Review Essay on Asian Security Discourse for the New Millennium:
On the Perspective of the Korean Peninsula

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In East Asia, four issues center on the discussion of security in the next century. The first one is associated with the significant long-term changes in the equations of military and economic power and the general framework of regional security in the region. Secondly, the underdeveloped institutionalism occurs not because of "culture" per se, but because of different ways of thinking. The problem has to do with the security of Asia as a region, not Asian security. Thirdly, despite Asianization and vastly divergent interests across East Asian countries, one common view that seems to be shared by all regional states is the United States' security commitment as the indispensable anchor for East Asian security. The last issue includes two interdependent topics, the Korea-U.S. relations and North Korea. The updating of the Korea-U.S. relations should start from the following two important approaches to the alliance countries: 1) the difference in security conception of the two countries, and 2) preparing each state's visions for unification of the two Koreas. On North Korea, it is necessary to acknowledge the North as a state alienated from the international order, which is dominated by the U.S.

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Another century is approaching, and this time it comes with a very special label, "a new millennium." Many scholars and analysts argue that "security" in Asia proposes an intrinsic instability in the twenty-first century and that it exists beyond our reach. "Security" is a very social construct. It comes into being at a specific time and in response to a specific set of circumstances. Therefore, we need to decode a security function in terms of the Asian context before pessimistic assumptions dominate our views on Asian security. Is Asia ready to embrace a new security discourse for the new millennium? The paper's purpose helps us think about this question.

The end of the Cold War brought about fundamental shifts in the nature of international security. The result is an emergence of a bonafide regional security complex, wherein state security perceptions and concerns are the functions of regional interstate interactions to such an extent that the state's security interests are closely tied to one another. In Barry Buzan's words, "The formative dynamics and structure of a security complex are generated by the states within the region- by their security perception of, and interactions with, each other." These affect both the form, the means of warfare, and the meaning of security itself. It is a natural realization that discussions on Asian security center on these new discourses of international security. Since every subject in Asia about security is tightly intertwined together, one cannot separate security from the economic, social, and cultural facets of the region.

The systematic approaches to Asian security have been addressed in the current security discussion without much satisfactory clarification, although their significance have been ever salient in the post-Cold War era. After the end of the Cold War, whenever we discuss Asian security, we only focus on Asian security either as a whole without specific considerations for the specific regions at issue, or in terms of the U.S., perspective toward each Asian individual state. Or, sometimes, certain groups of people prefer to deal with the problem with the label, "Asian Way." Therefore, we have been naturally familiarized with certain typical questions such as, "how do the proponents of neo-liberal institutionalism explain the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)?"; "should the U.S. now intensify efforts to draw Japan into what the two governments have described as a global partnership to contain a Chinese threat?"; or "how much can an Asian culture or civilization tell us about Asian security?" Each question does not fully answer the main problems that Asian security has encountered after the end of the Cold War. In each question, one perspective has been taken, and it tends to highlight some features

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1 For further readings, see Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1991); Ole Wæver, ed., Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993); Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1996); Keith Krause & Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Ken Booth, ed., Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998).

2 Barry Buzan, "The Post-Cold War Asia-Pacific Security Order: Conflict or Cooperation?" in Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region, eds. Andrew Machter and John Ravenhill (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 111.

3 Asia covered by the term and the diversity within that area is great. The distance from Tokyo to Jakarta is greater than that between London and Lagos or New York and Lima. When security is the subject under discussion, it is particularly relevant to keep such distance in mind. For this paper, East Asia is under consideration for discussion, which includes Northeast and Southeast Asia.
of the object under scrutiny but suppresses others.

Throughout this paper, I do not intend to present any designated policy options for any specific countries, or any newly designed theoretical framework to interpret the current security problems in the area. Rather, I would like to demonstrate a clear and comprehensive outlook of Asian security in which four positions are presented here: security complex of economic and military dimensions in the region, a debate on Asian Way and the underdevelopment of institutionalism, the U.S. presence in the region as a power balancer, and finally, the obsolete relationship between Korea and the U.S. Then, to handle those difficulties, a suggestion to overcome the virtual absence of effective Asian multilateralism will be introduced.

POST-COLD WAR AND ASIAN SECURITY

The Meaning of the Post-Cold War Era in Asia

Like the rise of the middle class as we study history, the end of the Cold War risks becoming an all-purpose explanation. As Fernand Braudel has demonstrated, while culture can change fairly rapidly, there are basic determinants of "civilization" that change only very slowly if at all. Following this view, the emergence and decline of the Cold War are the most primary dominant determinants in security discourses during the twentieth century. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991 and the following end of the Cold War have caused significant long-term changes in the equations of military/economic power, and the general framework of regional security in Asia as well as the rest of the world, notably Europe. Can the nations of the region define a satisfactory framework for interstate relations in pursuit of its separate national interests without inducing destabilizing geopolitical realignments or overt military hostilities?

The end of the Cold War has, on the one hand, substantially lessened ideological and military tensions and heightened hopes for cooperation between erstwhile adversaries of the Cold War period. On the other hand, it has sharpened economic and military (though lesser in extent) competition among erstwhile allies and friends during that period. However, as far as the physical or structural aspects of the region's security environment are taken into account, the changes have been hardly as dramatic as one might have expected so far. This happened because the Cold War had two dimensions-the settlement at Yalta and the ideological contest between the United States and the Soviet Union-both of which had any contemporary relevance for the Asia-Pacific.

The Cold War neither posed a barrier to the choices facing the states of the Asia-Pacific

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4 See Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilization (London: Penguin, 1993).
5 Arguably, with the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s and with the ideological complexion of Asian countries, the Yalta settlement had no appreciable impact on the foreign policy calculations of either the United States or the Soviet Union in Asia. To the contrary, as John Lewis Gaddis has described, the "long peace," which served the interests of both the U.S. and the Soviet, has become possible in Europe. Yalta prevented either state from establishing hegemony over the European continent and provided each power with an extended defense perimeter.
nor fundamentally affected how states interpreted or acted upon the underlying structural conditions shaping regional or sub-regional balances of power and interests. Unlike the European case, the end of the Cold War in 1989 did not initiate a change in the systematic context that unleashed the demand for the institutionalization of security or economic relationships.

