NEURAL CRYPTOGRAPHY

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ABSTRACT

Two neural networks which are trained on their mutual output bits show a novel phenomenon: The networks synchronize to a state with identical time dependent weights. It is shown how synchronization by mutual learning can be applied to cryptography: secret key exchange over a public channel.

1. INTRODUCTION

Neural networks learn from examples. This concept has extensively been investigated using models and methods of statistical mechanics [1, 2]. A "teacher" network is presenting input/output pairs of high dimensional data, and a "student" network is being trained on these data. Training means, that synaptic weights adopt by simple rules to the input/output pairs. After the training phase the student is able to generalize: It can classify – with some probability – an input pattern which did not belong to the training set.

Training is a dynamic process. The examples are generated step by step by a static network - the teacher. The student tries to move towards the teacher. It turns out, that for a large class of models the dynamics of learning and generalization can be described by ordinary differential equations for a few order parameters [3].

Recently this scenario has been extended to the case of a dynamic teacher: Both of the communicating networks receive an identical input vector, generate an output bit and are trained on the corresponding bit of their partner. The analytic solution shows a novel phenomenon: synchronization by mutual learning [4]. The synaptic weights of the two networks relax to a common identical weight vector which still depends on time. The biological consequences of this phenomenon are not explored, yet, but an interesting application in cryptography has been found: secure generation of a secret key over a public channel [6].

Before 1976, all cryptographic methods had to rely on secret keys for encryption which were transmitted between A and B over a secret channel not accessible to any opponent. Such a common secret key can be used, for example, as a seed for a random bit generator by which the bit sequence of the message is added (modulo 2).

In 1976, however, Diffie and Hellmann found that a common secret key could be created over a public channel accessible to any opponent. This method is based on number theory: Given limited computer power, it is not possible to calculate the discrete logarithm of sufficiently large numbers [7].

Here we show how neural networks can produce a common secret key by exchanging bits over a public channel and by learning from each other [4, 5, 6].

2. TRAINING THE TREE PARITY MACHINE

Both of the communicating partners A and B are using a multilayer network with K hidden units: A tree parity machine, as shown in figure 1. In this paper we use K=3, only. Each network consists of three units (perceptrons, i=1,2,3):

\[ \sigma_A^i = \text{sign}(w_A^i \cdot x_i); \quad \sigma_B^i = \text{sign}(w_B^i \cdot x_i) \]

The \( w \) are N-dimensional vectors of synaptic weights and the \( x \) are N-dimensional input vectors. Here we discuss discrete weights and inputs, only:

\[ w_{i,j}^{A/B} \in \{-L, -L+1, ..., L-1, L\}; \quad x_{i,j} \in \{-1, +1\} \]

The three hidden bits \( \sigma \) are combined to an output bit \( \tau \) of each network:

\[ \tau^A = \sigma_1^A \sigma_2^A \sigma_3^A; \quad \tau^B = \sigma_1^B \sigma_2^B \sigma_3^B \]

The two output bits \( \tau \) are used for the mutual training process. At each training step the two machines A and B receive identical input vectors \( x_1, x_2, x_3 \). The training algorithm is the following: Only if the two output bits are identical, \( \tau^A = \tau^B \), the weights can be changed. In this case only the weights for the identical bits are changed:

\[ w_{i,j}^{A/B} = \begin{cases} w_{i,j}^{A/B} + 1 & \text{if } \sigma_i^A = \sigma_i^B \\ w_{i,j}^{A/B} - 1 & \text{if } \sigma_i^A \neq \sigma_i^B \end{cases} \]
for each training step, the synaptic weights are always moved. Since, according to the learning rule, after synchronization at least one pair of weight vectors is changed, this finally results in identical weight vectors. As we will see in the following section, this finally results in identical weight vectors.

Note that the two multilayer networks may be considered as a system of random walks with reflecting boundaries. Each of the 6N components $w_{i,j}$ of the weight vectors moves on $2L+1$ lattice points. $w_{i,j}$ makes a step $x_{i,j} = \pm 1$ if the corresponding global signals $\tau$ and $\sigma$ allow this. If it hits a boundary it is reflected. Since any two weights $w^A_{i,j}$ and $w^B_{i,j}$ receive an identical input $x_{i,j}$, every common step where one component is reflected decreases the distance between the two weights. As we will see in the following section, this finally results in identical weight vectors.

3. GENERATION OF SECRET KEYS

Mutual learning of tree parity machines, as explained before, leads to synchronization of the time dependent synaptic vectors $w^A_i$ and $w^B_i$. This is the result of numerical simulations as well as analytic solutions of the model. Both partners start with random weight vectors (3 N random numbers each) and train their weight vectors according to the algorithm explained above. At each training step they receive three common random input vectors $x_i$.

It turns out that after a relatively short number of training steps all pairs of the weight vectors are identical, $w^A_i = w^B_i$. The two multilayer networks have identical synaptic weights. Since, according to the learning rule, after synchronization at least one pair of weight vectors is changed for each training step, the synaptic weights are always moved. In fact, it is hard to distinguish this motion from a random walk in weight space. Therefore the two multilayer networks perform a kind of synchronized random walk in the discrete space of $(2L+1)^3N$ points.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of synchronization time for $N = 100$ and $L = 3$. It is peaked around $t_{\text{sync}} \approx 400$. After 400 training steps each of the 300 components of the network A has locked into its identical counterpart of the network B. One finds that the average synchronization time is almost independent on the size $N$ of the networks, at least up to $N = 10000$. Asymptotically one expects an increase like $\log N$.

