Non-governmental organizations coalition in influencing global agenda

Koalisi Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat dalam memengaruhi agenda global

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Abstract

This study aims to show how a coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can influence the human rights agenda. This study relies on the advocacy coalition Framework (ACF) assumption that multiple varieties of actors involved in the policy process may combine to form coalitions. This study examines how Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and the International Crisis Group (ICG) formed a coalition to advocate for measures to address humanitarian crises in Sri Lanka and Darfur. This study employed qualitative research methods and relied on secondary sources related to the topic. The findings show that a coalition formed by human rights organizations can influence policies adopted by the international community and can also influence actions taken by national communities. This study concludes that just as states need to form a coalition with other states or work as “allies” to promote human rights on a national and global level, NGOs also function in a similar manner.

Keywords: Advocacy Coalition Framework; Amnesty International; International Crisis Group; Human Rights Watch

Introduction

Policies are not formulated in isolation and are not implemented in a vacuum. Regardless of policy the international community implements is as a result of multiple activities and group efforts. Understanding the public policy process has always been a major issue in politics and government. Hence, in 1991 Paul Sabatier, in collaboration with Jenkins-Smith, developed a theory for understanding public policy. This theory is known as the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, Jenkins-Smith et al. 2018, Sabatier 2019). As a theoretical framework, the following are the assumptions of the ACF since its inception: the multiple varieties of actors involved in the policy process may be combined into coalitions; policies formulated are based on coalition belief; the primary unit of analysis remains the policy subsystem; and to understand subsystem affairs a long-term period perspective is required (Weible et al. 2020). Actors’ beliefs are significant in ACF because they serve as a rallying point for advocacy coalitions. That is, like-minded actors frequently form a common cause in pursuit of their
policy objectives, simply because working together is more effective than acting alone. An advocacy coalition is formed when a collection of actors shares a set of values and participate in significant collective activities (Henry et al. 2014). Advocacy coalitions try to make a set of shared policy values and beliefs a reality by influencing the conduct of several government institutions over time (Haar & Pierce 2021).

Previous studies on ACF have demonstrated how the framework may be used to explain how significant policy shifts occur. Heinmiller et al. (2021) utilized ACF assumptions to describe how a pro-transparency advocacy coalition was developed to educate the public and persuade the government to ensure their commitment to the 2019 Right to Information Act in Ghana. Pierce (2011) employed the ACF framework to study data from congressional hearings on United States foreign policy and the establishment of Israel. Ingold (2011) applies the ACF framework to analyze coalition formation and the influence of this coalition on the Swiss CO₂ law of 2000. Albright (2011) used the ACF framework to illustrate how farmers, mayors, environmental organizations, and scientists created a coalition to lobby the government in Hungary for full execution of the 2003 flood management plan. To the best of our knowledge, no study has used the ACF framework to explain how advocacy coalitions influence national and international community actions in humanitarian crisis situations, despite the fact that few studies have used the ACF framework in various policy areas.

Thus, this study aims to demonstrate how a group of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can influence the human rights agenda. This study focuses on the ACF’s assumption that several varieties of actors may be united to form coalitions. The ACF proposes that the loose organization of individuals and groups work together in an informal or formal way to influence policymakers on how to achieve a common goal (Sabatier & Weible 2019). This explains how a coalition was formed among Amnesty International (AI), the Human Rights Watch (HRW), and the International Crisis Group (ICG) to influence the actions of national and international communities during the humanitarian crises in Sri Lanka and Darfur. AI and HRW are primarily human rights organizations, whereas ICG has conflict prevention as its main thematic area.

Notwithstanding, the ACF framework argues that organizations can work together to influence public policy, irrespective of their differences. The ACF framework states that not all cooperation are formal coalitions, although in some rare cases it may be, which explains how AI, ICG, and HRW can form a coalition without the existence of a formal agreement and cooperation in influencing the conduct of government institutions and international donors (Sabatier & Weible 2019). As a way of conceptualization, the global agenda should not be misinterpreted and limited to signing international human rights treaties. This study views global agenda from the perspective of traditional social science scholars, who describe agenda-setting as a means through which matters of importance are raised in the international community (Wolfe et al. 2013, Capella 2016, Moy et al. 2016). The term “global agenda” in this context refers to a discourse that draws the attention of national and international communities to the human rights situation in Sri Lanka and Darfur.

