On sva\textit{tan}tram \textit{anumānam}

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1. Preamble

It has been widely accepted that Candrakīrti (ca. 600–650) accuses Bhāviveka of employing the independent inference (\textit{sva\textit{tan}tram \textit{anumānam}/ sva\textit{tan}trā\textit{numāna}). Notably, however, this technical term is not found in the extant Sanskrit texts other than Candrakīrti’s \textit{Prasannapadā} (\textit{Pras}). The present paper, as a result of examination of the terms \textit{sva\textit{tan}tra} and \textit{anumāna} in Bhāviveka’s \textit{Prajñāpradīpa (PP)} and the \textit{Pras}, queries the validity of this technical term \textit{sva\textit{tan}tram \textit{anumānam}/ sva\textit{tan}trā\textit{numāna}}.

2. \textit{sva\textit{tan}tra} and \textit{anumāna} for Bhāviveka

The usages of the term \textit{sva\textit{tan}tra} in both \textit{PP} and \textit{Pras} have already been discussed in Matsumoto 1997, 2011, and Yotsuya 1999. The present paper is indebted to their contributions.

2.1. \textit{*sva\textit{tan}tra} for Bhāviveka

Yotsuya 1999 points out that there are five occurrences of the term \textit{rang dbang} equivalent to \textit{sva\textit{tan}tra} in the \textit{PP}.\textsuperscript{1} They are as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[i)] Yotsuya (1999: 49) = D tsha 129a7–b1; P tsha: 158b6–7: de la `dir rab tu byed pa’i don ni nye bar len pa po yod pa’i gan tshigs sun dbyung ba brjod pa dang | rang dbang gis(P: gi) rjes su dpag pa brjod pas| nye bar len pa po ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du bstan pa yin no|
  \item[ii)] Yotsuya (1999: 51) = D tsha 133b; P tsha 164b: de dag la byed pa po dang las su ’brel pa’i mtsphan nyid kyi phrad pa gzhan med na mi ’byung ba med pas gzhan nyid du smra ba rnam s kyi dam bcas pa la glags yo pa’i sgo nas yang dag par cho s kyi phyad par bsal ba’i skyon yod par bstan pa yin gyi rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa bstan pa ni ma yin no
\end{itemize}

Matsumoto (2011: 283): “The purpose (artha) of the chapter (i.e. the ninth chapter of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā) is to teach the essencelessness (niḥsvabhāvata) of the appropriator (upadātṛ) by stating the refutation (dūṣaṇa) of the reason (hetu) of the existence of the appropriator and by stating independently (raṇ dbaṅ gis, svatanryeṇa or sva\textit{tan}tram) the inference (anumāṇa).”

Yotsuya (1999: 50): “Hence, as [the opponent’s argument has a weak point, i.e.] it leaves itself open
to another explanation of the matter, he (=Nāgārjuna) shows that the thesis of those who advocate that [fire and firewood] are distinct has the fault of the specification of the correct predicate (yang dag par chos kyi khyad par bsal ba) being negated. [This is what is expressed by the verse, i.e. the MMK, k. 7]; but [Nāgārjuna] does not set forth an inferential statement based upon his own position (rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa) [in this verse]."

iii) Yotsuya (1999: 49) = D tsha 147b3; P tsha 182b5–6: da ni sun ’byin pa’i lan btab pa dang | rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa’i mthurs ’du byed nrams nram pa las ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du bstan pa’i don gyi dbang gis rab tu byed pa bcu gsum pa brtsam mo] Yotsuya (1999: 48): "Now, Chapter XIII [of the MMK] was composed [by Nāgārjuna], with the purpose of teaching that conditioned factors (saṃskṛta, ’du byed) have no [own-]nature (ngo bo nyid), from [an angle] different from the perspective (rnam pa las) [that was explained earlier], by giving a reply to the refutation and [presenting] a sva-tantra-inference (rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa) [Literally, "an inference independently"]."

