Teaching statistics in the physics curriculum:  
Unifying and clarifying role of subjective probability

Giulio D’Agostini  
Dipartimento di Fisica dell’Università “La Sapienza” 
and Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), P. le Aldo Moro 2, I-00185 Roma, Italy  
E-mail: dagostini@roma1.infn.it.

Subjective probability is based on the intuitive idea that probability quantifies the degree of belief that an event will occur. A probability theory based on this idea represents the most general framework for handling uncertainty. A brief introduction to subjective probability and Bayesian inference is given, with comments on typical misconceptions which tend to discredit it and comparisons to other approaches.

I. INTRODUCTION

Physics students encounter concepts of probability and statistics several times during their studies, usually in laboratory classes when the treatment of measurement errors is introduced and in statistical physics and quantum mechanics courses. Some universities also provide specialized courses on probability and statistics. However, there is a general consensus that the standard understanding of statistics is insufficient and confused.

In my opinion, the main reason for this unsatisfactory situation is that the fundamental issue concerning the concept of probability, which should precede any exposition of probability, is not treated with due care.

The purpose of this article is to introduce probabilistic reasoning from the point of view of subjective probability, on which Bayesian statistics is based. The choice of name is due to the key role played by Bayes’ theorem in updating probability in the light of new information.

II. SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY

We often find ourselves in a status of uncertainty about events which might occur. For example, a tossed coin would result in heads or tails (two possible events). Or, given N molecules at equilibrium in a box, we might be interested in the number of molecules at a given instant which are present in a sub-volume of the box (N + 1 events).

In general, we know that all events do not have the same chance of occurring. Consider two events E₁ and E₂. Stating that E₁ is more probable than E₂ (P(E₁) > P(E₂)) means that we consider E₁ to be more likely to occur than E₂. This statement is no more than the concept of probability that the human mind has developed naturally to classify the plausibility of events under conditions of uncertainty. In other words, probability is related to the “degree of belief in the occurrence of an event.” The usual definition of subjective probability one finds in introductory books is “the degree of belief that an event will occur.”

This definition of the concept of probability is not bound to a single evaluation rule, and there are many ways to obtain P(E). The assessment could be based on symmetry considerations, past frequencies, Monte Carlo simulations, complicated theoretical formulae, or Bayesian inference. What matters is that the meaning is the same in all applications, and is independent of the method of evaluation. For example, if we state that the probability of a Z° boson decaying to an e⁺e⁻ pair is

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3.3%, and that of observing 5 heads after 5 fair coin tosses is 3.1%, it means that we are slightly more confident that a $Z^+$ will decay into $e^+e^-$ than five tossed coins give all heads.

We also note that probability assessments depend on who (the “subject”) does the evaluation and, more precisely, on the status of the information that the subject holds at the moment of the assessment. Therefore what matters is always conditional probability, conditioned by the status of information $I$, that is, $P(E \mid I)$ is to be read “the probability of $E$ given $I$.” As a consequence, several persons might have simultaneously different degrees of belief on the same event, as is well known to poker players.

Subjective probability tends to disturb scientists, who pursue the ideal of objectivity. But, rigorously speaking, an objective knowledge of the physical world is impossible, if “objective” stands for something which has the same logical strength as a mathematical theorem. Nevertheless, if rational people share the same information, the ideal of objectivity is recovered through intersubjectivity.

Subjective probability does not imply that we may believe whatever we like, for example, flying horses or speaking dogs. I can imagine a flying horse as a combination of concepts that I have from my experience, but nevertheless, I do not believe flying horses to exist. There is a crucial ingredient of the subjective approach which forces people to make probability assessments that correspond effectively to their beliefs. This ingredient is the so-called coherent bet. If we consider an event to be 50% probable, then we should be ready to place an even bet on the occurrence of the event or on its opposite. However, if someone is ready to place the bet in one direction but not in the other direction, it means that this person thinks that the preferred direction is more probable than the other, and then the 50% probability assessment is incoherent, that is, this person is making a statement which does not correspond to his belief.

Even if an event and its opposite $(E)$ are not equiprobable, a bet can still be arranged if the odds are fixed proportionally to the beliefs on the two events: odds ratio($E : \overline{E}$) = $P(E) : P(\overline{E})$. Therefore, if someone considers a 2:1 bet in favor of $E$ to be fair, it means that that person judges $P(E) = 2/3$. Coherence prevents people from arbitrary probability assessments.

A coherent bet has to be considered virtual. For example, a person might judge an event to be 99.9999% probable, but nevertheless refuse to bet $999999 against $1, if $999999 is the order of magnitude of the person’s resources. Nevertheless, the person might be convinced that this bet would be fair if he had an infinite budget. This remark teaches us that probability assessments should be kept separate from decision issues. The latter can be more complicated, because decisions depend not only on the probability of the event, but also on the subjective importance of a given amount of money.

The first consequence of coherence is that probability assessments can be exchanged among rational people, with the guarantee that everybody is talking about the same thing, although the evaluations might differ due to a different status of information. The second important consequence is that it is possible to derive from the requirement of coherence the basic rules or axioms of probability. We will not give the derivation here, but simply summarize the well known rules:

\[
0 \leq P(E) \leq 1
\]

\[
P(\Omega) = 1
\]

\[
P(E_1 \cup E_2) = P(E_1) + P(E_2) \quad \text{if} \quad E_1 \cap E_2 = \emptyset,
\]

where $\Omega$ and $\emptyset$ stand for the certain and the impossible event, respectively, $\cap$ represents the logical product (also known as “AND”), and $\cup$ the logical sum (“OR”).

Another important relation which can be derived from coherence is the relation between joint probability and conditional probability:

\[
P(A \cap B) = P(A \mid B) P(B) = P(B \mid A) P(A),
\]

where $P(A \mid B)$ is the probability of the event $A$ under the hypothesis that $B$ is true. In the axiomatic approach Eq. (3) arises from the “definition” of conditional probability, that is,

\[
P(A \mid B) = \frac{P(A \cap B)}{P(B)} \quad \text{if} \quad P(B) \neq 0
\]
are the same. But the subjective approach does more. It guarantees that if the
numbers we use at the beginning of a calculation are coherent degrees of
beliefs, the result also has to be interpreted as a degree of belief, necessarily
following from the initial ones. For example, if we believe that a coin has
a 60% chance to give heads, then we implicitly attribute a 23% chance to 5
independent tosses of that coin to produce exactly 3 tails.

