Entrepreneurship Culture: Export Technologies, Strategies and Promoting Ukrainian Goods to the Market of the Ottoman Empire (Late 19th–Early 20th Centuries)

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Abstract

The article examines export techniques, strategies, and promoting Ukrainian goods to the market of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th–early 20th centuries. That historical period was chosen not by chance, but because there was a rapid economic recovery in Ukraine then. Although there was no a state but Ukrainian was part of the Russian Empire, a corporate community of Ukrainian entrepreneurs (representative organizations) was formed, and Ukrainian lands became the leading production region of the empire, it linked all those involved in trade relations with grains, sugar, coal, and mineral resources. The excess of production over the volume of the domestic consumer market encouraged entrepreneurs to export these goods, primarily to the nearest foreign markets. The market of the Ottoman Empire was determined as a priority in that respect. The study of the export direction of commercial activity of Ukrainian entrepreneurs became possible as a result of attracting a wide range of sources including “Government and business statistical directories, office documents of representative organizations, articles from periodicals of that time, archival materials”. Export techniques of Ukrainian businessmen were analyzed in the article as one of the components of business culture, and consists in introducing organizational and logistical techniques for export tasks, studying global experience, and using the most successful and effective mechanisms to influence the process of invading foreign markets. The paper shows that Ukrainian entrepreneurs had resorted to a variety of tools to promote their products including renting space in Turkey and participating in the "Floating Exhibition". The article concludes that, despite all efforts, Ukrainian entrepreneurs lost in competition with more developed countries and they had to pay attention to the increased domestic demand. The idea of Ukrainian trade and industry to organize a permanent trade mission in Istanbul in the form of a chamber of commerce, which originated in the early 20th century, it is implemented at the present stage of mutually beneficial partnership between Ukraine and Turkey.

Keywords: Export, export technologies, Ukrainian lands, Ottoman Empire, Russian Empire.

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Introduction

Relations between Ukraine and Turkey have a long tradition; at various stages of history, they have experienced a rise and fall. At the beginning of the 21st century, Turkey is an important partner of Ukraine in the foreign policy arena due to the common interest in building security and economic relations in the Black Sea region. In February 2020, the Ukrainian-Turkish Business Forum was held with the participation of the Presidents of both countries, the diplomatic mission of Turkey in Ukraine, missions of foreign companies in Ukraine, and other interested participants. That business forum has become the largest in the history of the two countries (Ukrinform, 2020).

Today, the Republic of Turkey ranks fourth in the list of countries to which Ukrainian agricultural products are exported and second among the countries from which Ukraine imports. In 2019, trade turnover between the countries increased by 22.3% compared to the previous year and amounted to $4.973 billion dollars; the main items of exports to Turkey in 2019 were ferrous metals 29.2%, grain crops 27.4%, food industry products 8.8%, seeds and fruits of oilseeds 17.8% (Ukraine-Turkey, 2020). Thus, trade also has a long-shared history and plays an important role in developing good neighborly relations.

It is quite natural that the intensification of exports of goods from Ukrainian lands to Turkey occurred in the late 19th – early 20th century, when the economy showed positive dynamics, reaching a peak of intensity on the eve of the First World War. Most of the Ukrainian lands at that time were part of the Russian Empire, forming the Southern and Southeastern economic regions, which represented a very rich in agricultural and industrial significance. Ukrainian entrepreneurs tried to establish the export of products of these industries on a permanent basis. Research interests include the study of the range of Ukrainian goods on the Turkish market in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, implemented export-oriented measures to promote goods on the Middle East market, and the reasons for the limitations of these operations. The research in this area will have scientific, theoretical, and practical benefits.

The materials and methods

Export technologies used by Ukrainian entrepreneurs to promote their goods on the market of the Ottoman Empire can be traced based on the following types of sources: Government directories ("Review of Russia's foreign trade on European and Asian borders"); Statistical collections of business organizations ("Statistical Yearbook of the Soviet Congress Representatives of industry and trade"); Office materials of representative organizations (numerous "Proceedings of Congresses", "Reports", "Reports of Commissions"); Analytical and informative articles from the periodicals of that time.

