Variability in competitive decision-making speed and quality against exploiting and exploitative opponents

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A presumption in previous work has been that sub-optimality in competitive performance following loss is the result of a reduction in decision-making time (i.e., post-error speeding). The main goal of this paper is to test the relationship between decision-making speed and quality, with the hypothesis that slowing down decision-making should increase the likelihood of successful performance in cases where a model of opponent domination can be implemented. Across Experiments 1–3, the speed and quality of competitive decision-making was examined in a zero-sum game as a function of the nature of the opponent (unexploitable, exploiting, exploitable). Performance was also examined against the nature of a credit (or token) system used as a within-experimental manipulation (no credit, fixed credit, variable credit). To compliment reaction time variation as a function of outcome, both the fixed credit and variable credit conditions were designed to slow down decision-making, relative to a no credit condition where the game could be played in quick succession and without interruption. The data confirmed that (a) self-imposed reductions in processing time following losses (post-error speeding) were causal factors in determining poorer-quality behaviour, (b) the expression of lose-shift was less flexible than the expression of win-stay, and, (c) the use of a variable credit system may enhance the perceived control participants have against exploitable opponents. Future work should seek to disentangle temporal delay and response interruption as determinants of decision-making quality against numerous styles of opponency.

How we choose to approach, engage and ultimately remove ourselves from competitive environments is a critical component in understanding industrial, political, educational and gambling behaviour. In the context of gambling, research has highlighted how problematic gambling behavior can be characterized as cyclic in nature (e.g.1,2), with cognitive psychology providing insights into how these cycles appear. Two empirical observations are key. First, the quality of decision-making following negative outcomes (e.g., losses) tends to be sub-optimal relative to the decision-making following positive outcomes (e.g.3). Second, an assumed cause of the deterioration of decision-making following negative outcomes is a reduction in processing time allocated to actions following losses (e.g.4). This *post-error speeding* is manifest in competitive environments in which an opponent behaves in a random way5,6, characteristic of many real-world devices such as fixed-odds betting terminals (FOBTs7). *Post-error speeding* also represents the flip side of *post-reinforcement pauses*8. Here, scaled temporal delays following wins may be initiated by the device itself (such longer audio feedback when the pay-out is larger9), or, by the player themselves who simply wishes to revel in the positive state that winning affords.

However, an important determinant of *post-error speeding* remains the interaction between the nature of the opponent and individual performance. Broadly, three classes of opponent can be identified. First, the opponent may play in an *unexploitable* way, usually taking the form of equal but random distribution of responses defined by the finite length of the game series. For example, in the context of the game Matching Pennies the opponent would select 50% heads and 50% tails, or, in the context of the game Rock, Paper, Scissors the opponent would select each of the three responses 33.3% of the time. This type of random play is the only way to guarantee the absence of loss maximization (but neither does it provide win maximization). Second, playing against *exploitable* opponents allow participants to maximize their wins. Here, opponent responding will be predictable (such as over-playing one response over another; item biases) and if this predictability is utilized by the player their win rate will increase. Third, *exploiting* opponent provide the threat of loss maximization. Here, opponents

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may examine participant response distributions for similar item biases and respond in a manner that would maximize losses for the player. Previous data suggests that post-error speeding is most likely to arise either when there is interaction with an unexploitable opponent (see above), or, when there is interaction with an exploitable opponent but the individual fails to acquire the appropriate mental model for domination 13. In contrast, post-error slowing is most likely during successful exploitation, with the degree of slowing predicted by the degree of exploitation 8 and as errors become rare events 11. Thus, the main goal of this paper is to specifically test the relationship between decision-making speed and quality, with the hypothesis that slowing down decision-making following losses increases the likelihood of future successful performance in cases where a successful model of opponent domination can be implemented.

The view that there is a link between negative outcomes and poorer-quality (faster) decision-making would appear to contrast other work, in which loss orient attention to the failed action or stimulus (for examples in the context of arm wrestling and Rock, Paper, Scissors; see 22). Specifically 13, argue that the phasic increase in arousal driven by negative outcomes also increases attention towards task-relevant features. While one might anticipate that increasing attentional resource might enhance the quality of subsequent decision-making under certain contexts (e.g., expected value maximization 14), Yechiam and Hochman 13 also report the tendency for losses to lead to an increased likelihood of exploration (switch) behaviour (see also 5, 19). Furthermore, persistent effects of continued loss lead to ‘restlessness’ whereas continued wins lead to ‘calmness’, essentially the expression of lose-shift and win-stay behaviour in the long run and even across tasks 8. Therefore, the increased investment of attention does not necessarily translate to better performance. Specifically, in the context of competition any natural predictability in behaviour such as lose-shift runs the risk of exploitation.

In addition to the self-imposed speeding up or slowing down of decision-making as a function of outcome, further variability in the speed of play is apparent in the use of a ‘credit’ (or ‘token’) systems. Such systems are apparent in a variety of real-world devices such as gumball machines. The gumball device is an example of a fixed credit system where the gumball desirer has to provide the machine with one (and only one) coin in order to receive one gumball: the coin puts the individual ‘in credit’ for one gumball, but to receive a second gumball the process must be completely repeated. This may be contrasted with a variable credit system represented by arcade and slot machines. Here, players must again provide coins to accrue credits but the system allows for more than one credit to be stored. For example, if our individual has given an arcade machine two quarters (25c), after losing the first game, the player can instantaneously begin the second game without pausing to insert more coins. Both the fixed credit and variable credit systems can, of course, be contrasted with no credit systems where the system can be played multiple times without interruption. These different types of a credit system create clear parallels with the allocation of time and the quality of decision-making described above. Specifically, a device that only accepts one credit at a time (i.e., fixed credit) creates a naturally slow cycle of play relative to the absence of such a system (i.e. no credit). The intermediate scheme (i.e., variable credit) allows for credit to be stored, giving the player the opportunity to decide when and how many credits to input, allowing for the possibility of multiple plays in quick succession. Under this reading, variable credit systems then appear to be a rather cynical design feature of gambling devices, given the joint observations that quicker processing times are more likely to lead to sub-optimal decision-making and that pathological gamblers prefer faster playing machines. The use of variable credit systems as promoting poorer rather than better quality decision-making is further reinforced by the literature on illusion of control 18, 19. Here, offering any kind of choice to individuals increases their perception of control in random environments (e.g., allowing individuals to select their own lottery numbers 19). While illusion of control is less likely to persist across multiple interactions 12, observations such as the hot hand fallacy and gambler’s fallacy 22, 23 continue to represent erroneous beliefs about the predictability of future events over the long run.

