The Inter-Communal Talks and Political Life in Cyprus: 1974-1983

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Abstract

This paper conducts historical research on the inter-communal talks and the political life in the two communities of Cyprus from 1974 to 1983. The period covered by the research commenced with the creation of the bi-regional structure on the island in 1974 and ceased with the declaration of Turkish Cypriot Independence in 1983. As this period constitutes an important threshold in the history of Cyprus, it might be argued that observing the political developments it covers is likely to be beneficial for the literature. The research focused on the two communities’ positions in negotiations as well as their elections and political actors. It utilized Turkish, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot newspapers (and official press releases), political leaders’ memoirs, national archives of USA (NARA) as well as official online documents. Its findings indicate that the two sides could not reach to a settlement mainly due to their disagreements on the authorities of central and regional governments. While the Turkish Cypriot side promoted broader authorities for the regional governments, the Greek Cypriot side favoured broader authorities for the central government. On the other hand, while Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash had managed to unite the majority of Turkish Cypriot right-wing voters, the Greek Cypriot right-wing was divided among supporters of Makarios and Clerides. On the other hand, while the Greek Cypriot left-wing was in cooperation with Makarios, the Turkish Cypriot left-wing opposed Denktash’s policies.

Keywords: Denktash, Makarios, Cyprus, Northern Cyprus, AKEL, DHSY, UBP, CTP.

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Toplumlararası Görüşmeler ve Kıbrıs'ta Siyasal Yaşam: 1974-1983

Öz

Bu çalışma, 1974-1983 arası dönemde Kıbrıs'in iki toplumdaki siyasal yaşamı ve toplumlararası barış görüşmelerini ele alan tarihsel bir araştırma gerçekleştirmiştir. Çalışmanın ele aldığı dönemde Kıbrıs Türk tarafının bağımsızlığını ilan ettiği 1983 yılına kadar süren dönem Kıbrıs tarihi açısından önemli bir dönüm noktası olduğu için, incelenmesinin literatür açısından faydalı olabileceği önune sürülebilir. Çalışma iki toplumun müzakerelerindeki pozisyonlarına, genel seçimleri ile başkanlık seçimlerine ve siyasi aktörlerine odaklanmıştır. Dönemin Türk, Kıbrıslı Türk ve Kıbrıslı Rum gazetelerinden (ve resmi basın özetlerinden), siyasi liderlerin hatıratlarından, ABD ulusal arşivlerinden ve internet üzerinden erişilebilen resmi belgelerden yararlanmıştır. Çalışmanın bulguları iki taraf arasındaki temel anlaşmazlığın siyasi gücün merkezi hükümet ile bölgesel hükümetler arasında nasıl paylaşılacağı noktasında olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Kıbrıs Türk tarafı bölgesel hükümetlere daha fazla yetki verilmesini savunurken Kıbrıs Rum tarafı çok sayıda yetkinin merkezi hükümete bırakılmasından yanadır. Ayrıca, Kıbrıs Türk toplum lideri Denktas Kıbrıs Türk sağının büyük bir çoğunluğunu birleştirmeye bağımsızlık Kıbrıs Rum sağ Makarios tarafı ile Kliridis taraftarları arasından bölünmüş durumdadır. Öte yandan, Kıbrıs Rum solu Makarios ile iş birliği içerisindeki Kıbrıs Türk solu Denktaş'ın politikalarına muhalefet etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Denktaş, Makarios, Kıbrıs, Kuzey Kıbrıs, AKEL, DIŞİ, UBP, CTP.

Introduction: From the 1960 system to federalism

Zeno of Citium, a Cypriot philosopher, promoted the ‘cosmopolitan utopia’ in a form of cosmopolitan citizenship, a world-wide political order and a universal law (Brown & Held, 2010, p.4). Ironically, the two communities of Cyprus, Zeno’s compatriots, having experienced a 300-year peaceful co-existence under the Ottoman rule, failed to build a multi-cultural political future in the era of modernity. It is historically known that, prior to the conquest of Istanbul (Constantinople) by the Ottomans in the mid-15th Century, Loukas Notaras, Grand Duke of Byzantium would rather ‘see a Turkish turban in the midst of the City than the Latin mitre’ (Baş, 2018, p.283). As a matter of fact, the Greek-Orthodox religious elites of Cyprus were pleased with the island’s conquest by the Ottoman Empire as they were liberated from the pressures exerted by Catholic-Venetian rulers. In the Ottoman era, the Orthodox Church in Cyprus enjoyed large freedoms and there had been no noteworthy income gap between the Muslims and the Christians of the island. There had been no ethnic hatred prevailing among the two communities in the Ottoman era. For instance, in 1804, the Orthodox Church helped the Ottoman authorities to suppress a bi-communal rebellion led by a number of Muslim opinion leaders. In 1820s, liberation of ethnic Greeks from foreign rulers and annexation of their territories by the Greek nation-state became a national goal for the Hellen-Orthodox nationalism. In the colonial era, the Greek Cypriot community promoted Enosis (unification of Cyprus with Greece) which was totally unacceptable to Turkish Cypriots as it would render them purely an ineffective minority in the Greek nation-state. (Kizilyürek, 2002). Not only the pro-Enosis Greek nationalism led Turkish Cypriots to promote the partition of the island by Greece and Turkey, but also the British rulers’ divide-and-rule policies damaged the inter-communal relations on the island (Yorgancioğlu & Kiralp, 2019).

