Budget Feasible Mechanism Design via Random Sampling

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Abstract

Budget feasible mechanism considers algorithmic mechanism design questions where there is a budget constraint on the total payment of the mechanism. An important question in the field is that under which valuation domains there exist budget feasible mechanisms that admit ‘small’ approximations (compared to a socially optimal solution). Singer [20] showed that additive and submodular functions admit a constant approximation mechanism. Recently, Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer [10] gave an \( \mathcal{O}(\log^2 n) \) approximation mechanism for subadditive functions and remarked that: “A fundamental question is whether, regardless of computational constraints, a constant-factor budget feasible mechanism exists for subadditive function.”

In this paper, we give the first attempt to this question. We give a polynomial time \( \mathcal{O}(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n}) \) sub-logarithmic approximation ratio mechanism for subadditive functions, improving the best known ratio \( \mathcal{O}(\log^2 n) \). Further, we connect budget feasible mechanism design to the concept of approximate core in cooperative game theory, and show that there is a mechanism for subadditive functions whose approximation is, via a characterization of the integrality gap of a linear program, linear to the largest value to which an approximate core exists. Our result implies in particular that the class of XOS functions, which is a superclass of submodular functions, admits a constant approximation mechanism. We believe that our work could be a solid step towards solving the above fundamental problem eventually, and possibly, with an affirmative answer.

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1 Introduction

Consider a scenario where a company is running a set of machines and each of which serves a set of jobs. There is an incurred expense for each machine to serve the jobs, and the total expense of the company is the sum of the expenses of all machines. Assume now the company would like to save its running expense by removing some of served jobs and paying those jobs a certain amount of subsidy. We may assume that every job has a cost of being not served (or equivalently, benefit of being served); the bottom line is therefore to have their cost compensated. The question that the company considers is that which jobs should be chosen such that the saved expense as much as possible given a universal budget constraint.

Formally, there is a set of agents (i.e., jobs) $A$, and for any subset $S \subseteq A$ there is a public known valuation $v(S)$. (In the above example, $v(S)$ gives how much expenses it can be saved if $S$ is removed.) Each agent $i \in A$ has a cost $c(i)$, which gives an incurred cost to the agent if he is selected. This defines a natural optimization problem, i.e., find a subset $S$ that maximizes $v(S)$ subject to $\sum_{i \in S} c(i) \leq B$, where $B$ is a sharp budget which gives an upper bound of compensation that can be distributed among agents. The budgeted optimization problem has been considered in a variety of domains with respect to different valuation functions, e.g., additive (i.e., knapsack), submodular, and subadditive.

However, agents, as self-interested entities, may want to get as much subsidy as possible. In particular, they can hide their true incurred cost $c(i)$ (which is known only by themselves) and claim ‘any’ amount, say $b(i)$. We therefore adopt the approach of mechanism design to manage self-interested, but strategic, behaviors of the agents. Specifically, given submitted bids $b(i)$ from all agents, a mechanism decides a winner set $S$ and a payment $p(i)$ to each winner $i$. A mechanism is called truthful (a.k.a. incentive compatible) if it is a dominant strategy for every agent to submit his true cost, i.e., $b(i) = c(i)$. Truthfulness is one of the central solution concepts in mechanism design; it ensures that every participant will behave precisely according to the mechanism protocol and his true interest.

Our problem has an important and practical extra ingredient: Budget, i.e., the total payment of a mechanism should be upper bounded by $B$. The budget constraint introduces a new dimension to mechanism design and restricts the space of truthful mechanisms. For example, in a single parameter domain, a monotone allocation rule plus its associated threshold payment, while still gives a sufficient and necessary condition for truthfulness [16], may not necessarily generate a budget feasible solution. Thus, a number of well known truthful designs (e.g., the seminal VCG mechanism [21,8,14]) do not apply, and new ideas have to be developed.

Another significant change due to the budget constraint is that, unlike the VCG mechanism which always generates a socially optimal solution, we cannot hope to have an output which is both socially optimal and budget feasible even if we are given unlimited computational power. Indeed, in a simple example like path procurement (whose valuation $v(\cdot)$ is a superadditive function), any budget feasible mechanism can have an arbitrarily bad solution. Therefore, the question that one may ask is that under which valuation domains there exist budget feasible truthful mechanisms that admit ‘small’ approximations (compared to a socially optimal solution).

The answer to the question crucially depends on the properties and classifications of the considered valuation function. In particular, given the following hierarchy for the functions [15]:

$$\text{additive} \subset \text{gross substitutes} \subset \text{submodular} \subset \text{XOS} \subset \text{subadditive},$$

which one admits a positive answer? Singer [20] initiated the study of approximate budget feasible
mechanism design and gave constant approximation mechanisms for additive and submodular functions. In recent work, Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer [10] considered subadditive functions and showed an $O(\log^2 n)$ approximation mechanism. Further, it was remarked that:

“A fundamental question is whether, regardless of computational constraints, a constant-factor budget feasible mechanism exists for subadditive function.”

— Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, Singer [10]

Our Results. In this paper, we give the first attempt to this question. Our first result is a sub-logarithmic approximation ratio mechanism for subadditive functions, improving the best known ratio $O(\log^2 n)$.

**Theorem 1.** There is a polynomial time budget feasible truthful mechanism for subadditive functions with an approximation ratio of $O\left(\frac{\log n}{\log\log n}\right)$, where $n$ is the number of agents.

Here we assume that we are given an demand oracle for the subadditive valuation function. This is in the same setting as the mechanism in [10] since it was proved that a value oracle is not sufficient [20]. The sub-logarithmic approximation further sheds light on the hope of a positive answer to the above question. We continue to explore budget feasible mechanisms under the domain of XOS and subadditive functions. Consider the following linear program (LP), where $\alpha(\cdot)$’s are variables.

$$\min \sum_{S \subseteq A} \alpha(S) \cdot v(S)$$

s.t. $\alpha(S) \geq 0, \quad \forall \ S \subseteq A$

$$\sum_{S: \ i \in S} \alpha(S) \geq 1, \quad \forall \ i \in A$$

In the above LP, if we consider each $\alpha(S)$ as the fraction covered by the subset $S$, the last constraint requires that all items in $A$ are fractionally covered; hence, it describes a linear program for the set cover of $A$. An important observation of the LP is that for any subadditive function $v(\cdot)$, the value of the optimal integral solution is precisely $v(A)$.

The above LP has a strong connection to cores of cost sharing games (considering $v(\cdot)$ instead as a cost function), which is a central notion in cooperative game theory [18]. Roughly speaking, the core of a game is a stable cooperation among all agents to share $v(A)$ where no subset of agents can benefit by breaking away from the grand coalition. It is well known that the cores of many cost sharing games are empty. This motivates the notion of $\alpha$-approximate core, which requires all the agents to share only $\alpha$ fraction of $v(A)$. The classic Bondareva-Shapley Theorem [5, 19] says that for subadditive functions, the largest value $\alpha$ for which the $\alpha$-approximate core is nonempty is equal to the integrality gap of the LP. Further, the integrality gap of the LP is one (i.e., $v(A)$ is also an optimal fractional solution) if and only if the valuation function is XOS; this is also equivalent to the non-emptiness of the core.

