From self to identity: a metaphysical shift

Nikolay Rybakov¹*, Natalya Yarmolich¹, Maxim Bakhtin²

¹Pskov State University, 2, Lenin Place, 180000, Pskov, Russia
²Director of the Edition «Encyclopedist-Maximum»

Abstract. The article examines the problem of identity realization in the modern information society. The authors analyze the concept of identity in comparison with the concept of self, reveal the features of the manifestation and deformation of identity, and explore ways to generate multiple identities. The study of the concept of identity is based on the worldview principles inherent in different epochs. An attempt is made to give a complete (holographic) picture of identity, and the question is raised about the criteria for distinguishing genuine identity from non-genuine (pseudo-identity). The relationship between the concepts of "I" and self is studied, identification is presented as a process of predication of "I". In the structure of identity, such features as constancy and variability are distinguished. On this basis, the classical and non-classical identities are distinguished and their characteristics are given. It is shown that the breakup of these components into independent parts results in the complete loss of the object's identity, which leads to its disintegration and death. It is shown that in the conditions of fluid reality, identity turns from a stabilizing factor into a situational one, which encourages the subject to constantly choose an identity. The conditions of transformation of identification into a diffuse process that loses the strict unambiguous binding of the subject to something fixed and defined are considered. Due to this, the identity of the subject is "smeared" all over the world. As a result of this process, the subject loses the need to identify itself with anything: it "collapses" into itself. As a result, there is a contradiction of identification: the multiplicity of identities gives the subject a huge choice between them, at the same time due to the diffusion of identity (its smearing around the world) the selection procedure itself loses its meaning. But if the identity is lost, there are problems with the self, so it turns out to be the end of the existence of the person himself. Therefore, in all the transformations of identities in the modern world, it is important that it is preserved.

1 Introduction

Nowadays, people talk and write about identity quite a lot and from a wide variety of angles. Interest in the concept of identity, notes Z. Bauman, "generated an unprecedented flurry of opinions", and formulates the key importance of identity for modernity: it "becomes a prism through which many important features of modern life are viewed,
evaluated, and studied" [1]. In other words, identity appears as a filter, as a polarizer, on the one hand, refractive, and on the other, coloring, multiplying the processes going on in modern society.

The purpose of this research is to study the possibilities of constructing identities, recommitting natural identities into artificial ones, and evaluating possible technologies for assembling artificial identities and switching identities. This raises the question of criteria for distinguishing genuine (true) identity from inauthentic (false) identity.

The authors believe that the conceptualization and categorization of the concept of identity should be carried out in close connection with the fundamental category of self. If there is no sameness, there is no identity, so there is no way to compare one and the other.

It is proved that identity has two aspects of manifestation: internal (binding an object to itself) and external (binding an object to a label outside of itself). The inner aspect leads us to the problem of the self, where the identity of the object to itself as the limit of indistinguishability is extremely important. This is the starting point of identity, from which the degrees of differentiation and divergence of objects are counted. The external aspect means that focusing and projection are present in the identification process. This leads to the fact that the point of focus at which the energy (force) lines of identity converge may be blurred depending on the scale of focus, the need for the focus itself. An identity that is narrowly deterministic and clearly defined can easily become diffuse and amorphous, losing its strict outlines. All this creates additional difficulties in studying the identity construct.

2 Materials and methods

Research on the problem of identity allows us to assert that the understanding of identity begins already in ancient philosophy, passes through the middle ages, but as a special problem it arises in Modern philosophy, passing through non-classical philosophy of the XIX-XX centuries and gradually becoming involved in the field of research in sociology and psychology. Over the past half-century, this problem has undergone significant changes, having received, with the light hand of E. Erickson, the name of the identity crisis, which was expressed in the appearance of a modern person's sense of losing their own "I" [2]. This causes, as a response, the desire to find this mysterious self. But what is identity?

The article "Identity" of the Great Russian encyclopedia says: "IDENTITY (from Ms.-century. lat. identicus – identical, identical), identity, sameness, coincidence of something with something; in social and humanitarian knowledge-a person's awareness of himself through a set of stable characteristics, the answer to the question "Who am I?" [3]. Here the duality of interpretation immediately draws attention to itself: a) the identity, the coincidence of something with something, that is, the identity of something, a broader field of application, being in General, and b) the social and humanitarian sphere, more precisely, the socio-anthropological sphere, limited only to the sphere of human being. This alone creates the widest possible opportunities for the development of the concept of identity with the extraordinary consequences that result from this.

