“Preferences for scarce medical resource allocation: Differences between experts and the general public and implications for the Covid-19 pandemic.

Simmy Grover¹ Alastair McClelland¹ and Adrian Furnham²

1. Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London, WC1H0AP
2. Norwegian Business School (BI), Nydalveien, Olso, Norway

Correspondence to Adrian Furnham: adrian@adrianfurnham.com

Abstract
This study concerns what lay people believe is the best way to allocate scarce medical resources. A sample of 515 individuals completed a short questionnaire asking them to rank order eight different ethical positions with respect to the allocation of scarce resources. They showed a strong preference for the ‘saves most lives’ and ‘sickest first’ options, with ‘reciprocity’ and a ‘lottery’ being least favoured. There was a reasonable degree of unanimity amongst respondents and comparatively few correlations with individual difference factors such as demography. The preference results are compared to expert recommendations (Emanuel et al., 2020) made in light of the current coronavirus pandemic and differences are highlighted. Implications for scarce medical resource allocations are discussed and limitations of the study acknowledged.

Key Words: ethics, resource allocation, lottery, utilitarianism
Introduction

In all countries, whether developed or developing, the demand for a medical resource frequently exceeds the supply. In developed countries, societies are dealing with the scarcity of specific, highly sought after medical resources and in developing countries the scarcity is usually more widespread. Allocation of scarce medical resources is a highly contentious issue: to whom these resources should be allocated, by which criteria; and who makes the decision? (Cillo et al, 2015; Guindo et al., 2012; Keller et al., 2014; Krüti et al., 2016). There is a World Health Organisation (WHO, 2014) report on this issue and many literature reviews (e.g., Scheunemann & Lewis, 2011). This issue has suddenly become a topic of great significance because of the Covid-19 crisis and the universal shortage of particular medical resources such as Intensive Care beds and ventilators (Boreskie, Boreskie & Melady, 2020; Rosenbaum, 2020).

There have been a number of systematic studies of scarce resource allocation focusing on attributes of the potential recipients of the resource by Furnham and his colleagues (e.g., Furnham, Ariffin, & McClelland, 2007; Furnham, Thomas, & Petrides, 2002; Furnham, Thomson, & McClelland, 2002; Nguyen Huynh, Furnham, & McClelland, 2020; Selvaraj, McClelland, & Furnham, 2019). In contrast, this study is specifically concerned with the preferences of the public for a particular system or principle by which to allocate resources.

The issue of scarce medical resource allocation is of interest not only to ethicists, but also to psychologists, philosophers, policymakers and the general public (Persad, 2017) especially given the current situation, and there is a growing applied and theoretical literature on this issue. Essentially the two philosophical principles, utilitarianism and egalitarianism have been used to conceive of the ethics behind resource allocation methods (Lamb, 1990). There are however a number of other identifiable principles which will be explored in this paper.
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory which focuses on the outcomes of actions rather than the actions themselves. Here the best/most ideal, action is one that brings about maximum happiness defined as “pleasure and the absence of pain” (Mill, 1863, p. 10). Thus, utilitarianism would mean allocation to the person whose health and well-being would bring about most happiness in society, thus giving rise to individual judgments of social worth (Banks, 1995).

Egalitarianism, which is a deontological theory, focuses on the act rather than the outcome and the morality of the act is determined by a known and accepted set of rules (Broad, 1930). The theory asserts that all individuals are equal in terms of social worth. However, with scarce resources, some sort of selection usually has to be made.

Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel (2009) demonstrated that these two philosophical perspectives were insufficient to capture the complexity that surrounds the issue of resource allocation. They specified eight primary ethical principles for medical resource allocation. The two utilitarian allocation principles are based on saving the most number of lives and the most number of life-years (also referred to as prognosis), respectively. The lottery and first-come, first-served methods are more individualistic and reflect an egalitarian approach to the allocation of resources. Prioritarianism, or prioritising the disadvantaged, gives rise to two possible allocation methods: sickest first and youngest first. This issue is currently widely debated in the media because of the current Covid-19 pandemic.

