Understanding and Detecting Hateful Content Using Contrastive Learning

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Abstract
The spread of hate speech and hateful imagery on the Web is a significant problem that needs to be mitigated to improve our Web experience. This work contributes to research efforts to detect and understand hateful content on the Web by undertaking a multimodal analysis of Antisemitism and Islamophobia on 4chan’s /pol/ using OpenAI’s CLIP. This large pre-trained model uses the Contrastive Learning paradigm. We devise a methodology to identify a set of Antisemitic and Islamophobic hateful textual phrases using Google’s Perspective API and manual annotations. Then, we use OpenAI’s CLIP to identify images that are highly similar to our Antisemitic/Islamophobic textual phrases. By running our methodology on a dataset that includes 66M posts and 5.8M images shared on 4chan’s /pol/ for 18 months, we detect 173K posts containing 21K Antisemitic/Islamophobic images and 246K posts that include 420 hateful phrases. Among other things, we find that we can use OpenAI’s CLIP model to detect hateful content with an accuracy score of 0.81 (F1 score = 0.54). By comparing CLIP with two baselines proposed by the literature, we find that CLIP outperforms them, in terms of accuracy, precision, and F1 score, in detecting Antisemitic/Islamophobic images. Also, we find that Antisemitic/Islamophobic imagery is shared in a similar number of posts on 4chan’s /pol/ compared to Antisemitic/Islamophobic textual phrases, highlighting the need to design more tools for detecting hateful imagery. Finally, we make available (upon request) a dataset of 246K posts containing 420 Antisemitic/Islamophobic phrases and 21K likely Antisemitic/Islamophobic images (automatically detected by CLIP) that can assist researchers in further understanding Antisemitism and Islamophobia.

Introduction
The spread of hateful content on the Web is an everlasting and vital issue that adversely affects society. The problem of hateful content is longstanding on the Web for various reasons. First, there is no scientific consensus on what constitutes hateful content (i.e., no definition of what hate speech is) (Sellars 2016). Second, the problem is complex since hateful content can spread across various modalities (e.g., text, images, videos, etc.), and we still lack automated techniques to detect hateful content with acceptable and generalizable performance (Arango, Pérez, and Poblete 2019).

Third, we lack moderation tools to proactively prevent the spread of hateful content on the Web (Konikoff 2021). This work focuses on assisting the community in addressing the issue of the lack of tools to detect hateful content across multiple modalities.

Most of the research efforts in the space of detecting hateful content focus on designing and training machine learning models that are specifically tailored towards detecting specific instances of hateful content (e.g., hate speech on text or particular cases of hateful imagery). Some examples of such efforts include Google’s Perspective API (Perspective API 2018) and the HateSonar classifier (Davidson et al. 2017) that aim to detect toxic and offensive text. Other methods aim to detect instances of hateful imagery like Antisemitic images (Zannettou et al. 2020b) or hateful memes (Kiela et al. 2020; Zannettou et al. 2018). These efforts and tools are essential and valuable, however, they rely on human-annotated datasets that are expensive to create, and therefore they are also small. At the same time, these datasets focus on specific modalities (i.e., text or images in isolation). All these drawbacks limit their broad applicability.

The lack of large-scale annotated datasets for solving problems like hate speech motivated the research community to start developing techniques that learn from unlabeled data (a paradigm known as self-supervised learning). Over the past years, the research community released large-scale models that depend on huge unlabeled datasets such as OpenAI’s GPT-3 (Brown et al. 2020), Google’s BERT (Devlin et al. 2019), OpenAI’s CLIP (Radford et al. 2021), etc. These models are trained on large-scale datasets and usually can capture general knowledge extracted from the datasets that can be valuable for performing classification tasks that the model was not explicitly trained on.

Motivated by these recent advancements on large-scale pre-trained machine learning models, in this work, we investigate how we can use such models to detect hateful content on the Web across multiple modalities (i.e., text and images). Specifically, we focus on OpenAI’s CLIP model because it helps us capture content similarity across modalities (i.e., measure similarity between text and images). To achieve this, CLIP leverages a paradigm known as Contrastive Learning; the main idea is that the model maps text and images to a high-dimensional vector space and is trained in such a way that similar text/images are mapped closer in
this vector space (for more details see Background section).

Focus & Research Questions. This work focuses on understanding the spread of Antisemitic/Islamophobic content on 4chan’s /pol/ board. We concentrate on hateful content targeted towards these two demographics mainly because previous work indicates that 4chan’s /pol/ is known for disseminating Antisemitic/Islamophobic content (Zannettou et al. 2020b; Prisk 2017). Specifically, we focus on shedding light on the following research questions:

- **RQ1:** Can large pre-trained models that leverage the Contrastive Learning paradigm, like OpenAI’s CLIP, identify hateful content with acceptable performance? How does CLIP’s performance compare to state-of-the-art classifiers for detecting hateful imagery?

