Development of cognitive processing and judgments of knowledge in medical students: Analysis of progress test results

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ABSTRACT

Background: Beside acquiring knowledge, medical students should also develop the ability to apply and reflect on it, requiring higher-order cognitive processing. Ideally, students should have reached higher-order cognitive processing when they enter the clinical program. Whether this is the case, is unknown. We investigated students’ cognitive processing, and awareness of their knowledge during medical school.

Methods: Data were gathered from 347 first-year preclinical and 196 first-year clinical students concerning the 2008 and 2011 Dutch progress tests. Questions were classified based upon Bloom’s taxonomy: “simple questions” requiring lower and “vignette questions” requiring higher-order cognitive processing. Subsequently, we compared students’ performance and awareness of their knowledge in 2008 to that in 2011 for each question type.

Results: Students’ performance on each type of question increased as students progressed. Preclinical and first-year clinical students performed better on simple questions than on vignette questions. Third-year clinical students performed better on vignette questions than on simple questions. The accuracy of students’ judgment of knowledge decreased over time.

Conclusions: The progress test is a useful tool to assess students’ cognitive processing and awareness of their knowledge. At the end of medical school, students achieved higher-order cognitive processing but their awareness of their knowledge had decreased.

Introduction

Students’ ability to apply acquired knowledge has been a research topic in medical education for many years (Boshuizen & Schmidt 1992; Eva 2005; Norman 2005). Most studies on knowledge application focus on knowledge growth and differences between beginning and advanced students (for a review, see Wrigley et al. 2012). However, an increase in knowledge does not necessarily imply that students are able to use the acquired knowledge. It may also be achieved through reproduction of factual knowledge, whereas knowledge application requires a deep understanding of factual knowledge. In the course of medical school, students’ knowledge becomes more organized, accessible, and hierarchically structured (Bloom 1956; Anderson et al. 2001; Krathwohl 2002), which is also known as students’ cognitive processing. Without insight into the cognitive processes involved we are not able to fully help medical students construct hierarchical knowledge.

Bloom’s taxonomy is a well-established framework in which cognitive processing is represented as a cumulative hierarchy of lower and higher levels of acquired knowledge. Mastery of the lower levels is required to achieve the higher levels (Bloom 1956; Anderson et al. 2001; Krathwohl 2002). The two lowest levels, remembering and understanding information, are considered lower-order cognitive abilities that require a minimal understanding of information (Crowe et al. 2008). The third level, applying information, is considered a transitional level by some researchers (Crowe et al. 2008). The third level, applying information, is considered a transitional level by some researchers (Crowe et al. 2008). The third level, applying information, is considered a transitional level by some researchers (Crowe et al. 2008). The third level, applying information, is considered a transitional level by some researchers (Crowe et al. 2008).

Practice Points

- Preclinical students answer questions using lower-order cognitive processing.
- Clinical students answer questions using higher-order cognitive processing.
- Students’ answering patterns correspond with their cognitive abilities.
- Students’ judgment of knowledge accuracy decreases over time.
- Progress tests can be used as a tool to measure students’ cognitive processing throughout medical school.

Another important aspect of medical students’ cognitive processing based upon Bloom’s taxonomy is awareness of their own knowledge and cognitive ability. This is known as metacognitive knowledge (Krathwohl 2002). It has been argued that especially medical students should acknowledge what they do not know, because as a doctor they need to make high-stake decisions about patients (Muijtjens et al. 1999). Metacognitive knowledge is usually measured by asking people to provide a judgment of their knowledge about...
a specific item. A way to consistently engage students in judging their own knowledge is to add an "I don't know" option to multiple choice questions. Several studies have investigated incorporation of judgments of knowledge into regular knowledge tests (Keislar 1953; Traub et al. 1969; Muijtjens et al. 1999). These studies generally showed that incorporating an "I don't know" option increased test reliability and provided valuable information about students’ metacognition. Other studies on self-judgments of knowledge, showed a positive correlation between metacognition and performance (Koriat et al. 2002; Koriat & Shitzer-Reichert 2002; Schleifer & Dull 2009). Furthermore, studies on the effects of experience and study progress on metacognitive knowledge showed that: (1) initial application of knowledge leads to underestimations of one’s own knowledge and (2) metacognitive ability becomes more general rather than domain-specific when students progress through their studies (Koriat & Shitzer-Reichert 2002; Veenman & Spaans 2005). We did not find any studies on the development of undergraduate medical students’ insight into what they do not know and awareness of their knowledge gaps when they progress to more advanced study years.

