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A New Hegemonic Hope: Daemonic Agency in the Techno-Thriller Novels of Daniel Suarez

[...] myths still have power, Sergeant. Sobol knew that. His games are predicated upon them. Myths are the archetypes that recur again and again in the hopes and fears of mankind. They have a hold upon us. The entire concept of a daemon stems from the guardian spirits of Greek Mythology—spirits who watched over mankind to keep them out of trouble, and that’s become real enough (Suarez, 2010, p.99).

Much has been said about hegemony over the last sixty years. Considered from afar, it seems that Gramsci’s *Prison Writings* (1971) on the cultural nature of class dominance have informed a fairly heterogeneous group of perspectives in the practice of contemporary critical thought. Today, the task of finding some common ground between the classical orthodoxy observed in the way the concept of hegemony is applied in the field of political science, and the epistemological malleability that characterizes its study in cultural theory, is
indeed challenging. At the crux of the matter is a simple question: How does one regain the ability to think freely and determine one’s own fate?

At the end of a twentieth century still obsessed with the remnants of the cold war, answers converged, in the vast space between scholarly articles in *Foreign Affairs* and Tom Clancy novels, towards the concept of the nation-state and its personification in powerful institutions like the US government, the CIA, the mafia and multinational corporations. The idea was to understand how these instances confine human thought and imagination to patterns of political passivity and personal self-alienation. While these tropes are still prevalent in the twenty-first century cultural landscape, the figuration of hegemony has gone through a clear shift toward what we can identify, given the epistemological underpinnings that I wish to explore in this article, as the field of technology. Nowhere is this more clearly depicted than in science fiction, a genre that has consistently dealt with the technological mindset’s efficient colonization of the virtual spaces that impose their dominance over both critical thought and personal self-expression.

While the connection between human thought and the mythological scaffolding of western civilization was recognized as an extremely potent subject of inquiry in the first half of the twentieth century, the legacy of this kind of epistemological questioning is too often reduced, today, either to nostalgic readings of texts like Campbell’s *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (2008) and the archetypal theories of C.G. Jung (1981), or solemn overviews of those ‘themes’ that have had the proverbial ‘influence on human creation’. In this essay, I will discuss how two recent science-fiction novels by American author Daniel Suarez, breaking with this folklorising trend, reinvest ancient mystical ideas about the spirit of human intelligence by connecting them to the technological conceptualization of artificial intelligence.
Long considered a somewhat plastic material waiting to be poured into the required ideological mould, technology has slowly acquired the status of a conceptual protagonist in western culture. This cultural process has, in a sense, come into its own in the twenty-first century techno-thriller, a sci-fi subgenre of which Suarez’s *Daemon* (2009) and *Freedom* (2010) are two early standout narratives. While it occasionally indulges in the elaborate fight scenes and formatted romantic intrigues associated with Hollywood blockbusters, Suarez’s writing remains deeply concerned with the impetus that drives human thought and action on a personal and collective level. In his novels, this concern materializes in the uncanny and complex figure of the daemon, a mysterious form of artificial intelligence that sets up a virtual network programmed to wreak havoc over the western military-industrial complex after the death of its creator, online video game engineer, and Bill-Gates-esque mastermind, Matthew Sobol. As its title suggests, *Daemon* establishes a connection between this virtual protagonist and the classical intermediate divinity whose figurative presence had been considered a threat to the great empires of Western civilization, even before Augustine’s theological attacks on pagan daemons in the wake of the sack of Rome in the fifth century. Like Augustine’s depiction of pagan demonology in *City of God* (2003), Suarez’s Daemon personifies what we might call a “virtual impetus of forced movement”, what the Stoics called *hegemonikon*, a term generally translated in English as the ‘directing principle’ (Epictetus, 1994). Separated by more than sixteen centuries, both Augustine’s famous tale of two cities and Suarez’s contemporary techno-thrillers present the Daemon as an agent of mutation threatening both the belief in an immutable state of things and the stable institutional mediation of this belief. Yet Suarez’s daemon network can hardly be considered a monotheistic institution. It is, more accurately, an extended
and idealized avatar of the typical decentralized grass-roots organization working to establish various commercial and social practices taken right out of *The Shock Doctrine* (Klein, 2008), or any other of the anti-globalization movement’s standard operating manuals for fighting corporations like Monsanto and Blackwater.

