Practical long-distance quantum key distribution system using decoy levels

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Abstract. Quantum key distribution (QKD) has the potential for widespread real-world applications, but no secure long-distance experiment has demonstrated the truly practical operation needed to move QKD from the laboratory to the real world due largely to limitations in synchronization and poor detector performance. Here, we report results obtained using a fully automated, robust QKD system based on the Bennett Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol with low-noise superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) and decoy levels to produce a secret key with unconditional security over a record 140.6 km of optical fibre, an increase of more than a factor of five compared with the previous record for unconditionally secure key generation in a practical QKD system.

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1. Introduction

Quantum key distribution (QKD) holds the promise of communication with security resting firmly on the foundation of quantum mechanics rather than unproven assumptions regarding current and future computational resources. In the Bennett Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [1], the most common prepare and measure protocol, the sender (Alice) ideally encodes a single photon with a bit value of either 0 or 1 in one of two conjugate bases and sends it to the receiver (Bob). When Bob receives a photon, he measures it in one of the two bases. Alice and Bob then publicly share their basis choices and only keep the bits where the bases match. Because the information is encoded in a single photon, any tampering by an eavesdropper (Eve) results in an increased error ratio detectable by the legitimate users of the system. After performing error correction [2] to remove any errors that may have arisen from the operations of an eavesdropper or from imperfections in the experimental apparatus, Alice and Bob perform a privacy amplification step [3] to erase any partial information Eve might have obtained about the transmission. The final result is a string of 0s and 1s that Alice and Bob share but about which Eve has negligibly small information.

Although it is straightforward to see how QKD with ideal sources and detectors is secure, real-world QKD systems must contend with imperfect experimental components. In 2000, it was pointed out that the use of attenuated lasers (which emit photons in a Poissonian distribution) drastically limits the secure range of laser-based QKD systems [4]. Eve could perform a photon number splitting (PNS) attack in which she selectively changes the channel transmittance based on photon number but still maintains the expected rate of detections at Bob. If the rate of multi-photon pulses at Alice is larger than the rate of photon detections at Bob, then Eve could block all the laser pulses containing single photons, and only allow transmission of the multi-photon pulses, which are inherently insecure. In this case, the entire string of ‘secure’ bits could, in fact, be known to Eve.

Several methods have been proposed to mitigate the effects of PNS attacks. The most straightforward is to simply use a very low mean photon number $\mu$, on the order of the channel transmittance, to guarantee that at least some of the detections at Bob originated from single photons at Alice [4]. Unfortunately, this results in very low secret bit rates as well as greatly limiting the possible transmission length due to dark counts in the detectors. The Scarani, Acin, Ribordy, Gisin (SARG) protocol [5], which allows for secure bits to be formed from both one- and two-photon signals, outperforms standard BB84, but it offers no performance advantage compared with BB84 with ‘decoy states’ as described below [6]. Differential phase shift QKD (DPS-QKD) is another method of protecting against PNS attacks [7], but a security proof against all attacks for the DPS-QKD protocol does not currently exist, so it does not provide the unconditional security needed for QKD.

The use of decoy states [8]–[11] with the BB84 protocol has provided a method for achieving high bit rates while protecting against PNS attacks and maintaining the underlying security of BB84. In a decoy state protocol, Alice transmits signals randomly picked from several different mean photon levels $\mu_j$ rather than just one. If Eve, who is ignorant of the $\mu_j$ value for each specific signal, were to attempt to perform a PNS attack, she would not be able to simultaneously modify the channel transmission for all the $\mu_j$ values to reproduce the expected statistics at Bob. By comparing the number of photon detections at each mean photon level, Alice and Bob can determine a rigorous bound on the number of single photons that have been received by Bob and incorporate this bound into the privacy amplification step.

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Decoy state protocols have been demonstrated over a free-space link [12] and in several different fibre systems [13]–[21]. However, many of the demonstrations, although they are important proof-of-principle experiments, employ bi-directional systems [13, 14, 20] that are susceptible to Trojan horse attacks, or do not perform the full QKD protocol, including error correction and privacy amplification, but instead only estimate the secret bit rate and range of the system [19]. Furthermore, most fibre systems have employed either local synchronization (transmitter and receiver share the same clock) [15, 16, 21] or synchronization over a separate fibre [19], methods that pose a significant barrier for deployment. Although a practical uni-directional fibre system with remote synchronization has been demonstrated over short distances of 25 km with high bit rates [17, 18], the detectors used in these experiments were not sufficiently quiet to enable long-distance fibre QKD. Here we describe the first practical fibre QKD system capable of secure operation over distances greater than 100 km. The system uses a three-level decoy-state protocol in a fibre phase-encoding QKD system with independent clocks at the transmitter and receiver and low-noise superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs). In addition to being secure against PNS attacks, our data are secure against Trojan horse attacks that afflict bi-directional systems and attacks based on differing timing responses between detectors [22].

