Scalable Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithms for Mean Field Games

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Abstract

Mean Field Games (MFGs) have been introduced to efficiently approximate games with very large populations of strategic agents. Recently, the question of learning equilibria in MFGs has gained momentum, particularly using model-free reinforcement learning (RL) methods. One limiting factor to further scale up using RL is that existing algorithms to solve MFGs require the mixing of approximated quantities such as strategies or q-values. This is far from being trivial in the case of non-linear function approximation that enjoy good generalization properties, e.g., neural networks. We propose two methods to address this shortcoming. The first one learns a mixed strategy from distillation of historical data into a neural network and is applied to the Fictitious Play algorithm. The second one is an online mixing method based on regularization that does not require memorizing historical data or previous estimates. It is used to extend Online Mirror Descent. We demonstrate numerically that these methods efficiently enable the use of Deep RL algorithms to solve various MFGs. In addition, we show that these methods outperform SotA baselines from the literature.

1. Introduction

Despite outstanding success of machine learning in numerous applications (Goodfellow et al., 2016; 2020), learning in games remains difficult because two or more agents require the consideration of non-stationary environments. In particular, it is hard to scale in terms of number of agents because one has to keep track of all agents’ behaviors, leading to a prohibitive combinatorial complexity (Daskalakis et al., 2006; Tuyls and Weiss, 2012). Recently, Mean Field Games (MFGs) have brought a new perspective by replacing the atomic agents by their distribution. Introduced concurrently by Lasry and Lions (2007) and Huang et al. (2006), the mean field approximation relies on symmetry and homogeneity assumptions, and enables to scale to an infinite number of agents. Solving MFGs is usually done by solving a forward-backward system of partial (or stochastic) differential equations, which represent the dynamics of both the state distribution and the value function. However, traditional numerical methods (see e.g. (Achdou and Capuzzo-Dolcetta, 2010; Carlini and Silva, 2014; Briñez Arias et al., 2018) and (Achdou and Laurière, 2020) for a survey) do not scale well in terms of the complexity of the state and action spaces. Recently, several deep learning methods for MFGs have been developed to tackle high-dimensional problems (see e.g. (Fouque and Zhang, 2020; Carmona and Laurière, 2019; Germain et al., 2022; Cao et al., 2020) and (Carmona and Laurière, 2022) for a survey). Nevertheless, these methods require the model (dynamics and rewards) to be completely known.

On the other hand, Reinforcement Learning (RL) has proved very efficient to solve Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and games with complex structures, from e.g. chess Campbell et al. (2002) to multi-agent systems (Lanctot et al., 2017). To tackle problems with highly complex environments, RL algorithms can be combined with efficient function approximation. Deep neural networks with suitable architectures are arguably the most popular choice, thanks to their ease of use and their generalization capabilities. Deep RL has brought several recent breakthrough results, e.g., Go (Silver et al., 2016), atari (Mnih et al., 2013), poker (Brown and Sandholm, 2018; Moravčík et al., 2017) or even video games such as Starcraft (Vinyals et al., 2019).

Many recent works have combined MFGs with RL to leverage their mutual potential – albeit mostly without deep neural nets thus far. The intertwining of MFGs and RL happens through an optimization (or learning) procedure. The simplest algorithm of this type is the (Banach-Picard) fixed-point approach, consisting in alternating a best response computation against a given population distribution with an

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A Mean Field Game (MFG) is a strategic decision making problem with a continuum of identical and anonymous players. In MFGs, it is possible to select a representative player and to focus on its policy instead of considering all players individually, which simplifies tremendously the computation of an equilibrium. We place ourselves in the context of a game and are interested in computing Nash equilibria. We stress that we consider a finite horizon setting as it encompasses a broader class of games, which needs time-dependent policies and distributions. We denote by $N_T$ the finite time horizon and by $n$ a generic time step. We focus on finite state space and finite action space, denoted respectively by $X$ and $A$. We denote by $\Delta_X$ the set of probability distributions on $X$. Each distribution can be viewed as a vector of length $|X|$. Then, the game is characterized by one-step reward functions $r_n : X \times A \times \Delta_X \to \mathbb{R}$, and transition probability functions $p_n : X \times A \times \Delta_X \to \Delta_X$, for $n = 0, 1, \ldots, N_T$. The third argument corresponds to the current distribution of the population. An initial distribution $m_0$ of the population is set and will remain fixed over the paper. The two main quantities of interest are the policy of the representative player $\pi = (\pi_n)_n \in (\Delta_A)^{N_T+1}$ and the distribution flow (i.e. sequence) of agents $\mu = (\mu_n)_n \in \Delta_X^{N_T+1}$. Let us stress that we denote the time of the game $n$ and that $\pi$ and $\mu$ are thus time-dependent objects. Given a population mean field flow $\mu$, the goal for a representative agent is to maximize over $\pi$ the total reward:

$$J(\pi, \mu) = \mathbb{E}_\pi \sum_{n=0}^{N_T} r_n(x_n, a_n, \mu_n) \bigg| x_0 \sim m_0$$

s.t.: $a_n \sim \pi_n(\cdot|x_n), x_{n+1} \sim p_n(\cdot|x_n, a_n, \mu_n), n \geq 0$.

Note that the reward $r_n$ together with the transition function $p_n$ are functions of the population distribution at the current time step $\mu_n$, which encompasses the mean field interactions. A policy $\pi$ is called a best response (BR) against a mean field flow $\mu$ if it is a maximizer of $J(\cdot, \mu)$. We denote by $BR(\mu)$ the set of best responses to the mean field flow $\mu$.

Given a policy $\pi$, a mean field flow $\mu$ is said to be induced by $\pi$ if: $\mu_0 = m_0$ and for $n = 0, \ldots, N_T - 1$,

$$\mu_{n+1}(x) = \sum_{x', a'} \mu_n(x') \pi_n(a'|x') p_n(x|x', a', \mu_n),$$

which we can simply write $\mu_{n+1} = P^{\pi_n, \mu_n}_{n+1} \mu_n$, where $P^{\pi_n, \mu_n}_{n+1}$ is the transition matrix of $x_n$. We denote by $\mu^\pi$ or $\Phi(\pi) \in \Delta_X^{N_T+1}$ the mean-field flow induced by $\pi$.

**Definition 2.1.** A pair $(\hat{\pi}, \hat{\mu})$ is a (finite horizon) Mean Field Nash Equilibrium (MFNE) if (1) $\hat{\pi}$ is a BR against $\hat{\mu}$, and (2) $\hat{\mu}$ is induced by $\hat{\pi}$.

