Fine-grained Synthesis of Unrestricted Adversarial Examples

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Abstract

We propose a novel approach for generating unrestricted adversarial examples by manipulating fine-grained aspects of image generation. Unlike existing unrestricted attacks that typically hand-craft geometric transformations, we learn stylistic and stochastic modifications leveraging state-of-the-art generative models. This allows us to manipulate an image in a controlled, fine-grained manner without being bounded by a norm threshold. Our model can be used for both targeted and non-targeted unrestricted attacks. We demonstrate that our attacks can bypass certified defenses, yet our adversarial images look indistinguishable from natural images as verified by human evaluation. Adversarial training can be used as an effective defense without degrading performance of the model on clean images. We perform experiments on LSUN and CelebA-HQ as high resolution datasets to validate efficacy of our proposed approach.

1. Introduction

Adversarial examples, inputs resembling real samples but maliciously crafted to mislead machine learning models, have been studied extensively in the last few years. Most of the existing papers, however, focus on norm-constrained attacks and defenses, in which the adversarial input lies in the ϵ-neighborhood of a real sample using the $L_p$ distance metric (commonly with $p = 0, 2, \infty$). For small $\epsilon$, the adversarial input is quasi-indistinguishable from the natural sample. For an adversarial image to fool the human visual system, it is sufficient to be norm-constrained; but this condition is not necessary. Moreover, defenses tailored for norm-constrained attacks can fail on other subtle input modifications [15]. This has led to a recent surge of interest on unrestricted adversarial attacks in which the adversary is not restricted by a norm threshold. These methods typically hand-craft transformations to capture visual similarity. Spatial transformations [15, 56, 1], viewpoint or pose changes [2], inserting small patches [7], among other methods, have been proposed to generate unrestricted adversarial examples.

In this paper, we focus on fine-grained manipulation of images for unrestricted adversarial attacks. Building upon the Style-GAN model [26] which disentangles fine and coarse-grained variations of images, we manipulate stylistic and stochastic latent variables in order to mislead a classification model. Loss of the target classifier is used to learn subtle variations to create adversarial examples. The pre-trained generative model constrains the search space to natural-looking images. We verify that we do not deviate from the space of realistic images with a user study using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Finally, we demonstrate that our proposed attack can break certified defenses, revealing new vulnerabilities of existing approaches. Adversarial training can be used as an effective defense, and unlike training on norm-bounded adversarial examples, it does not decrease accuracy on clean images. We elaborate on the proposed approach in Section 3.

2. Related Work

2.1. Norm-constrained Adversarial Examples

Most of the existing works on adversarial attacks and defenses focus on norm-constrained adversarial examples: for a given classifier $F : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \{1, \ldots, K\}$ and an image $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$, the adversarial image $x' \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is created such that $\|x - x'\|_p < \epsilon$ and $F(x) \neq F(x')$. Common values for $p$ are $0, 2, \infty$, and $\epsilon$ is chosen small enough so that the perturbation is imperceptible. Various algorithms have been proposed for creating $x'$ from $x$. Optimization-based methods solve a surrogate optimization problem based on the classifier’s loss and the perturbation norm. In their pioneering paper on adversarial examples, Szegedy et al. [48] use box-constrained L-BFGS [16] to minimize the surrogate loss function. Carlini and Wagner [9] propose stronger optimization-based attacks for $L_0, L_2$ and $L_\infty$ norms using better objective functions and the Adam optimizer [28]. Deep-Fool is introduced in [36] as a non-targeted attack optimized for the $L_2$ distance. It iteratively computes a minimal norm adversarial perturbation for a given image by linearly approximating the decision function. Gradient-based methods use gradient of the classifier’s loss with respect
to the input image. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [18] uses a first-order approximation of the function for faster generation, and is optimized for the \(L_\infty\) norm. Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [35] is an iterative variant of FGSM which provides a strong first-order attack by using multiple steps of gradient ascent and projecting perturbed images to an \(\epsilon\)-ball centered at the input. Other variants of FGSM are proposed in [13, 29]. Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [39] is a greedy algorithm that modifies pixels one at a time. It uses the gradients to compute a saliency map, picks the most important pixel and modifies it to increase likelihood of the target class. Li et al. [32] introduce a gradient transformer module to generate regionally homogeneous perturbations. They claim state-of-the-art attack results, which are independent of input images and can be transferred to black-box models. Generative attack methods [4, 40, 55] use an auxiliary network to learn adversarial perturbations, which provides benefits such as faster inference and more diversity in the synthesized images.

