Whether the word ‘passion’, as indicating the suffering or affection from without of a soul, is by now no more than a dead metaphor, surviving from an antique conception of the mind; whether, indeed, there is any way open to us of determining the passivity or otherwise of our inner life, apart, that is, from how it strikes us, from how we are prompted to describe it, are not questions that I can take up this evening. It is enough for my purpose that for much of the time our feelings, our emotions, our inclinations are as fluctuating or as imperious as if they were not totally under our control. We are elated: we are dejected: we get angry, and then our anger gives place to a feeling of absurdity: we remain in love with someone who is lost to us but whom we cannot renounce: we are interested in something, and suddenly we are bored, or frightened that we will be bored: we see a stranger, someone who is nothing to us, who is poor or crippled, and we feel guilt: someone does something wrong or foolish, and we are unaccountably transported by laughter, by ‘sudden glory’ as Hobbes called it, knowing what it was about, and then, as unaccountably, we are thrown down. Man is, in Montaigne’s famous phrase, une chose ondoyante, a creature of inner change and fickleness.

As we pass through these alternating states, these moods and reverses, which make up our inner life, there are, roughly, three things that we can do about them. We can put them into words: we can manifest them in our actions: or we can keep them to ourselves. We can conceal them, or we can reveal them: and
if we reveal them, we can do so in behaviour or in language. If later this evening we may find reason to modify this way of classifying the possibilities, in that it overlooks, on the one hand, differences, on the other hand, similarities, to which attention is necessary, nevertheless for the moment it will do.

It will do, if only because it has done for so many others. The assumption that in this classification we have the three fundamental ways in which man, or at any rate man as a social animal, can stand to his inner life, provides the normal or conventional background against which an account of expression is set. For if we take the two ways in which a man is said not to keep his feelings to himself, and the two media to which he then resorts, namely behaviour and language, we can then establish, corresponding to this distinction, a dichotomy between expression and what is indifferently called communication, description, assertion. Now it is within this dichotomy, or, to put it the other way round, by contrast to the notion of, say, assertion, that the notion of expression acquires its significance. In behaviour a man expresses his feelings: in language he asserts or describes them.

That is stage one of the conventional account of expression. But the account generally goes beyond this. For it is then recognised that just what is distinctive of the way in which we reveal our feelings when the medium is behaviour, can also be found when the medium of revelation is language. The case of interjections is customarily cited. The dichotomy between expression and assertion does not neatly correspond to the distinction between behaviour and language. For there can also be expressive language: or, to put it perhaps in a finer way, an expressive use of language. Nevertheless – and this is where stage two of the account is firmly grounded in stage one – the notion of expression remains derived from, or finds its paradigmatic instance in, the behaviour of a man in the grip of feeling: even if it is then, under the influence of the analogy between such a man's behaviour and what his language might be like, extended to his language, or to a fragment of his language. Language is regarded as expressive if and only if it displays certain characteristics that in the first instance pertain to behaviour.
The fundamental distinction between expressing and asserting or describing a feeling or emotion is a commonplace of eighteenth-century criticism: there linked, as it is at the first stage of the foregoing account, with the distinction between behaviour and language. We find it, for instance, in Lessing's *Laocoon*, where it is not unrelated to his famous principle of division between the arts. 'It is a different impression', Lessing writes, 'which is made by the narration of a man’s cries from that which is made by the cries themselves'.¹ For the subsequent attempt to take up or collect this distinction, once firmly seized in the contrast that behaviour and language by and large offer one another, and transplant it inside one of the terms of this contrast, thus making a division within language, our thoughts most naturally turn to the work of I. A. Richards.² His distinction between the scientific and the emotive uses of language was the first systematic attempt of our day to record the fact that we can express as well as assert our feelings in language. It was, of course, to Richards's work that the author of *Language, Truth and Logic* was indebted when he framed the famous emotive theory of ethics: a new account of language was invoked in order to redress the balance against the old morality.

