Соперничество России и США в Арктике: 
новый этап

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Аннотация: Статья посвящена геополитическому соперничеству в Арктике, которое развернулось в последние годы между США и Россией. Обе страны претендуют на лидирующие позиции в регионе. Арктика рассматривается в качестве региона, в котором в перспективе возможна промышленная добыча углеводородных ресурсов. Изменение климата открывает новые горизонты для развития судоходства в Арктике. Неслучайно, Россия и США усилили внимание к проблеме развития арктического торгового флота и наращивают ввод в строй военных судов. В этих вопросах Россия и США добились значительных успехов. Однако изменения в мировой политике, нарастание противоречий в мировой экономике привели к активизации политики России и США в Арктике. Для отстаивания своих интересов Россия и США приняли ряд документов, в которых определены направления арктической политики. В статье исследуются подходы России и США к реализации политики в Арктике, а также трудности, с которыми страны будут сталкиваться. Выводы, к которым приходит автор заключаются в том, что геополитическое соперничество в Арктике между ведущими арктическими государствами будет продолжаться. Россия и США, не имея возможности наладить промышленную добычу в Арктике, будут уделять повышенное внимание военной сфере. Создание необходимой военной инфраструктуры, строительство новых судов станет одной из ключевых задач каждого из государств. Помимо этого, Россия и США расширят поддержку арктического судостроения, которое рассматривается в качестве основного инструмента отстаивания экономических интересов.

Ключевые слова: Россия, США, Арктика, энергетика, судостроение

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Russia and USA in their Rivalry for Arctic: New Stage

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Abstract: The article relates to the geopolitical rivalry in the Arctic unwound in the recent years between the United States and Russia. Both countries claim leading positions here considering the Arctic as a region where the commercial production of hydrocarbon resources is eventually possible. Climate change breaks new ground for the shipping development in the Arctic. It stands to reason that Russia and the United States have redoubled their attention to the Arctic merchant shipping development and are enhancing naval vessels commissioning. Russia and the United States have made significant progress in this regard. However, changes in world politics, growth of contradictions in the world economy have led to stepping up policy of Russia and the United States in the Arctic. To defend their interests, Russia and the United States adopted a series of documents indicating the Arctic policy avenues. The article examines both Russia and the United States approaches to the policy implementation in the Arctic, as well as the future challenges facing the countries. The author finds that the geopolitical rivalry between the leading Arctic states for the Arctic will continue. Being unable to establish commercial production in the Arctic, Russia and the United States will implement the increased focus on the military sphere. The creation of the necessary military infrastructure, the construction of new vessels will become a key objective for both states. In addition, Russia and the United States will expand support for Arctic shipbuilding, which is seen as the main instrument for promoting their economic interests.

Keywords: Russia, USA, Arctic, energy, shipbuilding

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INTRODUCTION
Since early 21st century, the rivalry between Russia and the United States for the Arctic has exacerbated. The impetus for this was the discovery of large hydrocarbon deposits on the shelf of the Arctic seas and global warming [1]. New oil and gas fields, discovered in the Arctic, engrossed researchers and policymakers’ attention in many countries towards hydrocarbon resources exploiting. Assessment reports, provided by various research centers, contributed to that. Only later did the Arctic and non-Arctic states begin to place their attention on other Arctic problems [2].

Russia and the United States consistently took steps aimed at strengthening their positions. Russian interest in the Arctic was reflected in a series of key documents. Among these are “The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Fed-
eration for the Period up to 2020” (approved by the President of the Russian Federation in July 2001) [3]; “Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond” (approved in 2009) [4]; “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020” (approved in 2009) [5], which are worth highlighting. In July 2015, a new edition of the Maritime Doctrine was approved [6]. The document reflected issues related not only to the development of military capability in the region but to the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources as well. Thus, the Maritime Doctrine stated that the prospect for depletion of hydrocarbon reserves and other mineral resources on the land predisposed to the search for exploration and production of them on the continental shelf of Russia, and in the future on the sea slopes and the World ocean floor [6].

In November 2016 Russia approved the Foreign Policy Concept which said that Russia was pursuing a line aimed at maintaining peace and stability and constructive international cooperation in the Arctic [7].

