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Evolving Strategies at Reconciliation:
Inter-Korean Sports and Music Diplomacy in Historical Perspective

Peter Moody, Columbia University

Abstract
While sports and music diplomacy between North Korea and South Korea in 2018 revived hopes for peace and reconciliation, it is not so clear what impact exchanges like these have over the long term. This paper traces the historical context of inter-Korean music and sports ventures examining the motivations and reception of them in each half. It argues that sustained music and sports interactions between the Koreas have moved gradually yet decisively towards mutual accommodation. Nevertheless, there is some ambiguity regarding the simultaneous objectives of reaching out to the other side and legitimizing one's own political system.

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Introduction
In his 2018 New Year Speech, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un responded positively to an invitation from South Korea and the International Olympic Committee to participate in the Olympics in South Korea and form an inter-Korean women’s ice hockey team. Moreover, as part of its participation in the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, North Korea dispatched its 137-member Samjiyeon Orchestra to South Korea. The performance troupe began with the song “Nice to Meet You,” dazzled the audience through a repertoire of nearly as many South Korean songs as North Korean ones and finished with a heartwarming and familiar tune “See You Again.” By the end of the concert, a good portion of the audience was in tears, including people who were alive at the time of the Korean War. Following the North’s dispatch of Samjiyeon Orchestra concerts to the South, the South returned the favor by sending South Korean K-Pop groups and Korean singers to the North for two reciprocal concerts in April 2018 with the name “Spring is Coming.” Later in the same month, the two heads of state, Moon Jae-in of the South and Kim Jong Un of the North, met at the border to sign the Panmunjom declaration, signaling a new era of peace and joint prosperity.
Nearly two years later, with relations between North Korea and South Korea not entirely hostile but at an impasse, it is worth re-examining the significance of this cultural diplomatic initiative. This diplomatic overture involving sports and music diplomacy resulted in the first high-level talks since 2015, the first North and South Korean leader summit since 2007, and the first time ever the North Korean and South Korean leaders met at the DMZ (demilitarized zone between North and South Korea). Still, it was not an initiative that came out of nowhere. Since 1985, the two Korean governments have held joint events involving sports and/or music events even if at times in an irregular and/or unpredictable fashion. In order to anticipate the role sports and music initiatives will play on inter-Korean relations in the future, it is important to investigate how this kind of diplomacy first came about, what has characterized it since, and what it has meant in terms of a larger historical phenomenon.

Accordingly, this paper traces the heartening yet tumultuous path of sports and music diplomacy between North Korea and South Korea in order to investigate how conducive the exchanges have been towards reconciliation between the two states. Taking into account the motivations of the two Korean states, it argues that when it comes to music and sports exchange, there has been a gradual yet decisive move towards mutual accommodation as each state respectively has utilized these exchanges for its domestic and international policy objectives. Nevertheless, there is some ambiguity regarding the somewhat contradictory objectives music and sports diplomacy have of reaching out to the other side and legitimizing one’s own respective system.

With all the interactions between North and South Koreans (state-sanctioned or otherwise) what makes a sports and music together a useful topic for analysis? The justifications for such an inquiry can be thought of as both historical and thematic. On the historical level, the two have accompanied each other on the stage of inter-Korean relations in that an act of diplomacy in one area has frequently triggered or involved diplomacy in the other and vice versa. On the thematic level, music and sports are both tools on the international stage for national legitimacy. As Prévost-Thomas and Ramel (2018) say about music, it can provide “resources for reputation” and can help nations brand themselves, i.e. “craft an image for a person, a group or a nation state to be acknowledged” (Gienow-Hecht, 2018). This point about music is nearly identical to Cha’s (2009) emphasis on sports as soft power when he states, “in some cases a positive reputation in sport can augment a country’s global status and position on the world stage” (46). Additionally, sports and music both involve an act of “performance” in real time. While “performance” commonly refers to showcasing talent to entertain an audience, it has a literal meaning of ‘form to a great degree’ (Prévost-Thomas and Ramel, 2018). For music, this process of “really form”ing can involve establishing human relationships and creating partnerships among diverse groups of actors based on shared affinities for or emotional connections to pieces of music. For sports, this can involve stirring emotion on a mass scale which can contribute to social solidarity and can be instrumental to processes of nation-building (Cha, 2008).
In the case of North and South Korea, the story of music and sports diplomacy begins with a period of Sunrise (1985-1993) when music and sports exchange took place alongside diplomatic overtures, namely the 1985 reunion of families separated by the Korean War. In this period, sports and music initiatives were sporadic and contentious. Then there is the Sunshine policy and period (2000-2007) when there were persistent efforts at sports and music diplomacy largely following diplomatic breakthrough but with mixed results. Finally, there is the era of Moonshine (2018-) in which Sports and Music Diplomacy initiated diplomatic breakthrough. The reason I use the word Moonshine is not to ridicule it but to show how it went against conventional wisdom and at the same time has served as a glimmer of hope in what was previously a hostile and tense environment for any kind of diplomatic exchange. It has thus been characterized by its sense of urgency and spontaneous nature.

Previous Research on Sports and Music Diplomacy

Sports diplomacy is a topic that has received a great deal of attention in the disciplines of political science and sociology, particularly in the last decade. Much of the literature begins with a look at the Ping-Pong diplomacy between China and the United States. Kobierecki (2016), who considers sports contact as a way to achieve diplomatic breakthrough when other channels of communication are limited or nonexistent, has highlighted the motivations for each respective side during the Ping-Pong diplomacy initiative, namely that the Chinese side wanted to join the UN and deter the Soviet Union while the US side wanted to strengthen its position in the Cold War and thought that it could not afford to have the people of the most populous country in the world “live in angry isolation.” Believing that this Ping-Pong diplomacy succeeded in paving the way towards normalization between the two countries, Kobierecki further outlines out how it “sparked imaginations” for how sports could be used for diplomacy for both the United States and China.

