PSPACE has 2-round quantum interactive proof systems

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Abstract

In this paper we consider quantum interactive proof systems, i.e., interactive proof systems in which the prover and verifier may perform quantum computations and exchange quantum messages. It is proved that every language in PSPACE has a quantum interactive proof system that requires only two rounds of communication between the prover and verifier, while having exponentially small (one-sided) probability of error. It follows that quantum interactive proof systems are strictly more powerful than classical interactive proof systems in the constant-round case unless the polynomial time hierarchy collapses to the second level.

1 Introduction

A number of recent papers have provided compelling evidence (and proof, in some cases) that certain computational, cryptographic, and information-theoretic tasks can be performed more efficiently by models based on quantum physics than those based on classical physics. For example, Shor [29] has shown that integers can be factored in expected polynomial time by quantum computers, a quantum key distribution protocol of Bennett and Brassard [10] that does not rely on intractability assumptions has been proven secure under a wide variety of attacks [12, 25, 26], and Buhrman, Cleve, and Wigderson [13] have shown various separation results between quantum and classical two-party communication complexity models. In this paper we introduce the quantum analogue of another concept—interactive proof systems—and provide strong evidence that additional power is gained by interactive proof systems in the quantum setting.

Interactive proof systems were introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [22] and Babai [4]. Informally, in an interactive proof system a computationally unbounded prover interacts with a polynomial-time probabilistic verifier and attempts to convince the verifier to accept a given input string. A language \( L \) is said to have an interactive proof system if there exists a verifier \( V \) such that (i) there exists a prover \( P \) (called an honest prover) that can always convince \( V \) to accept when the given input is in \( L \), and (ii) no prover \( P' \) can convince \( V \) to accept with nonnegligible probability when the input is not in \( L \). The class of languages having interactive proof systems is denoted \( IP \).

Based on the work of Lund, Fortnow, Karloff, and Nisan [24], Shamir [27] proved that every language in PSPACE has an interactive proof system. Since any language having an interactive proof system is in PSPACE [20], this implies \( IP = \text{PSPACE} \). All known protocols for PSPACE require a nonconstant number of rounds of communication between the prover and verifier, and cannot be
parallelized to require only a constant number of rounds under the assumption that the polynomial
time hierarchy is proper. This is because the class of languages having constant-round interactive
proof systems is equivalent to the class AM \[4, 23\], and hence is contained in \( \Pi_2 \).

The main result we prove in this paper is as follows.

**Theorem 1** Every language in PSPACE has a 2-round quantum interactive proof system with expo-
nentially small probability of error.

This result contrasts with the facts mentioned above regarding classical interactive proof systems,
as it shows there are languages having 2-round quantum interactive proof systems that do not have
constant-round classical interactive proof systems unless AM = PSPACE.

We now summarize informally our technique for proving Theorem 1. Consider the following (unsuccess-
ful) method for trying to reduce the number of rounds required by a nonconstant-round protocol
for PSPACE to a constant: define the verifier so that it chooses all of its random numbers initially,
sends them all to the prover in one round (or in a constant number of rounds), receives all the re-
sponses from the prover, and checks the validity of the responses. This will not work, since the prover
may cheat by “looking ahead” and basing its responses on random numbers that would have been sent
in later rounds in the nonconstant-round case. However, using interactive proofs based on quantum
physics, this technique can be made to work, as the aforementioned behavior on the part of the prover
can be detected by a quantum verifier. We now sketch the method for doing this—a formal description
of the protocol appears in Section 3.

The prover first sends a superposition of sequences of random numbers and corresponding responses
to the verifier, and the verifier checks that the responses are valid according to a classical protocol
for PSPACE. (It will be shown that the prover cannot cheat by giving the verifier a superposition
that is biased towards certain random sequences—the verifier will be able to later check that the
superposition is close to uniform.) The verifier then chooses randomly one of the positions in the list
of random numbers and responses, sends back to the prover its responses starting at this position in
the list and challenges the prover to invert the computation it performed to obtain these responses.
Let us say that the random numbers and responses up to the chosen position in the list have low-
index, and the remaining random numbers and responses have high-index. The low-index responses,
which were not sent back to the prover in the second round, should now depend only on the low-
index random numbers (for otherwise the prover has cheated). The verifier may now check that
the superposition of high-index random numbers is uniform by performing an appropriately defined
measurement. However, if the prover has cheated by basing its low-index responses on high-index
random numbers, the low-index responses and high-index random numbers will be entangled in a
manner detectable by the verifier; with high probability, the high-index random numbers will fail
the uniformity test. By performing this process itself in parallel a polynomial number of times, the
probability a cheating prover escapes detection is made exponentially small, while the protocol still
requires only two rounds of communication.

