Abstract

Background. The increase in the complexity of the social and political situation of Eastern European countries raises questions about securitization of national and ethnic minorities and its impact on the management of ethno-politics in the countries of the subregion. Ethnopolitical management corresponds to the security of the subregion. Research interest in securitization of minority affairs is current, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Research aims. The purpose is to define the role of securitization of national and ethnic minorities issues in the management of ethno-politics in Eastern European countries. The research area encompasses: Belarus, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. The author asks the following research questions: 1) What are the areas of securitization of the issues of national and ethnic minorities concerned? 2) How does the securitization of the issues of national and ethnic minorities take place? 3) How does the securitization affect the process of ethnopolitical management in the studied countries?

Methodology. An interdisciplinary research approach was applied, integrating methods from political science, international relations and management. The conclusions from author’s own research carried out during foreign study trips in the years 2014–2017 were used. The literature has an interdisciplinary aspect. The realization of the goal is based on the application of a catalogue of research methods, including in detail, the following methods are mainly used in the research: system analysis; comparative method; behavioral method; a qualitative approach was also used in the realized research. The article uses the method of critical analysis of literature, where the concept of securitization is referred to.

Key findings. The role of securitization of national and ethnic minorities in the management of ethnopolitics in the countries of Eastern Europe is diversified (it concerns different minorities and different areas). Uncontrolled may lead
to deepening of the subregion’s security crisis (inter alia, to ethnopolitical conflicts), hindering the process of ethnopolitical management.

**Keywords:** ethnopolitical management, securitization, national and ethnic minorities, Russian minority, post-Soviet area, Eastern Europe.

**JEL Code:** F52, F53, J71.

**INTRODUCTION**

The observation of the multi-ethnic social and political reality of Eastern European countries in the second decade of the 21st century leads to a conclusion that today the phenomenon of securitization of national and ethnic minorities is gaining new meaning. The dynamics and expansion of the range of securitization is visible (concerns not only national and ethnic minorities, but also migration and religion), as well as an increase in the number of actors (subjects) securitizing. Looking at the area of Eastern Europe, it is clear that the process of securitization of minority issues is particularly relevant to three countries – Belarus, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine – which are, at the same time, one of the sub-regions of Eastern Europe*, which is dictated, among other things, by the social and political activity of the Russian minority in these countries. Thus, this area attracts research attention and serves as the focus of author’s research.

This situation is caused, among others, by the annexation of Crimea in 2014, which provokes a discussion in public space (at the state level and in expert societies) on the role of national and ethnic minorities in shaping the security of individual countries. These

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* Within the region are the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), Eastern Slavic countries (Russian Federation, Ukraine, Republic of Belarus) and the Republic of Moldova. The studied countries (Republic of Belarus, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine) also make up an element of the area referred to as Central and Eastern Europe – a space identified on the basis of geopolitics and international relations, which in the broadest conceptual sense includes: 1) countries of the Visegrad Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary); 2) Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia); 3) Republic of Belarus, Ukraine, and Republic of Moldova); 4) countries resulting from the break-up of former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia, and Kosovo); 5) other Balkan countries (Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania) (Baluk, 2016, p. 12–13; Lach, 2014, p. 35). According to the UN classification (United Nations Department of Statistics), the area of Eastern European countries includes: Republic of Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Hungary (Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use, 2019).
events have strengthened the current public debate on the impact of the potential of national and ethnic minorities in the countries of the subregion (Belarus, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine). They have also opened up a discussion in the public space on the perception of the potential of individual non-titular ethnoses in the Eastern European countries (degree of integration or assimilation, degree of openness/closure, spatial compactness or dispersion of minority groups, proximity of the home country, and conditions for the appearance of a given minority on the territory of the host country), in terms of the risk to the existence and integrity of the country and the titular nation. The annexation of Crimea will also provoke a discussion on the effectiveness of ethnopolitical management in the countries of the subregion.

**THE NATURE AND AREAS OF SECURITIZATION PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL AND ETHNICAL MINORITIES**

The theory of securitization is related to the Copenhagen school (1990s). Ole Wæver, who implemented the securitization category in security research, defined it as a “speech act” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). According to the researcher, a specific issue is positioned in terms of existential threats. The theory of speech acts is based on the observation that with the use of language it is possible not only to transmit information, but to create social facts. This means that there are statements that not only describe the world, but also create it. The dimension of authenticity is not so important as the dimension of accuracy (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 491; Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). Therefore, it is not important whether a threat exists objectively, but how it will be presented, by whom and with what arguments. In Łukasz Fijałkowski’s optics, “the securitization theory does not focus on the understanding of security as an objective

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*Ethno-politics refers to the relationship between ethnicity and politics. It is the influence of power elites representing the state on ethnic groups, whose political elites carry out “internal” verification of the state ethno-politics, and mutual relations between the ethnic groups themselves. Thus, three categories of ethno-politics are crucial for the analysis, which we can treat as its subjects: 1) the state; 2) political elites representing, on the one hand, the state and, on the other, ethnic groups; 3) ethnic groups (Wierzbicki, 2015, p. 54).
concept, but rather on the intersubjective process of including/excluding certain issues into the sphere of security. The focus is on the variation in time of what is understood as a security issue” (Fijałkowski, 2012, pp. 57–66).