Equivalently, $\hat{\pi}$ is a fixed point of the map $BR \circ \Phi$. Given a mean field flow $\mu$, a representative player faces a traditional MDP, which can be studied using classical tools. The value of a policy can be characterized through the $Q$-function defined as:

$$Q^{\pi, \mu}_{N_T+1}(x, a) = 0$$

and for $n \leq N_T$,

$$Q^{\pi, \mu}_n(x, a) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{n' \geq n} r_{n'}(x_{n'}, a_{n'}, \mu_{n'}) \bigg| (x_n, a_n) = (x, a) \right].$$

It satisfies the Bellman equation: for $n \leq N_T$,

$$Q^{\pi, \mu}_n(x, a) = r_n(x, a, \mu_n) + \mathbb{E}_{x', a'}[Q^{\pi, \mu}_{n+1}(x', a')], \quad (1)$$
where $x' \sim p(\cdot|x,a,\mu_n)$ and $a' \sim \pi_n(\cdot|x,a,\mu_n)$, with the convention $Q_{N+1}^n(\cdot,\cdot) = 0$. The optimal $Q$-function $Q^*_{\mu}$ is the value function of any best response $\pi^*$ against $\mu$. It is defined as $Q^*_{\mu}(x,a) = \max_a Q_n^{*\mu}(x,a)$ for every $n, x, a$, and it satisfies the optimal Bellman equation: for $n \leq N_T$,

$$Q_n^{*\mu}(x,a) = r_n(x,a,\mu_n) + \mathbb{E}_{x',a'}[\max_a Q_{n+1}^{*\mu}(x',a')],$$

(2)

where $Q_{N+1}^n(\cdot,\cdot) = 0$.

### 2.2. Fictitious Play

The most straightforward method to compute a MFNE is to iteratively update in turn the policy $\pi$ and the distribution $\mu$, by respectively computing a BR and the induced mean field flow. The BR can be computed with the backward induction (1), iteratively update in turn the policy $\pi$, and it satisfies the optimal Bellman equation: for $n \leq N_T$,

$$Q_{n+1}^{*\mu}(x,a) = r_{n+1}(x,a,\mu_{n+1}) + \mathbb{E}_{x',a'}[\max_a Q_n^{*\mu}(x',a')],$$

(2)

where $Q_{N+1}^n(\cdot,\cdot) = 0$.

### 2.3. Online Mirror Descent

The most straightforward method to compute a MFNE is to iteratively update in turn the policy $\pi$ and the distribution $\mu$, by respectively computing a BR and the induced mean field flow. The BR can be computed with the backward induction (1), iteratively update in turn the policy $\pi$, and it satisfies the optimal Bellman equation: for $n \leq N_T$,

$$Q_{n+1}^{*\mu}(x,a) = r_{n+1}(x,a,\mu_{n+1}) + \mathbb{E}_{x',a'}[\max_a Q_n^{*\mu}(x',a')],$$

(2)

where $Q_{N+1}^n(\cdot,\cdot) = 0$.

### 2.4. Deep Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement learning aims to solve optimal control problems when the agent does not know the model (i.e., $p$ and $r$) and must learn through trial and error by interacting with an environment. In a finite horizon MFG setting, we assume that a representative agent is encoded by a policy $\pi$, either explicitly or implicitly (through a $Q$-function) and can realize an episode, in the following sense: for $n = 0, \ldots, N_T$, the agent observes $x_n$ (with $x_0 \sim m_0$), chooses action $a_n \sim \pi_n(\cdot|x_n)$, and the environment returns a realization of $x_{n+1} \sim p_n(\cdot|x_n,a_n,\mu_n)$ and $r_n(x_n,a_n,\mu_n)$. Note that the agent does not need to observe directly the mean field flow $\mu_n$, which simply enters as a parameter of the transition and cost functions $p_n$ and $r_n$.

Based on such samples, the agent can approximately compute the $Q$-functions $Q^*_{\mu}$ and $Q^*_{\mu'}$ following (1) and (2) respectively where the expectation is replaced by Monte-Carlo samples. In practice, we often use trajectories starting from time 0 and state $x_0 \sim m_0$ instead of
When the state space is large, it becomes impossible to evaluate precisely every pair \((x, a)\). Vanilla RL considers infinite horizon, discounted problems and looks for a stationary policy, whereas we consider a finite-horizon setting with non-stationary policies. To simplify the implementation, we treat time as part of the state by considering \((n, x_n)\) as the state. We can then use standard \(Q\)-learning. However, it is important to keep in mind that the Bellman equations are not fixed-point equation for some stationary Bellman operators.

When the state space is large, it becomes impossible to evaluate precisely every pair \((x, a)\). Motivated by both memory efficiency and generalization, we can approximate the \(Q\)-functions by non linear functions such as neural networks, say \(Q_{\theta_1}^{\pi^1, \mu^1}\) and \(Q_{\theta_2}^{\pi^2, \mu^2}\), parameterized by \(\theta\). Then, the quantities in (1) and (2) are replaced by the minimization of a loss to train the neural network parameters \(\theta\). Namely, treating time as an input, one minimizes over \(\theta\) the quantities

\[
\hat{E} \left[ Q_{\theta_1}^{\pi^1, \mu^1}(x, a) - r_n(x, a, \mu_n) - Q_{\theta_1, n+1}(x', a') \right]^2,
\]

\[
\hat{E} \left[ Q_{\theta_2}^{\pi^2, \mu^2}(x, a) - r_n(x, a, \mu_n) - \max_{a'} Q_{\theta_2, n+1}^{\pi^2, \mu^2}(x', a') \right]^2,
\]

where \(\hat{E}\) is an empirical expectation based on Monte Carlo samples and \(\theta_t\) is the parameter of a target network.

3. Deep Reinforcement Learning for MFGs

To develop scalable methods for solving MFGs, a natural idea consists in combining in the above optimization methods (FP and OMD) with deep RL. This requires summing or averaging policies or distributions, and induces thereby a major challenge as they are approximated by non linear operators, such as neural networks. In this section, we develop innovative and scalable solutions to cope with this. In the sequel, we denote \(Q_{\theta_t}(n, x, a)\) with the time in the input when we refer to the neural network \(Q\)-function.

3.1. Deep Average-network Fictitious Play

To develop a model-free version of FP, one first needs to compute a BR at each iteration, which can be done using standard deep RL methods, such as DQN (Mnih et al., 2013). A policy that generates the average distribution over past iterations can be obtained by simply keeping in memory all the BRs from past iterations. This approach has already been used successfully e.g. by Perrin et al. (2020; 2021). However, it requires a memory that is linear in the number of iterations and each element is potentially large (e.g. a deep neural network), which does not scale well. Indeed, as the complexity of the environment grows, we expect FP to need more and more iterations to converge, and hence the need to keep track of a larger and larger number of policies.

An alternative approach is to learn along the way the policy generating the average distribution. We propose to do so by keeping a buffer of state-action pairs generated by past BRs and learning the average policy by minimizing a categorial loss. To tackle potentially complex environments, we rely on a neural network representation of the policy. This approach is inspired by the Neural Fictitious Self Play (NFSP) method (Heinrich and Silver, 2016), developed initially for imperfect information games with a finite number of players, and adapted here to the MFG setting. The proposed algorithm, that we call D-AFP because it learns an average policy, is summarized in Alg. 1. Details are in Appx. B.

