Enabling Conditions for Structures of Domination: Java’s Colonial Era “Cultivation System” and Indonesia’s Palm Oil Plantation System in Comparative Analysis*

MARK STEVENSON CURRY**

Historians of colonial-era Java have produced considerable debate about how the Dutch colonial era Cultivation System (1830-1870) brought prosperity to the Netherlands in contrast with the fortunes of Javanese societies under the imposition of mandatory production quotas. Separately, palm oil plantation agriculture in contemporary Indonesia, since the mid-1990s, has sparked a different debate on the state’s power to direct development over biodiversity and the rights and existence of Indigenous People. In comparative-historical analysis, the structures of domination in each era provide useful symmetries: the speed of implementation; the realization of extraordinary profits; the adverse incorporation of local communities; and environmental impacts. However, the enabling conditions that underpinned and sustained both the colonial era Cultivation System and the contemporary palm oil boom remain to be explored and applied to the paired agencies of investment capital and the developmental state. From historical accounts, four enabling conditions emerge: a catalyzing crisis; close control over information flows; maintaining an official monopoly over order and violence; and an official discourse intolerant of dissent or resistance. These symmetries in comparison permit an assessment of the state’s role as an agent for an anti-development double-action: what Harvey calls “Accumulation by Dispossession” and Santos (2007) calls “Epistemicide.”

Keywords: Cultivation System, Oil Palm Plantations, Indigenous Peoples, Environment, Enabling Conditions, Development

* I would like to acknowledge the people and institutions whose input towards the completion and publication of this article has been invaluable: Jannie de Jong at Rijksuniversiteit Groningen; OSIPP at Osaka University; Su-Ming Khoo at NUI Galway; Greg Robinson at the University of Quebec in Montreal; TWSC at Diliman; Mikyung Park; Teresa Tamayo; and the editors, staff and anonymous reviewers at AISR. I’m grateful to all. The faults otherwise are mine.

** PhD Candidate, National University of Ireland at Galway, Galway, Ireland; E-mail: curry.mark@gmail.com
DOI: 10.16934/isr.17.2.201612.55
I. INTRODUCTION

The idea for this paper derives from a course on Dutch history undertaken at Osaka University in 2012. The course introduced the Golden Age of Dutch development and focused on the 19th Century “Cultivation System” in colonial Java. This system of forced cultivation, imposed as a cap on the existing feudal labor relations, changed the fortunes of the Netherlands, restored its status as a formidable trading nation and promoted its claim to significance among the European Great Powers (Booth 2013, 6).

Separately, I was researching aspects of the global “land grab” between 2000 and 2011 (von Braun and Meintzen-Dick 2009, 1; Hall 2011, 1), a wave of land deals favorably described as “market led agrarian reform” by Deininger (2003, 1217). This complex phenomenon frequently involved relatively rich countries that were poor in arable lands and water—such as the Gulf states and China—and their quest for access to farmland and water in countries of the Global South (Margulis, McKeon and Borras 2013, 1). These deals were often speedily set up, opaque, cheap for investors, and appeared to offer limited developmental potential to the traditional inhabitants of the land (White and Dasgupta 2010, 603). Many deals have been set up in Indonesia, particularly for palm oil expansion (McCarthy, Vel and Afiff 2012, 532).

The research questions for this paper are these: What enabling conditions underpinned the original Dutch agricultural system in Java and Indonesia’s palm oil plantation boom? What similarities or symmetries could be identified among such enabling conditions? This research interest does not claim a basis for causality from the Dutch colonial project to the new boom in palm oil plantations. Neither does it attempt to directly compare two dissimilar agricultural modes of production. Instead, it reflects an interest in historical symmetries. Such symmetries or patterns are particularly realized in two respects: re-ordering the environment and the adverse incorporation of the local inhabitants, people whose lives, livelihoods, customs, societies and economies have experienced drastic change (Pelzer 1961; Stoler 1995; Scott 2009).

To address the topic, a basic timeline can aid an understanding of the logic behind the case selection. The Netherlands was in a state of political-economic crisis from 1825 until the beginning of the Cultivation System era (1830-1870) as implemented in its colonial territory of Java. The Ethical system of formal plantation-based agriculture followed from 1870 until independence in 1945—excluding the hiatus of World War II. President Suharto’s assumption of power in 1966, the New Order era, lasted until a new economic-political crisis in 1997-1998. The so-called Reformasi era of decentralization, and greater freedom of speech followed. The palm oil boom is common to all five presidencies of this latter era.

The two critical junctures relevant to this study are 1825 to 1830 and 1995 to
1998. These are the periods prior to rapid, extensive and extremely transformative changes to life and land use. With land use change came immense profits for domestic and foreign elites and insiders in what David Harvey (2004, 63-64) calls “accumulation by dispossession.” Why should these critical junctures be of interest? More specifically, why should Java’s Cultivation System from 1830 be compared to post-1995 palm oil plantations in Sumatra and Kalimantan? The former was not plantation-based but rather operated as a system of forced cultivation under the existing labor regime of agricultural tributes payable to the local chief or sultan. The Dutch rubber and tobacco plantations of the “ethical” period post-1870 might thus serve as a better model for comparison. Also, oil palm plantations did not emerge after the Reformasi; they had been in place since the 1980s. These objections can be addressed as follows:

First, the aim here is not to compare actual systems of agricultural development. We want to identify the enabling conditions that underpinned two discrete booms in agricultural output—to understand the logic of necessity and security common to both—with the objective of bringing into focus what is at stake today with respect to indigenous people and the environment. We also want to use the analysis to understand macro patterns and symmetries in the operations of investor capital and its linkages to state actors.

Second, the agricultural initiatives that followed both critical junctures in this analysis exhibited extraordinary speed of deployment; extraordinary profitability; and extraordinary intensification and expansion of prior practices. The key term is “prior practices.” These practices can be explained as follows: Tania Li (2007, 62) notes that the compulsory cultivation of coffee began in Sulawesi in 1822, eight years before the official establishment of the Cultivation System that fueled a massive demand for coffee in Europe. Similarly, small scale palm oil production was initiated in the 1980s, but the boom only began in the late 1990s and its subsequent massive expansion is tied to post-Suharto economic and development policies (McCarthy et al. 2012, 524). Tania Li’s (1999) Transforming the Indonesian Uplands does not reference palm oil at all, which indicates how recent—and how stealthy—the real boom was. In other words, the precipitous 1997 economic collapse in Indonesia and the dissolution of the New Order explain why this critical juncture matches well with the crisis the Netherlands faced from 1825 until 1830 (Fasseur 1992, 13).