The United States adopted a number of fundamental documents. One of the first documents to reflect Arctic issues was the Presidential Directive NSC-26, adopted in 1994 by the Bill Clinton administration. It focused on the Arctic and set out to shape the policy in the region [8]. Then, on January 9, 2009, a strategic planning document was promulgated — Directive NSPD-66 / HSPD-25. US President George Bush Jr. devoted it to the Arctic and politics in the region [9]. After Barack Obama came to power in 2013, a new document was prepared - “The US National Strategy in the Arctic Region” [10]. Thus, Russia and the United States consistently and incrementally fixed their Arctic interests in strategic documents.

In recent years, both Arctic states have increased their interest in the Arctic region, due to its growing geopolitical significance. The Arctic has been identified as one of the core concerns by the Russian foreign policy. Moreover, the region was viewed as a bridge to further economic development and security. Last decades were noteworthy for the implemented projects on construction of new nuclear-powered vessels, which should replace the vessels, introduced during the USSR period. New military infrastructure facilities, sea and river ports were restored and built on the Arctic direction. The main priority of Russia in the Arctic was natural resources development, which needed enormous investments (including foreign ones), the generally recognized extension of the continental shelf, the Russian status confirmation on the Northern Sea Route and its infrastructure development [11].

**ARCTIC AWAKENING**

Russia and the United States entered competition for the transport routes control. Climate change was considered as new opportunities for the hydrocarbons extraction and navigation. The United States advocates the internationalization of the Northeast Passage (Northern Sea Route (NSR)) and the Northwest Passage (NWP), which runs through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago along the coast of Canada. The United States raises sea routes potential that may arise from the melting of Arctic perennial ice. At the same time, the United States is very concerned about Russia’s plans to intensify traffic volume on the NSR. Russia sets out to increase supplies along the NSR. This volume grows up annually. According to the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation estimates, the traffic volume reached 33 million tons of cargo in 2020 [12]. “Cargo transportation along the NSR should increase to 80 million tons by 2025, and the NSR should become a global competitive transit artery,” — said the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin in March 2018 [13].

Fighting for cargo transportation is considered to become an important factor to specify
the positions of individual states in the Arctic. However, Russia and other countries are still not ready to lade the NSR. The navigation requires necessary coastal infrastructure. Much has already been done in this area over the past decade, but not enough yet to raise additional freight traffic.

RUSSIA AND THE USA: STAKE ON SHIPBUILDING

Russia pays much attention to shipbuilding development. The implementation of projects on the construction of new vessels, that could cross the Arctic ice, was considered as a condition for strengthening Russia’s leading position in the development of the Arctic. The State Program of the Russian Federation “Development of shipbuilding for 2013-2030” [14] was adopted in October 2012. The document focused on the construction of ice-class ships. Russia estimated its needs at 26 icebreakers, 230 tankers and 40 gas carriers [14]. In November 2014, cabinet council with the participation of the President of the Russian Federation pursued the matter of building ice-class ships again. More than 150 vessels for navigation in the Arctic were expected to be built in 30 years. Moreover, 10 nuclear-powered icebreakers and 30 platforms for oil and gas production were planned for building in the Arctic [15]. Russia expects to achieve a breakthrough in the Arctic by implementing two new projects. This refers to the construction of nuclear-powered icebreakers under the Project 10510 “Leader” (LK-110Ya, LK-120Ya) and multifunctional offshore nuclear-powered vessels under the project 10570. The vessels should be commissioned from 2027 and operate until 2066. In June 2020, construction of an icebreaker from the “Leader” series began at the Russian “Zvezda” shipyard. The icebreaker with its super nuclear propulsion system (110-120 MW) will be capable of breaking up Arctic ice up to 4 meters thick. Moreover, the increased width of the hull (47.5 m) will allow piloting for heavy-tonnage vessels in the Arctic [16].

Russia began upgrading its warships alongside building a new generation of icebreakers. The task was to build warships that could work in the Arctic independently, without any support of escort vessels. Military icebreakers should satisfy high-level requirements, particularly, to navigate in ice, reaching up to 2 m thickness. Russia drew up a long-term programme for the construction of diesel-electric icebreakers (project 21180). Its firstborn was the “Ilya Muromets” icebreaker, built in 2017. The icebreaker became the first ship, built specifically for the Navy in 45 years.

