Axioms for Rational Reinforcement Learning

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Abstract

We provide a formal, simple and intuitive theory of rational decision making including sequential decisions that affect the environment. The theory has a geometric flavor, which makes the arguments easy to visualize and understand. Our theory is for complete decision makers, which means that they have a complete set of preferences. Our main result shows that a complete rational decision maker implicitly has a probabilistic model of the environment. We have a countable version of this result that brings light on the issue of countable vs finite additivity by showing how it depends on the geometry of the space which we have preferences over. This is achieved through fruitfully connecting rationality with the Hahn-Banach Theorem. The theory presented here can be viewed as a formalization and extension of the betting odds approach to probability of Ramsey and De Finetti [Ram31, deF37].

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Keywords

Rationality; Probability; Utility; Banach Space; Linear Functional.
1 Introduction

We study complete decision makers that can take a sequence of actions to rationally pursue any given task. We suppose that the task is described in a reinforcement learning framework where the agent takes actions and receives observations and rewards. The aim is to maximize total reward in some given sense.

Rationality is meant in the sense of internal consistency [Sug91], which is how it has been used in [NM44] and [Sav54]. In [NM44], it is proven that preferences together with rationality axioms and probabilities for possible events imply the existence of utility values for those events that explain the preferences as arising through maximizing expected utility. Their rationality axioms are

1. Completeness: Given any two choices we either prefer one of them to the other or we consider them to be equally preferable;

2. Transitivity: A preferable to B and B to C imply A preferable to C;

3. Independence: If A is preferable to B and \( t \in [0, 1] \) then \( tA + (1 - t)C \) is preferable (or equal) to \( tB + (1 - t)C \);

4. Continuity: If A is preferable to B and B to C then there exists \( t \in [0, 1] \) such that B is equally preferable to \( tA + (1 - t)C \).

In [Sav54] the probabilities are not given but it is instead proven that preferences together with rationality axioms imply the existence of probabilities and utilities. We are here interested in the case where one is given utility (rewards) and preferences over actions and then deriving the existence of a probabilistic world model. We put an emphasis on extensions to sequential decision making with respect to a countable class of environments. We set up simple axioms for a rational decision maker, which implies that the decisions can be explained (or defined) from probabilistic beliefs.

The theory of [Sav54] is called subjective expected utility theory (SEUT) and was intended to provide statistics with a strictly behavioral foundation. The behavioral approach stands in stark contrast to approaches that directly postulate axioms that “degrees of belief” should satisfy [Cox46, Hal99, Jay03]. Cox’s approach [Cox46] has also been found [Par94] to need additional technical assumptions in addition to the common sense axioms originally listed by Cox. The original proof by [Cox46] has been exposed as not mathematically rigorous and his theorem as wrong [Hal99]. An alternative approach by [Ram31, deF37] is interpreting probabilities as fair betting odds.

The theory of [Sav54] has greatly influenced economics [Sug91] where it has been used as a description of rational agents. Seemingly strange behavior was explained as having beliefs (probabilities) and tastes (utilities) that were different from those of the person to whom it looked irrational. This has turned out to be insufficient as a description of human behavior [All53, Ell61] and it is better suited as a normative theory or design principle in artificial intelligence. In this article, we are interested
in studying the necessity for rational agents (biological or not) to have a probabilistic model of their environment. To achieve this, and to have as simple common sense axioms of rationality as possible, we postulate that given any set of values (a contract) associated with the possible events, the decision maker needs to have an opinion on whether he prefers these values to a guaranteed zero outcome or not (or equal). From this setting and our other rationality axioms we deduce the existence of probabilities that explain all preferences as maximizing expected value. There is an intuitive similarity to the idea of explaining/deriving probabilities as a bookmaker’s betting odds as done in [deF37] and [Ram31]. One can argue that the theory presented here (in Section 2) is a formalization and extension of the betting odds approach. Geometrically, the result says that there is a hyper-plane in the space of contracts that separates accept from reject. We generalize this statement, by using the Hahn-Banach Theorem, to the countable case where the set of hyper-planes (the dual space) depends on the space of contract. The answers for different cases can then be found in the Banach space theory literature. This provides a new approach to understanding issues like finite vs. countable additivity. We take advantage of this to formulate rational agents that can deal successfully with countable (possibly universal as in all computable environments) classes of environments.

Our presentation begins in Section 2 by first looking at a fundamental case where one has to accept or reject certain contracts defining positive and negative rewards that depend on the outcome of an event with finitely many possibilities. To draw the conclusion that there are implicit unique probabilistic beliefs, it is important that the decision maker has an opinion (acceptable, rejectable or both) on every possible contract. This is what we mean when we say complete decision maker.