III. INTERPLAY OF SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY WITH COMBINATORIAL AND
FREQUENCY BASED EVALUATIONS

It is not difficult to realize that the usual definitions of probability in terms of the ratio of favorable to
possible cases, or of successes to trials, cannot define the concept of probability, because they are based
on the primitive concept of equiprobability (see for example Ref. [11]). Nevertheless, in the subjective
approach these “definitions” can be easily recovered as useful evaluation rules.

The use of combinatorial evaluation is rather obvious, and the common urn and dice problems yield
“objective” answers, in the sense that all reasonable people will agree. Given \(N_W+N_B\) indistinguishable
white and black balls in an urn, there is no reason to consider a particular ball to be more likely to be
extracted (otherwise, we should bet more money on that ball than on the others). Then, as a straightforward
application of Eqs. (2)–(3), we find

\[
P(\text{white}) = \frac{N_W}{N_W + N_B} \quad \text{and} \quad P(\text{black}) = \frac{N_B}{N_W + N_B}.
\]

Sometimes urn problems are considered to provide a reference (or calibration) probability. If I assign
80% probability to the event \(E\), it means that I am as confident that this event will result as I am con-
fident of extracting a white ball from an urn which contains 100 balls, 80 of which are white. Everybody
understands how much I am confident in \(E\), independently of what \(E\) might be.

More generally, combinatorics (for countable events) and measure theory (when events form a con-
tinuum class) are just mathematical tools of probability theory, if the elements of the relevant space
are judged to be equiprobable. This point of view is the exact opposite and, in my opinion, more phys-
ical than that stated in many books on mathematical or statistical physics (for example, “probability
theory . . . is certainly a branch of analysis and in a narrow sense a branch of measure theory. Its most
rudimentary parts are rooted in combinatorics.”

The frequency based definition of probability needs a more extensive discussion. Empirical frequencies
can be used to evaluate probability by stating that we believe that what has happened more often in
the past will happen more probably in the future. This simple evaluation rule is applicable if there
are no other relevant pieces of information to take into account. Past frequencies can also be used
in a more formal way, together with other information, by applying Bayesian inference, which will
be introduced below. In general, the value of a probability will not be exactly equal to the relative
frequency. Only when the number of past experiments is very large will the results of Bayesian and
empirical frequency evaluations converge to the same value. An example will be given in Section IV
which shows quantitative disagreement between the two methods for a finite number of measurements.

Let us see more carefully how frequentists make use of their probability definition. It is clear that
the use of past frequencies to evaluate probability relies on a belief that the measurements were done
under the same conditions (of equiprobability) and that the relative frequency has approached a limit.
Thus, it is not correct to say that the frequentist approach is free of subjective ingredients. Moreover,
can frequentists assess that, for example, the probability of extracting a white ball from an urn which
contains 70 white balls and 30 black balls is 70%? Apparently they cannot, unless they have done
an experiment to “measure” the probability from a long series of experiments. Nevertheless, they do,
using the following type of reasoning:

1. We first say that “we see no reason why one ball should be preferred to another.” (The expression
   “equally probable” is avoided, but the meaning is exactly the same.)

2. “We naturally expect that, in the long run, each ball will be drawn approximately equally often.”
   It follows that the frequency of each ball is expected to be approximately similar and the frequency
   of white balls is proportional to their number in the box.

3. Finally, we “expect” a relative frequency approximately equal to the proportion of white balls in
   the box. Therefore, the probability is equal to the proportion of white balls.
In some texts (see for example, Ref. [15]), “a priori probabilities” are introduced by an *ad hoc* postulate; “…once the basic postulate has been adopted, the theory of probability allows the theoretical calculation of the probability of the outcome for an experiment.” But it is clear that in this context “postulate” is nothing but “belief,” but it sounds nobler.

In the subjective approach the terms of the problem are better defined and have a closer correspondence to intuitive concepts. In particular, a clear distinction is made between the following three ingredients which enter statistical considerations: past frequency, probability, and future frequency (“future” refers to unknown results, not necessarily occurring later in time). We now analyze the same example from the subjectivist perspective.

1. Given our status of knowledge, we have no reason to believe that one ball will be extracted more likely than the others (otherwise, we should be ready to bet more money on that particular ball). Therefore, we judge them all equally probable and, applying the basic rules of probability, we assign 70% probability to white. The 70% probability has a precise and intuitive meaning by itself, as a degree of belief of the result of any extraction. There is no need to think about a statistical ensemble of many such experiments. This reasoning might sound similar to the first point of the frequentist’s perspective. But in the frequentist approach the reasoning is very convoluted, because they do not speak about the probability of individual events, but only of “random mass phenomena,” as illustrated in Ref [14].

2. Nevertheless, we can always think of $N$ experiments with the same urn, reintroducing the ball after each extraction, or, more generally, of $N$ independent events, each of which is believed to occur with 70% probability. The relative frequency of the white balls, $f_W$, is an uncertain number with $N + 1$ possibilities, to each of which we attribute a degree of belief, $P(f_W)$, a consequence of the degree of belief of the individual event ($p = 70\%$) and of the believed independence of the $N$ events:

$$P(f_W) = \left( \frac{N}{N f_w} \right) p^{N f_w} (1 - p)^{N(1 - f_w)}.$$  

(6)

The expected value and standard deviation of the frequency are $E(f_W) = p$ and $\sigma(f_W) = \sqrt{p(1-p)/\sqrt{N}}$. These two quantities are related to the concepts of (probabilistic) prevision and of (standard) uncertainty of the prevision, respectively. When we consider a very large $N$, we judge that it is very unlikely to obtain a value of the relative frequency that differs more than 70%, as is born out by Eq. (6). This result is precisely what is expected from the law of large numbers, expressed by Bernoulli’s theorem, a consequence of Eq. (6).

Let us summarize the subjectivist point of view about past frequency, probability, and future frequency. Past frequency is experimental data, something that happened with certainty and to which the category of probability no longer applies. Probability is *how much we believe* that something will happen, taking into account all available information about the event of interest, including, if they are available, past frequencies which are relevant. Because probability quantifies the degree of belief at a given instant, it is not measurable. Whatever will happen later cannot modify the probability which was assessed before. It can only influence future assessments of the probability of other events. Future frequency is an uncertain number (or “random variable”), which can assume a set of values, to each of which we assign a degree of belief.