However, the Cold War still has a historical significance in Asia. Above all, the end of the insurgencies, or the marker of the Cold War, has left Asia with a structure of consolidated nation-states with mostly stable political institutions and stable borders. In the twentieth century, nation-building was the first task for those states that emerged from colonialism, and after a generation or more, national identities seemed secure. As always, there are still plenty of loose ends, ethnic and religious differences, as well as overlapping territorial claims. Nonetheless, while the economic dynamism continues, the foundations are firm and, likely to remain stable. Indeed, the economic achievements due to the Cold War have understandably given the region’s leaders great confidence in the future. East Asian countries were experiencing a rapid economic growth during the Cold War. Their confidence for the future and their national identity were consolidated as a result. This experience has been a key determinant sign of stability in the region.

It is also true that international politics is event-driven, and that the region’s resilience and stability have not been tested by a major challenge against the present equilibrium or by an outright crisis that undermines the status quo. Amid optimism about the region’s extraordinary dynamism, deeper anxieties persist regarding the sustainability of the existing balance of power. Therefore, in the future, these signs of stability may be misleading. Beneath a veneer of shared interests, there loom deeper differences and potential incompatibilities brought with the end of the Cold War that defy a ready resolution. Although Asia, mostly East Asian countries to be exact, has achieved a momentous prosperity unimaginable several decades ago, the transition toward a more autonomous and powerful region is uneven, incomplete, and replete with uncertainty. As a consequence, the outlines of a more durable security order are barely discernible at present. Indeed, rather than guaranteeing a peaceful or stable regional system, East Asia’s political and economic emergence could generate new patterns of competition and conflicts that will shape some of the principal contours of the international system into the next century.

**Security Complex of Military and Economic Dimensions**

The astonishing economic dynamism of the region is bringing with it a growing interdependence. Distances are shrinking and each of their economies is becoming more dependent on the well-being of the others. There is a security aspect to this new sense of regionalism. If we increasingly share a common destiny, then we will increasingly share common security concerns as well. Interdependence may reduce the risks of any

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"On the contrary, the Cold War provided an international context that acted as a barrier to change in the European security space; for example, the Cold War limited the foreign policy options available to the central and eastern European states. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other Warsaw Pact members were not free to join the NATO or the non-aligned movement until after 1990."
serious troubles. In other words, any troubles that might erupt will no longer be isolated from each other.

The major limitations of Asian regional security seem fairly straightforward. The differences in power among different nation-states, unresolved historical issues, the existence of largely autonomous cultures unaccustomed to long-term habits of association and interaction with their neighbors, and the extraordinarily rapid economic and social change in the recent years have all constrained the development of a more mature and institutionalized regional order. The Korean peninsula, especially, needs to pay greater attention to these factors than any other country in the region.\(^7\) Korea symbolizes the security confrontation of the post-Cold War world that is unfamiliar and troublesome for national policymakers. It focuses more on the interconnections between the economic and military dimensions of security which, in turn, makes the national calculus of costs and benefits more complicated and ambiguous. The proposition suggests that any future security order in Asia, especially in the Korean peninsula, will possess at least two mutually constitutive and interdependent elements, namely, the political-military and the economic.\(^8\)

Korea and other East Asian countries’ current economic crisis made them realize that the economic dimension of security has three identifiable and separate elements. First, economic security reflects a concern over the ability of the state to protect the social and economic fabric of a society. Second, economic security involves the ability of a state to act as an effective gatekeeper and to maintain societal integrity. Lastly, economic security concerns the ability of the state in cooperation with others to foster a stable international economic environment in order to reinforce cooperation in the military sector as well as to extract the welfare gains of openness. However, all these elements are closely associated with sensitive subjects like "sovereignty." These are the security conceptions of the Cold War era which are no longer applicable in the next century. This is because most of the East Asian states have approached the issue of economic security as a strategic one in which any kind of external threat is identified as a threat to a nation-state’s "sovereignty."

Therefore, a comprehensive exploration of the regional security systems in Asia cannot dodge the problem of economic security or treat the economic factor as an instrumental adjunct to the military requirements of security. Nor can we be satisfied with simply displacing the military definition of security with an economic conceptualization of security, for the military dimension remains too important, particularly in East Asia. According to realist argument, the break-up of the superpower overlay allows, and indeed compels local patterns of amity, enmity, and balance of power to reassert themselves. The security requirements of Asia in the new century demand a broader, systematic definition of the relationship between economic and military dimensions of security. It also suggests that an analysis of the security conceptions of Asia must be framed not only by these

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Jonathan D. Pollack advocates this position because, "...all states in the region have an obvious incentive to work credibly with one another on the Korean problem, as none would be immune to the potential consequences of another Korean confrontation; see "Pacific Insecurity: Emerging threats to stability in East Asia," Current (July-August 1996) No. 384, pp. 23-27.

\(^8\) Buzan was most significant on this approach in the post-Cold War era. See Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991).
two components of security alone, but also by how these two elements of security interact and the consequences of such interaction formulate a stable security order.

One typical concern of Asian instability is the increase in military expenditures in most Asian countries. States in the region are responding to the uncertainty of future threats, their rapidly expanding economic strength, and the diminishing security commitments of the superpowers. In many cases, they are purchasing state-of-the-art missiles, aircrafts, and warships from the United States, Russia, Europe, and other arms exporters. Of course, there is no evidence that any Asian nation is strengthening its armed forces in anticipation of going to war. Most analysts believe that Asian nations are modernizing their military for defensive purposes. Nevertheless, in contrast to other regions in the world, the Asian region is experiencing an arms buildup, which, at the very least, suggests that nations in the area feel insecure about their neighbors—the traditional realistic security dilemma. Thus, the phenomenal rates of economic growth experienced by the East Asian states suggest a shift of the economic balance of power in Asia’s favor for concurrent weapons modernization programs with a relative decline in the military-strategic capabilities of the United States and the other powers. Interestingly enough, these trends, which appear inexorable, but remain contested, could produce a balanced Asia that reproduces the European experience of the postwar period. Or, it could reproduce the European experience of the interwar period.

DOES THE ASIAN WAY REALLY MATTER?

Asian Way as Myth?

Regional stability in Asia is possible in the next century, if the region is able to expand its economic development for security space. The optimists do not deny the risks in the region, but they do suggest that the depth and complexity of economic interdependence among the states make the outbreak of the war very unlikely. This argument stems from the liberal views on how the international political economy operates. Several questions follow this axiom. Why is institutional interdependence so underdeveloped in Asia? Does the Asian way, or Asian identity, matter in the development of institutionalization? Then, how do we explain the recent economic difficulties of East Asian countries in terms of “Asian way”?

