Conflict management or conflict resolution: how do major powers conceive the role of the United Nations in peacebuilding?

Fanny Badache ☑, Sara Hellmüller ☑ and Bilal Salaymeh ☐

Geneva Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland

ABSTRACT
This article examines how major powers conceive the role of the United Nations (UN) in peacebuilding. We conceptualize the UN’s role along the distinction between conflict management and conflict resolution and distinguish between the types of tasks and the approach the UN can adopt. We map states’ conceptions of the UN’s role in peacebuilding by coding peace-related speeches at the UN Security Council (1991–2020) delivered by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States as well as Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey as rising regional powers. Our findings show that states’ conceptions differ regarding the type of tasks the UN should do. However, the main fault line between the countries lie in the approach the UN should adopt to conduct peacebuilding tasks. We conclude that major powers see a role for the UN beyond mere conflict management as long as it is done with respect for national sovereignty.

KEYWORDS United Nations; multipolarity; peacebuilding; conflict management; conflict resolution

Peacebuilding is the flagship activity of the United Nations (UN). It was defined by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his “Agenda for Peace” as the “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace” (United Nations, 1992). As of August 2022, the UN deploys 12 peacekeeping operations led by the Department of Peace Operations and 24 field missions led by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (special envoys and special political missions).

Looking at today’s world politics, scholars and practitioners have started to discuss the future of UN peace operations in the nascent multipolar world order (Cassin & Zyla, 2021; Coleman & Williams, 2021; de Coning, 2021; de...
Coning & Peter, 2019; Kenkel & Foley, 2021; Osland & Peter, 2021). Multipolarity is characterized by more diffused power structures. States, such as China and Russia, have become competitors to the U.S. dominance (Paris, 2014). Other powers, such as Brazil, India, South Africa, and Turkey, also play increasingly important roles in world politics (Call & de Coning, 2017b; Paul, 2018). These states may have different views on UN peacebuilding from the ones promoted by the United States and its allies in the unipolar early post-Cold War years.

Scholars have inquired into non-Western states’ approaches to peacebuilding, mainly through case studies (Adhikari, 2021; Bratersky & Lukin, 2017; Fung, 2016; Call & de Coning, 2017b; Jütersonke et al., 2021; Kobayashi, 2020; Kobayashi et al., 2022; Lewis, 2022; Peter & Rice, 2022; Yuan, 2020, 2022). They have explained that traditional and rising powers may differ in their conceptions of peacebuilding, in that the latter emphasize national sovereignty and ownership, have longer-term perspectives, prefer technical cooperation over aid, and mostly work with national governments rather than directly with civil society actors (Call & de Coning, 2017a; Peter & Rice, 2022). One emerging critique of this literature is that non-Western states’ conceptions have often been framed as illiberal, producing two main categories according to which countries are grouped: liberal and Western versus illiberal and non-Western (Jütersonke et al., 2021; Yuan, 2022). More generally, scholars debate the influence of these trends on the future of UN peacebuilding. For instance, Osland and Peter (2021) argue that multipolarity will limit the role of the UN to tasks related to conflict containment. Similarly, de Coning (2021) observes that large-scale ambitious operations are less likely to be deployed in the medium term.

We contribute to these debates by shedding light on an overlooked—even important—element: How major powers conceive the role of the UN in peacebuilding. In line with the UN’s own definition and other scholars (Barnett et al., 2007; Call & Cousens, 2007; Smith, 2004), we adopt a broad approach to the application spectrum of peacebuilding, defining it as actions before, during, and after warfare. The question of the UN’s role in peacebuilding is all the more important in today’s context of increased contestation of international institutions and global governance (Dingwerth et al., 2019; Hooghe et al., 2019; Kruck & Zangl, 2020; Newman, 2007; Stephen & Zürn, 2019; Zangl et al., 2016; Zürn & Stephen, 2010). Although contestation and critics of the UN have always existed, they take new shapes and their normative basis has changed due to global power shifts. In particular, contestation by rising powers can be an opportunity to redefine the role of international organizations (IOs) and the values underpinning multilateral actions to reflect 21st century world politics (Jacob, 2021). On the other hand, scholars also note that rising powers contest the representational content of the international order rather than its normative basis.
(Newman & Zala, 2018; Richmond & Tellidis, 2014). Whatever direction contestation takes, we know that states’ views and attitudes toward IOs differ (Stephen, 2012; Zürn & Stephen, 2010). Thus, it is important to look at how states conceive the role of the UN as a peacebuilding actor. In contrast to earlier studies, which have mostly provided content-focused analyses inquiring into states’ approaches to peacebuilding, we propose an actor-focused analysis that asks: What role do states assign to the UN in peacebuilding?

We develop a framework of states’ conceptualizations of the UN’s role in peacebuilding along the distinction between conflict management and conflict resolution. We further distinguish between the types of tasks the UN is legitimized to carry out and the approach through which it should carry out these tasks. Methodologically, we provide the first systematic mapping of states’ conceptions of the UN’s role in peacebuilding by coding member states’ peace-related speeches at the UN Security Council (UNSC) from 1991 to 2020. Our sample of countries includes three types of actors, which aims to reflect current balances of power: the “P3” being France, the United Kingdom, and the United States as Western permanent members of the UNSC; China and Russia as non-Western permanent members of the UNSC; and Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey as rising regional powers. Our findings show that the eight states have indeed different—and sometimes antagonist—conceptions of the UN’s role in peacebuilding. However, these differences do not follow a strict liberal/illiberal distinction, as sometimes portrayed in the literature, but rather lie in the way the UN should conduct peacebuilding tasks. We conclude that states do see a role for the UN in a multipolar world order in terms of tasks beyond mere conflict management as long as it is done with respect for national sovereignty and in cooperation with state authorities.

This article advances scholarship on states’ conceptions of peacebuilding in three ways. First, we complement the content-focused literature on states’ approaches to peacebuilding with an actor-focused analysis of what role they assign to the UN in peacebuilding. Second, we disaggregate states’ conceptions into tasks and approaches in peacebuilding, thereby providing for more nuances and overcoming binary classifications of liberal/illiberal and Western/non-Western. Third, this article relies on an overlooked source of information in the peacebuilding literature: speeches delivered at the UNSC. Overall, we contribute to a better understanding of the impact of multipolarity on peacebuilding by discussing what role powerful states assign to the UN in this new world order.

The article is structured as follows. We first situate our research in the existing literature and introduce our theoretical framework. We then discuss the methods used and the data analyzed before presenting our
empirical findings. The article concludes with a discussion of the findings and suggestions for future research avenues.

