REGIONAL STABILITY: BRAZIL AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN DEFENSE COUNCIL

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Introduction

South America, according to the United Nations Statistics Division (UN 2017), is composed of twelve countries and five territories. Thus, the independent countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. The territories of other countries in the subcontinent are: South Georgia, South Sandwich and the Falkland Islands, from the United Kingdom; French Guiana, from France; and Bouvet Island, from Norway. It appears that there are two European powers on the subcontinent, implying the importance of thinking about Defense in South America: France, in its overseas department (France 2017), being the 8th defense budget worldwide in 2016 (IISS 2017) and the 5th largest war power in the world (GFP 2017); and England, which owns overseas territories surrounding South America, of which the Falkland Islands stand out, contested by Argentina (UK 2012), being the 5th largest defense budget in the world in 2016 (IISS 2017) and the 6th greatest war power in the world (GFP 2017).

Although there were no wars in South America in the last century and it does not present a current scenario of conflicts, such as those that occurred in the Middle East (Medeiros Filho 2010), it can be said that, politically, the region is not absolutely stable. An example of this is the diagnosis made by Cepik (2005), who identified, just over a decade ago, three crisis risks around the security issue: between Colombia and Venezuela; between Bolivia and Ecuador; and in Brazil itself. Also, Medeiros Filho (2010), approximately seven years ago, also identified three regions with threats of territorial conflicts, which he called an arc of instability: the border between Chile, Peru

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and Bolivia; the border between Colombia and Venezuela; and the border between Venezuela and Guyana.

Proof of this regional instability, although in a different location from those identified above, was the recent Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Falkland or Malvinas Islands, the name depends on whoever claims it, involving economic, diplomatic, property, law of the sea, among others (Carvalho 2016). Venezuela, in accordance with diagnoses made after the death of Hugo Chávez in 2013, has been showing political instability with military support. Since 2016, the current president, Nicolás Maduro, has found it difficult to remain in power, with constant confrontations of the population against official forces (BBC 2017). The crisis intensified in 2017, with signs that the regime had become dictatorial and based on military support. However, opposition to the government, accused of disrespect for human rights, with allegations of torture and property invasions, has generated popular uprisings, and even military ones, such as the one broadcasted in the media on August 6, 2017, in Fort Paramacay (Melo 2017). At the end of 2018 and beginning of 2019, the crisis escalated, including demonstrations made by the Americans, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN), affirming that the government of Nicolás Maduro was illegitimate (G1 2019).

It must be understood that the referred crisis escalated in such a way that Donald Trump, president of the United States of America (USA), affirmed that “Venezuela is a disaster, it is a very dangerous disaster and a very sad situation”. Trump even recalled the economic embargo on Venezuelan oil exports, until then the third largest supplier to the United States, and said that the military option exists to defend American interests (Uol 2017), although none US military operation for the region was confirmed., according to Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon (Fox 2017).

In this context, one must be remembered of a regional institution, the South American Defense Council (SADC). Among the general objectives of this council of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), originally formed by the twelve countries of South America, is “consolidating South America as a zone of peace, the basis for democratic stability and integral development of our peoples and as a contribution to world peace.” (letter a, of Art. 4, of the SADC Statute, UNASUR 2008).

Due to the fact that Brazil is indicated as one of the possible protagonists in the region, having objectives and interests to be defended along with the SADC (ABDUL-HAK, 2013), the present work aims to: first, confirm, in military terms, the condition of Brazil as an important player in the region; and then analyze its possible contribution to the SADC in favor of South American stability. The relevance of this study is based on the fact
that there are those who argue that Brazil, although representing the main guarantor of the creation of the SADC, lacks in performance coherence, frequently presenting itself in a diachronic manner (Fuccile and Rezende 2013, 92). In addition to that is the fact that the Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff is studying the relevance and strategy to be adopted in relation to sending military personnel to missions at the SADC, as explained by General Elias, Deputy Chief of American Organizations, from the Head of Strategic Affairs, of the Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a Lecture on EMCFA at the Brazilian Army Command and General Staff School (ECEME), on August 11, 2017 (Martins Filho 2017).

