CRYPTANALYSIS OF \( \mathcal{HFE} \)

ILIA TOLI

Abstract. I transform the trapdoor problem of \( \mathcal{HFE} \) into a linear algebra problem.

1. Introduction

The problem of solving systems of multivariate polynomial equations is a well-known hard problem. In complexity theory, it is well-known to be an \( \mathcal{NP} \)-complete problem. Furthermore, even if we limit ourselves to the problem of solving systems of multivariate polynomial of degree two equations, we have again an \( \mathcal{NP} \)-complete problem. Therefore, it has been paid a lot of attention, since the invention of the idea of the \( \mathcal{PK} \) cryptography, by Diffie and Hellman [DH76].

A lot of cryptosystems have been proposed since then, where an eavesdropper is asked to accomplish the hard task of solving systems of quadratic equations. However, most of them had short lives. The information that an eavesdropper had on the shape of the private key usually sufficed to compromise the security. Some of their cryptanalyses aimed to recover the private key, or something equivalent, in the sense that gives the same privileges. Other cryptanalyses reduce the problem to accessible exhaustive searches, and so on. Recall that the ultimate task of the cryptanalysis is recovering cleartexts rather than recovering meticulously the whole set of the numberlets of the \( \mathcal{PK} \) [COU].

In this paper we focus on \( \mathcal{HFE} \). It is a \( \mathcal{PK} \) cryptosystem first proposed by Patarin [Pat96]. It is one of the modifications of a cryptosystem first proposed by Imai and Matsumoto [IM85], after having successfully cryptanalyzed it.

In its main version, its \( \mathcal{PK} \) is a system of \( n \) quadratic polynomial equations in \( n \) variables with coefficients in a finite field \( \mathbb{F}_q \), practically \( \mathbb{F}_2 \). Its private key is:

- a basis, up to an isomorphism, of an overfield \( \mathbb{K} \supset \mathbb{F}_q \), \( [\mathbb{K} : \mathbb{F}_q] = n \), as an \( \mathbb{F}_q \)-vector space;
- a single univariate polynomial \( f \) of a certain form, with coefficients in \( \mathbb{K} \);
- two invertible affine transformations of \( \mathbb{K} \).

1991 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary: 11T71; Secondary: 12H05.

Key words and phrases. Public key cryptography, hidden monomial, hidden field equations (\( \mathcal{HFE} \)), polynomial system solving.
Practically, \( p = q = 2 \). However, cryptosystems can be set up for any choice of \( p, q \). For simplicity, hereon we assume only that \( p = q \). The other case can be treated almost identically.

In the our cryptanalysis, we find another sparse univariate polynomial, such that its knowledge reduces eavesdropping to the task of solving a single univariate polynomial equation. Its solving in general is an \( \mathcal{NP} \)-complete problem. Due to its further structure, in the case of \( \mathcal{HFE} \) its solving is a pure linear algebra matter.

We call the single polynomial that we find in public an alias of the \( \mathcal{PK} \). All of the task of recovering it can be performed within \( \mathcal{O}(n^6) \) bit operations. Recall that \( n \) is actually the only security parameter to the legitimate user, and that the trapdoor problem is subexponential in it.

We assume that the reader is already familiar with \( \mathcal{HFE} \).

Most of the symbolic manipulations throughout this paper are done by means of Singular, Macaulay2, and CoCoA. If there ever are any calculus mistakes, it is because of the little part done by hand. In any case, the calculus errors in the examples do not prejudice the algorithms they illustrate.

2. The Cryptosystem

Let the parties committed to the tasks be:

- Alice who wants to receive secure messages;
- Bob who wants to send her secure messages;
- Eve, the eavesdropper.

Alice chooses two finite fields \( \mathbb{F}_q \prec \mathbb{K} \), and a basis \( \beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots, \beta_n \) of \( \mathbb{K} \) as an \( \mathbb{F}_q \)-vector space. In practice, \( q = 2 \). However, it can be any \( p^r \), for any \( p \) prime, and any \( r \in \mathbb{N} \).

Next she takes a univariate polynomial of the form:

\[
(1) \quad f(x) = \sum_{i,j} \gamma_{ij} x^{q^{\theta_{ij}} + q^{\varphi_{ij}}} + \sum_i \alpha_i x^{q^{\xi_i}} + \mu_0,
\]

with coefficients in \( \mathbb{K} \), and two affine transformations: \( S, T : \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K} \); one left, one right. Let \( \partial_f \) be the degree (private data) of \( f(x) \).

