Characterisation of Strongly Stable Matchings

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Abstract
An instance of a strongly stable matching problem (SSMP) is an undirected bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$, with an adjacency list of each vertex being a linearly ordered list of ties, which are subsets of vertices equally good for a given vertex. Ties are disjoint and may contain one vertex. A matching $M$ is a set of vertex-disjoint edges. An edge $(x, y) \in E \setminus M$ is a blocking edge for $M$ if $x$ is either unmatched or strictly prefers $y$ to its current partner in $M$, and $y$ is either unmatched or strictly prefers $x$ to its current partner in $M$ or is indifferent between them. A matching is strongly stable if there is no blocking edge with respect to it. We present an algorithm for the generation of all strongly stable matchings, thus solving an open problem already stated in the book by Gusfield and Irving [2]. It has previously been shown that strongly stable matchings form a distributive lattice and although the number of strongly stable matchings can be exponential in the number of vertices, we show that there exists a partial order with $O(m)$ elements representing all strongly stable matchings, where $m$ denotes the number of edges in the graph. We give two algorithms that construct two such representations: one in $O(nm^2)$ time and the other in $O(nm)$ time, where $n$ denotes the number of vertices in the graph. Note that the construction of the second representation has the same time complexity as that of computing a single strongly stable matching.

1 Introduction
An instance of a strongly stable matching problem (SSMP) is an undirected bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$, with an adjacency list of each vertex being a linearly ordered list of ties, which are subsets of vertices equally good for a given vertex. Ties are disjoint and may contain one vertex. Thus if vertices $b_1$ and $b_2$ are neighbours of $a$ in the graph $G$, then either (1) $a$ (strictly) prefers $b_1$ to $b_2$, which we denote as $b_1 \succ_a b_2$; or (2) $b_1$ and $b_2$ are in a tie on an adjacency list of $a$, and then we say that $a$ is indifferent between $a_1$ and $a_2$ and denote it as $b_1 =_a b_2$; or (3) $a$ (strictly) prefers $b_2$ to $b_1$. If a vertex $a$ prefers $b_1$ to $b_2$ or is indifferent between them, we say that $a$ weakly prefers $b_1$ to $b_2$ and denote as $b_1 \succeq_a b_2$. A matching $M$ is a set of edges, no two of which share an endpoint. Let $e = (v, w)$ be an edge contained in a matching $M$. Then we say that vertices $v$ and $w$ are matched in $M$ and that $v$ is a partner of $w$ in $M$, which we also denote as $v = M(w)$. If a vertex $a$ has no edge of $M$ incident to it, then we say that $v$ is free or unmatched in $M$. An edge $(x, y) \in E \setminus M$ is a blocking edge for $M$ if $x$ is either unmatched or strictly prefers $y$ to its current partner in $M$, and $y$ is either unmatched or weakly prefers $x$ to its current partner. In other words, an edge $(x, y)$ is blocking with respect to $M$, if by getting matched to each other, neither of the vertices $x$ and $y$ would become worse off and at least one of them would become better off than in $M$. A matching is strongly stable if there is no blocking edge with respect to it.

As is customary, we call the vertices of the graph men – those belonging to the set $A$, and women – the ones belonging to $B$. An ordered adjacency list of a vertex $v$ is also called its
preference list and denoted $L_u$. The problem of computing a strongly stable matching, if it exists, has already been solved. Let $n$ and $m$ denote the number of, correspondingly, vertices and edges in the graph. Irving [3] gave an $O(n^4)$ algorithm for computing strongly stable matchings for instances in which the bipartite graph is complete and there are equal number of men and women. In [7] Manlove extended the algorithm to incomplete bipartite graphs; the extended algorithm has running time $O(m^2)$. In [5] Kavitha, Mehlhorn, Michail and Paluch gave an $O(nm)$ algorithm for SSMP.

In this paper we study the problem of characterising the set of all strongly stable matchings. The problem was already stated in 1989 in the book by Gusfield and Irving [2] as one of the 12 open problems and posed again in many subsequent papers and also in a recent book by Manlove [8]. Let us mention here that in contrast to the problem of characterisation of the set of all strongly stable matchings, the structure of the set of all stable matchings in the stable matching problem, which is the classical variant without ties, is well understood. The set of stable matchings forms a lattice and although the number of stable matchings may be exponential, there are known compact representations of all stable matchings that can be constructed in $O(m^2)$ or even $O(m)$ time.

The set of strongly stable matchings has also been shown to form a distributive lattice [6]. However, no characterisation of such a set has been known so far. We give two compact representations of the set of all strongly stable matchings that can be constructed in, correspondingly, $O(nm^3)$ and $O(nm)$ time, where $n$ and $m$ denote the number of vertices and edges in the graph. We also show how to efficiently construct a partial order on the elements of the representation. The presented compact representations as well as the posets on the sets of elements of these representations can be used to solve a number of problems connected with strongly stable matchings. In particular, we are able to efficiently enumerate all strongly stable matchings, we can compute all stable pairs, where a pair $(a,b)$ is stable if $e = (a,b) \in E$ and there exists a strongly stable matching containing $e$, and many others. Also, any known algorithm for computing a strongly stable matching outputs either a man-optimal strongly stable matching or woman-optimal strongly stable matching. A man-optimal strongly stable matching has the property that each man is matched in it to the best partner he can have in any strongly stable matching. A woman-optimal strongly stable matching has an analogous property. It has been conjectured by Feder [1] that it may be NP-hard to decide if there exists a strongly stable matching which is neither man-optimal or woman-optimal. In the paper we disprove this conjecture.

One of the two representations of the set of stable matchings consists of $O(m)$ elements, each of which is a man-optimal stable matching among the set of all stable matchings containing a given edge. In the case of the strongly stable matchings we give an analogous representation, which for any stable pair $(a,b)$ has a class of strongly stable matchings, which are man-optimal among the set of strongly stable matchings containing $(a,b)$. We show that computing such a class can be reduced to computing a man-optimal strongly stable matching in an appropriately constructed instance of SSMP. The reduction is surprisingly simple. It is described in Section 2. The second representation of the set of stable matchings can be derived from differences (so called rotations) between consecutive matchings in a maximal sequence of stable matchings beginning with a man-optimal stable matching and ending with a woman-optimal stable matching. Our second representation can be analogously obtained from differences between consecutive classes of matchings in a maximal sequence of classes of strongly stable matchings. This second representation can be constructed in $O(nm)$ time – note that the time equals the running time of the algorithm computing a single strongly stable matching.
2 Preliminaries

In this section we recall some well-known theorems and theory concerning strongly stable matchings. We are going to make use of the following two theorems:

**Theorem 1** [3] There is an $O(nm)$ algorithm to determine a man-optimal strongly stable matching of the given instance or report that no such matching exists.

