Improving KernelSHAP: Practical Shapley Value Estimation via Linear Regression

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Abstract

The Shapley value solution concept from cooperative game theory has become popular for interpreting ML models, but efficiently estimating Shapley values remains challenging, particularly in the model-agnostic setting. We revisit the idea of estimating Shapley values via linear regression to understand and improve upon this approach. By analyzing KernelSHAP alongside a newly proposed unbiased estimator, we develop techniques to detect its convergence and calculate uncertainty estimates. We also find that the original version incurs a negligible increase in bias in exchange for a significant reduction in variance, and we propose a variance reduction technique that further accelerates the convergence of both estimators. Finally, we develop a version of KernelSHAP for stochastic cooperative games that yields fast new estimators for two global explanation methods.

1 INTRODUCTION

Shapley values are now used by many machine learning (ML) model explanation methods (e.g., SHAP, IME, QII, Shapley Effects, Shapley Net Effects, SAGE) [24, 25, 38, 13, 32, 23, 12]. The Shapley value was developed in cooperative game theory [36], but recent work shows that it provides a powerful tool for explaining how models work when either individual features [24], individual neurons in a neural network [18], or individual samples in a dataset [17] are viewed as players in a cooperative game. Shapley values have become a go-to method because they provide a principled way to allocate credit in cooperative games.

The main challenge when using Shapley values is calculating them efficiently. A naive calculation has computational complexity that is exponential in the number of players, so numerous approaches have been proposed to accelerate their calculation, sometimes using approximations. Besides brute-force methods [23], other techniques include sampling-based approximations [38, 37, 10, 12], model-specific approximations (e.g., TreeSHAP) [1, 25] and a linear regression-based approximation (KernelSHAP) [24].

Here, we revisit the regression-based approach and address several shortcomings in KernelSHAP. Recent work has raised questions about whether KernelSHAP is an unbiased estimator [29], and, unlike sampling-based Shapley value estimators [6, 26, 12], KernelSHAP does not provide uncertainty estimates. Furthermore, KernelSHAP provides no guidance on the number of samples required because prior work has not closely examined its convergence properties.

We address each of these problems, in part by building on a newly proposed unbiased version of the regression-based approach. Our contributions include:

1. We derive an unbiased version of KernelSHAP and show empirically that the original version incurs a negligible increase in bias in exchange for a large reduction in variance.
2. By assuming that KernelSHAP’s variance evolves at the same rate as the unbiased version, we show how to detect and forecast convergence, and how to calculate uncertainty estimates for the results.
3. We propose a variance reduction technique that further accelerates KernelSHAP’s convergence.
4. Finally, we adapt these estimators to stochastic cooperative games [9] to provide fast new approximations for two global explanation methods, SAGE [12] and Shapley Effects [32].

With these new insights and tools, we aim to enable a more practical approach to Shapley value estimation via linear regression.
2 THE SHAPLEY VALUE

This section provides background on cooperative game theory and the Shapley value.

2.1 Cooperative Games

A cooperative game is a function \( v : 2^D \to \mathbb{R} \) that returns a value for each coalition (subset) \( S \subseteq D \), where \( D = \{1, \ldots, d\} \) represents a set of players. Cooperative game theory has become increasingly important in ML because many methods frame model explanation in terms of cooperative games [11]. Notably, SHAP [21], IME [38] and QII [13] all define cooperative games that represent an individual prediction given a subset of features. For a model \( f \) and an input \( x \), SHAP (when using the marginal distribution [24]) analyzes the cooperative game \( v_x \) defined as

\[
v_x(S) = \mathbb{E}[f(x_S, X_{D\setminus S})], \tag{1}
\]

where \( x_S \equiv \{x_i : i \in S\} \) represents a feature subset and \( X_S \) is the corresponding random variable. Two other methods, Shapley Effects [32] and SAGE [12], define cooperative games that represent the model’s behavior across the entire dataset. For example, given a loss function \( \ell \) and response variable \( Y \), SAGE uses a cooperative game \( w \) that represents the model’s predictive performance given a subset of features \( X_S \):

\[
w(S) = -\mathbb{E}\left[\ell(\mathbb{E}[f(X) \mid X_S], Y)\right]. \tag{2}
\]

Several other techniques also frame model explanation questions in terms of cooperative games, where the players represent either individual features [23], neurons in a neural network [13], or examples in a dataset [17]. Each technique observes how some target quantity (e.g., the model loss) varies as groups of players (e.g., features) are removed, and the Shapley value summarizes each player’s contribution.

2.2 Shapley Values

The Shapley value is a celebrated cooperative game theory result for defining credit allocations to each player in a game [36]. The Shapley value assumes that the grand coalition \( D \) is participating and seeks to provide each player with a fair allocation of the total profit, which is represented by \( v(D) \). Fair allocations must be based on each player’s contribution to the total profit, but a player’s contribution is often difficult to define. Player \( i \)'s marginal contribution to the coalition \( S \) is the difference \( v(S \cup \{i\}) - v(S) \), but the marginal contribution typically depends on which players \( S \) are already participating. The Shapley value resolves this problem by deriving a unique value based on a set of fairness axioms [36]. We direct readers to other works that discuss these axioms in detail [36, 30]. The Shapley value can be understood as a player’s average marginal contribution across all possible player orderings, and each player’s Shapley value \( \phi_1(v), \ldots, \phi_d(v) \) for a game \( v \) is given by:

\[
\phi_i(v) = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{S \subseteq D \setminus \{i\}} \frac{(d-1)}{|S|} \left( v(S \cup \{i\}) - v(S) \right). \tag{3}
\]

Many ML model explanation methods can be understood in terms of ideas from cooperative game theory [11], but the Shapley value is especially popular and is also widely used in other fields [21, 33, 39].

2.3 Weighted Least Squares Characterization

The Shapley value can be characterized in several ways, but the perspective most relevant to our work is that it is the solution to a weighted least squares problem. Many works have considered fitting simple models to cooperative games [8, 20, 19, 14, 13, 28], particularly additive models of the form

\[
u(S) = \beta_0 + \sum_{i \in S} \beta_i.
\]

Such additive models are known as inessential games, and although a game \( v \) may not be inessential, an inessential approximation can provide a helpful summary of each player’s average contribution. Several works [8, 20, 14] model games by solving a weighted least squares problem using a weighting function \( \mu \):

\[
\min_{\beta_0, \ldots, \beta_d} \sum_{S \subseteq D} \mu(S) \left( u(S) - v(S) \right)^2.
\]

Perhaps surprisingly, different weighting kernels \( \mu \) lead to recognizable optimal regression coefficients \( (\beta_1^\ast, \ldots, \beta_d^\ast) \) [20]. In particular, a carefully chosen weighting kernel yields optimal regression coefficients equal to the Shapley values [8, 21]. The Shapley kernel is given by

\[
\mu_{\text{Sh}}(S) = \frac{d - 1}{(|S| |D| (d - |S|))},
\]

where the values \( \mu_{\text{Sh}}(\emptyset) = \mu_{\text{Sh}}(D) = \infty \) effectively enforce constraints \( \beta_0 = v(\emptyset) \) for the intercept and \( \sum_{i \in D} \beta_i = v(D) - v(\emptyset) \) for the sum of the coefficients. Lundberg and Lee [21] used this interpretation of the Shapley value when developing an approach to approximate SHAP values via linear regression.
3 LINEAR REGRESSION APPROXIMATIONS

Shapley values are difficult to calculate exactly because they require examining each player’s marginal contribution to every possible subset (Eq. 3). This leads to run-time that is exponential in the number of players, so efficient approximations are of great practical importance [33, 37, 24]. Here, we revisit the regression-based approach presented by Lundberg and Lee (KernelSHAP) [24] and then present an unbiased version of this approach that is simpler to analyze.