With manipulations that we skip in order to save space, she generates her \( \mathcal{PK} \); a set of \( n \) quadratic polynomials of degree two, in \( n \) variables. The interested reader may find details in [IM85, IM89, hfe, Tol03].

Her private key is:

- the basis \( B \) of \( \mathbb{K} \) as an \( \mathbb{F}_q \)-vector space;
- \( S, f, T \).
3. The Cryptanalysis

Applying invertible affine transformations is equivalent to composing with permutation affine polynomials. So, Eve knows that $S \circ f \circ T$ in $\mathbb{K}[x]$ is a certain univariate polynomial of the same form like (1), but generally of an enormous degree. This is easily seen if one observes the general form of such a compositum. So, $S \circ f \circ T$ is rather sparse, too.

Let $S, T$ denote the affine polynomials corresponding to the respective affine transformations, too. Eve can represent:

\[(2) \quad T = t_0x^{p_0} + \cdots + t_{n-1}x^{p_{n-1}} = (x + t) \circ (t_0x^{p_0} + \cdots + t_{n-1}x^{p_{n-1}}).\]

Next, Eve knows that $S$ is a permutation polynomial. So, it has a single root. Let it be $s'$. So, we have:

\[(3) \quad S = s + s_0x^{p_0} + \cdots + s_{n-1}x^{p_{n-1}} = (s_0x^{p_0} + \cdots + s_{n-1}x^{p_{n-1}}) \circ (x - s').\]

So, Eve can think of $S \circ f \circ T$ to be of the form:

\[(s_0x^{p_0} + \cdots + s_{n-1}x^{p_{n-1}}) \circ (x - s') \circ f \circ (x + t) \circ (t_0x^{p_0} + \cdots + t_{n-1}x^{p_{n-1}}).\]

It is easily seen that the polynomial $F = (x + s') \circ f \circ (x + t)$ is another polynomial of the same shape and degree of $f$. So, Eve may assume that the transformations $S$ and $T$ really are linear rather than affine, and that the private polynomial is a certain $F$. She can omit the translations without any loss.

Let Eve fix the canonical basis of $\mathbb{K}$, or a basis at her choice, too. She may assume to apply a nondegenerate linear transformation $L$ (that she does not know, but she need not) to the private basis $B$ of $\mathbb{K}$, and to $S \circ f \circ T$ in $\mathbb{K}[x]$. So, she obtains the canonical basis $I$ of $\mathbb{K}$, and another univariate pseudoquadratic polynomial $A = S \circ f \circ T \circ L$. As $T \circ L$ is just another linear transformation, Eve can assume that she knows the basis, and the polynomial is of the form $S \circ f \circ T$.

**Definition 3.1.** *The Hamming weight of a univariate polynomial is the maximum of the Hamming weights of the exponents of the monomials with nonzero coefficients.*

In order to calculate this single univariate public polynomial $S \circ f \circ T$, Eve writes down the pseudoquadratic polynomial of degree at most $q^n - 1$ in its general form:

\[(4) \quad A_dx^d + A_{d-1}x^{d-1} + \cdots + A_1x + A_0,\]

where she considers the $A_i$ like variables. She includes in such a polynomial only monomials which’s exponents have Hamming weight at most two. So, her number of variables is at most $\frac{n^2 + n}{2} + n$. 
Next, Eve has to do at most $\frac{n^2+n}{2} + n$ evaluations to the $PK$. So, she obtains a linear system of at most $\frac{n^2+n}{2} + n$ equations in the $\frac{n^2+n}{2} + n$ variables $A_i$. Solving it in $K$ enables Eve to recover $A = S \circ f \circ T$ in the form of a univariate polynomial with coefficients in $K$. It is a public knowledge that $A(x)$ exists, and is unique. So, we expect that the $\frac{n^2+n}{2} + n$ evaluations are necessary and sufficient.

Now Eve has reduced eavesdropping problem to the problem of solving a single univariate polynomial equation of a certain form and structure within its field of coefficients. She possesses the private key, indeed an alias of its. The only problem to Eve is that such a polynomial generally is of a huge degree. However, Eve knows that it is isomorphic to a very low degree polynomial of a certain form.

**Definition 3.2.** Two polynomials $a(x), b(x) \in F_q[x]/(x^q - x)$ are called isomorphic iff there exists a permutation polynomial $c(x)$ such that $a(x) = b \circ c(x) \mod (x^q - x)$ or $a(x) = c \circ b(x) \mod (x^q - x)$.

It is obvious that the above definition sets up an equivalence relation in the ring $F_q[x]/(x^q - x)$.