A third point in support of the case selection in this paper is that the Dutch plantation model of the post-1870 period was deliberately appropriated for national development by the then newly independent Indonesian state of the 1950s (White 1999, 206). Late colonial and early post-colonial modes of large scale agricultural production were thus directly concatenated. In other words, the more interesting comparative-historical case is that of the organizing logic behind the Cultivation System and the post-Reformasi agricultural initiatives because i) agra-
Enabling Conditions for Structures of Domination

rian and social impacts were so drastic; and ii) they both involved liberal dependency on large scale foreign investment (Hall et al. 2011, 5; Li 2007, 61-63). It is therefore less important that Cultivation System coffee and spice production differs categorically from contemporary palm oil production. Likewise, the fact that the Dutch exported agricultural produce from Java before the Cultivation System era, and that plantations existed in Indonesia before the current palm oil boom, does not disrupt this analysis. From a macro perspective, the importance is that symmetries in the enabling conditions underpinning these two discrete systemic booms can be identified, the structures of domination can be discussed, and a further research agenda can be outlined.

The study here looks historically back towards the Dutch system and then traces the secondary macro data in the academic literature forward to the post-Suharto Reformasi era. Four enabling conditions emerge under this examination: first, an economic and political crisis that spurs a rapid, comprehensive and encompassing extension and expansion of existing practices in agricultural production; second, a tight rein over the flow of information related to the imposed practices; third, an official monopoly over control, order and the meaning of force necessary to execute and maintain each respective system; and fourth, the existence of an official discourse intolerant of dissent and opposition, one that prefaces the urgent necessity of development as well as a monopoly over the power to enforce it. This structure of domination concomitantly highlights the backwardness and ignorance of the labor component upon which it relies.

The layout of the paper is as follows: section two, following, presents a brief theoretical framework to establish the importance of this research. This provides a context for understanding the case selection for the paper and the role of the enabling conditions that catalyzed the two different booms in agricultural production in colonial Java and independent Indonesia. Section three provides a review of related literature covering the colonial Cultivation System separately from the post-independence developments in agriculture. Section four gives the scope and limitations of the study. This is followed by an analysis and discussion of the findings in relation to aspects of dispossession and appropriation. The final section is the conclusion and recommendations for further research.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Charles Tilly (1985) argues that the modern nation state started in France in the early 1600s as a structure of domination that suppressed resistance at home and abroad to build authority and agency as an official protection racket. Tilly (1985, 169) calls this innovation in political scope and method “coercive exploitation” (Tilly 1985). The state’s legal, bureaucratic and substantive powers grew out of a zig-zag set of relations between its capacity to organize violence on a
large scale, its extraction of tributes, and its function as a conduit and reservoir for primitive accumulation (1985, 172). The modern nation state is the model that the 20th Century decolonizing countries took for their organization, institutions and practices. We can posit without elaboration that the political systems of both the colonial-era Netherlands and independent Indonesia were based on this model. We can further posit that the Dutch colonial state’s restless need for expansion and new “coercive exploitation” opportunities brokered the logic for conquest and occupation beyond its domestic territory, whereas the developmental logic of the newly independent Indonesian state was restricted to “coercive exploitation” (Tilly 1985) within its own borders. Precisely what configurations such exploitative practices took—quota-based forced cultivation or plantation production—are not the focus of this paper. We are concerned specifically with the symmetries in the enabling conditions that underpinned the respective configurations.

There is nonetheless a rider to our scope and level of focus. Carol Pateman (2007) examines the settler contract and its utility in legitimizing the takeover of territories in the USA, Canada and Australia. This work supplements Patrick Wolfe’s (2006) detailed critique of the “logic of elimination” of native societies in colonial contexts (Wolfe, 2006, 387-388). Wolfe (2006), states that race—and thus racism—became codified only in the late 1700s in Europe despite the longstanding prevalence of general xenophobia. Race, and racism, was extremely useful for (colonial) state-building because it focused the capacities for both organized violence and primitive accumulation. Race thus permitted Europeans to permanently reproduce asymmetrical relationships and modes of information sharing to leverage coercive exploitation (2006, 387). There are four important points associated with this insight.

First, racism as a social construct in Europe was established shortly prior to the Cultivation System era. Second, the decolonizing, independent Indonesia could not employ race for the “logic of elimination” (Wolfe 2006, 387). Instead, unequal relations were founded on a different dichotomy: modern versus backward. Those destined to be eliminated in the development of modern Indonesia were, and remain, the indigenous people and communities of rural peasants, as well as the environment itself. Third, if the colonizing state can be decisively critiqued on the grounds outlined above, the de-colonizing state cannot evade a doubly robust critique. Fourth, the role of dichotomies and exploitation brings us to the following important insights of Immanuel Wallerstein on capitalism at the world-systems level.

Wallerstein (2004, 1) dates the beginnings of the “capitalist world-economy” to the mid-1500s, roughly contemporaneous with Tilly’s (1985) idea of the French state emerging as an organization that legitimizes violence for long-term capital accumulation. More importantly, Wallerstein (2004, 2) adds that “[t]he imperative of the endless accumulation of capital generated a need for constant technological
change, a constant expansion of frontiers—geographical, psychological, intellectual, scientific.” We can posit without elaboration that for the decolonizing state with developmental and modernizing imperatives, expanding its frontiers takes the form of eliminating forests, biodiversity, and peasant and indigenous people. In other words, from this perspective the owners of capital in emerging markets, and the local brokers, administrators and managers to oversee such investments, have rights that trump those of subsistence communities.

Second, Wallerstein (1991) separately elaborates a particular double movement in his critique of culture. Culture is the “ideological battleground of the modern world system” (Wallerstein, 1991, 158). Here, culture exhibits two explicit characteristics: within-group and cross-group. This produces an arena for the operations of a system that depends on symbiosis between universalism (the greater good is good for all) and divisions/hierarchies of relative human value (some will benefit; some will be dispossessed). The important point is that the zig-zag between universalism and divisions/hierarchies is fundamental to the propagation of a capitalism that is iterative, promotes destruction as newness, and deliberately subordinates justice to legitimacy. This complex of associations and movements within the group and across groups is sustained by the agency of racism (or a suitable substitute based on othering the religions, customs, practices of those deemed suitable for dispossession). Colonial Dutch officials could relatively easily dispense resistance from Javanese workers who did not share their culture. For metropolitan, elite Indonesians, it is likewise relatively simple to do away with native, forest-dwelling peoples who not only seem to have no viable culture in a modern sense, but whose voice to articulate any such thing can easily remain unheard.

The above ideas articulate the perspectives framing this paper, the importance of the paper’s contribution to the literature, and its value in describing how the prerogatives of accumulation by dispossession operate both in “cross-culture” (colonial) and “within-culture” (developmental) senses. The contention is not that the Cultivation System in Java caused plantation agriculture in Indonesia or that Cultivation System methods and organization compare adequately with palm oil cultivation practices. The contention here is that the zig-zag structure of domination under capitalism identifies characteristics of the state as protection racketeer in both contexts. We are thus applying these theoretical ideas to two critical junctures in agricultural production in pre- and post-independence Indonesia to identify symmetries and parallels in the enabling conditions. This is an urgent task because the imperatives of capital are on course to eradicate environment, societies and lives of ordinary Indonesians who lack voice and intelligibility in neoliberal discourses. Simply stated, human development must prioritise those least able to defend themselves against the coercive exploitation of the modern nation state. This paper is a modest attempt to contribute to a movement of re-prioritizing narratives and values.
III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

1. The Cultivation System

According to Cornelius Fasseur (1992, 24), the Netherlands’ political and fiscal condition by 1830 was dismal. Wars in the East Indies had laid waste to Java as a colony, killed off hundreds of thousands of native and European people, and had concluded at enormous cost to the treasury. Also, Belgium’s secession from the Dutch crown had pressed the Dutch state into near bankruptcy. To rectify this state of affairs, the Cultivation System (Cultuurstelsel in Dutch) was introduced in Java in 1830 under the administration of Governor-General Johannes van den Bosch (van den Doel, 2010, 185).

