"Should I Worry?" A Cross-Cultural Examination of Account Security Incident Response

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Abstract—Digital security technology is able to identify and prevent many threats to users accounts. However, some threats remain that, to provide reliable security, require human intervention: e.g., through users paying attention to warning messages or completing secondary authentication procedures. While prior work has broadly explored people’s mental models of digital security threats, we know little about users precise, in-the-moment response process to in-the-wild threats. In this work, we conduct a series of qualitative interviews (n=67) with users who had recently experienced suspicious login incidents on their real Facebook accounts in order to explore this process of account security incident response. We find a common process across participants from five countries – with differing online and offline cultures – allowing us to identify areas for future technical development to best support user security. We provide additional insights on the unique nature of incident-response information seeking, known attacker threat models, and lessons learned from a large, cross-cultural qualitative study of digital security.

I. INTRODUCTION

State of the art security technology can keep out many malicious actors from user accounts. However, automated detection and protection systems are not perfect; humans must still practice security behaviors: e.g., avoiding clicking through SSL warnings, completing secondary authentication tasks. Prior work has explored how best to design warning messages and phishing trainings to keep users away from dangers [1–11]. Other work has examined how people learn security behaviors from stories of negative experiences [12–14], and yet other work has theoretically explored users’ mental models of warnings or security [15–19]. In these works, researchers typically simulate an attack in the lab, ask people to consider a theoretical scenario, or ask them to reflect on experiences that may have occurred in the distant past. While useful, theoretical approaches may lack ecological validity and approaches that require users to recall an incident long after it occurred may suffer from recall bias, leading to omissions or distortions of collected data. As such, we have little understanding of how users respond in the real world when their actual, valued accounts are threatened [20].

Our work takes a first step toward filling this gap: we conduct a series of open-ended qualitative interviews (n=67) soon after an in the wild security incident took place on participants’ real Facebook accounts. We specifically examine incidents in which Facebook identified and blocked a suspicious login to a user account, notified the user of this incident, and then asked the user to perform a secondary authentication task to regain access to their account. We use anonymized Facebook log records to identify and recruit participants, eliminating the need to recruit people based upon potentially biased self-reports. In our interviews, we asked participants to walk us through their experience of the incident. This included asking them about their feelings, information seeking processes, concerns over their account’s compromise, and actions following the incident (which we validated, when possible, with log records).

To both facilitate broader generalizability and explore how incident response may be influenced by user and environment characteristics, we recruited participants from five countries: Brazil, Germany, India, the United States, and Vietnam. Each of these countries has a different cultural context, which includes both offline and online components: e.g., level of collectivist identity, Internet penetration, and Internet censorship.

Based on rigorous analysis of the interview transcripts and timelines (Krippendorff’s alpha = 0.87) we identify and instantiate a common process of account security incident response (Figure 3). This process consists of incident awareness, mental model generation, and behavioral response. Variations in the execution of this process are driven by the information obtained through in-the-moment information seeking, their threat models and past experiences, and three attributes of their cultural context: degree of Internet censorship, cultural collectivism – as measured by Hofstede’s indices [23] – and differentiated platform use.

In addition to defining this process of account security incident response, we also qualitative identify what made notifying participants about this incident relatively effective, chiefly, attention capture through a unique, interactive task and the creation of a sense of partnership between the user and the platform. Our results also independently fill two gaps in prior literature. We identify camaraderie as a key motivation for security information seeking and find that incident-related information seeking may differ from general security advice seeking both in this motivation and in the channels and urgency of support. Further, we instantiate a taxonomy of known attacker threat models, filling a gap in the existing body of literature on user threat models, which primarily focuses on unknown, rather than known, attackers [18, 24].

By holistically understanding how users react to being notified of a potential threat, including the mental models they

1 Facebook has over 2 billion users worldwide [21], approximately two thirds of the estimated population currently online [22].

2 Over one third of participants in our study took what they perceived as a protective behavior after regaining access to their account (e.g., changing password, being more vigilant online).
we are able to identify areas for improvement and suggest new research directions to ensure better future security. In the remainder of the paper we detail these suggestions and the results from which they were drawn.

### II. RELATED WORK

Prior work on security incidents has focused heavily on the efficacy of warnings [3], [29]–[27]. More relevant to incident response, Bravo-Lillo et al. assessed user’s understandings of and intended behavioral response to 29 different warnings in a lab study [15], while Anderson et al. explored physiological response to different types of warning messages using fMRI scans [28]. Additional prior work provides a more general examination of user’s negative experiences, including reflections on negative experiences with software updates [13] and the effect of stories about negative security experiences on user behavior [29]. Most related to our work, Shay et al. surveyed U.S. Amazon Mechanical Turk crowd workers about whether they had ever experienced an account hijacking (someone taking over an email or social network account), what their concerns were about the incident, and what they thought had happened [30]. We build on their initial exploration by deeply examining how a diverse population responded to a specific, in-the-wild incident; our work additionally explores behavioral response and information seeking, topics previously unexplored.

Prior work has also considered users’ general mental models of the Internet [31], [32] and how those mental models influence security [17]. Further work has explored mental models of security threats [16], [24], [33]; and Rader and Wash define a taxonomy of these threat models, which are unknown to the victim. We add to the body of knowledge on threat models: (a) showing how mental models influence incident responses and (b) identifying four new folk models, specific to attackers that the the victim knows.

Finally, prior cross-cultural work in security has particularly focused on comparisons between two countries (often the US vs. another country). Topics covered include enterprise security [34], Internet buying behavior [35], online banking security [36], [37], and, in one case, general mental models [38]. A smaller set of papers has examined aspects of security across larger number of countries [39]–[43]. For example, Sawaya et al. surveyed users from seven different countries (not including South America or Southeast Asia) regarding their intention to behave securely, finding variance in intended action and security knowledge between cultures [43]. These works have all supported the need for a more nuanced examination of digital security from the lens of different user populations; a call echoed specifically for cross-cultural examinations in Crossler et al.’s position paper on future directions for behavioral cybersecurity research [44]. Our work takes another step toward answering that call: here, we report the first interview study on digital security conducted across more than two countries, and begin to fill gaps in understanding left by prior quantitative work, which identifies cultural differences but provides little understanding of why these differences exist.