In a more general setting, we consider sequential decision making where given any contract on the sequence of observations and actions, the decision maker must be able to choose a policy (i.e. an action tree). Note that the actions may affect the environment. A contract on such a sequence can e.g. be viewed as describing a reward structure for a task. An example of a task is a cleaning robot that gets positive rewards for collecting dust and negative for falling down the stairs. A prerequisite for being able to continue to collect dust can be to recharge the battery before running out. A specialized decision maker that deals only with one contract/task does not always need to have implicit probabilities, it can suffice with qualitative beliefs to take reasonable decisions. A qualitative belief can be that one pizza delivery company (e.g. Pizza Hut vs Dominos) is more likely to arrive on time than the other. If one believes the pizzas are equally good and the price is the same, we will choose the company we believe is more often delivering on time. Considering all contracts (reward structures) on the actions and events, leads to a situation where having a way of making rational (coherent) decisions, implies that the decision maker has implicit probabilistic beliefs. We say that the probabilities are implicit because the decision maker, which might e.g. be a human, a dog, a computer or just a set of rules, might have a non-probabilistic description of how the decisions are made.

In Section 3 we investigate extensions to the case with countably many possible
outcomes and the interesting issue of countable versus finite additivity. Savage’s axioms are known to only lead to finite additivity while [Arr70] showed that adding a monotone continuity assumption guarantees countable additivity. We find that in our setting, it depends on the space of contracts in an interesting way. In Section 4, we discuss a setting where we have a class of environments.

2 Rational Decisions for Accepting or Rejecting Contracts

We consider a setting where we observe a symbol (letter) from a finite alphabet and we are offered a form of bet we call a contract that we can accept or not.

Definition 1 (Passive Environment, Event) A passive environment is a sequence of symbols (letters) $j_t$, called events, being presented one at a time. At time $t$ the symbols $j_1, ..., j_t$ are available. We can equivalently say that a passive environment is a function $\nu$ from finite strings to $\{0, 1\}$ where $\nu(j_1, ..., j_t) = 1$ if and only if the environment begins with $j_1, ..., j_t$.

Definition 2 (Contract) Suppose that we have a passive environment with symbols from an alphabet with $m$ elements. A contract for an event is an element $x = (x_1, ..., x_m)$ in $\mathbb{R}^m$ and $x_j$ is the reward received if the event is the $j$:th symbol, under the assumption that the contract is accepted (see next definition).

Definition 3 (Decision Maker, Decision) A decision maker (for some unknown environment) is a set $Z \subset \mathbb{R}^m$ which defines exactly the contracts that are acceptable. In other words, a decision maker is a function from $\mathbb{R}^m$ to $\{\text{accepted, rejected, either}\}$. The function value is called the decision.

If $x \in Z$ and $\lambda \geq 0$ then we want $\lambda x \in Z$ since it is simply a multiple of the same contract. We also want the sum of two acceptable contracts to be acceptable. If we cannot lose money we are prepared to accept the contract. If we are guaranteed to win money we are not prepared to reject it. We summarize these properties in the definition below of a rational decision maker.

Definition 4 (Rationality I) We say that the decision maker ($Z \subset \mathbb{R}^m$) is rational if

1. Every contract $x \in \mathbb{R}^m$ is either acceptable or rejectable or both;
2. $x$ is acceptable if and only if $-x$ is rejectable;
3. $x, y \in Z$, $\lambda, \gamma \geq 0$ then $\lambda x + \gamma y \in Z$;
4. If $x_k \geq 0 \ \forall k$ then $x = (x_1, ..., x_m) \in Z$ while if $x_k < 0 \ \forall k$ then $x \notin Z$. 

If we want to compare these axioms to rationality axioms for a preference relation on contracts we will say that \( x \) is better or equal (as in equally good) than \( y \) if \( x - y \) is acceptable while it is worse or equal if \( x - y \) is rejectable. The first axiom is completeness. The second says that if \( x \) is better or equal than \( y \) then \( y \) is worse or equal to \( x \). The third implies transitivity since \( (x - y) + (y - z) = (x - z) \). The fourth says that if \( x \) has a better (or equal) reward than \( y \) for any event, then \( x \) is better (or equal) than \( y \).

2.1 Probabilities and Expectations

Theorem 5 (Existence of Probabilities) Given a rational decision maker, there are numbers \( p_i \geq 0 \) that satisfy

\[
\{ x \mid \sum x_ip_i > 0 \} \subset Z \subseteq \{ x \mid \sum x_ip_i \geq 0 \}.
\] (1)

Assuming \( \sum p_i = 1 \) makes the numbers unique and we will use the notation \( Pr(i) = p_i \).

Proof. See the proof of the more general Theorem 23. It tells us that the closure \( \bar{Z} \) of \( Z \) is a closed half space and can be written as \( \{ x \mid \sum x_ip_i \geq 0 \} \) for some vector \( p = (p_i) \) (since every linear functional on \( \mathbb{R}^m \) is of the form \( f(x) = \sum x_ip_i \)) and not every \( p_i \) is 0. The fourth property tells us that \( p_i \geq 0 \) \( \forall i \).

Definition 6 (Expectation) We will refer to the function \( g(x) = \sum p_ix_i \) from (1) as the decision makers expectation. In this terminology, a rational decision maker has an expectation function and accepts a contract \( x \) if \( g(x) > 0 \) and reject it if \( g(x) < 0 \).

Remark 7 Suppose that we have a contract \( x = (x_i) \) where \( x_i = 1 \) for all \( i \). If we want \( g(x) = 1 \), we need \( \sum p_i = 1 \).