IV. BAYESIAN INFERENCE

Let us consider again the case of an urn containing 70% white balls. Imagine that we have made $N_0$ extractions out of $N$ total, and have observed the relative frequency of white balls to be $f_{W_0}$. It is clear that, given perfect knowledge about the composition of the urn, all probabilistic considerations about the remaining $N - N_0$ extractions will be the analogues of those initially done for the $N$ extractions. The situation changes if we are uncertain about the composition of the urn. Most likely, after the first
$N_0$ extractions our beliefs about the result of the remaining extractions will change. Learning from data is the task of inference. This subject is the most interesting part of probability theory for physics applications, as we will see in the following.

Before attacking the problem formally, it is interesting to consider what we would intuitively expect. If we have observed only white balls in the first $N_0$ extractions, we would tend to believe that the remaining extractions will result in white balls much more than the initial 70%. But it is also clear that this change of belief would depend on how many extractions have been made, and how confident we were in our initial 70% evaluation. For example, if we had made only a couple of extractions, or if our prior belief was based on the information that the urn contains with certainty a percentage of white balls between 68% and 72%, our new belief would not differ much from the old one.

Now that we have sketched the ingredients which enter an inferential procedure based on probability calculus, we illustrate it using an example. Imagine six indistinguishable boxes with different numbers of black and white balls. The boxes are labelled $H_0, H_1, \ldots, H_5$ according to the number of white balls (see Fig. 1).

![Fig. 1. Six boxes each having a different composition of black and white balls. One box is chosen at random, then its content is inferred by extracting at random a ball from the box and reintroducing it inside. What is the probability of each box conditioned by all the past observations? What is the probability of the color of the next ball?](image)

Let us choose randomly one of the boxes. We are in a status of uncertainty concerning several events, the most important of which correspond to the following questions.

(a) Which box have we chosen, $H_0, H_1, \ldots, H_5$?

(b) If we extract randomly a ball from the chosen box, will we observe a white ($E_W \equiv E_1$) or black ($E_B \equiv E_2$) ball?

What is certain is that, given the status of information, the result must be one of the possibilities for each question:

$$\bigcup_{j=0}^5 H_j = \Omega$$

$$\bigcup_{i=1}^2 E_i = \Omega.$$  

In general, we are uncertain about all the combinations of $E_i$ and $H_j$: $E_W \cap H_0, E_W \cap H_1, \ldots, E_B \cap H_5$. The 12 constituents that we have to consider are not equiprobable. For example, $E_W \cap H_0$ and $E_B \cap H_5$ are impossible. Because $E_i$ and $H_j$ form complete classes of hypotheses, each event can be written as a logical sum of constituents: $E_i = \bigcup_j (E_i \cap H_j)$, $H_j = \bigcup_i (E_i \cap H_j)$. If we remember that the constituents are by construction mutually exclusive, we have that $P(E_i) = \sum_j P(E_i \cap H_j)$ and a similar sum rule for $P(H_j)$. If we apply Eq. (3) to each constituent, we can express the probability of the events of interest as

$$P(E_i) = \sum_j P(E_i \mid H_j)P(H_j)$$

$$P(H_j) = \sum_i P(H_j \mid E_i)P(E_i).$$

At this point it is important to model our process of knowledge. The $E_i$ play the role of observable effects: that is, what we can experience with our senses. The $H_j$ play the role of physical hypotheses: they are not directly observable, and in fact the rule of the game is that we can never look directly
inside a box. In our scheme the \( H_j \) are the possible causes of the effects. So the inference consists in guessing the cause from the effects. \(^[3]\)

The experiment consists in extracting balls at random from a given, but unknown box, and reintroducing it afterward. Our problem will be that of assessing the probability that the box is a particular one of the six boxes shown in Fig. 1. After we see the color of the ball, the first intuitive conclusion about the box content would be that the box that contains more balls of the same color which has just been extracted is the most believable. This consideration is at the basis of the maximum likelihood principle, which is considered by many people the only (or best) paradigm for making inferences. However, it is natural to think that the beliefs about the different causes are constantly updated, and therefore we need a method for making inferences which goes beyond the maximum likelihood principle and which takes into account all available information besides the last experimental observation.

From the previous remark, we can say that the aim of a measurement is to update our beliefs about each cause, given all available information. For example, after the first extraction, indicated by \( E^{(1)} \), which could result in either a white \( (E_W) \) or black \( (E_B) \) event, we will have \( P(H_j \mid E^{(1)}, I) \); after the first two extractions we have \( P(H_j \mid E^{(1)}, E^{(2)}, I) \), and so on. (\( I \) stands for the all the prior information about the process and will not be written explicitly in the following.)

Out of the many probabilities we are considering, the easiest ones to evaluate are the probabilities of observing the different effects given each cause: \( P(E_i \mid H_j) \). These probabilities are the analogue to the response of an apparatus when an experiment is performed. They are technically called likelihoods, because they say how likely the causes produce the effects. As for all the probabilities, they can be evaluated in several ways. Usually, in real measurements they are evaluated making use of past frequencies and some assumptions (beliefs), such as when we state that the errors are Gaussian distributed. In our example they can be evaluated by symmetry arguments, and we obtain

\[
\begin{align*}
P(E_W \mid H_j) &= j/5 \\
P(E_B \mid H_j) &= (5-j)/5 .
\end{align*}
\]  

At this point, let us rewrite Eq. (1) as

\[
P(H_j \mid E_i) = \frac{P(E_i \mid H_j)}{P(E_i)} .
\]  

The meaning of Eq. (12) is that the probability of \( H_j \) is altered by the condition \( E_i \) in the same ratio by which the probability of \( E_i \) is altered by the condition \( H_j \). Therefore, if we know how to calculate the right-hand-side of Eq. (12), we also know how to update \( P(H_j) \). This ratio is the essence of Bayesian inference. Clearly \( P(E_i) = 1/2 \) by symmetry, and, hence the updating ratios are

\[
\begin{align*}
P(H_j \mid E_W) &= 2j/5 \\
P(H_j \mid E_B) &= 2(5-j)/5 .
\end{align*}
\]  

If a white ball is observed, all hypotheses with labels \( j \leq 2 \) become less credible, while those with \( j \geq 3 \) become more credible. The reverse happens if we observe a black ball. However, the absolute level of credibility depends also on the initial probability.

To make this example generally valid, it is preferable to evaluate \( P(E_i) \) in a way that will be applicable when the symmetry between black and white is broken, as happens after the observations. We can use Eq. (13) and obtain, using the equiprobability of the box composition:

\[
P(E_i) = \sum_{j=0}^{5} P(H_j)P(E_i \mid H_j) = \frac{1}{6} \times \left( \frac{0+1+2+3+4+5}{5} \right) = \frac{1}{2} .
\]  

This formula makes explicit our intuitive equal beliefs about black and white balls. They depend on the information about the six boxes.

