Abstract

This paper deals with various philosophical aspects of the notion of listening correlated with forming and disabling of totalitarian communities. Traditional philosophy is mainly critical towards sensual knowledge, whereas contemporary thought is concentrated on listening as a significant and complex phenomenon that can be observed as a cognitive category and through various philosophical perspectives (politics, ethics). For Heidegger, listening has existential status and represents one of Dasein’s characteristics. According to him, listening is understanding the one who is close to us (whom we bear in ourselves) – a friend. In Heidegger’s philosophy of listening, Derrida recognises the possibility of forming a community of same and close. It alludes to homogenisation and enmity. Abandoning Heidegger’s thesis about listening to a friend, Derrida writes about the possibility of listening to the spectre representing an affirmation of the existence of absolute otherness. Listening to the spectre is the only correct ethics by which distance is made and totalitarian community avoided. Like Derrida, Nancy sees the danger of forming a totalitarian community in the sameness and closeness of society’s members. The way of avoiding the possibility of forming such a community Nancy sees in immediate (sensual) contact with the world. For Nancy, listening is a contact with the world not mediated by significations and understandings. Listening represents a metaphor of resistance towards aspirations of representative political systems in forming complete and closed communities. By presenting several contemporary philosophical concepts, this paper tries to demonstrate that listening, apart from creating closeness, can maintain an impossible community characterised by irrepresentability and heterogeneity and, more importantly, can function as the resistance toward totalitarian systems.

Keywords
listening, voice, community, spectre, mourning, friendship, death, intimacy, Dasein, irrepresentability

Introduction into the Philosophy of Audibility

Throughout the history of philosophy, vocal abilities played a significant role in philosophical practice. At first sight, looking from the perspective of metaphysics and traditional philosophy, in the hierarchy of cognitive abilities, voice as a sensual ability was explicated as the activity of lower value. Giving primacy to cause, transcendence, logos and reason at the expense of senses, metaphysical philosophy strived to present voice only as an instrument in the complex contemplative practice. However, was the situation really such in traditional philosophy and did senses really have an inferior position?

A paradoxical situation can be found already in Plato where thinking is more significant than writing and speech but where thinking is also defined as the “talk” of the soul with itself (Plato, 2015: 67, 189e). Although in Theaetetus it is not about a real conversation, in his other works, Plato gives priority to the discussion and live conversation over writing. Whereas writing makes the ability of remembering fade away, the orator is the one who leads the soul...
towards the truth (Plato, 2002: 69, 275a). In Aristotle, human being is defined as a being of a community, indicating that communication was an important human capacity and a significant characteristic of human. Each philosophical position that supported the importance of community at the expense of individuality was about voice, listening and, in the end, communication. In theological discourse, voice was the voice of the authority, divine power and, in the end, servility and obedience. In modern political philosophy, with the entrance of civil society in the sphere of the political, voice becomes the most important mode of discussion. In the XX century, with the emergence of existential, hermeneutical, and phenomenological philosophies, i.e. with a turn towards the importance of language in understanding the world, the position of listening was specified and positioned more clearly in theory.

Listening and speaking are not only expressions of the inner state but also ways of shaping and experiencing the world. They are not only instruments of communication but a sphere that already exists and in which we enter as communicative beings. Besides this, they are indicators of social status and position of power that subjects hold in society. Voice is not only something expressed, something that can be measured by a certain amount of decibels; it also functions as the inner voice of consciousness that warns us about the correctness of our deeds. It can come from thinking, but also, in Plato’s case, it can precede it (thinking as a talk that the soul conducts with itself). Voice is the indicator that a community exists through cooperation but also obedience, the imposition of own standpoints, rule and order, and, in the end, through the uttermost diversity and irreducibility of voices.

Listening to the World of Things

Through his analysis of language, Heidegger put a special emphasis on the concept of listening. For Heidegger, language is the essential characteristic of existence because it represents a way of Dasein’s understanding of the world and its relation to the others, which are both also characteristics of Mitsein. Understanding implies the possibility of presentation, i.e. appropriation of the understood (Heidegger, 2001a: 203). Each understanding represents a language activity formed in the talk, conversation, and listening of the uttered. Since Dasein is existentially oriented towards understanding, interpretation represents one of its fundamental characteristics.

