\alpha_h)$, where $\alpha_h$ is the scaling factor for cluster $c_h$ as defined in Equation 3. Then $C_1$ and $C_2$ securely multiply $b_h$ with $E_{pk}(\langle c_h \rangle$ using SMP to get $b' = \text{SMP}(b_h, E_{pk}(c_h)) = E_{pk}(\alpha_h \cdot \langle c_h \rangle) = E_{pk}(\alpha_h \cdot \langle c_h \rangle)$, where $\alpha$ is the global scaling factor. After this, for $1 \leq s \leq l$, $C_1$ and $C_2$ jointly compute two encrypted vectors as follows:

$$a_i[s] = \text{SMP}(b', E_{pk}(t_i[s])) = E_{pk}(\alpha_t \cdot t_i[s])$$

$$a'_i[s] = \text{SMP}(b_h, E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_h}[s])) = E_{pk}(\alpha_h \cdot \lambda_{c_h}[s])$$

Finally, with the two encrypted vectors $a_i$ and $a'_i$ as $C_1$’s input, $C_1$ and $C_2$ jointly compute the encrypted squared Euclidean distance between them using the SSED protocol. More specifically, the output of SSED($a_i, a'_i$) is $E_{pk}(\sum_{j=1}^{l} (\alpha_t \cdot t_i[s] - \alpha_h \cdot \lambda_{c_h}[s])^2)$. Following from Equation 4, it is clear that the output SSED($a_i, a'_i$) is equivalent to $E_{pk}(\langle \text{OPED}(t_i, c_h) \rangle^2)$.

2) The Secure Comparison (SC) Protocol: Given that $C_1$ holds $\langle E_{pk}(a), E_{pk}(b) \rangle$ and $C_2$ holds $sk$, the goal of SC is to return $E_{pk}(\gamma)$ such that $\gamma = 1$ if $a < b$, and $\gamma = 0$ otherwise. During SC, neither the contents of $(a, b)$ nor the comparison result $\gamma$ should be disclosed to $C_1$ and $C_2$.

We emphasize that it is desirable to have an SC protocol whose efficiency does not rely on the bit length of the input integers (i.e., $a$ and $b$) to be compared. We now discuss about such a solution constructed by combining SLSB [30] with...
the ideas proposed by Nishide et al. [31]. The SC solution proposed in [31] is based on the secret sharing scheme [32]. However, it is also applicable to our problem domain upon simple modifications.

In what follows, we briefly describe how $C_1$ and $C_2$ can securely compute the encryption of $\gamma$, given $(E_{pk}(a), E_{pk}(b))$ as $C_1$'s private input, using the ideas proposed in [31]. According to [31], the value of comparison result $\gamma$ solely depends on the following 3 predicates: $w : a < N/2$, $x : b < N/2$, and $y : b - a \mod N < N/2$. More specifically, $\gamma$ is given as:

$$\gamma = w \land \neg y \lor w \land y \lor \neg w \land y \lor \neg w \land \neg y$$

$$= w(1 - x) \lor (1 - w)(1 - x) \lor wxy \lor -w(y + 2-wy) + (w + y - wy) \tag{7}$$

More specifically, all possible combinations of $(w, x, y)$ and their corresponding $\gamma$ values are given in Table I where $\ast$ denotes either bit 0 or 1. The main challenge here is that how $C_1$ can compute $E_{pk}(w)$, $E_{pk}(x)$ and $E_{pk}(y)$ given $E_{pk}(a)$ and $E_{pk}(b)$.

As highlighted in [31], one can notice that $a \in \{0, 1, \ldots, \frac{N-1}{2}\}$ iff $[2a \mod N]_1 = 0$. Similarly, $a \in \{\frac{N-1}{2} + 1, \ldots, N - 1\}$ iff $[2a \mod N]_1 = 1$, where $[2a]_1$ signifies the least significant bit (LSB) of $2a \mod N$. That is, $w = 1$ (implying that $a < N/2$) if and only if the LSB of $(2a \mod N)$ is 0, i.e., $w \leftrightarrow 1 - [2a \mod N]_1$. Similar conclusions can be drawn for $x$ and $y$. Consider the case of computing $E_{pk}(w)$ from $E_{pk}(a)$. First, $C_1$ can locally compute $E_{pk}(2a)$. Then, in order to compute the encrypted LSB of $2a$, $C_1$ and $C_2$ jointly involve in the SLSB protocol [30]. At the end of this step, only $C_1$ knows $E_{pk}([2a]_1)$. Now $C_1$ can locally compute $E_{pk}(w) = E_{pk}(1) \ast E_{pk}([2a]_1)^{N-1} = E_{pk}(1 - [2a]_1)$. In a similar fashion, $C_1$ can compute $E_{pk}(x)$ and $E_{pk}(y)$. Finally, $C_1$ (with the help of $C_2$) can compute $E_{pk}(\gamma)$ based on Equation 7. Note that this step explicitly requires SMP as a building block.

3) The SMIN Protocol: Let $a$ and $b$ be two integers in $\mathbb{Z}^N$, and $s_a$ and $s_b$ be their associated secrets, respectively. For example, if $a$ and $b$ correspond to two data records, then their secrets can correspond to the record identifiers. Suppose that $\min(a, b)$ denote the minimum value between $a$ and $b$ and that $s_{\min(a, b)}$ denote the secret corresponding to $\min(a, b)$. Given that $(E_{pk}(a), E_{pk}(s_a))$ and $(E_{pk}(b), E_{pk}(s_b))$ as $C_1$'s private input, the goal of SMIN is to securely compute $(E_{pk}(\min(a, b)), E_{pk}(s_{\min(a, b)}))$ as the final output and it should be known only to $C_1$.

We now discuss a simple to SMIN based on the SC protocol. As discussed above, at the end of SC protocol, $C_1$ knows $E_{pk}(\gamma)$, where $\gamma$ denotes the comparison result of functionality $a \leq b$. Given $E_{pk}(\gamma)$, $C_1$ can securely compute the encryption of the minimum value between $a$ and $b$, i.e., $E_{pk}(\min(a, b))$, using the following formulation:

$$\min(a, b) = \gamma \ast a + (1 - \gamma) \ast b$$

More specifically, using the secure multiplication (SMP) protocol, $C_1$ with input $(E_{pk}(a), E_{pk}(b), E_{pk}(\gamma))$ and $C_2$ with $sk$ can compute $E_{pk}(\gamma \ast a)$ and $E_{pk}(\gamma \ast b)$. Note that the output of SMP will be known only to $C_1$. After this, $C_1$ can compute $E_{pk}(\min(a, b))$ as $E_{pk}(\gamma \ast a) \ast E_{pk}(b) \ast E_{pk}(\gamma \ast b)^{N-1}$ locally.