The most common way of verifying student knowledge is to use tests with different types of questions. First, there are questions that require students to remember and understand basic knowledge. We will refer to these as “simple questions”. Second, there are questions that require students to apply, analyze, and evaluate existing knowledge in combination with new information, which is provided through a case (Crowe et al. 2008). We will refer to these as “vignette questions”. Whereas simple questions aim at assessing lower cognitive processes of Bloom’s taxonomy, vignette questions also require students to use higher cognitive processing which positively affects long-term knowledge retention (Redfield & Rousseau 1981; Jensen et al. 2014).

In this study, we first investigated undergraduate medical students’ cognitive processing by analyzing their answers to simple and vignette questions throughout medical school. We hypothesized that students’ ability to provide correct answers to simple questions would increase because they continuously received theoretical education and had to apply basic, factual knowledge to most of their educational activities. We expected the number of correct answers to vignette questions to increase rapidly when students progressed into the clinical phase, where the emphasis is more on patient cases. We expected the number of incorrect and question mark answers to decrease because student knowledge would increase throughout medical school. Furthermore, we investigated whether students’ self-judgments of knowledge became more accurate over time. We hypothesized that the accuracy of students’ judgments of their own knowledge would increase throughout medical school.

Methods

Study design

We used data from the University of Groningen concerning the Dutch interuniversity progress test of 2008 and 2011 to assess our hypotheses. The progress test is based on the Dutch National Blueprint for the Medical Curriculum and aims to assess the final objectives of undergraduate training, covering the whole domain of medical knowledge at grade. The Dutch progress test is administered at fixed intervals to all students, four times per year. Each progress test consists of 200 multiple choice questions, comprising simple and vignette questions. Students are allowed to not answer a question by using the "I don’t know” option, hereafter referred to as question mark option. A correct answer is coupled with a reward, an incorrect answer with a penalty and using a question mark ends without reward or penalty (for more details about the Dutch Progress test, see Tio et al. 2016).

From each year, 2008 and 2011, we selected the progress test with the highest reliability, resulting in the first progress test from 2008 (a = 0.985) and the last progress test from 2011 (a = 0.928). Both tests had similar difficulty levels. For each question we calculated a p value by dividing the number of students who answered the question correctly by the total number of students who answered this question (Crocker & Algina 1986). The overall difficulty of a test is calculated by estimating the mean of all p values within the test. The p values – based on scores from first- to sixth-year medical students from four different medical schools – were 0.34 and 0.37, respectively. Similar p values were found for the University of Groningen: 0.34 and 0.38, respectively.

The sixth-year Groningen undergraduate medical curriculum is divided into a three-year preclinical and a three-year clinical program. As we were interested in students’ cognitive development, we only included data from first-year students from 2008 and last year students from 2011 who participated in one of the two programs. Data of students who did not take both tests were excluded from the dataset.

Data analysis

In accordance with Bloom’s taxonomy, the items of each test were classified as simple or vignette questions by one of the researchers (RT) and a student assistant. Simple questions were items requiring students to remember or/and basically understand the knowledge. Vignette questions were items requiring students to apply, analyze, or/and evaluate existing knowledge. An example of a simple question is:

The blood leaves the liver via the:

A. Hepatic duct
B. Hepatic vein
C. Superior mesenteric vein
D. Portal vein

An example of a vignette question is:

A 54-year-old male presents with severe head-ache, nausea, and vomiting since 48 h. At physical examination bilateral papillary edema is present. His blood pressure is 240/160mmHg. Urinalysis shows proteinuria (2+) and hematuria (1+); no glucose or ketone bodies.

Which of the following nephrologic diseases is most likely?

