On the Ālayavijñāna in the Awakening of Faith: Comparing and Contrasting Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s Views on Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna

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Abstract: The Awakening of Faith, one of the most seminal treatises in East Asian Buddhism, is well-known for its synthesis of the two Mahāyāna concepts of tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna. Unlike early Yogācāra texts, such as the Yogācarabhūmi, in which ālayavijñāna is described as a defiled consciousness, the Awakening of Faith explains it as a “synthetic” consciousness, in which tathāgatagarbha and the defiled mind are unified in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. East Asian Buddhist exegetes noted the innovative explanation of the Awakening of Faith and compiled the commentaries, among which Huayan master Fazang’s (643–712) commentary had a profound effect on the process of the establishment of the treatise as one of the most representative tathāgatagarbha texts in East Asia. However, as scholarly perceptions that the commentators’ interpretations do not always represent the Awakening of Faith’s tenets themselves have grown, the propriety of relying on Fazang’s commentary for understanding the treatise has also been questioned. What attracts our attention in this regard is that the Silla scholar-monk Wŏnhyo’s (617–686) commentaries, which are known to have significantly influenced Fazang’s, present very different views. This article demonstrates that two distinct interpretations existed in Wŏnhyo’s days for tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith, by comparing Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s commentaries, and further considers the possibility that the Awakening of Faith’s doctrine of ālayavijñāna is not doctrinally incompatible with that of early Yogācāra on the basis of Wŏnhyo’s view on ālayavijñāna.

Keywords: the Awakening of Faith; tathāgatagarbha; ālayavijñāna; Wŏnhyo (617–686); Fazang (643–712)

1. Introduction

The Treatise on the Awakening of Faith According to the Mahāyāna (C. Dasheng qixin lun 大乘起信論, hereafter, the Awakening of Faith), one of the most seminal treatises in East Asian Buddhism, is well-known for its synthesis of the two Mahāyāna concepts of tathāgatagarbha (“womb of Tathāgatas”, viz., the potential to achieve buddhahood) and ālayavijñāna (“storehouse consciousness”, viz., the fundamental mind of a sentient being). Unlike early Yogācāra texts, such as the Yogācarabhūmi, in which ālayavijñāna is described as a defiled consciousness, the Awakening of Faith explains it as a “synthetic” consciousness, in which tathāgatagarbha and the defiled mind are unified in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. East Asian Buddhist exegetes, who noted the innovative way of explanation of the Awakening of Faith, compiled commentaries, and among them, Huayan 华嚴 master Fazang’s 法藏 (643–712) Dasheng qixinlun yiji 大乘起信論義記 (hereafter, Yiji), had a profound
effect on the process of the establishment of the treatise as one of the most representative tathāgatagarbha texts in East Asia.¹

However, as scholarly recognition that the original tenets of the Awakening of Faith should not directly be identified with the commentators’ interpretations has grown, the prevailing reliance on Fazang’s commentary in understanding the Awakening of Faith has also been questioned. For instance, Kashiwagi Hirō states, in the preface of his extensive research on the Awakening of Faith, that the theories of the Awakening of Faith that were discussed by later Chinese Buddhist scholars are the so-called “ideas of the Awakening of Faith (起信論思想)”, rather than the original teaching of it (Kashiwagi 1981, p. 4).² Indeed, the dharma characteristics school (C. faxiang zong 法相宗), the Yogācāra school of Dharmapāla’s (ca. 6th century CE; C. Hufa 護法) line, which Fazang attempts to reconcile in the Yiji with the Madhyamaka teaching of Bhāvaviveka’s (ca. 500–570; C. Qingbian 清辨) line,³ had not even spread to China when the Awakening of Faith was compiled.⁴

The fact that Fazang’s commentary is no more taken as the ‘standard text’ for understanding the Awakening of Faith leads us to reconsider the doctrinal significance of other commentaries. In this regard, particular attention is given in this paper to the Silla master Wŏnhyo’s (617–686) commentaries, the Ksillon so起信論疏 and and the Taesŏn ksillon pyŏlgi大乘起信論別記 (hereafter, Pyŏlgi), which are known to have substantially influenced Fazang’s Yiji, but hold a distinctly different position than it by comparing Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s commentaries of the Awakening of Faith, this article seeks to demonstrate that the Awakening of Faith’s notions of tathāgatagarbha and dhyānavijñāna may be understood in a different

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¹ The predominant recognition of the Awakening of Faith as a so-called “tathāgatagarbha text” owes evident debts to Fazang’s identification of the treatise as “the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha” (C. Rulaiyang yuanqi zong 如來藏起宗) in his fourfold doctrinal taxonomy (C. jiaojian 教類) of Buddhist teachings. Based on Fazang’s interpretation, the thought of tathāgatagarbha has been regarded as a separate doctrinal system from the two major Mahāyāna traditions, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, especially by Japanese scholars. In fact, Katsumata Shinkyo argues that Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism cannot be explained merely in terms of the antagonistic evolution of the two doctrinal systems of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, by saying that Fazang’s recognition of the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha (C. Rulaiyang yuanqi zong 如來藏起宗) separately from Madhyamaka and Yogācāra shows his impartial perspective on Indian Buddhism (Katsumata 1961, pp. 939–94). Takasaki Jikido also admits that the present distinction of the tathāgatagarbha thought as a separate doctrinal system from Yogācāra is based on the traditional way of thinking that has been formed through Huayan doctrines (Takasaki 1960, p. 280).

² Kashiwagi also goes on to indicate that in the history of the development of “the ideas of the Awakening of Faith” in China and Japan, especially Fazang’s, understanding of the Awakening of Faith, offered a decisive direction (Kashiwagi 1981, pp. 4–5). Thereafter, Yoshizu Yoshihide also addresses this issue of “the ideas of the Awakening of Faith” in his article on Jingying Huiyuan’s 僧慧遠 (523–592) deviating interpretation of the Awakening of Faith. Although Kashiwagi emphasized the need to distinguish the original tenets of the Awakening of Faith from the later commentators’ interpretations of the Awakening of Faith, in this article, Yoshizu carefully suggests the possibility that the late commentators’ interpretations may also discuss some of the original teachings of the Awakening of Faith (Yoshizu 2005, p. 1).

³ In the Dasheng qixinlun yiji (Hereafter, Yiji), Fazang seeks to resolve the contemporary doctrinal tension revolving around the distinct positions of Madhyamaka master Bhāvaviveka (ca. 500–570; C. Qingbian 清辨) and Yogācāra master Dharmapāla (ca. 6th century CE; C. Hufa 護法), by using the teaching of the Awakening of Faith. At the beginning of the Yiji, Fazang introduces the contrasting positions of Madhyamaka exegete Jitānarpabha (d.u.; C. Zhiguang 俱智), and Yogācāra exegete Śīlabhadra (529–645; C. Jiexian 善賢), Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla’s successors, respectively, regarding the Buddha’s three-period teachings (C. sanshi jiao三時教). In his four-level taxonomy of Buddhist teachings, Fazang locates their teachings on the second and third level, designating them as the teaching of true emptiness and no-characteristics (C. Zhongkong wuxiang zong 佐空無相宗) and the teaching of consciousness-only and dharma characteristics (C. Weishi faxiang zong 唯識法相宗), respectively. The Awakening of Faith is located in the fourth and highest teaching, with the name of the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha (C. Rulaiyang yuanqi zong 如來藏起宗). In this highest teaching of the Awakening of Faith, the principle (C. li 理) and phenomena (C. shi 事), which are valued in the second and third teachings, respectively, are unimpededly interpenetrated. See the Yiji, Taishō shinshū daizakyō 大正新修大藏經 (Hereafter, T1846.44.242a29-242c05; 243b22-c01).

