Public Transportation in South Africa: Challenges and Opportunities

David P. Thomas¹*

¹ Department of Politics & International Relations, Mount Allison University, Sackville, Canada
* David P. Thomas, E-mail: dthomas@mta.ca

Abstract
This article engages with several important questions regarding the state of public transportation in South Africa. It provides a brief description of the historical legacy of apartheid in relation to public transport, and the challenges this posed to the government after 1994. This is followed by a summary of the changing policy frameworks in the post-apartheid era, and an examination of the current policies, trajectories, and major transportation projects within the country. For example, this includes a more detailed discussion of major infrastructure projects such as the Gautrain and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) in the form of Rea Vaya. Overall, the article argues that the South African government is struggling to build an inclusive public transportation infrastructure that addresses issues of poverty, access, and inequality. Finally, the article will conclude with a set of recommendations to build a more inclusive transportation policy framework for South Africa.

Keywords
public transportation, South Africa, poverty, inequality, mobility

1. Introduction
The provision of safe, accessible, and affordable public transport infrastructure is a fundamental prerequisite for the socio-economic advancement of the South African population. It also holds the potential to provide for decent wages and working conditions for the sector’s employees, as well as for those sectors that depend upon it for demand for their output. The system of apartheid left a legacy of social exclusion, and a highly distorted separation of people from both their places of work and the majority of social services required to live a productive life. Thus, the post-apartheid challenge has been to restructure these geographies of exclusion and inequality, and provide a more effective system of public transportation. However, the South African government has largely failed to address this crucial aspect of public policy planning in a sustainable manner. As scholar Karen (2011) asserts, “In general, there has been a very poor post-apartheid government response to the escalating mobility needs of low income travellers, who constitute the vast majority of South Africa’s urban population” (p. 1320). While some recent projects do show promise in terms of addressing the transportation needs of the majority of South Africans, the overall performance of the South African state conforms to the
views of Lucas stated above.
This article provides readers with an overview of the South African government’s approach to providing public transportation since the end of apartheid. It will begin by briefly describing the historical legacy of apartheid in relation to public transport, and the challenges this posed to the government after 1994. This will be followed by a summary of the changing policy frameworks in the post-apartheid era, and an examination of the current policies, trajectories, and major transportation projects within the country. For example, this will include a more detailed discussion of major infrastructure projects such as the Gautrain and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) in the form of Rea Vaya. Finally, the article will conclude with a set of recommendations to build a more inclusive transportation policy framework for South Africa.

2. Historical Context
Passenger transport under apartheid, and white minority rule before apartheid, was a crucial site of contestation and popular protest. As noted by scholar Khosa (1995), “The South African passenger transportation system was by and large designed for daily transportation of labor to and from the workplace” (p. 167). This often involved transporting Africans from the fringes of urban centres into the cities, based on the racially segregated nature of minority rule. Furthermore, “In time, transport became a site of popular struggles and a dramatic expression of tensions and disputes over control, management and affordability of racially divided spaces” (p. 168). Particular struggles have been documented by scholars and activists during the years of minority rule (Pirie, 1986; Stadler, 1981; Swilling, 1984; Lodge, 1983; Dauskardt, 1989), and constitute a rich historiography surrounding the important questions of public transport in South Africa. Most importantly for this study is to understand the context of the urban geography of apartheid, and the challenges presented to the post-apartheid government in 1994. As Donaldson (2006) explains,

“One of the greatest spatial challenges to overcome in the post-apartheid city is the inequality and spatial inefficiency caused by apartheid planning. Not surprisingly a World Bank report of the early 1990s considered South Africa’s cities among the most inefficient in the world. Cities were (are) characterized by low-density sprawl, fragmentation and separation, all of these contributing to the dysfunctional structure where privilege was racially determined. Over a period of four decades, black South Africans were systematically marginalized, among others, in terms of accommodation, leisure, employment, and transport. Structural deficiencies in the former apartheid city, resulting from segregation and low-density sprawl, created long-distance work-travel patterns” (p. 344).

