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RUSSIAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN THE SCOPE OF NEW GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION

Iranian-Russian relations have a distinct strategic character, but they have not yet reached the level of strategic alliance, and the two parties in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus are more than they are different. The main organizer of these relations is temporary interests and common challenges, particularly the Western and American challenge. Therefore, there is always a common concern that both countries are likely to converge with the West at the expense of the other. The study is important in analyzing the nature of relations between Russia and Iran. Both countries have strategic interests in an area of geo-strategic importance both at regional and international levels. The importance of these strategic relations goes beyond regional relations to the extent of the alliance, which makes the two countries on the road to the formation of a global axis, which gives great importance to understanding the nature and level of the relationship between the two countries. This study aims to study the development of Russian-Iranian relations and the nature of the factors influencing these relations in the period. The problem of the research is to try to analyze the nature of the Russian-Iranian relations and the controversy it raised over the dimensions of this relationship and its level and in view of the acquisition of this relationship of strategic importance at the international level. The relations between the two countries and areas of cooperation raised many questions to be addressed in this research. The main outcome of the study was that the two sides agree that the Arab Spring has begun to produce "radical Islamists." Moscow does not favor a Middle East with al-Qaeda in its tracks, and Tehran does not favor radical Salafi control.

Key words: Geopolitics, regional cooperation, internal cooperation, diplomacy, foreign policy initiatives, the main actors.
Российско-иранские отношения имеют ярко выраженный стратегический характер, но они еще не достигли уровня стратегического альянса, и две стороны на Ближнем Востоке, в Центральной Азии и на Кавказе более чем различны. Основным организатором этих отношений являются временные интересы и общие проблемы, в частности, проблемы Запада и Америки. Поэтому всегда существует общее опасение, что обе страны могут сблизиться с Западом за счет другой. 

Это исследование важно для анализа характера отношений между Россией и Ираном. Обе страны имеют стратегические интересы в области геостратегического значения как на региональном, так и на международном уровнях. Важность этих стратегических отношений выходит за рамки региональных отношений в той степени, в которой альянс, который ведет две страны по пути к формированию глобальной оси, которая придает большое значение пониманию характера и уровня отношений между двумя странами. Это исследование направлено на изучение развития российско-иранских отношений и характер факторов, влияющих на эти отношения в тот период. Задача исследования состоит в том, чтобы попытаться проанализировать природу российско-иранских отношений и возникшие разногласия по поводу размеров этих отношений, их уровня и с учетом отношения стратегического значения на международном уровне, а также отношения между двумя странами в области сотрудничества. Основным результатом исследования стало то, что обе стороны согласны с тем, что «арабская весна» начала производить «радикальных исламистов». Москва не поддерживает Ближний Восток с Аль-Каидой на своем пути, а Тегеран не поддерживает радикальный контроль салафитов.

Ключевые слова: геополитика, региональное сотрудничество, внутреннее сотрудничество, дипломатия, внешнеполитические инициативы, основные участники.

Introduction

The Iranian-Russian relations began first, depending on the line of relations between the two sides with the United States, and secondly related to Moscow and Tehran’s view of regional and international changes and the desired role played by each of them. It was logical for Tehran to rush to strengthen ties with Moscow as hostility grew with Washington, especially after the nuclear crisis that began in 2002, and the tightening of Western sanctions over time on Iran, but Russia hesitated long before developing relations with Tehran. While the Iranian-US rapprochement may well ease Russia’s burden of not having closer relations with Tehran, it will affect Russia’s growing political role in the region. Although US-Iranian talks may not result in friendly relations that erode a long history of enmity, dragging Tehran to the negotiating table means that the Russians are wary of Washington’s direct influence on many of the region’s files and the declining role of Russia.