Methodologically, this article employs a dialectical approach, as it allows, mainly, the interpretation of reality in a dynamic and procedural way, besides considering the facts in a constant flow of transformation (Demo 1985). The research can be classified as documental and bibliographic, by the exploratory research in documents and official websites of the analyzed countries (Gil 2002). In the methodology, among the Semantic Units that are the focus of the research stand out: regional stability; balance of military power in South America; Brazilian protagonism in South America; and South American Defense Council.

The organization of the article comprises 3 sections, in addition to the introduction and conclusion: in the second section, the SADC is studied, with an emphasis on regional stability; in the third section, the question of the Regional Defense Identity is analyzed, focusing on Civil-Military Relations; in the fourth section, a diagnosis of the regional Military Power is made, based on updated data from South American Armed Forces (FA).

The Council of South American Defense and regional stability

Great transformations have taken place in South America after the end of the Cold War, generating reforms and changes in public policies, including in the Defense Sector (Rodrigues 2013). Ambassador Tabajara (Oliveira 2017), during a Political Panel for the Brazilian Army Command and General Staff School delegation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the Strategic Studies Visit in 2007, listed three phases of the evolution of peace and war relations in South America, the first being marked by wars, such as the War of Paraguay, Chaco and Pacific. The second phase would be marked by collective attempts, during the 19th century, to establish peace through legal conferences, such as the Panama Congress, the two Lima congresses and the Washington Congress. The last phase, which began in the 20th
century, would be characterized, until today, by attempts, more effective than those of previous periods, such as the OAS, UNASUR, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) from 1941, the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty (TIAR), from 1947, and the SADC, from 2008 – the latter, typically for Defense. Abdul-Hak (2013) addresses the antecedents of cooperation in regional defense from the 1950s, commenting that the communist threat reduced the risk of interstate conflicts in South America, accentuating, however, geopolitical rivalries between military governments as it generated instability and hindered cooperation for a long time.

That is why D’Araujo (2010) states that “for the first time, in about two centuries of independent countries in the region, the issue of democracy was understood as the best formal condition for coexistence between countries and peoples” (p. 8). This expansion of democracy in South America is a consequence of the reduction of communist risk in the region, allowing the military governments to be replaced by civilians, and democracy and its themes to have more space on the political agendas of the South American countries. Despite this, many governments in the region have not yet reduced the military’s autonomy, generating so-called “reserve domains” in defense matters (Barany 2012, Huntington 1996, Rial 1996, Serra 2010, Velázquez 2008), risking regional stability due to the possibility of coups and the establishment of authoritarian regimes (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). At this point, Rodrigues (2013), although starting from the premise that there is a Latin American institutional pattern, points that there are differences between them, to the point of identifying three countries at risk of instability: Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. And, as already noted in the introduction, the Venezuelan crisis that started in 2016, and that continues until the present year of 2019, proves part of Rodrigues’ forecast.

The discussion of this article focuses on the operationalization of objectives contained in the SADC Statute (UNASUR, 2008). The SADC, created in 2008 as an organ belonging to UNASUR, had its creation led by Brazil, with Colombia’s opposition. This Colombian resistance deserves to be highlighted, as its acceptance was the result Brazilian efforts, marking its position as an articulator in the formation of a regional security subcomplex in South America (Rezende 2013, Buzan and Waever 2003). This cooperative environment emerged as a reaction to changes in the global geopolitical context: the emergence of new threats, the dynamics of the decline of American unipolarity, the growth of terrorism after 2001, among others. Thus, the SADC has been an important forum for discussion that has marked advances in regional defense, facilitating the formation of a regional security subcomplex. Among these advances, Fuccile and Rezende (2013, p. 91) mention:
Thus, this work primarily focuses on a specific objective of the SADC, to analyze the region in order to identify risks and threats that may affect regional peace (letter b, Article 5). The second objective of the SADC addresses has a general feature and consists in the promotion of a South American regional defense identity (letter b, Art 4ff). It should be noted that the SADC has three negative consensus, that is, excluded from any initiative of the institution: the SADC is not a collective security body; the SADC does not address security issues; and the SADC does not identify common opponents. In order to comply with the two objectives presented and the others foreseen, in compliance with the aforementioned imposed exclusions, the Center for Strategic Defense Studies (CEED) was created, linked to the SADC, to: identify the threats and risks to the region; foster a shared vision on Defense and Security; and to develop common conceptual approaches that allow the articulation of regional security and defense forces (UNASUR, 2010).

