Exploring the Vulnerability of Natural Language Processing Models via Universal Adversarial Texts

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Abstract

Universal adversarial texts (UATs) refer to short pieces of text units that can largely affect the predictions of Natural Language Processing (NLP) models. Recent studies on universal adversarial attacks require the availability of validation/test data which may not always be available in practice. In this paper, we propose two types of Data-Free Adjusted Gradient (DFAG) attacks to show that it is possible to generate effective UATs with manually crafted examples. Based on the proposed DFAG attacks, we explore the vulnerability of commonly used NLP models from two perspectives: network architecture and pre-trained embedding. The empirical results on three text classification datasets show that: 1) CNN-based and LSTM models are more vulnerable to UATs than self-attention models; 2) the vulnerability/robustness difference between of CNN/LSTM models and self-attention models could be attributed to whether or not they rely on training data artifacts for predictions; and 3) the pre-trained embeddings could expose vulnerability to both UAT and transferred UTA attacks.

1 Introduction

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have enabled significant advancement in a range of natural language processing (NLP) applications such as sentiment analysis (Yang et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2019) and topic classification (Sun et al., 2019). Despite the superior performance, DNNs are known to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Ma et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019; Ma et al., 2021), i.e., small changes on the input could lead to entirely incorrect predictions (Croce and Hein, 2020; Jiang et al., 2020). It has raised practical security concerns for the deployment of DNNs in safety-critical scenarios (Eykholt et al., 2018; Duan et al., 2020). Adversarially perturbed inputs are known as adversarial examples and the process of generating adversarial examples is known as adversarial attack. It has become a common practice to examine the vulnerability of DNNs to adversarial examples and mitigate the vulnerability by involving adversarial examples during the training process as a type of augmented data (Nie et al., 2020; Madry et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2019b; Zhang et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019b; Croce et al., 2020).

Most adversarial attack methods for NLP models (Alzantot et al., 2018; Ebrahimi et al., 2018b; Jin et al., 2020) are sample-wise methods that craft adversarial examples by manipulating each clean example. Different from sample-wise attacks, universal adversarial attack (Behjati et al., 2019) aims to generate Universal Adversarial Texts (UATs) or universal triggers (Wallace et al., 2019) for each class or the entire dataset to fool NLP models. However, existing methods (Wallace et al., 2019; Song et al., 2021; Behjati et al., 2019) all require the validation/test dataset of the task or some proxy datasets in a similar domain to craft UATs.

To more easily and efficiently generate UATs, we propose Data-Free Adjusted Gradient (DFAG) attacks. According to the evaluation, our proposed DFAG attacks achieve a comparable performance as the original linear approximation method (Wallace et al., 2019) on most of the NLP models. We find that UATs generated by our method highly overlap with those from the original linear approximation method (Wallace et al., 2019). This indicates that the vulnerability of UATs may be inherent in the models. To better understand the vulnerability, we take text classification as an example and dive into different neural network architectures. Empirical results show that CNN and LSTM models are notably more vulnerable to UATs than self-attention models. We also reveal that the effectiveness of UATs generated for LSTM and CNN...
models exposes certain training data artifacts, i.e., important words in the training data that are more closely correlated with the targeted class. In contrast, self-attention models are relatively more robust to UATs. This finding is consistent with previous study on model robustness to training data artifacts, so it is likely that self-attention models suffer less from training data artifacts.

Apart from the neural architectures, we also examine pre-trained embeddings, including static pre-trained word embeddings (Pennington et al., 2014; Mikolov et al., 2018) and contextualized ones from the pre-trained language model BERT (Devlin et al., 2018). These embeddings have been widely used in different NLP applications. Our experiments show that pre-trained word embeddings could deteriorate model robustness to UATs, and even self-attention models can become vulnerable with pre-trained embeddings. Upon further investigation, we find that UATs are often transferable among models that use the same pre-trained embeddings. This reveals one unique vulnerability of NLP models to UATs.