The relations between the two countries date back to the era of the Achaemenid Empire, which had relations with the Scythians, but the official relations between the two countries date back to the era of the Russian Empire and the Safavid state. Tsarist Russia sought several wars against the Safavid Empire and occupied several But in the Soviet era relations between the two countries were not good because the Shah of Iran in Pahlavi rule was against communism and suppressed it and his relations with the capitalist liberal west were stronger than his relations with the Soviet Union. But relations between the two countries improved after the Islamic revolution in 1979, which overthrew the rule of the Pahlavi, which brought back the spirit of Allah Mousavi Khomeini and the rule of Iran, but after the Islamists stood against communism relations again between the two countries and became the Soviet Union is one of the first countries to support Iraq in arms The Iraq-Iran War With the collapse of communism in Russia, Russia’s foreign relations were reconsidered and Russia considered
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it more appropriate for its interests to restore its relations with Iran, so now Russia and Iran are among the most co-operative countries. Russia today is the first country to support Iran’s nuclear project. J stands against Western countries, Russia and Iran have the same point of view in the Syrian crisis, which began since 2011 more understanding of the countries that support the Syrian-led Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, while the West stands against the government, the government.

The relations between Russia and Iran have undergone various stages, as they have witnessed conflicts and tensions, in accordance with the interests of the parties or their divergence, in addition to the geopolitical situation. There are other influential factors that make the building of good-neighborly relations and mutual cooperation necessary. The very rich natural resources of these two countries, especially oil and natural gas as well as manpower and military capabilities and influence in their region and beyond, all make the subject of Russian-Iranian relations an important issue at the international level.

Iran’s role in the region of Eurasia cannot be ignored or underestimated. It occupies a central strategic position, overlooking the Caucasus on the one hand and the Persian Gulf on the other, and the Central Asian Soviet region On the third hand. Iran occupies a prominent position in the strategies of major powers, including the Russian Federation, for several reasons, the most important of which is the Russian Federation’s dream of reaching warm waters and protecting its interests in the region. Iran is one of the major powers in the Middle East, to preserve their interests in this important region.

On the other hand, Iran is increasingly important to the Russian Federation because of its close geographical location. Iran has become the southern neighbor to be controlled to protect Russia’s national security. The geopolitical and strategic geography has made Iran the subject of conflict and the aging of major powers to establish and improve relations with it.

The study is based on the premise that strengthening Russian-Iranian relations in various fields is a strategic necessity for both countries to meet the regional and international challenges and changes facing them.

The cooperation between the two countries in the economic field is practically limited, as the volume of exchange “Russia has geopolitical goals, while Iran has national sectarian goals.” Trade in 2016 is about $1 billion, and rose 80 percent, Putin said in May 2017 when meeting with President Hassan Rowhani in Moscow. But this figure does not reflect strategic cooperation between the two countries, although Iranian and Russian officials have said there is a $45 billion approach to the oil-for-food program for the next 10 years. In addressing the nature of the relationship between Tehran and Moscow, it is useful to take the following observations into account: Russia is a big country, and wants to return an important pole in the world, while Iran is a strong regional state, wants to be independent in its decisions, and not follow any international force. The policy of the regime in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union pragmatism, puts its geopolitical interests above all considerations. In Moscow prefer to talk about “partnership”, rather than “alliance”, this confirms the previous idea of the pragmatism of Russian foreign policy. There is a lack of trust between the two countries, each afraid to sell the other to the West, because both of them dream of improving his relationship with the West.

Research problem

Many ask an important question: Are relations between Russia and Iran strategic or tactical? At least to the stage of relations between Iran and the Soviet Union, we find that it has gone through difficult stages. Stalin tried to occupy Azerbaijan in 1946. Iran’s Shah-led relationship with Moscow was very bad, given the Cold War and Iran’s involvement in Western alliances (with Britain and America). After the victory of the revolution in Iran in 1979, Khomeini’s takeover of power and the announcement of the Islamic Republic, Moscow did not welcome this revolution, fearing its Islamic slogans. Relations remained so, that Ayatollah Khomeini addressed President Gorbachev in 1986 and called on him to cooperate. Relations began to improve after the visit of Iranian Parliament Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1989 to Moscow and the signing of cooperation agreements.