The remainder of the paper has the following organization. In Section 2 we formally define quan-
tum interactive proof systems. In Section 3 we prove Theorem 1 by presenting a 2-round quantum
interactive proof system for the quantified Boolean formula problem and proving its correctness. We
conclude with Section 4, which mentions a number of open problems regarding quantum interactive
proofs.
2 Definition of quantum interactive proof systems

We now give a formal definition of quantum interactive proof systems. We restrict our attention to constant-round quantum interactive proof systems, although the definition is easily extended to a nonconstant number of rounds. The model for quantum computation that provides a basis for our definition of quantum interactive proof systems is the quantum circuit model. We will not define quantum circuits or discuss them in detail, as this has been done elsewhere (see Yao [31] and Berthiaume [11], for example).

A $k$-round verifier $V$ is a polynomial-time computable mapping $V : \Sigma^* \times \{0, \ldots, k\} \rightarrow \Sigma^*$, where each $V(x,j)$ is an encoding of a quantum circuit composed of quantum gates from some appropriately chosen universal set of gates. Universal sets of gates/transformations have been investigated in a number of papers [1, 7, 8, 16, 17]; for the purposes of this paper, we will assume only that this set includes the Walsh-Hadamard gate and any universal gate for reversible computation such as the Fredkin gate or Toffoli gate. Each encoding $V(x,j)$ is identified with the quantum circuit it encodes. Since the mapping $V$ is computable in polynomial time, each circuit $V(x,j)$ must be polynomial in size. The qubits upon which each $V(x,j)$ acts are assumed to be divided into two groups: message qubits and ancilla qubits. The message qubits represent the communication channel between the prover and verifier, while the ancilla qubits represent qubits that are private to the verifier. One of the verifier’s ancilla qubits is specified as the output qubit.

A $k$-round prover $P$ is a mapping from $\Sigma^* \times \{1, \ldots, k\}$ to the set of all quantum circuits. No restrictions are placed on the size of each $P(x,j)$ or on the gates from which these circuits are composed. Similar to the case of the verifier, the qubits of the prover are divided into message qubits and ancilla qubits. Note that although the prover is all-powerful in a computational sense (there is no bound on the complexity of the mapping $P$ or on the size of each $P(x,j))$, we of course require that the prover obey the laws of physics! This is enforced by requiring that the prover’s actions correspond to quantum circuits.

Given a pair $(P, V)$, we consider a quantum circuit composed in the manner illustrated in Figure 1 (the case $k = 2$ is shown). The probability that a pair $(P, V)$ accepts a given input $x$ is defined to be the probability that an observation of the output qubit in the $\{\ket{0}, \ket{1}\}$ basis yields $\ket{1}$ when the circuits $V(x,0), P(x,1), V(x,1), \ldots, P(x,k), V(x,k)$ are applied in sequence as illustrated, assuming all qubits are initially in the $\ket{0}$ state.

Now, we say that a language $L$ has a $k$-round quantum interactive proof system with error probability $\epsilon$ if there exists a $k$-round verifier $V$ such that

1. There exists a $k$-round prover $P$ such that if $x \in L$ then $(P, V)$ accepts $x$ with probability 1.
2. For all $k$-round provers $P'$, if $x \notin L$ then $(P', V)$ accepts $x$ with probability at most $\epsilon$.