Full securitization means identifying by an act of speech (usually by a political leader) an issue as a threat to survival (a security facility), which then allows (with the agreement of the relevant public) for extraordinary measures and suspension of the “normal policy” procedure to deal with the issue (Buzan et al., 1998; Fijałkowski, 2012a, pp. 150–151). In contrast, Wojciech Kostecki points out that securitization means making a given problem public as a threat to survival, and thus non-negotiable, and justifying emergency measures to solve it. He presents the matter of defending the interests of various entities through the application of measures that go beyond the traditional, routine and specific to a given sphere of activity. Securitization is based on three elements: the reference object, securitizing actor and functional actors, which have a real impact on the perception of security (Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Kostecki, 2012). Securitization is a process in which a typical political matter is transformed by an act of speech and becomes a new threat to security. This means moving the issue from the political sphere to the area of emergency, so as to create the conditions for justified or unjustified action without the typical rules of conduct in accordance with applicable procedures. The securitization process begins with a verbal explanation or reference to a specific actor as a potential threat. Then, the potential threat is identified as real, which requires immediate countermeasures, and finally the public accepts both the existence of the threat and the need to react. This situation takes place in an atmosphere of growing fear (Balzacq et al., 2016, pp. 494–531).

THE HIGHEST RISK OF SECURITIZATION TENDENCIES TOWARDS MINORITIES SEEMS TO OCCUR IN TWO CASES

1. When a minority is large, has a high level of territorial integrity, is hermetic, has very different cultural characteristics (language, religion, value system, etc.) and has a low economic and political position. On the one hand, it becomes a “breeding ground” for populists
| Nationality          | 1989          | 1999          | 2009          | 2019          |
|----------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
|                      | population    | %             | population    | %             | population    | %             |
| **BELARUS**          |               |               |               |               |
| Belarusians          | 7,904,623     | 77.86         | 8,159,073     | 81.23         | 7,957,252     | 83.7          | –             |
| Russians             | 1,324,099     | 13.22         | 1,141,731     | 11.38         | 785,084       | 8.3           | –             |
| Poles                | 417,720       | 4.15          | 395,712       | 3.95          | 294,549       | 3.1           | –             |
| Ukrainians           | 291,008       | 2.87          | 237,014       | 2.37          | 158,723       | 1.7           | –             |
| Jews                 | 111,977       | 1.10          | 27,810        | 0.28          | 12,926        | 0.1           | –             |
| Armenians            | 4,933         | 0.05          | 10,191        | 0.11          | 8,512         | 0.1           | –             |
| Tartars              | 12,522        | 0.12          | 10,146        | 0.11          | 7,316         | 0.1           | –             |
| Roma                 | 10,762        | 0.11          | 9,927         | 0.10          | 7,079         | 0.1           | –             |
| Lithuanians          | 7,606         | 0.07          | 6,387         | 0.06          | 5,087         | 0.1           | –             |
| Azerbaijanis         | 5,009         | 0.05          | 6,362         | 0.06          | 5,567         | 0.1           | –             |
| Germans              | 3,517         | 0.03          | 4,805         | 0.05          | 2,474         | 0.02          | –             |
| Moldavians           | 4,964         | 0.05          | 4,267         | 0.04          | 3,465         | 0.03          | –             |
| Georgians            | 2,840         | 0.03          | 3,031         | 0.03          | 2,400         | 0.02          | –             |
| Chuvash              | 3,323         | 0.03          | 2,242         | 0.02          | 1,277         | 0.01          | –             |
| Latvians             | 2,658         | 0.02          | 2,239         | 0.02          | 1,549         | 0.01          | –             |
| Killers              | 2,620         | 0.02          | 1,677         | 0.01          | 877           | 0.01          | –             |
| Uzbeks               | 3,537         | 0.03          | 1,571         | 0.01          | 1,593         | 0.01          | –             |
| Kazakhs              | 2,266         | 0.02          | 1,239         | 0.01          | 1,355         | 0.01          | –             |
| Bashkirs             | 1,252         | 0.01          | 1,091         | 0.01          | 607           | 0.01          | –             |
| other nationalities  | 16,469        | 0.16          | 14,876        | 0.15          | 246,115       | 2.47          | –             |
| **Total**            | 10,151,806    | 100           | 10,045,237    | 100           | 9,503,807     | 100           | 9,475,200     |
| **THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA** |           |               |               |               |
| Nationality          | 1989          | 2004          | 2014          |               |
|                      | population    | %             | population    | %             |
| Moldovans and Romanians | 2,773,500    | 64.5          | –             | –             |
| Moldavans            | –             | –             | 2,533,836     | 79.1          | 2,068,058     | 75.1          |
| Ukrainians           | 593,400       | 13.8          | 227,750       | 7.1           | 181,035       | 6.6           |
| Russians             | 559,000       | 13.0          | 129,664       | 5.9           | 111,726       | 4.1           |
| Jews                 | 64,500        | 1.5           | –             | –             | –             | –             |
## THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

| Nationality    | 1989 | 2004 | 2014 |
|----------------|------|------|------|
|                | population | %    | population | %    | population | %    |
| Bulgarians     | 86,000 | 2.0  | 59,489 | 1.9  | 51,867 | 1.9  |
| Romanians      | –     | –    | 70,215 | 2.2  | 192,800 | 7.0  |
| Gagauzi        | 150,500 | 3.5  | 144,268 | 4.5  | 126,010 | 4.1  |
| Roma           | –     | –    | –     | –    | 9,323  | 0.3  |
| other nationalities | 73,100 | 1.7  | 22,702 | 0.7  | 13,900 | 0.5  |
| undeclared     | 25,800 | 0.6  | 13,894 | 0.4  | 50,082 | –    |
| **Total**      | 4,300,000 | 100  | 3,201,818 | 100 | 2,804,801 | –    |

Source: own study based on: *Nacional’nyj sostav naseleniâ Ukrainy Belarus’* 2009 (2009); *Nacional’nyj sostav naseleniâ Ukrainy* 2001 (2001); *Recensamant.statistica* 2014 (2014); *Nacional’nyj statičeskij komitet Respubliki Belarus’* 2019 (2019).