- **RQ2:** How prevalent is Antisemitic/Islamophobic imagery and textual hate speech on 4chan’s /pol/?

To answer these research questions, we obtain all the posts and images shared on 4chan’s /pol/ between July 1, 2016, and December 31, 2017, ultimately collecting 66M textual posts and 5.8M images. Then, we leverage the Perspective API and manual annotations to construct a dataset of 420 Antisemitic and Islamophobic textual phrases. We retrieve 246K posts that include any of our 420 hateful phrases. Finally, we use OpenAI’s CLIP to detect Antisemitic/Islamophobic images when provided as input the above-mentioned hateful phrases and all images shared on 4chan’s /pol/; we find 21K images that are likely Antisemitic/Islamophobic.

Contributions & Main Findings. Our work makes the following contributions/main findings:

- We investigate whether large pre-trained models based on Contrastive Learning can assist in detecting hateful imagery. We find that large pre-trained models like OpenAI’s CLIP (Radford et al. 2021) can detect Antisemitic/Islamophobic imagery with 0.81, 0.54, 0.53, 0.54, accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score, respectively. The CLIP model outperforms two baselines that detect hateful imagery in terms of accuracy (0.11 increase), precision (0.17 increase), and F1 score (0.08 increase) (**RQ1**).

- We find that on 4chan’s /pol/, Antisemitic/Islamophobic imagery appears in a similar number of posts compared to Antisemitic/Islamophobic textual hateful content. This finding highlights the need for the development and use of multimodal hate speech detectors for understanding and mitigating the problem (**RQ2**).

- We make available (upon request from researchers) a large dataset of Antisemitic/Islamophobic posts, phrases, and images shared on 4chan’s /pol/.

- The released dataset includes 892 Antisemitic/Islamophobic phrases and 420 Antisemitic/Islamophobic images that are annotated by the authors of this paper (we expect no false positives in our human-annotated set). Additionally, we release a set of 21K images that were detected by the CLIP model as being Antisemitic/Islamophobic. Note that the set of 21K images includes images that are false positives, since the CLIP model has a precision score of 0.54 for detecting Antisemitic/Islamophobic images. Therefore, researchers aiming to use the dataset and create classifiers for Antisemitic/Islamophobic images, should consider the existence of false positives in the dataset. Nevertheless, we argue that the released dataset can assist researchers in future work focusing on detecting and understanding the spread of hateful content on the Web across multiple modalities (i.e., text and images).

Ethical Considerations. We emphasize that we rely entirely on publicly available and anonymous data shared on 4chan’s /pol/, hence we do not and are unable to obtain consent from users that shared posts/images anonymously on 4chan. Also, all of our study’s manual annotations (i.e., given an image/phrase, annotate if the image/phrase is Antisemitic/Islamophobic) were exclusively performed by the authors of this work, hence minimizing exposure of crowd workers to potentially disturbing content. Given that we only analyze publicly available anonymous data from 4chan and that all manual annotations are undertaken by the authors of this paper, our work is not considered human’s subject research by our institution’s Ethical Board Committee. For our analysis, we follow standard ethical guidelines (Rivers and Lewis 2014) like reporting aggregate results and not attempting to deanonymize users.

We also discuss some ethical implications of releasing our dataset and possible misuse of the dataset. There is a possibility that malicious actors can make use of our dataset and train models based on Generative Adversarial Networks (Goodfellow et al. 2014) with the goal of automatically generating new Antisemitic/Islamophobic imagery. Subsequently, malicious actors can share this Antisemitic/Islamophobic imagery on social media platforms, hence affecting people. To minimize this risk, we will make the dataset available only upon request and only to researchers that can provide a description of their intended use.

Disclaimer. This manuscript contains Antisemitic and Islamophobic textual and graphic elements that are offensive and are likely to disturb the reader.

Background

This section provides background information on Contrastive Learning and OpenAI’s CLIP model, on Google’s Perspective API, and 4chan’s /pol/ that is our data source.

Contrastive Learning. To understand Contrastive Learning, it is essential to grasp its differences compared to traditional Machine/Deep Learning (ML/DL) classifiers. Traditional ML/DL classifiers take as an input a set of labeled data, each accompanied with a class, and aim to predict the class from the labeled data, a paradigm known as supervised learning (Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil 2006).