⁴ As is well-known, Dharmapāla’s Yogācāra teaching spread to China when the famous pilgrim and translator Xuanzang 玄奘 (602–664) brought a new corpus of canonical texts from India in 645, after he had studied under Śīlabhadra, the teacher of Dharmapāla. Beside this, the fact that early commentaries, such as Tanyan’s 涅槃 (516–588) Qixinlun yishu 起信論義疏 and the Dunhuang manuscript of the Dasheng qixinlun shu 大乘起信論疏 (tentative title; T1846.35V) recently discovered in the archives of the Kyōu Shōoku 来古書庫, are written from significantly different perspectives than Wŏnhyo or Fazang’s, also suggests that the Awakening of Faith was interpreted in different ways, according to the commentators’ positions. For instance, while Wŏnhyo and Fazang explain the Awakening of Faith by drawing on the Lanxiàoštā Sūtra, Tanyan’s commentary and the anonymous Dunhuang text are written with considerable reference to the She dachenglun shu 欹大乘論疏. Paramārtha’s (499–569; C. Zhendi 眞箋) translation of Mahāyānasamgraha, never mentioning the Lanxiàoštā Sūtra. For more information on the Dunhuang manuscript of the Dasheng qixinlun shu, see Ikeda (2012).
way than what has broadly been accepted so far by relying on Fazang’s commentary. I shall discuss that while Fazang takes the position that despite its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, tathāgatagarbha interacts directly with the arising-and-ceasing mind, Wŏnhyo considers that tathāgatagarbha, which has a twofold nature, interacts with the arising-and-ceasing mind on the one hand, but on the other, preserves the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature. Based on Wŏnhyo’s understanding, I shall also suggest a possible doctrinal compatibility between the Awakenings of Faith and the early Yogācāra, which has been dismissed among scholars.

2. Tathāgatagarbha

In the Awakening of Faith, ālayavijñāna is defined as a unification of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing (mind of suchness) (viz. tathāgatagarbha) and the arising-and-ceasing (mind) in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. Such exegetes as Wŏnhyo and Fazang both find the doctrinal origin of this unique nature of ālayavijñāna in the Lankāvatāra Sūtra. In the same manner as the Awakening of Faith, the Lankāvatāra Sūtra explains the consciousness of a sentient being as having not only a phenomenal (or defiled), but also a ‘true’ or ‘real’, nature. In Gunabhadra’s four-fascicle recension of the Lankāvatāra Sūtra, the consciousness is described as consisting of three kinds of mental attributes; that is, [self] true character (C. [zhixiang] [自真相]), karmic character (C. yexiang 萬相), and evolving character (C. zhuanxiang 轉相).⑦ Likewise, Bodhiruci’s ten-fascicle version presents these three characters of the consciousness with slightly different names: the consciousness of wisdom character (C. zhixiangshí 智相), the consciousness of karmic character (C. yexiangshí 萬相), and the consciousness of evolving character (C. zhuanxiangshí 轉相).⑧ While the first character of the three, the (self) true character (or self-character) or the consciousness of wisdom character, corresponds to the right true nature of the consciousness, the other two correspond to the phenomenal nature. Wŏnhyo also indicates that the (self) true character among the three characters of the four-fascicle recension is also referred to as the self-character (C. zixiang 自相) in the 10-fascicle edition.⑨ Consulting the Lankāvatāra Sūtra in commenting ālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith, Wŏnhyo and Fazang both explain the first character of the three kinds of mental attributes described in the Lankāvatāra Sūtra as the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind, viz., tathāgatagarbha, of ālayavijñāna.⑩

Although Wŏnhyo and Fazang both consider the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature of ālayavijñāna as tathāgatagarbha by relying on the Lankāvatāra Sūtra, the next passage of Wŏnhyo’s Kisillon so suggests

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5 See the Awakening of Faith T1666:32.576b07-09: 心生滅者，依其所依故有生滅心，所謂不生滅者與生滅和合，非一非異，名為阿梨耶識。
6 Four recensions of the Lankāvatāra Sūtra are known: Bodhiruci’s (fl. 508–35) Ru lengjie jing 入楞伽經 in 10 fascicles (513), Gunabhadra’s (394–468) Lengjie abatualuo bojujing 楞伽阿跋陀洛般若經 in 4 fascicles (443), Dharmakṣema’s (d.u.) Lengjiejing 楞伽經 in 4 fascicles (412-433), and Śikṣānanda’s (fl. ca. 695) Dasheng ruanglej jing 大乘入楞伽經 in 7 fascicles (700). Among these, Dharmakṣema’s Lengjiejing is not extant.
7 See the Lengjie abatualuo bojujing T670:16.483a14-17: 譏識有三种相，轉相。業相，真相。大慧！略解有三种相，廣說有八相。何等为三？谓真相，现相，及分别事相。
8 See the Ru lengjie jing T671:16.521c9-522a03: 大慧！識有三種。何等三種？ 一者，轉相識，二者，業相識，三者，智相識。大慧！有八種識，略說有三種。何等為二？ 一者，別別相識，二者，分別事相識。
9 See the Kisillon so T1844:44.208cb8-09: 自真相者。十卷經中各名自相。
10 To explain the unification of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind and the arising-and-ceasing mind in a neither-identical-nor-different condition, Wŏnhyo and Fazang both quote the passage of the four-fascicle recension, in which the true character (C. zhixiang 自相) and the evolving character (C. zhuanxiang 轉相) are described as neither different nor identical by using the parable of a lump of soil and dust. For Wŏnhyo’s quotation, see the Kisillon so T1844:44.208ba19-c12: 此是不生滅心與生滅合也。非謂生滅與不生滅合也，非一非異，非生滅舉體而動，故心與生滅不異。而相不失生滅性，故生滅與心非一。又若一者，生滅識相滅滅時，心體心體應滅滅，諸於彼邊。若異異者，依無明風薰動時，靜心之體應不隨緣，即和合時，離此二邊，故非非異。⑬如四卷經云，譬如泥團敗壞，非異非異，若泥團處泥中亦是，若泥團處泥外非異，而實波流，是故非異。若不異者，泥團敗壞並無差別。如是轉識識相異異者，識相非因，若不異者，轉識識識相亦應滅，而自相實不減，故非自相相減，但業相減。 For Fazang’s quotation, see the Yiji T1846:44.255b16-26: 又若一者，生滅識相滅滅時，心體心體，故滅滅時，是故異異。⑭是異異者，依無明風薰動時，靜心之體應不隨緣，即和合時。離此二邊，故非非異。又若一則無和合，若異異無和合。非一異故得和合。如經云。譬如泥團敗壞非異非異。若泥團處泥中亦是，若泥團處泥外非異，而實波流，是故非異。若不異者，泥團敗壞並無差別。如是轉識識相異異者，識相非因，若不異者，轉識識識相亦應滅，而自相實不減，故非自相相減，但業相減。
that the two commentators did not agree in their views on tathāgatagarbha. In response to the question of whether or not the self-character (K. chasang 自相), i.e., tathāgatagarbha, of the consciousness arises due to defiled conditions, Wŏnhyo answers by introducing three types of views on the mind-essence (of the self-character) (K. chasang [simch’ê] 自相[心體])\footnote{Wŏnhyo uses self-character (K. chasang 自相), mind-essence (K. simch’ê 心體), and mind-essence of the self-character (K. chasang simch’ê 自相心體) in the same sense, as seen in the quotation below. In another place, Wŏnhyo also states that the mind-essence refers to the mind of self-character (K. chasangsim 自相). See the Kisillon so T1844:44.213c07-08: 而無別體。唯依心體。故言依心。即是自相自相心也. The compound word, the mind-essence of the self-character, is seen in two other places in the Kisillon so. See the Kisillon so T1844:44.213c17-19: 又復上說因滅故不相應心滅者。但說心中業相等滅。非謂自相心體滅也; T1844:44.216c24-25 其自相心體不滅。故言非是水滅。}, as follows:

