This article presents a summary of the main views in Dambeck's lectures on aesthetics on the basis of all known sources and compares the views thus obtained with views developed in German aesthetics in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century, with the aim of finding their chief source and reintegrating them both into German aesthetics and, more narrowly, into the aesthetics taught at Prague University. Johann Heinrich Dambeck constructed his lecture series on the plan of Zschokke's textbook *Ideen zur psychologischen Aesthetik* (1793) which has never been taken into account in any other research on his lectures. The close link between Dambeck's lectures and this textbook compels us to revise the current understanding of the nature of their ideas. Dambeck has so far been most often unproblematically presented as an adherent and disseminator of Kant’s and Schiller’s ideas about aesthetics in the Bohemian Lands. The key textbook on which he bases his university lecture series is, however, intentionally un-Kantian. Zschokke’s *Ideen* is part of the psychological-anthropological stream of Late-Enlightenment German aesthetics.

The lectures in aesthetics given by Johann Heinrich Dambeck (1774–1820) at Prague University from 1812 to 1820 still await their proper assessment. Despite this gap in our knowledge, one encounters numerous scholarly attempts to describe and explain the overall nature of these lectures. Most German literary historians of Bohemian origin generally considered Dambeck’s aesthetics to be built on the ideals of the *Humanität* of Johann Wolfgang Goethe and, in particular,
Friedrich Schiller. For some scholars, Dambeck was an advocate not only of the aesthetics of these Weimar classics, but also of Kant's *Critique of Judgement*; for others he remained an Enlightenment aesthetician who sought to thwart the penetration of the radical streams of German idealist aesthetics, including the *Sturm und Drang* movement and Romanticism, into Bohemia. An historian of Czech aesthetics, Eva Foglarová, has characterized Dambeck's aesthetics as Kantian with influences of the British school of taste. In this respect, Petr Vít and, under his influence, other historians of music, have seen Dambeck's aesthetics as being strictly Kantian. It is this interpretation that has spread most strikingly.

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2 Josef Pfitzner, *Das Erwachen der Sudetendeutschen im Spiegel ihres Schrifttums bis zum Jahre 1848* (Augsburg: Stauda, 1926), 139–41, 150; Wilhelm Krause, 'Karl Egon Ebert und das böhmische Biedermeier', *Dichtung und Volkstum: Neue Folge des Euphorion; Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte* 36 (1935): 199–200; Herbert Cysarz, *Die großen Themen der sudetendeutschen Schrifttumsgeschichte: Durchblick und Ausblick* (Brno: Rohrer, 1938), 21, and Herbert Cysarz, *Prag im deutschen Geistesleben: Blicke durch ein Jahrtausend* (Mannheim: Kessler, 1961), 34.

3 Christoph Khittl, 'Eduard Hanslicks Verhältnis zur Ästhetik', in Biographische Beiträge zum Musikleben Wiens im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert: Leopoldine Blahetka, Eduard Hanslick, Robert Hirschfeld, ed. Friedrich C. Heller (Vienna: VWGÖ, 1992), 94–95.

4 Krause, 'Karl Egon Ebert', 199–200; Herbert Zeman, 'Die österreichische Literatur im ausgehenden 18. und im 19. Jahrhundert: Spätaufklärung und Biedermeier', in *Literaturgeschichte Österreichs: Von den Anfängen im Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Herbert Zeman (Graz: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 1996), 316–17.

5 Eva Foglarová, 'Od krásných věd ke krásovědě: Příspěvek k počátkům české estetiky' [From the *Schöne Wissenschaften* to aesthetics: A contribution to the beginnings of Czech aesthetics], in *Estetika na křížovatce humanitních disciplín*, ed. Vlastimil Zuska (Prague: Karolinum, 1997), 174–77.

6 Even before Vít, the view that Dambeck had lectured 'in the spirit of Kant's philosophy' was expressed by Markus. But Vít was the first to try to confirm this opinion with the necessary analyses. Stanislaw A. Markus, *Musikästhetik*, vol. 2, *Die Romantik und der Kampf ästhetischer Richtungen* (Leipzig: Deutscher Verlag für Musik, 1977), 368, and Petr Vít, 'Die Musikästhetik in den Hochschulvorlesungen Johann Heinrich Dambecks', *Sborník prací filozofické fakulty brněnské univerzity* 29, no. H15 (1980): 47–61. Practically the same information in Czech as Petr Vít, *Estetické myšlení o hudbě: České země 1760–1860* [Aesthetic thought on music in the Bohemian Lands, 1760–1860] (Prague: Academia, 1987), 37–44. This is summarized in his 'Zur Frage der Abwandlungen musikästhetischer Begriffe in den böhmischen Ländern', *Acta Musicologica* 60 (1988): 199–200. After Vít's articles, the characterization of Dambeck's lectures as Kantian became a topos in the literature concerned with Eduard Hanslick, Jan Václav Tomášek, and the Bohemian aesthetics of music of the first half of the nineteenth century – for example, Geoffrey Payzant, 'Translator's Preface', in *On the Musically Beautiful: A Contribution towards the Revision of the Aesthetics of Music*, by Eduard Hanslick, ed. and trans. Geoffrey Payzant (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986), xv; Jaroslav Střítecký, 'Vom Prager/Wiener Formalismus zum Prager Strukturalismus: Zu einer mitteleuropäischen Tradition', in *Wege zu einer Wiener Schule der Musiksoziologie: Konvergenz der Disziplinen und empiristische Tradition*, ed. Irmgard Bontinck (Vienna: Gutmann, 1996), 46n2; Ines Grimm, *Eduard Hanslicks Prager Zeit: Frühe Wurzeln seiner Schrift 'Vom Musikalisch-Schönen'* (Saarbrücken: PFAU, 2003), 32, and Jiří Fukač, 'Tomášeks früher Beitrag zur musikalischen "Metakritik"', *Studien zur Musikwissenschaft: Beihefte der Denkmäler der Tonkunst in Österreich* 49 (2002): 120.
The fact that the opinions about Dambeck’s aesthetics are so diverse should come as no surprise. The diversity stems from the existing approaches, which are either not at all based on a thorough analysis of the lectures or come from only some of his views taken out of context. None of the published interpretations has yet to take into consideration the lectures as a whole; moreover, all of them uncritically rely on the book version, which was compiled and edited by Joseph Adolf Hanslik (1785–1859), as the source truly reflecting Dambeck’s views, without looking at other sources. This article seeks to close the gap: it presents a summary of the main views in Dambeck’s lectures on aesthetics on the basis of the manuscript extract, which was also made by Hanslik; it looks at the other sources as well, and compares the views thus obtained with views developed in German aesthetics in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century, with the aim of finding their chief source and reintegrating them both into German aesthetics and, more narrowly, into the aesthetics taught at Prague University.

