Social Entrepreneurship as Emancipatory Work

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Abstract
Building on the ‘entrepreneuring as emancipation’ perspective, I explore the emancipatory potential of social entrepreneurship as a means to disengage individuals enthralled to ideology and trapped by their own past behavior. I studied two former religious-based terrorists from Indonesia, and their social enterprise, a cafe chain, which has successfully emancipated 10 ex-terrorists. In this paper, I show how engagement in entrepreneurship can be emancipatory through allowing individuals not only to escape some ideological constraints but also to construct new meaning in life and new social roles and connections that provide a platform for building a new future. Importantly, because social entrepreneurship as a form of organizing permits autonomy from an exclusive focus on profitability, it afforded the entrepreneurs I studied to achieve a degree of emancipation both for themselves and also for those they served. My results also have substantial practical value in elucidating a potentially valuable tool in efforts to reduce terrorist violence. I develop a grounded process model of social entrepreneurship as emancipatory work to summarize the study and offer avenues for future research.

Keywords: social entrepreneurship, social enterprise, ideology, terrorism, emancipation
1. Executive summary

Despite the predominant focus on ‘wealth creation’ as a perspective in entrepreneurship research (Welter et al., 2017), we are witnessing the rise of new streams of inquiries that examine the social value added role of entrepreneurship (Zahra and Wright, 2016; Williams and Shepherd, 2016) and the notion of entrepreneurship as potentially emancipating (Rindova et al., 2009). Drawing on the ‘entrepreneuring as emancipation’ perspective (Rindova et al., 2009), I examined emancipation — “the act of setting free from the power of another” (Rindova et al., 2009: 478), and in so doing expand the range of restrictions from which emancipation can be gained to include other forces such as enthrallment to ideology (Juergensmeyer, 2017; Sanín and Wood, 2014), as well as one’s own past behavior and the social restrictions it may impose on one’s present and future.

In efforts to understand if emancipation via entrepreneurship may remove the restrictions faced by individuals trapped by an ideology and their own past behavior that restricts them, I studied two former Indonesian religious-based terrorists (“reformers”) ‘who have been there and come back’ (joining and leaving terrorism for a better, mainstream life style) via their culinary arts social enterprise that has disengaged 10 ex-terrorists, as a research site (Merton, 1987). Based on theory-building inductive research (Glaser, 1978, 1998; Strauss and Corbin, 1992) using primary and secondary data analysis and longitudinal observations of the reformers and their clients’ behavior, I show how engagement in entrepreneurship can be emancipatory through allowing peripheral and core players in terrorism not only to escape some ideological constraints but also to construct new meaning in life and new social roles and connections that provide a platform for building a new future. From here, I extend theory about entrepreneurship as emancipation to the processes through which entrepreneurs and those they serve can be emancipated from constraints of both ideology and their own past behavior. Using the involvement-engagement-disengagement theory (Horgan, 2014) as an organizing framework, I theorized a process model that depicts the inter-relationships between the dimensions and processes of emancipatory entrepreneurship and its outcomes, along with several contingencies. I call this the ‘social entrepreneurship as emancipatory work’ perspective.
I further demonstrate how social entrepreneurship is an important organizational form for this emancipation. Because social entrepreneurship as a form of organizing permits autonomy from an exclusive focus on profitability, it allowed the entrepreneurs I studied to achieve a degree of emancipation both for themselves and also for those they served. This shows how entrepreneurship in the form of social entrepreneurship can bridge the gap between emancipation as self- versus other-oriented described by Rindova and her colleagues. As a platform to create and share resources with others as a community, social entrepreneurship also serves as an agent of social welfare to achieve social development and thus extends the purpose of emancipation beyond its predominantly ‘for-profit’ context (Rindova et al., 2009; Jennings et al., 2016).

My results have substantial practical value in elucidating a potentially valuable tool in efforts to reduce terrorist violence. The social entrepreneurship as emancipatory work perspective offers new possibilities to reframe the questions about religious terrorism away from “punishing or correcting” terrorists, to “emancipating” them and understanding its processes and contingencies. This can be achieved by using “reformers” as trusted and legitimate emancipators, through the ‘brotherhood economic model’ that replaced the brotherhood the clients had developed or hoped to develop by joining terrorist groups, engaging them to perform humbling work to understand others’ needs and perspectives, using hospitality-based entrepreneurial ventures (e.g., cafes) as “spaces of encounter” that broadens clients’ social networks, and encouraging clients to work harmoniously with all stakeholders, among others.

This study offers new avenues for future social entrepreneurship as instrument of emancipation research including exploring and testing it on larger samples of core and peripheral terrorists and in various institutional contexts where entrepreneurship may be a more or less well-respected and high social status occupation in the society and thus a viable “escape route” for terrorists. It also opens up new opportunities to compare the efficacy of hospitality based versus to non-hospitality based ventures as enablers of terrorist disengagement and between the emancipatory approach versus confrontational- and counseling-based approaches more broadly. The study also opens new avenues to study how ideologists socially and discursively construct reality and how reformers and repented terrorists re-construct social reality and their ‘competitive dynamics’ in the market for ideology. Theoretically, each of these results and
questions expands and can inform research on entrepreneurship as emancipation in a wide variety of contexts, most of them less challenging than creating new lives for ex-terrorists.

2. Introduction

Entrepreneurship research has conventionally focused on ‘wealth creation’ as the fundamental objective of entrepreneurial activities (Welter et al., 2017). In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the broader social value of entrepreneurship (Zahra and Wright, 2016). Rindova and colleagues (2009) called for new research directions that considered entrepreneurship “outside of its traditional contexts including the activities of explorers, artists, and scientists…to migrant workers turned winemakers” (p. 489); those that focus on the pursuit of freedom and autonomy and that seek to disrupt the status quo and the social order. They believed that entrepreneurship research required “a bit of emancipation” [of new theoretical perspectives and contexts] (2009: 478) and proposed the notion of entrepreneuring as emancipation.

Rindova and her colleagues (2009: 478) used the term emancipation to describe “the act of setting free from the power of another” (Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary, 1996). One’s freedom and autonomy, however, can be restricted not only by the power of another (person, organization), but also by other forces. These include one’s own acceptance of restrictions, such as through enthrallment to ideology, as well as one’s own past behavior and the social restrictions it may impose on one’s present and future. Ideologies are ideas and tools to interpret and shape social reality towards preferred ends, and are tied to concrete power interests within the society (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). For example, the mass killing of the Tutsis by the Hutus in Rwanda has been described as carried out under an ideology – the Hutu Power supremacist ideology – driven by political and economic interests (Strauss, 2006). A person’s past behavior (e.g., an executioner or a survivor in the Rwandan genocide) could restrict one from living a ‘normal’ life and reintegrating into society. Prior research on entrepreneurship as emancipation tells us little about whether or how an individual may be emancipated from enthrallment to ideology or from the social restrictions of their own past behavior. In this paper, I seek to address the following research question: How can social entrepreneurship emancipate individuals from the constraints of ideology and their own past behavior?
I conducted this study within the context of religious terrorism, a type of terrorism that typically legitimizes violence as a religious, God-given imperative (Hoffman, 1995; Victoroff, 2005). This is an ancient social problem that has gained momentum in recent decades, in both developed and developing countries (Fox and Gilbert, 2016; Putra and Sukabdi, 2013). Scholars of religious terrorism emphasize how religion provides the ideology that legitimizes violence as part of an unbounded struggle against the forces of evil (Juergensmeyer, 2003) and also provides strategic guidance on how and where it is legitimate to carry the fight (Hegghammer, 2013).

Despite the burgeoning research on religious terrorism, little is known about the mechanisms of disengagement from terrorist ideology or about the individuals who have disengaged from religious terrorism and the processes that have allowed them to do so (Horgan, 2009). Prior research has shown how the use of the logic of confrontation such as punishment-and-deterrent approaches (e.g., any form of ‘War on Terror’) (Schneider et al., 2015), and to a smaller extent, the logic of counseling (e.g., psychological and religious counseling in terrorist rehabilitation programs) (Gunaratna et al., 2011) can be both inadequate and counterproductive in combating religious terrorism (Davies, 2017; Porges, 2015; Thrall and Goepner, 2017).

Using a longitudinal research design and both primary and secondary data analysis, I chose as a strategic research site (Merton, 1987) a social enterprise founded and managed by two former Indonesian religious-based terrorists (“reformers”) that has successfully disengaged 10 peripheral and core players from terrorism. I found that religious terrorists can be emancipated with the help of emancipators (“reformers”) to set them free from the ideological bonds of terrorism and from some of the social restrictions caused by their own past behavior. Second, I identified five emancipatory dimensions of social entrepreneurship — enterprise building, the broadening of perspectives, the performance of humbling work, learning to work harmoniously for the common good, and acting as role models to positively influence others to follow a similar path — that can be categorized as either market-based or relations-based emancipation. Together, these led to increased the opportunity costs to re-engage in terrorism (due to the ex-terrorists improved economic well-being), and helped to reduce suspicion and develop trust in others, develop empathy towards others, improve the ability to manage social relations and tensions (“social maneuvering”), and increase social status. These, in turn, helped individuals to reconstruct new meaning in life and develop new social roles and recognize more new venture opportunities. The efficacy of these processes, however, may have depended on important
contingencies, particularly the depth of the indoctrination as terrorists and involvement of the reformers in disengaging their fellow terrorists.