**Question:** Should it be said that the self-character of this consciousness arises just due to defiled conditions, or that it does not conform to the conditions? If it arises just due to defiled conditions, then when defiled conditions are exhausted, the self-character should disappear; if the self-character does not conform to defiled conditions and thus does not disappear, then it would naturally exist by itself (K. chaeyŏnyu 自然有). Again, if the self-character also disappears [as in the former case], then it amounts to nihilism; likewise [if] the self-character does not disappear [as in the latter case], in turn it amounts to eternalism.

**Answer:** Some say: The mind-essence of ālayavijñāna is ripened (K. isuk 異熟, vipāka) dharma, which is produced by karmic afflictions. Therefore, when karmic afflictions are exhausted, the base consciousness (K. ponsik 本識; viz. ālayavijñāna) disappears altogether. At the resultant [stage of] Buddhahood, however, there exists the pure consciousness that corresponds to the great perfect mirror cognition (K. taewŏn kyŏngji 大圓鏡智, ādarsa-jiñana), which has been attained from the two types of practice, practice of merits and wisdom. Thus, the minds in the both cases have identical meaning. Based on this meaning, the mind is said to be consistent until the resultant [stage of] Buddhahood.

Some say: The mind-essence of self-character moves its essence, and [this] is raised due to nescience (K. mamyŏng 無明, avidyā). This means that the serene [mind-essence] is moved and raised, not that nothing turns to something. [In other words, this mind-essence should be what originally exists, not what arises from nothing.] Therefore, the moving of this mind is what is caused by nescience, and is called the karmic character. This moving mind is basically the mind in itself, which is also called self-character. The nature of self-character is not involved with nescience. However, this mind, which is moved by nescience, also has the implication that [karmic seeds inherent in the mind continuously] produce the same types [of seeds]. Thus, although not falling into the fallacy of “naturally [existing by itself],” it still has the nature of non-ceasing. When nescience is exhausted, the moving character [of the mind] accordingly ceases, and [yet] the mind returns to the original basis by going after the initial enlightenment (K. sigak 始覺). [Therefore, the mind-essence of this mind does not cease.]

Some say: Both of the two masters’ views have a reasonable basis, because both rely on the teachings of the sacred scriptures. The former master’s view coincides with the tenets of the Yogācārabhūmi, and the latter’s with that of the Awakening of Faith. However, one should not take the meanings in a literal sense. Why? If the meaning of the former teaching is taken in a literal sense, then this would be attachment to dharmas (K. pŏp ajip 法我執, dharma-grāha); if the meaning of the latter teaching is taken in literal sense, this would be called attachment to self (K. in agyŏn 人我見, ātma-grāha). Again, if one attaches to the former meaning, one would fall into nihilism; if one attaches to the latter meaning, one would fall into eternalism. [Therefore,] one should know that the two meanings may not be taught.
[However, although they may not be taught, they may also be taught, because although they are not like [what it means], they are not unlike [what it means] either.]

According to the first view, the mind-essence of the *alayavijñāna* is described as what is subject to arising-and-ceasing in accordance with karmic afflictions. It is regarded as being produced by karmic afflictions and disappears when they are exhausted. By contrast, in the second view, the mind-essence is neither-arising-nor-ceasing. The mind-essence, or self-character, should originally exist (viz., does not first arise from nowhere), and moves its essence when being prompted by nescience; however, with nescience exhausted, the mind returns to the original basis (viz., does not cease).

In the third view, the first and second views are both accepted in that they have a reasonable basis, which relies on the sacred scriptures. This position might seem idiosyncratic at first, since the two former views take contrasting positions. In fact, the first and second views are respectively attributed to the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Awakening of Faith*, which are generally considered to take distinct or even incompatible doctrinal positions on a concept such as *alayavijñāna*. According to this third view, however, the real messages of the two teachings should not be assumed merely by their literal expressions. In other words, if properly understood beyond their literal meanings, the first and second views may both be accepted without any doctrinal conflict. It may then be said that in this view, the mind-essence—i.e., *tathāgatagarbha*—has a twofold nature, though in a somewhat paradoxical way; that is, the nature of arising-and-ceasing and neither-arising-nor-ceasing.

Wŏnhyo advocates the third view that the mind-essence—i.e., *tathāgatagarbha*—*of alayavijñāna*, has a twofold nature. When taken in their literal senses, the nature of arising-and-ceasing of the first view and the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing of the second should be seen as two distinct natures, which are incompatible for one single mind of *alayavijñāna*. In the same vein, the teachings of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Awakening of Faith* would be two incompatible doctrinal positions, because their explanations of a concept such as *alayavijñāna*, as mentioned above, conflict with each other. However, when considered beyond the literal meanings, these two seemingly opposite natures may be taken as compatible as a twofold nature of one single mind of *alayavijñāna*. The teachings may have literal meanings, and may also mean what is beyond the literal meanings. In this regard, the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Awakening of Faith*’s positions on *alayavijñāna* need not be seen as doctrinally conflicting with each other. It is a well-known fact that Wŏnhyo seeks to reconcile the early Yogācāra texts with the *Awakening of Faith* and the *Pyŏlgi*.

What should be noted, particularly in terms of our current issue, is that this passage reveals that there were two different views, that is, the second and the third, on the mind-essence (i.e., *tathāgatagarbha*). According to the typical understanding, based on Fazang’s interpretation of the *Awakening of Faith*, *tathāgatagarbha* is considered neither-arising-nor-ceasing. This way of understanding seems

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12 See the *Kisillon* so T1844:44.216c28-217a21: “此說自相，為當一向染緣所起，為當亦有不從緣義。若是一向染緣所起，染法盡時自相應滅，如其自相不從染緣故不滅者，則自然有。若無使自相緣即不滅者，則周自相不滅同常見。答，或有說者，染耶心體異執法，但為業感之所生。故業感盡時，本盡盡智，然於佛果，亦有福慧二行所感大圓鏡智所應空。而於二處心義同，以是性心至佛果耳。或有說者，自相心體，業體為彼無相所起，是則名相定，非謂相定無名，是故名相動。因無相起，名為業相。此動之心，本自為心，亦為自相。自相義門不由無明，然即此無明所動之心，亦有自相生之義，故無自然之過。而有生滅之義，無明盡時動相相減，心隨時覺還歸本相，或有說者，二師所說皆有道理，皆依聖典之所說故。初師所說即緣法意，後師義者諸法智，而亦不可言取義，所以然者，若初師說取義者，是非法我執，若後師說取義者，是四諦我執，若前後者，是法我執，覺義者，即佛說義，是即常義，如佛說義，是即常義。若知二義皆不可說，雖不可說亦不可。故由此之故，而生現起。”

13 Although it is not directly stated that Wŏnhyo himself advocates the third view in the *Kisillon so*, it is clear that Wŏnhyo defends the third view in the context. Moreover, at the beginning of the third view in the equivalent passage of the *Pyŏlgi*, “[if I] make a comment [on the two former views, it is as follows:]” (K. *p’e’nguhal* 詩曰) appears instead of “Some say.” See the *taesūng kisillon pyŏlgi* (hereafter, *Pyŏlgi*) T1845:44. 239a05.

