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ASSESSING THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA AND THE DPRK:
CHANGES, LESSONS LEARNED, AND FUTURE OUTLOOK

This paper reviews and examines the main drivers and events in U.S. foreign policy towards the People’s Republic of China (China) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) since the inception of the Trump administration. The article makes a direct comparison between the D. Trump administration and its immediate predecessor, the B. Obama Administration. We look at how U.S. Foreign policy towards these two Asian countries is, under Trump, framed by a reliance on personalism and power politics on part of the current U.S administration. The paper makes an assessment of how practical issues with both China (trade, geopolitics in Asia-Pacific), and North Korea (nuclear weapons, sanctions, human rights) have evolved over the last three years, presenting hypothesis for future scenarios in either the case of a Trump re-election, or a change of leadership in the White House.

Key words: North Korea, DPRK, US foreign policy, Trump, China, government, presidential election, administration, power politics, denuclearization.

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Оценка внешней политики администрации Трампа в отношении Китая и КНДР: изменения, полученные уроки и перспективы на будущее

В данной статье рассматриваются и исследуются основные движущие силы и события внешней политики США в отношении Китайской Народной Республики (КНР) и Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики (КНДР) с момента создания администрации Президента Дональда Трампа. В статье проводится прямое сравнение между администрацией Трампа и ее непосредственным предшественником, администрацией экс-Президента Барака Обамы. Авторы рассматривают в данной статье то, как внешняя политика со стороны нынешней администрации США в отношении этих двух азиатских стран, при Трампе, в большей степени основана на опоре...
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“North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.”
- Donald Trump, interview at Bedminster, August 8, 2017

“Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.”
- Donald Trump, address at the United Nations General Assembly, September 19, 2017

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to offer a panoramic of the main divers, events and scholarly insights gathered insofar in the media and relevant literature on the foreign policy of the Trump administration towards the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter, China) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereinafter DPRK or North Korea).

Since Trump’s presidential inauguration in January of 2017, the world has witnessed a fundamentally different tone coming from the White House regarding world affairs (Borger et al., 2019). Trump has been eager to show that he is willing to do and say things that previous US presidents would not, opting for quite an unorthodox style of conducting foreign affairs. This involves going to China and publicly criticizing previous US presidents regarding the way in which they [poorly, according to Trump] conducted foreign policy with the PRC, or engaging in verbal disputes with North Korea by way of social media (Nakamura and Parker, 2017). Trump lauded the Chinese government for, over the years, taking advantage of the US government, as Trump stated that he can sympathize with such actions. Those comments in Beijing were well-received by Trump’s Chinese audience, as reporters and others in the room started clapping and chanting in support of what Trump just said, viewing it as giving their country face. Previously, there was common acceptance that when the US president is overseas, the president and other members of US House and US Senate did not publicly criticize each other, let alone a sitting US president criticize other US presidents while overseas. The game has changed with Trump.

During the campaign trail, Trump, on numerous occasions, decided to harshly criticize China on trade, stating that “China is raping the US” regarding unfair trade practices (Nakamura and Parker, 2017). Surprisingly, even though Trump used such harsh rhetoric to criticize China, there were plenty of Chinese nationals in the Chinese media praising Trump. Important to point out is that Trump’s opponent, Hillary Clinton, is perceived by many in China as not being a friend of China’s, as she harshly criticized the Chinese government while in Beijing for the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. Specifically, she criticized China on its treatment of women in that speech. Hillary Clinton’s speech was viewed as the harshest by an American elite in China. That speech is significant to consider as to why the Chinese media was not supportive of her candidacy and why Trump was viewed as the better candidate to work with.

Also on the campaign trail and during his time in office, Trump has consistently presented himself as a magnificent thinker. As a result, Trump has stated that he will be able to get a great deal for the US with both China and the DPRK, as he is the best person capable of striking deals (Hirsch, 2019). Therefore, Trump took the rather unconventional approach in US politics and stated that he would be willing to meet with the leader of the DPRK. Then, when the meeting was arranged, Trump was asked by reporters if he had prepared before his meeting with the leader of the DPRK (Ward, 2019). Reflecting the tremendous arrogance that Trump has long-demonstrated, he said that he did not need to prepare, that it will be based on how he feels at the time, and the feeling or connecting he is able to have with the DPRK leader. Again, this stands in stark contrast to how previous US presidents conducted foreign affairs, especially on an issue as significant as the DPRK with its nuclear weapons program.

