Uncertain Evidence in Probabilistic Models and Stochastic Simulators

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Abstract

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as “uncertain evidence.” We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method “distributional evidence” as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey’s rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as “correct.” We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

1. Introduction

In classical Bayesian inference, the task is to infer the posterior distribution \(p(x|y)\) over the latent variable \(x\) given (an observed) \(y\). The joint distribution (or model), \(p(y,x)\), is assumed known, and is typically factorized as \(p(y,x) = p(y|x)p(x)\) where \(p(y|x)\) and \(p(x)\) is the likelihood and prior respectively. This paper deals with the case where \(y\) is not observed exactly; rather it is associated with uncertainty, which we refer to as “uncertain evidence.” This is a fairly common scenario as these uncertainties may stem from: observational errors; distrust in the source providing \(y\); or when \(y\) is derived (stochastically) from some other data.

As a running example, consider the experiment of recording the time \(t\) it takes for a ball to drop to the ground in order to determine the acceleration due to gravity, \(g\). Taking some prior belief about the value of \(g\), we may solve this problem using Bayesian inference. That is, we infer \(p(g|t) \propto p(g)p(t|g)\), where \(p(g)\) is the prior density of \(g\) and \(p(t|g)\) is the likelihood representing the physical model (or simulation) of the time \(t\) given \(g\). In this setup, the uncertainty about \(t\) given \(g\) is due to neglecting air resistance or ignoring variations in the distance the ball drops as a result of vibrations etc. Assume next, that the observations (or data) is given as in Table 1. It is not immediately obvious how the uncertainty relates to \(y\) and there are arguably at least two valid interpretations of the information in Table 1. (1) It describes a distribution of the real time \(t\). For example, the real time is normally distributed with mean \(0.5s\) and standard deviation \(0.05s\). (2) It describes additional uncertainty on the predicted time and the observed value is, indeed, \(0.5s\). For example, given the predicted time \(\hat{t}\) the observed time \(t\) is normally distributed with mean \(\hat{t}\) and standard deviation \(0.5s\). Importantly, in either case the uncertainty can be represented with a given external distribution, \(q(\cdot|\hat{t})\), which describes a stochastic relationship between \(t\) and an auxiliary variables \(\zeta\). We consider in case (1) and (2) the distributions \(q(t|\zeta)\) and \(q(\zeta|\hat{t})\). In the former case \(\zeta\) is left implicit (something gave rise to the uncertainty), and in the latter \(\zeta = \hat{t}\) and the observation is \(\hat{t} = 0.5s\). These two approaches are fundamentally different operations that may lead to profoundly different inference results.

Table 1: Uncertain observation of the time \(t\) in the ball dropping example.

| VALUE [s] | ±[s] |
|----------|------|
| \(t\)    | 0.5  | 0.05 |

The topic of observations associated with uncertainty has been studied since at least 1965 (Jeffrey, 1965). Of particular relevance are the work of Jeffrey (1965) and Shafer (1981); and Pearl (1988), giving rise to Jeffrey’s rule (Jeffrey, 1965) and virtual evidence (Pearl, 1988). In the example above, inference using approach (1) and (2) corresponds to Jeffrey’s rule and virtual evidence respectively.

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2Ideally one would remodel the system to account for such uncertainties, but this is rarely easy to do.

3In this context, external refers to a distribution provided from some external source.
Since then other approaches, closely related to Jeffrey’s rule and virtual evidence has been proposed (e.g., Valtorta et al., 2002; Tolpin et al., 2021; Yao, 2022). While each approach has its own merits and is applicable under (almost) the same circumstances, the original literature and most prior work comparing these methods, (e.g., Pearl, 2001; Valtorta et al., 2002; Chan & Darwiche, 2005; Ben Mrad et al., 2013; Tolpin et al., 2021), are reluctant to take a concrete stand on when each is more appropriate. This paints an obfuscated picture of what to do, practically, when presented with uncertain evidence. This obfuscation becomes problematic when practitioners outside the field of statistics deal with uncertain evidence and look to the literature for ways to address it, especially, considering the increased use of Bayesian inference in high-fidelity simulators and probabilistic models (e.g., Papamakarios et al., 2019; Baydin et al., 2019; Lavin et al., 2021; Liang et al., 2021; van de Schoot et al., 2021; Wood et al., 2022; Mishra-Sharma & Cranmer, 2022; Munk et al., 2022). For example, in physics it is not uncommon that likelihoods are given relatively ad-hoc forms where some notion of “measurement error” is attached to uncertain observations. However, the underlying (stochastic) physical model is usually taken to be understood perfectly. For example when inferring: the Hubble parameter via supernovae brightness (e.g., Riess et al., 2022); pre-merger parameters of black-hole/neutron star binaries via gravitational waves (e.g., Thrane & Talbot, 2019; Dax et al., 2021); neutron star orbital/spin-down/post-Newtonian parameters via pulsar timings (e.g., Lentati et al., 2014; Vigeland & Vallisneri, 2014); planetary orbital parameters via radial velocity/transit-time observations (e.g., Schulze-Hartung et al., 2012; Feroz & Hobson, 2014; Liang et al., 2021). In most cases a Gaussian likelihood is assumed for the data, but exactly how the error relates to the data generation process is not specified. If uncertainties about simulator/model observations arise given external data, then usually Jeffrey’s rule would apply, but it appears that virtual evidence is more often employed.

It is the purpose of this paper to provide novel insights, theoretical contributions and concrete guidance as to how to deal with observations with associated uncertainty as it pertains to Bayesian inference. We show, experimentally, how misinterpretations of uncertain evidence can lead to vastly different inference results; emphasizing the importance of carefully accounting for uncertain evidence.

2. Background

Bayesian inference aims to characterize the posterior distribution of the latent random vector $x$ given the observed random vector $y$. When observing $y$ with certainty the inference problem is “straightforward” in the sense that $p(x|y) = p(y|x)/p(y)$. However, exact inference is often infeasible as $p(y)$ is usually intractable, but if the joint $p(y,x)$ is calculable then inference is achievable via approximate methods such as importance sampling (e.g., Hammersley & Handscomb, 1964), Metropolis-Hastings (Metropolis & Ulam, 1949; Metropolis et al., 1953; Hastings, 1970), and Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (Duane et al., 1987; Neal, 1994). Unfortunately, standard Bayesian inference is incompatible with uncertain evidence where exact values of $y$ are unavailable.