While several works have referred to sports diplomacy in the context of improving relations between North and South Korea, there have been only a few scholars that have discussed in detail how that process has played out. Among those scholars is Merkel (2008) who describes how both North and South Korea have cooperated in Pan-Korea sports endeavors to meet a number of objectives, some of them contradictory. He sees utility in inter-Korean sports diplomacy in that it keeps the idea of reunification in the mind of the public without having to constantly engage in complex diplomatic procedures. Merkel elaborates on this point in another article (2012) by stating “although marching together at international sports events, exchanges and unification matches are not a cure for political tensions, animosities and conflicts between the two Koreas..., these emotional displays and celebrations of Pan-Korean unity help promote detente between the Koreas” while at the same time demonstrating that “nationalist and global forces can indeed be compatible and do not have to be contradictory” (522).
One question left unresolved in articles on inter-Korean sports diplomacy is how effective these exchanges have been in facilitating political developments. Lee and Maguire (2011) note how positively the North was portrayed by the South during the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, arguing that this strengthened a sense of “unitary Korean nationalism”; at the same time, they detect a gap between this sports nationalism and political nationalism that would truly lead to reconciliation. In a more recent work, Min and Choi (2018) conclude that the legacy of sports diplomacy between the North and South has been limited. They do not see sports diplomacy as a magic bullet solution nor do they see Ping-Pong diplomacy between the US and China as a useful comparison to the North-South relations on the Korean peninsula because in the former case, there was already a political foundation in place first. Nevertheless, the two authors leave the door open to success in the future by recommending the creation of a cooperative body to facilitate sports diplomacy and help it succeed.

Similar to the case of sports, music diplomacy has been a topic of interest that has peaked in recent years, and scholars focusing on it have highlighted the Cold War period. In place of Ping-Pong diplomacy as a formative event is the initiative of Jazz ambassadors, which began in the mid-1950s at the behest of the US State Department to project an alternative image of the United States as a means of soft power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Authors who have tracked this phenomenon include Dunkel and Nitzsche (2019) who demonstrate how jazz diplomacy between the United States and Soviet Union was not simply notable for its coordination but also for its competition among stakeholders (both state and nonstate) to shape the narrative of what precisely the event’s significance “emphasizing their own achievements and sidelining the contributions of the other” (17). Likewise, Mikkonen and Suutari (2016) trace how during the Cold War, the artists involved in music and other forms of cultural exchange made use of the exchanges for their own individual purposes at the same time states exploited the arts for political purposes. Prévost-Thomas and Ramel (2018) see the topic as a way to extend the analysis of diplomacy beyond state actors to those who may have cosmopolitan objectives beyond the mere national interest. This pluralistic perspective regarding musical diplomacy intersects with Merkel’s (2008) analysis of inter-Korean sports. Merkel sees the pluralistic framework most helpful for understanding how repeated encounters and cooperation through sports are part of each respective side’s calculus to achieve security and self-preservation.

While there has been a dearth of English-language scholarship on music diplomacy efforts on the Korean peninsula, a few articles have provided a micro-perspective on the role of non-state actors, unification activists in particular. The most frequently brought-up non-state actor is the Korean composer Yun I-sang who was from South Korea but became a citizen of West Germany following political persecution by the Park Chung Hee government. While a West German citizen, Yun periodically visited North Korea and was the impetus behind a joint North-South Korean concert for unification in the 1990s. Howard (2010), in addition to covering the above music exchange and others in the 1990s, provides a fascinating portrayal of what the Korean soundscape was like before the division of the peninsula and what the function
and development of North Korean music has been. Howard’s work raises a number of questions relating to what role music might play in the eventual unification of the Korean peninsula. Even if it leaves us without a firm conclusion regarding the prospects of music diplomacy in the future, it is helpful for understanding the divergences as well as some unexpected convergences in music practices across the DMZ.

This work is different in that it largely limits the analysis to state-to-state official music exchanges while adding the sports dimension; however, it is not the first work in the English language to consider Pan-Korean sports and music ventures alongside each other. Jonsson (2006) has previously filled that gap in the scholarship by contributing an extremely comprehensive work on North-South Korean encounters in various areas: athletic, artistic, academic, environmental, economic, and religious. However, by putting all of these interactions under the somewhat ambiguous label of “socio-cultural exchanges and cooperation,” Jonsson leaves little room to zero-in on a particular interaction and/or time period and its legacy. Moreover, by putting the majority of his attention on the relationship between socio-cultural exchanges and the prospects for unification (using the cases of Germany and Yemen as comparative scenarios), Jonsson creates a limited metric for how the legacy of sports and music diplomacy can be ascertained. For this article, the potential for progress on other fronts such as the opening up of more channels of communication and a general reduction of tensions will be more the focus more than unification.

**Method: Descriptive History as Opposed to Best Practices for Statecraft**

Because of the characteristics that music and sports diplomacy share and because the two have established a firm footing as research areas, now is an appropriate time to bring them into the same conversation (particularly when the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, which involved both, is still fresh in people’s minds). One can find an opportunity to apply insights from one research area to the other in the work *Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia* (2009), which is one of the most comprehensive works on the relationship between sports and international politics. The author, Victor Cha, who worked on North Korean issues for President George W. Bush and almost became the US ambassador to South Korea (before clashing with the Trump administration over its once consideration to launch a limited preemptive strike on North Korea), offers a unique insider’s view of sports diplomacy and even includes an episode in music diplomacy that he personally was part of: the 2008 visit of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra to Pyongyang and its performance there.¹

In a section titled “Greasing the Wheels,” Cha discusses the lubricating function of sports diplomacy (that can easily be extended to music diplomacy) as a “facilitating condition rather than a specific cause of diplomatic breakthroughs. He emphasizes timing as the critical factor that determines the efficacy of the sporting initiative. As he argues, “it can create momentum...once the underlying conditions are right.... Should the sporting event come before
any groundwork has been laid, then it won’t be nearly as effective” (73). Cha’s interpretation brings to mind a complex machine in which every gear has to be in place for the diplomacy engine to roar and have its intended effect. As a former official, he takes a prescriptive approach, portraying sports diplomacy as a tool or bargaining chip in the foreign policy arena with a predictable outcome more so than something that may be subject to variability due to local circumstances and historical contingency.

