BOOK REVIEWS

AN OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY: AN EXEGETICAL, CANONICAL, AND THEMATIC APPROACH. By Bruce K. Waltke, with Charles Yu. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2007. Pp. 1040. $44.99.

Waltke divides his study into three parts: six introductory chapters on OT theology and method; 21 chapters on salvation history (Genesis and the OT Histories), each chapter focused on what he calls a “gift”; and six chapters on “gifts” from other OT writings (Prophets, Wisdom, Ruth, etc.). Even with his claimed focus on history, W.’s solid and lengthy introduction defines his task as theological rather than historical, framed by his evangelical assumptions about revelation, inspiration, illumination, and a narrow canon. That the Apocrypha are doctrinally false (according to Reformers) is, for W., sufficient to exclude them from his OT theology (38). He critiques liberal and fundamentalist approaches, and claims that traditionalist interpretations (i.e., Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Jewish) “many times nullify the word of God” (76). Only an evangelical approach “stands under the bible” (77), he claims, though without critical defense. He clearly defines his audience as evangelical and not fundamentalist, even though he gives much attention to fundamentalist concerns such as whether biblical creation is science (194–203).

In parts 2 and 3, W. identifies primary OT themes (gifts), such as the land, warfare, the spirit, and covenant, and often traces a theme through the OT into the New. His use of critical methods, such as narrative criticism (plot, point of view, etc.) and poetics (Leitwort, motif, etc.), are well selected and executed, though he expresses some tension: “My conservative understanding of the narrative’s historical credibility stands in opposition to that of historical criticism” (95). He admits to ANE parallels with biblical creation themes but maintains that the biblical notion of creation is substantively distinct from such parallels, that biblical creation is a historical, not a mythic, notion. There is for him an originality to YHWH’s speaking creation out of nothing (200), without admitting that this same expression is found of Ptah in Egypt, and without engaging different internal OT myths of origin (Gen 1:1–2.4a; Gen 2; Ezek 28:13–16). Similarly W. claims that “biblical literature never conceptualizes God in the theological notions of pantheism or polytheism, which inform ancient Near Eastern myths” (188), but he fails to address the council scene of Psalm 82 or Elyon’s giving of Jacob to YHWH as YHWH’s portion (Deut 32:8–9). W.’s claim, then, that the Scriptures “creatively and rhetorically represent raw historical data to teach theology” (202) is not sufficiently defended. He has rightly adopted and defined one specific theological perspective, without noting its possible challenges.
Following Eichrodt, W. argues for one core theme to his OT theology, namely, that of God’s kingship (144), claiming it as the “proposed centre [that] accommodates the whole, but the whole [that] is not systematically structured according to it” (144). Yet this main theme is never fully engaged. For example, the end of chapter 14 on Exodus focuses on YHWH the warrior, the theme of war through Samuel-Kings, and the use of spiritual warfare imagery in the NT. Yet the Song of the Sea (Exod 15:1–18), possibly the earliest expression of YHWH’s kingship, receives only brief treatment (386). Likewise W.’s helpful treatment of the Psalms (covering historical approaches, genres, editing of the Psalter) focuses on the messianic claims in the Psalms with no mention of their images of YHWH’s kingship. Nor does W. engage any scholarship on YHWH’s kingship; the lack of reference to John Gray’s The Biblical Doctrine of the Reign of God (1979) is particularly surprising since Gray shares W.’s concerns with YHWH’s kingship and its reinterpretation through the testaments.

Thus W.’s OT theology does not achieve thematic unity around a notion of YHWH’s kingship, nor is unquestioned adherence to one narrow school of biblical interpretation sufficient to unify that theology. The resulting disunity is finally apparent in the lack of any conclusion that brings together the themes and ideas into a cohesive unit or relationship. W.’s often-brilliant analyses and exegeses of various themes does not make the work an OT theology, despite his lengthy introduction.

University of Toronto  

SHAWN W. FLYNN

STUDIEN ZUM JOHANNESKOMMENTAR DES THEODOR VON MOPSUESTIA. By Felix Thome. Hereditas: Studien zur alten Kirchengeschichte 26. Bonn: Borengässer, 2008. Pp. xxix + 463. €48.

Theodore of Mopsuestia wrote his commentary on John in the first decade of the fifth century, possibly earlier and certainly before his commentary on Paul’s Minor Epistles (22, 30). A Syriac translation appeared by the mid-fifth century, before the school of Edessa was expelled from the Empire in 489 and took refuge at Nisibis in Persia (2). The condemnation of Theodore in 553 culminated more than a century’s opposition to his views and helps explain why all but one of his works, save for fragments, have been lost in their original Greek. Nevertheless, for the East Syrian (Nestorian) church, Theodore was “the Interpreter” and a norm of orthodoxy. In 1868 the Archbishop of Amida discovered a Syriac text of the commentary on John in a monastery near Mosul in what is now Iraq. The manuscript, dated 1704 but presumably copied from earlier manuscripts, has been lost, yet copies of this “so-called archetype” have been preserved in four codices. The best edition of the Syriac translation was published in 1940 by Vosté, together with a Latin translation (8–10, 21–24). In 1948 Devreesse edited the Greek fragments taken from the commentary found in five exegetical catenae (25–27).
Thome assesses the Syriac translation by examining its relation to the catenae and to other evidence in Syriac and Latin (6–7, 10–19). The complexities he confronts can easily be discerned. He must evaluate the catenae while remaining aware of a wide range of other texts that might inform his conclusions. His work is to be commended and admired for its patient, painstaking, and careful examination. His cumulative arguments are demanding, but his general conclusions and their qualification amply reward careful attention. T. finds the Syriac translation a reliable guide to Theodore’s commentary, but he also argues that using it requires an awareness of the complexities and difficulties he so ably describes. Indeed, T.’s book is really a prolegomenon to new editions of the Syriac version and the Greek catenae fragments (72–73).

T.’s book consists of four parts. Part 1 lays out both the ancient evidence and modern secondary literature. Over half of this part weighs and finds wanting both Fatica’s Italian translation of Voste (32–48) and Kalantzis’s English translation of Devreesse (49–72). (T. is harder than necessary on Kalantzis’s translation, since his real issue has to do with the conclusions drawn from it.) Part 2 turns to the Syriac version and the catenae. With the exception of catena E, the Greek fragments establish the reliability of the Syriac translation and sometimes even clarify its meaning (159, 200–201). One problem with the Syriac version is that Theodore sometimes fails to cite the text of the Gospel, resorting to paraphrase (199). Surprisingly, T. here fails to refer to Theodore’s preface where he argues that, unlike the preacher, the commentator should focus on what is unclear in the biblical text. Part 3 examines the biblical citations found in the Syriac version. Here T.’s conclusion is inconclusive. My own reading suggests that, while the translator obviously has his own Syriac Bible in mind, he has paid careful attention to Theodore’s Greek, and, therefore, that once more it is possible to argue for the reliability of the Syriac version.

Part 4 examines the Syriac version for descriptions of Theodore’s opponents. T. supplies 26 passages, ordered according to the text of John (though they would have been better organized according to the categories T. lists in his conclusion). Most examples can be related to the two opponents Theodore actually names, Eunomius and Asterius (see 2–7, 9, 12–14, 16–17, 19, 21, 23). A second group involves the problem of reconciling the Fourth Gospel to the Synoptics (see 18, 24–26); here T. envisages pagan opponents of Christianity such as Porphyry and Julian the Apostate. (But reconciling the Gospels is an obvious exegetical task; need we think exclusively of opponents?) The remaining examples (8, 10–11, 15, 22), with the exception of the 20th, where the opponents are libertine Gnostics, seem to involve exegetical debates that could easily be found within the confines of “orthodoxy.” Even the examples involving theological issues need not always involve Arianizing or Apollinarian views. Surely we can suppose that Theodore wished to defend his divisive Christology against unitive views found in the interpretations given these Johannine texts by, say, Athanasius and the Cappadocians.
These and other questions are meant as a tribute to a fine book that engages the careful reader. No one now should use Theodore’s commentary on John without consulting T.’s work.

_rowan a. greer

_Jesus: A Portrait._ By Gerald O’Collins, S.J. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 2008. Pp. xvi + 246. $25.

_Salvation for All: God’s Other Peoples._ By Gerald O’Collins, S.J. New York: Oxford University, 2008. Pp. xii + 279. $29.95.

O’Collins explores the paradox that God’s saving love is universal (including, e.g., Melchizedek [Gen 14:18–20]), and yet is mediated through the one savior Jesus Christ (1 Tm 2:5). _Salvation for All_ aims “to set out in detail all the major biblical testimony to the universal scope of God’s offer of salvation” (v–vi), while _Jesus: A Portrait_ seeks “to know and understand Jesus . . . as a mystery (or rather the mystery) with which to engage ourselves for a lifetime” (xv). Having previously investigated this paradox in, for example, _Christology_ (1995; rev. ed. 2009) and _Jesus Our Redeemer_ (2007), O’C. continues his exploration in these two volumes, attentive to scholarship concerning Christ and world religions (e.g., by Jacques Dupuis) and also concerning Jesus of Nazareth and the NT (e.g., by Richard Bauckham).

_Salvation_ is divided into two parts. Chapters 1–10 examine testimony in the OT and NT to “the divine benevolence” to all peoples. O’C. contends that according to the Bible God’s salvific love is not a matter of either/or, but of both/and; God wills the redemption of both Israel and other peoples. For example, Isaiah 66 is “a classic role model in a balancing act”: it attests to the saving acts that “the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob has done and continues to do for the chosen people,” yet it also recognizes “the way in which the same God is at work in bringing revelation and salvation to all the nations” (47). Jesus of Nazareth also exhibited this inclusive outlook; he explicitly directed his ministry to his Jewish brothers and sisters and yet brought his “good news” to “outsiders” such as a centurion (Mt 8:5–13) and a Syrophoenician woman (Mk 7:24–30) without requiring that they become Jewish or one of Jesus’ followers. Further, Jesus’ orientation is upheld in the NT. For example, Paul acknowledges that Jesus directed his message first to God’s chosen people but also that God’s salvation in Christ Jesus includes the Gentiles (Rom 15:7–13).

In chapters 11–16, O’C. approaches the mystery of universality and particularity in a more systematic manner. At the outset he states his thesis, namely, that the first Christians held Jesus “to be the unique, universal Saviour: that is to say, the only one of his kind in being the Saviour of all men and women in all times and places” (162). O’C. then employs the notion of personal presence to clarify the universal salvific “work” of Jesus.
Christ and also of the Holy Spirit. To support his theological proposal, he invokes the vision of John Paul II as expressed, for example, in *Dominum et vivificantem* (1986) and *Redemptoris missio* (1990), a vision the pope lived out by hosting the world’s religious leaders at Assisi. Appealing to the image of creation singing praise to God—expressed in Vatican II’s *Sacrosanctum concilium* no. 83—O’C. envisions Jesus Christ as the “Cosmic Choir Master” with whom all people, “baptized and non-baptized alike” (224), give glory to the Creator. At the same time, implicitly building on *Nostra aetate* no. 2, O’C. writes of the Holy Spirit being “present and operative in and through all that is true and good in various cultures and religions around the world” (229). These reflections culminate in his discussion of Jesus Christ as “divine Wisdom” at the heart of creation (chap. 15) and also of the “saving faith” of non-Christians (chap. 16).

At the outset of *Jesus: A Portrait*, O’C. observes that, as knowledge of another person is always self-involving, so knowing Jesus Christ presupposes a readiness to understand oneself anew as well as a commitment to deepen one’s love of the Lord. The “object” of Christian faith is not a historical reconstruction of Jesus of Nazareth, but the living Christ whom the NT, the Christian tradition, and the church proclaim. The book then searches out that portrait. Chapter 1 discusses “The Beauty of Jesus”—a reflection guided by statements of spiritual masters such as Saint Augustine of Hippo and Fyodor Dostoyevsky. Chapters 2 and 3 explore how Jesus made present and enacted God’s kingdom or reign in word and deed. Chapters 4 and 5 illumine how Jesus’ miracles “manifested the reign of God and the divine promise to deliver sick and sinful human beings from the grip of evil” (80). Chapters 6–8 mine the divine wisdom of Jesus’ parables and present Jesus as the embodiment of this wisdom. Chapters 9 and 10 reflect on Jesus’ understanding of his suffering and death “as atoning for the sins of Jews and Gentiles alike” (162). In particular, these chapters approach the cross as the revelation of God’s self-sacrificing love, agape, for creation. In this Johannine perspective, O’C. observes that Christ continues to suffer with all suffering peoples. “*Ubi dolor, ibi Christus*” (182). Finally, chapters 11 and 12 explore the mystery of Jesus Christ’s risen life and, in doing so, invite readers to encounter the Lord anew. Working with John’s Gospel, O’C. reflects on the Johannine Jesus’ seven questions and the responses of those who have approached Jesus. This concluding reflection crystallizes the book’s portrait of Christ as “unqualified Love, the divine Love in person” (224).

Although the publication of *Salvation for All* and *Jesus: A Portrait* in the same year may be a coincidence, these books are in fact complementary. *Salvation* highlights the Christians’ point of departure and rationale for wanting to communicate with non-Christians. It can inspire and guide its readers to adopt a high regard for the “holy others” and to take seriously the unsettling questions and insights raised by interreligious dialogue (199). At the same time, *Jesus* invites its readers to meet again the risen
Lord who, with the Holy Spirit, unites all peoples in divine agape. In these
two books, as in his previous work, O’C. fulfills the role of “the faithful and
prudent” steward who makes available the Master’s riches (Lk 12:42).

University of Notre Dame

ROBERT A. KRIEG

PARTICIPATORY BIBLICAL EXEGESIS: A THEOLOGY OF BIBLICAL INTERPRE-
TATION. By Matthew Levering. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre
Dame, 2008. Pp. xi + 310. $60; $25.

Interest in the patristic and medieval traditions of biblical interpretation
has been growing in the last decade, in both Protestant and Catholic
circles. Levering’s book is a sophisticated and detailed contribution to the
approach. Nearly half its length consists of footnotes and bibliography that
testify to L.’s engagement with a broad range of secondary literature, while
the heart of his proposal is succinctly laid out in five chapters.

L.’s thesis is this: (1) our dominant historical-critical approach to biblical
interpretation demands that scholars reconstruct a linear history behind
biblical texts, but (2) it thereby suppresses appreciation for the participato-
ry dimensions and methods of biblical interpretation that prevailed in
patristic and medieval times, (3) leaving us in danger of losing essential
aspects of the church’s faith. L. acknowledges reliance upon John Paul II’s
Fides et ratio and on the philosophical and theological perspectives of
Matthew Lamb, a colleague at Ave Maria University, both of which pro-
vide theoretical platforms and justifications for L.’s approach.

Chapter 1 traces the shift from participatory to nonparticipatory (linear)
exegesis that occurred in the 14th century. L. uses Aquinas’s interpretation
of the Gospel of John as a model for the kind of participatory exegesis he
believes needs to be recovered. In chapter 2 he broadly traces the further
shift away from participatory exegesis from Aquinas to Raymond Brown.
The final three chapters set forth the model of participatory exegesis that
he believes will enable biblical interpretation to rediscover its proper ec-
clesial roots.

Throughout, L. claims a need for some historical-critical exegesis—espe-
cially to view biblical texts in their historical context, and he also states
that the basis for participatory exegesis lies in the “literal sense” of the text
itself, not in some outside schema. But he summarizes the more exegetical,
esential task in three steps: (1) reclaiming a participatory view of history;
(2) viewing interpretation as a participation in the life of the triune God;
and (3) trusting ecclesial authority to distinguish valid multilayered inter-
pretations from eisegetical ones.

L.’s goal is clearly in line with the current trend among many exegetes to
reclaim the great tradition of often-neglected patristic and medieval exe-
gesis. Moreover, the language of “participation” is fashionable in certain
areas of contemporary biblical studies, for example, in Pauline scholarship,
and for good reason: reclaiming the church’s rich heritage of ancient and
medieval biblical interpretation is a worthy project. Still, the enterprise is
disquieting for three reasons. First, the notion of participatory exegesis suffers from a certain vagueness; it remains unclear what is meant by the claim that by this method we participate in the life of the triune God. What does one make of the following: “The Trinitarian constitution of the ecclesial ‘fellowship’ provides the locus in which interpretation attains its object, God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” (87)? True as the statement might be, it does not in itself help us understand how God’s word miraculously nourishes and strengthens individuals who approach it with faith. Second, despite L.’s claims for historical-critical methods, I sense that he would always allow precritical exegesis the controlling, and final, word. In fact a review of L.’s commentary, Ezra and Nehemiah (2007), notes a lack of serious engagement with the text precisely because of limited historical-critical observations (see Ralph Klein’s review in Review of Biblical Literature [2008]). If the two types of exegesis can be brought together, L. does not yet seem to have found the formula. Finally, promoters sometimes use precritical exegesis to avoid complexities and uncertainties that can result from asking historical and contextual questions of ancient texts. Reclaiming and honoring past interpretations is one thing; making them the norm simply because of their antiquity is another. Whether L. has sufficiently brought historical criticism into a viable and valuable conversation with his participatory model is questionable.

