China in Latin America in the 21st century

Maurício Santoro

→ Abstract

In the last two decades, China became a major economic force in Latin America, due to trade and investment, and it established strong links with the countries in the region, including a strategic partnership with Brazil. However, Chinese influence is also provoking concerns in the United States, while the latter is trying to curb Beijing’s role in Latin America. This paper analyzes China’s actions in the region and the American response, using Brazil as a case-study environment because of its importance for the Chinese foreign policy and its current president, who adopted a pro-Trump foreign policy and a rhetoric that is very critical of Beijing. The author begins by analyzing China’s strategy towards Latin America presenting a historical outlook of major events thereto, particularly underscoring both growth and diversification of the Chinese investments in the last decade. The author then proceeds to analyzing current position of the U.S. towards Chinese actions in Latin America, additionally highlighting major U.S. concerns thereto. The final part of the paper represents a case-study of Chinese policy towards Brazil and correspondent Brasília’s position on the subject concerned. It is noted that close-term prospects are complicated to draw due to the dynamic changes in the international scenario, with the deterioration of the Washington-Beijing relations, and the cross-pressures that these disputes will bring to Brazil.

→ Keywords

Brazil, China, Latin America, United States, trade, investment, Belt and Road Initiative

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Introduction

China became very important to Latin America’s economy in the 21st century. In the last 20 years, bilateral trade grew tenfold¹ and the Chinese have consolidated themselves as the biggest economic partner of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and among the major ones of Colombia, Mexico, Perú and Venezuela, with a total sum of US$ 300 billion per year. In the 2010s, they rose as a relevant source of foreign direct investment, with a stock in the region of about US$ 105 billion, concentrated in agriculture, energy and mining.²

On the multilateral level, China is looking for regional support on its most important issues (Taiwan, Tibet), and became a member of the Inter-American Development Bank and created a cooperation forum with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC, in the Spanish acronym). The Asian nation has a strategic partnership with Brazil since 1993 and together they are a part of several international groups such as BRICS, BASIC and the two G-20s (the financial one and the one at the World Trade Organization).

The rise of China is happening at the same time that the United States and the European Union face a long crisis, with economic turmoil (low growth rates, high unemployment) and political unrest including Brexit and the ideological conflicts between liberalism and populism. A more assertive Chinese foreign policy has been leading to conflicts with the West and Asian neighbors, especially India. Although these tensions are concentrated in the South China Sea and the Himalayas, they are also present in Latin America, for Washington has traditionally considered the area its own sphere of influence, and it is concerned with Beijing’s new role as an economic powerhouse in the region.

This paper has the goal to understand China’s influence in Latin America in the early 21st century. In order to do so, in the first section, the text analyzes Chinese official documents and global economic data on the region.

Following that, the paper discusses the tensions between China and the United States in Latin America. They are a part of a larger trend of deterioration of bilateral relations between Beijing and Washington and a struggle for influence among the nations of the Global South. The American government is concerned over the stronger Chinese economic presence in the region, in time of crisis and instability in the United States.

The last section addresses the critical views towards China that began to arise in Brazil, especially under the current administration of Jair Bolsonaro, whose goal consisted in establishing a strong partnership with Donald Trump. As the biggest country in the region and also a nation with a major backlash against China, Brazil is an important case for the issues discussed in this paper.

China’s strategy towards Latin America

In colonial times in Latin America there were significant exports of silver from Spanish America to China, where the metal was used to buy silk, tea and porcelain. The Portuguese colony of Macau was also an important trade hub, and the Brazilian ports were also a part of the maritime route from Europe to Asia.³ In many ways this was the first real global network of commerce outside Eurasia.

In the 19th century, with the wars and rebellions in China, there was a flux of Chinese emigrants to the Americas, especially to Cuba, Mexico, Panama and Perú. In Brazil,
the Portuguese king John VI invited a group of a few hundred Chinese farmers to settle and produce tea – which they did, but without commercial success due to the inferior quality of the product. Later, in the second half of the 19th century, there was a big debate about using Chinese peasants as a replacement for black slaves, but due to racism against Asians only a small stream of immigrants was accepted on this base.¹

In the 20th century, war and revolution in China basically interrupted the economic links with Latin America. Some migration still happened, with a mix of reasons – political refugees, and/or Chinese looking for better opportunities. Most of them became small businessmen and joined the middle class.