A. Acute pyelonephritis
B. Acute tubulonecrosis
C. Necrotising arteriolitis
D. Papillary necrosis

For each test, we determined per student which questions were answered correctly, incorrectly, or with a question mark. As the number of simple and vignette questions
The underlying assumption was that students fill out a question mark if they do not know the correct answer to a question. In short, the accuracy of students’ judgment of knowledge was operationalized as the proportion of answers students did not know out of all the incorrect answers they gave. To compare students’ judgments of knowledge accuracy between the first and the last year we used paired samples t-test. All analyses were separately performed for students in the preclinical and the clinical program.

Results
We used progress test data from 548 first-year preclinical and 411 first-year clinical students. After excluding students who did not take both tests, data from 347 first-year preclinical and 196 first-year clinical students were analyzed.

Percentages of answers are shown in Table 1. As students progressed through their program, the percentage of correct and incorrect answers increased, whereas the percentage of question mark answers decreased.

Preclinical program
For the percentage of correct answers, we found main effects of time (F(1, 346) = 3800.15, p < 0.001) and type of question (F(1, 346) = 76.46, p < 0.001). Furthermore, we found an interaction effect between year and type of question (F(1, 346) = 15.48, p < 0.001). In Year 1, the percentage of correct answers to simple questions was slightly higher than that for vignette questions. In Year 3, the percentage of correct answers to simple questions was higher than that for vignette questions, as compared with Year 1 (Table 1).

For the percentage of incorrect answers, we found main effects of time (F(1, 346) = 2746.53, p < 0.001) and type of question (F(1, 346) = 135.95, p < 0.001). However, we did not find an interaction effect between year and type of question (F(1, 346) = 2.34, p = 0.127). In Year 3, the percentage of question mark answers was significantly lower than that in Year 1. Furthermore, the percentage of question mark answers to vignette questions was significantly higher than that for simple questions (Table 1).

Clinical program
For the percentage of correct answers, we found main effects of time (F(1, 195) = 1081.36, p < 0.001) and type of question (F(1, 195) = 57.08, p < 0.001). Furthermore, we found an interaction effect between year and type of question (F(1, 195) = 89.39, p < 0.001). We found a similar percentage of correct answers to vignette and simple questions, with the percentage of correct answers to vignette questions being slightly lower. In Year 3, the percentage of correct answers to both type of questions increased. However, the percentage of correct answers to vignette questions was significantly higher than that for simple questions (Table 1).

For the percentage of incorrect answers, we found main effects of time (F(1, 195) = 145.52, p < 0.001) and type of question (F(1, 195) = 5.18, p = 0.024). Furthermore, we found an interaction effect between year and type of question (F(1, 195) = 12.99, p < 0.001). Similar to the preclinical program, the percentage of incorrect answers increased in favor of vignette questions. In Year 4, the percentage of incorrect answers to vignette questions was significantly higher than that for simple questions. In Year 3, the percentage of incorrect answers to vignette questions was slightly lower than that for simple questions (Table 1).

For the percentage of question mark answers, we found main effects of time (F(1, 195) = 734.91, p < 0.001) and type of question (F(1, 195) = 76.90, p < 0.001). Furthermore, we found an interaction effect between year and type of question (F(1, 195) = 35.05, p < 0.001). Similar to the preclinical program, the percentage of question mark answers decreased. In this case, the percentage of question mark answers to simple and vignette questions was similar in both years; however, the decrease in question mark answers to vignette questions was larger than that for simple questions (Table 1).

Judgments of knowledge accuracy
Table 2 shows the outcomes of the paired sample t-test comparison of students’ judgments of knowledge accuracy.
between the first and the last year of the preclinical and the clinical program. In both programs, students’ judgments of knowledge accuracy decreased as students progressed through the preclinical and clinical programs.

