Private Constrained PRFs (and more) from LWE

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Abstract

In a constrained PRF, the owner of the PRF key $K$ can generate constrained keys $K_f$ that allow anyone to evaluate the PRF on inputs $x$ that satisfy the predicate $f$ (namely, where $f(x)$ is “true”) but reveal no information about the PRF evaluation on the other inputs. A private constrained PRF goes further by requiring that the constrained key $K_f$ hides the predicate $f$.

Boneh, Kim and Montgomery (EUROCRYPT 2017) presented a construction of private constrained PRF for point function constraints, and Canetti and Chen (EUROCRYPT 2017) presented a completely different construction for NC¹ constraints. In this work, we show two constructions of LWE-based constraint-hiding constrained PRFs for general predicates described by polynomial-size circuits.

The two constructions are based on two distinct techniques that we show have further applicability by constructing weak attribute-hiding predicate encryption schemes. In a nutshell, the first construction imports the technique of modulus switching from the FHE world into the domain of trapdoor extension and homomorphism. The second construction shows how to use the duality between FHE secret-key/randomness and ABE randomness/secret-key to construct a scheme with dual use of the same values for both FHE and ABE purposes.

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1 Introduction

Lattice-based cryptography, and in particular the construction of cryptographic primitives based on the learning with errors (LWE) assumption [Reg05], has seen a significant leap in recent years. Most notably, we now have a number of constructions of cryptographic primitives that “compute on encrypted data”. For example, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [Gen09, BV11, BGV12, GSW13], which enables arbitrary computation on encrypted data without knowledge of the secret key; attribute-based encryption (ABE) [SW05, GPSW06, GVW13, BGG+14], which supports fine-grained access control of encrypted data via the creation of restricted secret keys; new forms of pseudo-random functions (PRF) such as constrained PRFs [BW13, KPTZ13, BGII14]; and many more.

In this paper, we continue this line of inquiry and develop two new constructions of private ABE schemes (also called predicate encryption [BW07, KSW08, BSW11, O’N10]) and two new constructions of private constrained PRFs [BLW17], private variants of ABE and constrained PRFs respectively, that take us further along in the quest to extend the limits of computing on encrypted data using LWE-based techniques. Our private constrained PRFs support polynomial-time computable constraints, generalizing the recent results of Boneh, Kim and Montgomery [BKM17] for point functions and Canetti and Chen [CC17] for NC$^1$ functions.

In constructing these schemes, we develop two new techniques that we believe are as interesting in their own right as the end results themselves. We proceed to introduce the protagonists of our work and describe our results and techniques.

Predicate Encryption. Predicate Encryption (PE) is a strengthening of ABE with additional privacy guarantees [BW07, KSW08, BSW11, O’N10]. In a predicate encryption scheme, ciphertexts are associated with descriptive attributes $x$ and a plaintext $M$; secret keys are associated with Boolean functions $f$; and a secret key decrypts the ciphertext to recover $M$ if $f(x)$ is true (henceforth, for convenience of notation later in the paper, we denote this by $f(x) = 0$).

The most basic security guarantee for attribute-based encryption as well as predicate encryption, called payload hiding, stipulates that $M$ should remain private given its encryption under attributes $x^*$ and an unbounded number of unauthorized keys, namely secret keys $sk_f$ where $f(x^*)$ is false (we denote this $f(x^*) = 1$). The additional requirement in predicate encryption refers to hiding the attribute $x^*$ (beyond leaking whether $f(x^*)$ is true or false). It turns out that this requirement, called attribute-hiding, can be formalized in two ways. The first is the definition of weak attribute-hiding, which stipulates that $x^*$ remains hidden given an unbounded number of unauthorized keys. The second, called strong attribute-hiding, stipulates that $x^*$ remains hidden given an unbounded number of keys, which may comprise of both authorized and unauthorized keys. Both these requirements can be formalized using simulation-based and indistinguishability-based definitions (simulation based strong attribute hiding is known to be impossible [AGVW13]); jumping ahead, we remark that our constructions will achieve the stronger simulation-based definition but for weak attribute hiding.

A sequence of works showed the surprising power of strong attribute-hiding predicate encryption [BV15a, AJ15, BKS16]. A strong attribute-hiding PE scheme (for sufficiently powerful classes of predicates) gives us a functional encryption scheme [BSW11], which in turn can be used to build an indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) scheme [BV15a, AJ15], which in turn has emerged as a very powerful “hub of cryptography” [GGH+16, SW14].

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The only strong attribute-hiding predicate encryption schemes we have under standard cryptographic assumptions are for very simple functionalities related to the inner product predicate [KSW08, BW07, OT12], and build on bilinear groups. On the other hand, Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan and Wee (GVW) [GVW15a] recently constructed a weak attribute-hiding predicate encryption scheme for all circuits (of an a-priori bounded polynomial depth) from the LWE assumption. They also pointed out two barriers, two sources of leakage, that prevent their construction from achieving the strong attribute-hiding guarantee. Indeed, Agrawal [Agr16] showed that both sources of leakage can be exploited to recover the private attribute $x^*$ in the GVW scheme, under strong attribute-hiding attacks in the GVW scheme (that is, using both authorized and unauthorized secret keys).

**Private Constrained PRFs (CPRFs).** Constrained Pseudorandom Functions (CPRFs) [BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14] are pseudorandom functions (PRF) where it is possible to delegate the computation of the PRF on a subset of the inputs. Specifically, an adversary can ask for a constrained key $\sigma_f$ corresponding to a function $f$, which is derived from the (global) seed $\sigma$. Using $\sigma_f$ it is possible to compute $\text{PRF}_f(x)$ for all $x$ where $f(x)$ is true (in our notation, again, $f(x) = 0$). However, if $f(x) = 1$ then $\text{PRF}_f(x)$ is indistinguishable from uniform even for an adversary holding $\sigma_f$.

The original definition considers the case of unbounded collusion, i.e. security against an adversary that can ask for many different $\sigma_f_i$, but this is currently only achievable for very simple function classes or under strong assumptions such as multilinear maps or indistinguishability obfuscation. Many of the applications of CPRFs (e.g. for broadcast encryption [BW13] and identity based key exchange [HKKW14]) rely on collusion resilience, but some (such as the puncturing paradigm [SW14]) only require releasing a single key. Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV15b] showed that single-key CPRF is achievable for all functions with a-priori depth bound and non-uniformity bound under the LWE assumption.

Boneh, Lewi and Wu [BLW17] recently considered *constraint hiding* CPRFs (CH-CPRF or private CPRFs) where the constrained key $\sigma_f$ does not reveal $f$ (so, in a sense, the constrained key holder cannot tell whether it is computing the right value or not). They showed various applications for this new primitive, as well as constructions from multilinear maps and obfuscation for various function classes. Very recently, Boneh, Kim and Montgomery [BKM17] showed how to construct single-key private CPRFs for point functions, and Canetti and Chen [CC17] showed how to construct a single-key private CPRF for the class of NC\(^1\) circuits (i.e. polynomial-size formulae). Both their constructions are secure under the LWE assumption. They also showed that even collusion resistance against 2-keys would imply indistinguishability obfuscation.

The technical core of these constructions is lattice-based constructions of PRFs, initiated by Banerjee, Peikert and Rosen [BPR12] and developed in a line of followup works [BP14, BLMR15, BFP+15, BV15b].

1.1 *Our Results*

In this work, we present two new techniques for achieving the attribute-hiding guarantee from the LWE assumption. We exemplify the novelty and usefulness of our techniques by showing that they can be used to derive new predicate encryption schemes and new constraint-hiding constrained

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1 In addition, we also have several constructions of *functional encryption* schemes for computing inner products over large fields [ABCP15, BJK15, ALS16] (as opposed to the inner product predicate) and for quadratic functions [Lin16, Gay16] from standard assumptions.
PRFs [BLW17, CC17]. In particular, under the (polynomial hardness of the subexponential noise rate) LWE assumption, we construct:

- Our main result is two constructions of single-key constraint-hiding constrained PRF families for all circuits (of an a-priori bounded polynomial depth). This generalizes recent results of [BKM17] who handle point functions and [CC17] who handle NC1 circuits. Our new techniques allow us to handle arbitrary polynomial-time constraints (of an a-priori bounded depth), which does not seem to follow from previous PE techniques, e.g., [GVW15a]. We describe constrained PRFs, constraint-hiding and our constructions in more detail in the sequel.

- Along the way to our main result, we also derive two new predicate encryption schemes that achieve the weak attribute-hiding security guarantee. Our predicate secret keys are shorter than in [GVW15a] by a poly(\(\lambda\)) factor. They also avoid the first source of leakage identified in [GVW15a, Agr16]. We will describe these features in more detail in the sequel.

**Technical Background.** Like [GVW15a], we build a predicate encryption scheme starting from an FHE and an ABE, following the “FHE+ABE” paradigm introduced in [GVW12, GKP+13] for the setting of a-priori bounded collusions. The idea is to first use FHE to produce an encryption \(\Psi\) of the attribute \(x\), and use \(\Psi\) as the attribute in an ABE. This paradigm allows us to reduce the problem of protecting arbitrary polynomial-time computation \(f\) on a private attribute \(x\) to protecting a fixed computation, namely FHE decryption, on the FHE secret key. Henceforth, we suppress the issue of carrying out FHE homomorphic evaluation on the encrypted attribute, which can be handled via the underlying ABE as in [GVW15a], and focus on the issue of FHE decryption, which is where we depart from prior works.

With all LWE-based FHE schemes [BV11, BGV12, GSW13, BV14, AP14], decryption corresponds to computing an inner product modulo \(q\) followed by a threshold function. While constructing a strongly attribute hiding PE scheme for this function class is still beyond reach,² GVW construct an LWE-based weakly attribute hiding scheme by extending previous works [AFV11], and show how to attach it to the end of the decryption process of [BGG+14] ABE. Specifically, Agrawal, Freeman and Vaikuntanathan [AFV11] showed how to construct weakly attribute hiding PE for orthogonality checking modulo \(q\), i.e. the class where attributes \(x\) and functions \(f_y\) correspond to vectors and decryption is possible if \(\langle x, y \rangle = 0 \pmod{q}\). GVW rely on an additional feature of LWE-based FHE: that the value to be rounded after the inner product can be made polynomially bounded. Thus inner product plus rounding can be interpreted as a sequence of shifted inner products that are supported by [AFV11]. This in particular means that an authorized decryptor learns which of the shifts had been the successful one, a value that depends on the FHE randomness. This is one of the reasons why the GVW scheme is not strongly attribute hiding; there are others as described in [Agr16].

**First New Technique: Dual Use.** In this technique, we use the same LWE secret for the FHE and the ABE. Our main observation is that the structure of the [BGG+14] ABE scheme and that of the [GSW13] FHE scheme are so very similar that we can use the same LWE secret in both schemes. This can be viewed as encrypting the attribute under some FHE key, and then providing partly decrypted pieces as the ABE ciphertext. The PE decryption process first “puts the pieces together”

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²There are constructions for function classes that semantically seem astonishingly similar, such as inner product over the integers followed by rounding [ALS16] but there appears to be a big technical gap between these classes.
according to the FHE homomorphic evaluation function, which makes the ABE ciphertext decrypt its own FHE component, leaving us with an ABE ciphertext which is ready to be decrypted using the ABE key. Proving security for this approach requires to delicately argue about the randomness used in the FHE encryption.

**Second New Technique: Modulus Switching and HNF Lattice Trapdoors.** In this technique, we attempt to implement the rounding post inner-product straightforwardly by rounding the resulting ciphertext. This does not work since the attribute is encoded in the ciphertext in a robust way, so it is not affected by rounding (this is why more sophisticated methods were introduced in the past). However, we show how to homomorphically modify the rounding in a way that makes the rounding effective for small noise, and yet preserves the most significant bits properly encoded. Interestingly, for the proof of security of our PE scheme, we utilize the ability of generating trapdoors for LWE lattices of the form \([I\parallel A]\) (which corresponds to Hermite Normal Form), even when generating a trapdoor for \(A\) itself is not possible.

We first construct predicate encryption schemes using our techniques, on the way to our main results, which are constructions of constraint-hiding CPRFs for general constraints. With this executive summary, we move on to a more in-depth technical discussion of our results and techniques.

## 2 Technical Overview

We provide a brief overview of the GVW predicate encryption scheme, along with our constructions, focusing on the points where they differ and supressing many technical details.

**The [GVW15a] scheme.** In the GVW scheme, the decryption algorithm on input an encryption of \(x\) and the secret key for \(f\), computes a vector over \(\mathbb{Z}_q\) of the form:

\[
s|A\parallel A_f - (f(x) \cdot t + \delta)G| + \text{noise}
\]

where \(A_f\) is deterministically derived from the public parameters and \(f\) (the precise derivation is not relevant for the overview), and \(f(x) \cdot t + \delta\) corresponds to the inner product of a FHE ciphertext (upon homomorphic evaluation) and the corresponding secret key. Here, \(\delta\) is a small noise value bounded by \(B\), and \(t \gg B\) is a large constant, most commonly \(t = \lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor\) (but we will also use other values, see below). As usual in LWE-based constructions, the vector \(s\) is an “LWE secret”, and we use \text{noise} to denote non-specific low norm noise that is added to the ciphertext and accumulates as it is processed.\(^3\)

Decryption should be permitted when \(f(x) = 0\), which indicates that the policy \(f\) accepts the attribute \(x\), (and forbidden when \(f(x) = 1\)). Therefore, the GVW scheme gives out trapdoors for the \(2B + 1\) lattices

\[
\frac{|A\parallel A_f - \beta G|}{\forall |\beta| \leq B},
\]

and decryption tries all trapdoors until one works. This is called the “lazy OR” evaluation in [GVW15a] and has at least two problems: (1) In the context of a predicate encryption scheme, this ruins security by letting a successful decryption leak the FHE noise \(\delta\); and (2) Looking ahead, in the context of a constraint-hiding CPRF scheme (where one switches the function \(f\) and the input \(x\)), it ruins even correctness, preventing the holder of a constrained key from recovering the PRF value \(s|A\parallel A_x|\); rather, she only gets \(s|A\parallel A_x - \beta G|\) for some small noise term \(\beta\).