### III. METHODOLOGY

To investigate the process of in the wild security incident response, we conducted 15 pilot interviews and 67 non-pilot interviews with Facebook users from Brazil (BR), Germany (DE), India (IN), the United States (US), and Vietnam (VN) who had bee notified of a real suspicious login incident on their Facebook account during August 2017. Our research procedures were approved through our ethics review process.

Here, we describe our sampling and recruitment methodology, interview process, data analysis and validation procedure, and the limitations of our work.

#### A. Sampling and Recruitment

To maximize ecological validity and minimize self-report biases that may be introduced if we were to identify eligible participants by asking people to report whether they had experienced a particular incident [4], we consulted anonymized Facebook log records to identify people whose accounts had a suspicious login incident. To ensure comparability of data across participants and countries we sought to recruit people who had experienced the same type of account security incident during the same time period (two weeks). Suspicious login incidents are identified by Facebook machine learning systems that monitor for deviations from typical login patterns.

Facebook users who have a suspicious login to their account are notified and are then immediately required to go through a secondary authentication process (Figure 1). Secondary authentication requires users to complete one of a set of possible tasks – for example, identifying pictures of their friends, identifying people with whom they have recently messaged on Facebook messenger, using two-factor authentication if it is enabled – to regain account access.

We specifically sought to study participants from five different countries, each with a different cultural and technological profile, to maximize generalizability. We selected Brazil, Germany, India, the US, and Vietnam as these countries span four different continents and differ in Internet penetration, Internet freedom, Facebook adoption level and incidence of

![Fig. 1. (Left) The screen notifying users that a suspicious login has occurred. When available this screen includes information about the geographic location of the login. (Right) The screen in which participants can chose which secondary authentication task to complete.](Image:312x632 to 432x700)

3Prior work shows that people with different socioeconomic backgrounds report security and privacy incidents at very different rates [45].
Those who were interested in participating completed a short demographic and scheduling survey. We selected participants in an attempt to maximize diversity in terms of gender (M/F), age, and educational attainment.

B. Interview Protocol

At the beginning of the interview participants were reassured that there were no right or wrong answers and that the moderator was just interested in their opinions. Participants were asked about what they typically do on Facebook. Then, they were asked whether they remembered anything happening recently that was out of the ordinary when they were logging into their account or trying to use it. If they did not immediately recall the incident the interviewer asked if they happened to have done something like the secondary login process that we knew they had completed. After this prompting, all participants remembered the incident.

Incident Walkthrough. The participant was then asked to tell the moderator about what had happened. The moderator then paused, and explained to the participant that the moderator was going to draw a timeline on a piece of paper, to make sure they captured what the participant was saying. The moderator drew a line and placed the notification in the middle, they then added any events already described by the participant (e.g., behaviors afterwards, feelings at the time) and confirmed that these were accurate with the participant. See Figures 4 and 5 for examples.

Moderators then queried respondents:

- feelings: about the experience (at the time of the notification and at the time of the interview)
- mental models: what they think happened and why, and how they figured it out
- incident response: what they did during and after seeing the notification, including security behaviors (e.g., changing password) and information seeking

Interview questions were asked in different order depending on the way that participants initially described their experience, in order to create as natural and conversational a flow as possible. Relevant information from participant’s answers was iteratively added to the incident timeline.

Threat Model Assessment. Finally, if not already mentioned, the moderator asked participants to detail who they would be most worried about gaining access to their account (e.g., friend, stranger) and why (e.g., what they would be concerned about this person doing or accessing).

C. Interview Process

The interviews were conducted in the country’s official language. That is, US interviews were conducted in English, German interviews in German, Indian interviews in Hindi, Vietnam interviews in Vietnamese, and Brazilian interviews in Portuguese. To enhance consistency, all interviews, including

\[4\] We are not able to disclose these adoption and incidence figures.

\[5\] Compensation for interviews conducted by UX consultancy firms such as those used to schedule and interview participants in this study is typically higher than for academic interviews, especially in studies such as ours where study requirements make scheduling very tight – e.g., we wanted to conduct 15 interviews within two synchronous days.
those conducted in the US were completed by highly trained moderators who spoke both English and the native language of the country fluently.

**Moderator Training and Interview Consistency.** After developing the interview protocol, the researchers tested the interview protocol through 10 pilot interviews with U.S. participants and iteratively improved the protocol until it was consistently understood by participants and new issues stopped emerging. The researchers then distributed the final interview protocol to the moderators in each country as well as to an interview training manager who had extensive experience ensuring consistency across multi-country, multi-language interview studies. All moderators had at least three years of experience conducting UX research interviews in the country native language. To ensure that the protocol would be implemented as consistently and accurately as possible between moderators, a three-step, moderator training and validation process was conducted.

First, the researchers met with the interview training manager and talked through the goals for the protocol.

Once the researchers were satisfied that the interview training manager fully understood the protocol and would conduct interviews in a comparable manner, the interview training manager then repeated this process with each of the country interview moderators. The interview manager also conducted a test interview with each moderator in the role of interviewer, and the manager in the role of participant. After the interview training manager was satisfied with the moderators ability to comparably conduct interviews according to the protocol, the researchers met with each moderator and reviewed their understanding of the interview protocol and method of asking questions, providing additional feedback until all moderators were well prepared.

Finally, the first interview of the first day of each of the country interview sessions was treated as a pilot interview. This pilot interview was simultaneously translated. Both the researchers and the interview training manager listened to the interviews and provided feedback to the moderator immediately following the session and before the start of the non-pilot interviews that were ultimately analyzed. All pilot interviews met our standards for consistency and quality, and thus we proceeded with the non-pilot interviews, as planned.

**D. Data Analysis and Validation**

Interview recordings were transcribed and translated into English. We then analyzed the interview data, including the timelines, via a qualitative open-coding process [50]. Two researchers first reviewed seven of the transcripts and iteratively generated a codebook. They then independently coded the remaining 60 interview transcripts and timelines; and compared their codes using Krippendorff’s alpha, the recommended metric for checking the validity of qualitative interview coding. The Krippendorff’s alpha of this study is 0.87, which is above the required threshold of validity [51]. Further, after calculating the agreement metric, the interviewers reached 100% agreement on the final codes for each interview. In the results, we state the number of participants who expressed each theme, rather than using percentage values, to avoid over-implication of generalizability.