Relations with the Russian President Yeltsin, who was receiving orders from America, which is known for its very tense relations with Tehran, have gone through a period of ups and downs, until Putin came to open a real page of cooperation between the two countries. Iran has been the third importing country for weapons from Moscow from 2000 to 2005. President Medvedev in 2008 came with his liberal approach closest to the West by stopping cooperation with Iran, especially refusing to provide it with a system, prompting Tehran to file a complaint against Moscow and demanding compensation of $
The problem of the research is its attempt to analyze the nature of the Russian-Iranian relations and the controversy it raised over the dimensions of the relationship and its level and in view of the strategic importance of this relationship at the international level, Russia is one of the influential countries in the international political system is a permanent member of the Council Security, economically, is one of the countries that influence the security of the global energy, having large resources of oil and gas, and is one of the largest producers and exporters of weapons, and possesses a nuclear force high technology. Iran is one of the most important regional powers in the region. This force emerged after the occupation of Iraq and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Iran has significant oil and gas reserves and an important geo-strategic location. The development of relations between the two countries will be reflected directly at the international and regional levels, both for the Central Asian region and the Arab region. The relations between the two countries and areas of cooperation have raised many questions. Therefore, the research problem lies in the great importance of studying the relationship between Iran and Russia, and the nature of the factors affecting these relations.

The main question of this study is: “What are the relations between Russia and Iran?”

This main question is subdivided into the following sub-questions:

What role does Iran and Russia aspires to play in the international system?

What are the main factors that contributed to the gradual convergence between Russia and Iran?

What are the determinants of relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation?

How do the factors (economic cooperation, Caspian Sea, Caucasus, military cooperation, nuclear cooperation) affect Iranian-Russian relations?

What are the variables controlling the future of the two countries, and will these changes contribute to the abolition of traditional caution, which has governed the bilateral relations between them for a long time?

Literature Review:

The future of Iran-Russia relations is governed by its traditional determinants, the relationship of both sides to the United States, the common interests of both sides, as well as the regional and international rivalries, and the role that Iran and Russia aspire to play in the international system. The “alliance of necessity”, the “tactical intersection of interests” and the “transit alliance” remain dominant in Russian-Iranian relations. For four centuries, Iran-Russia relations have witnessed stages of tension and tension, in which the two sides have also witnessed forced cooperation to confront a common enemy. In general, Russian-Iranian relations have undergone four stages:

1. Tsarist Russia and colonial ambitions
2. The Soviet Union and the communist rule
3. Relations after the Islamic revolution
4. The disintegration of the Soviet Union

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the separation of the Muslim republics from Russia, the Russian bear was not worried about the possibility of Islamic Iran supporting these republics. Although a new form of bilateral relations between Moscow and Tehran appeared on the horizon in 1989 with a visit to Russia by then-president of the Islamic Shura Council Hashemi Rafsanjani, Lilsen, the first Russian president after the collapse of the Soviet Union, had a close view of the West; Tehran waited until 1992 to take a step forward in its relationship with Russia, with the two countries signing a joint cooperation agreement to build the Bushehr nuclear reactor as part of a long-term agreement. Since then, many factors have contributed to the gradual convergence between the two sides, including geographical proximity, common economic interests, and regional rivalries. The two countries have recognized the strategic importance of their joint cooperation, but many of the determinants that have restricted relations between the Islamic Republic and the Russian Federation cannot be ignored.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Yeltsin sought to placate the enemy of yesterday (the United States) and sought friendship and appeasement, which reflected a chill on the relationship between Moscow and Tehran. Despite initial indications of Russia’s desire to regain influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia during the 1990s.

At the same time, economic cooperation between the two countries was strengthened, and Iran signed contracts to purchase Russian weapons. The Russian economic crises played an important role in encouraging Russian companies and industrial complexes to move towards the Iranian market. But US pressure and sanctions on Russian companies led to Moscow’s retreat from its military and technological contracts with Iran after the
signing of the Gur-Chernomyrdin Memorandum in 1995, and Moscow suspended a contract to supply Iran with a research reactor in 1998.