14 See the *Pyŏlgi* T1845:44.229a12-229b22; T1845:44.239b02-23; T1845:44.237b24-c17 and the *Kisillon so* T1844:44.219b25-21c13. It has also been known that although Fazang substantially relies on Wŏnhyo’s commentaries, he never cites or quotes the passages from Wŏnhyo’s commentaries, in which the early Yogācāra doctrine or text is introduced to be reconciled with the teaching of the *Awakening of Faith*. Besides, in the *Ijang ẕi 二障義* (System of the Two Hindrances), Wŏnhyo comprehensively deals with this matter of reconciliation between the early Yogācāra and the teaching of the *Awakening of Faith* by focusing on the concept of the two hindrances (K. *Ijang 二障*). Detailed discussions may be found in Muller (2004, 2006).
very similar to the second view. However, there was another view on *tathāgatagarbha*, the third view that *tathāgatagarbha* has the twofold nature of not only neither-arising-nor-ceasing but also arising-and-ceasing, and this view was advocated by Wŏnhyo.

Wŏnhyo’s twofold view on *tathāgatagarbha* is also evident in his interpretation of the concept of [original] enlightenment (C. *benjje*, K. *pongak* [本見]), one of the two aspects of *alaya-vijñāna* presented in the *Awakening of Faith*, along with non-enlightenment (C. *buju*, K. *pulgak* 不覺). It is stated in the *Awakening of Faith* that (original) enlightenment indicates the mind-essence that is freed from deluded thoughts, implying that original enlightenment has the same connotation as *tathāgatagarbha*.

Wŏnhyo also says that it has a twofold meaning, just in a way that recalls the aforementioned twofold nature of the mind-essence; in his answer to the question of whether the reason why the mind-essence is called original enlightenment is because it lacks non-enlightenment or because it has the function of illumination of awakening, Wŏnhyo answers by saying that original enlightenment has a twofold meaning, original enlightenment and initial enlightenment (C. *shijue*, K. *sigak* 始覺), as follows:

**Question:** Is the reason why the mind-essence is called original enlightenment is because it lacks non-enlightenment or because it has the function of illumination of enlightening (K. *kakcho* 覺照)? If it is called original enlightenment only because it lacks non-enlightenment, then it would not have the [function of] illumination of enlightening. If then, it should be non-enlightenment. If it is called original enlightenment only because it has the function of illumination of enlightenment, then I am not sure if all defilements are eradicated from this [original] enlightenment. If defilements have not been eradicated, then [in turn] it would not have the function of enlightenment; if the defilements have been eradicated, then sentient beings should never exist.

**Answer:** [The reason why the mind-essence is called original enlightenment is] not only because it lacks non-enlightenment, but also because it has the function of illumination. Because it has the [function of] illumination, defilements can be also eradicated. What does this mean? When enlightenment that comes after delusions is considered to be called enlightenment, initial enlightenment has [the meaning of] enlightenment, while original enlightenment does not. When the original lack of delusion is said to be called enlightenment, original enlightenment is enlightenment, but initial enlightenment is not. The [matter of] eradicating defilements [may be discussed] likewise. When eradication of previously existing defilements is called eradication, initial enlightenment has the [function of] eradication, but original enlightenment does not. When the original lack of defilements is called eradication, original enlightenment refers to eradication, but initial enlightenment does not. Viewed from this [latter] way, [defilements] are originally eradicated, and thus originally there is no ordinary being, just as stated in the passage below, “all sentient beings are originally beings should never exist.

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15 See the *Awakening of Faith* T1666:32.576b10-14: 此識有二種義，能攝一切法、生一切法，云何為二？一者、覺義，二者、不覺義。所言覺義者，謂心體離念，離念相者、等虛空無所不遍。法界一相即是如來平等法身，依此法身說名本見。Here, the “enlightenment” (C. *jie 覺*), which is contrasted with non-enlightenment (C. *buju 不覺*), is also expressed as “original enlightenment” (C. *benjje 本見*). Strictly speaking, it may be said that there are two levels of meaning of original enlightenment: one that is contrasted with non-enlightenment and the other that is contrasted with initial enlightenment (C. *shijue 始覺*). The former may be seen as original enlightenment in a broad sense, in contrast to non-enlightenment, and the latter as in a narrow sense, in contrast to initial enlightenment within the category of the enlightenment. Yet, the *Awakening of Faith* states that initial enlightenment is ultimately not different from original enlightenment, and thus the broad and narrow senses of original enlightenment may be accordingly said to be not different from each other in an ultimate sense. See the *Awakening of Faith* T1666:32.576b14-16: 本見義者、對始覺義說，以始覺者即同本見。始覺義者，依本見故而有不覺，依不覺故說有始覺.

16 See the *Awakening of Faith* T1666:32.576b11-12: 所言覺義者、謂心體離念。Wŏnhyo also clearly says that the one mind essence is (or has) original enlightenment, and associates it with the nature of Tathāgata, namely, *tathāgatagarbha*. See the *Ksdillon so* T1844:44.20c18:20: 此一心體是[有]本見。而依無明動作生滅，故於此門 如來性行相不違。名如來藏。The essence of this one mind is/has the original enlightenment, and yet moves in accordance with nescience to produce the arising-and-ceasing. Therefore, the nature of Tathāgata of this abode [of arising-and-ceasing], which is hidden and does not manifest itself, is called *tathāgatagarbha*.”
consistently abiding (C. *changzhu*, K. *sangju* 常住) within the dharmas of nirvāṇa and bodhi.” However, although it is said that original enlightenment exists and thus originally there is no ordinary being (凡夫), there is not yet initial enlightenment and thus originally there are ordinary beings. Therefore, there is no fallacy [between the two cases]. If you [take only one aspect and] claim that there is original enlightenment, originally there are no ordinary beings, then there would not be initial enlightenment at last. If then, on what basis could ordinary beings exist? If those [ordinary beings] do not have initial enlightenment at last, then there would be no original enlightenment, [which is contrasted to initial enlightenment,] then on basis of what original enlightenment can it be said that there is no ordinary beings?17

