Resilient Virtualized Systems Using ReHype

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Abstract

System-level virtualization introduces critical vulnerabilities to failures of the software components that implement virtualization – the virtualization infrastructure (VI). To mitigate the impact of such failures, we introduce a resilient VI (RVI) that can recover individual VI components from failure, caused by hardware or software faults, transparently to the hosted virtual machines (VMs). Much of the focus is on the ReHype mechanism for recovery from hypervisor failures, that can lead to state corruption and to inconsistencies among the states of system components.

ReHype’s implementation for the Xen hypervisor was done incrementally, using fault injection results to identify sources of critical corruption and inconsistencies. This implementation involved 900 LOC, with memory space overhead of 2.1MB. Fault injection campaigns, with a variety of fault types, show that ReHype can successfully recover, in less than 750ms, from over 88% of detected hypervisor failures.

In addition to ReHype, recovery mechanisms for the other VI components are described. The overall effectiveness of our RVI is evaluated hosting a Web service application, on a cluster of VMs. With faults in any VI component, for over 87% of detected failures, our recovery mechanisms allow services provided by the application to be continuously maintained despite the resulting failures of VI components.

1 Introduction

System-level virtualization [28] enables server consolidation by allowing multiple virtual machines (VMs) to run on a single physical host, while providing workload isolation and flexible resource management. The virtualization infrastructure (VI) is comprised of software components responsible for managing and multiplexing resources among multiple VMs. Failure of a VI component due to software bugs or transient hardware faults generally results in the failure of the entire virtualized system. Recovery from such a failure typically involves rebooting the entire system, resulting in loss of the work in progress in all the VMs. This problem can be mitigated through the use of periodic checkpointing of all the VMs and restoration of all the VMs to their last checkpoint upon reboot. However, this involves performance overhead for checkpointing during normal operation as well as loss upon recovery of work done since the last checkpoint.

The hypervisor is the key irreplaceable component of the VI. The VI typically also includes other components, with specific functions and labels that vary across different VIs. The Xen [2] VI, that we used as our experimental platform, includes two other components: the Privileged VM (PrivVM), that controls, manages, and coordinates the VMs on the system, and the Driver VM (DVM) [6], that provides a safe way for I/O devices to be shared among VMs. While failure of the PrivVM and/or DVM can disrupt the ability to manage the system and/or prevent I/O devices from being accessible to VMs, failure of the hypervisor almost immediately results in the failure of all other system components – all the VMs and the rest of the VI.

Due to the critical role of the hypervisor, a large part of this paper focuses on the design and evaluation of a mechanism for recovering from hypervisor failures, using microreboot [4], called ReHype. Since the

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operation of VMs can also be disrupted by the failure of other VI components, mechanisms for tolerating the failure of the PrivVM and DVM are also briefly described. All of these mechanisms together comprise a resilient VI (RVI) that allows the entire system to operate through failure of VI components.

ReHype allows VMs to survive hypervisor failures without any loss of work in progress and without any performance overhead during normal operation. To the best of our knowledge, ReHype is the first mechanism the achieve this. Upon hypervisor failure, ReHype boots a new hypervisor instance while preserving the state of running VMs. VMs are stalled for a short duration during the hypervisor reboot. After a new hypervisor is booted, ReHype integrates the preserved VM states with the new hypervisor to allow the VMs to continue normal execution.

Failure almost always results in state corruption. For efficiency, ReHype reuses parts of the vulnerable state of the failed system, including the states of all the VMs. Hence, ReHype, like any recovery mechanism that relies on vulnerable state at the time a failure is detected, cannot be 100% guaranteed to restore all system components to valid states. Furthermore, since ReHype involves reinitializing part of the hypervisor state while preserving the rest of the state, the result of recovery may include inconsistencies in the hypervisor state, between hypervisor and VM states, and between the hypervisor and hardware states. For example, hypervisor failure can occur in the middle of handling a hypercall from a VM or before acknowledging an interrupt from a device controller.

A key contribution of our work is to identify the specific sources of state corruptions and inconsistencies, determine which of those are most likely to prevent successful recovery, and devise mechanisms to overcome these problems. We have implemented and tested ReHype with the Xen [2] hypervisor and VMs running Linux. We use the results of fault injection to incrementally enhance [26] an initial basic version of ReHype. These incremental steps improve the rate of successful recovery from an initial 5.6% of detected faults to over 88% of detected faults. Our evaluation of the final scheme points to ways in which the success rate can be further improved.

As discussed further in Section 14, ReHype builds upon the Otherworld [5] mechanism for microrebooting the Linux kernel while preserving process states, and the RootHammer [14, 15] mechanism for rejuvenation of the Xen hypervisor through a reboot while maintaining VM states in place. Otherworld microreboots an OS kernel, as opposed to a hypervisor. While ReHype does not involve any changes to the VMs or the applications in the VMs, Otherworld requires modifications for system call retries and, in many cases, application-level “crash procedures” that are invoked upon recovery. Service interruptions with Otherworld were measured to be tens of seconds long, as opposed to less than one second with ReHype. RootHammer does deal with the Xen hypervisor and provides proactive rejuvenation. However, proactive rejuvenation is much simpler than recovery from failures since it does not deal with possible arbitrary corruptions and inconsistencies throughout the system. Down times with RootHammer were measured to be tens of seconds long, as opposed to less than one second with ReHype.

The key contributions of this paper are:
• The design and implementation of ReHype – an efficient and effective mechanism that enables VMs to survive across hypervisor failures with minimum interruption.

• Using results from fault injection experiments, identifying specific sources of state corruption and inconsistencies in the hypervisor, between hypervisor and VMs, and between the hypervisor and hardware. The design and implementation of mechanisms to overcome these problems.

• An extensive evaluation of the effectiveness of ReHype deployed inside a test virtualized environment and on bare hardware. The evaluation consists of injecting hardware and software faults into the hypervisor while the hypervisor is hosting para-virtualized and fully-virtualized VMs running applications.

• An analysis and optimization of ReHype’s recovery latency.
• The design and implementation of a resilient VI (RVI), that integrates recovery mechanisms for all
the VI components.

• An evaluation of the resiliency of our complete RVI, deployed on bare hardware, hosting a cluster of
VMs running the Linux Virtual Server [35, 22], providing reliable Web service.

The following section discusses the requirements from a resilient hypervisor as well as key challenges to
providing such resiliency and approaches to meeting these challenges. Section 3 describes the implemen-
tation of a version of ReHype that provides basic transparent hypervisor microreboot but does not deal with
problems caused by state corruptions and inconsistencies. Incremental improvements to ReHype, based on
fault injection results, are described in Section 4. The details of the experimental setup are presented in Sec-
tion 5. Section 6 discusses the impact on ReHype of incorporating in the hypervisor support for a PrivVM
recovery mechanism. Additional enhancements to ReHype with respect to the handling interrupts and VM
control are discussed in Section 7. An evaluation of the effectiveness of the final version of ReHype with
respect to different fault types is presented in Section 8. Sections 9 and 10 present, respectively, a validation
of ReHype’s effectiveness on bare hardware and its ability to recover a hypervisor hosting fully-virtualized
(FV) VMs. The recovery latency of ReHype is discussed in Section 11. Section 12 presents the design and
implementation of our complete resilient VI (RVI), including mechanisms for recovery of the PrivVM and
DVM. An evaluation of the RVI is presented in Section 13. Related work is discussed in Section 14.

2 Tolerating VMM Failure

Hardware faults or software bugs in the virtual machine monitor (VMM) can cause the corruption of VMM
state or the state of VMs. As a result, the VMM or individual VMs may crash, hang, or perform erroneous
actions. The safest way to recover the system is to reboot the VMM as well as all of the VMs. However,
this requires a lengthy recovery process and involves loss of the work in progress of applications running in
the VMs. Periodic checkpointing of VMs can reduce the amount of lost work upon recovery. However, the
work done since the last checkpoint is lost and there is performance overhead during normal operation for
checkpointing. The alternative mechanisms discussed below involve less overhead and lost work but may
result in recovery of only parts of the system or even a complete failure to recover a working system. This
section discusses the basic design alternatives for mechanisms that can recover from VMM failure.

Virtualization is often used to consolidate the workloads of multiple physical servers on a single physical
host. With multiple physical servers, a single software or transient hardware fault may cause the failure of
one of the servers. An aggressive reliability goal for a virtualized system is to do no worse than a cluster
of physical servers. Hence, if a transient hardware fault or a software fault in any component (including
the VMM) affects only one VM running applications, the goal is met. Recovery from VMM failure that
avoids losing work in progress in the VMs necessarily relies on utilizing the VM states at the time of failure
detection. One or more of those VM states may be corrupted, resulting in the failure of those VMs even if
the rest of the system is restored to correct operation. Based on the reliability goal above, we define recovery
from VMM failure to be successful if no more than one of the existing VMs running applications fails and
the recovered VMM maintains its ability to host the other existing VMs as well as create and host new VMs
[18].

Successfully “tolerating” VMM failure requires detection of such failures and successfully recovering
from them, as defined above. To accomplish this goal, mechanisms must exist to: (1) detect VMM fail-
ure, (2) repair VMM corruption, and (3) resolve inconsistencies within the VMM, between the VMM and
VMs, and between the VMM and the hardware. As described in Subsection 2.1 detecting VMM failure

1 The terms hypervisor and VMM are used interchangeably.
boils down to being able to detect a VMM crash, hang, or silent corruption. Subsection 2.2 discusses different approaches to repairing VMM corruption and the tradeoffs among them in terms of implementation complexity and expected success rates. Inconsistencies among the states of different components following recovery may be resolved entirely in the VMM or may require VM modifications. Details of the sources of inconsistencies and techniques for resolving inconsistencies are described in Subsection 2.3.

2.1 Detection

Faults in the VMM can manifest as VMM crashes, hangs, or silent corruption (arbitrary incorrect actions). Crashes can be detected using existing VMM panic and exception handlers – if the VMM panics, a crash has occurred. Detecting VMM hangs requires external hardware. A typical hang detector, such as the one implemented in the Xen VMM, uses a watchdog timer that sends periodic interrupts to the VMM. The interrupt handler checks whether the VMM has performed certain actions since the last time the handler was invoked. If it has not, the handler signals a hang.

Silent VMM corruption is more difficult to detect. Detection mechanisms involve redundant (e.g., replicated) data structures and redundant computations (e.g., performing sanity checks). Fortunately, our fault injection results (Section 8) indicate that the majority of VMM failures (65%-80%) are caused by crashes and hangs and are thus detectable using the simple mechanisms discussed above.

2.2 Repairing VMM Corruption

Repair is initiated when the detection mechanism invokes a failure handler. Corrupted VMM state can then be repaired by either identifying and fixing the specific parts of the VMM state that are corrupted or simply booting a new VMM instance. A major difficulty with the first alternative is the requirement to identify which parts of the state are erroneous. This is likely to require significant overhead for maintaining redundant data structures. Furthermore, complex repair operations performed in the context of a failed VMM can increase the chance of failed recoveries [30]. The approach of using nested virtualization with on-demand checkpointing proposed by [32] can potentially be used to repair VMM state corruption but incurs a high runtime overhead (see Section 14). Hence, we focus on repair by booting a new VMM instance.

Normally, a full system reboot causes the loss of all the VM states. As mentioned earlier, safe recovery from such a reboot involves high overhead. To eliminate the overhead during normal operation, the VM states can be checkpointed to stable storage only after VMM failure is detected (in the failure handler). Once a new VMM instance boots up, the VMs can be restored. However, checkpointing VM states in the context of a failed VMM increases the chance of failed recoveries, since the VMM must perform I/O and access possibly corrupted structures that hold VM states. In addition, the time to save and restore VM states results in slow recovery, leading to lengthy service interruptions.

An alternative approach to a system-wide reboot, is to microreboot [4] the VMM. With this approach, VM states are preserved in memory across the reboot. This avoids the overhead of checkpointing VM states to stable storage. Once the new VMM has been booted, it must be re-integrated with the preserved VMs. This re-integration can be done by either recreating the VMM structures used to manage the VMs or reusing VMM structures preserved from the old VMM. Either way, some amount of VMM data needs to be preserved across a VMM reboot for the re-integration process.