On the other hand, Contrastive Learning is a self-supervised technique, meaning that there is no need to have classes and models learn from unlabeled data. The main idea behind Contrastive Learning is that you train a model that relies on unlabeled data, and the model learns general features from the dataset by teaching it which input samples

\[1\]https://zenodo.org/record/6993868#.ZCAS4uxBwxw
are similar/different to each other (Hadsell, Chopra, and Le-Cun 2006). In other words, Contrastive Learning relies on a set of unlabeled data samples with additional information on which of these samples are similar to each other. Contrastive Learning is becoming increasingly popular in the research community with several applications on visual representations (Chen et al. 2020; Kim et al. 2020), textual representations (Giorgi et al. 2021; Wu et al. 2020; Gao, Yao, and Chen 2021), graph representations (You et al. 2020; Hassani and Khasahmadi 2020), and multimodal (i.e., text/images, images/videos, etc.) representations (Radford et al. 2021; Diba et al. 2021; Yuan et al. 2021; Zhang et al. 2022).

OpenAI’s CLIP. OpenAI recently released a model called Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP) (Radford et al. 2021) that leverages Contrastive Learning to generate representations across text and images. The model relies on a text encoder and an image encoder that maps text and images to a high-dimensional vector space. Subsequently, the model is trained to minimize the cosine distance between text/image pairs. To train CLIP, OpenAI created a huge dataset that consists of 400M pairs of text/images collected from various Web sources and covers an extensive set of visual concepts. By training CLIP with this vast dataset, the model learns general visual representations and how these representations are described using natural language, which results in the model obtaining general knowledge in various topics (e.g., identifying persons, objects, etc.).

In this work, we leverage the CLIP model to extract representations for our 4chan textual/image datasets and assess the similarity between the text and image representations. The main idea is that by providing the pre-trained CLIP model with a set of hateful text phrases, we will be able to identify a set of hateful images that are highly similar to the hateful text query. To demonstrate CLIP’s potential in discovering hateful imagery from hateful text-based queries, we show an example from our 4chan dataset in Fig. 1. On the left side, we show examples of images that are highly similar to a benign text query like “cute cat sleeping,” while on the right, we show examples of images that are similar to an Antisemitic and toxic phrase (“gas the jews”). For each image, we report the cosine similarity between the representation obtained from the text query and the representation of the image in our dataset. This example shows that the CLIP model can detect objects in images (i.e., cats) and provide relevant images to the queries (i.e., the cats are indeed sleeping according to the query). Furthermore, by looking at the images for the toxic query, we observe that CLIP can identify harmful images based on the query and can link historical persons to it (e.g., the textual input does not mention Adolf Hitler; however, the model knows that Hitler was responsible for the holocaust). Also, CLIP can detect images that share hateful ideology by adding text on memes (i.e., CLIP also performs Optical Character Recognition and can correlate that text with the text-based query). Overall, this example shows the predictive power of the CLIP model in detecting hateful imagery from hateful text phrases.

Google’s Perspective API. As a first step towards identifying hateful phrases, we use Google’s Perspective API (Perspective API 2018; Google 2021), which provides a set of Machine Learning models for identifying how rude/aggressive/hateful a comment is. We use the Perspective API for identifying hateful text mainly because it outperforms other publicly available hate speech classifiers like HateOnar (Davidson et al. 2017; Zannettou et al. 2020a). This work focuses on the SEVERE_TOXICITY model available from Perspective API because it is more robust to positive uses of curse words (Google 2021), and it is a production-ready model. The SEVERE_TOXICITY model returns a score between 0 and 1, which can be interpreted as the probability of the text being rude and toxic.

4chan’s /pol. 4chan is an anonymous image board usually exploited by troll users (Hine et al. 2017). On 4chan, users can create a thread by creating a post that contains an image, and other users can create replies with or without images, and they might add references to previous posts. 4chan is well-known for its anonymity and ephemeral nature. These are the main reasons its users are aggressive in their posts, as there is a lack of accountability (Bernstein et al. 2011). Our work focuses on 4chan, particularly the Politically Incorrect board (/pol/). /pol/ is the main board for discussing world events and politics and is known for the spread of conspiracy theories (Zannettou et al. 2017; Tuters, Jokubauskaitı̈, and Bach 2018) and hateful content (Hine et al. 2017; Zannettou et al. 2020b).

Dataset
We collect the data about posts on 4chan’s /pol/ using the publicly available dataset released by Papasavva et al. (2020); the dataset includes textual data about 134.5M posts shared on /pol/ between June 2016 and November 2019. Our work focuses on the period between July 1, 2016, and December 31, 2017 (to match the time period of the image dataset mentioned below), including 66,383,955 posts. We complement the above dataset with the image dataset collected by Zannettou et al. (2020b). The dataset includes 5,859,439 images shared alongside /pol/ posts between July 1, 2016, and December 31, 2017. Overall, our dataset comprises all textual and image activity on /pol/ between July 1, 2016, and December 31, 2017, including 66M posts and 5.8M images.

