CHAPTER 6

Legacies and Futures

Abstract This chapter first examines the interaction between global governance aspirations and East Asian realities. It compares Cambodia and Timor-Leste in the extent to which the UN was able to achieve its objectives of stopping the fighting, transitioning to democratic governance, and developing out of poverty. Similarities and differences are addressed, as well as enduring legacies of UN administration. Lessons learned include the necessity of considering not only the justifiability of the initial intervention, as well as the legitimacy of UN policies while governing, but also the long-term conditions laid for the future governance of the polity. The chapter emphasises the importance of local ownership, consultation, participation, and perspectives, to the twin goals of transforming conflictual relationships, and ensuring a sustainable and equitable development model.

Keywords International organisations · Peacekeeping · Peacebuilding · Responsibility to Protect (R2P) · East Asia

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INTRODUCTION

By focusing on the two most prominent instances of liberal peacebuilding by the United Nations (UN), this volume illuminates the extent to which the post-Cold War optimism may have been misplaced. It also reveals shortcomings in terms of policy prescription inherent in the liberal paradigm itself. In particular, the substantive empirical chapters have identified the challenges faced by the agencies of global governance when universal aspirations are confronted by regional and local perspectives and conditions on the ground. This concluding chapter first, therefore, examines the interaction between global governance aspirations and East Asian (both Northeast and Southeast Asian) realities.

The second section of this conclusion compares these two prominent case studies in the extent to which the UN was able to achieve its avowed objectives of stopping the fighting, transitioning the polities to consolidated democratic governance, and developing them out of poverty. Both similarities and differences are addressed with regard to UN governance in Cambodia and Timor-Leste, as well as the enduring legacies of UN administrations and engagement.

The final concluding section looks at what lessons can be learned from studying these two cases. These include the need to consider not only the justifiability and necessity of the initial governance intervention, as well as the legitimacy of actions and policies of the UN while governing, but also the long-term conditions laid for the future governance of the polity. The importance of local ownership, consultation, participation, and perspectives is emphasised with regard to the twin goals of transforming conflictual relationships in order to build a positive and lasting peace; and ensuring a sustainable development model which is equitable and gives most benefit to those in most need.

PEACEBUILDING, PEACEKEEPING, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION

International organisation has been fundamentally, even though not exclusively, a reaction to the problem of war. Safeguarding international peace and security was the primary reason for the establishment of the UN in 1945. The aspiration “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” is enshrined in the opening lines of the UN Charter. Maintaining peace and security appears first in the Charter’s statement of purposes
and principles. Even the roles and non-military functions of international organisations dealing with other aspects of global governance are often justified by the contributions they can make to international peace and security. As noted in Chapter 1, however, the global governance agenda has evolved to include consideration of peace within states rather than exclusively focusing on the generation of peace between them. This has been reflected in the evolution of the peacekeeping agenda, as well as that of the human security paradigm and the responsibility to protect (R2P). And the UN has been at the forefront of this developmental path, often acting as a norm entrepreneur, challenging state prerogatives, and championing the rights of vulnerable individuals and groups.

This has proven to be extremely controversial, in particular in East Asia. As also outlined in Chapter 1, East Asian states are reputed to be among the most ardent champions of Westphalian sovereignty (Acharya 2003, p. 9). As a result of colonial experience and post-colonial state-building, security threats have generally been identified from the perspective of the state (Nishikawa 2009, p. 217). Facing diverse challenges, including ethnic insurges, disputed borders, and the remnants of colonial and/or Cold War experiences, successive governments in the region have adopted state-centric national security policies with an emphasis on national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity (Than 1998, p. 392). Hence, the region remains a decidedly state-centric security operating environment, resistant to Western concepts of universalism, solidarity, and collective security.

Indeed, East Asia is a unique region in that it combines outstanding economic growth with minimal international organisation. The closest to a regional economic forum is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), established in 1989 to further enhance economic growth and prosperity for the region and to strengthen the Asia-Pacific community. Yet not only does this organisation span the whole of the Asia-Pacific rather than just East Asia, but its membership is actually based on the concept of ‘open regionalism’ meaning that entities from around the world are eligible to join. For Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal (1998, p. 107) “APEC can be viewed as an attempt to avoid confronting the consequences of the ending of the Cold War”, while Mark Beeson (2008, p. 70) notes that for “an organisation that began with such high hopes, APEC has achieved surprisingly little”. In terms of regional security cooperation, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1994
with the stated objectives fostering constructive dialogue and consulta-
tion on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and
making significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building
and preventive diplomacy in the East Asian region. Yet the small and
medium powers of Southeast Asia which sit in the driving seat of the
ARF lack the resources to address regional governance issues.