But what, we must now ask, are these peculiar or distinctive characteristics of the way in which we reveal our feelings in behaviour, such that when we find these same characteristics recurring in our linguistic utterances, we feel it right to regard them too as expressive? We need, it would seem, to look at behaviour and how it stands to our inner life, or to that part of it which it reveals, to find the answer to our question. But there is a difficulty here, which, when taken care of, gives us stage three of the conventional account of expression. And that is that just as not all the occasions on which we reveal our feelings in speech can be regarded as assertive or declaratory of those feelings; in that our utterances may so approximate to the way in which we reveal our feelings in behaviour that they are better thought of as expressive: so now, there are occasions on which we reveal our feelings in behaviour, but what we do is

¹ Gottfried Lessing, *Laocoon*, iv.
² C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (London, 1923), and I. A. Richards, *Principles of Literary Criticism* (London, 1924).
not to be thought of as expressive; in that our behaviour so approximates to the way in which we reveal our feelings in language that it is better classified as declaratory. The kind of thing that would be cited here is gesture or ritualised behaviour.

But the effect of this reservation, it might be thought, is now such as to close us up in so narrow a circle that there is no issue from it. For what have we been told, to date? First, that we assert or declare our feelings when we reveal them in language: except in certain circumstances. Secondly, that we express our feelings when we reveal them in behaviour: except in certain circumstances. Then, when we go on to ask, what are the circumstances that constitute the exceptions, we learn that they are, in the first case, when we express our feelings, and in the second case, when we assert our feelings. So we assert our feelings in language unless we express them, and we express our feelings in behaviour unless we assert them. And to assert our feelings is to reveal them as we do in language unless we happen to express them: and to express our feelings is to reveal them as we do in behaviour unless we happen to assert them.

But the situation is not really as bleak as this suggests. For this way of putting the matter depends on there being no method to hand of separating off the central from the deviant cases of either the behavioural or the linguistic mode of self-revelation. When the conventional account of expression took its second step, it had a method of distinguishing the two kinds of case within the linguistic mode: by reference, that is, to (respectively) divergence from, and similarity to, the unitary kind of case exhibited by the behavioural mode. But when at the third step the behavioural mode lost its unity, are we to take this as indicating that we now have no method of picking out a characteristically behavioural and a characteristically linguistic way of revealing our feelings?

I shall waste no time before saying that I think we definitely have such a method: though unfortunately I cannot here go on to defend my contention.

The most familiar way of introducing my point would be to begin with the contrast between language as something rule-governed and behaviour as something law-like, or, rather, at best something law-like: so that when we reveal our feelings in
language, we should expect what we say to be connected with
the feeling we reveal by means of a rule, whereas when we
reveal our feelings in behaviour, we should expect what we do
and the feeling to be connected as instances of a constant con-
junction. That, at any rate, should account for the central cases
in the two modes: and the deviant cases in each mode can then
be identified by their approximation to the central cases of the
other. If we now link this up with the dichotomy between
assertion and expression, as we have so far gone along with it,
we can now say: when I say 'I am angry', this is character-
istically an assertion or declaration of my anger, in that what
I say and my anger are joined by a rule: when I scowl or bite
my lip, this is characteristically an expression, in that the scowl
or biting of the lip and my anger instantiate a constant con-
junction. We now add the two reservations: that if I scream
out 'I am angry' or if I scowl in a charade or some kind of
organised dumb-show, deviation will occur.

Recently an argument has been advanced against this
classification: not so much as to the lines it draws, but (what is
really more significant for our purposes this evening) as to the
nomenclature it attaches to these lines, and all that that
involves. More specifically, though it is undoubtedly right to
distinguish between the different ways in which 'I am angry'
and a scowl stand to the anger revealed, and indeed right to do
so as I have done, this by itself doesn't give us an account of
expression: or if it does, it doesn't give us the account in the
interests of which it is usually invoked – for example, in this
lecture. For it is not of the man who scowls and says nothing,
but of the man who says 'I am angry', that we say that he
expressed his anger. Expression is, in other words, where the
conventional account would set up description or assertion or
declaration.

True enough (the argument goes on), the word 'expression' is
used in connection with the revelation of feeling in behaviour.
A scowl, for instance, is a facial expression. We call it such.
Nevertheless it is worth observing, a shade more closely, just
how the word 'expression', more specifically the verb 'to
express', is used in these cases. Of the man who scowls, we say
that his scowl expressed anger, not that he expressed anger.
It is the expression, not the person, that expresses the feeling.

Professor Alston, from whom I derive this argument, ¹ is rightly not insistent on its philosophical potential. 'It would be an act of folly', he says, 'to place too much reliance on the word “express” in this connection.' Nevertheless it is worth staying with the argument a little longer: to make three comments on it.