Before discussing ways to treat uncertain evidence, we first introduce the highest level abstraction representing uncertain evidence. Specifically, we consider $\epsilon \in \mathcal{E}$, where $\mathcal{E}$ is a set of “statements” specifying the uncertainty about $y$. For example, in the drop of a ball example $\epsilon$ would be a statement represented as Table 1. In contrast $\zeta$ is a lower level abstraction which is encoded in $\epsilon$. Dealing with uncertain evidence is a matter of decoding or interpreting $\epsilon$, possibly identifying $\zeta$ and relating it to $p(y,x)$. The canonical example of interpreting uncertain evidence, as introduced by Jeffrey (1965, p. 165), is “observation by candlelight,” which motivated Jeffrey’s rule:

**Definition 2.1 (Jeffrey’s Rule (Jeffrey, 1965)).** Given $p(y,x)$, let the interpretation of a given $\epsilon \in \mathcal{E}$ lead to $y$ being associated with uncertainty, conditioned on auxiliary evidence $\zeta$—where $\zeta$ may be unknown—and denote the decoded uncertainty by $q(y|\zeta)$. Then the updated (posterior) distribution $p(x|\zeta)$ is:

$$p(x|\zeta) = \mathbb{E}_{q(y|\zeta)} [p(x|y)].$$

**In particular,** one considers the updated joint $p(y,x|\zeta) = p(x|y)q(y|\zeta)$, such that $q(y|\zeta)$ is a marginal of $p(y,x|\zeta)$.

Jeffrey envisioned the existence of the auxiliary variable (or vector), $\zeta$; however, Jeffrey’s rule is often defined without it (e.g., Chan & Darwiche, 2005). Nonetheless, we argue that reasoning about an auxiliary variable (or vector) $\zeta$ is the more intuitive perspective as some evidence must have given rise to $q$. Further, accompanying the introduction of Jeffrey’s rule is the preservation of the conditional distribution of $x$ upon applying Jeffrey’s rule, see e.g. Jeffrey (1965; Diaconis & Zabell, 1982; Valtorta et al., 2002) and Chan & Darwiche (2005). That is, the evidence $\zeta$ giving rise to $q(y|\zeta)$ must not also alter the conditional distribution of $x$ given $y$. Mathematically, Jeffrey’s rule requires that, $p(x|y,\zeta) = p(x|y)$. This, for instance, relates to the commutativity of Jeffrey’s rule, which is treated in full detail by Diaconis & Zabell (1982), and briefly discuss in Appendix A.

In contrast to Jeffrey’s rule is virtual evidence as proposed by Pearl (1988). Virtual evidence also includes an auxiliary virtual variable (or vector), but does so via the likelihood $q(\zeta|y,x) := q(\zeta|y)$, with the only parents of $\zeta$ being $y$: 

$$q(\zeta|y,x) := q(\zeta|y),$$

where
Virtual evidence
\[ p(y|x) q(\zeta|y) \]
Jeffrey’s rule

Figure 1: Jeffrey’s rule compared to virtual evidence in terms of the auxiliary evidence \( \zeta \). Both virtual evidence and Jeffrey’s rule are defined in terms of the base model \( p(y,x) \).

Definition 2.2 (Virtual evidence \cite{Pearl1988}). Given \( p(y,x) \) and suppose a given \( e \in E \) leads to the interpretation that we extend \( p(y,x) \) with an auxiliary virtual variable (or vector) \( \zeta \) such that: (1) in the discrete case, where the values of \( y \in \{y_k\}_{k=1}^K \) are mutually exclusive, the uncertain evidence is decoded to as likelihood ratio \( \lambda = \{\lambda_k\}_{k=1}^K \):

\[ \lambda_1 : \cdots : \lambda_K = q(\zeta|y_1) : \cdots : q(\zeta|y_K). \]  

The posterior over \( x \) given uncertain evidence is \cite{ChanDarwiche2005} a result we also prove in Appendix B.

\[ p(x|\zeta) = \sum_{k=1}^K \lambda_k p(y_k,x). \]  

(2) If \( y \) is continuous, decoding \( e \) leads to the virtual likelihood \( q(\zeta|y) \) such that the posterior is proportional to the (virtual) joint

\[ p(x|\zeta) \propto \int p(\zeta,y,x) \ dy = \int q(\zeta|y)p(y,x) \ dy. \]  

In practice, in the continuous case one can approximate the posterior using standard approximate inference algorithms requiring only the evaluation of the joint. In the discrete case, Eq. [3] the posterior inference is exact assuming a known \( p(y_i) \) for all \( i \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \). When comparing Jeffrey’s rule and virtual evidence \cite{Pearl1988,Valtortaetal2002,Jacobs2019} we can do so in terms of \( \zeta \) and the corresponding graphical model (Figure 1). This figure is a graphical representation of how Jeffrey’s rule and virtual evidence relate \( \zeta \) to the existing probabilistic model, \( p(y,x) \).

Particularly, Jeffrey’s rule and virtual evidence affect the evidence relating to the existing probabilistic model, \( p(y,x) \). Particularly, Jeffrey’s rule pertains to uncertainty about \( y \) given some evidence, while virtual evidence requires reasoning about the likelihood \( q(\zeta|y) \).

It is (perhaps) not surprising that one may apply Jeffrey’s rule, yet implement it as a special case of virtual evidence, by choosing a particular form of likelihood ratios, Equation (2), and vice versa \cite{Pearl1988,ChanDarwiche2005}. However, this is of purely algorithmic significance as the two approaches remain fundamentally different.

A third approach to uncertain evidence, recently introduced by \cite{Tolpinetal2021}, treats the uncertain evidence on \( y \) as an event. This approach, which we refer to as distributional evidence, defines a likelihood on the event \( \{y \sim D_q\} \) (reads as “the event that the distribution of \( y \) is \( D_q \) with density \( q(y)\)”) and considers the auxiliary variable \( \zeta = \{y \sim D_q\} \): Definition 2.3 (Distributional evidence \cite{Tolpinetal2021}). Let \( p(y,x) = p(y|x)p(x) \) be the joint distribution with a known factorization. Assume the interpretation of a given \( e \in E \) yields a density \( q(y) \), with distribution \( D_q \). Define the likelihood \( p(y \sim D_q|x) \) as:

\[ p(x|\zeta) = \exp \mathbb{E}_{q(y)} [\ln p(y|x)] \]  

where \( \zeta = \{y \sim D_q\} \) and \( Z(x) \) is a normalization constant that generally depends on \( x \). Typically we drop explicitly writing \( \zeta \) and simply write \( q(y \sim D_q|x) \). See \cite{Tolpinetal2021} for sufficient conditions for which \( Z(x) < \infty \).