This allows us to learn an approximation of the MFNE policy with a single neural network instead of having it indirectly through a collection of neural networks for past BRs. After training, we can use this neural average policy in a straightforward way. Although the buffer is not needed after training, a drawback of this method is that during the training it requires to keep a buffer whose size increases linearly with the number of iterations. This motivates us to investigate a modification of OMD which is not only empirically faster, but also less memory consuming.

3.2. Deep Munchausen Online Mirror Descent

We now turn our attention to the combination of OMD and deep RL. One could simply use RL for the policy evaluation step by estimating the \(Q\)-function using equation (1). However, it is not straightforward to train a neural network to approximate the cumulative \(Q\)-function. To that end, we propose a reparameterization allowing us to compute the cumulative \(Q\)-function in an implicit way, building on the Munchausen trick from Vieillard et al. (2020) for classical RL (with a single agent and no mean-field interactions).

**Algorithm 1 D-AFP**

1: Initialize an empty reservoir buffer \(\mathcal{M}_{SL}\) for supervised learning of average policy
2: Initialize the parameters \(\hat{\theta}^0\)
3: for \(k = 1, \ldots, K\) do
4: 1. **Distribution**: Generate \(\hat{\mu}^k\) with \(\pi_{\hat{\theta}^k-1}\)
5: 2. **BR**: Train \(\hat{\pi}_{\hat{\theta}^k}\) against \(\hat{\mu}^{k-1}\), e.g. using DQN
6: Collect \(N_{samples}\) state-action using \(\hat{\pi}_{\hat{\theta}^k}\) and add them to \(\mathcal{M}_{SL}\)
7: 3. **Average policy**: Update \(\pi_{\hat{\theta}^k}\) by adjusting \(\hat{\theta}^k\) (through gradient descent) to minimize:
8: \[
\mathcal{L}(\hat{\theta}) = \mathbb{E}_{(s,a) \sim \mathcal{M}_{SL}} [-\log (\pi_{\hat{\theta}}(a|s))],
\]
9: \(\hat{\pi}_{\hat{\theta}^k}\) is the neural net policy with parameters \(\hat{\theta}\)
10: end for
11: Return \(\hat{\mu}^K, \pi_{\hat{\theta}^K}\)
function $\tilde{q}$. However, this quantity $\tilde{q}$ is hard to approximate as there exists no straightforward way to sum up neural networks. We note that this summation is done by Perolat et al. (2021) via the use of the NeuRD loss. However, this approach relies on two types of approximations, as one must learn the correct $Q$-function, but also the correct sum. This is why we instead transform the OMD formulation into Munchausen OMD, which only relies on one type of approximation. We start by describing this reparameterization in the exact case, i.e., without function approximation. We show that, in this case, the two formulations are equivalent.

We consider the following modified Bellman equation:

$$
\begin{align*}
Q_{n+1}^{k+1}(x,a) &= 0 \\
Q_{n+1}^{k+1}(x,a) &= r(x,a,\mu_{n-1}^k) + \tau \ln \pi_{n-1}^k(a|x) \\
&\quad + \mathbb{E}_{x',a'}[Q_n^{k+1}(x',a') - \tau \ln \pi_n^{k}(a'|x')] ,
\end{align*}
$$

(3)

where $x' \sim p_{n}^{0}(\cdot|x,a,\mu_{n-1}^k)$ and $a' \sim \pi_{n}^{k}(\cdot|x')$. The red term penalizes the policy for deviating from the one in the previous iteration, $\pi_{n-1}^k$, while the blue term compensates for this change in the backward induction, as we will explain in the proof of Thm 3.1 below.

The Munchausen OMD (MOMD) algorithm for MFG is as follows: after initializing $\pi^0$, repeat for $k \geq 0$:

- Distribution update: $\mu^k = \mu^k e^k$
- Regularized $Q$-function update: $Q_{n}^{k+1}$ as in (3)
- Policy update: $\pi_{n}^{k+1}(\cdot|x) = \text{softmax}(\frac{1}{\tau}Q_{n}^{k+1}(x,\cdot))$.

**Theorem 3.1.** MOMD is equivalent to OMD in the sense that $\pi^k = \pi^k$ for every $k$.

As a consequence, despite seemingly artificial log terms, this method does not bias the Nash equilibrium (in contrast with, e.g., Cui and Koeppl (2021) and Xie et al. (2021)). Thanks to this result, MOMD enjoys the same convergence guarantees as OMD, see (Hadikhanloo, 2017; Perolat et al., 2022).

**Proof.** Step 1: Softmax transform. We first replace this projection by an equivalent viewpoint based on the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, denoted by $KL(\cdot||\cdot)$. We will write $Q_{n}^{k+1} = Q_n^{k+1} - \mu_n^{k-1}$ for short and $Q_n^0 = \mu_n^{0}$. We have $\mu_n^{0} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=0}^{T} Q_n^{t}$. We take $\pi_n^{0}$ as the uniform policy over actions, in order to have a precise equivalence with the following for $\tilde{q}_n^{0} = 0$. We could consider any $\pi_n^{0}$ with full support, up to a change of initialization $\tilde{q}_n^{0}$. We have:

$$
\begin{align*}
\pi_{n}^{k+1}(\cdot|x) &= \text{softmax}\left(\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t=0}^{k+1} Q_n^{t}(\cdot|x)\right) \\
&= \arg\max_{\pi \in \Delta_A} \left(\langle \pi, Q_n^{k+1}(x,\cdot) \rangle - \tau KL(\pi||\pi_n^{k}(\cdot|x)\rangle) \right),
\end{align*}
$$

(4)

where $\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle$ denotes the dot product.

Indeed, this can be checked by induction, using the Legendre-Fenchel transform: omitting $n$ and $x$ for brevity,

$$
\begin{align*}
\pi_{n}^{k+1} &\propto e^{\frac{1}{\tau} Q_{n}^{k+1}} \\
&\propto e^{\frac{1}{\tau} Q_{n}^{k} + \frac{1}{\tau} Q_{n}^{k+1}} = e^{\frac{1}{\tau} (Q_{n}^{k} + Q_{n}^{k+1})} \\
&\propto \ldots \propto e^{\frac{1}{\tau} Q_{n}^{k}}.
\end{align*}
$$

**Step 2: Munchausen trick.** Simplifying a bit notations,

$$
\begin{align*}
\pi_{n}^{k+1} &= \arg\max_{\pi} (\langle \pi, Q_n^{k+1} \rangle - \tau KL(\pi||\pi_n^{k})) \\
&= \arg\max_{\pi} (\langle \pi, Q_n^{k+1} + \tau \ln \pi_n^{k} \rangle - \tau (\langle \pi, \ln \pi_n^{k} \rangle) \\
&= \text{softmax} \left(\frac{1}{\tau} \tilde{Q}_{n}^{k+1} \right)
\end{align*}
$$

(4)

where $H$ denotes the entropy and we defined $\tilde{Q}_{n}^{k+1} = Q_n^{k+1} + \tau \ln \pi_n^{k}$. Since $Q_n^{k+1}$ satisfies the Bellman equation (1) with $\tilde{Q}$ replaced by $\pi_n^{k}$ and $\mu$ replaced by $\mu_n^k$, we deduce that $\tilde{Q}_{n}^{k+1}$ satisfies (3).