The system has been described in various ways. Conservatively articulated, it was the licensing of forcible mass production of tropical agricultural goods at negligible cost on Java, the dominant island in the Dutch Empire, and then selling the goods at extraordinary profit in Europe (van den Doel, 2010, 187). Robert van Niel (1972, 89; 1981, 25), an American historian of Indonesia and the Dutch colonial era, describes it as an ordered, logical system of enterprise for the Netherlands’ beneficial interest vis à vis its sovereign rights over dominions and assets taken by conquest. However, in practice it was non-coherent and could not overcome the distortions between official rhetoric and the realities of land and labor appropriation.

The system worked as follows: quotas were issued for the supply of consumer products from Java to be marketed in Europe. Such crops included coffee, for which West Java, in particular the Priangan region, was responsible; tobacco; spices like cinnamon; indigo; and sugar. The system was state-led with administrative powers and start-up capital provision (e.g. for sugar processing), but involved light regulation: the Department of Colonies counted a mere 67 employees in 1860 (Fasseur 1992, 15; 22-35). Oversight was devolved downstream through tiers of responsible officials to village chiefs authorized on the ground for securing land and labor for crop quotas under rigid guidelines. Europeans sent from the Netherlands in the service of the system were vetted for respectability, education and references from insider guarantors (1992, 19). To van Niel (1972, 89), the simplicity and efficacy of the system was in how it overlaid native communal labor structures of tribute, service and obligation with modern processing, transportation and marketing to consumers half a world away. Van den Doel’s (2010, 185-186) praise for the production concept is that these innovations were “an opportunity to harmonise the colonial government more with the traditional structure of indigenous society.” However, contracts were awarded primarily to European producers who were considered as appropriate to the system and its overseers, rather than on grounds of efficiency and proper adherence to rules and
norms. Over time, corruption and coercion became a problem requiring parliamentary control.

The debate over how the system can be understood and interpreted is sharp and continues until the present. Dutch agricultural production policy impacted Java in ways that cultural anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, described as deleterious from the perspective of the indigenous inhabitants, an assessment that corresponds with Elson’s (1978, 1) on agricultural involution under the Cultivation System. Fasseur (1992, 9-10) summarizes the conditions as follows: first, they kept urban and peasant Javanese societies separate and largely unaware of what was happening in either arena, while at the same time tying peasants to fixed locations on the land in order that harvest quotas be secured. Second, this had the additional effect of retarding or preventing the clear flow of information from the rural peripheries to the centers of power and administration. Third, it moreover kept workers from an understanding of how their produce was promoted in the centres of Europe as fashionable consumer items. Fourth and most critically, the sequestration of land and labor to fulfil ever-increasing production quotas mandated from the Netherlands became a factor in food and resource scarcities for rural populations in Java.

Tania Li (2007, 71) makes the point that compulsory coffee growing on the island of Sulawesi was organized to allow autonomy to cultivators precisely because official crown interventions in Java in the Cultivation System period had produced significant famine and poverty. Under these circumstances, such mitigating benefits to Javanese society as an increased money supply and the availability of consumer goods were effectively trickle-down and limited.

Other critiques specify the perspectives of the Javanese people under Dutch rule. Scholars such as Boomgaard (2002, 35), Fasseur (1992, 10) and Hugenholtz (1986 in Vu, 2003, 240) point to the subsistence crises experienced across parts of Java during the period of the Cultivation System. This resulted from the lack of available land, water and/or labor for the cultivation of subsistence crops under a system where export commodity quotas took precedence. Pierre van der Eng’s (2010, 291) Dependency Theory critique takes a similar perspective. He explains in orthodox center-periphery terms how the Netherlands accrued wealth while the colony remained trapped in both a relative and real state of under-development.

The rapid and massive changes to Javanese society under the Cultivation System era were observed cross-culturally from Europe and from within the culture of the colony itself. The Cultivation System itself, and the subsequent incorporation of the islands into what became modern Indonesia, were hotly debated from at least as early as 1848 with the activism of W. M. Baron van Hoëvell in the East Indies, and in 1860 with the publication of Eduard Douwes Dekker’s “Max Havelaar: Or The Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company”. Nevertheless, the colonized subject either was not free to speak in his and her own voice or was dismissed as instigator and troublemaker. As noted by
Fasseur (1992, 8), conservative historian and poet, Carel Gerretson, writing as recently as 1938 confidently extolled the virtues of the Cultivation System of the 19th Century. But this was with limited regard for how soon-to-be independent Indonesians felt about it. Decolonization in Africa and Asia, from the 1940s onwards, announced that the legitimacy of voice and narratives of the colonized subject.

Nevertheless, development in the era of independence across Southeast Asia, and specifically in Indonesia, has negatively affected minority and laboring groups and indigenous peoples (Clarke 2001, 419; Scott 2009, 4-5). This second order of dispossession requires to be understood. For this reason, the enabling conditions that precipitated the Cultivation System and, separately, the boom in oil palm plantation agribusiness formulate a valuable research agenda. In both the colonial and post-colonial cases the fundamental problems of social justice and inequity reflect critically on the responsible cross-culture and within-culture structures of domination.

2. The Road to the Palm Oil Boom

Historical studies related to primary resource agricultural production in Indonesia suggest an anomaly: a somewhat seamless transition appears to occur from the colonial era to the post-colonial independent state, and on through the New Order regime to the post-1998 Reformasi. This may account for why comparative-case enabling conditions have not been directly explored in the literature.

Michael Dove (1999, 204-205) points out that the plantations were steadily nationalized between the 1950s and 1960s by a national bureaucratic elite that found it convenient to maintain rather than change or even abolish the Dutch system. Agricultural justice was not a priority in independent Indonesia. Ben White (2005, 108) argues that state-managed agriculture was fundamentally conservative under all post-colonial regimes, in part because agriculture constituted a significant portion of state revenues and employment until the 1970s, and remained the prime source of income for workers at least until the 1990s. From Stoler (1995, 3) and Scott (2009, xii), it is clear that there is little to distinguish the Dutch efforts to project power, control the environment and tame the labor force from those of the independent Indonesian state. This section of the review thus considers in brief the scholarship on plantation agricultural production from the Dutch era to the oil palm boom years with consideration towards crises; discourses over production and purpose; control and order and the use of force; and marginalization, dispossession and adverse incorporation of the environment and the indigenous inhabitants.