## UKRAINE

| Nationality     | 1989     | 2001     | 2019  |
|-----------------|----------|----------|-------|
|                 | population | %    | population | %    | population |
| Ukrainians      | 37,419,000 | 72.7  | 37,541,700 | 77.8  | –    |
| Russians        | 11,355,600 | 22.1  | 8,334,100 | 17.3  | –    |
| Jews            | 486,300   | 0.94  | 103,600   | 0.2   | –    |
| Belarusians     | 440,000   | 0.85  | 275,800   | 0.6   | –    |
| Moldavians      | 324,500   | 0.63  | 258,600   | 0.5   | –    |
| Bulgarians      | 233,800   | 0.45  | 204,600   | 0.4   | –    |
| Poles           | 219,200   | 0.42  | 144,100   | 0.3   | –    |
| Hungarians      | 163,100   | 0.32  | 156,600   | 0.3   | –    |
| Romanians       | 134,800   | 0.26  | 151,000   | 0.3   | –    |
| Greeks          | 98,600    | 0.19  | 91,500    | 0.2   | –    |
| Tartars         | 86,900    | 0.17  | 73,300    | 0.2   | –    |
| Armenians       | 54,200    | 0.11  | 99,900    | 0.2   | –    |
| Gypsies (Roma)  | 47,900    | 0.09  | 47,600    | 0.1   | –    |
| Crimean Tatars  | 46,800    | 0.09  | 248,200   | 0.5   | –    |
| Germans         | 37,800    | 0.07  | 33,300    | 0.1   | –    |
| Azeri           | 37,000    | 0.07  | 45,200    | 0.1   | –    |
| Gagauzes        | 32,000    | 0.06  | 31,900    | 0.1   | –    |
| Georgians       | 23,600    | 0.04  | 34,200    | 0.1   | –    |
| other nationalities | 210,800 | 0.38  | 177,100   | 0.4   | –    |
| **Total**       | 51,452,000 | 100  | 48,052,300 | 100 | 42,288,000 | –    |

Source: own study based on: *Nacional’nyj sostav naseleniâ Ukrainy Belarus’* 2009 (2009); *Nacional’nyj sostav naseleniâ Ukrainy* 2001 (2001); *Recensamant.statistica* 2014 (2014); *Nacional’nyj statičeskij komitet Respubliki Belarus’* 2019 (2019).
or radical groups, as it does not have the political power and/or pressure to fight off possible attacks, while on the other hand, its low degree of openness and difference help it to be placed as a “scapegoat” by dissatisfied masses of the majority society. There may also be fears of the emergence of a “parallel society” and, possibly, in connection with the alleged “maladjustment” of members of minorities to the existing socio-economic conditions, an increase in their numbers, the creation of ghettos, which are a source of social pathologies, “overburdening” the social care system, etc. This community may, however, undergo the process of emancipation and despite many weaknesses, including those of an economic nature, and the lack of cultural elites, become an important political force (these weaknesses of the minority group in question, however, make it dependent on external help, e.g., from the home country, necessary for the development of national life, may also encourage actions with a high potential for illegality such as drawing funds from criminal activities, taking radical forms of contestation of the democratic system, or activities of a terrorist nature). As a result, a given minority becomes a real threat to the state within whose borders they exist, and even to stability in the region.

2. A minority is characterized by its hermetic nature and significant diversity of cultural characteristics, a high degree of concentration and significant size, significant economic and political power and a very good level of organization. There is a fear of the “foreign”, unknown in the majority society, additionally reinforced by fears of domination (economic, political, and cultural) of the national/ethnic minority and its possible centrifugal tendencies, if it lives near the home country (Szyszak, 2015, p. 108).

In the Eastern European countries, the main areas of securitization of the problems of national and ethnic minorities belong to: 1) ethnodemographic area (including national/ethnic identity, as well as language and religion of individual national and ethnic minorities) (Karolak-Michalska, 2020); 2) ethnodemographic area (including the number and nature of groups) of individual national and ethnic minorities, as well as the participation of a given minority in the socio-economic structure of a given society); 3) the ethnopolitical area (including a catalog of rights belonging to individual minorities, as well as their aspirations to change their status); 4) the ethnopolitical area (including the participation of minorities in the bodies of
legislative, executive, and judicial power, as well as in local government units of individual states; activity of minorities in political parties and non-governmental organizations). Minorities are to create a risk for the survival of the state, dominant nation, national religion, language, values, etc. The issue of threats to the security of the members of minorities themselves may arise, although these are incidental. The process of securitization of minority issues can take place both at the level of public discourse and in the adoption of concrete solutions and actions, both at national and local level (Szyszlak, 2015, p. 106).

Securitization of the issues of national and ethnic minorities in the countries of the subregion has a mixed character and does not concern all minorities – in practice, it depends mainly on the actual number of members of a given minority in the ethnic structure of the country.

In the case of minorities whose participation in the society of individual European countries is marginal (e.g., the Lithuanian minority in Belarus, the Polish minority in the Republic of Moldova, the Latvian minority in Ukraine), securitization issues usually do not occur, and if it resounds in public discourse, it is incidental and concerns specific cases of behavior of representatives of specific national or ethnic minorities (e.g., Roma minority). What is particularly important in each of these areas in the studied Eastern European countries, a different minority is securitized, and the degree of its securitization also differs (Table 2).

| aspect          | Belarus minority | Republic of Moldova minority | Ukraine minority |
|-----------------|------------------|------------------------------|------------------|
| Ethnic identity | Polish           | Russian, Romanian            | Russian, Hungarian |
| Ethnodemographic| –                | Russian, Romanian, Bulgarian | Russian, Hungarian |
| Ethno-lawful    | –                | Russian                      | Russian          |
| Ethnopolitical  | Polish           | Russian                      | Russian          |

Source: own study.