Conceptualization of the UN’s role in peacebuilding

Crisis of multilateralism and critics of liberal peacebuilding

To understand the UN’s role in peacebuilding in a context of changing world politics, we define UN peacebuilding as an institution in the sense of a “collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations” (March and Olsen, 1983, p. 948). The constitutive practices and rules of UN peacebuilding have changed over time and have reflected a broader consensus, referred to by Paris (2003) as “global culture.” In the early post-Cold War era, this global culture was based on liberalism and hence UN peacebuilding was mostly justified in relation to liberal principles such as human security and the responsibility to protect (Ogata & Cels, 2003; Tadjbakhsh, 2010). The liberal peace agenda was strongly pushed by Western powers, led by the P3—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as permanent members of the UNSC. In recent years, however, we have seen an increasing contestation of the liberal international order. This has implications for both the UN as an institution and its role in peacebuilding.

Regarding the first, scholars largely agree that multilateralism is in crisis (Zürn, 2021). Constitutive of this crisis is the fact that IOs are contested by citizens, states, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Contestation from states comes not only from emerging powers but also from Western democracies where populist and nationalist forces have gained more political power (Ikenberry, 2018; Jones & Stedman, 2017; Turner & Kühn, 2019). This increasing contestation and global power shifts pose challenges to multilateral institutions (Dingwerth et al., 2019; Kruck & Zangl, 2020; Newman, 2007; Stephen & Zürn, 2019; Zangl et al., 2016; Zürn & Stephen, 2010), including the UN. Indeed, its incapacity to bring armed conflicts, such as Syria, Yemen, and most recently Ukraine, to a negotiated end is an illustration of this crisis (Hellmüller, 2021).

Regarding the second, the liberal approach to peacebuilding is also in crisis. Liberal peacebuilding can be defined as “the promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms and a range of other institutions associated with ‘modern’ states as a driving force for building ‘peace’” (Newman et al., 2009, p. 3). In the mid-2000s, scholars started to criticize liberal peacebuilding for its flawed underlying assumptions of universality (Call & Cousens, 2007; Mac Ginty, 2008; Sending, 2009), for maintaining an unequal power balance based on Western dominance (Chandler, 2010; Duffield, 2007; Pugh, 2004), and for leaving a very fragile peace in many contexts, if a
peace at all (Jabri, 2010; Richmond, 2008; Tadjbakhsh, 2010). These critiques heralded a “local turn” in peacebuilding (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013), with authors underlining the need for international peacebuilding to more carefully interact with local actors, dynamics, and processes (Björkdahl et al., 2014; Hellmüller, 2013, 2018). Some scholars proposed alternatives to liberal peacebuilding, such as the concepts of “hybridity,” or “pragmatism” as post-liberal approaches (Chandler, 2017; Mac Ginty, 2011).

**Conceptualization of the UN’s role in peacebuilding**

With multilateralism as well as the liberal approach to peacebuilding in crisis, the question is what role can the UN play in building peace across the globe? To answer this question, we analyze how major powers conceive the UN’s role in peacebuilding. To do so, we draw on the distinction between two main approaches to peacebuilding prevalent in the literature: conflict management and conflict resolution (Miall et al., 1999; Ramsbotham et al., 2005). The two concepts have different views on what peacebuilding should entail (tasks) and how peacebuilding should be done (approach).

Conflict management is based on the assumption that war is endemic to international relations and can never be fully avoided due to unavoidable differences of values and interests between states. Thus, all that can be done is to manage it by containing violence. This is achieved through bargaining and negotiation between the belligerents (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009). The focus of conflict management is on the result in the form of a settlement of a conflict that enables the end of violence and foresees institutions that can channel conflicts in the future (Miall, 2004). This also means that the status quo is generally accepted. As a consequence, the main task of the UN according to this approach is to help the parties through high-level diplomacy to find a settlement and to monitor that settlement once it is reached, for instance by sending an observer mission. As such, the UN should mostly aim at ending violence in view of establishing a negative peace. Given that only a minimal role for third parties is foreseen, the main approach of the UN to peacebuilding according to conflict management theory is state-centric in that it should strictly uphold the sovereignty and consent of the host state.

Conflict resolution, in turn, considers war as avoidable and aims at addressing the root causes of conflict. It seeks to find a common ground between the parties’ different underlying interests (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009), trying to identify solutions that may have been missed due to entrenched positioning (Miall, 2004). Conflict resolution therefore goes beyond power bargaining and allows for a stronger role of third parties to help the belligerents move from their positions to their interests in order to find a mutually acceptable agreement, because “peace requires more
than a deal among the parties” (Wallensteen, 2019, p. 8). As such, the main task of the UN according to conflict resolution theory is to support wide-ranging peacebuilding programs addressing the root causes of the conflict in view of building a long-term positive peace. This involves tasks beyond traditional security conceptions. For instance, since underdevelopment and the absence of a law-based political system are considered as drivers of conflict, tasks also include promoting economic reforms and the rule of law. The main approach of the UN to peacebuilding according to conflict resolution theory takes a societal rather than a state-centric focus. While the idea is still to work with the respective governments, it also foresees an important role for other actors, such as civil society. It is important to note that we do not equate the conflict resolution approach with liberal peacebuilding. While they may overlap in some instances, the objective of conflict resolution is not necessarily the enabling of a liberal transition as the root causes may also be addressed through other (illiberal) means.

Table 1 summarizes our conceptualization of the UN’s role in peacebuilding. The distinction between tasks and approaches allows for the possibility that states consider the UN’s role as a mix between the two ideal types of conflict management and conflict resolution. For instance, a state could legitimate conflict management tasks, but with a conflict resolution approach or vice versa.

### Data and methods

To capture states’ conceptions of the UN’s role in peacebuilding, we conduct a qualitative content analysis of peace-related speeches delivered by member states in the UNSC from 1991 to 2020. To do so, we build an original dataset of speeches coded with the software Nvivo.

### Dataset on UNSC peace-related speeches

Within the UN, the most important arena in the area of peace and security is the UNSC. The UNSC is the organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 24, UN Charter). It is composed of five permanent members with veto power and ten non-permanent members elected for a two-year term by the General Assembly.² The UNSC is the only UN organ with the right to issue binding resolutions.
(Sievers & Daws, 2014). Beyond its formal authority, it is also a “performative space” (Curran & Holtom, 2015) with strong symbolic power (Hurd, 2002), in which states manifest their role, power, and involvement in the international arena. In sum, the UNSC’s discussions reflect the main themes of international politics.