One minor point: While the footnotes are a goldmine of useful information and demonstrate L.’s serious engagement in scholarly discourse, the index is more suggestive than complete; if one wants to track the mention of specific authors or topics, be forewarned of many lacunae.

Sulpician Generalate, Paris

RONALD D. WITHERUP, S.S.

DESTERRADAS HIJAS DE EVA: PROTAGONISMO Y MARGINACIÓN DE LA MUJER EN EL CHRISTIANISMO PRIMITIVO. By Fernando Rivas Rebaque. Teología Comillas. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, 2008. Pp. 268. €18.

In this work (Banished Daughters of Eve: The Protagonist Roles and Marginalization of Women in the Early Christianity), Fernando Rivas Rebaque examines women’s roles in the church during the first five centuries and in varied social locations. He highlights the process by which women’s public ecclesial roles (as community leaders, missionaries, or teachers of the faith) became increasingly limited. Well before the end of the second century women leaders in the East and West were largely pushed out of public and into private roles (i.e., ascetic, devotional, and charitable concerns) supporting the early Christian community. Compelled by Galatians 3:28, R. brings to his study the conviction that the church needs an understanding of women that reflects a more authentic theology, namely, a theology freed from the cultural trappings of patriarchy and the limitation it places on women’s leadership in and ownership of the church. For R., there is no better way to address this challenge than to study how
women were understood in early church history, precisely because during this early period we discover the roots of where we find ourselves today in terms of both church thinking and practice.

While R.’s claim is not new, its framing is distinctive and notably problematic. He rightly recognizes that the early church’s efforts toward inculturation and evangelization took place in the context of the patriarchal society of the Greco-Roman world. Accordingly, he reasons, if the church was to both remain faithful to the tradition’s memory of Jesus Christ and yet express this tradition in a manner culturally intelligible in this early period, then not surprisingly it would adopt a patriarchal mindset to make the gospel comprehensible. However, in laying out this argument, R. draws a sharp and too facile separation between “culture and history” on the one hand, and “theology” on the other. In part he creates this separation by identifying conventional understandings of women as the substance of a given cultural and historical context not to be equated or confused with what he terms “natural” or God-given. Problematically, R. uses this separation to imply that the faith of the church (theology) exists in some acultural, pure form that is immediate and thus unmediated. For R. the purest form of theology stands outside culture and yet is compromised by entering culture in order to be effective in the world. Consequently his work bypasses the question, Is not the faith of the church (in the realm of ideas and practices) always already inculturated? If so, on what basis can theologians and the church’s hierarchy have direct access to an acultural form of the church’s faith (the substance of theology)? Is there a slip here into fideism? Moreover, among the problems that such an approach engenders is the perception that the church eschews any culpability for its accommodation to patriarchy, thereby reducing patriarchy to nothing more than an unfortunate, albeit necessary, compromise.

In the end, R.’s work sustains a worldview that continues to marginalize women in spite of his stated aim. For example, he is critical of various models of female dualism that subordinate and circumscribe women’s agency, and of the ways that sexuality and sin become linked and used to limit possibilities for women (see chap. 2), but he does not critically consider how his own retelling of this history might be done in a manner that subverts the subordination of women. Although he takes care to point out the woes brought forth by the subordination of women, he does not make clear the related interests of men in retaining their social capacity to dominate. His retelling of this history could serve to transform the social relations of domination and subordination today without slipping into an anachronism that he rightly seeks to avoid, without, however, succeeding. He cites Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’s early work, but his own work could be strengthened by her subsequent treatment of hermeneutics and theological method. Rosemary Radford Ruether’s sustained critique of dualism could likewise assist R.; both would deepen the coherence of his claims.

By and large, R.’s work resonates with much of the “new feminism” and therefore with John Paul II’s notion of “the genius of women.” Nonetheless
he nudges the agenda of this discourse with a passionate, concluding exhortation, claiming that there is no legitimate reason for the church to maintain a division between women and men within its own structures, or to give this division legitimacy by referencing the tradition. The Catholic Church, he insists, must develop strategies that promote women’s leadership, authority, and governance within the Church.

Boston College

NANCY PINEDA-MADRID

POSSIDIUS OF CALAMA: A STUDY OF THE NORTH AFRICAN EPISCOPATE AT THE TIME OF AUGUSTINE. By Erika T. Hermanowicz. Oxford Early Christian Studies. New York: Oxford University, 2008. Pp. xvi + 254. $110.

Modern readers owe their image of Augustine largely to Peter Brown’s Augustine: A Biography (1967, rev. ed. 2000) and, more recently, to Gary Wills’s Augustine (1999, written for a popular audience) and to Serge Lancel’s St. Augustine (2002, integrating material from Augustine’s recently discovered letters). But each of Augustine’s biographies is a response to the culture and curiosity of the biographer’s own time. Antiquity owed its image to Augustine’s first biographer and junior episcopal colleague, Possidius of Calama (ca. 370–ca. 440). No less than Brown or Wills, Possidius wrote as a creature of his own place and time.

Augustine himself provides substantial grist for the biographical mill. In his Confessions and Retractions, and between the lines in his numerous letters, he reveals himself as a man ever in flux: from a lustful adolescent to an ascetic old man, from a rationalizing Manichee to a Catholic who accepted much on faith. But, strangely enough, the man of inner turmoil and constant development is not Possidius’s friend and mentor. Possidius seems to know only a man whose late life colors all appropriations of his years in ministry. There is no mention of his years in the boiling cauldron of lust in Carthage or the angst-ridden garden scene of his conversion.

In the first half of her book, Erika Hermanowicz offers a life of Possidius and a rationale for his static portrayal of Augustine. After Augustine’s death in 430, the memory of Augustine faced twin perils: the advent of the Arian Vandals and opposition by bishops in Italy and Gaul to many of his stances, especially on questions arising from his Manichaean past and his positions on predestination and free will in the Pelagian controversy. Rather than depict Augustine as a man of his own time, Possidius portrays him as a theologian who answered the questions of Possidius’s days. “Possidius takes on the role of mediator who tries to ‘adjust’ Augustine’s life and works to make them more like they ‘should’ be” (6).

H.’s book, then, is rather about Possidius than Augustine. Precisely in showing how Possidius revamps Augustine and his work, she reveals the life and times of Possidius, a “self-confident author” (66) who basks in the light of his subject. He used extended materials from Augustine’s own writings to depict Augustine less as a novel theologian and more as a domesticated heir of Cyprian and the milieu that produced Donatism.
The second half of the book moves from a literary to a historical study. Contrary to most other scholars who see Possidius’s work as inadequate in substance and veracity, H. considers it a deliberately crafted hagiography, one that reveals—almost through a historical-critical reading—the trials and triumphs of the African episcopate in the late-fourth and early-fifth centuries through the life of a man schooled in the episcopal culture in the age of Donatism (83–84). She reveals the deliberate way in which the Donatists crafted their use of antitheretical legislation to condemn their own Maximianist schismatics; in so doing they paved the way for Catholics to use the same laws against the Donatists.

H. is remarkably knowledgeable about subtle changes in ecclesiastical politics between the time of the inception of the Donatist controversy and Augustine’s writings. She understands how both sides used canon and civil law, as well as violence, to their own advantage in attempting to repress the other and to regain stolen churches and land. She offers lucidly written insights into the reception of the person and writings of Augustine. Finally she gives readers new eyes with which to read an eminently political biography of Augustine, showing how a tight network of personal loyalties among Possidius and his associates impacted theological controversy in ways reminiscent of Elizabeth Clark’s work in The Origenist Controversy (1992). I highly recommend H.’s volume for seminary and graduate libraries and, despite its cost, to scholars of Augustine.

Fordham University, Bronx, N.Y. Maureen A. Tilley

Eclesialidad, reforma y misión: El legado teológico de Ignacio de Loyola, Pedro Fabro, y Francisco de Javier. By Santiago Madrigal. Madrid: Editorial San Pablo y Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, 2008. Pp. 334. €20.

Madrigal’s book commemorates the Jesuit Jubilee Year 2006 marking the death of Ignatius of Loyola and the birth of two of his early companions, Peter Faber and Francis Xavier. The book’s perspective is threefold: the ecclesiastical passion of Ignatius, the implications of the Protestant Reformation for Faber, and the missionary zeal of Xavier, introducing ecclesiological paths that differ yet emerge from the same foundation. Key is the early Jesuits’ love for the Church: Ignatius through an ecclesiology that emerged during his pilgrim period and became concrete in the Spiritual Exercises; Faber in his experience of and struggle against the different and foreboding outcomes of the Protestant Reformation, especially in Germany; and Xavier as he traveled to India, Goa, Malacca, the Moluccas Islands, and Japan and endeavored to arrive at some resolution with differing manners of worshiping God.

M. rightly insists that the theological legacy about which he writes is never restricted to the Society of Jesus. However, the manner in which he introduces his thesis is cluttered with perplexing and unnecessary refer-
ences to Melchior Cano (an early Dominican detractor of the Society of Jesus), Greek gods, Cervantes, and other seemingly extraneous figures. M.'s writing comes alive, though, when he focuses specifically on his three Jesuits. Clearly indicating the indispensable, experiential nature of all things Ignatian, he explores the formative episodes of their lives. Beginning with Ignatius is imperative for several reasons: the spiritualities and ecclesiologies of Faber and Xavier were inculcated by him; his ecclesiology is present throughout and comes to fruition at the conclusion of the Spiritual Exercises (“To Have the True Sentiment Which We Ought to Have in the Church Militant”) (352); and Ignatius develops the supposition that salvation itself takes place within the Church.

Faber is described as the one who walked “the world” in order to find God. His travels brought him into the zenith of 16th-century ecclesiastical reform, principally in Germany. He was known as the theologian of the early Jesuits, and his skills were put to use throughout the Continent. The profound influence of the Exercises provided the underpinning for his ecclesiology: its Christocentric orientation and passion for the journey through life, guided by Ignatius’s eminent question, “What should I do for Christ?”

In Faber’s letters to Ignatius from the Diet of Worms (where he was sent in 1540 to uphold Catholicism in Germany) and the Diet of Ratisbon (1541), he indicated that he and the Church must set examples to counter the misery, sin, and infamy he was experiencing. This would come about, he proposed, if Catholic dogma, the liturgy, and love for saintly relics and the Virgin Mary were upheld. M. illustrates how Faber also advocated an apostolate of charity and love toward the Protestants, and attempted to discover what they had in common and not just what separated them. Herein we witness an ecclesial approach somewhat unknown at the time. As Faber’s experience of Protestantism was distinct, Ignatius sent him as a resident theologian to the Council of Trent. En route, he died in Rome (1546).

M.’s investigation of Francis Xavier contains biographical material superfluous to anyone vaguely familiar with the origins of the Society. Nevertheless, it affords the opportunity to examine Xavier’s viewpoint that all of life is a journey, but only the mystical journey allows one truly to see the material world. Foundational, once again, are the Exercises as well as the sustaining memory of his Jesuit companions. He ventured into a world unknown to most Europeans and encountered religions hitherto inconceivable. M. suggests that this mentality and experience are exemplified today by such documents as “Our Mission and Interreligious Dialogue,” coming from the Jesuits’ 34th General Congregation in 1995. He suggests further that care must be taken not to connect arbitrarily the social and cultural contexts of yesterday with today (e.g., Xavier’s propensity to baptize immense numbers of people at one time). Nonetheless, M. contends that the Society of Jesus—in the theological legacy of Ignatius, Faber, and Xavier—is inextricably linked with encounters with other religions as much as with missionary activity.
Ultimately, according to M., the Jesuits’ ecclesiology rests in the principles of the service of God and the helping of souls, ideals emphasized in Vatican II’s *Lumen gentium*. These ideals resonate well with the Jesuit idea of pilgrimage—that one is always on the way to the Absolute—as lived by Ignatius, Faber, and Xavier.

*Santa Clara University*

**Tom Powers, S.J.**

**The Cambridge Companion to the Jesuits.** Edited by Thomas Worcester, S.J. Cambridge Companion to Religion. New York: Cambridge University, 2008. Pp. xii + 361. $90; $29.99.

There are many delights and several deficiencies among these 18 essays. Gemma Simmonds’s chapter on Mary Ward is a model of clarity and balance. Her coverage of Ward’s efforts to found a congregation of women Jesuits traces a tortuous story. The “English Ladies” were banned by Urban VII, and like-minded groups were marginalized by other popes, at least beyond the borders of the Gallican church, where female congregations, modeled along Jesuit lines, established a foothold. Later, after the French Revolution, women’s institutes spread across Europe and the United States.

The same narrative virtues characterize Thomas Cohen’s contribution on minorities in the Society of Jesus. Author of a colorful history of António Vieira and the missionary church in Brazil, Cohen documents the priority early Jesuits gave to quality as well as to numbers in recruitment. The policy helps explain the high proportion of New Christians—converted Jews—among the first cohorts, until anti-Semitism and bias against non-Europeans shut that experiment down, along with the induction of native clergy.

Other standouts include Gauvin Bailey’s tour of Jesuit architecture in Latin America, Stanislaw Obirek’s summary of the Society’s history in Poland and Eastern Europe, Nicolas Standaert’s chapter on the Jesuits in China, and Gerald McKevitt’s overview of Jesuit schools in the United States. Obirek maps out what for most readers is unknown territory. McKevitt synthesizes a complicated story (although he fails to highlight the centrality of the GI Bill to the expansion of higher education). Standaert’s treatment of “communities of effective ritual”—small devotional associations—challenges the image of the Society’s China mission as purely one of top-down evangelization. And Bailey runs with the exuberance of Jesuit-sponsored buildings in the 16th and 17th centuries.

The rest of the book is a letdown. A few chapters, like Jacques Monet’s on the Jesuits in New France and Mary Ann Hinsdale’s on theological discourse since Vatican II, barely rise above pious memorials. The three chapters devoted to Ignatius are adequate, and Philip Endean’s insistence on how the Spiritual Exercises lend themselves to multiple interpretations, while not new, is worthwhile. The difficulty with this part of the volume may be that Jesuit spirituality has been picked over so often that it is easy
to get lost in curlicues without communicating why it made such an impact in the first place.

Louis Caruana’s approach to “the Jesuits and the quiet side of the scientific revolution” takes a promising starting point and drops it. The idea that Jesuit scientists tended to stick with empirical work and stay away from theory, so as to avoid theological controversy, rings true. But Caruana exhibits an uncritical understanding of Imre Lakatos’s methodological position, on which the idea is based, when he contends that data dredging is how science normally works, so Jesuits are off the hook. This will come as news to practitioners paid by research institutes to speculate. Similarly, Jonathan Wright builds a good case that the suppression of the Society resulted from the convergence of circumstantial political factors, but he goes on about “endless anti-Jesuit propaganda” while skipping the ultramontane conservatism of postrestoration Jesuits in Europe.

Reasons for these flaws seem both organizational and political. Organizationally the Cambridge Companion series works well when focused on demarcated subjects, as with The Cambridge Companion to the Modern German Novel. But the purview of The Jesuits is too sprawling for a single collection. Editor Thomas Worcester recognizes that substantive coverage cannot live up to the expansiveness of the title and that the contents heavily favor the early days of the Society. Even so, the fact remains that his conclusion neither summarizes earlier analyses nor lays out questions they pose.

Instead Worcester uses the chapters politically as a springboard for motivational lessons about the Society. The editor’s thumb is too plainly on the scale. His introduction underscores “the venom of those seeking destruction of the Society” as if there were few other, less demonic forces at work, and his conclusion is less than frank about the challenges facing Jesuits today. We are told that Jesuits “live with several tensions,” but many of these tensions are left unspecified—the topic of sexuality does not come up. The enterprise would have been riskier but possibly less opaque and apologetic if edited under joint Jesuit–non-Jesuit auspices.

Arizona State University, Emeritus

Peter McDonough

The Death of God: An Investigation into the History of the Western Concept of God. By Frederiek Depoortere. New York: T. & T. Clark, 2008. Pp. xi + 207. $130.

