Geopolitical Challenges to Liberal Internationalism, the New World Order, and the Democratic Peace

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The post-Cold War "New World Order" has been heralded as the fulfillment of the Kantian dream of democratic perpetual peace long trumpeted by liberal internationalists. However, while it is true that democratic values are (for the moment) triumphant, and that universalism is riding piggy-back fashion upon waves of globalization, the victory is far from complete, and the process far from inevitable. Universalism is itself subject to limits, and those excluded from full participation may well rebel against the dominance of the western democratic core. If western states do not wish such revolt to gain momentum, they must take steps to ensure that the benefits of participation and economic well being are not spread too unevenly across the globe.

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THE NEW NEW WORLD ORDER

Since the 'Realist' dominance of the 1950s and 1960s, thought about international order reform and its influence upon the domestic policies of constituent states has experienced a resurgence, 'to such an extent that we might be tempted to equate the intellectual mood of the present time with the utopian impulse of the post-1918 decade.' (Carlsnaes 1986, 8) This process has picked up speed since the fall of communism. There is now perhaps a greater chance of securing the post-First World War utopian aims of liberal internationalism in the contemporary environment of international normative consensus; but only if an international order is constructed that reflects a concern with legitimacy on the one hand but that recognizes and responds to structural dangers on the other.

With the end of the Cold War, a number of writers have advanced the hypothesis that an image of world politics consistent with that portrayed by Woodrow Wilson eighty years ago has now become applicable and appropriate. 'Wilson's ideas and ideals now appear less unrealistic and more compelling. Old ideas are new again.' (Kegley 1995, 10) The advocates of such a worldview would tend to adhere to an optimistic (one might even say idealistic) vision of the inevitable march of democracy leading to a peaceful global community administered by shared values and the rule of law. A global concert of democratic states is the end goal. This worldview is reflected in President George Bush Senior's 'New World Order' and the endism of Francis Fukuyama. For many, it is the fulfillment of Kant's vision of 'perpetual peace'- no competing ideology can now hope to challenge the dominant democratic paradigm, thus all states are moving inexorably towards eventual membership of the democratic club.

Membership of this club, once it becomes all-encompassing, precludes further armed conflict between states-democracies tend not to fight each other, as power rests in the hands of the people, and it is the people who suffer in times of war. It is also felt that greater openness within and between states in the international community decreases one of the chief causes of war conflict through misunderstanding, miscalculation and distrust. Thus, perhaps we can finally move the Kantian concept of perpetual peace from the category of utopian dream to that of practicable objective.

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

Earlier incarnations of this vision of an international society placed considerable emphasis upon the role played by the international community in furthering democratization. However, more recent work has tended to neglect the international context when analyzing democratic transition. Partly this is due to the modern tendency of demarcation of intellectual boundaries between academic disciplines, and partly because of the (until recent) dominance in international relations of theories that
dichotomized the international and the domestic in political analysis. This paper contends that the international community still has a vital role to play in the consolidation of democracy in post-totalitarian states. By international community I refer specifically to the notion of a community of stable democratic states, the actions of which can impinge upon the interplay of domestic socio-political forces in transitional states. Thus I reject the international/domestic political dichotomy, and also the “billiard-ball” model of unitary rational states acting within an anarchic environment.

There are a number of ways in which the international community has in the past, and could in the future continue to favorably influence democratic transition. First there is the notion of contagion from the West. It seems that in a similar manner to that feared by Western Cold War strategists concerning the spread of communism, democratic transition toppled one after another domino in the communist bloc. Democratic contagion spread from Poland to Czechoslovakia to East Germany to Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in little more than a year, then to Albania, Slovenia, Latvia, the Russian Republic and Mongolia the following year. (Whitehead 1996, 5) Contagion from the West continues, especially with regard to the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and those states which wish to join these organizations, but also in Southeast Asia where democratic contagion has influenced regime change in Cambodia and Vietnam, and in East Asia where democratic values have spread from America through Japan to Korea, and have even impacted upon China (although here the process might more adequately be termed contagion from the East).

