From Bell’s Theorem to Secure Quantum Key Distribution

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Any Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol consists first of sequences of measurements that produce some correlation between classical data. We show that these correlation data must violate some Bell inequality in order to contain distillable secrecy, if not they could be produced by quantum measurements performed on a separable state of larger dimension. We introduce a new QKD protocol and prove its security against any individual attack by an adversary only limited by the no-signaling condition.

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In 1991 Artur Ekert published his seminal paper Quantum Cryptography based on Bell’s theorem [1]. For the first time, it was argued that quantum nonlocality could be good for something! It was already known, since 1964, that quantum correlations allow one to perform some tasks classically impossible, like violating Bell’s inequality between space-like separated regions [2]. But Ekert’s proposal was the first addressing a useful task and this had a huge impact on the development of Quantum Information Science. Yet, none of today’s security proofs of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) make a direct use of quantum nonlocality (see however the recent work of Ref. [3]). The existing proofs are either based on the no-cloning theorem, or on the monogamy (i.e. non shareability) of entanglement. All proofs heavily exploit the Hilbert space artillerу of quantum physics.

In the recent years, quantum nonlocality underwent yet another important twist. Thanks to the seminal paper by Popescu and Rohrlich [4], it was realized that one can study nonlocality without Hilbert space. Indeed, although quantum states violate Bell inequalities, there is nothing quantum in the derivation of a Bell inequality. The picture is richer when one adds the assumption of no-signaling, i.e. that the correlations between distant partners cannot be used to send information, as is the case for quantum correlations. The no-signaling principle suffices to severely limit the set of correlations. Formally, a correlation is a conditional probability distribution $P(a, b|x, y)$, where $a$ and $b$ are Alice and Bob’s output data, respectively, and $x$ and $y$ are their choices of inputs. For instance, $x$ and $y$ could be their choice of measurement settings and $a$ and $b$ the obtained results. The no-signaling condition implies that the marginals are independent of the partner’s input:

$$P(a|x, y) = \sum_{b} P(a, b|x, y) = P(a|x). \quad (1)$$

For finite alphabets for inputs and outputs, the set of all these correlations is convex with a finite number of extremal points, hence it is a polytope. This new conceptual tool allows one for the first time to study quantum nonlocality from the outside, that is without all the Hilbert space machinery. Several recent papers explore this new avenue [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. In particular, it is proven in [8, 9] that no-signaling alone implies that nonlocal correlations are also monogamous since they cannot be cloned.

It is thus natural to ask whether, as suggested by Artur Ekert, the security of QKD does not rely, ultimately, on quantum nonlocality. At first sight this seems unlikely. The standard answer runs as follows: if Alice and Bob are sufficiently entangled, then the adversary Eve is essentially factorized out. Despite this standard answer, the situation is more subtle: If the Alice-Bob correlation is local, it can be reproduced by (classical or quantum) variables coming from a source. However, a perfect copy of these variables could also be sent to Eve. Then it could be that Alice and Bob share a separable states of larger dimension! Indeed, the local variables necessarily enlarge Alice and Bob’s Hilbert space. As an example, consider BB84 [10], where Alice and Bob choose between two different measurements. Their correlation can be reproduced by the four-qubit separable state

$$\rho_{AB} = \frac{1}{4} (|00\rangle_1 |00\rangle_2 + |11\rangle_1 |11\rangle_2) \otimes (|00\rangle_3 |00\rangle_4 + |11\rangle_3 |11\rangle_4). \quad (2)$$

Here, Alice holds the first and third qubit. Whenever she measures in the $z$ ($x$) basis she is actually measuring the first (third) qubit in this basis. The same happens for Bob, with the second and fourth qubit. Clearly, their measurement results are completely correlated when the bases agree and uncorrelated otherwise. However their state is separable, so BB84 becomes insecure even in the ideal noise-free situation! In summary, all security proofs of QKD assume that the legitimate partners, Alice and Bob, know the dimensions of the Hilbert space describing their quantum systems. In practice, this is usually a reasonable assumption, however it underlines that assumptions are necessary for any security proof. Moreover it is conceptually interesting to disenstange the consequences of no-signaling from those relying on the Hilbert space
formalism. Experimentally, additional Hilbert-space dimensions correspond to “side-channels”, i.e., to degrees of freedom coded accidentally. For example, in photon polarization coding, the wavelength could be accidentally correlated to the state of polarization.

