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On Being and Becoming an Animal: Engelhardt’s Two Notions of Animality

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Abstract

The principal objective of this essay is to briefly present and discuss what could be thought of as Engelhardt’s two approaches on animality. The first, rather literal use of the term, refers to non-rational animals stricto sensu, while the second and more important one thematizes humanity’s ontological self-degradation resulting from the dominant pleasure-oriented culture of our time. As for the first, aiming to moderate his outright acceptance of animal use, I invoke Dworkin’s insights on sanctity, which substantiate a plausible alternative stance. As for the second, I attempt to critically reconstruct the way in which, according to Engelhardt, humanity, having rejected every transcendent inquiry, is increasingly embracing its lower nature. In conclusion, I will hint that this return to animality may be impeded by upcoming challenges that already leave a noticeable imprint on a global scale.

Key-words: Tristram Engelhardt Jr., morality, moral standing, self-consciousness, animals, animality, critical interests, sanctity of life, post-metaphysical culture, immanence, individualism, end of history

I. Introduction

Few, if anyone, would impugn the claim that Engelhardt’s seminal contribution to contemporary bioethical and generally philosophical debates is that extensive, that it resists all attempts to fully grasp it; beyond a shadow of a doubt, numerous scholars will commit themselves to evaluating his overall input and it is in this context of post mortem tribute that this paper would like to situate itself. When embarking on decoding his thought and reading his books and numerous articles, one has to carefully address two major difficulties. The first lies in the fact that Engelhardt articulates his arguments drawing from a vast philosophical, theological and medical tradition, while his knowledge...
of Western history and culture is equally formidable.\(^1\) Such a mastery is rarely found, hence though admirable, it makes it very difficult for anyone to assess the synthesis that stems from its employment. Besides, the currently dominant views on how scholarship should be carried out explicitly favor specialization in a usually narrow field, thus complicating the fruitful reception of more ambitious and demanding academic endeavors. The second challenge results from the very philosophical and spiritual assumptions of his work. More specifically, it is known that, while some of his books and articles adopt a purely secular argumentative line, others bring out a passionately defended religious commitment – one that foreseeably leads to normative conclusions diametrically opposed to the secular ones. Self-evidently upsetting as it is for all his readers, this twofold approach, both secular and religious, demands a very delicate handling by anyone approaching Engelhardt’s thought and poses intricate interpretive difficulties.\(^2\)

Therefore, focusing on a particular set of arguments pertaining to a specific field of scholarly interest or even to a specific concept, seems quite wise an option, albeit not too daring. In this regard, this paper will briefly discuss a rather neglected topic, that is the humans-animals conceptual pair, which will be examined in the light of two distinct perspectives. The first will elaborate on some secular-oriented theses of Engelhardt on the proper attitude of humans towards animals, the latter having risen to the center of many philosophers’ attention during the past decades. My pivotal aim will be to critically reconstruct his arguments in support of animal use and experimentation, since he is notorious for totally rejecting animal rights.\(^3\) In trying to slightly moderate his claims, I will explore and invoke other secular accounts on the same issue, which, though equally hesitant to acknowledge certain rights, nevertheless do resort to middle-level claims about the value of nature and offer insights into our motivation to respect and preserve nature as a whole. The second point that I will raise is related to the notion of animality, examined from the human point of you, and not so much to animals themselves. I should clarify that this second section will make use both of secular and religious ideas expounded by Engelhardt. My objective will be to build upon his suggestion that humanity is gradually immersing itself in a spirituality-hostile culture, which is radically anti-metaphysical and aspires to ultimately transform humanity into a consumerist species, that is a merely sentient animal. What I am going to hint

\(^1\) Laurence B. McCulough, “Foreward: A Professional and Personal Portrait of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.”, in Reading Engelhardt: Essays on the Thought of H. Tristram Engelhardt, ed. Brendan B. Minogue, Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez and James E. Reagan (Dordrecht: Springer, 1997), xii-xvii.

\(^2\) Walter S. Davis, “Book Review: H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Christian Bioethics, Swets and Zeitlinger, 2000”, Theoretical Medicine 23 (2002): 97-100.