Several methods have been proposed for defending against adversarial attacks. These approaches can be broadly categorized to empirical defenses which are empirically robust to adversarial examples, and certified defenses which are provably robust to a certain class of attacks. One of the most successful empirical defenses is adversarial training [18, 29, 35] which augments training data with adversarial examples generated as the training progresses. Adversarial logit pairing [24] is a form of adversarial training which constrains logit predictions of a clean image and its adversarial counterpart to be similar. Many empirical defenses attempt to defeat adversaries using a form of input pre-processing or by manipulating intermediate features or gradients [31, 19, 57, 44, 33, 58]. Few approaches have been able to scale up to high-resolution datasets such as ImageNet [57, 33, 58, 42, 24]. Most of the proposed heuristic defenses were later broken by stronger adversaries [9, 51, 3]. Athalye et al. [3] show that many of these defenses fail due to an issue they term obfuscated gradients, which occurs when the defense method is designed to mask information about the model’s gradients. They propose workarounds to obtain approximate gradients for adversarial attacks. Vulnerabilities of empirical defenses have led to increased interest in certified defenses, which provide a guarantee that the classifier’s prediction is constant within a neighborhood of the input. Several certified defenses have been proposed [54, 43, 14, 50] which typically do not scale to ImageNet. Cohen et al. [10] use randomized smoothing with Gaussian noise to obtain provably \(L_2\)-robust classifiers on ImageNet.

2.2. Unrestricted Adversarial Examples

For an image to be adversarial, it needs to be visually indistinguishable from real images. One way to achieve this is by applying subtle geometric transformations to the input image. Spatially transformed adversarial examples are introduced in [56] in which a flow field is learned to displace pixels of the image. They use sum of spatial movement distance for adjacent pixels as a regularization loss to minimize the local distortion introduced by the flow field. Similarly, Alahi et al. [1] iteratively apply small deformations, found through a gradient descent step, to the input in order to obtain the adversarial image. Engstrom et al. [15] show that simple translations and rotations are enough for fooling deep neural networks. This remains to be the case even when the model has been trained using appropriate data augmentation. Alcorn et al. [2] manipulate pose of an object to fool deep neural networks. They estimate parameters of a 3D renderer that cause the target model to misbehave in response to the rendered image. Another approach for evading the norm constraint is to insert new objects in the image. Adversarial Patch [7] creates an adversarial image by completely replacing part of an image with a synthetic patch. The patch is image-agnostic, robust to transformations, and can be printed and used in real-world settings. Song et al. [46] search in the latent (\(z\)) space of AC-GAN [38] to find generated images that can fool a classifier, and show results on MNIST [30], SVHN [37] and CelebA [34] datasets. Since the \(z\) space is not interpretable, their method has no control over the generation process. On the other hand, our method can manipulate real or synthesized images in a fine-grained, controllable manner. Existence of on-the-manifold adversarial examples is also shown in [17], which considers the task of classifying between two concentric n-dimensional spheres. A challenge for creating unrestricted adversarial examples and defending against them is introduced in [6] using the simple task of classifying between birds and bicycles.