**Theorem 2** [3] In a given instance of SSMP, the same vertices are matched in all strongly stable matchings.

We introduce some notation and definitions.

For a given edge $(m, w)$ any matching $M$ such that $(m, w) \in M$ is called an $(m, w)$-matching. Let us denote the set of all strongly stable matchings of $G$ by $\mathcal{M}_G$. Let $\mathcal{M}_G(m, w)$ be the set of strongly stable $(m, w)$-matchings in $G$.

Let $L_v$ be a preference list of vertex $v$. $L_v$ is a linearly ordered list of ties. The first tie on $L_v$ contains highest ranked edges for $v$ and we say that the rank of every edge $(v, w)$ contained in this list is 1 and denote $rank_v(v, w) = 1$. Similarly, the second tie on $L_v$ contains edges of rank 2 with respect to $v$ and so on. For a strongly stable matching $M$, by $rank_M(v)$ we denote $rank_v(v, M(v))$.

We define an equivalence relation $\sim$ on $\mathcal{M}_G$ as follows.

**Definition 1** For two strongly stable matchings $M$ and $N$, $M \sim N$ if and only if each man $m$ is indifferent between $M(m)$ and $N(m)$. Denote by $[M]$ the equivalence class containing $M$, and denote by $\mathcal{X}$ the set of equivalence classes of $\mathcal{M}_G$ under $\sim$.

For two strongly stable matchings $M$ and $N$, we say that $M$ dominates $N$ and write $M \succeq N$ if each man $m$ weakly prefers $M(m)$ to $N(m)$. If $M$ dominates $N$ and there exists a man $m$ who prefers $M(m)$ to $N(m)$, then we say that $M$ strictly dominates $N$ and we call $N$ a successor of $M$.

Next we define a partial order $\preceq^*$ on $\mathcal{X}$:

**Definition 2** For any two equivalence classes $[M]$ and $[N]$, $[M] \preceq^* [N]$ if and only if $M \succeq N$.

Let $M$ and $N$ be any two matchings. Then the symmetric difference $M \oplus N = (M \setminus N) \cup (N \setminus M)$ contains alternating paths and alternating cycles, where a path $p$ (cycle $c$) is alternating (with respect to matching $M$) if its edges alternately belong to $M$ and to $E \setminus M$. If $M$ and $N$ are two strongly stable matchings of the same graph, then by Theorem 2 $M \oplus N$ contains only alternating cycles. Alternating cycles of $M \oplus N$ display an interesting property captured in:

**Lemma 1** [3] Let $M$ and $N$ be two strongly stable matchings. Consider any alternating cycle $C$ of $M \oplus N$. Let $(m_0, w_0, m_1, w_1, ..., m_{k-1}, w_{k-1})$ be a sequence of vertices of $C$ where $m_i$ are men and $w_i$ are women. Then there are only three possibilities:

- $(\forall m_i) w_i = m_i \iff (\forall w_i) m_i = w_i \iff (\forall m_i) w_i \preceq m_i \iff (\forall w_i) m_i \succeq w_i \iff (\forall m_i) w_i \succeq m_i \iff (\forall w_i) m_i \preceq w_i \iff (\forall m_i) w_i \preceq m_i \iff (\forall w_i) m_i \succeq w_i$

Subscripts are taken modulo $k$. 

3
Below we introduce two operations transforming pairs of strongly stable matchings into other strongly stable matchings.

**Definition 3** Let $M$ and $N$ be two strongly stable matchings. Consider any man $m$ and his partners $M(m)$ and $N(m)$.

By $M \land N$ we denote the matching such that:

- if $M(m) \succeq_m N(m)$ then $(m, M(m)) \in M \land N$
- if $M(m) \preceq_m N(m)$ then $(m, N(m)) \in M \land N$

Similarly by $M \lor N$ we denote the matching such that:

- if $M(m) \succeq_m N(m)$ then $(m, N(m)) \in M \lor N$
- if $M(m) \preceq_m N(m)$ then $(m, M(m)) \in M \lor N$

From [6] it follows that both $M \lor N$ and $M \land N$ are strongly stable matchings, and $M, N \preceq M \lor N$ and $M, N \succeq M \land N$.

We extend operations $\lor$ and $\land$ to the set $X$ of equivalence classes. Let $[M], [N] \in X$. Denote $[M] \lor [N] = [M \lor N], [M] \land [N] = [M \land N]$.

**Theorem 3** [6] The partial order $(X, \preceq^*)$ with operations meet $\lor$ and join $\land$ defined above forms a distributive lattice.

Note that the set $\mathcal{M}_G(m, w)$ is closed under meet and join operations. It implies that the set of equivalence classes of $\mathcal{M}_G(m, w)$ under $\sim$ forms a sublattice of $X$. hence there is a single man optimal equivalence class of $\mathcal{M}_G(m, w)$.

### 3 Construction of the auxiliary graph $G_{(m, w)}$

In this section we describe an $O(nm)$ algorithm for computing a man-optimal matching in $\mathcal{M}_G(m, w)$ or deciding that no such matching exists.

Let $(m, w) \in E$ be an edge of the graph $G$. The idea is very simple. In order to calculate a man-optimal matching in $\mathcal{M}_G(m, w)$ we are going to define a new graph $G_{(m, w)}$, such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between strongly stable matchings in $\mathcal{M}_G(m, w)$ and $\mathcal{M}_G(m, w)$. Moreover, a man-optimal matching of $G_{(m, w)}$ is going to be a man-optimal matching of $\mathcal{M}_G(m, w)$.