A few notes regarding the above definition are in order. First, we note that there are a number of other ways in which we could have defined quantum interactive proof systems, such as a definition based on quantum Turing machines or a definition requiring that each circuit as above be given by $V(|x|, i)$ or $P(|x|, i)$, with $x$ supplied as input to each circuit, for example. We have chosen the above definition because of its simplicity. Given the apparent robustness of the class of “polynomial-time computable quantum transformations,” we suspect these definitions to be equivalent, although we have not investigated this question in detail. Second, we assume that each circuit corresponds to a unitary operator (e.g., no “measurement gates” are used). The action of any general quantum gate (i.e., a gate corresponding to a trace-preserving, completely positive linear map on mixed states of qubits) can always be simulated by some unitary gate (possibly adding more ancilla qubits) [3]. As this will
not increase the size of a verifier’s circuit by more than a polynomial factor, and will not affect the complexity of the mapping $V$ significantly, our definition is equivalent to a definition allowing more general quantum gates.

3 2-round quantum interactive proof systems for the QBF problem

We begin this section by defining the quantified Boolean formula problem, which is complete for PSPACE. A quantified Boolean formula is a formula of the form $Q_1x_1\cdots Q_nx_nB(x_1,\ldots,x_n)$, where each $Q_i$ is an existential or universal quantifier ($\exists$ or $\forall$) and $B(x_1,\ldots,x_n)$ is a Boolean formula (without quantifiers) in the variables $x_1,\ldots,x_n$. The quantified Boolean formula (QBF) problem is to determine if a quantified Boolean formula is true.

To prove Theorem 1 it is sufficient to prove that there exists a 2-round quantum interactive proof system with exponentially small error for the QBF problem. This is because a verifier (and any honest prover) may first compute a polynomial-time reduction from a given problem in PSPACE to the QBF problem, then execute the protocol for QBF (adjusting various parameters in the protocol to reduce error as necessary).

3.1 A classical protocol for QBF

Our 2-round quantum interactive proof system for the QBF problem is based on a variant of the Lund–Fortnow–Karloff–Nisan protocol due to Shen [28], to which the reader is referred for a detailed description. In this section we review some facts regarding this protocol that will later be helpful.
Let us suppose the input formula \( Q = Q_1 x_1 \cdots Q_n x_n B(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \) is fixed. Also let \( \mathbb{F} \) be a finite field, write \( N = \left( \frac{n+1}{2} \right) + n \), and let \( d \) be the length of \( Q \) (with a slight modification of the protocol, \( d = 3 \) is sufficient). The protocol is as follows. For \( j = 1, \ldots, N-1 \), the prover sends the verifier a polynomial \( f_j \) over \( \mathbb{F} \) of degree at most \( d \), and the verifier chooses \( r_j \in \mathbb{F} \) and sends \( r_j \) to the prover. The prover then sends a polynomial \( f_N \) to the verifier in the final round, and the verifier chooses \( r_N \in \mathbb{F} \) (there is no need for \( r_N \) to be sent to the prover). The verifier then evaluates a particular polynomial-time predicate \( E(Q, r_1, \ldots, r_N, f_1, \ldots, f_N) \) and accepts if and only if the predicate evaluates to true.

A formal description of \( E \) may be derived from the paper of Shen. Since the details of the predicate are not necessary for our discussion, we will only state certain properties of \( E \). First, for any sequence of random numbers \( r_1, \ldots, r_N \in \mathbb{F} \) there exist polynomials \( c_1, \ldots, c_N \), where each polynomial \( c_j \) depends only on \( r_1, \ldots, r_{j-1} \), that correspond to the answers that should be given by an honest prover. These polynomials, which are well-defined regardless of the Boolean value of \( Q \), satisfy the following properties:

1. If \( Q \) evaluates to true, then for all sequences \( r_1, \ldots, r_N \), \( E(Q, r_1, \ldots, r_N, c_1, \ldots, c_N) = true \).
2. If \( Q \) evaluates to false, then for all sequences \( r_1, \ldots, r_N \), \( E(Q, r_1, \ldots, r_N, c_1, f_2, \ldots, f_N) = false \) for all polynomials \( f_2, \ldots, f_N \).
3. If \( Q \) evaluates to false, then for any \( k \in \{1, \ldots, N-1\} \) and \( r_1, \ldots, r_{k-1} \in \mathbb{F} \), the following holds. If \( f_1, \ldots, f_k \) are such that \( f_k \neq c_k \), then there are at most \( d \) values of \( r_k \) for which there exist \( r_{k+1}, \ldots, r_N \) and \( f_{k+2}, \ldots, f_N \) such that \( E(Q, r_1, \ldots, r_N, f_1, \ldots, f_k, c_{k+1}, f_{k+2}, \ldots, f_N) = true \).
4. If \( Q \) evaluates to false, then for any \( r_1, \ldots, r_{N-1} \) and \( f_1, \ldots, f_N \) for which \( f_N \neq c_N \), there are at most \( d \) values of \( r_N \) for which \( E(Q, r_1, \ldots, r_N, f_1, \ldots, f_N) = true \).

