VISUAL PROMPTING FOR ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS

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ABSTRACT

In this work, we leverage visual prompting (VP) to improve adversarial robustness of a fixed, pre-trained model at test time. Compared to conventional adversarial defenses, VP allows us to design universal (\textit{i.e.}, data-agnostic) input prompting templates, which have plug-and-play capabilities at test time to achieve desired model performance without introducing much computation overhead. Although VP has been successfully applied to improving model generalization, it remains elusive whether and how it can be used to defend against adversarial attacks. We investigate this problem and show that the vanilla VP approach is not effective in adversarial defense since a universal input prompt lacks the capacity for robust learning against sample-specific adversarial perturbations. To circumvent it, we propose a new VP method, termed Class-wise Adversarial Visual Prompting (C-AVP), to generate class-wise visual prompts so as to not only leverage the strengths of ensemble prompts but also optimize their interrelations to improve model robustness. Our experiments show that C-AVP outperforms the conventional VP method, with 2.1× standard accuracy gain and 2× robust accuracy gain. Compared to classical test-time defenses, C-AVP also yields a 42× inference time speedup. Code is available at https://github.com/Phoveran/vp-for-adversarial-robustness.

Index Terms— visual prompting, adversarial defense, adversarial robustness

1 Introduction

Machine learning (ML) models can easily be manipulated (by an adversary) to output drastically different classifications. Thereby, model robustification against adversarial attacks is now a major focus of research. Yet, a large volume of existing works focused on training recipes and/or model architectures to gain robustness. Adversarial training (AT) \cite{AT}, one of the most effective defense, adopted min-max optimization to minimize the worst-case training loss induced by adversarial attacks. Extended from AT, various defense methods were proposed, ranging from supervised learning to semi-supervised learning, and further to unsupervised learning \cite{AT2,AT3,AT4,AT5,AT6,AT7,AT8,AT9,AT10}.

Although the design for robust training has made tremendous success in improving model robustness \cite{AT11,AT12}, it typically takes an intensive computation cost with poor defense scalability to a fixed, pre-trained ML model. Towards circumventing this difficulty, the problem of test-time defense arises; see the seminal work in Croce \textit{et. al.} \cite{Croce}. Test-time defense alters either a test-time input example or a small portion of the pre-trained model. Examples include input (anti-adversarial) purification \cite{AT13,AT14,AT15,AT16} and model refinement by augmenting the pre-trained model with auxiliary components \cite{AT17,AT18,AT19}. However, these defense techniques inevitably raise the inference time and hamper the test-time efficiency \cite{Croce}. Inspired by that, our work will advance the test-time defense technology by leveraging the idea of \textit{visual prompting (VP)} \cite{VP}, also known as model reprogramming \cite{Reprogramming1,Reprogramming2,Reprogramming3}.

Generally speaking, VP \cite{VP} creates a universal (\textit{i.e.}, data-agnostic) input prompting template (in terms of input perturbations) in order to improve the generalization ability of a pre-trained model when incorporating such a visual prompt into test-time examples. It enjoys the same idea as model reprogramming \cite{Reprogramming1,Reprogramming2,Reprogramming3} or unadversarial example \cite{VP2}, which optimizes a universal perturbation pattern to maneuver (\textit{i.e.}, reprogram) the functionality of a pre-trained model towards the desired criterion, \textit{e.g.}, cross-domain transfer learning \cite{AT20}, out-of-distribution generalization \cite{VP2}, and fairness \cite{AT21}. However, it remains elusive whether or not VP could be designed as an effective solution to adversarial defense. We will investigate this problem, which we call \textit{adversarial visual prompting (AVP)} in this work. Compared to conventional test-time defense methods, AVP significantly reduces the inference time overhead since visual prompts can be designed offline over training data and have the plug-and-play capability applied to any testing data. We summarize our \textbf{contributions} as below.

\textcircled{1} We formulate and investigate the problem of AVP for the first time and empirically show the conventional data-agnostic VP design is incapable of gaining adversarial robustness.

