Getting something out of nothing

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Abstract

We study quantum key distribution with standard weak coherent states and show, rather counter-intuitively, that the detection events originated from vacua can contribute to secure key generation rate, over and above the best prior art result. Our proof is based on a communication complexity/quantum memory argument.

1 Introduction

The best-known application of quantum cryptography is quantum key distribution (QKD) [1]. The goal of QKD is to allow two parties, Alice and Bob, to share a common string of secret in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Such a key can subsequently be used for, for example, perfectly secure communications via the so-called one-time-pad. Unlike conventional cryptography, the security of QKD is guaranteed by the fundamental law of physics—the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. The best-known protocol for QKD is the Bennett-Brassard protocol (BB84) [1]. In BB84, Alice sends Bob a sequence of single photons in one of the four polarizations (vertical, horizontal, 45-degree and 135-degree) and Bob randomly performs a measurement in one of the two conjugate bases. In principle, the security of QKD has been proven in a number of papers including [2, 3, 4].

For practical implementations, an attenuated laser pulse (a so-called weak coherent state) is often used as the source. The security of QKD with a rather generic class of imperfect devices has been proven in GLLP [5], following the earlier work [6]. Recently, Hwang [7] has proposed a decoy state idea for improving the performance (i.e., the key generation rate and distance) of QKD systems. We [8] have demonstrated rigorously how the decoy state idea can be combined with GLLP to obtain a key generation rate (per pulse emitted by Alice) which is lower bounded by:

\[ S \geq Q_{\text{signal}} \{ -H_2(E_{\text{signal}}) + \Omega_1[1 - H_2(e_1)] \}, \]

where \( Q_{\text{signal}} \) and \( E_{\text{signal}} \) are respectively the gain and quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the signal state, \( \Omega_1 \) and \( e_1 \) are respectively the fraction and QBER of detection events by Bob that have originated from single-photon signals emitted by Alice. Here, the gain means the ratio of Bob’s detection events to Alice’s total number of emitted signals.

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Decoy state QKD has subsequently been investigated by Wang [9] and by Harrington [10].

The key goal of this paper is to increase the above key generation rate in Eq. 1 by a term \( Q_{\text{signal}} \Omega_0 \) where \( \Omega_0 \) is the fraction of detection events of Bob that have originated from vacua emitted by Alice. More concretely, we have the following main Theorem.

**Theorem 1**
The key generation of an efficient BB84 scheme is given by:

\[
S \geq Q_{\text{signal}} \{-H_2(E_{\text{signal}}) + \Omega_0 + \Omega_1[1 - H_2(e_1)]\},
\]

where \( \Omega_0 \) is the fraction of detection events by Bob that has originated from the vacuum signals emitted by Alice. In other words, we find that each detection event by Bob that has originated from a vacuum (i.e., nothing) emitted by Alice automatically contributes to a bit of secure key over and above the prior art result (Eq. 1) presented in [5] and also [8].

Before we embark on a detailed discussion, let us check for the consistency of our result. Naively, one might think that our suggestion that the vacuum will contribute to a secure key is an insane idea because if nothing is emitted by Alice, what is the origin of security? We remark that the vacuum alone does not contribute to a secure key. More concretely, suppose all the signals sent by Alice are vacuums and there are no background events. Then, \( \Omega_0 = 1, \Omega_1 = 0, \) and \( E_{\text{signal}} = 1/2. \) Therefore, from Eq. 2, we get the lower bound 0 for the key generation rate. The reason is that the term \( \Omega_0 \) is exactly cancelled by the error correction term \( -H_2(E_{\text{signal}}). \)

What Eq. 2 does say is that no privacy amplification is needed for the vacua state. This is intuitively clear because Eve cannot have any a priori information on Alice’s bit, if nothing is emitted from Alice’s laboratory.