In a similar manner, apart from the encrypted minimum value, $C_1$ and $C_2$ compute the encryption of the secret associated with the minimum value. More specifically, they compute $E_{pk}(s_{\min(a, b)})$ using the following formulation:

$$s_{\min(a, b)} = \gamma \ast s_a + (1 - \gamma) \ast s_b$$

Example 3: Suppose $C_1$ holds $E_{pk}(\gamma)$ and $E_{pk}(4)$ (i.e., $a = 7$ and $b = 4$). Without loss of generality, let $E_{pk}(s_1)$ and $E_{pk}(s_2)$ denote their respective secrets. It is clear that the SC protocol returns $E_{pk}(0)$ (i.e., $\gamma = 0$) as output to $C_1$ since $a \leq b$ does not hold in this example. The output of SMIN is $E_{pk}(\min(7, 4)) = E_{pk}(\gamma \ast a + (1 - \gamma) \ast b) = E_{pk}(b) = E_{pk}(4)$ and $E_{pk}(s_{\min(a, b)}) = E_{pk}(s_2)$.

4) The SMIN$_k$ Protocol: Given $k$ encrypted integers, the SMIN$_k$ protocol computes an encrypted vector $\Gamma$ of length $k$ such that the entry corresponding to the minimum value is an encryption of 1 and the rest are encryptions of 0. We now discuss a novel SMIN$_k$ protocol constructed using the SMIN protocol as a building block. The overall steps in the proposed SMIN$_k$ protocol are give in Algorithm 4.

Suppose $E_{pk}(d_1), \ldots, E_{pk}(d_k)$ denote the list of $k$ encrypted integers and $i$ denotes the index (or location) of integer $d_i$ in the list, for $1 \leq i \leq k$. Initially, using the SMIN protocol, $C_1$ with input $(E_{pk}(d_1), E_{pk}(1))$ and $(E_{pk}(d_2), E_{pk}(2))$ and $C_2$ can compute $T = E_{pk}(d_1 \ast d_2)$ and $I = E_{pk}(s_{\min(d_1, d_2)})$, where $s_{\min(d_1, d_2)}$ denotes the location of the minimum value between $d_1$ and $d_2$. Note that the output of the SMIN protocol is known only to $C_1$. After this

| $w$ | $x$ | $y$ | $\gamma$ |
|-----|-----|-----|---------|
| 0   | 1   | *   | 0       |
| 1   | 0   | *   | 1       |
| 0   | 0   | 0   | 0       |
| 0   | 0   | 1   | 1       |
| 1   | 1   | 0   | 0       |
| 1   | 1   | 1   | 1       |
Algorithm 3 $\text{SMIN}_k(E_{pk}(d_1), \ldots, E_{pk}(d_k)) \rightarrow \Gamma$

Require: $C_1$ holds $(E_{pk}(d_1), \ldots, E_{pk}(d_k))$ and $\pi$; $C_2$ holds $sk$.

1. $C_1$ and $C_2$:
   (a) $(T, I) \leftarrow \text{SMIN}((E_{pk}(d_1), E_{pk}(1)), (E_{pk}(d_2), E_{pk}(2)))$
   (b) for $i = 2$ to $k - 1$ do:
      • $(T, I) \leftarrow \text{SMIN}((T, I), (E_{pk}(d_{s+1}), E_{pk}(s + 1)))$

2. $C_1$:
   (a) $\Delta \leftarrow I \cdot N^{-1}$
   (b) for $i = 1$ to $k$ do:
      • $\Delta'[i] \leftarrow E_{pk}(i) \cdot \Delta$
      • $\phi[i] \leftarrow \Delta'[i] \cdot r_i$ where $r_i \in_R Z_N$
   (c) $u \leftarrow \pi(\phi)$; send $\phi$ to $C_2$

3. $C_2$:
   (a) Receive $u$ from $C_1$
   (b) for $i = 1$ to $k$ do:
      • $u'[i] \leftarrow D_{sk}(u[i])$
   (c) for $i = 1$ to $k$ do:
      • if $u'[i] = 0$ then $U[i] \leftarrow E_{pk}(1)$
      • else $U[i] \leftarrow E_{pk}(0)$
   (d) Send $U$ to $C_1$

4. $C_1$:
   (a) Receive $U$ from $C_2$
   (b) $\Gamma \leftarrow \pi^{-1}(U)$

$C_1$ with input $(T, I)$ and $(E_{pk}(d_1), E_{pk}(3))$ can compute $E_{pk}(\min(d_1, d_2, d_3))$ and $E_{pk}(s_{\min(d_1, d_2, d_3)})$ using $\text{SMIN}$. The above process is repeated until $I = E_{pk}(s_{\min(d_1, \ldots, d_k)})$ is computed (known only to $C_1$), where $s_{\min(d_1, \ldots, d_k)}$ denotes the index (or location) corresponding to the minimum value among the $k$ input values. This process is shown as Step 1 in Algorithm 3

After this, $C_1$ and $C_2$ perform the following set of operations:

- $C_1$ computes $E_{pk}(i - s_{\min(d_1, \ldots, d_k)})$ and randomizes it to get $\phi[i] = E_{pk}(r_{i} \cdot (i - s_{\min(d_1, \ldots, d_k)}))$, where $r_i$ denotes a random number in $Z_N$ and $1 \leq i \leq k$. Observe that exactly one of the entries in $\phi$ is equal to encryption of 0 (i.e., when $i = s_{\min(d_1, \ldots, d_k)}$) and the rest are encryptions of random values. Hereafter, we use the notation $r \in_R Z_N$ to denote a random number $r$ in $Z_N$.
- $C_1$ computes $u = \pi(\phi)$ and sends it to $C_2$. Here $\pi$ is a random permutation function known only to $C_1$.
- Upon receiving $u$, $C_2$ decrypts it component-wise using $sk$ to get $u'[i] = D_{sk}(u[i])$. After this, $C_2$ generates an encrypted vector $U$ as follows. If $u'[i] = 0$, then $U[i] = E_{pk}(1)$, and $E_{pk}(0)$ otherwise. $C_2$ sends $U$ to $C_1$.
- Finally, $C_1$ gets the desired encrypted vector $\Gamma$ as output by performing an inverse permutation on $U$.

