Individual Experiences of Surveillance: Attitudes Towards Camera Surveillance in Slovakia*

MARTIN KOVANIČ**
Comenius University, Bratislava

Abstract: After the fall of the communist regime, Slovakia saw the introduction and subsequent rapid growth of camera surveillance, particularly around the turn of the millennium. These developments occurred in a specific political, cultural, and historical context, which affects perceptions of and reactions to surveillance by individual citizens. The post-communist context is characterised by relatively low levels of resistance to the introduction of various technological surveillance mechanisms, including the rapid introduction of Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) in public spaces. However, individuals who are under surveillance (surveilled subjects) are not passive. They are aware of the surveillance and its mechanisms, they interact with the surveillance devices, and they self-manage their digital image in various surveillance contexts. Using semi-structured qualitative interviews this article examines experiences of and individual attitudes towards the camera surveillance of Slovak citizens against the wider backdrop of the characteristics of post-communist surveillance culture. It is based on an analysis of individual stories of attitudes towards and personal experiences with CCTV in private, semi-private, and public places. The analysis of individual-level interactions reveals that citizens are aware of the presence of cameras and react to them in various ways, ranging from compliance and various strategies of negotiation with surveillance systems right up to some forms of resistance.

Keywords: surveillance, camera system, CCTV, surveilled subject, Slovakia

Introduction

The urban landscape of Slovak towns and municipalities has changed with the increased use of CCTV cameras, especially since the turn of the millennium. Public camera systems are used by the municipal police for the purposes of crime control and risk management with the intention of eliminating undesirable be-

* This work was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency under Contract No. APVV-16-0389.
** Direct all correspondence to: Martin Kovanič, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava, Gondova 70/2, Bratislava 811 02, Slovak Republic, e-mail: martin.kovanic@uniba.sk.

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haviour from public spaces. They also affect socio-spatial practices in the city [Coleman 2004]. Being monitored influences the choices individuals make when moving through and living in private and public spaces.

Being subjected to a surveillance mechanism is a specific individual experience. Despite the fact that the experience of surveillance often appears benign and unobtrusive and is therefore becoming increasingly normalised [Murakami Wood and Webster 2009], the attitudes and experiences of individuals vary. These individual experiences are affected by the intensity of surveillance [Gilliom 2006] as well as the subjectivity of the surveilled individual [Ball 2009; Ball et al. 2009].

Moreover, interactions with surveillance are context-specific, relating to the surveillance ‘imaginaries’ and ‘practices’ that form the surveillance culture of a specific cultural space [Lyon 2014]. These imaginaries and practices of contemporary technological surveillance are generated by social practices, which are influenced by the imaginaries and practices of surveillance in the past. The attitudes of citizens towards surveillance are influenced by the cultural and political context of their given country.

The purpose of this article is to provide some insight into individual experiences with camera surveillance. It analyses individual reactions to camera surveillance in a post-communist context, focusing on Slovakia. Understanding the micro-level context of the functioning of surveillance is vital for discussions of the legitimacy of surveillance—its legality and popular acceptance—as well as the rapid expansion of technological surveillance in the crime-fighting field, especially in countries, like Slovakia, where there is a low level of trust in institutions and the legal system [Friedewald et al. 2015: 75].

The advancement of camera surveillance changed the landscape of urban areas in Slovak municipalities. This growth occurred without any major public discussions, and it is unclear what attitudes regular citizens held towards camera surveillance before its implementation. This research is based on semi-structured interviews with Slovak citizens who were asked about the mechanisms of camera surveillance and their attitudes and experiences with this surveillance in various life contexts. This article briefly discusses the general characteristics of mass surveillance before examining general attitudes towards surveillance in post-communist surveillance culture, which affects the individual experiences of the surveilled subjects. It then presents a theoretical discussion of the surveilled subject and the results of the empirical research.

**New surveillance and its mass character**

The processes of globalisation, commercialisation, and digitisation in the contemporary world have created a system in which it is increasingly difficult to evade technologies for data collection, storage, and social sorting [Andrejevic 2012]. Modern information technologies with surveillance capabilities have become
embedded in our daily lives and are present in the majority of social settings, ranging from private to public ones. Surveillance can be defined as ‘any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered’ [Lyon 2001: 2]. It has become ubiquitous in both the online and physical worlds, and it affects a large variety of actors, including states, organisations, smaller social groups, such as the family, and particular individuals [Marx 2016: 22]. The agents of surveillance range from states and their institutions (such as the tax office and intelligence agencies) to multinational corporations (mostly technological firms such as Google and Facebook) and individuals (parents monitoring their children).

