Cryptanalysis of a family of self-synchronizing chaotic stream ciphers

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Abstract
Unimodal maps have been broadly used as a base of new encryption strategies. Recently, a stream cipher has been proposed in the literature, whose keystream is basically a symbolic sequence of the (one-parameter) logistic map or of the tent map. In the present work a thorough analysis of the keystream is made which reveals the existence of some serious security problems.

Key words: Unimodal maps, symbolic dynamics, stream cipher, known-plaintext attack, control parameter estimation, initial condition estimation.

1. Introduction
The partition of the state space transforms a measure-preserving dynamical system into a stationary stochastic process called a symbolic dynamics. In the case of chaotic systems (i.e., governed by chaotic maps), the resulting symbolic dynamics has some specific properties, like sensitivity to initial conditions and strong mixing, which are very attractive for cryptographic purposes. For instance, the symbolic dynamics of a chaotic map can be used as a Random Number Generator (RNG) and, more generally, as a source of entropy. Unimodal maps are particularly useful in this regard, since their generating partitions comprise two intervals, thus leading to a natural source of Random Bit Generators (RBGs). Among all possible applications of RNGs and RBGs in cryptography, their role as keystream generators in stream ciphers is especially important.

Recently a stream cipher based on the symbolic dynamics of the (one-parameter) logistic map and tent map, was proposed in [2]. If the parameter of either map is selected conveniently, then its symbolic sequences pass all the statistical tests necessary for their consideration as keystreams. However, we show that this requirement is not enough to guarantee the security of this stream cipher and point out some cryptographic weaknesses.

The work described in this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 the encryption scheme of [2] is explained. After that, some issues relevant to the security of the cryptosystem are highlighted (Sec. 3). In Sec. 4 the cryptosystem is analyzed taking into account the dynamics of the underlying chaotic system. The problems derived from the selection of the logistic and tent maps are also discussed there. Finally, the main results and conclusions of the work are summarized in Sec. 5.

2. Description of the encryption scheme
In the cryptosystem described in [2] the transformation of the plaintext into the ciphertext is done bitwise and driven by symbolic sequences generated either by the logistic map or by the tent map. Recall that the logistic map is defined as

\[ f_\lambda(x) = \lambda x(1 - x), \] (1)
for \( x \in [0,1] \) and \( \lambda \in [0,4] \), and the tent map is given by the following equation:

\[
f_\lambda(x) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{x}{\lambda}, & \text{if } 0 \leq x < \lambda, \\
\frac{(1-x)}{(1-\lambda)}, & \text{if } \lambda \leq x \leq 1,
\end{cases}
\]

where \( x \in [0,1] \) and \( \lambda \in (0,1) \). Henceforth we will refer to \( \lambda \) as the control parameter.

Given a closed interval \( I \subseteq \mathbb{R} \) and a map \( f : I \mapsto I \), the orbit of (the initial condition) \( x \in I \) is defined as the set \( O_f(x) = \{ f^n(x) : n \in \mathbb{N}_0 \} \), where \( \mathbb{N}_0 = \{ 0 \} \cup \mathbb{N} = \{ 0, 1, \ldots \} \), \( f^0(x) = x \) and \( f^n(x) = f(f^{n-1}(x)) \).

A continuous map defined on an interval of \( \mathbb{R} \) that is increasing (decreasing) to the left of an interior point and decreasing (increasing) thereafter is said to be unimodal. Examples of unimodal maps are provided by the logistic and tent maps. A unimodal map attains its maximum (minimum) at a single point \( x_c \) (\( x_c = 1/2 \) for the logistic map, and \( x_c = \lambda \) for the tent map), called the critical point. If \( f : I \mapsto I \) is unimodal, then any orbit can be encoded into a binary sequence,

\[
B_\infty(f, x) = \{ B_i(f, x) \}_{i=0}^\infty = \theta(f^0(x))\theta(f^1(x))\ldots\theta(f^{N-1}(x))\
\]

where \( \theta(\cdot) \) is the step function

\[
\theta(y) = \begin{cases} 
0, & \text{if } y < x_c, \\
1, & \text{if } y \geq x_c.
\end{cases}
\]