Given an instance of our problem with agents set $A$, we may consider the above LP and its integrality gap for every subinstance $A' \subseteq A$; among which the largest integrality gap characterizes the worst scenario between the optimal integral and fractional solution of the problem. Our second result is the following.
Theorem 2. There is a budget feasible truthful mechanism for subadditive functions with approximation ratio linear to the largest integrality gap over all subinstances of the above LP. In particular, for XOS functions, the mechanism has a constant approximation ratio.

For some special subadditive functions whose integrality gaps are bounded by constants (XOS is one such example), our mechanism will have a constant approximation. Note that the mechanism may have exponential running time. For some special XOS functions like matching and clique, the mechanism can be implemented in polynomial time (given a demand query to the valuation function, see Section 6). Further, our mechanisms also work for non-monotone functions and a generalized subadditive functions (see Section 5).

Our results show an interesting connection between budget feasible mechanism design and integrality gap, as well as the existence of $\alpha$-approximate core. While our mechanisms do not answer the above fundamental question posed in [10] directly, we believe that they could be a solid step towards solving the problem eventually, and possibly, with an affirmative answer.

In the design of budget feasible mechanisms, due to the sharp budget constraint, the major approach used by previous works, e.g., [20, 6, 10], is based on a simple idea of adding agents one by one greedily and carefully to ensure that the budget constraint is not violated. Our mechanisms use another simple, but powerful, approach: Random sampling. We add agents into a test set $T$ with probability half each and compute an optimal budgeted solution on $T$ (to derive efficient computation, a constant approximation to the optimum suffices). Note that all agents in $T$ are only for the purpose of ‘evaluation’ and will not be winners anyway. The computed optimal solution on $T$ gives a close estimate to the optimal solution of the whole set with a high probability. We then, using the evaluation from $T$ as a threshold, compute a real winner set from the remaining agents. Random sampling appears as a powerful approach and has been used in other domains of mechanism design, e.g., digital goods auctions [13], secretary problem [2, 1], social welfare maximization [9], and mechanism design without money [7]. It is intriguing to find applications of random sampling in other mechanism design problems.

Related Work. Our work falls into the subject of algorithmic mechanism design, which is a fascinating field initiated by the seminal work of Nisan and Ronen [17]. There are two main threads in algorithmic mechanism design: approximate social welfare with efficient computation or with frugal payment; our work belongs to the latter.

As mentioned earlier, the study of approximate mechanism design with a budget constraint was originated by Singer [20] and constant approximation mechanisms were given for additive and submodular functions. The approximation ratios were later improved in [6]. Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer [10] considered subadditive functions and showed an $O(\log^2 n)$ approximation mechanism. They also considered cut function, which is a special non-monotone function, and gave constant approximation mechanisms. Ghosh and Roth [12] considered a budget feasible mechanism design model for selling privacy where there are externalities for each agent’s cost.

In an independent work, Badanidiyuru, Dobzinski, and Oren [3] considered maximizing social welfare for subadditive functions with a knapsack constraint and gave a $2 + \epsilon$ approximation algorithm with demand queries. We consider the same problem and present a $4 + \epsilon$ approximation algorithm; the algorithm is used as a subroutine in our truthful mechanisms. However, the focus of our paper is completely different from [3]: ours is on truthful mechanism design, whereas [3] is on social welfare maximization.
2 Preliminaries

In a marketplace there are \( n \) agents (or items), denoted by \( A \). Each agent \( i \in A \) has a privately known incurred cost \( c(i) \geq 0 \). For any given subset \( S \subseteq A \) of agents, there is a publicly known valuation \( v(S) \), meaning the social welfare derived from \( S \). We assume that \( v(\emptyset) = 0 \) and the valuation function is monotone, i.e., \( v(S) \leq v(T) \) for any \( S \subseteq T \subseteq A \) (in Section \[ \ref{sec:approx} \] we will discuss how to remove the monotone assumption).

We will consider XOS and subadditive functions in the paper; both are rather general classes and contain a number of well studied functions as special cases, e.g., additive, gross substitutes, and submodular.

- **Subadditive (a.k.a. complement free):** \( v(S) + v(T) \geq v(S \cup T) \) for any \( S, T \subseteq A \).

- **XOS (a.k.a. fractionally subadditive):** There is a set of linear functions \( f_1, \ldots, f_m \) such that \( v(S) = \max \{ f_1(S), f_2(S), \ldots, f_m(S) \} \) for any \( S \subseteq A \). Note that the number of functions \( m \) can be exponential in \( n = |A| \).

Another definition is that \( v(S) \leq \sum_{T \subseteq A} x(T) \cdot v(T) \) whenever \( \sum_{T : i \in T} x(T) \geq 1 \) for any \( i \in S \), where \( 0 \leq x(T) \leq 1 \) and \( 2^A \) is the power set of \( A \). That is, if every element in \( S \) is fractionally covered, then the sum of the values of all subsets weighted by the corresponding coefficients is at least as large as \( v(S) \). Feige \[ \cite{Feige98} \] showed that the two definitions are equivalent.

Our objective is to pick a subset of agents with maximum possible valuation given a sharp budget \( B \) to cover their incurred costs, i.e., \( \max_{S \subseteq A} v(S) \) given \( c(S) = \sum_{i \in S} c(i) \leq B \). However, agents, as self-interested entities, have their own objective as well; each agent \( i \) may not tell his true privately known cost \( c(i) \), but, instead, submit a bid \( b(i) \) strategically. We use mechanism design and its solution concept truthfulness to manage strategic behaviors of the agents. Upon receiving \( b(i) \) from each agent, a mechanism decides an allocation \( S \subseteq A \) of the winners and a payment \( p(i) \) to each \( i \in A \). We assume that the mechanism has no positive transfer (i.e., \( p(i) = 0 \) if \( i \notin S \)) and is individually rational (i.e., \( p(i) \geq b(i) \) if \( i \in S \)).

In a mechanism, agents bid strategically to maximize their utilities, which is \( p(i) - c(i) \) if \( i \) is a winner and 0 otherwise. We say a mechanism is truthful if it is of the best interest for each agent to report his true cost, i.e., \( b(i) = c(i) \). For randomized mechanisms, we consider universal truthfulness in this paper: a randomized mechanism is called universally truthful if it takes a distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms.

Our setting is a single parameter domain, as each agent has only one private parameter which is his cost. It is well- known \[ \cite{Feige98} \] that in the single parameter setting, a mechanism is truthful if and only if its allocation rule is monotone (i.e., a winner keeps winning if he unilaterally decreases his bid) and the payment to each winner is his threshold bid (i.e., the maximal bid for which the agent still wins). Therefore, to the end of designing a truthful mechanism, it suffices to design a monotone allocation.