The plantation history of the Indonesian islands was spurred by the ambitions of Jacobus Nienhuys in 1863 on the Sumatran east coast in 1863 under lease from
the local sultanate and by the use of force to subjugate the local population in accordance with his designs (Stoler 1995, 15). By this time, the Cultivation System as practiced in Java was a spent force: remittances to the Dutch treasury had dwindled, and clamor for reform within Europe and in the colony had made the utility of the existing system contentious and prohibitive (Booth 2013, 14). The so-called open door policy spearheaded in Sumatra relied on the roles of colonial officials, private enterprise planters and, notably, missionaries to subdue, marginalize and exclude indigenous inhabitants from tracts of land that under colonial law allowed the planters leasehold tenure for 75 years (Pelzer 1961, 66-67; Li 2007, 61; 67). This opening of frontier lands was characterized as an exercise in force and domination under crown rights exercised by the administrative bureaucracy to “kill and command” (Li 2007, 68). Without rights of redress, peasant workers received as little education as necessary for them to obey orders, a critique articulated by Dutch observers of the time (White 2005, 111).

The carefully maintained estate records regarding the conduct and behavior of laborers in efforts to maintain order and efficient production provide a valuable insight into information control and labor management. As Stoler (1995, 10) describes it, every instance of gambling, prostitution, money-lending, theft or misbehavior was recorded for punitive action, dismissal or exclusion. Pelzer (1961, 68-69) shows that the local sultans sided with the planters and estates against the interests of the peasants even as they succumbed to conditions of impoverishment and hunger in the years leading up to World War II.

The transition to independence following the War did nothing to alleviate the adverse incorporation of agrarian labor as instituted and maintained under the Dutch colonists. Pierre van der Eng (2012, 1) details the extent and severity of famines in the 1950s and 1960s that occurred across Indonesia and argues that official state discourse, censorship and disruption of data collection ensured that action to alleviate the crises was suppressed. In acts of resistance, the Sumatran labor movements and unions drew substantial support from estate laborers in the 1950s, according to Stoler (1995, 7-8). But after the implementation of Suharto’s New Order, investment under the protection of the state and its powers was specifically directed to the Sumatran plantations in efforts to subdue popular resistance and establish the new regime’s prerogatives. The Suharto state—modelled on the colonial Dutch system, according to Li (2007, 61)—used force and the insistence on a rigid doctrine of national development but it also controlled flows of information by purging liberal academic professionals in the social and agricultural sciences and replacing them with a new generation trained in American neoclassical economics (White 2005, 109).

From the 1980s, farmland was converted extensively for industrial use with concomitant ecological and agricultural losses as well as adverse effects on peasant life, values and culture (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 1-2). Deagrarianization
on one hand was countered on the other by appropriating forested lands to increase reserves for industrial agricultural exploitation and timber extraction. This in turn imposed penalties on local inhabitants: forced migration, exclusion from lands, and the eradication of homes, livelihoods and culture. The organizing locus for such compulsory transitions was “regulation, force, markets and legitimation” (4). The scale and ambition of these policy interventions was not extensive or intensive enough to associate them with the critical junctures relevant to this research.

The end of the New Order and Suharto’s era constitutes a critical juncture for the purposes of this paper: it was a political and economic crisis demanding drastic solutions. The post-1998 Reformasi solution response included a shift to decentralization. Investment liberalization allowed new entrants into the market for extractive industry development amid the empowerment of regional brokers and political/business actors. Rapid and radical primitive accumulation followed in inverse proportion to the effects on traditional agricultural practices. This owes much to the pre-existing narrative of national development and prejudice against people whose interests did not correspond with those of the state or who opposed the state outright.

In the latter part of the 1990s—the period of time relevant to the inquiry of this paper—in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, “swidden” farming practices came under intense official scrutiny and pressure. Swiddening involves shifting crop cultivation to new locations to take advantage of soil fertility and to ease population pressures on existing land resources. State institutions and policy makers developed a powerful discourse charging peasant and indigenous communities with the destruction of rain forests, soil erosion, and contributions to climate change (Mertz 2009, 259; Fox et al. 2009, 305-306). These actors also passed laws to deal with their insistence of indigenous- and peasant-produced threats to the environment. Various scholars in turn vigorously debated such official policies by arguing that definitions of degradation were misleading or false and data gathering was skewed (Dove 1986, 221; Brown and Schreckenberg 1998, 1-2; Sunderlin 1997, 2). States remained intransigent despite the tide of data demonstrating the unjust folly of targeting indigenous peoples’ farming practices and relegating their experiences and narratives (Erni, 2009, 39-40). Biodiversity conservationists and international agriculture researchers such as Ziegler (2011, 846) and Schmidt-Vogt (2009, 275) insisted that such laws and decisions favoured commercial agriculture and agribusiness, firms specialising in palm oil plantations.

The official policy approach has been dispossession by coercive exploitation. Migrants have been transplanted directly into indigenous communities; agribusiness has been privileged; and land has been commoditized, privatized and sectioned off under general discourses of national development, economic competitiveness, and modernization (Fox et al. 2009, 305). Scott (2009) argues that upland communities are systematically being engulfed by states like Indonesia’s to
bring “nonstate spaces and people to heel” (Scott 2009, 4-5). This is operational policy mobilized in the language of development, modernization, and national integration but which disguises its shared real values: the accumulation by dispossession of the colonial era. Scott (5) describes the process as akin to Britain’s 18th Century system of “enclosures”. In other words, minority groups that have gained the least from independence and material economic development are at once further alienated and coercively exploited while concomitantly being blamed for the need to do so. Michael Dove (1999, 204-205) explains that official discourses attribute the need for violence and force against peasant and indigenous communities to their own ignorance and backwardness. Whereas enlightened elites see themselves in opposite—or cross-cultural—terms, they deploy the same within-culture pejorative language against the marginalized and excluded as did colonial Dutch administrators and production managers. The capacity to own and manipulate discourses provides a skein of legitimacy for those licensed to wield local power.

3. The Palm Oil Boom in Perspective

Palm oil plantations constitute a major trend in tropical agriculture in Asia. According to Miettinen et al. (2012, 20), in 1990 the presence of palm oil plantations in Sumatra and Kalimantan was negligible. The acceleration in each decade since has been extraordinary. Between 2007 and 2010 over 190,000 hectares (ha) per year were cleared for cultivation. From 528,000 ha in 2000 the extent of industrial oil palm coverage only on peatland had reached 1,285,000 ha by 2010 and is expected to continue accelerated growth (37). Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011, 91) provide figures for expected future growth of palm oil in West Kalimantan from 338,000 ha (benchmarked in 2002) to 3.2 million ha and in East Kalimantan from 70,000 ha to 2.1 million ha. McCarthy, Vel and Afiff (2012, 531) state that 33 firms continue to open as much as 400,000 ha of new area for palm oil annually. Marguliset al. (2013, 1; 4) argue that the phenomenon of exploiting new territories for cultivation is not only a result of complex movements of opaque global capital and information but is specifically driven under conditions of crisis, such as were experienced globally in 2007-2008. This is in symmetry with the historical crisis that precipitated the Dutch invention of the Cultivation System in the 19th Century.

