A Byzantine Logician’s “Image” within the Second Iconoclastic Controversy. Nikephoros of Constantinople

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Abstract

The article is devoted to the study of the single example of logical education in Byzantium – the famous two pages from the hagiography of Patriarch Nikephoros (†829) containing the list of chapter headings copied by Ignatios the Diacon from an elementary textbook of logic. It is argued that, during the disputes of the second iconoclastic controversy, Patriarch Nikephoros implemented almost all the elements of logical knowledge listed by Ignatios. The article represents a short overview connecting the standard logical topics from the 8th- and 9th-century education program with the variety of arguments and techniques used by Nikephoros in the Major Apology and the Antirrhetics. The authors try to reconstruct the “image” of Patriarch Nikephoros as a logician and to describe the logical educational standard of his epoch.

Keywords

Byzantine theology – history of logic – Nikephoros 1 of Constantinople

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1 Introduction

The history of logical education in Byzantium is a field that requires scholarly investigation for several reasons: the lack of published Byzantine texts and textbooks on logic, the lack of scientific investigations on the history of education in logic in Byzantium, and the lack of scholars able to combine logical and Byzantine studies as applied to the history of education. First of all, it should be stated that the majority of historical surveys on education in Byzantium\(^1\) contain almost no information on the history of the teaching of logic. Studies on the history of education in the Middle Ages\(^2\) usually ignore the Byzantine educational tradition, and works on the history of philosophy and logic in

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1. P. Lemerle, *Le Premier Humanisme Byzantin: Notes et remarques sur enseignement et culture à Byzance des origines au x siècle*, Paris, 1971, p. 326; A. Markopoulos, “Education”, in: *The Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies*, Oxford Handbooks in Classics and Ancient History, eds. E. Jeffreys, J.F. Haldon, R. Cormack, Oxford, 2008, pp. 785-795; A. Markopoulos, “In Search For ‘Higher Education’ In Byzantium,” *Zbornik radova Vizantoloskog instituta*, Vizantološki institut SANU, 50/1 (2013), pp. 28-44; R. Browning, “The Patriarchal School at Constantinople in the Twelfth Century,” *Byzantion*, 32 (1962), pp. 167-202, 33 (1962), pp. 11-40; C.N. Constantinides, *Higher Education in Byzantium in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries (1204-ca. 1310)*, Nicosia, 1982, p. 222; R. Browning, “Enlightenment and Repression in Byzantium in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,” *Past and Present*, 69 (1975), pp. 3-23; R. Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind. Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, Princeton and Oxford, 2005; N. Kalogeras, “Education envisioned or The Miracle of Learning in Byzantium,” *Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum*, 13 (2009), pp. 513-525; N. Kalogeras, *Byzantine childhood education and its social role from the sixth century until the end of Iconoclasm*, Chicago, 2000, p. 297; X.Π. Σχοινάς, *Η Παιδεία στην Αυτοκρατορία της Νικαιας (1204-1261)*, Θεσσαλονίκη, 2006, σ. 127; P. Speck, *Die kaiserliche Universitaet von Konstantinopel*, München, 1974, s. 120; Ф. И. Успенский, *Очерки по истории византийской образованности [F.I. Uspensky, Essays on the History of Byzantine Education]*, Санкт-Петербург, 1891; R. Cholij, *Theodore the Stoudite: The Ordering of Holiness*, Oxford, 2002, p. 275.

2. H. Ridder-Symoens (ed.), *A History of the University in Europe. Vol. 1: Universities in the Middle Ages*, Cambridge, 1992; Rashdall Hastings, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, 3 vols., Oxford, 1987; P. Riché, *Education and Culture in the Barbarian West: From the Sixth through the Eighth Century*, Columbia, 1978, pp. 126-127, 282-298; R. B. Begley, J. W. Koterski, *Medieval Education*, Fordham, 2005, p. 83; F. Cordasco, *A Brief History of Education: A Handbook of Information on Greek, Roman, Medieval, Renaissance, and Modern Educational Practice*, 1976; M. Chiappetta, “Historiography and Roman Education,” *History of Education Journal*, 4 (1953), pp. 149-156; Yun Lee Too, *Education in Greek and Roman antiquity*, Boston, 2001; T. Hoyer, *Sozialgeschichte der Erziehung. Von der Antike bis in die Moderne*, Darmstadt, 2015; И. Б. Романенко, *Образовательные парадигмы в истории античной и средневековой философии [I. B. Romanenko, Educational Paradigms in the History of the Ancient and Medieval Philosophy]*, St. Petersburg, 2002; Ch. H. Haskins, *The Rise of Universities*, Ithaca (NY),
Byzantium do not usually deal with educational questions. Nevertheless, such prominent Byzantine scholars and theologians as John of Damascus, Theodore the Studite, Theodore Prodromos, John Tzetzes, and Theodore Metochites (the list is not exhaustive) represent some good examples of the high standard of logical education in Byzantium throughout its history. In the present work, the case of Patriarch Nikephoros’ logical education is considered as the most widely known example from the history of logical education in Byzantium demonstrating both the logical techniques used by him in his pro-image writings as well as comprehensive data relating to his logical education.