Ancient Egyptians, Hittites, Greeks, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Persians (Akçay, 2018, p. 137) Hellenic League and Romans were among the earliest settlers and rulers of the island. In the Medieval age, the island was ruled by the Byzantium Empire, Arabs, Richard the lion-heart, Knights Templar, Lusignans and Venetians (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p.11). Cyprus was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1571. Towards the end of the 19th Century, the Ottoman Empire suffered a sharp decline in its power. This urged Istanbul to find a strategic partner in its struggle against Russian expansionism. To this end,
the Ottoman Empire leagued with Britain and Cyprus became a British protectorate in 1878 (Akgün, 2018, p.419). In 1914, in a way contradictory to the international law, London declared that it unilaterally (without Ottoman Empire’s consent) annexed Cyprus (Yüksel, 2009, pp. 162-164). During the establishment period of the Republic of Turkey, Ankara could not conduct proactive policies towards Cyprus. It prioritized the preservation of the status quo created by the Treaty of Lausanne as it assured Turkey’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. In 1925, Cyprus officially became a British Colony. In early 1930s, Greek Cypriots launched a nationalist mobilization to attain Enosis. The British suffocated Greek Cypriots’ pro-Enosis rebellion. Nevertheless, in 1950s, the pro-Enosis demands emerged once again and Greek Cypriots managed to convince Athens to promote the unification of Cyprus with the Greek nation-state. Ankara made noticeable efforts to discourage Athens from following pro-Enosis policies as these policies were likely to damage Greco-Turkish relations, the stability in the region and intra-NATO balances. Nonetheless, in mid-1950s, Enosis became the official Greek thesis. This led Ankara and Turkish Cypriots to promote the partition of the island by Greece and Turkey (Şahin & Topbaş, 2015). Washington aimed for the termination of this intra-NATO conflict and encouraged the sides to settle the dispute within the framework of the ‘independent Cyprus’ (Armaoğlu, 2009, p. 644).

The Republic of Cyprus, founded in 1960, was based on the political equality and partnership of the two communities on the island. Based on the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey, Britain and Greece became the guarantors of Cyprus’s independence, constitutional order and territorial integrity (Göktepe, 2013). In 1963, Greek Cypriot President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, demanded a set of constitutional amendments that would practically terminate the political equality between the two communities (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, pp.33-34). The Greek Cypriot leader aimed to pave the way for the establishment of a form of majority-rule (Greek Cypriot rule) on the island by abolishing the veto rights that assured Turkish Cypriots’ political equality (Hoffmeister, 2006, pp.4-11). When Makarios’s demands were rejected by the Turkish side, Greek Cypriot armed groups led by extreme nationalist leaders such as Polycarpous Georgadjis and Nicos Sampson launched massive violence against Turkish Cypriots. The violence conducted by these armed groups urged Turkish Cypriots to form ghettos and separate themselves physically from Greek Cypriots (Kızılyürek, 2016, p.293-336). With the involvement of Turkey and Greece, the conflict gained an international dimension. In mid-1964, Washington sharply discouraged Turkey from taking military action in Cyprus. While the Cypriot state remained under Greek Cypriot control, Turkish Cypriots found themselves isolated from the political scene (Bölükbaşı, 1993).

In 1967, when the Greek Cypriot armed forces led by General George Grivas attacked a Turkish Cypriot village, an imminent Turkish intervention was once more impeded by the US mediation. As a consequence, in 1968, Makarios declared that he would negotiate with Turkish Cypriot community and seek for a peaceful solution. During the talks, the Turkish Cypriot side accepted to abolish the veto rights as demanded by Makarios. Nonetheless, it demanded local autonomy and this was rejected by the Greek Cypriot leader. From 1968 to 1974, the inter-communal peace talks created no tangible outcome as the two sides could not overcome the dispute on local governance (Kiralp, 2018, pp. 448-451). In 1974, the extreme nationalist Junta of Colonels in Athens overthrew Makarios via the Greek officers in Cyprus and appointed Sampson as the new head of the state. As the Zurich-London status quo was endangered, Turkey took military action as a guarantor state. The Turkish military action led to the collapse of the military dictatorship in Greece (Uslu, 2003, pp. 122-129). The Greek Cypriot habitants of the North left the South and the Turkish Cypriot habitants of the South for the North.² This created a de facto bi-regional structure in Cyprus.

² The surface area of the North which is inhabited by Turkish Cypriots amounts to 3,355 km² ( Sağsan & Yıldız, 2010, p. 41) and it covers 37% of total Cypriot soil (Hoffmeister, 2006, p.12).
After the military intervention in 1974, the UN exerted pressure on Turkey to remove its troops from Cyprus. On 1 November 1974, the UN General Assembly resolution 3212 asked the parties to recall their military forces (United Nations, 1 November 1974). On 13 December 1974, the UN Security Council endorsed resolution 364 and asked the sides to remove their forces from Cyprus. Additionally, it authorized Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to mediate the sides and resolve the Cyprus Question (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1974). In February 1975, influenced by the Greek lobby, USA exerted an arms embargo on Turkey due to its military action in Cyprus (Gordon & Taşpinar, 2009, p. 27). On 10 February 1975, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş and Greek Cypriot negotiator Glafcos Clerides (who was also the President of Greek Cypriot House of Representatives) met to negotiate the future of the island. The Turkish Cypriot side demanded the establishment of a bi-zonal federation while the Greek Cypriot side favoured a multi-cantonal federation (Milliyet, 11 February 1975, p.1). In Turkish politics, while Süleyman Demirel and his AP (Adalet Partisi-Justice Party) favoured a federal solution, Necmettin Erbakan and his party MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi-National Salvation Party) promoted the establishment of an independent Turkish Cypriot state (NARA, 30 August 1976). Alparslan Türkeş and his party MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-Nationalist Movement Party) also opposed the federation formula (Milliyet, 15 December 1976, p.6). On the other hand, Bülent Ecevit and his party CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-Republican People’s Party) had since March 1974 embraced federation as an appropriate solution model for the Cyprus Question (Milliyet, 28 March, 1974, p.11).

