Original Paper

Leadership Amidst Transition and Liminality: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslavia

Jesenko Tešan¹* & Joan Davison²

¹ The European Graduate School, EGS, Saas-Fee, Switzerland
² Department of Political Science, Rollins College, Winter Park, Florida, USA

Received: March 4, 2020       Accepted: March 24, 2020      Online Published: March 30, 2020
doi:10.22158/ape.v3n2p16         URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n2p16

Abstract
A history of empires and communism created a liminality in the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H). When leaders throughout the Soviet Bloc began to discredit communism, an opportunity opened for the leadership of B&H to unify the popular will and transition to democracy. Yet, the appropriate leadership, a master of ceremonies from van Gennep and Turner’s perspectives, a philosopher from Plato’s view was absent. Politicians instead repackaged themselves as nationalists and supported extremists and divisive actions, culminating in war. Subsequently, the mechanisms associated with the Dayton Peace Accords conceived to return B&H to normalcy instead made the divisive liminality a new normal as power sharing elites benefitted if they held to nationalist claims and ignored societal reintegration. This, study examines the reasoning and tactics of elites who rejected the mantle of good leadership and now abuse the spirit of the constitutional and institutional power sharing mechanisms to maintain the schizophrenic division and conflict. It also introduces the type of virtuous leader states needed for transition.

Keywords
leadership, liminality, Plato, transition, charisma, Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. Introduction
Max Weber contends divinised charismatic politics, as opposed to rational government, can be understood as a diagnosis of a fundamental acute societal atrophy. While poor leadership can trigger national degeneration, societal confusion and disorder also can create conditions for specific figures to emerge as tricksters to exploit the turmoil. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, and especially Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), aspects of poor leadership, liminal confusion and trickster logic dated to Tito
and his successors who manipulated chaos and mimetic behaviour to hold authority. In the 1980s, while some leaders in the former Soviet Bloc discredited communism and supported democratic solutions in response to the popular will, the post-communist Yugoslav elites promoted divisive nationalisms with enduring negative consequences for society. Indeed, the seed of the troubles for B&H was not the inability to accommodate multiple nationalisms and religions within a single state, but rather the relative absence of Platonic leaders with the intellectual, and above all moral, capacity to guide the multicultural society to freedom. This study focuses upon leaders in the former Yugoslavia and B&H, some of whom extolled virulent, exclusive nationalisms as an alternative to the delegitimized Titoism, rather than guiding the nascent democratic communit as to a free identity. It notes how institutional technologies (both peace treaties and constitutional power-sharing) intended for conflict resolution provided a context which permitted—and arguably fuelled—the post-Dayton permanent liminality which creates rules that permit self-interested elites to perpetuate societal division rather than mobilizing society for the common good (Tešan, 2017). As a result, since 1995, B&H’s individuals and society face an unsuccessful transition and unwilled condition of democratic atrophy, which can be best described in Max Weber’s warning in the midst of the Versailles Treaty negotiations: “[n]ot summer’s bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness” (Weber, 1948, p. 128).

2. The Liminal Iron Cage of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Long before Foucault, Weber indirectly addressed the moments of transition—liminal moments—which are pregnant with the discourses that offer a fertile turf for the rise of particular leaderships and concomitant madness in society. To Foucault the excess of meaning “become so burdened with attributes, signs, allusions that they finally lose their own form. Meaning is no longer read in an immediate perception, the figure no longer speaks for itself; between the knowledge which animates and the form into which it is transposed, a gap widens” (1965, p. 18) and opens to madness. For Weber, the madness deserves a diagnosis of a sick element(s) in a society. Virtuous leaders attempt to unify society and create vision of the possibility of the ideal. Yet, as Szakólczai demonstrates, there exists a palpable link among modernity, liminality, pathogenesis, schismogenesis, and the emergence of tricksters (2015) which often precludes such leadership. Weber previously related modernity with its rationalization and bureaucratization to the trap of the iron cage: “The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so... This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism,... with irresistible force... In Baxter’s view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the ‘saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment.’ But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage” (1958, p. 181). According to Weber, normally the transition to capitalism and hence parliamentary democracy is linked to the process of rationalization, but also concomitant with irrationality, such that these must constantly
be balanced. He shows that modern modes of production are the product of the maximization of rational technologies which simultaneously affect the increase of irrationality and irrational elements—the lack of freedom. Thus, the transitory moments of modernity interact with the perpetual “iron cage”.

The democratic atrophy in post—1995 B&H correlates with liminal moments and the associated error-substance which Weber links to divinised elements of “charismatic leadership” (Horvath, 2013). Regarding the Versailles Treaty, Weber cautioned that moments of transition might bear the seeds of politics of passions, that is irrationality, rather than politics of responsibility (Mommsen, 1998). He worried that peace treaties could carry the pathological seeds from the atrocities of the war into society via the politics of passions which were vulnerable to secular divine grace in the form of charismatic leaders, that is, the error-substance. B&H now parallels the Weimar case to the extent that the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) institutionalize B&H constitutional structures which constrain transition and protect nationalists (Tešan, 2017, 2018). Indeed, the Weberian rise of politics of conviction and divine grace, along with the promises of nationalist elites, contrasts with a “rational, value-free” authority. The contemporary nationalist elites also contrast with the “charisma” of leaders such as St. Paul. They often accumulate personal wealth and lack self-discipline. They trump the rational experts and bureaucrats, whether of the Yugoslav Federation or Dayton Peace Process. In B&H, these sophistic politicians ignore the human spirit’s desire for freedom and interaction; they now bear responsibility for the violent conflicts, ethnic hatred, and prevailing liminal trap.

2.1 The Qualitative Nature of Leadership: The Breuilly-Weber Conversation

Breuilly (1993, 2012) provides additional insight to the modern charismatic nationalist leader. He hones the concept through focus on Weber’s distinction between traditional and modern nationalistic charismatic power. The traditional charismatic leader resurrects sacred myths and places; the modern leader relies upon the institution and structure of the state. Where precisely the collapse of Yugoslav society and subsequent schismogenesis of B&H fits is unclean. There appears to be various forms of charismatic authority represented in Vojislav Šešelj, Alija Izetbegović, Radovan Karadžić, Slobodan Milošević and other nationalist leaders. The people (nation) chose and followed these leaders because they appeared to embody certain values or traditions. As leaders should, they offered security, but the security came through division and conflict rather than unity and order; the security depended upon embracing the mythical past rather than ushering society into the future.