II

For Dambeck the central principle, the one that contains all the rules of aesthetics and art, is the ‘free representation or communication of beautiful feelings’ (die freie Darstellung oder Mittheilung schöner Empfindungen). He considers the attribute of ‘beauty’ to be the most important of the individual elements of this all-encompassing principle and he identifies the fundamental feature of beauty to be the fact that it is pleasing (gefällt). He was determined to explain why it is pleasing on the basis of human nature. He understood that as comprising three separate natures – rationally cognitive, rationally moral, and sensuous. To each of them he attributed a particular kind of desire. The satisfaction of

7 For more on the untenability of such an approach, see Tomáš Hlobil, ‘Kantův kriticismus a pražské přednášky z estetiky Johanna Heinricha Dambecka’ [Kant’s criticism and Dambeck’s Prague lectures on aesthetics], Hudební věda 48 (2011): 161–72, and Tomáš Hlobil, ‘Pražské univerzitní přednášky z estetiky Johanna Heinricha Dambecka: Hledání jejich autentické podoby’ [Dambeck’s Prague University lectures on aesthetics: The search for their authentic form], Hudební věda 49 (2012): 123–30.

8 Knowledge of Dambeck’s lectures on aesthetics is provided by two fundamental sources in particular: the manuscript extract and the book edition. Both were made by Hanslik: [Joseph Adolf Hanslik], ‘Dambeck’s Vorlesungen über Aesthetik im Auszuge: Prag 1819’, manuscript, signature XVIII E 46, National Library, Prague; Johann Heinrich Dambeck, Vorlesungen über Aesthetik, 2 vols., ed. Joseph A. Hanslik (Prague: Enders, 1822, 1823). In this description of the nature of Dambeck’s aesthetics, I start primarily from the manuscript, because, as I have demonstrated, it contains a more original form of the lectures than the book. For more on the relationship between the two sources and their authenticity, see Hlobil, ‘Pražské univerzitní přednášky’; For Joseph Adolf Hanslik, see Berger et al., Deutsches Literatur-Lexikon, s.v. ‘Hanslick (Hanslik), Joseph (Adolf)’; and, most recently, Hubert Reitterer, ‘Josef Adolf Hanslik jako knihovník a satirik’ [Hanslik as a librarian and a satirist], Hudební věda 43 (2006): 385–406.
the individual desires corresponds to the three kinds of perfection – cognitive, moral, and sensuous. Perfection always arouses delight (Wohlgefallen), enjoyment (Vergnügen), and pleasure (Lust). The non-satisfaction of desire calls forth the opposite states. These perfections cannot, however, be identified with beauty. Dambeck understands beauty as autonomous perfection arising only with the conjunction (Verbindung) or merging (Verschmelzung) of the three preceding perfections and relating to feeling (Empfindung). Beauty cannot be experienced even in the act of (true) knowledge, or in (moral) behaviour, or (agreeable) sensuous perception. One can only feel (empfinden) it. Dambeck conceives feeling as an autonomous faculty (Empfindungsvermögen), which must not be confused either with passive sensuous knowledge based on the effect of external things on the human mind (which he called Rührung) or with the sensuous feeling (sinnliches Gefühl) of the agreeable (angenehm). Although during the sensuous feeling of the agreeable we also experience a state of pleauure (Lust), this is a pleasure of a lower level than the kind that accompanies feeling (Empfinden). It is a pleasure connected exclusively with the passive senses, unlike the pleasure of feeling (Empfinden) which is bound to ideas (Vorstellungen) that are actively formed by the higher faculties of the mind. But according to Dambeck, one may exclude sensuousness and the sensuously agreeable from beauty and art either. He considered sensuousness and the subject matter mediated by it to be a necessary condition of art and beauty. We encounter beauty (Schönheit) not only in art, but also in nature. Beauty cannot be confused with the beautiful (das Schöne). The beautiful is universally pleasing, an idea that is unattainable and unrealizable in life. By contrast, beauty is its particular expression, created by specific circumstances of a cultivated kind (or genre) of art and by the artist himself. Beautiful feelings (schöne Empfindungen) – the actual subject matter of aesthetics as the study of aesthetic feelings (ästhetische Empfindungslehre) – are further divided by Dambeck according to the three human natures. To the cognitive faculty he ascribes the manifold (das Mannigfaltige), the identical (das Identische), variety (Verschiedenheit), uniformity (Einförmigkeit), simplicity (Einfalt), unity (Einheit), proportionality (Verhältnismäßigkeit), similarity (Aehnlichkeit), the habitual (das Gewohnte), the suitable (das Schickliche), the unusual (das Ungewöhnliche), probability (Wahrscheinlichkeit), veracity (Wahrheit), the natural (das Natürliche), and contrast (Kontrast). To the moral faculty he ascribes legality and morality. And to the sensuous faculty he ascribes agreeableness bound to the instincts, first and foremost the instinct of self-preservation and the instinct of well-being (Trieb nach Wohlseyn). Ultimately, Dambeck distinguishes three main kinds of beauty – the sublime, the graceful, and the tragic. In sum, it is fair to say that Dambeck’s aesthetic system is based on the conviction that although beauty always stems
from the subject’s feeling it cannot at the same time be separated from the pertinent properties of the thing, which evoke this feeling. He considers aesthetics understood in this way to be a field of study beneficial particularly for practising artists, for it provides them with a lasting source, or obligatory rules, for suitably, effectively, and successfully creating, that is, for creating in harmony with the requirements of human nature.9

