Religious Diversity and Rational Choice of Religion

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In my essay I consider the situation of a person who really believes in the existence of the Ultimate Reality. The person in question should choose one of the historical religions or construct his or her own pluralist-sceptical Meta-religion. To do so rationally, he or she must use appropriate criteria. I think that the list of these criteria should include the following: internal and external coherence, empirical (mystical) confirmation, credible justification or testimony, existential usefulness, and universality. A comparison of the great historical religions and skeptical-pluralistic Meta-religion leads to the thesis that all of them similarly fit these criteria. The exception to this is the criterion of credibility, which attributes a higher epistemic value to Christianity, although it is possible to discuss whether this value is conditioned by a historical coincidence. In addition, Christianity (understood in a particularist way) faces the objection that I call ‘Schellenberg-Hick’s pliers’. I suppose that it can be avoided by advocating Christian pluralism. Its content can be formulated as follows: just as the Eucharistic signs make available the salvific sacrifice of Christ and the love of God the Father, so Christian mystery could also be universally made available by the signs of non-Christian religions.

Keywords: religious diversity, choice of religion, Ultimate Reality, Christianity, exclusivism, pluralism

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In this essay\(^1\), I examine the situation of a person who believes that, in the language of J.L. Schellenberg, ‘there is a reality ultimate in three ways: in the nature of things (metaphysically), in inherent value (axiologically), and its importance for our life (soteriologically)’ [Schellenberg, 2015, p. 18]. The awareness of the existence of such a reality – let us call it the Ultimate Reality – entails the need (if not obligation) to relate to it intentionally or (if it has a personal character) to come into contact with it on both sides. Such a relationship or contact is called religion. The person in question is therefore a religious person. However, a religious person faces the fact that there are many religions. This fact gives rise to a problem in the way of how religion should be understood and practiced. This problem can be solved in one of the following ways:

(1) either one particular religion is seriously accepted, practiced, and recognized as at least having some relevant ‘superiority’ over other religions;

(2) either you accept the main message common to many religions, practicing selectively different religions (within a religious ‘mix’), or practicing one of them, but in a neutral manner without being convinced of its essential superiority;

(3) or a new religion is (individually or collectively) constructed and practiced.

If a religious person is rational, then

– in the case of (1) he or she should have clear and well-founded criteria for the choice of religion;

– in the case of (5) he or she should have such criteria in relation to the construction of a new religion;

– in the case of (2) he or she should justify its belief with respect to the relative value of the existing (and taken into account) religions, which also requires the existence of appropriate criteria for their evaluation; moreover, even if such a person is a religious pluralist, he has to consider which religion is the best way to the Ultimate Reality given the contemporary conditions of his or her life.

Criteria

As you can see, in all cases, a person who is both rational and religious should have criteria for selection, assessment (evaluation), or construction of his religion. Let us generally call these criteria standards of religious rationality. I believe that the following criteria should be included in this set:

(i) internal and external coherence: a good religion (or, strictly speaking, its doctrinal content) cannot imply contradictions and should be coherent with our most comprehensive knowledge of the world;

(ii) empirical confirmation: a good religion should be confirmed by data of religious experiences;

(iii) credible justification or testimony: a good religion should be supported by some evidence or reliable epistemic authorities;

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(iv) existential usefulness: a good religion should provide some crucial benefits for individual and social human life, e.g. motivation for moral and creative action, help in suffering, etc;

(v) universality: a good religion should be accessible and acceptable for all people or, if it is a part of history, should continue or anticipate other religions.