For given \( r_1, \ldots, r_{k-1} \), we call the polynomial \( c_k \) the correct polynomial corresponding to \( r_1, \ldots, r_{k-1} \).

Clearly, if \( Q \) evaluates to true, an honest prover can always convince the verifier to accept by sending the correct polynomials \( c_1, \ldots, c_N \) corresponding to the verifiers random numbers \( r_1, \ldots, r_{N-1} \).

Now suppose that \( Q \) evaluates to false. By item 2, a cheating prover cannot send the correct polynomial \( c_1 \) on the first round, for the prover rejects with certainty in this case. Hence the prover must send \( f_1 \neq c_1 \) if the verifier is to accept. Now suppose for \( k \in \{1, \ldots, N-1\} \) and \( r_1, \ldots, r_{k-1} \) the prover has sent polynomials \( f_1 \neq c_1, \ldots, f_k \neq c_k \) during rounds \( 1, \ldots, k \). Unless the verifier randomly chooses one of \( d \) particular values for \( r_k \), the prover may not send \( c_{k+1} \) on the next round without causing the verifier to reject. Hence, if the prover sends an incorrect polynomial on round \( k \), then with probability at least \( 1 - d/|\mathbb{F}| \) it must send an incorrect polynomial on round \( k+1 \). Finally, if the prover does not send the correct polynomial \( c_N \) during the last round, the verifier accepts with probability at most \( d/|\mathbb{F}| \). Hence, the total probability that the verifier accepts may not exceed \( (dN)/|\mathbb{F}| \).

Since the error probability of the protocol depends on the size of \( \mathbb{F} \), \( \mathbb{F} \) may be chosen sufficiently large at the start of the protocol. It will be convenient for us to take \( \mathbb{F} \) to be the field with \( 2^k \) elements for \( k \) polynomial in \( n \) (hence yielding exponentially small probability of error). For any chosen \( k \), the verifier (and honest prover) may use a deterministic procedure to implement arithmetic in \( \mathbb{F} \)—specifically, compute an irreducible polynomial \( g \) of degree \( k \) over \( GF(2) \) in deterministic polynomial time \( [9] \), identify elements of \( \mathbb{F} \) with polynomials over \( GF(2) \) of degree at most \( k-1 \), and take arithmetic to be the usual arithmetic on polynomials modulo \( g \). There is thus a natural correspondence between \( k \) bit strings and elements of \( \mathbb{F} \).
3.2 Quantum verifier’s protocol for QBF

We now describe the verifier’s protocol for our 2-round quantum interactive proof system for the QBF problem.

We use the following conventions when describing the quantum circuits corresponding to the verifier’s actions. Collections of qubits upon which various transformations are performed are referred to as registers, and are labeled by capital letters in boldface. The registers required by the protocol are $R_{i,j}, S_{i,j},$ and $F_{i,j}$ for $1 \leq i \leq m$ and $1 \leq j \leq N$, where $N$ is as in the classical protocol described in Section 3.1 and $m$ is some polynomial in $n$ specified depending on the desired error as described below. Each register $R_{i,j}$ and $S_{i,j}$ consists of $k$ qubits, where $2^k$ is to be the size of the field $F$. We view the classical states of these registers as elements in $F$ in the usual way. Each $F_{i,j}$ consists of $d + 1$ collections of $k$ qubits, for $d$ as in the classical protocol, and we view the classical states of these registers as polynomials of degree at most $d$ with coefficients in $F$. The verifier may also use any polynomial number of additional ancilla qubits in order to perform the transformations described. In addition, the verifier will store the vector $u$ and any auxiliary variables needed for the protocol—as there will be no need for the verifier to perform quantum operations on these values, we consider them as being stored classically (although there is no difference in the behavior of the protocol if they are thought of as being stored in quantum registers).