\(^3\)A knowledgeable reader might notice that in [GVW15a] there is a plus sign in Eq. (1) instead of the minus sign. This alternative notation is equivalent and will be more useful for us.
Moving on, in the proof of security, a simulator needs to generate secret keys whenever \( f(x) = 1 \). To this end, the reduction knows a short \( R_f \) for which

\[
AR_f = A_f - (t + \delta^*)G \tag{2}
\]

We can then rewrite

\[
[A \parallel A_f - \beta G] = [A \parallel AR_f + (\delta^* + t - \beta)G]
\]

and since \( \beta - \delta^* - t \neq 0 \), we will be able to generate trapdoors for this lattice knowing only \( R_f \) using the trapdoor extension techniques of [ABB10b, MP12].

### 2.1 Dual-Use of Secret and Randomness

Our first technique hinges on the key observation is that the structure of the \([BGG^{+}14]\) ABE scheme and that of the \([GSW13]\) FHE scheme are so very similar that we can use the same LWE secret in both schemes; we refer to this as the “dual use” technique.

Instead of (1), we will compute a vector of the form

\[
s[B \parallel B_f - \overline{\Psi}_f] \tag{3}
\]

Here, \( \Psi_f \) denotes the GSW FHE ciphertext upon homomorphic evaluation under the key \((s - 1)\). We stress that we are reusing \( s \) here. Concretely, \( \Psi_f \) can be written as:

\[
\left( \begin{array}{c}
B \\
SB + \delta
\end{array} \right) R_f + f(x)G
\]

where \( R_f \) is small. \( \overline{\Psi}_f \) refers to \( \Psi_f \) with the bottom row \( \overline{\Psi}_f \) deleted so that it has the same height as \( B \). Again, we need to first explain how to arrive at a vector of this form, and second, how to generate secret keys for such vectors.

**Compactification.** Using techniques from ABE, we can generate vectors of the form:

\[
s[B \parallel B_{f,j} - \psi_{f,j} \overline{G}]\]

where \( \psi_{f,j} \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) are the entries of \( \overline{\Psi}_j \) and \( \overline{G} \) refers to \( G \) with the bottom row deleted. In particular, we can write

\[
\psi_f = \sum_j \psi_{f,j} \cdot E_j
\]

where \( E_j \) is a 0,1-matrix whose \( j \)’th entry is 1 and 0 everywhere else. Then, we can write

\[
B_f + \overline{\Psi}_f = \sum_j (B_{f,j} - \psi_{f,j} \overline{G}) \cdot \overline{G}^{-1}(E_j)
\]

**Dual Use Decryption.** The secret key for \( f \) is a trapdoor for the lattice \([B \parallel B_f] \). Observe that whenever \( f(x) = 0 \), we have \((s - 1)\Psi_f \approx 0\) (property of GSW FHE), which means we can compute

\[
s[B \parallel B_f - \overline{\Psi}_f] + [0 \parallel \Psi_f] \approx s[B \parallel B_f]
\]

and thus decrypt.
In order to generate secret key whenever \( f(x) = 1 \) in the proof of security, the reduction knows a short \( W_f \) for which

\[
BW_f = B_f - \overline{\Psi}_f
\]

We can then rewrite

\[
[B\|B_f] = [B\|BR_f + \overline{\Psi}_f] = [B\|B(R_f - W_f) + G] 
\]

and we will be able to generate trapdoors for this lattice knowing only \( R_f, W_f \).

2.2 Modulus Switching and Trapdoor Extension in Hermite Normal Form

The crux of this technique is to replace Eq. (1) with a computation producing a vector of the form

\[
s[A\|A'_f - f(x)G'] + \text{noise}
\]

where \( G' \) is a different gadget matrix and \( A'_f \) is again deterministically derived from the public parameters and \( f \). We will also make sure to sample a small \( s \), specifically from the LWE noise distribution (this is known as LWE in Hermite Normal Form (HNF) and was shown equivalent to the standard form \([ACPS09]\)), the reason for doing so will be clear in a little bit. Next, we will address two challenges: first, how to arrive at a vector of this form, and second, how to generate secret keys for such vectors, both of which require new techniques.

**Modulus Switching.** We first describe how to get to Eq. (4) starting from Eq. (1) (to get to the latter, we will proceed as in GVW). We would like to use the magnitude gap between \( t \) and \( \delta \), and, inspired by modulus switching techniques in FHE \([BV11,BGV12]\), “divide by \( t \)” to remove the dependence on \( \delta \). This seems odd at first since \( t \cdot G \) and \( \delta \cdot G \) actually have the same magnitude, so dividing by \( t \) will not eliminate the \( \delta \) component. Therefore we will first find a linear transformation that maps \( \delta G \) into a matrix of small entries, while mapping \( t \cdot G \) into a gadget matrix with big entries. Recall that eventually this transformation is to be applied to the processed ciphertext from Eq. (1), so due to the noise component, we are only allowed linear operations with small coefficients (or more explicitly, multiplying on the right by a matrix with small values).

As we pointed out \( \delta G \) and \( tG \) have the same magnitude so it might seem odd that a low-magnitude linear transformation can shift them so far apart. However, since \( G \) is a matrix with public trapdoor, it is possible to convert \( G \) into any other matrix \( M \) using a small magnitude linear transformation which is denoted by \( G^{-1}(M) \) (note that this is just a formal notation, since \( G \) doesn’t have an actual inverse). Specifically, we will multiply by \( G^{-1}(G_p) \), where \( G_p \) is the gadget matrix w.r.t a smaller modulus \( p = q/t \) (we assume that \( p \) is integer). Recall that our conceptual goal is to divide by \( t \), and end up with a ciphertext in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \), we can now reveal that indeed \( G' = G_p \). Applying this transformation to the ciphertext results in

\[
s[A\|A_fG^{-1}(G_p) - f(x)tG_p] - [0][\delta sG_p] + \text{noise} \mod p,
\]

and indeed, since we use low-norm \( s \), we have that \( ||\delta sG_p|| < q \), and we can now think about it as part of the noise. However, \( tG_p \) is still not a valid gadget matrix over \( \mathbb{Z}_q \). Still, we can now divide the entire expression by \( t \) which results in

\[
s\left[\frac{A_f}{t} \right] \left\lfloor \frac{A_fG^{-1}(G_p)}{t} - f(x)G_p \right\rfloor + \text{noise} \mod p,
\]

where \( A' = A/t \) and \( A'_f = A'_f/t \).
as in Eq. (4). This technique is reminiscent of the one used by Boneh, Kim and Montgomery [BKM17] in constructing a private CPRF for point functions (but was obtained independently of theirs).

**HNF Trapdoor Extension.** The standard way to generate keys that decrypt whenever \(f(x) = 0\) is to provide a trapdoor for \([A'\|A'_f]\) (over \(\mathbb{Z}_p\)) as in previous ABE schemes. Indeed, this will provide the required functionality, but introduce problems in the proof. As in Eq. (2), the simulator can find a low-magnitude \(R_f\) s.t. \(A R_f = A f + (t + \delta^*) G\), however, when applying our modulus switching from above, we get

\[
A' R'_f = A'_f - G_p - E,
\]

where \(E\) is a low-magnitude error matrix which is the result of the bias introduced by \(\delta^*\) and various rounding errors (note that \(E\) is easily computable given \(R'_f\)). Therefore, we have that

\[
[A'\|A_f] = [A'\|A'R'_f + G_p + E],
\]

which is no longer a form for which we can find a trapdoor using \(R'_f\).

To resolve this, we observe that we can find a trapdoor for the matrix \([I\|A'\|A'_f]\) = \([I\|A'\|A'R'_f + G_p + E]\), which corresponds to generating trapdoors for *lattices* in Hermite Normal Form. This follows from the trapdoor extension methods of [ABB10b,MP12] since

\[
[I\|A'\|A'R'_f + G_p + E] \cdot \begin{bmatrix} -E \\ -R_f' \\ I \end{bmatrix} = G_p.
\]

We will therefore change the way secret keys are generated in our scheme, and generate them as trapdoors for \([I\|A'\|A'_f]\) instead of trapdoors for \([A'\|A'_f]\). This might seem problematic because our ciphertext processes to \(s[A'\|A'_f - f(x) G'] + \text{noise}\) as in Eq. (4) and not to \(s[I\|A'\|A'_f - f(x) G'] + \text{noise}\). However, since \(s\) is short, the zero vector itself has the form \(0 = sI + \text{noise}\) (with \(\text{noise} = -s\)), and therefore we can always extend our ciphertext to this new form just by concatenating the zero vector.

**Comparison with GVW15 Predicate Encryption.** [GVW15a] pointed out that there are two barriers to achieving strongly attribute-hiding predicate encryption from LWE. First, multiple shifts approach to handle threshold inner product for FHE decryption leaks the exact inner product and therefore cannot be used to achieve full attribute-hiding. That is, authorized keys leak the FHE decryption key and in turn the private attribute \(x\). Second, we do not currently know of a fully attribute-hiding inner product encryption scheme under the LWE assumption. Here, authorized keys leak the error terms used in the ciphertext. Indeed, Agrawal [Agr16] showed that both sources of leakage can be exploited to recover the private attribute \(x\) in the GVW scheme. Both of our new constructions do not explicitly contain the first source of leakage.

### 2.3 From PE to Constraint Hiding CPRF

It was shown in [BV15b] that the [BGG+14] ABE structure can be used to construct constrained PRFs for arbitrary bounded-uniformity bounded-depth functions, without collusion. Namely, a pseudorandom function where it is possible to produce a constrained key \(\sigma_f\) for a function \(f\) whose description length is a-priori bounded by \(\ell\) and its depth is a-priori bounded by \(d\), s.t. the constrained key can be used to compute \(\text{PRF}(x)\) for all \(x\) where \(f(x) = 0\). At a high level, they considered a
set of public parameters for the ABE scheme, and some ciphertext randomness $s$ (currently not corresponding to any concrete ciphertext). To compute the PRF at point $x$, the considered the circuit $U_x$ which is the universal circuit that takes an $\ell$-bit long description of a depth-$d$ function, and evaluates it on $x$. Now, they compute $\text{PRF}_s(x) = \left\lfloor \frac{sA_{U_x}T}{T} \right\rfloor$ for a sufficiently large $T$. This essentially the deterministic variant to setting $\text{PRF}_s(x) = sA_{U_x} + \text{noise}$ except here the noise is deterministic since the PRF computation needs to be deterministic. The matrix $A_{U_x}$ is exactly the matrix that would be computed in the ABE decryption process if given a key $sk_{U_x}$. The constrained key corresponds to an ABE ciphertext encrypting the description of $f$. Therefore, constrained keys can be processed like ABE ciphertexts into the form $s(A_{U_x} - U_x(f)G) + \text{noise}$, for any circuit $U_x$. Indeed, when $f(x) = 0$ the constrained key can be used to compute $\text{PRF}(x)$. The construction itself is more complicated and contains additional features to ensure pseudorandomness in all of the points that cannot be computed using the constrained key.

This seems to be readily extendable to the PE setting, where the attribute hiding property should guarantee the constraint hiding of the CPRF. Indeed, now as in Eq. (1), the constrained key will only process to $s(A_{U_x} - (t(f(x) + \delta)G) + \text{noise}$. When $f(x) = 0$ this is equal to $s(A_{U_x} - \delta G) + \text{noise}$ which does not allow to compute the correct value.

However, it is easy to see how using either of our new methods it is possible to overcome this issue. In a sense, in both methods the FHE noise which is embodied in the $\delta$ term is made small enough to be conjoined with the noise. The modulus switching technique allows to remove the $\delta$ term via multiplication by $G^{-1}(G_p)$ and dividing by $t$, and in the dual use method, the FHE noise is not multiplied by $G$ to begin with. There are many other technical details to be dealt with, but they are resolved in ways inspired by [BV15b]. One technical difference between our solution and [BV15b] is that we do not use admissible hash functions to go from unpredictability to pseudorandomness, but instead we “compose” with the Banerjee-Peikert [BP14] pseudorandom function, which saves some complication as well as tightens the reduction somewhat. This could be used even in the setting of [BV15b] when constraint hiding is not sought.

Organization of the Paper. We start the rest of this paper with background information on lattices, LWE, trapdoors and FHE schemes in Section 3. Our first technique, namely dual-use, and the resulting PE and private CPRF scheme are presented in Section 4. Our second technique, namely HNF trapdoors and modulus switching, and the resulting PE and private CPRF schemes are presented in Section 5. These two sections can be read independently of each other. In each section, we first present the PE scheme and then the private CPRF scheme.