A special place in the problem of securitization of national and ethnic minorities against the Eastern European background is occupied by the Russian minority – securitization both in the ethnoidentity,
ethnodemographic and ethnopolitical area mainly in Ukraine. When considering securitization of the Russian minority in the ethnodemographic field, we should first of all refer to its demographic potential. In Ukraine, the Russian minority accounted for 17.3% of the total Ukrainian population, i.e., 8.1 million, being spread over the country’s entire territory in 2001. It held a special position in the southern regions (26.9% of the total: Kherson Oblast Russian – 14.1%; Nikolaev Oblast – 14.1%; Odessa Oblast – 20.7%; Autonomous Republic of Crimea – 58.5%; city of Sevastopol 71.6%) and Eastern (29% of the total: Dnipropetrovsk Oblast 17.6%; Donetsk Oblast 38.2%; Kharkiv Oblast 25.6%; Lugansk Oblast 39%; Zaporizhia Oblast 24.7%), while at the same time becoming a significant factor influencing the ethnic differentiation of Ukrainian regions (including Crimea) (Nacional’nyj, 2001). What is particularly important is that “the Ukrainian Russians do not feel they are an influential population. Most of them consider themselves indigenous because they are the descendants of displaced persons or settled in Ukraine as part of internal migration, when the ethnic factor was replaced by Soviet identity. Russians have a high status in the social structure of Ukraine” (Kubaczyk et al., 2017, p. 239). The Russian population – living mainly in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine – is also an important part of the local professional staff, being an important “element” of the local electorate. The presence of Russians in Ukraine not only significantly changes the ethnic structure of the state, but also significantly affects linguistic dualism. The lack of data concerning the current number of the Russian population in Ukraine (the last population census was carried out in 2001, the next one, according to the announcements of the Ukrainian state authorities, is to take place in 2020) makes it difficult to establish their exact number. Nevertheless, the estimates indicate that currently there are about 8 million Russians living on the Ukrainian soil. An example of securitization of the demographic potential of the Russian minority can be seen in the events of the annexation of Crimea in 2014, when the inhabitants of eastern Ukrainian regions (Odessa, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Lugansk regions) who organized anti-Russian protests also referred to the Russian minority in their slogans, such as “through which the annexation took place”; “If there were no Russians in Ukraine, we would have peace of mind”; “The Russians owe everything – let them divide their country, not ours”; “It is the Russians, it is the Russian minority in Ukraine...
that threatens the integrity of our country”; “Russians from Ukraine to Russia. There are too many of you here”; “Russians go home – nobody wants you here”; “Russians give up the Ukrainian land!”; “Let Putin finally take his own, they owe the divisions of people in Ukraine, they owe the divisions of Ukrainian land” (Demonstracii, 2017).

It should be added that the higher the difference in qualitative and quantitative structure, the stronger its correlation with state security – potentially in more ethnically diverse countries, internal security (e.g., in the form of the emergence of separatist movements, attempts to change the status of certain non-titular nations) and external security (e.g., in the form of intervention by the home state of a given minority) are more likely to be threatened. This relationship is based on feedback – the security of the state both internal and external also affects the ethnic diversity of the countries concerned, which is manifested, inter alia, in migration movements or the return of particular ethnoses to their historical homelands. The ethnic structure of the countries of the subregion should also be taken into account by the state authorities in the practice of ethnopolitical management. Thoughtful and taking into consideration a number of factors (including the ethnic structure of society), the process of planning, organizing, and monitoring of ethno-politics in a certain country also helps to ensure its security.

In the ethnic identity area, in turn, Russians in both Belarus, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine are being securitized because of their national identity. This situation is, on the one hand, determined by historical circumstances (it was the Russia that played a key role and social-political and cultural position in the ethnic mosaic of the USSR republics, forming the core of the Soviet population). On the other hand, the current position of the omnipresent Russian culture and language in the states of the subregion, as well as the ethnic policy of the Russian Federation towards its citizens living outside the borders of their historical homeland, ready even to intervene by force to defend the rights of Russians living in the post-Soviet area (as confirmed by the events of the annexation of Crimea in 2014). In this context, an example of securitization of the national identity of the Russian minority may be associated with formal political activity. For example, the “Russian Block” Party, which represents the interests of Russians in Ukraine, repeatedly during numerous demonstrations, conferences, and meetings,
pointed to the determinants of Russian identity, including the Russian language, showing its “superiority” over the Ukrainian language. There were slogans among politicians: “Russian identity is above Ukrainian”; “Let the Ukrainian authorities accept that Russian identity plays a significant role in Ukrainian society”; “The Russian language should have a state status – let the Ukrainian authorities finally accept the superiority of what is Russian over what is Ukrainian”; “Russian identity has a central place in the post-Soviet space. No other national identity, including the Ukrainian one, can match it”; “Ukraine accept that your national identity is Russian”; “The Russian identity in Ukraine is the only right choice! Other solutions are not good”; “Russian identity is the best choice for Ukraine – if such a solution is not adopted peacefully, it is possible that it will have to be introduced by other methods” (Deâtel’nost, 2017). This is how the slogans met with the reaction of the public – such rhetoric appeared in public discourse that Russian identity may be a source of threat to the evolution of Ukrainian identity.