Reflecting on the special case of Hitler, Breuilly contends: “Charismatic domination was a ‘solution’ to factionalism. How much faction leaders and their followings ‘believed’ in Hitler is secondary. If the leader and this following had success, such ‘as if’ beliefs would become elements of a charismatic movement” (2011, p. 487). Truth is not primary; success, however that might be defined, is primary. The diminution of truth then allows for elites to appeal through generalizations, scapegoating, and mythical claims. Successes, whether for Milošević, Šešelj, Tjudman, or Karadžić served to prove their claims. Success for Milošević and Šešelj in Kosovo meant “persecuted” Serbs fighting NATO; even a loss would
be a victory within the myth of martyrdom.

Breuilly further examines the dynamic and explains that “charismatic leadership of opposition movements that take power [...] began as small and sectarian and that is when the charismatic leadership position was established” (2011, p. 6). The fascist charismatic leader does not respond to groundswell popular demand, but employs his talents, his charisma, to create the demand. This is supply side politics with the charismatic elite as leader creating facts, issues, and even results. Thus, Serbians could not oppose Milošević once he appealed to victimhood amidst the courage and sacrifice of the Field of Blackbirds. So too, Šešelj claimed the legacy of the brave Chetniks who similarly sacrificed during World War II to liberate the Serbs. He now sought their allegiance against “historic enemies” and Bosnia’s “pagans” (Šešelj, 2003, p. 2, p. 7).

Moreover, according to Breuilly in relation to Weber, “[t]o exercise state power under modern conditions, as Weber was acutely aware, requires control of large-scale bureaucratic organisations such as a civil service and the various branches of armed forces” (2011, p. 7). Breuilly contends state power is an a priori condition for a modern “opposition movement” to emerge otherwise the latter need not exist. Both Milošević and Izetbegović seem to demonstrate this awareness as they sought to build bases of power at the republic level while the post-Tito Yugoslavian Federation withered (Tešan, 2007). Further, along with Šešelj, and Karadžić, each understand the authority and power a modern leader obtains from a loyal, mobilized paramilitary.

Breuilly then apparently aligns with Weber’s notion of tension between the individual trapped in an iron cage and their place in the society. Breuilly seems to imply two options: charismatic personalities or state power given that “[...]charismatic power based on domination of a following by an extraordinary leader is sectarian and oppositional and usually does not get beyond this phase” (2011, p. 16). This case study of leaders in former Yugoslavia and B&H suggests, however, that such a view is a simplification, that leaders exist on spectrums, that Plato’s sophists are timeless, and that within B&H, traditional, hybrid and modern styles could be combined because the intent often was to maintain power, even if divisive, rather than progress toward a common good.

This research expands Szakolczai’s permanent liminality (2016) and Horvath’s trickster logy (2018) whilst then offering through the modernist school of nationalism, including Breuilly, an alternative lens to understand the rise of irrational Yugoslavian and B&H politicians. The research presents original evidence based upon interviews with Raif Dizdarević, who served as the last Chair of the Collective Presidency of Yugoslavia, and translation of recordings from the B&H Assembly during the Sarajevo Spring. Then study the assesses the tactics and strategies of politicians behind the stolen moments of transition and concludes: when the magical spirit of life has been beaten to the point of no return as happened with B&H’s atrocities, such that the magic atrophies amid horrors, the need for leadership becomes all the more necessary but also all the more elusive.
2.2 The Rupture of Order and the Necessity of Leadership

The late 1980s witnessed rupturing of the communist political order throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Certain leaders, such as Gorbachev, opened the windows to these events which unleashed the will to break from oppressive, imitative forces and myopic world-views. Yet, the outcome of these opportunities varied with some societies transitioning to democracy, while movements in other regions were frustrated and stalled. Notable is the role and nature of leadership in these critical transitory times. Horvath discusses that solution of such crises requires a special leader, consistent with Elias’ view, with more, not less, ability and virtue, and operating above the threshold of liminality (1998). Accordingly, the German Democratic Republic (DDR) benefitted from its association with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) which served a rational, masterful role in the reintegration of the people of the DDR into freedom. Helmut Kohl and the German state offer a modern charismatic rationalized leadership model. Vaclav Havel as President of Czechoslovakia focused upon the power of the powerless, supervised the Velvet Revolution and Divorce, and guided the communitas through the pain of transition to its emergence as a free society. He acted as a genuine master of ceremonies. By contrast, some of the republics of the former Yugoslavia were impeded because the communitas fell under the power of elites who themselves existed in the margins, mobilized people against imaginary enemies, and perpetuated the permanent transition and liminality. Given the history and tradition of cosmopolitan tolerance within B&H, the outcome seemed shocking, unless one views these processes through the politics of irrationality and emergence of Horvath’s tricksters. For example, Milošević and Karadžić mastered the tricksters’ politics well: they understood that nationalistic propaganda must contain an element of historically accepted myth (Zimmerman, 1996; Danner, 1998; Karadžić, 2016, p. 4; Milošević, 2001). The irrational aims contained elements of reality.

Yet, the reality was that B&H long had served as a model of multiculturalism in which the people did not question the ability to coexist. In the 1980s and early 1990s, liberal thought via the media and art scene, such as Top Lista Nadrealista, developed in B&H, and then spread to other Yugoslav republics. Notably, the initial events of the Sarajevo Spring’s peaceful revolution of 1992, illustrated the will of the communitas and democratic leadership to break with the communist identity. People, united from various demographic backgrounds, desired to leave behind one identity and the associated liminal pseudo-reality, and cross into a new milieu which not only existed as a concept in the collective mind, but also was being realized elsewhere in the region. The people of the Sarajevo Spring demonstrated their wish to transition to freedom. Yet, liminality prevailed, and thus uncertainty and ambiguity perpetuated popular confusion regarding the real meanings of communism, nationalism, and freedom. The necessary type of appropriate leadership, a master of ceremonies, struggled to take hold because elites perceived such virtuous Platonic leaders as a threat. As Raif Dizdarević highlights, this created a void for nationalists, such as Šešelj and Izetbegović, as well as political opportunists, such as Milošević and Karadžić, to manipulate transitory individuals and societies. To be clear, the critical detail must not be the mythical ancient hatred or inability of certain peoples to consolidate democracy, but rather Turner’s “betwixt-and-between” space.
affecting identity as leaders opted not to orchestrate, or even support, the transition out of liminality (v. Gennep, 1960; Turner, 1967, 1969). The circumstance suggests, consistent with Weber, a fundamental tension (and potential oscillation) between rational and irrational elements in politics. Karadžić’s famous speech in the Parliament of B&H in October 1991 illustrates these elements. Seemingly rational, he states, “You cannot interfere in the matters that are regulated by the federal constitution. I am trying in the most peaceful way to tell you this as well.” Then he moves to primordial arguments about ethnic sovereignty and survival, concluding, “You want to take Bosnia and Herzegovina down the same highway of hell and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia are travelling. Be careful. Do nothing that will lead Bosnia to hell and do nothing that may lead the Muslim people to their annihilation, because the Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is war. How will you prevent everyone from being killed in Bosnia?” (Karadžić, 1996, p. 942).

