A Different Text Attack Algorithm in Integer Factoring Based Schemes

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Abstract: Text attack in integer factoring based schemes is generally calculated as an intrinsic characteristic of its symmetric attack. In this article, we illustrate that asymmetric integer factoring based schemes are also vulnerable to a text attack. Also, we show that a single message is required to increase a successful text attack versus the Lucas scheme.

Key words: Integer factoring schemes, RSA scheme, Lucas scheme, text attack.

INTRODUCTION

The widely employed public key encryption schemes now base their security on the difficulty of the integer factoring problems such as the RSA scheme. Its security based on the difficulty of factoring a modulus which is the product of two large primes. On account of its reputation, the RSA scheme is liable to considerable attacks. Various attacks are relied on the multiplicative inverse. To conquer this weakness, many ideas are suggested and defeated. Other methods are considered to apply analogues of RSA. This is being the right technique to break the symmetric attack. Thus, encryption relied on Lucas sequences is suggested. In this article, we introduce a novel text attack algorithm that requires a single message. The proposed attack algorithm illustrate that the integer factoring based schemes are similar to RSA scheme. This means that all attacks are relied on theorem 1 in the next section as a basis of this scheme.

Lucas System: Suppose \( p, q \) are both integer numbers, \( z = p^2 - 4q \) is a non-square, \( g = \frac{p + \sqrt{z}}{2} \) and \( s = g - \frac{p - \sqrt{z}}{2} \). \( \sqrt{z} \) is the root of \( r^2 - px + q = 0 \) in the quadratic residue \( q \). The Lucas sequences \( v_i(p,q) \) and \( u_i(p,q) \) for \( i \in \mathbb{Z} \) are then determined as the integers achieving by the following equation:

\[
\begin{align*}
    s' &= v_i(p,q) + \frac{u_i(p,q)\sqrt{z}}{2} \\
    2s' &= p + g - q
\end{align*}
\]

Thus \( g' = p^*g - q \) and \( g' = p^*g' - q^*g' \). Then the Lucas sequences meet the following recurrence function:

\[
\begin{align*}
    v_0(p,q) &= 2; \\
    v_i(p,q) &= p; v_i(p,q) = p^*v_{i-1}(p,q) - q^*v_{i-2}(p,q); \\
    u_0(p,q) &= 0; \\
    u_i(p,q) &= 1; u_i(p,q) = p^*u_{i-1}(p,q) - q^*u_{i-2}(p,q)
\end{align*}
\]

The recurrence function in certain times is employed as another definition of Lucas sequences. As long as multiplication is swappable it tracks that:
Theorem 1: This theorem contains certain public characteristics of Lucas sequences

\[ 4q^i = v_l(p, q)^2 - z\ast u_l(p, q)^2 \]

(4)

\[ v_l(p, q) = v_l(m, p, q) \]

(5)

\[ u_l(p, q) = u_l(m, p, q) \]

(6)

\[ v_{l+1}(p, q) = \frac{v_l(p, q)w_l(p, q) - z^2 u_l(p, q)u_m(p, q)}{2} \]

(7)

\[ u_{l+1}(p, q) = \frac{u_l(p, q)w_m(p, q) + v_l(p, q)w_m(p, q)}{2} \]

(8)

Proof 1: formula (4) can be proofs as follows:

\[ 4\ast q^i = 4g \ast g^i = 2\ast g^i + 2\ast g^i \]

(4)

\[ = (v_l(p, q) + u_l(p, q)\sqrt{z})(v_l(p, q) - u_l(p, q)\sqrt{z}) \]

(5)

\[ = v_l(p, q)^2 - z\ast u_l(p, q)^2 \]

(6)

Formula (4) now involves that:

\[ g^i = \frac{v_l(p, q)}{2} + \frac{u_l(p, q)\sqrt{z}}{2} - \frac{v_l(p, q)^2 - 4\ast g^i}{2} \]

(7)

And since \( g^i = p^{-i/2} + \sqrt{p^{-i/2} - 4\ast g^i/2} \)

With \( \rho = v_l(p, q) \) and \( q = g^i \). So we have

\[ (g^i)^m = \frac{v_l(p, q)^m}{2} + \frac{u_l(p, q)^m\sqrt{z}}{2} - \frac{v_l(p, q)^2 - 4\ast g^i}{2} \]

(8)

Evaluating the coefficients of this formula with \( g^i = v_l(p, q)/2 + u_l(p, q)\sqrt{z}/2 \).