We will write \( E(x) \) instead of \( g(x) \) (assuming \( \sum p_i = 1 \)) from now on and call it the expected value or expectation of \( x \).

2.2 Multiple Events

Suppose that the contract is such that we can view the symbol to be drawn as consisting of two (or several) symbols from smaller alphabets. That is we can write a drawn symbol as \((i, j)\) where all the possibilities can be found through \(1 \leq i \leq m, 1 \leq j \leq n\). In this way of writing, a contract is defined by real numbers \( x_{i,j} \). Theorem 5 tells us that for a rational decision maker there exists unique \( r_{i,j} \geq 0 \) such that \( \sum r_{i,j} = 1 \) and an expectation function \( g(x) = \sum r_{i,j}x_{i,j} \) such that contracts are accepted if \( g(x) > 0 \) and rejected if \( g(x) < 0 \).
2.3 Marginals

Suppose that we can take rational decisions on bets for a pair of horse races, while the person that offers us bets only cares about the first race. Then we are still equipped to respond since the bets that only depend on the first race is a subset of all bets on the pair of races.

**Definition 8 (Marginals)** Suppose that we have a rational decision maker (Z) for contracts on the events \((i, j)\). Then we say that the marginal decision maker for the first symbol \((Z_1)\) is the restriction of the decision maker \(Z\) to the contracts \(x_{i,j}\) that only depend on \(i\), i.e. \(x_{i,j} = x_i\). In other words given a contract \(y = (y_i)\) on the first event, we extend that contract to a contract on \((i, j)\) by letting \(y_{i,j} = y_i\) and then the original decision maker can decide.

Suppose that \(x_{i,j} = x_i\). Then the expectation \(\sum r_{i,j}x_{i,j}\) can be rewritten as \(\sum p_ix_i\) where \(p_i = \sum_j r_{i,j}\). We write that

\[
Pr(i) = \sum_j Pr(i, j).
\]

These are the marginal probabilities for the first variable that describe the marginal decision maker for that variable. Naturally we can also define a marginal for the second variable (considering contracts \(x_{i,j} = x_j\)) by letting \(q_j = \sum_i r_{i,j}\) and \(Pr(j) = \sum_i Pr(i, j)\). The marginals define sets \(Z_1 \subset \mathbb{R}^m\) and \(Z_2 \subset \mathbb{R}^n\) of acceptable contracts on the first and second variables separately.

2.4 Conditioning

Again suppose that we are taking decisions on bets for a pair of horse races, but this time suppose that the first race is already over and we know the result. We are still equipped to respond to bets on the second race by extending the bet to a bet on both where there is no reward for (pairs of) events that are inconsistent with what we know.

**Definition 9 (Conditioning)** Suppose that we have a rational decision maker (Z) for contracts on the events \((i, j)\). We define the conditional decision maker \(Z_{j=j_0}\) for \(i\) given \(j = j_0\) by restricting the original decision maker \(Z\) to contracts \(x_{i,j}\) which are such that \(x_{i,j} = 0\) if \(j \neq j_0\). In other words if we start with a contract \(y = (y_i)\) on \(i\) we extend it to a contract on \((i, j)\) by letting \(y_{i,j_0} = y_i\) and \(y_{i,j} = 0\) if \(j \neq j_0\). Then the original decision maker can make a decision for that contract.

Suppose that \(x_{i,j} = 0\) if \(j \neq j_0\). The unconditional expectation of this contract is \(\sum_{i,j} r_{i,j}x_{i,j}\) as usual which equals \(\sum_i r_{i,j_0}x_{i,j_0}\). This leads to the same decisions (i.e. the same Z) as using \(\sum_i \frac{r_{i,j_0}}{\sum_k r_{k,j_0}}x_{i,j_0}\) which is of the form in Theorem 5. We write that

\[
Pr(i|j_0) = \frac{Pr(i, j_0)}{\sum_k Pr(k, j_0)} = \frac{Pr(i, j_0)}{Pr(j_0)}.
\]
From this it follows that

\[ Pr(i_0)Pr(j_0|i_0) = Pr(j_0)Pr(i_0|j_0) \] (3)

which is one way of writing Bayes rule.

### 2.5 Learning

In the previous section we defined conditioning which lead us to a definition of what it means to learn. Given that we have probabilities for events that are sequences of a certain number of symbols and we have observed one or several of them, we use conditioning to determine what our belief regarding the remaining symbols should be.

**Definition 10 (Learning)** Given a rational decision maker, defined by \( p_{i_1, \ldots, i_T} \) for the events \( (i_t)_{t=1}^T \) and the first \( t-1 \) symbols \( i_1, \ldots, i_{t-1} \), we define the informed rational decision maker for \( i_t \) by conditioning on the past \( i_1, \ldots, i_{t-1} \) and marginalize over the future \( i_{t+1}, \ldots, i_T \). Formally,

\[
P_{\text{informed}}(i) = Pr(i|i_1, \ldots, i_t) = \frac{\sum_{j_{t+1}, \ldots, j_T} p_{i_1, \ldots, i_t, j_{t+1}, \ldots, j_T}}{\sum_{j_1, \ldots, j_T} p_{i_1, \ldots, i_{t-1}, j_1, \ldots, j_T}}.
\]

### 2.6 Choosing between Contracts

**Definition 11 (Choosing contract)** We say that to rationally prefer contract \( x \) over \( y \) is (equivalent) to rationally consider \( x - y \) to be acceptable.