**The Daemon as a spiritual impetus towards necessary change**

Through the character of Pete Sebeck, the detective (and computer neophyte) who is the first to investigate the Daemon’s carnage and the unlikely hero chosen by Matthew Sobol to “justify the freedom of humanity” (Suarez, 2010, p.47), the reader is eventually made privy to the Daemon’s sole objective: provide humanity with the leverage needed to undermine the monolithic path ploughed out by those who have a vested interest in the establishment and preservation of global capitalism. Sobol, who reveals himself to Sebeck in a mysterious virtual dimension is here the bearer of a spiritual message not unlike the one Augustine felt called upon to carve out through the metaphor of the olive press, symbolizing the process of cultural purification required to properly direct human activity after the fall of Greco-Roman civilization. For Sobol, the technological force harnessed by the daemonic network must be used as a new kind of olive press, one that violently compels humans to redefine the way they deal with the perpetually displaced energy that drives existence, a process that he calls necessary change:

There are those who resist necessary change. Even now they think only of protecting their investments. I am at war with them. A war that you’ll never see on the evening news. And to my mind, the outcome of this war will decide whether civilization flourishes—or collapses into a thousand-year dark age.
Perhaps even with the eclipse of the human race as the dominant species on this planet (Suarez, 2009, p.426).

A key characteristic of this configuration is how it personifies the technological apparatus in a trope that is in solid lineage with the classic daemonic figure sketched out by the Neo-Platonist Apuleius. In *De Deo Socratis* (traditionally translated as ‘The God of Socrates’) the ‘daemon’ is presented as an intimate counsellor that accompanies thinkers in the process of reflection (Apuleius, 1993). As is the case for Suarez’s virtual fiend, the subject of Apuleius’ treatise poses a challenge to readers accustomed to the modern triangular constellation of a wilful thinking subject connecting to an object of knowledge through the mediation of secular understanding. Indeed, both daemons personify a force that is difficult to locate, since it essentially rests in a space in between (*in media res*) the terrestrial thinking subject and the immutable plane of a fixed idea. The presence of this mediating force that directs human reflection has long been considered a threat to the idea of a modern subject aware of his immanent position and the limits of his knowledge. More often than not, this force has been represented as the kind of metaphysical spirit whose exact nature became the topic, beginning in the 19th century, of a plethora of speculative investigations inspired by Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1979). What distinguishes Suarez’s narrative is the way it uses the conceptual possibilities offered by recent technological advances to question the precise metaphysical status of this spirit. In this respect, *Daemon* continues a line of questioning whose origins trace back to Apuleius’ second century treatise. In the following excerpt, we can appreciate the matter-of-factness with which Apuleius describes the Daemon as what modern contemporary epistemologists, rhetoricians and literary theorists alike would call a figure of thought:
You may call this daemon in our tongue, according to my interpretation, a Genius, I know not whether rightly, but certainly at my peril; because this God (or daemon), who is the mind of every one, though it is immortal, nevertheless, is after a certain manner generated with man (Apuleius, 1993, part 15).

Heidegger’s conception of a technological push forward

Although the concept of the figure of thought has only recently become the subject of ostensible epistemological investigation, the kind of questioning it actualizes stems from a tradition that finds a particularly polemical development in the writings of Martin Heidegger. In *What is Called Thinking?* (2004), for instance, Heidegger focuses his investigation on the ‘calling’ that excites human thought into existence. Unlike what we find in the texts of Apuleius and Suarez, Heidegger’s conception of human thought sees it as something that endures in a place he calls the ‘clearing of pure being’.