A mechanism is said to be budget feasible if its total payment is within the budget constraint, i.e., \( \sum_i p(i) \leq B \). Assume without loss of generality that \( c(i) \leq B \) for any agent \( i \in A \), since such agent will never win in any budget feasible truthful mechanism. We evaluate a mechanism according to its approximation ratio, which is defined as \( \max_{I} \frac{\text{opt}(I)}{\text{M}(I)} \), where \( \text{M}(I) \) is the (expected) value of a mechanism \( \text{M} \) on instance \( I \) and \( \text{opt}(I) \) is the optimal value of the following problem: \( \max_{S \subseteq A} v(S) \) subjected to \( c(S) \leq B \). Our goal in the present paper is to design truthful budget feasible mechanisms for XOS and subadditive functions with small approximation ratios.
3 A Sub-Logarithmic Approximation Mechanism

In this section we give an $o(\log n)$ approximation truthful mechanism for subadditive valuation function. Note that the representation of a subadditive function usually requires exponential size in $n$. Thus, we assume that we are given access to a demand oracle, which, for any given price vector $p(1), \ldots , p(n)$, returns us a subset $T \in \arg \max_{S \subseteq A} (v(S) - \sum_{i \in S} p(i))$. A demand oracle enables us to evaluate the values of the function $v(\cdot )$, and a polynomial number of queries can be asked in a polynomial time mechanism.

3.1 Subadditive Function Maximization with Budget

We first describe an algorithm that approximates $\max_{S \subseteq A} v(S)$ given that $c(S) \leq B$. That is, we ignore for a while strategic behavior of agents and consider a pure maximization problem where the objective is to pick a subset with maximum possible valuation under the budget constraint. Dobzinski et al. [10] considered the same question and gave a 4 approximation algorithm for the unweighted case (i.e., the restriction is on the size of selected subset). Our algorithm extends their result to the weighted case and runs in polynomial in $n$ time if we are given a demand oracle.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textbf{SA-ALG-MAX} \\
\hline
\textbullet{} Let $v^* = \max_{i \in A} v(i)$ and $V = \{v^*, 2v^*, \ldots, nv^*\}$ \\
\textbullet{} For each $v \in V$ \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{- Set $p(i) = \frac{v}{2B} \cdot c(i)$ for each $i \in A$, and find $T \in \arg \max_{S \subseteq A} (v(S) - \sum_{i \in S} p(i))$.} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{- Let $S_v = \emptyset$.} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{- If $v(T) < \frac{v}{2}$, then continue to next $v$.} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{- Else, in decreasing order of $c(i)$ put items from $T$ into $S_v$ while budget constraint is not violated.} \\
\hline
\textbullet{} Output: $S_v$ with the largest value $v(S_v)$ for all $v \in V$. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

**Lemma 3.1.** SA-ALG-MAX is an 8 approximation algorithm for subadditive function maximization given a demand oracle.

**Proof.** Let $S^*$ be an optimal solution. Note that $v(S^*) \geq v^* = \max_{i \in A} v(i)$ and $c(S^*) \leq B$. For all $v \leq v(S^*)$, we first prove that the algorithm will generate a non-empty set $S_v$ with $v(S_v) \geq \frac{v}{4}$. Since $T$ is the maximum set returned by the oracle, we have

$v(T) - \frac{v}{2B} c(T) \geq v(S^*) - \frac{v}{2B} c(S^*) \geq v - \frac{v}{2B} \cdot B \geq \frac{v}{2}$

Hence, $v(T) \geq \frac{v}{2}$. If $c(T) \leq B$, then $S_v = T$ and we are done. Otherwise, by the greedy procedure of picking items from $T$ to $S_v$, we are guaranteed that $c(S_v) \geq \frac{B}{2}$. Assume for contradiction that $v(S_v) < \frac{v}{4}$. Then

\[ v(T \setminus S_v) - \frac{v}{2B} c(T \setminus S_v) \geq v(T) - v(S_v) - \frac{v}{2B} (c(T) - c(S_v)) \]
\[ \geq v(T) - \frac{v}{4} - \frac{v}{2B} c(T) + \frac{v}{2B} \cdot \frac{B}{2} \]
\[ = v(T) - \frac{v}{2B} c(T) \]

5
The later contradicts to the definition of $T$, since $T \setminus S_v$ is then better than $T$. Thus, we always have $v(S_v) \geq \frac{1}{4}$ for each $v \leq v(S^*)$. Since the algorithm tries all possible $v \in \mathcal{V}$ (including one with $\frac{v(S^*)}{2} < v \leq v(S^*)$) and outputs the largest $v(S_v)$, the output is guaranteed to be within a factor of 8 to the optimal value $v(S^*)$.

Note that we can actually modify the algorithm to get a $4 + \epsilon$ approximation with runtime polynomial in $n$ and $\frac{1}{\epsilon}$. To do so one may simply replace $\mathcal{V}$ by a larger set $\{ev^*, 2ev^*, \ldots, \lceil \frac{n}{\epsilon} \rceil ev^* \}$. Both algorithms suffice for our purpose; for the rest of the paper, for simplicity we will use the 8 approximation algorithm to avoid extra parameter $\epsilon$ in the analysis.

We will use $\text{SA-alg-max}$ as a subroutine to build a mechanism for subadditive functions in the subsequent section. When there are different possible sets maximizing $v(S) - \sum_{i \in S} p(i)$, we require the algorithm to compute a fixed set (i.e., the result will be the same for all possible answers on oracle queries). This property is important for truthfulness of our mechanism. To implement this, we assume that there is a fixed order of all items $i_1 \prec i_2 \prec \cdots \prec i_n$. We first compute

$$T_1 \in \arg\max_{S \subseteq A} \left( v(S) - \sum_{i \in S} p(i) \right)$$

and

$$T_2 \in \arg\max_{S \subseteq A \setminus \{i_1\}} \left( v(S) - \sum_{i \in S} p(i) \right).$$

If $v(T_1) - \sum_{i \in T_1} p(i) = v(T_2) - \sum_{i \in T_2} p(i)$, we know that there is a subset without $i_1$ that gives us the maximum; thus, we can ignore $i_1$ for consideration. If $v(T_1) - \sum_{i \in T_1} p(i) > v(T_2) - \sum_{i \in T_2} p(i)$, we know that $i_1$ should be included in any optimal solution; hence, we will always include $i_1$ and proceed the process iteratively for $i_2, i_3, \ldots, i_n$. One can see that this process gives a fixed outcome that maximizes $v(S) - \sum_{i \in S} p(i)$.

### 3.2 Mechanism

In this section, we will describe our mechanism for subadditive functions.

| SA-RANDOM-SAMPLE |
|-------------------|
| 1. Pick each item independently at random with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ into group $T$. |
| 2. Run $\text{SA-alg-max}$ for items in group $T$; let $v$ be the value of the returned subset. |
| 3. For $k = 1$ to $|A \setminus T|$ |
| - Run $\text{SA-alg-max}$ on the set $\{i \in A \setminus T \mid c(i) \leq \frac{B}{k} \}$ where each item has a cost $\frac{B}{k}$, denote the output by $X$. |
| - If $v(X) \geq \frac{\log \log n}{80 \log n} \cdot v$ |
| - Output $X$ as the winner set and pay $\frac{B}{k}$ to each item in $X$. |
| - Halt. |
| 4. Output $\emptyset$. |

In the above mechanism, we first sample in expectation half of items to form a testing group $T$, and then use $\text{SA-alg-max}$ to compute an approximate solution for items in $T$ given the budget constraint $B$. As it can be seen in the analysis of the mechanism, the computed value $v$ is in expectation within a constant factor from the optimal value of the whole set $A$. That is, we are
able to learn the rough value of the optimal solution by random sampling. Next we consider the remaining items $A \setminus T$ and try to find a subset $X$ with relatively big value in which every item willing to “share” the budget $B$ at a fixed share $\frac{B}{k}$. (This part of our mechanism can be viewed as a reversion of the classic cost sharing mechanism.) Finally, we use the information $v$ from random sampling as a benchmark to determine whether $X$ should be a winner set or not.