When Mao Zedong was in power, the communist regime was not recognized by the nations in the regions, who followed the United States and established embassies in Taiwan. Until the middle of the 1970s, the only exceptions were Cuba and Chile, where left-wing leaders searched for relations with the People’s Republic. But when Washington and Beijing started their rapprochement, the political scenario changed and the biggest countries in Latin America started to send their diplomats to Mao, although Taiwan still kept allies including Paraguay and several other nations in Central America and the Caribbean.

At the time, the People’s Republic was one of the poorest nations in the world, and it was not seen by Latin American governments as an economic opportunity. However, in countries such as Brazil, diplomats perceived Beijing as a rising star in the politics of the Global South, and a partner for discourse in multilateral organizations, in common defense of the interests of developing nations.²

After Mao’s death and the rise of Deng Xiaoping, the accelerated development of China resulted in an annual rate of growth of almost 10% in 40 years.³ This new prosperity changed the country into a huge consumer of food, energy and raw goods produced in Latin America. In the 2010s, China bought 10% of the oil it consumed from the region, 1/3 of iron ore and around 60% of soy.⁴

The Chinese also wanted the Latin American support for their major strategic concerns, such as Taiwan and Tibet.⁵ About half of the 16 countries which recognize Taipei are in the region, but as trade with the People’s Republic of China had increased, some of the former Taipei supporters turned their diplomatic ties to Beijing, such as El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Panama.⁶

Since 2008 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published two White Papers containing the guidelines of its diplomatic strategy towards Latin America.⁷ The documents highlight the importance of trade and investment, but go beyond that, establishing a dozen sectors of cooperation and partnership in public policies. In education, for example, the Chinese government created 65 centers for the study of Latin America and expanded the teaching of Spanish and Portuguese.⁸

¹ Lee 2018.
² Oliveira 2004; Spektor 2010.
³ For Chinese economic data, see “Real GDP growth,” International Monetary Fund, accessed December 1, 2020, http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/CHN?year=2017.
⁴ Gallagher 2016, 45–47.
⁵ Roett and Paz 2008.
⁶ Carrie Kahn, “China lures Taiwan’s Latin American allies,” National Public Radio, October 13, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/10/13/654179099/china-lures-taiwans-latin-american-allies.
⁷ “China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. 2016/11/24,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, accessed December 1, 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1418254.shtml.
⁸ Mac Margolis, “Latin America needs a China strategy,” Bloomberg, December 14, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-12-14/latin-america-needs-a-china-strategy; Daniel Mandur Thomaz, “Por que a China aposa na língua portuguesa,” BBC Brazil, August 23, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/internacional-41022424.
The general lines of the Sino-Latin American relations are well exemplified by trade with Brazil, the biggest country in the region. It jumped from US$ 2.3 billion (2000) to US$ 100 billion (2019). Since 2009, China is the most important one among Brazil’s economic partners, the destination of 1/3 of its exports. About 80% of Brazil’s sells to China are three groups of commodities: soy, oil and iron ore. In contrast, Chinese exports to Brazil constitute a broad range of industrial products in telecommunications, television sets and electronic equipment.¹

In the 2010s, Chinese investments in Latin America grew significantly. China began by concentrating in infrastructure, especially in production or transportation of the commodities that it buys from the region. In these sectors, it invests more than the sum of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.² In recent years, it diversified its portfolio, also allocating resources in consumer goods and services.³

Some of China’s infrastructure projects are controversial, of dubious viability, such as a railway crossing South America, connecting the Brazilian southeast port of Santos, in the Atlantic Ocean, to Perú’s Pacific seashore; or a channel in Nicaragua, linking both oceans. However, the Chinese established a major presence in many sectors. In Brazil, during the 2014–16 recession they became the leading foreign buyer in processes of mergers and acquisitions of Brazilian companies, and the biggest investor in electrical energy after the national government.⁴

## China and the United States in Latin America

How to deal with China became one of the main issues in the foreign policy of the United States. Although there is a strong economic relationship between both countries, with a bilateral annual exchange of US$ 550 billion in goods, divergent interests led to increased tensions, in particular in the disputes for maritime limits in the South China Sea and in the trade war launched by Donald Trump’s administration.

