Constrained Pure Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Games

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Abstract
We study the problem of checking for the existence of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs. The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonnegative rational weights on incoming edges from players who picked the same strategy augmented by a fixed integer bonus for picking a given strategy. These games capture the idea of coordination within a local neighbourhood in the absence of globally common strategies. We study the decision problem of checking whether a given set of strategy choices for a subset of the players is consistent with some pure Nash equilibrium or, alternatively, with all pure Nash equilibria. We identify the most natural tractable cases and show NP or coNP-completness of these problems already for unweighted DAGs.

1 Introduction
Identifying subclasses of games where equilibria is tractable is an important problem in algorithmic analysis of multiplayer games. Pure Nash equilibria (NEs) may not exist in games and checking whether a game has a pure NE is in general a hard problem. Even for subclasses of games in which a pure NE is guaranteed to exist (for instance, potential games) computing one remains PLS-hard (Fabrikant, Papadimitriou, and Talwar 2004). Although, Nash’s theorem guarantees the existence of mixed strategy NE in all finite games, computing one is still a hard problem. Therefore, identifying restricted classes of games where equilibrium computation is tractable and also precisely identifying the borderline between tractability and hardness in such restricted classes is of obvious interest. In this paper, we study the borderline of tractability in a natural subclass of games where the utilities of players are restricted to be pairwise separable. These are called polymatrix games (Janovskaya 1968) and they form an abstract model that is useful to analyse strategic behaviour of players in games formed via pairwise interactions. In polymatrix games, the payoff for each player is the sum of the payoffs he gets from individual two player games he plays against every other player. Polymatrix games are well-studied in the literature and include game classes with good computational properties like the two-player zero-sum games. They also have applications in areas such as artificial neural networks (Miller and Zucker 1991) and machine learning (Erdem and Pelillo 2012).

In terms of tractability, the restriction to pairwise interactions does not immediately ensure the existence of efficient algorithms. Computing a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium remains PPAD-complete (Cai and Daskalakis 2011) and checking for the existence of a pure NE is NP-complete in general. This motivates the need to further analyse the type of pairwise interactions that would ensure tractability. In this paper, we argue that another important factor which influences tractability is the structure of the underlying interaction graph and presence of individual preferences (that we call bonuses).

The main restriction that we impose on polymatrix games is that each pairwise interaction form a coordination game. Henceforth, we will refer to these games simply as coordination games on graphs. Coordination games are often used in game theory to model situations where players attain maximum payoff when they agree on a common strategy. The game model that we study, extends coordination games to the network setting where payoffs need not always be symmetric and players coordinate within a certain local neighbourhood. The neighbourhood structure is specified by a finite directed graph whose nodes correspond to the players. Each player chooses a colour from a set of available colours. The payoff of a player is the sum of weights on the edges from players who choose the same colour and a fixed bonus for picking that particular colour. This game model is closely related to various well-studied classes of games. For instance, coordination games on graphs are graphical games (Kearns, Littman, and Singh 2001) and they are also related to hedonic games (Dreze and Greenberg 1980; Bogomolnaia and Jackson 2002). In hedonic games, the payoff of each player depends solely on the set of players that selected the same strategy. The coalition formation property inherent to
Coordination games on graphs make the game model relevant to cluster analysis. The problem of clustering has been studied from a game theoretic perspective for instance in (Feldman, Lewin-Eytan, and Naor 2012; Pelillo and Buló 2014). Feldman and Friedler (2015) introduced a framework for the analysis of clustering games on networks where the underlying coalition formation graph is undirected and, as a result, a potential game. Hoefer (2007) also studied clustering games that are polymatrix games based on undirected graphs where each player has the same set of strategies. These games are also potential games.

Coordination games on graphs constitute a game model which can be useful for analysing the adoption of a product or service within a network of agents interacting with each other in their local neighbourhoods. For example, consider the selection of a mobile phone operator. The interaction between users can be represented by a coordination game where the weight of the edge from $i$ to $j$ represents the total cost of calls from $j$ to $i$. Also, the bonus function can represent individual preferences of users over the providers. Now suppose that mobile network operators allow free calls among its users. Then each mobile phone user faces a strategic choice of picking an operator that maximises his cost savings or, in the case of unweighted graphs, maximises the number of people he can call for free. If players are allowed to freely switch their operator based on their friends' choices, then the stable market states correspond to pure Nash equilibria in this game. One can observe similar interactions in peer-to-peer networks, social networks and photo sharing platforms.

A similar game model based on undirected graphs was introduced in (Apt et al. 2014) and further studied in (Rahm and Schiefer 2015). The transition from undirected to directed graphs drastically changes the status of the games. For instance, in the case of undirected graphs, coordination games are potential games whereas in the directed case, Nash equilibria may not even exist. Moreover, the problem of determining the existence of pure NEs is NP-complete for coordination games on directed graphs (Apt, Simon, and Wojtczak 2016). However, pure NE always exists for several natural classes of graphs (Simon and Wojtczak 2016).

However, in many practical situations, finding just one pure Nash equilibrium may not be enough. In fact, there can be exponentially many Nash equilibria, each with a different payoff to each player (see Example 2). Ideally, we would like to ask for the existence of a Nash equilibrium satisfying some given constraints. In this paper, we focus on checking whether a partial strategy profile (i.e. strategy choices for a subset of the players) is consistent with some pure Nash equilibrium or, alternatively, with all pure Nash equilibria. We will refer to these as \( \exists \)NE and \( \forall \)NE decision problem, respectively. We identify the most natural tractable cases and show NP or coNP-completeness of these problems already for unweighted DAGs.

**Related work.** The complexity of checking for the existence of pure Nash equilibria in a game crucially depends on the representation of the game. Normal form representation can be exponential in the number of players whereas graphical games and polymatrix games provide a more concise representation of strategic form games. While checking for the existence of pure Nash equilibria can be solved in LogSpace for games in normal form, it is NP-complete for graphical games even when the payoff of each player depends only on the strategy choices of at most three other players (Gottlob, Greco, and Scarcello 2005). On the other hand, it is solvable in polynomial time for graphical games whose dependency graph has a bounded treewidth (Gottlob, Greco, and Scarcello 2005) or when each player has only two possible strategies (Thomas and van Leeuwen 2015). For polymatrix games, checking for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete even when all its individual 2-player games are win-loss ones (Apt, Simon, and Wojtczak 2016).

Gilboa and Zemel (1989) were the first to study the computational complexity of decision problems for mixed Nash equilibria with additional constraints for two player games in normal form. For many natural constraints the corresponding decision problems were shown to be NP-hard. Further hardness results were shown in (Conitzer and Sandholm 2008) and (Bilo and Mavronicolas 2012). The existence of constrained pure NE can be solved in LogSpace for normal form games simply by checking every pure strategy profile. For graphical games the problem is NP-hard even without any constraints (Gottlob, Greco, and Scarcello 2005), but because of the special structure of our games, this result does not directly apply in our setting. On the other hand, constrained pure NE can be found in polynomial time for graphical games played on graphs with a bounded treewidth (Greco and Scarcello 2009). We are not aware of any prior work on this problem for polymatrix games. Our paper is the first to identify several subclasses of polymatrix games for which the existence problem of a constrained Nash equilibrium is tractable.

## 2 Background

A **strategic game** \( \mathcal{G} = (S_1, \ldots, S_n, p_1, \ldots, p_n) \) with \( n > 1 \) players consists of a non-empty set \( S_i \) of **strategies** and a **payoff function** \( p_i : S_1 \times \cdots \times S_n \to \mathbb{R} \), for each player \( i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \). Let \( S := S_1 \times \cdots \times S_n \) and let us call each element \( s \in S \) a **joint strategy**. Given a joint strategy \( s \), we denote by \( s(i) \) the strategy of player \( i \) in \( s \). We abbreviate the sequence \( (s(j))_{j \neq i} \) to \( s_{-i} \) and occasionally write \( (s(i), s_{-i}) \) instead of \( s \). We call a strategy \( s(i) \) of player \( i \) a **best response** to a joint strategy \( s_{-i} \) of his opponents if for all \( x \in S_i \), \( p_i(s(i), s_{-i}) \geq p_i(x, s_{-i}) \). We do not consider mixed strategies in this paper.

Given two joint strategies \( s' \) and \( s \), we say that \( s' \) is a **deviation of the player** \( i \) from \( s \) if \( s_{-i} = s'_{-i} \) and \( s(i) \neq s'(i) \). If in addition \( p_i(s') > p_i(s) \), we say that the deviation \( s' \) from \( s \) is **profitable** for player \( i \). We
call a joint strategy $s$ a (pure) **Nash equilibrium** if no player can profitably deviate from $s$. For any given strategic game $G$, let $\text{NE}(G)$ denote the set of all (pure) Nash equilibria in $G$.

We now introduce the class of games we are interested in. Fix a finite set of colours $M$. A weighted directed graph $(G, w)$ is a structure where $G = (V, E)$ is a graph without self loops over the vertices $V = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ and $w$ is a function that associates with each edge $e \in E$, a nonnegative rational weight $w_e \in \mathbb{Q}_{\geq 0}$. We say that a node $j$ is a **successor** of the node $i$, and $i$ is a **predecessor** of $j$, if there is an edge $i \to j$ in $E$. Let $N_i$ denote the set of all predecessors of node $i$ in the graph $G$. By a **colour assignment** we mean a function that assigns to each node of $G$ a finite non-empty set of colours. A **bonus** is a function $\beta$ that to each node $i$ and a colour $c$ assigns an integer $\beta(i, c)$.

Given a weighted graph $(G, w)$, a colour assignment $C : V \to 2^M \setminus \emptyset$ and a bonus function $\beta : V \times M \to \mathbb{Z}$, a strategic game $G(G, w, C, \beta)$ is defined as follows:

- the players are the nodes;
- the set of strategies of player (node) $i$ is the set of colours $C(i)$;
- the payoff function $p_i(s) := \sum_{j \in N_i} w_{j \to i} + \beta(i, s(i))$.