Another initiative that deserves appreciation was the creation of the South American Defense School (ESD) in 2015, in Ecuador. The objective of this school is to contribute to the materialization of the SADC’s objectives, having to coordinate its actions with CEED and national schools (UNASUR, 2015).

Therefore, it is clear that the main mechanisms of the SADC that prepare the region to face threats to regional peace are CEED and ESD. In this sense, these institutions must, among other duties, also promote the formation of a South American defense identity.

**Promotion of a South American Defense Identity**

The promotion of a regional South American Defense identity can be analyzed from different perspectives, however, for the purposes of this work, the lens of civil-military relations is chosen. One must first understand what these concepts consist of.

Regional defense identity is the result of the evolution of a broader concept, that of “security community”, which refers to a region whose member States would have the political will not to fight each other, cooperating in security matters in order to guarantee peace (Deutsch 1966). Thus, there were,
basically, two types of communities: those that only consider the relationship between its members (cooperating “inwardly”) and those that also understand the relationship with third parties (deterring “outwardly”) (Medeiros Filho 2017). In this sense, it appears that when establishing their common security interests, each security community adopts its own personality, a regional defense identity.

The civil-military relationship, on the other hand, is an essential concept when studying the construction of modern states and talking about Strategic Studies. In a Weberian view, it can be explained that the State has a legitimate monopoly on the use of force in its territory, with such truth being valid for various types of competing political organizations: feuds, cities, republics, kingdoms, clans and other types. In this line of thought, the rationalization of this use of force and the specialization of public functions, including the military, combined with the concentration of power and wealth, guarantees that in the clash between competing political organizations, the one that has the greatest rationalization and the greatest concentration of resources will most likely reach victory (Tilly 1990). From the specialization of the essentially military public service emerged the study of the civil-military relationship, having a diverse field of study, including areas such as: the relationship between the Armed Forces, society and the State; defense and security in an international and regional perspective; coups d’état; democratic consolidation; Armed Forces and diplomacy; among others (Costa 2014). In this path, since Clausewitz (1984), and more recently (Huntington 2016), the civil-military relationship is understood, in very tight synthesis, as the objective civil control of political power over military power.

As this work presents regional stability as one of its focuses, it must be understood that the objective civilian control elevates society’s military security to the maximum, providing balance to the system and that military security aims to respond to external threats. However, the civil-military relationship, if understood in the context of a National Security Policy, which focuses not only on military security, but also on internal security - against internal threats (subversion), and on situational security - against the risk of erosion of the system itself (Huntington 2016), there should be other concerns. In this sense, it can be understood that talking about civil-military relations, while speaking only in defense against external threats, when thinking about the South American region, one must, necessarily, also consider the effects of the erosion of a country, or a subversion, over the entire region in which it operates.

When speaking of civil-military relations one is also speaking of control. Clausewitz (1984) already stated that military power must be
subordinated to political power. This subordination relationship, commonly named civil-military relationship, comprises the traditional discussion around civil control to be exercised by two basic mechanisms that must be internalized: institutions and the supervision of military actions by the civil leadership. This concern occurs because “any armed force strong enough to defend a country is also strong enough to overthrow a government, possibly with a coup.” (Bruneau 2016, 434).

However, this discussion around control is not enough and Bruneau (2016) proposes a model of analysis with a focus on public spending, involving, in addition to the control of Military Power, the measurement of effectiveness as a capacity to be demanded by political power, on the expenditure execution. In this way, the author defines effectiveness as “the ability to execute policies and obtain the expected results”, distinguishing it from efficiency, which would be the “ability to carry out the assigned tasks and missions at an optimal cost.” (437).

Regarding effectiveness, Bruneau (2016) proposes three basic requirements for the Armed Forces to fulfill their missions, whether it be for external defense, homeland security or peace and humanitarian aid missions, for example: i) there must be a plan that can be called doctrine or strategy; ii) there must be structures and processes to formulate plans and execute them; and iii) there must be a commitment of resources, financial and personnel, to ensure the implementation of the plan.