2 On the Logical Education of Patriarch Nikephoros

P. Lemerle listed a number of hagiographies in which information about education, including the topic of logic, is given with some degree of detail: those of John of Damascus, Theodore the Studite, Cyril the Philosopher, Patriarch Nikephoros, etc. However, the Life of the Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople is uncommon and peculiar in this respect. It contains almost two pages concerning the logical education of Patriarch Nikephoros. This strange hagiographic passage, which includes the list of chapter headings (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις) of an elementary handbook on logic, was discussed by P.J. Alexander, O. Neugebauer, P. Lemerle, P.M. Schuhl, B. Lagard, E.A. Fisher, and J. Duffy. The results of these discussions are as follows: the passage appears to be a quotation pasted...
by Ignatios the Diacon into the text of the *Life* from an unknown handbook; research into various Byzantine logical handbooks is still needed; and the era of the modern reconstructions of Patriarch Nikephoros’ thought is still to come. The present article aims at answering this last issue and represents an attempt to estimate the level of Patriarch Nikephoros’ education in logic as represented in the *Life* by analyzing the arguments and techniques used by Nikephoros in his most famous pro-image writings, the *Major Apology* on behalf of the holy images and the three *Antirrhetics* against Mamonas-Constantine Kopronymos.

We begin by considering the logical education of Nikephoros as presented in the *Life*. Ignatios listed the following headings:

1. On logical relations between concepts as proposition terms: “<he investigated> what sort <of things> serves as a logical subject and what the <logical> predicate is, and whether it is predicated of everything or of nothing, or in general, and <other> similar <questions>”

2. On the proposition elements: “what the elements <of proposition> are discovered according to <philosophers>, and whether <the elements>
are only homonymous of that of physics and geometry"\textsuperscript{13} (τί ποτε δὲ τὰ στοιχεία θέλει δηλοῦν παρ’ αὐτοῖς, καὶ εἰ τῶν φυσικῶν ἢ γεωμετρικῶν ταύτα μόνον ὑμώνυμα).

3. On propositions: “how many <kinds of> propositions\textsuperscript{14} there are, and in what way they are convertible” (προτάσεις δὲ πόσαι, καὶ πῶς ἀντιστρέφουσι); “what is the meaning\textsuperscript{15} of the contradiction?” (τίς ἀντιφάσεως δύναμις); “<he studied> what kinds <of terms> are attached in predication, what further specifications <there are>, what is analogous to the limitless as defined by <philosophers>” (τὰ προσκατηγορούμενα δὲ ποία, προσδιορισμοὶ δὲ τίνες, καὶ τίσιν ἀναλογεῖ τὸ κατ’ ἐκείνους ἀόριστον).

4. On syllogistics: “and how many modes of syllogisms <there are>; <he studied> the kind and number of figures <of a syllogism>” (τρόποι δὲ πόσοι τῶν συλλογισμῶν ὁποία καὶ πόσα τὰ σχήματα); “what sort is hypothetical, what sort is categorical, and in what way they differ” (ποῖος ὑποθετικὸς, ποῖος δὲ κατηγορικὸς, καὶ τί διαφέρουσι).

5. On argumentation: “<he investigated > whether the <argument> reductio ad impossibilem acts as proof in every <case>” (καὶ εἰ πάντας ἡ εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγὴ βεβαιοῖ); “how and in how many ways <the figures of a syllogism> can be reduced; how one can come to a <syllogistic>

\textsuperscript{13} E. Fisher and J. Duffy suggested the following translation: “<He studied> what the elements <of proof> purport to clarify according to <philosophers>, and whether <elements> is a homonym [denoting things having the same name but different natures and definitions in the case] of physics and geometry alone, <or in other disciplines as well>. We argue that this sentence is devoted to the elements of proposition rather than the elements of proof, according to the common order presented in medieval logical handbooks in which themes are listed from the elementary to the complex: terms, propositions (premises), syllogisms (proof). We maintain that the first five topics listed by Ignatios are dedicated rather to issues of proposition rather than to issues of syllogism. The discussion on syllogisms begins a little bit later, with the words τρόποι δὲ πόσοι τῶν συλλογισμῶν. It seems to us that the "chapter headings" related to the proof theory begin even later, with the words ποίαν ἀνάγκην ἔσχεν ὁ ἀποδεικτικός.

\textsuperscript{14} E. Fisher and J. Duffy suggested here the "premises <of a syllogism>" instead of our "propositions." Formally, it is possible to translate προτάσεις as premises, but we argue that the discussion on syllogism and its elements is initiated later.

\textsuperscript{15} E. Fisher and J. Duffy suggested "<and> what the power of the contradiction <of a proposition is>" substituting "the power of" for δύναμις instead of "the force of a word", i.e., "the meaning."
conclusion and how many kinds of syllogisms there are" (ὅπως δὲ καὶ ποσάκις ταῦτα κεράννυται, πῶς συμπεραίνεται καὶ ἀναλύεται).

6. On paralogisms: "<and> how a fallacious argument is formulated – what kind is sophistical and how it can be at once false and plausible" (τίς παραλογισμοῦ σύνθεσις, τίς σοφιστικὸς καὶ πῶς ψευδής τε ἢ ἀμα καὶ πιθανός).

