Some Amendments to the New Critical Edition of Prasannapadā Chapter One

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Prasannapadā Chapter One is well-known for its author Candrakīrti’s justifications for Buddhapāliita’s prasaṅga argumentative method and his severe criticisms toward Bhāviveka’s svatantrānumāna. This chapter of PsP has been repeatedly examined since its publication by Louis de La Vallée Poussin over 1903–1913 (PsP_L). But owing to the lacunae in the manuscripts Poussin relied on, PsP_L contains many controversial passages. Currently, the new critical edition published by Anne MacDonald in 2015 (PsP_M) provided an improved reading of the whole chapter, whereas still there is left the task of amendment. This paper, hereby, ahead of a forthcoming corrigendum of the whole PsP_M, aims to show several possible amendments to § 27 and § 28 in particular which have already caused a series of debates among scholars, like Hopkins (1983), Tanji (1988), MacDonald (2000; 2003), Oetke (2003), Yonezawa (2004), Matsumoto (2011) and so on.

Some amendments to § 27

§ 27 (A) yadā caivaṃ svatantrānumānanabhidhāyitvam mādhyamikasya, tadā kuto nādhyātmikāny āyatanāni svata utpannānīti svatantrā pratijñā, yasyāṃ sāṃkhyāḥ pratyavasthāsyante,

§ 27 (B) ko `yaṃ pratijñārthaḥ | kiṃ kāryātmakaḥ svata uta kāraṇāmaka iti | kiṃ cātaḥ | kāryātmakaś cet siddhasādhanam | kāraṇātmakaś ced viruddhārthatā, kāraṇātmanā vidyamānaśaiva sarvasyotpattimata utpādāt ||

PP

§ 27 (C) kuto `smākaṃ vidyamānavād iti hetuḥ, yasya siddhasādhanam viruddhārthatā vā svāt, yasya siddhasādhanaśa yasyāś ca viruddhārthatāyāḥ pariḥārthaḥ yatnam kariṣyāmaḥ | tasmāt paroktadoṣāprasaṅgād eva tatparihāra ācāryabuddhapāliitena na varṇanīyaḥ || (PsP_M § 27, pp. 147–149)

§ 27 consists of three parts. §27(A) and (C) are Candrakīrti’s responses to §27(B) which is cited from Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa (PP). To explain Nāgārjuna’s thesis of that things do not arise from themselves, Buddhapāliita declares it in a prasaṅgic way that
“Things do not arise from themselves. Because their arisings would be meaningless.” Against this statement of *prasaṅga*, Bhāviveka argues that since Buddhapālita cannot be exempt from *Sāṃkhya*’s criticism in § 27(B), Buddhapālita fails to defeat the *Sāṃkhya* opponents. With the attempt to defend Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti firstly declares in § 27(A) that as a *Mādhyamika*, Buddhapālita has no independent inference and therefore would not admit an independent probative thesis in regard to which the *Sāṃkhya* opponents could object. In § 27(C), Candrakīrti further argues that since a *Mādhyamika* would not acknowledge the reason of an independent probative inference, Buddhapālita is exempt from *Sāṃkhya*’s accusation of § 27(B).

The problematic readings of § 27(B) are marked in bold.

§ 27(B) ko `yaṁ pratiṇāarthah | kiṁ kāryātmakaḥ\(^1\) svata uta kāraṇātmaka\(^2\) iti | kiṁ cātah | kāryātmaka\(^3\) cet siddhasādhhanam | kāraṇātmaka\(^4\) ced viruddhārthatā, kāraṇātmanā vidyamānasyaiva sarvasyotpattimata utpādāt ||

1 Q: kāryātmanaḥ; PDBJL: kāryātmakaḥ; em. by LVP: kāryātmakāt. Tib: ’bras bu’i bdag nyid las.
2 Q: karaṇātmana; PDBJL: kāraṇātmaka; em. by LVP: kāraṇātmakād. Tib: rgyu’i bdag nyid las.
3 Q: kāryātmanaḥ; PBJL: kāryātmakaś; D: -makeś; em. by LVP: kāryātmakāc. Tib: ’bras bu’i bdag nyid las.
4 Q: karaṇātmanś; PDBJL: kāraṇātmakaś; em. by LVP: kāraṇātmakāc. Tib: rgyu’i bdag nyid las.