As Milan Kučan, the first President of Slovenia from 1991 to 2002 recently emphasized, the subsequent complex war throughout the former Yugoslavia, particularly as waged within B&H, then demonstrated the ability of nationalist elites to trick people into an irrational conflict. The violence became an instrument for mimetic proliferation of a sacrificial logic, destroying historical identities and tolerances (Telesković, 2020). The war transformed liminality to a quintessential character which due to the spiralling violence and chaos further complicated the post-war transition. Nationalist extremists encouraged unreflective mimetic behaviour, created defensive communitas, and advocated perpetual schism within the post war liminal space as they explicitly preached against transition to a societal reintegration. Given such authorities, it seems B&H might be trapped, void of rational Platonic leadership and/or demos.

Unlike Wydra, who considers an “authority vacuum” (2007; 2015) as the space from within which the condition of liminal leadership emerges, this research draws attention to the epistemological gap which shrouds B&H. Within this space, the self and society, face contradictory truth(s) that nurtures epistemological schizophrenia. The brutal human rights abuses which still punctuate any discourse, open an abyss providing space for new leaders and truths. In B&H, Weber’s politics of conviction reject moral, rational leadership, stereotype identities, and foment violence. They abuse the spirit of constitutional power sharing mechanisms in favour of legislative immobilism which then justifies claims for separatism. They manipulate the rational mechanisms of the Dayton Peace Accords (conceived with the intention to return B&H to normalcy with rights and vetoes for all groups) to perpetuate division. Under power sharing, elites thrive if they hold to the nationalist perspective which initially hijacked transition, including the democratic imagination of the Sarajevo Spring.

2.3 Prelude to the Storm: The Void of Platonic Leaders

As Annas (1981) identifies, doubts about democracy’s ability to survive go back to Plato, who regarded it as very fragile because it occupies liminal space. What the Republic is about, is not only justice and the just person, but rather a perpetual wrestling for democracy-to-be. In fact, what makes a harmonious condition in society, thence political institutions, to be worthy of the label democratic is the perpetual
resistance of extreme ends competing in a free context. During the late 1980s and early 1990s the republics in Yugoslavia experienced and wrestled with raw democracy, while lacking the necessary virtuous leaders to transform and reaggregate the situation. Too easily, elites silenced the people, the demos. The internal skills ground into the demos, as Plato envisioned, were pushed and trapped in the void of transition and conflict; the extremes voiced appealing claims which stalled the oscillation that democracy necessitates. Pseudo-democratic populisms and nationalisms occupied the extremes. Visions of democracy, with rights and tolerance, struggled to survive between extremes. The B&H situation suggests democracy atrophies not because what is the proper or improper “statesman” or “leader” but rather because of how leadership is forged.

Former Yugoslavia, particularly the Balkan region, is comprised of a diverse population with relationships among and within heterogeneous communities. Since the recent wars (1991-2001) in that region, the once nicely varied social webs now are forced to abandon this rich tapestry for a hardened, grid-like utopian design of uniformity institutionalized in and through the DPA (Tešan, 2018). This study posits that the essence, to tap into Plato’s vocabulary, of designs and architecture of political institutions such as DPA, should support heterogeneous populations and heterogeneous environs consistent with their societal webs. Problems perpetuate or develop when post-war political institutions (such as the DPA or Weber’s Versailles “Peace”) do not mirror the essence of the pre-war relationship but rather are post-war shadows, offering leaders conditioned by conflict and liminality.

As Annas argues, Plato’s Republic forged its theory on “forms and essentialism.” Yet, Plato does not try to prove that homogeneity is better than heterogeneity. He is not deterministic in that sense, but he seems to show that in this world (nature) there are many truths, depending on one’s background or worldview. His attempt is not to hammer down a single and right objective one-size-fits-all universal approach thence utopian Republic. Rather he encourages a method of how-to search for the essence relative to the ever-changing material world, in this case a democratic polity and adequate leadership.

According to Plato, a “form” exists apart from specific physical manifestations, however, it would be inaccurate to say that Plato qua Socrates when building the theory of the Republic and its leadership would argue that heterogeneity is wrong. For example, Socrates highlights a boy who recognizes a triangle in the sand, and Socrates deduces that there exists some universally applicable truth. Yet, related to this case’s concern about leadership in transitory environments, Plato did not argue that forms follow a strict definition of uniformity, but that the method towards those “essences” does. The love of wisdom or philo-sophia is the essential contribution of Statesman and/or the Republic to this case.

Regarding leadership as a “form,” problems develop when the essence of leadership is not derived from the ideal form not only with regard to philosophy but also with the character of the given society in time and place. Indeed, real forms must be distinguished from false forms. Considering Plato’s Cave analogy in the Republic, in this temporal world when a designer or architect (the leadership) constructs an object, the construction is based on the non-being, or to borrow Plato’s vocabulary the object exists as the “shadow” of the real ideal. Very rarely an architect, in this case Yugoslavian politicians as well as
the statesmen who designed the Dayton Peace Accords, can understand the real essence. The shadows rather than the real essence are taken for the “truth.” The onus falls on the inversion of the shadows and forms, and hence a hyper anthropocentric design method purporting not just the mistaken appearance for reality, but more importantly its wider effect on the social relations, leaders and polity. Consequently, B&H’s liminal socio-political state can best be described as the Republic in reverse. Real democracy, to be worthy of its name, wrestles in constant flux under the pressures of polyphony and heterogeneity. Such real democracy without real leadership, however, degenerates during transitory moments. The liminality of communism, transition, and war stressed the heterogeneity of B&H. Sophist elites mimicked democracy; elites ignored democracy’s need for responsive oscillation. Although voices for polyphonic democracy arose, these demands encountered first communist bureaucrats and then nationalist voices. The former feared the uncertainty of democracy; the latter railed that pluralist democracy was an existential threat and that disciplined, managed, national democracy was essential.

