Cognizable Object in *Tshad ma rigs gter* According to Go rams pa

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Abstract  The article presents Go rams pa’s interpretation and classification of cognizable object as explained by Sa skya Panḍita in his famous *Tshad ma rigs gter*. The text consists of introduction to the translation of the original, translation of Go ram pa’s commentary to the first chapter of *Tshad ma rigs gter*, edition of the original, and outline of the Tibetan text.

Keywords  Valid cognition · Cognizable object · Appearing object · Conceived object · Apprehended object · Object of engagement

It is probably true that nobody who studies Sa skya Panḍita’s *Tshad ma rigs gter* can avoid referring to Go rams pa’s commentaries on this work, as he or she searches for the answers to the numerous questions that appear during the lecture. Sa skya Panḍita usually takes for granted that the reader knows the basic definitions and the necessary context. However, what might be obvious to the philosophical audience in the thirteenth century in Tibet is definitely not obvious for a modern reader in the West. Even though Sa skya Panḍita’s autocommentary clarifies a lot of issues from the root text, its reading said without any exaggeration must be accompanied or even preceded by a study of some more encyclopedic commentary like Go rams pa’s *sDe bdun mdo dang bcas pa’i dgongs pa phin ci ma log par ‘grel ba tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa* (*The Faultless Commentary on the Intention*).
in the first chapter on the cognizable object Sa skya Panḍita gives no definition of the technical terms that he uses throughout the text. From the very beginning the reader finds himself in the very center of an intense hot philosophical debate, which presupposes not only the knowledge of basic terminology but also the whole philosophical background out of which the problems discussed are picked up. Thus the tasks of the commentarial tradition of the Tshad ma rigs gter include clarifying terminology within the conceptual system used in this treatise and contextualizing the discussed problems, with possible solutions offered by different traditions of Tibetan epistemology. This clear division of commentarial work is probably the reason why Go rams pa (Go rams pa bsod nams seng ge, 1429-1489) wrote two commentaries to the Tshad ma rigs gter: sDe bdun mdo dang bcas pa’i dgongs pa phin ci ma log par ‘grel ba tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa and Tshad ma rigs gter gyi dka’ gnas rnam par bshad pa sde bdun ra bgsal (The Complete Explanation of Difficult Points in Treasury of Epistemology that Perfectly Elucidates Seven Treatises). The first one is very encyclopedic and can be treated as an introduction to the second,1 since the first one—as the title announces—is just an explanation of general intention of the treatise and mainly aims at clarifying terminology used in the Tshad ma rigs gter. The second one, much more extensive, concentrates on particular epistemological problems and, as the title says, “difficult points” debated in Tibetan epistemology. It is much more elaborate and goes much deeper into the issues discussed in the text of Sa skya Panḍita, which now can be clearly restated in the light of the first commentary and then solved. The first commentary can also be treated as a kind of shortcut to Sa skya Panḍita’s philosophy, providing an especially clear map of the system—following Go rams pa’s famous, unique ability to present complicated matters in a very accessible way.

What is presented below is the translation of the first chapter of sDe bdun mdo dang bcas pa’i dgongs pa phin ci ma log par ‘grel ba tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa by Go rams pa. Meant as the introductory commentary to the first chapter of the Tshad ma rigs gter, it explains the notion of the cognizable object, provides basic definitions and discusses the divisions of the cognizable object. The fact that the main concern of this chapter is only the clarification of the terminological system set up by Sa skya Panḍita—and not the philosophical problems that arise within it—does not mean that there is no discussion and debate with other views of Tibetan epistemology. Thus before presenting the translation I will discuss a few crucial issues addressed by Go rams pa, who formulated them in a very concise manner, perhaps even too concise for the Western reader.

Sa skya Panḍita starts his treatise with the definition of the cognizable object as follows: “Definition of the object: that which is knowable by mind.”2 This very short definition is explained by Go rams pa as follows:

1 Go rams pa has the very same approach in case of his two commentaries to Pramāṇavārttika. Cf. van der Kujip (1983, p. 122).

2 TR p. 49 [yul gvi mtshan nyid blo sgra bya].
Definition of the object is the following: that which is to be known by mind. Definition of the cognizable [shes bya] having equal scope is that which can be made into an object of mind. Definition of the perceptual [gzhal bya] is that which is to be realized by valid cognition. Definition of the established basis [gzhi grub] is that which is observed by valid cognition. Definition of really existent [yod nges] is that which can be seen by valid cognition. After rewording Sa skya Panḍita’s formula in the first sentence, Go rams pa provides a useful list of synonyms, which all describe the cognizable object in terms of perception, thus cutting off all possible doubts concerning the scope of the listed terms. The object is always something that is cognized, realized, observed, seen, known by the mind or valid cognition and seems to be defined solely in terms the cognitive process operating on it. Even though Go rams pa does not talk about the object apart from cognizing it, it does not mean that the philosophical position behind is idealism. Sa skya Panḍita’s view—following closely Dharmakīrti—is based to a large extent on the Sautrāntika realistic system, which did not claim that the perceived object is in any way constructed in the act of perception itself. Simply, for Buddhist philosophers there is no sense in talking about the object apart from the perception that confirms its existence.

After introducing the subject of the chapter, Go rams pa divides his commentary into three parts: (1) refutation of non-Sa skya systems, (2) presentation of Sa skya system and (3) rebuttal of objections to the Sa skya position. Out of these three I will address mainly the first and third ones, since they are polemical while the middle part is just the terminological map with particular definitions (the sa bcad following the edition serves not only as the outline of the whole text but also as the presentation of systematic divisions of the cognizable object).

Four main points on the above mentioned map are four types of cognizable object introduced by Tibetan philosophers in the process of inventive assimilation of Dharmakīrti’s system. As Śākya mchog ldan says:

If to analyze the object, what comes from the scriptures is apprehended object and object of engagement. Concerning the conventions introduced by early Tibetans, there are appearing object and conceived object.

Here Tibetans went much further than Dharmakīrti, who distinguished only two types of the cognizable object. This introduction of two others had to become an important issue that divided Tibetan philosophers. mTshur ston gzhon nu seng ge, Sa skya Panḍita’s teacher who influenced him to a large extent, accepts only threefold division of the cognizable object:

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3 The original cf. the edition at the end of this text.
4 Cf. Dreyfus (1997, pp. 76–79).
5 Go rams pa of course presents the view that he himself considers general Sa skya position, but historically it is just one—and most orthodox—of quite a few ways of reading the Tshad ma rigs gter within the Sa skya school.
6 S. p. 296 [yul la dbye na/ gzhung las ‘byung ba ni/gzung ba’i yul dang/ ‘jug pa’i yul lo/ bod snga mas tha snyad byas pa ni/ snang yul dang zhen yul lo].
7 Cf. Hugon 2004, pp. xii–xv.
Generally there are three types of cognizable object, namely apprehended object, conceived object, object of engagement.\(^8\)

However his student Sa skya Panḍita accepts a fourfold division of the cognizable object and Go rams pa in the text translated below lists them in the same order, adding at the beginning the fourth one: the appearing object \([snang yul]\). Thus we have the context for the issue raised at the beginning of “Refutation of others’ systems” in Go rams pa’s commentary as well:

Some Tibetans say that since the appearing object and the apprehended object have the same meaning, the universal is the apprehended object of the conceptual [cognition] and nonexistent clearly [appearing] is the apprehended object of the reverse nonconceptual cognition.\(^9\)

Go rams pa follows closely Sa skya Panḍita in his attack on the followers of Phya pa chos kyi seng ge, who are often referred to as “some Tibetans”. What is at stake here is the status of the appearing object and the so-called object universal \([don spyi]\),\(^10\) as will be shown in the analysis to follow. Before that however, the notion of reverse nonconceptual cognition \([rtog med log shes]\) has to be clarified.

Reverse nonconceptual cognition is the type of erroneous cognition defined as follows in the \(Tshad ma rigs gter\):

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\text{definition of reverse cognition: apprehension of something invalidated by something that is not [that what was to be apprehended].}^{11}
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The so called reverse cognition in the \(Tshad ma rigs gter\) is classified as non-cognizing state of mind, so actually it is not cognition in the proper sense. It does not apprehend the object that it seems to apprehend, it grasps something else, and that is why it is reverse cognition or even the opposite of cognition. Actually, in the case of reverse cognition there is no proper cognition being harmed in this way or another but rather proper valid cognition is just replaced with invalid perception. As ‘Jam dbyangs blo gter dbang po says in his commentary to the \(Tshad ma rigs gter\):

\[8\] Hugon (2004, p. 4) \([\text{spyir shes pa’i yul la gsum ste/ gzung yul dang/ zhen yul dang/ ’jug yul lo/}]\).

\[9\] The original cf. the edition at the end of this text.

\[10\] The two Tibetan terms \(don spyi\) and \(sgra spyi\) come from Dignāga’s distinction between \(śabdāsāmānya\) and \(arthasāmānya\). Concerning the role of \(don spyi\) in Tibetan philosophy, compare Dreyfus (1997, pp. 251–260). Also cf. Pind (1991). Concerning the term \(don spyi\), Tillemans says: “The unacceptable, or completely nonexistent, type of universal which Dharmakīrti is supposedly refuting, is one which is substantially existent \((r dzas yod)\) and is a different object from its particulars \((spyi don gzh an)\). Tibetan commentators stress, however, that there are universals that are simple mental constructs and have at least conventional existence. In other words, it is argued that Dharmakīrti recognized the mental \(apo ha\) \((blo’i gzh an sel)\), or more exactly speaking, the \(don spyi\), object-universal, which figures so prominently in dGe lungs and Sa skya exegeses. This notion of a \(don spyi\) is used to great advantage in explaining Dharmakīrti’s thought, although it is not clear that the term \(don spyi\) \((= *\text{arthasāmānya})\) itself ever explicitly figured in this exact use in Dharmakīrti’s or even in other Indian logicians’ works” (Tillemans 1999, pp. 163–164); compare also Tillemans’ remarks on Go rams pa and Sa skya Panḍita in this context—Tillemans (1999, pp. 220–222, 229 n.6, 234 n.15). For an extensive analysis of \(don spyi\) (translated as “concept”) cf. Stoltz (2006).

\[11\] TR 84 \([\text{log rtog gi mshan nyid ni/ de ’dzin pa de min gyis/ gnod pa}].\)
Definition of reverse cognition: it is the apprehension of the object in such a way that it is the state of mind which is invalidated by other valid cognition [cognizing] that it is not that [object but] it is something else.\textsuperscript{12}

Thus reverse cognition is not just wrong apprehension of the object that is given in valid cognition as well. It is wrong perception because it misses the object completely and grasps something else.

Generally there are two types of that cognition—conceptual and non-conceptual. Go rams pa gives the following classification of them:

There are three conceptual reverse cognitions: the erroneous one concerning shape, like apprehending a multicolored rope as a snake; the erroneous one concerning time, like apprehending a present blue color as the blue color from the past; the erroneous one concerning the object, like apprehending aloe tree and juniper tree as one type.

There are two non-conceptual reverse cognitions: the error of sense consciousness, like a sense consciousness seeing two moons; and the error of mental consciousness, like the consciousness of seeing clearly the dream.\textsuperscript{13}

In case of both types of reverse cognition, what is perceived does not exist at all, even though it does somehow arise within the field perception.\textsuperscript{14} Hence the name “nonexistent clearly appearing” in case of non-conceptual perception.

Go rams pa aims at showing that in the case of non-conceptual reverse cognition the so called nonexistent clearly appearing cannot be considered an apprehended object, since an apprehended object is an outer entity that is given to the subject either directly or indirectly by way of its aspects. The illusion of two moons, seen after pressing the eyeballs or dreamt, does not exist on the outside. Thus they are not apprehended by the subject in the way that the real tree is apprehended. But still there is something that is given in cognition, something within the field of perception that is taken to be two moons, that looks like two moons. This is called the appearing object.