Variations of the VMM microreboot approach can be categorized based on two dimensions: (I) whether the new VMM is rebooted in place (as with ReHype) or in a reserved memory area (similarly to Otherworld [5]); and (II) whether the VMM structures for managing VMs from the old VMM instance are preserved and directly reused, or new instances of these structures are created and populated with state from the old VMM instance. The choice in Dimension (I) affects the complexity of the operations that must be done in the failure handler. The choice in Dimension (II) affects the complexity of the operations required for reintegrating the
preserved VMs with the new VMM instance. Since, in general, minimizing the complexity of operations required for recovery increases the probability of successful recovery, these choices are important. The rest of this subsection discusses these variations.

If the new VMM is booted in place, the failure handler must perform two operations that are not needed if the VMM is booted into a reserved memory area: 1) preserve VMM state (data structures) from the failed VMM instance, needed for reintegration with the preserved VMs, by copying it to a reserved memory area; and 2) overwrite the existing VMM image in memory with a new image. If the VMM is booted into a reserved memory area, the entire old VMM state is preserved since, on boot, the new VMM is confined to the reserved memory area. Thus, the copying of old VMM state is not needed. In addition, if the VMM is booted into a reserved memory area, the new VMM image can be preloaded into the reserved memory area without affecting the operation of the current VMM. Obviously, this choice involves memory overhead for the required reserved area.

Since the state of the old VMM instance may be corrupted, the ability to successfully recover is directly related to the amount of data reused from the old VMM instance. In some cases, data structures in the new VMM instance can be re-initialized to static values (e.g., clearing all locks) or reconstructed from sources that are unlikely to be corrupted (e.g., obtaining the CPUID of a core from the hardware). However, some data structures are dynamically updated, based on the activity of the system, and cannot be re-initialized with static or “safe” values. For example, a VM’s page table or the VMM’s timer heap.

With respect to the choices along Dimension (II) above, reusing preserved data structures from the old VMM instance is simpler to implement, as only pointers to the preserved structures need to be restored in the new VMM instance. Creating new instances of VMM data structures is more complex, as it requires deep copy of all the required structures from the old VMM and updating all pointers within those structures. With either of the alternatives along Dimension (II), there is a possibility of ending up with corrupted values in the new VMM’s data structures. With new data structure instances, there is a higher probability of failure during the deep copy operations in the reintegration phase. If the preserved structures are reused, there is a greater risk of also introducing into the new VMM instance corrupted pointers, which may lead to further corruption later on, after the system resumes normal operation. This risk with the reuse of preserved structures can be partially mitigated by proactively rejuvenating the system [15] soon after recovery.

Given the tradeoffs presented in this subsection, ReHype uses the microreboot approach and opts for a simple implementation that does not require major modifications to the VMM. With ReHype, the VMM is rebooted in place. ReHype preserves and reuses almost all of the VMM’s dynamic memory, but updates a few key data structures with “safe” values, as described in Sections 3 and 4. The benefit of reusing most of the VMM’s data structures is that it allowed ReHype to be easily integrated into a VMM (Xen in our case) with minor (900 LOC added/modified) modifications.

2.3 Resolving Inconsistencies

VMs and VMMs are generally designed and implemented with the assumption that lower system layers are, for the most part, reliable. Hardware mechanisms typically assume that the layer above will interact with the hardware correctly (according to the specifications). These assumptions are violated when the VMM fails due to hardware or VMM software faults. Thus, after recovery from a failed VMM, even if none of the states of the system components are corrupted, these states may be inconsistent, preventing the system from operating correctly.

The VMM executes some operations in critical sections to ensure atomicity, e.g. updating a VM grant table. Atomicity can be violated when a VMM failure occurs in the middle of such critical sections. In such cases, some data structures may be partially updated, leading to inconsistencies within the VMM (VMM/VMM). The VMs expect the VMM to provide a monotonically increasing system time, handle hypercalls, and deliver interrupts. The hardware expects the VMM to acknowledge all interrupts it receives.
When a VMM failure occurs, the assumption of a reliable VMM is violated and this can lead to inconsistencies between the VMM and VMs (VMM/VM) and between the VMM and hardware (VMM/hardware). The recovery process must resolve these inconsistencies so that the virtualized system can continue to operate correctly. The rest of this subsection discusses these inconsistencies and techniques for their resolution.

Sources of VMM/VMM inconsistencies include partially updated structures, unreleased locks, and memory leaks. The options for resolving these inconsistencies are, essentially, special cases of the options for dealing with state corruption, discussed in the previous subsection. Resolving inconsistencies caused by partially updated structures requires either constructing new instances of the data structures using information from the failed VMM, or using redundant information, logged prior to failure, to fix the preserved instance of the data structure. A scheduler’s run queue is an example of a data structure for which the former technique can be used. Inconsistency can occur if a VCPU becomes runnable but the VMM fails before inserting it into the run queue. Resolving this inconsistency requires re-initializing the run queue to empty upon bootup and re-inserting all runnable VCPUs (obtained from the failed VMM) into the run queue. For other data structures, such as the ones that track memory page usage information, reconstruction is more difficult, so the latter technique may be preferable. For instance, an inconsistency can occur if a failure happens right when a page use counter has been updated but before that page has been added to a page table. Resolving this inconsistency by traversing all page table entries to count the actual mappings to that page can be done, but is complex and slow. Instead, the entire mapping operation can be made atomic with respect to failure using write-ahead logging, involving a small overhead during normal operation and simple, fast correction of any inconsistencies upon recovery.

Locks and semaphores acquired prior to VMM failure must be released (re-initialized to a static value) upon recovery to allow the system to reacquire them when needed. In order to do so, all locks and semaphores must be tracked and re-initialized in data structures that are reused or copied from the failed VMM.

A memory leak can occur if a failure happens between the allocation and freeing of a memory region in the VMM. Since failures are rare, such a memory leak is generally benign, as long as the leaked region is small relative to the total memory size. After VMM recovery, the system can be scheduled to be rebooted to reclaim leaked memory. Alternatively, leveraging [15], after recovery, the virtualized system can be quickly rejuvenated to reclaim any leaked memory.

Sources of VMM/VM inconsistency include erratic and/or non-monotonic changes in system time, partially executed hypercalls, and undelivered virtual interrupts. The correct operation of many VMs depends on a system time that is monotonically increasing at a constant rate. In a virtualized system, the VMs’ source of time is the VMM. When a VMM is rebooted, its time keeping structures are reset, potentially resulting in a time source for VMs that is erratic (e.g., ceases to advance or advances suddenly by a significant amount) or that is not monotonically increasing. In addition, such a reset can result in timer events set using time relative to the VMM’s system time prior to recovery to be delayed. One technique for resolving this inconsistency is to simply save the VMM time structures upon failure and restore those structures after the VMM reboot and before the VMs are scheduled to run. This allows time to continue moving forward with no interruption visible by the VMs. For external entities that interact with the VMs and expect time to remain approximately synchronized with real time, additional mechanisms, such as NTP, are required to slowly accelerate time in the virtualized system to catch up with real time.

When the VMM recovers from a failure, partially executed hypercalls must be re-executed. Our experimental results show that, at least for the hypercalls that were exercised by our target system, simply retrying hypercalls works most of the time and allows VMs to continue to operate. However, hypercalls that are not idempotent may fail on a retry, in which case the VM executing the hypercall may also fail.

Hypercall retry can be implemented by modifying the VM to add a “wrapper” around hypercall invocation that will re-invoke the hypercall if a retry value is returned by the VMM. The VMM must also be modified to return, upon recovery, a retry value indicating a partially executed hypercall. This approach
provides the VMs control over which hypercalls to retry and allows the VMs to gracefully fail if a hypercall retry is unsuccessful.

Hypercall retry can also be implemented without modifying the VMs. To force re-execution of a hypercall after recovery, the VMM adjusts the VM’s instruction pointer to point back to the hypercall instruction (usually a trapping instruction). When the VM is scheduled to run, the very next instruction it executes will be the hypercall. This mechanism is already used in the Xen [2] VMM to allow the preemption of long-running hypercalls transparently to the VMs. It should be noted that this mechanism can also deal with VMM failures that occur while in the middle of handling a VM trapping instruction that is not part of a hypercall.

The VMM is responsible for delivering interrupts from hardware and event signals from other VMs as virtual interrupts to the destination VM. These virtual interrupts may be lost if the VMM fails. Some inconsistencies of this type can be resolved without any modifications to the system by relying on existing timeout mechanisms that are implemented in the kernels and device drivers of the VMs. A timeout handler can resend commands to a device or resignal another VM if an expected interrupt does not arrive within a specified period of time. We have verified that timeout mechanisms exist for the Linux SCSI block driver (used for SATA disks) and the Intel E1000 NIC driver, representing the most important devices for servers (storage and network controllers). Obviously, such timeout mechanisms do not deal with lost interrupts from unsolicited sources, such as packet reception from a network device. However, at least for network devices, the problem is ultimately resolved by existing higher-level end-to-end protocols (e.g., TCP).

A source of VMM/hardware inconsistency is unacknowledged interrupts. The processor blocks delivery of pending interrupts that are of lower or equal priority than the current interrupt being serviced by the VMM. These blocked interrupts can be delivered once the in-service interrupt has been acknowledged by the VMM. In addition, for level-triggered interrupts, the interrupt controllers will block an interrupt source until the previous interrupt from that source has been acknowledged. Since VMM failure can occur at any time, the interrupt being serviced at the point of failure may never get acknowledged, thus blocking interrupts of lower or equal priority indefinitely. If VMM recovery is done without performing a hardware reset, a mechanism is needed to either reset both the pending interrupt state in the processor and the I/O controller, or acknowledge all pending interrupts during recovery. In the case of acknowledging pending interrupts, the interrupt source must be blocked at the interrupt controller before the interrupt is acknowledged to prevent another interrupt from slipping by before the VMM is ready to handle the interrupt.

### 3 Transparent VMM Microreboot

We have implemented a ReHype prototype for version 3.3.0 of the Xen [2] VMM. This section describes the implementation of a version of ReHype that provides the basic capability to microreboot the VMM while preserving the running VMs and allowing them to resume normal execution following the microreboot. Improvements to the basic scheme that enhance recovery success rates are discussed in Section 4.

To microreboot the VMM, ReHype uses the existing Xen port of the Kdump [7] tool. Kdump is a kernel debugging tool that provides facilities to allow a crashed system to load a pristine kernel image, in this case the VMM image, on top of the existing image, and directly transfer control to it. The Kdump tool by itself, however, does not provide any facilities to preserve parts of memory, such as those holding VM states. The burden of memory preservation is on the kernel or VMM being booted.

A VMM microreboot is differentiated from a normal VMM boot by the value of a global flag added to the initialized data segment of Xen. The flag is clear in the original VMM image on disk. Upon the initial system boot, the recovery image is loaded to memory using the Kdump tool and the flag in that image is then set. All the modifications to the bootup process described henceforth refer to actions performed when the flag is set (the microreboot path).
On boot, the stock Xen VMM initializes the entire system memory and allocates memory for its own use. The modifications for ReHype must ensure that, upon recovery, the new VMM instance preserves the memory used by VMs and memory that was used by the previous VMM instance to hold state needed for managing the VMs. Hence, as described in Subsection 3.1, the ReHype version of the Xen VMM allocates “around” the preserved memory regions during a VMM microreboot. When the new VMM instance is booted and initialized, it does not contain information about the running VMs, and thus has no way to run and manage them. Subsection 3.2 describes how the VMM and VM states preserved during VMM recovery are re-integrated with the new VMM instance.

3.1 Preserving VMM and VM States

The state that must be preserved across a VMM microreboot includes information in the VMM’s static data segments, the VMM’s heap, the structure in the VMM that holds information about each machine page, and special segments that are normally used only during VMM bootup.

VMM microreboot involves overwriting the existing VMM image (code, initialized data, and bss) with a pristine image. The VMM’s static data segments (initialized data and bss) contain critical information needed for the operation of the system following bootup of the new VMM instance. For example, this includes interrupt descriptors and pointers to structures on the Xen heap, such as Domain 0’s VM structure and the list of domains. Hence, some of the information in the old static data segments must be preserved. While it is only necessary to preserve a subset of the static data segments, since they are relatively small, we reduce the implementation complexity by preserving the segments in their entirety.

Figure 1 shows the memory layout for Xen, as modified for ReHype. In particular, the bss segment is extended by approximately 1MB — sufficient space to hold complete copies of the original bss and initialized data segments. This is done by changing the linker script used for creating the Xen image. Since the area reserved is in the bss segment, no extra disk space is taken up for the new VMM image. The bss segment only takes up space when it is loaded into memory. Upon failure detection, before initiating a VMM microreboot, the failure handler copies the initialized data and (unextended) bss segments to this new reserved memory.