The result is an urban geography of a dual nature: an elite class living in “developed” areas of the city using cars, while in the poorest areas people use a combination of travelling by foot, bicycle, minibus, bus, taxi, commuter train, and sometimes cars or trucks (de Saint-Laurent, 1998). Conditions for those in rural areas are equally bleak. Barrett (2001) describes the problems for those in rural areas as follows:
“They often not only have no access to regular bus or taxi services, but even the road system may not reach the area. The shocking condition of many rural roads also contributes to reduced access to transport” (p. 1). The nature of this exclusion in both urban and rural areas can be described as mobility-related exclusion, defined by Kenyon et al. (2002) as “the process by which people are prevented from participating in the economic, political and social life of the community because of reduced accessibility to opportunities, services and social networks, due in whole or in part to insufficient mobility in a society and environment built around the assumption of high mobility” (pp. 210-211). Mobility-related exclusion presents a debilitating obstacle for a society aiming to transform inequalities based on race, class, and gender. Yet it is precisely this form of exclusion that was designed to be eliminated (or at least substantially addressed) in the post-apartheid era.

Transportation is an area of public policy that always intersects with other aspects of poverty, but these are particularly deep in the post-apartheid context, and deserving of immediate attention during the period of transition in the early 1990s. As Boraine (2006) notes, “Changing the racial pattern of inequality hinges on systematic responses to the material forces, demographic, economic, environmental and institutional, that shaped the inherited apartheid city form” (p. 259). Thus, while this article focuses exclusively on the field of transportation, many other factors are relevant to the ability to be mobile, ranging across income level, employment status, gender, ability, and social networks. The transition to a new ethos regarding transportation in South Africa had already began by 1992 with the formation of the National Transport Policy Forum (NTPF). The NTPF brought together members from the ANC, the Department of Transport (DOT), and a wide range of civil society actors (Khosa, 1995, p. 183). This marked the first time that public discussion occurred amongst a broad and credible representation of actors in the country. In addition, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994 declared that (ANC, 1994):

“The needs of women, children, and disabled people for affordable and safe transport are important. Adequate public transport at off-peak hours, and security measures on late-night and isolated routes, must be provided. Additional subsidies for scholars, pensioners, and others with limited incomes will be considered” (p. 38).

Transportation was viewed as a basic human right, along with other important social services such as health and education. However, as noted by Khosa (2001), “The liberation movement in general and the ANC in particular, had not prepared a single comprehensive document on transport policy when the first general elections took place in 1994” (p. 4). Thus, although the liberation movement had flagged transportation as a serious issue for transformation, it was not systematically developed as a rigorous policy area until after 1994.

A shift away from the earlier language defining transportation as a basic human right and social service began in 1996, with the publication of the White Paper on Transport Policy. This roughly coincided with the ANC’s macroeconomic shift away from the RDP toward GEAR (Growth, Employment and
Reconstruction). Khosa (2001) argues that “The central tenet of the White Paper on Transport Policy is that all freight and passenger transport operations should be run on a commercial basis rather than as a social service” (p. 4). Walters (2012) also documents the shift to a more market-based approach to the provision of transport services at this time: “In future, all operators would be required to tender for their subsidised services. This would ‘open up the market’ to new previously disadvantaged operators… as well as to potential international operators” (p. 2). Regarding the particular impact of this orientation on bus services, Barrett (2001) observed that “The government’s implementation of the competitive tendering system… is leading to cuts in jobs and declining conditions of employment for bus workers” (p. 1). Transportation was, therefore, not immune from the broader neoliberal logic embraced at the time by the ruling party. Although elements of a populist transportation policy framework still existed, such as mentioning basic needs in line with the RDP, a significant thrust of the White Paper focused on promoting competition in the transport sector and reducing government involvement in the operation and construction of infrastructure and services (Department of Transport, 1996).

In 1998, the government formulated a new document entitled Moving South Africa Forward (MSA): Toward a Transport Strategy for 2020. The purpose was to provide a more detailed strategy for implementing ideas in the White Paper, and to conceptualize concrete policy for the next twenty years. The overall thrust of the document is described by Khosa (2001) as follows:

“The vision captured in the MSA is bold, but what differentiates it from the RDP and the White Paper on National Transportation Policy is its un-shameful use of the neo-liberal language and its commitment to user charges. Scattered throughout the MSA report is the uncritical replacement of words, such as, ‘passengers’ with ‘customers’ and ‘clients’, in clear market orientated approach to public passenger transport in South Africa” (p. 9).