A number of post-Cold War peripheral states have shown a great inclination to make geopolitical sacrifices in the interest of peace (thereby playing by Western rules) in order to be accepted as part of the European cosmos. Finland has given up its claim to amputated Karelia (the cradle of the Finnish nation), Hungary has renounced its claims upon Transylvania (the cradle of Hungary) as well as parts of Slovakia, Ukraine and Serbia, and dominant Czechia acquiesced to a velvet divorce from an unhappy Slovak spouse. Likewise territorial disputes between Japan and Korea and Russia have not prevented improved relations between these countries.

The peoples of these countries are increasingly ‘westernized’ in their outlook, even to the extent of claiming that ‘(i)f it had not been for ‘the system,’ we would have been like the West.’ (Przeworski 1991, 188) They, and the regimes representing them, have allowed considerable penetration of their societies by western media, cultural and economic organizations. Private organizations (from satellite television operators to car manufacturers), foreign state operations (from the BBC to overseas aid), and multi- and non-governmental organizations (from the World Bank to Save the Children) offer a constant diet of the advantages of belonging to the democratic club, and put pressure on transitional regimes to move in a direction acceptable to this club.

Should this method of democratic encouragement not be sufficient, there lurks a more forceful argument for playing by western rules. The Western victory in the Cold War was as much military as economic or cultural. The United States and
its allies now possess an overwhelming preponderance of military force with which to ensure that their world-view prevails. The West has in the past shown that it is not above imposing democracy upon countries that show tardiness in transition. According to Whitehead: ‘The essential point is that approaching two-thirds of the democracies existing in 1990 owed their origins, at least in part, to deliberate acts of imposition or intervention from without (acts, moreover, that were undertaken within living memory).’ (1996, 9)

For some commentators, even the Gorbachev ‘revolution’ was imposed by the West. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which set up the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) regime, also set up an international framework that worked to systematically undermine the Soviet totalitarian vision. Thus it was not just the general ‘vitality and attractiveness’ of the Western polity, but rather a specific coherent and disputed set of Western requirements, incentives, and reassurances embodied in an international treaty that shaped Moscow’s foreign policy options in response to the Soviet Union’s systemic crisis. (Whitehead 1996, 377-8) In addition, Richard Davy contests, the actions and strength of the West at this time served to stimulate the reemergence and evolution of civil society in the countries of East-Central Europe. (Quoted in Whitehead 1996, 379)

The demise of the United Nations Security Council stalemate between, in ideological terms, diametrically opposed veto holders has increased the likelihood of intervention in support of democratic transition. The West appears to be in a position to dominate militarily, economically, politically, and even morally. Even should the West not choose to implement a program of direct intervention in support of democracy, it remains in a position to impose its wishes through effective control of multinational organizations transitional countries feel a strong imperative to join. Membership of such exclusive clubs can be conditional upon candidates adopting regimes with which the West feels comfortable the continued exclusion of Turkey from the European Union and (until very recently) of China from the World Trade Organization provide good examples of such a policy. President Clinton noted that ‘multilateral action holds promise as never before’ and that there now exists an opportunity to ‘reinvent the institutions of collective security.’ (Kegley 1995, 12)

European political leaders were also quick to recognize that the collapse of the Eastern bloc represented both a threat and opportunity. (Dinan 1994, 465-6) Many believed that with the death of the Warsaw Pact, and the challenge posed by systemic change to NATO’s raison d’être, the European Community’s hour had come with the end of the Cold War. (Hill 1996, 291) In true geopolitical style, there were calls for the European Union to fulfill its destiny and come to represent the whole of the continent after which it was named and not just the western half. Furthermore, with the demise of the great “heartland” power, the USSR, and the partial withdrawal of the great “insular” power, the United States, renewed efforts were made to build the Union’s political strength into something approaching that of its economy.