2 Generating Universal Adversarial Texts

Problem Formulation. Consider a text classifier $f$ mapping from input $x$ to label $y$. The goal of universal adversarial attack is to generate a small sequence of tokens $t = (t_1, t_2, ..., t_k)$ (i.e., an UAT), which can be inserted into any clean example $x$ to cause misclassification towards a targeted wrong label $\tilde{y}$. Previous work (Behjati et al., 2019; Wallace et al., 2019) showed the effectiveness of UAT when three words are inserted at the beginning of the input sequence. Here, we follow their settings and predetermine the adversarial target class $\tilde{y}$. The attack problem can be formally defined as: for any clean example $\{(x, y)|(x, y) \in \mathcal{D} \text{ and } y \neq \tilde{y}\}$, we aim to make the classifier $f$ predict the perturbed example $t \oplus x$ as the targeted label $\tilde{y}$, i.e., $f(t \oplus x) = \tilde{y}$. The problem can be solved by minimizing an adversarial loss $\mathcal{L}_{adv}(t \oplus x, \tilde{y})$, which is the cross-entropy loss defined with the targeted label.

$$\arg \min_{t} \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}}[\mathcal{L}_{adv}(t \oplus x, \tilde{y})]$$ (1)

2.1 Gradient-based Attack

A UAT is composed of discrete tokens for which we search from the vocabulary $\mathcal{V} = w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_{|\mathcal{V}|}$ ($|\mathcal{V}|$ is the size of vocabulary). Each word $w_i$ in the vocabulary is represented by a dense vector called embedding $e_i$. In order to find the optimal UAT, Behjati et al. (2019) applied gradient descent for $t$ in the embedding space and identified the word in the vocabulary by projecting the nearest embeddings of the word. More efficiently, Wallace et al. (2019) proposed a linear approximation approach to generate gradients to approximate the loss of substituting $t$ with $t_{update}$, i.e., $\mathcal{L}_{adv}(t_{update} \oplus x, \tilde{y})$. According to the first-order Taylor approximation, we measure the effectiveness of the substitution by the inner product of the gradient $\nabla_{e_i} \mathcal{L}_{adv}$ with the embedding of $t_{update}$.

$$\arg \min_{e_i} e_{update}^T \nabla_{e_i} \mathcal{L}_{adv}$$ (2)

The approximation scores for all the possible substitution words in the vocabulary can be efficiently calculated via matrix multiplication, where $E \in \mathbb{R}^{|\mathcal{V}| \times m}$ denotes the embedding matrix with vocabulary size $|\mathcal{V}|$ and embedding size $m$. It only needs one forward and backward pass to compute the gradients for all the positions of UAT tokens. The equation is shown below where $\nabla_{e_i} \mathcal{L}_{adv}$ has the dimensions for positions of UAT tokens and embedding size $m$.

$$A = E \times \nabla_{e_i} \mathcal{L}_{adv}$$ (3)

Both approaches require batches of data to update the UAT $t$. However, we can still use the linear approximation approach as a baseline for our experiment due to its efficiency. This approach requires a batch of examples to calculate the gradient for each update of the UAT, as shown in Equation (4) where $n$ examples are consumed.

$$\nabla_{e_i} \mathcal{L}_{adv} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \nabla_{e_i} \mathcal{L}_{adv}(t \oplus x_i)$$ (4)

2.2 Data-free Adjusted Gradient Attack

The universal property of UATs indicates that they reflect the inherent vulnerability of well-trained NLP models. Moreover, Wallace et al. (2019) reveals that UATs are a form of training data artifacts for natural language inference models. We suspect the validity of this conclusion across all text classification tasks, which is shown in Section 3.4.
Generating pseudo-samples. We pass the \( t \oplus x \) into the embedding layer, which outputs the dense representation \( e \) in the embedding space. We then manipulate \( e \) to generate \( K \) pseudo-samples \( e_{ps} \) in the embedding space during each iteration. The gradients of the pseudo-samples are then aggregated to apply the linear approximation attack. We refer to this approach as the DFAG (Data-Free Adjusted Gradient) attack.

We employ the following two techniques to generate pseudo-samples, which have been proved to be effective in approximating gradients for model interpretation (Smilkov et al., 2017; Sundararajan et al., 2017).

