Does liberal democracy promote economic development? interrogating electoral cost and development trade-off in Nigeria’s fourth republic

Aloysius-Michaels Okolie1, Kelechi Elijah Nnamani1*, Gerald Ekenedichukwu Ezirim1, Chukwuemeka Enyiazu2 and Adanne Chioma Ozor1

Abstract: The popular thinking in western scholarship projects progressive deepening of liberal democratic principles and praxis as the panacea for economic prosperity in the peripheral socio-economic formation. While comparative studies on these relationships in both established and fledgling democracies have produced differential results, the link between electoral cost and economic development in transitional states is under-studied. This study therefore provides an empirical analysis of how election cost in Nigeria’s fourth republic undermines expected development returns. Using the Marxist Instrumentalist framework of analysis, documentary data and content analysis, this study argues that the electoral timetable of a four-year fixed-term of office for elected officers only serves the economic interests of the local bourgeoisies and their foreign collaborators. It diverts huge public spending from human and capital development to the procurement of election logistical materials usually sourced from the industrialised states. Thus, while

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Aloysius-Michaels Okolie is a Professor of Political Science and the current Dean of the Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His research interests include international political economy, elections, and development studies.

Kelechi Elijah Nnamani is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He is a procurement consultant to UNICEF. He researches on neoliberal studies, public procurement and elections.

Gerald Ekenedichukwu Ezirim is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His areas of interest are peace and conflict, democratisation and all politics.

Chukwuemeka Enyiazu holds a PhD and teaches at the Department of Political Science, Abia State University, Uturu. His research interests include security, international relations and elections.

Adanne Chioma Ozor teaches at the Social Sciences Unit, School of General Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Her research interests include peace and conflict and elections.

PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

The debate on the suitability of liberal democracy in supporting economic development in post-colonial African states has unabatedly continued to remain at the centre of current intellectual discourses and conversations. Although scholars seem to be focused on the endogenous constraints to the capacity of liberal democracy in generating the expected development outcome, specific attention is yet to be paid on how exorbitant spending on elections undermines human development in Nigeria. This study therefore argues that the electoral timetable of a 4-year tenure system renewable only once, which sustains exorbitant public expenditure on elections is antithetical to the human development drive of the Nigerian state. It diverts public spending, incapacitates the state from addressing the economic priority needs of the people, and deepens the gap between the rich and poor. Redesigning and returning the content of liberal democracy in line with the demands, peculiarities and realities of the Nigerian state are highly recommended in the study.
the economic base of the metropolitan states and the local elite are expanding, the citizens are at the receiving end of this unfair arrangement. Consequently, the study recommends an electoral reform which prioritises a six-year single tenure system in Nigeria.

Subjects: African Studies; International Politics; Comparative Politics; Politics & Development

Keywords: Liberal democracy; election cost; metropolitan states; economic development; fledgling democracies; local bourgeoisie

1. Introduction

The third wave of democratisation which occurred in the late 20th Century revolutionised different political systems across Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America. Among other things, it dislodged communist regimes, military dictatorships, one-party rules and other forms of authoritarianism in countries such as South Korea, Costa Rica, Philippines, Kyrgyzstan, Venezuela, Taiwan, Ghana, and Colombia (Rose & Shin, 2001; Schenoni & Mainwaring, 2019). Thereafter, it facilitated the ascendancy of governance system based on peoples’ will and popular participation, deepened legitimacy crisis of authoritarian rules in the emergent democratic states and raised the number of democracies from 44 in 1975 to 150 in 2003 (DeSilver, 2017; Huntington, 1991; Shin, 1994). Nigeria’s recent experimentation of liberal democracy began in 1999. Prior to this shift, the country was under the grip of military dictatorship which lasted for more than three decades. Successive military regimes before the shift to democratic rule bequeathed to Nigeria an array of economic and political problems which ultimately “elevated” the country to a fragile and pariah status. They institutionalised corruption, perpetrated various forms of human rights abuses, plundered and diverted huge public funds, collapsed national infrastructure, deepened the vulnerability of citizens to poverty, crippled the educational system and eventually stagnated economic growth (Fasakin, 2015).

For example, Babangida’s military regime diverted over 2 USD billion accruing from the sale of crude oil, recovery worth 2 USD billion was made from Abacha, his family and top associates including Ismaila Gwarzo, Dalhatu Tofida and Anthony Ani (Olukoshi, 2000). Successive military governments promulgated controversial and infamous decrees which facilitated illegal arrests, torture and detention of rights and political activists including Olusegun Obasanjo, Shehu Sani, Wole Soyinka, Musa Yar’Adua, Frank Ovied Kokori, Chima Ubani, Beko Ransome-Kuti, Kunle Ajibade and Tunji Abayomi; arrests and execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine other environmental activists; outright proscription of trade and labour unions such as Academic Staff Union of Universities and the Nigerian Labour Congress; and the closure and suspension of the operation of media houses (Human Rights Watch, 1997). Similarly, socio-economic indicators were extremely dismal—the percentage of Nigerians living below the poverty line moved from 41 to 80 between 1992 and 1998 (Mustapha, 1999), external debts grew from 5.1 USD billion in 1978 (14 percent of GDP) to 17.6 USD billion by 1983 (50 percent of GDP), reaching US$29 billion by 1987 (124 percent of GDP) (Olukoshi, 2000). Under these gloomy conditions, “the political space was contrived, entrepreneurial creativity and ingenuity stifled, and the logic of difference, of social pluralism, cultural divergence and identities, suppressed” (Adejumobi, 2000, p. 2).

The above scenarios as well as demands from several pro-democracy civil society organisations such as National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), the Centre for Constitutionalism and Demilitarisation (CCD) and the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) were the internal dynamics which propelled and heightened an aggressive campaign for democratisation in Nigeria. Pro-democracy activists insisted that only a system of governance based on competitive elections, rule of law, and constitutionalism can reconcile the inherent contradictions in Nigeria (Fasakin, 2015). Similarly, external pressures from the advanced democratic states and neoliberal
institutions provided the momentum for the liberalisation of political and economic space in Nigeria. These external forces compelled Nigeria to urgently domesticate the core principles of liberal democracy as a condition for cooperation, friendship, financial and technical assistances.

Indeed, these collective efforts, as well as the promise that democratisation would foster economic development further reinforced the adoption of democratic governance in Nigeria in 1999. Although the country’s democratic credentials spanned through the first republic (1960–1966) to second republic (1979–1983) down to the botched third republic (1993), it is only at the present fourth republic that the country is experiencing the longest uninterrupted years of democratic rule (Yagboyaju & Akinola, 2019). Beyond liberalising the political space, Nigeria through the instrumentality of National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy implemented market-based economic reforms such as deregulation, privatisation, trade liberalisation etc as part of the measures to open the economic space for competitive engagements. It is argued that economic progress can only be generated in an atmosphere of liberty, profit-maximising activity, effective allocation of resource in the marketplace, free-flow of information and secure control of property, which provide incentives for people to work and invest (Baum & Lake, 2003; Bhalla, 1994; Jamo, 2013; Leblang, 1997; North, 1990; Rodrik, 1998).

Meanwhile, events in the aftermath of the military disengagement suggest a contradiction of the working nexus between democratic deepening and economic gains. A study by Nnamani (2015) covering the fourth republic observes that the Nigerian state is still grappling with pervasive poverty, stunted economic growth, rising debt, widened inequality, deplorable infrastructure, food crisis and the growing cost of living. In 2018, Nigeria displaced India as the poverty capital of the world when the country’s population living in extreme poverty grew to 91 million (Kharas et al., 2018). Ranking 162 out of 186 sampled countries, the country’s access to improved basic and critical infrastructure is among the lowest globally (Bello-Schüemann & Porter, 2017). The absence of these facilities could explain the country’s poor performance in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report in 2016 where it ranked 169 out of 190 countries (Olawoyin, 2018).

The wide discrepancy between what was promised or hoped for and the current economic realities in Nigeria instigates doubt over the avowed nexus between liberal democracy and economic development. Sceptics question and challenge the role of liberal democracy in driving the economic development of Nigeria. Ake (2000) argues that brand of liberal democracy in practice in Nigeria should not be construed as the Athenian model of the rule of the people, noting that the former has become the rule of the privileged class following the industrial revolution wherein the interest of the minority elite class is pursued and advanced. The study contends that classic democracy has been rendered ineffective by the logic of liberalism which promotes economic inequality. Similarly, Obi (2008) notes that the institutionalisation of liberal democracy in Nigeria is nothing but a clandestine move to expand and consolidate capitalist penetration, in which market-based reforms are foisted and implemented for the benefit of the core bourgeoisie and their local surrogates. Further, Okolie (Okolie, 2016, p. 21) demonstrates that an inherent bifurcation of the political and economic realms and the foisting of liberal democratic ethos on fledgling political economy rather lead to development of underdevelopment. Fundamentally, he argues that development can only be positively attained when a given state naturally generates critical deliverables extracted from the political economy and attuned towards self-discovery, self-extension and self-expansion.