Frederiek Depoortere’s slim volume is an expansive history of the Western concept of God, from the Milesians to Nietzsche, with particular attention to “how we have lost God in the West (viii).” As he mentions in his preface, given the immensity of his project, he has methodically relied on “carefully selected” secondary works to construct this history, leaving to us the judgment of the appropriateness and adequacy of this reliance. Beginning with Nietzsche’s proclamation of “the death of God,” D. points out that, according to Nietzsche, God did not simply or quietly pass away, but
we took an active part in murdering God. Although God’s death might not have been as dramatic as Nietzsche opined, D. continues, the need for God gradually decreased with the West’s ever-rising faith in science and technology. D., then, is investigating how God’s retreat happened through time.

In a systematic, coherent, and clear fashion, D. outlines the concept of God in the pre-Socratics, in Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, in Augustine’s “synthesis of Neo-Platonism and biblical faith,” and in the medieval synthesis from Augustine to Aquinas, with the last’s eventual breakdown. He examines the notion of divine omnipotence, Descartes’s impact, and “the theological origins of modernity.” D. considers the emergence of modern science, including the concepts of *natura pura* and the autonomy of natural philosophy, and, notably, the impact of biblical literalism, as major contributing factors in the disintegration of a sacramental sense of God’s presence in all things, especially in the sacraments. This medieval sense of sacramental presence was replaced by the more indirect and distancing cerebral information about God as provided through Bible study and sermons, a development that (unintentionally) contributed to the evolution and dominance of an empiricist approach to nature that grounded the natural sciences.

In his important fifth and final chapter, D. investigates the origins of the phrase “death of God,” tracing connections between Luther, Hegel, and Nietzsche, while also taking into account Heine and Kant. Luther’s reinterpretation of the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* challenged the Chalcedonian definition of faith regarding the divine attributes; Christ, according to Luther, did not die merely according to his humanity but also according to his divinity. D. here relies on Eberhard Jüngel’s assertion that Luther’s revised version of this doctrine gave currency to the phrase “God is dead,” which subsequently entered into philosophy. Hegel then adopted the phrase, but spoke of the *feeling* that God is dead. This sense of *feeling* is hugely important as it implies an experience that stands even in the face of the impossibility of God’s death—impossible since the statement “God is dead” in itself is “nonsensical” (i.e., if God exists, God is eternal; if God does not exist, God cannot die). Hegel is concerned with the experience of loss, and he links this loss with Protestantism’s strong division between nature and grace. The pervasive medieval awareness of the divine presence thus increasingly has turned into the sense of a God who is at best distant. D. notes this turn as one of history’s “great ironies”: the very movement that so urgently pursued the quest *ad fontes* unintentionally played a role in modernity’s sense of the loss of God.

Of course, in such a general work there are lacunae. The book is concerned more with the philosophical notion of God, less with the Christian notion. While D. examines biblical references relating to God’s omnipotence and mentions the early christological controversies, there are only passing references to the Trinity; Jesus and the Holy Spirit are
scarcely mentioned. D.’s treatment of the Reformers is too sweeping when, for example, he simply states that they “rejected the idea that God could be encountered in nature” (quoting Zwingli). Indeed, for Zwingli this may apply, but Luther and Lutheran theologians were more nuanced than Calvin and Zwingli, from Luther’s insistence on the Real-präsenz to his defence of religious images and the composing of hymns. Thus D.’s general conclusions sometimes fit too neatly into his framework. Still, in a work of this scale, this is hardly avoidable. Absent also is engagement with thinkers after Nietzsche who struggled with the “God is dead” theology, such as Dorothee Sölle and Jürgen Moltmann in their theology after Auschwitz.

These criticisms aside, D. has written a refreshing, interesting, and courageous volume. Well-written and well-edited, it is an informative source for students of theology and philosophy. D. also shows signs of humor—look for references to Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman!

Milltown Institute, Dublin

GESA ELSBETH THIENGEN

Paradox in Christian Theology: An Analysis of Its Presence, Character, and Epistemic Status. By James Anderson. Paternoster Theological Monographs. Eugene, Ore.: Wipf & Stock, 2007. Pp. xv + 328. $43.

Anderson’s fine study is guided by two questions: Are any essential Christian doctrines genuinely paradoxical? And, if they are, can a person rationally believe them? (6). A. defines paradox as “a set of claims which taken in conjunction appear to be logically inconsistent” (6), and he attempts to demonstrate that two foundational Christian doctrines—the Trinity (chap. 2) and the Incarnation (chap. 3)—are paradoxical. He employs an inductive method to reach this conclusion, arguing that the classical (patristic) interpretations of the teachings are paradoxical and that thus far no modern theologian has avoided paradox without falling into heterodoxy (famously, modalism, tritheism, and subordinationism in the case of trinitarian doctrine).

Regarding his definition of paradox: as A. is only too aware, to say that a belief is apparently contradictory does not entail that it is really contradictory. For example, insofar as the mathematician Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is irreducibly paradoxical, it is rational to believe in some paradoxical truths. For example, if a mathematical system is consistent (i.e., derives no inconsistent theorems), it is incomplete (there are some consistent theorems it does not reach or move to conclusion). But crucially we can say that we know Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is not a real contradiction.

This, A. thinks, is not the situation with Christian doctrine; we do not know that our apparently inconsistent set of beliefs is not really inconsis-
tent. Instead, in part 2 and indeed in his central chapter (chap. 6), he argues that we should take apparent contradictions in Christian doctrine to be merely apparent contradictions (MACs) (221). Transparently, the choice is between believing the doctrines to be consistent or believing them to be inconsistent. To believe the latter would turn one’s belief into an irrational one. Rather, A. argues, the “only acceptable option for Christians is to treat these doctrines as MACs” (221). Are we entitled to do so? He answers, yes, insofar as such MACs are what he acronymically calls MACRUEs (merely apparent contradictions resulting from unarticulated equivocation) (221–22). Presumably this means that unarticulated equivocation (UE) is (etiologically or diagnostically) the source or explanation of merely apparent contradictions such that, if we replace UE with AE (articulated equivocation), we eliminate the MACs, leaving us with consistency. But this does not seem to be true. A.’s simple but model trinitarian calculus (226–28) does not make any distinctions that, for example, Augustine’s De Trinitate does not make; hence even by A.’s own critique it must follow that AE does not convert MACs into RNCs (real noncontradictions). If this is the case, then unless we really do remove the inconsistency by one or other “strategy” (226), we may be forgiven for thinking that the ball is on the foot of those who think that the inconsistency is real. We then retreat to the position that God is incomprehensible (238–43) and move to the conclusion that this is the real source of MACs. But here is the rub. God is incomprehensible according to both monotheism without intratrinitarian differentiation (Judaism, Islam) and monotheism with intratrinitarian differentiation (Christianity). So it is not obvious that incomprehensibility should lead us to “not be in the least surprised to find MACRUEs arising in their systematic theorizing about God” (241), since it is not obvious to Jewish or Islamic philosophers.

This leads to the central paradox of the book. In the absence of a representation of the central Christian doctrines that avoid paradox while resisting heterodoxy (chaps. 2 and 3), A. thinks the optimal strategy is to treat these doctrines as MACRUEs. But if this is not satisfactory, what to do? A.’s inductive method does not preclude the possibility that there can in the future be such a consistent representation (it may even exist right now but was missed in A.’s sampling procedure). Such a possibility would doubtless engender debate over what is “orthodox” or “heterodox.” To give a particular example, what some theologians would term “subordinationism” others would not. (But are they merely disagreeing over words?—I think A.’s notion of “equivocation,” suitably translated, would apply in this realm rather than in the one in which he employs it.) The strategy is one of “(the) faith (that is believed) seeking understanding”—such that we go back to the drawing board if our attempt at “understanding” (achieving satisfactory consistency) does not work.

A.’s book is a model of presentation: symmetrically organized, leanly written as far as its topic permits, and entirely lacking in obfuscation. It is one for students of advanced studies in the subject. I learned
much from it and suspect the dialectic of argument is not finished from A.’s end.

Roehampton University, London

NEIL B. MACDONALD

LA PATIENCE DE DIEU: JUSTIFICATIONS THEOLOGIQUES DU DELAI DE LA PAROUSIE. By Joël Spronck. Tesi Gregoriana 160. Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 2008. Pp. 352. €27.

According to the NT, Christ brought salvation to the world, but not completely; only at his return or parousia will he finish his work. Until then, a world with evil (e.g., the Holocaust) continues to exist. Why is God taking so long to establish justice? Why the delay of the parousia? With exceptional structural and stylistic clarity, Spronck examines how various thinkers have answered this question. He marshals a wide range of sources into two main presentations: a long biblical section (15–180) followed by a section on contemporary theology (181–280), then a brief conclusion (281–83). Despite the many sources covered, his argument remains easy to follow. He has mastered his material and has presented it coherently.

Part 1 (summarized on p. 183) explores biblical and patristic explanations for the delay. Some emphasize divine sovereignty and that God’s mysterious plan has not yet reached its appointed end. Others argue that human cooperation will hasten its approach (because, e.g., a more effective preaching will bring Christ’s members closer to the number fixed by God). In the meantime, God’s patient love grants us more time for conversion. S. mixes these familiar points into a balanced synthesis, including the claim that human failing might continue the delay.

S. also presents particular explanations that may be unfamiliar. One I especially liked was Justin Martyr’s argument (First Apology) that God has delayed the parousia because God foresees that humans, some of whom are not yet born, will repent in the future (129). The notion of God’s care underlying this reason resembles S.’s comment about Revelations 6:9–11: by waiting for others to join them, Christian martyrs demonstrate God’s wish for a “universal, communal, ecclesial . . . salvation” (154), a claim that contrasts to the medieval emphasis on individual judgment at the time of death (174–80). Notions of social or ecclesial salvation also appear in a beautiful homily by Origen, who, citing Matthew 26:29, thinks that Christ and the saints delay their perfect happiness by waiting for us to join them (171–72). Their waiting indicates that the parousia has been delayed so that we too might enter the one body of Christ—a reflection that every generation can apply to itself.

In part 2, S. provides a sharp progression of ideas from Oscar Cullmann to Jean Daniélou and beyond. Cullmann’s analysis of NT eschatology explains the delay (with its toleration of evil) by God’s love, giving humans time to repent through the preaching of the church (211, coinciding with S.’s conclusion to part 1 [183]). S. does, however, find two weaknesses in Cullmann’s formulations: an unfitting “esthetic” justification of evil for the
sake of a greater good (215) and a reluctance to acknowledge the significance of human effort in the divine plan (221–25). For the latter deficiency, Daniélou, who stresses the importance of divine-human collaboration (234, 246–48), offers a corrective. If God delays the parousia so that more individuals can appropriate the salvation acquired by Christ and thereby join the number of the saved (251–52), the delay obviously encourages repentance. Thus, according to S., Daniélou restores the balance of divine sovereignty and human collaboration found in the NT (183). Further, Daniélou offers a confirmation of the sovereignty/collaboration balance by linking it to the two natures of Christ, thereby connecting biblical eschatology to the doctrine of Chalcedon (240).

Cullmann’s other defect, according to S., is his acceptance without protest of whatever evil occurs during the delay. S. calls this an “esthetic” justification, apparently because it can make evil seem attractive in light of the good that follows. (S. does not seem to recognize that supporting tragedy amounts to an opposite esthetic.) To describe such evil, S. turns to Joseph Ratzinger, who calls the delay a “scandal,” yet one that Christians must admit, because Christ applied the same image to himself (259). Paul agrees, by calling the cross a skandalon in 1 Corinthians 1:23 (263). Therefore, S. places the delay and its toleration of evil “under the sign of the Passion” (271), which only faith and conversion can accept (262–63). Those who have such faith will surmount the scandal and recognize in the parousia’s delay the patient love of God, giving sinners time to repent (281).

By drawing our attention to the biblical texts, S. invites us to rejuvenate our faith. His book’s high quality is evident in its clarity, balance, and careful study of sources old and new.

Canisius College, Buffalo

Daniel Jamros, S.J.

Wolfhart Pannenberg on Human Destiny. By Kam Ming Wong. Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2008. Pp. ix + 177. $99.95.

Kam Ming Wong intends to offer a “comprehensive theological anthropology” grounded in the notion that our destiny is to exist as fully human, that is, to live as creatures in relationship with God. Nonetheless, he admits, we can never be fully human in this life because sin (self-centeredness) has disrupted our relations with God, with our own destiny, and with ourselves. Relying on the categories and methods of Wolfhart Pannenberg, W. argues that our true character as created in God’s image will not appear until the end of history, and that death convincingly demonstrates the universality of sin and the need of Christ’s redemption (97). In fact, W. contends, Pannenberg’s approach to theological anthropology can help make sense of the ultimate meaning and purpose of human destiny as created in and destined to become the image of God proleptically present in Christ (40).
Pannenberg, as W. describes his thought, claims to bracket all doctrines except the image of God and sin, offering not a “dogmatic anthropology” but a “fundamental-theological anthropology” (4, 159). W. disagrees with this approach and claim, contending that one must include Christology, soteriology, and eschatology to arrive at a coherent theological anthropology, even from Pannenberg’s perspective. Pannenberg does in fact set the priority of the future for determining all meaning, including past and present, placing all our understanding of human fullness within an understanding of history as completed by the final coming of Christ Jesus. In the process of so conceiving the human within history, ethics is related to dogmatics within a reconceived understanding of Plato’s notion of the good: the good in the future draws humanity forward to God in Christ as highest good and final criterion of human behavior (153); salvation is understood as becoming fully human in and through our relying on God in Christ Jesus. In this presentation, W. demonstrates an admirable command of the major features of Pannenberg’s thought, and the book is worth reading if only to learn how Pannenberg attempts to construct an anthropology that is philosophically astute and theologically relevant to a contemporary understanding of humanity grounded in history.

W. tries to demonstrate Pannenberg’s de facto reliance on Christology from another angle. He believes Herder provided Pannenberg with a new way of thinking about the image of God as part of our human destiny, but whereas “Herder leaves Christology completely out of the picture,” Pannenberg attempts to place Herder’s anthropology on a christological foundation, despite Pannenberg’s rejection of the charge. Pannenberg finds the transformed image of God to be in Christ and not simply in humanity as providentially guided by God. Christ’s history, W. continues, “contributes constitutively to general anthropology” but “not by providing an entirely new point of departure.” Rather, his history transforms “the already existing reality of man and his historical question about himself” (38). There follow, then, these claims: human beings have a disposition pointing to the image of God (59); human openness to the world necessarily presupposes openness to God (73, 89, 102); it belongs to our essence to hope for life beyond death (76); and we cannot, with Karl Barth, “annex ethics to a Christological foundation” (144) but must instead hold on to a universally accessible anthropological basis. Thus Pannenberg attempts to modify Herder without annexing ethics.

Yet perhaps it is Pannenberg’s reliance on Herder that causes other theological difficulties that were rightfully identified more than 40 years ago by Barth, his teacher. Barth questioned whether Pannenberg’s Christology was anything more than a symbol of a presupposed general anthropology. One does not have to be a Barthian to see that this question looms over especially Pannenberg’s interpretation of the Resurrection. W. insists that Pannenberg meant to say that Christ’s resurrection “constituted” his Sonship “retroactively” (10, 55, 163–64) and that Jesus could be the Son of
God only “proleptically” and “retrospectively” from the perspective of the end since all must be interpreted from the end and in light of the future. But herein we see the crucial christological issue. If, with Pannenberg (52, 163), we disjoin the Incarnation from the Resurrection and claim that Christ’s Sonship comes into being only by virtue of his human relations with the Father in the Spirit, then what of Christ’s preexistence? What of Christ’s earthly life as the incarnate Word whose message received its meaning from his ontological relation with his Father in the Spirit and not from his human relation to God? What about Pannenberg’s idea that God depends on historical events for the realization of his kingdom? Failure to answer these questions adequately is a major weakness of this study, a weakness that will require a more critical approach to theological anthropology than is offered here.

St. John’s University, Queens, N.Y.  

PAUL D. MOLNAR

SILENCE, LOVE, AND DEATH: SAYING “YES” TO GOD IN THE THEOLOGY OF KARL RAHNER. By Shannon Craigo-Snell. Marquette Studies in Theology 56. Milwaukee: Marquette University, 2008. Pp. 253. $27.

Craigo-Snell’s work, begun during doctoral studies at Yale, attempts to show Rahner’s relevance in a postmodern context by engaging critics who find his theology, driven by a turn to the subject, to be foundationalist, essentialist, and universalizing. She argues persuasively that his theology is not foundationalist in the sense that it proceeds either from a purely rational, philosophical basis or from the assertion of a universal religious experience. Rahner’s theology, rather, starts from faith in the mystery of God revealed in Jesus Christ, and its goal is to lead one more deeply into this mystery. C.-S. argues further that, while Rahner’s transcendental analysis of the human person as standing in the world before the mysterious God may see certain features of human being to be universally true, his work as a whole recognizes the radically interpersonal, historical, and cultural dimensions of human existence. As such, C.-S. views Rahner’s theology as a genuine alternative both to a modern-essentialist and a postmodern-constructivist stance.