In particular, we will highlight the materials that were collected and published by the miners of the Southern Economic Region under the title "Export of products of the mining and mining industry of the South of Russia"; the first two issues are of great importance to the topic of the research, as they included measuring the standards of the representative institution of the Ukrainian mining industry in export issues and the statistical and economic description of the Middle East, including a complete analysis of the Turkish market.

The problem of export of Ukrainian riches was considered by domestic historians in different historical times: imperial (P. I. Fomin), Soviet (V. V. Krutikov), modern (I. M. Zhilenkova, O. Ye. Pylypenko, N. R. Temirova, I. O. Shandra etc.). Materials of the Turkish researcher H. Çapraz (2010) from Süleyman Demirel University were involved in the preparation of the article.

In most European and American studies, information about the Ukrainian provinces at the turn of the 19th – 20th centuries; it was presented in the general context of the development of the Russian Empire in the post-reform period, the authors traced the dynamics of key industrial indicators (Mc. Kay, 1970), the peculiarities of factory legislation and the main directions of government policy (Puttkamer Jo. von, 1996). In general, mentions of Ukrainian lands of that period of development in
the pages of world historiography can’t be considered numerous, but they are always accompanied by definitions such as the region "most developed", "technically equipped", "in tune with world and European trends."

General scientific and special historical methods (systemic, structural-functional, synchronous, statistical, analytical-synthetic, comparative-historical, problem-chronological, etc.) were used to study the whole array of historical sources and scientific literature.

Discussion

I. Economic and geographical advantages of exporting Ukrainian goods to the Ottoman Empire

Historical and geographical factors have shaped Istanbul as a world trade center. The large-scale world trade in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, as well as local and transit trade, made the Turkish straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles one of the most important centers for the development of trade and the world merchant navy. The port of Istanbul "Golden Horn" at that time was the safest place for ship parking; at the turn of the century; it was rebuilt and upgraded in such a way that the number and tonnage of ships became the largest in the Mediterranean basin, exceeding Marseille and Genoa. The importance of Turkey as a market for foreign goods has been constantly increasing over the centuries: from 1880 to 1905 years, imports of foreign goods increased significantly by 42 % (Exports Abroad. Issue 2, p. 173).

In general, at the turn of the 19th – 20th centuries the export operations of the Russian Empire; the Ottoman state occupied the 12th position, in the Middle East - the second place after Iran. During that period, exports from Russia to Turkey fluctuated in the amount of about 2%, and in absolute terms – tended to increase. Thus, in 1899–1903 years, 17.5 million rubles worth of products were exported to Turkey (2.2 % of total exports), 1904–1908 years – 19.7 million rubles (1.9 %), in 1909–1912 years – 31 million rubles (2.1 %), 1913 – 35 million rubles (2.4 %) (Review, 1915, p. 3). It is noteworthy that in the trade relations between the two countries, imports from Russia dominated (Statistical Yearbook, 1913, p. 5). The main articles were on cereals (wheat, rye, and barley), grain products, sugar, rubbing alcohol, mining products (coal and anthracite in the Donets Basin, iron ore in the Kryvyi Rih deposits), ferrous minerals (iron and steel in the Southern Economic Zone, etc.), and heavy industry products, especially mining. It has the highest expectations of Ukrainian exporters and the highest expectations of Turkish consumers.

At the end of the 19th century, the economic situation in the Ottoman Empire was deepening as the share of the manufacturing industry was growing, the railways and water transport was developing rapidly, and the demand for mineral fuels was increasing naturally. Domestic Turkish coal deposits were not distinguished by high quantitative and qualitative indicators, and therefore the import of English fuel grew rapidly and the entrepreneurs in the Ukrainian provinces (mainly coal and mineral industries) had tried to occupy their place in the Turkish fuel market. The importance of selling Ukrainian coal of the Donets coal deposit in the Black Sea basin was emphasized by the French scientist F. Le Play in the late 30s of the 20th century, pointing to the numerous benefits for all participants in such trade (Export Abroad. Issue 1, p3; Le Play, 2020).