As before we assume that we have a decision maker that takes rational decisions on accepting or rejecting contracts \( x \) that are based on an event that will be observed. Hence there exist implicit probabilities that represent all choices and an expectation function. Suppose that an agent has to choose between action \( a_1 \) that leads to receiving reward \( x_i \) if \( i \) is drawn and action \( a_2 \) that leads to receiving \( y_i \) in the case of seeing \( i \). Let \( z_i = x_i - y_i \). We can now go back to choosing between accepting and rejecting a contract by saying that choosing (preferring) \( a_1 \) over \( a_2 \) means accepting the contract \( z \). In other words if \( E(x) > E(y) \) choose \( a_1 \) and if \( E(x) < E(y) \) choose \( a_2 \).

**Remark 12** We note that if we postulate that choosing between contract \( x \) and the zero contract is the same as choosing between accepting or rejecting \( x \), then being able to choose between contracts implies the ability to choose between accepting and rejecting one contract. We, therefore, can say that the ability to choose between a pair of contracts is equivalent to the ability to choose to accept or reject a single contract.
We can also choose between several contracts. Suppose that action $a_k$ gives us the contract $x^k = (x^k_i)_{i=1}^m$. If $E(x^j) > E(x^k) \forall k \neq j$ then we strictly prefer $a_j$ over all other actions. In other words a contract $x^j - x^k$ would for all $k$ be accepted and not rejected by a rational decision maker.

Remark 13 If we have a rational decision maker for accepting or rejecting contracts, then there are implicitly probabilities $p_i$ for symbol $i$ that characterize the decisions. A rational choice between actions $a_k$ leading to contracts $x^k$ is taken by choosing action

$$ a^* = \arg\max_k \sum_i p_i x^k_i. \quad (4) $$

2.7 Choosing between Environments

In this section, we assume that the event that the contracts are concerned with might be affected by the choice of action.

Definition 14 (Reactive environment) An environment is a tree with symbols $j_t$ (percepts) on the nodes and actions $a_t$ on the edges. We provide the environment with an action $a_t$ at each time $t$ and it presents the symbol $j_t$ at the node we arrive at by following the edge chosen by the action. We can also equivalently say that a reactive environment $\nu$ is a function from strings $a_1j_1, \ldots, a tj_t$ to $\{0, 1\}$ which equals 1 if and only if $\nu$ would produce $j_1, \ldots, j_t$ given the actions $a_1, \ldots, a_t$.

We will define the concept of a decision maker for the case where one decision will be taken in a situation where not only the contract, but also the outcome can depend on the choice. We do this by defining the choice as being between two different environments.

Definition 15 (Active decision maker) Consider a choice between having contract $x$ for passive environment $env_1$ or contract $y$ for passive environment $env_2$. A decision maker is a set $Z \subset \mathbb{R}^{m_1} \times \mathbb{R}^{m_2}$ which defines exactly the pairs $(x, y)$ for which we choose $env_1$ with $x$ over $env_2$ with $y$.

Definition 16 (Rational active choice) To choose between action $a_1$ with contract $x$ and $a_2$ with contract $y$ in a situation where the action may affect the event, we consider two separate environments, namely the environments that result from the two different actions. We would then have a situation where we will have one observation from each environment. Preferring $a_1$ with $x$ to $a_2$ with $y$ is (equivalent) to consider $x - y$ to be an acceptable contract for the pair of events.

Remark 17 Definition 16 means that $a_1$ with $x$ is preferred over $a_2$ with $y$ if $a_1$ with $x - y$ is preferred over $a_2$ with the zero contract.
Proposition 18 (Probabilities for reactive setting) Suppose that we have a reactive environment and a rational active decision maker that will make one choice between action $a_1$ and $a_2$ as described in Definitions 15 and 16, then there exist $p_i \geq 0$ and $q_i \geq 0$ such that action $a_1$ with contract $x$ is preferred over action $a_2$ with contract $y$ if $\sum p_i x_i > \sum q_i y_i$ and the reverse if $\sum p_i x_i < \sum q_i y_i$. This means that the decision maker acts according to probabilities $Pr(\cdot|a_1)$ and $Pr(\cdot|a_2)$.

Proof. Let $\tilde{Z}$ be all contracts that when combined with action $a_1$ is preferred over $a_2$ with the zero contract. Theorem 1 guarantees the existence of $p_i$ such that $\sum p_i x_i > 0$ implies that $x \in \tilde{Z}$ and $\sum p_i x_i < 0$ implies that $x \notin \tilde{Z}$. The same way we find $q_i$ that describe when we prefer $a_2$ with $y$ to $a_1$ with the zero contract. That these probabilities ($p_i$ and $q_i$) explain the full decision maker as stated in the proposition now follows directly from Definition 16 understood as in Remark 17.