The mortality rates for Covid-19 are much higher for vulnerable populations, in particular those individuals over the age of 80 years and those with underlying health conditions (Wu & McGoogan, 2020). Consequently, due to the limited supply of ventilators doctors in some of the hardest hit regions of Italy have had to allocate ventilators to younger patients, as their prognosis is more favourable. However this method of allocation is not the
preferred choice of medical professionals but seemed necessary given the circumstances faced by the doctors (Rosenbaum, 2020).

Two further methods were classified by Persad et al. (2009) under the heading ‘social usefulness’: *instrumental value* and *reciprocity*. These are defined thus: Instrumental value prioritises those with specific skills and usefulness such as scientists producing a vaccine, front-line health care workers treating critically ill patients, or key workers who are essential to maintain vital infrastructure. In normal circumstances, this would also include those who had agreed to improve their health following treatment (e.g., stopped smoking, lost weight, etc.) and thus would require fewer resources in the future. Reciprocity prioritises those who have been useful to society in the past, such as giving blood or organ donation. Persad et al. suggested that the majority of these principles for allocation are morally justifiable but insufficient on their own. However they consider the first-come, first-served and sickest first allocation methods to be inherently flawed and unfair in comparison to the other six principles, as the former incorporates irrelevant factors such as the wealth of the individual, and the later ignores prognosis.

Krütli et al. (2016) explored how lay people, general practitioners (GPs), medical students and other health professionals evaluated the fairness of the following allocation principles for scarce medical resources: ‘sickest first’, ‘waiting list’, ‘prognosis’, ‘behaviour’ (i.e. prioritising those who do not undertake risky behaviours that may negatively impact their condition), ‘instrumental value’ ‘combination of criteria’ (i.e. ‘youngest first’, ‘prognosis’, and ‘lottery’ principles), ‘reciprocity’ ‘youngest first’, ‘lottery’, and ‘monetary contribution’. Participants rated the allocation principles in three different patient scenarios (donor organs, hospital beds during an epidemic, and joint replacements).

Krütli et al. (2016) found that although GPs displayed different response patterns across the allocation scenarios, lay people were very consistent, and clearly favoured ‘sickest first’
followed by ‘waiting list’. These results are at odds with current conclusions proposed by some ethicists (e.g., Persad et al., 2009), who suggest that neither of these principles are morally justifiable. From a theoretical perspective, the ‘sickest first’ allocation method is prioritising those who have the most need for the resources but not those that are most likely to survive (Krütli et al., 2016).

Many countries have adopted specific protocols that delineate which groups of individuals should be prioritised in a situation of scarcity. For example, the Swiss Federal Office for Public Health would prioritise health care workers, followed by individuals at higher risk of adverse outcomes and then individuals who are integral to the running of crucial services - in a situation for administering a vaccine against pandemic influenza. This protocol prioritises instrumental value and then prognosis. Organ donation however prioritises the sickest first and then prognosis (Krütli et al., 2016).

Emanuel et al. (2020) suggest four values that underlie allocation protocols that are adopted by countries, which are: “maximizing the benefits produced by scarce resources, treating people equally, promoting and rewarding instrumental value, and giving priority to the worst off.” (p.2). Further, they stress that an individual’s wealth should in no way influence his or her priority in relation to the receipt of medical resources. There are a number of ways that these values can be put into practice. Maximising benefits can be operationalised by both the ‘Saving the most lives’ or ‘Prognosis’ allocation methods; treating people equally can be achieved through the ‘lottery’ allocation method or on a ‘first-come, first-served’ basis; instrumental value can be both restrospective (‘reciprocity’) or prospective; and prioritising the worst off is captured by the ‘sickest first’ and ‘youngest first’ criteria. Emanuel et al. recommend that in the current Covid-19 pandemic, maximising benefits should be the most important value for allocating medical resources when treating patients.
The current crisis has meant that there is much debate surrounding medical ethics and ethical decision-making (Pauls, Migneault & Bakewell, 2020). With many health care systems across the world struggling to meet the demand in the current crisis, medical professionals have had to make life and death decisions about the allocation of medical resources. The majority of research and debate has focused on establishing an allocation framework based on the views of medical practitioners and ethicists. However, with the exception of Krüti et al (2016), there has been little serious or investigation into the beliefs of lay individuals with respect to the allocation of scarce resources. This study aims to do just this.