The error probability of the protocol will depend on $m$ and $k$ as described below in Section 3.3—we may take $m$ and $k$ to be fixed polynomials in $n$ to obtain exponentially small error.

It will be convenient to refer to certain collections of the quantum registers mentioned above; for a given vector $u \in \{1, \ldots, N\}^m$ we let $R^{(u)}$ be the collection of registers $R_{i,1,\ldots, R_{i,u_i-1}}$ for $i = 1, \ldots, m$, and we let $F^{(u)}$ be the collection of registers $F_{i,1,\ldots, F_{i,u_i}}$ for $i = 1, \ldots, m$. See Figure 2 for an example. We also let $R_i$ and $F_i$ denote the vectors $(R_{i,1,\ldots, R_{i,N}}) \text{ and } (F_{i,1,\ldots, F_{i,N}})$, respectively.

The verifier’s protocol is described in Figure 3. The check in step 1 refers to the classical protocol described in Section 3.1. Naturally this check is performed by reversibly computing the predicate $E$ (described in Section 3.1), so as not to alter superpositions of valid pairs $(R, F)$. The transformation $H^\otimes k$ in step 4 is the Walsh-Hadamard transform applied to each qubit of the register in question, where

$$H : |0\rangle \mapsto \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle) \quad \text{and} \quad H : |1\rangle \mapsto \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)$$

as usual. The random choice of the vector $u$ in step 2 can be simulated efficiently with negligible error using the Walsh-Hadamard transform appropriately. (Note that this negligible error will not change the fact that the protocol has one-sided error.)

![Figure 2: Example division of $R$ and $F$ for $N = 8$, $m = 5$, and $u = (6, 4, 7, 2, 5)$.](image-url)
1. Receive quantum registers \( R \) and \( F \) from the prover. Reject if \((R_i, F_i)\) contain an invalid proof that the input formula \( Q \) evaluates to true for any \( i \in \{1, \ldots, m\} \).

2. Choose \( u \in \{1, \ldots, N\}^m \) uniformly at random and send \( u \) and \( F(u) \) to the prover.

3. Receive \( S \) from the prover and subtract \( R_{i,j} \) from \( S_{i,j} \) for each \( i,j \).

4. Apply transformation \( H^\otimes k \) to each register of \( R(u) \). If \( R(u) \) now contains only 0 values, then accept, otherwise reject.

Figure 3: Quantum verifier’s protocol for the QBF problem.

3.3 Proof of correctness

We now prove that the above protocol is correct. First we show that there exists an honest prover \( P \) such that \((P, V)\) accepts with certainty whenever the input formula \( Q \) evaluates to true.

Given QBF \( Q \) and \( m \times N \) matrix \( R \) of elements in \( \mathbb{F} \), let \( C(R) \) denote the corresponding matrix of correct polynomials as defined in Section 3.1. For each \( i \), \( C(R)_{i,1}, \ldots, C(R)_{i,N} \) is thus the sequence of polynomials the honest prover returns in the classical protocol given random numbers \( R_{i,1}, \ldots, R_{i,N} \).

The honest (quantum) prover first prepares superposition

\[
2^{-km/2} \sum_R |R\rangle |C(R)\rangle
\]

in registers \( R \) and \( F \), adds the contents of each register \( R_{i,j} \) to \( S_{i,j} \), and sends \( R \) and \( F \) to the verifier. Under the assumption \( Q \) is true, each pair \((R_i, F_i)\) the verifier receives is a valid pair with respect to the classical protocol, so the verifier will not reject in step 1.

The behavior of the honest prover in the second round is as follows. For each \( i,j \), let \( T_{i,j} \) be a unitary transformation such that

\[
T_{i,j} : |R\rangle |0\rangle \mapsto |R\rangle |C(R)_{i,j}\rangle.
\]

Upon receiving \( u \) and \( F(u) \) in the second round, the prover applies transformation \( T_{i,j}^{-1} \) to \( S \) together with \( F_{i,j} \) for each appropriate pair \( i,j \). This returns each register of \( F(u) \) to its initial zero value. The prover then sends \( S \) to the verifier. It may be checked that after subtracting each \( R_{i,j} \) from \( S_{i,j} \), the registers \( R(u) \) will not be entangled with any other registers (as each register of \( F(u) \) depends only on those of \( R(u) \)), and are in a uniform superposition over all possible values. Thus, each register of \( R(u) \) is put into state 0 during step 4, and hence the verifier accepts with certainty.

