A New Signature Scheme Based on Factoring and Discrete Logarithm Problems

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ABSTRACT

In 1994, He and Kiesler proposed a digital signature scheme which was based on the factoring and the discrete logarithm problem both. Same year, Shimin-Wei modified the He-Kiesler signature scheme. In this paper, we propose an improvement of Shimin-Wei signature scheme based on factorization and discrete logarithm problem both with different parameters and using a collision-free one-way hash function. In our opinion, our scheme is more secure than the earlier one.

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1. INTRODUCTION

It is well known that Diffie and Hellman [1] gave the concept of public key cryptography. Since then, several public key cryptosystems based on a hard mathematical problem either factoring or discrete logarithms have been proposed. Those cryptosystems in which said problem was easy to solve were found to be insecure. Also, the encryption in digital signature scheme is based on the same mathematical problems which are used to design public key cryptosystems. Hence, security of the digital signatures [2, 5, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14] depends upon the hardness of either factoring and discrete logarithm. However, most of these are found to be insecure [4, 7, 9, 10].

In a paper, Harn [3] and He-Kiesler [6] proposed digital signatures which were based on factoring and discrete logarithm problem both. Same year, Lee and Hwang [10] have shown that having ability to solve the discrete logarithm problem only, one can break He-Kiesler scheme. Although, Shimin Wei [15] have proposed an improvement over He-Kiesler scheme [6]. Now, we propose a new digital signature scheme by improving the Shimin Wei [15] signature scheme based on factorization and discrete logarithm problem both with different parameters and using a collision-free one-way hash function in this paper.

2. OVERVIEW

2.1 He-Kiesler's Scheme

Let p be a large prime such that p-1 has two large prime factors \(p_1\) and \(q_1\). Let \(n = p_1 q_1\) and let \(g\) be a primitive element or an element of large order of \(GF(q)\). Note that if a common \(p\) is used by all users, the two factors of \(n\) must be kept secret from every user (actually these two factors will never be used by anyone, and thus can be discarded once \(n\) is produced).
Any user A has a secret key $x_1 (1 < x_1 < n)$ such that $\gcd(x_1; p-1) = 1$. From $x_1$ constructed the quadratic residue $x = x_1^2 \mod (p-1)$ and corresponding public key $y = g^{x_1^2} \mod p$.

To sign a message $m$, A does the following

1. Randomly chooses an integer $t_1 (1 < t_1 < n)$ such that $\gcd(t_1; p-1) = 1$, and calculates $t = t_1^2 \mod (p-1)$
2. Computes $c = x_1 t_1 \mod (p-1)$
3. Computes $p \mod g = y_1^{2t_1} \mod g$ and makes sure that $y_1 \neq 1$.
4. Finds $s$ such that $m = xr + ts \mod (p-1)$
5. Sends $\text{sig}(m) = (r, s, c)$ as the signature.

To verify that $(r, s, c)$ is a valid signature of $m$, one simply checks the identity

$$g^{x_1^2} = c^r r^{s} g^{2ts} \mod p.$$  

### 2.2 Shimin Wei’s Scheme

Let $p$ be a large prime such that $p-1$ has two large prime factors $p_1$ and $q_1$. Let $n = p_1 q_1$ and let $g$ be a primitive element of Galois field $\text{GF}(q)$. User A has a secret key $x (1 < x < n)$ such that $\gcd(x, p-1) = 1$. The corresponding public key $y = g^{x} \mod p$. To sign a message $m$, A does the following

1. Randomly chooses an integer $t (1 < t < n)$ such that $\gcd(t, p-1) = 1$,
2. Computes $r_1 = g^{x^t} \mod p$ and makes $r_2 = g^{x^{t^2}} \mod p$ and makes sure that $r_1 \neq 1$.
3. Find $s$ such that

$$mt^{-1} = xr_1 + ts^2 \mod (p-1).$$

4. Send $\text{sig}(m) = (r_1, r_2, s)$ as the signature.

To verify that $(r_1, r_2, s)$ is a valid signature of $m$, one checks the identity

$$r_1^{x^t} r_2^{x^{t^2}} = y^r g^{2ts^2}.$$  

### 3. THE NEW DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME

This scheme can be divided into three phases: initialization, digital signature generation and digital signature verification.

