No-clicking Event in the Quantum Key Distribution

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We discuss the ‘no-clicking’ event, which is harmful for legitimate users in Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution: We describe an attack where no-clicking events are utilized in the same way as double-clicking events are utilized in the quantum Trojan-pony attack. We discuss how to deal with the no-clicking events. We discuss how to estimate the security of the protocol against the proposed attack by using a formula involved with the fraction of adversarial removals of events.

PACS: 03.67.Dd

I. INTRODUCTION

Information processing with quantum systems, e.g., quantum cryptography [1, 2, 3], quantum computation [4], and quantum metrologies [5, 6], enables us to do some tasks that we cannot do with its classical counterparts. In addition to the practical importance, this fact has big theoretical implications.

The Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol [2] is one of the most promising quantum information processing technology. Security of the BB84 protocol was studied in the ideal case where the source, the channel, and the detector are all perfect [7]. However, no actual device is perfect. Later, security of the BB84 protocol in the case where the channel was imperfect while the source and the detector were perfect was given [8, 9, 10, 11, 12].

An imperfect source gives rise to the problem of photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [13, 14, 15]. Methods to deal with the problem are given in Refs. [16] and [17]. However, the problem of the PNS attack becomes more serious when the imperfect source is combined with loss [13, 14, 15]. Thus, a practicable long-distance BB84 QKD system, which usually has high loss, is not secure against the PNS attack. The decoy method [18, 19, 20] and the SARG04 protocol [21] are two independent ways to overcome the problem of the PNS attack combined with high loss. The long-distance BB84 protocol supplemented with a decoy can be secure as long as detectors are perfect.

A remaining step is, therefore, to resolve problems due to imperfect detectors. Imperfect detectors give rise to undesired events, e.g. double-clicking and no-clicking. A no-clicking event can be easily overlooked because they are not exposed. However, no-clicking events can give rise to a post-selection effect as in the case of detection-loopholes [22] for Bell’s inequality violation.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss problems due to no-clicking in the BB84 protocol. Our presentation is in the following order: In Section II, we describe why the no-clicking event is problematic. In Section III, we discuss how to deal with the no-clicking event. In Section IV, we discuss how to estimate the security of the protocol. In Section V, we conclude.

II. PROBLEMATIC NO-CLICKING EVENT

Let us define terminology. A loss-event is the case where no detector of Bob clicks even when a quantum carrier with a bit of key, e.g., a pulse of photons, was sent by Alice. Here, Alice, Bob and Eve are the legitimate sender and receiver of quantum carriers, respectively. The loss-event may be either due to a channel-loss event in which the quantum carrier was lost in the channel or due to a no-clicking event in which the detector did not click because of imperfection. That is, either channel-loss or no-clicking can give rise to a loss-event. However, channel-loss and no-clicking events cannot be discriminated by Alice and Bob.

The possibility that no-clicking event was problematic was first noted in Ref. [13]. In order to deal with the no-clicking event, they "conservatively" assume that "Eve has control on $\eta_b$ (detection efficiency),..." (Here Eve denotes an eavesdropper.) What they mean is the following: As mentioned above, a loss event may be due to either a channel-loss event or a no-clicking event. What they assume is that detectors are perfect; thus, all loss events are due to channel losses. Here channel losses are due to Eve’s action.

However, imperfect detectors give rise to post-selection effects that may be harmful for Alice and Bob. This is implied by a few papers. The post-selection effect by imperfect detectors is mentioned in Section XIII of Ref. [17]. Other interesting post-selection effects are discussed in Ref. [23] and Refs. [24] and [25].

The References [24] and [25] overlap with our paper, but are different, as will be discussed in Section V. How to coherently deal with all post-selection effects due to the no-clicking event, including those works [17, 23, 24, 25], is an open problem. In Ref. [17], they discuss the problem with detector efficiency. They give a formula (Eq. (58) of Ref. [17]) for the key generation rate. However, a fraction ‘$f$’ of random removal is not provided. Now let us see at how a no-clicking event can be problematic in more detail.

