Detection efficiency and noise in semi-device independent randomness extraction protocol

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In this paper, we analyze several critical issues in semi-device independent quantum information processing protocol. In practical experimental realization randomness generation in that scenario is possible only if the efficiency of the detectors used is above a certain threshold. Our analysis shows that the critical detection efficiency is \( \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2} \) in the symmetric setup, while in the asymmetric setup if one of the bases has perfect critical detection efficiency then the other one can be arbitrarily close to 0. We also analyze the semi-device independent random number generation efficiency based on different averages of guessing probability. To generate more randomness, the proper averaging method should be applied. Its choice depends on the value of a certain dimension witness. More importantly, the general analytical relationship between the maximal average guessing probability and dimension witness is given.

\textbf{Introduction} - A bound on the Hilbert space dimension is an important resource for quantum information processing, which can increase the performance of the quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum random number generation (QRNG) protocols to avoid the attacks exploiting imperfections of the devices. Based on the certified system dimension, the notion of semi-device independent (SDI) protocol can be defined in the prepare and measure scenario, which assumes the knowledge of the dimension of the underlying physical system but otherwise nothing about the actual physical implementation of the state preparation and measurement. The first SDI quantum key distribution (SDI-QKD) protocol was proposed by Pawlowski and Brunner [1]. Then the SDI random number generation (SDI-RNG) protocol has been proposed, analyzed [2,6] and, eventually experimentally realized [7]. All of them use a dimension witness [8] to certify randomness of the measurement outcomes.

To guarantee the randomness without relying on assumption on the internal functioning of the state preparation and measurement devices, device independent (DI) protocols based on Bell inequalities were previously proposed [3,11]. However, the DI protocols require high detection efficiency to avoid the, so called, detection loophole [12]. The critical detection efficiency of the maximally entangled state to exclude the possibility of a local hidden variable description is 82.8\% [13], when Alice and Bob have measurement setups with equal detection efficiencies. This requirement can be reduced to \( \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2} \) if the non-maximally entangled state are used [14]. Similar to the detection loophole in the DI case, SDI protocol also require the measurement setup in Bob’s side to have high detection efficiency. Now, there are two methods to solve this problem, both based on making some additional assumption. In [6,13,16] a nonlinear dimension witness to certify generated random numbers is used, however the state preparation device and measurement device are assumed to be independent [17,20]. More recently, Canas et al. applied a trusted blocking device to solve this problem [21].

In this work we analyze the critical detection efficiency without any additional assumption. We prove that the critical detection efficiency is \( \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2} \) in the symmetric case (where Bob’s two measurement bases have the same detection efficiency), while it can be arbitrarily close to 0 in the asymmetric case (where one of Bob’s two measurement bases has perfect detection efficiency). We also calculate the amount of certified randomness based on different averages of guessing probability. The result demonstrates that different averaging methods should be applied depending on the dimension witness values, and that true randomness can be generated if the dimension witness value is larger than the classical dimension witness upper bound. More importantly, the analytical relationship between the dimension witness and maximal average guessing probability is given, which can be directly applied in the future SDI quantum information
Critical detection efficiency in SDI protocol - A SDI protocol involves two parties: the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob). They both get classical input $x$ for Alice and $y$ for Bob. Then Alice sends a state $\rho_x$ to Bob. We do not know what this state is but assume an upper bound on its Hilbert space dimension $d$. Bob chooses a measurement based on $y$ and obtains the outcome $b$. Then the parties estimate the conditional probability distribution $p(b|x,y)$. A dimension witness is a function of this probability distribution. Dimension witnesses’ quantum bound $Q_d$ is the largest value of this function possible to obtain with the communications of systems of dimension $d$. Similarly the classical bound $C_d$ is the largest value possible to obtain with the communication of $\log d$ classical bits.

The powerhorse of SDI protocols has been a task known as $2 \rightarrow 1$ Random Access Code [22]. The objective of the parties is for the sender to encode two classical bits $a_0$ and $a_1$ into a single qubit of communication aiming to maximize the probability of successfully decoding a single bit of the receiver’s choice. Both first: QKD [1] and QRNG [2] protocols have been based this code. Protocols from [3] were based on its generalization. Moreover, the ones using nonlinear witnesses [6, 15, 21] are also the realizations of the same task but with a different measures of its efficiency. The sets of preparations and measurements which are optimal are the same in all these protocols. Therefore, we will limit our analysis to the simplest case - the one form [2].

