Election Forensics and the 2004 Venezuelan Presidential Recall Referendum as a Case Study

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Abstract. A referendum to recall President Hugo Chávez was held in Venezuela in August of 2004. In the referendum, voters were to vote YES if they wished to recall the President and NO if they wanted him to continue in office. The official results were 59% NO and 41% YES. Even though the election was monitored by various international groups including the Organization of American States and the Carter Center (both of which declared that the referendum had been conducted in a free and transparent manner), the outcome of the election was questioned by other groups both inside and outside of Venezuela. The collection of manuscripts that comprise this issue of *Statistical Science* discusses the general topic of election forensics but also focuses on different statistical approaches to explore, post-election, whether irregularities in the voting, vote transmission or vote counting processes could be detected in the 2004 presidential recall referendum. In this introduction to the Venezuela issue, we discuss the more recent literature on post-election auditing, describe the institutional context for the 2004 Venezuelan referendum, and briefly introduce each of the five contributions.

Key words and phrases: Election forensics, post-election audits, Venezuelan Presidential Recall Referendum, exit polls, electronic voting systems, election accuracy.

1. INTRODUCTION

In every democracy, citizens have the opportunity to participate in elections at different levels. It is critically important that elections be free and fair, by which we mean that institutions and safeguards to guarantee full access of eligible voters and of candidates must be in place. In most advanced democracies we can reasonably assume that this will be the case (except in localized instances of malfeasance or non-intentional error) but with the advent of many new democracies around the world, opportunities for irregularities of all kinds have multiplied (Mebane, 2007).

Since approximately the 1960s (Hyde, 2011), the practice of inviting international observers to monitor the electoral process as it takes place has become almost standard practice. International organizations such as the United Nations or the Organization of American States, alongside non-governmental groups such as the Carter Center, have often been asked to produce a “seal of approval” for elections that were expected to be contested. The 2004 Venezuelan Referendum to Recall the President was one such election as we discuss below. While ensuring that elections are free and fair has been the main focus of these organizations in recent years, less has...
been done about the question of whether the election outcome reflects the intentions of the electorate.

Election monitoring, typically conducted by observation of the electoral process as it occurs in the field, is aimed at detecting irregularities such as voter access and the integrity of ballot boxes, but does not address the issue of election accuracy. We say that an election is accurate when the outcome of the election is consistent with the preferences of voters. By accurate we do not mean perfect; in every election, there will be some differences between the official vote count and the actual votes that were cast by the electorate. These differences are often inconsequential, in that they do not affect the outcome of the election. When the differences are large enough to determine an outcome that is not reflective of voters’ intentions, then the election is said to be inaccurate (Mebane, 2007).

The consequences of conducting elections that are provably flawed, either by mistake or by malfeasance, can be costly from a political, social and even economic point of view. A winner who is perceived to be “illegitimate” might not be able to gain the respect of disgruntled voters and in extreme cases, might be unable to lead (as was the case with the presidential elections of 2001 in Bangladesh, European Union, 2001). Further, after an election has been conducted, it is a challenge to decide what to do even when significant irregularities have been detected. An example close to home was the voting in Jasper County, South Carolina, during the presidential election of 2000. While it was clear that tampering with voting machines had occurred, the legal battles that ensued post-election did not lead to widely accepted rulings (Jacobson and Rosenfeld, 2002). (The discussions came to an end once it was argued that even if the fraudulent voting in Jasper County had not occurred, South Carolina would have been a Bush state anyway.) In practical terms, any remedial measure implemented after an election has been declared inaccurate has its own limitations and thus, fixing an election problem after the fact is typically very difficult.

The introduction of voting machines of different kinds has created some uncertainty in the outcome of elections, even in well-established democracies such as the United States (Lehoucq, 2003). Voting machines do not always produce printed reports, and when they do, the reports are unsuitable for detecting voting irregularities (Dopp, 2009). Data reports are rarely produced in formats that enable statistical analyses and often, the data are stored in proprietary file formats that limit their usefulness. Serious errors in vote counting have been documented; an example of a software failure that resulted in inexplicably lost votes occurred during the 2008 presidential election in several counties in California, where optical-count scanners manufactured by Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold Election Solutions) not only did not count votes but also deleted any signs that the votes had been cast at all (Zetter, 2008). Voter-verifiable paper ballot records used by some electronic voting machines are not error- and tamper-proof either (Balzarotti et al., 2008) because machines can be programmed to produce apparently matching counts and paper reports that can be difficult to identify as fraudulent.