Let $G_{(m, w)} = (A \cup B, E')$ be a subgraph of $G$. Preference lists of $G_{(m, w)}$ are derived from preference lists of $G$. Below we describe which edges should be removed from $E$ in order to obtain the set $E'$.

- $(m, w)$ is removed from $E$
- let $m'$ be a vertex such that $(m', w) \in E$ and $m \succeq_w m'$. We remove $(m', w)$ from $E$.
- let $m'$ be a vertex such that $(m', w) \in E$ and $m =_w m'$. We remove $(m', w)$ from $E$. Additionally we remove every edge $(m', w') \in E$ such that $w \succeq_{m'} w'$.
- let $m'$ be a vertex such that $(m', w) \in E$ and $m \preceq_w m'$. We remove $(m', w)$ from $E$. Additionally we remove every edge $(m', w') \in E$ such that $w \preceq_{m'} w'$. 


• let \( w' \) be a vertex such that \((m, w') \in E \) and \( w \succ_m w' \). We remove \((m, w') \) from \( E \).

• let \( w' \) be a vertex such that \((m, w') \in E \) and \( w =_m w' \). We remove \((m, w') \) from \( E \).

Additionaly we remove every edge \((m', w') \in E \) such that \( m \succ_{w'} m' \).

• let \( w' \) be a vertex such that \((m, w') \in E \) and \( w' \succ_m w \). We remove \((m, w') \) from \( E \).

Additionaly we remove every edge \((m', w') \in E \) such that \( m \succeq_{w'} m' \).

This concludes the construction of the graph \( G_{(m, w)} \).

**Lemma 2** Let \( M \in \mathcal{M}_G(m, w) \). Then \( M' = M \setminus \{(m, w)\} \in \mathcal{M}_{G_{(m, w)}} \).

**Proof.** We will prove that \( M' \subseteq E' \) and that \( M' \) is a strongly stable matching of \( G_{(m, w)} \).

To prove \( M' \subseteq E' \) we need to observe that none of the removed edges \((E \setminus E')\) is matched in \( M \). Let us assume by contradiction that an edge \((m', w')\) was removed from \( E \) and is matched in \( M \). Obviously \( m \neq m' \) and \( w \neq w' \). From the construction of \( G_{(m, w)} \) it follows that there is an edge \((m, w')\) or \((m', w)\) which caused the removal of \((m', w')\). We can easily check that such an edge blocks \( M \). It leads to a contradiction.

Strong stability of \( M' \) is straightforward – if there were an edge \( e \) blocking \( M' \), it would also block \( M \). \( \square \)

**Lemma 3** Let \( M' \) be some strongly stable matching of \( G_{(m, w)} \). If \( M' \cup \{(m, w)\} \) is a strongly stable matching of \( G \), then for each strongly stable matching \( N \) of \( G_{(m, w)} \), matching \( N \cup \{(m, w)\} \) is a strongly stable matching of \( G \). If \( M' \cup \{(m, w)\} \) is not a strongly stable matching of \( G \), then \( \mathcal{M}_G(m, w) = \emptyset \).

**Proof.**
Let \( M' \) be any strongly stable matching of \( G_{(m, w)} \). Consider an edge \((m, w)\). Denote \( M = M' \cup \{(m, w)\} \). From the construction of \( G_{(m, w)} \) it follows that only edges from the set \( E \setminus E' \) can potentially block \( M \). We will prove that if any edge blocks \( M \), then set \( \mathcal{M}_G(m, w) \) is empty. Let us analyse the construction of the graph \( G_{(m, w)} \). We have the following cases:

• let \( m' \) be a vertex such that \((m', w) \in E \) and \( m \succ_w m' \). We removed \((m', w) \) from \( E \).

• let \( m' \) be a vertex such that \((m', w) \in E \) and \( m =_w m' \). We removed \((m', w) \) from \( E \).

Additionaly we removed every edge \((m', w') \in E \) such that \( w \succ_{m'} w' \).

• let \( m' \) be a vertex such that \((m', w) \in E \) and \( m \prec_w m' \). We remove \((m', w) \) from \( E \).

Additionaly we remove every edge \((m', w') \in E \) such that \( w \succeq_{m'} w' \).

• let \( w' \) be a vertex such that \((m, w') \in E \) and \( w \succ_m w' \). We removed \((m, w') \) from \( E \).

• let \( w' \) be a vertex such that \((m, w') \in E \) and \( w =_m w' \). We removed \((m, w') \) from \( E \).

Additionaly we removed every edge \((m', w') \in E \) such that \( m \succ_{w'} m' \).

• let \( w' \) be a vertex such that \((m, w') \in E \) and \( w \succ_m w' \). We removed \((m, w') \) from \( E \).

Additionaly we removed every edge \((m', w') \in E \) such that \( m \succeq_{w'} m' \).
Case 1. An edge \((m', w)\) cannot block \(M\).

Case 2. Note that from the construction of \(G'\), if vertex \(m'\) is matched in \(M\), then neither \((m', w)\) nor \((m', w')\) can block \(M\). If vertex \(m'\) is unmatched in \(M\), then from Theorem 2 vertex \(m'\) is unmatched in every strongly stable matching of \(G'\). Let us assume that there exists some matching \(N \in M_G(m, w)\). Then \(N' = N \setminus (m, w)\) is strongly stable in \(G'\), so \(m'\) is unmatched in \(N'\). Hence \((m', w)\) blocks \(N\), contradiction.

We omit proofs of the remaining cases as these proofs are analogous to the proof of Case 2. \(\square\)

From above lemma, we conclude that either every strongly stable matching of \(M_G(m, w)\) corresponds to some strongly stable matching of \(M_G(m, w)\), or none of them. Additionally we can easily compute a man-optimal strongly stable matching \(M'\) in \(G(m, w)\) and check if \(M' \cup \{(m, w)\}\) is strongly stable in \(G\). This implies the following theorem:

**Theorem 4** Let \((m, w) \in E\). There is an \(O(nm)\) algorithm for deciding whether \(M_G(m, w)\) is empty, and computing a man-optimal matching of \(M_G(m, w)\) if it exists.

### 4 Basic representation

In this section we prove the existence of a compact representation \(I(M_G)\) of the lattice \(M_G\). This representation is a generalization of the representation given in [2] for the classical stable marriage problem. Representation \(I(M_G)\) is simple to construct and its correctness is easy to prove. However, its construction takes \(O(nm^2)\) time.

