Reinforcement Learning in BitTorrent Systems

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Abstract—Recent research efforts have shown that the popular BitTorrent protocol does not provide fair resource reciprocation and may allow free-riding. In this paper, we propose a BitTorrent-like protocol that replaces the peer selection mechanisms in the regular BitTorrent protocol with a novel reinforcement learning based mechanism.

Due to the inherent operation of P2P systems, which involves repeated interactions among peers over a long period of time, the peers can efficiently identify free-riders as well as desirable collaborators by learning the behavior of their associated peers. Thus, it can help peers improve their download rates and discourage free-riding, while improving fairness in the system.

We model the peers’ interactions in the BitTorrent-like network as a repeated interaction game, where we explicitly consider the strategic behavior of the peers. A peer, which applies the reinforcement learning based mechanism, uses a partial history of the observations on associated peers’ statistical reciprocal behaviors to determine its best responses and estimate the corresponding impact on its expected utility. The policy determines the peer’s resource reciprocations with other peers, which would maximize the peer’s long-term performance, thereby making foresighted decisions.

We have implemented the proposed reinforcement-learning based mechanism and incorporated it into an existing BitTorrent client. We have performed extensive experiments on a controlled Planetlab test bed. Our results confirm that our proposed protocol (1) promotes fairness in terms of incentives to each peer’s contribution e.g. high capacity peers improve their download completion time by up to 33%, (2) improves the system stability and robustness e.g. reducing the peer selection fluctuations by 57%, and (3) discourages free-riding e.g. peers reduce by 64% their upload to free-rider, in comparison to the regular BitTorrent protocol.

I. INTRODUCTION

Peer-to-peer (P2P) content sharing protocols dominate the traffic on the Internet, and thus, have become an important part in building scalable Internet applications [1]. The P2P protocols are used by a variety of Internet applications such as content distribution [2], voice over IP [3], and streaming multimedia P2P applications [4], [5].

In P2P content distribution systems, fairness among peers is an important factor, as it encourages peers to actively collaborate in disseminating content, which can lead to an improved system performance. However, even BitTorrent [6], one of the most popular protocols used in P2P content distribution, does not provide fair resource reciprocation, particularly for node populations having heterogeneous upload bandwidths [7]–[10]. This is because the tit-for-tat strategy implemented in BitTorrent only exploits a short-term history for making upload decisions. More specifically, upload decisions are made based on the most recent observations of the resource reciprocation. This also implies that the upload decisions are short backward-looking and not forward-looking, i.e., the decisions are not foresighted. Thus, a peer can keep following the tit-for-tat policy only if it continuously uploads pieces of a particular file to its associated peers and as long as it receives pieces of interest in return. However, this is not always feasible as irrespective of peers’ willingness to cooperate, they may not always have pieces in which the other peers are interested in [11]. However, such behavior is still perceived as a lack of cooperation for interacting peers. In addition, it has been shown that BitTorrent systems do not effectively cope with selfish peers’ behaviors such as free-riding [12]–[14], because of their built-in optimistic unchoke mechanism. While the optimistic unchoke mechanism enables peers to continuously discover better peers (or leechers) to reciprocate resources, it can provide a major opportunity for selfish peers to obtain data without uploading in return. This mechanism may also lead to unfairness in the system, as it forces high-capacity peers to interact with low-capacity peers.

Unlike the approaches that are using short-term observation history, reputation-based schemes have been proposed to overcome the limitations of tit-for-tat and optimistic unchoke mechanisms by exploiting global histories (e.g., [15]–[17]). However, in order to maintain such a global history across peers, these approaches require significant communication overhead. Moreover, the reliability of global history can be unclear as peers may exhibit different reciprocation behaviors with different peers. Alternatively, the long-term local (or private) history of upload behaviors with associated peers’ is used in several other reputation-based approaches such as [11], [18]–[20]. While these approaches can reduce the communication overheads, the focus of these systems is still on maximizing the immediate utility, which may be less desirable than maximizing the long-term utility, as peers can repeatedly interact with each other over a long period of time.

In this paper, we model the peer interactions in the BitTorrent-like network as a repeated interaction game – repeated interactions (i.e., reciprocating resources) among several participants (i.e., peers) in which a participant takes actions (i.e. unchoke peers) so as to maximize long term reward (i.e., cumulative download rates). The underlying state of the environment changes stochastically, and is contingent upon the decisions of the participants. In our model, peers can
apply reinforcement-learning (RL) to make upload decisions. We explicitly consider the strategic behaviors of peers, where the peers can observe partial historical information about the reciprocation behaviors of their associated peers. Based on this information, the peers that apply the RL-based strategy can estimate their future expected rewards, and then, can determine accordingly their best responses. The future expected rewards can be determined using various types of interactive learning techniques. We use reinforcement learning, since it enables the peers to improve their peer selection strategies based solely on the knowledge of their past interactions, but not on the knowledge of the complete reciprocation behaviors of the peers in the entire network. The reinforcement learning enables each peer to forecast the impact of the current peer selection on the future expected utility and to maximize it. Therefore, the RL-based peer selection mechanism replaces both the tit-for-tat and the optimistic unchoke mechanisms in the regular BitTorrent protocol.

Note that our protocol supports a non real-time media transmission scenario, which has received less attention in the multimedia research community compared to the on-demand media streaming scenario. In this type of protocols, the requested content needs to be completely downloaded before it is displayed. Thus, the ordering of which pieces are downloaded first is not important, but the overall time required for completely downloading the content is important. Note that, however, the proposed protocol can be easily adapted to on-demand media streaming applications using existing techniques such as [21]–[23].

The proposed protocol consists of three main processes:

- **Learning Process**, which provides updated information about statistical behaviors of the associated peers’ resource reciprocation,
- **Policy Finding Process**, which computes the peer selection policy based on the reinforcement learning, and
- **Decision Process**, which determines the associated peers that will be unchoked and choked during every re choke period based on the peer selection policy.