It is my belief that in understanding the precise nature of this clearing and the way it organizes the human being’s relationship to the mobile flow of thought, we can grasp the problem posed by Heidegger’s conception of the technological mindset. We can thus fully appreciate the new possibilities offered by the study of the daemon as a hegemonic figure of thought in contemporary science fiction, and beyond. In discussing the ontology of human thought in his post-war essays, Heidegger is led to define a crucial misunderstanding regarding what he calls the essence of technology. To those who believe that technology is an instrument meant to serve the conscious will of a modern subject in control of the consequences of actions that have been rationally planned out, he offers the following: “the essence of technology stems from the presence of what is present, that is, from the Being of beings—something of which man can never be the master, of which he can at best be the servant” (Heidegger, 1977, p.235). If man can at best be a servant to the
presence inscribed in the essence of technology, it is because this essence is located in a space foreign to human subjectivity. Heidegger details this idea by deferring to Plato: “An interpretation decisive for Western thought is that given by Plato. He says that between beings and Being there prevails the χωρισμός; ή χώρα is the locus, the site, the place. Plato means to say: beings and Being are in different places” (ibid., p.227). To Heidegger, any serious attempt at understanding how humans make their decisions and direct their action will inevitably need to tackle how finite human subjectivities interact with a realm of spiritual being that conceals itself from modern consciousness.

This kind of question is similar to the one raised by Suarez in Daemon and its sequel, Freedom (2010); similar, but not identical. In a world dominated by globalized corporate and military interests, the effective action of an individual human consciousness is an idea that is growing more folkloric by the day. What happens in actuality seems to be programmed by forces that exceed what can be imagined or rationalized by an average citizen. In the Suarez novels, Matthew Sobol firmly believes that citizens, on both individual and collective levels, lack the will and insight required to enact effective change and create the possibility of true personal freedom. This is where the revolutionary possibilities of twenty-first century technology (virtual modelling, web 2.0, social networks, video games, etc.) become manifest. The virtual agent developed by Sobol gains its power through its ability to motivate a large group of disenfranchised humans—people victimized by the arbitrary fluctuations of free market capitalism—to use their creativity to craft a fairer society. But what is the precise sense of ‘motivation’ here? Is it the power to guide people to a specific path? Is it the ability to seduce people into relinquishing their free will and individual judgment in the interest of a higher end? Is it the ability to devise a plan whose transcendent rationality will naturally move humanity
forward? In *Daemon* and *Freedom*, the ground on which these questions rest is slowly dissolving. As Loki (a reference to the famous shape-shifter in Norse mythology), a powerful security operative chosen by the Daemon to lead the darknet infantry, explains to an NSA agent specialized in code decryption, “You don’t understand the Daemon. You keep thinking it’s something we obey like automatons. But that’s not it at all. The Daemon’s darknet is just a reflection of the people in it. It’s a new social order. One that’s immune to bullshit” (Suarez, 2010, p.34). On a basic level, Suarez sketches a fairly innovative vision of technology as a hegemonic force that transcends any pre-determined, computerized (as we are used to saying) plan.

The Daemonic Hegemon, a figure of ethereal intelligence

Despite its ability to enact unthinkable levels of carnage and material destruction, the Daemon has no subjective presence. Like the Daemon presented in Apuleius’ treatise, it is a silent force that directs human reflection. But how does this directing principle work? What is the nature of its process? This is where things get interesting, where the figure of a *daemonic hegemon* comes into conflict with Heidegger’s pervasive ideas regarding the essence of technology and the way it informs pure thought. The first thing to note, in this respect, is Heidegger’s statement that “there is no demonry [sic] of technology” (1977 p.28). We might say that Suarez’s entire narrative enterprise is a direct strike against this intriguing assertion. Although Heidegger remains elusive on what he means by this statement, the logic of his essay suggests that technology, if properly understood in its essence, provides a pure and unobstructed model for accessing the locus of pure thought—the clearing—first identified by Plato. Obviously, the games and trickery associated with the
cultural representation of daemonic avatars in Western culture have no place in this process. Is technology—or, more accurately, the mindset it puts in place—a rational end zone, a prophetic homeland that humans should strive to reach? With Heidegger, things are never that simple. In *The Question Concerning Technology* (1977), he reminds us that Greek *telos*, all too often translated as ‘aim’ or ‘purpose’, in his view expresses the specific freedom provided by circumscription. “Circumscription gives bounds to the thing. With the bounds the thing does not stop; rather from out of them it begins to be what, after production, it will be” (1977, p.8). In doing this, he anticipates a common criticism addressed to opponents of technological development: the question is not whether technology forces humans into a fascist ordering of nature, whether it imposes arbitrary and short-sighted dehumanizing aims, but rather how these aims are set up and how much freedom they provide the human mind to imagine the future. People react to boundaries, and action is inconceivable without some kind of interaction between the mind and its binding material environment which, for Heidegger and the generations of thinkers who have followed his path, is formed by the words and figures that eventually harden to constitute the stable and immutable tools and objectives of conceptual thought. His main interest in technology rests in the way it affects the boundaries—the *telos*—of human thought, the point being that technology sets up a very specific kind of boundary, i.e. a very specific way of pushing human thought forward. This pushing forward, *veranlassen*, is translated in English editions as “to start something on its way” (Heidegger, 1977, p.9 footnote). The expression is but one of the many formulas Heidegger uses to plot out the problem of causation. As he often explains regarding the effects of a questioning that starts things on their way, causation can be
thought of as a path, a rudimentary roadway which provides reflection with proper bounds and yet whose final destination is concealed.