III

Dambeck never cited the source from which he drew his opinions. Despite his silence, I shall take the liberty of stating, already at this point, a preliminary conclusion on the basis of this summary of his main views (and will analyse the omitted views later in this article) – namely, Dambeck, without ever admitting it, adopted the core of his aesthetic system from Heinrich Zschokke (1771–1848), a Privatdozent at the University of Frankfurt an der Oder.10 Astonishingly, Zschokke’s textbook *Ideen zur psychologischen Aesthetik* (1793)11 – which has never been taken into account in any other research on Dambeck’s lectures12 – contains all the views considered here.13 From the striking dependence of Dambeck’s lectures on Zschokke’s textbook there follows a need to identify precisely the relationship between the two texts and then find the sources of the ideas that are not drawn from this key source.

The relationship between Dambeck’s Prague lectures on aesthetics and Zschokke’s *Ideen* may be best explained by closely comparing the two. Zschokke's
The textbook comprises an introduction (pp. 1–32) and four parts. The first part is concerned with the essence and the aim of fine art (pp. 35–67); the second, with the beautiful (pp. 68–175); the third, with taste (pp. 176–228); and the fourth, with aesthetic feelings (pp. 229–396). The organization of Dambeck’s lectures departs from Zschokke’s in only one respect – namely, the sections devoted to genius, which Zschokke includes in the exposition of taste, Dambeck has made into a new, separate, fourth part. Though the headings of the individual parts are slightly different in each of the two texts, the changes made by Dambeck do not change the nature of the original exposition in any way. Only the change in the heading of Zschokke’s fourth part, which in Dambeck is the fifth part, merits attention. Dambeck substitutes the German words ‘Eigentliche ästhetische Empfindungslehre’ for the Hellenism ‘Aesthetische Pathologie’. But even this change in terminology does not alter the overall meaning, for Zschokke too had already worked with the German expression used here. Noticeable differences between the two texts appear only after a more detailed comparison of the content of the individual parts.

Introduction

Zschokke and Dambeck have structured their Introductions differently from one another. Following the traditional practice, Zschokke includes in his the definition of aesthetics as a field of study, including a concise history of it, but also describes the emergence and development of art, and presents a concise classification of the various kinds of art. By contrast, Dambeck concentrates exclusively on a definition of aesthetics. He defines its subject matter and tries in a Zschokkean way to clarify the differences amongst the key terms ‘Empfindung’, ‘Gefühl’, ‘Rührung’, ‘Anschauung’, ‘Vorstellung’, and ‘Begriff’. He also presents a realist definition of aesthetics, and explains its aims and uses. He did not include the passages about art in his introduction, reserving the subsequent section for them.

Part One

The organization and content of the introduction to Part One, which is concerned with art, is different in each of the two texts. Dambeck does not develop his definitions of art and classifications until this point, and works with somewhat different initial concepts than Zschokke. I shall return later in our discussion to

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14 I first always give the heading of the part in Zschokke, then in Dambeck: ‘Einleitung zur psychologischen Aesthetik’ / ‘Einleitung’; ‘Ueber das Wesen und den Zweck der schönen Kunst’ / ‘Vom Wesen der schönen Kunst überhaupt’; ‘Kritik des Schönen’ / ‘Versuch einer Theorie des Schönen’; ‘Ueber den ästhetischen Geschmack’ / ‘Vom Geschmack + Vom Genie’; ‘Aesthetische Pathologie’ / ‘Eigentliche ästhetische Empfindungslehre’.

15 For example, Zschokke, Ideen, 230.
the sources from which Dambeck drew his views. The clear similarity of the two expositions is evident from § 14, in which Zschokke turns his attention to various theories of art and criticism of them. First, he analyses the concept of art as an activity arousing pleasure, then as an activity satisfying the human need to be continuously occupied with something in an agreeable way, as the beautification of reality and an imitation of beautiful nature. Here, Dambeck ends his borrowing, whereas Zschokke continues with the exposition and criticism of the concept of art as the completion of the beautiful (Nachbildung des Schönen) and the representation of a certain state of feeling (Darstellung eines bestimmten Zustandes der Empfindsamkeit). After a summary and a critique of earlier theories, both expositions culminate in the construction of the so-called ‘principle of aesthetics’. The principle – a guarantee of the scholarly nature of the field – should, according to both Zschokke and Dambeck, contain all other principles and rules; it should also be contained in all the features of art, and should unite all parts of aesthetics in a whole, to determine the essential purpose of all the fine arts and to elevate them to the highest possible level of perfection. Zschokke, moreover, demands that this principle be the product of empirical reason (empirische Vernunft), not pure reason a priori, for the aesthetics advocated by Zschokke should, unlike Kant’s, not be transcendental, but psychological. He bases his finding of this principle on the conviction that it is a universal human instinct to communicate one’s feelings (Empfindungen miztheilen). From the existence of this instinct, he then derives the desired aesthetic principle proclaiming the ‘freie Mittheilung der schönen Empfindungen’. Dambeck then adheres to this principle, and expands it with the term ‘representation’ (Darstellung). He discusses the ‘freie Darstellung oder Mittheilung der schönen Empfindungen’. This expansion with ‘Darstellung’ does not contradict Zschokke’s views; he too works with the term, though aware of its difference. The other small divergences are linked with the inclusion of the terms with which Dambeck sought to make more precise his idea of the nature of art. They are mainly the terms Humanität, ‘aesthetic need’ (ästhetisches Bedürfnis), and ‘the ideal’ (ideal). (I shall consider their origin later in this article.) Dambeck diverges from Zschokke most strikingly in the conclusion,
in which he classifies and broadly characterizes the individual kinds of art. This part, whose manuscript is about sixty pages long, is without a counterpart in Zschokke’s work, because the classification of art in the Introduction is truly concise and tends to overlap with the introductory sections of Part One of Dambeck’s exposition. (I shall also analyse the sources of Dambeck’s classification of art below.)