In the case of conceptual reverse cognition, there is something to play the role of apprehended object—a rope mistakenly taken to be a snake which is the appearing object. The error here is just wrong conceptualization by which the concept—or the so called object universal\textsuperscript{15}—of the snake is taken to be an outer object. Non-conceptual reverse cognition cannot be explained in that way, since there is no

\textsuperscript{12} Tshad ma rigs gter gyi mtshan ’grel sde bdun gsal ba ’i sgron me (The Commentary on Treasury of Epistemology that is The Torch Elucidating Seven Treatises) in: TRC 377 [yul de nyid du ’dzin pa la de min pa gzhan yin pai tshad ma gzhag gyis gnod pa yod pa ’i blo ni log shes kyi mtshan nyid].

\textsuperscript{13} G54 [rtog pa dang rtog med log shes gnyis las/ dang po ni/ thag khrul la sbrul du ’dzin pa la bu nmam pa la ’khrul ba dang / da ltar gyi sngon po la ’das pa’i sngon por ’dzin pa la bu dus ’khrul pa dang / sha pa dang shug pa gnyis rigs gcig tu ’dzin pa la bu yul la ’khrul pa dang gsun mo// rtog med log shes la/ zla ba gnyis snang gi dbang shes la bu dbang shes ’khrul pa dang/ rmi lam gsal snang gi shes pa la bu yid shes ’khrul pa gnyis yod do//].

\textsuperscript{14} This is also the case even when the type of the tree is mistakenly identified or when white conch is perceived as yellow due to the jaundice (the example used by Sa skya Paññita). Cf. discussion of this issue in Stoltz (2006, pp. 574–577).

\textsuperscript{15} The status of object universal is analyzed below.
concept involved that could be blamed for erroneous experience. There is only what appears while there is nothing that could be apprehended correctly. Determining the status of this kind of perceptual illusions was not an easy task for Buddhist philosophers, and the text of Sa skya Paṇḍita under discussion here remains ambiguous. As we can see in the commentary translated below, Go rams pa himself admits that he is not certain what the original view of the Tshad ma rigs gter is—on the one hand he claims that non-conceptual erroneous cognition does not have an appearing object and on the other hand that the nonexistent clearly appearing, which is the object of non-conceptual erroneous cognition, is an appearing object. The reason for this hesitation is a very general statement of Sa skya Paṇḍita himself, who, in discussing the status of nonexistent clearly appearing and object universal, used the general term “the object” without specifying which of the four he actually meant. In any case what both have in common is the fact that what appears within the field of cognition does not represent the outer object (the concept of the snake does not represent any real snake or the rope and dreamt object does not represent any really existing outer object).

That is why Go rams pa shortly says—and this is what the whole critique comes down to—that the nonexistent clearly appearing and the object universal, which are the objects of erroneous cognition, cannot be apprehended objects. The reason is that, whenever cognition has apprehended object, it cannot be erroneous. Thus they are given as appearing objects. This approach was probably one of the reasons for introducing differentiation between appearing object and apprehended object, upheld by Sa skya Paṇḍita in the Tshad ma rigs gter.

After polemics with the view of the followers of Phya pa chos kyi seng ge, Go rams pa presents four divisions of cognizable objects:

– Division into four objects from the point of view of the way of making into an object.
– Division into two truths from the point of view of the nature.
– Division into direct and indirect from the point of view of the object of engagement.
– Division into two, the particular and the universal, from the point of view of the way of engagement.

And finally he comes to the conclusion that the ultimate and the only perceptual is the particular. This part of the text is a kind of encyclopedic dictionary to the first chapter of the Tshad ma rigs gter. However in the third and the last part of Go rams pa’s text the reader can clearly see that different divisions, done from different points of view, become useful tools for dealing with the opponents who attacked one crucial statement of Sa skya Paṇḍita.

Sa skya Paṇḍita claimed that ultimately the only object of valid cognition is the particular. This statement became one of the hottest points in the debates over his system of epistemology. And the reason was that at first sight this very statement seems to contradict one of the main axioms of Buddhist epistemology formulated by Dignāga in his main treatise (PS I 2), namely that there are only two types of

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16 The other argument given by Go rams pa, following Sa skya Paṇḍita, is discussed in Stoltz (2006).
perceptuals, namely the particular in the case of direct perception and the universal in the case of inference. Thus a severe debate over the status of the universal began.\footnote{As Dreyfus points out, the controversy was actually stimulated by the ambiguous position of the forefathers of Tibetan epistemology and Sa skya Pan dita’s position is “not without support” in Dharmakirti’s writings. In discussing valid cognition, Dharmakirti asserts that nondeceptiveness (avisamvadanam, mi slu ba), the defining characteristic of valid cognition, consists of the capacity to perform a function in accordance with the way it is cognized by that cognition. Only causally effective phenomena (vastu, dngos po) have such a capacity. So, valid cognitions are nondeceptive inasmuch as they relate appropriately to real things (svalaksana, rang mtschan) Therefore, the conclusion that only real, that is, specifically characterized phenomena are objects of valid cognitions is hard to resist” (Dreyfus 1997, p. 78).}

Confronting this serious accusation, Go rams pa refers to his clear divisions of the cognizable objects that he just introduced: “there are the two posited—particular and universal—since there are two ways of comprehending: from the point of view of own nature only the particular is comprehended, whereas the other is comprehended from the point of view of the object universal.”

One can look at this explanation as Go rams pa’s interpretation of Dignāga. Dignāga indeed introduces two types of cognizable objects by way of referring to two types of cognition. Since there are two ways of cognizing, there are accordingly two cognizable objects. But this does not mean that from the point of view of the object in itself there are two different types. This approach in not without support in Dignāga himself, who in a very concise way says “mtshan nyid gnyis gzhal bya”\footnote{PS I.2b.} which can be understood as two characteristics [mtshan nyid], namely particular [svalakṣaṇa, rang mtschan] and universal [sāmānyalakṣaṇa, spyī mtschan], being referred to the one and only object: the perceptual [gzhal bya]. The perceptual itself cannot be given apart from either of the two—and only two—ways of perception. Since there is no third type of perception—perceiving some general perceptual in itself, which is neither universal nor particular—the very perceptual must be in the end either the universal or the particular. It cannot be universal, since direct perception reveals the particular existing independently outside, and this fact is taken for granted together with Sautrāntika realism mentioned above. Additionally Go rams pa refers to the very definition of valid cognition in Dharmakirti, to claim that in the philosophy of the forefather of Buddhist epistemology “it is shown that it is cognition that becomes the cause for adopting and rejecting the objects that can bring benefit and harm. In this way the object that can bring benefit and is to be adopted by valid cognition and the object that can bring harm and is to be abandoned are exclusively the particular, since what is exclusively particular can bring benefit and harm while the universal can not do this.” Thus there are strong premises for admitting that ultimately the particular is the only cognizable object, but still it is not clear why the perception referring to the universal can be called valid cognition. Go rams pa does not explain it in detail but claims only that the universal “is comprehended from the point of view of the object universal”. Now out of two types of appearing object—nonexistent clearly appearing and object universal—the second one turns out to be a crucial point in the debates on the object
of cognition. The question now is: What is the so-called object universal and what does it mean to comprehend from the point of view of it?

Unfortunately the definition of the object universal is hardly found in G鈒am pa. From G鈒am pa鈥檚 commentary we know that the object universal is the subcategory of appearing object and, in particular, is an object that appears directly to conceptualization. The modern Tibetan dictionary of epistemology defines it as follows: “Category of general manifestation. An imputation establishing exclusively the conceptual manifestation or it is a manifestation in the mind similar to object. For example it is like a vase appearing in conceptualization.”\(^{19}\) The object universal is thus mental representation of the object and, according to the definition of the universal \([\text{spyi mitshan}],^{20}\) it is the basis of the universal itself and necessary point of reference for it. The object universal is thus related to the singular object that is represented by it and also related to the universal. As a manifestation in the mind or, to put it more precisely, as the act of cognizing mind, object universal has its particular moment, since it is just a singular act or mental event. At the same time it has its general moment, since it is referred to as universal, which seems to be its conceptual content. Thus the object universal is triggered in the mind by a particular, but what it does is to establish or grasp a universal. These two aspects make the object universal different from the nonexistent clearly appearing. This is clearly stated by G鈒am pa:

concerning the first one [the object universal], even though it is not a particular, on the basis of it the object of engagement, which is the particular, is obtained, and concerning the second one [nonexistent clearly appearing] its own nature is not the particular and [therefore] on the basis of it object of engagement, which is the particular, is not obtained at all.\(^{21}\)

It is worth noticing that G鈒am pa insists on the fact that in its nature a nonexistent clearly appearing is not any particular while, talking about the object universal, he does not refer to its nature—probably because he felt that it is not so clear or at least ambiguous, as I pointed out above.\(^{22}\) Nevertheless the difference—and it is a crucial difference—between the two is the quality of providing the possibility of obtaining the particular. In this way the object universal—despite its mental nature—turns out to perform the function as every self-sufficiently existing particular and this function

\(^{19}\) bod rgya tshad ma rig pa'i tshig mdzod 1988, p. 166 [spyi'i nang gses/ rtog pa'i snang ngo tsam du grub pa'i sdro btags kyi cha'am don gyi cha 'dra blo la snang ba/ dper na/ rtog pa la snang ba'i bum pa lta bu'o/].

\(^{20}\) The definition is as follows: “Phenomenon which is solely imputed by conceptualization as an object that is not established on its own. These are non-compounded phenomena like space etc. that are there by way of excluding what is to be negated and must depend on arising of object universal [yul rang ngos nas grub pa ma yin par rtog pas btags pa tsam gyi chos/ nam mkha' la sogs pa dgag bya bceu pa dang don spyi 'char ba la llos dgos pa'i 'dus ma hyas kyi chos rnams so/];” bod rgya tshad ma rig pa'i tshig mdzod 1988, p. 200.

\(^{21}\) The original cf. the edition at the end of this text.

\(^{22}\) Cf. analysis of the status of don spyi in Stoltz (2006).
is making possible the obtainment of the particular.\footnote{Cf. the analysis of similar situation in Dharmakirti in Dreyfus (1997, p. 74). It is thus clear that some difficult points discussed in Tibetan epistemology are in fact of Indian origin.} It is not particular, as is clearly stated by Go rams pa, but one can say that to some extent it performs the function of particular. This twofold nature of the object universal is in fact the key to understanding the issue at stake in the polemics presented by Go rams pa in the most important sections of the last part of his commentary.

The remaining fragment of that last part of the commentary is the review of Indian philosophical views that Buddhist epistemology had to confront. They were not debated in Tibetan philosophy\footnote{That is why the reason Go rams pa included them is more his respect for the tradition and completeness of the presentation. This concise historical overview is too general to be discussed here and getting into details would amount to writing a history of the development of Buddhist epistemology in India, which is not the aim of this paper. Cf. Eltschinger (2014).}, since in the Land of Snow there were no other traditions challenging Buddhist epistemology. Thus Buddhist thinkers put their effort in refining Buddhist epistemology itself by way of debating on its internal problems in more and more detail.

The commentary part of which is translated below is one attempt to provide a clear conceptual frame for discussing the Tshad ma rigs gter and also for solving intensely debated problems. Go rams pa calls it “elucidation of the meaning \[don gsal bar byed pa\],” and this, indeed, is what he tries to do by giving a neat map of the terminology that can serve as a general framework for reading Sa skya Pañḍita’s work. Written in an accessible style, supplying basic definitions and sketching the main ideas and contexts, it is particularly helpful as both a prolegomenon and companion to the Tshad ma rigs gter. On top of that, Go rams pa is considered the most faithful and orthodox commentator of Sa skya Pañḍita\footnote{The lineage of transmission from Sa skya Pañḍita to Go rams pa cf. van der Kuijp (1983, p. 118). His contemporary Śākya mchog ldan (gser mdog pan chen śākya mchog ldan 1428–1509) was no less a perceptive commentator of Tshad ma rigs gter but definitely a less orthodox thinker adhering also to the view of other-emptiness \[gzhan stong\] fought against by Go rams pa [more about his refusal of this view cf. Cabezón and Dargyay (2006, pp. 97–144)].} because he does not depart from the original meaning and intention of the Tshad ma rigs gter.\footnote{Cf. Dreyfus (1997, p. 27).} That is why, out of so many commentaries to Tshad ma rigs gter, both within Sa skya tradition and others, probably sDe bdun mdo dang bcas pa’i dgongs pa phin ci ma log par ‘grel ba tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa by Go rams pa seems one of the most natural starting points for our reception of this fundamental treatise of Tibetan epistemology. Acknowledged conformity of Go rams pa’s interpretation with the Tshad ma rigs gter also makes his text a very good starting point for investigating interpretational differences within Sa skya lineage itself and gives a clear point of reference for comparative studies of sGe lugs and rNying ma interpretations of the Tshad ma rigs gter\footnote{There is no commentary to the Tshad ma rigs gter written in the bka’ brgyud tradition, but very interesting polemics with Sa skya Pañḍita can be found in the Tshad ma rigs gzhung rgya mts sho (The Ocean of Epistemological Treatises) by 7th Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho (1454–1506).} as well.
Translation

Cognizable Object [shes bya'i yul]

There are the two in the first [chapter on cognizable object]: (1) definition [and] (2) division.