Over the last decade or two, there has been renewed interest in the development of statistical methodology that can be used in the course of election audits (both pre- and post-election) to detect irregularities and guarantee the integrity of the elections. The ultimate goal of election auditing is to determine whether the winner of the election has been called correctly. In the United States, concerns about the legitimacy of elections reached a new height after the 2000 presidential election, where a combination of flawed administrative practices, voter suppression and other irregularities threw into question the outcome in Florida. The idea that the results of an election should be confirmed via some kind of post-election manual tallying is becoming more accepted and has been institutionalized in many states in the U.S. In California, for example, the law now requires that ballots cast in no fewer than one percent of the precincts in any election be manually recounted (Saltman, 2006; Stark, 2008). Many other state legislatures are considering bills that will also require a post-election audit of anywhere between 1% and 10% of the precincts, selected randomly in different ways. While these are positive steps toward creating a system for carrying out post-election audits in an “objective” way, no system that establishes a fixed proportion of precincts to be audited can guarantee that a full manual recount would confirm the outcome, with a sufficiently high probability. Stark (2008, 2010) proposes an approach to sample precincts that depends on the apparent margin of victory, the number of precincts in the election, the number of ballots cast in each precinct and the target level of confidence that the real winner is called. McCarthy et al. (2008) propose a simi-
lar approach to selecting precincts for post-election manual ballot re-count that depends on the power with which we wish to identify the true election winner. The collection of technologies and methods that can be used to assess the legitimacy of elections is known as election forensics (Mebane, 2007). In addition to the more statistical aspects of election forensics, other published research has focused on the mechanics of post-election auditing (Estok, Nevitte and Cowan, 2002; Norden et al., 2007).

The manuscripts that are included in this issue of Statistical Science propose different but complementary methods to collect, analyze and interpret post-election data, and provide an overview of the type of statistical tools that can be useful in evaluating the integrity of an election. The motivation for all of the manuscripts included in this set was the 2004 presidential referendum carried out in Venezuela, where voters were asked to vote YES or NO to the question of whether President Hugo Chávez should be recalled. Questions about the election’s accuracy were raised almost immediately and several groups in Venezuela and abroad set out to analyze some of the data that became available after the official results were announced. While the manuscripts included in this issue suggest that various forms of apparently intentional tampering seem to have occurred, other contributions to the literature (Taylor, 2005; Weisbrot, Rosnick and Tucker, 2004) argue that the evidence is insufficient to conclude that the outcome of the referendum was not correct.

The remainder of this introduction is organized as follows. First, we briefly describe the 2004 presidential referendum in Venezuela. We then discuss each of the five manuscripts that comprise the Venezuela referendum set. We finish with a brief conclusions section.

2. THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL RECALL REFERENDUM IN VENEZUELA

In 1998, President Hugo Chávez was elected President of Venezuela with almost 58% of the vote. As is required in Venezuela, the election was organized by the CNE (Consejo Nacional Electoral), a body composed of five individuals who must be confirmed by the legislative branch of the Venezuelan government and that has the mission of ensuring that elections are transparent and conducted according to the electoral normatives. In 1999, a new national Constitution was enacted. The new Constitution allowed for the conduct of presidential recall referenda and established the protocol under which this type of referendum could be conducted. In 2000, President Chávez agreed to run for early re-election and was re-elected to a new six-year term with almost 60% of the vote. While the integrity of the 2000 election already raised some questions, no formal challenge was submitted. However, the political situation in Venezuela continued to deteriorate and led to a national strike that was resolved only when a new CNE was established in 2003 (with mediation by the Carter Center) and agreed to organize a presidential recall referendum to be conducted in 2004.