Methodology
This section describes our methodology for detecting hateful text phrases and hateful imagery, focusing on Antisemitic and Islamophobic content.

Identifying Antisemitic and Islamophobic Phrases
Here, our goal is to identify a set of phrases that are Antisemitic/Islamophobic. To do this, we follow a multi-step semi-automated methodology. First, we use the SEVERE_TOXICITY scores from the Perspective API to iden-
Figure 1: Example of images similar to text queries on 4chan (i.e., cosine similarity between the text CLIP-representation and the image CLIP-representation equals 0.3 or more). On the left side, we show a benign text query (“cute cat sleeping”), while on the right, we show the results for a toxic and Antisemitic query (“gas the jews”).

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To identify posts that are toxic/offensive without considering the target (e.g., if it is Antisemitic). Specifically, we consider all posts that have a score of 0.8 or more as toxic, following the methodology by Ribeiro et al. (2021). Out of the 66M posts in our dataset, we find 4.5M (6.7%) toxic posts.

Having extracted a set of toxic posts from 4chan’s /pol/, we then aim to identify the main targets of hate speech on /pol/ by extracting the top keywords. To do this, we preprocess the data to remove HTML tags, stop words, and URLs, and then we create a term frequency-inverse document frequency array (TF-IDF). Next, we manually inspect the top 200 words based on their TF-IDF values and identify the words related to Jews or Muslims. As a result, we find seven keywords: “jews,” “kike,” “jew,” “kikes,” “jewish,” “muslims,” and “muslim.” Then, based on these keywords, we filter the toxic posts obtained from the previous step, hence getting a set of 336K posts with a SEVERE_TOXICITY score of 0.8 and include at least one of the seven keywords. Note that we decide to focus on the top 200 terms because we want to focus on popular targeted groups in the set of toxic posts. Moreover, while terms such as “Islam” or “Islamic” might appear crucial to include in our list of keywords, we do not include them because their TF-IDF scores are far from the top ones; the term “islam” occupies the position 275th, “islamic” the 1014th position, “mohammed” the position 1553th, and “prophet” the position 2505th.

Since our goal is to create a set of Antisemitic/Islamophobic phrases, we need to break down the toxic 4chan posts into sentences and then identify the ones that are Antisemitic/Islamophobic. To do this, we apply a sentence tokenizer (NLTK 2021b) on the 336K posts, obtaining 976K sentences. To identify common phrases used on 4chan’s /pol/, we apply WordNet lemmatization (NLTK 2021a), excluding all sentences that appear less than five times. We obtain 4,582 unique common phrases; not all of these sentences are Antisemitic/Islamophobic. We note that some phrases are contained in longer phrases. However, we do not treat them as duplicates, given that the text encoder of the CLIP model encodes them differently.

Identifying whether a phrase is Antisemitic/Islamophobic is not a straightforward task and can not be easily automated. Therefore, we use manual annotation on the 4,582 common phrases to annotate the common phrases as Antisemitic/Islamophobic or irrelevant. Two authors of this paper independently annotated the 4.5K common phrases. On average, these phrases include 11.10 words (σ = 20.82). We discard long phrases (over seven words) during the annotation since our preliminary experiments showed that OpenAI’s CLIP returns a considerable amount of false positives.
when provided with long text queries. We also consider as irrelevant phrases that target multiple demographic groups (e.g., hateful towards Muslims and Jews like “fuck jews and muslims” or hateful towards African Americans and Jews like “fuck niggers and jews”). To ease the annotation process, we create a spreadsheet that includes a clear description of our labels, as well as all the information that an annotator needs in order to inspect and correctly annotate a phrase (e.g., number of terms per phrase). Phrases labelled as Antisemitic express hostility to, prejudice towards, or discrimination against Jews (Dictionaries 2021). Phrases labelled as Islamophobic express fear of, hatred of, or prejudice against the Islam or Muslims in general (Merriam-Webster 2021). The two annotators agreed on 91% of the annotations with a Cohen’s Kappa score of 0.69, which indicates a substantial agreement (Kvalseth 1989). After the independent annotations, the two annotators discussed the disagreements to come up with a final annotation on whether a phrase is Antisemitic/Islamophobic or irrelevant. After our annotation, we find 326 Antisemitic and 94 Islamophobic phrases. The list of the Antisemitic/Islamophobic phrases is available (González-Pizarro and Zannettou 2022).