Raif Dizdarević witnessed the stagnant leadership who fearing the uncertainty of democracy, created the void in which tricksters emerged and agitated. Personal interviews with him are key evidence for this research. As a party and government leader, Dizdarević’s authority depended upon legal-rational legitimacy, a legitimacy which he recognized was waning. He realized the need for dedicated leaders and lamented the presence of opportunists within the post-Tito party. He worried Yugoslavia would struggle to evolve into a democratic modern state, because it lacked professional leadership, civic associations and the ability to address socio-economic challenges (Tešan, 2007). Thus, communist legacy, rather than multinational federalism, was the primary impediment, but xenophobic nationalism became a product of failed leadership. Weakness in the central government allowed authoritarian nationalist leaders on the periphery in the republics to fill the void and manipulate the masses (Tešan, 2007). Indeed, perhaps under Dizdarević’s guidance the epistemological gap might have been avoided, providing conditions for transition.

Dizdarević identifies the dual legacies of the system and Tito’s charisma as the fundamental problem, citing “…history dragging into the future…[W]e (communists) take all of the responsibility for the collapse of Yugoslavia…had Tito been surrounded with professional experts with new ideas, energy and visions, perhaps the Balkans today would look much different” (Tešan, 2007, p. 25). His perspective is insightful: Dizdarević notes the benefits and drawbacks of charismatic leadership while regretting the lack of professional politicians and experts especially during times of change. The leadership did not reform and embrace democracy; the nationalist opportunists embraced the charismatic mantle. He also implies the problem of the iron cage—when bureaucratic rationality becomes stifling its expertise requires revitalization. In times of crises, leaders must respond to the oscillation of the demos while stressing unity of purpose and the common good. Lacking such leadership, the void provided space for tricksters and chaos (Tešan, 2007). Accordingly, the Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution, critical of stagnant government operations and party ideology, became
one element of Milošević’s appeal in the republics (Milošević, 1999).

Indeed, following Tito’s death in the mid-1980s, the Yugoslav elite, or in Dilas’ terms The New Class, began to splinter, dismantling the inter-elite cooperation necessary for leadership, reform, and a democratic future (1957). Society needed new leadership focused on the common good, but it was lacking. Dizdarević lamented, “…some members brought their own men…their favourites…this was detrimental to Yugoslavia’s survival as a federation of different nationalities” (Tešan, 2007, p. 24). By the late ‘80s, “cooperation was turning into antagonistic competition” and “the federation acted as fireman. We went from one region to another putting the fire out” (Tešan, 2007, p. 25). Therefore, in a critical moment, the leadership was incapable of political innovation or response to citizens’ needs, and rather focused on maintaining its position as Dilas predicted. Dizdarević states: “the Party huffed and puffed…we dozed off for a moment.” The system came to a halt, and “… failed to democratise and turn into a modern state” (Tešan, 2007, p. 31). Failed leadership policies, elite manipulation, and the lack of professional politicians created the space for polar extremisms.

Eventually, in response to Milošević’s nationalist rallies and speeches in the republics, the federal government attempted to reassign him to a bureaucratic post, but this came too late. Dizdarević summarizes: “They masked themselves as nationalists and used sweet words and fanned nationalism to gain the attention of confused masses” (Tešan, 2007, p. 38). The federal government and old leadership recognized the dangerous tactics of the extremist voices within the liminal void. Milošević specifically was identified as a problem. Notably, Dizdarević’s language closely parallels that of scholars of liminality: “masked”, “sweet words”, “fanned nationalism”, and “confused masses.” Yet, Milošević’s very status as a marginalized outcast on the party’s and bureaucracy’s periphery positioned him to appeal to other liminal individuals. He co-opted Šešelj and recruited Karadžić. Various analyses of Karadžić suggest he possessed ambition which exceeded his abilities. He first began his political career in the Green Party, but motivated by power, not ideology, he later joined Milošević’s Serbian Democratic wing in B&H (Borger, 2017; Danner, 1998). Danner claims Karadžić’s ambitious character“could not help but make him attractive to a great political manipulator like Milošević” (Danner, 1998). Šešelj, by contrast, espoused a nationalism more extreme than that which Milošević favored. Milošević attempted to contain and direct Šešelj’s fanatical Serbian Radical Party, but the two men often clashed.

In January 1990, the 14th extraordinary communist party congress permanently adjourned. The Congress was called amidst transformations throughout Central Europe, not to embrace such transition, but to attempt to secure the floundering status quo. The decision was reached that new elections would be convened at the republican level rather than the federal. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman later drafted and implemented amendments to the new Croatian Constitution which threatened Croatian Serbs in Krajina, leading Jovan Rašković to create “Srpska Autonomna Oblast.” The (il)logic of the politics of passion snowballed, affecting not only B&H but all of Yugoslavia. The liminal situations, first communism and then transition, further derailed into conflict while reinforcing the rise of
authorities who prophesized existential fear as normalcy, proclaimed war identities, and justified violence. A pathological normal evolved which suffocated the nascent democratic spirit.

3. The Art of Transgression and Elite Perspectives: The B&H War Archive
Reflecting to pre-war B&H, the Sarajevo Spring of 1992 demonstrated that people aimed to break from authoritarian mentalities, but their free will and critical moment were transgressed. Thomassen frames comparable revolutions throughout Central Europe as rituals involving “imitation,” “trickster” and “crowd behaviour” (2012, p. 684). So too, the Sarajevo Spring attempted to peacefully transform a hyper-rational communist system of thought. “Rational” humans seeking transition appeared almost “irrational” or “fanatical” (especially to the old elite) as people poured into Sarajevo with their democratic spirit challenging the false promises of monolithic government. The liminality, as an anti-structure, cried for a leader to serve as a virtuous leader, a master of ceremonies (Turner, 1974). Yet most elites could not look beyond the rationalized bureaucracy or their legalistic legitimacy to see the emerging truth; they hid in the Parliament, and willingly “opted out” (Turner, 1974, p. 233). The representatives existed in their own isolated confusion, outside the Spring’s particular liminality. Another key source of evidence for this research are the oral tapes of the parliamentary debates from the Sarajevo Spring which Tešan translated to English.