Under the assumption that subsequent decision-making following negative outcomes tends to be faster and sub-optimal, establishing exactly what represents ‘sub-optimal’ decision-making is determined by the specific competitive context and the degree to which outcomes are a function of skill and/or luck. One natural place to start is by examining behaviour when participants interact with random (i.e., unexploitable) agents in competitive zero-sum games. These types of game can be used to measure the degree of deviation from optimal decision-making since ideal response distributions can be clearly set out, opponent characteristics can be perfectly controlled, the resolution of competition is fast yielding a high signal-to-noise ratio, and, games are both intuitive and often fun to play thereby providing participants with intrinsic motivation in a laboratory setting (see 25, 26, for a discussion of some of these issues).

Competitive environments are characterized by the mutual goals of maximizing wins and minimizing losses 27. The only way to minimize losses in zero-sum games is to behave in accordance with a mixed-strategy (MS) 28–30, see also minimax solution 11). Here, all actions must be randomized and the selection of the next action must not be contingent on the outcome of the previous action. Unfortunately, such behaviour runs counter to reinforcement learning heuristics. According to the keystone principles of operant conditioning (e.g., 27), we will be more likely to repeat an action in the light of reinforcement (win-stay) and more likely to change an action in the light of punishment (lose-shift). Despite the historic view that the mechanisms associated with punishment and reward are simply the inverse of one another, there is converging evidence from a number of fields to suggest that they exist and operate independently of one another 13. In particular, lose-shift appears to be a more robust phenomenon than win-stay, possibly in part due to the high cost of ‘losing’ from an evolutionary perspective 29, 35. Fundamental differences between reinforcement learning principles are further supported by animal work in which lose-shift mechanisms are also anatomically distinct from win-stay mechanisms (c.f., lesioning of the ventrolateral striatum), where lose-shift represents a “choice reflex” within the animal brain 16, p. 1. Differences in the degree to which win-stay and lose-shift behaviour are under cognitive control are similarly reflected in human work in which responses following wins tend to approach MS whereas responses following losses reveal a higher-than-expected level of shift behaviour 8. Furthermore, manipulating the value of wins modulates the...
degree of *win-stay* behavior whereas manipulating the value of losses does not change the degree of *lose-shift* behavior\(^\text{35}\). Once again, the main message here though is that while such reinforcement learning principles are contingent on both environment and species\(^\text{36–40}\), natural predictability in behaviour expressed via *win-stay* and/or *lose-shift* runs the risk of exploitation in competitive environments.

**Experiment 1**

As an initial test of competitive decision-making in Experiment 1, participants interacted with a computer opponent according to a mixed-strategy (MS) in the zero-sum game of Rock, Paper, Scissors (RPS; see\(^\text{41}\) for a review). In terms of defining optimal and sub-optimal performance, the Nash\(^\text{42}\) equilibrium for RPS against an opponent playing mixed-strategy is for the participant to also play mixed-strategy. In this respect, the *no credit* condition served as an attempted replication of the data from\(^\text{35}\) (baseline), and\(^\text{4}\), where each trial consisted of a single response only. Here, performance should approximate optimal MS following *wins* where the single stay response and the two shift responses are played roughly 33.3% of the time. Conversely, performance after negative outcomes (both losses and draws) should be characterized by an increase in shift behaviour over the 66.6% predicted by optimal performance. Given the unexploitable nature of the opponent, performance should also be characterized by post-error speeding\(^\text{5,15,43}\).

In Experiment 1, variations in a credit system were used to establish different temporal delay conditions (see Supplementary Materials A and B). In the *no credit* condition, participants simply made a single response selection on each of the 90 trials. For the *fixed credit* condition, participants had to ‘insert one credit’ on each of the 90 trials before they could make their game decision (c.f.\(^\text{43,44}\)). This condition should slow down the cycle of play by providing mandatory response interruptions (and hence, regular temporal delays). If slowing down decision-making time increases the quality of decision-making, then there should be a reduction in shift behaviour exhibited following negative outcomes\(^\text{45}\). In the *variable credit* condition, participants had the same 90 credits in the *fixed credit* condition, but when and how many credits to insert was the participant’s decision. The same constraint existed in that participants could not play the trial unless they had at least 1 credit stored on the computer. Thus, the *variable credit* condition should also slow down the cycle of play by providing voluntary response interruptions (and hence, intermittent temporal delays). Since multiple credits could be inserted at any point during the condition, the degree of interruption should be intermediate, somewhere between the *no credit* and *fixed credit* condition. Therefore, the reduction in shift behaviour following negative outcomes should be more than that shown in the *fixed credit* condition, but less than that shown in the *no credit* condition. Finally, if pausing serves as way to maintain better rather than worse quality decision-making then participants should input more credits following positive relative to negative outcomes. All manipulations of trial lag expressed via variations in the credit system were within-participants to reduce the noise traditionally associated with between-participant designs (e.g.\(^\text{46–48}\)).