In the academic and political debate, there is criticism about Washington’s troubles in terms of adapting to the new scenario with China as a major leader in a revitalized Asia,⁵ and a warning over the “Thucydides’s trap” where the rise of a new great power leads to war due to the fear of a current hegemon, as in the struggles between Athens and Sparta narrated by the Greek historian.⁶

The center of discussions is the conflict for influence in Indo-Pacific Asia – a geopolitical concept presently in vogue in American policy circles⁷ – but the rivalry with China is also present in the reflections on foreign policy towards Latin America.⁸ For many analysts, the growth in the Chinese influence in the region in the last two decades has a negative impact on American national interests, and Washington has been negligent and lacking clear guidelines in the policy for the region, in contrast with dynamic China’s actions.⁹

Beyond the rise of Sino-Latin American trade, the US has been watching with concern the increased engagement of China with infrastructure and defense in the region: investments, ¹ Data from Brazil’s Ministry of Economy, see www.mdic.gov.br.
² Dollar 2017.
³ Cariello 2018.
⁴ Marta Watanabe, and Daniel Rittner, “China lidera aquisições no país e busca novos setores,” Valor Económico, December 26, 2017, https://valor.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2017/12/26/china-lidera-aquisicoes-no-pais-e-busca-novos-setores.shtml.
⁵ Cole 2013; Hayton 2014; Kaplan 2014; McGregor 2017; Rachman 2016.
⁶ Allison 2017.
⁷ Auslin 2020; Doyle and Rumley 2019; Medcalf 2020.
⁸ Evan Ellis 2014; Gallagher 2016; Roett and Paz 2008.
⁹ Kevin Gallagher, “China steps into the Latin American void that Trump has left behind,” Foreign Policy, March 6, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/06/china-steps-into-the-latin-american-void-trump-has-left-behind/; Antonio Hsiang, “As America withdraws from Latin America, China steps in,” The Diplomat, January 4, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/as-america-withdraws-from-latin-america-china-steps-in/.
selling of arms, lending to governments with hostile relations with the United States, such as Venezuela. In recent years, the US government vetoed acquisitions of Chinese companies in their country and worried about similar transactions in Latin America. The focus of these efforts has been the activities of Huawei in implementation of the 5G Internet pattern.\footnote{Randy Woods, and Andrew Mayeda, “Trump steps up efforts to check China’s influence in Latin America,” Bloomberg, January 4, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-04/trump-steps-up-efforts-to-check-china-influence-in-latin-america.}

The US government is putting pressure on Latin American nations to ban Huawei from investing in 5G in the region, threatening them to cut access to international development banks or to suspend aid and international cooperation projects, especially in the smaller nations in Central America. However, this is not an easy choice, for these nations are also vulnerable to Chinese menaces, such as barriers against exports.\footnote{Ernesto Londoño, “To Influence El Salvador, China dangled money. The US made threats,” The New York Times, September 21, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/21/world/americas/china-el-salvador-trump-backlash.html; Oliver Stuenkel, “Huawei or not? Brazil faces a key geopolitical choice?,” Americas Quarterly, June 30, 2020. https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/huawei-or-not-brazil-faces-a-key-geopolitical-choice/.} Besides, Huawei is already present in the major countries of the region as a provider of telecommunications equipment in Brazil and of cell phones in Mexico.

Especially under Trump, American diplomacy towards Latin America has been concentrated on problems such as curbing migrations and organized crime. There is not a positive agenda for the region, such as trade deals. The US decision to quit the Transpacific Partnership had negative consequences for certain countries such as Chile, Mexico and Perú, which considered the agreement a good way to boost their exports. The rise of protectionism and revision of treaties, such as NAFTA, contributed to growing feelings of anxiety and instability.

The Trump administration most serious attempt to court Latin America away from China’s influence was the “Growth in the Americas” initiative of 2019. The program aims to increase private investment in the region, with cooperation regarding the adjustment of the regulatory framework and procurement policy of the countries in the area.\footnote{“Growth in the Americas,” U.S. Department of State, accessed December 1, 2020, https://www.state.gov/growth-in-the-americas/}. However, this program does not offer direct official investment from the American government, which is actually dealing with serious problems of underfinanced infrastructure in the United States itself.

On the other hand, China has offered Latin America the possibility of joining the Belt and Road Initiative, its giant global infrastructure project. In this new ‘geopolitics of connectivity’,\footnote{Abdenur and González 2018.} 19 countries of the region are now part of the New Silk Road, most of them in Central America and the Caribbean, with the exception being Chile. Brazilian authorities, for example, say they want Chinese investment but through their own policies, and reject what they see as the political burden of joining the Belt and Road.\footnote{Santoro 2019.}

However, there are efforts of American scholars and diplomats to rethink their historical relations with China and Asia in general\footnote{Campbell 2016; Green 2017.} and similar studies on Chinese actions in Latin America,\footnote{Evan Ellis 2014; Gallagher 2016.} which could lead to policy changes in future.