Among the six better Sanskrit manuscripts, Q is in favor of an ablative *karmadhāraya* reading, while the other five manuscripts are in favor of a nominative *bahuvrīhi* reading. MacDonald (2003; 2008; 2015, 368) argues that Q’s reading is the result of deliberate interference, and claims that “An explicit distinction between things as effects and things as causes is, however, not made by Buddhapālita; he merely refers to things in general. Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, on the other hand, clearly distinguish the subject that arises as either an effect or a cause. Bhāviveka ... takes things as effects. ... Candrakīrti, by contrast, takes things as causes as the subject.” Since in PP Tib the last sentence of § 27(B) reads “skyepacan thams cadnirgyu’ibdag nyid dutodypa kho nalas skyebai phyir,” MacDonald reconstructs the PP Skt as “*kāraṇātmanā vidyamānād eva*,” and argues that the meaning of it should be “because all that arises arises only from something that exits with the nature of a cause,” which implies that Bhāviveka takes the subject as effects. In contrast, since PsP Tib reads “skyebadang ldanpa thams cadnirgyu’ibdag nyid dutodypa kho nalaskye ba’i phyir,” MacDonald argues that this implies that Candrakīrti takes the subject as
causes. Finally, MacDonald concludes that PDBJL’s nominative bahuvrihi reading is pref-
erable.

However, as far as I am concerned, MacDonald’s justifications all failed. Firstly, in the
commentary of MMK 1.3 (PsP § 125, pp. 278–279), Candrakīrti clearly regards the causes
as the subject of the thesis of non-arising. Secondly, according to Inaba (1986, 288–289),
the ablative suffix las in PP Tib is no more than a translation of independent genitive of
vidyamānasya, and as a result, PP Tib and PsP Tib have no essential difference in meaning.
Taken together, there is no any evidence to prove that Q’s reading is deliberately interfered.

In my opinion, Q’s unique reading is trustworthy mainly for two reasons. Firstly, as a
citation from PP, Q’s reading of this passage corresponds well to PP. Secondly, the content
of this passage also suggests the ablative karmadhāraya readings are a better choice. To
criticize Buddhapālita’s claim of that things do not arise from themselves (svatatas), the
Sāṃkhya opponent asks that what does “svatatas” mean to Buddhapālita here. In Sāṃkhya’s
view, if the word “svatatas” means “from effects themselves,” then the thesis would become
“things do not arise from effects themselves,” and thus would be exactly what Sāṃkhya
School agrees with. But if it means “from causes themselves,” then thesis would become
“things do not arise from causes themselves,” and thus would contradict with Sāṃkhya’s
satkāryavāda. This is to say, the ablative words “kāryātmanah” and “kāraṇātmanah” are ex-
pected to be two possible explanations of the ablative word svatatas. Therefore, the ablative
karmadhāraya readings here should be superior.

Some amendments to § 28

§ 28 (E) ucyate, naitad evam | kim kāraṇam | yasmād yo hi yam artham pratijnānīte, tena
svaniścayavad anyeṣām niṣcayotpādanecchayāyopapattyāsāv artho ’dhigataḥ saivopapattiḥ
parasmāy upadesṭavyā | tasmād eṣa tāvan nyāyaḥ, yat pareṇaiva svābhupagatapratijñātārthasaśādhan
am upādeyam | sa cayoṣ param prati hetudṛṣṭāntasambhavāt svaprajñāmātrasārasāratayaiva kevalam
svaprajñātārthasaśādhanam upādatta iti nirupapatīkapakṣābhupagamāt svātmānam evāyaṁ
kevalam visamvādayan, na śaknoti pareṣāṃ niścayam ādhamāt iti | idam evāyaḥ spaṣṭataram
dūṣaṇam, yad uta svaprajñātārthasaśādhanāsāmarthyam iti kim atrānunānabādhodbhāvanayā
prayojanam || (PsP § 28, pp. 151–152)

§ 28 consists of two parts. Part D uncited here is a pūrvapakṣa which argues that
Mādhyamikas can adopt an inference established merely for themselves to refute oppo-
nents. Part E is Candrakīrti’s response to this pūrvapakṣa. The problematic readings are sa and svapratijñātārthasādhanam in Part E. The editorial information is as follows:

| sa       | na in all Skt mss.; ma yin in Tibetan translation |
|----------|--------------------------------------------------|
| svapratijñātārthasādhanam | svapratijñānārthamātram P; svaṁ Q; om. G; svapratijñātārthamātram in all other Skt mss; rang gi dam bc’i ba’i don gi sgrub par byed pa in Tibetan translation. |

In regard to the reading of sa in § 28 (D), MacDonald (2000; 2015) insists that the original reading na in all manuscripts cannot be made to yield a contextually meaningful and satisfying sense and therefore emended na to sa, even though sa is unsupported neither by Sanskrit manuscripts nor by PsP Tib. Now let us examine MacDonald’s reasons.

**Reason (1):** MacDonald (2015, vol. 2, 72, n. 155) noted that *Lakṣanāṭīkā (*LṬ) reads tac cāyam. She argues that “It would seem, however, *LṬ’s author was in fact relying on a manuscript of the PsP that read sa cāyam and that *LṬ’s copied sa cāyam degenerated independetly to tac cāyam due to scribal error and interferece ...” And the note “tasmāt parenaiva sva-pratijñātārthasādhanam hetudṛṣṭāntādibhir upādeyaṁ na_asmābhiḥ | atha so ’pi pare(paro) vinā hetvādibhiḥ param pratipādayiṣyati ity āha | tac cāyam ityādi” in *LṬ suggests the existence of sa in PsP.