The region’s early experience with international organisation, the
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, was established through Japanese
conquest. The region was firmly divided during the Cold War, and to a
certain extent still bears the scars and consequences of this ideological
divorce, as well as a suspicion of external great power manipulation and
intervention. The major economies of the region have all experienced
economic growth and development largely in the context of a supportive
trans-regional regime composed of the United States and international
organisations with a global focus, and therefore may see little need to
change.

States in the region have also been less effective in terms of building
institutions and taking collective action because of the fact that the polit-
cical regimes are diverse, ranging from authoritarian to democratic. Japan,
Taiwan and South Korea are more democratic than the other coun-
tries in the region. Only two countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia and
Timor-Leste, can now be considered to be democratic but still remain
unconsolidated (Peou 2010). Indeed, not only the polities of the region,
but also the economies can be seen as a poor match. In 2002, China
and Japan managed to negotiate free trade arrangements with Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries but not with each other.
Japan and South Korea have been talking about a free trade arrangement
since the late 1990s but have still to put anything of substance together,
and in 2019 engaged in tit-for-tat sanctions, which have continued and
even escalated under conditions of COVID-19 in 2020 (Howe 2020,
pp. 105–106).

This, then, is why the case studies evaluated in this volume are of
such paramount importance. First, they are, in themselves, the two most
comprehensive examples of peacebuilding within state entities rather
than between them, and governance by international organisation, ever
attempted. Second, they are both situated in a region traditionally seen as
hostile to external intervention, and this has raised serious questions about
the legitimacy of UN actions. Third, the peacekeeping and peacebuilding
initiatives both occurred after the normative watershed that was the end
of the Cold War, and can, to a certain extent, be judged in accordance with the new human-centred prescriptions espoused by the intervening actors.

**Case Comparison**

The Cambodian case study developed in Chapters 2 and 3 from 1991, reflected with perfect timing, the operationalisation of post-Cold War new world order optimism concerning the prospects for governance by international organisations, and in particular the newly energised UN. As detailed in Chapter 2, the UN action was extremely legal, and followed a somewhat traditional peace and security mandate, but with a focus on building peace between conflictual parties within a single state entity. The UN objectives were putting an end to the war, getting the country to transition from militarised to electoral forms of competition, and putting Cambodia on a path towards peace and prosperity. The achievements of this relatively short intervention by the UN (from UNTAC’s role in the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in October 1991 to the end of its mission after the first national elections in July 1993) were mixed.

From a limited, negative peace perspective, they were mostly positive. Support came from all the P5 Members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), something only possible as a result of the post-Cold War new world order détente bridging the ideological divides within that body, as well as China’s attempts to gain international rehabilitation after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Other great powers and middle powers, such as Japan and ASEAN Member countries, were also very supportive of the process. For the most part, the brutal civil war was ended. Refugees were, on the whole, successfully repatriated. The mission succeeded in organising and holding a national election with a 96% turnout. The foundations were laid for the Cambodian population to enjoy more freedom from fear and, as a result of economic growth following in the wake of the end of the fighting, significant improvement in freedom from want.

Initial shortcomings, however, included that the Khmer Rouge in particular refused to disarm, violated the ceasefire, and stayed out of the electoral process, leading to other factions also refusing to disarm or cooperate fully with the mission, thus leaving the peace process marred by political violence and intimidation. The mission was slow in deploying its peacekeepers and failed to take effective control of the factions’ administrative structures in national defence, foreign affairs, public security,
and information and was unable to complete the disarmament process. As detailed in Chapter 2, even when fully deployed, the idea of fewer than “200 UNTAC civilian administrators effectively overseeing the operations of even five central ministries…let alone controlling them as they were supposed to do under the Paris Agreements—seems, in retrospect, implausible” (Berry 2012, p. 176). The national election itself fell well short of being fully free and/or fair—it was neither free from political violence and intimidation nor fair in terms of levelling the political playing field. The legitimacy of the UN operations declined as they lost the confidence (or in some cases never gained it) of various local factions and actors.

