Democratic Security Policy in Colombia: Approaches to an enemy-centric counterinsurgency model

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Política de Seguridad Democrática en Colombia: aproximaciones a un modelo de contrainsurgencia centrado en el enemigo

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Abstract
The purpose of this document is to reflect upon the Democratic Security Policy (PSD by its abbreviation in Spanish) that took place in Colombia under the presidency of Álvaro Uribe Vélez, between 2002 and 2010. To this end, in the fight against the guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC by its abbreviation in Spanish) and the National Liberation Army (ELN by its abbreviation in Spanish), the PSD is understood, in these terms, not so much as a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, but on the contrary, as a predominantly enemy-centric model. It is also theoretically presented as a hybrid model between the scheme of compulsion and accommodation proposed by Hazelton (2011, 2013, 2017), and the authoritarian model that Zukhov (2012), or Byman (2016) approach, among others. In this regard, the work draws on data from the database on the internal armed conflict expressly facilitated by the Vice-Presidency of the Republic, and by a set of in-depth interviews with the main actors involved in the conflict during the time of the study, from the Government, as well as from the Military Forces, the guerrillas and the paramilitaries.

Keywords: Counterinsurgency; Democratic Security Policy (PSD by its abbreviation in Spanish); Armed Conflict; Colombia; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC by its abbreviation in Spanish); National Liberation Army (ELN by its abbreviation in Spanish)

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Resumen

El siguiente trabajo tiene como propósito reflexionar sobre la Política de Seguridad Democrática (PSD) acontecida en Colombia bajo la presidencia de Álvaro Uribe Vélez entre 2002 y 2010. A tal efecto, en la lucha contra las guerrillas de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) y el Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), la PSD se entiende, a tenor de estas líneas, no tanto como una estrategia contrainsurgente basada en la población sino, todo lo contrario, como un modelo mayoritariamente centrado en el enemigo. Asimismo, teóricamente se presenta como un modelo híbrido entre el esquema de compulsión y acomodación que plantea Hazelton y el modelo autoritario que abordan Zukhov o Baldy, entre otros. Al respecto, el trabajo se nutre de cifras provenientes de la base de datos sobre el conflicto armado interno expresamente facilitadas por la Vicepresidencia de la República, y por un conjunto de entrevistas en profundidad con actores protagonistas del conflicto durante el tiempo objeto de estudio, tanto del Gobierno, como de las Fuerzas Militares, las guerrillas y los paramilitares.

Palabras clave: Contrainsurgencia; Política de Seguridad Democrática; Conflicto Armado Colombia; FARC; ELN

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1.INTRODUCTION

The main objective of the following work is to analyze the dimension of the Democratic Security Policy (PSD by its abbreviation in Spanish), which took place in Colombia under the presidency of Álvaro Uribe Vélez in his two periods of government (2002-2006 and 2006-2010), emerging from its strong counterinsurgency tendency and despite the fact that, during these years, the official governmental position was always that the FARC and ELN were not guerrillas but terrorist groups.

Apart from this consideration, the fact is that most of the academic literature on this subject has always maintained the conception of understanding guerrillas as insurgent actors (Daly, 2012; Gruber & Pospisil, 2015; Marks, 2017) within a scenario of internal armed conflict. However, the PSD integrates in itself a series of changes in the form not only of recognizing but also of fighting the insurgent enemy, which justifies its nourished interest as object of study. And the point is that, a good part of the specialized works with greater academic relevance emphasize that the counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) experienced in Colombia under the PSD, by its characteristics, responds mainly to the population-centric COIN paradigm.
(DeShazo, McLean, & Mendelson, 2009a; Berrios, 2017; Ospina, 2017). However, and unlike these, the following work vies for vindicating a dimension of the PSD where instead, it would be possible to find more reactive, even more authoritarian elements, typical of the COIN schemes that are focused on the enemy.

This is how this work is organized into four clearly differentiated parts. Initially, a theoretical approach to the concept of COIN, to its main elements and, above all, to the two models that are predominant in the specialized literature: the focus on the enemy, and the focus on the population (Jardine & Palamar, 2013; Paul, Clarke, Grill, & Dunigan, 2016). Subsequently, we present the methodological aspects that characterize this work, proposing not only the starting point of why to conceive the PSD within the models of COIN focused on the enemy, but also identifying some of the variables, sources of information, and research techniques used to this end. In the third part, the Colombian case is carefully studied from two very specific theoretical references that converge in the construction of the COIN model focused on the enemy. On the one hand, the model of compulsion and accommodation suggested by Hazelton (2011, 2013, 2017), and on the other, the authoritarian model proposed by Menjivar and Rodriguez (2005), Zukhov (2012), or Byman (2016). Finally, we present the conclusions that, as a corollary, seek to identify both future lines of research and other debates that are still unresolved after this work.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: NOTIONS, SCOPE AND MEANING OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY ACTION

The concept of counterinsurgency can not be simplistically reduced to strictly tactical or strategic terms, but, on the contrary, it must be understood as a concept that is in constant redefinition by the state policy-makers in order to satisfy the traditional Weberian idea that substantives the State in strict terms of legitimate and exclusive monopoly of violence over a given territory (Weber, 2005). However, the complexity of the notion of COIN goes through its own academic identification. That is, should COIN be understood as a discipline or sub-discipline of strategic studies, or better as a practice, or even as a tool from the state? Initially, and transcending from a debate that does not involve this work, it can be pointed out that COIN, in any case, is conceived from its beginnings in the sixties, as a kind of programmatic doctrine at the dawn of the influence of the RAND Corporation and whose objective is to respond “to the problems of Cold War low-intensity conflict, under conditions of nuclear superpower confrontation, against agrarian communist insurgencies in the former territories of European empires in Asia and Africa” (Killcullen, 2012, p. 131).