Palpable disagreement among the representatives about the meaning of the protesting crowd illustrates elite confusion. Representative FaikUzunović expressed amazement verging on admiration: “… we must not underestimate the human element and spontaneous positive energy of all those citizens who unarmed marched against the aggressors, the fascists” (War Archive, 1992, p. 5/3). EnverKreso and SejfudinTokić, proclaimed their heroism and valour: “the people from Sarajevo have done something that when better times come will be commemorated in a glorious poem. The nation with its bare life and courage stood up against automatic weapons” (War Archive, 1992; Kreso, tape 4/7). MuhamedFilipović countered, characterizing the demonstrators as threats: “…we are in the moment where we need to maximise our concentration and understand that the country has been attacked […]. Therefore, I believe that we should not squander the power going into the debate and any relationships with these subversive and sub-legal creations. You see, if we talked to them, the state and democracy would be very poor if left to these people to create democracy. Don’t dream the dreams about these people. It is a group of usurpers.” (War Archive 1992: Filipović, tape 5/1).

Later he cited the legal power of the Assembly and argued that the crowd were aggressors seeking to overthrow the constitutional state:
A task of this Assembly is to take all the means in its power. The Constitution gives the right to B&H to defend itself. As Bosnia is under the dual aggression: internal and external […]. At the moment in B&H what happens is anti-constitutional secession. Today in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Parliament/Assembly, we have a group of adventurers trying to make some kind of internal coup” (War Archive, 1992: 5/1).
Filipović, tape 1/2ss).

Such a view dominated. The demos sought leadership, “masters of ceremony” to transition to peace, freedom and democracy. The representatives constructed a chasm, a void which became part of the critical moment or out-of-orderly situation, feeding from and detrimental to the social change, and its democratic spirit. The majority of the representatives in the Assembly created a false narrative of the Sarajevo Spring as subversive and dangerous; ignoring their citizens, they petitioned the international community to restore order. Mirko Prskalo argued: “What is our mandate? Where is our rule? I agree with Professor Filipović that the strongest weapon of our country now is its legality and the sovereignty received by the international society” (War Archive 1992: Prskalo, tape 6/1 AM). Accordingly, the grassroots of sovereignty in the people were rejected for the recognition of external bodies.

The representatives did not attempt to meet with the people; rather they hid inside the Parliament building, watching via closed circuit cameras the outside wave of peaceful marchers, which they labelled “fanatics”. Admittedly, debate occurred and a few members of the Assembly disagreed with the dominant narratives, but they lacked the courage necessary to accept the call to lead and foster the unity of the emerging polity. Mirsad Džapo criticized the Assembly’s betrayal couched in hyper-rational constitutional discourse and old legislation. His comments identify the textbook liminality:

“...Today we are in true extraordinary situation. We are located in the building where there is a continuum parade of all kinds of people in all directions. I'm not sure, but I am afraid that this kind of Parliament that we have at the moment in this extraordinary situation may throw-out the ‘Saviour’ for the nation. We have law, and the Saviour is the last thing this nation needs....” (War Archive 1992: Džapo, tape 4/4).

They feared a new saviour, perhaps a Platonic leader, which the demos might prefer to the legal authority of the elites. Representative Tokić summarizes the retreat from potential leadership: “...one of the reasons why the nation and these peoples are now in the parliament is that we were not here. The government has not been functioning, hence, had we been here yesterday and the day before my dear colleagues this would not had happen” (War Archive 1992: tape 6/2). This view echoes Dizdarević’s analysis. Rational, bureaucratic leadership lacked the charisma of a Saviour. They ignored the popular pulse for democracy and thereby left open the vacuum to the irrationality which would promote violence against imagined threats.

Milošević, Šešelj, Izetbegović and Karadžić, would take the mantle of Saviour, but change the meaning of leadership and democracy. Horrors would emerge as a by-product of both these charismatic elites and the violent non-democratic state apparatus. Returning to Weber, after the politics of irrationality and extremisms hijack the politics of rationality, chaotic transition ensues. The demos weakened and frayed, the people became peoples, and they succumbed to violence and ethnic conflict, fascism, and sadism.
3.1 Problematic Elites and the Problem of Leadership

Accordingly, irrational tricksters such as Šešelj, Izetbegović, Milošević and Karadžić, opted to dehumanize individuals and peoples, while encouraging discord and violence. These “liminal authorities” naturally turned against order and harmony, perpetuated chaos, and slammed the door on democracy (Horvath, 2013). Significant, given the reality of democracy’s necessary wrestling if it is to hear all voices and engage dialogue and dissension, is these nationalist elites appeared because the withering communist system was unable to continue to suppress their ideas. The Yugoslav state previously denied Šešelj, Izetbegović and Tudjman opportunity to teach and speak; now they seized the stage. They fed on not only the declining system’s failures, but also the myths from across the centuries which now seemed to hold credence.

Milošević arguably is the most notable of the ultranationalists who affected not only B&H, but also the greater region. He retold ancient myths of Serbia’s founding after defeat in Kosovo. He stirred popular sensitivities by recalling histories of Ottoman and Croat mistreatment of Serb populations. While some truth existed in these histories, Milošević exaggerated the Serbian vulnerability and ignored the decades of peace that existed. Milošević also encouraged the military and para-militaries to engage in torture and ethnic cleansing against non-Serb populations. Not only were the Albanians, Bosnians and Croats identified as threats to the Serbs, but they were demonized for occupying Serbian living space (Milošević, 1999). Milošević’s “leadership” realizes Plato’s fear that “democratic” authorities turn tyrannical. Illustrative of his movement toward tyrannical tactics was his discourse at the Field of Blackbirds in 1989. He emphasized that the Serbs’ survival of their enslavement under the Turks is reason for optimism if it leads to unity and redemption. He focused upon the importance of valor, loyalty and even martyrdom to overcome 600 years of oppression. Milošević offered himself as the Serbs’ master and savior. His speech characterizes a reversal of cosmopolitan rational discourse to irrational politics. He then appealed to other politicians, such as Šešelj and Karadžić, encouraging paramilitaries and building a personalized state apparatus.