Example 4: Let $k = 5$ and the input to $\text{SMIN}_k$ be $\langle E_{pk}(3), E_{pk}(6), E_{pk}(13), E_{pk}(2), E_{pk}(9) \rangle$. The output at the end of Step 1 in the proposed $\text{SMIN}_k$ protocol is $\langle T, I \rangle = \langle E_{pk}(2), E_{pk}(4) \rangle$ and it will be known only to $C_1$. Note that since ‘2’ is the minimum among the five input values, the output of Step 1 is encryption of ‘2’ and encryption of the location corresponding to ‘2’ in the input list (i.e., $s_{\min(3, 6, 13, 2, 9)} = 4$). After this, $C_1$ computes $\phi[1] = E_{pk}(r_1 \cdot (1 - 4)), \phi[2] = E_{pk}(r_2 \cdot (2 - 4)), \phi[3] = E_{pk}(r_3 \cdot (3 - 4)), \phi[4] = E_{pk}(r_4 \cdot (4 - 4)), \phi[5] = E_{pk}(r_5 \cdot (5 - 4))$. Without loss of generality, let the random permutation function $\pi$ (known only to $C_1$) be as follows. Now $C_1$ computes $u = \pi(\phi) = \langle \phi[3], \phi[1], \phi[4], \phi[5], \phi[2] \rangle$ and sends the resulting vector $u$ to $C_2$. Upon receiving $C_2$ decrypts it using $sk$ and identifies that $D_{sk}(u[3]) = 0$. Note that the rest of the values are random numbers. Then $C_2$ computes $U = \langle E_{pk}(0), E_{pk}(0), E_{pk}(1), E_{pk}(0), E_{pk}(0) \rangle$ and sends it to $C_1$. Finally, $C_1$ computes the final output as $\Gamma = \pi^{-1}(U)$.

B. The Proposed PPODC Protocol

In this sub-section, we discuss our proposed PPODC protocol which is based on the standard $k$-means algorithm discussed in Section III-C. As mentioned in Section III-A, our system model consists of $n$ users denoted by $U_1, \ldots, U_n$. User $U_j$ holds a database $T_j$ of $m_j$ data records with $l$ attributes, for $1 \leq j \leq n$. Without loss of generality, let the aggregated database be $S = \bigcup_{j=1}^{n} T_j = \{t_1, \ldots, t_m\}$, where $m = \sum_{j=1}^{n} m_j$ denotes the total number of records in $S$. For simplicity, let $t_1, \ldots, t_{m_1} \in U_1, t_{m_1+1}, \ldots, t_{m_1+m_2} \in U_2$, and so on. We assume that all users agree upon using two cloud service providers $C_1$ and $C_2$ for outsourcing their respective databases as well as the $k$-means clustering task. Remember that, in our system model, $C_2$ generates a public-secret key pair $(pk, sk)$ based on the Paillier cryptosystem [19] and the public key $pk$ is sent to all users and $C_1$.

After the users outsource their data (encrypted under $pk$) to $C_1$, the goal of PPODC is to enable $C_1$ and $C_2$ to jointly compute the global cluster centers using the aggregated encrypted data in a privacy-preserving manner. At a high level, our protocol computes the global cluster centers in an iterative manner until the pre-defined termination condition (given in Equation 6) holds.

The overall steps involved in the proposed PPODC protocol are given in Algorithms 4 and 5. The main steps are shown in Algorithm 4. Briefly, the PPODC protocol consists of the following three stages:

- **Stage 1 - Secure Data Outsourcing:**
  During this stage, each user $U_j$ has to securely outsource an encrypted version of his/her database $T_j$ to $C_1$. To minimize the data encryption costs of users, we achieve data outsourcing through randomization techniques. Note that this stage is run only once. At the end of this stage, only $C_1$ knows the (attribute-wise) encryptions of the $n$ databases.
• **Stage 2 - Secure Computation of New Clusters:**  
  In this stage, \( C_1 \) initially selects \( k \) data records at random (from the aggregated encrypted records) and assigns them as initial clusters (this step is the same as the initialization step in the traditional \( k \)-means algorithm). Then, \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \) jointly assign each data record to a new cluster. After this, they compute the new cluster centers in encrypted format. The main goal of this stage is similar to the assignment and update stages given in Algorithm 1.

• **Stage 3 - Secure Termination or Update:**  
  Upon computing the new cluster centers (in encrypted format), \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \) securely verify whether the sum of the squared Euclidean distances between the current and new clusters is less than or equal to \( \beta \) (termination condition based on Equation 6). Here \( \beta \) denotes the pre-defined threshold value agreed upon by all the participating users. If the termination condition holds, then the protocol terminates returning the new cluster centers as the final output. Otherwise, \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \) update the current clusters to the new clusters and repeat Stages 2 and 3.

We emphasize that Stage 1 of PPDOC is executed only once whereas Stages 2 and 3 are run in an iterative manner. We now discuss the steps in each of these three stages in detail.

1) **Stage 1 - Secure Data Outsourcing (SDO):** Data are typically encrypted before being outsourced for privacy reasons. However, to avoid computation overhead on the users side due to having to encrypt their data, we consider the following approach for data outsourcing. User \( U_j \) generates two random shares for each attribute value of his/her data record \( t_i \). Precisely, for the \( s \)th attribute of data record \( t_i \), \( U_j \) generates two random shares \( (t_{i,s}^1, t_{i,s}^2) \) given by \( t_{i,s}^1 = t_i[s] \mod N \) and \( t_{i,s}^2 = N - r_i[s] \), where \( r_i[s] \in \mathbb{Z}_N \) and \( 1 \leq s \leq l \). Observe that \( t_i[s] = t_{i,s}^1 + t_{i,s}^2 \mod N \). User \( C_j \) outsources the random shares \( t_{i,s}^1 \) and \( t_{i,s}^2 \) to \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \), respectively, instead of encrypting the database attribute-wise and outsourcing it to \( C_1 \). Thus, we are able to avoid heavy encryption costs on the users during the data outsourcing step. Here we assume that there exist secure communication channels, which can be established using standard mechanisms such as SSL, between user \( U_j \) and the two clouds \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \). Each user \( U_j \) sends the random shares of his/her data to \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \) separately through the secure communication channels.

After receiving the random shares for all the data records, \( C_2 \) computes \( E_{pk} \left( t_{i,s}^1 \right) \) and sends it to \( C_1 \). Then \( C_1 \) computes \( E_{pk}(t_i[s]) = E_{pk}(t_{i,s}^1) \cdot E_{pk}(t_{i,s}^2) \), for \( 1 \leq i \leq m \) and \( 1 \leq s \leq l \).