**Method.**  
**Participants.** 36 individuals were analysed in the study: 25 were female, 3 were left-handed, with mean age = 20.11 (sd = 3.27). One individual was replaced due the recording of only 89 credits in the *variable credit* condition, and a second individual was replaced as a result of playing Scissors 100% and 99% of the time during the *fixed* and *no credit* conditions. Replaced participants undertook the experiment using the same counter-balanced order as the removed participants. All studies reported in this paper were approved by Research Ethics Board 2 at the University of Alberta under the protocol PRO00086116. All experiments were performed in accordance with relevant guidelines and regulations, including obtaining written informed consent. All participants completed the studies for course credit and no participant took part in multiple experiments.

**Stimuli and apparatus.** Pictures of two gloved hands representing the 9 interactions between participant and opponent during Rock, Paper, Scissors were used from\(^\text{3}\) (approximate on-screen size 10.5 cm × 4 cm). Stimulus presentation and response monitoring was conducted by Presentation (version 18.3, build 07.18.16).

**Design.** Participants completed 270 round of RPS split across three counter-balanced blocks of 90 trials each. In the *no credit* condition, participants made one response per round involving the selection of Rock, Paper or Scissors. In the *fixed credit* condition, participants had to make two responses per round: a response to insert one credit and a second response that allowed them to pick their response for that trial. In the *variable credit* condition, participants were allocated 90 credits at the start of the block, inserted as many as credits as desired, but could only play a round if their current credit score was 1 or above. For both *fixed* and *variable* conditions, if the number of inserted credits fell below 1, a warning sign appeared on screen and participants could not proceed with game responses. All opponents played 30 Rock, 30 Paper and 30 Scissors responses in a randomized order across each block (i.e., *unexploitable*). In this and all subsequent experiments, credit manipulation was a within-participants factor and opponency was a between-participants factor split across Experiments (1 = *unexploitable*, 2 = *exploiting*, 3 = *exploitable*).

**Procedure.** On-screen instructions from the various conditions are presented in Supplementary Information A and examples of the on-screen displays are presented in Supplementary Information B. At each trial and for each block, the participant’s current score was displayed for 500 ms, with a credit counter starting at 90. In the *no credit* condition, participants simply had to select 4, 5, or 6 on the number pad corresponding to the selection of RPS to decrease the counter by 1. In the *fixed credit* condition, a current credit counter was also displayed and would be red when the current number of credits was 0. Participants were always prompted with the display of ‘Insert 1 Credit’ at every trial and had to press 0 on the number pad before selecting their choice of RPS. The *variable credit* condition was identical to the fixed credit condition, apart from the prompt of ‘Insert × Credits’ at...
Results. Item and outcome biases. Item and outcome biases were initially analysed using a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA. The proportion of Rock selection did not significantly vary as a function of item: \[F(2,70) = 0.86, \text{MSE} = 0.003, \eta^2_p = 0.018\]. No did the proportion of Rock selection significantly differ from the expected value of 33.3% as assessed by a one-sampled t-test (\(t_{35} = 0.86, p = 0.397\)). The rough equivalency of wins (32.93%), losses (33.89%) and draws (33.18%) would be anticipated on the basis of an opponent playing MS in all conditions (see Table 1).

Reinforcement learning biases. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the three strategies at trial \(n + 1\) as a function of trial \(n\) outcome. To assess traditional reinforcement learning biases, the proportion of \(win\)-\(stay\), \(lose\)-\(shift\) and \(draw\)-\(shift\) were analysed as a function of condition using separate one-way repeated-measures ANOVAs, and, with respect to the value expected on the basis of MS behaviour (33.3% stay responses, 66.6% shift responses; see Fig. 1a) using one-sampled t-tests. Group average data are shown in Fig. 1a and individual data are shown in Supplementary Fig. C1. \(win\)-\(stay\) behaviour did not alter as a function of condition: \[F(2,70) = 0.46, \text{MSE} = 0.014, p = 0.632, \eta^2_p = 0.013\] and the observed average value of 36.67% did not differ significantly from the expected value of 33.33\% \(t_{35} = 1.10, p = 0.280\). \(lose\)-\(shift\) behaviour did not alter as a function of condition: \[F(2,70) = 0.43, \text{MSE} = 0.007, p = 0.655, \eta^2_p = 0.012\] but the observed average value of 77.23% did differ significantly from the expected value of 66.66\% \(t_{35} = 4.75, p < 0.001\). \(draw\)-\(shift\) behaviour did not alter as a function of condition: \[F(2,70) = 0.16, \text{MSE} = 0.011, p = 0.853, \eta^2_p = 0.005\] and the observed average value of 70.65% did not differ significantly from the expected value of 66.66\% \(t_{35} = 1.53, p = 0.136\). The degree of shift behaviour following loss was greater than that following draw \(t_{35} = 2.91, p = 0.006\;\text{(two-tailed)}\).
following negative outcomes were faster than decision-times following positive outcomes, consistent with other behaviour despite its sub-optimality 36,37. These data were also consistent across resilience of outcome speeds subsequent decision-making and leads to an overuse of shift behaviour. This highlights the valence of the previous competitive encounter and the speed and quality of the next encounter: a negative type [F(2,50) = 2.15, MSE = 32,678, \( \eta^2 = 0.060 \)] in the absence of a significant main effect of credit type [F(2,70) = 0.07, MSE = 0.08, p = 0.930, \( \eta^2 = 0.002 \)] and interaction [F(4,140) = 2.10, MSE = 12,361, p = 0.085, \( \eta^2 = 0.016 \). Tukey’s HSD test (p < 0.05) revealed both losses (457 ms) and draws (438 ms) yielded significantly faster RTs than wins (543 ms; see Fig. 2).