- **Smooth noise**: the Gaussian noise \( \eta \) is generated with mean 0 and standard deviation \( \sigma \). We denote this method as DFAG (Smooth) to accredit the SmoothGrad method (Smilkov et al., 2017).

\[
e_{ps} = \{ e + \eta_i \mid i \in [1..K] \}
\]

where \( \eta_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2) \) (5)

- **Path method**: we sample \( K \) pseudo-samples evenly along the straight path from the origin to the given sample. We denote this method as DFAG (Integrated) to accredit the Integrated Gradient method (Sundararajan et al., 2017).

\[
e_{ps} = \{ e_{ps} \mid i \in [1..K] \}
\]

where \( e_{ps} = \frac{i}{K} \times e \) (6)

3 Attacking Text Classification Models

This section introduces model configurations and attack settings, and analyzes the experimental results. We also publish the source code for all the settings and experiments on Github \(^1\) to reproduce the result.

3.1 Modeling Setup

**Tasks and Datasets.** Our experiments include Stanford Sentiment Treebank (SST-2) (Socher et al., 2013), Yelp (Zhang et al., 2015) datasets for sentiment classification task, and AG-News constructed by (Zhang et al., 2015) for topic classification task.

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\(^1\)https://github.com/xinzhel/attack_ulta
| Task           | Architecture | Pre-trained | Attack Success Rate | ASR Ratio |
|---------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------|------------|
|               |              |             | Baseline | DFAG (Smooth) | DFAG (Integrated) |         |
| SST-2         | LSTM         | /           | 0.53     | 0.53         | 0.52             | 1        |
|               |              | GloVe       | 0.43     | 0.44         | 0.3              | **1.02** |
|               |              | FastText    | 0.85     | 0.85         | 0.81             | 1        |
|               |              | BERT        | 0.43     | 0.25         | 0                | 0.58     |
|               | CNN          | /           | 1        | 0            | 1                | 1        |
|               |              | GloVe       | 1        | 1            | 1                | 1        |
|               |              | FastText    | 1        | 0            | 1                | 1        |
|               |              | BERT        | 0.25     | 0.2          | 0.1              | 0.8      |
|               | Self-attention | /        | 0.43     | 0.43         | 0.43             | 1        |
|               |              | GloVe       | 1        | 1            | 1                | 1        |
|               |              | FastText    | 1        | 1            | 1                | 1        |
|               |              | BERT        | 0.16     | 0.15         | 0                | 0.94     |
|               | LSTM         | /           | 0.55     | 0.26         | 1                | **1.82** |
|               |              | GloVe       | 0.81     | 0.89         | 0.13             | 1.1      |
|               |              | FastText    | 0.58     | 0.4          | 0.24             | 0.69     |
|               |              | BERT        | 0.16     | 0.14         | 0.05             | 0.88     |
|               | CNN          | /           | 1        | 0            | 0                | 0        |
|               |              | GloVe       | 0.91     | 0            | 0.37             | 0.41     |
|               |              | FastText    | 1        | 0            | 0.98             | 0.98     |
|               |              | BERT        | 0.24     | 0.14         | 0.02             | 0.58     |
|               | Self-attention | /        | 0.15     | 0.15         | 0                | 1        |
|               |              | GloVe       | 0.97     | 0.97         | 0.68             | 1        |
|               |              | FastText    | 0.98     | 0.98         | 0                | 1        |
|               |              | BERT        | 0.1      | 0.07         | 0.03             | 0.7      |
|               | LSTM         | /           | 0.3      | 0.3          | 0.3              | 1        |
|               |              | GloVe       | 0.3      | 0.18         | 0                | 0.6      |
|               |              | FastText    | 0.2      | 0.2          | 0.2              | 1        |
|               |              | BERT        | 0        | 0            | 0                | /        |
|               | CNN          | /           | 1        | 1            | 1                | **1.03** |
|               |              | GloVe       | 0.88     | 0.91         | 0.41             | 1.03     |
|               |              | FastText    | 1        | 0.98         | 1                | 0.98     |
|               |              | BERT        | 0.04     | 0.06         | 0                | 1.5      |
|               | Self-attention | /       | 0.02     | 0.01         | 0                | 0.5      |
|               |              | GloVe       | 0        | 0            | 0                | /        |
|               |              | FastText    | 0.1      | 0.38         | 0.13             | **3.8**  |
|               |              | BERT        | 0        | 0            | 0                | /        |