This study is structured as follows. The ACF framework explains in the beginning shows how actors can work together, regardless of their differences, to build a coalition and influence public policies. The conflicts in Sri Lanka and Darfur are explored in the next section, as these two cases demonstrate the importance of NGOs forming coalitions and their influence on society. This was followed by the reconciliation commission and advocacy coalition in both Sri Lanka and Darfur. The final section describes how advocacy coalitions in Sri Lanka and Darfur drew national and international attention to the humanitarian crisis.

Research Method

This study employed qualitative research methods and relied on secondary sources related to conflicts and humanitarian crises in Sri Lanka and Darfur; the role of NGO’s in influencing the global human rights agenda, and advocacy for immediate humanitarian intervention in both countries. Books, periodicals, newspapers, technical reports, official documents, and United Nations resolutions were among the
secondary sources evaluated. Secondary sources are works that evaluate, describe, and analyze events or phenomena in detail. Scholars gather and archive this information in the form of books, reports, articles, resolutions, and conference papers (Roth et al. 2015, Mohajan 2018).

Relevant documents published during the conflicts and humanitarian crises in Sri Lanka and Darfur were evaluated to produce an objective outcome. This review was conducted to support the study’s argument that, just as states collaborate as partners to achieve their policy goals, NGO’s also function in a similar manner through a coalition. Furthermore, meticulous attention was given to the reports available on the websites of Amnesty International, the International Crisis Group, and Human Rights Watch.

**Result and Discussion**

**Conflict in Sri Lanka and Darfur**

As stated in the introduction, an advocacy coalition is formed when a group of actors shares common values and engages in major collective activities. The conflicts in Sri Lanka and Darfur are discussed in the following section, as these two cases highlight the importance of NGO’s building coalitions to promote human rights agenda. Just as states collaborate as partners to achieve their policy goals, NGO’s operate in a similar manner through a coalition.

**Sri Lanka**

The conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan Government lasted for approximately three decades, making it one of the longest civil wars in Asia (Petrie 2012). Sri Lanka, which used to be known as Ceylon, gained independence from the British Government in 1948; since then, it has been characterized by a myriad of ethnic conflicts. According to the 2001 census, the main ethnic groups in Sri Lanka are the Sinhalese comprising of 82 percent, Tamil comprising of 9.4 percent and Sri Lanka Moor comprising of 7.9 percent of the total population. The Sinhalese groups resented favoritism given to the Tamils by the British since the colonial period. For instance, a few years after independence, Sinhalese began disenfranchising Tamil migrants from India, working on plantations, and declaring Sinhala the official language. In addition to resentment, the Sinhalese Government renamed the country from Ceylon to Sri Lanka in 1972, and the official religion in the country became Buddhism. The Tamil Tigers (LTTE) have been pushing for independence in eastern and northern Sri Lanka for the minority Tamil group, and this has created rising tensions within the country (Amnesty International 2010a, Mohan 2014, Human Rights Watch 2018).

In 1983, the LTTE succeeded in ambushing a convoy of armies and killing thirteen of the soldiers, which triggered a riot that led to the loss of 2,500 Tamils (Petrie 2012). India, which has a large Tamil population, responded to the attack by deploying a peacekeeping mission to Sri Lanka in 1987. The peacekeeping force did not really help matters, and contributed little to improving the situation in Sri Lanka. Three years later, India was forced to leave due to escalating violence. The situation in the country reduced to some extent, but this was probably as a result of the tsunami that occurred in 2004 in Sri Lanka. The conflict escalated again in August 2005 with the assassination of Lakshman Kadirgamar, the foreign minister of Sri Lanka at that time (Petrie 2012). This reignited the conflict for the next two years, as rebels and the government breached the cease-fire agreement and resumed violence. Following the breach of the cease-fire agreement, it has become the primary objective of the government to destroy the LTTE. It formally launched its campaign in 2006 through the use of force, and, in July 2007, it succeeded in seizing control of the LTTE. In May 2009, after a severe one-year period of violence, the Sri Lankan Government killed Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the separatist group, and announced its victory (Yass 2014).