2) **Stage 2 - Secure Computation of New Clusters (SCNC):**  
  Given the (attribute-wise) encrypted versions of users’ data, during Stage 2, \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \) jointly compute the new cluster centers in a privacy-preserving manner. To start with, \( C_1 \) randomly selects \( k \) encrypted data records (from the aggregated data) and assigns them as initial clusters. More specifically, the \( k \) encrypted data records are assigned to \( E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_1}), \ldots, E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_k}) \), respectively. For example, if the 3rd data record is selected as the first cluster \( c_1 \), then \( E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_1}) \) is set to \( E_{pk}(t_3[s]) \), for \( 1 \leq s \leq l \). Also, \( E_{pk}([c_h]) \) is set to \( E_{pk}(1) \) since each initial

![Algorithm 4 PPDOC](https://example.com/algorithm4)

**Require**: \( U_j \) holds a private database \( T_j \) with \( m_j \) data records, \( sk \) is known only to \( C_2 \)  

1) **Stage 1 - Secure Data Outsourcing:**

   - For \( 1 \leq i \leq m, \)
     - \( U_j \) computes \( t_i[s] = t_i[s] + r_i[s] \mod N \), \( t_i^2[s] = N - r_i[s] \), and \( t_i[s] \) is a random number in \( \mathbb{Z}_N \); sends \( t_i^1[s] \) to \( C_1 \) and \( t_i^2[s] \) to \( C_2 \).
     - \( C_2 \) sends \( E_{pk}(t_i^1[s]) \) to \( C_1 \).
     - \( C_1 \) computes \( E_{pk}(t_i[s]) = E_{pk}(t_i^1[s]) \cdot E_{pk}(t_i^2[s]) \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq m \).

2) **Stage 2 - Secure Computation of New Clusters:**

   - For \( 1 \leq i \leq m, \)
     - \( (a). \) Select \( k \) records at random and assign them to initial clusters denoted by \( E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_1}), \ldots, E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_k}) \), where \( c_1, \ldots, c_k \) denote the current clusters.
     - \( E_{pk}([c_h]) = E_{pk}(1) \) for \( 1 \leq h \leq k \).

3) **for \( 1 \leq i \leq m, \)**

   - \( (a). \) \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \):
     - \( E_{pk}(d_i[h]) \) \( \leftarrow \) \( \text{SSED}_{D_p}(E_{pk}(t_i), E_{pk}(c_h)) \), for \( 1 \leq h \leq k \), where \( E_{pk}(c_h) = \{ E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_1}), \ldots, E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_k}) \} \).
     - \( \gamma_{i,h} \) \( \leftarrow \) \( \text{SMP}(\Gamma_{i,h}, E_{pk}(t_i[s])) \), for \( 1 \leq h \leq k \) and \( 1 \leq s \leq l \).

4) **for \( 1 \leq h \leq k, \)**

   - \( (a). \) \( W_{h}[s] = \prod_{i=1}^{m} \Lambda_{i,h}[s] \), for \( 1 \leq s \leq l \).
   - \( E_{pk}([c_{h}]) = \prod_{i=1}^{m} \Gamma_{i,h} \).

5) **Stage 3 - Secure Termination or Update**

   - \( \gamma \) \( \leftarrow \) \( \text{SETC}(\Omega, \Omega') \), where \( \gamma \) denotes whether the termination condition holds or not, \( \Omega = \{ E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_1}), E_{pk}([c_1]) \}, \ldots, E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_k}), E_{pk}([c_k]) \} \) and \( \Omega' = \{ W_1, E_{pk}([c_{1}]), \ldots, W_k, E_{pk}([c_{k}]) \} \).

6) **if \( \gamma = 1 \) then, for \( 1 \leq h \leq k \) and \( 1 \leq s \leq l, \)**

   - \( (a). \) \( C_1 \):
     - \( O_{h}[s] \leftarrow W_{h}[s] \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{m} \Lambda_{i,h}[s] \) and \( \delta_{h} \leftarrow E_{pk}([c_{h}]) \) \( \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{m} \Gamma_{i,h} \).
     - \( \text{Send} \ O_{h}[s] \) and \( \delta_{h} \) to \( C_2 ; r_{h}'[s] \) and \( r_{h}''[s] \) to each user \( U_j \).
   
   - \( (b). \) \( C_2 \): Send \( O_{h}'[s] \) \( \leftarrow \) \( D_{sh}(O_{h}[s]) \) and \( \delta_{h}' \) \( \leftarrow \) \( D_{sh}(\delta_{h}) \) to each user \( U_j \).

else, for \( 1 \leq h \leq s, \)

   - \( E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_{h}}) \) \( \leftarrow \) \( W_{h} \) and \( E_{pk}([c_{h}]) \) \( \leftarrow \) \( E_{pk}([c_{h}]) \).
   - Go to Step 3.

7) **for \( U_j \),**

   - \( \text{foreach} \) received pairs \( (O_{h}',r_{h}') \) and \( (\delta_{h}',r_{h}'') \) do:
     - \( \lambda_{c_{h}}'[s] = O_{h}'[s] \mod N, 1 \leq s \leq l \);
     - \( |c_{h}'[s] = \delta_{h}' - r_{h}''[s] \mod N \);
     - \( |c_{h}'[s] = \lambda_{c_{h}}'[s] \) and \( S_j \leftarrow S_j \cup \mu_{c_{h}} \).
cluster $c_h$ consists of only one data record, for $1 \leq h \leq k$.

For each encrypted data record $E_{pk}(t_i)$, $C_1$ and $C_2$ compute the squared Euclidean distance between $t_i$ and all the clusters based on the order-preserving Euclidean distance function given in Equation 6. To achieve this, $C_1$ and $C_2$ jointly execute the SSED protocol with $E_{pk}(t_i)$ and $E_{pk}(c_h)$ as $C_1$’s private input, for $1 \leq i \leq m$ and $1 \leq h \leq k$, where $E_{pk}(c_h) = (E_{pk}(\lambda_{c_h}), E_{pk}(|c_h|))$. The output of SSED protocol is denoted by $E_{pk}(d_i[h])$. Note that $d_i[h] = (\text{OPED}(t_i, c_h))^2$. Now, $C_1$ and $C_2$ jointly execute the following set of operations:

- For $1 \leq i \leq m$, with the $k$ encrypted distances as $C_1$’s private input to the secure minimum out of $k$ numbers (SMIN$_k$) protocol, $C_1$ and $C_2$ compute an encrypted bit vector $\Gamma_i$.
  The important observation here is that $\Gamma_i[g]$ is an encryption of 1 iff $d_i[g]$ is the minimum distance among $\langle d_i[1], \ldots, d_i[k] \rangle$. In this case, $t_i$ is closest to cluster $c_g$, where $1 \leq g \leq k$. The rest of the values in $\Gamma_i$ are encryptions of 0. Note that the output of SMI$k$_k, i.e., $\Gamma_i$, is known only to $C_1$.