The main characteristic of contemporary technology-mediated surveillance is its mass character. Unlike personalised surveillance, which targets people who have been identified for surveillance for a specific reason [Clarke 1988: 499], mass surveillance is involuntary, non-discriminatory, routinised, and often automated. It collects data from any individual that has contact with the surveillance mechanism. These data are often available in real time, but they can also be stored for a long period of time and subsequently accessed and analysed by various third parties [Marx 2002: 15]. Camera surveillance falls in the category of mass surveillance, since it targets all the individuals who move within the range and physical capabilities of the camera.

The introduction of surveillance has social impacts that are dependent on pre-existing social relations, political practices, and cultural specifics. One of the prominent social costs or effects of surveillance is ‘social sorting’, which is the result of the functioning of any surveillance system that ‘obtains personal and group data in order to classify people and populations according to varying criteria, to determine who should be targeted for special treatment, suspicion, eligibility, inclusion, access, and so on’ [Lyon 2002: 20]. These systems thus create different categories of person. These categories are not the result of a specific value-neutral operation; they are persistent stereotypes, which are embedded in a society and may therefore lead to the marginalisation of certain groups that are exposed to different surveillance systems using much more invasive monitoring and control. Monahan [2010: 97] argues that in this regard, surveillance ‘operates as a mechanism for societal differentiation; it assists with discerning or actively constructing differences among populations and then regulating those populations according to their assigned status’.

Social sorting is an inherent feature of any surveillance mechanism, ranging from targeting individuals based on physical characteristics, such as race by CCTV operators [see Norris and Armstrong 1999], to airport controls [see Gilliom and Monahan 2013] and increased surveillance in response to negative economic conditions [see Gilliom 2001]. Closely linked to social sorting is ‘profiling’, which

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1 Communist citizens had an experience with personalised surveillance whereby technologies were used to spy on specific individuals who were of interest to the security forces.
attempts to pre-empt future unfavourable or problematic conduct based on existing profiles or classifications of individuals or groups [Clarke 1993]. It is based on the risk minimisation principle of new surveillance.

Attitudes towards surveillance in the post-communist context

The existing academic literature suggests that the public in the post-communist region takes a rather favourable view of technological surveillance such as CCTV [Los 2002; 2010; Svenonius, Björklund and Waszkiewicz 2014]. The rise of surveillance in post-communist Europe—both its technological proliferation and citizens’ support for surveillance—is the result of the transformation of fear of the state into a fear of crime after the fall of the communist regimes. According to Los, during the transition period, once the ‘preoccupation with keeping out of the state’s sight (and wrath) had subsided, the fear of being victimized by random crime rose conspicuously’ [Los 2002: 169].

This turn from fearing autocratic surveillance to accepting the new surveillance is a result of the maintenance of a ‘culture of fear and suspicion’. This culture was created and preserved by the communist secret police as a tool of the regime to maintain power, and that culture survived. The fear of the state was replaced by a fear of crime as the state grew weaker and lost its crime-control capabilities, and in response to small- and large-scale corruption, the privatisation of security by former secret police personnel, the re-definition of threats, and the new visibility of crime (e.g. the mass media’s shift in focus towards ‘bad news’) [Los 2002]. The earlier ‘good news’ media, which had prevented the publication of some information, such as environmental hazards, alcoholism, traffic accidents, corruption, and crime, had helped reassure the public that it was safe. After the regime change, the shift to bad news made crime and risk much more visible and introduced new discourses and idioms of moral outrage and victimhood. These developments were traumatising citizens, and this was manifested as a disorientation and normative chaos that led to a rise in uncertainty and insecurity [Sztompka 2008: 140].

2 This shift towards ‘bad news’ has a racial element when it is in relation to the Roma population. They have been overrepresented as perpetrators of crime, especially in the tabloid media. For a more complex analysis of the media framing of Roma populations, see Kroon et al. [2016].