Thus, in order to obtain a South American defense identity based on the civil-military relationship, as a capacity for control and effectiveness, this discussion is based on two basic assumptions set out as follows. The first assumption considers that the place and function of military institutions in society are determining factors for the stability of the State (Vieira 2004). This relationship was verified by Bruneau (2016) in the Portuguese case, as he found that not only the Portuguese military, but also civilians are directly influenced by internal political stability and by external actors, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union. Regarding institutionalization, he identified the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the joint military professional training as essential elements for the effectiveness of the Portuguese Armed Forces’ actions, even in the midst of the economic crisis experienced by Portugal. Rodrigues (2013), in the same sense, relates the risk of military intervention in a country to several factors: the level of professionalism in the AF, the military ideology, the strength of political institutions, the protection of one’s interests by the military, the weakness of civil governments, and the country’s political culture.

The second assumption is that public opinion is extremely relevant to
this civil-military relationship (Ramos 2012). In this sense, Rodrigues (2013) and D’Araujo (2010) argue that the use of the AF to maintain internal order, as has occurred in Brazil and the Andean countries of South America, would be a risk of domestic intervention, due to the construction of a military ideology that protects society and the construction of public opinion that views the AF as the salvation for the weakness of civil governments. Likewise, returning to the question of the effectiveness of military spending, currently, the concept of governance has linked this mechanism not only to political power, at the institutional level, but also to society itself, acting directly on public bodies (Brasil 2014, Nardes et al 2014).

For the reasons that have been exposed, the analysis will consist of an appreciation of the following factors, in order to verify the risk of misuse of the Armed Forces by the political power of the studied countries: level of control of the military over the civil power, depending on: the existence of control institutions, such as the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the existence of institutions of effectiveness in the field of military expenses; and public opinion research on political and military institutions in the countries of South America.

In addition to the factors indicated in Table 1, the existence of a normative provision, whether in the Constitution or in Law, is also considered a relevant factor, as the attribution of the AF to guarantee the constitutional order, stability, or, as it appears in Art. 142, of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, 1988: “they are intended to defend the country, to guarantee constitutional powers”. In addition to Brazil, according to the Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and the Caribbean (Donadio 2016), only three countries in South America have such normative predictions: Chile, Ecuador and Paraguay.

Thus, beforehand, it can be pointed out that Guyana and Suriname were not identified in the sources surveyed. In relation to civilian control, it is clear that only Peru and Venezuela have the possibility of active military personnel taking over the Ministry of Defense, a situation that undermines the characterization of civilian control, as it will be limited to the President of the Republic. Regarding effectiveness, the research was limited to verifying the existence of external control institutions, without considering internal controls, legal provision for systematizing control or its suitability for international standards. But, by making use of only this parameter, it can be said that of the twelve South American countries, ten present external control institutions - without being able to specify Guyana and Suriname, for not having been found, based on the sources used. Regarding the level of confidence in governments, only two countries exceeded 80%: Uruguay and
Ecuador. The worst country in confidence in the government was Venezuela, with 49.4%. Regarding the level of confidence in the Armed Forces, it can be said that in five countries acceptance exceeds 80%: Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Peru, in that order. Being the only one to exceed 90% Ecuador, presents 92% confidence. The country with the worst confidence in the AF was Venezuela, with 61%, and all the others were above 70%.

Table 1 – Data Comparison on Civil-Military Relations Between South American Countries