1. Definition of the object is the following: that which is to be known by mind.  
   Definition of the cognizable [shes bya] having equal scope is that which can be made into an object of mind. Definition of the perceptual [gzhal bya] is that which is to be realized by valid cognition. Definition of the established basis [gzhi grub] is that which is observed by valid cognition. Definition of really existent [yod nges] is that which can be seen by valid cognition.

2. [Division] 
   There are three [subparagraphs] in the second [paragraph on division of cognizable object]:

   2.1 Refutation of others’ systems,
   2.2 Presentation of our own system,
   2.3 Rebuttal of objections.

2.1. Some Tibetans say that since the appearing object and the apprehended object have the same meaning, the universal is the apprehended object of the conceptual [cognition] and the nonexistent clearly appearing is the apprehended object of the reverse nonconceptual cognition [rtog med log shes].

There are two lines of reasoning in the refutation of this [view]. First, the subject matter [chos can] is both conceptual and nonconceptual reverse cognition; it entails [thal] that they are not erroneous cognitions, because they are the cognition having apprehended the object. Secondly, the subject matter is both the universal and the nonexistent clearly appearing; it entails that as for the object that can be seen they are seen by cognition of other person nearby, because they are apprehended objects substantially different from the cognition to which they themselves appear.

2.2. [Presentation of our own system] 
   There are five in the second [subparagraph]:

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28 Rewording of the definition from the Tshad ma rigs gter: “Definition of the object: that which is knowable by mind [yul gyi mthsan nyid blo srig bya]/”, TR I 1 [p. 49].
29 Sa skya Panḍita gives the following „definition of reverse cognition: apprehension of something invalidated by something that is not [that what was to be apprehended] [log rtog gi mthsan nyid n/ de ’dzin pa de min gyis/ gnod pa]” TR 84. Cf. discussion in the introduction.
30 Go rams pa, following Sa skya Panḍita, points out the paradoxical, and thus unwanted consequence of the assumption that erroneous cognition really apprehends an object. Cf. discussion in the introduction to the translation.
31 The discussion of this argument cf. Stoltz (2006).
2.2.1 Division into four objects from the point of view of the way of making into an object;
2.2.2 Division into two truths from the point of view of the nature [ngo bo];
2.2.3 Division into direct and indirect [mgon lkog] from the point of view of the object of engagement;
2.2.4 Division into two: particular and universal from the point of view of the way of engagement;
2.2.5 Reducing to one—the particular which is the ultimate perceptual.

2.2.1. [Division into four objects from the point of view of the way of making into an object]
There are three [parts] in the first [2.2.1]:
2.2.1.1 Analysis of phenomena becoming four objects;
2.2.1.2 Analysis of what are the four objects for a certain subject;
2.2.1.3 The nature of each of the four objects.

2.2.1.1. [Analysis of phenomena becoming four objects]
All phenomena being related to individual mind as subject [yul can] turn out to be an appearing object, a conceived object and an object of engagement. Concerning the apprehended object, Sautrāntika sets up only five external āyatanas and in the system of Cittamātra an apprehended object is not maintained.

2.2.1.2. [Analysis of what are the four objects for a certain subject]
All non-erroneous non-conceptual cognitions have an appearing object, whereas erroneous non-conceptual cognitions do not have an appearing object; all conceptualizations [rtog pa] have an appearing object.
Concerning the apprehended object, only the two direct perceptions\(^{32}\) knowing a thing [don] have it.
Concerning the conceived object, conceptualizations that are compatible with a thing [don]\(^{33}\) have it.
Concerning the object of engagement, valid cognition, articulated sound that is compatible with the thing [don], and sentient beings have it.

2.2.1.3. [The nature of each of the four objects]
There are four:

2.2.1.3.1 Appearing object,
2.2.1.3.2 Apprehended object,
2.2.1.3.3 Conceived object,
2.2.1.3.4 Object of engagement.

\(^{32}\) Two out of four direct perceptions are meant here, namely direct sense perception [dbang po mgon sum] and direct mental perception [yid mgon sum].

\(^{33}\) What is meant here is the inferential cognition that refers correctly to the object that really exists when the representation in the mind is accurate.
2.2.1.3.1.1 Definition and
2.2.1.3.1.2 Division.

2.2.1.3.1.1. The first one [definition] is the following: whatever object that appears by way of bringing out the aspects\(^{34}\) or that appears directly without aspects.

2.2.1.3.1.2. [Division] Here are the two:

2.2.1.3.1.2.1 Appearing object of nonconceptual cognition

2.2.1.3.1.2.2 [Appearing object] of conceptualization \([\text{rtog pa}]\).

2.2.1.3.1.2.1. [Appearing object of nonconceptual cognition] Here are the two:

2.2.1.3.1.2.1.1 One that is appearing object through reference to the aspects,

2.2.1.3.1.2.1.2 One that is appearing object through non-reference to the aspects.

2.2.1.3.1.2.1.1. The first one is like the thing apprehended by direct perception as being the knowledge of the thing [different from it].

2.2.1.3.1.2.1.2. Second one is like that which is to be experienced by direct perception as being self-knowledge.

2.2.1.3.1.2.2. Appearing object of conceptualization is like an object universal \([\text{don spyi}]\).\(^{35}\)

Alternatively, among four objects, the appearing object for valid cognition does not exist as a substance that is different from the cognition possessing the object. And when referring to that which appears in its own time, we refer only to three:

– that which is experienced by direct perception as being self-knowledge;
– the nonexistent clearly appearing directly to reverse \([\text{log}]\) nonconceptual cognition;
– the object universal directly appearing to conceptualization.

Concerning the second one, even though it is the appearing object of that cognition, generally it is not appearing object, which, I think, is the intention of the \(Tshad ma rigs gter\), but it should be [further] analyzed.\(^{36}\)

2.2.1.3.2. [Apprehended object] Here are

2.2.1.3.2.1. The definition: the outer thing directly bringing about \([\text{gtod byed}]\) the aspect similar to it in the direct perception apprehending it.

2.2.1.3.2.2. Division:

\(^{34}\) Tibetan term \(rnam pa\) is the translation of Sanskrit \(ākāra\). Concerning the meaning of the term in Indian and particularly in Buddhist philosophy cf. Kellner (2014). Cf. also McClintock (2014) and Moriyama (2014).

\(^{35}\) Cf. footnote 10 in the introduction.

\(^{36}\) Cf. discussion in the introduction.
2.2.1.3.2.2.1 From the point of view of the subject [yul can] it is the object apprehended by direct sense perception and the object apprehended by direct mental perception.

2.2.1.3.2.2 From the point of view of the object there are five: physical form, sound, smell, taste, touchable.

2.2.1.3.3. [Conceived object] Here is
2.2.1.3.3.1. The definition: what is to be known when the conceiving mind makes it important by way of apprehending it.
2.2.1.3.3.2. Here the division is:

2.2.1.3.3.2.1 Conceived object of conceptual valid cognition,
2.2.1.3.3.2.2 Conceived object of subsequent cognition.\(^{37}\)

The first are objects of engagement of inferential valid cognition. The second are like the very objects of engagement of both valid cognitions\(^{38}\) that become conceived objects of subsequent cognition caused [drangs] by them.

2.2.1.3.4. [Object of engagement] Here is
2.2.1.3.4.1. The definition: the main one which is an object that became the basis for engagement making the subject and the thing compatible.
2.2.1.3.4.2. Division. If it is divided from the point of view of the subject, out of three mentioned above, in case of the first one, which is the object of engagement of valid cognition, there are two: the object of engagement of direct perception and the object of engagement of inference. In the case of the former one the object of engagement of direct perception as knowledge of a thing is the outer thing as the particular; and the object of engagement of direct perception as self-knowledge is cognition as the particular; and the object of engagement of direct yogic perception according to Sautrāntika is the particular which is skandhas specified by

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\(^{37}\) Subsequent cognition [bcad shes] is briefly characterized by Sa skya Paṇḍita as follows: “Subsequent cognition is recollection of what is past [bcad shes ’das pa dran pa yin]” TR, p. 78. Go rams pa gives the following definition: “Definition of subsequent cognition: “knowledge engaging in the object that has been realized before and is kept intact [in memory] which is knowledge contradicting projections that are opposite to it [object] [bcad shes kyi mtsan nyid/ sngar rtogs zin gyi byed pa ma nyams pa ’i don la/ log phyogs kyi sgro ’dogs dang ’gal bar ’jug pa ’i rig pa].” G, p. 51. Dreyfus summarizes Sa-pan’s critique of this concept introduced by Phya pa chos kyi seng ge: “Sa-pan grants that subsequent cognition exists, but does not accept it as a division of nonvalid cognition. For Sa-pan, subsequent cognitions are nonrealizing cognitions. He rejects the idea that subsequent cognitions have any cognitive role. They merely repeat a previous cognition without contributing to the identification of an object. Hence, it is not even a realization of a previously realized object, as Ge-luk thinkers would have it. Sa-pan compares the identification of an already cognized object to cutting a tree already cut. Just as something that is already established and not forgotten does not need to be reestablished, something previously understood cannot be understood unless one forgets it in the meanwhile.

Sa-pan is particularly critical of the idea of the second moment of a perception as a subsequent cognition. Since perception merely holds its object and since this object is in constant transformation, the subsequent moments of perception are as valid as the first moment. Therefore, no perception can ever be a subsequent cognition. Only the conceptions that are recollections (dran shes) of something previously realized can be subsequent cognitions.” (Dreyfus 1997, p. 391).

\(^{38}\) Direct perception and inference.
substancelessness and according to aspectarians [rnam rigs pa, vijñaptivādin] is phenomenalities [chos nyid rnams].

In case of the latter the object of engagement of inference is referred to as that which is to be proven through authentic premise [rtags yang dag gi bsgrub bya]. The object of engagement of the sound is like the ox being the particular that is the object of engagement of compatibility between the sound “ox” and the thing.

2.2.2. [Division into two truths from the point of view of the nature]

In the case of the two truths from the point of view of the nature, according to Vaibhāsika when something is destroyed or inquired into by the mind, then that nonengagement of the mind apprehending it is the definition of the truth of complete projection. For example, it is like the vase that the mind apprehending it is not engaged into when it is destroyed, and it is like the water known to the world the mind apprehending it is not engaged into when it is analyzed by the mind in terms of particular eight atomic substances.

When something is destroyed or inquired into by the mind, that engagement of the mind apprehending it is the definition of absolute truth. For example, it is like the āyatana of form as it is accepted, for it is said in Abhidharmakośa:

If something is destroyed or excluded intellectually [blo yis gzhan bsal]
Mind does not engage into it.
It exists as complete projection as vase or water.
The absolute exists the other way.

39 More on this topic cf. John D. Dunne saying: “In practice, the Buddhist adept is meant to realize all four aspects of that truth, and one such aspect is impermanence, especially as applied to the psychophysical aggregates (skandha). Certainly, on Dharmakīrti’s system the constituents that make up the aggregates can be considered causally efficient, ultimately real particulars. Nevertheless, the impermanence of those particulars is not ultimately real. Instead, as with any quality applied to that which possesses it, impermanence is formed through a process of abstraction and exclusion. That is, a quality such as impermanence is conceptually abstracted from the particulars it qualifies, but in ontological terms, that quality is reducible to the particulars themselves” (Dunne 2006, p. 509).