2.3. Fine-grained Image Generation

With recent improvements in generative models, they are able to generate high-resolution and realistic images. Moreover, these models can be used to learn and disentangle various latent factors for image synthesis. StyleGAN is proposed in [26] which disentangles high-level attributes and stochastic variations of generated images in an unsupervised manner. The model learns an intermediate latent space from the input latent code, which is used to adjust style of the image. It also injects noise at each level of the generator to capture stochastic variations. Singh et al. introduce Fine-GAN [45], a generative model which disentangles the background, object shape, and object appearance to hierarchically generate images of fine-grained object categories. Layered Recursive GAN is proposed in [60], and generates image background and foreground separately and recursively without direct supervision. Stacking is used in [12, 22, 27, 41, 63] to generate images in
a coarse to fine manner. Conditional fine-grained generation has been explored in several papers. Bao et al. [5] introduce a Conditional VAE-GAN for synthesizing images in fine-grained categories. Modeling an image as a composition of label and latent attributes, they vary the fine-grained category label fed into the generative model, and randomly draw values of a latent attribute vector. AttnGAN [59] uses attention-driven, multi-stage refinement for fine-grained text-to-image generation. Hong et al. [20] present a hierarchical framework for semantic image manipulation. Their model first learns to generate the pixel-wise semantic label maps from the initial object bounding boxes, and then learns to generate the manipulated image from the predicted label maps. A multi-attribute conditional GAN is proposed in [53], and can generate fine-grained face images based on the specified attributes.

3. Approach

Most of the existing works on unrestricted adversarial attacks rely on geometric transformations and deformations [15, 56, 1], which are oblivious to latent factors of variation. In this paper, we leverage disentangled representations of images for unrestricted adversarial attacks. Style-GAN [26] is a state-of-the-art generative model which learns to disentangle high-level attributes and stochastic variations in an unsupervised manner. More specifically, stylistic variations are represented by style variables and stochastic details are captured by noise variables. Changing the noise only affects low-level details, leaving the overall composition and high-level aspects such as identity intact. This allows us to manipulate the noise variables such that variations are barely noticeable by the human eye, yet the synthesized image can fool a pre-trained classifier. The style variables affect higher level aspects of image generation. For instance, when the model is trained on bedrooms, style variables from the top layers control viewpoint of the camera, middle layers select the particular furniture, and bottom layers deal with colors and details of materials. This allows us to manipulate images in a controlled manner, providing an avenue for fine-grained unrestricted attacks.

Formally, we can represent Style-GAN with a non-linear mapping function \( f \) and a synthesis network \( g \). The mapping function is an 8-layer MLP which takes a latent code \( z \), and produces an intermediate latent vector \( \mathbf{w} = f(z) \). This vector is then specialized by learned affine transformations \( A \) to styles \( \mathbf{y} = (\mathbf{y}_s, \mathbf{y}_s) \). Style variables in turn control adaptive instance normalization operations [21] after each convolutional layer of the synthesis network \( g \). Noise inputs are single-channel images consisting of un-correlated Gaussian noise that are fed to each layer of the synthesis network. Learned per-feature scaling factors \( B \) are then used to generate noise variables \( \eta \) which are added to the output of convolutional layers. The synthesis network takes style \( \mathbf{y} \) and noise \( \eta \) as input, and generates an image \( \mathbf{x} = g(\mathbf{y}, \eta) \). We then pass the generated image to a pre-trained classifier \( F \). We seek to slightly modify \( \mathbf{x} \) so that \( F \) can no longer classify it correctly. We achieve this through perturbing the style and noise tensors, which control different aspects of image generation in a fine-grained manner. More specifically, we initialize adversarial style and noise variables as \( \mathbf{y}_0^{adv} = \mathbf{y} \) and \( \eta_0^{adv} = \eta \) respectively. These adversarial tensors are then iteratively updated in order to fool the classifier. Loss of the classifier determines the update rule, which in turn depends on the type of attack. As common in the literature, we consider two types of attacks: non-targeted and targeted.