\textcircled{2} We propose a new VP method, termed class-wise AVP (C-AVP), which produces multiple, class-wise visual prompts with explicit optimization on their couplings to gain better adversarial robustness.

\textcircled{3} We provide insightful experiments to demonstrate the pros and cons of VP in adversarial defense.
2 Related work

Visual prompting. Originated from the idea of in-context learning or prompting in natural language processing (NLP) [26–29], VP was first proposed in Bahng et al. [20] for vision models. Before formalizing VP in Bahng et al. [20], the underlying prompting technique has also been devised in computer vision (CV) with different naming. For example, VP is closely related to adversarial reprogramming or model reprogramming [21–23, 30–32], which focused on altering the functionality of a fixed, pre-trained model across domains by augmenting test-time examples with an additional (universal) input perturbation pattern. Unadversarial learning also enjoys the similar idea to VP. In [25], unadversarial examples that perturb original ones using ‘prompting’ templates were introduced to improve out-of-distribution generalization. Yet, the problem of VP for adversarial defense is under-explored.

Adversarial defense. The lack of adversarial robustness is a weakness of ML models. Adversarial defense, such as adversarial detection [18, 33–37] and robust training [2, 6, 9, 10, 17, 38], is a current research focus. In particular, adversarial training (AT) [1] is the most widely-used defense strategy and has inspired many recent advances in adversarial defense [11, 12, 19, 39–41]. However, these AT-type defenses (with the goal of robustness-enhanced model training) are computationally intensive due to min-max optimization over model parameters. To reduce the computation overhead of robust training, the problem of test-time defense arises [13], which aims to robustify a given model via lightweight adversarial input perturbations (a.k.a. input purification) [14, 42] or minor modifications to the fixed model [43, 44]. In different kinds of test-time defenses, the most relevant work to ours is anti-adversarial perturbation [16].

3 Problem Statement

Visual prompting. We describe the problem setup of VP following Bahng et al. [20, 22–24]. Specifically, let $D_{tr}$ denote a training set for supervised learning, where $(x, y) \in D_{tr}$ signifies a training sample with feature $x$ and label $y$. And let $\delta$ be a visual prompt to be designed. The prompted input is then given by $x + \delta$ with respect to (w.r.t.) $x$. Different from the problem of adversarial attack generation that optimizes $\delta$ for erroneous prediction, VP drives $\delta$ to minimize the performance loss $\ell$ of a pre-trained model $\theta$. This leads to

$$\text{minimize} \quad \mathbb{E}_{(x, y) \in D_{tr}}[\ell(x + \delta; y, \theta)]$$

subject to

$$\delta \in C,$$

where $\ell$ denotes prediction error given the training data $(x, y)$ and base model $\theta$, and $C$ is a perturbation constraint. Following Bahng et al. [20, 22, 23], $C$ restricts $\delta$ to let $x + \delta \in [0,1]$ for any $x$. Projected gradient descent (PGD) [1, 25] can then be applied to solving problem (1). In the evaluation, $\delta$ is integrated into test data to improve the prediction ability of $\theta$.

Adversarial visual prompting. Inspired by the usefulness of VP to improve model generalization [20, 23], we ask:

**AVP problem** Can VP (1) be extended to robustify $\theta$ against adversarial attacks?

At the first glance, the AVP problem seems trivial if we specify the performance loss $\ell$ as the adversarial training loss $[1, 2]$:

$$\ell_{\text{adv}}(x + \delta; y, \theta) = \maximize_{x'} \ell(x' + \delta; y, \theta),$$

where $x'$ denotes the adversarial input that lies in the $\ell_\infty$-norm ball centered at $x$ with radius $\epsilon > 0$.

Recall from (1) that the conventional VP requests $\delta$ to be universal across training data. Thus, we term universal AVP (U-AVP) the following problem by integrating (1) with (2):

$$\text{minimize} \quad \lambda \mathbb{E}_{(x, y) \in D_{tr}}[\ell(x + \delta; y, \theta)] + \mathbb{E}_{(x, y) \in D_{tr}}[\ell_{\text{adv}}(x + \delta; y, \theta)]$$

(U-AVP)

where $\lambda > 0$ is a regularization parameter to strike a balance between generalization and adversarial robustness [2].