Heidegger’s starting point in the analysis of understanding is in talk as the existential-ontological foundation of language (Heidegger, 2001a: 203). Language is realised as talk, i.e. interpretation. Talk is an active discussion, interpretation in the world, communication with the other, and therefore it represents one of the fundamental characteristics of Dasein. Since it is at the same time Mitsein because of having the characteristics of openness towards the world, characteristics of Dasein are both the understanding of one’s existence and the interpretation of the understood. Because it represents the fundamental characteristics of existence, interpretation is as primordial as understanding. Talk is, therefore, the articulation of intelligibility (Heidegger, 2001a: 203–204). Each form of understanding is a talk about something, communication, acceptance, and rejection. Talking is neither simply a transfer of information about something, nor is it only the activity that enables our sociality. Language is pointing out the specificity of certain things, that is, making things the things. Heidegger states that language speaks through
“bidding [...] thing world and world thing to come to the between of the dif-ference” (Heidegger, 2001b: 203). By bidding the things, we name them, give them their singularity and point out their authenticity. Bidding the things is neither making some real-world present nor binding the named with the world in which they exist, but making a difference between the world and things named. Language is emphasising the difference between things, but also between things and the world.

I Listen, Therefore, I Obey (Submit Myself)

In Heidegger, relation to listening is neither only about auditive processes nor is it understood only as giving and taking information from the interlocutor. Instead, it represents the possibility of understanding and interpretation of the other. In Being and Time, Heidegger several times points out the importance of listening as one of the fundamental characteristics of Dasein, by which the world is being understood. Listening has a much broader meaning than participating in communication; listening to music or other’s talk represents a form of understanding the world. In other words, listening is a metaphor of conscious participation in a dialogue with the other, by which the existence of the one who takes part in the dialogue is acknowledged.

Heidegger investigates this problem in paragraph 34 of the Being and Time in which he states that listening is constitutive to talking.

“Listening to [...] is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others.” (Heidegger, 2001a: 206)

Listening is not only openness towards the world but also the possibility of understanding the world and expressing closeness towards the other. In the same chapter, when defining language characteristics of listening, Heidegger writes:

“Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its own most potentiality-for-Being -- as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it.” (Heidegger, 2001a: 206)

Further, he writes:

“As a Being-in-the-world with Others, a Being which understands, Dasein is ‘in thrall’ to Dasein-with and to itself; and in this thralldom it ‘belongs’ to these.” (Heidegger, 2001a: 206)

From these sentences, several things can be perceived. Firstly, listening is defined as the articulation of understanding. Further, openness towards the other is the authentic definition of Dasein, i.e. Dasein is also Mitsein. And finally, the third definition of Dasein is its thralldom to the Other, which indicates that through listening (but also speaking), Dasein shows its affiliation to the community and that the language is in the foundation of Mitsein. This thralldom is not subordination to a higher cause through inferiority to the community. On the contrary, through speaking, Dasein shapes Mitsein, not only through acceptance and listening but also through “not hearing, resisting, defying, and turning away” (Heidegger, 2001a: 207).

In “Language”, Heidegger makes a difference between language as a human activity and language as what it speaks (Heidegger, 2001b: 194). In other
words, language speaks in a way that it names or bids (calls) the world thing. If we adopt the definition that the language is a call-bid and not the instrument in man’s hands, then it represents a self-contained entity into which a man falls by birth and enables him to understand and to be open towards the world. In that sense, each language activity is not a transfer of thoughts into sentences but a response to the bid, i.e. command of language to insist on the difference between the world and thing.

“Mortals speak in so far as they listen.” (Heidegger, 2001b: 206)

That listening is not bare listening to the person next to the other; it is a response to the command of language to articulate the difference.

“Response, as receptive listening, is at the same time a recognition that makes due acknowledgment.” (Heidegger, 2001b: 206)

To simplify this, language acknowledges the world of singular things, i.e. the world thing is expressed (interpreted) through language. Language is the one that reveals the world as plural, different, and specific. When speaking, we acknowledge something by which we accentuate the difference between thing and world and thing towards other things. In other words, language is the activation of difference, an essential difference by which the specificity of a certain thing is accentuated.