40 The conception of three natures [mtshan nyid gsum] is meant here. Among these three natures there are two that are considered as phenomenality or absolute truth, namely yongs su grub pa and one type of gzhan gyi dbang, which is pure [dag pa’i gzhan dbang]. The other two: ma dag pa’i gzhan dbang and kun brtags are considered to be the truth of complete projection [kun rdzob].

I decided to translate chos nyid as “phenomenality” to preserve in English the affinity from Sanskrit and Tibetan between dharma [chos] as phenomenon and dharmatā [chos nyid] in the sense of absolute truth [don dam bden pa].

41 The eight atomic substances [rdul rdzas brgyad] according to abhidharmic philosophy are divided into two groups. The first group encompasses the earth atom [sa rdul], water atom [chu rdul], fire atom [me rdul] and the wind atom [rlung rdul]. The second one encompasses the ones based on the previous four: the form atom [gzugs rdul], smell atom [dri rdul], taste atom [ro rdul] and the atom of the touchable [reg bya’i rdul].

42 A, p.18 [6.5]. Concerning the relation of Vasubandhu and Buddhist epistemology after Dignaga, Arnold says that the latter “retains the basic intuition underlying Vasubandhu’s approach: the idea that there are two fundamentally different kinds of things (the reducible and the ontologically basic) and that the “two truths” (or, emphasizing sat rather than satya, two kinds of existsents) should be understood as consisting of two sets of enumerable entities. Now, however, it is not dharmas that are said to constitute the set of “ultimately existent” (paramārthasat) phenomena, but svalaṅkānas. And where Vasubandhu had (in keeping with the conventional sense of the Sanskrit word) understood svalaṅkānas as definitions individuating dharmas as categories, svalaṅkānas are now viewed as the unique, discrete phenomena that
Sautrāntika holds that the definitions of the two are two phenomena: the one that is effective [don byed nus pa] on the absolute [level] and the one that is not, since it is said that “the absolute is whatever is effective,” etc.

Cittamātra maintains that the definition of the truth of complete projection is whatever thoroughly increases afflictions while being really perceived [dngos su dming], and the definition of absolute truth is whatever necessarily increases complete purity while being really perceived. Since in Abhidharmasamuccaya it is said:

The perceived [object] that thoroughly expands afflictions while being perceived, exists as complete projection. The perceived [object] that expands complete purity while being perceived, exists as absolute.

Madhyamaka maintains that the definition of absolute truth is that which is apprehended by the apprehension seeing really. For example, it is like that which is apprehended by the apprehension of the ārya’s mind-stream in equipoise. The definition of the truth of complete projection is that which is apprehended by the apprehension seeing falsely. For example the real object of the mind of the ordinary being. As it is said in Madhyamakāvatāra:

Since all things are seen really and falsely,
There is the apprehension of two natures: real and false.
Any object seen really is suchness;
And what is seen falsely is complete projection, as [Buddha] said.

Footnote 42 continued
are the direct objects of perceptual cognition—such that svalakṣaṇas here would correspond to what had been, for Vasubandhu, the potentially innumerable tokens of the type dharma. These ontological primitives are, moreover, here defined particularly by their being causally efficacious—which means (in terms of the epistemological concerns of this program) by their capacity in particular to cause perceptual cognitions” (Arnold 2005, p. 28).

Cf. summary of Sautrāntika theory: “Given the theory of causality, the idea of spatiotemporal restriction then serves to positively establish the entire Sautrāntika system:
(1) Whatever exists, occupying space and time, is produced (kṛtaka) or conditioned (samskṛta) by a cause, because spatiotemporal restriction is impossible without a cause.
(2) A conditioned, individual and impermanent thing is able to produce an effect through restricting the effect to a particular place and time (desākālaṁiyama) in accordance with its own spatiotemporal location. [= x’, y’ and z’]
(3) A pervasive and permanent thing, if it existed, could not produce an effect because it would be unable to restrict the effect to a particular place and time; this is because it would have no spatiotemporal location of its own.

From this theory of causality, one can derive the ontological distinction between the individual and the universal, and thus the theory of momentariness, in the following way:
(1) Only the individual (svalakṣaṇa) is causally efficacious (arthakriyāsamartha) and therefore ultimately real (paramārtha). A pervasive and permanent thing such as the universal (sāmānya) is causally inefficacious and therefore not existent in reality (asat).
(2) Because a pervasive and permanent or non-momentary thing does not exist in reality due to its lack of causal efficacy, all existents are exclusively impermanent (aniṭya) or momentary (kṣaṇīka)” (Yoshimizu 2007, pp. 1073–1074).

Cf. C 6.23-31.

C p. 102 [6.23].
2.2.3. [Division into direct and indirect from the point of view of the object of engagement]

Concerning the two: the direct and indirect from the point of view of the object of engagement there is:

2.2.3.1 Definition and
2.2.3.2 Division.

2.2.3.1. Here the definition is what is to be realized without referring to the universal and what is to be realized through the universal.

2.2.3.2. Here the division is into:

2.2.3.2.1 Division of the direct,
2.2.3.2.2 Division of the indirect. 48

2.2.3.2.1. Here is the division into:

2.2.3.2.1.1 Division from the point of view of object,
2.2.3.2.1.2 Division from the point of view of subject.

2.2.3.2.1.1. Here are the two:

2.2.3.2.1.1.1 The bearer of quality [chos can]
2.2.3.2.1.1.2 Phenomenality.

2.2.3.2.1.1.1. Here there are the [outer] thing and cognition.

2.2.3.2.1.2. Division from the point of view of subject is done into two:

2.2.3.2.1.2.1 Division from the point of view of non-conceptual non-erroneous [cognition],
2.2.3.2.1.2.2 Division from the point of view of non-conceptual erroneous cognition.

2.2.3.2.1.2.1. Here are three direct ones in:

– direct perception as knowledge of the thing,
– direct perception as self-knowledge,
– direct yogic perception.

They are like the following: the first one is five things such as form etc.; the second one is all cognitions; the third one is phenomenality.

2.2.3.2.1.2.2. They are like two moons being the direct for the sense consciousness of the appearing of two moons. 49

2.2.3.2.2. Division of the indirect is done into

2.2.3.2.2.1 Division of the object and
2.2.3.2.2.2 Division of the subject.

48 Compare the discussion on Sa skya Pañḍita’s and Go rams pa’s understanding of this term in Dreyfus (1997, pp. 416–427).

49 Cf. discussion of this example in the introduction.
2.2.3.2.2.1. Here are the three above mentioned [and they can be described] thus. The first one is the vase that is the indirect for the conceptualization apprehending the vase. Concerning cognition it is the cognition of one’s own mindstream that is the indirect for the person who does not have direct cognition of other mind’s cognition. Phenomenality is the indirect for ordinary beings.

2.2.3.2.2.2. Division from the point of view of the subject is done into

2.2.3.2.2.2.1 Division from the point of view of inference,
2.2.3.2.2.2.2 Division from the point of view of the state of mind that is not valid cognition.

2.2.3.2.2.2.1. There are three indirects for the inference based on the thing [dngos stobs], inference based on trust, and inference based on opinion—they are what is proven in these three reasonings [gtan tshigs].

2.2.3.2.2.2.2. There are three indirects as

2.2.3.2.2.2.2.1 [Object of] sequential cognition,
2.2.3.2.2.2.2.2 [Object of] reverse cognition,
2.2.3.2.2.2.2.3 [Object of] doubt.

2.2.3.2.2.2.2.1. Like the blue [colour], which is the indirect of the reliable [nges] cognition caused [drangs] by direct sense perception apprehending [it] earlier.

2.2.3.2.2.2.2.1. Like the permanent sound, which is the indirect for the conceptualization apprehending permanent sound.

2.2.3.2.2.2.3. Like a direct doubt of somebody doubting whether sound is permanent or impermanent.

Therefore if there is something that is the direct for reverse non-conceptual cognition, it would not necessarily be the direct; and if there is something that is the indirect in case of reverse conceptual cognition, it would not necessarily be the indirect. This is because if there is something that is an appearing object of the reverse nonconceptual cognition, it is not necessarily an existent [yod pa], and because if there is something that is a conceived object of reverse conceptual cognition, it is not necessarily an existent. In the case of that which is the indirect of the doubt, some parts of the thing are indirect and the others are not indirect.

2.2.4. [Division into two: particular and universal from the point of view of the way of engagement]

In the case of particular and universal from the point of view of the way of engagement there is

2.2.4.1 Definition and
2.2.4.2 Division.

2.2.4.1. Respectively, [the first one is] the thing that stays autonomous [ma ‘dres par gnas pa] in terms of object, time, essence and [the second is] projection [sgro btags] appearing as common in terms of object, time, essence. Or else, the thing

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50 Cf. Yoshimizu (2007, pp. 1067–1069).
staying as uncommon and projection appearing as common, since in Pramāṇaviniścaya it is said:

They are the essence of the thing staying as uncommon;
And the particular itself.\(^{51}\)

So [the topic] is known in both ways: directly [from Dharmakirti]\(^{52}\) and indirectly [from Go rams pa].\(^{53}\)

2.2.4.2.1. If the particular is divided, there are

2.2.4.2.1.1 the particular which is a thing [don] and
2.2.4.2.1.2 the particular which is consciousness.

2.2.4.2.1.1. Here there is

2.2.4.2.1.1.1 The matter which is an outer thing [don] and
2.2.4.2.1.1.2 The matter which is an inner thing.

2.2.4.2.1.1.1. Here there are five outer āyatanas like the form etc.
2.2.4.2.1.1.2. Here there are five inner āyatanas like the eye etc.

2.2.4.2.1.2. If the particular which is consciousness is divided, there are six groups of conditioned consciousness [rnam par shes pa] and the related ones ['khor]\(^{54}\).

2.2.4.2.2. If the generally characterized object is divided, previous Tibetan thinkers said that there are two: the universal of the exclusion [ldog pa]\(^{55}\) which is

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\(^{51}\) PVin 1.153.1.

\(^{52}\) According to Sa skya Pandita, claiming to follow Dharmakirti of course, these crucial notions are understood as follows: "Apprehending of a particular is nonconceptual. Apprehending of the universal is conceptual. Here particular is the thing and universal is that which does not exist as object established. The so called particular itself, individuals, thing, substance, the isolated, the absolute, etc. are established as the ones that are effective, substance, as unmixed with other, as cause and result. They are what is to be accepted and what is to be abandoned into which normal beings engage or withdraw from. So since they are the object of engagement, they have the same meaning as the thing. [...]"

The universal, apoha, the reverse, devoid of aspects, non-autonomous, related—the so called relative etc.—do not stay within absolute. They are not established as any object. Not being the object of sense, they are projections of the mind. [rang mtshan 'dzin pa rtog med/ spyi 'dzin pa ni rtog pa yin/ de la rang mtshan dngos po ste/ spyi ni dngos por grub pa med/ rang gi mtshan nyid gsal ba dngos po rdzas leg pa don dam pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni don byed nus pa rdzas phan tshun rna 'dres pa rgyu dang 'bras bur grub pa skye bu thams cad kyi blang dor bya ba'i 'jug yul yin pas dngos po don du don gcig pa yin te/ [...] spyi dang/ gshan sel dang/ ldog pa dang/ rnam gcos dang/ 'drel pa dang/ 'brel pa dang/ kun rdzob ces bya ba la sogs pa ni/ don la mi gnas pa/ dngos por ma gdub pa/ dbang po'i yul ma yin pa blos sgro brtags pa"] TR 85n.

\(^{53}\) Cf. discussion of Go rams pa’s understanding of rang mtshan in: Yoshimizu (2007, pp. 1067–1069). Also cf. Yoshimizu (2004, pp. 117–133); Dreyfus (1997, pp. 67–82, 90–94, 111–118).

\(^{54}\) In other words, the division is made into the so called main mind [gtso sems], including all the above mentioned six consciousnesses [miṅ gi rnam par shes pa, rna ba’i rnam par shes pa, sna’i rnam par shes pa, lce’i rnam par shes pa, lus kyi rnam par shes pa, yid kyi rnam par shes pa] and mental acts [sems byung] which are called ‘khor—the ones related [to the main mind].