The presidential recall referendum (RR) was conducted in August of 2004. This election was the first in which touch-screen voting machines were ever used in a national election in Venezuela. A large proportion (about 87%) of all votes were cast in voting centers that used touch-screen voting machines. The machines produced a vote confirmation paper receipt for each voter, that were deposited in sealed ballot boxes. Most of those paper voting records were not analyzed. The machines were connected to the totalizing servers of the CNE via telephone lines and transmitted the voting totals in each specific machine to the servers. Two post-election audits of a subset of the voting centers were conducted in cooperation with the Carter Center and with the Organization of American States.

In the RR, participants could choose to vote SI (to recall the president) or NO (to allow him to remain in his post). The official count was 59% for NO and 41% for SI. The Carter Center declared that the elections had been fair and transparent and their report pointed to no major irregularities (Carter Center, 2005a, 2005b). Other non-governmental organizations, however, carried out analyses of different sets of data arising from the election and the two post-election audits and raised questions about the integrity of the RR.

3. ANALYSES OF THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL RECALL REFERENDUM

Here we briefly introduce the manuscripts that were accepted for inclusion in the Venezuela issue. Four of the manuscripts, those by Hausmann and Rigobon, Prado and Sansó, Pericchi and Torres, and Martín suggest that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the referendum was fraudulent. In contrast, the contribution by Jiménez, while still
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3.1 Delfino and Salas

Delfino and Salas compare the proportion of YES votes in each voting center with the proportion of voters registered in that center who had signed the petition to request the referendum. The assumption underlying their analysis is that most of the people who signed the petition for the referendum are likely to vote YES. This is a plausible assumption given that no signature collection centers were allowed outside of Venezuela (yet voting centers were established in embassies and consulates around the world) and that individuals participating in the signature drive were easily identifiable by the government (but votes cast during the referendum were secret).

Delfino and Salas find discrepancies between what one might expect given the distribution of signing registered voters across centers and the official proportion of YES votes in each of the centers. These discrepancies appear to be larger in voting centers with touch-screen voting machines than in non-computerized centers. In the more populous centers (where the number of registered voters is largest) the relationship between the proportion of YES votes appears to be too tightly associated with the proportion of registered voters who signed the petition for the referendum.

Finally, the authors also compare the correlation between the proportion of YES votes and the proportion of signatures in each voting center, in two groups of centers defined by the proportion of signatures, in different elections that were held in the same voting centers between 1998 and 2004 and find inexplicable results. In all other elections, the correlations are low in centers with small percentages of registered voters who signed the petition, and higher in centers with large proportions of signatures. In contrast, the correlations were very high in both groups of voting centers during the RR, a result that cannot be easily explained.

3.2 Pericchi and Torres

Pericchi and Torres propose an approach to evaluate the integrity of elections that relies on the Newcomb–Benford Law for first and second digits and on a generalization of the law for cases where the total number of observations is capped. The main goal of the Pericchi and Torres work is to develop a new statistical tool that can be used in a wide variety of applications to determine whether numerical outcomes show irregularities.

The Newcomb–Benford Law establishes that the distribution of digits (first, second, etc.) is not uniform. In principle, therefore, one can compare the distribution of first significant digits, second significant digits and so on to the distribution that would be expected under the Newcomb–Benford Law, and use the discrepancy as a test statistic for the hypothesis that the observed distribution of digits is not due to tampering. The Newcomb–Benford Law holds only asymptotically when the digits arise from aggregated unit-less counts in small samples. Because the distribution of the first significant digit depends on the size of the sample, Pericchi and Torres suggest that the second Benford Law (or the law that refers to the distribution of the second significant digit) has better statistical properties in small samples.

The authors use several elections around the world to illustrate the approach they propose for detecting departures from what would be expected under no irregularities. They find that in all cases, the null hypothesis that the frequency distribution of second significant digits behaves according to Newcomb–Benford is not rejected. The only exception is the 2004 Venezuelan presidential recall referendum, where the Bayes factor for assessing the posterior probabilities of the null model and the observed frequency distribution for the second significant digit suggest that the Newcomb–Benford model is not consistent with the observed frequencies.