In [2] the plaintext is encrypted through the symbolic dynamics of either the logistic map or the tent map, with fixed control parameter \( \lambda \) and initial condition \( x_0 \). If the plaintext is \( N \) bit long, then the first \( m + N \) points of \( O_{f_\lambda}(x_0) \) are computed with the selected map, and the corresponding symbolic sequence is produced. The first \( m \) bits of this symbolic sequence are used to bear the initial condition. Indeed, according to the theory of symbolic dynamics, given \( \varepsilon > 0 \) and a generating partition \( \alpha \) of \( I \) with respect to \( f \) (like the partition \( \alpha = \{ [0, x_c), [x_c, 1] \} \) in the case of unimodal maps of the unit interval), any real number \( x \in I \) can be represented with precision \( \varepsilon \) as a symbolic sequence of \( f \) with respect to \( \alpha \), with initial condition \( x \) and length above a certain threshold [3]. Therefore, once the precision \( \varepsilon \) has been set, \( m \) is chosen to be larger than the corresponding threshold.

The scheme proposed in [2] divides the finite binary sequence

\[
B_{m+N}(f_\lambda, x_0) = \{ B_i(f_\lambda, x_0) \}_{i=0}^{m+N-1} = \theta(f^0(x))\theta(f^1(x))\ldots\theta(f^{m+N-1}(x))
\]

into two segments: \( B_{\text{init}} = \{ B^\text{init}_{i=0}^{m-1} \} \) with \( B^\text{init}_i = B_i(f_\lambda, x_0) \), and \( B_{\text{ks}} = \{ B^\text{ks}_{i=0}^{N-1} \} \) with \( B^\text{ks}_i = B_{m+i}(f_\lambda, x_0) \). The initial segment \( B_{\text{init}} \) contains the information on \( x_0 \) up to the precision wished. The final segment \( B_{\text{ks}} \) is the keystream of the cipher, i.e., the plaintext \( P = \{ P_i \}_{i=0}^{N-1} \) is transformed into the pre-ciphertext \( C = \{ C_i \}_{i=0}^{N-1} \) according to

\[
C_i = P_i \oplus B^\text{ks}_i = P_i \oplus B_{m+i}(f_\lambda, x_0),
\]

where \( i = 0, 1, \ldots, N-1 \), and \( 0 \oplus 0 = 1 \oplus 1 = 0 \), \( 0 \oplus 1 = 1 \oplus 0 = 1 \). Finally, the pre-ciphertext \( C \) and \( B_{\text{init}} \) are combined into the ciphertext or encrypted message \( M = \{ M_i \}_{i=0}^{m+N-1} \) which is sent to the receiver through an insecure channel. Generation of \( M \) is driven by a shuffler block, implementing an injective map \( \pi : \{ 0,1,\ldots,m-1 \} \mapsto \{ 0,1,\ldots,N-1,N \} \), which inserts the \( m \) bits of \( B_{\text{init}} \) into the pre-ciphertext \( C \) according to the following rule. (a) If \( 0 \leq \pi(i) \leq N-1 \), then \( B^\text{init}_i \) is inserted before \( C_{\pi(i)} \); (b) if \( \pi(i) = N \), then \( B^\text{init}_i \) is inserted after \( C_{N-1} \), i.e., \( M_{m+N-1} = B^\text{init}_i \). Thus, a ciphertext with, say, \( \pi(i) < N \) for any \( i \), looks as follows:

\[
M = C_0 C_1 \cdots C_{i_0-1} B^\text{init}_{i_0} C_{i_0} \cdots C_{i_{m-1}-1} B^\text{init}_{i_{m-1}} C_{i_{m-1}} \cdots C_N,
\]

where \( \pi(jk) = i_k, k \in \{ 0,1,\ldots,m-1 \} \), and \( i_0 < \ldots < i_{m-1} \). The shuffler block, i.e., the map \( \pi \), is also known at the receiver, thus making the recovery of \( x_0 \) feasible.