Now, let us prove our main result (Eq. 2). We shall use the method of communication complexity. As noted by Ben-Or [3] and by Renner and Koenig [11], the number of rounds of universal hashing needed for privacy amplification in QKD is at most given by any upper bound to the size of Eve’s quantum memory which contains information on the key. In other words, we have, informally:

**Theorem 2** [3, 11]: The key generation rate in QKD

\[
S \geq N - S_{\text{Eve}}
\]

where \( N \) is the size of the sifted key shared between Alice and Bob and \( S_{\text{Eve}} \) is the size of Eve’s quantum memory. [A more formal definition involving the relevant \( \epsilon \) and \( \delta \) can be found as Eq. (11) in [11].]

**Remark**: Note that Theorem 2 only gives a lower bound to the key generation rate because it does not consider the possibility of advantage distillation in QKD [12].

In summary, all we need to compute (a lower bound to) the key generation rate is to work out the size of Eve’s quantum memory.

**Proof of Theorem 1**: Now, note that Eve has two pieces of information on the key. The first piece, which is strictly quantum, comes from Eve’s eavesdropping attack during the quantum transmission from Alice to Bob. The second piece is classical and comes from the classical error correction part.

We argue that the first piece, from eavesdropping the quantum transmission, consists of two parts: single-photon part and multi-photon part. It should be emphasized that the vacua signals do not contribute at all. This is because, since Alice is emitting nothing, Eve cannot possibly learn anything about Alice’s key. Eve can influence and, in fact, decide on Bob’s key by sending her own photons into Bob’s detector. However, Bob’s key does not really tell Eve anything about Alice’s key.

Let us consider the multi-photon part first. We take the most conservative assumption that Eve has all the information on all multi-photon signals. Her quantum memory
size on the multi-photon part is then given by $Q_{\text{signal}}\Omega_m$. Here, $\Omega_m$ is the fraction of detection events of Bob that have originated from multi-photon signals. Note that $\Omega_0 + \Omega_1 + \Omega_m = 1$. The single-photon part is given by simply $Q_{\text{signal}}\Omega_1 H_2(e_1)$, where $e_1$ is the phase error rate of the single-photon signals. From Shor-Preskill’s proof \cite{Ref1}, $e_1 = e_1$, which is the bit-flip error rate for the single-photon signals. So, the quantum memory for single-photon part is actually given by $Q_{\text{signal}}\Omega_1 H_2(e_1)$. Adding the two parts, the first piece of Eve’s information has a memory size $Q_{\text{signal}}[\Omega_1 H_2(e_1) + \Omega_m]$. The second piece of Eve’s information, which comes from classical error correction, is asymptotically given by $Q_{\text{signal}}H_2(E_{\text{signal}})$.

In summary, adding the two pieces together, the total quantum memory size of Eve is given by $S_{\text{Eve}} = Q_{\text{signal}}[H_2(E_{\text{signal}}) + \Omega_1 H_2(e_1) + \Omega_m]$. Now, the length of the sifted key (per pulse emitted by Alice) shared by Alice and Bob is $N = Q_{\text{signal}}[\Omega_0 + \Omega_1 + \Omega_m]$. Therefore, the number of secure key bits (per pulse emitted by Alice) is given by

$$S \geq N - S_{\text{Eve}} = Q_{\text{signal}}[-H_2(E_{\text{signal}}) + \Omega_0 + \Omega_1[1 - H_2(e_1)]] \quad \text{(4)}$$

which is precisely Eq. (2). This concludes the proof of our Theorem 1.

In summary, we have increased the key generation from Eq. (1) in the prior art result \cite{Ref5} to Eq. (3) by showing that, rather counter-intuitively, the detection events due to vacua contribute directly to the secure key. What is interesting about this result is that it is based on a communication complexity approach and is not entirely clear whether it can be derived from an entanglement distillation approach. In future, it will perhaps be interesting to rephrase this result in the general framework of $\Gamma$ states \cite{Ref13}, which generalizes the entanglement distillation approach.

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