| Country            | Civil-Military Relations Institutionalization | Public Opinion – Confidence |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                    | Civil Control  | Efficiency                  | Government | Armed Forces |
| Argentina (ARG)    | MD⁴ e EMCFA    | Auditoria General de la     | 66,5       | 74,2         |
|                    |                | Nación Argentina             |            |              |
| Bolivia (BOL)      | MD⁴ e EMCFA    | Controladoría General del   | 78,2       | 74,2         |
|                    |                | Estado Plurinacional de      |            |              |
|                    |                | Bolivia                     |            |              |
| Brasil (BRZ)       | MD⁴ e EMCFA    | Tribunal de Contas da       | 56,5       | 84           |
|                    |                | União                       |            |              |
| Chile (CHL)        | MD⁴ e EMCFA    | Controladoría General de la | 77,7       | 86,3         |
|                    |                | República de Chile          |            |              |
| Colômbia (COL)     | MD⁴            | Controladoría General de la | 62,4       | 82,3         |
|                    |                | República de Colombia       |            |              |
| Equador (ECU)      | MD⁴            | Controladoría General del   | 81,5       | 92           |
|                    |                | Estado de la Republica del  |            |              |
|                    |                | Ecuador                     |            |              |
| Guiana (GUY)       | -              | -                           |            |              |
| Paraguai (PRY)     | MD⁴ e EMCFA    | Controladoría General de la | 76,7       | 76,6         |
|                    |                | Republica de Paraguay       |            |              |
| Peru (PER)         | MD e EMCFA     | Controladoría General de la | 58,6       | 81,4         |
|                    |                | Republica de Peru           |            |              |
| Suriname (SUR)     | -              | -                           |            |              |
| Uruguai (URY)      | MD⁴ e EMCFA    | Tribunal de Cuentas de la   | 82,9       | 79           |
|                    |                | Republica Oriental del      |            |              |
|                    |                | Uruguay                     |            |              |
| Venezuela (VEN)    | MD e EMCFA     | Controladoría General de la | 49,4       | 61           |
|                    |                | Republica Bolivariana de    |            |              |
|                    |                | Venezuela                   |            |              |

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Observations:
- Acronyms: MD – Ministry of Defense or similar; EMCFA – Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff or similar.

¹Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa em América Latina y caribe: ed 2016 (DONADIO, 2016)
²According to the list of members of the Latin American and Caribbean Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions. Available at: <http://www.olacefs.com/listado-de-miembros/>. Access on 19 Aug. 2017.
Therefore, it can be inferred, based on the current crisis in Venezuela, exposed in the introduction, that internal instabilities with support from the military can be better generated when the Ministry of Defense accepts the appointment of an active military, the Government does not enjoy confidence of the people, and the AFs are also unreliable. From the above, and considering that this work focuses only on military identity and not on government policy, implying the lack of confidence in the government for this partial conclusion, that the AFs of the following countries may have an identity that best contributes to the stability of South America: Brazil and Chile, as they are the only ones who: have MD and EMCFA; that to be Minister of Defense, the military must be from the reserve, giving priority to civilian control; have an external control institution, guaranteeing the effectiveness of the control; and confidence in AF is over 80%.

Military Power in South America

Hobbes (1974) identified three basic elements of power: the military, the economic and the ideological. These elements can be classified in two parts: the power of empire, temporal, focused on the security aspect, involving only the military power; and the power of dominance, focusing on supporting the first, whether with resources - economic power, or will and ideology - ideological power. In this way, “the limitation of power endangers the peace and security of the State, since the control and possibilities of manipulating resources are restricted. Therefore, one must maximize power, in order to guarantee greater autonomy to the exercise of politics. Here, then, is the proposal for the accumulation of multidimensional power ”. (Rochman 1999).

One of the theorists who methodized this assessment of power was Ray S. Cline (1994). Inspired by Realist authors, he grouped the existing criteria into five major factors, which are divided into concrete and intangible. The concrete factors are: critical mass, economic capacity and military capacity. Intangibles include: national will and national strategy. Cline’s Perceptible Power Theory is not being analyzed here and, therefore, the formula will not be presented, nor will each item be analyzed, paying attention only to the military capacity factor. Military capacity was treated from the conventional
point of view, that is, Army, Navy and Air Force, including strategic weapons, such as nuclear artifacts. Issues such as strategic scope and military effort were not included in military capacity, as they are part of the synergy with issues of geographic positioning and military expenditures. Over time it became clear that this concrete component had other intangible issues such as the training of troops, the effectiveness of armaments, the logistics infrastructure, among other issues that make the analysis very complex (Rochman 1999).

The attempt to quantify military power did not end with Cline - its formula was expanded by some and other formulas and methods were developed over time. Gen. Meira Mattos (1977), for example, added to Cline’s formula the ability to persuade intangible elements and, more contemporaneously, culture was included (Monteiro-Costa and Vlach 2007). The following are examples: the Organski-Kugler Index; the Elcano Index of Global Presence; and Castro’s Formula of International Power (Castro 2012, 179).