C.-S. asks what it means to say yes to God in silence, in love, and in death—three themes central to Rahner’s theological anthropology. After a general sketch, she first reflects on silence as a characteristic of the divine-human dialogue, asking how it might be “an element of discourse” (54) before the Holy Mystery. Silence can acknowledge the real otherness of and express openness to the other, creating the possibility for the other to speak. Silence is a central characteristic of saying yes to God because it “marks a posture of openness to the unknown, unmanipulable other” (78).

Chapter 3 takes up the second theme, that of openness to the other, namely, love. In love, the other is not only affirmed but embraced. The radicality of Rahner’s notion of love of neighbor is deepened by its
grounding not merely as an obligation following from the love of God, but in the notion that the act of loving the neighbor is the preeminent way in which we know and love God. The unconditionality of God’s love for us calls forth in us a boundless response of love for the neighbor with whom God has identified. Love of neighbor is the central way of saying yes to God because human persons are the preeminent locus of God’s self-revelation.

There follows a fine exposition of C.-S.’s third theme, Rahner’s theology of death (chap. 4). Death, seen as the consummation of a whole human life that is both gift and task, is not only something to be passively suffered but something to be actively undertaken. A sensitive account of Rahner’s understanding of Christian death as a dying with Christ highlights the true nature of Christian sacrifice, both Christ’s and ours, as self-entrustment in hope to the Holy Mystery we call God. C.-S. elucidates the communal dimension by drawing on Rahner’s reflections on hope: we “hope that God is. As we live in this hope . . . we can begin to envision the possibility we hope for . . . [and] imagine that the void ever surrounding human life is the mysterious and loving God of Jesus Christ” (137). Such hope can flourish only in a community. Dying with Christ is the final way of saying yes to the Holy Mystery we call God, the consummation of the self-surrender throughout life that characterizes true love of the other.

A final chapter brings C.-S.’s interpretation of Rahner into dialogue with critics (e.g., Fergus Kerr, Jennifer Erin Beste, Johannes Baptist Metz, Miguel Díaz, and John Milbank) chosen to express typical, important postmodern questions and concerns. After briefly characterizing “postmodernism” and astutely pointing out the importance of the influence on Rahner of Aquinas and Ignatius or Loyola (not only Heidegger!), C.-S. returns to insights and arguments presented earlier to engage the critical questions mentioned above, showing that it is difficult to dismiss Rahner as an “obsolete modernist” (208). In a final coda, she suggests how Rahner can be part of a constructive dialogue with contemporary feminist theologies dealing with theological anthropology, silence/silencing, and social justice.

Perhaps C.-S.’s analysis and interpretation will confirm more Rahner fans than convert his critics; yet her nuanced reading of Rahner responds well to the critics and questions she chose to address. In any case, this thoughtful and insightful book is a fine resource for a college seminar. It concretizes a central theme, saying yes to God, whose formulation strikes many as abstract. That is a great service.

Boston College School of Theology and Ministry

JOHN R. SACHS, S.J.

THE POLITICS OF POSTSECULAR RELIGION: MOURNING SECULAR FUTURES. By Ananda Abeysekara. Insurrections. New York: Columbia University, 2008. Pp. xvi + 324. $50.

Is there a future for democracy, especially in view of the innumerable atrocities that have been committed in its name? Can democracy be saved
and transformed from its violent, nationalist, genocidal, racist, and colonial pasts into a positive force for shaping human societies? In this provocative and well-argued work, the postmodern philosopher of religion Ananda Abeysekara uses Derridean deconstruction to challenge the conventional view that democracy can be redeemed from its unsavory legacies and transformed into a positive sociopolitical force. A. judges that the supporters of democracy, such as John Dewey, Jeffrey Stout, John Rawls, Paul Gilroy, Slavoj Žižek, and John Milbank, essentialize secular ideals of, for example, justice, law, or human rights into the substance of democracy. These thinkers, he argues, not only take for granted that democracy is a problem that can and must be reconstructed, refashioned, or improved, but they also uncritically assume that democratic principles such as freedom, justice, human rights, or tolerance can be retrieved, shorn of their undesirable association with historical atrocities, and be renewed and refashioned to meet the challenges and needs of contemporary societies.

By contrast, A. insists, democratic norms such as human rights, freedom of the press, the rule of law, justice, and fairness are utopian and contingent norms that can be only promised and therefore repeatedly deferred to the future. For A., the real issue is this: “We can and must only think whether we can continue to inherit such a future, not only because (as some might argue rightly) untold atrocities have been committed in the name of defending and sustaining the very name/identity of democracy . . . but also because democracy remains, in each of its futures, deferred, as a promise” (2). Besides questioning whether it is possible to rely on inheriting democracy as a promise that is constantly and indefinitely being deferred, A. also contends that this deferred promise of democracy conveniently glosses over the violent binaries that undergird its name—binaries such as majority/minority, Black/White, Christian/Muslim, Sinhalese/Tamil, Sunni/Shi’î, and citizens/illegal aliens. He explains that although old laws could be repealed and new laws instituted to improve the relations between, say, Blacks and Whites or Christians and Muslims “to create a better climate of respect and mutual regard,” the new laws would still do nothing to question the very political and genocidal distinction between names that are defined in terms of numerical categories such as majority and minority.

A. thus redefines democracy not as a problem but as an aporia, that is, an impasse that allows no retrieval, reconstruction, renewal, or improvement. In particular, he calls for an active forgetting of history and for an uninheriting of the fundamental distinction of majority/minority that remains crucial to the idea of democracy. For A., the only solution is to deconstruct democracy in the Derridean sense, thereby uninheriting and mourning its irresolvable contradictions. To those who argue that the problems of democracy could be resolved over time, A. replies, “It is precisely because we have become so skillful in the art of problematizing our democracy and seeing it as a ‘problem’ that we today remain hamstrung and thus unable to imagine new domains of the political” (88).
A.’s use of Derridean deconstructionism, with its call for mourning secular futures, is a tour de force that paves the way for articulating new frameworks that go beyond the limitations of democracy, providing new insights and approaches for dealing with the concerns of minorities who often find themselves marginalized within existing democratic frameworks. A.’s call to “mourn secular futures” is especially poignant, since the uncritical reliance on democracy as the solution to sociopolitical problems has paradoxically exacerbated the problems, with the dominant majority seeking to marginalize the minority as the permanent “Other.”

A. proposes no neat solutions beyond his contention that democracy is an aporia that cannot be resolved or improved, but only mourned and uninherited—an approach fitting well with his Derridean sensibilities. Although this conclusion may be disconcerting for some, others will find in this seminal work a useful challenge that encourages creative thinking that can take us beyond the very majority/minority binary that serves as democracy’s cornerstone.

Xavier University, Cincinnati

JONATHAN Y. TAN

SOZIALE GERECHTIGKEIT ZWISCHEN FAIRNESS UND PARZIZIPATION: JOHN RAWLS UND DIE KATHOLISCHE SOZIALLEHRE. By Franz-Josef Bormann. Studien zur theologischen Ethik 113. Freiburg i. Brsg.: Herder, 2006. Pp. 436. €50.

Tübingen’s Franz-Josef Bormann compares social justice as understood in the Catholic social tradition with John Rawls’s theory of justice, searching for possible connections between Rawls’s philosophy and Catholic doctrine. In this Habilitation (University of Freiburg i. Brsg.) B. explores the content and reasonableness of both resulting notions of social justice (10–11). In the second half of the 20th century, philosophical discourse about justice was considerably stimulated and shaped by Rawls, while theological discourse on justice appropriated surprisingly little of his methods or content. B. goes on to explore the possibility of a responsible reception of Rawls within theology and theological ethical discourse.

In part 1, B. presents Rawls’s theory in three chronological blocks: before 1971; as then presented in his 1971 A Theory of Justice; and in further developments up to his death in 2002. He describes Rawls’s theory as a justice approach to ethics, normatively oriented, that moves toward a universal claim. Yet, as B. suggests, “problems emerge when attributes are assigned to this strict, universally conceived, moral standpoint—attributes that are quite evidently indebted to the particular, extremely specific context within which the idea of fairness originated, attributes that repeatedly threaten to discredit the very notion of a universally valid theory of justice” (102). After presenting the substance of Rawls’s theory, B. outlines methodological problems, questions about content, and especially concerns about the anthropological and societal background of his thought.
According to B., Rawls felt himself misunderstood by the theological community. Still, late in his life he became increasingly interested in the role of religious argument in the political discourse of pluralistic societies. However, while these late reflections deserve attention, B. cautions against relying solely on them for a foundation on which to construct a theological reception of his theory (222). In B.’s opinion the entirety of Rawls’s theory should be engaged.

In part 2, “Social Justice in the Play of Catholic Social Teaching,” B. examines Catholic documents concerning justice, focusing especially on documents from the United States and Germany. B. had in fact served as a research fellow in Harvard University’s philosophy department during the formation of the many drafts that preceded the U.S. Bishops Conference’s 1986 economic pastoral. And he finds in the earlier drafts citations of Rawls’s work that, although dropped from the final version, betray some links between the two notions of justice. On the other hand, B. finds no links between the German Catholic Church’s 1997 “Das Sozialwort der Kirchen: Für eine Zukunft in Solidarität und Gerechtigkeit” and Rawls’s theory. In this he disagrees with commentators who suggest such a link.

At the end of part 2, B. briefly outlines differences and “compatibilities” between Rawls’s theory and Catholic social teaching. They have in common: concern with social, even institutional, transformation; affirmation of the normative universality of ethics; and the judgment that such an ethics requires a deontological grounding. They significantly differ in their understandings of the content of social justice: Rawls’s theory is based on a notion of fairness that is dominated by a commitment to extreme egalitarianism; the church’s concept focuses on participation, justice for the whole community (Gemeinwohlgerechtigkeit). They also differ in their understandings of the poor, the family, and the state.

B. concludes that Rawls’s notion of justice neither offers an entirely new paradigm for Catholic social thought nor that it is absolutely irrelevant to church teaching. Both approaches offer insights needed for a just society. B. does give too much attention to Rawls’s theory, less to Catholic ethics, and even less to their comparison. But in general his presentation of both approaches is excellent: on fairness as a paradigm for (political) philosophy, and on participation as a paradigm for (Catholic) theology.

Lehrstuhl für Moraltheologie, University of Regensburg

Kerstin Schögl-Flierl

Moral Theology for the Twenty-First Century: Essays in Celebration of Kevin Kelly. Edited by Bernard Hoose, Julie Clague, and Gerard Mannion. New York: T. & T. Clark, 2008. Pp. xvi + 301. $140.

As a public voice honoring the life and work of Kevin Kelly, this collection raises the bar on what such Festschriften can achieve. Each essay—26 by friends and colleagues of Kelly and one by the honoree himself—takes a theme characteristic of Kelly’s work and mines it for continuing rele-
vance to moral theology in the service of real people and the pastoral care of their self-expressed needs.

The collection is divided into five parts following trajectories from Kelly’s work: fundamental moral theology, medical and sexual ethics, social and political ethics, ecclesiology, and the interface of moral and pastoral theology. Vatican II’s call for an aggiornamento of the Church and its theology was not missed by mid-century professors of moral theology or their students; these essays build on the council’s agenda of renewal, engage the tradition, and advance the conversational moral methodology pioneered by Kelly and John Mahoney—a conversational methodology of “hearing one another into speech through an inclusive model of listening and learning in the round” (4). As John Battle writes of his student experience with Kelly in the late 1960s at St. Joseph’s College, Upholland, “it was often remarked that he ‘left us with more questions’ and ‘had not given any easy clear-cut notable answers’ . . . those who listened to him were left with work to do themselves, having been encouraged on how to think, but not told what to think” (263). As Kelly himself admits, though not specifically addressing the question of authoritative teaching, “discovering God’s will is not a matter of discovering what God has already decided we should do. Rather, discovering God’s will lies in ourselves deciding what is the most loving and responsible thing for us to do” (286, internal quote from his From a Parish Base [1999]).

The essays on issues in fundamental moral theology explore the role of salvation and the influence of the Spirit in the lives and relationships of the faithful, how conscience operates in a world of so many contingencies, dialogue as a means of uncovering not only the sensus fidelium but a fundamental source of moral knowledge that rises from human experience, of error and authenticity, and of hospitality, healing, and hope. Whether investigating the precepts of the natural law, extraordinary versus ordinary care, or relational responsibility, neither historical nor contemporary moral theology ever swerves far from either medical or sexual ethics; thus, the essays of part 2 engage the tradition on topics such as the moral status of the human embryo, contraception, sexual complementarity, and homosexuality. As many now recognize the global scope of interdependency, the essays of part 3 examine the multiple layers of dependency, particularly as found in gender inequalities (exposed in the HIV/AIDS pandemic), in the balance of the natural world and environmental justice, and in recognition of the equal dignity of all persons—hetero- and homosexual—in light of the common good. Although ecclesiology may not often find a place in moral theology, the relationship between the Church and its thinking on the moral life institutionally, socially, and personally is critical; part 4 bridges the divide by wrestling with ecumenism, inclusivity, church leadership, sacramental integrity, and social justice. The final section, an appraisal of Kelly’s pastoral methodology, may form an outline for a dissertation; in the meantime, a graduate seminar would find it a fitting invitation to consider a vocation in moral theology.
Some essays are more colloquial than academic, but this difference ought not to be taken negatively. The less formal essays reveal insights gained from work with Kelly, gratitude for his pastoral approach, and hope for the new directions that may be tried profitably to bring good news to God’s people in need. This Festschrift not only introduces readers to Kelly’s wide range of influence (at least in the English-speaking world), but it also suggests that members of the guild commit to dialogically probe the depths of the tradition, to bring more experiences to the table, and to collaborate in finding what matters most in and for the real world. With these issues in mind, the collection will be helpful in a graduate course dedicated to the principal preoccupations of moral theology since Vatican II.

Barry University, Miami Shores, Fla.  

MARY JO IOZZIO

RETRIEVING THE NATURAL LAW: A RETURN TO MORAL FIRST THINGS. BY J. Daryl Charles. Critical Issues in Bioethics. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008. Pp. x + 346. $34.

As an issue of a series sponsored by the Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity (Bannockburn, Ill.), this volume is intended to bring “thoughtful and biblically informed Christian voices in bioethics into dialogue with other voices that are influential today” (ix). Daryl Charles, an evangelical scholar at Princeton, presents an argument—primarily but not exclusively to his fellow Protestants—for the need and the acceptability of natural law thinking in Christian ethics.

Two judgments prompt this project. The first is C.’s belief that over the past 30 years Western societies have experienced a dissolution of ethical consensus, as evidenced in bioethics, due to the denial of any transcendent moral order from which to judge human behavior, giving rise to ethical pluralism and relativism, and even to a refusal to speak in terms of good and evil, right and wrong. Tolerance has replaced moral judgments. The second factor is C.’s concern about how Christians, in such a culture, might engage in public discourse with those who do not share their Christian faith. They cannot participate in ongoing debates and work for the common good, he insists, without some shared moral grammar and some objective basis for making moral judgments.

C.’s response is a retrieval of natural law thinking, recognizing that many, if not most, of his Protestant colleagues are averse to such an approach. Natural law theory, he maintains, provides both “foundational principles of morality—the permanent things that govern both private and public life” (38)—and “a common grammar for moral discourse and a common basis for moral judgments in a pluralistic environment” (44). He believes that the extent to which the Christian community and Christian scholars can embrace a natural law approach will determine their ability to relate to and address their surrounding culture. Further, C. argues for the legitimacy of natural law thinking by showing how it has been an integral part of the Christian tradition, reviewing approaches to natural law in the
pre-Christian and Christian traditions as well as among the Protestant Reformers (who accepted natural law) and more recent Protestant theologians who reject natural law thinking.

Although there is much that is insightful and informative in his early chapters, C. fails to offer a clear and coherent explanation of how he understands the natural law. Instead, he alludes to what it means to figures such as the Apostle Paul, C. S. Lewis, and John Paul II. He employs phrases such as “permanent things,” “a law written on the heart,” “nature as an endowment,” “ethical norms rooted in the order of creation,” “first principles of moral reason,” “universal human moral intuitions,” necessary truths that “certain human actions are of necessity morally right or wrong by nature,” the “sole source of all value judgments,” and “the fundamental structure of human nature.” These various descriptions surely say something about the nature of natural law, but for readers not already schooled in the notion, they leave impressions without a clear idea of what natural law is and what concretely it has to offer.