To allay concerns regarding RT outliers, and to maintain consistency with previous protocols in our laboratory, participants were rejected as a result of their average median RT being at least twice as large as the group average median RT (c.f.5,19) within any ANOVA cell, resulting in a reduced sample of 26 in Experiment 1. An identical two-way repeated-measures ANOVA replicated the full sample data: a significant main effect of outcome [F(2,50) = 15.01, MSE = 4651, p < 0.001, \( \eta^2 = 0.375 \), in the absence of a significant main effect of credit type [F(2,50) = 0.15, MSE = 32,678, p = 0.127, \( \eta^2 = 0.079 \)] or interaction [F(4,100) = 1.60, MSE = 4898, p = 0.182, \( \eta^2 = 0.060 \)]. Again, Tukey’s HSD test (p < 0.05) revealed both losses (377 ms) and draws (369 ms) yielded subsequently faster RTs than wins (424 ms).

**Credit selection.** A final set of data unique to the variable credit condition was the distribution of credits as a function of trial n (win, lose, draw) as a function of credit (no, variable, fixed) across Experiments 1–3. Standard error in parenthesis.

**Table 2.** Proportion of strategy at trial n + 1 (stay, upgrade [shift], downgrade [shift]) relative to outcome at trial n (win, lose, draw) as a function of credit (no, variable, fixed) across Experiments 1–3. Standard error in parenthesis.

|                 | Win   | Lose  | Draw  | Win   | Lose  | Draw  | Fixed credit |
|-----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------------|
| Experiment 1 (unexploitable) |       |       |       |       |       |       |              |
| No credit       | 0.376 | 0.234 | 0.294 | 0.384 | 0.220 | 0.302 | 0.357        |
| Lose            | 0.384 | 0.234 | 0.384 | 0.220 | 0.302 | 0.357 | 0.346        |
| Draw            | 0.302 | 0.220 | 0.302 | 0.357 | 0.346 | 0.360 | 0.360        |
| Experiment 2 (exploiting) |       |       |       |       |       |       |              |
| No credit       | 0.295 | 0.382 | 0.327 | 0.300 | 0.390 | 0.326 | 0.298        |
| Lose            | 0.300 | 0.390 | 0.326 | 0.298 | 0.388 | 0.360 | 0.360        |
| Draw            | 0.326 | 0.390 | 0.360 | 0.360 | 0.360 | 0.360 | 0.360        |
| Experiment 3 (exploitable) |       |       |       |       |       |       |              |
| No credit       | 0.368 | 0.401 | 0.398 | 0.322 | 0.433 | 0.366 | 0.428        |
| Lose            | 0.322 | 0.433 | 0.366 | 0.428 | 0.376 | 0.376 | 0.376        |
| Draw            | 0.433 | 0.366 | 0.428 | 0.376 | 0.376 | 0.376 | 0.376        |

Reaction times. A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out on trial n + 1 median RTs using credit type (no, variable, fixed) and outcome at trial n (win, lose, draw; see Fig. 1b, Table 3). The single response selection RT in the no credit condition was compared to the first (credit input) response RT in the fixed credit condition, and the response selection RT in the variable credit condition. Group average data are shown in Fig. 1b and individual data are shown in Supplementary Fig. C2. Analyses revealed a significant main effect of outcome [F(2,70) = 14.09, MSE = 23,832, p < 0.001, \( \eta^2 = 0.287 \)] in the absence of a significant main effect of credit type [F(2,70) = 0.07, MSE = 75,370, p = 0.930, \( \eta^2 = 0.002 \)] and interaction [F(4,140) = 2.10, MSE = 12,361, p = 0.085, \( \eta^2 = 0.016 \). Tukey’s HSD test (p < 0.05) revealed both losses (457 ms) and draws (438 ms) yielded significantly faster RTs than wins (543 ms; see Fig. 2).

**Discussion.** The data from Experiment 1 replicated a number of key findings related to quality and speed of contiguous decision-making in a competitive environment. Specifically, high-quality, mixed-strategy (MS) behaviour was more likely following positive outcomes. In other words, following wins, participants stayed with their original response approximately 1/3 of the time and changed to one of two new responses approximately 2/3 of the time. This was in contrast to performance following negative outcomes (specifically, losses), which were characterized by increases in shift behaviour beyond that predicted by MS3,5. Moreover, decision-times following negative outcomes were faster than decision-times following positive outcomes, consistent with other unexploitable competitive contexts45. Therefore, Experiment 1 provides support for the connection between the valence of the previous competitive encounter and the speed and quality of the next encounter: a negative outcome speeds subsequent decision-making and leads to an overuse of shift behaviour. This highlights the resilience of lose-shift behaviour despite its sub-optimality36,37. These data were also consistent across no, fixed
and variable credit conditions. That is, the addition of an extra response per trial (approximately 400 ms) in the fixed credit condition did not change the distribution of participant responding. There was also no evidence that the voluntary decision to slow down the cycle of play via variable credit changed responding relative to the no credit condition.

One reason why there was no effect of the credit systems in Experiment 1 was that the participants were in no danger of being exploited. Lack of exploitation may also have been the reason why deviations from MS were observed (although does not help to explain why there was over-use of shift behaviour following negative outcomes but not over-use of stay behaviour following wins). Slower, improved and/or better-managed decision-making may be observed when there are clearer threats of exploitation. This is evidenced in certain primate data: when a computerized opponent played according to MS, primates were observed to overplay certain responses, Figure 1.