\(^{55}\) Go rams pa refers here to the dge lugs system in which ldog pa, as Tillemans explains, functions it the context of realism: “although objects of thought, such as universal, sādhyā etc, are themselves no more than mind-created appearances/representations (snang ba = pratibhāsa) or exclusions (ldog pa=vyāvṛtti),
non-implicative negation \([\text{med dgag}]^{56}\) and the universal of intellectual apoha \([\text{blo} \ i \ \text{ghzan sel}]^{57}\). However the explanation in the texts says that

there are three universals based on thing, no-thing and both; the universals and also the three aspects are there because they are based on thing, no-thing and both. \(^{58}\)

Or else there can be division into four:

- universal of the one [category] divided into different ones,
- universal of different ones reduced to one,
- universal of the one appearing as one,
- universal of the different ones appearing as different.

This is because similar divisions are made in case of apoha, since universality \([\text{spyi}]\), universal and apoha have the same meaning. \(^{59}\)

Footnote 55 continued

it does not follow that if \(x\) is such an object of thought, \(x\) is mind-created—real particulars can be said to be the ascertained objects \((\text{nges yul})\), or equally, to use the words of dGe ‘dan grub pa and ICang skya rol pa’s rdo rje, they are the explicit objects \((\text{dngos yul})\) of thought; elsewhere in Tsong kha pa and virtually all other dGe lugs pa writers on the matter, it is routinely mentioned that they actually appear \((\text{snang ba})\) to thought” \(\) \(\) (Tillelmanss 1999, p. 216). Compare also Tillelmanns (1999, pp. 222–224).

The term ldog pa in Sa skya tradition is understood in the following way (note that Dreyfus translates ldog pa as distinguisher): ‘Only individuals (gsal ba, vyakiti) are real. Thus universals, being universally characterized phenomena and not specific individuals, can be only unreal. They are conceptual characteristics (known as distinguishers, ldog pa, vyavrtti) through which we categorize things. The reason universally characterized phenomena are unreal is they do not meet the three sets of identity conditions delineated by Dharmakirti. Saky Chok-den, for example, defines a universal as that unique distinguisher which is the mere preclusion of [things of] discordant kinds.’ A universal is a distinguisher; that is, it is not a real property but a negatively constructed one. For example, the universal cowness is not some essential property that all cows would share but merely the exclusion of all cows from a class (non-cow) to which they do not belong” \(\) \(\) \(\) (Dreyfus 1997, p. 154).

56 Concerning non-implicative negation \([\text{prasajyapratisedha}, \text{med dgag}]\) Avalokitavrata says: “This \([\text{prasajyapratisedha}]\) has the following characteristics: (1) it does not show the sign of arthapatti; (2) is devoted to negation, aims only at negation, i.e. simply negates what is asserted by the other party; (3) does not affirm the existence of an entity or non-entity; (4) having [the characteristic of] negation and without having [those of] implication and the affirmation of an entity, expresses [the object of negation] by its own word, as when one, meaning ‘not a Brahman’ says ‘not a Brahman’ by which he simply makes negation.” Quotation translated in: Kajiyama 1973, p. 170.

57 According to Go rams pa one of the possible divisions of apoha is into \([\text{yod pa gzhan sel}]\) and \([\text{med pa gzhan sel}]\). The first one is further divided into sound apoha \([\text{gsra}’i \ gzhan sel}]\) and intellectual apoha \([\text{blo} \ i \ gzhan sel}]\); Cf. his sde bdun mdo dang beas pa’i dgongs pa phin ci ma log par ‘grel ba tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa in: dpal sa skya pa’i tshad ma rig pa’i gzhung gces bs dus, G 71. Cf. also Tillelmanns’ remark quoted in footnote 10.

58 PV III 51 c. As Dreyfus says, “Sa-gya thinkers seem to be on stronger grounds when they argue that realism is unsound as an interpretation of Dharmakirti’s ideas. Go-ram-ba denounces one of the main Geluk interpretive moves: that which differentiates universal \((\text{spyi, sambaya})\) and universally characterized phenomena \((\text{spyi mthun, sambanyalakshana})\). No such distinction is ever made by Dharmakirti, argues Go-ram-ba. On the contrary, Dharmakirti repeatedly identifies these two. For example, Dharmakirti specifies three types of universally characterized phenomena: ‘Since they rely on either thing, nonthing, [or] both, these universals are also threefold.’ This division serves as a typology of both universals and universally characterized phenomena. Itsuggests no difference between the two. Therefore, their separation is without solid basis in Dharmakirti’s system. Universals can be no more real than universally characterized phenomena” \(\) \(\) \(\) (Dreyfus 1997, p. 157).

59 As Dreyfus says, „Sa-pan provides a parallel list for the conceptual domain of universally characterized phenomena: universal \((\text{spyi, sambaya})\), elimination of others \((\text{gzhan sel, anyapoha})\),
2.2.5. Reducing to one: the particular that is the ultimate perceptual.

Concerning reducing to one—the particular which is the ultimate perceptual—if you think what it means to say that the perceptual is particular only as in [quotation] “Particular only [is] the perceptual”\textsuperscript{60}, then generally according to the tradition of texts on reasoning [\textit{rtog ge}] it means that first after identifying what is known as valid cognition for the ones that have philosophical system and the ones who do not have, there comes the moment for proving that the teacher similar to that is the embodiment of valid cognition; because after identifying that [valid cognition as] non-deceptive [\textit{mi bslu}] clarifying of the object not known before, later it is said that “Bhagavan that has it is valid cognition itself.”\textsuperscript{61} Concerning the meaning of what is known as valid cognition for everyone who is engaged in a philosophical system and who is not, \textit{Pramāṇaviniścaya} says: “Concerning achieving what is beneficial and abandoning what is not beneficial, one starts with reliable and true [\textit{nges par yang dag pa}] cognition.”\textsuperscript{62} And it is shown that it is cognition that becomes the cause for adopting and rejecting the objects that can bring benefit and harm. In this way the object that can bring benefit and is to be adopted by valid cognition and the object that can bring harm and is to be abandoned are exclusively the particular since what is exclusively particular can bring benefit and harm while the universal can not do this. As it is said, “Since what is to be accepted and abandoned have consequences, all beings engage into them”\textsuperscript{63} and “Why to pursue and investigate the object that is not effective?”\textsuperscript{64} It is only the particular which, when comprehended by direct perception that is the knowledge of the thing, is the apprehended object. When it is comprehended by direct inference, it is the conceived object. Based on these two valid cognitions at the time when the being engages into it, there is object of engagement because of nondeceptiveness. Concerning the intention here auto-commentary to the \textit{Tshad ma rigs gter} says: “If one thoroughly comprehends [\textit{jal}] this very particular, it is the object of engagement. If one comprehends the indirect, it is the conceived object. Based on these two valid cognitions at the time when the being engages into it, there is object of engagement because of non-deceptiveness.”\textsuperscript{65} The meaning of the phrasing “directly comprehends” and also what is the meaning of phrasing “thoroughly comprehending” is known through the modifier.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{Footnote 59 continued}
distinguisher (\textit{idog pa}, \textit{vyāṣṭित}), preclusion (\textit{rnam good}, \textit{vyavaccheda}), indeterminate (literally mixed, \textit{'dres pa}), relation (\textit{'brel ba}, \textit{sambandha}), relative (\textit{kun rdzob}, \textit{samvṛti}). These phenomena do not exist in reality (\textit{don la mi gnas pa}) for they are superimposed (\textit{sgro btags pa}) by thought” (Dreyfus 1997, p. 77).
\textsuperscript{60} PV III 53 d.
\textsuperscript{61} PV II 7 a. Concerning interpretation of this verse and Buddha as embodiment of valid cognition in Dharmakīrti, cf. Van Bijlert (1989, pp. 115–120 and 158–168). Also cf. Ruegg (1994); Silk (2002); Steinkellner (1983).
\textsuperscript{62} PVin 1.152.3.
\textsuperscript{63} PVin 1.173.4.
\textsuperscript{64} PV I 211 ab.
\textsuperscript{65} TR 53 (auto commentary to 11a).
\textsuperscript{66} \textit{tshig grogs}—literally “accompanying word”. technical term of Tibetan grammar referring to words modifying or enriching the meaning of the words they accompany. Adjectives, adverbs etc. are included into this category. Here the terms “directly” and “thoroughly” are meant.

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In short, when valid cognition engages only in comprehending the particular by way of direct perception and inference, then even though the perceptual is twofold from the point of view of the way of engaging, namely, particular and universal, only the particular as an object of engagement is the perceptual. This is non-erroneous intention of the phrase “particular only is the perceptual”\(^{67}\). As it is said in the commentary of Devendrabuddhi,

Since it is only the particulars which can be comprehended [\textit{rtogs}] from the point of view of their own nature and of the other, how can they be defined? [They are presented] by way of two perceptuals.\(^{68}\)

2.3 [Rebuttal of objections]

There are two [paragraphs] in the rebuttal of objections:

2.3.1 Rebuttal of the objection concerning the nonexistence of the object of erroneous cognition,

2.3.2 Rebuttal of the objection concerning the apprehended object as a particular.

2.3.1. Here are four:

2.3.1.1 Rebuttal of objection concerning the contradiction in claiming two perceptuals,

2.3.1.2 Rebuttal of the objection concerning the similarity of objects i.e. the object universal and the nonexistent clearly [appearing],

2.3.1.3 Rebuttal of the objection concerning contradiction with experience,

2.3.1.4 Rebuttal of the entailment [\textit{thal ba}] that negation [\textit{dgag pa}] is not realized by valid cognition.

2.3.1.1. If someone says: “If at the time of engaging by way of comprehending exclusively the particular by the two: direct perception and inference, the apprehended object is only a particular, then there is contradiction, with acarya Dignāga claiming that there are two perceptuals”, there is no fault [in our system]. This is because there are the two posited—particular and universal, since there are two ways of comprehending: from the point of view of own nature only a particular is comprehended and the other is comprehended from the point of view of the object universal.\(^{69}\)

2.3.1.2. If someone says: “If object universal—despite its nonexistence in reality [\textit{don}]—is a perceptual, then also nonexistent clearly [appearing] is similar to it”, there is no fault [in our system]. This is because concerning the first one [object universal], even though it is not a particular, on the basis of it the object of engagement, which is the particular, is obtained,\(^{70}\) and concerning the second one [nonexistent clearly appearing] its own nature is not the particular and [therefore] on the basis of it object of engagement, which is the particular, is not obtained at all.

\(^{67}\) PV III 53 d.

\(^{68}\) D 144.

\(^{69}\) Cf. discussion in the introduction and also Dreyfus (1997, p. 78).

\(^{70}\) Sa skya Paṇḍita and Go rams pa in this case follow Dharmakirti. Cf. Dreyfus (1997, p. 74).
2.3.1.3. If someone says: “If the appearing object is not the particular, it contradicts the fact that it appears clearly to the cognition”, there is no fault [in our system]. This is because there are two parts: the part of the aspect appearing clearly to conceptualization and the part of projection referring to it as external. Out of these two the first one is cognition and the second is the universal.

2.3.1.4. If someone says: “It entails nonexistence of valid cognition comprehending a nonexistent thing, since the object of engagement of the valid cognition is the object that becomes the cause for performing accepting and rejecting, so it must be a particular”, there is no fault [in our system]. This is because of the [aforementioned] analysis whether there is or is not valid cognition comprehending nonexistent thing.

The meaning of that it is explained non-erroneously by the four and a half stanzas of the *Tshad ma rigs gter* from “If to say that, since [Dignaga] accepts two objects, it invalidates [Sa skya Panḍita’s position]” to “since you prove […], there is no contradiction.”

2.3.2. Here are the two:

2.3.2.1 Objection,
2.3.2.2 Answer.

2.3.2.1. It is said: “It is not admissible to accept that the perceptual which is apprehended object is the particular only. This is because the wise one negated the apprehended object being an outer thing [and] here [in the *Tshad ma rigs gter*] it is not possible for the apprehended object to be cognition.”

2.3.2.2. There are three:

2.3.2.2.1 The teaching of general presentation of tenets,
2.3.2.2.2 Refutation of other [scholars’] analysis,
2.3.2.2.3 Proving the sugata tradition.