Overall, I extend theory about entrepreneurship as emancipation to the processes through which entrepreneurs and those they enable can be emancipated from constraints of both ideology and their own past behavior. I also demonstrate how social entrepreneurship is an important organizational form for this emancipation, because it permits engagement in valuable profit-generating activities without requiring a narrow focus on profit maximization. My findings also have substantial practical value in elucidating a potentially important tool in efforts to reduce terrorist violence.

2. Religious terrorism: What it is and possibilities to counter it

Religious terrorism, a form of terrorism ostensibly justified by religious principles and imparted by religious authority (Victoroff, 2005; Hoffman, 1995), is an ancient social problem that has infused adversarial relations among groups of people across the globe. Religious terrorism scholars emphasize how religion may provide ideological grounds that legitimate violence against those considered to embody the forces of evil (Juergensmeyer, 2017). As argued by Chertoff (2008: 11), many religious terrorist organizations “are inspired by a malignant ideology, one that is characterized by contempt for human dignity and freedom and a deprived disregard for human life.” Ideology is used in this context as “a set of more or less systematic ideas that identify a constituency, the challenges the group confronts, the objectives pursued on behalf of that group, and a program of action” (Sanín and Wood, 2014, p. 214). Ideology contains instrumental value that motivates and coordinates group members including strategies and tactics about how and where it is legitimate to fight (Hegghammer, 2013) as well as normative commitments to a cause (Sanín and Wood, 2014).

Today, religious terrorism is a major global social problem that has generated violent attacks in both the West and the East, killing thousands since the turn of the 21st century. In 2001–2015, there were more than 160,000 terror attacks worldwide, most of which are classified as religious terrorism (Farivar, 2016). Within societies, it creates mistrust of “others” based on religion, race, and ethnicity. Well-known examples of religious terrorism include the 9/11/2001 attacks in the U.S. and the Bali bombings (2002 and 2005) in Indonesia — which killed 3,000 and 220 people respectively, injured thousands and generated millions in economic loss —
committed by Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (an Al Qaeda associate), respectively (Council of Foreign Relations, 2009). Religious terrorists have demonstrated global ambitions by constantly recruiting new members worldwide, and they are not easily detectable thanks to their “dark networks” (Milward and Raab, 2006). Additionally, their organizations have proved innovative and adaptable to change (Gill et al., 2013).

Scholars have argued that confrontational methods to stem terrorism, such as the War on Terror (e.g., military intervention, war-by-proxy, imprisonment and execution of terrorists and suspected terrorists), which cost the U.S. government alone approximately $1.6 trillion between 2001 and 2013 (Belasco, 2014) are inadequate by themselves and often counter-productive. Many observers have claimed that states’ oppression of terrorists fuels the cycle of hatred, mistrust and retribution, both because religious terrorists and their extended communities view their deaths as courageous, as in the service of God, and as martyrdom for a noble cause and also because of so-called collateral damage that occurs in the process (Wattana, 2006; Barter and Zatkin-Osburn, 2014). Hence, governmental attempts to wipe out terrorists may stimulate new terror attacks, solidify terrorists’ commitment to their cause, and encourage the development of new strategies and tactics (Corkburn, 2017; Mudie, 2017).

An adage states, “No one is born a terrorist.” (Woodroffe, 2010). Research demonstrates that terrorist groups typically enlist members through a gradual process of engagement. The involvement-engagement-disengagement model (Horgan, 2014; Taylor and Horgan, 2006) brings our attention to the broader social and political forces that shape religious terrorists. Religious terrorism can be driven by “push” forces such as a religious group’s perceptions of suppression of their religion by a prevailing regime. It can also be driven by beliefs that some other group, such as “the West,” is evil and aims to enforce a different religion or even wipe out members of a different religions group (Putra and Sukabdi, 2013; Sukabdi, 2015). It is also driven by “pull” forces such as parental or sibling influence, arranged marriages orchestrated by terrorist leaders to secure new joiners (Magouirk et al., 2008), revenge for perceived mistreatment (Berko and Erez, 2005), or the cultural view that terrorists epitomize masculinity (Baxendale, 2015). Overall, social engineering and ideologization from social institutions — terrorist organizations, radical religious cell groups, radical clerics, radical religious schools, etc. — have been demonstrated to be important forces in transforming peaceful individuals into terrorists. Religions contain certain shared beliefs and attitudes as well as evaluative (i.e.,
assessments of good and bad) and affective components (i.e., what “feels right”) that can be re-framed to influence and lure believers into using violence (Wolkomir, 2001). Ideologization (Berger, 1981) can legitimize terrorist attacks as a form of martyrdom (Barter and Zatkin-Osburn, 2014) and promote violence as a divine duty to eliminate enemies (Hoffman, 1995).

Although our understanding of involvement-engagement has improved over the last two decades, very little research explores whether and how religious terrorists disengage from terrorist activities and ideology or what processes might be effective in encouraging disengagement (Horgan, 2009; Horgan and Altier, 2012). Reasons for this research gap include the covert nature of terrorist organizations, individuals’ fear of reprisal from terrorist leaders for acting as an informant, and the difficulty of identifying, communicating with and exploring ex-terrorists’ motivations, thoughts and experiences.

In recent years, terrorist rehabilitation programs have gained popularity in the Middle East (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Iraq) as well as Asia (e.g., Singapore and Indonesia). These programs often treat terrorists as social deviants and provide psychological and religious counseling aimed to correct the terrorists’ misinterpretation of religious scripts and involve counseling by clerics (Sukabdi, 2015). Other tactics involve giving economic subsidies to terrorists and their families to reduce their dependence on terrorist institutions, along with recreational sports and fine arts programs (Angel and Gunaratna, 2012; Gunaratna et al., 2011; Horgan and Braddock, 2010). Despite their promise, terrorist rehabilitation programs are expensive and their efficacy has been difficult to measure (Gunaratna et al., 2011) especially given that many rehabilitated terrorists have returned to terrorism (Burke, 2013; Davies, 2017; Porges, 2015). Moreover, terrorist rehabilitation programs are generally state-led and thus many terrorists mistrust them (Burke, 2013; Osborne, 2016). In the next section, I discuss emancipation, a key theme that emerged in this study.

3. The emancipatory potential of social entrepreneurship

Social entrepreneurship has emerged as a fast-growing field of study and practice spanning the management, non-profit, sustainability, healthcare, and public policy domains. Across these fields, scholars disagree both on the definition of social entrepreneurship and about why it may be interesting or important (Choi and Majumdar, 2014; Chandra and Shang, 2017a; Maier et al., 2016; Roy et al., 2014). Nonetheless, within the management literature, scholars
have coalesced around social entrepreneurship viewed as an organizational form that combines social welfare and commercial logics (Doherty et al., 2014; Mair and Marti, 2006; Short et al., 2009).

A promising yet understudied aspect of social entrepreneurship is its potential for emancipating either social entrepreneurs or those they serve. Emancipation is the act of setting oneself or one’s community (e.g., ethnic, political, religious or cultural) free, or an act of others setting an individual or group free so that they can pursue happiness, liberty, and society’s resources (Coole, 2015; Laclau, 1996). Emancipation also means to be free from “restraint, control or power of another, to release from paternal care and responsibility, and to be free from controlling influence” (Merriam-Webster.com, 2002). Synonyms of the verb emancipate include liberate, free, release, and unshackle; antonyms include confine, shackle, restrain, oppress, enslave, subjugate (Merriam-Webster.com/thesaurus, 2002). Oppressive forces precede emancipation, because without oppression the need for emancipation would not exist (Laclau 1996; Wittmann-Price, 2004).

Critical social theorists argue that societal oppression, whereby social institutions work to maintain control over people, their resources, freedom of choice, social relations and the like, is a fundamental part of social reality (Horkheimer, 1982; Laclau, 1996). Social reality is seen to comprise the “lifeworld” (i.e., humans and their intersubjective experiences) and the “system” (e.g., dominant forces such as societal norms, political system) (Habermas, 1985, 1987). The system is described as colonizing the lifeworld and becoming a predominant influence on individuals’ behavior, ethics and rationality. For example, according to Habermas (1987), our capacity to reason and communicate to achieve mutual understanding is central to overcoming narrow self-interests and the domination of economic and political power. Therefore, emancipation is about communicative action — the activities that build connections via dialogue.

From this perspective, ideology is seen as both intertwined with systems of oppression and as a tool of oppression itself. Ideology could manifest in a soft form (i.e., “what to avoid” such as avoid making friends with people of certain/different religious beliefs and ethnicities) or in a more extreme form (i.e., “what to do” such as supporting, participating in, to leading terror attacks). Scholars have argued that absent the intendedly manipulative development of ideology there would be little or no religious-based terrorism (Juergensmeyer, 2017). “Producers” of ideology such as terrorist organizations frame religious principles and texts so they provide
instrumental (motivation, strategy and tactic) and normative (moral) guidance (Sanín and Wood, 2014) to their “consumers” who then internalize, accept and perpetuate the ideology. Ideologies require *solidarity* (Berger and Luckmann, 1966), or a feeling of brotherhood among the “consumers” based on common interests, objectives, and standards. Once the group of consumers in question adopts an ideology, ideology producers can select, add and modify the original body of theoretical propositions of the ideology and the consumers are likely to vigorously affirm the changes because they have committed themselves to the ideology (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Hence, ideology is a tool to *socially construct* reality, attached to a concrete power interest, and where “the *same* overall universe is interpreted in different ways” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 141). A terrorist can be a warrior or criminal simultaneously to different groups of people depending on one’s ideological stance. Accordingly, ideology is a product of communicative action through which a social reality is shaped and breached by communication.