Table 1: Attack success rates on different NLP models. One targeted class is selected to attack for each task: "negative" class for SST-2, Yelp, "Business" class for AG-News. The baseline attack refers to Wallace et al. (2019), while the DFAG (smooth) and DFAG (integrated) attacks use the smooth noise and path method. We use the ASR ratio of the DFAG attack to the baseline attack to measure the effectiveness of our DFAG attacks. The **numbers in bold** indicate that our DFAG attacks are more effective than the baseline. The ratios of less than 0.5 are marked in the **italics and underlining**, which indicate that our DFAG attacks are much less effective than the baseline.

**Model architectures.** We use three classical neural networks as the text classifiers.

- LSTM: Two-layer LSTM with 512 hidden dimensions. We take the final hidden state of the last time step for fully connected and softmax
layers to compute the probability distribution of all the classes.

- **CNN** (Zhang and Wallace, 2017): Four 1-dimensional convolution layers with filter sizes (2, 3, 4, 5) respectively. Each layer has six filters and is followed by the ReLU activation function and max-pooling layers. Therefore, the total output dimension is 24.

- **Self-attention**: One self-attention layer where we set 5 parallel attention heads (Vaswani et al., 2017) followed by a self-attentive pooling layer (McCann et al., 2017).

**Pre-trained embeddings.** We use static word embeddings GloVe (Pennington et al., 2014), FastText (Mikolov et al., 2018) and the contextualized embeddings from the last hidden layer of the pre-trained language model BERT (Devlin et al., 2018). The pre-trained embeddings can then be fed into the text classifiers. GloVe and FastText have different designs for obtaining word embeddings. GloVe embeddings are trained on a word co-occurrence matrix using a log-bilinear function where any pairs of word vectors are bilinearly mapped into the co-occurrence counts, while FastText embeddings are obtained by training a skip-gram model on word pairs from negative sampling.

All the pre-trained parameters are fixed without fine-tuning, as we aim to separate the vulnerability of the pre-trained embeddings from that of the model architectures and training. Specifically, we want to avoid propagating the information of the training data into pre-trained parameters, which would benefit the analyses of pre-trained embeddings and training data artifacts. In addition, when models use BERT embeddings with LSTM or CNN for classification, self-attention building blocks of BERT could interfere with our evaluation of architectures.

**Training hyperparameters.** We train all the models with the Adam optimizer, learning rate 5e-5, and batch size 64. The maximum number of training epochs is set to 5, and early stopping would occur when the validation accuracy has no improvement for one epoch.

**3.2 Attack Setup**

**Attack hyperparameters.** We select the first example from the attack data used by the baseline and then update the UATs in a maximum of 10 iterations with an early stop if there is no decrease of the loss $L_{adv}$ for more than three iterations. We generate ten pseudo-samples during each iteration. The standard deviation of Gaussian noise is set as 0.01.

**Constraints of substitution tokens.** The vocabulary of BERT models has been built along with its pre-trained tasks, whereas we construct the word-level vocabulary from the training data for other models. Since sentiment words have strong indications for sentiment classification, sentiment words are filtered out following the practice in Wallace et al. (2019). In addition, our test examples are restricted to long sequences (>10 words) to preserve semantics to a large extent. BERT employs word-piece segmentation to process textual data into a sequence of sub-word units. However, when one or more sub-word are selected as the UAT tokens, the input may be re-segmented into a different sequence, such as the sub-word "##oot" which would be re-segmented into "#" "o" and "##ot". Our experiment shows that the word-level attack achieves similar performance, and tokens in the word unit cover 76.6% tokens in the BERT vocabulary. Therefore, we only consider substitution tokens in the word units to avoid the re-segmentation issue. The word-level substitutions also prevent that sub-words in UATs become unknown words during the UAT transfer attack.

**Evaluation.** We calculate Attack Success Rate (ASR) to measure the performance of the attack: the percentage of examples that are misclassified by the model as the targeted class among all the evaluation samples. We select evaluation examples that do not belong to the targeted class from the original test data.

**3.3 Experimental Results**

We first empirically verify the effectiveness of our attack on three neural network architectures, then evaluate the vulnerability of pre-trained embeddings via UAT transfer attacks.