First, assuming the premiss of the argument to be correct, I want to make an observation which may do something to take away from what must seem to anyone brought up on the conventional account of expression, the totally unprepared-for character of the conclusion. To such a person it must seem incredible that a man's saying something can express something: except deviantly. For to him expression goes with behaviour, not with language. But expression of what?, we might ask: surely not expression of thoughts? No, it will be agreed, not expression of thoughts: we characteristically express our thoughts in words: it is our emotions, our feelings, our moods, that we characteristically express in behaviour. But once this is conceded, we are half-way, or some way, to removing the strangeness of the argument's conclusion. For at the core of every feeling is a thought. It is, for instance, a thought that by and large secures a feeling its object: it is a thought that gives to feeling much of its elaboration and refinement. So part of what justifies the usage 'He expressed his anger', said of the man who puts it into words, is that we may regard what he does as expressing the thought that gives his anger its distinctiveness or inner elaboration.

Secondly — and here I come to question the premiss of the argument — it is far from clear that just any utterance by a man of the form 'I am angry with X' justifies us in saying of that man that he expressed his anger with X. I suspect that certain further requirements are imposed upon the conditions of utterance; requirements, I would suggest, taken from either end of the spectrum of conditions in which I may say 'I am angry'. Roughly, it seems that the utterance must either verge upon the ceremonial use of language or else be highly impassioned or emotive in its overall character — and it is worth

¹ William S. Alston, 'Expressing', in Philosophy in America, ed. Max Black (London, 1965).
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noting that these are precisely the two kinds of occasion when it has been held that language takes on much of the nature of behaviour.

Thirdly, it is worth noting that though 'He behaved angrily' does not entail 'He expressed his anger', the contrapositive would seem to hold. 'He didn't express his anger' or 'He expressed no anger' entails 'He didn't behave angrily' or 'He didn't exhibit his anger'. This suggests that the point is very narrowly verbal. Alternatively it may mean (as they like to say) that there is a great deal more work to be done here; of a largely unpromising kind, we might add.

However, to many it will seem that the cogent objections to the conventional account of expression come not from specifically linguistic considerations, like those Alston advances, but from a rather different area. For it will be felt that to understand by the expression of a feeling the piece of behaviour that is constantly – constantly, that is to say, as opposed to conventionally – conjoined with that feeling utterly fails to account for, or do justice to, one indubitable and highly important feature of expression: what we might call its appropriateness, or its physiognomic character. By this I mean the way expression seems so finely matched or adjusted to the inner state of which it is the outer correlate, that we can see the one in the other. Phenomenologists and Wittgenstein and Stuart Hampshire are all agreed that any philosophical account of perception that requires us to place physiognomy outside the pale of what we see is to that extent inadequate. And, indeed, if we continue to take ordinary language as our guide in these matters, the fact of physiognomic perception is most certainly reflected in the idioms and turns of common speech. We say of a scowl not merely that it expresses anger but that it is itself angry: a smile can be the expression of pleasure, and when it is, it is a pleased smile.

To spell out the argument: If a scowl is the expression of anger, simply because it is the constant correlate of anger, then, if something other than a scowl were the constant correlate of anger then that piece of behaviour, rather than a scowl, would express anger. Any constant conjunction could be other than it is. Therefore any (or almost any) other piece of behaviour
could be the expression of anger. Therefore it cannot be that we see anger in a scowl unless we are prepared to say that we can see anger in any other (or almost any other) piece of behaviour. In point of fact, however, we see anger in a scowl and such-like things to the exclusion of all other pieces of behaviour. Therefore, the understanding of expression, or the expression of feeling, in terms of constant conjunction is false: at least in that it is not the whole truth.

I want to consider a number of objections to or comments on this argument.\(^1\) If we imagine them for a moment laid out according to the part of the argument to which they relate, I shall then take them in the inverse order.

The first comment would be that the argument ignores the well-established cultural relativity of expression. Since this contention is very large, and not perhaps all that easy to interpret, I shall put it aside: using only as much of it as comes out in the remaining comments.

Secondly, it might be said that the argument is wrong to suggest that the constant conjunction theory of expression requires that we are able to see, that we can see, anger in every other piece of behaviour that could be correlated with anger. All it requires is that we should be able to see, that we could see, anger in any particular piece of behaviour were it actually, that is in point of fact, correlated with anger. If it is now retorted that this comes to the same, for if we can see some characteristic of a piece of behaviour in one connection, when the behaviour enters into one specific correlation, then we must also be able to see it in another connection, for either the piece of behaviour has that characteristic or it hasn’t, this retort would exhibit very well precisely what is wrong with the original argument. For it treats physiognomic properties as though they were physical characteristics either had or not had by something, and if had, then there to be seen. In reality, however, physiognomic properties are, or are close to, what Wittgenstein in the second part of the *Philosophical Investigations*\(^2\) called aspects:

\(^1\) Cf. My 'On Expression and Expressionism', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, nos. 68–9 (1964), fascs. 2–3.