Let us now split both the private and the public polynomials $f$ and $A$ into three pieces: the quadratic part, the linear part, and the constant term. Our important observation here is that the linear transformations sends the quadratic part of $f$ into the quadratic part of $A$; the linear part of $f$ into the linear part of $A$, and the constant term of $f$ to the constant term of $A$ isomorphically and separately; without stirring the parts. Besides, none of the transformations changes the constant part. So, we assume the constant part of the polynomial we are looking for to be known.

The quadratic and linear part of $A$ define respectively a quadratic and a linear form: $Q, L : K^n \rightarrow K$. The compositions of $f$ with the matrices $S, T$ bring the respective forms into new forms. So, such compositions correspond to joint bases change for these forms.

The important observations of the paragraph above will help us to bring the trapdoor problem into a pure linear algebra problem.

Let us get rid for now of the constant part, and pick it up for last.

We write down their matrices. In characteristic two, the formula that associates a symmetric bilinear form (i.e., a symmetric matrix) to the quadratic form is:

$$b(x, y) = q(x + y) + q(x) + q(y).$$

Alice has limitations on the degree $d$ of $f$. Indeed, if it is too big, the number of the undesired solutions grows a lot. Besides, if she goes far away with $d$, the problem becomes hard to her, too. In any case, all what we are looking for, is to render Eve’s position as good as Alice’s.
Therefore, we know that the matrix of the quadratic form of the public polynomial has a tiny rank. We bring it into the canonical form. This process corresponds to a basis change of $\mathbb{K}^n$ for $A$. We apply the same basis change to the matrix of the linear form.

Up to now, we have obtained two matrices, transpose, (those that bring the quadratic polynomial into the canonical form), and a polynomial. The polynomial is the sum of the associated polynomials to the matrices of the new quadratic and linear forms, and of the constant part. This polynomial has exactly as many quadratic monomials as $f$ does. The problem now are the monomials of the linear part. They generally still preserve their huge degree.

Well, it is a public knowledge that we can apply to the new linear form matrix a basis change that brings most of its into the canonical form, apart the minor of its in the same position with the nonzero minor of the new quadratic matrix. Doing so, and applying the same basis change to the quadratic matrix, we get rid of most of the linear monomials, too, and do not cause any change to the quadratic polynomial. The new polynomial associated to the new quadratic and linear matrices is more or less of the same degree as $f$. So, Eve is able to solve it.

So, she has a polynomial and two matrices that indeed put her in the same position with Alice in decryption. This completes breaking $\mathcal{HFE}$.

Remark 3.3. The matrices that Eve finds are with coefficients in $\mathbb{K}$. Those of Alice instead, with coefficients in $\mathbb{F}$. This is not any sort of problem. Besides, it is a public knowledge that Eve should as well limit herself to transformations with coefficients in $\mathbb{F}$, and obtain an alias of the key, anyway. In practice, there is no reason to do so.

3.1. For most of the rest of this paper we give a step-by-step example of how do we practically recover $A(x)$, and then on how do we actually choose well a pair of linear transformations that enable us to solve it.

4. A Toy Example

We are given the following toy $\mathcal{PK}$ from Wolf [Wol03]:

\[
\begin{align*}
  x_1 + x_3 + x_1x_2 + x_1x_3 + x_2x_3 \\
  x_3 + x_1x_3 + x_2x_3 \\
  x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_1x_2 + x_2x_3 + 1.
\end{align*}
\]

(6)

All what we know besides the $\mathcal{PK}$ equations, is that the base field is $\mathbb{F}_2$, and that the degree of field extension is 3. In some fashion, we will have these data public. Without them, Bob will be unable to encrypt.

We fix the basis $t^2, t, 1$ of $\mathbb{K} = \mathbb{F}_2^3$ as an $\mathbb{F}_2$-vector space. We choose it at our pleasure. We take $\mathbb{K} = \mathbb{F}_2[t]/(t^3 + t + 1)$. Again, we choose
the irreducible polynomial of degree \( n \) from \( \mathbb{F}_2[t] \) for generating \( K \) at our pleasure.

Now we write the general form of the polynomial we are looking for; an alias of the private polynomial \( f \). It has at most \( 3^2 = 9 \) terms.

Explicitly, in this case it is of the form:

\[
(7) \quad a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3 + ex^4 + fx^5 + gx^6.
\]

Now we evaluate the \( PK \) in 7 points: \( x = 0, 1, t, t+1, t^2, t^2+1, t^2+t \).