iv) Yotsuya (1999: 49, note 8) = D tsha 153a5–6; P tsha 190a5–6: de la ’dir rab tu byed pa’i don ni pha rol pos smras pa’i sun ’byin pa’i lan btab pa dang | rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa kha na ma tho ba med pa bstan pa’i mthurs ’du byed nrams nram pa las ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du bstan pa yin no] Matsumoto (2011: 283): "The purpose of the chapter (i.e. the thirteenth chapter of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā) is to teach the essencelessness of the conditioning factors (saṃskāraḥ) by rejecting (parihāra) the refutation (dūṣaṇa) stated by the opponent (para) and by showing independently (raṅ dbaṅ du, sva-tantram) the faultless (anavadya) inference (anumāna)."

v) Yotsuya (1999: 52–53): The Vātsīputrīyas (gnas ma’i bu’i sde pa dag yang phyir zlog par byed de| . . . de’i phyir de ni rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa yin pas| gtan tshigs ’gal ba la ’khrul ba med pa’i gnod pa yang yod do| bshad pa| de bzhin gshegs pas khang pa brtsegs ma’i nang nas skyes pa’i shing a mra’i ’bras bu’i ro’i bye brag tu lung du ma bstan pa la sogs pa dag gis gan tshigs kyi don ’gal ban yid yin pa’i phyir| de ni rigs pa ma yin pas rtog ge phyi mas gnod pa yang med la| rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa yang ma yin no] Yotsuya (1999: 52–53): "The Vātsīputrīyas (gnas ma’i bu’i sde pa), however, refute (phyir zlog par byed) [us, i.e. the Mādhyamikas, who maintain that the Tathāgata does not ultimately exist after Nirvāṇa] in the following way: . . . And therefore, since that [viz. the above-statement] is done by a reasoning autonomously, there is also the unerroneous refutation (khrul ba med pa’i gnod pa) relating to [the fact that our] logical reason (gtan tshigs) might be contradictory (’gal ba). The reply [by Bhāvaviveka]: "The significance of your logical reason is contradictory because of the fact that the Tathāgata has not specifically (bye brag tu) determined the taste of their fruit of [the actually non-existent] mango tree which has grown in a palace (khang pa brtsegs ma), etc. Therefore this, [i.e. your argument], is incorrect. Hence it is also impossible [for you] to refute [us] by the latter reasoning (rtog ge phyi ma). Nor is this a sva-tantra-reasoning (rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa) [Literally, “Nor is this an inference independently.”]."
Notably, the term rang dbang in the PP is used adverbially, as Matsumoto 1997 indicates. Since 'svatantra (rang dbang)' is not an adjective, it does not modify 'inference' (anumāna; rjes su dpag pa) but must be taken adverbially as modifying a verb like 'taught' (bstan pa) or 'stated' (brjod pa), even where that verb is not explicitly given. Accordingly, it is implausible to postulate the term svatamtrānumāna or svatantram anumānam in the PP.

2.2. anumāna for Bhāviveka

Bhāviveka employs the term inference (rjes su dpag pa, anumāna) in the initial part of the PP as follows:

slob dpon gyi zhal snga nas kyi tshig lc’ur byas pa dag kho nas rjes su dpag pa dang | sun dbyung ba’i gsal pa dang | de kho na dag bstan pa dang | lta ba ngan pa’i dra ba zhi bar byed pa dang ldan pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i tshul bka’ btsal mod kyi |3 | (D tsha 45b6–7; P tsha 53b7–8.)

Matsumoto (2011: 283): “The Master [Nāgārjuna] preached the doctrine (tshul, nīti) of the Prajñāpāramitā which teaches clear and true inferences (anumāna) and refutations (dūṣaṇa) and pacifies the net of wrong views.” Ames (1993: 213): “The ācārya [Nāgārjuna] has taught [both] the correct verbal expression and the reality of inference (anumāna) and refutation (dūṣaṇa) just by means of [his Mūla-madhyamaka-ıkārikā [MMK]. He has stated the doctrine (naya) of the perfection of discernment (prajñā-pāramitā), which puts an end to the net of bad views. Nevertheless, . . . .”