3 Research on the effects of the media regarding the fear of crime has presented a wide range of sometimes contradictory results. A review of existing research was done by Heath and Gilbert [1996]. Their main finding was that the effects were not simple and straightforward; they depended both on the characteristics of the message conveyed by the media as well as on the audience. In summarised form, the finding was that media messages do not affect all of the people all of the time, but some of the messages do affect some of the people some of the time. The shift from ‘good’ to ‘bad’ news after the fall of communism
The combination of a bypassing of modernist processes and a move towards post-industrial surveillance ensured that the new surveillance would bear the stamp of communist control and the above-mentioned maintenance of a culture of suspicion and division [Los 2010]. This led to citizens’ somewhat unconditional acceptance of the new technology-intensive surveillance mechanisms introduced in post-communist countries by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. As opposed to human surveillance,4 which was associated with the previous regime, technological surveillance is predominantly accepted by the general population [Svenonius, Björklund and Waszkiewicz 2014]. This acceptance is manifested as a lack of opposition to its expansion from the public, civil society, and political forces. Additionally, leaks of sensitive documents about highly visible public personas—something Larson refers to as ‘wild eavesdropping’—obtained through wiretapping, bugging, or secret recording have been normalised in the region of Central and Eastern Europe to provide ‘proxy justice or accountability’ when institutional mechanisms fail to do so [Larson 2017].

Human surveillance was associated with the functioning of communist state security agencies and the subsequent controversies surrounding secret police files and the lustration process in Central and Eastern European countries. Debates about lustration in most post-communist countries of the region led nevertheless to the creation of some sort of lustration mechanism, which condemned the practices of the communist secret police, albeit with a different timing and in a distinctive form [Williams, Szcerbiak and Fowler 2005]. The perception of human and personal surveillance therefore remains negative.

Svenonius et al. [2014: 108] argue that contemporary surveillance mechanisms in the post-communist context are ‘more often than not seen as appropriate responses to a particular security problem, and discussions concern rather how to finance more surveillance than its historicity and ethics’. Therefore, the population accepts the use of surveillance for the purposes of fighting crime and preventing it. Opposition to human surveillance is manifested in the increasing use and acceptance of technological solutions such as wiretapping, data retention, and CCTV. Experiences from Poland suggest that video surveillance is marketed as an act of modernisation [Björklund and Svenonious 2013].

brought about a considerably more drastic change in the message conveyed by the media when it came to crime, crisis, and uncertainty. Therefore, it can be assumed that the effects on the fear of crime were more severe than in Western countries, where the change was either more gradual or not captured in the design of studies at all.

4 A type of surveillance that does not have a mass character and is personal and individualised, relating to a specific individual or individuals of interest. During the period of the communist regime, this type of surveillance was conducted by the secret police and their collaborators. It sometimes made use of technologies such as telephone interceptions and photography, but it did not have a mass character.
The argument of modernisation was identified by the Urban Eye project in Hungary. During the transformation period, public demands to combat crime increased and CCTV was perceived as the modern Western world’s ‘silver bullet’ for eradicating crime [Hempel and Toepfer 2004: 32]. Therefore, support for technological surveillance there is not only perceived as a means to a specific goal (in this case, the provision of security) but also as a way of overcoming the pre-modern communist past and of ‘catching up’ with developed democracies.

Camera surveillance in Slovakia

Closed-circuit television cameras are becoming increasingly common in public places across Slovak municipalities. The movement of individuals in the streets and squares as well as other public and commercial areas is being constantly monitored and recorded in an increasing number of areas. The reasons for this development include the relatively easy availability of new technologies and the conviction private owners and local municipal police have that the introduction of CCTV in public spaces helps prevent and solve criminal activity and delinquency. This can be characterised as a turn towards a situation-directed type of prevention, which focuses on specific contexts rather than specific individuals [Björklund 2012: 55–56]. This is in line with the turn towards risk management [Beck 2011] as well as the belief that individual places can be classified in various crime-risk zones based on a rational cost-benefit calculation and that appropriate measures can be taken to decrease crime. What matters is no longer the individual but rather the situation.

The birth of public camera systems in Slovakia dates back to 1999 with the installation of the first cameras in Bratislava. In the first half of the 2000s, the number of cameras in Slovakia was fairly limited (fewer than ten cameras in larger settlements). The exception was Bratislava, which had thirty-eight public cameras by 2004. The biggest growth in camera systems can be seen in recent years [Kovanič 2017]. Other Slovak towns experienced rapid growth, although the actual number of cameras is still relatively small. However, the picture is completely different when private cameras are taken into account. Although there is no official information on their number, information from retailers suggests that in 2015 there was a three-hundred percent annual rise in sales in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. This recent growth can be explained by the support for and co-funding of crime-fighting schemes from the government. Citizens’ attitudes towards the proliferation of cameras in public places are an understudied phenomenon, and therefore attention shall turn to the surveilled subject.