Then the Navy commissioned the construction of the combat icebreaker “Ivan Papanin” (project 23550). It was an Arc7 ice-class patrol ship, functioning both as an icebreaker and a tug, and having guided missile systems. The icebreaker could break ice up to 1.7 m thick. It was officially laid in April 2017 [17], launched in October 2019 and should be commissioned in 2023. Furthermore, the icebreaker can assist in rescue operations and for security and patrol. At the same time, the ship is the first of its kind, equipped with heavy weapons.

Unlike Russia, the United States emphasised political aspects over practical steps to strengthen its position in the Arctic, including shipbuilding. The US top-priority task was unhindered access to the Arctic spaces. For this reason, the American side showed heightened interest in the sea arteries, advocating their internationalization. At the same time the US Administration warned the world community of possible conflict over natural resources and the “lands” of the Arctic [18]. One can agree with Finnish journalists Juha Käpylä and Harri Mikkola, who believed that the United States of America was traditionally a “lazy Arctic power” that limited out its political attention to the region, and even then, mainly own
The Arctic was always on the margins of American politics [19]. In 2014, the United States approved the Navy’s second naval Arctic roadmap for 2014-2030 [20]. The document specified the functions and tasks of the US Navy for the coming decades, among which was ensuring freedom of navigation in the Arctic Ocean and the movement of trade flows in global common spaces [20]. Furthermore, the United States heightened interest in the Arctic and the problems of the region, which required to coordinate the efforts. Eventually, on July 16, 2014, former Coast Guard Admiral Robert J. Papp was named the first US Special Representative for the Arctic and entrusted with the task of revitalizing American policy in the Arctic.

In mid-2019, the US Department of Defense presented a new version of Arctic Strategy [21]. The document said that “the Arctic is directly related to the security of the United States, and the central focus of American policy is the deployment of a flexible combat group, which could provide a competitive advantage in this key region” [21]. It also emphasised that “The Arctic is also a shared region and a potential corridor for strategic competition” [21]. The document reflected the US Department of Defense approach to protect national interests in the Arctic, noting the need for strengthening the military presence in the region of the Arctic and non-Arctic states. Russia and China were accused of “militarizing the Arctic.” Thus, the document was aimed at reducing the possibilities of the Russian Northern Sea Route.

The United States launched efforts to build new heavy and middle class icebreakers to protect US sovereignty, drawing up The Coast Guard’s Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program, which accounted for near $ 2.6 billion [22]. The first icebreaker is expected to operate by 2024 [22], and the others — by November 2027 [23]. The PSC’s mission will be to provide ongoing access to both polar regions and to support the country’s economic, commercial, maritime and national security needs [24]. Construction of the icebreakers started after the US Coast Guard published a new strategy for the Arctic [25]. One of the theses in the document emphasized that the United States should confront Russia and China in the Arctic, which, in turn, also declared the region a zone of their interests [26].

In June 2020, US President Donald Trump issued a Memorandum on “Protecting US National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic” [27]. The document called for the administration to develop a plan within 60 days, which should include the construction of minimum three heavy icebreakers by 2029, as well as recommendations for locations of two support bases in the United States and two more bases outside the country. Another main focus was “the new ice fleet should satisfy the full range of tasks for national and economic security, including the promotion of exploration and exploitation of resources, laying and maintaining submarine cables” [27]. The memo was sent to the Pentagon, State Department, Department of Commerce and Homeland Security. The document was to expand and give additional relevance to the long-standing US Coast Guard plan on building three heavy and three medium icebreakers. D. Trump’s memorandum on expanding the US Arctic capabilities showed that the US administration was increasingly concerned about the actions of Russia and China in the Arctic.

**RIVALRY CUTTING-EDGE: RECENT DOCUMENTS**

In recent years, the United States and Russia, calling for extending Arctic cooperation within the framework of multilateral mechanisms, have simultaneously strengthened their naval potential and stepped up military activity. Additional measures intended to expand the naval forces capabilities, provide military works,
and continue to form military units, prepared for operations in Arctic conditions. All these plans were reflected in the documents, developed in the countries during the 2020–2021 timeframe.

