Turkey’s May 27, 1960 Coup through The French Diplomatic Reports*

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Abstract

The rule of Democratic Party and the May 27, 1960 coup that ended it are accepted as the first experience of true multi-party political life, and as a critical turning-point in Turkish political history representing the first military coup. With this in mind, this work re-reads the coup through the reports and analysis of the French embassy in Ankara. The reports sent to Paris by Henry Spitzmuller, the French ambassador of the time, on May 27 and afterwards reflect the responses to political developments in diplomatic circles, most of all the political landscape which emerged in Turkey following the coup. It also, more importantly, provides us with important clues as to the causes of the coup. The French saw the main reasons for the coup as being the constitutional order left over from the one-party era, the partisanship of the president and the authoritarian attitude of Adnan Menderes towards opposition.

Keywords

Turkey, May 27 1960 Coup, Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Henry Spitzmuller, The Democratic Party.

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* Date of Arrival: 23 February 2017 – Date of Acceptance: 20 June 2017

You can refer to this article as follows:

Yücel, İdris (2019). “Turkey’s May 27, 1960 Coup through the French Diplomatic Reports”. bilig – Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkic World 90: 43-65.

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Introduction

The 1950s, in which Turkey experienced first long term multi-party political life, represent an important step on its road to democracy. By the end of the decade, however, the country was in chaos from the political figures who grew up in the one-party era attempting multi-party democracy within one-party political and constitutional mechanisms. This internal disorder, which resulted in a military coup, initiated a new era in Turkey.¹ A half-century later, both the Democratic Party (DP) era and the May 27 coup as Turkey’s first military intervention, have still been maintaining their place in debates on contemporary politics.² Much academic literature has been produced by historians and political scientists on the period; most of it by the members of two different political currents. This literature has, naturally, analyzed the issue in the framework of internal political dynamics. The aim of this article is to use oft-cited diplomatic sources to approach the May 27 coup through the reports of an outside observer.³ This research is based on those reports and telegraphs of Henry Spitzmuller, who served as France’s 70th ambassador to Turkey from June 8, 1957 onwards, on the coup.⁴

The basis of this research is a series of problématiques arising from curiosity about how the French saw the coup, which are concentrated around three main headings: the French ambassador’s opinions on how the military coup was carried out and what kind of political landscape subsequently emerged in Turkey; how diplomatic circles reacted to the coup; and what the French saw as the reasons behind the coup. Therefore, this work will first evaluate the ambassador’s observations on how the May 27 coup had occurred, what society’s reaction was and the mindsets of the coup’s main actors. Then, it will consider how international circles reacted to the coup and issues regarding official recognition of the military administration. Finally, it will look at Ambassador Spitzmuller’s psychological, sociological and political analyses of the reasons behind the coup.

Domestic Developments and the May 27 Coup

Ambassador Spitzmuller worked long and hard throughout April and May 1960 to send reports to Paris on issues including the emerging political tensions in Turkey, the fight between the government and opposition, the extremely controversial Commission of Enquiry⁵ and the declaration of
martial law. He underlined the extreme tensions in the country, saying that it was absolutely essential that the DP take a step back from its policies of repression and immediately hold a new election. In a telegraph dated May 26, 1960, Spitzmuller concluded that “according to information I have obtained from trustworthy sources, tomorrow in Eskişehir, Menderes will take an important step towards reconciliation by announcing the dismissal of the notorious commission of enquiry, which has caused chaos in the country”. However, a military coup was plotted on the morning of May 27. The ambassador informed Paris at 6.40 a.m. in the first telegraph of the day that the army had taken over the government overnight and that the President, Parliamentary Speaker and leading DP figures were under arrest. As soon as the decision was taken to intervene, General Cemal Gürsel, who was in Izmir at the time, was appointed to the presidency of the National Unity Committee (NUC) by the officers who had carried out the coup. According to Spitzmuller, General Gürsel had not been a commander at the forefront, possibly as the result of his reserved personality. He had reached the highest rank over his career, and under ordinary circumstances would have completed his duties and retired. Gürsel was respected and valued by his peers, his soldiers, and throughout the military in general.