Finally, we search for these Antisemitic/Islamophobic phrases on the entire dataset. We extract all posts that include any of the Antisemitic/Islamophobic phrases (Textual dataset), finding 247K posts. Note that we remove 864 (0.35%) posts that contain both Antisemitic and Islamophobic phrases. Overall, we find 209K (84.85%) Antisemitic posts and 37K (15.15%) Islamophobic posts (see Table 1).

### Identifying Antisemitic and Islamophobic Images

Our goal is to identify Antisemitic and Islamophobic imagery using the pre-trained CLIP model (Radford et al. 2021). To do this, we encode all images in our dataset using the image encoder on the CLIP model, hence obtaining a high-dimensional vector for each image. Also, we encode all the Antisemitic/Islamophobic phrases (extracted from the previous step), using the text encoder on the CLIP model, obtaining a vector for each phrase. Then, we calculate all the cosine similarities between the image and text vectors, which allows us to assess the similarity between the phrases and the images. The main idea is that by comparing a hateful phrase to all the images, images with a high cosine similarity score will also be hateful. To identify a suitable cosine similarity threshold where we treat a text and an image similarly, we perform a manual annotation process.

**Identifying a suitable threshold.** First, we extract a random sample of ten Antisemitic/Islamophobic phrases (eight Antisemitic and two Islamophobic to match the percentage of Antisemitic/Islamophobic phrases in our dataset). Then, we extract a random sample of 200 images for each phrase while ensuring that the images cover the whole spectrum of cosine similarity scores. Specifically, we extract 50 random images with cosine similarity scores for each of the following ranges: [0.0, 0.20], [0.2, 0.25], [0.25, 0.3], [0.3, 0.4]. To select these ranges, we plot the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of all cosine similarity scores obtained by comparing the ten randomly selected phrases and all the images in our dataset (we omit the figure due to space constraints). We find that 40% of the scores are below 0.2, and we expect these images to be entirely irrelevant to the phrase. To verify this, we select the [0.0, 0.20] range. Additionally, we select the [0.2, 0.25] because it has a considerable percentage of the scores (50%), and we expect that the images will not be very similar again. Finally, we select the [0.25, 0.3] and [0.3-0.4] ranges because we expect that the ideal threshold is somewhere in these two ranges, and devoting half of the selected images in these ranges will help us identify a suitable threshold.

Then, two authors of this paper independently annotated the 2,000 images to identify which are Antisemitic/Islamophobic or irrelevant. In a similar fashion to our annotations for toxic phrases, we labeled images as Antisemitic, those that clearly express hostility, prejudice towards, or discrimination against Jews (Dictionaries 2021). Images labeled as Islamophobic clearly express hatred of or prejudice against Muslims (Merriam-Webster 2021). The annotators agreed on 94% of the annotations with a Cohen’s Kappa score of 0.75, which indicates a substantial agreement. Again, the two annotators solved the disagreements by discussing the images and deciding a final annotation on whether the image is Antisemitic/Islamophobic or irrelevant.

As a result, our initial ground truth dataset of Antisemitic and Islamophobic imagery includes 291 (14.55%) hateful images: 239 (82.13%) of them are Antisemitic and 52 (17.87%) are Islamophobic. Having constructed an initial ground truth dataset of Antisemitic and Islamophobic imagery, we then find the best performing cosine similarity threshold. We vary the cosine similarity threshold, and we treat each image as Antisemitic/Islamophobic (depending on the phrase used for the comparison) if the cosine similarity between the phrase and the image is above the threshold. Then, we calculate the accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score, for each of the ten phrases. We report the average performance across all phrases and the standard deviation (as the area) in Fig. 2. We observe that the model performs best with a cosine similarity threshold of 0.3 as we achieve 0.84,

![Figure 2: Performance of the CLIP model in identifying Antisemitic/Islamophobic imagery for varying cosine similarity thresholds. The lines refer to the average metric for ten random phrases (2K images), while the area refers to the standard deviation across the ten phrases.](image-url)
Improving performance. Given the relatively small percentage (27.6%) of the images that are actually Antisemitic/Islamophobic, we set out to investigate how we can improve this performance. We hypothesize that we can improve the detection performance by considering the number of hateful phrases that have high cosine similarity with the detected images. Indeed, based on our annotated dataset, we find that images associated with a higher number of hateful phrases are more likely to be Antisemitic/Islamophobic (see Fig. 3). For instance, by considering only images associated (i.e., cosine similarity between the phrase and the image at least 0.3) with ten or more hateful phrases, 54.1% of them can be identified as Antisemitic/Islamophobic (see Fig. 3).