Meanwhile, other recent studies on democracy-development hypothesis in the developing countries suggest interrogating how endogenous variables such as corruption, electoral malpractice, leadership deficit, ethno-regional power contestation, insecurity, weak government institutions and fragile civil society militate against development in the fourth republic. For instance, while Adediran (2015) admits that the domestication of the core principles of liberal democracy is important for development, the study believes that its suitability for economic development in Nigeria has been challenged by the weak capacity of the state to check the rising cases of
corruption. For Akhaine (2011), Nigeria’s attainment of expected development under democracy was hindered by leadership crisis, primitive capital accumulation, absence of general agreement among the competing nationalities, and the citizenship question. In addition, Adagbabiri (2015) identified election malpractices, bad governance, and political instability as threats to the liberal democracy in Nigeria. Ezirim et al. (2016) see ethno-regional power contestation as a major constraint on the capacity of liberal democracy to generate the required development outcomes.

While these clarifications are germane in understanding the dynamics of liberal democracy-development thesis, scholars are yet to examine the link between election cost and economic development in Nigeria. Section 223 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria stipulates an electoral timing of two terms of four-years each for all elected officials. This tenure system allows a fixed term of four years, renewable once by election. Between 1999 and 2019, Nigeria has conducted six (6) elections into national and sub-national offices. Conducting elections in Nigeria is capital intensive, given the high stakes associated with electoral contestations, logistical demands, and difficulty in accessing most terrains. As such, it drains government coffers of public funds usually spent by the Electoral Management Body (EMB) on the procurement of logistical materials and personnel cost while private funds are expended by candidates and political parties on vote-buying, campaign messages, mobilisation and other logistics. While the cost of elections is growing exponentially, it is diverting public spending from issues of human development to political development. Indeed, the wide gap between the poor and rich is deepening, critical infrastructure is decaying, health services are almost unavable or unaffordable in some cases, industries are almost non-existent, unemployment and poverty rates are rising, research and learning standards are depreciating, debt profile increasing, the power supply is epileptic while the inflation rate is appreciating steadily (Fasakin, 2015).

In this article, we examine the interface between electoral cost and economic development, with specific attention to Nigeria’s Human Development Index. This study argues that the subsisting tenure system of 4 years renewable only once for elected public officials is largely unprogressive and unsustainable, given the current socio-economic realities of the Nigerian state. Expending huge public finance every four years to prosecute elections as part of the routine rituals to deepen liberal democracy is antithetical to the development drive of Nigeria. Fundamentally, the insistence to sustain the current tenure regime suggests a conspiracy between the western nations supplying election materials and equipment at exorbitant cost and the local surrogates who divert campaign and election funds for personal use. Reversing the two terms of 4 years each and adopting a 6-year single term which aligns with the existing realities is key to refocusing public expenditure to the priority needs of the citizens. This will not only boost inclusive and rapid economic development, but reduce the high stakes usually associated with electoral contests in Nigeria.

2. Methodology
This study relied on qualitative information gleaned from documentary data and field observation of successive elections in the fourth republic. The documentary method of data generation simply refers to the systematic means of generating data by reviewing existing documents. It primarily involves detailed examination of documents containing relevant information about a particular event under study. It is used mostly by scholars in social sciences and humanities to review a set of documents for historical or social reasons or to create a larger narrative through the study of multiple documents surrounding an event or individual (McCulloch, 2004). According to Payne & Payne (Payne & Payne, 2004, p. 60), the documentary method is a technique used to categorise, investigate, interpret and identify limitations of physical sources, most commonly written documents whether in the private or public domain (personal papers, commercial records, or state archives, communications or legislation).

Sources of documentary research include data generated from books, official documents, journal articles, historical documents, directories, handbills, maps, conference papers, periodicals, mass media and other online materials. The relevance of this methodological tool cannot be
underestimated. It permits access to information that may be difficult or impossible to elicit through direct personal contact. It provides a quicker and more cost-effective means of generating data than direct methods such as survey. Documentary methods avail researchers access to the inner recesses of group life, the motivations of individual behaviour, organizational structure as well as bureaucratic processes.

In this study, the documentary method of data collection was helpful in discovering knowledge gaps that needed to be addressed, developing the research problem, and presenting the research methodology. It provided an opportunity to explore extensive studies on election costs and economic development in Nigeria. Thus, wide intellectual conversations and literature were drawn from diverse sources including journal articles, books, newspapers, magazines, book chapters, materials from Civil Society Organisations and official publications from the Independent National Electoral Commission, 1999 Constitution, Electoral Laws of 2006 and 2010, UNDP Human Development Report, and the 2010 Political Party Finance Handbook. Consequently, these data were analysed through the aid of a content analytical technique. Using this analytical tool, data were interpreted to permit the understanding of the hidden and obvious intent of the information. This contributed immeasurably to the discoverability of regularities and patterns in them. We used tables and figures to further clarify major variables of the study including election spending and economic development in Nigeria.

Meanwhile, in analysing the interface between election costs and economic development in the Nigeria’s fourth republic, the study relied on the basic assumptions of the Marxist Instrumentalist theory of the state. This theory was developed by Miliband (Miliband, 1969, 1970, 1977) and popularized for social analysis in McGowan and Worker (1981) and Domhoff (1990). This group of scholars leveraged on Marx and Engels’ description of the state as the executive committee for managing the affairs of the bourgeoisie to develop a framework for understanding how privileged elite use the instrumentality of the state to advance and maximize their common economic interests in the peripheral societies. The theory specifically seeks to establish how the capitalist class uses and manipulates the institutional and legal processes of the states in the periphery to pursue and advance their collective interests. It argues that the powerful capitalist states pressurise the developing states to adopt specific policies, political ideologies and general development paradigms which promote their well-being and jettison others that compromise their economic interests.

In other words, the Marxist Instrumentalist theory conceptualises the state in the peripheral socio-economic formation as one captured, co-opted, controlled and constantly influenced by the powerful capitalist nations and institutions to adopt and domesticate political systems and values which correspond and advance to the interest of the latter. This thinking therefore contradicts the liberal persuasion which sees the state as an unbiased and neutral power broker in relation to the interest of capital and labour. Rather, the theory believes that states in the capitalist economic formation exist principally to foster, advance, defend and deepen institutions that promote capitalist accumulation and profit maximisation. Indeed, this theoretical perspective challenges an analyst to focus on identifying those metropolitan states, institutions and local surrogates that employ the state apparatus to advance their collective interests. Marxist Instrumentalist theory, therefore draws attention to the linkages and shared interests between the members of the powerful capitalist institutions and other key policy actors in order to demonstrate that the peripheral state lacks the autonomy or initiatory role since its power is entirely rooted in the economy controlled by the powerful states and their collaborators.

In applying this theory to the present study, we note that the various attempts at globalising liberal democracy were mainly not driven by the desire to liberate undemocratic states from grips of authoritarianism and underdevelopment. Rather the democratisation project in the peripheral states is a class scheme reflecting the interest of the powerful capitalist states acting in complicity with the local politicians. Adejumobi (Adejumobi, 2000) argues that its crafting and hegemonic interest which it represents is mainly that of the capitalist bourgeois class. As a result, issues of
primitive capital accumulation and unending acquisition of private property were adequately prioritised in the constitutions of liberal democracies while equality and socio-economic rights were relegated to the background.

Prior to the military disengagement from politics in 1999, there was a great deal of international pressure on Nigeria by many powerful capitalist states and institutions including the United States, United Kingdom, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, to liberalise its political and economic spaces. The acceptance and institutionalisation of democratic values became a conditional caveat for accessing loans, technical assistance, grants and maintaining robust interactions with the purveyors of capitalism. As Nigeria’s economic condition and international image waned helplessly under successive military regimes, it naturally yielded to the incessant calls for the restoration of democracy by the powerful capitalist states and allied institutions. At the transitional stage of democratic re-establishment in Nigeria, the advanced capitalist states in alliance with the local political actors bequeathed systems, which correspond to their demands and interests. Among the systems fashioned on the Nigerian state is the electoral timetable of a 4-year term of office renewable only once for elected public officials. This electoral arrangement was adopted essentially to facilitate the recycling of capital among the comprador bourgeoisie and the ruling class through the instrumentality of the state. Nigeria appropriates huge public funds to procure election materials from the advanced capitalist states every 4 years. Through kick-backs, heavy financial inducement and diversion of electoral funds, the local elite also benefit from the foisted arrangement.

Indeed, this theory challenges an analyst to understand that the democratisation project was not propelled by the need to resolve internal socio-economic challenges facing the people; rather, it represents a critical aspect of the liberalisation drive and widening of global capitalist order orchestrated by the purveyors of liberalism. This explains why the achievement of democracy was immediately followed by the implementation of neoliberal economic reforms under the auspices of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy. Instead of fulfilling its promises of engendering economic development, liberalisation has deepened the impoverishment of Nigerians. Paradoxically, it has empowered the ruling class and ensured that state institutions are constantly used as instruments for capital accumulation. The theory also challenges us to understand that the electoral culture of a four-year fixed-term renewable only once, imposed on most developing states by external forces was principally designed as a conduit through which public funds are diverted to enrich the western nations from where the electoral materials are procured. As Nigeria appropriates huge public funds to conduct elections on a four-year basis, the pressing socio-economic needs of the citizens are often de-prioritised, thereby deepening human and capital development crisis in the country.