**Data Validation.** During the interviews, participants often attributed receiving the account security notification to a particular action taken by themselves (e.g., logging in from a new device) or by someone else (e.g., an attempted “hack”). Unfortunately, while Facebook classifiers can predict a potential unauthorized access with existing technology it is difficult to validate the accuracy of those predictions, aside from using user self reports. As such, we cannot use log data to validate whether participants’ mental models (including their timelines reflecting back on what may have caused the incident) were accurate. However, we were able to use internal log records to validate the completion of some behaviors users reported doing after the incident. Specifically, we could validate whether they actually changed their password or their privacy / security settings. We found that, of the 14 participants who reported doing so, 12 actually had done so, and one of the two who had not had done so four weeks prior to the incident, and thus may have experienced telescoping bias, in which participants may perceive older events as being more recent than they really are [52]. Our finding: that 12 of 14 reports were perfectly accurate offers support for the credibility of our data, and evidence in confirmation of the validity of security interview data, at least when collected soon after a security incident.

**E. Sample Descriptives**

We had 15 non-pilot participants in Brazil, 11 in Germany, 15 in India, 17 in Vietnam, and 9 in the US. In all countries we aimed to recruit 15 participants, in order to achieve sample sizes within best-practice recommendations for qualitative research. Table I shows the demographics of our participants.

| Gender | Education | Age | FB Use |
|--------|-----------|-----|--------|
| BR     | 8M/7F     | 9PS/6HS | 10M/5X/0B | 14V/10F/7M/3B |
| DE     | 6M/5F     | 5PS/6HS | 3M/7X/1B  | 9V/12F/4M/3B |
| IN     | 14M/1F    | 11PS/4HS| 14M/1X/0B | 9V/8F/4M/3B |
| US     | 4M/5F     | 3PS/6HS | 4M/4X/1B  | 13V/5F/9M/1B |
| VN     | 12M/5F    | 7PS/10HS| 14M/3X/0B | 12V/8F/8M/7B |

1 PS: post-secondary education (some college or above), HS: high school diploma or less education
2 M: post-Millennial and Millennial [53] (ages 18-37), X: Gen X (ages 38-54), and B: Baby Boomer (ages 55+)
3 Using Facebook to V: view content (passive), F: connect with friends, M: Facebook Messenger, and B: run a business.

**F. Limitations**

While we attempted to obtain a sample in each country that was demographically diverse in terms of gender, education, and age, we were unable to do so in India and Vietnam. We hypothesize that this is due to cultural norms around gender in both countries. We discuss how such issues may be mitigated in future work in Section VII. We also did not achieve our goal...
We hypothesize that users may be so habituated to all types of “warning” messages, as has been shown in a plethora of other work on SSL warnings [1], [2], that they simply click through the message and their attention is only captured when they must perform a task. Our findings parallel findings that SSL warnings were more effective (able to combat habituation) when people had to take an action (e.g., highlight text) in order to proceed. This suggests that, when merited, incident secondary authentication tasks as part of the notification process may be effective and beneficial for both users and platforms; perhaps more so than warning messages or more stringent security requirements, both of which may be met with user resistance and negative platform sentiment [13]. That said, platforms must be careful of over-acting “security theater” [54] and causing users to feel a false sense of safety, which may reduce their likelihood of protecting themselves when necessary.

The remaining minority of participants became alert to the potential incident from the notification message itself. For example, BR14 noticed the message and the information described peaked their attention, “Facebook said that there was someone in Brasilia [a different city in Brazil] trying to access my account, and I was at home, so [I thought]...that can’t be right.” Throughout the remainder of the paper we use the term “notification” to refer to whichever portion of the notification flow participants referenced as what alerted them that there was potentially something wrong with their account.

Respondents felt surprised, fearful, and/or annoyed. Some participants were surprised (8 of 67) when alerted to the incident. They expressed a lack of awareness that Facebook conducted these types of “checks”: US1 says, “I was surprised at first just because I had never seen that specific type of check before. Maybe I see like emails or something but I had never seen that before from Facebook.”

17 participants expressed fear in response to the notification for one (or both) of two reasons. Eleven participants felt afraid because they feared that someone had gained access to the account. These participants went through the mental modeling process immediately upon gaining awareness and swiftly concluded that the incident was caused by an attacker. On the other hand, eight of the 17 were afraid they would not be able to complete the secondary authentication process and regain access to their account; these participants were concerned with how they would get back into their account before being concerned about why or what had happened. IN6 for example says “I was afraid, what if I don’t know the comments [that I have to identify], and I lose my account? That’s the only place I can run my business”. Three of the eight participants who had this concern did, in fact, need to attempt more than one secondary login task before successfully completing one task and regaining access to their account.
Finally, annoyance was only observed among 14 participants who received the notifications frequently, the majority of whom concluded that the notifications were due to routine Internet use (Section IV-B provides more detail on the mental models of these participants). Our findings echo prior work showing that repeated warnings elicit annoyance [3], [55], while account hijacking incidents may elicit fear [30].

Secondary login process can create a sense of partnership. Despite potentially feeling annoyed, surprised, or fearful, many (32 of 67) participants felt positively about the fact that they were alerted to an incident. They perceived the notification process as a form of active partnership with the platform: Facebook was watching out for threats to their account and they as the user were completing a task (the secondary authentication task) to help Facebook keep them secure. BR11 explains that now that she knew Facebook was “on my side” and that “I don’t think anyone else could do [the secondary authentication task], I felt safe after [that]”. Similarly, DE1 says, “it made me feel like...[Facebook] is on top of the game...somebody is watching out to make sure I don’t get hacked” and DE3 says that now that he knows about the notification process and has done the secondary authentication task, “I feel much safer about my account.” Enhancing this sense of partnership further is that participants felt that the secondary task they had to complete was secure - the vast majority (46 of 67) trusted the method of secondary authentication “it seemed much safer than those security questions” (US5) - .