So each node simultaneously chooses a colour and its payoff is the sum of the weights of the edges from its neighbours that chose the same colour augmented by a bonus to the node from choosing this colour. We call these games **coordination games on directed graphs**, from now on just **coordination games**. When the weights of all the edges are 1, we obtain a coordination game whose underlying graph is unweighted. In this case, we simply drop the function $w$ from the description of the game. In the case the payoff function is defined by $p_i(s) := \sum_{j \in N_i} w_{j \to i} + \beta(i, s(i))$. Similarly if all the bonuses are 0, we obtain a coordination game without bonuses. Likewise, to denote this game we omit the function $\beta$. Note that an edge with positive integer weight $w$ can be simulated by adding $w$ nodes and $2w$ unweighted edges to the game, and any positive integer bonus can be simulated similarly. However, if all weights and bonuses are represented in binary, as we assume in this paper, such an operation can increase the size of the graph exponentially and be inefficient.

**Example 1** Consider the unweighted directed graph and the colour assignment depicted in Figure 1. Take the joint strategy $s$ that consists of the underlined strategies. Then the payoffs are as follows: $0$ for the nodes 1, 7, 8, and 9; $1$ for the nodes 2, 4, 5, and 6; $2$ for the node 3.

Note that $s$ is not a Nash equilibrium. For example, node 1 can profitably deviate to colour $a$. In fact the coordination game associated with this graph does not have a Nash equilibrium. Note that for nodes 7, 8 and 9 the only option is to select the unique strategy in its strategy set. The best response for nodes 4, 5 and 6 is to always select the same strategy as nodes 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Therefore, to show that the game does not have a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to consider the strategies of nodes 1, 2 and 3. We denote this by the triple $(s_1, s_2, s_3)$. Below we list all such joint strategies and we underline a strategy that is not a best response to the choice of other players: $(\underline{a}, a, b), (a, a, \underline{b}), (a, c, b), (a, c, c), (b, a, c), (b, c, b)$ and $(b, c, c)$.

Let $Q \subseteq V$ be a nonempty subset of all the nodes of a given graph $G$. A **query** is a function $q : Q \to M$ which satisfies the following property: for all $i \in Q$, $q(i) \in C(i)$. We say that a query $q$ is **consistent** with a strategy profile $s$ if $q = s|_Q$, i.e. $q(i) = s(i)$ for all $i \in Q$. We call a query $q : Q \to M$ **monochromatic** if for all $i, j \in Q$, $q(i) = q(j)$ and otherwise we call the query **polychromatic**. A query $q$ is said to be **singleton** if $|Q| = 1$. Obviously every singleton query is also a monochromatic one. In this paper, we study the following decision questions.

**Given a graph** $G = (V, E)$, **weights** $w$, **colour assignment** $C$, **bonus function** $\beta$, and **query** $q$.

- (\exists\, \text{NE problem}) Is there a Nash equilibrium in $G(G, w, C, \beta)$ that is consistent with $q$?
- (\forall\, \text{NE problem}) Is every Nash equilibrium in $G(G, w, C, \beta)$ consistent with $q$?

Formally, \exists\, \text{NE problem} asks if there exists $s \in \text{NE}(G)$ such that $q = s|_Q$, while the \forall\, \text{NE problem} asks whether for all $s \in \text{NE}(G)$ it is the case that $q = s|_Q$. Note that \forall\, \text{NE} is not a complement of \exists\, \text{NE}. Actually, any non-singleton \forall\, \text{NE query} can be reduced to a series of singleton \forall\, \text{NE queries} $q(i)$ for every player $i \in Q$. Note that trivially \forall\, \text{NE} \in \text{NP} and \forall\, \text{NE} \in \text{coNP}$, because checking whether a joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium and is consistent with $q$ can be done in polynomial time.

Given a directed graph $G$ and a set of nodes $K$, we denote by $G[K]$ the subgraph of $G$ induced by $K$. A (directed) graph $G = (V, E)$ is a **complete graph** if for all $i, j \in V$ such that $i \neq j$, we have $i \to j \in E$. That is from every node there is an edge to every other node. Given the set of colours $M$, we say that a directed graph $G$ is **colour complete** (with respect to a colour assignment $C$) if for every colour $c \in M$ each component of $G[V_c]$ is a complete graph, where
Graph Class | ∃NE | ∀NE
---|---|---
2 colours+monochromatic query | \( \mathcal{O}(|G|) \) | \( \mathcal{O}(|G|) \)
2 colours+polychromatic query | \( \mathcal{O}(|G|) \) | \( \mathcal{O}(|G|) \)
DAGs+3 colours+singleton query | \( \mathcal{O}(|G|^2 \cdot s) \) | \( \mathcal{O}(|G|^2 \cdot s) \)
DAGs with out-degree \( \leq 1 \) | \( \mathcal{O}(|G|^2 \cdot 3) \) | \( \mathcal{O}(|G|^2 \cdot 3) \)
colour complete graphs no bonuses | \( \mathcal{O}(nm \cdot m!) \) | \( \mathcal{O}(nm \cdot m!) \)

Table 1: Summary of the results. The last two classes are unweighted; a simple reduction from the PARTITION problem and its complement, shows NP and coNP hardness of their ∃NE and ∀NE problems, respectively, in the weighted case.

\( V_c = \{ i \in V \mid c \in C(i) \} \). In particular, every complete graph is colour complete, but not vice versa (see Figure 4 in the appendix).

Table 1 summarises our results in terms of the number of arithmetic operations needed. We use binary representation for all values in \( w \) and \( \beta \). The size of the input game graph is \( |G| = \mathcal{O}(nm + e) \), where \( n \) is the number of nodes in a graph, \( m \) is the number of colours and \( e \) is the number of edges.

Note that these graph classes can occur naturally in practice. Graphs with two colours can model duopoly markets and simple cycles are used in Token ring architectures. Unweighted DAGs with out-degree \( \leq 1 \) can model indirect elections such as the US primaries where votes are cast for delegates, who may have their own preferences, rather than for presidential nominees directly. In this context, the ∃NE question answers who can become the leader based on the list of candidates each voter realistically considers voting for (represented by the set of available colours) and ∀NE can tell us if a given candidate wins no matter how the undecided voters (i.e., players with non-singleton set of available colours) vote. Colour complete graphs can model situations where every user benefits as the number of users increases even if they do not know each other directly, e.g., users joining a torrent swarm. Also, in the context of a market with multiple products, the ∃NE/∀NE questions can tell us which product can/will dominate the market in the end.

3 Graphs with Two or Three Colours

We start by studying coordination games with two colours and monochromatic queries. To fix the notation, let \( G = (V, E) \) and the colour set be \( M = \{0, 1\} \). Let \( q \) be a monochromatic query. Without loss of generality, we can assume \( q(i) = 0 \) for all \( i \in Q \), because otherwise we can rename the colours. We show how to deal with the ∃NE decision problem first.

**Theorem 1** The ∃NE problem for coordination games with two colours and monochromatic queries can be solved in \( \mathcal{O}(|G|) \) time using Algorithm 1.

Similarly, Algorithm 2 below solves the ∀NE problem for monochromatic queries.

**Algorithm 1:** Algorithm for ∃NE on arbitrary graphs with two colours and monochromatic queries.

**Input:** A coordination game \( G((V, E), w, C, \beta) \) and monochromatic query \( q : Q \rightarrow M \).

**Output:** YES if there exists a Nash equilibrium consistent with \( q \) and NO otherwise.

```
1 for i ∈ V do
2 if 0 ∈ C(i) then s(i) = 0 else s(i) = 1
3 set S := { i | s(i) = 1 }
4 while S ≠ ∅ do
5 remove any element from S and assign it to i
6 for { j ∈ V / i → j ∈ E } do
7 if s(j) = 0 and 1 ∈ C(j) and
8 p_j(1, s_{-j}) > p_j(s) then
9 s(j) = 1
10 add j to S
11 if ∀i∈Q s(i) = 0 return YES else return NO
```

**Algorithm 2:** Algorithm for ∀NE on arbitrary graphs with two colours and monochromatic queries.

**Input:** A coordination game \( G((V, E), w, C, \beta) \) and monochromatic query \( q : Q \rightarrow M \).

**Output:** YES if all Nash equilibria are consistent with \( q \) and NO otherwise.

```
1 Lines 1-9 of Algorithm 1 where every 0 is replaced by 1 and every 1 by 0.
2 if \( \forall i \in Q \) s(i) = 0 return YES else return NO
```

**Theorem 2** The ∀NE problem for coordination games with two colours and monochromatic queries can be solved in \( \mathcal{O}(|G|) \) time using Algorithm 2.

In fact, any polychromatic ∀NE query can be reduced to two monochromatic ones and so we get the following.

**Corollary 1** The ∀NE problem for coordination games with two colours and polychromatic queries can be solved in \( \mathcal{O}(|G|) \) time.

However, we will show that even answering singleton ∀NE queries for unweighted DAGs is coNP-hard in the presence of three colours and no bonuses. We first analyse the following gadget.

**Proposition 1** For any Nash equilibrium \( s \) in \( D(X_1, \ldots, X_k, x; Y) \) from Figure 2: (a) \( s(Y) = x \) iff \( \exists_i s(X_i) = x \) and (b) \( s(Y) = \neg x \) iff \( \forall_i s(X_i) = \neg x \).

Using this gadget we are able to show the following.

**Theorem 3** The ∀NE problem for singleton queries is coNP-complete for unweighted DAGs with three colours and no bonuses.

**Proof.** We reduce from the tautology problem for formulae in 3-DNF form. Assume we are given a formula \( \phi = (a_1 \land b_1 \land c_1) \lor (a_2 \land b_2 \land c_2) \lor \ldots \lor (a_k \land b_k \land c_k) \)
with $k$ clauses and $n$ propositional variables $x_1, \ldots, x_n$, where each $a_i, b_i, c_i$ is a literal equal to $x_i$ or $\neg x_i$ for some $j$. We will construct a coordination game $G_{\phi}$ of size $O(n+k)$ such that a particular singleton $\forall$NE query is true for $G_{\phi}$ iff $\phi$ is a tautology.

First for every propositional variable $x_i$ there are four nodes $X_i, \neg X_i, L_i, \overline{L}_i$ in $G_{\phi}$, each with two possible colours $\top$ or $\bot$. We connect these four nodes using gadgets $D(X_i, \neg X_i, \top; L_i)$ and $D(X_i, \neg X_i, \bot; \overline{L}_i)$. This makes sure that in any Nash equilibrium, $s$, we have $s(L_i) = \top$ and $s(\overline{L}_i) = \bot$ iff $X_i$ and $\neg X_i$ are assigned different colours. Next, for every clause $(a_i \land b_i \lor c_i)$ in $\phi$ we add to the game graph $G_{\phi}$ node $C_i$. We use gadget $D(a_i, b_i, c_i, \top; C_i)$ to connect literals with clauses, where we identify each $x_i$ with $X_i$ and each $\neg x_i$ with $\neg X_i$. Note that Proposition 1 implies that the colour of $C_i$ is $\top$ iff all nodes $a_i, b_i, c_i$ are assigned $\top$. We add two nodes $T$ and $F$ to gather colours $\top$ and $\bot$ from the $L_i$ and $\overline{L}_i$ nodes. Also, we add an additional node $\Phi$ to gather the values of all the clauses. We connect these using gadgets $D(L_1, \ldots, L_n, \top; T)$, $D(\overline{L}_1, \ldots, \overline{L}_n, \bot; F)$, and $D(C_1, \ldots, C_k; \top; \Phi)$.