A valuable contribution in this manuscript is the extension of the law to cases where the total number of counts is bounded. Under a restriction on the maximum number of counts, different voting precincts (or other units) tend to have a constant number of voters. Pericchi and Torres show that the frequency distribution of the second significant digit is less sensitive to departures from the expected behavior under the law even when the total number of units in each center is about the same.

3.3 Prado and Sansó

Prado and Sansó use exit poll data from two independent surveys conducted during the RR by a nongovernmental organization called Súmate and by Primero Justicia, a political party in the opposition. Both groups collected voting information na-
tionwide, by interviewing voters as they exited the voting centers. To guarantee confidentiality, respondents were asked to put their vote in a sealed envelope and in a box similar to ballot boxes. No other information—gender, age, socio-economic status or any other—was collected from the participants.

The forecasts that were obtained from both exit polls were in remarkable agreement. Both predicted that the YES vote would win, with about 60% of the total votes cast. The sharp discrepancy with the official CNE results, which reported that the NO vote was about 59%, was the motivation for the Prado and Sansó contribution.

Prado and Sansó carry out a simple analysis, that consists in exploring whether the exit poll results are likely if we were to assume that the official CNE election results are true. In other words, if in fact the NO received almost 60% of the vote, what is the probability that we would observe the exit poll results that were observed in each voting center? The calculation is tantamount to computing a p-value for the hypothesis that the CNE results are correct, when using the exit poll results as the test statistic. They find that for a large proportion of the voting centers, these p-values are small, typically below 0.02, providing some evidence against the assumption that the CNE results are reliable. They note that this result is observed in centers all over the country, whether large or small and for both computerized and manual voting systems.

The disagreement between the official results and what the exit polls predicted can be attributable to factors other than tampering by the CNE. Prado and Sansó offer several alternative explanations for the differences, but provide arguments that cast doubt on most of them. Still, this type of analysis, while suggestive, in no way can lead to a conclusion of tampering by the government, something with which the authors readily agree. While inconclusive, the comparison of official results and believable forecasts is a useful tool to at least call attention to electoral events where irregularities may be present.

Some potentially significant drawbacks in the Prado and Sansó analyses are listed here. First, they have no information at all about the proportion of voters who refused to respond to the exit poll survey. Second, they do not know anything about the non-respondents. If we are to reasonably assume that the probability of being a respondent in the exit poll is associated with voting patterns, then the conclusions from their study can be dramatically altered if the proportion of nonignorable nonrespondents happens to be large. Jiménez (see below) also mentions the fact that Prado and Sansó appear to ignore the fact that the sample of voters to be interviewed by exit pollsters was not a simple random sample but rather was stratified by gender, age category, time of day and other variables. As long as respondents were selected randomly within stratum and as long as the number of individuals in each stratum is proportional to the number of persons in the population in the same stratum, the Prado and Sansó analysis is adequate.

### 3.4 Martín

Martín’s analyses are novel in that she uses what might be termed metadata. Metadata means different things in different contexts; in the survey context, metadata include, for example, the time it takes each respondent to complete the survey, the number of attempts made to contact the participant, etc. (Groves et al., 2009). In summary, metadata arise from the process of conducting the election rather than from the election itself. Martín uses information on the number of bytes of incoming and outgoing data to CNE servers, start and close time of connections between voting centers and CNE servers, and number of data packets in the incoming and outgoing transmissions.

Martín finds unexplainable differences in the volume of information transmitted (both outgoing and incoming) by what she calls High Traffic Centers and Cellular Centers when compared with the Low Traffic Centers. From a technological point of view and given election normative, transmitted data behavior should not differ across centers. Further, Martín finds that there is a statistically significant association between the number of votes cast in a center and the size of the packets that were transmitted from the center to the CNE servers; this is unexpected under the election normative that requires that centers transmit only a total count to CNE.