In modern research on the problem of identity, the emphasis is shifted to the description of the phenomenon of multiple identities, the existence of a person in the identity lab, and the multilevel identity [4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9]. In other words, from the question "what is identity" through the questions "how does it manifest itself" and "what types of identities exist", there was a transition to the study of the problem "how many identities exist". The core problem that draws attention to itself is: what is identity for? And it entails a whole series of questions that are discussed in one way or another. What is its meaning? What is the basis of identity(s)? Why is identity(s) necessary for human existence? How do identity(s) exist? Can a person do without identity(s) at all? And, therefore, the key question about the
Genesis of identity(s): how does it arise? This is followed by the inevitable question of identity transformations.

And in these conditions, new problems become relevant and come to the fore: from describing identity situations to studying the possibilities of producing new identities for different occasions, to constructing pre-set, possibly quite unusual identities. In a theoretical context, this means developing and creating an identity construct (concept) with a large heuristic potential.

Quite close to this idea came M. A. Nazarova and S. I. Chernykh, who write that currently there is a conceptualization and categorization of the concept of identity, "the structure is being developed, parameters are being determined, concepts, phenomena and processes close to it are being studied (identity crises, identification, self-identity, self-identification, self-determination, etc.). We believe that for all its many meanings, the concept of identity has a meaningful basis, which is preserved when it is used. It has heuristic properties and is a corresponding disciple matrix for the study of modern social relations" [10, 1164-1165]. The question is, what is the nature of this content base?

In the process of searching for answers to these and other questions, methodological problems arise that can only be addressed to clarify the situation of identity. Let's denote some of them.

The first problem. As already mentioned, the problem of identity as a specific philosophical problem arises in modern times. Why? If we turn to the peculiarities of the worldview of that era, it turns out that its fundamental worldview principle is the principle of the empirical, individualized "I". The whole world is concentrated in this "I", comes from it. Then, in its entirety, the question of this "I" arises, the individual asks about himself: who am I? What am I like? The nearest and most accessible to the study of this "I" is that which can be seen in itself: sensations, the psyche, consciousness, and finally reason. In addition, being established in society, the individual must adapt to live in different spheres: economic, social, political, spiritual. Hence, different types of identity implementations. From the study of various manifestations of identity, it is natural to move to the study of the implementation of identity in various spheres that appear in society. This is the basis for assertions about the multiplicity and multilevel nature of identity, as well as about its multiplicity. The logic of studying the problem of identity leads researchers, we repeat, to the problem of multiple identities. And this is obvious and is presented as a breakthrough in the study of identity, as an extension of ideas about this phenomenon. The origins of the latter problem are connected with a radical change in social processes, when instead of social reality as a solid reality, they suddenly discovered that the social world is beginning to be dominated by total mobility, that this world, in the words of Z. Bauman, began to represent the co-fight "liquid reality "("liquid reality"). The conceptual and ideological envelope that the fluid social world was Packed into was, as we know, the philosophy of postmodernism. Although it is virtually a thing of the past, the problems it raised have left a very noticeable mark on the history of worldview and methodology.

Problem two. The peculiarity of postmodernism was that it tried to separate multiplicity from unity and, by turning multiplicity into an absolute outside and without unity at all, to show what the visible, perceived world would be like in this case and what it would be like for a person to live in it. In the literature, the disappearance of the familiar reality is well described-instead of it, "hyperreality" appears, the world of simulacra is established, chaos reigns with complete decentralization and de-hierarchization of being. Rhizomatic processes are replacing the unrestrained flow of becoming, in them everything and everything is "other", "other", not connected in any way with the previous one. Becoming loses its meaning, and methodological anarchism becomes the dominant trend in the subject's attitude to the world. However, as it turns out, there is no one to turn to the world, since postmodernism proclaims not only the disappearance of reality, but also the death of
the subject—after all, along with the disappearance of the object, the subject must inevitably disappear. Having prepared the world for such a spectacular end, postmodernism – sooner or later – itself had to disappear in the depths of the multiplicity it generated.

