Measuring bot and human behavioral dynamics

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ABSTRACT
Bots, social media accounts controlled by software rather than by humans, have recently been under the spotlight for their association with various forms of online manipulation. To date, much work has focused on social bot detection, but little attention has been devoted to the characterization and measurement of the behavior and activity of bots, as opposed to humans'. Over the course of the years, bots have become more sophisticated, and capable to reflect some short-term behavior, emulating that of human users. The goal of this paper is to study the behavioral dynamics that bots exhibit over the course of one activity session, and highlight if and how these differ from human activity signatures. By using a large Twitter dataset associated with recent political events, we first separate bots and humans, then isolate their activity sessions. We compile a list of quantities to be measured, like the propensity of users to engage in social interactions or to produce content. Our analysis highlights the presence of short-term behavioral trends in humans, which can be associated with a cognitive origin, that are absent in bots, intuitively due to their automated activity. These findings are finally codified to create and evaluate a machine learning algorithm to detect activity sessions produced by bots and humans, to allow for more nuanced bot detection strategies.

CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Social media networks; • Information systems → Web and social media search;

KEYWORDS
social bots, bot behavior, human dynamics, social media & society

1 INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the last few years, social media have been conveying an ever increasing portion of human communications. At the same time, research progress and increasing availability of cheap hardware has brought the emergence of sophisticated forms of artificial intelligence. The concurrence of these two factors is at the root of the emergence of social bots, both as a field of investigation for the scientific community and as a topic of interest for the generalist media and the society at large [2, 16].

Social bots are all those social media accounts that are controlled by artificial, as opposed to human, intelligence. Their purposes can be many: news aggregators, for example, collect and relay pieces of news from different sources; chatbots can be used as automated customer assistants. However, as a by now large number of studies has shown, the vast majority of bots are employed as part of large-scale efforts to manipulate public opinion or sentiment on social media, such as for viral marketing or electoral campaigns, often with quantifiable effects [4, 18, 35].

In light of this fact, scholars’ efforts to investigate social bots can roughly be grouped in two categories. On one side, many studies have focused on the theme of bot detection, i.e., on how to recognize bot accounts as such [8, 9, 11]. A second line of research deals instead with the impact of the viral deployment of automated accounts on large-scale social phenomena such as information spread and sentiment manipulation [21, 28].

The characterization of bots’ behaviour is thus a topic that can yield actionable insights, especially when considered in comparison with humans’. Our present work examines an aspect of such comparison that, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been explored in detail in the existing literature: the short-term behavioural dynamics, i.e., the temporal evolution of behavioural patterns over the course of an activity session of bots as opposed to that of humans. Prior studies have examined the performance of human users when engaging in continuous online interactions, finding measurable changes, for example, in the amount of reactions to other users’ post, or in the quality (in terms of grammatical correctness and readability) of the produced content [22, 29].

We hypothesize that such behavioural changes, if at all present, should be starkly different in the case of bot accounts, when compared with human counterparts. To investigate the matter, we analyze a dataset of posts from the Twitter platform, focusing our attention on the discussion preceding the 2017 French presidential election. A previous study considered the role played by bot accounts in that context, finding evidence of the presence of a large number of such actors, working to create (or destroy) consensus around specific candidates by means of (mis)information diffusion—a phenomenon also observed in many other analogous events.

1.1 Contributions of this work
Over the course of single activity sessions, we measure different quantities capturing user behaviour, e.g., propensity to engage in social interactions, or amount of produced content, and finally contrast results between bots and humans.