3 Preliminaries

3.1 Constrained Pseudo-Random Functions

In a constrained PRF family [BW13,BGI14,KPTZ13], the owner of a PRF key $\sigma$ can compute a constrained PRF key $\sigma_f$ corresponding to any Boolean circuit $f$. Given $\sigma_f$, anyone can compute the PRF on inputs $x$ such that $f(x) = 0$. (As described before, our convention throughout this paper is that $f(x) = 0$ corresponds to the predicate $f$ being satisfied). Furthermore, $\sigma_f$ does not reveal any information about the PRF values at the other locations. A constrained PRF family is constraint-hiding if $\sigma_f$ does not reveal any information about the internals of $f$. This requirement can be formalized through either an indistinguishability-based or simulation-based
Definition 3.1 (Constrained PRF). A constrained pseudo-random function (PRF) family is defined by a tuple of algorithms \((\text{KeyGen}, \text{Eval}, \text{Constrain}, \text{ConstrainEval})\) where:

- \(\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\ell, 1^d, 1^r)\) is a ppt algorithm that takes as input the security parameter \(\lambda\), a circuit max-length \(\ell\), a circuit max-depth \(d\) and an output space \(r\), and outputs a PRF key \(\sigma\) and public parameters \(\text{pp}\).
- \(\text{Eval}_{\text{pp}}(\sigma, x)\) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a key \(\sigma\) and a string \(x \in \{0, 1\}^*\), and outputs \(y \in \mathbb{Z}_{r}\);
- \(\text{Constrain}_{\text{pp}}(\sigma, f)\) is a ppt algorithm that takes as input a PRF key \(\sigma\) and a circuit \(f: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\), and outputs a constrained key \(\sigma_f\);
- \(\text{ConstrainEval}_{\text{pp}}(\sigma_f, x)\) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a constrained key \(\sigma_f\) and a string \(x \in \{0, 1\}^*\), and outputs either a string \(y \in \mathbb{Z}_{r}\) or \(\perp\).

Previous works define and analyze the correctness, pseudorandomness and constraint hiding properties separately. However, for our purposes it will be easiest to define a single game that captures all of these properties at the same time. This definition is equivalent to computational correctness and selective punctured pseudorandomness [BV15b], and selective constraint hiding [BLW15].

Definition 3.2. Consider the following game between a PPT adversary \(A\) and a challenger:

1. \(A\) sends \(1^\ell, 1^d\) and \(f_0, f_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\ell\) to the challenger.

2. The challenger generates \((\text{pp}, \text{seed}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\ell, 1^d, 1^r)\). It flips three coins \(b_1, b_2, b_3 \in \{0, 1\}\), intuitively \(b_1\) selects whether \(f_0\) or \(f_1\) are used for the constraint, \(b_2\) selects whether a real or random value is returned on queries non-constrained queries, and \(b_3\) selects whether the actual or constrained value is returned on constrained queries.

   The challenger creates \(\text{seed}_f \leftarrow \text{Constrain}_{\text{pp}}(\text{seed}, f_{b_1})\), and sends \((\text{pp}, \text{seed}_f)\) to \(A\).

3. \(A\) adaptively sends unique queries \(x \in \{0, 1\}^*\) to the challenger (i.e. no \(x\) is queried more than once). The challenger returns:

   \[
   y = \begin{cases} 
   \perp, & \text{if } f_0(x) \neq f_1(x). \\
   U(\mathbb{Z}_r), & \text{if } (f_0(x) = f_1(x) = 1) \land (b_2 = 1). \\
   \text{ConstrainEval}_{\text{pp}}(\sigma_f, x), & \text{if } (f_0(x) = f_1(x) = 0) \land (b_3 = 0). \\
   \text{Eval}_{\text{pp}}(\sigma, x), & \text{otherwise.}
   \end{cases}
   \]

4. \(A\) sends a guess \((i, b')\).

The advantage of the adversary in this game is defined as \(\text{Adv}[A] = |\Pr[b' = b_1] - 1/2|\). A family of PRFs \((\text{KeyGen}, \text{Eval}, \text{Constrain}, \text{ConstrainEval})\) is a single-key constraint-hiding selective-function constrained PRF if for every PPT adversary \(A\), \(\text{Adv}[A] = \text{negl}(\lambda)\).
3.2 Weakly Attribute Hiding Predicate Encryption

Following prior works, we associate $C(x) = 0$ as true and authorized, and $C(x) \neq 0$ as false and unauthorized.

**Syntax.** A Predicate Encryption scheme $\mathcal{PE}$ for input universe $\mathcal{X}$, a predicate universe $\mathcal{C}$, a message space $\mathcal{M}$, consists of four algorithms ($\mathcal{PE}.$Setup, $\mathcal{PE}.$Enc, $\mathcal{PE}.$KeyGen, $\mathcal{PE}.$Dec):

$\mathcal{PE}.$Setup($1^\lambda, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{M}$) $\rightarrow (pp, msk)$. The setup algorithm gets as input the security parameter $\lambda$ and a description of $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{M})$ and outputs the public parameter $pp$, and the master key $msk$.

$\mathcal{PE}.$Enc($pp, x, \mu$) $\rightarrow$ ct. The encryption algorithm gets as input $pp$, an attribute $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and a message $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$. It outputs a ciphertext $ct$.

$\mathcal{PE}.$KeyGen($msk, C$) $\rightarrow$ sk$_C$. The key generation algorithm gets as input $msk$ and a predicate $C \in \mathcal{C}$. It outputs a secret key sk$_C$.

$\mathcal{PE}.$Dec($sk_C, C, ct$) $\rightarrow$ $\mu$. The decryption algorithm gets as input the secret key $sk_C$, a predicate $C$, and a ciphertext $ct$. It outputs a message $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$ or $\bot$.

**Correctness.** We require that for all $\mathcal{PE}.$Setup($1^\lambda, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{M}$) $\rightarrow (pp, msk)$, for all $(x, C) \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{C}$ such that $C(x) = 0$, for all $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$,

$$\Pr \left[ \mathcal{PE}.$Dec(($sk_C, C, ct$) = $\mu$ $\geq 1 - \negl(\lambda),$$

where the probabilities are taken over the coin of $\mathcal{PE}.$Setup, $sk_C \leftarrow \mathcal{PE}.$KeyGen($msk, C$), ct $\leftarrow$ $\mathcal{PE}.$Enc($pp, x, \mu$).

**Definition 3.3 (PE (Weak) Attribute-Hiding).** Fix ($\mathcal{PE}.$Setup, $\mathcal{PE}.$Enc, $\mathcal{PE}.$KeyGen, $\mathcal{PE}.$Dec). For every stateful p.p.t. adversary Adv, and a p.p.t. simulator Sim, consider the following two experiments:

| exp$^{\text{real}}_{PE,\text{Adv}}(1^\lambda)$: | exp$^{\text{ideal}}_{PE,\text{Sim}}(1^\lambda)$: |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| 1. $x \leftarrow$ Adv($1^\lambda, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{M}$) | 1. $x \leftarrow$ Adv($1^\lambda, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{M}$) |
| 2. $(pp, msk) \leftarrow$ $\mathcal{PE}.$Setup($1^\lambda, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{M}$) | 2. $(pp, msk) \leftarrow$ $\mathcal{PE}.$Setup($1^\lambda, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{M}$) |
| 3. $\mu \leftarrow$ Adv$^{\mathcal{PE},\text{KeyGen}(msk,\cdot)}$($pp$) | 3. $\mu \leftarrow$ Adv$^{\mathcal{PE},\text{KeyGen}(msk,\cdot)}$($pp$) |
| 4. $ct \leftarrow$ $\mathcal{PE}.$Enc($pp, x, \mu$) | 4. $ct \leftarrow$ Sim($mpk, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{M}$) |
| 5. $\alpha \leftarrow$ Adv$^{\mathcal{PE},\text{KeyGen}(msk,\cdot)}$($ct$) | 5. $\alpha \leftarrow$ Adv$^{\mathcal{PE},\text{KeyGen}(msk,\cdot)}$($ct$) |
| 6. Output ($x, \mu, \alpha$) | 6. Output ($x, \mu, \alpha$) |

We say an adversary Adv is admissible if all oracle queries that it makes $C \in \mathcal{C}$ satisfy $C(x) \neq 0$ (i.e. false). The Predicate Encryption scheme $\mathcal{PE}$ is then said to be (weak) attribute-hiding if there is a p.p.t. simulator Sim such that for every stateful p.p.t. adversary Adv, the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:

$$\left\{ \text{exp}_{\mathcal{PE},\text{Adv}}^{\text{real}}(1^\lambda) \right\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \approx \left\{ \text{exp}_{\mathcal{PE},\text{Sim}}^{\text{ideal}}(1^\lambda) \right\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$$
3.3 Learning With Errors

The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem was introduced by Regev [Reg05]. Our scheme relies on the hardness of its decisional version.

Definition 3.4 (Decisional LWE (DLWE) [Reg05] and its HNF [ACPS09]). Let $\lambda$ be the security parameter, $n = n(\lambda)$ and $q = q(\lambda)$ be integers and let $\chi = \chi(\lambda)$ be a probability distribution over $\mathbb{Z}$. The DLWE$_{n,q,\chi}$ problem states that for all $m = \text{poly}(n)$, letting $A \leftarrow Z_q^{n \times m}$, $s \leftarrow Z_q^n$, $e \leftarrow \chi^m$, and $u \leftarrow Z_q^m$, it holds that $(A, sA + e)$ and $(A, u)$ are computationally indistinguishable. The problem is equally hard in its “Hermite Normal Form”: when sampling $s \leftarrow \chi^n$.

In this work we only consider the case where $q \leq 2^n$. Recall that GapSVP$_{\gamma}$ is the (promise) problem of distinguishing, given a basis for a lattice and a parameter $d$, between the case where the lattice has a vector shorter than $d$ and the case where the lattice doesn’t have any vector shorter than $\gamma \cdot d$. SIVP is the search problem of finding a set of “short” vectors. The best known algorithms for GapSVP$_{\gamma}$ [Sch87] require at least $2^{\Omega(n/\log \gamma)}$ time. We refer the reader to [Reg05, Pei09] for more information.

There are known reductions between DLWE$_{n,q,\chi}$ and those problems, which allows us to appropriately choose the LWE parameters for our scheme. We summarize in the following corollary (which addresses the regime of sub-exponential modulus-to-noise ratio).

Corollary 3.1 ([Reg05, Pei09, MM11, MP12, BLP+13]). For any function $B = B(n) \geq \tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$ there exists a $B$-bounded distribution ensemble $\chi = \chi(n)$ over the integers s.t. for all $q = q(n)$, letting $\gamma = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{n}/B)$, it holds that DLWE$_{n,q,\chi}$ is at least as hard as the quantum hardness of GapSVP$_{\gamma}$ and SIVP$_{\gamma}$. Classical hardness GapSVP$_{\gamma}$ follows if $q(n) \geq 2^{n/2}$ or for other values of $q$ for $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$ dimensional lattices and approximation factor $q/B \cdot \text{poly}(n[\log q])$.

3.4 Trapdoors and Discrete Gaussians

Let $n, q \in \mathbb{Z}$,

$$g = (1, 2, 4, \ldots, 2^{\lceil \log q \rceil - 1}) \in Z_q^{\lceil \log q \rceil}$$

and $m = n[\log q]$. The gadget matrix $G$ is defined as the diagonal concatenation of $g$ $n$ times. Formally, $G = g \otimes I_n \in Z_q^{n \times m}$. For any $t \in \mathbb{Z}$, the function $G^{-1} : Z_q^{n \times t} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{m \times t}$ expands each entry $a \in Z_q$ of the input matrix into a column of size $[\log q]$ consisting of the bit-representation of $a$. For any matrix $A \in Z_q^{n \times t}$, it holds that $G \cdot G^{-1}(A) = A \pmod{q}$.

The (centered) discrete Gaussian distribution over $\mathbb{Z}^m$ with parameter $\tau$, denoted $D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \tau}$, is the distribution over $\mathbb{Z}^m$ where for all $x$, $Pr[x] \propto e^{-\pi \|x\|^2/\tau^2}$.

Let $n, m, q \in \mathbb{N}$ and consider a matrix $A \in Z_q^{n \times m}$. For all $v \in Z_q^n$ we let $A^{-1}_\tau(v)$ denote the random variable whose distribution is the Discrete Gaussian $D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \tau}$ conditioned on $A \cdot A^{-1}_\tau(v) = v \pmod{q}$. If $h \leftarrow A^{-1}_\tau(v)$ then $\|h\| \leq k\sqrt{m}$ with probability at least $1 - e^{-\Omega(k^2)}$.

A $\tau$-trapdoor for $A$ is a procedure that can sample from a distribution within $2^{-n}$ statistical distance of $A^{-1}_\tau(v)$ in time $\text{poly}(n, m, \log q)$, for any $v \in Z_q^n$. We slightly overload notation and denote a $\tau$-trapdoor for $A$ by $A^{-1}_\tau$. The following properties have been established in a long sequence of works.

Corollary 3.2 (Trapdoor Generation [Ajt96, MP12]). There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $\text{TrapGen}(1^n, q, m)$ that for all $m \geq m_0 = m_0(n, q) = O(n \log q)$, outputs $(A, A^{-1}_m)$ s.t. $A \in Z_q^{n \times m}$ is within statistical distance $2^{-n}$ from uniform and $\tau_0 = O(\sqrt{n \log q \log n})$.  

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We use the most general form of trapdoor extension as formalized in [MP12].

**Theorem 3.3** (Trapdoor Extension [ABB10b, MP12]). Given $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, with a trapdoor $A_{τ}^{-1}$, and letting $B \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m'}$ be s.t. $A = BS \pmod{q}$ where $S \in \mathbb{Z}^{m' \times m}$ with largest singular value $s_1(S) \leq σ$, then $(A_{τ}^{-1}, S)$ can be used to sample from $B_{τ}^{-1}$.

Note that since only an upper bound on the singular value is required, this theorem implies that $A_{τ}^{-1}$ is derived from $A_{τ'}^{-1}$ whenever $τ \leq τ'$. A few additional important corollaries are derived from this theorem. We recall that $s_1(S) \leq \sqrt{\frac{m}{n}}\|S\|_∞$ and that a trapdoor $G_{O(1)}^{-1}$ is trivial.

The first is a trapdoor extension that follows by taking $S = [I \mid 0]$.