**Darfur**

The Darfur crisis has been described as a humanitarian crisis, because most of the victims in the region are civilians. The level at which lives and livelihoods have been destroyed since the conflict began is
alarming. Just a few months into the conflict, there was a record of thousands of civilians deliberately killed or facing indiscriminate attacks; hundred thousand people had fled to Chad in pursuit of refuge. In 2003, the United Nations estimated that 3,000 people had been killed since the conflict began; 670,000 people had been displaced, and another 95,000 had taken refuge in Chad (United Nations 2004, Totten 2011).

The Darfur crisis is best explained by understanding the geographic characteristics of the region. The region comprises a collection of small ethnic groups classified as clans and tribes with highly heterogeneous and intricate inter-community relationships. Over the years, the relationship between groups has been characterized by brutality and conflicts. Millions of people have been affected, so much that hundreds of thousands have been internally displaced and some others are refugees. The brutality and conflicts affected not only the people but also the infrastructures because of the constant burning of the villages. The main issue for the disputes has been overgrazing and land rights and was usually settled through the use of traditional conflict resolution mechanism (Pely 2017). However, from mid 1990s, communal relations became more tensed and the use of traditional conflict resolution mechanism was no longer effective in resolving conflicts. Darfur was ignored by the central government in Khartoum and this created its division into three states. They include Southern, Western and Northern Darfur; each governed by non-Fur administrators.

From 2000, opposition against the Khartoum regime began to rise as guerilla groups. Among these groups were The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and together. in early 2003, they began to launch insurgencies against the government. SLM/A was an armed political group attacking government troops they were comprised of members of ethnic groups which had settled in Sudan (Jumbert & Lanz 2013). The initial response of the local authorities in Darfur was to initiate a peaceful solution but their attempt at doing this yielded no results. In response, the government used large offensive against the groups and also used Janjaweed - a tribal militia to respond to the insurgencies. A few months after the incidence, the airport located at the North Darfur was attacked by the SLM/A. This caused the death of seventy government soldiers and planes were also destroyed. This attack was described by the SLM/A as a protest against the government for the marginalization and underdevelopment within the region and the government failure to protect the locals from attacks by nomadic groups. In this case, Khartoum had the key responsibility to protect Darfur citizens from atrocities but “flagrantly and willfully flouted its responsibility” (Bellamy 2013, Jumbert & Lanz 2013, Jumbert 2014).

The humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka and Darfur explains why the foremost human rights organizations, AI, ICG, and HRW, acted in favor and closely with the people. The crimes against humanity in both states served as the foundation for collaboration between AI, ICG, and HRW to influence the human rights agenda.

Reconciliation commission and advocacy coalition in Sri Lanka and Darfur

Sri Lanka

The Sri Lankan Government began promoting a reconciliation commission a few years after the war. The commission was created to act as an independent system for restorative justice and reconciliation following three decades of civil war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). However, the commission failed to investigate numerous human rights atrocities identified by human rights organizations committed by the ruling government and LTTE in the final days of the civil war (International Crisis Group 2010a). In addition, it was observed that the majority of commission members were retired senior government officials who made no effort to question the narratives produced by the government (International Crisis Group 2010a). Instead, they accepted the government’s narrative as the official history of the civil war. This shows that the reconciliation commission was simply a platform created by the government to continue the misrepresentation of facts in order to serve government political objectives (International Crisis Group 2010b).
The commission also failed to protect the people who stood as witnesses to the alleged crimes. The witnesses to these alleged crimes were labeled “traitors” by the government because they had presented evidence against the government (International Crisis Group 2010b). In addition to this, the judicial institution in Sri Lanka had established “Anti–Terrorism” principles. These principles further violated the people and their rights, because it empowered the police and military to use violence against those who stood or spoke against the government. In acting in a coalition, AI, HRW, and ICG declined to attend the reconciliation commission meeting. They declined the invitation to attend the reconciliation commission meeting because they believe that the commission will not be able to produce any credible investigations and the witnesses were likely to be at risk. By jointly refusing to attend the meeting, AI, HRW, and ICG used it as an effective strategy to ensure the Sri Lanka government adhered to the UN principles. Hence, in a joint letter addressed to Secretary of the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation and signed by AI, ICG and HRW, explained their reason for declining the invitation. They declined the invitation due to the government’s inability to address impunity and continuing human rights violations, and because their purpose as NGOs was to stand closely with the Sri Lankan people; thus, any action that might pose a threat to the people must be avoided (Amnesty International 2010b, International Crisis Group 2010b). It was on this basis that the organization expressed its willingness to participate in a credible and genuine effort that fostered reconciliation and pursued accountability in Sri Lanka.