3. Understanding liberal democracy and economic development

It is axiomatic to contend that the end of the Cold War in the 1990s led to the emergence of the United States as an unrivalled global power and a unipolar state. As a global power influencer, the preoccupation of the United States is to export liberal democracy and economic openness to states which were hitherto under the stranglehold and strangulation of authoritarianism and autarky (Okolie & Nnamani, 2016). It made concerted efforts in globalising liberal democracy through three major ways. First, it prioritised liberal democracy as the centrepiece of its external relations with other states. Secondly, through its allied international financial institutions, the United States made the institutionalisation of liberal democratic ethos as the basis for extending financial and technical assistance to hapless states. Thirdly, it participated directly in uprooting undemocratic regimes across regions of the world particularly in Africa, Eastern Europe and South Asia. Through its wide network, the United States and its allies promoted liberal democracy as the best and most popular form of governance and further established a working nexus between it and economic development. With these efforts, the concepts of liberal democracy and economic development have not only acquired wide currency but dominated intellectual discourses globally.
Conceptualising liberal democracy and economic development is usually problematic, given the avalanche of studies as well as litanies of conversations in the extant literature, inhibiting the development of universally acceptable definitions. Although this exercise is definitely not an attempt to join in the endless debate or search for grand clarifications, our task is to provide a working definition that will, at the interim, drive the present study. Broadly, democracy, according to Diamond, Linz & Lipset (Diamond et al., 1990, pp. 6–7), is a “system of governance that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organised groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government powers, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the election of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties—freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organisations—sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation”. Flowing from the preceding definitions, Dahl (1989) outlined seven fundamental features of democracy, namely:

(a) Control over governmental decisions about policy constitutionally vested in elected officials;
(b) Relatively frequent, fair and free elections;
(c) Universal adult suffrage;
(d) Right to run for public office;
(e) Freedom of expression;
(f) Access to alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by either the government or any other single group;
(g) Freedom of association;
(h) Right to form and join autonomous associations such as political parties, interest groups etc.

Meanwhile, liberal democracy is one of the dominant models of democracy, which, in its contemporary form, denotes a cluster of rules and institutions allowing a wider participation of the majority of citizens in the selection of representatives who make binding and authoritative decisions. Specifically, these clusters include elected government; free and fair elections in which every citizen’s vote has an equal weight; suffrage which embraces all citizens irrespective of sex, race and creed; freedom of conscience, information and expression on all public matters broadly defined; the right of all adults to oppose their government and stand for office; and associational autonomy—the right to form independent associations including social movements, interest groups and political organizations (Held, 1993, pp. 20–21). In summary, the key indicators of liberal democracy include free, fair and competitive elections, multipartyism, respect of basic civil and political rights, and creation of an institutional mechanism that promotes accountability. As a working definition for this study, liberal democracy is an institutional arrangement that provides a framework for the projection of the rule of law, competitive electoral process, multipartyism, accountability, civil and political rights, rights for survival and reproduction of material needs and collective decisions. This definition is relevant to our study as it aptly embodies the basic features of Nigerian democracy captured in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic as amended.

Like liberal democracy, economic development is replete with conceptual difficulties mainly due to the obvious disagreements among scholars and policy-makers over the actual meaning of the concept. In fact, Okolie and Nnamani (2017) observed that many states, institutions, international development partners and scholars have become obsessed with the use of economic development in the 21st Century to the point of it becoming a buzzword. The University of Iowa’s Centre for International Finance and Development acknowledges that major development actors have frequently used the concept of economic development mainly due to the increasing attention devoted to issues of people’s welfare, poverty reduction, GDP growth, standard of living and qualitative healthcare. Accordingly, Todaro & Smith Todaro & Smith (2012), as cited in Tukuta et al. (2016) conceive economic development as an increase in living conditions, improvement of
the citizens’ self-esteem needs and free and just society. Within this framework, the major yardstick for measuring economic development is the Human Development Index—a composite statistic of per capita income, life expectancy and education which in turn exerts considerable impact on output and could trigger economic growth. To us, therefore, economic development is the continuous and determined actions of states and decision-makers to improve the standard of living and economic health of a specific locality. It is the qualitative and quantitative transformation or alteration in an existing economy. It entails an increase in literacy level, life expectancy general welfare of the citizens, safety; decline in poverty rate, child and maternal mortality; improvement of health and safety, critical infrastructure; and, human capital development.

Existing literature on the link between liberal democracy and economic development is extensive and has dominated intellectual discourses from the 1960s to date. The crux of the contention revolves around the question of whether or not the institutionalisation of democratic values can foster economic prosperity in a given state. Accordingly, this debate is broadly split into two ideological stands. Scholarly writings in support of the liberal democracy-economic development nexus gained prominence in the mainstream of liberal scholarship and policy circles. This group of scholars drew inspirations and insights from the economic progress recorded in the established democracies and, thus, argue that liberal democratic deepening can generate favourable development outcomes (Aggarwal & Goodell, 2009; Aghion & Howitt, 2009; Apergis, 2017; Baum & Lake, 2003; Bhalla, 1994; Friedman, 1962; Goodin, 1979; Jamo, 2013; King, 1981; Kohli, 1986; Leblang, 1997; McCord, 1965; Rodrik, 1998). They identify property rights, political stability, human development, and innovations as the inherent characteristics of liberal democracy which create the necessary atmosphere for capital and human development. Particularly, McCord (1965), Claude (Claude, 1976), Holt and Turner (1966), Goodell and Powelson (1982), and Kohli (1986) note that liberal democracy, which guarantees civil liberties, political rights and other forms of freedom, is key to resolving economic inequality and internal conflicts bedevilling most developing societies.

On the other hand, the perceived antagonism against the liberal democracy-economic development stems from the realities of most transitional states (Olson, 1982; Przeworski & Limongi, 1993; Rodrik, 1999; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000; Przeworski et al., 2000; Rocha, 2011, 2013). Specifically, Gupta et al. (1998) argue that the time limits associated with liberal democracy predispose democratic states to embark on short-time economic policies considered to be unsustainable and limited in scope, which are introduced to increase their popularity and chances for the next election. Macroeconomic policies which can stimulate economic growth and ensure efficient allocation of resources are sacrificed on the altar of reelection. Similarly, Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) aver that rapid economic growth requires an undemocratic regime that stifles or delays the expansion of basic civil and political rights and the development of democratic procedures and institutions, noting that due process and unlimited human rights could undermine national development plans. The study advanced three major reasons in support of the foregoing proposition, which include: 1) the dysfunctional consequences of “premature” democracy act, which in turn, slow growth, 2) the inability of democratic regimes to effectively and speedily implement the kinds of policies which facilitate rapid growth, and 3) the uniqueness of the present world-historical context requiring pervasive state involvement in the development process, which in turn, unduly fettered by political democracy (Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990).

Reflecting on Nigeria’s situation, recent studies seem to focus on how endogenous variables such as corruption, electoral malpractice, leadership deficit, ethno-regional/ethno-religious power contestations, insecurity, weak governmental institutions and fragile civil society militate against the development of Nigeria in the fourth republic (Abdulhamid-Ozohu, 2016; Adefiran, 2015; Igwe, 2010; Ijere, 2015; Jamo, 2013; Lawal & Olukayode, 2012; Lysias & Newman, 2013; Majekodunmi, 2012; Rudebeck, 2016). Although these variables appear appropriate in appreciating the bane of development in the fourth republic, there is however a paucity of research on how the cost of conducting elections hinders the economic development of Nigeria with specific attention to the human development. The thrust of this present study is to address this gap identified in the literature.
4. Analysis and findings

4.1. Dynamics and culture of electoral democracy in Nigeria's fourth republic

A growing body of literature on democratisation emphasizes the indispensability of competitive elections. Competitive elections are a critical component of democracy, and most importantly, a *sine qua non* for the sustenance of liberal democracy (Lindberg, 2004, 2006; SI Lindberg, 2009). Democratic deepening at least at the theoretical level involves, in part, improvement in the conduct of regular, competitive, free and fair elections. Electoral democracy on its part specifies the *modus operandi* for selecting candidates for elective positions through multiparty, regular and competitive elections. This is perhaps important, because it is assumed that a competitive, regular and multiparty system creates and promotes a platform for participation, legitimacy, and orderly succession, germane for democratic survival (Omotola, 2010). Bratton (1998) as cited in Omotola (2010) acknowledges that the regularity, openness and legitimacy of elections signal whether basic constitutional, attitudinal and behavioural foundations are being laid for sustainable democratic governance. Also, the existence of an unbiased umpire and effective regulatory framework for electoral governance is equally seen as a necessary condition for the deepening of electoral democracy.