The general public opinion in the Greek Cypriot community preferred the unitary state as the solution formula. In the pre-1974 era, Makarios refused to provide Turkish Cypriots with local autonomy as he believed that it was ‘too much’ for the ‘minority’. Since they characterized the power-sharing issue of the Cyprus Question as a problem between the numerical ‘majority’ (Greeks) and the ‘minority’ (Turks), for many years they could not accept Turkish Cypriots as equal partners. On the other hand, for Denktaş and a significant portion of Turkish Cypriots, having considered the pre-1974 experiences, an independent Turkish Cypriot state backed by Turkey was more preferable than a bi-communal partnership with Greek Cypriots. While the primary choice of Greek Cypriots was the unitary state, a two-state solution was popular among Turkish Cypriots. In one sense, the federal formula found the middle ground between these two contrasting theses. (Kizilyürek, 2005).

In the post-1974 era, a significant difference between the two sides had to do with their attitudes towards the division of political power between the central and regional governments. While Clerides promoted the concentration of a broad range of authorities at the central government, Denktaş favoured devotion of more authorities to regional governments (Fileleftheros, 11 Şubat 1975, p.1). In countries suffering due to ethnic conflicts; the lesser ethnic group (particularly if it is also economically weaker) generally tries to concentrate the political power at the regional governments. In doing so, the minor group increases its chances to preserve its political will against the majority (Horowitz, 1985; Kellas, 1991). Therefore, it might be argued that the Turkish Cypriot community had a number of political reasons leading it to promote larger authorities for regional governments.

On 13 February 1975, the Turkish Cypriot side proclaimed the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (Bozkurt, 14 Şubat 1975, p.1). Even though it was declared in the proclamation text of TFSC (Turkish Federated State of Cyprus) that the Turkish Cypriot side would continue negotiations with the Greek Cypriot side to establish a mutually acceptable constitutional arrangement, the UN Security Council, with the resolution 367 it endorsed on 12 March 1975, expressed that it characterized the proclamation of TFCS as a ‘unilateral decision’, noted that it ‘regretted’ this decision, stated that the final solution to the Cyprus Question could only be found within a mutually accepted framework and invited the sides to continue negotiations (United Nations, 12 March 1975). On 28 April 1975, Denktaş and Clerides, accompanied with Waldheim, met in Vienna and negotiated on the division of political power between central and regional governments. The two leaders could not reach to an agreement and they decided to maintain their dialogue (Clerides, 1992, pp. 253-259). Greek Cypriot leader
Makarios was refusing to contact directly with the Turkish Cypriot ‘minority’ and he had therefore appointed Clerides as the Greek Cypriot representative in peace talks. Additionally, Makarios did not trust Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis and Clerides. He was suspicious about a potential Karamanlis-Clerides conspiracy that could by-pass him by reaching to an agreement with the Turkish side. The US diplomats reported to State Department that Makarios’s distrust towards Clerides and Karamanlis was among the factors negatively affecting the inter-communal talks (NARA, 26 June 1975). On 5 June 1975, Denktash and Clerides met again. Denktash offered Clerides the establishment of a bi-communal administration till the comprehensive settlement was reached. Clerides did not accept this offer (Milliyet, 8 June 1975, p.1).

On 25 June 1975, the Turkish government closed all the US bases in Turkey as a response to the imposition of an arms embargo on Turkey. The US government had three installations in North Cyprus; one foreign broadcast information service and two diplomatic communication facilities. On 29 June 1975, the TFSC government made the decision to close down the US installations in the North. Osman Örek, Minister of Defence, promulgated that no American citizen would be allowed to enter the installations (NARA 29 June 1975). The next Denktash-Clerides meeting, held in Vienna between 31 July 1975 and 2 August 1975, demonstrated that the two sides had serious disagreements over the authorities that would be devoted to the central and regional governments (Milliyet, 1 August 1975, p.1).

In Vienna, Denktash and Clerides also negotiated on the Turkish Cypriots that remained in the South and Greek Cypriots that remained in the North. They signed an agreement according to which the Turks who remained in the South would be allowed to leave for the North and the Greeks in the North would be allowed to leave for the South (Fileleftheros, 2 August 1975, p.1). The final round of the talks took place in New York (8-10 September 1975) and created no tangible outcome. Clerides told the Greek Cypriot press that Denktash had proposed nearly nothing to negotiate (Fileleftheros, 10 September 1975, p.1). However, according to the Turkish press, Clerides told Denktash that the talks could only proceed on the condition that the Turkish Cypriot side agreed to return a significant portion of the Turkish-controlled areas to the Greek side and this attitude deadlocked negotiations (Milliyet, 9 September 1975, p.1). At this point, in his personal memoires, Clerides claims that the Turkish side asked him to prepare a proposal for a bi-zonal federation, which would designate around 25-30 percent of Cypriot territory as the Turkish area, but the Greek Cypriot side refused to do so (Clerides 1992, pp. 344-355).