Thus, COIN responds in particular to a logic of conflicts that have changed due to the geopolitical order of Post-Cold War (Taylor & Flint, 2002), but which continue to be influenced by the concurrence of national liberation guerrillas acting against a colonizer or post-colonizer agent (i.e. Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria). At the same time, the
State (i.e. Peru, Colombia), sensu contrario, seeks to reinforce its legitimacy and, by extension, to defeat the insurgent threat that is taking place in its sovereign territory.

That is to say, based on the above it can be pointed out that an irremediable confrontation between the insurgent, who initiates the action, and the State, who responds in COIN mode is being fed. A COIN that counts with issues against it, to say, the development of an armed confrontation generally in peripheral contexts (Saleyhan, 2007; Tollefsen & Buhaug, 2015), inaccessibility where in a conjunctural manner juxtapose unresolved agrarian struggles, national demands, or colonial disputes and that, as McAlister (1967), Taylor (1997) or Dixon (2009), point out, use preexisting networks - being families, tribes, or political parties - for the sake of a popular malaise that feeds the social foundations of popular insurrection (Thompson, 1966).

Against this, the counterinsurgent attempts to isolate such networks and bases of support by marginalizing the resources that sustain the insurgent action by means of an accumulation, mostly, of small actions that respond to a top-down logic. This leads, according to Garcia Guindo (2014, p. 37), to “a highly dynamic, decentralized and three-dimensional form of war in which the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations are more interdependent than in typical conventional operations, and where the desired final state can only be achieved through military capabilities”. Thus and following Hammes (2012), COIN in this work, rather than a discipline or possible theoretical field of strategic studies, is conceived as a capacity and a strategy of the State against very particular contexts of violence, such as the Colombian one, where the main enemies are the guerrillas from the FARC and the ELN.

As noted above, within the multiple readings and theoretical approaches that accompany the COIN studies, two major ways of directing action against counterinsurgency groups could be identified. That is, population-centric COIN and enemy-centric COIN, and while both are about prescriptive theories of responding to the insurgent enemy, as recognized by Killcullen (2005, 2006), are not mutually exclusive, depending on the scenario where the armed confrontation takes place. In this respect, it should be pointed out that the first case is also called COIN model of governance (Hazelton, 2013), of welfare (Shultz, 1979), or classic (Evans, 2015), and it is inspired by political, economic and social reforms from which victory in the face of the insurgency can be achieved. On the other hand, in the second case the coercive logic prevails, either through the suppression of cost-benefits that aid insurgency (Shultz, 1979), with a greater drive against the enemy supported by a cooption of demands through partial reforms (Hazelton, 2011), or even the incorporation of non-democratic methods into counterinsurgency action (Zukhov, 2012).

2.1. Population-centric counterinsurgency

The population-centric COIN is developed mainly from the Anglo-French school, whose main references are Thompson (1966) and Galula (2007), among
Winning the “hearts and minds” of the people has become enshrined as a pivotal component of counter-insurgency warfare ever since 1952 when General Sir Gerald Templer declared it would be the key to success in fighting the communists.

others (Dixon, 2009). This approach has the victory over hearts and minds\(^2\) as its main motto, which seeks to get emotional support from the popular bases whenever they pursue their own rational interest. That is why economic, social and political reforms that intervene on the causes of exclusion that legitimize the insurgency become essential. This because, according to Crane (2007), it is a priority when it comes to reversing the support of the legitimation communities (Mann, 1997) and to mitigate their political factors, making intelligence and isolation actions against insurgents a priority.

That is, the military victory is not so much privileged as the political victory. In this way, efforts must prioritize what is political in order to achieve the support of the population (75%), rather than developing a purely military component (25%). Therefore, the difficulty of its implementation lies in the achievement of a perfect balance between coercion and the search for cooperation, between search and destroy missions against guerrilla groups, and the establishment of secure and hold operations, in order to protect the population from insurgent influence (Evans, 2015).

According to the Malaysian experience, Thompson (1966) emphasizes the importance of reversing the insurgent action aimed at breaking the ties between the State and the civilian population, for which the most important thing for in this model of COIN is to avoid military imprinting and prevail a set of actions that satisfy the demands of society and contribute to generate order and stability. That is, the armed action is only understood as efficient in the phases of construction of the insurgency or in the beginnings of the guerrilla preparation (Taylor, 1997), being less effective when the insurgency has consolidated as a real threat to the interests of the State.

It is for this reason that the population-centric COIN demands five nuclear pillars or foundations for its successful implementation. These are, 1) an effective Government, with a well-defined political objective; 2) transparent and defined legal constraints to the COIN enforcement action; 3) a comprehensive plan of economic, political, social and cultural reforms that act as a roadmap in the management of armed violence; 4) with a special emphasis on dismantling the insurgent political structure - for which the intelligence work must fall mainly on the Police, due to its greater proximity to the civilian population; and 5) that prioritizes a centripetal logic, from the center to the periphery, paying more attention to the centers of higher population density in the State (Taylor, 1997). In addition, and in the same line with what is suggested by Herrero (2012), the possible creation of strategic villages with which to prevent the cooptation or relocation of insurgencies in the peripheral enclaves, and the contribution to the gradual process of territorial consolidation of the State.

\(^2\) Winning the “hearts and minds” of the people has become enshrined as a pivotal component of counter-insurgency warfare ever since 1952 when General Sir Gerald Templer declared it would be the key to success in fighting the communists.
Finally, Galula (2007) integrates a sequential logic of activities that equally identify the most specific aspects of the population-centric COIN. The first must be to considerably weaken the insurgency so that it does not represent a real military threat. After that, it is necessary to restore the authority over the population and isolate it from the insurgency, although without exceeding the limits and consolidating, at the same time, an effective network of information and security on the population. In the third place, intervention becomes necessary on the local political organization, especially through the police, with the intention of promoting spaces for local electoral competition where, far from engaging candidates from the State, it is the civilian population who chooses them. Finally, it is time to test the new local authorities, which will ensure that there is no recruitment in favor of the insurgency neither small groups that help it. It is at this point that support for projects of economic, political, social and cultural transformation is a priority, independent from COIN, and in parallel to the last actions with which to reduce, almost completely, the insurgency.