Wŏnhyo argues that the mind-essence is called original enlightenment because it has the meaning of not only original enlightenment, as represented in the literal expression of original enlightenment, but also initial enlightenment. On the one hand, original enlightenment has the meaning of the original lack of non-enlightenment and, in this sense, all sentient beings are considered as constantly abiding. On the other hand, original enlightenment is called as such because it has the function of illumination of enlightening, explaining the presence of ordinary beings. Two seemingly contrasting characters are both accepted as the twofold aspect of original enlightenment, i.e., *tathāgatagarbha*. Here again, Wŏnhyo takes original enlightenment not just in the literal sense, but in the sense beyond literal expression. One might indicate that the division of (original) enlightenment into original and initial enlightenment is already stated in the *Awakening of Faith* and Fazang also provides a proper explanation of them in his commentary. However, a comparison of Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s explanation on the two types of original enlightenment, original enlightenment that is pure in nature (C. *xingjing benjue*, K. *suyom haesong* 本覺淨本覺) and original enlightenment that conforms to impurity (C. *suiran benjue*, K. *suyom pon’gak* 隨染本覺), discloses that their views on original enlightenment are not identical, but rather implies a significant difference. In the *Kisillon so*, Wŏnhyo addresses these two types of original enlightenment as the basis of the twofold aspect of (original) enlightenment, which have just been discussed above, original enlightenment and initial enlightenment, respectively.18 In other words, Wŏnhyo explains each side of the twofold aspect of original enlightenment in a separate way, by relating them to each type of original enlightenment among the two; that is, the original enlightenment that is pure in nature and the original enlightenment that conforms to impurity. This respective interpretation of the twofold meaning of original enlightenment may also be applied back to the twofold nature of the mind-essence, the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing and arising-and-ceasing. Then, it seems that in Wŏnhyo’s interpretation of the *Awakening of Faith*, the terms that have the connotation of *tathāgatagarbha*, such as the mind-essence or original enlightenment, have a twofold nature/meaning, each side of which has a distinct meaning/nature. In Wŏnhyo’s commentary on the *Nirvana Sutra*, the *Yŏlban chongyo* 混染宗要, original enlightenment that conforms to impurity appears with a slightly modified name, as the nature of realization that conforms to impurity (K. *suyōm haesōng* 隨染解性).19 Given this, we may presume that in Wŏnhyo’s works, the two terms—nature of realization (K. *haesōng* 解性) and original enlightenment—are distinguished from each other, with different implications.

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17 See the *Puògī* T1845:44.230b02-ff: ‘問，為常，心體只無不覺名本覺。為當，心體有覺用名為本覺。若言只無不覺名本覺者，可亦無覺義故是不覺。若言有覺義故名本覺者，未知此覺為斷惑不。若不斷惑則無與，如其有斷則無凡夫。答，非但無聞，亦有明照。以有在故，亦有不定。此義云何，若就先眠後覺名為覺者，始覺有覺，本覺中無。若論本來不眠名為覺者，本覺是覺，始覺則非覺。斷義亦爾，先有後名無為斷者，始覺有斷。本覺無斷。本來還惑名為斷者，本覺是斷，始覺非斷。若依此義，本來斷故，本來無凡，如下文文，一切眾生，從來本來，入於涅槃菩提之法，然雖曰有本覺故本來無凡而未有始覺故，本來有凡，是故無過。若汝言有本覺本來無凡，則斷無有斷，望覺有凡者他，亦非始覺則無本覺，依此本覺以說無凡。’

18 See the *Kisillon so* T1844:44.211c26-212a01: ‘雖說混染，於中分別者，若論始覺所起之門，隨染相屬而得益益，由此根本隨染本覺。從來相關有親疏故，論其本覺所顯之門，普益倉卒不相相屬，由其本來性淨本覺，等通一切無親疏故。

19 See the *Yŏlban chongyo* T1769:38.250a03-250a17.
Although Fazang likewise mentions the two types of original enlightenment in the Yiji, it does not seem that he recognizes any distinction between them, because he often interchangeably uses the terms “original enlightenment” and “nature of realization”, which are distinguished by Wŏnhyo as the two types of original enlightenment: the original enlightenment that is pure in nature and the nature of realization that conforms to impurity.\textsuperscript{20} For instance, in explaining original enlightenment as the cause of uncontaminated (C. sullou 無漏, anāśāra) dharmas along with the conditions of permeation from learning (C. wen xunxi 閻嘗習, srūtra-vāsana), Fazang draws on a passage from Paramārtha’s commentary on the Mahāyānasamgraha, in which the nature of realization, not original enlightenment, is presented as the cause of sainthood, together with the permeation from learning.\textsuperscript{21} This shows that Fazang identifies original enlightenment with the nature of realization. Fazang also uses these two terms side by side in a compound word, as if the words have the same meaning.\textsuperscript{22} Most of all, he clearly identifies these two concepts in the Huayan wujiao zhang 華嚴五教章 by saying that the nature of realization mentioned in Paramārtha’s commentary on the Mahāyānasamgraha refers to the original enlightenment of the Awakening of Faith.\textsuperscript{23} Given all of this, it does not seem that Fazang distinguishes the two types of original enlightenment in the same way as Wŏnhyo does. Although Fazang addresses the two types of original enlightenment, it is apparent that he does not see any valid distinction between them. Rather, it seems that these two terms just refer to two names given to tathāgataagarbha, which has only one (not a twofold) nature, merely by depending on whether or not it is combined with the arising-and-ceasing mind.

In fact, just as Fazang identifies the two types of original enlightenment, Fazang describes tathāgataagarbha as having one, not a twofold, nature. Unlike Wŏnhyo, as discussed above, who considers the mind-essence, i.e., tathāgataagarbha, to have a twofold nature of arising-and-ceasing and neither-arising-nor-ceasing, Fazang says that the tathāgataagarbha has only the one nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing.\textsuperscript{24} This implies, along with his identification of the two types of original enlightenment, that, for Fazang, tathāgataagarbha and other concepts that have an equivalent connotation, such as original enlightenment, do not have a twofold meaning/nature, but only one. I have mentioned that among the three views introduced by Wŏnhyo on the mind-essence, the second view is very similar to Fazang’s interpretation of tathāgataagarbha as neither-arising-nor-ceasing. It seems very likely then that Wŏnhyo introduced the second view by keeping in his mind an exegese such as Fazang.

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\textsuperscript{20} In Wŏnhyo’s works, such as the Ÿolhan chonggo, the nature of realization that conforms to impurity refers to the original enlightenment that conforms to impurity. See footnote 19 above.

\textsuperscript{21} See the Ru longxiexin xuanqi 人窮信心玄奇 T1790:39.431c11-14: 以習習海中 有帶宛之異, 名本覺, 為無漏因。多聞習為異地土。或亦聞習習合為一無漏因。論雲, 多聞習習與本識中解性相合, 一切聖人以此為因。"In the ocean of habituated tendencies (vāsana), there is the truth that assumes delusion, and it is called original enlightenment. [This] constitutes the cause of uncontaminated [dharmas] (anāśāra), while permeation from great learning works as auxiliary conditions. Otherwise, permeation of hearing combined with the ocean of habituated tendencies serves as the one cause of uncontaminated [dharmas]." [Therefore] Paramārtha’s commentary on the Mahāyānasamgraha states that permeation from great learning is combined with the nature of realization in the base-consciousness, and this is taken as the cause of all sainthood."

