Analysis of Russian Foreign Policy from Aspect of Russian Turkish Relations

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Abstract
According to August 1996 records the last official status of Chechnya was postponed till 2001. Until that time Chechnya would be accepted independent in the presidency of Aslan Mashadov, the official general. However, this defeat was disgraceful according to Moscow and it was just a war that each side desired to revenge and test each other. The appointment of Putin, who was being more ambitious and aggressive than the others, foreshadowed the new applications to be implemented by the army. In September 1999, a series of bombings in the Moscow apartments caused the deaths of many people and caused property damage, which was used as a reason for the shady accusation of Chechnya. The government blamed the Chechen separatists for attacking areas of rebellion. The victory of the Russian forces fighting the guerrilla opposition forces destroyed the capital Grozny and other cities.

Keywords
Russian Foreign Policy, Russian Turkey Relations, Chechen Problem

1. Introduction
In the past, the process of war was slow and deceptive. The use of weapons of mass destruction and the attacks by artillery were granted permission. However, Russia entirely dominated Chechnya in the very first months of 2000 not taking into consideration the national and international protests. The guerrilla fighters of the mountains and the strategy of Chechenia aim to keep Russia out of balance as soon as possible (Aktukun, 1995).

The resisters intensified their attacks against the Chechen that cooperated with Moscow, just before the election to determine the member who would represent Chechenia in the Russian Parliament. According to the news of
Interfax News Agency, the son of Urus-Martan town Mayor died upon the bombing of the bag full of bombs that left by those saying “you have a pack from Moscow”. A bomb was also held for the house of Isa Ibrahimov, who participated in the elections as a candidate. Bombing Ibrahimov’s son was slightly injured, causing damage in nearby houses. In the meantime, the mafia group acting in Yekaterinburg, where Russian President Boris Yeltsin was born, established a party so as to attend the elections.

According to news of Izvestiya Journal of Moscow, some of the members of the group called Uralmas, known well by the local folk, were criminal; some of them were those wanted by the police. In their certificate of formation, the purpose of the mafia party was expressed as “the adaptation of the peoples’ wishes to social and political life”. Municipality, governorship, and the Russian parliamentary elections would be held in the city after a while. In Russia a vast number of mafia members had attended the elections just to obtain parliamentary immunity so far. But this party was the first to have been established by a mafia openly (Akgonenc, 1994).

According to Izvestiya, Aleksandr Habarov, the party leader, is a person who was arrested for various crimes including carrying gun without permission in 1996. Habarov’s assistant and the second character of the movement, businessman Aleksandr Kruk is the vice head of the party. The 23 founders Kostantin Tsiganow, who is called the “Founding”, is a person who has fled Russia because he is being sought by the police. Izvestiya wrote that “some properties of the party were confiscated” in an operation launched by Yekaterinburg Police short while ago. The party properties that the journal mentioned consisted of eight kalashnikovs, five guns, antitank mine, and a great number of bullets! Of the activities of the party carrying on the political combat by arms, blackmailing by listening to the telephone calls of their probable rivals comes first (Aslan, 1997).

The main source of income for the Mafia party is to give honey producers $200 per ton in Yekaterinburg. The City Governor Eduard Rossel does not accept the existence of a mafia group called Uralmas, but the security forces make secret operations against the party members. Interestingly, the party statue contains the article, “neither the members of the party nor the party is repobisible for each other’s acts”. Izvestiya wrote, “Mafia party seriously prepares for the elections”.

Kavkaz website, mirroring the views of the resisters, declared that 4 people whom it named as betrayer were punished. Kavkaz stated that the shariah courts sentenced the 34 people cooperating with Moscow with capital punishment and some 80 people were investigated. Supyan Addullayev, member of Chechen High Military Council characterised the election to be held as “a meaningless show”. Describing the voting as “illegal” Abdullayev said, “The Russians claims that we tried to obstruct the election” but “a non existing thing could not be obstructed” he added as well. The parliamentary elections in Russia were held in last December but no ballot boxes were carried out in Chechnya on account of the battle royals (Knight, 1999).
Putin got more popularised along this event, and thus Yeltsin eventually felt obliged to hand over the presidency chair that was clearly proved to be rough. The sad president made public that he retired by the New Year. It was surprising that Putin won the first tour with the 50 percent of the votes in the presidential elections held in March 2000. As long as the oppressed Chechnya issue was solved Putin would not pay attention for the Russia’s broken political and economical structures. One of the first signs of this may be that Putin suggested the limitation of the large self-determination application that was adopted by many governments (Behar, 1998).