These findings prompt Martín to suggest that CNE servers, voting machines or both might have been programmed to process votes in different types of voting centers differently. Other explanations for the differential behaviors are possible as well, and in the absence of information about the association between transmission volume and type of voting center, it is not possible to conclude that tampering took place. Martín’s contribution, however, is valu-
able in that it highlights the use of transmission metadata and proposes approaches to explore those data. Electronic voting systems are becoming the norm worldwide, and therefore, forensic methods that make use of transmission metadata might become the standard hot auditing approach. The limitations of Martín’s approach can serve to inform future protocols, so that more conclusive (perhaps even causal) conclusions can be reached in election auditing.

3.5 Hausmann and Rigobón

Hausman and Rigobón use the same exit poll data that were analyzed in the Prado and Sansó manuscript. In addition, they also use the (known) proportion of signatures in favor of holding the referendum, by voting center. Hausmann and Rigobón reason as follows: both the proportion of signatures in a voting center and the proportion of reported YES votes collected in the exit poll at the center are independent and noisy measurements of the vote intention of voters in the center. Voters in a center who had earlier signed the petition for a referendum are expected to have cast a YES vote, but for many reasons, it is also expected that the number of actual YES votes in a center will not be identical to the number of voters who signed the petition. Similarly, if the exit polls are reasonably well conducted, one would expect that in those centers where the voters cast a high percentage of YES votes, the survey numbers would also indicate a large proportion of YES votes. Because the noise in the two estimates of intention of vote are due to different factors, it is also reasonable to think that the errors in the two measurements will be uncorrelated.

The authors found that the correlation between the estimated residuals from models where the observed number of YES votes were regressed on either the proportion of signatures or on the predicted proportions of YES in the exit polls were highly correlated, at least in voting centers where by all indications, the YES should have defeated the NO votes. By using a latent variable approach to explain this apparent correlation, they conclude that the evidence leads to rejection of the null hypothesis of no electronic fraud. The statistical evidence, coupled with several other observations, lead these authors to conclude that voting machines in about 70% of the voting centers were manipulated to produce official counts that did not reflect voters’ intent.

In addition to the analyses described above, Hausmann and Rigobón also address the issue of selection of voting centers where a hot audit was conducted by the government. Each voting machine provided voters with a paper confirmation of their vote. The paper ballots were to be put in a sealed ballot box that could later be used to audit the accuracy of the tallies by the voting machines. An audit conducted on the same day in which the voting took place selected what was supposed to be a random sample of 1% of voting machines. For these, the machine tallies were to be compared with the paper ballots in the ballot box. This audit was conducted in a less than satisfactory way (see the Carter Center report of 2004). Hausmann and Rigobón argue that the selection of voting machines for this audit was far from random and indeed suggest that the CNE selected machines only from those centers in which the CNE knew no electronic fraud had been committed.

The Hausmann and Rigobón conclusions that fraud did indeed occur are somewhat of a stretch given the evidence. While it is true that the null hypotheses of no departures from what would be expected if the election results reflected voters’ intentions is rejected, there may be many other explanations for what was observed. Undoubtedly, the results from these analyses are persuasive, in particular when coupled with other facts such as the refusal of the CNE to share its random number generator for selecting machines to be audited. In a briefing paper published by the Center for Economic and Policy Research, Weisbrot, Rosnick and Tucker (2004) state that not only the random number generator but the source code and other relevant material were shared by the CNE with a group of international observers.

3.6 Jiménez

The manuscript by Jiménez serves both as a valuable contribution to this issue and also as a discussion of several of the other manuscripts we include here. Jiménez uses only the actual votes that were cast in each voting machine in voting centers with two or more machines. In the absence of a full manual count of the paper ballots, Jiménez proposes that the most reliable approach consists in testing a sequence of hypotheses that account for scenarios where irregularities were present but are explainable by causes other than deliberate fraud.

Jiménez proposes to base all inference on the sampling distribution of test statistics which can be derived by permutation of the voting cards of each voter in each voting center. First, he assumes that the joint conditional distribution of outcomes per
voting machine given the total vote count in each center is a multivariate hypergeometric distribution. If we observe \( \nu \) votes in a machine, where \( y \) and \( n \) correspond to YES and NO votes, and where \( \nu - y - n \) correspond to OUT votes (where OUT denotes votes that are not valid for different reasons), any such vector of size \( \nu \) can be viewed as a permutation of a vector with the same counts, but where votes are shuffled across voters in the machine. That is, if voters are randomly assigned to machines, then given \((\nu, y, n)\) any permutation of vote cards has the same probability of occurring.