3.1 Optimization Objective

The least squares characterization of the Shapley value suggests that we can calculate the values \( \phi_1(v), \ldots, \phi_d(v) \) by solving the following optimization problem:

\[
\begin{align*}
\min_{\beta_0, \ldots, \beta_d} & \quad \sum_{0 < |S| < d} \mu_{SH}(S) \left( \beta_0 + \sum_{i \in S} \beta_i - v(S) \right)^2 \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad \beta_0 = v(\emptyset), \quad \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^d \beta_i = v(D).
\end{align*}
\] (4)

We introduce different notation to make this problem easier to solve. First, we denote the non-intercept coefficients as \( \beta = (\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_d) \in \mathbb{R}^d \). Next, we denote each subset \( S \subseteq D \) using the corresponding binary vector \( z \in \{0, 1\}^d \), and with tolerable abuse of notation we write \( v(z) \equiv v(S) \) and \( \mu_{SH}(z) \equiv \mu_{SH}(S) \) for \( S = \{i : z_i = 1\} \). Lastly, we denote a distribution over \( Z \) using \( p(z) \), where \( p(z) \propto \mu_{SH}(z) \) when \( 0 < 1^T z < d \) and \( p(z) = 0 \) otherwise. We can now rewrite the optimization problem as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\min_{\beta_0, \ldots, \beta_d} & \quad \sum_z p(z) \left( \beta_0 + z^T \beta - v(z) \right)^2 \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad \beta_0 = v(\emptyset), \quad 1^T \beta = v(1) - v(0).
\end{align*}
\] (5)

3.2 Dataset Sampling

The challenge with solving the optimization problem above (Eq. 5) is that it requires evaluating the cooperative game \( v \) with all \( 2^d \) coalitions. Evaluating \( v(0) \) and \( v(1) \) is sufficient to ensure that the constraints are satisfied, but all values \( v(z) \) for \( z \) such that \( 0 < 1^T z < d \) are required to fit the model exactly. KernelSHAP manages this challenge by subsampling a dataset and optimizing an approximate objective. Using \( n \) independent samples \( z_i \sim p(Z) \) and their values \( v(z_i) \), KernelSHAP solves the following approximate version of the problem:

\[
\min_{\beta_0, \ldots, \beta_d} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left( \beta_0 + z_i^T \beta - v(z_i) \right)^2 \\
\text{s.t.} \quad \beta_0 = v(0), \quad 1^T \beta = v(1) - v(0).
\] (6)

A similar dataset sampling approach is used by LIME [35], and it offers the flexibility to use only the number of samples required to get an accurate approximation of the objective. Given a set of samples \( (z_1, \ldots, z_n) \), solving this problem is straightforward. The Lagrangian with multiplier \( \nu \in \mathbb{R} \) is given by:

\[
\hat{L}(\beta, \nu) = \beta^T \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n z_i z_i^T \right) \beta \\
- 2\beta^T \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n z_i (v(z_i) - v(0)) \right) \\
+ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (v(z_i) - v(0))^2 \\
+ 2\nu (1^T \beta - v(1) + v(0)).
\]

If we introduce the shorthand notation

\[
\hat{A}_n = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{z}_i \hat{z}_i^T \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{b}_n = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{z}_i (v(z_i) - v(0))
\]

then we can use the problem’s KKT conditions [5] to derive the following solution:

\[
\hat{\beta}_n = \hat{A}_n^{-1} \left( \hat{b}_n - \frac{1}{1^T \hat{A}_n^{-1} \hat{b}_n - v(1) + v(0)} \right).
\] (7)

This is the method known as KernelSHAP [24], and the implementation in the SHAP repository\(^1\) also allows for regularization terms in the approximate objective (Eq. 6). As we show in Section 4, it is unclear whether it is unbiased, and understanding its variance and rate of convergence is not straightforward. Next, we proceed by deriving an alternative approach that is simpler to analyze.

3.3 An Exact Estimator

Consider the solution to the problem that uses all \( 2^d \) player coalitions (Eq. 5). Rather than finding an exact solution to an approximate problem (Section 3.2),

\(^1\)http://github.com/slundberg/shap
we now derive an approximate solution to the exact problem. The full problem’s Lagrangian is given by

\[
\mathcal{L}(\beta, \nu) = \beta^T \mathbb{E}[ZZ^T] \beta \\
- 2\beta^T \mathbb{E} \left[Z(v(Z) - v(0))\right] \\
+ \mathbb{E} \left[(v(Z) - v(0))^2\right] \\
+ 2\nu (1^T \beta - v(1) + v(0)),
\]

where we now consider \( Z \) to be a random variable distributed according to \( p(Z) \). Using the shorthand notation

\[
A = \mathbb{E}[ZZ^T] \quad \text{and} \quad b = \mathbb{E} \left[Z(v(Z) - v(0))\right]
\]

we can write the solution to the exact problem as:

\[
\beta^* = A^{-1} \left(b - 1^T A^{-1} b - v(1) + v(0)\right). \tag{8}
\]

Due to our setup of the optimization problem, we have the property that \( \beta^* = \phi(\nu) \). Of course, we cannot evaluate this expression in practice without evaluating \( v \) for all \( 2^d \) coalitions \( S \subseteq D \).

However, knowledge of \( p(Z) \) means that \( A \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times d} \) can be calculated exactly and efficiently. To see this, note that \( (ZZ^T)_{ij} = Z_i Z_j = 1 \) (if \( i = j = 1 \)). Therefore, to calculate \( A \), we only need to estimate \( p(Z_i = 1) \) for the diagonal values \( A_{ii} \) and \( p(Z_i = Z_j = 1) \) for the off-diagonal values \( A_{ij} \). Expressions for these values are given in Appendix \( A \).

Since \( b \) cannot be calculated exactly and efficiently due to its dependence on \( v \), this suggests that we should use \( A \)'s exact form and approximate \( \beta^* \) by estimating (only) \( b \). We suggest the following estimator for \( b \):

\[
\tilde{b}_n = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n z_i v(z_i) - \mathbb{E}[Z] v(0).
\]

Using this, we arrive at the following alternative to the KernelSHAP estimator (called unbiased KernelSHAP, see Section 4.1):

\[
\tilde{\beta}_n = A^{-1} \left(\tilde{b}_n - 1^T A^{-1} \tilde{b}_n - v(1) + v(0)\right). \tag{9}
\]

In the next section, we compare these two approaches both theoretically and empirically.

## 4 ESTIMATOR PROPERTIES

We now analyze the consistency, bias and variance properties of the Shapley value estimators, and we consider how to detect, forecast, and accelerate their convergence.

### 4.1 Consistency, Bias and Variance

A consistent estimator is one that converges to the correct Shapley values \( \beta^* \) given a sufficiently large number of samples. If the game \( v \) has bounded value, then the strong law of large numbers implies that

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \hat{A}_n = A \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{n \to \infty} \hat{b}_n = \lim_{n \to \infty} \bar{b}_n = b,
\]

where the convergence is almost sure. From this, we see that both estimators are consistent:

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \hat{\beta}_n = \lim_{n \to \infty} \tilde{\beta}_n = \beta^*.
\]

Next, an unbiased estimator is one whose expectation is equal to the correct Shapley values \( \beta^* \). This is difficult to verify for the KernelSHAP estimator \( \hat{\beta}_n \) due to the interaction between \( A_n \) and \( b_n \) (see Eq. 9). Both \( A_n \) and \( b_n \) are unbiased, but terms such as \( \mathbb{E}[A_n^{-1} b_n] \) and \( \mathbb{E}[A_n^{-1} \mathbb{1}^T A_n^{-1} b_n/(1^T A_n^{-1})] \) are difficult to characterize. To make any claims about KernelSHAP’s bias, we must rely on empirical observations.

In contrast, it is easy to see that the alternative estimator \( \tilde{\beta}_n \) is unbiased. Because of its linear dependence on \( \tilde{b}_n \) and the fact that \( \mathbb{E}[\tilde{b}_n] = b \), we can see that

\[
\mathbb{E}[\tilde{\beta}_n] = \beta^*.
\]

We therefore conclude that the alternative estimator \( \tilde{\beta}_n \) is both consistent and unbiased, whereas the original KernelSHAP \( \hat{\beta}_n \) is only provably consistent. In the remainder of this work, we refer to \( \tilde{\beta}_n \) as unbiased KernelSHAP.