\(^3\) David B. Morris, “Animal Pain: The Limits of Meaning”, in Meanings of Pain, ed. Simon Van Rysewyk (Cham: Springer, 2016), 396.
is that, despite the fact that such an estimation is not unduly expressed, science and technology will to a significant extent substitute for the old, classical transcendental tradition in becoming humanity’s wholly new quasi-religious vision.

II. The permissibility of animal use

During the past decades, there has been a growing interest in the philosophical delegitimization of animal use, regardless of whether animals are used for medical experimentation, cosmetic testing or simply for food. Peter Singer and other widely recognizable thinkers pioneer in this field, indicating that animal equality is unjustifiably violated by numerous human undertakings. They assert that, since human and non-human animals share the capability of sentience, no discrimination against the latter is morally tenable. Others, while they question the moral status of animals, consider respectful treatment as a moral obligation of rational humanity towards animals. On the opposite side, Engelhardt’s secular morality presents three mutually supportive arguments that are destined to ground the moral superiority of humans and their derivative right to use animals in order to meet their needs and preferences.

The first argument takes as starting point the character of morality itself, namely the fact that its origin is strictly human, at least as far as secular morality is concerned. In the absence of any other rational beings except for human persons, it follows that humans are the only beings capable of constructing reflective judgments concerning their conduct. The very notion of reflectively judging in the robust sense of the term is equally a human privilege. Hence, human conduct cannot be criticized and condemned, cannot be reformed or ameliorated, but by humans. It seems, then, that secular morality ‘suffers’ from a certain self-referentiality. The latter’s negative consequence lies in the fact that in the end no fully grounded and world-wide accepted secular morality can be unearthed, because this undertaking would presuppose a preexisting consent on how competing moral principles and visions of the good should be ranked. That moral pluralism is irresolvable is also thematized

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4 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: Open Road Media, 2015); also Peter Singer, “All Animals Are Equal”, in Animal Rights: Past and Present Perspectives, ed. Evangelos D. Protopapadakis, 163-178 (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2012).
5 Onora O’Neill, “Environmental Values, Anthropocentrism and Speciesism”, Environmental Values 6, no. 2 (1997): 127-142.
6 See Evangelos D. Protopapadakis, “Animal Rights or Just Human Wrongs?”, in Animal Ethics: Past and Present Perspectives, ed. Evangelos D. Protopapadakis, 279-291 (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2012).
7 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., “Animals: Their Right to Be Used”, in Why Animal Experimentation Matters: The Use of Animals in Medical Research, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul and Jeffrey Paul (New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 175-185.
8 David E. Guinn, “Religion and Bioethics in the Public Sphere”, in Handbook of Bioethics and
in human rights debates, within which it is recognized that reaching a philosophically justified catalogue of human rights constitutes a task difficult to accomplish, given the variety and divergence of existing accounts of the human good.9

However, the self-referential character of morality has also a positive effect. More specifically, Engelhardt argues that, morality being human-centered and absent any other beings capable of reflection, its quintessence lies in that all actions in need of moral consideration will be deemed from an exclusively human perspective. In a nutshell, only humans can judge themselves for the ways they treat animals and this moral judgment is interwoven with, or rather will take into account, any possible contribution of animals to human life, health, prosperity, and traditional cultural rituals. It may be that in the West many people are religiously indifferent and scorn their cultural heritage, but other centuries-old cultures (Confucianism for example) around the world that survived secularism and retained their vivacity use animals for ritual reasons.10 In such cases, animals are not malevolently used, but are regarded as means for the faithful accomplishment of a certain ritual performance, which consolidates community’s connection with the past and attests to its willingness to preserve its cultural particularity. By the same token, the issue of testing future medicines on animals provides another indicative example, indeed one citizens in the West are more familiar with. This is not to deny that animals feel pain and suffer during these testings, but rather that all these regrettable collateral damages are morally examined in the light of the expected profit of these trials, which could hopefully result in the alleviation of human pain, the prolongation of human life and the improvement of its quality. Engelhardt does not claim that this is the right thing to do; rather, he explains that a secular morality has nowhere to resort to so as to ground the impermissibility of causing pain to animals, because it lacks a convincing account of the reasons why animal pain should impede the elimination of human pain. The above strategy is closely connected with another aspect of Engelhardt’s argumentation. This second claim is of Kantian origin and expounds the idea that only humans are ends in themselves, hence animals, not being ends in themselves, can nevertheless be used as means contributing to humanity’s well-being. Following Kant’s fundamental assumptions, he asserts that agency, that is competence for reflective, rational and coherently articulated action, is only achieved by humans and that it is in this exceptional attribute that humanity’s superiority is to be found and grounded. Only humans are able to recognize themselves as free moral agents accountable for their actions. The self-consciousness of moral freedom