7. On enthymeme: "<he inquired into> what sort of syllogism has only one premise" (καὶ οἷς ὁ μονολήμματος).

8. On dialectical argument: "how the dialectical17 syllogism proves in as much as possible things which are <not necessarily but> probably true, and what an argument by induction is in the case of things that are probably true" (ὁ λεκτικὸς δὲ ὡς ἐνδεχόμενον συνάγει τὰ ἕνδοξα, καὶ τίς ἡ τούτων ἐπαγωγή).

9. On proof: "<he considered> the demonstrative syllogism and what sort of force it has to seek after truth from the weaker arguments" (ποίαν ἀνάγκην ἔσχεν ὁ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἐκ τῶν χειρόνων θηρεύειν ἀλληθείαν); "<he examined> which sorts of these premises are problem-atic, which are axiom-atic, and which are so to speak like axioms, <and> what matter, mixtures, and combinations they admit of" (τὰ προβλήματα δὲ τούτων ὁποία, τὰ ἀξιώματα, τὰ ὡς ἐν ἀξιώμασιν ὑλὴν δὲ τίνα λαμβάνουσι, μίξεις τε καὶ συμπλοκάς); "<he studied> what the first principles of physics are and how they are indemonstrable" (τίνες τε πρῶται τῶν φυσικῶν ἄρχαι καὶ πῶς ἀναπόδεικτοι).

10. On categories: "<he learned> what the state of being stationary is, in how many ways identity occurs, and that otherness occurs in the categories of place, relation, manner, and time" (τίς ἡ στάσις, ἡ ταυτότης δὲ ποῦ, καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ πῶς καὶ πότε).

P. Lemerle assessed this passage as artificial and also as being pas à sa place both in terms of logical and chronological perspectives. Lemerle assumed that Ignatios had given only a formal exposition of the educational program as the traditionally necessary section of the hagiographical genre, just copying the list of chapter headings and pasting them into the text of the Life. Nevertheless, it is obvious that they represent the real content of the contemporary logical

16 E. Fisher and J. Duffy suggested the following translation: "<and> in what way and how frequently these methods of argumentation can be combined; <he studied> how one can grow a syllogistic conclusion and accomplish the reduction of a syllogism".

17 Reading with E. Fisher διαλεκτικός for the printed λεκτικός and ἐνδεχομένος for the printed ἐνδεχόμενος.
education received not only by Nikephoros, but also by Theodore the Studite and Tarasios, as well as by Ignatios himself.  

18 P. Alexander confirmed this hypothesis: “What kind of education did Nicephorus receive? His medieval biographer felt that he could not omit this *topos* required by the canons of the hagiographical genre. On the other hand, he seems to have lacked specific information. Consequently, he inserted a brief sketch of the educational curriculum of the day and paid no attention to Nicephorus’ personal experiences. In view of this silence of sources the modern biographer must reconstruct the probable schooling received by Nicephorus from the general knowledge of Byzantine education in the eighth century.”  

19 It is also possible to make a parallel attempt to reconstruct the probable logical education of Nikephoros by analyzing the logical tools and techniques he used in the *Major Apology* and the *Antirrhetics*, because “only in very few cases will it be possible to locate the precise source used by a theologian of the ninth century for a particular argument [...] In most instances it will be necessary to proceed in a more haphazard way. Where the sources cannot be defined, parallels from the Aristotelian commentaries, from the *Dialectica* of John of Damascus, and from Aristotle will be noted to prove the scholastic nature of an argument. In other cases, even this will be impossible and the scholastic character of a passage will be affirmed simply on grounds of terminology, style, and content.”  

20 Alexander gave several examples to show the “scholastic” (i.e., logical) nature of the patriarch’s reasoning with the help of Aristotelian material directly applied to the image question.  

21 L. Lukhovitskiy also interpreted several rhetorical devices used by Nikephoros as logical ones.  

22 He also argued that the second period of the iconoclastic controversy centered around the dispute over terms.  

23 Ch. Erismann outlined the basic feature of Nikephoros’ image theory as combining

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18 P. Lemerle, *Le premier Humanisme Byzantin. Notes et Remarques sur Enseignement et Culture à Byzance des Origines au Xe Siècle*, Paris, 1971, p. 131-132.
19 P. Alexander, *The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople*, Oxford, 1958, p. 57-58.
20 P. Alexander, *The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople*, Oxford, 1958, p. 190.
21 P. Alexander, *The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople*, Oxford, 1958, p. 191-213.
22 Л. В. Луховицкий, “Риторические приемы в антииконоборческом трактате патриарха Никифора Константинопольского Apologeticus atque Antirrhetici,” *Voprosy Filologii*, 27/3 (2007), pp. 85-93.
23 Л. В. Луховицкий, “Византийское иконоборчество – спор о терминах?” *Indo–European Linguistics and Classical Philology*, xiv/2 (2010), pp. 155-163.
Aristotelian terminology of relatives with the Platonic notion of relation.24 B. Lourié traced the way Nikephoros dealt with severe logical difficulties, concluding that Nikephoros was obliged “to admit one or other blatant disruption of the Aristotelian logical laws.”25 We have tried to complete these examples with other occurrences of logical issues in the Major Apology and the Antirrhetics to make evident the usage by Nikephoros of almost all the logical techniques listed in the Life. We carry out this analysis on the basis of the logical terminology and logical structure of the arguments put forth by Nikephoros.

