Sequencing United Nations Peacemaking: 
Political Initiatives and Peacekeeping Operations – 
Supporting Information (SI)

This supporting information provides a set of additional analyses and robustness checks that further support our argument and findings of the main article. The table of contents for these is:

A.1. Testing the Assumptions of the Multinomial Logit
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A.1: Testing the Assumptions of the Multinomial Logit Regression Model

The multinomial logit model is based on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. As Cheng and Long (2007) summarize, IIA assumes that adding or omitting of (additional) outcome categories does not affect the relative odds associated with the predictors in the other, remaining categories. On substantive grounds, this means that, for example, when the UN has to choose between a peacekeeping and a technocratic mission, the odds of choosing the former over the latter should not depend on whether a third alternative, e.g., a diplomatic mission, is present or absent. While there are reasons to argue theoretically for or against the validity of the IIA assumption in our setup, we examined it more systematically via the Hausman and McFadden (1984) test and the Small-Hsiao (1985) test. Both tests have the null hypothesis of “odds (outcome-j vs. outcome-k) are independent of other alternatives,” which implies that significant test statistics would suggest that the IIA is violated. We conducted both tests for the full model of the main text, i.e., when including peacekeeping operations. Table A.1 presents the results.

However, the test statistics do not provide evidence that the assumption is violated. In addition, we also manually omitted one category after another and re-estimated the model again to see whether the coefficients substantially differ across estimations. As this is not the case, and since neither Wald nor likelihood-ratio tests suggest that we should combine any of the alternatives, we have no reason the question the validity of the IIA assumption in our context. The same conclusion applies to the setup pertaining to H2 in the main text.
### Table A.1. Clustered Standard Errors

| Clustered Standard Errors | Hausmann-McFadden | Small-Hsiao |
|---------------------------|-------------------|-------------|
| Diplomatic Mission        | 9.290             | 14.831      |
|                           | (0.901)           | (0.537)     |
| Technocratic Mission      | 7.376             | 19.737      |
|                           | (0.965)           | (0.232)     |
| Development Mission       | 12.257            | 13.631      |
|                           | (0.726)           | (0.626)     |
| Peacekeeping Mission      | 6.490             | 16.458      |
|                           | (0.982)           | (0.421)     |

**Notes.** Table entries are \( \chi^2 \) values; \( p \)-values in parentheses.

### A.2: First Hypothesis Testing: Main Model without Controls

We re-estimated our main model for H1 while omitting all control variables. Clarke (2005) argues against the inclusion of control covariates under some circumstances as – instead of lowering the bias in coefficient estimates – they actually may be more likely to lead to wrong results. Table A.2 shows, though, that the inclusion or exclusion of our results does not alter the substance of our main finding pertaining to *Conflict Link*. The result for *Peace Duration* also remains mainly robust, although development missions do not seem to differ much from peacekeeping operations any longer. Finally, *War Dummy* is statistically insignificant throughout Table A.3.

### Table A.2. Without Controls

|                  | Diplomatic | Technocratic | Development |
|------------------|------------|--------------|-------------|
| Conflict Link    | -2.314**   | -2.983***    | -2.188***   |
|                  | (0.922)    | (0.715)      | (0.708)     |
| Peace Duration   | 0.040**    | 0.019        | 0.017       |
|                  | (0.019)    | (0.018)      | (0.021)     |
| War Dummy        | 0.637      | 0.034        | -0.097      |
|                  | (0.487)    | (0.385)      | (0.353)     |
| Constant         | 1.009      | 2.995***     | 1.877***    |
|                  | (0.814)    | (0.700)      | (0.660)     |
| Obs.             |            |              | 352         |
| Log Pseudolikelihood |         |             | -441.482    |
| Wald \( \chi^2 \) |            |              | 26.03       |
| Prob > \( \chi^2 \) |            |              | 0.002       |

Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; peacekeeping mission is baseline category.

* * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
### Table A.3. Controlling for the Number of Previous Missions

|                          | Diplomatic | Technocratic | Development |
|--------------------------|------------|--------------|-------------|
| Conflict Link            | -0.958     | -2.945***    | -2.448***   |
|                          | (0.753)    | (0.857)      | (0.714)     |
| Peace Duration           | 0.032*     | 0.020        | 0.020       |
|                          | (0.019)    | (0.020)      | (0.020)     |
| War Dummy                | 0.269      | 0.065        | 0.019       |
|                          | (0.477)    | (0.428)      | (0.380)     |
| Missions Count           | 0.015**    | 0.001        | -0.004      |
|                          | (0.007)    | (0.010)      | (0.011)     |
| Constant                 | -0.074     | 2.925***     | 2.047***    |
|                          | (0.606)    | (0.730)      | (0.668)     |
| Obs.                     |            |              |             |
| Log Pseudolikelihood     |            |              | -439.449    |
| Wald $\chi^2$            |            |              | 55.31       |
| Prob $>\chi^2$           |            |              | 0.000       |

Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; peacekeeping mission is baseline category; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

### A.3: Controlling for the Number and Type of Previous Missions

The UN does not always end a mission before starting a new one. Missions can run simultaneously. This kind of interdependence is not fully acknowledged in the main text and, thus, we modified the main models as follows. First, we now control for the number of missions that have been active until point $t$. Second, we also control for the type of earlier missions. To this end, Table A.3 is a modified version of Table 5 in the main text, but we exclude controls (for simplicity, see also the robustness check above demonstrating that our results are not influenced by the inclusion or exclusion of the confounding factors) and add a variable counting the number of previous missions in a country (regardless of its type). Table A.4 is similar, but instead of one count variable, we consider four – one for each type of political mission or peacekeeping.

### Table A.4. Controlling for the Type of Previous Missions

|                          | Diplomatic | Technocratic | Development |
|--------------------------|------------|--------------|-------------|
| Conflict Link            | -1.745**   | -2.015**     | 0.692       |
|                          | (0.718)    | (0.825)      | (1.704)     |
| Peace Duration           | 0.026      | 0.023        | 0.026       |
|                          | (0.021)    | (0.023)      | (0.023)     |
| War Dummy                | 0.763*     | 0.662        | 0.532       |
|                          | (0.409)    | (0.447)      | (0.524)     |
| Diplomatic Count         | 0.561***   | 0.186        | -0.218      |
|                          | (0.194)    | (0.147)      | (0.325)     |
| Technocratic Count       | -0.031     | 0.032        | -0.099**    |
|                          | (0.042)    | (0.038)      | (0.048)     |
| Political-Development Count | 0.040  | -0.114       | 0.824***    |
|                          | (0.223)    | (0.213)      | (0.218)     |
| Peacekeeping Count       | -0.722***  | -0.591***    | -0.586***   |

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Several interesting findings emerge from these two tables. First, our results remain largely robust, supporting the notion that the more difficult cases are likely to attract costlier missions. Second, the model fit greatly improves by not only taking into account the number of previous missions, but also their type (Table A.4). Third, it is particularly then Table A.4 that points to some interesting, and previously unknown, path dependencies and interlinkages between missions: while a specific type of mission in the past generally increases the likelihood of that mission type in the future (e.g., previous diplomatic missions are positively related to diplomatic missions now), the same does not apply with different types of initiatives. In fact, the variable Peacekeeping Count is even negatively signed throughout Table A.4. Part of this is in line with our escalatory logic, but a more detailed analysis of Table 8 of the main text is necessary. Table A.5 provides this: the analysis summarized here is a replication of Table 8 of the main text, but we now include missions counts or the disaggregated mission-count items. As shown in Table A.5, however, our main results remain robust (positive and significant effects of the mission dummies with respect to peacekeeping as the baseline), while there is some evidence for mission interdependencies.