The inauguration of Nigeria's two decades of electoral democracy in 1999 was seen as a natural response to the prevailing socio-economic and political demands of the ‘third wave of democratisation. In line with the liberal democratic principles, the 1999 Constitution was fashioned to prioritise electoral democracy. Specifically, Section 14 (2a) provides that the sovereignty resides with the people of Nigeria from whom the government through the constitution derives all its powers and authority (Ezirim et al., 2016). On the other hand, Section 153 (1a-f) recognises the Independent National Electoral Commission as the Electoral Management Body, statutorily empowered to superintend the organisation of elections in Nigeria. As a chronic imitator of the political systems of advanced democracies, the constitution provides an electoral culture of four years fixed term of office renewable only once for the executive branch. For the legislature, it is four years renewable tenure subject to the decision of the constituents. This suggests that Nigeria has conducted six general elections in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019. By implication, the ongoing fourth republic is the longest democratic dispensation in the country.

While these successive elections have led to a successful transfer of power from one elected government to another, they were adjudged to be flawed and marred by irregularities. These include vote-buying, intimidation of voters, snatching of ballot boxes, the militarisation of polls, rigging, falsification of election results and under-age voting. Ezirim et al., (Ezirim et al., 2016) further aver that electoral democracy in Nigeria's fourth republic was characterised by either deliberate exclusion of election candidates from participation through various acts of violence or imposition of preferred candidates by political godfathers. This trend has produced a disastrous outcome and eroded the credibility and sanctity of electoral democracy in Nigeria. The then late President Umaru Yar’adua admitted in a rare testimony that the 2011 election, which brought him into power was fraught with irregularities. Most importantly, the lack of independence of the EMB and associated interference of the local politicians in the elections as well as the perceived complicity of the commission in aiding the ruling parties have undermined electoral processes in Nigeria. A lack of internal democracy at party levels facilitates the monopolisation of party machinery by godfathers, leading to the emergence of mediocre party candidates. The absence of an internal mechanism for the resolution of disputes has heightened tensions and resulted in numerous litigations against political parties by disenchanted members.

The hitches and abnormalities characterising Nigeria’s electoral democracy are, no doubt, intrinsically linked to the institutionalised two-tenure renewable system. This tenure system was externally supported by the purveyors of liberal democracy and domesticated by the local accomplices solely for self-interest. In Nigeria, the winner-takes-all mentality as well as the high stakes usually associated with political offices heightens electoral contestations among the competing,
polarised and distrusted ethnic nationalities who perceive political power as a means of advancing their peculiar economic interests. The struggle is usually intensified when it is obvious that access to state power guarantees an unfettered gateway to huge petro-dollar revenue. Indeed, the incumbent’s penchant for re-election often reinforces the tendency for divisiveness, violence, rancour and instability. For instance, the re-election bid of the then President Goodluck Jonathan in 2015 accounted for the deaths of 106 people while the election-related conflict in 2011 led to the deaths of 800 people and the displacement of 65,000 (Birch & Muchlinski, 2018; Harwood, 2019). The two-tenure system affects governance and policy responses since incumbent officials seeking re-election often devote a substantial part of their time and energy in politicking and grandstanding for a favourable outcome. This manifested in the 2015 and 2019 re-elections of Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari, respectively, in Nigeria when both leaders abandoned their jobs for campaigns. Also, given the monetised and winner-takes-all approach of Nigerian politics, incumbent candidates ruthlessly divert public funds for re-election campaigns. It drains the national treasury and redirects public expenditure to campaign funding rather than to human and capital development. A classic example is the ongoing investigation into the Office of the National Security Adviser which, at the interim, has revealed that the sum of 2.1 USD billion appropriated for procurement of military equipments was diverted and used to prosecute the 2015 general elections for the Peoples Democratic Party.

4.2. Multi-partyism and electoral processes in the fourth republic

Democratisation literature affirms the indispensability of political parties in supporting democratic consolidation (Katsina, 2016; Narud, 1996; Rahat et al., 2008). Yogboyaju (2012) likened this relationship as one which exists between the umbilical cord and foetus. Through voters’ mobilization and education, interest aggregation, political class recruitment and the formation of government, political parties serve as the heart which pumps the needed blood for the survival of democracy. Indeed, the viability and health of any democracy are determined by the type of party system adopted in a given state. The choice should correspond with the nature, character, peculiarities, realities and existing demands of the political system. In pluralistic settings with rivalling nationalities like Nigeria, a multiparty system is prioritized as a system that accommodates diversity. It also provides the avenue for aggregating the diverse inputs and interests of citizens. Hence the broader these channels, the likelihood of wider participation in governance.

As a precursor to the democratic engagement in 1999, nine political parties including the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), All Peoples Party (APP), Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJ), Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), the Alliance for Democracy (AD), United Democratic, National Solidarity Movement, and United Progressive Party were duly registered by the EMB and supervised by the military transition government in 1998. Local government elections were conducted across the 778 councils in Nigeria with the full participation of the aforementioned parties. Results collated indicate that the People’s Democratic Party, All People’s Party, Alliance for Democracy won in 389, 182 and 100 councils, respectively. The remaining six parties won in 103 councils. The follow-up general elections were conducted on 7th January and 27 February 1999 with PDP securing the majority of votes cast. According to the results released by INEC, PDP won the presidential seat, 21 governorship and 265 out of 469 seats in the National Assembly. APP won 9 gubernatorial and 103 seats in the National Assembly while AD had 6 governorship seats and 88 seats in national assembly. In 2003, the number of political parties increased from 9 to 28 which participated in the general elections. At the end, PDP secured the majority of seats including the Presidency, 27 governorships and 299 national assembly seats. The APP which latter, changed its name to All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP), won eight (8) governorships and 124 national assembly seats. AD retained one governorship and 40 national legislative seats respectively. Further, the number of registered political parties expanded from 28 in 2003 to 57 in 2007. Meanwhile, election results announced by the INEC indicates that the PDP dominated the national politics with 29 governorship and 350 national assembly seats while ANPP won 5 governorship and 77 national positions. The Alliance for Democracy which rebranded as Action Congress (AC) won two
gubernatorial seats and 36 national assembly seats. Meanwhile three other registered political won only 6 seats in the national parliamentary.

In the 2011 general elections, sixty-one (61) registered political parties contested and recorded the following results: PDP retained the presidency, 23 governors and 203 seats in the national assembly; Action Congress had 6 governors and 69 seats in the national parliament; while the newly registered Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) which split from ANPP won a governorship seat and 28 national assembly seats. The ANPP had 3 governors and 28 national parliamentarians while the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) recorded two governorship seats and seven in the national assembly. Labour Party (LP) won a governorship position and 8 seats in the federal parliament. On the other hand, the Accord Party, Democratic People's Party and Peoples Party of Nigeria had 5, 1 and 1 seats respectively in the national assembly.

Consequently, mainstream opposition parties including CPC, Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), ANPP, splinter of APGA and Democratic People's Alliance (DPA) merged and produced a historic mega opposition known as the All Progressives Congress (APC) in 2013. At the end, PDP, APC and 23 other political parties were cleared by EMB to contest the 2015 general elections. Meanwhile 68 political parties contested the 2019 general elections. By and large, the multiplicities of political parties in Nigeria's fourth republic is definitely not an attempt to broaden the political space for wider participation of citizens in the governance process, it is rather class and economically incentivized. The growing number of registered political parties is sustained and thrives on pecuniary benefits from INEC's annual subvention. By the provision of the Electoral Act of 2010, INEC is mandatorily empowered by law to provide annual subvention to political parties.

Specifically, Section 91(2) of the Electoral Act of 2010 provides that 30% of the annual financial support should be disbursed across all registered political parties while 70% should go to political parties that won National Assembly elections in relation to the number of seats won. Although the totality of the annual subventions is shrouded in secrecy, further inquiry shows that the EMB released the sum of N3 billion to political parties as subvention between 2003 and 2009. With this, INEC's annual subvention has become a big business for many political parties to make such money without doing anything (Galadima, 2019). With this, local politicians and ruling elite see the formation of political parties as an avenue to partake in the primitive capital accumulation. Most fundamentally, the number of parties in Nigeria imposes an economic cost on the EMB. It causes logistical problems particularly in the production of ballot papers. Undeniably, the current number of political parties is in variance with the demands and existing realities of the Nigerian state.

4.3. Election cost and economic development trade-off in Nigeria

Election funding is an integral aspect of electoral administration. It determines the acceptability, reliability, viability, inviolability and outcome of the electoral processes. Paucity of funds could undermine the integrity of the electoral process while availability of regulated finance could guarantee the success of electoral democracy. Given its relevance, funds are usually sourced, appropriated and expended by relevant stakeholders (political parties, candidates and EMB) although supposedly in accordance with the appropriation laws and other extant rules, to meet the cost and demands of prosecuting elections. Elections in fledgling democracies like Nigeria are usually expensive comparable the established democracies. This could be due to high reliance on imported election materials, inaccessible terrains, monetisation of votes, mass population, poverty, illiteracy and fragile nature of these states.