2.1 On the Logical Education of Nikephoros via the Major Apology

Strictly speaking, the works of Nikephoros, which are dedicated to the dogmatics of image veneration, do not contain the purely logical material as do the works of John of Damascus. But being rather thorough and precise, they involve detailed argumentation as well as methodological reflection on the logical status of every step in discussions and arguments, direct and indirect deductions not only of his own statements, but also those of his opponents. It is thus possible to list the most evident examples of the logical machinery used by Nikephoros in the Major Apology to blame opponents for improper reasoning:

1. “The Patriarch Nicephorus was well equipped with all the paraphernalia of scholastic logic. He operated with concepts such as those of essential qualities (οὐσιώδεις ποιότητες)26 and indicative properties (παραστατικὰ ἰδιώματα)27.”28

2. Nikephoros tried to blame the iconoclasts for their self-contradictory and self-conflicting inferences and conclusions.29 Contradicting verity itself, the iconoclasts would be humbled by themselves and “by the verity of facts itself” (ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθείας),30 “having once

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24 Ch. Erismann, “Venerating likeness: Byzantine iconophile thinkers on aristotelian relatives and their simultaneity,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 24/3 (2016), p. 411.
25 B. Lourié, “Theodore the Studite and “Hypostasis” as a Paraconsistent Notion,” in: Theodore the Stoudite: Intellectual Context, Logic, and Theological Significance. Texts and Studies in Eastern Christianity, eds. C. Erismann and B. MacDougal, Brill, forthcoming 2017.
26 PG 100, col. 588D.
27 PG 100, col. 617B.
28 P. Alexander, The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople, Oxford, 1958, p. 198.
29 Л. В. Луховицкий, “Риторические приемы в антииконоборческом трактате патриарха Никифора Константинопольского Апологетик ауте Антииррheticи,” Voprosy Filologii, 27/3 (2007), p. 89.
30 PG 100, col. 661C.
fallen off from the truth, relying unreasonably on their hasty arguments, they make up lies ... being compatible neither with the truth nor with themselves, they re-examine the inquiries that have nothing to do with them” (καθάπαξ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποσφαλέντες, τοῖς εἰκαίοις αὐτῶν λογισμοῖς τηνάλλως ἐπερειδόμενοι [...] τὰ ψευδή συμπλάσσονται [...] τὸ ἀσύμβατον πρὸς τε ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχοντες, ἐξερευνώντες ἐξερευνήσεις οὐδὲν αὐτῶς προσηκούσας).31

3. On sophisms and paralogisms: “they drag most people into their abyss through sophistry and false reasoning” (πολλοὺς σοφιζόμενοι καὶ παραλογίζόμενοι, ἐπὶ τὸ Ἴδιον ἔχουσι βάραθρον).32

4. On equivocation as the four-term fallacy: “being aware that the nature of things cannot be changed, but that things often do not differ by their names, they take the difference of the name and, as true adherents of idols, they had no fear in applying the name of demonic idols to the pure icon of the Savior of our Christ and God, calling it an idol” (ὡς τῶν μὲν πραγμάτων εἰδότες τὸ μεταβάλλειν οὐ πεφυκότων, τῶν ὀνομάτων δὲ ως τὰ πολλὰ τὸ ἀδιαφορέων ἐνδεικνυμένων, ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς προσεγγορίας χωροῦσι διαφοράν, καὶ τὸ τοῖς διαμονικοῖς σεβάσμασιν ἀνακείμενον ὄνομα, τῇ τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἤμων Χριστοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ σεβασμίς εἰκόνι, οἱ τῷ δὲ ντό τῶν εἰδώλων ἐρασται ἀποφρίσαι οὐ καταπεφρίκασι, εἰδωλον ταύτην ἀποκαλέσαντες).33

On the false substitution of the nature of facts by iconoclasts: “[they] restamp the very nature of things” (σούτω γὰρ καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἡ φύσις αὐτῷ παρακεχάρακται).34

5. On semantic unambiguity: “how opponents were not frightened by such clear and unambiguous [consequences]” (τὰ σούτω σαφῆ καὶ ἄναμφιλεκτα).35

6. On the opposite notions as extremes (τὰ ἄκρα) possessing opposite properties (ἀντικείμενα ταῖς ποιότησι).36

7. On improper syllogism: “he, being inexpert and ignorant, would like to draw conclusions” (συλλογίζοιτο ἀμαθῶς καὶ ἀπαιδεύτως).37

31 PG 100, col. 573A.
32 PG 100, col. 568B.
33 PG 100, col. 697A.
34 PG 100, col. 229C. See also Л. Луховицкий, “Риторические приемы в антииконоборческом трактате патриарха Никифора Константинопольского Apologeticus atque Antirrhetici,” Voprosy Filologii, 27/3 (2007), p. 89.
35 PG 100, col. 741A.
36 PG 100, col. 760C.
37 PG 100, col. 760C.
8. On identity and difference: “identifying all that is opposite (immiscible) and incompatible” (εἰ ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν ἄγων τὰ πάντη ἀμίγη καὶ ἀσυνύπαστα).38