To Promise Oneself to the Specters, to Listen to Them and to Wait for Their Answers

Jacques Derrida forms his theoretical position through a critique of Husserl’s theory of the constitution of sense and De Saussure’s theory about the foundation of difference in the concept of signified/signifier and parole/langue. Each form of differentiation in Husserl and De Saussure has for Derrida the irreducible foundation in the inaudible difference he finds in the word *différence / différance* – neither a word nor a concept (Derrida, 1982: 7). In the graphic difference, which appears by changing the phoneme “e” into “a”, there is a space of constituting the sense. For Derrida, this difference represents the difference of all the differences (before the ontological one), which is by itself inaudible (Derrida, 1982: 5). Derrida finds in Heidegger the presence of phonocentrism, which is visible in his emphasis on listening and speaking as ways of understanding. Critique of Heidegger’s philosophy of listening, especially the part in *Being and Time*, Derrida puts forward in his “Heidegger’s ear”.

While considering the concept of friendship, Derrida critically analysis Heidegger’s thesis about listening as making present, approaching, and belonging and thus to point out the immediate closeness between listening and belonging. This connection can be observed in the etymological closeness of words *hören* and *gehören* (to listen – to belong). Taking this closeness into consideration, Derrida asks whether the concept of listening produces a too big intimation and closeness of *Dasein* with the speaker. Derrida points out Heidegger’s understanding of language as a bid-call to make present something that is absent. Derrida finds that Heidegger’s bid-call is a metaphysics of presence because the bid demonstrates the binary opposition: “absence of thing” – “presence in language”. Further on, Derrida shows that Heidegger’s
concept of listening is primarily connected to listening to somebody close and somebody one can understand, thus a friend.

“It is not entirely excluded, nor is it certain that belonging to the same community or to the same people, the experience of the same tongue, or the participation in the same struggle is the requisite condition for a voice of the friend to be carried bei sich by Dasein.” (Derrida, 1993: 178)

It is about a friend we understand and whose voice we carry by ourselves, in ourselves. That friend is the one we understand, whose language we understand, and he is thus close to us, closer than the one we do not understand. Here we can refer to Heidegger’s definition of language as the bid for making present and closer. Language makes close, makes a Dasein intimate with the other Dasein because they understand each other through a common language. Listening as understanding and speaking as interpreting connotes belonging to the same community, formed through a Dasein’s closeness with other Dasein. Here, we can observe a paradox produced by intimation and closeness because they can strengthen connections between members of a community that can result in enmity towards others with whom there is no closeness.

Do We Listen Only to Friends?

Derrida analyses one of the most prominent theoreticians of enmity, Carl Schmitt, in whose theory of the political he finds the plausible theory of friendship with distance. For Derrida, friendship is neither intimation nor approaching, but aporetic relation, which includes simultaneous closeness and distance. Friendship with closeness always produces excessive intimacy and, thus, homogenisation, which results in forming communities confronted with other communities. The concept of friendship is thus equally dangerous as the concept of enmity. Following Schmitt’s concept, Derrida demonstrates that each friendship should include enmity so that between the subjects or individuals a distanced relation without excessive intimacy is formed. That distance alludes that the other should be observed, in Schmitt’s sense, as enemy, i.e. he should be let be the other. In the end, the other is the other if left to act without assimilation or excessive closeness. They do not need to be understood or grasped, and we do not need to know their language. We do not have to listen to them because we do not have to understand their language at any cost, but we must let them remain the other. Derrida indicates the totalitarian aspect of voice, a voice which calls, which orders, and which brings us close. Voice which is an authority and which has the need to subordinate and assimilate other subjects.¹