On 20 November 1975, the UN Security Council resolution 3395 urged the parties to remove their armed forces from the island (Milliyet, 21 November 1975, p.1). As a response to the Security Council’s resolution, Denktash told the press that it was not the Turkish forces whose presence in the North was unnecessary. Instead, it was that of the UN forces (Milliyet, 23 November 1975, p.1). On 23 November 1975, Denktash made another statement and expressed that it was the Turkish intervention of 1974 that urged nations to accept the fact that the Turkish Cypriots were politically equal with Greek Cypriots. Therefore, the Turkish forces could not leave the island unless the Cyprus Problem was solved and the peace was permanently restored (Milliyet, 24 November 1975, p.1). On 17 February 1976, Denktash and Clerides met once again in Vienna. They negotiated on the issue of territorial adjustment. However, within a few weeks after the talks, it was leaked to the press that Clerides did not properly inform Makarios about these negotiations and this urged the first to resign his positions as the Greek Cypriot negotiator and the President of the House of Representatives (Clerides, 1992).

**Peace talks, elections and the political and economic situation in the North**

On 20 June 1976, Turkish Cypriot parliamentary and presidential elections were held. CTP (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi-Republican Turkish Party) had been established before the 1974 as a liberal-democrat party. Nevertheless, in the post-1974 era, it shifted towards a socialist line. The right-wing
UBP (Ulusal Birlik Partisi-National Unity Party) was established in 1976 by Denktaş’s encouragements and it was the most powerful party of the North. Another left-wing party, the TKP (Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi-Communal Salvation Party) was also founded in 1976 and it was composed of pro-Ecevit social democrats and a small fraction of socialists. The HP (Halkçı Parti-Popular Party) was founded in 1975 and it had a centrist position (Kızılyürek, 2005, pp.252-255). In the presidential elections, Denktaş’s rival was Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu, the founding leader of CTP. UBP won 53.7 percent of the votes and 30 out of 40 seats. While TKP won six seats by 20.1 percent of the votes, CTP and HP gained two seats each, the former by a margin of 12 percent and the latter by 11.7 percent. In the presidential elections, Denktaş defeated his rival Berberoğlu by 76 percent of the votes to 21 percent (Ker-Lindsay & Faustman 2009, p. 267).

On 5 September 1976, Greek Cypriots’ general elections were held. After his resignation, in 1976, Clerides founded the right-wing party DHSY (Dimokratikos Sinagermos-Democratic Rally) composed of influential businessmen and leading cadres of EOKA B. The two left-wing parties, Communist AKEL (Anorthotiko Komma tou Ergazomenou Laou-Progressive Party of the Working People) and EDEK (Eniaia Dimokratiki Enosi Kendrou-United Democratic Central Union) had been founded in pre-1974 era. Encouraged by Makarios, the anti-Clerides centre-right figures led by Makarios’s ex-Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyriianou, established the DHPA (Dimokratiki Paraktaksi-Democratic Front) in 1976 (Kızılyürek, 2005, pp. 157-165). In 1976 elections, Makarios, AKEL, EDEK and DHPA joined forces against Clerides. AKEL, EDEK and Makarios’s DHPA formed an electoral coalition. They won 71.9% of the votes and 9, 4 and 21 seats respectively. Tassos Papadopoulos, who was appointed as the Greek Cypriot negotiator in inter-communal talks, was also involved in the anti-DHSY alliance and he won the elections as an independent candidate (Schober, 2010, p.442). Clerides and DHSY lost the elections and they remained outside the House of Representatives (Bozkurt, 7 September 1976, p.1).

In Turkish Cypriot politics, the main difference between the left-wing and the right-wing political parties was their attitudes towards the Cyprus Question. Simply put, the left-wing supported the reunification of the island more enthusiastically when compared to the right-wing (Loizides, 2007, pp.178-184). The Turkish Cypriot left-wing maintained dialogue on the Cyprus Question with its Greek Cypriot counterpart via the international events organized in foreign countries. In Turkish Cypriot left-wing’s agenda, the search for a solution to the Cyprus Problem manifestly overshadowed the anti-Capitalist struggle against the bourgeoisie. As a matter of fact, the UBP had embraced market economy, it had nationalist attitudes and a significant amount of the emerging Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie tended to support Denktaş and the UBP. Furthermore, Denktaş had clearly embraced an anti-Communist political line. It is also a fact that, in 1970s and 1980s, the CTP and TKP were mainly supported by the middle-class. Nevertheless, as the Turkish Cypriot left lacked good relations with

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3 Bülent Ecevit was the social democrat Prime Minister of the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-Republican People’s Party)-MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi-National Salvation Party) coalition government that instructed Turkish Armed forces to intervene in Cyprus in 1974.
4 The EOKA B was a terrorist organization that played a key role in the coup of 15 July 1974 by helping Greek Officers to overthrow Makarios. During the Turkish intervention of 1974, the organization slaughtered over 200 Turkish Cypriot civilians (See: Christofides, 2016, pp.11-12).
5 The DHPA was afterwards named as DHKO (Dimokratikon Komma-Democrat Party).
6 For instance, CTP’s leader Özker Özgür and TKP’s leader Alpay Durduran attended the meeting of World Parliament of Peoples for Peace held in September 1980 in Sofia. There, they issued a joint declaration with the Greek Cypriot delegation that promoted a federal, reunited and independent Cyprus coupled with the removal of all foreign troops from the island (Billuroğlu, 2012, p.105). As previously noted in this paper, the Greek Cypriot side and the UN was urging for the removal of Turkish troops from the island and the Turkish side was expressing that this was impossible unless the Cyprus Question was solved. As a reaction to the declaration issued in Sofia, Denktaş harshly criticized the leaders of CTP and TKP (Moudouros, 2017, p. 150).
Ankara, they failed to represent the Turkish citizens that constituted a large portion of the working-class in the northern Cyprus (see Kızılyürek 2005, pp.248-255).