In addition to the letter of decline addressed to the commission, AI, HRW, and ICG issued a joint letter to Taro Aso, the then-Japanese prime minister, urging him to take a more active role in addressing the terrible humanitarian crisis in Northern Sri Lanka. Consequently, they requested Japan’s assistance to confront the catastrophic military endgame between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government (Human Rights Watch 2009, Pattison 2010). Prior to this, Japan had been recognized as an important actor on the humanitarian stage and recognized for being one of the largest international donors to Sri Lanka. Due of this, AI, ICG, and HRW expressed their optimism about the role Japan could play in saving the lives of civilians and contributing to sustainable peace, human rights, and development in the country. In the letter, AI, ICG, and HRW presented the facts they had gathered from their groundwork in Sri Lanka. Evidence of advocacy coalition was observed in the Sri Lanka crisis as AI, HRW, and ICG jointly lobbied for actions to be taken by the international community in Sri Lanka. Without the investigation from AI, ICG, and HRW, the world might have remained uninformed of the dire situation in Sri Lanka, as the Sri Lanka government had shut down all independent news sources and denied journalists access to the conflict zones (Afp 2009, Yap & Scott 2010, Petrie 2012).

Darfur

The response of the international community to the crisis in Darfur was slow. One of the reasons was because the conflict coincided with conflict resolution negotiation happening in Southern Sudan at that time. It appeared that the conflict negotiation was highly sensitive and international actors involved in it did not want to disrupt the process towards peace in Southern Sudan. Similarly, the crisis in Darfur coincided with the conflict in Iraq. Hence, the conflict in Darfur was seen as just another African Civil War. In addition to this, prior to the report published by these organizations, the focus of the international community was on the peace talks of Sudan in Kenya and little attention was given to the internal crisis in Sudan.

ICG described the crisis in Darfur as a “man-made” disaster which is what the organization was founded to address (Haugbolle & Hastrup 2013). It was AI in July 2003 and later ICG in December 2005 that brought international attention to the conflict in Darfur through their reports. The following are among the reports produced by International Crisis Group at the early stage of the crisis, Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis, ICG Africa Report No76, 25 March, 2004; Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur, Africa Report No80, 23 May, 2004; Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace, ICG Africa Report No73, 11 December, 2003; Sudan’s Dual Crises: Refocusing on IGAD, Africa Briefing, 05 October, 2004. While Amnesty International produced the following reports, Sudan: At the mercy of killers – destruction of villages in Darfur, June 2004; Sudan, Darfur Rape as a weapon of war Sexual violence and its consequences, July 2004; Sudan: Arming the perpetrators of grave abuses in Darfur, 16 November, 2004; Sudan: Intimidation
and denial, Attacks on freedom of expression in Darfur, August 2004; Sudan No one to complain to: No respite for the victims, impunity for the perpetrators. 2 December 2004; Darfur: Extrajudicial execution of 168 men, April 2004; Sudan, Darfur Too Many people killed for no reason, 3 February, 2004; Darfur Incommunicado detention, torture and special courts 8 June 2004; Sudan, who will answer for the crimes January 2005 (Totten 2011). In the Darfur crisis, the information about the humanitarian condition was gotten from people who had settled in Chad following the conflict. While conducting interviews in a refugee camp in Chad, AI, HRW, and ICG found the story these people shared to be unacceptable and thought the world could not sit back and let people suffer (Taha 2011).