**Corollary 3.4.** Given $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, with a trapdoor $A_{τ}^{-1}$, it is efficient to sample from $[A \mid B]_{τ}^{-1}$ for all $B$.

Next is a trapdoor extension that had been used extensively in prior work. It follows from Theorem 3.3 with $S = [-R^T \mid I^T]$.

**Corollary 3.5.** Given $\bar{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m'}$, and $R \in \mathbb{Z}^{m' \times m}$ with $m = n\lceil \log q \rceil$, it is efficient to sample from $[\bar{A} \mid AR + G]_{τ}^{-1}$ for $τ = O(√{mn'}\|R\|_∞)$.

Note that by taking $\bar{A}$ uniform and $R$ to be a high entropy small matrix, e.g. uniform in $\{-1, 0, 1\}$ and relying on the leftover hash lemma, Corollary 3.2 is in fact a special case of this one.

The following shows a different method for trapdoor extension which corresponds to matrices in Hermite Normal Form. This trapdoor generation method is mentioned in passing in [MP12] as a method for improving parameters by relying on computational assumptions. Our use of this property is quite different. Technically it follows from Theorem 3.3 with $S = [-E^T \mid -R^T \mid I^T]$.

**Corollary 3.6** (Trapdoor Extension in HNF). Let $n, q, m' \geq 1$ and let $m = n\lceil \log q \rceil$. Given $\bar{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m'}$, $R \in \mathbb{Z}^{m' \times m}$ and $E \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m}$, the trapdoor $[I \mid \bar{A} \mid AR + G + E]_{τ}^{-1}$ is efficiently computable for $τ = O(√{mn'}\|R\|_∞ + √{mn}\|E\|_∞)$.

### 3.5 Lattice Evolution

The following is an abstraction of the evaluation procedure in recent LWE based FHE and ABE schemes that developed in a long sequence of works [ABB10b, MP12, GSW13, AP14, BGC+14, GVW15b]. We use a similar formalism as in [BV15b, BCT16] but slightly rename the functions.

**Theorem 3.7.** There exist efficient deterministic algorithms $\text{EvalF}$ and $\text{EvalFX}$ such that for all $n, q, ℓ \in \mathbb{N}$, and for any sequence of matrices $(A_1, \ldots, A_ℓ) \in (\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n\lceil \log q \rceil})^ℓ$, for any depth-$d$ Boolean circuit $f : \{0, 1\}^ℓ \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ and for every $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_ℓ) \in \{0, 1\}^ℓ$, the following properties hold.

- The outputs $H_f = \text{EvalF}(f, A_1, A_ℓ)$ and $H_{f,x} = \text{EvalFX}(f, x, A_1, \ldots, A_ℓ)$ are both matrices in $\mathbb{Z}^{ℓn\lceil \log q \rceil \times n\lceil \log q \rceil}$.
- It holds that $\|H_f\|_∞, \|H_{f,x}\|_∞ \leq (n \log q)^{O(d)}$.
- It holds that
  $$[A_1 - x_1 G \mid A_2 - x_2 G \mid \ldots \mid A_ℓ - x_ℓ G] \cdot H_{f,x} = [A_1 \| A_2 \| \ldots \| A_ℓ] \cdot H_f - f(x)G \pmod{q} \quad (7)$$

We will call this the “key equation” for matrix evolution.
For a proof of this theorem, we refer the reader to [BV15b]. This evolution method was extended by [AFV11,GVW15a] to show that in the case of the inner product function it is possible to compute EvalFX with only one of the two operands.

**Theorem 3.8.** There exist efficient deterministic algorithms EvalF\textsuperscript{ip} and EvalFX\textsuperscript{ip} as follows. Let \( n,q,\ell,\overline{\lambda} = (\overline{A}_1, \ldots, \overline{A}_t), x \) be as above. Let \( \ell^\prime \in \mathbb{N} \) and \( \overline{B} = (\overline{B}_1, \ldots, \overline{B}_{\ell'}) \in (\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n})^\ell' \), and let \( f : \{0,1\}^\ell \to \{0,1\}^\ell' \) be a depth \( d \) boolean circuit with \( \ell' \) output bits. Then:

- \( H_f = \text{EvalF}^{ip}(f, \overline{A}, \overline{B}) \) and \( H_{f,x} = \text{EvalFX}^{ip}(f, x, \overline{A}, \overline{B}) \) are both in \( \mathbb{Z}^{((\ell+\ell')n \log q) \times n \log q} \);
- It holds that \( \|H_f\|_\infty, \|H_{f,x}\|_\infty \leq \ell'(n \log q)^{O(d)} \);
- It holds that for all \( y \in \mathbb{Z}^\ell' \)

\[
\left( [\overline{A} \overline{B}] - [x] y \otimes G \right) \cdot H_{f,x} = [\overline{A} \overline{B}] - \langle f(x), y \rangle G \pmod q, \tag{8}
\]

where the inner product is over the integers (or equivalently modulo \( q \)).

We note that EvalFX\textsuperscript{ip} does not take \( y \) as input and furthermore that \( y \) can have arbitrary integer values (not necessarily binary). We will later extend these theorems to functions that output matrices in Section 3.6.

### 3.6 Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)

A (secret-key) homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme w.r.t a function class \( \mathcal{F} \) is a semantically secure encryption scheme adjoined with an additional p.p.t. algorithm Eval\textsuperscript{s.t.} for all \( f \in \mathcal{F} \) and \( x \in \{0,1\}^\ell \) it holds that if sk is properly generated and ct\(_i = \text{Enc}_{sk}(x_i)\), then \( \text{Dec}_{sk}(\text{Eval}(f, ct_1, \ldots, ct_\ell)) = f(x) \) with all but negligible probability. The following is a corollary of the [GSW13] encryption scheme. We note that the common use of the scheme is with \( t = q/2 \) but we will use \( t \approx \sqrt{q} \) in this work.

**Lemma 3.9 (Leveled FHE [GSW13]).** Let \( q,n,t,d \geq 1 \) and let \( \chi \) be \( B \)-bounded. If \( q > 2t \geq 4B(n \log q)^{O(d)} \) then there exists an FHE scheme for the class \( \mathcal{F}_d \) of depth \( d \) circuits based on DLWE\(_{n,q,\chi}\) with the following properties.

- The ciphertext length is \( \ell_c = \text{poly}(n \log q) \).
- Decryption involves (i) preprocessing the ciphertext (independently of the secret key) into a binary vector \( c \in \{0,1\}^{\ell_s} \) for \( \ell_s = \text{poly}(n \log q) \); (ii) taking inner product \( \langle c, s \rangle \pmod q \) for an integer secret-key vector \( s \), which results in \( t\mu + \delta \) with \( |\delta| \leq B(n \log q)^{O(d)} \); (iii) extracting the output \( \mu \) from the above expression.

Moreover, for any \( f \in \mathcal{F}_d \), the depth of \( f'((\cdot)) = \text{FHE.Eval}(f, (\cdot)) \) is at most \( d' = d \cdot \text{polylog}(n \log q) \).

### 3.7 The Banerjee-Peikert Pseudorandom Function

Banerjee and Peikert [BP14] introduced an LWE-based key homomorphic pseudorandom function which was the basis for the [BV15b] constrained PRF. While [BV15b] only drew from the ideas in [BP14], we use their construction explicitly as a building block, which simplifies our analysis. We present their construction using the our instance evolution terminology.
For all $x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, consider the circuit (more precisely, arithmetic formula) $T_x(y_0, y_1)$ which computes the product $\prod_{i \in [\ell]} y_i$, using a balanced binary multiplication tree. Note that we are never actually computing $T_x$ on any input. We are only using its formal combinatorial structure for the purpose of evolution as described next.

**Corollary 3.10** (follows from [BP14, Theorems 3.7, 3.8]). Let $n, p, \ell \geq 1$ be integers, let $\chi$ be $B$-bounded and assume DLWE$_{n, p, \chi}$. Then there exists an efficiently computable randomized function $E : \{0, 1\}^\ell \to \mathbb{Z}^{n[\log p]}$ with bounded norm $\|E\|_\infty \leq B\sqrt{\ell} \cdot (n[\log p])^{\log \ell}$, such that, letting $C_0, C_1 \sim \mathbb{Z}_{p}^{n \times n[\log p]}$ and denoting $\vec{C} = (C_0, C_1)$, $C_x = \text{EvalF}(T_x, \vec{C})$ for all $x$.

$$F_s(x) = sC_x + E(x) \pmod{p}$$ is pseudorandom, where $s \sim \mathbb{Z}_p^n$. Furthermore, the same holds for

$$F'_d(x) = dG_p^{-1}(C_x) + E(x) \pmod{p}$$

where $d \sim \mathbb{Z}_p^{n[\log p]}$ and $C_x, E$ as above.

### 4 Our First Construction: The Dual-Use Technique

In this section, we present the dual-use technique and construct a new weakly attribute-hiding PE scheme and a constraint-hiding constrained PRF based on LWE. We will use the machinery for lattice evolution developed in Section 3.5. First, in Section 4.1, we extend this machinery to work for computations that output not just scalars but matrices. Then, in sections 4.2 and 4.3, we describe our weakly attribute-hiding PE scheme and a constraint-hiding constrained PRF scheme, respectively.

#### 4.1 Lattice Evolution of Matrix-Valued Functions

We first extend evolution of matrices from Section 3.5 to deal with functions whose output is a matrix instead of a bit (we still treat the input as bits).

**Notation.** Given a matrix $X \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n[\log q]}$, we will index its $n^2 \log q$ entries by numbers, for convenience of notation (as opposed to the standard practice of using a pair of numbers to index the row and column separately). We use $x_{j, \tau} \in \{0, 1\}$ where $j \in [n^2 \log q], \tau \in [\log q]$ to denote the $\tau$'th bit of the $j$'th entry of $X$. This means that we can write

$$X = \sum_{j, \tau} x_{j, \tau} \cdot 2^\tau E_j$$

where $E_j$ is a 0,1-matrix whose $j$'th entry is 1 and 0 everywhere else. Throughout, we use $j \in [n^2 \log q], \tau \in [\log q]$ and $i \in [\ell]$ and we avoid explicitly quantifying over these variables.

**Matrix computation.** Suppose $f : x_1, \ldots, x_\ell \mapsto X_f$ where these matrices have the same dimensions as $A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_\ell$. Then, we require the following key relation between $H_f$ and $H_{f,x}$:

$$\left[ A_1 - x_1G \right] \cdots \left[ A_\ell - x_\ell G \right] \cdot H_{f,x} = \left[ A_1 \right] \cdots \left[ A_\ell \right] \cdot H_f - X_f$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)
Constructing $H_{f,x}$ and $H_f$. Let $f_{j,\tau} : x_1, \ldots, x_\ell \mapsto \{0, 1\}$ denote the function that outputs $\tau$’th bit of the $j$’th entry of $X_f$. Then, we define $H_f$ as follows.

$$H_{f,j,\tau} := \text{EvalF}(f_{j,\tau}, \{A_i\}), \quad H_f := \sum_{j,\tau} H_{f,j,\tau} \cdot G^{-1}(2^\tau E_j)$$

Then, the key relation (Equation 9) follows readily from the following relations:

$$\begin{bmatrix} A_1 - x_1 G & \cdots & A_\ell - x_\ell G \end{bmatrix} \cdot H_{f,j,\tau,x} = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \cdots A_\ell \end{bmatrix} \cdot H_{f,j,\tau} - x_{f,j,\tau} G$$

where the first equation is the key relation for functions with scalar output. These two relations together show us that the setting of

$$H_f := \sum_{j,\tau} H_{f,j,\tau} G^{-1}(2^\tau E_j), \quad H_{f,x} := \sum_{j,\tau} H_{f,j,\tau,x} G^{-1}(2^\tau E_j)$$

satisfies equation 9.

4.2 Weakly Attribute-Hiding Predicate Encryption

In this section, we describe the dual use technique and use it to construct a weakly attribute-hiding predicate encryption scheme.

**Notation.** We use gadget matrices $G \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{(n+1) \times (n+1) \log q}$ and we write $\overline{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{n \times (n+1) \log q}$ to denote all but the last row of $G$. Given a circuit computing a function $f : \{0, 1\}^\ell \mapsto \{0, 1\}$, and GSW FHE encryptions $\Psi := (\Psi_1, \ldots, \Psi_\ell)$ of $x_1, \ldots, x_\ell$, we write $\Psi_f$ to denote $\text{fhe.eval}(f, \Psi)$. Noting that $\Psi_f$ is a matrix, we let $\overline{\Psi}_f$ denote the last row of $\Psi_f$, and $\overline{\Psi}_f$ to denote all but the last row of $\Psi_f$. In addition, we write $\overline{\Psi}_f$ to denote the circuit that computes $\Psi \mapsto \overline{\Psi}_f$, namely it takes as input the bits of $\Psi$ and outputs the matrix $\overline{\Psi}_f$.

We let $e \xleftarrow{} \mathbb{Z}^m$ denote the process of sampling a vector $e$ where each of its entries is drawn independently from the discrete Gaussian with mean 0 and standard deviation $\sigma$ over $\mathbb{Z}$.

Our predicate encryption scheme works as follows.

- **Setup($1^\lambda, 1^\ell, 1^d$):** sample $(B, T_B)$ where $B \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{n \times (n+1) \log q}$ and $T_B$ denotes the trapdoor for $B$. Pick $B_j \xleftarrow{} \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{n \times (n+1) \log q}$ and $p \xleftarrow{} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. Output

  $$\text{mpk} := \left( B, \{B_j\}_{j \in [L]}, p \right), \quad \text{msk} := \left( T_B \right)$$

  where $L = \ell \cdot (n + 1)^2 \log^2 q$.  