These initial shortcomings contributed to a failure fully to achieve the longer-term objectives of this unprecedented multifaceted UN mission, which included a triple transition from war to peace, from socialist authoritarianism to liberal democracy, and from poverty to prosperity through market-based economic reconstruction (Peou 1997, 2000). Chapter 3 further developed the long-term challenges faced by UN agencies following the withdrawal of the initial peacekeeping mission after the national election in July 1993; but also, the long-term consequences of the shortcomings of UN policymaking and peacebuilding efforts from the perspectives of broader interpretations of human security and positive peace.

Chapter 3 detailed, in particular, how UN agencies have worked to achieve a number of human-centric policy objectives related to the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), transitional justice, and to an extent, distributive justice. While overall, post-UNTAC UN efforts to assist Cambodia across a broad range of policy platforms have been supported by the local administration some UN activities have encountered resistance; most notably those carried out by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Khmer Rouge tribunal (the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia: ECCC).

Death rates across the board have declined. There has been significant socio-economic progress reflected in an average rate of economic growth between 1994 and 2015 of 7.6%, ranking sixth in the world (World Bank 2018). With gross national income per capita reaching $1070, the country gained its lower middle-income status in 2015. In 2018, the country’s Human Development Index (HDI) value was 0.581,
also placing Cambodia in the medium human development category—positioning it at 146 out of 189 countries and territories (UNDP 2019, pp. 2–3). Yet these aggregate measurements fail to capture the ongoing challenges faced by the most vulnerable in Cambodia. Some 70% of the population remains among the ‘working poor’, with the disabled, those affected by HIV, women, garment workers, rural populations, and the young particularly vulnerable. Many Cambodians have had to go outside Cambodia, in particular to Thailand, to find work and better pay, further exposing them to the dangers of human trafficking and exploitation. Yet the greatest legacy shortcomings are to be found in the attempt by international organisations to promote liberal democracy and the rule of law with the illegitimate government constantly entrenching its power and violating human rights, thereby undermining the freedom from fear entitlements of all.

The case of Timor-Leste, developed in Chapters 4 and 5, was likewise initiated at a watershed moment in the contributions of international organisations in general, and the UN in particular. Failures to intervene and protect the most vulnerable in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Rwanda, and in Kosovo, in the face of practices that are “shocking to the conscience of humanity” (part of jus cogens, or a generally accepted principle of international law) had somewhat discredited the normative initiatives and human-centred global governance claims of the world body (Bassiouni 2008, p. 16). Part of the UN attempt to come to terms with these perceived failures has been detailed in Chapter 1 with the discussions surrounding the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), and the evolution of the R2P paradigm, as well as the normative development paradigm linked to the MDGs and later to the SDGs. Timor-Leste also, however, forms an important part of this narrative. Indeed, Timor-Leste itself represented unfinished business for the UN, as the military intervention and forced annexation of the territory by Indonesia following the Portuguese withdrawal in 1975, was feebly countered by the global body. The UNSC called on Indonesia to withdraw all its forces from the territory without delay, and on all states to respect the territorial integrity and the people’s right to self-determination (Martin 2001, pp. 17–18), but did not condemn Indonesia for an act of aggression justifying enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Chapter 4 assessed the four UN missions deployed to Timor-Leste; the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), the UN Transitional Administration of East Timor (UNTAET), the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), and the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). As in Cambodia, the UN aimed for a triple transition in the new country, from military occupation to independence, from Suharto’s dictatorship to liberal democracy, and from poverty to prosperity by way of market-based economic development. The UN missions, and ambitions, in Timor-Leste far exceeded those in Cambodia, and were tantamount, from the UN perspective, to “starting from Scratch” (Asahi 2012, p. 4). Thus, a benevolent altruistic foreign autocratic authority was installed by outsiders without the direct consent of the local inhabitants. Indeed, UNTAET represented a sovereign authority in Timor-Leste, and initially locals were not permitted to take part in the governing structures (Howard 2014, p. 128).

This could be seen as a continuation of League Mandates or UN Trusteeships discussed in Chapter 1, but under direct control of the international organisation. It was questionable whether such assumption of total authority was entirely legitimate, it could certainly be considered a major usurpation of sovereignty, and it stored up problems for the future in terms of generating distrust among local actors. The governance structures imposed on Timor-Leste by the UN and other members of the international community had a mixed record, but the primary challenge was one of legitimacy due to lack of local engagement and input in their construction.