In 2005, the ICG, upon returning from Darfur and Chad, expressed its discontent with the excuses of the United States government for its indifferent response in Darfur. ICG specifically described the excuses as “Lame Excuses” and identified that the U.S government inaction was because the Darfur crisis was not considered as a national security issue. AI had questioned United Nations Security Council Resolution 1556, the resolution which demanded that the government in Sudan disarm the militia and implement justice for those who had committed human rights abuses (United Nations 2004, Totten 2011). For AI, the resolution did not do enough in protecting the right of the people in Darfur nor did it place the Security Council as an enforcing agent for human rights. Furthermore, it suggested that although the resolution created an opportunity for continued evaluation of conflict, the resolution was ineffective in creating any rapid response mechanism to deal with the dire human rights conditions in the country. Human rights NGO’s were the first to initiate actions when the Security Council failed to take responsibility for the humanitarian disaster in Darfur by advocating for urgent humanitarian intervention (Bellamy & Williams 2011, Bellamy 2013).

Following multiple appeals, the Security Council imposed a weapons embargo on Sudan, demanded that the Janjaweed Militias be disarmed, coordinated the distribution of humanitarian relief, and offered support to the African Union Peacekeeping Force. The entrance of the African Union Peacekeeping Force complicated the situation. The African Union troops, until the latter part of October 2004, were mandated to protect only the small Union’s Observer mission in Sudan (United Nations 2004, Totten 2011). In addition, the anticipated 3,300 African Union Peacekeeping Force were not reached; only 597 peacekeepers were deployed in Sudan (Bellamy & Williams 2011, Bellamy 2013). There was no way this number of peacekeepers could meet the dire needs of civilians in this region, coupled with the fact that their activities were restricted to protecting a small defined area. This entire event necessitated an increasing role of NGOs. The information released by these organizations helped in providing knowledge of the situation in Darfur. Darfur had been known for being marginalized, prone to drought and easily isolated and this caused difficulties in getting information. Before this organization published their report of the conflict situation in Darfur, the information which filled the mainstream media described the conflict in Darfur as a vicious and invisible conflict (Toïngar 2014).

When AI, ICG, and HRW investigated the conflict in the region, it was very timely because it was the first-time people had access to more accurate information. Advocacy coalition was evidence in the Darfur crisis on the 25th of May, 2006 when AI, ICG, and HRW addressed a joint letter to the United Nations just like the same mechanism used in Sri Lanka to form a coalition in order to influence the human rights global agenda. In the letter, signed by Gareth Evans of ICG, Irene Khan of AI and Kenneth Roth of HRW, the organizations affirmed that the Darfur peace agreement which had been signed in Abuja, Nigeria could help in curbing the human rights situation in western Sudan only when the provisions of protection agreed on are implemented quickly.

The NGOs noted that the responsibility to protect is not only a duty for states within the region but also the duty of members of the Security Council and the international community more broadly (Amnesty International 2006, United Nations Security Council 2006). The NGOs further added the role of a more formidable international force to win the confidence of the fighting parties, monitor and guarantee the peace agreement. The record of the Sudanese government breaking peace agreement called for a greater international presence in order to ensure peace agreements are followed. Through advocacy coalition, the NGOs letter requested the Security Council to implement all necessary measures especially the arms embargo and sanction for the Sudanese government officials. The request to sanction the Sudanese
government officials was backed by the existing UN Resolution 1674 (United Nations Security Council 2004). The resolution demanded all states to comply with the decisions made by the Security Council. AI, ICG, and HRW concluded by recommending that it was necessary for the Security Council to visit Sudan.

Coalition has been highlighted as a primary tool used by NGO’s to influence human rights agenda. AI, ICG, and HRW were able to form a coalition that influenced the human rights agenda in Sri Lanka and Darfur. Their influence can be observed in the dissemination of information about the wars, human rights violations, and advocacy for immediate humanitarian intervention in Sri Lanka and Darfur.