9 Onora O’ Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 74-77.

10 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., “How a Confucian Perspective Reclaims Moral Substance: An Introduction”, Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 9, no. 1 (2010): 3-9.

Religion, ed. David E. Guinn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 126-127.
and responsibility distinguishes humans from animals, since the former are aware of their ability to overcome what nature dictates and comply with the principles of moral autonomy. It is from the awareness of this ontological competence that stems our ‘right’ to morally evaluate human actions.\(^1\) When judging one’s actions, we just state that things should have been done in another (moral) way and we take it for granted that they could have been otherwise. The very concept of moral philosophy would be inconceivable, if it had not been for this elementary ontological prerequisite, namely that humans do have the freedom of moral choice. The normative conclusion drawn from the above strategy is that human rights enjoy a deontological priority against the interests of animals (as for example the interest to avoid pain) and cannot be equated with them. Nonetheless, no right to malevolent actions is recognized\(^2\), first because malevolence implies an overall rejection of morality itself and, second, because animal maltreatment undermines one’s ability to respect humanity and act in accordance with the moral law. If we shift from a more or less reasonable animal use to intentional viciousness, then persons are inescapably going to be our next victims. This Kantian-inspired remark suggests the continuity of morality and dispels the illusion that the corruption of our sentimental world due to animal maltreatment will not infringe on the realm of purely human interaction. In Engelhardt’s words: “We owe to persons both respect and beneficent regard. To animals we owe only beneficent regard.”\(^3\)

The self-reflective character of human nature provides the basis for the third argument as well, but in what follows it will not be correlated to a certain aspect of the transcendental subject, but rather to our empirical self. A major and intuitively strong argument against animal use is that animals, as sentient beings, have feelings similar to ours. This common sentient background, it is usually said, should be interpreted as a moral constraint; pain and pleasure, in other words, are conditions shared both by humans and animals and, consequently, deserve an equal moral consideration. On the contrary, Engelhardt shows that this common empirical background is subject to incommensurably divergent appropriations. Human pain and pleasure are not just the outcome of a merely sensory stimulation, whose imprint is destined to gradually vanish. They are constitutive parts of one’s bio-history and are incorporated in the reflectively constructed narrative of her life. This approach admits of further elaboration. Indeed, the value of these experiences is not simply empirical, as is the case with animals. What makes them indispensable for our self-recognition is the fact that, taken as a whole, they

\(^{11}\) Engelhardt, “Animals: Their Right to Be Used”, 188-191.

\(^{12}\) Christopher Tollefsen, “Missing Persons: Engelhardt and Abortion”, in At the Roots of Christian Bioethics: Critical Essays on the Thought of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., ed. Ana Smith Iltis and Mark J. Cherry (Massachusetts: M & M Scrivener Press, 2010), 172-173.

\(^{13}\) H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 144-145.
represent the development of our life. All these experiences, though retaining their origin from the empirical realm, are somehow cut off from it and transformed into a higher level, within which pain and pleasure are conceptually translated into various meanings, such as happiness, felicity, disappointment, anxiety, fear of death, anticipation etc. Human sentience, then, is much more delicate and refined than that of animals; it facilitates the reception of the external world whose content, transmitted through our senses, is all the more meaningful as it is subject to a creative, non-mechanical, interpretation.\textsuperscript{14} The internalization of the external world and its understanding in the light of our rational and emotional undertakings enriches and normatively upgrades human experience, since the latter is placed within the realm of human culture and determines the self-reflective evaluation of our life. As self-conscious beings, we place pleasure and pain within a wider meaningful context, which remains inaccessible to animals.\textsuperscript{15} Human right-claims are ultimately reduced to the uniquely human awareness that our life has a past and turns to the future with rationally constructed expectations.