Certainly Article J.1 of the Treaty on European Union (commonly known as the
Maastricht Treaty), which introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy seemed to ‘talk the talk.’ It promised ‘to safeguard the common values, the fundamental interests, and the independence of the Union,’ to ‘strengthen the security of the Union and its member states in all ways,’ to ‘preserve peace and strengthen international security’ and to ‘promote international cooperation and develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ (Regelsberger et al. eds. 1997, 1 (My emphasis))

This phenomenon overlaps somewhat with another aspect of international influence upon regime transition, that of consensual influence. If the West were to rely solely upon forced democratization, there may be no escape from Rousseau’s famous paradox concerning the notion of being ‘forced to be free.’ However, many transitional countries are on the whole, ‘freely’ choosing democracy because of the attraction of the West. Such ‘democracy by convergence’ dictates that the most fundamental question concerns ‘how an almost universal wish to imitate a way of life associated with the liberal capitalist democracies of the core regions (the wish for modernity) may undermine the social and institutional foundations of any regime perceived as incompatible with these aspirations.’ (Whitehead 1996, 21) Primarily the attraction is economic. Yet for the countries of East-Central Europe this is not the whole story. There is also a perception that they share a common European cultural heritage with the West, and a common geopolitical identity with the Western European states of the European Union.

The lack of this perceived shared heritage is perhaps one of the greatest challenges to democratic transition and consolidation in Asia. Yet even here the concept of universalizing principles of right and wrong is taking hold. In September 1997 Robin Cook, the then British Foreign Secretary was lambasted by Malaysia’s prime minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad for his so-called ethical foreign policy crusade when he singled out Myanmar’s military junta for criticism. According to the Telegraph’s Matt Frei, Dr. Mahathir spoke for the region at that time when he told Asia Week: “The West thinks it is so very right and correct that it can sit in judgment of others and even prosecute people ... but the West has got many sins.” (1997) Mahathir also criticized the major article of faith of those who champion universal values, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pointing out that many Asian states were not able to participate in its drafting as they were under the boot of colonial oppression at the time. The buzz words then were “Asian Values” and “sekampung,” the Malaysian word for togetherness, which together supposedly reflected an alternative heritage emphasizing collective rights and duties to society rather than “Western” individual rights. However, recent developments (May 2002) have apparently seen even the Malaysian government losing patience with the Myanmar Junta and applying pressure for the release of long-time pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Indeed, according to Allex Spilius, a release would be credited squarely to the efforts of Razali Ismail, a Malaysian diplomat and United Nations special envoy to Burma.

Various aspects of ‘globalization’ give further support to the notion of a peaceful
world community of shared interests and norms governed by the rule of law. Chiefs among these are the components of economic integration and interdependence that make it inherently unprofitable and thus irrational to fight major wars (multinational corporations, the twenty-four hour global stock market, transnational capital flows, etc.) Finally, environmental and social challenges facing humanity as a whole (global warming, ecological diversity, the ozone layer, the energy resources crisis, Malthusian population concerns, aids and drugs) may increase the pressure for cooperation rather than competition among the various political subdivisions of humanity in the interest of species survival.

CHALLENGES

We should not, however, place too great an emphasis upon the progress that global democratization has made in recent years. While many countries have been embroiled in regime transition, this has not necessarily led to democratic consolidation. Although there has been a wave of democratization, Samuel Huntington is correct to warn us that such waves are usually followed by corresponding (if more limited) waves of counter-democratic authoritarianism, and that democratization tends to follow a two-step-forward, one-step-back pattern. (1991, 25) In particular, states undergoing a regime transition are at their most volatile, a danger to their own people and to their neighbors. Thus we must always be aware in our brave new world order that not all transitions from authoritarian rule result in democracy.

Likewise, we should not rely absolutely and unquestioningly upon the continued integration of the global economy. First, many analysts are of the opinion that the process is about to move into reverse, with increased tariff barriers placed in the way of free trade, increased economic regionalism and attempts at regional autarchy perhaps even going as far as the development of exclusive regional trading blocs. Second, the effects of economic globalization are not evenly distributed by no means all groups or all societies benefit equally, or even at all from the process. Even if this were not the case, there is no guarantee that economic interdependence would lead to the elimination of conflict. As far back as the beginning of the twentieth century, writers such as Norman Angell (1911) pointed out that warfare is no longer a rational instrument of policy for this very reason, yet that century saw the bloodiest and most destructive wars in the history of mankind.

