Our three discussants fit an “ideal statistican” profile, combining deep theoretical understanding with serious scientific interests. The three essays—which are more than commentaries on my article—reflect in a telling way their different applied interests: Andrew Gelman in social sciences, Sander Greenland in epidemiology, and Robert Kass in neuroscience. Readers who share my bad habit of turning to the discussions first will be well rewarded here, but of course I hope you will eventually return to the article itself. There the emphasis is less on specific applications (though they serve as examples) and more on the development of statistical inference.

Figure 1 concerns the physicist’s twins example of Section 3. From the doctor’s prior distribution and the fact that sexes differ randomly for fraternal twins but not for identical ones, we can calculate probabilities in the four cells of the table. The sonogram tells the physicist that she is in the left-hand column, where there are equal odds on identical or fraternal, just as Bayes rule says. In my terminology, the doctor’s indirect evidence is filtered by Bayes rule to reveal that portion applying directly to the case at hand.

There is a leap of faith here, easy enough to make in this case: that the doctor’s information is both relevant and accurate. We would feel differently if the doctor’s evidence turned out to be just three previous sets of twins, two of which were fraternal. A standard Bayesian analysis might then start from a beta(2, 3) hyperprior distribution on the prior probability of identical. The calculation of posterior odds would now be more entertaining than the actual one in Figure 1, but the results less satisfying.

How much respect is due to conclusions that begin with priors, or hyperpriors, of mathematical convenience? The discussants are divided here: Gelman, judging from the examples in Chapter 5 of his excellent book with Carlin, Stern and Rubin, is fully committed; Kass, as a follower of Jeffries, is mildly agreeable but with strong reservations; while Greenland seems dismissive (calling objective Bayes “please don’t bother me with the science’ Bayes”).

Section 4’s empirical Bayes motivation for the James–Stein rule implicitly endorses Gelman’s position, except that maximum likelihood estimation of $M$ and $A$ in (1) finesses the use of a vague hyperprior for them. The same remark applies to the discussion of false discovery rates in Section 6. By Section 9, however, my qualms, along Greenland’s lines, become evident: do the estimates $\hat{\mu}_i$ in Table 2 fully account for selection bias, as they would in a genuine Bayesian analysis? Kass and I part company here. I believe we need, and might get, a more complete theory of empirical Bayes inference while he is satisfied with the present situation, at least as far as applications go. Gelman is happy with both theory and applications.

The ground is steadier under our feet for both James–Stein and Benjamini–Hochberg thanks to their frequentist justifications, Theorems 1 and 2. We do not really need those prior distributions (1) and (7). The procedures have good consequences guaranteed for any possible prior, which is another way of stating the frequentist ideal. My “good work rules” comment in Section 10 had in mind the emergence of key ideas such as JS and BH from the frequentist literature.

Gelman is certainly right: Bayesian statistics has transformed itself over the past 30 years, riding a hierarchical modeling/MCMC wave toward a stronger connection with scientific data analysis. This does not make it an infallible recipe. MCMC methodology has encouraged the use of mathematically convenient distributions at the hyperprior level, perhaps a dangerous
trend. We could certainly use some new theory either justifying the recipe or improving upon it.

Maximum likelihood, the crown jewel of classical statistics, is a theory of direct evidence: the MLE is nearly optimal among nearly unbiased estimates, while the Fisher information bound tells us how accurate a direct estimate can be. The most striking lesson of postwar statistical theory, exemplified by the James–Stein estimator, is the failure of maximum likelihood estimation in high dimensions. That failure was the original motivation for this talk and article, and my (hopefully not futile) call for a more principled theory of indirect evidence.

“Second-level maximum likelihood” (using I. J. Good’s terminology), as in the empirical Bayes estimation of $M$ and $A$ for the baseball data, is a tactic for breaking through the MLE dimensional barrier. So are hierarchical Bayes, random effects models, and regression techniques. There is no want of methodology here, all of which can be useful in bringing indirect information to bear, but I find it difficult to know which methods are appropriate, let alone optimal, in the analysis of large-scale problems.

The baseball data has outlived several of the players. It has the sterling virtue of including the “Truth” so we can honestly compare prediction methods. On the downside, nobody cares much about 40-year-old batting averages. We can imagine the same table except where the proportions refer to cure rates for some horrible disease, obtained from 18 different experimental drugs. In such a case, pulling the Clemente of drugs down from 0.400 to 0.294 might seem less desirable.

Relying entirely on direct evidence is an unaffordable luxury in large-scale data analyses, but indirect evidence can be a dangerous sword to wield. Some theoretical guidance would be welcome here, perhaps a theory quantifying the relevance of group data to individual estimates.

Kass and Gelman rather casually “dis” false discovery rates, not on very good grounds as far as I can see. Fdr methods have done what I would have thought impossible 15 years ago: displaced Type I error violators’ prison. She, and the rest of us, can continue up the ordered list of $p$-values as far as desired, at each step letting the local false discovery rate tell her the ever-increasing risk of misleading her collaborators.

I like Hal Stern’s distinction between modelers and nonmodelers, invoked by Gelman. These days there are three groups to consider,

$$\text{data miners} \ll \text{frequentists} \ll \text{Bayesians},$$

the inequality signs $\ll$ referring to the amount of probabilistic modeling. Bayesian modeling is almost always in addition to, rather than instead of, any frequentist modeling of sampling densities. Data miners are the atheists of the statistical world, not devoted to either major philosophy. In fact they often work directly with algorithms, skipping probabilistic modeling entirely. Good data-analytic ideas such as boosting and neural networks have come out of the data-mining/machine learning world (which Rob Kass has at least one foot in), along with a welcome dose of raw energy. Magical properties are sometimes attributed to new algorithms—“boosting methods can never overfit”—before they are digested and understood in frequentist/Bayesian terms.

Methodology by itself is an ultimately frustrating exercise. A little statistical philosophy goes a long way but we have had very little in the public forum these days, and I am genuinely grateful to our editor, David Madigan, for organizing this discussion.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This work was supported in part by NIH Grant 8R01 EB002784 and by NSF Grant DMS-08-04324.