**Remark:** In OMD, $\frac{1}{\tau}$ (denoted $\alpha$ in the original paper (Perolat et al., 2022)), is homogeneous to a learning rate. In the MOMD formulation, $\tau$ can be seen as a temperature.

**Stabilizing trick.** We have shown that MOMD is equivalent to OMD. However, the above version of Munchausen sometimes exhibits numerical instabilities. This is because, if an action $a$ is suboptimal in a state $x$, then $\pi_n^{k}(a|x) \to 0$ as $k \to +\infty$, so $Q_n^{k}(x,a)$ diverges to $-\infty$ due to the relation $Q_n^{k+1} = Q_n^{k+1} + \tau \ln \pi_n^{k}$.

This causes issues even in the tabular setting when we get close to a Nash equilibrium, due to numerical errors on very large numbers. To avoid this issue, we introduce another parameter, denoted by $\alpha \in [0,1]$ and we consider the following modified Munchausen equation:

$$
\begin{align*}
\tilde{Q}_{n+1}^{k+1}(x,a) &= r_{n+1}(x,a,\mu_{n-1}^k) + \alpha \tau \log(\pi_{n}^{k}(a|x)) \\
&\quad + \mathbb{E}_{x',a'}[\tilde{Q}_{n}^{k+1}(x',a') - \tau \ln \pi_n^{k}(a'|x')],
\end{align*}
$$

(5)

where $x' \sim p_n^{0}(\cdot|x,a,\mu_{n-1}^k)$ and $a' \sim \pi_n^{k}(\cdot|x')$. In fact, such iterations have a natural interpretation as they can be obtained by applying OMD to a regularized problem in which, when using policy $\pi$, a penalty $-\frac{1}{\tau} \log(\pi_n^{k}(a|x))$ is added to the reward $r_n(x,a,\alpha_n,\mu_n)$. Details are provided in Appx. C.

**Deep RL version.** Motivated by problems with large spaces, we then replace the Munchausen $Q$-function at iteration $k$, namely $\tilde{Q}_n^k$, by a neural network whose parameters $\theta_n^k$ are trained to minimize a loss function representing (5).
Since we want to learn a function of time, we consider \((n, x)\) to be the state. To be specific, given samples of transitions

\[
\{(n_i, x_i), a_i, r_{n_i}(x_i, a_i, \mu_{n_i}^{k}), (n_i + 1, x'_i)\}_{i=1}^{N_B},
\]

with \(x'_i \sim p_{n_i}(x_i, a_i, \mu_{n_i}^{k})\), the parameter \(\theta^k\) is trained using stochastic gradient descent to minimize the empirical loss:

\[
\frac{1}{N_B} \sum_i \left| Q_\theta((n_i, x_i), a_i) - T_i \right|^2,
\]

where the target \(T_i\) is:

\[
T_i = -r_{n_i}(x_i, a_i, \mu_{n_i}^{k}) - \alpha r \log(\pi^{k-1}(a_i|(n_i, x_i))) - \sum_{a'} \pi^{k-1}(a'|n_i + 1, x'_i) \left[ Q_{\theta^{k-1}}((n_i + 1, x'_i), a') - \tau \log(\pi^{k-1}(a'|n_i + 1, x'_i)) \right].
\]

Here the time \(n\) is passed as an input to the \(Q\)-network along with \(x\), hence our change of notation. This way of learning the Munchausen \(Q\)-function is similar to DQN, except for two changes in the target: (1) it incorporates the penalization for deviating from the previous policy, and (2) we do not take the argmax over the next action but an average according to the previous policy. A simplified version of the algorithm is presented in Alg. 2 and more details are provided in Appx. B.

**Algorithm 2 D-MOMD**

1. **Input:** Munchausen parameters \(\tau\) and \(\alpha\), numbers of OMD iterations \(K\) and DQN estimation iterations \(L\)
2. **Output:** cumulated \(Q\) value function, policy \(\pi\)
3. Initialize the parameters \(\theta^0\)
4. Set \(\pi^0(a|(n, x)) = \text{softmax}\left(\frac{1}{\tau} Q_{\theta^0}(n, x, \cdot)\right)(a)\)
5. for \(k = 1, \ldots, K\) do
6. 1. **Distribution:** Generate \(\mu^k\) with \(\pi^{k-1}\)
7. 2. **Value function:** Initialize \(\theta^k\)
8. for \(\ell = 1, \ldots, L\) do
9. Sample a minibatch of \(N_B\) transitions:
   \[
   \left\{\left(n_i, x_i), a_i, r_{n_i}(x_i, a_i, \mu_{n_i}^{k}), (n_i + 1, x'_i)\right\}_{i=1}^{N_B}
   \]
   with \(n_i \leq N_T, x'_i \sim p_{n_i}(x_i, a_i, \mu_{n_i}^{k})\) and \(a_i\) is chosen by an \(\epsilon\)-greedy policy based on \(Q_{\theta^k}\)
10. Update \(\theta^k\) with one gradient step of:
    \[
    \theta \mapsto \theta - \frac{1}{N_B} \sum_{i=1}^{N_B} \left| Q_\theta((n_i, x_i), a_i) - T_i \right|^2
    \]
    where \(T_i\) is defined in (6)
11. end for
12. 3. **Policy:** for all \(n, x, a\), let
    \[
    \pi^k(a|(n, x)) = \text{softmax}\left(\frac{1}{\tau} Q_{\theta^k}(n, x, \cdot)\right)(a)
    \]
13. end for
14. Return \(Q_{\theta^K}, \pi^K\)

**4. Experiments**

In this section, we first discuss the metric used to assess quality of learning, detail baselines to which we compare our algorithms, and finally present numerical results on diverse and numerous environments. The code for Deep Munchausen OMD is available in OpenSpiel (Lanctot et al., 2019).1

**4.1. Exploitability**

To assess the quality of a learnt equilibrium, we check whether, in response to the reward generated by the population MF flow, a typical player can improve their reward by deviating from the policy used by the rest of the population. This is formalized through the notion of exploitability. The exploitability of a policy \(\pi\) is defined as:

\[
\mathcal{E}(\pi) = \max_{\pi'} J(\pi'; \mu^\pi) - J(\pi; \mu^\pi),
\]

where \(\mu^\pi\) is the mean field flow generated from \(m_0\) when using policy \(\pi\). Intuitively a large exploitability means that, when the population plays \(\pi\), any individual player can be much better off by deviating and choosing a different strategy, so \(\pi\) is far from being a Nash equilibrium policy. Conversely, an exploitability of 0 means that \(\pi\) is an MFNE policy. Similar notions are widely used in computational game theory (Zinkevich et al., 2007; Lanctot et al., 2009).