In Greek Cypriot politics, it is difficult to claim that AKEL had followed a revolutionary line aimed at the destruction of socio-economic system prevailing in Cyprus. However, it manifestly managed to unite the vast majority of Greek Cypriot working-class. The Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie was composed of pro-Makarios, as well as anti-Makarios elements. The upper-middle class and the middle-class were overwhelmingly pro-Makarios (Markydes, 1977, pp.55-86). Furthermore, Makarios had good relations with Greek Cypriot communists and socialists as the Greek Cypriot working-class enjoyed broad social rights. Greek Cypriot workers freely enjoyed the right to establish worker-unions and they benefited quite advantageous social insurance opportunities. On the other hand, Makarios’s policies paved the way for significant economic growth that greatly satisfied powerful companies and exporters as well as merchants and craftsmen. The civil servants had also had quite effective trade-unions and they enjoyed government-sponsored housing in relatively low-priced co-operatives (Kiralp, 2014, pp. 185-186). Nonetheless, the Cold War’s ideological orientations played quite a deterministic role in shaping Greek Cypriot politics. Makarios’s relations with Cypriot communists as well as the USSR and the Non-Aligned Movement had led the Western bloc to perceive him as an anti-NATO leader. Clerides’s pro-Western attitudes were among the key reasons creating the Clerides-Makarios conflict (Clerides, 1992). Furthermore, In Ezekias Papaioannou’s (leader of AKEL) terms, DHSY was a party ‘representing the Imperialist circles of the West and defending their interests in Cyprus’ (Charavghi 12 August 1976, p.1). Thus, while Clerides represented a pro-Western political attitude; Makarios, DHPA, AKEL and EDEK followed rather anti-Western paths.

From August 1974 to May 1975, particularly due to the lack of agricultural labour force, Turkish Cypriots cultivated less than 25 percent of the total planted areas in the North (NARA 16 May 1975). A number of Turkish citizens were sent to northern Cyprus by the Turkish government as a response to Turkish Cypriot authorities’ demands. In addition to these agricultural workers, the TFSC government also allowed the Turkish soldiers who joined the military intervention of 1974 to stay in northern Cyprus (Dolunay & Keçeci, 2017, p. 537). As regards the unemployment in the Turkish Cypriot community, based on the official records, in May 1975, there were around 2,500 unemployed persons in northern Cyprus and 600 of them were university graduates (NARA, 16 May 1975). Thanks to the employment policies conducted based on Turkey’s financial support, in 1981, the number of unemployed persons decreased to 1208 and only 60 of them were university graduates (Yenidüzen, 27 March 1981, p.5).

When the economic sources of the TFSC are considered, the financial aid supplied by Turkey appears to be of vital importance. For instance, in 1981, the %52 of the TFSC budget was composed of funds provided by Turkey (Yenidüzen, 27 February 1981, pp. 4-5). In the post-1974 era, the Greek Cypriot diplomatic efforts made negative impacts on Turkish Cypriot economy and Turkish Cypriot products had very limited access to the international market. The Greek Cypriot side filed cases in countries such as the UK and Holland to prevent Turkish Cypriots from exporting goods to the European market. Furthermore, it took measures to prevent tourism and airways companies from sending tourists to the North. It also urged the US and European governments to prevent companies from making investments in the North (NARA, 19 July 1979). In mid-1970s, citrus fruits were Turkish Cypriots’ primary export goods. On the other hand; food products, fuel-oil, machines and motored vehicles constituted the primary goods they imported. Turkey absorbed 43.5% of Turkish Cypriot exports; United Kingdom 33.4% and Holland 11.6%. Additionally, 64.3% of their imports were from Turkey; 12.2% from United Kingdom, 5.6% from Germany and 3.8% from Lebanon. Cyprus’s official currency was Cypriot lira and Turkish Cypriots continued to use the Cypriot lira till 1983. At that time, one Cypriot lira was equivalent to 36 Turkish liras (Milliyet, 10 August 1976, p. 6).
On 9 January 1977, Denktash wrote a letter to Makarios and asked him to meet and negotiate the Cyprus Question. Makarios replied positively and the two leaders met on 27 January 1977. They agreed on the establishment of a federal partnership. According to Makarios’s unofficial proposal, the Turkish area of the federation would not exceed 20 percent of the Cypriot territory. According to Denktash’s unofficial counter-proposal, however, around 33 percent of the island’s territory would be designated as the Turkish area. Additionally, Makarios demanded the freedom of movement, right of settlement and right to own property for all Cypriot citizens everywhere in Cyprus, as well as the right of refugees to return to their houses (Clerides 1992, p. 409). On 12 February 1977, accompanied by Waldheim, Denktash and Makarios met again. After the negotiations, they signed an agreement. The agreement had four main principles. First, the sides would establish an independent and non-aligned federal state. Second, the territorial adjustment of the state would be discussed in the light of economic viability and land ownership. Third, the freedom of settlement and the right to own property would be discussed in the light of practical difficulties. Fourth, the authorities of the central government would safeguard the bi-communal character, as well as the unity of Cyprus (Milliyet, 14 February 1977, p.1). On 6 April 1977, Turkish Cypriot negotiator, Umit Suleyman Onan and Greek Cypriot negotiator, Tassos Papadopoulos met in Vienna. The talks produced no satisfactory results due to the two sides’ contrasting attitudes towards the territorial issue (Charavghi, 7 April 1977, p.8).

