Intergovernmental Cooperation and the Idea of Community in the Institutional and Decision-making Sphere of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy

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The Treaty of Lisbon (TL) altered the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) not only in its institutional structure, but also in its function and decision making processes. These changes affected the competences of member states, other authorities, and their relationships. They also influenced the prospects for intergovernmental cooperation and the evolutionary development of communitisation phenomena within this policy.

1. Introduction

The Treaty of Lisbon\textsuperscript{1} (TL) modified\textsuperscript{2} the institutional structure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).\textsuperscript{3} This important change is a valuable case study, as it also modified the function and decision making system of the CFSP.\textsuperscript{4} The Foreign Policy sphere was recognised throughout the decades of integration as the competence of states. In the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, these issues should be approached through the prism of ensuring the process is participated in by authorities and institutions that represent the supranational interest. Therefore, it seems that the Treaty of Lisbon, by modifying the framework of the decision-making process of the CFSP, also influenced the methods of cooperation and relations between decision-making institutions.

The Treaty provides for the basic principles that constitute the foundations of deliberations on the subject. Title V of the Treaty on European Union,\textsuperscript{5} ‘General provisions on the Union’s external action and specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, is dedicated to the issue under discussion.

The Treaty stipulates that the Union ensures consistency between different areas of its external action, and their conformity with other EU policies. It seeks to harmonise
external action by institutions, as the Council and the Commission are assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This cooperation ensures the consistency of actions and an increase in effectiveness (Ref. 5, art. 21). Interestingly, the High Representative and the Commission may submit joint proposals to the Council for other areas of external action (Ref. 5, art. 22, para. 2). However, it is mentioned that it is the European Council that identifies the strategic objectives and interests of the EU (Ref. 5, art. 22, para. 1) that concern the CFSP and other areas connected with external actions of the Union. These decisions may involve relations with a particular state or region, or they may be related to a specific subject. They determine the duration of these relations and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States.

### 2. The Institutional Framework

Considering procedural and institutional issues, it should be mentioned that the Common Foreign and Security Policy is subject to specific principles. It is determined and followed by the European Council, and the Council must act unanimously, unless the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts is ruled out. The CFSP is implemented by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and by the Member States. Furthermore, the specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission is mentioned (Ref. 5, art. 21, para. 1). The Court of Justice of the European Union does not have jurisdiction within the discussed provisions. The exception is its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of the Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions and procedural rules. According to Article 40, the implementation of the CFSP does not affect the application of the procedures or the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences. It should be emphasised that within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the European Union, when conducting the CFSP, bases its actions on the development of political cooperation and mutual confidence between the Member States. The other basis is the identification of issues of general interest and the achievement of a higher degree of convergence of actions (Ref. 5, art. 24, para. 2).

The Council plays a significant role in this scope, as it frames the CFSP and takes the necessary decisions on the basis of general guidelines and strategic lines defined by the European Council (Ref. 5, art. 26, para. 2). To be more specific, the Union conducts the CFSP by adopting general guidelines, decisions defining actions and positions to be taken as well as arrangements for the implementation of the decisions within the scope of strengthening systematic cooperation between the Member States (Ref. 5, art. 20).

Additionally, the Treaty of Lisbon modifies the provisions regulating operation of the pre-Lisbon General and Foreign Affairs Council (Ref. 5, art. 16). Currently, two Councils are operating; namely, the Foreign Affairs Council and the General Affairs Council. Presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council no longer falls within the power of the Presidency, but is performed by the High Representative. This aspect is also
significant when viewed through the prism of interpenetration of community and intergovernmental elements in the decision-making mechanisms of the CFSP.

The Foreign Affairs Council elaborates the Union’s external actions on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensures that the Union’s action is consistent. It is responsible for the whole of the Union’s external action, which is the common foreign and security policy, common security and defence policy, common commercial policy, and cooperation within the scope of development and humanitarian aid. However, the operation of the Foreign Affairs Council is essentially different from the rules adopted in other units of the institution. This is because the President of the Foreign Affairs Council, i.e. the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, both takes part in the work of the European Council (Art. 4, para. 4 of the Rules of Procedures of the Council),¹¹ and serves as a member of the European Commission. Therefore, it is much easier for him/her to take supranational interests into consideration while programming actions of the Council, which he/she presides over (Ref. 9, pp. 157–159).