\(^2\) Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford, 1953), Part ii, xi.
whose existence, it might be said, depends upon their being seen, rather than, as the argument suggests, vice versa.

Thirdly, with this last comment in mind, it may now seem less implausible than the argument suggests to hold that we could see anger in any piece of behaviour: for this means only that we should see it were that behaviour correlated with anger. And if we now think that there are many pieces of behaviour that we just could not imagine ourselves seeing as angry, the explanation for this may be that we cannot, or perhaps just do not, imagine their being correlated with anger. Of course if we do not or cannot imagine the correlation, the physiognomic perception will remain inconceivable. And there is a further difficulty here, to which perhaps insufficient attention is paid in the philosophical discussion of imagination: the difficulty of what it is to imagine something like a correlation, for is not imagination ordinarily thought of as being, like perception, intractably particular in its operation?

Nevertheless, a problem remains. For if it is dogmatic to assert that we could never see anger in any piece of behaviour except that actually correlated with anger, it seems equally unwarranted to assert, without further demonstration, that there is no piece of behaviour that we could not see as angry were it correlated with anger. For this seems to suggest that physiognomic perception, the seeing of anger in a bodily gesture or movement, is nothing over and above bare intellectual awareness, the awareness that anger and the bodily gesture or movement in question are correlated. Physiognomic perception must be more than that. So perhaps there is more to the argument than we have given it credit for.

This brings us to the last, the most important, comment that I have to make. And that is that the supposition, said to be intrinsic to the constant conjunction theory of expression, to the effect that any piece of behaviour could come to be the expression of, say, anger, needs to be taken seriously. And in the argument before us it noticeably is not. It is not, because of a slipperiness in the way in which the notion of behaviour, of a piece of behaviour, is handled.

For when we are asked to suppose that, say, a smile rather than a scowl might become the expression of anger, through
becoming its correlate, the words 'scowl' and 'smile' as they occur in this supposition are not intended simply to pick out differing ways in which the face might be pulled or might crease: they do not refer just to the lie of the face, as we might call it. For that by itself is not expression. A particular lie of the face expresses a feeling when and only when it comes about as the result of something that we do. A frown expresses anger when we frown: a smile pleasure when we smile. To put the matter the other way round: even as things stand we can smile or scowl in a purely configurational sense, in that our face can become dishevelled in this or that way, and thus express nothing. As, for instance, foolish parents discover when a baby 'smiles' with wind. It is precisely because the baby doesn't smile, though there is a smile on its face, that no constant conjunction is upset.

And having got only so far, we may pause for a moment. For we may already have in our possession a small bit – as we shall see later, it is no more than a small bit – of the reason why we feel that we can see anger in a scowl: where by 'scowl', we mean simply what I have called a particular lie of the face. For in seeing the scowl we are immediately made aware of the activity whereby it came into being. And from the activity we are led, a stage further back, to the feeling. The activity is a bridge which we may traverse in our imagination from face to feeling. In *Feeling and Expression* Professor Stuart Hampshire made great use of this idea.\(^1\) Indeed slightly transposed, it became crucial to his philosophical account of how we come to acquire knowledge of other minds. The transposition, which may have somewhat obscured this similarity, was that, instead of the imaginative reconstruction of the scowl to which I make reference, Hampshire introduced the far more overt method of mimicry or imitation. We come to learn the feelings or sentiments of others through an inner mimicry of their natural expression, he argues: thereby reviving a late nineteenth-century view of the matter.\(^2\) Neither in his terms nor in my terms, would I go as far as Hampshire goes: he being undoubtedly influenced here by the view, to which he subscribed

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\(^1\) Stuart Hampshire, *Feeling and Expression* (London, 1961).

\(^2\) The main proponent of this view was Karl Groos.
at this stage, of the inner life as the residue or shadow of once open, now inhibited, behaviour. Nevertheless, the distinction made here between the two sides of expression, activity and trace as we might think of them, certainly has its bearing upon our knowledge of others; if only indirectly, through helping us to understand physiognomic perception.