9. On the part and the whole: “hence, if one rejects the part, then he must reject the whole, for the whole is made up of [its] parts” (εἰ οἷν τὸ μέρος καθέλοι τις, τὸ ὅλον ἔσται καθηρήκης· ἐκ τῶν μερῶν γὰρ τὸ ὅλον).39

10. On the relationship between contradictory statements and between contrary statements: “they make statements that are opposite and contradictory to the utterances of the Divine Spirit” (ὡς ἀντίπαλα καὶ ἀντίθετα τῶν τοῦ θείου Πνεύματος λογίων φθεγγόμενοι).40 “they attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable and the incompatible” (οὕτω γὰρ συγχέοντες καὶ συμφύροντες καὶ κατὰ ταυτὸν ἄγοντες τὰ πάντη ἀσυνύπαστα καὶ ἀσυνύπαρκτα).41

The most frequent accusation is that of various contradictions made by the iconoclasts: self-contradictions, contradictions to the Gospel and the holy fathers, as well as their use of contradictory sets of axioms.

2.2 On the Logical Education of Nikephoros via the Antirrhetics

Nikephoros worked on the meta-level of discussion, and he even built an argumentation-theoretic refutation of iconoclastic reasoning in the *Antirrhetics*. One can reconstruct and list the notions of argumentation theory and logical tools used to accuse the opponents precisely and decisively:

1. On logically illegal arguments: he branded different logically illegal iconoclastic arguments using such argumentation terms as specification by generalization (καθολικὸς προσδιορισμός).42
2. On distinguishing definitions: “In discussing the difference between painting (γραφή) and circumscription (περιγραφή) Nicephorus was in agreement with the schoolmen in distinguishing definitions proper (ὁροί) from descriptions (ὑπογραφαί).”43
3. On self-contradictions: self-deception as the sign of a fool (τὸ γε ἑαυτοὺς παραλογίζεσθαι, τῶν ἀνόητων πάνυ καὶ σφαλερῶν ὑπάρχει τεκμήριον).44

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38 PG 100, col. 760C.
39 PG 100, col. 748C.
40 PG 100, col. 741D.
41 PG 100, col. 604D.
42 PG 100, col. 225A. See also P. Alexander, *The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople*, Oxford, 1958, p. 198.
43 P. Alexander, *The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople*, Oxford, 1958, p. 199.
44 PG 100, col. 208C.
“They make mistakes fooling themselves” (ἐαυτοὺς πλανώντες παραλογίζοντες), and in doing so, they will be caught in their own networks (τοῖς ἑαυτῶν δικτύοις). Nikephoros built the refutation of iconoclastic arguments not by analyzing their sense and meaning or their contradictions to traditions of faith, but by demonstrating their self-contradiction, which is sufficient to refute them.

4. On equivocation as the four-term fallacy: “they mix [the meanings of] the words” (παρασυγχέουσι τὰς φωνὰς).

5. On the logical status of demonstrations and the absurdity of the iconoclasts’ constructions: “here [Constantine] abandons the interrogative form [...] he does not pay any attention to [his] previous inventions, and reveals his views by using a non-logical method, speaking not on the basis of evidence from the Scripture or holy fathers, but states what his power [as emperor] and the viciousness of his mind allow him to do” (ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἀποδύεται τὸ τῆς πεύσεως σχῆμα [...] τῶν μὲν προτέρων ὑπορεφῇ πλασμάτων, ἀποφαίνεται δὲ λοιπὸν τὰ δοκοῦντα: οὐ κατὰ λογικὴν μέθοδον προερχόμενος, οὐ κατὰ γραφικὴν ἤ πατρικὴν ἀπόδειξιν τὸν λόγον ποιούμενος, ἀλλ’ ἀπερ αὐτῷ ἢ ἐξουσία ἐπέτρεπε, καὶ ἢ τοῦ νοὸς σαθρότης).

6. On reductio ad impossibilem: “the weakness and incoherence of his words are clearly visible, since he deduces consequences that are contrary to his own premises” (ἐναντία ταῖς οἰκείαις συμπεραίνει θέσεις), “they do not see to what abyss they are led by the absurdities arising from their premises” (τῶν ὑποθέσεων αὐτῶν ἀναφαινομένας ἀτοπίας). In the related context the following words are usually used: conclusion (θέσις), supposition, assumption, hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις), conclude, infer, deduce (συμπεραίνω), construct an argument (κατασκευάζεται), “nothing prevents us from bringing him to a contradiction
based on the content of his own speech” (οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει καὶ νῦν ἐκ τῆς τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ ὑποθέσεως ὄρμημένους, πάλιν εἰς ἀντίφασιν αὐτὸν περιάγειν).