\textsuperscript{22} See the Huayan yisheng jiao fenqi zhan 華嚴一教義分齊章 T1866:45.485c14-20: 有具性者。瑜伽論云。種性略有二種。一具性住。二習所成。本性住者, 論謂菩薩六處殊勝有如是相。從無始世。展轉所生法火所得。習所成者, 論先出菩薩根所。此中本性。即內六處中意為殊勝。即數抄彼識中本覺解性為性種性。

\textsuperscript{23} See the Huayan yisheng jiao fenqi zhan 華嚴一教義分齊章 T1866:45.487c04-c05: 羅什論疏為黎耶中辨性。起信論中, 說黎耶二義中本覺是也。

\textsuperscript{24} By comparison, Fazang describes tathāgataagarbha as neither-arising-nor-ceasing, the seven consciousnesses as arising-and-ceasing, and alāyavijñāna as arising-and-ceasing and neither-arising-nor-ceasing. See the Yiji T1846:44.225s29-b03: 『以如來藏無生滅, 如水波浪。』七識生滅, 如水波浪。三界諸識亦生滅亦不生滅, 如海含動鰲。四無明猶依非生滅不生滅, 如起波風風本非浪。"First, tathāgataagarbha neither-arises-nor-ceases, just like the nature of the wetness of water; second, the seven consciousnesses only arise-and-cease, just like waves [of water]; third, alāyavijñāna not only arises-and-ceases but also neither-arises-nor-ceases, just like the ocean that contains [the natures of] moving and stillness; the fourth, nescience and deluded attachments neither arise-and-cease nor neither-arise-nor-cease, just like arising waves and strong wind are neither water nor water nor waves." Fazang also states that tathāgataagarbha maintains the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing even when it is involved in the abode of arising-and-ceasing (C. shengnie men 生滅門). See the Yiji T1846:44.225s13-c15: 非生滅耶, 極動者, 此生滅中, 亦乃如來藏 唯不動亦在此門中。"It is not just that alāyavijñāna, which has both natures of moving and stillness, belongs to [the abode of] arising-and-ceasing; rather tathāgataagarbha, which never move, also belongs to this abode."
Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s distinct views on tathāgatagarbha are also reflected in their understanding of ālayavijñāna. As mentioned above, ālayavijñāna is defined in the Awakening of Faith as a unification of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing (mind of suchness, viz. tathāgatagarbha) and the arising-and-ceasing mind in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. Wŏnhyo accounts for the unification of these two minds in ālayavijñāna as twofold, namely, in a non-identical (K. piil 非一) condition on the one hand, and in a non-different (K. pīi 非異) condition on the other hand, in a similar way to how he considers tathāgatagarbha to have a twofold nature.\(^{25}\) It may be said that there are two (viz., non-identical) minds in ālayavijñāna, that is, the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind and the arising-and-ceasing mind; however, the mind-essence of these two minds is not separated (viz., non-different) and thus constitute one single mind. This mind, which has the two minds and yet is not separated, is called ālayavijñāna.\(^{26}\)

The twofold condition of ālayavijñāna is explained by Wŏnhyo as a logical consequence that follows when two mistaken views are removed; the view that the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind (viz., tathāgatagarbha) is either identical with or different from the arising-and-ceasing mind (viz., phenomenal mind). Wŏnhyo also gives a warning, in this regard, of nihilism and eternalism in a similar way to how he does in discussing the twofold nature of tathāgatagarbha, mentioned above. The view that they are identical would end up with nihilism because the mind-essence, or tathāgatagarbha, could not move along in accordance with various conditions.\(^{27}\) The logical basis of this twofold condition of ālayavijñāna, in this sense, may be traced back to the twofold nature of tathāgatagarbha. Viewed from the perspective of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, tathāgatagarbha is distinct from the arising-and-ceasing mind and thus their unification in ālayavijñāna will also be in a non-identical condition. In this case, ālayavijñāna may not be seen as identical to (or not-different from) tathāgatagarbha. By contrast, from the perspective of the arising-and-ceasing nature of tathāgatagarbha, it may be said to accord with the arising-and-ceasing mind and accordingly, their unification will be in a non-different condition. In this case, ālayavijñāna is viewed as identical to (or not-different from) tathāgatagarbha.

On the basis of this twofold unification in ālayavijñāna, Wŏnhyo also explains the Lankāvatāra Sūtra’s inconsistent statements on the relationship between ālayavijñāna and tathāgatagarbha. The Lankāvatāra Sūtra is well-known for taking an ambiguous position on the relationship between ālayavijñāna and tathāgatagarbha. Ālayavijñāna is sometimes equated with tathāgatagarbha, thereby implying that it

\(^{25}\) Wŏnhyo explains the neither-identical-nor-different [condition], in which the two types of mind are unified, as twofold, by saying, “As for the neither-identical-nor-different [condition], [on the one hand,] the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind moves its essence, and thus this mind is not different from the arising-and-ceasing [mind]. Yet, [on the other hand, the mind] does not lose the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature and thus the arising-and-ceasing [mind] is not identical to the [neither-arising-nor-ceasing] mind.” See the Kṣiṣṇo so T1844.44:208b20-22: 非一非異者，不生滅性非一。若此二種，依此遺失，若非一非異，故心與生滅不異，而常不失不生滅性，故生滅與心非一。In other words, the two types of minds are said to be unified in a not-different or in a not-identical condition, depending on whether tathāgatagarbha (or, the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind) moves its essence in accordance with the arising-and-ceasing mind or keeps its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature. In this passage, the implication is that the nature of tathāgatagarbha consists of two distinct aspects, and the twofold condition of the unification in ālayavijñāna is explained based on these aspects. In fact, Fazang cites this same passage by Wŏnhyo in the equivalent place of the Yiji. However, the implication is different: The nature of tathāgatagarbha has only the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, and thus, for Fazang, the twofold unification in ālayavijñāna is determined depending on whether this neither-arising-nor-ceasing tathāgatagarbha is non-identical to or non-different from the arising-and-ceasing mind. A more detailed discussion shall follow below in the main text.

\(^{26}\) See the Pyŏksog T1845.44:22b25-26: 非一非異者，不生滅性非一。為小異者，名道渠邪耶也。

\(^{27}\) See the Kṣiṣṇo so T1844.44:208b22-26: 又若一名，生滅滅相滅盡之時。心非之體亦應滅盡。猶於斷滅。若非一異。依無明風重動之時，靜心之體不應隨緣。故常性滅。離此二道，若非一異。Fazang also states a similar passage in the Yiji (T1846.44:25b16-19: 又若一名，生滅滅相滅盡之時。心非之體亦應滅盡。猶於斷滅。若非一異。依無明風重動之時。靜心之體不應隨緣。故常性滅。離此二道，若非一異) However, as discussed above, Fazang’s understanding of tathāgatagarbha is different from Wŏnhyo’s, and his interpretation of the unification in ālayavijñāna, which is based on his understanding of tathāgatagarbha, also has a different implication than Wŏnhyo’s. More discussion will follow soon.
When the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind (viz., \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \)) and the arising-and-ceasing mind are unified in a non-identical condition, \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) is described as separated from the \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \). On the contrary, when they are unified in a non-different condition, \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) and \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) are identified with each other.\footnote{28} In Wŏnhyo’s view, if the \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) did not have a twofold nature, but had only one nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing, the unification, if ever, between \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) and the arising-and-ceasing mind would only occur in a non-identical condition, and \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) could not move along in accordance with the arising-and-ceasing mind.

Fazang’s view on \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) is quite different from Wŏnhyo’s. I have mentioned that Fazang only accepts the unitary nature of \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \): the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing. Then, the twofold unification in \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) should occur between the neither-arising-nor-ceasing \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) and the arising-and-ceasing mind; Fazang does not need the twofold nature of \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) to explain the twofold unification in \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \). When considered from Wŏnhyo’s perspective, the unification of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) and the arising-and-ceasing mind constitutes only one side of the twofold unification, that is, the unification in a non-identical condition.