The problem (U-AVP) can be effectively solved using a standard min-max optimization method, which involves two alternating optimization routines: inner maximization and outer minimization. The former generates adversarial examples as AT, and the latter produces the visual prompt $\delta$ like (1). At test time, the effectiveness of $\delta$ is measured from two aspects: (1) standard accuracy, i.e., the accuracy of $\delta$-integrated benign examples, and (2) robust accuracy, i.e., the accuracy of $\delta$-integrated adversarial examples (against the victim model $\theta$). Despite the succinctness of (U-AVP), Fig. 1 shows its ineffectiveness to defend against adversarial attacks. Compared to the vanilla VP (1), it also suffers a significant standard accuracy drop (over 50% in Fig. 1 corresponding to 0 PGD attack steps) and robust accuracy is only enhanced by a small margin (around 18% against PGD attacks). The negative results in Fig. 1 are not quite surprising since a data-agnostic input prompt $\delta$ has limited learning capacity to enable adversarial defense. Thus, it is non-trivial to tackle the problem of AVP.

4 Class-wise Adversarial Visual Prompt

No free lunch for class-wise visual prompts. A direct extension of (U-AVP) is to introduce multiple adversarial visual prompts, each of which corresponds to one class in the training set $D_{tr}$. If we split $D_{tr}$ into class-wise training sets $\{D_{tr}^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^{N}$
(for $N$ classes) and introduce class-wise visual prompts $\{\delta^{(i)}\}$, then the direct C-AVP extension from (U-AVP) becomes

$$
\text{minimize}_{\{\delta^{(i)}\}_{i\in [N]}} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left\{ \lambda \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \in \mathcal{D}_{tr}^{i}} [f(x + \delta^{(i)}; y, \theta)] + \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \in \mathcal{D}_{tr}^{i}} [f_{\text{adv}}(x + \delta^{(i)}; y, \theta)] \right\}
$$

(C-AVP-v0)

where $[N]$ denotes the set of class labels $\{1, 2, \ldots, N\}$. It is worth noting that C-AVP-v0 is decomposed over class labels. Although the class-wise separability facilitates numerical optimization, it introduces challenges (C1)-(C2) when applying class-wise visual prompts for adversarial defense.

- **(C1) Test-time prompt selection:** After acquiring the visual prompts $\{\delta^{(i)}\}$ from (C-AVP-v0), it remains unclear how a class-wise prompt should be selected for application to a test-time example $x_{\text{test}}$. An intuitive way is to use the inference pipeline of $\theta$ by aligning its top-1 prediction with the prompt selection. That is, the selected prompt $\delta$ and the predicted class $i^*$ are determined by

$$
\delta = \delta^*, \ i^* = \arg \max_{i \in [N]} f_i (x_{\text{test}} + \delta^{(i)}; \theta),
$$

(3)

where $f_i (x; \theta)$ denotes the $i$-th class prediction confidence. However, the seemingly correct rule (3) leads to a large prompt selection error (thus poor prediction accuracy) due to (C2).

- **(C2) Backdoor effect of class mis-matched prompts:** Given $\delta^{(i)}$ from (C-AVP-v0), if the test-time example $x_{\text{test}}$ is drawn from class $i$, the visual prompt $\delta^{(i)}$ then helps prediction. However, if $x_{\text{test}}$ is not originated from class $i$, then $\delta^{(i)}$ could serve as a backdoor attack trigger [45] with the targeted backdoor label $i$ for the ‘prompted input’ $x_{\text{test}} + \delta^{(i)}$. Since the backdoor attack is also input-agnostic, the class-discriminative ability of $x_{\text{test}} + \delta^{(i)}$ enabled by $\delta^{(i)}$ could result in incorrect prediction towards the target class $i$ for $x_{\text{test}}$.