5 See (in Slovak language): http://www.retailmagazin.sk/aktualne-vpravo/764-rastie-online-predaj-bezpecnostnych-kamier.
Individual interactions with surveillance

Existing research into the experiences of surveilled subjects is almost exclusively reduced to the experience ‘of oppression, coercion, ambivalence, or ignorance’ [Ball 2009: 640]. However, surveilled individuals are both objects of surveillance and ‘acting subjects’ [Klauser and Albrechtslund 2014: 284]. Acting subjects interact with the surveillance device, self-manage their image, and are able to resist the ‘surveillance gaze’—a reduced visualised representation of reality [Koskela 2000: 250–251].

Furthermore, the capacity to interact depends on a subject’s surveillance capital. Surveillance capital refers to ‘how surveillance subjects utilize the everyday forms of tacit knowledge and cultural know-how that is acquired through first-hand experience of power relations to challenge the very same power relations’ [McCahill and Finn 2014: 4]. Knowledge, experience, and awareness of surveillance are all factors that structure the dynamics of struggles over surveillance. They allow individuals to either contest and resist a surveillance practice or take advantage of it.

A similar argument has been proposed by Ball [2009]. What is exposed by an individual under surveillance depends both on the invasiveness of the data collection mechanism and on the ‘subject’s prior knowledge of the data collection process, and, by inference, its consequences’ [ibid.: 647]. How an individual reacts to surveillance is dependent upon social, cultural, and surveillance capital. Research on surveillance at Toronto’s Pearson International Airport has shown that individuals under surveillance are concerned with both the outcome of the surveillance and the process as well as how it meets the criteria of procedural justice [Saulnier 2017].

Struggles over camera surveillance in Slovakia

Slovak citizens’ experiences with surveillance were studied with the aid of semi-structured interviews. The analysis in this article is based on the results of forty-seven semi-structured interviews conducted between March 2013 and January 2014 in the IRISS project and seven interviews conducted by the present author for the SOURCE project between March and May 2015. The sampling method used for the choice of interviews was non-probability convenience sampling. However, the choice of respondents sought to attain a certain degree of sample variability, especially when it came to gender, age, and social situation (the education and occupation of the respondent). An overview can be found in the following table:

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6 Some interviews in the IRISS project were conducted by other Slovak participants in the project: Erik Láštic, Martin Maňuch, and Anna Šovčíková.
The respondents were well balanced in terms of gender, but with respect to age there were more younger respondents. There were only six respondents over forty years of age. In terms of education levels, the sample skewed towards respondents with a university education. Only two respondents reported having primary education as their highest achieved level.

The chosen sampling procedure created several limitations for the analysis. It did not allow for any generalisations of the attitudes and experiences for the wider public, and any analysis based on socio-economic characteristics would only offer limited added value. Additionally, all the interviews were conducted with respondents residing in Bratislava, making the results regionally specific. However, some of the respondents who were not originally from Bratislava also mentioned their experiences from other Slovak regions. The middle-class background of the respondents represented a limit in terms of the variety of surveillance they experience, and it influences their expectations of the normality of the behaviour that camera surveillance aims to shape. On the other hand, the qualitative nature of the data provides insight into the patterns of thinking about and experiencing CCTV surveillance and its rationalisation strategies.

### The analytical framework

Lyon emphasises that ‘the persons surveilled are not merely subject to surveillance but subjects of surveillance’ [Lyon 2007: 159]. This means that individuals, if they are aware of surveillance mechanisms, do not remain passive. They engage with surveillance and react to it; they have certain expectations and sometimes fears. Lyon further identifies three possible types of engagement with surveillance mechanisms. The first one is compliance. When the system is deemed to be legitimate and necessary, it produces an agreement with the surveillance mechanism. Compliance is affected to a large extent by the knowledge of surveillance: to what extent one knows what kind of data is being gathered, where it is stored and transferred, for how long, and so on. Compliance can also be associated with ignorance, which is simply not caring about surveillance at all [ibid.].
The second possible reaction is negotiation. This means that compliance is questioned either in relation to the space where surveillance mechanisms are gathering the data (sense of space) or in the type of data that are being collected (sense of control). A surveillance mechanism is not dismissed as illegitimate as such, but some sort of negotiation does take place. The last reaction is resistance. This means that some sort of action is taken in order not to be the subject of surveillance (ibid.: 163–169). Resistance to surveillance can take many forms. It is either organised resistance, which aims to remove or regulate surveillance on a larger scale, or it can take the form of individual everyday resistance.