2. Finite statistics decoy state protocol

The security of our protocol rests on knowing the number of sifted bits arising from single photons produced by Alice, and the disturbance, or bit error ratio, on those bits. Our approach has been to develop a finite statistics version of Koashi’s security proof based on the uncertainty principle [23, 24]. The resulting secret bit yield has a form that is similar to that of Gottesman et al [25], with the addition of finite efficiency factors. The number of secret bits distilled from each basis is calculated as

\[
N_{\text{secret}} = N_{\text{sifted}} \left[ y_{-} \mu e^{-\mu} \left( 1 - f_{\text{PA}} H_2(b_{+}^*) \right) - f_{\text{EC}} H_2(B) - \left( 1 - \frac{1}{f_{\text{DS}}} H_2(z) \right) \right],
\]

(1)

where \( N_{\text{sifted}} \) is the number of sifted bits in the selected basis, \( B \) is the observed bit error ratio in this basis, \( y_{-} \) is a lower bound on the transmittance of single photons, \( b_{+}^* \) is an upper bound on the single-photon bit error ratio in the conjugate basis, \( z \) is the fraction of zeroes among the sifted bits in this basis, \( H_2(\cdot) \) is the Shannon binary entropy function, and \( f_{\text{PA}}, f_{\text{EC}} \) and \( f_{\text{DS}} \) are privacy amplification, error correction and deskewing efficiency factors needed to accommodate the finite statistics of the data.

The decoy state protocol allows us to determine a lower bound on the single-photon transmittance \( y_{-} \) and an upper bound on the single-photon error ratio \( b_{+}^* \). The value of \( y_{-} \) is the minimal value of \( y_{1} \) satisfying the following inequalities:

\[
Y_{j}^+ \leq e^{-\mu_j} \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{(\mu_j)^n}{n!} y_n \leq Y_{j}^-,
\]

where \( y_n \) is the transmittance of an \( n \)-photon signal and \( Y_{j}^+ (Y_{j}^-) \) is the upper (lower) bound on the yield of detection events when mean photon number \( \mu_j \) is used for transmission. In contrast to other work where \( Y_{j}^{\pm} \) are calculated assuming that the underlying detection statistics are Gaussian, we make no such assumption and use the full binomial distribution to calculate the bounds within a user-defined confidence level, \( \epsilon \), chosen to be \( 1 \times 10^{-7} \) for this experiment. Our
The protocol implements key distribution in a universally composable manner [26]–[28], resulting in a key that is \( \epsilon' \)-secure, with \( \epsilon' \leq 10\epsilon \) [24].

We use two methods to determine the single-photon error ratio \( b_1 \). The first, referred to as the ‘worst-case’ scenario, makes the conservative assumption that all observed errors occur on single photons. In this case, \( b_1^+ \) is simply equal to the number of observed errors divided by the number of sifted bits that arose from single photons prepared by Alice, which can be computed from the lower bound \( y_1^- \). However, we can obtain a tighter bound on \( b_1 \) by utilizing the information contained in the differing error ratios at each \( \mu_j \) and constructing a set of inequalities involving the bounds on the observed bit error ratios \( B_j \) and the \( n \)-photon bit error ratios \( b_n^j \):

\[
B_j^- \leq e^{-\mu_j} \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{(\mu_j)^n}{n!} y_n b_n \leq B_j^+.
\]

Analogous to the method for finding \( y_1^- \), \( b_1^+ \) is found by determining the maximal value of \( b_1 \) that satisfies these inequalities. Computing this tighter bound on \( b_1 \) can be carried out by linear programming, as for \( y_1^- \), but here it is subject to quadratic constraints, so the analysis is computationally more intensive, although still tractable. In either case, the bounds on \( y_1 \) and \( b_1 \) are valid even if the quantum channel is time varying [29].