In this letter, we first present a new 4-state QKD protocol, next demonstrate its security against any individual attack by any adversary only limited by the no-signaling condition. In particular, Eve could be supra-quantum, since there are nonsignaling correlations not achievable using quantum states. In the new protocol, Alice and Bob have for each realization the choice between two measurements with binary outcomes. Essential is that their measured data violate the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) Bell inequality:

$$P(a_0 = b_0) + P(a_0 = b_1) + P(a_1 = b_0) + P(a_1 = b_1) \leq 3,$$

where $$P(a_j = b_k) = P(a = b = 0|x = j, y = k) + P(a = b = 1|x = j, y = k)$$. For example, Alice and Bob could share a Werner state, $$\rho_W = WP_{\phi^+} + (1 - W)1/4$$, with visibility $$W$$, where $$P_{\phi^+}$$ denotes the projector onto $$|\phi^+\rangle = (|00\rangle + |11\rangle)/\sqrt{2}$$. and perform the measurements that maximize the violation of the CHSH-Bell inequality. But any other way to obtain data violating is equally good. Hence we name our new protocol the CHSH-protocol. Violation of implies that in three out of the four measurement choices, Alice and Bob are correlated (the three first terms in ), though not necessarily maximally, while in the fourth case they are anti-correlated. The analog of basis reconciliation goes as follows: Bob announces all his measurement settings, Alice keeps all her data, but for the case of anti-correlation, she flips her bit. Compared to BB84, the partners keep all data, however, all data are noisy. For $$W > 1/\sqrt{2}$$ the new protocol produces data that violate Bell’s inequality. Hence there are no local variables that Eve could hold.

In the sequence, we limit our analysis to isotropic raw correlations with visibility $$V$$:

$$P(a, b|x, y) = V^2 \delta(a + b = x \cdot y) + (1 - V)^2 \frac{1}{4}$$

where $$\delta(r = s) = 1$$ whenever the equality holds modulo 2, and 0 otherwise. For $$V \leq 1/\sqrt{2}$$, such correlations can be distributed by quantum physics (e.g., by a Werner state with $$W = \sqrt{2V}$$) and for $$V > 1/2$$ they violate the Bell inequality. This does not imply any loss of generality: Alice and Bob can map any binary correlation into these isotropic correlations by local operations and classical communication keeping the Bell violation.

Let us study the security of this protocol. As usual, it is assumed that the distribution of the correlation is done by Eve. Any attack consists of a three-party distribution

$$P(a, b, e|x, y, z)$$ whose marginal is:

$$P(a, b, e|x, y, z) = \sum_e P(a, b, e|x, y, z) = \sum_e P(e|z)P(a, b|x, y, z, e).$$

where for the second equality we used the no-signaling condition: Eve’s output $$e$$ is independent of Alice and Bob’s inputs $$x$$ and $$y$$. We can restrict our considerations to attacks where Eve prepares extreme points of Alice and Bob’s no-signaling polytope. Indeed, consider an attack where this is not the case, that is, some of the terms appearing in Eq. do not correspond to an extreme point of Alice-Bob’s no-signaling polytope. Then, these terms can be expressed as a convex combination of extreme points

$$P(a, b, e|x, y, z, e) = \sum_{\lambda} P_{\text{ext}}(a, b|x, y, z, e, \lambda)P(\lambda).$$

Giving the knowledge of $$\lambda$$ to Eve, one has an attack consisting of extreme points and that is at least as good as the previous one, since, c.f. We need to recall now some facts about nonsignaling correlations with binary input and output. Barrett and co-workers proved that in this simple binary case, the number of extremal nonsignaling correlations is very limited

\[ \sum_{\lambda} P_{\text{ext}}(a, b|x, y, z, e, \lambda)P(\lambda). \]
If moreover one concentrates on the correlations that violate the CHSH-Bell inequality, then one finds a unique extremal correlation that violates it; this is the isotropic correlation \( \| \) with \( V = 1 \). This correlation appears in the literature as PR-box \( \| \), or NonLocal Machine \( \| \) or Unit of Nonlocality \( \| \). Moreover, there are 8 extremal correlations that saturate the inequality \( \| \), see Fig. 1.