3. Which Approach?

The lack of a general consensus on how best to approach uncertain evidence means that it is difficult to know what to do, in practical terms, when faced with uncertain evidence. In isolation, each approach discussed in the previous section appears well supported, even when applied to the same model \cite{BennMadetal2013}. However, the underlying arguments remain somewhat circumstantial. Prior work tends to create contexts tailored for each approach and it is unclear how reliable or generalizable those contexts are. As such, much prior work is not particularly instructive when deducing which approach to adopt for new applications that do not fit those prior context. We argue that the apparent philosophical discourse fundamentally stem from a disagreement about the model \( M \in \mathcal{M} \) in which we seek to do inference given uncertain evidence \( e \in E \). This can be framed as an inference problem where we seek to find (or directly define) \( p(M|e) \). The significance of this perspective is that reasoning about the triplet \( M \in \mathcal{M}, e \in E \), and \( p(M|e) \) makes for a better foundation that encourages discussions about and makes clear the underlying assumptions.

How then should we define \( p(M|e) \)? In the general case, reaching consensus is close to impossible as it requires fully specifying \( \mathcal{M} \) and \( E \) (all possible models and conceivable evidences). However, while universal consensus is arguably unattainable; “local” consensus might be. Here locality refers to defining \( p(M|e) \) on constrained and application dependent subsets \( \mathcal{E} \subset E \) and \( \mathcal{M} \subset \mathcal{M} \). This perspective was considered by \cite{GroveHalpern1997}, yet does not seem to have resurfaced in this context since \cite{GroveHalpern1997} define \( \mathcal{M} \) in terms of a prior \( p(M) \) and implicitly
defines $\bar{E}$ as a set of trusted statements pertaining to (conditional) probabilities. They further define the likelihood $p(\epsilon|M)$ which evaluates to one if the model $M$ is consistent with the evidence $\epsilon$ and zero otherwise. From this they are able to calculate $p(M|\epsilon) \propto p(\epsilon|M)p(M)$.

### 3.1. Uncertain Evidence Interpretation

We propose to limit the consideration of $\bar{E}$ and $\tilde{M}$ to constrained, but widely applicable (and application dependent) subsets set in the context of inference. To construct $\bar{E}$ and $\tilde{M}$ we begin with the assumption that a base model, $p(y|x)$, is always available. We further assume that $\bar{E}$ contains evidence in the form of statements which we interpret in a literal sense. To ensure inference with exact evidence is possible, we require that $\bar{E}$ contain evidences that encode exact evidence about $y$. For example $\epsilon =$ “the value of $y$ is $\tilde{y}$.” Finally, we constrain the form of uncertain evidence by requiring $\epsilon$ to encode uncertainty in one of three ways: (I) $\epsilon$ encodes a distribution $q$ over $y$, for example $\epsilon =$ “The distribution of $y$ is $q(y|\zeta)$”. (II) $\epsilon$ encodes a conditional distribution about $y$ given $x=\tilde{x}$, for example $\epsilon =$ “if $x=\tilde{x}$ then the distribution of $y$ is $q(y|x=\tilde{x})$.” (III) Uncertain evidence is explicitly expressed in terms of a likelihood of $y$, for example let $\gamma \in \{0, 1\}$ and consider $\epsilon =$ ‘$\gamma = 1$ is twice as likely to explain the evidence compared to $\gamma = 0$.” We define $\tilde{M}$ implicitly by requiring that the random variable $\epsilon$ partitions $M$ such that the posterior $p(x|\epsilon)$ takes a certain form:

**Definition 3.1.** Given $\epsilon \in \bar{E}$, we define $p(M|\epsilon)$ and $\tilde{M}$ implicitly through the partitions of $M$ as generated by $\epsilon$, such that inference given $\epsilon$ becomes,

$$p(x|\epsilon) = E_{M(y)}[p(x|M)] = \begin{cases} p(x|y), & \text{if } \epsilon \text{ is exact,} \\ \int p(x|y)q(y|\zeta)dy, & \text{if } \epsilon \text{ is type (I),} \\ \frac{p(x|y) \cdot |D_y|}{p(\gamma = q(y)|\zeta)} |\zeta|, & \text{if } \epsilon \text{ is type (II),} \\ \int p(x|y)q(y|\zeta)dy, & \text{if } \epsilon \text{ is type (III)}, \end{cases}$$

where type (I-III) leads to Jeffrey’s rule, distributional evidence, and virtual evidence respectively. We emphasize that the definitions of $\bar{E}$, $\tilde{M}$, and $p(M|\epsilon)$ are not fundamental truths. Rather, they are subject to our beliefs about how one ought to approach uncertain evidence in a form found in $\tilde{E}$. In particular, notice that type (I) and (II) evidences are similar in that they describe a distribution of $y$. The crucial difference lies in the conditional relationship giving rise to said probability. In type (I) we assume uncertainty is due to external (unknown) evidence, represented by $\zeta$ not found in $x$ or $y$. On the other hand, in type (II) $\zeta$ is $x$ (or a subset thereof). Even though we argue that Jeffrey’s rule is preferable given type (I) uncertain evidence, it turns out there are cases where Jeffrey’s rule is, in fact, inconsistent with $p(y,x)$—which we show in the following section. Nonetheless, from a mathematical perspective, Jeffrey’s rule can still be applied. This is justified, in part, as Jeffrey’s rule leads to a “new” model $p(y,x|\zeta)$ which is closest to $p(y,x)$ as measured by the KL divergence $D_{KL}(p(y,x|\zeta)||p(y,x))$ constrained such that $\int p(y,x|\zeta)dy = q(y|\zeta)$ [Peng et al. 2010 and citations therein]. Despite this, if Jeffrey’s rule is inconsistent with $p(y,x)$ it may preferable to either: (1) update the model $p(y,x)$ to be compatible with the given uncertain evidence or (2) acquire compatible data—be it exact observations or better uncertain evidence.

### 3.2. Consistency

We define consistency in terms of whether or not one can extend the joint distribution with auxiliary variables (or vectors) such as to contain the uncertainty encoded in $\epsilon \in \bar{E}$.

**Definition 3.2 (Consistency).** Consider an auxiliary variable (or vector) $\zeta$ and the associated density $q$ derived from $\epsilon$, where $q$ can take the form of either $q(\gamma|\cdot)$ or $q(\cdot|\zeta)$. We then say that Jeffrey’s rule, virtual evidence, and distributional evidence are consistent with $p(y,x)$ if a joint exists, $p(\zeta,y,x) = p(\zeta|y,x)p(y,x)$, such that either $p(\zeta|\cdot) = q(\cdot|\cdot)$ or $p(\cdot|\zeta) = q(\cdot|\cdot)$ depending on the form of $q$.