2.3.2.2.1. Non-Buddhists [*Tīrthikas*] who say that the nature [ngo bo nyid] is the cause claim the nature as a cause. Followers of Īśvara claim Īśvara as a cause.

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71 The fragment mentioned is as follows: “They say, if [Dignaga] accepts two objects, it invalidates [Sa skya Panḍita’s position that there is only one]. From the point of view of the way of engagement there are two: particular and universal. If they say that even nonexistent is similar to the perceptual, then concerning this, there can’t be any purpose for that object. Appearance such as a strand of hair etc. is mind itself. Appearance as a strand of hair is not established as an object. So if to analyze whether it exists as an object or does not exist, it is universal. If they say: both nonexistent things object universal and nonexistent clearly appearing are established together with self-knowing and that is why they are clear, then both mistaken cognitions have no object but because they are experienced by self-knowing, they are cognitions themselves. Moreover because of apprehending non-being, they are mistaken cognitions. If they say, if there is no object that is a particular, the nonexistence of the object contradicts the perceptual, then since you prove whether what is to be rejected is the existing or nonexistent object, there is no contradiction [yul gnyis bzhed pas gnod ce na/’jug tshul sgo nas rang spyi gnyis/’med pa’ang gzhal byar mtsungs she na/’de la yul gvi digos nus med/’skra soTa snang ba blo nyid yin/’skrar snang don la grub pa med/’de ni dngos por yod med ces/’rtog pas dpyod na spyi mtsshan yin/’dngos med gnyis po rang rig gi/’shugs la grub pas gsal zhe na/’khrul shes gnyis la yul med cing/’rang rig gis ni myong ba’i phyir/’shes pa nyid yin de yang ni/’med pa’dzin phyir ’khrul shes yin/’rang mtshan min pa’i yul med na/’dngos med gzhal byar ’gal zhe na/’bsgrub pa’i phyir na ’gal ba med].” TR 11d-15.
Sāmkhya claims prakṛti as cause. Leftovers eaters\textsuperscript{72} and two Śrāvaka schools\textsuperscript{73} claim atoms as it [a cause]. Cittamātrins claim that all appearances [snang ba] are mind. Nīhsvabhāvavādins\textsuperscript{74} admit that all dharmas are on the absolute [level] free from projections [spros pa dang bral ba] and that on the relative [level] they are acceptable as being similar either to Vastusatpadārthavādins [Śrāvaka] or to worldly opinions.

2.3.2.2.2. Claiming that nature is the cause is not admissible since it is undermined by the argumentation refuting creation without the cause. Claiming Īśvara and prakṛti as cause is also not admissible since it is undermined by the argument refuting creation from the permanent.\textsuperscript{75}

2.3.2.2.3. Here are the two:

2.3.2.2.3.1 Identification of the intention and
2.3.2.2.3.2 The way it was proven by ācharyas.

2.3.2.2.3.1. When addressing conventions sugata proclaimed atoms; and there are two systems—that of Vaibhāṣika and that of Sautrāntika. When addressing thatness of the conventional, he proclaimed Cittamātra. Concerning that there are two [systems], that of true and false aspects. When addressing thatness of the absolute, he referred to all dharmas as free from projections.

2.3.2.2.3.2. Thus out of these four Buddhist systems, which one was settled by ācharyas? Concerning this question there are two

2.3.2.2.3.2.1 Knowledge of the real [outer] thing,\textsuperscript{76}
2.3.2.2.3.2.2 Knowledge of the aspect [in cognizing consciousness]\textsuperscript{77}

2.3.2.2.3.2.1. When accepting [the system of knowledge of the outer thing] he rejected the claim of Vaibhāṣika, that the sense consciousness apprehends directly without aspects the outer object simultaneous with it. Then he proclaimed the system of Sautrāntika, which claims the cognition of the outer object [phyi don rtogs] in the way that after three conditions\textsuperscript{78} coming together in the first moment in the second moment there is only sense consciousness born having an aspect. As it is

\textsuperscript{72} The so called “leftovers eaters [gzegs zan pa]” are the followers of Kanāḍa (Kaṇabhakṣa or Kaṇabhuj, around 200-400 A.D.), legendary founder of Vaiśeṣika whose names mean “atom eater”.

\textsuperscript{73} Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika are meant here.

\textsuperscript{74} The term refers to both Madhyamaka schools, namely, Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika.

\textsuperscript{75} Locus classicus for these critiques are of course first chapter of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, sixth chapter of Madhyamakavatāra [dbu ma la ’jug pa], cf. also Śūnyatāsaptati 1–6.

\textsuperscript{76} don rig—here as synonym for philosophical systems of Śrāvakayāna.

\textsuperscript{77} rnam rig—Cittamātra school.

\textsuperscript{78} The conditions meant here are: objective condition [mig rkyen] being the thing perceived, subjective condition [bdag rkyen] being the sense organ, and immediate condition [de ma thag rkyen] being the mind.
known from the words of a śācarya himself: “If engaging in analysis of the outer [object], I fully rely on the level of Sautrāntika.”

2.3.2.2.2.2. At the time of proclaiming of knowledge of the aspect, he rejected the claim of true aspectarians that gross appearances [rags pa snang ba] are truly established within sense consciousness and proclaimed lack of aspects, since it is said “Thus object and consciousness do not exist as gross appearances.” So then there are two [traditions] here: Sautrāntika and Cittamātra. If the above formulated objection is treated by way of Sautrāntika, the first argument does not hold because in this tradition the outer object referred to through the aspect is referred to as an apprehended object.

If it is treated by way of Cittamātra, [the same] is claimed, since in this tradition the subject and object got on the basis of apprehended object is not established. That is why in the Tshad ma rigs gter it is said:

As long as the outer is accepted, for that long the cause is said to be an apprehended object. If what is to be cognized is posited as inside one, object and subject are not established.  

The explanation of the first chapter being the analysis of the object is completed.

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79 Tibetan Classics edition does not identify the source of quotation but only indicates that this sentence is similar to Sa skya Pandita’s formulation from his autocommentary. However in dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa'i zhal lung by 'jam mgon 'ju mi pham rnam rgyal rgya mtsho (The Complete Explanation of Madhyamakālaṃkāra Called Oral Transmission Rejoicing the Guru Manjuśrī) which is his the commentary to Sāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāra, this sentence is quoted again and attributed explicitly to Dharmakīrti. Both editions of Go rams pa’s commentary I used render this sentence as follows: gal te phy rol dpoyod la 'jug pa ni/ kho bo mdo sde'i skabs la rnam par brten/ while Jamgon Mipham version reads: gal te phy rol dpoyod la 'jug pa ni/ kho bo mdo sde'i skas la rnam par brten/. Apart from small difference in case of agentic particle, there is also skas instead of skabs in the version from 'Jam mgon mi pham. In translation I follow his version, since skabs does not make good sense in the sentence.

80 PV III.211 ab.

81 The argumentation presented in 2.3.2.

82 TR I 28 [s. 68].
Edition of the original
The text below is the edition based on the woodblock print original reproduced in the collected works of Go rams pa:

Kun-mkhyen go-rams-pa bsod-nams-seṅge’i gsun ‘bum, Dehra-Dun: Sakya College 1996, vol. 2, pp. 387–400.

The text was compared with two latest editions of Go rams pa’s commentary:
K1— dpal sa skya pa’i tshad ma rig pa’i gzhung gces bsdu, New Delhi: Institute of Tibetan Classics 2006 (bod kyi gtsug lag gces bsdu vol. 20), pp. 40–49.
K2— Tshad ma rigs gter rtsa ba dang ‘grel pa bzhugs, Sichuan: People’s Press 2008, pp. 68–79;

In square brackets are the titles of the sections inserted by the editor of Institute of Tibetan Classics included into the translation as well. Numbers within the text indicate the page of the Sakya College edition. The edition is followed by the outline of the chapter showing the structure of the text.

<387> shes bya yul/
dang po la gnis te/ dang po ni yul gyi mtshan nyid blo’i rig par bya ba/ de dang khyab mnyam pa’i shes bya’i mtshan nyid/ blo’i yul du byar rung ba/ gzhal bya’i mtshan nyid/ tshad mas rtogs par bya ba/ gzhir grub kyi mtshan nyid/ tshad mas dmigs pa/ yod nges kyi mtshan nyid/ tshad mas bltar rung ba’o//

gnis pa la gsum ste/ gshan lugs dgag /rang lugs bzhag /rtsod pa spang ba’o//
[gzhan lugs dgag pa/]
dang po ni bod kha cig snang yul dang/ gzung yul don gcig pas <388> don spyi de rtog pa’i gzung yul dang/ med pa gsal ba de rtog med log shes kyi gzung yul yin zhes zer ro//
‘di dgag pa la rigs pa gnis las/ dang po ni/ rtog pa dang rtog med log shes gnis po chos can/ ‘khrl shes ma yin par thal/ gzung yul can gyi shes pa yin pa’i phyir/ gnis pa ni/ don spyi dang med pa gsal ba gnis po chos can/ mthong rung gi yul na gnas pa’i gang zang gshan gyi shes pa mthong bar thal/ rang snang ba’i shes pa las rdzas tha dad pa’i gzung yul yin pa’i phyir/
[rang lugs bzhag pa/]

gnis pa la lnga ste/ yul du byas tshul gyi sgo nas yul bzhir dbye ba/ ngo bo’i sgo nas bden pa gnis su dbye ba/ ‘jug yul gyi sgo nas mngon lkog gnis su dbye ba/ ‘jug tshul gyi sgo nas rang spyi gnis su dbye ba/ mthar thug gi gzhal bya rang mtshan gcig tu bsdu ba’o//
[yul du byas tshul gyi sgo nas dbye ba/]
dang po la gsum ste/ chos gang yul bzhir ‘gyur dpyad/ yul can gang la yul bzhir yod dpyad/ yul bzhi so so’i ngo bo’ol/
dang po ni/ chos thams cad yul can gyi blo so so la ltos nas/ snang yul/ zhen yul/ ‘jug yul gsum du ‘gyur la/ gzung yul ni mdo sde pas phyi’i skye mched lnga po kho na la ‘jug cing/ sems tsam pa’i lugs la gzung yul gyi rnam gzhag med do/ gnis pa ni/ rtog med ma ‘khrl ba’i shes pa thams la snang yul yod cing/ rtog med ‘khrl shes rnam la snang yul med/ rtog pa thams cad la snang yul yod do/ gzung yul ni/ don rig mngon <389> sum gnis po kho na la yod cing/ zhen yul ni/ rtog pa don mthun rnam la yod/ ‘jug yul ni/ tshad ma dang/ rjod byed sgra don mthun dang/skyes bu rnam la yod do//