### Table 3.

|                      | Experiment 1 (unexploitable) | Experiment 2 (exploiting) | Experiment 3 (exploitable) |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| **Without outlier removal** |                             |                           |                            |
| No                   | 559 (57)                    | 448 (40)                  | 418 (35)                   |
| Variable             | 523 (37)                    | 462 (32)                  | 478 (30)                   |
| Fixed                | 547 (60)                    | 461 (44)                  | 419 (33)                   |
| **Win**              |                             |                           |                            |
| No                   | 514 (38)                    | 400 (33)                  | 393 (30)                   |
| Variable             | 492 (48)                    | 459 (47)                  | 462 (42)                   |
| Fixed                | 436 (23)                    | 423 (24)                  | 536 (45)                   |
| **Lose**             |                             |                           |                            |
| No                   | 403 (37)                    | 355 (32)                  | 341 (39)                   |
| Variable             | 492 (48)                    | 459 (47)                  | 462 (42)                   |
| Fixed                | 444 (25)                    | 433 (24)                  | 536 (45)                   |
| **Draw**             |                             |                           |                            |
| No                   | 341 (26)                    | 341 (26)                  | 341 (26)                   |
| Variable             | 423 (24)                    | 536 (45)                  | 463 (35)                   |
| Fixed                | 457 (33)                    | 479 (41)                  | 530 (43)                   |

Table 3. Reaction times for the three outcomes (win, lose, draw) as a function of credit (no, variable, fixed) across Experiments 1–3. Standard error in parenthesis.
Experiment 2

Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, apart from the change in opponency to Scissors. The proportion of win outcomes did not significantly vary as a function of credit condition: $F(2, 70) = 1.41, MSE = 0.030, \eta_p^2 = 0.030$, $p = 0.250$, nor did the observed average value of 30.15% differ significantly from the expected value of 33.33% as assessed by a one-sampled t-test: $t(35) = -1.15, p = 0.257$.

**Table 4. Distribution of credits entered as a function of preceding outcome (win, lose, draw) across Experiments 1–3. Standard error in parenthesis.**

|                | Start     | Win        | Lose       | Draw       |
|----------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|
| **Experiment 1** (unexploitable) | 0.168 (0.044) | 0.305 (0.048) | 0.237 (0.039) | 0.290 (0.037) |
| **Experiment 2** (exploiting)    | 0.148 (0.051) | 0.258 (0.035) | 0.359 (0.046) | 0.235 (0.030) |
| **Experiment 3** (exploitable)   | 0.110 (0.035) | 0.371 (0.044) | 0.280 (0.029) | 0.239 (0.032) |

**Results. Item and outcome biases.** Rock selection did not significantly vary as a function of no, variable and fixed credit conditions $F(2, 70) = 0.93, MSE = 0.002, p = 0.398, \eta_p^2 = 0.026$ nor did the proportion of Rock selection significantly differ from the expected value of 33.3% as assessed by a one-sampled t-test: $t(35) = 1.17, p = 0.252$. Similarly, the proportion of win outcomes did not significantly vary as a function of credit conditions $F(2, 70) = 1.93, MSE = 0.002, p = 0.152, \eta_p^2 = 0.052$ nor did the proportion of Rock outcomes as a function of credit condition produced no significant main effect of condition: $F(2, 70) = 1.91, MSE = 0.003, p = 0.156, \eta_p^2 = 0.052$, nor an interaction: $F(2, 70) = 1.35, MSE = 0.005, p = 0.253, \eta_p^2 = 0.037$.

**Reinforcement learning biases.** Win-stay behaviour did not alter as a function of condition: $F(2, 70) = 0.43, MSE = 0.014, p = 0.653, \eta_p^2 = 0.012$ but the observed average value of 80.18% did differ significantly from the expected value of 66.66% ($t(35) = 9.11, p < 0.001$). Lose-shift behaviour did not alter as a function of condition: $F(2, 70) = 1.34, MSE = 0.009, p = 0.268, \eta_p^2 = 0.037$ but the observed average value of 80.18% did differ significantly from the expected value of 66.66% ($t(35) = 4.47, p < 0.001$). The degree of shift behaviour following loss was greater than that following draw ($t(35) = 3.46, p = 0.001$; two-tailed; see Figure 1a and Table 2).

**Reaction times.** A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA on trial $n + 1$ median RTs using credit type (no, variable, fixed) and outcome at trial $n$ (win, lose, draw; see Fig. 1b and Table 3) revealed a significant main effect of outcome $F(2, 70) = 15.84, MSE = 27.581, p < 0.001, \eta_p^2 = 0.312$ in the absence of a significant main effect of credit type $F(2, 70) = 0.43, MSE = 100.698, p = 0.650, \eta_p^2 = 0.012$ and interaction $F(4, 140) = 0.42, MSE = 17.775,
Following the removal of 10 individuals for Experiment 2 (see Experiment 1 for details), the significant main effect of outcome was replicated \[F(2,50) = 12.23, \text{MSE} = 10,949, p < 0.001, \eta^2_p = 0.329\] in the absence of a significant main effect of credit type \[F(2,50) = 0.96, \text{MSE} = 67,351, p = 0.391, \eta^2_p = 0.037\] and interaction \[F(4,100) = 2.36, \text{MSE} = 7214, p = 0.059, \eta^2_p = 0.086\]. Tukey’s HSD test \((p < 0.05)\) revealed both losses (441 ms) and draws (445 ms) yielded significantly faster RTs than wins (514 ms).

**Credit selection.** A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA failed to show significance in credit distribution as a function of outcome in the **variable condition** (see Table 4): \(F(2,70) = 2.53, \text{MSE} = 0.06, p = 0.087, \eta^2_p = 0.067\).

**Discussion.** Experiment 2 tested the idea that the failure to extend or truncate decision-making times via the use of credit systems was due to there being no negative consequences for deviation from optimal performance (lose-shift). If an opponent exploited these deviations, then behaviour should more closely align with MS, especially when given more (fixed credit, variable credit) rather than less (no credit) time to make decisions. However, at a group level, participants fared no worse against an **exploiting** (Experiment 2) versus **unexploitable** (Experiment 1) opponent as \(t\) rates were not significantly different (33.41% vs. 33.89%, respectively; between-participants \(t\)-test: \(t[70] = 0.82, p = 0.410\)). Furthermore, the variance of lose rates was not significantly smaller in Experiment 2 relative to Experiment 1 (Levene’s test: \(t[70] = 0.85, p = 0.360\))—something that might have been predicted if participants were more likely to operate under mixed-strategy to avoid exploitation in Experiment 2 but not Experiment 1. A final possibility is that any exploiting opponent designed with a static rule of course could be reconfigured to become an exploitable opponent. The idea that there is a variety of individual experiences against non-mixed-strategy opponents will be revisited.