2.2. Enemy-centric counterinsurgency

In this type of COIN, there are activities of a conventional type that are carried out, with which a military defeat of the enemy is sought, allowing to integrate elements that, even, can approach the dirty war, the transgression to the norms of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the appeal to paramilitary groups or the negative impact of the civilian population (Ucko, 2016).

This theoretical model could be said to be relatively marginal with respect to the population-centric model so that, in the absence of further conceptual development, experience shows a remarkable number of cases, especially in the Latin American continent (i.e. Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru). Even, its scope is such that it could be identified, at least, up to three sub models as for example the suppressive COIN, the compulsion and accommodation COIN, and the authoritarian COIN. Thus, the Colombian case study that will be addressed will be characterized as a kind of hybrid model of the latter two.

Suppressive COIN would be characterized by resorting to the use of force and fear against the civilian population with the aim of modifying not only the behavior of the insurgents but also the behavior of the population in which they can find support. Thus, it is not a matter of bringing suffering per se, but rather its purpose is for the population to avoid this mourning by changing their behavior, as proposed by Wolf and Leites (1970). This model is based on the Cold War deterrence theory (Waltz, 1995), which operates in three levels: the strategic level of the two superpowers, the limited conventional warfare level, and the level below this last one, where the COIN is located.
Similarly, this model is based, as proposed by Shultz (1979), on the paradigms of rational choice, the game theory, and the systems theory, so that the insurgency is understood as the key to endogenous and exogenous inputs that produce outputs. That is to say, the bases and political support act as inputs that allow the insurgent system to grow made up of infrastructure, facilities, troops, logistics, military apparatus or international support, among other elements. In front of these inputs, both the physical elimination and the psychological demoralization of the enemy become necessary. The priority for the suppressive COIN, therefore, is to have a force that allows the submission of the population, after calculating costs and benefits, and always according to a relative excess in suffering and destruction. That is, the priority is to reduce the incomes of the insurgency as well as the support of the social bases from the population, whose incentives are marked by a relative persuasion in favor of the State.

The second enemy sub model is called COIN of compulsion and accommodation, and has been recently developed by Hazelton (2011, 2013, 2017). The purpose here is to affect the will and the ability for conflict of the insurgent, while undermining its elements of support. This is manifested in the intensification of the direct attack against the guerrillas rather than in avoiding the number of civilian casualties as well as in the implementation of partial and focused socio-economic reforms.

This is how two ways of fighting the insurgency are identified. On the one hand, the direct path or compulsion, that seeks not only to inflict direct damage to the guerrilla but also to reduce its capacity of recruitment and cooptation. That is, it must affect the guerrilla “as they target the State, with small-unit tactics and targeting their lines of communication, bases, and caches” (Hazelton, 2013, p. 13). Thus, it is a matter of attacking the insurgent capacities, especially in terms of troops, supplies, financing sources, and territorial control, adversely affecting the civilian population as long as their possible proximity or support to the insurgency is punished. Everything, because the objective is to infuse fear, to dissuade collaboration with the insurgency, and to keep the message of inexorable victory in favor of the State unrestricted.

Indirectly, the above must be accompanied by elements of limited accommodation, generating alliances with local and national power centers, as well as focused and partial socioeconomic reforms, in order to reduce social support to the insurgency and optimize the mechanisms of intelligence and influence on the population. In this way, the objective is to transform the local order where the guerrillas operate in favor of an alliance between institutions, productive fabric, and civil society, where all can find positive reinforcements in maintaining counterinsurgency unity, being the co-optation essential, above all, of the local elites and de facto leaders, such as religious leaders, politicians, clientelistic networks, and warlords.

Finally, the authoritarian COIN has, in practice, found Russia to be its best reference, although it has been a mainly domestic demonstration, with the exceptions
of Afghanistan or Tajikistan. This COIN is favored by the absence of democratic guarantees, which allows, as Zukhov (2012) points out, an indiscriminate use of force and the implementation of collective punishments, which requires an enormous capacity of resources, intelligence, logistical capacity, and coordination. This coupled with actions that are unacceptable such as concentration camps, forced relocation, burned land actions, deportation, or cordon and search practices, actions that were successful in building *homo sovieticus*, according to Kapuściński (1994).

3. METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS

As pointed out in the introduction, the hypothetical approach from which this research work starts is to answer the following question: what is the COIN model that would predominantly characterize the PSD? Thus, the answer to this effect is to argue that more than a model focused on governance or population, as stated by DeShazo, McLean and Mendelson (2009a; 2009b) or Ospina (2014; 2017), the Colombian case from 2002 to 2010 would respond more strongly to an enemy-centric COIN, with elements of compulsion and accommodation, as well as authoritarian.

Thus, there are variables that can be identified, as for example, the characteristic features of the compulsion proposed in Hazelton (2011; 2013; 2017), but present in other works such as Foley, Griffin and Mccartney (2011) or Gilly and Gilly (2014), where military expenditures, the strengthening of the public force, the combat capacity, the impact on the finances of insurgent groups, and the destruction of their ties with the civilian population are essential. In respect of the accommodation or co-optation, very focused and partial economic and social reforms can be proven, without depth, and without affecting the social structure, as well as the alliances with warlords like the paramilitaries. Also, the traits of the authoritarian model would be found in the use of the paramilitary phenomenon, the undemocratic excesses of the counterinsurgency struggle, and the direct involvement of the civilian population.