We also investigate other ways to improve performance by using different distance metrics or applying dimensionality reduction techniques. In particular, we experiment with Euclidean distance and Mahalanobis distance (Mahalanobis 1936), with both performing substantially worse than cosine distance. Also, we try reducing the dimensionality of the CLIP embeddings to 64, 128, and 256 dimensions using the Uniform Manifold Approximation and Projection approach (McInnes et al. 2018), without any performance gains. Note that we do not include the actual performance with different distance metrics and after dimensionality reduction due to space constraints. Based on these results, for our detection and analysis, we use the cosine distance metric on the original embeddings obtained from the CLIP model.

Baseline models. Here, we aim to compare the performance of the CLIP model (that considers an image as Antisemitic/Islamophobic if it has a cosine similarity of 0.3 or more for at least ten hateful phrases), using our final ground truth dataset, which combines the two above-mentioned annotation procedures (4K images). Our ground truth dataset includes 678 Antisemitic images, 214 Islamophobic images, and 3,158 non-hateful images. We compare our method of identifying Antisemitic/Islamophobic imagery with two hateful detection models (see Table 2).
First, **MMBT-GRID** (Kiela et al. 2019) is a multimodal architecture that consists of supervised multimodal transformers using Image-Grid features. We use the pre-trained weights released by Kiela et al. (2020) for hateful image detection. Second, we use **MOMENTA** (Pramanick et al. 2021), which analyzes the input’s local and global perspective for detecting harmful memes and their targets. Several experiments show that it outperforms several robust approaches. **MOMENTA** can identify images that have the potential to cause harm to individuals, organizations, and communities, which is also the focus of our work. This model is pre-trained with two datasets related to COVID-19 and US politics. While our 4chan dataset is different from those, we use MOMENTA as it is a generalizable model (Pramanick et al. 2021).

Table 2 shows the results for Antisemitic/Islamophobic imagery detection. We observe that the CLIP model outperforms all baselines in accuracy, precision, and F1 score, with an improvement of 0.11, 0.17, and 0.08, respectively (compared to the second-best performing model). Also, we find that the CLIP model has a lower recall score than the baselines. Nevertheless, in this work, we favor precision over recall, as we aim to reduce the number of false positives generated by our method.

### Results

This section presents our results from analyzing the Antisemitic/Islamophobic Textual and Visual datasets.

**Popular Phrases in the Textual Dataset**

We start our analysis by looking into the most popular phrases in our Antisemitic/Islamophobic textual datasets. Fig. 4 shows the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the number of posts per each Antisemitic/Islamophobic phrase. We observe that these hateful phrases tend to appear in a considerable amount of posts. For instance, 90.4% and 92.47% of the Antisemitic and Islamophobic phrases appear in at least ten posts. Furthermore, we identify that the percentage of Antisemitic phrases (41.8%) that appear in at least 100 posts is slightly lower than the percentage of Islamophobic phrases (49.46%). At the same time, we observe that a small percentage of phrases (11.54%) is shared in more than 1000 posts on the Antisemitic/Islamophobic textual datasets combined.

We also report the top 15 phrases, in terms of the number of posts, in our Antisemitic and Islamophobic Textual dataset. For each phrase, we report the number of posts that contain it.

**Popular Images in the Visual Dataset**

We also look into the popularity of images in our Antisemitic/Islamophobic datasets (in terms of the number of posts they shared). Fig. 5 shows the CDF of the number of posts for each Antisemitic/Islamophobic image. We observe
Antisemitic/Islamophobic Content Over Time

This section presents our temporal analysis that shows the distribution of Antisemitic/Islamophobic content over time. Fig. 6 shows the number of hateful posts per day in the Antisemitic Textual/Visual datasets. We run Kendall’s tau-b correlation to determine the relationship between the number of posts in the Antisemitic Textual and Visual dataset. We find a strong, positive, and statistically significant correlation ($\tau = .635, p < .001$), indicating that Antisemitic content is spread both using text and images in a similar fashion.

We also observe the highest volume of textual and image content between April 6, 2017, and April 9, 2017, with 4,132 (1.97% of the dataset) posts in the Textual dataset and 2,223 (1.55%) posts in the Visual dataset. This finding confirms previous findings from Zannettou et al. (2020b) that identified a spike in the spread of the Happy Merchant memes on April 7, 2017.

By inspecting the top 15 most frequent images during that period (we omit the figure due to space constraints), we identified that those images are related to the decision of Donald Trump to remove Steve Bannon from the National Security Council Post on April 5, 2017 (Costa and Phillip 2017) and a missile attack in Syria on April 7, 2017 (Rosenfeld 2017). According to newspapers (Baker, Haberman, and Thrush 2017; Haberman, Peters, and Baker 2017), Jared Kushner, the Jewish Trump’s son-in-law, seemed to be acting as a shadow secretary of state visiting and taking Middle East portfolios after that event. This political decision spread a volume of image content with the face of Jared Kushner. Also, there are some references to Donald Trump that indicate that he is controlled by Israel (e.g., most popular images are associated with the phrases “fuck trump and fuck jews”, and “fuck trumpstein and fuck jewish people”).