Indeed, individuals often act according to a different rationality than that of economic well being. Furthermore, it is by no means certain that the global threats to mankind's existence will engender cooperation indeed, many analysts would argue that Malthusian competition for limited resources is more likely to lead to a cut-throat world embodying Darwinian notions of 'survival of the fittest.' This world-view has led to the emergence of an alternative multipolar vision of the future that of a world divided into competing politico-economic blocs. This is not a new concept. The German geopolitician, general
and professor, Karl Haushofer, provided perhaps the most (in-) famous exposition of this view as a justification for German expansion during the Nazi period. Haushofer's pan-regions foresaw the world being divided into a number of autarkic political and economic zones, within each of which a single great power would hold sway and exploit the resources of vassal states and regions, excluding the influence and participation of its great power rivals. The model for these regions would be the role played by the United States in the Americas under the Monroe Doctrine indeed, contemporary versions of this vision have referred to these regions as 'Monroes.'

The theoretical underpinning for this approach is the belief that hard 'geoeconomics' functioning as instruments of national policy are not played out in terms of 'win-win' cooperation, but rather as aspects of a zero-sum game. States are more interested in relative economic positioning and getting a larger share of the cake, than they are in increasing the size of the cake so that all may benefit albeit to a lesser extent. These perceived geopolitical challenges reinforce those dangers emphasized by authors who continue to write in accordance with the tenets of the realist paradigm in international relations. For them, nothing has really changed since the end of the Cold War, and the new New World Order is every bit as utopian as the old inter-war one. East-West tensions remain, and although things may be somewhat more peaceful between superpowers at the moment, the potential remains for a resumption of conflict and contradictory ideologies indeed, if anything the post-Cold War environment could be even further from the universalist ideal as there are now, with the inclusion of China, two potential challengers to democratic values. Realists not only reject the notion of achieving a universal consensus based on peaceful norms and beliefs, but also the integration project the continuing primacy of the state within an anarchic international environment is seen as a firm reality for the foreseeable future, with the EU representing nothing more than a metastate fulfilling all of the traditional statecentric functions concerning power and national interest. (Baylis 2001, 271)

For Neorealists like Kenneth Waltz, 'states are made functionally similar by the constraints of structure, with the principle differences among them defined according to capabilities.' (1995, 80) States are seen as autonomous political units, with autonomy being the counterpoint of anarchy at the structural level, and anarchy not varying with content. Thus 'the logic of anarchy obtains whether the system is composed of tribes, nations, oligopolistic firms, or street gangs.' (Waltz 1995, 81) This logic is one of competition and relative gains rather than cooperation and absolute gains for all. Even democratic states must be wary of other democratic states, for as pointed out by John Mearsheimer in a number of works since the end of the Cold War, not only has the end of that confrontation led to an increase in hot wars around the world, but also that "the possibility always exists that a democracy will revert

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1 See Howe, Brendan. 1993. "Geopolitics, Geopolitiks, and Nazi Foreign Policy." M.A. Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury.
2 See Taylor, Peter J. ed. 1993. Political Geography of the Twentieth Century: A Global Analysis. New York: Halstead Press.
to an authoritarian state. Liberal democracies must therefore worry about relative power among themselves. Lamentably, it is not possible for even liberal democracies to transcend anarchy.” (see Ray 1995, 346)

THE IMPLICATIONS

This paper does not set out to refute Kantian claims of the pacifying influence of democracy, interdependence or membership of international organizations upon states. Such effects have been admirably and empirically demonstrated by (among a distinguished list of many others) Russett and O’Neal (2001, Weart (1998) and Benoit (1996). Russet and O’Neal describe these premises as the three sides of the Kantian triangle (2001, 35) and have demonstrated the independent pacific effect of each (albeit with significantly less confidence with regard to the systemic effects of international governmental organizations). Rather, what is attempted here is an assault on the complacency inherent in the liberal belief in inevitable progress and the failure of such statistical analysis as carried out by authors such as those mentioned above to take into account sub-and trans-state socio-political influences and movements. Thus, in general, this paper sets out to sound a note of caution against an overly-optimistic belief in the functioning of “virtuous circles.” (Russett and O’Neil 2001, 39-41)

Russett and O’Neal find that democracies are inherently more pacific, and in particular for pacific dyads, regardless of the age of the democracy (120). That is as may be. However, the age of the democracy is not really the issue, and this could be seen as something of a straw man. What is more important is the stability of a new democracy. Here sub- and trans-state influences have garnered an increasing role. Likewise it is perfectly possible to accept that a network of developed and increasingly interdependent states is likely to encourage the development of pacific dyads between, but raise the challenge that interdependence per se can also be a source of conflict at a sub-or trans-state level. Finally, while accepting that shared membership of international organizations can have a pacific effect on the behavior of states, particularly if pacific foreign and domestic policies are made a pre-requisite for membership, what is at issue is whether membership is open to all, and if so whether it is truly in the form of a free association.