The final mechanism for subadditive functions, which we denote by $\text{SA-MECHANISM-MAIN}$, is a uniform distribution of the above $\text{SA-RANDOM-SAMPLE}$ and the following one which simply picks a single item with the largest value.

### MECHANISM-LARGEST-ITEM
- Let $i \in \arg\max_i v(i)$ be the winner.
- Pay all budget $B$ to the winner $i$.

**Theorem 3.1.** $\text{SA-MECHANISM-MAIN}$ runs in polynomial time given a demand oracle and is a universally truthful budget feasible mechanism with an approximation ratio of $O\left(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n}\right)$.

To the end of proving the claim, we first establish the following lemma.

**Lemma 3.2.** For any given subset $S \subseteq A$ and a positive integer $k$, assume that $v(S) \geq k \cdot v(i)$ for any $i \in S$. Further, suppose that $S$ is divided uniformly at random into two groups $T_1$ and $T_2$. Then, with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$, we have $v(T_1) \geq \frac{k-1}{2k} v(S)$ and $v(T_2) \geq \frac{k-1}{2k} v(S)$.

**Proof.** We first claim that there are disjoint subsets $S_1$ and $S_2$ with $S_1 \cup S_2 = S$ such that $v(S_1) \geq \frac{k-1}{2k} v(S)$ and $v(S_2) \geq \frac{k-1}{2k} v(S)$. This can be seen by the following recursive process: Initially let $S_1 = \emptyset$ and $S_2 = S$; and we move items from $S_2$ to $S_1$ arbitrarily until the point when $v(S_1) \geq \frac{k-1}{2k} v(S)$. Consider the $S_1, S_2$ at the end of the process; we claim that at this point, we also have $v(S_2) \geq \frac{k-1}{2k} v(S)$. Note that $v(S) \leq v(S_1) + v(S_2)$. Let $i$ be the last item moved from $S_2$ to $S_1$; therefore, $v(S_1 \setminus \{i\}) < \frac{k-1}{2k} v(S)$, which implies that $v(S_2 \cup \{i\}) > \frac{k+1}{2k} v(S)$. Thus, $v(S_2) + v(i) \geq v(S_2 \cup \{i\}) > \frac{k+1}{2k} v(S)$. As $v(i) \leq \frac{1}{k} v(S)$, we know that $v(S_2) > \frac{1}{2} v(S) > \frac{k-1}{2k} v(S)$.

Consider sets $X_1 = S_1 \cap T_1, Y_1 = S_1 \cap T_2, X_2 = S_2 \cap T_1$ and $Y_2 = S_2 \cap T_2$. Due to subadditivity we have $\frac{k-1}{2k} v(S) \leq v(S_1) \leq v(X_1) + v(Y_1)$; hence, either $v(X_1) \geq \frac{k-1}{2k} v(S)$ or $v(Y_1) \geq \frac{k-1}{2k} v(S)$. Similarly, we have that either $v(X_2) \geq \frac{k-1}{2k} v(S)$ or $v(Y_2) \geq \frac{k-1}{2k} v(S)$. Clearly, partitioning $S_1$ into $X_1, Y_1$ and partitioning $S_2$ into $X_2, Y_2$ are independent to each other. Therefore, with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ the most valuable parts of $S_1$’s partition and $S_2$’s partition will get into different sets $T_1$ and $T_2$, respectively. Thus the lemma follows.

**Proof of Theorem 3.1.** Let $S = A \setminus T$. It is obvious that the mechanism runs in polynomial time since $\text{SA-ALG-MAX}$ is in polynomial time. If the mechanism chooses $\text{MECHANISM-LARGEST-ITEM}$, certainly it is budget feasible as the total payment is precisely $B$. If it chooses $\text{SA-RANDOM-SAMPLE}$, either no item is a winner or $X$ is selected as the winner set. Note that $|X| \leq k$ and each item in $X$ gets a payment of $\frac{B}{k}$. It is therefore budget feasible as well.

*(Truthfulness.)* Truthfulness for $\text{MECHANISM-LARGEST-ITEM}$ is obvious (as the outcome is irrelevant to the submitted bids). Next we will prove that $\text{SA-RANDOM-SAMPLE}$ is truthful as well. The random sampling step does not depend on the bids of the items, and items in $T$ have no incentive to lie as they cannot win anyway. Hence, it suffices to only consider items in $S$. Observe that every agent will be a candidate to the winning set only if $c(i) \leq \frac{B}{k}$. Consider any item $i \in S$ and fixed bids of other items. There are the following three possibilities if $i$ reports his true cost $c(i)$.
Therefore, it suffices to prove that the main mechanism has an approximation ratio of $\frac{B}{k}$. Then we have $c(i) \leq \frac{B}{k}$ and his utility is $\frac{B}{k} - c(i) \geq 0$. If $i$ reports a bid which is still less than or equal to $\frac{B}{k}$, the output and all the payments do not change. If $i$ reports a bid which is larger than $\frac{B}{k}$, he still could not win for a share larger than $\frac{B}{k}$ and will not be considered for all smaller shares. Therefore, he derives $0$ utility. Thus for either case, $i$ does not have incentive to lie.

- Item $i$ wins with a payment $\frac{B}{k}$. Then we have $c(i) \leq \frac{B}{k}$ and his utility is $\frac{B}{k} - c(i) \geq 0$. If $i$ reports a bid which is still less than or equal to $\frac{B}{k}$, the output and all the payments do not change. If $i$ reports a bid which is larger than $\frac{B}{k}$, he still could not win for a share larger than $\frac{B}{k}$ and will not be considered for all smaller shares. Therefore, he derives $0$ utility. Thus for either case, $i$ does not have incentive to lie.

- Item $i$ loses and payment to each winner is $\frac{B}{k} \geq c(i)$. In this case, if $i$ reduces or increases his bid, he cannot change the output of the mechanism. Thus $i$ always has zero utility.

- Item $i$ loses and payment to each winner is $\frac{B}{k} < c(i)$ or the winning set is empty. In this case, if $i$ reduces his bid, he will not change the process of the mechanism until the payment offered by the mechanism is less than $c(i)$. Thus, even if $i$ could win for some value $k$, the payment he gets would be less than $c(i)$, in which case his utility is negative. If $i$ increases his bid, he lose and thus derives zero utility.

Therefore, SA-RANDOM-SAMPLE is a universally truthful mechanism.

(Approximation Ratio.) It remains to estimate the approximation ratio. For any subset $Z \subseteq A$, let $OPT(Z)$ denote the optimal solution over the agents in $Z$ under the budget constraint; and $OPT = OPT(A)$ denote the optimal solution for the whole set.

If there exists an item $i \in A$ such that $v(i) \geq \frac{1}{2}v(OPT)$, then MECHANISM-LARGEST-ITEM will output an item with value at least $\frac{1}{2}v(OPT)$ and we are done. In the following, we assume that $v(i) < \frac{1}{2}v(OPT)$ for all $i \in A$. Then, by Lemma $3.2$, with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$ we have $v(OPT(T)) \geq \frac{1}{8}v(OPT)$ and $v(OPT(S)) \geq \frac{1}{8}v(OPT)$. Hence, with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$ we have

$$v(OPT(S)) \geq v(OPT(T)) \geq \frac{1}{8}v(OPT).$$

Therefore, it suffice to prove that the main mechanism has an approximation ratio of $O\left(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n}\right)$ given the inequalities $[1]$.