First, let us see why Fred, a friend of Eve in detectors, is introduced [17]. Imperfectness in detector is not something that is supposed to be in full control of Alice and Bob. It can be that the imperfectness gives rise to systematic errors that happen to be useful for Eve. Thus, Alice and Bob may consider the worst case in which a hypothetical being, Fred, who wants to help his friend
Eve has full control of the detector. He can turn the detector on or off as he wants. Because it is not excluded that Fred can get information about the basis of the detector, he is supposed to know the basis. One might say that if a friend of Eve has access to Bob’s detector, why doesn’t the friend read the final plain text of Bob directly and sends it to Eve [26]. That powerful friend can break the whole system of Alice and Bob, of course. However, the Fred we consider is less powerful than this friend of Eve. Fred is confined in a detector, so he cannot observe something outside the detector by any means except by quantum carriers given to him via a window of the detector.

An alliance of Eve and Fred can cheat a careless Alice and Bob, for even moderate loss, who take no account of no-clicking events: Like in the case of the quantum Trojan pony attack [17], Eve performs an opaque (intercept-resend) attack in the following way: Eve does not know the basis of Alice, of course. However, she does a measurement that is randomly picked up between Z and X for each photon pulse sent by Alice. Here, Z and X are measurements in the z basis, {0|1} and in the x basis, {0|1}, respectively. Here, |0⟩ and |1⟩ are two orthogonal states; |0⟩ = 0, |0⟩ = 1/√2(|0⟩ + |1⟩), and |1⟩ = 1/√2(|0⟩ − |1⟩). When the outcome of the Z measurement is 0 (1), Eve prepares multiple copies of |0⟩ (|1⟩), namely |0⟩ ⊕2N (|1⟩ ⊕2N). Then, she forwards them to Bob. In the same way, when the outcome of the X measurement is 0 (1), Eve prepares multiple copies of |0⟩ (|1⟩), namely |0⟩ ⊕2N (|1⟩ ⊕2N). Then, she forwards them to Bob. The strategy of Fred is the following: He splits the state |k⟩ ⊕N (k = 0, 1, 0, 1) to |k⟩ ⊕N−1 and |k⟩. When N − 1 is large enough, Fred can identify the state with high reliability. If the basis of the state that Eve has forwarded is the same as that of the detector, Fred gives the remaining state, |k⟩, to the detector. If different, Fred turns off the switch of the detector. Now let us see how Eve can eavesdrop without being detected. Note that the only case in which Eve’s action can be caught is when the basis of Eve and that of Alice and Bob alliance do not match; Alice and Bob happen to adopt the same basis and Eve happens to adopt the other basis. However, in the above attack, whenever a non-matching case happens Fred turns off the detector. Therefore, Eve’s action is not detected at all even if she performs the above attack for every quantum carrier if Alice and Bob simply discard no-clicking events.

The above attack using no-clicking event is in parallel with the quantum Trojan pony attack [17]. In the quantum Trojan pony attack, Eve attempts to nullify non-matching cases by making Bob’s detector double-click. If Alice and Bob simply discard the data for a double-click event, the quantum Trojan pony attack reduces to an attack using no-clicking event in which Alice and Bob discard the data for a no-clicking event. However, a double-clicking event can be detected directly. Alice and Bob take into account a double-clicking event in their estimate of the security [14, 17]. A no-clicking event can be detected indirectly: When the detector does not click when it is supposed to, we say that a no-clicking event is detected. We term the attack using a no-clicking event as a quantum ‘Trojan-dark-pony’ attack. An easy way to maintain security is for Alice and Bob to regard a no-clicking event as an ‘error event’ that contributes to the quantum bit error rate (QBER) [27]. In this case, however, loss lower-bounds the QBER. Thus, even for a moderate loss, there is no secure protocol even if everything else is perfect. Thus, this method is not practical.

### III. HOW TO DEAL WITH NO-CCLICKING EVENTS

Before we discuss how to maintain security, we have to characterize detectors for a no-clicking event. However, in order to characterize a detector, we need to find a principle governing the behavior of the detector. At first look, one might think that it is difficult to find the principle governing behavior of detectors for a no-clicking event because a no-clicking event is neither a desired nor an ideal process. However, this is not the case.

Proposition 1: a no-clicking event can be dealt with by using a normal quantum measurement, POM. That is, a certain positive-operator is assigned for a no-clicking event.