Suppose that we are going to make a sequence of $T < \infty$ decisions where at every point of time we will have a finite number of actions to choose between. We will consider contracts, which can pay out some reward at each time step and that can depend on everything (actions chosen and symbols observed) that has happened up until this time and we want to maximize the accumulated reward at time $T$.

We can view the choice as just making one choice, namely choosing an action tree. We will sometimes call an action tree a policy.

Definition 19 (Action tree) An action tree is a function from histories of symbols $j_1, ..., j_t$ and decisions $a_1, ..., a_{t-1}$ to new decisions, given that the decisions were made according to the function. Formally,

$$f(a_1, j_1, ..., a_{t-1}, j_{t-1}) = a_t.$$ 

An action tree will assign exactly one action for any of the circumstances that one can end up in. That is, given the history up to any time $t < T$ of actions and events, we have a chosen action. We can, therefore, choose an action tree at time 0 and receive a total accumulated reward at time $T$. This brings us back to the situation of one event and one rational choice.

Definition 20 (Sequential decisions) Given a rational decision maker for the events $(j_t)_{t=1}^T$ and the first $t-1$ symbols $j_1, ..., j_{t-1}$ and decisions $a_1, ..., a_{t-1}$, we define the informed rational decision maker at time $t$ by conditioning on the past $a_1, j_1, ..., a_{t-1}, j_{t-1}$.

Proposition 21 (Beliefs for sequential decisions) Suppose that we have a reactive environment and a rational decision maker that will take $T < \infty$ decisions. Furthermore, suppose that the decisions $0 \leq t < T$ have been taken and resulted in history $a_1, j_1, ..., a_{t-1}, j_{t-1}$. Then the decision makers preferences at this time can be explained (through expected utility maximization) by probabilities

$$Pr(j_t, ..., j_T|a_1, j_1, ..., a_{t-1}, j_{t-1}, a_t, a_{t+1}, ..., a_T).$$
Proof. Definition 20 and Proposition 18 immediately lead us to the conclusion that given a past up to a point \( t - 1 \) and a policy for the time \( t \) to \( T \) we have probabilistic beliefs over the possible future sequences from time \( t \) to \( T \) and the choice is categorized by maximizing expected accumulated reward at time \( T \).

3 Countable Sets of Events

Instead of a finite set of possible outcomes, we will in this section assume a countable set. We suppose that the set of contracts is a vector space of sequences \( x_k, k = 0, 1, 2, \ldots \) where we use pointwise addition and multiplication with scalar. We will define a space by choosing a norm and let the space consist of the sequences that have finite norm as is common in Banach space theory. If the norm makes the space complete it is called a Banach sequence space \([\text{Die84}]\). Interesting examples are \( \ell^\infty \) of bounded sequences with the maximum norm \( \| (\alpha_k) \|_\infty = \max |\alpha_k| \), \( c_0 \) of sequence that converges to 0 equipped with the same maximum norm and \( \ell^p \) which for \( 1 \leq p < \infty \) is defined by the norm

\[
\| (\alpha_k) \|_p = \left( \sum |\alpha_k|^p \right)^{1/p}.
\]

For all of these spaces we can consider weighted versions \( (w_k > 0) \) where

\[
\| (\alpha_k) \|_{p,w_k} = \| (\alpha_kw_k) \|_p.
\]

This means that \( \alpha \in \ell^p(w) \) iff \( (\alpha_kw_k) \in \ell^p \), e.g. \( \alpha \in \ell^\infty(w) \) iff \( \sup_k |\alpha_kw_k| < \infty \). Given a Banach (sequence) space \( X \) we use \( X' \) to denote the dual space that consists of all continuous linear functionals \( f : X \to \mathbb{R} \). It is well known that a linear functional on a Banach space is continuous if and only if it is bounded, i.e. that there is \( C < \infty \) such that \( \frac{|f(x)|}{\|x\|} \leq C \ \forall x \in X \). Equipping \( X' \) with the norm \( \|f\| = \sup \frac{|f(x)|}{\|x\|} \) makes it into a Banach space. Some examples are \( (\ell^1)' = \ell^\infty \), \( c_0' = \ell^1 \) and for \( 1 < p < \infty \) we have that \( (\ell^p)' = \ell^q \) where \( 1/p + 1/q = 1 \). These identifications are all based on formulas of the form

\[
f(x) = \sum x_ip_i
\]

where the dual space is the space that \( (p_i) \) must lie in to make the functional both well defined and bounded. It is clear that \( \ell^1 \subset (\ell^\infty)' \) but \( (\ell^\infty)' \) also contains “stranger” objects.

The existence of these other objects can be deduced from the Hahn-Banach theorem (see e.g. [Kre89] or [NB97]) that says that if we have a linear function defined on a subspace \( Y \subset X \) and if it is bounded on \( Y \) then there is an extension to a bounded linear functional on \( X \). If \( Y \) is dense in \( X \) the extension is unique but in general it is not. One can use this Theorem by first looking at the subspace of all sequences in \( \ell^\infty \) that converge and let \( f(\alpha) = \lim_{k \to \infty} \alpha_k \). The Hahn-Banach
Theorem guarantees the existence of extensions to bounded linear functionals that are defined on all of $\ell^\infty$. These are called Banach limits. The space $(\ell^\infty)'$ can be identified with the so called ba space of bounded and finitely additive measures with the variation norm $\|\nu\| = |\nu|(A)$ where $A$ is the underlying set. Note that $\ell^1$ can be identified with the smaller space of countably additive bounded measures with the same norm. The Hahn-Banach Theorem has several equivalent forms. One of these identifies the hyper-planes with the bounded linear functionals [NB97].