We take $d = 2$ and apply the following dimension witness to distinguish between the classical and quantum systems

$$T = E_{000} + E_{001} + E_{010} - E_{011} - E_{100} + E_{101} - E_{110} - E_{111},$$

where $E_{a_0a_1y} = p(b = 0|a_0, a_1, y) = tr(\rho_{a_0a_1} M_b = 0)$, $a_0, a_1, y, b \in \{0,1\}$, $M_b = 0$ is the measurement operator acting on the two dimensional state $\rho_{a_0a_1}$ with the input parameter $y$ and the measurement output $b = 0$. In the two dimensional space, the upper bound of $T$ for the classical system is 2, while the quantum allow for the two dimensional space, the upper bound is $2$, the new dimension witness value is

$$\tilde{T} = E_{000} + E_{001} + E_{010} - E_{011} - E_{100} + E_{101} - E_{110} - E_{111}$$

$$= \eta_0 E_{000} + \eta_1 E_{001} + \eta_0 E_{010} - \eta_1 E_{011} - \eta_0 E_{100} + \eta_1 E_{101} - \eta_0 E_{110} - \eta_1 E_{111}.$$  \hfill (3)

Since Bob has two measurement bases setup, it is natural to consider symmetric and asymmetric cases, i.e. with $\eta_1 = \eta_0$ and $\eta_1 \neq \eta_0$ respectively. In the symmetric case, Bob’s two measurement bases $M_0^b$ and $M_1^b$ have the same detection efficiency $\eta_0 = \eta_1 = \eta$, thus the new dimension witness is

$$\tilde{T}_1 = \eta(E_{000} + E_{001} + E_{010} - E_{011} - E_{100} + E_{101} - E_{110} - E_{111}).$$  \hfill (4)

By applying the quantum dimension witness upper bound $2\sqrt{2}$, we can get the new dimension witness value $2\sqrt{2}\eta$. To violate the classical dimension witness upper bound (that is to guarantee $\tilde{T}_1 > 2$), the corresponding critical detection efficiency in the symmetric case is $\frac{2}{\sqrt{2}}$.

In the asymmetric case, Bob’s two measurement bases $\{M_0^b, M_1^b\}$ and $\{M_0^b, M_1^b\}$ have different detection efficiency ($\eta_0 \neq \eta_1$). This scenario can be realized by the neutral kaons system [23], where the first basis can be performed by lifetime measurement quite efficiently, but the second basis can be performed by strangeness measurement with small efficiency. Here, we simply assume the first base has the perfect detection efficiency ($\eta_1 = 1$), thus the dimension witness will be transformed to

$$\tilde{T}_2 = E_{000} + \eta_1 E_{001} + E_{010} - \eta_1 E_{011} - E_{100} + \eta_1 E_{101} - E_{110} - \eta_1 E_{111}.$$  \hfill (5)

Applying the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm optimization numerical calculation method [24], we calculate the maximal dimension witness value with different detection efficiency $\eta_1$

$$\maximize: \tilde{T}_2(\eta_1),$$

subject to: $E_{a_0a_1y} = tr(\rho_{a_0a_1} M_b = 0)$,

where $\rho_{a_0a_1} = \frac{1}{2}(I + s_{a_0a_1} \sigma)$ is the arbitrary two dimensional quantum state preparation, $s_{a_0a_1}$ is the Bloch vector and $\sigma$ is the Pauli matrix vector. $M_b = 0 = c_y I + t_y \sigma$ is the arbitrary two dimensional positive-operator valued measure (POVM) ($t_y$ is the Bloch vector), which should satisfy the semi-definite restriction ($M_0^b + M_1^b = I$). The corresponding calculation result is given in Fig. 1.

From the calculation result, we can find that the quantum dimension witness value will violate the classical dimension witness upper bound with arbitrary nonzero detection efficiency $\eta_1$, which obviously improves the previous critical detection efficiency.

In a practical experimental realization, measurement outcomes may be affected by the environment noise in
the quantum channel or the dark counts on the detector’s side. We model this by adding the white noise in the state preparation setup with probability $p$. Then the effective state prepared is given by the following equation

$$\rho_{\text{practical}} = (1 - p)\rho_{\text{perfect}} + p\mathcal{I}_2.$$  

where $\rho_{\text{perfect}}$ is the perfect state preparation without considering any noise. By considering the practical state preparation $\rho_{\text{practical}}$, we get the following dimension witness value

$$T_{\text{practical}} = (1 - p)\tilde{T}_j.$$  

To violate the classical dimension witness upper bound 2, the background noise $p$ should satisfy $p < 1 - \frac{2}{\tilde{T}_j}$. If Bob has the perfect detection efficiency in two bases ($\eta_0 = \eta_1 = 1$), the maximal tolerated background noise is $1 - \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2} \simeq 0.293$. In the finite detection efficiency case, the corresponding maximal tolerated background noise with different detection efficiency in the symmetric and asymmetric case is given by Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 respectively.