Let us now return to the main argument. I have maintained that the supposition that a different piece of behaviour might be correlated with anger from that which now expresses it, is not exhausted by the thought that when we are angry a smile, say, might appear on our face. For this seems compatible with the supposition that when we are angry, we should scowl and a smile should appear on our face: equally, with the supposition that when we are angry, a smile should appear on our face from nowhere, or absent-mindedly. The supposition, taken seriously, as I have been insisting that it should be taken, seems to be to some such effect as that when we are angry, we should smile. We may later have to revive this formulation, but it will do for a start.

But now we have a difficulty: and that, of course, is to understand what is meant here by 'smiling'. It is naturally no part of my case to suggest that 'smile' must mean 'produce such-and-such a lie of the face'. But the trouble is that what looks like the other way in which we can understand the word 'smile', the other leg on which the meaning of the word rests, is not available to us either. For this other way of understanding 'smile' is where to smile is to express pleasure. Put more generally, having isolated things that we do with our body or parts of our body both from the feelings that they express and from the bodily modifications in which they issue, it now seems impossible to identify them without making reference to at least one of these things. Yet the supposition of a change in correlations of feeling and behaviour seems to require that we refer to neither.

The precise nature of the difficulty must be firmly grasped. For nothing has been said to suggest that we could not express our inner states other than as we do: which is all to the good, since any such suggestion would be empirically false. The difficulty is rather that, as things stand, we seem to have no
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way of indicating how we would express ourselves differently: since the terms that we use to identify or pick out the expressive activities seem so firmly rooted in the two circumjacent conditions from which, for the purpose of this argument, we need to detach them.

I now have a suggestion as to how we might extricate ourselves from this impasse, which will roughly occupy us for the rest of this lecture. I suggest that we turn to a rather different kind of activity from either smiling or scowling, but which has this in common with those activities: that it is regarded, and surely rightly, as expressive. I am referring to the activities upon which the visual arts repose: for instance, painting. Whether all painting is expressive or not, or whether the expressiveness of painting is a distinctively modern conception, I shall leave undiscussed. In our culture, in the context of the late bourgeois world, painting is certainly a mode of expression. But now we must ask in the light of all that has already been said, How can this be? How can painting be expressive, when it seems so contrived, so sophisticated and self-conscious an affair, so remote from the movements of the mind and the body?

We are not yet in a position to answer this question. To our existing account of the matter, we need to add another element before we can take in this further aspect of expression. And that is the tendency, operative in us (we are to believe) from the earliest experiences, to find objects in the outer world that seem to match, or correspond with, what we experience inwardly. This tendency is particularly sharp or poignant for us when we are in the grip of a strong feeling, but it is never long out of operation. A broken tree or tower will represent for us the sense of power or strength laid waste: the blue of the distant sky suddenly realises a feeling, a lost feeling perhaps, of happiness. The objects, of course, have originated quite independently of us: they are parts of the environment, which we in some broad sense appropriate, because they have this special resonance for us. Once again we find a reflection of this phenomenon in ordinary speech. For the correspondence between inner feeling and outer object leads us to characterise the object in the language of feeling. The landscape is cheerful, the sky is grim, the estuary is melancholy. And indeed it is only
a piece of theory, an epistemological presupposition, that leads us to think that there is available a neutral description drained of emotion that fits the original perception we have of such objects. I shall call this tendency, following a famous nineteenth-century usage, the finding of 'correspondences'.

Now, it is upon this foundation that the function of painting as an expressive activity in part depends. Not wholly, but in part. For the concept of expression in painting, properly understood, would seem to lie at the intersection of two constituent notions. One notion, which is where painting joins itself most obviously with scowling or smiling, is that of a bodily activity – in this case, more specifically, a manual activity – whose variations coincide with variations of inner state. If we find this thought surprising, this is of course only because we are not painters. To put the matter the other way round: the manual activity of painting acquires expressiveness in this sense only when the activity itself has become habitual. It is, in other words, only in the hands of painters that painting is expression. It is useful to recall that we do not have a more general phenomenon than this that we are called upon to explain.

The other notion constituent of the concept of expression in painting is formed upon what I have called 'correspondence'. There is, however, now a difference. I have introduced the notion of correspondence by reference to the selection or isolation of natural objects as matching our feelings. We are now to envisage that these matching objects are made, not selected. So we bring into being, where previously we discovered, correlates to our inner states.