This analysis is based on two resources. The part related to compulsion responds, especially, to a largely quantitative treatment. Thus, the added value in this respect rests on the access to the database of the conflict that exists in the Observatory for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (ODHDIH by its abbreviation in Spanish) attached to the Vice-Presidency of the Republic until 2014. This access, expressly facilitated for this investigation, allows knowing by municipal breakdown the number of armed actions on the part of the FARC, the ELN, its territorial control, as well as the number of military operations put into effect. The interesting thing about this source is its rigorousness compared to other predominant sources in the study of the Colombian case, such as those from the Center of Research and Popular Education (CINEP by its abbreviation in Spanish) or the Resource Center for the Analysis of Conflicts (CERAC by its abbreviation in Spanish), because unlike them, the processing of the figures comes directly from the Ministry of Defense, which in
turn integrates into the database the information that the Administrative Department of Security provided until 2010 and, since then, jointly the National Police and the General Command of the Military forces.

As for the accommodation component, this can be verified from the generation of infrastructure for economic integration, free trade agreements, liberalization for investment in energy, social programs such as *Familias en Acción*, as well as in the development of the Integral Action doctrine, in which the Military Forces built infrastructure for essential services such as health, education and roads. All this without extensively modifying the social and economic structure of the country, with its characteristics of inequality of wealth and land tenure, large landholdings, under-exploitation of agriculture - 70% of the country’s arable land has not been integrated into the productive process (FAO, 2016), and clientelistic networks that hinder the transparent exercise of the policy. This is evident in the persistence of “two countries” with very different social and economic characteristics: the center and the periphery (Ríos, 2016).

On the other hand, the part that is related to the authoritarian imprint of the PSD highlights the presence of testimonies derived from in-depth interviews that were carried out for this investigation. In this way, the selection of personalities who had leading positions within the different actors who were involved in the Colombian internal armed conflict during the period of time of this study, between 2002 and 2010, is done. Thus, the contributions of the former president of Colombia, Álvaro Uribe Vélez and his former defense minister, Marta Lucía Ramírez, are collected; also, from the ex-vice minister of defense and Major General (r), Henry Medina. On the part of the paramilitarism, two commander-in-chief of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia were interviewed: Fredy Rendón, “El Alemán”, as former leader of the Group Elmer Cárdenas, and Edwar Cobos, “Diego Vecino”, as ex-commander of the Group Heroes de los Montes de María. On the part of the FARC, Elda Neyis, “Karina”, ex-commander of the 42nd Front was interviewed; as well as José Luis Ramírez, “Byron”, ex-commander of the Carlos Alirio Buitrago Front from the ELN, and Olimpo de Jesus Sánchez, “Cristóbal”, ex-deputy commander Front Ernesto Che Guevara from the ELN, and general commander from the Guevarista Revolutionary Army (ERG by its abbreviation in Spanish).

4. THE COLOMBIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: DEMYSTIFYING THE POPULATION-BASED COIN PARADIGM

The most representative studies from recent years that have focused on analyzing COIN policies in the particular context of the Colombian internal armed conflict have coincided in a paradigmatic character as a governance model, that is population-centric (DeShazo, McLean, & Henderson, 2009a; Berrios, 2017; Ospina,
However, according to the approach that is formulated in the following pages, the attempt is to emphasize that, on the contrary, the COIN model that is enclosed in the PSD integrates elements that rather merit its classification as an example of enemy-centric counterinsurgency fight. That is to say, _sensu contrario_ to what was proposed in a large part of the most outstanding works in the Colombian analysis, the thesis that is being tried to assert is precisely that the COIN in Colombia, at least from 2002 to 2010, has responded to a logic that is predominantly belligerent and sometimes even undemocratic.

That is to say, and according to the hybrid character of the COIN models that Kilcullen (2012) pointed out, it could be affirmed that reality offers elements that would allow to categorize the Colombian COIN between Hazelton’s model of compulsion and accommodation (2011, 2013, 2017) and the authoritarian model, especially collected by Zukhov (2012), Byman (2016), or Ucko (2016), among others.

From the Hazelton model, the Colombian COIN that elapsed under the PSD between 2002 and 2012 would focus the logic of compulsion by means of the use of force that has been substantially intensified throughout this decade. That is, territorial control is intensified by means of increasing public expenditure on security and defense, which is verifiable with the increase in the number of personnel in the public force. Similarly, substantial intervention on the funding resources of insurgencies is also taking place, especially on coca production and its processing into cocaine hydrochloride, kidnapping and extortion, and the co-opting and recruiting capacity of armed groups.

Accommodation is verified on its part through very partial social and economic reforms, which do not transform the country’s social and economic structure based on inequality of wealth and land tenure, lack of access to essential services, lack of economic diversification and roads, unemployment, low levels of education, and the division between urban and rural country.

On the other hand, the absence of democratic restrictions could be highlighted from the authoritarian model, which leads the Colombian public force to set itself as the actor with the greatest number of direct violations of the Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law during the last decade, far above the guerrillas and the various paramilitary groups. Likewise, the creation of a man that is submissive to power and authority is built through a gradual process of militarization of every-day life that condemns any expression that could question the PSD, with great popularity among the most important demographic centers of the country, and which at some point use a kind of dirty war thanks to the connivances with paramilitary groups and the local political power, especially between 2002 and 2005.

### 4.1. Compulsion and accommodation in Colombia

For this type of COIN, there is a key element resulting from the use of force against insurgent groups, translated in turn into a double dimension: on one hand,
the direct confrontation against the guerrillas, their resources, and their connections in terms of troop strength and recruitment; on the other hand, a strengthening of the intelligence, information and coordination of operational structures, in the case of Colombia, of Security and Defense, which at the hand of selective improvements, must feedback, not only the work of interfering with the capacities and wills of the insurgency but, equally, to contribute to the use of the force in favor of the State.

When Álvaro Uribe arrived at the Colombian presidency in 2002, the magnitude of the violence adjudicated Colombia to the notion of failed State (Mason, 2002; Rotberg, 2004). According to the figures favored by the ODHIDH (n.d.) expressly for the purpose of this work, for example, almost 1,200 armed actions from the FARC and ELN were accounted, the violent death rate per 100,000 inhabitants was 69.62, there were 28,775 violent homicides, 680 massacres, 2,882 kidnappings, and almost 600,000 cases of forced displacement.