Regarding the estimators’ variance, unbiased KernelSHAP is once again simpler to characterize. The values \( \tilde{\beta}_n \) are a function of \( b_n \), and the multivariate central limit theorem (CLT) \([41]\) asserts that \( \tilde{b}_n \) converges in distribution to a multivariate Gaussian, or

\[
\tilde{b}_n \sqrt{n} \xrightarrow{D} \mathcal{N}(b, \Sigma_{\tilde{b}}) \tag{10}
\]

where \( \Sigma_{\tilde{b}} = \text{Cov}(Z v(Z)) \). This implies that for the estimator \( \tilde{\beta}_n \), we have the convergence property

\[
\tilde{\beta}_n \sqrt{n} \xrightarrow{D} \mathcal{N}(\beta^*, \Sigma_{\tilde{\beta}}) \tag{11}
\]
where, due to its linear dependence on $\tilde{b}_n$ (see Eq. [9]), we have the covariance $\Sigma_{\tilde{\beta}}$ given by

$$\Sigma_{\tilde{\beta}} = C \Sigma_\beta C^T$$

and

$$C = A^{-1} - A^{-1} 1 1^T A^{-1} / 1^T A^{-1} 1.$$  

This allows us to reason about unbiased KernelSHAP’s asymptotic distribution. In particular, we remark that $\beta_n$ has variance that reduces at a rate of $O(1/n)$.

In comparison, the original KernelSHAP estimator $\hat{\beta}_n$ is difficult to analyze due to the interaction between the $\tilde{A}_n$ and $\tilde{b}_n$ terms. We can apply the CLT to either term individually, but it is difficult to reason about $\beta_n$’s distribution or variance.

To manage the difficulty in analyzing KernelSHAP, we present a simple experiment to compare the two estimators. We approximated the SHAP values for an individual prediction in the census income dataset and empirically calculated the mean squared error relative to the true SHAP values$^2$ across 250 runs. We then decomposed the error into bias and variance terms as follows:

$$\mathbb{E}[||\hat{\beta}_n - \beta^*||^2] = \mathbb{E}[||\tilde{\beta}_n - \mathbb{E}[\tilde{\beta}_n]||^2] + ||\mathbb{E}[^{\hat{\beta}_n} - \beta^*||^2].$$

Figure 1 shows that the error for both estimators is dominated by variance rather than bias$^3$. It also shows that KernelSHAP incurs virtually no bias in exchange for a significant reduction in variance. In Appendix [6], we provide global measures of the bias and variance to confirm these observations across multiple examples and two other datasets. This suggests that although KernelSHAP is more difficult to analyze theoretically, it should be used in practice because its bias is negligible and it converges faster.

### 4.2 Variance Reduction via Paired Sampling

Now that we have analyzed each estimator’s properties, we consider whether their convergence can be accelerated. We propose a simple variance reduction technique that leads to significantly faster convergence in practice.

When sampling $n$ subsets according to the distribution $z_i \sim p(Z)$, we suggest a paired sampling strategy where each sample $z_i$ is paired with its complement $1 - z_i$. To show why this approach accelerates convergence, we focus on unbiased KernelSHAP, which is easier to analyze theoretically.

When estimating $b$ for unbiased KernelSHAP ($\tilde{\beta}_n$), consider using the following modified estimator that combines $z_i$ with $1 - z_i$:

$$\hat{b}_n = \frac{1}{2n} \sum_{i=1}^n (z_i v(z_i) + (1-z_i)v(1-z_i) - v(0))$$

Substituting this into the unbiased KernelSHAP estimator (Eq. [9]) yields a new estimator $\tilde{\beta}_n$ that preserves the properties of being both consistent and unbiased:

$$\tilde{\beta}_n = A^{-1} \left( \hat{b}_n - \frac{1}{2} (1^T A^{-1} b_n - v(1) + v(0)) \right).$$

For games $v$ that satisfy a specific condition, we can guarantee that this sampling approach leads to $\tilde{\beta}_n$ having lower variance than $\beta_n$, even when we account for $b_n$ requiring twice as many cooperative game evaluations as $\hat{b}_n$ (see proof in Appendix [B]).

**Theorem 1.** The difference between the covariance matrices for the estimators $\beta_{2n}$ and $\beta_n$ is given by

$$\text{Cov}(\beta_{2n}) - \text{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_n) = \frac{1}{2n} C G_v C^T,$$

where $G_v$ is a property of the game $v$, defined as

$$G_v = -\text{Cov}\left( Zv(Z), (1 - Z)v(1 - Z) \right).$$

For sufficiently large $n$, $G_v \geq 0$ guarantees that the Gaussian confidence ellipsoid $\tilde{E}_{2n,\alpha}$ for $\beta_{2n}$ contains the corresponding confidence ellipsoid $E_{n,\alpha}$ for $\beta_n$, or $\tilde{E}_{n,\alpha} \subseteq E_{2n,\alpha}$, at any confidence level $\alpha \in (0,1)$.
Above, we showed that unbiased KernelSHAP (\(\bar{\beta}_n\)) detection and forecasting problem by developing an approach for convergence. We address this as it provides no guidance on the number of samples required to obtain accurate estimates. We find that there is significant variation between the variance and the number of samples over the course of estimation. We find that the product is constant as the number of samples increases, which suggests that the \(O(\frac{1}{n})\) rate often holds in practice. Although this property is difficult to prove formally, it can be used for a simple variance approximation.

When running KernelSHAP, we suggest estimating the variance by selecting an intermediate value \(m\) such that \(m << n\) and calculating multiple independent estimates \(\hat{\beta}_m\) while accumulating samples for \(\hat{\beta}_n\). For any \(n\), we can then approximate \(\text{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_n)\) as

\[
\text{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_n) \approx \frac{m}{n} \text{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_m),
\]

where \(\text{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_m)\) is estimated empirically using the multiple independent estimates \(\hat{\beta}_m\). This approach has a negligible impact on the algorithm’s run-time, and the covariance estimate can be used to provide confidence intervals for the final results.

Whether we use the original or unbiased version of KernelSHAP, the estimator’s covariance at a given value of \(n\) lets us both detect and forecast convergence. For detection, we propose stopping at the current value \(n\) when the largest standard deviation is a sufficiently small portion \(t\) (e.g., \(t = 0.01\)) of the gap between the largest and smallest Shapley value estimates. For unbiased KernelSHAP, this criterion is equivalent to:

\[
\max_i \sqrt{\frac{1}{n} (\Sigma_{\hat{\beta}})_{ii}} < t \left( \max_i (\hat{\beta}_n)_i - \min_i (\hat{\beta}_n)_i \right).
\]

To forecast the number of samples required to reach convergence, we can use the property that the estimates have variance that reduces at a rate of \(O(\frac{1}{n})\). Given a value \(t\) and estimates \(\hat{\beta}_n\) and \(\Sigma_{\hat{\beta}}\), the approximate number of samples \(\hat{N}\) required is:

\[
\hat{N} = 1 \frac{1}{t^2} \left( \max_i (\hat{\beta}_n)_i - \min_i (\hat{\beta}_n)_i \right)^2.
\]

This allows us to forecast the time until convergence at any point during the algorithm. The forecast is expected to become more accurate as the estimated terms become more precise.

This approach is theoretically grounded for unbiased KernelSHAP, and the approximate approach for the standard version of KernelSHAP relies only on the assumption that \(\text{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_n)\) reduces at a rate of \(O(\frac{1}{n})\). Algorithms for both approaches are given in Appendix G, and they illustrate both the variance reduction and convergence detection techniques.
5 STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE GAMES

We have focused so far on developing a regression-based approach to estimate Shapley values for any cooperative game. We now discuss how to adapt this approach to stochastic cooperative games, which leads to fast estimators for two global explanation methods.

5.1 Stochastic Cooperative Games

Stochastic cooperative games return a random value for each coalition of participating players $S \subseteq D$. Such games are represented by a function $V$ that maps coalitions to a distribution of possible outcomes, so that $V(S)$ is a random variable $[9, 7]$.

To aid our presentation, we assume that the uncertainty in the game can be represented by an exogenous random variable $U$. The game can then be denoted by $V(S, U)$ where $V(\cdot, U)$ is a deterministic function of $S$ for any fixed value of the variable $U$.