In Fazang’s view, however, the \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \), which only has the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing, still moves itself and produces the arising-and-ceasing [phenomena].\footnote{30} and is unified with the arising-and-ceasing mind in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. The former activity of the \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \), the activity of moving itself and producing the arising-and-ceasing, is well-known as the dependent origination of \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) (C. \text{rupaizang yuanqi} \text{如來藏緣起}) or the dependent origination of Thussness (C. \text{zhenu ru yuanqi} \text{真如緣起}); the latter activity of its unification with the arising-and-ceasing mind in a neither-identical-nor-different condition as the unification of truth and delusion (C. \text{zhewang hehe} \text{真妄和合}).\footnote{31}

The doctrine of dependent origination of \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) (or Thussness) means that all of the phenomenal world is evolved from \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) (or Thussness). This doctrine is often regarded as deviating from, or even contradictory to, the position of the early Yogācāra tradition,
which conforms to (phenomenal) conditions to constitute the participates in such an activity as the dependent origination. Fazang declares that the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha was also predominantly accepted as a doctrinal frame for understanding it. In the four-fold taxonomy (C. jiapán 教剎) of Buddhist teaching, which Fazang expalciates at the beginning of the Yiji, texts such as the Awakening of Faith and the Lankāvatāra Sūtra are attributed to the fourth and highest level as the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha (C. Rulaiyang yuanqi zong 如來緣起宗). According to this doctrine, tathāgatagarbha, despite its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, directly participates in such an activity as the dependent origination. Fazang declares that the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha indicates the doctrine of interfusion and non-obstruction between the principle and phenomena (C. lishi rongtong wuain shuo 理事融通無說), implying that a direct interaction occurs between the principle (C. li 理; viz., tathāgatagarbha) and phenomena (C. shi 事; viz., the arising-and-ceasing).

The unification of truth and delusion refers to the unification of the tathāgatagarbha (viz., truth) and the arising-and-ceasing mind (viz., delusion) in a neither-identical nor-different condition. Fazang used this term to account for the unification of the two minds in the ālayavijñāna, and afterwards, it came to be adopted widely throughout East Asia, along with its connotation. As a result, the ālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith is generally called the consciousness in which truth and delusion are unified (C. zhenwang hehe shi 真妄和合識). Fazang’s view on the twofold unification in the ālayavijñāna might not appear different from Wŏnhyo’s in its appearance; just as Wŏnhyo does, Fazang also explains the Lankāvatāra Sūtra’s equivocal statements regarding the relationship between tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna in terms of the twofold unification in ālayavijñāna. However, the implications of the twofold unification in Fazang’s view are different from those in Wŏnhyo’s. Unlike Wŏnhyo, who explains each side of the twofold unification respectively based on the twofold nature of the tathāgatagarbha, Fazang interprets this twofold unification in ālayavijñāna as a single

32 The four levels of the teachings are as follows: the teaching of attachment to dharmas following their characteristics (C. Suixiang fazhi zong 隨相執相宗), the teaching of no-characteristics in true emptiness (C. Zhenkong wuxiang zong 真空無相宗), the teaching of dharmas characteristics in consciousness-only (C. Weishi fazxiang zong 唯識法相宗), and the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha (C. Rulaiyang yuanqi zong 如來緣起宗); see the Yiji T1846:44.254b22-28: 第二隨相執相宗者。現今東流一切經論，通大小乘，宗途有四。一隨相執相宗，即小乘諸部之也。二真空無相宗，即般若性空。中觀等論所說是也。三唯識法相宗，即解深密等經。緣像等論所說是也。四如來緣起宗，即有相密嚴等經。起信観性等論所說是也。

33 See the Yiji T1846:44.243b28-c03: 此四之中，初則隨相執相。次則事融通。三則依理起事別說。四則理事融通無礙。以此宗中許不致緣縁於阿和耶識，此則融通於事也。亦許依他緣起無性即如。此則事起於理也。

34 See footnote 33 above.

35 See the Yiji T1846:44.245c245b07. In this passage, Fazang explains the unification in ālayavijñāna by introducing not only the truth and delusion, but also the origin and derivative (C. benmo 本末), as another pair with the same connotation. In fact, Yoshizu Yoshihide, in his insightful article (1983) on the Huayan notion of interfusion between the nature and the characteristics (C. xingshang rongyi 性命相融), demonstrates that a series of paired notions, such as the mutual penetration of the truth and delusion (C. zhengwang jiaochu 真妄交會), the non-obstruction between the principle and phenomena (C. lishi wuain 理事無異), the interfusion between the nature and characteristics, and the equality of the origin and derivatives (C. benmo pingdeng 本末平等), all have the same connotations in Fazang’s works. For detailed information, see Yoshizu (1983).

36 See footnote 28 above.

37 As Wŏnhyo also does, Fazang relates the sūtra’s statement that tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna are separate from each other to the non-identical (C. buyi 不一) condition between the truth and delusion (see the Yiji T1846:44.255a14-18: 第二不一義者，即以前無末之木唯生滅故。與彼無末之末生滅法而不一也。依是義故。經云。如來藏者。不在於梨耶中，是即說末法生有滅。如來藏者不生不滅; he associates the statement that they are identical to the non-different (C. buyi 不異) condition between them (see the Yiji T1846:44.255a9-12: 末末平等明不異者。經云。甚深如來藏。而與七識。又經云。何時耶識名如末藏。而與無明七識共依。如大海波常不動)
state, in which the truth and delusion are interfused to each other. In other words, for Fazang, the neither-identical-nor-different condition of the unification is a new state in the unitary condition, which is distinguished from both the non-identical condition and the non-different condition. Although the neither-identical-nor-different condition of ālayavijñāna may be called ‘twofold’ merely based on its formal division into ‘not-identical’ and ‘not-different’, it does not mean that it has two distinct aspects, because the tathāgatagarbha has a unitary, not twofold, nature. This interfused state of the tathāgatagarbha and the arising-and-ceasing mind in ālayavijñāna is known by Fazang as “the unification of truth and delusion”, and is explicated in his comments on ālayavijñāna, as follows:

As for the above statement, “This consciousness has two natures [of the enlightenment and the non-enlightenment],” the “natures” are somewhat difficult [to understand] and now I summarize the [entire] passage above and below to briefly describe the meaning. For the rest of the passages, one will then understand it when [later] reading it. As for what [it is like, it is] as follows: Thusness (C. zhenru 真如) has two aspects. One is the aspect of unchangeability (C. bibi yu 不變義), and the other is the aspect of conforming to [changing] conditions (C. xixian yi 隨緣義). Nescience (C. wuming 無明, avidyā) also has two meanings. One is the aspect of emptiness that lacks the essence (C. wutong yu 無體即空義), and the other is the aspect of functioning that forms phenomena (C. youyou fangshengyi 有用成事義). Truth (C. zhen 真), [i.e., Thusness] and delusion (C. wang 妄), [i.e., nescience] constitute the abode of Thusness (C. zhenruemen 真如門) on the basis of the former aspects, and constitute the abode of arising-and-ceasing (C. shenmiemen 生滅門) on the basis of the latter aspects.

[The two latter aspects, that is,] Thusness that conforms to conditions (C. xixian zhenru 隨緣真如) and nescience that forms phenomena (C. fangsheng wuming 成事無明) each also have two aspects. One is the aspect of opposing itself and according with the other (C. weizi shuntao 他自願他義), and the other is the aspect of opposing the other and according with itself (C. weita shunzi yi 他願自他義). In the case of nescience [that forms phenomena], the first [aspect of] opposing itself and according with the other has two further aspects. One is [the aspect of] being capable of refusing [language] expositions to reveal the virtuous merits of the nature [of Thusness] (C. nengfanduiquan shixinggongde 能對詮示性功德), and the other is [the aspect of] being capable of knowing the meaning of names to accomplish pure functions (C. nengzhimingyi chengshi 能知名義成淨用). The [second aspect of] opposing the other and according with itself also has two aspects. One is [the aspect of] covering truth (C. fuli 覆理), and the other is [the aspect of] forming delusory mind (C. chengwangxin 成妄心). In the case of Thusness [that conforms to conditions], the [aspect of] opposing the other and according with itself has also two aspects. One is [the aspect of] reversing delusion and defilements to reveal its own merits (C. fanduiwuguan xianzide 翻對妄染顯自德), and the other is [the aspect of] internally perfuming nescience to arouse pure functions (C. neixunwuming qijingyong 內薰無明起淨用). [The aspect of] opposing itself and according with the other has also two aspects. One is the aspect of hiding its true essence (C. yinzhichi 陰自顯體義), and the other is the aspect of manifesting delusive dharmas (C. xianxianwangfa yi 顯現妄法義).