Both virtual evidence and distributional evidence are, by their definition, always consistent. Virtual evidence is defined as an extension of the graphical model $p(y,x)$ through the auxiliary variable (or vector) $\zeta$ and its likelihood $q(\gamma|\cdot)$. That is we can always consider $p(\gamma|\cdot) := q(\gamma|\cdot)$ such that $p(\zeta,y,x) := p(\zeta|\cdot)p(\gamma)\gamma(y,x)$. Similarly, in the case of distributional evidence, we can consider $p(\zeta|\gamma) := p(\cdot|x)p(\gamma|x)p(x)$. However, despite distributional evidence being consistent, notice that it introduces $\zeta$ as independent of $y$. As such, distributional evidence introduces an entirely new likelihood with respect to $x$ and we can consider $p(\zeta|x)p(x)$ as a new model. This results in the loss of the physical interpretation of the relationship between $y$ and $x$ as defined through $p(y|x)$ even though $q(\gamma|\cdot)$ is derived from $p(y|x)$. On the other hand, in the case of Jeffrey’s rule, we cannot guarantee consistency, and so one needs to be mindful of the potential mismatch between the base model and $q(y|\zeta)$. While [Diaconis & Zabell 1982] provide an extensive and theoretical examination of Jeffrey’s rule they leave out important points concerning necessary conditions for Jeffrey’s rule to satisfy consistency that we present here and prove in Appendix B.1.

**Theorem 3.3.** Necessary and sufficient conditions for Jeffrey’s rule to be consistent with respect to $p(y,x)$ given $q(y|\zeta)$ (that is, there exists a joint $p(\gamma,y,x)$ such that $p(y|\zeta) = q(y|\zeta)$):
1. (Necessary and sufficient) There exists \( p(\zeta | y) \) such that for all \( \zeta \) and \( y \),

\[
q(y | \zeta) = \frac{p(\zeta | y)p(y)}{\mathbb{E}_{p(y)}[p(\zeta | y)]}
\]

2. (Necessary) If \( q(y | \zeta) = \prod_{i=1}^{D} q(y_i | \zeta) \) then it must hold that: (1) \( \zeta \) is a random vector \( \zeta = (\zeta_1, \ldots, \zeta_D) \) where each \( \zeta_i \) uniquely links to \( y_i \), such that \( q(y_i | \zeta) = q(y_i | \zeta_i) \) and (2) \( x \) is likewise multivariate and each \( x_i \) uniquely links to \( y_i \), such that \( p(y_i | x) = p(y_i | x_i) \).

3. (Necessary) Let \( p(\zeta) = \mathbb{E}[p(\zeta | y)] \), then it must hold that: (1) \( \text{Cov}[y] \geq \mathbb{E}[\text{Cov}[y | \zeta]] \), where \( \geq \) denotes determinant inequality. (2) For each \( y_i \) it holds that \( \text{Var}[y_i] \geq \mathbb{E}[\text{Var}[y_i | \zeta]] \). In particular, if the variance \( \text{Var}[y_i | \zeta] = \sigma^2 \) is constant and independent of \( \zeta \) we have \( \text{Var}[y_i] \geq \sigma^2 \) with equality if and only if \( \mathbb{E}[y_i | \zeta] = \mu \) is constant.

Unfortunately, validating consistency of Jeffrey’s rule is in general infeasible as Theorem 3.3.1 (1) is usually intractable to assess. One can only reliably conclude if Jeffrey’s rule is inconsistent in special cases via Theorem 3.3.2-3.

### 3.3. Distributional Evidence: Exact or Implied Inference?

While we generally prefer Jeffrey’s rule over distributional evidence and although Jeffrey’s rule is technically applicable given type (II) uncertain evidence, why then do we prefer distributional evidence given type (II)? If we were to use Jeffrey’s rule in this case its interpretation becomes unclear if \( q \) is of the form \( q = g(x) \) where \( g(\cdot) \) is a selector function which selects a subset of the variables in \( x \). As we ultimately seek to infer a posterior over the latent variables given \( \zeta = g(x) \), it violates the intuition that \( \zeta \) should be an auxiliary variable (or vector) not found in \( x \), which is required by Jeffrey’s rule. Specifically, we can consider two kinds of uncertain evidence of this form: (1) a functional \( g(y | g(x)) \) specified for all \( x \) and \( y \) and (2) a conditional form such that \( g \) is a distribution specified for only a specific value of \( g(x) = g(\hat{x}) \). In case (1) one arguably ought to replace the model \( p(y, x) \rightarrow q(y | g(x))p(x) \) such that \( q(y | g(x)) \) becomes the new likelihood. However, in case (2) we cannot simply replace the model, as we do not know the form of \( q \) for any other value of \( g(x) \) than \( g(\hat{x}) \). In particular, we can think of case (2) as the limiting case of observing \( D = \{y_i\}_{i=1}^{N} \) for \( N \rightarrow \infty \), where \( y_i \sim D, p(y | g(x) = g(\hat{x})) \), where the empirical distribution of \( D \) in the limit represents \( p(y | g(x) = g(\hat{x})) \). As pointed out also by Tolpin et al. (2021) there is a similarity between observing \( D \) for large \( N \) and instead condition on \( q(y) \) associated with the empirical distribution represented by \( D \).

From this perspective, distributional evidence provides for inferring \( p(x | y \sim D) \) as opposed to \( p(x | D) \). This view is useful, particularly when \( D \) is unavailable yet its distributive representation, \( q \), is. One caveat to distributional evidence, that Tolpin et al. (2021) do not discuss, is whether or not \( Z(x) \) in Equation (5) is calculable. In particular, Tolpin et al. (2021) appears to leave it as a normalization constant that is never calculated. That is, they compute the function \( f(y \sim D) | x = p(y \sim D | x)Z(x) \) when performing inference, where \( f \) is the numerator in Equation (5)—a “pseudo-likelihood.” The difference between computing \( p(y \sim D | x) \) and \( f(y \sim D | x) \) in the context of inference is:

\[
p(x | y \sim D_q) \propto \begin{cases} p(y \sim D_q | x)p(x) & \text{if known } Z(x), \\ f(y \sim D_q | x)p(x) & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}
\]

While the first expression above leads to posterior inference as expected, the second expression leads to an implied posterior via the implied joint:

\[
f(y \sim D_q | x)p(x) = p(y \sim D_q | x)p(x)Z(x) = p(y \sim D_q | x)\hat{p}_a(x),
\]

where \( \hat{p}_a(x) = p(x)Z(x) \) is a distributional evidence adjusted unnormalized prior on \( x \). As such, regardless of whether or not a known \( Z(x) \) is available, the same likelihood on the event \( \{y \sim D_q\} \) but different priors on \( x \) is used. To ensure that the use of Equation (7) leads to a valid posterior, it is enough to show that the adjusted prior \( p_a(x) \propto \hat{p}_a(x) \) normalizes in \( x \):

**Theorem 3.4.** Under the same assumptions as in Theorem 1 in the paper of Tolpin et al. (2021), the adjusted prior \( p_a(x) = p(x)Z(x) / C \) normalizes. That is \( C < \infty \).