Spitzmuller describes how the people had responded extremely positively to the intervention, with people coming out to welcome the army in Ankara amidst a festival atmosphere, and states that the coup had been carried out without blood being spilt. Istanbul was also under the army’s control, and the French community in Turkey was not at any risk. An unnamed French military attaché also writes that popular displays of joy continued on May 28, with all newspapers going to print and young people going around the streets of Ankara singing. Villagers came in by car and truck to applaud the soldiers and especially those of the Military Academy, which had formed the vanguard of the coup. Students from Ankara University’s Political Science and Law faculties went on a celebration march and carried out demonstrations of gratitude. The military attaché tells that at 9.45 a.m., 5,000 students formed a human wave, processing behind three big portraits of Atatürk, adding that they carried a black-covered coffin bearing the words “death to dictatorship and reaction” as a reference to the DP’s use of the religious feelings of the masses for political purposes.
The National Unity Committee chaired by Cemal Gürsel held several press conferences and issued press statements in order to reassure national and international milieu. At a press conference on May 29, Gürsel announced that there would be elections in approximately three months, with the newly elected government to decide whether the DP should be tried, and that the temporary government would abide by the London and Zurich agreements on Cyprus. In addition, the military administration expressed its contentment with the positive responses and attitudes of the representatives of foreign governments. General Gürsel introduced his new cabinet at a press conference on May 30, giving important hints about what his government’s policies would be: the government would, as he suggested, work for freedom, remove censorship, and attempt to improve the social, political, and economic situations of ordinary citizens.

On the other hand, while the technical ministries under administrative bureaucrats were to continue unaffected, the interior ministry underwent important changes: all DP-linked bureaucrats, whatever their rank, were replaced and senior officers took over from provincial governors. No legal proceedings were pursued against government members who had openly criticized the harsh measures of the government, such as Minister of Education Mehmet Atif Benderlioglu, Minister of Transportation Şemi Ergin and Minister of Tourism and Press İbrahim Sıtkı Yırcalı. Spitzmuller says that even though denigrating those purged was prohibited, authorities turned a blind eye to the lurid details about the DP leaders being published in the press, leading to the moderation of the early days gradually giving way to a harsher climate.

Another issue which aroused interest in the military regime’s press statements was the junta’s attitude towards İsmet İnönü. İnönü was first mentioned in Statement 18 released on May 28, in which they stated that “İnönü and other party members are very much in our good graces.” Gürel responded to a journalist’s question as to whether he had consulted with İnönü before carrying out the coup by saying “All my life, I have never done politics. If I had shared this idea with İnönü, he would have told me to give up this action. The people are aware of this.” Spitzmuller says that both the army and the CHP were at pains not to appear to be acting in concert. Thus, İnönü had underlined several times that the military should not inter-
fere in politics. The masses were applauding the army for bringing about a more moderate administration, but the ambassador believed that, as the coup had not been carried out by the people, putting Turkey back on track depended on the relationship between different power blocs, both seen and unseen. It should not be forgotten that 48 hours before, 50,000 villagers had been enthusiastically applauding Menderes in Eskişehir.

Over the days following the intervention, the authorities sought to quickly establish their regime’s legitimacy and acting to create a new constitution. First of all, it announced the formation of a constitutional committee which would act according to democratic and Kemalist values. Siddik Sami Onar, who formed the committee together with professors Naci Şensoy, Hüfzı Velıdet Velidedeoğlu, Hüseyin Nail Kubalı, Ragıp Farıca, Tarık Zafer Tunaya and İsmet Giritli. This technocratic delegation, formed of select lawyers from Istanbul University, presented a positive image both to domestic and international opinion.