Those counter views on the Asian “myth” generally argue that the attempt to rhetorize Asianism is basically an expression of “inverted orientalism,” which is the East Asian tendency to identify the “West” in antithesis to the “East.” This state-sponsored discourse of uniqueness is no more than a self-serving act of Asian elites to legitimize their patriarchal
rule, "crony capitalism," or "neomercantilist behavior." Since the latest financial crisis began in the region in the summer of 1997, many Western critics have been quick to claim the bankruptcy of the Asian model and the victory of Anglo-American liberal democracy and laissez-faire capitalism in the paradigmatic rivalry dating back to the early 1980s. Unfortunately, this is a misperception.

Observing the recent economic difficulties in East Asia in terms of the paradigmatic conflict as they are rooted in real interest, power, and culture, I believe the tendency of Asianization may retreat but will not go away. Within this vein, Johnson's point is well taken. Indeed, it could gain momentum if mishandling of the crisis leads to stronger anti-Western nationalism and greater regional solidarity. Movements of Asianization should not be rejected lightly just because of the Asian elites' self-serving inclination to rhetorize Asianism. One needs to move beyond the discourse centering around some cultural givens and traditions in order to look at other non-cultural dynamics of Asianization.

Unlike the claims made by some advocates of an Asian way, the discourses of East Asian regional security are not primarily concerned with defining the substantive values of a regional community and how best to protect them. More ambitious, and universal claims of an Asian way amount to a recipe for the conversion of Western "liberal" states. This prospect may be of some appeal to conservatives fearful of disintegration and moral decay in what they see as their own ill-disciplined societies, but it has not attracted much support in liberal-democratic quarters of the West. The values associated with an Asian way are therefore of little intrinsic significance to regional security discourse beyond their location within the existing nation-states. Rather, the major concern is how an Asian way functions as an operational or procedural code in shaping regional security and strategic issues.

As we have witnessed, current economic difficulties in the region have not diminished the importance of security at all. Rather, these difficulties have increased their weight in world affairs, and they suggest the possibility of Asia finding a new, distinctive (and, by implication, superior) Asian way of coping with global, political, and social issues, including those arising from security concerns. Multilateralism or institutional inter-dependence is necessary for the continuity of stable economic development and its successful expansion to the security realm in the next century.

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11 Krugman is most enthusiastic to uncover the myth of the "Asian miracle." He said that, not unlike the now-rebutted Stalinist Soviet economy, it tends to stagnate following an early spurt of growth pumped up by vast input of physical resources. Thus, the model is of "perspiration rather than inspiration." See Paul Krugman, "The Myth of Asia's Miracle." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6, pp. 62-78.

12 For instance, Robert Wade provides a fascinating account of the clash between the Asian and model of the interventionist state and the orthodox World Bank views, dating back to the early 1980s. See Robert Wade, "Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: The East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective." New Left Review, Vol. 217 (May-June, 1996): pp. 3-36.

13 Johnson claims that the Asian crisis has actually strengthened the case for some aspects of the Asian model. As Johnson sees it, "the region's current financial crisis shows the virtue of this way of doing things: if you depend on foreigners for capital, you can never tell when they will suddenly rise up and holler for repayment. The lesson is to redouble devotion to the autarky that is central to one version of the Asian way." See Chalmers Johnson, "Cold War Economics Meets Asia," The Nation (February 1998): pp. 16-19.

14 See A. Dupont, "Is there an 'Asian Way?"" Survival, Vol. 38, pp. 13-33; Y. Funahashi, "The Asianization of Asia." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, pp. 73-86; K. Ogura, "A Call for a New Concept of Asia," Japan Forum, Vol. 20, pp. 37-44.
Institutional Interdependence and Asian Culture

Kissinger, a prominent American diplomat, once noted:

"Whereas the nations of Europe are grouped in common institutions, the nations of Asia view themselves as distinct and competitive. The relations of the principal Asian nations to each other bear most of the attributes of the European balance-of-power system of the nineteenth century . . . ."18

The role ascribed to international institutions ranges from those analysts who view international institutions as the foundation of international society16 to those who dismiss international institutions as the expressions of state power,17 or as insignificant determinants of state action as compared to the underlying structure of power.18 Following these theoretical configurations, it is difficult to prescribe the degree of Asian institutional development within these three roles since Asian institutionalism is still at the very beginning stage. In Asia, as Richard Betts notes, "the leap from economic multilateralism to multilateral security planning is not yet in sight."19 Indeed, threats to security in East Asia come from a lack of an effective regional security mechanism to manage new sources of instability unleashed by regionalization.20

Then, this question arises: Why is the level of multilateralization of security's economic and military dimensions so underdeveloped in Asia?21 There are a number of explanations, but three explanations are most prominent: the asymmetry in the evolution of the European and Asian nation-states22, the context of international politics in the Asia-Pacific that compels states to focus on relative rather than absolute gains in the calculation of state policy,23 and the cultural barriers to collective identity formation and the consequent

18 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 826.
16 Scholars such as Bull, Keohane fall into this group: see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1977); Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984); Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 59-81.
17 Robert Gilpin is most typical for this position: see Robert Gilpin, War and Changes in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981).
18 Most of the realists are on this position: see John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of Institutions," International Security, Winter 1994/95, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 5-49; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
19 Richard Betts, Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 72.
20 Deng Yong, "The Asianization of East Asian Security and the United States' Role," East Asia Vol. 17 (Autumn 1995), p. 97.
21 Unquestionably, there are late developments of institutionalization in Asia. It was nine years ago (1990) APEC was established. It has not only charted a path for the development of regional free trade, it has also grown into an annual summit of the region's leaders. Four years later the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was created as a means of consulting about the region's security interests.
22 Friedberg argues that the European nation-state building and the Asian nation-state are at different stages of evolution: the European state is increasingly characterized by an erosion of sovereignty and growing economic interdependence; and by the need of national authorities to consolidate and sustain internal power by increasing external cooperation. See Aaron Friedberg, "Hope for Stability: Prospects for Peace in a Multiple Asia," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 5-33.
23 A core issue of the neoliberal-neoliberalist debate centers on the assumptions about the state preferences. The neoclassical school assumes that states are relative gains maximizers, and the neoliberal institutionalist school assumes that states are absolute gains maximizers. Powell has argued that preferences are not immutable, but are linked quite closely to the external constraints facing a state, and that those constraints
impairment of international cooperation and institution-building.