For the local points, all the outcomes are deterministic and known by Eve. However, if Alice and Bob share a nonlocal machine, they have the guarantee of perfect monogamy \( \| \), so Eve cannot be correlated at all. Eve’s optimal attack then consists of the combination of extreme points that mimics Alice-Bob’s correlation with the minimal weight for nonlocal points. Therefore, she prepares only those local points that are closer to Alice and Bob’s correlation. This can be easily understood in Figure 1 in order to reproduce the quantum correlation observed by Alice and Bob, represented by a square, Eve should send an equal mixture of the eight local points lying on the facet, plus the nonlocal machine on top of it. In what follows \( p_{NL} \) denotes the probability that Eve prepares a nonlocal machine. The Bell violation observed by Alice and Bob fixes the value of \( p_{NL} \), since \( p_{NL} = 2V - 1 \). When the observed data are local, Eve can mimic them with deterministic local points. However, when the correlation is nonlocal, Eve is sometimes forced to send a nonlocal machine, where she cannot be correlated because of the non-signaling principle. The resulting probability distribution, after basis reconciliation, is summarized in Table 1, where \( p_L = 1 - p_{NL} \). Eve’s information on Alice and Bob’s outcomes is represented by two variables \( (e_a, e_b) \). The value at each position of the table gives the probability for the corresponding outcomes, e.g. \( P(a = 0, b = 0, e = (?, ?)) = p_L/8 \). Notice that since only Bob announces his measurement, Eve sometimes has deterministic information on Bob’s but not on Alice’s symbol after the basis reconciliation, even if her preparation was local. For example, consider the instance when Bob announces \( y = 1 \), then, even when Eve knows \( a_0 \) and \( a_1 \), she might not know Alice’s output. Moreover, one can see that, due to the properties of the local points lying on the CHSH facet, Eve has full information on both outcomes only when \( a = b \).

Once the optimal individual attack has been determined, it is time to study the secrecy properties of the resulting probability distribution. One can see that: (i) a secure key can already be established with one-way communication protocols and quantum states, (ii) this probability distribution contains secret correlations if and only if the CHSH inequality is violated, i.e. \( p_{NL} > 0 \), and (iii) it seems challenging to reach the Bell violation limit, \( p_{NL} = 0 \), by means of the known two-way advantage distillation techniques. The detailed calculation of these results will be given in a forthcoming paper [12].

In the case of one-way distillation protocols, it is clear that the flow of information has to go from Alice to Bob.
The quantum rates for our protocol without pre-processing are shown in Figure 2. The disturbance is defined in the standard way, namely $D = 0$ corresponds to a perfect channel, and $p_{NL} = \sqrt{2(1-2D)} - 1$. The critical disturbance is $D \lesssim 6.3\%$. Note that the fundamental difference between our security analysis and Ekert’s protocol: in his scheme, $D = 0$ guarantees perfect security. This is not the case here, since the eavesdropper is only limited by the no-signaling principle. In the case of two-way communication, a positive key rate is obtained when $D \lesssim 11.36\%$, or $p_{NL} \gtrsim 0.093$, still not sufficient to cover the region of Bell violation. Therefore, the binary probability distribution of Table II when the Bell violation is small, either contains bipartite bound information or is distillable using a new technique. Both alternatives appear very interesting.

Finally, it is also relevant to study the protocol in the standard scenario where the eavesdropper is quantum and Alice and Bob know their Hilbert spaces. A general security proof is beyond the scope of the present work. Here, we study the simple case of collective attacks, where Alice, Bob and Eve are assumed to share copies of the same state. We compare the obtained rates with those for the BB84 protocol in Ref. [10], see Fig. 2. The quantum rates for our protocol without pre-processing are the same as for BB84 with pre-processing given by $\gamma = \sin^2(\pi/8)$ [12]. For high disturbances, Alice starts adding noise, achieving the same rates and critical disturbance as for BB84, namely $D = 12.4\%$ [17].

To summarize, usual security proofs of QKD are based on entanglement theory. However, entanglement theory, like e.g. entanglement witnesses, assume fixed dimensions for Alice and Bob’s Hilbert spaces. If data do not violate any Bell inequality, then they can be produced by quantum measurements on a separable state of large dimension (the extra dimension allows one to include all supplementary local variables). Hence no QKD could be achieved without either a violation of some Bell inequality, or assumptions about the dimension of the relevant Hilbert spaces. In this letter we presented a QKD protocol aimed at producing data that violate the CHSH-Bell inequality. We proved its security against the most general individual attack without signaling, independently of any assumption about Hilbert spaces. To our knowledge, our results represent the first step towards the characterization of optimal nonsignaling eavesdropping attacks. Note also that the same data, i.e., same state preparation and measurements, can be secure in the standard quantum scenario or against no-signalling eavesdroppers: only the amount of error correction and privacy amplification has to be changed. We would like to conclude with a comment on the role played by Bell inequalities in our discussion. It is often said that any Bell inequality is just an example of an, often non-optimal, entanglement witness. However, they are more than this, since they are derived without invoking the quantum formalism. As shown here, they are witnesses of useful correlations independent of the Hilbert space structure.

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