We implemented our proposed protocol on top of an actual BitTorrent client, and performed extensive experiments in a controlled Planetlab test bed. The new proposed algorithm is executed simply through policy modifications to existing clients with no changes to the BitTorrent protocol. Our protocol does not demand full adoption or sparse adoption of the RL-based peer selection mechanism (as in [2]) and can be run by any number of peers in a BitTorrent-like network. We evaluated and quantified the performance of the proposed protocol, and compared its performance with the regular BitTorrent protocol. Based on the experimental results, the proposed protocol provides the following advantages against the regular BitTorrent protocol:

1) It discourages free-riding by limiting the upload to non-cooperative peers.
2) It promotes cooperation among high-capacity peers.
3) It improves fairness; the peers that contribute more resources (i.e., higher upload capacities) can achieve higher download rates. While, the peers that contribute fewer resources may achieve lower download rates.
4) It improves the system robustness by minimizing the impact of free-riding on the contributing peers’ performance.
5) It improves the stability of the peer selection mechanism, which affects directly the performance of the system.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we briefly describe the BitTorrent systems. In Section III we briefly define the game and the adopted reinforcement learning solution and describe the RL-based peer selection mechanism. Section IV presents the design of the proposed protocol. Details of our protocol implementation are discussed in Section V. The experimental results are presented in Section VI. Finally, we discuss related work in Section VII and the conclusions are drawn in Section VIII.

II. BITTORRENT OVERVIEW

In this section we briefly overview the BitTorrent protocol [6]. The BitTorrent protocol is often adopted for P2P content distribution, because it can efficiently scale with a large number of participating clients.

Before the content distribution process begins, the content provider divides the possessed data content into multiple pieces, or chunks. Then, the provider creates a metainfo file, which contains information necessary to initiate the content downloading process. The metainfo file includes the address of the tracker, which plays the role of coordinator that facilitates peer discovery. A client downloads the metainfo file before joining a torrent (or swarm) – a group of peers interested in a particular content. Then, it connects the tracker to receive a peer set, which consists of randomly selected peers currently exchanging the same content. The peer set may include both leechers, peers that are still downloading content pieces, and seeds, peers that have the entire content and upload it to other peers. The client can then connect and exchange (or, reciprocate) its content pieces with its associated peers – the peers in its peer set.

While reciprocating content pieces, each leecher determines a set of peers among its peer set from where it can download its content pieces. The peer selection is determined by choking mechanisms which determined the choking decisions. BitTorrent leechers adopt two choking mechanisms: the tit-for-tat resource reciprocation mechanism and the optimistic unchoke mechanism. The tit-for-tat mechanism prefers the peers that upload their pieces at the highest rate among the associated peers. Specifically, every 10 seconds (or rechoke period), a leecher checks the current download rates from its associated peers and selects the peers that are uploading their pieces at the highest rates. Then, the leecher uploads only to the selected associated peers, while choking (i.e., blocking download) the rest of them during the rechoke period.

The available upload bandwidth is equally divided into the unchoked peers. The optimistic unchoke mechanism reserves a portion of the available upload bandwidth to provide pieces
to peers that are randomly selected. The purpose of this mechanism is to enable the leechers to continuously discover better peers to associate itself with, and bootstrap newly joining leechers into the tit-for-tat mechanism. Optimistic unchoke is randomly rotated among the associated peers, typically once every three rechoke periods, allowing enough time for leechers to demonstrate their cooperative behaviors.

The number of unchoked peers (slots) may vary depending on specific implementation, and it can be fixed or dynamically changed as a function of the available upload bandwidth.

Seeds deploy different choking mechanism as they already completed to download content. The most common implementation is based on round-robin schedule, aiming to distribute data uniformly. This implementation is also deployed in our implementation.

III. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING FOR RESOURCE RECIPROCATION IN P2P NETWORKS

Peers in BitTorrent-like systems often make repeated decisions to select unchoked peers given their dynamically changing environment. The evolution of the peers’ interactions across the various rechoke periods is modeled as a repeated interaction game. We assume that this stochastic game is played over a long period of time, in order to support several popular applications such as video streaming or large-size file delivery.

In each time slot (i.e., rechoke period), every peer is in a state and needs to select its optimal action. The peers choose their own actions independently and simultaneously in each rechoke period. After that, the peers are rewarded for taking their actions and transit into the next states. The reward (received by each peer) and the state transition are contingent upon other peers’ states and actions.

During the repeated multiple peers’ interactions, the peers can only observe a partial history of their associated peers’ reciprocation behaviors. Based on these observations, the peers that adopt the RL-based peer selection policy can estimate their future expected rewards and can identify their best responses. The estimation of the future expected reward can be computed using different types of learning schemes. In this paper, we use reinforcement learning [24], as it allows the peers to improve their peer selection strategy using only knowledge of their own past reciprocation, without knowing the complete knowledge of reciprocation behavior of the associated peers in the network.

Formally, a reinforcement learning environment can be represented by a tuple, \((I, S, A, P, R)\). \(I\) is a set of peers in the game. If there are \(M\) peers in the game, \(I\) can be denoted by \(I = \{1, \ldots, M\}\). \(S\) is the set of state profiles of all peers in the game, i.e., \(S = S_1 \times \cdots \times S_M\), where \(S_j\) is the state space of peer \(j\). \(A\) is the joint action space \(A = A_1 \times \cdots \times A_M\), where \(A_j\) is the action (peer selection) space for peer \(j\). \(P : S \times A \times S \rightarrow [0, 1]\) is a state transition probability function that maps from state profile \(S(t) \in S\) at time \(t\) into the next state profile \(S(t + 1) \in S\) at time \(t + 1\) given corresponding joint actions \(A(t) \in A\). Note that \(t\) here is discrete and measured in time slots. Finally, \(R : S \times A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+^M\) is a reward vector function defined as a mapping from the state profile \(S(t) \in S\) at time \(t\), and corresponding joint actions \(A(t) \in A\), to a vector with each element being the reward to a particular peer.

To find the optimal policy in the game (e.g., a stochastic game model [25], [26]), peers may require the entire history of the interactions among peers in the networks. However, this may be infeasible for real P2P networks. Unlike such games, finding a RL-based policy only requires the peers’ own histories of observations through their experiences (or interactions). Therefore we expect the RL-based peer selection policy to be suboptimal.