Now, we need to express that for every Nash equilibrium $s$: $s(T) = \top$ and $s(F) = \bot$ implies that $s(\Phi) = \top$. For this we use the gadget from Figure 3. It includes three nodes $T, F, \Phi$ that we already defined in $G_{\phi}$. We claim that $\forall$NE query $q(Z) = \ast$ is true for $G_{\phi}$ iff $\Phi$ is a tautology. (The full proof is in the appendix.)

On the other hand, we can show that answering polychromatic $\exists$NE queries is NP-hard for unweighted DAGs even with two colours and no bonuses. The construction is similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.

**Theorem 4** The $\exists$NE problem is NP-complete for unweighted DAGs with two colours and no bonuses.

Building on this we can show the following when there are three colours to choose from.

**Corollary 2** The $\exists$NE problem for singleton queries is NP-complete for unweighted DAGs with three colours and no bonuses.

Note that we can also show $\text{NP}/\text{coNP}$-hardness for DAGs with out-degree at most two, because we can make arbitrary number of copies of any given node, e.g. to make three copies $i_1, i_2, i_3$ of node $i$ we can add nodes $i' \mapsto i_1, i \mapsto i_2$ and edges $i \mapsto i_1, i' \mapsto i_2, i' \mapsto i_3$.

## 4 Simple Cycles

We consider here coordination games whose underlying graph is a simple cycle. To fix the notation, suppose that $V = \{0, 1, \ldots, n-1\}$ and the underlying graph is $0 \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow n-1 \rightarrow 0$. We assume that the counting is done in cyclic order within $\{0, \ldots, n-1\}$ using the increment operation $i \oplus 1$ and the decrement operation $i \ominus 1$. In particular, $(n-1) \oplus 1 = 0$ and $0 \ominus 1 = n-1$.

For $i \in V$, let $Z_i(w) = \{c \in C(i) \mid \beta(i,c) + w \geq \beta(i,c')$ for all $c' \in C(i)\}$ denote the set of colours available to player $i$ with the bonus at most $w$ below the maximum one available to $i$. For every $i \in V$, define $A_i := Z_i(0)$, i.e. all colours with the maximum bonus, $B_i := Z_i(w_i \ominus 1 \rightarrow -1)$, and $C_i := Z_i(w_i \ominus 1 \rightarrow 0)$. Obviously $\emptyset \neq A_i \subseteq B_i \subseteq C_i \subseteq C(i)$ for every $i$. It is quite easy to see that in any NE player $i$ can only select a colour from $C_i$. Let us fix a query $q : Q \rightarrow M$. In this section, without loss of generality, we assume that $0 \in Q$ (if $0 \notin Q$, then we can always re-label the nodes in the cycle).

**Algorithm 3: $\exists$NE on a simple cycle**

**Input:** A simple cycle on nodes $\{0, \ldots, n-1\}$, sets $A_i, B_i, C_i$ for $i \in V$, a query $q : Q \rightarrow M$.

**Output:** YES if there exists a Nash equilibrium consistent with $q$ and NO otherwise.

1. Let $X_0 = \{q(0)\}$.
2. for $i = 0$ to $n-1$ do
3. if $X_i \not\subseteq B_{i+1}$ then
4. \hspace{1cm} $X_{i+1} = (X_i \cap C_{i+1}) \cup A_{i+1}$
5. else
6. \hspace{1cm} $X_{i+1} = X_i$
7. if $i \ominus 1 \in Q$ then
8. \hspace{1cm} if $q(i \ominus 1) \notin X_{i+1}$ then
9. \hspace{2cm} return NO
10. else
11. \hspace{2cm} $X_{i+1} = \{q(i \ominus 1)\}$
12. return YES

**Theorem 5** The $\exists$NE problem for simple cycles can be solved in $O(|G|)$ time.
Algorithm 4: Algorithm for \( \exists \)NE on a simple cycle.

Input: A simple cycle on nodes \( \{0, \ldots, n-1\} \), sets \( A_i, B_i, C_i \) for \( i \) in \( V \), a query \( q : Q \rightarrow M \).

Output: YES if all NEs are consistent with \( q \) and NO otherwise.

for \( c \in M \) do
  if Alg. 3 for \( q' := \{0 \rightarrow c\} \) returns NO then
    continue with the next \( c \)
  else
    Consider \( X_i \) computed by Alg. 3 for \( q' \):
    if exists \( i \in Q \) such that \( X_i \neq \{q(i)\} \) then
      return NO
  return YES

Proof. [sketch] We argue that Algorithm 3 solves the \( \exists \)NE problem for simple cycles. In other words, we argue that given a simple cycle over the nodes \( V = \{0, \ldots, n-1\} \) and a query \( q : Q \rightarrow M \), the output of Algorithm 3 is YES iff there exists a Nash equilibrium \( s^* \) which is consistent with \( q \). Suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium \( s^* \) which is consistent with \( q \). We can argue by induction on \( V \) that on termination of Algorithm 3, for all \( i \in V \), we have \( s^*(i) \in X_i \).

Conversely, suppose the output of Algorithm 3 is YES. From the definition, this implies that for all \( i \in V \), \( X_i \neq \emptyset \) and for all \( j \in Q: q(j) \in X_j \) (in fact, \( X_j = \{q(j)\} \)). We define a Nash equilibrium \( s^* \) as follows. First, let \( s^*(0) = q(0) \). Next we assign values to \( s^*(i) \) starting at \( i = n-1 \) and going down to \( i = 1 \) as described below.

- If \( i \in Q \) then \( s^*(i) = q(i) \).
- If \( i \notin Q \) and \( X_i \subseteq B_i \) then by Algorithm 3 we have \( X_i = X_i \). Let \( s^*(i) = s^*(i \oplus 1) \).
- Assume \( i \notin Q \) and \( X_i \notin B_i \). If \( s^*(i \oplus 1) \in X_i \cap C_i \), set \( s^*(i) = s^*(i \oplus 1) \). Otherwise \( s^*(i \oplus 1) \notin A_i \) and we set \( s^*(i) \) to any element in \( X_i \). A proof that \( s^* \) is a NE in the appendix. □

Algorithm 4 reduces the \( \exists \)NE problem to \( m \) \( \exists \)NE queries.

Theorem 6 The \( \forall \)NE problem for simple cycles (unweighted simple cycles) can be solved in \( O(m|G|) \) time (respectively, \( O(|G|) \) time using Algorithm 7 in the appendix).

5 Colour Complete Graphs

We show that \( \exists \)NE and \( \forall \)NE problems can be solved in polynomial time for coordination games \( G((V, E), C) \) played on unweighted colour complete graphs with \( n \) nodes and a fixed number of colours, \( m \), and no bonuses.

Theorem 7 The \( \exists \)NE and \( \forall \)NE problems for unweighted colour complete graphs and no bonuses can be solved in \( O(nm \cdot m!) \) time.

Proof. We claim that the set of total orders on the set of colours induces a set of joint strategies which contains the whole set \( \text{NE}(G) \). Specifically, every total order \( \geq \) on \( M \) will be mapped to a joint strategy \( SP(\geq) \) as follows: assign to each player the highest colour available to him according to the total order \( \geq \). Formally, for all players \( i: SP(\geq)(i) = \max_{\geq} C(i) \). For any Nash equilibrium \( s \) let us define a relation \( \geq_s \subseteq M \times M : x \geq_s y \) iff there exists player \( i \) such that \( \{x, y\} \subseteq C(i) \) and \( s(i) = x \).

Lemma 1 The relation \( \geq_s \) is acyclic, i.e. for all \( k \geq 2 \) there is no sequence of colours \( x_1, \ldots, x_k \) such that \( x_1 \geq_s x_2 \geq_s \ldots \geq_s x_k \).

Note Lemma 1 may fail when bonuses are introduced into the game. We also need the following folk result.

Lemma 2 Any acyclic binary relation on a finite set can be extended to a total order.

For the relation \( \geq_s \) let \( \geq^*_s \) be a total order from Lemma 2 such that \( \geq^*_s \subseteq \geq^*_s \).

Lemma 3 For any Nash equilibrium \( s \), \( SP(\geq^*_s) = s \).

From Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 we know that for every Nash equilibrium \( s \), there exists at least one total order on \( M \) that induces it. Therefore, for \( \exists \)NE problem (\( \forall \)NE problem) it suffices to check for all possible total orders \( \geq \) on \( M \), whether the induced joint strategy \( SP(\geq) \), is a Nash equilibrium and if so, whether any (respectively, all) of them is consistent with \( q \). There are \( m! \) total orders on \( M \). Checking whether an induced strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium consistent with \( q \) takes \( O(nm) \) time. This gives \( O(nm \cdot m!) \) in total. □

Note that there are coordination games on colour complete graphs with one-to-one correspondence between the set of total orders on colours and the set of all Nash equilibria (Example 2 in the appendix), and so with exponentially many different NEs.

6 Directed Acyclic Graphs

In Section 3 we showed that the \( \exists \)NE and \( \forall \)NE problems are NP and coNP complete respectively even for unweighted DAGs with out-degree at most two and no bonuses. We now show that if the out-degree of each node in an unweighted DAG is at most 1 (there are no constraints on the in-degree of nodes) then these problems can be solved efficiently.

Theorem 8 Algorithm 5 solves the \( \exists \)NE problem for unweighted DAGs with out-degree at most one in \( O(|G|^{2.5}) \) time.

Proof. [sketch] Intuitively, for each node, \( i \), we compute the set, \( X(i) \), of colours that can possibly be assigned to \( i \) in any Nash equilibrium. Such a set is trivial to compute for source nodes in \( G \), and for the other nodes it can be computed by constructing a suitable bipartite graph based on the sets precomputed for all its neighbours and running a matching algorithm. In lines 7-10 we remove colours that are dominated by others. We need the following lemma.
Algorithm 5: Algorithm for \( \exists \text{NE} \) on unweighted DAGs with out-degree \( \leq 1 \).