In the current oil palm boom, the problem for Indonesia and Malaysia is how to clear new lands for cultivation quickly enough. By 2008, total global palm oil output was 45 million tons, with Indonesia and Malaysia producing over 80 percent (Colchester and Chao 2011, 4). Demand, however, is accelerating. India and China increased their imports of palm oil by 300 percent and 500 percent, respectively, between 1996 and 2007. By 2014 Indonesia had at least 9.4 million hectares under cultivation with an intention to expand cultivation by 10 to 20
million ha more (5). The program is state-mediated with smallholder farmers operating in conjunction with commercial estates. Official discourse on the economy holds such figures in high self-regard but there are several reasons to critique this form of development.

First, the official policy relegates or ignores the misuse of labor, chemical poisoning and public health tragedies, spoiled water resources, land appropriations, human evictions, and forest clearances through cutting and burning, which played a role in recent years in the notorious smoke hazes across large parts of Southeast Asia (Hall et al. 2011, 90). Second, the operations to clear land and exclude inhabitants have included what McCarthy, Vel and Afiff (2012, 523) call “virtual” incursions: projects set up for logging interests or in order to attract investment funds by use of land as collateral. Third, the process of exclusion of the inhabitants and destruction of the ecology is permanent whether or not the newly converted resources are fully utilized (Hall et al. 2011, 5). This kind of coercive exploitation encapsulates what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) describes as the eradication of knowing and knowledges. A fourth point is that following the Reformasi decentralization policies, the way was cleared for direct foreign investment in oil palm agribusiness with McCarthy, Vel and Afiff (2012, 532). Decentralization empowered local officials as key actors embedded at the nexus between “businessmen, brokers, investors, ... and large corporations” (12). They have great discretionary powers with ample opportunities for graft and corruption at the expense of the voice, livelihoods and lives of indigenous populations and peasant communities.

This comparative-historical approach to the literature reveals that particular enabling conditions underpin the complex array of decisions, procedures, policies and operations that have promoted significant change on landscapes and peoples in modern Indonesia. The urgency and importance of this approach is because the narratives of those communities that have been engulfed, dispossessed and excluded are facing extinction. By understanding the enabling conditions we gain insight into the structures of domination they subtend. Such enabling conditions can be summarized as i) crisis-driven economic imperatives; ii) opacity in maneuvering and tight control over information flows; iii) the concomitant engagement of elites, bureaucrats and administrators with an official monopoly over control, order and violence; and iv) the prevalence of an official discourse intolerant of dissent and opposition.

IV. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Specific limitations to the novel aspects of the argument outlined above include the following: we have separated the argument from particular path dependency issues, such as the results of the Java Wars from 1825-1830 or the oppo-
Enabling Conditions for Structures of Domination

sitional political vacuum resulting from the eradication of the PKI in the late 1960s. Secondly, we have not engaged with the liberal and so-called “ethical” reform of the colonial agricultural economy after 1870. The focus here is only on the enabling conditions relevant to the Cultivation System and Reformasi-era policies for reasons given above. A comprehensive analysis requires engagement with the plantation-style agricultural system of the post-1870s, which involved reforms that were meant to curb excesses, increase oversight, and liberalize the production system. Thirdly, the paper does not engage with the decisions of administrators in contemporary Indonesia or during the Cultivation System era, apart from some aspects of the start-up process. Only English language sources have been considered, an obvious drawback to a full-length inquiry. The point, however, is to show that the organizing energy and logic of primitive accumulation and “accumulation by dispossession” in contemporary Indonesia enjoys symmetries and shared patterns with the Dutch innovations of some 150 years earlier. Also, despite decolonization and the plethora of human development processes available, there are real, identifiable and present victims whose voices must be accounted for. Questions of justice and equity in nominally independent states that rely to large extent on the legacy of subjugation under colonialism for their legitimacy are difficult to avoid.

V. FINDINGS

This paper identifies four enabling conditions that give rise to the idea of symmetries between the two advances in agricultural capitalism discussed here.

1. A State of Crisis

From Fasseur (1992, 24), the Netherlands was near bankrupt by 1830 after its protracted wars in the East Indies at a cost of some 200,000 thousand lives amid a trade vacuum. The loss of Belgium as an asset to the Dutch crown created the imperative to restore wealth and power. This meant re-evaluating the role of the colonies with respect to the rights the Dutch crown had over them, which in turn led to van den Bosch’s state-led implementation of the Cultivation System. In this case, crisis as an agent of radical change is unambiguous.

By comparison, in this analysis, the transition to national independence of Indonesia and the Suharto coup d’état are not relevant crises because in the agrarian economy no significant change emerged: the state nationalized the plantations but ran them more for political purposes than for economic ones (Dove 1999, 206). However, the collapse of the three decades-long New Order and the advent of the Reformasi era constitute a real crisis era for this argument. The collapse was precipitated by the 1997-1998 economic and social crises in Indonesia, which in turn sparked the real beginnings and acceleration of the land
appropriation and local inhabitant exclusion in Sumatra and Kalimantan for industrial palm oil plantation expansion (Colchester and Chao 2011, 5-6). In other words, the government’s fiscal trauma, the need to mollify creditors and donors, and the opportunity to act ambitiously and at pace after the fall of Suharto all coalesce as elements of a crisis in need of drastic solutions (Sunderlin 2003, 301).

2. Informational Asymmetries

Although van den Bosch was succeeded by Jean Baud, Jan Jacob Rochussen and others, the actual design and practical administration of the Cultivation System were kept a closely guarded secret from domestic Dutch political and civic actors. Curtailing press freedom was one measure of control until as late as 1854 (Fasseur 1992, 26). Critics of the system, such as writer, reformer and politician, Wolter van Hoëvell, were pressed into resignation and removed from the East Indies. Such levers of control and enforcement suited the system’s administrators who relished clear, direct and unimpeachable lines of authority free from cosmopolitan, liberal Dutch observers. However, even after complaints about the system were initially lodged, it took 25 years before a commission of inquiry was sent to examine the status of sugar production in Java (44). Other issues, as such as the extraction of levies at every stage of production, underpayment for produce, the taxing of land even during failed harvests, and corruption by middlemen and village chiefs, went officially unacknowledged (35-43).