The competences modified by the Treaty of Lisbon, and the institutional legitimacy of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, are important issues in these deliberations. The High Representative presides over the Foreign Affairs Council, ensures implementation of the decisions adopted by that body and by the European Council, represents the Union in matters relating to the CFSP and conducts political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf. So the High Representative combines national voices in one Union position in international organisations. Interestingly, according to art. 30, para. 2 of the Treaty on European Union, in cases requiring a rapid decision, the High Representative, at his/her own motion or at the request of a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within 48 hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period.

In fulfilling his/her mandate, the High Representative is assisted by the European External Action Service, which works in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States. It comprises officials from the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services.¹² The Council acts on a proposal of the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission (Ref. 5, Art. 27, para. 1, 2, 3). In order to maintain good communication between the essential bodies engaged in implementation of the foreign policy, the High Representative has been included in the European Council.¹³ However, there is no dependency of the Council in relation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. His/her appointment is possible with the agreement of the President of the Commission, but the choice is made precisely by the European Council.¹⁴

Admittedly, the Treaty of Lisbon does not fundamentally change the institutional set-up of the European Union; the decision-making triangle of Commission, Parliament and Council has been maintained. Still, the Treaty has introduced certain modifications ‘to make the functioning of the Union more effective, consistent and transparent’.¹⁵ Therefore, while discussing primary provisions concerning the
subject, it can be stated that the Treaty of Lisbon, by establishing new bodies entering into the composition of the CFSP, has changed the institutional mechanisms of decision-making.

One significant change in the competence and decision-making sphere of the CFSP was the assignment to the office of the High Representative of functions that prior to the Treaty of Lisbon had separate legal settings. Currently, one figure fulfils the dual role of the High Representative of the Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commissioner for external relations. This solution emphasises one aspect that is especially significant from the perspective of these deliberations: the distinction between the intergovernmental and community spheres, and at the same time the coexistence of these two approaches within one process of forming the EU’s foreign policy. The reason for such coexistence is that the High Representative, as a vice-president of a supranational European Commission, in theory should represent and consider in his/her decisions primarily the EU interest, as the other commissioners do. However the High Representative is also a part of the Council. So while presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council, which gathers the Member States’ ministers who represent national interests, the High Representative is the greatest example of combining in one position the intergovernmental sphere of the Council with the supranational interest of the Commission.

It is natural that the process of forming EU policies is mostly multi-faceted, because of the variety of interests. It is also based on the competences distributed between EU institutions and Member States’ governments. It has been said that the High Representative’s position in two institutions that represent contradictory interests may cause a loyalty dilemma. But the specific position of the High Representative may also constitute a conciliatory element of the decision-making process. Still, effective distribution of competences by the Treaty among different EU institutions (Ref. 3, pp. 120–124) in the scope of the CFSP, and the joining of some competences within one office, may be treated as a method of increasing the effectiveness of the EU foreign policy decision-making process. It also enhances the uniformity of further actions undertaken. Therefore, notwithstanding the institutional framework, the personal competences, skills and political influence of the figure holding the office of High Representative are crucial.

Simultaneously, the Treaty introduced subsidiary bodies, determined their tasks and provided them with specific competences – for example, the Political and Security Committee, which under that name was introduced to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) pursuant to the Treaty of Nice (it was formerly the Political Committee). It acts on the basis of art. 38 of the TEU and Council Decision 2001/78/CFSP of 22 January 2001. The Committee keeps track of the international situation in the areas falling within the common foreign and security policy, and helps define policies by drawing up ‘opinions’ for the Council. It acts at the request of the Council or of the High Representative, or on its own initiative. It also monitors the implementation of agreed policies, all of this without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative. Furthermore, the Political and Security Committee exercises political control over crisis management operations and sets their strategic direction (Ref. 5, art. 28).
Officials of the Member States at the rank of ambassador meet within the Committee, usually twice a week. They are chaired by a representative of the state holding the EU presidency, and in special circumstances by the High Representative. The Committee has established three subsidiary bodies: the Politico-Military Group, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and the so-called Nicolaïdis group, which prepares the agendas for the meetings (Ref. 3, pp. 122–126).

3. Principles of the Functioning of the CFSP's Decision-making Process

Despite the general principle of the decision-making procedure, there are certain situations where Council decisions are made by a qualified majority. In particular, this applies to decisions concerning a joint action, common position, or taking a decision on the basis of a common strategy already approved by the Council. One should also mention executive aspects concerning implementation of joint action or a common position, as well as the appointment of special representatives. Additionally, there is the exercise of powers arising from the EU’s legal and international personality, such as concluding an international agreement if it aims at implementing joint action or a common position.