The Sri Lanka and Darfur crises as a global agenda

Sri Lanka

Following the action taken by the coalition of NGO, the international community showed a renewed interest in the situation in Sri Lanka. Canada, European Union, United States, Australia, and India described the LTTE as a terrorist organization and this crippled the access of organization to external funds (Petrie 2012). Likewise, Norway ended its intermediary role in the peace agreement between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE in 2009. This was largely because NGOs had published reports of the group engagement in inhumane activities such as recruiting children as child soldiers, suicide bombings and challenging the Sri Lanka forces from their operating station. Further action was taken in 2009 following the increased fighting in the country which left over 250,000 people displaced, the European Union foreign ministers requested for the establishment of an independent inquiry to investigate alleged crimes by both the Sri Lanka government and the Tamil Tiger rebels. Initially, the United States did not play an active role in the conflict since the country gained independence in 1948.

The United States had granted more than $3.6 billion, largely in the form of food aid. It took actions in suspending military aid which Sri Lanka used to enjoy following the human rights violations in the country. The United States and the Sri Lankan Government had been working together indirectly through the Agency for International Development. The agency had offered programs pointed towards governance, democracy, economic growth, and humanitarian assistance. The International Criminal Court responded to the activities of NGOs working in Sri Lanka by pursuing actions for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The president of Sri Lanka, Rajapaksa, LLRC, Security Council experts and the UN secretary-general established an expert panel to investigate the operations of the military between the LTTE and the Sri Lanka army until the conflict ended in May 2009. The report prepared by this panel received approvals from AI, ICG, and HRW (Nick 2012).

Darfur

AI, ICG, and HRW pointed out the failure of the international community to respond to the Darfur crisis (Bellamy 2013, Jumbert & Lanz 2013, Jumbert 2014). They acknowledged that even if the government had failed to act, there was no excuse for the international community inability to implement the principle of Responsibility to Protect. The crisis in Darfur began in early 2003, two years before the introduction of the Responsibility to Protect. The logical assumption held was for Darfur to be among the first point of call by the international community. This appeared not to have been the case; it took the efforts of NGOs (AI, ICG, and HRW) to lobby the international community to act in Darfur. The wide acceptance of the principle of “Responsibility to Protect” provided a major advancement in the international community. It called for an international commitment to protect populations from war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and genocide and was also endorsed by the UN Security Council.

The main issue, however, was in the implementation of the doctrine, it proved difficult for nations to follow the principles. In addition to this, even with the knowledge of leaders and policymakers across the world, there was no warning given to the Khartoum government for its campaign for ethnic cleansing. It took repeated documentation and publications from AI, ICG, and HRW to draw the international community to act in this case but this was after the scale of violence had increased phenomenally.
In reacting to this in July 2004, the African Union created a small monitoring mission in the region, comprising of 300 troops and 60 monitoring personnel. This commission began deliberation on the need to reduce the rate of conflict in the region. At this time, it was emphatically stated that if Africa was to ever experience any meaningful development, a lot of mechanisms needed to be implemented to reduce conflicts (Bellamy 2013, Jumbert & Lanz 2013, Jumbert 2014). In the following years, the mission of the African Union expanded to over 7,000 troops in Darfur. It was observed that despite the well-meaning intention of the African Union, it was limited by its capabilities. According to its constitution, the African Union mission can only act as an observer mission which meant that it could not protect the lives of civilians.

The mission was limited to protecting civilians when they are attacked in their presence and only when the mission had enough troops to intervene but, in its case, it lacked adequate troops. The problem with the limitation made it almost impossible for the mission to be in close contact with each affected citizen in that region, hence those who were not at reach with the mission were endangered. Coupled with this, there were other internal issues the mission was dealing with, this includes lack of adequate funding for the mission with many soldiers left unpaid. Despite this limitation, it is important to note that getting the African Union to act was one step taken by the NGOs toward influencing other actors in the international community. In the first three months of 2004, the United Nations Security Council began discussing the situation in Darfur, mainly because they were receiving more detailed information of the atrocities in the region. It was also at this point that AI, ICG and HRW advocacy increased in the council. It took a lot of advocacy and preparation of reports so that, on the 2nd of April, 2004, the Security Council finally decided to include the crisis in Darfur as an agenda. Although the crisis was not giving high priority, it was classified under “other matters,” it was recorded as the first steps in bringing the matter to the Security Council agenda. Between May and August 2004, the Security Council discussed the crisis in Darfur every week and was regularly updated on the situation in the region through the reports produced by ICG, AI, and other NGOs and human rights officials (Ndungu 2011).