III. Moral Realism and Critical Interests

The above description of Engelhardt's blatantly anthropocentric attitude should not be taken as reflecting an unmitigated hostility against animals or an unjustified, relentless prioritization of humanity. First, because these are not the views Engelhardt himself embraces, given his religious commitment and the totally different stance it suggests. Second, because they are typical of a great deal of secular moral philosophers, who reject the accusation of speciesism and underline the distinctiveness of human experience. In this section, my main objective will be, first, to examine some of the less intuitively attractive conclusions previously described from the perspective of value realism, as expressed by Ronald Dworkin, and, second, to use his notion of critical interests in support of Engelhardt’s third argument. Life’s Dominion has arguably made a tremendously influential contribution that revolutionized public debates on abortion and euthanasia. Nevertheless, despite the fact that its scope does not openly raise environmental concerns, there are some hints worth attending to. In its crucial third chapter on sanctity, Dworkin makes an allusion to nature and claims that “in our culture, we tend to treat distinct animal species (though not individual animals) as sacred. We think it very important, and worth considerable economic expense, to protect endangered species from destruction at human hands or by a human enterprise. [...] We see the evolutionary process through which species were

\textsuperscript{14} Engelhardt, “Animals: Their Right to Be Used”, 185-188.

\textsuperscript{15} H. Tristram Engelhardt, “Bioethics and the Process of Embodiment”, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 18, no. 4 (1975): 486-500.
developed as itself contributing, in some way, to the shame of what we do when we cause their extinction now. Indeed, people who are concerned to protect threatened species often stress the connection between art and nature themselves by describing the evolution of species as a process of creation.”

I find Dworkin’s account very attractive especially when it comes to the moral evaluation of hunting. In Engelhardt’s Texan cultural context hunting as a leisure activity may be an established practice that no one would consider questioning. However, using animals to advance medicine and killing them in order to exhibit our hunting skills or mitigate our harshness do not seem to bear any substantial moral affinity. Dworkin rejects all skeptical challenges against morality and calls attention to the fact that our concerns about protecting and preserving nature can be explained through his notion of sanctity. The latter admits either secular-darwinian or religious grounding depending on the convictions of each individual. Let us invoke the paradigm of the Siberian tiger or of white lions. Mesmerizing and impressive, these animals bear witness to a creative process that we are unable to imitate. Their beauty and strength instill into our soul a sense of awe, accompanied with reasonable fear. But putting fear aside, we cannot but admire their exotic colors, their commanding look, their predatory skills and velocity. One could turn to more elegant examples (such as red panda or deer) and enumerate other aspects of their way of being that stir a certain moral objection or repulsion against their destruction. What lies at the core of this approach is the call to respect what eludes our competence to reconstruct it. Animal species and the beauties of nature encompass an aesthetic excellence and a history of creative development that motivates us to protect it, at least avoid its uncritical and mindless waste, without involving ourselves in sticky questions about rights, balancing of interests etc. In this regard, a refined mentality marked by self-restraint is to be gradually shaped.

I will now explore another aspect of Dworkin’s argumentation, which seems to support Engelhardt’s view on the outstanding character of human experience. The former’s thought is steered by the aspiration to bring out the reasons that justify the so-called ‘right to death’, that is the right of patients who suffer from unspeakable pains and whose medical condition is irreversible to be allowed to die and, additionally, to receive from their doctor the aid they need in order to achieve this goal. Thus, Dworkin claims that advance directives and euthanasia protect individuals’ “critical interests”, which are opposed to the purely experiential interests: “But most people think that they also have what I shall call critical interests: interests that it does make their life genuinely better to satisfy, interests they would be mistaken, and genuinely worse off, if they did not recognize. Convictions about what helps to make a life good on the whole are convictions

16 Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia and Individual Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 75-76.
about those more important interests. They represent critical judgments rather than just experiential preferences. Most people enjoy and want close friendships because they believe that such friendships are good, that people should want them. I have many opinions about what is good for me in that critical sense.”¹⁷