Since SA-ALG-MAX is an $8$ approximation of $v(OPT(T))$, we have $v \geq \frac{1}{8}v(OPT(T)) \geq \frac{1}{64}v(OPT)$. Clearly, if SA-RANDOM-SAMPLE outputs a non-empty set, then its value is at least $\frac{\log \log n}{120 \log n} \cdot v \geq \frac{\log \log n}{120 \log n} \cdot v(OPT)$. Hence, it remains to prove that the mechanism will always output a non-empty set as given formula $[1]$.

Let $S^* = \{1, 2, 3, \ldots, m\} \subseteq S$ be an optimal solution of $S$ given the budget constraint $B$ and $c_1 \geq c_2 \geq \cdots \geq c_m$. We recursively divide the agents in $S^*$ into different groups as follows:

- Let $\alpha_1$ be the largest integer such that $c_1 \leq \frac{B}{\alpha_1}$. Put the first $\min\{\alpha_1, m\}$ agents into group $Z_1$.

- Let $\beta_r = \alpha_1 + \cdots + \alpha_r$. If $\beta_r < m$ let $\alpha_{r+1}$ be the largest integer such that $c_{\beta_r + 1} \leq \frac{B}{\alpha_{r+1}}$; put the next $\min\{\alpha_{r+1}, m - \beta_r\}$ agents into group $Z_{r+1}$.

Let us denote by $x+1$ the number of groups. Since items in $S^*$ are ordered by $c_1 \geq c_2 \geq \cdots \geq c_m$, we have $\alpha_{r+1} \leq \alpha_r$ for any $r$. If there exists a set $Z_j$ such that $v(Z_j) \geq \frac{\log \log n}{10 \log n} \cdot v$, then the mechanism does not output an empty set, as it could buy $\alpha_j$ items at price $\frac{B}{\alpha_j}$ given that SA-ALG-MAX is an $8$-approximation and the threshold we set is $v(Z_j) \geq \frac{\log \log n}{80 \log n} \cdot v$. Thus, we may assume
that \( v(Z_j) < \frac{\log \log n}{10 \log n} \cdot v \) for each \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, x + 1 \). On the other hand, by subadditivity, we have

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{x+1} v(Z_j) \geq v(S^*) = v(OPT(S)) \geq v(OPT(T)) \geq v.
\]

Putting the two inequalities together, we can conclude that

\[
(x + 1) \cdot \frac{\log \log n}{10 \log n} \cdot v > v,
\]

which implies that \( x > \frac{5 \log n}{\log \log n} \geq \frac{5 \log m}{\log \log m} \).

On the other hand, since \( S^* = \{1, 2, 3, \ldots, m\} \) is a solution for \( S \) within the budget constraint, we have that

\[
B \geq \sum_{j=1}^{m} c_j \geq c_1 + \alpha_1 c_{\beta_1 + 1} + \cdots + \alpha_x c_{\beta_x + 1} > \frac{B}{\alpha_1 + 1} + \frac{\alpha_1 B}{\alpha_2 + 1} + \cdots + \frac{\alpha_x B}{\alpha_{x+1} + 1}.
\]

Hence,

\[
1 \geq \frac{1}{\alpha_1 + 1} + \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2 + 1} + \cdots + \frac{\alpha_x}{\alpha_{x+1} + 1} \geq \frac{1}{2 \alpha_1} + \frac{\alpha_1}{2 \alpha_2} + \cdots + \frac{\alpha_x}{2 \alpha_{x+1}}.
\]

In particular, we get

\[
2 \geq \frac{1}{\alpha_1} + \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2} + \cdots + \frac{\alpha_{x-1}}{\alpha_x} \geq x^\frac{1}{\alpha_1} \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2} \cdots \frac{\alpha_{x-1}}{\alpha_x},
\]

where the last inequality is simply the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means. Hence, we get \( 2 \geq x^\frac{1}{\alpha_x} \), which is equivalent to \( \alpha_x \geq \left( \frac{x}{2} \right)^x \). Now plugging in the fact that \( m \geq \alpha_x \) and \( x \geq \frac{5 \log m}{\log \log m} \), we come to a contradiction. This concludes the proof.

## 4 Integrality-Gap Approximation Mechanisms

The mechanism SA-MECHANISM-MAIN gives a sub-logarithmic approximation for subadditive functions. The next question one would ask is whether there exists a constant approximation truthful mechanism. In this section we give another mechanism attempting to answer this question. Our mechanism has an approximation ratio which equals to the integrality gap of a linear program. For special cases when the integrality gap can be bounded by a constant (e.g., all XOS functions have integrality gap 1), our mechanism will have a constant approximation ratio.

For simplicity, we will first present our mechanism for XOS functions. Next in Section 4.2, we will discuss how to generalize it to subadditive functions.

### 4.1 XOS Functions

We will first consider XOS functions. Given an XOS function \( v(\cdot) \), by its definition, assume that \( v(S) = \max \{ f_1(S), f_2(S), \ldots, f_m(S) \} \) for any \( S \subseteq A \), where each \( f_j(\cdot) \) is a nonnegative additive function, i.e., \( f_j(S) = \sum_{i \in S} f_j(i) \). Note that the value \( m \) may not be bounded by a polynomial of \( n = |A| \).

In our mechanism, we use a random mechanism ADDITIVE-MECHANISM for additive valuation functions as an auxiliary procedure, where ADDITIVE-MECHANISM is a universally truthful mechanism and has an approximation factor of at most 3 (see, e.g., Theorem B.2, [6]).
Claim 4.1. For any \( S \subseteq S^* \), \( f(S) - t \cdot c(S) \geq 0 \).

**Proof.** Suppose by a contradiction that there exists a subset \( S \subseteq S^* \) such that \( f(S) - t \cdot c(S) < 0 \). Let \( S' = S^* \setminus S \). Since \( f \) is an additive function, we have \( c(S') + c(S) = c(S^*) \) and \( f(S') + f(S) = f(S' \cup S) = f(S^*) = v(S^*) \). Thus,

\[
\begin{align*}
v(S') - t \cdot c(S') & \geq f(S') - t \cdot c(S') \\
& = v(S^*) - t \cdot c(S^*) - (f(S) - t \cdot c(S)) \\
& > v(S^*) - t \cdot c(S^*),
\end{align*}
\]

which contradicts the definition of \( S^* \). 

The following claim is critical for truthfulness.

**Claim 4.2.** If any item \( j \in S^* \) reports a different cost \( b(j) < c(j) \), then set \( S^* \) remains the same.