In sum, the encryption is done in three steps:

1. **Symbolic sequence**: \( B_{m+N}(f_\lambda, x_0) = B_{\text{init}} \parallel B_{\text{ks}} \) (\( \parallel \) stands for “juxtaposition”).
2. **Pre-ciphertext**: \( C = P \oplus B_{\text{ks}} \) (the \( \oplus \) operation is bitwise)
3. Considerations about the synchronization procedure

In chaos-based cryptosystems, decryption of the ciphertext requires perfect regeneration of the orbit(s) involved in the encryption stage. This being the case, the receiver must know the control parameter(s) and the initial condition(s) used by the transmitter. Those values can be obtained by the receiver from either the secret key or the design specifications. However, the agreement on the initial condition can be settled indirectly using synchronization techniques. Indeed, if the chaotic systems at the transmitter and receiver are suitably coupled, their orbits converge to each other although they have been derived from different initial conditions. Synchronization implies that, after a transient time, the chaotic system(s) at the receiver reproduces the dynamics of the chaotic system(s) at the transmitter, which further allows the recovering of the plaintext without knowledge of \( x_0 \). This is certainly not the case of the cryptosystem proposed in [2], since the initial condition have to be known in order to reproduce the keystream \( B^ks \). As a consequence, the whole ciphertext must be received before decryption can start while, in conventional synchronization schemes, decryption is progressively achieved during the reception of the ciphertext. We conclude that, what is called synchronization in [2] is rather a method to codify and send the initial condition, than a usual synchronization technique.

Furthermore, nothing is mentioned in [2] about how \( x_0 \) is obtained from \( B^{init} \). We briefly address this issue here. According to the theory of symbolic dynamics, a symbolic sequence of length \( L \) partitions the...
state interval \( I \) into \( 2^L \) subintervals \( I_j^{(L)}, 1 \leq j \leq 2^L \), that is, \( I = I_1^{(L)} \cup I_2^{(L)} \cup \ldots \cup I_{2^L}^{(L)} \), with \( I_j^{(L)} \cap I_k^{(L)} = \emptyset \) for \( j \neq k \). The binary sequences of length \( L \) obtained for each \( x \in I_j^{(L)} \) are the same. Therefore, a given symbolic sequence of length \( L \) singles out the subinterval \( I_j^{(L)} \) its initial condition \( x_0 \) belongs to, what provides an estimation of \( x_0 \). The estimation error depends on the width of \( I_j^{(L)} \), which in turn depends on the map considered. In the case of the symmetric tent map (i.e., the tent map with \( \lambda = 1/2 \)), all the subintervals \( I_j^{(L)} \) have width equal to \( 1/(2^L) \) (see Fig. 1). Hence if the first \( n \) bits of \( B_{\text{init}}(f_{1/2}, x_0) \) locate \( x_0 \) in the subinterval \([k/2^n, (k+1)/2^n]\), then the bit \( B_n \) determines whether \( x_0 \) belongs to either the left (\( B_n = 0 \)) or the right (\( B_n = 1 \)) half of that subinterval. Nevertheless, this dichotomic search cannot be done in a general case. Indeed, the subintervals \( I_j^{(L)} \) associated to the logistic map and the tent map with \( \lambda \neq 1/2 \) are not equal-width. However, in [7] it is shown that the symbolic sequences of unimodal maps can be assigned a linear order. This linear order preserves the order of the corresponding initial conditions in \( \mathbb{R} \) and can be used to estimate \( x_0 \) through a binary search procedure [8].

![Figure 1: Symbolic intervals for different iterations of the symmetric tent map.](image)

4. Problems derived from the dynamics of the underlying chaotic systems

A crucial step in the design of a chaos-based cryptosystem is the selection of the underlying chaotic map(s). In this section it is shown that the choice of the logistic map and the tent map for the scheme proposed in [2] implies serious security problems.