All these criteria have their origins in our ordinary, especially scientific, cognitive practices. For I believe that religious rationality is a special case of rationality in general. Therefore:

(i') since we require our beliefs (on various matters) to be internally and externally coherent, we should also require coherence in relation to religious beliefs;

(ii') since we expect our beliefs to be consistent with experience, and since experimentation is an important factor in choosing between competitive scientific theories, we should confront religious beliefs with the data of their specific experience, which is religious experience;

(iii') since we treat the lack of credible justification as an epistemic flaw, we should also justify religious beliefs, remembering, of course, about the specificity of their justification: as religious beliefs are very often testimonial in nature, their justification will have to refer to reliable epistemic authorities;

(iv') since pragmatic factors (especially when other factors are not decisive) are also taken into account in the evaluation of beliefs and theories, we should take into account their specific existential usefulness in the evaluation of religions;

(v') since we consider intersubjectivity or universality as (at least) a necessary condition or component of rationality, it should be the same with religion: a religion whose message cannot be (neither directly nor indirectly) accessible to all people cannot be a good religion.

Applications

Let us now try to apply the above criteria to the assessment of religions we know. For the sake of simplicity, let us limit ourselves to the great historical religions, which are still seriously believed by large groups of people (Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam), and ignore their internal diversity. Let us also consider the religious proposal (2) and (3). In a sense, they constitute the two sides of one phenomenon: for today it is difficult to construct a new type of religion (3) without reference to the existing religions; in turn, a pluralistic religion of type (2) cannot function otherwise than as a creative reconstruction or reinterpretation of historical religions. I will continue to call the proposal (2)–(3) Meta-religion, essentially without entering into the consideration of its actual or possible concretizations.

As for the first criterion – the criterion of coherence – the doctrine of each great historical religion can be interpreted in such a way as to avoid internal contradiction. Similarly, assuming the complementarity of science and faith and accepting the epistemic limitations of the first and possible modifications of the second, each of these doctrines can be made coherent in relation to the scientific image of the world. The situation is worse regarding the coherence between religion and metaphysical knowledge. The multitude of competing views or metaphysical sys-
tems means that particular religions can only be in agreement with some of them. The discrepancy between religions, therefore, interplays with discrepancies between metaphysicists or ontologists.

This fact can be the basis for an argument in favour of Meta-religion: since there is a widespread metaphysical-religious disagreement, it is best to opt for a Meta-religion that would reduce the set of competing statements. However, serious doubts can be raised as to whether a religion free of metaphysical statements or assumptions is possible\(^2\). Moreover, since the disagreement between beliefs does not automatically imply the falsity of any of them, limiting oneself to a neutral Meta-religious view carries the risk of overlooking a religion which contains a wealth of true content.

As for the second criterion – the criterion of empirical confirmation – it must be stressed that all great historical religions fulfil it to a high degree. Each religion has a developed mystical tradition, created by people who somehow experience religious phenomena, both common (for many religions) and specific (for a given religion). Mystical experiences, which, in some way, confirm certain religious doctrines, have not only been ‘documented’, but also examined by epistemological analyses showing their epistemic reliability [see, for example: Alston, 1991].

It should be remembered, however, that the main weakness of religious experience is its containment of a strong interpretive factor – a stronger one than in the case of the theoretical factor in the empirical data of science. As a consequence, the results of this experience, carried out in the context of different religious traditions, differ significantly from each other. In such a situation, the empirical criterion – although it indicates a certain cognitive value of religion – is not distinctive when it comes to the comparative assessment of religions. This fact may, as before, speak in favour of Meta-religion, which could focus on a common layer between the content of religious experiences of different traditions. Again, however, it is questionable whether it is possible to experience or isolate only this common layer. One may also ask whether such a procedure will not lead to the omission of some important specific content present in the religious experience of a particular tradition.