Nevertheless, Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 in two important ways. First, the data continued to show the increased use of shift behaviour following negative outcomes over that predicted by mixed-strategy. The idea that lose-shift behaviour reliably manifests itself against putatively unexploitable (Experiment 1) and exploiting (Experiment 2) opponents suggests something of the immutability of this particularly reinforcement learning rule, relative to the flexibility observed in the expression of win-stay behaviour. This observation is consistent with previous human data where win-stay but not lose-shift behaviour modulated as a function of outcome value\(^6\), electrophysiological work where feedback-related negative (FRN) to wins but not losses modulate as a function of frequency\(^7\), and, also animal work where lose-shift is seen as a more hard-wired reflex\(^35,36\). These ideas also align with the principle of loss aversion\(^58\) (although see\(^59\)), loss attention whereby negative outcomes decrease inertia\(^13\), and evolutionary accounts where avoiding the damage following losing is more important that reaping the benefits following success\(^34,35\). Second, the RT data suggests that part of the reason for this sub-optimal behaviour may be the self-imposed reduction in time allocated to decisions following negative outcomes (i.e., post-error speeding). In a final attempt to explore the relationship between the quality, speed and control of competitive decision-making in Experiment 3, we exposited participants to an exploitable opponent.

**Experiment 3**

Previous work suggests that the development of a mental model leading to the successful exploitation of an opponent can radically change competitive performance. For example, post-error speeding becomes post-error slowing during successful exploitation, with the degree of slowing predicted by the degree of exploitation\(^10\). Therefore, it is possible that the sense of environmental control established during successful exploitation will also translate to an increased utility for varying decision-making times via credit systems.

In terms of the specific exploitable rule used in Experiment 3\(^39\), if a computer opponent plays one item more often than another (e.g., Rock) then humans will learn to play the appropriate counter-item with increased frequency (e.g., Paper; see also secondary salience\(^36\)). Therefore, opponents with item biases should lead to increases in both win-stay and lose-shift participant behaviours. This is because increasing the frequency of item repetition for an opponent should similarly reinforce the repetition of a participant’s item following wins and also reinforce the change of a participant’s item following losses. By observing the degree of change across win-stay and lose-shift proportions, exploitable opponents serve as a final test of flexibility between these reinforcement learning heuristics.

Experiment 3 was identical to both Experiment 2, apart from the change in opponency to exploitable. Here, opponents in each of the three conditions (no, variable and fixed) were given an item bias of 51.11%. For example, Rock was played for 46 trials whereas both Paper and Scissors were played for 22 trials each, in a random order. The assignment of item bias (R, P, S) to condition was counterbalanced, as was the order of conditions. All other parameters and all statistical analyses were identical to Experiments 1 and 2. Two individuals were replaced due the recording of only 89 credits in the variable credit condition. Of the final sample of 36 participants, 1 declined to provide demographic information. Of the remaining sample of 35 individuals, 23 were female and 32 were right-handed (mean age = 21.46, \text{stddev} = 5.05).

**Results.** **Item and outcome biases.** Rock selection did not significantly vary as a function of no, variable and fixed credit conditions \(F(2,70) = 0.37, \text{MSE} = 0.012, p = 0.691, \eta^2_p = 0.010\) nor did the proportion of Rock selection significantly differ from the expected value of 33.3% as assessed by a one-sampled \(t\)-test: \(t[35] = 0.96, p = 0.343\). However, wins did significantly vary as a function of credit conditions \(F(2,70) = 4.80, \text{MSE} = 0.003, p = 0.011, \eta^2_p = 0.121\), and were increased in the variable credit condition relative to the fixed credit condition (37.28% vs. 33.49%; see Table 1). Global win rates were also significantly higher than the expected value of 33.3%
as assessed by a one-sampled t-test: $t(35) = 3.26, p = 0.003$, and were significantly greater than the win rates experienced against an exploiting opponent in Experiment 2: between-participants t-test: $t(70) = 3.76, p < 0.001$.

For Experiment 3, the arc-sine transformed distribution of Rock (34.88%), Paper (32.84%), Scissors (32.28%) responses did not vary: $F(2,70) = 0.56, MSE = 0.042, \eta^2_p = 0.016$ nor interact with condition (no, variable, fixed); $F(4,140) = 0.65, MSE = 0.028, p = 0.628, \eta^2_p = 0.018$. Arc-sine proportions of win, lose and draw outcomes produced a significant main effect: $F(2,70) = 6.08, MSE = 0.006, p = 0.004, \eta^2_p = 0.148$ as well as an interaction: $F(4,140) = 2.70, MSE = 0.004, p = 0.033, \eta^2_p = 0.072$. The increase in wins relative to losses and draws expected as a result of the opponent being exploitable was only significant in the variable credit condition (see Table 1).

A small but significant item bias for Rock was revealed across Experiments 1–3, with the observed value of 34.73% different from the expected value of 33.3%: $t(107) = 2.07, p = 0.040$. This is consistent with previous work36,31,33–35. A binomial test was also carried out for each individual under the null hypothesis that their average proportion of Rock was 33.3% and the null could be rejected ($\alpha = 0.050$) for 100 out of 108 individuals, of whom 58 showed Rock selection above the value expected by mixed strategy. The most parsimonious explanation for this effect is a primary effect44, akin to the over selection of Heads in the two-response game Matching Pennies, where participants have a tendency to select the first item. This 58% is similar in magnitude to other ‘majorities’ reported in decision-making work (e.g., the 55% of individuals who demonstrate more environmental sampling in loss relative to gain experimental contexts45, p. 338).