**Input:** A coordination game \( G((V, E), C, \beta) \) and query \( q : Q \rightarrow M \)

**Output:** \( \text{YES} \) if there exists a Nash equilibrium consistent with \( q \) and \( \text{NO} \) otherwise.

1. Topologically sort \( V \) into a sequence \((i_1, \ldots, i_n)\).
2. for \( j := 1 \ldots n \) do
3. \( X(i_j) := \emptyset \)
4. \( Y := \{X(k) \mid k \rightarrow i_j \in E\} \)
5. for \( c \in C(i_j) \) do
6. \( S := \{Z \in Y \mid c \in Z\}; \quad C' := C \setminus \{c\}; \)
7. \( Y' := Y \setminus S; \)
8. if \( \exists c' \in C' \) such that \( |S| + \beta(i_j, c) - \beta(i_j, c') < 0 \) then
9. continue with the next \( c \)
10. while \( \exists c' \in C' \) such that \( |S| + \beta(i_j, c) - \beta(i_j, c') \geq |Y'| \) do
11. \( C' := C' \setminus \{c'\}; \quad Y' := Y' \setminus \{Z \in Y' \mid c' \in Z\} \)
12. Construct the following bipartite graph \( G' := (V' = Y', \{\{c' \times \{1, \ldots, |S| + \beta(i_j, c) - \beta(i_j, c')\} \mid c' \in C'\}, E') \)
13. where \( Z \to (c', x) \in E' \) if \( c' \in Z \)
14. if the maximum bipartite matching in \( G' \)
15. has size \( |Y'| \) then
16. add \( c \) to \( X(i_j) \)
17. if \( i_j \in Q \) then
18. if \( q(i_j) \not\in X(i_j) \) return \( \text{NO} \)
19. \( X(i_j) := \{q(i_j)\} \)
20. return \( \text{YES} \)

Lemma 4 If Algorithm 5 returns \( \text{YES} \), then for all \( i \in V \), for all \( c \in X(i) \), there exists a Nash equilibrium \( s^* \) such that \( s^*_i = c \) and for all \( j \neq i \), \( s^*_j \in X(j) \).

Now, if Algorithm 5 returns \( \text{YES} \), then from the definition, for all \( i \in V \), \( A_i \neq \emptyset \) and for all \( j \in P \), \( A_j = \{q(j)\} \). By Lemma 4 it follows that there exists a Nash equilibrium \( s^* \) which is consistent with \( q \).

Conversely, suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium \( s^* \) which is consistent with \( q \). Let \( \theta = (i_1, \ldots, i_n) \) be the topological ordering of \( V \) chosen in line 1 of Algorithm 5. We argue that for all \( j \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \), \( s^*(i_j) \in X(i_j) \). The claim follows easily for \( i_1 \). Consider a node \( i_m \) and suppose for all \( j < m \), \( s^*(i_j) \in X(i_j) \). For \( c \in C \), let \( N_m(s^*, c) = \{i_k \in N_m \mid s^*(i_k) = c\} \). Since \( s^* \) is a Nash equilibrium, \( s^*(i_m) \) is a best response to the choices made by all nodes \( i_k \in N_m \). This implies that for all \( c \neq s^*_m \), \( |N_m(s^*, c)| + \beta(i_j, c) \leq |N_m(s^*, s^*_m)| + \beta(i_j, s^*_m) \). Note that \( |S| \geq |N_m(s^*, s^*_m)| \) and so \( c \) is not discarded in line 8. Also, it guarantees the existence of a matching of size \( |Y'| \) at line 12 and thus \( s^*(i_m) \in X(i_m) \).

We claim that if the Hopcroft–Karp algorithm is used for each matching at line 11, then Algorithm 5 runs in \( \mathcal{O}(|G|^2) \). First, for each node \( k \), \( X(k) \) is in \( Y \) at most once and so is matched at most once for each colour. We claim that the worst case running time is for \( |Y'| = |V'| \). Now, due to lines 9-10 we have \( |S| + \beta(i_j, c) - \beta(i_j, c') \leq |Y'| = \mathcal{O}(n) \), so \( G' \) at line 11 has \( \mathcal{O}(nm) \) nodes, \( \mathcal{O}(n \cdot m) \) edges and one matching takes \( \mathcal{O}(\sqrt{nm} \cdot n^2 m) \) time.

Similarly Algorithm 6 solves the \( \exists \text{NE} \) problem.

Algorithm 6: Algorithm for \( \forall \text{NE} \) on unweighted DAGs with out-degree \( \leq 1 \).

**Input:** A coordination game \( G((V, E), C, \beta) \) and query \( q : Q \rightarrow M \)

**Output:** \( \text{YES} \) if all Nash equilibria are consistent with \( q \) and \( \text{NO} \) otherwise.

1. Topologically sort \( V \) into a sequence \((i_1, \ldots, i_n)\).
2. for \( j := 1 \ldots n \) do
3. \( X(i_j) := \{\text{the set of colours player } i_j \text{ can play in any Nash equilibrium (lines 3-13 of Algorithm 5)}\) \)
4. if \( i_j \in Q \) and \( X(i_j) \neq \{q(i_j)\} \) then
5. return \( \text{NO} \)
6. return \( \text{YES} \)

Theorem 9 Algorithm 6 solves the \( \forall \text{NE} \) problem for DAGs with out-degree at most one in \( \mathcal{O}(|G|^2) \) time.

7 Conclusions

We presented a simple class of coordination games on directed graphs. We focused on checking whether a given partial colouring of a subset of the nodes is consistent with some pure Nash equilibrium or, alternatively, with all pure Nash equilibria. We showed these problems to be NP-complete and coNP-complete, respectively, in general. However, we also identified several natural cases when these decision problems are tractable.

In the case of weighted DAGs with out-degree at most one and colour complete graphs with no bonuses a simple reduction from the PARTITION problem and its complement, shows NP and coNP-hardness of their \( \exists \text{NE} \) and \( \forall \text{NE} \) problems, respectively. This does not exclude the possibility that pseudo-polynomial algorithms exist for these problems. We conjecture that even for unweighted colour complete graphs these problems are NP/coNP-hard in the presence of bonuses or when the set of colours, \( M \), is not fixed.

There are several ways our results can be extended further. One is to study other constraints, e.g. uniqueness of Nash equilibrium or checking maximum payoff for a given player. Another is to look at different solution concepts, e.g. strong equilibria. And yet another is to look for more classes of graphs that can be analysed in polynomial time. Given that these decision problems
are already computationally hard for DAGs with three colours, the possibilities for such new classes are rather limited.

Finally, we only focused on pure Nash equilibria in this paper, which may not exist for general graphs. On the other hand, mixed Nash equilibrium always exist due to Nash’s theorem. It would be interesting to know whether the complexity of finding one is PPAD-complete problem just like it is for general polymatrix games (Cai and Daskalakis 2011).

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Appendix

A Full algorithms

Algorithm 2: Algorithm for \(\forall NE\) on arbitrary graphs with two colours and monochromatic queries.

Input: A coordination game \(G((V,E),w,C,\beta)\) and monochromatic query \(q: Q \rightarrow M\).

Output: YES if all Nash equilibria are consistent with \(q\) and NO otherwise.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{for } i \in V & \text{ do} \\
\text{if } s(i) = 1 & \text{ then } s(i) = 0 \\
\text{set } S := \{i \mid s(i) = 0\} \\
\text{while } S \neq \emptyset & \text{ do} \\
\text{for } j \in V / i \to j \in E & \text{ do} \\
\text{if } s(j) = 1 & \text{ and } 0 \in C(j) \text{ and } p_j((0,s_{-j})) > p_j(s) \text{ then} \\
\text{s(j) = 0} \\
\text{add j to S} \\
\text{if } \forall i \in Q s(i) = 0 & \text{ return YES else return NO}
\end{align*}
\]

B Full proofs of lemmas and theorems

Theorem 1 The \(\exists NE\) problem for coordination games with two colours and monochromatic queries can be solved in \(O(|G|)\) time using Algorithm 1.

Proof. We show that Algorithm 1 solves the \(\exists NE\) problem and that its running time is \(O(|G|)\). Let \(s\) be a partial order on all joint strategies \(s : V \rightarrow M\) defined as follows: \(s \leq s'\) iff for all \(i \in V, s(i) \leq s'(i)\). Let \(s_0\) denote the value of \(s\) once line 3 is reached. The colouring \(s_0\) may not be a Nash equilibrium, so Algorithm 1 tries to correct this with the minimum number of switches from 0 to 1. Note that for any colouring \(s\) we have \(s_0 \preceq s\). Note that lines 3-9 of Algorithm 1 can be seen as a function \(F : (V \rightarrow M) \rightarrow (V \rightarrow M)\) from the initial colouring, in this case \(s_0\), to a new colouring, \(F(s_0)\). Note that \(F\) is monotonic according to \(\preceq\), i.e. if \(s \preceq s'\) then \(F(s) \preceq F(s')\). This is simply because the more colour 1 is used initially, the more players would like to switch to it. Also, any Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of \(F\), because no player would like to switch at line 7. We now need the following lemma.

Lemma 5 For every joint strategy \(s\), \(F(s)\) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Every node with colour 1 in \( F(s) \) is added to the set \( S \) at most once: either at the beginning or when it switches from 0 to 1. If a node does not have a predecessor with colour 1, it cannot possibly have an incentive to switch to 1, because this would give him reward 0. Every time a predecessor of a node switches to 1, we consider that node in line 7 and whether it is a predecessor with colour 1, it cannot possibly have an incentive when it switches from 0 to 1. If a node does not have a predecessor with colour 1, it cannot have an incentive to switch back from 1 to 0 because the payoff for choosing 1 is weakly increasing for every player after each strategy update.

Now, if Algorithm 1 returns YES, then the correctness follows from Lemma 5. Since in this case, \( F(s_0) \) is consistent with \( q \) and by Lemma 5 it is a Nash equilibrium. Conversely, if Algorithm 1 returns NO then there exists \( i \in Q \) such that \( F(s_0)(i) = 1 \). Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium \( s' \) consistent with \( q \). Then \( s_0 \preceq s' \) and \( F(s_0) \preceq F(s') = s' \), but \( s'(i) = q(i) = 0 \); a contradiction.