The third criterion – the criterion of credible justification or testimony – appears to be more distinctive. Religious beliefs can be justified by reference to metaphysics; however, as I pointed out, this path has become entangled in the problem of disagreement between metaphysical positions. In this case, it is better to base the justification for religious beliefs on the credibility of the relevant religious authorities. A credible religious authority is an authority such that we have serious reason to believe it to be particularly connected with the Ultimate Reality. Again, reasons referring to the knowledge or wisdom of authority require its assessment from the point of view of the adopted (but debatable) metaphysical assumptions. It is different with reasons such as the uniqueness of authority in terms of power and goodness. Indeed, all historical religions attribute such uniqueness to their founders or key figures. However, as R. Swinburne says, ‘none of the great religions can

\(^2\) Sometimes Buddhism was considered to be such a religion. However, I believe that this is a false view, even if a far-reaching reinterpretation of Buddhism would be made.
make any serious claim on the basis of particular historical evidence for the truth of their purported revelations, apart from the Christian religion’ [Swinburne, 2010, p. 112]. Let us add that this is because the source Christian writings, attesting to the uniqueness of its Founder, have six features that no other holy book of historical religions has in common:

– firstly, these writings include information about the sanctity, Divine self-awareness, numerous miracles, and resurrection of the Founder;
– secondly, they refer to a substantial number of witnesses of these founding events or states;
– thirdly, they are the work of many authors who had known these witnesses;
– fourthly, they were written several dozen years after the earthly life of the Founder (and in this case, the distance, as for ancient texts, is very small);
– fifthly, they concern events and people whose historical context (due to the relative proximity to our times and the number of historical sources) is available to us or quite well known;
– sixthly, the content of these writings had been spreading for a longer time without the use of violence or even against the risk of repression.

Of course, it is possible to discuss, and it has been discussed (from the point of view of contemporary standards of credibility), to what extent Christian writings are credible and whether this degree is sufficient. The fact is, nonetheless, that credibility is higher than in the case of other religions’ writings, and the followers of Meta-religion do not attribute to their authorities such a position as historical religions do to their founders. Christianity, therefore, has an advantage both over historical religions and Meta-religion in the aspect of credibility.

Some may say that at least some of the abovementioned features can be explained by accidental historical circumstances. One could argue, for example, that Jesus of Nazareth was born in a historical-cultural context which enabled more reliable information about him to reach us. This fact weakens the importance of the reasons invoked here, although it does not call them into question. After all, randomness of evidence does not mean that it is missing.

To sum up the analysis of the application of third criterion, we can say that Christianity meets the criterion of credibility more adequately than other religions. This does not mean, however, that other religions are completely incredible. Their doctrines are simply dominated by statements which (due to their nature) are not subject to historical verification or which (due to their distance in time) are very difficult to verify.

Let us come to the fourth criterion – the criterion of existential usefulness. It is not easy to apply it to religions for at least two reasons. First of all, the diversity of human personalities and cultures created by people suggests that, for different people, different factors may appear as valuable and helpful in life. Secondly, theologies of great historical religions include or can be characterized by plasticity, which allows for the interpretation of official doctrines in appropriation to the contemporary needs of people. In such a situation, any historical religion and Meta-religion can be considered potentially existentially useful. The advantage of the latter is its almost unlimited malleability. This advantage, however, from another point of view, appears to be a disadvantage: a religion that offers everything according to
our preferences does not really offer anything immutable. Moreover, a religion in which we invent the way of salvation cannot be ‘good news’ for us insofar as being a way that is really given to us. It is from religion that we expect we will not solely rely on ourselves. We seek a serious impulse that comes not from us, but from the Ultimate Reality. In this respect, Meta-religion certainly gives way in favour of historical religions.

As far as the last criterion is concerned – the criterion of universality – every religion faces an obstacle with literal fulfilment. For every religion (even Hinduism, which is probably the oldest of the aforementioned religions) is (due to its historical and geographical limitations) inaccessible to some groups of people. This also concerns Meta-religion, which is only formally a religion for everyone. In fact, Meta-religion is the religion of an elite group of people who are able to distance themselves from the historical religions of their milieu.

The situation is different if we interpret the criterion of universality more liberally. In this case, we can say that certain crucial contents of a given religion are anticipated or repeated in other religions. This interpretation is made possible by the historical-content links between Hinduism and Buddhism and between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as well as between various forms of Meta-religion and historical religions. Due to these links, almost every religion can be treated as universal. The only question at issue is which religion should be taken as a point of reference for the others.