Stochastic cooperative games provide a useful tool for understanding two global explanation methods, SAGE [12] and Shapley Effects [32]. To see why, assume an exogenous variable $U = (X, Y)$ that represents a random input-label pair, and consider the following game:

$$W(S, X, Y) = -\ell\left(\mathbb{E}[f(X)|X_S], Y\right). \tag{16}$$

The game $W$ evaluates the (negated) loss with respect to the label $Y$ given a prediction that depends only on the features $X_S$. The cooperative game used by SAGE can be understood as the expectation of this game, or $w(S) = \mathbb{E}_{X_Y}[W(S, X, Y)]$ (see Eq. 2). Shapley Effects is based on the expectation of a similar game where the loss is evaluated with respect to the full model prediction $f(X)$ (see Appendix C). As we show next, an approximation approach tailored to this setting yields significantly faster estimators for these methods.

5.2 Generalizing the Shapley Value

It is natural to assign values to players in stochastic cooperative games like we do for deterministic games. We propose a simple generalization of the Shapley value for games $V(S, U)$ that averages a player’s marginal contributions over both (i) player orderings and (ii) values of the exogenous variable $U$:

$$\phi_i(V) = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{S \subseteq D \setminus \{i\}} \left(d-1\right)^{-1} \mathbb{E}_U[V(S \cup \{i\}, U) - V(S, U)].$$

Due to the linearity property of Shapley values [36, 30], the following sets of values are equivalent:

1. The Shapley values of the game’s expectation $\bar{v}(S) = \mathbb{E}_U[V(S, U)]$, or $\phi_i(\bar{v})$
2. The expected Shapley values of games with fixed $U$, or $\mathbb{E}_U[\phi_i(v_U)]$ where $v_u(S) = V(S, u)$
3. Our generalization of Shapley values to the stochastic cooperative game $V(S, U)$, or $\phi_i(V)$

The first two items in this list suggest ways of calculating the values $\phi_i(V)$ using tools designed for deterministic cooperative games. However, the expectation $\mathbb{E}_U[V(S, U)]$ may be slow to evaluate (e.g., if the expectation is across an entire dataset), and calculating Shapley values separately for each value of $U$ will be intractable if $U$ has many possible values. We therefore introduce a third approach.

5.3 Shapley Value Approximation for Stochastic Cooperative Games

We now propose a fast linear regression-based approach for calculating the generalized Shapley values.

Figure 3: Shapley value-based explanations with 95% uncertainty estimates. Left: SHAP values for a single prediction with the census income dataset. Right: SAGE values for the German credit dataset.
Figure 4: Convergence forecasting for SHAP, Shapley Effects and SAGE. The required number of samples is compared with the predicted number across 100 runs (with 90% confidence intervals displayed).

$\phi_i(V)$ of stochastic cooperative games $V(S,U)$. Fortunately, this only requires a simple modification of the approaches discussed above.

First, we must calculate the values $\mathbb{E}_{U}[V(1,U)]$ and $\mathbb{E}_{U}[V(0,U)]$ for the grand coalition and the empty coalition. Next, we replace our previous $b$ estimators ($\bar{b}_n$ and $\tilde{b}_n$) with estimators that use $n$ pairs of independent samples $z_i \sim p(Z)$ and $u_i \sim p(U)$. To adapt KernelSHAP to this setting, we use

$$\tilde{b}_n = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} z_i (V(z_i, u_i) - \mathbb{E}_{U}[V(0, U)]).$$

We then substitute this into the original KernelSHAP estimator as follows:

$$\tilde{\beta}_n = \hat{A}_n^{-1} \left( \tilde{b}_n - 1^{T} \hat{A}_n^{-1} \tilde{b}_n - v(1) + v(0) \right). \quad (17)$$

By the same argument used in Section 3.2, this approach estimates a solution to the weighted least squares problem whose optimal solution is the generalized Shapley values $\phi_i(V)$. This adaptation of KernelSHAP is consistent, and the analogous version of unbiased KernelSHAP is consistent and unbiased (see [24]).

Figure 5: Convergence acceleration for SAGE and Shapley Effects. The ratio of the maximum standard deviation to the gap between the largest and smallest Shapley values is compared across six estimators.

Appendix D. These can be run with our variance reduction method, and we also can provide uncertainty estimates and detect convergence.

6 EXPERIMENTS

We conducted experiments with four datasets to demonstrate the advantages of our Shapley value estimation approach. We used the census income dataset [22], the Portuguese bank marketing dataset [31], the German credit dataset [22], and a breast cancer (BRCA) subtype classification dataset [4]. To avoid overfitting with the BRCA data, we analyzed a random subset of 100 out of 17,814 genes (Appendix E).

We trained a LightGBM model [21] for the census data, CatBoost [31] for the credit and bank data, and logistic regression for the BRCA data. Code for our experiments is available online [4].

To demonstrate local and global explanations with uncertainty estimates, we show examples of SHAP [24] and SAGE [12] values generated using our estimators (Figure 3). Both explanations used a convergence threshold of $t = 0.01$ and display 95% confidence intervals, which are features not previously offered by KernelSHAP. We used the dataset sampling approach for both explanations, and for SAGE we used the estimator designed for stochastic cooperative games ($\tilde{\beta}_n$). These estimators are faster than their unbiased alter-
Table 1: SHAP estimator run-time comparison. Each value represents the ratio of the average number of samples required relative to the fastest estimator for that dataset (lower is better).

| Estimator                        | Census Income | Bank Marketing | German Credit | BRCA Subtypes |
|----------------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| Unbiased                         | 380.63        | 176.45         | 17437.44      | 90.40         |
| Unbiased + Var Reduction         | 128.60        | 90.61          | 422.17        | 40.44         |
| Original (KernelSHAP)            | 12.74         | 7.41           | 13.74         | 2.49          |
| Original + Var Reduction         | 1.00          | 1.00           | 1.00          | 1.00          |

natives, but the results are nearly identical.

To measure the run-time differences between each estimator when calculating SHAP values, we compared the number of samples required to explain 100 instances for each dataset (Table 1). Rather than reporting the exact number of samples, which is dependent on the convergence threshold, we show the ratio between the number of samples required by each estimator; this ratio is independent of the convergence threshold when convergence is defined by the mean squared estimation error falling below a fixed value (Appendix E). Table 1 displays results based on 100 runs for each instance, which show that the dataset sampling approach (original) is consistently faster than the unbiased estimator, and that variance reduction enables significantly faster convergence. In particular, we find that our paired sampling approach yields a 9× speedup on average over the original KernelSHAP.

To investigate the accuracy of our convergence forecasting method, we compared the predicted number of samples to the true number across 250 runs. The number of samples depends on the convergence threshold, and we used a threshold $t = 0.005$ for SHAP and $t = 0.02$ for Shapley Effects and SAGE. Figure 4 shows the results for SHAP (using the census data), Shapley Effects (using the bank data) and SAGE (using the BRCA data). In all three cases, the forecasts become more accurate with more samples, and they vary within an increasingly narrow range around the true number of samples. There appears to be a positive bias in the forecast, but this diminishes with more samples.

Finally, to demonstrate the speedup from our approach for stochastic cooperative games, we showed that our stochastic estimator converges faster than a naive estimator based on the underlying game’s expectation (see Section 5.2). We plot the ratio between the maximum standard deviation and the gap between the smallest and largest values, which we use to detect convergence (using a threshold $t = 0.01$). Figure 5 shows that that the stochastic approach yields a dramatic speedup for both SAGE (using the BRCA data) and Shapley Effects (using the bank data), and that the variance reduction technique accelerates convergence for all estimators. The estimators based on the game’s expectation are prohibitively slow and could not be run to convergence. The fastest estimators for both datasets are stochastic estimators that use the variance reduction technique, and only these methods converged for both datasets in the number of samples displayed. As in the case of SHAP, the dataset sampling approach is often faster than the unbiased approach, but the unbiased approach is slightly faster for SAGE when using the variance reduction technique.