¹ Here, I refer to Adorno’s understanding of gramophone in his article “The Curves of the Needle” which represents a metaphor for a one-way communication through blind or submissive listening. According to Adorno, emergence of gramophone signified not only a new sort of amusement, satisfaction of cultural needs, but also a new sort of technical reproducibility of music. With the emergence of this technical device emerged also a new sort of (one-way) communication in which one only listens. This form of communication marked a symbol of authoritarian order in which subjects listen to what they are being exposed to, without the possibility of participating. Listening thus represented both a sort of obedience and fulfillment of ordered tasks, without the possibility for interference. More about this in Sretenović (1994).
Through two aspects of philosophy, Derrida indicated the possibility of thinking the voice beyond metaphysical presence, authority and totalitarianism: one is the notion of spectral, whereas the other is the phenomenon of the work of mourning. Both concepts suggest the impossible communication or communication in the impossible community, the community of same and the Other, the Other being dead, i.e. spectral. In *Spectres of Marx*, Derrida shows that the spectre is an entity, a being that exists beyond the logic of presence/absence. Communication with the dead is not only mourning but also communication beyond presence. By voice addressed to the dead and the voice of the dead, which resonates in our ears, tangibility, finiteness, and the logic of presence/absence is overcome. Overcoming the difference between those two entities (live – dead) through listening to the voice of the dead represents acceptance of responsibility towards the future. Fidelity and loyalty to the spectre is loyalty to incompleteness or to democracy to come and which will never be achieved because once such democracy is achieved, it will produce a closed community, which again can be exclusive towards anyone who does not belong to it. Thus, the voice of the ghost, of the spectre, is not an insane communication in which we talk with the absent figure. On the contrary, it is a metaphor of affirmation of the other who is not next to us and who does not belong to us, who corrodes our so-called finite space in which close members of the finite and closed community are gathered together.

Although the spectre represents the ‘otherworldly’ being, their presence is not possible without their body.

“For there is no ghost, there is never any becoming-specter of the spirit without at least an appearance of flesh, in a space of invisible visibility, like the dis-appearing of an apparition. For there to be ghost, there must be a return to the body, but to body that is more abstract than ever.” (Derrida, 1994: 157)

We understand the spectre as something that is different, the Absolute other, and towards which or whom we need to show unconditional hospitality, without assimilation and identification. Regardless of its otherness, ‘other worldliness’, and non-understandability, we should address it in the way of absolute unconditionality. In other words, we should learn how to communicate with the specters.

**Derrida, Nancy and the Work of Mourning**

Mourning can be seen as a way of communication with the dead. In Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, we can see that the Being-towards-death is authentic characteristics of *Dasein* itself.

“But its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it ‘is’ at all.” (Heidegger, 2001a: 284)

*Dasein*’s death is its own because nobody can take upon oneself the death of the other. This means that Being-there (*Dasein*) cannot take over the death of the other, it can only have it in its experience. Derrida goes further and considers the death of a friend to be something interiorised, something one bears in themselves. Every friendship is a promise or an oath that after the death of one of the friends, the other will mourn them. Friendship is problematic because it bears the concept of death – the highest act of friendship is to mourn the friend after their death. A friend is the one we bear in ourselves, and thus by the act of their death the remaining one, through the act of mourning, incorporates...
the friend’s dead body into their own. Mourning a friend is an appropriation, a sort of injection of their image into the body of the one who mourns, who remained, who survived. They are incorporated into the body of the mourner like an intruder, an incurable virus. The deceased is in the body but is not appropriated nor assimilated; it is merely the other.

“It is within us but it is not ours.” (Derrida, 2001: 44)

Mourning is addressing the other who is within us, injected into us like the intruder and thus absolutely different from us. In other words, a friendship is bearing the dead being within oneself, whom we revive through the process of mourning.

“Ghosts: the concept of the other in the same […] the completely other, dead, living in me.” (Derrida, 2001: 41–42)

A dead friend is in me and completely different from me, they haunt me and, like an intruder or an incurable virus, constantly spoils my being, weakening my immunity. Mourning is not something that happens only after death. Since friends mourn each other, they are being prepared for this act from the beginning of their friendship. Thus, mourning as the communication with the dead is what is announced to happen as soon as two people become friends.