To analyze states’ conceptions of the UN’s role in peacebuilding, we built a dataset of peace-related speeches delivered at the UNSC by major powers (Badache et al., 2022). We focused on the speeches of three categories of actors: (1) France, the United Kingdom, and the United States as Western members of the P5; (2) China and Russia as non-Western members of the P5, and (3) Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey as non-permanent members and rising regional powers. The inclusion of the so-called “P5” is justified by the fact that these five states have a crucial role and influence in peacebuilding, mainly because of their veto power. We selected Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey among the non-P5 regional powers as they have been active in peacebuilding-related issues. For example, in the last two decades, Brazil has been engaged in many peacebuilding efforts and has enhanced its political weight in shaping the global discussion in this regard, as can be seen for instance in its participation in the creation of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission in 2005. South Africa is active notably in peacebuilding in Africa and chairs the UNSC Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention in Africa (Nieuwkerk, 2012). Turkey’s role in UN-led peace missions has increased since 2000. Moreover, Turkey also started its own experience of peacebuilding and stabilization endeavors in Somalia (Akpinar, 2013). In addition, they all are members of the G20. Brazil and South Africa are also BRICS members and belong to the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) dialogue forum.

To compile a corpus of single peace-related speeches for the eight countries from 1991 to 2020, we followed two main steps. Firstly, we retrieved the relevant UNSC meeting records (documents coded as S.PV). The pdf documents were extracted from the UN Digital Library. Using the “speeches” research engine of the library, 3 speeches containing the word “peace” in the title of the meeting (for instance peacekeeping, peacebuilding, maintenance of international peace and security) were extracted for each country in the analyzed time period. The main limitation of this selection criteria is that it excludes country-specific meetings because the agenda title of such meetings usually reads as follows “The situation in country X.” The advantage of this selection is that we retrieved states’ conceptual discourses on peace, not necessarily influenced by their specific interests in a given country. Furthermore, we only selected speeches when countries were speaking in their own national capacity and not in another role, that is, as president of the UNSC or chair of a commission for instance. Then, we manually checked the extracted speeches to avoid possible tagging mistakes during
logging the speeches in the library. Meetings logged as peacekeeping/peacebuilding while their agenda did not directly address these themes were excluded.⁴ In total, we found 108 peace-related UNSC meetings from 1991 to 2020.

Secondly, since the pdf documents included the interventions of all actors present during the specific meeting (president of the UNSC, members of the Secretariat, all members of the UNSC), we extracted the speeches of the eight countries composing our sample. To do so, we copied and pasted the relevant parts of the pdf documents into a word document. Overall, our database contains 525 individual speeches that are distributed among the eight countries as displayed in Figure 1 below. Logically, speeches from the P5 countries represent the largest share of our corpus as they are permanent members. Rising regional powers made speeches when they were elected members to the UNSC, that is for South Africa from 2007–2008, 2011–2012, and 2019–2020, for Brazil from 1993–1994, 1998–1999, 2004–2005, and 2010–2011, and for Turkey from 2009–2010. Non-members of the UNSC can also be invited to participate in UNSC meetings if their interests are affected by a question on the agenda or member states can bring a matter to the attention of the UNSC according the Article 35(1) of the UN Charter.⁵

**Coding of UN’s role conceptions**

To understand states’ conceptions of the UN’s role in peacebuilding, we coded all the speeches according to what states said about the mandate tasks of UN peace missions as well as the approaches the UN should take to build peace, as outlined in Table 2. All speeches were coded by two
Researchers. A detailed codebook and regular meetings ensured validity and inter-coder reliability. For the \textit{tasks}, we coded the speeches according to whether the tasks aligned more with a conflict management or conflict resolution approach. Tasks limited to ending violence and establishing a negative peace were coded as part of the conflict management approach. This involves mostly security-related tasks, such as demilitarization, demining, as well as observing, monitoring, and reporting on ceasefires to ensure violence does not erupt again. In turn, tasks related to addressing the root causes of conflict and establishing longer-term peace were coded as part of the conflict resolution approach. This includes political tasks, such as democratization and good governance, legal tasks, such as human rights promotion and rule of law, as well as economic tasks, such as economic reconstruction.

In terms of \textit{approaches}, the main distinction is between a state-centric and a societal approach. We thus coded speeches with a focus on the state as the main interlocutor as part of the conflict management approach. This includes references to state consent, national (rather than local) ownership and responsibility, and state sovereignty. In turn, we coded speeches with a focus on the society as part of the conflict resolution approach. This includes references to civil society, local ownership, and the concept of responsibility to protect giving the UN a secondary responsibility when states are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens.

\textbf{Empirical findings}

The empirical section presents states’ conceptions of the UN’s role in peacebuilding according to the conceptual framework presented above. We discuss first how states conceive the peacebuilding tasks the UN should do, and then we present our findings regarding the approach. We analyze
states’ conceptions along the conflict management and conflict resolution theories presented above.

**What tasks for the UN in peacebuilding?**

In the context of rising contestation of multilateralism, it is important to note beforehand that all states studied recognize the UN as a central peacebuilding actor and do not question its role overall. While the UN’s actions in peacebuilding are sometimes criticized (including in relation to cases of sexual abuses), it is often praised by studied states in the UNSC. That being said, we observe variation among countries that we present here. **Figure 2** below compares states’ conceptions of the type of peacebuilding tasks the UN should perform. More specifically, the spider chart displays for each country the share of the two variables (that is, conflict management and conflict resolution tasks) out of the total references. We can see that France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and South Africa have the highest shares in conflict resolution tasks. In contrast, Russia, China, Turkey, and Brazil score higher on conflict management tasks. These trends are analyzed in more detail in the following.

**Figure 2.** Distribution of references to conflict management and conflict resolution tasks across countries.
France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and South Africa see the UN’s role mostly in performing conflict resolution tasks. They state that to achieve lasting peace, the UN should address the root causes of conflicts that lie in human rights violations, weak governance structures, and a lack of democratic institutions (USA_4272_2001). For instance, a British diplomat states that

I do not agree that missions should not look at human rights and humanitarian factors. These are conflict drivers; they are root causes; they need to be fixed. We cannot turn the clock back, so we need military, political and development solutions. (UK_8349_2018)

This perspective is also present in French diplomats’ speeches:

The goal of sustainable peace is one of the major reasons for the development of peacekeeping. It requires that we deal with immediate and vital priorities, such as protection of the civilians and human rights, as well as with long-term goals, such as supporting political processes, security sector reform and many others. (FR_8033_2017)

South Africa, the regional power most in favor of conflict resolution, also agrees: “the United Nations must move away from managing conflict towards laying the necessary groundwork for an inclusive dialogue, peaceful transition and long-term sustainable peace” (SA_8033_2017). In their view, UN peacebuilding should thus include tasks related to the root causes of conflicts:

Peacebuilding goes beyond disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and beyond giving the necessary assistance to refugees. It also involves longer-term needs such as reviving the economy, rebuilding infrastructure, strengthening the rule of law and establishing democratic institutions. (SA_5187.R1_2005)

In addition, each of the P3 as well as South Africa underlines specific tasks. For instance, the United Kingdom is a strong advocate of addressing gender issues in UN peace missions and of adopting a gender perspective in all UN actions (UK_8393_2018; UK_5052_2004). Consequently, UK diplomats are in support of a strong role for the UN in addressing gender and sexual-based violence and promoting women’s rights and participation. France repeatedly puts forward the need to protect civilians (FR_7196_2014; FR_7464_2015) and the United States emphasizes good governance (USA_4766_2003; USA_6954_2013; USA_7143_2014). As regards South Africa, diplomats make several references to the rule of law (SA_6472_2011; SA_6903_2013) and reconciliation (SA_6299.R1_2010; SA_8668_2020).