First of all, due to lack of details in [2], it is assumed that the interleaving of the symbolic block \( B_{\text{init}} \) in the pre-ciphertext \( C \) to build the ciphertext \( M \), is performed in a random way. In a chosen-plaintext...
attack, a cryptanalyst has access to the encryption device and thus can obtain the output corresponding to any input. If $P_i = 0$ for $0 \leq i \leq N - 1$, i.e., all the bits of the plaintext $P$ are chosen to be zero, then $\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{0} \oplus \mathbf{B}^{\text{ks}} = \mathbf{B}^{\text{ks}}$, and the corresponding ciphertext is $\pi (\mathbf{B}^{\text{init}} || \mathbf{B}^{\text{ks}})$. Call this particular ciphertext $\mathbf{B}^{\text{shuffled}}$. According to [9], given a symbolic sequence $\mathbf{B}_L(f_\lambda, x_0)$ of a unimodal map $f_\lambda$ (see Eq.(5)), both the control parameter $\lambda$ and the initial condition $x_0$ can be estimated in a straightforward way. Actually, the problem we are dealing with is not quite the same, since the available symbolic sequences are distorted through the permutation procedure. Nevertheless, we will presently show that the estimation of the control parameter is still possible using $\mathbf{B}^{\text{shuffled}} = \pi (\mathbf{B}^{\text{init}} || \mathbf{B}^{\text{ks}})$ instead of $B_{m+N}(f_\lambda, x_0) = \mathbf{B}^{\text{init}} || \mathbf{B}^{\text{ks}}$, where $f_\lambda$ is the logistic map or the tent map, and the estimation method depends on $f_\lambda$. Consequently the first step in the cryptanalysis of this cipher calls for discerning the chaotic map used in the generation of $\mathbf{B}^{\text{shuffled}}$, the encryption of $P = \mathbf{0}$. Once this step has been completed, the next step is to estimate the control parameter.

![Wooters' distance of the logistic map with respect to the logistic map. The length of the symbolic sequences is $N = 10^4$, whereas the words are of width $w = 10$.](image)

**Figure 2:** Wooters’ distance of the logistic map with respect to the logistic map. The length of the symbolic sequences is $N = 10^4$, whereas the words are of width $w = 10$.

4.1. **Identification of the chaotic map from symbolic sequences**

The dynamics of every chaotic system has some particular characteristics that make it distinct. These “fingerprints” are also present in their symbolic dynamics and can be brought to light via statistical comparison of the corresponding symbolic sequences. A method along these lines exploits the “statistical distance” between symbolic sequences to discriminate one chaotic map from another. In this paper we consider the statistical distance defined by Wooters [10]. Let

$$P_i = \left\{ \frac{1}{w} \sum_{j=1}^{w} b_{ij} \right\}_{i=1}^{N}$$

be two probability distributions.

Wooters’ statistical distance between $P_1$ and $P_2$ is given by

$$D_W(P_1, P_2) = \cos^{-1} \left( \sum_{j=1}^{w} \sqrt{p_j^{(1)} \cdot p_j^{(2)}} \right).$$

Since $D_W$ is calculated from two probability distributions, it is necessary to establish a method to derive a probability distribution from the dynamics of a unimodal map. Let $\mathbf{B}_L(f_\lambda, x_0)$ be a symbolic sequence of a unimodal map $f_\lambda$. A probability distribution can be obtained from $\mathbf{B}_L(f_\lambda, x_0)$ just by grouping all bits in a sliding window of length $w$. As a result, a binary sequence of length $L$ is transformed into a sequence of $L - w + 1$ $w$-bit integers (or words), taking some of the $2^w$ possible values. The probability distribution
Figure 3: Wootters’ distance of the skew tent map with respect to the logistic map for \( N = 10^4 \) and \( w = 10 \).

assumed to \( B_L(f_\lambda, x_0) \) is determined by counting the number of occurrences of each word and dividing the result by \( L - w + 1 \).