Results

It is hard to expect that the application of the criteria discussed here will lead to unambiguous results. Certainly, however, this application allows us to draw some conclusions helpful for further searches. Here are some of them:

1. In light of the criteria of coherence, empirical confirmation, and existential usefulness, all religions appear to be (more or less) equally legitimate. Only by adding appropriate metaphysical and/or existential-axiological (and perhaps also epistemological) assumptions can we compare religions and find more helpful indicators for the rational choice of a religion.

2. In a restrictive interpretation, the criterion of universality cannot be fulfilled by any religion, while, in a liberal interpretation, it is fulfilled by all historical religions and Meta-religion. As we can see, the criterion of universality also does not allow for an evaluative comparison of religions. However, it provides an important clue for the choice of religion: a good religion should retain some links with other religions.

3. The criterion of credible justification or testimony – or simply, the criterion of credibility – allows a higher epistemic value to be attributed to Christianity.

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3 For example, T.D. McNabb and E. Baldwin develop a certain epistemological-metaphysical theory (proper functionalism), and then, in its light, test the doctrines of selected religions. As a result, they reject Islam, orthodox Hinduism, and Mormonism. Their positive conclusion is that only ‘a god who resembles the Judeo-Christian tradition conception of God is a precondition needed to make intelligible an account of proper function; and […] to make intelligible the capacity for human knowledge’ [McNabb, 2019, p. 34‒37].
However, this superiority is weakened by the hypothesis that our fairly good knowledge of the origins of Christianity is the result of a historical coincidence or that such knowledge is not sufficient to accepting the (revelatory and salvific) claims of Christianity.

The above conclusions entitle searches in the two opposite directions prevalent in contemporary philosophy of religion. The first is related to the approach represented by the pluralistic-sceptical Meta-religion, according to which each historical religion is more or less an equally good—though culturally limited and relative—response to the Ultimate Reality. On the other hand, the second approach attributes a distinguished position to Christianity. Such a choice is justified by the fact that Christianity (as opposed to other religions) best meets the criterion of credibility, and also best fits the image outlined by the (recognized as true) metaphysics of personal theism and the axiology of sacrificial love.

The above analyses have also shown that Meta-religion does not have any significant advantage over historical religions. What is more, it turns out that there are doubts as to the possibility of a reliable realisation of its project. In particular, this impossibility is most evident when Meta-religion is confronted with the criterion of existential usefulness: a constructed religion does not contain the notion of reciprocation from the Ultimate Reality. Yes, every religion can be treated as a relative and subjective response to this Reality. But can the reality actually be ultimate in the axiological and soteriological sense if it does not reveal itself to us and if it does not do anything for us? If the Ultimate Reality is, in Schellenberg’s language, ‘the deepest possible value’ and a guarantee of ‘the ultimate or deepest human good’ [Schellenberg, 2015, p. 19–20], it must communicate with us coherently and clearly. It cannot, therefore, remain silent or communicate in an unclear or vague way. It cannot, therefore, remain silent or communicate in an unclear or vague way. According to the pluralist-sceptical Meta-religion or its consequences, however, the Ultimate Reality communicates only in such a way. In fact, adherents of Meta-religion implicitly admit, simply, that God is silent. But ‘if God were silent, we would be left to our own resources [… ] there would be little hope of salvation’ [Davis, 2009, p. 31–32].

As you can see, the pluralist-sceptical Meta-religion has its drawbacks, and is fed mainly on the fact of disagreement between religions. However, this fact is not enough to undermine the revelatory claims of a given religion. After all, ‘it is not disagreement alone that leads us to think that you are unreliable’ [Murray, Rea, 2008, p. 118] or that your religion is incredible. In other words, ‘deeply rooted disagreement by itself does not entail that there is no single perspective more likely to be true than others, or that all religious perspectives have roughly the same epistemic support’ [Netland, 2007, p. 235]. What, then, is the essential factor undermining the approach called particularism—an approach according to

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4 Such an approach (in different versions) can be found, among others, in: [Geivett, Phillips, 1995, p. 211–245; Swinburne, 2008; Judycki, 2018, p. 117–128]. I discuss it in detail in: [Wojtysiak, 2012, p. 103–113].