Postmodernism is one of the variations on the theme of Plato's "Parmenides", where the assumption of the one as the one (one) leads to the conclusion that such a one cannot exist, as well as the world cannot exist where there is only one unit. But in contrast to Plato, postmodernism tried to put as a starting point of reasoning the hypothesis that the many (plural) is one. The result was the same: if the plural is one, then the world cannot exist in this case either. The study of the properties of the impossible world just gives its unusual properties, in particular, the appearance of objects-simulacra, the loss of signs of the ability to denote—they begin to point only to themselves, so the real soil from which something objective can grow disappears. Such a world inevitably collapses into itself, thus creating a mass of duplicates-fakes, so that, once in such a world, it is difficult to say where the original is the original and where the substitute is, so they merge in their different manifestations and mislead even experts.

Postmodernism is interesting because it tried to depict a world in which multiplicity is absolute without the slightest attempt to think of the existence of a single one, and showed what it is like to live in such a world. For us, it is not so much postmodernism that is valuable, as the experience of constructing, or rather extracting from the depths of the history of philosophy, the concept that "works out" and "thinks through" the consequences that can be realized if such a regime is approved in human life.

In other words, the problem of the multiplicity of identity returns us to the long-standing problem of the relation of the one and the many, going back to antiquity, to Plato, developed in Neoplatonism and systematically stated by Proclus. In particular, Proclus proves that multiplicity is somehow involved in the one, without it there would be no set [11]. In other words, it clearly says: the one is primary. Postmodernism thinks differently. Logically, the situation here is quite transparent, since there are only two options: the source is either the one for the multiple, or the multiple for the single. However, the reality is much more complicated.

The Russian philosopher A. S. Posov wrote that the problem of "the One seems clear and solvable for most philosophers, thinkers, and sages of all tribes and epochs, but the problem of multiplicity has been and still is a stumbling block for many, both in the East and in the West" [CIT. po: 12]. This is understandable, since the empirical experience of a person is associated with multiplicity: everywhere, wherever one looks, one is confronted with a variety of States of being, often without even thinking about the unity of many events. In thinking, too, multiplicity seems to be more accessible to the ordinary mind, and it seems more natural to man than to the freely abstract one.

Pragmatism makes multiplicity a principle of the human relation to the world, limiting this relation exclusively to multiplicity as a direct given [13]. But if we understand that unity must "Shine through" behind all multiplicity, then multiplicity itself is not the final point of research, but only the primary stage from which we should move on to the universal, to a polyphonic and unified image of the world. The ability to see unity in the multitude is, according to P. A. Florensky, the most important test for the dialectical vision of the world [14]. The ascent to unity, to the one as the basis of multiplicity, just requires the construction of a philosophical concept that allows you to think through all possible variations of the phenomenon under study.

To study this problem, the article uses the methods of contextual analysis, abstraction, generalization, idealization, synthesis, comparative, dialectical, historical and genetic.
3 Results

The information society that disrupted the measured life of a person gave rise to a sense of loss of himself. And although he had previously realized that he played different roles in his life, the sense of multiple "I" sharpened the question of himself: «Who am I? » This is the question of the self and the related problem of identity.

The concept of self-first appears in the later works of the ancient Greek philosopher Plotinus. Here is how A. F. Losev describes the appearance of this category: "Let's take such expressions as 'I was born' or 'I died'. In order for these judgments to have any meaning, and they have this meaning in the deepest degree, it is necessary that the subject and predicate in these judgments are different from each other and do not coincide in one indistinguishable identity. So "I" is one thing, but birth or "death" is quite another. But what, then, is this "I", the "I" itself? And whatever predicates we ascribe to this "I", every new judgment that arises here necessarily presupposes some separate existence of some "I", which is not limited to exactly any predicates" [15]. And further: "... the 'I' is the first highest neo-Platonic category of the primordial unity, but not itself, taken separately and independently, but taken in application to a person when he is the subject of infinitely diverse predications" [15]. Analyzing in detail the self in the understanding of Plotinus and the interpretation of this concept by modern Western philosophers, A. F. Losev notes that the principle of the self is "as important and primary intuition of Neoplatonism as the intuition of time and eternity" [15], that Plotinus, "constructing a whole hierarchy of times and eternities", feels "the need for maximum condensation" of these intuitions and "the need to perceive them in a single, in no sense repeated point", which means the appearance of "a new for antiquity... experience of being as... as universal as possible, and on the other hand – as individual as possible" [15]. In a word, "the sharpest dialectic of the individual and the universal in the age of ellinism" [15] becomes extremely important, if not key, for understanding the problem of the self.