We can see from this analysis that—without surprise—the P3 promote a liberal approach to peacebuilding and understand the root causes of conflict as laying in a lack of democratic institutions and non-respect of human
rights. Our results for South Africa are also in line with previous studies that show that the country adopts a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding beyond mere conflict management (Nyuykonge & Zondi, 2017).

China, Russia, Turkey, and Brazil make more references to conflict management than conflict resolution tasks for the UN in peacebuilding. They share a conception of the UN as a key actor that can help in stabilizing a given context when a conflict emerges (BR_5895.R1_2008; BR_6805_2012; BR_8349_2018; RU_6789_2012; RU_6603_2011; CH_6370_2010) and support the finding of a political solution, for instance through the use of good offices and mediation (CH_6592_2011; RU_6668_2020; RU_4766.R1_2003; RU_7564_2015; TR_6472_2011; TR_7196_2014; TR_8668R1_2020; BR_6603_2011). It is not surprising that Turkish diplomats often refer to mediation since the country cocreated the Group of Friends of Mediation in 2010.

That being said, references to conflict resolution tasks are not completely absent from these countries’ speeches, but different tasks are being emphasized. For instance, China focuses to a large extent on economic reconstruction (CH_6897_2012; CH_6903_2013; CH_7217_2014). This is not surprising in light of the Chinese perspective of economic underdevelopment as a root cause of conflict and their concept of “developmental peace” (Wong, 2021; Yuan, 2020, 2022). China also makes some references to other conflict resolution tasks, such as the rule of law (CH_5187_2005; CH_6472_2011; CH_6533_2011) and reconciliation (CH_6270_2010; CH_6592_2011; CH_6805_2012; CH_6987_2013).

Russia also views the UN’s role in some conflict resolution tasks, but only those that aim to restore security in conflict-affected countries such as ensuring the rule of law and security sector reform. As it states,

> an important priority in peacebuilding is assistance in restoring security in countries where national armies or police are not able to fully carry out their functions. In such cases, assisting in the reform of the security sector, programs of demobilization, reintegration, and disarmament as well as demining are crucial. Closely related to that is the need to restore the rule of law in post-conflict countries. (RU_6897_2012)

However, Russia is the only country that explicitly states to be against the UN engaging in some types of conflict resolution tasks. It clarifies for instance that it opposes extensive mandates of peace missions that include tasks such as gender mainstreaming and human rights. As it states: “we believe that it is counterproductive to overemphasize, in the recovery context, gender and human rights issues that have no direct bearing on the root causes of the crisis situation” (RU_7359_2015). These results are in line with the literature that shows Russia’s preference for “short-term goals of
conflict management over long-term goals of conflict resolution” (Lewis, 2022, p. 653).

Turkish representatives also make a few references to conflict resolution tasks for the UN, such as strengthening the rule of law (TR_6165_2009; TR_6299_2010), security sector reform (e.g., TR_7802_2016), and human rights promotion (TR_8033_2017; TR_7629_2016). In other words, Turkey is in favor of “structural peacebuilding” (Sazak & Woods, 2017, p. 97).

Like China, Brazil refers to economic reforms as a key driver of conflict resolution: The UN’s efforts should “focus not only on supporting institutions in the field of justice and security, as it is also important to enhance the capacity of the institutions in charge of economic revitalization, public administration and the provision of basic services” (BR_6472_2011). This is in line with Brazil’s advocacy role to link security and development (Abdenur & Call, 2017). Diplomats also mention measures to foster the rule of law (see for instance, BR_5052_2004; BR_6178_2009) and security sector reform (BR_7802_2016; BR_8668_2020).

We can conclude from this analysis that the P5 differ significantly in terms of their conceptions of the peacebuilding tasks the UN should engage in. On the one hand, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States see the UN’s role in conflict resolution tasks that address the root causes of the conflict. They mostly refer to those conflict resolution tasks that are in line with a liberal peacebuilding approach (democratization, good governance, human rights, etc.). On the other hand, China and Russia also sometimes mention conflict resolution tasks but in more “value-neutral” areas, such as economic reconstruction or security sector reform and rule of law respectively. However, beyond these conflict resolution tasks, both countries mostly stress conflict management tasks. Among the rising powers, South Africa is the only one that refers more often to conflict resolution tasks. Brazil and Turkey mostly refer to conflict management tasks, but nonetheless, also underline some conflict resolution tasks. What the rising powers have in common is an emphasis on non-military tasks for conflict management (that is, mediation) and resolution (that is, activities that foster socio-economic development) (Call, 2018; Nyuykonge & Zondi, 2017).

Despite significant differences in countries’ conceptions of the UN’s role, we can see that some peacebuilding tasks such as mediation, security sector reform, and fostering the rule of law are underscored by both traditional and rising powers. These tasks could thus constitute the common denominator for future UN peacebuilding efforts (Osland & Peter, 2021). In addition, we will show in the next section that the heart of the discussion relates to the UN’s approach to peacebuilding, rather than to the type of tasks.
What should be the approach of the UN in peacebuilding?

The most significant difference among the states relates to the approach to peacebuilding. As Figure 3 shows, the P3 are strongly in favor of a conflict resolution approach whereas Russia and China advocate for a conflict management approach. As regards the rising powers, they mention more of a conflict management approach while envisaging some aspects of conflict resolution. The subsequent sub-sections present the findings for these three country clusters.

France, the United Kingdom, and the United States clearly foresee a conflict resolution more than conflict management approach. This means that the UN should cooperate both with civil society groups and national authorities in peacebuilding. This is not to say that the P3 disregard the principles of national ownership or sovereignty. As the United Kingdom states, we need the right combination of national ownership and international support [...] The international community has a moral duty to help States resolve conflict and a strong interest in seeing this succeed. But for peace to be sustainable, it must be owned and driven forward by the people of the country. It is therefore critical that national/transitional Governments and local civil society are involved from the beginning and help set priorities for peacebuilding and reconstruction. (UK_5187_2005)

Figure 3. Distribution of references to conflict management and conflict resolution approach across countries.
The United States also mention sovereignty and national ownership: “First, peacebuilding cannot succeed without national ownership. That is indispensable. Government, civil society and citizens must be engaged regularly in order to ensure the international community responds to their needs” (USA_6805_2012). In other words, the P3 underscore the importance of national ownership, but make it clear that they see it as referring to both state as well as societal ownership.