By engaging in historical narrative and content analysis of media released at the time of sports and music events, this work seeks to depict a more complex and comprehensive picture of inter-Korean sports and music exchanges than what previous researchers have offered. While conceding to Cha’s point that sports diplomacy is not a panacea, it questions his implication that sports (or music) diplomacy can only be effective under an already favorable diplomatic climate. For one thing, the most recent sports and music diplomacy initiative between the Koreas in 2018 did not wait for this kind of groundwork to be laid. In fact, one could argue that it turned Cha’s assumption on its head because sports and music exchange preceded diplomatic breakthrough rather than followed it. While not exactly dodging the question of effectiveness, this paper is aimed more at the historically descriptive than the policy prescriptive. It thus seeks to avoid blanket-statement policy recommendations such as that given by Abdi et al. (2018:366) who echo Cha by arguing that “states can expect diplomatic outcomes if appropriate sports diplomacy resources and conversion strategies are implemented in an orderly, innovative and accurate manner.”

This paper is, however, in concordance with another one of Cha’s points: namely his notion of sports diplomacy as a useful barometer for public officials. Cha sees utility in a diplomatic sports venture as a “barometer of public opinion” (73) that can enable officials to gauge whether or not a future diplomatic effort will be worth the effort. Sometimes it is difficult if not impossible to anticipate just how the public will respond to diplomacy efforts, and that may be a good reason for attempting cultural diplomacy in the first place. The public reaction to joint sporting and music events can be instructive not only for the official engaged in diplomacy but also for the outside observer covering them. As such, this article will include a look at their reception in the North as well as South Korea. Although public opinion polling is not possible in North Korea at this time, a look at how they are represented (and/or concealed) in media outlets there will give some indication of how the state wants them to be viewed and what the public window into them has been.²

Sunrise (1985-1991)

In the first 40 years of Korean division (1945-1984), the outlook for sports and music exchanges on a state-to-state level was dark, nearly a blackout. In the realm of sports however, there were attempts to bring some kind of North/South sports joint endeavor into fruition. From the time the International Olympic Committee (IOC) first conferred provisional recognition to the North
Korea National Olympic Committee (NOC) in 1963, there were repeated meetings between the North and South to discuss the possibility of forming a united sports team to send to the Olympics (Merkel 2008). With no agreement on when or how that would happen, however, both states sent separate teams from then on.

The state of state-sanctioned music exchange between the North and South in the first 40 years since division was similarly bleak. Not only were there restrictions on mutual interactions and consumption of cultural products from each respective side (many of which remain until the present day), there was virtually no study of North Korean music in the South and vice versa (Bae, 2018). However, the theme of unification of the homeland (joguk tongil) was a resource for each state to procure internal legitimacy and this sometimes manifested itself in music. In 1965, for instance, in an effort to spur workers into fulfilling the 7-year economic plan, the Pyongyang College Music College held a Unification of the Homeland Concert that featured works of music about what was characterized as the struggle of the South Korean people in resisting America and the Park Chung-hee administration (*Rodong Sinmun*, 1965).

The prospects for inter-Korean music began to change in the mid-1980s when following a flood in the Han River in 1984, the North offered to send disaster aid to the South through its Red Cross organization. The coordination that this flood relief offer involved opened a channel of communication, through which the North and South used the following year to implement a reunion of separated families from the Korean War and an arts exchange of music and dance performances. Remarkably, the initiative got off the ground quickly, and in September of 1985, there was a family reunion and joint performance in Pyongyang and a parallel performance in Seoul in December of the same year.

Despite the success in the launch of this historic and for many a long-awaited music exchange, the reception of the other Korea’s performances in both the North and South was not entirely positive. Much of the dance and music performances were nominally “traditional” and/or “national,” but the events proved that these words could mean quite different things for people who had been culturally separated for so long and under different systems of governments and ideological orientations. For the North, the notion of national or minjok music meant ridding the past music of its feudal and colonial vestiges and updating it in a way that could be appreciated and digested by modern audiences. For the South music of the nation largely meant preservation of past music but with individual expression mixed in (Bae, 2018). Below we have two perspectives from the time period that demonstrate how the cultural exchange resulted not so much in mutual understanding and Pan-Korean solidarity but instead in expressions of antagonism and superiority:
Perspective from North Korea

It was a pitiful sight to see the people of the Seoul troupe who made that awful noise of hybrid music that was disorderly and insulted our elegant national music yet was somehow called “traditional music.”

Bak U-yeong
Pyongyang College of Music and Dance Professor
(Bak, 1986)

Perspective from South Korea

The North Koreans also gave two performances at the Seoul National Theater. The North Korea performance demonstrated for the most part that they have not preserved Korean traditions and have sacrificed humanity for uniformity.3

(KTV, 2018)

For sports, the situation was even more hostile with the North and South clashing over the circumstances surrounding the 1988 Summer Olympics for which the International Olympic Committee (IOC) selected Seoul as the host. As Radchenko (2011) outlines through a thorough look at diplomatic reports, the games were “a fork in the road for the Korean Peninsula” between a road to repaired relations and a continued, contentious struggle for international legitimacy. Sensing the threat that the Seoul Olympics posed to their plight for securing legitimacy, the North first proposed that the Olympics be held jointly in the North and South with an equal number of events in each state. When the IOC only offered North Korea the right to march together with the South in the opening ceremony and the opportunity to participate in cultural activities, the North was not impressed and suggested that violence could break out in Seoul during the Olympics if its demands were not met. This led to a series of discussions between the IOC and North Korea, and the two sides almost agreed to have the North host 2-3 sports. However, the Pyongyang side miscalculated that China and the Soviet bloc would back up its attempt to secure better terms, and the negotiations ended up breaking down. Then the North sought to sabotage the South’s hosting of the games by bombing Korean Air flight 858 in November of 1987 but stopped short of doing anything dramatic during the Olympic Games themselves. In the end, the North was left with only Cuba and Ethiopia to join its united front to boycott the Seoul Olympics.