Recall that equivalence classes of \(M_G(m, w)\) under \(\sim\) form a sublattice of \(M_G\). Thus \(M_G(m, w)\) contains its own equivalence class of man-optimal strongly stable matchings.

**Definition 4** By \(M(m, w)\) we denote the equivalence class of man-optimal strongly stable \((m, w)\)-matchings.

**Definition 5** An equivalence class of a matching \(N\) is called irreducible if \([N]_\sim = M(m, w)\) for some \(m, w\).

By \(I(M_G)\) we denote the set of irreducible equivalence classes. We will consider \((I(M_G), \preceq)\) as the partial order with the dominance relation inherited from \(M_G\).

A subset \(S\) of \(I(M_G)\) is said to be closed in \(I(M_G)\) if there is no element in \(I(M_G) \setminus S\) that precedes an element in \(S\).

Let \(S \subseteq I(M_G)\) be a closed set. Denote \(\vee S = \bigvee_{T \in S} T\). Obviously \(\vee S\) is an equivalence class of \(\sim\). Hence every closed subset of \((I(M_G), \preceq)\) corresponds to an equivalence class. We will prove that it is a bijection from the set of closed subsets of \((I(M_G), \preceq)\) to the set of equivalence classes of \(\sim\).

**Definition 6** Let \(M\) be any strongly stable matching. We define the irreducible support \(U(M)\) to be

\[
U(M) = \{M(m, w) : (m, w) \in M\}
\]

**Lemma 4** Let \(M\) be any strongly stable matching. Then \([M] = \vee U(M)\). 

Proof. Suppose that \([M] \neq \bigvee U(M)\). There is a man \(m_1\) such that \((m_1, w_1) \in M\) and for every matching \(M' \in U(M)\), it holds that \(w_1 \neq_{m_1} M'(m_1)\). Note that \(M(m_1, w_1)\) is in \(U(M)\), so \(M'(m_1) \prec_{m_1} w_1\). There must be a pair \((m_2, w_2) \in M\) such that in any matching from the class \(M(m_2, w_2)\) man \(m_1\) gets matched to a woman strictly worse than \(w_1\). Class \(M(m_2, w_2)\) dominates class \([M]\), because \((m_2, w_2) \in M\). This gives a contradiction because \(m_1\) prefers \(w_1\) to any partner of any matching in \(M(m_2, w_2)\). \(\square\)

By \(C(U(M))\) we denote the set of all irreducible matchings that dominate some matching in \(U(M)\), i.e. \(C(U(M))\) is the closure of \(U(M)\).

**Lemma 5** Let \(M\) be a strongly stable matching. Then \([M]_{\sim} = \bigvee C(U(M))\).

**Proof.** If \([M] \not\preceq^* [N]\) then \([M] \lor [N] = [N]\), so \(\bigvee C(U(M)) = \bigvee U(M)\) since each matching in \(\bigvee C(U(M))\) dominates some matching in \(\bigvee U(M)\). \(\square\)

**Lemma 6** Let \(M\) be a strongly stable matching. \([M] = \bigvee S\) for a set of equivalence classes that excludes \([M]\) if and only if \([M] \notin I(M_G)\).

**Proof.** \((\Leftarrow)\) follows from Lemma 5.

\((\Rightarrow)\) If \([M] = \bigvee S\), then every class in \(S\) dominates \([M]\). So if \([M] \notin S\), then for any pair \((m, w) \in M\) there is a class \([M'] \in S\), such that \(M(m) =_{m} M'(m)\) and \(M'\) strictly dominates \(M\). Hence \([M] \neq M(m, w)\) and \([M]\) cannot be an irreducible class. \(\square\)

**Lemma 7** If \(S\) and \(T\) are distinct closed subsets of \(I(M_G)\), then \(\bigvee S \neq \bigvee T\).

**Proof.** Since \(S\) and \(T\) are closed and \(S \neq T\) one of the maximal matchings of \(S \cup T\) (with respect to dominance) cannot be in \(S \cap T\). So one of the sets (say \(S\) without loss of generality) contains a class \([M]\) that does not dominate any matching in \(T\). Moreover for some \(m\) and \(w\) we have that \([M] = M(m, w)\). Since \([M] \in S\), vertex \(m\) has a partner no better than \(w\) in any matching in \(\bigvee S\). We claim that \(m\) has a better partner than \(w\) in every matching in \(T\), so \(\bigvee S \neq \bigvee T\).

To prove this fact, suppose that \((m, w') \in M'\) and \(w' \preceq_m w\) for some \([M'] \in T\). From the definition of \(M(m, w)\) there is a matching \(N \in M(m, w)\) such that \((m, w) \in N\). We can easily see that \(N \land M'\) contains \((m, w)\), so \(M(m, w) \preceq M(m, w) \land [M] \preceq [M']\).

Thus \(M(m, w)\) dominates \(M'\) contradicting the fact that \(M(m, w)\) dominates no matching in \(T\). \(\square\)

**Lemma 8** If \(S\) is a closed subset of \(I(M_G)\) and \([M]_{\sim} = \bigvee S\), then \(S = C(U(M))\).

The following theorem is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 4, 5, 6, 7.

**Theorem 5** The function \(S \to \bigvee S\) is a bijection between the nonempty closed subsets of \(I(M_G)\) and \(\mathcal{X}\).

**Theorem 6** Representation \((I(M_G), \prec)\) can be constructed in time \(O(nm^2)\).
Proof. It is easy to see that the set $I(M_G)$ can be computed in time $O(nm^2)$. It suffices to run the algorithm described in Theorem 9 for each edge $(m, w) \in E$. Obviously the set $I(M_G)$ has at most $m$ elements. In order to determine the precedence relation on $(I(M_G), \prec)$ we simply examine each pair of equivalence classes of $I(M_G)$ and test whether one class dominates the other one. Each test clearly takes $O(n)$ time. This shows that the construction takes $O(nm^2)$ time. \qed

5 A Maximal Sequence of Strongly Stable Matchings

In this section we will be interested in computing a sequence of strongly stable matchings $M_0 \succ M_1 \succ \ldots \succ M_z$ such that $M_0$ is a man-optimal strongly stable matching, $M_z$ is a woman-optimal strongly stable matching and for each $1 \leq i \leq z$, there exists no strongly stable matching $M'$ such that $M_{i-1} \succ M' \succ M_i$. We will call such a sequence a maximal sequence of strongly stable matchings. In order to do this, we need to be able to compute a strict successor of any strongly stable matching $M$, where by a strict successor of $M$ we mean any strongly stable matching $M'$, which is a successor of $M$, i.e., $M \succ M'$ and such that there exists no strongly stable matching $M''$ such that $M \succ M'' \succ M'$.