Ambience intersects the interests of the two countries

The pivotal moment in the development of relations between Moscow and Washington to take the form it was today when Putin came to power in 2000, then turned Russian policy towards America from dependence to the lack of confidence and frank and declared. Even Putin’s third term, we see clear Russian efforts to restore the role of the United States’ superpower, which may not be urgent at the global level, but it is already at the regional level.

Russia has begun to consider strengthening its status in Central Asia and returning to the Middle East, prompting it to re-evaluate Iran’s geostrategic role and direct influence in the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, Central Asia and the Middle East.

At the same time, US military operations and the ensuing military presence in Afghanistan in 2001, followed by Iraq in 2003, raised the concerns of Iran and Russia alike. Similar positions and fears of NATO’s progress towards the East were raised in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Caspian region.

Putin tried to form a front against the authoritarian and expansionist policy of the United States, including China, Iran, India and Brazil, to re-create a balance in international relations to end the one-pole policy of the United States.

The partnership between the two countries can be summarized in the following areas:

Economic Cooperation

Iran can be a privileged trading partner of Russia. The trade balance between the two countries in 2012 reached $ 3.65 billion; $ 3.4 billion of which is the volume of Russian exports to the Iranian market, compared to only 0.6 percent of Iranian exports; Of the Iranian partnership.

There are expectations that the volume of trade will increase three times as much as it is now. However, Russia exports only 2.5% of its total exports to Iran, due to the same determinants of relations between the two countries.

There is also a need for political will on the part of the two sides to expand economic cooperation between them, especially in establishing infrastructure to support development in Iran and Russia, as well as in third countries. This includes oil and gas extraction and transmission lines and the establishment of international transport routes for both domestic and foreign goods. The role of Iran in the Caucasus, and the compatibility with Russia.

Following the end of the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008, Iran followed a successful policy of dealing with Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. It facilitated travel to its territory and developed bilateral relations with the Caucasus countries. Despite the escalation of the dispute between Iran and Azerbaijan, this did not create a problem for the party Russian territory, and another point to be noted is the fear of some of Iran’s support for the Muslims of the Russians; in contrast to what is said, but Iran can not support Sunni groups Salafist, and Russia is aware of this; so try to maintain a specific partnership with Iran In this area without Affected by many other files.

The Caspian Sea

The difference between the Caspian Sea, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran is one of the most important factors affecting Iranian-Russian relations.

The treaties of 1921 and 1940 between Iran and the former Soviet Union gave equal rights to both sides of navigation in the Caspian Sea and exploitation of the resources of this water basin. The treaties also prohibited foreign vessels from sailing as a closed sea. But the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to a change in the political map of the region and the emergence of a number of new independent states. Despite the 20-year talks, they have not reached a satisfactory agreement. On the other hand, bilateral and trilateral treaties were organized to divide the northern part of the sea between Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, while the southern part, which includes Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, remained in dispute. Russia is seeking to extend its influence in a geographically rich location and its wealth was until recently a part of its natural border, but Russia remains a strong competitor to Iran for energy in the Caspian Sea and its export lines. At the same time Moscow sees in the American and Western presence in this strategic region a threat to its status and security, and repeated attempts to contain and encircle; and that is why Moscow supports the positions of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in their dispute with Iran.

Military cooperation

Iran is Russia’s third partner in terms of military cooperation after China and India. This partnership
began during the visit of former President Mohammad Khatami to Moscow in 2001 to sign a military cooperation agreement between the two countries in the fall of that year. Tehran has been very interested in developing its missile systems through this cooperation, and has aspired to obtain licenses for the manufacture of Russian weapons, unless Moscow is satisfied. Russia classifies all weapons and shipping shipments to Iran as defensive weapons.