Despite the high quality, the wide range of Ukrainian coal, the regional proximity of the mining areas to the markets, the hope of the industrialists, the achievement of this strategic goal, and the superiority, the competition with British coal was extremely difficult for a number of reasons, such as the increasing needs of the domestic market for mining and mining products, and the lack of the level of coal navigation in The Black Sea, the small number of merchant ships in the southern Ukrainian ports, insufficient diplomatic support, and the unwillingness of Ukrainian exporters to trade in the Turkish market.

Consumption of mineral fuel by Istanbul in 1908/1909 amounted to 27 million poods (1 pood – 16.38 kilograms), of which: 65% English coal, the rest is coal from Heraclea and other neighboring
mines in Asia Minor; the main consumers were the railways (5.4 million poods), the coasting fleet (3.0
million poods) and gas plants (2.4 million poods) (Fomin, 1924, p. 70). Turkish coal itself was consumed
mainly by government agencies and the local shipping company on the Bosphorus. British coal heated
the entire large-scale international merchant fleet of the Bosphorus, Turkish railways, gas plants, and
more. British fuel was so established in the Middle East that only in 1900 its import to Turkey amounted
to 394 thousand tons (24.4 million poods) (Exports abroad. Issue 1, p.11).

The fuel trade in Turkey was controlled by several large firms that had long and well-organized
trade relations with British coal traders. That circumstance was a serious obstacle to the penetration
of Ukrainian coal into the Middle East market. Attempts to supply Ukrainian coal to Turkish railways
(for example the Eastern Railways), bypassing intermediaries also proved to be a burdensome difficult
condition for the standard contracts that Turkish railways have usually entered into with foreign
suppliers.

Ukrainian businessmen often re-invaded the Turkish market or directed problems toward the
government of the Russian Empire, relying on its effective support in export matters. Miners rightly
indicated that there are industries in which government support for trade "is beneficial to society and
state power, creating its economic interests" (Exporting abroad. Issue 1, p. 3). The situation worsened
noticeably at the beginning of the 20th, when surplus coal production above the level of consumption
became evident. Mining engineer M. S. Avdakov provided the following data: in 1902, the mining
capacity of the Donbas was 1.1 million pounds; Consumption for this year is planned at 486 thousand
pounds, estimated production – 587 thousand pods, the rest of coal in mines – 50 thousand pounds
(Export abroad. Issue 1, p. 8). It was evident that the overproduction of about 150 thousand pounds,
the high capacity available to increase the coal production several times. The mining industry found a
way out of this situation in search of new foreign markets.

Geographically, regarding the countries of the Black Sea coast, the Donetsk coal basin held the
same position as the British coal basin in relation to the North Sea countries. The Istanbul market of
fuel consumption had more inclinations to the Donetsk basin than to English coal mines (Report, 1903,
p. 9). From English ports, steamers flew to Istanbul in 10-11 days, while from Mariupol (Ukrainian port
on the Sea of Azov) – in 2.75 days (Export Abroad. Issue 1, p. 8). Such calculations clearly showed the
proximity of the Turkish market to Ukrainian deposits and the impressive distance from the British.
The capacity of the Donbass mines was so significant that exports did not violate the interests of the
domestic consumer market of the Russian Empire, and the variety of brands and quality of Ukrainian
coal opened up prospects for successful competition against British fuel (Proceedings of the XXVII
Congress, 1903, p. 48).

In the '60s and '70s of the 19th century, all Black Sea ports were under the influence of British
coal trade, even Ukrainian. The expulsion of British fuel from their territories was a huge victory for
the Donbass coal miners; the '90s of the 19th century; put on the agenda a new task – the active export
of Ukrainian coal to the Black Sea coast. The nearest foreign coastal market was considered to be
Turkish.