**Proof of Theorem 3.4** Assume, as done by Tolpin et al. (2021), that the set of distributions \( Q \) is implicitly defined through the set of parameters \( \Theta \) where \( \theta \in \Theta \) parameterizes \( q_\theta \) such that \( Q = \{q_\theta \theta \in \Theta\} \). Assume further that \( \sup_y \int q_\theta(x) d\theta < \infty \). Then the bound on \( Z(x) \), as derived by Tolpin et al. (2021), is independent of \( x \). It then follows that \( Z(x) \leq \bar{Z} \) for all \( x \) such that:

\[
C = \int \hat{p}_a(x) \, dx = \int p(x)Z(x) \, dx \leq \int p(x)\bar{Z} \, dx = \bar{Z} < \infty.
\]

This implies that \( p_a(x) = p(x)Z(x) / C \) is a valid marginal as it normalizes in \( x \), which concludes the proof.

### 3.4. Complexity

The primary consideration when comparing Jeffrey’s rule, virtual evidence, and distributional evidence, is their applicability given a certain type of uncertain evidence. In a
We carry out three experiments in which the appropriate treatment of the given uncertain evidence is to use Jeffrey’s rule, virtual evidence, and distributional evidence. As we illustrate in Section 4.1, this difference may range from significant to negligible and is a function of the base model as well as the uncertain evidence. Therefore, when inference is time-sensitive, it may be beneficial to initially perform inference using an approach of low computational complexity and then subsequently follow up with the appropriate approach to verify inference results. Our complexity analysis assumes no analytical solution is feasible, and that approximate inference is employed; that is, sampling-based inference methods as well as Monte Carlo estimations of expectations is used. We use $c_l$ to denote the complexity for achieving adequate approximate posterior inference, and we use $n_c$ to denote the number of required samples for adequate Monte Carlo estimations of expectations. Note that this relies on the additional assumption that inferring $p(x|y)$ has the same complexity as inferring $p(x|\zeta) = \int p(x,y|\zeta) dy$. From this we find that the complexity of Jeffrey’s rule, Equation (1), requires estimating the expected posterior leading to a complexity of $c_l n_c$, while virtual evidence is $c_l$ as it only involves inferring the posterior under the joint given by Equation (4). As for distributional evidence, Equation (5), if the new likelihood is analytically tractable the complexity is $c_l$, since it requires only inferring a posterior distribution. If the likelihood is approximated using Monte Carlo estimation the complexity increases to $c_l n_c$. Therefore, virtual evidence is, in general, more efficient than both Jeffrey’s rule and distributional evidence.

Finally, we note that a reduction of the complexity gap between Jeffrey’s rule and virtual evidence is achievable using amortized inference (Gershman & Goodman, 2014). Amortized inference reduces the cost of inference in exchange for an upfront computational cost. Therefore, estimating an expected posterior, which is the case for Jeffrey’s rule, can be significantly sped up.

4. Experiments

In this section we illustrate the importance of making the appropriate interpretation and treatment of uncertain evidence.

We carry out three experiments in which the appropriate treatment of the given uncertain evidence is to use Jeffrey’s rule. We then compare against making a misinterpretation leading to either virtual evidence or distributional evidence. We demonstrate how such misinterpretations can lead to inference results that range from being significantly different to almost indistinguishable. Most prior work (e.g., Chan & Darwiche, 2005; Ben Mrad et al., 2013; Mrad et al., 2015; Jacobs, 2019) compares only Jeffrey’s rule and virtual evidence for discrete problems, whereas we focus on the continuous case.

Figure 2: Analytical posterior results given uncertain evidence $q(y|\zeta)$ using Jeffrey’s rule, virtual evidence, and distributional evidence. (Left) We set $\mu_x = 1$, $\sigma_x = 1$, $\sigma_y|x = 0.3$, $\sigma_q = 1$, and $\zeta = 2$ from which we derive the remaining means and (conditional) variances as described in Section 4.1. (Right) same as (left) except with $\mu_x = 0$, $\sigma_x = 5$, $\sigma_y|x = 0.5$, $\sigma_q = 0.5$, and $\zeta = 2$.

4.1. Uncertain Evidence and the Multivariate Gaussian

We consider a multivariate Gaussian model where the base model factorizes as $p(x,y) = p(x)p(y|x)$ where $p(x) = \mathcal{N}(\mu_x, \sigma_x^2)$ and $p(y|x) = \mathcal{N}(x, \sigma_y^2|x)$. The aim is to infer the posterior distribution of $x$, ideally given an exact observation of $y$. However, we assume this is unavailable and instead we are given uncertain evidence, $e$, of type (I); that is we are given the density $q(y|\zeta) = \mathcal{N}(\zeta, \sigma^2_y)$ and instead seek to infer $p(x|\zeta)$. Using Equation (6) implies performing inference using Jeffrey’s rule. To ensure Jeffrey’s rule is consistent, Theorem 3.3, we take on the perspective of an “oracle” and impose the restriction that all marginal and conditionals are Gaussians, which leads to the joint also being Gaussian (e.g. Bishop, 2006, ch. 2.3). We see that Theorem 3.3 (II) is trivially satisfied as $x = x, y = y$, and $\zeta$ are one-dimensional. Further, we find a $p(\zeta|y)$ that satisfies Theorem 3.3 (I) by choosing $p(\zeta|y) = \mathcal{N}(\mu_{\zeta|y}, \sigma_{\zeta|y}^2)$ such that $\mu_{\zeta|y} = (y\sigma_y^2 + \mu_x\sigma_q^2)/(\sigma_x^2 + \sigma_q^2)$ and $\sigma_{\zeta|y}^2 = \sigma_\zeta^2\sigma_q^2/(\sigma_\zeta^2 + \sigma_q^2)$ where $\sigma_{\zeta}^2 = \sigma_x^2 + \sigma_q^2$ as $\sigma_y^2|_x$. Specifically, we see how the variance constraint $\sigma_\zeta^2 \geq 0$ ensures that we satisfy Theorem 3.3 (III) as $\sigma_\zeta^2 \geq 0 \iff \sigma_y^2 = \sigma_x^2 + \sigma_q^2$ or $\sigma_y^2 \geq \sigma_\zeta^2$ and imply $\sigma^2_y \geq \mathbb{E} \text{Var}(y|\zeta)$. Please see Figure 2 for the values used in the experiment.