3.1. Non-targeted Attacks

In order to generate non-targeted adversarial examples, we need to change the model’s original prediction. Starting from initial values \( \mathbf{y}_0^{adv} = \mathbf{y} \) and \( \eta_0^{adv} = \eta \), we perform gradient ascent in the style and noise spaces of the generator to find values that maximize the classifier’s loss. At time step \( t \), the update rule for the style and noise variables is:

\[
\mathbf{y}_t^{adv} = \mathbf{y}_0^{adv} + \epsilon \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{y}_t^{adv}} J(\mathbf{F}(\mathbf{y}_t^{adv}, \mathbf{\eta}_t^{adv}), c_x))
\]

\[
\mathbf{\eta}_t^{adv} = \mathbf{\eta}_0^{adv} + \delta \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{\eta}_t^{adv}} J(\mathbf{F}(\mathbf{y}_t^{adv}, \mathbf{\eta}_t^{adv}), c_x))
\]

in which \( J(\cdot, \cdot) \) represents the classifier’s loss function (e.g. cross-entropy), \( c_x \) is the ground-truth class for \( \mathbf{x} = g(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{\eta}) \), and \( \epsilon, \delta \in \mathbb{R} \) are step sizes. Note that \( F(\cdot) \) gives the probability distribution over classes. This formulation resembles Iterative-FGSM [29]; however, the gradients are computed with respect to the noise and style variables of the synthesis network. Alternatively, as proposed in [29] we can use the least-likely predicted class \( l_\mathbf{x} = \arg \min \mathbb{F}(\mathbf{x}) \) as our target:

\[
\mathbf{y}_t^{adv} = \mathbf{y}_0^{adv} - \epsilon \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{y}_t^{adv}} J(\mathbf{F}(\mathbf{y}_t^{adv}, \mathbf{\eta}_t^{adv}), l_\mathbf{x}))
\]

\[
\mathbf{\eta}_t^{adv} = \mathbf{\eta}_0^{adv} - \delta \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{\eta}_t^{adv}} J(\mathbf{F}(\mathbf{y}_t^{adv}, \mathbf{\eta}_t^{adv}), l_\mathbf{x}))
\]

We found the latter approach more effective in practice. We use \( (\epsilon, \delta) = (0.004, 0.2) \) and \( (0.004, 0.1) \) in the experiments on LSUN and CelebA-HQ respectively. We perform multiple steps of gradient descent (usually 2 to 10) until the classifier is fooled. Unlike I-FGSM that generates high-frequency noisy perturbations in the pixel space, our pre-trained generative model constrains the space of generated images to realistic ones.

3.2. Targeted Attacks

Generating targeted adversarial examples is more challenging as we need to change the prediction to a specific
3.3. Input-conditioned Generation

Generation can also be conditioned on real input images by embedding them into the latent space of Style-GAN. We first synthesize images similar to the given input image $I$ by optimizing values of $y$ and $\eta$ such that $g(y, \eta)$ is close to $I$. More specifically, we minimize the perceptual distance between $g(y, \eta)$ and $I$. We can then proceed similar to equations 3–6 to perturb these tensors and generate the adversarial image. Realism of synthesized images depends on inference properties of the generative model. In practice, generated images resemble input images with high fidelity especially for CelebA-HQ images.

4. Results and Discussion

We provide qualitative and quantitative results demonstrating our proposed approach. Experiments are performed on LSUN [61] and CelebA-HQ [25]. LSUN contains 10 scene categories each with around one million labeled images and 20 object categories. We use all the 10 scene classes as well as two object classes: cars and cats. We consider this dataset since it is used in Style-GAN, and is well suited for a classification task. For the scene categories, a 10-way classifier is trained based on Inception-v3 [47] which achieves an accuracy of 87.7% on LSUN's test set. The two object classes also appear in ImageNet [11], a richer dataset containing 1000 categories. Therefore, for experiments on cars and cats we use an Inception-v3 model trained on ImageNet. This allows us to explore a broader set of categories in our attacks, and is particularly helpful for targeted adversarial examples. Note that there are multiple classes representing cars and cats in ImageNet, so we identify and group those classes. CelebA-HQ is a high-quality version of the CelebA dataset [34] consisting of 30,000 face images at $1024 \times 1024$ resolution. We consider the gender
classification task, and use the classifier provided by Kar- 
as et al. [26]. This is a binary task for which targeted and 
non-targeted attacks are similar.