The US initiative and the rise of the left-wing

On 3 August 1977, Makarios passed away. Spyros Kyprianou became the new President (Milliyet, 4 August 1977, p.1). In August 1978, the US diplomat Mathew Nimetz visited Cyprus. Washington took the initiative to mediate the sides. However, neither the Turks nor the Greeks were satisfied with the US interference. Washington aimed to avert Soviet interference in the Cyprus Question, favoured an intra-NATO settlement and therefore preferred to avoid a Security Council debate on the Cyprus issue. Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador to Washington, expressed to US officials that Ankara did not favour US-sponsored formulas (NARA, 2 November 1978). However, the USA, UK and Canada proposed the ‘Nimetz Plan’ to the sides. According to the plan, the Turkish side would allow Greek Cypriot inhabitants of Varosha, the most developed tourism region on the island that had remained isolated since 1974, to return to their properties under UN supervision. Additionally, the international airport in Nicosia that had remained in the UN-controlled buffer-zone would be re-activated for bi-communal and international use (NARA, 15 November 1978). Since the plan was prepared by NATO countries, AKEL persistently urged Kyprianou not to accept it (NARA, 7 December 1978). Consequently, the US-sponsored initiative failed.

In 1979, Turkey’s help and efforts made Turkish Cypriot Community an observing member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (Uslu, 2018, p.56). On 19 May 1979, Denktash and Kyprianou met and they signed the high-level agreement according to which the two sides agreed to establish a non-aligned, united, independent, bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. Based on the agreement, the sides assured that they would negotiate on the issues of demilitarization as well as the citizens’ freedoms of movement, property ownership and settlement. One of the articles of the agreement obliged the Turkish side to allow Greek Cypriot inhabitants of Varosha to return prior to a comprehensive settlement (Milliyet, 20 May 1979, p.1). Nevertheless, the Denktash-Kyprianou agreement hardly did anything more than clarifying the solution formula as the inter-communal talks recorded no noteworthy success for decades. On 12 September 1980, the Turkish army seized power in Ankara. On 24 May 1981, Greek Cypriots held their legislative elections and AKEL enjoyed an

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7 The Varosha issue has a special importance within the Cyprus Question. With its resolutions 550 (endorsed in 1984) and 789 (endorsed in 1992), the UN Security Council urged the Turkish side to not to open the city to the settlement of anyone else than its legal inhabitants and to leave it to UN control. In 2012, the European Parliament invited Turkey to leave the city to UN control (PIO, 2012).
outstanding victory by winning 32.8 percent of the votes. Clerides’s DHSY also recorded significant success by winning 31.9 percent (PIO, 28 May 1981). AKEL and DHSY won 12 seats each, Kyprianou’s DHKO won eight and EDEK the remaining three (PIO, 26 May 1981).

On June 28, 1981, Turkish Cypriots held their legislative and presidential elections. Denktash defeated his pro-federation socialist and social democrat rivals (CTP’s candidate Berberoğlu and TKP’s candidate Ziya Rızkı) in the first round by winning around 51 percent of the votes in the presidential elections. However, when compared to the 1976 elections, it was a certainty that his popularity among Turkish Cypriots significantly decreased (Ker-Lindsay & Faustman 2009, p. 267). Furthermore, the UBP lost the majority in the parliament. While it won 18 out of 40 seats with 42.5 percent of the votes, TKP won 13 seats with 28.5 percent and CTP six seats with 15 percent. The centrist DHP (Demokratik Halk Partisi-Democratic People’s Party) won two seats. TBP (Türk Birliği Partisi-Turkish Unity Party)⁸, a right-wing nationalist party, managed to win one seat. In total, TKP, CTP and DHP won 21 out of 40 seats, and the three parties were provided with the essential parliamentary support to establish a coalition government (Yenidüzen, 3 July 1981, p.1). Nevertheless, the two left-wing parties lacked good relations with the Turkish government and this urgent DHP to lean on the right-wing (Özgür, 1992, p.53). Consequently, Mustafa Çağatay, leader of UBP, established a three-party government composed of UBP, DHP and TBP (Milliyet, 8 March 1982, p.1).

