Trusted Inter-Domain Fast Authentication Protocol in Split Mechanism Network

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SUMMARY Previous inter-domain fast authentication schemes only realize the authentication of user identity. We propose a trusted inter-domain fast authentication scheme based on the split mechanism network. The proposed scheme can realize proof of identity and integrity verification of the platform as well as proof of the user identity. In our scheme, when the mobile terminal moves to a new domain, the visited domain directly authenticates the mobile terminal using the ticket issued by the home domain rather than authenticating it through its home domain. We demonstrate that the proposed scheme is highly effective and more secure than contemporary inter-domain fast authentication schemes.

key words: split mechanism, trusted computing, inter-domain fast authentication

1. Introduction

In traditional networks, the IP address is not only used to denote identity information of the host but also its location information, which leads to the route scalability problem. So it is difficult for the Internet to support mobility and multi-homing [1]. Internet Architecture Board (IAB) solves the IP address semantics overload problem by introducing two namespaces to represent the identifier and location of a node, that is “Locator/Identifier Split” [2].

In this paper, the Internet is divided into a core network and multiple access networks. Access IDentifier (AID) and Routing IDentifier (RID) are introduced. AID represents public identity information of Mobile Node (MN), which includes identifier of MN, type of MN etc. When MN moves in the network, AID remains unchanged. RID represents location information of MN and is used for routing. RID includes identifier of a domain, subnet identifier of Access Switch Router (ASR) and so on. When MN moves, ASR will assign a new RID to it. The communication between the user and access network is accomplished through the use of AID. Transmission of packets in the core network is accomplished through the use of RID. A link between AID and RID is established by building an access identity resolution map. This resolution map is implemented by ASR [3].

In a split mechanism network, when the mobile terminal moves to a different domain, it needs to be re-authenticated. If we select the method of access authentication, terminals that handoff frequently will experience unacceptable latency, which is fatal for some real-time services. Therefore, an inter-domain fast authentication method should be designed to minimize the handover process.

Many inter-domain fast authentication methods have been proposed, which includes [4]–[7]. Through research analysis we can discover that the existing fast authentication methods only realize the authentication of the terminal user identity. They do not consider platform identity and platform credibility of the terminal. Unfortunately, most current information security threats come from within the network. It is urgent to prevent terminal platforms from acting maliciously, i.e. virus insertion and tampering. Trusted computing technology proposed by Trusted Computing Group (TCG) can solve this problem effectively. Trusted computing guarantees the existing terminal security through binding a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) on the terminal [8].

TPM is a separate trusted coprocessor. TPM has a set of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) [9], which are used to store platform integrity measurement values. When TPM measures a component, it creates an event and records it in Stored Measurement Log (SML). PCR value and SML value are used together to prove the status of the platform. In order to guarantee that the PCR value is credible, TPM uses the Attestation Identity Key (AIK) private key to sign the PCR value. The verifier uses AIK public key to verify the signature value of PCR, and judges whether the platform is credible by comparing SML to the PCR value.

We first construct a trusted inter-domain fast authentication model framework. Then we propose a trusted inter-domain fast authentication protocol. The proposed scheme can realize proof of identity and integrity verification of the platform as well as the proof of user identity. Through security and performance analysis, we show that our protocol is more secure and has better performance.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sect.2 gives the trusted inter-domain fast authentication model framework. Section 3 describes the trusted inter-domain fast authentication protocol in detail. In Sect.4, we analyze the security and performance, and conclusion is discussed in Sect.5.
2. Trusted Inter-Domain Fast Authentication Model Framework

Trusted inter-domain fast authentication model framework is displayed in Fig. 1.

MN is a wireless terminal. A TPM chip is embedded in it. AC_H (Authentication Center in MN’s home domain) is responsible for the register of the terminal, proof of user identity and generation of the ticket. Privacy-CA_H (Privacy-Certificate Authority in MN’s home domain) is responsible for the verification of MN and issue AIK public key certificate. GAC (Global Authentication Center) is a global authentication server, which assigns key to each AC used to signing ticket. In the Home Domain (HD), MN connects to the network through ASR. When MN first accesses, it sends the ticket issued by AC_H to AC. Then AC decrypts the ticket and verifies the identity and platform of the MN.

3. Protocol Description

3.1 Symbol Explanation

Symbols used in the protocol are defined in Table 1.

| Symbol   | Definition                                      |
|----------|------------------------------------------------|
| ID_A     | identifier of entity A                         |
| AID_A    | access identifier of entity A                  |
| K_{A-B}  | key shared between entity A and B              |
| K\_ticket| the key used to issue ticket                   |
| E_K(M)   | symmetric encryption with key K to message M   |
| (M)_K    | signature with key K to message M             |
| AIK_{Pub}| AIK public key of platform A                   |
| AIK_{Pri}| AIK private key of platform A                  |
| Cert(AIK_{Pub})| AIK public key certificate of platform A         |
| T_A      | time stamp generated by entity A              |
| v        | a random number generated by entity A          |

Fig. 1 Trusted inter-domain fast authentication model framework.