Spitzmuller states that, at a meeting with the US ambassador on the evening of May 27, they both felt that the coup was not inimical to Turkey’s allies. The military authorities procured an escort for the US ambassador to return from his residence to the embassy on the day of the coup. In telegraphs on the same day, the French embassy reported in a number of telegraphs that the coup was not antagonistic towards NATO and Turkey’s allies. It cannot, however, be said that the coup created much surprise in diplomatic circles. After all, French diplomats and ambassador Spitzmuller had from time to time mentioned the possibility of a military coup ever since the start of May. For example, twenty four days before the military coup, the French embassy in Vienna had sent a telegraph to Paris and Ankara saying that the Austrian ambassador in Ankara had sent reports to Vienna claiming that important threats were still on the agenda following domestic turbulence in Turkey. The reports from Ankara informed Vienna that the government did not have the military entirely under its control and that some military units had been influenced by the anti-government protests. In other words, French diplomats had been aware that a military intervention was likely on the table ever since May 3. Spitzmuller had reported on May 15 that whilst the Democrats got their strength from the masses and the innumerable opportunities provided by power, the CHP’s power came from the residents
of big cities, from large numbers of intellectuals and students, and from the military—which up until then had remained outside the political fight. Thus the ambassador emphasized that the army was henceforth an active political actor.

Spitzmuller’s May 23 report also contained details of how anti-DP attitudes within the military were hardening. The Military Academy students were demanding the release of four arrested non-commissioned officers, and their march through the main arteries of the capital turned into an anti-government protest. Many officers also endorsed the march. The ambassador added that the “national chief” and victorious commander of the War of Independence, İsmet İnönü, still retained his prestige within the army, reflecting that conditions did not leave much room for normalization. Spitzmuller claimed that rumours about military intervention had only begun spreading openly a few days before the coup. Indeed, explicit claims were made two days before the coup, at an Argentinian embassy reception, that the military intervention would take place on Saturday (May 28). As far as we can tell from his writings, both the French embassy and many other diplomats in Ankara were aware of the disquiet within the army and the possibility of an intervention. However, we must pay attention to the nuance between awareness of the possibility of an intervention and foreknowledge that an intervention would happen. Even if a certain date had been mentioned at the Argentinian embassy reception, Ambassador Spitzmuller did not make any certain judgments about a coming intervention in his reports before May 27. From his writings, we understand that the French ambassador did not have any definite information about a military intervention; he was simply aware of the possibility of military intervention due to dissatisfaction within the military.

Spitzmuller discussed the first repercussions of the military coup with the French diplomats based in a number of different countries. Among these discussions, the reports from New Delhi and Tehran are especially of interest. The French mission to India told Paris that the coup in Turkey had not come as a big surprise to India. According to the India Times, Menderes’s political mistakes had created the risk of internal disorder and civil war. These developments, it said, needed to be evaluated as a competition between authoritarian policies and liberal approaches having brought the
civilians and army into conflict.²⁹

Henri Roux, the French Ambassador in Tehran reported in a May 28 telegram that Iran had responded calmly to the coup in Turkey, saying that Prime Minister Manouchehr Eghbal, whom he had met with the day before, was unsurprised and had said, “This may be better for us, as Menderes is no longer able to carry out the visit to Moscow we had not wanted.”³⁰

This dialogue between the Prime Minister and French ambassador is a clear evidence that the western bloc was disturbed with Prime Minister Menderes’s increasing intimacy with Soviet Russia. However, this dialogue alone is insufficient evidence for us to say that the military intervention in Turkey was a NATO-supported operation.

Following the intervention, both General Gürsel and the NUC hoped that diplomatic relations with other countries would be able to continue uninterrupted, with the NUC regularly emphasizing that it would remain bound by all Turkey’s treaties and agreements with foreign countries, whether political, military or economic, and that it would abide by the principle of peace in its foreign policy.³¹ The Foreign Ministry also sent a circular to all diplomatic mission representatives informing them that the Turkish Armed Forces had taken over the government, but that Turkey was determined to maintain all its existing diplomatic relations with foreign countries.³² It also said that Gürsel had held talks with the U.S., British, Soviet Russian and Greek diplomats after seizing power and that all these countries had accepted the new regime, however, foreign countries might formally take some time to undergo the procedures for recognizing it.³³