The notion of critical interests provides us with an alternative insight into the meaning and relative weight of our sensory exchanges with the world. I will focus on the issue of pain, which is also crucial for those supporting animal rights. In Dworkin’s analysis, it is only through the mediation of critical interests that one can reach an understanding of the meaning of death.¹⁸ These interests do not only depict the evaluative priorities we embraced in the course of our life, but they equally reflect our judgements on how we should die. For many people, living in a persistent vegetative state with no self-consciousness and devoid of all life’s attractions is an abhorrent prospective that would destroy in retrospect their critical interests. Patients at the end of life may feel intolerable pains and experience suffering beyond any description. This condition, if examined in the light of Dworkin’s distinction between “critical” and “experiential” interests, is not comparable to the pains felt by animals. The most significant aspect of human suffering is not that it attacks our body nor that it impedes our vital functions. Rather, it lies in that indescribable suffering violates our human dignity as self-conscious authors of our life and marks our failure to live up to our critical interests. A humiliating death and an agonizing pre-death period stain our life’s narrative. These external and empirical adversities, then, invade our inner self as rational beings and their detrimental effect threatens to eliminate our efforts to lead a critically examined life. A liberal state, Dworkin claims, properly respects individual freedom only by acknowledging that each person has a right to determine the conditions of her death. This does not mean that all citizens of democratic states will accord that the intolerable pain at the end of life deprives them of their dignity or that the loss of certain human capacities makes their life worthless. These evaluations are deeply personal, since the worth of each human life can be measured both objectively and subjectively. As a result, my impression is that Dworkin’s conceptual distinction has significant interpretive strength in environmental concerns as well, because, though indirectly, it offers an ontologically thin, but sufficiently clear, account of what differentiates animal from human experience.

IV. Humanity in the post-modern era: Renouncing its moral standing and embracing animality

All previous sections were concerned with animals, strictly speaking, and with the arguments set in favor of humanity’s right to use them in its various

¹⁷ Ibid, 201-202.
¹⁸ Ibid, 208.
undertakings. Thus, a significant distinction was presupposed throughout the paper between animals and humans, the latter being attributed moral priority for various reasons. In my introductory observations, I suggested that for Engelhardt (and evidently this is not at all a revolutionary assertion) certain layers of animality can equally be found (and intensified, depending on the historical circumstances) in humans in the sense that human beings are prone to neglecting their soul, are vulnerable to pleasures and fail to diligently refine their most precious attributes.

This position is formulated in the context of a thorough criticism of the current Western culture. He disputes the foundations of the dominant secular morality and offers a forceful description of the moral and spiritual disorientation that deters individuals from searching for God and responsibly shaping their life. Modern liberal societies have displaced religiosity from the public sphere and promote an “after God” culture, which underscores individual autonomy, holds in high regard sexual freedom and addresses in a superfluous way major moral issues, such as abortion, euthanasia, substitute maternity, complex and morally dubious reproductive options, human tissue market etc. In our postmodern cultural environment, no ultimate moral truth can be grounded through the use of public reason and the Rawlsian proposal for reaching a reflective equilibrium is also deemed to be infeasible. Engelhardt’s main concern is the recession of spirituality and the massive blindness towards the pivotal human questions about the existence of God, the meaning of human life, the proper content of morality. These tendencies, which he imputes to the politically correct morality of Western Christianity and the gradual isolation of God from the major philosophical systems articulated in the course of modernity, are intensified by the secular doctrine that declares the ‘end of history’. The latter shall be precipitated by the relatively established economic prosperity enjoyed by Western citizens and the progressive eclipse of all metaphysical, ideological and transcendent inquiries. The thirst for truth, meaning and moral guidance is destined to be quenched, or rather replaced, with worldly pleasures.

Provocative as it is, this description of our era is intended to show that, following Kojève’s insights, humanity will embrace animality in that the scope of its interests will only include the quest for individual eudemonia and economic security, an entrenched moral indifference and relativism, contempt of ideological quarrels and concerns about social justice, equality, rights etc. In other words, the long-established requirement of leading an examined life, which has determined the very essence of Western culture, will see the emergence of

19 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., “Bioethics Critically Reconsidered: Living after Foundations”, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 33 (2012): 97-105.