**Method**

**Participants**

In total, 515 participants completed the questionnaire, of which 50% were female (age range: 18 to 70 years, \( M = 22.6 \) years, \( SD = 10.15 \)). In all 44.7% had a degree and 63% were single (21% married, 17% co-habiting). Participants competently spoke an average of 1.94 languages (SD = .82) and 46.4% of the sample had children. Additionally, they rated themselves on the following scales: How religious are you? (Not at all 1 to Very 8); \( M = 2.09 \) (\( SD = 2.75 \)); How would you describe your political beliefs? (Very Left Wing 1 to Very Right Wing 8); \( M = 5.38 \) (\( SD = 1.97 \)); How Optimistic are you (Not at all 1 to Very 8); \( M =5.68 \) (\( SD = 1.94 \)). They also rated themselves on how healthy they were from Very poor (1) to very good (100); \( M = 68.62 \) (\( SD = 19.53 \)). They also rated whether they thought Alternative Medicine worked on a 7 point (Disagree 1 to Agree 7); \( M = 4.11 \) (\( SD = 2.49 \)). Asked if they believed in Life after Death 53.8% said No, and 45.8% yes.

**Questionnaire**
Medical people often have to make difficult ethical choices when they have to choose who to treat because there are too many people wanting treatments that are limited. As a consequence, ethicists have come up with different systems, strategies or principles. A recent study suggests there are essentially 8 principles that may be used to allocate scarce medical interventions. These are listed below: In this questionnaire we are interested in your views and which principles you personally would advocate. We would like you to rank order these. Please read through all eight then put a 1 (meaning most preferred) against the one you think is best/fairest. Then put a 2 against the principle you think next fairest. Continue until you have ranked all eight.

RANK (1 to 8)

_____ Lotterly: the random allocation of interventions, through drawing recipients blindly

_____ First-come, first-served: allocating interventions based on the order of request, or requirement.

_____ Sickest first: prioritising those with the worst future prospects if left untreated.

_____ Youngest first: prioritising those who have had the least life years, and thus have the potential to live longer if cured.

_____ Save the most lives: aiming to save the most individual lives possible, through offering all people treatment.

_____ Prognosis or life-years: aiming to save the most life-years, thus prioritising those with positive prognoses, and excluding those with poor prognoses.

_____ Instrumental value: prioritising those with specific skills and usefulness – e.g. those producing a vaccine, or those who have agreed to improve their health following treatment and thus requiring fewer resources (stop smoking, lose weight, etc.)

_____ Reciprocity – prioritising those who have been useful in the past – e.g. past organ donors.
Results

Complete rank data for the eight ethical principles was provided by 468 participants. Individuals who incorrectly gave multiple ethical principles the same level of preference were removed as well as those that had missing data. There was no evidence to suggest that data was missing other than at random, Little’s MCAR test, $\chi^2(20) = 20.15, p = .449$. Table 1 shows the mean rank position of each of the eight principles (ordered from lowest – most preferred to highest – least preferred) for participants with complete data. To obtain a measure of the extent to which participants were in agreement about the relative importance of the eight ethical principles, Kendall’s coefficient of concordance was computed, and was found to be significant, $W = .40, \chi^2(7) = 1305.73, p < .001$. This indicates a moderate level of agreement amongst the participants.