France’s position on recognizing the new government was clear. Ambassador Spitzmuller believed that France would have no trouble recognizing a military government; indeed, he was of the opinion that it would be very much in France’s interests to act fast on recognition. The Ambassador wanted the French Foreign Ministry to urgently confer with London and Washington—in order for the three big powers to present a united front—and also with the other prominent NATO members.³⁴ However, the ambassador’s idea of producing a synchronized response with the Americans and British made no concrete progress as the US and Britain acted faster. Spitzmuller thought that the Americans making a symbolic gesture would help them at a time when anti-American feelings were rife, whilst the British did not see
any reason for cutting relations; indeed, they felt much closer to the new
government, especially on the Cyprus question. Diplomatic relations be-
tween Turkey and France continued from where they had previously stood
upon Foreign Minister Selim Sarper’s request, which emphasized that nei-
ther nation needed to re-recognize the other. On the afternoon of May 30,
Turkey’s ambassador in Paris, Faik Zihni Akdur, was received by the French
Foreign Ministry General Secretary while Ambassador Spitzmuller was ac-
cepted by Minister Sarper.

In his missive on the June 1 NATO council, Spitzmuller writes that the
Turkish Foreign Ministry had informed them that Britain, the US, France,
Germany, Soviet Russia, Italy, Iran, Greece, Pakistan, Norway, Iraq, Bel-
gium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Israel, China and South Korea had
recognized the new government as of the previous night. Foremost among
the countries reluctant over recognition was Canada. The Federal Canadian
Government was extremely disconcerted by the coup in Ankara. Francis
Lacoste, the French ambassador in Ottawa, reported that the Canadians
were surprised and upset by a military coup being undertaken in the polit-
ical life of a friend and ally, despite the coup being bloodless and its leaders
taking measures towards the preservation of democracy. Although all the
other members of NATO recognized the coup administration within a few
days, the Canadian ambassador in Ankara was under instruction to contin-
ue waiting.

The Causes of the Coup

Spitzmuller says that a trustworthy military source told him that the coup
was rescheduled at short notice. Whilst the intervention had been planned
to take place after Menderes’s return from Kütahya on the night of May
27-28 under normal conditions, the decision to carry out a coup was im-
plemented a day early after the intelligence on certain precautions taken
by the government. Spitzmuller reports that just as the government had
planned during the September 6-7, 1955 riots, there had been a conspir-
acy planned by the government to distribute thousands of guns, explosives
and military uniforms in Istanbul. Following explosions and disturbances,
the army would be divided, with one side favoring the government. The DP
leaders, foremost among them the President and Interior Minister, resented
opposition, and also planned to completely close the Military Academy and
Istanbul University. When this plan was uncovered, the coup was put into action one day early.40

Leaving aside the details of the intervention, Spitzmuller analyzes the long-term causes of the coup at some length from his own perspective in a report on June 1. In the report, entitled “the fall of the democratic regime” (La chute du régime démocrate), the ambassador expressed that the Democrats, who now held a complete monopoly over power, wished to eliminate all institutions and individuals who opposed them, that there was no safety valve to limit this, that there was no counter-device that could be used to restore the balance, and that the fight between the government and the opposition had reached unsustainable levels. The tensions between the two parties, and especially their leaders, had continually increased and had finally reached a critical point where normal political life could not be continued.41 The notorious commission of enquiry that was equipped by the parliament with extraordinary powers, displayed a fanatical attitude, leading to calamitous outcomes (Sütçü 2011: 198). The ambassador claimed that the self-confident DP leaders, bureaucrats, collaborators, loyal followers and those who took orders from them, who now believed they held all the cards, had got rid of everyone they saw as untrustworthy, unwilling, or close to the opposition through repression, blackmail and usurpation.42