7 DISCUSSION

In this work, we discussed several approaches for estimating Shapley values via linear regression. We began by introducing an unbiased version of KernelSHAP, whose properties are simpler to analyze than the original version. We then developed techniques for detecting convergence, calculating uncertainty estimates, and reducing the variance of both the original and unbiased estimators. Finally, we adapted our approach to provide significantly faster estimators for two global explanation methods that are based on stochastic cooperative games. Our work makes significant strides towards making Shapley value estimation more practical by automatically determining the required number of samples, providing confidence intervals, and accelerating the estimation process.

Our work contributes to a mature literature on Shapley value estimation [6, 26] and to the growing ML model explanation field [32, 38, 13, 24, 12]. We have focused on improving the regression-based approach to Shapley value estimation, and we leave to future work a detailed comparison of this approach with sampling-based [38, 37, 10, 12] and model-specific approximations [1, 25]. We believe that certain insights from our work may be applicable to LIME, which is based on a similar dataset sampling approach [35]. Prior work has noted LIME’s high variance when using an insufficient number of samples [8], and recent work has developed concentration results to analyze LIME’s convergence properties [16, 27]. For future work, a similar approach may prove useful for developing a convergence detection and forecasting method for LIME.
A Calculating $A$ exactly

Recall the definition of $A$, which is a term in the solution to the Shapley value linear regression problem:

$$A = \mathbb{E}[ZZ^T].$$

The entries of $A$ are straightforward to calculate because $Z$ is a random binary vector with a known distribution. Recall that $Z$ is distributed according to $p(Z)$, which is defined as:

$$p(z) = \begin{cases} Q^{-1} \mu_{\text{Sh}}(z) & 0 < 1^T z < d \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where the normalizing constant $Q$ is given by:

$$Q = \sum_{0 < 1^T z < d} \mu_{\text{Sh}}(z)$$

$$= \sum_{k=1}^{d-1} \binom{d}{k} \frac{d-1}{k(d-k)}$$

$$= (d-1) \sum_{k=1}^{d-1} \frac{1}{k(d-k)}.$$

Although $Q$ does not have a simple closed-form solution, the expression above can be calculated numerically. The diagonal entries $A_{ii}$ are then given by:

$$A_{ii} = \mathbb{E}[Z_i Z_i] = p(Z_i = 1)$$

$$= \sum_{k=1}^{d-1} p(Z_i = 1|1^T Z = k)p(1^T Z = k)$$

$$= \sum_{k=1}^{d-1} \binom{d-1}{k} \cdot Q^{-1}(k) \frac{d-1}{k(d-k)}$$

$$= \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{d-1} 1/k(d-k)}{\sum_{k=1}^{d-1} 1/(d-k)}.$$

This is equal to $\frac{1}{2}$ regardless of the value of $d$. To see this, consider the probability $p(Z_i = 0)$:

$$p(Z_i = 0) = 1 - p(Z_i = 1)$$

$$= 1 - \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{d-1} 1/(d-k)}{\sum_{k=1}^{d-1} 1/(d-k)}$$

$$= \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{d-1} 1/d(d-k)}{\sum_{k=1}^{d-1} 1/k(d-k)}$$

$$= p(Z_i = 1)$$

$$\Rightarrow A_{ii} = \frac{1}{2}$$
Next, consider the off-diagonal entries $A_{ij}$ for $i \neq j$:

$$A_{ij} = \mathbb{E}[Z_i Z_j] = p(Z_i = Z_j = 1)$$

$$= \sum_{k=2}^{d-1} p(Z_i = Z_j = 1 | 1^T Z = k) p(1^T Z = k)$$

$$= \sum_{k=2}^{d-1} \binom{d}{k-2} \cdot \binom{d}{k} Q^{-1} \frac{d-1}{k(d-k)}$$

$$= \frac{1}{d(d-1)} \sum_{k=1}^{d-1} \frac{k-1}{k(d-k)} d-k$$

The value for off-diagonal entries $A_{ij}$ depends on $d$, unlike the diagonal entries $A_{ii}$. Although it does not have a simple closed-form expression, this value can be calculated numerically in $O(d)$ time.

B VARIANCE REDUCTION PROOF

We present a proof for Theorem 1 and we prove that a weaker condition than $G_v \succeq 0$ holds for all cooperative games (i.e., the diagonal elements satisfy $(G_v)_{ii} \geq 0$ for all games $v$).

B.1 Theorem 1 Proof

We proposed a variance reduction technique that pairs each sample $z_i \sim p(Z)$ with its complement $1 - z_i$ when estimating $b$. We now provide a proof for the condition that must be satisfied for the estimator $\bar{\beta}_n$ to have lower variance than $\hat{\beta}_n$. As mentioned in the main text, the multivariate CLT asserts that

$$\bar{\beta}_n \sqrt{n} \xrightarrow{D} \mathcal{N}(b, \Sigma_{\bar{\beta}}),$$

$$\hat{\beta}_n \sqrt{n} \xrightarrow{D} \mathcal{N}(b, \Sigma_{\hat{\beta}})$$

where

$$\Sigma_{\bar{\beta}} = \text{Cov}(Zv(Z)),$$

$$\Sigma_{\hat{\beta}} = \text{Cov}\left(\frac{1}{2}(Zv(Z) + (1 - Z)v(1 - Z))\right).$$

We can also apply the multivariate CLT to the Shapley value estimators $\tilde{\beta}_n$ and $\hat{\beta}_n$. We can see that

$$\tilde{\beta}_n \sqrt{n} \xrightarrow{D} \mathcal{N}(\beta^*, \Sigma_{\tilde{\beta}}),$$

$$\hat{\beta}_n \sqrt{n} \xrightarrow{D} \mathcal{N}(\beta^*, \Sigma_{\hat{\beta}})$$

where, due to their multiplicative dependence on $b$ estimators, the covariance matrices are defined as

$$\Sigma_{\tilde{\beta}} = C \Sigma\beta C^T,$$

$$\Sigma_{\hat{\beta}} = C \Sigma\beta C^T.$$
Next, we proceed by examining the relationship between $\Sigma_{\bar{b}}$ and $\Sigma_{\tilde{b}}$, because they dictate the relationship between $\Sigma_{\bar{\beta}}$ and $\Sigma_{\tilde{\beta}}$. To simplify our notation, we introduce three jointly distributed random variables, $M^0$, $M^1$ and $\bar{M}$, which are all functions of the random variable $Z$:

\[
M^0 = Z v(Z) - \mathbb{E}[Z] v(0)
\]

\[
M^1 = (1 - Z) v(1 - Z) - \mathbb{E}[1 - Z] v(0)
\]

\[
\bar{M} = \frac{1}{2} (M^0 + M^1).
\]

To understand $\bar{M}$’s covariance structure, we can decompose it using standard covariance properties and the fact that $p(z) = p(1 - z)$ for all $z$:

\[
\text{Cov}(\bar{M}, \bar{M})_{ij} = \frac{1}{4} \text{Cov}(M^0_i + M^1_i, M^0_j + M^1_j)
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{4} \left( \text{Cov}(M^0_i, M^0_j) + \text{Cov}(M^1_i, M^1_j) + \text{Cov}(M^0_i, M^1_j) + \text{Cov}(M^1_i, M^0_j) \right)
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{2} \left( \text{Cov}(M^0_i, M^1_j) + \text{Cov}(M^0_i, M^0_j) \right).
\]

We can now compare $\Sigma_{\bar{b}}$ to $\Sigma_{\tilde{b}}$. To account for each $\bar{M}$ sample requiring twice as many cooperative game evaluations as $M^0$, we compare the covariance $\text{Cov}(\bar{b}_{2n})$ to the covariance $\text{Cov}(\tilde{b}_n)$:

\[
n \left( \text{Cov}(\bar{b}_{2n}) - \text{Cov}(\tilde{b}_n) \right)_{ij} = -\frac{1}{2} \text{Cov}(M^0_i, M^1_j).
\]

Based on this, we define $G_v$ as follows:

\[
G_v = -\text{Cov}(M^0_i, M^1_j)
\]

\[
= -\text{Cov} \left( Z v(Z) - \mathbb{E}[Z] v(0), (1 - Z) v(1 - Z) - \mathbb{E}[1 - Z] v(0) \right)
\]

\[
= -\text{Cov} \left( Z v(Z), (1 - Z) v(1 - Z) \right).
\]