In recent years, scholars have conceptualized the notion of “entrepreneuring as emancipation” (Rindova et al., 2009). Rindova and colleagues argue that emancipation consists of three dimensions (Habermas, 1971; Horkheimer, 1982; Laclau, 1996; Rindova et al., 2009; Wittmann-Price, 2004). The first is autonomy seeking — seeking and utilizing methods to break free (or help others break free) from oppression such as dominant practices and well-established values in an industry (e.g., Google, which breaks away technological constraints, that is the algorithms to conduct search, and cultural constraints, in terms of the information content of that the algorithms can make available). The second is authoring — taking ownership of oneself and/or one’s group and actions, by re-defining and re-writing relationships, social arrangements and rules of engagement. Authoring means moving from the passive, to being used by others to achieve their goals, to setting goals and writing the rules and taking action. The third dimension is making declarations of actions, accomplishments, needs and desires — by using clear, discursive language and rhetorical acts related to the actor’s intentions to create change such as by declaring one’s mission to change dominant business practices (e.g., Google declared that it “made its own rules” by refusing to “smoothen” its earnings to create an impression of steady growth, deviating from a standard industry practice).

The explicit theorization of emancipation through entrepreneurship (Rindova et al., 2009; Jennings et al., 2016) has so far been mostly confined to traditional for-profit organizations and
the “advanced economies” in the North American or Western context more generally. For instance, Rindova et al. (2009) discuss Google as examples of for-profit companies that broke away from the conventional for-profit business model, re-wrote their rules of engagement, set their values, and declared them uncontestable. Jennings et al. (2016) examined the likelihood for Canadian female entrepreneurs in for-profit businesses who “broke away from existing operating models.” Emancipation of individuals captive to an ideology and those trapped by their own past behavior, such as religious terrorists located in the developing economies provides a strategic context to make new contributions to the emancipatory potential and processes of social entrepreneurship.

4. Indonesia: A laboratory for examining religious terrorism

Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous nation, comprises over 300 ethnic groups (e.g., Javanese, Sundanese, and Dayaks) and six official religions – Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. It is home to 13% of the world’s Muslims (Pew Research Centre, 2017), the vast majority of whom are moderate and peaceful (Makin, 2009). Muslims comprise 87% of the Indonesian population (Pew Research Centre, 2017). Extremism and terrorism are, unfortunately, not new in Indonesia. The country has a history with the Indonesian Islamic State (NII) and the Darul Islam movements of the 1940s, both of which aimed to convert the country to an Islamic state (Elson and Formichi, 2011) in the context of the “unity in diversity” principle (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika), one of Indonesia’s founding principles. The recent awakening of a utopian Islamic caliphate in Indonesia occurred after the fall of former Indonesian President Soeharto in 1998, who had ruled for 31 years (Jati, 2013). Some scholars perceived Soeharto as a suppressor of Islamic leaders (Jati, 2013; Heiduk, 2012). The post-reform (post-Soeharto) era was followed by movements supporting increased freedom of expression and press, and also by increased religious conflicts between Islam and other religions (and among different schools of Islam), along with heightened terrorist activities (McCoy, 2013).

Indonesia has been the target of recent terrorist attacks, including the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, and bomb attacks in 2003 and 2009 targeting Westerners in Jakarta, which killed more than 200 people and injured more than 300. Following these attacks, the Indonesian National Police arrested over 900 suspected terrorists between 2000 and 2014 (Budiari, 2014). Although large-scale terror attacks in Indonesia have declined in recent years, there have been
increasing numbers of small-scale terror attacks carried out by groups claiming religious justifications, targeting mostly the police who are considered ‘enemies’ (Chan, 2017). Scholars and commentators on religious terrorism have identified several factors that may be driving religious terrorism in Indonesia. These include the ideologization from radical Muslim religious leaders (Milla et al., 2013; Muluk et al., 2013), perceptions of unfair treatment (Hui, 2010), dissatisfaction with how the Indonesian government has dealt with Muslim vs. non-Muslim conflicts (Putra and Sukabdi, 2013), solidarity for victims of violence and related revenge-seeking (Sukabdi, 2015), and arguments that the suppression of political Islam during the Soeharto regime fed radical counter-responses (Muzakki, 2014).

The Indonesian government has frequently adopted a confrontational approach to countering religious terrorism (e.g., joint special operations between the police and military (Singh, 2016); extra-judicial killings, detentions and torture, Carnegie, 2016). But in recent years, the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT’s) has also increasingly employed a ‘persuasive’ approach (e.g., creating counter radical rhetoric in the media (Ramakhrisna, 2016); collaborating with the two largest Islamic civil society organizations Nadlhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah as well as schools, universities, clerics and NGOs to promote moderate Islam (Arifianto, 2016; Carnegie, 2015) as well as other ‘soft’ approaches (e.g., encouraging terrorists to repent, joint prayer sessions between counter-terrorism police and terrorists, encouraging repented terrorists to write books that advocated against terrorism, (Carnegie, 2016)). Recently, the government has also encouraged the ‘rehabilitative/de-radicalization’ approach (e.g., psychological and religious counseling of religious terrorists and radicals implicated in terror attacks while in prison (Perdani, 2103; Sukabdi, 2015)); financial support and religious discussions (Sumpter, 2017). The social entrepreneurship model that I studied is new to Indonesia’s counter-terrorism arena and we know very little about how and why it might be effective.

5. Research methodology

This qualitative study employs an inductive approach (Glaser, 1978, 1998; Strauss and Corbin, 1990) to generate insights from “rich-and-thick” data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) about terrorist disengagement within the social entrepreneurship context. The setting has unique qualities suitable as a strategic research site (Merton, 1987) for understanding 1) how individuals captive to a terrorist ideology achieved emancipation, 2) how social entrepreneurship played a
role in facilitating the emancipation of such individuals, and 3) how Asia — in this case Indonesia, a country that has become a battleground for different ideologies for decades (Berger, 2004; Chertoff, 2008) — provided a natural laboratory to understand emancipation. Essentially, this constitutes a “revelatory case” study (Yin, 2003: 42; see also Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Weick, 1993) as it examined a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation: religious ex-terrorists who voluntarily left their old world for a better, mainstream life style and who also acted as “evangelists” and attracted others to pursue the same path via an unconventional approach, social entrepreneurship. The case of interest may be the world’s first social enterprise program that uses social entrepreneurship as a novel counter-terrorism model. Gaining access to religious terrorists is difficult due to the covert nature of terrorist organizations; thus this research required persistent outreach efforts to build trust and rapport with ex-terrorists.

The organization I studied, ‘Retro Cafe’, aims to help terrorists to return to conventional life through job training, salaries and business “stock share” ownership. Its profits are largely reinvested in the business to increase its scale and social impact (social mission). Retro Cafe is highly market oriented as it sells “retro” (using a branding strategy that capitalizes on retro nuances and decor) and “fusion” (Eastern for the taste + Western for the presentation) style grilled seafood popular among middle to lower middle class Indonesians. Indonesia has no specific legal framework for social enterprises, thus the Retro Cafe SE is registered as commercial enterprise.

Retro Cafe was founded in 2009 in an urban area, by Marty, a former religious terrorist, along with four others who are co-owners. One of the co-owners, Ferry, is another former religious terrorist who served 10 years in prison for his terrorist activities. Marty was ‘reformed’ first in a gradual manner during which he developed wide contacts with foreigners as a part-time tourist guide, he then studied in a university in Western Europe, and worked in the commercial world as a marketing manager in a large hospitality group in a major city and a journalist prior to setting up the social enterprise. This social enterprise has employed and disengaged 10 religious terrorists, and 20 high school dropouts. The social enterprise has continued to grow; as of 2016, it employed 25 employees in its two cafes — which form the core of the enterprise’s businesses — as well as two dessert shops, a noodle shop, and a canteen inside a university (all are located

1 To ensure anonymity all names, places and other inconsequential details have been anonymized and all source materials that might jeopardize this anonymity have been removed from the references.
in two cities in central Indonesia). To start up this enterprise in 2009, Marty funded it entirely with his personal funds from his other business. The founder further expanded this SE to other cities and plans continued expansion.

5.1. Data sources

6.1.1. Primary data. I interviewed seven informants from Retro Cafe, which I divided into three categories — management, beneficiaries (“clients”), and experts — using a semi-structured interview format (see Table 1). The data collection process is summarized in Table 1.

---Insert Table 1 about here---

The first management interviews were conducted with Retro Cafe SE founder, Marty, a graduate of a madrasah (Islamic secondary school) in a city in central Indonesia. Marty reports he was born into a middle class family; his father was a civil servant. Despite being a top performer at the madrasah, he believes that he was not selected for Jihad because, as he confessed, he did not always listen to his teachers’ teachings and he was critical of his teachers’ views. However, he swore allegiance (‘baiat’) to a local terrorist movement and stated that he would have been a terrorist if given the opportunity. Marty was working for an English-language newspaper, Jakarta office, where he discovered that that his good friend in the madrasah was involved in a terrorist attack in Indonesia in 2002. This, he said, motivated his quest to find ways to disengage his fellow terrorists. The next management interview was with Benny, CEO of Retro Cafe, former journalist with an international newspaper and a political science researcher but not an ex-terrorist.