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gsum pa la/ snang yul/ gzung yul/ zhen yul/ ‘jug yul dang bzhi las/ dang po la mtshan nyid dang/ dbye ba gnyis/ dang po ni/ des rnam par gtad pa’i sgo nas snang ba’am/ rnam med du dngos su snang ba gang rung gyur pa’i yul lo/ gnyis pa la/ rtog med shes pa’i dang/ rtog pa’i snang yul gnyis/ dang po la rnam pa gtad pa’i sgo nas snang yul du ‘gyur ba dang/ rnam pa ma gtad pa’i sgo nas snang yul du ‘gyur ba gnyis/ dang po ni/ don rig mngon sum gyis gzung don lta bu/ gnyis pa ni/ rang rig mngon sum gyis myang bya Ita bu’o/ rang ngan yul bzhii’i rang tshan du gyur pa’i snang yul ni yul can gyi shes pa las rdzas gzhan du med cing/ rang dus su snang ba la ‘jog pa rang rig mngon sum gyis myang bya dang/ rtog med log shes la dngos su snang ba‘i med pa gsal ba dang/ rtog pa la dngos su snang ba‘i don spyi gsum po kho na la ‘jog cing/ bar pa ni shes pa de’i snang yul yin kyang sphyi snang yul ma yin zhes pa rigs gter gyi dgongs pa yin nam snyam ste dpyad do//

gnyis pa la mtshan nyid ni/ rang ‘dzin mngon sum la rang ‘dra’i rnam pa dngos su gtod byed kyi phyi don no/ dbye ba/ yul can gyi sgo nas dbang po'i mngon sum gyis gzung yul dang/ <390> yid kyi mngon sum gyis gzung yul gnyis/ yul gyi sgo nas gzugs sgra dri ro reg bya lnga’o/

gsum pa la mtshan nyid ni/ rang ‘dzin stangs kyi gtsor byed pa’i blos zhen nas rig par bya ba/ de la dbye na rtog pa tshad ma’i zhen yul dang/ bcdad shes kyi zhen yul gnyis/ dang po ni/ rjes dpag tshad ma’i ‘jug yul rnam so/ gnyis pa ni/ tshad ma gnyis kyi ‘jug yul de nyid des drangs pa’i bcdad shes kyi zhen yul du ‘gyur ba Ita bu’o//
bzhi pa la mtshan nyid ni/ yul can don mthun gyi byed pa ‘jug pa’i gzhir gyur pa’i yul gyi gtsor bo’o/ dbye ba la yul can gyi sgo nas dbye na snag tar gsum las dang po tshad ma’i ‘jug yul la mngon sum dang/ rjes dpag gi ‘jug yul gnyis/ dang po la don rig mngon sum gyi ‘jug yul ni phyi rol gyi don rang mtshan dang/ rang rig mngon sum gyi ‘jug yul ni shes pa rang mtshan dang/ rnal ‘byor mngon sum gyi ‘jug yul ni mdo sde pa’i lta na bdag med pas khyad par du byas pa’i phung po rang mtshan dang/ rnam rig pa ltar na chos nyid rnam yin na83/ rjes dpag gi ‘jug yul ni rtags yang dag gi bsgrub bya rnam la ‘jog go /sgra’i ‘jug yul ni ba lang rang mtshan pa de ba lang zhes pa’i sgra don mthun gyi ‘jug yul yin pa Ita bu’o//

[ngo bo’i sgo nas bden pa gnyis su dbye ba/]

gnyis pa’i ngo bo’i sgo nas bden pa gnyis la/ bye brag tu84 smra bas bcom pa’am blos gzhi gna pa na der ‘dzin gyi blo mi ‘jug pa de kun rdzob bden pa’i mtshan nyid de/ dper na bcom pa na de ‘dzin gyi blo mi ‘jug pa bum pa Ita bu  493  dang/ blos rduls brgyad so so phy e pa na der ‘dzin gyi blo mi ‘jug pa ‘jig ren grags pa’i chu Ita bu’o// bcom pa’am blos gzhi gpa na der ‘dzin gyi blo ‘jug pa de don dam bden pa’i mtshan nyid de/ dper na gzugs kyi skye mched Ita bu’o zhes ‘dod de/ mzdod las/ gang la bcom dang blo yiss gzhan/ bsal na de blo mi ‘jug pa/ bum chu bzhin du kun rdzob tu// yod de don dam yod gzhan no/ zhes gsungs pa’i phyir ro// mdo sde pas/ don dam par don byed nus pa dang mi nus pa’i chos gnyis de gnyis kyi

83 In K1, K2 also „ná” but I read as “no”.
84 In K1 without „tu”.
mtshan nyid du ‘dod de/ don dam don byed nus pa gang/ zhes sogs gsungs pa’i phyir/ sms tsam pas/ gang la dngos su dming nas kun nas nyon mongs pa rgyas su rung ba de kun rdzob bden pa’i mtshan nyid dang/ gang la dngos su dming nas rnam byang rgyas pa khyab pa de don dam bden pa’i mtshan nyid du bzhes de/ kun btus las/ gang la dming nas kun nas nyon mongs ‘phel bar’85 ‘gyur ba’i dming pa ni kun rdzob tu yod pa’o/ gang la dming nas rnam par byung ba ‘phel bar ’gyur ba’i dming pa ni don dam du yod pa’o// zhes gsungs pa’i phyir/ dbu ma pas/ mthong ba yang dag pa’i ‘dzin stangs kyis gzung bya de don dam bden pa’i mtshan nyid de/ dper na ‘phags rgyud kyi mnyam gzhag gi ‘dzin stangs kyis gzung bya lta bu’o// mthong ba brdzun pa’i ‘dzin stangs kyis gzung bya de kun rdzob bden pa’i mtshan nyid de/ dper na so skye’i blo’i <392> dngos yul lta bu zhes bzhes de/ ‘jug pa las/ dngos kun yang dag brdzun par mthong ba yis/ dngos rnyed bgo bo gnyis ni ‘dzin par ‘gyur// yang dag mthong yul gang de de nyid de// mthong ba brdzun pa’ang kun rdzob bden par gsungs// zhes gsungs pas so//

’[‘jug yul gyi sgo nas mngon lkog gnyis su phye ba/]
gsum pa ’[‘jug yul gyi sgo nas mngon lkog gnyis la mtshan nyid dang/ dbye ba gnyis/ dang po mtshan nyid la don spyi la ma ltos par rtogs par bya ba dang/ don spyi’i sgo nas rtogs par bya ba’o//
gnyis pa dbye ba la/ mngon gyur gyi dbye ba dang/ lkog gyur gyi dbye ba gnyis/ dang po la yul gyi sgo nas dbye ba dang/ yul can gyi sgo nas dbye ba gnyis las/ dang po lachos can dang/ chos nyid gnyis/ dang po la don dang shes pa gnyis so/ yul can gyi sgo nas dbye ba la/ rtog med ma ‘khrul ba’i sgo nas dang/ rtog med ‘khrul shes kyi sgo nas dbye ba gnyis las/ dang po la don rig mngon sum/ rang rig mngon sum/ rnal ‘byor mngon sum la gyur dang gsum las/ dang po ni/ gzugs sogs don lnga’o// gnyis pa ni shes pa thams cad do// gsum pa ni chos nyid lta bu’o// gnyis pa ni/ zla gnyis de zla ba gnyis snang gi dbang shes la mngon gyur yin pa lta bu’o//
gnyis pa lkog gyur gyi dbye ba la yul dang yul can gyi dbye ba gnyis las/ dang po la sngar ltar gsum las/ dang po ni bum pa de bum ‘dzin rtog pa la lkog gyur yin pa dang/ shes pa ni rang rgyud kyi shes pa de gzhan sms shes pa’i mngon shes med pa’i gang zag la lkog gyur <393> yin pa dang/chos nyid so skye la lkog gyur yin pa lta bu’o// yul can gyi sgo nas dbye ba la/ rjes dpag gi sgo nas dbye ba dang/ tshad min gyi blo’i sgo nas dbye ba gnyis las/ dang po la dngos rtobs rjes dpag yid chos rjes dpags grags pa’i rjes dpags la lkog gyur gsum ni gtan tshigs gsum po de’i bsgrub bya lta bu’o// gnyis pa la bcd shes/ log shes/ the tshom la lkog gyur dang gsum las/ dang po ni/ sngon po de sngo ‘dzin dbang mngon gyis drangs pa’i nges shes la lkog gyur yin pa lta bu’o// gnyis pa ni sgra rtag pa de sgra rtag ‘dzin rtog pa la lkog gyur yin pa lta bu’o// gsum pa ni sgra rtag mi rtag gang rung de de ltar the tshom za ba po’i the tshom mngon gyur pa la de yin pa lta bu’o// des na rtog de med ltog shes la mngon gyur yin na mngon gyur yin pas ma khyab cing/ rtog pa log shes la lkog gyur yin na lkog gyur yin pas ma khyab ste/ rtog med log shes kyi snang yul yin na yod pas ma khyab pa’i phyir dang/ rtog pa log shes kyi zhen yul

85 K1 „par“.
yin na yod pas ma khyab pa’i phyir/ the tshom la lkog gyur yin pa la ni don la gnas pa’i phyogs rams lkog gyur yin la/ cig shog ni lkog gyur ma yin no/

[’jug tshul gyi sgo nas rang spyi gnyis su phyel ba/]

bzhi pa ‘jug tshul gyi sgo nas rang spyi gnyis la/ mtshan nyid dang/ dbye ba gnyis las/ dang po ni rim bzhin/ yul dus rang bzhin ma ‘dres par gnas pa’i dngos po dang/ yul dus rang bzhin thun mong bar snang ba’i sgro btags <394> so/ yang na thun mong ma yin par gnas pa’i dngos po dang/ thun mong bar snang ba’i sgro btags te/ rnam nges las/ de ni thun mong ma yin par gnas pa’i dngos po’i rang bzhin te/ rang gi mtshan nyid do// ces gsungs pa’i dngos shugs gnyis las shes so// gnyis pa/ rang mtshan la dbye na/ don dang shes pa rang mtshan gnyis/ dang po la phyi don bem po dang/ rang don bem po gnyis/ dang po la/ gzugs sogz phyi’i skye mched Inga/ gnyis pa la mig sogs rang gi skye mchel Inga’ol/ shes pa rang mtshan la dbye na/ rnam par shes pa tshogs drug ‘khor dang bcas pa yod do// spyi mtshan la dbye ba/ bod snga rabs pa rams/ long po med dgag gi spyi dang/ blo’i gzhon sel ba’i spyi gnyis gsungs kyang/ gzhung las bshad pa ni/ dngos po dang/ dngos med dang/ gnyis ka la brten pa’i spyi gsum ste/ dngos dang dngos med gnyis ka la/ brten phyir spyi de’ang rnam pa gsum/ zhes gsungs pa’i phyir/ yang gcig la tha dad du ’byed pa’i spyi/ tha dad la gcig du sdu pa’i spyi/ gcig la gcig tu snang ba’i spyi/ tha dad la tha dad du snang ba’i spyi dang bzhir dbyer rung ste/ gzhon sel la de ltar phyel ba gang zhig spyi dang spyi mtshan gzhon sel gsum gnad gcig pa’i phyir ro/]

[mtshan thug gi gzhal bya rang mtshan gcig tu bsdu ba/]

Inga pa mthar thug gi ghral bya rang mtshan gcig tu bsdu ba ni ‘o na/ rang gi mtshan nyid gcig gzhal bya// zhes sogs gzhal bya rang mtshan gcig tu gsungs pa’i don ji ltar snyam <395> na/ spyir rtog ge’i gshung lugs las/ dang po grub mtsha’ la zhugs ma zhugs thams cad la grags pa’i tshad ma ngos bzungs nas/ de dang ‘dra ba’i Ston pa tshad ma’i skyes bur bsgrub pa skabs kyi don yin te/ mi bslu ma shes don gsal ngos bzung nas/ de’i og tu/ de ltan bcom ldan tshad ma nyid/ ces gsungs pa’i phyir/ grub mtsha’ la zhugs ma zhugs thams cad la grags pa tshad ma’i don ni/ rnam nges las/ phan pa dang mi phan pa thob pa dang spong ba ni nges par yang dag pa’i shes pa sngon du ‘gro ba can yin pas zhes pa’i skabs nas bstan pa ltar phan gnod nus pa’i yul la blang do dang pa’i rgyur gyur pa’i shes pa yin la/ de lta bu’i tshad mas blang bya’i phan pa nus pa’i yul dang/ dor bya’i gnod par nus pa’i yul ni rang mtshan kho na yin te/ rang mtshan kho nas phan gnod nus kyi spyi mtshan gyis de mi nus pa’i phyir te/ de ni blang do’bras can pas/ skyes bu thams cad ‘jug pa yin/ zhes dang/ don byed nus pa ma yin la/ don gnyer brtags pas ci zhig bya// zhes gsungs pa’i phyir dang/ rang mtshan gcig nyid la don rig mngon sum ‘jal byed du ‘jug pa’i tshe gzung yul dang/ rjes dpags ‘jal byed du ‘jug pa’i tshe zhen yul yin la/ tshad ma de gnyis la brten nas skyes bu ‘jug pa’i tshe mi bslu bas na ‘jug yul yin te/ ‘di la dgongs nas/ rigs gter rang ‘gral las/ rang mtshan de nyid dngos su ‘jal na gzung yul yin la/ lkog gyur du <396> ‘jal na zhen yul la yin cing/ gnyis ka yang skyes bu ‘jug na mi bsul bas ‘jug yul yin no/ zhes gsungs so/ dngos su ‘jal na zhes pa’i don yang mngon gyur du ‘jal na zhes pa’i don yin pa tshig grogs kyi stobs kyi shes so/
mdor na rang mtshan gcig nyid la tshad ma mngon rjes gnyis ‘jal byed du ‘jug pa’i
tshe ‘jug tshul gyi gzhal bya la rang spyi gnyis su yod kyang ‘jug yul gyi’\(^{86}\) gzhal bya
rang mtshan kho na yin pa ni/ rang gi mtshan nyid gcig gzhal bya/ zhes sogs kyi
dgongs pa ‘khrul pa med pa ste/ lha’i ‘grel par/ de ltar na rang gi mtshan nyid kho na
rang gi ngo bo dang/ gzhan gyan ngo bo’i sgo nas rtogs pa’i phyir/ de dag gi mtshan
nyid ci ‘dra pa\(^{87}\) dang/ gzhal bya gnyis nyid du rnam par gzhag nas zhes gsungs so//

[rt sod pa spong ba/]

gsum pa rtsod pa spong ba la gnyis te/ ‘khrul shes yul med la rtsod pa spong ba
dang/ gzung yul rang rang mtshan la rtsod pa spong ba’o/ dang po la bzhi ste/ gzhal bya
gnyis su gsungs pa dang ‘gal ba spong ba/ don spyi dang med pa gsal ba yul du
mtshungs pa’i rtsod pa spong ba/ myong ba dang ‘gal ba spong ba/ dgag pa tshad
mas mi rtogs par thal ba spong ba’o/\)

\(^{86}\) K1 without ‘’jug yul gyi’’.
\(^{87}\) K1, K2 ‘’ba’’.