As in the citations i), iii), and iv) above, the term ‘inference’ is paired with a term equivalent to ‘disproof’ (sun dbyung ba or sun ’byin pa, dūṣaṇa). These two modes of argumentation remind us of the ‘proof’ (sādhana) and ‘disproof’ (dūṣaṇa) in Dignāga’s Nyāyamukha (NM). The former is defined as that which proves one’s own proposition, whereas the latter is an objection against the proposition from the opponent by indicating the logical faults. It can be concluded that inference (anumāna) for Bhāviveka is synonymous with proof (sādhana) for Dignāga.

3. svatamtrānumāna for Candrakīrti

What follows are the occurrences of the term ’svatantra’ in the Pras.7)

I) svatamtrānumāna: Pras_LVP 16.2, 34.4 (twice).
I-1) Pras_LVP 16.1–2; MacDonald 2015a, 145.2–146.1 (a part of § 25): sarvathā priyānumānatām evātmana ācāryaḥ prakāṣatdasty asthāne ’py anumānāni praveśayan | na ca mādhyamikasya svataḥ svatamtrānumānāṃ kartuṁ yuktaṁ | pakṣāntarābhhyapatamābhāvāt ||

MacDonald (2015b: 403–404): de’i phyir slob dpon ni gnas ma yin par yang rjes su dpag pa tshang.
bar byed pa na bdag nyid rjes su dpag pa la dga’ ba nyid mgon par byed pa yin no\| dbu ma pa yin na ni rang gi rgyud kyi rjes su dpag par bya ba rigs pa yang ma yin te\| phyogs gzhan khas blangs pa med pa’i phyir ro\]

MacDonald (2015b: 61): “Thus the Master [Bhāviveka] introducing an inference even when it is inopportune (asthāna), reveals nothing but his liking—at all costs (sarvathā)—for instance. But because he does not maintain any other position (pakṣa), it is not right for the Mādhyamika himself to formulate an autonomous inference (svatantram anumānam ).”

I-2) Pras_LVP 34.3–5; MacDonald 2015a, 186.4–6 (a part of § 56): ucyate — svantram anumānam bruvatām ayaṃ doṣo jāyate | na vayaṃ svantram anumānam prayuñjmahe parapratijñāniśedhaphalatvād asmadanumānānām |

MacDonald (2015b: 424): brjod par bya ste| rang gi rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa smra ba dag la nyes pa ’dir ’gyur gyi khot bo cag ni rang rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa mi sbyor te| rjes su dpag pa dag ni gzhan gyi dam bca’ ba ’gog pa tsam gyt ‘bras bu can yin pa’i phyir ro\]

MacDonald (2015b: 130): “Reply: This fault (doṣa ) occurs for those voicing an independent inference (svatantram anumānam ). We do not employ an independent inference, because our inferences (anumāna ) result in the negation of the opponent’s thesis.”

II) svantrā pratijñā: Pras_LVP 16.2.

Pras_LVP 16.11–12; MacDonald 2015a, 147.5–7. (a part of § 27): yadā caivaṃ svantrānumānamabhidhāvyitvāḥ mādhyamikasya | tadā kuto nāḍhyātmikānā āyatānānī svata utpānānātī svantrā pratijñā | yasyām Sāṁkhyāḥ pratyaṅvasṭhāsyante . . . .