As discussed above, for each VM, the state that must be preserved includes both the VM’s memory image and parts of the VMM state used to manage the VM. Since this information is maintained on the VMM’s heap, the VMM’s heap must be preserved. Preserving the VMM’s heap requires modifications of the VMM’s bootup code. During VMM initialization, before the heap is created, the old heap (from the previous VMM instance) is walked to identify all the free pages. When the new heap is created and populated with free pages, only pages that are free in the old heap are added to the new heap. This ensures that the new VMM will not allocate (overwrite) any pages that are still in use. To access the old heap, the page table from the old VMM must be restored. This requires copying the old page directory from the old bss segment, preserved as discussed above, to the new bss segment.

The Xen VMM maintains a structure (page_info) that holds information about each machine page, such as the page ownership and use count. For all the pages that are preserved across a VMM microreboot, the
information in this structure must be preserved. This structure is allocated in a special memory area, between the bss segment and the heap. The VMM bootup code was modified to avoid initializing the page_info entries for pages that are not free.

The stock Xen VMM image includes two static segments (init.text and init.data) that are normally used during bootup and then freed to the heap so that they can be used for other purposes. Hence, with stock Xen, a microreboot would overwrite these segments, potentially corrupting data in pages that had been reallocated. To prevent this problem, the bootup code (normal and microreboot) has been modified to avoid freeing these pages. This results is an extra 100KB memory overhead.

Preserving the heap and static data segments of a failed VMM is unsafe — it can result in recovery failure if those preserved values are corrupted by the failed VMM. Section 4 discusses mechanisms that dramatically improve the chances of successful recoveries despite re-using the preserved heap and static data segments.

### 3.2 Re-integrating VMM and VM States

Following a VMM microreboot, the VMM does not have the information required to resume execution and manage the VMs that were running at the time of failure. The missing system state includes the list of VMs it was managing, the system time that was provided to the VMs, information for interrupt routing (to processors) and forwarding (to VMs), and timer events that were scheduled by the VMs. To allow the virtualized system to continue running, these components of the system state must be restored. As discussed in the previous subsection, all the required state is preserved across a VMM microreboot. Hence, all that is needed is to re-integrate the preserved information with the new VMM instance. This re-integration is accomplished by copying a few key values from the old static data segments to the new static data segments. The restoration is done before the VMs can be scheduled to run. The following structures are restored:

- Pointer to xmalloc free list: prevent memory leaks.
- Pointers to the domain list and hash table: allow Xen to access the state of the running VMs.
- Pointer to the Domain 0 descriptor: since Domain 0 is not rebooted as part of recovery, the pointer to it must be restored to allow Xen access to the Domain 0 structure.
- Pointers to timer event objects: restore pending timer events on the old timer heap to the new timer heap.
- Pointer to the machine-to-physical (m2p) mapping table: make available mapping of machine frame numbers to physical frame numbers.
- System time variables: maintain monotonically increasing time. The time-stamp counter (TSC) must not be reset.
- IRQ descriptor table and IO-APIC entries, including correct IRQ routing affinity and mask: allow VMs to continue to receive interrupts from their devices.
- Structures for tracking the mappings of pages shared between VMs and the VMM: prevents overwriting mappings that are still in use.

There are two additional differences between the VMM microreboot path and a normal VMM boot: Domain 0 is not created and VMs are re-associated with the scheduler. The bootup code has been modified to skip Domain 0 creation and to restore the global pointer to Domain 0 so that the new Xen can access Domain 0’s state. VMs are re-associated with the VMM’s scheduler by invoking the scheduling initialization routines for each VM and inserting runnable VCPUs into the new run queue.
Table I: Improvements over the basic ReHype recovery.

| Mechanism        | Description                                                                 |
|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| NMI IPI          | Use NMI IPIs in failure handler. Avoid IPI blocking by failed VMM.          |
| Acknowledge       | Acknowledges all in-service interrupts in all processors to avoid blocked    |
| interrupts       | interrupts after recovery.                                                  |
| Hypercall retry  | All partially executed hypercalls are retried transparently to the VMs.     |
| FixSP            | Stack pointer set to “safe” value in failure handler.                      |
| NMI “ack”        | Execute iret to “ack” NMI when hang detected on non-CPU0.                   |
| Reinitialize      | Dynamically allocated spin locks and non-spin locks are unlocked.           |
| locks            |                                                                             |
| Reset page counter| Reset page use counter based on page validation bit.                         |
| Acknowledge       | Acknowledges all in-service and pending interrupts in all processors to     |
| interrupts       | avoid blocked interrupts after recovery.                                    |
| (enhanced)       |                                                                             |
| Clear “running” VCPU flag | Clear the VCPU flag that indicates the VCPU is currently running before     |
|                  | rescheduling the VCPU.                                                     |

Some of the structures needed by the VMM are re-created during a microreboot. These include the idle domain as well as structures holding hardware information, such as the model and type of the CPU and the amount of memory available. For structures that are re-created on the heap, ReHype prevents a memory leak by first freeing the old structures.

4 VMM Recovery Improvements

The scheme presented in the previous section provides basic capabilities for VMM microreboot. However, as explained below, with this basic mechanism the probability of successful recovery is very low. This section starts with the basic scheme and incrementally enhances it to achieve high recovery success rates. Table I shows the mechanisms used to improve the basic recovery scheme. As in [26], the choice of enhancements is guided by results from fault injection experiments. The last two mechanisms in Table I were motivated by additional experimentation and are discussed in more detail in Section 7.

We used software-implemented fault injection to introduce errors into CPU registers when the VMM is executing. The goal of the injection was to cause arbitrary failures in the VMM and evaluate the effectiveness of different recovery mechanisms. Two system setups were used: 1AppVM and 3AppVM. Details regarding these setups are presented in Section 5. The 1AppVM setup (Figure 2), with a single AppVM (AppVM_Blk) running a disk I/O (block) benchmark, was used to quickly identify major shortcomings with the recovery mechanisms. The more complex 3AppVM setup (Figure 3) was used to further stress the recovery mechanisms, once the majority of sources of failed recoveries had been fixed. The three AppVMs run different workloads. Two of the three AppVMs (AppVM_Net and AppVM_Unix) are booted when the entire system is booted. The third AppVM (AppVM_Blk) is booted after VMM recovery, as a check of whether the recovered virtualized system maintains the ability to create new VMs.

Table II summarizes the possible outcomes from an injected fault (an injection run). Only detected VMM failures lead to VMM recoveries. With the 1AppVM setup, a recovery is considered successful if the benchmark in AppVM_Blk completes correctly. With the 3AppVM setup, following the explanation in Section 2, a recovery is considered successful if AppVM_Net and/or AppVM_Unix complete their bench-
Table II: Injection outcomes.

| Outcome                  | Description                              |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Detected VMM failure     | Crash: VMM panics due to unrecoverable exceptions |
|                          | Hang: VMM no longer makes observable progress |
| Silent failure           | Undetected failure: No VMM crash/hang detected but applications in one or more VMs fail to complete successfully |
| Non-manifested           | No errors observed                        |

Table III: Recovery success rates out of detected VMM failures (crash/hang). Target system: 1AppVM (Figure 2).

| Mechanism         | Successful Recovery Rate |
|-------------------|--------------------------|
| Basic             | 5.6%                     |
| + NMI IPI         | 17.6%                    |
| + Ack interrupts  | 48.6%                    |
| + Hypercall retry | 62.6%                    |
| + FixSP+NMI “ack” | 77.0%                    |
| + Reinitialize locks | 95.8%                  |

marks correctly, and AppVM_Blk is able to boot and run its benchmark to completion without errors. Silent failures, discussed in Section 8, do not trigger VMM recovery and are thus excluded from further discussion in this section.

The incremental enhancement of ReHype, discussed in this section, is based on a sequence of fault injection campaigns, with each successive campaign conducted on a further enhanced version of ReHype. As the scheme is improved, recovery failures become less frequent, and more injections are needed per campaign in order to identify the most important remaining cause of recovery failures. Thus, the number of injections performed in the different campaigns progressively increases from 300 to over 2800.

In the rest of this section, each version of the recovery scheme is described, and fault injection results are presented. This is followed by an analysis of the main cause of failed recoveries, motivating the next version of the recovery scheme. At each step, only the problem that led to the plurality of failed recoveries is analyzed and fixed. Table III summarizes the rate of successful recoveries with the basic ReHype scheme and the various incremental improvements that were made.

**Basic:** As shown in Table III with the Basic recovery scheme (Section 3), the successful recovery rate is only 5.6%. A large fraction of recovery failures (44%) occur because the failure handler is unable to initiate the VMM microreboot. Normally, the failure handler relies on interprocessor interrupts (IPIs) to force all processors to save VM CPU state and halt execution before microrebooting the VMM. Microrebooting the VMM cannot proceed until all processors execute the IPI handler. Therefore, the failure handler is stuck if a processor is unable to execute the IPI handler due to a blocked IPI or memory corruption.

**NMI IPI:** To get around the above problem, non-maskable interrupt (NMI) IPIs are used. In addition, a spin lock protecting a structure used to set up an IPI function call must be busted to prevent the failure handler from getting stuck.

Table III shows an increase in recovery success rate to 17.6% when these fixes are used. Only 8.2% of the failures are now caused by an inability to initiate the VMM microreboot. The plurality of the remaining failures (45%) are due to interrupts from the block device not getting delivered to the PrivVM. This causes the block device driver in the PrivVM to time out, thus leading to the failure of block requests from the AppVM.

The block device uses level-triggered interrupts. For such interrupts, the I/O controller blocks further interrupts until an acknowledgment from the processor arrives. If the VMM fails before acknowledging pending interrupts, those level-triggered interrupts remain blocked after recovery.
Acknowledge interrupts: To prevent level-triggered interrupts from being blocked, the failure handler must acknowledge all pending interrupts on all processors. Pending interrupts can be classified as interrupts waiting to be serviced by the VMM or interrupts currently being serviced by the VMM (in-service). Acknowledging in-service interrupts can be easily accomplished by executing the EOI instruction for every interrupt that has been delivered to the VMM. It is necessary to perform this operation in the failure handler since information about pending interrupts in the CPU are cleared after a CPU reset during a VMM reboot. A more complete (and more complex) approach at acknowledging all pending interrupts, including interrupts waiting to be serviced, is discussed in Section 7.

Table III shows that when this mechanism is added, the successful recovery rate jumps to 48.6%. Of the remaining unsuccessful recoveries, 52.8% are caused by a crashed AppVM or PrivVM after recovery. The crashes are caused by bad return values from hypercalls. Since VMM failures can occur in the middle of a hypercall, it is necessary to be able to transparently continue the hypercall after recovery. Without mechanisms to do this, after recovery, the VM starts executing right after the hypercall, using whatever is currently in the EAX register as the return value.

Hypercall retry: The ability to restart a hypercall is already provided in Xen. The mechanism involves changing the program counter (PC) of the VCPU to the address of the instruction that invokes the hypercall. For each VM, the VMM determines whether a hypercall retry is needed after the VMM microreboot, before loading the VM state. Specifically, for each VCPU, the VMM checks if the VCPU’s PC is within the VM’s hypercall page. If so, the VMM updates the VCPU’s PC. Arguments to the hypercall are already preserved in the VM VCPU state.

Table III shows that, with hypercall retry, the successful recovery rate is 62.6%. Out of the remaining unsuccessful recoveries, 41% are caused by the same symptom encountered and partially solved with the Basic scheme — the inability of the failure handler to initiate the VMM microreboot. With the improved recovery rate, the causes of this symptom not previously resolved are now responsible for the plurality of failed recoveries.

The experimental results show two causes for the symptom above: (1) NMI IPIs sent to the wrong destination CPU due to stack pointer corruption and (2) NMI Is are blocked due to the Xen NMI-based watchdog hang detection. Problem (1) occurs because a corrupted stack pointer is used to obtain the CPUID of the currently running processor. The obtained CPUID is incorrect and is, in turn, used to create a CPU destination mask for the NMI IPI. This mask can end up containing the sending processor as one of the destination CPUs. The result of this is that an IPI is incorrectly sent to the sending processor. This IPI is dropped and the sender waits forever for the completion of the IPI handling.

Problem (2) is due to the fact that NMI delivery is blocked if a CPU is in the middle of handling a previous NMI — an iret instruction matching a previous NMI has not been executed [11]. The Xen hang detector is based on periodic NMIs from a watchdog timer. If a hang is detected on a processor, that processor immediately executes the panic handler and never executes an iret instruction. This prevents the processor from getting an NMI IPI from the boot processor to initiate recovery.