Table A.5. The Escalatory Logic of UN Missions – Controlling for the Number and Type of Previous Missions

|                  | UN Mission First Difference | UN Mission First Difference |
|------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Diplomatic, t-1  | 5.676***                   | 6.805***                   |
| (0.855)          | (0.832)                    |
| Technocratic, t-1| 2.668***                   | 3.217***                   |
| (0.377)          | (0.450)                    |
| Political-Development, t-1 | 0.812***       | 0.988**                   |
| (0.317)          | (0.419)                    |
| Peace Duration   | 0.015                      | 0.014                      |
| (0.020)          | (0.019)                    |
| War Dummy        | 1.316**                    | 0.932                      |
| (0.659)          | (0.758)                    |
| Missions Count   | 0.010                      | -0.769**                   |
| (0.021)          | (0.304)                    |
| Diplomatic Count | -0.061                     |                           |
| (0.058)          |                           |
| Technocratic Count| 0.017                    |                           |
| (0.071)          |                           |
| Political-Development Count | 0.155***       |                           |
| (0.058)          |                           |
| Peacekeeping Count | 0.155***                |                           |
| (0.071)          |                           |
Decisions to authorize political missions could come from a number of sources, which might be made simultaneously with the decision to, e.g., authorize a peacekeeping mission. There is not a single UN actor making decisions, but rather the missions arise from different authorizing bodies. To account for this influence, we modified Tables 5 and 8 of the main text by omitting the controls while adding a variable capturing a mission’s authorizing body. Here, we distinguish between the General Assembly (reference category), the Security Council, the Secretary General, and a General Assembly Subsidiary Body. Tables A.6 and A.7 summarize the findings of these modified models. First, our results pertaining to H1 and H2 remain robust: in particular, Conflict Link remains negatively signed and significant in Table A.6, while all mission dummies in Table A.7 exert a positive influence. However, the authorizing body does not necessarily have a significant influence: only when it comes to the “escalation of missions” is the Security Council much more involved than the General Assembly; the binary items for the authorizing body are all insignificant in Table A.6, though.

### Table A.6. Controlling for Authorizing Body

|                      | Diplomatic | Technocratic | Development |
|----------------------|------------|--------------|-------------|
| Conflict Link        | -2.234**   | -2.669***    | -2.001***   |
|                      | (0.951)    | (0.695)      | (0.763)     |
| Peace Duration       | 0.029*     | 0.019        | 0.015       |
|                      | (0.016)    | (0.017)      | (0.018)     |
| War Dummy            | 0.409      | 0.123        | -0.113      |
|                      | (0.521)    | (0.387)      | (0.327)     |
| Security Council     | -0.368     | -0.613       | -0.480      |
|                      | (0.733)    | (0.490)      | (0.597)     |
| Secretary General    | 1.702      | -0.875       | 0.505       |
|                      | (1.110)    | (1.334)      | (0.989)     |
| General Assembly Subsidiary Body | -0.561     | 1.299        | 0.856       |
|                      | (1.604)    | (1.317)      | (1.298)     |
| Constant             | 1.307      | 3.122***     | 2.070**     |
|                      | (1.014)    | (0.871)      | (0.856)     |

Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; peacekeeping mission is baseline category; p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
## Table A.7. The Escalatory Logic of UN Missions – Controlling for Authorizing Body

| Authorizing Body                                | UN Mission First Difference |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Diplomacy$_{t-1}$                               | 5.894***                    |
|                                                 | (0.796)                     |
| Technocracy$_{t-1}$                             | 2.725***                    |
|                                                 | (0.382)                     |
| Political-Development$_{t-1}$                   | 0.878***                    |
|                                                 | (0.325)                     |
| Peace Duration                                  | 0.014                       |
|                                                 | (0.020)                     |
| War Dummy                                       | 1.183*                      |
|                                                 | (0.677)                     |
| Security Council                                | 1.919***                    |
|                                                 | (0.620)                     |
| Secretary General                               | 1.434                       |
|                                                 | (1.061)                     |
| General Assembly Subsidiary Body                | 1.863*                      |
|                                                 | (1.003)                     |
| Obs.                                            | 321                         |
| Log Pseudolikelihood                            | -250.151                    |
| Wald $\chi^2$                                   | 88.32                       |
| Prob $> \chi^2$                                 | 0.000                       |

Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

### References for the Supplementary Information

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