II. The main Ukrainian export goods on the Turkish market

The greatest riches of the Ukrainian lands – grain crops, sugar, products of the mining and mining
industry –were also the main export goods. In the late 19th – early 20th centuries annual grain exports
from Ukraine abroad accounted for 70 % of all-Russian exports (over 300 million poods) and that figure
was constantly growing. In particular, the value of exported grain breads in 1905 amounted to
517 billion rubles, in 1910 – 679 billion rubles (On the state, 1912, p. 6). The Black Sea and the Azov
Sea ports used to play an important role in export operations and Odessa Seaport was the largest of
them all. I. Zhilenkova, a Ukrainian researcher, estimated that in 1910, 4.2 million poods (more than a
half) were exported out of total 8 million poods of grain delivered by rail to seaports and land customs
checkpoints through the Black Sea and the Azov Sea ports. From there, the goods were shipped mainly
to the Middle East. In the early 20th century, Odessa Seaport accounted for about 70% of wheat grain
exports (out of total exports through the Black Sea and the Azov Sea ports). In 1911, 1.8 million poods of wheat flour were shipped from there to Turkey (Zhilenkova, 2015, p. 46). Most of it was directed to Istanbul markets and the rest was supplied to other Turkish cities (Çapraz, 2010).

Also, Ukrainian lands played an extremely important role in sugar exports, as it were those lands that were home to some of the world’s largest sugar factories. Tereshchenko Trading House played the leading role in the industry; the Trading House started off from grain trading but later it became the largest sugar trading center in the region. Besides China, Egypt, and the Balkans, the product was exported to Turkey that bought granulated sugar worth almost 3.5 million rubles and refined sugar worth about 22.1 thousand rubles in 1911–1912. Turkey was ranked second after Iran in this regard.

Another important export category was rubbing alcohol used mainly as fuel for lamps and medical purposes. Turkey was the key sale market for Ukrainian rubbing alcohol that accounted for more than 50% of exports of this product (Pilipenko, 2007, p. 124).

Mining products were also exported from the Ukrainian lands to the Middle East. In particular, Turkey used to buy coal for the needs of railways and steamships, for example, in 1908, it exported 100 thousand poods of Donetsk coal. However, these revenues were unstable. Entrepreneurs of Ukrainian provinces realized that English coal was so rooted in the Turkish market that only joint efforts of Donetsk Basin mine owners could secure them a new market, as individual exporters could not afford to organize those trade operations due to high financial costs.

The issue of export of goods from the mining South to Turkey was first raised at the congresses of mine owners in a somewhat indirect format: the 15th Kharkov Entrepreneurs Congress (1890) started a conversation "on measures to develop the merchant fleet and coal trade in the Azov Sea and the Black Sea and to improve navigation along the Donets, the Don and the Dnieper" (Exports abroad. Issue. 1, p. 1). During the discussion, it became obvious that the situation can only be improved in those areas "once the coal trade becomes a regular thing in Istanbul" (Fomin, 1924, p. 64). As a regular rather than a seasonal cargo, coal had a potential to provide long-term planning for full-fledged voyages. Entrepreneurs' estimates showed that the price of Donetsk coal was about 17-19 kopecks per pound (in the port of Istanbul), i.e. about as much as the English one. However, as we can conclude from entrepreneurs' reports, successful competition was only possible "if a new product is cheaper than the old one and allows the buyers to overcome the habit" (Export abroad. Issue. 1, p. 2). According to entrepreneurs, Ukrainian coal could only become a successful competition to the English one in Istanbul, if the government awards exporters with an export premium of 4 kopecks per an exported pood (this premium should cover the price gap, economically justified price reduction, incidental expenditures, etc.) (Export abroad. Issue. 1, p. 4). The mine owners also supported their arguments with a popular proverb that reads "one should fight the enemy either with an identical or a better weapon".

The Entrepreneurs Representative Association prepared a fully validated report to justify such government spending (about 1.6-1.8 million rubles). As an example, they cited the experience of the leading European countries’ having spent millions to solve such problems (Export abroad. Issue. 1, p. 4). Unfortunately, that idea did not come into fruition, and the government was forced to deal with export problems caused by the overproduction of coal mines and the excess of domestic demand observed in the Russian Empire in the mid-1890s.

In May 1892, the first actual attempt was made to export Ukrainian coal to Turkey, when the Mining and Industrial Company in Southern Russia (one of the largest joint-stock companies in Donbass) sent a large consignment of the best brand fuel from Mariupol to Istanbul. However, the idea turned out a complete and utter failure, as Donetsk coal proved unable to compete with the English one due to the low prices of the latter, well-organized supply chains, and cheap freight from the UK (Krutikov, 1992, p. 108).