When comparing Jeffrey’s rule to virtual and distributional evidence we fix the base model $p(x,y)$ and the density $q(y|\zeta)$ but vary the interpretation of the distributional evidence. In particular, since $q(y|\zeta)$ is symmetric in $y$ and $\zeta$, we take for virtual evidence $q_V(y|\zeta) = \mathcal{N}(y, \sigma^2_y)$. In the case of distributional evidence we analytically solve for $p(y \sim D_q|x)$ as well as the adjusted prior $p_\theta(x)$ by assuming the density $D$ is implicitly defined through the mean, $\theta$, of $q(y|\zeta) = \mathcal{N}(\theta, \sigma^2_y)$, see Appendix C.1. In all
cases, we arrive at Gaussian distributed posteriors \(p(x|\zeta)\), and we show the different posteriors in Figure 2. We note how in Figure 2 in the left panel the three methods result in vastly different posteriors, whereas those in the right panel are indistinguishable. This emphasizes the importance of carefully choosing the approach in dealing with uncertain evidence.

### 4.2. The Drop of a Ball

Consider the running example in this paper of the classic “high school” experiment in which a student attempts to estimate the gravitational acceleration, \(g\), on the surface of Earth inferred by an experiment in which the time taken, \(\hat{t} = 0.43\) s, for a ball to fall 1 m is measured. Given the uncertain evidence \(q(t|\hat{t}) = \mathcal{N}(0.43, (0.03)^2)\) we notice that \(g \simeq 9.81\) m s\(^{-2}\) is well covered by the posteriors of Jeffrey’s rule and virtual evidence but is excluded by distributional evidence. Recall, however, that both virtual evidence and distributional evidence are inappropriate in this case and serve to illustrate what happens when the uncertain evidence is misinterpreted.

This again exemplifies the potential error one might make when a certain type of uncertain evidence is misinterpreted. Particularly, distributional evidence should not be expected to produce reasonable results in this case. Recall that both virtual and distributional evidence are inappropriate by construction. To make, for example, distributional evidence the correct interpretation, we can modify this example so that the student’s setup is somewhat shaky, so \(x\) varies slightly. The student instead uses a very accurate time measurement device; the measurements of the time are exact. The student may then carry out repeated measurements in this single experiment and conclude that the measured time \(t\) is distributed as \(q(t|g) = \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)\). In this case the uncertain evidence is of type (II) since the uncertainty is conditioned on the latent variable \(g\).

### 4.3. Planet Orbiting Kepler 90

The Kepler satellite (Borucki et al., 2010) measured the flux from over half a million stars over 5 years. Dips in the...
while the other (planar) orbital parameters, eccentricity, while we assume an error on our ability to model the transits (but not in correlation with $P$) and approximate posterior distributions using Jeffrey’s rule compared to when using the other two methods.

Observations of transit times allow us to infer the orbital properties of the planet. However, the received flux from distant stars varies for other reasons (e.g., stellar pulsations, telescope temperature) and it is therefore common to fit a joint orbit/stellar/telescope model to the observed flux to infer orbital parameters. However, a good approach is to extract this information in two phases: first to fit a model of the star and to extract from this the transit times and second to extract orbital parameters from these transit times. Thus the measurements of transit times constitute uncertain evidence, in that they are provided as estimated times with an associated error. In the case of a single planet, it is only possible to infer the orbital period, $P$, and the anomaly angle $\omega + M$, while the other (planar) orbital parameters, eccentricity, $e$, and argument of perigee, $\omega$, remain marginally unconstrained (but not in correlation with $P$ and $\omega + M$). We simulate data, based on Kepler-90g, with $P = 210$ days, $e = 0.05$, $\omega = 100$ deg and $\omega + M = 198$ deg using TTVFAST (Deck et al., 2014) and approximate posterior distributions using amortized inference within PYPROB (Le et al., 2017). Baydin et al., 2019. The prior over $P$ is taken to be normal with $210 \pm 1$ days. The prior over eccentricity is taken to be uniform between 0 and 0.15. The angular variables have uniform priors between 0 and 360 deg. In Fig. 5, we provide additional experimental details and show the 1D and 2D marginal posterior distributions over orbital parameters given the three different approaches to uncertain evidence. We note that while the marginal posterior distributions of $e$, $\omega$ and $\omega + M$ are all in agreement, the posterior over $P$ is significantly different when extracted using Jeffrey’s rule compared to when using the other two methods.

5. Related Work

Of important related work is that of (Valtorta et al., 2002), who propose an approach for dealing with uncertain evidence which is in some way an extension to Jeffrey’s rule. Their algorithm, the soft evidential update method, is tailored for Bayesian networks (BN) and they incorporate uncertain evidence by extending the BN with evidence nodes for each new piece of uncertain evidence. Their approach updates the prior BN (prior to receiving uncertain evidence), denoted $M_P$, by solving for a new “updated” BN, $M_U$. The resulting $M_U$ minimizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence between $M_P$ and $M_U$ under the constraint that the marginal distribution of $M_U$ of each uncertain evidence variable must equal the given distributions. Given a single piece of uncertain evidence their update method reduces to Jeffrey’s rule. Another approach is that of Yao (2022), which is similar to, and discussed by Tolpin et al. (2021). The difference of this approach compared to distributional evidence lies in the definition of the likelihood $p(y \sim D_q(x))$, for which Yao (2022) proposes $p(y \sim D_q(x) \sim \mathbb{P}_{y|x}(y|x))$. However, as discussed by Tolpin et al. (2021), this definition lacks many (what they deem) desired properties associated with distributional evidence, Equation (5).

6. Conclusions

We have considered the problem of Bayesian inference when given uncertain evidence and the importance of its proper interpretation. This involved discussing and providing new insights into three different approaches in dealing with uncertain evidence: Jeffrey’s rule, virtual evidence, and distributional evidence. Particularly, this leads to the definition of different types of commonly encountered uncertain evidence. We have discussed compatibility between a given probabilistic model and uncertain evidence as defined in terms of consistency. We have demonstrated in three different experiments how misinterpretations of the type of uncertain evidence may lead to different inference results. This illustrates the importance of carefully making the proper interpretation of uncertain evidence on a case-by-case basis.