Thus, in March 2020, the President of Russia signed a decree “On the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period up to 2035” [28]. The document outlined the fundamental objectives of Russia’s policy in the Arctic, emphasising the need to ensure the protection of the country’s national interests [28]. Then, in October 2020, the document, provided for an increase in the state’s defense capability and the solution of long-term tasks in the Arctic, “On the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period until 2035” was adopted [29].

In December 2020 V.V. Putin signed a decree, under which the Northern Fleet was equated with an interspecific strategic territorial integration of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, performing the tasks of a military district [30]. Thus, for the first time in the history of Russia, a separate navy status was equated to a military district. The decree entered into force on January 1, 2021. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation noted that this would allow, among other things, to improve cooperation in solving defense problems in the Arctic strategic direction [31].

Finally, late March 2021, the Northern Fleet of the Russian Federation conducted the “Umka-2021” exercise. That was the first time three Russian strategic nuclear submarines immediately surfaced in the area of the Franz Josef Land archipelago, Alexandra Land Island [32]. They broke one-and-a-half-meter ice and surfaced in the Arctic according to a single plan and idea at the prearranged time within the 300 meters area [33]. The submarines surfaced in the Arctic showed Russia’s ability to secret preparation for a massive nuclear strike. The US and UK submarines performed similar maneuvers in the past.

Activity in the Arctic between the United States and Russia was a close run. On July 29, 2020, the Trump administration announced that career diplomat James (Jim) DeHart would be the U.S. coordinator for the Arctic region [34]. His mission included strengthening coordination between US government bodies in defending national interests and countering Russian Arctic policy matters.

Under the new US President Joe Biden, who took office in early 2021, Arctic policy gained new impetus. Its key challenge was to counteract the build-up of Russian power in the Arctic. Its presence has grown dramatically in recent years with the establishment of new Arctic Commands, new Arctic brigades, revamped airfields and other infrastructure, deep-water ports, new military bases along the Arctic coast, efforts to build air defense and coastal missile systems, early warning radars, and a variety of other things along the Arctic coastline [35]. This justified the assumption, made by former US national security adviser John Bolton in December 2020, who believed that the Biden administration would likely follow in the footsteps of the Trump administration and continue to obstruct the Russian militarization of the Arctic [36].

In early 2021, the United States published a new strategy for the Navy, “Blue Arctic” [37]. The document followed the instructions of former President Donald Trump, given in mid-2020, whereby the American president demanded to strengthen the American presence in the Arctic to counter Russia and China challenges there [38]. As a result, the developed Navy strategy stipulated that the United States would pursue a policy aimed at countering Russian policy in the Arctic. However, the American side set out to dominate as a Navy in the north polar region [38]. To achieve
its goals, the United States brings pressure on NATO allies to ensure unhindered access to the Arctic region and has strong defense relationships with six out of eight members of the Arctic Council. Four of them are NATO allies: Canada, Denmark (including Greenland), Iceland and Norway. The United States maintains relations with Finland and Sweden under the enhanced capabilities program.

In March 2021, the United States published the “Regaining Arctic Dominance” document [35], noted that the Arctic had the potential to become a contested space where United States’ great power rivals, Russia and China, sought to use military and economic power to gain and maintain access to the region at the expense of US interests [35].

CONCLUSION

In the coming decades, the Arctic states will rival for expanding their military potential and transport capabilities in the Arctic. Only later can such rivalry fade to the chase for the exploitation of hydrocarbons on an industrial scale. At the turn of 2050-2060, when new technologies for deep-water drilling may appear, commercial production of hydrocarbons on the shelf of the Arctic seas will become possible.

Until this period, the United States and Russia will wage a geopolitical struggle to expand their influence in the Arctic. Moreover, great-power competition in the Arctic is too narrow and too confrontational to be the overarching US approach to the region [39].

Thus, the Arctic hydrocarbons will not play a significant role in meeting a need for energy resources and impact the world market. However, the countries have already begun to prepare for such a struggle.

The geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the United States comes at a time of cardinal changes in world politics, when new alliances arise and political and economic alliances are formed. The Arctic can become the region where the “Arctic Game” will unfold in the coming decades, similar to the one that took place between Russia and Great Britain in Central Asia in the 19th century.

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