Of course we cannot simply think of this as an extension of the original notion and imagine that there will not also be differences that accrue to the notion when it is extended in this way. As a minimum there will be aspects of the notion that were so unproblematic in the original context as to escape detection, and that only rise to prominence in the new context. The thinker who has most powerfully drawn our attention to the difficulties that arise when we pass from natural correspondences to the deliberate construction or assemblage of elements in the interests of expression is, of course, Professor Ernst Gombrich. That part of his argument which bears directly upon
the present issue may be summarised as follows: When in nature we find something that corresponds to an inner feeling, what we do is that we select something out of a pre-existent range of elements as being the closest match to that state. It is the selection – that is, the picking out of one object rather than another – that gives the notion of match or closeness its significance: but just because the range out of which the selection is made is pre-existent, we do not need to insist on this point. When, however, we turn to the bringing into being of expressive elements, the range, which can no longer be equated simply with the bounty of nature, needs explicit formulation. Unless the repertoire, as the range is called in this context, is defined and known, we cannot talk of anything being selected in preference to anything else, and hence expression becomes a vacuous notion.¹

The details of this argument deserve careful attention. But not here this evening. For you will recall that I invoked this further notion of correspondence, only so as ultimately to throw light upon expression taken in a more general sense than that of artistic expression. I chose to introduce this notion in the context of art, for there the gap between the bringing into being of an element that corresponds to a certain inner state and the inner state itself is so wide that I can survey the phenomenon in comfort: but that does not mean that I need examine the mechanism by which such elements are brought into being in the area of art, in any detail. So I shall now turn back to my main subject this evening – the expression of feelings in behaviour – and see how the account I have given can be enriched by the notion of correspondence.

At first sight it might seem surprising that it could be. For we seem to find no application for the notion. We cannot, say, equate painting out of anger with scowling, and the angry painting that we thereby paint with the scowl that results, without total absurdity: as though we might start to scowl, and then observe the scowl, and then experience dissatisfaction with the scowl as it is, and so scowl a little differently, and eventually get the scowl we want. Of course this conception is absurd: but

¹ E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion* (London, 1960), ch. 12, and *Meditations on a Hobby Horse* (London, 1963), passim.
that is because it overlooks the narrowness of the gap between the activity and the trace, not because it conceives of a gap at all. Accordingly, to arrive at a less absurd, at a more realistic, conception, what we have to do is to imagine the process spread out across time and barely obtruding into consciousness. We postulate, that is, merely some kind of negative feed-back that occurs from perception or thought to the expressive activity, which ultimately brings about a change in what I have earlier on called ‘the life of the face’.

If we can accept this insertion of the new element into the account of the expression of feeling in behaviour, we may now return to the impasse into which our examination of the constant conjunction theory of expression led us. For that theory seemed to require us to suppose that any particular feeling could find expression in any other piece of behaviour than that in which it does, were that piece of behaviour to be correlated with it. So, for instance, anger could be expressed by smiling rather than by scowling. But the difficulty we had in understanding this supposition was how words like ‘scowling’ or ‘smiling’ were to be taken. For it seemed inadequate to define them in terms of a certain lie of the face: and it seemed inviting self-contradiction to define them in terms of the feeling that they currently express. But now perhaps we have a third way open to us of taking them, directly derivative from the foregoing discussion. On this reading, to scowl would be ‘to produce an angry lie of the face’: to smile would be ‘to produce a happy lie of the face’. In other words, smiling and scowling would be intentional verbs having as their aims the bringing about of something in so far as it fell under a certain description.

How does this help us? More specifically, does it or does it not make it possible for us to understand the supposition that is allegedly implicit in the constant conjunction theory of expression? That is, we could express our inner states other than as we do. The answer is, I think, that it does: on a certain assumption. I shall first of all try to show how it does, and then turn and look at the assumption.

At the outset it must be said that the way in which physio-gnomic change is made intelligible is not by equating this, as I earlier suggested we should, with the possibility that a man
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might, say, be angry and smile. For if we employ this new intentional notion of expression, then it is clear that a man could not be angry and smile. Or rather he could be angry and smile: but in such an eventuality his smile would not be the expression of his anger. He might be angry and smile, just as he might be angry and cough.

However, though a man could never express his anger other than by scowling, nevertheless there might be physiognomic change in this way: that the configuration on his face might be different. The man might be angry, and scowl, and the lie of his face might be that which currently appears on the face of a man who smiles.