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\(^{397}\) \(^{398}\)
gnyis pa ni/ ngo bo nyid rgyur ‘dod pa ni mi ‘thad de/ rgyu med las skye ba ‘gog pa’i rigs pas gnod pa’i phyir/ dbang phyug dang gtso bo rgyur ‘dod pa yang mi ‘thad de/ rtag pa las skye ba ‘gog pa’i rigs pas gnod pa’i phyir/

gsum pa la/ dgongs pa ngos gzung ba dang/ de nyid slob dpon gyis ji ltar gtan la phab pa dang gnyis las/ dang po ni/ bde bar gshegs pas tha snyad la ‘jug pa’i tshe rdul phran zhal gyis bzhes la/ ‘di la bye brag smra ba dang/ mdo sde pa’i grub mtha’ gnyis yod do/ tha snyad kyi de kho na nyid la ‘jug pa’i tshe sms tsam zhal gyis bzhes la/ ‘di la rnam bden brdzun gnyis yod do// don dam pa’i de kho na nyid la ‘jug pa’i tshe chos thams cad spros pa dang bral ba la ‘jug par mdzad do//

ghis pa ni/ de ltar sangs <399> rgyas pa’i grub mtha’ bzhi las/ slob dpon gyis gang gtan la dbab pa yin zhe na/ ‘di la don rig dang/ rnam rigs gnyis las/ dang po khas len pa’i tshe/ bye brag tu smra bas dbang shes kyis rang dang dus mnyam pa’i phyi don rnam med rjen char du ‘dzin par ‘dod pa de bkag nas skad cig snga mar rkyen gsum tshogs pa las skad cig gnyis par dbang shes yul gyi rnam ldan du skyes pa tsam la phyi don rtogs par ‘dod pa mdo sde pa’i grub mtha’ zhal gyis bzhes te/ slob dpon nyid kyi zhal nas/ gal te phyi rol dpyod la ‘jug pa na// kho bos mdo sde’i skabs la rnam par brten// zhes gsungs par grags so//

gnyis pa/ rnam rig zhal gyis bzhes pa’i tshe rnam bden pas dbang shes la rags par snang ba bden grub tu ‘dod pa de bkag nas rnam med zhal gyis bzhes te/ de phyir don dang shes pa la/ rags snang yod min zhes sogs gsungs pa’i phyir/ des na skabs ‘dir mdo sms gys las/ gong du smras pa’i rtsod pa de mdo sde pa’i dbang du byes pa yin na/ gtan tshigs dang po ma grub ste/ de’i lugs la rnam pa gtod byed kyi phyi don nyid gzung yul du ‘jog pa’i phyir rol/ sms tsam pa’i dbang du byas na ‘dod pa yin te/ de’i lugs la gzung yul gyi dbang du byas pa’i yul dang yul can grub pa med pa’i phyir/ don ‘di la dgongs nas/ rigs gter du/ ji srid phyi rol khas len pa// de srid rgyu la gzung yul zet// shes bya nang gir zhugs pa na/ yul <400> dang yul can grub pa med// ces gsungs so// yul btag pa’i rab tu byed pa ste dang po bzhad zin to// //
Outline of the chapter “Cognizable object [shes bya’i yul]”

1. mtshan nyid

2. dbye ba
   2.1. gzhan lugs dgog pa
   2.2. rang lugs bzhag pa
   2.2.1. yul du byes tshul gyi sgo nas yul bzhir dbye ba
      2.2.1.1. chos gang yul bzhiri ’gyur dbyad pa
      2.2.1.2. yul can gang la yul bzhir yod dbyad pa
      2.2.1.3. yul bzhiri so so’i bgo bo
      2.2.1.3.1. snang yul
         2.2.1.3.1.1. mtshan nyid
         2.2.1.3.1.2. dbye ba
            A 2.2.1.3.1.2.1. rtog med shes pa’i snang yul
               2.2.1.3.1.2.1.1. rnam pa gtad pa’i sgo nas snang yul
               2.2.1.3.1.2.1.2. rnam pa ma gtad pa’i sho nas snang yul
            B 2.2.1.3.1.2.2. stog pa’i snang yul
               A 2.2.1.3.1.2.2.1. rang rig mngon sum gyis myong bya
               B 2.2.1.3.1.2.2.2. rtog med log shes la dngos su snang ba’i med pa
tgsal ba
               B 2.2.1.3.1.2.2.3. rtog pa la dngos su snang ba’i don spyi
   2.2.1.3.2. gzung yul
      2.2.1.3.2.1. mtshan nyid
      2.2.1.3.2.2. dbye ba
         2.2.1.3.2.2.1. yul can gyi sgo nas dbye ba
            2.2.1.3.2.2.1.1. dbang po’i mngon sum gyis gzung yul
            2.2.1.3.2.2.1.2. yid kyi mngon sum gyis gzung yul
         2.2.1.3.2.2.2. yul gyi gyi sgo nas dbye ba
            2.2.1.3.2.2.2.1. gzugs
            2.2.1.3.2.2.2.2. sgra
            2.2.1.3.2.2.2.3. dri
            2.2.1.3.2.2.2.4. ro
            2.2.1.3.2.2.2.5. reg bya
   2.2.1.3.3. zhen yul
      2.2.1.3.3.1. mtshan nyid
      2.2.1.3.3.2. dbye ba
         2.2.1.3.3.2.1. rtog pa tshad ma’i zhen yul
         2.2.1.3.3.2.2. bcad shes kyi zhen yul
   2.2.1.3.4. ’jug yul
      2.2.1.3.4.1. mtshan nyid
      2.2.1.3.4.2. yul can gyi sgo nas dbye ba
      2.2.1.3.4.2.1. tshad ma’i ’jug yul
      2.2.1.3.4.2.1.1. mngon sum gyi ’jug yul
2.2.1.3.4.2.1.1.1. don rig mngon sum gyi 'jug yul
2.2.1.3.4.2.1.1.2. rang rig mngon sum gyi 'jug yul
2.2.1.3.4.2.1.1.3. rnal 'byor mngon sum gyi 'jug yul
   2.2.1.3.4.2.1.1.3a phung po
   2.2.1.3.4.2.1.1.3b chos nyid
2.2.1.3.4.2.1.2. rjes dpag gi 'jug yul
2.2.1.3.4.2.2. sgra'i 'jug yul
2.2.2. ngo bo'i sgo nas bden pa gnyis su dbye ba
2.2.3. 'jug yul gyi sgo ngsong gnyis su phe ba
   2.2.3.1. mtsphan nyid
   2.2.3.2. dbyes ba
   2.2.3.2.1. mngon gyur gyi dbyes ba
      2.2.3.2.1.1. yul gyi sgo nas dbyes ba
      2.2.3.2.1.1.1. chos can
      2.2.3.2.1.1.1.1. don
      2.2.3.2.1.1.1.2. shes pa
      2.2.3.2.1.1.2. chos nyid
   2.2.3.2.1.2. yul can gyi sgo nas dbyes ba
      2.2.3.2.1.2.1. rtag med ma 'khrul pa'i sgo nas dbyes ba
      2.2.3.2.1.2.1.1. don rig mngon sum gyi mngon gyur
      2.2.3.2.1.2.1.2. rang rig mngon sum gyi mngon gyur
      2.2.3.2.1.2.1.3. rnal 'byor mngon sum gyi mngon gyur
      2.2.3.2.1.2.2. rtag med 'khrul shes kyi sgo nas dbyes ba
   2.2.3.2.2. lhog gyur gyi dbyes ba
   2.2.3.2.2.1. yul gyi dbyes ba
      2.2.3.2.2.1.1. phyi don
      2.2.3.2.2.1.2. rang rgyud kyi shes pa
      2.2.3.2.2.1.3. chos nyid
   2.2.3.2.2.2. yul can gyi dbyes ba
      2.2.3.2.2.2.1. rjes dpag gi sgo nas dbyes ba
      2.2.3.2.2.2.1.1. dngos stogs rjes dpag gi lhog gyur
      2.2.3.2.2.2.1.2. yid ches rjes dpag gi lhog gyur
      2.2.3.2.2.2.1.3. grags pa'i rjes dpag gi lhog gyur
      2.2.3.2.2.2.2. tshad min gyi sgo nas dbyes ba
      2.2.3.2.2.2.2.1. bcad shes pa'i lhog gyur
      2.2.3.2.2.2.2.2. log shes pa'i lhog gyur
      2.2.3.2.2.2.2.3. the tshom gyi lhog gyur
2.2.4. 'jug tshul gyi sgo nas rang spyi gnyi su dbyes ba
   2.2.4.1. mtsphan nyid
   2.2.4.2. dbyes ba
      2.2.4.2.1. rang mtsphan
      2.2.4.2.1.1. phyi don
2.2.4.2.1.1.2. nang don
2.2.4.2.1.2. rnam par shes pa
2.2.4.2.2. sphyi mthshan
  A 2.2.4.2.2.1. dngos pa la brten pa’i pyi mtshan
  A 2.2.4.2.2.2. dngos med la brten pa’i pyi mtshan
  A 2.2.4.2.2.3. gnyis ka la brten pa’i pyi mtshan
  B 2.2.4.2.2.1. gcig la tha dad du ‘byed pa’i sphyi mtshan
  B 2.2.4.2.2.2. tha dad la gcig tu sduq pa’i sphyi mtshan
  B 2.2.4.2.2.3. gcig la gcig tu snang ba’i sphyi mtshan
  B 2.2.4.2.2.4. tha dad la tha dad du snang ba’i sphyi mtshan
2.2.5. mthar thug gi gzhal bya rang mtshan gcig tu bsdu ba

2.3. rtsod pa spong ba
2.3.1. ’khrul shes yul med la rtsod pa spong ba
  2.3.1.1. gzhal bya gnyis su gsungs ba dang ‘gal ba spong ba
  2.3.1.2. don sphyi dang med pa gsal ba yul du mtshung pa’i rtsod pa spong ba
  2.3.1.3. myong ba dang ‘gal ba spong ba
  2.3.1.4. dgag pa tshad mas mi rtogs par thal ba spong ba
2.3.2. gzung yul rang mtshan la rtsod pa spong ba
  2.3.2.1. rtsod pa
  2.3.2.2. rtsod lan
    2.3.2.2.1. grub mtha’ rnam bzhag spyir bstan pa
    2.3.2.2.2. gzhon gyis brtag pa dgag pa
    2.3.2.2.3. bde bar gshegs pa’i lugs bsgrub pa
    2.3.2.2.3.1. dgongs pa ngos bzung ba
    2.3.2.2.3.2. de nyid slob dpon gyis ji ltar gtan la dbab pa
      2.3.2.2.3.2.1. don rig
      2.3.2.2.3.2.2. rnam rig

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