Wendt's proposition draws our attention to the perspective of the last explanation with regard to this paper. Borrowing his explanation on collective identity, the relatively low level of institutionalized cooperation among Asian countries is due to the absence of an emergent collective identity in Asia. This factor bears directly on the debate generated by Huntington's hypothesis that the root cause of future international conflicts will be located in a clash of civilizations. Wendt argues that one solution to the problem of collective action—a motor propelling the institutionalized cooperation in the European security space—is located in the process of collective identity formation, which has arguably occurred in Europe and is at an embryonic state in the Asia-Pacific.

Huntington's argument centers on this discussion. His proposition may be the most frequently discussed topic in the second half of the twentieth century with the exception of George Kenan's "containment" piece. Of course, Huntington's emphasis on the importance of civilizational conflict has been roundly criticized as being unable to account for the shift in loyalty from the state to civilization, or to demonstrate that such a shift has taken place, since he ignores the continuing force of nationalism. He has also been criticized for suggesting that Western values have only a specific rather than an universal legitimacy. Yet, Huntington does reframe our attention to the existence of civilizations and the importance of difference and force ourselves to consider whether that difference plays a role in the shaping of state preferences. His argument is important because it provides a clue to this question: What are the barriers to collective identity formation in Asia? From the security standpoint, civilizational differences in Asia produce divergent intersubjective structures that generate antagonistic interpretations of the material balance of power.

Here we come to the deepest layer of risks to our future well-being. "Culture" should not mean Asian values or even cultural sensitivity (those things that the guidebooks tell you, such as not spitting on your host's floor or patting the heads of his children). Rather, it should mean that societies with different traditions will tend to see a common problem in different ways. This happens not only in Asia, but also in the Western world. Cultural isolation is the carbon monoxide poisoning of international relations, deadly, yet, so insidious that the players are often unaware of its effects on their judgement. There are differences in the way states approach security, but these variations are usually better explained by the specific conditions of the region rather than by culture. In other

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\[1\] For more detail discussion, see Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997).

\[2\] Wende identifies three variables in the formation of collective identity: structural contexts, systemic processes, and strategic practice. The combination of these three variables with one another promote collective identity formation and provide an important foundation for multilateral institutions by increasing the willingness to act on generalized principles of conduct and diffuse reciprocity. See Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State."
words, the problem has to do with the security of Asia as a region connected to the international security environment, not Asian security based on cultural differences.

Alex Inkeles has some advice on this debate. He has called on the increasing convergence of modern or modernizing societies. Inkeles recognizes the continuing divergences in the development of modern societies and does not necessarily contradict. Huntington's emphasis is on the persistent differences across civilizations. Yet, he has robustly documented many striking similarities between modern societies in terms of not only technology, organizational differentiation, and specialization, but also the nature of education, stratification, and personality patterns. Moreover, Inkeles' picture of converging interconnected modern societies meshes with Hobsbawm's point that "nationalism, however inescapable, is simply no longer historical force it was in the era of between the French Revolution and the end of imperialist colonialism after WWII."28

THE U.S. ROLE IN ASIA

Some may disagree with the argument that economic and military dimensions of security are intertwined in Asia. This prescription should not be taken to mean that all aspects of the region's security would be affected by the economic chaos. Supporting this view, the security situation in the region's potential flashpoints, such as the Korean peninsula, has not changed significantly as a result of the recent financial crisis. This is true because of another characteristic feature of Asian security: The U.S. is still a predominant regional power.

In Asia, bilateral relationships are the most conspicuous than any other region in the world. All the powers in the region have been particularly energetic in reanimating existing ties or engaging high profile personal diplomacy in order to improve relations. The United States is very likely to lead bilateral relationships in Asia, and this trend will continue into the next century. Despite Asianization and vastly divergent interests across Asian countries, one common view that seems to be shared by many of the regional states is that the United States' security commitment is the indispensable anchor for East Asian security. To say the least, an abrupt and large-scale American withdrawal would leave a power vacuum at which no other power would be able to fill without any profoundly destabilizing consequences.

The Clinton administration's defense report entitled, "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region," committed Washington to maintain the current force levels of about 100,000 troops in the East Asian region as a part of "a strategy based on American leadership," which was designed "to enable the U.S. to deal with two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously."29 Entering the new century, there are no signs of any reversals or significant modifications of the U.S. policy; and the U.S.

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27 See Alex Inkeles, Convergence and Divergence in Industrial Societies (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998).
28 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), p. 169.
29 Joseph S. Nye, "The Case for Deep Engagement," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, pp. 90-102.
still seems determined to maintain its hegemonic position in the post-Cold War world in general, Asia in particular. In the case of Iraq or Kosovo, the U.S. foreign policy of engagement is based on a multilateral settlement, whereas in the case of Asia, such as China or North Korea, it is based on a bilateral settlement.

Indeed, America is ideally situated to play the role of Asian balancer. It is feared less than any other great power because it is geographically separated from Asia by the Pacific Ocean. It has no territorial disputes with any Asian nations, and has bilateral alliances with four Asian nations that have freely chosen to align with it. The U.S. also possesses the economic and military power to underwrite a regional balance of power.

Unquestionably, the end of the Cold War provided the United States with a unique opportunity to reassess its role in the East Asia and in the world as well. For nearly five decades, it acted more like an empire than a republic, creating a global network of client states, establishing hundreds of military installations around the world, conscripting young men to staff these advanced outposts and fight in distant wars, and spending hundreds of billions of dollars annually on the military.\textsuperscript{30} The justification for this interventionist strategy so unlike to the original American design was the threat of totalitarian communism. With that threat gone in the new millennium, the United States should return to its roots, rather than look for another convenient enemy.

The U.S., therefore, is about to encounter new problems with the post-Cold War Asia. The main problem is not to borrow Oran Yong's and Joseph Nye's terminology, a structural one resulting from a decline of its "hard" military or economic power, but an entrepreneurial and/or intellectual one reflecting inadequacy in the exercise of "soft" power.\textsuperscript{31} The problem is closely related to the "inward-looking" tendency and scarcity of Asian affairs expertise in the recent U.S. administrations. It may not be any easier to solve a soft-power problem than to solve a hard-power problem. However, without solving the problem, the U.S. is likely to fail to continue to play as critical and effective a role in shaping the security environment of post-Cold War Asia as it played in defining that of the region during the Cold War era.