The history of observations in the network up to time \(t - 1\) is defined as

\[
H(t) = \{S(0), A(0), R(0), \ldots, S(t - 1), A(t - 1), R(t - 1)\} \in \mathcal{H}(t)
\]

which summarizes all previous states, actions and rewards of the peers in the network up to time \(t - 1\), where \(\mathcal{H}(t)\) is the set of all possible histories up to time \(t - 1\). Since a peer \(j\) cannot access the entire history of observations, i.e., \(\mathcal{H}(t)\), but rather a portion of \(\mathcal{H}(t)\), a set of observations that peer \(j\) can access is expressed as \(O_j(t) \in O_j\) and \(O_j(t) \subseteq \mathcal{H}(t)\). Note that the current state \(S_j(t)\) is always observable, i.e., \(S_j(t) \in O_j(t)\).

The state transition probability is calculated from \(O_j(t)\). If there are \(N_j\) peers associated with peer \(j\), then the state of peer \(j\) is represented by a tuple \(\{s_{ij}\}\) for all \(i \in C_j\), where \(C_j\) denotes the set of peers with peer \(j\). Thus, \(s_{ij}\) can be expressed with one bit and the state space of peer \(j\) can be expressed as

\[
S_j = \{(s_{1j}, \ldots, s_{N_j})|s_{ij} \in \{0, 1\} \text{ for all } i \in C_j\}
\]

where \(N\) denotes the number of peer \(j\)’s associated peers in \(C_j\), i.e., \(|C_j| = N\). Therefore, a state \(S_j(t) \in S_j\) can capture the uploading behavior of the associated peers at time \(t\).

2) Action Space of Peer \(j\) – \(A_j\): The action of peer \(j\) represents the set of its peer selection decisions. The peer selection decision of peer \(j\) to peer \(i\) at time \(t\) is denoted by \(a_{ji}\), and is defined as

\[
a_{ji}(t) = \begin{cases} 
0, & \text{if peer } j \text{ chooses peer } i \\
1, & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

In order to minimize the computational complexity, we consider \(s_{ij} \in \{0, 1\}\) in this paper. However, the granularity of state can be easily extended.
Thus, $a_{ij}$ can also be expressed with one bit. The action space of peer $j$ can be expressed as

$$A_j = \{ (a_{j1}, \ldots, a_{jN}) | a_{ji} \in \{0, 1\} \text{ for all } i \in C_j \}.$$  

(5)

Hence, an action $A_j(t) \in A_j$ is of vector that consists of peer $j$’s peer selection decisions to its associated peers at time $t$. In the proposed protocol, we assume that peer $j$ is able to unchoke $N_u(\leq N)$ peers. Note that peer $j$ allocates the same amount of upload bandwidths to all unchoked peers, the variable case can be future explored. Thus, the bandwidth allocated to an unchocked peer $i$ by peer $j$ at time $t$ is determined by $L_{ji}(t) = B_j/N_u$, where $B_j$ is the maximum upload bandwidth available to peer $j$.

3) State Transition Probability of Peer $j$: A state transition probability represents the probability that an action $A_j(t) \in A_j$ of peer $j$ in state $S_j(t) \in S_j$ at time $t$ will lead to another state $S_j(t+1) \in S_j$ at time $t+1$. This can be expressed as

$$P_{A_j(t)}(S_j(t), S_j(t+1)) = \Pr(S_j(t+1)|S_j(t), A_j(t)).$$  

(6)

A peer $j$ can estimate the state transition probability functions based on its history interactions of $S_j(t')$, $A_j(t')$ and $S_j(t'+1)$ for $t' < t$, which may be stored in a transition table. While we deploy an empirical frequency based algorithm to estimate the state transition probability function in this paper, which is presented in Section IV-A other algorithms (e.g., [27]) can also be used.

4) The Reward of Peer $j$ $- R_j$: The reward of a peer in a state is its total estimated download rate in that state. Thus, a reward of a peer in a state is the sum of the estimated download rates from all of its associated peers. More specifically, a reward of peer $j$ from state $S_j(t) \in S_j$ can be expressed as

$$R_j(S_j(t)) = \langle S_j, [L_{ij}]_{i \in C_j} \rangle = \sum_{i \in C_j} L_{ij}$$  

(7)

where $\langle X, Y \rangle$ denotes the inner-product of two vectors $X$ and $Y$. A set of rewards for all peers in the system is denoted by $\mathcal{R} = \{R_1, \ldots, R_N\}$.

5) RL-based Policy $\pi_j$: The policy $\pi_j$, which can be obtained from the reinforcement learning, can provide a specific action $A_j$ for peer $j$ in state $S_j(t)$ at time $t$, i.e., $\pi_j : S_j \rightarrow A_j$. Thus, $A_j(t) = \pi_j(S_j(t))$.

The actions that the policy provides to peer $j$ are determined such that they can maximize the cumulative discounted expected reward, which is defined for a peer $j$ in state $S_j(t)$ at time $t = t_e$ given a discount factor $\gamma_j$ as

$$R_j^f(S_j(t_e)) = \sum_{t=t_e+1}^{\infty} \gamma_j^{t-(t_e+1)} \cdot R_j(S_j(t)).$$  

(8)

Thus, the policy $\pi_j$ maps each state $S_j(t) \in S_j$ into an action, i.e., $A_j(t) = \pi_j(S_j(t))$, such that each action maximizes $R_j^f(S_j(t_e))$.

The policy can be deployed as a peer selection algorithm, which enables each peer to maximize its own long-term utility. While the policy $\pi_j$ can be obtained using well-known methods such as value iteration and policy iteration [28], the environment dynamics keeps changing in practice, and thus, the policy needs to be updated frequently. This may require a high computational complexity. Hence, it is important to reduce the complexity for finding the policy, such that the proposed algorithm can be efficiently deployed.

IV. THE PROTOCOL DESIGN

In this section, we describe the proposed protocol design that replaces the tit-for-tat and optimistic unchoke peer selection mechanisms, which are deployed in the regular BitTorrent systems, with the RL-based peer selection mechanism.

The protocol design is summarized in Fig. 1. The protocol consists of three main processes running in parallel:

1) The learning process, which provides updated information about statistical behaviors of the associated peers’ resource reciprocation $O_j(t) \subseteq H(t)$. This process is necessary since the peers’ reciprocation behaviors are not foretold. Therefore, peers are required to act in the environment in order to gain observation of the transition function and the rewards of the associated peers.

2) The policy finding process, which computes the policy using reinforcement learning. This process needs to be running in the entire downloading process as the changes of peers’ reciprocation behaviors (identified by the learning process) can result in the policies obtained in the previous time slots being outdated.