The confidence intervals shown in Table 1 show that the only principles with overlapping confidence intervals were ‘first-come, first-served’ and ‘instrumental value’. However, when examining the distribution of the difference between the rankings, the 95% confidence interval did not capture zero. Therefore it can be concluded that all of the mean rankings for the eight principles are significantly different from one another.

Insert Table 1

Individual Correlates

Table 2 shows the distribution of First Choice of most preferred mechanism for medical resource allocation. The most popular choice was ‘Save the most lives’ followed by ‘Sickest first’ and then ‘Youngest first’. These three choices will be examined further. Due to the low selection of other choices the sample sizes were not adequate for analysis there the data was recoded so that all other choices were placed in a category labelled “Other”.

Insert Table 2 here
Table 2 shows the first choices of the participants. A multinomial logistic regression was run to investigate which aspects of individuals influenced their most preferred solution for the allocation of medical resources. Specifically, we investigated which individual differences lead individuals to prefer an allocation method that is not the most common preferred allocation method (in this sample the most common first choice was ‘Save the most lives’). We used eight individual difference criteria as predictors: sex, age, education, ratings of health, religious beliefs, political beliefs, belief in the efficacy of alternative medicine and belief in Life after Death. The reference category was set to be ‘Save the most lives’. The Likelihood Ratio test statistic suggests that final model contains non-zero predictors: $\chi^2(24) = 54.49, p < .001$. The model compares each category: sickest first, young first, and other, to the reference category.

Insert Table 3 and 4 here

Table 3 shows the parameter estimates for each predictor variable with each comparison in the model. The multinomial regression model made three comparisons: those individuals that selected ‘Sickest first’ to the most common choice, those individuals that selected ‘Youngest first’ to the most common choice, and those individuals that selected any of the other 5 options to the most common choice. Table 4 shows which predictors have a significant effect in the overall model compared to the nested models in Table 3 and the majority of predictors investigated are significant or close to significance.

**Comparing Sickest first to Save the most lives**

The only significant predictor was Gender but whether participants believed in life after death and the efficacy of alternative medicine were quite close to significance ($p = .065$ and $p = .064$ respectively). The odds ratio for females relative to males is 1.89 for preferring ‘Sickest first relative to ‘Save the most lives’ given all other predictor variables in the model are held
constant. In other words, females are 1.89 times more likely than males to prefer ‘Sickest first’ to ‘Save the most lives’, \( p = .007 \).

The odds ratio for those believing in life after death relative to those that do not believe is 1.66 for preferring ‘Sickest first’ relative to ‘Save the most lives’ given all other predictor variables in the model are held constant. In other words, participants believing in life after death are 1.66 times more likely than those that don’t believe in life after death to prefer ‘Sickest first’ to ‘Save the most lives’, \( p = .065 \).

The odds ratio for those believing in the efficacy of alternative medicine relative to those that do not believe in the efficacy of alternative medicine is .91 for preferring ‘Sickest first’ relative to ‘Save the most lives’ given all other predictor variables in the model are held constant. In other words, participants believing efficacy of alternative medicine are more likely than those that don’t believe in its efficacy to prefer ‘Save the most lives’ to ‘Sickest first’, \( p = .064 \).

Comparing ‘Youngest first’ to ‘Save the most lives’:

The significant predictors were how religious participants viewed themselves and their self-perception of their physical health. The odds ratio for more religious participants relative to less religious participants is .82 for preferring ‘Youngest first’ relative to ‘Save the most lives’ given all other predictor variables in the model are held constant. In other words, those participants that are more religious are more likely than those less religious to prefer ‘Save the most lives’ to ‘Youngest first’, \( p = .020 \).

The odds ratio for those perceiving their physical health to be good relative to those that don’t is 1.03 for preferring ‘Youngest first’ relative to ‘Save the most lives’ given all other predictor variables in the model are held constant. In other words, participants perceiving
their physical health to be better are 1.03 times more likely than those that don’t perceive their physical health to be good to prefer ‘Youngest first’ to ‘Save the most lives’, \( p = .006 \).