It is rather clear that FSB with which Putin had close relations was charged in a great role. The biggest problem of Putin outside the country is to make the government get more support and hope to find financial resources relying on this. In a more extented aspect, his permanent seat in the Security Council influences Russia greatly, but in many areas of the world upon which he had impact—for instance, the Middle East and Africa, he was disregarded now. Through the Yeltsin term, the Russians expected more from Putin and new Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov (Calis, 2001).

2. Putin’s Foreign Policy

2.1. Putin’s Caucasus Politics

The US imperialism, chasing rainbows in Caucasus, hurrying up the period of the dissolution and putting down of Russia, creating new hegemony areas for itself through the Gorbachev and Yeltsin terms, encountered the most harsh response of the late years during the Putin term (Cam, 1995).

Putin desired to enhance the Russia’s control over Caucasus seen as the “backyard” of Russia, and stability as well.

This period was experienced as a process in which military actions and threats played dominant roles in the sense that USA was menaced in this region. Taking a serious step in this direction by Chechenia operation Putin threatened Afghanistan to bomb where Russia had to retreat from in 1989. He explained this “special interest” for Afghanistan through that Afghanistan-originated radical Islamist armed operations stirred up trouble in the region (Elekdag, 2000).

This new militarist policy of the Putin government against the Caucasus has a feature that threats Turkey in the middle and long terms, which acted as a tool of US in Caucasus, in Bakuceyhan Pipe Line, Blue Stream Project and a series of projects as well.

Today, the interest of USA in Caucasia region arises from its wish to include Caucasia region into NATO, and the indisputable oil resources of the region. Today, the British BP, Amocco, AIOIC oil companies and the other oil companies of the US are active in Azerbaijan. These big Oil companies stand as the foreign policy determinant factors more than being companies that undertook crucial roles in the direction and management of US’ Caucasia Policies.
2.2. Putin's European Policies and Operation Preparation in the Foreign Affairs

It has been asserted that the Russian President Vladimir Putin prepares to dismiss the Foreign Affairs Minister, Igor Ivanov. The reason beneath this is that Ivanov fell behind developing the relations with the West. It has many times become a current issue that Ivanov did not completely adopt the policy Putin applied after the 9/11 events and he had self-assertive attitudes at times (Elekdag, 2000).

Nowadays, it has been rumored that Putin is in search of a new foreign affairs minister. Last week, it was asserted that Putin plans to replace Ivanov with Grigoriy Yavlinski, the liberal “Yabloko” Party leader. According to the claims that Russian news site Lenta.ru suggested by relating it to the Kremlin authorities, Putin aimed to dismiss the Foreign Affairs Minister with whose works he was not contented and to charge opponent Yavlinski in the power. Complaining about Russia has not got qualified diplomats, criticised harshly the foreign ministry staff and Minister Ivanov as they could not establish successful relations with the western media (Cam, 1995).

However, such claims were contradicted and it was emphasized that the issue was brought to agenda by Yabloko Party that wished to get more popular in the eve of the elections. Yet, the rumors about the replacement of the minister were not removed. According to the last assertion, Putin wanted to appoint Petersburg University Rector Mrs. Verbitskaya, a fellow townsman of Putin, to the Foreign Ministry (Calis, 2001).

Other rumors are about that the Russian leader would begin a purifying operation in the foreign affairs ministry, and at the same time, by discharging many ambassadors he would pave way for the members of the Russian Single Party to enter into the parliament, and the Party was known with its closeness to Kremlin. Brzeszinski primarily expresses the importance of Euroasia: “the power dominating Euroasia could control two thirds of the world's most developed and productive regions”.