Part Two
Both scholars reserve Part Two for the beautiful, but they each have again organized the introduction to this section differently. Zschokke’s introduction is longer, and comprises a survey of various theories of beauty followed by their critique.\(^{22}\) He pays the most attention to the theories of Karl Philipp Moritz (1756–1793) and Immanuel Kant, criticizing both especially because they have intentionally forced out sensuality (Reiz, Rührung) from beauty. Moreover, Zschokke criticizes Kant’s influential theory also for its being largely useless in the practice of art.\(^{23}\) In the next part of his exposition, which explains beauty from man’s sensually rational nature, Dambeck again adheres to Zschokke. Both scholars make beauty contingent upon feeling, and connect it to the three basic faculties and the corresponding three kinds of perfection (cognitive, moral, and sensuous). Dambeck repeats Zschokke’s distinction between the beautiful as an idea and beauty as its particular expression, as well as the view that one encounters beauty in art and in nature. He also adopts the exposition of the ideal of beauty. He skips over only the sections about its universality\(^{24}\) and the concluding summary section, in which Zschokke, now wholly and without digressions, again presents the principle of aesthetics – the ‘freie Mittheilung schöner Empfindungen’ – as universally valid, useful both for artists and for critics.\(^{25}\) Moreover, Dambeck includes in this section reflections rebutting possible reservations and objections to his advocating the idea that beauty is contingent upon morality. In sum, it is fair to say that neither the additions nor the omissions fundamentally change the meaning of the exposition of this part.

Part Three
We have already considered the principal difference in the organization of the exposition of Part Three of Zschokke’s and Dambeck’s texts. In Part Three, ‘Concerning Aesthetic Taste’, Zschokke includes an exposition of genius, which

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 68–109.
\(^{23}\) Ibid., 88–104.
\(^{24}\) Ibid., 148–63.
\(^{25}\) Ibid., 169–75.
Dambeck makes into a separate, fourth section. The organization and content of the actual exposition of taste are, however, again similar in both works; only the headings of the individual sections are not identical. The various definitions of taste most often describe it as the faculty of feeling and determining the perfect and the imperfect. Both scholars discuss the distinctness and purity of taste, and compare it with other kinds of judgement. They pay the most attention to the question of the universality of taste with regard to sensuality. Of the differences between the two expositions, one has to point out Dambeck’s omission of Zschokke’s reflections on whether the sex drive or the social instinct comes first, as well as the interpretation of taste as the sensus communis and reflections on the relationship between taste and morality. The omission of these points does not fundamentally change the meaning of the source. That is also true of the omitted part about beauty being contingent on morality, for Dambeck has already elaborated on this topic in sufficient measure and in a similar way in the part on beauty; moreover, like Zschokke, he returns to it also in the last part, on beautiful feelings. Apart from the omissions, one also notes comparatively long and numerous additions in this part. Dambeck expands the exposition with observations relating to the causes of differences in taste, to the instruments for cultivating taste, and to the various kinds of taste. But not even these differences cause a fundamental tension amongst the ideas between the two expositions.

Dambeck proceeds similarly also in the part concerned with the topic of genius as a self-constituting creative force. Here too he has slightly expanded Zschokke’s expositions. He explores, for example, the difference between ‘being a genius’ and ‘having genius’, and classifies various kinds of genius according to different fields, and, using Shakespeare as his example, he extensively analyses the connection between artistic genius and bad taste. He completely adheres to Zschokke’s enumeration of the traits of genius. Both scholars include in this list a vivid

26 I always first give the section heading in Zschokke, then in Dambeck: ‘Vom Geschmack überhaupt’/’[Vom Geschmack]’; ‘Eigentümlichkeiten des ästhetischen Urtheils’+’Reinigkeit des Geschmacksurtheils’/’Eigenheiten und Reinheit des Geschmacksurtheils’; ‘Gemeingültigkeit des Geschmacksurtheils’/’Untersuchung der Quantität des Geschmacksurtheils in Betreff seiner Gültigkeit’; ‘Ueber die Allgemeingültigkeit und Eingültigkeit des Geschmacksurtheils durch die Sinnlichkeit’/ (here, Dambeck has no comprehensive heading); ‘Organisation der Nerven’/’Ein Blick auf die Beschaffenheit der Nerven’; ‘Niedre Seelenvermögen’/’Untere Seelenvermögen: Erfahrungen’; ‘Tribe’/’Tribe’; ‘Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Quantität der Gültigkeit des ästhetischen Urtheils’/’Bestimmung der Quantität des ästhetischen Urtheils in Rücksicht seiner Gültigkeit’; the other sections are devoted to the question of genius.

27 Ibid., 334–38.

28 Dambeck’s heightened interest in Shakespeare was long lasting. See, for example, his translations, published in a parallel English and German edition, William Shakespeare, Venus und Adonis; Tarquin und Lukrezia, trans. Johann Heinrich Dambeck (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1856).
imagination that supplies art with its subject matter; understanding (Verstand) able to infuse material with form; sensibility as a source of artistic manners, and a perspicacious spirit. In greater detail than Zschokke, Dambeck describes how understanding operates, and again also describes the features (Merkmahle) of genius and the nature of universal genius. The same conclusion applies both to the exposition of genius and to the exposition of taste: neither the additions nor the omissions have fundamentally changed the original meaning of Zschokke's views; he has only elaborated some of them and shortened others.