It is for this reason that the cornerstone of his eight years in power, and which in turn was the key that allowed its promotion and subsequent electoral victory, was precisely the Democratic Security Policy (PSD by its abbreviation in Spanish). This PSD aims at assuming security as a joint task that must be a priority for all the authorities of the State, where a huge investment of resources becomes necessary, same that in the first four years and being used strictly in the fight against the guerrillas, was estimated in US$1,835 million (Presidencia de la República, 2007, p. 33). Likewise, between 2006 and 2010, there are another US$5.770 million added (Presidencia de la República, 2010, p. 30), to which other US$8 billion coming from the Plan Colombia have to be included as well (Otero, 2010). A deeply militarized Plan Colombia after the attacks of September 11th and that, unlike its initial approach, during the whole republican presidency of George W. Bush considered the military cooperation and the fight against narcotics as a priority.

The truth is that, during these years, the PSD is articulated at all times with the Plan Colombia, to the point of being confused in many occasions, emphasizing especially on the need of optimizing the resources that are destined to technical and human intelligence. This, with the aid of a top-level advisory from Washington and with particular emphasis on strengthening the instruments of cooperation and coordination of the Armed Forces together with the National Police. Besides, in a sustained manner, during the presidency of Álvaro Uribe there was a security and defense expenditure that was maintained stable, exceeding 4% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which ranked the country as the fourth country in the continent that most incremented its military budget, after Chile, Venezuela, and Ecuador, and the one with the greatest coverage of public forces by number of inhabitants - with an average of 881 military people per 100,000 inhabitants, rate surpassed only by Bolivia (Mindefensa, 2011b, p. 17).

Translated into figures, the Colombian National Police, between 2002 and 2010, went from 110,000 members to 160,000, and the Military Forces increased
from 203,000 to 270,000 military personnel, so that, in aggregate terms, the public force manpower in Colombia experienced an increase of 40%, and a notable advance regarding modernization, organization, coordination, distribution and provision of resources (Mindefensa, 2010, p. 68). In the same way, 60 anti-guerrilla battalions, 15 mobile brigades, 8 territorial brigades, more than 40 detachments with high-precision snipers, 24 instruction and training centers, 12 Plan Meteoro military companies for the roads, and 9 support battalions were created. Also, the high mountain battalions that were developed in Parque de Farallones (Valle del Cauca) were optimized, together with the ones located in El Espino (on the axis Arauca, Boyacá, Casanare), Valencia (Cauca), Génova (Quindío), Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, and Serranía de Perijá, groups that sought to act directly on enclaves of guerrilla presence, with little population, but directly affecting the vertebral axes of the guerrilla (Medellín & Rangel, 2010, p. 154). If we finally add to the above the training component of Plan Colombia, which included, among other things, exercises and combined operations, military education in the United States, and joint experimentation in intelligence, communications, control and command, then one can say that the change in the correlation of forces in favor of the State was a matter of time.

Assuming that during the presidency of Andrés Pastrana a total of 2,150 operatives of the public force against the FARC and ELN were counted, under the presidency of Alvaro Uribe these amount raised to almost 17,000, obtaining, during the first two years, the disappearance of the guerrilla from the geographic central enclaves in the country, such as Cundinamarca, Caldas, Risaralda, Quindío, Boyacá, Santander, and northern Meta (ODHDIH, n.d.). In fact, only in 2002, the PSD began with the Operación Libertad I that would already be the first sample of what Uribe’s intention was, when initiating an operative of dispute against the guerrillas and the subsequent territorial control that involved more than 15,000 military people within a field of action of more than 70,000 km² - that covered eastern Tolima, all the department of Cundinamarca, the northern Meta and the southern-eastern Boyacá - and that left with itself not only a symbolic defeat within the FARC, but also the death in combat of some traditional guerrilla leaders such as “Manguera”, “El Viejo” or “Marco Aurelio Buendía” (Pizarro, 2011). At the same time, the Fuerzas de Tarea Conjunta (within which the Omega stands out) began to act directly on the two most powerful blocs of the FARC, the East and the South, so that for the first time in a long time the Colombian public forces began to direct combat operations in settings of great rootedness of the guerrilla, as it happened with Caquetá, Guaviare, Meta, or Putumayo (Vargas, 2012; Spencer, 2016).

For its part, the ELN also begins to suffer from the jolts of the PSD in such a way that, as pointed out by the sources of ODHDIH (n.d.), during the first presidency term of Álvaro Uribe there is already a significant change in the volume of operations, whilst the Military Forces directed up to 1,484 combats, there were only 258 actions of an almost reduced guerilla to the departments of Arauca, Norte de Santander and eastern and northeastern Antioquia.
Thus, between 2002 and 2010, 2,501 battles were directed against the ELN, and 14,418 armed actions against the FARC. In turn, granted that in 2002 the FARC accumulated 1,042 armed actions in 346 municipalities, and the ELN did the same with 154 actions in 65 municipalities, in 2010 the correlation of forces had changed substantially. This is because 724 actions from the FARC are collected, already in 166 municipalities, and scarcely 65 guerrilla activities from the ELN in 27 municipalities (ODHDIH, n.d.).

Hence, throughout all this process, of obvious weakening in general terms, the FARC accumulated significant casualties on historical names of its structure, as is the case with members of the Secretariat, “Negro Acacio”, “Raúl Reyes”, “Mono Jojoy “and” Alfonso Cano”, or “Martín Caballero”, head of the Front 37th from the South of Bolivar and “Iván Ríos”, head of the Central Bloc. The same happens with an ELN that for example, between 2009 and 2010, suffered the loss of three of its most important leaders of the Bolshevik Front in Lebanon - “Mauricio”, “Duván” and “Lain” - leading to its disappearance from the department of Tolima in addition to several captures within the National Directorate.