Marx [2003: 374–384] identifies eleven tactics of everyday struggles over surveillance. He categorises them as ‘discovery moves, avoidance moves, piggybacking moves, switching moves, distorting moves, blocking moves, masking moves, breaking moves, refusal moves, cooperative moves, and counter-surveillance moves’. Avoidance moves refer to changes in the location or time of an activity so as not to be under surveillance. Piggybacking and switching involve tactics of masking oneself to surveillance or switching places with an individual of interest. Distorting moves attempt to confuse the surveillance mechanism by manipulating the data that the given system gathers. Blocking and masking moves aim to prevent the surveillance mechanism from being able to obtain the information. Breaking involves rendering the surveillance device inoperable. Refusal moves refer to the decision not to participate in a surveillance mechanism that requires consent. Cooperative moves entail working with sympathetic agents within the surveillance apparatus. Counter-surveillance is a tactic that makes use of other types of surveillance in order to shift the balance of power in the relationship between the surveilled and the watcher.

The acceptance of surveillance without reservations

As noted above, the first public CCTV cameras only came into use in Slovakia at the beginning of the 21st century. Moreover, public cameras comprise only one portion of all the cameras that monitor public and semi-public spaces. Cameras have become an integral part of the urban landscape. The habituation of citizens to the presence of these devices has led to the normalisation of CCTV surveillance and its acceptance. This attitude is epitomised in the opinion quoted here:

I think that using CCTV cameras is positive, especially if the police watch the feeds live and then they can take action if they see that something unlawful is going on. I don’t really see any negative sides. I am not worried about the fact that I can be on the record. (Interview ID 35, male, 49 years, entrepreneur)

Avoidance moves also involve the ‘displacement of crime’ [Eck 1993], whereby criminal activities shift to a different location after the installation of a new CCTV camera on a certain street.
Compliance with surveillance is characterised by two features: trust in the effectiveness of the surveillance technology and the ‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ mentality. Cameras are perceived as a legitimate law enforcement tool that is able to provide more security without any additional social costs. This is especially true for public cameras operated by the municipal police, which with a live camera feed should be able to intervene when necessary. However, empirical studies from Western countries question the effectiveness of public camera schemes on the reduction of crime and their preventive effects [Cameron et al. 2008; Ditton and Short 1999; Gill and Springs 2005; Wells, Allard and Wilson 2006], with some exceptions when it comes to vehicle and property crimes [Piza et al. 2019]. Trust in camera systems is therefore irrational, based on the positive image ascribed to cameras by politicians and security entrepreneurs and on its symbolic value as a discursive object, which is deployed in public debates as a reaction to perceptions of crime [Norris 2012: 40].

This is combined with the ‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ narrative, in which an accepting citizen claims that, seeing herself as a law-abiding citizen, there is nothing problematic about being the subject of a ‘surveillance gaze’. The social effects of surveillance, such as ‘social sorting’ (categorising personal data into specific categories with the aim of controlling and managing individuals and societies) [Lyon 2003: 2], are not considered since its effects are often invisible at first sight. This mentality leads to the general ‘banality’ of camera surveillance, a qualitative characteristic of the ordinariness and ultimate goodness of this measure [Goold, Loader and Thumala 2013: 983–984]. Surveillance has been internalised and has become a banal part of everyday life in the public sphere.

The acceptance of camera surveillance is reinforced by a specific personal experience and its perception, in which the camera gaze is appropriated for protection and feelings of safety. A respondent from eastern Slovakia living in a town with a Roma settlement believes that the installation of cameras in the town centre brought more security:

I don’t have any problem with these cameras; I think it is good that they are there. In the past, there were not any cameras, and it would happen that you got mugged or assaulted. But now they are there, and it is a bit better. Therefore, I think that they helped. I would like to see more cameras in places where Roma live … I feel threatened by them. (Interview ID 2, female, 22 years, student)

The support for CCTV surveillance is the result of a perception of a real and direct threat, and it becomes a projection screen for the resolution of fears and feelings of unsafety. The respondent’s real-life perception is that the streets where she walks became safer after the installation of cameras. This, however, does not mean that crime rates in the town, and on the monitored streets for that matter, have decreased. The installation of cameras brings with it the problem of crime displacement: the movement of crime from monitored to unmonitored public
areas [Johnson, Guerette and Bowers 2012]. Nevertheless, in this case the surveillance mechanism is instrumentalised by the citizens, and that leads to its acceptance.