**Attack effectiveness.** As shown in Table 1, our DFAG attacks with smooth gradients achieve competitive results on LSTM and self-attention models to the baseline. Moreover, the DFAG (Integrated) attack always performs better on CNN models, except the GloVe-CNN model on AG-News. Note that this finding does not involve BERT-based
models since BERT composes of multi-head self-attention layers.

To quantify how much effectiveness our DFAG attacks achieve relative to the baseline attack, we also report the ASR ratio of our DFAG attack to the baseline, i.e.,

\[
\frac{\text{ASR of the DFAG}}{\text{ASR of the baseline}}
\]

Here, we choose the better one between the two DFAG attacks. It shows that our DFAG attacks achieve more than 50% effectiveness of the baseline in most cases. An ASR ratio of more than 1 indicates that our DFAG (Smooth) attack even outperforms the baseline on several models. Note that our DFAG attacks are proposed to more easily and efficiently examine the vulnerability of NLP models to universal adversaries, rather than competing the ASR with existing attacks.

**Failure cases on CNN models.** Both DFAG attacks exhibit low success rates against CNN models on the Yelp dataset. By contrast, the baseline attack achieves nearly 100% success rates on all CNN models, where only the GloVe embeddings drop around 10% success rates on Yelp and AG-News datasets. This marks some failure cases of our DFAG attacks.

**Comparing UATs generated by the baseline and our DFAG attacks.** By comparing the UATs, we find that they actually generate many overlapped UAT tokens, especially for SST-2 models, as shown in Table 3. We suspect that the low overlap rates for AG_News and Yelp models are due to their large vocabulary sizes.

**The vulnerability of pre-trained embeddings.** As shown in Table 1, the use of pre-trained word embeddings sometimes makes the models more vulnerable, especially for self-attention models. This counter-intuitive result indicates the existence of embedding vulnerabilities in pre-trained embeddings. Our UAT transfer attacks also confirm the vulnerability of pre-trained embeddings. The result in Table 2 shows that UATs tend to achieve the best transferability on models with the same pre-trained embeddings. This phenomenon is also observed for BERT, although the success rate drops.

**Measuring UAT transfer attacks.** The absolute transfer ASR is not suitable to measure transferability because vulnerable models tend to have low ASRs. Therefore, in Table 2, we normalize the absolute transfer ASR by dividing by the original ASR of the victim model. The higher the normalized ASR the more transferable the UATs are to the target models (columns of Table 2). Take the first row as an example: the absolute transfer ASR of the BERT-LSTM model is only 0.06, while the vulnerable models always have higher ASRs. The normalized ASRs remove the effect of the varying vulnerabilities of the target models since it would amplify the absolute transfer ASR for the robust models, causing the value for BERT-LSTM from 0.06 to 0.44 (0.06 dividing by 0.14).

### 3.4 Training Data Artifacts in UATs

Training data artifacts are hypothesis words that are highly correlated with the labels. The artifacts have been explored by neural NLP models as the shallow shortcut and spurious correlations for the predictions (Gururangan et al., 2018; Branco et al., 2021). Wallace et al. (2019) argues that effective UATs for Natural Language Inference (NLI) models expose training data artifacts. Through our analyses, we further prove that training data artifacts should be attributed to the existence of UATs. Interestingly, we also find that the self-attention architecture provides certain robustness to such training data artifacts.

**Measuring training data artifacts of UATs.** We follow Gururangan et al. (2018); Wallace et al. (2019) and compute the point-wise mutual information (PMI) between each word \(w\) and the targeted class \(\tilde{y}\) as:

\[
\text{PMI}(w, \tilde{y}) = \log \frac{p(w, \tilde{y})}{p(w)p(\tilde{y})}
\]

The denominator is the expected probability of the word \(w\) appearing in class \(\tilde{y}\). The numerator is the observed probability. PMI measures how much more the word \(w\) occurs in the targeted class than we expect. We measure the training data artifacts of UAT words by their PMI ranks. We rank all the words according to their PMI scores in descending order. Then, the high-rank words show a high correlation with the targeted class, i.e., indicating training data artifacts. We also measure the frequency of each trigger word (i.e., the frequency in a particular class vs. the total frequency) because PMI would amplify words with low frequency.

