Self-Organized Segregation within an Evolving Population

N.F. Johnson\textsuperscript{1}, P.M. Hui\textsuperscript{2}, R. Jonson\textsuperscript{1} and T.S. Lo\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} Department of Physics, University of Oxford, 
Parks Road, Oxford, OX1 3PU, England, United Kingdom

\textsuperscript{2} Department of Physics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong

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Abstract

An evolving population, in which individual members (‘agents’) adapt their behaviour according to past experience, is of central importance to many disciplines. Because of their limited knowledge and capabilities, agents are forced to make decisions based on inductive, rather than deductive, thinking. We show that a population of competing agents with similar capabilities and knowledge will tend to self-segregate into opposing groups characterized by extreme behavior. Cautious agents perform poorly and tend to become rare.

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In physical systems, simple rules applied to a set of $N \geq 3$ interacting objects can give rise to complex dynamical behavior. Although generally intractable analytically, such problems are simplified considerably by the fact that the inter-particle interactions are typically instantaneous, time-independent and decrease with increasing particle-particle separation. An arguably more complex problem which is of central importance in social, economic and biological sciences \cite{1,2}, is that of an evolving population in which individual members (‘agents’) adapt their interactions, and hence behavior, according to their past experiences. Even the two-player ($N = 2$) prisoners’ dilemma game played by memory-less agents on a lattice, has been shown numerically to yield rich spatio-temporal patterns \cite{6}. Evolutionary game theory has been applied to such many-agent systems \cite{7}. However it is well-known that such analysis provides little insight into the system’s dynamics.

Of particular interest is the situation where agents repeatedly compete for a limited resource, or to be in a minority. Rush-hour drivers, facing the nightly choice between two alternative routes home, wish to choose the route containing the minority of traffic \cite{8}. In financial markets, more buyers than sellers implies higher prices; hence it is better for a trader to be in the minority group of sellers. Animals (salesmen) foraging for food (customers) will do better if they hunt in areas with fewer competitors. Regular attendees at a popular bar may try to avoid over-crowded evenings \cite{2,5}. More generally, the problem of how to flourish in a population of equally ambitious people with similar capabilities, but where there are typically more losers than winners, is one that many people face daily.

Here we introduce a simple, yet realistic, model for such an evolving population containing adaptive agents who compete to be in the minority. Only partial information about the system is available to the agents and no a priori ‘best’ strategy exists: agents are hence forced to make decisions based on inductive, rather than deductive, thinking. Each agent tries to learn from its past mistakes and will adjust its strategy in order to survive. We find that a population of such agents with similar capabilities will tend to polarize itself into opposing groups. Although a large number of possible strategies exist, the most successful agents are those who behave in an extreme way.

Inspired by Ref. \cite{9} we consider the model of an odd number $N$ of agents repeatedly
choosing whether to be in room ‘0’ or room ‘1’. These agents could be daily traders or rush-hour drivers: choosing room ‘0’ denotes choosing to buy a given asset or choosing to take route A, respectively, while ‘1’ denotes choosing to sell the asset or choosing to take route B. After every agent has independently chosen a room, the winners are those in the minority room, i.e. the room with fewer agents. The ‘output’ for each time-step is a single binary digit denoting the winning room. Each agent is given a bit-string of length $m$ containing the previous $m$ outcomes. Each agent also has access to a common register or ‘memory’ containing the outcomes from the most recent occurrences of all $2^m$ possible bit-strings of length $m$. Consider $m = 3$; denoting $(xyz)_w$ as the $m = 3$ bit-string $(xyz)$ and outcome $w$, an example memory would comprise $(000)_1, (001)_0, (010)_0, (011)_1, (100)_0, (101)_1, (110)_0, (111)_1$. Following a run of three wins for room 0 in the recent past, the winning room was subsequently 1. Faced with a given bit-string of length $m$, it might seem sensible for an agent to simply predict the same outcome as that registered in the memory. The agent will hence choose room 1 following the next 000 sequence. If 0 turns out to be the winning room, the entry $(000)_1$ in the memory is replaced by $(000)_0$. If all $N$ agents act in this way, however, the system will be inefficient since all agents will choose the same room and will hence lose; all the agents are spotting the same trends and assuming that they will continue indefinitely. Because of this, the trend fails to continue. The critical quality of a successful financial trader, for example, is the ability to follow a trend as long as it is valid, but to correctly predict when it will end. Hence we assign each agent a single number or ‘strategy’ $p$: following a given $m$-bit sequence, $p$ is the probability that the agent will choose the same outcome as that stored in the memory, i.e. he will follow the current prediction, while $1-p$ is the probability he will choose the opposite, i.e. he will reject the current prediction. Using the example memory, the agent (e.g. trader or driver) will choose 1 (e.g. sell or take route B) with probability $p$ after spotting the sequence 000, and 0 (e.g. buy or take route A) with probability $1-p$.