The present study advances our understanding of bots and human user behavior in the following ways:

• We reveal the presence of short-term behavioural trends among humans that are instead absent in the case of bots. Such trends may be explained by a deterioration of human user’s performance (in terms of quality and quantity of produced content), and by an increasing engagement in social interactions over the course of an online session; in both cases, we would not expect bots to be affected, and indeed we record no significant evidence of any short-term temporal evolution for this category of users.
In the spirit of the research line on bot detection, we codify our findings in a set of highly predictive features capable of separating human activity sessions from bots’ ones; then, we design and evaluate the performance of a machine learning framework that leverages this features to detect bot activity sessions. This can prove extremely desirable when trying to detect so-called cyborgs, users that are in part controlled by humans and in part bots. Our session classification system yields an accuracy of 94% AUC (Area Under the ROC curve). The addition of the features identified by our analysis yields an average improvement over the baseline of up to 14% AUC.

2 DATA & METHODS

Our dataset consists of a collection of more than 16M tweets, posted by more than 2M different users. The tweets were posted between April 25 and May 7, 2017, the two-weeks period leading to the second round of the French presidential election. A list of 23 keywords and hashtags was manually compiled and used to collect the data through the Twitter Search API.1

To classify the users between bots and humans, we employed the Botometer API2 (previously known as BotOrNot [11]), which provides a free-to-use, feature-based classification system. When queried about a Twitter user name or user id, Botometer retrieves from Twitter information about more than a thousand features associated with that account, grouped into six categories: content, friend, network, sentiment, temporal, and user meta data; the API returns a bot score for each category, plus an overall score. A bot score is a number representing the likelihood for the account to be controlled by a bot, and it ranges from 0 (definitely human) to 1 (definitely bot).

Here, we used Botometer to calculate the bot score of more than 380k users in our dataset, namely all users who posted at least 5 tweets during the observation time, minus those whose account was since deleted (27k), or which privacy setting prevented Botometer to access the necessary information (15k accounts). The 380k users are responsible for more than 12M out of the overall 16M tweets.

It is important to note that Botometer does not use any session-related features, nor does incorporate any notion of activity sessions [32]: this is important to guarantee that the behavioral differences that later emerge are not just an artifact of the classifier using session-based features to separate bots from humans (that would be circular reasoning).

The distribution of the bot scores is reported in Figure 1. To determine the value of $T$ we first considered the distribution of the inter-time between two consecutive tweets from the same user, reported in Figure 2. The overall distribution (cf. inset of Figure 2) displays the characteristic long tail, both for humans and bots. In human behaviour, this is a common feature, known as burstiness [19]; observing burstiness among bots does not come as a surprise either, as the newer, most sophisticated bots are indeed known to sample their inter-event times from long-tailed distributions, precisely for the purpose of avoiding detection [15, 16]. However, a closer inspection, centred on the typical time range of a session duration (10 minutes to 2 hours, main figure), highlights the presence of peaks corresponding to regular values (10 minutes, a quarter of an hour, half an hour and so forth) and, although the peaks are present in both distributions, they are significantly more pronounced in the case of bots.

Figure 1: Frequency distribution of the bot scores obtained with Botometer. We classified as bots the 5% top scoring accounts, corresponding to a minimum value of 0.53 (green line). We set instead 0.4 as a threshold (maximum) value for the labeling of a human. Both choices are informed by previous analyses and intended to reduce the risk of misclassifications [32].

strategy, we set the threshold for humans to 0.4, leaving unlabeled all the accounts with a score value between the two thresholds. Summarizing, we have 19k users labeled as bots and 290k users labeled as humans, while the remaining 78k are left unlabeled.

To organize the dataset in sessions, the tweets were first grouped by user and sorted according to the time of posting. A session is a group of consecutive tweets separated by an amount of time larger than a certain threshold of $T$ minutes, or in other words, every time an user posts a tweet after a period of inactivity of at least $T$ minutes, we say that s/he (or it) has started a new sessions.

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Figure 2: Distribution of the time difference between two consecutive tweets. The overall distribution (inset) shows the characteristic long tail for both humans and bots. The detail of the 10 minutes to 2 hours time range (main figure) reveals the presence of peaks corresponding to multiples of 5 minutes; the peaks are present both in the humans’ and bots’ distribution, but they are much more marked in the latter.