Comparing ‘Other’ to ‘Save the most lives’:
The significant predictors were participants’ belief in alternative medicine, whether participants believed in life after death and whether they had a university degree. Age was also very close to significance, \( p = .051 \). The odds ratio for those participants who had a greater belief in the success of alternative medicine relative to those that don’t is .84 for preferring ‘Other’ relative to ‘Save the most lives’ given all other predictor variables in the model are held constant. In other words, those participants that believe in alternative medicine are more likely than those that don’t to prefer ‘Save the most lives’ to ‘Other’, \( p = .008 \).

The odds ratio for those believing in life after death relative to those that don’t is 2.52 for preferring ‘Other’ relative to ‘Save the most lives’ given all other predictor variables in the model are held constant. In other words, participants believing in life after death are 2.52 times more likely than those that don’t believe in life after death to prefer ‘Other’ allocations for medical resources to ‘Save the most lives’, \( p = .008 \).

The odds ratio for those with a university degree relative to those that don’t is 1.85 for preferring ‘Other’ relative to ‘Save the most lives’ given all other predictor variables in the model are held constant. In other words, participants with a university degree are 1.85 times more likely than those without a degree to prefer ‘Other’ allocations for medical resources to ‘Save the most lives’, \( p = .036 \).

The odds ratio for older individuals compared to younger individuals is 1.03 for preferring ‘Other’ relative to ‘Save the most lives’ given all other predictor variables in the model are held constant. In other words, participants who are older are 1.03 times more likely than those
that are younger to prefer ‘Other’ allocations for medical resources to ‘Save the most lives’, $p = 0.051$.

**Discussion**

There are two important results from this study. The first is the degree of public consensus evident in Tables 1 and 2. This shows considerable agreement about which principles are most and least favoured. The preference for ‘save the most lives’ seen in this lay sample is the same first preference suggested by experts in the field (Emanuel et al., 2020). The results also indicate that people tend to be utilitarians rather than egalitarians. Very few participants in the current sample chose the instrumental categories of ‘instrumental value’ or ‘reciprocity’ as an highly rated choice, which is consistent with the findings of Krütli et al. (2016) for both lay and GP participants, but at odds to what the experts suggest in their recent recommendations (Emanuel et al., 2020).

A pictorial representation of the decision-making flow guided by expert suggestions from Emanuel et al. (2020) is shown in Figure 1 and the mean rank ordered preference in the current sample in Figure 2. As can be seen, the first level of agreement is the same: at the population level, both groups prefer to save the most lives. However, at the next level divergence in opinion is evident. The experts continue to wish to maximise benefits of the resources with a preference for maximising ‘life-years’ however the lay sample in this study shift to prioritising those who are worst off. An important caveat is that the expert opinion is based on the current Covid-19 crisis and therefore incorporates decision-making that is specific to the current pandemic, such as the reduce severity of symptoms in the young. The lay sample was collected prior to the emergence of Covid-19.
The second main finding is that there are relatively few individual difference correlates of participants’ preferences showing consensus between the participants. Studies which have looked not at the principles of allocation, but the recipients of allocation, show that individuals are happy to make very clear choices dependent on the recipients demography (sex, age, education), life-style (smoking, drinking), ideology (political and religious beliefs) and social group (class, ethnicity, foreignness) (e.g., Furnham et al., 2007, 2009). Equally, they are relatively happy to prioritize according to the medical condition, particularly the extent to which the problem is primarily caused by the patient themselves (by their life style) or whether it is seen to be beyond the control of the patient (Nguyen Huynh et al., 2020).

Yet in this study where we examined a wide range of individual differences few seemed to impact on the preference for an allocation principle. We did find some differences: women prefer ‘Sickest first’ over ‘Save the most lives’. Religious individuals preferred to save the most lives rather than focusing on the young. Older and better educated people were more likely to favour some less popular principles.