A few respondents sought out information about authenticity. This sense of partnership clearly relies on participants believing that the notification and task were actually from Facebook. While the majority of respondents immediately trusted the notification and/or secondary authentication task, a few wondered – is this notification malicious? – that is, they sought out information about the authenticity of the notification. DE7 said “At first, I thought, maybe this is someone trying to hack me, to find out about my friends. I've never seen this on Facebook before, maybe it got hacked. So then I looked it up and found a page from Facebook explaining what this is.” Five of 67 participants (four of whom expressed surprise in reaction to the notification) sought out information about message authenticity; and three other participants raised authenticity concerns, but “trusted that [the notification] was probably ok” (IN6) and completed the secondary authentication process without seeking out additional information about authenticity. The fact that these concerns were raised by eight participants is, in fact, encouraging: users are thinking critically about what information is being asked of them. This also underscores the importance of having easily accessible information (e.g., the Facebook help page [56] that DE7 consulted) that people can use to verify the authenticity of such notification messages and tasks.

B. Mental Model Generation

Participants try to develop a mental model – a rough internal representation of how something happened or how something works – of the incident either while being notified (after gaining awareness of the incident, but before regaining access to their account) or after they have regained access to their account, but before taking a protective behavior to prevent future incidents.

Participants identify one of three possible causes for the incident: something they did, an attacker attempting to gain access, or “random selection” by Facebook. Overall, 29 of our participants thought the incident about which they were being notified was caused by something they did, while 31 thought the incident was caused by an attacker, and 7 did not associate the incident with anything about their account, but
After regaining access to his account, he changed his password, "just in or something of which the platform would disapprove. For caused by doing something "bad": doing something insecure they sometimes used a VPN or private browsing mode on their Six participants thought that the notification appeared because password like 10 times, and then it happened," reported IN9. and then I forgot that I did that, so I just retyped my old incident was caused by mistyping their password, sometimes one that they used only rarely. Four participants thought that the notification / secondary authentication task was given to all Facebook users, potentially to increase Facebook’s reputation or to counteract a current issue, like Fake News. For example, IN4 says “I hear about fake news a lot...So, I just merely think that they are cracking down or something, and everyone had to do this extra thing, that’s what I thought.”

Of those who thought that the incident was caused by something they did, nine attributed it to logging in from a new location. For example, BR12 says “Yeah, it’s because...it seemed that I logged in from another country. So it appeared to Facebook that there was a suspicious access.” Seven participants thought that the incident was caused by using a new device, or one that they used only rarely. Four participants thought that the incident was caused by mistyping their password, sometimes repeatedly: “well, I reset my password like four months ago and then I forgot that I did that, so I just retyped my old password like 10 times, and then it happened,” reported IN9. Six participants thought that the notification appeared because they sometimes used a VPN or private browsing mode on their browser to access Facebook.

Finally, nine participants thought that the incident was caused by doing something “bad”: doing something insecure or something of which the platform would disapprove. For example, DE1 says: “I thought about it that maybe I did something wrong. Did I click on a link or did I get an email?” VN1 says “I hacked likes. So basically, I just hacked number of likes on the post,” which they later explain means that they ran a scheme with their friends to all like each other’s posts. VN1 thought that Facebook would disapprove of this practice. He explained that because Facebook had figured out he was doing this, they probably made him do this extra login procedure. Figure 4 shows the timeline drawn by VN1 of his experience of the incident. In reality, these nine users were incorrect, as, while Facebook does also have processes to protect users from spam and malicious actors, these processes would not have resulted in a suspicious login notification.

Seven participants had a variety of less accurate mental models, all of which illustrated a misperception of the incident. Four of these participants thought that the notification and secondary authentication task was “a random security check, like TSA does at the airport” (US2) or that Facebook was performing “like a checkup to make sure [they] account was ok” (BR7). The remaining three believed that the notification and secondary authentication task was given to all Facebook users, about unknown attackers, 19 about known attackers, and the remaining 23 about both. Of the 31 participants who thought this specific incident was caused by an attacker, 10 thought that an unknown attacker was attempting to gain access, 13 thought that it was a known attacker, and 8 mentioned both types of attackers – each of these conceptions was in line with their general threat model for their Facebook account.

In general, participants threat models for their Facebook accounts consisted of (a) who they were worried about gaining access to the account and (b) what they were worried about an attacker accessing. Across all participants, 25 were concerned about unknown attackers, 19 about known attackers, and the remaining 23 about both. Of the 31 participants who thought this specific incident was caused by an attacker, 10 thought that an unknown attacker was attempting to gain access, 13 thought that it was a known attacker, and 8 mentioned both types of attackers – each of these conceptions was in line with their general mental model. That is, if they were generally concerned about an unknown attacker and they thought that this incident was caused by an attacker, rather than e.g., something they did, they thought that the attacker was unknown to them. Similarly, those general Facebook threat models centered around someone they knew (a known attacker) gaining access to their account and who thought that this specific incident was caused by an attacker, attributed the incident to a particular person they knew: “I have been going through a breakup and he’s real savvy with devices and that sort of thing...I think it was him” (VN3).

In general, participants whose threat models centered around unknown attackers – “someone bad trying to get in” (US6) – expressed conceptions of these attackers that fell broadly into the mental model types previously defined by Wash [18].
That is, they conceived of these unknown attackers as “digital graffiti artists” – who gain access to accounts in order to show off – or “burglars” – who gain access to accounts for the purpose of theft. Among those whose threat models centered around a known attacker, some participants conceived of these known attackers also as “digital graffiti artists” and “burglars”. However, these participants also described four additional folk models from which they drew to form their mental model of this particular account security incident. Here, we define a taxonomy of these known attacker folk models:

- **the Spy**: Some participants expressed concern that someone they knew would attempt to gain access to their account in order to provide information to the government about them (e.g., information obtained by reading their private messages, or information about their business). For example, VN10 describes a conversation with a “hacker” friend who he knows provides information to the government about people: “Well I have a friend who is a [government] hacker. And I mentioned about this situation. Okay, and then my friend said that I should talk to this other hacker and show this code and tell that I am this person, I’m his friend, this, this... and then this other hacker said he was sorry and stopped doing that.”

- **the Snoop**: Other participants expressed concern that someone they knew would want gossip or to know something private about them, not something that was financially valuable, but something personal (like how their relationship with their significant other was going). BR12 suspected her best friend of snooping, she says “My best friend, why would she have done this? She should have asked me, I would have given her permission or told her about it.”