Yet, the retreat from dialogue, preceded this moment. Constraints on free speech in the region dated to the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires and continued under the Communist Party. Perhaps if the communist one-party system had not denied Šešelj and Izetbegović the academic freedom to teach nationalism and ethnicity at Sarajevo University, the subsequent radicalization of messages and outcomes would have been avoided. If ideas were exchanged freely, then other ideas necessarily could contend. In the absence of such a public wrestling with ideas, Šešelj and Izetbegović fuelled the retreat from rational dialogue. Izetbegović writes in his Islamic Declaration: “There can be no peace or coexistence between the ‘Islamic faith’ and non-Islamic societies and political institutions [...] Islam clearly excludes the right and possibility of activity of any strange ideology on its own turf…the state should be an expression and should support the moral concepts of the religion” (1970, p. 22). Izetbegović viewed his declaration as a rejection of both fundamentalism and Westernization, one he offered as a reformist Muslim. He further claimed that as a civic leader he represented all people.
Nevertheless, the language of the declaration appeared to equate religion, nation, and sovereign statehood, demanding a singular loyalty. As such it threatened Serbs in the region, or at least could be so argued, and consequently B&H unity.

In response, Šešelj, founded the far-right Serbian Radical Party, threatening the Muslims and pushing Milošević farther to extremes. Šešelj’s platform, countered Izetbegović’s declaration as a plan for a Muslim state in B&H, with a call for a Greater Serbia (Šešelj, 1999). Ultimately, he was found guilty of hate speech provoking extremists to commit war crimes against Croats. Yet, Marko Attila Hoare suggests Šešelj is a minor figure:

“I hope Šešelj is sufficiently humiliated by the low sentence; it at least marks him down as a second- or third-ranking player, which he was. He was a loudmouthed attention-seeker who made himself infamous to the international public in the 1990s by his extreme statements, and certainly relished the publicity of being indicted and tried.” (Gadžo, 2018).

Karadžić too used extreme language and advocated extreme tactics. He often publicly dismissed Europe’s criticisms, telling them to “f--k themselves” (Karadžić, 2009, p. 533). In a November 1991 speech, he claimed the only solution was to separate institutions based on ethnicity and if necessary “fight to the finish for our survival, a battle for our living space” (Karadžić, 1996, p. 941). In a radio transcript he predicted, “There will be rivers of blood. Sarajevo will be a black cauldron where 300,000 Muslims will die. It will be a real bloodbath” (Karadžić, 2009, p. 532).

To be clear, these violence inspiring speeches and rallies were not the exception, but a daily tactic of the ultranationalists (Karadžić, 1996, p. 939; Milošević, 1999). Their use of emotional language and mythical appeals also were complemented with the tools of both traditional and modern leaders. They secured loyalty within their institutions and paramilitaries with daily meetings with individuals who enjoyed their political patronage. Šešelj and Karadžić regularly visited their troops (Šešelj, 2003, pp. 2-15; Milošević, 1999). Milošević’s control of the press and television throughout the region enabled him to ignite and enflame fears. They also maintained tight control over bureaucratic organizations and budgets which served their nationalist causes (Milošević, 1999). As the war in B&H highlights, these nationalist leaders, to borrow from Franz Borkenau (1950, 1971), seem to be intolerant of the historic impulse toward connection and community necessary to move beyond liminality. They adapted the pathological mindset of the communists and inspired the emergence of schismatic new identities.

These authorities who embraced virulent, exclusive nationalisms rather than guiding the nascent democratic communitas to a free identity bear the onus for the frozen conflict and transition. Their rhetoric and actions manipulated the ambiguity of time and place to scam people into focusing upon irrational, imaginary threats which then became real, cementing B&H into a violent schismogenesis via the technologies of the rational peace truce. Certainly, communism and its post-Tito legacy represented a liminality in which authorities manipulated mimetic behaviour to maintain control, but the grotesque violence was absent. After Tito’s death, members of the collective leadership prioritised self-interest over societal interests. Ultranationalists and/or irrational politicians then claimed legitimacy and
replaced one anthropocentric (communist) world-view with another anthropocentric world-view: the virulent “my nation” against “your state”. They fed the popular democratic imagination nationalist strategies and structures which only mimicked democratisation. Indeed, the problem for B&H was not the inability to accommodate multiple nationalisms and religions within a single state, but rather the context of suppression of potential Platonic leaders with the intellectual, and above all moral, capacity and will to guide the multicultural society.

As the demos was silenced, so were Plato’s leaders. Yet, as discussed, the Republic suggests democracy can re-emerge if the context of a spectrum of views, including extremes, exist and dialogue, with leadership oscillating but never to the poles. In other words, for Plato, it is the question “how” rather than the prescriptive “what” question related to heterogeneity (or if the case required, homogeneity). For instance, throughout history in Yugoslavia, especially in B&H, the multiplicity of different world-views did not pose a major cosmological or identity problem. Diverse identities were welcomed. In the 14th century, when no nation-state in Europe wanted to accept Sephardi Jews escaping Spain, B&H opened its doors. Social relations, including the architecture and culture of the region became richer. Thus, in a democracy to be—the Republic—diversity is welcomed as it is simply understood as its “form” or essence should mirror the essence of the society: demos. The Republic famously concludes with philosopher kings. So too, Socrates warns tyranny proceeds from democracy. Thus, leadership must aspire to its ideal and form within the current heterogeneity and democracy of the former Yugoslavia. In the Republic, there is a space—a context and/or infrastructure—for everything and everyone (including prostitutes) provided proper education.

3.2 The Failure of Rationality, Technology, and the DPA without Leadership

As discussed, the Cave metaphor highlights the problem of deception and therefore the necessity of real, if possible ideal, leaders. In the case of B&H, the context of heterogeneity prior to 1992 needs to be revisited so that society rejects and ousts tricksters, whilst the demos nurtures leaders with the virtues to guide a heterogenous democracy. Leaders must be virtuous. Applied to B&H, and in particular nationalist and extremist politicians, reason and experiential knowledge were used, or abused, to conclude and convey that existential threats existed to the nation. According to Kant, reason allows us to structure the world to be a better place, but the manipulation of reason by hyper rational “Princes” also can produce a nation’s mostunfinest moments. In B&H, a fewelitistsappealed with irrational politics, leading people to bloody and irrational war. The DPA institutionalized their rational politics of separate group identities. Now, under the DPA, many politicians still focus upon divisive politics, behaving as conflict entrepreneurs.