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• **Enc**(mpk, x, M ∈ {0, 1}): pick s ← \(\mathbb{Z}_q^n\), e, e_0, e_j ← \(\mathbb{Z}_m\), e' ← \(\mathbb{Z}\), R_i ∈ {0, 1}^{(n+1)\log q × (n+1)\log q}

and compute

\[
\Psi_i := \left( \frac{B}{s^TB + e^T} \right) R_i + x_i G
\]

Let \(\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_L\) denote the binary representation of \(\Psi := [\Psi_1 | \cdots | \Psi_L]\). Compute

\[
c_0^T := s^TB + e_0^T, \quad c_j^T := s^T[B_j - \psi_j G] + e_j^T
\]

and \(\kappa := s^T p + e' + M \cdot [q/2] \pmod q\).

The PE ciphertext consists of the FHE ciphertext \(\Psi\) and the ABE ciphertexts computed as above. That is,

\[
ct := (\Psi, c_0, \{c_j\}_{j \in [L]}, \kappa)
\]

• **KeyGen**(msk, f): Let \(\hat{f}\) denote the circuit computing \(\Psi \mapsto \Psi f\) and

\[
H_{\hat{f}} := \text{EvalF}(\hat{f}, \{B_j\}_{j \in [L]}), \quad B_{\hat{f}} := [B_1 | \cdots | B_L] \cdot H_{\hat{f}}
\]

Sample a short \(sk_f\) using \(T_B\) such that

\[
[B | B_{\hat{f}}] \cdot sk_f = p
\]

Output \(sk_f\).

• **Dec**(sk_f, ct): Let \(\hat{f}\) denote the circuit computing \(\Psi \mapsto \Psi f\) and parse the ciphertext \(ct\) as \((\Psi, c_0, \{c_j\}_{j \in [L]}, \kappa)\). Compute:

\[
\Psi_f := \hat{f}(\Psi)
\]

\[
H_{\hat{f}, \Psi} := \text{EvalFX}(\hat{f}, \Psi, \{B_j\}_{j \in [L]})
\]

\[
c_j := [c_1 | \cdots | c_L] \cdot H_{\hat{f}, \Psi} + \Psi_f
\]

Compute

\[
\kappa' := [c_0 | c_j] \cdot sk_f
\]

and output the MSB of \(\kappa - \kappa'\).

We now analyze the correctness of the PE scheme (in the process setting the parameters) and prove its (selective) security under the polynomial hardness of LWE with a sub-exponential modulus-to-noise ratio.

**Theorem 4.1** (Correctness). The PE construction above is correct as per Definition 3.2.

**Proof.** The key relation tells us that

\[
[B_1 - \psi_1 G | \cdots | B_L - \psi_L G] \cdot H_{\hat{f}, \Psi} = [B_1 | \cdots | B_L] \cdot H_{\hat{f}} - \Psi_f = B_{\hat{f}} - \Psi_f
\]

Multiplying both sides by \(s^T\), we have

\[
c_j \approx s^T[B_1 - \psi_1 G | \cdots | B_L - \psi_L G] \cdot H_{\hat{f}, \Psi} + \Psi_f
\]

\[
= s^T B_{\hat{f}} - s^T \Psi_f + \Psi_f
\]

\[
= s^T B_{\hat{f}} - [s^T | -1] \cdot \Psi_f
\]

\[
\approx s^T B_{\hat{f}} - f(x) \cdot [s^T | -1] \cdot G
\]
where the first approximate equality is because of the accumulated error which is a product of the LWE errors and the low-norm matrix $H_{f,\psi}$, the second equality is because of the key relation, and the final approximate equality is because of the decryption equation of the GSW FHE scheme. Then, when $f(x) = 0$, 

$$\kappa' := |c_0| c_j \cdot sk_f \approx s^T [B | B_j] \cdot sk_f = s^T p$$

Now, decryption succeeds in recovering $M$ since $\kappa := s^T p + e' + M \cdot \lfloor q/2 \rfloor \pmod{q}$.

**Setting Parameters.** The error growth on FHE evaluation is by a multiplicative factor of $(n \log q)^{O(d_f)}$ where $d_f$ is the depth of the circuit computing $f$. Furthermore, the error growth on ABE evaluation has magnitude at most $(n \log q)^{O(d_f)}$ where $d_f$ is the depth of the circuit that performs GSW FHE evaluation for the function $f$. We know that $d_f = d \cdot \text{poly}(\log n, \log \log q)$. The total error growth thus has magnitude $(n \log q)^{d \cdot \text{poly}(\log n, \log \log q)}$ which should be at most $q/4$ for correctness.

On the other hand, we would like to set $q = O(2^n)$ for some constant $\epsilon$ so as to rely on the hardness of sub-exponential-error LWE. It is possible to find a setting of parameters that satisfy all these conditions, analogous to Section 5.1.

**Theorem 4.2 (Security).** The scheme PE is secure as per Definition 3.3 under the LWE$_{n,q,X}$ assumption, and thus under the worst case hardness of approximating GapSVP, SIVP to within a $2^{O(n^\epsilon)}$ factor in polynomial time.

**Proof.** We provide a proof sketch for selective security of the PE scheme.

First, we describe a set of auxiliary algorithms consisting of alternative algorithms ($\text{Setup}^*, \text{KeyGen}^*, \text{Enc}^*$) that will be used in the proof of security. We are given $A = (p, p', \ldots)$ and the selective challenge $x^*$. Here, $(c, p')$ is either $(s^T B + e, s^T p + e')$ or uniformly random.

$\text{Setup}^*(B, p, x^*) :$ pick $W'_j \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{(n+1)\log q}, R_i \in \{0, 1\}^{(n+1)\log q \times (n+1)\log q}$. Compute

$$\Psi_i := AR_i + x^* G$$

$$B_j := BW'_j + \psi_j G$$

where, as before, $\psi_j$ denote the bits of $\Psi = [\Psi_1 | \cdots | \Psi_l]$. Output

$$\text{mpk} := \left( B, \{B_j\}_{j \in [L]}, p \right)$$

$$\text{msk}^* := \left( \{W'_j\}_{j \in [L]} \right)$$

$\text{Enc}^*(B, p, x^*) :$ Compute

$$c_0^T := c^T, \quad c_j^T := c^T W'_j$$

Output

$$\text{ct} := (\Psi, c_0, \{c_j\}_{j \in [L]}, p' + M \cdot q/2)$$

$\text{KeyGen}^*(\text{msk}^*, f) :$ On input $f$ such that $f(x^*) \neq 0$,

$$B_f = [BW'_1 + \psi_1 G | \cdots | BW'_L + \psi_L G] \cdot H_f$$

$$= [BW'_1 | \cdots | BW'_L] \cdot H_{f,\psi} + \Psi_f$$

$$= B(W'_j + R_j) + f(x^*) \overline{G}$$

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where
\[ W'_f := [W'_1 \mid \cdots \mid W'_L] \cdot H_{f,\psi}, \quad \Psi_f = A R_f + f(x^*) G \]

We can then sample a short sk\( f \) using \( W'_f + R_f \) such that
\[ \begin{bmatrix} B \mid B_j \end{bmatrix} \cdot \text{sk}_f = p \]

Output \( \text{sk}_f \).

We now proceed to describe a sketch of the proof of security through a sequence of games, using the auxiliary algorithms described above.

**Game 0.** Real world.

**Game 1.** Switch to Setup\(^*\), Enc\(^*\) that are given \( A = (B_c) \) and use \( W'_f \). When \( c \) is the LWE vector relative to \( B \), game 0 and game 1 are statistically close by an application of the leftover hash lemma. (In this proof sketch, we ignore the issue of smoothing the errors in the ciphertext, which can be done by noise flooding). Note that in this game, the challenger does not know the LWE secret \( s \).

**Game 2.** Switch to KeyGen\(^*\) that uses \((W'_j, R_i)\) instead of \( T_B \). The difference between game 1 and game 2 is that in the former, secret keys are generated using \( T_B \) whereas in the latter, they are generated using \( W'_j + R_f \), by employing the ABB trick [ABB10a]. Thus, games 1 and 2 are statistically indistinguishable.

**Game 3.** Switch \( c \) in \( A \) from \( s^T B + e \) to a random \( c \) (this changes both \( a \), \( b \), \( e \) and \( \Psi \)). Games 2 and 3 are computationally indistinguishable by the LWE assumption.

**Game 4.** Switch from KeyGen\(^*\) back to KeyGen. Games 3 and 4 are statistically indistinguishable by the same argument as Games 1 versus 2.

Now, in game 4, we argue that \( x^*_1, \ldots, x^*_n \) is information-theoretically hidden, as follows:

- First, note that the distribution of the NO keys only depends on \([B \mid B_j]\), that is, on \((mpk, f, T_B)\), and leak no information about the FHE encryption randomness \( R_1, \ldots, R_n. \)

- Secondly, mpk and the ciphertext depend on the \( \psi_i \)'s and the \( W'_j \)'s, but not on the FHE encryption randomness \( R_1, \ldots, R_n. \)

- Using these two observations, we argue that \( \psi_i \) hides \( x^*_i \). Indeed, by left-over hash lemma, we know that \( AR_i \) is statistically close to uniform given \( A = (B_c) \), and therefore completely hides \( x^*_i \).
Remark: Relation to the GVW15 Security Proof. Many of the steps in the proof are analogous to what happens in GVW15. The crucial difference is that in GVW15, the leftover hash lemma (LHL) was used to hide the FHE secret key which is embedded as part of the ABE attributes. Using the fact that NO keys do not leak any information about the randomness \( W_j \) used to simulate ABE ciphertext, one can apply LHL to this randomness and therefore, hide the FHE secret key, and consequently, hiding the attributes. In our scheme, LHL is applied to the randomness \( R_j \) used for FHE encryption, and not on the randomness \( W'_j \) used to simulate the ABE ciphertext.

4.3 Constraint Hiding Constrained PRF

We now present a Constraint Hiding CPRF construction that relies on the [BV15b] CPRF together with the dual use technique from Section 4.2.

Our constraint hiding CPRF scheme works as follows.

- \texttt{CPRF.Keygen}(\( 1^\lambda, 1^\ell, 1^{\ell_x}, 1^d \)) takes as input the security parameter \( \lambda \), the maximum description length \( \ell \) of constraint functions, their input length \( \ell_x \) and depth \( d \), and outputs public parameters \( pp \) and a secret key \( \sigma \) for the CPRF scheme. Let \( L = \ell \cdot (n + 1)^2 \log^2 q \).

Sample \( B, B_1, \ldots, B_L \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_n^{n \times (n+1) \log q} \) and \( D, C_1, \ldots, C_{\ell_x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m} \) for some \( m = \Omega(n \log q) \). Sample a uniformly random vector \( s \in \mathbb{Z}_{q^n}^n \). Output

\[
 pp := \left( B, \{ B_j \}_{j \in [L]}, \{ C_j \}_{j \in [\ell_x]}, D \right), \\
 \sigma := s
\]

- \texttt{CPRF.Eval}_{pp}(\sigma, x) outputs the evaluation of the PRF on an input \( x \).

Let \( U_x : \{0,1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0,1\} \) be the circuit that takes as input a description of a function \( f \) and outputs \( f(x) \). Now consider the circuit \( \widehat{U}_x : \{0,1\}^L \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (n+1) \log q} \) that takes as input a GSW encryption \( \widehat{f} \) of the description of \( f \) and outputs \( \overline{\Psi}_x \) where \( \Psi_x := \text{FHE.Eval}(U_x, \widehat{f}) \).

Let \( \widehat{U}_x \) denote the circuit computing \( \Psi \mapsto \overline{\Psi}_x \) and

\[
 H_{\widehat{U}_x} := \text{EvalF}(\widehat{U}_x, \{ B_j \}_{j \in [L]}), \quad B_{\widehat{U}_x} := [B_1 | \cdots | B_L] \cdot H_{\widehat{U}_x}
\]

Compute \( C_x := \text{EvalF}(T_x, C_1, \ldots, C_{\ell_x}) \) (as defined in Section 3.7) and fix \( M_x = D G^{-1}(C_x) \).

The PRF output is

\[
 y = \left[ s^T \cdot B_{\widehat{U}_x} \cdot G^{-1}(M_x) \right].
\]

- \texttt{CPRF.Constrain}_{pp}(\sigma, f) outputs a constrained key \( \sigma_f \).

Pick \( e, e_0, e_j \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}^m, R_i \in \{0,1\}^{(n+1) \log q \times (n+1) \log q} \) and compute GSW ciphertexts

\[
 \Psi_i := \left( \frac{B}{s^T B + e^T} \right) R_i + f_i G
\]

where \( (f_1, \ldots, f_\ell) \) is the description of the function \( f \).
Let $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_L$ denote the binary representation of $\Psi := [\Psi_1 | \cdots | \Psi_L]$. Compute
\[ c_0^T := s^T B + e_0^T, \quad c_j^T := s^T [B_j - \psi_j G] + e_j^T. \]

The constrained key consists of the FHE ciphertext $\Psi$ and the “ABE ciphertexts” computed as above. That is,
\[ ct := (\Psi, c_0, \{c_j\}_{j \in [L]}) \]

- CPRF.ConstrainEval$_{pp}(\sigma_f, x)$ takes as input a constrained key $\sigma_f$ and an input $x$ and outputs a (potential) PRF output.

Let $\hat{f}$ denote the circuit computing $\Psi \mapsto \Psi_x$ (as above) and parse the constrained key $ct$ as $(\Psi, c_0, \{c_j\}_{j \in [L]})$. Compute:
\[ \Psi_x := \hat{U}_x(\Psi), \quad H_{\hat{U}_x, \Psi} := \text{EvalFX}(\hat{U}_x, \Psi, \{B_j\}_{j \in [L]}), \quad c_{\hat{U}_x} := [c_1 | \cdots | c_L] \cdot H_{\hat{U}_x, \Psi} + \Psi_x \]

Output
\[ y' = \left[ c_{\hat{U}_x} G^{-1}(M_x) \right] \]

**Theorem 4.3** (Correctness, Pseudorandomness, Constraint Hiding). Under the DLWE$_{n, q, \chi}$ hardness assumption, CPRF is correct, pseudorandom and constraint hiding.