Authors who address the problem of identity do not do without the key concept of "I". However, this concept is often limited to epistemological (I as the center of knowledge), psychological (I as the self), or social meaning (I as self-representation) [16]. However, the primary "I" is much more serious: «"The originality of the invention of "I" (le moi) that it cannot correlate with any of the earlier concepts with which this "I" is usually confused neither with the subject nor spirit, nor soul, nor intellect, nor with the individual or personality, etc. Hence, it is necessary to distinguish them in order to take into account not only the appearance of the "I" in philosophy, but also the revolution that this "I" now gives place to. It is from the"I " that one or another concept — thinking, soul, intellect, or mind — now receives a new interpretation. They will be understood from the "I" as from the "thinking thing" (res cogitans). One should not confuse the"I " (le moi) and the self (le soi, Selbst), marked by reflexivity " [17]. If we take the "I" as a fundamental meta-physical concept, then the psychological I, as well as all other Self-interpretations, are purely secondary, derived from the "I" as the first and obvious datum, from which, in particular, Descartes begins to build his philosophy of cogito. The author of these lines, like many other philosophers, spent a lot of time and effort to understand the meaning of Cartesian thesis "cogito ergo sum", finding out whether Descartes' "I think" and "I exist" coincide, how to combine them in the "thinking thing", describing the situation as "the agony of the syllogism" [18]. The famous Cartesian doubt, as well as the evidence, has been a constant worry for many centuries for philosophers trying to understand these fundamental intuitions.

"I" and "self" are very close, but not identical in meaning. The "I" is a category of primordial unity, taken as applied to man as the subject of infinitely different predications, while the self is the reflection of the "I", its self – knowledge: "Self-knowledge is necessary
for everything that has fallen away from the primary intellectual unity, because it seeks to restore the harmony of unity in itself" [19]. Primacy, evidence, reflexivity, self-knowledge, universality, individuality—this is not a complete list of concepts that are used in describing the self. Losev, in his work "the very self" [20], emphasizes that the category of self is the most syncretic, including extremely voluminous and complex differentiated content, which is difficult to structure in any way.

The primary "I" applied to a person is very difficult to understand. If this is the first one, then it encompasses everything, there is nothing outside of it, which makes it possible to conclude that everything is identical with everything. Can a person believe that he is absolutely merged with everything, forming a complete and indistinguishable identity? Yes. The fact that the "I" is the identity of everything with everything means that the "I" absorbs all the content of the world. N. A. Berdyaev believes that man is given to himself primarily, he is before and greater than the world [21]. "I" is universality. However, the "I" cannot escape from itself: this would be its liberation from itself. And since it takes into itself all the relations that make it identical with everything, it is only in the "I" that the universality is first found, which, without being anything definite or meaningful, allows for infinite variations of concrete predications in relation to itself.

The first one is whole, internally merged; it is a pure self-coincidence, a self-sufficient identity with simplicity. If something falls away from it, loses its integrity and simplicity, then there is a need to search for the self. The self is unmanifested in everything that is not one, that has a secondary nature to it. As soon as the falling away occurred, something lost both the ability and the ability to fully embrace and hold its self within itself. And since nothing can exist without retaining the self, becoming impossible, so far as the partial retention of the self means a deformation of the nature of the existing object.

The self of a thing is not only diversified in predictions, but under certain conditions it is subject to other-being fragmentation, deformation, which manifests itself in the form of inauthentic realization of the thing. The predominance of individuality and detachment leads to the closure of the thing in itself, its collapse, while the continuity and continuity of generating a new one indicates the mechanism of "splitting" of absolute individuality.