#### 3.1 Initialization

Let there exists a center which initialize the system and manage the public directory. Let, the center selects the following parameters:

* $p$: a large prime $p = 4p_1 q_1 + 1$, where $p_1 = 2p_2 + 1$, $q_1 = 2q_2 + 1$, and $p_1$, $q_1$, $p_2$, $q_2$ are all primes and let $n = p_1 q_1$.
* $g$: an primitive element of Galois field $\text{GF}(q)$,
* $h(.)$: a collision-free one-way hash function.

Further, the user chooses a private key $X \in Z_n$ such that $\gcd(X, n) = 1$ and computes a corresponding public key which is certified by the certificate authority as

$$y = g^{x^2} \mod p.$$ (1)
3.2 Digital Signature Generation

To sign a message $M$, the signee carries out the following steps.

1. Randomly select an integer $T \in Z_n$ such that $\gcd(T, n) = 1$,

2. Computes

$$r_1 = g^{y^i} \mod p$$

and makes

$$r_2 = g^{y^{-i}} \mod p$$

3. Find $s$ such that

$$h(r_1, r_2, m)T^{-1} = Xr_1 + Ts^2 \mod n.$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

Where $h$ is a collision-free one-way hash function defined by the system.

4. $(r_1, r_2, s)$ is a signature of message $M$. The signee then sends $(r_1, r_2, s)$ to the verifier.

3.3 Digital Signature Verification

On receiving the digital signature $(r_1, r_2, s)$ the verifier can confirm the validity of the digital signature by the following equation

$$r^{-i}r_1^{k(r_1, r_2, m)} = y^{r_2}g^{2h(r_1, r_2, m)s^2}$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

If the equation holds, then $(r_1, r_2, s)$ is a valid signature of message $M$.

Theorem 3.1 If the signee follows the above digital signature scheme protocol, the verifier always accepts the digital signature.

Proof: The theorem can be proved, since Eq.(5) can be derived as follows by Eq.(4) we have

$$Xr_1 = h(r_1, r_2, m)T^{-1} - Ts^2$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

Squaring both sides in the above equation

$$X^2r_1^2 = [h(r_1, r_2, m)^2T^{-2} + T^2s^4 - 2h(r_1, r_2, m)s^2]$$

$$= h(r_1, r_2, m)^2T^{-2} + T^2s^4$$

Hence by Eq. (2) and (3), we have

$$r_1^{x^i}r_2^{k(r_1, r_2, m)s^2} = g^{y^{r_2}g^{2h(r_1, r_2, m)s^2}}$$
$$= g^{y^{r_2}g^{2h(r_1, r_2, m)s^2}}$$
$$= g^{y^2g^{2h(r_1, r_2, m)s^2}} \mod p.$$  

The above equation is equivalent to Eq. (5). With the knowledge of the signee’s public key $y$ and the signature $(r_1, r_2, s)$ of message $M$, the verifier can authenticate the message $M$ because the verifier
can be convinced that the message was really signed by the signee. Otherwise, the signature \((r_1, r_2, s)\) is invalid.

4. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME

**Attack 1:** An adversary (Adv) attempts to derive the private key \(X\) from the corresponding public key \(y\) for any user. In this case, the Adv has to recover a private key \(X\) from Eq. (1) which is polynomially equivalent to both FAC and DLP.

**Attack 2:** The Adv has to choose randomly a three tuple \((r_1, r_2, s)\). This is as difficult as solving the FAC, DL problem and collision-free one-way hash function simultaneously.

**Attack 3:** An Adv attempts to forge a valid signature \((r_1, r_2, s)\) for message \(M\). In this case, the Adv tries to derive the signature \((r_1, r_2, s)\) for a given message \(M\) by letting two integer fixed and finding the other one. Adv randomly select \(r_2\) or \(r_1\) or \(s\) or \(r_2\) or \(r_1\) respectively such that the Eq.(5) satisfied.

5. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we proposed a new digital signature scheme whose security is based on factorization (FAC), discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and collision free hash function under a more suited parameters provides better security.

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