Proof. Correctness follows from a computation similar to the one in Section 4.2. In particular, the key relation tells us that
\[ [B_1 - \psi_1 G | \cdots | B_L - \psi_L G] \cdot H_{\hat{U}_x, \Psi} = [B_1 | \cdots | B_L] \cdot H_{\hat{U}_x} - \Psi_x = B_{\hat{U}_x} - \Psi_x \]

Multiplying both sides by $s^T$, we have
\[ c_{\hat{U}_x} \approx s^T [B_1 - \psi_1 G | \cdots | B_L - \psi_L G] \cdot H_{\hat{U}_x, \Psi} + \Psi_x \]
\[ = s^T B_{\hat{U}_x} - s^T \Psi_x + \Psi_x \]
\[ = s^T B_{\hat{U}_x} - [s^T | -1] \cdot \Psi_x \]
\[ \approx s^T B_{\hat{U}_x} - f(x) \cdot [s^T | -1] \cdot G \]

Then, when $f(x) = 0$, the constrained evaluation algorithm outputs
\[ y = \left[ c_{\hat{U}_x} G^{-1}(M_x) \right] = \left[ s^T B_{\hat{U}_x} G^{-1}(M_x) \right] \]
which is indeed the PRF output on $x$. The error growth behaves as in the PE scheme and thus, the parameters are set as in Theorem 4.1.

The proof of security closely follows the outline of Theorem 5.5 for our modulus-switching based private CPRF construction. We omit the details from this version. \(\square\)
5 Our Second Technique: Modulus Switching in HNF

This section contains our PE and CH-CPRF constructions based on the modulus switching method. We start with a technical lemma that explains how rounding is used to push the FHE noise into the ABE noise, as explained in the introduction. This is followed by our construction of a Weakly Attribute Hiding Predicate Encryption in Section 5.1 and our construction of Constraint Hiding Constrained PRF in Section 5.2.

Throughout this section we denote \(|x|_p = \left\lfloor \frac{x}{q/p} \right\rfloor\) when the operand is \(x \in \mathbb{Z}_q\) and output in \(\mathbb{Z}_p\), for \(q,p\) that will be defined appropriately in the relevant sections. We extend this operator to vectors and matrices by applying it element-wise. We start with the aforementioned rounding lemma.

**Lemma 5.1.** Let \(n,m',t,p\) be integers and consider \(q = t \cdot p\). Let FHE be the scheme guaranteed in Lemma 3.9, with some depth bound \(d\), let \(d', B\) as in the lemma statement, and assume that \(t\) conforms with the conditions of the lemma. Denote \(m = n \lceil \log q \rceil\).

Let \(sk \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{t\times t} \leftarrow \text{FHE.Keygen}(1^n)\) and \(\tilde{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{t\times t} \leftarrow \text{FHE.Enc}(sk, x)\) for some \(x \in \{0,1\}^\ell\), and for any circuit \(f : \{0,1\}^\ell \to \{0,1\}\) define the circuit \(f' : \{0,1\}^{t \times p} \to \{0,1\}^{t \times s}\) as \(f(\cdot) = \text{FHE.Eval}(f, \cdot)\).

Let \(M \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{n \times m'}, \tilde{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times t \times m}, \tilde{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{t \times t \times m}\). Denote

\[
\begin{align*}
A_f &= [\tilde{A} \mid \tilde{B}] \cdot H_f, \\
\Psi_f &= [\tilde{A} - \tilde{x} \otimes \tilde{G} \mid \tilde{B} - sk \otimes \tilde{G}] \cdot H_{f,x}
\end{align*}
\]

where \(H_f = \text{EvalF}^p(f', \tilde{A}, \tilde{B})\) and \(H_{f,x} = \text{EvalFX}^p(f', \tilde{x}, \tilde{A}, \tilde{B})\). Then

1. \(\Psi_f = A_f - (f(x) \cdot t + e)G\) where \(|e| \leq B_{\text{FHE}} = B(n \lceil \log q \rceil)^O(d)\).

2. \(|\Psi_f G^{-1}(M)|_p = |A_f G^{-1}(M)|_p - f(x)M + E| where \(|E|_\infty \leq 2 + \frac{B_{\text{FHE}}\|M\|_\infty}{t}\).

**Proof.** By Theorem 3.8,

\[
\begin{align*}
\Psi_f &= [\tilde{A} - \tilde{x} \otimes \tilde{G} \mid \tilde{B} - sk \otimes \tilde{G}] \cdot H_{f,x} \\
&= [\tilde{A}\mid \tilde{B}] \cdot H_f - \langle f(\tilde{x}), sk\rangle G \\
&= A_f - \langle \text{FHE.Eval}(f, \tilde{x}), sk\rangle G
\end{align*}
\]

where by Lemma 3.9, \(\langle \text{FHE.Eval}(f, \tilde{x}), sk\rangle = t \cdot f(x) + e\) with \(|e| \leq B(n \lceil \log q \rceil)^O(d)\), so (1) follows. Moreover,

\[
[\Psi_f G^{-1}(M)]_p = [(A_f - (t \cdot f(x) + e)G)G^{-1}(M)]_p
\]

\[
= [A_f G^{-1}(M) - t \cdot f(x)M - eM]_p
\]

\[
= [A_f G^{-1}(M) - eM]_p - f(x)M
\]

\[
= [A_f G^{-1}(M)]_p - f(x)M - E
\]

where \(E = (e/t)M + \Delta\) for a rounding-errors matrix \(\|\Delta\|_\infty \leq 2\), and therefore \(|E|_\infty \leq 2 + |e| \cdot (\|M\|_\infty / t)\). \(\square\)
5.1 Weakly Attribute Hiding Predicate Encryption

The scheme is parameterized by $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$ which governs the lattice hardness assumption that underlies the construction. Essentially, with parameter $\epsilon$ the scheme will be secure under the polynomial hardness of approximating lattice problems to within a $2^{O(n^\epsilon)}$-factor.

- **PE.Setup**$(1^\lambda, 1^d) \rightarrow (\text{pp, msr})$. Define $\ell = \lambda$ (this is the supported attribute length). Set $n = \lfloor (nd)^{1/\epsilon} \rfloor$. Let $\gamma$ be the $B = O(\sqrt{n})$-bounded distribution from Corollary 3.1. Let $p, \tau$ be integer parameters such that $\tau \geq z_1, p \geq 4z_2 \cdot \tau$ for parameters $z_1, z_2 = 2^d \cdot \text{polylog}(n)$ that will be specified throughout the analysis. Let $t = \Theta(p)$ and $q = p \cdot t$. Denote $m = n\lfloor \log q \rfloor$. Recall Corollary 3.2 and let $m_0 = m_0(n, q)$ as in the corollary statement. Let FHE be the scheme from Lemma 3.9 with depth parameter $d$, define $\ell_s, \ell_c, d'$ as in the lemma statement, and let $\ell_p = \ell \cdot \ell_c$.

Recall Corollary 3.2 and let $m_0 = m_0(n, p)$ as in the corollary statement. Consider $m' = \max\{n + 1, \lfloor \log m_0 \rfloor + 2\lambda, m_0\}$ (note that $m_0$ is w.r.t $p$ but $m'$ needs to be larger than $(n + 1)\lfloor \log q \rfloor$). Generate a matrix with a trapdoor $(A_0, A_0^{-1}) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^n, p, m')$, i.e. $A \in \mathbb{Z}_{n \times m'}$. Sample a uniform $v \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^n$. Generate uniform $\tilde{A} \xleftarrow{\$} (\mathbb{Z}_{q \times m})^\ell_p$ and $\tilde{B} \xleftarrow{\$} (\mathbb{Z}_{q \times m})^\ell_s$.

Let $\text{msk} = A_0^{-1}$ and $\text{pp} = (A, v, \tilde{A}, \tilde{B})$. 

- **PE.Enc**$_{\text{pp}}(\mu, x) \rightarrow \text{ct}$. Generate $s$ $\xleftarrow{\$} \text{FHE.Keygen}(1^\lambda)$, s.t. $sk \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell_s$ and compute $x \leftarrow \text{FHE.Enc}(sk, x)$. Sample a vector $s \xleftarrow{\$} \chi^m$, an error vector $e \xleftarrow{\$} \chi^m$, and an error scalar $e \xleftarrow{\$} \chi$. Sample $R_A \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{(m' \times m)}\ell_p$ and $R_B \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{(m' \times m)}\ell_s$. Sample a matrix $A_t \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m'}$ and a vector $v_t \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. Encrypt as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbf{u}_0 &= sA + [sA_t + e]_p \pmod{p} \\
\mathbf{u}_\mu &= sv + [sv_t + e]_p + \mu[p/2] \pmod{p} \\
\mathbf{a} &= s(\tilde{A} - \tilde{x} \otimes \mathbf{G}_q) + eR_A \pmod{q} \\
\mathbf{b} &= s(\tilde{B} - \tilde{x} \otimes \mathbf{G}_q) + eR_B \pmod{q}
\end{align*}
\]

Output $\text{ct} = (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{u}_0, \mathbf{u}_\mu, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b})$.

- **PE.Keygen**$_{\text{msk}}(f) \rightarrow s_{k_f}$. Define $f'() = \text{FHE.Eval}(f, \cdot)$ and compute $A_f = [\tilde{A} \cdot \tilde{B}] \cdot H_f$, where $H_f \leftarrow \text{EvalFX}(f', \tilde{A}, \tilde{B})$. Compute $\hat{A}_f = [A_f G^{-1}(G_p)]_p$. Use $A_0^{-1}$ to sample $v_f \| k_f = |I||A||\hat{A}_f|^{-1}(v)$, i.e. s.t. $[A \cdot \hat{A}_f]k_f = v - h_f \pmod{p}$. Output $sk_f = k_f$.

- **PE.Dec**$_{\text{pp}}(\text{ct}, sk_f) \rightarrow \mu$. Compute $H_{f,x} \leftarrow \text{EvalFX}(f', \tilde{A}, \tilde{B})$ and set $a_{f,x} = [\tilde{a} \cdot \tilde{b}] | H_{f,x}$. Compute $\hat{a}_{f,x} = (1/t)(a_{f,x} G^{-1}(G_p))$ and $b' = \mathbf{u}_\mu - [u_0 \| \hat{a}_{f,x}]k_f$ (mod $p$). Return 0 if $|b'| < \frac{p}{q}$ and 1 otherwise.

**Analysis.** Correctness and security are stated and proven next. We note that since $q \leq 2^n$ regardless of the exact manner we choose $p, \tau$ we have that any polynomial of the form $\text{poly}(\lambda, B, \lfloor n\lfloor \log q \rfloor\rfloor^{O(d')})$ is upper bounded by a function of the form $2^{d \cdot \text{polylog}(n)}$. This is since $n\lfloor \log q \rfloor \leq n^2$, $\lambda < n$ and $d' = d \cdot \text{polylog}(n)$.

**Theorem 5.2 (Correctness).** The **PE** construction above is correct as per Definition 3.2.
Proof. Let \( \mathbf{ct} \) be an encryption of message \( \mu \) under attribute \( x \) and let \( \mathbf{k}_f \) be a secret key for a function \( f \). Let \( \mathbf{H}_f = \text{EvalF}^p(f', \mathbf{A}, \tilde{\mathbf{B}}) \), \( \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \text{EvalFX}^p(f', \mathbf{A}, \tilde{\mathbf{B}}) \), \( \mathbf{A}_f = [\mathbf{A} \parallel \mathbf{B}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_f \), and denote \( \Psi_f = [\mathbf{A} - \tilde{x}\mathbf{G} \parallel \tilde{\mathbf{B}} - s\mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} \). By Lemma 5.1, \( \Psi_f = \mathbf{A}_f - (f(x) \cdot t + e)\mathbf{G} \) where \( |e| \leq B_{\text{FHE}} = B(n \log q)^{O(d)} \). Then

\[
\mathbf{a}_{f,x} = [\tilde{\mathbf{a}} \parallel \tilde{\mathbf{b}}] \mathbf{H}_{f,x}
= \left( s[\mathbf{A} \parallel \mathbf{B}] - [\tilde{x} \parallel s\mathbf{k}] \otimes \mathbf{G} \right) + e[\mathbf{R}_A \parallel \mathbf{R}_B] \mathbf{H}_{f,x}
= s\Psi_f + e[\mathbf{R}_A \parallel \mathbf{R}_B] \mathbf{H}_{f,x}
= s(\mathbf{A}_f - (f(x) \cdot t + e)\mathbf{G}) + e[\mathbf{R}_A \parallel \mathbf{R}_B] \mathbf{H}_{f,x}
\]
Therefore,

\[
\tilde{\mathbf{a}}_{f,x} = \mathbf{a}_{f,x} \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{G}_p)
= \frac{s(\mathbf{A}_f - (f(x) \cdot t + e)\mathbf{G}) \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{G}_p) + e[\mathbf{R}_A \parallel \mathbf{R}_B] \mathbf{H}_{f,x} \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{G}_p)}{t}
= s \left( \frac{\mathbf{A}_f \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{G}_p)}{t} - \frac{f(x)s\mathbf{G}_p - (e/t)s\mathbf{G}_p + e_1}{e_2} \right)
= s \cdot \left( \frac{\mathbf{A}_f \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{G}_p)}{t} - \frac{f(x)s\mathbf{G}_p + e_1 + e_2 + s\Delta}{e_3} \right)
\]
where \( \Delta \) is the matrix of rounding errors, i.e. \( \|\Delta\|_\infty \leq 1/2 \). We can bound the error \( e' = e_1 + e_2 + e_3 \) as follows: \( \|e_1\|_\infty \leq Bm'(\ell_p + \ell_s)(n \log q)^{O(d')}n \log p \cdot \|e_2\|_\infty \leq nBp(n \log q)^{O(d')}/t, \|e_3\|_\infty \leq nB/2 \). Note that \( \ell_p, \ell_s = \text{poly}(n \log q) \), hence \( \|e'\|_\infty \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, B, n \log q)^{O(d')} \).