We also evaluate the distribution of Islamophobic posts over time. Fig. 7 shows the number of Islamophobic posts per day in our Textual/Visual datasets. We also find a statistically significant, strong, and positive correlation ($\tau = .393, p < .001$). In both datasets, we find a peak of activity on May 23, 2017, with 482 and 361 posts in the Textual and Visual datasets, respectively. By manually inspecting the top 15 images shared that day, we identify that the high volume of posts is related to the Manchester Bombing: on May 22, 2017, a British man detonated a suicide bomb in the foyer of the Manchester Arena as people were leaving a concert by pop singer Ariana Grande. On May 23, ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack. (Cobain et al. 2017)

This event raised hateful online narratives defining Muslims as terrorists (Downing, Gerwens, and Dron 2022). We find images that contain explicit references to this attack and images questioning whether Islam is a religion of peace. Overall, our findings highlight that both textual and visual hateful content is likely influenced by real-world events, with peaks of hateful activity observed during important real-world events that are related to the demographic groups we study.
Related Work

Hate Speech detection. Hate speech has recently received much research attention, with several works focusing on detecting hate speech in online social media. Initial research on hate speech analysis is typically oriented toward monolingual and single-classification tasks due to the complexity of the task. They used simple methods such as dictionary lookup (Guermazi, Hammami, and Hamadou 2007), bag of words (Guermazi, Hammami, and Hamadou 2007), or SVM classifiers (Malmasi and Zampieri 2017; Senarath and Purohit 2017). Recent efforts are proposing multilingual and multitask learning by using deep learning models (Wang et al. 2020; Ousidhoum et al. 2019; Glavaš, Karan, and Vulić 2020). While previous approaches to characterize and identify hate speech focus purely on the content posted in social media, some research efforts shift the focus towards detecting hateful users by exploiting other contextual data (Ribeiro et al. 2018; Ahmed, Vidgen, and Hale 2021; Chaudhry and Lease 2022; Waseem and Hovy 2016). Furthermore, other research efforts investigate to what extend the models trained to detect general abusive language generalize between different datasets labeled with different abusive language types (Karan and Šnjader 2018; Meyer and Gambäck 2019; Rizoiu et al. 2019; Salminen et al. 2020; Nejadgholi and Kiritchenko 2020). While less explored, some work focuses on multimodal settings formed by text and images (Das, Wahl, and Li 2020; Kiela et al. 2020). Gomez et al. (2020) build a large dataset for multimodal hate speech detection retrieved from Twitter using specific hateful seed keywords, finding that multimodal models do not outperform the unimodal text ones.

Antisemitism. Antisemitism has grown and proliferated rapidly online and has done so mostly unchecked; Zannettou et al. (2020b) call for new techniques to understand it better and combat it. Ozalp et al. (2020) train a scalable supervised machine learning classifier to identify Antisemitic content on Twitter. Chandra et al. (2021a) propose a multimodal system that uses text, images, and OCR to detect the presence of Antisemitic textual and visual content. They apply their model on Twitter and Gab, finding that multiple screenshots, multi-column text, and texts expressing irony, and sarcasm posed problems for the classifiers. To characterize Antisemitism, Enstad (2021) propose an analytical framework composed of three indicators: Antisemitic attitudes, incidents targeting Jews, and Jew’s exposure to Antisemitism. Their results show that attitudes vary by geographic and cultural region and among population sub-groups.

Islamophobia. Surveys show that Islamophobia is rising on Web communities (Hafez et al. 2019). Vidgen and Yasseri (2020) build an SVM classifier to distinguish between tweets non-Islamophobic, weak Islamophobic, and strong Islamophobic with a balanced accuracy of 83%. Cervi (2020) use clause-based semantic text analysis to identify the presence of Islamophobia in electoral discourses of political parties from Spain and Italy. Chandra et al. (2021b) apply topic modeling and temporal analysis over tweets from the #coronajihad to identify the existence of Islamophobic rhetoric around COVID-19 in India. Civila, Romero-Rodriguez, and Civila (2020) apply content analysis over 474 images and texts from Instagram posts under the hashtag #StopIslam. Alietti and Padovan (2013) conduct telephone surveys on 1.5K Italians on Antisemitic and Islamophobic attitudes, finding an overlap of ideology for both types of hate speech.