The toy values of the parameters render the wrong idea that we will have to evaluate a generic-coefficients polynomial in the whole set of the elements of the overfield. Indeed, it is very far from being like that. We need only \( n^2 \) evaluations. Card \( K = p^n \), instead.

From the evaluations we obtain the following system:

\[
\begin{align*}
& a = 1 \\
& a + b + c + d + e + f + g = t^2 \\
& a + tb + t^2c + (t+1)d + (t^2+t)e + (t^2+t+1)f + (t^2+1)g = 0 \\
& a + (t+1)b + (t^2+1)c + t^2d + (t^2+t+1)e + tf + (t^2+1)g = 0 \\
& a + t^2b + (t^2+t)c + (t^2+1)d + tc + (t+1)f + (t^2+t+1)g = t^2 \\
& a + (t^2+1)b + (t^2+t+1)c + (t^2+t)d + (t+1)e + t^2f + tg = t^2 + 1 \\
& a + (t^2+t)b + tc + (t^2+t+1)d + t^2e + (t^2+1)f + (t+1)g = 1.
\end{align*}
\]

We solve this system, and find the our alias key:

\[
(8) \quad A(x) = t^2x^6 + (t^2+1)x^5 + (t^2+t+1)x^4 + (t^2+1)x^3 + (t^2+t)x^2 + 1.
\]

As the polynomial we are looking for is unique, the solution to the system above exists, and is unique. Now Eve has only to solve the equation \( A(x) = y \) in order to recover \( x \). Even though it is of an enormous degree, the number of solutions that Eve finds is equal to those that Alice is expected to find. This is a public knowledge. Eve, too, can discard undesired solutions by the same means that Alice does. Much the same like Alice. The last task for Eve is that of recovering two suitable matrices that lower the degree of \( A(x) \).

5. Conclusions

5.1. In \( \text{HFE} \) the \( PK \) hides a single univariate pseudoquadratic polynomial. In any fashion, this polynomial is very sparse. It has at most \( \frac{n^2+n}{2} + n \) terms of a certain well-known shape. So, in any case, Eve can recover it in \( \mathcal{O}(n^6) \) bit operations, for \( n \) the degree of the field extension. Recall that \( n \) is Alice’s only security parameter, and that the trapdoor problem is already only subexponentially harder with it.
5.2. Even if we take the private polynomial to be of higher Hamming weight, the amount of calculi required to recover it is almost the same. Recall that the size of the $PK$ is already almost impractical.

5.3. The problem of solving a single univariate pseudoquadratic polynomial equation upon finite fields is an $\mathcal{NP}$-complete problem [KS99]. So, it is reasonable to look for cryptosystems that provide it as a trapdoor problem. The experience up to now has shown that hiding polynomials does not help the security of a cryptosystem, restricts choices, and renders the size of the $PK$ impractical. The privileged position of a legitimate user must rely elsewhere.

References

[COU] http://www.cryptosystem.net/ttm/.
[DH76] Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. In IEEE Trans. Information Theory, pages 644–654, 1976. http://www.cs.jhu.edu/~rubin/courses/sp03/papers/diffie.hellman.pdf.
[hfe] http://www.minrank.org/hfe/ or http://www.hfe.info/.
[IM85] Hideki Imai and Tatsuo Matsumoto. Algebraic methods for constructing asymmetric cryptosystems. In Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes, Proceedings Third International Conference, pages 108–119, Grenoble, France, 1985. Springer-Verlag.
[IM89] Hideki Imai and Tatsuo Matsumoto. Public quadratic polynomial tuples for efficient signature-verification and message-encryption. In Advances in Cryptology, Eurocrypt ’88, pages 419–453. Springer-Verlag, 1989. http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/papers/0330/03300419.pdf.
[KS99] Aviad Kipnis and Adi Shamir. Cryptanalysis of the HFE public key cryptosystem by relinearization. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1666:19–30, 1999.
[Pat96] Jacques Patarin. Hidden fields equations (HFE) and isomorphisms of polynomials (IP): Two new families of asymmetric algorithms. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1070:33–on, 1996. http://www.minrank.org/hfe.pdf.
[Tol03] Ilia Toli. Hidden polynomial cryptosystems. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2003/061, 2003. http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/061.pdf.
[Wol03] Christopher Wolf. Efficient public key generation for multivariate cryptosystems. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2003/089, 2003. http://eprint.iacr.org/.

DIPARTIMENTO DI MATEMATICA Leonida Tonelli, via F. Buonarroti 2, 56127 Pisa, ITALY., toli@posso.dm.unipi.it