Let $M$ be a strongly stable matching $M$ and $m$ a vertex in $A$. Suppose that there exists a strongly stable matching $M'$ such that $m$ gets a worse partner in $M'$ than in $M$, i.e., $M(m) \succ_m M'(m) = w'$. What edge incident to $m$ can potentially belong to $M'$? Obviously it must be an edge $(m, w)$ such that $M(m) \succ_m w$. By Lemma 1 we also get that $m \succ_w M(w)$. This way we get that any edge $(m, w)$ such that $w \prec_m M(m) \land M(w) \prec_w m$ potentially belongs to a strict successor $N$ of $M$ such that $m$ has a worse partner in $N$ than in $M$. In the algorithm computing a strict successor of $M$, the set $E_c$ contains for each man $m$ highest ranked edges incident to him that potentially belong to some strict successor $N$ of $M$ such that $M(m) \succ_m N(m)$.

We can observe that if man $m$ gets a worse partner in a strongly stable matching $M'$, then it automatically means that certain other men must also get worse partners in $M'$ and certain women must get better partners in $M'$. For example, let us assume that $M'(m) = w' \prec_m w = M(m)$. Then, if there exists $w_1$ such that $w_1 =_m w$ and $m =_{w_1} M(w_1)$, then $w_1$ must have a better partner in $M'$ than in $M$, (otherwise $(m, w_1)$ would block $M'$) and as a result, by Lemma 1 $w_1$'s current partner $M(w_1)$ must have a worse partner in $M'$ than in $M$. Similarly, if there exists $w_1$ such that (1) $w_1 =_m w'$ and $m \succ_{w_1} M(w_1)$ or (2) $w \succ_m w_1 \succ_m w'$ and $m =_{w_1} M(w_1)$, then $w_1$ must have a better partner in $M'$ and $M(w_1)$ must have a worse partner in $M'$.

In Algorithm given below we maintain a directed graph $G_d = (V, E_d)$, whose every edge $(m, w) \in E_d \cap M$ is directed from $w$ to $m$ and every other edge $(m, w)$ is directed from $m$ to $w$. $G_d$ satisfies:

**Property 1** Let $M$ be a currently considered strongly stable matching and $x$ a vertex such that $\text{rank}_M(x) \neq \text{rank}_{M_\nu}(x)$. Then graph $G_d$ constructed with respect to $M$ has the property that for every vertex $y$ reachable from $x$ in $G_d$ and any strongly stable matching $N$ such that $M \succ N$ and $\text{rank}_M(x) \neq \text{rank}_N(x)$ it holds $\text{rank}_M(y) \neq \text{rank}_N(y)$.

A strongly connected component $S$ of a directed graph $G' = (V', E')$ is such a maximal set of vertices $S \subseteq V'$ that for every pair of vertices $x, y \in S$ vertex $y$ is reachable from $x$, i.e., there exists a directed path from $x$ to $y$ visiting only vertices of $S$. We say that $e = (v, w)$
is an outgoing edge of $S$ if $v \in S$ and $w \notin S$. The number of outgoing edges of $S$ is denoted as $\text{outdeg}(S)$. Depending on the context, we treat a strongly connected component $S$ as a set of vertices, a set of (undirected) edges or a directed subgraph. We say that a matching $M$ is perfect on $S$ if every vertex of $S$ is matched in $M \cap S$.

We can notice that strongly connected components of $G_d$ help in finding strict successors of the considered strongly stable matching in the following sense:

**Observation 1** Let $M$ be a strongly stable matching and $N$ its successor. Then the set $X = \{v : \text{rank}_M(v) \neq \text{rank}_N(v)\}$ has the property that each strongly connected component $S$ of $G_d$ is either a subset of $X$ or is disjoint with $X$. Also, $X$ has no outgoing edge in $G_d$.

In the algorithm while computing a strict successor of a given strongly stable matching $M$ we consider each strongly connected component $S$ of $G_d$ with $\text{outdeg}(S) = 0$ and try to find a perfect matching on $S$ in the graph $G_c$. If we are successful, then we prove that this gives us a strict successor of $M$. Otherwise, we change the graphs $G_c$ and $G_d$ by allowing edges of lower rank and continue.

Another graph, which we keep in Algorithm is $G_c$. We will prove that it satisfies:

**Property 2** Let $m$ be any man and $N$ any strict successor of $M$ such that $M(m) \succ_m N(m)$. Then $\text{rank}_N(m) \geq \min\{\text{rank}_m(m, v) : (m, v) \in E' \cup E_c\}$.

### 5.1 Correctness of Algorithm

Below we prove the correctness of Algorithm computing a maximal sequence of strongly stable matchings. We begin with the following simple observations.

**Fact 1** During the whole execution:

1. $E_c \subseteq E_d$

2. Let $l(m) = \min\{\text{rank}_m(m, v) : (m, v) \in E' \cup E_c\}$. Then every edge $e = (m, w)$ of $E_d$ satisfies $l(m) \geq \text{rank}_m(e) \geq \text{rank}_M(m)$ and $\text{rank}_w(e) \leq \text{rank}_M(w)$.

3. Each edge $(m, w)$ of $E_c$ is contained in some strongly connected component $S$ of $G_d$ with $\text{outdeg}(S) = 0$.

**Proof.** The second point follows 15 and 18 of Algorithm. The third point follows from lines 16-18 of Algorithm. \hfill \Box

**Fact 2** If we show, that we never delete an edge $e$ of $E_c$ which belongs to a strongly stable matching $N$ dominated by the current matching $M$, then it implies that Property 2 is satisfied.