Figure 5: Inferred orbital parameters of an exoplanet around a Kepler star. We simulate 7 transits, $t$, of the system, and assume an error on the measured transits of 20 mins ($q(t|\zeta)$) while we assume an error on our ability to model the transits of 10 mins, the likelihood. While the marginal posterior distributions of $e$, $\omega$ and $\omega + M$ are all in agreement, the posterior over $P$ is significantly different when extracted using Jeffrey’s rule compared to the other two methods.
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A. Commutativity of Jeffrey’s Rule

It is well known (Diaconis & Zabell [1982]) that Jeffrey’s rule does not generally commute with respect to different pieces of uncertain evidence, $\epsilon_A, \epsilon_B$. That is, applying Jeffrey’s rule first with respect to $\epsilon_A$ and then subsequently with respect to $\epsilon_B$ is not necessarily equal to applying Jeffrey’s rule in the reverse order. This is easily seen with the following example: Let $\epsilon_A$ and $\epsilon_B$ carry contradictory information about the same variable $y$. For each piece of uncertain evidence, consider the associated auxiliary variable $\zeta_A$ and $\zeta_B$ and the densities $q(y|\zeta_A)$ and $q(y|\zeta_B)$. Then from Jeffrey’s rule we have the updated distribution of the latent variable $x$:

$$p(x|\zeta_A, \zeta_B) = E_{q(y|\zeta_A)}[p(x|y, \zeta_A)] = E_{q(y|\zeta_B)}[p(x|y)] = p(x|\zeta_B)$$

$$p(x|\zeta_B, \zeta_A) = E_{q(y|\zeta_A)}[p(x|y, \zeta_B)] = E_{q(y|\zeta_A)}[p(x|y)] = p(x|\zeta_A),$$

where we use $p(\cdot|\zeta_1, \zeta_2)$ as an overloaded notation for applying Jeffrey’s rule first with respect to $\zeta_1$ and subsequently with respect to $\zeta_2$. In this example, we see that the second piece of uncertain evidence dominates and “overwrites” or “forgets” the first. This illustrates that if two pieces of “incompatible” uncertain evidence are given, care must be taken when using Jeffrey’s rule. We leave the topic of addressing commutativity of Jeffrey’s rule for future discussion, but we briefly mention that a potential remedy could be to define a mixture of $q(y|\zeta_A)$ and $q(y|\zeta_B)$, which would require incorporating $\epsilon_A$ and $\epsilon_B$ jointly rather than sequentially.

As a final note, we point out the likelihood-bases approaches to uncertain evidence, such as virtual evidence, does commute with respect to multiple pieces of uncertain evidence. In particular, given two incompatible pieces of uncertain evidence and associated auxiliary variables $\zeta_A$ and $\zeta_B$, the joint density would assign zero probability on that event, $p(\zeta_A, \zeta_B, y, x) = 0$, which in turn may indicate a misspecification of the model.

B. Proofs

**Proof of Equation (3).** Consider the assumptions in Definition 2.2 and let $y \in \{y_k\}_{k=1}^K$ be discrete. From Equation (2) it follows that $p(\zeta|y_k) = c_\lambda_k$ with $k = 1, \ldots, K$ for some $c_\in \mathbb{R}_+$. This leads to,

$$p(x|\zeta) = \sum_{k=1}^K p(x|y_k, \zeta) = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^K p(\zeta|y_k)p(x|y_k)}{\sum_{j=1}^K p(\zeta|y_j)}$$

$$= \frac{\sum_{k=1}^K c_\lambda_k p(x|y_k)}{\sum_{j=1}^K c_\lambda_j p(y_j)} = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^K \lambda_k p(x|y_k)}{\sum_{j=1}^K \lambda_j p(y_j)}$$



B.1. Proofs for Theorem 3.3

**Proof of Theorem 3.3 (1).** (Necessary) Given $p(y, x)$ and uncertain evidence $q(y|\zeta)$ we need to show that, if the approach of Jeffrey’s rule is consistent, then Theorem 3.3 (1) is true. Consistency requires that there exists a joint $p(\zeta, y, x) = p(\zeta|y, x)p(y, x)$ containing $q(y|\zeta)$. This implies finding a $p(\zeta|y, x)$ such that for all $\zeta$ and $y$:

$$q(y|\zeta) = \frac{\mathbb{E}_{p(x)}[p(\zeta|y, x)p(y|x)]}{\mathbb{E}_{p(y)}[\mathbb{E}_{p(x)}[p(\zeta|y, x)p(y|x)]]}$$

$$= \frac{p(\zeta|y)p(y)}{\mathbb{E}_{p(y)}[p(\zeta|y)]},$$

where $p(\zeta|y) = \int p(\zeta|y, x)p(y|x)p(x)/p(y) \, dx$. That is, if no such $p(\zeta|y)$ exists satisfying Theorem 3.3 (1) then the approach of Jeffrey’s rule cannot be consistent.

(Sufficient) Assume there exists $p(\zeta|y)$ satisfying Theorem 3.3 (1). Define $p(\zeta, y, x) = p(\zeta|y)p(y|x)p(x)$ from which it immediately follows that $p(y|\zeta) = q(y|\zeta)$. Further, using d-separation (Pearl [1988]), it follows that defining $p(\zeta, y, x)$ in this way...
way ensures that \( p(x|y, \zeta) = p(x|y) \) i.e., it satisfies Theorem 3.3 (1). This proves Jeffrey’s rule is consistent, such that:

\[
p(x|\zeta) = \mathbb{E}_{p(y|\zeta)} [p(x|y, \zeta)] = \mathbb{E}_{q(y|\zeta)} [p(x|y)].
\]

\( \square \)

**Proof of Theorem 3.3 (2).** Let each \( \{y_i\}_{i=1}^D \) be conditionally independent given \( \zeta \) such that \( q(y|\zeta) = \prod_{i=1}^D q(y_i|\zeta) \). Further, assume Jeffrey’s rule is consistent such that there exists a joint model \( p(\zeta, x) \) where \( p(y|\zeta) = q(y|\zeta) \). Then it follows, via d-separation, that if and only if all paths between each \( \{y_i\}_{i=1}^D \) are conditionally blocked can they be conditionally independent given \( \zeta \). This implies that no two or more \( y_i \) can share the same auxiliary variable or latent variable or depend on each other. Figure 6 shows the only possible graphical model satisfying this constraint, which leads to:

\[
p(y|\zeta) = \prod_{i=1}^D p(y_i|\zeta) \Rightarrow p(y|x) = \prod_{i=1}^D p(y_i|x_i).
\]

\( \square \)

**Proof of Theorem 3.3 (3).** Assume Jeffrey’s rule is consistent such that \( q(y|\zeta) = p(y|\zeta) \) which implies \( p(\zeta) = \mathbb{E}_{p(y)} [p(\zeta|y)] \).