This instrumentalisation of camera surveillance and demands for more cameras for the purpose of crime-fighting is guided by racially informed moral panic about the Roma, which are stereotypically viewed as perpetrators of crime and as individuals who behave in indecent ways. According to Fiske, surveillance is a mechanism of imposing norms upon those ‘who have been othered into the abnormal’ category and are often the objects of increased surveillance [1998: 81]. In the case of Slovakia, this otherness category of abnormality is often connected to the Roma minority, who are considered unfit to live and function with normal society by a large number of Slovaks.8

Compliance with camera surveillance is also connected with the protection of personal property. Trusting in the panoptic effects of cameras, individuals make use of them to decrease their own fear of crime or fear of getting their property stolen:

I notice the cameras because of my car … I park my car where I work. Therefore, I try to park the car in a place where I can be seen on the camera. (Interview ID 50, female, 32 years, reception manager)

Conversely, the trust in its panoptic effects works both ways. The same respondent was the culprit of a car accident, hitting a parked car when parking her own car in the town centre:

I was thinking about whether I should run away or leave a note for the owner. Then I looked around and saw that there was a camera that has footage of me hitting the other car. So I decided to leave a note for the driver. (ibid.)

Acceptance means that the respondent believes that the camera schemes are both legitimate and effective. This results in the modification of behaviour when under the gaze of the camera and expectations that other people would do the same.

Acceptance is also connected with the expected behaviour of others when under surveillance. The belief in the panoptic effects of camera surveillance is linked to expectations of ‘normality’ and of what is considered a normal appearance and normal behaviour. One respondent discusses her neighbour, who rejected the introduction of cameras in their apartment building:

8 The results of the survey conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs in June 2019 showed that 60.8% of young Slovaks between the ages of 15 and 19 would not want Roma as their neighbours. The full results can be found at: http://www.ivo.sk/8561/sk/aktuality-obcianske-spolunazivanie-ocami-tinedzerov-sprava-zo-sociologickeho-vyskumu.
She said that she did not want to be on camera; she did not want anyone looking at her. But she has two daughters who always used to bring in these boyfriends who are pricks and came in drunk, puked all over the building, and argued all the time. Once they smashed the front doors. These kinds of people are against cameras. If you are a normal person, you consider the camera a help. Cameras ensure that people do what they are supposed to do and don’t do what they shouldn’t do. (Interview ID 39, female, 53 years, manager)

To the ‘accepting citizen’, objections to camera surveillance are considered to have ulterior motives. They are presented as ‘not normal’. A normal citizen who has ‘nothing to hide’ also has ‘nothing to fear’ from surveillance, which is believed to enforce normality and prevent undesirable behaviour. If somebody refuses to consent to the disciplinary ritual, then she has something to hide.

Surveillance, but not at any cost

Surveillance is not always supported at any cost. A ‘negotiating citizen’ who on the surface has a ‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ mentality has limits to what invasion of privacy she will accept. These limits relate to three situations: the place where the surveillance takes place, the purpose for which the surveillance is carried out, and the extent to which the surveillance is controlled by the state.

An example of the sense of place is the distinction between the private and the public sphere:

Personally, I don’t care; let’s put them everywhere! We can talk about privacy in our houses, but it is different outside. When we are on the streets, we are controlled by other people and we lose our privacy automatically anyway. (Interview ID 24, male, 24 years, shop assistant)

There is a clear identification of places where cameras are perceived to be legitimate and where their legitimacy is questioned. There is the realm of the public space, where respondents have different privacy expectations than in their private realms (their homes, where they have a right ‘to be left alone’). The sense of place where monitoring should not take place extends to semi-public places such as public transport (trains and public buses were mentioned in the interviews) and certain parts of shopping malls (such as in the proximity of changing rooms).