**Lemma 9** Assuming that at some point Algorithm satisfies Property 2, it also satisfies Property 1.

**Proof.** Suppose that at some point of the execution Property 2 is satisfied. Let $M$ be a current strongly stable matching, whose strict successor we want to compute and $m$ any man such that $M(m) \succ_m M_z(m)$. Let $N$ be any strict successor of $M$ such that $M(m) \succ_m N(m)$. By Fact 1(2) any edge $e = (m, w)$ of $E_d \setminus M$ satisfies $l(m) \geq \text{rank}_m(e) \geq \text{rank}_M(m)$ and $\text{rank}_w(e) \leq \text{rank}_M(w)$. Edge $e$ is directed in $G_d$ from $m$ to $w$. We want to show, that if
\[ \text{rank}_N(m) \neq \text{rank}_M(m), \text{ then } \text{rank}_N(w) \neq \text{rank}_M(w). \] By Property 2, \( \text{rank}_N(m) \geq l(m) \). This means that \( \text{rank}_N(w) < \text{rank}_M(w) \). Otherwise \( e \) blocks \( N \) or Lemma 1 does not hold.

If \( e = (m, w) \) is an edge of \( E_d \cap M \), then by Lemma 1, if \( \text{rank}_N(w) \neq \text{rank}_M(w) \), then \( \text{rank}_N(m) \neq \text{rank}_M(m) \).

Thus, we have shown, that for every edge \((x, y)\) of \( G_d \) and any strongly stable matching \( N \) dominated by \( M \), it holds \( \text{rank}_M(x) \neq \text{rank}_N(x) \) implies \( \text{rank}_M(y) \neq \text{rank}_N(y) \). Therefore lemma is proved.

\[ \square \]

**Lemma 10** No edge \( e \) deleted in line 19 of Algorithm can belong to any strongly stable matching \( N \) dominated by \( M \).

**Proof.** Suppose that the algorithm wants to delete an edge \( e = (m, w) \) from \( E_c \) because it is dominated by some newly added edge \((m', w)\). We want to show that \( e \) cannot belong to any strongly stable matching dominated by \( M \). Suppose to the contrary that \( e \) belongs to a strongly stable matching \( N \) dominated by \( M \). Since \( \text{rank}_w(m, w) \neq \text{rank}_M(w) \), because \( e \in E_c \), we get that \( \text{rank}_N(w) \neq \text{rank}_M(w) \). Edge \( e \) belongs to \( E_c \) and \( m' \) has an incident edge in \( E_c \). Therefore by Fact 3 \( m' \) and \( m \) belong to a common strongly connected component and hence \( M(m') \succ_m N(m') \). Then by Property 2 \( \text{rank}_w(m', w) \leq \text{rank}_N(m') \). Therefore \( e = (m, w) \) cannot belong to \( N \) as it would be blocked by \((m', w)\).

\[ \square \]

**Lemma 11** Let \( M' \) be a maximum matching in \( G_c \), \( Z \) a set of men reachable from a free man \( x_0 \) by alternating paths and \( N(Z) \) women adjacent in \( G_c \) to \( Z \). Then assuming Algorithm satisfies Properties 1 and 2, edges of \( G_c \) and lowest ranked edges of \( E' \) incident to women in \( N(Z) \) cannot be contained in any strongly stable matching dominated by \( M \).

**Proof.** Let us assume that \( e = (m, w) \) is an edge such that \( w \in N(Z) \) and there is a strongly stable matching \( N \) such that \( e \in N \) and \( M \prec N \).

We can easily prove that \( |Z| = |N(Z)| + 1 \) and that every woman in \( N(Z) \) is matched in \( M' \) with a man in \( Z \). Edge \( e \) is the lowest ranked edge incident to \( w \).

Let \( \tilde{E} \) be the set of edges incident to women in \( N(Z) \) which Algorithm wants to remove. Consider \( N \cap \tilde{E} \); let \( U' \) be their female endpoints and \( Z' \) be their male endpoints. From our assumptions it follows that \( w \notin U' \), hence \( U' \neq \emptyset \). \( N \) matches men in \( Z' \) with women in \( U' \), so \( |Z'| = |U'| \leq |N(Z)| < |Z| \).

We will prove the existence of an edge \( e' = (m', w') \) such that \( m' \in Z \setminus Z' \) and \( w' \in U' \) and then show that it blocks \( N \).

Assume that \( M' \) contains no such edge. Then it pairs women in \( U' \) with men in \( Z' \) and since \( |U'| = |Z'| \), \( M' \) pairs the men in \( Z' \) with the women in \( U' \). Hence \( x_0 \in Z \setminus Z' \) as \( x_0 \) is free in \( M' \). Consider the alternating path from \( x_0 \) to \( w \). Let \((a, b)\) be the first edge on the path with \( b \in U' \cup Z' \). If \( b \in Z' \), \( e' \) is a matching edge and \( a \in U' \), contradicting the fact that \((a, b)\) is the first edge on the path with \( b \in U' \cup Z' \). Thus \( b \in U' \) and \( a \in Z \setminus Z' \).

Since \( w' \in U' \), \( \text{rank}_w(N(w')) = \text{rank}_w(m') \). We claim that in \( N \) vertex \( m' \) is either unmatched or matched to a woman strictly below \( w' \) on his preference list. To prove this note that \( m' \) cannot be matched to a vertex strictly better than \( w' \) because \( M \) dominates \( N \) – if follows easily from Property 1. If \( m' \) is matched in \( N \) to a woman \( w'' \) such that \( \text{rank}_w(m') = \text{rank}_w(w'') \), then \((m', w'') \in E_d \) from the definition of \( G_d \). If \((m', w'') \in E_c \) then \( m' \in Z' \), a contradiction. If \((m', w'') \notin E_c \), then at some point it must have been deleted
from $E_c$ and by Lemma \[10\] it cannot belong to $N$. Hence $m'$ has to be matched in $N$ to a vertex strictly worse than $w'$.

We conclude that $(m', w')$ blocks $N$, a contradiction. \hfill \Box

**Lemma 12** Suppose that matching $M_{i-1}$ output by Algorithm is strongly stable or $M_{i-1} = M_0$. Then matching $M_i$ output by Algorithm is strongly stable and is a strict successor of $M_{i-1}$.