According to Heidegger, the reason why it is so difficult for humans to control their own destiny is that modern culture has progressively lost its ability to understand its essence outside the technological mode of pushing forward that he calls ‘enframing’ (ge-stell). This enframing, a key concept in Heidegger’s late thought, can in many respects be assimilated to today’s engineering mindset, characteristic of a society that, in defining technology as an end in itself (and thus establishing the erroneous modern understanding of the word telos), has lost interest in any deep mode of creative cultural experimentation. This is an engineering mindset, perhaps even what Kunda calls an “epistemological engineering worldview” (2006), that has slowly imposed itself as a directing principle to those Google or Facebook systems engineers for whom ideas, identities and opinions are first and foremost flat forms of data that need to be monitored and mediated in order to preserve an effective flowing of information. The question of what is to be done with this information is increasingly anachronistic, insofar as the creative investment of information is immediately considered a more or less imaginary and subjective treatment of organic material. In this mindset, it is quite easy to argue that the Facebook page, rather than imposing itself as a hegemonic interface that sets severe limits on the moulding of personal selfhood, is simply an instrument made available to reveal personalities and motivations whose essences, like any so-called objective data, lie outside the reach of human culture and knowledge. In the Ge-stell mindset, the boundaries of human thought are cold and unwavering, much like the rigid apparatuses of commercial software programs, thus leaving modern individuals with the heavy burden of deciding where to exercise their free will. In rekindling the richness of Aristotelian
causation, Heidegger directs our attention towards what he considered the natural life paths that exist, in the realm of speculative thought, as ‘artistic potentiality’ rather than concrete objectified data. This artistic, or, better yet, figurative way of thinking is in deep contrast with the modern *weltbild*, the enigmatic German expression aptly translated in English as the “world picture” (Heidegger, 1977). If we read Heidegger’s essays carefully, we will see a clear connection between the subject that ‘pictures’ a world around his solemn presence and the enframed push, divested from the cultural processes that stir personal or collective desire, that must now be understood as those ever-increasing levels of efficiency in revealing a mysterious will heretofore hidden in the brush of natural ignorance. If the world is going anywhere, it is in the direction of decreasing the time and space separating individuals from a personal goal (*telos*) whose unconcealment is more or less a moot point. This explains why personal desire has become such an inconsequential issue in the twenty-first century. And so, once again, we are led back to the question of existential impetus, to the question of how human life is directed, albeit in awkward fashion.

**Radically effective** action determined by what is naturally there, in *standing reserve*

The expression that Heidegger uses to define the direction imposed by technology, its own specific starting things on their way, is *standing-reserve*. Standing reserve is what characterizes the enframing of modern science. The human mind colonized by the enframed mindset is called upon to think of nature as something whose coherence and logical meaning are already decided. Nature becomes something that the human mind simply needs to
passively craft (in the sense of ‘giving a form to the thing’) and reveal. In other words, although it can be arranged in a variety of aspects, nature proceeds from an immutable ‘standing’ code ready to serve the whims of the creative programmer. In the directing process specific to modern technology, Heidegger would argue that the concept of causation is confined to the systems engineer’s revealing of the standing-reserve of nature, a great loss considering the richness of Aristotle’s traditional fourfold theory of causation. Throughout the late writings on science and technology, the point that comes across is that nature has lost its power to inspire, and thus cause, in the sense of the archaic *causa formalis*, groundbreaking forms of creation. Within the purview outlined by modern technology, the only possible mode of causation is the *causa efficiens*, which stands for a causing that is responsible for a specifically designed effect and thus the ultimate characteristic of a human subject totally knowledgeable of the needs of his species, the range of his tools, and the effects of his acts. This modern causing is something that twenty-first century consumers understand quite well. For the vast majority of people involved in creating the stuff of contemporary existence, for most pop musicians, architects and creators of fast-food menus alike, real or true creation is widely understood as an efficient activity measured by how effective a human agent’s acts are in reaching a planned effect.