3.2 Generation of the Ticket

GAC shares K\_ticket with all ACs. Each AC uses K\_ticket to generate the Ticket for local registered user. The generation of the Ticket\(_{MN}\) can be expressed in Eq. (1).

\[
\text{Ticket}_{MN} = E_{K_{ticket}}(AID_{MN}, SML, Cert(AIK_{Pub})_{K_{MN}}, \text{Lifetime}_{MN}, ID_{AC_H})
\]  

(1)

AID\(_{MN}\) is the access identifier of MN; K\(_{MN}\) is the key owned by MN, which is known by AC\(_H\) and stored in it; Lifetime\(_{MN}\) is the expiry date of the certificate of MN issued by AC\(_H\), and it also represents the expiry date of the ticket; ID\(_{AC_H}\) is the identifier of AC\(_H\). SML is a measurement stored log of MN. Cert(AIK\(_{Pub}\)\(_{MN}\)) is AIK public key of MN platform. When MN’s access authentication is complete, it submits SML and Cert(AIK\(_{Pub}\)\(_{MN}\)) to AC\(_H\).

3.3 Trusted Inter-Domain Fast Authentication Protocol

When MN completes access authentication in HD, AC\(_H\) encrypts Ticket\(_{MN}\) using K\(_{MN}\) and sends it to MN. MN saves Ticket\(_{MN}\).

The protocol is displayed in Fig. 2. Suppose MN roams from ASR\(_1\) to ASR\(_3\), the authentication process in detail is as follows:

1) When MN roams to ASR\(_3\), it extracts Ticket\(_{MN}\) and (PCR\(_{AIK_{Pub}}\)), then sends the message Ticket\(_{MN}\), \(E_{K_{MN}}((\text{PCR})_{AIK_{Pub}}, AID_{MN}, T_{MN})\) to ASR\(_3\).

2) After ASR\(_3\) receives this message from MN, it forwards it directly to AC_F.

3) AC_F uses K\(_{ticket}\) to decrypt Ticket\(_{MN}\) and gets (AID\(_{MN}\), SML, Cert(AIK\(_{Pub}\)\(_{MN}\)), K\(_{MN}\), Lifetime\(_{MN}\), ID\(_{AC_H}\)).

AC_F first verifies the validity of Lifetime\(_{MN}\). If Lifetime\(_{MN}\) is invalid, authentication fails. If Lifetime\(_{MN}\) is valid, AC_F uses K\(_{MN}\) to decrypt \(E_{K_{MN}}((\text{PCR})_{AIK_{Pub}}, AID_{MN}, T_{MN})\), and gets (PCR\(_{AIK_{Pub}}\), AID\(_{MN}\) and T\(_{MN}\)).

Then AC_F compares whether this AID\(_{MN}\) is the same as AID\(_{MN}\) in Ticket\(_{MN}\). If they are the same, it shows that MN’s identification is credible, otherwise authentication fails.

At last, AC_F verifies the platform.

AC_F uses Cert(AIK\(_{Pub}\)\(_{MN}\)) to verify (PCR\(_{AIK_{Pub}}\)) and compares PCR value in SML to current PCR value. If they are equal, then verify the identity of the MN platform and platform integrity. Hence, authentication to MN completes.

4) AC_F precomputes PMK\(_0\). PMK\(_0\) is a random number decided by AC_F. AC_F assigns master key PMK\(_0\) used
by MN and \( ASR_3 \) to MN, and sends the authentication result \( E_{K_{ACF}}(AID_{MN}, PMK_0, T_{ACF}) \), \( E_{K_{ACF}}(PMK_0, ID_{ASR}) \) to \( ASR_3 \), \( K_{ACF} \) is the key shared by \( AC_F \) and \( ASR_3 \).

5) \( ASR_3 \) receives authentication success message, updates its mapping table, admits MN to access, and sends \( E_{PMK_0}(AID_{MN}, T_{ACF}, ID_{ASR}) \), \( E_{K_{ACF}}(PMK_0, ID_{ASR}) \) to MN. In the following process, MN and \( ASR_3 \) will use \( PMK_0 \) to negotiate session keys. If authentication fails, it will return MN “authentication failure” information.

4. Security and Performance Analysis

4.1 Security Analysis

1) security of Ticket

Secret information Ticket\(_{MN} \) is encrypted by \( K_{ticket} \) which is shared by \( AC_H \) and \( AC_F \). This key is issued by GAC and used by A\( \)Cs in each domain to issue ticket. It is confidential to other members, which ensures the security and unforgeability of Ticket\(_{MN} \).

2) anti-replay

\( T_{MN} \) is embedded in the message encrypted by \( K_{MN} \). Even if someone intercepts \( E_{K_{MN}}((PCR)_{A}^{\text{AID}_{MN}}, AID_{MN}, T_{MN}) \) and replays it, \( AC_F \) can detect it according to the \( T_{MN} \). \( AC_F \) extracts time stamp \( T_{MN} \) in \( E_{K_{MN}}((PCR)_{A}^{\text{AID}_{MN}}, AID_{MN}, T_{MN}) \), and compares it to its current time. If the time interval is less than five minutes, \( AC_F \) agrees that the information is authentic. Otherwise the information is considered too old, outdated, and the requester is not trusted.