In the sequel, we consider problems for which a BR can be computed exactly given a mean-field flow. Otherwise an approximate exploitability could be used as a good proxy to assess convergence, see e.g. Perrin et al. (2021).

**4.2. Baselines**

To assess the quality of the proposed algorithms, we consider three baselines from the literature: Banach-Picard (BP) fixed point iterations, policy iterations (PI), and Boltzmann iterations (BI). FP can be viewed as a modification of the first one, while OMD as a modification of the second one. They have been discussed at the beginning of Sec. 2.2 and Sec. 2.3 respectively, in the exact case. Adapting them to the model-free setting with deep networks can be done in a similar way as discussed above for D-AFP and D-MOMD. See Appx. B for more details. The third baseline has been introduced recently by Cui and Koeppl (2021). It consists in updating in turn the population distribution and the policy, but here the policy is computed as a weighted softmax of the optimal \(Q\)-values (and hence requires the resolution of an MDP at each iteration). More precisely, given a reference policy \(\pi_B\), a parameter \(\eta > 0\), and the \(Q\)-function \(Q^k\)

1See https://github.com/deepmind/open_spiel/blob/master/open_spiel/python/mfg/algorithms/munchausen_deep_mirror_descent.py.
computed at iteration $k$, the new policy is defined as:
\[
\pi^k_n(a|x) = \frac{\pi_{B,n}(a|x) \exp \left( Q^k_n(x,a)/\eta \right)}{\sum_{a'} \pi_{B,n}(a'|x) \exp \left( Q^k_n(x,a')/\eta \right)}.
\]
In the plots, D-BP, D-AFP, D-PI, D-BI and D-MOMD refer respectively to Deep Banach-Picard iterations, Deep Average-network Fictitious Play, Deep Policy Iteration, Deep Boltzmann Iteration, and Deep Munchausen OMD.

4.3. Numerical results

Epidemics model. We first consider the SIS model of Cui and Koeppl (2021), which is a toy model for epidemics. There are two states: susceptible (S) and infected (I). Two actions can be used: social distancing (D) or going out (U). The probability of getting infected increases if more people are infected, and is smaller when using D instead of U. The transitions are:
\[
p(S|I,D,\mu) = p(S|I,U,\mu) = 0.3, \\
p(I|S,U,\mu) = 0.9^2 \cdot \mu(I), \\
p(I|S,D,\mu) = 0,
\]
where $\mu(s) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-s}}$. The reward is:
\[
\rho(s,a,\mu) = -I(s) - 0.5 \cdot D(s),
\]
and the horizon is $N_T = 50$. Note that, although this model has only two states, the state dynamics is impacted by the distribution, which is generally challenging when computing MFG solutions. As shown in Fig. 1, both D-MOMD and D-AFP generate an exploitability diminishing with the learning steps, whereas the other baselines are not able to do so. Besides, D-MOMD generates smooth state trajectories, as opposed to the one observed in Cui and Koeppl (2021), that contained many oscillations. For this example and the following ones, we display the best exploitability curves obtained for each method after running sweeps over hyperparameters. See Appx. D for some instances of sweeps for D-MOMD.

![Figure 1](image1.png)

**Figure 1.** Left: exploitability. Right: evolution of the distribution obtained by the policy learnt with D-MOMD.

Linear-Quadratic MFG. We then consider an example with more states, in 1D: the classical linear-quadratic environment of Carmona et al. (2015), which admits an explicit closed form solution in a continuous space-time domain. We focus on a discretized approximation (Perrin et al., 2020) of the time grid \(\{0, \ldots, N_T\}\), where the dynamics of the underlying state process controlled by action $a_n$ is given by $x_{n+1} = x_n + a_n \Delta_n + \sigma \epsilon_n \sqrt{\Delta_n}$, with $\epsilon_n$ a vector of $N$ i.i.d. noises on $\{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$, truncated approximations of $N(0, 1)$ random variables. Given a set of actions $(a_n)_n$, in state trajectory $(x_n)_n$ and a mean field flow $(\mu_n)_n$, the reward $r(x_n, a_n, \mu_n)$ of a representative player is given for $n < N_T$ by
\[
\left[ -\frac{1}{2} |a_n|^2 + q a_n (\bar{m}_n - x_n) - \frac{\kappa}{2} |\bar{m}_n - x_n|^2 \right] \Delta_n,
\]
where $\epsilon_n$ is the noise term. For the experiments, we used $N_T = 10$, $\sigma = 1$, $\kappa = 0.5$, and $N = 100$. The action space is $\{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$.

In Figure 2 (top), we see that the distribution estimated by D-MOMD concentrates, as is expected from the reward encouraging a mean-reverting behavior: the population gathers as expected into a bell-shaped distribution. The analytical solution (Appx. E in (Perrin et al., 2020)) is exact in a continuous setting (i.e., when the step sizes in time, state and action go to 0) but only approximate in the discrete one considered here. Hence, we choose instead to use the distribution estimated by exact tabular OMD as a benchmark, as it reaches an exploitability of $10^{-12}$ in our experiments. Figure 2 (bottom right) shows that the Wasserstein distance between the learnt distribution by D-MOMD and the benchmark decreases as the learning occurs. In Figure 2 (bottom left), we see that D-MOMD and D-AFP outperform other methods in minimizing exploitability.

![Figure 2](image2.png)

**Figure 2.** Top: Evolution of the distribution generated by the policy learnt by D-MOMD. Bottom left: Exploitability of different algorithms on the Linear Quadratic environment. Bottom right: Wasserstein distance between the solution learnt by D-MOMD and the benchmark one, over its iterations.
Exploration. We now increase the state dimension and turn our attention to a 2-dimensional grid world example. The state is the position. An action is a move, and valid moves are: left, right, up, down, or stay, as long as the agent does not hit a wall. In the experiments, we consider $10 \times 10$ states and a time horizon of $N_T = 40$ time steps. The reward is: $r(x, a, \mu) = r_{\text{pop}}(\mu(x))$, where $r_{\text{pop}}(\mu(x)) = -\log(\mu(x))$ discourages being in a crowded area – which is referred to as crowd aversion. Note that $\mathbb{E}_{x \sim \mu}(r_{\text{pop}}(\mu(x))) = \mathcal{H}(\mu)$, i.e., the last term of the reward provides, in expectation, the entropy of the distribution. This setting is inspired by the one considered by Geist et al. (2022). The results are shown in Fig. 3. D-MOMD and D-AFP outperform all the baselines. The induced distribution matches our intuition: it spreads symmetrically until filling almost uniformly the four rooms.