To compare informational asymmetries of the Cultivation System era with those of the palm oil cultivation phenomenon in Indonesia can be done in the following ways. First, Indonesia and Malaysia lead the world in palm oil production and access to arable lands ensured that Indonesia featured prominently in the global land grab between 2000 and 2010. Yet scholars took the better part of that decade to register the fact. As late as 1999, Tania Li (1999) does not mention palm oil in an edited compilation of essays on the transformation of upland Indonesia. Secondly, the scale of the land deals in general that allowed palm oil expansion to proceed so rapidly was hidden behind a maze of intermediaries and legal shelters related to flows of international investment capital (Margulis et al. 2013, 2). Thirdly, the islands of Kalimantan and Sumatra retain what McCarthy, Vel and Afiff (2012, 525) describe as “frontier” value: wilderness rich in resources and far from legal and institutional provisions that might offer protection to the people who inhabit it. Fourthly, Reformasi decentralization policies after 1998 promoted the collusion of local officials, brokers, proxies, lenders and local and international business people. The lack of relative oversight gave them powers for decision-making and licensing agreements in an environment that rewarded discretion with extraordinary opportunities for rent-seeking and profiteering (McCarthy et al. 2012, 532). Fifthly, Indonesia’s contribution to the global land grab since 1998 suggests that opera-
tions took place with insufficient “transparency, consultation, and respect for the rights of local communities living off the land” (Margulis et al. 2013, 2). Development as justice and development informed by the human rights of traditional inhabitants has never been entertained under official discourse in pre- and post-colonial Indonesia.

3. Labor Control and the Monopoly on Force

Angus Maddison (1989; 2007) in several accounts reports on the Cultivation System’s control over the supply of labor. This included the administration of identity books and pass laws that bear a striking similarity to conditions under apartheid South Africa. Fasseur (1992, 13) makes clear from van den Bosch’s and Baud’s (minister of colonies, 1840-1848) respective mandates that no resistance to the authority of the colonial administration was tolerated, a point Li (2007) also makes in referencing the Dutch colonial orders to “kill and command” (68).

The review in this paper of Indonesian plantation history has outlined three oppressive processes: i) predatory, coercive and violent land acquisitions; ii) the engulfment and exclusion of indigenous and local inhabitants; iii) the adverse incorporation and control of labor (Stoler 1995; Hall et al. 2009; Li 1999). These issues of social justice remain equally relevant regarding the palm oil boom. While the experience is too recent for a comprehensive data set to have been formulated, the questions necessary for such an inquiry include: “Who are the present owners, users and occupiers of the land? Are their rights and interests being respected? What is the legal process by which lands for new plantings are acquired? Are these laws being observed? Do they offer adequate protection for communities?” (Colchester and Jiwan 2006, 18). In prior estate-labor relations, the perceived ignorance and backwardness of the inhabitants was articulated by elites as grounds for their exclusion or adverse incorporation into the systematic processes of their dispossession or pacification (Dove 1999, 204; Li 2007, xvii; White 1999, 236). It can be assumed that the rapid and extensive conversion of forested and indigenous lands to palm oil cultivation means that the same conditions, prejudices and attitudes hold true in the Reformasi era. Indeed, as Scott (2009, 4-5) argues, Southeast Asian states like Indonesia’s are policy driven to eradicate the way of life of peoples that do not recognize the state or the legitimacy of its rights over their cultures. Palm oil development—and the characteristics of its rollout—serves this purpose adequately.

4. Official Discourses of Control and Domination

Discourses of domination deserve extensive treatment but two brief observations may serve to trace out the argument. One, as van Niel (1972, 1) indicates, the Cultivation System proffered the idea to the Javanese colonial subjects that the
arrangement was voluntary; it was the extension of beneficial arrangements from an enlightened crown to subjects who might be glad (at least) not to be under British, Spanish or French control. However, the opposite ultimately obtained. Dutch officials under quota orders from Europe made usurious impositions on the property and labor of their subjects and slowly constricted and neutered any real notion of free choice. Resistance, as Li (2007, 68) points out, under the explicit directive of the Dutch crown, was summarily eliminated. And resistance was taken to include any form of non-prescriptive behaviour, such as failure to be pliant and compliant; failure to serve quotas, stubbornness, larceny, gambling, aggression, usury and so on (Li 2009, 68; 70; Stoler 1995, 10). Resistance narratives—Max Havelaar, for example—had to be published in Europe in Dutch for the excesses of the system to be recognized. Thus, official discourses preferred not to take stock of the high cost to social and economic existence in Java for over a decade after the peak profitability of the Cultivation System (Boomgaard 2002, 3-4). The period from 1843 to 1854 was an extended subsistence crisis, involving population losses from food shortages, epidemics, and official neglect.

Comparing the Cultivation System case with Reformasi-era Indonesian conditions, a close parallel applies. The state’s dominant discourse is of national development, modernization, economic growth and protection of forest and agricultural resources through enforcing deterrence measures on the “primitive” practices of upland tribes. (Li 2007, xiv). However, Michael Dove (1986, 221) explains the state’s preference for intensive over swidden farming as a function of petty accumulation, maximization of extraction opportunities, the centralization of control via rational structures of compliance and shared interests, and the operation of non-negotiable law. Indigenous peoples share few of these ambitions but lack the power to articulate responses. Andrew Basiago (1995, 199) reverses the discourses and faults the state for encroaching on rain forests and harming sustainable development processes, including via state support for commercial agricultural pollutants into lands and waterways (see also Ziegler et al. 2011, 847). Acutely expressed, Dutch colonization in Java in the 19th Century improved the material lot of loyal servants of the crown and conferred petty fiefdoms on various regents. Likewise, agricultural modernization in decentralized Reformasi-era Indonesia has elevated state functionaries and selected businesses to wealth and influence by fiat (see McCarthy et al. 2012, 524). However, such modernization methods have obliterated the livelihoods, habitats, and even the lives of the people for whom rural development has been a catastrophe.

Rather than acknowledge the threat to human resources, narratives and knowledges, developmental states like Indonesia restrict and eliminate dissenting voices from below. This has been done by articulating under “neo-populist ideology and nationalist sentiments” (White 1999, 236) a policy discourse that posits village life and norms as backward, stubborn, resistant, uneconomical and wasteful. Mid-
Enabling Conditions for Structures of Domination

Middle-income, traditionally agrarian states with a robust developmental agenda are stubbornly opposed to strong peasant leadership that might constitute a danger to policy, political tenure and opportunities for “accumulation by dispossession.” Being able to frame peasant and community leaders as radicals or communists has been sufficient in countries like Indonesia and the Philippines to ensure their assassination (White 2005, 108; Borras et al. 2007, 1560).

The consequences of such discourse-generation have been immensely damaging. Laws reduced the traditional rights and territories of rural communities, and Southeast Asia’s forests were torched under the authority of a modernization discourse organized by privileged business interests and elites (Ross 2000, 5).