**Criticism of China in Brazil**

The growing presence of China in Latin America is also provoking a nationalist backlash from social groups which feel threatened by its rise. Brazil is an important case for many reasons: it is the biggest economic partner of the Chinese in the region and it has...
recently elected a president very critical of the Asian giant. For the first two years, Brazil was in a search to establish an alliance with Trump and the United States.

President Jair Bolsonaro is a former Army captain and congressman, who ran as the candidate of a small conservative party presenting himself as an outsider against a corrupt status quo, after a decade of recession and corruption scandals in Brazil. His victory highlighted a widespread rejection against political establishment. His promises concerning diplomacy were to rollback the initiatives of the left wing governments of 2003-2016 and take Brazil closer to the United States.\(^1\) He is the first Brazilian head of state since the diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic in 1974 to make public statements criticizing Beijing as a negative influence for the country.

During the presidential campaign, Bolsonaro also broke Brazilian diplomatic tradition by visiting Taiwan – something that no other leader of Brazil ever did. The trip was part of the Asian tour that included Japan and South Korea and ostensibly left out the People’s Republic. In Taipei, he praised the Taiwanese society as a synthesis of the best of American and Japanese cultures.

Chinese diplomats in Brazil feared that the trip was a sign of an ending to the “One China policy” that all Brazilian administrations followed since 1974, and reacted by sending a letter to all members of Brazil’s Congress highlighting how important this issue is to Beijing.\(^2\)

The anti-China statements were not limited to the president. He chose as his minister for foreign affairs a career diplomat Ernesto Araújo, a newly promoted ambassador who had written in support of Trump’s vision of international affairs and who argued for need of Western countries to reconnect with their Christian heritage in order to face what he saw as the threat of a rising China.\(^3\)

These positions are rare in Brazil’s Foreign Service whose members usually support stronger ties with Beijing and helped to build partnerships such as BRICS, BASIC, G20 and other multilateral groups that bind Brazil and China together. Since 1993, the relationship has been considered by both governments as a ‘strategic partnership’ and they developed several bilateral initiatives, the most ambitious being the CBERS Program, a joint project for building and launching satellites that has already produced five artifacts since 1988.\(^4\)

Nowadays there are three main lines of criticism of China in Brazil, and they are all present in the groups that are a part of the coalition of Bolsonaro administration. These three types of rhetoric are the economic, the national security and the cultural case against China.

The criticism centered on economic policy blames China for unfair competition against Brazilian industry and points to Chinese practices such as dumping, low salaries or weak labor/environmental legislation as factors that curb Brazilian industrial development. These discussions are not exclusive to Brazil, but they have special resonance in the country that faced a severe backlash in terms of deindustrialization, with sectors like textiles and toys suffering from the negative impacts of China’s imports.

Bolsonaro’s own views on international trade are ambivalent. In his career in Congress, he has sided with protectionist groups who were against a bigger opening of the Brazilian economy. However, in his presidential campaign he assumed the pro-market and free trade positions, which are defended by the country’s business establishment, and nominated an economic team aligned with this worldview. That puts Bolsonaro in sharp

\(^1\) Bolsonaro 2018.
\(^2\) Maurício Santoro, “A Gafe de Bolsonaro,” O Globo, March 14, 2018, https://oglobo.globo.com/opiniao/a-gafe-de-bolsonaro-22485852.
\(^3\) Araújo 2017; Consuelo Dieguez, “O Chanceler do Regresso,” Vultos da República, April 2019, https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/o-chanceler-do-regresso/; Richard Lapper, “Bolsonaro took aim at China. Then reality struck,” Americas Quarterly, April 23, 2019, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/bolsonaro-took-aim-at-china-then-reality-struck/.
\(^4\) Correa and Barbosa 2017; Lima 2016.
contrast with other nationalist politicians in the United States and Europe, who are usually in favor of higher tariffs and less globalization.

National security is a more common option for the nationalist right in its criticism of China. This is usually expressed as a concern about Chinese control of natural resources and infrastructure in the country. The most famous statement from Bolsonaro on the issue is his line that: "China is not buying in Brazil. China is buying Brazil."¹

The president is not alone in this view, which is shared by many officers in the Armed Forces. They do not like the idea of having a foreign government in charge of key assets in Brazil. Generals, Admirals and Air Force senior officers form about 40% of the cabinet and are also present as chairmen in public companies and state agencies – an unprecedented level in Brazilian history, even among the military dictatorships of the country, and without parallel in any major democracy.