**Definition 22 (Rationality II)** Given a Banach sequence space $X$ of contracts, we say that the decision maker (subset $Z$ of $X$ defining acceptable contracts) is rational if

1. Every contract $x \in X$ is either acceptable or rejectable or both;
2. $x$ is acceptable if and only if $-x$ is rejectable;
3. $x, y \in Z$, $\lambda, \gamma \geq 0$ then $\lambda x + \gamma y \in Z$;
4. If $x_k \geq 0 \ \forall k$ then $x = (x_k)$ is acceptable while if $x_k > 0 \ \forall k$ then $x$ is not rejectable.

**Theorem 23 (Linear separation)** Suppose that we have a space of contracts $X$ that is a Banach sequence space. Given a rational decision maker there is a positive continuous linear functional $f : X \to \mathbb{R}$ such that

$$\{x \mid f(x) > 0\} \subset Z \subseteq \{x \mid f(x) \geq 0\}. \quad (5)$$

**Proof.** The third property tells us that $Z$ and $-Z$ are convex cones. The second and fourth property tells us that $Z \neq \mathbb{R}^m$. Suppose that there is a point $x$ that lies in both the interior of $Z$ and of $-Z$. Then the same is true for $-x$ according to the second property and for the origin. That a ball around the origin lies in $Z$ means that $Z = \mathbb{R}^m$ which is not true. Thus the interiors of $Z$ and $-Z$ are disjoint open convex sets and can, therefore, be separated by a hyperplane (according to the Hahn-Banach theorem) which goes through the origin (since according to the second and fourth property the origin is both acceptable and rejectable). The first two properties tell us that $Z \cup -Z = \mathbb{R}^m$. Given a separating hyperplane (between the interiors of $Z$ and $-Z$), $Z$ must contain everything on one side. This means that $Z$ is a half space whose boundary is a hyperplane that goes through the origin and the closure $\bar{Z}$ of $Z$ is a closed half space and can be written as $\{x \mid f(x) \geq 0\}$ for some $f \in X'$. The fourth property tells us that $f$ is positive.

**Corollary 24 (Additivity)** 1. If $X = c_0$ then a rational decision maker is described by a countably additive (probability) measure.
2. If $X = \ell^\infty$ then a rational decision maker is described by a finitely additive (probability) measure.
It seems from Corollary 24 that we pay the price of losing countable additivity for expanding the space of contracts from $c_0$ to $\ell^\infty$ but we can expand the space even more by looking at $c_0(w)$ where $w_k \to 0$ which contains $\ell^\infty$ and $X'$ is then $L^1((1/w_k))$. This means that we get countable additivity back but we instead have a restriction on how fast the probabilities $p_k$ must tend to 0. Note that a bounded linear functional on $c_0$ can always be extended to a bounded linear functional on $\ell^\infty$ by the formula $f(x) = \sum p_i x_i$ but that is not the unique extension. Note also that every bounded linear functional on $\ell^\infty$ can be restricted to $c_0$ and there be represented as $f(x) = \sum p_i x_i$. Therefore, a rational decision maker on $\ell^\infty$ contracts has probabilistic beliefs (unless $p_i = 0 \; \forall i$), though it might also take asymptotic behavior of a contract into account. For example (and here $p_i = 0 \; \forall i$), the decision maker that makes decisions based on asymptotic averages $\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$ when they exist. That strategy can be extended to all of $\ell^\infty$ (a Banach limit). The following proposition will help us decide which decision maker on $\ell^\infty$ is described with countably additive probabilities.

**Proposition 25** Suppose that $f \in (\ell^\infty)'$. For any $x \in \ell^\infty$, let $x_i^j = x_i$ if $i \leq j$ and $x_i^j = 0$ otherwise. If for any $x$,

$$\lim_{j \to \infty} f(x^j) = f(x),$$

then $f$ can be written as $f(x) = \sum p_i x_i$ where $p_i \geq 0$ and $\sum_{i=1}^\infty p_i < \infty$.

**Proof.** The restriction of $f$ to $c_0$ gives us numbers $p_i \geq 0$ such that $\sum_{i=1}^\infty p_i < \infty$ and $f(x) = \sum p_i x_i$ for $x \in c_0$. This means that $f(x^j) = \sum_{i=1}^j p_i x_i$ for any $x \in \ell^\infty$ and $j < \infty$. Thus $\lim_{j \to \infty} f(x^j) = \sum_{i=1}^\infty p_i x_i$.

**Definition 26 (Monotone decisions)** We define the concept of a monotone decision maker in the following way. Suppose that for every $x \in \ell^\infty$ there is $N < \infty$ such that the decision is the same for all $x^j$, $j \geq N$ (See Proposition 25 for definition) as for $x$. Then we say that the decision maker is monotone.