Where the Trump Administration Differs: a Comparison with the Obama years

During Obama’s presidency, he maintained a calculated view regarding foreign affairs, thinking
things through and not acting based on personal profit or changing his mind very fast. After the 2016 presidential election, in which Trump lost the popular vote but won the electoral vote, Obama invited Trump to the White House for a meeting. At that meeting, Obama made the case that the most serious issue Trump would face as president is the situation with the DPRK (Seib, Solomon, and Lee, 2016). Despite being warned, Trump did not attempt to study the DPRK in terms of how to handle relations with the DPRK. Instead, reflecting the arrogance mentioned earlier, Trump thought that he could simply win over the leader of the DPRK based on his personal charisma.

Also, during Obama’s presidency and for the previous years, Republicans did not broach the idea of engaging the DPRK. Instead, Republicans embraced the idea of getting tough with the DPRK and isolating it. The idea was that the US should not engage such a reckless state. The DPRK would need to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions in order to start a dialogue with the US. Following that thinking, when Democratic presidents such as Clinton or Obama aimed to engage the DPRK, it was met with sharp criticism and condemnation by Republicans, arguing that is not the way to deal with such a rogue regime. However, under Trump, with his very kind words for the leader of the DPRK and his smiling and close embracing of Kim at their meetings, there has not been any Republican condemnation of this. Significantly, Trump has failed to achieve any progress in terms of the DPRK abandoning its nuclear weapons program or ending the launching of missiles.

Whereas previous US presidents have sought out leading experts and those with extensive experience in foreign affairs, Trump has followed a very different approach. In stark contrast to previous presidents, Trump employs his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, to conduct numerous matters related to foreign policy. This results in some embracing the view that Trump is aiming to advance his personal wealth and business deals in foreign affairs. In short, this president does not adhere to accepted protocol in terms of how to conduct foreign affairs as president.

In an apparent attempt to instill fear in the DPRK in April of 2017, Trump stated that the US was “sending an armada” to the DPRK. Given that this was a complete bluff by Trump, it demonstrates how he is not concerned about being perceived as not following through on such a threat. In the international relations literature, audience costs focuses on the consequences the leader will pay for such an empty promise. In the event that a Democratic President issued such an empty threat, the Republicans would have accused the Democrat of treason and argued that this sends the message to all in the world that the US cannot be trusted. However, no such statements were issued by Republicans.

**Unconventional Realism and Power Politics: Introducing the Characteristics of Trump’s Foreign Policy Administration.**

Given that Trump often changes his mind in both domestic and international politics, it appears that he does not think things out (In demonstrating how Trump changes his mind very often, after talking with a Fox News talk host, Tucker Carlson, Trump decided not to bomb Iran after Iran shot down a US drone. Carlson made the case to Trump that it would not be a proportionate response to Iranian actions, hence just war theory. While this case is not about DPRK or China, nonetheless it adequately demonstrates how Trump does not think things out in foreign affairs, especially on the issue of military action and war. Thus, instead of Trump being committed to a certain IR theory, simply follows the advice of the last person he speaks with, or simply aims to financially benefit himself). Or when he does, it appears that he is primarily interested in advancing his own economic ties. For example, on numerous occasions he publicly stated that the Saudi government rents out apartments with his company and thus rhetorically asked: why would he not be interested in having good ties with Saudi Arabia? Trump’s interest in building a Trump Tower in Moscow has also been well-documented just as his overture to Kim Jong-un containing more than one reference to the potential of Wonsan and other locations in the DPRK as an ideal spot for the construction of Trump Hotels. This “personalistic” way of conducting international meetings is, according to observers of US politics, far out of the ordinary and mostly against diplomatic protocol (Šimunjak and Caliandro, 2019). Due to this, members of the Democratic party in the US have shown interest in accessing Trump’s tax returns in order to verify whether any link between his business interests and the way he is conducting foreign affairs can be established.

**The Trump Administration Policy Towards China**

In terms of human rights issues, Trump has not made China’s poor human rights practices an
issue and has stated that it is up to China to decide how to handle Hong Kong, which certainly plays out well with China. Trump has also not made the detention of Uyghurs in Xinjiang an issue, although members of the US House and Senate have raised the issue as have some members of his administration. However, it is clear to the Chinese government that human rights are not an area that Trump is interested in pressing the Chinese government on. Due to Trump’s own authoritarian style of governing, it is not surprising that he does not favor human rights issues. Trade issues, however, are very different.