It follows that if indeed \( f(x) = 0 \) then \( \tilde{\mathbf{a}}_{f,x} = s\mathbf{A}_f + e' \). Now, recall that the distribution of \( \mathbf{k}_f, \mathbf{h}_f \) is Gaussian with parameter \( \tau \) subject to \( |\mathbf{A}| \tilde{\mathbf{A}} = \mathbf{v} - \mathbf{h}_f \) (mod \( p \)). Therefore \( \|\mathbf{k}_f\|_\infty \leq \tau \sqrt{\lambda(m + m')} \) and \( \|\mathbf{h}_f\|_\infty \leq \tau \sqrt{\lambda n} \) with all but \( 2^{-\lambda} = \text{negl}(\lambda) \) probability. By definition,

\[
\mathbf{u}_0 = s\mathbf{A} + [s\mathbf{A}_t + e]_p, \quad \mathbf{u}_\mu = s\mathbf{v} + [s\mathbf{v}_t + e]_p + \mu[p/2]
\]
Denote \( \mathbf{e}_0 = [s\mathbf{A}_t + e]_p \) and \( \mathbf{e}_\mu = [s\mathbf{v}_t + e]_p \), then \( \|\mathbf{e}_0\|_\infty, \|\mathbf{e}_\mu\| \leq (n + 1)B \). Therefore,

\[
\tilde{b}' = \mathbf{u}_\mu - [\mathbf{a}_{f,x}]_{\frac{\mathbf{a}_f}{e'}} \mathbf{k}_f
= s\mathbf{v} + e_\mu + \mu[p/2] - s[\mathbf{A} \tilde{\mathbf{A}} - f(x)\mathbf{G}_p] \mathbf{k}_f - [\mathbf{e}_0 \parallel \mathbf{e}'] \mathbf{k}_f
= \mu[p/2] + e_\mu - s\mathbf{h}_f - [\mathbf{e}_0 \parallel \mathbf{e}'] \mathbf{k}_f + f(x)s[0 \parallel \mathbf{G}_p] \mathbf{k}_f
\]
where \( |e'| < \tau \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, B, n \log q)^{O(d')} \). Therefore there exists some \( z_2 = 2^{\text{polylog}(n)} \) s.t. when we set \( p > 4z_2\tau \) we get that \( |e'| < \frac{p}{4} \). Hence, if \( f(x) = 0 \) then \( \tilde{b}' = \mu[p/2] + e' \in \mu[p/2] + \frac{p}{4} \) and in particular \( \mu = 0 \) implies \( |\tilde{b}'| < \frac{p}{4} \) and \( \mu = 1 \) implies \( |\tilde{b}'| > \frac{p}{4} \).

Theorem 5.3 (Security). The scheme \( \text{PE} \) is secure as per Definition 3.3 under the LWE_{n,q,x} assumption, and thus under the worst case hardness of approximating GapSVP, SIVP to within a \( 2^{\tilde{O}(n')} \) factor in polynomial time.
Sketch. Define the simulator $\text{Sim}(\text{pp}) \rightarrow \text{ct}$ that generates $\text{ct} = (\tilde{x}, \textbf{u}_0, \textbf{u}_\mu, \tilde{\textbf{a}}, \tilde{\textbf{b}})$ by computing $\tilde{x} \leftarrow \text{FHE.Enc}(\text{sk}, 0^f)$ and sampling all the other $\text{ct}$ parts uniformly from $\mathbb{Z}_q$ as required. We now show a sequence of hybrids, where the first hybrid corresponds to $\exp_{\text{real}}$ and the last hybrid corresponds to $\exp_{\text{ideal}}$ with the simulator $\text{Sim}$ we just defined.

**Hybrid $\mathcal{H}_0$.** This is $\exp_{\text{real}}$.

**Hybrid $\mathcal{H}_1$.** We change the Setup algorithm, specifically the generation of $\tilde{\textbf{A}}, \tilde{\textbf{B}}$: Let $x$ be the attribute declared by the adversary. Generate $\text{sk} \leftarrow \text{FHE.Keygen}(1^\lambda)$ and compute $\tilde{x} \leftarrow \text{FHE.Enc}(\text{sk}, x)$. Sample $\textbf{R}_A \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{m' \times (m\ell_p)}$ and $\textbf{R}_B \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{m' \times (m\ell_s)}$, and define

$$\tilde{\textbf{A}} = (t\textbf{A} + \textbf{A}_t)\textbf{R}_A + \tilde{x} \otimes \textbf{G}_q, \quad \tilde{\textbf{B}} = (t\textbf{A} + \textbf{A}_t)\textbf{R}_B + \text{sk} \otimes \textbf{G}_q.$$  

$\textbf{A}$ is statistically close to uniform in $\mathbb{Z}_p^{n \times m'}$ and $\textbf{A}_t$ is uniform in $\mathbb{Z}_t^{n \times m'}$, therefore the matrix $t\textbf{A} + \textbf{A}_t$ is close to uniform in $\mathbb{Z}_q$. Since each $\textbf{R}_A, \textbf{R}_B$ are sampled uniformly and independently and $m' \geq (n + 1)|\log q| + 2\lambda$, indistinguishability follows from the extended leftover hash lemma.

**Hybrid $\mathcal{H}_2$.** We change the Enc algorithm. Sample $s \leftarrow \chi_q^n, e \leftarrow \chi_q^{m'}$ and $e \leftarrow \chi_q$ as in the original encryption algorithm, then compute

$$\textbf{u}_0' = s(t\textbf{A} + \textbf{A}_t) + e, \quad \textbf{u}_\mu' = s(tv + v_t) + e.$$  

Encrypt as follows:

$$\textbf{u}_0 = \lfloor \textbf{u}_0' \rfloor_p, \quad \textbf{u}_\mu = \lfloor \textbf{u}_\mu' \rfloor_p, \quad \tilde{\textbf{a}} = \textbf{u}_0'\textbf{R}_A, \quad \tilde{\textbf{b}} = \textbf{u}_0'\textbf{R}_B.$$  

The distributions remain as in the original scheme so statistical indistinguishability is maintained:

$$\textbf{u}_0 = \lfloor \textbf{u}_0' \rfloor_p = \lfloor s(t\textbf{A} + \textbf{A}_t) + e \rfloor_p = s\textbf{A} + \lfloor s\textbf{A}_t + e \rfloor_p$$  

$$\textbf{u}_\mu = \lfloor \textbf{u}_\mu' \rfloor_p = \lfloor s(tv + v_t) + e \rfloor_p = sv + \lfloor sv_t + e \rfloor_p$$  

$$\tilde{\textbf{a}} = \textbf{u}_0'\textbf{R}_A = (s(t\textbf{A} + \textbf{A}_t) + e)\textbf{R}_A = s(\tilde{\textbf{A}} - \tilde{x} \otimes \textbf{G}_q) + e\textbf{R}_A$$  

$$\tilde{\textbf{b}} = \textbf{u}_0'\textbf{R}_B = (s(t\textbf{A} + \textbf{A}_t) + e)\textbf{R}_B = s(\tilde{\textbf{B}} - \text{sk} \otimes \textbf{G}_q) + e\textbf{R}_B$$

**Hybrid $\mathcal{H}_3$.** We change the Keygen algorithm. We’re only required to generate keys for $f(x) = 1$, otherwise the adversary is not admissible. Recall that in $\text{PE.Keygen}$ we sample from $[1][\textbf{A}]^{-1}(\textbf{v})_f$, where $\tilde{\textbf{A}}_f = [\textbf{A}_f \textbf{G}^{-1}(\textbf{G}_p)]_p$ and $\textbf{A}_f = [\tilde{\textbf{A}} \| \tilde{\textbf{B}} \| \text{H}_f]$. Using the notation

$$\Psi_f = [\tilde{\textbf{A}} - \tilde{x} \otimes \textbf{G}_q] [\tilde{\textbf{B}} - \text{sk} \otimes \textbf{G}_q] \cdot \text{H}_{f,x} ,$$  

after the changes that were made in the previous hybrid, we have:

$$\Psi_f = [\tilde{\textbf{A}} - \tilde{x} \otimes \textbf{G}_q] [\tilde{\textbf{B}} - \text{sk} \otimes \textbf{G}_q] \cdot \text{H}_{f,x} = (t\textbf{A} + \textbf{A}_t)[\textbf{R}_A \| \textbf{R}_B] \cdot \text{H}_{f,x} .$$
\[
[\Psi_f G^{-1}(G_p)]_p = \left[ (tA + A_t)R_A || R_B \cdot H_{f,x} G^{-1}(G_p) \right]_p
\]
\[= A[R_A || R_B] \cdot H_{f,x} G^{-1}(G_p) + A[R_A || R_B] \cdot H_{f,x} G^{-1}(G_p)_p
\]
\[= A[R_A || R_B] \cdot H_{f,x} G^{-1}(G_p) + E' \quad \|E'\|_\infty \leq (n[\log q])^{O(d')}
\]
and by Lemma 5.1,
\[
[\Psi_f G^{-1}(G_p)]_p = [A_f G^{-1}(G_p)]_p - f(x)G_p + E \quad \|E\|_\infty \leq 2 + \frac{B_{\text{FHE}} \cdot p}{t}
\]
Therefore, when \( f(x) = 1 \),
\[
\hat{A}_f = [A_f G^{-1}(G_p)]_p = [\Psi_f G^{-1}(G_p)]_p + G_p - E
\]
\[= A[R_A || R_B] \cdot H_{f,x} G^{-1}(G_p) + G_p + E' - E
\]
where \( \|E' - E\|_\infty \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, B, (n[\log q])^{O(d')}) \). Given \( [R_A || R_B] H_{f,x} G^{-1}(G_p) \) we can also compute \( E' - E \), and then, by Corollary 3.6, we can compute the trapdoor \( [I || A] \hat{A}_f]_{\tau}^{-1} \) for any \( \tau \geq z_1 \) for
\[
z_1 = O(\sqrt{mn}) \left[ [R_A || R_B] H_{f,x} G^{-1}(G_p) \right]_{\|\| + \sqrt{mn} \|E' - E\|_\infty}
\]
\[\leq \text{poly}(\lambda, B, (n[\log q])^{O(d')}) \leq 2^{d \cdot \text{polylog}(n)}.
\]
We will choose our parameters so that indeed \( \tau \geq z_1 \) which will allow us to sample from \( [I_n || A] \hat{A}_f]_{\tau}^{-1}(v) \). Note that in this hybrid \( A_{\tau_0}^{-1} \) is no longer used.

**Hybrid \( H_4 \).** In **Setup:** Generate \( A \) uniformly instead generating it with a trapdoor. Statistical indistinguishability holds by Corollary 3.2.

**Hybrid \( H_5 \).** In **Enc:** Generate \( u_0', u'_\mu \) uniformly in \( Z_q^m, Z_q \) respectively. This is indistinguishable assuming hardness of DLWE_{q,n,\lambda}. Note that now \( u_0 = [u_0']_p \) and \( u_\mu = [u'_\mu]_p \) are uniform in \( Z_p^n, Z_p \) as well.

**Hybrid \( H_6 \).** In **Enc:** Generate \( \bar{a} \) and \( \bar{b} \) uniformly from \( Z_p^m \). This is indistinguishable by the extended leftover hash lemma since \( u_0' \) is uniform, \( R_A, R_B \) were randomly and independently generated and \( m' \geq (n + 1)[\log q] + 2\lambda \). The only information that \( ct \) reveals now is \( \bar{x} \).

**Hybrid \( H_7 \).** In **Setup:** Generate \( A \) together with a trapdoor (the opposite of Hybrid 4). Statistical indistinguishability holds by Corollary 3.2.

**Hybrid \( H_8 \).** In **Keygen:** Generate keys with \( A_{\tau_0}^{-1} \) (the opposite of Hybrid 3). Indistinguishability holds since the keys are sampled from the same distribution.

**Hybrid \( H_9 \).** In **Setup:** Generate the matrices \( \bar{A}, \bar{B} \) as in the real **Setup** algorithm (the opposite of Hybrid 1). Indistinguishability holds by the leftover hash lemma.
Hybrid $H_{10}$. Change $\tilde{x}$ to $\tilde{x} \leftarrow \text{FHE.Enc}(sk,0^t)$. By Lemma 3.9, those hybrids are indistinguishable under DLWE$_{n,q,X}$. In this hybrid the Enc algorithm is equivalent to the simulator Sim that was defined at the beginning of the proof, therefore it is equivalent to $\exp_{\text{ideal}}$. \hfill \Box \hfill \Box

5.2 Constraint Hiding Constrained PRF

We present a constraint hiding constrained PRF scheme that supports all functions expressible by boolean circuits of depth $d$, input length $k$ and description length $\ell$, for predefined polynomials $\ell, k, d$. We will rely on the hardness of LWE with sub-exponential noise to modulus ratio, as in our predicate encryption scheme. Working with a predefined polynomial input length $k$ makes the analysis much simpler than [BV15b], however we note that relying on a different hardness assumption (a variant of one dimensional SIS) it is possible to support a-priori unbounded inputs as in [BV15b].