FixSP+NMI “ack”: Problem (1) above can be fixed by not relying on the stack pointer to obtain the CPUID during failure handling. Instead, the CPUID can be obtained by first reading the APICID from the CPU and then converting the APICID to CPUID, using an existing APICID to CPUID mapping structure stored in the static data segment of Xen. With this technique, the VMM has a chance to continue with the recovery despite a corrupted stack pointer. However, the corrupted stack pointer can cause critical problems that are unrelated to the CPUID. Specifically, the handler invoked when VMM failure is detected must save VCPU registers (located on the stack) into preserved VMM state. A corrupted stack pointer leads to saving the contents of a random region in memory as the saved VCPU register values. At a later point in time, this can lead to execution at an arbitrary location in memory, with VMM privilege, leading to a VMM crash. Specifically, when attempting to load the saved VCPU registers after recovery, the VMM may try to restore
Table IV: Recovery success rates out of detected VMM failures (crash/hang). Target system: 3AppVM (Figure 3).

| Mechanisms                 | Successful Recovery Rate |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| Reinitialize locks         | 88.6%                    |
| + Reset page counter       | 92.2%                    |

A corrupted value as the VCPU code segment register. This may cause the VMM to continue executing with VMM privilege using corrupted (incorrect) register values.

ReHype implements a solution to Problem (1) above that avoids the deficiency described in the previous paragraph. Specifically, the failure handler, invoked upon VMM failure, sets the stack pointer to a “safe” value. This can be done based on the observation that the failure handler never returns, and therefore, the stack pointer can be reset to any valid stack location. The address of the bottom of the stack is kept by Xen in a static data area. The stack pointer is set to that value minus sufficient space for local variables used by the failure handler.

Problem (2) above is resolved by forcing the execution of `iret` in the failure handler. The values at the top of the stack are set so that the `iret` instruction returns back to the failure handler code.

With the two improvements above, the rate of successful recoveries is 77.0%. The majority of the increase is due to fixing the stack pointer. Since hangs are responsible for only a small fraction (7.1%) of detected VMM failures, the impact of fixing problem (2) on the overall recovery success rate is small. However, with this fix, there was successful recovery from all hangs detected in this set of injection runs.

Out of the remaining unsuccessful recoveries, 82.8% are due to spin locks being held after recovery. Spin locks that are statically allocated are re-initialized on boot, but locks that are on the heap are not. This causes the VMM to hang immediately after recovery.

**Reinitialize locks:** Re-initializing dynamically-allocated spin locks requires tracking the allocation and de-allocation of these locks. All locks that are still allocated upon recovery are initialized to unlocked state. This tracking of spin locks is the only extra work that ReHype must perform during normal operation. The associated performance overhead is negligible since the allocation and de-allocation of spin locks is normally done only as part of VM creation and destruction. Furthermore, there are only about 20 spin locks that are tracked per VM.

Locking mechanisms that are not spin locks must also be re-initialized to their free states. A key example of this are the page lock bits used to protect access to bookkeeping information of pages. With the previous version of the recovery scheme, not initializing these bits resulted in 10% of unsuccessful recoveries.

As shown in Table III, re-initializing locks increases successful recovery rate to 95.8%. For the remaining recovery failures there is no one dominant cause.

While the 1AppVM system setup is useful for uncovering the main problems with the Basic ReHype recovery, it is very simple, thus potentially hiding important additional problems. To better stress the virtualized system, the rest of the experiments in this section use the 3AppVM setup. The results with this setup are summarized in Table IV.

As shown in Table IV with the 3AppVM setup, the reinitialize locks mechanism results in a recovery success rate of 88.6%. Hence, there is a decrease in the success rate compared to the 1AppVM setup.

Out of the remaining recovery failures, about 35% are due to the VMM hanging immediately after recovery. This problem is caused by a data inconsistency resulting from a VMM failure while in the middle of handling a page table update hypercall. This hypercall promotes an unused VM page frame into a page table type by incrementing a page type use counter and performing validity check on the page frame. After the validity check, a validity bit is set to indicate that the page can be used as a page table for the VM. Inconsistency arises when a VMM failure occurs before the validity check is completed but after the page type use counter has been incremented. When the hypercall is retried after recovery, since the page use
counter is not zero and the validity bit is not set, the VMM code assumes that validation is in progress and waits by spinning. Of course, there is no validation taking place, and the CPU is declared hung by the hang detector.

**Reset page counter:** To fix the above problem, the VMM bootup code is modified to check the consistency between the validity bit and page use counter. If the page type use counter is non-zero but the validity bit is not set, then the page type use counter is set to zero.

With the page counter fix employed, recovery success rate improves to 92.2%. The remaining causes of failed recoveries vary widely and are discussed further in Section 8.

5 Experimental Setup

This section presents the experimental setups used to evaluate and validate ReHype and the RVI as a whole. Specifically, this section discusses details of the different system configurations used for stressing the recovery mechanisms of the RVI, the different workloads that are used, the fault injection campaigns and fault types, the fault injection outcomes, and the failure detection mechanisms.

5.1 System Configurations

The physical machines used for running experiments are equipped with 8GB of memory and dual quad-core Intel processors (Nehalem or Core 2). In general, the virtualized system under evaluation is comprised of the Xen VMM, augmented with ReHype, hosting the PrivVM, possibly a DVM (depending on the campaign), and one or more AppVMs. All experiments in this work make use of one of three basic system configurations: 1AppVM, 3AppVM, and 5AppVM (Figures 2-4). In one set of campaigns (Section 10), the AppVMs are FV VMs. In all the rest, they are PV VMs.

With the 1AppVM configuration (Figure 2), the VMM hosts two VMs: a PrivVM (Domain 0) and a single AppVM (AppVM_Blk). AppVM_Blk runs the Blkbench benchmark (Subsection 5.2), which continuously performs disk I/O (block) operations. The PrivVM hosts the block backend for the AppVM_Blk. Each of the VMs consists of one virtual CPU (VCPU) that is pinned to its own physical CPU (PCPU).

With 3AppVM (Figure 3), there are three AppVMs: AppVM_Blk, AppVM_Net, AppVM_Unix, running benchmarks Blkbench, Netbench, and UnixBench, respectively (Subsection 5.2). The PrivVM’s root filesystem is in memory and the PrivVM does not access any devices. A separate Driver VM (DVM) [6] hosts the backend drivers for AppVM_Blk and AppVM_Net. AppVM_Unix has direct access to an IDE controller, and thus does not rely on the DVM for any device access. Each VM consists of one VCPU, which is pinned to its own PCPU. To check whether the recovered system maintains its ability to create new VMs, the system attempts to boot AppVM_Blk after a possible VMM recovery to run the Blkbench benchmark.

Much of the evaluation of ReHype is with the VMM hosting paravirtualized (PV) AppVMs. The system must be able to host PV VMs since the critical PrivVM and Driver VMs are PV VMs. Furthermore, for the purpose of stressing ReHype, PV VMs are a good choice since the VMM is highly involved in supporting many typical VM operations, such as page table updates, process scheduling, and timer operations. The use of ReHype with the VMM hosting fully-virtualized (FV) AppVMs is presented and evaluated in Section 10.

For many of the experiments using the 1AppVM and 3AppVM configurations (except Sections 9, 10, and 11), the entire target system was run in a fully-virtualized (FV) VM. Figure 5 shows this setup when the target system is the 3AppVM configuration. This setup simplified and sped up the fault injection campaigns by facilitating the restart of the target system and refresh its disk images after each injection run to isolate the effects of faults injected in different runs [16, 22]. Since there is a potential that running the target system in a VM may bias the results, we have run experiments to validate the 3AppVM results on bare hardware (Section 9).
Figure 2: System configuration for 1AppVM. AppVM_Blk accesses block device (disk) through the PrivVM.

Figure 3: System configuration for 3AppVM. AppVM_Blk created after recovery. AppVM_Net and AppVM_Blk accesses I/O devices through the DVM. AppVM_Unix accesses block device directly.

Figure 4: System configuration for 5AppVM. AppVMs access I/O devices through DVMs. Each AppVM has access to two disks, hosted on separate DVMs, which the AppVM uses to form a single RAID level-1 block device. Each AppVM has access to two NICs, with only one NIC active at a time.

Figure 5: Target system is 3AppVM deployed inside a FV VM. Injection is performed from the “outer” VMM.
The 5AppVM configuration (Figure 4), consists of a PrivVM, two DVMs, and five AppVMs. The five AppVMs together run a reliable Web service workload (Subsection 5.2). Experiments using the 5AppVM configuration run directly on bare hardware. As with the 3AppVM configuration, the PrivVM’s root filesystem is in memory and the PrivVM does not access any devices. The AppVMs access their I/O devices through the DVMs. For seamless operation despite failure of a DVM, for each AppVM, the root disk is configured as a RAID Level-1 device, with each disk of the RAID hosted on a separate DVM [18, 21]. The AppVM’s network device is accessed through a single DVM with the other DVM acting as a hot-spare.

5.2 Workloads

For much of the evaluation of ReHype, we use synthetic workloads, consisting of three micro benchmarks: **Blkbench**, **Netbench**, and **UnixBench**. **Blkbench** stresses the interface to the block device (disk) by creating directories and creating, removing, and copying 1MB files. To ensure block activity, this benchmark prevents caching of block and filesystem data by the AppVM’s OS. When evaluating the results of each injection run, an unsuccessful application completion is recorded if: (1) the application reports errors (failure of I/O operations), and/or (2) at the end of the run, the files and directories created differ from a reference image.

**Netbench** is a user-level ping program that exercises the network interface. It consists of two processes: one running in an AppVM (the VM host), and another running on a separate physical machine (the PM host). Every 1ms, the PM host transmits a UDP packet to the VM host, which, upon receiving this packet, transmits UDP packet back to the PM host. For each injection run, if a VMM failure is detected, an unsuccessful application completion is recorded if: (1) there is a interruption of more than 10s at any time during a run, and/or (2) at any time after the recovery procedure completes, there is a 1s interval during which the rate of packet reception at the PM host drops by more than 10% compared to the rate during normal operation. If no VMM failure is detected, an unsuccessful application completion is recorded if, at any time during a run, there is a 1s interval during which the rate of packet reception at the PM host drops by more than 10% compared to the rate during normal operation. While these failure criteria cover complicated failure modes, based on our experience, the effects of a failed VMM on **Netbench** is typically simple — in the vast majority of cases, the PM host simply stops receiving packets from the VM host.

Our **UnixBench** is a subset of the set of programs in UnixBench [34], with minor modifications to improve logging and failure detection. The selected programs were chosen for their ability to stress the VMM’s handling of hypercalls such as virtual memory management and process scheduling. For each injection run, an unsuccessful application completion is recorded if: (1) one or more programs in UnixBench terminate prematurely due to failed system calls, and/or (2) the resulting program output differs from a reference output.

To evaluate the overall resiliency of our RVI, we use a workload that is more representative of practical deployments of virtualization: cluster middleware that provides high availability, hosting Web service. The middleware is the Linux Virtual Server (LVS) [35, 29], running on a cluster of VMs (virtual cluster). LVS is an open-source load-balancing solution for building highly-scalable and highly-available servers using clusters of servers. Out of the five AppVMs (virtual servers), three run the Apache web server and two act as a primary and backup load balancers (directors) that forward client requests to the servers. The Web servers are stressed by five instances of the Apache ab benchmark running on a remote host. Each one of two of the ab instances sequentially sends 3770 HTTPS requests for a static web page. Each one of three of the ab instances sequentially sends 365 HTTPS requests for a dynamically-generated Web page. The Apache Web server executes the **Blkbench** program to generate a response for each request for a dynamically generated web page.

The LVS cluster is considered to have failed if it is unable to service Web requests. However, LVS director and server failover involves terminating client connections. Any time a director or real server fails, existing client connections through the director or with the real server are terminated. Furthermore, in the
Table V: Fault types used in fault injection campaigns.

| Fault Type   | Description                                                                 |
|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Register     | Flip random bit in a random general purpose register, instruction pointer, stack pointer, or system flags register * |
| Code         | Flip random bit in a random byte of an instruction                          |
| NOP          | Replace random instrs with NOP                                              |
| Destination  | Flip random bit in destination operand of instruction                       |
| Source       | Flip random bit in random source operand of instruction                     |
| Branch       | Replace branch instructions with NOP                                         |
| Loop         | Reverse directions of loops                                                 |
| Pointer      | Flip random bit in operand of memory access instructions                    |
| Interface    | Use bad function arguments                                                  |

* When the target system is run inside a FV VM, we do not inject into the reserved bits and the VM-8086 bit of the EFL register. This is due to the limitation of performing fault injection into a VM as some hardware faults cannot be accurately emulated [22].

case that a new director becomes the new primary director, all connections must be terminated and re-formed using the new primary director. Hence, for each injection run, an unsuccessful application completion is recorded if a client experiences more than two connection timeouts during the run.