**Randomness generation certified with average guessing probability** - In the randomness generation protocol we are given an infinite supply of pseudorandom numbers (PRN) which we assume to be independent of the devices that we are using. The aim of the protocol is to generate certifiable randomness (it is impossible in the case of pseudorandomness). We can use PRN in many different ways, effectively choosing the joint distribution of the inputs $a_0, a_1, y$. For example, if we discover that more randomness is generated for inputs $a_0 = a_1 = y = 0$ then in a vast majority of rounds this input will be chosen. Other settings will be used only sporadically to estimate the value of $T$.

In the previous work [2], we showed that the critical dimension witness value to generate random number should be 2.64 by using the maximal guessing probability to estimate randomness (randomness generation means Eve’s maximal guessing probability should satisfy $\max_{a_0, a_1, y} p(b|a_0, a_1, y) < 1$), which is obviously larger than the classical dimension witness upper bound 2.

To generate much more randomness, we will apply new randomness estimation methods, which should have two important properties. The first property is that the randomness generation efficiency should be larger than in the previous maximal guessing probability method, the
second is that the random numbers should be certified as soon as the dimension witness value is larger than the classical dimension witness upper bound. Now, we analyze the randomness generation efficiency with partial average guessing probabilities \( p^{(2)}_{\text{guess}}, p^{(3)}_{\text{guess}} \) and full average guessing probability \( p^{(4)}_{\text{guess}} \) given by the following equations

\[
\begin{align*}
      p^{(1)}_{\text{guess}} &= \max_{b,a_0,a_1,y} p(b|a_0,a_1,y), \\
      p^{(2)}_{\text{guess}} &= \frac{1}{4} \sum_{a_1,y} \max_{b} p(b|0,a_1,y), \\
      p^{(3)}_{\text{guess}} &= \frac{1}{4} \sum_{a_1,y} \max_{b} p(b|1,a_1,y), \\
      p^{(4)}_{\text{guess}} &= \frac{1}{8} \sum_{a_0,a_1,y} \max_{b} p(b|a_0,a_1,y),
\end{align*}
\]

where \( p^{(1)}_{\text{guess}} \) is the maximal guessing probability, which has been applied to estimate the min-entropy function value \([22]\) of the measurement outcomes in the previous work \([2]\). Since \( p_{\text{guess}} \geq \max\{p^{(2)}_{\text{guess}}, p^{(3)}_{\text{guess}}, p^{(4)}_{\text{guess}}\} \) it is natural to think that the new methods will generate much more randomness compared to the previous work.

In the experiment estimating the min-entropy on \( p^{(1)}_{\text{guess}} \) or \( p^{(4)}_{\text{guess}} \) corresponds to uniform distribution of the inputs, while using \( p^{(2)}_{\text{guess}} \) implies choosing \( a_0 = 0 \) almost always and \( p^{(3)}_{\text{guess}} \) almost never.

By considering different dimension witness value, we solve the following optimization problem to estimate the guessing probabilities \( p^{(i)}_{\text{guess}} \)

\[
\begin{align*}
      \text{maximize} & : p^{(i)}_{\text{guess}}, \\
      \text{subject to} & : E_{a0a1y} = \text{tr}(\rho_{a0,a1} M_y^{b=0}), \\
      & \sum_{a_0,a_1,y} (-1)^y E_{a0a1y} = T,
\end{align*}
\]

where \( i = \{1, 2, 3, 4\} \), \( \rho_{a0,a1} = \frac{1}{2} (I + s_{a0,a1} \cdot \vec{\sigma}) \) and \( M_y^{b=0} = c_y I + t_y \cdot \vec{\sigma} \) are arbitrary state preparation and positive-operator valued measures (POVM) in the two-dimensional Hilbert space. The corresponding min-entropy function system can be given by

\[
H^{(i)}_{\infty} = -\log p^{(i)}_{\text{guess}}. 
\]

By using nonlinear optimization, the min-entropy function for different dimension witness has been calculated and is given in Fig. 4. From the calculation result, we can find that the average guessing probability methods can generate much more randomness compared to the maximal guessing probability method, and random numbers can be generated as soon as the dimension witness is larger than the classical upper bound. For different dimension witness value \( T \), the optimal either \( p^{(2)}_{\text{guess}} \) or \( p^{(4)}_{\text{guess}} \) guessing probability should be chosen to generate randomness.