Discussion & Conclusion

In this work, we explored the problem of Antisemitism/Islamophobia on 4chan’s /pol/ using OpenAI’s CLIP model. We devised a methodology to identify Antisemitic/Islamo-
phobic textual phrases using Google’s Perspective API and manual annotations and then used the CLIP model to identify hateful imagery based on the phrases. We found that the CLIP can play a role in detecting hateful content; using our methods, the CLIP can detect hateful content with an accuracy of 81%. Also, we found that Antisemitic/Islamophobic imagery exists in a similar number of posts when compared to Antisemitic/Islamophobic speech on 4chan’s /pol/. Additionally, our work contributes to research efforts focusing on understanding and detecting hateful content by making a dataset of 420 Antisemitic/Islamophobic phrases, 246K textual posts, and 21K images available (upon request). Below, we discuss the implications of our findings for researchers focusing on detecting hate speech and for researchers working on large pre-trained models like OpenAI’s CLIP.

Prevalence of Antisemitic/Islamophobic Imagery. Our findings show that images play a significant role in the spread of hateful content. This is likely because 4chan is an imageboard and a fringe Web community; hence, a large volume of hateful content is disseminated via images. Nevertheless, the problem of hateful imagery exists on other mainstream platforms (e.g., Twitter), hence it is of paramount importance to develop better and more accurate systems for the detection of hateful content across multiple modalities. For instance, we argue that the spread of hateful content via videos is an unexplored problem, and there is a need to develop models across text, images, and videos.

Performance and Sensitivity of CLIP model. Our experiments indicate that large-pre-trained models like CLIP are pretty powerful and have general knowledge that can be used for various tasks. When considering the hateful content detection task, the CLIP model should be used with caution. This is because the CLIP model highly depends on how the input text query is written, influencing the number of false positives returned. When CLIP is used for moderation purposes, we argue that it is essential to have humans in the loop to ensure that the automated model works as expected. Additionally, we observed that the CLIP model performs worse when considering input text queries that comprise many words. This poor performance also occurs when images contain text that are long (from our annotations we observed that many false positives are screenshots of images with a lot of text). This indicates that we need more powerful text encoders that can capture the primary meaning of textual phrases, irrespectively of how long they are. Also, we emphasize that CLIP’s performance on detecting hateful content yields a substantial number of false positives, which is expected given the nature of the problem (i.e., hate speech is sometimes hard to identify and subjective). The same applies to all the baselines that we experimented with, in particular, to a larger extent since their precision score is poorer compared to CLIP. CLIP’s poor precision score (0.54) is also reflected in the dataset that we are releasing. Researchers that aim to use the dataset for other downstream tasks (e.g., implementing classifiers for hateful content) should have this limitation in mind and potentially make additional manual annotations to decrease the number of false positives in the dataset.

Biases on CLIP model. Large pre-trained models like OpenAI’s CLIP are trained on large-scale datasets from the Web, and these datasets might include biases, hence some of the bias is transferred to the trained model. From our experiments and manual annotations, we observed some instances of such biases; e.g., the CLIP model identifying an image showing a terrorist as similar to a text phrase talking about Muslims (i.e., the model is biased towards Muslims, thinking they are terrorists). When considering that these models can be used for moderation purposes (e.g., detecting and removing hateful content), such biases can result in false positives biased towards specific demographics. This can cause users to lose trust in the platform and its moderation systems and may cause them to stop using the platform. Overall, given the increasing use of such models in real-world applications, there is a pressing need to develop techniques and tools to diminish such biases from large pre-trained models.

Limitations. Our work has several limitations. First, we rely on Google’s Perspective API to initially identify hateful text, which has its limitations (e.g., might not understand specific slurs posted on 4chan) and biases when detecting hateful text. Second, our analysis focuses on a small number of short textual phrases (at most seven words), mainly because our preliminary results showed that CLIP does not perform well in detecting hateful imagery when considering long phrases. Therefore, our approach is likely to miss some Antisemitic/Islamophobic text and imagery because of the small number of phrases that we consider. Third, we rely entirely on a pre-trained CLIP model; this is not ideal since the CLIP model is trained on a public dataset obtained from multiple Web resources and is not specific to our platform of interest (i.e., 4chan). This might result in the model not recognizing some 4chan slurs or slang language. Fourth, our work and analysis focuses on a single data source (4chan’s /pol/), a limitation that does not allow us to investigate the performance of CLIP on other more mainstream communities like Twitter, Facebook, and Reddit (e.g., how CLIP performs on content shared on mainstream platforms). As part of our future work, we plan to investigate CLIP’s performance on other platform and we intend to fine-tune the CLIP model with datasets obtained from mainstream social networks such as Twitter and Reddit as well as fringe Web communities that are often associated with the alt-right (e.g., Gab). Finally, as discussed above, the released dataset includes a substantial number of false positives, which indicates that researchers should consider the existence of false positives in the dataset when using it.

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