We can now put all the ingredients together. From Eq. (12), using Eqs. (10) and (1), we find

\[
\begin{align*}
P(E) &= \sum_{j=0}^{5} P(H_j)P(E \mid H_j) = \frac{1}{6} \times \left( \frac{0+1+2+3+4+5}{5} \right) = \frac{1}{2} .
\end{align*}
\]
Bayes’ theorem is simply a compact representation of what has been done in the previous steps. This point is an important one and is often misunderstood by those who see Bayesian inference as a kind of credo or some strange mathematical formalism. Bayes’ theorem is a formal tool for updating beliefs using logic instead of only intuition. Indeed, we can show that in many simple problems intuition might not be enough, and formal guidance becomes crucial.

Bayes’ theorem is just a normalization factor such that \( \sum_j P(H_j | E_i) = 1 \). Neglecting the normalization factor and rewriting \( P(H_j) \) as \( P_0(H_j) \) to indicate that this probability is the probability before the observations, we obtain:

\[
P(H_j | E_i) \propto P(E_i | H_j) P_0(H_j),
\]

or

\[
posterior \propto likelihood \times prior.
\]

Bayes’ theorem is a formal tool for updating beliefs using logic instead of only intuition. Indeed, we can show that in many simple problems intuition might not be enough, and formal guidance becomes crucial.

Table I shows how the beliefs about the box composition change with the observations. Note how the hypotheses are incompatible with at least one observation are “falsified” forever. But, after some observations, the other unfalsified hypotheses are not equally likely. This result shows that probabilistic inference is much more natural and powerful than Popper’s simpler scheme of falsification. After approximately 50 trials, we are practically sure to have obtained \( H_1 \), but are never certain. Similarly, we cannot tell that \( H_2 \), \( H_3 \) and \( H_4 \) are ruled out. They are simply extremely unlikely.

Table II shows how the beliefs about the box composition change with the observations. Note how the hypotheses which are incompatible with at least one observation are “falsified” forever. But, after some observations, all the other unfalsified hypotheses are not equally likely. This result shows that probabilistic inference is much more natural and powerful than Popper’s simpler scheme of falsification. After approximately 50 trials, we are practically sure to have obtained \( H_1 \), but are never certain. Similarly, we cannot tell that \( H_2 \), \( H_3 \) and \( H_4 \) are ruled out. They are simply extremely unlikely.

Table III also shows, as indicated by \( P(E_W | I_k) \), the belief of obtaining a white ball in the next extraction (it should be, more precisely, indicated by \( P(E_{W(k+1)} | I_k) \)). They are evaluated applying Eq. (14) using \( P(H_j) = P(H_j | I_k) \). After some initial fluctuation, \( P(E_W | I_k) \) converges to 20\%, consistent with the fact that we assign the highest belief to \( H_1 \), which has a 20\% content of white balls. It is interesting to note that \( P(E_W | I_k) \) is always greater than 20\%. This result is consistent with the fact that \( H_0 \) is ruled out at the first extraction, and hence only boxes with at least 20\% white balls are considered.

For comparison, Table IV also gives the observed relative frequency of white balls, \( f(E_W) \). This frequency could be used as an alternative way of assessing probability. We see that the convergence to 20\% is much slower than that calculated by Bayesian inference. Moreover, there are fluctuations below 20\%, inconsistent with the fact that a white ball percentage below 20\% has been proved impossible. The reason why the Bayesian method works better than the frequency method is that the latter does not take into account all of the available information. This problem is a general one with frequentist methods, which are based on hidden assumptions of which the user is often unaware. The effect is that practitioners using frequentist methods often solve problems different than what they had in mind. For example, in this case the frequency solution corresponds to a problem with a very large number of boxes with a white ball percentage ranging almost continuously from 0 to 100. Clearly a different problem.
| trial $k$ | $E^{(k)}$ (score) | Probability of the hypotheses $P(H_j|I_k)$ | $P(E_W|I_k)$ | $f(E_W)$ |
|----------|------------------|------------------------------------------|------------|---------|
| 0        | –                | 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167     | 0.50       | –       |
| 1        | $E_W$ (1,0)      | 0 0.067 0.133 0.200 0.267 0.333         | 0.73       | 1       |
| 2        | $E_B$ (1,1)      | 0 0.200 0.300 0.300 0.200 0             | 0.50       | 0.50    |
| 3        | $E_B$ (1,2)      | 0 0.320 0.360 0.240 0.080 0             | 0.42       | 0.33    |
| 4        | $E_B$ (1,3)      | 0 0.438 0.370 0.164 0.027 0             | 0.35       | 0.25    |
| 5        | $E_W$ (2,3)      | 0 0.246 0.415 0.277 0.062 0             | 0.43       | 0.40    |
| 10       | (3,7)            | 0 0.438 0.468 0.092 0.002 0             | 0.33       | 0.30    |
| 20       | (6,14)           | 0 0.458 0.522 0.020 $\approx 10^{-5}$ 0 | 0.31       | 0.30    |
| 30       | (7,23)           | 0 0.854 0.146 $\approx 10^{-4}$ $\approx 10^{-10}$ 0 | 0.229   | 0.233   |
| 40       | (9,31)           | 0 0.936 0.064 $\approx 10^{-5}$ $\approx 10^{-13}$ 0 | 0.213   | 0.225   |
| 50       | (9,41)           | 0 0.9962 0.004 $\approx 10^{-8}$ $\approx 10^{-19}$ 0 | 0.2008  | 0.180   |
| 60       | (11,49)          | 0 0.9985 0.002 $\approx 10^{-10}$ $\approx 10^{-23}$ 0 | 0.2003  | 0.183   |
| 70       | (11,59)          | 0 0.9999 $\approx 10^{-4}$ $\approx 10^{-13}$ $\approx 10^{-29}$ 0 | 0.20002 | 0.157   |
| 80       | (12,68)          | 0 1.0000 $\approx 10^{-5}$ $\approx 10^{-15}$ $\approx 10^{-34}$ 0 | 0.200003 | 0.176   |
| 90       | (15,75)          | 0 1.0000 $\approx 10^{-5}$ $\approx 10^{-16}$ $\approx 10^{-36}$ 0 | 0.200003 | 0.188   |
| 100      | (18,82)          | 0 1.0000 $\approx 10^{-5}$ $\approx 10^{-16}$ $\approx 10^{-39}$ 0 | 0.200003 | 0.180   |

TABLE I. Results of a simulated experiment in which a box is selected at random (it happens to be $H_1$) and balls are extracted and then reintroduced. The analysis program guesses the box content and the probability of having a white ball in a future extraction, $P(E_W|I_k)$. This probability is also compared to the observed relative frequency of the white balls, $f(E_W)$.
Coming back to the probability of the different boxes, the difference between the Bayesian and frequentist solution is not only matter of quantity, but of quality. In the latter approach the concept of probability of hypotheses, a concept very natural to physicists, is not defined, and therefore no direct comparison between Bayesian and frequentist results is possible. Nevertheless, frequentist methods deal with hypotheses using the well known procedure of hypothesis tests, in which a null hypothesis is accepted, or rejected with a certain level of significance. Unfortunately, this procedure is a major source of confusion among practitioners and causes severely misleading scientific conclusions.