In the latter part of the book, C. turns to what he calls “critical categories” and to a test case, namely, the application of natural-law thinking to the issue of euthanasia. Among the critical categories are personhood and human dignity, the meaning of suffering, freedom and responsibility, the common good, truth-telling or linguistic integrity, and tolerance. Here C.’s discussions are insightful and even prophetic, calling the reader to honest and critical reflection. However, they disappoint in that C. does not explicitly connect the categories to what has preceded. How do they fit with natural law thinking? Are these among the “permanent things”? Or something else? Adding to the ambiguity is C.’s frequent appeal to theological beliefs such as the imago Dei and redemptive suffering. Even his discussion of euthanasia does not clearly and robustly illustrate the use of a natural law approach.

There is much that is good and valuable in this volume, especially C.’s social analyses throughout. His project is important and worthwhile, and it is instructive to see how an evangelical theologian approaches natural law. I hope that some of his colleagues will be persuaded. However, his study lacks a crisp analysis of natural law and how it might contribute to Christian ethics and to bioethics. And, while natural law is a most valuable theory, C. may be placing too much hope in its possibilities. Is our society open to the existence of “moral first things”?

The Catholic Health Association, St. Louis

Ronald P. Hamel

United States Welfare Policy: A Catholic Response. By Thomas J. Massaro, S.J. Moral Traditions Series. Washington: Georgetown University, 2007. Pp. xi + 257. $59.95; $26.95.

Massaro’s study reveals much about America’s treatment of its weak and poor. His primary focus is on their fate under the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, read from the ethical and religious perspectives of Catholic
social teaching. The act is situated historically, as arising from English Poor Laws and the legacy of the New Deal. M. then addresses the 1996 changes made to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Act (AFDC), replacing it with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Act (TANF). TANF, as M. points out, adopted (Republican) policies that (1) required work for benefits; (2) turned control of most welfare programs to the states; (3) stopped the “subsidizing” of illegitimacy; (4) made welfare a temporary safety net, not a lifetime support system; (5) ended the open-ended entitlement feature of welfare by block-granting programs to the states and establishing enforceable spending caps; and (6) renewed the vital role of private institutions. For six years following the passage of TANF, a program of continuing evaluation was to result in the permanent reauthorization. However, because of political complexities, infighting, and lack of proper evaluation, Congress never agreed on the permanent reauthorization. In 2005 the act was temporarily extended until 2010. M. presented, in 2006, this study to serve, based as it is on Catholic social teaching, as a foundation for the 2010 reauthorization debate. He continues with consideration of six interrelated aspects of reauthorization needing, for the sake of the poor and marginal, Catholic attention: (1) the TANF funding mechanism; (2) work participation requirements; (3) eligibility rules, including time limits, sanctions, and exemptions; (4) marriage promotion program and the family cap; (5) work support programs ancillary to TANF; and (6) the imposition of disproportionate burdens on particular demographic groups (194–95). And he closes by exhorting the Church to advocate authentic welfare reform truly benefitting the poor.

M. demonstrates extensive knowledge not only of the Church’s social teaching but also of the contribution of USCCB pastoral letters and of Catholic Charities to American understanding and practice of assistance at all social levels. His own sources are visible in extensive footnotes and a comprehensive bibliography. I want to critique, however, the three principles that M. claims as the key for a just social policy: (1) that social membership be universal; (2) that policies be measured by the principle of the preferential option for the poor; and (3) that people not be placed in impossible situations. I agree with these, but I would emphasize two further teachings found in Economic Justice for All (1986). First, as stated in no. 70 of this pastoral, a greater focus is needed on principles of distributive justice, requiring that the allocation of income, wealth, and power in society be evaluated in light of the effects on persons whose basic material needs are unmet. Second, the pastoral gives high social priority to: (1) the securing of social and economic rights (esp. no. 81); (2) fulfilling the basic needs of the poor (esp. no. 90); and, importantly, (3) increasing active participation in economic life by those who are presently excluded or vulnerable (no. 91). These two key teachings have their basis in John A. Ryan’s A Living Wage (1906) and Distributive Justice (1916), to which M. appeals. He does not, however, allow the strong redistributive and participatory themes to shape his three principles. Framing the entire study of the
Welfare Reform Act of 1996 in the context of distributive justice and social and economic rights would give clearer criteria for how American society is to treat the weakest and poorest in their midst.

Of course, much has changed economically since Ryan wrote these books. The current economic crisis caused by the subprime mortgage debacle and rising unemployment will put greater stress on meeting the basic needs of all citizens. Further, reauthorization efforts in 2010 will be directed by a Democratic Congress and a Democratic executive. Perhaps with this new political, economic, and social configuration, Catholic leadership can touch on themes such as distribution and active rights that were impossible just a few years ago. M. might consider writing follow-up articles to incorporate these new realities into his analysis. Still, this book as it is remains helpful for anyone doing social ethics, involved in working with the poor, or active in welfare concerns.

Ateneo de Manila University

PASQUALE T. GIORDANO, S.J.

REFUGEE RIGHTS: ETHICS, ADVOCACY, AND AFRICA. Edited by David Hollenbach, S.J. Washington: Georgetown University, 2008. Pp. vii + 224. $26.95.

“There Is More than One Way of Dying” is the arresting title given to the first chapter of this compelling and challenging collection. Abebe Feyissa’s perspective on the effects of her 15-year stay in the Kakuma refugee camp in northern Kenya brings into sharp focus the texture of the individual lives that make up the 33 million who currently live as refugees or internally displaced people. Indeed a hallmark of the entire collection is this commitment to ground the investigation in the diverse experiences of refugees. This commitment accompanies, moreover, a complex and sophisticated interdisciplinary analysis of the ethical concerns at the heart of this study. The collection, which began as a conference in Nairobi, Kenya, uses the language of human rights as a political and ethical framework within which to discuss the range of interlocking oppressions that characterize the lives of displaced persons. Within this frame an impressive range of issues, at once deeply personal and highly political, are analyzed. This analysis in turn creates a platform for advocacy that is capable of conveying the multilayered nature of the oppressions that refugees experience.

Part 1, with essays by Feyissa (with Rebecca Horn) and William O’Neill, foregrounds the uniqueness of the human rights challenges associated with being a displaced person. Both essays capture with great sensitivity the particular ways in which displacement undermines one’s relationships, one’s senses of identity and connection to a place, a community, a history, and one’s sense of the future. Possibly we for whom mobility is a privilege have lost our understanding of the significance of rootedness, of belonging to a place. However, these essays remind us of the elemental importance of being connected to and with a place—a connection that is severed with displacement.
Part 2 identifies the ethical issues that arise within camps and settlements. Each essay opened my eyes to new questions as well as to new ways of seeing. On reading these essays (by the Joint Commission for Refugees of the Burundian and Tanzania Episcopal Conferences, by Lucy Hovil and Moses Chrispus Okello, by John Burton Wagacha and John Guiney, and by Loren Landau), I was struck by how Christian social ethics has utterly neglected this world. Each author highlights the complex ethical issues that arise within settlements and illustrates how this particular context challenges, in fundamental ways, many of the assumptions with which the moral tradition has functioned.

The collection continues with two further sections, one examining how considerations of gender are shaped by and shape the experience of displacement, and another more extensive section that looks at the issues of conflict, protection, and return. These highly discursive essays probe some of the most intractable moral problems of our day, highlighting the synergy of violence and poverty that is at the heart of most experiences of displacement. The essays on conflict, protection, and return are especially strong in that they not only foreground the deleterious role that violence plays in displacement, but they also take an unusually comprehensive view of its role. There are certainly points at which I disagree with the analysis and the positions taken, but this is to be expected when such multifaceted issues are under consideration.

Both David Hollenbach's introduction and Agbonkhianmeghele Oroborator's conclusion affirm the crucial role that rights language can have in the pursuit of social justice. In my view the key to the success of the rights framework here lies in the authors' appreciation of the ways in which rights talk has evolved, especially in the past two decades. Thus cultural, social, and economic rights are regarded, not as addenda to the classic civil and political ones, but rather as fundamental. Important too is the way the reality of cultural and religious pluralism is managed within the framework of rights. Such management is achieved in diverse ways by the different authors and more successfully by some than by others. Nonetheless, in demonstrating that a firm attachment to rights can be harmonized with an appreciation of the ethical significance of cultural, social, and religious contexts, the collection makes an important contribution to methodological debates.

This is a challenging, illuminating, and ground-breaking collection, representing the best of contemporary Christian ethical endeavor.

Trinity College, Dublin

LINDA HOGAN

CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION. Edited by John Witte Jr. and Frank S. Alexander. New York: Cambridge University, 2008. Pp. xvi + 343. $90; $29.99.

Witte and Alexander characterize this work as “an authoritative but accessible introduction” to the story of law and Christianity that hopes
to highlight some enduring contributions that Christian teachings on law, politics, and society have made to Western legal ideas and institutions (xiv). The 16 essays, by distinguished legal scholars, theologians, and historians, provide intriguing glimpses into an emerging interdisciplinary field focused on the dialectical interaction of law and religion.

“How do legal and religious ideas and institutions, methods and mechanisms, beliefs and believers influence each other—for better and for worse, in the past, present, and future? These are the cardinal questions that the burgeoning field of law and religion study has set out to answer” (3).

Growing out of an ongoing Christian Legal Studies project sponsored by W. and A.’s Center for the Study of Law and Religion (Emory University), the collection is intended, as W. explains, to illustrate what can be learned through using the “binocular of law and religion.” By employing the lenses of both law and religion to examine jurisprudential and theological questions, this methodology promises fresh insight into “familiar ideas and institutions that traditionally were studied through the ‘monocular of law’ or the ‘monocular of religion’ alone” (3). W.’s introduction uses this binocular approach to survey the grand sweep of Western history with a view toward illustrating the ways in which four watershed moments in the Western religious tradition (the Christian conversion of the Roman Empire, the papal revolution of the 11th to 13th centuries, the Protestant Reformation, and the Enlightenment) triggered massive transformations in the Western legal tradition.

Subsequent chapters pursue a diverse range of more discrete historical, doctrinal, and topical inquiries, employing the binocular methodology with varying degrees of success. Fruitful examples are found in Harold Berman’s chapter on the Christian sources of general contract law and in A.’s study on property and Christian theology. Berman, the foundational figure in this interdisciplinary field, locates the roots of modern contract law in the work of 12th-century canonists and 17th-century English Puritan theologians. Theological premises (e.g., breaking promises is a sin, promises have a right to enforcement when the promises made were reasonable and equitable, and a sovereign God of order requires obedience to agreements made by contracting parties) provided the basis for an integrated body of contract law. Although 19th-century legal scholars replaced those premises with a secular faith in the autonomy and intent of the contracting parties, Berman suggests that contemporary discussion of contested issues in contract law is likely to be distorted by inattention to the religious sources from which modern doctrines derive.

A.’s chapter is a rich reflection on property as an analogy for the human condition theologically understood. Property law defines the relationships of persons with respect to things, and the core theological doctrines of Creation, Fall, and Redemption inform our understanding of who persons are in relationship to one another and the created order as we strive to distinguish the proper spheres of what is mine, yours, and ours. A. includes
an interesting discussion of environmental law and the ways the doctrines of creation and redemption challenge us to relate to the land not as ours alone but as given to us “for our use and benefit, and to hold for the use and benefit of others” (216).

Don Browning argues that Christian thinking about marriage and the family can make an important contribution to contemporary family law, but if it hopes to contribute to the secular legal debate, this thinking cannot be presented as rooted purely in revelation. Instead, Christianity must “understand itself as a carrier of forms of practical rationality applied to marriage and family that its sacred narratives reinforce but neither fully create nor completely dominate. Only when its rational core is detected and advanced in legal deliberations can the confessional narratives of the Christian tradition be understood to enhance, rather than to disqualify, its contributions to contemporary law” (163). Participants in current debates about marriage law will learn much from this essay.

Although some chapters are harder to characterize as examples of a distinctive binocular methodology, they still provide helpful background regarding the understanding of law within Judaism and early Christianity, the development of church law and the role it plays within the lives of religious communities, and the religious sources of Western laws of procedure, proof, and evidence.

This volume is an inviting introduction to an important field. Because they are introductory, many chapters inevitably leave readers wanting more. Those interested in going deeper can consult the suggestions for reading that follow each chapter, or turn to the hefty two-volume work also edited by W. and A., *The Teachings of Modern Christianity on Law, Politics, and Human Nature* (2006).

*Boston College Law School*  
GREGORY A. KALSCHEUR, S.J.

**Baptism Today: Understanding, Practice, and Ecumenical Implications.** Edited by Thomas F. Best. Faith and Order Paper 207. Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical, 2008. Pp. xiii + 448. $39.95.

Liturgical theologian Gerard Austin once commented that when he went to graduate studies in the 1960s, just after his ordination to the priesthood, he was convinced that the most important sacrament he had received was holy orders. After studying ecclesiology with Yves Congar, however, he realized that he had been wrong; the most important sacrament he had received was baptism. This book is a tribute to that insight.

Thomas Best (former director of Faith and Order at the World Council of Churches) shaped this collection to reflect the ecumenical state of affairs regarding baptism some 25 years after the landmark Faith and Order convergence document, *Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry*, the so-called Lima Document (1982). The book is divided into five parts. Part 1 serves as a primer in ecumenical ecclesiology and sacramentology,
surveying the baptismal practice, theology, and liturgy of 18 churches. Ranging from the practice of both infant and believer baptism in the highly sacramental churches (Orthodox, Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran) to churches that eschew sacramental liturgy (e.g., Salvation Army, Quakers), this (most substantial) part of the book provides an excellent overview of significant questions that face each church regarding baptism. Many contributions are by top scholars of liturgy.

Part 2 consists of three surveys of major strands of Christian tradition: Paul Meyendorff for the Orthodox, James Puglisi for Roman Catholics, and Karen Westfield Tucker for Protestants. These articles raise major considerations that arise concerning baptismal theology and practice. How can we come to a substantial mutual recognition of one another’s baptism? What are the limits of diversity in baptismal doctrine and practice? And—perhaps the most fundamental and difficult question of all—what exactly do we mean by sacramental efficacy? Does something really happen in liturgical rites? This last question has remained unresolved since the church-dividing debates of the 16th century, even though much progress has been made toward a consensus. Still, as part 1 makes clear, basic disagreements persist among the churches regarding the nature of sacraments as such.

Part 3 surveys three recent attempts at common recognition of baptism: a declaration about mutual agreement in Germany, a common baptismal certificate in Australia, and an ecumenical statement from the Massachusetts Council of Churches. In each case Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Orthodox are represented. Part 4 consists of two essays that try to understand the role of baptism in (a) the secularized situation of a post-Christian Sweden and (b) the multicultural and interreligious context of India and Africa. Part 5 collects the baptismal liturgies of 13 churches.

In addition to the basic theological question of sacramentality mentioned above, a number of themes recur. One is the essentially ecclesial or communal dimension of baptism. Baptism should not be viewed as a purely private, familial rite of passage, but as an event of the entire church community, local and universal. A second theme is the trinitarian dimension of baptism, not only regarding the use of the triune name for God but also with reference to contemporary ecclesiology and sacramental theology. A third area of common concern focuses on baptism as event and initiation as process. Many churches have (re)discovered the importance of the catechumenate and preparation for the sacramental event. Most of the surveys of theology and practice included here also attend to the importance of lifelong initiation and continued faith-formation, especially but not exclusively for those baptized in infancy.

My first instinct on receiving this book was to ask why Eucharist is not the first focus of ecumenical concern in the wake of the Lima Document. Of course the Eucharist and ordained ministry are very important sacramental and ecclesiological questions, but as Austin’s earlier-mentioned
insight attests, baptism is clearly the most important sacrament, and reflecting on it honestly and well, as this book does, will greatly advance the cause of ecumenism.

_John F. Baldovin, S.J._

**New Paths toward the Sacred.** By Catherine McCann. New York: Paulist, 2008. Pp. ix + 233. $19.95.

McCann argues that a sense of sacredness, of the holy, constitutes the core of religious experience. She expands this notion by appeal to Bernard Lonergan’s theory of cognition, Rudolf Otto’s own concept of the sacred, and an understanding of the esthetic. First, she describes and analyzes human cognition according to Lonergan’s four qualitatively different cognitive levels: (1) experience, (2) inquire and understanding, (3) reflection and judging, and (4) responsibility—levels interconnected in dynamic human responses to their four corresponding “transcendental precepts”: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible. McC. then describes how following Lonergan’s four precepts in the context of religious faith gives rise to the experience that all creation is full of God’s presence and, thus, sacred. She insists that day-to-day experience can be infused with an awareness of the sacred, of God’s active presence.

McC. next appeals to Otto’s notion of the sacred as _mysterium tremendum et fascinans._ Within this context she examines the concept and experience of the secular, the “nonsacred,” and finds that within even the process of secularization there emerges a sense of freedom—even freedom from determination by imposed religious values—that can be identified as sacred. Even the secular can be, in fact is, experienced as sacred in the sense that God can be known as acting there.