About 75% of the world population lives in Euroasia and the region has most of the geographical abundance of the world both in the sense of economic enterprises and underground resources. Euroasia has 60% of the world GNP and 75% of the three fourths of the common energy resources. Eurasia is also a place where there are the most ambitious and dynamic states in political context. The biggests 6 economies and 6 biggest arms sellers other than USA are in Euroasia. The whole nuclear forces of the world known officially except one and all of the secret nuclear forces of the world are in Euroasia. The most crowded two nations of the world, which are keen on regional hegemony and global effect, are in Euroasia. All the potential political and economical challengers of the USA priority are the Euroasians (Behar, 1998).

Fortunately, “Euroasia is too big to form a political unity according to USA”. After the US has said that the predetermination of the central actors and key
axes would be useful to foresee the great potential challenge in the Euroasia continent. Then adds: The Euroasian ecole proposes the the Turan folks' (Finn-Uighur, Mongo, Turk, Manchu) ethno-cultural ties and the political fate brotherhood of in the frame of such states as Scythian, Hun, Gokturk and Mongol Empires, supports that an Euroasian Turan Folk could exist as the Russians integrated with them via locating in that environment through the history. But, some Russian interest environments aimed to regain legitimacy for the current Russian hegemony over the Euroasia nations by corrupting these theses not in scientific aspect but in political opportunism aspect (Aslan, 1997).

The ideal was also considered to add that the intensification of the struggle between Russian Euroasianism and Turkish Euroasianism arised out of the Sultan Galiyev’s rebellion (Aktukun, 1995).

Oya A. Mugisuddin states that the Russian nationalism got more and more ultranationalistic and she related this point to fundamentalism, as for Europe; it supported Russia by the fear that the stability in the region would be broken on account of an authority gap in Euroasia (Akgonenc, 1994).

Arhtur Sagadeev emphasizes that there was continuity between the Russianisation policies in the USSR period and the great power ideology of the Tsardom regime; the great power ideology did not change even while the USSR administrators gave up the proletariat internationalism, and this tendency went on in the Russian Federation period as well. Stating that Iran and Russia acted in accord in general to prevent the effect of the West on the developments about energy in Caucasia and Middle East Stephan Blank makes this comment about the Russian foreign policy, “What new Euroasia coalitions are possible? Which of them might be the most dangerous one for the US interests and what could be done to prevent such condition”.

The points that Brzesinski abstains from spurting, “If Russia rejects that the West becomes an ambitious actor and keeps control over the South or she allies with the big eastern actors, then, the priority of the US in Euroasia narrows down seriously. The same situation would be in question when the two big eastern actors ally in any way as well” (Knight, 1999).

3. Russian-Turkish Relations

Nadir Ozbek makes this comment, “Turkey’s desire to carry out an active policy in Caucasia and Central Asia caused that Russia and Turkey came up againsts in the rather early periods in which the Euroasianist emphasises did not sharpened as present in the Russian foreign policy” (Elekdag, 2000).

This comment shows that the Euroasianist tendencies gain power against the reformists in Russia. As to Sergei Stankovic who consulted the Russia Federation Presidency in 1992, he states that, “Two ways designated as Atlanticism and Euroasianism arised out of our foreign policy”, and he adds that Russia has to seek a new balance between East and West. Irfan Ulku states that there are such Russian Nationalists as Prince Trubetskoy, G. Vernadski, P. Savitski who are the
ideational leaders of the historiography Ecole known as Euroasianism, and their principal arguments are the Euroasia nationalism and distrust in Europe, and then he makes an interesting comment, “The role of the Euroasianist argument in Russian assessment and Yusuf Akcura’s Three Policy are almost similar. Yet, the political targets are different and sometimes against each other” (Ivanov, 2001).

“Russia’s primary objective is the reunion of the CIS under her hegemony”. Slank expresses that Russia’s current strategy consists of Tsardom and the Soviet divide and rule policies, and Russia supports the separatists against Georgia and Azerbaijan to obtain bases and strategical support points, to change CFE, to create a special domination area for herself and to keep control over the local energy sector. Mevlut Tikence states that Russia has considered the CIS as a common part of her federation; started to cause conflicts among the countries in Caucasus, if not, she has started to dominate the region as so-called conciliator upon creating conflicts between the ethnic groups in these countries against their countries in which they live, and as a result of this, Georgia and Azerbaijan felt obliged to participate in the CIS (Behar, 1998).