France, the United Kingdom, and the United States thus acknowledge the need to cooperate with the host state in peacebuilding. However, what is interesting in their speeches, is that they understand this cooperation as reciprocal. They stress that the UN needs commitment from the host state in peacebuilding (USA_6903_2013; USA_7918_2017; UK_6805_2012; FR_7918_2017). A French diplomat says for instance: “Here I wish to stress the need for cooperation with the host country, which needs to work both ways: we must, of course, cooperate with the host country, but that country must also respond to our appeals and offer its own perspective on the problem” (FR_6789_2012). Related, the P3 are the only states mentioning the principle of responsibility to protect as a justification to overtake state sovereignty in order to protect civilians (see for instance FR_5761_2007; FR_8243_2018; UK_5379_2006; USA_7196_2014). Thus, the overall approach is a societal, rather than a state-centric one.

China and Russia stress a conflict management approach to peacebuilding. China strongly emphasizes a strict conflict management approach based on the full respect of state sovereignty and consent (see for instance, CH_4272_2001; CH_6954_2013; CH_7143_2014). As mentioned above, it refers to some conflict resolution tasks, but it also states that, “all parties must respect the United Nations Charter and the universally recognized norms of international law with regard to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country in question, and refrain from interfering in internal disputes and differences” (CH_5052_2004). In that sense, the UN is granted an auxiliary and supporting role in peacebuilding (CH_4223_2000; CH_5052_2004). Chinese diplomats also underscore that the UN should respect the host country’s specific interests, traditions, culture, and not impose “pre-designed solutions” (CH_5052_2004). In terms of interlocutors and cooperation, diplomats make no reference to societal actors beyond state authorities. In other words, China prioritizes “good government” over ‘good governance’” (Yuan, 2020, p. 28).

The speeches of Russian diplomats are also very clear regarding the approach the UN should adopt in peacebuilding, which can be summarized with the following quotation:

In developing and adopting peacebuilding decisions, we need to consider the interests of all parties, respect the sovereignty of States and encourage national
responsibility for implementing relevant programmes. Such programmes must be implemented solely with the consent and in coordination with national Governments. (RU_6270_2010)

Even if Russia is sometimes in favor of tasks that go beyond the mere management of conflict such as security sector reform (see above), diplomats insist on a conflict management approach to peacebuilding that fosters national ownership (e.g., RU_6165_2009; RU_7143_2014; RU_8668_2020) and respects the sovereignty of states (see for instance RU_4272_2001; RU_5895_2008; RU_7217_2014).

Like China, Russia emphasizes the role of the UN in strengthening national capacities with the aim to make conflict-affected countries achieve self-development and be able to safeguard their own security. Moreover, Russia makes it clear that the UN should cooperate with the national government exclusively (RU_6270_2010) and interaction with civil society groups should be done through the government: “Cooperation with local population groups and non-governmental organizations can be complementary and should be coordinated by the authorities” (RU_8579_2019). This latter element is part of Russia’s state-based model of conflict management (Lewis, 2022). In addition, Russian diplomats always refer to the principles of state consent and sovereignty when speaking about the UN’s role in peacebuilding (see for instance RU_5895_2008; RU_6270_2010; RU_7317_2014; RU_8661_2019).

For the three rising powers (Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa) studied, there are no major differences between them regarding the UN’s approach to peacebuilding. The gaps between the number of their references to conflict management and conflict resolution are less important than for the tasks. Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey refer more often to conflict management, but the three countries also emphasize some dimensions of a conflict resolution approach. What the three countries have in common is that they strongly emphasize national ownership. For instance, Turkey insists on the need to foster national ownership in the peacebuilding process by building national capacities: “First, bearing in mind the importance of national ownership of the peacebuilding process, priority should be given to the issue of building national capacities. Our aim should be to transfer expertise rather than to create dependence on it” (TR_6224_2009). A South African diplomat said: “Without national ownership of peacebuilding, any intervention will likely be regarded as an imposition. And, as history has taught us, imposed solutions are soon disregarded by their very beneficiaries and are bound to fail dismally” (SA_5895_2008) (see also for instance SA_5761_2007; SA_6533_2011) (for Brazil see for instance BR_7629_2013; BR_8668_2020).

Rising powers thus underline the importance of country-specific approaches (for instance see TR_6897.R1_2012). Relatedly, rising powers
underscore the need to build on local and national capacities in the peacebuilding process. The objective is to avoid dependency upon international actors. A South African diplomat explains:

[While the United Nations can take a lead in promoting international standards, the emphasis must be on building local frameworks, tools and mechanisms to support justice, law and order [...] Capacity needs to be built up through the communities and States that we aim to support. (SA_5052_2004)]

The main difference between rising powers’ definition of the conflict management approach and the Chinese and Russian ones is that the former also envisage cooperation with local stakeholders and civil society organizations. According to them, all segments of societies should be included in peacebuilding, including youth and women (TR_6472_2011; TR_6897.R1_2012; TR_7629_2016; BR_6903_2013; SA_8579_2019). This is also in line with the peacebuilding practices of these countries. For instance, South Africa repeatedly underlines the importance of engaging local partners (Nyuykonge & Zondi, 2017).

Table 3 summarizes states’ conceptions of the UN role in peacebuilding. The P3 underscore a conflict resolution approach which consists of working with all groups in society and do not hold a strict vision of sovereignty. On the contrary, China and Russia constantly underline that peacebuilding activities (whatever they are) should be done in respect of the principles of the UN Charter, that is, state sovereignty and non-interference, and in cooperation with national authorities only. As regards the rising powers, their discourse around the approach is more nuanced. Like China and Russia, they insist on the need to foster national ownership in the peacebuilding process by building national capacities. In particular, their narrative is centered on the need to avoid dependency (and conditionality) upon international aid and to adopt context-specific approaches. Yet, at the same time, rising powers also advocate for the UN to work with local communities and civil society actors.

**Conclusion**

Scholars recognize that changes in the global distribution of power pose challenges to IOs (Kruck & Zangl, 2020), and to UN peace operations in particular (Abdenur, 2019; de Coning, 2019; Peter, 2019). Although non-Western
and rising powers have increased their material contributions to UN peace operations in the last decades, scholars posit that their impact on peacebuilding is likely to derive more from their discourse than their resources (Call & de Coning, 2017b). Against this background, the goal of this article was to provide empirical evidence on how major powers conceive the role of the UN in peacebuilding. In our examination, we distinguished between the UN’s role in conflict management and in conflict resolution. We further differentiated between the tasks the UN should do and the approach it should adopt. We argued that these distinctions allow for a more fine-grained analysis by going beyond the “liberal/illiberal” or “Western/non-Western” dichotomies. Empirically, we provide an original dataset on member states’ peace-related speeches at the UNSC as our main source.