In 1895, the mine owners introduced a number of measures to promote export trade in general. Special attention was given to the Turkish market among all the foreign markets. Successful trade in
Ukrainian fuel was to be facilitated by scrupulous selection of coal brands, homogeneity of supplies, employment of own agents and coal warehouses, government awards to steamer owners for export of coal to Istanbul (1 kopecks per pood) (Petitions, 1896, p. 2633–2634). Unfortunately, those suggestions remained on paper only (Short Essay, 1908, p. 95).

Once the government of the Russian Empire transitioned to an open protectionism policy in the late 1890s, entrepreneurs of the Southern Economic Region expressed readiness to expand coal trade in Istanbul. They believed that in order to do this, the government should make significant investments in the development of the Southern infrastructure, namely: to equip Mariupol Port at the public expense; to build a coal harbor in Odessa; to offer export bonuses to exporters; to lower railway tariffs from stations of departure to Mariupol Port; to ease the tax pressure on the extracting industry; to reduce or abolish numerous municipal and port fees, etc. (Krutikov, 1992, pp. 108, 109; (Export abroad. Issue V, p. 4). S. Yu. Vitte, Minister of Finance, approved of Ukrainian industrialists’ desire to secure preferential terms for the organization of exports to Turkey from the government. He considered increasing the share of Donetsk coal in Istanbul as one of the strategic objectives of the foreign trade and an integral part of the development of the domestic coal industry. Under the protection of the high-ranking official, the mine owners received a number of benefits: exemption of coal cabotage from the port fee (in Mariupol - 1/8 kopecks per pood); 5-year ship duty exemption period for vessels on the Mariupol-Istanbul route (about 1/3 kopecks per pood); general reduction of railway and export tariffs. All these measures were put in place in order to bring the price of Donetsk coal closer to that of the English one on the Istanbul market (Krutikov, 1992, p. 109).

Subsequently, the mine owners did not abandon their export efforts (Shandra, 2020, p. 137). During the year of 1901, a special commission of mine owners continued to “discuss the project of organizing an office for export of mineral fuel through the Azov and the Black Sea ports to the Balkan Peninsula and abroad.” The commission used materials provided by Radochich’s commission office in Istanbul: P. V. Martynovych, their representative, came to Kharkiv with valuable data on trade in English and Donetsk coal in Turkish ports (Export abroad. Issue. 1, p. 5).

Experts considered the export of Ukrainian coal to Istanbul to be a matter of national importance, and the government was to assist mine owners by taking the following measures: to establish special reduced railway export tariffs on the route from all the stations of departure to Mariupol Port; to exempt exported coal from port dues; to join efforts of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as consulates and diplomatic missions (Resolutions, 1902, p. 5445). Entrepreneurs were positive that at least partial implementation of those measures “would give them every chance of securing a strong position on the coal markets of Istanbul” (Export abroad. Issue. 1, p. 122).

Exports of Ukrainian anthracite to Turkey was negligible in numbers, according to the Kharkiv Committee for the Transportation of Mining Cargo: 1908/1909 - no export activities, 1910 - 218 thousand poods, 1911 - 543 thousand poods, 1912 - 1,259 thousand poods, 1913 - 176 thousand poods (Fomin, 1924, p. 72). In general, in the first decade and a half of the 20th century, exports of Ukrainian mineral fuel to Turkey amounted to 2.6 million poods (26% of all exports of Ukrainian fuel abroad) (Fomin, 1924, p. 73).

The export of Ukrainian iron ore, iron, and iron products to Turkey was sporadic. A. Pylypenko, a Ukrainian researcher, noted the relative decline of iron ore exports abroad at the turn of the 19th – 20th centuries due to the crisis of the metallurgical industry in Western Europe. Therefore, domestic metal exporters had to redirect their efforts to the countries of the East; on the contrary, those countries were reliving a period of a construction boom and there was a strong demand for those goods there. It was especially true for Turkey with the start of railway construction. Therefore, there arose a favorable opportunity for the export of iron ore and finished products in large quantities (Pylypenko, 2007, p. 131).
In 1906, one of the Ukrainian factories sold 500,000 poods of rails to Turkey, though it can be just a lucky coincidence because the export prices were very low (Export Abroad. Issue 1, p. 90). Exports of metallurgical goods could only be successful if all Ukrainian metallurgical enterprises were subordinated to one central body of trade in iron products. Inspired by the intensified development of factories and plants and railway construction in Turkey at the end of first decade of the 20th century, Ukrainian producers started to hope that the Turkish market would eventually become favorable for large-scale exports of metallurgical goods (especially construction iron), so entrepreneurs once again stressed the need to establish government-level commercial offices and chambers of commerce in the economic centers of Turkey.