- **the Who Else**: In an variation on the “Big Fish” model [18], some participants explained that they could not understand how an unknown person could gain access to their account without knowing them – nor why they would want access – and therefore concluded that the attacker must be someone they know. For example, IN3 explains: “It is totally impossible that [an unknown person] gets my account, or he wants my account, he can’t get into my account because he is totally unknown and he doesn’t know anything about me.”

- **the Humiliator**: Finally, participants thought that someone they knew might want to gain access to their account for no other reason than to humiliate them: “if he just did it for fun, or to show me he could, that’s ok. But if it’s not just for fun, then I’m afraid that he would change all the information of my posts and he would upload photos or videos to humiliate me.” (VN13) This is an offshoot of the “Digital Graffiti Artist” model [13], in which participants express being ok with someone they know doing some “graffiti” (e.g., unauthorized posting) but not humiliating graffiti.

The emphasis on known attackers among many of our participants not only informs future research, but also suggests potential vulnerabilities in some of the secondary authentication methods: identifying pictures of friends may be difficult for a hacker who doesn’t know you, but could be quite easy for someone who does. As shown in recent research on the privacy and security risks for domestic violence victims [57] account access by known attackers can be equally, or even more dangerous, than access by unknown attackers. As such, we urge focus on known attacker threat models in the ongoing development of user security mechanisms.

Finally, participants’ threat models included not only an attacker, but also a type of access desired by the attacker (as shown in the folk models described above). Overall, 46 participants were worried about someone acting as them on their profile, 26 were worried about someone accessing their messages, 23 were worried about someone getting hold of their PII or their pictures, respectively, and 10 were concerned about financial loss or being reported to the government, respectively. These concerns informed participants mental models of why the attacker was attempting to gain access and thus influenced the protective actions participants chose to take after regaining access to their accounts, as described in Section [IV-C].

**Past experiences with similar incidents may reduce perception of threat.** Participants who reported having seen a similar incident notification on Facebook in the past (14 participants) often reported a shift in their mental model of the incidents over time: while at first they thought that an attacker was attempting to gain access, after repeated checkpoints they started viewing the incidents as “routine” (DE5). DE2 explains, “the first time, I was worried...[now I understand] Facebook asks all users this when they go into a foreign country [now] I don’t think it has to do with me.” Similarly, VN6 explains that she was originally concerned for her account, but subsequent checkpoints made her think that this was just a routine security check: “The first time that it appeared, I thought it was someone who was trying to access to my Facebook but the next times, I realized that it was Facebook [trying] to enhance the security.” Thus, while the secondary authentication task appeared to break through most participant’s fatigue and capture their attention, repeated incident notifications led to a familiar – e.g., to SSL warnings – situation of fatigue, despite the initial success.

While some participants may indeed see the incident notifications frequently due to false positives – e.g., caused by use of privacy enhancing technologies (VPN, private browsing) [58] or frequent travel – this does not mean that an authentic threat cannot also occur. These habituated users are at particular risk once a new threat occurs, as their mental models do not appear to adjust, even if the events preceding the incident we studied differed from typical events preceding prior notifications. As such, our results join the chorus of other results echoing the caution to platforms to intensify efforts to avoid false positives or at least use UI indicators to differentiate incident notifications based on classifier confidence, such that participant attention can be re-captured in high-risk situations.

**Participants only mention past experiences with Facebook, not other platforms.** It is interesting to note that experiences on other platforms did not appear to influence
mental models of the incidents we studied. In fact, no participants mentioned similar experiences on other platforms, they only referenced prior experiences on Facebook. This is perhaps surprising, as prior work has suggested that negative experiences, or stories about those experiences, can generally inform users’ security posture. We hypothesize that this may have occurred for two reasons. First, our incidents are not precisely negative experiences but rather prevented negative experiences, which are perhaps less powerful. Second, most participants considered the secondary authentication process quite unique — as DE1 explains, “there is no other provider doing this type of authorization” — it is thus possible that the uniqueness of the secondary authentication task may have prevented generalization from other prior experiences. Our findings thus raise questions about what precise types of negative experiences generalize across platforms, and the level of similarity between experiences required to allow users to make connections, whether positive — behavior transfer — or negative — fatigue transfer — between them.

Participants may reach out for support as part of the process of mental modeling. In addition to drawing on their own understandings and past experiences to form their incident mental models, 17 participants sought out additional information to help them understand the incident. They sought information about causation: “I wanted to know, why is this happening? What happened to my account?” (VN2). The information they collected, either from other people or through online sources (how people sought out information is discussed in more detail in Section V) influenced the cause they ultimately attributed to the incident and whether, and what, proactive behavior they took. For example, US7 says, “well, I searched on Google, and it said that sometimes there are these people online, and they just try getting into a bunch of accounts. And so I thought wow, that’s probably what’s happening here, you know? At first I thought it was no big deal, but then after reading that, I thought, wow, I should probably do something about that.”

Despite the majority reaching plausible mental models, many oscillated between multiple possible models. Finally, the mental models that many participants developed through their process of causal reasoning were what we characterize as weak. That is, of the 51 participants who had plausible mental models of the incident (that it as caused by something they did or by an attacker), 27 offered up multiple possible models or hypothetical causes for the incident, or repeatedly cavsted the mental model they described with “I don’t know” or other statements of low confidence. For example, US4 provides a hypothesis for why they saw the notification but notes they are not too sure they are correct, “I think, maybe they see I’m logging in two locations, I don’t know, honestly, but I just go on with it.” Similarly, some participants, like IN11, offered multiple possible explanations for what happened “Well, my thought is that maybe I have accessed my Facebook account... either from an unsecured line. Or I might have shared certain things, which I shouldn’t have done. Or I shared some certain details to my friends and colleagues and they try to check the account from a different location or something like that.” As described further in the next section, these oscillations led to uncertainty about what to do next.

C. Behavioral Response

Ultimately the mental model that participants generated about the incident informed their behavioral response: whether and what behavior to take to proactively secure their accounts and attempt to prevent future incidents. Participants who felt that an attacker had gained access to their account changed their password, while those who thought the notification was because they were traveling tended not to take any action.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, those participants with inaccurate mental models (e.g., those who thought that they had received the notification because of behavior the platform disapproved or that the incident was a “random security check”) were less likely to take effective action (e.g., they would avoid liking posts) or any action at all. In fact, every participant who thought that they were selected randomly, or that everyone experienced the same incident on Facebook did not engage in a post-incident behavior.