5.3 Fault Injection Campaigns and Fault Types

The evaluation in this work is focused on the recovery mechanisms. The fault injection campaigns used are designed to “stress” the recovery mechanisms in a variety of ways. The goal is to first expose problem areas and then evaluate the effectiveness of the refined mechanisms to recover from a variety of system corruptions. We used the UCLA Gigan fault injector [16, 9, 22] to inject faults into different VI components. Gigan can reside in the VMM and inject many types of faults into the VMs and the VMM. Injection into VMs can be done without any modifications to the VMs. Hence, with configurations where the target system runs in an FV VM (Figure 5), Gigan runs in the outer VMM, so injection does not require any modifications (intrusion) of the target system. Details of the fault injection campaigns and fault types using the three different system configurations (1AppVM, 3AppVM, and 5AppVM) are discussed below.

A fault injection campaign consists of many fault injection runs. A single fault injection run that uses the 1AppVM system configuration consists of first booting the VMM along with the PrivVM and AppVM_Blk. AppVM_Blk begins running the blkbench benchmark and a fault is injected into the VMM. The injection campaign infrastructure allows the target system sufficient time for the VMM to recover and for the benchmark to complete. If the benchmark does not complete, a timeout mechanism identifies system failure. At the end of each run, fault injection logs and benchmark output are retrieved and stored for analysis.

An injection run using the 3AppVM configuration is similar to the 1AppVM configuration, except that an injection is performed only after the VMM, PrivVM, DVM, AppVM_Net, and AppVM_Unix have been booted and the two AppVMs have started running their respective benchmarks. Nine seconds after the two AppVMs begin running their benchmarks, AppVM_Blk is booted to run its own benchmark. The injection run ends when all three AppVMs complete their benchmark runs or a timeout occurs.

For the 5AppVM configuration, an injection run begins by booting the VMM, PrivVM, two DVMs, and five AppVMs. After the remote clients begin to generate requests, a single fault is injected into one of the VI components. Mechanisms are added to restart a node (AppVM) the director deemed as failed. If no nodes are restarted during a run, one AppVM is randomly selected to be destroyed and recreated about 50 seconds after a fault is injected, to ensure that, if recovery had occurred, the VI is still correctly providing basic functionality.

Three types of faults are used to evaluate ReHype: random single bit-flips in CPU registers during execution of VMM code, random single bit-flips in the VMM code segment (Code), and software faults in
the VMM (SW). Bit-flips in CPU registers are used since most transient hardware faults in CPU logic and memory are likely to be manifested as erroneous values in registers. Furthermore, these faults can cause arbitrary corruptions in the entire system. Table IV shows the different fault types in more detail. We refer to the last seven rows of Table IV collectively as software faults, since they simulate typical programming errors [27].

An injection is triggered after a random time period between 500ms to 6.5s after the AppVMs begin running their benchmarks. For Code and SW faults, a breakpoint is used to trigger an injection. We used the fault injection tool in [31] to generate a list of injection targets. The breakpoint is set on the target VMM instruction after the designated time has elapsed. To increase the activation rate of Code and SW faults, we used the Xenoprof [24] sampling profiler to identify the most frequently executed functions in the VMM, considering only the instructions in those functions as possible targets for fault injection. In each run, a breakpoint is set on a randomly selected CPU of the target system. For register injection, to ensure that the injection occurs only when the VMM is executing, a fault is only injected after the designated time has elapsed and 0 to 20,000 VMM instructions, chosen at random, have been executed.

To evaluate the resiliency of our RVI as a whole, we inject faults into CPU registers while the CPU is executing: 1) the VMM, 2) the DVM (user and kernel-level), and 3) the PrivVM (user and kernel-level). The parameters of register injection are similar to what was described above. We only inject into CPU registers in these experiments as this type of fault can not only be used to emulate the effects of some software faults, but based on our evaluation of ReHype (see Section 8), can be equally stressful on the recovery mechanisms as Code and SW faults.

5.4 Fault Injection Outcomes

Table III summarizes the possible outcomes of each injection run when evaluating ReHype (the target is only the VMM). The outcome of each injection run when evaluating the entire RVI is classified in a similar way: detected (VMM/PrivVM/DVM crash or hang), silent (undetected failure), or non-manifested. In general, a crash occurs when one or more VI components panic due to unrecoverable exceptions. A hang occurs when a VI component does not perform its expected operation in a timely manner. A silent failure occurs when no VMM/DVM/PrivVM hang or crash is detected but: (1) the VI fails to host or create new AppVMs and/or (2) the applications (workload) in one or more AppVMs fail to complete successfully. What constitutes unsuccessful completion is application specific, as discussed in Subsection 5.2. Non-manifested means that no errors are observed.

5.5 Failure Detection

We rely on simple techniques to detect when a VI component has crashed or hanged. In particular, a crash is detected when the VMM or the kernel of the PrivVM or DVM invokes the panic handler due to unrecoverable exceptions. VMM hangs are detected using a watchdog mechanism built into Xen. Specifically, Xen maintains a watchdog counter that is supposed to be incremented by a normal timer event every 100ms. A watchdog NMI is generated every 100ms of unhalted CPU cycles. If the watchdog NMI handler detects that the watchdog counter has not been incremented for 300ms, the system is declared hung. The detection of hangs of the DVM and PrivVM relies on mechanisms we have added to the VMM and are described in Subsections 12.2.1 and 12.2.2 respectively.

6 Impact on ReHype of VMM Support for PrivVM Recovery

While the ability to recover from a failed VMM is critical for VI resiliency, there is also a need to handle failures of the other VI components – PrivVM and DVM. Hence, our RVI includes, in addition to ReHype,
mechanisms for tolerating failures of DVMs [17, 21] and the PrivVM [20].

The experimental results reported in this paper up to this point were obtained using a system that included only ReHype and the DVM recovery mechanisms, with the DVM recovery mechanisms disabled. Our mechanism for PrivVM recovery required modifications to the VMM [20]. In addition, we modified the mechanism for logging information from the VMM. The focus of this section is on assessing the extent to which these VMM modifications (discussed further below), affected the effectiveness of ReHype. We refer to the RVI version with only ReHype and DVM recovery mechanisms as RVI_HD, and with all mechanisms, including the PrivVM recovery, as RVI_HDP.

VMM modifications for PrivVM recovery involved the addition of about 365 lines of code and the use of about 128MB of VMM memory to store the PrivVM’s kernel and filesystem images (see Subsection 12.2.2 for details). Additional modifications were made to reduce the intrusion of logging information from the VMM at the point of failure for post-mortem analysis. Specifically, results of experiments with ReHype suggested that some failed recoveries may be caused by logging operations accessing corrupted state in the failed VMM. Hence, modifications included disabling outputs by the VMM to the serial console as well as the use of per-CPU memory buffers, instead of a single shared buffer, to store outputs from the VMM’s crash handler, thus eliminating the need for locks to maintain write ordering.

Modifications to the VMM require revalidating ReHype since such modifications can alter the alignment and location of critical data structures in the VMM, which can affect the outcome of faults. As an example, consider an unrecoverable VMM failure due to a fault in the stack pointer leading to corruption of a critical VMM data structure located near the VMM’s stack. This failure may not occur if that same critical data structure is allocated in a different area of memory. Since the focus is on ReHype, both the DVM and PrivVM recovery mechanisms were disabled for this revalidation.

Table VI shows a comparison of successful recovery rates with ReHype in RVI_HDP vs. RVI_HD (RVI_HD results from Section 4). The trends with the two RVI versions are similar: in both versions there is a decrease in the success rates when going from the simple 1AppVM configuration to the more complex 3AppVM configuration and an improvement in success rates when the last recovery enhancement discussed so far (Reset page counter) is applied. However, with all configurations, the success rate in RVI_HDP is lower. This difference is likely to be related to differences in exactly where critical data structures, such as descriptor tables and page directories/tables, are located in memory. Corruption of these data structures will often lead to failure during a VMM microreboot. Specifically, close to 19% of failed recoveries with RVI_HDP were caused by a combination of fatal page faults during the reboot of the new VMM and corruption of segment descriptor tables leading to the crash of the entire target system (FV VM) by the outer VMM hosting the target system (Subsection 5.1). These particular types of failures, while possible, did not occur with RVI_HD.

RVI_HDP is used in the rest of this paper.

7 Enhancements to ReHype with Respect to Interrupts and VM Control

In the process of working with ReHype and analyzing experimental results, we identified two additional simple enhancements that increase ReHype’s and our RVI’s overall effectiveness. The first enhancement

| Configuration | Mechanisms               | Successful Recovery Rate |
|--------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1AppVM       | Reinitialize locks       | 93.3% (95.8%)            |
| 3AppVM       | Reinitialize locks       | 83.0% (88.6%)            |
| 3AppVM       | + Reset page counter     | 88.1% (92.2%)            |
improves the handling of interrupts that are pending, but not yet being serviced, at the time of VMM failure. This enhancement reduces the number of cases where, after VMM recovery, a single AppVM fails. The second enhancement is a small modification of the way the VMM handles the VM pause hypercall, to reduce VMM hangs after recovery. This section is focused on these enhancements.

As discussed in Section 4, a significant enhancement of ReHype is a mechanism that, when a VMM failure is detected, acknowledges all in-service interrupts, thus significantly reducing failures caused by level-triggered interrupts blocking future interrupts from the same device. This acknowledge interrupts mechanism only acknowledges interrupts that are currently being serviced by the CPU. In fact, a CPU can only acknowledge an interrupt that is currently being serviced by that CPU. However, there may also be interrupts that are pending, waiting to be serviced by the CPU. Such interrupts cannot be acknowledged by the mechanism described in Section 4 and, for level-triggered interrupts, block future interrupts from that same device.

To resolve the above problem, the VMM failure handler is modified to service and acknowledge all pending interrupts. This must be done prior to rebooting the VMM, since booting the VMM resets the CPU, causing all information regarding pending interrupts will be lost. The enhanced acknowledge interrupts mechanism first masks all interrupts at the I/O controller, preventing new interrupts from being sent to the CPUs. The CPUs then install a new interrupt descriptor table that contains dummy interrupt handlers. These handlers simply acknowledge the interrupt and return. Interrupts are then enabled on each CPU in order to flush all pending interrupts and allow them to be acknowledged. Recovery of the VMM resumes when there are no more pending interrupts (checked by reading the Interrupt Request Register on the CPU).

Table VII shows the impact of the enhanced acknowledge interrupts mechanism. The impact on the successful recovery rate is small, when “successful recovery” is defined as in Section 2. However, the rate of recoveries in which not even a single AppVM fails increases significantly. This is due to the fact that in many of the successful recoveries in which a single AppVM failed, that single AppVM was AppVMNet and the failure was caused by blocked interrupts from the network interface card.

The evaluation of the resiliency of our complete RVI (Section 12) motivated another enhancement to ReHype. Specifically, in some cases, a single fault can cause both the VMM and a DVM to fail. In such cases, the DVM failure may be detected before the VMM failure is detected, resulting in VMM recovery being initiated in the middle of the DVM recovery. We found that, in many such cases, the VMM fails immediately after the VMM recovery process completes and DVM failure handling resumes. As explained below, this problem is due to inconsistency among parts of the VM state maintained by the VMM, and can be easily avoided.

The VMM maintains, for each VM, a pause counter. If that counter is non-zero, the VM cannot be scheduled to run. The VMM maintains, for each VCPU, a running flag that indicates whether the VCPU is currently executing. This flag is set when the VCPU is scheduled to run and cleared when the VCPU is descheduled. The inconsistency mentioned above is between the pause counter of a VM and the running flags of the VM’s VCPUs.