How language and discourse act through the movement of their figurative constructions

This comes through, for instance, in Louis Althusser’s use of the word *efficace*, the French adjective for what is efficient, to express the impetus of historical/political movement, or what critical theorists now call cultural
agency. Although Heidegger and Althusser both share an interest in how the inherent movement (or agency) of human thought is determined by its material conditions, the latter’s late writings question this agency from a grossly materialistic perspective that appears almost offensive in regard to the pristine quality of Heidegger’s exposition of ontological Being. These writings detail what Althusser identified as the figurative nature of ideological constructs. In analyzing the hegemonic force behind Machiavelli’s *Prince*, for instance (Althusser, 2010), they emphasize the literary quality that enables Machiavelli’s sketching of Cesare Borgia to transcend the realm of history and personal biography and affect readers in their deepest intimacy. The Prince is much more than a human leader: his presence unleashes an affective movement whose effect is similar to that of any well-wrought narrative. This presence is what Machiavelli calls the Prince’s *virtù*, a notion that has consistently baffled attempts at formal definition. Rather than seeing the protagonist as an immanent other limited by constraints similar to their own, readers are swept up by a rhetorical force that seduces them into carving their own actions out from the figure’s inspired direction. This figurative force comes through in the presentation of both the Prince’s actions and personae, and it is through this enigmatic sense of *virtù* that the Prince can be said to offer a provisional answer to the question: ‘where are we going?’ Figurative force is an issue that remains extremely potent in contemporary discussions on the politics of culture. When the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, for instance, reflects in his prison writings on what can be done to counteract the authority of Capitalism’s hegemonic worldview, he mentions the need for progressive political parties to adopt the form of a “modern prince” (1971).
Heidegger’s *poiesis*: art seen as the technological unconcealment of truth

These considerations seem to be in line with Heidegger’s conception of a human thought called towards unconcealment by pure Being, insofar as they both seem to emphasize the figurative character of the agency that pushes human thought forward. But this is only true if we equate Althusser’s concept of figuration with Heidegger’s reading of the traditional platonic concept of *poiesis*, which would be a mistake. For Heidegger, *poiesis* represents a ‘saving power’ that humans can access once they have understood the essence of technology. If we follow his complex thought process through and through, we will end up with the assertion that the true essence of technology resides in *poiesis* as the coming into presence of art. To those who have the common reaction of relating *poiesis* to the Humanist concept of poetry, the notion that technology will in some sense save humanity through a kind of artistic process may sound like a violent proposition, reminiscent of the fascist dehumanization that swept over most of Europe in the 1930s, and to which Heidegger himself succumbed for a brief period in 1933. And yet there remains something pervasive in the way he uses his understanding of the essence of technology to redefine the critical mission of art:

> Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other hand, fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art (Heidegger, 1977, p.35).

In the few glib comments on art at the end of the essay on technology, Heidegger insists on the questioning that is the crucial element in its coming to presence. When artistic thought falls into a decadent aesthetic-mindedness, when it becomes obsessed with its own fictitious historicity and self-
importance, it loses its ability to move forward towards the free clearing. Questioning “builds a way” (p.3), and that is precisely what art is called upon to do in Heideggerian thought: build a way towards that place of primordial ‘presencing’ introduced by Plato in the *Symposium*, and what Heidegger describes as the clearing of pure being.