While the 1988 Seoul Olympics were a failure in inter-Korean sports diplomacy, they were a vital resource for the South’s reputation internationally; the resulting confidence of the South Korean government combined with its need to rehabilitate its image domestically (from incidents of political oppression during the 1980s) resulted in a series of liberalizing reforms, including the lifting of the ban on the works of wolbuk jakka or the writers and artists who had gone to North Korea shortly after liberation or during the Korean War. As Bae (2018) reveals, this degree of openness led to the full-scale research of North Korean music in the South. By February of 1990, the South Korean government’s passing of the Five Principles of Inte-Korean Exchange had set up an Inter-Korean Cultural Exchange Cooperation Promotion which provided a window of opportunity for the first big music exchange event since 1985: The Pan-National Unification Concert in October of 1990.
This endeavor involved ethnic Koreans from all over the world performing in six joint concerts in North Korean performance halls. In this case, it was non-governmental actors such as the Hwang Byungki (South Korean gayageum player, composer, and Ewha University professor) and Yun I-sang (composer who was at this time a German national but frequent visitor to the North) who took the leading roles in facilitating the event. The media reports on the event from the North and South struck a much more conciliatory tone that that of 1985:

| Perspective from North Korea | Perspective from South Korea |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Embracing the four principles and five policies of unification that the Great Leader Kim Il Sung presented, our people can hardly contain our joy as we make the 1990s shine as the decade of unification and open the Pan-National Unification concert in Pyongyang at a time when the wish for unification of our fellow people is higher than it has ever been before. | The large-scale North Korean collective art has made the Seoul Traditional Music Performance members learn and feel a lot. The dramatic composition,...stage equipment, and lighting techniques...were something to learn from. |
| Yun I-sang, who has carried out the unification party beginning with music, launched the opening of this concert in Pyongyang, where musicians from the North and South as well as diaspora Koreans have gathered together. | Of course, many of North Korea's performances strongly represented the revolutionary ideology and the Juche idea, and the diaspora Koreans and South Korean traditional musicians had a variety of reactions to this. However, if you set aside the subject matter, there was a lot of points the South Korean artists could reference in terms of how the North Koreans set the stage. |
| The launching of the concert has ignited the unwavering support and empathy of the musicians from the North, South and abroad. | The concert has played a decisive role in opening up inter-Korean exchange that should continue. |
| *(Rodong Sinmun, 1990)* | *(JoongAng Ilbo, 1990)* |

One can note positive developments on the North Korean’s report side with the mention of the 1990s as a decade of unification, as we can see a signaling of a willingness to engage in these kinds of events over the long term. On the South Korean report’s side, we can see a similar desire for continuing the cultural exchange process as well as praise for North Korea’s stage equipment and the technological aspects of its performance. At the same time, we can detect some subtle jabs in the ongoing rivalry for superiority: the North Korean report conspicuously highlights Pyongyang as the center of this Pan-National Korean community gathering and the South Korean report places its side and that of the overseas Koreans in the same category when referring to an ambivalent reaction to North Korea’s revolutionary ideology as reflected in its performance.

Meanwhile there was already an initiative in sports diplomacy taking place, specifically the Inter-Korean Unification Soccer Matches. These games were held in Pyongyang on October 11 and Seoul on October 23. Similar to the initiation of Ping-Pong diplomacy between the United States and China, a sporting event in a third country (in this case the 1990 Asian Games
in Beijing) provided the opportunity for sports representatives to meet, and on September 22nd, the two sides held a press conference to announce it. A South Korean newspaper report prior to the Pyongyang soccer match and a North Korean newspaper report prior to the Seoul match noted the historical significance of these games but alluded to continued challenges with sports exchanges in regard to the continued competitive environment for legitimacy:

| Perspective from South Korea | Perspective from North Korea |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| According to the Ministry of Sports, 66 of our athletes, will arrive in Pyongyang at 11:40 am tomorrow and will stay at Pyongyang Koryo Hotel, where they will watch athlete training and the circus on the 10th. | So many laborers and athletes came out to the balcony and the stairs of the Panmun building’s balcony and stairs, waving flower bouquets and singing songs of unification as the athletes crossed over to the South. |
| Following this, we will return to Seoul through Panmunjom on the 13th after the first day of the historic unification soccer competition. | The farmers in the South who had been involved in the fall harvest stopped their work and waved to our athletes..... On a road in Bulgwang villages, 5-6 youth held placards, entered the streets, and were arrested by plainclothes police officers. There was also the appearance of citizens who welcomed our athletes while carrying maps of the blue united Korea and placards that said “Our homeland is one” but were blocked by police officers. |
| As for the TV broadcasting, our side requested live broadcasting but as North Korea insisted on recording it instead, we agreed to receive and broadcast international signals using live sound receiving international signals and filmed by the North. | Although there was no success in forming a united team, there has been success in this unification soccer match, and the coming and going from Pyongyang to Seoul is a happy occasion that will continue. |

(MBC News, 1990)  
(Rodong Sinmun, 1990)

The challenge the South Korean report raises is all too reminiscent of the most recent soccer exchange between North and South Korea: the October 15th, 2019 World Cup qualifying match in Pyongyang which in addition to not being broadcasted live, had no fans in the stadium. As for the North Korean report, regardless of whether or not the scene involving the police officers actually happened, the depiction of it here portrays cold South Korean state power standing in the way of North-South unification that people in the North and South were in support of. The fact that these matches were taking place concurrently with high level talks between the premiers of North and South Korea suggests that the reference to the obstructing police officers was a way for the North Korean government to deflect blame onto the South for the lack of political progress these talks were achieving.

Despite the lack of political agreement between the two premiers, the North and South Korea sides succeeded in agreeing to more rounds sports diplomacy that were more cooperative in nature: a joint North/South team at the World Table Tennis Championships in Chiba Japan from April to May of 1991 and a joint soccer team at the World Youth Soccer Championships
in June of 1991. For both of these endeavors, it was agreed that the name 코리아 or KOREA would be used (with KOR as the abbreviation) as the team name, the white flag with the blue Korean peninsula map as the team flag, and the beloved Korean song Arirang as the team song (Ministry of Unification, 1992). The youth men’s soccer team made it to the quarterfinals and the women’s table tennis team won the gold medal. TV news reports about the table tennis championship from the South and from a Pro-Pyongyang resident community in Japan were unambiguously positive and hopeful about the prospects for unification:

| Perspective from South Korea | Perspective from the Pro-Pyongyang Korean Resident Community in Japan |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| After 46 years of division, the North and South team under the name Korea participated together for the first time. Under the slogan of one mind, with utmost sincerity, they practiced together in Japan for one month. The support from the Ethnic-Koreans in Japan too resonated with one voice | North and South Korea have become one at the World Table Tennis Championships emerging as powerful contenders as Korea achieves victory. This is a historical moment that shows the people of the world the oneness of the homeland as well as the nation. |
| (National Archives of Korea, 1991) | (Chongryon Film Studio, 1991) |

Although there were restrictions on interactions between North and South Koreans during this time, the footage of Ethnic-Koreans in Japan (or Zainichi Koreans) loyal to either the North or South singing Arirang during the medal awards and in dancing/drumming circles outside gave the North and South Koreans on the peninsula a taste of what unification could look and sound like.