Part Four

Part Four of Zschokke's Ideen and Part Five of Dambeck's lectures present the study of aesthetic feelings as a discipline which 'teaches [the artist] how feelings must be awakened, increased, reduced, suppressed, and named'. Both scholars undertake a detailed analysis of the faculty of feeling (Empfindungsvermögen), comparing it to the faculty of desire (Begehungsvermögen), clarify enjoyment (Vergnügen), and consider the extent to which feelings can be communicated. The expositions culminate in an identical classification of beautiful feelings according to the laws of the three human natures and their desires. Here it should be emphasized that the enumeration of beautiful feelings in both expositions practically means an enumeration of formal features (Merkmahle) of things (for example, unity and diversity), which aid in arousing them. These features cannot be identified directly with beauty, for they are not connected with the suitable subject matter. They are, however, a necessary condition for it. In other words, Zschokke and, based on him, Dambeck have tried to join the traditional system of aesthetic categories for the identification of the qualities of beautiful things together with feeling (which has now been given preference). Of the omitted places of this part, one must mention the striking abridgement of the exposition of one of these categories – namely, proportionality (Verhältnißmäßigkeit). Zschokke rightly considers proportionality to be a term reflecting the heart of the discord between his psychological aesthetics and Kant's transcendental conception of

29 Zschokke, Ideen, 231.
30 Ibid., 234–65.
31 Here again one sees differences in the headings of the individual parts and sections. See, in particular, the more precise headings of the parts discussing the relationship between the feelings and the individual natures. I always first give the heading in Zschokke, and then in Dambeck: 'Welche Empfindungen soll der edle Künstler mittheilen?' / 'Nähere Untersuchung des Charakters schöner Empfindungen in Bezug auf die Gesetze erkennender Natur'; 'Das thebanische Gesetz: eis to kretton mimeisthai' / 'Nähere Untersuchung des Charakters schöner Empfindungen in Bezug auf die Forderungen sittlicher Natur'; 'Sinnliche Natur' / 'Nähere Untersuchung des Charakters schöner Empfindungen in Bezug auf die Forderungen sinnlicher Natur'.

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beauty. With the help of this conception, he endeavours to support an explanation of borderline cases, where a thing awakens delight (*Wohlgefallen*), without us even knowing its purpose, always at the level of the features of things, not exclusively with reference, like Kant, to the harmonic play of subjective cognitive faculties. Zschokke understands proportionality as a formal feature that evokes delight, but in itself, without a link to suitable material, is not yet (nor can it ever be) beauty. He was unable to imagine beauty without content, which is why he criticized Kant’s formalistic conception of beauty. Dambeck, by shortening the exposition, rid the concept of proportionality of its privileged status and made it equal to the other concepts. He thereby implicitly skips over (as he does in the constituting of the all-encompassing principle) the core of Zschokke’s dispute with the *Critique of Judgement*. One can safely disregard the other differences in the exposition of the individual feelings, because they in no way change the original meaning. The basic differences, but again not fundamentally in terms of ideas, can be traced in the part that distinguishes between the three main kinds of beauty – the sublime, the tragic, and the graceful. Here, Dambeck, among other things, adds his observations about different versions of the sublime, about mistakes regarding the sublime and degrees of the graceful. He makes the greatest changes in the conclusory exposition about the ridiculous, in which he includes a new topic, the question of the comic as an aesthetic variant of the ridiculous. Zschokke closes the *Ideen* with a recapitulating section about the ‘signature of the beautiful’, outlining the means that the artist must use in order to fulfil the purpose of fine art, that is, to communicate beautiful feelings. Dambeck did not adopt this section; he completed the exposition with the theory of the comic.

IV

A comparison of the contents of Zschokke’s *Ideen* and the manuscript extract of Dambeck’s lectures confirms their being closely bound. The Prague professor ordinarius constructed his lecture series on the plan of Zschokke’s textbook. He took from it the method of exposition and argumentation, including numerous examples, as well as the orientation to the practical usefulness of aesthetics for the artist. Apart from structural and methodological similarities, the two expositions share a clear, even marked, similarity of ideas. This becomes evident in a comparison of Dambeck’s main views and the preface (*Vorbericht*), in which Zschokke presents in a nutshell the main theses of his own psychological aesthetics.

32 Zschokke, *Ideen*, xvii–ixx, 287–96.
33 Ibid., 394–96.
34 Ibid., vii–xxiv.
art on the basis of the ‘free communication of beautiful feelings’ and conceives the expositions themselves as the fulfilment of this principle. In sum, it is fair to say that the core of Dambeck’s lectures and aesthetic system paraphrase Zschokke’s views. This conclusion is not weakened even by the fact that Zschokke is not at all mentioned either in the manuscript or the book version of the lectures, nor, indeed, is it weakened even by the indisputable possibility of finding sources of the individual ideas in addition to Zschokke’s Ideen. For in no other book do these views appear in the form of a complete aesthetic theory comparable with Zschokke’s and Dambeck’s system(s). Concerning departures from Zschokke’s model, it is fair to say that most of Dambeck’s changes, whether small (related to style, substituting an alphabetical classification for Zschokke’s numbering, changing headings) or large (including expanding and omitting), tend to break up the original model rather than refine it. Zschokke’s exposition is, in comparison with Dambeck’s, clearer, more coherent, more apposite, and, on top of that, firmly integrated into the contemporaneous literature on aesthetics, which he openly contended with.

35 The same conclusion holds also for the book version, which adheres to Zschokke, it seems, even more strikingly – namely, making argumentation more precise using Zschokke’s arguments, or including notes and a bibliography. A definitive confirmation of this conclusion would require a proper analysis.