For duplicate message received within five minutes, even if the time-stamp is not old, will be discarded. Since this message may be a replayed message. We can store the messages within five minutes. If the messages are stored for longer than five minutes, they will be deleted. So when a new message is coming, we can compare it to the stored messages, if they are the same, we will not process it.

So the protocol can resist replay attack.

3) anonymity of user identification

MN’s real identity is not appeared in the messages during the protocol interaction process. We use MN’s access identification \( \text{AID}_{MN} \) to represent MN. Only its local authentication center \( AC_H \) has some of the MN’s private information. \( AC_H \) is securely protected, so MN’s private information can not flow outside, thus ensuring the anonymity of user identification.

4) location privacy of mobile node

MN’s correspond node only knows MN’s AID. MN’s RID is hidden inside the network, so it can not obtain. For the eavesdroppers, in the access network they can see only the mobile node’s AID, and cannot trace mobile node’s RID. In the core network, they can only obtain the mobile node’s RID, but was unable to reverse track the mobile node’s AID. An eavesdropper cannot obtain corresponding relationship between identity and topological location information of mobile node. Therefore, the mobile node’s location privacy is well protected.

### Table 2 Protocol security comparison.

| Security Metric                  | ours | CPK-F | IWAA | SSP | SEP |
|----------------------------------|------|-------|------|-----|-----|
| user anonymity                   | Y    | N     | Y    | Y   | N   |
| mutual authentication            | Y    | Y     | Y    | Y   | Y   |
| anti-replay                      | Y    | Y     | Y    | Y   | Y   |
| key negotiation fairness         | Y    | N     | N    | Y   | Y   |
| proof of platform identity       | Y    | Y     | N    | N   | N   |
| platform integrity verification  | Y    | Y     | N    | N   | N   |

### Table 3 Protocol performance comparison.

| Performance Metric               | ours | CPK-F | IWAA | SSP | SEP |
|----------------------------------|------|-------|------|-----|-----|
| hash operation times             | 1    | 1     | 1    | 2   | 2   |
| exponential operation times      | 0    | 0     | 2    | 3   | 0   |
| symmetric encryption times       | 4    | 0     | 2    | 4   | 7   |
| symmetric decryption times       | 4    | 0     | 1    | 3   | 7   |
| public key encryption times      | 1    | 3     | 0    | 0   | 0   |
| public key decryption times      | 0    | 3     | 0    | 0   | 0   |

5) Platform identity credibility and platform integrity

\( PCR \) sent to \( AC_F \) by MN is signed using A\( \)K private key. When \( AC_F \) verifies, it use A\( \)K public key in \( Ticket_{MN} \) to decrypt. MN’s A\( \)K private key is only owned by MN platform, and others have no way to get. Thus the identity of MN platform is verified.

After \( AC_F \) gets \( PCR \), it compares it to \( SML \) in \( Ticket_{MN} \). If they are equal, platform identity of MN can be guaranteed.

We compare our protocol with CPK-F in [4], IWAA in [5], SSP (Protocol based on Self-Certified) in [6], SEP (Protocol based on Self-Encryption) in [7] in security and performance. Please look at Table 2 to get the security comparing results.

4.2 Performance Analysis

The efficiency of the protocol is measured by the calculations performed in the protocol, including exponentiation operation, hash operation, symmetric encryption/decryption, public key encryption/decryption and so on.

Performance analysis and comparison of results are shown in Table 3.

During the authentication process, the CPU and TPM in the mobile terminal can do some encryption/decryption operation in parallel, which shortens the computation time and reduces the communication delay. A public key encryption process and a symmetric key encryption are done by the TPM, and the terminal does not consume the CPU computing performance. The execution speed of symmetric encryption is much faster than public key encryption/decryption and exponentiation operation.

The protocol interaction will not generate a great flow on the network. It just needs a message passed back and forth, reducing the network traffic. Fast authentication process does not require the AC in its home domain, reducing the burden of the home domain AC, and also shortening the authentication delay.
On the whole, the proposed inter-domain fast authentication protocol has a higher efficiency and better security.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed a trusted inter-domain fast authentication scheme for split mechanism networks. Compared with other fast authentication schemes, our scheme is more secure and more effective. It can realize the dual authentication of terminal and platform, anonymity and untraceability of user identification, anonymity and anti-replay of platform. It can realize fast authentication in a foreign domain using the ticket issued by the AC in its home domain while not requiring direct involvement of the home AC. It reduces the burden of the AC in its home domain and also shortens the authentication delay. The ticket proposed in this paper is not valid forever but has a term of validity. This involves life time setting and regeneration of the ticket, which is also the question that we must consider as a next step.

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