In order to synthesize a variety of adversarial examples, 
we use different random seeds in Style-GAN to obtain var-
ious values for \( z, w, y \) and \( \eta \). Style-based adversarial ex-
amples are generated by initializing \( y_{\text{adv}} \) with the value of 
\( y \), and iteratively updating it as in equation 3 (or 5) un-
til the resulting image \( g(y_{\text{adv}}, \eta) \) fools the classifier \( F \).
Noise-based adversarial examples are created similarly using 
\( \eta_{\text{adv}} \) and the update rule in equation 4 (or 6). We can 
also combine the effect of style and noise by simultane-
ously updating \( y_{\text{adv}} \) and \( \eta_{\text{adv}} \) in each iteration, and feeding 
g(\( y_{\text{adv}}, \eta_{\text{adv}} \)) to the classifier. In this case, the effect 
of style usually dominates since it creates coarser modifica-
tions. To make sure the iterative process always converges 
reasonable number of steps, we measure the number of 
updates required to fool the classifier on 1000 randomly-
selected images. In the case of non-targeted attacks on 
LSUN, 3.7 ± 1.8 and 6.8 ± 3.6 (mean ± std) updates are 
required for noise-based and style-based examples respec-
tively. For targeted attacks, we first randomly sample a tar-
get class different from the ground-truth label for each im-
age. In this case, the number of updates required for noise-
based and style-based attacks are 4.5 ± 1.7 and 9.1 ± 4.2 
respectively. For the CelebA-HQ dataset, 6.2 ± 4.1 and 
7.3 ± 3.0 updates are needed for noise and style manipu-
ation respectively. While using different step sizes makes 
a fair comparison difficult, we generally found it easier to 
fool the model by manipulating the noise.

Figure 2 illustrates generated adversarial examples for 
non-targeted and targeted attacks on LSUN. Original im-
age \( g(y, \eta) \), noise-based image \( g(y, \eta_{\text{adv}}) \) and style-based 
image \( g(Y_{\text{adv}}, \eta) \) are shown. As we observe, adversar-
ial images look almost indistinguishable from natural im-
ages. This also holds in targeted attacks even when origi-
nal and target classes are very dissimilar. Manipulating the 
noise variable results in very subtle, imperceptible changes.
Varying the style leads to coarser changes such as different 
colorization, pose changes, and even removing or inserting 
new objects in the scene. We can also control granularity of 
changes by selecting specific layers of the model. Man-
ipulating top layers, corresponding to coarse spatial res-
olutions, results in high-level changes. Lower layers, on the 
other hand, modify finer details. In the first two columns of 
Figure 2, we only modify top 6 layers (out of 18) to gen-
erate adversarial images. The middle column corresponds to 
changing layers 7 to 12, and the last two columns use the 
bottom 6 layers.

Figure 3 depicts adversarial examples on CelebA-HQ 
gender classification. Males are classified as females and 
vice versa. As we observe, various facial features are al-
tered by the model yet the identity is preserved. Similar to 
LSUN images, noise-based changes are more subtle than 
style-based ones, and we observe a spectrum of high-level, 
mid-level and low-level changes. Figure 4 illustrates adver-
sarial examples conditioned on real input images using the 
procedure described in Section 3.3. Synthesized images re-
semble inputs with high fidelity, and set the initial values in 
our optimization process. In some cases, we can notice how 
the model is altering masculine or feminine features. For in-
stance, women’s faces become more masculine in columns 
2 and 4, and men’s beard is removed in column 3 of Figure 
3 and column 1 of Figure 4.