3) The decision process, which determines the decisions on peer selection in each rechoke period based on the policy and the observed state.

More details about these processes are discussed next.

A. The Learning Process

It is difficult to estimate (or learn) the other peers’ states, rewards and state transition probabilities due to the unannounced information, network scalability constraints, time-varying network dynamics, etc. In our proposed protocol, a RL-based peer learns the other peers’ states, rewards, state transition probability, etc., using the observations of its competing peers from the past. Thus, each peer needs to update the above information regularly through the learning process, while downloading content from its associated peers.

The learning process consists of two main methods that compute the estimated reward and state transition probability, which is depicted in Fig. 2.

1) Computing Reward: The reward of peer $j$ represents its total download rates from its associated peers estimated by peer $j$. In the rewards calculation method, the associated peers
are classified into two types based on the available information about their resource reciprocation history.

For associated peers that have reciprocated their resources with peer $j$, referred to as peers with reciprocation history, peer $j$ estimates their upload rates based on the weighted average of the past upload rate samples. This can reduce the fluctuation induced by the protocol and network dynamics in the sampled upload rates of the associated peers. Specifically, peer $j$ estimates the upload rates $L_{ij}$ of peer $i \in C_j$ based on recently observed resource reciprocation $L_{ij}$ as

$$L_{ij}(t + 1) \leftarrow \alpha_j \cdot L_{ij}(t + 1) + (1 - \alpha_j) \hat{L}_{ij}(t)$$

(9)

where $\alpha_j$ denotes the weight for most recent resource reciprocation.

For associated peers who have not yet reciprocated their resources with peer $j$, which are referred to as peers without resource reciprocation history, peer $j$ initializes the information about such peers by optimistically estimating that they reciprocate their resources with high probability and high upload rate. This enables peer $j$ to efficiently discover additional peers, and bootstrap newly joining peers, which is important for the efficiency of the system. Whenever peer $j$ uploads to a peer without resource reciprocation history and the peer does not upload to $j$ in return, peer $j$ reduces the peer’s presumed upload rate, as this provides $j$ with more confidence that the particular peer may not actively reciprocate its data. This also prevents the associated peers from taking advantage of a peer through optimistic initialization and possible free-riding. Note that white-washing [29] is not possible in our design either, since peers are identified by their IP addresses.

2) Finding State Transition Probability: The state transition probabilities are updated every rechoke period, and thus, each peer can capture the time-varying resource reciprocation behaviors of its associated peers. Every rechoke period at $t + 1$, peer $j$ stores 3-bit triplets for its associated peer $i$, $(s_{ij}(t), a_{ij}(t), s_{ij}(t + 1))$. Peer $j$ stores the triplets for its associated peers that are in its reduce peer set, which will be discussed later in this section, or peers that uploaded to peer $j$ at time $t$ or $t + 1$. In our design, we compute the state transition probability functions based on the empirical frequency, and assume that the state transition of each peer is independent. Thus, the state transition probability $P_{A_{ij}}(S_j(t), S_j(t + 1))$ from $S_j(t) = (s_{1j}(t), \ldots, s_{N_j}(t))$ to $S_j(t + 1) = (s_{1j}(t + 1), \ldots, s_{N_j}(t + 1))$ given an action $A_j(t) = (a_{j1}(t), \ldots, a_{jN}(t))$ can be expressed as

$$P_{A_{ij}}(S_j(t), S_j(t + 1)) = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \Pr(s_{ij}(t + 1) | s_{ij}(t), a_{ji}(t)).$$

B. The Policy Finding Process

The policy finding process runs in parallel with the learning process, while using the information obtained from the learning process. This process is depicted in Fig. 8. Finding the policy based on the reinforcement learning frequently may result in high computational complexity requirement, if the number of the associated peers becomes large. Hence, in order to practically implement the proposed algorithm, it is critical to reduce the number of peers that a peer considers for reciprocation (see Section III). Therefore, this process needs to begin with reducing the set of associated peers, and then, finds the policy $\pi_j$ that maximizes the cumulative discounted expected reward (i.e., in Eq. 8) in the reduced peer set.

1) Reducing Associated Peer Set: As discussed in Section III in order to find $\pi_j$ efficiently, it is important for peer $j$ to reduce the set of associated peers while selecting the peers who can reciprocate their resources with higher probability and with higher upload rate in the reduced peer set. Specifically, peer $j$ computes the expected rewards (or download rates) $\hat{L}_{ij}$ from each peer $i \in C_j$, defined as

$$\hat{L}_{ij}(t + 1) = L_{ij}(t) \times \Pr(i \sim j),$$

(10)

where $\Pr(i \sim j)$ denotes the probability of resource reciprocation with peer $i$. Based on the computed $\hat{L}_{ij}$, peer $j$ reduces its associated peer set by iteratively eliminating the peers with the smallest $\hat{L}_{ij}$ in its associated peer set. The algorithm for peer set reduction is presented in Algorithm 1.

The algorithm computes $\hat{L}_{ij}$ in (10) for $i \in C_j$ (lines 3-4). Then, the associated peers are ordered based on the computed $\hat{L}_{ij}$ (line 5). The peer set reduction is performed in the “while loop” (lines 7-13) that reduces the peer set by $c_2$ peers in every iteration. In the loop, the algorithm selects $c_1$ peers with the smallest $\hat{L}_{ij}$ values denoted by $G$ (line 8), from the reduced group of peers $C_j'$. It then obtains policy $\pi_{j,G}$ for the peers in $G$ (line 9). Based on $\pi_{j,G}$, it calculates the probabilities for the peers to be unchoked (lines 10-14). Given the calculated probability, it removes the $c_2$ peers with the lowest probability to be unchoked (line 15). The algorithm runs until $|C_j'| = T$ (line 7).
Considered peers is available for a newly joining peer to collect information such as the rewards and state transition mechanism in the initialization phase. This enables the peer to begin with adopting the regular BitTorrent mechanisms and upload rates that are expressed in the P2P network.