Now we show that the verifier accepts with exponentially small probability in case \( Q \) is false, given any prover. We begin by examining the total state of the prover and verifier as the protocol is executed. In step 1 the prover sends registers \( R \) and \( F \) to the verifier. The state of the system at this point may be expressed as

\[
|\psi\rangle = \sum_{R,F} \alpha(R, F) |R\rangle |F\rangle |\xi(R, F)\rangle,
\]

where each \( \alpha(R, F) \) is a complex number and \( |\xi(R, F)\rangle \) is a normalized vector representing the state of the prover’s ancilla registers (which may be entangled with \( R \) and \( F \) in any manner the prover
Finally, for each \( v \) \( \Pr[A] \) where each state of the prover’s registers as well as register probability \( j \) for example, \( R \) from above (i.e., \( \psi \)). Since the verifier rejects any pair \( R, F \) this probability is at most

\[
\sum_{R, F} \alpha(R, F) |\psi\rangle |\eta(R, F)\rangle |\xi(R, F)\rangle \ \leq \ 1
\]

We also define a number of events based on these random variables. Recall the definition of \( C(R) \) from above (i.e., \( C(R) \) is the \( m \times N \) matrix of correct polynomials an honest prover answers for given \( R \)). For \( 1 \leq i \leq m \) and \( 1 \leq j \leq N - 1 \), define \( A_{i,j} \) to be the event that \( F_{i,j'} \) does not contain \( C(R)_{i,j'} \) for \( j' \leq j \) and \( F_{i,j+1} \) does contain \( C(R)_{i,j+1} \) for \( R \) denoting the contents of \( R \). For \( 1 \leq i \leq m \), define \( A_{i,N} \) to be the event that \( F_{i,j'} \) does not contain \( C(R)_{i,j'} \) for every \( j' \). Note that we must have \( \Pr[A_{i,1} \cup \cdots \cup A_{i,N}] = 1 \) for each \( i \), as the verifier surely rejects in step 1 if \( F_{i,1} \) contains \( C(R)_{i,1} \).

Finally, for each \( v \in \{1, \ldots, N\}^m \) define events \( B_v \) and \( D_v \) as \( B_v = \bigcap_i A_{i,v_i} \) and \( D_v = \bigcup_i A_{i,v_i} \).

In step 2 the verifier chooses \( u \) randomly and sends \( u \) and \( F^{(u)} \) to the prover. The prover applies some transformation to its registers (now including \( F^{(u)} \)), sends some register \( S \) to the verifier, and the verifier subtracts the contents of \( R \) from \( S \). The state of the system may now be described by

\[
\sum_{R, F^{(u)}} \beta(R, u, F^{(u)}) |R\rangle |F^{(u)}\rangle |\eta(R, u, F^{(u)})\rangle,
\]

where each \( \beta(R, u, F^{(u)}) \) is a complex number and \( |\eta(R, u, F^{(u)})\rangle \) is a normalized vector describing the state of the prover’s registers as well as register \( S \).

The verifier now executes step 4. Assuming for now that \( u \) is fixed, this results in acceptance with probability

\[
\left\| \sum_{R, F^{(u)}} \beta(R, u, F^{(u)}) |R\rangle |R^{(u)}\rangle \langle 0 | H^{\otimes k} | R_{1,u_1} \rangle \cdots \langle 0 | H^{\otimes k} | R_{m,u_m} \rangle |F^{(u)}\rangle |\eta(R, u, F^{(u)})\rangle \right\|^2 = 2^{-lk} \sum_{R^{(u)}, F^{(u)}} \left\| \sum_{|R^{(u)}\rangle} \beta(R, u, F^{(u)}) |\eta(R, u, F^{(u)})\rangle \right\|^2,
\]

where \( l \) denotes the number of registers to which \( H^{\otimes k} \) was applied, i.e., \( l = \sum_{i=1}^m (n - u_i + 1) \). By the triangle inequality, this probability is at most

\[
2^{-lk} \sum_{R^{(u)}, F^{(u)}} \left( \sum_{|R^{(u)}\rangle} |\beta(R, u, F^{(u)})| \right)^2
\]