Those with weak mental models either chose multiple behaviors (a minority: 6 of 27) or did nothing at all (the remainder). For example, VN13 had a weak mental model consisting of multiple hypotheses for the incident. This led to confusion about what to do after regaining access to his account: “I don’t really know [which one happened]...and now what to do? I don’t know” (VN13).
Finally, as aforementioned, 14 participants had experienced a similar Facebook security notification repeatedly, which led them to attribute the incident to something “routine” (DE5) that they did and feel annoyed about being notified. Consequently, none of these participants took a follow up action to further protect their account. Exemplifying this phenomena of fatigue, US3 says, “it’s just the same thing again, the only thing to do would be to stop [using private browsing]”.

On-platform responses included changing passwords and settings, behaving “better”, and checking accounts for evidence of tampering. 24 of 67 respondents took an on-platform action in response to the incident and eight checked something (e.g., messages, settings) for evidence of tampering. This behavior was typically taken before any off-platform behaviors.

On Facebook, nine participants changed their password and five updated their privacy or security settings, while 10 changed their behavior on Facebook. When updating privacy / security settings, participants either added trusted contacts to their account, set up two factor authentication, or set up SMS notifications of suspicious events. Of the latter, IN13 explains that setting up SMS notifications will keep their account more secure, because they will be able to complete the secondary authentication process immediately: “now I put in my cellphone [number so] that I should receive alerts if someone tries logging into my Facebook account...so it won’t be a surprise and I can kick them out right then.” BR4 mentions changing his security settings to make sure his pictures were not publicly visible. He explains, “if they’re using those to protect my account, what good is it if everyone sees them?” (Figure 5 contains the full timeline of BR4’s incident experience).

Those who changed their behavior on Facebook took a variety of different efforts to behave in ways they perceived as more safe or more approved by the platform. IN2 says “I actually stopped adding strangers in my friend list and also stopped commenting on strangers’ posts,” because he associated these behaviors as “unsafe” and likely to have led to an attacker gaining access to his account (and thus, causing the notification). Similarly, VN4 says “Now I would not click on something that is unclear, [like] sometimes I was tagged by my friends in some apps and auto comments, so [now], I will stay away from them. I will just click on the thing that I know, but for things that I don’t know, I won’t click them.” Of the ten users who started avoiding certain behaviors, six had attributed the incident to having done something “bad”, the other four had weak mental models and did multiple behaviors “just in case” (IN2).

Participants also checked their Facebook accounts for tampering. Of those who did so, six checked their messages to see if any had been sent without their permission. For example, IN3 says, “I checked the messages to see if there was anything [sent] deceiving other friends.” 10 participants also checked their Facebook timelines for content that they had not posted or likes that they had not actioned; and five checked the Pages they ran on Facebook to see if anything had been posted or changed without their permission.

Off-platform behaviors aim to reduce risk of encountering the incident again, but sometimes through security-compromising choices. A smaller portion, 11 respondents, updated their off-platform security posture based on the particular incident we studied. BR4 (Figure 5) not only adjusted his security settings, but also “also changed my password for other things too.” While such adjustments may be positive, at times, users learned less advantageous lessons. IN9 mentions that he forgot his password and then, after repeatedly typing his old password, encountered the notification and secondary login process. To avoid this happening again he explains that, “I changed my passwords on all my social media sites to be the same, so I don’t forget”, leading him to weaken, rather than strengthen, his overall security posture. Of the 11 respondents, it appears that three improved their security posture (one started using a password manager, two changed their passwords on other accounts to novel passwords), four made potentially less secure changes (saving passwords in browser, avoiding using VPN, using more similar or simpler passwords), and the remaining five made vague behavioral efforts to be safer or more vigilant: e.g., “I’m more careful on email too, now” (US5).

Behavioral response is not always immediate. For example, IN4 says “The second time [I got a notification]...I was worried that I had been hacked...so now I have changed my password [and set my] privacy settings [to] very highly private. So, I am not worried now.” While going through the notification once did not worry him, going through a second time did, and he subsequently decided to take action. Similarly, DE3 searched the Internet for information about the incident a few days after it occurred, deciding to change her password because “the articles I saw seemed to say it was likely someone really was trying to get in and recommended changing the password.”

Behavioral response was also informed through information seeking. Seven participants in addition to DE3 sought out information about behavior: what to do after regaining access to their accounts. US3 says “it wasn’t clear if I was supposed to do something else or just go back to using the account...so I asked around to my friends about it”. Four of the eight participants who sought advice on behavior concluded that they should change their passwords, while two decided from the information they collected that they did not need to take any further action. The remaining participant was told “my friend, he said, just be alert for the next few days, in case anything weird goes on in the account” (IN12). Of these eight participants, all but one had what we characterize as weak mental models. They used outside information to bolster their understanding of what to do about what happened, even if they were still uncertain about the incident cause.

V. Incident-Response Information Seeking

As described in the prior section, participants sought out information about authenticity, causation, and/or behavior at
different points in the response process. In this section we discuss how they sought information and their overarching motivation for doing so. We place these findings in the context of prior work on general security advice-seeking and consequently show that incident-response information is unique from general digital security information-seeking in the sources of support used, the urgency of seeking support, and motivations for seeking support.

Sources of support and urgency of support. A total of 23 participants sought out support during the incident response process. They used three support channels: 16 participants consulted informal sources (majority: family and friends), seven searched online, and five consulted the Facebook help pages (these five navigated directly to the Facebook help center, without first searching the Internet in general). BR4, for example, reached out to his friends. He thought that he knew what had happened to his account, “I thought it had been hacked” but wanted to see if “any of my friends had experienced this, before doing something” (Figure 5 shows his incident timeline).

In contrast, prior work on support sources for digital security or Internet use shows that people often get advice about digital security through both informal (family, friends) and formal sources (librarians, workplace IT staff, paid support staff) [60]–[63]. However, none of our participants sought information from a formal source and only three mentioned consulting a particular friend or family member because they were an expert. Additionally, again in contrast to prior work [60], participants did not mention evaluating the information they received (either from people or from online sources) for quality. In the moment of incident response, users may be searching urgently for information, preoccupied with concern for their account rather than concern about the legitimacy of information they find: IN14 says, “I tried to find it online. Like [I googled] “Why is Facebook asking me to verify my comments, ask me to change my password and my privacy setting?” I just wanted to find out what was wrong, fast!”