“We prepare for the death of a friend; we anticipate it; we see ourselves already as survivors, or as having already survived. To have a friend, to call him or her by name and to be called by him or her, is already to know that one of the two of you will go first, that one will be left to speak the name of the other in the other’s absence.” (Brault and Naas, 2001: 13)

Friendship is thus a sort of violence because it announces the coming death of a friend. There is a promise that the one who remains will mourn his deceased friend. Mourning and rejecting to mourn a friend is a paradox of communication because it represents the friend’s betrayal. Just as each remembering the friend and mourning them is approaching and annihilation of the otherness, so is ignorance to mourn betrayal of the other, which leads to the conclusion about the impossible mourning. By mourning the other, we are put in a paradoxical situation; we anticipate our death.

“In the experience of fatal, original, and impossible mourning, I anticipate my own death, I relate to myself as mortal.” (Derrida, 1995: 322)

Contrary to Derrida, for Nancy, the death of the other motivates us to communicate with them through the announcement of their death, which reveals thus the finitude of human existence. The dying cannot announce their death, and therefore, their death cannot be confirmed without the voice of the other. In other words, there is no death without the voice of the other. As Nancy puts it:

“It is, or it ‘will be’, my death that says ‘he is dead’ in their speaking; in this way, my death is not, it will not be, anywhere else.” (Nancy, 2000: 91)

Death is singular, and something that happens in a community, just like birth and other existences are singular moments. It is a significant characteristic of each existence and what cannot and must not be mastered by either individual or group. A community must not master the death of its members; it is only “the presentation to its members of their mortal truths” (Nancy, 1991: 15).
Sharing of Voices – Democratisation as a General Right to Be “Loud”

Voice and listening hold a significant place in Nancy’s thought because they represent the expressions of meaning. Voice is an example of how body and plurality as concepts have existential significance. Voice is a bodily phenomenon, and as such, it is never the same because it is always such, and such voice in this or that context or situation, expressed in this or that way. For Nancy, voice is neither interpretation nor anticipation of a given object but an announcement (Nancy, 1990: 220). Voice itself is not an activity that expresses the opinion. Also, it does not proceed with some process of understanding. On the contrary, voice is the bearer of meaning, and since we each time speak in this or that way, in this or that tone, the conclusion is that meaning is plural. Nancy rejects the connection between voice and signification because signs have no authenticity/originality since their function is to represent the object, to stand for something which is absent. In a political sense, signification is a metaphor for the representativeness of people who do not participate in political decision-making because of the representatives’ existence.

Nancy makes a difference between the classical existential concept of hearing (Hören, entendre) as understanding and listening (écoute) as original and immediate audio action which is not connected to understanding (entendre) or meaning (vouloir-dire). When it comes to listening, Nancy thinks of the original bodily contact with the world of sonority. Such relation excludes listening as meaning (Nancy, 2007: 31). Listening is a direct and immediate relation to the sound, and it excludes significations, orders, authoritarian speech, or submissive obedience. Here, Nancy is close to Rousseau’s concept, according to which sound is neither articulation of thought, nor does it have meaning. In other words, listening is listening to only what is not coded (Nancy, 2007: 36). Sound can be understood as the openness of meaning, transparency, and availability. Because sound, each sound, is singular and original announcement means that it is non-instrumentalised because it is not a tool in the function of thinking. Sound is neither inscribed nor fixated because each sound is singular plural, bodily and non-consistent, and thus it appears, disappears, and is succeeded by the other sound. In this way, Nancy indicates the originality of relation with the world, which is not mediated by relations. Like in Rancière, who speaks about the crisis of the image, which is, through critique and analysis, transformed into critical, analytical, historical-educational, or aesthetic text, in Nancy, there is also the tendency to understand original sound as resistance towards signification of the sound, because through signification it is transformed into the other which diminishes its specific importance. Sound is an immediacy of human experience and a metaphor for changeable/fluid experience of the world. Bodily changeability, non-consistency, and singular plural is a fact, and it represents a resistance towards any communion and finitude. In a political sense, sound beyond signification is the original understanding of democracy without representation, i.e. intermediacy, democracy to come, which will never happen.