The importance of these developments for transitional states cannot be overemphasized. We must remember that the Cold War was not won by “democracy” but rather by a closely allied geopolitical bloc of democratic states. Of crucial relevance is where the geopolitical line is drawn, should regionalism become a fact, and certain states face exclusion from the European and North American core. As pointed out by Ole Tunander, this question represents a synthesis of a “bipolar friend-foe structure” and a “hierarchical cosmos-chaos structure.” (1997, 17) It is by no means certain that the Western core will accept all its peripheral suitors. Indeed, it is already apparent

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that Russia and the Ukraine have, to a considerable extent, been rebuffed.

Reason has its limits, and the transferring of reason to the alien world presupposes a possible common code, a possible enlightened, transparent world beyond the shadows of Otherness. According to universalism, these dark shadows are not first and foremost to be contained, they must be rolled back and finally annihilated by the light of reason if not by reason, then by force. The existence of a Wall (or geopolitical division between cosmos and chaos) speaks of the limits of universalism and about the Other as a fundamental concept. (17)

Thus we must consider the exclusion of certain states, which wish to become part of the core to be not only a possibility, but rather a probability. What then is likely to happen to the process of democratic transition within these countries? First and foremost, a point will come where such countries and societies will cease to model themselves upon those shining examples and role-models by which they have been rebuffed. Excluded from one cosmos, it is likely that they will attempt to create an alternative one. This may take the form of an alternative form of democracy, but there is no guarantee that this will be the case. It may be based on the Chinese model of ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics.’ Alternatively, it may be based upon a concept similar to that of ‘Asian values.’ Perhaps Islam will throw up an alternative cosmos or core of values and power. Whatever the case, if the ideological blueprint of Western/universalist democracy is rejected, it is likely that what emerges in its place will be less democratic, and maybe even hostile to the West and its values. If one state sets foot upon such a path, it is important to recognize that there is every chance of the contagion process acting in reverse. This could involve not only the transmission of material favorable to the newly evolving less than democratic cosmos, but also transmission of the democratic good life from which individual states, societies or regimes might perceive themselves to be irredeemably excluded.

It is also likely that the controlling influence of the West in favor of democratic transition will be diminished. In particular, here the European Union is already showing a rather mixed record. Brussels responded with alacrity to the end of the Cold War, establishing PHARE programs of technical assistance to aid seven East European countries in their transformation. ‘However, the Community failed to maintain this momentum, in part because of its internal conflicts over Maastricht and economic and monetary union, in part because the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the USSR uncovered deep differences of priorities within Western Europe about how to handle the collapse of the Soviet bloc.’ (Whitehead 1996, 381-2)

Although recently, and particularly since the Amsterdam Treaty and the implementation protocols included in the Nice Treaty, the European enlargement project appears to have resumed, with a number of accession negotiations underway with Baltic, Eastern European, Balkan and Mediterranean countries, the pace is still
painstakingly slow, and the democratization process could even stall in some of the countries queuing up for membership before consolidation benefits are felt. Furthermore, common foreign policy and security provisions have proven to be the most resistant to agreement in the within the EU, and each potential enlargement adversely affects the interests of existing member states. Finally, for every state that sees its chances of joining increasing, there is another that sees the door being ever more firmly closed in its face. Even if this were not the case, evidence from psychological experiments indicate that the success of some members of a group actually decreases the contentment of other members of a group that either feel jealously, resentment at the success of others, or disappointment due to an expectancy gap generated by inflated aspirations growing at a faster rate than satisfaction of expectations.