In the ethnic-rights area, securitization of the Russian minority concerns, among others, recognition of Russian as a second official language in Ukraine. The main arguments of supporters of giving this status to Russian are: support for the Russian-speaking citizens, specificity of the southern and eastern regions historically formed in the conditions of influence of the Russian language and culture, lack of regulation of the language issue leading to separatist/irredentist tendencies of the Russian-speaking population, demographic potential of the Russian minority. On the other hand, the opponents are right in pointing to the lack of restrictions on the use of Russian in Ukraine, therefore, there is no need to change its position. In the above context, an example of securitization of the change in the status of the Russian language in Ukraine is the Donbass war, which has been commented on in the Ukrainian state media, and which in its rhetoric refers to the Russian-speaking population living in the occupied territories, pointing out, on the one hand, that it is both a “victim” of separatist activities and, on the other hand, that it has “contributed”, among other things, by its activities aimed at changing the status of the Russian language into the official language to the situation in the region.

In the ethnopolitical area, securitization of the Russian minority concerns its activity in political parties and NGOs. In 2013,
14 pro-Russian parties were active in Ukraine with the aim of creating a pro-Russian movement on Ukrainian territory (for comparison, Hungarians have two political parties). For instance, the Russian Bloc took part in the parliamentary elections in 2012, and its leaders (2), won in the majority of the districts. In turn, within NGOs, the interests of the Russian minority are represented by about 96 organizations, some of which have a national status (e.g., the “Russian Community of Ukraine”). The Romanian minority, in contrast, has 19 organizations (Teres & Jakubowski, 2015, pp. 524–525).

In the years 1991–2019, the Russian minority organizations adopted an ethnopolitical and ethnocultural character. An example of securitization of Russians in the ethnopolitical dimension can be the anti-Russian marches in the cities of the Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk regions, which took place, among others, in February 2015: “The Russian Community of Crimea is to blame for everything”; “You should have banned your organizations – you used our good Ukrainian heart”; “Organizations of Russians in Ukraine are a threat to our country”; “Organizations of the Russian minority are at the service of Putin – it threatens Ukraine”; “No more leniency of the organizational activity of Russians – no more demonstrations”; “Ban the organizations of Russians in Ukraine” (Demonstracii, 2017).

By studying the activity of national and ethnic minorities in political parties and NGOs, it can be noted that the particular importance for country security, as well as the management of its ethno-politics are those organized activities that report the centrifugal, separatist activities. In comparison with the subregion countries, in the case of Belarus this problem does not exist, while in the Republic of Moldova (Gagauzia and Transnistria) and Ukraine (Crimea, Donbass, and Transcarpathia) it has a crucial dimension. Separatist tendencies of particular ethnic groups are an important element in shaping ethno-politics and country security policy. They are also becoming a space in which the reaction of the government authorities is necessary, including the skillful management of ethnopolitical processes in the country. It seems crucial that separatist issues should not be “temporarily frozen” but peacefully resolved without disturbing the territorial integrity of countries. Research on the “ethnic realities” and socio-political activity of individual minorities in the Eastern Europe indicates that it would be a mistake to claim that the dynamics of national processes in the subregion has been exhausted.
Actually, in all countries we are dealing with different examples of ethnic tensions (e.g., as a result of securitization of national and ethnic minority issues), which may result in internal or international conflicts (of different destructive power) affecting the process of ethnopolitical management.

**ACTORS AND TOOLS FOR SECURITIZATION OF PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL AND ETHNICAL MINORITIES**

A special role in the securitization process is played by the securitizing actors (entities) and the auditorium: “The first point to the security risk of a given object (security object), starting the securitization process as if and directing this message to the audience. The last may either accept the argumentation or reject it and de facto decide on the success or failure of the process. If the first option wins, there will be an opportunity to take non-standard countermeasures” (Fijałkowski, 2012, p. 155), although their use is not a condition for full securitization (Szyszlak, 2015, p. 105). This unique role of securitizing actors (subjects) is contained in the fact that it is the subject (actor) who defines a given matter — in this case, the issue of national and ethnic minorities — as belonging to the scope of security, pointing to it as a serious source of danger. For the success of the securitization process, it is important that the securitizing actors reach the audience with their message, for which it will be convincing. In the case of the issue of national and ethnic minorities, the arguments used are mainly addressed to people who perceive this subject as important from the point of view of perceived as actual or potential threats to the security of their own or local community, their own ethnic group, the country of living (these threats may be of a different nature: economic, cultural, political, etc.). There are many motives of securitizing actors and they cannot always be clearly defined:

It seems that this is easiest to do for politicians and political parties. Including the issues of national and ethnic minorities in the scope of security, they hope above all to take over the segment of the electorate, which in the act of choosing political representatives will express its concerns about national and ethnic minorities and/or its dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs. It may also be a way to create a clear political image, to mark one’s political distinctiveness (Szyszlak, 2015, p. 114; Buzan & Wæver, 2003).
Experts in the subject agree that a special role as a securitizer falls to the government, which is dictated by the catalogue of instruments at its disposal in the process of including minority issues in the area of security and due to the impact on the implementation of specific policies of the country, including ethnic and cultural policy (Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Buzan et al., 1998; Szyszłak, 2015, p. 114; Fijałkowski, 2012a). It is worth mentioning that the objectives of the government may be different: from distracting society’s attention from other problems, the intention to win/maintain the support of citizens, through limiting the influence of minorities (cultural, economic, political, etc.). The main actors of the securitization process may also include local government (securitization of minority issues may also be a way to draw attention to a given region by showing “problems with a minority” and to obtain additional support from the headquarters to overcome them), NGOs, as well as the media (primarily by creating the image of national and ethnic minorities as a source of security threats; in the case of the media, this most often concerns the local mass media, but also national media) (Szyszłak, 2015, p. 115; Fijałkowski, 2012a, p. 115; Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Buzan et al., 1998). There may be also the third actor in securitization, namely, mother countries, pointing out the threats to the security of their minorities in another country or countries and taking “extraordinary” measures to prevent them (in a radical form these measures may take the form of force intervention).