The beneficiaries’ interviews were conducted with three Retro Cafe employees/beneficiaries. The first is Ferry, a graduate of a madrasah in a city in eastern Indonesia, raised in a wealthy family, who joined an international terrorist group and left Indonesia and was later arrested and imprisoned in Indonesia. At the time of the interviews, Ferry had been working in the social enterprise for three years. He grew up in the wealthiest family in his village. He said that he has read many books on Islamist movements since childhood and was inspired by them. The others in this beneficiary category include Reno and Rama, both high school dropouts but not former terrorists. I interviewed them to gain their views
of the social enterprise’s operations as well as their interactions with the management and other ex-terrorists including Ferry. I also conducted interviews with two terrorism experts, Chelsea, a U.S. terrorism expert, and Zaza, a psychologist working for a state agency in Indonesia.

My most intensive interviews focused on Marty and Ferry, their personal background and life journey into religious terrorism, and their disengagement process from terrorism. Ten other ex-terrorists had left Retro Café. I was unable to interview them for this study but I was able to reconstruct important parts of their stories through information provided by the founders and others who knew them before or during their time at Retro Café. I used the interviews with Benny, Reno, Rama and Chelsea and Zaza to validate the statements used by Marty and Ferry and to explore new themes. All interviews were recorded (with the informants’ permission) and transcribed. All interviews, except those with Chelsea (the U.S. terrorism expert), were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia, and transcribed to Bahasa, and then translated to English by a professional translator. I sought the help of two bilingual Indonesians to check the accuracy of the transcription, and to reduce jargon. In total, 11 rounds of interviews with seven key informants were conducted from January 2013 to October 2016 generating 35 hours of interviews. I also observed Marty and Ferry’s behavior and their social media postings between 2013 and 2016.

6.1.2. Secondary data. I collected a total of 57 online news articles and seven videos (n = 64) about the social enterprise, and about Marty and Ferry from local and international newspapers, YouTube, TEDxTalks, and various writings by several of the people I interviewed (see Table 1). All video materials were transcribed in Bahasa Indonesia and translated into English by an independent transcriber and a translator, respectively, both experts in Bahasa and English.

6.1.3. Data analyses. I followed Glaser’s (1998: 8) approach that treats “all as data.” The data analyses comprised constant comparison of data where statements, stories and incidents are respectively compared with other statements, stories, and incidents; and interviews with the management were compared to interviews with the clients and experts and my offline and online observations until common pattern emerged (Glaser, 1998; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). I read the interview transcripts, news articles and books, and watched the above noted videos and documentaries; based on the transcriptions, I coded and analyzed the qualitative data line-by-line and paragraph-by-paragraph (“open coding”, Strauss and Corbin, 1990) with the help of RQDA
package (Chandra and Shang, 2017b; Huang, 2010), a qualitative data analysis software within the R statistical computing environment (R Development Core Team, 2009). I cross-validated the consistency and accuracy of the statements of all key informants across the interviews and the media sources through manual reading and assessment to ensure the convergence of facts about events, actors, relations, thoughts, opinions and feelings. When I found factual inconsistencies across sources I investigated and resolved these inconsistencies. I subsequently grouped the codes by identifying relationships between categories and their sub-categories (or “axial coding”, Strauss and Corbin, 1990) and identified conditions that gave rise to their interactions and their context (or “theoretical coding”, Glaser, 1978). Finally, I consulted the relevant literature to help me understand the findings. I iterated between the literature, my data, and the emerging theory I was building in order in order to build a “process model” (Van de Ven and Engleman, 2004) explaining connections between the constructs that emerged from the analyses (Glaser, 1998). I presented this case to colleagues and students and audiences in public forums and received several rounds of critical feedback that allowed me to revise the theory, returned to the data and further refined the process model (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). I also produced biographical analyses of the terrorists’ journeys into religious terrorism and identified factors that appear to drive terrorism in Indonesia based on the informants’ experiences and insights in order to provide contextual knowledge to inform my interpretations and theory-building efforts (Glaser, 1978, 1998).

6. Analysis and findings

6.1. The emancipatory function of SE for terrorist disengagement

At the most general level, I found that engagement in social entrepreneurship can sometimes serve to emancipate religious terrorists from the ideology and past behaviors that constrain them. The Retro Cafe adopts a humanistic approach to disengaging terrorists (clients). Marty, the former terrorist who founded Retro Café brought in-depth knowledge, compassion for terrorists, and learning from his various failed projects aimed at disengaging terrorists. For example, he had previously offered five ex-terrorists employment to manage various small businesses (e.g., looking after fish ponds) — all of which failed — without additional support and engagement (as Retro Cafe provides). As Marty recalled,
I grew up with them [the radicals] in the madrasah [religious boarding school]...so I know very well how they think.... In fact, one of the main suspects of [a major] bombing was my roommate and mentor...and after that [the bombing] I began asking myself why, as graduates of the same madrasah, I can work [as a journalist] for an international newspaper while he played fireworks [bombs]...what made us different? Since then I began to search for solutions.

Marty expressed criticism about how the state treated terrorists and ex-prisoners (which many terrorists became) saying there were no programs, particularly for education and job training, to help them reintegrate into mainstream society; also most were required to report frequently to correctional officers, on a schedule that impeded them from working at regular jobs. In addition, society’s discrimination against ex-prisoners precluded them from working in most public- and private-sector jobs. Marty also said that he discovered how food can be an instrument of healing and peace, inspired by what he described as local traditions among ethnic groups in conflict zones who make peace through communal eating. Together, these insights led Marty to develop Retro Cafe, which prepares and sells retro-style grilled seafood. In the initial years, Marty did not recognize that he was establishing and running a social enterprise until he was interviewed by people from Ashoka, a social enterprise support organization. As Marty illustrates, “I choose to solve the [terrorism] problems via social enterprise. Through social enterprise, the projects can be self-sustained.” This is possible, in part, because Retro Cafe has a deep engagement with the ex-terrorists and is commercially viable. He added, “The first greeting among Indonesians is about whether you have eaten. And most celebrations involve food in Indonesia. Eating is central to our culture. And starting a food business in small-scale cafe… is the easiest.”

Marty attributed his modest success to the fact that he “has been there and found a way out,” and that he is now a trusted, legitimate reformer/emancipator whose aim is to help others develop a new, better, legitimate lifestyle. Three years after his successful disengagement from radical ideology (2012), Marty began his quest to emancipate other terrorists including Ferry by offering “fate changing” employment and franchising opportunities from Retro Cafe along with several new businesses that he had established. Various sources confirmed Marty’s claim that his social enterprise has emancipated 10 ex-terrorists by engaging them in the café, on average each
ex-terrorist had spent about one year in the café. Following their emancipation, all of these individuals pursued self-employment in the areas that included laptop sales and repair, math tutorials, meat and poultry shop, glass installation business and foreign currency trading, among others. These ex-terrorists included both peripheral and central players and some return to visit the café regularly. The café recruits new ex-terrorists on an on-going basis, but as Marty said “we never searched for them [the terrorists], for if we do they may think that we are doing ‘counter intelligence’ on them.” A terrorism analyst reported that Marty’s programs also reached out to terrorists’ wives via coaching on home-based businesses and cooking courses to help the women make the ends meet while their husbands serve out their prison time. They also conduct workshops on “anger management” for terrorists in prison and have trained hundreds of prison officers in dealing with high-risk terrorists in the prisons.

My observations suggest the emancipatory potential of social entrepreneurship that counters religious terrorism by employing a non-confrontational engagement approach of teaching new skills and outlining the potential for a meaningful life, which helped the ex-terrorists to gradually detach from religious extremism. This social enterprise’s disengagement (i.e., re-engagement) approach does not use common terrorist rehabilitation strategies such as cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT; Mullins, 2010; Taylor and Horgan, 2006), which directly challenges terrorists’ religious beliefs and behavior (Hofmann et al., 2012), or religious counseling by clerics (Angel and Gunaratna, 2012; Gunaratna et al., 2011). Rather, the Retro Cafe uses indirect disengagement strategies by engaging terrorists in enterprise-building, broadening their social circles, serving customers as a humbling process, building harmonious relations with all stakeholders, among others.

My analysis identified two types of emancipation practiced in this social enterprise: market- and relations-based emancipation. Market-based emancipation uses market logic to emancipate individuals by teaching them to be enterprising, by creating what I called a “brotherhood economic model” where members create and share economic resources and become a community of learning and growing. Relations-based emancipation refers to the purposeful efforts to change (or remove) the social relationships (friends and sometimes family) and networks in which terrorists are embedded and to use the cafe to create new relationships and networks that set them free from the influence of terrorist institutions. Relations-based emancipation in this social enterprise consisted of four elements: broadening the former
terrorists’ perspectives and social networks, serving customers as a *humbling* process, working to cooperate with and *harmonize* their relations with all stakeholders, and *role modeling* as a way to create a positive influence on others. I describe each of these elements in greater detail below.

6.1.1. Market-based emancipation

6.1.1.1. Enterprise building

The Retro Cafe emancipates terrorists (clients) by providing them with ownership shares in the social enterprise, fair salaries, managerial posts, and decision-making opportunities to help them develop critical thinking skills. Furthermore, they receive hands on business experience that instills entrepreneurial values.