All of these data show that the Euroasianism in Russia aims to expand more and keep the control of the area whereas that of us aims an anti-imperialist collaboration in the area. The foreign policy of Russia in the recent years has set an example for this. Nevertheless, it is potentially important to get out of the western reformist axis. Moreover, it has been seen that there are ones who support a regional cooperation among the Russians. At the end of this process, both the Turks and the Russians will comprehend the necessity of a regional cooperation much better. We hope that both countries will understand that the West provides no benefit at all (Calis, 2001).

The US has comprehended that the prerequisite for maintaining its dominance over the world is up to dominating Euroasia. As a matter of fact, Zbigniew Brzezinski lays bare this both in the symposiums he attended and in his book “The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives”. The US desires to use Turkey as tool in its dominance struggle in Euroasia (Aktukun, 1995).

The fact that US was removed from its western sphere of influence by its western partners meant that the attendance of the US in the Euroasia chessboard play ended automatically. Brzezinski was not satisfied with the dissolutions of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Iraq, on the one hand, he proposes the split of Russia into three (as European Russia, a Siberian Republic, and a Far East Republic), and on the other, he claims that the national integrities of Turkey and Iran remained unclear. Is it a determination or a wish (Aslan, 1997)?

Some of our intellectuals support the partnership of the US policies in the region without taking into consideration in detail the future results of balancing our alienation by Europe via cooperating with US. We see that some of our intellectuals and authors have referred so much to the book of Brzezinski recently and they tried to adapt the Turkey’s foreign policy options with those of the US (Cam, 1995).
Sukru Elekdag says: “From this point of view, Brzesinski emphasizes that the main goal of Washington should be the prevention of that the six big actors of Euroasia, France, Germany, Russia, China, Japan and India form alliances against America through conspiring with each other. In the 21st century Washington’s Euroasia strategy will have a vital importance in the sense of securing the super power status of America as well as the security and welfare of the USA. Because of the geo-strategical position in Euroasia, it must be expected that Turkey should be located in an important position in the frame of the US strategy. The support given by the US for Turkey’s energy production project with Khazar-Ceyhan pipe line project has been the first signs of this”.

Ergun Balci, too, agrees with Elekdag on the issue of the pipe lines. “As Brzezinski states US does not want the single ascendancy of a country both in Europe and Asia. The policy of US to prevent the ascendancy of a single country in Euroasia has continued up to present. For that reason, the US has supported the Bakuceyhan Pipe Line Project just to prevent that the oil roads in Central Asia and Caucasus could be mastered by Russia”.

Hasan Koni, with a different attitude other than above, states as, “Turkey’s strategical mistake might be her convention with the US that remotely interfered with this area to be active in an energy field in which Russia is active. That USA has supported Turkey in Euroasia energy corridor since 1996 is not regarded as a successful condition because of the distrust China and Russia place for such a country which has sided the West unquestioningly”.

An important fact that Erol Manisali has put forth for a while indicates that it does not conform to the Turkey’s national interests that we opposed Russia on account of relying on Brzesinski; just because the interests of the US are different from those of Turkey. The US does not want the opening of new oil fields whereas Turkey needs oil though. Think why Iraq was put an embargo insistently. It makes us think that Bakuceyhan scenario is a deception. Manisali, related to this issue, makes this comment, “The interests of the US have been identified with that of the producers in the Gulf except Iran. Commencing a full-scale production in Khazar is disadvantage of the Middle East Exporters and US. The US wants to put the Khazar oils into action at least 15 - 20 years after, only if it were in the directing position in Khazar”.

4. The Effect of Putin Politics on Turkey

Contrary to the fears, Putin’s administration did hardly affect Turkey. The ice was already broken in the Yeltsin term. Ankara left the “From Adriatic to the Great Wall” policy. The flank problem of CEF was solved by a last-minute goal. Deep state support for the Chechen and Duma’s support for PKK ended up, S-300s intended for Cyprus became Crete’s portion, and Moscow followed a more fair policy in the Karabagh issue which concerned Turkey closely (Cam, 1995).

The only friction factor between the two countries, passing the Straits was
solved upon the revealing of that Baku-Novorossisk line was not the real rival of the Bakuceyhan Project, and the efforts of a team led by Guven Erkaya, Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces (Calis, 2001).