This is the matrix referenced in the main text. Notice that $G_v$ is the negated cross-covariance between $M^0$ and $M^1$, which is the off-diagonal block in the joint covariance matrix for the concatenated random variable $(M^0, M^1)$. This matrix is symmetric, unlike general cross-covariance matrices, and its eigen-structure determines whether our variance reduction approach is effective. In particular, if the condition $G_v \succeq 0$ is satisfied then we have

\[
\text{Cov}(\bar{b}_{2n}) \succeq \text{Cov}(\tilde{b}_n),
\]

which implies that

\[
\text{Cov}(\bar{\beta}_{2n}) \succeq \text{Cov}(\tilde{\beta}_n).
\]

Since the inverses of two ordered matrices are also ordered, this gives us the result:
This has implications for quadratic forms involving each matrix. For any vector \( a \in \mathbb{R}^d \), we have the inequality

\[
a^T \text{Cov}(\bar{\beta}_{2n})^{-1}a \leq a^T \text{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_n)^{-1}a.
\]

The last inequality has a geometric interpretation. It shows that the confidence ellipsoid (i.e., the confidence region, or prediction ellipsoid) for \( \hat{\beta}_n \) is contained by the corresponding confidence ellipsoid for \( \bar{\beta}_{2n} \) as large values of \( n \) lead each estimator to converge to its asymptotically normal distribution. This is because the confidence ellipsoids are defined for \( \alpha \in (0, 1) \) as

\[
\bar{E}_{2n, \alpha} = \left\{ a \in \mathbb{R}^d : (a - \beta^*)^T \text{Cov}(\bar{\beta}_{2n})^{-1}(a - \beta^*) \leq \sqrt{\chi^2_d(\alpha)} \right\}
\]

\[
\hat{E}_{n, \alpha} = \left\{ a \in \mathbb{R}^d : (a - \beta^*)^T \text{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_n)^{-1}(a - \beta^*) \leq \sqrt{\chi^2_d(\alpha)} \right\}
\]

where \( \chi^2_d(\alpha) \) denotes the inverse CDF of a Chi-squared distribution with \( d \) degrees of freedom evaluated at \( \alpha \). More precisely, we have \( \hat{E}_{n, \alpha} \subseteq \bar{E}_{2n, \alpha} \) because

\[
(a - \beta^*)^T \text{Cov}(\bar{\beta}_{2n})^{-1}(a - \beta^*) \leq \sqrt{\chi^2_d(\alpha)} \Rightarrow (a - \beta^*)^T \text{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_n)^{-1}(a - \beta^*) \leq \sqrt{\chi^2_d(\alpha)}.
\]

This completes the proof.

### B.2 A Weaker Condition

Consider the matrix \( G_v \), which for a game \( v \) is defined as

\[
G_v = -\text{Cov} \left( Zv(Z), (1 - Z)v(1 - Z) \right).
\]

A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for \( G_v \geq 0 \) is that its diagonal elements are non-negative. We can prove that this weaker condition holds for all games. For an arbitrary game \( v \), the value \((G_v)_{ii}\) is given by:

\[
(G_v)_{ii} = -\text{Cov} \left( Z_i v(Z), (1 - Z_i)v(1 - Z) \right)
\]

\[
= -\mathbb{E} [Z_i (1 - Z_i)v(Z)v(1 - Z)] + \mathbb{E} [Z_i v(Z)] \mathbb{E} [(1 - Z_i)v(1 - Z)]
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E} [Z_i v(Z)]^2 + \mathbb{E} [v(S)|i \in S]^2 \geq 0.
\]

Geometrically, this condition means that the confidence ellipsoid \( \bar{E}_{2n, \alpha} \) extends beyond the ellipsoid \( \hat{E}_{n, \alpha} \) in the axis-aligned directions. In a probabilistic sense, this means that the marginal variance for each Shapley value estimate is lower when using the paired sampling technique.
C SHAPLEY EFFECTS

Shapley Effects is a model explanation method that summarizes the model $f$’s sensitivity to each feature \[^{32}\]. It is based on the following cooperative game:

$$
\hat{w}(S) = \text{Var}(E[f|X_S]).
$$

(18)

To show that this can be viewed as the expectation of a stochastic cooperative game, we show a reformulation of this game introduced by Covert et al. \[^{12}\]:

$$
\hat{w}(S) = \text{Var}(E[f(X)|X_S])
\quad= \text{Var}(f(X)) - \mathbb{E}_{X_S}[\text{Var}(f(X)|X_S)]
\quad= c - \mathbb{E}_{X_S}[\mathbb{E}_{X_{D\setminus i}|X_S}[\{(E[f(X)|X_S] - f(X_S, X_{D\setminus i})^2\}]]
\quad= c - \mathbb{E}_{X}[\{(E[f(X)|X_S] - f(X))^2\}].
$$

If we generalize this cooperative game to allow arbitrary loss functions (e.g., cross entropy loss for classification tasks) rather than MSE, then we can ignore the constant value and re-write the game as follows:

$$
\hat{w}(S) = -\mathbb{E}_{X}\left[\ell(E[f(X)|X_S], f(X))\right].
$$

Now, it is apparent that Shapley Effects is based on a cooperative game that is the expectation of a stochastic cooperative game, or $\hat{w}(S) = \mathbb{E}_X[\hat{W}(S, X)]$, where $\hat{W}(S, X)$ is defined as:

$$
\hat{W}(S, X) = -\ell(E[f(X)|X_S], f(X)).
$$

Unlike the stochastic cooperative game implicitly used by SAGE, the exogenous random variable for this game is $U = X$.

D STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE GAME PROOFS

For a stochastic cooperative game $V(S, U)$, the generalized Shapley values are given by the expression

$$
\phi_i(V) = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{S \subseteq D\setminus\{i\}} \binom{d-1}{|S|}^{-1} \mathbb{E}_U[V(S \cup \{i\}, U) - V(S, U)]
\quad= \frac{1}{d} \sum_{S \subseteq D\setminus\{i\}} \binom{d-1}{|S|}^{-1} \mathbb{E}_U[V(S \cup \{i\}, U)] - \mathbb{E}_U[V(S, U)].
$$

The second line above shows that the generalized Shapley values are equivalent to the Shapley values of the game’s expectation, or $\phi_i(\hat{V})$ where $\hat{V}(S) = \mathbb{E}_U[V(S, U)]$. Based on this, we can also understand the values $\phi_1(V), \ldots, \phi_d(V)$ as the optimal coefficients for the following weighted least squares problem:

$$
\min_{\beta_0, \ldots, \beta_d} \sum_z p(z) \left(\beta_0 + z^T \beta - \mathbb{E}_U[V(z, U)]\right)^2
\quad\text{s.t.} \quad \beta_0 = \mathbb{E}_U[V(0, U)], \quad 1^T \beta = \mathbb{E}_U[V(1, U)] - \mathbb{E}_U[V(0, U)].
$$
Using our derivation from the main text (Section 3.3) we can write the solution as

\[
\beta^* = A^{-1} \left( b - 1^{T} A^{-1} b - \mathbb{E}_U[V(1, U)] + \mathbb{E}_U[V(0, U)] \right),
\]

where \( A \) and \( b \) are given by the expressions

\[
A = \mathbb{E}[ZZ^T] \\
b = \mathbb{E}_Z \left[ Z \left( \mathbb{E}_U[V(Z, U)] - \mathbb{E}_U[V(0, U)] \right) \right].
\]

Now, we consider our adaptations of KernelSHAP and unbiased KernelSHAP and examine whether these estimators are consistent or unbiased. We begin with the stochastic version of KernelSHAP presented in the main text (Section 5.3), Recall that this approach uses the original \( A \) estimator \( \hat{A}_n \) and the modified \( b \) estimator \( \tilde{b}_n \), which is defined as:

\[
\tilde{b}_n = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} z_i (V(z_i, u_i) - \mathbb{E}_U[V(0, U)]).
\]