For a given internal parameter \( \lambda \), the guessing probabilities \( p^{(2)}_{\text{guess}}, p^{(3)}_{\text{guess}} \) and \( p^{(4)}_{\text{guess}} \) change to

\[
\begin{align*}
      p^{(2,\lambda)}_{\text{guess}} &= \frac{1}{4} \sum_{a_1,y} \max_{b} p(b|0,a_1,y,\lambda), \\
      p^{(3,\lambda)}_{\text{guess}} &= \frac{1}{4} \sum_{a_1,y} \max_{b} p(b|1,a_1,y,\lambda), \\
      p^{(4,\lambda)}_{\text{guess}} &= \frac{1}{8} \sum_{a_0,a_1,y} \max_{b} p(b|a_0,a_1,y,\lambda).
\end{align*}
\]

The min-entropy function \( H^{(1)}_{\infty}, H^{(2)}_{\infty}, H^{(3)}_{\infty} \) and \( H^{(4)}_{\infty} \) as a function of dimension witness value \( T \). The green dotted line is \( H^{(1)}_{\infty} \), the blue solid line is \( H^{(2)}_{\infty} \), the black dot-dashed line is \( H^{(3)}_{\infty} \), and the red dashed line is \( H^{(4)}_{\infty} \). To generate more random numbers, the min-entropy function \( H^{(4)}_{\infty} \) should be applied to estimate the generated random number if the dimension witness value satisfies \( T < 2.5 \), while \( H^{(2)}_{\infty} \) should be used if \( T \geq 2.5 \).

**Analytic bound on randomness** - We have numerically calculated the min-entropy function based on different guessing probability methods in the previous section. Now we find the upper bound of the guessing probability \( p^{(2)}_{\text{guess}}, p^{(3)}_{\text{guess}} \) and \( p^{(4)}_{\text{guess}} \). Similar to the previous work \([10]\), we assume Alice’s and Bob’s devices are governed by internal variables \( \lambda \), and the distributions of these variables is \( q_\lambda \), where \( \int q_\lambda d\lambda = 1 \). Since the observer has no access to the the value of the variable \( \lambda \), he will observe the following distribution in practical experiment

\[
E_{a0a1y} = \int p(b = 0|a_0,a_1,y,\lambda) q_\lambda d\lambda. 
\]

For a given internal parameter \( \lambda \), the guessing probabilities \( p^{(2)}_{\text{guess}}, p^{(3)}_{\text{guess}} \) and \( p^{(4)}_{\text{guess}} \) change to

\[
\begin{align*}
      p^{(2,\lambda)}_{\text{guess}} &= \frac{1}{4} \sum_{a_1,y} \max_{b} p(b|0,a_1,y,\lambda), \\
      p^{(3,\lambda)}_{\text{guess}} &= \frac{1}{4} \sum_{a_1,y} \max_{b} p(b|1,a_1,y,\lambda), \\
      p^{(4,\lambda)}_{\text{guess}} &= \frac{1}{8} \sum_{a_0,a_1,y} \max_{b} p(b|a_0,a_1,y,\lambda).
\end{align*}
\]

By considering the best guessing probability over Alice’s different inputs \( a_0 \) and \( a_1 \), an upper bound of the guessing probability can be estimated by
where \( j = \{2, 3, 4\} \), \( \theta_\lambda \) denotes the angle between Bob’s two measurements \( M_\lambda^{0, b=0} \) and \( M_\lambda^{1, b=0} \) by considering the best guessing strategy, more detailed analysis was given in Ref. [16]. Since the correlation between the guessing probability and parameter \( \theta_\lambda \) has been established, we will prove the relationship between the dimension witness value \( T_\lambda \) and the parameter \( \theta_\lambda \)