5 Let us add that the practical weakness of Meta-religion is that it is impossible to seriously practice a ‘mixture’ of divergent religions. On the other hand, practicing any religion or a coherent set of religions with distance (without engagement) is not real practice, and religious engagement is difficult to reconcile with pluralism.
which a particular religion (let us say: Christianity) includes privileged revelation of the Ultimate Reality?

**Schellenberg-Hick’s Pliers**

In a loose reference to J. Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument and J. Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis, I would call the factor in question Schellenberg-Hick’s Pliers (or dilemma). I propose its presentation as follows:

1. ‘If [the Christian] God exists, then for any capable finite person S and time t, the Christian God is at t open to being in a personal [i.e. positively meaningful and conscious] relationship with S at t’ [Schellenberg’s Principle [Schellenberg, 2015, p. 130]].

2. There is at least one person S and (much more than one) time t such that, due to the lack of real access to the Christian revelation, S in t is not in a personal relationship with the Christian God. [Empirical data]

3. The Christian God does not exist. [1, 2 by Modus Tollens]

   But if you do not agree with (3), you must say:

4. The Ultimate Reality is in itself ‘ineffable, transcategorial – beyond the range of our human categories of thought’, though in relation to us can be experienced in different ways [Hick’s Principle [Hick, 2007, p. 220]].

5. ‘In relation to us the [Ultimate] Real is experienced in our human terms as [among others] the good and loving persona of the Real […]’ [Empirical data [Hick, 2007, p. 220]].

6. The Christian God exists as one of the possible (and culturally relative) modes of experiencing the Ultimate Reality for us, though he does not exist in itself [4, 5 by Instantiation].

   In sum, a Christian particularist, when he wants to avoid Schellenberg’s objection of the inaccessibility of the Christian God for some people, must become (Christianly coloured, at most) a pluralist in Hick’s sense. However, if he wants to avoid this consequence, he again falls into Schellenberg’s objection. This, in turn, allows him to be, at most, a sceptical or pluralistic ultimist. As a result, a Christian particularist falls into the pliers.

Can a Christian particularist defend himself against Schellenberg-Hick’s pliers? The following lines of defence can be found in literature:

(M) Molinism: ‘God in his providence has so arranged the world that those who would respond to the gospel [i.e. the Christian revelation] if they heard it, do hear it. […] Those who […] never hear the gospel would not respond to it if they did hear it. Hence, no one is lost because of historical and geographical accident. Anyone who wants or even would want to be saved will be saved’ [Moreland, Craig, 2003, p. 624].

(SS) Special solution: The Christian God reveals or will reveal himself to those who do not know Christian revelation in a special way: for example, through extraordinary individual visions, at the moment of death or shortly after it.
(A) Agnosticism or sceptical theism applied to the problem of inaccessibility: we do not know how a Christian God can be open to a personal relationship with those who cannot know the Christian revelation or recognize its epistemic and salvific value; nor do we know whether people who are beyond the reach of this revelation enter or will enter into this relationship; but we know that an omnipotent and merciful God can do good things, regarding which we do not know whether or how he does them [Cf. Okholm, Phillips, 1995, p. 20‒23; otherwise Salamon, 2017, p. 122‒123].

(I) Inclusivism: The Christian God, through the ‘seeds of truth’ present in different religions and cultures, reveals himself to every human being, inviting him or her to a personal relationship; however, the fact is that the fullness of revelation and the ultimate source of salvation lies in Christianity.

Note that the solution (M), though sophisticated, engages in rather risky or extravagant metaphysics. The solution (SS) is an ad hoc option. The solution (A), on the other hand, carries all the difficulties of sceptical theism, and, in fact, admits that there is no solution from a human perspective. On the other hand, the solution (I), although the most intuitive, still suggests an advantage for Christians (or people living within the real reach of Christian revelation) in terms of the possibility of access to God.