As a final remark concerning the six box problem, imagine changing the method of preparation of the boxes. For example, we could have a large bag containing in equal proportion black and white balls. We select at random five balls, and without looking at them we introduce them in the box. Then the game goes on as before. Clearly the initial beliefs about the box compositions are now different, as they can be calculated from the binomial distribution:

\[ P_0(H_j) = \binom{5}{j} \frac{1}{2^5}. \]  

(19)

Balanced compositions are more likely than those containing balls of the same color. Therefore, even after the first extraction, the most favored box composition will not be that having all balls of the extracted color. This influence of the conclusions from the prior knowledge is absolutely reasonable and is mostly important when the number of extractions is low. It becomes negligible and then disappears asymptotically when the amount of experimental data is very large. Bayesian inference balances in an automatic way the contributions of experimental evidence and prior knowledge.

V. MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY

Let us move to the application of Bayesian inference to measurement uncertainty. Conceptually, it is the same as in the six box example, except that in most cases true values and, as an approximation, effects may assume continuous real values (strictly speaking, effects are by nature discrete). Let us call \( \mu \) the true value and \( X \) the observation. Because we are dealing with continuous quantities, we must use probability density functions. The function \( f(\mu | I) \) describes the uncertainty about \( \mu \) given the status of information \( I \); \( f(x, \mu | I) \) describes the simultaneous uncertainty about the possible outcome of the experiment and the true value; \( f(x | \mu, I) \) is related to the performance of the experiment, as it describes the uncertainty about the outcome of the experiment under the hypothesis that \( \mu \) has a particular value; and finally \( f(\mu | x, I) \) is the result of a measurement, and describes the uncertainty about \( \mu \) updated by the observation \( X = x \).

We could follow the same logical steps sketched for the six box example and arrive at an analogous formulation for Bayes’ theorem, namely

\[ f(\mu | x, I) \propto f(x | \mu, I) f(\mu | I). \]  

(20)

Using the symbol \( f_0(\mu) \) for the prior probability density and assuming \( I \) to be implicit, we have the more compact formula

\[ f(\mu | x) \propto f(x | \mu) f_0(\mu). \]  

(21)

Obviously, in this case the normalization denominator is given by the integral \( \int f(x | \mu) f_0(\mu) d\mu \), integrated over all possible values of \( \mu \).

As an example, consider a detector characterized by Gaussian response, that is,

\[ f(x | \mu) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi} \sigma} e^{-(x-\mu)^2/2\sigma^2}. \]  

(22)

In practice (at least in routine measurements) the width of the response around the true value \( \sigma \) is much narrower than our uncertainty about \( \mu \). For example, if the temperature in a room is measured, we would choose a thermometer which has a \( \sigma \) of the order of a degree or better; otherwise, we do not...
obtain a better estimate of the temperature than what can be inferred from our physiological feeling. Without going into mathematical proofs, it is plausible that if the width of the prior probability density is much larger than \( \sigma \), the prior probability density acts as a constant:

\[
 f(\mu \mid x) = \frac{(2\pi\sigma^2)^{-1/2} e^{-(x-\mu)^2/2\sigma^2} k}{\int^{\infty}_{-\infty} (2\pi\sigma^2)^{-1/2} e^{-(x-\mu)^2/2\sigma^2} k \, d\mu}
\]

(23)

where \( k \) is a constant. Because the integrand is symmetric in \( x \) and \( \mu \), we obtain:

\[
 f(\mu \mid x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma}} e^{-(\mu-x)^2/2\sigma^2}.
\]

(24)

Note the inverted positions of \( \mu \) and \( x \) in the exponent, to remind us that \( \mu \) is now the random variable (uncertain number), and \( x \) a parameter of the distribution. The probability of \( \mu \) is concentrated around the observed value, described by a Gaussian probability distribution with a standard deviation \( \sigma \). The function \( f(\mu \mid x) \) contains the complete status of uncertainty, from which an infinite number of probabilistic statements about \( \mu \) can be calculated. For example, if we believe that the detector response is Gaussian and that \( x \) has been observed, then we must attribute a 68% probability to \( \mu \) to be in the interval \( x - \sigma \leq \mu \leq x + \sigma \), 95% to be within \( x - 2\sigma \leq \mu \leq x + 2\sigma \), and so on.

Although it was not explicitly written in Eq. (24), we understand that this result depends on all available knowledge concerning the experiment, including calibration constants, influence parameters (temperature, pressure, etc), noise, and so on. In physics jargon, we say, “it depends on systematic effects.” Let us call all these physical quantities on which the result can depend influence parameters and indicate them by \( h_i \). For simplicity, let us assume that each influence parameter can assume continuous values. Generally, we are also in a status of uncertainty about the exact value of these parameters. Because the uncertainty about one of these quantities could depend on knowledge about the others, we must consider the general case of a joint probability density function \( f(h) \equiv f(h_1, h_2, \ldots, h_n) \). Therefore, the Bayes formula is written, more precisely, as

\[
 f(\mu \mid x, h) \propto f(x \mid \mu, h) f_0(\mu).
\]

(25)

Probability theory tells us how to get rid of the uncertain influence parameters. We have to make a weighted average over the possibilities for \( h \), with the weight given by how much we believe in each possibility. Specifically,

\[
 f(\mu \mid x) = \int f(\mu \mid x, h) f(h) \, dh.
\]

(26)

We now have a method of handling uncertainty due to systematic errors which is very intuitive and does not introduce ad hoc ingredients into the theory. There is no well defined and consistent solution using other approaches.