Two years later, in 2000, the central government passed the National Land Transport Transition Act. This sought to define clearly the responsibilities of each level of government in the delivery of public transport, establish the principle that transportation authorities should exist, and clarify arrangements for competitive tendering (Walters, 2000, p. 3). The Act also articulated a potential vision for creating safe, affordable, and effective land transportation across the country.

The most compelling evidence regarding the failure of the post-apartheid state to transform public transit infrastructure during the first ten years of democracy is contained in the Department of Transport’s National Household Travel Survey, conducted in 2003 and published in 2004. This survey is the first, and only, comprehensive national survey of South Africans dealing with the subject of public transportation. It provides a wealth of information regarding the population’s lived experiences of the transport system, and constructs a dismal narrative regarding outstanding transport challenges. The survey indicates that the vast majority of South Africans were dissatisfied with the state of public transit, as transportation was either not available, too expensive, too far away from home, unsafe, or did not travel where needed (Department of Transport, 2004). According to a summary of the findings by

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Barrett (2004), “24% said transport is not available or is too far, 19% said the safety of public transport is an issue (including driver behaviour), and 19% said it is too expensive” (p. 2). On the specific issue of affordability, roughly one third (32%) of households spent more than 10% of household income on public transport, which was the maximum target set by the White Paper in 1996, and 19% spent more than 20% of household income on public transport (Dept. of Transport, 2004). Ten years after the collapse of apartheid, pressing needs for safe, affordable, and accessible public transportation remained.

3. Current Projects and Policies

The transportation industry in South Africa employs roughly 420,000 people, and trade union density is around 40% (Satawu, 2006). If minibus workers are excluded, the trade union density jumps to roughly 55% (Satawu, 2006). The national government has also prioritized transportation spending in recent years, as it views transportation as “the heartbeat of South Africa’s economic growth and social development” (Department of Transport, 2013). For example, national expenditure on public transport grew between 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 “from R4.7 billion to R8.2 billion, at an average annual rate of 20.7 per cent” (National Treasury, 2011, p. 21). Thus, the transport sector has the potential to act as a catalyst for economic development and job provision, and is an important sector of the South African economy.

Lucas (2011), in her studies of social exclusion in South Africa due to transport difficulties, summarizes the four key problems with transportation in the literature: “(i) low access to private vehicles and public transit services, (ii) affordability issues linked with high levels of reliance on the use of minibus taxis, (iii) the legacy of apartheid planning and new post-apartheid housing development patterns, and (iv) over-reliance on walking and exposure to risk” (p. 1322). This provides an indication of the continuing struggles faced by the majority of South Africans in relation to transportation infrastructure. Despite government initiatives such as the taxi recapitalisation programme (2006), the publication of two additional strategy documents in 2007, and the replacement of the 2000 National Land Transport Transition Act with the 2009 National Land Transport Act, significant challenges remain for South Africans in accessing reliable and affordable public transportation. To the list above could be added the question of multiple layers of government participating in the planning of transportation infrastructure, and the difficulties in coordination that arise. For example, the national government provides overall guidance through the Acts mentioned above, but municipalities are often responsible for the actual planning and delivery of services. In some cases—such as the Gautrain project analyzed below—provincial governments have also taken the lead, and arguably without properly including/consulting municipalities.

This section of the article will document two of the most recent initiatives in the field of transportation development. The first—The Gautrain—is included due to the unprecedented level of expenditure on
this project, and also to illustrate the elite-based nature of this development. The second—the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)—provides a slightly more optimistic perspective on the state of public transportation infrastructure development. Both of these cases also conform to an overall trend in funding for transportation mega-projects. Other examples of these projects include R29bn spent on the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project, R7bn for the King Shaka International Airport (north of Durban), and R7.7bn for the Taxi Recapitalisation Programme (City of Cape Town, 2012). Several of these projects are aimed at building “world class” transportation infrastructure so that South Africa can continue to attract mega-events to the country. Hosting events such as the 2010 World Cup of Soccer, and thus attracting thousands of visitors to the country, is viewed by the South African state as a means through which economic growth and “development” can occur. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the merits of this development strategy in further detail, several scholars have questioned the potential for inclusive economic benefits from such enterprises (Cottle, 2011; Black & Van der Westhuizen, 2004; Cornelissen & Swart, 2006; and Harris, 2011). It is sufficient to note that transportation mega-projects are often an important element in the overall strategy of hosting/attracting these mega-events to South Africa.