7. On Aristotelian relatives: Nikephoros defined the image as related to the pattern, calling it a relative notion (τῶν πρὸς τι) as the effect of a cause. “[...] the icon possesses a relation to the archetype as the effect of a cause. Therefore, it is necessary that the icon both be one of the relatives and be called such.”

8. On the definition accuracy requirement: “in this case, one should refrain from antidosis, synecdoche” and “other tropes as not corresponding to the exact meaning of the words” (παραιτητέον γὰρ νῦν τὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀντιδόσεως λόγον εἰρημένα, ἤτοι κατὰ συνεκδοχὴν, ἢ καθ’ έτερον τρόπον λεγόμενα, ὡς οὐ ταῖς κυρίαις τῶν λέξεων σημασίαις προσαγόμενα).

9. On the difference and the property: “distinctive properties” (γνωριζόμενη ταῖς ἰδιότησι), “about physical differences and essential qualities” (φυσικαὶ διαφοραὶ καὶ οὕσιώδεις ποιότητες).

10. On homonyms: “[the name of Christ] is homonymous [to the icon]” (διὸ καὶ ὁμωνύμως αὐτῷ προσαγορεύεται), “the icon, taking the name common to both natures, is homonymous to the prototype” (ἡ εἰκὼν [...], ὡς ἐκείνη, τῷ κοινῷ τῶν φύσεων ὄνοματί προσχρωμένη, ὁμωνύμως τῷ ἀρχετύπῳ προσαγορεύεται).

Using logical terminology, Nikephoros tried to qualify the fallacies and argumentation failures in order to determine how the opponents came to a false conclusion. It could be argued that Nikephoros is interested both in refuting iconoclastic thought as well as in analyzing the way in which such a refutation could be built. He is interested not only in the argumentation itself but in its structure, too. As for his own argumentative strategies, it should be noted that sometimes Nikephoros used a more sophisticated refutation structure than was necessary. We try to show this through the following examples from the Major Apology.

54 PG 100, 296C.
55 Ch. Erismann, “Venerating likeness: Byzantine iconophile thinkers on aristotelian relatives and their simultaneity,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 24/3 (2016), p. 411.
56 PG 100, col. 236A.
57 PG 100, col. 300B. Here we give only one example, but it should be noted that an investigation of the use by Nikephoros of the five voices of Porphyry is promising in terms of future research.
58 PG 100, col. 316A.
59 PG 100, col. 324AB.
Argumentation: Successes and Failures of Nikephoros

Analyzing the iconoclastic argumentation, we can argue that Nikephoros often works on a meta-level qualifying the ways and schemes of opposing reasoning. For example, he shows how the opponents take the premises accepted both by iconophiles and iconoclasts, but which are related to the anti-polytheism argumentation, and how the iconoclasts apply them to accuse those who venerate icons as idolatrous:

[..] he [Emperor Constantine V] collected the utterances, partly borrowed from the sayings of the Holy Spirit, and partly wisely compiled by our blessed fathers for the refutation of the errors of vile idolatry, on the one hand, and for exposing the unbelief and insanity of people who do not know God, on the other hand. Having chosen these utterances maliciously and senselessly and, to speak the truth, having tainted his soul with idolatry, [he] applied them to sacred icons.

Sometimes he accuses iconoclasts even for using acceptable argumentation tools. For example, it is not permitted to use in discussion the set of mutually acceptable premises, but it is highly recommended. Nevertheless, Nikephoros blames the opponents doing so:

[...] to the muddy and bitter stream of heretics, they mix a sweet and pure source of truth.

He even reflects on the reasons why the arguments of opponents are often logically convincing and persuasive although being false and godless:

60 PG 100, col. 560C.
61 PG 100, col. 565A.
These profane and faithless [people], if, of course, they were not baptized into the name of Constantine, but into the Trinity (I think that they would not deny this, because otherwise, we would not need these competitions and struggles, and they would not deliver us so many cases), let them clearly tell us, where did the idols creep in from? And if they keep inviolable and whole the seal of confession, then why do they always have the ready name of idols?

Οὗτοι δὲ οἱ ἀνιερώτατοι καὶ ἀπιστότατοι, εἰ μὴ εἰς τὸ ὄνομα Κωνσταντίνου, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὴν Τριάδα ἐβαπτίσθησαν (οἴμαι δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἀποφήσειαν· ἢ γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲν ἐδέησαν ἡμῖν τῶν νῦν ἁγωνισμάτων τοιαύτα, οὐδ’ ἂν ὃλον ἡμῖν πραγμάτων τοσούτων ἐπεσώρυχον), πόθεν αὐτοῖς ἡ τῶν εἰδώλων παρείσδυσι, λεγέτωσαν ἡμῖν τρανέστατα· καὶ εἰ τὴν σφραγῖδα τῆς ὁμολογίας ταύτης ἀσύλον τε καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον τηροῦντες διατελούσι, πῶς αὐτοῖς διὰ γλώσσης καὶ πρόχειρον τὸ τῶν εἰδώλων ὄνομα;  

However, sometimes Nikephoros commits logical errors himself. Let us look in more detail:

They are forced to reason in this way [...] they say that Christians worship idols, and the worshiper of idols does worship what does not exist [...] these words lead them to the conclusion that, since we worship the living and true God, then they have to recognize the fact that our God is not God.