Each time an agent gets into the minority (majority) room, he gains (loses) one point. If the agent’s score falls below a value $d < 0$, then his strategy is modified, i.e. the agent gets a new $p$ value which is chosen with an equal probability from a range of values, centered
on the old $p$, with a width equal to $R$. Hence $d$ is the number of times (or the amount of money) a driver (or trader) is willing to be wrong (or to lose) before modifying his/her strategy. Although this is a fairly crude ‘learning’ rule as far as machines are concerned [10], in our experience it is not too dissimilar from the way that humans actually behave in practice. Since $0 \leq p \leq 1$, we can for simplicity enforce reflective boundary conditions. Our conclusions do not depend on the particular choice of boundary conditions (see Fig. 1). Upon strategy modification, the agent’s score is reset to zero. Changing $R$ allows the way in which the agents learn to be varied. For $R = 0$, the strategies will never change (though the memory will). If $R = 2$, the strategies before and after modification are uncorrelated. For small $R$, the new $p$ value is close to the old one.

As agents (e.g. traders or drivers) are constantly attempting to do the opposite of other agents, a reasonable expectation is that they should eventually organise themselves so that their strategies are evenly spread within $0 \leq p \leq 1$. Alternatively, given that no a priori best strategy exists, one might expect that agents would be ambivalent as to whether a present trend will continue, and hence cluster around $p = \frac{1}{2}$. Surprisingly, the opposite is true. Figure 1(a) shows the frequency distribution $P(p)$ at various times. The distribution $P(p)$ eventually becomes peaked around $p = 0$ and $1$ (solid line) regardless of the initial $P(p)$ distribution; these $p$ values respectively correspond to always or never following what happened last time. The lifespan $L(p)$, defined as the average length of time a strategy $p$ survives between modifications, shows similar behavior (solid line in Fig. 1(b)). Henceforth we denote $P(p)$ and $L(p)$ as representing the long-time limits (solid lines). If we consider the game simply as a random walk, with individual agents deciding randomly which room to choose, we would expect the mean number in room 0 or 1 to be $N/2$ with a standard deviation of $\sqrt{N/4}$. At each timestep, the net number of points awarded will therefore be $-\sqrt{N}$. The average lifespan would be $d\sqrt{N}$. The observed average lifespan is indeed proportional to $d\sqrt{N}$. However the average value of the $L(p)$ in Fig. 1(b) (solid line) is larger than $d\sqrt{N}$ by a factor of approximately 2 for $d = -4$, confirming that the agents are organizing themselves better than randomly. Furthermore, the root-mean-square (rms) separation of the strategies is higher than the value for uniform $P(p)$, indicating the desire of agents to do the opposite
of the majority. It increases with $N$ due to increased possibilities for self-organization. Even when $R$ is large, and the strategy values are hence picked randomly upon modification, the rms strategy separation remains high. The rms strategy separation and the average value of $L(p)$ are typically maximal at $R \sim 0.5$; this is a compromise between a lack of learning when $R \sim 0$ and excessive strategy modification for large $R$. We also note that the standard deviation of the actual attendance time-series for room 0 (or room 1) is less than that obtained for agents choosing via independent coin-tosses: this again confirms that the system is organizing itself better than random.

Varying the length of the bit-string $m$ has little effect on $P(p)$ and $L(p)$: since all agents have similar capabilities and available information, these benefits tend to cancel out. It is what each agent decides to do with the common knowledge which matters ($p = 0, 1$ agents outperform $p = \frac{1}{2}$ agents). Similarly if the memory is not updated dynamically according to the recent outcomes as discussed earlier, but is instead kept constant (i.e. time-independent) or is randomly chosen at each time-step, then $P(p)$ and $L(p)$ are also essentially unchanged. Once again, the memory is common to all agents and hence all agents agree on the current prediction: no agent hence has any relative advantage in terms of available information. It has been shown for the basic minority game, in contrast to the claim in Ref. [11], that the memory is relevant since it can introduce hidden correlations into the winning-room time series. This point will be discussed in detail for the present model elsewhere.