Given this, the COIN in the dimension of compulsion posed by Hazelton (2013, 2017) would integrate a necessary strengthening in the capacity of the State against the insurgency. However, it also requires a dimension in terms of intervention on the funding sources and on relations with the civilian population that, equally, the PSD did not neglect. Based on the above, between 2002 and 2010, 20,062 laboratories from coca farmers were destroyed, 1,233 tons of marijuana, 5.3 tons of heroin, and 1,269 tons of cocaine were seized in a way that, while in 2002 the coca area was 130,364 hectares, in 2010 it had reduced to 58,073 hectares. This happened after spraying almost one million hectares with glyphosate (UNODC, 2013). Similarly, in 2002 the number of kidnappings in Colombia was 2,882 and there were 262 cases of extortion, while in 2010 the figures were reduced to 282 and 152 cases, respectively (Revista Criminalidad, 2012).

Together with the weakening of the financing sources, it was possible to construct an imaginary of security in favor of the State that contributed substantially to change the traditional perception of weakness that for decades had characterized the Colombian institutionality. This affected when reducing the recruitment capacity of the guerrillas and influencing the achievement of a greater number of demobilizations. In respect thereof, we can highlight the recovery of the control over roads, which for a long time were at the mercy of “pescas milagrosas”, as happened with the routes between Valledupar-Santa Marta, Valledupar-Maicao-Riohacha, Valledupar-Pailitas, Cartagena and Sincelejo, or Medellín-Mutatá (Medellín & Rangel, 2010, p. 126). All in short, will contribute to reduce the FARC’s force from 18,000 to just over 8,000 combatants, and the ELN from 5,000 to less than 1,800 troops (Ríos, 2017a). Likewise, the demobilization of 15,095 FARC guerrilla fighters and 3,188 ELN guerrilla fighters was motivated; as 36,664 guerrilla people,
mainly from the FARC and the ELN were captured, and another 13,879 were finally discharged (Mindefensa, 2010).

All of the above shows the magnitude of a PSD that, however, paradoxically, for Alvaro Uribe was not circumscribed in a fight against the guerrillas and therefore, strictly speaking, to a COIN strategy:

I never spoke nor used the word conflict. The word conflict applies to the dispute between insurgencies and dictatorships. Between guerrillas and non-democratic systems. In Colombia, there has always been a solid democracy, challenged by groups that ended up reduced to narcoterrorism. Nor have I ever used the concept of war because our problem in Colombia was a problem of public order. What we had to do was to guarantee security and ensure compliance with the citizen. This was done based on three axes: security, investment, and social policy (A. Uribe, personal interview, June 2015).

Nevertheless, the truth is that, according to the figures that are in the National Statistical Department or in the Department of Social Prosperity, as well as to the reports published on an annual basis by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), it is not possible to appreciate favorable dynamics in the indicators that initially supported and legitimized the conflict, such as the Gini coefficient of income distribution, land distribution, or regarding unsatisfied basic needs. That is to say, the PSD as COIN was mostly reduced to a military dimension, as expressed by the ex- Minister of Defense Marta Lucía Ramírez when she was asked about the topic:

Social sovereignty of borders: that was the key. Without infrastructure, how to address poverty, which is the most important structural basis of violence in Colombia? None of this was implemented by President Uribe, who was assaulted by an eagerness for results that ended up being negative (M. L. Ramírez, personal interview, June 2015).

That is to say, following the same model of Hazelton, the logics of accommodation or cooptation can be verified, only in a residual manner, as partial socioeconomic reforms that sought to secure specific sectors for investment, by the agency of greater means of communication and transportation, and also responding to targeted demands from the most vulnerable population with subsidy programs such as Familias en Acción, from which more than two million families benefited by receiving school and health assistance subsidies in cases of extreme poverty and vulnerability (Mills, 2016).

Equally, there were attempts to reconnect the ties between the Government and some localities affected by the guerrilla or the lack of governance through the Community Councils, in which communities participated in public and direct conversations with the President (Kilcullen, 2016). A doctrine of the comprehensive action was even developed in order to respond to specific demands for infrastructure.
and essential services in remote populations, with the clear aim of reducing the levels of discontent with the government and, by extension, the possible motivations to support the insurgency (Ospina, 2011, 2014, 2017).

These elements, *prima facie*, are characteristic of a COIN scheme focused on governance and population. That is how they are understood in works like the one presented by DeShazo, McLean and Mendelson (2009b) when they highlight the intervention model through the Plan of Integral Consolidation of La Macarena as paradigm of the PSD and the COIN of governance, and by which six municipalities in the department of Meta were recovered at a crowning moment of the PSD, thanks to governance activities such as infrastructure development, access to essential services, or the institutional improvement. Moreover, these same authors point out in parallel events, facts such as that the PSD left with it a much more dynamic and effective judicial reform, in addition to a better democratic quality at the local level, which helped to weaken corruption, and the traditional functioning of insurgent groups in Colombia (DeShazo, McLean & Mendelson, 2009a); an affirmation that later has been deepened and emphasized by Holmes and Gutiérrez (2014).

However, the truth is that such reforms did not change the more substantial aspects of violence. This is because, in spite of everything and during the time that was taken to achieve this, there were no substantial improvements in the diversification of productive activity (CEPAL, 2015), neither in the inequality indexes (CEPAL, 2011), nor in the democratization of the land (PNUD, 2011), and less regarding a reform of the political system in order to allow localities to express their voice in front of the central government. That is to say, although there were activities and plans for the socioeconomic reform (Mills, 2016), they could also have been indicated to be designed in order to allow an adequate functioning of a coercive counterinsurgency model, served by the generation of economic resources and the mitigation of the support to the insurgency with the aim of contributing to the coercive consolidation of the state apparatus. Thus, there were no social or economic reforms broad enough as for deeply transforming the situation of poverty, unemployment, lack of governance, or access to essential services – see the levels of Quality of Life or Unmet Basic Needs in a temporary perspective according to the National Planning Department - and the few socioeconomic reforms that took place only served as a component of partial attention to social demands. In other words, it could be said that when people were taken into account, it was only as a foothold to reduce the insurgency, but not to improve their living conditions in a profound way.