MacDonald (2015b: 405–406): gang gi tshe de ltar dbu ma pas rang gi rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa mi brjod pa nyid yin par de’i tshe| . . . zhes bya bar gang la grangs can pa dag gis phyir zlog par byed par ’gyur ba nang gi skye mched rnam bdag las skye ba med de zhes bya ba’i rang gi rgyud kyi dam bca’ ba lta ga la yod|

MacDonald (2015b: 65): “And when in this way the Mādhyamika does not state an independent inference (svatantra numāna ), how [could there possibly be] an independent thesis (svatantrā pratijñā ) [like Bhāviveka’s, viz.,] “The inner bases (āyatanānī ) have not arisen from self,” in regard to which the Sāṅkhyaḥ could object, . . . .”

III) svantrānumāna tabelabhāvyitvam: Pras_LVP 16.11. See above.

Pras_LVP 18.5–7.; MacDonald 2015a, 149.3–150.1 (a part of § 28): athāpi syāt mādhyamikānāḥ pakṣahetudṛṣṭāntānam asiddheḥ svantrānumānamabhidhāvyitvāt svata upistipratiṣedhappariṣṭāntāḥ ādhanām mā bhūd ubhayasiddhena vānumānāna parapratijñānirākarānam |

MacDonald (2015b: 406): ci ste yang dbu ma pa rnam kyi ltar na phyogs dang gan tshigs dang dpe dag ma grub pas rang gi rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa ma brjod pa nyid kyi phyir bdag las skye ba dgag pa’i dam bca’ ba’i don sgrub pa dang | gnyi ga la grub pa’i rjes su dpag pas gzhan gyi dam bca’ bsal bar ma gyur mod|

MacDonald (2015b: 68–71): "Even if it were [argued]: [It] may [indeed] be, since Mādhyamikas do not state independent inferences (svatantrānumāna ) owing to the fact that propositions (pakṣa ),
reasons (hetu) and examples (drṣṭānā) are not established [for them], that there is neither proof (sādhana) of the content (artha) of the thesis (pratijñā) negating arising from self nor refutation (nirākaraṇa) of the opponent’s thesis by way of an inference established for both [parties of the debate] (ubhayasiddha); …”

IV) svatantraprayogavākhyābhidhānam: 25.8.

*Pras*_ LVP 257–9; MacDonald 2015a, 167.1–4 (a part of § 39): api cātamanas tarkaśāstrātikauśalāmātram ācikhyāsur aṅgikṛtamadhyamakadarśanasasyāpi yat svatantraprayogavākhyābhidhānān [tad atitarām anekadoṣasamudāyās padam asya tārkikasyopalakṣyate | MacDonald (2015b: 413): gzhan yang rtog ge ba ‘dis bdag nyid rtog ge’i bstan bcos la shin tu mkhas pa tsam zhig bstan par ’dod pas| dbu ma pa’i lta ba khas len bzhin du yang rang gi rgyud kyi sbyor ba’i ngag brjod pa gang yin pa de ni ches shin tu nyes pa du ma’i tshogs kyi gnas su rtogs te| MacDonald 2015b: 91–92. “Moreover, this logician’s (tārkika) [i.e., Bhāviveka’s] asserting — despite [his] acceptance of the Madhyamaka view (madhyamakadarśana) —of independent inferential statements (svatantraprayogavākhyā) out of a desire to communicate [therewith] no more than his extreme skill (atikauśala) in the science of reasoning (tārakāśāstra) is observed to be, to a more extreme degree (atitarām), the basis for an assemblage of many faults.”

3.1. *svatantra* as Adjective

In the Tibetan *Pras*, the term *svatantra* is always rendered into rang (gi) rgyud kyi. Grammatically speaking, the occurrence of ‘independent thesis’ (*svatantrā pratijñā*) in II) above indicates the term *svatantra* in the *Pras* functions as an adjective. Accordingly, it follows that Candrākīrti introduces the syntagma ‘independent inference’ (*svatantram anumānam*) in contradistinction to ‘our inference’ (*asmadanumāna*) cited in I-2) above. Notably, ‘independent inference’ and ‘our inference’ are synonymous with ‘proof’ (sādhana) and ‘disproof’ (dūṣaṇa), respectively, for Dignāga. Concerning a definition of the term ‘inference’ (*anumāna*), therefore, it could be concluded that Candrākīrti does not follow Bhāviveka but Dignāga and rejects ‘independent inference’ which is synonymous with ‘proof.’