With our mechanism for recovery from DVM failure (Subsection 12.2.1), the first step is for the PrivVM to pause the failed DVM, using the VM pause hypercall. When the VM pause hypercall is invoked, the VMM increments the VM’s pause counter and sends an IPI to stop any of the VM’s VCPUs that are currently...
Table VIII: Recovery success rates of ReHype across different fault types: register (Reg), software (SW), and VMM code bit flips (Code). Success rates shown with 95% confidence intervals. Target system: 3AppVM.

| Fault Type | Successful Recovery Rate as defined in Section 2 | Rate of Recoveries with no AppVM failure |
|------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| Reg        | 89.1% ± 4                                     | 73.0% ± 4                              |
| SW         | 88.1% ± 6                                     | 67.7% ± 8                              |
| Code       | 88.6% ± 4                                     | 72.0% ± 8                              |

running. The VMM then waits until all the VM’s VCPUs have been descheduled, by checking, for each of the VCPUs, if the running flag has been cleared. The problem can manifest if VMM failure is detected after the pause counter is incremented and before one of the VM’s VCPUs has been scheduled out. Thus, the running flag of that VCPU is not cleared. After recovery, the VM pause hypercall is retried and ends up waiting forever for the running flag to be cleared. The solution to this problem is straightforward: upon VMM microreboot, initialize the relevant part of the VMM state to safe values (Subsection 2.2) before any VCPUs are scheduled. Specifically, all the running flags of all the VCPUs are cleared.

8 Analysis of ReHype

This section analyzes fault injection results for the final version of ReHype, with all the enhancements from Sections 4, 6, and 7. Subsection 8.1 is focused on the recovery success rates and causes of VMM recovery failures with different fault types. Subsection 8.2 is focused on the causes of silent VMM failures.

8.1 Recovery Effectiveness

While the experimental results discussed in the previous sections were used to guide enhancements of ReHype, this subsection presents an evaluation of the effectiveness of the final scheme. This evaluation is based not only on faults in CPU registers, but also software faults and random single-bit VMM code corruption (see Subsection 5.3). In addition, the main causes of recovery failures are discussed.

Table VIII shows the recovery success rates of ReHype when deployed on the 3AppVM configuration (Subsection 5.1) with different types of faults. These results indicate that the effectiveness of ReHype is similar across the different fault types.

Overall, recovery using ReHype failed in about 12% of detected failures. Based on the discussion in Section 2, failed VMM recoveries can be classified into four categories: (i) unsuccessful VMM reboot, (ii) successful VMM reboot but all AppVMs fail to complete their benchmarks successfully, (iii) successful VMM reboot and benchmark in AppVM_Blk completes successfully but benchmarks in both AppVM_Net and AppVM_UNIX fail to complete successfully, and (iv) successful VMM reboot and successful completion of benchmarks in AppVM_Net and/or AppVM_UNIX but benchmark in AppVM_Blk fail to complete successfully.

Across the three fault types, between 1/3 and 2/3 of recovery failures are in category (i) above. The majority of these failures are caused by triple fault exceptions generated during the execution of the VMM failure handler, triggering a hardware system reset. A triple fault exception is generated if an exception is triggered while trying to invoke the double fault handler. A double fault exception is generated if an exception is triggered while trying to invoke an exception handler. The inability to invoke an exception handler is generally due to the corruption of the interrupt descriptor table or memory address mapping data structures, such as page tables or the global descriptor table. In our experiments, such corruption occur most frequently when the injected fault affects the stack pointer register. In fact, nearly half of failures in category (i) for register injection is due to stack pointer corruption leading to triple fault exceptions.
Table IX: The impact of silent failures – percentages of manifested faults that result in silent failures. “System failures” are defined in Section 2. Target system: 3AppVM.

| Fault Type | Silent Failures / Manifested  |
|------------|-------------------------------|
|            | 1 AppVM Failure | System Failure |
| Reg        | 8.1%             | 10.9%           |
| SW         | 0.6%             | 35.0%           |
| Code       | 0.9%             | 22.5%           |

Other recovery failures in category (i) are caused by various VMM corruptions and inconsistencies including: (1) corruption of VM’s VCPU registers, causing the new VMM to crash after recovery when attempting to schedule the VCPU; (2) corruption of the timer heap, which leads to a page fault in the VMM when the old timer heap is walked to restore timer events; and (3) page table corruption, causing the new VMM to page fault early in the boot code.

Recovery failures in categories (ii)-(iv) are generally caused by multiple problems that may appear to be independent but actually manifest due to a single fault. These problems are typically instances of: (a) VM kernel panics due to error return values from hypercalls or VM state corruption, (b) VM I/O requests/replies and timer events not handled due to the loss of virtual interrupts, and (c) the VMM completes the recovery process but latent corrupted state causes it to fail repeatedly following recovery. In some cases, a single problem affects multiple VMs and in other cases different problems affect different VMs. In all cases, more than one AppVM fails to execute its benchmark successfully. For AppVM_Blk, this occurs most often because, after recovery, the VMM is unable to successfully create a new VM.

A representative example of how a hypercall can fail after recovery and eventually result in a VM failure is related to the hypercall retry mechanism (Section 4). Specifically, it relates to the fact that a hypercall that would have succeeded in normal operation, fails when it is retried after a VMM microreboot (the hypercall is not idempotent). One such hypercall is used by a VM to unmap a page that is shared with another VM (the page owner). This informs the VMM that the caller is no longer using the page and the appropriate VMM bookkeeping (update the grant table) should be done. If the VMM fails after the hypercall has removed the mapping from the caller VM’s page table, the retry of the hypercall fails since the hypercall expects the page to still be mapped. This prevents the grant table from being properly updated. At a later point in time, the VM that owns the page fails (panics) when it tries to, again, share the page with another VM.

8.2 Silent Failures

Faults during VMM execution can lead to failures that are not detectable by simple VMM crash and hang detectors. Such failures are referred to as silent failures. A simple example of such a scenario is a fault that causes the VMM to corrupt the states of multiple VMs, leading to the subsequent failure of all of those VMs. Table IX shows the percentages of silent failures out of manifested faults for the different VMM fault types. The single AppVM failures are mostly either Netbench or UnixBench failing to complete successfully, due to failed hypercalls or blocked/lost virtual interrupts.

Silent system failures can be classified similarly to recovery failures (Subsection 8.1) into four categories: (i) failure of the entire system (i.e., hardware reset), (ii) all AppVMs fail to complete their benchmarks successfully, (iii) benchmark in AppVM_Blk completes successfully but benchmarks in both AppVM_Net and AppVM_Unix fail to complete successfully, and (iv) benchmarks in AppVM_Net and/or AppVM_Unix complete successfully but benchmark in AppVM_Blk fails to complete successfully.

The main causes of silent system failures for each of the categories are similar to those for recovery failures. Specifically, for category (i), the main cause of failures are triple faults generated before VMM failures are detected. For category (ii)-(iv), there are two main causes of silent system failures: (a) VM kernel
Table X: Recovery success rates of ReHype on bare hardware across different fault types. Success rates shown with 95% confidence intervals. Target system: 3AppVM. Success rates with the same system running in an FV VM (Table VIII) shown in parenthesis.

| Fault Type | Successful Recovery Rate as defined in Section 2 | Rate of Recoveries with no AppVM failure |
|------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| Reg        | 90.9% ± 7 (89.1%)                                | 69.2% ± 14 (73.0%)                     |
| SW         | 87.6% ± 2 (88.1%)                                | 72.1% ± 7 (67.7%)                      |
| Code       | 91.0% ± 3 (88.6%)                                | 73.0% ± 15 (72.0%)                     |

Table XI: The impact of silent failures on bare hardware – percentages of manifested faults that result in silent failures. Target system: 3AppVM. Values in parenthesis are results from running target system inside a FV VM (copied from Table IX).

| Fault Type | Silent Failures / Manifested |
|------------|-----------------------------|
|            | 1 AppVM Failure | System Failure |
| Reg        | 5.8% (8.1%)     | 12.6% (10.9%) |
| SW         | 1.2% (0.6%)     | 36.0% (35.0%) |
| Code       | 1.3% (0.9%)     | 22.3% (22.5%) |

Panics due to error return values from hypercalls or VM state corruption, and (b) VM I/O requests/replies and timer events not handled due to the loss of virtual interrupts.

9 Validation of ReHype on Bare Hardware

As explained in Section 5, the experimental evaluation of ReHype discussed so far was performed with the target system running in an FV VM (Figure 5). Since any deployment of ReHype in a production environment would be on bare hardware, it is important to determine whether the effectiveness of ReHype on bare hardware is significantly different. This determination is the focus of this section.

A first attempt to deploy ReHype on bare hardware failed with the VMM hanging during every microreboot. As part of the boot process, the VMM normally performs low-level BIOS accesses to gather information about the hard disks, using Enhanced Disk Drive Services, and information about the display, by accessing the Extended Display Identification Data. We determined that these operations cause the hang during the VMM microreboot. We believe that this may be due to a bug in the BIOS that manifests when the system is not fully reset prior to booting. Interestingly, in order to overcome buggy BIOS implementations, the option to skip the BIOS probing of devices is already provided as command line arguments to the Xen VMM as well as the Linux kernel.

Overcoming the problem discussed above required a minor modification to the VMM so that it skips the BIOS probing of devices during microreboot. It should be noted that, if needed, it is straightforward to add the ability to save the information obtained during the initial boot from the BIOS probing and restore this information during a microreboot.

Table X shows the recovery success rates of ReHype with the 3AppVM configuration (Figure 3), deployed on bare hardware. The injection campaign was the same as the one performed with the entire target system deployed in a VM (Subsection 8.1). Since a fault injection run on bare hardware takes much longer to complete (roughly four times longer [22]), we injected fewer faults per campaign than when the target system was deployed in a VM, resulting in larger confidence intervals. For ease of comparison, the table also includes the results when the system is deployed in a VM (Table VIII). Table XI shows the percentages of silent failures out of manifested VMM faults when the system is deployed on bare hardware. The results from the same measurements when the system is deployed in a VM (Table IX) are also shown.

23
Table XII: Recovery success rates of ReHype hosting FV AppVMs with the target system running on bare hardware across different fault types. Target system: 3AppVM. Success rates shown with 95% confidence intervals. Success rates with the same system running on bare hardware but hosting PV AppVMs (Table X) shown in parentheses.

| Fault Type | Successful Recovery Rate as defined in Section 2 | Rate of Recoveries with no AppVM failure |
|------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| Reg        | 88.2% ± 6 (90.9%)                                | 85.5% ± 2 (69.2%)                      |
| SW         | 82.9% ± 6 (87.6%)                                | 78.4% ± 12 (72.1%)                     |
| Code       | 82.5% ± 4 (91.0%)                                | 79.6% ± 5 (73.0%)                      |

Table XIII: The impact of silent failures on a system hosting FV AppVMs running on bare hardware – percentages of manifested faults that result in silent failures. Target system: 3AppVM. Values in parenthesis are results when the system hosts PV AppVMs (Table XI).

| Fault Type | Silent Failures / Manifested | System Failure |
|------------|------------------------------|----------------|
| Reg        | 7.9% (5.8%)                  | 14.0% (12.6%)  |
| SW         | 2.1% (1.2%)                  | 28.3% (36.0%)  |
| Code       | 3.5% (1.3%)                  | 23.9% (22.3%)  |

Based on Tables X and XI, the impact of faults is essentially the same when the system is deployed on bare hardware as when it is deployed in a VM. This matches previous results with other target systems, comparing the impact of faults with the system deployed on bare hardware vs. in a VM [22]. Furthermore, this result reinforces the validity of various measurements presented in this paper with target systems deployed in VMs.

10 Validation of ReHype with FV AppVMs

As explained in Section 5, the experimental evaluation of ReHype discussed so far was performed with all the VMs using paravirtualized (PV) OS kernels. However, in most deployments of virtualization, utilizing hardware support for virtualization [33], most of the AppVMs are fully virtualized (FV), where the guest OS kernels are not modified in order to run in VMs. Hence, this section is focused on validating ReHype with FV AppVMs.

We experimented with ReHype in a system with FV AppVMs, where these AppVMs use hardware-assisted paging [1] and are configured with para-virtualized devices. Processors with hardware-assisted paging are widely available and the mechanism is commonly used to reduce the overhead and complexity of address mapping in virtualized systems. When using device controllers without special support for virtualization, para-virtualized devices are sometimes used to allow sharing among VMs while maximizing performance [13]. For ReHype, there are significant advantages to using hardware-assisted paging, as opposed to the alternative of using shadow page tables, and the use of para-virtualized devices, as opposed to the alternative of fully-virtualized devices. In both cases, these choices reduce VMM activity, and thus the opportunities for recovery failures due to inconsistencies among different parts of VMM state.