The willingness of the West to pay for the New World Order has proven remarkably short lived. First, there is considerable pressure upon the major protagonists to cash in on the 'peace dividend.' Second, with the (at least temporary) abeyance of the Soviet threat, other security considerations command the attention of the West one of the reasons why the crisis in Former Yugoslavia proved such a failure of collective security policy was that attention was distracted by unfolding events in the Gulf. Finally, the removal of a common enemy has lead the major Western powers to look toward their own particular interests and compete with each other for primacy, further undermining support for collective action or individual responsibility. Indeed, recent statements by the German government cast doubt on where the money will be found for those currently under consideration. Furthermore, In their relations with transitional states Western powers often look to cultivate protégé regimes rather than promote democratic transition and consolidation per se. Rwanda provided a horrific demonstration of partisan support, with the French supporting a Francophile regime that gave every appearance of genocidal tendencies against an English speaking rebel movement, while the United States supported the very short lived 2002 Venezuelan military coup against the democratically elected but pro-Cuban President Chavez.

The consensual process of democratic transition is also under threat. The Western way of life only exerts a positive attraction as long as it is perceived to be desirable and preferable to other alternatives. Should the capitalist democratic world system enter a pronounced downturn this may no longer be the case, particularly if increased inter-regional competition should lead to a new wave of protectionism and shrinking global trade. Furthermore, the promised benefits of democratic transition have been slower to materialize within transitional states than many may have hoped. Something of an expectancy gap has developed, and may lead to a degree of discontent sufficient to undermine or even reverse the liberalization that has already taken place.

THE INTERNAL MECHANICS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

The process of democratic transition itself is a source of considerable uncertainty
and hardship. Some groups are bound to lose out, at least in the short term. Support for transition is only generated by the general optimism that ultimately all will benefit; the hope that even if this is not the case, then at least the majority will do so; and the common belief held by most, that they will form part of this majority. As pointed out by Pridham, such uncertainty may be exciting and creative, ‘but if it becomes too generally threatening, or if it lasts too long without fruitful outcome, then the chances of an authoritarian relapse becomes very great.’ (1991, 5)

The optimism and expectancy of a large number of individuals and groups in transitional states may have been misplaced. More than any other form of government, democracy depends for its legitimacy upon the consent of a majority of those governed. In order to generate and maintain such consent, democracy must provide what the majority of people want. It is not necessary here to enter into the debate about which sort of regime is more likely to promote development and economic success. All that is necessary is to recognize that democracy is dependent to a certain extent for its survival upon economic factors (whether more or less dependent than authoritarian regimes is again irrelevant at this juncture), and that to some degree it has failed to fulfill the expectations of the citizens of a number of transitional states within this arena. This may have been in part due to the unrealistic initial expectations of people in the first place. However, that does not make the threat to democratic consolidation any less real.

Evidence suggests that a citizen’s political perceptions vary in accordance with economic circumstances, (Maravall 1997, 201) and many countries are currently in what Przeworski terms the ‘valley of transition,’ faced with four potential outcomes: (1) Reforms may advance under democratic conditions. (2) Reforms may advance through dictatorship. (3) Democracy may survive by abandoning reforms. (4) Both reforms and democracy may be undermined. (1991, 138) The inevitable costs of transition include corruption, inflation, underemployment of capital and labor, allocative inefficiencies and distributional effects. No matter the universal aspirations, no reform makes all better off, and certainly some will always benefit more than others. Any group that perceives itself worse off in relative, let alone absolute terms is therefore likely to resist the implementation of the reform. Transitional states are faced with two courses of action, a gradualist reform path, or a bitter pill strategy designed to right as many social reforms in as short a time as possible. The majority of states have accepted the OECD cant:

While a gradualist approach may cause lesser social tensions, a long period of moderate reforms entails the danger that both reformers and the population will ‘become tired of reforms,’ as they do not seem to bring visible changes. Also during long periods of reforms various anti-reform and other lobbies may mobilize their forces and may gradually strangle the reform process.3
Thus the bitter pill has tended to be swallowed. Unfortunately, even when people do support the radical treatment at the outset, this support erodes, often drastically, as social costs are experienced. (Przeworski 1991, 167) The supposedly short, sharp, shock of the bitter pill strategy can appear to go on for an inordinately long period of time.