3.1 The Gautrain

Connecting Tshwane/Pretoria, Johannesburg, and the OR Tambo Airport, the Gautrain Rapid Rail Project cost roughly R30 billion ($4.1 billion USD) and travels at a maximum speed of 160 to 180 kilometres per hour (Gautrain Management, 2011a). It services ten stations over a total distance of 80 kilometres, and is aimed primarily at current car users who commute between Johannesburg and Tshwane/Pretoria. In addition, the train also targets airport passengers. The Gautrain Management Agency estimates a projected ridership of 120,000 passengers per day, and the fares “will be lower than the perceived cost of using a car” (Gautrain Management, 2011b). The Gauteng government conveys multiple rationales for the project: to ease severe traffic congestion between Tshwane/Pretoria and Johannesburg; to stimulate economic growth by directly creating jobs related to the project; but also to stimulate broader growth through tourism promotion; and to develop a more environmentally friendly method of transport for the region (Gautrain Management, 2011c). In addition, the first section of the train was completed in time to facilitate travel during the World Cup of Soccer in July 2010. This initial track was operational in June 2010, while most of the remaining sections were opened on 2 August 2011.

Critical analysis of the Gautrain reveals several potential problems with the project. These critiques focus on the following interconnected issues: it may deepen mobility-related exclusion in the province; it prioritizes wealthy, as opposed to poor, citizens in the allocation of public funds; costs for the project have escalated considerably from initial estimates; the alleged environmental benefits do not exist; and other options for a more effective and integrated transportation plan were not sufficiently considered. First, the project was explicitly designed to promote public transportation for an elite class of citizens.
living in geographically distinct areas from the poor majority. The national government’s Portfolio Committee on Transport (2005) echoed these concerns in 2005 when it recommended that the project should not go ahead: “Projected ticket-prices, the up-market location of the majority of stations… these and other features have all been deliberately chosen to provide an affluent sector of the Gauteng community with a first-world public transport mode” (p. 4). This may deepen mobility-related exclusion, as it essentially creates a two-tier system of transport based on geographically distinct areas of the province. It also allocates unprecedented, and scare, resources for the Gautrain despite the dire and pressing need for more comprehensive, safe, and efficient transportation for the majority of South Africans—who are living below the poverty line.

The initial cost estimate to build the Gautrain was R7 billion, and this was the figure used to conduct feasibility studies and cost-benefit analyses for the project. However, the total costs have now escalated to over R30 billion, and continue to rise (Gautrain Cost, 2011). It is instructive to compare this figure to other investments in public transit, and note whom these investments will benefit. Keeping in mind that this R30 billion rand project will target roughly 60,000-70,000 individual passengers per day, the 2005 budget “makes allocations for existing and ailing passenger rail infrastructure of R100 million for 2006-2007 and R250 million for 2007-2008 [which are used daily by some 7 million South Africans]” (Portfolio Committee, 2005, p. 1). The Portfolio Committee on Transport (2005) argues that “the very significant size of the estimate cost to the public sector of the Gautrain project and the relatively modest number of passengers it will carry do need to be weighed seriously against the back-drop of the bulk of our public transport systems which are in a dire state, with extremely high levels of public dissatisfaction” (p. 2).