The legacy of UN governance in Timor-Leste is, like that of Cambodia, a somewhat mixed bag. After a number of false dawns, the fighting between various factions in the country was quelled, and in a relatively short period of time since independence, Timor-Leste has actually developed a comparatively good record of democratic competition and has firmly established many of the conditions for a working representative democracy. By 2012, ten years after independence, Timor-Leste had held three sets of free and fair elections (two presidential and one parliamentary) without significant disruption beyond stone-throwing incidents, appearing to consign its recent fractious and violent past to the pages of history, and allowing the withdrawal of UNMIT (Della-Giacoma 2012).

Despite the now conventional wisdom that local ownership is essential for successful peacebuilding, the UN practice on the ground in Timor-Leste excluded local stakeholders in the design of governance
structures. Chapter 5 has outlined, that, despite some improvement in terms of aggregate national development statistics, this has been limited, and what improvements have taken place, have not trickled down sufficiently to the most vulnerable sections of society. As with Cambodia, the youth, women, and rural populations remain particularly vulnerable (Howe 2019, pp. 196–197). Peace has been bought, substantially through the Petroleum Fund, which is a finite resource. It is unclear whether conflictual relationships and their drivers have been transformed sufficiently within Timor-Leste to survive a dramatic economic downturn, such as may be on the horizon at the time of writing, with the dual impact of the COVID-19 crisis, and the 2020 Russia–Saudi Arabia oil price war.

These two paradigmatic case studies demonstrate the humanitarian and human-centred ‘turn’ taken by international organisations in general, and the UN in particular, when attempting to address the global governance challenges of the post-Cold War operating environment. In both cases, however, there was an overarching concern with restoring order, reflected in budget figures for related segments of the administrations. This had the positive effect of stopping the fighting, and achieving the first goal of UN governance, transitioning from conditions of war to those of peace (a negative or narrow peacebuilding endeavour). In Cambodia, even in the face of internal resistance, the international community was able to pursue a degree of criminal and retributive justice through the ECCC, but this has been limited, primarily to the pursuit of defeated and discredited Khmer Rouge, rather than those who remain part of the contemporary governance structure. In Timor-Leste, the UN Special Independent Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste led to the punishment of only a single individual (subsequently pardoned) for the violence of 2006. Thus, in both cases, stability and an end to the fighting was prioritised over criminal and retributive justice.

In the case of Cambodia, however, this focus meant that insufficient attention was paid to human rights, the rule of law, and the robustness of the democratic project. In Timor-Leste, the main negative consequence was a lack of local ownership and legitimacy. Thus, the second aspiration, to transform governance in the countries from authoritarian models to liberal democracy, was not achieved in Cambodia, and faces future challenges in Timor-Leste, despite free and fair elections. The fact that Timor-Leste has become more democratic than Cambodia, despite their similar economic successes and the fact that the tribunal in Cambodia has
been more successful than the tribunal in Timor-Leste, further reflects the importance of local conditions on the ground.

In particular, in addition to political cultures and domestic governance infrastructure, leadership factors play significant roles. Not only was the legitimate democratic government of Timor-Leste established in opposition to the external dictatorship of Suharto, but also one of the key components of a functioning democracy, contestation between popular and legitimate leadership alternatives, was available in Mari Alkatiri and Xanana Gusmão (although they may at times have strayed from strictly democratic methods). By contrast, in Cambodia, the focus (both domestically and among international sponsors) was primarily upon the establishment of stable governance, rather than ensuring democratic contestation, and, once Norodom Ranariddh had been successfully sidelined by Hun Sen, there was little effective contestation.

The third aim, to transition the countries out of poverty to prosperity by way of market-based economic development, was partially achieved for both Cambodia and Timor-Leste. Yet, despite some apparent progress, there are concerns that not enough of any wealth actually generated goes to alleviate the poverty of the most vulnerable, and there is too much dependency on external capital and actors in both cases.