To analyse its computational complexity, note that each node can be added to the set \( S \) at most once, because the colour of each node changes at most once and so each edge is considered at most once as well. Moreover, we can compute \( p_j((1, \ldots, j)) \) and \( p_j(s) \) in constant time, by storing for each node the sum of weights of edges from neighbours with colour 1. Every time the colour of a node \( j \) changes in line 8, for any neighbour \( i \) of \( j \) we add the weight of the edge leading from \( j \) to \( i \) to the stored value for node \( i \); we need to make such an update \( O(e) \) times in total. Thus the total complexity of this algorithm is \( O(n + e) \).

Theorem 2 The \( \forall \wedge \forall \) problem for coordination games with two colours and monochromatic queries can be solved in \( O(|G|) \) time using Algorithm 2.

Proof. Let \( s_0 \) be the joint strategy defined by lines 1–2 in Algorithm 2. By an argument very similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we can show that \( F(s_0) \) is a Nash equilibrium. If Algorithm 2 returns NO then there exists a \( j \in Q \) such that \( F(s_0)(j) \neq q(j) \). Therefore, \( F(s_0) \) is a Nash equilibrium which is not consistent with \( q \).

To show the converse, as in the proof of Theorem 1, we define a partial order \( \preceq \) on joint strategies as before. Note that for any joint strategy \( s \) we have \( s \preceq s_0 \). Again, note that lines 3–9 of Algorithm 2 define a function \( F : (V \rightarrow M) \rightarrow (V \rightarrow M) \) which satisfies the property: if \( s \preceq s' \) then \( F(s) \preceq F(s') \).

Now suppose that Algorithm 2 returns YES then for all \( i \in Q \): \( F(s_0)(i) = 0 \). We need to prove that every Nash equilibrium is consistent with \( q \). Suppose this is not the case, then there exists a Nash equilibrium \( s' \) and a node \( j \in Q \) such that \( s'(j) \neq q(j) \). By our assumption, this implies that \( s'(j) = 1 \). We have \( s' \preceq s_0 \) and therefore \( s' = F(s') \preceq F(s_0) \). From \( s'(j) = 1 \) and \( F(s_0)(j) = 0 \) we get a contradiction.

The time complexity analysis of Algorithm 2 is the same as that of Algorithm 1.

Corollary 1 The \( \forall \wedge \forall \) problem for coordination games with two colours and polychromatic queries can be solved in \( O(|G|) \) time.

Proof. Let \( q : Q \rightarrow M \) be a polychromatic query. Define \( P_0 \) and \( P_1 \) to be the sets of players asked to pick 0 and 1, respectively, by \( q \). Formally, \( P_0 = \{ i \in Q \mid q(i) = 0 \} \) and \( P_1 = \{ i \in Q \mid q(i) = 1 \} \). Let \( q_0 = q|_{P_0} \) and \( q_1 = q|_{P_1} \). It can be verified that every Nash equilibrium is consistent with \( q \) iff every Nash equilibrium is consistent with \( q_0 \) and \( q_1 \). Note that both \( q_0 \) and \( q_1 \) are monochromatic queries and therefore, by Theorem 2, both of them can be answered in \( O(|G|) \) time. Thus the claim follows.

Proposition 1 For any Nash equilibrium \( s \) in \( D(X_1, \ldots, X_k; x; \gamma) \) from Figure 2: (a) \( s(Y) = x \) iff \( \exists i \ s(X_i) = x \) and (b) \( s(Y) = \neg x \) iff \( \forall i \ s(X_i) = \neg x \).

Proof. (a) If \( \exists i \ s(X_i) = x \) then player \( Y \)'s payoff for picking \( x \) is at least \( k \) and for \( \neg x \) is at most \( k \), so it has to be \( s(Y) = x \). On the other hand, if \( \forall i \ s(X_i) \neq x \) then player \( Y \)'s payoff for picking \( x \) is \( k - 1 \) and for \( \neg x \) is \( k \), so it has to be \( s(Y) = \neg x \). On the other hand, if \( \exists i \ s(X_i) \neq x \) then player \( Y \)'s payoff for picking \( x \) is at least \( k \) and for picking \( \neg x \) is at most \( k - 1 \), so it has to be \( s(Y) \neq x \).

Theorem 3 The \( \forall \wedge \forall \) problem for singleton queries is \( \text{coNP} \)-complete for unweighted DAGs with three colours and no bonuses.

Proof. To prove \( \text{coNP} \)-hardness we provide a reduction from the tautology problem for formulae in 3-DNF form, which is \( \text{coNP} \)-complete. Assume we are given a 3-DNF formula \( \phi = (a_1 \land b_1 \land c_1) \lor (a_2 \land b_2 \land c_2) \lor \ldots \lor (a_k \land b_k \land c_k) \) with \( k \) clauses and \( n \) propositional variables \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \), where each \( a_i, b_i, c_i \) is a literal equal to \( x_j \) or \( \neg x_j \) for some \( j \). We will construct a coordination game \( G_\phi \) of size \( O(n + k) \) such that a particular singleton \( \forall \wedge \forall \) query is true for \( G_\phi \) iff \( \phi \) evaluates to true for all truth assignments.

First for every propositional variable \( x_i \), there are four nodes \( X_i, \neg X_i, L_i, T_i \) in \( G_\phi \), each with two possible colours \( \top \) or \( \bot \). We connect these four nodes using gadgets \( D(X_i, \neg X_i, \top, L_i) \) and \( D(X_i, \neg X_i, \bot, T_i) \). This makes sure that in any Nash equilibrium, \( s \), we have \( s(L_i) = \top \) and \( s(T_i) = \bot \) iff \( X_i \) and \( \neg X_i \) are assigned different colours.

Next, for every clause \( (a_i \lor b_i \lor c_i) \) in \( \phi \) we add to the game graph \( G_\phi \) node \( C_i \). We use gadget \( D(a_i, b_i, c_i, \top; C_i) \) to connect literals with clauses, where we identify each \( x_i \) with \( X_i \) and each \( \neg x_i \) with \( \neg X_i \). Note that Proposition 1 implies that the colour of \( C_i \) is \( \top \) iff all nodes \( a_i, b_i, c_i \) are assigned \( \top \).
We add two nodes $T$ and $F$ to gather colours $\top$ and $\bot$ from the $L_i$ and $\overline{L}_i$ nodes. Also, we add an additional node $\Phi$ to gather the values of all the clauses. We connect these using gadgets $D(L_1, \ldots, L_n; \top; T)$, $D(\overline{L}_1, \ldots, \overline{L}_n; \bot; F)$, and $D(C_1, \ldots, C_k; \top; \Phi)$. The first two gadgets guarantee that if in a Nash equilibrium $s$ the colour of $T$ is $\top$ and the colour of $F$ is $\bot$ then $s$ corresponds to a valid truth assignment. The last gadget guarantees that the colour of $\Phi$ is $\top$ iff at least one of $C_i$'s has colour $\top$.

Now, we need to express that for every Nash equilibrium $s$: $s(T) = \top$ and $s(F) = \bot$ implies that $s(\Phi) = \top$. We will use gadget from Figure 3. It consists of the three nodes $T, F, \Phi$ that we already defined in $G_\phi$ and several additional ones. We claim that $\forall NE$ query $q(Z) = \ast$ is true for $G_\phi$ iff $\Phi$ is a tautology. However, equivalently, we will prove that $\forall$NE query $q(Z) = \ast$ is false for $G_\phi$ iff $\phi$ is not a tautology.

$(\Rightarrow)$ Let $s$ be a Nash equilibrium which does not satisfy query $q(Z) = \ast$, which essentially means that $s(T) = \bot$. We will show that the following truth assignment $\nu(x_i) = s(X_i)$ makes $\phi$ false. Looking at the gadget in Figure 3 we can easily deduce that all nodes $W, X, Y$ are assigned $\bot$ in $s$, because otherwise $Z$ would have an incentive to switch to $\ast$. This means that it has to be $s(X_i) = s(\Phi) = \bot$, and $s(U) = \top$ so $s(T) = \top$. Next, $s(T) = \top$ implies that $s(L_i) = \top$ for all $i$ and $s(F) = \bot$ implies that $s(\overline{L}_i) = \bot$ for all $i$, so $s(\neg X_i) = \neg s(X_i)$ for all $i$. Finally, $s(\Phi) = \bot$ implies that $s(C_i) = \bot$ for all $i$, but then $\nu$ makes every clause in $\phi$ false, and so also makes the whole formula $\phi$ false.

$(\Leftarrow)$ Let $\nu: \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \to \{\top, \bot\}$ be a truth assignment that makes $\phi$ false. We form the following Nash equilibrium, $s$, by first setting $s(X_i) = \nu(x_i)$ and $s(\neg X_i) = \neg \nu(x_i)$ for all $i$. Note that this makes the best response of nodes $L_i$ to be $\top$ and of nodes $\overline{L}_i$ to be $\bot$. It follows that the best responses of $T$ and $F$ are $\top$ and $\bot$, respectively. On the other hand, since $\nu$ makes $\phi$ false, all clauses $C_1, \ldots, C_n$ in $\phi$ are false, and so for all $i$: $s(C_i) = \bot$ is $C_i$'s best response. Finally, the best response of node $\Phi$ is $\bot$. Looking at the gadget in Figure 3, given the values $s(T) = \top, s(F) = s(\Phi) = \bot$, one can easily see that $s(U) = \top, s(W) = s(X) = s(y) = s(Z) = \bot$ are these nodes best responses. Therefore, $s$ is a Nash equilibrium which does not satisfy query $q(Z) = \ast$. □

**Theorem 4** The $\exists$NE problem is NP-complete for unweighted DAGs with two colours and no bonuses.

**Proof.** To prove NP-hardness we provide a reduction from the 3-SAT problem, which is NP-complete. Assume we are given a 3-SAT formula $\phi = (a_1 \lor b_1 \lor c_1) \land (a_2 \lor b_2 \lor c_2) \land \ldots \land (a_k \lor b_k \lor c_k)$ with $k$ clauses and $n$ propositional variables $x_1, \ldots, x_n$, where each $a_i, b_i, c_i$ is a literal equal to $x_j$ or $\neg x_j$ for some $j$. We will construct a coordination game $G_\phi$ of size $O(n + k)$ such that a particular $\exists$NE query is true for $G_\phi$ iff $\phi$ is satisfiable.