From the law of total variance we have:

\[
\text{Cov} \ [y] = \mathbb{E} [\text{Cov} \ [y|\zeta]] + \text{Cov} \ [\mathbb{E} [y|\zeta]],
\]

with the right-hand side being a sum of two positive semi-definite matrices. Since for two positive semi-definite matrices \( A \) and \( B \) it holds that \( \det(A + B) \geq \det(A) + \det(B) \) [Paksoy et al., 2014], and as \( \det(A), \det(B) \geq 0 \) this leads to:

\[
\text{Cov} \ [y] \geq \mathbb{E} [\text{Cov} \ [y|\zeta], y] .
\]

Further, we have that the elements in the diagonal of the left-hand side of Equation 8 are the variances of \( y \) with respect to \( p(y) \) and therefore:

\[
\text{Var} [y_i] = \mathbb{E} [\text{Var} [y_i|\zeta]] + \text{Var} [\mathbb{E} [y_i|\zeta]] \\
\geq \mathbb{E} \text{Var} [y_i|\zeta], \text{ as } \text{Var} [\mathbb{E} [y_i|\zeta]] \geq 0.
\]

Finally we prove that:

\[
\text{Var} [y_i] = \mathbb{E} [\text{Var} [y_i|\zeta]] \leftrightarrow \mathbb{E} [y_i|\zeta] = \mu.
\]

We first prove “\( \Rightarrow \)”: \( \text{Var} [y_i] = \mathbb{E} [\text{Var} [y_i|\zeta]] \Rightarrow \text{Var} [\mathbb{E} [y_i|\zeta]] = 0 \).

As \( \text{Var} [x] = \mathbb{E} [\{x - \mathbb{E} [x]\}^2] \) is an expectation of a non-negative variable, it follows that \( \text{Var} [x] = 0 \) if and only if \( x \) is constant. Therefore, we have that:

\[
\text{Var} [\mathbb{E} [y_i|\zeta]] = 0 \leftrightarrow \mathbb{E} [y_i|\zeta] = \mu,
\]

\( \square \)
where \( \mu \) is some constant.

Next we prove “\( \Leftarrow \)” which follows trivially by combining Equation (10) with Equation (9):

\[
\text{Var} [\mathbb{E} [y_i | \zeta]] = 0 \Rightarrow \text{Var} [y_i] = \mathbb{E} [\text{Var} [y_i | \zeta]].
\]

From this we can conclude that:

\[
\text{Var} [y_i] = \mathbb{E} [\text{Var} [y_i | \zeta]] \Leftrightarrow \mathbb{E} [y_i | \zeta] = \mu,
\]

thereby concluding the proof. \( \Box \)

C. Other Derivations

C.1. Distributional Evidence and Normal Distributions

Consider the densities \( p(y|x) = \mathcal{N}(\mu_{y|x} | \sigma_{y|x}^2) \) and \( q(y) = \mathcal{N}(\mu_q | \sigma_q^2) \) and the distributional evidence likelihood, Equation (5):

\[
\ln p(y \sim D_q|x) \propto \mathbb{E}_q [\ln p(y|x)] = - \frac{1}{2 \sigma_y^2} \mathbb{E}_q \left[ (y - \mu_{y|x})^2 \right] - \ln \left( \sqrt{2\pi \sigma_y^2} \right)
\]

\[
= - \frac{1}{2 \sigma_y^2} \left[ \mathbb{E}_q[y^2] - 2 \mu_q \mu_{y|x} + \mu_{y|x}^2 \right] - \ln \left( \sqrt{2\pi \sigma_y^2} \right)
\]

\[
= - \frac{1}{2 \sigma_y^2} \left[ \mu_q^2 - 2 \mu_q \mu_{y|x} + \mu_{y|x}^2 \right] - \ln \left( \sqrt{2\pi \sigma_y^2} \right)
\]

\[
= - \frac{1}{2 \sigma_y^2} (\mu_q - \mu_{y|x})^2 - \ln \left( \sqrt{2\pi \sigma_y^2} \right). \tag{11}
\]

Assuming the distribution \( D_q \) is implicitly defined via its mean \( \mu_q \), such that \( p(y \sim D_q) \) normalizes with respect to \( \mu_q \), we identify from Equation (11) \( p(y \sim D_q|x) \) to be a Gaussian with mean \( \mu_{y|x} \) and variance \( \sigma_{y|x}^2 \). From this we see that distributional evidence in this special case leads to the same likelihood as the one in the base model, \( p(y = \mu_q|x) \). That is, \( p(y \sim D_q|x) = p(y = \mu_q|x) \). Further, we find that the normalization constant

\[
Z(x) = \int \exp \mathbb{E}_q [\ln p(y|x)] \, d\mu_q = \frac{\sqrt{2\pi \sigma_y^2}}{\sqrt{2\pi \sigma_{y|x}^2}} = 1,
\]

is independent of \( x \). This leads to the distributional evidence adjusted prior \( p_a(x) \propto p(x)Z(x) = p(x) \) being equal to the non-adjusted prior \( p(x) \)

\[
p_a(x) = \frac{p(x)}{\int p(x) \, dx} = p(x).
\]

In this case, \( p(x|y \sim D_q) \) always takes the form \( p(x|y \sim D_q) \propto q(y \sim D_q|x)p(x) \). Further, we can generally say that if \( p(y|x) = \mathcal{N}(\mu_{y|x} | \sigma^2) \) and \( q(y) = \mathcal{N}(\mu_q | \sigma_q^2) \) then posterior inference using distributional evidence given uncertain evidence reduces to exact evidence in the base model \( p(x, y) \) given exact evidence, \( p(x|y = \mu_q) \). These results generalizes to the multivariate case where the likelihood in the base model and the distributional evidence density are defined on an observable vector \( y = (y_1, \ldots, y_K) \) and each \( y_k \) is i.i.d. such that \( p(y|x) = \prod_{k=1}^K p(y_k|x) \) and \( q(y|x) = \prod_{k=1}^K q(y_k|x) \).