Unlike perturbation-based attacks, \( L_p \) distances between 
original and adversarial images are large, yet they are visu-
ally similar. Moreover, we do not observe high-frequency 
perturbations in the generated images. The model learns to 
modify the initial input without leaving the manifold of real-
istic images. Note that the classifiers are trained on millions 
of images, yet they are easily fooled by these subtle on-the-
manifold changes. This poses serious concerns about rob-
ustness of deep neural networks, and reveals new vulnera-
bilities of them. Additional examples and higher-resolution 
images are provided in the supplementary material.

4.1. User Study

Norm-constrained attacks provide visual realism by \( L_p \) 
proximity to a real input. To verify that our unrestricted ad-
versarial examples are realistic and correctly classified by 
an oracle, we perform human evaluation using Amazon Me-
chanical Turk. In the first experiment, each adversarial im-
age is assigned to three workers, and their majority vote is 
considered as the label. The user interface for each worker 
contains nine images, and shows possible labels to choose 
from. We also include the label “Other” for images that 
workers think do not belong to any specific class. We use 
2400 noise-based and 2400 style-based adversarial images 
from the LSUN dataset, containing 200 samples from each 
class (10 scene classes and 2 object classes). The results 
indicate that 99.2% of workers’ majority votes match the 
ground-truth labels. This number is 98.7% for style-based 
adversarial examples and 99.7% for noise-based ones. As 
we observe in Figure 2, noise-based examples do not de-
viate much from the original image, resulting in easier pre-
diction by a human observer. On the other hand, style-based 
images show coarser changes, which in a few cases result in 
unrecognizable images or false predictions by the workers.

We use a similar setup in the second experiment but for 
classifying real versus fake (generated). We also include 
2400 real images as well as 2400 unperturbed images gen-
erated by Style-GAN. 74.7% of unperturbed images are la-
beled by workers as real. This number is 74.3% for noise-
based adversarial examples and 70.8% for style-based ones, 
indicating less than 4% drop compared with unperturbed 
images generated by Style-GAN.
Figure 2: Unrestricted adversarial examples on LSUN for a) non-targeted and b) targeted attacks. Predicted classes are shown under each image. First two columns correspond to manipulating top 6 layers of the synthesis network. The middle column manipulates layers 7 to 12, and the last two columns correspond to the bottom 6 layers.
4.2. Evaluation on Certified Defenses

Several approaches have been proposed in the literature to defend against adversarial examples, which can be broadly divided into empirical and certified defenses. Empirical defenses are heuristic methods designed to mitigate effects of perturbations, and certified defenses provide provable guarantees on model’s robustness. Almost all of these methods consider norm-constrained attacks. Most of the empirical defenses were later broken by stronger adversaries [8, 3]. This has led to a surge of interest in provable defenses. However, most certified defenses are not scalable to high-resolution datasets. Cohen et al. [10] propose
the first certified defense at the scale of ImageNet. Using randomized smoothing with Gaussian noise, their defense guarantees a certain top-1 accuracy for perturbations with $L_2$ norm less than a specific threshold.

We demonstrate that our unrestricted attacks can break the state-of-the-art certified defense on ImageNet. We use 400 noise-based and 400 style-based adversarial images from the object categories of LSUN, and group all relevant ImageNet classes as the ground-truth. Our adversarial examples are evaluated against a randomized smoothing classifier based on ResNet-50 using Gaussian noise with standard deviation of 0.5 [10]. Table 1 shows accuracy of the model on clean and adversarial images. As we observe, the accuracy drops on adversarial inputs, and the certified defense is not effective against our attack. Note that we stop updating adversarial images as soon as the model is fooled. If we keep updating for more iterations afterwards, we can achieve even stronger attacks. Our adversarial examples are learned on Inception-v3, yet they can fool a defended model based on ResNet-50. This indicates that these inputs are transferable to other models, showing their potential for black-box attacks. Considering the variety of methods used for creating unrestricted adversarial examples, designing effective defenses against them is a challenging task. We believe this can be an interesting direction for future research.