But this, it will be said, is surely just the possibility that I rejected earlier on in the lecture. I considered that physiognomic change was not achieved simply when, say, a smile in the sense of a lie of the face appeared on the face of an angry man. I said it was also necessary that the man should smile. And now I appear to have abandoned that claim.

I think, however, that the new intentional notion of expression should allow us to see how that claim can be abandoned and yet the spirit that animated it be retained. For what we are now to insist upon in the case of the man who is angry and expresses this in a smiling lie of the face is that he should see the lie of the face as angry and should bring it about just because he does. What I was insistent upon was activity, and this element of activity is now adequately safeguarded. The difference between my original claim and the present formulation is that, since the activity is now identified intentionally, the appropriate word for the activity is not ‘smile’ but ‘scowl’.

I said just now that this attempt to make sense of the notion of physiognomic change rests upon a certain assumption. And the assumption is that there is a basis for physiognomic perception independent of the constant conjunctions that hold between behaviour and inner state. For if there was no such independence, then the lies of the face that any man would see as angry would be those, and just those, which appear on the faces of angry men. So we could not appeal to his attempt to assume an angry face as any kind of explanation of the deviant or unorthodox way in which he might express his anger. But I
think that the phenomenon of correspondences does seem to suggest that in man there is some independent base of physiognomic perception.

One way in which the suggestion can come to seem absurd is if we assume that if there is such a basis, it could be of any breadth: that if our physiognomic perception is not totally derived from our familiarity with the correlations of inner state and behaviour, then we should in principle be able to see, even as things stand, any phenomenon in any emotional light. The argument from parody is a much-used weapon in the philosophy of mind. It is not only use that accounts for its bluntness.

I am very conscious that at this stage my argument displays a yawning gap. Even if I cannot close this gap, I should like at least to bridge it. The gap originates in my assertion that an inner state is expressed when and only when there is activity: again, that only if I do something, can someone else see my feelings in my behaviour. This, it will be said, is manifestly false. Do we not indisputably see embarrassment in a confused countenance?

Well, let me first make a concession. I am prepared to concede that an activity should be insisted on only where there is a possible activity. It is only when I can bring about a certain lie of the face that the lie of the face is not expressive if it merely appears. But having said this, I must now ask how much I have conceded. More specifically, how do I determine when there is and when there isn’t an activity? Why, for instance, is laughing an activity and blushing, presumably, not?

Part of this question must lie enmeshed in the question with which I began this lecture: where much the same issue was raised concerning our inner states and the determination of their activity. I wish, however, to lay aside as much of my question as cannot be dealt with independently of those highly ‘inward’ issues.

Here I would like to suggest simply three criteria of an activity. They are, it will be apparent, criteria for only a weak sense of activity: nevertheless it is one we use. First, that it can be inhibited. I can stop laughing at will, anyhow on occasions: but I cannot stop myself blushing. The Empress Eugénie, it is said, had herself bled so that she should not blush at her
husband's stories. But this is not the kind of case I have in mind. To define direct inhibition, or stopping oneself doing something in the requisite sense, has its difficulties. But one requirement would be that there should not be some identifiable thing that we do, of which in turn we could ask whether it can be inhibited or not, in order to bring about the desired inhibition. We stop ourselves: we do not do something so as to stop ourselves.

Secondly, I would suggest that another requirement of an activity is that it should not be identifiable solely by reference to a bodily change: like, say, a hiccough. In order to tell, for instance, whether a man is smiling, where this is an activity, we must take into account the whole of, or a large part of, the rest of what he is doing and of what is happening to him. And as the description of this changes, so likewise our attribution of activity changes.

And, thirdly, I would suggest that an activity is something for which we can always cite beliefs in explanation or justification. If we find something funny, and are amused, and laugh, the laughter it seems expresses the amusement, only if we can cite the belief, interchangeably with the emotion, as the reason for our laughter. This is perhaps what philosophers like Dewey have had in mind when they insisted that all expression was not just expression of emotion but expression of a particular emotion. For when we cite the belief it is to the effect not simply that there is something or other that is funny, but that some particular thing is funny. I have brought you to one of those many points where we can see so clearly the intersection of the various aspects of the human being that the philosophy of mind has traditionally taken delight in isolating. I can think of no better place to stop.

1 Cf. Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (London, 1872), chap. xiii.

2 John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (London, 1934).