**Example 27** Let $f \in \ell^\infty$ be such that if $\lim \alpha_k \to L$ then $f(\alpha) = L$ (i.e. $f$ is a Banach limit). Furthermore define a rational decision maker by letting the set of acceptable contracts be $Z = \{ x \mid f(x) \geq 0 \}$. Then $f(x^j) = 0$ (where we use notation from Proposition 24) for all $j < \infty$ and regardless of which $x$ we define $x^j$ from. Therefore, all sequences that are eventually zero are acceptable contracts. This means that this decision maker is not monotone since there are contracts that are not acceptable.

**Theorem 28 (Monotone rationality)** Given a monotone rational decision maker for $\ell^\infty$ contracts, there are $p_i \geq 0$ such that $\sum p_i < \infty$ and

$$\{ x \mid \sum x_i p_i > 0 \} \subset Z \subset \{ x \mid \sum x_i p_i \geq 0 \}.$$ 

(6)
**Proof.** According to Theorem 23 there is \( f \in (\ell^\infty)' \) such that (the closure of \( Z \)) \( \overline{Z} = \{ x \mid f(x) \geq 0 \} \). Let \( p_i \geq 0 \) be such that \( \sum p_i < \infty \) and such that \( f(x) = \sum x_i p_i \) for \( x \in c_0 \). Remember that \( x^j \) (notation as in Proposition 25) is always in \( c_0 \). Suppose that there is \( x \) such that \( x \) is accepted but \( \sum x_i p_i < 0 \). This violate monotonicity since there exist \( N < \infty \) such that \( \sum_{i=1}^n x_i p_i < 0 \) for all \( n \geq N \) and, therefore, \( x^j \) is not accepted for \( j \geq N \) but \( x \) is accepted. We conclude that if \( x \) is accepted then \( \sum p_i x_i \geq 0 \) and if \( \sum p_i x_i > 0 \) then \( x \) is accepted.

4 Rational Agents for Classes of Environments

We will here study agents that are designed to deal with a large range of situations. Given a class of environments we want to define agents that can learn to act well when placed in any of them, assuming it is at all possible.

**Definition 29 (Universality for a class)** We say that a decision maker is universal for a class of environments \( \mathcal{M} \) if for any outcome sequence \( a_1, j_1, a_2, j_2, \ldots \) that given the actions would be produced by some environment in the class, there is \( c > 0 \) (depending on the sequence) such that the decision maker has probabilities that satisfy

\[
Pr(j_1, \ldots, j_t \mid a_1, \ldots, a_t) \geq c \quad \forall t.
\]

This is obviously true if the decision maker’s probabilistic beliefs are a convex combination \( \sum_{\nu \in \mathcal{M}} w_\nu \nu, w_\nu > 0 \) and \( \sum_{\nu} w_\nu = 1 \).

We will next discuss how to define some large classes of environments and agents that can succeed for them. We assume that the total accumulated reward from the environment will be finite regardless of our actions since we want any policy to have finite utility. Furthermore, we assume that rewards are positive and that it is possible to achieve strictly positive rewards in any environment. We would like the agent to perform well regardless of which environment from the chosen class it is placed in.

For any possible policy (action tree) \( \pi \) and environment \( \nu \), there is a total reward \( V_{\nu}^\pi \) that following \( \pi \) in \( \nu \) would result in. This means that for any \( \pi \) there is a contract sequence \( (V_\nu^\pi)_{\nu} \), assuming we have enumerated our set of environments. Let

\[
V_{\nu}^* = \max_{\pi} V_{\nu}^\pi.
\]

We know that \( V_{\nu}^* > 0 \) for all \( \nu \). Every contract sequence \( (V_{\nu}^\pi)_\nu \) lies in \( X = \ell^\infty((1/V_{\nu}^*)) \) and \( \| (V_{\nu}^\pi) \|_X \leq 1 \). The rational decision makers are the positive, continuous linear functionals on \( X \). \( X' \) contains the space \( \ell^1(V_{\nu}^*) \). In other words if \( w_\nu \geq 0 \) and \( \sum w_\nu V_{\nu}^* < \infty \) then the sequence \( (w_\nu) \) defines a rational decision maker for the contract space \( X \). These are exactly the monotone rational decision makers.

Letting (which is the AIXI agent from \([Hut05]\))

\[
\pi^* \in \arg \max_{\pi} \sum_{\nu} w_\nu V_{\nu}^\pi \quad (7)
\]
we have a choice with the property that for any other \( \pi \) with
\[
\sum_\nu w_\nu V^\pi_\nu < \sum_\nu w_\nu V^{\pi^*}_\nu.
\]

Hence the contract \((V^{\pi^*}_\nu - V^\pi_\nu)\) is not rejectable. In other words \( \pi^* \) is strictly preferable to \( \pi \). By letting \( p_\nu = w_\nu V^*_\nu \), we can rewrite (7) as
\[
\pi^* \in \arg \max \pi \sum_\nu p_\nu \frac{V^\pi_\nu}{V^{\pi^*}_\nu}. \tag{8}
\]