Kant also informs this analysis when placed in conversation with Weber. Recall that Weber viewed in the Versailles Treaty the next war. Contrasting, Kant explores the possibility of perpetual peace, although his definitive articles set a high standard perhaps forecasting its limits. Nevertheless, the failure of the Versailles Treaty and the optimism of the Perpetual Peace provide bases to consider the DPA. The treaty and constitution which the DPA offers is a technology for peace and government. The treaty carefully
structures power-sharing and provides group protections. Yet, technologies cannot replace good leaders. Indeed, self-interested elites and ultranationalist authorities can manipulate technologies, constitutions and institutions to the detriment of society. The DPA intended to protect and represent all individuals. Yet, the segmentation of people into ethnic categories for proportional representation perpetuates and reinforces the war-time ultranationalist insistence on difference and separation. Politics of identity and passion dominate. In turn, the system limits political competition (and oscillation) within ethnic categories such that governmental elites are relatively secure without meaningful electoral challenges (Davison & Tešan, 2011). Their political security allows them both to engage not only in corruption but also impede movements toward unity. Most politicians accept their success as linked to divisive and conflictual rhetoric and policies. The hyper rationalism associated with the DPA and its institutions—painfully structured to not exclude any group—overlooks the necessity of good leaders for a heterogenous society which seeks to transition. The DPA technology still requires humans, and lacking good leadership, is misdirected. In fairness, the European Union and its High Representatives to B&H came to understand the need for appropriate, good leaders. Though external institutions themselves, they have removed the most corrupt and criminal elites, prohibited destructive campaign practices, and pushed for constitutional change. They readily admit that change is necessary so that the B&H government (who are not ideal leaders) move closer to the “truth” (Tešan, 2017).

Plato in the Republic shows that painters and poets do not possess knowledge of objects or forms; they copy copies. Homer writes about war but, unlike the people of the former Yugoslavia, has never been through war. Plato says: those who know Do. Thus, Republic book 10 ends with an attack on Homer, artistry and poets. Yet, apart from merely enjoying aesthetic elements in art, tragedy and poetry, one can still learn through education. So too, apart from the legal technology of the DPA, potential leaders need to learn how certain things are actant, hence learning brings them closer to knowing, albeit they must choose to love wisdom.

4. Discussion: The Leadership for Heterogeneity and Democracy

Zoran Đinđić stands among politicians whose leadership sought to promote unity and dialogue in the former Yugoslavia. Đinđić was born in the pluralist city of Brčko in B&H. An intellectual and politician, he served as mayor of Belgrade and then prime minister of Serbia until his assassination in 2003. Organized crime and extremist political movements viewed him as an unwelcome leader, perhaps a gadfly, not unlike Socrates; indeed, he seems to fit Plato’s idea of leader and leadership. Đinđić embraced Dilas’s concept of the lie and “dictated imagination” (2000, pp. 265-75) of the elites, The New Class (1957). Like Dilas, Đinđić, albeit in “democratic” settings and with different outcomes, tried to persuade people to move to the truth of what their democratic responsibilities and possibilities entailed. He focused upon the potential problems of the process of democratisation, in the Yugoslav context, the “destruction of one political system” and the “passage from the state of repressive singularity into the state of repressive plurality” (2010, p. 16).
With Đinđić is evident the existence of Platonic leaders to counter the opportunistic voices. Leaders exist on a spectrum and pull society in the wrestling match of democracy and iron cage of modernity. While concerns about irrational politics and tricksters in B&H and the region, stretch back through Tito to the Byzantine and Ottoman empires, so too does an exceptional history of tolerance. As B&H continues to struggle for its future, as the extremes wrestle against one another and democracy, the society does possess some immunities against the virus. The ‘problem’ of leadership, like the ‘problem’ of democracy is complicated, more so under heterogeneity.

Consider Željko Komšić, the current Croat member of the B&H Presidency, who Croats reject as Bosnian even though his father was Croatian and his grandfather fought with the Chetniks. His background is too complex—like that of B&H—to characterize with a single identity. Is he an opportunist stealing the Croatian seat, a leader attempting to unify peoples, or a contemporary politician hoping (and perhaps believing) his own self-interests coincide with society’s well-being? Despite the claim of some Croats that he does not represent them, he currently is serving his third consecutive term since 2006 as their representative in the B&H tripartite presidency. His platform emphasizes the social welfare state, democracy, civil nationalism and pro-Europeanism (Davison, 2013). Thus, Komšić’s platform seems consistent with the contention that real leadership necessitates unifying diverse interests to pursue shared goals for common benefits.

His leadership also offers sharp contrast with that of the Bosnian Serb member of the Presidency Milorad Dodik, a Serbian nationalist, who often uses inflammatory rhetoric, initiating or supporting divisive policies. Like Karadžić, he claims that Srebrenica was fake news or in his words “staged tragedy with an aim to Satanize the Serbs” (Voice of America 2018). In September 2019, Dodik praised the creation of a separate Republika Srpska Interior Ministry militarised police force for the protection of Bosnian Serb citizens and property (Smith 2019). Dodik also continues to contend that B&H is “an impossible state” and that the Republika Srpska’s divergent interest is best served through autonomy or secession. Dodik illustrates a politician who opts to use the DPA to perpetuate liminality and block unity.

To conclude regarding Đinđić, Komšić, Dodik and other politicians, they exist on a spectrum from Platonic leader to irrational politician to self-serving trickster. Real leaders do not merely advance individual and societal freedom, security, and opportunity; real leaders facilitate these outcomes while also unifying society. By contrast, tricksters claim to value security, but contend security and prosperity only can come at the cost of division. In extreme cases, the supposed security mandates division through tactics which include ethnic cleansing, walling, and secession. Šešelj, Izetbegović, Milošević and Karadžić made such claims. While Milošević represents an archetype irrational politician/trickster whose access to material power enabled devastating results, Šešelj, Izetbegović, and Karadžić also fuelled the destruction of B&H. They responded to Milošević with supporting or contending narratives which rather than countering his divisive tactics, furthered the basis for popular beliefs in mythical notions of insecurity and enemies. Karadžić asserted that the Bosnian Serbs must “admit that the
Muslims have been planted to us as a people whose executioners we are to be” (Karadžić, 2009, p. 532). The problem with such binary division, and certainly such violence, however, is that real security and freedom is then elusive because individuals and societies are locked into a debilitating schism. Recalling Weber, irrational politicians and their politics actually open society to insecurity through the creation of enemies and perpetuation of violent “solutions”. Currently citizens are trapped in a viral, divisive liminality which some elected officials and their institutions find convenient to perpetuate. In Weber’s terminology, B&H elites are living off the politics rather than for the politics, and accordingly freezing liminality such that B&H exhibits many of the features of the iron cage of modernity. It seems evident from other post-transition experiences that a focus upon unity in both the difficult and prosperous times is the opening to individual and collective flourishing and freedom. Unfortunately, contemporary examples of leadership tend not to advance the Platonic model. Looking east, the people of the former Yugoslavia see Turkey and Russia; citizens who look west see the UK and US. B&H’s own communities ultimately must provide the foundation from which leaders rise.