Ferry and three other clients each received a 12.5% ownership share of the social enterprise’s business plus salaries; Marty retained the remaining 50% and he reinvested his half of the profits from operations in the social enterprise. All staff (the ex-terrorists and high school dropouts) started at Retro Cafe by doing menial jobs (e.g., washing dishes, clearing tables) but they could move up the ladder to managerial posts (e.g., accounting, purchasing, managing) and head chefs based on their talents, skills, interests and aptitudes. The social enterprise provided a basic equality of economic opportunity to the ex-terrorists. It also offered them a new perspective — that they can receive justice and respect despite their perception that society treats them unfairly. Ferry recalled the quandaries that he faced after being released from prison in 2009:

*I was released [and] got married....I was unemployed and had no idea what to do. Then I called him [Marty] and...we shared ideas about [self-employment] jobs...from starting a laundry service to culinary business....At that time it was only ideas....Finally, I worked in a small warung [an eatery, a low-paid job] and we [continued] sharing and exchanging ideas.... [Marty] encouraged me...he offered me opportunities. After almost one year, we agreed to start [Retro Cafe]. Marty gives us shares as managers of the cafe. We have monthly salaries. We have dividends at the end of the year. I am the head chef.*
After prison release, we [terrorists] had no money...how could we survive? We needed new friends to rebuild our economic life. When I visited [terrorists] they didn’t ask how my life in the prison had been; the first thing they asked was “How is your life outside?”

In other words, when Ferry, like other ex-prisoners and ex-terrorists, was released from prison, he had no money, no marketable skills, no direction or job training, plus he had to provide for his family, and help pay back the family debt that had accumulated when he was in prison. Thus, solving the urgent resource problems facing just-released ex-terrorists is a priority. As Marty noted, “The first twelve months after prison release is the most critical window that will determine if a terrorist will rejoin the old networks [which are everywhere]…and this is the period that a social enterprise can come and disengage from them.”

The former terrorists were also given opportunities to learn culinary and business skills at the social enterprise. This involved culinary training by a chef from a five-star restaurant, a friend of Marty, and entrepreneurship skills from Chinese Indonesian entrepreneurs who were invited to mentor the staff on a pro-bono basis. Marty frequently took the terrorists to eat at various high-end restaurants to show them the workings of the high-end culinary business, from “the back of the house” (the kitchen and storage/receiving rooms) to “the front of the house” (the dining room and reception area), to taste the foods and see the craftsmanship of the chef, and the techniques of the wait staff and managers.

One important aspect of learning to run such a social enterprise is the attempt to find a good match between the passion of the clients and a specific job that matches their skills, aptitudes and interests (Cardon et al., 2013) or else helping them to develop a passion for the work that is available. For instance, Ferry developed a passion for cooking and serving at the social enterprise. As Ferry recalled, “Somehow, I realized that I have an interest in cooking and the culinary business.” He later used the same approach to emancipate other ex-terrorists. He also started another business, a car rental business in 2015, while retaining the job and ownership in the cafe.

The enterprise building aspect of the social enterprise also includes regular staff meetings where Marty challenges his clients to think critically and question all aspects of the business, from purchasing supplies, menu items, marketing strategies, food presentation and service, to cafe décor, inventory and accounting processes, profits, and business expansion plans. Such
critical thinking skills may generalize in a way that allows the ex-terrorists to question and counteract the ideology that restricts them and to see things from various perspectives.

Unlike many terrorist rehabilitation programs (Gunaratna et al., 2011), Retro Café offers no psychological and religious counseling. In other words, the ex-terrorists are not counseled as if they are mentally or emotionally broken nor are they lectured about the fallacies or loopholes in their religious or terrorist ideology. According to Marty, the first question that terrorists would typically ask a counseling cleric at the start of a rehabilitation program is “Have you joined Jihad, Sir?” Since most clerics never joined any Jihad, they quickly lost their credibility; rendering a counseling program untrustworthy. Instead the café operates on Marty’s theory that exposure to secular, capitalist and entrepreneurial values, and in particular, gaining direct experience in managing and working within a social enterprise, in interacting with staff and customers and suppliers, plays a critical role in changing the terrorists’ mindset to a more balanced worldview. Such exposure is evident in Marty’s reflection on his own journey from terrorism and what drove his “clients” to leave their terrorist groups:

After graduating [from the madrasah and swearing an oath of allegiance to a local terrorism movement] I learned English by talking to foreigners [as a tour guide]. Meeting them made me start to question the ways [that the school] had tried to brainwash me. I studied literature and communications in Indonesian universities and became excited by capitalism, so I then worked in a fancy job in marketing, [had] a flashy car and all that. My friend [a terrorist in several large scale terror attacks in Indonesia]... was very narrow minded, while I was exposed to a more secular way of thinking [and had broader social contacts].

The goal [of Retro Cafe] is disengagement from violence by providing them with a new atmosphere and new perspective, by doing worldly things. For example, currency trading requires participants to embrace capitalist values.

Importantly, Marty set a clear rule with the ex-terrorists that their relationship with him was “purely business”. He did not interrogate them about their past or try to indoctrinate them to any beliefs, nor did he try directly to sway them from their radical ideology. But he indirectly instilled new perspectives, ways of thinking and positive behaviors using business ideology. As
Marty recalled, “We don’t go to their ideology first because no one likes being told [what to believe].” Marty created what I labeled a *brotherhood economic model* that provides and cares for staff members in the social enterprise in a manner that parallels how terrorist organizations provide a sense of camaraderie, caring and a sense of meaning for their members (‘brothers’). Throughout the interviews with Marty and Ferry, they often use the word ‘ikhwan’ (‘brothers’), which reflected a strong sense of ‘brotherhood’ among people in the (or were a part of a terrorist) movement. Marty suggested that he did not try to transform or emancipate the terrorists with a confrontational approach but rather by providing them economic resources, marketable skills, brotherhood, and a sense of renewed personal capabilities, which gradually altered the ex-terrorists’ worldviews. Hence, engagement in entrepreneurship — not just getting a job — helps disengage the ex-terrorists:

*I am not doing this by fighting their ideology directly….my concept is three H’s…..heart, to win their hearts….hands, by training them…and finally heads. By giving them different skills and [approaches to] social interactions, they will automatically change their ideology [the heads].

*I am enjoying…seeing the former combatants become active in the discussion of the new business. We don’t use the model “plug and play” [mere employment without ownership]….If it’s just “plug and play,” they won’t feel involved or [develop] a sense of ownership.

Another characteristic of the social enterprise’s brotherhood economic model is the provision of business and general life skills training and career advice via a community of learning and growing. As Ferry recalled that, at the start of his culinary training:

*I didn’t know how to drive a car, and Marty kept asking me “Why don’t you take a [driving] class?” I didn’t understand what his intention was. I realized that once I learnt driving and I could drive, that it is meaningful and has a lot of good points. So he didn’t give me something instantly… Maybe it takes one week to learn how to drive but the benefit is lifelong, and can be meaningful for brothers….I also want them to grow from
incapable to capable. ... So Marty often gives [new or potential social enterprise members] this advice. “So, please come here and let’s discuss things ... who knows there’s [maybe] something we can help you with.” He always nudges me... “Look at this opportunity; please try lobbying there; join this three-day motivational training...” So he is the type who gives support specifically to each brother, and more generally, to the employees.

Ferry’s statement mirrored that of Reno, a Retro Cafe operations manager, who is a high school dropout. Providing a bigger picture of the enterprise building process in the social enterprise, Reno states:

[Marty says,] “You are better than [the others] because your school [Retro Cafe] is the school of life, from the real world, not in the academic world”...[This] really encourages me and builds my confidence. He gives me an opportunity to learn English...He equips us with advanced culinary skills, he paid private tuition for us to learn from a [master] chef. We learn hotel style not hawker style culinary arts.

Benny, the CEO of the cafe, emphasized that what one thinks a lot about will influence one’s behavior, as he said, “the program [in Retro Cafe] is suitable because it is something that keeps the terrorists busy so that they no longer have the time to think about radical ideology. Our previous programs that failed such as running fish ponds didn’t keep them occupied enough, so they had a lot of time to think about those radical views.” As the cafe gradually instills secularism and capitalism as an alternative ideology, as Mary claimed earlier, it may have helped sway the ex-terrorists’ radical worldviews.

As terrorism psychologist Zaza stated, “We [the state] are still experimenting with various approaches [to help the terrorists]. We found that using scholarly clerics won’t work because they can’t communicate with/convince the terrorists. I suspect that a holistic approach is needed, for example using humble clerics to persuade them, providing vocational training, helping the terrorists understand that we are not in a war zone ... hence violence is unnecessary, working with their wives and children...particularly in some areas in Java where the wives are very dominant and it would be impossible for the husbands to join terrorism without getting the wives’ approval.” Zaza emphasized that religious and psychological counseling to correct the
ex-terrorists interpretation of the religious texts was still the main model used by the state. This differs remarkably from Retro Cafe that does not employ any forms of religious and psychological counseling. However, Zaza’s statement nonetheless lends some conceptual support for the holistic approach employed by Retro Cafe, for example, through the economic brotherhood model, its efforts to educate the wives of terrorists about pluralism, and rebuilding relations with different others.