Algorithm 1 Peer-set Reduction Algorithm for Peer j

1: **INPUT**:
   - $C_j$ - set of associated peers of peer j
   - $T$ - targeted size of reduced peer set (constant)
   - $L_{ij}$ - rewards (or download rates) from peer i
   - $Pr(s_{kj})$ - probability to be in $s_{kj}$
   - $Pr(i ⇝ j)$ - the resource reciprocation probability of peer i
   - $c_1, c_2$ - constants such that $T \gg c_1 > c_2$

2: **OUTPUT**:
   - A reduced set of peers $C_j^f \subseteq C_j$ where $|C_j^f| = T$

3: for all $i \in C_j$ do
4:   $\hat{L}_{ij} = L_{ij} * Pr(i ⇝ j)$;
5: order $C_j$ in a non-decreasing order of the $\hat{L}_{ij}$;
6: $C_j^f \leftarrow C_j$;
7: while $|C_j^f| > T$ do
8:   $G = \{ C_j^f, \ldots, C_j^f \}$;
9:   calculate $\pi^*_{j,G}$ //policy for set G;
10:   for all $k$ such that $C_j^f \in G$ do
11:     $Pr(j ⇝ k) \leftarrow 0$ //estimate probability that j unchoke s k based on $\pi^*_{j,G}$
12:   for all $s_{kj} \in S_j$ do
13:       if $\pi^*_{j,G}(s_{kj}) = 1$ then
14:         $Pr(j ⇝ k) \leftarrow Pr(j ⇝ k) + Pr(s_{kj})$;
15:   order G in a non-decreasing order of the $Pr(j ⇝ k)$ values;
16:   if $c_2 > |C_j^f| - T$ then
17:       $c_2 \leftarrow |C_j^f| - T$;
18: $C_j^f \leftarrow C_j^f - \{G_1, \ldots, G_2\}$;
19: return $C_j^f$

Fig. 4. A decision process.

2) **Scaling**: Scaling of the rewards can be considered in the cases where the number of reciprocation samples is small in comparison to the difference between the lowest to the highest upload rates that are expressed in the P2P network.

C. The Decision Process

The decision process includes two phases: the initialization phase and the RL (Reinforcement Learning) phase, which is depicted in Fig. 4.

1) **Initialization Phase**: Since no information about associated peers is available for a newly joining peer j, peer j begins with adopting the regular BitTorrent mechanisms (i.e., the tit-for-tat mechanism and the optimistic unchoke mechanism) in the initialization phase. This enables the peer to collect information such as the rewards and state transition probabilities with respect to its associated peers. During this phase, j discovers new peers, i.e., downloads from peers for the first time. Once j’s peer discovery is slowed down (see Section V for more details), it replaces the regular BitTorrent RL-based peer selection mechanisms, and operates in the RL phase.

2) **RL Phase**: In this phase, peer j determines the decisions on peer selection based on the policy obtained from the policy finding process in every rechoke period. Peer j determines its current state $S_j$ and the corresponding action $A_j$ based on the policy $\pi_j$, i.e., $A_j = \pi_j(S_j)$. Note that $A_j$ is a set of decisions on peer selection of peer j, i.e. either to choke or to unchoke.

V. IMPLEMENTATION

In this section, we discuss our proposed protocol prototype and study how to determine several design parameters.

Our RL-based client is implemented on top of the Enhanced CTorrent client, version 3.2 [30]. We enhance the original client such that our client can operate in RL-enhanced mode, where it reciprocates its resources using the proposed RL-based mechanism, or in regular mode, where it reciprocates its resources based on the regular BitTorrent peer selection mechanism. We add the functionality for the RL-enhanced mode to support the proposed protocol requests. More specifically, in the RL-enhanced mode we implemented the three different processes that are discussed in Section IV.

A. The Learning Process

The learning process consists of two methods, the reward calculation method and the state transition probability calculation method. In Section IV-A2 we discussed how to estimate the state transition probability, and in this section we will describe the reward calculation method.

The reward calculation method can be applied differently depending on the associated peer types: peers with or without reciprocation history.

1) **Peers with Reciprocation History**: While calculating the reward of a peer with resource reciprocation history, the samples of $L_{ij}$ will obviously fluctuate over the rechoke time period due to the experienced P2P network dynamics. Because of this fluctuation, $L_{ij}$ samples may be atypical. Thus, a typical upload rate of a peer with reciprocation history can be estimated based on a weighted average of the samples as in (9). This is the estimated reward of peer j obtained from peer i. As recent resource reciprocations are considered more important than the past reciprocations, we set $c_5 = 0.5$. Based on several trials for $c_5$ such that $0.5 + \epsilon \leq c_5 \leq 1 - \epsilon$ for small $\epsilon \geq 0$ on various sets of our experiments (see more details in Section VI), we can verify that a smaller $c_5$ achieves less fluctuation of the reward. Thus, we set $c_5$ as 0.5. Fig. 5 shows an example for sampled upload rates $L_{ij}$ of a peer i in our network and the correspondingly estimated upload rates $\hat{L}_{ij}$ measured by another associated peer in the network. We can clearly observe less variations of the $\hat{L}_{ij}$ in the computation of the $L_{ij}$. 

Fig. 5. Sampled upload rate and the correspondingly estimated upload rate.
2) **Peers without Reciprocation History**: If there is no resource reciprocation history for peer \( i \), a leecher \( j \) optimistically initializes the information about the rewards and the reciprocation probabilities of its associated peers. Specifically, the initial estimated upload rate is set to be the highest upload rate \( L_{ij}^{\text{max}} \) that is pre-determined in the P2P network, i.e., \( L_{ij} \leftarrow L_{ij}^{\text{max}} \), and the probability of reciprocation with \( j \) is initiated to 1, i.e., \( \Pr(i \rightarrow j) \leftarrow 1 \). This optimistic initialization enables newly joining leechers to download almost immediately. Peer \( j \) needs to continue updating the initially assumed reward in every non-reciprocated event (i.e., peer \( j \) uploads resources to peer \( i \) while peer \( i \) does not upload resources to peer \( j \)). When peer \( j \) estimates the reward for peer \( i \), peer \( j \) can assume that

(i) \( \hat{L}_{ij} \) satisfies

\[
\frac{\hat{L}_{ij}(n-1)}{\hat{L}_{ij}(n)} < \frac{\hat{L}_{ij}(n)}{\hat{L}_{ij}(n+1)}
\]

where \( n \) denotes the number of non-reciprocated events,

(ii) \( \hat{L}_{ij}(n) \) decreases exponentially such that it approaches 0 after several attempts.