We now derive an upper bound on \([1]\) by considering the random variables defined above. First, we state a definition and prove a lemma regarding this definition that will be useful for this task.
**Definition 1** For any nonempty, finite set $S$ and mapping $f : S \to \mathbb{R}^+$, define

$$
\theta_S(f) = \frac{1}{|S|} \left( \sum_{s \in S} \sqrt{f(s)} \right)^2.
$$

**Lemma 1** Let $f, g : S \to \mathbb{R}^+$ satisfy $\sum_{s \in S} f(s) \leq 1$ and $\sum_{s \in S} g(s) \leq 1$, let $\lambda \in [0, 1]$, and let $r = |\{ s \in S | f(s) = 0 \}|/|S|$. Then

$$
\theta_S(\lambda f + (1 - \lambda)g) \leq 1 - \lambda r + 2\sqrt{1 - r}.
$$

**Proof.** First note that for any set $T \subseteq S$ and function $h : T \to \mathbb{R}^+$ with $\sum_{s \in T} h(s) \leq 1$, we have

$$
\sum_{s \in T} \sqrt{h(s)} \leq \sqrt{|T|} \sqrt{\sum_{s \in T} h(s)}
$$

by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and hence $\theta_T(h) \leq 1$. Now define $S' = \{ s \in S | f(s) = 0 \}$. We have

$$
\sqrt{\theta_S(\lambda f + (1 - \lambda)g)} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{|S|}} \sum_{s \in S} \sqrt{\lambda f(s) + (1 - \lambda)g(s)}
$$

$$
= \frac{\sqrt{(1 - \lambda)r}}{\sqrt{|S'|}} \sum_{s \in S'} \sqrt{g(s)} + \frac{\sqrt{1 - r}}{\sqrt{|S \setminus S'|}} \sum_{s \in S \setminus S'} \sqrt{\lambda f(s) + (1 - \lambda)g(s)}
$$

$$
= \sqrt{(1 - \lambda)r} \sqrt{\theta_{S'}(g)} + \sqrt{1 - r} \sqrt{\theta_{S \setminus S'}(\lambda f + (1 - \lambda)g)}
$$

$$
\leq \sqrt{(1 - \lambda)r} + \sqrt{1 - r}.
$$

Thus $\theta_S(\lambda f + (1 - \lambda)g) \leq 1 - \lambda r + 2\sqrt{(1 - \lambda)r(1 - r)} \leq 1 - \lambda r + 2\sqrt{1 - r}$ as claimed. \(\blacksquare\)

Now, note that

$$
\left| \beta(R, u, F^{(u)}) \right|^2 = \Pr \left[ R = R, F^{(u)} = F^{(u)} \right]
$$

for each $R$ and $F^{(u)}$; the actions of the prover and verifier are norm-preserving, and hence will not affect the probabilities corresponding to each $R$ and $F^{(u)}$. Thus (3) may be rewritten

$$
2^{-\ell k} \sum_{R^{(u)}, F^{(u)}} \left( \sum_{R^{(u)}} \sqrt{\Pr \left[ R = R, F^{(u)} = F^{(u)} \right]} \right)^2. \tag{2}
$$

For each pair $R^{(u)}, F^{(u)}$, define a mapping $X_{R^{(u)}, F^{(u)}} : \mathbb{F}^l \to [0, 1]$ as follows:

$$
X_{R^{(u)}, F^{(u)}} (\overline{R}^{(u)}) = \Pr \left[ \overline{R}^{(u)} = \overline{R}^{(u)} \mid R^{(u)} = R^{(u)}, F^{(u)} = F^{(u)} \right].
$$