In particular, the U.S. role in Asia is embodied by its relations to China and Japan. In East Asia, the common pivot of this regional security complex is China. China is directly or indirectly involved in almost all of the most pressing security issues in the region. The avoidance of an unnecessary confrontation with China is more essential to the future U.S. role in Asia than any other subject. China does not see itself as an aggressive power. Some may say that China's ruthlessness, even at the cost of damaging its reputation and economic interests, has been evident in handling of the takeover of Hong Kong and determination to acquire islands in the South China Sea. China feels it is fully within its rights to change the humiliated territorial map, even though most

\textsuperscript{30} In early 1950, President Truman approved a joint State/Defense Department working group to review the nation's security policy. The result was NSC Memorandum. 68, which proposed a massive conventional military build-up. Although President Truman seemed sympathetic to at least some of the recommendations, he deferred action and ordered further study of the issue. It was North Korea's invasion of South Korea that turned NSC. 68 into Washington's de facto policy blueprint.

\textsuperscript{31} Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books. 1991); Oran R. Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society." \textit{International Organization}, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 281-308.
other countries view such an action as aggressive and dangerous. In the debate between the pro-containment and the pro-engagement schools of thought regarding China, it currently favors the latter group. The advocates of containment policy have captured most of the headlines, but those who advocate engagement policy have made the stronger case.

Policymakers in Washington seem to understand that world peace in the next century will depend largely upon whether the increasing intercourse between China and the United States will lead to a constructive confluence of impulses, or a disastrous collision of interests. China is a revisionist power, but, for the foreseeable future, it will seek to maintain the status quo and so should the United States. This proposition has clearly been proven in the case of the Korean peninsula, in which the Chinese position toward North Korea is somewhat advantageous to the South. The relations to China should be neither historically predetermined nor dependent on the frightening accidental events imagined by some of the pessimists. It will be decided by the usual historical mixture of likely trends and deliberate human efforts to shape them. Therefore, wisdom on both sides of the Pacific can play a role.

In 1942, the Ming court left Nanking for the northern capital. It was a sensible military decision, bringing the government closer to the perennially-threatened Mongolian borders. Yet, it was also a decisive moment in history. China was turning its back on the sea coasts and retreating into a landlocked empire. It was against the possibility of maritime trade opening by its ocean ships and was opting for an economy based on agriculture. Buried in this practical decision, if one wants to be fanciful, was China’s isolation, its decline in the nineteenth century and the troubles that it brought. Thus, to China, the belief that it must right the wrongs of the humiliating history that began during this time is the main reason why the country does not see itself as an aggressive power.

At the same time, for East Asians, the lingering uncertainties about the future of Japan were also troublesome. All of the East Asian countries, except for Thailand, had lived under the disastrous Japanese-dominated East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere in the 1930s and 1940s. Unlike many in the West and in Japan who have come to see Japan as a reformed militarist nation, and a “civil power,” many East Asians still view Japan
with varying degrees of suspicion in terms of its militaristic past. In other words, unlike those in the West who believe the Japanese militaristic culture of "sword" has given way to a pacific culture of "chrysanthemum," many East Asians see the revival of militarism as, by no means, a foregone scenario of the future Japan.55

A concern about Japan becomes more significant with the consideration of Korean security. The security of Korea has long been a matter of substantial importance to Japan, not just for military reasons, but also for a full range of political, economic, and cultural considerations. The security of Korea is vital to Japan's own security because the renewal of conflict in Korea would be perceived to have a more serious impact on Japan than any other conflicts that might occur in Asia. In view of the existing security arrangements with the U.S., Japan would be drawn into the Korean conflict, either directly or indirectly. Furthermore, in view of the two Koreas' existing ties with their patrons, such a conflict could escalate into a major nuclear confrontation imperiling Japan's security. For these reasons, Japanese leaders from time to time have believed that the best policy was to promote a "peaceful coexistence" between South and North Korea by encouraging them to expand the scope of their contacts and dialogue.

Therefore, it would be fair to say that Japan is worried about the instability arising from North Korea's isolation and appears to reluctantly accept the division of Korea. Although Japan, through its policy statements, asserts its support for Korean reunification by peaceful means, a unified Korea would present some difficulties to Japan. First, in the long term, a unified Korea could emerge as a stronger regional competitor. Second, reunification could see the eventual departure of U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula, leaving Japan as the only country with a U.S. military base in East Asia. Finally, a unified Korea could pursue cooperation with China and Russia in order to balance Japan's economic superpower status.

UPDATING KOREA-U.S. RELATIONS: A NEW ALLIANCE IN THE NEW ERA

In many cases, alliance theory centers on the International Relations studies.36 If the initial conditions under which an alliance produces changes and these changes generate divergence in the security conceptions of the participants, then the likelihood of alliance termination is greater. On the other hand, if such changes continue to give rise to convergent conceptions of security, then the basis for alliance perpetuation exists. Within this vein, the most important issue in Korea-U.S. relations is whether the United States would maintain ground forces in South Korea with the disappearance of "Sovietology"
and South Korea's successful Nordpolitik with Beijing and Moscow. This is a question for new configuration of the Korea-U.S. alliance theory.

The Mutual Defense Treaty between South Korea and the U.S. was created in a different era. Now the Cold War has ended, hegemonic communism has collapsed, and allied states have prospered. In fact, recent events have rendered every assumption obsolete that underlined Washington's commitment to the South. With these changes in the international environment, America's defense commitments should change as well. By the 1980s, Seoul outstripped its northern rival Pyongyang financially, technologically, and diplomatically. Seoul had a bigger population, greater access to foreign markets, and the ability to outspend militarily. By the early 1990s, even the North's allies were changing sides, as both the Soviet Union and China recognized Seoul. Moscow is now shipping arms to the South to help pay off its debts. U.S. officials, nevertheless, act as if nothing has changed since 1953. According to the Department of Defense, the U.S.-ROK alliance "is a vital component in our national objective of supporting and promoting democracy."