**Joint prompts optimization for C-AVP.** The failure of C-AVP-v0 inspires us to rethink the value of class-wise separability. As illustrated in challenges (C1)-(C2), the compatibility with the test-time prompt selection rule and the interrelationship between class-wise visual prompts should be taken into account. To this end, we develop a series of new AVP principles below. Fig. 2 provides a schematic overview of C-AVP and its comparison with U-AVP and the predictor without VP.

First, to bake the prompt selection rule (3) into C-AVP, we enforce the correct prompt selection, i.e., under the condition that

$$
f_p (x + \delta^{(y)}; \theta) > \max_{k \neq y} f_k (x + \delta^{(k)}; \theta) \quad \text{for} \quad (x, y) \in \mathcal{D}^{(y)}.
$$

The above can be cast as a CW-type loss [46]:

$$
\ell_{C-AVP,1} (\{\delta^{(i)}\}; \mathcal{D}_{tr}, \theta) = \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \in \mathcal{D}_{tr}} \max_{k \neq y} \{ f_k (x + \delta^{(k)}; \theta) - f_p (x + \delta^{(y)}; \theta), -\tau \},
$$

(4)

where $\tau > 0$ is a confidence threshold. The rationale behind (4) is that given a data sample $(x, y)$, the minimum value of $\ell_{C-AVP,1}$ is achieved at $-\tau$, indicating the desired condition

with the confidence level $\tau$. Compared with (C-AVP-v0), another key characteristic of $\ell_{C-AVP,1}$ is its non-splitting over class-wise prompts $\{\delta^{(i)}\}$, which benefits the joint optimization of these prompts.

Second, to mitigate the backdoor effect of mis-matched prompts, we propose additional two losses, noted by $\ell_{C-AVP,2}$ and $\ell_{C-AVP,3}$, to penalize the data-prompt mismatches. Specifically, $\ell_{C-AVP,2}$ penalizes the backdoor-alike targeted prediction accuracy of a class-wise visual prompt when applied to mismatched training data. For the prompt $\delta^{(i)}$, this leads to

$$
\ell_{C-AVP,2} (\{\delta^{(i)}\}; \mathcal{D}_{tr}, \theta) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \in \mathcal{D}_{tr}^{i}} \max_{k \neq y} \{ f_k (x + \delta^{(k)}; \theta) - f_p (x + \delta^{(y)}; \theta), -\tau \},
$$

(5)

where $\mathcal{D}_{tr}^{i}$ denotes the training data set by excluding $\mathcal{D}_{tr}^{i}$. The class $i$-associated prompt $\delta^{(i)}$ should not behave as a backdoor trigger to non-$i$ classes’ data. Likewise, if the prompt is applied to the correct data class, then the prediction confidence should surpass that of a mis-matched case. This leads to

$$
\ell_{C-AVP,3} (\{\delta^{(i)}\}; \mathcal{D}_{tr}, \theta) = \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \in \mathcal{D}_{tr}} \max_{k \neq y} \{ f_k (x + \delta^{(k)}; \theta) - f_p (x + \delta^{(y)}; \theta), -\tau \},
$$

(6)

Let $\ell_{C-AVP,0} (\{\delta^{(i)}\}; \mathcal{D}_{tr}, \theta)$ denote the objective function of (C-AVP-v0). Integrated with $\ell_{C-AVP,0} (\{\delta^{(i)}\}; \mathcal{D}_{tr}, \theta)$ for $q \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, the desired class-wise AVP design is cast as

$$
\text{minimize}_{\{\delta^{(i)}\}_{i\in [N]}} \ell_{C-AVP,0} (\{\delta^{(i)}\}; \mathcal{D}_{tr}, \theta) + \sum_{q=1}^{3} \gamma q \ell_{C-AVP,q} (\{\delta^{(i)}\}; \mathcal{D}_{tr}, \theta),
$$

(C-AVP)

where $\gamma > 0$ is a parameter for class-wise prompting penalties.