- After this, $C_1$ and $C_2$ securely multiply $\Gamma_{i,h}$ with $E_{pk}(t_i[s])$ using the secure multiplication (SMP) sub-protocol. Precisely, $C_1$ and $C_2$ compute $\Lambda_{i,h}[s] = \text{SMP}(\Gamma_{i,h}, E_{pk}(t_i[s]))$. The observation here is that since $\Gamma_{i,g} = E_{pk}(1)$ only if $t_i$ is closest to cluster $c_g$, $\Lambda_{i,g} = E_{pk}(t_i)$ denoting that $t_i$ is assigned to new cluster $c'_g$. Also, $\Lambda_{i,h}$ is a vector of encryptions of 0, for $1 \leq h < k$ and $h \neq g$.

Next, $C_1$ computes the new cluster centers locally by performing homomorphic operations on $\Lambda_{i,h}$ and $\Gamma_{i,h}$ as follows:

- Compute (in encrypted format) the $s^{th}$-component of the numerator for the center of new cluster $c'_h$ as $W_h[s] = \prod_{i=1}^{m} \Lambda_{i,h}[s]$, for $1 \leq h \leq k$ and $1 \leq s \leq l$. The observation here is $W_h[s] = E_{pk}(\mu_{c'_h}[s])$. Remember that $\mu_{c'_h}[s] = \frac{\mu_{c'_h}}{|c'_h|}$, where $\mu_{c'_h}$ denotes the center of cluster $c'_h$.

- Compute the number of data records (in the encrypted format) that belong to the new cluster $c'_h$ as $E_{pk}(|c'_h|) = \prod_{i=1}^{m} \Gamma_{i,h}$, for $1 \leq h \leq k$.

3) Stage 3 - Secure Termination or Update (STOU):
Given the new clusters (in encrypted format) that belong to the new cluster $c'_h$ as $E_{pk}(\lambda_{c'_h}[s]), E_{pk}(|c'_h|)$ where $\lambda_{c'_h}[s] \neq \lambda_{c'_h}[s]$. Remember that $\lambda_{c'_h}[s] = \lambda_{c'_h}$ for $1 \leq h \leq k$, and $1 \leq s \leq l$, they compute

$$G_i[s] = \text{SMP}(E_{pk}(\lambda_{c'_h}[s]), E_{pk}(|c'_h|))$$

$$= E_{pk}(\lambda_{c'_h}[s] * |c'_h|)$$

$$G'_i[s] = \text{SMP}(W_i[s], E_{pk}(|c_i|))$$

$$= E_{pk}(\lambda_{c'_h}[s] * |c_i|)$$

Note that $W_i[s]$ computed in Stage 2 is equivalent to $E_{pk}(\lambda_{c'_h}[s])$.

- Now, by using the secure squared Euclidean distance (SEED) protocol with input vectors $G_i$ and $G'_i$, $C_1$ and $C_2$ jointly compute $H_i = \text{SEED}(G_i, G'_i)$. Precisely, they compute the encryption of squared Euclidean distance between vectors in $G_i$ and $G'_i$ given by,

$$H_i = E_{pk}\left(\sum_{s=1}^{l} (\lambda_{c'_h}[s] * |c'_h| - \lambda_{c'_h}[s] * |c_i|)^2\right)$$

- Given $Z_i$ and $H_i$, $C_1$ and $C_2$ can securely multiply them to get $H'_i = \text{SMP}(H_i, Z_i) = E_{pk}\left(f_2^2 * \sum_{s=1}^{l} (\lambda_{c'_h}[s] * |c'_h| - \lambda_{c'_h}[s] * |c_i|)^2\right)$.
Algorithm 5 SETC(Ω, Ω′)

Require: C1 has Ω = \{ (Epk(\lambda_{c_1}), Epk(|c_1|)), …, (Epk(\lambda_{c_k}), Epk(|c_k|)) \}, Ω′ = \{ (W_1, Epk(|c'_1|)), …, (W_k, Epk(|c'_k|)) \}

1: C1 and C2:
   (a) \tau_i ← SMP(Epk(|c_i|), Epk(|c'_i|)), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
   (b) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k do:
       • Vi ← SMP_{k−1}(\tau_i), where \tau'_i = \bigcup_{j=1, j\neq i}^k \tau_j
       • Zi ← SMP(V_i, V_i)
   (c) V ← SMP(V_1, \tau_1)
   (d) Y ← SMP(V, V)
   (e) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ s ≤ l do:
       • Gi[s] ← SMP(Epk(\lambda_{c_i}[s]), Epk(|c'_i|))
       • Gi'[s] ← SMP(W_i[s], Epk(|c_i|))
   (f) H_i ← SSED(G_i, G_i'), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
   (g) H_i' ← SMP(H_i, Z_i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k

2: C1: L ← \prod_{i=1}^k H_i' and R ← Y^\beta
3: C1 and C2:
   (a) Epk(\gamma) ← SC(L, R), note that the output of SC is known only to C1
4: C1: Send Epk(\gamma) to C2
5: C2: Decrypt Epk(\gamma) and send \gamma to C1

At the end of the above process, C1 has Y = Epk(f^2) and H_i', for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Now C1 locally computes:

\[ R = Y^\beta = Epk(f^2 \ast \beta) \quad \text{and} \]
\[ L = \prod_{i=1}^k H'_i = \prod_{i=1}^k Epk\left(\sum_{s=1}^l (\lambda_{c_i}[s] \ast |c'_i| - \lambda_{c'_i}[s] \ast |c_i|)^2\right) \]
\[ = Epk\left(\sum_{i=1}^k \sum_{s=1}^l (\lambda_{c_i}[s] \ast f_i \ast |c'_i| - \lambda_{c'_i}[s] \ast f_i \ast |c_i|)^2\right) \]

At this point, C1 has encryptions of the integers corresponding to both the left-hand and right-hand sides of the termination condition given in Equation 6. Therefore, the goal is to now securely compare them using the secure comparison (SC) protocol. More specifically, by using L and R as C1’s private input to the SC protocol, C1 and C2 securely evaluate the termination condition:

\[ \sum_{i=1}^k \sum_{s=1}^l (\lambda_{c_i}[s] \ast f_i \ast |c'_i| - \lambda_{c'_i}[s] \ast f_i \ast |c_i|)^2 \leq f^2 \ast \beta \]

The output is Epk(\gamma) = SC(L, R), where \gamma = 1 iff the termination condition holds, and \gamma = 0 otherwise. Note that Epk(\gamma) is known only to C1. After this, C1 sends Epk(\gamma) to C2, who decrypts it and forwards the value of \gamma to C1.