20 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., After God: Morality and Bioethics in a Secular Age (New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2014). This account is primarily based on the last chapter of Engelhardt’s last book, to which I had access only through its recent Greek translation.
another, less demanding, attitude. Hence, the emphasis is put rather on “life”, on its enhancement, enjoyment and prolongation, and not on the prerequisite of self-reflective examination and rationality. From an anthropological point of view, humanity is left without solid ontological roots and decisively rejects the eminence of its moral status, in full compliance with Singer’s doctrines. This turn to animality signifies an emaciation that inescapably gives life to crucial bioethical consequences.²¹ For example, the surge of interest for regenerative medicine, life prolongation, genetic enhancement and cosmetic improvements can be explained as expressing this increasingly growing adherence to the attractions abundantly found in the realm of immanence. In trying to secure the most rewarding life experiences, the Western world abandons its past metaphysical explorations and secular moral narratives, in order to comply with what I would call a “radical or insatiable empiricism”. Embracing animality, therefore, involves the shift of emphasis to the exaltation of our sensory capacities, that is to a more or less empirical self, devoted to the consumption of experiences and hesitant to commit itself to anything else but satisfaction and pleasure. The new, satisfaction-centered civilization that emerges marginalizes every longing for the transcendent, may that be the question about God or morality, and commits itself to securing immanent satisfactions for the “animal-man.”²²

V. Conclusion-Final Remarks

What Engelhardt provides us with is the philosophical narrative of the estimated development of Western culture in the decades to come. Any talk about development in literal terms, however, is rather ungrounded for him, given that his conclusions are more or less congruent with the Neohegelian analysis on the end of history. It is now clear that in examining his rejection of animal rights in the first part of this paper, I only intended to underline that the current philosophical upheaval on the upgrade of animals’ moral status is indissolubly connected with the emergence of a thin anthropology, which is much less willing to escape from immanence and worldly lures. But is there anything that could undermine the above interpretive scheme and mark the end of the end of history?

Engelhardt himself is fully aware of the fact that the significant demographic decline observed in the wealthy West, and especially within the European Union, along with the migration crisis are bound to challenge the beatitude of the West. Besides, solid, closely-knit communities of non-European immigrants and refugees

²¹ H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Christian Bioethics (Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger, 2000), 139.

²² H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., “Re-reading Re-reading Engelhardt”, in At the Roots of Christian Bioethics: Critical Essays on the Thought of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., ed. Anna Smith Iltis and Mark J. Cherry (Massachusetts: M & M Scrivener Press, 2010), 290-291.
are increasingly expanding across Europe owning to the political instability in the Middle East and other regions. Hence, the citizens of the more or less prosperous West are already confronted with pressing questions about policies of integration and solidarity, security and education issues etc. Equally disturbing and dreadful have been the persistent manifestations of the upcoming environmental crisis. Climate change, for which it is the Western world that should be held accountable, is reasonably expected to jeopardize current lifestyles and question our postmodern culture’s certitude that the regard for the public sphere is merely optional and that one can live in total indifference to all communal and social concerns. As for the destiny of metaphysics and Engelhardt’s beloved spiritual tradition, all speculations are risky. For all that, it would not be premature to state that in our time science and state-of-the-art technology seem to be functioning as substitutes for the transcendent explorations he mourns. The longing for the unseen God has given its place to an equally passionate desire for the absolutely tangible fruits of modern technology, medicine and biotechnology, whose promising achievements are fervently welcomed with a quasi-religious eagerness. In this regard, the prospect of improving and enriching humanity’s gene pool\(^\text{23}\), the keenness to enhance our nature\(^\text{24}\) and the commitment to the long-awaited hope for the substantial prolongation (and even immortality\(^\text{25}\)) of human life seem to serve, if I may say, as an “alternative metaphysics”; that is, they represent the “after God”, post-traditional doctrine that guides contemporary thought and, most importantly, governs humanity’s future aspirations.

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\(^{23}\) Julian Savulescu, “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children”, Bioethics 15, no. 5-6 (2001): 413-426.

\(^{24}\) See Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson, “Moral Enhancement, Freedom, And The God Machine”, The Monist 95, no. 3 (2012): 399-421; also Evangelos D. Protopapadakis, “In Defense of Pharmaceutically Enhancing Human Morality”, Current Therapeutic Research 86 (2017): 9-12.

\(^{25}\) Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (London: Harvill Secker, 2015), 20-29.
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