The concept of "I" does not need to clarify the boundaries of its existence and the limits of fragmentation, fragmentation, because of its primary integrity. The procedure of self-determination is necessary only if the integrity of the object is violated. Accordingly, the necessity and need for self-determination in a person arises only when its integral nature is disintegrated. In real life, he is faced with the insufficiency and inability to realize his own nature, which leads him to realize his inferiority and inferiority.

K. Marx, comparing a person in some respects with a commodity, writes: "Since he is born without a mirror in his hands and is not a fichtean philosopher: "I am I", then a person first looks, as in a mirror, at another person. It is only by treating Paul like himself that the man Peter begins to treat himself like a man. At the same time, Paul as such, in all his Pavlovian corporeality, becomes for him a form of manifestation of the "man" kind " [22]. However, it is difficult to agree with him. It is not enough to look at another person in order to then treat yourself as a person, because the condition for "looking at another person as in a mirror" is the ability to see as such. This is possible when Peter and Paul are already endowed with this ability before they notice each other. Without immersion in a single field of vision, they will never be able, even when looking at each other, to see this other, and therefore, through him, to see themselves. The fichtean "I am I" rejected by Marx just speaks of the existence of a preliminary condition of viewing. The self is the primary basis for the individual, allowing him to relate to the rest of the world, as a result of which identity arises.

The primary and obvious intuition of the "I", with which a person began his being process, and which he felt as solid and reliable, suddenly slipped away from under his feet.
Subsequent predication became extremely problematic and difficult, because it was not clear how to replace the "I" in the predicate "I am ". The non-compliance of the criteria of self-identification and self-identification with the States of fluid reality, the impossibility of making identifications led to an identity crisis that gave rise to many new problems [23]. The violated identity (self) became a condition and factor of inadequate predictions.

Identity includes both constancy and variability. The dominance of constants under any transformations (a very strict condition) forms a classical identity. This means that a person associates himself with a certain community, group based on a single principle of existence, common functions performed, matching goals, etc. The dominance of variability, which leads to irreversible consequences, becomes the basis of non-classical identity. Loss (loss) of identity (disintegration of an object) is a complete break between the constant and variable components, which actually means the disintegration of the existing X.

The crisis of "I" identity is associated with the transformation of social reality. Classical identity is a fluid balance between constancy and variability. If the environment changes linearly, evolutionarily, the equilibrium has time to be restored. This expresses the natural drift of identity, which is not felt by the actors, because they are floating in this stream, and shifts in identity are not perceived either as a crisis or as a special problem. If the changes in the environment increase non-linearly, abruptly, the equilibrium is no longer restored, and the correspondence is deformed. In a rapidly changing reality, with a sharp increase in the activity of subjects, the question of constructing their own existence becomes acute.

This is most clearly seen at the stage of the information society, where the problem of identity is also becoming more acute. Fluid reality manifests itself in contradictory ways and people are not always able to understand the opposite trends that they face. This creates the feeling that there is a whole range of identities that have to be chosen between. As z notes. Bauman, "the problem of identity" has changed its appearance and content: before, a person was faced with the question of how to acquire the chosen identity, how to become so-and – so, now-which identity to choose and how to make a different choice if the previously chosen identity loses its value or loses its seductive features [24]. And more: "According to the famous remark of Christopher Lash, the 'identities' that are coveted these days are represented by something that 'can be put on and taken off like a costume»...» [24]. Identity turns from a stabilizing factor in these conditions into a situational phenomenon that forces the subject to constantly change following changes in reality.

Everything screams about it. For example, advertising: "Baskin31Robbins: ice cream that the whole world loves! » What is it about? Yes, about an identity that you don't have yet, but that you need to acquire. The whole world is eating this ice cream. The people who consume it are the same, the same, similar in that they eat it. And you, who have not tried it yet, are not like everyone else, so you fall out of this community, are not identical to other people. This is not good, identify yourself immediately. Advertising imposes an identity, making a choice for a person, he can only give himself to the situation.