Putin encountered many problems when he first came to the head. But those ones did not include Turkey. Turkey was a country to cooperate within the Blue Stream and the other projects more then to be a rival or an enemy. Erol Manisali’s criticism for Brzezinski is very significant, “Brzezinski confesses how the USA has become the sole super power (Elekdag, 2000)”.

The USA has become the sole super power not only with its economic, military, technologic, and cultural hegemony but with the power to canalize the big international institutions at will. These are largely known. Brzezinski says a more interesting thing. The US has whatever it wants done in the ways open to negotiation and dialogue. The US established such an order for its hegemony; so what would do the other states, institutions, companies, and individuals? (Knight, 1999).

Criticising those who support following in US’ wake, Manisali states that those may deceive as showing the so-called negotiation and dialogue ways as if peace and democracy. Then he adds, “Another different view causes more different things; to base on the social (national) interests by resisting to the impositions” (Behar, 1998).

Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser express in plain words, “Europe may get more reluctant in taking responsibility for a country whose basic interests exist in the Muslim world according to its own perspectives. This will create a disaster in Turkey, restrict the hopes of Turkish American collaboration, and as an extension of this it will slow down the freedom of movement of the USA in Caucasus and Middle East” (Aslan, 1997).

Moreover, trading volume was increasing constantly, Enka-Koc partnership was feeding Moscow, and the military technological cooperation was developing. However, the ones who charged the country with the roles hard to act in Central Asia and Caucasus, believed that Russia should lead despite the choices of the neighboring countries, believed that we had nothing to sell/present other than geography to the West, did not content with Putin’s coming to the head. They criticised him for his steps taken for Caucasus’ stability. They blamed Ankara for being short-sighted. Nevertheless, they could not change the course of the relation between the two countries (Akgonenç, 1994).

5. Turkey Factor in Russian Foreign Policy

In the comments made on Turkey’s foreign policy, stresses on the Euroasia region increased within the last one year extremely. In fact, Euroasia depicts a political attitude to be defined as Euroasianism even a geopolitical centered doctrine as well as depicting a geographical region. Kemalism, an ideology good at geopolitics, contains a serious Euroasia idea as well (Cam, 1995).

Before all, in this region where the imperialism does not want the foundation
of the national states, the characteristics of the region must be primarily contemplated over to create a national state. The relations Mustafa Kemal made with the USSR, the Balkan and Sadabat Pacts, and the foreign policy of Mustafa Kemal in general are the signs of this (Calis, 2001).

Here, we think that the criticisms of Helmut Schimidt made for Brzezinski’s book seem meaningful and informative, “the power of the USA will decrease in the course of time” (Behar, 1998).

The aim of Brzesinski is to carry out the American hegemony despite this above. The author welcomes the progresses made through the European integration period and the extension of NATO towards the east. But, while doing so, he regards the neighboring countries as the customers and dependents of the USA. No matter some British may not reject such kind of classifications but the responses of those from the Continent will not be in this way (Aktukun, 1995).

On the contrary, they consider the Brzezinski’s American hegemony arguments a new reason for the forming of a more powerful European Union that will secure the self-determination rights of the region” (Ivanov, 2001).

From his words, we clearly understand that American thinkers abstain from a power or alliance that will affect the American hegemony in Euroasia. For instance, Henry Kissenger, “America, in geopolitical aspect, is a country far from Euroasia that is a big land than the US with its resources and population. That of the two major spheres of Euroaisa, Europe and Asia, either of each is dominated by a sole big state forms the best definition of a strategical threat for the US whether it is cold war or not” (Elekdag, 2000).

6. The Effects of The Changing Power Balances in Euroasia on Russia

The ones who develop thinking and strategy on Euroasia split into two in Turkey. The first group, basing on the world conjecture having changed since 1990, touches on the issue in the context of our national interests in such a period when the exclusion of Turkey from the EU has become definite and the big energy resources of the region and their transportation routes are discussed (Elekdag, 2000).

As for the second group, let alone support the efforts of the first one, they claim that Euroasia may be a power against the world imperialist blocks in future and the basic axis of the reponses of the underdeveloped to imperialism. In fact, the ones supporting the both opinions place great importance on Turkey’s national interests except some differences. For that reason, we, Kemalists consider important the opinions of the two groups and we take into consideration all of these opinions while examining the Euroasia option in a Kemalist point of view. We think that both the two groups have some failures in some certain matters (Ivanov, 2001).