In the context of the practical implementation of completed decisions, the Treaty provides that if the international situation requires operational action by the Union, the Council adopts the necessary decisions that determine their scope and objectives, the means to be made available to the Union, the conditions for their implementation and their duration. The decisions commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity (Ref. 5, art. 28, paras. 1, 2). Subsequently, the Treaty provides details of procedural issues. Namely, when taking decisions, the European Council and the Council are expected to act unanimously (with a few exceptions).

Each member of the Council who abstains from voting may simultaneously make a formal declaration. In such cases, the member is not obliged to apply the decision but accepts that the decision commits the Union. In the spirit of mutual solidarity, the concerned Member State refrains from any action that could conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision. Likewise, the other Member States respect this particular position. Notably, the decision is not adopted if the members of the Council submitting declarations in relation to abstaining represent at least one third of the Member States, comprising at least one third of the population of the Union (Ref. 5, art. 31, para. 1).

Therefore, before taking any actions at the international level or entering into any commitment that could affect the Union’s interests, each Member State consults the others within the European Council or the Council. Member States ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. However, it is emphasised that such coordination and cooperation need to be based on the mutual solidarity principle (Article 32).

The Treaty of Lisbon also specifies the role of the European Parliament in the functioning of the CFSP. Its importance has increased in parallel to the consolidation
of the position of the High Representative, who regularly consults the Parliament on the main aspects of the CFSP and the common security and defence policy, and informs the Parliament of how those policies are evolving. The Parliament may address questions or make recommendations to the Council or the High Representative. Furthermore, twice a year it holds a debate on the progress made in implementing the common foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy (Ref. 5, art. 36). The task of the High Representative is also to ensure that the recommendations of the European Parliament are taken into consideration when reaching final agreements within the CFSP decision-making process.

In the context of shaping relations between the decision-making process and the consultation mechanisms of the CFSP, one should note that the subsequent stages of the decision-making process provided by the Treaty are the basis for a legislative procedure. Nevertheless, the developed forms of consultation such as working groups, commissions, officials’ meetings (both at intra-institutional and inter-institutional levels) and representatives of the main institutional players, influence the final result of the process. The framework of the decision-making process altered by the Treaty of Lisbon has influenced new forms of cooperation between the players in the consultation mechanisms. This is also partly shown by new competences given to the bodies engaged in shaping the CFSP. The consultation mechanisms accompanying the process are different and concern both community and intergovernmental spheres at the supranational level.

When emphasising the fundamental differences between following the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon periods, one should note that the idea of the intergovernmental nature of cooperation within the former second pillar of the EU (concerning the CFSP) has been maintained. This constitutes a clear distinction from the decision-making process implemented in the policies traditionally included in the former first pillar of the EU, where the community approach is dominant. Another considerable difference concerns the thresholds necessary for taking a decision. In the case of the Common Foreign and Security Policy it is unanimity of the Member States that is required (with few exceptions).

4. The EU Presidency and the Chairman of the European Council

In relation to the Presidency of the EU in the scope of the CFSP, the Lisbon system is grounded in three bases. In the operational system, concerning pursuing a policy, it is based on the principle of relative centralisation of the High Representative’s competences. In the cooperation system, concerning correlation of actions of particular Union institutions, it is based on a close policy relation and close connections. They are visible between the High Representative and actions of the President of the European Council (and of the European Council itself), the Foreign Affairs Council and the Commission. The system of legitimacy and forming of support inside the Union for actions taken up within the CFSP is also important. It includes working committees, the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) and the European Parliament (Ref. 9, pp. 157–159).
Furthermore, since the EU is an international organisation that created a multilevel political system, it seems perfectly natural that it joins intergovernmental and community aspects. Its functioning is multilevel, and it works in two dimensions. The horizontal one concerns relations within the institutional system of the EU, and the vertical one has various levels: union, national, regional and local. In this context, one should interpret the objective and competence scope of the Presidency. In this dimension it seems to be a procedural bridge between different aspects of the decision-making process in the European Union. Its functioning joins national interests with supranational procedures. This constitutes a middle ground providing the decision-making capability of the EU within a multilevel management system.23

The changes connected with the Presidency in the Council and establishing the function of the President of the European Council are notable. It has been mentioned that in order to provide continuity of work, and bearing in mind inter-institutional agreements, the President of the Council cooperates closely with the President of the European Commission. Additionally, the President of the European Council represents the Union without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Still, these two have to maintain a close relationship with regard to the legal setting of both functions within the decision-making process (Ref. 5, art. 15).