On the whole, UN governance objectives in Timor-Leste were much more ambitious, and, at least in terms of the second set of aspirations, more successful. In part this was down to the timing of the case studies—immediately after the Cold War for Cambodia, when negative peace and top-down governance and development models were still in the ascendency; in part this was because of the much longer commitment and involvement of the UN missions in Timor-Leste (12 years of effort as compared to 18 months in Cambodia). In both cases, regardless of duration of actual UN governance, there are concerns revolving around the legacies of the interventions. These two points reveal the importance of long-term vision, commitment, and legacy or *jus post-intervention*, when determining the success of governance by international organisations.

Despite both cases being strongly representative of the normative and human-centred turn in the UN global governance agenda, both were only possible due to specific geostrategic conditions holding true. For Cambodia, it was not only the end of the Cold War, but also the rapprochement between adversaries across multiple fault lines, and the (temporary) bridging of the ideological divide at the UNSC. For Timor-Leste, it required not only the global geostrategic actors to acquiesce
to UN intervention, but also the collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime in Indonesia, and the initiative of the new President, B. J. Habibie. Thus, no matter the aspirations of the UN and other international organisations in terms of providing ‘good governance’ for the vulnerable populations of the world, realpolitik will always play a role in determining the extent of what can be attempted, and what can be achieved. As Otto von Bismarck famously noted, “Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable—the art of the next best” (Howe 2018, p. 94). Hence conditions on the ground and in the wider international operating environment must be “ripe for resolution” (Zartman 1989).

**Implications and Prescriptions**

This volume has demonstrated the impact of changing perceptions of global governance responsibilities among the international community as represented by international organisations in general, and the UN in particular, as well as less formal regimes, institutions, and norms. The legal case for UN peacekeeping and even peacebuilding operations is now firmly established, even if they may be seen as violating strict conceptualisations of the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Both case studies reflect an awareness of, and sensitivity towards the legal requirements incumbent upon international organisational actors. That the UN, while governing, has responsibilities towards those who are governed that are at least as binding as those upon national governments is also well established, but is less well defined in positive international law (Howe et al. 2015, pp. 6–7).

Indeed, responsibilities while protecting, or post-protection may be recognised under some aspects of customary international law or international norms and generally accepted practices, but until they are formally codified, they will be subject to dispute and competing interpretations (Howe 2008, p. 117). Codification not only clears up confusion regarding rights and responsibilities, it also strengthens the nature of the obligations upon actors. Until such formal codification, these normative imperatives will remain in the realm of considerations of legitimacy rather than strictly enforced and enforceable legality. Perhaps, not surprisingly therefore, the case studies have revealed less consistent conformity with normative prescriptions among international organisational actors. These shortcomings include lack of consultation with and empowerment of local
actors; a top-down rather than bottom up approach; a degree of short-
termism when it comes to governance vision; and a failure adequately to
include broad-based measures aimed at transforming conflictual relations,
rather than simply aiming for a negative peaceful settlement or resolution
of overt conflicts.

As a result, in both case studies, the UN missions fell short of their
own human-centred aspirations, and therefore can be considered to have
had limited governance efficacy. And these are considered the paradigm-
atic case studies. There are many other cases where, due to geopolitical
considerations, the international community embodied in international
organisations, failed to take any action, let alone sufficient action to alle-
viate the suffering of the most vulnerable. The lessons to be learned,
however, are not that UN governance is either unworkable, or ineffec-
tive. Rather the lessons are that steps should be taken to assist local actors
to develop governance models which reflect a concern for the human
security of the most vulnerable instead of measuring governance success
by gains in aggregate statistics; that local ownership is vital; that freedom
from fear, freedom from want, and freedom from indignity must all be
included in related policy platforms; that we must ensure that the shadow
of the future is not discounted; and that we must not be disheartened
by pragmatic limitations of what can be achieved, but rather should make
sure that we are doing all we can, given these constraints.

Finally, and crucially, given the unique considerations of East Asia (and
other regions), these case studies demonstrate that rather than empha-
sising universalism, the UN must give greater credence and prioritisation
to local ownership and regional perspectives when attempting to provide
good governance. Indeed, the aim should not be conformity to a universal
model, but rather a tolerant approach which would allow different world-
views to coexist in harmony with mutual respect and non-aggression.
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter already makes clear the importance of
regional arrangements, noting in Article 52, paragraph 2, that “Members
of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting
such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local
disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies
before referring them to the Security Council”, and in paragraph 3, that
the “Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settle-
ment of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such
regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by
reference from the Security Council”. As noted above, the East Asian
region is particularly deficient in the formal provision of peace and security mechanisms. This does not, however, mean that actors in the region do not have important and growing roles to play in the generation of peace and security.