Equation (1) involves three efficiency factors (\( f_{EC}, f_{PA} \) and \( f_{DS} \)) that quantify finite statistics effects during the stages of QKD. Asymptotically, all three factors approach unity, but for a finite session length they are strictly greater than one. Reconciliation via practical error-correcting algorithms does not achieve the Shannon capacity of the binary symmetric channel, and the extra overhead in parity checks that needs to be communicated between Alice and Bob is expressed by the factor \( f_{EC} \). Privacy amplification involves removing any partial information Eve may have gained by disturbing the single-photon signals that comprise the sifted bits. Following Koashi [23], we numerically compute the logarithm (base two) of the number of typical strings that are needed to describe with high confidence the output of a binary symmetric channel with a given bit flip probability, using the bit error ratio in one basis to determine the amount of privacy amplification required in the other basis. The factor \( f_{PA} \) denotes how much the size of this output differs from the Shannon entropy of the single-photon signals. The last finite statistics effect we consider is due to the imbalance between the two detector efficiencies, which leads to a bias between the 0s and 1s for the sifted bits in each basis. This bias can reduce Eve’s search space of guessing over likely reconciled keys prior to privacy amplification. Asymptotically, Shannon entropy again gives the required reduction in secret information, but any practical algorithm for removing the bias, or deskewing, is likely to have inefficiencies, which is encompassed by the factor \( f_{DS} \). We followed Peres [30] in iterating von Neumann’s algorithm for generating unbiased bits out of the reconciled keys to determine the value of \( f_{DS} \).

3. Automated QKD system

A diagram of the automated, reconfigurable QKD system used [31] is shown in figure 1. A 1550 nm distributed feedback laser emits photons with a 100 ps pulse width (full width half maximum (FWHM)) at a clock rate of 10 MHz, and the resulting photons are sent to Alice’s phase encoder. The photon wavepacket is split into a ‘short’ and a ‘long’ path, and the portion of the wavepacket that traversed the long path is modulated by the electro-optic phase.
modulator, located outside the interferometer for stability. Likewise, the wavepacket is again split in Bob’s decoder, and only the part of the wavepacket that travelled through Alice’s long path is modulated. Interference ultimately occurs between the Alice-long-Bob-short and Alice-short-Bob-long amplitudes. Polarization maintaining fibre is used within the interferometers to ensure that these two paths are indistinguishable.

The quantum channel consists of 151.5 km of spooled dark optical fibre in an isolated container. The measured fibre attenuation was 0.206 dB km$^{-1}$, and shorter distances are obtained by redefining Alice’s enclave to include a portion of the fibre. The bit and basis selections at Alice and Bob are determined by the outputs of physical random number generators, and a high-speed optical switch, driven by a pseudo-random pattern, provides the three intensity levels needed for our decoy state protocol. (In a deployed system, the pseudo-random pattern generator would simply be replaced by a physical random number generator.) We tested various combinations of sending probabilities and attenuation levels to determine the accuracy of the mean photon numbers. Including long-term drifts, the overall accuracy of the $\mu$ levels was $\sim$0.1 dB, which is in good agreement with the number of photons detected at Bob.

The SNSPDs [32] used for these measurements are cooled to 3 K in a closed-cycle refrigeration system and coupled to single-mode telecom fibre. They operate in ungated mode with a measured timing jitter of 69 ps and a recovery time of $<10$ ns. The detectors were individually current biased to a matching detection efficiency of 0.5%, resulting in a summed average dark count rate over the entire acquisition period of 78.1 counts s$^{-1}$.

The system is fully automated and able to run for many hours without user intervention. Independent rubidium oscillators are employed as frequency references at Alice and Bob and
Figure 2. Sifted bit rate and bit error ratio for entire data run. Bit rate and error ratio are for data at $\mu_2$, and each point is an average over 60 s of acquisition time. The dashed green line shows the average error ratio of 2.01%. Approximately 4.5 h into the data run, the bit rate fell and the error ratio increased, probably indicating a polarization misalignment. The system was able to recover from this error without any user intervention. Data from the entire run period were used to make secret bits.

are synchronized prior to each QKD run. To synchronize the clocks, the mean photon number is set to a very high value (corresponding to several thousand detection events per second at Bob), and the received detection events are used to create a photon arrival time histogram that is used to determine the current average frequency offset between the two oscillators, which is corrected by adjusting one of the clocks’ frequencies. After the synchronization step but before the QKD session, a tuning step is performed to keep the interferometer balanced. Tuning runs are insecure sessions executed at a high photon number to quickly obtain the statistics needed for interferometer adjustments, while QKD runs adhere to the requirements for secure key generation. To minimize the effects of system de-tuning, tuning runs are promptly followed by QKD runs. The use of ungated detectors and post-selection of detection timestamps in software relaxes the system timing requirements to the phase modulator voltage pulse width, 2–3 ns, rather than being constrained to the sub-nanosecond electrical detector gate width required for avalanche photodiodes. However, we observed that the width of the peaks in the arrival time histograms was typically only a few hundred picoseconds, indicating that our synchronization scheme should work at clock rates up to 1 GHz under these conditions. Periodically, the polarization controller is automatically adjusted to compensate for any polarization drifts within the fibre by maximizing transmission through the linear polarizer.
4. Results and conclusions