Proposition 1 is already adopted in Ref. [23]. However, let us describe why Proposition 1 is valid, for those who are not convinced. Usually, a quantum detector is a ‘black-box’ that gives rise to macroscopically distinct events for microscopic inputs. For example, a photon polarization detector gives clicking of a photon detector between two photon detectors as an output for an input photon. However, although a no-clicking event literally does not give a noticeable event, a no-clicking event can still be macroscopically distinguished from other events. Thus, there is no difficulty in assigning a number, say 0, to a no-clicking event, like in the case of other noticeable events. With Proposition 1, we can characterize a no-clicking event. What we have to do is to identify the positive-operator corresponding to a no-clicking event by repeated measurements.

Let us now discuss how to maintain security for a no-clicking event. First let us introduce a quantity Δ, the fraction of adversarially removed events, that is important in estimating the security of a protocol. In Ref. [17], they consider a hypothetical situation where Fred can freely remove some cases that would lead to the QBER, for example, as he does in non-matching cases in the quantum Trojan-dark-pony attack above. If Alice and Bob have no knowledge on how many times Fred did the adversarial removal, then they have to assume the worst case that Fred did the removal all of the instances; thus, clearly the protocol is not secure. However, if Alice and Bob know a bound on the fraction of adversarially removed event, Δ, and Δ is small enough, then the security of the protocol can be recovered with a reduced key gen-
eration rate depending on the fraction $\Delta$\textsuperscript{17}: The larger the fraction $\Delta$ is, the smaller the key generation rate is. Therefore, the problem of estimating security reduces to how to estimate the fraction $\Delta$.

However, although Eve does not know the identity of the quantum carriers that Alice has sent, it is Eve’s freedom that she replace Alice’s quantum carriers by any other quantum carriers. In the quantum Trojan-dark-pony attack, for example, it can be that a quantum carrier $|0\rangle$ is replaced by either $|0\rangle \otimes N$ or $|1\rangle \otimes N$ if the $Z$ measurement is chosen. Therefore, we must analyze Bob’s detector for all different states of $N$ quantum bits. If the number of quantum bits $N$ is unlimited, the analysis is impossible. Thus, we assume that the number of quantum bits $N$ is bounded by a certain number $M$ so that the analysis can be done. This assumption amounts to the assumption that there is a bound on light intensity at Bob’s site, which can be checked by Bob. With the assumption, what we have to do is to analyze all states of quantum bits whose number is less than $M$. Then, by repeated measurements, we estimate the positive-operator measuring corresponding to a no-clicking event of Bob’s detector in each basis $b$, where $b = z, x$. With the positive-operator thus obtained, we can calculate the detector efficiency, $\eta_b(|\psi\rangle)$, for each state $|\psi\rangle$ and basis $b$.

Let us consider the simplest case where $\eta_b(|\psi\rangle) = 1$ for all states $|\psi\rangle$ and bases $b$. In this case, Fred has no chance to turn off the switch; thus, the fraction $\Delta$ is zero. Next, let us consider a case where $\eta_b(|\psi\rangle) = \eta_0$ for all states $|\psi\rangle$ and bases $b$. Here, $\eta_0$ is a real number between 0 and 1. Here, the question is how large the fraction $\Delta$ is. In this case, it is clear that the fraction $\Delta$ is bounded by $1 - \eta_0$. This corresponds to the simple, but impractical, method above where Alice and Bob regard a no-clicking event as an ‘error event’ contributing to the QBER. Thus, we need to get a tighter bound for the fraction $\Delta$. It appears that it is hard to do so because there is no way to discriminate accidental removals by imperfection from intentional removals by Fred. However, this is not the case as far as the quantum Trojan-dark-pony attack is concerned. This can be explained as follows: Let us recall that the basic strategy of the quantum Trojan-dark-pony attack is that Fred suppresses (enhances) what is advantageous (disadvantageous) for Alice and Bob. More specifically, Fred turns off the switch of Bob’s detector in non-matching cases because only non-matching cases contribute to the QBER, and he does nothing in matching cases because in matching cases, Eve can obtain information on the key of Alice and Bob without contributing to the QBER at all. However, in this case where all $\eta_b(|\psi\rangle)$’s are identically $\eta_0$, it is not that all no-clicking events are adversarial removals. That is, some removals are rather friendly for Alice and Bob: Each state is removed with a fixed rate $1 - \eta_0$, regardless of basis $b$. For example, even when $|\psi\rangle = |1\rangle \otimes n$ ($n < M$) is the input state for Bob’s detector as in the quantum Trojan-dark-pony attack, the removal rates for two bases are both $1 - \eta_0$ because $\eta(|1\rangle \otimes n)_z = \eta(|1\rangle \otimes n)_x = \eta_0$. Here, removals when the detector is in the $x$ basis are adversarial for Alice and Bob, but those when the detector is in $z$ basis are friendly for Alice and Bob because this is the matching case advantageous for Eve. The effect of friendly removals is opposite that of adversarial removals, and here the numbers of friendly and adversarial removals are the same. Therefore, effectively, the fraction $\Delta(|1\rangle \otimes n)$ for the state $|1\rangle \otimes n$ is bounded by $|\eta(|1\rangle \otimes n)_z - \eta(|1\rangle \otimes n)_x| = 0$ regardless of how those events are removed, accidentally or intentionally. However, for other states, for example, $|(0) + |0\rangle \otimes n$, whether an attack using the state is adversarial or friendly is not as clear as in the above case. A removal of a certain state for a basis is partially adversarial while the removal of a state for the other basis is partially friendly, and similar arguments apply.