Proofs: formulas (5) and (6). Finding \( g^{i+m} = g^i \ast g^m \) as total of Lucas sequences and evaluating the coefficients demonstrates formulas (7) and (8).

Theorem 2: Suppose \( p \) is a prime number \( q = 1 \), and \( \gcd(z, p) = 1 \). So the sequence \( v_l(p, 1) \mod p \) is cyclic and the size of the cycle divides \( p - \left[ \frac{z}{p} \right] \).

Proof 2: \( g \) and then also \( g^p \) are algebraic integers in \( q(\sqrt{z}) \). So we have \( a^p = (p/2 + \sqrt{z}/2)^p \equiv p/2 + (\sqrt{z})^p \)

\[ p/2 = p/2 + (\sqrt{z})^{p-1/2} = \sqrt{z}/2 \]

\[ g^p = p/2 + (\sqrt{z})^{p-1/2} = \sqrt{z}/2 \]

So if \( \left[ \frac{z}{p} \right] = 1 \) then \( g^{p-1} \equiv 1 \mod p \) and if \( \left[ \frac{z}{p} \right] = -1 \) then \( g^{p+1} \) it follows that the sequence \( g^i \) and also \( v_l(p, 1) \) is cyclic with a cycle that divides \( p - \left[ \frac{z}{p} \right] \).

The proposed scheme: Assume \( n = p \ast q \) is composite modulus. Suppose \( e \) and \( d \) are the public key and the private key of entity \( A \) respectively, corresponding to \( e \ast d = 1 \mod \theta(n) \). The exponent key \( e \) is employed to encrypt message and also for signature verifications; the private key \( d \) is employed to recover message and to sign messages. Assume an attacker Oscar desires to let entity \( A \) to sign the message \( m \) without authorization. Oscar can attack as follows. First select an arbitrary integer number \( i \) and lets entity \( A \) to sign or to recover \( m^- = m \ast i^e \mod n \). Oscar then obtains \( w^i = m^i \ast i^e \mod n \) and then the signature \( w \) of message \( m \) as \( w = w^- \ast i^{-1} \mod n \). As a result, message attacks versus the composite modulus appear fairly in nature is a result of its multiplicative inverse. Through re-expressing this attack with the extended Euclidean method, it seems that asymmetric schemes are also vulnerable to an attack. Employing the RSA scheme the attack works as follows:

* Oscar selects an integer number \( i \) co-prime to \( e \). Then utilizes the extended Euclidean method to obtain \( j, a \in Z \) where \( i \ast j \ast e \ast a = 1 \).

* Oscar finds \( m^- \equiv m \ast i^e \mod n \).

* Then, Oscar inquires Alice to sign \( m^- \) and obtains \( w^- = m' \mod n \).

* Hence, Oscar can calculate the signature \( w \) as follows: \( w \equiv w^- \ast i^m \mod n \).

Proof: If \( i \ast j \ast e \ast a = 1 \), then \( d = d(i \ast j \ast e \ast a) = d \ast i \ast j \)

\[ + a \mod \theta(n) \]

Lucas type scheme attack: The former attack is appropriate also for asymmetric schemes. In this section, we illustrate its mechanism versus Lucas type scheme. The attacker Oscar can attempt to obtain a signature \( w \) on a message \( m \) as follows.

* Oscar selects an integer number \( i \) co-prime to \( e \). Then utilize the extended Euclidean method to obtain \( j, a \in Z \) where \( i \ast j \ast e \ast a = 1 \).

* Oscar finds \( m^- \equiv v_k(m, 1) \mod n \).