**Proof.** Let \( b \) be the bid vector where \( j \) reports \( b(j) \) and others remain unchanged. First we notice that for any set \( S \) with \( j \in S \), \( (v(S) - t \cdot b(S)) - (v(S) - t \cdot c(S)) = t(c(j) - b(j)) \) is a fixed positive value. Hence,

\[
\begin{align*}
v(S^*) - t \cdot b(S^*) &= v(S^*) - t \cdot c(S^*) + t(c(j) - b(j)) \\
& \geq v(S) - t \cdot c(S) + t(c(j) - b(j)) \\
& = v(S) - t \cdot b(S).
\end{align*}
\]

Indeed, in the second step of the mechanism, we can use SA-ALG-MAX to compute an approximate solution, which suffices for our purpose. Step 4 can be done easily by a demand query. Hence, if we are given an access to an oracle which, for any subset \( X \) of items, gives a linear function \( f(X) = v(X) \), then the mechanism can be implemented in polynomial time.
Further, for any set \( S \) with \( j \notin S \), we have
\[
 v(S^*) - t \cdot b(S^*) > v(S^*) - t \cdot c(S^*) \\
\geq v(S) - t \cdot c(S) \\
= v(S) - t \cdot b(S). 
\]
Therefore, we may conclude that 
\[ S^* = \arg \max_{S \subseteq A \setminus T} (v(S) - t \cdot b(S)). \]

Our main mechanism for XOS functions, denoted by \textsc{XOS-mechanism-main}, is simply a uniform distribution of the two mechanisms \textsc{mechanism-largest-item} and \textsc{XOS-random-sample}. We have the following result.

**Theorem 4.1.** The mechanism \textsc{XOS-mechanism-main} is budget feasible, universally truthful, and provides a constant approximation ratio for XOS valuation functions.

The theorem follows from the following lemmas.

**Lemma 4.1.** The main mechanism \textsc{XOS-mechanism-main} is universally truthful.

**Proof.** Our mechanism is a combination of two mechanisms, in which \textsc{mechanism-largest-item} is obviously truthful. Therefore, it remains to prove that \textsc{XOS-random-sample} is truthful. To this end, since all items are single parameter, it suffices to show that \textsc{XOS-random-sample} is monotone, that is, a winning item will still be in the winning set with a smaller bid. Assume that item \( i \) is in the winning set of \textsc{XOS-random-sample}. If \( i \) decreases its bid, then by Claim 4.2 and the rule of the mechanism, \( S^* \) does not change. When the mechanism runs \textsc{Additive-mechanism} for \( S^* \) with respect to additive function \( f(\cdot) \), since \textsc{Additive-mechanism} is a truthful mechanism, \( i \) will still be in the winning set when decreasing its bid. Therefore, \textsc{XOS-random-sample} is monotone, and thus, truthful.

**Lemma 4.2.** The main mechanism \textsc{XOS-mechanism-main} is budget feasible.

**Proof.** It suffices to prove that both \textsc{mechanism-largest-item} and \textsc{XOS-random-sample} are budget feasible. Clearly, \textsc{mechanism-largest-item} is budget feasible. \textsc{XOS-random-sample} uses a budget feasible mechanism \textsc{Additive-mechanism} as a final output for winning set and payments to them. Therefore, threshold payments in \textsc{XOS-random-sample} can be only smaller than those in \textsc{Additive-mechanism} providing us that \textsc{XOS-random-sample} is budget feasible as well.

**Lemma 4.3.** The main mechanism \textsc{XOS-mechanism-main} has a constant approximation ratio.

**Proof.** Let \( OPT \) denote the optimal solution given budget \( B \), and let \( k = \min_{i \in OPT} \frac{v(OPT)}{v(i)} \). Thus \( v(OPT) \geq k \cdot v(i) \) for each \( i \in OPT \). By Lemma 3.2, we have \( v(OPT \cap T) \geq \frac{k-1}{k} v(OPT) \) with probability at least \( \frac{1}{2} \). Thus, if we denote the optimal solution of \( T \) given budget \( B \) by \( OPT(T) \), then we have \( v(OPT(T)) \geq v(OPT \cap T) \geq \frac{k-1}{k} v(OPT) \) with probability at least \( \frac{1}{2} \), as \( OPT \cap T \) is a particular solution and \( OPT(T) \) is an optimal solution for set \( T \) with budget constraint.

We let \( OPT^* \) be the optimal solution with respect to the item set \( S^* \), additive value function \( f \) and budget \( B \). In the following we will show that \( f(OPT^*) \) is a good approximation to the actual social optimum \( v(OPT) \). Consider the following two cases:
• $c(S^*) > B$. Given the condition, we can always find a subset $S' \subseteq S^*$, such that $\frac{B}{2} \leq c(S') \leq B$. By Claim 4.1, we know $f(S') \geq t \cdot c(S') \geq \frac{v(OPT(T))}{8B} \cdot \frac{B}{2} \geq \frac{v(OPT(T))}{16}$. Then by the fact that $OPT^*$ is an optimal solution and $S'$ is a particular solution with budget constraint $B$, we have $f(OPT^*) \geq f(S') \geq \frac{v(OPT(T))}{16} \geq \frac{k-1}{64k} v(OPT)$ with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$.

• $c(S^*) \leq B$. Then $OPT^* = S^*$. Let $S' = OPT \setminus T$; thus, $c(S') \leq c(OPT) \leq B$. By Lemma 3.2, we have $v(S') \geq \frac{k-1}{4k} v(OPT)$ with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$. Recall that $S^* = \arg \max_{S \subseteq A \setminus T} (v(S) - t \cdot c(S))$. Then with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$, we have

$$f(OPT^*) = f(S^*) \geq v(S^*) - t \cdot c(S^*) \geq v(S') - t \cdot c(S') \geq \frac{k-1}{4k} v(OPT) - v(OPT) \cdot \frac{8B}{k-2} \geq \frac{k-2}{8k} v(OPT).$$

In either case, we get $f(OPT^*) \geq \min \left\{ \frac{k-1}{64k} v(OPT), \frac{k-2}{64k} v(OPT) \right\} \geq \frac{k-2}{64k} v(OPT)$ with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$. Then in the last step of our mechanism $XOS$-random-sample, we use the output of additive-mechanism ($f, S^*, B$) as our final output. Recall that additive-mechanism has approximation factor of at most 3 with respect to the optimal solution $f(OPT^*)$. Thus, the solution given by $XOS$-random-sample is at least $\frac{1}{3} \cdot f(OPT^*) \geq \frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{k-1}{4k} v(OPT) = \frac{k-2}{384k} v(OPT)$.

On the other hand, since $k = \min_{i \in OPT} \frac{v(i)}{v(OPT)}$, the solution given by mechanism-largest-item satisfies $\max_i v(i) \geq \frac{1}{k} v(OPT)$. Combining the two mechanisms together, our main mechanism $XOS$-mechanism-main has performance at least

$$\left( \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{k-2}{384k} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{k} \right) v(OPT) = \frac{k+382}{768k} v(OPT) \geq \frac{1}{768} v(OPT).$$

This completes the proof of the lemma. $\square$

### 4.2 Subadditive Functions

Here we use our results of the previous subsection for $XOS$ functions to design a truthful mechanism for subadditive functions. Let $S_1, \ldots, S_N$ be a permutation of all possible subsets of $A$, where $N = |2^A|$ is the size of the power set $2^A$. For each subset $S \subseteq A$, consider the following linear program, where there is a variable $\alpha_j$ associated with each subset $S_j$.

$$\text{LP}(S) : \quad \min \sum_{j=1}^{N} \alpha_j \cdot v(S_j)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \alpha_j \geq 0, \quad 1 \leq j \leq N$$

$$\sum_{j: i \in S_j} \alpha_j \geq 1, \quad \forall i \in S$$

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In the above linear program, the minimum is taken over all possible non-negative values of $\alpha = (\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_N)$. If we consider each $\alpha_j$ as the fraction of the cover by subset $S_j$, the last constraint implies that all items in $S$ are fractionally covered. Hence, $LP(S)$ describes a linear program for the set cover of $S$. For any subadditive function $v(\cdot)$, it can be seen that the value of the optimal integral solution to the above $LP(S)$ is always $v(S)$. Indeed, one has $S \subseteq \bigcup_{j: \alpha_j \geq 1} S_j$ and $\sum_j \alpha_j \cdot v(S_j) \geq \sum_j: \alpha_j \geq 1 v(S_j) \geq v(\bigcup_{j: \alpha_j \geq 1} S_j) \geq v(S)$.