Election cost in this context refers to the aggregate costs incurred by political parties, EMB, candidates and other stakeholders before, during and after elections. It implies the totality of expenditure made by the Election Management Body in providing logistics, security, sensitive and non-sensitive materials, civic and voters’ education and managing the pre- and post-election litigations. It also includes the huge expenditure incurred by political parties and election
candidates in obtaining nomination forms, printing and displaying posters, inducing party stalwarts, hiring thugs, procuring weapons, renting crowds, providing transport, paying staff and agents, offsetting media advert bills, buying votes, paying litigation fees, and resolving other sundry issues.

Section 15 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended) and Section 2 of the Electoral Act of 2010 (as amended) confine election administration within the purview of the Independent National Electoral Commission. These laws specifically define the extent of the EMB’s powers and roles and made provisions for its funding. To discharge its numerous responsibilities including the conduct of elections, INEC receives statutory allocations from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. From 1999 to 2019, INEC has conducted six elections in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019. Within this period, INEC received and expended the totality of N730.99 billion only, for the conduct of elections (Abdallah, 2018). A further breakdown indicates that the sum of N450 billion was spent on electoral expenditure, while N191.8 billion was voted for personnel cost. On the other hand, capital expenditure gulped the sum of N54.7 billion while N36.9 billion covered the personnel cost. Additionally, the sum of N234.5 billion was approved for the conduct of the 2019 general elections in Nigeria. In summary, INEC’s total expenditure from 1999 to 2019 stood at a staggering sum of N965.49 billion. Meanwhile, the electoral expenditure of components of the total budget rose steadily from N1.5 billion in 1999, N29 billion in 2002, N45.5 billion in 2006, N111 billion in 2010, N87.8 billion in 2014 and N189 billion in 2018. A substantial aspect of this expenditure is devoted to the procurement of electoral materials from western nations. In 2018, the sum of N27 billion was appropriated and spent for importing technological devices for the prosecution of 2019 general elections (Thisday, 2017).

Beyond these statutory allocations and expenditures of the EMB, political parties’ spending also contributes substantially to the huge cost of prosecuting elections in Nigeria. Although Section 90 (2–7) of the Electoral Act of 2010 (as amended) regulates party financing and expenditures in Nigeria, subsisting evidence suggests that political parties have treated this provision with utter disdain. The initial Electoral Act of 2006 placed an expenditure limit not higher than N500 million, N100 million, N20 million and N10 million naira for presidential, governorship, senatorial, House of Representatives and State Assembly candidates. Meanwhile, the 2010 Electoral Act reviewed and modified party financing and pegged expenditure limits for presidential and governorship candidates at N1 billion and N200 million, respectively, while candidates for Senate and House of Representatives were expected to spend no more than N40 million and N20 million respectively. In the same vein, State House of Assembly candidates has a spending limit of N10 million.

Despite these regulatory frameworks, evidence shows that party financing and campaign expenditure have consistently violated the extant legal limits (Ayeni, 2019). In 1999, the Presidential Fund-Raising Dinner for the PDP’s candidate Olusegun Obasanjo realized the sum of N400 million and received 7 USD million (N1,120,000,000) from Gen. Theophilus Y. Danjuma. In outright contravention to the existing legal limit of N500 million for Presidential candidates, the sum of N5.5 billion was raised as campaign fund for the PDP presidential candidate in 2003 (see Table 1 for breakdown). Tables 2 and 3 reveal that the then governorship candidates of Alliance for Democracy—Bola Ahmed Tinubu of Lagos State and People’s Democratic Party—Chief James Onanefe Ibori of Delta state got N1.3 billion and N2.3 billion naira respectively from friends, cronies, government contractors, business moguls and other donors as campaign finance for the 2003 election as against the limits imposed by the law. During the 2015 general elections, Tables 4 & 5 indicate that PDP generated the sum of N22.442 billion and expended the sum of N2.5 billion on campaigns. On the other hand, the campaign finances of APC were unclear as the Buhari Support Organisation claimed it generated the sum of N54 million from Nigerians and spent N1.091 billion on campaign (see Table 5). However, the single donation of the ex-Vice President Atiku Abubakar—N50 million, 12 Land Cruisers and an Aircraft to the APC Presidential candidate and the wide discrepancy between funds generated and expenditures as seen in Table 5 contradict this claim.
Table 1. Atiku Presidential campaign in 2003/Atiku Presidential campaign in 2003

| Identity of Contributor(s)                             | Amount (N) |
|--------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Friends of Atiku                                       | N1 billion |
| Aliko Dangote                                          | N250 million |
| Emeka Offor                                            | N200 million |
| 21 PDP Governors                                       | N210 million |
| Group from Europe                                      | N144 million |
| Rivers friends of Obasanjo/Atiku                       | N150 million |
| Construction Companies in the Country                  | N200 million |
| Dr. Samuel Uche (Businessman)                          | N50 million |
| PDP Caucus in the Senate                               | N12 million |
| Principal Staff of the Villa (Aso Rock)                | N10.6 million |
| AVM Shekari                                            | N10 million |
| First Atlantic Bank                                    | N10 million |
| Ministers                                              | N10 million |
| Otunba Fasawe                                          | N6.5 million |
| PDP National Working Committee                         | N3.6 million |
| Dr. Ngozi Anyaegbunam                                  | N500,000.00 |
| Dr. Garnaliel Onosode                                  | N100,000.00 |
| Corporate Nigeria (Pledges)                            | N2 billion  |
| Grand Alliance                                         | Boeing 727 & 2 Luxury Buses for campaign |
| Anonymous Group                                        | Two Luxury Buses |

Source: (Ukase, 2015)

Table 2. List of donors to Bola Ahmed Tinubu Governorship campaign in 2003

| Identity of Donor(s)                                | Amount |
|------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Mr. Wale Tinubu                                      | N100 million |
| The Governor’s friend                                | N150 million |
| The Deputy Governor’s friends                        | N76 million |
| Femi Otedola, M.D of Zenon Oil & Gas                  | N10 million |
| Prince Albert Awofisayo, Continental Pharmaceutical Ltd | N10 million |
| Chief Remi Adiakwu Bakare                            | N10 million |
| Chief Ayoku, the Babalaje of Lagos                   | N10 million |
| Alhaji and Alhaji K.O Tinubu and children             | N10 million |
| Friends of the Lagos State Executive Secretaries     | N10 million |
| Senator Tokunbo Afikoyumi                            | N5 million |
| Mrs. Stela Okoli                                     | N5 million |
| Lady Joy Udensi                                      | N10 million |
| Friends of Lagos State Permanent Secretaries         | N2 million |
| The Tinubu family                                    | N1 million |
| Chief Abiodun Kasamu                                 | N1 million |

Source: (Ukase, 2015)
Okolie et al., Cogent Social Sciences (2021), 7: 1918370
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2021.1918370

Table 3. List of donors to Chief James Onanefe Ibori Governorship campaign in 2003

| Identity of the Contributors                                      | Amount        |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| Vice President Atiku Abubakar                                     | N34 million   |
| Michael Ibru (On behalf of Ibru family and friends)              | N250 million  |
| Mr. Peter Okocha (on behalf of Delta North Professionals)        | N200 million  |
| Chief Michael Oki                                                | N200 million  |
| Olorugun John Oguma                                              | N120 million  |
| Chief Mike Omeruah                                                | N120 million  |
| Chief Newton Jibunor                                              | N100 million  |
| Chief Nam Okechukwu                                              | N100 million  |
| Alhaji Inuwa Umoru                                               | N100 million  |
| Bube Okorodudu                                                    | N10 million   |
| Mr. Tony Anenih Jnr on behalf of friends of Ibori                | N50 million   |
| Chief Emeka Offor                                                | N5 million    |
| Anonymous Donor                                                   | N35 million   |
| Mr. Terry Wayas                                                   | N35 million   |
| Austin Odili                                                       | N30 million   |
| Chief Tony Anenih, Chief Lucky Igbinedion and others              | N26 million   |
| Zenith Bank                                                       | N25 million   |
| Mr Wole Tinubu                                                    | N20 million   |
| Alhaji Abdulrazaq Abdurraham                                     | N10 million   |
| Chief Diepreye Alamieyesiegha                                    | N10 million   |
| Akintola Williams                                                 | N10 million   |
| Core Group                                                        | N10 million   |
| Chief Tom Ikimi boat worth                                        | N7 million    |
| Chief Edwin Clarke on behalf of Ijaws of Delta                   | N5 million    |
| Delta State House of Assembly                                     | N6 million    |

Source: (Ukase, 2015)

By implication, Nigeria’s elections rank among the most expensive in the world (Abdallah, 2018). It surpasses that of India with a population six (6) times larger than Nigeria. It is equally more expensive than that of most industrialised economies—United Kingdom, Canada and Australia—with £113 million (in 2010), 375 USD million (2010) and 197.6 USD million. In a recent astonishing revelation, the Chief Technical Adviser to INEC Chairman, Professor Bolade Eyinla admitted that the EMB, political parties and candidates spent between 1.5 USD billion and 2 USD billion in the last 2015 general election (Aziken et al., 2017). These conventional expenditures by political parties exclude spending on security, feeding, accommodation, vote-inducing fees and honorarium for party agents. Amidst the obvious contravention of the campaign finance regulation, the EMB has demonstrated incapacity to enforce compliance on the violators.