Some may argue that the enduring U.S. presence of ground forces in ever-expanding NATO provides a model for what is likely to happen in Northeast Asia following Korean unification. This would be a mistake. Russia is not China, and compared to China, Russia's concern over changes in the surrounding political geography appears chaotic and badly managed. Unlike NATO expansion, if the Korea-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty is extended to a unified Korea, there would be no buffer states separating the United States and China. Beijing could quietly let it be known that it did not wish to have the U.S. remain in Korea or would prefer some reduction in their presence. One meaningful option for the U.S. is to gradually transform the treaty with South Korea from one structured on land forces to one on naval forces. This would conform to South Korea's own expanding fleet, satisfy the need to reduce highly visible bases on the peninsula, and ameliorate any Japanese concerns about the South Korean navy.

Whatever specific policy options are to be adapted, three traditional but newly configured U.S. interests exist with Korea. First is the broader U.S. interests in fostering the spread of market-oriented economies and democratic political systems. This interest is rooted in the American belief, generally confirmed by history, that an open, democratic world is a safer, secure, and more prosperous world, for the U.S. and the world at large. Active and sustained U.S. involvement in Korea furthers this interest, as South Korea's progress toward a more democratic polity and open economy testifies. The U.S. objective of supporting Korean unification essentially on Seoul's terms might also further the spread

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57 In general, specialists on the Korean peninsula in the U.S. suggest more modest U.S. role in the region, agreeing the continuity of American troops in Korea for the purpose of East Asian stability. But, some aggressive scholar contends that the U.S. should withdraw its forces from South Korea. For example, see Doug Bandow, "America's obsolete Korean Commitment" Orbis (Fall 1990), Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 603-17.

58 United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Feb. 1995), p. 19.

59 Since the early 1990s, the South Korean government has focused on strengthening its navy power under the label of "Blue Navy." For more extensive treatment, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea Is Easier than the Pentagon Thinks." International Security (Spring 1998), Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 135-70.
of democratization and market-oriented economies. Together these factors have underpinned support the U.S. to play a sustained role in Korean security. The mixture of economic and military dimensions of security, which is the very nature of Asian security, is prototypical with these interests.

Second, in the short to medium-term, Seoul feels that the threat of the North attack on the South remains high due to internal political imperatives which may arise in the North. South Korea also fears that North Korea, in the face of declining military strength, might risk a strike before the balance of military strength turned too far against the North. The U.S. security guarantee is a deterrent which the South Korean military cannot match, no matter what the attack, even if the ROK successfully blunted it. This would devastate South Korea and destroy the economic and political achievements of the past five decades.

Lastly, South Korean policymakers do recognize that in the long term, their nation will remain surrounded by powerful and potentially hostile states-Japan, China, and Russia. South Korea will probably never possess the economic, political, or military clout of these nations. A security link to a powerful, friendly, but distant state with vital interests in the region, such as the U.S., enhances South Korea's strategic position significantly. 10

Thus, to keep these interests, it is necessary that updating the Korea-U.S. relations should start from the two important approaches to the alliance countries: the differences in security conception of the two countries and the preparation of each state's visions for unification. Throughout the Cold War, a precarious but stable peace had existed on the Korean peninsula.41 However, over the past several years, growing tensions in the alliance have become apparent. This is due to the difference in the underlying conception of security, which has become more critical with the Cold War being over. In the Korea-U.S. case, a fraying of relations on the surface may stem from disagreements over specific policies toward the North, but the primary cause of the friction is the increasingly divergent definitions of security between the two allies. Based on the two traditional IR (International Relations) theories, realism and liberalism, Cha tries to explain the two countries' different perceptions on security and engaging policies to North Korea as its results.42 His work makes full sense since an ambiguous coexistence between the Cold War ideology and post-Cold War ideology is lingering uniquely in the Korean peninsula.

10 Of course, the preservation of Cold Korea-U.S. ties has not always been easy. Tensions clearly exist in Korea-U.S. relations today, the inevitable consequence of the need to restructure the relationship on a more equal basis. The Korea-U.S. economic relationship, for example, has become a source of tension which could stunt general bilateral relations, and, Seoul has been wary of efforts by the U.S. to establish links with the DPRK. However, this does not necessarily mean a real conflict. The assertion of Korea independence and national identity is not incompatible with Korea's friendship with the U.S. There is no fundamental conflict between the two nations. Indeed, the U.S. and South Korea will continue to share critical strategic, economic, and political interests.

11 Park has explained this ambiguous stability by a concept of the two conflicting triangles; Moscow and Beijing with Pyongyang and Washington and Tokyo with Seoul. According to him, with the Cold War over, there is no longer a bipolar system that guarantees peace and stability in Northeast Asia. See Song Whan Park, "The Washington-Seoul-Pyongyang Triangle," Tong Whan Park, ed., The U.S. and the Two Koreas: A New Triangle (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 1998), pp. 1-18.

12 Victor Cha, "Realism, Liberalism and the Durability of the U.S.-Korean Alliance," Asian Survey (July 1997), Vol. 37, No. 7, pp. 609-25.
According to Cha, Washington largely viewed its Korean policy within the context of broader global geostrategic concerns, while Seoul viewed its U.S. policy within the narrow context of bilateral competition with the North. With the end of the Cold War, a gradual shift toward more pluralist conceptions of security by the U.S. has taken place. Not that security and stability in a traditional realist sense have become irrelevant, but that greater emphasis can be placed on alternative means of achieving both. By contrast, South Korea’s security conceptions have exhibited less change, remaining entrenched in classic realist mindsets. This is a very Cold War-obsessed mentality.\(^{43}\) This divergence accounts for much of the current and potential difficulty in implementing the agreements. It also flags a deeper, more fundamental problem for the alliance to deal within the post-Cold War security in East Asia. This view should be remedied in the next century.

With regard to the U.S. role in East Asia, North Korea cannot be omitted from the U.S. strategic configuration. The conventional outsiders’ view of North Korea is that of a “rogue” regime, irrational, dangerous, provocative, and even aggressive. But this view clearly requires a re-evaluation. Indeed, it is probably closer to the truth to assume the opposite about North Korea: it is a rational and defensive state.\(^{44}\) Undoubtedly, North Korea would still like to rule the entire Korean peninsula, as every other sovereign state would so since the beginning of the Westphalia era. Almost certainly, however, it knows that South Korean and U.S. military strength make that goal unachievable and foolish to pursue.