Spitzmuller here makes interesting comments on the political and sociological structure of the coup. He says that it is impossible to characterize those who removed Menderes and his supporters from power as a purely popular movement. An anti-DP movement had developed over the preceding years in big cities, but this category only formed 10 percent of the Turkish people. On the other hand, despite all their largesse, their free transport to meetings where food and drink was given out, and all their demagogy aimed at villagers, the DP had suffered a loss of interest among the rural segment of the population. Nonetheless, a majority of the population remained faithful to the DP and especially Menderes. The ambassador believed this loyalty did not stem from their ideology: the DP had a complex party program that was similar to the CHP, and did not seek to make their policies fundamentally different. Spitzmuller believed that the Turkish people were more interested in individuals and clans than ideas or ideologies. Indeed, though the declaration of martial law had not upset the rural population, there was
a response from city-dwellers. In this context, the ambassador evaluated the position of both political structures in relation to one another before coming to any conclusions.

In the ambassador’s views, the DP had emerged as a movement in opposition to the failures and deficiencies of the existing party: the one party of Atatürk’s time, the CHP. The CHP, over its 25-year history, followed up the spectacle of Atatürk’s unquestioned leadership with the rule of İsmet İnönü. The party lost the spirit of the early days of the nation and succumbed to inertia. The ambassador claims that the only important action of the CHP following Atatürk’s death was to end the one-party regime and introduce multi-party democracy. On this point, he adds a critical judgment about the introduction of multi-party democracy in Turkey, saying the move showed that the CHP was truly committed and resolved to introduce a truly democratic system. However, the CHP had omitted the issue of the necessary preconditions required to reach this goal. The establishment and maintenance of democracy first required the creation of democratic-spirited generations of people, who, he added, were extremely rare in Turkey, a country lacking in public debate and closed to differing ideologies. In addition, another important matter that they had not addressed was the need for radical constitutional changes from the one-party era.

The ambassador continued his analysis as follows: under one-party rule, the president can, in some senses, also be the prime minister, since it is natural that the president would both be a member of a party and of parliament. On the other hand, in a multi-party parliamentary regime, the president is in the position of an arbiter, and needs to be impartial. Hence, the president cannot be partisan or part of politics in a way that would violate his essential duties and responsibilities. It was this basic mistake that, over time, led Turkish political life into a cul-de-sac and caused chaos due to the enmity between the two parties and their leaders and the increased weight of a growing opposition. The authoritarian character of President Bayar, his overt abuse of his position and cliquey attitude had led to considerably more abuse of power by the Democrats as their power and authority grew.

Spitzmuller considered the fundamental difference between the DP and the CHP to be that while the Democrats had dynamism in technical and financial matters, the CHP had conservative policies. It is an undeniable
truth that the Democrats made significant breakthroughs in the modernization and industrialization of the country. Despite not having an established party program, with their manifesto being full of inadequacies, confusions and contradictions, and despite endless waste and bribery solely in pursuit of popularity, the Democrats established many factories and built many roads, accelerated production and increased imports and exports. Indeed, Ankara’s population doubled over the decade and the country’s population increased by 30 percent, yet no significant rise in unemployment rates was seen. Even if it was low by Western standards, Turkish quality of life increased significantly, with a rise in both production and consumption. In sum, the Turkish people enjoyed real development without getting worried about how the investment was being financed by foreign countries.