In terms of positive outcomes regarding US relations with both the DPRK and China, we have not witnessed any significant improvement. In fact, regarding US-China relations, owing to Trump’s desire to take on China regarding what he views (and is the case in some instances) as unfair trade practices, the situation has not improved with the implementation of tariffs. Even though Trump met the leader of the DPRK, there has not been any action to halt missile launchings or end the nuclear weapons program. In short, despite Trump’s talk about how he will “make America great again” and achieve victories for the US, we have not seen any of it.

The Trump Administration Policy Towards North Korea

The Trump administration may go down in history as the one that moved the US out of an unprecedented rise of tensions with North Korea early in 2017, created a unique opening in otherwise nearly irreparable relations between two countries throughout 2018, but failed in 2019 to seize its landmark opportunity to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and for all. If the risk of any military confrontation – or worse, a nuclear standoff – appears far removed today than it was two years ago, it is also true that the Singapore summit (June 2018) and the Hanoi Summit (February 2019) already feel like a different era, and nearly all glimpses of hope for a definitive peace breakthrough on the Korean peninsula have vanished.

President Donald J. Trump’s core administration has been characterized by the lack of proper expertise on the Korean issue, and it has been slowly but steadily destabilized by a series of resignations and/or dismissals, first former secretary of state Rex Tillerson, then General Mattis, Dawsay, and Ryan, 2018; More recently, even his long-time adviser, John Bolton lost his position (Baker, 2019).

Meanwhile, the world witnessed North Korea maintain strategic advantage as Kim Jong Un made clear in his New Year’s address that after the first meetings with both Trump and South Korean president Moon Jae-in it was time for the U.S. to deliver, and, failing this, North Korea could turn to China for security and economic development, taking South Korea along with it (Pands, 2019). After the 2018 Singapore Summit, expectations began to rise, until shortly prior to the 2019 Hanoi summit President Trump affirmed he had an “incredible” meeting with North Korean envoy Kim Yong Chol (The Guardian, 2019). Throughout 2018 the impression was that time had never been riper for the U.S. to put forth a concrete, tangible roadmap for denuclearization in exchange for viable economic modernization and security guarantees, yet nothing really happened (Bang, 2018).

In hindsight, it is hard to remember how only in October 2018, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had returned from his second trip to Pyongyang convinced that North Korea was on the same page as the U.S. regarding denuclearization – that is, disarmament first, and some unspecified “bright future” later – a notion which has lost any residual credibility as North Korea showed by the end of 2018 that it was openly continuing to develop its military capabilities (Kim, 2018).

Clearly, what the Trump administration failed to grasp is that North Korea and the U.S. are not on the same page, for obvious reasons: first, the Singapore agreement was never intended to be a denuclearization protocol, and as The Economist pointed out, Trump had simply been overselling the document since he signed it (Lee, 2018). Second, throughout 2018, in spite of all rapprochement gestures, meetings, and summits, U.S. policy attempts and statements focused exclusively on what the U.S. wanted (namely the ‘complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement’ – CVID) – with little consideration for any other party’s strategic objectives; not only the interests of the DPRK but perhaps more importantly, the motivations that could induce key regional partners (China, Japan, Russia and South Korea) to boldly support Washington.

The Trump administration seems unable to grasp, after years of negotiation, and the experience of the failed six-party talks, that denuclearization or overall disarmament alone will not make North Korea less dangerous because the country today has no option for maintaining legitimacy but resorting to aggression (Bang, 2018).

The U.S. cannot craft a tenable proposal without understanding the nature of the regime and the
significance of its arsenal. North Korea strategically chose nuclear weapons and military strength over economic development decades ago, as affirmed numerous times by North Korea’s current high-ranking defector, Tae Young-ho (Min, 2018). For over 70 years, the government has sacrificed everything for this mission; since the 1960s, economic development, individual freedoms, and the welfare of the population have been made expendable in pursuit of this goal. A country so invested in its nuclear capability cannot abandon it without an adequate trade-off. This trade-off is nowhere in sight because neither the U.S. nor any other regional stakeholder (China, Russia, South Korea and Japan) alone possesses all of the means of persuasion and the coercive tools necessary to persuade Kim Jong Un (Bang, 2018).