In 1981 elections on both sides, left-wing parties recorded significant success. Nonetheless, the factors shaping the rise of Greek Cypriot left-wing were quite different than the factors increasing the power of Turkish Cypriot left-wing. AKEL, since late 1950s, had enjoyed the support of around one-third of total Greek Cypriot voters. Makarios was an influential leader and he directly manipulated the inter-party cooperation in elections. On many occasions, he urged AKEL to show fewer candidates and pave the way for the rise of right-wing in general elections. For instance, in the 1970 elections, AKEL won nine out of 35 Greek Cypriot seats in the House of Representatives by gaining 39.8% of the votes. In those elections, Clerides’s Eniaion (United Party) won 15 seats by only 25.5% of the votes. The same tactic was utilized in 1976 elections and AKEL sacrificed its potential seats and paved the way for the rise of DHPA against Clerides (Kizilyurek, 2005, p.137-171). In the post-Makarios era, AKEL actually did not enjoy an increase in its votes. What it enjoyed was a fair proportional representation as no other Greek Cypriot leader but Makarios could convince the leadership of AKEL to sacrifice the party’s seats by showing fewer candidates. When it comes to Turkish Cypriot left-wing, they owed their electoral success in 1981 elections largely on the ‘social justice’ discourse. In addition to the reunification of Cyprus, TKP’s and CTP’s electoral programs included planned economy, social insurance and nationalization of commerce. The left-wing accused Denktaş, UBP and the Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie of staying in power by violating the social justice. On the other hand, Denktaş was quite dissatisfied with the dialogue held between the Turkish Cypriot left-wing and AKEL on the Cyprus Question. He claimed that the 1981 elections clearly monitored the emergence of an ideological cleavage between nationalists and Marxists-Leninists in the Turkish Cypriot community (Moudouros, 2017, pp.151-152).

The rise of PASOK and the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence

In October 1981, Waldheim proposed a solution formula to Denktaş and Kyprianou. According to the plan, the island would be divided into three administrative units: The Greek Cypriot region, the Turkish Cypriot region and the federal region. Excluding the federal region, 70 percent of the island would be under Greek Cypriot control and the remaining 30 percent would be designated as the Turkish-controlled area (Milliyet 26 October 1981). Neither side accepted Waldheim’s proposal. In the following two years, the talks could not proceed. Meanwhile, on 1 January 1981, Greece became a member of European Economic Community. On 18 October 1981, PASOK (Panellinio Sosialistiko

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⁸ The TBP was founded by a group of Turkish citizens and it constituted the first attempt to unite the Turkish citizens in northern Cyprus under the roof of a political party (Kizilyurek, 2005, p. 256).
Kinima-Panhellenic Socialist Movement) won the elections and came into power in Greece. PASOK’s discourse had an anti-Turkish character. For instance, when he was in the opposition, Andreas Papandreou (leader of PASOK) had asked the Greek government to destroy the Turkish ship Sismik I carrying out soundings in the Aegean Sea at a point claimed by both countries (Clogg, 2013, p.173). When he came into power, Papandreou signed a treaty with Kyprianou and launched the ‘Collective Defence Doctrine’. While DHSY, DHKO and EDEK clearly promoted PASOK’s policy on Cyprus, AKEL was highly displeased. According to AKEL, PASOK’s policies would damage Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot relations by inflaming the tension. As a reaction to this, Papandreou urged Kyprianou to cease collaboration with AKEL and he created the effects he desired shortly after the presidential elections of 1983 (Mavratsas, 2000, pp. 60-84).

On February 13, 1983, Kyprianou, supported by AKEL, won the presidential elections of the Republic of Cyprus by receiving 56.5 percent of the votes. He enjoyed a clear victory against his rivals, Clerides and Vassos Lyssarides (leader of EDEK) who gained 33.9 and 9.5 percent, respectively (Yenidüzen, 15 February 1983, p.1). On 8 August 1983, Waldheim’s successor, Perez de Cuellar, prepared a solution framework and proposed it to the two sides. Accordingly, 77 percent of the island would be under Greek Cypriot control and 23 percent under Turkish Cypriot. The legislative system would have a bi-cameral character. Greek Cypriots would comprise 70 percent of the members of the House of Representatives (lower-house) and Turkish Cypriot members the remaining 30 percent. In the Senate (upper-house), the representatives of the two communities would be equal in number. Both sides rejected the Aide Memoire of de Cuellar (Hoffmeister, 2006, p. 64). Greek Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicos Rolandis was displeased with Kyprianou’s intransigent attitudes and when the latter rejected the UN Secretary General’s proposal, the first resigned (Fırat, 2009, p.107) It is also essential to note that, the dissolution of AKEL-DHKO partnership constituted a threshold in Greek Cypriot politics. Since 1974, the anti-NATO parties AKEL, DHKO and EDEK had established a form of alliance against the pro-NATO party DHSY. When Kyprianou ended his cooperation with AKEL, the latter remained as the only anti-NATO party as the others became overwhelmingly pro-European with the PASOK in power in Greece. In the post-Cold War era, AKEL as well embraced the pro-European line and the Cold War-type cleavages in Greek Cypriot community largely came to an end (Kızılyürek, 2005, pp.171-205). As regards Turkish Cypriot political parties’ attitudes towards the Cold War alliances; the left-wing was manifestly anti-NATO and it had good relations with Greek Cypriot communists. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot right-wing was staunchly anti-Communist and pro-Turkey (Billuroğlu, 2012, pp. 100-138).

Denktaş expresses in his book that there was a consensus between Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot side dating back to 1974. Based on that consensus, the Turkish side would make attempts to find a federal solution to the Cyprus Question. If these attempts were to fail, the Turkish Cypriot side would declare independence (Denktaş, 2008, pp. 23-24). The UBP and the nationalist right-wing were overwhelming in favour of independence. Nevertheless, there also had been a number of influential social democrat figures supporting the proclamation of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The common argument of the right-wing and the pro-TRNC social democrats was that the Greek Cypriot side was not motivated for a federal settlement, the Turkish Cypriot community was becoming incapable of making medium-term economic plans and it was losing time. Although a clear portion of leading cadres of TKP and CTP opposed the declaration of independence, the intra-party decision-making processes of TKP and CTP led the two parties to support the proclamation of TRNC (Billuroğlu, 2012, pp.105-127).