First, for every propositional variable $x_i$ there are four nodes $X_i, \neg X_i, L_i, \overline{L}_i$ in $G_\phi$, each with two possible colours $\top$ or $\bot$. Intuitively, for a given truth assignment, if $x_i$ is true then $\top$ should be chosen for $X_i$ and $\bot$ should be chosen for $\neg X_i$ and the other way around if $x_i$ is false. To select only the Nash equilibria which correspond to valid truth assignments we make use of the gadget $D$ presented in Figure 2. We connect these four nodes using gadgets $D(X_i, \neg X_i, \top; L_i)$ and $D(X_i, \neg X_i, \bot; \overline{L}_i)$. This makes sure that in any Nash equilibrium, $s$, we have $s(L_i) = \top$ and $s(\overline{L}_i) = \bot$ iff $X_i$ and $\neg X_i$ are assigned different colours. This is because from Proposition 1 it follows that if $s(L_i) = \top$ then $\top$ is assigned to at least one of $X_i, \neg X_i$ and if $s(\overline{L}_i) = \bot$ then $\bot$ is assigned to at least one of them as well. So necessarily, $\top$ and $\bot$ are assigned to exactly one of them.

Next, for every clause $(a_1 \lor b_1 \lor c_1)$ in $\phi$ we add to the game graph $G_\phi$ node $C_i$. We use gadget $D(a_1, b_1, c_1; \bot; C_i)$ to connect literals with clauses, where we identify each $x_i$ with $X_i$ and each $\neg x_i$ with $\neg X_i$. Note that Proposition 1 implies that $s(C_i) = \top$ iff at least one of nodes $a_1, b_1, c_1$ is assigned $\top$.

Finally, we have two nodes $T$ and $F$ which gather all nodes whose colours should be $\top$ and $\bot$, respectively. We connect these using gadgets $D(L_1, \ldots, L_n; C_1, \ldots, C_k; \top; T)$ and $D(\overline{L}_1, \ldots, \overline{L}_n; \bot; F)$. We claim that $\exists$NE query $q(T) = \top, q(F) = \bot$ is true for $G_\phi$ iff $\phi$ is satisfiable.

$(\Rightarrow)$ Assume that $s$ is a Nash equilibrium consistent with $q$ in the game $G_\phi$. We claim that the truth assignment $\nu: \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \to \{\top, \bot\}$ that assigns $\nu(x_i) = \top$ iff $s(X_i) = \top$, and $\nu(x_i) = \bot$ iff $s(\neg X_i) = \top$, makes $\phi$ true.

Since $s$ is a Nash equilibrium and $s(T) = \top$, Proposition 1 implies that all $L_i$-s and $C_i$-s are assigned colour $\top$. Similarly, $s(F) = \bot$ implies that all $\overline{L}_i$-s are assigned colour $\bot$. But this means that the assignment of the colours to $X_i$-s and $\neg X_i$-s corresponds to a valid truth assignment. Furthermore, for any $i \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$: $s(C_i) = \top$ implies that at least one of the literals $a_i, b_i, c_i$ is assigned $\top$. Therefore $\nu$ makes every clause $C_i$ true and so the whole formula $\phi$ true as well.

$(\Leftarrow)$ Assume $\phi$ is satisfiable. Take a truth assignment $\nu: \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \to \{\top, \bot\}$ that makes $\phi$ true. We will construct a Nash equilibrium $s$ consistent with $q$. For all $j$, if $\nu(x_j)$ is true then assign $s(X_j) = \top$, $s(\neg X_j) = \bot$, and if $\nu(x_j)$ is false then assign $s(X_j) = \bot$, $s(\neg X_j) = \top$. It follows that if we assign $s(L_i) = \top, s(\overline{L}_i) = \bot$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, n$ then $L_i$ and $\overline{L}_i$ have no incentive to switch. Furthermore, because $\nu$ makes every clause $C_i$ true, $\top$ is assigned to $s$ at least one of the nodes $a_i, b_i, c_i$, so if we set $s(C_i) = \top$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, k$, then no $C_i$ has an incentive to switch. Finally, setting $s(T) = \top$ and $s(F) = \bot$, makes $s$ consistent with $q$ and neither $T$ nor $F$ has an incentive to switch. □
Corollary 2 The $\exists\text{NE}$ problem for singleton queries is NP-complete for unweighted DAGs with three colours and no bonuses.

Proof. To prove NP-hardness we again reduce from the 3-SAT problem. Assume we are given a 3-SAT formula $\phi$. In Theorem 4 we constructed a game $G_{\phi}$ for which $\phi$ is satisfiable if and only if there exists a Nash equilibrium $(q(T) = \top, q(F) = \bot)$ is true for $G_{\phi}$, where $T$ and $F$ are two nodes of $G_{\phi}$. We now combine this reduction with the gadget depicted in Figure 2, which consists of several nodes including nodes $T$ and $F$ from $G_{\phi}$, to form a new game $G_{\phi}'$. We claim that a singleton query $q(Z) = \ast$ is true in $G_{\phi}'$ iff $\phi$ is satisfiable.

$(\Rightarrow)$ Let $s$ be a Nash equilibrium satisfying $s(Z) = \ast$. Notice that based on the structure of the gadget, $s(Z) = \ast$ implies that $s(X) = s(Y) = \ast$, which implies that $s(T) = \top$ and $s(F) = \bot$. We already know that this implies that $s$ is a Nash equilibrium.

$(\Leftarrow)$ If $\phi$ is satisfiable then there exists a Nash equilibrium $s$ in $G_{\phi}$ such that $s(T) = \top$ and $s(F) = \bot$. Notice that $s$ can easily be extended to a Nash equilibrium $s'$ in $G_{\phi}'$ by setting $s'(X) = s'(Y) = s'(Z) = \ast$, which is consistent with the query $q$.

Theorem 5 The $\exists\text{NE}$ problem for simple cycles can be solved in $O(|G|)$ time.

Proof. We show that given a simple cycle over the nodes $V = \{0, \ldots, n-1\}$ and a query $q : Q \to M$, the output of Algorithm 3 is YES if and only if there exists a Nash equilibrium $s$ which is consistent with $q$.

Suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium $s$ which is consistent with $q$. We can argue by induction on $n$ that on termination of Algorithm 3, for all $i \leq n$, we have $s^{\ast}(i) \in X_{i}$, which in turn implies that the output of Algorithm 3 is YES. Since $s^{\ast}$ is consistent with $q$, we have $s^{\ast}(0) = q(0)$ and by line 1 of Algorithm 3, $X_{0} = \{s^{\ast}(0)\}$. Assume that we have $s^{\ast}(i) \in X_{i}$ and consider the iteration of the loop in line 2 of Algorithm 3 for $i + 1$. We have the following cases.

If $X_{i} \subseteq B_{i+1}$ then $s^{\ast}(i) \in B_{i+2}$, by the definition of $B_{i+1}$ and the fact that $s^{\ast}$ is a Nash equilibrium, we have that $s^{\ast}(i+1) = s^{\ast}(i)$. This is because $s^{\ast}(i)$ strictly dominates any other strategy choice for node $i$. By line 6 in Algorithm 3, we have $X_{i+1} = X_{i}$ and therefore, $s^{\ast}(i+1) \in X_{i+1}$.

If $X_{i} \not\subseteq B_{i+1}$ and $s^{\ast}(i+1) \in A_{i+1}$ then by line 4 of Algorithm 3, we have $s^{\ast}(i+1) \in X_{i+1}$. If $s^{\ast}(i+1) \not\subseteq A_{i+1}$, then since $s^{\ast}$ is a Nash equilibrium, $s^{\ast}(i+1) = s^{\ast}(i)$ and $s^{\ast}(i+1) \in C_{i+1}$ (otherwise node $i+1$ would have a profitable deviation to a strategy in $A_{i+1}$). Therefore, by line 4 of Algorithm 3, we have $s^{\ast}(i+1) \in X_{i} \cap C_{i+1} \subseteq X_{i+1}$.

Conversely, suppose the output of Algorithm 3 is YES. From the definition, this implies that for all $i \in V$, $X_{i} \neq \emptyset$ and for all $j \in Q$, $q(j) \in X_{j}$ (in fact, $X_{j} = \{q(j)\}$). We define a Nash equilibrium $s^{\ast}$ as follows. First, let $s^{\ast}(0) = q(0)$. Next we assign values to $s^{\ast}(i)$ starting at $i = n-1$ and going down to $i = 1$ as described below.

- If $i \in Q$ then $s^{\ast}(i) = q(i)$.
- If $i \not\in Q$ and $X_{i} \subseteq B_{i+1}$ then by Algorithm 3 we have $X_{i+1} = X_{i}$. Let $s^{\ast}(i) = s^{\ast}(i+1)$.
- Assume $i \not\in Q$ and $X_{i} \not\subseteq B_{i+1}$. If $s^{\ast}(i+1) \in X_{i} \cap C_{i+1}$ set $s^{\ast}(i) = s^{\ast}(i+1)$. Otherwise $s^{\ast}(i+1) \in A_{i+1}$ and we set $s^{\ast}(i)$ to any element in $X_{i} \setminus B_{i+1}$.

It is straightforward to verify that for the joint strategy $s^{\ast}$ defined as above, for all $i \in V$, $s^{\ast}(i) \in X_{i}$. We now argue that $s^{\ast}$ is a Nash equilibrium. Suppose not, then there exists $j \in V$ and a strategy $x \in C(j)$ such that $p_{j}(x, s^{\ast}_{\sim j}) > p_{j}(s^{\ast})$. We have the following cases.

Case $j \not\in Q$. If $X_{j+1} \subseteq B_{j}$ then by the definition of $s^{\ast}$, we have $s^{\ast}(j) = s^{\ast}(j+1)$ and so $x \neq s^{\ast}(j+1)$. By the definition of $B_{j}$ and $X_{j+1}$, we have that for all strategies $y \in C(j)$: $\beta(j, s^{\ast}(j)) + w_{j+1 \rightarrow j} \geq \beta(j, y)$. Now, we have that $p_{j}(s^{\ast}) = \beta(j, s^{\ast}(j)) + w_{j+1 \rightarrow j} \geq \beta(j, x) + 1 > p_{j}(x, s^{\ast}_{\sim j})$ which is a contradiction.

Case $j \in Q$. Consider the value of $X_{j}$ in line 7 of Algorithm 3 during the iteration when $i = j+1$. Since the output of Algorithm 3 is assumed to be YES, we have that $q(j) \in X_{j}$. Now applying a similar case analysis as above, we can argue that node $j$ does not have a profitable deviation from $s^{\ast}$.