The assumption (i) means that the ratio of the estimated rate of two consecutive events is an increasing function of \( n \). This also implies that the increasing uncertainty about peer \( i \)'s reciprocation behavior. Moreover, the assumption (ii) is required to prevent the non-reciprocated behavior including free-riding. Thus, a function satisfying (i) and (ii) can have a form, such as

\[
f(n) = \beta g(n) \times L_{ij}^{\text{max}}
\]

where \( \beta (\leq 1) \) is a constant and \( g(n) > 1, \forall n \geq 1 \) is a function that grows faster than a linear function. In our implementation, we use function \( f(n) = 0.95^{2n} \times L_{ij}^{\text{max}} \) because the function satisfies properties (i) and (ii), as shown in Fig. 4.

**B. The Policy Finding Process**

As shown in Section IV in every iteration of the policy finding process, the associated peer set is first reduced. Based on our experiments, we observe that when the reduced size of peer set is more than 7 peers, finding the RL-based policy slows down the RL-enhanced client performance. Thus, in our implementation, we set the size of the reduced peer set as seven, i.e., \( T = 7 \) in Algorithm 1.

The computed policy holds for up to additional three rechoke periods, which is determined considering the tradeoff between the time for enough reciprocation and the time for capturing the network dynamics.

**C. The Decision Process**

The initialization phase and the RL phase in the decision process are implemented as follows.

1) **Initialization Phase**: In the initialization phase, peer \( j \) makes its decisions on peer selection based on the regular BitTorrent mechanisms, as it does not have enough information to calculate the policy.

In order to determine the duration of the initialization phase we study extensive experiment results, which include both flash crowd scenarios as well as steady state scenarios. In these experiments, the number of peers that have not uploaded to peer \( j \) from the beginning of the downloading process is counted every rechoke period. Fig. 7 shows the median of the counted numbers of peers collected from all the leechers in the network over time (rechoke periods) for several experiments of flash-crowd scenarios.

Fig. 7 shows that the peer counted value is exponentially decreasing and stabilized quickly. Then, peer \( j \) can switch from the initialization phase to the RL phase. In our implementation, a peer \( j \) counts the number of peers without reciprocation history within every rechoke period. Once the count reduces by one in duration of three rechoke periods and for two consecutive durations (i.e., six rechoke periods), peer \( j \) switches to the continuous phase and begins to adopt the RL-based strategy. Based on our experiments, peers switch from the initialization phase to the continuous phase approximately 60 rechoke periods later in the flash-crowd scenarios and approximately 36 rechoke periods later in the steady-state...
scenarios. However, different network settings might lead to different durations of the initialization phase.

2) RL Phase: In the RL phase, the peer selection decisions are made based on the RL policy every ten seconds (as in regular Bit Torrent). The selected peers will be unchoked for a rechoking period of ten seconds. The minimum number of unchoked peers is four. The number of unchoked peers can increase if

1) The peer that makes the peer selection decision does not saturate its upload capacity, or,

2) The upload bandwidth of the peer that makes the peer selection decision is higher in comparison to most of the peers it interacts with.

We compare the performance of the proposed protocol with that of the regular Bit Torrent implemented in the Enhanced C Torrent client. The minimum number of unchoked slots in the regular Bit Torrent implementation is also set as four. The number of slots can increase if a peer’s upload capacity is not saturated. In this implementation, one unchoke slot is always reserved for optimistic unchokes that are rotated every three rechoke periods.

VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

We perform extensive experiments on a controlled testbed, in order to evaluate the properties of the proposed protocol.

A. Methodology

All of our experiments are performed on the Planetlab experimental platform [31], which utilizes the nodes (machines) located across the globe. We execute all the experiments consecutively in time on the same set of nodes. Unless otherwise specified, the default implementations of leecher and seed in regular Bit Torrent systems are deployed.

The upload capacities of the nodes are artificially set according to the bandwidth distribution of typical Bit Torrent leechers [7]. The distribution was estimated based on empirical measurements of Bit Torrent swarms including more than 300,000 unique Bit Torrent IPs. Since several nodes are incapable to match the target upload capacities determined by the bandwidth distribution, we scale the upload capacity and other relevant experimental parameters such as file size by 1/20th. However, we have not set limitations on download bandwidth.

All peers begin the download process simultaneously, which emulates a flash crowd scenario. The initial seeds have stayed connected throughout the entire experiment. To provide synthetic churn with constant capacity, leechers disconnect immediately after completion of downloading the entire video file, and reconnect as new comers immediately while requesting the entire video file again. This enables our experiments to have the same upload bandwidth distribution for the duration of the experiment.

Unless otherwise specified, our experiments host 104 Planetlab nodes, 100 leechers and 4 seeds with a combined capacity of 128 KB/s, serving a 99 MB video file.

B. Experiment Results: Single RL Leecher in a Network

We start with the experiment where only a single leecher adopts the RL-enhanced protocol, while the rest of the leechers in the network run with the regular Bit Torrent, and there are no free-riders in the network (note that this is a common scenario that was tested by other proposed protocols such as [7], [32]). Fig. 8 compares the download time of a single leecher, while adopting the RL-enhanced protocol and the regular Bit Torrent protocol as a function of the leecher’s upload capacity over 7 trials.

In Fig. 8 as in [33] separate boxplots are depicted for the different scenarios. The top and the bottom of the boxes represent the 75th and the 25th percentile sample of download time, respectively, over all 7 runs of the experiments. The markers inside the boxes represent the median, while the vertical lines extending above and below the boxes represent the maximum and minimum of samples of download time within the ranges of 1.5 time the box height from the box border. Outliers are marked individually with “+” mark.

The results in Fig. 8 provide several insights into the operation of our RL-based proposed protocol. High and Low capacity leechers benefit from the RL-enhanced with
12%-27% improvement of their download time performance as indicated by the median. This improvement provides leechers with an incentive to adopt the proposed protocol. Moreover, the RL-based strategy does not simply improve performance; it also provides more consistent performance across multiple trials. By selecting to unchoke peers based on historical behavior information, our proposed protocol avoids the randomization present in the regular BitTorrent tit-for-tat and optimistic unchoke implementations, which cause to unstable peer selections and results in slow convergence.

Peer Selection Mechanism Stability

We further study the peer selection mechanism stability. The stability of the peer selection mechanism affects directly the performance of the system since once a peer starts to upload to another peer it takes time till the peer reaches its full capacity. In the BitTorrent protocol [6], the author suggests allowing 30 seconds for a peer to reach its full capacity. Thus, a system that has a high fluctuation in peer selection will have many occurrences of peers that do not reach their full capacity.