As an example, consider a single calibration constant related to a scale offset \( Z \). If the calibration had been done, then we believe \( Z \) to be around zero, with a standard uncertainty of \( \sigma_z \). Let us model this uncertainty by a Gaussian:

\[
 f_0(z) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma_z}} e^{-z^2/2\sigma_z^2}.
\]

(27)

The \( z \) dependent likelihood is now

\[
 f(x \mid \mu, z) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma}} e^{-(x-(\mu+z))^2/2\sigma^2}.
\]

(28)

Taking again a constant for the prior probability density for \( \mu \), we have the following inference on \( \mu \) conditioned by the observed value \( x \) and the unknown value \( z \):

\[
 f(\mu \mid x, z) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma}} e^{-(\mu-(x-z))^2/2\sigma^2}.
\]

(29)
Applying Eq. (26) we have

\[
f(\mu | x) = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi} \sigma} e^{-\frac{(\mu-(x-z))^2}{2\sigma^2}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi} \sigma_z} e^{-\frac{z^2}{2\sigma_z^2}} dz , \tag{30}
\]

from which we obtain

\[
f(\mu | x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi} \sqrt{\sigma^2 + \sigma_z^2}} e^{-\frac{(\mu-x)^2}{2(\sigma^2+\sigma_z^2)}} . \tag{31}
\]

The probability density function which describes \( \mu \) is still centered around the observed value \( x \), but with a standard deviation which is the quadratic combination of \( \sigma \) and \( \sigma_z \). This result is one of the suggested “prescriptions” for combining statistical and systematic “errors” used by researchers. In the Bayesian inference it is just a theorem, with all assumptions clearly stated. Another interesting property of Bayesian inference is that, when it is applied to a multidimensional problem, that is, inferring simultaneously many true quantities from the same set of data with the same instruments, we obtain a joint distribution \( f(\mu_1, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_m | \text{data}) \) which also contains the detailed information about correlations. For further examples, as well as for approximation methods to be used in everyday applications, see Ref. [11].

As a final remark on measurement uncertainty, let us consider again the Bayesian inferential framework sketched by Eq. (17), which is often summarized by the motto learning by experience. According to my experience in teaching, the Bayesian spirit not only shows the correct way of making inferences, but also gives guidance in the teaching of laboratory courses. Equation (17) means that scientific conclusions depend both on likelihood and prior information. The likelihood describes the status of knowledge concerning instrumentation, environment conditions, and influence factors, experimenter’s contribution, etc. Good prior information means a good knowledge of the studied phenomenology. The importance of these two contributions is well known to good experimenters. The balance of the two contributions allows researchers to accept a result, compare it critically with others, repeat measurements if needed, calibrate the instruments, and finally produce useful results for the scientific community. My recommendation [39] is to teach the theory of measurement uncertainty only after students have experienced by themselves these aspects of experimentation, and have learned in parallel the language of probability, the only language on which a consistent theory of uncertainty can be based.

**VI. SUMMARY**

Subjective probability is based on the idea that probability is related to the status of uncertainty and not (only) to the outcome of repeated experiments. This point of view, which corresponds to the original meaning of “probable,” was the one to which Bayes, Bernoulli, Gauss, Hume, Laplace, and others, subscribed. This point of view is well expressed by the following words of Poincaré, “If we were not ignorant, there would be no probability, there could only be certainty. But our ignorance cannot be absolute, for then there would be no longer any probability at all. Thus the problems of probability may be classed according to the greater or less depth of our ignorance.”

The concept of probability is kept separate from the evaluation rules, and, as a consequence, this approach becomes the most general one, applicable also to those problems in which it is impossible to make an inventory of possible and favorable equiprobable cases, or to repeat the experiment under the same conditions (those problems are the most interesting ones in real life and research applications). The other approaches are recovered, as particular evaluation rules, if the limiting conditions on which they are based hold.

As far as physics applications are concerned, the importance of the subjectivist approach stems from the fact that it is the only approach which allows us to speak in the most general way about the probability of hypotheses and true values, concepts which correspond to the natural reasoning of physicists. As a consequence, it is possible to build a consistent inferential framework in which the language remains that of probability. This framework is called Bayesian statistics, because of the crucial role of Bayes’ theorem in updating probabilities in the light of new experimental facts using the rules of
logics. Subjective ingredients of the inference, unavoidable because researchers do not share the same status of information, are not hidden with the hope of obtaining objective inferences, but are optimally incorporated in the inferential framework. Hence, the prior dependence of the inference should not be seen as a weak point of the theory. On the contrary, it obliges practitioners to consider and state clearly the hypotheses which enter the inference and to take personal responsibility for the result. In any case, prior information and evidence provided by the data are properly balanced by Bayes’ theorem, and the result is in qualitative agreement with what we would expect rationally. Priors dominate if the data is missing or of poor quality or if the hypothesis favored by the data alone is difficult to believe. They become uninfluential for routine high accuracy measurements, or when the evidence provided by the data in favor of a new hypothesis is so strong that physicists are obliged to remove deeply rooted ideas.

The adjectives “subjective” and “Bayesian” are not really necessary, and sometimes give the impression that they have some esoteric meaning. As has been mentioned several times, the intent is to have a theory of uncertainty in which “probability” has the same meaning for everybody, precisely that meaning which the human mind has naturally developed. Therefore, I would rather call these methods probabilistic. The appellatives “subjective” and “Bayesian” should be considered temporary, in contraposition to the conventional methods which are at present better known.

The status of the art on Bayesian statistics can be found in Refs. 44 and 45. Ref. 43 provides a general introduction to Bayesian reasoning from an historical and philosophical perspective. References 3 and 46 are considered milestones. Many other references can be found in Ref. 11. Applications in statistical physics can be found in Refs. 47, 48, 49, and 50. Finally, as a starting point for Web navigation, Ref. 51 is recommended.

1 G. D'Agostini, “Bayesian reasoning versus conventional statistics in high energy physics,” Proc. of the XVIII International Workshop on Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods, Garching (Germany), July 1998. V. Dose, W. von der Linden, R. Fischer, and R. Preuss, eds. (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1999); LANL preprint physics/9811046. A copy can be found at the author’s URL: http://www-zeus.roma1.infn.it/~agostini/.

2 “Probable” comes from Latin and was used exactly with its contemporary meaning much before a formal theory of probability was developed.

3 B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability (J. Wiley & Sons, 1974).

4 Note how “will” does not imply necessarily time ordering, but a condition of uncertainty concerning something that might have been already happened.

5 D. Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748; electronic version at http://www.utm.edu/research/hume/wri/lenq/.