Figure 3: Fraction of tweets appearing in a given position in the course of a session. Both distributions (bots and humans) are long-tailed, with the first showing higher values in the tail, thus indicating that bot are likelier than humans to post more tweets in the course of a same session (i.e. without a break of 60 minutes or more).

more likely to engage in longer sessions (with a number of tweets in the order of the tens or larger).

3 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

Once classified the users as bots and humans, and organized the tweets in sessions, we proceed to study the temporal dynamics of the two categories of users. Our results are summarized in Figure 4. We focus on four quantities: the fraction of retweets and of replies among all tweets posted at a certain position in a session; the number of mentions appearing in a tweet; and the length of the tweet itself.

As detailed below, the first three of these four features provide an indicator of the quantity and quality of the social interactions of an user over the course of a session. The fourth one (text length) is instead a measure of the amount of content produced by an user. As correlations between the length of a session and the dynamics of performance indicators have been observed on social networks [22, 29], we carry out our analysis on sessions of similar lengths only (20 to 25 posts), resulting in a total of 1500 bot sessions and 13k human sessions.

A retweet is a repost of a tweet previously posted by another user. We thus expect to see an increase in the number of human retweets during the course of a session, as users get exposed to other users’ posts. The fraction of retweets over the total number of tweets, grouped by their position in the session, is shown in Figure 4a: in general, the fraction of retweets is higher for humans at all positions; human users increase their number of retweets over all the course of their sessions, starting with a rapid increase in the first 2-3 posts and then slowing down. Such trend is not evident among bots, that seem instead to oscillate around a constant value.

As a second type of interaction, we consider the reply. The reply, as the name suggests, is a tweet posted in response to some other tweet. The same considerations as for the retweets apply here: we expect to see the fraction of replies increase over the course of a human sessions. Our results, reported in Figure 4b, confirm our expectation: as for the retweets, the fraction of replies increases and decelerates, for humans, over all the first 20 tweets. Bots, on the other hand, don’t exhibit an analogous increase.

On Twitter, users can mention other users in their post; another possible measure of social interactions is thus the average number of mentions per post. As for the previous cases, we expect the number of mentions to increase, on average, as human users proceed in their session. The results (Figure 4c) do indeed show an increase in the average number of mentions by humans over the course of the first 20 tweets. Again, bots don’t seem to change their behaviour in the course of the session.

The features analyzed so far are all indicators of the amount of social interactions in which users engage. We now consider the average length (in characters) of a tweet, which is a measure of the amount of content produced and is thus an interesting indicator of the short-term behavioural dynamics. Before, counting the number of characters, the tweet is stripped off all urls, mentions and hashtags, so to only account for the part of the text effectively composed by the user. A previous study has failed to show any significant variation in this quantity over the course of a short-term session on Twitter [22]: however, analyses of other platforms have shown that the average post length decreases on similar time scales [29]. Here, the human data show a clear decreasing trend, whereas no trend emerges for what concerns the bots (see Figure 4d).

Notice that for the last three quantities (replies, mentions and text length) we have excluded all retweets from our analysis, as their content is not produced by their poster: whereas the fact itself of posing a retweet can be considered a behavioural indicator, the content of the retweet could hardly provide any valuable insight in this respect.
In general, our experiments reveal the presence of a temporal evolution in the human behaviour over the course of an online session on an online social network, whereas, confirming our expectations, no evidence is found of a similar evolution for bot accounts. In the next session, we proceed to further investigate the significance of these temporal trends by incorporating them in a classifier for bot detection.

4 PREDICTIONS

As the experiments described in the previous section show, human behaviour over the course of an online session evolves in a measurably different manner with respect to bot users. To further investigate this difference, we implement a classifier that, leveraging the quantities considered above, categorizes tweets as either produced by a bot or a human. Using five different off-the-shelf
machine learning algorithms, we train our classifier using 10-fold cross-validation on a dataset of labeled tweets; the dataset, different from the one analyzed above, consists in three groups of tweets produced bot account active in as many viral spamming campaigns at different times, plus a group of human tweets. All accounts are labeled by human annotators, and a thorough description of the dataset is provided in [10]. In particular, the groups of accounts considered here are the ones named ‘social spambots #1-3’ and ‘genuine accounts’ [10], for a total of circa 3.4M tweets posted by 5k bot accounts and 8.4M tweets posted by 3.5k human accounts.