We compare the peer selection fluctuations of the two protocols. A stable peer selection mechanism should minimize the peer selection fluctuations. We measured peer selection fluctuations by comparing the peer selection decisions during two consecutive rechoke periods and measuring the difference between the two decisions, e.g., replacing an unchoked peer by a different peer counts as one change. Fig. 9 indicates the average number of peer selection changes as a function of time (rechoke period units) for a single peer. It shows that the average number of peer selection changes is lower in the RL-enhanced network for the majority of the time, with an average of 2.1 changes in the regular BitTorrent network as compared to 0.9 average changes in the RL-enhanced network. Thus, the RL-enhanced peer selection mechanism is more stable than the peer selection mechanism in the regular BitTorrent, reducing the peer selection fluctuations by an average of 57%.

Note that the optimistic unchoke mechanism contributes about 1 change every 3 rechoke periods, thus contributing an average change of about 1/3 per time unit in the regular BitTorrent network. Therefore, the decrease in optimistic unchoke is not the main reason for the stability improvement of the peer selection mechanism. Instead, replacing the tit-for-tat mechanism, which relies on short-term history of associated peers with the RL-based mechanism that relies on a long history and performs foresighted unchoking decisions is the main contributor for this stability.

C. Experiment Results: Performance of Leechers in Network without Free-Riders

We compare a system consisting of all leechers adopting the regular BitTorrent protocol, to a system consisting of all leechers running in RL-enhanced mode, adopting the RL-based strategy. In this section, we assume that there are no free-riders in the network. Note that this experiment hosted only 50 leechers. Fig. 10 shows the download completion time of leechers. For each group of leechers having the same upload capacity, separate boxplots are depicted for the different scenarios.

The results show the clear performance difference among high-capacity leechers, which are the fastest 20% leechers, and low-capacity leechers, which are the slowest 80% leechers. High-capacity leechers can significantly improve their download completion time – leechers having the upload capacity of at least 18kB/sec improve their download completion time by up to 33% in median. Unlike in the regular BitTorrent system, where leechers determine their peer selection decisions based on the myopic tit-for-tat that uses only the last reciprocation history, the RL-enhanced leechers determine their peer selection decisions based on the long term history. This enables the leechers to estimate the behaviors of their associated peers more accurately. Moreover, since part of the peer selection decisions is randomly determined in the regular BitTorrent, there is a high probability that high capacity leechers need to reciprocate with the low-capacity leechers [7]. However, the randomly determined peer selection decisions are significantly reduced in the proposed approach, as the random decisions are taken only in the initialization phase or in order to collect the reciprocation history of newly joined peers. As a result, the high capacity leechers increase their probability to reciprocate resources with other high capacity leechers.

![Fig. 9. Peer selection mechanism dynamics](image)

![Fig. 10. Download completion time for leechers.](image)
This is confirmed in the results of Fig. [11] which shows the unchoking percentage among the 20% high capacity leechers, comparing the two different systems. It is clearly observed that the collaboration among high capacity leechers improves when leechers adopt the RL-based strategy. Thus, we can conclude that the RL-based strategy improves the incentive mechanisms in BitTorrent networks: as a leecher contributes more to the network, it achieves higher download rate.

Recent studies [7]–[9], [19] show that the regular BitTorrent protocol suffers from unfairness particularly for high capacity leechers. In Fig. [12] we compare the upload rates and the average download rates of the leechers. The ratio of these values can indicate the degree of fairness in the system. The results in Fig. [12] show that fairness is improved in the RL-enhanced network, since high-capacity leechers increased their download rate getting closer to their upload rate, in spite of the restriction of limited seeds’ upload rate. On the other hand, in the RL-enhanced network, the download rates of low-capacity leechers decrease, getting close to their upload rates by at most 36%, compared to the regular BitTorrent system. However, all the peers that are slowed down by the RL-based strategy still download faster than their upload rate.

D. Experiment Results: Performance of Leechers in Network with Free-Riders

In this section, we investigate how effectively the proposed protocol can prevent selfish behaviors such as free-ridings. Note that the RL-based strategy shows a similar performance for the leechers that upload their content in a network that includes free-riders (i.e., shows the improved fairness, etc.). Hence, in this section, our focus is on studying how the free-riders are punished due to their selfish behaviors. Fig. [13] shows the time that the free-riders complete downloading 99MB video file in a network consisting of 50 contributing leechers, and increasing number of free-riders (i.e., 5, 10, and 15 free-riders). It compares the results of the RL-enhanced network to the regular BitTorrent network. Fig. [13] confirms that in the RL-enhanced network the leechers are able to effectively penalize the free-riders, as it takes longer time for the free-riders to complete their downloads (requires 8%-20% more time as measured by the median, in comparison to the regular BitTorrent protocol).

The RL-enhanced leechers can efficiently capture the selfish behaviors of the free-riders. Thus, they unchoke the free-riders with a significantly lower probability. Hence, the free-riders can download their content mainly from seeds and not from the leechers. The results shown in Fig. [14] also confirm that the leechers in the regular BitTorrent network upload approximately 2.8-3.7 times more data to the free-riders compared to the RL-enhanced network. This also shows that the RL-enhanced networks are more robust to the selfish behaviors of peers than the networks operating with the regular BitTorrent protocol. For example, in the network with 15
free-riders, the leechers in the regular BitTorrent systems upload 4.5% of their total upload capacity to free-riders, while they only upload 1.6% of their total upload capacity in the RL-enhanced network. Thus reducing by 64% their upload capacity to free-riders.

Therefore, our experiment results confirm that the RL-based strategy provides incentives for adoption because it improves the peer’s download rate, improves the stability of the peer selection mechanism, improves collaboration among high capacity peers, improves fairness in the system, and discourages non-cooperative behaviors such as free-riding.

VII. RELATED WORK

A fairly large number of P2P architectures that support distribution of multimedia over the Internet has been proposed in the last years within the scientific community [34]–[38]. More specifically, BitTorrent, the protocol that dominates the traffic on the Internet [1], has been highly influential in the design and development of many other modern commercial P2P streaming systems such as [4], [5], [39].