Let us now consider the general case where $\eta_b(|\psi\rangle)$ depends on the state $|\psi\rangle$. For each state $|\psi\rangle$, we have a relation that

$$\Delta(|\psi\rangle) \leq |\eta_z(|\psi\rangle) - \eta_x(|\psi\rangle)|,$$

as shown above. Then the bound $\Delta$ for all states is simply the maximal one among all $\Delta(|\psi\rangle)$’s,

$$\Delta \leq \text{Max}\{\Delta(|\psi\rangle)\},$$

Our recipe in Eq. (2) is still quite loose bound for $\Delta$. One reason is that it is not that a state that gives maximal $\Delta$ is the only one utilized in the actual attack. In other words, the situation can be that the state that gives maximal $\Delta$ is not so effective in the eavesdropping. However, Eq. (2) is much tighter than the simple method above where all no-clicking events are treated as error events. It might be that for some detectors, the bound in Eq. (2) is too large for a protocol to be secure. However, it seems to be possible to design detectors such that the no-clicking rate of each state does not depend on the basis, in which case the fraction $\Delta$ is zero. In other words, if loss of each state is independent of the basis then the fraction $\Delta$ is zero. It is notable, however, that even if the overall loss is independent of the basis, it might be that the the fraction $\Delta$ is not zero because it is an absolute value of $\eta_z(|\psi\rangle) - \eta_x(|\psi\rangle)$ that bounds the fraction $\Delta$ in Eq. (1).

The bound in Eq. (2) can be easily translated to a bound for the quantum Trojan-pony attack by only replacing the detector efficiency $\eta$ with the probability of a non-double-clicking event. In this case, however, the bound in Eq. (2) is not that useful because it is not easy to make the bound small in most natural designs of detectors.

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\textbf{IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION}

The results in Ref. [24] overlap with ours. Let us see how they differ. What is the same is that both escape Alice and Bob’s test by keeping the detector from clicking in the case of a non-matching basis. However,
what we consider is more general that what they considered. What they considered is more specific, a detector timing mismatch. Even if there is no detector timing mismatch, therefore, detectors must be inspected for all possible ways in order to get security. Giving security proofs for the BB 84 QKD system with no-clicking by coherently dealing with all post-selection effects including those in Refs. [17] and [23] [24] [25] is an open problem.

In conclusion, we discussed a ‘no-clicking’ event that is harmful for Alice and Bob in the BB 84 QKD. A no-clicking event can give rise to a post-selection effect. Specifically, we described an attack, which we term the quantum Trojan-dark-pony attack, where no-clicking events are utilized in the same way as double-clicking events are utilized in the quantum Trojan-pony attack. We discussed how to deal with the no-clicking events: The formalism of positive-operator-valued-measurement (POM) also applies to a no-clicking event, as is known [23]. The problem of characterizing a no-clicking event reduces to that of identifying a positive-operator corresponding to a no-clicking event. We discussed how to estimate the security of the protocol, against the quantum Trojan-dark-pony attack with a positive-operator by using a formula involving the fraction $\Delta$ of adversarial removals of events given in Ref. [17].

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the Korean Research Foundation grant funded by the Korean Government (MOEHRD) (KRF-2005-003-C00047) and by the Korea Science and Engineering Foundation (R01-2006-000-10354-0).

We would like to thank Eric Corndorf, Hoi-Kwong Lo, Ranjith Nair, Xiang-Bin Wang, and Horace Yuen for interesting discussions.

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