If one further restricts the class of environments by assuming \( V^*_\nu \leq 1 \) for all \( \nu \) then for every \( \pi \), \((V^*_\nu) \in \ell^\infty\). Therefore, by Theorem 28 the monotone rational agents for this setting can be formulated as in (7) with \((w_\nu) \in \ell_1\), i.e. \( \sum_\nu w_\nu < \infty \). However, since \((p_\nu) \in \ell_1\), a formulation of the form of (8) is also possible. Normalizing \( p \) and \( w \) individually to probabilities makes (7) into a maximum expected utility criterion and (8) into maximum relative utility. As long as our \( w \) and \( p \) relate the way they do it is still the same decisions. If we would base both expectations on the same probabilistic beliefs it would be different criteria. When we have an upper bound \( V^*_\nu < b < \infty \ \forall \nu \) we can always translate expected utility to expected relative utility in this way, while we need a lower bound \( 0 < a < V^*_\nu \) to rewrite an expected relative utility as an expected utility. Note, the different criteria will start to deviate from each other after updating the probabilistic beliefs.

### 4.1 Asymptotic Optimality

Denote a chosen countable class of environments by \( \mathcal{M} \). Let \( V^\pi_{\nu,k} \) be the rewards achieved after time \( k \) using policy \( \pi \) in environment \( \nu \). We suppress the dependence on the history so far. Let
\[
W^\pi_{\nu,k} = \frac{V^\pi_{\nu,k}}{V^*_{\nu,k}}
\]
denote the skill (relative reward) of \( \pi \) in environment \( \nu \) from time \( k \). The maximum possible skill is 1. We would like to have a policy \( \pi \) such that
\[
\lim_{k \to \infty} W^\pi_{\nu,k} = 1 \ \forall \nu \in \mathcal{M}.
\]
This would mean that the agent asymptotically achieve maximum skill when placed in any environment from \( \mathcal{M} \). Let \( I(h_k, \nu) = 1 \) if \( \nu \) is consistent with history \( h_k \) and \( I(h_k, \nu) = 0 \) otherwise. Furthermore, let
\[
p_{\nu,k} = \frac{p_{\nu,0}}{\sum_{\mu \in \mathcal{M}} p_{\mu,0} I(h_k, \mu)}
\]
be the agent’s weight for environment \( \nu \) at time \( k \) and let \( \pi^\nu \) be a policy that at time \( k \) acts according to a policy in
\[
\arg \max_\pi \sum_\nu p_{\nu,k} \frac{V^\pi_{\nu,k}}{V^{*}_{\nu,k}}. \tag{9}
\]
In the following theorem, we prove that for every environment \( \nu \in \mathcal{M} \), the policy \( \pi^\nu \) will asymptotically achieve perfect relative rewards. We have to assume that there exists a sequence of policies \( \pi_k > 0 \) with this property (as for the similar Theorem 5.34 in [Hut05] which dealt with discounted values). The convergence in \( W \)-values is the relevant sense of optimality for our setting, since the \( V \)-values converge to zero for any policy.

**Theorem 30 (Asymptotic optimality)** Suppose that we have a decision maker that is universal (i.e. \( p_\nu > 0 \forall \nu \)) with respect to the countable class \( \mathcal{M} \) of environments (which can be stochastic) and that there exists policies \( \pi_k \) such that for all \( \nu \), \( W_{k}^{\pi_k,\nu} \to 1 \) if \( \nu \) is the actual environment (or the sequence is consistent with \( \nu \)). This implies that \( W_{k}^{\pi_k,\mu} \to 1 \) where \( \mu \) is the actual environment.

The proof technique is similar to that of Theorem 5.34 in [Hut05].

**Proof.** Let

\[
0 \leq 1 - W_{k}^{\pi_k,\nu} =: \Delta^k_\nu, \quad \Delta^k = \sum_{\nu} p_{\nu,k} \Delta^k_\nu. \tag{10}
\]

The assumptions tells us that \( \Delta^k_\nu = W_{k}^{\pi_k,\nu} - 1 \to 0 \) for all \( \nu \) that are consistent with the sequence (\( p_{\nu,k} = 0 \) if \( \nu \) is inconsistent with the history at time \( k \)) and since \( \Delta^k_\nu \leq 1 \), it follows that

\[
\Delta^k = \sum_{\nu} p_{\nu,k} \Delta^k_\nu \to 0.
\]

Note that \( p_{\mu,k}(1 - W_{k}^{\pi_k,\mu}) \leq \sum_{\nu} p_{\nu,k}(1 - W_{k}^{\pi_k,\nu}) \leq \sum_{\nu} p_{\nu,k}(1 - W_{k}^{\pi_k,\nu}) = \sum_{\nu} p_{\nu,k} \Delta^k_\nu = \Delta^k \). Since we also know that \( p_{\mu,k} \geq p_{\mu,0} > 0 \) it follows that \( (1 - W_{k}^{\pi_k,\mu}) \to 0 \).

## 5 Conclusions

We studied complete rational decision makers including the cases of actions that may affect the environment and sequential decision making. We set up simple common sense rationality axioms that imply that a complete rational decision maker has preferences that can be characterized as maximizing expected utility. Of particular interest is the countable case where our results follow from identifying the Banach space dual of the space of contracts.

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