Our analysis points to two main findings. First, even if the P3 are most strongly in favor of conflict resolution tasks, China, Russia, and the rising regional powers also underline their importance. Our study thus confirms that “Western and non-Western approaches cannot be seen as dichotomous” (Peter & Rice, 2022, p. 27). In other words, overall, all countries can conceive a conflict resolution role for the UN. However, they have different conceptions of the root causes of conflict. Secondly, the more significant difference between countries relates to the approach with which the UN should undertake these tasks. Put differently, our findings demonstrate that—rather than the content of peacebuilding—what distinguishes major powers’ conceptions of the UN’s role is the type of (legitimate) intervention. We have seen that Russia, China, and the three rising powers prefer a conflict management approach to peacebuilding that respects sovereignty and fosters national ownership. For instance, even if Russia is in favor of measures aiming at strengthening the rule of law, it emphasizes that the UN’s role should be to support national authorities. As for China, our findings help understand that the country can vote in favor of large-scale peace operations when they are established within the context of state consent (Fung, 2019). That being said, rising powers (but not China and Russia) also make references to a societal approach, especially the dimension of local ownership. Finally, the P3 are clearly in favor of a conflict resolution approach and underline the importance of working with actors beyond state governments.

So, what kind of UN peacebuilding is legitimate (and feasible) in a multipolar world order? Our research allows us to say that states see a role for the UN in terms of tasks beyond mere conflict management as long as it is done with respect for national sovereignty and in cooperation with state authorities. We can thus expect that future debates in the UNSC will be more about the extent to which peace interventions are intrusive in states’ domestic affairs and prescriptive in terms of the values and norms they promote. We concur with other scholars (de Coning, 2021) that the UN is less likely to engage in large-scale peacebuilding endeavors in the future.
and more likely to concentrate its efforts to manage conflicts through more minimalist—and potentially political more than peacekeeping—missions (Hellmüller et al., 2022). In a sense, it is possible that the future of peacebuilding is “its past” (Novosseloff, 2022).

This article makes several contributions to the existing literature. First and foremost, by providing the first systematic analysis of how states view the UN’s role in peacebuilding, it adds to the literature on states’ approaches to peacebuilding that has mainly focused on countries’ (national) conceptions of peacebuilding. Using an overlooked source of information in the peacebuilding literature—speeches delivered at the UNSC—we add to this body of research by offering an actor-focused analysis of states’ conceptions and by providing a nuanced discussion on these conceptions. Furthermore, we have disaggregated states’ conceptions into tasks and approaches in peacebuilding, thereby providing for more nuances and overcoming binary classifications of liberal/illiberal and Western/non-Western. Secondly, the article contributes to a better understanding of the impact of today’s world politics on UN peacebuilding. The shift from unipolarity to multipolarity has material and ideational consequences (Hellmüller, 2022). In this article, we have looked at the latter by uncovering what are the dominant conceptions of the UN’s role.

Despite these contributions, the analysis presented in this paper has a number of limitations. Firstly, the analysis was made at the discourse level, which does not allow to capture potential discrepancies between peacebuilding discourses and practices. For instance, voting behaviors could demonstrate some flexibility in states’ conceptions of the UN’s role (Stähle, 2008). The second limitation is that speeches made by states’ representatives in the UNSC may not fully correspond to these states’ national preferences. We can expect a kind of “socialization effect” when state representatives speak at the UN. For instance, recent research on the debates at the UN General Assembly has shown that permanent representatives differ from other national representatives as they tend to have a more positive appreciation of the UN and their discourses are more homogeneous (Gray & Baturu, 2021). In order to have an accurate understanding of states’ conceptions of the UN’s role, the analysis could be complemented with an examination of states’ discourses made in other contexts and for a different audience, such as governmental speeches (see for instance Paris, 2020). A third limitation is that—despite the fact that the analysis was done from 1991 to 2020—the coding results did not allow us to capture any systematic change in countries’ conceptions over time. What is more, for the rising powers, we only captured their conceptions at specific points in time (during their membership in the UNSC), which should further be contextualized according to the national political context in that period.
The empirical evidence provided here could be used by scholars to understand if peace missions are really “what states make of them” (Coleman & Williams, 2021) and whether the UN has adjusted to global power shifts (Kruck & Zangl, 2020). In other words, do the current trends in the UN’s role in peacebuilding conform to the different conceptions that major powers have? Or does it reflect the conceptions of a particular set of countries? More research should be done in this regard to better understand how multipolarity affects UN peacebuilding.

Notes
1. While good offices and mediation can be considered as serving the purpose of conflict resolution and often aim at resolving rather than merely managing conflicts, the most pressing objective is to find a deal to end violence. Moreover, states often refer to it when arguing for a more limited role of the UN (in contrast to UN’s engagement on human rights, for instance). We thus considered it as part of conflict management.
2. The current composition of the UNSC can be found here: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members (last accessed April 7, 2022).
3. https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?ln=en&cc=Speeches
4. This included speeches under general or technical agendas like: Maintenance of international peace and security and protection of UN personnel, associated personnel and humanitarian personnel in conflict zones.
5. Rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the UNSC.
6. To create this measure, we first created a weighted score for CM and CR because countries do not have the same number of references since the P5 have more speeches than the rising powers.
7. We refer to the individual speeches in the following way: name of the country_number of the meeting record_year of the meeting.
8. We thank one reviewer for drawing our attention to this aspect.

Acknowledgements
This article benefited from the comments of a number of colleagues during presentations at various conferences. In particular, we wish to thank the participants in the seminar series of the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding of the Geneva Graduate Institute (May 2021), the European International Studies Association conference (September 2021), and the International Studies Association annual convention (March 2022). We warmly thank Flavia Keller for her support in editing. Data associated with the article can be found here: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/0OROVZ

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding

This article was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation as part of the five-year project “A Child of its Time: the Impact of World Politics on Peacebuilding” [Grant N°PR00P1_185726].

ORCID

Fanny Badache http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7395-2163
Sara Hellmüller http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5411-8459
Bilal Salaymeh http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3642-0958

Reference list

Abdenur, A. E. (2019). UN peacekeeping in a multipolar world order: Norms, role expectations, and leadership. In C. de Coning & M. Peter (Eds.), United Nations peace operations in a changing global order (pp. 45–66). Palgrave Macmillan.