1) When the first group examines today’s power balances they ask for the American collaboration to split the front that our neighboring countries, Greece,
South Cyprus, Syria, Iran, and Armenia formed together with Russia, and against the Slavic-Orthodox approach of Russia in the region. This attitude can make Turkey America’s subcontractor in the region along with seeming as if correct in this conjecture, and can be the means of articulation of whole Euroasia in the imperialist system. We see that this group sometimes is not enough to analyse the objectives of the imperialist powers notably the US in the region as well. Nevertheless, it is clear that their basic thoughts are our national interests.

2) The second group sees the Eurasian Option as a chance for the underdeveloped to create an anti-imperialist bloc against the imperialist axes, but they don’t have any concrete data on how to implement this 21st century strategy. For example, this group, Russia’s deciding that there should be an easy partner in this strategy, how to break Russia’s stance against Turkey is not certain. Moreover, it is also unclear how to overcome the problem that the Turks in the region are oppressed by Russia and China (Aslan, 1997).

Now, let’s comment on the arguments of both groups according to the Kemalist point of view by examining them critically. Our purpose, like the first group, is to bring together the middle and long term Euroasian Strategies based on our National independence with a Euroasia union of forces to be established against the imperialist system. Turkish Foreign Politics set off on a quest with the effect of our exclusion from the EU. This quest creates a chance to remove the effects of the controlled policies Turkey carried out normally and the domestic effects of them. At least it enables these issues to be brought into the discussion board (Knight, 1999).

If we do not account for his short ministry period, Mumtaz Soysal was regarded as the most consistent foreign affairs minister in Turkish Foreign Politics aftermath of 1980. Moreover, in this period two experienced state ministers, Sukru Sina Gurel and Ahad Andican assisted Ismail Cem. The foreign affair ministry under the effect of DLP (Democratic Left Party) began to mention “region centered foreign policy” concept just after a few days. This concept depicts a model that Bulent Ecevit mentioned from 1995 onwards.

7. The Thoughts and Strategies of Politicians, Military and Authors on Euroasia Project

While introducing the study, “Turkey 2010-2020: Global Actors’s Rise”, prepared by the Foreign Affairs Ministry and DLF to the press Ismail Cem said, “We desire to be in EU but our vision is much larger. We define our own goal as the center and determinant of the rising Euroasia fact” (Ivanov, 2001).

State Minister Ahad Andicad states that Euroasia, which is abundant with such resources as oil, gold, natural gas, and uranium that are still significant strategical raw materials at the beginning of the 21st century, will be tried to be subjected to the Arabization process by the West, and he also adds that Turkish World should prevent this situation.
The dominant tendency in Turkey is to see the Euroasia strategies restricted with Azerbaijan and Central Asia. But now, we started to see the writings that interpreted Eurasia from a general geopolitical point of view. The comments about Euroasia were mainly like those of Cafer Tayyar Sadiklar or those of Yasin Aslan. Sadiklar says, “Euroasia has two significant features. One of them is that the population living in the region is mainly consisted of Muslims and Turks”.

As a result of this fact, Turkey has become the brain of the Euroasia region. As for the second feature, it is that Turkey is the only democratic and secularistic country in the region. This fact contributes much to Turkey’s importance. Yasin Aslan who says that the existence of the New Turkish World Generation will be one of the most important factors of the geopolitical concept especially about Asia in the 21st Century evaluates as, Russia tries to strengthen her control over Central Asia and Mongolia, and China tries to strengthen her control over Tibet and Uighur autonomous region. But the efforts and wishes of the countries in the region to obtain full freedom pose a threat for the Russian and Chinese dominances. The domestic conflicts in the mentioned countries, just like happened between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, will ease the business of the two dominant powers. Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and India have of primary importance in Central Asia.

They are seen as the power balances against the Russian-Chinese hegemony. These interpretations contain the true ones, but in general they have no deep meaning at all. From now on, the Euroasia option has been started to be discussed deeper.