Finally, once the termination condition has been securely evaluated, C1 locally proceeds as follows:

- If \gamma = 1 (i.e., when the termination condition holds), the newly computed clusters are the final clusters which need to be sent to each user U_j. For this purpose, C1 takes the help of C2 to obliviously decrypt the results related to the new cluster centers. More specifically, C1 initially picks two sets of random numbers (r'_h[s], r''_h) and computes O_h[s] = W_h[s] \ast Epk(r'_h[s]) = Epk(\lambda_{c_h}[s] + r_h[s] \mod N) and \delta_h = Epk(|c'_h|) \ast Epk(r''_h) = Epk(|c'_h| + r''_h \mod N), for 1 ≤ h ≤ k and 1 ≤ s ≤ l. After this, C1 sends O_h[s] and \delta_h to C2. In addition, C1 sends r'_h[s] and r''_h to each user U_j (through separate and secure communication channels).

- For 1 ≤ s ≤ l, C2 successfully decrypts the received encrypted values using his/her secret share sk to get O'_h[s] = D_{sk}(O_h[s]) and \delta'_h = D_{sk}(\delta_h) which it forwards to each user U_j (through separate and secure communication channels). Observe that, due to the randomization by C1, the values of O'_h[s] and \delta'_h are random numbers in \mathbb{Z}_N from C2’s perspective.

- Upon receiving the entry pairs \langle \delta'_h, r'_h \rangle, each user U_j removes the random factors to get \lambda_{c'_h}[s] = O'_h[s] - r'_h[s] \mod N and |c'_h| = \delta'_h - r''_h \mod N, for 1 ≤ h ≤ k and 1 ≤ s ≤ l. Finally, U_j computes the final cluster center \mu_{c'_h} as \mu_{c'_h}[s] = \lambda_{c'_h}[s] \mod |c'_h| and adds it to his/her resulting set S_j.

On the other hand, when \gamma = 0, then C1 locally updates the current clusters to new clusters by setting Epk(\lambda_{c_h}) = W_h and Epk(|c_h|) = Epk(|c_h'|), for 1 ≤ h ≤ k. After this, the above process is repeated in an iterative manner until the termination condition holds. That is, the protocol goes to Step 3 of Algorithm 4 and executes Steps 3 to 6 with the updated cluster centers as input.

C. Security Analysis of PPODc under the Semi-honest Model

In this section, we show that the proposed PPODc protocol is secure under the standard semi-honest model [18], [33]. Informally speaking, we stress that all the intermediate values seen by C1 and C2 in PPODc are either encrypted or pseudo-random numbers.

First, in the data outsourcing process (i.e., Step 1 of Algorithm 4), the values received by C1 and C2 are either random or pseudo-random values in \mathbb{Z}_N. At the end of the data outsourcing step, only C1 knows the encrypted data records of all users and no information regarding the contents of T_j (the database of user U_j) is revealed to C2. Therefore, as long as the underlying encryption scheme is semantically secure (which is also the case in the Paillier cryptosystem [21]), the aggregated encrypted databases do not reveal any information to C1. Hence, no information is revealed to C1 and C2 during Stage 1 of PPODc.

The implementations of SMP, SSED, and SLSB sub-protocols given in [30], [34] are proven to be secure under the semi-honest model [18]. Also, the SC protocol given in [31] is secure under the semi-honest model. In the proposed SSEDOP protocol, the computations are based on using either SMP or SSED as a sub-routine. As a result, SSEDOP can be
proven to be secure under the semi-honest model. Further, since SMIN and SMINκ are directly constructed from SC, the security proofs for them directly follow from the security proof of SC given in [31]. In summary, the privacy-preserving primitives utilized in the proposed PPODC protocol are secure under the semi-honest model.

We emphasize that the computations involved in Stages 2 and 3 of PPODC are performed by either $C_1$ locally or using one of the privacy-preserving primitives as a sub-routine. In the former case, $C_1$ operates on encrypted data locally. In the latter case, the privacy-preserving primitives utilized in our protocol are secure under the semi-honest model. Also, it is important to note that the output of a privacy-preserving primitive which is fed as input to the next primitive is in encrypted format. Since we use a semantically secure Paillier encryption scheme [19], all the encrypted results (which are revealed only to $C_1$) from the privacy-preserving primitives do not reveal any information to $C_1$. Note that the secret key $sk$ is unknown to $C_1$. Hence, by Composition Theorem [33], we claim that the sequential composition of the privacy-preserving primitives lead to Stages 2 and 3 in our proposed PPODC protocol and are secure under the semi-honest model. Putting everything together, it is clear that PPODC is secure under the semi-honest model.

D. Performance Analysis of PPODC

First of all, we emphasize that a direct implementation of the proposed PPODC protocol is likely to be inefficient. To address this issue, we propose two strategies to boost its performance: (i) offline computation and (ii) reusability of intermediate results. In what follows, we extensively analyze the performance of PPODC based on these two strategies.

In the Paillier cryptosystem [19], encryption of an integer $a \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ is given by $E_{pk}(a) = g^a \ast r^N \mod N^2$, where $g$ is the generator, $N$ is the RSA modulus, and $r$ is a random number in $\mathbb{Z}_N$. It is clear that Paillier’s encryption scheme requires two expensive exponentiation operations. In this paper, we assume $g = N + 1$ (a commonly used setting that provides the same security guarantee as the original Paillier cryptosystem) as this allows for a more efficient implementation of Paillier encryption [35]. More specifically, when $g = N + 1$, we have

$$E_{pk}(a) = (N + 1)^a \ast r^N \mod N^2$$

$$= (a \ast N + 1) \ast r^N \mod N^2 \quad (8)$$

As a result, an encryption under Paillier is reduced to one exponentiation operation. Our main observation from Equation (8) is that the encryption cost under Paillier can be further reduced as follows. The exponentiation operation (i.e., $r^N \mod N^2$) in the encryption function can be computed in an offline phase and thus the online cost of computing $E_{pk}(a)$ is reduced to two (inexpensive) multiplication operations. Additionally, encryption of random numbers, 0s and 1s can be precomputed by the corresponding party (i.e., $C_1$ or $C_2$) as they are independent of the underlying protocol.