Another major concern with the Gautrain is that other options, in particular less expensive ones, were not adequately investigated nor publicly discussed prior to the decision to begin the project. Cosatu (2006) lamented the lack of engagement with other priorities and systems of transportation, arguing that “we must debate the alternatives”. Van der Westhuizen (2007) asserts, “Alternative transportation modes also do not seem to have been properly investigated, nor has it been shown why Gautrain expenditures are considerably more than other alternatives” (p. 340). He mentions several potential alternatives to the Gautrain, such as a dedicated bus lane, electric trolleybuses, or a light rail system, all of which would be far less expensive. However, there is little evidence that the provincial government debated any of these alternatives in a rigorous manner. Indeed, a systematic cost-benefit analysis of the Gautrain reveals fundamental problems with the proposed benefits of the project in light of the massive expenditure of public funds (Van der Westhuizen, 2007, pp. 335-342). Urban transport expert Romano Del Mistro, of the University of Cape Town, asserts, “In my view, alternative modes of transport other than the Gautrain have not been debated sufficiently” (as quoted in Stephen, 2005). Del Mistro argues that passengers travelling via bus on dedicated bus lanes could potentially travel between Tshwane and Johannesburg in 69 minutes, compared to 60 minutes on the Gautrain, but the cost would be far less.
Overall, the province proceeded with the project without transparently and rigorously debating alternatives to rapid rail in the region.

If so many problems with the Gautrain were known to exist before the provincial government began the project, how do we explain the reasons for its approval and continuation? Van der Westhuizen offers a convincing answer to this question by claiming that the rationale is found within an understanding of political symbolism. Mega projects such as the Gautrain are often associated with the government in power at the time, and the quest to leave a legacy may be associated with the Gautrain. Van der Westhuizen (2007) argues that,

“Political symbolism appears to override utilitarian or rational considerations and within that context, the Gautrain as a mega-project needs to be understood as signaling South Africa’s pre-eminence as the modern African state. In other words, the Gautrain symbolically buttresses the country’s quest to punch above its weight in international affairs” (p. 334).

Placed within the context of other mega projects throughout the Global South, Van der Westhuizen suggests that the quest to appear modern plays an important role in the construction of such projects. Moreover, “notions of speed, connectivity and above all, modernity perform a highly strategic discursive role, not only in terms of urban boosterism but also as a demonstration of South Africa’s being a part of the African continent” (Van der Westhuizen, 2007, p. 337). Indeed, the Gautrain is often referred to as the “Shilowa Express” in South Africa, which alludes to the manner in which people view the project as a personal undertaking of the former Premier. As Jane Barrett (2011) elucidates, “Shilowa was clearing enamoured with the idea of having a smart train… and wanted a legacy project with his name on it”. This helps explain why a project with so many fundamental flaws would proceed without substantial debate or consideration of less expensive alternatives, or other spending priorities for the province in the area of public transportation.

There are also environmental implications of the Gautrain for consideration, especially in light of the Gautrain Management Agency’s claim that “it will have distinct environmental advantages over other forms of transport” (Gautrain Management, 2011c). The environmental impact of thousands of drivers switching to rail transportation raises the possibility of decreased carbon emissions from vehicles, and less air pollution in the province. Significantly, the Gautrain Management Agency (2011e) asserts:

“Public transport produces 95% less carbon monoxide, 90% less in volatile organic compounds and about half as much carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxide per passenger-km as private vehicles. In line with this, Gautrain will considerably reduce air pollution generated by transport as it is anticipated that Gautrain will reduce CO2 emissions by about 70 tons”.

However, this assessment fails to consider the substantial increase in emissions generated by power stations that provide electricity to operate the Gautrain. This is particularly relevant in South Africa, as most electricity is generated by coal power plants. The conclusions drawn from the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) regarding the emissions debate reveal a startling reality. After careful
analysis of the data on emissions, the EIA concludes:

“No net gain or decrease in overall emissions can be observed after comparisons are made between the overall increase (power station) and decrease (from a regional decrease in vehicle numbers) in calculated emissions. Viewed purely on an air emissions basis this suggests that the impact from the Gautrain development will be neutral” (Bohlweki, 2002, p. 40).

So, decreased emissions along the busy corridor between Johannesburg and Tshwane/Pretoria will be offset by rising emissions from coal power plants in other provinces, such as neighbouring Mpumalanga. Although air quality will improve in Gauteng, this pollution will simply be transferred to other areas of the country.