After stating that upon the understanding of the fact that the battle field of the strategical combat will be Euroasia in his writings in Turkey Diary Murat Yilmaz continues as, “But, we here offer the discussion of the cultural means that Euroasia contains beyond the strategical debates”. Busra Ersanli interprets Euroasia in a more different way (Behar, 1998).

8. Conclusion

While we are emphasizing the cooperation of the national states in a Kemalist manner, Behar comments. The Euroasia option is the latest contribution of the Soviet system to world politics. Lenin’s conception of self-determination has ruled out the nation-state model from the beginning. The emperorship, socialist unity and the Euroasia CIS made the multinationalism an identity within a historical continuity. The concept of Euroasia, which exists in Russian political thought since the beginning of the century, but which has been on the political agenda for the last ten years, reminds us of the borders of the ancient empires. In this frame, it carries over the consciousness of nation beyond the state borders. The religion and language have important roles in Russian nationalism; meanwhile Russian nationalism also contains the approaches of a challenge to Europe with east-west synthesis and forming the alternative civilization field together with the other nations and culture.

Prof. Dr. Mahir Kaynak’s important and interesting determinations related to
It is seen inevitable that the Chinese’s rapidly increasing economy will cause a great energy and raw material deficiency and the nearest place to procure them is Central Asia. Here is the dilemma of the Turks. Countries that regard China as a threat to themselves; Especially the US should support Russia to restrict China. This includes securing natural resources. Another alternative is the Turkish bloc and Russia’s alliance against Chinese sovereignty. Such a solution is inclined to merge with Turkey, Central Asia, Turkey and Russia which should be in the alliance. There seems to be no solution, as it is independent from both China and Russia and has no alliance with them. Today, Russia’s strategy, including Turkey, all the world is to bring Turkey into an alliance with him. We are not aware of the impact on Russia’s increased Turkey” (Cam, 1995).

In Turkey, on 28 April 1998 organized by the Caucasus War Colleges, at a symposium on the Middle East and Eurasia perspective, the retired former commander of the War College Full General Kemal Yavuz explained that some parts will be given above. He stated that a unipolar world politics conjuncture would not create a just and peaceful world which makes the following decisions (Akgonenc, 1994).

He says the US is the coordinator of Euroasia; The establishment of Pax Americana in the Middle East was initiated, and the in US-controlled US, Jordan, was under US control, and the United States tried to get Egypt into the group, but failed. “Two in the direction of the Russian Federation (the Caucasus and Kazakhstan), and two aspects of Iran (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan) try to turn Turkey into Central Asia in Azerbaijan. The conspicuous side of these directions is that the acting directions of the regional forces coincide in response to the care that the outstanding big countries of these directions took not to provoke each other”.

Yavuz continues as, “To sustain the social peace and adaptation by means of the satisfaction of our people in materially and morally by providing an understanding directed to the state administration and social expediency and by inspired by this power, it is necessary to give the national interests prominence via carrying out a more quality foreign policy”. Army War College Head of Education Staff Officer Senior Colonel Dr. Yilmaz Tercan defines Euroasia in the same symposium; “Euroasia has been the sensitive area where stability and security are going to be imperiled till 2010, in the period when the most changes have happened”.

The world was on the stage where the US was led by the Soviet-led circles of influence, and the peace balance that broke out during the Cold War was broken due to the fact that regional sovereignty and global productivity often fought. Tezcan analyses the risks and threats in Euroasia in four categories as West, North, East, and South Axises. He defines one of these threats of the eastern axis as the cooperation between Russia and China and its development. This determination is as important as some environments regard the Russian-Chinese convergence and their anti-American attitudes as the main factors of the
formation of a free Euroasia block in Iran. Naval Staff Officer Senior Colonel Albay Nazmi Cesmeci says, “Turkey has gained an incomparable position in the Euroasia strategy both as being in the center of risks and uncertainties and as being on the new market’s intersecting roads”.

Why Germany is resisting Turkey’s EU EU EU to join the EU stressed Cismigiu, considering that Germany is Turkey’s accession to the EU to be eligible for their own interests and economic aspects.

Turkish Armed Forces saw that NATO concept has changed and our national interests in the region are not compatible with the US just like in the Northern Irak example; for that reason, we can say that Turkish Armed Forces will play an important role in determining the Euroasia strategies (Knight, 1999).

Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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