Among the four aspects for each of the truth and delusion, on the basis of [the two aspects, that is,] the aspect of refusing [language] expositions to reveal [the virtuous merits] in case of nescience and the aspect of reversing delusion to reveal merits in case of Thusness, one can come to have original enlightenment. On the basis of [the two aspects, that is,] the aspect of being capable of knowing the meaning of names in case of nescience and the aspect of internally perfuming in case of Thusness, one can come to have initial enlightenment. In addition, on the basis of [the two aspects, that is,] the aspect of covering the truth in case of nescience and the aspect of hiding the essence in case of Thusness, one can come to have the original non-enlightenment (C. genben bujue 根本不覺). And, on the basis of [the two aspects,
that is, the aspect of forming delusion in case of nescience and the aspect of manifesting delusion in case of Thusness, one can come to have the derivative no-enlightenment (C. zhimó bùjùe 枝末不覺).

In this abode of arising-and-ceasing, [the nature of] the truth and delusion is briefly divided into four aspects, but in detailed level, there are eight aspects. When [paired aspects from Thusness and nescience] are unified to constitute the dependent origination, there are four divisions, namely, two for enlightenment and two for non-enlightenment. When the origin and its derivatives are not separated from each other, there are only two divisions, namely, enlightenment and non-enlightenment. When [they are all] interfused to encompass each other, there are only one, namely, the abode of arising-and-ceasing of the one mind (C. yīxīn shēngmíngrén —一心生滅門). 38

The unification of the truth and delusion, described in the above passage, may be represented in Figure 1.

![Figure 1](image-url)

**Figure 1.** The unification of truth and delusion in Fazang’s commentary of the *Awakening of Faith*. 39

As seen in Figure 1, the mutual interfusion between Thusness and nescience represents a state, in which truth and delusion, are intricately interconnected to constitute alayavijñāna. For Fazang, the neither-identical-nor-different state of the unification in alayavijñāna is not dividable into two aspects of the non-identical condition and the non-different condition; rather, it is a unitary state called ‘synthetic’ consciousness. It was due to this interpretation that the concept of alayavijñāna of the *Awakening of Faith* has been regarded as doctrinally incompatible with that of early Yogācāra Buddhism. The ‘synthetic’ structure of the alayavijñāna, in which the neither-arising-nor-ceasing fathāgatagarbha is directly interacting with the arising-and-ceasing mind, is simply incongruous with the early Yogācāra’s

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38 See the Yi Ji T1846:44.255c18-256a13: 前中言此識有二義者。此義稍難。今總括上下文略敘其意。餘可至文當知。何者。謂則如如二義。一不變義。二隨緣義。無明中亦二義。一無常分。二無明分。此前名中。各有初義故成上真如門也。各以後義故成此生滅門也。此隨緣義及成事無明中亦有二義。一逢自願他義。二逢他願自義。無明中初逢自願他亦有二義。一能反對詮示性功德。二能知名義成淨用。逢他願自亦有二義。一覆真理。二成妄心。然則中違他願自亦有二義。一覆對妄染自體。二內重無明起浄用。逢自願他亦有二義。一隨自願體義。二違現妄法義。此上隨自各四義中由無明中反對詮示義。及顯如中違妄現德義。從此此義得有本覺。又由無明中能知名義。及知如中內重義。從此此義得有始覺。又由無明中覆顯義。及顯如中體義。從此此義得有本不覺。又由無明中成妄義。及知如中現妄義。從此此義得有始末不覺。此生滅門中。真妄略開四義。廣即有八門。若約兩兩相對合成緣起。即有四門。謂二覺二不覺。若約末末不相離。唯有一門。謂一心生滅門也。

39 This figure was originally composed by Whalen Lai (1988, p. 252) in his article titled “the I-ching and the Formation of the Hua-yen Philosophy.” Here, I have added the part of the abode of Thusness and made some modifications in English translations. I introduce this figure to facilitate the understanding of the reciprocal interfusion between truth and delusion, or Thusness and nescience, described in this passage.
understanding of tathāgatagarbha or Thusness as the unconditioned dharmas, which never take part in any phenomenal activity. Moreover, the alayavijñāna in this ‘synthetic’ state has a metaphysical implication, which is generally not accepted in Buddhist tradition.\textsuperscript{40} It might be said that Fazang succeeded in compromising the contemporary doctrinal tension by interpreting alayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith as the ‘synthetic’ consciousness, in which the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind and the arising-and-ceasing mind are interpenetrated to each other. However, as far as Fazang’s claim that tathāgatagarbha and the phenomenal world, or Thusness and nescience, are unified in one state has a metaphysical connotation, his interpretation of alayavijñāna also remains odd from the general standpoint of Buddhist tradition.

4. Concluding Reflections

The Awakening of Faith has been considered to doctrinally deviate from the early Yogācāra because of its innovative description of alayavijñāna as the ‘synthetic’ consciousness, in which the tathāgatagarbha and the phenomenal mind are unified. This way of understanding has mostly been based on Huayan exegete Fazang’s commentary, according to which Thusness and nescience, truth and delusion, or principle and phenomena, are interpenetrated in the alayavijñāna. The question of how the neither-arising-nor-ceasing tathāgatagarbha can participate in the arising-and-ceasing activities of the phenomenal world still remains a problem innate to Fazang’s interpretation. In comparison, Wŏnhyo’s commentaries of the Awakening of Faith suggest an alternative view on the alayavijñāna. By considering the twofold nature of tathāgatagarbha, which includes not only the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, but also the arising-and-ceasing nature, Wŏnhyo explains how tathāgatagarbha keeps its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature on the one hand, and also engages itself in the phenomenal world on the other hand. On the basis of this understanding the tathāgatagarbha, the unification of the tathāgatagarbha and the arising-and-ceasing mind in alayavijñāna is also explained in a twofold way—the unification in a not-identical condition on the one hand, and in a not-different condition on the other hand. In this way, Wŏnhyo explains doctrinal compatibility between the alayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith and that of the early Yogācāra, and based on his perspective on the tathāgatagarbha and the alayavijñāna, we may see a possible doctrinal connection between the Awakening of Faith and the early Yogācāra.

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*Lengqie abatuoluo baojing* 棱伽阿跋多罗宝經 T670.
*Ru lengqiexin xuanyi* 入楞伽心玄義 T1790.
*Taes˘ung kisillon py˘olgi* 大乘起信論別記 T1845.

\textsuperscript{40} Whalen Lai (1980, pp. 252–55) also argues that Fazang’s doctrines were influenced by ontological metaphysics of classical Chinese philosophy, such as that of the Yijing 易经, by indicating a similarity between Fazang’s scheme of the mutual permeation of Thusness and delusion and Yijing’s “One-Two-Four-Eight” diagram, which stands for evolutionary process of phenomena from the one supreme principle.
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