**Self-attention is robust to training data artifacts.** The training data artifacts are highly reflected on UATs generated for CNN and LSTM.
| Dataset | FastText | GloVe | BERT |
|---------|----------|-------|------|
|         | LSTM | CNN | Self-Attention | LSTM | CNN | Self-Attention | LSTM | CNN | Self-Attention |
| FastText-LSTM | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.42 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.05 | 0.44 | 0.08 | 0 | 0.05 | 0.44 | 0.08 | 0 |
| SST | 1 | 1 | 0.93 | 0.7 | 0.91 | 1 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| GloVe-LSTM | 0.31 | 0.07 | 0 | 1.0 | 0.31 | 0.73 | 0 | 0.43 | 0.08 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SST | 0.96 | 1 | 0.82 | 1.0 | 0.96 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| BERT-LSTM | 0.08 | 0.1 | 0.02 | 0.37 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 1 | 0.67 | 0.7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SST | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.05 | 0.0 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 1 | 1.16 | 1.56 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 2: The vulnerability of pre-trained embeddings is reflected by the UAT transfer attack. Rows: Each row represents the source models on which the UATs are generated. Columns: each column specifies a target model of the transfer attack. For example, the first row of the second column demonstrates the normalized ASR when we apply UATs generated on the FastText-LSTM model to the FastText-CNN model.

| Dataset | Overlap Rates | Total Tokens | Overlap Tokens | Vocabulary Size |
|---------|---------------|--------------|----------------|-----------------|
| SST-2   | 76%           | 21           | 16             | 17,356          |
| AG-News | 33%           | 6            | 2              | 114,068         |
| Yelp    | 12%           | 8            | 1              | 746,663         |

Table 3: Overlap rates of the UATs generated by the baseline and our DFAG attacks.

models, while self-attention models generate UATs with low training data artifacts. The result is shown in Table 4. In order to verify the robustness of self-attention models to training data artifacts, the top 5 tokens with high training data artifacts are manually selected to evaluate the LSTM, CNN, and self-attention models. Only the self-attention model shows 0 attack success rates, as can be inferred from Table 5. The robustness of self-attention models may be attributed to their contextualized token representations: each token is represented by attending all the input tokens based on the attention scores. This type of architectures prevents the model from leveraging shallow shortcuts (class-wise triggers) for predictions.

4 Related Work

Universal adversarial perturbations. Behjati et al. (2019); Wallace et al. (2019); Song et al. (2021) generated the input-agnostic perturbations of text for NLP models. These works follow the initial work (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017) of finding Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs) for images. Compared to the instance-specific adversarial perturbations (Liang et al., 2018; Ebrahimi et al., 2018b,a; Li et al., 2020), UAPs is a more severe security issue (Ribeiro et al., 2020). Behjati et al. (2019) employed projected gradient descent for devising UATs. Wallace et al. (2019) followed the linear approximation to generate adversarial text (Ebrahimi et al., 2018b) to generate UATs, which converges faster than Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). Song et al. (2021) generated natural UATs with less grammatical errors and more fluency via Adversarially Regularized Auto Encoder (ARAE). In this paper, we refer to the gradient approximation method. The original idea was proposed by Ebrahimi et al. (2018b) called Hotflip and then utilized by Wallace et al. (2019) to generate universal triggers.

Gradient x Embedding scores for model interpretation. The first-order Taylor approach and Gradient x Embedding scores are also used to generate the saliency map in the field of model interpretation (Sundararajan et al., 2017; Li et al., 2016; Smilkov et al., 2017). However, they aim to attribute the softmax output of a neural network to input features while we identify the important words for substitutions in terms of adversarial loss $L_{adv}$. Hence, the gradient is calculated for the output logits of the correct class rather than the adversarial loss, and also they use the embeddings of the original input instead of substitution words.