Another sign the cultural diplomacy was having an impact on transforming attitudes in both the North and South was the reception of the 1990 Year-end Unification Traditional Music Concert at the Seoul National Theater in December. Just as musicians from the South were invited to the North two months earlier, musicians from the North were invited to the South, and the focus was on traditional Korean music before the division. As Bae (2018) highlights, it was not hard to fill the theaters, and much of the response from the South Koreans was positive. There were comments about how the music was Western oriented but brought out the unique style and emotion of “our country,” the music was noted for embodying a modernization of tradition, and there was curiosity in the North’s invented instrument the 33-stringed okryugeum. The concert was also an opportunity for musicians from the North to be introduced to South Korea’s Sameul Nori, the four-percussion piece invented traditional music from, and percussion ensembles similar to Sameul Nori later appeared in the North as a result of this exchange (Bae, 2018).

Overall, this Sunrise period (1985-1991) for sports and music diplomacy between North and South Korea demonstrated an appetite for both cultural exchange and a reconciled relationship despite challenges in logistics, perceptions, and rival claims to legitimacy. While
not exactly precursors for political reconciliation, the fact that they took place alongside high-
level state talks suggests their utility in helping maintain support for political diplomatic
initiatives. As Howard (2010) points out, cultural events like the Pan-National Unification
Concert in the 1990s “functioned as a public statement to the citizens...that relationships were
changing and that there would be greater acceptance of each other” (75) moving forward.
Because of the frequent lack of political progress during this progress and the slowdown in
political as well as cultural interaction following North Korea’s eventual withdrawal from the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, it is easy to dismiss this early period of North-
South interaction as inconsequential. Nevertheless, the “mutual recognition of sovereignty”
sports and music diplomacy had to involve to some degree paved the way for the agreement
that allowed the two states to join the UN simultaneously in 1991 (Howard, 2010: 72) and
furthermore set a precedent for them to deal directly with each other as opposed to relying on
outside bodies to do their bidding.

Sunshine (1998-2008)

While the Sunshine Policy is typically associated with the North Korea engagement policies of
the Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) South Korean presidential
administrations, as Moon (2012) reveals, the term itself traces back to September 1994 when
Kim Dae-jung (who had lost a presidential election against Kim Young-sam two years earlier)
traveled to Washington DC and made a speech to the Heritage Foundation, an American
conservative think tank. In this speech he recommended that the US have patience and pursue
a “sunshine” policy in the process of negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear program.
He expressed his belief that engagement was the only effective way to encourage states like
North Korea to come out of their isolation, and he buttressed this claim with the Aesop fable of
the North Wind and the Sun. In this fable, the warmth of the sunshine causes a man to remove
his coat while the cold wind only makes him tug on his coat harder.

Once Kim Dae-jung became president in 1998, he had the opportunity to make this
Sunshine Policy proposal a reality. In April of that year, he outlined principles for it, which in
addition to professing an abandonment of the idea of unification by absorption of the North,
included a commitment to resumption of the exchanges and cooperation initiatives of the early
1990s. In the first two years of Kim Dae-jung’s presidential terms, the policy was not successful
in establishing a direct channel of communication with the North; nevertheless, the initiative
breathed new life into inter-Korean economic, social, and cultural exchanges including a 1998
agreement between Hyundai group and the North Korean government to develop Mt. Kumgang
for tourism (Moon, 2012).

Additionally, in the following year, right before the new millennium, there were two
concerts in Pyongyang, and these were the first ever to be managed by South Korean
broadcasting companies. The first of the two, the November 1999 SBS-sponsored “Peace and
Friendship Concert 2000,” conspicuously highlighted the sociocultural distinctions between North and South Korea by including a repertoire of mostly South Korean pop (as well as an American soul band performance led by Roger Clinton, the younger brother of then-President Bill Clinton). The second, the December 1999 MBC-sponsored “National Unification Concert,” however, was much more collaborative with the North, and had a wider variety of material including traditional and popular music from the North and South (O and Kang, 2018). With the two sides consulting each other for a long time over the repertoire that opened with North and South Korean singers together bellowing out the North Korean song “Nice to Meet You” (Bangabseumnida), the concert became a valuable opportunity for exchange. It was not simply a means for the select Pyongyang crowd in the audience to be exposed to South Korean music. It was also an opportunity for the South Korean TV audience to be exposed to North Korean music and by doing so, get a glimpse of North Korea that was not related to the military or the North Korean famine that had just taken place in the preceding years (MBC News, 1999).

The political breakthrough of the Sunshine policy took place a few months later in April of 2000 when North Korean leader Kim Jong Il agreed to meet with South Korean president Kim Dae-jung in June for a summit meeting. At this summit meeting, the two sides agreed to the June 15th Declaration, which set the stage for more sports and music diplomacy by committing to a stimulation of “co-operation and exchanges in civic, cultural, sports, public health, environment and all other fields.” In what might be described as a test-run of this article’s implementation, the IOC arranged for North and South Korea to walk together in the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympics opening ceremony. The significance of this event was that it broadcasted dreams and hopes for unification and reconciliation to a broad audience outside of the Korean peninsula:

| Perspective from North Korea | Perspective from Australia |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| At the 27th Olympics in Sydney, 110,000 audience members welcomed the north and south athletes who entered jointly. | This is one of the unforgettable moments in sport. Athletes from South Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea together as one. |
| A brass band played Arirang as the national emotions overflowed. | Dual flag bearers Eun-sun Jeong female basketball player and Bak Jeong-choi, a young man who is skilled in the art of judo. |
| As a symbolic measure that leaned toward reconciliation, it was the first time athletes entered together in a line, shoulder to shoulder, which gave it a special significance. As they held hands and waved while entering the stadium, the 110,000 people let out an applause cheer like thunder. | And it’s nice to see. |
| It was the longest applause out of all the other countries | Flying the peninsula of Korea flag, marking that team as a unified team, and that is without doubt a special sign to the entire world. |
| (Rodong Sinmun, 2000) | -Australian announcer’s narration for the opening ceremony |

(Seven Sport, 2000)
In addition to demonstrating that music and sports diplomatic ventures are often intertwined (as can be seen in the reference to the Korean song Arirang), the North Korean report of the event is noteworthy for its Pan-Korean expression of pride instead of an exclamation of its athletes and/or system as superior. The Australian announcer’s decision not to distinguish the two athletes by their particular Koreas is also worth noting (although it is possible that he just did not know who was from where).