With the system setup described above, ReHype works with FV AppVMs, without any modifications. We evaluated ReHype with the 3AppVM configuration (Figure 3) running on bare hardware, with all three AppVM being FV VMs. A difference in the setup compared to the description in Subsection 5.1 is that AppVM_Uunix accesses its block device through the DVM rather than directly.

Table XII shows the recovery success rates of ReHype on the 3AppVM configuration (Figure 3), deployed on bare hardware, with FV AppVMs. For ease of comparison, the table also includes the results
Table XIV: Breakdown of recovery latency using ReHype with and without optimization.

| Operations                                      | Time (no opt.) | Time (with opt.) |
|-------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------|
| CPU initialization: - Initialize and wait for all CPUs to come online | 150ms          | 150ms            |
| Timer/hardware initialization: - Initialize/calibrate platform timer, TSC, I/O APIC, NMI watchdog, etc. | 410ms          | 310ms            |
| Memory initialization: - Record page number of all allocated pages in old heap (Use to preserve content of old heap) | 2330ms         | 250ms            |
| - Restore and check consistency of page frame entries | 20ms           | 20ms             |
| - Create and allocate free pages to VMM’s heap | 30ms           | 30ms             |
| - Scrub unallocated pages | 200ms          | 200ms            |
| Other                                           | 5ms            | 5ms              |
| Total                                           | 2895ms         | 715ms            |

when the system is hosts PV AppVMs (Table X). Overall, the results with FV AppVMs are very similar to those with PV AppVMs. For SW and Code injections, the successful recovery rate is a little lower with FV AppVMs compared to with PV AppVMs. This is mainly caused by differences in the VMM instructions targeted with the two configurations. As described in subsection 5.3 the instruction targets are chosen based on profiling the VMM and selecting the instructions that belong to functions most frequently executed. Since there are different activities in the VMM when hosting FV and PV VMs, the two configurations yield different VMM execution profiles, and thus, different sets of instruction targets. We experimented with using the same set of instruction targets for the two setups and found that the recovery success rate were essentially the same.

Table XIII shows the percentages of silent failures out of manifested VMM faults when the system hosts FV AppVMs. The results from the same measurements when the system hosts PV AppVMS (Table XI) are also shown. Here again, there are no statistically significant difference between the two sets of results. Overall, the results in this section demonstrate that the effectiveness of ReHype is similar with FV AppVMs and PV AppVMs.

11 Recovery Latency

When VMM failure is detected, Rehype pauses all the VMs on the system and unpaused them only when the reboot of the new VMM instance completes. Hence, execution of all the applications running on the VMs is blocked. For some applications, the duration of this service interruption is critical. The focus of this section is on the analysis of VMM recovery latency with ReHype and modifications to minimize this latency.

We evaluate the recovery latency using the same setup used in Section 9 the 3AppVM configuration (Figure 3) running on bare hardware. The impact of recovery on the Netbench benchmark (Subsection 5.2) is used to measure the recovery latency. During normal operations, the ping inter-arrival time of Netbench is roughly 1.1ms. During recovery, AppVM Net is paused, so the recovery latency is measured by simply recording the change in the ping inter-arrival time on the separate physical machine. For this measurement, the VMM crash handler is invoked directly, thus excluding the detection latency.

Using the procedure described above, we measured a recovery latency of 2895ms. To obtain a breakdown of this latency into the main steps involved in recovery, we added code to log the timestamps of
key events. Table XIV (middle column) shows the results. The bulk of the recovery time is spent by the VMM initializing hardware devices and creating data structures associated with the management of CPUs, memory, platform timers, and interrupt controllers. Specifically, the majority of the recovery time is spent performing memory initialization operations, with the bulk of that time spent scrubbing (zeroing) all unallocated pages. Scrubbing unallocated memory pages is a security measure that prevents the leaking of data among VMs.

To reduced the recovery latency, we identified two time-consuming operations that can be skipped on a VMM reboot: the scrubbing of unallocated pages and the check of whether the NMI watchdog mechanism works properly. When a VMM microreboot is initiated, unallocated pages are either already scrubbed by the failed VMM or are on a list of pages to be scrubbed. Hence, assuming that the old VMM instance was correctly performing memory scrubbing up until VMM failure was detected, the page scrubbing step can be skipped.

As explained in Sections 2 and 4, Xen includes a hang detection mechanism based on periodic NMIs from a watchdog timer. During reboot, there is a check of whether the NMI watchdog mechanism operates correctly. This check involves counting the number of NMI interrupts received by the VMM within an interval of 100ms and verifying that it is above a preset threshold. Our second recovery latency optimization is to skip this check during a VMM microreboot. Together, as show in Table XIV the two optimizations reduce the recovery latency from 2895ms to 715ms.

It should be noted that recovery time could be reduced by modifying the VMM boot code to parallelize some of the initialization operations. For example, while waiting for CPUs to come online, entries in the old page frame table can be checked and restored. Such optimizations would require a significant engineering effort to refactor the VMM boot code.

12 A Resilient Virtualization Infrastructure

As discussed earlier, while ReHype is the key mechanism for resilient virtualization, it is also necessary to provide resiliency to failures of other VI components: the privileged VM (PrivVM) and driver VM (DVM). This section presents resiliency mechanisms for the PrivVM and DVM, and explains how the different parts of our resilient VI (RVI) fit together, so that, as a whole, the virtualized system can tolerate any single VI component failure. To facilitate the explanation, a brief overview of key aspects of the Xen VI is presented in Subsection 12.1 Our RVI is presented in Subsection 12.2. Subsection 12.3 provides measures of the implementation complexity.

12.1 Xen VI Overview

In order to allow multiple VMs to share I/O devices, Xen uses a mechanism called the split device driver architecture [6, 23, 25]. With this organization, a frontend driver resides in each AppVM sharing a device. The actual device driver as well as a backend driver reside in the DVM. In each AppVM, I/O requests are forwarded by the frontend driver to the backend driver, which invokes the actual device driver. In Xen [2], the frontend and backend drivers communicate through a ring data structure in an area of memory shared between the AppVM and DVM.

The privileged VM (PrivVM) is used to perform system management operations, such as creating, destroying, and checkpointing VMs. The VMM does not permit these operations to be invoked by any other VMs. The functionality of the PrivVM is provided by a combination of kernel modules and user-level processes running in the PrivVM. One user-level process, XenStored, provides access to a dynamic database of system configuration information, called XenStore. XenStored also provides mechanisms for VMs to be informed of changes to certain configuration states by allowing VMs to register watches on those states in the
In most Xen deployments, the PrivVM not only controls and manages other VMs, but also serves as a DVM. However, such a configuration makes each of these components vulnerable to failures of the other, and is thus a poor choice for achieving resiliency. Stock Xen allows the system to be configured so that the DVM functionality is in a separate VM.

12.2 Design and Implementation of a Resilient VI

Figure 6 shows the main components of our RVI hosting a virtual cluster consisting of multiple AppVMs. The VI resiliency enhancements include: ReHype for detecting and recovering from VMM failure, two DVMs to enable uninterrupted access to devices for the AppVMs, a DVM Manager for controlling recovery from DVM failure, DVM failure detectors for detecting and notifying AppVMs and the DVM Manager of the DVM failure, a XenStore Backup Agent (XBA), and PrivVM failure detectors along with mechanisms in the VMM and XBA to microreboot and restore the state of a failed PrivVM. The following subsections briefly explain how these mechanisms provide resiliency to DVM and PrivVM failures.

12.2.1 DVM Recovery

When a DVM fails, applications accessing I/O devices through that DVM are blocked. DVM crashes are detected when the crash handler in the DVM’s kernel makes a hypervisor call to the VMM, or when the VMM responds to illegal DVM activity by killing the DVM. DVM hangs are detected when the DVM stops context switching among processes or when the DVM stops consuming requests on its shared rings with AppVMs [17, 21].

If the DVM is microrebooted and hardware devices are reset, the duration of the interruption may be on the order of seconds [17]. Such long interruptions can result in the failure of the workload running in the AppVMs. Therefore, unlike other VI components, we do not rely on microreboot to recover from DVM failure. Instead, recovery from a DVM failure involves failing over to a redundant DVM with access to separate hardware devices [18, 21]. However, microreboot must still be used to replace the failed DVM, so that the fault tolerance capabilities of the system are restored.

The PrivVM controls the process of microrebooting the DVM, which includes: pausing the failed DVM, booting a new DVM instance, destroying the failed DVM, and integrating the new DVM with existing VMs on the system. The destruction of the failed DVM and subsequent releasing of all its memory to the VMM must be done after all the devices that the failed DVM owns are re-initialized by the newly booted DVM. For systems without I/O MMUs [3], this particular ordering of events can prevent ongoing DMA operations initiated by the failed DVM from corrupting memory that has been released to the VMM. The new DVM

![Figure 6: A resilient virtualization infrastructure (RVI) based on Xen, highlighting the main resiliency components.](image-url)
instance is re-integrated with existing VMs by reforming the respective frontend-backend connections. This is done transparently to the applications in the AppVM by extending existing mechanisms in the frontend drivers responsible for resuming and suspending devices [17, 21].

12.2.2 PrivVM Recovery

The mechanisms used to detect crashes and hangs of the PrivVM’s kernel are similar to those used for the DVM. As described in Subsection 12.1, the PrivVM hosts user-level processes that are essential to the correct operations of the VI. To detect the failure of these processes, we use a user-level monitoring process, called hostmon, that periodically checks for the existence of these processes [20]. When hostmon detects the disappearance of one of these critical processes, it uses a hypercall to cause the VMM to crash the PrivVM and trigger full PrivVM recovery.

Of the three VI components, only the VMM has the privileges required to recover a failed PrivVM. Hence, the VMM is responsible for releasing all the resources of the failed PrivVM and booting the new PrivVM instance. Since the PrivVM kernel and root file system may be corrupted during PrivVM failure, pristine PrivVM kernel and filesystem images must be used for the new PrivVM. The required pristine images are stored, compressed, in the VMM address space, consuming approximately 128MB.

A key requirement for microrebooting the PrivVM is to restore state in the PrivVM needed for managing and controlling the system. This state includes the XenStore, stored as a file in the PrivVM, and watches in the XenStored process. Since all the PrivVM state, including the file system, is in memory, failure of the PrivVM results in the complete loss of its state. Hence, to preserve the critical PrivVM state, the XenStore and XenStored states are replicated. To survive PrivVM failure, the replicated states must be stored in a different VI component. While there are several alternatives, the simplest choice is to maintain the replicated state in one of the DVMs. This DVM is referred to as DVM_XS [20].

The backup copy of the critical PrivVM state is maintained in the DVM_XS by a user-level process — the XenStore Backup Agent (XBA). XenStore write requests, watch registrations, and requests to start or end XenStore transactions are forwarded by XenStored to the XBA before performing the operations in the PrivVM. The XBA performs all operations on a local copy of the XenStore located on the filesystem of the DVM_XS. After a microreboot, the new PrivVM acquires up-to-date XenStore and XenStored states from the XBA. If the DVM_XS fails, the XenStore and XenStored states are transmitted from the PrivVM to the XBA on the newly recovered DVM_XS.

Simply maintaining a backup copy of critical PrivVM state is insufficient for the correct recovery of the PrivVM. Failure of the PrivVM can lead to inconsistencies in the state of the recovered PrivVM and between the recovered PrivVM and other VMs. These inconsistencies can occur when the PrivVM fails while in the middle of management operations such as creating/destroying VMs or handling XenStore requests from VMs. To avoid these problems, we added mechanisms to make VM management operations (VM create/destroy) as well as XenStore request handling atomic [20]. Transactionalizing these operations requires maintaining a log that tracks the individual steps of each operation. This log is kept safe on the DVM_XS and allows the recovery mechanism to determine how far along the operation progressed before failure and, if necessary, how to undo partially completed operations. With this information, even across PrivVM failures, VM management operations are either executed to completion or aborted and there is a response to all XenStore requests, thus leaving the VI in a consistent state.