Let $\tilde{v}(S)$ be the value of the optimal fractional solution of $LP(S)$, and $\mathcal{I}(S) = \frac{\tilde{v}(S)}{v(S)}$ be the integrality gap of $LP(S)$. Let $\mathcal{I} = \max_{S \subseteq A} \mathcal{I}(S)$; the integrality gap $\mathcal{I}$ gives a worst-case upper bound on the integrality gap of all subsets. Hence, we have $\frac{v(S)}{I} \leq \tilde{v}(S) \leq v(S)$ for any $S \subseteq A$. The classic Bondareva-Shapley Theorem [5, 19] says that the integrality gap $\mathcal{I}(S)$ is one (i.e., $v(S)$ is also an optimal fractional solution to the LP) if and only if $v(\cdot)$ is an XOS function.

**Lemma 4.4.** $\tilde{v}(\cdot)$ is an XOS function.

**Proof.** For any subset $S \subseteq A$, consider any non-negative vector $\gamma = (\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_N) \geq 0$ that satisfies $\sum_{j: \gamma_j \geq 1} \gamma_j$ for any $i \in S$. Then, we have

$$\sum_{j=1}^N \gamma_j \cdot \tilde{v}(S_j) = \sum_{j=1}^N \gamma_j \cdot \min_{\beta_j, k \geq 0} \left( \sum_{k=1}^N \beta_{j,k} \cdot v(S_k) \right) \quad \forall i \in S, \sum_{k: i \in S_k} \beta_{j,k} \geq 1$$

$$= \min_{\beta \geq 0} \left( \sum_{j=1}^N \gamma_j \sum_{k=1}^N \beta_{j,k} \cdot v(S_k) \right) \quad \forall i, \forall i \in S, \sum_{k: i \in S_k} \beta_{j,k} \geq 1$$

$$= \min_{\beta \geq 0} \left( \sum_{k=1}^N \left( \sum_{j=1}^N \gamma_j \beta_{j,k} \right) \cdot v(S_k) \right) \quad \forall i, \forall i \in S, \sum_{k: i \in S_k} \beta_{j,k} \geq 1$$

$$\geq \min_{\alpha \geq 0} \left( \sum_{k=1}^N \alpha_k \cdot v(S_k) \right) \quad \forall i \in S, \sum_{k: i \in S_k} \alpha_k \geq 1$$

$$= \tilde{v}(S)$$

The inequality above follows from the fact that for any $i \in S$,

$$\sum_{j: \beta_{j,k} \geq 0} \gamma_j \beta_{j,k} = \sum_j \gamma_j \sum_{k: i \in S_k} \beta_{j,k} \geq \sum_j \gamma_j \sum_{j: \gamma_j \geq 1} \gamma_j \geq \sum_{j: \gamma_j \geq 1} \gamma_j \geq 1.$$  

Hence, $\tilde{v}(\cdot)$ is fractionally subadditive, which is equivalent to XOS. \hfill \square

We are now ready to present our mechanism for subadditive functions.

**SA-MECHANISM-MAIN-2**

1. For each subset $S \subseteq A$, compute $\tilde{v}(S)$.
2. Run XOS-MECHANISM-MAIN for the instance with respect to XOS function $\tilde{v}(\cdot)$.
3. Output the result of XOS-MECHANISM-MAIN.
Theorem 4.2. The mechanism SA-MECHANISM-MAIN-2 is budget feasible, universally truthful, and provides an approximation ratio of $O(1)$ for subadditive functions, where recall that $\mathcal{I}$ is the largest integrality gap of $LP(S)$ for all subsets.

Proof. Note that the valuations $v(\cdot)$ are public knowledge; thus computing $\hat{v}(\cdot)$ and run XOS-MECHANISM-MAIN with respect to $\hat{v}(\cdot)$ do not affect truthfulness. The claim then follows from Theorem 4.1 and the fact that $\frac{v(S)}{I} \leq \hat{v}(S) \leq v(S)$ for any $S \subseteq A$ (i.e., using $\hat{v}(\cdot)$ instead of $v(\cdot)$ we only lose a factor of $I$ in the approximation ratio). \qed

5 Extensions

In the current section we consider two extensions for valuation functions where the mechanisms described before still can be applied.

5.1 Non-Monotone Functions

In general, $v(\cdot)$ can be a non-monotone subadditive (or XOS) function, e.g., the cut function studied in [10]. That is, for any $S \subseteq T \subseteq A$, it is not necessarily that $v(S) \leq v(T)$. We next describe how to apply our mechanisms to non-monotone functions.

For any subset $S \subseteq A$, define $$\hat{v}(S) = \max_{T \subseteq S} v(T).$$

Clearly, $\hat{v}(\cdot)$ is monotone and inherits the classification of $v(\cdot)$; that is, if $v(\cdot)$ is subadditive (or XOS), so does $\hat{v}$. Note that given a demand oracle, $\hat{v}(\cdot)$ can be computed easily. Then we can apply our mechanisms to $\hat{v}(\cdot)$ directly. Further, we have the following observations.

- For any subset $S \subseteq A$, let $OPT(S)$ be an optimal solution of $v(\cdot)$ on $S$. Then $OPT(S)$ is an optimal solution of $\hat{v}(\cdot)$ on $S$ as well. In particular, this implies that $\hat{v}(\cdot)$ and $v(\cdot)$ will have the same optimal value on the whole set and testing set in random sampling.

- In mechanism XOS-RANDOM-SAMPLE, the computed $S^* \in \arg \max_{S \subseteq A | T} \{v(S) - t \cdot c(S)\}$ is an optimal solution for $\max_{S \subseteq A | T} \{\hat{v}(S) - t \cdot c(S)\}$ as well, i.e., $\hat{v}(S^*) = v(S^*)$. Let $\hat{f}$ be the linear function with $\hat{f}(S^*) = \hat{v}(S^*) = v(S^*)$ computed for $\hat{v}(\cdot)$. Note that in $\hat{f}(S^*)$, each item $i \in S^*$ has a non-negative contribution to the value of $\hat{f}(S^*)$ (otherwise, $S^*$ will not be an optimal solution). Hence, we can run ADDITIVE-MECHANISM for additive function $\hat{f}(\cdot)$ on $S^*$, which yields the desired result.

Therefore, all our mechanisms described above continue to work for non-monotone functions with the same approximation ratios.