**Reason (2):** MacDonald (2000, 177) states that “The question remains, however, as to the precise identity of the referent of ayam. Clearly ayam cannot refer to the Sāṅkhya, for, depending on the scope allocated to the initial na (i.e. its limit being either upādatte or ādhātum) , the sentence would be at the least self-contradictory, or a most unexpected and unlikely defense of the opponent. But should it be assumed that the subject is the Mādhyamika, we are met with an untimely and strange defense of the Mādhyamika’s procedure of proof, would have to accept that asya of the next sentence does not refer back to ayam of the previous, and are confronted overall with a logically unsatisfying sequence of statements.”

Embedded in these seemingly simple reasons are a number of rather difficult philological and philosophical problems. Firstly, Reason (1), unsupported by any philological evidence, is no more than a hypothesis. In fact, we can also suppose an opposite hypothesis that the original na was copied to ta in *LT due to a scribal error since na and ta may have similar forms in some Brāhmī script, and furthermore, ta is amended to tac since ta is impossible in grammar here. This hypothesis seems more convincing than MacDonald’s one.
Secondly, Reason (2) does not hold either. If the original reading of svapratijñātārthamātram is not editorially amended to svapratijñātārthasādhanam, the initial na of this sentence can be logically satisfying. Since in P, akṣaras ta and na have similar forms, it is reasonable to reckon that the reading of svapratijñānārtha- in P is a scribal error of svapratijñātārtha-. In this manner, all the Sanskrit manuscripts support the reading of svapratijñātārthamātram. The problem, nevertheless, is that the Tibetan translation reads rang gi dam bca’ ba’i don gi sgrub par byed pa which can be reconstructed into svapratijñātārthasādhanam just as what is adopted both by Poussin and MacDonald in their critical editions. However, PsP Tib contains several corruptions in § 28 (E) like “di ni gzan la gtan tshigs kyang ma yin no” which makes no sense in the context. This reveals the Tibetan translation of the whole passage of § 28 (E) is untrustworthy. It seems that rang gi dam bca’ ba’i don gi sgrub par byed pa is no more than an indeliberate confusion of svapratijñātārthasādhanam and svapratijñātārthamātram among which the former occurs once just before in the same passage. If we remain the original readings of Sanskrit manuscripts, we can translate § 28 (E) as follows.

[We would] reply: No, this is not the case. [For] what reason? Because [it is] of course [that disputant] who proposes a [certain] matter who should, with the desire to bring about certainty in others analogous to [his] own certainty, teach the other [party] exactly the reasoning by means of which [he] has come to understand this matter. Therefore this, first, is the regular procedure: Only the opponent has to employ a proof of the matter proposed [on the basis of that] which [he himself] maintains. But on account of — in the view of [his] opponent (=Mādhyamika) — the impossibility of [valid] reasons and examples, only his thesis is the core. Even though [only his thesis is the core], he does not only employ the matter he has proposed, [namely, he also employs reasons and examples]. Thus, since he maintains a proposition lacking justification, he, fooling only himself, is not able to instill certainty in [his] opponents. Just this is a very clear criticism towards him [=Sāṃkhya], namely, [he] is incapable of proving the matter he has proposed. Therefore, in this case, what is the point of bringing out the sublation by means of an inference.

Initially, Candrakīrti declares that if someone wants to propose a certain matter, he/she has the desire to bring about certainty in others just like in himself. Since the reasons and examples what the opponents employed are unestablished for Mādhyamikas, only the opponents’ thesis is the core. Despite of this fact, the opponents still employ reasons and examples which are doomed to be in vain. To such a degree, the opponents cannot justify their thesis and therefore are unable to instill certainty in Mādhyamikas. Candrakīrti be-
lieves that only by pointing out this, it is enough to refute opponents, and the bringing out the sublation by means of an inference, what the pūrvapakṣa of § 28 is eager to advocate, is pointless.

As far as I am concerned, since the above translation fits well with Candrakīrti’s thoughts, it is felicitous to retain the original readings of Sanskrit manuscripts. I will take Michael Witzel’s comment on higher textual criticism as the conclusion of this paper:

A careful critic, thus, will not do away, relying merely on his/her ‘genius’, with all corrupt passages many of which are and will remain obscure even to the most experienced and ingenious scholars. “Solving” such problems in a facile way (lectio facilior) will sooner or later turn out to have been a serious mistake. One better leaves the unusual, difficult reading (lectio difficilior) in the text—for the benefit of future readers.

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