In the case under consideration, the sequence \( B_{m+N}(f_\lambda, x_0) = B^{\text{init}} \parallel B^{\text{ks}} \) generated at the transmitter, is not accessible to the cryptanalyst. Indeed, as explained in Sec. 3, a chosen-plaintext attack with \( P = 0 \) returns \( B^{\text{shuffled}} = \pi(B_{m+N}(f_\lambda, x_0)) \) rather than \( B_{m+N}(f_\lambda, x_0) \), which amounts to the presence of noise in the calculated probability distribution. Therefore, the parameters \( N \) and \( w \) must be selected to guarantee a small value of Wootters’ distance between the probability distributions obtained from \( B_{m+N}(f_\lambda, x_0) \) and the one derived from \( B^{\text{shuffled}} \). From this point of view, it is convenient to have a large value of \( N \) and a small value of \( w \). On the other hand, the value of \( w \) should not be very small, since the entropy of the probability distribution must be as close as possible to the entropy of the underlying chaotic system to achieve an accurate reconstruction of the dynamics involved. Our experience shows that the choice \( w \gg 10 \) and \( N \geq 10^4 \) implies a drastic reduction of the noise induced by the shuffling process.

Wootters’ distance can be used, for example, to estimate the control parameter of the logistic map. This task is carried out by computing Wootters’ distance from the symbolic sequence \( B^{\text{shuffled}} \) (generated with an unknown value \( \hat{\lambda} \) of the control parameter) to the symbolic sequences generated with \( \lambda \) ranging in an interval. These distances are computed in Fig. 2 for two values of \( \hat{\lambda} \) with \( N = 10^4 \) and \( w = 10 \); the corresponding symbolic sequences were generated with different initial conditions. Figure 2 shows that around the right value of \( \lambda \) there exists a basin of attraction, which leads immediately to an estimation of \( \hat{\lambda} \). Furthermore, the basin of attraction is always easily observed independently of the shuffling procedure, as it has been verified through different simulations and random interleaving of \( B^{\text{init}} \) and \( B^{\text{ks}} \).

If we consider now a symbolic sequence of the tent map with control parameter \( \hat{\lambda} \), then Wootters’ distance to the logistic map produces a picture with no basin of attraction (see Fig. 3(a), where the Wootters’ distance is always upper 0.9) or with a basin of attraction around \( \lambda = 4 \) (see Fig. 3(b)). In this case, we conclude that the chosen map is the logistic map with \( \hat{\lambda} = 4 \), or the tent map with an unknown value for the control parameter. A further analysis of Wootters’ distance to the tent map makes possible to discard the logistic map in this situation. Figure 4 depicts Wootters’ distance to the tent map when \( B^{\text{shuffled}} \) is generated using the tent map with two different values for \( \hat{\lambda} \). Again, it is possible to discern a basin of attraction around \( \hat{\lambda} \), which has been verified for different random configurations of the interleaving of \( B^{\text{init}} \) and \( B^{\text{ks}} \). Nevertheless, there is an especial situation where it is impossible to distinguish the logistic map from the tent map. It occurs for the logistic map with \( \lambda = 4 \) and the skew tent map with \( \lambda = 0.5 \). In this situation, both maps are topological conjugate [11, p. 68] and the Wootters’ distance of the logistic map with respect to the tent
map shows a basin of attraction around $\lambda = 0.5$. Nevertheless, from a practical point of view it is possible to discern between both maps even when there exists topological conjugacy, since when working with finite precision arithmetics the symmetric tent map possesses a “digitally stable” fixed point at $x = 0$. The effects of digital degradation for the symmetric tent map can be observed in Fig. 4. Indeed, digital degradation is the reason why Wootters’ distance with respect to the tent map always shows peaks at $\lambda = 0.5$. However, if the Wootters’ distance of the logistic map with $\lambda = 4$ to the skew tent map is calculated, we can observed that it appears a peak instead of a basin of attraction (see Fig. 5(a)), which can be used to distinguish the logistic map from the skew tent map when the theoretical condition of topological conjugacy is satisfied. As a matter of fact, digital degradation causes a dependency of the shape of Wootters’ distance with respect to the initial condition of the given symbolic sequence, and also with respect to the quantization steps used in its computation. Future work will be focused on the further and thoroughly examination of that dependence.