οὔτως συλλογισαμένους ἀποφήνασθαι [...] λέγουσιν εἰδώλοις ἀναθέσθαι τὸ σέβας Χριστιανοῦ, ὁ δὲ εἰδώλοις προσκυνῶν, τοῖς μὴ οὕσι προσκυνεῖ [...] συμπεραίνει ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς, ἐπειδὴ θεῷ προσκυνοῦμεν ἡμεῖς ζώντες καὶ ἀληθινῷ, μηδὲν ἐτερὸν ὁμολογεῖν αὐτούς, ἢ τὸν θεόν ἡμῶν μὴ εἶναι θεόν.  

Nikephoros either makes a mistake this time or sophistically identifies icon worship with the worship of God, implementing an unacceptable method of using the four-term fallacy (quadrupling the terms of the syllogism). Another problem is his background assumption. “Christians worship God by worshiping icons” is a circular argument or the petitio principii within the conclusion mentioned above: he tries to establish icon worship as God worship by stating that the one implies the other. This example could be considered in detail by

62 PG 100, col. 609A.  
63 PG 100, col. 592B.
reconstructing Nikephoros’ argumentation as opposed to the iconoclastic way of reasoning: Nikephoros applies the *reductio ad impossibilem* method here. He reconstructs the ‘iconoclastic syllogism’ as follows:

1. Christians worship idols.
2. *The worshiper of idols worships something non-existent.*
3. Christians worship something non-existent.

assuming the ‘iconophilistic syllogism’:

4. Christians worship icons.
5. *The worshiper of icons worships God.*
6. Christians worship God.

and the ‘iconoclastic axiom’ as

7. Icons are idols.

(1) is valid within iconoclastic theory but invalid within that of iconophiles. (2) and (4) are valid in both theories. (5) is validated by iconophiles but not by iconoclasts. Nikephoros undertakes the indirect proof (apagogical argument) assuming that (7) is true, and building the sequence of enthymemes which could be completed in the following way:

1. Christians worship idols.
2. The worshiper of idols worships something non-existent.
3. Icons are idols.
4. The worshiper of idols worships something non-existent.
5. The worshiper of icons worships God.
6. The worshiper of God worships something non-existent.

*But God is not something non-existent by definition.*

10. Therefore, the worshiper of God worships that which is not God.

Nikephoros argues that because of such a contradiction, one has to conclude that icons are not idols (the rejection of (7), i.e., the refutation of the iconoclastic axiom), concealing that to avoid a contradiction is also possible by rejecting (5), i.e., the iconophilistic premise. To conclude, both the iconophiles and the iconoclasts trying to avoid the contradiction did the same thing: they reject each other’s axioms or premises, stating that they proved by such a rejection their own premises using, in fact, the circle argument fallacy but not the proof by assuming the opposite.
But at the same time, Nikephoros often undertakes rather sophisticated ways of thinking in perfectly correct fashion. Let us exhibit this more explicitly. Consider the following iconoclastic argument:

If Constantine did not save us from idolatry, Christ in no way could be of any help to us. Why, therefore, when confessing that we are liberated from idols by Christ, do we again bow to idols at the divine altar?

Εἰ μὴ Κωνσταντῖνος ἡμᾶς τῆς εἰδωλομανίας ἔρρύσατο, Χριστὸς κατ’ οὐδένα τρόπον ἠφελήσαι δεδύνηται. Πῶς τοίνυν ὁμολογούντες εἰδώλων ἀπηλλάχθαι διὰ Χριστοῦ, πάλιν εἰδώλοις κατά τὸ θείον προσκυνοῦσι θυσιαστήριον;64

The reaction of Nikephoros is as follows:

For they say these words, too, by the inspiration of the father of lies, as I am sure, is clear to everyone, because they hope to combine the two opposites, each extremely hostile to the other, in the one confession, I mean lies and truth. They have reached such insanity and stupidity that they do not notice that they are spinning in a circle of empty arguments and useless proofs. And if they unreasonably think that in both respects they speak the truth, then they have to accuse even the Gospel of lying.

Καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ψεύδους ἐμπνεόμενοι ταῦτα περιλαλοῦσι, παντὶ τῷ σαφές, ὡς γε ἐκαυτὸν πείθω, ἐκ δύο τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ ἀλλήλοις εἰς ἄκρον μαχομένων, τῶν τε ψευδών, φημὶ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰς ἐν τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ φρόνημα ἴναι οἴομενοι ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰ τῆς ἀνοίας αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐμπληξίας διῆλασεν, ὡς ἐκαυτῶς λεληθέναι, κενεμβατούντας ἐπὶ λογισμοῖς εἰκαῖοις, καὶ ἀνγύτοις ἐπι- χειρήμασι. Εἴπερ γὰρ κατ’ ἄμφω ἀληθεύειν ἀνοήτως οἴονται, ὡς αὐτοῖς καὶ ψευδηγορίας κατὰ τοῦ Ἔυαγγελίου οἴσειν γραφὴν.65