6 It is of crucial importance to have neatly separated in one’s mind “belief” from “imagination,” “subjective” from “arbitrary.” A clear analysis of the first two concepts was done by D. Hume. The concept of coherence makes subjective degrees of belief not arbitrary.

7 The coherence rule is often described in the following way. Imagine that you assess the value of the probability, and hence the odds, and then another rational person chooses the direction of the bet. This situation is similar to the case where two persons wish to equally divide some goods: one makes the partition, and the other one has the choice.

8 In the axiomatic approach one does not attempt to define what probability is and how to assess it. Probability is just a real number satisfying the axioms. Using the axioms and the rules of logic, the probability of logically connected events can be evaluated. But the problem remains that probability is never well defined, which is a source of confusion mentioned in the introduction.

9 It is obvious that, in an approach in which probability is always conditional probability, Eq. 8 cannot “define” conditional probability. The interpretation of Eqs. (4) and (5) in the subjective approach is that we are free to assess two of the three probabilities, but the third one is constrained by coherence. If the three assignments do not satisfy Eq. (5), it is possible to imagine a combination of bets in which one wins or looses with certainty, depending on the direction of the bets. Section 8.2 of Ref. 11 describes an example showing that the point of view on conditional probability described here is the same as that intuitively used.
One could argue that this number can also be obtained in any other approach, and this argument is formally true. The question is how to interpret it. Clearly 23% is neither a ratio of the number of favorable cases over the number of equiprobable cases, nor an evaluation from a long experiment on the relative frequency of favorable results. Only in the subjective approach is the result of each step of a probability calculation consistent with the definition.

G. D’Agostini, “Bayesian reasoning in high energy physics – principles and applications,” CERN Report 99-03, 19 July 1999; electronic version at http://wwwas.cern.ch/library/cern_publications/yellow_re-
ports.htm and at author’s URL (see Ref. 1).

The concept of probability, well separated by the evaluation rules, is magnificently expressed in Chapter 6 of Hume’s essay.

M. Kac, Probability and Related Topics in Physical Sciences (Interscience Publishers, 1959).

G. Polya, Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning, Vol. II: Patterns of Plausible Inference (Princeton University Press, 1968).

F. Reif, Fundamental of Statistical and Thermal Physics (McGraw-Hill, 1965).

R. von Mises, Probability, Statistics and Truth, 1928 (George Allen & Unwin, 1957), second edition.

The term prevision rather than expected value is the preferred term of subjectivists. Prevision is a more general concept than the well known expected value, and can be applied to uncertain numbers as well as to events. When applied to events, prevision reduces to probability.

The law of large numbers is certainly the most known and the most misused law of probability. Bernoulli’s theorem talks about probabilities of relative frequencies, and not about a “limit of relative frequency to probability,” an expression which could give the idea of a limit in the usual mathematical sense. The theorem does not say that if at a certain moment a number in a lottery has appeared less frequently than what expected from probability, then it will come out a bit more often in the future in order to obey the law of large numbers. It does not even justify the frequency based “definition” of probability. As pointed out by de Finetti: “For those who seek to connect the notion of probability with that of frequency, results which relate probability and frequency in some way (and especially those results like the ‘law of large numbers’) play a pivotal role, providing support for the approach and for the identification of the concepts. Logically speaking, however, one cannot escape from the dilemma posed by the fact that the same thing cannot both be assumed first as a definition and then proved as a theorem; nor can one avoid the contradiction that arises from a definition which would assume as certain something that the theorem only states to be very probable.”

I find that students gain much in awareness of statistical matters if a clear distinction is made between descriptive statistics, probability theory, and inferential statistics. For example, an experimental histogram of a measured quantity should never be called a “probability distribution,” but should be called its correct name of “frequency distribution.”

Indicating by the subscript 1 the quantities referring to the remaining extractions, we have the obvious result:

\[
E[f_w^1] = p \quad \text{and} \quad \sigma(f_w^1) = \sqrt{p(1-p)/N_1}. \]

Note, however, that the prevision of the relative frequency of the entire ensemble is in general different from that calculated a priori. Calling \( n_1 \) the uncertain number of favorable results in the next \( N_1 \) trials, we have the uncertain frequency \( f_w = (f_w^0 N_0 + n_1)/N \), and hence

\[
E[f_w \mid N_0] = (f_w^0 N_0 + p N_1)/N, \quad \sigma(f_w \mid N_0) = \sqrt{p(1-p) N_1/\sqrt{N}}. \]

It is easy to understand that, as \( N_0 \) approaches \( N \), we are practically sure about the overall relative frequency, because it belongs now to past.

The importance of this reasoning is well expressed by Poincaré: “... these problems are classified as probability of causes, and are the most interesting of all from their scientific applications.”

H. Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis, 1905 (Dover Publications, 1952).

One can make frequency distributions of experimental observables (such as the readings of a scale) under apparently identical conditions of the quantity to be measured and of the measurement conditions, and use them to evaluate the likelihood. Instead, it is never possible to make a frequency distribution of true values, because they refer to an idealized concept. The only way to assess probabilities of true values is using a probability inversion following the reasoning we are developing. I find it crucially important that students be taught from the beginning about the distinction between the values of the reading (what is accessible to our senses) and that of the physics quantity (an abstract concept). Similarly, speaking about “data uncertainty” makes no sense (apart from pathological cases). Once the experiment is performed, data are certain by definition. What is uncertain are true values. The opposite reasoning is a product of frequentist teaching, according to which the true value is a constant of unknown value, and the category of probable is assigned only to data.
This time consuming procedure is not really needed, although introduced for teaching purposes, and one can use only the scores. Because the likelihoods in our example do not depend on the \( k \)th order of the results. The fact that only two numbers \((N_W \text{ and } N_B)\) are sufficient to summarize the relevant information for the inference is related to the statistical concept of **sufficiency**. Instead, the idea that the \( k!/(N_W!N_B!) \) possible sequences are considered a priori equiprobable, though the individual events \( E_W^{(i)} \) (not to be confused with \( E_W^{(j)} \)) are not independent (because the probability of each event depends on the score of the previous \( i \)−1 events, as it is clear from Eqs. (14) and (15) and as can be easily understood from Table II), is related to the concept of **exchangeability** which we will not consider here.

Poincaré’s opinion about the probability of hypotheses is very enlighting. He calls the problem of assessing the ”probability of the causes” (that is, of hypotheses) “the essential problem of the experimental method.”