5. Communitisation Process and Intergovernmental Approach

In relation to the institutional and decision-making modifications of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, it is important to mention that the sphere of foreign policy is historically conditioned and deeply rooted in the theory of international relations as the domain of states.24 Together with the consolidation of the supranational decision-making process in the sphere of the CFSP, one must keep in mind that it is subject to the process of communitisation. This means transferring competences from the national to the supranational level, as well as including the ‘European interest’ into the debate of the Council, which comprises ministers for foreign affairs of the Member States’ governments. In order to see the multifaceted character of this issue, the process of communitisation of the decision-making mechanism of the CFSP has its influence on forms of communication in the decision-making sphere at the national level.

Significantly, existing institutions, bodies or agencies (Ref. 10, pp. 456–470; Ref. 17, pp. 202–213), despite their secondary function, may play a primary role in the subsequent stages of the process. This phenomenon can be perceived as support for the European interest in ongoing negotiations. So despite the determined frameworks of decision-making mechanisms and specific procedures, the process is influenced by external institutional players from the so-called decision-making environment. This shows that the sphere of intergovernmental decisions, which are still dominant in the CFSP, at the EU level, may be confronted with a more considerable amount of political interests than would seemingly stem from the primary provisions of the Treaty and the defined procedure.
To complete these deliberations it is necessary to mention the essence of intra-institutional processes of consultations within the frameworks of competences granted to the institutions involved in the decision-making process or mechanisms of consultations within the CFSP. The importance of grassroots officials and of consultations at the basic level of the competent bodies has already been mentioned in the literature. However, this has mainly been in the context of the exclusive competences of the EU, that is, the former first pillar. Although the intergovernmental nature of the foreign policy sphere at the EU level is dominant, it involves a considerable number of institutions/bodies/agencies in the decision-making mechanism. What is more, the highly developed intra-institutional process of consultations results in taking the community interest into consideration when making final decisions. These aspects might be treated as a specificity of the EU institutional mechanism and a bottom-up method of including the European interest into the debate at the ministerial level.

Let us focus on the role of modification of decision-making mechanisms in relation to effectiveness of the process. In other words, we must answer the question of how the role and functioning of the main players within the system determine the effectiveness of the procedures in the CFSP’s decision-making process. In relation to this aspect, it seems justified to assume that effectiveness of the decision-making mechanism within the CFSP is conditioned by the level of communitisation of the process of reaching agreements. Additionally, one must bear in mind that it is also dependent on competences provided by the Treaty and the scope of the powers of specific institutions, as well as political involvement of the main players. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the Treaty of Lisbon caused an increase in the effectiveness of the CFSP’s decision-making process through the growing importance of communitised elements of the system.

However, it seems important to examine the form of the intergovernmental dimension of the discussed policy, and the role of the intergovernmental sphere in the decision-making process of the CFSP. Traditionally, the modernist understanding of the role, function and competence of the state among the EU members/decision-makers is favourable to the intergovernmental nature of the process. Additionally, if one keeps in mind that some financing for the pursuit of the CFSP and the human resources used in this process comes from contributions by the governments, it is clear that such a situation considerably affects the influence of the Member States on decisions. Furthermore, there is the very important issue of also pursuing the CSDP within the CFSP, which has not been mentioned yet.

6. The Common Security and Defence Policy in the Process of Communitisation

The essence of European integration in the scope of foreign and security issues is not duplicating the tasks and competences of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Such an assumption is essential when seeing the issue through the prism of pursuing the Common Security and Defence Policy together with the CFSP. Therefore, the
assumed role of the CFSP is to create proper mechanisms for effectively responding to challenges connected with the concept of the European Union’s security.28

The Treaty stipulates that the Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence (Ref. 5, art. 24, para. 1). The common security and defence policy is an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It provides the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use these assets in missions outside its borders for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks is undertaken using assets provided by the Member States (Ref. 5, art. 42, para. 1).

In this respect, administrative expenditure borne by the institutions is charged to the Union budget. Operating expenditure arising from the implementation of this Chapter is also charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications. In cases where expenditure is not charged to the Union budget, it is charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise (Ref. 5, art. 41, paras. 1, 2).

The Council is a decision-making institution in relation to issues establishing the specific procedures. The goal is to guarantee rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of the CFSP, and in particular for preparatory activities for missions. Still, the Council acts after consulting the European Parliament (Ref. 5, art. 41, para. 3).

Analysing the CSDP through the prism of communitisation obviously shows that in this sphere of the CFSP, the process is slower. Still, the Member States ensure civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council (Ref. 5, art. 42, para. 3). Decisions relating to the CSDP, including those initiating a mission, are adopted by the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative, together with the Commission (where appropriate), may propose the use of national resources together with Union instruments (Ref. 5, art. 42, para. 4).