Figure 1 Inter-Korean march at the Sydney Summer Olympics Opening Ceremony
Source: YouTube

A similar style of reporting from North Korea can be found in a Rodong Sinmun article (2002a) about the September 2002 Unification Soccer match in Seoul. Instead of asserting superiority, the article highlighted the “comrades of each class” that filled up the stadium, the banners reading “no matter who wins, we are one,” the ringing out of the Arirang song, and references to both the 2000 summit and the hope of a “unified prosperous country once it is fully established.” Mirroring the sports and music diplomacy run of 1991, there were two South Korean concerts in Pyongyang the same month as the soccer game. The South identified one as “Lee Mi-ja: A Special Concert” and the other “Oh! Reunified Korea” (O and Kang, 2018), but the North simply referred to both of them together as “The South Korean Cultural Broadcast Performance Group.” Despite this dry title, a North Korean news article from the Rodong Sinmun (2002b) lauded the South Korean trot singer Lee Mi-ja, particularly her rendition of Monggeumpo Tareyong, a song in the Seodo Sori form indigenous to the North. The article described her performance by praising her overflowing love for the Korean people, as well as her artistic technique. This was a rare North Korean showcase of a South Korean singer, and it was especially unusual that the article mentioned details about the performance and the songs.

Even with these signs of optimism and receptiveness, there was beginning to be a routine to the inter-Korean sports and music events and the way were being reported on. The march together in the Olympics opening ceremony continued in 2004 and 2006 but without a joint
team or other developments, they were somewhat anticlimactic. For music, the South Korean coverage of its singers performing in the North reflected an interest in penetrating the music scene in Pyongyang rather than genuine cultural exchange. When it came to the North Korean reports on these events, they were generally positive but were typically terse in nature and rarely if ever made it to the first page of the paper. Along with this somewhat buried coverage, there was a formulaic sequence of events that one can detect: arrival in Pyongyang, receiving flowers, performance that ends with the song “See You Again” (*Dashi Mannayo*), a possible visit to Mangyongdae--the professed birthplace of Kim Il Sung, and departure. Moreover, accompanying the articles were large group shots or long shots of performances in which the faces of individual performers can barely be seen. From this practice one could easily suspect that the North Korean state had little incentive to spread awareness about these performances to its people broadly and perhaps simply saw them as a way to reward its most loyal supporters.

![Figures 2 and 3](image)

A contrast between how prominently the South Korean trot singer Lee Mi-ja was featured in the *Rodong Sinmun* in 2002 and how insignificantly the South Korean pop music singers appear in the same newspaper 2003

On the other hand, it is possible that the South Korean performances themselves were part of the reason why the artists were not featured more prominently in the North Korean press, for it was not a given that whatever music was popular in the South would automatically translate into popularity in the North. For instance, in the 2002 Pyongyang concert, while the rock singer Yoon Do-hyun of the band YB lightened the atmosphere and won smiles and applause for his remark “We might be a little noisy, but do not be afraid….think of us as a frolicking flock of birds,” his heavy metal song “Mask Dance” (*Talchum*) did not get the same approval (MBC, 2002a), and his syncopated freestyle version of Arirang received mixed reactions (MBC, 2002b). The next year, in the 2003 Unification Concert to commemorate the newly-built Ryugyong Chung Ju-yung Gymnasium (named after the founder of Hyundai Group which paid for most of its construction), the South Korean boy group Shinhwa and girl group Baby Vox received blank stares and even expressions of scorn and disgust from North Korean audience members (This is likely has to do with their risqué dance moves and revealing clothing.
as much as the unfamiliarity of the music). Granted, there were a few songs from this concert that were mentioned in the North Korean press report (*Rodong Sinmun*, 2003) including Lee Sun-hee’s “Beautiful Country” (*Areumdaeun Gangsan*), but the report anonymized the singers when describing the performances by using designations like “Female Soloist and Dance” and “Male Soloist.”

Nevertheless, there was one South Korean singer who broke the mold and attained somewhat of a star status. At the request of North Korea, South Korea dispatched the longtime pop singer Cho Yong-pil to Pyongyang for a concert in 2005 even in the midst of a politically turbulent period internationally (O and Kang, 2018). Under the headline “South Korean Singer Performance” and next to a full-body rock star photo shot, a North Korean news article (*Rodong Sinmun*, 2005) outlined most of his set list that included a fair mix of his own material and songs that would have been familiar to a North Korean audience due to their popularity around the time of the Japanese colonial period. A notable moment of this concert was when Cho Yong-pil made the audience a part of the performance by getting the audience to sing Arirang with him and acknowledging their faces on the jumbo screen (SBS, 2005).

In November 2005, the same year as the Cho Yong-pil concert, the South Korean online news service Oh My News organized and carried out the Pyongyang Unification Marathon, which perhaps symbolized the long road to political reconciliation that was still ahead. While the Oh My News report of the event (H. Lee, 2015) optimistically portrayed how the thick fog at daybreak gradually gave way to sunshine in a way that seemed the bless the event, the prospects for the Sunshine Policy as a whole by this time were not so bright. Despite the great efforts at diplomacy, for much of this period of the Sunshine Policy period, a nuclear standoff
with North Korea continued, and there was even a deadly naval clash between North and South Korea in 2002 at the same time as the Japan Korea World Cup soccer championship. Some may attribute this lack of political progress to an inherent ineffectiveness of the cultural exchange component of the Sunshine Policy, but one can easily turn this assumption around and claim that the events were not organized to their full extent or that there were simply not enough of them to be consequential. Also, it is worth considering that perhaps because most of them took place in the North, they ultimately failed to win over an increasingly weary South Korean public who by this time had been caught up in the “cash-for-summit scandal,” in which the Kim Dae-jung government was suspected to have facilitated illegal cash remittances from Hyundai group to North Korea shortly before the 2000 summit (Son, 2004).