The results could be interpreted partly in terms of self-interest. In general, women live longer than men, and young people are likely to live longer than older people, particularly if they contract Covid-19. Those who rated themselves as having good physical health (which is generally related to age) showed a preference for ‘youngest first’ than ‘save the most lives’. Older individuals were potentially more likely to believe in ‘Other’ allocation options than saving the most lives which could be interpreted as them being potentially more selfish or that they sense their mortality.

There are various implications that follow from research in this area. In most countries it is politicians who allocate financial resources, but medical staff (perhaps informed by ethical committees) who make decisions about individual patients. Informal conversations with doctors suggest that few articulate clear ethical principles in their daily work and that there is
disagreement between them. Studies such as this at least given them information about what
the public favours. The doctors dealing with the Covid-19 crisis have highlighted their
discomfort and concern with the decisions they have had to make in the allocation of
ventilators in northern Italy (Rosenbaum, 2020). With many medical professionals requesting
guidance on how they should be making allocation decisions (Townsend & Eburn, 2020).

There are also implications for the study of medical ethics. Krutli et al. (2016) concluded
“A number of ethicists reject ‘sickest first’ and ‘waiting list’ as morally unjustifiable
allocation principles, whereas those allocation principles received the highest fairness
endorsements by lay people and to some extent also by health professionals. Decision makers
are advised to consider whether or not to give ethicists, health professionals, and the general
public an equal voice when attempting to arrive at maximally endorsed allocations of scarce
medical resources.” (p. 2). In the current pandemic crisis there is a lot of discussion (Boreskie
et al., 2020; Pauls et al., 2020; Solnica, Barksi & Jotkowitz, 2020) about the most appropriate
way to arrive at a just medical resources allocation principle but little or no empirical data to
suggest what the public think.

An important insight for policy makers in the current crisis is that at the first level of
decision-making there is universal agreement between the experts and lay people but as
Figure 1 and 2 show there is quite a significant deviation at the second level. This suggests
the general public may struggle to agree with decision-making that is being made at this level
and beyond. Although the decisions made concerning medical resources may seem unfair at
the level of the individual, it must be borne in mind that such decisions may have to be made
(particularly if available resources are overwhelmed) in order to save the most lives in the
population.

For example, the ageist approach evident in Italy (Rosenbaum, 2020) is a distressing
criteria but the situation is not that clear cut. Other healthcare professionals highlight that age
may appear like a criteria but other factors, which tend to be confounded with age, are the
decision criteria, such as frailty and polymorbidity (Boreskie et al., 2020). Multiple factors
are involved in triaging patients and regardless of whether or not medical resources are
strained those factors relating to patients likelihood of survival are the ones that will save the
most lives at the population level (Pauls et al., 2020).

Medical resource allocation principles are applied at the population level but decision-
making at the individual level may not always reflect population level principles. As an
example, in the current crisis if a medical professional had a single ventilator and two patients
with similar symptoms and prognosis that needed the ventilator to survive. If one
patient was a 13-year-old child and the other an 85-year-old adult, most individuals would
give the ventilator to the child: youngest-first. However, when a COVID-19 vaccine is
developed, initially there will not be enough vaccine to vaccinate everyone. Consequently,
the most at-risk groups such as the elderly would likely be targeted first. Indeed,
in the UK, the seasonal flu jab is available – only to the elderly (or those with a health
condition) for free on the NHS. So not youngest first – but oldest first.

There were a number of limitations in this study. It was run in 2019 before the Covid-19
virus pandemic. There is, however, no reason to assume that people have or would change
their views on allocation, though recent public debate and personal experiences with the
pandemic may have influenced their preferred philosophy. For example, it appears that in
general, the young are far less adversely affected by the virus than the old, which might
influence a decision to allocate resources to the youngest as a matter of principle, in the event
of a shortage. Thus, future research should examine what effect the current situation is having
on individual’s decision-making in relation to allocation of medical resources and also the
allocation of personal protective equipment (PPE).
A second limitation, statistical rather than theoretical, was the use of a rank-order methodology which limits the type of analysis that can be undertaken. Researchers in the area point out that if people are given ratings rather than rankings they often choose not to make distinctions between patients with different characteristics, whereas ranking forces participants to make such distinctions. Indeed, often people who take part in these studies express some anxiety at being “asked to play God”, yet do not suggest who should be making these crucial ethical decisions (Furnham et al., 2002ab). But such decisions are being made by doctors across the world because of the Covid-19 pandemic – and an ethical framework which is acceptable to both health professionals and the lay public is urgently needed.
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Table 1. The mean rank position of the eight ethical principles.