The privacy doctrine suggests that there is a difference between the private and public realms. In the public realm, a certain ‘degree of access and participation by the others must be accepted’ [Silva-Tarouca Larsen 2011: 12]. However, the divide between these two realms is not straightforward and has a normative aspect. Nevertheless, this does not mean that privacy has no value in the public space. In that environment, citizens have a reasonable right to public anonymity and to remain ‘nameless’ in the face of other actors, such as the government.
and its institutions [Slobogin 2002: 238–239]. Its protection is therefore desirable since camera monitoring has its ethical implications. Maintaining the dignity and autonomy of the individual is linked to the ability to make decisions concerning herself, her body, and her data, and to protection against unwanted scrutiny and judgement [ibid.: 185].

The acceptance of surveillance is also dependent on its declared purpose and the trust of the individual in the possibilities of meeting that purpose. The declared purpose of public camera systems is to prevent criminal behaviour and to provide a new tool with which to solve crime. As already discussed, the effectiveness of camera systems in meeting those aims is contested by empirical studies. Similar doubts about effectiveness are a characteristic of the ‘negotiating citizen’:

I am really indifferent about the use of CCTV cameras. I can’t really recall any arguments that would persuade me that it is great to have, nor the ones that would suggest that it is negative and evil. It might help catch some criminals after the deed, but I am not sure whether it can really help stop a crime while it’s happening. I haven’t seen any data, so I can’t really say. (Interview ID 43, female, 26 years, NGO employee)

These accounts suggest that acceptance is dependent on the belief that cameras work and are effective. The problem of effectiveness is closely linked to the problem of transparency or a sense of control. The interviewees hinted at a lack of awareness of the positions of cameras, a lack of knowledge of the procedures concerning recordings (such as their storage and the transfer of information to other law enforcement agencies), the non-existence of public discourse on the effectiveness of their use, and the non-existence of schemes of effectiveness evaluation by the municipal police.

Murakami Wood and Webster argue that it is more important for law enforcement authorities to show that they are ‘doing something’ against crime and thus that they have something to show to the public. The ‘stage-set security’ or ‘security theatre’ ‘gives us symbols of safety in a society in which everything is seen as a potential source of risk and where fear dominates. It assuages our fear of the dangerous other and society as a space of negative possibilities in a risk society’ [Murakami Wood and Webster 2009: 263]. This applies to various activities: from full-body scanners at the airport to the ever-increasing numbers of CCTV cameras in our cities.

The effectiveness issue is corroborated by the personal experience of certain respondents who are aware of the presence of cameras in certain locations, and who have witnessed illegal conduct but did not see the desired reaction from the police. This is illustrated in the following story:

I know exactly where the cameras are, but I don’t think that they are very effective, because I used to work in a bar. There were often fights on the streets, but the police never came even though it was right under the camera. (Interview ID 54, female, 23 years, student)
When the effectiveness of the system is doubted, there is a decrease in trust and support for camera surveillance. Cameras should not be perceived as an end in themselves. They are not a panacea. The effective functioning of public camera systems is dependent on the attentiveness of its operators and timely reactions from the municipal police to the ongoing criminality. In this sense, the support for camera surveillance is closely linked to the credibility and trustworthiness of the police and their ability to make use of the technology and react accordingly and promptly. Even though surveillance is normalised, the ‘negotiating citizen’ questions its place, purpose, and transparency.

Refusing surveillance

Camera surveillance is not considered to be just a positive mechanism, even by people who have ‘nothing to hide’ and consider themselves law-abiding citizens. For them, being under constant surveillance leads to feelings of uneasiness. The ‘objecting citizen’ refuses camera monitoring on the grounds of it being an invasion of autonomy and a presumption of guilt:

I don’t find the use of CCTVs in public that positive. I do not feel that it helps prevent criminality. I think that criminality is actually on the decline, but the cameras are still widely used. And I don’t think that this decrease is related to the use of cameras. I consider CCTV to be some kind of presumption of guilt. Everybody is suspicious. (Interview ID 22, male, 27 years, PhD student)

Combined with the violation of personal autonomy, this criticism also questions the effectiveness of surveillance, most importantly in emphasising the ‘displacement of crime’. This refers to crime relocating itself to places that are not under constant surveillance. Maximum security could only be achieved if there were cameras everywhere, which is not a desirable scenario in the eyes of ‘objecting citizens’.