The probability in (2) may be written as

$$
\sum_{R^{(u)}, F^{(u)}} \Pr \left[ R^{(u)} = R^{(u)}, F^{(u)} = F^{(u)} \right] \theta_T \left( X_{R^{(u)}, F^{(u)}} \right). \tag{3}
$$
Define $Y_{R(u), F(u)} : \mathbb{F}^t \to [0, 1]$ and $Z_{R(u), F(u)} : \mathbb{F}^t \to [0, 1]$ as follows:

$$Y_{R(u), F(u)}(R(u)) = \Pr[R(u) = R(u), F(u) = F(u), B_u],$$

$$Z_{R(u), F(u)}(R(u)) = \Pr[R(u) = R(u), F(u) = F(u), -B_u],$$

for events $B_u$ and $-B_u$ defined previously. We have

$$\theta_{F}(X_{R(u), F(u)}) = \theta_{F}(\lambda_u Y_{R(u), F(u)} + (1 - \lambda_u) Z_{R(u), F(u)}).$$

for $\lambda_u = \Pr[B_u | R(u) = R(u), F(u) = F(u)].$

Now consider the values of $\overline{R}$ for which $Y_{R(u), F(u)}(\overline{R}) = 0$; we claim the number of such values is at least $(1 - dm2^{-k}) 2^{kl}$ for every $R(u), F(u)$. This may be argued as follows. First, fix values for $R(u), F(u)$, and $i$, and assume event $A_{i,u}$ takes place. By the properties of the classical protocol discussed in Section 3.1, there are at most $d$ values of $R_{i,u}$ that do not cause the classical protocol to reject in this case. Thus, the number of values of $\overline{R}$ for which

$$\Pr[\overline{R} = R(u) | R(u) = R(u), F(u) = F(u), A_{i,u}] \neq 0$$

is at most $d 2^{k(l-1)}$. Since we have

$$0 \leq Y_{R(u), F(u)}(\overline{R}) \leq \sum_{i=1}^{m} \Pr[R(u) = R(u) | R(u) = R(u), F(u) = F(u), A_{i,u}],$$

the total number of values of $\overline{R}$ for which $Y_{R(u), F(u)}(\overline{R}) \neq 0$ is at most $dm 2^{k(l-1)}$.

Now we may apply Lemma 1 to obtain

$$\theta_{F}(X_{R(u), F(u)}) \leq 1 - \Pr[B_u | R(u), F(u)] \left( 1 - dm2^{-k} \right) + 2\sqrt{dm2^{-k}},$$

and hence

$$\sum_{R(u), F(u)} \Pr[R(u) = R(u), F(u) = F(u)] \theta_{F}(X_{R(u), F(u)}) \leq 1 - \Pr[B_u] \left( 1 - dm2^{-k} \right) + 2\sqrt{dm2^{-k}}. \quad (4)$$

It remains to bound (4), given that $u$ is chosen uniformly from $\{1, \ldots, N\}^m$. Let $U$ denote the random variable corresponding to the verifier’s choice of $u$. We bound $\Pr[B_U]$ by conditioning on the events $D_v$ that describe the exact places where the prover tries to “sneak in” the correct polynomials. Specifically, we have

$$\Pr[B_U] = \sum_u \Pr[B_u] \Pr[U = u] = N^{-m} \sum_{u,v} \Pr[B_{u,v}] \Pr[D_v]$$

$$= N^{-m} \sum_v (N^m - (N - 1)^m) \Pr[D_v] = 1 - \left( 1 - \frac{1}{N} \right)^m > 1 - e^{-m/N}.$$}

Thus, the overall probability that the verifier accepts is at most

$$1 - \left( 1 - e^{-m/N} \right) \left( 1 - dm2^{-k} \right) + 2\sqrt{dm2^{-k}}.$$

By initially choosing $m$ and $k$ to be sufficiently fast growing polynomials in the input size $|x|$ (e.g., $m = (|x| + 1)N$ and $k = 2|x| + 6 + \lceil \log(dm) \rceil$), this probability may be made smaller than $2^{-|x|}$, which completes the proof.
4 Conclusions and Open Problems

We have defined in this paper a natural quantum analogue of the notion of an interactive proof system, and proved that there exist 2-round quantum interactive proof systems with exponentially small error for any PSPACE language. We do not know if constant-round quantum interactive proofs characterize PSPACE, or if there are such proof systems for (presumably) larger classes (e.g., does NEXP have constant-round quantum interactive proofs?). We have investigated neither the polynomial round case nor the $k$-round case for $k > 2$; what languages have such quantum proof systems?

Several variants on interactive proof systems have been studied, such as multiprover interactive proofs [5, 14, 19, 21], probabilistically checkable proofs [3, 21], and interactive proof systems having verifiers with very limited computing power [15, 18]. How do quantum analogues of these models compare with their classical counterparts?

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