Crowd modeling with congestion. We consider the same environment but with a maze, and a more complex reward function:

$$r(x, a, \mu) = r_{\text{pos}}(x) + r_{\text{move}}(a, \mu(x)) + r_{\text{pop}}(\mu(x)),$$

where $r_{\text{pos}}(x) = -\text{dist}(x, x_{\text{ref}})$ is the distance to a target position $x_{\text{ref}}$, $r_{\text{move}}(a, \mu(x)) = -\mu(x)\|a\|$ is a penalty for moving ($\|a\| = 1$) which increases with the density $\mu(x)$ at $x$ – which is called congestion effect in the literature. The state space has $20 \times 20$ states, and the time horizon is $N_T = 100$. We see in Fig. 4 that D-MOMD outperforms the other methods.

Multi-population chasing. We finally turn to an extension of the MFG framework, where agents are heterogeneous: each type of agent has its own dynamics and reward function. The environment can be extended to model multiple populations by simply extending the state space to include the population index on top of the agent’s position. Following Perolat et al. (2022), we consider three populations and rewards of the form: for population $i = 1, 2, 3$,

$$r^i(x, a, \mu^1, \mu^2, \mu^3) = -\log(\mu^i(x)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \mu^j(x) \bar{r}^{i,j}(x),$$

where $\bar{r}^{i,j} = -\bar{r}^{j,i}$, with $\bar{r}^{1,2} = -1, \bar{r}^{1,3} = 1, \bar{r}^{2,3} = -1$. In the experiments, there are $5 \times 5$ states and the time horizon is $N_T = 10$ time steps. The initial distributions are in the corners, the number of agents of each population is fixed, and the reward encourages the agent to chase the population it dominates and flee the dominating one. We see in Fig. 5 that D-AFP outperform the baselines and D-MOMD performs even better.

Figure 3. Top: exploitability. Bottom: evolution of the distribution obtained by the policy learnt with D-MOMD.

Figure 4. Maze example. Top: exploitability. Bottom: evolution of the distribution obtained by the policy learnt with D-MOMD.

Figure 5. Multi-population chasing example. Top: Exploitability. Bottom: evolution of the distributions for the three populations.

5. Conclusion

In this work, we proposed two scalable algorithms that can compute Nash equilibria in various MFGs in the finite horizon setting. The first one, D-AFP, is the first implementation of Fictitious Play for MFGs that does not need to keep all
previous best responses in memory and that learns an average policy with a single neural network. The second one, D-MOMD, takes advantage of a subtle reparameterization to learn implicitly a sum of $Q$-functions usually required in the Online Mirror Descent algorithm. We demonstrated numerically that they both perform well on five benchmark problems and that D-MOMD consistently performs better than D-AFP as well as three baselines from the literature.

**Related Work.** Only a few works try to learn Nash equilibria in non-stationary MFGs. Guo et al. (2020) establish the existence and uniqueness of dynamic Nash equilibrium under strict regularity assumptions in their Section 9, but their RL and numerical experiments are restricted to the stationary setting. Perolat et al. (2022) prove that continuous-time OMD converges to the Nash equilibrium in monotone MFGs, supported by numerical experiments involving trillions of states; however, their approach is purely based on the model and not RL. Mishra et al. (2020) propose an RL-based sequential approach to dynamic MFG, but this method relies on functions of the distribution, which is not scalable when the state space is large. Perrin et al. (2020) prove the convergence of FP for monotone MFGs and provide experimental results with model-free methods ($Q$-learning); however, they avoid the difficulty of mixing policies by relying on tabular representations for small environments. Cui and Koeppl (2021) propose a deep RL method with regularization to learn Nash equilibria in finite horizon MFGs; however, the regularization biases the equilibrium and they were not able to make it converge in complex examples, whereas D-MOMD outperforms the baselines in all the games we considered. Perrin et al. (2022) and Perrin et al. (2021) use another version of FP with neural networks, but their approach needs to keep in memory all the BRs learnt during the iterations, which cannot scale to complex MFGs. In our D-OMD algorithm the policy is computed using a softmax, which is reminiscent of maximum entropy RL methods (Todorov, 2008; Toussaint, 2009; Rawlik et al., 2012) which led to efficient deep RL methods such as soft actor critic (Haarnoja et al., 2018). However there is a crucial difference: here we use a KL divergence with respect to the previous policy, as can be seen in (4).

**Future work.** We would like to include more complex examples, with larger state spaces or even continuous spaces. Continuous state spaces should be relatively easy to address, as neural networks can handle continuous inputs, while continuous actions would require some adjustments particularly to compute $\text{argmax}$ or softmax of $Q$-functions. Furthermore continuous spaces require manipulating continuous population distributions, raising additional questions related to how to represent and estimate them efficiently.

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Algorithm 3 Forward update for the distribution

1: **Parameter:** policy \( \pi = (\pi_n)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T} \)
2: **Output:** mean field flow \( \mu = (\mu_n)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T} = \mu^\pi = (\mu_n^\pi)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T} \)
3: Let \( \mu_0 = m_0 \)
4: for \( n = 1, \ldots, N_T \) do
5: \( \mu_n = P_{n-1}^{\mu_{n-1}, \pi_{n-1}} \mu_{n-1} \)
6: end for
7: Return \( \mu = (\mu_n)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T} \)

Algorithm 4 Backward induction for the value function evaluation

1: **Parameters:** policy \( \pi = (\pi_n)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T} \), mean field flow \( \mu = (\mu_n)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T} \)
2: **Output:** state-action value function \( Q^\pi,\mu \)
3: Let \( Q_{N_T}(x, a) = r_{N_T}(x, a, \mu_{N_T}) \)
4: for \( n = N_T - 1, \ldots, 0 \) do
5: Compute
\[
Q_n(x, a) = r_n(x, a, \mu_n) + \mathbb{E}_{x' \sim p_n(\cdot | x, a, \mu_n), a' \sim \pi_n(\cdot | x')} [Q_{n+1}(x', a')] \\
\text{where the expectation is computed in an exact way using the knowledge of the transition:}
\]
\[
\mathbb{E}[Q_{n+1}(x', a')] = \sum_{x'} p_n(x' | x, a, \mu_n) \sum_{a'} \pi_{n+1}(a' | x') Q_{n+1}(x', a')
\]
6: end for
7: Return \( Q = (Q_n)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T} \)

A. Algorithms in the exact case

In this section we present algorithms to compute MFG equilibria when the model is fully known.

A.1. Subroutines

The distribution computation for a given policy \( \pi \) is described in Alg. 3 using forward (in time) iterations. The evaluation of the state-action value function for a given policy \( \pi \) and mean field flow \( \mu \) is described in Alg. 4. The computation of the optimal value function \( Q^*_{\mu} \) for a given \( \mu \) is described in Alg. 5. A best response against \( \mu \) can be obtained by running this algorithm and then taking an optimizer of \( Q_n^*_{\mu}(x, \cdot) \) for each \( n, x \).