12.3 Implementation Complexity

As a partial measure of the engineering effort required to implement our RVI, Table XV shows the number of lines of code (LOC) added or modified to implement the recovery mechanisms for the three RVI components, broken down by the system layer (privilege level) at which the new or modified code executes. The basic
Table XV: Implementation complexity of our RVI. Lines of code (LOC) added or modified to implement the recovery mechanisms for the three RVI components. For the VMM and PrivVM, the “Enhanced” mechanism includes the LOC for all improvements made in addition to the “Basic” mechanism.

| Component | Mechanism | User-level | Kernel | VMM |
|-----------|-----------|------------|--------|-----|
| VMM       | Basic     | 0          | 0      | 830 |
|           | Enhanced  | +40        | +40    | +70 |
| PrivVM    | Basic     | 1730       | 1770   | 350 |
|           | Enhanced  | +575       | +40    | +15 |
| DVM       | Failover  | 780        | 1390   | 340 |

PrivVM recovery mechanism has the highest LOC count. Most of this code, at the user and kernel levels, is related to backing up and restoring the XenStore and XenStored state. At the VMM level, most of the code is for detecting PrivVM failures, booting a new PrivVM instance, and cleaning up the state of the old PrivVM instance. The added code for the “enhanced” PrivVM recovery mechanism is to reduce inconsistencies following PrivVM recovery, as described in the last paragraph of Subsection 12.2.2.

Similarly to the PrivVM, the VMM has state that must be maintained across a recovery. However, unlike the PrivVM, the VMM preserves this state in place, in memory. This reduces the amount of code needed for saving and restoring state. As shown in Table XV, over 90% of the additions and modifications are for implementing the basic VMM microreboot capability described in Section 3. Altogether, the eight enhancements described in Sections 4 and 7 required the addition or modifications of only 70 LOC.

For DVM failover, the modifications to the VMM implement a mechanism to directly notify AppVMs that a DVM has failed, thus causing failover to be initiated quickly. At the kernel level, more than half of the modifications are to the network frontend driver in the AppVMs to implement the failover to the backup DVM. Most of the remaining changes are to the block device frontend driver in the AppVMs to forward failure notifications to the RAID driver [21]. At the user level, the bulk of the changes are for a dedicated “DVM manager” process, that runs in the PrivVM and is responsible for interacting with the XenStore and updating device information during failover.

13 Evaluation of the Resiliency of the RVI

This section evaluates our complete RVI to determine how well the various VI detection and recovery mechanisms work together. This evaluation uses the 5AppVM configuration (Figure 4) running on bare hardware, hosting the LVS workload (Subsection 5.2). The evaluation involved injecting between 940 and 1980 register faults during the execution of each of the three VI components. Details of the experimental setup are described in Section 5.

Recovery from a VI component failure is considered successful if (1) the LVS workload completes successfully — no more than two requests from the clients fail (Subsection 5.2), and (2) at most one AppVM fails and the recovered VI is able to continue hosting the remaining VMs as well as create and host new VMs (Section 2).

In most cases, recovery using microreboot is expected to be successful only if single faults do not manifest as errors in multiple components of the system. Hence, for the RVI, it is important to evaluate the likelihood that a fault in one VI component can cause failures in other components of the system. Figures 7-9 show the distributions of component failures caused by faults injected during the execution of each one of the VI components, along with the distributions of successful recoveries from those failures. These results show that the vast majority of component failures are confined to the component into which the faults are injected. This demonstrates that the Xen VI provides a high degree of fault isolation. As a result, as shown in Figures 7-9, our RVI recovers successfully from a great majority of component failures.
Figure 7: Distributions of component failures and successful recovery from those failures when injecting faults into CPU registers during VMM execution.

Figure 8: Distributions of component failures and successful recovery from those failures when injecting faults into CPU registers during DVM execution.

Figure 9: Distributions of component failures and successful recovery from those failures when injecting faults into CPU registers during PrivVM execution.
Table XVI: For faults in each of the Xen VI components, the recovery success rates out of detected failures.

| VI Component | Successful Recovery Rate |
|--------------|--------------------------|
| VMM          | 87.5%                    |
| DVM          | 96.0%                    |
| PrivVM       | 96.8%                    |

While uncommon, a single fault in a VI component can cause other components to fail either together with the faulty component or independently. For example, when faults are injected during VMM execution (Figure 7), about 2.8% of manifested faults cause an AppVM to fail together with the VMM. Not surprisingly, given the privileged nature of the VMM, faults in the VMM cause the highest rate of multiple component failures compared to faults in other VI components. Specifically, with faults occurring during VMM execution, close to 5.5% of manifested faults result in the failure of multiple system components. With faults occurring during the execution of the DVM or PrivVM, less than 1.5% of manifested faults result in the failure of multiple system components.

Not all failures of multiple components are due to the direct propagation of errors across components. Specifically, a fault may initially corrupt only a single component and cause the failure of only that component. However, that failure may be followed by an incomplete recovery of the affected component, leaving the system in an inconsistent state, leading to the failure of other components.

When there are multiple component failures, successful system recovery requires recovery to be performed successively on each failed component. For example, for faults occurring during VMM execution, about 2.5% of manifested faults lead to the failure of a DVM and/or PrivVM. Recovery is successful in only about half of these cases, requiring VMM recovery followed by DVM and/or PrivVM recovery. The low recovery success rate in this case is likely due to incomplete VMM recovery.

As shown in Figures 7-9, some faults in VI components are not detected by our detection mechanisms, but result in system failures (as defined in Section 12). Specifically, the fault may not be detected but still cause the LVS workload to fail (App-Silent failures) or prevent the VI from correctly hosting current AppVMs or creating new AppVMs (VI-silent failures). App-Silent failures can occur, for example, when faults in the DVM cause files used for servicing client requests to become corrupted. The vast majority of VI-silent failures are caused by faults in the VMM and PrivVM. The majority those caused by faults in the VMM are due to failure of the entire system, most likely brought on by triple faults (see Subsection 8.1).

As a summary of the effectiveness of our recovery mechanisms, implemented together in one system, Table XVI shows, for faults in each of the Xen VI components, the recovery success rate out of detected failures. Faults in the VMM result in the lowest success rate then faults in the other VI components. This is likely due to the fact that ReHype reuses state from the failed VMM instance.

14 Related Work

Microreboot plays a critical role in all the recovery mechanisms of our RVI. The term microreboot was introduced in [4] to denote an inexpensive recovery technique for software systems, based on recovery of only the failed components. Many researchers have proposed the use of microreboot for recovery from device driver failures [6, 23, 31, 8, 17, 12, 21]. ReHype is different from these works in that it microreboots the hypervisor and addresses the problems of preserving system components when a lower layer, the underlying system, is rebooted.

The two works that are most closely related to ReHype are RootHammer [15] and Otherworld [5]. RootHammer uses microreboot to rejuvenate [10] virtualized systems based on the Xen VI. It reduces the time for this rejuvenation by rebooting only the Xen VMM and Domain 0, while preserving in memory the
states of VMs and their configurations. During rejuvenation, Domain 0 is properly shut down and the VMs suspend themselves cleanly. New instances of the VMM and Domain 0 are booted, without a hardware reset, and execution of the previously suspended VMs is resumed.

Unlike ReHype, RootHammer performs the VMM (and Domain 0) reboot within a healthy and functioning system, so that suspension of system components can be done cleanly, without state corruption. Hence, RootHammer does not need to resolve potential inconsistencies within the VMM state, between the VMM and VMs, and between the VMM and hardware. Furthermore, with RootHammer, there is no concern for the safety of the VMM due to corrupted VM states during VM re-integration. Unlike RootHammer, ReHype does not require Domain 0 to be rebooted and preserves in place Domain 0 as well as management structures for the AppVMs across a VMM failure. As result, the down time with RootHammer is tens of seconds, much longer than with ReHype (Section[11]).

Otherworld [5] allows a Linux kernel to be recovered from failures, using microreboot, while preserving in place the state of the running processes. Otherworld rebuilds many kernel data structures associated with each process, such as the process descriptor, the file descriptor table, and signal handler descriptors. Restoration of kernel components requires traversing many complex data structures in a possibly corrupted kernel, increasing the chance of failed recoveries. In many cases, user-level processes require custom crash procedures in order to properly resume execution. In the version of Otherworld evaluated in [5], recovery of user-level processes involves copying of the entire memory state of each process. As a consequence of the complex recovery procedure, service interruption time is tens of seconds. There is mention in [5] of the possibility of directly mapping, instead of copying, user-level processes’ memory states, but that option is not evaluated.

Compared to Otherworld, ReHype benefits from the simplicity of the state that the VMM keeps for the VMs, enabling a simpler and faster recovery process. ReHype reuses the VM descriptors in place and does not copy VM memory states. With ReHype, all the states of the applications are maintained within the VMs. Hence, application failure handlers or any other application modifications are not needed. VM failure handlers could potentially be useful for performing data integrity checks in the VM using VM-specific knowledge. Since there are fewer types of kernels than there are applications, if VM failure handlers are needed, fewer have to be written.

Hardware-enforced protection domains can potentially be used to reduce silent data corruption and increase the rate of successful recoveries. In the context of virtualized systems, this approach is proposed with a mechanism called TinyChecker in [32]. TinyChecker relies on nested virtualization to run a small checker hypervisor beneath the main hypervisor. Critical VMM data structures used for managing the system and most of the memory states of VMs are write protected. Writes to these protected memory areas trap to the checker hypervisor. Based on the context of an access, TinyChecker determines which memory areas can be safely modified. For potentially unsafe modifications, TinyChecker uses on-demand checkpointing to save a copy of the memory location before allowing the update. If a VMM failure occurs, the checkpoint can be used to restore a valid state.

In [32] there is no evaluation of TinyChecker’s effectiveness for detection or recovery. TinyChecker incurs overhead for nested virtualization. Even though TinyChecker itself is likely to be reliable since it is small and simple, it is susceptible to hardware faults. TinyChecker, or something like it, is likely to be most useful in conjunction with ReHype. TinyChecker by itself cannot protect against erroneous updates of “valid” memory areas and cannot resolve inconsistencies due to recovery.

We initially proposed and evaluated an earlier version of ReHype in [19]. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no other implementation or evaluation, in the context of recovery from failures, of a mechanism that can reboot a hypervisor while preserving hosted AppVMs in place. We proposed and evaluated our PrivVM recovery mechanism in [20], and believe that work to also be unique. This paper extends our original ReHype work by incorporating new recovery enhancements, providing an evaluation and optimization of recovery latency, and greatly expanding the recovery effectiveness evaluation to include additional
fault types, operation on bare hardware, and hosting of FV VMs. In [20] we presented an evaluation of an earlier version of our complete RVI. This paper presents the first evaluation of our complete RVI on bare hardware, as it would actually be deployed.

15 Conclusions and Future Work

Over the last decade, there has been a rapid increase in the use of system-level virtualization in servers and datacenters of all sizes. The virtualization infrastructure (VI) is a software layer that allows multiple VMs to run on a single host. The VI introduces a critical single point of failure where a transient hardware fault or software fault that cause a VI component to fail, lead to the failure of all the VMs running on the host. This paper presented a resilient VI (RVI), based on Xen, that uses microrollback to recover failed VI components, while preserving VMs running applications (AppVMs) in place. Due to the critical role in the VI of the hypervisor (VMM), much of the paper is focused on ReHype – the recovery mechanism for the hypervisor.

ReHype was developed by first implementing the basic recovery functionality and then incrementally enhancing the basic mechanism, guided by fault injection results. For successful recovery, ReHype must avoid or resolve state corruption and inconsistencies in the hypervisor, between hypervisor and VMs, and between the hypervisor and hardware. A fault injection campaign emulating a variety of software and transient hardware faults, yielded a successful recovery rate of approximately 88%. This is achieved with essentially no performance overhead during normal operation, negligible memory overhead, and changes or additions of only 900 lines of code in the hypervisor. With ReHype, recovery latency – the duration service interruption for the AppVMs – is less than 1 sec.

We have also developed recovery mechanisms for the driver VMs (DVMs) and privileged VM (PrivVM). These mechanisms, together with ReHype, form our RVI. We evaluated the RVI hosting a workload consisting of cluster middleware and web servers. For this entire system, for detected faults in the VMM, PrivVM, and DVM, the failure recovery rate were 87%, 96%, and 96%, respectively.

ReHype uses simple detection mechanism that detect crashes and hangs. As a result, depending on the fault type and system setup, between 10% and 36% of manifested faults lead to silent failures – they are not detected and thus the recovery mechanisms are not triggered. Two key goals for future research are: reducing silent failures, and further improvements of the recovery success rate. For both goals, hardware-enforced protection domains may be used to reduce random memory corruption. Additional benefits could be gained by maintaining redundant information during normal operation and proactively performing sanity checks. Such redundant information could also be used to transactionalize certain hypercalls and provide reliable re-delivery of pending virtual interrupts.

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