5.2 Relaxed Subadditive Functions

A valuation function $v(\cdot)$ is called $K$-subadditive if for any disjoint subsets $S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_\ell \subseteq A$ of items, $v(S_1 \cup S_2 \cup \cdots \cup S_\ell) \leq K \cdot (v(S_1) + v(S_2) + \cdots + v(S_\ell))$. Note that a function is subadditive in the usual sense if and only if it is 1-subadditive.

For this case we may consider another valuation function: For any $S \subseteq A$, define $\hat{v}(S) = \min \left\{ v(S_1) + v(S_2) + \cdots + v(S_\ell) \mid S_1, \ldots, S_\ell \text{ is a partition of } S \right\}$.
Note that \( \tilde{v}(\cdot) \) approximates \( v(\cdot) \) within a factor of \( K \), that is, \( K \cdot \tilde{v}(S) \geq v(S) \geq \tilde{v}(S) \). It can be seen that this new function is subadditive. Thus, by applying our mechanisms to \( \tilde{v}(\cdot) \), we lose an extra factor of \( K \) in the approximation ratio with respect to the optimal solution of \( v(\cdot) \). In particular, when \( K \) is a constant, our mechanisms will have the same order of approximation ratio.

6 Special Examples

In this section we consider a few concrete examples of XOS and subadditive functions. The main purpose of which is to illustrate how general scheme works in particular settings, and give certain evidence that the general approach is natural and can be efficiently implemented in certain circumstances.

6.1 Matching

In the instance of matching, we are given a (bipartite) graph \( G = (U, E) \), where each edge \( e \in E \) corresponds to an agent with a value \( v(e) \) and a privately known cost \( c(e) \). For any subset of edges \( S \subseteq E \), its value \( v(S) \) is defined to be the total value of the largest matching induced by the edge set \( S \). It is well known that matching is not submodular (e.g., edge \( (u_3, u_4) \) contributes one to the set \( \{(u_1, u_2), (u_2, u_3)\} \) but contributes zero to \( \{(u_2, u_3)\} \) when all edges have unit value). However, matching is in the class of XOS functions; hence, our mechanism XOS-MECHANISM-MAIN gives a constant approximation.

We argue that our mechanism XOS-RANDOM-SAMPLE, and thus, XOS-MECHANISM-MAIN, can be implemented in polynomial time for matching. In random sampling, computing an optimal solution for the testing group \( T \) is equivalent to solving a maximum weighted matching problem with a budget constraint, which admits a polynomial-time approximation scheme [4]. (Note that similar to SA-MECHANISM-MAIN and its subroutine SA-ALG-MAX, it is not necessary to compute an optimal solution for the testing group; any constant approximation suffices to our mechanisms.) The set \( S^* \) can be computed according to the following simple subroutine: for each remaining edge \( e \in E \setminus T \) we set the new value \( w(e) = v(e) - t \cdot c(e) \) and then compute a maximal matching with respect to \( w \) in the induced subgraph \( E \setminus T \); this forms the set \( S^* \). Finally, for this given selected matching \( S^* \), its valuation is already additive with respect to its members. Therefore, the implementation can be done in polynomial time. This gives the following claim.

**Proposition 6.1.** XOS-MECHANISM-MAIN is a constant approximation mechanism for matching and can be implemented in polynomial time.

6.2 Clique

Given a graph \( G = (U, E) \), each vertex \( i \) is an agent with a value \( v(i) \) and a privately known cost \( c(i) \). For a given subset of vertices \( S \subseteq U \), its value \( v(S) \) is defined to be the value of the largest weighted clique in \( S \), i.e., \( v(S) = \max \{ \sum_{i \in T} v(i) \mid T \subseteq S \text{ is a clique} \} \). Note that clique is not submodular as well (e.g., consider a graph with vertices \( \{i_1, i_2, i_3, i_4\} \) of unit value each and edges \( \{(i_1, i_2), (i_1, i_4), (i_2, i_3), (i_2, i_4)\} \); the contribution of \( i_1 \) to \( \{i_2, i_3\} \) is zero, but to \( \{i_2, i_3, i_4\} \) is one). Further, it can be seen that clique is an XOS function (this follows simply from the definition of \( v(S) \)). Hence, given a demand oracle, SA-ALG-MAX computes a subset whose value is a constant approximation to the optimal solution. In addition, the set \( S^* \) can be computed by a single demand
query; and the linear function for \( v(S^*) \) can be found easily by demand queries for elements in \( S^* \) one by one. Hence, we have the following claim.

**Proposition 6.2.** XOS-mechanism-main plus subroutine SA-alg-max gives a constant approximation mechanism for clique and can be implemented in polynomial time given a demand oracle.

### 6.3 From Cost Minimization to Valuation Maximization

In this section we will consider our motivating example discussed at the beginning of the Introduction. A company serves a set \( A \) of agents (or jobs). Let \( \mathcal{R} \) denote the set of solution spaces, i.e., all possible ways to serve the agents. For any \( r \in \mathcal{R} \), there is a cost function \( f_r(\cdot) \) which gives the running cost to serve different subsets of agents by solution \( r \). For any subset \( S \subseteq A \), we want to spend as little cost as possible. Hence, the cost to the company is given by

\[
    c(S) = \min \{ f_r(S) \mid r \in \mathcal{R} \}.
\]

The model includes a number of well-studied problems. For example, in job scheduling, \( \mathcal{R} \) corresponds to all possible assignments between jobs and machines; in facility location, \( \mathcal{R} \) includes all combinations of facilities to open; and in congestion games, \( \mathcal{R} \) gives all possible assignments between agents and resources. For each of these minimization problems, the cost of the whole set \( c(A) \) gives the value of an optimal solution.

Assume now the company would like to remove some of the agents from \( A \) by paying them a certain amount of subsidy. Our objective is save the running cost as much as possible. Hence, for any \( S \subseteq A \), we can define

\[
    v(S) = c(A) - c(A \setminus S).
\]

That is, the valuation of \( S \) is equal to the difference of the costs between the whole set \( A \) and the remaining set \( A \setminus S \).

**Proposition 6.3.** If \( c(\cdot) \) is a supermodular function, then \( v(\cdot) \) is a submodular function.

The above claim applies to, e.g., congestion games when the latency functions are polynomials with positive coefficients (thus the cost function is supermodular); hence, our mechanisms can be applied, as well as mechanisms specifically designed for submodular valuation \[20\, 6\]. When \( c(\cdot) \) is a submodular function, it can be seen that \( v(\cdot) \) is neither submodular nor subadditive. However, in some examples (e.g., in job scheduling, the cost is a square root function with respect to the total length of scheduled jobs), we can show that \( v(\cdot) \) is a relaxed subadditive function, and our mechanisms therefore can be applied.

Our model links cost minimization problems with budget feasible mechanism design. For a variety of problems, e.g., facility location, and job scheduling with various minimization objectives, the valuation function \( v(\cdot) \) defined above may not necessarily fall into the class of (relaxed) subadditive functions. The design of budget feasible mechanisms with small approximations for these problem is an intriguing question, which we leave for future work.

\[\textsuperscript{2}\] Our result does not contradict to the hardness of max-clique approximation. Indeed, given the access to powerful oracles, even a simple value query of the whole set will give the value of an optimal clique solution.
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