36 The question arises as to why Dambeck was silent about Zschokke’s Ideen. The work was not mentioned even in the announcements of the Collegia of aesthetics, which appear in the university lecture lists. Though one can only speculate as to why, the most likely reason is that the Court in Vienna had set different textbooks for instruction in aesthetics – namely, Johann Joachim Eschenburg, Entwurf einer Theorie und Literatur der schönen Wissenschaften (Berlin: Nicolai, 1783), and Johann August Eberhard, Theorie der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften, 3rd ed. (Halle: Waisenhaus, 1790).

37 For example, the conviction that beauty can only be felt was widely shared, and appears in all the textbooks that Dambeck could draw upon. The linking of beauty and the agreeable (das Angenehme) or its being contingent upon morality was also widespread.

38 Though one can safely disregard them, that does not mean Dambeck did not know, or could not know, other possible sources.

39 In preparing the book version, Hanslik clearly also struggled with the lack of cohesion in Dambeck’s lectures. Good evidence of that is the numerous additions and corrections in terminology. For more on this, see Hlobil, ‘Pražské univerzitní přednášky’. Not even Hanslik managed satisfactorily to clean up the exposition, which was mercilessly pointed out even by contemporaneous critics. See the anonymous review ‘Prag bei Enders: Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik von Joh. Heinr. Dambeck’, Allgemeines Repertorium der neuesten in- und ausländischen Literatur 5, no. 3 (1823): 35–37. The places where Dambeck’s changes contributed to making Zschokke’s exposition more precise are rare. Among the most striking are the headings of the three parts of the discussions on beautiful feelings in relation to the cognitive, moral, and sensuous faculties (see note 31) and his moving the exposition of genius from the part on taste to a separate part. But then the question remains whether the additions making it more precise were not Hanslik’s.

40 The manuscript extract of Dambeck’s lectures contains a minimum of references to works by specific authors. Of those that I identified as important sources of his lectures, he mentions only Friedrich Bouterwek. Hanslik’s editorial work probably included, among other things, the completion of pertinent bibliographies.
Zschokke’s views form the core of Dambeck’s lectures, but they do not exhaust the eclectic nature of those lectures. Among the most important places in which Dambeck departs from the model that was so decisive for him are the interpretations of art. In these places in the lectures he follows on especially from Friedrich Bouterwek (1766–1828), a professor at Göttingen. Again without citing his sources, Dambeck quotes Bouterwek’s definition of art as the ‘Hervorbringung eines Gegenstandes durch Herrschaft des Geistes über den Stoff’. Furthermore, he also adopts from Bouterwek the concept of aesthetic need (ästhetisches Bedürfnis) as one of the basic human needs, which resides in the feeling of the free harmonic play of all human faculties and in the feeling of their striving for elevation and of their common development. He links this concept with Zschokke’s principle of aesthetics. Without admitting it, he also advocates Bouterwek’s conception of art as an activity that leads human beings to Humanität.

Bouterwek’s influence can be traced also in other parts of the lectures. Dambeck often repeats the view that beauty is necessarily a relational concept (Verhältnisbegriff). Following Bouterwek, Dambeck also differentiates between the ridiculous and the comical, and pays particular attention to the comical as an aesthetic form of the ridiculous.

In addition to the influence of Bouterwek, one occasionally also finds in Dambeck’s lectures influences of other aestheticians at universities in central Germany, which he has not admitted. A professor of philosophy at Frankfurt, later Leipzig, Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770–1842), may have inspired Dambeck not only in the introductory formulation of his definition of art by distinguishing art from science (that is, all scholarship) and nature, but also, in particular, to his basic division of the individual kinds of art according to the criterion of time and

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41 For Bouterwek’s aesthetics, see Fritz Jurczok, ‘Friedrich Bouterwek als Ästhetiker’ (diss., Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 1949), and, most recently, Sandra Richter, *A History of Poetics: German Scholarly Aesthetics and Poetics in International Context, 1770–1960* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010), 101–5.
42 In the manuscript, Dambeck cites Bouterwek four times. All the references are in Part Five: the first in the exposition of the sublime, the second about the grace, the third and fourth in the exposition of the ridiculous.
43 Friedrich Bouterwek, *Ästhetik* (Leipzig, 1806; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1976), 198. In my enumeration, I limit myself to theses expanding on Zschokke’s views; I do not refer to views in which Bouterwek and the other authors mentioned agree with Zschokke.
44 Ibid., 36.
45 Ibid., 16.
46 For example, ibid., 51.
47 Ibid., 165–94.
48 Wilhelm Traugott Krug, *Versuch einer Systematischen Enzyklopädie der schönen Künste* (Leipzig: Hempel, 1802; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1976), 198. In my enumeration, I limit myself to theses expanding on Zschokke’s views; I do not refer to views in which Bouterwek and the other authors mentioned agree with Zschokke.
space.\textsuperscript{49} Probably following the Leipzig philosopher Christian August Heinrich Clodius (1772–1836),\textsuperscript{50} Dambeck divided the arts into contingent and non-contingent.\textsuperscript{51} Lastly, among those who may have inspired Dambeck was another Leipzig professor \textit{ordinarius} of philosophy, Karl Heinrich Heydenreich (1764–1801), whom Zschokke advocated as the most important forerunner of psychological aesthetics.\textsuperscript{52} Dambeck may have received the impulse to expand the all-encompassing principle about representation (\textit{Darstellung}) from Heydenreich, because it was Heydenreich who was convinced that not only the instinct to communicate (\textit{mitzutheilen}) one's feelings (\textit{Empfindungen}) was peculiar to man, but so too was the instinct to represent (\textit{darzustellen}) those feelings.\textsuperscript{53}

V

The eclectic nature of the ideas in Dambeck’s lectures on aesthetics explained in our analysis\textsuperscript{54} is not in itself particularly interesting. It only becomes interesting when we compare and contrast the discovered nature of Dambeck’s aesthetics with previous interpretations, for it invites their fundamental revision in three important respects:

1. The close link between Dambeck’s lectures and the works of Zschokke, Bouterwek, Krug, Clodius, and Heydenreich clearly demonstrates that the existing approach that describes his lectures by linking out-of-context and isolated views with the views of contemporaneous great thinkers in German aesthetics, in particular, Kant and Schiller, is highly misleading, for the decisive influence on the formation of Dambeck’s lectures was not the crucial works such as the \textit{Critique of Judgement} and \textit{On the Aesthetic Education of Man} but the textbooks of

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 46–47. Simply the interpretations of the individual kinds of art no longer completely match each other.