In securitization theory, a special case is when an actor in the process of securitization of minority issues becomes a minority itself, or more precisely its representatives:

The identity, language, values, cultural material heritage of the minority, etc. and even the physical survival of the ethnic group itself are presented as endangered in its existence. The political and economic activities of decision-makers, as well as churches and religious associations, majority society or other ethnic groups, the media are defined as a source of danger. The aim of these actions may be to draw attention to the threats faced by a minority, but it may be to facilitate the intervention of third countries, including the mother country (Szyszłak, 2015, p. 115; see also: Buzan & Wæver, 2003).

Taking up the issue of considering securitization of national and ethnic minorities carried out by individual entities in the Eastern European countries, it is also necessary to refer to the aspect
of practice of the activities of the indicated entities. Observations of the socio-political reality of the countries of the subregion indicate that, first of all, it is extremely difficult to determine exactly the specificity of their activities – although they show some similarities in action, mainly concerning the time and circumstances of their increased activity, they still clearly retain their specificity of action both in the dimension of a given country (against the background of other securitizing entities) and against the background of the subregion (the same category of entities, e.g., political parties in comparative terms in Belarus, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine).

According to the position and activity of a given actor on the social and political scene, a communication is formed for a specific group of recipients (audience). The addressees of the message – depending on the extent of a given securitization actor’s influence – are either a narrower audience (e.g., in the case of local media) or a wider audience (e.g., in the case of nationwide media). Another “force” of the message will come from the state authorities with special powers and instruments, and another from the regional (local) population, whose voice is often not heard. For example, the President of the Council of the Republic of Belarus, Mikhail Myasnikovich, who visited Poland in February 2019, gave an interview to the Polish Press Agency in which he expressed his negative assessment of Polish schools in Belarus, suggesting that they may contribute to stimulating the ethnic emigration of Poles from Belarus to Poland (Prezes, 2019). This information became publicly available, quoted in the press as well as on many Internet portals. It points out that in the case of the media in the Eastern European countries, the securitization of the issues of national and ethnic minorities has a diverse character. It depends on whether we have contact with state or private media (e.g., representing the interests of a given group), as well as the extent (national or local) of their influence and channels of access to recipients (Internet, press, etc.).

The author’s own research carried out in the countries of the subregion leads to the conclusion that often it is the minority itself or the population living in individual regions of a given country that secures a given area of national and ethnic minorities (e.g., mother language of a minority). This situation particularly concerns the Russians in Ukraine living in the eastern part of the country, who, by undertaking long-term (since 1991) activity to change the status
of the language, evoke negative moods among the Ukrainian society. An example of a situation which was met with reluctance of the Ukrainian society in the Dnipropetrovsk region towards the activity of Russians to change the status of the Russian language was the sending by the Russians from the Slavic Party of an official letter aiming at changing the status of the Russian language to an official language to President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on February 12th, 2001. Thanking the head of state for his visit to Dnipropetrovsk, which they called “Novorossiya”, they expressed their concern about the discrimination of the Russian language, asking Putin to regulate this issue. In response to the letter, local residents, including those of Ukrainian nationality, took to the streets demonstrating the slogans that the goal of the aspirations of the Russian minority to give the Russian language the official language status in Ukraine was to “disturb the existing order and threaten the security of Ukraine” (Obrašenie, 2001).

Local authorities, which are obliged to react to local events, especially in the context of ensuring security within the territorial unit they are in charge of, also need a commentary. It should be added that many times the leaders of local authorities are representatives of individual minorities, and their positions are treated first of all as a kind of opportunity to realize the interests of the ethnic group from which they come. For example, such practices were very intensive in the south-eastern regions of Ukraine. Trying to change the position of the Russian language, also the leader of the Russian minority – in 2010 Governor E. Matvijcuk of Odessa, declared that Russian will have an official language status in the Odessa region because it flows “in the blood of its inhabitants”. Moreover, it is a means of international communication for them, so its status should be raised (Odeskij, 2010; Žiteli, 2009).

Observation of the activity of entities securitizing the issues of national and ethnic minorities in the states of the subregion leads to the conclusion that they have a diverse character (they concern different minorities) and retain their own specificity.
THE IMPACT OF SECURITIZATION ON THE PROCESS OF ETHNOPOLITICAL MANAGEMENT IN THE STUDIED COUNTRIES

In the process of managing ethno-politics, understood as “the whole process of planning, management, as well as supervision of detailed country policy, which is carried out by public authorities on the basis of a number of internal and external conditions”, the awareness of the existing securitization of the issues of national and ethnic minorities in various areas (identity, ethnodemographic, ethnolegal, and ethnopolitical) seems to be crucial for the effectiveness of the management process, and also constitutes an important element in planning, management and supervision of ethno-politics in individual states of the subregion. From the point of view of ethno-politics management, it seems particularly important to carry out detailed analysis of securitization of national and ethnic minorities issues, including the ethnodemographic, ethnopolitical, ethnolegal as well as problems of ethnoidentity. Particular analyses are required for securitization of social-political activity of national and ethnic minorities.