We emphasize that the actual online computation costs (with an offline phase) of the privacy-preserving primitives used in our protocol can be much less than their costs without an offline phase. For example, consider the secure multiplication (SMP) primitive with $E_{pk}(a)$ and $E_{pk}(b)$ as $C_1$’s private input. During the execution of SMP, $C_1$ has to initially randomize the inputs and send them to $C_2$. That is, $C_1$ has to compute $E_{pk}(a) \ast E_{pk}(r_1) = E_{pk}(a + r_1 \mod N)$ and $E_{pk}(b) \ast E_{pk}(r_2) = E_{pk}(b + r_2 \mod N)$, where $r_1$ and $r_2$ are random numbers in $\mathbb{Z}_N$. This clearly requires $C_1$ to compute two encryptions: $E_{pk}(r_1)$ and $E_{pk}(r_2)$. However, since $r_1$ and $r_2$ are integers chosen by $C_1$ at random, the computation of $E_{pk}(r_1)$ and $E_{pk}(r_2)$ is independent of any specific instantiation of SMP. That is, $C_1$ can precompute $E_{pk}(r_1)$ and $E_{pk}(r_2)$ during the offline phase and thus boosting its online computation time. In a similar manner, $C_1$ and $C_2$ can precompute certain intermediate results in each privacy-preserving primitive.

To better understand the performance improvements due to the above offline computation strategy, we have analyzed the offline and online computation costs of each privacy-preserving primitive (for a single execution) used in PPODC separately. The results are given in Table III. Here $l$ denotes number of attributes and $k$ denotes number of desired clusters. From our analyses, following from Table III we observed that the actual online computation cost (with an offline phase) of each primitive is improved by at least 50% in comparison to its online computation cost without an offline phase.

An important observation in PPODC is that some of the intermediate results (apart from those computed during the offline phase) computed in earlier steps can be reused in later computations without affecting the security. This leads to our second performance improvement strategy - reusability of intermediate results. This would be better illustrated by the following example. Consider that $C_1$ with private input $(E_{pk}(a), E_{pk}(b_1))$ and $C_2$ jointly want to compute $E_{pk}(a \ast b_1)$ using SMP. During this process, $C_1$ initially computes $E_{pk}(a + r \mod N)$ and $E_{pk}(b_1 + r_1 \mod N)$ and sends them to $C_2$, where $r$ and $r_1$ are random numbers in $\mathbb{Z}_N$.\footnote{The time that takes to perform one exponentiation under $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$ is equivalent to $\log_2 N$ multiplication operations. Therefore, exponentiation is considered to be an expensive operation in comparison to multiplication.}

![Table II](image)

**TABLE II**

**ONLINE AND OFFLINE COMPUTATIONAL COSTS FOR DIFFERENT STAGES IN PPODC**

| Stage | Online | Offline |
|-------|--------|---------|
| Stage 1 (one-time) | $6m \ast l$ mul. | $2m \ast l$ exp. |
| Stage 2 (per iteration) | $m \ast (2l \ast k + l + 17k - 4 \lfloor \frac{b}{2} \rceil - 14) + k \ast (l + 1) + 1$ exp. | $m \ast (7l \ast k + 3l + 32k - 7 \lfloor \frac{b}{2} \rceil - 29) + k \ast (3l + 1) + 1$ exp. |
| Stage 3 (per iteration) | $k \ast (2k + 5l) + 9$ exp. | $k \ast (4k + 9l + 2) + 20$ exp. |
TABLE III
ONLINE AND OFFLINE COMPUTATION COSTS OF PRIVACY-PRESERVING PRIMITIVES (MEASURED IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF EXPONENTIATIONS)

| Primitive | Online | Offline |
|-----------|--------|---------|
| SMP       | 2      | 4       |
| SSED      | 3l     | 4l      |
| SSED_{opt}| 2k + 7l| 4k + 12l|
| SLSB      | 1      | 3       |
| SC        | 7      | 17      |
| SMIN      | 14     | 30      |
| SMIN_{k}  | 16k - 4 | k/2 - 14 | 31k - 7 | k/2 - 29 |

Upon receiving the ciphertexts, C_2 decrypts them to get \( a + r \mod N \) and \( b_1 + r_1 \mod N \) and proceeds with the rest of the computations involved in SMP. At a later stage, suppose C_1 with private input \((E_{pk}(a), E_{pk}(b_2))\) and C_2 want to compute \( E_{pk}(a + b) \). The key observation here is that C_1 can compute and send only \( E_{pk}(b_2 + r_2 \mod N) \) to C_2, where \( r_2 \) is a random number in \( \mathbb{Z}_N \). That is, there is no need for C_1 to again compute \( E_{pk}(a + r \mod N) \) and send that to C_2. After receiving \( E_{pk}(b_2 + r_2 \mod N) \) from C_1, C_2 can decrypt it to get \( b_2 + r_2 \mod N \) and use the intermediate result \( a + r \mod N \) already computed in the previous step to proceed with further computations of SMP. The above example clearly demonstrates that reusability of intermediate results can save both computation and communication costs.

By taking both the above two strategies (i.e., offline computation and reusability of intermediate results) into consideration, we could optimize the performance of PPODC. Without loss of generality, let us denote such an implementation by PPODC_{opt}. We estimated the online and offline computational costs, measured in terms of required multiplication (mul.) or exponentiation (exp.) operations, for each stage of PPODC_{opt} separately. The results are given in Table III. Here m denotes the sum of the data records of all users. It is important to note that Stage 1 of PPODC_{opt} is run only once whereas Stages 2 and 3 are run in an iterative fashion until the termination condition holds.

The total communication costs for each stage of PPODC_{opt} are extensively analyzed and the results are shown in Table IV. Here K denotes the size (in bits) of the Paillier encryption key [19]. Following from our analyses, we can observe that the costs (both computation and communication) of Stage 2 are significantly higher (depends on m) than the costs of Stage 3 in each iteration.

VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

First of all, we emphasize that PPODC is 100% accurate in the sense that the outputs returned by PPODC and the standard k-means clustering algorithm (applied on the corresponding plaintext data) are the same. Therefore, in this section, we extensively analyze the computation costs of PPODC by performing various experiments using a real dataset under different parameter settings. Note that ours is the first work to address the PPODC problem and thus there exist no prior work to compare with our protocol.

A. Platform and Dataset Description

We implemented the protocols (both the direct implementation and optimized version of PPODC) in C using the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic (GMP) library [36]. For the optimized version of PPODC (denoted by PPODC_{opt}), we considered both the performance improvement strategies mentioned in Section V-D. The experiments were conducted on two Linux machines (playing the roles of C_1 and C_2), each with an Intel® Core™ i7-2600 CPU (3.40GHz) and 8GB RAM, running Linux version 3.12.6. The two machines were communicating over a TCP/IP network.