As mentioned in the main text, the strong law of large numbers lets us conclude that \( \lim_{n \to \infty} \hat{A}_n = A \). Now, we can understand the \( b \) estimator’s expectation as follows:

\[
\mathbb{E}[\tilde{b}_n] = \mathbb{E}_{ZU} \left[ Z (V(Z, U) - \mathbb{E}_U[V(0, U)]) \right] \\
= \mathbb{E}_Z \left[ Z (\mathbb{E}_U[V(Z, U)] - \mathbb{E}_U[V(0, U)]) \right] \\
= b.
\]

With this, we conclude that \( \lim_{n \to \infty} \tilde{b}_n = b \) and that \( \hat{\beta}_n \) is consistent, or

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \hat{\beta}_n = \beta^*.
\]

To adapt unbiased KernelSHAP to the setting of stochastic cooperative games, we use the same technique of pairing independent samples of \( Z \) and \( U \). To estimate \( b \), we use an estimator \( \hat{b}_n \) defined as:

\[
\hat{b}_n = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} z_i V(z_i, u_i) - \mathbb{E}[Z] \mathbb{E}_U[V(0, U)].
\]

We then substitute this into a Shapley value estimator as follows:

\[
\hat{\beta}_n = A^{-1} \left( \hat{b}_n - 1^{T} A^{-1} \hat{b}_n - v(1) + v(0) \right) \frac{1^{T} A^{-1} 1}{1^{T} A^{-1} 1}.
\]

This is consistent and unbiased because of the linear dependence on \( \hat{b}_n \) and the fact that \( \hat{b}_n \) is unbiased:

\[
\mathbb{E}[\hat{\beta}_n] = \mathbb{E}_{ZU} \left[ Z V(Z, U) - \mathbb{E}[Z] \mathbb{E}_U[V(0, U)] \right] \\
= \mathbb{E}_Z \left[ Z (\mathbb{E}_U[V(Z, U)] - \mathbb{E}_U[V(0, U)]) \right] \\
= b.
\]

With this, we conclude that \( \mathbb{E}[\hat{\beta}_n] = \beta^* \) and \( \lim_{n \to \infty} \hat{\beta}_n = \beta^* \).
E EXPERIMENT DETAILS

Here, we provide further details about several experiments.

E.1 Datasets and Hyperparameters

For all three explanation methods considered in our experiments, SHAP [24], SAGE [12] and Shapley Effects [32], we handled removed features by marginalizing them out according to their joint marginal distribution. This is the default behavior for SHAP, but it is an approximation to what is required by SAGE and Shapley Effects. However, this choice should not affect the outcome of our experiments, which are focused on the convergence properties of our Shapley value estimators (and not the underlying cooperative games).

Both SAGE and Shapley Effects require a loss function (see Section C above). We used the cross entropy loss for SAGE and the soft cross entropy loss for Shapley Effects.

For the breast cancer (BRCA) subtype classification dataset, we selected 100 out of 17,814 genes to avoid overfitting on the relatively small dataset size (only 510 patients). These genes were selected at random: we tried ten random seeds and selected the subset that achieved the best performance to ensure that several relevant BRCA genes were included. A small portion of missing expression values were imputed with their mean. The data was centered and normalized prior to fitting a $\ell_1$ regularized logistic regression model; the regularization parameter was chosen using a validation set.

E.2 SHAP Runtime Comparison

To compare the runtime of various SHAP value estimators, we sought to compare the ratio of the mean number of samples required by each method. For a single example $x$ whose SHAP values are represented by $\beta^*$, the mean squared estimation error can be decomposed into the variance and bias as follows:

$$E[||\hat{\beta}_n - \beta^*||^2] = E[||\hat{\beta}_n - E[\hat{\beta}_n]||^2] + ||E[\hat{\beta}_n] - \beta^*||^2.$$

Since we found that the error is dominated by variance rather than bias (Section 4.1), we can make the following approximation to relate the error to the trace of the covariance matrix:

$$E[||\hat{\beta}_n - \beta^*||^2] \approx E[||\hat{\beta}_n - E[\hat{\beta}_n]||^2] = \text{Tr}(\text{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_n)).$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

If we define convergence based on the mean estimation error falling below a threshold value $t$, then the convergence condition is the following:

$$E[||\hat{\beta}_n - \beta^*||^2] \leq t.$$

Using our approximation (Eq. 20), we can see that this condition is approximately equivalent to

$$E[||\hat{\beta}_n - \beta^*||^2] \approx \text{Tr}(\text{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_n)) \approx \frac{(\Sigma_{\hat{\beta}})}{n} \leq t.$$

For a given threshold $t$, the mean number of samples required to explain individual predictions is therefore based on the mean trace of the covariance matrix $\Sigma_{\hat{\beta}}$ (or the analogous covariance matrix for a different estimator). To compare two methods, we simply calculate the ratio of the mean trace of the covariance matrices. These are the ratios reported in Table 1, where each covariance matrix is calculated empirically across 100 runs.
Table 2: Global measures of bias and variance for each SHAP value estimator. Each entry is the mean bias and mean variance calculated empirically across 100 examples (bias/variance, lower is better).

|                        | Census Income | Bank Marketing | German Credit |
|------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| Unbiased               | 0.0000/0.0026 | 0.0000/0.0016  | 0.0001/0.0322 |
| Unbiased + Var Reduction| 0.0000/0.0008 | 0.0000/0.0008  | 0.0001/0.0008 |
| Original (KernelSHAP)  | 0.0000/0.0001 | 0.0000/0.0001  | 0.0001/0.0000 |
| Original + Var Reduction| 0.0000/0.0000 | 0.0000/0.0000  | 0.0001/0.0000 |

F CONVERGENCE EXPERIMENTS

In Section 4.1 of the main text, we provided an empirical comparison of the bias and variance for the original and unbiased versions of KernelSHAP using a single census income prediction. The results (Figure 1) showed that both versions have their estimation error dominated by variance rather than bias, and that the original version has significantly lower variance. To verify that this result is not an anomaly, we replicated it on multiple examples and across several datasets.

First, we examined several individual predictions for the census income, German credit and bank marketing datasets. To highlight the effectiveness of our variance reduction approach (Section 4.2), we added these methods as additional comparisons. Rather than decomposing the error into bias and variance as in the main text, we simply calculated the mean squared error across 100 runs of each estimator. Figure 6 shows the error for several census income predictions, Figure 8 for several bank marketing predictions, and Figure 10 for several credit quality predictions. These results confirm that the original version of KernelSHAP converges significantly faster than the unbiased version, and that the variance reduction technique is effective for both estimators. The dataset sampling approach (original KernelSHAP) appears preferable in practice despite being more difficult to analyze, because it converges to the correct result much faster.

Second, we calculated a global measure of the bias and variance for each estimator using the same datasets (Table 2). Given 100 examples from each dataset, we calculated the mean bias and mean variance for each estimator empirically across 100 runs given 2048 samples. The results show that the bias is nearly zero for all estimators, not just the unbiased ones; they also show that the variance is often significantly larger than the bias. However, when using the dataset sampling approach (original) in combination with the paired sampling technique, the bias and variance are comparably low (≈ 0) after 2048 samples.

Finally, in Section 4.3 of the main text, we also proposed assuming that the original KernelSHAP estimator’s variance reduces at a rate of $O(\frac{1}{n})$, similar to the unbiased version (for which we proved this rate). Although this result is difficult to prove formally, it seems to hold empirically across multiple predictions and several datasets. In Figure 7, Figure 9 and Figure 11, we display the product of the estimator’s variance with the number of samples for the census, bank and credit datasets. The results confirm that the product is roughly constant as the number of samples increases, indicating that the variance for all four estimators (not just the unbiased ones) reduces at a rate of $O(\frac{1}{n})$.

G ALGORITHMS

Here, we provide pseudocode for the estimation algorithms described in the main text. Algorithm 1 shows the dataset sampling approach (original KernelSHAP) with our convergence detection and variance reduction techniques. Algorithm 2 shows KernelSHAP’s adaptation to the setting of stochastic cooperative games (stochastic KernelSHAP). Algorithm 3 shows the unbiased KernelSHAP estimator, and Algorithm 4 shows the adaptation of unbiased KernelSHAP to stochastic cooperative games.
Figure 6: Census income SHAP value estimation error on four predictions.