Algorithm 5 Backward induction for the optimal value function

1: **Parameters:** mean field flow \( \mu = (\mu_n)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T} \)
2: **Output:** optimal state-action value function \( Q^*_{\mu} \)
3: Let \( Q_{N_T}(x, a) = r_{N_T}(x, a, \mu_{N_T}) \)
4: for \( n = N_T - 1, \ldots, 0 \) do
5: Compute
\[
Q_n(x, a) = r_n(x, a, \mu_n) + \mathbb{E}_{x' \sim p_n(\cdot | x, a, \mu_n)} [\max_{a' \in A} Q_{n+1}(x', a')] \\
\text{where the expectation is computed in an exact way using the knowledge of the transition } p_n
\]
6: end for
7: **Output:** \( Q = (Q_n)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T} \)
A.2. Main algorithms with fully known model

Banach-Picard Fixed point iterations are presented in Alg. 6. Fictitious Play is described in Alg. 7. Policy iteration (for MFG) is presented in Alg. 8. Online Mirror Descent is described in Alg. 9.

Algorithm 6 Banach-Picard (BP) fixed point
1: Input: Number of iterations $K$; optional softmax temperature $\eta$
2: Initialize $\pi^0$
3: for $k = 0, \ldots, K$ do
4:   Forward update: Compute $\mu^k = \mu^{k-1}$, e.g. using Alg. 3 with $\pi = \pi^{k-1}$
5:   Best response computation: Compute a BR $\pi^k$ against $\mu^k$, e.g. by computing $Q^*\mu^k$ using Alg. 5 with $\mu = \mu^k$ and then taking $\pi^k_n(\cdot|x)$ as a(ny) distribution over $\arg\max Q^*_n\mu^k(x, \cdot)$ for every $n, x$; alternatively, compute a soft version: $\pi^k_n(\cdot|x) = \text{softmax}(Q^*_n\mu^k(x, \cdot)/\eta)$
6: end for
7: Output: $\mu^K = (\mu^K_n)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T}$ and policy $\pi^K = (\pi^K_n)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T}$

Algorithm 7 Fictitious Play (FP)
1: Input: Number of iterations $K$
2: Initialize $\pi^0$
3: for $k = 0, \ldots, K$ do
4:   Forward update: Compute $\mu^k = \mu^{k-1}$, e.g. using Alg. 3 with $\pi = \pi^{k-1}$
5:   Average distribution update: Compute $\bar{\mu}^k_n(x)$ as the average of $(\mu^0, \ldots, \mu^k)$:

$$\bar{\mu}^k_n(x) = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \mu^i_n(x) = \frac{k-1}{k} \bar{\mu}^{k-1}_n(x) + \frac{1}{k} \mu^k_n(x)$$

6:   Best response computation: Compute a BR $\pi^k$ against $\bar{\mu}^k$, e.g. by computing $Q^*\bar{\mu}^k$ using Alg. 5 and then taking $\pi^k_n(\cdot|x)$ as a(ny) distribution over $\arg\max Q^*_n\bar{\mu}^k(x, \cdot)$ for every $n, x$
7: end for
8: Output: $\bar{\mu}^K = (\bar{\mu}^K_n)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T}$ and policy $\bar{\pi}^K = (\bar{\pi}^K_n)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T}$ generating this mean field flow
Algorithm 8 Policy Iteration (PI)

1: **Parameters:** softmax temperature $\eta$; number of iterations $K$
2: Initialize the sequence of tables $(\bar{q}^0_n)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T}$, e.g. with $\bar{q}^0_n(x,a) = 0$ for all $n,x,a$
3: Let the projected policy be: $\pi^0_n(a|x) = \text{softmax}(\bar{q}^0_n(x,\cdot)/\eta)(a)$ for all $n,x,a$
4: **for** $k = 1,\ldots,K$ **do**
5: Forward Update: Compute $\mu^k = \mu^{\pi^{k-1}}$, e.g. using Alg. 3 with $\pi = \pi^{k-1}$
6: Backward Update: Compute $Q^k = Q^{\pi^{k-1},\mu^k}$, e.g. using backward induction Alg. 4 with $\pi = \pi^{k-1}$ and $\mu = \mu^k$ and then let $\pi^k_n(\cdot|x)$ be a(ny) distribution over $\text{argmax} Q^*_n(x,\cdot)$ for every $n,x$; alternatively, compute a soft version: $\pi^k_n(\cdot|x) = \text{softmax}(Q^k_n(x,\cdot)/\eta)$
7: **end for**
8: **Output:** $Q^K_n, \pi^K$

Algorithm 9 Online Mirror Descent (OMD)

1: **Parameters:** inverse learning rate parameter $\tau$; number of iterations $K$
2: Initialize the sequence of tables $(\bar{q}^0_n)_{n=0,\ldots,N_T}$, e.g. with $\bar{q}^0_n(x,a) = 0$ for all $n,x,a$
3: Let the projected policy be: $\pi^0_n(a|x) = \text{softmax}(\bar{q}^0_n(x,\cdot))(a)$ for all $n,x,a$
4: **for** $k = 1,\ldots,K$ **do**
5: Forward Update: Compute $\mu^k = \mu^{\pi^{k-1}}$, e.g. using Alg. 3 with $\pi = \pi^{k-1}$
6: Backward Update: Compute $Q^k = Q^{\pi^{k-1},\mu^k}$, e.g. using backward induction Alg. 4 with $\pi = \pi^{k-1}$ and $\mu = \mu^k$ and then update the regularized $Q$-function and the projected policy: for all $n,x,a$,
\[
\bar{q}^k_n(x,a) = \bar{q}^{k-1}_n(x,a) + \frac{1}{\tau}Q^k_n(x,a)
\]
\[
\pi^k_n(a|x) = \text{softmax}(\bar{q}^k_n(x,\cdot))(a)
\]
7: **end for**
8: Return $\bar{q}^K, \pi^K$
B. Deep RL Algorithms

We now present details on the deep RL algorithms used or developed in this paper. In this work, we focus on the use of deep RL for policy computation from the point of view of a representative agent. We assume that this agent has access to an oracle that can return $r_n(x_n, a_n, \mu_n)$ and a sample of $p_n(|x_n, a_n, \mu_n)$ when the agent follows is in state $x_n$ and uses action $a_n$. In fact, the collection of samples is split into episodes. At each episode, the agent start from some $x_0$ sampled from $m_0$. Then it evolves by following the current policy, and the transitions are added to a replay buffer.

In order to focus on the errors due to the deep RL algorithm, we assume that the distribution is updated in an exact way a priori. In fact, the collection of samples is split into episodes. At each episode, the agent start from some $x_0$ sampled from $m_0$. Then it evolves by following the current policy, and the transitions are added to a replay buffer.