For our experiments on real dataset, we used the KEGG Metabolic Reaction Network (Undirected) dataset from the UCI KDD archive [37] that consists of 65,554 data records and 29 attributes. Since some of the attribute values are missing in the dataset, we removed the corresponding data records and the resulting dataset consists of 64,608 data records.

As part of the pre-processing, we normalized the attribute values and scaled them into the integer domain \([0, 1000]\). Then we selected sample datasets (from the preprocessed data) by choosing data records at random based on the parameter values under consideration. We fixed the Paillier encryption key size to 1,024 bits (a commonly accepted key size) in all our experiments. For each sample dataset, we encrypted each of its data record attribute-wise using the Paillier encryption function [19] and stored this encrypted data on the first machine. Note that the corresponding secret key sk is stored on the second machine.

We executed PPODC and PPODC_{opt} over the encrypted data stored in the first machine under the above setting. The results presented in the rest of this section are averaged over ten sample datasets.

B. Empirical Analysis using Real Dataset

To see the actual efficiency gains of PPODC_{opt} over PPODC, we first evaluated their computation costs using different sampled datasets of varying sizes. Specifically, we fix the value of l and k to 10 and 8, respectively, and executed PPODC and PPODC_{opt} on datasets of varying number of records m. The results per iteration are shown in Table V. On the one hand, the running time of PPODC varies from 31.88 to 159.4 minutes when m varies from 2,000 to 10,000. On the other hand, the online running time of PPODC_{opt} varies from 11.72 to 58.58 minutes when m varies from 2,000 to 10,000. From these results, it is clear that the online computation time of the optimized version of PPODC is around 2.7 times less than the online computation time of the direct implementation of PPODC. That is, the performance improvement strategies proposed in Section V-D boost the performance of PPODC by 60-65%. We emphasize that the running time reported in this section also includes the communication costs, such as packet encoding and decoding, and network delays.
TABLE IV

| Stage                      | Communication Cost (in bits) |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Stage 1 (one-time)         | $4m \times l \times K$      |
| Stage 2 (per iteration)    | $(4m \times l \times k + 2l \times k + 2 \times m \times l + 21m \times k - 2m \times \lfloor \frac{l}{2} \rfloor - 19m + 1) \times 2K$ |
| Stage 3 (per iteration)    | $(k \times (3k + 6l + 2) + 15) \times 2K$ |

TABLE V

| $m$  | PPODC (Direct Implementation) | PPODC$_{opt}$ (Online + Offline) | PPODC$_{opt}$ (Online) |
|------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|
| 2,000| 31.88                         | 23.52                           | 11.72                  |
| 4,000| 63.76                         | 47.04                           | 23.43                  |
| 6,000| 95.64                         | 70.56                           | 35.15                  |
| 8,000| 127.52                        | 94.08                           | 46.87                  |
| 10,000| 159.4                         | 117.6                           | 58.58                  |

Having shown the performance improvement of PPODC$_{opt}$ over PPODC, we next analyze the online computation costs of PPODC$_{opt}$ based on different parameters. The computation cost of PPODC$_{opt}$ per iteration mainly depends on three parameters: (i) the number of data records of all users ($m$), (ii) the number of attributes ($l$), and (iii) the number of clusters ($k$). Therefore, we evaluate the performance of PPODC$_{opt}$ by varying these three parameters.

For $m = 6,000$, Figure 2(a) shows the online running time of PPODC$_{opt}$ for varying values of $l$ and $k$. For example, when $l = 10$ and $k = 8$, the online running time of PPODC$_{opt}$ is 36.14 minutes. The online running time of PPODC$_{opt}$ for $l = 10$ and varying values of $k$ and $m$ are shown in Figure 2(b).

The observation is that the running time grows linearly with $k$ and $m$. As shown in Figure 2(c) when $k = 8$, a similar trend is observed for varying values of $m$ and $l$. Putting everything together, it is clear that the running time of PPODC$_{opt}$ grows linearly with $m$, $k$, and $l$. This further justifies our theoretical analysis in Section VI-D.

We observed that around 99% of the computation time of PPODC$_{opt}$ is due to Stage 2. Also, the running time of each user is in few milliseconds (since he/she doesn’t involve in any expensive operations), which makes our protocol very efficient from the end-user’s computational perspective. In summary, the above results show that the proposed PPODC protocol, together with our optimizations, achieves reasonable efficiency given the stronger privacy guarantees.

A Note on Scalability. We emphasize that the computation costs of PPODC$_{opt}$ can be high for large datasets. However, it is worth noting that the performance of PPODC$_{opt}$ can be further improved by parallelizing the underlying operations. This is because the assignment of each data record to a new cluster in Stage 2 is independent of other records and thus we can almost parallelize the computations of Stage 2 at the record level. More specifically, $C_1$ and $C_2$ can utilize a cluster of nodes to perform their respective computations in parallel. Note that most of the current cloud service providers, such as Google and Amazon, typically support parallel processing on high performance computing nodes. Some of the large-scale parallel processing frameworks include Spark and Hadoop. Hence, by properly exploiting the parallel processing capability of clouds, we believe that the scalability issue of PPODC$_{opt}$ can be addressed to a great extent.

VII. Conclusions

Existing privacy-preserving distributed clustering techniques, which can allow the users to collaboratively and securely perform the clustering task, incur heavy costs (both communication- and computation-wise) on the participating users. To address this issue, in this paper, we introduced the problem of privacy-preserving and outsourced distributed clustering (PPODC) where a set of users can securely outsource their databases and the intended clustering task to a cloud environment. We proposed a novel PPODC protocol under a federated cloud environment that can perform the $k$-means clustering on the users aggregated encrypted data in a privacy-preserving manner. At the core of our protocol, we proposed new transformations to construct an order-preserving Euclidean distance function and evaluate the termination condition of the $k$-means clustering algorithm over encrypted data.

The proposed PPODC protocol ensures data confidentiality of all users and incurs negligible costs on the user side. We theoretically estimated the complexities of our protocol and experimentally analyzed its efficiency using a real dataset. Our results show that our protocol incurs reasonable costs on the cloud side and is practical for non-real-time applications. One important contribution of our protocol is that most of its underlying computations can be parallelized. As future work, we plan to implement the proposed protocol using parallelism on a cluster of nodes and evaluate its performance. Also, we will extend the research ideas proposed in this paper to other data mining tasks, such as classification, association rule mining, and regression analysis.

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