Third, McC. compares the experience of the sacred with that of the esthetic, showing these experiences to be similar. On this basis she concludes with an empirical study of religious experience that carries with it, or is carried by, a strong esthetic dimension, namely, an extended study of reactions to a particular garden. The garden is the Shekina Garden, found in County Wicklow, a region known as the “garden of Ireland.” In addition to trees, shrubs, ponds, and a stream, the garden includes several well-appointed sculptures. It has grown around the sculptures, incorporating them into itself. A random sample of 13 persons of different ages, religious affiliations, and occupations spent a reflective day in the Shekina Garden; six months later, each was interviewed. The interviews were structured around six themes: expectations, cognitive experience (according to Lonergan’s four transcendental precepts), esthetic experience, experience of the sacred, effects after the visit, and the significance of the place. The study concludes: place is highly significant for religious experience; experience of the sacred is enhanced when esthetic and numinous aspects of human experience are awakened; exposure to art heightens esthetic and religious
experience; the term sacred appears to be more effective in having and in talking about religious experience than the terms religion and spirituality; and depth experiences can be fostered by creating reflective spaces for personal experiencing. McC. closes with suggestions for implementing the conclusions of the study.

Although this work is a revision of McC.’s doctoral dissertation, it reads easily and in fact is hard to put down. I found it to be a mature work of theology and of theological research and writing, timely and important for theology today. Of studies about religious experience, it is remarkable and helpful. The book will be of interest to many and useful in teaching theology and spirituality.

Jesuit Residence at Marquette University, Milwaukee

ROBERT FARICY, S.J.

GLOBALIZATION, SPIRITUALITY, AND JUSTICE: NAVIGATING THE PATH TO PEACE. By Daniel E. Groody. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 2007. Pp. xxiv + 280. $24.

Daniel Groody situates the quest for justice in the light of the church’s identity—in contrast to spiritualities that are detached from the church both as traditions and as concrete communities. G. identifies resources firmly within the lived ecclesiastical tradition that can ground the quest for justice, allowing neither a divorce of piety from the realities of the 21st century nor an isolation of concern for justice simply to the self-initiated who are socially inclined.

Organized by topics, the book confirms in the major resources it highlights that social responsibility is integral to religious living, making it an excellent resource for those who want to more consciously experience the theological roots of their own work for justice. Chapter 1 outlines the socioeconomic state of the world through an analytical contrast between the lives of the rich and the poor. G. illustrates how social location yields radically different experiences of contemporary life, punctuating his text with accessible images—for example, he notes that in 2005 “the world spent as much money on fragrances as all of Africa and the Middle East spent on education” (7). Although better economic, political, and social planning is needed, the tools of social science are not enough. G. argues that an “inner view” is essential, a view from “the terrain of the human heart,” to see the world as it is, as a choice between God and mammon. The situation of globalization can be solved only through a conversion of heart.

There follow discussions of resources available for addressing the foundations of the “inner view.” G. argues that the tools of market logic will never reach to the deeper spiritual disorders of the human heart that perpetuate a world order that is “economically inefficient, politically unsustainable and morally indefensible” (14). Rather, only spiritual practices can offer alternatives to the “common sense” culture and can address
its inability to critique what is so death-dealing to the human spirit. A Christian theological reflection that is attentive to poverty and in dialogue with world religions and other academic disciplines is capable of helping us respond to the challenges of building an alternative world today.

From this point on, the book has the shape more of a collection than a developing argument. Subsequent chapters show how Scripture, patristic texts, Catholic social teaching, and world religions can ground a life of justice. G. has a striking chapter on icons of justice, pointing to transformative moments in the lives of major justice figures of our times. He concludes with chapters that link social theologies, liturgy, and spirituality with justice.

Some might find the “collection” aspect of the volume its greatest asset and its greatest weakness. G. does, however, offer an undergirding for his text in the difference between the narrative of the gospel and the narrative of the “Empire,” but this remains undeveloped. He could, for example, have spent more time arguing why one narrative would be preferred over another. Again, he clearly addresses the concern that a spiritual hunger remains in a world of plenty and that there are desires of the human heart that are met only through sacrifice and discipline, making clear that one cannot address one’s spiritual hunger without taking responsibility for the world, finding God as one finds one’s neighbor. Some might wish, though, that he had addressed in more depth the clash of these two worldviews in practice. The concreteness of his first chapter could be more integrated with the material that follows. But perhaps that is another book. Fitting with his underlying contrast between Christ and mammon, Christianity is portrayed as countercultural. Again, though, the lack of concreteness carries a price. Less attention is given to positive elements in American culture that might become building blocks of a committed life. Attention to detail and to practice would direct attention there.

Sections of the book aptly meet the needs of a religiously less informed public, making this an ideal text for a wide audience, including undergraduates. Each chapter has questions for reflection and a bibliography for further study. It could complement a more empirical study of globalization. As a text, it is also inspirational and is a pleasure to read for anyone seeking a reminder of the keys to living a just life in our times.

Niagara University, N.Y.                Judith A. Merkle, S.N.D.deN.
SHORTER NOTICES

BEGINNINGS: ANCIENT CHRISTIAN READINGS OF THE BIBLICAL CREATION NARRATIVES. By Peter C. Bouteneff. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2008. Pp. xv + 240. $22.99.

Peter Bouteneff examines the successive biblical and patristic reception and interpretations of Genesis 1–3. He accepts the ancient linking of these chapters, visible already in the Septuagint’s assumption that ‘adam in the chapters has one and the same referent.

Some highlights of the text: Strangely enough, only from the first century BCE do sacred texts elaborate the Hexameron and use Adam and Eve for anthropological insights. Philo was unique among Jews both for his attention to Genesis and for his allegorical and literal exegesis. Paul viewed Adam as the original sinner and foil to Christ, unlike his predecessors who stressed Cain’s or the angels’ sin. The Apologists, in clarifying the relationship of the OT to the Gospels and Epistles, used typology (Adam for Christ, Eve for Mary, the tree for the cross) to show that history was not a linear trajectory from Adam: “History began with the incarnate Christ, such that Adam was made in his image” (86). The Apologists also arrived at creatio ex nihilo and formulated an understanding of the human person and sin. Again, Origen’s work on Genesis forced him to reflect on literal and allegorical exegesis. The three Cappadocians then successfully adapted Origen’s legacy: their teaching on creation and the origin of humanity was “narrated exclusively through the lens of regeneration, or restoration, in Christ” (168).

B. enables modern readers to see how early Christian intellectuals conceptualized their faith by confronting biblical texts of “beginnings,” and how they built on one another’s work. Alert to theological implications, B.’s understanding of both the Bible and the Fathers is well-informed, and he respects modern as well as ancient scholarly approaches. The book is a superb contribution to biblical hermeneutics, patristic interpretation, and systematic theology.

LIBERATING THE BIBLE: A GUIDE FOR THE CURIOUS AND PERPLEXED. By Linda M. MacCammon. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 2008. Pp. xv + 269. $24.

This guide deftly incorporates insights of mainstream biblical scholarship into a reading of several central biblical texts that focus on the character of God and the manner and purpose of divine-human interactions. MacCammon attempts “to liberate the Bible from its reputation and its use as a divinely sanctioned rule book” (2). Throughout the discussion of Genesis, Exodus, Isaiah, the Gospel of Matthew, and Paul’s Letter to the Galatians, M. orients nonspecialist readers to the historical and literary contexts while maintaining a focus on the revelatory nature of the text. She neither oversimplifies difficult interpretive issues nor engages in obscure technical discussions.

M.’s excellent guide is diminished, however, by her attempt to uncover an overarching program of human development that progresses from Genesis through the NT. This desire to see the Bible as divine pedagogy for humanity (137) leads M. to interpret the variety of perspectives on God’s character in Genesis as an evolution of God’s character. The Noachian covenant indicates to her that God had evolved from an omnipotent, omniscient deity “to a sadder, wiser deity” who realizes that his punishment was “a bit excessive” (46). Yet God’s response to moral corruption in Genesis 6–9 is the same as his response in Genesis 3—punishment followed by care and compassion. The presentation of the Abrahamic stories asserts that God abandons the “rule-centered ethic of obedience” and adopts “a more flexible, developmental model” (53). Yet, while Abraham questions and even debates God (Gen 15, 18),
obedience remains an essential element of that relationship (Gen 12, 22).

Other sections of the book are notable for what they omit. M.’s overview of the Judean monarchy fails to mention the Josian reforms. Her suggestion that there is no canonical account of God’s interaction with his people between 450 BCE and the birth of Jesus (182) ignores such postexilic writings as the Chronicler’s History, the Book of Daniel, and most of the Wisdom Literature. Her discussion of Matthew and Galatians says little about the centrality of Jesus’ death and resurrection as the ground of Christian faith and life.

BRIGID CURTIN FREIN
University of Scranton, Pa.

THE SHEEP OF THE FOLD: THE AUDIENCE AND ORIGIN OF THE GOSPEL OF JOHN. By Edward W. Klink III. Society for New Testament Studies Monograph 141. New York: Cambridge University, 2007. Pp. xvi + 316. $101.

The Gospel of John was not written for a specific, local community but for a larger, general readership. Thus Klink argues in what began as a dissertation under the direction of Richard Bauckham. Bauckham put forward a general version of this theory that has come to be known as the Gospels for All Christians approach (GAC). K.’s book is the first to apply the theory to the Gospel of John.

In chapter 1, K. presents the basics of Bauckham’s theory and the method used. Chapter 2 discusses the notion of “community” as it applies to early Christianity, arguing that it should not denote geographically distinct groupings but the basic relationship that unites all Christians. Moreover, K. argues, the notion of “sect” is an inappropriate term for Christian groups. Chapter 3 critiques readings of John that attempt to find a reflection of the community history in the Gospel. And chapter 4 asks about the “implied reader,” arguing that the Gospel expected a variety of readers, some with little knowledge of the Christian story. K. concludes that the Gospel was not written for “internal” use but as a missionary document (chap. 5).

Many issues raised by K. are significant and deserve reexamination. His critique is intelligent and challenging. He does not merely nudge scholarship this way or that; he rather dismantles many aspects of current scholarship and appears to return to a stage that many will associate with the 1950s. K.’s critique calls attention to some extremes in modern scholarship, but, if his project is to succeed, a more focused attack on modern exegesis is called for. Otherwise he runs the risk of being seen simply as the spokesperson for a conservative strain of Johannine scholarship. That would be unfortunate.

URBAN C. VON WAHLDE
Loyola University, Chicago

HISTOIRE DE LA LITTÉRATURE GRECQUE CRÉTIENNE: INTRODUCTION. Edited by Enrico Norelli and Bernard Pouderon. Initiations aux Pères de l’Église. Paris: Cerf, 2008. Pp. 334. €32.

This work introduces a projected six-volume series intended as a standard French-language reference text of the Greek Fathers from Paul to the Council of Chalcedon. The series is under the direction of Bernard Pouderon. Here the eight contributors (from French, Swiss, and Italian universities) discuss various aspects of methodology: problems of demarcation and definition of the field (Enrico Norelli); a survey of histories of Christian literature from Eusebius to modern patrologies (Paolo Siniscalco); how the texts survived and were transmitted (Rémi Gounelle); the literary forms that Christians employed (Gilles Dorival); sketches of the christological and trinitarian controversies (Marie-Anne Vannier); the esthetic ideals of Christian writers (Marie-Ange Calvet-Sebasti); a survey of the history of printed editions (Martin Wallraff); and an annotated presentation of the principal working tools, particularly but not exclusively those in French, that a student in the field may need (Benoît Gain).

The volume’s approach and interests are noticeably affected by the institutional situation in France. Civil (state-run) universities (with the exception of those in Alsace and Lorraine) do not have departments of theology, so the Fathers are studied principally in departments of classical languages or ancient history. Many issues of method-
Salvation and Globalization in the Early Jesuit Missions. By Luke Clossey. New York: Cambridge University, 2008. Pp. xii + 327. $99.

Clossey writes that his wide-ranging book may be “most neatly classified as a work of historical ‘dromography,’ a neologism indicating the study [according to T. Matthew Ciolek] of ‘geography, history and logistics of trade, movement, transportation and communication networks’” (10). C. argues that studies of early modern Catholic missions have generally not conveyed the extent to which the missions operated as a unified global phenomenon, and were experienced as such by missionaries. Rather than relying on external, often hostile, descriptions of the Jesuits, C. searches out a common “missionary mentality” that shaped the Society’s ministries by drawing on the writings of 53 Jesuits who worked in Germany, Mexico, and China. That is, C. underscores an internal, consistent mentality that was common to the Jesuits’ missionary work and that was as global as were the locations to which the Jesuits traveled. “Taking up a global perspective,” C. argues, “allows us to see the existence of a global religion, at the heart of which lies, in the principal argument of this book, the importance of salvific religion and soteriology—the study and technology of salvation” (6).

One notable difference between C.’s book and most historiographical work on the Society is that although the Society was well known, especially in Europe and Latin America, for conflicts with other religious orders, C. underscores shared similarities. His linguistic skills are strong—a rare asset even among historians of early modern religion—permitting him to draw on Jesuit letters and documents written in Chinese, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Latin, and Portuguese. The many unpublished documents C. has retrieved from European, Mexican, and U.S. archives will greatly interest historians, and readers will also be helped by the book’s extensive bibliography and chronologies of popes, Jesuit generals, and secular rulers, as well as by the prosopographical information supplied on principal Jesuits.

Thomas M. Cohen
Catholic University of America, Washington

Suffering Saints: Jansenists and Convulsionnaires in France, 1640–1799. By Brian E. Strayer. Portland, Ore.: Sussex Academic, 2008. Pp. xi + 424. $95.

Interest in the role of Jansenism in European politics has increased over recent decades because it has become clear that without understanding Jansenism, an analysis of the ancien régime as a whole is impossible. A majority of theologians, however, have overlooked Jansenists, regarding them as a negligible homogeneous, rigorist group that defended double predestination. Strayer’s book, which replaces William Doyle’s (all too brief) Jansenism (2000) as the most comprehensive survey, changes that. The excellent introduction and first two chapters introduce principal concepts and persons, making it easy to follow the complicated Jansenist network that evolved within political, social, economic, and intellectual realities of France. S. relies heavily on published sources and secondary literature, but also offers numerous insights from careful archival studies (e.g., statistical analyses of the numbers of imprisoned Jansenists). By quoting various private documents, he develops what most church historians have neglected: the personal and the social—the Jansenists’ experiences of love and happiness, of sorrow and pain.
The Jansenists’ insistence on following the ideas of Cornelius Jansen’s *Augustinus* provoked a two-century controversy, fought with persistence by both the “sectarians,” the state, and church authorities. It was, however, their bitter polemics against Catholics and Jesuits that ultimately encouraged skepticism of Christianity as a whole; many historians consider Jansenism the “chief agent of dechristianization” in France. Moreover, following their 1763 victory over the Jesuits, the movement transformed into a semipolitical group that fiercely questioned state absolutism as well as ecclesiastical despotism by appeal to the rights of conscience. While certainly contributing to the development of notions of human rights and individualism, the movement also paved the way to the French Revolution.

The Jansenists understood themselves to be the true church, the persecuted and suffering saints, and S. succeeds in guiding us through their world with ample sympathy but also critique. He tells a fascinating story of the human drama of the Jansenists and their ideals, “the holy experiment they established at Port-Royal, the church-state controversies in which they engaged, their bizarre descent into violence, and their gradual support of toleration” (294). This well-rounded book is certainly the best English overview of Jansenism and a must for graduate classes on early modern religion.

ULRICH LEHNER
Marquette University, Milwaukee

**Port-Royal et l’École française de spiritualité: Colloque de Port-Royal des Champs, 15–16 septembre 2006.** Edited by Hélène Michon and Laurence Devillairs. Chroniques de Port-Royal 57. Paris: Bibliothèque Mazarine, 2007. Pp. 291. €34.

As a contributor to this conference suggested, the title should have a question mark, for the notion of a “French School of Spirituality,” developed in the 20th century by Henri Brémond, remains vague and certainly equivocal. If one can place Pierre de Bérulle as the archetype of a multifaceted movement, his disciples were instrumental on both sides of the Jansenist conflict that weakened and probably ruined the French Catholic renewal. Vincent de Paul, Jean-Jacques Olier, and Jean Eudes find places in the movement, but they were fierce anti-Jansenists; on the other side, Saint-Cyran, Arnauld, Quesnel, and their followers also manifest a strong continuity with the original Bérullian spirituality. But can we speak of a “school”? Yves Krumenaker, the author of a study of the question expresses his doubts: what is a school without a master, without a method? Different contributors to the conference offer reasonable if not unexpected answers. These individuals, they claim, have in common a particular sense of transcendence (greatness of God), a distinct christological interpretation based on the notion of sacrifice that stresses the redemptive mediation of the incarnate Word. All these themes are well known. As Uka Mochiguzi’s presentation of Christian humility in a work by Antoine Arnauld indicates, the major common reference among them all remains Saint Augustine.