- CPRF.Keygen$(1^\lambda, \ell, k, d) \rightarrow (pp, \sigma)$. We let $n$ be a parameter to be chosen later as a function of $\lambda, \ell, k, d$. We let $q = p \cdot t$ and $t'$ be s.t. $t'/p$. If we wish to rely on the hardness of lattice problems with approximation ratio $2^{\tilde{O}(n')}$, then all values $p, t, t'$ will be of size $2^{\tilde{O}(n')}$ as well. The resulting constrained PRF scheme will support constraint functions of description length $\ell$, input length $k$ and depth $d$. The PRF itself outputs random elements in $\mathbb{Z}_{p/t'}$, i.e. $\log(p/t')$ bits of randomness.

Denote $m = n [\log q]$ and $m' = n [\log p]$. Let FHE be the scheme from Lemma 3.9 with depth parameter $d$, define $\ell_c, \ell_s, d'$ as in the lemma statement, where $\ell_c$ is the FHE ciphertext length, $\ell_s$ is the FHE key length and $d'$ is the max depth of FHE.$\text{Eval}_{pp}(f, \cdot)$ for any $f$ of depth at most $d$. Denote $\ell_p = \ell \cdot \ell_c$. Let $G_q$ and $G_p$ denote the gadget matrices of dimensions $n \times n [\log q]$ and $n \times n [\log p]$ respectively.

Generate $\tilde{A} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} (\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m})^{\ell_p}$ and $\tilde{B} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} (\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m})^{\ell_s}$. Generate $D \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^{n \times m'}$ and $C = [C_0 || C_1] \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} (\mathbb{Z}_p^{n \times m'})^2$. Sample a vector $s \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \chi^n$ and compute $sk \leftarrow \text{FHE.Keygen}(1^\lambda)$. Sample an error vector $e_b \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \chi^{m\ell_s}$ and let $\tilde{b} = s(\tilde{B} - sk \otimes G_q) + e_b$. The public parameters are $pp = (\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}, \tilde{C}, D, b)$ and the master seed is $\sigma = (s, sk)$.

- CPRF.$\text{Eval}_{pp}(\sigma, x) \rightarrow y \in \mathbb{Z}_{p/t'}$. Let $U_f : \{0,1\}^{\ell} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ be the circuit that takes as input a description of a function $f$ and outputs $f(x)$. Now consider the circuit $U'_f : \{0,1\}^{\ell_p} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell_s}$ that takes as input an encryption of a description of $f$, i.e. $\tilde{f} = \text{FHE.Enc}(sk, f)$, and outputs FHE.$\text{Eval}(U'_f, \tilde{f})$, i.e. an FHE encryption of $f(x)$. Compute $A_x = [\tilde{A} || \tilde{B}] \cdot H_x$, where $H_x \leftarrow \text{Eval}_{FHE}(U'_f, \tilde{A}, \tilde{B})$. Compute $C_x = \text{Eval}_{FHE}(T_{\tilde{C}})$ (as defined in Section 3.7) and fix $M_x = DG_{p^{-1}}(C_x) \mod p$. Output $y = s \cdot \frac{A_x G_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t'.t}$.

- CPRF.$\text{Constrain}_{pp}(\sigma, f) \rightarrow \sigma_f$. Compute $\tilde{f} = \text{FHE.Enc}(sk, f)$. Sample an error vector $e_a \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \chi^{m\ell_p}$ and compute $\tilde{a} = s(\tilde{A} - \tilde{f} \otimes G_q) + e_a$. Output $\sigma_f = (\tilde{a}, \tilde{f})$. 

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• CPRF.ConstrainEvalpp(σf, x) → y′ ∈ Zr. Compute af,x = |a||b| · Hf,x, where Hf,x ← EvalFXip(U′ x, f, A, B), and output

\[ y' = \left( \frac{a_{f,x}G_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t' \cdot t} \right) \]

**Analysis.** The following will be useful in the security and correctness proof.

**Lemma 5.4.** Let d′ denote the depth of the circuit U′. Consider af,x and A as defined in CPRF.ConstrainEval and CPRF.Eval, then:

\[ \frac{a_{f,x}G_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} = sA_xG_q^{-1}(M_x) - f(x)sM_x + e'' \]

where \(\|e''\|_\infty \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, B, (n[\log q])^{O(d')}}\).

**Proof.** Recall that \(\|e_a\|_\infty \leq B\) and \(\|H_{f,x}\|_\infty \leq (n[\log q])^{O(d')}\). Hence

\[ a_{f,x} = |a||b| \cdot H_{f,x} \]

\[ = s(\tilde{A} - \tilde{f} \otimes G_q)|\tilde{B} - sk \otimes G_q| \cdot H_{f,x} + [e_a|e_b| \cdot H_{f,x} \]

where \(\|e\|_\infty \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, B, (n[\log q])^{O(d')})\). Therefore

\[ \frac{a_{f,x}G_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} = (s\Psi + e)G_q^{-1}(M_x) = s \cdot \frac{\Psi_xG_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} + e/t \cdot G_q^{-1}(M_x) \]

(10)

\(\|e\|_\infty \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, B, (n[\log q])^{O(d')})\).

By Lemma 5.1, \(\Psi_x = A_x - (f(x) \cdot t + e)G_q\) where \(|e| \leq B_{\text{FHE}} = B(n[\log q])^{O(d)}\), therefore

\[ \frac{\Psi_xG_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} = \frac{A_xG_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} - f(x)M_x - e/tM_x \|E\|_\infty \leq B_{\text{FHE}} \cdot (p/t) \]

(11)

From Equations 10 and 11, we get

\[ \frac{a_{f,x}G_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} = s \cdot \frac{\Psi_xG_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} + e' \]

\[ = s \cdot \left( \frac{A_xG_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} - f(x)M_x - E + e' \right) + e' \]

\[ = sA_xG_q^{-1}(M_x) - f(x)sM_x - sE + e'' \]

where \(\|e''\|_\infty \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, B, (n[\log q])^{O(d')})\).

**Theorem 5.5** (Correctness, Pseudorandomness, Constraint Hiding). Under the DLWE n,q,λ hardness assumption, CPRF is correct, pseudorandom and constraint hiding.

**Proof.** Let A be a PPT adversary against CPRF and consider the game from Definition 3.2. The proof proceeds with a sequence of hybrids.
Hybrid $\mathcal{H}_0$. The game from the definition.

Hybrid $\mathcal{H}_1$. Change the way that the vectors $\bar{a}$ and $\bar{b}$ are computed in Constrain and Keygen respectively: Define the matrices $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{A} - \tilde{f} \otimes G_q$ and $\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{B} - sk \otimes G_q$. Then let $\bar{a} = s\hat{A} + e_a$ and $\bar{b} = s\hat{B} + e_b$ where $e_a \leftarrow \chi^{mt^*}$, $e_b \leftarrow \chi^{mt^*}$. This is simply a change in notation.

Hybrid $\mathcal{H}_2$. Change the Eval algorithm. Up to this hybrid, in Eval we computed $M_x = DG_p^{-1}(C_x)$ and the output was

$$y = \left[ s \cdot \frac{A_x G_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t'} \right].$$

Consider the vector $d = sD + e_d$ where $e_d \leftarrow \chi^{n\log p}$. In this hybrid the output of Eval will be

$$y^* = \left[ \frac{v}{t'} \right] \quad \text{where} \quad v = \frac{a_{f,x} G_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} + f(x) \left( DG_p^{-1}(C_x) + E(x) \right)$$

and $E(\cdot)$ is the function from Corollary 3.10, and in particular $|E(x)| \leq B \sqrt{k} \cdot (n \log p)^{\log k}$.

We analyse now the event that $y^* \neq y$. Note that

$$dG_p^{-1}(C_x) = sDG_p^{-1}(C_x) + e_d G_p^{-1}(C_x) = sM_x + e \quad \|e\|_\infty \leq B \cdot n \log p$$

By Lemma 5.4,

$$\frac{a_{f,x} G_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} = s \cdot \frac{A_x G_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} - f(x)sM_x + e'' \quad \|e''\|_\infty \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, B, (n \log q)^{O(d')})$$

Hence

$$y = \left[ s \cdot \frac{A_x G_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t'} \right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{t'} \left( \frac{a_{f,x} G_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} + f(x)sM_x - e'' \right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{t'} \left( \frac{a_{f,x} G_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} + f(x) \left( DG_p^{-1}(C_x) - e \right) - e'' \right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{t'} \left( \frac{a_{f,x} G_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} + f(x)DG_p^{-1}(C_x) + e(x) - \left( f(x)E(x) + f(x)e + e'' \right) \right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{t'} \left( v - e'' \right)$$

where $\|e''\|_\infty$ is bounded by a value $E' = \text{poly}(\lambda, B, (n \log q)^{O(d')}, B \sqrt{k} \cdot (n \log p)^{\log k})$. Therefore $y^* \neq y$ only when there exists $i \in [n \log p]$ such that the $i$th entry of the vector $v$ is $E'$-close to $t'\mathbb{Z} + t'/2$, i.e. when the $i$th entry of the vector $tv$ is $tE'$-close to $(t \cdot t')\mathbb{Z} + (t \cdot t')/2$. Let $\text{Borderline}_x$ denote this event, then $\neg \text{Borderline}_x \implies y^* = y$. We can bound the advantage in distinguishing between this hybrid and the previous one by the probability of $\text{Borderline} = \bigvee_x \text{Borderline}_x$:

$$|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{H}_2}(A) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{H}_1}(A)| \leq \Pr_{\mathcal{H}_2}[\text{Borderline}]$$

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Lemma 5.6. The following holds:
\[
\Pr \left[ \bigvee_{x \in \{0,1\}^k} \text{Borderline}_x \right] \leq n\lceil \log p \rceil 2^{k' E' / t'} = \operatorname{negl}(\lambda),
\]
where the probability is over the randomness of the key generation algorithm in \( \mathcal{H}_2 \).

Proof. Fix an arbitrary value for \( x \) and some coordinate \( i \in [n\lceil \log p \rceil] \) and note that
\[
tv = a_{f,x}G_q^{-1}(M_x) + f(x)t \left( dG_p^{-1}(C_x) + E(x) \right)
\]
where \( a_{f,x} = [\bar{a}||\bar{b}]H_{f,x} = s[A||B]H_{f,x} + [e_a||e_b]H_{f,x} \). Recall that \( \|s\|_\infty \leq B < t < p \), where \( p,t \) are prime and \( q = p \cdot t \), so each entry of \( s \) is a unit in \( \mathbb{Z}_q \). Similarly, \( \|H_{f,x}G_q^{-1}(M_x)\| \leq (n\lceil \log q \rceil)^{O(d')} < t \leq p \) and so each entry of \( H_{f,x}G_q^{-1}(M_x) \) is a unit in \( \mathbb{Z}_q \).

Since \( [A||B] \) is uniform over \( \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m(\ell_p + \ell_s)} \), it follows that each entry of \( s[A||B]H_{f,x}G_q^{-1}(M_x) \) is uniform over \( \mathbb{Z}_q \) and so the marginal distribution of the \( i \)th entry of \( tv \) as a function of the randomness of \( \text{Keygen} \) is uniform over \( \mathbb{Z}_q \). Therefore, the probability of this value being \( tE' \)-close to \( (t \cdot t')\mathbb{Z} + (t \cdot t')/2 \) is at most \( E'/t' \). Applying the union bound over all possible values of \( x \) and \( i \), the lemma follows.

Note that in this hybrid, if \( f(x) = 0 \) then the output of \( \text{Eval} \) is identical to the output of \( \text{Constrain Eval} \), so the adversary has no advantage in guessing \( b_3 \).

Hybrid \( \mathcal{H}_3 \). Change \( d \): sample it uniformly from \( \mathbb{Z}_p^{n\lceil \log p \rceil} \). This change is computationally indistinguishable under \( \text{DLWE}_{n,p,\chi} \).

Hybrid \( \mathcal{H}_4 \). Change again \( \text{Eval} \): compute \( v \) by first sampling a vector \( u_x \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^m \) and setting
\[
v = \frac{a_{f,x}G_q^{-1}(M_x)}{t} + f(x)u_x.
\]
Recall that the adversary can query each distinct \( x \) once. By Corollary 3.10, those hybrids are indistinguishable under \( \text{DLWE}_{n,p,\chi} \).

In this hybrid, if \( f(x) = 1 \) then the output of \( \text{Eval} \) is uniformly distributed over \( \mathbb{Z}_p^m \), so the adversary has no advantage in guessing \( b_2 \).

Hybrid \( \mathcal{H}_5 \). Change \( \text{Constrain} \): compute \( \tilde{f} \) as \( \tilde{f} \leftarrow \text{FHE.Enc}(sk, 0) \). By Lemma 3.9, those hybrids are indistinguishable under \( \text{DLWE}_{n,q,\chi} \). At this stage the adversary has no information about \( f \) and therefore it has no advantage in guessing \( b_1 \), which completes the proof.

Choice of parameters. In order to satisfy the requirements in the above proof, we require that \( n\lceil \log p \rceil 2^{k' E' / t'} = \operatorname{negl}(\lambda) \). For the sake of concreteness, we will set \( \operatorname{negl}(\lambda) \) to \( 2^{-\lambda} \). Recalling that \( E' = \text{poly}(\lambda, B, (n\lceil \log p \rceil)^{O(d')}, B \sqrt{k} \cdot (n\lceil \log p \rceil)^{\lambda k}) \), we get \( t' \geq 2^{O(\lambda^{k+1} + (d + \log k) \cdot \log(n))} \). This can be satisfied by setting \( n = (\lambda kd)^{1/c} \) and setting \( t' = 2^{\mathcal{O}(n^c)} \) appropriately. Then \( p, t \) can be chosen to be polynomially related in size to \( t' \) s.t. \( t', p/t' \) are prime.
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