The author’s own research leads to the conclusion that effective ethnopoltical governance strongly correlates with security and its system in a given Eastern European country. In order to promote a sense of improved security in the ethnopolitical dimension of the subregion’s countries (especially the Republic of Moldova due to the conflict in Transnistria and Ukraine due to the Donbass war), it is necessary above all to: 1) treat each of the inhabitants of a given territorial unit (in a unique way, areas intensely diversified ethically) as a special security entity; 2) build an organization of a system of forces and measures to ensure ethnopolitical security that would

* In defining ethnopolitical security, we define a complex system of state measures to prevent and resolve conflicts. Ethnopolitical security is an element of the whole system of state and international security. The direct sources of the main problems in the sphere of ethnopolitical security are security threats, defined as phenomena causing fear or anxiety. The sources of threats are mainly contemporary ethnic conflicts, negative effects of long-term political, social, economic, and geopolitical crises. In turn, the indirect causes of the increase in the deficit of the ethnopolitical security area include: excessive ethnic, demographic, social, and economic diversity within the states and disproportions in the level of social and economic development of the subregion states. They also initiate such phenomena as the intensification of criminalization of societies (especially as regards the increase in corruption-generation, dynamics of terrorism and extremism, and increased activity of international organized crime) (Olędzka, 2017, p. 56–58; Weller & Wolff, 2008, p. 7–8).
correspond to the level of threats; 3) adapt the necessary level of financing of the security system to the identified and monitored ethno-political threats; 4) educate personnel with professional background; 5) apply the approach to the functioning of the ethno-political security system against the background of a clearly defined development and state security strategy, and 6) manage the security system as a whole efficiently (Kwieciński, 2009, p. 9). Moreover, the bodies responsible for ethno-political security in the states of the subregion should focus on the process of its management.

In the countries of the subregion (Belarus, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine), there are still no important achievements to treat ethno-political security as a specific “product” of a good country. It points out that the protection of the subregion’s countries against threats of an ethno-political nature should be strengthened and addressed: 1) prevention – aimed at preventing the emergence of a threat (including securitization) and, if not possible, limiting its effects; 2) preparation – assessment of potential threats (including those related to securitization), their analysis and determination of the degree of probability of a given threat occurring; planning tasks should be carried out, developed options and procedures for action in hazardous situations, identification of one’s own forces and means necessary to take and carry out actions; 3) response – focusing rescue actions and estimating losses; 4) reconstruction – restoring the living conditions of the population and functioning of municipal systems and administrative structures in a given area in the shortest possible time. It seems particularly important that the process of ensuring state security is continuous and immediate at all levels of governance. It should be added that

(...) the essence of efficient management of the process of ensuring state security is the precise and rapid translation of the strategic concept developed at the highest level of management into specific objectives (included in field strategies) for individual elements of the state security system or contractors in individual sectors of administration (ministers or heads of government administration organizational units), and then into detailed sub-tasks implemented at the operational level (Kulisz, 2011, p. 110).

It should be remembered that due to the dynamics of changes in the security environment, as well as the limitations in building potential event scenarios and difficulties in forecasting (e.g., due
to the lack of comprehensive data), one can only talk about the state of state security, including in the ethnopolitical dimension, more or less close to an ideal state.

The existence of separate titular and non-titular nations within a given territory, as well as securitization of the issues of national and ethnic minorities is connected with a serious challenge to the security of individual countries, as well as with the challenge of ethnopolitical management. Particularly telling is the situation when the state conducts an ethnopolitical policy hostile to a given minority, considering it as an actual or potential threat to its security, or possibly an ethnopolitical indifference to minorities. It is characterized, e.g., by a lack of support for their culture, appropriate legal regulations, institutional solutions etc. As a consequence, this situation may result in the development of extremist movements, both in the majority society and among minorities, the latter being a tool for achieving their goals, e.g., in the form of separatist aspirations, or simply minority struggles for their rights or survival.

Looking for an answer to the question about the impact of securitization on ethnopolitical governance processes in Eastern European countries, we can see that: 1) in each of the countries, this impact has its specificity and depends on the subject (of a given minority) and the entity (securitizer); 2) it concerns all stages of the process of ethnopolitical governance – especially planning, which as a result of securitization often requires redefining the instruments of influencing the ethnopolitics, their strengthening or complete change; 3) may be both positive (forces the development of new ethnopolitical solutions to ensure ethnopolitical security in a given country) and negative (may encourage hostile state ethnopolitics towards a given minority); 4) uncontrolled securitization may lead to a deepening of the subregion’s security crisis (e.g., to ethnopolitical conflicts), hindering the process of ethnopolitical governance. In comparison with the subregion countries, the influence of securitization of minority issues on the processes of ethnopolitical management is particularly visible in Ukraine (it concerns the Russian minority). As a result of the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass, the Ukrainian authorities are redefining ethno-politics and introducing new solutions in its scope, e.g., concerning language issues (in 2019 a law limiting the number of classes in schools with learning in the mother tongue came into force).
CONCLUSION