Support facilitates camaraderie. In addition to eliciting information that augmented participants technical understanding (authenticity, causation) and awareness of protective behaviors, for 14 of the 23 participants who sought out information seeking, this practice served to create a sense of camaraderie. Illustrating this last point, IN4 says, “I asked my friends...I came across 2 or 3 friends, they told me that their...accounts had been hacked...So, I thought, ok it’s not just me.” Similarly, US7 says “I wanted to find out if this was normal, like something other people have had,” and BR4 says “Well I was at work and I asked people there whether they have received anything like that, they said no, so I was the only one that had experienced that, I worked in a shopping center, they said that this had never happened to them and I got a bit afraid.” Pre-existing sense of camaraderie may also reduce motivation to seek information during incident response: for example, US4 says “I thought [the secondary authentication process] happened sometimes with everyone so I didn’t discuss [or seek out information].”

Camaraderie is a previously un-considered motivation for and goal of security information seeking. As we uncovered this motivation in one of the first explorations of in-situ, post-incident information seeking, we hypothesize that camaraderie may be most relevant to security information seeking done in response to an incident, rather than for general security knowledge.

Further, participant emphasis on camaraderie may in part explain the prior success of using social influence to encourage security and privacy behavior [64]. While prior work on social influence has emphasize the importance of social proof – others having pre-tested a behavior makes you more likely to adopt it – our findings suggest that users may also adopt behaviors exhibited by others, or avoid seeking out additional information about them, because they receive comfort from feeling that they are part of a larger group.

Participants who avoid seeking out information during or soon after an incident may consider the incident private or embarrassing. Finally, those who consider account security (or other security and privacy) incidents private may avoid seeking out information. For example DE5 mentioned that “I don’t like to share personal things. I don’t share anything personal like this [incident] with anyone, including my wife.” They may also avoid doing so because they view seeking support as embarrassing: VN13 says, “I didn’t want to ask anyone because it was embarrassing, like I didn’t know how to use Facebook. So I just hoped I was doing [the right thing].” 11 of the 44 participants who did not seek out information reported avoiding doing so because this was a private incident (5 participants) or because looking for support would be embarrassing (6 participants). These sentiments of privacy and embarrassment around support have not been raised in prior security advice research. The majority of the remaining participants who did not seek out information had strong mental models, or had been repeatedly notified of similar incidents on the platform, and thus we hypothesize that they did not feel that they needed additional information.

VI. Influence of Cultural Context

The processes of incident response and information seeking we define in the prior sections was broadly consistent across participants, who were recruited from 5 different countries with differing Internet and cultural contexts. That said, variations in how participants enacted portions of these processes appeared to be influenced by attributes of their cultural context.

Degree of Internet censorship in the participant’s country appears to influence their threat models: all six of the participants who described a government-related threat model were from more censored countries, India and Vietnam. These participants described “the Spy” threat model: that someone they knew would gain access to their account, see something they should not have said and share information with the government. Two of these participants also worried that an unknown hacker might gain access and say negative things about their government publicly, rather than discovering things they’ve said privately to others. This is a version of the “Digital Graffiti Artist” threat model, but with more dire consequences:
“My major concern is that if my account gets hacked and someone abuses [says bad things about] prime minister Modi through my account, then it’ll be a big problem for me. Maybe I’ll not be able to stay in my country. That’s a big problem” (IN14).

Collectivist cultural identity appears to influence both participants’ threat models and the sources of support they consult when information seeking. Those from more collectivist cultures (Vietnam, Brazil, and India) were more concerned about someone they knew gaining access to their account than an unknown “hacker”. This finding aligns with findings from prior work on Internet purchasing practices which showed significant differences in online risk perception between individualist and collectivist cultures (often centered around emphasis on online retailer reputation) [65]. This emphasis on known attackers also led participants from Brazil and Vietnam to express concern about feelings of violation from account security incidents; these concerns were not raised by any participants from the US or Germany. BR13 explains, “I would feel that someone was violating me. And I wouldn’t know what to do because then I wouldn’t be able to do anything to recover.” Among Brazilian participants, this was, in fact, the second most-frequently mentioned concern about someone gaining access to their account.

Those from more collectivist countries also differed in their information sources: all but one of the participants from Brazil, Vietnam, and India who sought out information did so from a person. In contrast, those in the US were split regarding seeking out information from online sources vs. people, and only two participants in Germany mentioned seeking out information at all, one from an online search and one from a peer. Prior work has suggested that those who rely on people they know well (e.g., friends, family) have lower Internet skill than those who seek information online [66]–[68]. However, our results suggest that collectivist identities, in addition to potential variance in Internet skill due to recency of Internet adoption, may also be relevant to explaining variance in security information seeking channels.

Differentiated platform use also influences threat models, specifically users’ types of concerns about access. For example, 10 of 17 participants in Vietnam used Facebook for business purposes compared to 2 of 11 participants in Germany, 1 of 9 in the US, 3 of 15 in India, and 3 of 15 in Brazil. Vietnamese participants describe threat models that include being concerned about financial consequences from someone accessing their Facebook account, far more than do participants from other countries. For example, VN6 explains: “My page has a few tens [of] thousands of likes, so basically, if that admin’s right was stolen, then I can’t earn my living and they could use it for bad purpose.” Similarly, fewer participants in Germany and India – the two countries whose participants reported using Facebook Messenger the least – mentioned being concerned about someone gaining access to their messages.

Finally, prior cross-cultural work has focused quite broadly on the effects of culture or has considered factors related to a single cultural factor: Internet penetration and skill [43], [69]. While it is possible that differentiated platform use is related to the recency of Internet adoption (or skill) of participants in a certain country, we observe no country-based usage patterns that indicate skill-based biases: for example, passive viewing of content on Facebook is equally prevalent in the US as in Brazil and Vietnam. Further, only six of 67 participants (from four of five countries) mentioned “fear” of not being able to complete the secondary authentication task, and no participants mentioned not engaging in a particular behavioral response due to concerns about skill / ability.