Abdenur, A. E., & Call, C. T. (2017). A “Brazilian Way”? Brazil’s approach to peacebuilding. In C. T. Call & C. de Coning (Eds.), Rising powers & peacebuilding: Breaking the mold? (pp. 15–38). Palgrave Macmillan.

Adhikari, M. (2021). Peacebuilding with “Chinese characteristics”? Insights from China’s engagement in Myanmar’s peace process. International Studies Review, 23(4), 1699–1726. https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viab039

Akpinar, P. (2013). Turkey’s peacebuilding in Somalia: The limits of humanitarian diplomacy. Turkish Studies, 14(4), 735–757. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.863448

Badache, F., Hellmüller, S., & Salayme, B. (2022). United Nations Security Council peace-related speeches (UNSCPeaS).

Barnett, M., Kim, H., O’donnell, M., & Sitea, L. (2007). Peacebuilding: What is in a name? Global governance. A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 13(1), 35–58. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01301004.

Björkdahl, A., Höglund, K., Millar, G., Van der Lijn, J., & Verkoren, W. (Eds.). (2014). Peacebuilding and friction: Global and local encounters in post-conflct societies. Routledge.

Bratersky, M., & Lukin, A. (2017). The Russian perspective on UN peacekeeping: Today and tomorrow. In C. de Coning, C. Aoi, & J. Karlsrud (Eds.), UN peacekeeping doctrine in a new era: Adapting to stabilisation, protection and new threats (pp. 132–151). Routledge.

Call, C. T. (2018). Interests or ideas? Explaining Brazil’s surge in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Third World Quarterly, 39(12), 2272–2290. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1549943

Call, C. T., & Cousens, E. M. (2007). Ending wars and building peace. International Peace Academy.

Call, C. T., & de Coning, C. (2017a). Conclusion: Are rising powers breaking the peacebuilding mold? In C. T. Call & C. de Coning (Eds.), Rising powers and peacebuilding: Breaking the mold? (pp. 243–272). Palgrave Macmillan.

Call, C. T., & de Coning, C. (Eds.). (2017b). Rising powers and peacebuilding: Breaking the mold? Palgrave Macmillan.
Cassin, K., & Zyla, B. (2021). The end of the liberal world order and the future of UN peace operations: Lessons learned. *Global Policy, 12*(4), 455–467. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12993

Chandler, D. (2009). Notes on contributors. *Review of International Studies, 36*(1), 1–2. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021509990581

Chandler, D. (2017). *Peacebuilding: The twenty years’ crisis, 1997-2017*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Coleman, K. P., & Williams, P. D. (2021). Peace operations are what states make of them: Why future evolution is more likely than extinction. *Contemporary Security Policy, 42*(2), 241–255. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1882802

Curran, D., & Holtom, P. (2015). Resonating, rejecting, reinterpreting: Mapping the stabilization discourse in the United Nations Security Council. *Stability: International Journal for Security and Development, 4*(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.gm.

de Coning, C. (2019). How UN peacekeeping operations can adapt to a new multipolar world order. *International Peacekeeping, 26*(5), 536–539. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2019.1677286

de Coning, C. (2021). The future of UN peace operations: Principled adaptation through phases of contraction, moderation, and renewal. *Contemporary Security Policy, 42*(2), 211–224. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1894021

de Coning, C., & Peter, M. (eds). (2019). *United Nations peace operations in a changing global order*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Dingwerth, K., Witt, A., Lehmann, I., Reichel, E., & Weise, T. (eds). (2019). *International organization under pressure: Legitimating global governance in challenging times*. Oxford University Press.

Duffield, M. (2007). *Development, security and unending war: Governing the world of peoples*. Polity Press.

Fung, C. (2016). What explains China’s deployment to UN peacekeeping operations? *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 16*(3), 409–441. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcv020

Fung, C. J. (2019). *China and intervention at the UN security council: Reconciling status*. Oxford University Press.

Gray, J., & Baturo, A. (2021). Delegating diplomacy: Rhetoric across agents in the United Nations General Assembly. *International Review of Administrative Sciences, 87*(0), 718. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852321997560

Hellmüller, S. (2013). The power of perceptions: Localizing international peacebuilding approaches. *International Peacekeeping, 20*(2), 219–232. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2013.791570

Hellmüller, S. (2018). *The interaction between local and international peacebuilding actors*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Hellmüller, S. (2021). The challenge of forging consent to UN mediation in internationalized civil wars: The case of Syria. *International Negotiation, 27*(1), 103–130. https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10013

Hellmüller, S. (2022). Peacemaking in a shifting world order: A macro-level analysis of UN mediation in Syria. *Review of International Studies, 48*(3), 543–559. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021502200016X.

Hellmüller, S., Lobjoy, M., & Tan, X.-Y. R. (2022). *Beyond generations: A New approach to categorizing peace missions*. Global Governance.
Hooghe, L., Lenz, T., & Marks, G. (2019). Contested world order: The delegitimation of international governance. *The Review of International Organizations, 14*(4), 731–743. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9334-3

Hurd, I. (2002). Legitimacy, power, and the symbolic life of the UN security council. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 8*(1), 35–51. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-00801006

Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The end of liberal international order? *International Affairs, 94*(1), 7–23. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241

Jabri, V. (2010). War, government, politics: A critical response to the hegemony of the liberal peace. In O. Richmond (Ed.), *Advances in peacebuilding: Critical developments and approaches* (pp. 41–57). Palgrave Macmillan.

Jacob, C. (2021). Institutionalizing prevention at the UN. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 27*(2), 179–201. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02702003

Jones, B. D., & Stedman, S. J. (2017). Civil wars & the post–cold war international order. *Daedalus, 146*(4), 33–44. https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00457

Jütersenke, O., Kobayashi, K., Krause, K., & Yuan, X. (2021). Norm contestation and normative transformation in global peacebuilding order(s): The cases of China, Japan, and Russia. *International Studies Quarterly, 65*(4), 944–959. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab060.

Kenkel, K. M., & Foley, C. (2021). Responding to the crisis in United Nations peace operations. *Contemporary Security Policy, 42*(2), 189–196. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1899543

Kobayashi, K. (2020). Japanese pathways to peacebuilding: From historical legacies to contemporary practices. *Pathways to Peace and Security, 58*(1), 9–25. https://doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2020-1-9-25.

Kobayashi, K., Krause, K., & Yuan, X. (2022). Pathways to socialisation: China, Russia, and competitive norm socialisation in a changing global order. *Review of International Studies, 48*(3), 560–582. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210522000146.