On the other hand, the ambassador claimed that there were serious legal and moral charges against the Democrats. While İnönü had played by the rules and handed over power, Menderes had refused to abide by the same rules. This was his final mistake, provoking a big avalanche against him. Spitzmuller thought that Menderes was a person educated in local ways. His character and behavior resembled the practical governing style of the Ottoman governments, and was similarly both structurally feudal and performative. Moving on to the concrete causes of the coup, Spitzmuller said that the army’s intervention was provoked by its sensitivities on the issues of attacks on the principles of democracy, violations of the constitution and deviation from the principles of law and individual rights. The ambassador explained that, in addition to countless errors and scandals, the Democrats had made one final ill-considered mistake by trying to repress anti-government protestation using all its powers. The Democrats had not only shown a burst of anger through its physical and intellectual powers against the opposition: at the same time, by proclaiming martial law, they had provided the army a clear and easy excuse to overthrow their government. After all, the army had a powerful chain of command and control over military equipment. Spitzmuller says that “we may imagine that it had crossed the minds of the army many times to end the confusion and chaos that never seemed to stop in the face of administrators who hid their real responsibility for events while giving the order to fire upon the mob,” adding that the army had ceased listening to orders and had chosen instead to prioritize national security by overthrowing the government.
Spitzmuller divides the military intervention into two phases. The first phase came about as the result of a mentality change which began two or three years earlier. At that time, some of the soldiers began to worry about the country’s social and political situation and think deeply about the increasing gulf between social strata. Spitzmuller claims that the Turkish people of the time were divided into two different groups who were completely culturally different: 5-6 percent were more or less westernized city-dwellers, while on the other hand 75-80 percent were illiterate yokels in the countryside, living tenth century lifestyles with tenth century mentalities. The ambassador believed that at the time the soldiers began to become preoccupied with these thoughts, the increase in DP’s repression and violent anti-democratic measures caused an increase in negative assessments of the party within the military -both on an objective and a subjective basis, forming the second phase. The lack of solutions to social problems and the deepening of the crisis over time caused a further maturation of these soldiers’ interventionist ideas, and while their active staff numbers increased, the numbers sympathetic to a putsch multiplied and their solidarity was strengthened. When the April 27/30 crisis erupted, crystallizing their inclinations and ideals, their plans both became clearer, and their technical capabilities and chances of success increased.

**Conclusion**

Evaluating the May 27, 1960 coup from the French perspective, we see that the French ambassador did not see the military intervention as a surprise; indeed, he expected an intervention based on the existing conditions. After all, Spitzmuller had spoken about the possibility of a military intervention in the context of martial law weeks earlier. From the French ambassador’s perspective, Turkish society -most of all, university students and city-dwellers -responded extremely positively to the May 27 coup, and DP-supporters did not launch a counter-coup movement. Announcements by General Cemal Gürsel and the NUC in the days following the coup were received positively by many NATO members -most of all France, but also the US and Britain -who quickly established relations with the new administration. Evidence that the Western bloc saw the intervention as extremely positive ranged from the fast establishment of relations by western countries to the satisfaction of the Iranian prime minister, as related by the French ambassador.
dor in Tehran, that Menderes would no longer be able to make his planned visit to Moscow. This stance arose from the fact that Western countries had long since given up on the Menderes government. In addition, Ambassador Spitzmuller not only complimented the personality of Cemal Gürsel, but also related his positive views on the NUC’s constitutional project, which he said would lead to freedom of expression and of the press.

Spitzmuller’s conclusions about the causes of the coup are noteworthy. The ambassador solely blamed the governing party. In his eyes, the DP provoked the coup in the first place by violating the constitution and individual rights in contravention of legal principles and attacking the basic principles of democracy. Secondly, Spitzmuller believed that another cause of the coup were the generations who had lived through one-party rule and the incompatibility between the constitution left over from that time and multi-party democracy. For instance, the role of a president must necessarily be completely different under one-party rule as compared to multi-party democracy. However, the ambassador claims that President Celal Bayar’s interference in politics in a way exceeding his basic duties and responsibilities, his partisanship, and his displays of authoritarianism and cliquey behaviors were another important cause of the coup. Further studies of diplomatic reports from the other NATO member-states and many other diplomatic missions in Ankara may be fruitful to test and contribute to these judgments and conclusions evaluating the May 27 coup and DP policy from the French perspective.

Notes

1 The terminology used in Turkish for the May 27 military coup has generally been shaped according to political preference. For more on the controversy between the terms darbe and ihtilal, see Özdemir 1960.

2 On Turkish political life in the DP era and the period in which Turkey moved to multi-party democracy, see Karp 1959, Yalman 1947, Koltuk 2008, VanderLippe 2006, Ahmad 1977, Simpson 1965.

3 For academic works based on sources at the American and British archives on the causes of the May 27 coup and how foreign diplomats saw it, see Armaoğlu 1996, Göktepe 2002.