Jiménez formulates the null hypothesis of a fair referendum, where the votes per machine correspond to a random draw from the multivariate hypergeometric distribution indexed by \((\nu, y, n)\). A main point in his discussion is that rejection of the null hypothesis does not imply that the referendum was unfair; other alternatives are also possible. He proceeds by formulating and testing several alternative hypotheses and finally concludes that indeed, the departures from the null model that were observed in the 2004 RR cannot be explained by innocent mistakes or random chance.

The final conclusion from Jiménez’s analysis is, as in the earlier contributions, that the irregularities in the referendum introduced a bias in favor of the winning position, and that the bias was large enough to have resulted in the incorrect result with high probability. Even though Jiménez agrees at least in part with the other contributors, he is critical of several of the approaches that they used to arrive at their results. One such criticism is that no one made use of the “full information” that was available from the official reports. By “full information” Jiménez refers to the nonvalid votes and abstentions reported at the lowest electoral unit level. While his point that all available information ought to be used in forensic analyses is well taken, it seems that in the case of the 2004 Venezuelan RR this additional piece of data did not lead to results that contradicted those by the other authors in this issue.

4. DISCUSSION

There are many ways in which an election can be rigged, so that the outcome does not in the end reflect voters’ intentions. The increasing popularity of electronic voting systems has allowed for the possibility of subtle tampering that can be difficult to identify except through a complete audit. In some instances, even completing an audit can be a challenge if the electronic voting machines do not produce a paper confirmation of vote that can be saved for a manual count if the audit becomes necessary.

There has been quite a lot of discussion in the recent literature on how to define an election protocol that can reduce the opportunity for fraud (or even innocent mistakes) and increase voter confidence in the outcome. An example is the work by Elklit and Reynolds (2002), who propose an election assessment approach consisting of 11 different steps (see their Table 1). For each step, Elklit and Reynolds provide performance indicators and also variables that can be used to determine whether the performance is adequate. Dopp (2009) focuses on post-election auditing protocols and presents a comprehensive set of procedures to be carried out before the post-election audit begins, as it progresses and once it has been completed. Dopp and Elklit and Reynolds, and indeed much of the political science literature, emphasize the procedural aspect of election assessment and auditing. Stark (2008), in contrast, views the issue of designing a post-election audit as a constrained optimization problem and provides insight on the size of the post-election audit sample as well as a sequential testing approach that either confirms the election outcome after a partial audit or leads to a complete re-count.

The collection of manuscripts included in this Venezuela issue provides good insight into some of the statistical tools that may be useful when evaluating the integrity of an election. While the focus of most of the work was the 2004 Presidential Recall Referendum held in Venezuela, the major contribution of the Venezuela issue is methodological; the manuscripts in this issue propose creative ways in which different sources of information arising in an election can be analyzed and interpreted to assess the election. None of the election forensic projects described in this issue can, by themselves, provide convincing evidence that irregularities observed in the electoral process are due to deliberate fraud. Even Jiménez, who proposes the most sophisticated (from a statistical viewpoint) methodology, is still unable to establish that tampering occurred with certainty. The collection of tools and conclusions, however, does paint a persuasive picture which suggests that a battery of tests and data sources may be more effective for election performance assessment than a single method.

Because it is so critical that the true winner is called in an election, it would be ideal if we could design election audit procedures that allow causal in-
ference. This, however, is not possible and as a consequence election forensics can only suggest associations. The approach proposed by Martín, however, can be amenable to a quasi-experimental design if the properties of the transmissions between voting machines and central servers are well understood before the election begins; this would allow deciding if the behavior of transmissions that are carried out during the election is surprising in some way. Martín’s work shows, above all, that there are ways other than traditional vote counting that can shed some light on the quality of an election.

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