An analysis of the South American region, theoretically, deals with the formation of the balance of military power in South America, not with focus in deterrence between countries, but in a regional security complex (Buzan 1991). Along this path, the region should be classified, in an intermediate way, as a “security regime”, located between the intense African conflicts and the peace of Western Europe (Buzan and Waever 2003). Thus, the result presented in Table 2 was based on indicators from the following repositories: Global Fire Power (GFP 2017) and Military Balance of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS 2017).

From what is shown in Table 2 (next page), it can be seen that, although a regional power balance is difficult to ascertain, and here there is no presumption of quantifying with methods such as Cline’s or others, as previously indicated, there is sufficient data to make some comparison. The limitations of these comparisons are known because, as it can be seen, the defense budget values in the GFP and IISS are examples of divergence, putting the reliability of the comparisons at risk. However, because they are recognized bodies in this area and because the variation is small, possibly due to the compilation criteria used, they nonetheless become valid for the proposed objective.

It can be seen that Brazil, as listed by the GFP, really has a prominent position among the others, as it is the winner in terms of effective troops, air assets, artillery pieces, rocket launchers and defense budget. With the highlight that, adding all the troops from the other countries, Brazil continues to be the one with the largest number. There are, however, other countries with relative military capabilities, as they are among the 50 largest military powers
in the world, such as Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela and Chile. Also noteworthy are specific aspects such as Chile’s capacity in armored tanks, with the largest number in the region; Colombia’s largest naval capacity, although presenting the highest percentage in military spending, its effective amount is the 2nd in the region. Therefore, it can be inferred that Brazil really is a regional power in South America in military terms, being even able to face a coalition formed by other countries.

Table 2 – Military Power Comparison Between South American Countries

| Country       | Position in PwC Index | Total Military Manpower | Total Aerial Means | Armored Tanks | Artillery Pieces | Rocket Launchers | Total Naval Means | Defense Budget (mil US$) | International Training Activities | Defense Expenditure (% GDP) | Defense Expenditure (mil US$) | Active Armed Forces (thousand) | Estimated Reserve (thousand) |
|---------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Brasil        | 17º                   | 1,987,000               | 697                | 1,707         | 563             | 180              | 110               | 24,500,000            | 4                             | 23,545                        | 1,335,000                     | 1,340,000                     |                              |
| Argentina     | 35º                   | 127,720                 | 248                | 828           | 289             | 32               | 42                | 4,330,000             | 4                             | 5,181                         | 0,96                          | 74,000                        |                              |
| Peru          | 39º                   | 369,330                 | 267                | 890           | 243             | 80               | 60                | 2,560,000             | 4                             | 2,086                         | 1,16                          | 81,000                        | 188,000                      |
| Colômbia      | 40º                   | 511,550                 | 457                | 1,345         | 155             | 0                | 234               | 12,145,000            | 5                             | 8,953                         | 3,35                           | 293,000                       | 35,000                       |
| Venezuela     | 45º                   | 123,000                 | 280                | 700           | 104             | 52               | 50                | 4,000,000             | 0                             | 1,444                         | 0,43                          | 115,000                       | 8,000                        |
| Chile         | 47º                   | 137,850                 | 243                | 2346          | 0               | 8                | 69                | 5,483,000             | 6                             | 3,318                         | 1,41                          | 65,000                        | 40,000                       |
| Bolivia       | 61º                   | 81,900                  | 85                 | 137           | 86              | 0                | 173               | 315,000               | 0                             | 443                           | 1,24                          | 1,220                        | 1,310                        |
| Equador       | 70º                   | 158,500                 | 122                | 385           | 100             | 18               | 19                | 2,400,000             | 1                             | 1,565                         | 1,58                          | 40,000                        | 118,000                      |
| Uruguai       | 104º                  | 25,900                  | 50                 | 434           | 64              | 0                | 20                | 490,000               | 2                             | 494                           | 0,91                          | 25,000                        | -                            |
| Paraguai      | 105º                  | 183,200                 | 31                 | 63            | 50              | 0                | 40                | 145,000               | 2                             | 267                           | 0,98                          | 11,000                        | 165,000                      |
| Suriname      | 132º                  | 2,270                   | 3                  | 40            | 0               | 0                | 3                 | 67,410                | 1                             | 0                             | 0                             | 2                             | -                            |
| Guinea        | -                     | 0                       | 0                  | 0             | 0               | 0                | 0                 | 0                     | 0                             | 46                            | 1,34                          | 3,000                         | 1,000                        |
| **TOTAL**     |                       | 1,721,220               | 1,786              | 7,168         | 1,091           | 190              | 710               | 31,935,410            | 27                            | 23,797                        | 13                            | 710,220                       | 556,310                      |

Source: Elaborated by the author.