These effects can be understood in terms of recent empirical assessments compiled by researchers such as van Vliet, Mertz, Heinemann et al. (2012, 418-420). They investigated the drivers for land use change in swiddener areas worldwide. In their findings, public policy regarding logging, forestry, agriculture and land use in Southeast Asia has substantially relegated the adverse impacts on swiddener culture. In Indonesia, monoculture tree crops, exemplified by oil palm, are the prevalent crop incursion on swiddener lands (424). The primary negative impact areas in order of importance are i) access to land held under traditional or customary title; ii) equity; iii) labor demand across all types of crop growing (labor supply is thus introduced from other areas); iv) increased conditions of conflict; v) food security; vi) demographic stability; and vii) cultural identity (425). These impacts are all unambiguously antihuman development. Some instances of positive impact do emerge: primarily regarding income, health and education, and social network development. However, having higher earning potential and access to education does not necessarily mean good, fixed job prospects and stable purchasing power. But when the impacts of public policy and land use transformation in swiddener territories are recorded with respect to the environment, there are almost no positive results. Across the gamut of such issues as water quality, forest cover, biodiversity, soil fertility, soil erosion, agrobiodiversity and weed pressure the findings are overwhelmingly negative but they are not given due state-actor attention.

The problem underlying such research findings is that they do not conform to the information nexus between the state, investors, business interests and the media. In other words, similarly to the impacts of the Cultivation System, profits and benefits accrue (cross-culture) to the investor and state actor interests while the negative effects are borne almost exclusively (within-culture) in an informational void by the local and indigenous dispossessed laboring communities. Under the present system, not only are indigenous communities excluded from the benefits of the plantation system encroaching on their territories, but they have additionally forfeited their territory and culture into the process. These are potentially devastating consequences of development. Imprinted on the cleared land and
on the vanishing peoples of a country like Indonesia is the way that critical juncture cusps in time (1830 and 1998) provide symmetries regarding then- and now-enabling conditions.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It should be emphasized that this paper does not claim the Cultivation System as a direct causal factor in the contemporary system of plantation cultivation in Indonesia. Rather, the aim has been to use a comparative-historical method to examine these systems of coercive exploitation for common enabling conditions. Observing the intensification and extension of agricultural practice, the management strategies and methods, and the proceeds in terms of outputs, costs and profits gives an aperture onto the following enabling conditions: crisis and crisis resolution; informational asymmetries; the application or threat of force to ensure efficiency; and the use of official discourses to smooth away opposition or resistance, and to protect the urban beneficiaries from cognitive dissonance.

The paper outlines the set of these enabling conditions to posit a resonance or symmetry between them. The usefulness of this symmetry is that it in turn enables us to observe some important characteristics of the modern state and its structures of domination. The state outlined above, whether colonial-era Dutch or Reformasi Indonesian, operates as an agent for Tilly’s (1985) concept of “coercive exploitation” to maximize primitive accumulation.

Enabling conditions also allow us to observe Wallerstein’s (1991) idea of a zig-zag mode of the propagation of capitalism within-and across-cultures, operating cyclically between tensions of newness and destruction and newness and legitimacy. The restless continuation of the system is precipitated by crisis, positioned through informational asymmetries, radically intensified by the state’s monopoly over force, and buffered and escorted through the management of information. The necessity and value of comparing two superficially different modes of agricultural production in discrete eras may now be clearer. The colonial-era and the Reformasi-era systems for “accumulation by dispossession” are to be properly understood as developments in the recent history of capital entwined with the modern nation state. In this paper, the state’s function as an agent in the semi-privatized business of protection racketeering is newly reemphasized.

Research on globalization’s imperatives regarding land, people and governance is picking up the pace (Margulis et al. 2013). More detailed micro-level historical work needs to be done on comparing the late colonial plantation estate system in Indonesia with plantation-type practices after independence, taking pre- and post-New Order into the assessment. Primary resource data such as the official records, contracts, agreements and licensing that has underpinned the palm oil land grab are needed. To this ongoing research agenda, James Scott’s (2009)
historical reading and analysis can be used to map out a template of resistance for the entire Southeast Asian region.

More importantly, however, we first need to recognize, following Amartya Sen (2009), that development is intrinsically bound up in questions of justice. Second, we need to develop the understanding that the zig-zag mode of “accumulation by dispossession” pushing ahead now in plantation expansion Indonesia is not only the practice of injustice, it is what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) calls the suppression or eradication of existing knowledges: “epistemicide” (xix-lxii). Third, following Gurminder Bhambra’s (2014) ideas, we need to use such elements of the record as the enabling conditions detailed here to redress historical losses, resuscitate truncated narratives of the dispossessed and regenerate them as mutually intelligible expressions of solidarity against structures of domination in this and other contexts.

REFERENCES

Basiago, Andrew D. 1995. “Sustainable Development in Indonesia: A Case Study of an Indigenous Regime of Environmental Law and Policy.” *International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology* 2(3): 199-211.

Bhambra, Gurminder, K. 2014. *Connected Sociologies*. London: Bloomsbury.

Boomgaard, Peter. 2002. “From Subsistence Crises to Business Cycle Depressions, Indonesia 1800-1940.” Project Paper No. 1 in *Coping with Crisis in Indonesia: Comparative, Local and Historical Dimensions*.

Borras, Saturnino, Danilo Carranza, Jennifer Franco and Mary Ann Manahan. 2007. “Anti-Poverty or Anti-Poor? The World Bank Market Led Agrarian Reform Experiment in the Philippines.” *Third World Quarterly* 28(8): 1557-1576.

Booth, Anne. 2013. “Varieties of Exploitation in Colonial Settings: Dutch and Belgian Policies in Indonesia and the Congo.” *Coercion, Extraction, Investment and Development: Comparing the Nature, Change and Long Term Consequences of Colonial Institutions in the Netherlands Indies and Belgian Congo*. London: SOAS University of London.

Brown, David and Kathrin Schreckenberg. 1998. “Shifting Cultivators as Agents of Deforestation: Assessing the Evidence.” *Overseas Development Institute* 29: 1-10.

Clarke, Gerard. 2001. “From Ethnocide to Ethnodevelopment? Ethnic Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in Southeast Asia.” *Third World Quarterly* 22(3): 413-436.