**Proof.** By previous lemmas we can assume that at the moment of outputting $M_i$, Algorithm satisfies Properties \[1\] and \[2\]. $M_i$ is output because $M'$ is perfect on a strongly connected component $S$ with $\text{outdeg}(S) = 0$. Thus $M_i$ is of the form $(M' \cap S) \cup (M \setminus S)$. First we prove that $M_i$ is strongly stable. Suppose to the contrary that $M_i$ is blocked by some edge $e = (m, w)$. We can notice that it cannot happen that exactly one of the vertices $m, w$ belongs to $S$. It is so because of the following. Suppose that $m \in S$. Then $e$ would be an outgoing edge of $S$, a contradiction. If $w \in S$ and $m \notin S$, then $M(m) = m, M_i(m)$ and $M(w)_w < M_i(w)$, which would mean that $e$ blocks $M = M_{i=1}$, a contradiction.

Hence, the endpoints of a blocking edge $e$ must both belong to $S$. Let us notice that at the moment of calculating alternating paths the edges of $E_c$ incident to vertex $v$ have the same rank with respect to $v$. Since $e$ blocks $M_i$, it must have at some point belonged to $E_c$ and got deleted later. An edge incident to woman $w$ can get deleted only if it is dominated by another edge of $E_c$. This then means that the rank of edges currently incident to $w$, and thus to $M_i$, is higher than that of $e$ - a contradiction.

Now we prove that $M_i$ is a strict successor of $M_{i-1}$. Let $v$ be any vertex of $S$ and $N$ any successor of $M_{i-1}$ such that $\text{rank}_N(v) = \neq \text{rank}_{M_{i-1}}(v)$. Then $\text{rank}_{M_{i-1}}(v) = \neq \text{rank}_N(v)$. By Property \[2\] the rank of every vertex of $S$ in $M_{i-1}$ must be different from its rank in $N$. By Property \[2\] for any man $m$ of $S$ we have $\text{rank}_N(m) \geq \text{rank}_{M_i}(v)$. This concludes the proof. \hfill \Box

Finally, we have a lemma with an easy proof.

**Lemma 13** After the updating of graphs $G_e$ and $G_d$ in line 38, Algorithm satisfies Properties \[1\] and \[2\].

Using previous lemmas, we have proved:

**Theorem 7** Algorithm computes a maximal sequence of strongly stable matchings.

### 5.2 Running Time of Algorithm

Without any additional modifications we can rather easily prove:

**Theorem 8** The running time of Algorithm is $O(m^2)$

**Proof.** Each time we introduce a new edge or edges to $E_d$ we need to compute strongly connected components of $G_d$. Computing strongly connected components of any directed graph $G' = (V', E')$ can be done in $O(|E'|)$ time. Since each edge $e$ of $G$ is added to $G_d$ at most once and since $G_d$ is a subgraph of $G$ at all times, the overall time spent on computing strongly connected components of $G_d$ is $O(m^2)$.

Each time we introduce a new edge to $E_e$ we need to compute women reachable by alternating paths from free men in $G_e$. Each such computation takes $O(|E_e|)$ time. Every edge of
\( G \) is added to \( G_c \) at most once and for all times \( E_c \subseteq E \) - hence the time spent on computing alternating paths in \( E_c \) during the whole execution of Algorithm is \( O(m^2) \).

Updating graphs \( G_d \) and \( G_c \) takes \( O(m) \) time overall. \( \square \)

Next, we show that Algorithm can be modified so that it runs in \( O(nm) \) time. To this end we are going to use the concept of levels introduced in \([5]\). We define the level of an edge, vertex and matching in the same way as in \([5]\):

**Definition 7** Let \( E_i \) be the edges added to \( G_c \) in phase \( i \) and define the level \( l(e) \) of an edge \( e \) to be the phase when this edge was first added to \( G_c \). Edges never added to \( G_c \) have no level assigned to them.

Thus, the set of edges ever added to \( G_c \) consists of the disjoint union \( E_\infty \cup E_c \cup \ldots E_r \), where \( r \) is the total number of phases in the algorithm. Note that \( r \leq m \).

**Definition 8** Define the level \( l(v) \) of a vertex \( v \) to be the minimum level of the edges in \( G_c \) incident to \( v \). The level of an isolated vertex is undefined.

**Definition 9** The level \( l(M) \) of a matching \( M \) is the sum of the levels of the matched women. A matching \( M \) is level-maximal if \( l(M) \geq l(M') \) for any matching \( M' \) which matches the same men.

We show that in order to make Algorithm run in \( O(nm) \) time it suffices to change Line 24.

Line 24 of the modified algorithm, called Algorithm Mod, is: "let \( w \) be a free woman in \( G_c \) of maximal level reachable from \( m \) by an alternating path \( p \) in \( E_c \)". Because of this modification we prove:

**Lemma 14** Matching \( M' \) is level-maximal at all times of the execution of Algorithm Mod.

The proof of this lemma is the same as that of its analogue in \([5]\) and is based on the following lemmas, also proved in \([5]\):

**Lemma 15** For a man, all incident edges in \( G_c \) have the same level. All women adjacent to a man of level \( i \) have level at most \( i \). When a woman loses an incident edge in \( E_c \) she loses all her incident edges in \( E_c \).

**Lemma 16** A matching \( M \) is level-maximal iff there is no alternating path in \( G_c \) from a free woman in \( M \) to a woman of lower level.

**Lemma 17** If \( M' \) is level-maximal, \( m \) is a free man in \( M' \), \( w \) is a woman of maximal level reachable from \( m \) by an augmenting path \( p \) in \( E_c \), then \( N = M' \oplus p \) is level-maximal.

The search for augmenting paths in \( G_c \) and its analysis are also the same as in \([5]\). Therefore we have:

**Lemma 18** The total time of Algorithm Mod spent on computing augmenting paths in \( G_c \), i.e. on lines 22 – 31, is bounded by \( O(nm) \).

Below we show that the time needed to compute strongly connected components during the execution of Algorithm Mod can be estimated more carefully than in Theorem \([8]\).
Lemma 19 The overall time of Algorithm Mod spent on computing strongly connected components of $G_d$ is $O(nm)$.