\textsuperscript{50} For the most recent work on Clodius’s aesthetics, see Richter, \textit{History of Poetics}, 68–72.

\textsuperscript{51} As with Krug’s classification of the individual kinds of art, Dambeck somewhat departs from Clodius’s original definition of the contingent and non-contingent arts when he describes the first group as arts for external use and external needs, and the second as arts that are not limited to external need, are guided by the ideals to which no object of experience corresponds, and are intended exclusively for immediate aesthetic delight (\textit{Wohlgefallen}). Christian August Heinrich Clodius, \textit{Entwurf einer systematischen Poetik, nebst Collectaneen zu ihrer Ausführung}, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1804), 5.

\textsuperscript{52} Zschokke, \textit{Ideen}, ix, 53.

\textsuperscript{53} Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, \textit{System der Aesthetik} (Leipzig, 1790; repr. Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1978), 150–53. For Heydenreich’s aesthetics, see Paul Schlüter, \textit{Carl Heinrich Heydenreichs System der Ästhetik} (Bleicherode: Nieft, 1939).

\textsuperscript{54} Mainly the illustrative examples are original, particularly those from Dambeck’s private life and Prague life, for example, observations about the works of Mozart, Schiller, and Shakespeare performed there.
aesthetics used in central Germany in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century. From them Dambeck adopted the organization of his lectures, the system of aesthetics, and the key ideas.55

2. The close link between Dambeck’s lectures and these textbooks – and this is even more important for their rightful inclusion in the history of aesthetics – also compels us, if not outright to revise the current understanding of the nature of their ideas, then at the very least to understand them more precisely. Dambeck has so far been most often unproblematically presented as an adherent and disseminator of Kant’s and Schiller’s ideas about aesthetics in the Bohemian Lands. The key textbooks on which he bases his university lecture series, are, however, intentionally un-Kantian, and in some respects even anti-Kantian.56 Zschokke’s, Bouterwek’s, and Heydenreich’s textbooks are part of the psychological-anthropological stream of Late-Enlightenment German aesthetics.57 The adherents of this stream argued against both Kant’s theory of pure judgement of taste expressed in the *Critique of Judgement* and the theory of transcendental aesthetics presented in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The aim of Kant’s opponents was to create a system of aesthetics built on empirical, intentionally anti-transcendentalist foundations. Advocates of anthropological-psychological aesthetics did not accept Kant’s thorough distinction between ‘Empfindung’ as sensation and ‘Gefühl’ as a feeling, and continued to cling to the term ‘Empfindung’ in the sense of feeling pleasure (*Lust*) or displeasure (*Unlust*) as a cornerstone of the presented aesthetics systems. They openly criticized Kant’s decision to exclude sensuality (*Sinnlichkeit*) and sensuous agreeableness

55 I shall leave aside the fundamental question of whether it is at all possible to build a closed school aesthetic system of the kind the lectures were meant to offer, on the basis of works like Schiller’s *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* or Kant’s *Critique of Judgement*.

56 Apart from Zschokke’s reservations about Kant’s decision to exclude sensuality from taste, beauty, and art, and attacking the formalistic conception of beauty and the uselessness of the *Critique of Judgement* in a work of art, see particularly the preface to Zschokke, *Ideen*, ix–xi, ix–xxii. Bouterwek’s conception of aesthetics was also anti-Kantian, though Kant is not explicitly named in it. Bouterwek stated his aim as follows: ‘Vom höchsten Standpunkte des unmittelbaren Bewußtseyns aus, unabhängig von allen transcendentalen und metaphysischen Schulbegriffen, die Empfindung des Schönen zu erklären, und dieser Erklärung gemäß zur Beurtheilung des Schönen in der Natur und Kunst richtige Grundsätze aufzustellen und zu entwickeln.’ Bouterwek, *Ästhetik*, 21–22. For similar reflections, see ‘Die physiologischen und die transcendentalen Eintheilungen der schönen Künste, wie sie auch immer ausfallen mögen, gehen die Aesthetik nichts an.’ *Ibid.*, 267. Bouterwek in particular then criticized Kant’s decision to exclude sensuality from the pure judgement of taste. *Ibid.*, 13–15. Reservations about Kant’s *Critique of Judgement* in the form of corrections and explanations of his alleged views are to be found in Heydenreich, *System*, 81–85, 109–10.

57 Krug and Clodius were far more favourably inclined to the *Critique of Judgement*. Krug, in particular, in the two books adheres to Kant and tries to systematize Kant’s ideas and to apply them broadly to the whole subject of aesthetics.
(Annahmlichkeit) from beauty, taste, and art, and they sought their reintegration. They did not reconcile themselves to Kant’s transcendently subjective solution to questions of aesthetics, and also sought, despite the acknowledged priority of subjective feeling, to keep the qualities of beautiful things at the centre of aesthetics research. They linked these qualities to the concept of the perfections, which were no longer conceived in strictly objective terms, but rather in connection with the three human natures. In sum: the axiom of Zschokke’s, Bouterwek’s, Heydenreich’s, and Dambeck’s aesthetics stems from a conviction about the subjectively objective nature of beauty, that is, its link not only with the subject’s feelings, but also with the properties of the object, which these feelings awaken by having an effect on man in harmony with his nature.