Kruck, A., & Zangl, B. (2020). The adjustment of international institutions to global power shifts: A framework for analysis. *Global Policy, 11*(3), 5–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12865

Lewis, D. (2022). Contesting liberal peace: Russia’s emerging model of conflict management. *International Affairs, 98*(2), 653–673. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa221

Mac Ginty, R. (2008). Indigenous peace-making versus the liberal peace. *Cooperation and Conflict, 43*(2), 139–163. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836708089080

Mac Ginty, R. (2011). *International peacebuilding and local resistance: Hybrid forms of peace*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Mac Ginty, R., & Richmond, O. P. (2013). The local turn in peace building: A critical agenda for peace. *Third World Quarterly, 34*(5), 763–783. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.800750

March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1983). The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life. *American Political Science Review, 78*(3), 734–749. https://doi.org/10.2307/1961840.

Marchetti, R., & Tocci, N. (2009). Conflict society: Understanding the role of civil society in conflict. *Global Change, Peace & Security, 21*(2), 201–217. https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150902872091

Miwall, H. (2004). *Conflict transformation. A multi-dimensional task*. Retrieved from Berlin.
Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O., & Woodhouse, T. (1999). Contemporary conflict resolution. The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts. Polity Press.

Newman, E. (2007). A crisis of global institutions? Multilateralism and international security. Routledge.

Newman, E., Paris, R., & Richmond, O. (2009). Introduction. In E. Newman, R. Paris, & O. Richmond (Eds.), New perspectives on liberal peacebuilding (pp. 3–25). United Nations University Press.

Newman, E., & Zala, B. (2018). Rising powers and order contestation: Disaggregating the normative from the representational. Third World Quarterly, 39(5), 871–888. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1392085

Nieuwkerk, A. V. (2012). South Africa and peacekeeping in Africa. African Security, 5(1), 44–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2012.653307

Novosselloff, A. (2022). A comparative study of older One-dimensional UN peace operations - Is the future of UN peacekeeping its past? Retrieved from Oslo, Nicosia.

Nyuykonge, C., & Zondi, S. (2017). South African peacebuilding approaches: Evolution and lessons. In C. T. Call & C. de Coning (Eds.), Rising powers and peacebuilding: Breaking the mold? (pp. 107–126). Palgrave Macmillan.

Ogata, S., & Cels, J. (2003). Human security—protecting and empowering the people. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 9(3), 273–282. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-00903002

Osland, K. M., & Peter, M. (2021). UN peace operations in a multipolar order: Building peace through the rule of law and bottom-up approaches. Contemporary Security Policy, 42(2), 197–210. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1898166

Paris, R. (2003). Peacekeeping and the constraints of global culture. European Journal of International Relations, 9(3), 441–473. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661030093004

Paris, R. (2014). The geopolitics of peace operations: A research agenda. International Peacekeeping, 21(4), 501–508. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2014.946743

Paris, R. (2020). The right to dominate: How old ideas about sovereignty pose new challenges for world order. International Organization, 74(3), 453–489. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000077

Paul, T. V. (2018). Assessing change in world politics. International Studies Review, 20(2), 177–185. https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/iyv037

Peter, M. (2019). UN peace operations: Adapting to a New global order? In C. de Coning & M. Peter (Eds.), United nations peace operations in a changing global order (pp. 1–22). Palgrave Macmilla.

Peter, M., & Rice, H. (2022). Non-Western approaches to peacemaking and peacebuilding: State-of-the-art and an agenda for research. Retrieved from University of Edinburgh:

Pugh, M. (2004). Peacekeeping and critical theory. International Peacekeeping, 11(1), 39–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/1353331042000228445

Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. (2005). Contemporary conflict resolution. Polity Press.

Richmond, O. (2008). The UN and liberal peacebuilding: Consensus and challenges. In J. Darby & R. M. Ginty (Eds.), Contemporary peacemaking. Conflict, peace processes and post-war reconstruction (pp. 257–270). Palgrave Macmillan.
Richmond, O. P., & Tellidis, I. (2014). Emerging actors in international peacebuilding and statebuilding: Status Quo or critical states? Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 20(4), 563–584. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02004006

Sazak, O., & Woods, A. E. (2017). Breaking with convention: Turkey’s New approach to peacebuilding. In C. T. Call & C. de Coning (Eds.), Rising powers and peacebuilding: Breaking the mold? (pp. 167–190). Palgrave Macmillan.

Sending, O. J. (2009). Why peacebuilders fail to secure ownership and be sensitive to context. Retrieved from Oslo.

Sievers, L., & Daws, S. (2014). The procedure of the UN security council. Oxford University Press.

Smith, D. (2004). Towards a strategic framework for peacebuilding: Getting their act together. Retrieved from Oslo:

Stählé, S. (2008). China’s shifting attitude towards united nations peacekeeping operations. The China Quarterly, 195, 631–655. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741008000805

Stephen, M., & Zürn, M. (eds). (2019). Contested world orders: Rising powers, Non-governmental organizations, and the politics of authority beyond the nation-state. Oxford University Press.

Stephen, M. D. (2012). Rising regional powers and international institutions: The foreign policy orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa. Global Society, 26(3), 289–309. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2012.682277

Tadjbakhsh, S. (2010). Human security and the legitimisation of peacebuilding. In O. P. Richmond (Ed.), Advances in peacebuilding: Critical developments and approaches (pp. 116–136). Palgrave Macmillan.

Turner, M., & Kühn, F. P. (2019). ‘The west’ and ‘the rest’ in international interventions: Eurocentrism and the competition for order. Conflict, Security & Development, 19(3), 237–243. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1608014

United Nations. (1992). An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Retrieved from New York:

Wallensteen, P. (2019). Understanding conflict resolution (5th ed.). Sage.

Wong, K. C. (2021). The rise of China’s developmental peace: Can an economic approach to peacebuilding create sustainable peace? Global Society, 35(4), 522–540. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2021.1942802

Yuan, X. (2020). Chinese pathways to peacebuilding: From historical legacies to contemporary practices. Pathways to Peace and Security, 58(1), 26–45. https://doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2020-1-26-45

Yuan, X. (2022). The Chinese approach to peacebuilding: Contesting liberal peace? Third World Quarterly, 43(7), 1798–1816. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2074389

Zangl, B., Heußner, F., Kruck, A., & Lanzendörfer, X. (2016). Imperfect adaptation: How the WTO and the IMF adjust to shifting power distributions among their members. The Review of International Organizations, 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-016-9246-z.

Zürn, M. (2021). Multilateralism in crisis: A European perspective. In T. Meyer, J. L. de Sales Marques, & M. Telo (Eds.), Towards a New multilateralism: Cultural divergence and political convergence? (pp. 119–131). Routledge.

Zürn, M., & Stephen, M. (2010). The view of Old and New powers on the legitimacy of international institutions. Politics, 30(1_suppl), 91–101. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2010.01388.x