3.2. The Usages of *svatantra-* in Compound

In the occurrences III) and IV) above, the term *svatantra* appears in compound form always consisting of three members. If taking into consideration the adverbial usage in the PP, it can be construed that the term *svatantra* modifies not the second member of the compound, namely, *anumāna* or *prayogavākhyā*, but the third member, namely, *anabhidhāyitva* or *abhidhāna*. In this case, it is unnecessary to elicit the compound *svatantrānumāna* consisting of two members.

If the term *svatantra* functions as an adverb in the occurrences of I) cited above, it modi-
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fies the predicatives kartum, bruvatām, or prayuñjmahe.

4. Conclusion

From the usages in the PP, we can reconstruct neither a compound svaṭantrānumāna nor a syntagma svaṭantram anumānam, for rang dbang, the term equivalent to svaṭantra, is used adverbially. It seems that the term ‘inference’ (anumāna) for Bhāviveka is synonymous with ‘proof’ (sādhana) for Dignāga.

It is indeed true that Candrakīrti uses the term svaṭantra as an adjective in his Pras. However, if Candrakīrti introduced a syntagma svaṭantram anumānam in the Pras, it would follow that Candrakīrti postulated the inference (anumāna) as consisting of proof (sādhana) and disproof (dūṣana) based not on Bhāviveka but on Dignāga and rejected the former mode of argumentation. On the other hand, if Candrakīrti followed Bhāviveka’s adverbial usage of svaṭantra even in its occurrences together with anumāna in the Pras, it would be unnecessary to formulate a syntagma svaṭantram anumānam.

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Notes

1) Yotsuya (1999: 48): “the term svaṭantra- (rang dbang) appears four times (exactly speaking, it appears in five contexts, but since two of them have almost the same content, I count them as one).”

2) Matsumoto 1997: 400, note 83. However, Matsumoto 2011 does not refer to this opinion, although the adverbial usage is retained in the English translation.

3) Matsumoto 2011: 283. Cf. D tsha 178b2; P tsha 222a2–3 (Matsumoto 1997: 377, 2011: 284–285) and D tsha 226a1; P tsha 283b3–4 (Matsumoto 1997: 378, 2011: 284–285).

4) NM (T 1628_1a7): त्रेंअष्टात्रधिर्योऽधिकारिन्यासंगस्त त्रेंथक्ष्यभाबहीनकारते (*sādhanadūṣaṇārtham idam ārabhyate). See Katsura 1977: 109–110.

5) Katsura ibid. NM 1 (T 1628_1a8–9): न्यासमुद्धिर्मित्य इति वर्णालम्बरस्य तत्रात् तत्रात् sādhaṇaṁ tatra tu svayam | sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthanirākṛtaḥ ||

6) Katsura ibid. NM 19a (T 1628_3c18): दुष्कर्यविचित्र होति दुष्कर्यविचित्र होति (dūṣaṇaṁ nyūnatādyuktiḥ). See also Katsura 1982: 97.

7) See also Yonezawa 2004b: (59).

8) Cf. Yonezawa (2004a: 131): Bhāvivekaḥ kila svaṭantrasādhanavādī.

Abbreviations

LVP  de la Vallée Poussin, Louis.
MABh  Madhyamakāvatāra-Bhāṣya. See de La Vallée Poussin 1907–1912.

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NM  Nyāyamukha T 1629. See Katsura 1977 and 1982.
Pp  dbu ma’i rtsa ba’i ’grel pa shes ral sgron ma (Prajñāpradīpa) D 3853; P 5253.
Pras  Prasannapadā. See MacDonald 2015a and de La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913.

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