Colchester, Marcus and Sophie Chao. 2011. “Oil Palm Expansion in South East Asia: An Overview.” *Oil Palm Expansion in South East Asia: Trends and Implications for Local Communities and Indigenous People*, (1-23). Bogor
and Moreton-in-Marsh UK: Sawit Watch.  
Colchester, Marcus and Norman Jiwan. 2006. *Promised Land: Palm Oil and Land Acquisition in Indonesia: Implications for Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples*. Bogor and Moreton-in-March: Forest Peoples Programme, Sawit Watch, HuMa and The World Agroforestry Centre.  
Deininger, Klaus. 2003. “Land Markets in Developing and Transition Economies: Impact of Liberalization and Implications for Future Reform.” *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 85(5): 1217-1222.  
Dove, Michael R. 1986. *The Ideology of Agricultural Development in Indonesia. Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia*, 221-247. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Dove, Michael R. 1999. “Representations of the ‘Other’ by Others: The Ethnographic Challenge Posed by Planters’ Views of Peasants in Indonesia.” In *Transforming the Indonesian Uplands* edited by T. M. Li, 203-230. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.  
Elson, Robert E. 1978. “The Cultivation System and ‘Agricultural Involution’.” *Working Paper Centre of Southeast Asian Studies* No. 14. Melbourne: Monash University Press.  
Erni, Christian. 2009. “Shifting the Blame: Southeast Asia’s Indigenous Peoples and Shifting Cultivation in the Age of Climate Change.” *Indigenous Affairs* 1(2): 38-50.  
Fasseur, Cornelius. 1992. “The Politics of Colonial Exploitation: Java, the Dutch, and the Cultivation System.” Translated by Robert Elson and Ary Kraal. *Studies on Southeast Asia No. 8*. Ithaca: SEAP.  
Fox, Jefferson, Yayoi Fujita, Dimbab Ngidang, Nancy Peluso, Lesley Potter, Niken Sakuntaladewi, Janet Sturgeon and David Thomas. 2009. “Policies, Political-Economy, and Swidden in Southeast Asia.” *Human Ecology Interdisciplinary Journal* 37(3): 305-322.  
Hall, Derek. 2011. “Land Control, Land Grabs, and Southeast Asian Crop Booms.” Paper presented at the *Conference on Global Land Grabbing* April 6-8, 2011, University of Sussex.  
Hall, Derek, Philip Hirsch and Tania M. Li. 2011. *Powers of Exclusion: Land Dilemmas in South East Asia*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.  
Harvey, David. 2004. “The ‘New’ Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession.” *Socialist Register* 40(1): 63-87.  
Li, Tania M. 1999. “Marginality, Power and Production: Analysing Upland Transformations.” In *Transforming the Indonesian Uplands* edited by T. M. Li. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.  
Li, Tania M. 2007. *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development and the Practice of Politics*. Durham, N.C: Duke University Press.  
Maddison, Angus. 1989. “Dutch Income in and from Indonesia 1700-1938.” *Modern
Asian Studies 23(4): 645-670.
Maddison, Angus. 2007. The World Economy Vol. 1: A Millennial Perspective: New Delhi: OECD Academic Foundation.
Margulis, Matias E., Nora McKeon and Saturnino Borras. 2013. “Land Grabbing and Global Governance: Critical Perspectives.” Globalizations 10(1): 1-23.
McCarthy, John F., Jacqueline Vel and Suraya Aiff. 2012. “Trajectories of Land Acquisition and Enclosure: Development Schemes, Virtual Land Grabs, and Green Acquisitions in Indonesia’s Outer Islands.” Journal of Peasant Studies 39(2): 521-549.
Mertz, Ole, Christine Padoch, Jefferson Fox, Rob Crabb, Stephen Leisz, Nguyen, Tranh L., Tran, Duc V. 2009. “Swidden Change in Southeast Asia: Understanding Causes and Consequences.” Human Ecology (37): 259-264.
Miettinen, Juka, Al Hooijer, Daniel Tollenaar, Sue Page and Chris Malins. 2012. “Historical Analysis and Projection of Oil Palm Plantation Expansion on Peatland in Southeast Asia.” White Paper No. 17 for the International Council on Clean Transportation (February).
Pateman, Carol 2007. “The Settler Contract.” In Contract and Domination edited by Carol Pateman and Charles Mills, 35-38. New York: Polity Press.
Pelzer, Karl J. 1961. “Western Impact on East Sumatra and North Tapanuli: The Roles of the Planter and the Missionary.” Journal of Southeast Asian History 2(2): 66-71.
Ross, Michael L. 2005. Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, João A. Nunes and Maria P. Meneses. 2007 “Opening Up the Canon of Knowledge and Recognition of Difference.” In Another Knowledge is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies, xix-lxii.
Schmidt-Vogt, Dietrich, Stephen Leisz, Ole Mertz, Andreas Heinimann, Thiha Thiha and Peter Messerli. 2009. “An Assessment of Trends in the Extent of Swidden in Southeast Asia.” Human Ecology 37: 269-280.
Scott, James C. 2009. The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sen, Amartya K. 2009. The Idea of Justice. New York: Allen Lane.
Stoler, Ann. 1995. Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt 1870 to 1979. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Sunderlin, William D. 2003. “Dampak krisis dan perubahan politik, 1997-1999” [The crisis and political change]. In Ke mana harus melangkah?: masyarakat hutan, dan perumusan kebijakan di Indonesia (301-337) edited by C. Colfier, and I. Resosudarmo [Where to go? Community forests and policymaking in Indonesia]. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor.
Tilly, Charles. 1985. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” In Bringing the State Back In edited by Peter Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, 169-186. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Van den Doel, Wim. 2010. “The Dutch Empire. An Essential Part of World History.” *BMGN: Low Countries Historical Review* 125(2/3): 179-208.

Van der Eng, Pierre. 1998. “The Second Epoch: Liberal Imperialism and Decolonization, 1846-1974.” *Revista de Historia Economica* 16(1): 291-321.

Van Niel, Robert. 1972. Measurement of Change Under the Cultivation System in Java, 1837-1851. *Indonesia* 14: 89-109. Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program.

Van Niel, Robert. 1981. “The Effect of Export Cultivations in Nineteenth-century Java.” *Modern Asian Studies* 15(1): 25-58.

Van Vliet, Nathalie, Ole Mertz, Andreas Heiniman, Tobias Langanke, Unai Pascual, and Birgit Schmook. 2012. “Trends, Drivers and Impacts of Changes in Swidden Cultivation in Tropical Forest-Agriculture Frontiers: A Global Assessment. *Global Environmental Change* 22(1): 418-429.

Von Braun, Joachim and Ruth Meinzen-Dick. 2009. “Land Grabbing by Foreign Investors in Developing Countries: Risks and Opportunities.” *IFPRI Policy Brief (April)* 13.

Vu, Tuong. 2003. “Of Rice and Revolution: The Politics of Provisioning and State-Society Relations on Java, 1945-1949.” *South East Asia Research* 11 (3): 237-268.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1991. Culture as the Ideological Battleground in the Modern World-System, 158-183. In Immanuel Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and Geoculture: essays on the changing world system*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2004. *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

White, Ben N. 1999. Nucleus and Plasma: Contract Farming and the Exercise of Power in Upland West Java. In *Transforming the Indonesian Uplands* edited by T. M. Li, 231-256. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.

White, Ben N. 2005. “Between Apologia and Critical Discourse: Agrarian Transitions and Scholarly Engagement in Indonesia.” In *Social Science and Power in Indonesia* edited by V. Hadiz and D. Dhakidae, 107-142. Jakarta: Equinox Publishing.

White, Ben N. and Anirban Dasgupta. 2010. “Agrofuels Capitalism: A View from Political Economy.” *Journal of Peasant Studies* 37(4): 593-607.

Wolfe, Patrick. 2006. “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.” *Journal of Genocide Research* 8(4): 387-409.

Ziegler, Alan D., Jefferson M. Fox, E. Webb, Christine Padoch, Stephen J. Leisz and Rob Cramb. 2011. “Recognizing Contemporary Roles of Swidden Agriculture in Transforming Landscapes of Southeast Asia.” *Conservation Biology* 25(4): 846-848.