How should one write a history of psychotherapy? At the outset, several choices present themselves. One could attempt a chronological study, commencing, say, with the definition of a new science of “psycho-therapeutics”, the term proposed in 1872 by Hack Tuke, and then proceeding through its main propagator and popularizer, Hyppolite Bernheim, tracing the fates of hypnosis, suggestion and psychogenic disorders through fin-de-siècle Europe and America. Or, one might note that Tuke’s definition is retrospectively proposed in relation to the debates concerning animal magnetism, and consequently follow the line of works of the “Mesmer to Freud” ilk (and Mary Baker Eddy, in Stefan Zweig’s version), tracing teleologies, unknowing precursors and unwitting heirs. Alternatively, one might adopt the perspective that something like psychotherapy, broadly considered, has always featured in the Western medico-therapeutic traditions, and perhaps non-Western traditions as well, depending upon the scale of one’s aspirations to universality. The manner in which one proceeds has critical consequences not only for the historiography of psychotherapy, but for the definition of what constitutes psychotherapy and its ongoing identity. For one significant trait of the institutions of psychotherapy is the utilization of some version of history to form, authorize and legitimate its identity, be it through stressing supposed novelty or supposed continuity. Thus a critical task for the history of psychotherapy is that of disentangling its subject from such histories.

In this work, the late Stanley Jackson adopted the long-term approach. Given the recent vintage of the term “psychotherapy”, the question of using a more general term arises, to avoid overt anachronism. Thus Jackson proposed that the subject of his history would be “psychological healing”, which he used to refer to “the variety of efforts taken to minister to a person’s ailments by psychological means or psychological interventions—whether or not

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Stanley W Jackson, Care of the psyche: a history of psychological healing, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1999, pp. xiii, 504, £30.00 (hardback 0-300-07671-1).
they have been accompanied by medicinal or psychological interventions” (p. 4). Thus, whilst Jackson did not define what he meant by “psychological”, the contexts make clear that it could be taken as “non-material”. (He refers to the use of the term as the title for the English translation of Pierre Janet’s own historical work, Les médications psychologiques (Paris, Alcan, 1919), a diachronically organized history of psychotherapy that culminates with Janet himself.) Jackson maintained that there exists a small number of basic elements which make up all forms of psychological healing, and that these endlessly recur under various guises. He identified these, and then arranged his study through charting how these have been utilized through Western history from the Greeks to the present. These elements are: catharsis and abreaction, confession and confiding, consolation and comfort, the use of the passions, the use of imagination, suggestion, persuasion, conditioning and reward or punishment, explanation and interpretation, self-understanding and insight, and self-observation and introspection. This list has echoes of the keywords of present-day schools of psychotherapy—hypnotherapy, psychoanalysis, cognitive therapy and behaviour therapy. Jackson collated a vast array of views on these subjects by different authors through the epochs, drawing his sources mainly from philosophy, theology, medicine, psychiatry and psychoanalysis.

Any such history has to be attentive both to continuities and disjunctions. The critical question is how these are viewed. The endless repackaging of practices and conceptions in the history of psychological healing to give a patina of novelty certainly lends some plausibility to Jackson’s thesis, and enables his arrangement to be a useful and interesting way of organizing it. Whilst one might question a number of the inclusions and exclusions, together with some of Jackson’s readings, the assembled materials nevertheless form a vast and invaluable compendium. More critically, Jackson’s book does not highlight the history of the competing disciplines utilizing such practices, the role of their institutions and the intersections with wider societal issues. His strong thesis is that whilst cultural influences have shaped practices in different times and places, there nevertheless exist some elements which “transcend space and time” and that these are fundamental to psychological healing, and he speculated “whether human nature might have some limiting influence on the number and nature of such elements” (pp. 383–4). Thus his thesis of the basic continuity underlying the history of psychological healing is necessarily linked to a thesis concerning the basic continuity of human nature. An issue not raised here is the extent to which these practices have actually played a critical role in giving rise to particular conceptions of human nature, through rendering it amenable to specific therapeutic regimes, and have led to these conceptions subsequently being adopted by patients and social groupings. A further question arises as to whether the strong form of the continuity thesis embodied here is simply an effect of the historiographical organization of the work. When different practices in disparate times and cultures are categorized under the same rubrics, it is but a short step to assert an essential identity. To take one example, the chapter on “confession and confiding” begins by presenting definitions of these terms and then proceeding to consider the Judeo-Christian tradition. However, a reading of the definitions indicates that they make little sense outside the very tradition which frames them. Even when the same term is used in different historical arenas, such as the “imagination”, the range of conceptions associated with this term indicates that it would be misleading even to assert a family resemblance between the varying usages. Yet it is hard to see how one could combine an account attentive to the semantic shifts of such terms within and between languages and cultures on the one hand, and between
therapeutic idiolects on the other, and still maintain Jackson’s continuity thesis. If such an endeavour requires different historiographical perspectives, Jackson’s work nevertheless forms an essential and formidable resource.

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Jonathan Andrews and Andrew Scull, Undertaker of the mind: John Monro and mad-doctoring in eighteenth-century England, Medicine and Society Series, No. 11, Berkeley and London, University of California Press, 2001, pp. xxi, 364, illus., £24.95, US$35.00 (hardback 0-520-23151-1).

Jonathan Andrews and Andrew Scull come at the social history of medicine from very different angles. Scull is a long-established figure known for his sweeping and controversial sociological theories based on historical material. Andrews is more junior, but has already made a distinguished contribution to the study of British madness between c. 1600 and 1900. His is closely archival work backed up by careful use of theories from various disciplines. At first sight, the pair might seem to be mismatched, but the collaboration that resulted in this book has proved highly successful. There is a tension between the approaches, but for most purposes that has proved productive. Indeed, the most stimulating sections are those where the authors disagree most, for, in contrast with most “textbook” expositions, both sides of a debate are expounded with equal vigour. The conclusions reached about prominent and emotive issues like alleged wrongful incarceration are balanced. One reason for the success of the collaboration is that both Andrews and Scull write extremely well and the style of this book is unusually lucid, readable and entertaining by the standard of most academic works. Fifty engaging and informative text illustrations add to the appeal.

John Monro’s career is already well researched. He was a visiting physician to Bethlem Hospital (Bedlam) in London, a successful private madhouse keeper, and a “society” physician. This book builds on existing scholarship by using evidence about some of the prominent cases in which Monro was involved to explore the wider context of mad-doctoring. The six substantial chapters deal with Monro and Bethlem; debates about lunacy in the eighteenth century, including Monro’s public spats with William Battie; religion and madness, including Methodism and the case of Alexander Cruden (an excellent chapter); a short chapter on the madness of the Earl of Orford; one on the image and reality of keeping private madhouses; and a long concluding chapter on criminal insanity. Rather than relying on purely “medical” sources, the authors examine a wide range of materials, including visual images, diaries and family papers, to get closer to the experience of patients, their families and the wider community, as well as doctors. A rich and detailed analysis of the life and work of Monro is used as a way of exploring how people dealt with the mentally troubled in the eighteenth century. Monro is the focus, but the aim is to write about the mad business, professionalization of identification and treatment, attitudes towards the mad, madhouses and mad-doctors, the experience of madness among sufferers and observers, and medical understandings of the abnormal mind. Andrews and Scull capture very well the ambiguous definitions of mental disability, its Protean nature, and the deeply ambivalent attitudes among medical men and lay people alike towards mad-doctoring as a trade and profession.

There are small points that one might criticize. Some of the material has been recycled from other books by these two prolific authors. Other sections are familiar