Individuals who object to camera surveillance engage in some of the tactics of everyday struggle against surveillance. The most frequently mentioned tactics fall into the category of avoidance movements, whereby individuals either refrain from certain behaviour or avoid places where they are conscious of being under surveillance:

In my hometown, my friend showed me all the cameras in the city, some of which were hidden. In the main street, when I am in a pub and need to go out for a cigarette, I am very aware of whether CCTV is present there. In that case, I will look for an ashtray. If there isn’t one around, I’ll not smoke rather than be caught throwing my cigarette butt on the ground. (Interview ID 8, female, 22 years, HR firm employee)
Respondents recognise the panoptic effects of camera surveillance, which leads to their management of the digital self, such as the inhibition of behaviour of not smoking in front of a camera if there is no ashtray outside even when the original plan was to go outside for a cigarette.

The ‘objecting citizen’ is aware of surveillance and its possibly negative effects. Increasing technological advancement has brought the introduction of more sophisticated cameras, which have the ability to turn and zoom and to provide high-quality recordings. More profound knowledge about camera surveillance and its technical aspects appears to result in more questions and objections.

**Conclusion**

The culture of surveillance refers to the manner in which surveillance is ‘imagined, and experienced, and about how mundane activities ... are affected by and affect surveillance’ [Lyon 2018: 2]. The experience of living within post-communist surveillance culture is not straightforward; it is the result of a twofold legacy that manifests itself on the societal level. Pop-Eleches and Tucker [2017] identify living through communism and living in a post-communist country as two different experiences that have shaped the attitudes of citizens in these countries. Low levels of social capital and interpersonal trust persisted in the post-communist period and did not fundamentally increase through the process of democratization [Uslaner and Badescu 2003]. The reduction of the deficient social capital continued even more with a combination of increased elite corruption, lethal violence, and increasing social inequality [Karstedt 2003]. This created a specific situation for interactions with surveillance, and specifically camera surveillance, which is installed for specific crime-fighting purposes.

For the purposes of security, technological surveillance is desired for the purposes of fighting and deterring crime [Svenonius, Björklund and Waszkiewicz 2014] as well as supplementing relatively low interpersonal trust [Szrubka 2013]. However, as the analysis of the attitudes and experiences of Slovak citizens showed, it does not translate into unconditional support for camera surveillance. Citizens are not just passive objects of surveillance; their attitudes depend on their surveillance capital [McCahill and Finn 2014] and specific individual knowledge, attitudes, and experiences with cameras. The experience of the surveilled subject is an experience of exposure and interaction [Ball 2009].

Despite its inherent limitations, stemming from the methodological design of the research and inability to make generalisations from it for all of society, this article creates a typology of interactions with camera surveillance and their rationalisations. ‘Accepting citizens’ comply and are normalised to be accepting of surveillance, which is perceived in a positive light as a tool for the normalisation of the behaviour of others. Accepting citizens trust in the effectiveness of cameras, and they perceive them as a technological fix to a specific security problem,
as theorised by the post-communist surveillance culture literature. The demand for more cameras for the purposes of fighting crime is connected to demands to normalise the behaviour of others, which is most visible in the perception of the Roma minority as perpetrators of crime and is connected to racist stereotypes of indecency.

The other two categories diverge from these expectations. ‘Negotiating citizens’ have objections to where the cameras are installed, what purpose they serve, and how they are controlled. ‘Objecting citizens’ reject camera surveillance on the grounds that it is an invasion of personal autonomy and is ineffective in its stated purpose of deterring crime. Both objections and negotiations come from an interplay of a variety of attitudes, thought processes, and personal experiences. The prevalence of the individual types of citizens within the general population remains to be researched further by means of representative quantitative research.

Nevertheless, within post-communist surveillance culture, citizens also demand effectiveness, transparency, and knowledge about surveillance practices, even if they are not voiced explicitly in the public sphere. The individual processes of interacting with the camera systems are more complex, and policies aimed at combating crime with technology should therefore address this complexity, provide more transparency, and create effective evaluation schemes. Both transparency and accountability are required in order to keep the balance between surveillance and democracy [Haggerty and Samatas 2010] and to guarantee the sustainability of individual rights and liberties.

Martin Kovanič is a post-doctoral researcher in the Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava. His research interests include surveillance, security, and post-communist politics. He has published several articles on these issues. In 2015 he was a visiting research fellow at Vienna Centre for Societal Security.

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