**Reinforcement learning biases.** Win-stay behaviour did not alter as a function of condition: $F(2,70) = 0.99, MSE = 0.021, p = 0.376, \eta^2_p = 0.028$ and the observed average value of 43.88% did differ significantly from the expected value of 33.3%: $t(35) = 3.16, p = 0.003$. Lose-shift behaviour did alter as a function of condition: $F(2,70) = 3.72, MSE = 0.014, p = 0.029, \eta^2_p = 0.096$, with no credit (77.48%) varying from fixed (69.80%) but not variable credit (74.31%; Tukey’s HSD, $p < 0.05$). The observed average value for lose-shift behaviour (73.86%) significantly differed from the expected value of 66.66% ($t(35) = 2.55, p = 0.015$). Draw-shift behaviour did not alter as a function of condition: $F(2,70) = 1.59, MSE = 0.018, p = 0.212, \eta^2_p = 0.043$ and the observed average value of 66.09% did not differ significantly from the expected value of 66.66% ($t(35) = 0.17, p = 0.864$). The degree of shift behaviour following loss was greater than that following draw ($t(35) = 3.46, p = 0.001$; two-tailed; see Fig. 1, Table 2).

**Reaction times.** A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA on trial $n + 1$ median RTs using credit type (no, variable, fixed) and outcome at trial $n$ (win, lose, draw; see Fig. 2, Table 3) revealed a significant main effect of outcome $F(2,70) = 15.90, MSE = 19,083, p < 0.001, \eta^2_p = 0.308$ in the absence of a significant main effect of credit type $F(2,70) = 1.89, MSE = 130,885, p = 0.158, \eta^2_p = 0.051$ and interaction $F(4,140) = 0.34, MSE = 16,148, p = 0.850, \eta^2_p = 0.010$. Tukey’s HSD test ($p < 0.05$) revealed wins (563 ms), losses (512 ms) and draws (458 ms) were all significantly different from one another.

Following the removal of 7 individuals for Experiment 3, a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA on trial $n + 1$ median RTs using credit type (no, variable, fixed) and outcome at trial $n$ (win, lose, draw; see Fig. 2, Table 3) revealed a significant main effect of outcome $F(2,56) = 13.63, MSE = 9918, p < 0.001, \eta^2_p = 0.328$ in the absence of a significant main effect of credit type $F(2,56) = 2.09, MSE = 65,379, p = 0.133, \eta^2_p = 0.069$ and interaction $F(4,112) = 0.29, MSE = 6018, p = 0.886, \eta^2_p = 0.010$. RTs for losses (454 ms) and draws (413 ms) were faster RTs than wins (488 ms), although only the difference between draws and wins was significant (Tukey’s HSD, $p < 0.05$).

**Credit selection.** A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA on credit distribution was significant: $F(2,70) = 3.51, MSE = 0.05, p = 0.035, \eta^2_p = 0.091$, showing that significantly more credits were entered following wins relative to draws (see Table 4).

**Cross-experiment comparison**

A number of central conclusions can be drawn by summarizing the data across Experiments 1–3. First, the data reliably show that reaction times following losses were faster (or more ‘impulsive’45) than reaction times following wins (see also4, Experiment 1). Such post-error speeding has previously been conceptualized as a self-imposed reduction in time allocated to decisions following losses, with the individual aiming to exit the failure state as quickly as possible (contra4). However, this raises the concern that the less time one thinks about one’s next decision, the more likely it is to be sub-optimal, giving rise to cycles of poor performance. To investigate these ideas further, RT differences between losses and wins (collapsed across credit condition) were calculated on an individual basis for the two experiments in which a model of opponent performance could be learnt (Experiments 2 and 3; $n = 72$), and, compared with the difference between win and loss rates experienced by the same participant (following45). Figure 2a depicts a significant, positive correlation between the degree of success exhibited by the participants (i.e., more wins) and the degree to which decisions following losses were slower than decisions following wins (i.e., post-error slowing; $r = -0.202, p = 0.036$). Thus, slowing down decision-making following losses increases the likelihood of future successful performance.

Two further correlations were examined in an attempt to pinpoint which reinforcement learning mechanism might be more sensitive to promotion following extra decision-making time. A significant, positive correlation between post-error slowing and win-stay rates ($r = 0.295, p = 0.002$; Fig. 2b) was contrasted with a non-significant, negative correlation between post-error slowing and lose-shift rates ($r = -0.103, p = 0.287$; Fig. 2c). Therefore, reduced impulsivity exhibited by participants following loss was also linked to the ability to re-initiate successful win-stay but not lose-shift strategies.
MSE = 0.03, however with the use of fixed outcomes is that there is no consistency either within or between participants in lose trials that could be used to recreate exploitable and exploiting opponents, respectively. One critical issue are themselves exploitable—an alternative approach may be to design where participants achieved 18–24% differential between their win and lose rate). It is clear that more extreme error speeding the likelihood of future successful performance. (Figure 2. (a) Scatterplot comparing average lose minus win reaction time (RT) indexing the degree of post-error speeding (lose < win) or post-error slowing (lose > win) against the rate of wins minus losses indexing participants who were successful (more wins) or unsuccessful (more losses). The significant, positive correlation (r = 0.202, p = 0.036) shows that slowing down decision-making following losses relative to wins increases the likelihood of future successful performance. (b) Scatterplot depicting the significant, positive correlation (r = 0.295, p = 0.002) between the degree of post-error slowing and individual expressions of win-stay behaviour. (c) Scatterplot depicting the lack of a significant correlation (r = −0.103, p = 0.287) between the degree of post-error slowing and individual expressions of lose-shift behaviour. Across (a−c), filled-in circles represent participants from Experiment 2 (n = 36) and unfilled circles represent individual participants from Experiment 3 (n = 36).