The Brazilian military officers have a conservative view of foreign policy, which usually supports the consensus of the last decades, but are more critical of the rapprochement with Latin American left-wing regimes, and usually careful about China. They recognize the economic importance of the country, but they do not want to be politically close to Beijing. Trained as officers in a dictatorship in the apex of the Cold War, they often have strong anti-communist views that they associate with the People’s Republic.²

The last line of criticism is the one that is about cultural identity. This is the case – dear for the president and the foreign affairs minister – that Brazil should seek a special relationship with the United States and closer ties to the Western nations. It often has a religious approach, emphasizing the Brazilian Christian heritage and highlighting that China has very different values and political system. In the words of ambassador Araújo: "We want to sell soy and iron ore, but we’re not going to sell our soul."³

Statements like these contradict traditional pillars of Brazilian foreign policy, such as the support for multilateralism and a pragmatic approach regarding international trade. For example, it was the dictatorship that recognized the People’s Republic in 1974, despite the anti-communism of the military regime.

The criticism of China along cultural lines is concentrated in a group that call themselves the “anti-globalists.” They oppose international organizations which they see as tools for spreading liberal values, and defend traditional visions of national sovereignty. They are close to the American alt-rights and to populist movements in Europe. In Bolsonaro administration, they gather around one of the president’s sons, congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro⁴ and the minister of foreign affairs.

Anti-globalists are usually young and somewhat of outsiders – ambassador Araújo, for example, was until a few months ago a middle-rank diplomat, who was never the head of a foreign mission, nor did he hold high office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; they usually have a strong social media presence, but tend to be mocked by traditional press outlets who often present them as radicals.

Foreign policy towards China in the Bolsonaro administration is the result of conflicts and negotiations between these different groups and oscillates between keeping

¹ "A China está comprando o Brasil", diz o presidenciável Jair Bolsonaro,” BOL Videos, video, 6:39, https://videos.bol.uol.com.br/video/a-china-esta-comprando-o-brasil-diz-o-presidenciavel-jair-bolsonaro-0402CD9A3460D0996326.
² Maurício Santoro, "Mourão ganha protagonismo com viagem à China,” Revista Época, May 26, 2019, https://epoca.globo.com/mourao-ganhou-protagonismo-em-viagem-china-artigo-23694767.
³ Lapper 2019.
⁴ Bolsonaro has five sons, and the three adult ones are all professional politicians: a senator, a congressman and a member of Rio de Janeiro’s city council. This is a new situation in Brazil, and the political role of the president’s family is controversial in the country, somewhat like similar discussions about Trump’s daughter and son-in-law in the United States.
the traditional pragmatic approach of Brazilian diplomacy or adopting more critical and careful views of Beijing. The main dispute has been anti-globalists versus senior military officers. The conflict led to disagreements and offences exchanged through the media and to the firing of many officials, including cabinet ministers, aligned with both groups.

Vice-president Hamilton Mourão, a retired Army general, rose as the key player for the Brazilian groups searching for a pragmatic relationship with China. Mourão stressed the importance of the Chinese market and investments for Brazil, and that the country should not take sides in the trade war between Washington and Beijing and instead try to use the conflict as an opportunity to boost the country’s national interests.

The vice-president stated that the government would not veto Huawei’s business in Brazil and that the Chinese company will be able to take part in the auction to implement the 5G Internet pattern. He also expressed caution about the possibility of Brazil joining the New Silk Road, but underlined that China’s investments are welcomed.¹

The anti-globalists get a lot of headlines because of their controversial statements, but during the first year of his administration (2019), Bolsonaro usually conducted a pragmatic diplomacy towards China, including a successful visit to the country. Chinese investment from state owned companies was politically important in the November 2019 pre-salt oil auction – if not for their rapport, only the Brazilian Petrobras would have taken part in the operation.²

However, the anti-China trend is still present on the sidelines of the administration, and it sometimes comes to the center of the debate. During the Covid-19 pandemic, officials close to the president – such as his son Eduardo Bolsonaro and the minister of education Abraham Weintraub – blamed Beijing for the outbreak of what they called “the Chinese virus.” There is currently an investigation in the Supreme Court against Weintraub, for anti-Chinese racism. These comments provoked strong responses from China’s diplomats in Brazil, who have become very active on social networks and mainstream media, responding to Brazilian politicians.³

The tensions did not escalate into a major change of foreign policy, but they raised the mistrust in Brasília-Beijing relations in the middle of a delicate situation of the pandemic, and stimulated state governors to pursue their own medical diplomacy with China, in search of masks and respirators.⁴

The perspectives for the near future are of a complicated situation due to the changes in the international scenario, with the deterioration of the Washington-Beijing relations, and the cross-pressures that these disputes will bring to Brazil. The global economic crisis due to the pandemic is increasing the importance of Chinese markets to Brazilian exports – from January to June 2020 they grew 14.6%, amid a drop of 15.2% in sells to other countries.⁵

The Brazilian president has a difficult challenge to balance the attempt to establish a preferential relationship with the United States in a time of a rising China in Latin America.