The mosaic of identities testifies to the extinction of the process of associating oneself with any communities, with the rooting of its essential characteristics in something deep and stable. Identification becomes diffuse and as a result turns into a self-winding process, which loses the need to relate something to something. Each point of the topos (place, region, locus) becomes the center of identity and there is no need for predication as establishing a relationship with the deep core. Any actor can now say that they carry their identity with them. It is encapsulated, transformed into a virtual indication of the blurring of the "I" around the world. The whole world is now becoming the basis for identity. Any subject feels comfortable in any region of the world. Through the Internet, a special identity is formed: not national, not cultural, not state, not ethnic, not religious, but actually Internet-based. This has the effect of blurring the line between authentic and virtual identity, the subject disappears the need to identify himself with anything: every time he
"wraps" himself and, thanks to the Internet space, "smears" all over the world. A sort of wave-particle dualism of identity…

Generally speaking, the situation is quite interesting. On the one hand, there are many represented identities from which the subject can choose something, on the other hand, the diffusion of the identity itself, which turns into its collapse, so that there is nothing to choose from. But identity is obligatory, because it is the self in its being. Identity is dead-the self is lost, the human being is stopped.

Under these conditions, the process of re-commutation of natural identities begins, technologies for assembling new identities from "improvised" elements appear, where the natural and unnatural, organic and inorganic, harmonious and ugly are added to "one dish". The era of constructing artificial identities is coming, new identities are being created and implemented in real life. There is a service sphere that offers services for changing identity—after all, a person changes their image, sometimes wants to change their gender, it is possible to create an art identity, pseudo—identity. It is possible that identity services will become a very profitable business area. The construction of identities means that the weakening and destruction of natural identities begins, and new patterns are created that are imposed on identifying subjects. The possibilities of creating identities for every taste and color in accordance with the desires, whims and goals of people are expanded. The peculiarity of such identities is that over time they will acquire the status of natural formations that do not arouse suspicion among actors.

Artificial identities include PIN codes (PIN) – personal identification numbers – codes of Bank cards, credit cards, and mobile phones. IP addresses, and each computer, each port, each node has its own indexing. In the pub locational field – indices of the DOI, ORCID, Hirsch, etc.

Now we will answer the questions posed by E. A. Orlova: "... how and why (for what purpose) the identity of a socio—cultural unit — a person, community, societal integrity—is formed and maintained in the ideas and behavior of people in the biological, social, cultural, and historical time scales" [25]. To do this, we reformulate them in our terminology. We are talking about the sense of self-identity (identity) of different socio-cultural formations, thought of as the primary one. In other words, why do we need "I", self and identity?

There is no question of the necessity of the first unity as a fundamental category of Neoplatonism, because this is what makes the world exist at all. It is what makes everything whole. In relation to man, the primordial one gives the primary and visible concept of "I", which is the condition and guarantee of human existence.

The self is the certainty of onticity. This category indicates that something is exactly itself, such as it is, and nothing else. Without this definiteness, there can be neither separateness (separateness, individuality, etc.), nor coherence (continuity, continuity, novelty, etc.).

Identity structures the ontic, formats the self through the other: definiteness is possible in multiple ways- the world is polyvariant. But each time the generated unit sets a reference frame for structuring various predicated phenomena. Methods of fixing these phenomena in the corresponding niches are the identification procedure.

Identification and identity form the external, superficial, empirically obvious, present level of being, outward. If the researcher delves into the depths of being, he will find something that does not lie on the surface and requires metaphysical explication.

### 4 Discussion

The "I" is the primary and obvious datum, in relation to which it is permissible to ask: who is this "I" in itself. The question of itself is a question posed in relation to an existing
construct. This itself indicates a person in his isolation, outside of other people, and indicates that a person is significant in itself and for itself. Reflection on the "I" is initially axiological.

How and where does this significance of a person for himself arise? Ordinary intuition tells us that the "I" is a person who has something that does not free him from himself, otherwise he will not be himself. And whatever properties one ascribes to oneself, it is clear that they are actually ascribed to the one who has a place before any predicates, differing from them. This primacy is responsible for the special feeling of a person that comes from somewhere in his depths and makes his existence stable regardless of any thing. Moreover, each person is "given" this feeling as inherent only to him. Being all-encompassing and universal, it is always completely concentrated in the individual whole person. And if it were fragmented, the self would not arise.