6.1.2. Relations-based emancipation

6.1.2.1. Broadening of social networks

A key dimension of the social enterprise’s emancipatory approach is that the Retro Cafe experience broadens the ex-terrorists’ social networks and interactions (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 2004) with people from different religion, ethnic and racial groups. As one psychologist from a university in Central Java who had conducted many studies on Indonesian terrorists commented, “the terrorists who are released from the prison [are] prone to rejoining their old groups…because they feel lonely…we need ways to help them interact and reconnect with the wider segments of the society.” In fact, the initial failures of Marty’s programs prior to Retro Cafe (e.g., employing terrorists to look after fish ponds) were, he believed, due in part to the seclusion of the ex-terrorists within the ventures, which precluded them from having social interactions with people of all kinds of backgrounds. In addition, as Marty recalled, “in many cases, the ex-terrorists he worked with had never interacted with people from different backgrounds before spending time working in Retro Cafe; in the cafe they have to negotiate, talk and serve in the restaurant, not just handing out food.” Marty attributed his exposure to Western values through his work as an international journalist and marketing manager in a hospitality group and as a graduate of a European university as something that enabled him to see the world from both the terrorists’ and the westerners’ point of view, noting, “basically, I am a social broker, I know how to play well in both worlds.”

Not only does Retro Cafe serve as an “exit point” for ex-terrorists, it also serves as what the founder calls an “open tent” (a word coined by Marty) where employees can meet people of all walks of life, from police and anti-terror officers, judges, ethnic Chinese, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and Westerners (all possible ‘enemies’), to religious hardliners. For instance, the
founder invited a European chef, a Christian, to train his staff in world-class culinary skills. An Australian chef was invited and volunteered to work alongside the ex-terrorists in the kitchen to help them experience working together with people from different cultures (“others”). Marty also accepted a donation from a church in Western Europe to build the social enterprise’s working capital. He facilitated a meeting between a terror victim’s family and Ferry, which helped both parties express their thoughts and feelings and jump-start the reconciliation and healing process. This slowly enhanced the ex-terrorists’ social skills, reduced suspicions and built trust in “outsider” groups. These “social broadening” efforts can alter or even replace the social networks that terrorists consider home and create new friendships and business partnerships that improve their business and their community’s intergroup relations. As described by Marty:

*In the food industry, we cannot choose who our customers are — whoever comes in must be served.... that’s life’s reality. Although Ferry is a Muslim, if the customer is a Franciscus [a Catholic], he must serve Franciscus. For people like Ferry, interaction with people from different backgrounds is important. Someone becomes a Ferry [i.e., a terrorist] because he rarely makes friends with, rarely meets people of different backgrounds. They live in their own imagination.... [This broad exposure] gives them what I call a cognitive opening, which provides them with a different perspective on things. These interactions allow them to establish a level of trust [with outsiders].*  

*We get [them] ... to meet people from various walks of life and expose them to different ideologies. I want them to meet Western people and see for themselves: Are they really evil?*

Reno, a school dropout and a manager at Retro Cafe, revealed how his interactions with his former terrorists co-workers, gradually helped him to better understand the terrorists and thus reduce his prejudice toward terrorists:

*At first, I felt uncomfortable working with him [Ferry]. He always asks so many questions [about my personal life]. It seemed like he was interrogating us.... But gradually we could see that he is a very kind man. In the early days, he often told stories ...about life in prison, how to go into war, he knew so much about Jihad. I realized that every story that*
Ferry told us was his own story. Maybe he tried to cover it so that our friends do not fear him; so they won’t feel afraid to work with him. Terrorists, actually, they are just ordinary people; but due to the indoctrination, they become terrorists.

Another important observation was the role of the cafe’s marketing strategy in enhancing social interactions. For example, one of the best-seller menu items had a name that contains a sexual expression (animal genitalia) that connotes male enhancement. This became a frequent point of conversation between curious male and female customers and the ex-terrorists. Quality food and affordability are also important for Retro Cafe’s social broadening efforts, as Marty recalled “We serve good food that fits the middle class’ taste buds…our price is about 1/3 of the competitors. The food provides an excellent platform for nearly everyone to start engaging with each other.” But, as Marty said, “We never brand it as a terrorist club.”

Chelsea, the U.S. terrorism expert, acknowledged that the Retro Cafe’s purpose of and approach to social interactions differ markedly from those of terrorist organizations, for good reasons. As, Chelsea stated, “[a local terrorist organization] has various small scale businesses…That’s how they build bonds in the organization…through doing business with the same people that you do religious study with.” Retro Cafe, on the other hand, focuses on building bonds with people who are different from the ex-terrorists in a natural environment and this may help them reintegrate and pursue a mainstream lifestyle.

6.1.2.2. Performing humbling work

One of the most interesting aspects of the social enterprise’s emancipation approach is the humbling process built into the job, which aims to instill new attitudes from literally serving others. The humbling process is critical to address the religious terrorists’ superior attitude; as they have been trained to believe in an ideology that claimed that they were representing the voice of God and they served as “moral guardians” against corrupt secular lives that pervade the country (e.g., alcohol, drugs, nightlife, disco parlors). It also helps the ex-terrorists to develop a sense of equality among people, to learn mutual respect; similarly learning to treat “the customer as king” helps them to put others’ interests before their own, which can help them see the world from the other’s perspective. Humbling work helps them also to develop a sense of “empathy for
consumers,” which many terrorists lack. They learn to serve customers either through cooking, bringing dishes to the tables, clearing tables, washing dishes, decorating the cafe, listening to the customers’ concerns and trying to please the consumers so that they will return. “The act of serving customers changes their attitude [towards people of different religion, race and ethnicity],” says Marty. Marty illustrated this process:

*Serving is about attitude….it means [literally] “to serve”….to be lower than the person you are serving. Why do these people become terrorists? … It’s because they think they are the most righteous, [as they are] promised to enter heaven…[and that they] represent the voice of God, [and should] engage in violence in the name of God. So this is what I am fighting against through [this] social enterprise.*

*When you cook, you have customers and you have to serve them. You can’t choose your customers and you can’t tell the customer they are wrong.*

In one sense, Retro Cafe’s approach, which requires the ex-terrorists to serve customers, including sometimes difficult and demanding customers, eventually helped them learn to be patient in dealing with people. The cafe experience also teaches the ex-terrorists about how to handle criticisms from others without resorting to violence and to accept pluralistic views of the world.

For Ferry, the cafe taught him new, positive values including the fact that differences — in beliefs, values, religious orientations, cultural norms, etc. — need to be accepted as a reality in life:

*When you assemble a bomb, there are only two possibilities: it explodes or it does not. While if you cook, there are many possibilities, because it is served to many people. Some will think it’s too salty, some, not salty enough, and so on.*

Overall, the humbling work in the cafe allows the terrorists to have empathetic feelings towards others (Hockerts, 2017) and not easily blame others with whom they disagree.
6.1.2.3. Working harmoniously

Particularly striking were the ways that ex-terrorists initially treated certain behavior and groups of people as “enemies.” For example, the local terrorists refused to line up for flag-raising ceremony (a common practice in Indonesian schools and offices every Monday morning) or to shake hands with certain groups of people (e.g., female or transgender). They also viewed state employees such as the police, prosecutors and judges as enemies (“thagut”) for their role in counter-terrorism or prosecuting them to jail. In one of his writings, Marty pointed out that in addition to Muslims, even members of different Islamic sects are considered enemies [by the terrorists and radicals]. Constructing such a broad picture of others as evil contributes to the difficulty of joining those pursuing a mainstream lifestyle. This supports another key strategy of the emancipation approach of Retro Café by helping the ex-terrorist employees build harmonious relations with a wide range of partners — customers, cafe goods suppliers, state agencies, beef and vegetable sellers/distributors in the private sector, counter-terrorism agencies, the police, families of terrorists, community leaders, the media, schools, prison officials, and terrorist groups and their leaders. People involved with Retro Café use neutral terms when referring to terrorist groups. For instance, Marty does not call his SE concept “de-radicalization” but rather “disengagement” to reduce stigmatization of the ex-terrorists. And he avoids using demonizing or degrading terms as they can further alienate terrorists and possible recruits. Throughout the interviews, Marty always spoke about the terrorists respectfully and never blamed them. At times he called the ex-terrorists in a positive way as “ex-combatants.” The strategy of the café is built on a practical philosophy that disengagement from terrorism is a positive, gradual process. He uses the phrase, “finding common ground” guide ex-terrorists in their attempts work together with a variety of people to solve problems. As Marty noted, “I never talk about extremism or terrorism [when it pertains to the social enterprise]. I talk about ‘food for peace’. When we have common ground, we can talk about other things.”

The social enterprise also dealt tactfully with slander from a local Jihadist group by determinedly refusing to engage in counter-slanderering them. Avoiding direct conflict and willingness to “become anyone’s friend” emerged as consistently important values and tactics. Following the founders’ lead, Retro Cafe clients gradually became committed to using food diplomacy as an indirect, peaceful form of response. As Reno recalled:
... We were slandered; [the Jihadists said] that our meats are not halal...that this is a place for lovers, for all negative things. Maybe it’s due to its appearance...with dim lighting. So those “ikhwan” [brothers] don’t like a place like ours. It’s our challenge to disprove their assumptions [without counter slander or negative responses]. It’s proven [later] that they [a radical madrasah and their friends] often ordered our food for their meetings [regularly]. That’s what I like!