ALTERNATIVES

Such developments need not necessarily pose a threat to democratization as long as democracy is seen as 'the only game in town.' No matter how great its failings, if there is no plausible alternative, then democratic transition is not likely to be seriously undermined. However, circumstances in a number of transitional states would appear ideal for throwing up an alternative to democracy. The Islamic fundamentalist threat is of course to the fore of most observer's minds. However, nationalist, anti-Western sentiments are also prevalent in China, Russia, Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia. Comparisons with the German inter-war transitional experience can usefully be drawn at this point. From the very outset of the post-war economic order there were those, including advisors at the Versailles negotiations such as Keynes and Mackinder, who worried whether the Germans had been left with sufficient economic power to build a democratic state. The Silesian coalfields were annexed by Poland, and the Saar region was given over to France. Even after the years of hyper-inflation (which destroyed savings and led to the alienation of the middle class) had finally been put behind them, Weimar politicians were still due more economic disasters than any government could hope to cope with. 'Not only the German Government, but the states, the big cities, even the churches, as well as industry and business, borrowed at high rates and short notice, spending extravagantly without much thought of how the loans were to be repaid except by borrowing more.' (Bullock 1962, 143)

When, in light of their own financial problems, American loans were called in, Germany was left more susceptible than any other country to the Great Depression which began in the United States in 1929, intensified and spread in 1930 and 1931, and lasted throughout 1932. Keynes later claimed that by destroying the German economy, the allies sowed the seeds of Nazism. Germany could not compete, was forced to become an autarkic state, and had to grab markets physically rather than sell through free trade (especially after the collapse of the British led free trade system) to avoid the foreign economic 'squeeze.' Many transitional states are similarly struggling to compete, and there is a growing awareness of the uneven distribution of the fruits of globalization. To a certain extent the anti-WTO riots of recent months and the horrendous terrorist actions of September 11th 2001 spring from this same source.

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3. 1990 OECD statement. 'Transition from the Command to a Market Economy.' Quoted in Przeworski 1991, 165.
CONCLUSION

Although Samuel Huntington’s work on the Clash of Civilizations and his concept of the ‘call of the blood’ has come under a rigorous bombardment from Western academics, it is disturbingly apparent that his ideas resonate fairly strongly with academics and practitioners of foreign policy within a number of transitional states. As mentioned by Russett and O’Neal, the danger lies in its potential not just to interpret events, but also to shape them thereby ‘becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, intensifying conflicts or bringing about some that otherwise would not have occurred.’ (2001, 241) In order to facilitate democratic transition and consolidation, it is vital that the West not isolate these countries geopolitically and economically, but rather provide material and moral support to those actors most concerned with democratic values, and to the regimes as a whole. If this is not done, there is just as likely to be an anti-democratic counter-wave as a New World Order of perpetual peace based on shared values. This may continue to take the form of disaffected groups within transitional states operating through one or another means of direct action, or just as conceivably, the form of an increase in the numbers of rogue states who reject the rules of liberal internationalism and threaten the return of a true international anarchy.

The current members of “international society” have considerable rational incentive to maintain their collective action, but the growth of this community to encompass other states is far from rationally pre-ordained. Present members actually have a number of rational incentives to resist expansion. More members will possibly lead to more costs in terms of integration and involvement in conflictual areas. Wider membership also almost inevitably means greater policy divergence, and therefore increasing strains upon the coalition and diminishing individual policy returns. Finally, more partners means that the profits of incumbency (i.e. world leadership) must be spread more thinly.

Thus it would be rational to predict that the “Euro-Atlantic cosmos” will be maintained as a minimal winning coalition, containing sufficient members to take control of the fixed prize of office and no more. It is also not rational for surplus states to seek to join an already winning coalition, as they will have no leverage and therefore cannot expect to reap any rewards, only contribute to costs. (See Laver 1997, 138) However, it is in the rational self-interest of the current winning coalition to dissuade attacks such as those that occurred on September 11, 2001. It may be that the most cost-effective way of doing so is to remove the discontent which fuels such extreme acts, and actively manage the functioning of the “virtuous circle” of democracy, interdependence and international organisations through a degree of social engineering and enlightened benevolence, rather than building up resentment through suppression simply because we currently have the wherewithal to do so.
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