The surge in the election costs in the fourth republic suggests untoward consequences on the economic development of Nigeria. Every year preceding the election, the size of national budgets is usually expanded to accommodate the costs and demands of elections. For instance, the 2014 approved national budget was N4.962 trillion as against a lowered figure of N4.5 trillion in 2015, while the sum of N9.12 trillion was budgeted for the 2018 fiscal year as against N8.92 trillion approved for 2019 (BudgIT, 2019). The implication is that election imposes an additional cost on the Nigerian state which is usually met through external borrowing. Analysing the economics of 2015 general elections, ThisDay (2017) observes that the funds used in conducting the 2015...
general election could have been properly channelled in creating jobs for the teeming unemployed youths and building infrastructure that supports human and capital development. Onubedo and John (2019) note that the sum of N234 billion ($669 million) approved for the 2019 general elections is almost the current running budget for capital projects in both health and education. The study decreed that in a country where over 70% of the citizens live in extreme poverty and an economy based on unrestrained borrowings, the tendency to spend prodigiously during election hurts capital expenditure, public provision and economic progression. Public spending on elections could revitalise the agricultural sector, drive industrialisation, revamp the health sector, provide social services to the citizens, and promote quality and affordable educational system in Nigeria. In another study, Ochonu (2020) wondered how a country that experiences fiscal volatility and where a greater percentage of its citizens struggle to survive on 2 USD per day could appropriate and expend an outrageous 670 USD million to conduct the 2019 general elections. Ochonu (2020) concludes that liberal democracy has been an unreasonably costly project in Nigeria since the return of civilian rule in 1999.

### Table 4. List of contributors to Presidential candidate of PDP in the 2015 election

| Name of Donor(s)                                                                 | Amount     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Tunde Ayeni                                                                     | N1 billion |
| Tunde and Group of friends                                                      | N2.6 billion |
| Jerry Gana and friends                                                          | N5 billion |
| National Automotive Council                                                      | N450 million |
| PDP Governors Forum (N50 million each x 21 governors)                            | NN1.05 billion |
| Bala Shagaya Representing the Oil and Gas sector                               | N5 billion |
| Construction Sector                                                             | N310 million |
| Transport and Aviation Sector represented by Didi Ndimou                          | N1 billion |
| The Real Estate Sector represented by Oluchi Okoye                                | N4 billion |
| Food and Agric Sector represented by Chief Ominife Uzeogbu                        | N500 million |
| Cizally Limited                                                                 | N250 million |
| Power sector represented by Tunde ayeni                                           | N500 million |
| National association of Stevedores                                               | N25 million |
| Mr. Sam Egwu                                                                    | N1 million |
| Halima Jibril                                                                   | N5 million |
| Ajuji Best Hotel                                                                | N1 million |
| **TOTAL**                                                                       | **N22,442 Billion** |

Source: (Ukase, 2015)

### Table 5. Campaign expenditure by Presidential candidates of the PDP and APC in 2015 elections

| Item                                          | PDP (Amount Spent) | APC (Amount Spent)     |
|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Campaign Rallies                              | N1.057 billion     | N595,082 million       |
| Bill Boards                                   | N155.13 million    | N99.23 million         |
| Electronic Media Campaign Coverage            | N508.35 million    | N391.05 million        |
| Electronic Media Advert                       | N7.339 million     | N5.556 million         |
| **TOTAL**                                     | **N2.5 billion**   | **N1.091 billion**     |

Source: (Ukase, 2015)
Okolie (2019) therefore remarked that the Nigerian state prioritises huge spending on election over the welfare of the citizens. The humongous election costs strain and deplete government spending on critical areas of human and capital development. This tendency to sacrifice the welfare of the citizens over elections has indeed affected different spheres of human development in Nigeria. An exploration of the Human Development Index (HDI) shows that the country’s performance is abysmally poor in the international rating. Table 6 presents the poor Human Development Index of Nigeria from 2001 to 2019. In terms of categorisation, countries whose HDI falls between 0.811 and 1.0 are seen as having “High Human Development Index”, those within the range of 0.711–0.810 are classified under the “High Human Development Index”. On the other hand, those with 0.511 to 0.710 are known to be having Medium Human Development Index while low human development index falls between 0.1 and 0.510. From this analysis, it is evident that Nigeria has consistently recorded abysmal poor performance in the HDI, a key indicator for measuring economic development.

Similarly, Table 7 shows the progressive appreciation in the level of unemployment within the period under study. The percentage of unemployed Nigerians grew from 13.1% in 2000 to 19.7% and moved higher to 26.2% in 2014. Also, the official publication of the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics indicates that the number of people without jobs in Nigeria rose from 75.94 million in 2015, 80.66 million in 2016, 85.1 million in 2017 to 90.5 million in 2018. These rising unemployment records are key factors fuelling terrorism, militancy and separatist agitations across the country. Sadly, while these poor economic indicators persist throughout the fourth republic, spending huge funds on election every four years remains a key priority of Nigerian governments.

Bearing the foregoing in mind, several commentaries have analysed the implication of sustaining the current 4-year fixed-term renewable for another term of 4 years on the overall development of Nigeria. While opponents insist that the status quo should be maintained arguing that the country only needs good governance to overcome myriads of political and economic challenges compounding it, proponents support a departure from the current arrangement to a single 6-year term of office (Iwok,

| Year | Nigeria's Human Development Index |
|------|---------------------------------|
| 2001 | 0.463                           |
| 2002 | 0.466                           |
| 2003 | 0.453                           |
| 2004 | 0.448                           |
| 2005 | 0.470                           |
| 2006 | 0.506                           |
| 2007 | 0.511                           |
| 2008 | 0.483                           |
| 2009 | 0.419                           |
| 2010 | 0.423                           |
| 2011 | 0.467                           |
| 2012 | 0.471                           |
| 2013 | 0.500                           |
| 2014 | 0.504                           |
| 2015 | 0.527                           |
| 2016 | 0.528                           |
| 2017 | 0.533                           |
| 2018 | 0.534                           |
| 2019 | 0.534                           |

Source: (Saheed & Egwaikhide, 2012; UNDP, 2012).
Iwok's (2019) advocacy is based on the conviction that re-election pressure creates room for wastage of state resources and primitive capital accumulation. Vergne (2009) argues that the quest to recover money spent during the election and to amass wealth for future elections occurring every 4 years is so corrupting and overwhelming that everything else, including campaign pledges, due process and governance are relegated to the background. To accumulate state resources, white-elephant projects are created as channels for stealing public funds while fictitious contracts are awarded consistently at an overvalued price to facilitate and sustain capital accumulation (Vergne, 2009). The money voted for educational development, healthcare service delivery, job creation, and improvement in critical infrastructure including power are embezzled and shared among cronies, party members and relatives of the officials. The failed 16 USD billion power project under former President Olusegun Obasanjo as well as the alleged 2 USD billion purposely meant for the purchase of arms but shared to party members and friends by the then National Security Adviser, Sambo Dasuki, are classic examples. Indeed, critical areas that support human and capital developments are often neglected, leading to a consistent decline in the overall indices of economic development.

Indeed, a six-year single tenure arrangement offers a practical, promising and lasting solution to the myriads of challenges associated with the present tenure system in Nigeria. Rather than spending lean resources to fight for re-election, it will help leaders to focus on fulfilling their campaign promises by providing purposeful leadership that will drive development initiatives. Most importantly, it will drastically minimize the financial burden, which the present tenure system imposes on the state and better channel it to issues that facilitate human development.

### Table 7. Unemployment rate in Nigeria 1999-2014

| Year | Unemployment Rate in Nigeria (%) |
|------|---------------------------------|
| (1) 2000 | 13.1 |
| (1) 2001 | 13.6 |
| (1) 2002 | 12.6 |
| (1) 2003 | 14.8 |
| (1) 2004 | 13.4 |
| (1) 2005 | 11.9 |
| (1) 2006 | 12.3 |
| (1) 2007 | 12.7 |
| (1) 2008 | 14.9 |
| (1) 2009 | 19.7 |
| (1) 2010 | 21.1 |
| (1) 2011 | 23.9 |
| (1) 2012 | 27.4 |
| (1) 2013 | 24.7 |
| (1) 2014 | 26.5 |

Source: (International Monetary Fund, 2014; NBS, 2012; CBN, 2015).
5. Conclusion
The study has established that the cost of sustaining electoral democracy negates the economic development of Nigeria. It has noted that the imitated electoral culture of a 4-year fixed-term of office renewable only once is not sustainable in the light of the prevailing economic conditions of the Nigerian state. The tenure system only helps to advance the interest of the dominant class—the interests of the metropolitan states and their local collaborators. Apart from supporting the economic growth of the industrialised nations of the world whose equipment and technologies Nigeria substantially rely on to conduct election, it also avails the local politicians the opportunity to partake in primitive capital accumulation. It has further observed that the idea of deepening political participation through multipartyism is a hoax in Nigeria since the proliferation of political parties is driven essentially by materials gains. Political parties are formed to partake in the statutory annual subvention of the EMB.