This ease with which win-stay behaviour can be initiated, relative to the inflexibility of lose-shift behaviour, was further reinforced by also looking across studies in another way. The average proportion of win-stay behaviour (36.67%, 30.15%, 43.88%, respectively) was compared to the average proportion of lose-shift behaviour (77.23%, 80.18%, 73.86%, respectively) across Experiments 1–3 in a two-way, mixed ANOVA (behaviour as a within-participants factor, and, experiment as a between-participants factor). There was no main effect of experiment: F(2,105) = 1.27, MSE = 0.02, p = 0.287, η² = 0.024, but there was a main effect of behaviour: F(1,105) = 293.78, MSE = 0.03, p < 0.001, η² = 0.730, as well as an experiment × behaviour interaction: F(2,105) = 5.89, MSE = 0.03, p = 0.004, η² = 0.041. The only significant difference to arise from the current data set was the difference in win-stay behaviour between the exploiting opponent (Experiment 2) and the exploitable opponent (Experiment 3; Tukey’s p < 0.05). This is consistent with previous data where win-stay rates modulate to a greater degree than lose-shift rates, highlighting that the former is under cognitive control whereas the latter retains more of a reflexive quality. This is, of course, not to suggest that lose-shift behaviour could not be attenuated using substantial delays between decisions (c.f, 1, 6.5 and 12 s lags used⁴⁶), simply to say it is easier to stay following wins than it is to shift following loss.

General discussion

The main goal of this paper was to specifically test the relationship between decision-making speed and quality, with the hypothesis that slowing down decision-making following losses increases the likelihood of future successful performance in cases where a successful model of opponent domination can be implemented. The data confirm that self-imposed reductions in processing time following losses (post-error speeding) are causal factors in determining poorer-quality behaviour (see Fig. 2). Specifically, the data also provide evidence that win-stay (rather than lose-shift mechanisms) might be more sensitive to promotion following extra decision-making time.

Second, the data reinforce the inflexibility of lose-shift as a decision-making heuristic in competitive contexts. However, it is important to address the idea that the potency of the lose-shift heuristic may in part be due to the weakness of the opponent manipulation across Experiments 1–3. Relative to the unexploitable opponent in Experiment 1, where we expected average win rates to be around 1/3 (32.93%) as a result of the use of MS, we did not see a reduction in win rate in Experiment 2 (32.59%) when the opponent was designed to take advantage of any transitory idiosyncratic item bias that participants might have (exploiting). Moreover, while significantly different from Experiment 1, the average win rate against exploitable opponents in Experiment 3 (35.30%) was not comparable to the degree of success observed in previous studies against exploitable opponents (c.f.⁴⁸ where participants achieved 18–24% differential between their win and lose rate). It is clear that more extreme expressions of exploiting and exploitable opponents should be used in future research. However, since there can be no guarantee that participant will offer themselves up to exploitation—nor take advantage of opponent who are themselves exploitable—an alternative approach may be to design exploitable and exploiting conditions with fixed rather than variable win rates⁵⁷–⁶⁰. For example⁵⁷ created an 80–20% differential between win and lose trials that could be used to recreate exploitable and exploiting opponents, respectively. One critical issue however with the use of fixed outcomes is that there is no consistency either within or between participants in

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**Figure 2.** (a) Scatterplot comparing average lose minus win reaction time (RT) indexing the degree of post-error speeding (lose < win) or post-error slowing (lose > win) against the rate of wins minus losses indexing participants who were successful (more wins) or unsuccessful (more losses). The significant, positive correlation (r = 0.202, p = 0.036) shows that slowing down decision-making following losses relative to wins increases the likelihood of future successful performance. (b) Scatterplot depicting the significant, positive correlation (r = 0.295, p = 0.002) between the degree of post-error slowing and individual expressions of win-stay behaviour. (c) Scatterplot depicting the lack of a significant correlation (r = −0.103, p = 0.287) between the degree of post-error slowing and individual expressions of lose-shift behaviour. Across (a−c), filled-in circles represent participants from Experiment 2 (n = 36) and unfilled circles represent individual participants from Experiment 3 (n = 36).
the behaviour that will ultimately be reinforced or punished. This may have large scale consequences for how behaviour is perceived and the degree to which participants believe success and failure is under their control.

Finally, the data provide future directions for understanding how the use of a variable ‘credit’ (or ‘token’) system may influence the perceived control participants have against exploitable opponents. Specifically, win rates against exploitable opponents (Experiment 3) were enhanced in the variable credit condition, and participants also inserted more credits following wins in the variable credit condition. This interaction between variable credit and exploitable opponents may reflect an increased sense of control\cite{16,20}, as a result of the successful implementation of a mental model of the competitive environment. Relative to unexploitable or (prima facie) exploiting opponents, exploitable opponents offer a clear opportunity for strategic learning, where success is clearly indexed by an increase in win rate. Similarly, performance during the variable credit condition was also characterized by an increased opportunity for environmental control: the game slows and speeds according to the distribution of credits dictated by the participant. Importantly, the observation that more credits were inserted following win trials against exploitable opponents suggests that participants were initiating their own form of post-reinforcement pause\cite{8}; increasing the time allocated to decision-making on the next round, thereby increasing their chances of consecutive success.

In future work, it will be important to disentangle two features of any putative credit system: temporal lag and response interruption\cite{6}. Relative to the no credit conditions, both fixed and variable credit conditions extended the time between trials (temporal lag) as a result of requiring participants to switch from their RPS task to a credit entering task (see\cite{6}, for a review on the extensive task-switching literature). Therefore, any potential costs or benefits accrued from credits systems could be due to (a) providing individual with more time to make better decisions, (b) disrupting cyclic or poorer-quality motor patterns associated with response selection, or, (c) a combination of the two. Some of our future research will be focused around using average reaction time derived from a fixed credit block as an average delay time around which participants are exposed to temporal lags between trials. This type of manoeuvre will help to reveal any effects of temporal delay independently of the contribution of response interruption, in the larger context of dynamic decision-making against numerous styles of opponency.

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Author contributions
B.J.D. designed the studies, analysed the data and wrote the manuscript.

Competing interests
The author declares no competing interests.

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