Securitization of the issues of national and ethnic minorities in the Eastern European countries is a phenomenon that takes on a different degree of intensification, which depends, among other things, on the number of securitizing actors and their interests, their socio-political position, as well as the range of impact, finally, on the subject of securitization related to ethnic diversity and socio-political activity of individual national and ethnic minorities. It points out that individual areas of securitization of national and ethnic minorities may be: a) securitized by given actors (e.g., government, political parties, NGOs, media, third countries, and the minority itself); b) desecuritized by a group of the same actors; c) securitized and desecuritized – the actors may use a hybrid approach, consisting of, on the one hand, selective securitization and partial desecuritization of individual conditions (e.g., securitized is the socio-political activity of a minority, but not its mother language). The research and own observations lead to the conclusion that the effectiveness of securitization by individual entities depends on the sensitivity and vulnerability of the society of the subregion’s countries (Belarusian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian) to a specific type of narrative, but also on the positional strength of the securitization entities. On the one hand, it shows what individual societies of Eastern European countries are afraid of in relation to non-titular nations living on their territories. On the other hand, it provides an impulse for the state authorities to work out systemic solutions in the field of ethnopolitical management that will eliminate these fears. The phenomenon of securitization of minorities will particularly affect the Russian population living in the countries of the subregion – mainly in Ukraine (as a result of the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass), and also in the Republic of Moldova (mainly due to the conflict in Transnistria), affecting the process of ethnopolitical management in these countries. In Belarus, where the Russian minority has a special position (the Russian language has the status of second national language), securitization of this minority, if any, is marginal. While creating the management of ethno-politics, the authorities of the subregion should keep in mind that well-prepared mechanisms for the functioning of ethno-politics (including those monitoring securitization of national and ethnic minorities, as well
as identifying the actors of securitization) give a chance for Belarus, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine, respectively to adapt to effective functioning in the conditions of a complex socio-economic reality in the post-Soviet space, which is particularly important in achieving optimal solutions for local multi-ethnic societies. When the Belarusian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian authorities undertake to develop the principles and mechanisms of ethno-politics in their countries, they must not forget that this policy will be implemented in a situation where different ethnic groups have different or even divergent interests, between them there is usually polarization in the resources at their disposal, in the scale of their influence, and differentiation in relation to their ability to pursue their interests. The effectiveness of ethno-politics will depend, on the one hand, on the outline of the level of cooperation between them (different ethnic groups) and on the definition of what is the social or national interest in an ethnic context. On the other hand, whether the divergence of interests between ethnic groups will not become such a significant barrier (e.g., as a result of securitization of minority issues) that it will hinder the construction of ethnopoliitical principles and mechanisms. It is important that, in a situation where the development of an agreement is blocked, the state authorities should carry out social dialogue. Ethno-politics in the states of the subregion should include ideas for solving problems in its scope (including those related to securitization of the issues of national and ethnic minorities), actions in this area, as well as the results and their evaluation (Peters, 2004, pp. 4–6; Kraft & Furlong, 2007, pp. 4–5).

In managing ethno-politics, it is important to balance the expectations of ethnically diverse interest groups. It is crucial that the actions of state authorities in the implementation of ethno-politics take into account three main levels: 1) the level of awareness of the issues of diversity in social life (including those related to securitization of national and ethnic minorities) and its consequences for the management of ethno-politics; 2) the level of structure, processes, and procedures in the country, in which there may be errors leading to discrimination of particular ethnic groups, e.g., as a result of securitization of their issues (at this level, indicators of representation of individual ethnic groups in the authorities may be an indication for the identification of problems); 3) the level of behavior, relating to the actual attitudes and behavior of individual ethnic
communities living in one country and for the purposes, on the one hand, set by national or ethnic minority organizations, on the other hand, by the state in terms of ethnic policy. This level is shaped both by the degree of awareness of individual ethnic groups living in a given country, as well as systemic solutions at the level of procedures and processes taking place in the country. When managing ethno-politics, the government must, in a way, “equip itself” with the idea that ethnic policy requires constant and in-depth research, focusing, among other things, on questions about it: 1) are the changes in ethno-politics systematic, resulting from some common vector, or are they rather the result of ad hoc actions at the tactical or operational level (including those related to securitization of national and ethnic minorities)?; 2) do changes in ethno-politics lead to consolidation of minorities (and their political mobilization) or rather weaken ethnic separateness (inter alia, due to fears of disclosure)?; 3) how will ethno-politics change at the local and regional level, and are these changes affected by possible existing securitization of individual areas of the issues of national and ethnic minorities? Without taking into account the processes of securitization of national and ethnic minority issues occurring in the countries of the subregion, the management of ethno-politics in Belarus, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine, respectively, will not be optimal.

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ROLA SEKURYTYZACJI Mniejszości Narodowych i Etnicznych w Zarządzaniu Etnopolityką w Państwach Europy Wschodniej

Abstrakt

Tło. Wzrost złożoności sytuacji społecznej i politycznej państw Europy Wschodniej rodzi pytania o sekurytyzację mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych oraz jej wpływ na zarządzanie etnopolityką w państwach subregionu. Zainteresowanie badawcze sekurytyzacją problematyki mniejszości jest aktualne (zwłaszcza po aneksji Krymu w 2014 roku) i zyskuje na znaczeniu.

Cele badawcze. Celem jest określenie roli sekurytyzacji mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w zarządzaniu etnopolityką w państwach Europy Wschodniej. Obszar badań obejmuje: Białoruś, Republikę Mołdawii i Ukrainę. Pytania badawcze przybierają następującą postać: 1) Jakie są obszary sekurytyzacji dotyczące mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych? 2) Kto i w jaki sposób dokonuje sekurytyzacji mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych? 3) W jaki sposób sekurytyzacja wpływa na proces zarządzania etnopolityką w badanych państwach?

Metodologia. Zastosowano interdyscyplinarné podejście badawcze, integrujące metody z zakresu nauk politycznych, stosunków międzynarodowych i zarządzania. Wykorzystano wnioski z badań własnych autora, przeprowadzonych podczas zagranicznych wyjazdów studyjnych w latach 2014–2017. Literatura ma charakter interdyscyplinarny. W badaniach wykorzystano przede wszystkim: analizę systemową; metodę porównawczą; metodę behawioralną; w realizowanych badaniach wykorzystano również podejście jakościowe. W artykule wykorzystano metodę krytycznej analizy literatury, w której odwołano się do koncepcji sekurytyzacji.

Kluczowe wnioski. Rola sekurytyzacji mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w zarządzaniu etnopolityką w państwach Europy Wschodniej jest zróżnicowana (dotyczy różnych mniejszości i różnych obszarów). Niekontrolowana może prowadzić do pogłębienia się kryzysu bezpieczeństwa w subregionie (m.in. do konfliktów etnopolitycznych), utrudniając proces zarządzania etnopolityką.

Słowa kluczowe: zarządzanie etnopolityczne, sekurytyzacja, mniejszości narodowe i etniczne, mniejszość rosyjska, obszar poradziecki, Europa Wschodnia.