Theorem 6 The $\exists\text{NE}$ problem for simple cycles (unweighted simple cycles) can be solved in $O(|G|)$ time (respectively, $O(|G|)$ time using Algorithm 7 in the appendix).
Proof. We first show that in the case of unweighted simple cycles, for which Nash equilibrium always exists, Algorithm 7 solves the VNE problem for unweighted simple cycles in $\Omega(|G|)$ time. In other words, we argue that given an unweighted simple cycle over the nodes $V = \{0, \ldots, n-1\}$ and a query $q: Q \rightarrow C$, the output of Algorithm 7 is YES iff for every Nash equilibrium $s^*$, the joint strategy $s^*$ is consistent with $q$.

Suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium $s^*$ which is not consistent with $q$. For the sake of simplicity, assume that $s^*(0) = q(0)$ and let $j$ be the minimal index such that $s^*(j) \neq q(j)$. By induction we argue that if Algorithm 7 does not terminate with an output NO before the iteration with $i = j \oplus 1$, then for all $k$ such that $0 \leq k \leq j$: $s^*(k) \in X_k$. Since $s^*(0) = q(0)$, line 1 of Algorithm 7 implies $X_0 = \{s^*(0)\}$. Assume that we have $s^*(i) \in X_i$ for $i < j$ and consider the iteration of the loop in line 2 of Algorithm 7 for $i \oplus 1$. We have the following cases.

If $X_i \subseteq B_{i \oplus 1}$ then $s^*(i) \in B_{i \oplus 1}$, by the definition of $B_{i \oplus 1}$ and the fact that $s^*$ is a Nash equilibrium, we have that $s^*(i \oplus 1) = s^*(i)$. This is because $s^*(i)$ strictly dominates any other strategy choice for node $i \oplus 1$. By line 6 in Algorithm 7, we have $X_{i \oplus 1} = X_i$ and therefore, $s^*(i \oplus 1) \in X_{i \oplus 1}$.

If $X_i \not\subseteq B_{i \oplus 1}$ and $s^*(i \oplus 1) \not\in A_{i \oplus 1}$ then by line 4 of Algorithm 7, we have $s^*(i \oplus 1) \in X_{i \oplus 1}$. If $s^*(i \oplus 1) \not\in A_{i \oplus 1}$, then since $s^*$ is a Nash equilibrium, $s^*(i \oplus 1) = s^*(i)$ and $s^*(i) \in C_{i \oplus 1}$ (otherwise node $i \oplus 1$ has a profitable deviation to a strategy in $A_{i \oplus 1}$). Therefore, by line 4 of Algorithm 7, we have $s^*(i \oplus 1) \in X_i \cap C_{i \oplus 1} \subseteq X_{i \oplus 1}$.

Now consider the iteration of Algorithm 7 when $i = j \oplus 1$. By the above argument, $s^*(j) \in X_j$ and by assumption $s^*(j) \neq q(j)$. Therefore, the condition on line 8 is satisfied and the output of the algorithm is NO.

Conversely, suppose the output of Algorithm 7 is NO. Let $j$ be the index such that the algorithm terminates with $i = j$. This implies that $j \in Q$ and $\{q(j)\} \not\subseteq X_j$. Note that by definition, $X_j \neq \emptyset$. Define a partial joint strategy $s_1$ on the nodes $\{0, \ldots, j\}$ inductively as follows. Let $s_1(0) = q(0)$ and $s_1(j) \in X_j \setminus \{q(j)\}$. We define $s_1(i)$ starting at $i = j - 1$ going down to $i = 1$ as follows.

- If $i \in Q$ then $s_1(i) = q(i)$.
- If $i \not\in Q$ and $X_i \subseteq B_{i \oplus 1}$ then by Algorithm 7 we have $X_i = X_{i \oplus 1}$. Let $s_1(i) = s_1(i \oplus 1)$.
- Assume $i \not\in Q$ and $X_i \not\subseteq B_{i \oplus 1}$. If $s_1(i \oplus 1) \in X_i \cap C_{i \oplus 1}$ we set $s_1(i) = s_1(i \oplus 1)$. Otherwise we have that $s_1(i \oplus 1) \not\in A_{i \oplus 1}$ and we set $s_1(i)$ to any element in $X_i \setminus B_{i \oplus 1}$.

We can then extend $s_1$ to a joint strategy $s_2$ by allowing nodes $j + 1, j + 2, \ldots, n - 1$ to switch, in this order, to their best response strategies. Note that this is well defined since the best response of a node $i$ depends only on the strategy of its unique predecessor $i \oplus 1$ on the cycle. If $s_2$ is a Nash equilibrium then we have a joint strategy which is not consistent with $q$.

Finally, we show that Algorithm 4 solves the VNE problem in $\Omega(m|G|)$ time for weighted simple cycles. First, suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium $s^*$ which is not consistent with a VNE query $q: Q \rightarrow M$. Consider the iteration of the main loop of Algorithm 4 for $c = s^*(0)$. Note that Algorithm 3 for $q'(0) = s^*(0)$ would return YES, because $s^*$ is consistent with $q'$. From the proof of Theorem 5 we know that, for every $i \in V$, the set $X_i$ this algorithm computes is equal to the set of colours node $i$ can have in any Nash equilibrium consistent with $q'$. Note that there has to be $i^* \in Q$ such that $q(i^*) \neq s^*(i^*) \in X(i^*)$, because $s^*$ is not consistent with $q$. Thus Algorithm 4 returns NO, because $X_{i^*} \neq \{q(i^*)\}$.

Conversely, suppose Algorithm 4 returns NO for a query $q$. Then, there exists $i^* \in Q$ for which $X_{i^*}$ computed by Algorithm 4 is $\neq \{q(i^*)\}$. Let us pick any $x \in X_{i^*} \setminus \{q(i^*)\}$. Based on the interpretation of the set $X(i^*)$, there exists a Nash equilibrium $s^*$ such that $s^*(i^*) = x$. Such $s^*$ would not be consistent with $q$, which concludes the proof.

Lemma 1 The relation $\succ_s$ is acyclic, i.e. for all $k \geq 2$ there is no sequence of colours $x_1, \ldots, x_k$ such that $x_1 \succ_s x_2 \succ_s \ldots \succ_s x_k \succ_s x_1$.

Proof. Suppose there is such a sequence. From the definition of $\succ_s$ there exist players $i_1, \ldots, i_k$ such that $\{x_j, x_{j+1}\} \subseteq C(i_j)$ and $s(i_j) = x_j$ for all $j = 1, \ldots, k$ (where we identify $x_{k+1} = x_1$). For a joint strategy $s$ and colour $c \in M$, let $\#c(s)$ denote the number of players who chose colour $c$ in $s$, i.e., $\#c(s) = |\{v \in V | s(v) = c\}|$. Note that for all player $i_j$’s payoff in $s$ is $\#x_j(s) - 1$ and switching to $x_{j+1}$ would give him payoff $\#x_{j+1}(s)$. Therefore, $\#x_j(s) - 1 \geq \#x_{j+1}(s)$, because otherwise $s$ would not be a Nash equilibrium. However, this implies $\#x_1(s) - k \geq \#x_1(s)$; a contradiction.

Lemma 2 Any acyclic binary relation on a finite set can be extended to a total order.

Proof. Let $\succ$ be an acyclic relation on a finite set $S$ and $k = |S|$. The directed graph defined by $G = (S, \succ)$ is a DAG, because $\succ$ is acyclic. Therefore we can topologically sort all the elements in $S$ into a sequence $x_1, \ldots, x_k$ in such a way that $x_i \succ x_j$ implies $i \leq j$. Notice that a relation $\succ^*$ defined as $x_i \succ^* x_j$ iff $i \leq j$ is a total order on $S$.

Lemma 3 For any Nash equilibrium $s$, $SP(s^*_{s}) = s$. 
Proof. Suppose that $SP(z^*)_i(i) \neq s(i)$ for some player $i$. This means $s(i) \neq \max_{s \in C} C(i)$, so there exists $x \in C(i)$ such that $x \succeq^*_s s(i)$ and $x \neq s(i)$. However, $\{x, s(i)\} \subseteq C(i)$ implies that $s(i) \succeq x$ and so also $s(i) \succeq^*_s x$ should hold; a contradiction with the fact that $\succeq^*_s$, as a total order, is antisymmetric. □

Example 2 Let the set of colours $M = \{1, \ldots, m\}$ and consider a clique consisting of $(m-1)m/2$ players. For every $x, y \in M$ such that $x < y$ there is exactly one player in this clique whose available colours are $x$ and $y$ only. It is easy to see that for the total order $\succeq$ defined as $m \succeq m-1 \succeq \ldots \succeq 1$ the number of players choosing colour $m$ in $SP(\succeq)$ is $m-1$, which is the maximum possible. It can be verified that in $SP(\succeq)$, all the players who picked colour $x$ receive a payoff of $x-2$, each colour gives a different payoff and no player can improve his payoff. It follows that $SP(\succeq)$ is a Nash equilibrium. If we consider any other total order on $M$, it will result in a permutation of this sequence of payoffs. Because all of these numbers are different, no two joint strategies induced by two different total orders are the same.

Lemma 4 If Algorithm 5 returns YES, then for all $i \in V$, for all $c \in X(i)$, there exists a Nash equilibrium $s^*$ such that $s^*_i = c$ and for all $j \neq i$, $s^*_j \in X(j)$.

Proof. Let $\theta = (i_1, \ldots, i_n)$ be the topological ordering of $V$ chosen in line 1 of Algorithm 5. We show that for all $j$ : $1 \leq j \leq n$, for all $c \in X(i_j)$, there exists a Nash equilibrium $s^*$ such that $s^*_j = c$ and for all $k \neq j$, $s^*(i_k) \in X(i_k)$. For $i \in V$, let $A_i = \{c \in C(i) \mid \beta(i, c) \geq \beta(i, c')\}$ for all $c' \in C(i)$ be the set of colours available to player $i$ with the maximum bonus.