We proceed to organize the dataset in session separate by 60 minutes intervals, as described in Section 2 above. As a result, each tweet is tagged with three session features: session id, position of the tweet in the session and length of the session. Six behavioural features are also considered: whether the tweet is a retweet, or a reply, the numbers of mentions, hashtags and urls contained in the tweet, and the text length. We use the nine features to train four classifiers, using five different techniques: Decision Trees, Extra Trees, Random Forest and Adaptive Boosting.

The training and testing of the model is done via 10-fold cross-validation on the entire dataset. The details are reported in Figure 5; on average over the 10 folds, the AUC scores between 86% and 81% for all models. As a further verification, for each one of the five models, we choose the best classifier among the ten obtained in the cross-validation and test it on the full dataset. The performance, as expressed by the AUC measure, improves for the DT, the ET and the RF, raising from 90%, 94% and 94% respectively to 97%, and decreasing for the AB and the kNN, dropping from 89% to 84%; the ROC curves are plotted in Figure 6a. However, aside from the details of the effectiveness of each classifier, the results just described go to show that short-term behavioural patterns can effectively be used to inform bot detection.

To quantify precisely the impact of the introduction of the information concerning the session dynamics, we train four more classifiers, equivalent to the ones described above in all respects, except for the set of features used for the training: here only the behavioural features (retweet, reply, hashtags, mentions, urls, text length) are included while the three features characterizing the session dynamics (session id, position in session, session length) are left out. The four models (again DT, ET, RF and AB; we omitted kNN, the slowest to train among all these models, due to time constraints) are again trained and tested via 10-fold cross-validation. We don’t report here the details of all the folds, but again we further tested the best classifier for each method on the whole dataset, and the corresponding ROC curves are plotted in Figure 6b. The new four models serve as a baseline to compare the full models to, in order to get a quantitative indication of the impact of the introduction of the three session features on the performance of the classifiers. The difference is particularly pronounced for the first three models (DT, ET, RF), for which the AUC yields a 83% for the baseline versions, 14 points lower than their counterparts trained with all the nine features. The AB model also performs worse without the session features (AUC 80%, compared to the 84% obtained with the full features).

All the testing of our classifiers was done, until this point, on the annotated dataset from [10]. As an example of the effectiveness of leveraging session-level behavioural dynamics for bot detection, we would now be interested in carrying out some sort of testing on the dataset of the French election tweets introduced in Section 2. As such dataset lacks annotations, a proper test can not be performed, but we can still exploit the Botometer scores to get some information about the performance of our classifiers, and again draw a comparison with the baseline case where session features are omitted. To this purpose, we let the bot threshold (Botometer score value above which an account is consider a bot) on all the range of values between 0 and 1, and for each case compare the results given by the classifiers, trained on the ‘spambots’ dataset as described above, with these ‘annotations’. Again, let us remark that our purpose here is to evaluate the effectiveness of the introduction of the feature describing the session dynamics, and not to exactly evaluate the sensitivity of the classifiers.

The test is performed using the two AB classifiers, the one trained with the full features and the baseline one, and the results are shown in Figure 7. The left part of the graph is not actually very informative, as when the bot threshold is set below 0.4, the ‘positive’ account will actually include many humans. It is roughly in correspondence of the 0.4 value that the true positive rate (TPR) of the classifier starts increasing, and although the baseline classifier’s TPR increases as well, the former outperforms the latter at all points.

To summarize, the results exposed in this section show that features describing the short-term behavioural dynamics of the users can effectively be employed to implement a bot detection system or to improve existing ones, thus further confirming that a difference exists in such dynamics between humans and bots.