4.2. Authoritarian counterinsurgency in Colombia

In relation to the above, it could also be pointed out that the PSD as a model of COIN, integrated elements that are characteristic of authoritarian models, especially the direct involvement of the civilian population as *de facto* police forces in the
counterinsurgent struggle, the use of paramilitarism as an armed wing parallel to the state (which also agrees with Hazelton’s co-optation component in alliances with de facto leaders), as well as the centered excesses of violence, particularly on the civilian population.

For the purposes of the paramilitarism, one must begin by pointing out that in Colombia, it was legal for decades, as recognized by the Legislative Decree 3398 from 1965 - turned into permanent legislation after Law 48 from 1968 - and because of whom there was a legal basis from which to form civil self-defense groups under the control of the Armed Forces. It is under this rule that the paramilitary groups that for decades controlled the region of Magdalena Medio (Medina, 1990), but also others such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Cordoba and Urabá (ACCU) and the controversial CONVIVIR (Ronderos, 2014), especially rooted in the north part of the country. In fact, only when these paramilitary structures were outlawed in September 1997, under the presidency of Ernesto Samper, did the paramilitary political project of the Castaño brothers gain strength through the so-called United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC by its abbreviation in Spanish). And, in this regard, it should be noted that it is no secret that paramilitary groups supported the operations of the security forces for much of the past decade, as recognized by the ex-Minister and Major General Henry Medina Uribe:

Regarding paramilitarism, I have hundreds of approvals for the creation of self-defense groups, which was a legal and legitimate right. The problem is when it is constructed as a criminal action against the State where the groups finally share equal actions and disputes of power, and where the truly defeated is society. When I presented my position in the PSD, I was a minority. It was thought that, by the influence of the Maoism, if the guerrillas could make use of all forms of fighting, the Army could as well. But it was not supposed to be that way. That would place us in the same position. However, the majority and the collusion of operatives with the AUC, especially at the field not the institutional doctrine level, is proving to be an undeniable reality (H. Medina, personal interview, September 2015).

In fact, several guerrilla fighters recognize that one of the keys to understand the defeat or, at least, the armed weakening that they experienced at the beginning of the last decade was precisely the connivance between paramilitarism and public forces:

The AUC were our greatest enemies. The civilian population suffered. We developed several combat actions in southwest Antioquia and in the border with Chocó. They were the other enemy to fight against. However, the paramilitarism was a public policy of the government (“Cristóbal”, personal interview, September 2015).

The AUC asserted the saying of removing the water from the fish in order to choke it. And so they inflicted too much harm on us. Notice that we even had to plant in Urabá or
in Antioquia. Above all, since the year 2000 when the AUC were consolidated, Ramón Isaza had controlled the paramilitary groups. Directly, the ELN will not be able to do anything and will disappear. And to that, add the impact of the PSD because I am sincere, after 24 years in the FARC, I saw 6 presidents and none of them hit us as hard as Uribe Vélez (“Karina”, personal interview, May 2015).

We did well until the AUC arrived and the FF.MM (Colombian Military Forces) were strengthened. That affects us a lot (...) In short, we lost the war. The AUC won. We lost the political and military war. What the PSD did by hitting us that hard, was taking us to our denaturalization. For example, we became a force that was just by the freeway. We did not do guerrilla warfare but hit the ground. There was a lot of paramilitarism. So much that the Central Command (COCE by its abbreviation in Spanish) told us that it was a lost war (“Byron”, personal interview, June 2015).

That is to say, the paramilitarism played a key role in weakening the guerrillas, especially in Cesar, La Guajira, Magdalena, Atlántico, Córdoba or particular scenarios in Antioquia, just as it has been recently revealed in works such as that from Ríos (2017b). In fact, one hypothesis that could be presumed would be that effective paramilitary demobilization actually arrives once the correlation of forces has shifted and favored the State, and when the achievements of the PSD and Plan Colombia lead to a sort of irreversibility against the interests of the guerrilla. Perhaps, this can be found in the testimonies of two of the paramilitary heads of the AUC that were interviewed in this respect:

The AUC, along with paramilitaries and Convivir eradicated part of the existing militias in the region. Just in Urabá, 7,000 people died, from which 4,500 were guerrilla fighters. Everyone, the Police, the Army, the AUC, were acting against a common enemy. Then, after the demobilization, the police sent us where we had done the work. That gave them credibility. With Uribe, we had agreed everything. We delivered everything. Everything clean (...) Towards 2002-2003 the truth is that we realized that we are useful idiots of the public force and of the US strategy. They all wanted us to do the dirty work. That led us to the decision of putting a ceasefire in the armed confrontation. The State already had combat capabilities. We had already done the dirty work. We had to step aside (“El Alemán”, personal interview, June 2015).

Given the lack of state, we ended up attacking and capturing all the FARC support. We began to build our State (...). We won. We took the territory. Finally, we consolidated and implemented our state model under the power of arms. We did not experience a process of submission to justice. Law 975 was designed by the executive, made law by the legislative, and countersigned by the Constitutional Court. Even an Exploratory Commission was created, and an agreement with the Organization of American States (OAS) was reached, which brought into being the Peace Support Mission (MAPP/OEA by its abbreviation in Spanish). Is that submission? Submission means to negotiate
and accept an agreement with a prosecutor for delivery. Our situation cannot be called submission to justice. It was a political process in due form, and denying it was the great mistake of Uribe and Santos (“Diego Vecino”, personal interview, May 2015).

Two more elements that would bring part of the PSD to the most characteristic budgets of the authoritarian COIN could be added to the obvious relationship with the paramilitarism: the involvement of the civilian population in the counterinsurgent armed struggle, and the undemocratic excesses in the before mentioned confrontation scenario.