Ukrainian entrepreneurs understood that the success of developed Western European countries on the Middle East market was achieved through careful local market surveys, adjusting to the needs, and systematic work for the future. They tried to develop a similar business plan to facilitate effective export of their own goods (clear classification of coal brands and a list of their quality specifications, development of a customer base, etc.).

III. Export technologies and new market conquering strategies

In the early 1890s, exporters found intensifying assistance in diplomatic missions and commercial agents of the government of the Russian Empire. In its instructions to commercial agents abroad, the Ministry of Finance explicitly pointed out the necessity to give "practical assistance to domestic entrepreneurs in equipping warehouses, finding trading partners and concluding commercial agreements" (Krutikov, 1992, p. 109).

Entrepreneurs themselves were engaged in active export-oriented activities. Food industry players were mostly limited to one-time contracts and supplies. It was the representatives of the coal industry that did the most diverse work on the promotion of Ukrainian goods on the Turkish market. Thus, in the summer of 1893, a coal warehouse opened in Istanbul on the initiative of N. S. Avdakov, member of the Congress of Miners of Southern Russia (Kharkov), and that warehouse was actively operating during 1893-1894 (Local news, 1893, p. 1538). However, little progress was made in the competition against British coal. Despite all the government’s concessions, Donetsk coal was still more expensive in Turkish ports, while English exporters were more skilled in organizing trade.

In 1902, an international expedition of mine owners was organized to study foreign markets and it had a fairly large budget – 10 thousand rubles. (Report, 1903, p. 11). Their agenda included the issue of selling mineral fuel to neighboring countries including Turkey. N. S. Avdakov, mining engineer, was sent to Turkey to study the Turkish fuel market. Annual fuel consumption in the Black Sea region was estimated to reach 600 million poods, so the expedition allowed experts to make a positive conclusion about the possible export of Ukrainian coal (Fomin, 1924, p. 66). At the same time, the mine owners emphasized that "the export of Donetsk coal abroad deserves the undivided attention of the government, as it will increase the trade importance and presence of the Russian Empire in the Middle East" (Short Essay, 1908, p. 96).

Ukrainian exporters relied on the mediation of trading companies in Istanbul. Interest in Ukrainian fuel was expressed by "Foscolo, Mangot & Co", one of the largest trading companies in Istanbul that owned two warehouses in the suburbs of Jubali (with a capacity of 1.5 thousand tons of coal each) and a plot of land (capacity up to 10 thousand tons of coal) (Export abroad. Issue 1, p. 18). However, as entrepreneurs joked, this "foreign voyage" achieved no practical results. The main reason why all these attempts failed was not so much a lack of government support, but a lack of a commercial organization that could take over the export trade.

A few attempts were made to fill in this gap by establishing a coal and iron stock exchange in Kharkiv in the summer of 1902 (Shandra, 2012). The Kharkiv Stock Exchange Committee prepared a draft Articles of Association for the Donetsk Coal, Coke and Anthracite Exporting Joint Stock Company (Report, 1905, p. 3). However, the very nature of the stock exchange as an economic institution proved ineffective for the establishment of a commercial export organization. Still, the stock exchange was
quite successful in informing exporters about fuel prices on the Turkish market: all the updates were published twice a week in the "Bulletin ..." (Export abroad. Issue 1, p. 71).

It was banking structures that made another attempt to establish a permanent export of mining goods to Turkey, as they became increasingly more interested in the industrial prospects of the Ukrainian provinces in the early 20th century. Thus, the Kharkiv Branch of the International Bank founded the South Russian Society of Domestic and Export Trade in Anthracite ("Yuroveta"). The newly established society participated in organization of regular deliveries of Donetsk anthracite to Northern Italy (Genoa) and coal and coke to Southern Italy (Naples) and made them possible. Still, English fuel remained the dominant player in the Turkish market.