During the past years, military cooperation has included deals between the two sides for the purchase of anti-tank missiles, the TOR-M1 rocket system, the SU-25UBT, the MiG-29, the Sukhoi-24 and the military transport helicopters, as well as spare parts and maintenance for the Iranian army. Russian-made tanks.

Russia’s profits from military cooperation with Iran are estimated at between $11 billion and $13 billion. In 2007 alone, Russia signed a contract to hand over five S300 surface-to-air missile systems at a cost of $800 million. In 2010, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev canceled the contract because of US and Israeli pressure, which caused a crisis between the two countries, especially after former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad harsh criticism of Russian policy, the Kremlin responded violently, and Tehran filed a lawsuit before the International Court of Appeal against the Russian government “Russ Auburnexport” Bug compensation Meh $4 billion, due to the cancellation of the company to supply contract s300 systems (IBM or 1) to Iran.

Russian military sources denied a deal was reached during talks between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Hassan Rowhani on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek in September. Asserting that the Russian exporters “are not now looking to supply the system” S-300 Vmtn-2500 “anti-aircraft missiles to Iran, but it can not be ruled out in the future.

Nuclear cooperation

Moscow’s possession of nuclear energy technology and reactor construction is one of the most important elements of the Russian economy. Russia is building reactors in Turkey, Iran, Vietnam, China and India. Iranian analysts believe that if sanctions are lifted, and Tehran can extract international recognition of the legitimacy of its nuclear program, Iran can benefit from all its oil revenues to invest in nuclear energy, and thus achieve with Russia a huge trade balance in this area, especially that the Russian partner Russia has been a permanent member of the Security Council. It has not only the technology to build reactors but also can supply Tehran with nuclear fuel for the reactor if it wants to, but since the early 1990s, Past cooperation in Nuclear energy toured between the Islamic Republic and Russia alarmed the United States and Israel, and American pressure led her time to limit this cooperation in the framework of the completion of the Bushehr reactor, which delayed the Moscow handed over more than once. However, Russia will be able to fully defend its economic interests by allowing continued cooperation with Iran in the nuclear power and civilian space research sectors. In view of the importance of this pivotal stage, we recommend that you see the details.

Since the Iranian nuclear crisis was activated in 2002, Russia has sought to strengthen its role as a mediator to help resolve this crisis peacefully. After US and Israeli threats in 2005 to launch a military attack on Iran, Moscow has proposed a uranium enrichment project on Russian soil. Russia’s subsequent Security Council sanctions on Iran in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2011; which affected the relations between the two countries to reach a slowdown in Moscow to complete the stages of the Bushehr reactor for more than seven years, as well as the refusal to supply Iran with nuclear fuel, Accession to the Organization of Sheng J. All this raises doubts about the possibility of building strategic relations between the two sides, 18 despite Moscow’s hope that Iran will achieve a breakthrough in the Iranian nuclear crisis following the election of moderate President Hassan Rowhani and his followers a new approach to negotiation.

Conclusion

The first is the “Arab Spring” and the Syrian crisis and the solution to solve it. Tehran and Moscow have sided with the Syrian regime in all diplomatic forums. The two countries have never shared a position in this regard, as they did in fact. In this file.

The second is the arrival of Rohani to the Iranian presidency, after years of hard-line approach by his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose presidency has seen many positions and policies that have strained relations with Moscow.

Finally, the variable openness of Iran and the US potential, and the future of relations between Iran and the Gulf States, specifically Saudi Arabia. All these variables have not yet yielded results, and
may be waiting to resolve some of them, which are linked in one way or another.

The question remains: if these variables will contribute to the abolition of traditional caution, which has long governed the bilateral relations between them? Here are a number of points: The instability in Syria and the presence of militant groups may shift over time to Russia through Chechnya and the northern Caucasus regions; this will threaten their interests there and adversely affect the extraction of 40 billion barrels of oil from Iran, Caspian Sea. The two sides agree that the Arab Spring has begun to produce “radical Islamists”. Moscow does not prefer a Middle East where al-Qaeda roams, nor does Tehran favor radical Salafist control.

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