Extensive research has focused on modeling and analyzing the performance of the BitTorrent systems, since the main mechanisms and the design rationale of the BitTorrent protocol were first described [6].

Qiu and Srikant [40] studied a fluid analytical model of BitTorrent systems. They analytically studied the choking mechanism and how it affects the peer performance. They showed that the optimistic unchoke mechanism may allow free-riding. They also claimed that the system with tit-for-tat strategy eventually converges with a Nash equilibrium where fairness is achieved and all peers download at their upload capacities. However, as shown in our results, which are in consistent with other existing works such as [7], [9], [19], [32], the choking mechanism in BitTorrent may fail to attain fairness for realistic swarms. Fan et al. [41] characterized the design space of BitTorrent-like protocols capturing the fundamental tradeoff between performance and fairness. We also study such tradeoffs and show that the RL-based strategy improves the fairness in the system for the cost of reduced download rates of low-capacity leechers. This encourages leechers to contribute more resources (i.e., maximize their upload rate). Levin et al. [32] propose an auction base model to model the peer selection mechanism, claiming that BitTorrent uses auction to decide which peers to unchoke and not the tit-for-tat as widely believed.

Other researchers have studied the feasibility of free-riding behavior; Shneidman et al. [42] showed that it is possible to free-ride in BitTorrent systems. They identified forms of strategic manipulation that are based on Sybil attacks and uploading garbage data. Liogkas et al. [12] implemented three exploits that allow free-riders to obtain higher download rates under specific circumstances. Locher et al. [13] with BitThief extended this work by showing that free-riders can achieve higher download rate, even in the absence of seeds. Similarly, Srivianos et al. [14] showed that a free-rider, which can maintain a larger-than-normal view of the system, has a much higher probability to receive data from seeds and via optimistic unchoke. Our protocol replaces the optimistic unchokes, the most important vulnerability identified in these studies, with the RL-based policy based unchokes.

Fairness in BitTorrent systems was studied as well. Geo et al. [9] showed the lack of fairness in BitTorrent systems. Piatek et al. [7], observed the presence of significant altruism in BitTorrent, where peers make contributions that do not directly improve their performance. Izhak-Ratzen in [19] identified the potential lack of fairness and proposed the Buddy protocol that matches peers with similar bandwidth. Legout et al. [10] studied clustering of peers having similar upload bandwidth. They observed that when the seed is under provisioned; all peers tend to complete their downloads approximately at the same time, regardless of their upload rates. Moreover, high-capacity peers assist the seed to disseminate data to low-capacity peers. This can happen because the tit-for-tat strategy is based on short-term history. A peer can benefit from the tit-for-tat strategy only if it can continuously upload pieces and as long as it receives pieces of interest in return. Piatek et al. [11] showed that this is not always possible, as peers can have no piece to offer. Our work also considers the unfairness in BitTorrent systems, and shows that the proposed approach can improve the fairness by using a long-term history based strategy.

In order to reduce free-riding and encourage collaboration, various reputation systems have been proposed. Payment systems (e.g., [43], [44]), which enable peers to earn credits according to their uploads to other peers have been proposed. However, in practice these systems require a centralized entity to prevent cheating, and thus, have arguably scalability limitations. To overcome such weaknesses in payment systems, various designs of reputation systems have been proposed (e.g., [11], [15]–[17], [45]). In these systems, peers can make choking decisions bases on private history as well as globally shared history. However, these reputation systems require significant communication overheads to maintain the global history. Moreover, there is no guarantee that each peer expresses the same behavior to different peers with different attributes.

Other researchers have also acknowledged the importance of contribution incentives in P2P systems and have proposed different alternatives. Anagnostakis et al. [46] suggested to extend the BitTorrent incentives to n-way exchanges among rings of peers, providing incentive to cooperate. Piatek et al. [7] proposed the BitTyrant client, who applies a new peer selection mechanism that reallocates upload bandwidth to maximize peers’ download rates. However, whereas the appearance of a single BitTyrant client in a BitTorrent system reveals improving performance; in the case of a widespread adoption the system performs a severe loss of efficiency [47]. Levin et al. [32] proposed the propshare client that rewards other peers with proportional shares of bandwidth. They show that the propshare client improves performance in a swarm consisting predominately of BitTorrent peers. However, when the majority of peers run with propshare clients there is no
clear difference in performance in comparison to the regular BitTorrent protocol. In addition, all these systems relay on short-term history aim to maximize the immediate utility but not the long-term utility, which can show only suboptimal performance. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose the RL-based strategy that can replace the existing mechanisms deployed in BitTorrent protocol, while maximizing long-term utility of participating leechers.

**VIII. CONCLUSION**

In this paper, we propose a BitTorrent-like protocol that replaces the tit-for-tat and the optimistic unchoke peer selection mechanisms in the regular BitTorrent protocol with a novel RL-based mechanism.

In our proposed protocol the evolution of the peers’ interactions across the various rechoke periods are modeled as repeated interactions in a game. During the repeated multi-peer interactions, the peers can observe partial historical information of associated peers’ reciprocation behaviors. Through this peers can estimate the impact on their future rewards and then adopt their best peer selection action. The estimation of the impact on the expected future reward is performed using reinforcement-learning, as it allows the peers to improve their peer selection mechanism using only knowledge of their own past interactions, without knowing the complete reciprocation behavior of the peers in the network.

Our experiment results show that our proposed protocol improves the stability of the peer selection mechanism, improves collaboration among high capacity peers, improves fairness in the system, enhances the robustness of the network by effectively discouraging non-cooperative behaviors such as free-riding, and importantly improves the downloading rates of the peers deploying the protocol.

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Dynamics in Peer Selection Mechanism

- RL BitTorrent
- Regular BitTorrent

Number of Changes vs. Time (Rechoke Period)
Decision Process

Initialization Phase

RL-Phase

State Monitor $S_j$

Action Finder

Associated Peers

Upload Rate to $j$

$\pi^*_j$

Foresighted Actions

$A_j$
Discovering Ratio of New Peers Through BitTorrent

**Unchoking periods (10 seconds each)**

- **Number of Peers that were not discovered**
  - Flash-Crowd, regular BitTorrent
  - Flash-Crowd, RL-enhanced Strategy
  - Steady State, regular BitTorrent
  - Steady State, RL-enhanced Strategy
  - 2 Optimistic Unchokes per 3 Rechoke Periods