Smith et al. (2020, p. 1) note that many transitions towards peace in East Asia have been mostly managed by domestic actors through illiberal national and subnational processes of co-option and repression, “which diverge dramatically from the prevailing models of liberal and post-liberal peace-building”. This reflects both the authoritarian and state-centric heritage of East Asian actors and would seem to reject the role of global governance through the UN. Even more so than is the case with liberal peacebuilding, illiberal peacebuilding is unlikely to move beyond mere negative peace or may even provide only a temporary stability within a conflict-affected territory. Illiberal peacebuilding reflects the power political management of conflict, without the legality (and universality) of conflict resolution as touched upon in Chapter 1. In conflict resolution, as embodied in the UN approach to Cambodia and Timor-Leste, and detailed in the case study chapters of this volume, actors seek to bring an end to the conflict through a legal ‘final’ agreement, but potentially leave underlying trust issues between unresolved (Howe 2012, p. 66).

Illiberal peacebuilding may, however, possess greater legitimacy due to a closer reflection of domestic and local conditions and norms, rather than attempts to aspire to an eternal or universal truth or ideal. Rather than rejecting illiberal peacebuilding outright, the authors of this volume advocate incorporation of local voices and perspectives by the universal body in its attempt to address the challenges of governance. Hence, the chapters in this book have indicated the need for an approach which reflects a desire for conflict ‘transformation’, implying the further step of transforming conflictual relationships which undermine trust, thereby making a true and efficient ending of the conflict possible.

Louis Kriesberg (1997, p. 64) elaborates that conflict resolution aims to solve the issues that led to the conflict while conflict transformation changes the relationships between the parties to the conflict. In other words, conflict transformation seeks “to change the conditions that give rise to the underlying root causes of the conflict” which can transpire in the forms of nation-building, reconciliation and healing, change agency, and social transformation (Diamond 1994, p. 3). Thus, conflict transformation draws attention to the systematic transforming of ‘social relationships’ potentially leading to a comprehensive and lasting peace
Yet as also mentioned in Chapter 1, and above, East Asian perspectives on peacebuilding do not necessarily reject the supposedly universal normative principles related to human security and the R2P, they just interpret them differently. In fact, newly empowered and assertive East Asian actors may offer new hope for governance, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding initiatives in the region, whether or not there are regional organisations capable of harnessing their contributions.

First, even if national interest is often to the fore when East Asian actors engage in their humanitarian diplomacy, this is not necessarily a bad thing, as it makes them more likely to follow through on their peacekeeping, peacebuilding, official development assistance (ODA), disaster risk reduction (DRR), crisis relief, post-crisis reconstruction, and structural adjustment commitments than has generally been the case among more traditional Western actors. Second, East Asian actors may have a comparative advantage in promoting global governance agendas because they are simply more acceptable as regional partners by countries where human security is challenged, due to their non-interventional heritage. They are therefore likely to have more substantial impact. The third element of constructive influence wielded by actors in the region concerns the politics of attraction, and soft power broadly defined. While Western models have tended to demand almost dictatorial influence in recipient political, social, or economic structures in return for assistance, those from East Asia, and other non-Western regions, have involved unconditional assistance, local ownership, and empowerment. Regional actors have experienced a considerable degree of success through the politics of attraction, whereby other regional states and their citizens seek to emulate them. This can be considered something of a normative ‘flying dove’ model, with conflict-affected states learning from and being inspired by the human-centred transformations and niche diplomatic activism of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This contrasts with the more traditional economic development flying geese model in East Asia, which has conversely led to an increase in human security challenges for many of the most vulnerable in the region (Howe 2016).

It is up to the UN to harness and empower these initiatives at the regional and even global level in order to build peace and ensure good governance for human security in the future. This is particularly important where regional structures are under-developed. Thus, these case studies of UN administration in Southeast Asia, centred in the broader normative and operational East Asian region, demonstrate the need not only to
bear in mind the R2P when stimulating intervention, but also the newer concept of responsibility while protecting, and perhaps even a responsibility post-protection in terms of providing adequate resources for a good governance legacy.

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