Most importantly, re-elections avail incumbents the opportunity to use state resources to perpetuate themselves in power. Huge public funds are squandered by state officials to rent crowds, hire thugs, sponsor media adverts and buy votes during elections. The use of public fund is augmented by donations from political merchants who constantly seek rent and political patronage from the newly elected leadership. This scenario has serious implications for governance in the post-election era. It hinders the effective delivery of public goods. This is because political merchants who sponsor electoral candidates recoup their spending through contract awards and diversion of public funds. Therefore, the culture of expectation and entitlement which ought to characterise the relationship between the leaders and citizens is constantly eroded following the monetisation of the campaign process. Consequent upon this institutionalised culture, leaders abscond from their contractual obligations of providing basic and critical infrastructure to the citizens, thereby widening socio-economic inequality.

In the light of the foregoing, this study has proposed a single tenure system of 6 years. This will help to refocus government expenditure on the priority needs of industrialization, healthcare, education, food sufficiency, and infrastructural development. Also, a multi-party system involving not more than ten (10) political parties is recommended to minimise the outrageous costs usually incurred by the EMB in organising elections for more than 50 parties. INEC should be empowered by law to ensure full compliance on party financing and expenditure in line with the extant regulatory framework. Finally, liberal democracy should be reviewed to accommodate the demands, local contents, peculiarities and realities of the Nigerian state.

Funding
The authors received no direct funding for this research.

Author details
Aloysius-Michaels Okolie1
E-mail: aloysius.okolie@unn.edu.ng
Kelechi Elijah Nnamani1
E-mail: kelechi.nnamani@unn.edu.ng
ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6504-1928
Gerald Ekenedirichukwu Ezirim1
ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8918-5352
Chukwuemeka Enyiazu2
E-mail: enyiazue@yahoo.com
ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4827-4193
Adanne Chioma Ozor4
E-mail: adanne.azor@unn.edu.ng
ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0888-6414
1 Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Enugu State, Nigeria.
2 Department of Political Science, Abia State University Uturu, Abia State.
3 Social Science Unit, School of General Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Enugu State, Nigeria.

Citation information
Cite this article as: Does liberal democracy promote economic development? interrogating electoral cost and development trade-off in Nigeria’s fourth republic. Aloysius-Michaels Okolie, Kelechi Elijah Nnamani, Gerald Ekenedirichukwu Ezirim, Chukwuemeka Enyiazu & Adanne Chioma Ozor, Cogent Social Sciences (2021), 7: 1918370.

References
Abdollah, N. M. (2018). 2019 elections set to be Nigeria’s most expensive. Daily Trust Newspaper. https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/2019-elections-set-to-be-nigeria-s-most-expensive-263938.html, on August 12, 2020.
Abdulhamid-Ozohu, S. (2016). Democracy, good government and development in Nigeria. Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research, Vol. 8(7), 80–88.
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2000). Why did the west extend the franchise? democracy, inequality and growth in historical perspective. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), 1367–1399. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300555042
Adagbagbiri, M. M. (2015). Challenges of democracy in Nigeria’s fourth republic. Public Policy and Administration Research, 5(12).

Adegbala, O. (2019). Is there any link between democracy and economic development in Nigeria? https://ssrn.com/abstract=2637159 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2637159, December 27, 2019.

Adejumobi, S. (2000). Between democracy and development in Africa: What are the missing links? A Paper Presented to the World Bank Conference on “Development Thinking in the Next Millennium”, Paris 26–28 June 2000.

Aggawal, R., & Goodell, J. W. (2009). Markets versus institutions in developing countries: National attributes as determinants. Emerging Markets Review, 10 (1), 51–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ememar.2008.10.001

Aghion, P., & Howitt, P. (2009). The economics of growth. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.

Ake, C. (2000). The feasibility of democracy in Africa. Codiesia.

Akhaine, S. O. (2011). Democracy and development in Nigeria: The missing. African Political Economy, Vol. 38(130), pp. 645–652. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2011.634612

Apergis, N. (2017). Democracy and market crashes: Evidence from a worldwide panel of countries. Finance Research Letters, 22(c), 244–248. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2016.12.014

Ayeni, O. O. (2019). Commodification of politics: Party funding and electoral contest in Nigeria. SAGE Open, 9(2), 215824401985585. https://doi.org/10.1177/215824401985585

Aizen, E., Ovuokporie, E., Agbakwuru, J., & Ajayi, O. (2017) 2015 election cost N1 trillion – INEC. Vanguard Newspaper. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/02/2015-election-cost-n1-trillion-inec/, on November 12, 2019.

Baum, M. A., & Lake, D. A. (2003). The political economy of growth: Democracy and human capital. American Journal of Political Science, 47(2), 333–347. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5907.00023

Bello-Schünemann, J., & Porter, A. (2017). Building the future infrastructure in Nigeria until 2040. Institute for Security Studies. https://issfiles.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-21.pdf, on12 August, 2020.

Bhalla, S. S. (1994). Freedom and economic growth: A virtuous cycle? In A. Hadenius (Ed.), democracy’s victory and crisis: Nobel symposium (pp. 195–241). Cambridge University Press.

Birch, S., & Muchlinski, D. (2018). Electoral violence prevention: What works? Democratization, 25(3), 385–403. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2017.1365841.

Bratton, M. (1998). Second elections in Africa. Journal of Democracy, 9(1), 51–66.

BudgetIT (2019). 2019 approved budget analysis. https://yourbudget.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/2019-Approved-Budget-Analysis.pdf on August 19, 2020.

Claude, R. (1976). The classical model of human rights development. In R. Claude (Ed.), Comparative Human Rights (pp. 6–50). The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dahl, R. (1989). Democracy and its critics. Yale University Press.

DeSilver, D. (2017). Despite concern about global democracy, nearly six-in-ten countries are now democratic. Pew Research Center. Available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/12/06/despite-concerns-about-global-democracy-nearly-six-in-ten-countries-are-now-democratic/.

Diamond, L., Linz, J. J., & Lipset, S. M. (1990). Introduction: Comparing experiences with democracy. In L. Diamond, J. J. Linz, & S. M. Lipset (Eds.), Politics in developing countries: Comparing experiences with democracy (pp. 1–38). Lynne Rienner.

Dohrnoff, G. W. (1990). The power elite and the state: How policy is made in America. Aldine De Gruyter.

Ezirim, G. E., Nnanma, K. E., & Nnaegbo, O. (2016). Democracy at the crossroads: Ethno-regional power contestations and democratisation in a diversified Nigeria, 1960–2015. South East Journal of Political Science, 1(1), 2015

Fasakin, A. (2015). State and democratisation in Nigeria. Democracy and Security, 11(3), 298–317. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2015.1068694.

Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. University of Chicago Press.

Galadima, B. (2019). Stop funding political parties, CPC tells INEC. Premium Times Online Newspapers. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/politics/93597-stop-funding-political_parties_cpc_tells_inec.html, on December 15, 2019.

Goodell, G., & Powelson, J. P. (1982). The democratic process and prospects for development. In R. Gostil (Ed.), Freedom in the world: Political rights and civil liberties (pp. 167–176). Freedom House.

Goodin, R. E. (1979). The development-rights trade-off: Some unwarranted economic and political assumptions. Universal Human Rights, 1(2), 31–42. https://doi.org/10.2307/761793

Gupta, D., Madhoven, M., & Blee, A. (1998). Democracy, economic growth and political instability: An integrated perspective. Journal of Socio-Economics, 27(5), 587–611. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1053-5579(98)00113-9

Harwood, A. (2019). From Africa in transition, Africa in program, and Nigeria on the brink: Tracking election violence in Nigeria. Council on Foreign Affairs. https://www.cfr.org/blog/tracking-election-violence-nigeria, on January 5, 2020.

Held, D. (1993). Prospects for democracy: North, south, east, west. Polity Press.

Holt, R. T., & Turner, J. E. (1956). The political bases of economic development. Van Nostrand.

Human Rights Watch (1997). Human rights watch world report 1997 - Nigeria, 1 January 1997. Human Rights Watch. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68d8f0.html.

Huntington, S. P. (1991). Democracy’s third wave. Journal of Democracy, 2(2), 12–34. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1991.0016

Igwe, L. E. (2010). Democracy and development in Nigeria: Issues and challenges. International Journal of Economic Development Research and Investment, 1(2 & 3). 2010. http://www.eajournals.org/wp-content/uploads/Socio-Economic-Security-and-Democratic-Participation-in-Nigeria.pdf.

Ijere, T. C. (2015). Democracy and development in Nigeria: An appraisal of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) sixteen years. International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies, 2(9), 1–7.