We conclude that Wootters’ distance between a given symbolic sequence and a large set of symbolic sequences of the logistic map, can discriminate which chaotic map has been used in the encryption procedure. Furthermore, Wootters’ distance leads to an estimation of the control parameter of both the logistic map and tent map, which can be further improved as it is shown next.

4.2. Estimation of the control parameter from symbolic sequences

As mentioned above, the method to estimate the control parameter from symbolic sequences depends on the underlying chaotic map. In the case of the logistic map, the critical point does not depend on the control parameter, whereas the control parameter determines the critical point for the tent map. This explains the need for different estimation methods.

4.2.1. Control parameter estimation for the logistic map

A method to estimate the control parameter of unimodal maps with a fixed critical point using symbolic sequences, can be easily derived from the results of [7], as shown in [9], and applied to cryptanalysis in [13, 14, 15]. As it was mentioned above, in [7] it is proved that for a certain family of unimodal maps $\mathcal{F}$ which includes both the logistic map and the tent map, it is possible to assign a linear order to their

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1The term “digitally stable” means that the fixed point is stable under finite computing precision. That is, any chaotic orbit will finally lead to $x = 0$ after a limited number of iterations. The number of iterations has an upper bound determined by the finite precision. Some discussions on this phenomenon with floating-point arithmetic can be found in [12].
symbolic sequences, denoted by ≤, that preserves the order of the corresponding initial conditions in \( \mathbb{R} \). To be specific, if \( I \subset \mathbb{R} \) is a closed interval and \( f : I \rightarrow I \) belongs to \( F \), then (i) \( B_L(f, x_1) < B_L(f, x_2) \) implies \( x_1 < x_2 \), and (ii) \( x_1 < x_2 \) implies \( B_L(f, x_1) \leq B_L(f, x_2) \), where \( x_1, x_2 \in I \). In particular, for the logistic and tent maps it follows:

(A) \( B_L(f, x) \leq B_L(f, \lambda(x)), \forall x \in [0, 1] \), eventually after a transient orbit in the case of the logistic map.

(B) If \( \lambda_1 < \lambda_2 \), then \( B_L(f, \lambda_1(x_c)) \leq B_L(f, \lambda_2(x_c)) \), since the critical value \( f(\lambda(x_c)) \) is a non-decreasing, monotone function of \( \lambda \).

The estimation of the control parameter of the logistic map \( f_\lambda \) is based on (A) and (B), and it proceeds in two stages.

1. Search for the maximum binary sequence of length \( l \leq L \) contained in \( B_L(f, x_0) \).
2. Use the maximum binary sequence and the monotonic relation between \( B_l(f, \lambda(x_c)) \) and \( \lambda \), to get an estimation of \( \lambda \) through a binary search procedure [3].