Overall, the social enterprise improves the ex-terrorists’ ability to manage social relations and tensions in a harmonious way, which I label as social maneuvering. On Sundays, the café serves Catholic people who come to the café after their church service. As Ferry stated, “one of my religious teachers approached me to rejoin his terrorist group for four times…but I politely refused him [without creating new enemies].” He also recalled, “My intense interaction with many people [of different religion, race and ethnicity] has taught me that the use of violence isn’t the best way to achieve what we want….I no longer see Jihad as war literally.”

Marty also provided an example of how Ferry worked harmoniously with non-Muslims in exploring entrepreneurial opportunities together. As Marty stated, “One of them works with Ferry, to create a new product… it’s fresh milk. He is not a Muslim [he is a Christian]. So he and Ferry went together to Jakarta to explore and collaborate.” Therefore, in one sense, the café reframes the concept of those that the terrorist ideology labels as enemies first into “neutral parties” for collaboration, business opportunities and mutual growth and later as potential friends. This was not imaginable before Ferry joined the cafe.

6.1.2.4. Role modeling

The last key dimension of emancipation is the role modeling process. Retro Cafe’s founder, Marty, trains and encourages his ex-terrorist colleagues to become role models for other terrorists who are still in prison and their sympathizers. Role modeling involves, first, improving the socio-economic status of the ex-terrorists and subsequently using their success and resources to attract other terrorists to join the social enterprise and influence their relations towards “different” others. So essentially, the ex-terrorists model their success and their new, satisfying meaningful lifestyle to attract others.
By encouraging the terrorists to emancipate other terrorists, along with struggling high school dropouts who are prone to joining the terrorists, the social enterprise turns into a self-directed initiative as disengaged terrorists begin to positively influence other terrorists to follow in their footsteps. Through this social enterprise, the former terrorists had found meaning in their lives as they realized that they were playing an important role in society — helping young people, including former terrorists, find meaningful work by teaching them how to run a business and then recruiting others to the cafe. On this, Marty stated:

Merely being employed is not everything for former terrorists.…They need to feel they are a part of society again. So I encouraged Ferry to start searching for others [terrorists and high school dropouts] willing to work at the cafe. This gave him [Ferry] a feeling that he was a useful member in the community because he was helping to solve [on a small scale] one of Indonesia’s acute social problems: unemployment.

Because Ferry felt comfortable with my approach, he began talking to [influencing] others [terrorists]. There was one guy who held a high rank [in a local terrorist organization, killed by Indonesian police in 2009]…[He] often came here and discussed [our business] with us....and talked about opening another cafe ... so I let them work together.

As a role model, Ferry was motivated to spread his positive influence to other terrorists to seek a new, nonviolent lifestyle. As Ferry said:

The function of paying them a visit [in prison], the function of giving them the skills ... to sustain my food business, will open the opportunity [for anyone] interested .... If one wants to do catering or dessert, he is welcome ... that’s what I often said to the brothers. So the brothers may choose ... “Oh I don’t like grilled seafood, I like making lamb curry.... I don’t like that but I like this and this and this.”... So by finding what they like can be motivational, without forcing these brothers. I just want to give them an example.

I feel that [influencing others is] a part of me that I would like to spread to friends... I visited the penitentiaries...[and brought grilled seafood with me and said to the prisoners.] “Look at this, the seafood...” They tried it and said it was delicious. Can you
make these [grilled seafood]? Now try, this is the recipe. This is how you do it. So, what if this can make money? Actually, some of them have an interest. Going forward...their children can be taught these life skills so they don't look up to their fathers [take their terrorist path] but to themselves [because] they have skills once they graduate from the pesantren [madrasahs].

Seeing their mentors’ industriousness and commitment to their work has helped the ex-terrorists see that there is a viable, interesting, fruitful path other than terrorism. The former-terrorists-turned-small-business-co-owners, -chefs, -managers, and -accountants, learned to leverage their skills and reputation and became coaches to help others start small businesses. Describing his own success as a role model, Ferry noted:

All 30 entrepreneurs [partners of a cooperative in a city in central Indonesia] unanimously agreed to pick me as the role model [after hearing Ferry’s success story]. I am now in the sub-division of food products...which are all under my management....So we went directly to each SME to check how they are progressing in batik [Javanese fabric dying], vinegar making, handicrafts, etc. I often give lectures there and visit our small to medium enterprise friends...I often receive invitations to give lectures to a few universities that were interested in entrepreneurship for young people.

6.2. Disengagement outcomes and contingencies

Terrorist disengagement via the Retro Cafe is evidenced by the broad new meaning and new social roles that the clients reported finding and their sense of liberation from their “old baggage.” For instance, Ferry reported how he had reframed his views of jihad and gained a wider worldview:

My priority is now around my family and this business. This is my new Jihad. I don’t want to go back to violence anymore. ... Somehow, I found that I like to cook, to serve people and also to send delivery food out to customers. From there, I realized that I have an interest in cooking [and serving] and the culinary business because food is among our
daily needs... I think [that] what [I learned] was the patience and desire to restart a new life... It’s like rebuilding things... I have dreams of having children... having “silaturahmi” [visits to friends and families for casual chats with] ...my family members in the village. There’s no more burden or intimidation that makes my life narrow or difficult....[and] I realized that my old world had many deficiencies, and many things weren’t fulfilled. So, in my view, going back to the old world would be a setback. We have a lot to learn from the past.

As I cycled recursively from data to theory and back to data, I began asking whether the social enterprise was an effective model to disengage all ranks of religious-based terrorists: the core versus the peripheral players (Helfstein and Wright, 2011). I made “constant comparisons” (Glaser 1998; Strauss and Corbin, 1990) across the data and found that the 10 ex-terrorist “graduates” from the café included both peripheral and core players. But none of them returned to terrorism; all of them became small business owners (e.g., foreign currency trading, glass installation, laptop sales and repair). That some former ‘core players’ have found a better, mainstream life style outside of terrorism through their experience in Retro Café lends some support to the efficacy of the SE as a new model of counter-terrorism. Importantly, as Marty explained, some of the ex-terrorist “graduates” still come to visit the café once in a while, which suggests that the sense of brotherhood developed through the café still exists and has a positive and lasting effect on the ‘brothers.’ This also suggests that long-term relationship management between the “reformers” and the “graduates” may be critical to keep the latter disengaged over a long period of time.

This analysis reveals several contingencies that may explain the disengagement outcomes of the social enterprise’s emancipatory approach: the terrorists’ depth of engagement in the terrorist organization, and the roles of reformers in the social enterprise. First, peripheral players may be the easiest to disengage while some core players could also be disengaged, suggesting that there was merit to the emancipatory social entrepreneurship approach. What remains to be known is whether the emancipatory social entrepreneurship is effective to disengage the majority of the core players, and if so, how. Second, access to terrorists is difficult and it appears that the “reformers” — those that hold legitimacy and trusted for fellow terrorists
— like Marty and Ferry, have the advantage over state and other organizations that do not have ex-terrorists on staff to connect with, recruit and emancipate fellow terrorists.

8. Theorizing about social entrepreneurship as emancipatory work.

Entrepreneurship scholars have shown increasing interest in the positive social impact of entrepreneurship beyond direct economic value (Zahra and Wright, 2016; Williams and Shepherd, 2016) and in particular its emancipatory potential (Rindova et al., 2009). The so-called ‘entrepreneuring as emancipation’ (Rindova et al., 2009) perspective broadens entrepreneurship from its narrow ‘wealth creation’ form (Welter et al., 2017); which is a form of scholarly emancipation in itself. Although entrepreneurship research has not examined religious terrorism and religious terrorism research does not conventionally study entrepreneurship, this paper provides insights to both fields and shows how entrepreneurship could revolutionize our understanding of its role as an approach to emancipate people captive to terrorist ideology and their own past behavior and the consequential social restrictions they face in the present and future. The emancipatory entrepreneurship perspective enables scholars to reframe questions about religious terrorism, from asking “punishing or correcting” terrorists to “emancipating” them and understanding its processes and contingencies.

In efforts to understand whether and how emancipation via entrepreneurship may offer an alternative pathway to disengagement, I studied ex-terrorists ‘who have been there and come back’ (joining and leaving terrorism for a better, mainstream lifestyle) via their culinary arts social enterprise that has disengaged 10 ex-terrorists, as a strategic research site. I theorized a process model that depicts the inter-relationships between the dimensions and processes of emancipation and the outcomes, along with their contingencies (Figure 1). The process model is grounded in the involvement-engagement-disengagement theory (Horgan, 2014) as its organizing framework, based on this study’s evidence that disengagement from radical ideology is also a process.

---Insert Figure 1 about here---

Existing confrontational and counseling based approaches in counter-terrorism are inadequate and counterproductive (Davies, 2017; Thrall and Goepner, 2017; Porges, 2015)
because, as this study shows, first, local terrorists view the state as an ‘enemy’, and second, it is difficult to find clerics who are legitimate and trusted by the terrorists. Hence, trust is a major issue. The involvement of “reformers” (or emancipators such as Marty), who could bridge different worlds (e.g., Islam and the West), is a central element of emancipatory entrepreneurship. But the question about who is or should be an emancipator is absent from the emancipatory entrepreneurship literature. The reformers occupy a unique social position (Battilana, 2006) with an unusual mix of social and economic skills that confers legitimacy and trust (in the eyes of fellow terrorists) as emancipators. An emancipated person can transform into an emancipator after developing a sense of compassion towards others (e.g., terrorists) with similar experiences and background (Miller et al., 2012). This parallels the “victim entrepreneurship” (Williams and Shepherd, 2014) where, driven by compassion, victims of natural disasters create new ventures to alleviate others’ suffering without a narrow focus on profit maximization.