**Conclusion: Christian pluralism?**

In this situation, I would propose a fifth solution that goes one step beyond the typical inclusivism. It would consist of the reinterpretation of data (2) and (5). According to it, all people can experience a personal relationship with the Christian God within the framework of their religions. In fact, all religions (including non-Christian religions) probably contain Christian themes or motifs (e.g. the motif of sacrificial love or the motif of Divine solidarity with people) to such an extent that it is possible for non-Christians to enter into such a relationship. These motifs make present – through various forms of anticipation or repetition – the founding Christian events for everyone. In this way, all people have equal access to them. The distinguished position is achieved, at most, by Christian theologians, who have the best point of reference in building the theory of relations between God and people. As a result of inter-religious exchange of opinions, however, this point could appear to be distinguished only historically, but not in terms of content.6

My solution could be a working hypothesis in comparative studies of religions. It could also contribute to inter-religious dialogue, in which each side would appreciate the multiplicity of religions while maintaining its own specificity. It could also be an intermediate path between pluralist Meta-religion and exclusivist Christian particularism. Since it goes further than typical Christian inclusivism, I would call it radical Christian inclusivism or even Christian pluralism. Pluralism here does not mean the relativization of the Christian revelation (as a special revelation), but

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6 Some Christian theologians seem to be approaching this conception in a limited way, discussing, in particular, close relations between Christianity and Judaism. Perhaps this approach – in a broader context – is also realized in C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien’s novels.
its multiple expressions and reliable availability in various religions. Just as the Eucharistic signs make available the salvific sacrifice of Christ and the love of God the Father, so – in some analogous (though not the same) way – their mystery (i.e. Christian mystery) could also be universally made available by the signs of other (non-Christian) religions. They only need to be interpreted accordingly, in a (implicitly or explicitly) Christian way.

Someone may object that a theologian of any religion could apply the method of radical inclusivism or qualified pluralism to his own religion. This, in turn, could lead (again) to incoherent pluralism, although at a higher level – to the ‘pluralism of pluralisms’: Christian, Buddhist, Islamic, and so on. Let us note, however, that such a situation would mean an important progress in inter-religious dialogue: all sides of this dialogue would understand that they are not religious rivals but relatives. Moreover, each side could be interpreted positively by the other in the language of its own tradition. Perhaps this dialogue could lead to the common belief that all great religions basically speak of the same, and such the same is something more than (Hick’s) ‘the ultimate transcategorial Real’. In such an approach, the dispute over whether to call this something more Christian, Buddhist, Islamic etc. loses greater significance, without diminishing the importance of the Christian message.

The proposed solution is only a tentative project of further research or more concrete action rather than a closed position. It remains an open question whether this project – too particularistic for some and too pluralistic for others – has a theoretical and practical chance of success.

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Perhaps this something more can be called “the ultimate good”, and the theory of religion (i.e. the theory of a relationship between the Absolute and the humans) can be developed in the perspective that J. Salamon (2017) calls agatheism. It could be ascribed to by a neutral researcher of religions, who sees in each of them the orientation towards the ultimate good, as well as a Christian, who sees the essence of Christian revelation in the manifestation of God’s boundless goodness and love. It seems that there are no obstacles for representatives of other religions to ascribe to it. Because of lack of space, I cannot enter into a discussion with Salamon. I would only like to point out that we are separated by a starting point, but not an ending point. Well, Salamon begins with human agathological imagination in general, and I start with Christian agathological imagination. Salamon is also sceptical about the possibility of objectively demonstrating the epistemic and agathological superiority of a given religion over others; I am inclined to think of the (at least epistemically) distinguished status of Christianity. Next, regarding the point of arrival, I allow for the possibility of (at least agathological) convergence of all religions. As a result, we both reject exclusivism, believing, however, that pluralism should appear in a qualified form.
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