Towards a new paradigm of “figurative agency” in which to imagine and conceptualise the “pushing forward” of human thought

At this point, it is time to come back to Suarez’s writing. Does he not share in Heidegger’s vision of a technological impetus that moves civilization forward, beyond the dead-end world controlled by those hegemons who would confine humans to live and think within a forcefully determined standing-reserve of nature serving their vested interests? Isn’t this how we can interpret Suarez’s decision to write a novel that displays the groundbreaking power of technology? The answer to these questions lies with the daemon’s epistemological status and the way it redefines the human relationship with technology. In both novels, the peculiar nature of the daemon is a constant subject of enquiry. Neither a personified subject, nor a computerized operating system, the daemon is a mysterious form of intelligence—artificial only in the ancient Greek sense—whose sole purpose, it seems, is to force human beings into dealing with the crisis of their own purpose and effective agency in the world. As such, it is a figurative agent, closer to a queer admixture of Apuleius’ daemonic interlocutor, the Stoics’ *Hegemonikon*, and Machiavelli’s *Prince* than to any pure ontological Being.

Throughout Heidegger’s writing, there is a sense that the calling of pure Being and the human response to this call is utterly sacred and proceeds from
an autotelic form of agency inspired by the immutable Christian God. In Heidegger’s vision, the caller of human thought is a solemn spirit. To hear the calling, one must abide by the rules of classical scholarship, adopt an intricate phenomenological method of questioning, and follow a specific kind of path moulded on what Heidegger considers art’s pious mode of revelation in ancient Greek culture: “It was pious, promos, i.e. yielding to the holding-sway and the safekeeping of truth” (Heidegger, 1977, p.34). The path is a very powerful metaphor in Heidegger’s writing. Despite the confusion he creates by claiming again and again that they lead nowhere, the paths he ploughs out in his post-war essays are tirelessly directed toward an alleviation of the tension between those divine and human destinings inherent to modern existence. Indeed, there is no denying that they seek final repose in a singular and immaterial place that holds sway.

The question of this holding sway is at the centre of the crisis depicted by Suarez in his two techno-thrillers. To those who ask: ‘where are we going?’, the conservative forces that control the global economy in Daemon’s and Freedom’s fictitious early twenty-first century simply answer: ‘to where everything is accomplished, to that place where you can finally enjoy what is really there, as long as you abide by the laws and pay the market value’. The presupposition here, of course, is twofold: people know what they want, and this want is for their wanting to end, as quickly as possible. As a genre, science fiction was quick to point out, much like Heidegger, the endemic problem with this kind of worldview, quick to highlight both the lack of a clearly recognized human drive beyond the death-driven sexual impulse, and the absence of a universally shared and satisfying goal. Unlike the Heideggerian post-war essays, however, the writings of Asimov, Clarke, Dick et al. (and now Suarez) provide both an artistic treatment free of hermetic scholastic idealizations, and
a concrete figurative depiction of the confrontation between the technological and humanist economies of meaning. In many respects, science fiction is the best example of how literary reflection is clearly distinguished from a philosophical method that refuses to seriously consider the influence of figurative constructions, especially those figures that enable what Terry Cochran calls “literary thought experiments” (2008), on human action.

When Julianna Frink, that character in Philip K. Dick’s *The Man in the High Castle* (1992) whose relationship with the world is defined by the hexagrams of the *I Ching*, finally confronts the author of the alternate history narrative that sketches out a world that is the reversal of the one she inhabits, she is called a “daemon, a little chthonic spirit that...roams tirelessly over the face of the earth” (Dick, 1992, p. 258). Although he tackled many of the same issues as Heidegger, Dick’s narrative treatment emphasizes the influence of deeply profane cultural crafting on the establishment of the agents that direct human desire. In his stories, it is the spirit emanating from ersatz robotic animals, B-movie actors and cheap jewellery that leads humans on their way.

Suarez’s writing is in the same spirit as Dick’s best work. It poses the question of cultural hegemony from a perspective that refuses the safe reification of mythological forces inspired by the theories of Jung and Campbell. His Daemon starts out where Julianna Frink left off. Instead of personally roaming over the face of the earth as a private individual to shake things up, it destroys the consolidated space in which the creative powers of most humans have been confined. In doing so, it creates the possibility for a new kind of path, one whose push forward is fuelled by the mysterious intertwining of human curiosity and the virtual tools of the twenty-first century.
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