Let us decipher the logical structure of this argument of Nikephoros. In this passage, Nikephoros analyzes the argument structure of his opponents, asserting formally the following: the main iconoclastic axiom about the identity of icons and idols is false (ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ψεύδους ἐμπνεόμενοι ταῦτα περιλαλοῦσι). And it is false not only because of the doctrinal belief, but owing to a more complex construction based on contradiction. Indeed, the axioms are the starting points, unprovable within the framework of the theory itself, but

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64 *PG 100, col. 601A.*
65 *PG 100, col. 601AB.*
acceptable either because of their obviousness or because of being an assumption (belief). Indeed, Nikephoros could here simply deny the truth of the axiom about the identity of icons and idols and assert the reverse statement referring to the evidence of the opposite one. It would also be a usual argument in this case. He could have done so but he did not. He proposed the following reasoning which could be qualified as an indirect proof construction. He proposed to consider the iconoclastic axiom to proceed from as a true one. He also showed that, in their reasoning, the opponents involved arguments used by the holy fathers against idolatry acceptable both by the iconoclasts and the iconophiles, being logically qualified as the earlier theorems. And then he showed that such a combination (iconoclastic axiom and anti-idolatry theorems) deduced something contradictory to the Gospel itself (ἐἰπέρ γὰρ κατ’ ἄμφω ἀληθεύειν ἀνοήτως οἴονται, ὄφα αὐτοῖς καὶ ψευδηγορίας κατά τοῦ Εὐαγγελίου οἴσειν γραφήν). But since the Gospel (being a set of axioms) cannot be false, it only remains either to reject the truth of the iconoclastic axiom, or to accept a contradictory way of thought, as the iconoclasts do (ἐκ δύο τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ ἀλλήλοις εἰς ἀκρον μαχομένων, τῶν τε ψευδῶν, φημί, καὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν, εἰς ἐν τῷ ὁμολογίας φρόνημα οἴναι οἴμενοι).

4 Conclusions

Since the review of logical tools and techniques used by Nikephoros in his treatises requires separate research that goes beyond the scope of the present article, we have tried to show only that almost all the logical issues listed in the Life are represented in his works. Thus, there is reason to believe that Patriarch Nikephoros really had received a logical education in the form described by Ignatios the Diacon. Furthermore, this list of chapter headings does not coincide with the contents of the Dialectic of John of Damascus. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Nikephoros at least was well aware of the following logical topics: the categories; definition theory; syllogistics; proof theory; sophisms, paralogisms and polysyllogisms studies; argumentation theory.

To illustrate the acquaintance of Patriarch Nikephoros with the other sections of logical knowledge, which are indicated in the Life but not yet analyzed by P. Aleksander, L. Lukhovitsky, B. Lourié, Ch. Erismann, or by us, further studies of the texts written by Patriarch Nikephoros are necessary. Since the critical opinion regarding the logical skills of Nikephoros is also represented in academic literature (for example, P. Alexander named the majority of

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66 PG 94, cols. 525-528.
deductions built by Nikephoros as clumsy,67 B. Lourié argues that “the logical problem that will be resolved by Theodore the Studite becomes more understandable against the background of the contemporaneous failed attempt to do the same by Patriarch Nicephorus,”68 etc.), we should state that Nikephoros’ logical education69 is nevertheless rather up-to-date with the 9th-century period of the history of logic, and that some of Nikephoros’ judgments concerning the logical status of iconoclastic argumentation are interesting in some respects from the point of view of modern logics as well. The various examples of meta-level reasoning by Nikephoros show that he is aware of using some kind of axiomatic method (at least some prototype of it), and, along with this method, he is aware of using a variety of logically based refutation techniques, although sometimes making logical mistakes. In conclusion, it would be possible to evaluate the logical skills of Nikephoros using a five-point grading scale as follows: above-average performance in the theoretical part and average performance in the practical one.

67 P. Alexander, The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople, Oxford, 1958, p. 201.
68 B. Lourié, “Theodore the Studite and “Hypostasis” as a Paraconsistent Notion,” in: Theodore the Stoudite: Intellectual Context, Logic, and Theological Significance. Texts and Studies in Eastern Christianity, eds. C. Erismann, B. MacDougal, Brill, forthcoming 2017.
69 The history of Byzantine logical handbooks is still to be described. For example, one can find the logical handbooks within the Russian educational tradition based on some Byzantine (the brothers Leichoudes’s handbooks on logic and rhetoric) and Ancient Greek sources (the classical Russian handbooks of M.V. Lomonosov and I.S. Rizhsky). See М. Сменцовский, Братья Лихуды, [M. Smentsovsky, Brothers Leichoudes], St. Petersburg, 1899]; Г. Павлова, А. Федоров, Михаил Васильевич Ломоносов: Жизнь и труды [G. Pavlova, A. Fedorov, Mikhail Vasilevich Lomonosov: His Life and Work], Moscow, 1980; Д. Щукина, Н. Егоренкова, “Риторическая практика” И. С. Рижского (1796) в Горном университете: история и современность” [D. Shchukina, N. Egorenkova, “Rhetoric practice” by I.S. Rizhsky (1796) at the Mining University: History and Contemporaneity], Journal of Mining Institute, 225 (2017), pp. 376-384.