* Then Oscar asks Alice to sign \( m^- \). If Alice signed then Oscar will knows \( w^- \) where \( w^- = v_k(m^- \ast 1) \mod n \).
* Now Oscar finds the signature \( w \) of \( m \) as follows
\[
v_j v_r d(m, l) = v_j(w_j, l) \mod n \tag{10}
\]
\[
u_j v_r d(m, l) = \frac{u_j(m, l) v_j(w_j, l)}{u_e(w_j, l)} \mod n \tag{11}
\]
\[
w = v_j d(m, l) = v_j v_r d(m, l)v_e(m, l)
\]
\[
+ \frac{z \times u_j v_r d(m, l)u_e(m, l)}{2} \mod n
\tag{12}
\]
Such that \( z = m^2 - 4 \). Formula (10) results from formula (5). Since \( v_3(w_j, l) = v_3(v_j v_r d(m, l), l) = v_j v_r d(m, l) \mod n \)

Formula (11) is a result of formula (6) since
\[
u_j v_r d(m, l) = u_j(v_j v_r d(m, l), (l) = u_j(v_j v_r d(m, l), l) = u_j(v_j v_r d(m, l), 1)
\]
\[
+ u_j(v_j v_r d(m, l), 1) u_e(v_j v_r d(m, l), 1) = u_j(v_j v_r d(m, l), 1) u_e(m, l) \mod n
\]
Furthermore, \( i * j + e * a = 1 \) involves
\[
v_r d(m, l) = v_j v_r d + e v_r d(m, l)
\]
Therefore Formula (12) is a reference of formula (7). Notice that this attack is an analogue to the message attack on composite modulus introduced in former section, by employing algebraic numbers replace \( m \) by \( g = m + \sqrt{2} \) and employ formula (1).

The only extra step can be verify is that \( u_j v_r d(m, l) \) is calculable from \( m \) and \( v_j v_r d(m, l) \). This can be illustrated by employing formula (6) and noticing that, \( u_j v_r d(m, l) = u_j v_r d + e v_r d(m, l) = u_j v_r d(m, l) u_e(v_j v_r d(m, l), 1) \mod n \). If \( g = m + \sqrt{2} \). Then a signature \( v_r d(m, l) \) is employed to find \( g^r d = v_r d(m, l) / 2 + u_r d(m, l) \)
\[
\sqrt{2} / 2
\]
\[
\text{Obtain as follows } g^r d = g^{(i r + e a)} d = (g^r d)^{e d} \mod n
\]
Therefore formula (10) and formula (11) corresponds to the calculation of \( w^{-j} \) and formula (12) corresponds to the multiplication of \( w^{-j} \) by \( m^r \) in formula (9).

**General modulus attack:** Many reports[10-11] stated that the employ of a general composite modulus is risky. Certainly, if a message is transmitted to two entities that have relatively prime public keys, then the message can be decrypted. Since the text attack needs single message, the Lucas type scheme is susceptible to the general modulus attack. We will show this in the following assumption. Suppose \((e_1, d_1)\) and \((e_2, d_2)\) is the public and secret keys. Assume \( m = r(M) \) is the message to be encrypted. Suppose \( e_1 \) and \( e_2 \) are co-prime, the attacker Oscar can decrypt \( m \) from the message \( w_1 = r(W_1) = r(e_1 * M) \mod n \) and \( w_2 = r(W_2) = r(e_2 * M) \mod n \) in the following way. Oscar applies the extended Euclidean method to obtain the integers \( j \) and \( a \) where \( j * e_1 + a * e_2 = 1 \). Then, Oscar finds \( r(M) \) = \( r((j * e_1 + a * e_2)M) = r(j * W_1 + a * W_2) \mod n \). But if \( r(j * W_1) \neq r(a * W_2) \mod n \), then
\[
m = (w_1 + g * w_1 + i) * \frac{y(j * W_1) - y(e_2 * W_1) - y(a * W_2)}{y(W_1) - y(W_2)} \left[ \frac{y(e_1 * W_2) - y(W_2)}{y(W_1) - y(W_2)} \right]^{-1} - r(j * W_1) - r(a * W_2) \mod n
\]

Else
\[
m = \frac{[3 * (j * W_1)^2 + g^r W_1] - 2 * r(j * W_1)]^2}{4[(j * W_1)^2 + g * r(j * W_1) + 1]}
\]

Proof: simple because
\[
y(e_2 * W_1) = y(e_1 * W_2) \mod n
\]

**CONCLUSION**

We are introduced a different attack method on integer modulus. The new scheme has allowed raising an invulnerable message attack with a single message versus Lucas type scheme. This also verifies that the employ of asymmetric schemes is not really the best method to prevent the attacks.

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