Even after there was a political breakthrough with the Second Korean Summit in 2007 (during which Kim Jong Il and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun agreed to a tangible set of reconciliation proposals), a few months later, the South Korean public elected the conservative Lee Myung-bak who based part of his campaign on taking a different approach with the North. True to his word (in this case at least), he ended up abandoning much of the Sunshine policy principles.

Moonshine (2018-?)

Even during the subsequent “Sunset” period of North-South Korean relations (2008-2017), there were notable moments that attest to Cha’s (2009) theory of sports ventures as a useful “barometer of public opinion.” At a qualifying basketball match between North and South Korea for the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games (right after the sinking of the Cheonan South Korean naval vessel), half of the South Korea basketball team turned their backs during the North Korean anthem, and in a women's soccer semifinal match, North Korean fans remained seated during the South Korean national anthem (J. Lee, 2010). At the 2012 Summer Olympics in London, the North Koreans reacted very strongly to a mistake of putting the South Korean flag next to North Korean athletes’ photos and names on the wide screen (Yoon and Wilson, 2016). This perhaps provoked fears in the North of the South unifying the peninsula by force or absorption. Then in 2014, when the Asian games were in Incheon, South Korea, despite the fact that North Korean TV complained that the South Korean government wouldn’t allow them to bring their own cheerleaders, there were South Koreans with the unified Korean flag in the audience cheering on the North Korean soccer team (Borowiec, 2014). Finally, in the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio De Janeiro, the fact that a picture of a selfie shot between two young gymnasts from the North and South went viral in and outside Korea demonstrated that the hopes for reconciliation had not gone away (Bachor, 2016).

It took, however, a series of heated remarks regarding the prospects of nuclear warfare (expressed remotely) between North Korean chairman Kim Jong Un and United States president Donald Trump in the summer and fall of 2017 for sports and music diplomacy to become a
prominent part of the political calculus again. Even before the Trump administration’s self-professed Maximum Pressure policy reached its boiling point, the just-elected South Korean president Moon Jae-in throughout 2017 was raising the possibility of North-South joint sports teams in the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics and even joint hosting the 2030 World Cup. At the time, some international observers toyed with the term “Moonshine Policy” to cynically describe his diplomatic overtures as if they were outlandish. North Korea initially rejected the offer for joint teams and even though two of its figure skaters qualified for the games, there was no indication that they would even participate in the games for the rest of the year.

Everything changed in January 2018, when Kim Jong Un signaled his willingness to participate in the games. Soon after, North Korea, South Korea, and the IOC agreed not only to North Korea’s participation but also a joint march together in the opening ceremony and a unified Korean women’s ice hockey team. Instead of squabbling with the North about how many people they could bring and who would pay for what, the Moon Jae-in government agreed to cover the costs of North Korea’s request to send 229 cheerleaders, 140 musicians of the Samjiyeon Orchestra, and others (Fifield, 2018).

Perhaps the biggest advantage of this sports diplomacy was that it virtually assured that the North would not disrupt the Olympics in any way. Nevertheless, the games were not an entirely smooth process. While a strong majority was in favor of letting North Korea participate in the games, there was significant opposition, particularly young people, to the joint ice hockey team (SPN, 2018) because of concerns that it was unfair to the South Koreans who had already trained together for quite some time. Moreover, in an interesting convergence (or rather collision) between sports and music diplomacy, there was an uproar about what looked to many South Koreans like North Korean cheerleaders wearing masks of Kim Il Sung and cheering for him. The South Korean Minister of Unification promptly confirmed that this was not the case, and that the purpose of the masks was to show they were singing the man’s part of the North Korean love song “Hwiparam (Whistle)” (Bhat, 2018).

Figures 6 and 7 The North Korean cheerleaders singing the male point of view part from the song Whistle and the scene from the music video that features this male character. (YouTube)
Less controversial and perhaps more surprising were the two performances of the North Korean Samjiyeon Orchestra: one in Pyeongchang and the other in Seoul. While omitting references that glorified North Korean leaders, the concert included a variety of songs including songs from the North Korean propaganda pop girl group Moranbong Band, South Korean popular songs, and medleys of international music. A few months later, South Korea returned the favor by sending to the North K-Pop singers as well as music artists who had performed in Pyongyang during the Sunshine period to North Korea for a set of concerts under the name “Spring is Coming.” Following the practice of certain singers in the 2000s, the set lists included North Korean songs including Girls’ Generation member Seohyun’s performance of “The Blue Willow Tree,” which delighted the crowd and kept some of them clapping throughout the performance (Yonhap News, 2018).

While there was likely a confluence of factors that led to Kim Jong Un’s sudden shift in course and pursuit of diplomacy during this respite from tensions, sports and music diplomacy at least provided the lubricant if not the ignition switch that made it possible for the subsequent political breakthroughs to happen both between the North and South and between North Korea and the United States. While both North and South Korea saw the utility in entertaining sports and music diplomacy, their reasons for doing so were not necessarily the same. For North Korea, sports and music diplomacy ventures have historically been a way to enhance legitimacy for its system and can facilitate state-to-state interactions. Kim Jong Un was desperately seeking both of these when he was facing severe sanctions and the cold shoulder from even neighbors like China. For South Korea, sports and music diplomacy can keep tensions down (for a time) and has the potential to increase person-to-person interactions. Because the North’s need for state-to-state exchange and the South’s need for tension reduction were so great in 2018, sports and music joint ventures helped both states move towards their objectives, and that is likely why they were pursued with such enthusiasm and precision.
In terms of the impact of sports and music diplomacy on the South Korean public, there are a number of ways this can be measured and considered. One way is to look at trend data from year to year regarding the question of “What is your perception of North Korea?” The following graph below shows how South Korean attitudes toward the North have fluctuated over time:

![Graph showing the ratio of South Koreans' positive to negative attitudes towards North Korea from 2003 to 2019.](image)

Figure 10  This ratio was calculated by dividing the total percentage of positive attitudes (“someone to support” + “someone to cooperate with”) by the total percentage of negative attitudes (“someone who is a threat” + “someone who is an enemy”).

Source: Kim et. al. (2019).