This, then, is a disappointing collection of uneven papers, linked together by too vague a concept. Some papers seem too underdeveloped for publication. Also regrettable is the neglect of classic themes, such as priestly spirituality, that might have helped to discern the specific contribution of Port-Royal, that is, of the Jansenists, to this significant movement.

JACQUES GRES-GAYER
Catholic University of America, Washington

**Barth and Dostoevsky: A Study of the Influence of the Russian Writer Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky on the Development of the Swiss Theologian Karl Barth, 1915–1922.** By P. H. Brazier. Paternoster Theological Monographs. Colorado Springs: Paternoster, 2008. Pp. xxiv + 245. $34.

The scope of this exemplary work of theological archeology, based on Brazier’s doctoral work, is broader than its title indicates. B. does not claim or wish to supplant Bruce McCormack’s indispensable study of Barth in the years from 1909 to 1936 (*Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology* [1996]).
Yet his desire to assess precisely the extent and nature of Dostoevsky’s influence on Barth leads him to offer this more nuanced account of the critical period of Barth’s early development.

Most notable among the influences on Barth were the friendship and collaboration with E. Thurneysen, whose own work on Dostoevsky commanded Barth’s respect and admiration. It was Thurneysen “who first put me on the trail of . . . Dostoevsky without whose discovery I would not have been able to write the first or the second edition of the commentary on Romans” (75). Reading Dostoevsky preceded and prepared the way for Barth’s appropriation of the Bible and his reappropriation of the Reformers. B. shows that Dostoevsky provided Barth not simply with illustrations or examples, but rather convictions about the deepest meanings of “sin” and “grace.” Among Dostoevsky’s greatest novels, it is Crime and Punishment (with its central character Raskolnikov who acts as though he were God) that has the greatest impact on Barth. Here Barth encountered for the first time the emptiness and horror of the tempter’s promise: eritis sicut deus—you will be like God!

Dostoevsky’s influence on Barth was admittedly brief, but without understanding that influence, B. suggests, the evolution and grounds of Barth’s mature theology will remain opaque. This study is therefore essential reading for all Barth scholars. It also offers important evidence that all great theology is also autobiographical.

 Jon Nilson
Loyola University, Chicago

Ratzinger’s Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI. By Tracey Rowland. New York: Oxford University, 2008. Pp. xiii + 214. $24.95.

The election of Joseph Ratzinger to the see of Peter has drawn new attention to the theology of this remarkably productive theologian. Now, along with the primarily chronological account of his theology in Aidan Nichols’s The Thought of Benedict XVI (a vade mecum for Ratzinger’s publications, revised in 2005), we now have Rowland’s more thematic approach. Chapter 1 places Benedict in his contemporary theological context, followed by a chapter on his controversial hermeneutic of Vatican II. R. then depicts the main themes and contours of the pope’s theology: revelation, Scripture, and tradition; his criticisms of the traditional way of presenting moral theology and his attempt to interpret moral theology as a guide to the Christian’s response to God’s love (a much neglected theme in most accounts of his thought, only partially corrected by his encyclical Deus caritas est); the pope’s communio ecclesiology; his analysis of the woes and crises of the post-Christian West; and his concern with liturgy, culminating in his motu proprio allowing greater use of the Mass of John XXIII.

On the liturgy, R. tendentiously writes: “Rather than being ecclesial lepers, in the pontificate of Benedict XVI Catholics who have for several decades suffered behind an iron curtain of parish tea party liturgies and banal ‘cuddle me Jesus’ pop songs . . . are more likely to be welcomed in from the cold . . . [after] a period of intense puritanism, reminiscent of Cromwellian England” (143). Fortunately, such gratuitous editorializing is rare; and its occasional presence should not deter readers from this accessible account of Benedict’s sometimes difficult theology. The pope’s deep and passionate love for the adventure of theology shines through this text, which is geared to the reasonably educated lay reader. Not only papal enthusiasts but also libraries and professional theologians will want to have this book.

Edward T. Oakes, S.J.
Mundelein Seminary, Ill.

Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945–1960: The Soul of Containment. By William Inboden. New York: Cambridge University, 2008. Pp. xi + 356. $80.

William Inboden’s main title indicates the scope and substance of his fine book, namely, the influence of religion and foreign policy on each other in this period. The subtitle discloses the thesis: George Kennan’s policy of containment of the Soviet Union defined the geopolitics of U.S. foreign policy, but the presidents of
that period developed a “diplomatic theology” that gave containment both its inner rationale and its means of rallying support. Both Truman and Eisenhower saw the contest as a religious war, pitting believers in God and spiritual values against atheists and materialists. Both men worked to create a civil religion involving belief in a supreme being, a moral law above human laws, the role of the state as servant not master, and the special vocation of the United States as instrument of divine providence. They saw this civil religion as involved in a quest for U.S. preservation and a necessary instrument in conflict. Both presidents sought religious allies, and both experienced great frustration when religious groups—Protestant and Catholic—balked at compromising religious particularities while agreeing in principle to participate. Both presidents are portrayed as Christian believers sincerely committed to what they were doing, not as Machiavellians cynically manipulating religion for political purposes.

In 1959, after noting the ascending threat of nuclear holocaust, Kennan warned that humankind risked destroying what God had given. I. observes that, “to Kennan, the spiritual divide in the world conflict now stood not between the United States and the Soviet Union, but between God and humanity” (312). I. shows critical judgment in his well-researched exposition, but mainly implicitly and indirectly. Perhaps he should have used Kennan’s later polarity actively and openly throughout the book to question the whole project of naming the conflict a religious war between God and atheism, of creating a civil religion to arm and motivate the friends of God, and of recruiting leaders of religions to line up on God’s side.

THEODORE R. WEBER
Emory University, Atlanta

BLOOD AND FIRE: GODLY LOVE IN A PENTECOSTAL EMERGING CHURCH. By Margaret M. Poloma and Ralph W. Hood Jr. New York: New York University, 2008. Pp. ix + 257. $42.

At one level Poloma and Hood’s book is a straightforward ethnographic study of “Blood and Fire,” an Atlanta-based charismatic ministry affiliated with the emerging-church movement. At another level it struggles toward an empirical, scientific assessment of the Great Commandment “to love God and to love your neighbor as yourself” by appeal to the notion of “godly love”—a concept developed by sociologist Pitirim Sorokin that denotes the relationship between perceived divine love and the human response to that love. In nine chapters the authors portray a community centered on notions that God’s kingdom is supernaturally relational and that Christian life must be designed in terms of committed human relationships. Their penetrating investigation asks incisive questions not only about the scientific assessment of godly love but also about the extent to which the emerging-church movement can be integrated into the landscape of parachurch ministry, charismatic Christianity, and contemporary Pentecostalism.

As a social-scientific assessment, the work admirably explores godly love, revealing a complex field of emotional energy, ideology, ritual, economic reality, business practices, spiritual formation, leadership and discipleship dynamics, conflict, and changing vision. At the same time, the authors repeatedly signal their desire to break out of the traditional mold of sociological and ethnographic study. While psychologist H. remains the more detached observer, sociologist P.’s concluding reflections on the research journey reveal her not only as a scholar but also as a pilgrim. In turn, the book invites readers to join in a similar pilgrimage marked by the hope, exuberance, compassion, misunderstanding, division, and eventual demise of the original vision of the emerging-church ministry. The book offers no overarching metanarrative but numerous stories that bear witness to the power of godly love and the human struggle to respond.

WOLFGANG VONDEY
Regent University, Virginia Beach

THE TENACITY OF UNREASONABLE BELIEFS: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE FEAR OF TRUTH. By Solomon Schimmel. New York: Oxford University, 2008. Pp. vii + 282. $29.95.

Schimmel’s is a fresh voice in the ongoing critique of fundamentalism. Too
often, anti-fundamentalists suffer from unacknowledged commitments to reductionism, as they also routinely miss the fact that the fundamentalist option attracts and empowers an untold number of contemporary people—psychologically, socially, spiritually, and even intellectually. As professor of education and psychology at Boston's Hebrew College, S. knows firsthand the appeal and shortcomings of the fundamentalist worldview. Writing as a self-described "heretic" (7) whose rejection of Orthodox Jewish belief (but not practice) animates the entire book, he offers an impassioned analysis of fundamentalism's distinctive mindset and the emotional and cultural support systems that perpetuate its antimodern agenda.

The book focuses on varieties of "scriptural fundamentalism" (4) found in the Abrahamic family of religions—specifically on Jewish, Christian, and Muslim claims that the core sacred texts of their respective traditions constitute coherent, authoritative, and infallible directives from a supernatural deity to ancient human prophets. The author is at his best when he seeks to expose the motivations, criteria, premises, and warrants behind centrist Orthodox Judaism's conviction that God literally revealed the Torah to Moses on Mount Sinai some three millennia ago. A detour into serpent-handling sects, assertions about NT anti-Semitism and contemporary Catholic denials of transubstantiation, and uncritical comparisons of Muslim law with American democracy render sections on Christianity and Islam relatively ineffective. S. never seriously engages the scholarly consensus that distinguishes between modern fundamentalism and classic orthodoxy; nor does he devote much attention to Catholic fundamentalism. His interrogation of fundamentalism slips at times into a critique of theism itself.

Despite these limitations, the book represents an intelligent inquiry into the cognitive world of secular modernity's religious discontents that is both fearlessly frank and unusually empathetic. S.'s sensitivity to the individual fundamentalist's socialization process and to the storied loss of faith that profoundly shapes ex-fundamentalists makes the book a highly original contribution to interdisciplinary fundamentalism studies. Scripture scholars, comparativists, and Christian readers unacquainted with yeshiva-based Jewish intellectual life will profit from this provocative work.

PETER A. HUFF
Centenary College of Louisiana,
Shreveport

HOW BALTHASAR CHANGED MY MIND: 15 SCHOLARS REFLECT ON THE MEANING OF BALTHASAR FOR THEIR OWN WORK. Edited by Rodney A. Howsare and Larry S. Chapp. New York: Crossroad, 2008. Pp. vi + 304. $34.95.

This deeply appreciative yet nonidolatrous collection offers a set of snapshot answers to the question, "Why Balthasar?" The answers include: (1) Balthasar provides a richly textured, multivoiced, biblical, cruciform, and apocalyptic rendition of Catholic theology and tradition; (2) this same theology represents a genuine engagement without capitulation, yet beyond mere opposition, to many of modernity's intellectual aporias; (3) Balthasar's relational or personalist ontology of gift provides a christocentric hermeneutic of Being that reveals (following Guardini) an important "third thing" besides nature and grace: nature as illuminated by graced vision. Along these lines, Balthasar provides a riposte to impersonal accounts of Being that would split Being from the Good, and thereby call into question the fundamental Christian stance of gratitude for all that is; (4) Balthasar's oeuvre, in particular his theological rendition of "form," overcomes intellectual disjunctions between body and soul, physical and spiritual senses, empiricism and idealism, sanctity and theological rigor, obedience and freedom, eros and agape, beauty and truth, scientific study and loving attachment to the good.

The prose is clear and bright, helped along by engaging literary and autobiographical vignettes. The writers' collective love for teaching is obvious, making the book an unusually helpful entrée to the motifs of Balthasar's work. I include here only a few of the book's many highlights. Rodney Howsare illuminates Balthasar's reading of modernity through his own Balthasar-
ian reading of Flannery O’Connor’s The Violent Bear It Away. Both authors gain from the relation. Francesca Murphy neatly explains the Balthasarian-inspired alterations to her pedagogical stance. Danielle Nussberger connects Balthasar to liberation theology in a way that sheds light on each. She also provides a perspicacious discussion of Balthasar’s contrast between sanctity and Hegelianism (139–40) that elegantly sums up a key thread running through his work. Russell Reno and Cyril O’Regan observe underdeveloped areas of Balthasar’s work, suggesting future avenues for Balthasar scholarship. Finally, O’Regan’s discourse on James Joyce’s The Dead is itself worth the price of the book (170–71).

Anthony C. Sciglitano Jr.
Seton Hall University,
South Orange, N.J.

To the Jew First: The Case for Jewish Evangelism in Scripture and History. Edited by Darrell L. Bock and Mitch Glaser. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Kregel, 2008. Pp. 347. $16.99.

This anthology, a product of two conferences sponsored by Chosen People Ministries, offers biblical, theological, and practical perspectives on evangelizing Jews. The 14 essays rest on the assumption that the “greatest act of love and respect for the Jewish people . . . is to bring them the message of eternal life through the Messiah of Israel, Jesus” (13). Only by accepting Jesus will Jews have a place in the world to come.

While the essays reflect varying degrees of methodological sophistication, most share the assumption that the OT is replete with messianic prophecies fulfilled by Jesus, that the biblical books are historically reliable, and that “if Jesus is not the way for Jews, he is not the way for Gentiles, either” (308). Several essays contain numerous, lengthy quotations from other authors, thereby detracting from the flow of the narrative.

Among many disconcerting assertions, it is claimed that the Nazi genocide was a “harbinger of Israel’s future and final Holocaust, which will be much more devastating than Hitler’s Holocaust” (151). Through “God’s mega-phone of pain and suffering,” seen in Israel’s “past and future holocausts,” the Jewish people have been drawn back (and continue to be drawn) into the “divine reality” (153). “Like a faithful husband, the covenant Lord pursues his adulterous wife, Israel” (134).

The writers are all Protestant, but Catholic analogues may be found, such as Roy Schoeman’s Salvation Is from the Jews (2003). In these cases, readers should be wary of the modes of biblical interpretation, of soteriological assumptions, and of the lack of engagement with the depth of Jewish thought and practice.

Mary C. Boys, S.N.J.M.
Union Theological Seminary,
New York City

Christian Realism and the New Realities. By Robin W. Lovin. New York: Cambridge University, 2008. Pp. viii + 231. $90; $29.99.

Seeking an update of the 20th-century movement called Christian Realism, Lovin suggests four contemporary Christian approaches to the world: (1) the witness who never appeals to power; then three types of power-embracing realists: (2) the antiutopian who argues the need for power to restrain evil; (3) the counterapocalyptic who seeks to restrain the power unleashed against evil; and (4) the pluralist. L. develops this last position (a midway between the other realists) as he examines the parallel but differing political approaches of Reinhold Niebuhr and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Beginning in chapter 4, L. takes another middle position, this time between advocates of Rawlsian liberal democracy and those who accuse Rawlsians of hostility to Christianity and religion. He criticizes “liberal political philosophers” for whom “any truth stated in religious terms becomes suspect” (119), but then he argues that “Christian realists . . . must insist that their zeal for the truth does not extend to imposing it on those who do not see it” (119). Nonetheless he insists on an “Unapologetic Principle: No context is required to explain itself in terms that reduce it to an instrument of other purposes” (129), by which he means that the church need not defend its right to
L. describes multiple, distinct public forums where various human goods are discussed, rejecting Rawls’s single “public political forum” for its lumping together all public discussions under governmental supervision. Within these multiple forums, claims founded on theological truths are valid. The governmental (i.e., legal coercive) forum must never overrule truths legitimate in other institutional contexts. Again, though, unless all institutional contexts, including that of the church, can make their own claims unapologetically, L. warns, there is a possibility that “everyone ends up owing his or her whole life to some one context.” Here is the realist claim that it is the competing claims—the unresolved tensions—that keep society pluralist and individuals free.

L.’s last chapters deal primarily with the challenges that the Soviet collapse and globalization present to Christian Realism’s usual balance and equilibrium. Although this analysis is well done, L. does not explore Christian Realist treatments of terrorism or the inability of the global financial system to prevent economic collapse.

CHRISTINE E. GUDORF
Florida International University, Miami

BACK TO DARWIN: A RICHER ACCOUNT OF EVOLUTION. Edited by John B. Cobb Jr. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008. Pp. xiv + 434. $36.

Originating at a conference on religion and evolutionary biology held at the Center for Process Studies (Claremont, Calif., October 2004), these 23 papers examine both the standard formulation of what is called the “Neo-Darwinian synthesis”—the combination of Darwin’s insights about random mutation and natural selection with modern genetics—and recent attempts to reconcile that formulation with religion. The material is arranged in four broad categories, beginning with the scientific consensus and moving through critiques and amplifications brought about by expanding consideration of the means by which evolutionary changes are introduced. Francisco Ayala, in five papers, lays out the basic theory and modern discoveries that have forced its modification. Sections 3 and 4 are respectively devoted to philosophical challenges to neo-Darwinism and the attempts by process theologians to synthesize evolution with theological understanding of the role of God in the world.