The most interesting and non-standard approach to the promotion of goods was the participation of Ukrainian exporters in the so-called Floating Exhibition. This large-scale event was organized by the Russian Society of Shipping and Trade in the fall of 1909 and it was held on Emperor Nicholas II, one of the best Russian steamers. During that period, the exhibition of industrial goods was to visit a few port cities in Bulgaria (2 cities), Turkey (15 cities), Greece (1 city), and Egypt (2 cities).

The mine owners presented their exposition in the form of a specially arranged shop window designed as an underground part of a coal mine with samples of goods from the mining and mining industry (coal, metals, ores, salt, coke, briquettes, etc.). The rest was sorted into boxes and handed to interested consumers as samples at the ports where the Floating Exhibition ship made a stop. In addition, the Donbass mine owners prepared a brochure "L'industrieminière et métallurgique" ("Mining and metallurgical industry") and published it in French; the brochure contained a brief description of the geographical location of the Donetsk Coal Basin as well as crucial information about the industry products. The brochure was accompanied by a map of Ukrainian coal deposits and diagrams on the development of the mining and mining industry. Another pamphlet "Liste des expéditeurs" ("List of Exporters") contained a list of all consignors of fuel, salt, ores, and metals with a number of stations of departure and expected production capacity (Proceedings of the XXXV Congress, 1911, p. 19). In addition to exhibits, mine owners decorated the shop window with diagrams, decorations, glass paintings, and the press reported that it "had a unique and spectacular look" (Export Abroad. Issue 1, p. 2).

The exhibition was hosted by N. D. Krechunesco, an authorized engineer, who provided extensive information to interested consumers on the quality of goods and delivery conditions. P. A. Palchinsky, engineer, conducted an information campaign among local residents prior to the Floating Exhibition entering the next port. They worked with consular and diplomatic missions on possible export assistance. According to Prof. P.I. Fomin, "the exhibition was a wide-scale and rationally organized event" (Fomin, 1924, p. 71).

In Turkey, exhibitors had the opportunity to visit as many as 15 ports, namely: Istanbul, Dardanelles, Ason, Thessaloniki, Souda, Jaffa, Haifa, Beirut, Tripoli, İskenderun, Mersin, Smyrna, Samsun, Kerasund and Trebizond (Fomin, 1924, p. 72). Each of the ports held a certain commercial interest for Ukrainian producers. The markets of Istanbul and Smyrna attracted the greatest interest of fuel traders. Mine owners tried to acquaint consumers with the incredibly rich range of Donbass mineral fuel, to introduce buyers to types of fuel, little-known in this region such as anthracite and semi-anthracite.

The exhibition undoubtedly increased the interest of Middle Eastern consumers in Ukrainian goods. Representatives of the Istanbul Branch of the Russian Foreign Trade Bank and N. V. Charikov, ambassador of the Russian Empire in Istanbul, expressed a high willingness to promote export of Donetsk fuel (Export Abroad. Issue 1, p. 2). The official opening of the local branch of the Russian Foreign Trade Bank was especially devoted to the exhibition being in Istanbul, and it was aimed at significantly facilitating export operations in the Middle East (Export Abroad. Issue 1, p. 124).

A local committee was organized in each of the cities on the Exhibition route; it was in charge of all the preparations. Invitations to the Exhibition were distributed free of charge; the organizing
committee tried to separate general public and traders by inviting them on different days and arranged joint meetings for local merchants and exhibitors to exchange views on measures needed to revive export relations. In turn, the exhibitors gathered the necessary information about the local fuel market.

During the Exhibition, representatives of the mining industry received numerous requests for free samples, paid test samples, and paid test batches of coal from Turkish consumers. As a result of the Exhibition, mine owners of the Ukrainian provinces received a large number of requests for the supply of large consignments of coal, inquiries about prices and conditions of purchase (for example, the Ottoman Railway Smyrna-Kessab, the Eastern Railways).