As one can see from the table, the ratio of positive to negative attitudes dramatically increased from 2016 and reached its highest level since the end of the Sunshine Policy in 2008. Although there may be other possible explanations for the low levels of support during the period following Sunshine such as the 2010 sinking of the South Korean naval vessel and the North Korean shelling of Yeongpyeong Island in the same year, the fact that the ratio did not change when state-sponsored North-South exchanges were nearly nonexistent, and then suddenly rose following reinvigorated efforts at them suggests that they exchanges do contribute to a shift in attitudes, which can help boost support for political diplomacy efforts.

Without such survey data in the North, it is much harder to reach any kind of conclusion regarding the impact of sports and music exchanges on the North Korean public. While there was no noticeable change in the Rodong Sinmun report in terms of the practice of reporting very briefly on the events, interviews with defectors suggest that others outside of the Pyongyang elite have been exposed to South Korean concerts in the North including the most recent “Spring is Coming” music performance (Denyer and Kim, 2019). Therefore, working within official channels may help to broadly promote positive impressions about South Koreans, as long as the
organizers of events consider tastes and the taboos of the Pyongyang audience to win their support for future initiatives.

2019 has not witnessed the same success as 2018 for either sports and music diplomacy or political breakthrough. The highly anticipated Hanoi summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un in February ended without a deal, and there has been little willingness from the North Korean side to engage in joint endeavors with the South ever since. For instance, a South Korean group interested in joining the Pyongyang Marathon reached out to the North in April, but received no response (Ouellette, 2019). When it came to the highly anticipated 2022 World Cup qualifying match between the Koreas scheduled to take place in North Korea in October, there was again no response until the last minute upon which the North refused to allow live broadcasting and only allowed the game to be played in a stadium devoid of fans.

Conclusion: Bread and Circuses, Road to Reconciliation and/or Template for The Future?

Considering the long view of sports and music diplomacy on the Korean peninsula, it is worth asking whether sports and music diplomacy been a genuine road to reconciliation or if they have been akin what the Ancient Greek philosopher Juvenal outlined as the phenomenon of “Breads and Circuses”: simply giving citizens a spectacle to distract them and without any lasting impact. This may not be as much as an either/or question as it is a both/and one. If Juvenal were around today, he might certainly point to North Korea as a prime example of this phenomenon as the state has invested heavily in spectacle as a way of boosting its image and has had a longstanding practice of co-opting segments of the population. Yet even in South Korea there is the perception and possibility that all of the sports and music diplomacy efforts are in vain, just for show, and something that most North Koreans won’t be affected much by.

In terms of whether sports and music diplomacy are also a genuine a road to reconciliation, it is hard to say. The historical developments traced here suggest that they might be necessary for buttressing support for political dialogue but not sufficient for ensuring that the political dialogue pursued is ultimately successful. As Dean Ouellette (2019), a specialist on inter-Korean relations and North Korean tourism argues, “sports are especially good for early stages of contact.” Perhaps, along with music performances, they can, as Ouellette puts it “serve as mutually acceptable spaces of opening and can be the only avenue for contact despite contingencies on the ground.” Although there is currently some reluctance displayed by the North Korean state in continuing cultural contact with the South, leaving the door open to it remains a means of presenting an alternative path to confrontation. This is a path that can appeal to a wide range of North Koreans including chairman Kim Jong Un who has emphasized sports and tourism as part of a national branding strategy and a way to “co-opt the youth and entrepreneurs” as well as be seen as “young, hip and international” (Ouellette, 2019).
When it comes to prospects for future success in inter-Korean relations, the elephant in the room is North Korea’s relationship with the United States. South Korea’s inter-Korean policy, no matter how bold it may be at times, is often at the mercy of the US-North Korean relationship and how it evolves and takes form. With this in mind, the bumpy yet impactful sports and music reconciliation process between the two Koreas may be a useful template for improving relations between North Korea and the United States (even if there is far less cultural affinity between the two than the two Koreans). So far, American sports and cultural diplomacy with North Korea has largely been a one-way process of sending a handful of musicians and athletes to Pyongyang, but with the recent report of Kim Jong Un’s request to exchange orchestras with the United States (Palmeri, 2019) and with a US House congressional moving a bill forward to push for reunification family meetings between Korean-Americans and their relatives in the North (H. Lee, 2019), now may be an opportune time for the United States to propose sports, music and family reunions together as a way to break the paralysis of the current impasse.

At the same time, sports and music diplomacy by their very nature have residual effects within North Korea and South Korea, and these effects can be positive. One possible impact might be the expansion of the conception of Korean identity from a homogeneous to heterogeneous category (in South Korea at least). More cultural contact with another group of Koreans will lead more native South Koreans to attain cultural knowledge about other groups of Koreans within their borders (such as North Korean defectors and diaspora Koreans), and this might trigger social empathy, or in other words, the ability to imagine what it is like to be other people in terms of their social, economic and political circumstances. As Jang (2019) points out, “if one develops social empathy, he/she gets increased understanding of social and economic inequalities, which in turn leads to interest in social and economic justice and societal well-being” (45).

For all the reasons expressed above, the sports and music diplomacy pursued on the Korean peninsula up until this point can be considered a helpful template on and off the Korean Peninsula as long as it is a supplement rather than a substitute to political negotiation.

Notes
1. Cha reveals that it was North Korea that requested the visit by the New York Philharmonic Orchestra to Pyongyang, He uses the phrase “while unrelated to sports” when explaining this interaction but I beg to differ as I find it involved some of the same diplomatic processes.

2. While juxtaposing media reports from the North and South to analyze how particular events were characterized and interpreted, this article is not a comparative analysis between the North and South and has no intention of engaging in moral equivalencies.
3. The part of the video that included the second sentence of this quotation was removed from the video sometime in 2018 (perhaps as a conciliatory gesture in a year of engagement with the North). I have the original clip that displayed the quote in my possession, and it can be seen at: http://vimeo.com/373569553.

4. The Australian announcer misstated the name of the North Korean judo athlete (who was actually a coach at the time). His real name is Bak Jeong-cheol. The fact that his surname was spoken first (opposite of the case for the South Korean athlete) alludes to either the frenzy in arranging the joint march in a short period of time, or the different choices in name order North and South Korean made when submitting names to a cosmopolitan audience, or both.

5. See for instance: Zhou (2017) and Breen (2017)

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