4 Henry Spitzmuller was born in the 17th of March 1900 and held law degree from l’Ecole des Sciences Politiques in Paris. His diplomatic career started in 1925.
and he has held various diplomatic posts in Brussels, La Haye, Warsaw and Geneva between 1925-1936 and served at the French Embassy in Bucharest since 1936 including the period of the Second World War. Spitzmuller was appointed as the 70th French Ambassador to Turkey (including the French diplomats in Ottoman Empire) and stayed in post until 1963 till the ambassadorship of Bernard Hardion. For the biography and diplomatic career of Ambassador Spitzmuller, see Bichis 2013.

5 The Commission of Enquiry, whose duty was to examine the activities of the political opposition and opposition press and take measures as needed, was established on April 18, 1960. The commission, consisted of 15 DP MPs, was given extraordinary powers. The commission was not only able to judge; it could also issue punishments to individuals and institutions it found guilty without the possibility of appeal (Bulut 2009).

6 Writings and reports on government-opposition relations, the policies of the DP government, and analysis of the essential problems of Turkish political life 1956-60, the period leading up to the May 27 coup would be seen at Les archives diplomatiques du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à La Courneuve (Hereafter MAE), Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 21. Les désordres dans la région de Césarée et la réaction gouvernementale, M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Son Excellence Monsieur Couve de Murville Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 11 April 1960. MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 27. Nouvelles mesures contre l’opposition-Commission d’enquête, M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Son Excellence Monsieur Couve de Murville Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 20 April 1960. MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 35. M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Paris, 28 April 1960. MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 40. M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Paris, 3 Mai 1960. MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 75. Développement des dernières manifestations, M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Son Excellence Monsieur Couve de Murville Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 15 Mai 1960. MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 104. Situation Intérieure, M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Son Excellence Monsieur Couve de Murville Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 23 Mai 1960.

7 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 107. M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Paris, 26 Mai 1960.
8 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 108. M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Paris, 27 Mai 1960. For interviews of witnesses to the main actors of the intervention, the preparation and realization periods and the judgment on Yassı Ada, see (Birand vd. 1991). The memoirs of Rifki Salim Burçak, who was arrested in the May 27 coup and witnessed the Yassı Ada process, present a thematic and comprehensive explanation of the coup from the DP perspective from May 27 to the completion of the trials (Burçak 1976).

9 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 142. M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Paris, 28 Mai 1960.

10 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 137. À l’attention de M Baraduc, 27 Mai 1960.

11 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 146. À l’attention de M Baraduc, 28 Mai 1960.

12 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 145. À l’attention de M Baraduc, 28 Mai 1960.

13 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 156. M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Paris, 29 Mai 1960.

14 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 172. M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Paris, 31 Mai 1960. For the May 27 coup and succeeding years from the perspective of army-political relations see (Özdağ 1997; George 2011; Özbudun 1966).

15 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 166-167. M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Paris, 30 Mai 1960.

16 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 166-167. M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Paris, 30 Mai 1960.

17 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 154. M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Paris, 29 Mai 1960.

18 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 184. Conférence de presse du General Gursel, M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Son Excellence Monsieur Couve de Murville Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 31 Mai 1960.

19 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 154. M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Paris, 29 Mai 1960.

20 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 154. M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Paris, 29 Mai 1960.

21 MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 178.
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39 On September 6-7, 1955, demonstrations held in Istanbul on the political situation in Cyprus suddenly turned to looting, resulting in the vandalism of primarily Greek, but also Armenian and Jewish homes and businesses. (Güven 2009, Demir 2007).