The distinctive contribution of the conference, according to Cobb, was to “introduce a Whiteheadian voice into the present discussion of evolution” (17). The major theme of the book, well served by the editor’s arrangement and introduction of material, is the integration of science and religion that does justice both to the independence of each and to the harmony that they must achieve to provide a coherent view of the world as a whole—subjective and objective realities alike.

Ayala’s exposition of the science is accessible to the general reader; the same cannot always be said for the attempts to apply process thought to the evolutionary synthesis. The work of Whitehead is notoriously difficult, and some writers appear to assume they are talking to the initiated—not an unreasonable assumption for a conference, but at times making for slow going. The required effort to penetrate the language, however, can be worth it.

T. MICHAEL MCNULTY, S.J.
Conference of Major Superiors of Men, Silver Spring, Md.

CHRISTOLOGY AND SCIENCE. By F. LeRon Shults. Ashgate Science and Religion. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008. Pp. x + 181. $30.

Shults argues for a reconstructive Christology, namely, a Christology shaped (1) by a heightened awareness of how earlier philosophical categories impact current theological understanding, and (2) by a refined critical awareness of how new learning, especially in science, offers to theology new sets of categories, for example, in new notions of relationality, contextuality, and interdisciplinarity. S. describes how many christological formulations arose from reciprocal mediations among science, philosophy, and theology, and how they often continue to govern current intelligibilities. In turn,
categories that can emerge from a reconstructive Christology can help reformulate the questions that guide christological investigations, as well as lead to more nuanced understanding of foundational biblical statements.

Chapter 1 establishes the importance of philosophical categories. The final three chapters are case studies in Christology that are defined as three moments, namely, epistemological, soteriological, and eschatological. These moments reflect meaning grounded in distinct patterns of experience: the intellectual, the moral, and the esthetic. The text is artfully crafted, and each chapter provides a good general overview of current conversations at the intersection of science and theology.

While S. contrasts ancient or medieval and contemporary categories and recognizes that systematic theology can contribute further refinements to his case studies, he might also have shown how earlier writings continue to assist current reconstructive efforts. Anselm is a case in point. Anselm appropriated in constructive fashion the jurisprudential vocabulary of his own culture, as it wrestled with notions of satisfaction of God’s injured honor (75). Yet, as R. W. Southern (Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape [1990]) has demonstrated, Anselm, in adverting to a biblical comprehension of the superabundance of God’s love, superseded and transposed the meaning and assumptions of that vocabulary. Anselm still contributes to what S. himself calls for, namely, a renewed comprehension for today of Christ’s agency (103).

JAMES R. PAMBRUN
St. Paul University, Ottawa, Ont.

TRANSFORMING CONFLICT THROUGH INSIGHT. By Kenneth R. Melchin and Cheryl A. Picard. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2008. Pp. xii + 156. $45.

In a clear, rhetorical style, Melchin and Picard argue that Lonergan’s cognitive theory suggests a mediation process—one oriented around the transformative power of insights—that can navigate conflicts successfully. Conflicts, they contend, result not just from competing interests; they are often rooted in the underlying perspectives from which interests arise. People experience, understand, evaluate, and affectively respond to interests through particular perspectives, so much so that what first needs to be addressed are the perspectives rather than the interests, especially when the perspectives have become limited, skewed, or otherwise distorted.

M. and P. explain that “insight mediation” can facilitate the discovery of links between conflicting interests and underlying perspectives. Once the links are grasped, the transformative power of insights can rework people’s perspectives, allowing misunderstandings and displaced affective responses to be addressed and increasing the chance for mutually resolving the differing interests.

This approach, based on P.’s experience as a practitioner and teacher of conflict resolution and M.’s expertise as an ethicist and Lonergan scholar, is engaging and provocative. However, I hoped for more from them. For example, they do not address how their theory could apply to large-scale conflicts such as war, terrorism, or genocide. Instead, in their last chapter they demonstrate the method’s effectiveness by focusing on only two smaller-scale cases: one between a victim of armed robbery and her assailant, and another between a persistent offender and his local community. They also sketch implications of their theory for democracies and justice systems but leave these tantalizing ideas underdeveloped. Nonetheless, the result is a wonderful introduction to how insight theory can contribute to conflict mediation, an introduction best suited for graduate students and scholars who can more readily pursue the theory’s implications for a broader field of conflict resolution.

JASON KING
St. Vincent College, Latrobe, Pa.

ARGUING THE JUST WAR IN ISLAM. By John Kelsay. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 2007. Pp. 263. $24.95.

For those who are not expert on Shari’a or on recent discussions about its interpretation, Kelsay outlines the applications of Shari’a reasoning that various Islamic militant groups have advanced concerning Islamic political ethics gener-
ally and the use of armed force particularly. After describing the historical emergence of Islam, the consensus achieved regarding the use of military force in the “golden age” of Shari’a (11th and 12th centuries), and subsequent judgments of the ‘ulama until 1400, K. turns to more recent attempts by Muslims to understand right conduct “when they are not in position of power” (6). Much of that discussion was and is based on Al-Shaybani’s development of just war criteria in his Book of Foundations (8th century).

K. then analyzes recent key pronouncements by militants claiming inspiration from ibn Taymiyya’s late-18th-century claim that fighting to repel threats to, and incursions into, Muslim lands is obligatory. These declarations include “The Neglected Duty” that was used to justify the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the Charter of Hamas, and al-Qa’ida justification of terrorism. K. also presents arguments by Shari’a scholars who criticize the militants’ appeals to right authority and proportionality criteria, especially in the latter’s attempt to justify suicide bombing. K. argues that disagreements between Islamic militants and Muslim proponents of democracy reflect a “crisis of legitimacy” within Islam.

Those less familiar with these internal Muslim disagreements might, from this text, still wonder whether, why, and how these disagreements warrant the label of “crisis of legitimacy,” and might be more tempted to attribute both al-Qa’ida’s popularity and the marginalizing of Muslim moderates in the West to our own Western fixation on bin Laden-style radicals. Still, K.’s final point is salient: the means by which democratic states conduct the war on terrorism will help, as much as Shari’a reasoning, to determine whether Islamic militants or democrats prevail.

Although the past two decades have seen many books on disability, most are written from disability-rights or philosophical perspectives. Reinders now gives us a systematic study of disability from a theological perspective. In the process he both rejects traditional approaches that rely on analyses of human qualities and formulates a convincing redefinition of personhood.

R. begins with a profoundly cognitively impaired individual named Kelly, asking what notion of personhood would include her. He finds that traditional theories of personhood that stress self-autonomy, self-consciousness, or a unique ability to reason would exclude individuals like Kelly. R. concludes that, in fact, no intrinsic capabilities can ground a person’s being; rather, personhood can be grounded only extrinsically and only by God; it is God’s unconditional love for each person, regardless of an individual’s capacities, that grants the worth of each person. In terms of requirements placed on us, this notion of the grounding for personhood suggests a shift away from a paradigm grounded in each person’s capabilities to what appears to be a more passive notion of embracing each person as already valued by God.

Persons with profound intellectual disabilities are excellent teachers of their extrinsically sourced value, but to learn from them we must befriend them. Access to the public realm will not suffice; they must also gain entrance into our circle of friends. Only in this way will we learn our interdependence. For R., worth is received in relationship, not earned, and we are truly human because we stand in communion with God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (274).

If taken seriously, this insightful book should lead to a conversion of heart and a recognition that we can give only because we have received. Because of its emphasis on being rather than doing, however, it offers little guidance on how to take our gifts into the world.

MICHAEL DUFFEY
Marquette University, Milwaukee

RECEIVING THE GIFT OF FRIENDSHIP: PROFOUN D DISABILITY, THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY, AND ETHICS. By Hans S. Reinders. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008. Pp. x + 404. $36.

MARILYN MARTONE
St. John’s University, Jamaica, N.Y.
Bringing together theologians, legal theorists, military personnel, activists, and survivors, *Torture Is a Moral Issue* contributes to ongoing interdisciplinary conversations about torture. Principally focused on Iraq, the essays attend to normative debates, international human rights law, and the diverse contexts of torture (Guatemala, Chile, the United States). There is a general denunciation of torture on theological, ethical, and legal grounds; many essays critique American exceptionalism and other Bush policies developed to circumvent prohibitions against torture.

Five parts structure the book. After Hunsinger’s stimulating introduction, part 1 functions as a prolegomenon; parts 2 through 4 appropriate theological insights respectively from Christian, Jewish, and Muslim scholars; part 5 offers normative and strategic recommendations for ending torture. The structure is thus coherent but at times too limiting. A particular strength is the sustained reflection on torture with respect to fundamental theological principles and their interaction with other disciplines; however, it would have been fruitful if, for example, the thought of some theologians had been interspersed—or engaged directly with one another—throughout the book’s sections. Opportunities for cross-fertilization do not fully materialize.

The essays are uniformly strong, and their distinctive genres (e.g., the testimonials of Dianna Ortiz [survivor] and Tony Lagourains [interrogator] or the sermons of Fleming Rutledge, Ellen Lipmann, and Yahya Hendi) complement the more scholarly contributions. Yet interest in shared questions (e.g., the “ticking time bomb” case broached by H., William Cavanaugh, and Melissa Weintraub) require more constructive analysis through synoptic comparison. Louis Richardson’s sober vision for government responsibility would nicely interface with David Gushee’s evangelical account of the state (informed by Rom 13:1–7, but cautious about trusting government too much). Inclusion of a bibliography and index would flesh out such resonances.

This accessible book continues to redress the absence of moral outrage against torture. It would be suitable for wide audiences and useful as a pedagogical tool for undergraduates.

**Jonathan Rothchild**
Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles

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**Catholic Spirituality and Prayer in the Secular City**. By Robert A. Burns. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2008. Pp. vii + 171. $24.99.

This slim volume charts the remarkable transformation of America’s religious landscape since the 1960s, exploring more specifically how America’s unprecedented religious pluralism has affected Roman Catholic spiritual lives. Burns emphasizes how, over the past 40 years, the growing chasm between organized religion and “spirituality” has led to the proliferation of alternative religious practices even while institutional churches have continued to play important roles in national life (4–5). B. underscores the continuity, in the decades following Vatican II, between the Catholic mystical tradition and the increasing centrality of “lay spirituality.” Also, the development of distinctly feminist spiritualities, emerging out of a rejection of traditional, noninclusive formulations of the faith (56–57), and the growth of Hispanic and African-American spiritualities, are presented as aspects of the Church’s general shift from a monolithic structure to one that embraces a plurality of voices. Finally, the adaptation of traditional devotional practices (90–94) alongside the growing importance of the charismatic movement (98–105) is taken as highlighting the Church’s ability to renew itself while remaining faithful to its own identity.

B.’s work is introductory, aiming at breadth rather than depth. Thus, topics that deserve more nuance are treated only cursorily: chapter 3 attempts a history of Catholic mysticism in 20 pages, devoting one paragraph each to Augustine and
Ignatius of Loyola (22, 27); discussions of “the Eucharist” and “contemplation” (43, 52) in chapter 4 are too brief.

The book will interest readers with limited previous knowledge of today’s Church or teachers and students of entry-level courses on American Catholicism.

**THOMAS CATTOI**

Jesuit School of Theology
at Berkeley

L’ÉTHIQUE COMME VOCATION: SE LAIS-SE R CHOISIR POUR CHOISIR. By Thierry Lievens. Donner raison 22. Bruxelles: Lessius, 2008. Pp. 284. €24.

Lievens takes up the most important questions of living: How do I discover the right and good? How do I orient my life to God’s will? He insists that answering those questions requires not only careful reflection but also inner assent in which the head, heart, and senses come to a unified decision. His argument is grounded in a firm faith that God gives the human person the possibility of choosing, among the many possibilities of life, that which is fully oriented to God and unites one most closely with God.

L. clarifies this Christian conviction from the viewpoint of Ignatian spirituality in dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas, Paul Ricoeur, and Jean Ladrière. Concise and readable ethical, spiritual, and theological reflections are brought to bear on the question of how to choose the good. L. cogently argues that, in the last analysis, it is being-with-others that truly fulfills the individual person. He also presents a sober and precise explanation of what, in the Ignatian tradition, is called the schola affectus, namely, an affectivity in which the different levels of human living—those of the body, rationality, and spirituality—come to a dynamic unity amid their tensions. Drawn into this unity, the human person is then capable of giving himself- or herself fully to God. The possibility begins in a recognition of having been chosen by God and of God’s interest in the major but also minor decisions of everyday life: it then spills out to the doing of the ethically good while finding—as a by-product—one’s true life and one’s real vocation.

L. could have better developed the theological theme of moving from founding awareness to action. His study might also have been enriched by taking more account of contributions in other languages.

**HANS ZOLLNER, S.J.**

Gregorian University, Rome

EXPLORING PERSONHOOD: AN INTRO- DUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HU- MAN NATURE. By Joseph Torchia, O.P. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. Pp. xv + 295. $75; $29.95.

Many philosophy departments at Catholic colleges and universities retain the curricular goal of introducing students to the grand narrative of Western thought emergent in Greek philosophy. Often the introductory course will examine Plato and Aristotle under the theme of “mind, self, and reality” before launching into other historical figures, especially Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, and contemporary formulations.

Torchia’s book, although developed within a “philosophy of the human person” course, would fit perfectly within introductory historical courses, especially for more gifted students and for teachers who wish to provide students with a solid grounding in a contemporary Thomistic account of personhood.

T. does introduce students to the Western grand narrative. His central chapter on Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology is preceded by four chapters ranging from the pré-Socratics to Augustine and then followed by four chapters: two given to Descartes, Hume, and the modern splitting of the integrated human person, and two devoted to contemporary postmodern expressions of the mind-body split.

The centrality of Aquinas allows T. to show how the *Summa theologicae*’s “Treatise on Man,” with its robust theory of nature and dynamically integrated theory of the person as substance, both resolves the quandaries and complements the insights of Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine. The Aquinas chapter also radiates forward, providing the basis
for T.’s critique of contemporary accounts that reduce personhood to observational performances, and suggesting that an ethics dislodged from personal nature and endowments necessarily loses its moorings.

Readers undeterred by fears of “foundationalism” will appreciate T.’s study as a hearty meal in a day when so many offerings are thin and unsatisfying. Those suspicious of anything that probes a metaphysical grounding for personhood and ethics, however, may suffer indigestion. Even for such readers T.’s argument is worth encountering. He is not interested in refuting adversaries or making overclaims for his position. Exploring Personhood is modestly offered as an “alternative account.” It is an account that deserves attention, especially by those disinclined to examine it.

JOHN F. KAVANAUGH, S.J.
St. Louis University, Mo.

THE BIG QUESTIONS IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION. By Keith Ward. West Conshohocken, Pa.: Templeton Foundation, 2008. Pp. vi + 281. $16.95.

In many respects a recasting of Ward’s recent books (Pascal’s Fire and Divine Action), this book focuses on questions concerning the (1) origin and (2) end of the universe, (3) biological evolution, (4) miracles, (5) space and time, (6) soul, (7) the epistemology of science and theology, (8) naturalistic explanations of ethics and religion, (9) God, and (10) revelation and divine action. His treatment is relatively standard, but with two unique features. First, he includes a discussion of Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism in addition to Jewish and Christian religions. He is well qualified for this inclusion; he recently finished a monumental four-volume study of comparative theology (Religion and Revelation, Religion and Creation, Religion and Human Nature, and Religion and Community, 1994–2000). I am not aware of anyone who has taken on this comparative task as systematically as has W. Unfortunately, because of its immensity, his treatment of religions other than Judaism and Christianity is sometimes too brief.

The second unique feature is W.’s general metaphysical and epistemological frameworks for these discussions. Among his central metaphysical themes are these: God is cosmic consciousness and a necessary being (24); cosmic consciousness needs an object of consciousness, and for God this is all possible states; God chooses some of these states and gives them actuality (26); the universe that we have is probably the only one that could have produced complex intelligent life, but such an evolutionary universe carries with it suffering and waste (65); laws of science are manifestations of the faithfulness and reliability of God (90); and God’s intentions for the universe are not determining (260). W.’s epistemology is more sketchy. He argues for multiple modes of knowing (scientific, historical, and artistic), multiple types of facts, and different kinds of truth; but he leaves these claims largely undeveloped (176–88).

The book does not have the usual textbook apparatus (objectives beginning and questions ending each chapter); still, I recommend it for introductory courses in science and religion. It is less encyclopedic and much more chatty than Ian Barbour’s Religion and Science [1990, 1997], a standard for such courses. And as with all W.’s writings, it is filled with charm, humor, and wit.

EUGENE E. SELK
Creighton University, Omaha