Synchronization of neural networks can immediately be translated to key generation in cryptography: The common identical weights of the two partners A and B can be used as a key for encryption, either immediately as one-time pad, as a seed for random bit generators or as a key in other encryption algorithms (DES,AES).

Compared to algorithms based on number theory, the neural algorithm has several advantages: First, it is very simple. The training algorithm is essentially a linear filter which can easily be implemented in hardware. Second, the number of calculations to generate the key is low. To generate a key of length $N$ one needs of the order of $N$ computational steps. Third, for every communication, or even for every block of the message, a new key can be generated. No secret information has to be stored for a longer time.

But useful keys have to be secure. An attacker E who is recording the communication between A and B should not be able to calculate the secret key. Attacker will be discussed in the following.
4. ATTACKS

A secure key exchange protocol should have the following property: Any attacker who knows all of the details of the protocol and all of the information exchanged between A and B should not have the computational power to calculate the secret key.

We assume that the attacker E knows the algorithm, the sequence of input vectors and the sequence of output bits. In principle, E could start from all of the \((2L + 1)^{3N}\) initial weight vectors and calculate the ones which are consistent with the input/output sequence. It has been shown, that all of these initial states move towards the same final weight vector, the key is unique \([10]\). However, this task is computationally infeasible.

Hence one has to find an algorithm which tries to adapt to the known input/output. Note that the training rule for A and B has the property: If a pair of units is synchronized it remains so forever. The synchronous state is an attractor of the learning dynamics. Any algorithm for the attacker E should have this property, too.

An immediate guess for a possible attack is the following: E uses the same algorithm as one of the partners, say B. If \(\tau^A = \tau^B\) the weight vectors of E are changed for which the unit \(\sigma_i^E\) is identical to \(\tau^A\).

In fact, numerical simulations as well as analytic calculations show that an attacker E will synchronize with A and B after some learning time \(t_{\text{learn}}\) \([6, 8, 9]\). However, the learning time is much longer than the synchronization time. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the ratio between synchronization and learning times. On average, learning is about 1000 times slower than synchronization. But even the tail of the distribution never exceeded the factor 10 (for 1000 runs). Therefore, if the training process is stopped shortly after synchronization, the attacker has no chance to calculate the key. The key is secure for this algorithm of attack.

Why does this work at all? What is the difference between the partner B and the attacker E, who both have the same information? The reason is that B can influence the network A whereas E can only listen. Synchronization as well as learning is a competition of attraction and repulsion controlled by the output bits. One can show, for the parity machine the probability for repulsion is much larger for E than for A and B, at least close to synchronization. This is not true for the committee nor the simple perceptron \([7, 9]\).

However, one cannot exclude that E finds attacks which perform better than the simple attack described above. In fact, recently several attacks were found which seem to crack the key exchange \([11]\). The most successful one has two additional ingredients: First, an ensemble of attackers is used. Second, E makes additional training steps when A and B are quiet, \(\tau^A \neq \tau^B\).

![Figure 3: Distribution of the ratio of synchronization time between networks A and B to the learning time of an attacker E.](image)

An ensemble is helpful if the distribution of learning times is broad. Then there may be a chance that some of, say 10000, attackers will synchronize before A and B. If one reads all of the 10000 encrypted messages one will detect the key from those messages which have a meaning. The additional training step goes as follows: If \(\tau^E \neq \tau^A\) search for the unit with smallest internal field \(w_i^E \cdot x_i\), flip the corresponding \(\sigma_i^E\) and proceed with training as above. This step enforces learning by changing only the information which is close to the decision boundary.

This algorithm succeeds to find the key for the value \(L = 3\). There is a nonzero fraction \(P(L)\) of attackers which synchronize with the two partners A and B \([11]\). However, a detailed numerical calculation of the scaling of key generation showed that this fraction \(P(L)\) decreases exponentially fast with the number \(L\) of weight values \([12]\). The synchronization time, on the other hand, increases only like \(L^2\), as expected from the random walk analogy. Therefore, in the limit of sufficiently large values of \(L\) neural cryptography is secure.

In addition, it has been shown that key generation by mutual learning can be made even more secure by combining it with synchronization of chaotic maps \([13]\).

5. SUMMARY

Interacting neural networks are able to synchronize. Starting from random initial weights and learning from each other, two multilayer networks relax to a state with time dependent identical synaptic weights.

This scenario has been applied to cryptography. Two partners A and B can generate a secret key over a public channel by training their parity machines on the output bits of their partner. A and B did not exchange any information...
over a secret channel before their communication. Although an attacker can record the communication and knows the algorithm she is not able to calculate the secret common key which A and B use for encryption.

This holds for all attackers studied so far. Of course, one cannot prove that no algorithms exist for a successful attack. Future has to show whether neural cryptography remains secure for more advanced attacks.

To our knowledge, neural cryptography is the first algorithm for key generation over public channels which is not based on number theory. It has several advantages over known protocols: It is fast and simple, for each messages a new key can be used and no information is stored permanently. Therefore neural cryptography may lead to novel applications in the future.

6. REFERENCES

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