Adversarial transferability. Empirical study also mentioned the transferability of universal adversarial perturbations (UAPs) across models with distinguished architectures and pre-trained modules, such as image adversaries from VGG-19 to GoogleLeNet (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017) or ResNets to other networks (Wu et al., 2020), and adversarial texts from GloVe-based Reading Comprehension models to ELMo-based models. In terms of explanations for adversarial transferability, Liang
et al. (2020) proved its correlation with knowledge transferability, which relates to pre-trained knowledge. Also, adversarial transferability between imitated models and victim models (Wallace et al., 2020; He et al., 2021) also enhanced the relationship between pre-trained, transferable knowledge and adversarial transferability. These works motivate us to study the effect of pre-trained embeddings via the UAT transfer attack. Yuan et al. (2021) also studies the transferability of different architectures and pre-trained modules. Different from our study, they generate the sample-wise adversarial texts. Interestingly, they achieve an opposite conclusion that architecture types are more sensitive than pre-trained embeddings to transfer attacks.

5 Conclusion

In this work, we investigated the vulnerability of Natural Language Processing (NLP) models to Universal Adversarial Texts (UATs). We proposed two types of Data-Free Adjusted Gradient (DFAG) attacks which can generate effective UATs without real data. Our DFAG attacks lower the requirement of using UATs to understand the vulnerability of NLP models. With DFAG-generated UATs, we found that the robustness of self-attention to words with training data artifacts and revealed the unique (transferable) vulnerability of pre-trained embeddings. Our findings could help build robust NLP models against adversarial attacks. Future work could expose whether the pre-trained vulnerability

| Tokens   | Models    | Frequencies | PMI Ranks |
|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| "appears"   | LSTM      | 11.0 / 11.0 | 3664      |
| "Feels"     | CNN       | 12.0 / 12.0 | 3665      |
| "Lawrence"  | CNN       | 11.0 / 12.0 | 4747      |
| "pleasurable" | Self-Attention | 0.0 / 4.0 | 17181     |
| "unique"    | LSTM      | 13.0 / 14.0 | 4990      |
| "refreshingly" | CNN          | 10.0 / 10.0 | 4305      |
| "mess"      | Self-Attention | 1.0 / 30.0 | 15939     |

(a) SST-2

| Tokens   | Models    | Frequencies | PMI Ranks |
|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| "quickinfo" | LSTM      | 1813.0 / 1813.0 | 13250     |
| "Qtr"     | LSTM      | 62.0 / 63.0  | 15777     |
| "hellip"  | LSTM,CNN  | 80.0 / 80.0  | 13187     |
| "Spitzer" | CNN       | 220.0 / 238.0 | 16114     |

(b) AG-News

As shown in Table 1, self-attention models are robust to UATs. Therefore, there are no effective UATs listed for self-attention models.

| Tokens   | Models    | Frequencies | PMI Ranks |
|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| "giving" | LSTM      | 8184.0 / 12057.0 | 338822   |
| "Horrible" | LSTM     | 4136.0 / 4158.0 | 311571   |
| "inedible" | LSTM     | 2035.0 / 2108.0 | 311733   |
| "Slowest" | CNN      | 117.0 / 117.0   | 311557   |
| "BUYER"  | CNN       | 97.0 / 97.0     | 309895   |
| "disrespected" | CNN     | 216.0 / 217.0   | 311570   |
| "restrain" | Attention | 8.0 / 41.0     | 735421   |

(c) Yelp

Table 4: Training data artifacts of UAT tokens. Frequencies: In-class frequencies are displayed relatively to the total frequencies.
Table 5: Evaluating the performance of SST models with the top-5 words out of the whole vocabulary according to their PMI ranks.

| PMI Ranks | Models | ASR |
|-----------|--------|-----|
| 1         | LSTM   | 0.2 |
|           | CNN    | 0.1 |
|           | Self-Attention | 0 |
| 2         | LSTM   | 0.1 |
|           | CNN    | 0.1 |
|           | Self-Attention | 0 |
| 3         | LSTM   | 0.1 |
|           | CNN    | 0.1 |
|           | Self-Attention | 0 |
| 4         | LSTM   | 0.2 |
|           | CNN    | 0.4 |
|           | Self-Attention | 0 |
| 5         | LSTM   | 0.2 |
|           | CNN    | 0.5 |
|           | Self-Attention | 0 |

could make UATs transferable across different NLP tasks. Moreover, our result should also be verified on large-scale models. More detailed analyses of different filter sizes and attention heads are also interesting future works.

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