For the Deep RL part, the approaches can be summarized as follows:

- Alg. 4: Intuitively, he updates are replaced by stochastic gradient steps so as to minimize the following loss with respect to $\theta$:
  \[
  Q_\theta((n, x_n), a_n) - r_n(x_n, a_n, \mu_n) - \mathbb{E}_{x_{n+1}\sim p_n(|x_n, a_n, \mu_n), a'_{n+1}\sim \pi_{n+1}(|x_{n+1}')} [q((n+1, x_{n+1}'), a')]^2,
  \]
  where $\mathbb{E}$ denotes an empirical expectation over a finite number of samples picked from the replay buffer and $q$ is replaced by a target network $Q_{\theta'}$ whose parameters are frozen while training $\theta$ and that are updated less frequently than $\theta$. Combined with Policy Iteration (Alg. 8), this leads to the algorithm referred to as Deep Policy Iteration (D-PI).

- Alg. 5: We can proceed similarly, except that the target becomes:
  \[
  r_n(x_n, a_n, \mu_n) + \mathbb{E}_{x_{n+1}\sim p_n(|x_n, a_n, \mu_n), a'_{n+1}\sim \pi_{n+1}(|x_{n+1}')} \max_{a'} q((n+1, x_{n+1}'), a').
  \]

In fact, in our implementation we use DQN (Mnih et al., 2013) as a subroutine for the BR computation. Combined with Banach-Picard iterations (Alg. 6), this leads directly to the algorithm referred to as Deep Banach-Picard (D-BP).

- To obtain Deep Average-network Fictitious Play (D-AFP) (Algo. 1), at each iteration, the best response against the current distribution is learnt using DQN (Mnih et al., 2013). This policy is used to generate trajectories, whose state-action samples are added to a reservoir buffer $M_{SL}$. This buffer stores state-actions generated using past policies from previous iterations. Then, an auxiliary neural network for the logits representing the average policy is trained using supervised learning using $M_{SL}$: stochastic gradient is used to find $\tilde{\theta}$ minimizing approximately the loss:
  \[
  \mathcal{L}(\tilde{\theta}) = \mathbb{E}_{(s,a)\sim M_{SL}} \left[ -\log (\bar{\pi}_\theta(a|s)) \right]
  \]

In our implementation, for the representation of the average policy, we use a neural network $\bar{\ell}_a$ with parameters $\omega$ for the logits, and then we compute the policy as: $\bar{\pi} = \text{softmax}(\bar{\ell}_a)$. This step is reminiscent of Neural Fictitious Self Play (NFSP) introduced in Heinrich and Silver (2016), which was used to solve Leduc poker and Limit Texas Hold’em poker. However, the overall algorithm is different. Indeed, in NFSP as described in Algorithm 1 of Heinrich and Silver (2016), the neural network for the average policy and the neural network for the Q-function are both updated at each iteration. We reuse the idea of having a buffer of past actions but in our case, between each update of the average policy network, we do two operations: first, we update the mean field (sequence of population distributions) and second, we learn a best response against this mean field.

- To obtain Deep Munchausen Online Mirror Descent (D-MOMD) (Algo. 2), we can simply modify the target in (7) as follows:
  \[
  Q_\theta((n, x_n), a_n) - r_n(x_n, a_n, \mu_n) - \tau \ln \pi_{n-1}(a_n|x_n) \]
  \[
  - \mathbb{E}_{x'_{n+1}\sim p_n(|x_n, a_n, \mu_n), a'_{n+1}\sim \pi_{n+1}(|x_{n+1}')} \sum_{a'} \pi_n(a'|x_n) q((n+1, x_{n+1}'), a', a'_{n+1}) - \tau \ln \pi_{n}(a'|x_{n+1}'))^2,
  \]
  where $q = Q_{\theta'}$ is a target network whose parameters $\theta'$ are frozen while training $\theta$. This is similar to equation (7) of Vieillard et al. (2020) which introduced the Munchausen RL method. However, in our case the distribution $\mu_n$ appears in the reward $r_n$ and in the transition leading to the new state $x'_{n+1}$. So while Vieillard et al. (2020) simply repeatedly update the Q-network, we intertwine the updates of the cumulative Q-network with the updates of the population distribution.
C. Details on the link between MOMD and regularized MDPs

Consider regularizing the MFG with only entropy, that is
\[ J(\pi, \mu) = \mathbb{E}_\pi \left[ \sum_{n=0}^{N_T} (r_n(s_n, a_n, \mu_n) - (1 - \alpha) \tau \ln \pi_n(a_n|s_n)) \right]. \] (8)

Notice that we choose \((1 - \alpha) \tau\) here because it will simplify later, but it would work with any temperature (or learning rate from the OMD perspective).

Now, let’s solve this MFG with OMD with learning rate \((\alpha \tau)^{-1}\), adopting the KL perspective. The corresponding algorithm is:
\[
\begin{aligned}
\pi_{n+1}^{k+1} &\in \text{argmax} \langle \pi_n^k, q_n^k \rangle - \alpha \tau \text{KL}(\pi_n^k || \pi_n^{k+1}) + (1 - \alpha) \tau \mathcal{H}(\pi_n) \\
q_{n+1}^{k+1} &= r_{n+1}^{k+1} + \gamma P \langle \pi_{n+1}^{k+1}, q_{n+1}^{k+1} \rangle - (1 - \alpha) \tau \ln \pi_{n+1}^{k+1}
\end{aligned}
\] (9, 10)

Next, using \(Q_n^k = q_n^k + \alpha \tau \ln \pi_n^k\), we can rewrite the evaluation part as:
\[
\begin{aligned}
\pi_{n+1}^{k+1} &= \text{softmax} \left( \frac{Q_n^k}{\tau} \right) \\
Q_n^{k+1} &= r_{n+1}^{k+1} + \alpha \ln \pi_{n+1}^{k+1} + \gamma P \langle \pi_{n+1}^{k+1}, Q_{n+1}^{k+1} \rangle - \tau \ln \pi_{n+1}^{k+1}
\end{aligned}
\] (11, 12)

We remark that it corresponds to the “scaled” version of Munchausen OMD, meaning that it amounts to solving the MFG regularized with \((1 - \alpha) \tau \mathcal{H}(\pi)\) with OMD. We retrieve with \(\alpha = 1\) the unscaled version of Munchausen OMD, addressing the unregularized MFG. It also makes a connection with the Boltzmann iteration method of Cui and Koeppl (2021), in which a similar penalization except that the penalty involves a fixed policy instead of using the current policy. Their prior descent method, in which the reference policy is updated from time to time, can thus be viewed as a first step towards Munchausen OMD.
D. Hyperparameters sweeps

Figure 6. D-MOMD, Exploration game with four rooms: Sweep over the network size. The neural network architecture is feedforward fully connected with one or two hidden layers, except for the curve with label [], which refers to a linear function. This illustrates in particular that the policy cannot be well approximated using only linear functions, hence the need for non-linear approximations, which raises the difficulty of averaging or summing such approximations (here neural networks).
Figure 7. D-MOMD, Exploration game with four rooms: Sweep over $\tau, \alpha$ and learning rate.