References

Annas, J. (1981). An Introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Borger, J. (2017, April 7). How Radovan Karadžić embraced evil. The Daily Beast. Retrieved August 8, 2019, from https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-radovan-karadzic-embraced-evil

Breuilly, J. (1993). Nationalism and the state. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Breuilly, J. (2011). Max Weber, charisma and nationalist leadership. Nations and Nationalism, 17, 477-499. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00487.x

Breuilly, J. (2012). What does it mean to say that nationalism is “popular”? In M. van Ginderachten, & M. Beyen (Eds.), Nationhood from Below. Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century (pp. 23-43). London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230355354_2

Danner, M. (1998, February 5). Bosnia: The Turning point. The New York Review of Books. Retrieved September 9, 2019, from https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1998/02/05/bosnia-the-turning-point/

Davison, J. (2013). The left’s attraction amidst Bosnia and Herzegovina’s nationalist politics. In J. C. Rosas, & R. Ferreira (Eds.), Left and Right: The Great Dichotomy Revisited (pp. 333-348). London: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Davison, J., & Tešan, J. (2011). The Beauty and the beast: Civil society and nationalisms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Southwestern Journal of International Studies, 4, 24-52.

Đinđić, Z. (2010). Jugoslavijakao Nedovršena Država. Beograd: Fond. Dr Zoran Đinđić.

Dilas, M. (1957). The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System. New York: Praeger.

Foucault, M. (1965). Madness and Civilisation. New York: Vintage Books.

Gadžo, M. (2018, April 18). Serbian “radical” Vojislav Šešelj convicted of war crimes. Aljazeera. Retrieved May 30, 2019 from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2018/04 serbian-radical-vojislav-seselj-convicted-war-cri

Published by SCHOLINK INC.
Gennep, A. van. (1960). The Rites of Passage. London: Routledge.

Horvath, A. (1998). Tricking into the position of the outcast: A Case study in the emergence and effects of communist power. Political Psychology (pp. 331-347). https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00107

Horvath, A. (2013). Modernism and Charisma. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137277862

Horvath, A., & Szakolczai, A. (2018). Political anthropology. In S. Turner, & W. Outhwaite (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Political Sociology 2, Sage Publications (pp. 189-204). https://doi.org/10.4135/9781526416513.n12

Izetbegović, A. (1970). The Islamic Declaration. Sarajevo.

Karadžić, Case IT-95-5/18. (1996). Trial Chamber of Indictments, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (pp. 918-993). Retrieved October 5, 2019, from http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/960711IT.htm

Karadžić, Case IT-95-5/18. (2009). Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Retrieved October 12, 2019, from http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/091027IT.htm

Karadžić, Case IT-95-5/18. (2016). Trial Judgement, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Retrieved October 5, 2019, from http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement_summary.pdf

Milošević, Case 02-54. (1999). Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 22 May. Retrieved August 30, 2019, from http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_Milošević/ind/en/mil-ii990524e.htm

Milošević, Case IT-02-54-T. (2001). Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 22 November. Retrieved August 30, 2019, from http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_Milošević/ind/en/mil-ii011122e.htm

Mommsen, W. (1998). Max Weber and the treaty of Versailles. In M. Boemeke, G. Feldman, & E. Glaser (Eds.), The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years (pp. 535-546). Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139052450.024

Šešelj, Case IT-03-67. (2003). Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Retrieved October 5, 2019, from http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/ind/en/ses-ii030115e.pdf

Smith, L. (2019, September 25). New gendarmerie stokes fears in breakaway Republika Srpska. The Times. Retrieved September 27, 2019, from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/new-gendarmerie-stokes-fears-in-breakaway-republika-srpska-ns07r7g58

Szakolczai, A. (2015). Liminality and experience: Structuring transitory situations and transformative events. In A. Horvath, B. Thomassen, & H. Wydra (Eds.), Breaking Boundaries: Varieties of
Liminality. New York: Berghahn Books, 11-38. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt9qcxbg.5

Szakolczai, A. (2016). Permanent Liminality and Modernity. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315600055

Tešan, J. (2007). The Cancer that festers from within: The Decline of ideology and the collapse of Yugoslavia (MSc thesis). London: London School of Economics and Political Science.

Tešan, J. (2017). Defending the nation from her nationalism(s). Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 23(1), 81-97. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2017.1273681

Tešan, J. (2018). Perpetual peace treaty as war: a study in permanent liminality (PhD thesis). Cork, Ireland: University College Cork.

Thomassen, B. (2012). Notes towards an anthropology of political revolutions. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 54(3), 679-706. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417512000278

Telesković, D. (2020, January 23). The Great Interview with Milan Kucan: Thirty Years after the 14th Congress. Nedeljnik. Retrieved March 20, 2020, from https://www.nedeljnik.rs/mi-smo-znali-da-skj-ne-shvatamo-kao-svoju-ako-ne-prihvote-nase-predloge-hrvati-nisul-malata-akon-sripnute-velika-ispovest-milana-kucana-30-godina-posle-cetrnaestog-kongresa/

Turner, V. (1967). Betwixt and between: The liminal period in Rites de Passage. In The Forest of Symbols. New York: Cornell University Press.

Turner, V. (1969). The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure. Chicago: Aldine.

Turner, V. (1974). Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Voice of America. (2018, August 14). Bosnian Serb leader denies scope of Srebrenica massacre. Retrieved October 4, 2019, from https://www.voanews.com/europe/bosnian-serb-leader-denies-scope-srebrenica-massacre

War Archive, Republic of Bosnian and Herzegovina. (1992, April 7-12). Sarajevo: The Assembly of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Weber, M. (1958). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Wydra, H. (2007). Communism and the Emergence of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491184

Wydra, H. (2015). Liminality and democracy. In A. Horvath, B. Thomassen, & H. Wydra (Eds.), Breaking Boundaries: Varieties of Liminality. New York: Berghahn Books, 183-202. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ct9qcxbg.14

Zimmermann, W. (1996). Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers—America’s Last Ambassador tells what Happened and Why. New York: Times Books.