Finally, the Gautrain illustrates a more general problem regarding the existence of several layers of government implementing transport systems in the region, with little coordination between them. This problem is evident in the case of the Gautrain, as at least two of the major municipal governments in the region were not sufficiently consulted during the planning of the project. For example, the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM) commented, “…the Department’s Transport Division was not proactively involved, or invited, in the feasibility and planning studies undertaken for the project by Gautrain” (as quoted in Portfolio Committee, 2005). The Gautrain was managed by the Province as a stand-alone project, despite the fact that municipal governments are typically responsible for planning public transport in the Province. An article in the South African Communist Party’s (SACP’s) on-line journal (2006) captures this problem well:

“Municipalities are required to draw up integrated transport plans and drive the implementation of such plans... However with the Gautrain we have a project that has been driven provincially. The province has by-passed the spirit of the law and of national policy by setting up the Gautrain as a separate public company. The project has ridden roughshod over the integrated transport planning of the three major metros in Gauteng, all of whom have had to retroactively accommodate it, prejudicing their own plans and potentially compromising funds available for more pressing priorities”.

Thus, the provincial government’s process of planning and implementing the Gautrain project has resulted in a rapid rail system being planted in the region with very little consideration for how it might integrate with municipal transportation priorities and plans.

3.2 Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)

One of the more promising projects currently being implemented in South Africa is that of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT). BRT was initially proposed in the Department of Transport’s Public Transport Strategy Action Plans of 2007, and constitutes a system of buses with dedicated lanes/tracks, and stations for individuals to access the service. It is a project that builds from success in Brazil with the BRT system, and could be viewed as an example of South-South cooperation in the field of public transport. The Rea Vaya BRT system in Johannesburg is currently in operation, along with MyCiTi in Cape Town. Planning is also underway for further BRT systems in other cities, such as Tshwane. In Gauteng
province, contrary to the Gautrain, the Rea Vaya connects residents of Soweto to the core of Johannesburg, and does a better job of connecting people from historically segregated areas to their places of work. This is a positive step in terms of battling mobility-related exclusion for citizens who can access the stations. In addition, it is much less expensive to build than rapid rail transit. Roughly R3bn rand has been spent on the first two phases of the Rea Vaya (City of Cape Town, 2012), compared to over R30bn on the Gautrain.

One of the central challenges for the BRT system has been integrating and incorporating the minibus taxis. The Rea Vaya, for example, runs parallel to many of the previous taxi routes. As noted by Walters (2012):

“Taxi owners and their drivers were (amongst other) concerned about their future earnings, the loss of revenue as their taxi vehicles had to be removed from the route, the potential job losses, the complexities associated with a ‘formal’ business, etc. This led to protracted negotiations and many acrimonious meetings” (p. 8).

This transition for the taxi industry needs to be negotiated over a long period of time, and poses a substantial challenge for municipalities to proceed with the BRT implementation. Often each new section requires another set of negotiations with the taxi industry (Walters, 2012, p. 9), and may result in fewer overall jobs in the transport sector.

A second concern relates to a larger problem with public transport in the region—lack of overall integration and holistic thinking. In the case of the Gautrain and the Rea Vaya, the BRT system had to be implemented after the Gautrain was already a fait accompli. Planners did not engage in deliberation and debate in advance of constructing the Gautrain, but rather built it as a stand-alone project without considering how it might integrate with other modes of transportation, such as a BRT system. Mostert (2011, p. 2) summarizes the problem as follows: “Formal public transport is fragmented… There is no integrated ticketing, scheduling, marketing or branding. Different operators offer different services under different sets of rules. Users do not perceive formal public transport to be a coherent product” (p. 2). After hearing sustained criticism on this front, the province of Gauteng recently announced the creation of a specialist steering committee that will develop a long-term integrated transport plan for the province. The team was tasked with developing a five-year plan by January 2012, a 25-year plan by March 2013, and is composed of transport planning experts, academics, government officials, and the Policy Research Officer of the South African Transport and Allied Workers’ Union (Department of Roads, 2011). Although the formation of this committee is a welcome and necessary development for the future of transportation in Gauteng, the fact that this is occurring after the construction of both the Gautrain and the Rea Vaya remains troubling. Overall, the lack of integration and strategic thinking around multiple, and overlapping, forms of public transport is a serious problem in the country.
4. Future Possibilities and Potential