Incorporating Dambeck’s lectures into the anthropological-psychological current of Late-Enlightenment German aesthetics demonstrates that its previously having been unproblematically linked with the aesthetics of German Idealism is in no case straightforward; the ideas from which scholars have so far deduced the link as a conviction about beauty and taste being united with freedom or about education in Humanität and morality by means of beauty and art are too fragmentary and were too widely shared and too differently interpreted in the various streams of aesthetics in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century to be able to demonstrate this close link convincingly. Nor can it reasonably be claimed that Dambeck looked upon all idealist aesthetics negatively or even inimically. Such a conclusion is undermined, among other things, by his enthusiasm for Schiller, which is clear from the inaugural lecture and the lecture series.58 The relationship between Dambeck’s lectures and the aesthetics of German Idealism may be best explained by the attitude of the author of the key source, Zschokke, towards Kant.59 Zschokke intentionally conceived his psychological aesthetics as a counterpart both to Kant’s transcendental aesthetics and to the concept of the pure judgement of taste. This aim did not, however, prevent him from understanding psychological aesthetics, as Ernst Stöckmann has pointed out,60

58 Johann Heinrich Dambeck, Uüber Werth und Wichtigkeit der Aesthetik, Geschichte der Künste und Wissenschaften, und Geschichte der Philosophie (Prague: Widtmann, [1812]), 7–8. See also the obituary, Ludwig Jeitteles, ‘Erinnerung an Johann Heinrich Dambeck’, Hyllos 3 (1821): 85. His emphasis on Schiller undoubtedly also facilitated his being raised to the nobility by Francis II, on 16 November 1802.
59 Zschokke, Ideen, ix.
60 Ernst Stöckmann, Anthropologische Ästhetik: Philosophie, Psychologie und ästhetische Theorie der Emotionen im Diskurs der Aufklärung (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2009), 280n12. See also the entry by Dieter Kliche, ‘Ästhetik/ästhetisch’, the section ‘Ästhetische Pathologie’, in Ästhetische Grundbegriffe: Historisches Wörterbuch in sieben Bänden, vol. 1, ed. Karlheinz Barck et al. (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2000), 329–31.
even as an expansion, as he himself said, of ‘such a fortuitously elaborated’

theory. Zschokke did not see, or rather was unable to see, the fundamental,

insurmountable difference between his own exposition and the expositions in

the vein of the *Critiques*. It aptly confirms the way in which he viewed the creation

of aesthetics as a respected academic field. Typically of him, Zschokke gave most

of the credit for the ennoblement of aesthetics to a disparate trio of authors:

Johann Georg Sulzer, Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, and Immanuel Kant, without

setting any divisions amongst their views. In a single breath he calls them all

thinkers ‘welche durch ihre Bemühungen das brache, wüste Feld der Aesthetik

mit vorzüglichem Glück bearbeiteten, die Gränzen derselben berichtigten und

Ordnung hineinführten’. Dambeck took a similar approach. At Prague University,

without admitting it, he spread Zschokke’s ‘Empfindungsästhetik’ while openly

advocating selected views of Schiller and Kant. The result of this syncretizing

approach was a partial shift of Zschokke’s reflections on art from empiricism

towards the suprasensual Ideals and a contribution to *Humanität*, two ideas – let

us recall – declared not only by Kant and Schiller, but also in contemporaneous

textbooks. The relationship between the anthropological-psychological current

and the transcendentalist-idealist current of German aesthetics was clearly not –

at least on the part of the first group of aestheticians – purely negative, even

though they did not accept the transcendental method, the unignorable basis of

Kant’s *Critiques*.

3. The revision of the descriptions of Dambeck’s lectures, which have to be

seen not as strictly Kantian or Schillerian, but as anthropological-psychological

and open to the partial impulses of German idealist aesthetics, provides

essential new information that enables them to be put in their proper place in

the history of aesthetics at Prague University. The analysis shows that Prague

University in the second decade of the nineteenth century was still a bastion of

emotionalist aesthetics, hardly the vanguard of idealist aesthetics. The emotionalist

orientation, which had already been imprinted on the aesthetics taught at Prague

by the founder, Carl Heinrich Seibt (1735–1806), and were then buttressed by his

successor, August Gottlieb Meißner (1753–1807), assumed a third form in Dambeck’s

lectures: after Seibt’s Gellertian preference for sentiment (*Gefühl*) over rules and

Meißner’s ‘Rührungsästhetik’, which in questions of art put the importance of


61 Zschokke, *Ideen*, ix.

62 Ibid., 27. Zschokke may have been inspired to that attitude by Heydenreich, who also

expressed admiration for Kant’s *Critiques*, and also took issue with the views in his own

expositions, without even realizing that his ‘Empfindungsästhetik’ contradicts the

transcendental view. Heydenreich, *System*, xxxvi, 82.

63 Dambeck, following Zschokke, did not hesitate to describe Kant as an example of

a scholarly genius or to advocate his views on the relationship between art and nature.
morality towards the bottom of the list, Dambeck’s lecture series was conceived as psychological-anthropological ‘Empfindungslehre’. Dambeck drew the impulses for its creation from contemporaneous textbooks written in German at universities outside the Austrian Monarchy, which were newer than the textbooks set by the Court at Vienna for the teaching of aesthetics at Austrian universities.

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64 Tomáš Hlobil, Geschmacksbildung im Nationalinteresse: Die Anfänge der Prager Universitätsästhetik im mitteleuropäischen Kulturraum 1763–1805, Bochumer Quellen und Forschungen zum 18. Jahrhundert 2 (Hanover: Wehrhahn, 2012).

65 For more on the set textbooks, see note 36. The analysis raises a number of other important questions aiming in various directions. Perhaps the most interesting for musicology concerns the relationship between Dambeck’s emotionalist aesthetics and Eduard Hanslick’s formalistic aesthetics: Was Hanslick’s formalism a youthful rebellion?
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