Proof. Pearce [10] and Pearce and Kelly [11] sketch how to extend their algorithm and that of Marchetti-Spaccamela et al. [9] to strong component maintenance. Their algorithm runs in $O(nm)$ time if edges can only be added to the graph and not deleted and $n, m$ denote the number of vertices and edges, respectively. In Algorithm (and Algorithm Mod) edges of $G_d$ can be deleted – in line 38. However, they are deleted only when $M'$ is perfect on a strongly connected component $S$. As a result only a strongly connected component $S$ of $G_d$ vanishes and other strongly connected components are unaffected. Some of the edges of $G_d$ having one or two endpoints in $S$ remain in $G_d$. We can treat them as though they were added anew to the graph. Since the ranks of men increase as we output subsequent strongly stable matchings, we can notice that each edge can be added anew to the graph $G_d$ at most three times. This proves the lemma. □

As a consequence of Lemmas [18] and [19] we obtain:

Theorem 9 Algorithm Mod runs in $O(nm)$ time.

6 Rotations

Based on a maximal sequence $C$ of strongly stable matchings it is possible to build a concise representation of the set of all strongly stable matchings. It is done very similarly as in the classical stable matching problem without ties. There such a representation is constructed from an analogous maximal sequence $D$ of stable matchings $M'_0 > M'_1 > \ldots > M'_z$, where $M'_0$ and $M'_z$ denote appropriately a man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matching. Let us note that in both problems a maximal sequence of (strongly) stable matchings is not unique.

The symmetric difference $M \oplus N$ of two matchings, with the same sets of matched vertices consists of alternating cycles. A symmetric difference $M_{i-1} \oplus M_i$ of two consecutive stable matchings in $D$ is called a rotation. It turns out that in the case of the stable matching problem without ties every rotation consists of one alternating cycle and irrespective of a maximal sequence $D$ of stable matchings one always gets the same set of rotations. The set of stable matchings is characterised by a partial order $(\Pi, \leq)$ on rotations with a relation of preceding defined as follows. We say that rotation $R_1$ precedes rotation $R_2$ and denote $R_1 \leq R_2$ if in every maximal sequences $D$ of a given instance a rotation $R_1$ occurs before a rotation $R_2$. Every stable matching corresponds to a closed subset of $\Pi$. Theory regarding rotations is very well described in the book by Gusfield and Irving [2].

In the case of strongly stable matchings we proceed analogously. We define a rotation as a symmetric difference $M_{i-1} \oplus M_i$ of two consecutive strongly stable matchings in $D$. This time, however, a rotation may consist of more than one alternating cycle. Also, we define an equivalence class on rotations so that $R_1 = M \oplus N$ is equivalent to $R_2 = M' \oplus N'$ if and only if $M \sim M'$ and $N \sim N'$. On the set of classes of rotations we construct a partial order $(\Pi', \leq')$ in time $O(nm)$.

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Algorithm
1: let $M_0$ be any man-optimal strongly stable matching of $G$
2: let $M_z$ be any woman-optimal strongly stable matching of $G$
3: $M \leftarrow M_0$
4: let $M'$ contain edge $(m, M(m))$ for every man $m$ such that $M(m) = m M_z(m)$
5: let $E_d$ contain all edges of $M$
6: let $G_d$ be a directed graph $(V, E_d)$ in which every edge $(m, w) \in E_d \cap M$ is directed from $w$ to $m$ and every other edge $(m, w)$ is directed from $m$ to $w$
7: $E' \leftarrow E \setminus E_d$
8: let $E_c = M'$ and let $G_c = (V, E_c)$
9: for a vertex $x$ let $S(x)$ denote a strongly connected component of $G_d$ containing $x$
10: for each $(m, w) \in M$ remove from $E'$ each edge $(m', w)$ dominated by $(m, w)$ and each edge $(m, w')$ such that $w' \succ_m w$
11: let $i = 1$
12: set phase number $j = 1$
13: repeat
14: while $(\exists m \in A) (\text{deg}_{G_c}(m) = 0 \text{ and } \text{outdeg}(S(m)) = 0)$ do
15: add the set $E_m$ of top choices of $m$ from $E'$ to $E_d$
16: if $\text{outdeg}(S(m)) = 0$ then
17: add every edge $(m, w) \in E_m$ such that $m \succ_w M(m)$ and $M(m) \succ_m w$ to $E_c$
18: for every edge $(m, w)$ of $E_c$ that becomes dominated by some newly added edge $(m', w)$ remove it from $G_c$
19: remove $E_m$ from $E'$
20: end if
21: end while
22: while $(\exists m \in A) (m \text{ is free in } M' \text{ and } \text{outdeg}(S(m)) = 0)$ do
23: if an alternating path from $m$ to a free woman $w$ in $E_c$ exists then
24: let $w$ be a free woman in $M'$ reachable from $m$ by an alternating path $p$ in $E_c$
25: $M' \leftarrow M' \oplus p$
26: else
27: let $Z$ be the set of men reachable from $m$ by alternating paths in $E_c$
28: let $N(Z)$ be the women adjacent to $Z$ in $E_c$
29: delete all lowest ranked edges in $E_c \cup E'$ incident to any $w \in N(Z)$
30: end if
31: end while
32: while $(\exists S)(\text{outdeg}(S) = 0 \text{ and } (M' \text{ perfect on } S))$ do
33: $M \leftarrow (M' \cap S) \cup (M \setminus S)$
34: $M_i \leftarrow M$
35: output $M_i$
36: $i \leftarrow i + 1$
37: $M' \leftarrow M' \setminus S$
38: update $G_c$ and $G_d$: $E_c \cap S$ contains only edges of the form $(m, M(m))$ such that $m$ is a man and $M(m) = m M_z(m)$; an edge $(m, w)$ stays in $G_d$ only if $\text{rank}_m(w) = \text{rank}_M(m)$ and $\text{rank}_w(m) \leq \text{rank}_M(w)$.
39: end while
40: $j \leftarrow j + 1$
41: until $(\forall v \in A) \text{rank}_M(v) = \text{rank}_{M_z}(v)$

Figure 1: Algorithm for computing a maximal sequence of strongly stable matchings