It is also necessary to consider North Korea as a state alienated from the U.S.-dominated international order. While the North Koreans, from our point of view, seem to be continually breaking the rules of the game, they are not a part of the game and have never accepted the rules in the perspective of the “West.”\(^{45}\) The Kim Jong Il regime, like its predecessor, Kim Il Sung’s, has been a ruthless government that in many respects has done its people terrible disservice. From the standpoint of international security, however, North Korea is not Nazi Germany or even Iraq. It is an alienated, defensive state facing possible extinction. Although North Korea is heavily armed, a war would only hasten its demise, contributing nothing to the solution of the serious problems the regime faces. North Korea is fully aware of this. The logic of the nuclear deal was in essence a quid pro quo: Pyongyang would trade its ultimate insurance policy—its nuclear weapons program—for a new economic and political engagement with the U.S., the ROK, and Japan.

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43 As a typical example, to the U.S., the Agreed Framework (1994) on North Korean nuclear project marks a tilt toward more pluralist definition of security in East Asia, while the South Korea remains embedded in classic realist conceptions of security to secure its advantageous initiatives through containing North Korea.

44 Several scholars insist that North Korean government be much more rational than we understand: Among them, in particular, Shari Sharif, accepting North Korea has changed its policies on economics, trade and foreign relations over the years, argues that, not only internal events under the Kim Jong Il administration, but also external events play key roles in the future of North Korea. See Shari Sharif, “Reforms and Changes to North Korea,” Contemporary Korea, Vol. 274 (Feb 1999): pp. 62-68.

45 There are several cases to prove this argument. For instances, DPRK is profoundly opposed to America’s reinstatement of Japan as the region’s economic hegemon, and of course to the original division of the Korean peninsula and the establishment of a South Korean government they believe could not survive without American military backing. These positions are all possible on the rational and consistent DPRK’s foreign policy.
ironically enough, the underlying assumption of the nuclear deal in the perspectives of the U.S. and South Korea was that it would catalyze the multi-faceted economic and political engagement of Pyongyang with the international community.

Based on this calculation, the most critical re-evaluation of current policies toward North Korea for the next time space is that policies toward North Korea have been mainly focused on the nonproliferation theory until today. But, it does not say anything about how a unified Korea would transform the strategic politics of East Asia in the next century. Nor can it describe how a failure to unify Korea might result from outside powers actively working to maintain partition, perhaps using non-proliferation as a mask for a decidedly more geopolitical purpose. Indeed, unification would look fundamentally different to Seoul if outside powers had propped up a weak regime in the North for the indefinite future as a way to restrict Seoul’s own military and economic power.

ASIAN WAY OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

European Model in East Asia?

As explained so far, the end of the Cold War and the end of the world’s fear for destruction have had an unexpected effect on Asian security. The above analysis leads us to identify four characteristic features of Asian security in the twenty-first century: Asian countries’ critical concerns on the power relations among their neighbors are as follows: unquestionably, how to continue economic prosperity in the region, then to transfer its positive effect into the military-political space is the key factor in the Asian security discourse; the U.S. continuous presence as a balancer is foreseeable; and Asian culture should not be blamed for the underdevelopment of institutionalization. To launch a less conflicting security frame among Asian countries in another time space, I suggest the Asian way of institutional interdependence.

What is the best way to develop institutional interdependence among Asian countries? In Europe, there is an increasing identification of self-interests of each nation-state with collective interests of Europe as a whole. In Europe, this tendency is manifested by the development of cooperative federalism within the European political space occupied by the European Union. This same process is underdeveloped in Asia: Asia lacks not only an effective system of collective security or defense on par with NATO, but lacks the institutionalization of economic cooperation approaching the level achieved by the European Union.

* At the least, the 1994 U.S.-DPRK deal appears to have defused temporarily the threat of war in Korea. This is considered to be a major success by the U.S.

* According to Manning, “The danger is that, unlike East Germany, North Korea is not go quietly. Neither Seoul, Washington, nor Tokyo appear prepared for any sudden change in the status quo.” Then, Manning suggests a soft landing and gradual reunification process within three stages: modest confidence building measures, deeper economic involvement, and confederation proposal. See Robert Manning, “The United States and the Endgame in Korea: Assessment, Scenarios, and Implications,” Asian Survey (July 1997), Vol. 37, No. 7, pp. 600-2.
There are two reasons why the European model of institutionalization cannot be applied to Asia without some adjustments, let alone the cultural differences, or collective identities. First, the Asian nation-states and the European nation-states are at difference stages of evolution. The European states are increasingly characterized by an erosion of sovereignty and growing economic interdependence and by the need of national authorities to consolidate and sustain internal power by increasing external cooperation. The progressive erosion of national sovereignty in Europe is the result of two tendencies: the voluntary transfer of sovereignty to international or supranational institutions to resolve outstanding conflicts between states;\(^8\) and the progressive involuntary loss of sovereignty to the market mechanism and the subsequent efforts to recapture that sovereignty via membership in international institutions that facilitate multilateral governance and joint problem solving. Contrary to this European trend, the domestication of international politics has not progressed very far in Asian countries. Consequently, the need for international institutions to resolve outstanding political-military conflicts or the interdependence dilemmas within Asia have not been perceived as necessary or useful by the states of the region.

A second explanation may be located in the context informing the calculus of state action. The Asian countries remain fixated with issues of territorial integrity and face acute territorial challenges. States remain encumbered by norms against the use of the military instrument to resolve outstanding disputes among themselves and remain challenged in many cases by internal threats to its legitimacy. Therefore, among Asian countries, the issue of trust still remains asleep. Thus, this external context should lead us to expect barriers of cooperation between the nations in the region. Moreover, the continued preoccupation with relative gains drives states to be less concerned with ensuring optimal outcomes within the region and more concerned with ensuring that cooperation does not lead to an advantageous change in the hierarchy of regional power. Asian states remain defensively positional--states are more concerned with their relative power position than assuring cooperative outcomes that maximize the absolute gains from cooperation.

**East Asian Institutionalization**

My argument for the creation of any virtual institutions to deal with Asian security issues is the combining of neo-realist and neo-liberal visions for the Asian way of institutional interdependence. Neo-realists have tended to see a return to multipolar power balancing, as a sort of usual pre-Cold War business. Neo-liberals see an urgent need for a new round of cooperative institution-building to prevent new conflicts emerging in an increasingly interdependent world. Yet, in many ways, there are no fundamental differences between these two broad paradigms on security. Both assume that the pursuit of rational self-interest is the driving force of international relations. Both focus primarily on state actors, and despite the interests of Kantian-inspired liberals in the inter-subjective or universal values of a global community, it is the nation-state, not some global collective security, that

\(^8\) The typical example for this case is that, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was the first step towards mollifying the historic enmity between France and Germany.
is to be secured from threats.