However, to be able to speak of a Brazilian protagonism, it must be understood that such political will must, first, be translated into national public policies. Defense public policies should be seen not only as government policies, but also as State policies, as they deal with Security and National Defense. In this context, they presuppose agreements between political parties and society, as well as between diplomacy and the military (Oliveira 2005). The original Brazilian project, in 2006, aimed at regional technological development in the Defense sector and the institutionalization of defense ministers’ meetings (Medeiros Filho 2010). In 2008, in the mission that Defense Minister Nelson Jobim called “military diplomacy”, he toured the neighboring countries...
defending the greater exchange of personnel, the holding of joint military exercises, the participation of joint peacekeeping missions and the integration of defense industrial bases (Jobim 2010). Both Jobim, in his period as Minister of Defense (2007-2011), and Celso Amorim (2011-2015), defended cooperation in the SADC as an “extra-regional deterrence factor”, aiming to defend the region’s countless natural resources, although not becoming a conventional military organ such as NATO, (Medeiros Filho 2017). As a result, the regional identity assumed by Brazil, in the period, remained in line with the identity sought by the SADC: cooperation “inwards” and deterrence “outwards”.

It should also be noted that at the time when the SADC was being negotiated and institutionalized, in the years 2007 and 2008, Brazil remained with considerable economic growth, being one of the BRICS. This situation of economic prosperity later changed, with a reduction in the Brazilian scenario. Likewise, Brazil’s cooperation agreements with countries in the region, which between 2002 and 2010 added up to twelve bilateral defense agreements, were not surpassed afterwards (Rezende 2013).

Final Remarks

South America is a region that, in the last two centuries, has sought to maintain regional peace and stability, not as a primary goal, but even as a consequence of internal political contexts, the countries were busy with domestic problems. Currently, there is an evolution in the attempts at cooperation, mainly in the military area, with emphasis on UNASUR, with its SADC.

The SADC has objectives to be achieved, of which the identification of risks and threats that may affect regional peace and the promotion of a regional South American Defense identity stands out. Thus, it appears that the Civil-Military Relationship itself has a great impact on regional stability, in which if not well developed, it could represent a risk to State sovereignty, as it increases the possibility of coups and the establishment of authoritarian regimes through the inappropriate, and to the advantage of illegitimate pressure groups, use.

Regarding the South American Defense identity, it is clear that there is a tendency towards effective control of AF, the vast majority of verified countries converging to the existence of civilian institutions of control and efficiency in resource spending. However, it was also possible to perceive the tendency towards greater confidence in the FA than in Political Power, which increases the risk of them being employed illegitimately, as effective
control in the hands of illegitimate groups can generate authoritarianism and instability. In this context, the Armed Forces that stood out most in terms of confidence, which could shield the State from this risk, were Brazil and Chile. However, due to the great military capacity in the continent, Brazil would be the only one to be able to disseminate this Brazilian military identity in the South American subcontinent, contributing substantially to the formation of the South American Defense identity in favor of stability in South America.

In view of the above, it is concluded that it would be desirable for the Brazilian government to defend a greater role in military terms in South America, with the SADC being the main field of action. Although the challenges exist, the gains in domestic and foreign political stability, regional security and national development outweigh the efforts, justifying a national strategy in this regard. Thus, it is suggested in this work that forums, such as the Center for Strategic Defense Studies and the South American Defense School, constituents of the SADC, should be sought by Brazilian Armed Forces in order to expand regional influence and disseminating the Brazilian Defense identity and creating a South American Defense identity.

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**ABSTRACT**

The South American Defense Council and Brazil have regional importance, considering that stability in South America is not guaranteed. This study has the objectives of confirming, in military terms, the condition of Brazil as an important regional protagonist; and analyzing its possible contribution to regional stability.

**KEYWORDS**

Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano. Estabilidade regional. Brasil.

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