In the scheme defined in [2], \( L = m + N \) and, as mentioned before, a chosen-plaintext attack with \( P = 0 \) returns \( B^\text{shuffled} = \pi(B_{m+N}(f, x_0)) \) instead of \( B_{m+N}(f, x_0) = B^\text{mit} || B^\text{ks} \). This problem can be overcome by considering not only the maximum binary sequence of length \( l \leq m + N \) in \( B_{m+N}(f, x_0) \), but the set of the, say, \( Q \) greatest sequences of length \( l \). If the interleaving of \( B^\text{mit} \) in \( B^\text{ks} \) is done randomly, it was verified experimentally that for \( Q \) large enough, the set of the \( Q \) greatest sequences of length \( l \) always includes \( B^\text{mit}_l(f, x_0) \) or a good estimation of it, \( B^\text{max}_l(f, x_0) \) being the maximum sequence obtained from \( B_{m+N}(f_\lambda, x_0) \). In [15], it is pointed out that a good estimation of \( \lambda \) requires values of \( Q \) over \( 10^6 \approx 2^{20} \) (a typical number in actual chosen-plaintext attacks); the estimation error lies then below \( 10^{-8} \) (see Fig.1 in [17]). In our case, this estimation is also degraded by the fact that the method is applied on approximated values of \( B_{m+N}(f_\lambda, x_0) \). Needless to say, an estimation of \( \lambda \) amounts to reducing the key space, and this compromises the security of the cipher. All in all this analysis underlines the critical role of the shuffler in the encryption scheme of [2].

Figure 5: Wootters’ distance of the (a) logistic map for \( \lambda = 4 \) and \( x_0 = 0.593563 \); and (b) the skew tent map for \( \lambda = 0.5 \) and \( x_0 = 0.213988 \) respect to the skew tent map for \( N = 10^4 \) and \( w = 10 \). The quantization steps of x- and y-axis are \( 2^{-6} \) and \( 2^{-4} \) respectively.
4.2.2. Control parameter estimation for the tent map

The method described in the previous section does not apply to the tent map because its critical point depends on the control parameter: $x_c = \lambda$. In this case, we can resort to the analysis of the ratio between 1-bits and 0-bits in symbolic sequences of the tent map. As it was emphasized in Sec. 3.1, this ratio is equal to $R = \frac{1-\lambda}{\lambda}$, hence it can be used to estimate of the control parameter. Moreover, the number of 1-bits and 0-bits is not modified by the shuffling procedure, so the estimation of the control parameter can be performed on $B_{\text{shuffled}}$ instead. Fig. 6 shows the error in the recovery of the control parameter from the ratio $R$ obtained with different $B_{\text{shuffled}}$ and $\lambda$ ranging in (0, 1). The estimation error decreases as the length of the plaintext $N$ increases, but a perfect recovery of $\lambda$ requires not only large values of $N$ but also extended-precision arithmetic libraries. Indeed, when implementing the cryptosystem, the shortcomings of finite precision arithmetic and finite statistical sampling causes a deviation of the computed value of $R$ from its theoretical value, which further entails a residual error in the estimation of $\lambda$. It was experimentally verified that this residual error is around $10^{-4}$, the numerical simulations being carried out with double-precision floating-point arithmetic. In any case, the estimation of the control parameter of both the logistic map and tent map, implies a severe reduction of the key space that must be taken into account when designing the cipher.

4.3. Digital degradation

A main characteristic of stream ciphers is that the keystreams must have a very long period. In the context under examination, the period of the keystreams depends on the periodic behavior of the symbolic sequences of the logistic map and the tent map. It is well known that any finite-precision orbit, hence any symbolic sequence of chaotic map, is periodic. This problem is especially important in the case of the symmetric tent map. In particular, for $\lambda = 0.5$ the origin is an attractive fix point for all orbits, and this represents a complete degradation of the random properties of the corresponding keystreams. Therefore,
the recommendations given in [6] must be taken into account in order to avoid the consequences of the dynamical degradation.

5. Conclusions

In this paper we have analyzed a recent stream cipher that is built on the symbolic sequences of the (parametric) logistic and tent maps. We conclude that this cipher is insecure since a chosen-plaintext attack makes possible to estimate the control parameter of the underlying chaotic map, based on a “noisy” version of the keystream. This estimation can be done with an approximate error that goes from $10^{-4}$ (tent map) to $10^{-8}$ (logistic map), what amounts to a strong reduction of the key space. More generally, the results of this paper and of [14] hint to the fact that symbolic sequences of unimodal maps are insecure when used as keystreams.

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