Figure 7: Census income SHAP value variance estimation on four predictions.
Figure 8: Bank marketing SHAP value estimation error on four predictions.

Figure 9: Bank marketing SHAP value variance estimation on four predictions.
Figure 10: German credit SHAP value estimation error on four predictions.

Figure 11: German credit SHAP value variance estimation on four predictions.
Algorithm 1: Shapley value estimation with dataset sampling (KernelSHAP)

Input: Game \( v \), convergence threshold \( t \), intermediate samples \( m \)

// Initialize
\( n = 0 \)
\( A = 0 \)
\( b = 0 \)

// For tracking intermediate samples
\( \text{counter} = 0 \)
\( \text{Atemp} = 0 \)
\( \text{btemp} = 0 \)
\( \text{estimates} = \text{list()} \)

// Sampling loop
\( \text{converged} = \text{False} \)

while not converged do

// Draw next sample
\( \text{Sample } z \sim p(Z) \)

if variance reduction then

\( \text{Asample} = \frac{1}{2} (zz^T + (1-z)(1-z)^T) \)
\( \text{bsample} = \frac{1}{2} (zv(z) + (1-z)v(1-z) - v(0)) \)

else

\( \text{Asample} = zz^T \)
\( \text{bsample} = z(v(z) - v(0)) \)

// Welford’s algorithm
\( n = n + 1 \)
\( A += (\text{Asample} - A) / n \)
\( b += (\text{bsample} - b) / n \)
\( \text{counter} += 1 \)
\( \text{Atemp} += (\text{Asample} - \text{Atemp}) / \text{counter} \)
\( \text{btemp} += (\text{bsample} - \text{btemp}) / \text{counter} \)

if \( \text{counter} == m \) then

// Get intermediate estimate
\( \beta_m = \text{Atemp}^{-1} (\text{btemp} - 1^{T} \text{Atemp}^{-1} \text{btemp} - v(1) + v(0)) \)
\( \text{estimates}.append(\beta_m) \)
\( \text{counter} = 0 \)
\( \text{Atemp} = 0 \)
\( \text{btemp} = 0 \)

// Get estimates, uncertainties
\( \beta_n = \text{A}^{-1} (b - 1^{T} \text{A}^{-1} b - v(1) + v(0)) \)
\( \Sigma_\beta = m \cdot \text{Cov(estimates)} \) // Empirical covariance
\( \sigma_n = \sqrt{\text{diags}(\Sigma_\beta) / n} \) // Element-wise square root

// Check for convergence
\( \text{converged} = \left( \frac{\max(\sigma_n)}{\max(\beta_n) - \min(\beta_n)} < t \right) \)

end

return \( \beta_n, \sigma_n \)
Algorithm 2: Shapley value estimation with dataset sampling for stochastic cooperative games

Input: Game $V$, convergence threshold $t$, intermediate samples $m$

// Initialize
$n = 0$
$A = 0$
$b = 0$

// For tracking intermediate samples
counter = 0
$A_{\text{temp}} = 0$
$b_{\text{temp}} = 0$
$\text{estimates} = \text{list()}$

// Sampling loop
converged = False
while not converged do

    // Draw next sample
    Sample $z \sim p(Z)$
    Sample $u \sim p(U)$

    if variance reduction then
        $b_{\text{sample}} = \frac{1}{2}(zV(z,u) + (1-z)V(1-z,u) - E_U[V(0,U)])$
        $A_{\text{sample}} = \frac{1}{2}(zz^T + (1-z)(1-z)^T)$
    else
        $b_{\text{sample}} = z(V(z,u) - E_U[V(0,U)])$
        $A_{\text{sample}} = zz^T$

    // Welford’s algorithm
    $n = n + 1$
    $b += (b_{\text{sample}} - b) / n$
    $A += (A_{\text{sample}} - A) / n$
    counter += 1
    $b_{\text{temp}} += (b_{\text{sample}} - b_{\text{temp}}) / \text{counter}$
    $A_{\text{temp}} += (A_{\text{sample}} - A_{\text{temp}}) / \text{counter}$

    if counter == $m$ then
        // Get intermediate estimate
        $\beta_m = A_{\text{temp}}^{-1}(b_{\text{temp}} - 1\frac{1^T A_{\text{temp}}^{-1} b_{\text{temp}} - E_U[V(1,U)] + E_U[V(0,U)]}{1^T A_{\text{temp}}^{-1} 1})$
        $\text{estimates}.\text{append}(\beta_m)$
        counter = 0
        $A_{\text{temp}} = 0$
        $b_{\text{temp}} = 0$

        // Get estimates, uncertainties
        $\beta_n = A^{-1}(b - 1\frac{1^T A^{-1} b - E_U[V(1,U)] + E_U[V(0,U)]}{1^T A^{-1} 1})$
        $\Sigma_\beta = m \cdot \text{Cov}(\text{estimates})$ // Empirical covariance
        $\sigma_n = \sqrt{\text{diag}(\Sigma_\beta) / n}$ // Element-wise square root

        // Check for convergence
        converged = $(\frac{\text{max}(\sigma_n)}{\text{max}(\beta_n) - \text{min}(\beta_n)} < t)$
    end

return $\beta_n, \sigma_n$
Algorithm 3: Unbiased Shapley value estimation

Input: Game $v$, convergence threshold $t$

// Initialize
Set $A$ (Section 3.3)
Set $C$ (Eq. 13)
n = 0
b = 0
bSSQ = 0

// Sampling loop
converged = False
while not converged do
  // Draw next sample
  Sample $z \sim p(Z)$
  if variance reduction then
    bsample = $\frac{1}{2}(zv(z) + (1-z)v(1-z) - v(0))$
  else
    bsample = $zv(z) - \frac{1}{2}v(0)$
  // Welford’s algorithm
  n = n + 1
diff = (bsample - b)
b += diff / n
diff2 = (bsample - b)
bSSQ += outer(diff, diff2) // Outer product
  // Get estimates, uncertainties
  $\beta_n = A^{-1}\left(b - 1^T A^{-1} b - v(1) + v(0)\right)$
  $\Sigma_\beta = bSSQ / n$
  $\Sigma_\beta = C\Sigma_\beta C^T$
  $\sigma_n = \sqrt{\text{diag}(\Sigma_\beta)} / n$ // Element-wise square root
  // Check for convergence
  converged = \left(\max(\sigma_n) > \min(\beta_n) - t \right)
end
return $\beta_n$, $\sigma_n$
Algorithm 4: Unbiased Shapley value estimation for stochastic cooperative games

Input: Game $V$, convergence threshold $t$

// Initialize
Set $A$ (Section 3.3)
Set $C$ (Eq. 13)
n = 0
b = 0
bSSQ = 0

// Sampling loop
converged = False
while not converged do
  // Draw next sample
  Sample $z \sim p(Z)$
  Sample $u \sim p(U)$
  if variance reduction then
    bsample = $\frac{1}{2} \left( z V(z, u) + (1-z) V(1-z, u) - \mathbb{E}_u [V(0), U] \right)$
  else
    bsample = $z V(z, u) - \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}_u [V(0, U)]$
  // Welford’s algorithm
  n = n + 1
  diff = (bsample - b)
  b += diff / n
  diff2 = (bsample - b)
bSSQ += outer(diff, diff2) // Outer product

  // Get estimates, uncertainties
  $\beta_n = A^{-1} \left( b - 1_{1^T A^{-1} b - \mathbb{E}_u [V(1, U)] + \mathbb{E}_u [V(0, U)]} \right)$
  $\Sigma_b = bSSQ / n$
  $\Sigma_\beta = C \Sigma_b C^T$
  $\sigma_n = \sqrt{\text{diag}(\Sigma_\beta) / n}$ // Element-wise square root

  // Check for convergence
  converged = $\left( \frac{\max(\sigma_n)}{\max(\beta_n) - \min(\beta_n)} < t \right)$
end
return $\beta_n, \sigma_n$
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