4.3. Adversarial Training

Adversarial training increases robustness of models by injecting adversarial examples into training data [18, 35, 29]. This approach makes the classifier robust to perturbations similar to those used in training; however, it can still be vulnerable to black-box adversarial inputs transferred from other models [49]. To mitigate this issue, Ensemble Adversarial Training is proposed in [49] to augment training data with perturbations transferred from other pre-trained models. The main drawback of adversarial training is that it degrades performance of the classifier on clean images [35]. Various regularizers have been proposed to tackle this issue [62, 52].

We show that while adversarial training makes the model robust to our unrestricted adversarial inputs, it does not degrade accuracy on clean images. We perform adversarial training by incorporating generated images in training the LSUN classifier. 400k clean images as well as 50k noise-based and 50k style-based adversarial inputs are used to train the classifier. Same number of samples are used across all scene categories. Table 2 shows accuracy of the strengthened and original classifiers on clean and adversarial test images. Similar to norm-constrained perturbations, adversarial training is an effective defense against our unrestricted attack. However, accuracy of the model on clean test images remains almost the same after adversarial training. This is in contrast to training with norm-bounded adversarial inputs, which hurts classifier’s performance on clean images. This is due to the fact that unlike perturbation-based inputs, our generated images live on the manifold of realistic images as constrained by the generative model.

|                      | Adv. Trained | Original |
|----------------------|--------------|----------|
| Clean                | 87.6%        | 87.7%    |
| Adversarial (noise)  | 81.2%        | 0.0%     |
| Adversarial (style)  | 76.9%        | 0.0%     |

Table 2: Accuracy of adversarially trained and original classifiers on clean and adversarial test images.

5. Conclusion and Future Work

We present a novel approach for creating unrestricted adversarial examples leveraging state-of-the-art generative models. Unlike existing works that rely on hand-crafted transformations, we learn stylistic and stochastic changes to mislead pre-trained models. Loss of the target classifier is used to perform gradient descent in the style and noise spaces of Style-GAN. Subtle adversarial changes can be crafted using noise variables, and coarser modifications can be created through style variables. We demonstrate results in both targeted and non-targeted cases, and validate visual realism of synthesized images through human evaluation. We show that our attacks can break state-of-the-art defenses, revealing vulnerabilities of current norm-constrained defenses to unrestricted attacks. Moreover, while adversarial training can be used to make models robust against our adversarial inputs, it does not degrade accuracy on clean images.

The area of unrestricted adversarial examples is relatively under-explored. Not being bounded by a norm threshold provides its own pros and cons. It allows us to create a diverse set of attack mechanisms; however, fair comparison of relative strength of these attacks is challenging. It is also unclear how to even define provable defenses. While several papers have attempted to interpret norm-constrained attacks in terms of decision boundaries, there has been less effort in understanding the underlying reasons for models’ vulnerabilities to unrestricted attacks. We believe these can be promising directions for future research. We also plan to further explore transferability of our approach for black-box attacks in the future.
6. Appendix

We provide additional examples and higher-resolution images in the following. Figure 5 illustrates adversarial examples on CelebA-HQ gender classification, and Figure 6 shows additional examples on the LSUN dataset. Higher-resolution versions for some of the adversarial images are shown in Figure 7, which particularly helps to distinguish subtle differences between original and noise-based images.

Figure 5: Unrestricted adversarial examples on CelebA-HQ gender classification. From top to bottom: Original, noise-based and style-based adversarial images. Males are classified as females and vice versa.
Figure 6: Unrestricted adversarial examples on LSUN for a) non-targeted and b) targeted attacks. From top to bottom: original, noise-based and style-based images.
Figure 7: High resolution versions of adversarial images. From left to right: original, noise-based and style-based images.
Figure 7: High resolution versions of adversarial examples. From left to right: original, noise-based and style-based images.
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