Despite its centrality, the relationship between the emancipators and clients is largely undocumented in emancipatory entrepreneurship research. In this paper, I show the virtue of not confronting or challenging or criticizing clients’ ideological stance or forcing clients in any way. Rather, emancipation could start by winning the terrorists’ trust and equipping them with new skills and economic resources as priorities. Ideological change (disengagement) is easier to take place when the trust level between the emancipator and clients is high(er) at the later stages of emancipation. Emancipatory entrepreneurship also requires voluntary involvement and engagement from clients and giving them the freedom to make life choices and thinking about the consequences. But it does not mean giving unlimited freedom to clients as it requires a close and deep engagement of both emancipators and clients where the former assumes multiple roles, from a coach, a boss, to a family and a friend.

Importantly, emancipation is not limited to autonomy seeking, authoring and declaration making (Rindova et al., 2009) but, as this study shows, may include new elements that I categorized into market- (i.e., enterprise building as a means of creating and sharing resources) and relations-based (i.e., broadening of social networks, performing humbling work, building harmonious relations with various stakeholders, and role modeling) dimensions (see Figure 1).
Enterprise building increases clients’ *opportunity costs* to re-engage in terrorism because the enterprise improves their economic opportunities and resources. Broadening of social networks helps reduce suspicion on and develop *trust* in people with different religion, ethnicity and race. Humbling process helps clients to *empathize* (Hockerts, 2017) with and appreciate others’ needs, to accept criticism and even to entertain “the others”’ point of view – all of which weakens fundamentalist ideology (Muluk et al., 2013). Building harmonious relations with various stakeholders — a non-confrontational approach to solving social conflicts (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009; Praszker et al., 2010) — develops clients’ ability to manage social relations and tensions (*social maneuvering*). Role modeling develops clients’ *social status* (Lee, 2011) and may also enhance the clients’ own well-being, or the “helping others help oneself” theory (Schwartz and Sendor, 1999). Consequently, these processes help clients’ *reconstruct a new meaning in life, reconstruct new social roles and connections, and recognize and create opportunities* to spin off new ventures. However, the overall efficacy of the emancipatory entrepreneurship model likely depends on certain contingencies: the depth of indoctrination (i.e., degree of commitment and involvement in a terrorist ideology) of a client and degree of involvement of the “reformers” in emancipating clients. The deeper a client’s involvement in and commitment to the ideology, the harder it may be to emancipate him or her (see Figure 1).

This paper demonstrates how social entrepreneurship is an important *organizational form* for this emancipation, because it promotes engagement in valuable profit-generating activities without requiring a narrow focus on profit maximization. Importantly, because social entrepreneurship as a form of organizing permits this autonomy from an exclusive focus on profitability, it allowed the entrepreneurs I studied to achieve a degree of emancipation both for themselves and also for those they served. This shows how entrepreneurship in the form of social entrepreneurship can bridge the gap between emancipation as self- versus other-oriented described by Rindova and her colleagues (2009). Moreover, social entrepreneurship also allows autonomy to use the enterprise as a platform to share resources with others as a community. In the context of developing economies, often marked by state absence and withdrawal (Defourny et al., 2009), this study shows how entrepreneurship particularly in the form of social entrepreneurship can serve as an *agent of social welfare* to achieve social development and thus
extends the purpose of emancipation beyond its ‘for-profit’ context (Rindova et al., 2009; Jennings et al., 2016).

Last but not least, this paper offers substantial practical value in elucidating a potentially valuable tool in efforts to reduce terrorist violence. It shows the virtue of developing a sense of solidarity and brotherhood through group effort to achieve a common goal (profit). In turn, this replaces the brotherhood individuals had developed or hoped to develop by joining terrorist groups. It suggests greater involvement of “reformers” as “evangelists” to reform terrorist movement from within. It also reveals the merits of hospitality-based entrepreneurial ventures (e.g., cafes) as “spaces of encounter” (Mayblin et al., 2015; Valentine, 2008) with different others and as bridges to a mainstream lifestyle. Overall, it highlights the logic of emancipation as a new paradigm in counter-terrorism work.

9. Avenues for future research

This article’s findings open several new avenues for future research. First, the single revelatory case in this study limits the generalizability of the findings. More research is needed involving a larger number of core and peripheral terrorists (Helfstein and Wright, 2011) working within a social enterprise to examine how social enterprise programs can help to disengage terrorists. Second, entrepreneuring is a well-respected and high social status occupation in Indonesia (Begley and Tan, 2001; Kristiansen and Indarti, 2004) and is therefore a viable “escape route” for terrorists. This raises the question of whether different institutional contexts favor entrepreneurship as an alternative pathway for terrorists, and, if so, how. Third, hospitality-based ventures (e.g., cafes) appear to be appropriate vehicles of emancipatory social entrepreneurship and spaces of inclusion. This opens up new opportunities to compare the efficacy of hospitality based versus to non-hospitality based ventures as enablers of terrorist disengagement and between the emancipatory approach versus confrontational- and counseling-based approaches more broadly. Last but not least, this study opens new avenues to study how ideologists socially and discursively construct reality and how reformers and repentent terrorists re-construct social reality and their ‘competitive dynamics’ (Chen and Miller, 2012) in the market for ideology. Theoretically, each of these results and questions expands and can inform
research on entrepreneurship as emancipation in a wide variety of contexts, most of them less challenging than creating new lives for ex-terrorists.

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### Table 1

#### Data Collection

| Name of informant | Education background | Past role(s) | Current role & institution | Length of interview | Recorded (or not) | Non recorded data |
|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|----------------------------|---------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Marty (an alias)  | A madrasah in central Indonesia; Bachelor (Literature), central Indonesia; Master (Politics), Western Europe | Swore an oath of allegiance to a local terrorist movement; Freelance tour guide; Marketing manager of a large hospitality group in Jakarta; Journalist for an English language newspaper in Indonesia | Founder, Retro Cafe; Founder of a local NGO | 9 hours (3 interviews) | Yes (for 7 hours) | 5-day intense interaction with the informant in an SE symposium, at the author’s invitation and institution; Skype discussion; Facebook; WhatsApp messaging. |
| Perry (an alias)  | A madrasah in eastern Indonesia; Bachelor (Literature), in central Indonesia; Master (Politics), Western Europe | The richest boy in his village; A jihadist fighter; Imprisoned for 10 years | Shareholder, Retro Cafe; Spun off new businesses (i.e., tour & travel) | 6 hours (2 interviews) | Yes | 4 email exchanges; Facebook observation. |
| Benny (an alias)  | Bachelor (Politics) in central Indonesia | Non-terrorist; A journalist in an international newspaper in Indonesia Research Director of a local NGO | CEO, Retro Cafe (successor of the founder) | 5 hour (1 interview) | No | 5-hour informal discussion on the progress of the SEs; the SEs’ “clients”; succession process. |
| Reno (an alias)   | School drop-out | Small scale trading (failed); Worked at an eatery | Operations Manager, Retro Cafe | 3 hours (1 interview) | Yes | 2 email exchanges. |
| Zaza (an alias)   | Bachelor (Psychology), Indonesia; Master (Psychology), Indonesia; PhD (Psychology), Australia | Terrorism psychologist at a state agency in Indonesia; Psychologist of a private clinic; Head of an NGO dealing with psychological problems | Terrorist psychologist at a state agency in Indonesia; | 6 hours (2 interviews) | Yes | 5 email exchanges; her own prior research on research on terrorism in the prison; One conversation via phone call (30 minutes). |
| Chelsea (an alias)| Bachelor (Politics), U.S.; Master (Politics), U.S. | n/a | A U.S. terrorism expert | 3 hours (1 interview) | Yes | 2 email exchanges. |

Secondary data collected in 2013 and 2016

Name of media sources & number of articles (total = 64):

- Jakarta Globe (10), Jakarta Post (10), Asia Times (2), Kompas (5), BBC.co.uk (1), Washington Post (1), Financial Times (1), South China Morning Post (2), Forbes Indonesia (1), Tempo (2), The Star (1), Daily Star (1), WesternAustraliaToday (1), TheAustralasian (1), AustralianBroadcastingCorporation (1), SBS.com.au (1), SoloPos (1), Suara Islam (1), Detik (1), Suara Merdeka (1), LeFigaro.fr (1), PBS (1), VOA news (1), Khabar South East Asia (2), East Asia Forum (2), NPR (1), Radio Netherlands (1), AlJazeera (1), PhilStar (1), Ashoka.org (1), Youtube videos (3), TEDTalks (2), KompasTV (1), a film documentary on the recruitment of Islamic State members (1).
Figure 1
A Process Model of Social Entrepreneurship as Emancipatory Work

Emancipation Dimensions
(what is done for clients)

Market-Based Emancipation:
Enterprise building as a means to create and share resources

Relations-Based Emancipation:
Broadening of social networks, Humbling process, Building harmonious relations, Role modeling

Emancipation Processes
(what changes occur with clients)

Opportunity cost to re-engage
Trust in others
Empathy towards others
Social maneuvering ability
Social status

Emancipation Outcomes
(what the emancipated clients become)

New meaning in life
New social roles
New venture opportunities

Depth of prior indoctrination
Involvement of “reformers” in emancipation process