This "something" forms the inner basis (core) of a person as the carrier of all infinite predications. The "I" in itself is not reduced to any characteristics and States, is not equal to their sum, it turns out to be such due to its internal integrity and therefore is primary in relation to everything that is predicated of it. Predication is important in that it contributes to the realization and unfolding of the human self. The primary "I" through it expands to infinity the area of its being, expands the horizons of development of the world from the singularity and separateness to the universality of the States of the latter. Thanks to the self, it condenses these infinite manifestations and realizations as much as possible in one single and unique point – the "I". The self organically combines the most universal and the most individual, revealing an amazing and unique unity of man, concentrated in his "I" and representing his innermost personal beginning. This dialectic of the individual and the universal in the self also sheds light on the fate of this category itself: depending on the situations that arise and due to its own duality, the self is subject to numerous transformations.

This is, say, falling away from the maximum community and transferring the source of the self directly to the empirical person. Here the self turns into the maximum autonomy of the individual, making the basis of an exclusive own Ego. The result is extreme individualism. Possible separation from the maximum of individuality with renesemee self-outward relation to man, and this is complete loss of the unique-STI, which means a complete disintegration of personality, even if he physically was not there. A good example is mankurt in the novel of Aitmatov "Snowstorm station".

The self is the General principle of understanding any phenomena, which gives a certain something independence and isolation from everything else. As a result, any something is taken as absolutely individual. The self is the basis and condition of a person's communication with the world: both with objects and with people. Interaction and communication require the emergence of the new as going beyond the boundaries of their individuality and isolation. The emergence of the new is the spontaneous emergence and self-affirmation of the self, and this happens always and everywhere constantly, continuously and continuously. This is the paradox of the self: it is ind...
When the identity "I" am "I" is subjected to further predication due to the irremediable formation of an absolutely new one, and "I am" I "receives various interpretations through the substitution of "I" by any other object, the result of this action is an identity of the purest water, and its implementation is identification. Identity is multiplication, when the "I" as an absolute individual is revealed in numerous ways through its other-through masks, roles, imitations, etc., which gives a variety of identities.

The choice and fitting of identities indicates that society has a scattering of identities as a given. Or: a multi-faceted (plural) identity is divided into a spectrum of specific (private) identities (identity through ice cream is one of them), and an inexperienced person can easily get lost and even disappear in their maze. Before him, there is a need and a need to plunge into the mosaic of identities, switch between them, learn to exist in this polyidentical world, otherwise it is not far to a mental shift, or even to an extreme outcome...

When artificially constructing identities, all natural-historical stereotypes are broken, and the problem of identity will lose its historical basis and perspective, since in the conditions of fluid reality, any privileged reference point becomes superfluous due to the fact that reality takes on a rhizomatic appearance. The rhizome [26] does not develop, it is only transformed from one of its partial States to another, because there is simply no concept of development for its beating. It does not change from the lowest to the highest, does not become smaller or larger, but only changes, becoming different from its previous state. The rhizome is initially multiple, being at the same time a whole formation. Here there is no opposition or binarity; the one (multiplicity) is the essential principle of the other (singularity); this other (singularity) is that which propagates, outlines, and transforms the first (multiplicity). That is why the fluid reality as a psychotic process closes the identity to itself, without experiencing any need or need to identify with anything. Simulacra of identity, pseudo - and false identities, implicit (explicit) and implicit (implicit) identities, inverted identities, as well as their numerous superpositions that look fresh and natural flourish here.

5 Conclusions

It is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of "I" and the self. Of these, the" I "performs the function of the first unity in relation to the person, while the self includes an extremely generalized content associated with reflection on the "I". Without the retention of the self, nothing can exist as a whole.

Identity is the result of replacing the second self in the identity of the "I" am "I" with any other object, and its realization is identification.

Identity includes constancy and variability, and as a result of the dominance of one of these sides, we can talk about classical and non-classical identity.

In the context of the information society, we should talk about the emergence of technologies for assembling artificial identities and the emergence of the service sphere for changing identities.

Thus, the process of predicting identities based on the self acquires a new meaning and significance for the individual's life in the context of the transition to the global information age.
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