Several pressing issues will need to be addressed in order for a more inclusive, accessible, and effective system of public transport to exist in South Africa. First, scholars have drawn attention to the need to include gender in our analysis of current and future transportation challenges. In particular, Potgeiter (2006) has indicated a “need for national qualitative and quantitative study that provides insight and baseline data on how issues of transport are gendered and consequences on the quality of lives of women. National roundtable discussion should be facilitated which could develop a national action plan and research agenda related to women and the transport sector”. Specific studies regarding the gendered aspects of transportation infrastructure suggest that not enough care is being taken to evaluate the different roles of women in the (re)production of the household, and what impact this has on their transportation needs (Mahapa & Mashiri, 2001). Furthermore, this would require analyzing the needs of women in a variety of contexts, including both urban and rural. Any future planning and policy-making process will need to incorporate a rigorous gender analysis.

A second key recommendation is for transportation planning to become a more deliberate process, which results in a more deeply integrated and complementary set of transport facilities and services. Transport scholars refer to this method of planning as one in which “transport governance” exists. For example, Chakwizira and Mashiri (2009) assert that “without a transport governance policy… such interventions are unlikely to enjoy much traction in terms of finding solutions to the region’s transport problems” (p. 8). As noted above, transportation infrastructure has been constructed in a relatively haphazard manner, without careful consideration for the multiple levels of governance. One of the key aspects of developing more comprehensive and inclusive transport governance would be the establishment of local transport authorities. These would be capable of coordinating transportation development at the local level, and would include a broad and representative collection of individuals. The 2000 National Land Transport Transition Act provided for the creation of these bodies at the municipal level, and the 1996 White Paper identified fragmentation between different levels of government as a serious problem across the country. However, transport authorities have still not been created to tackle these important issues of integration and local ownership. In light of the slow movement to create transport authorities, Mostert (2011) argues that “a special purpose agency should be created immediately to oversee the coordination of all formal public transport… This agency should be staffed by people who have a holistic view of public transport and who have a record of commitment to improving public transport” (p. 26). At the national level, this process could be similar to the one undertaken in the early 1990s with the National Transport Policy Forum (NTPF), which would include voices from government, organized labour, and other civil society organizations. At the provincial level it might resemble the recently constituted body in Gauteng mentioned in the previous section of this article. This body includes government actors, organized labour, transport experts, and relevant private sector partners. At the municipal level it would involve the creation of transport
authorities composed of local politicians and citizens. These authorities are crucial in terms of integrating local transport with other important infrastructure and services in the region, including health, education, and economic development. Transport authorities could then be consulted by provincial and national governments while planning important transport projects. Overall, this focus on integration and broader participation could facilitate a more inclusive, democratic, and equitable public transport system. It has the potential to allow each level of government to prioritize transport needs more effectively, and also communicate these with other levels of government.

The previous two recommendations illustrate problems with the process of planning and identifying transport priorities. In addition, there is an abundance of specific problems with transportation infrastructure that work to reproduce and sustain mobility-related exclusion in South Africa. For example, Lucas (2011) provides a set of five recommendations, each of which addresses a direct aspect of social exclusion for the poor in South Africa. They are as follows: “(i) to reduce or subsidise the cost of travelling by minibus taxi; (ii) improve public transport (particularly bus) provision; (iii) regulate the operation and fares structures of minibus taxis; (iv) improved policing at stations and other transport waiting areas; and (v) provide affordable housing in closer proximity to employment and other key activities” (p. 1333).

This list, while not exhaustive, provides an indication of the many pressing and specific needs for the majority of South Africans. It also demonstrates the manner in which other policy areas—i.e., housing—are connected to transportation and mobility. Most importantly, it indicates that further government regulation and support is needed to ensure that South Africans can safely and accessibly move about the country. This has not been possible under the neoliberal, and in some cases elite-driven, approach of the post-apartheid era, which has emphasized cost-recovery, user fees, competition, and “market forces” as a solution to several transport challenges. A new dispensation is needed that rejects unprecedented spending on elitist projects such as the Gautrain, and moves toward responding to the urgent transport needs of the majority of South Africans. Moreover, this can only be accomplished by building a more inclusive and democratic process for determining public transport needs and policy.

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