The lack of skill-related influence that we observe is likely due to the fact that those in our sample were sufficiently skilled with online tasks to schedule an interview with us and complete a demographic survey, all online. While this limits our ability to comment on the relevance of skill in the response process, or the variance of skill by culture, it does allow us a unique opportunity to reveal the influence of other, more sociological cultural factors such as censorship atmosphere and collectivist identity, which may otherwise be overshadowed by differences in skill. Further, it is encouraging that among our sample of users who were all able to complete the same online task (scheduling the interview), we do not observe country-level variance in incident response-relevant skills.

VII. Summary and Discussion

In this work, we inductively define a common process of account security incident response through an in-depth exploration of the experiences of users who had recently been notified of an account security incident. In sum, the notification process – particularly the use of the secondary authentication task, which created a sense of platform-user partnership – appears to be relatively effective both at alerting users to a threat and facilitating security action, when appropriate (more than a third of respondents took a protective on-platform action).

While the incident notification process was effective for many participants, it was far less effective among participants who had weak mental models. That is, while the majority (51) of participants established plausible mental models for what had caused the incident, nearly half of those with plausible models established multiple plausible models – it could have been my brother trying to log in to my account or it could have been because I logged in from a new phone – and were undecided between them. This lack of certainty regarding why the incident had happened led to lack of certainty about what to do next. While some participants (9) reached out for support from others in these cases, many others chose not to take any proactive protective action (e.g., changing their passwords).

Shifting the Cognitive Effort: a Call for Causal Modeling. Users are not cybersecurity experts. As such, requiring users to determine the technical cause of an incident, with little information to go upon aside from the fact that a login that a platform has decided is suspicious (with no disclosure regarding how this determination was made), is a challenging, and perhaps unreasonable, request. Yet, our results – supported by prior work on mental modeling [15], [24], [70] – illustrate that
Additionally, they each have to perform a task: the platform has facilitation and more appropriate user security behavior may be habituated – and high risk warnings; and consequently the effect of transparently communicating classifier confidence that this is additional support for future work should examine other; further, an algorithm communicating this information had a similar effect on the decision made as having human trust in the algorithm [79]. Thus, we argue communicating the confidence of a decision-making algorithm in their judgement with each other [77]–[79]. Psychology studies have found that more information (up to an overload threshold) improves decision making [76] and empirically illustrates that people make decisions in groups by sharing their individual confidence in their judgement with each other [77]–[79].

This information does not necessarily need to be communicated by a human peer. Psychology studies have found that communicating the confidence of a decision-making algorithm had a similar effect on the decision made as having human group members share their judgement confidence with each other; further, an algorithm communicating this information increased human trust in the algorithm [79]. Thus, we argue that this is additional support for future work should examine the effect of transparently communicating classifier confidence (e.g., numerically or through UI indicators of risk level) on the strength of the platform-user partnership and on users’ ability to differentiate between low risk warnings – to which they may be habituated – and high risk warnings; and consequently whether increased transparency – and enhanced partnership – facilitates more, and more appropriate user security behavior.

Enhancing the Platform-User Partnership Through Transparency. Participants’ describe the incident response process we study as a form of partnership between themselves and the platform. Both entities appear to share goals: they both want the user’s account to remain safe (the platform wants to ensure user engagement, while the user wants to avoid a multitude of consequences) and they both want the user to regain access to their account after it has been temporarily locked (the platform loses money the longer the user is away from the platform, and the user loses the value that they get from using the site). Additionally, they each have to perform a task: the platform has to monitor for attacks and secure the account, while the user has to complete the secondary authentication task. To further enhance the trust in this partnership, and reduce in-action on high risk incidents due to fatigue, we suggest increased transparency on the part of platforms. Recent work has shown that many users are able to make “rational” decisions when presented with more transparent information regarding their level of risk, prior to deciding whether to practice a security behavior [73] and that stories about the consequences, and in some case causes, of incidents are effective in encouraging user behavior [7]. Relatively, prior work in other fields shows that more information (up to an overload threshold) improves decision making [76] and empirically illustrates that people make decisions in groups by sharing their individual confidence in their judgement with each other [77]–[79].

Considerations for Cross-Cultural Study of Security. Finally, to our knowledge, our work is one of the first qualitative studies of security across a relatively large number of countries in different continents and cultural settings. During our experimental design and the process of conducting our study, we learned three main lessons that can inform future work.

First, cultural contexts may influence demographics in uncontrollable ways. In India, we were able to recruit only one female participant, and we had low female representation in Vietnam as well. This is due in part to cultural norms around women participating in such studies, visiting an interview site unaccompanied, and etc. In the future, we would recommend that in-person interview studies seeking to recruit women in places with these norms should consider in-house interviews, rather than using an office-based interview location. Recruitment may still be difficult, and as such snowball sampling may also be necessary.

Second, considering specific, relevant dimensions of culture (e.g., Internet penetration, Internet censorship, platform use types) helped us identify potential effects of culture on user security more precisely than would have been possible if we had considered nationality as a singular representation of culture. The consideration of culture in terms of relevant dimensions allows us to hypothesize about why we observe variations by nationality – something absent from prior security cross-cultural work [41], [43] – and supports more concrete avenues for future work: e.g., developing tools that specifically protect users in censored countries from “Digital Graffiti Artists”, by detecting a negative-sentiment post about a government leader and requesting SMS-confirmation before posting. We are not the first to propose consideration of cultural dimensions [23]. Traditionally, dimensions such as collectivism or masculinity were used to fully represent a particular culture, and this approach has been reasonably, questioned [80]. We agree that Internet-relevant dimensions cannot offer a full picture of culture. However, we do suggest that consideration of domain-specific dimensions (e.g., censorship, penetration) can be a valuable part of cross-cultural security work. As such, developing a taxonomy of cultural dimensions relevant to security may be a fruitful direction for future work.

Third, and finally, our results suggest increased need for cross-cultural work. For example, prior work on security threat models has devoted little attention to known attackers – perhaps because US and DE participants who are more typically studied in security research were, at least in our sample, primarily concerned about unknown “hackers”. Interviewing a more culturally diverse set of participants allowed us to identify a set of known attacker models, which can now be used in future research. There are likely a number of additional, unexplored aspects of user security perceptions, mental models, and even behaviors (e.g., the “like” hacking and repetitive, reciprocal social liking behavior described by only our Vietnamese participants) that have not yet been revealed due to heavy research focus in North America and Europe.
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