5 DISCUSSION

The results detailed in the previous two Sections provide evidence of the existence of significant differences in the temporal evolution of behaviour over the course of an online session between human and bot users.

In particular, in Section 3 we analyze four different indicators of the users’ behaviour and find, among humans, trends that are not present among bots: first of all, an increase in the amount of social interaction, measured as the fraction of retweets, the fraction of replies, and the number of mentions contained in a tweet; secondly, a decrease in the amount of content produced, measured as the average tweet length. Such trends are present up to the 20th post in human sessions, whereas the same indicators remain roughly constant for bots. This may be partly due to the fact that, as a sessions progresses, users grow more tired and become less likely to perform more complex actions such as composing an entirely original post [22]. At the same time, we hypothesize that another possible (and possibly concuring) explanation may be given by the fact that, as time goes by, users are exposed to more and more posts, thus increasing their probability to react, for example by retweeting or by mentioning the author of a previous post. In both cases, bots would not be affected by such considerations, and no behavioural change should be expected from them.

It is worth noting again that Botometer does not implement any notion of activity sessions nor does it use any session-based features for bot classification [32]. This ensures that the behavioural
Figure 5: Cross-validation AUC plots for five specific models: 5a Decision Trees (DT), 5b Extra Trees (ET), 5c Random Forests (RF), 5d Adaptive Boosting (AB) and 5e k Nearest Neighbors (kNN). For all the four models, the plot shows ROC curves and AUC scores (in legend) for each of the 10 cross-validation folds (thinner lines), and the mean ROC curve (blue line) with its AUC (in legend) and confidence area (± 1 std, in gray). ET and RF yield the best cross-validated average performance (Mean AUC=86%), followed by DT and AB (83%) and kNN (81%).
Figure 6: Area Under the ROC curve plot. We show five models, yielding the highest AUC among the trained ones. Each of the models exploits three session features in conjunction with six behavioural features. These models all significantly outperform the baseline models that do not include the three session features derived from our experimental analysis.

Figure 7: Comparison of the performance on the French election data between the two AB classifiers trained on the ‘spambots’ data. One classifier is trained with the full features (red circles), while in the training of the other the session features are omitted (green squares). The set of ‘positives’ is taken as all the tweets posted by accounts scoring more than the corresponding Botometer score (horizontal axis), and could indeed contain some human accounts, especially for lower values. Nonetheless, the higher TPR goes to show that the introduction of the session features significantly improves the performance of the classifier.

In Section 4, we use the results obtained in Section 3 to inform a classification system for bot detection. Our purpose there is to highlight how the introduction of features describing the session dynamics (session id, position of the tweet in the session and length of the session) can substantially improve the performance of the detector. To this purpose, we use a range of different machine learning techniques (Decision Trees, Extra Trees, Random Forests, Adaptive Boosting, k Nearest Neighbors) to train, through 10-fold cross-validation, two different set of classifiers: one including the features describing the session dynamics (the full model), and one without those features (the baseline). The comparison between the two sets of models, carried out both on the annotated dataset user for the cross-validation and on the dataset of tweets concerning the French elections, show that the full model significantly outperforms the baseline.

6 RELATED WORK

Although bots in some rare occasions have been used for social good, e.g., to deliver positive interventions and interactions [26, 27], their use is mostly associated with malicious operations. Bots, for example, have been involved with social media manipulation of political conversation [4, 18, 21, 24, 35], the spread of disinformation and fake news [15, 28], conspiracy [31] and extremist propaganda [14, 17], as well as stock market manipulation [13].

The increasing evidence brought our research community to propose a wealth of techniques to address the challenges posed by the pervasive presence of bots in platforms like Facebook and Twitter. Social bot detection is one such example. A recent review [16]
suggested to classify bot detection approaches under three classes: (a) methods based on social network structure and dynamics; (b) systems based on crowd-sourcing and human annotations; (c) learning algorithms based on informative features that separate bots from humans. Our work differentiates from this literature as it is not directly aimed at bot detection, yet our findings can be used to inform detection based on bot and human features and behaviors.