The original sound is the perpetual changing of meaning, which subverts the stability and the concept of presence, as is the spectre for Derrida. Since it is original and has no relation towards meaning (intermediary), sound is constantly and repeatedly different, and it represents a metaphor for plurality that resists uniform ideologies. Like a spectre, which haunts living presences, it is continuously the other, always a changeable activity, which subverts every
form of sameness and uniformity. The existence of the absolute other is the confirmation of the existence of the impossible relation between me or the same other, where between them and me, me and the other, dead, spectre, there is an insurmountable gap. This gap, which should be understood as the difference, singular plural, as constant changing of meaning, and thus subversion of sameness, is the only condition for shaping communal life, the impossible community. That community is impossible because it must not be named; its name must not be uttered. As soon as the name is pronounced, it ceases to be a community. Therefore, we must listen to the spectres, we must accept their existence, because that way we accept the other but, more importantly, we accept the unsurmountable gap between me and the other which must exist because only by the existence of deep abyss between subjects, the other freed from the violence of the same can exist.

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Sažetak
Rad se bavi različitim filozofijskim aspektima pojma slušanja u svezi s oblikovanjem i obustavljanjem totalitarnih zajednica. Tradicionalna filozofija uglavnom je kritički nastrojena prema čulnom znanju, dok se suvremena misao usmjerava na slušanje kao značajan i kompleksan fenomen koji može biti promatan kao kognitivna kategorija i kroz različite filozofiske perspektive (politika, etika). Za Heideggera, slušanje ima egzistencijalni status i predstavlja jedno od Daseinovih obilježja. Po njegovu mišljenju, slušanje je razumijevanje onoga tko nam je blizak (koga nosimo u sebi) – prijatelja. U Heideggerovoj filozofiji slušanja, Derrida prepoznaje mogućnost oblikovanja zajednice istih i bliskih, Aludira na homogenizaciju i neprijateljstvo. Napaštajući Heideggerovu tezu o slušanju prijatelja, Derrida piše o mogućnosti slušanja sablasti koja predstavlja afirmaciju egzistencije apsolutne dragosti. Slušanje sablasti jedina je ispravna etika putem koje se uspostavlja udaljenost i izbjegava totalitarnu zajednicu. Poput Derridaa, Nancy vidi opasnost u oblikovanju totalitarne zajednice u istosti i bliskosti članova društva. Način izbjegavanja mogućnosti oblikovanja takve zajednice Nancy vidi u izravnom čulnom dodiru s svijetom. Za Nancya, slušanje je dodir s svijetom neposredno svidljiv svijet, a slušanje predstavlja metaforu otpora prema aspiracijama predstavničkih političkih sustava u oblikovanju potpunih i zatvorenih zajednica. Slušanje sablasti jedina je ispravna etika putem koje se uspostavlja udaljenost i izbjegava totalitarnu zajednicu. Slušanje sablasti jedina je ispravna etika putem koje se uspostavlja udaljenost i izbjegava totalitarnu zajednicu. Slušanje sablasti jedina je ispravna etika putem koje se uspostavlja udaljenost i izbjegava totalitarnu zajednicu. Slušanje sablasti jedina je ispravna etika putem koje se uspostavlja udaljenost i izbjegava totalitarnu zajednicu. Slušanje sablasti jedina je ispravna etika putem koje se uspostavlja udaljenost i izbjegava totalitarnu zajednicu.

Ključne riječi
slušanje, glas, zajednica, sablast, žalovanje, prijateljstvo, smrt, intima, Dasein, nepredstavljenost