¹ Santoro 2019.
² Bruno Rosa, “As estatais chinesas que chamaram a atenção no leilão do pré-sal,” Época, June 11, 2019, https://epoca.globo.com/economia/as-estatais-chinesas-que-chamaram-atencao-no-leilao-do-pre-sal-24066343.
³ Felipe Frazão, “O influenciador digital de Pequim na polarização,” O Estado de São Paulo, April 11, 2020, https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral-o-influenciador-digital-de-pequim-na-polarizacao,70003268057.
⁴ João Paulo Charleaux, “A diplomacia paralela da compra de respiradores pelo Maranhão,” Nexo Jornal, April 21, 2020, https://www.nexojornal.com.br/expresso/2020/04/21/A-diplomacia-paralela-da-compra-de-respiradores-pelo-Maranh%C3%A3o.
⁵ Aricia Martins, “Vendas para a China crescem 15% e sustentam saldo comercial,” Valor Econômico, July 27, 2020, https://valor.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2020/07/27/vendas-para-china-crescem-15-e-sustentam-saldo-comercial.ghtml.
Conclusion

In the first two decades of the 21st century, China became an important economic partner of Latin America, and in the case of Brazil, also a relevant ally in the big issues of the global agenda. The Chinese search for food, mining resources and energy in the region, and have been investing in the infrastructure necessary for its production and transportation.

The Sino-American trade war poses serious problems to Latin America, for it depends on both partners and usually lacks diplomatic autonomy or domestic consensus for bold moves that could exploit the opportunities of the ‘conflict’. The region is reacting to the cross-pressures, without the chance to propose something new. Even if Washington has not managed to formulate a coherent alternative to Beijing’s investments in infrastructure, its political pressure created an environment where joining the BRI is a risky move for the biggest nations in the region.

The case of Brazil is an interesting illustration of the point, showing that even a president who stated a clear view on the matter is, in practice, linked to several interest groups, which leads to few viable options. The threat to Brazilians – and the other Latin Americans – is that the growing tensions between China and the United States will lead to more economic problems in a moment where the risk of a global recession is strong, and the region suffers from another round of instability and crisis.

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Политика Китая в Латинской Америке в XXI веке

М. Санторо

→ Аннотация

За последние два десятилетия Китай стал крупной экономической силой в Латинской Америке благодаря торговле и инвестициям, и установил прочные связи со странами региона, включая стратегическое партнерство с Бразилией. Однако китайское влияние вызывает озабоченность в Соединенных Штатах, которые пытаются ограничить роль Пекина в Латинской Америке. В статье анализируются действия Китая в регионе и реакция Соединенных Штатов на примере Бразилии – такой выбор обусловлен ее важностью для внешней политики Китая, а также личностью ее нынешнего президента, который в первые два года правления избирал риторику в отношении Пекина, поддерживавшую Дональда Трампа. Автор начинает исследование с анализа стратегии Китая в отношении региона Латинской Америки, представляя исторический очерк основных событий в данном контексте, особенно подчеркивая как рост, так и диверсификацию китайских инвестиций в последнее десятилетие. Затем автор анализирует текущую позицию США по отношению к действиям Китая в Латинской Америке, дополнительно выделяя основные сферы обеспокоенности США в данном вопросе. Заключительная часть статьи представляет собой тематическое исследование политики Китая в отношении Бразилии и соответствующей позиции нынешней бразильской администрации по данному вопросу. Отмечается, что в краткосрочной перспективе ситуация осложняется изменениями в международной конъюнктуре, а именно ухудшением отношений между Вашингтоном и Пекином и перекрестным давлением, которое окажет на Бразилию последствия этого взаимодействия в уже существующей ситуации развития многих кризисов в регионе Латинской Америки.

→ Ключевые слова

Бразилия, Китай, Латинская Америка, Соединенные Штаты, торговля, инвестиции, Один пояс и один путь

Конфликт интересов: Автор заявляет об отсутствии потенциально-го конфликта интересов.