International Monetary Fund. (2014). IMF world economic outlook.

Iwok, I. (2019). Could six-year single term be solution to Nigeria’s electoral logjam? Business Day. https://businessday.ng/politics/article/could-six-year-single-term-be-solution-to-nigerias-electoral-logjam/ on August 19, 2020.

Jamo, I. A. (2013). Democracy and development in Nigeria: Is there a link? Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (OMAN Chapter), 3(3), 85–94.
Katsina, A. M. (2016). Peoples democratic party in the fourth republic of Nigeria: Nature, structure, and ideology. SAGE Open, 6(2), 215824401665191. https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244016651910

Kharas, H., Hamel, K., & Hofer, M. (2018). Rethinking global poverty reduction in 2019. Brookings Institutions. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/12/13/rethinking-global-poverty-reduction-in-2019/, on August 25, 2020.

King, D. Y. (1981). Regime type and performance. Comparative Political Studies, 13(4), 477–504. https://doi.org/10.1177/001041408101300406

Kohl, A. (1986). Democracy and development. In J. Lewis & V. Kallab (Eds.), Development strategies reconsidered (pp. 153–182). Transaction Books.

Lawal, T., & Oluokayode, O. V. (2012). Democracy and development in Nigeria. International Journal of Development and Sustainability, 1(2), 448–455.

Leblang, D. A. (1997). Political democracy and economic growth: Pooled cross-sectional and time-series evidence. British Journal of Political Science, 27(3), 453–472. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123497210215

Lindberg, S. I. (2004). The democratic qualities of competitive elections: Participation, competition and legitimacy in Africa. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 42(1), 61–105. https://doi.org/10.1080/14662040408565569

Lindberg, S. I. (2006). Democracy and elections in Africa. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lindberg, S. I. (2009). Democratization by elections: A new mode of transition? Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lysias, D. G., & Newman, E. U. (2015). Democracy and national development in Nigeria: Challenges and prospects. International Journal of African and Asian Studies, 13, 134–139.

Majekodunmi, A. (2012). Democratisation and development in Nigeria: The fourth republic in perspective. International Journal of Academic Research in Economics and Management Sciences, 1(5), 62-74.

McCord, W. (1963). The springtime of freedom. Oxford University Press.

McCulloch, G. (2004). Documentary research in education, history, and the social science. Routledge Falmer.

McGowan, P., & Worker, G. (1981). Radical and conventional models of U.S. foreign economic policy making. World Politics, 33(3), 347–382. xxiii. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010207

Miliband, R. (1969). The state in capitalist society. Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Miliband, R. (1970). The capitalist state. New Left Review, 59 (2): 53–60.

Miliband, R. (1977). Marxism and politics. Oxford University Press.

Mustapha, A. R. (1999). The Nigerian transition: Third time lucky or more of the same? (Mi meo), Oxford.

Narud, H. M. (1996). Electoral competition and coalition bargaining in multiparty systems. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 8(4), 499–525. https://doi.org/10.1177/095169289600800004

Nigeria Bureau of Statistics (2018). Labor force statistics - volume I: Unemployment and underemployment report. Nigeria Bureau of Statistics. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiWrdvXcrnAhX2BJUHcUAOGUQFjAeEgOIAxA&usg=AM9mB01%2FFnigianistat.gov.ng%2Fdownload%2F8586%2F5uAovVaw2VfMv_ maT2OpeE1sAdo9Ofn on April 20, 2019.

Nnamani, K. E. (2015). International monetary fund and crisis of development in Nigeria, 2000-2014. An Msc Thesis Presented to the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka in Partial Fulfilment for the Award of Master of Science in International Relations.

North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press.

Obi, C. (2008). No choice, but democracy: Pissing the people out of politics in Africa? Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

Ochonu, M. (2020). Liberal democracy has failed in Nigeria: What alternative pathways are available towards accountable governance in Nigeria? https://africasacongress.com/2020/02/liberal-democracy-has-failed-in-nigeria

Okolie, A. M. (2016). Democracy and development trade off: Exploring the alternative options. Studies in Politics and Society, 4(1), 21–36.

Okolie, A. M. (2019). State of the nation address delivered by the President, Nigerian political science association, Professor Aloysius-Michaels Okolie, at the 32nd Annual Conference of the Association held at University of Calabar, Cross River state, on Monday 22nd through 25th July 2019.

Okolie, A. M., & Nnamani, K. E. (2016). United States’ trans-Saharan counter terrorism partnership and management of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, 2005–2015. Caritas University Journal of Political Science (CUJOPS), 1(1), 19–46.

Okolie, A. M., & Nnamani, K. E. (2017). Reflection on the nexus between public procurement reforms and economic development in Nigeria. African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies, 9, 1.

Olawoyin, O. (2018). Nigeria drops in 2018 world bank ease of doing business ranking. Premium Times Newspaper. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/news/293549-nigeria-drops-in-2018-world-bank-ease-of-doing-business-ranking.html, on October 05, 2019.

Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. economic growth, stagnation and social rigidities. Yale University Press.

Olukoshi, A. O. (2000). Economy and politics in the Nigerian transition. African Journal of Political Science, 5(2), 5–29. Special Issue. https://doi.org/10.13140/rjyt.521.27308

Omotola, J. S. (2010). Election and democratic transition in Nigeria under the fourth republic. African Affairs, 109(437), 535–553. https://doi.org/10.1093/aaafadv/adq040

Onubogu, G., & John, P. (2019). Effects of 2019 elections: Predicting the economy’s response in Nigeria. Center for the Study of Economies of Africa (CSEA). http://cseafrica.org/effects-of-2019-elections-predicting-the-economys-response-in-nigeria/, on January 21, 2020.

Payne, G., & Payne, J. (2004). Key concepts in social research. Sage Publications.

Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world 1950-1990. Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1993). Political regimes and economic growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(3), 51–69. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.7.3.51

Rohat, G., Hazan, R. Y., & Katz, R. S. (2008). Democracy and political parties. Party Politics, 14(6), 663–683. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068808093405

Rocha, M. A. (2011). Analysing the relationship between democracy and development: Defining basic concepts
and assessing key linkages. Commonwealth Good Governance 2011/12.

Rocho, M. A. (2013). Emerging democracies: Rising to the challenges. Overseas Development Institute Briefing 84. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8699.pdf, on 25th August 2018.

Rodrik, D. (1998). Why do more open economics have bigger governments? Journal of Political Economy, 106(5), 997–1032. https://doi.org/10.1086/250038

Rodrik, D. (1999). Democracies pay higher wages. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 707–738. https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553995561115

Rose, R., & Shin, D. C. (2001). Democratization backwaters: The problem of third-wave democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 31(2), 331–354. Apr, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123401000138

Rudebeck, L. (2016). Democracy and development – A disputed pair. Africa Development, Volume XLII, No. 1, 2016, pp. 1–22. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2016

Saheed, Z., & Egwaikhide, C. I. (2012). Impact of social crises on economic development: Theoretical evidence from Nigeria. American International Journal of Contemporary Research, 2(6), 36–43. June 2012. 10.3923/sscience.2012.36.43.

Schenoni, L., & Mainwaring, S. (2019). Hegemonic effects and regime change in Latin America. Democratization, 26(2), 269–287. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1516754

Shin, D. C. (1994). On the third wave of democratization: A synthesis and evaluation of recent theory and research. World Politics, 47(1), 135–170. Oct., 1994. https://doi.org/10.2307/2950681

Sirowy, L., & Inkeles, A. (1990). The effects of democracy on economic growth and inequality: A review. Comparative International Development, 25(1), 126–157. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02716908

Thisday (2017). INEC: A wasted N27bn investment in technology? Thisday Newspapers. https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/04/14/inec-a-wasted-n27bn-investment-in-technology/, on July 10, 2019.

Todaro, M. P. & Smith, S. C. (2012). Economic development (Eleventh Edition). Addison-Wesley: Boston.

Tukuta, M., Makambe, U., Bhariri, P., & Chikori, G. (2016). Export-led industrialization and development through national re-branding and best practices: A comparative study of Botswana and Zimbabwean economies. International Journal of Developing and Emerging Economies, 4(1), 22–33. February 2016

Ukase, P. (2015). Political parties and election/campaign financing in Nigeria: Interrogating the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. A Paper Presented at a Two Day National Conference on 2015 Election Organized by the Electoral Institute, INEC Annex, Abuja.

UNDP (2012). What is human development index. UNDP Publishers. www.hdr.undp.org/en/hdi-what-it-is on July 10, 2019.

UNDP (2015). Human development index. UNDP Publishers. https://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi, on July 10, 2019.

Vergne, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), 63–77. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpe.2008.09.003

Yagboyaju, D. A. (2012). Party system, democratization and national development in Nigeria’s fourth republic: An appraisal of the interconnections. Business and Management Journal, 1(2), 54–61. August, 2012

Yagboyaj, D. A., & Akinola, A. O. (2019). Nigerian State and the Crisis of Governance: A Critical Exposition. SAGE Open, 9(3), 215824401986581. https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244019865810