Missions for which the Union may use civilian and military means include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue missions, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention and peace-keeping, and the use of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism (Ref. 5, art. 43, para. 1). The Council adopts decisions relating to the missions, defining their objectives and scope, and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, ensures coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such missions
(Ref. 5, art. 43, para. 2). Therefore, it seems justified to state that the political and economic consequences of the implementation of the CSDP also determine the position and role of the Member States’ governments in the decision-making process.

7. Conclusion

In conclusion, the structure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is based on four hierarchical institutional levels. According to the Treaty, the top level is the European Council, which defines the general direction of actions, and in case of an inability to solve conflicts at the lower decision-making levels, it is the highest authority in the decision-making system. The second level, playing an essential role in current affairs, is the Council. Therefore, the decision-making institutions of the most considerable influence within the CFSP, and having crucial competences in this policy given by the Treaty, are the bodies which, at the EU level, represent and ensure the influence of the Member States. Thus, when one attempts to draw conclusions about the process of communitisation of the EU foreign policy sphere, this phenomenon can be perceived more clearly at the hierarchically lower stages of the decision-making process.

The power of the Member States and the influence of their will and interests on decisions concerning the CFSP has to be confronted with several factors conducive to the community approach. First is the historically developed high culture of conflict resolution in this policy. Secondly, the President of the European Council closely cooperates with the High Representative, and joins the intergovernmental level of the European Council with the interests of the Commission in the foreign policy. In this respect, the Treaty of Lisbon did not change the competences of the European Council. However, by introducing a permanent President who is no longer subject to the rotating Presidency, it provides better opportunities for incorporating the European interest into political compromises.

Another level in the hierarchy is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy. From the perspective of including the European interest into the decision-making process of the CFSP, one should note that the High Representative is a body with a high position in the system; it represents the EU interest and integrates the approaches of the Member States. He/she is a figure of compromise in the sphere of policy where opposing national interests are confronted. In this context, it is important to mention that pursuant to other decisions of the European Council, but outside the Treaty regulations, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was established within the frameworks of the General Secretariat. Its role is to provide the High Representative with substantive support. Bodies such as the Military Committee or the EU Military Staff play a similar role to the Planning and Early Warning Unit.

Establishing such bodies was the result of incorporating the issue of defence into the competences of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Therefore, the main tasks of the Military Staff are early warning, situation assessment, strategic planning and crisis management. These tasks change in the event of conflict. At such times, the EU Military Staff processes information from intelligence organisations and establishes a hierarchy
of priorities. During operations conducted by the EU, it monitors all the military aspects, and thus it can better perform the function of conducting strategic analysis. The Military Committee is composed of the chiefs of military staff of the Member States.

Functions of mediation between the political and administrative levels are performed by the Political and Security Committee. It is mentioned that its operation does not intervene with the task of COREPER, which performs a function of integrating communication between administrations at the EU and national level. Both Committees, which constitute the third level in the CFSP hierarchy, use the support of numerous working groups and the group of European Correspondents. The European Correspondents prepare the agendas of meetings of the Political and Security Committee and relevant items on the agenda of the European Council and the EU Council sessions. These groups form the last, fourth level of the hierarchy.29

Therefore, the CFSP, in the institutional and decision-making aspect, may be treated as a specific paradox of the EU decision-making process. On the one hand, it is still distinctly based on the intergovernmental cooperation structure, where the Council, together with the European Council and representatives of governments of the Member States, plays a crucial role in the decision-making process. On the other hand bodies such as the High Representative or the President of the Council are focused on including the European dimension into this policy. They internalise both approaches without interfering with the competences of the Member States, and simultaneously not considerably influencing the EU’s institutional balance between the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. Therefore, in the decision-making processes of the CFSP, the idea of the community and intergovernmental approaches interpenetrate. Still, the balance has not been reached yet, as the intergovernmental sphere seems to be prevailing.

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27. Cf. R. Zięba (2008) Koncepcja bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej. In: R. Zięba, (Ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne), p. 157.
28. Cf. M. Tałasiewicz, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa*, online: http://www.arch.zpsb.szczecin.pl/uploads/jean_monnet/wspolna%20polityka%20zagraniczna%20i%20bezpieczenstwa%20-%20mtalasiewicz.pdf (accessed 21 March 2014).
29. See: M. Field (2013) The anatomy of EU policy-making: Appointing the experts. *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)*, 1(17), online: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2013-007a.htm (accessed 22 April 2014).

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