Bernard Harbaš

Smrt, zajednica, žalovanje – o glasu i slušanju u filozofiji

Zusammenfassung
Die Arbeit behandelt verschiedenartige philosophische Aspekte des Begriffs des Hörens bezüglich der Schaffung und Auflösung totaliterer Gemeinschaften. Die traditionelle Philosophie steht dem sinnlichen Wissen zumeist kritisch gegenüber, während der zeitgenössische Gedanke auf das Hören als ein belangvolles und komplexes Phänomen ausgerichtet ist, welches sich als kognitive Kategorie und aus diversen philosophischen Perspektiven (Politik, Ethik) betrachten lässt. Das Hören hat für Heidegger einen existenziellen Status und repräsentiert eine der Eigenschaften des Daseins. Seines Erachtens ist Hören das Verständnis desjenigen, der uns nahesteht (den wir bei uns tragen) – des Freundes. In Heideggers Philosophie des Hörens erkennt Derrida die Möglichkeit, eine Gemeinschaft der Selben und Nahen zu formen. Er macht Anspielungen auf Homogenisierung und Feindseligkeit. Indem er Heideggers These vom Hören des Freundes verwirft, schreibt Derrida über die Möglichkeit, einem Gespenst zuzuhören, welches die Affirmation der Existenz abstrakter Andersheit abbildet. Dem Gespenst zuzuhören ist die einzig richtige Ethik, durch die Distanz hergestellt und eine totalitäre Gemeinschaft vermieden wird. Ebenso wie Derrida sieht Nancy die Gefahr in der Schaffung einer totalitären Gemeinschaft aufgrund von Selbigkeit und Nahekommen der Gesellschaftsmitglieder. Einen Weg, der Eventualität der Formung einer solchen Gemeinschaft auszuweichen, zeigt Nancy in direktem (sinnlichem) Kontakt mit der Welt. Für Nancy bedeutet das Hören eine nicht durch Signifikationen und Verständnisse vermittelte Berührung mit der Welt. Das Hören stellt eine Metapher für den Widerstand gegen die Aspirationen der repräsentativen politischen Systeme dar, vollkommene und geschlossene Gemeinschaften zu gestalten. Indem es mehrere zeitgenössische philosophische Begriffe vorstellt, versucht dieses Paper zu demonstrieren, dass
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Das Hören, abgesehen von der Schaffung einer Nähe, auch eine unmögliche Gemeinschaft aufrechtzuerhalten vermag, die durch Nichtrepräsentativität und Heterogenität gekennzeichnet ist, und nicht zuletzt als Widerstand gegen totalitäre Systeme fungieren kann.

Schlüsselwörter
Hören, Stimme, Gemeinschaft, Gespenst, Trauer, Freundschaft, Tod, Intimität, Dasein, Nichtrepräsentativbarkeit

Bernard Harbaš

La mort, la communauté, le deuil – sur la voix et l’écoute en philosophie

Résumé
Ce travail aborde divers aspects philosophiques du concept de l’écoute lié à la formation et au renversement des communautés totalitaires. La tradition philosophique relève principalement d’une critique envers la connaissance sensorielle, alors que la pensée contemporaine a trait à l’écoute, en tant que phénomène significatif et complexe, qui peut être considérée comme une catégorie cognitive, et peut également être analysée à travers diverses perspectives philosophiques (politique, éthique). Pour Heidegger, l’écoute a un statut existentiel et présente l’une des caractéristiques du Dasein. Selon lui, écouter c’est comprendre celui qui nous est proche (celui que nous portons en nous) – l’ami. Dans la philosophie heideggérienne de l’écoute, Derrida voit la possibilité de former une communauté des mêmes et des proches. Il fait allusion à l’homogénéisation et à l’hostilité. En rupture avec la thèse heideggérienne sur l’écoute de l’ami, Derrida écrit sur la possibilité de l’écoute du spectre qui présente l’affirmation d’une existence de l’altérité absolu. L’écoute du spectre est l’une seule éthique juste au travers laquelle se constitue la distance et s’évite la communauté totalitaire. À l’instar de Derrida, Nancy voit un danger dans la formation de communautés totalitaires dans l’identité et la familiarité. La manière d’éviter toute possibilité de formation d’une telle communauté, Nancy la voit dans le contact direct (sensoriel) avec le monde. Pour Nancy, écouter c’est être en contact avec le monde sans l’entremise de significations et de compréhensions. Écouter présente une métaphore de résistance envers les aspirations des systèmes politiques représentatifs à former des communautés entières et fermées. En présentant quelques concepts philosophiques contemporains, ce travail s’applique à démontrer que l’écoute, hormis créer des affinités, peut préserver une communauté invraisemblable caractérisée par le non-représentationnel et l’hétérogénéité, mais aussi, et ce qui est bien plus important, peut fonctionner comme une force de résistance envers les systèmes totalitaires.

Mots-clés
écoute, voix, communauté, spectre, deuil, amitié, mort, intimité, Dasein, non-représentation