The standard hypothesis test is based on the following reasoning: One formulates a basic hypothesis (“null hypothesis”) \( H_0 \) and defines an observable \( \theta \) for which one is able to calculate a probability distribution under the condition that \( H_0 \) is true. Then one defines a **prior interval** in which \( \theta \) has a high probability to occur and, as a consequence, a complementary region in which the probability is low. This latter probability is indicated by \( \alpha \) and typical values considered are 1% and 5%. Finally, conclusions are drawn depending on where the experimental value of \( \theta \) occurs. If it falls inside the high probability region, then \( H_0 \) is accepted. If it falls in the low probability region then “\( H_0 \) is rejected with significance \( \alpha \)” (see for example, Ref. 28).

Because this point is rather delicate and touches concepts well rooted in all those who are accustomed with standard statistical methods, it would need a long and careful discussion. I refer the reader to Ref. 11 and references therein. For a short account see also Refs. 14 and 19. The source of confusion is due to the fact that the statement, “the null hypothesis \( H_0 \) is rejected with a 1% significance,” is interpreted often (from my experience I would say almost always) as if \( H_0 \) had only a 1% chance of being correct. This mistake is not made only by students, but also by working scientists.

Obviously, prior knowledge is not always so vague as to be not influential. If one thinks of two sequential independent measurements of the same quantity performed with instruments of (generally speaking) similar quality, the global inference is obtained by iterating Bayes’ theorem, as was seen in the six box example. The prior of the second inference, i.e. the final of the first one, has a similar weight of the second data. The presence of the priors in the inference is often considered as a weak point of Bayesian inference. But the criticism is not justified, because priors play a role which is consistent with what prior knowledge is expected to do. For an extensive discussion on this subject see Ref. 52.

This result might seem trivial, because it is more or less how physicists interpret the results of measurements, even if they are not aware of Bayesian statistics. This interpretation is due to the fact that physicists’ intuition is very close to Bayesian reasoning and probability inversions of the kind \( P(\mu - \sigma \leq x \leq \mu + \sigma) = 68% \) implies that \( P(x - \sigma \leq \mu \leq x + \sigma) = 68% \) are considered very natural. However, in other approaches this inversion is arbitrary, although researchers do so intuitively, with a reasoning described in Refs. 1 and 11. But, unfortunately, most people are not aware of the implicit assumptions on which this intuitive probability inversion is based, namely uniform priors and symmetric likelihood. If these assumptions do not hold, the numerical results are mistaken.

The fact that a consistent theory of measurement uncertainty which takes into account statistics and systematic contributions can only be achieved in the Bayesian scheme is also recognized by the metrology organizations. For example the ISO Guide 93 states: ”Type B standard uncertainty is obtained from an assumed
probability density function based on the degree of belief that an event will occur [often called subjective probability...].” “Recommendation ... upon which this Guide rests implicitly adopts such a viewpoint of probability ...as the appropriate way to calculate the combined standard uncertainty of a result of a measurement.” (According to the ISO recommendations, “The uncertainty in the result of a measurement generally consists of several components which may be grouped into two categories according to the way in which their numerical value is estimated: A) those which are evaluated by statistical methods; B) those which are evaluated by other means.” More precisely, the Type A uncertainty is evaluated from the dispersion of the results in the measurements of the physical quantity of interest, Type B is evaluated from all other information concerning the measurement, and it includes all uncertainties due to systematic errors.

International Organization for Standardization, “Guide to the expression of uncertainty in measurement,” Geneva, Switzerland, 1993.

Errors within quotation marks remind the reader that error is often used improperly as a synonym for uncertainty. The metrology organizations, in particular ISO\cite{ISO} and DIN\cite{DIN} have done much work to bring some clarification in the terminology concerning measurement error, measurement errors and measurement uncertainty. The result of this work has been adopted also by NIST\cite{NIST}.

DIN Deutsches Institut für Normung, “Grunbegriffe der Messtechnick – Behandlung von Unsicherheiten bei der Auswertung von Messungen” (DIN 1319 Teile 1–4, Beuth Verlag GmbH, Berlin, Germany, 1985). Parts 3 and 4 have been reedited after the ISO Guide.

B. N. Taylor and C. E. Kuyatt, “Guidelines for evaluating and expressing uncertainty of NIST measurement results,” NIST Technical Note 1297, September 1994. URL: http://physics.nist.gov/Pubs/guidelines/outline.html

G. D’Agostini, “Measurements errors and measurement uncertainty – critical review and proposals for teaching,” Internal Report 1094, Department of Physics, University of Rome “La Sapienza,” May 1998 (in Italian). A copy can be found at the author’s URL.

For example, Gauss makes explicit use of the concepts of prior and posterior probability of hypotheses in his derivation of the Gaussian distribution\cite{Gauss}. He derives a formula equivalent to the Bayes’ theorem valid for \textit{a priori} equiprobable hypotheses (condition explicitly stated). Then, using some symmetry arguments, plus the condition that the final distribution is maximized when the true value of the quantity equals the arithmetic average of the measurements, he obtained that the mathematical function of the error distribution (playing the role of likelihood) is what we now name after him.

C. F. Gauss, \textit{Theoria motus corporum coelestium in sectionibus conicis solem ambientium}, 1809, n.i 172–179 (Werke 7, Gotha, F. A. Perthes, 1871), pp. 225-234.

Frequentist ideas began in the early 1900’s (see for example, Ref. \cite{Frequentist} and references therein).

C. Howson and P. Urbach, \textit{Scientific Reasoning – the Bayesian Approach} (Open Court, 1993), second edition.

J. M. Bernardo and A. F. M. Smith, \textit{Bayesian Theory} (John Wiley & Sons, 1994).

A. O’Hagan, \textit{Bayesian Inference}, Vol. 2B of Kendall’s advanced theory of statistics (Halsted Press, 1994).

H. Jeffreys, \textit{Theory of Probability} (Oxford University Press, 1961).

E. T. Jaynes, “Clearing up mysteries – the original goal,” in \textit{Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods}, J. Skilling, ed. (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989).

R. Scozzafava, “The role of probability in statistical physics,” Transport Theory and Statistical Physics, 1999 (to appear); R. Scozzafava, “A classical analogue of the two-slit model of quantum probability,” Pure Mathematics and Applications, Series C 2, 223–235 (1991).

B. Buck and V. A. Macaulay, eds., \textit{Maximum Entropy in Action} (Oxford University Press, 1991).

P. Grassberger and J. P. Nadal, eds., \textit{From Statistical Physics to Statistical Inference and Back} (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994).

The International Society for Bayesian Analysis (ISBA), URL: http://www.bayesian.org/