The study of bots’ characteristic is another recent research thread that attracted much attention. Researchers discovered that bots exhibit a variety of diverse behaviors, capabilities, and intents [25, 32]. A recent technical memo illustrated novel directions in bot design that leverage Artificial Intelligence (AI): AI bots can generate media and textual content of quality potentially similar to human-generated content but at much larger scale, completely automatically [2]. In this work, we highlighted similarities and dissimilarities between bots’ and humans’ behavioral characteristics, illustrating the current state of bots’ capabilities.

Provided that bots oftentimes operate in concert (botnets), this attracted the attention of the cybersecurity research community. Examples of such botnets have been revealed on Twitter [1, 12]. Botnet detection is still in its early stage, however much work assumed unrestricted access to social media platform infrastructure. Different social media providers, for example, applied bot detection techniques in the back-end of other platforms, like Facebook [5, 30] and Renren (a chinese ‘Twitter-like social platform) [33, 36]. Although these approaches can be valuable and show promising results [3, 6, 30], for example to detect large-scale bot infiltration, they can be implemented exclusively by social media service providers with full access to data and system infrastructure.

Researchers in academic groups who don’t have unrestricted access to social media data and systems, proposed many alternative techniques that can work well with smaller samples of user activity, and fewer labelled examples of bots and humans. The research presented here is one such example. Other examples include the classification system proposed by Chu et al. [7, 8], the crowd-sourcing detection framework by Wang et al. [34], the NLP-based detection methods by Clark et al. [9], and the BotOrNot classifier [11].

Some historical user activity data is still needed for these methods to function properly, either by indirect data collection [7–9, 23, 34], or, like in the case of BotOrNot [11], by interrogating the Twitter API (which imposes strict rate limits, making it impossible to do large-scale bot detection). Given these limits, we believe that it is very valuable to have a deep understanding of human and bot behavioral performance dynamics: our findings can inform data collection and annotation strategies, can help improve classification accuracy by injecting expert knowledge and produce better, more informative and predictive features, and ultimately allow for a better understanding of interaction mechanisms online.

7 CONCLUSIONS

In the present work we have investigated the behavioral dynamics of social network users over the course of an online session, with particular attention to the differences emerging between human and bot accounts under this perspective. User session dynamics have been investigated in the literature before but, to the best of our knowledge, never applied to the problem of bot detection.

Our analysis revealed the presence of behavioral trends at the session level among humans that are not observed in bot accounts. We hypothesized two possible mechanisms motivating such trends: on one side, humans’ performance deteriorates as they engage in prolonged online sessions; this decline has been attributed to a cognitive origin in related work. On the other hand, over the course of their online activity, humans are constantly exposed to posts and messages by other users, so their probability to engage in social interaction increases. Devising methods to further test each of these two hypotheses could possibly constitute an avenue for future research. Furthermore, the presence of such behavioral differences between the two categories of users can be exploited to improve bot detection techniques. To investigate this possibility, we trained two categories of classifiers, in one case including features describing the session dynamics, while omitting them in the other. The comparison shows that session features bring an increase of up to 14% AUC, thus substantially improving the performance of the bot detectors. This suggests that features inspired by cognitive dynamics can be useful indicators of human activity signatures, which may be harder to replicate by bots. Importantly, the adopted classifier does not leverage any session-related features, thus ensuring that the results we observe are genuine and not the artifact of circular reasoning. It may be an interesting object of future work to better characterize the interplay between the features studied here and other features leveraged by various bot detection techniques, such as the ones mentioned in the ‘Related Work’ Section.

Overall, our study contributes both to the ongoing investigation around the detection and characterization of social bots, and to the understanding of online human behaviour, specifically in its short-term dynamical evolution over the course of activity sessions.

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