So, on the one hand, the establishment of structures that in the form of peasant soldier units began to assume work from the police force all over the country took place since 2003, except for Amazonas, Guainía, San Andrés and Vaupés. So much that up to 598 squads of 36 members each were created, which meant militarizing up to 21,500 peasants in the country (Arbeláez, 2006). In addition, networks of informants were also created, involving civilians throughout the military intelligence tactic, as was the case with territorial control or the provision of information or surveillance.

The best example was the “reward Monday”, that is, payments of 2.5 million pesos (approximately 800 dollars) to all those citizens who cooperated with sufficient information to capture guerrilla members, or avoid acts of terrorism. Not coincidentally, the first contributions to this type of rewards ended up being paramilitary control enclaves that contributed to weaken the Caribbean Block, and the operating fronts in the Montes de María. In fact, by the year 2004, the number of informants amounted to 3,200,000 citizens so that the citizens who collaborated in the counterinsurgent war, in the background did it according to the official ideological base of the PSD, leading to a worrying trend, which has been increasing over the years. Moreover, according to Angarita (2011, pp. 318-319), it became “a source of corruption to the extent that it was lent to undue charging through alliances between criminals and agents of the public force who, being protected by confidentiality, escaped the controls that any government activity must have and more, if there are high amounts of money involved”.

Finally, it would highlight the antidemocratic excess in which the PSD often incurred. In this regard, we should not forget violations to the International Law such as the attack in the Ecuadorian territory with which Raul Reyes, known as the Chancellor of the FARC, was killed. Also, the fact that the Colombian armed conflict developed “in-doors” implied significant difficulties in the systematic application of the norms on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, even further, of the concurrence of negative reinforcements such as the Directive 029 promoted by the then Minister of Defense, Camilo Ospina, and with which the members of the public force who were responsible for bringing down guerrilla fighters were paid economic benefits.
This, for example, led to the “false positives” scandal. A scandal that, in the background, responded to Alvaro Uribe’s propagandistic quest to permanently justify the apparent strength and necessity of the PSD. That is to say, according to the necessity for a total and direct confrontation with the armed groups, it was presumed that it needed to show continuous visible results in order to legitimize it and to endure. However, the result was that of a practice that ended up projecting how guerrillas killed non-guerrilla civilians. Counting between 2001 and 2010, and according to CINEP (2011), a total of 1,119 victims were recorded in 887 extrajudicial executions.

On the other hand, these excesses also appeared in the very logic of the combats, in such a way as, according to CINEP (2010, p. 3), between January 2002 and June 2011, a total of 12,997 violations to the Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law would have occurred in Colombia, from which 5,486 would have been attributed to paramilitary groups, 4,358 to the public force, 2,507 to the FARC, 321 to the ELN, and 325 to minor guerrillas, such as the People’s Liberation Army (EPL by its abbreviation in Spanish). Even today, this data that would give a good account of the chronicity, continuity, intensity, and excesses that the armed conflict experienced under the implementation of the PSD.

5. CONCLUSIONS

At this point, it is possible to observe how the reality of the most significant data that the PSD offers, invites us at least, not to reject the thesis of understanding that the actions of COIN happened under the same, responded to a strong reactive component of dispute and belligerence. In fact, a significant issue in the text is that, precisely after the PSD, neither the FARC nor the ELN were the same guerrillas that began the change of the century.

In both cases, there is a weakening of its structures and territorial presence, as well as in its sources of financing, which can be appreciated from any source of rigor that addresses the armed conflict as an object of study. Moreover, the process of dialogue with the FARC in Havana, formally finalized after the signing of the Peace Agreement with the Government of Colombia in November 2016, would have not been possible without the change in the correlation of forces in favor of the State and the irreversible weakening experienced by the guerrilla. The same could be said of an ELN that at present occupies a geographic and armed position practically reduced to the northeastern side of the country and that at least, formally, is in the interest of advancing in a process of dialogue that takes place in Quito with an agenda that is very similar to the one developed with the FARC-EP.

Furthermore, the most authoritarian elements of the PSD were left behind. The paramilitarism, at least formally, demobilized under Law 975 of 2005, Justice and Peace, although with many doubts and shadows regarding the components of truth, reparation and non-repetition, and that would connect with the redefinition
of the phenomenon through what are now known as “criminal gangs”. Likewise, the research on “false positives” has experienced many obstacles due to the intermediation of military justice and the concealment of evidence to the Attorney General’s Office, although in recent years progress has been made with regard to the status of many of the processes, almost in paralysis since 2010.

In any event, and within a framework of armed post-conflict in Colombia, COIN actions will continue to be necessary, not only because of the possible mutation of the criminal phenomenon, but especially because of the power vacuum that is involved in the handover of weapons by the FARC and the continuity of coca cultivation in huge proportions of territory. Also, the continuity of the guerrilla phenomenon with the ELN, especially the activism of the Eastern and Western Fronts of War, which are the most wayward with the peace process, and the possible dissidents that arise within the FARC makes the continuity of a COIN strategy to be required. However, if it is about making the Peace Agreement sustainable, and improving the living conditions of millions of Colombian citizens, especially in those areas that have been most affected by decades of conflict, structural measures and reforms will also be essential to provide better distribution of the country’s resources, a strengthening of the productive fabric, a greater generation of resources, and a progress in the quality and coverage of unsatisfied basic needs that continue to affect in a negative way almost 40% of the civilian population.

Finally, a word of final criticism can also be said about the overused counterinsurgency model of governance. These pages confirm once again that most of the times what is considered a population-centric model are actually partial measures of co-optation of demands combined with coercive efforts. In this sense it could be affirmed, perhaps recalling Machiavelli (1998) that the model of governance exists more in the minds of theorists than in practical reality. This speaks not so much against the governance model, but in favor of the fact that, if the case is reducing the insurgency in terms of the efficiency of related media, it must establish a state of security at the very beginning, supported perhaps by local elites and cooptation of social demands. No matter how, such action will always be subject to democratic constraints that affect its legitimacy, and hence its medium-term sustainability, if not complemented by a long-term transformation of a country such as Colombia with political, economic, and social structures that are still very dysfunctional.

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