**Discussion**

In this study we hypothesized that, due to increasing cognitive processing, students’ ability to provide more correct answers to simple and vignette questions would increase. In line with this hypothesis, we found that the percentage of correct answers to both types of questions increased as students progressed through the curriculum. In the preclinical years and the first year of the clinical programme, the percentage of correct answers to simple questions was higher compared with vignette questions. However, at the end of the curriculum the percentage of correct answers to vignette questions was higher compared with simple questions. This confirms our second hypothesis that clinical experience can help students identify correct answers to vignette questions. Our findings may imply, therefore, that students increasingly engage in higher levels of cognitive processing throughout medical school. Additionally, we expected students’ self-judgment of knowledge to become more accurate over time. However, we found a decrease in students’ judgments of knowledge accuracy. As students progressed through both the preclinical and clinical program they provided more correct but also more incorrect answers to progress test questions.

The observed decrease in students’ judgments of knowledge accuracy is not in line with the literature on metacognition, stating that subjects with higher knowledge levels have higher metacognition ability than subjects with lower knowledge levels (Maki, Jonas & Kalldod 1994; Kruger & Dunning 1999). Students in later years seemed to underestimate their knowledge compared with novice students (Kampmeyer et al. 2015). One explanation may be that students may have weighed the probability and degree of benefit of a correct answer against the probability and degree of penalty of an incorrect answer. The outcome of this weighing process has been shown to depend heavily on the penalty of an incorrect answer (Espinosa & Dunning 1999). Students in later years, who were sitting a progress test more often than female students (Budescu & Bar-Hillel 1993). One might argue that the formula scoring may have blurred the findings of our study. However, students’ awareness of their knowledge is part of the cognitive system and by giving them an option to not answer the questions we force them to reflect on their knowledge. Research on self-regulation revealed that students are more able to assess whether they can answer specific questions than to perform a self-assessment (Eva & Regehr 2007, 2011). However, our findings demonstrated that students in later years, who were sitting a high-stakes assessment, rather answered questions they did not know the answer to.

In a more general sense, the retrospective character of this study does not allow us to control for many other variables that may have influenced its outcome. However, laboratory research, which allows to control all variables, has been criticized due to the lack of reproducibility in real life situations. Within the educational environment, the Dutch progress test offers a unique opportunity to study students’ cognitive processing and judgments of knowledge in a naturalistic setting.

**Practical implications and future research**

It may be beneficial for student knowledge acquisition when the learning environment is tailored to students’ current state of cognitive processing. Students may not be able to identify their own knowledge gaps in the last year of medical school, which may – in extreme cases – cause possible harm to patients. Furthermore, our study revealed that whether students will answer a progress test question may not be related to judgment of knowledge or self-confidence is not necessarily predictive of performance (Harrell et al. 1993; Cleave-Hogg & Morgan 2002). It might have been further enforced by hindsight bias, referring to health care situations where people overestimate the extent to which they would have known something that just happened (Arkes et al. 1981).

**Strengths and limitations**

A distinctive feature of this study is the use of students’ progress test results, which eliminates bias regarding willingness to participate in our study. Although the progress test is a valid and reliable assessment tool for measuring factual knowledge (Muitjens et al. 1999; Schuwirth & van der Vleuten 2012; Wrigley et al. 2012), we demonstrated that the progress test can also be used to assess students’ cognitive processing and the accuracy of their self-judgments of knowledge.

Due to a limited number of places in the clinical program at the time of our study, students were enrolled at different times. Therefore, we were not able to use the same sample of students and we had to analyze the data of both programs separately. Another limitation of our study may be that we used data from a single university. The outcomes may differ from those of other universities with different curricula. However, the underlying cognitive development should be similar at student level, which means that our findings should be replicable across universities and curricula. As guessing is heavily influenced by risk-taking behavior, the use of formula scoring might produce bias regarding students’ answers. For example, male students tend to guess more often than female students (Budescu & Bar-Hillel 1993).

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regulation, because students in later years may have adapted their answering strategies.

Future research should explore and increase the understanding of cognitive aspects of curriculum design. Additionally, further studies are necessary to better understand why students do not answer questions that require higher-order cognitive processing earlier in their medical training. Finally, if self-judgment of knowledge is a desired feature for progress tests, further research should determine the optimal penalty for incorrect answers.

Conclusions
Preclinical students reproduced their knowledge through lower-order cognitive processing, whereas clinical students applied their knowledge through higher-order cognitive processing. The accuracy of students’ judgments of knowledge decreased over time.

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