The discussion held was followed by the deployment of a mission to Darfur. The NGOs succeeded in drawing the attention of world leaders to Darfur. In July 2004, Colin Powell, the then United States Secretary of State, and former United Nations secretary-general, Kofi Annan, embarked on a visit to Darfur and Khartoum. The trip initiated many important actions implemented by the Sudanese Government, one of which was the disarmament of the Janjaweed. About this time, the United States dispersed a draft resolution on Darfur. On July 30, following weeks of repeated negotiation in the Security Council, the council adopted Resolution 1556 which reinstated that the Sudanese Government obliged to its commitment of disarming the Janjaweed and hold those responsible for the atrocities accountable. In addition, the Security Council requested that the secretary-general submit a monthly report on the progress in fulfilling the demands of Resolution 1556 and shared its intention of taking more actions such as the imposition of sanctions and arms embargo on Janjaweed, all other non-governmental groups, and individuals (United Nations Security Council 2004). In addition, another resolution was established known as Resolution 1706 which made provision for the deployment of United Nation peacekeepers to the region. Faced with the reports from the NGOs, the Security Council amplified its action by taking more legal steps.

This was through the establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry. From several investigations, the commission stated that the crimes committed against humanity can be classified as a genocide. The commission also confirmed the killing of civilians, enforced disappearances, torture, indiscriminate attacks by the Sudanese Government and all these are confirmed in the reports of AI, ICG and HRW on Darfur (Amnesty International 2004, Human Rights Watch 2004, United Nations 2004). With these reports from the commission, the Security Council invited the International Criminal Court (ICC) to proceed with further investigation (United Nations Security Council 2004). Three months after, the ICC began an investigation in Darfur and it had continued its investigation in spite of the opposition received from the Sudanese Government. Other notable international actors that have acted on the crisis after receiving reports from the AI, ICG and HRW were the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The EU approach to the crisis was mainly to support the actions taken by the African Union. As it was clearly identified by the EU that AU remains the main player in the Darfur crisis,
because of its commitment to the “African solution to African problems” as a principle. NATO also reacted through the provision of logistical support and expertise to the AU mission (Gardachew 2021).

The ability of the AI, ICG, and HRW to draw international attention to the humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka and Darfur is critical to their success. The activities of the AI, ICG, and HRW demonstrate that the international norm of responsibility to protect is not the responsibility of governments alone. These NGOs have positioned themselves as actors capable of fulfilling international mandate.

Conclusion

The Advocacy Coalition Framework was utilized in this study to describe how a coalition was formed between Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and the International Crisis Group (ICG) to advocate for measures to address humanitarian crises in Sri Lanka and Darfur. As observed in the case studies, one of the key assets of the AI, ICG, and HRW is the ability to provide timely reports on the ongoing humanitarian violations, early warning alerts, and media lobbying campaigns through traditional and electronic media. In Darfur and Sri Lanka, AI, ICG, and HRW advocacy aim to lessen the possibility of internal conflict by advocating a more inclusive government and actively engaging local and foreign actors.

Several warnings regarding the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur and Sri Lanka were issued by the AI, ICG, and HRW. They have consistently raised concerns about human rights breaches in Darfur and Sri Lanka, emphasizing the issues of peace, security, and justice. In Darfur, the AI, ICG, and HRW publicly advocated robust international interventions, including UN peacekeepers, no-fly zones, and sanctions. In Sri Lanka, the AI, ICG, and HRW worked hard to retain international attention on the humanitarian situation, highlighting the government’s failure to meet its legal responsibilities and political pledges regarding the treatment of hundreds of thousands of Tamil civilians caught up in the combat zone and wrongfully confined to internment camps through advocacy and media campaigns. AI, ICG, and HRW through their reports identified appropriate policy options and responses to be taken in a given human rights situation. It was observed that these organizations carefully described humanitarian challenges in both states and thereafter identified opportunities for improvement. The Darfur and Sri Lanka humanitarian crises demonstrate that a coalition of NGOs can influence the actions of international actors and ensure that states conform to international standards.

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