| Ethical Principle                  | $M$ ($SD$) | 95% CI  |
|-----------------------------------|------------|---------|
| Save the most lives               | 2.28 (1.52)| 2.14 – 2.42 |
| Sickest first                     | 2.69 (1.85)| 2.52 – 2.86 |
| Youngest first                    | 3.66 (1.73)| 3.50 – 3.82 |
| Prognosis – or life years         | 4.24 (1.77)| 4.08 – 4.40 |
| First come, first served          | 5.19 (1.92)| 5.02 – 5.36 |
| Instrumental value                | 5.47 (1.86)| 5.30 – 5.64 |
| Reciprocity                       | 5.92 (1.59)| 5.78 – 6.06 |
| Lottery                           | 6.56 (1.97)| 6.38 – 6.74 |

Table 2: Frequency of most preferred ethical principle

| First Choice                  | Frequency | Percent |
|-------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Lottery                       | 11        | 2.4     |
| First-come, first-served      | 12        | 2.6     |
| Sickest first                 | 151       | 32.3    |
| Youngest first                | 45        | 9.6     |
| Save the most lives           | 196       | 41.9    |
| Prognosis or life-years       | 24        | 5.1     |
| Instrumental value            | 24        | 5.1     |
| Reciprocity                   | 5         | 1.1     |
| Total                         | 468       | 100     |
## Table 3:

| Category            | B     | Std. Error | Wald   | df | Sig.  | Exp(B) | 95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B) | Lower Bound | Upper Bound |
|---------------------|-------|------------|--------|----|-------|--------|-----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|
|                     |       |            |        |    |       |        |                                   |             |             |
| Sickest first       |       |            |        |    |       |        |                                   |             |             |
| Intercept           | -1.619| 0.686      | 5.564  | 1  | 0.018 | 1.888  | 1.185 - 3.008                     |             |             |
| Gender              | 0.636 | 0.238      | 7.157  | 1  | 0.007 | 1.888  | 1.185 - 3.008                     |             |             |
| Age                 | 0.015 | 0.012      | 1.633  | 1  | 0.201 | 1.015  | 0.992 - 1.040                     |             |             |
| Education           | 0.118 | 0.231      | 0.258  | 1  | 0.611 | 1.125  | 0.715 - 1.770                     |             |             |
| Ratings of health   | 0.009 | 0.006      | 2.303  | 1  | 0.129 | 1.009  | 0.997 - 1.021                     |             |             |
| Religious beliefs   | -0.039| 0.050      | 0.606  | 1  | 0.436 | 0.962  | 0.871 - 1.061                     |             |             |
| Political beliefs   | 0.025 | 0.064      | 0.154  | 1  | 0.695 | 1.025  | 0.904 - 1.163                     |             |             |
| Efficacy of Alt Med | -0.096| 0.052      | 3.430  | 1  | 0.064 | 0.909  | 0.821 - 1.006                     |             |             |
| Life after death    | 0.508 | 0.275      | 3.401  | 1  | 0.065 | 1.662  | 0.969 - 2.850                     |             |             |
| Youngest first      |       |            |        |    |       |        |                                   |             |             |
| Intercept           | -3.223| 1.097      | 8.627  | 1  | 0.003 | 1.888  | 1.185 - 3.008                     |             |             |
| Gender              | -0.088| 0.371      | 0.057  | 1  | 0.812 | 0.915  | 0.442 - 1.895                     |             |             |
| Age                 | 0.030 | 0.017      | 3.315  | 1  | 0.069 | 1.031  | 0.998 - 1.065                     |             |             |
| Education           | -0.230| 0.361      | 0.406  | 1  | 0.524 | 0.795  | 0.392 - 1.611                     |             |             |
| Ratings of health   | 0.028 | 0.010      | 7.491  | 1  | 0.006 | 1.029  | 1.008 - 1.050                     |             |             |
| Religious beliefs   | -0.194| 0.083      | 5.382  | 1  | 0.020 | 0.824  | 0.700 - 0.970                     |             |             |
| Political beliefs   | -0.140| 0.094      | 2.198  | 1  | 0.138 | 0.869  | 0.723 - 1.046                     |             |             |
| Efficacy of Alt Med | -0.021| 0.079      | 0.068  | 1  | 0.794 | 0.980  | 0.839 - 1.143                     |             |             |
| Life after death    | 0.423 | 0.413      | 1.050  | 1  | 0.305 | 1.527  | 0.680 - 3.432                     |             |             |
| Other               |       |            |        |    |       |        |                                   |             |             |
| Intercept           | -1.116| 0.834      | 1.788  | 1  | 0.181 | 0.885  | 0.488 - 1.606                     |             |             |
| Gender              | -0.122| 0.304      | 0.161  | 1  | 0.688 | 0.885  | 0.488 - 1.606                     |             |             |
| Age                 | 0.029 | 0.015      | 3.813  | 1  | 0.051 | 1.030  | 1.000 - 1.060                     |             |             |
| Education           | 0.617 | 0.294      | 4.406  | 1  | 0.036 | 1.854  | 1.042 - 3.298                     |             |             |
| Ratings of health   | 0.005 | 0.007      | 0.486  | 1  | 0.486 | 1.005  | 0.991 - 1.020                     |             |             |
| Religious beliefs   | -0.106| 0.066      | 2.609  | 1  | 0.106 | 0.899  | 0.790 - 1.023                     |             |             |
| Political beliefs   | -0.147| 0.079      | 3.469  | 1  | 0.063 | 0.864  | 0.740 - 1.008                     |             |             |
| Efficacy of Alt Med | -0.178| 0.068      | 6.969  | 1  | 0.008 | 0.837  | 0.733 - 0.955                     |             |             |
| Life after death    | 0.923 | 0.346      | 7.132  | 1  | 0.008 | 2.518  | 1.278 - 4.957                     |             |             |

Note. The reference category is: Save the most lives.
Table 4: Likelihood Ratio tests of each predictor in final model

| Effect               | Model Fitting Criteria | Likelihood Ratio Tests |
|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
|                      | AIC of Reduced Model   | BIC of Reduced Model   | -2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model | Chi-Square | df  | Sig.  |
| Gender               | 1159.86                | 1259.17                | 1111.86                   | 10.059      | 3   | 0.018 |
| Age                  | 1155.38                | 1254.69                | 1107.38                   | 5.581       | 3   | 0.134 |
| Education            | 1155.64                | 1254.95                | 1107.64                   | 5.840       | 3   | 0.120 |
| Ratings of health    | 1158.92                | 1258.23                | 1110.92                   | 9.124       | 3   | 0.028 |
| Religious beliefs    | 1157.09                | 1256.39                | 1109.09                   | 7.285       | 3   | 0.063 |
| Political beliefs    | 1156.40                | 1255.70                | 1107.40                   | 6.596       | 3   | 0.086 |
| Efficacy of Alt Med  | 1158.45                | 1257.76                | 1110.45                   | 8.654       | 3   | 0.034 |
| Life after death     | 1158.00                | 1257.30                | 1110.00                   | 8.198       | 3   | 0.042 |
Figure 1:

**Fair Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in the Time of Covid-19**

Emanuel et al. (2020)

Across all patients (Covid-19 and non-Covid-19)

Figure 2:

**Based on current results**

Across all patients