The prevailing discourses on regional security in Asia represent an intriguing attempt to reconcile the basic assumptions of neo-realism and neo-liberalism outlined above with the notion of different Asian security culture. There appears to be no lack of "uncertainty": the presence of a flash-pointing state like North Korea, the fears over the neo-nationalist ambitions of China which lay claims to much of the South China Sea, the lingering memories of Japan's imperialist past, the unresolved territorial disputes, and the political instability in Russia and its former eastern republics are all commonly cited as potential security threats. In addition, many states in the region have been engaged in extensive military modernization programs, which have significantly lifted the general level of defense spending. There is a widespread perception that the predominant post-Second World War American military presence may not be sustainable over the long term. However, for the moment, the prevailing "uncertainty" and the realist abhorrence of a power vacuum provide the rationale for the continuous U.S. role as a balancer.

The most critical aspect in the Asian way of institutionalization is associated with "sovereignty." It can be handled by combining multilateralism with bilateralism. We understand that multilateralism, as a form of relations between three or more states, is generally thought to be a cooperative mechanism for restraining self-interests of the states through agreed rules or shared beliefs. Sometimes, the formal structure of a regime with norms, rules, and punishments for deviants may involve the surrendering of some powers of sovereign statehood. However, the case is somewhat different in Asia. Multilateralism is generally considered to be supporting rather than replacing the predominant bilateral security arrangements among states in the region. Despite the criticisms for the failure of the United States to adapt its bilateral security treaties with regional states (Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines) to the post-Cold War environment, these treaties remain the dominant mechanisms for regional security. Various bilateral treaties with the United States have been reinvigorated in 1995 and 1996 with concerns over China's regional ambitions and instability in North Korea. Japan itself has floated proposals for bilateral security dialogue with the states of ASEAN, although the ASEAN response has been tentative due to their concerns of provoking China's regional sensibilities. For its part, China appears to be operating under the assumptions that policies of containment are falling into place, and as a result of this pressure, it has partly cultivated closer relations with Russia. These developments appear to have injected a new dose of bilateralism into strategic planning which could seriously undermine even the limited ambitions of proponents of regional multilateralism. Therefore, the bilateral accomplishments and multilateral tasks by the U.S. acting as a balancer may be one of the most important features of the Asian way of institutionalization.

If the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) continues to be successful, it can set a good example to the "Asian way" of institutionalization. For example, the ARF official statements represent a blending of concerns with cooperative approaches to security first given by the CSCE (Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the values of an Asian Way. The statement from the second ARF meeting in 1995, for example, "recognizes that the concept of comprehensive security includes not only military aspects but also
political, economic, social and other issues. It also outlines a three-stage process for security dialogue, namely, the promotion of confidence-building, development of preventive diplomacy and elaboration of approaches to conflicts. And, following the ASEAN tradition, the meeting endorses the principles of consensual decision-making. The various proposals for CBMs (Confidence Building Measures) and preventive diplomacy, which focus on transparency, a range of official dialogues on security planning, and the development of principles of dispute resolution, amount to regional adaptations of European and UN discourses on the subject.

Finally, the tendency toward orthodoxy in regional security discourse is demonstrated in the process of the so-called, "track two" dialogue, which has become an important part of the ARF itself. Track two dialogues refer to the discussions of often sensitive security issues among governmental and non-governmental personnel with an understanding that they meet in a strictly non-official capacity. Some of the recommendations of such dialogue may, however, serve as the foundation for later development of government policy. Some analysts argue that this process reflects in itself an Asian preference for informal policymaking methods.

Noticeably, attention is directed toward adapting cooperative institutions to the specific and different aspects of Asia. This might be called an "intersection of Western-style institution-building and Asian-style ethos-building." This version of regional security tends to assume that there is a discernible "Asian way" of security, fundamentally different from the West, which must be a part of any attempts to build a regional security community. In philosophical terms, it could be said that the liberal value of toleration meets halfway with the idea of an Asian way. It is perhaps a propitious example of what John Rawls refers to as a "shared basis of agreement among reasonable peoples."

CONCLUSION

The term security deserves the widest definition, and the security and well-being of various countries have become highly interdependent. In East Asia, these include the increasing arms building, the regional financial crisis, the emergence of famine in North Korea, the humanitarian struggle in East Timor, and the issues of entangling sovereignties surrounding China. All these happened or are happening in the time space at the start of the new millennium. In particular, if the Asian countries' haze underlined the limitations of the sovereign states in dealing with the current economic hardships, then the economic crisis was an eloquent statement of the inevitability of regional interdependent security.

Korea represents one of the most typical Asian security concerns in the twentieth century. The South Korean economy is the size of the economies of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand combined. This made the relief operation organized by the International

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9 The term is originally from Evans, see P. Evans, "The Prospects for Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region," D. Ball, ed., in The Transformation of Security in the Asia-Pacific Region (London: Frank Cass, 1996).

90 John Rawls, "The Law of Peoples," S. Shute and S. Hurley, eds., in On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 42-43.
Monetary Fund the largest in the region. At the same time, the country, at issue, is of particular interests because it is intertwined with interests of superpowers. This is the current circumstantial condition the Korean peninsula is confronted with at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Throughout this paper, I have explained several important subjects regarding Asian security: the security complex of military-economic dimensions, the lesser development of institutional multilateralism in Asia, the never-ending U.S. presence in the region, and its relation to a critical flashpoint of Asian security, the Korean peninsula. Then, I proposed the Asian way of liberal institutionalization in order to handle these security intricacies. In the next century, the nature of Asian security will continue. Without a clear and comprehensive interpretation of those multiple spheres of security terrain in the region, the prevailing pessimistic view will last even in the new time space.

George Orwell once said, "whoever controls the past will control the future." Even though history is not an infallible guide, it is the best we have. Yet, the problem is that with the removal of Soviet power and the relative reduction of the U.S. presence at hand, the states of this region are, the first time in our modern history, facing the need to sort out their relations with each other largely free from foreign presence that had dominated the area since the mid-nineteenth century. Whereas the nineteenth century history or the inter-War period history is a key lesson to the West, Asia doesn't have that kind of history in order to learn from the past. We also know that bad analysis makes our prediction worse. This makes us realize how valuable the present is, ending the Cold War history and entering the post-Cold War history.

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