Throughout 2018 and 2019, the U.S. pursued a futile, piecemeal approach whereby North Korea would give away one piece of its nuclear puzzle, and, upon verification, the U.S. would reciprocate. By the end of last year, mainstream commentary introduced some common sense: arms-control is impossible unless Chairman Kim hands over a comprehensive inventory of all weapons of mass destruction (Lee, 2018).

However, even in this case, what should have been condicio sine qua non for negotiating with North Korea from day one was heralded by the Trump administration (Hillyard, 2018) as the possible result of yet another “courtesy visit,” as that is exactly what the Hanoi Summit ended up amounting to, absent a coherent plan to overcome the stalemate (Choe, 2019).

Further meetings and exchanges of letters between Trump and the North Korean leader in 2019 have added nothing to the negotiation process; the recent failure of formal talks in Sweden on October 4 and 5 (Kim, 2019) simply resulted in North Korea issuing a statement (Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 2019) to announce an end-of-year deadline, plus its own view point of expectations from negotiations, none of which bodes well for the current administration.

Asymmetric Interests: the US in Asia Pacific under Trump

The Trump administration has brought to the fore the asymmetric nature of US interests in Asia-Pacific, with the intersection of American, Chinese and North Korean security priorities being a good example. For the US, a nuclear-armed North Korea is no more than a regional threat, but for the remaining members of the Six-party Talks (particularly South Korea and China) the stakes are much higher, because the collateral damage resulting from armed conflict with the DPRK (and possibly, with China) would be devastating and have tremendous political, economic, and humanitarian cost for the region.

Things change when viewed from Beijing. China has now been (for over three decades) the DPRK’s only anchor, preventing it from drowning. China is Pyongyang’s main (often sole) trade and economic partner as well as aid provider. Yet China fundamentally mistrusts North Korea, and it has been willing to support US efforts at the UN to implement harsher sanctions over the last four years. Somehow, for all his un-diplomatic way of conducting international negotiations, Trump has shown remarkable intuition in sensing that, the “lips and teeth” alliance of the Cold War era between Pyongyang and Beijing is barely at the level of lip service.

What about the DPRK? North Korea views China almost as a ‘necessary evil’ of sorts. In the past, North Korea had no problem denouncing the fact that China abandoned the essential tenets of socialism by embracing economic modernization and transformation to a market-oriented system, not to mention their perceived betrayal through compliance with UNSC sanctions, led by the U.S. The historical tendency and the political nature of the DPRK is one that mistrusts outsiders and China is essentially no exception. This geopolitical arrangement presents an issue of asymmetric state interests, between the three countries.

Lessons learned and Future Hypotheses

The year 2020 will bring new elections in the US and with them, answers that are crucial for a wide array of issues concerning US presence in Asia-Pacific, particularly for the future of bilateral relations between US, China and the DPRK.

The question of “What would another four years of Trump look like?” appears to be of particular concern for diplomats, pundits and international relations scholars alike. If there has been one steady, recognizable trait in the way the Trump administration operates so far, it is the sheer unpredictability and the utter disregard for diplomatic norms and protocol – mostly evident in official statements and resulting so far in poor negotiation results – and the way the US president likes to conduct foreign affairs, both on an institutional level and his personal meetings with other world leaders. We can formulate a twofold scenario.
On the one hand, should Trump be re-elected after the 2020 campaign, we will probably witness more of the same, meaning, a strong affirmation of US exceptionalism, perhaps increasing tensions between US and China, not only on trade issues, but also in geopolitical affairs, which intertwine China, US and the DPRK. Trump has shown that he is content to maintain a simple status quo of amicable relationship with the DPRK – albeit at surface level – while at the same time pressuring China into keeping a certain degree of observance of international sanctions against the DPRK, absent which he would find justification to propose rearming of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan.

On the other hand, it is not clear what the situation could evolve into, if Trump were not president. Recent presidential history has shown that US administrations usually rush to erase any possible trace of legislation by their predecessors – as in the case of the ABC (Anything But Clinton’s) policy towards the DPRK famously stated by former vice-president D. Cheney at the start of the Bush II administration. Should the Democratic Party manage to assemble a pool of candidates strong enough to contrast and perhaps defeat Trump in the coming elections, geopolitical balances in east Asia are likely to change, though it is difficult to predict in what direction.

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