On 15 November 1983, with the unanimous approval of the Turkish Cypriot parliament, Denktaş declared unilateral independence and changed the name of TFSC to the TRNC. In the text of the declaration of independence, it was expressed that the proclamation of the TRNC would not affect the quest for a bi-communal federation. On the contrary, it was expressed that the Turkish Cypriot side
favoured the continuation of the inter-communal talks (Milliyet, 16 November 1983, p.1). The TRNC was recognized exclusively by Turkey. On 18 November 1983, US President Ronald Reagan sent his Special Representative, Donald Rumsfeld, to Ankara. According to the Turkish press, the US government asked Turkey to revoke her decision on to recognize the TRNC and asked Denktaş to revoke the declaration of independence. After his meeting with Rumsfeld, Evren told the press that he expressed to President Reagan’s Special Representative that the decisions would not be revoked. The Turkish leader asked the US government to convince the Greek Cypriot side to continue negotiations (Milliyet, 20 November 1983, p.1). In his memoirs, Evren mentions that he expressed to Rumsfeld that Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence was useful for the NATO since the left-wing was rising on both sides and this could give Soviets a chance to increase their influence in the Eastern Mediterranean (Evren, 1991, p. 441). With the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence, Greece declared that it would break diplomatic relations with any state recognizing TRNC (Coufoudakis, 1985, p. 283). Papandreou and Kyprianou applied to the UN Security Council to condemn the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence and urge Turkey and Denktaş to revoke the decision (PIO, 16 November 1983a). Furthermore, Kyprianou sent letters to all heads of state and claimed that the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence was a ‘threat to regional peace’. Kyprianou asked them to side with Greek Cypriots within the UN and urge Turkey to revoke the decision (PIO, 16 November 1983b).

On 18 November 1983, the UN Security Council endorsed resolution 541 and called ‘upon all the states not to recognize any other state than the Republic of Cyprus’. While Pakistan voted against the resolution and Jordan abstained, all the remaining members of the Security Council, including the five permanent members (USA, USSR, UK, China and France) voted for. The UN resolution 541 demanded the revocation of Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence (United Nations, 18 November 1983). Kyprianou, satisfied with the resolution and Greece’s support, asked the Turkish side to remove Turkish troops from the island as a precondition for re-launching the inter-communal talks (Moran, 2011). After the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence, the UN continued to encourage the sides for a settlement. In September 1984, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar invited Denktaş and Kyprianou to New York. With the aid of the Secretary General, the two leaders launched ‘indirect negotiations’. Kyprianou visited Washington, Paris and London to ask the three states’ governments to exert pressure on Turkey. Furthermore, the Cyprus issue was in UN General Assembly’s 1984 agenda. However it was removed from the agenda thanks to the initiative taken by Zambia, which was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement supporting the Greek Cypriot side (Milliyet, 21 September 1984, p.1).

Conclusions

The research conducted by this paper reached to the conclusion that, from 1974 to 1983, the disagreements on the authorities of central and regional governments constituted the main difficulty in the peace talks. While the Greek Cypriot side demanded broader authorities for the central government, the Turkish Cypriot side promoted broader authorities for the regional governments. Even though the Denktaş-Makarios and Denktaş-Kyprianou agreements created the essential basis for a federal solution, the two sides could not settle their disagreements on the power-sharing issue and the problem remained unresolved. The uncertainty was among the key factors motivating the Turkish Cypriot side to declare independence. Nonetheless, the Security Council urged member-states to not to recognize TRNC. As the Greek Cypriot efforts limited Turkish Cypriot economy’s access to the international market, the financial aid provided by Turkey played a vital role in the North’s economy. As regards party systems, both sides had multi-party democracies composed of right-wing as well as left-wing parties. The Turkish Cypriot left-wing supported the reunification of Cyprus while the right-wing promoted independence. Additionally, while the Turkish Cypriot right-wing established good relations with Turkey, the left-wing lacked such relations. This largely deprived the Turkish Cypriot left-
wing from the opportunity to represent Turkish agricultural workers in the North. Furthermore, Denktaş was greatly dissatisfied with the dialogue held between the two sides’ left-wings. Nevertheless, as the Turkish Cypriot left-wing promoted the ‘social justice’ in 1981 and they enjoyed a significant rise in their popular support in presidential and parliamentary elections, it might be argued that a noticeable amount of Turkish Cypriots was hardly satisfied with the TFCS government’s policies on the distribution of economic sources in the North.

While the Turkish Cypriot left-wing lacked good relations with Denktaş, Makarios and the Greek Cypriot left-wing had joined forces against Clerides and his right-wing party DHSY. The Greek Cypriot right-wing had two prominent leaders: Makarios and Clerides. The Greek Cypriot left-wing had chosen the first for cooperation and struggled against the latter whose political stance was undoubtedly pro-NATO. In other words, while Denktaş was the only dominant leader of Turkish Cypriot right-wing, the Greek Cypriot right-wing was divided among the supporters of Makarios and Clerides. In the post-Makarios era, as the results of 1981 elections monitored, AKEL and DHSY became significantly more influential in Greek Cypriot politics. As regards relations with Greece and Turkey, Greek Cypriot left-wing party AKEL lacked good relations with Papandreou and Turkish Cypriot left-wing parties TKP and CTP lacked good relations with Evren.

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