\[
T_\lambda = E_{00}^\lambda + E_{01}^\lambda + E_{10}^\lambda - E_{11}^\lambda
= \text{tr}[(\rho_{00}^\lambda - \rho_{01}^\lambda)M_\lambda^{0, b=0}] + \text{tr}[(\rho_{01}^\lambda - \rho_{11}^\lambda)M_\lambda^{1, b=0}] + \text{tr}[(\rho_{01}^\lambda - \rho_{11}^\lambda)M_\lambda^{0, b=0}] + \text{tr}[(\rho_{00}^\lambda - \rho_{11}^\lambda)M_\lambda^{1, b=0}]
= \frac{1}{2}((s_{0}^3 - s_{1}^3) \cdot t_0^3 + (s_{0}^3 - s_{1}^3) \cdot t_1^3 + (s_{1}^3 - s_{0}^3) \cdot t_0^3 + (s_{1}^3 - s_{0}^3) \cdot t_1^3)
= \frac{1}{2}((s_{0}^3 - s_{1}^3) \cdot (t_0^3 + t_1^3) + (s_{0}^3 - s_{1}^3) \cdot (t_0^3 - t_1^3))
\leq |t_0^3 + t_1^3| + |t_0^3 - t_1^3|
\leq \sqrt{2} + 2\cos(\theta_\lambda) + \sqrt{2 - 2\cos(\theta_\lambda)},
\]

where \( s_{0}^3 \equiv s_{00}^3, s_{1}^3 \equiv s_{01}^3, s_{2}^3 \equiv s_{10}^3, s_{3}^3 \equiv s_{11}^3 \). The first inequality uses \( |s_{0}^3 - s_{1}^3| \leq 2 \) and \( |s_{1}^3 - s_{0}^3| \leq 2 \), the second inequality can be proved by considering \( |t_0^3 + t_1^3| + |t_0^3 - t_1^3| = \sqrt{|t_0^3|^2 + |t_1^3|^2 + 2|t_0^3||t_1^3|\cos(\theta_\lambda)} + \sqrt{|t_0^3|^2 + |t_1^3|^2 - 2|t_0^3||t_1^3|\cos(\theta_\lambda)} \) reach the maximum if \( |t_0^3| = |t_1^3| = 1 \). Based on the given internal variables \( \lambda \), we get the relationship between the guessing probability \( p_{\text{guess}}^{(j, \lambda)} \) and the dimension witness value \( T_\lambda \) as the following inequality

\[
p_{\text{guess}}^{(j, \lambda)} \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{\frac{1 + \sqrt{1 - \frac{(T_\lambda^2 - 4)^2}{4}}}{2}} = f(T_\lambda),
\]

where the analysis uses the inequality \( \cos(\theta_\lambda) \leq \sqrt{1 - \frac{(T_\lambda^2 - 4)^2}{4}} \). Note that function \( f(T_\lambda) \) is concave and decreasing, we will apply this property to prove the relationship between the practical experimental estimated value \( T \) and \( p^{(j)}_{\text{guess}} \).

Since the internal variables \( \lambda \) can not be detected in practical experiment, we can only get the observed dimension witness value \( T \) as

\[
T = \int T_\lambda q_\lambda d\lambda.
\]

Based on the observed dimension witness value \( T \), upper bound of the guessing probability \( p^{(j)}_{\text{guess}} \) is

\[
p^{(j)}_{\text{guess}} = \int p^{(j, \lambda)} q_\lambda d\lambda
\leq \int f(T_\lambda) q_\lambda d\lambda
\leq \int f(T) q_\lambda d\lambda
= f(T)
= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{\frac{1 + \sqrt{1 - \frac{(T^2 - 4)^2}{4}}}{2}},
\]

where the first inequality uses the previous result, the second one applies Jensen’s inequality and concavity property of \( f \). By using this bound on the guessing probability, we calculate the min-entropy function \( -\log_2(f(T)) \) with different dimension witness \( T \) in Fig. 5. From the calculation result, we can find that the maximal min-entropy function is 0.228 when the dimension witness reaches \( \sqrt{2} \), while the min-entropy function is larger than 0 if the dimension witness is larger than the classical dimension witness upper bound.

![FIG. 5: Min-entropy function \(-\log_2(f(T))\) with different dimension witness \( T \), the figure is based on the analytic result, which is the lower bound on the previous numerical calculation result \( H^2_\infty \), \( H^3_\infty \) and \( H^{(3)}_\infty \).](image-url)

**Conclusion** - We have calculated the critical detection efficiency for semi-device independent random number generation in the symmetric and asymmetric case. The maximal tolerable white noise has also been analyzed. To improve the randomness generation, three type of averaging guessing probability have been tested in our work. We also give the general analytical relationship between the average guessing probability and the dimension witness. Our analysis result can be directly applied in practical experimental realization and the future research on
other semi-device independent quantum information processing protocols.

To further decrease the critical detection efficiency and improve the random number generation efficiency in the SDI protocols is an open problem for the future research.

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