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45 Following Spitzmuller's telegraph of May 31, 1960, it is extremely interesting to read the Iranian shah's recommendations to the Turkish administration
on the political position of the president. The shah gave Turkey’s rulers this advice: “I recommend you to hold elections as soon as the conditions mature and the people are completely ready. Nonetheless, the president must remain above political parties and only govern the military. If the army stays linked to just one party, especially the party of government, it will be impossible to avoid the military becoming involved in politics. In conclusion, the chief of staff must remain above party politics and must not have a special relationship with any party.” MAE, Série Europe 1946-1960, Turquie 1956-1960, Vol 65, No: 175. M. Henry Spitzmuller Ambassadeur de France en Turquie à Paris, 3 Juin 1960. There are other reports in the literature matching those of the embassy reports that claim that President Bayar wanted harsher policies and had a more authoritarian attitude than Menderes. Güliz Sütçü approves the same situation from an interview with Aydın Menderes, PM Menderes’s son (Sütçü 2011: 199).
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Fransız Elçilik Raporlarına Göre 27 Mayıs 1960 Darbesi*

İdris Yücel**

Öz

Demokrat Parti iktidarı ve bu dönemi sonlandıran 27 Mayıs 1960 darbesi, gerek ilk kez gerçek anlamda çok partili hayata geçişin gerekse ilk askeri darbenin tecrübe edilmiş adına Türk siyasi tarihi içerisinde oldukça kritik bir dönemeç olarak kabul edilmektedir. Günümüze kadar çoğunlukla iç siyasi dinamikler temelinde yorumlanan bu sürecin yabancı diplomatlar gözünden okunması 27 Mayıs darbesinin karşılaştırmalı esasa göre anlaşılmasını için önemlidir. Bu kaygıdan yola çıkarak, bu çalışma, 27 Mayıs darbesini Ankara'daki Fransa Büyükelçiliğinin rapor ve analizleri üzerinden yeniden okumaktadır. Dönemin Fransız elçisi Henry Spitzmuller’in, 27 Mayıs 1960 günü ve sonrasında Paris’e sunduğu raporlar, darbe sonrasında Türkiye’de ortaya çıkan politik manzara başta olmak üzere, gelişmelerin diplomasi çevrelerinde uyardığı yankı ve daha da önemli darbenin nedenleri üzerine önemli ipuçları sunmaktadır. Fransız gözüyle darbenin başlica nedeni, tek parti döneminde kalma anayasa düzen, cumhurbaşkanının tarafı tutumu ve Adnan Menderes’in muhalefet karışımdaki otoriter tavurularıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Türkiye, 27 Mayıs Darbesi, Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Henry Spitzmuller, Demokrat Parti.

* Geliş Tarihi: 23 Şubat 2017 – Kabul Tarihi: 20 Haziran 2017
Bu makaleyi şu şekilde kaynak gösterebilirsiniz:
Yücel, İdris (2019). "Turkey’s May 27, 1960 Coup through the French Diplomatic Reports". bilig – Türk Dünüyası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 90: 43-65.

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Военный переворот 27 мая 1960 года во французской дипломатической переписке*

Идрис Юджель**

Аннотация
Правление Демократической партии, окончившееся переворотом 27 мая 1960 года, являются поворотными моментами в политической истории Турции, как из-за перехода к многопартийной системе, так и опыта первого военного переворота. Хотя до сих пор переворот изучался только в контексте внутренней политической ситуации, важно также рассматривать этот период через взгляд иностранных дипломатов. Данная работа изучает переворот 27 мая через переписку дипломатов французского посольства в Анкаре. Отчеты французского посла в Анкаре Анри Шпитцмюллера от 27 мая 1960 года и последующих дней отражают реакцию дипломатических кругов на развитие событий и, что еще важнее, их мнение о причинах переворота. Согласно мнению дипломатов, основными причинами являлись конституционный строй, унаследованный со времен однопартийной системы, предвзятость президента и авторитарное отношение Аднана Мендереса к оппозиции.

Ключевые слова
Турция, переворот 27 мая, Аднан Мендерес, Джелал Баяр, Анри Шпитцмюллер, Демократическая партия.

* Поступило в редакцию: 28 февраля 2017 г. – Принято в номер: 20 июня 2017 г.
Ссылка на статью: Yücel, İdris (2019). “Turkey’s May 27, 1960 Coup through the French Diplomatic Reports”. bilig – Журнал Гуманитарных Наук Турецкого Мира 90: 43-65.
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