We now provide some analytic analysis. The simplest example of our system contains $N = 3$ agents $i, j, k$ with brain-size $m$ and three discrete $p$ values $p = 0, \frac{1}{2}, 1$. (The fact that $N < 3$ is impossible suggests that our system contains the level of complexity typically associated with 3-body, versus 2-body, problems). All agents agree on the current prediction (say 0). Agent $i$ will choose 0 or 1 with probability $p_i$ and $1 - p_i$ respectively. Likewise for $j$ ($p_j$) and $k$ ($p_k$). The $2^3$ possible decisions for $ijk$ are 000, 001, 010, 100, 110, 101, 011, 111. There are $3^3 = 27$ possible configurations ($p_i, p_j, p_k$). For a given $(p_i, p_j, p_k)$, the 8 possible decisions yield the expected gain for the agents. For example for $(p_i, p_j, p_k) = (0, 0, \frac{1}{2})$, $i$ and $j$ both choose 1 while $k$ chooses 0 with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. Hence $k$ wins with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ whereas $i$ and $j$ both lose. The net number of points gained per agent per turn, given by
the points awarded minus the points deducted, is $-1$ for $i$, $-1$ for $j$, and $0$ for $k$. The total is hence $-2$. Given that the maximum is $-1$ (there is a maximum of one winner) we see that $(0, 0, \frac{1}{2})$ is not optimal.

Table 1 shows the various configuration types, or classes. The last column shows the average points per agent: $[-\frac{1}{2}]$ for class i) implies the average agent loses $-\frac{1}{2}$ point per turn, and would hence modify its strategy after time $2d$. Such strategy modification allows the system to sample the 27 configurations. Classes vi), vii) and viii) are optimal, having maximum points. To obtain the average distribution $P(p)$ and $L(p)$, we must average over all 27 configurations. Since some classes are more favourable (i.e., more points) we should weight the distributions in an appropriate way. In the extreme case of large weighting, we include only the optimal classes vi), vii) and viii), yielding $P(0) : P(\frac{1}{2}) : P(1) = 2.5 : 1 : 2.5$ and $L(0) : L(\frac{1}{2}) : L(1) = 5 : 1 : 5$. For zero weighting, we instead consider the system as visiting all configurations with equal probability regardless of points gained per agent; such a zero-weight averaging is similar to that for the microstates in a gas within the microcanonical ensemble and yields $P(0) : P(\frac{1}{2}) : P(1) = 1 : 1 : 1$ and $L(0) : L(\frac{1}{2}) : L(1) = 1 : 1 : 1$. For an intermediate case, whereby all classes are weighted by the average points per agent, we obtain $P(0) : P(\frac{1}{2}) : P(1) = 1.1 : 1 : 1.1$ and $L(0) : L(\frac{1}{2}) : L(1) = 1.5 : 1 : 1.5$. In fact, any sensible weighting which favours the more profitable configurations yields a non-uniform $P(p)$ and $L(p)$ as observed numerically. This implies that the population, by self-segregating, has also managed to self-organize itself around the most profitable configurations. We emphasize that the system is dynamic since the membership of the various configurations is constantly changing ($i$, $j$ and $k$ inter-diffuse) but $P(p)$ remains essentially constant. For general $N$ we can loosely think of $i, j, k$ as three equal-size groups of like-minded agents.

In summary, we have shown that an evolving population of agents with similar capabilities and information will self-segregate. To flourish in such a population, an agent should behave in an extreme way ($p = 0$ or $p = 1$).

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TABLES

TABLE I. Configuration classes showing the distribution of the three agents (each denoted by x) and the average points awarded per time-step for each strategy-value \( p \). Also given are the number of distinct configurations per class, and the average number of points per agent per time-step.

| Class | \( p = 0 \) | \( p = 1/2 \) | \( p = 1 \) | No. configs. | Ave pts/agent |
|-------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|--------------|
| i)    | -          | xxx[-1/2][-1/2][-1/2] | -          | 1           | [-1/2]       |
| ii)   | x[-1/2]   | xx[-1/2][-1/2] | -          | 3           | [-1/2]       |
| iii)  | xx[-1][-1] | x[0]        | -          | 3           | [-2/3]       |
| iv)   | xxx[-1][-1][-1] | - | - | 1 | [-1] |
| v)    | -          | -          | xxx[-1][-1][-1] | 1 | [-1] |
| vi)   | x[1]      | -          | xx[-1][-1] | 3 | [-1/3] |
| vii)  | xx[-1][-1] | -          | x[1]      | 3           | [-1/3]       |
| viii) | x[0]      | x[-1]     | x[0]      | 6           | [-1/3]       |
| ix)   | -          | xx[-1/2][-1/2] | x[-1/2] | 3 | [-1/2] |
| x)    | -          | x[0]      | xx[-1][-1] | 3 | [-2/3] |
Figure Captions

Figure 1: Distribution of (a) strategies $P(p)$. At $t = 0$, $P(p)$ was chosen to be flat. Dashed line shows $P(p)$ at intermediate times. Solid line shows $P(p)$ at large times. (b) Corresponding lifespans $L(p)$. The parameters $R = 0.2$, $N = 101$, $d = -4$ and $m = 3$. Dotted lines show the long-time distributions using periodic (as opposed to reflective) boundary conditions.