5 Experiments

**Experiment setup.** We conduct experiments on CIFAR-10 with a pretrained ResNet18 of testing accuracy of 94.92% on standard test dataset. We use PGD-10 (i.e., PGD attack with 10 steps [1]) to generate adversarial examples with $\epsilon = 8/255$ during visual prompts training, and with a cosine learning rate scheduler starting at 0.1. Throughout experiments, we choose $\lambda = 1\text{ in (U-AVP)}$, and $\tau = 0.1$ and $\gamma = 3\text{ in (C-AVP)}$. The width of visual prompt is set to 8.
Table 1: VP performance comparison in terms of standard (std) accuracy (acc) and robust accuracy against PGD attacks with $\epsilon = 8/255$ and multiple PGD steps on (CIFAR-10, ResNet18).

| Evaluation metrics (%) | Std acc | Robust acc vs PGD w/ step # |
|------------------------|---------|-------------------------------|
| Pre-trained            | 94.92   | 0 0 0 0                       |
| Vanilla VP             | 94.48   | 0 0 0 0                       |
| U-A VP                 | 27.75   | 16.9 16.81 16.81 16.7        |
| C-AVP-v0               | 19.69   | 13.91 13.63 13.6 13.58       |
| C-AVP (ours)           | 57.57   | 34.75 34.62 34.51 33.63       |

C-AVP outperforms conventional VP. Tab. 1 demonstrates the effectiveness of proposed C-AVP approach vs. U-AVP (the direct extension of VP to adversarial defense) and the C-AVP-v0 method in the task of robustify a normally-trained ResNet18 on CIFAR-10. For comparison, we also report the standard accuracy of the pre-trained model and the vanilla VP solution given by (1). As we can see, C-AVP outperforms U-AVP and C-AVP-v0 in both standard accuracy and robust accuracy. We also observe that compared to the pretrained model and the vanilla VP, the robustness-induced VP variants bring in an evident standard accuracy drop as the cost of robustness.

Prompting regularization effect in (C-AVP). Tab. 2 shows different settings of prompting regularizations used in C-AVP, where ‘S’ represents a certain loss configuration. As we can see, the use of $\ell_{C-AVP,2}$ contributes most to the performance of learned visual prompts (see S3). This is not surprising, since we design $\ell_{C-AVP,2}$ for mitigating the backdoor effect of class-wise prompts, which is the main source of prompting selection error. We also note that $\ell_{C-AVP,1}$ is the second most important regularization. This is because such a regularization is accompanied with the prompt selection rule (3). Tab. 2 also indicates that the combination of $\ell_{C-AVP,1}$ and $\ell_{C-AVP,2}$ is a possible computationally lighter alternative to (C-AVP).

Class-wise prediction error analysis. Fig. 3 shows a comparison of the classification confusion matrix. Each row corresponds to testing samples from one class, and each column corresponds to the prompt (‘P’) selection across 10 image classes. As we can see, our proposal outperforms C-AVP-v0 since the former’s higher main diagonal entries indicate less prompt selection error than the latter.

Comparisons with other test-time defenses. In Tab. 3, we compare our proposed C-AVP with three test-time defense methods selected from Croce et al. [13]. Note that all methods are applied to robustifying a fixed, standardly pre-trained ResNet18. Following Croce et al. [13], we divide the considered defenses into different categories, relying on their defense principles (i.e., IP or MA) and needed test-time operations (i.e., IA, AN, and R). As we can see, our method C-AVP falls into the IP category but requires no involved test-time operations. This leads to the least inference overhead. Although there exists a performance gap with the test-time defense baselines, we hope that our work could pave a way to study the pros and cons of visual prompting in adversarial robustness.

6 Conclusion
In this work, we develop a novel VP method, i.e., C-AVP, to improve adversarial robustness of a fixed model at test time. Compared to existing VP methods, this is the first work to peer into how VP could be in adversarial defense. We show the direct integration of VP into robust learning is not an effective adversarial defense at test time for a fixed model. To address this problem, we propose C-AVP to create ensemble visual prompts and jointly optimize their interrelations for robustness enhancement. We empirically show that our proposal significantly reduces the inference overhead compared to classical adversarial defenses which typically call for computationally-intensive test-time defense operations.
7 References

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