In general, as noted in the records of the representative organization of mining, "serious relations were established with the government of Turkey" (Proceedings of the XXXV Congress, 1911, p. 19). Riza-Ahmet, Speaker of the Turkish Parliament, who visited the exhibition, expressed readiness to promote the use of Ukrainian coal in heating public and government buildings in Istanbul.

Chambers of commerce became an effective form of representation of economic interests in the late 19th – early 20th century. Istanbul housed the chambers of commerce from France, Italy, Great Britain, and Greece, and those chambers were the main advocates of the interests of those countries on the market of the Ottoman Empire. With a significant lag behind the world’s leading countries, the Consulate General of the Russian Empire in Turkey started working on the establishment of a Russian trade bureau (Export Abroad. Issue. 1, p. 17).

In 1909, the mine owners of the Ukrainian provinces started consultations with the Russian Embassy in Istanbul on the establishment of a Russian Chamber of Commerce with the mediation of the Congresses of Miners of Southern Russia, their representative corporation. In addition, they managed to establish business contacts with Turkish enterprises interested in exporting mineral fuels from the Ukrainian provinces (Proceedings of the XXXIV Congress, p. 29). The first stage of this process was the opening of the Resident Russian Trade Committee in Istanbul in 1910. The Committee held weekly meetings to analyze local market conditions, current economic issues, commercial offers, and private firm inquiries. Once the Russian Chamber of Commerce was opened in Istanbul, all the parties concerned immediately recognized it as a necessary measure, provided that the exports to Turkey would get a significant boost.

Owing to the rapid economic growth of the economy of the Russian Empire in the late 19th–early 20th century, the problem of the export of heavy industry products lost its urgency because the goods were in high demand on the domestic market. As Prof. P.I. Fomin used to note "those exports did not play a particularly significant role in the life of our Southern mining industry" (Fomin, 1924, p. 64). Thus, Ukrainian exporters eventually lost their motivation to continue working on the creation of organizational structures for export trade.

Research Results

In the late 19th–early 20th century, the global trade was demonstrating a stable growth and the Ottoman Empire was taking an active part in it, therefore, making the Turkish market a magnet for many world exporters. In the history of Ukrainian lands, that period is also characterized by rapid economic growth in agricultural production, food industry, accelerated development of mining and metallurgy. Economic and geographical factors playing into the hands of Ukrainian entrepreneurs and the interest of Turkish consumers demonstrated significant advantages of the export of Ukrainian goods to the market of the Ottoman Empire.

Ukrainian goods such as sugar, grain, and coal had a significant export potential on the Turkish market. The rest of the goods rarely made an appearance on the Middle East market. And even the top leading Ukrainian export categories had multiple failed attempts to conquer the Turkish market. The world’s most influential manufacturers (in particular, Great Britain and Germany) had already
cemented their positions in the region and were not going to give in even if other countries’ products were obviously of better quality.

In the early 20th century, it becomes obvious that it is not enough just to have a quality product, one must also deal with a number of export issues on organizational and entrepreneurial, governmental and interstate levels. Ukrainian exporters tried to acquire warehouses in Turkey to store their goods, sent commercial research expeditions, engaged diplomatic missions and stock exchanges in export processes, founded special export trade companies, participated in international trade and industrial exhibitions, and worked hard to speed up preparations for opening the Chamber of Commerce of the Russian Empire in Istanbul. Despite all these efforts, it was obvious that they lagged far behind the perfectly organized English export system that it was extremely difficult to compete with. In the early 20th century, the Russian Empire as a whole and the Ukrainian lands within it were only just starting to develop a long-term export strategy, analyze the global experience and test certain organizational forms of export trade.

Nowadays, Turkey is one of the largest importers of Ukrainian goods. However, the existing bilateral trade statistics leave some room for improvement. Just like in previous centuries, the top exports of Ukraine are coal, metal, iron ore, and food products.

Turkey and Ukraine have strategic interests in deepening trade cooperation between the countries. The Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry hosts the Ukrainian-Turkish Business Council, and the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce periodically convenes Turkish-Ukrainian business forums. Business circles are actively discussing the signing of a bilateral free trade agreement, introduction of measures to increase trade opportunities between the countries, and strengthening of bilateral trade, economic and investment cooperation.

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