Let $i_j$ be a node such that $N_{i_j} = \emptyset$. In the iteration of the algorithm which considers node $i_j$, we have $Y' = \emptyset$ every colour which does not belong to $A(i_j)$ is removed in line 10. Thus $X(i_j) = A(i_j)$. Let $D = \{i_k \in V \mid N_{i_k} = \emptyset\}$. Consider the partial joint strategy $s' : D \rightarrow C$ defined as $s'(i_j) = c$ and for $i_k \in D$ such that $i_k \neq i_j$ let $s'(i_k) \in A(i_k)$. Now $s'$ can be extended to a joint strategy $s^* : V \rightarrow C$ by successively making each node (according to the ordering $\theta$) choose its best response. Since $G$ is a DAG, it easily follows that $s^*$ is a Nash equilibrium and for all $i_k$, $s^*(i_k) \in X(i_k)$.

Now consider a node $i_m$ such that $N_{i_m} \neq \emptyset$ and let $c \in X(i_m)$. Let $D = \{i_m\} \cup \{i_j \in V \mid$ there is a path from $i_j$ to $i_m$ in $G\}$. By definition, for all $i_j$ in $D$, we have $j \leq m$ (according to the ordering $\theta$). Consider the partial joint strategy $s' : D \rightarrow C$ defined inductively as follows. Let $s'(i_m) = c$. Suppose that $s'(i_j)$ is already defined for some $i_j \in D$, then for each $i_k \in N_{i_j}$ we do the following. If $s'(i_j) \in X(i_k)$ then let $s'(i_j) = s'(i_j)$. If $s'(i_j) \notin X(i_k)$, then consider the iteration of Algorithm 5, which adds $s'(i_j)$ to $X(i_j)$. If $X(i_k)$ is removed from $Y'$ in line 10 because of colour $c'$ then let $s'(i_j) = c'$. Otherwise, if the corresponding maximum bipartite matching in line 12 matches $X(i_k)$ with $(c', x)$, then define $s'(i_k) = c'$. Since the out-degree of $G$ is at most 1, $s'(i_k)$ is assigned a value exactly once and so $s'$ is a valid function.

By definition of $s'$, for all $i_j \in D$, $s'(i_j) \in X(i_j)$. Given a node $j \in D$, a partial joint strategy $s' : D \rightarrow C$ and $c \in C(j)$, let $N_j(s, c) = \{k \in N_j \mid s(k) = c\}$. We now argue that for all $i_j \in D$, $s'(i_j)$ is a best response for node $i_j$ to $s'_{-i_j}$.

Suppose $N_j = \emptyset$. Since $s'(i_j) \in A(i_j)$, it follows that $s'(i_j)$ is a best response to $s'_{-i_j}$. Now suppose $N_j \neq \emptyset$ and $s'(i_j)$ is not a best response to $s'_{-i_j}$. Then there exists a $c' \in C(i_j)$ such that $p_{i_j}(c', s'_{-i_j}) > p_{i_j}(s')$. This implies that $|N_j(s', c')| + \beta(i_j, c') > |N_i(s', s'(i_j))| + \beta(i_j, s'(i_j))$. Consider the iteration of Algorithm 5 in which $s'(i_j)$ is added to $X(i_j)$. By the definition of $s'$ and Algorithm 5, in this iteration, $|S| = |N_i(s', s'(i_j))|$. If $c'$ is removed from $C'$ in line 10 then we would have $p_{i_j}(s') = |N_i(s', s'(i_j))| + \beta(i_j, s'(i_j)) = |S| + \beta(i_j, s'(i_j)) \geq |S| + \beta(i_j, s'(i_j)) \geq |N_i(s', c')| + \beta(i_j, c') = p_{i_j}(s')$: a contradiction. Therefore $s^n$ is a Nash equilibrium constructed in line 11 we need to have $s_i(s', c') \in Y'$. Notice that every node in $Y'$ is matched with some other node in line 12, because the size of the matching is $|Y'|$. Again, by the definition of $s'$, for all nodes $i_k \in N_i(s', c')$ the node $X(i_k)$ would need to be matched with $(c', x)$ for some $1 \leq x \leq |S| + \beta(i_j, s'(i_j)) - \beta(i_j, c')$. But this is impossible, because $|N_i(s', c')| > |S| + \beta(i_j, s'(i_j)) - \beta(i_j, c')$, thereby contradicting the assumption that $s'(i_j) \in X(i_j)$.

As in the earlier case, $s'$ can now be extended to a joint strategy $s^* : V \rightarrow C$. First, for all $j \in \{i \mid N_i = \emptyset\} \setminus D$, set $s'(j) \in A(j)$. Then successively make each node according to the ordering $\theta$ choose its best response. The resulting joint strategy $s^*$ is a Nash equilibrium. □

Theorem 8 Algorithm 5 solves the $\exists$NE problem for unweighted DAGs with out-degree at most one in $O(|G|^2)$ time.

Proof. We show that given an unweighted DAG $G = (V, E)$ with out-degree at most 1 and a query $q$, Algorithm 5 returns YES iff there exists a Nash equilibrium $s^n$ which is consistent with $q$.

Suppose Algorithm 5 returns YES. Then from the definition, for all $i \in V$, $X_i \neq \emptyset$ and for all $j \in P$, $X_j = \{q(j)\}$. By Lemma 4 it follows that there exists a Nash equilibrium $s^n$ which is consistent with $q$.

Conversely, suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium $s^n$ which is consistent with $q$. Let $\theta = (i_1, \ldots, i_n)$ be the topological ordering of $V$ chosen in line 1 of Algorithm 5. We argue that for all $j \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, $s^n(i_j) \in X(i_j)$. The claim follows easily for $i_1$. Consider a node $i_m$ and suppose for all $j < m$, $s^n(i_j) \in X(i_j)$. For $i_m$ in $C$, let $N_{i_m}(s^n, c) = \{i_k \in N_{i_m} \mid s^n(i_k) = c\}$. Since $s^n$ is a Nash equilibrium, $s^n(i_m)$ is a best response to the choices made by all nodes $i_k \in N_{i_m}$. This implies that for all $c \neq s^n(i_m)$, $|N_{i_m}(s^n, c)| + \beta(i, c) \leq |N_{i_m}(s^n, s^n(i_m))| + \beta(i, s^n(i_m))$. This condition guarantees that Algorithm 5 will find a matching of size $|Y'|$ for $G'$ defined in line 11 and thus $s^n(i_m) \in X(i_m)$.

The computational complexity of Algorithm 5 mainly
depends on the maximum matching algorithm in bipartite graphs used at line 11. There are several such algorithms, each with a different computational complexity. We can use the standard Hopcroft-Karp algorithm which has complexity $O(E\sqrt{V})$ where $E$ is the number of edges and $V$ is the number of nodes in a given bipartite graph. For $l = 1, \ldots, n$, let $Y_l$ denote the value of $Y$ at line 4 of Algorithm 5 for $j = l$. Note that all of these sets are disjoint, because each node is a predecessor of at most one other node. Let $f(x)$ be the function that returns the maximum running time of one iteration of the loop between lines 6-13 for a set $Y$ of size $x$. Note that for any $j$, this loop is executed at most once for each colour. Consider the function $g(x) := f(x) - f(0)$; note that $g(x) = O(f(x))$. It is easy to see that $g(x)$ is increasing, convex (the complexity of the matching problem is at least linear in $x$), and $g(0) = 0$. We will show that such defined $g$ is superadditive, i.e. $g(a) + g(b) \leq g(a + b)$ for any $a, b \geq 0$.

**Lemma 6** Any convex, increasing function $h$ such that $h(0) = 0$ is superadditive.

**Proof.** Consider any $a, b \geq 0$ and the linear function $q(x) := x \cdot h(a + b)/(a + b)$, which is the line connecting the $(0, 0)$ and $(a + b, h(a + b))$ points on the curve defined by function $h$. As $h$ is convex we have that any point along $q(x)$ for $x \in [0, a + b]$ is at least as high as $h(x)$. In particular, $q(a) \geq h(a)$ and $q(b) \geq h(b)$. At the same time $h(a + b) = q(a) + q(b)$, which concludes the proof.  

We now have that the total running time of Algorithm 5 is $O(m \cdot \sum_{j=1}^n f(|Y_j|)) = O(m \cdot \sum_{j=1}^n g(|Y_j|) + f(0))) = O(m \cdot \sum_{j=1}^n g(|Y_j|)) = O(m \cdot g(\sum_{j=1}^n |Y_j|)) = O(m \cdot f(|V|))$, where the third equality holds because $g$ is superadditive. As a result, it suffices to estimate the matching time for a graph $G'$ with $|V'| = |V|$. Due to lines 9-10 we have $|s| + \beta(i, j, c) - \beta(j, i, c') \leq |V'| = O(n)$. For such a $V'$, the bipartite graph $G'$ at line 11 would have $n + nm = O(nm)$ nodes and $n \cdot nm = n^2 m$ edges. The complexity of one matching for such a $G'$ is $O(n^2 m \sqrt{nm})$. This implies that the total running time of Algorithm 5 is $O((nm)^{5/2}) = O(|G|^{5/2})$, because $|G| = O(nm)$.  

**Theorem 9** Algorithm 6 solves the vNE problem for DAGs with out-degree at most one in $O(|G|^{2.5})$ time.

**Proof.** [sketch] The proof is similar to that of Theorem 8. Let $\theta = (i_1, \ldots, i_n)$ be the topological ordering of $V$ chosen in line 1 of Algorithm 6. First, we need the following lemma which essentially follows from the proof of Lemma 4.

**Lemma 7** For $j \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, in the iteration of Algorithm 6 for the node $i_j$, consider the set $X(i_j)$ computed in line 3 (lines 3-13 in the long version). For all $c \in X(i_j)$, there exists a Nash equilibrium $s^*$ such that $s^*(i_j) = c$ and for all $k \leq j$, $s^*(i_k) \in X(i_k)$.

Suppose the output of Algorithm 6 is NO. Let $i_j$ be the node which is being processed when the algorithm outputs NO. This implies that $i_j \in Q$ and there exists a $c \neq q(i_j)$ such that $c \in X(i_j)$. From Lemma 7 there exists a Nash equilibrium $s^*$ such that $s^*(i_j) = c$. Thus $s^*$ is a Nash equilibrium which is not consistent with $q$.

Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium $s^*$ which is not consistent with $q$. Let $i_j$ be the first node in the ordering $\theta$ such that $s^*(i_j) \neq q(i_j)$. We can argue that for all $k < j$, $s^*(i_k) \in X(i_k)$ and in the iteration of Algorithm 6 for the node $i_j$, at line 3, $s^*(i_j) \in X(i_j)$. This implies that the condition on line 4 is satisfied and the algorithm outputs NO. The bound on the running time follows from the analysis given in the proof of Theorem 8. \[\square\]