We chose $\mu_j$ values with associated sending probabilities that were near-optimal for a fibre length of 135 km based on the results of simulations. The selected mean photon numbers were ($\mu_0 = 0.0025$, $\mu_1 = 0.13$ and $\mu_2 = 0.57$) ($\mu_0$, ideally the vacuum state, was constrained to be 23.5 dB below the high $\mu_2$ level by the extinction ratio of the switch) with associated sending probabilities (0.1, 0.2, 0.7). Before each 10 s QKD run, a 1 s clock synchronization step and two 500 ms tuning runs were performed. The system was allowed to run for 20.3 h before being stopped manually. Not including the overhead time for classical communication, synchronization and tuning, QKD data were acquired for 5.6 h. Figure 2 displays the stability of the sifted bit rate and bit error ratio of the system over the entire data run.

In 5.6 h of acquisition time and using a timing window of 184 ps, the number of detection events recorded at $\mu_2$, $\mu_1$, and $\mu_0$ was 80 776, 5729 and 341, respectively, and a total of 40 538 sifted bits with a bias (fraction of zeros in one basis) of 0.494 were created. The sifted bits and the basis choices both passed the FIPS 140–2 cryptographic randomness tests [33]. After data were collected, the bits were sifted and error corrected using either a regular (3,14)
low-density parity check forward error correction code, or the modified CASCADE protocol for interactive error correction [34]. Using interactive error-correcting codes yields more secret bits than forward error correction, but the security of a protocol using two-way error correction has not yet been conclusively proven. The error-corrected bits were then privacy amplified as described in equation (1) after determining the bounds on the single-photon transmittance and error ratio. The efficiency factors due to the finite data size were determined to be $f_{EC} \approx 1.06$ for the modified CASCADE protocol and $f_{EC} \approx 1.51$ for forward error correction, $f_{PA} \approx 1.09$ and $f_{DS} \approx 1.05$. As a final step, Wegman–Carter authentication [35] was performed on the secret bits and all the messages between Alice and Bob.

As shown in figure 3, $b_1$, the bound on the single-photon error ratio, is significantly higher when the worst-case assumption that all the errors occur on single photons is made. The tighter $b_1$ bound not only yields more secret bits at any given distance, but it also extends the distance over which secret bits can be exchanged. In the case where forward error correction is performed, use of the ‘worst-case’ $b_1$ results in 1412 secret bits at 135 km and a maximum range of 137.4 km. When the tighter bound on $b_1$ is used, 3549 secret bits are produced at 135 km and the range of the system is extended to 140.6 km, a new record for key distribution secure against general attacks [25], including PNS attacks. Using the modified CASCADE protocol for error correction extends the distance even further to 144.3 km.

By choosing different mean photon numbers and sending probabilities and acquiring data for longer times, it would be possible to extend the range even further in this system. Figure 4 shows the results of simulations based on the system properties to determine the maximum

![Figure 4](http://www.njp.org/)

**Figure 4.** Simulated performance of system used in this work for different acquisition times and distances. The optimal mean photon number and sending probabilities are found for each distance and acquisition time. The data point at 135 km matches the prediction of the simulation. Even with an efficiency of 0.5%, the SNSPDs enable the creation of secret bits out to 166.1 km.
range of the system. With the same detectors used in this work, this system could achieve a range of 166.1 km. Although the detection efficiency of these detectors is currently quite low, by embedding the detectors in a stack of optical elements designed to increase absorption at the target wavelength [36] and improving the optical coupling to the detector, it should be possible to increase the system detection efficiency considerably. An increase to 50% (assuming the same dark count and background photon rates) would result in bit rates higher by approximately two orders of magnitude at any given distance in the asymptotic limit, and an increase in the tolerable link loss to over 50 dB. From our results, which are the first demonstration of assured security over long distances in a practical system, we can infer that reasonable improvements in component technology will result in several hundred bits per second over distances of 100 km, more than an order of magnitude higher than what is presently available.

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