Islamic Revivalism in Indonesia: The Caliphate, Sharia, NKRI, Democracy, and the Nation-State

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ABSTRAK
Artikel ini bertujuan untuk meneliti perspektif gerakan revivalis Islam di Indonesia terhadap konsep negara-bangsa dan demokrasi. Istilah gerakan revivalis Islam yang digunakan dalam studi ini diantaranya adalah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Fron Pembela Islam (FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), dan Forum Umat Islam (FUI). Setelah jatuhnya rezim Presiden Suharto pada tahun 1998, Indonesia telah mengalami peningkatan aktivisme Islam yang tujuannya berkisar antara pelaksanaan syariah (hukum Islam) dan, sampai batas tertentu, pendirian kembali khilafah Islamiyah (negara Islam transnasional). Demi tujuan tersebut, gerakan-gerakan revivalis ini telah sering menggelar protes massa, terutama untuk menyikapi kebijakan pemerintah Indonesia yang dianggap tidak Islami. Beberapa protes berakhir dengan kekerasan sehingga dapat dikatakan bahwa upaya-upaya penerapan syariah dan pendirian negara Islam tersebut telah memicu sejumlah konflik di masyarakat Indonesia. Penelitian ini mengasumsikan bahwa aktivisme yang berpotensi memicu kekerasan atau konflik tersebut bermula dari pemahaman atau penentangan gerakan revivalis ini terhadap konsep negara-bangsa dan demokrasi. Atas latar belakang inilah penelitian ini dilakukan untuk menganalisis perspektif mereka mengenai konsep negara-bangsa dan demokrasi. Penelitian ini berargumen bahwa meskipun gerakan-gerakan revivalis Islam

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This research examines Indonesian Islamic revivalist movements' perspectives on the concepts of the nation-state and democracy. The Islamic revivalist movements studied in this research include Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and Forum Umat Islam (FUI). Following the fall of the authoritarian Suharto's regime in 1998, Indonesia witnessed an escalation of Islamic activism whose goals revolve around the implementation of Sharia (Islamic law) and, to a certain extent, the reestablishment of a caliphate (transnational Islamic state). To this end, revivalist movements have been staging frequent mass protests, mainly addressing Indonesian government policies that are deemed un-Islamic. Some of the protests have ended violently, which implies that their Sharia and Islamic state goals have become a source of conflict in Indonesian society. This research suggests that this violent activism stems from different versions of the concept of the nation-state and democracy, which disagree with broadly accepted definitions. This research was conducted against this backdrop to analyze each movements' perspectives on the concept of nation-state and democracy and argues that, despite each movement advocating the implementation of Sharia, their understandings of the concepts of the nation-state and democracy differ.

Keywords: Indonesia, sharia, caliphate, nation-state, political Islam, Islamic movement

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INTRODUCTION

Since the collapse of Suharto's regime in 1998, Indonesia has seen a rise in Islamic revivalist activism that calls for the implementation of Sharia and the establishment of a caliphate. Salim and Azra (2003, 1–2) argue that political Islam following the Suharto era has been characterized by what is known as the “formalization of Islam,” seen in rising demands for the implementation of Islamic law and the mushrooming of Islamic revivalist movements such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and Forum Umat Islam (FUI) in various regions across the country. Prior to the collapse of the New Order, these movements operated underground to avoid the regime’s repression. The toppling of the regime opened up

1 HTI became public in 2000 and since then has been actively calling for the establishment of the caliphate and implementation of the Sharia. In July 2017, Joko Widodo’s administration disbanded the organization for basing itself on an ideology that challenges the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. See Movanita (2017).
the political sphere for these movements, allowing them to consistently campaign for the implementation of Sharia through collective action, such as protests, mass mobilization, statements on media platforms, petitions, and other methods. These movements have discussed a variety of issues, from economic concerns such as the rise of gasoline prices to pornography, as reflected in the protest against the hosting of Miss World. These protests in principle aim to highlight the government’s inability to address existing problems while at the same time offering Sharia as their solution.

The term “Islamic revivalist movement” refers to any social movement that aims to revitalize Islamic teachings and its principles in the public sphere through involvements in various social activities. Esposito and Voll (2001, 39) defined the Islamic revival as the revitalization of Islamic teachings and principles throughout the Islamic world, manifested in an increase in piety and the implementation of Islamic ethics and culture among Muslims. They regarded the Egypt-based *Ikhwanul Muslimin*⁡² and Pakistan-based *Jamaat al-Islami*⁡³ as Islamic revivalist movements that aim to establish a system of governance based on Sharia in their respective countries. Similarly, Islamic movements in Indonesia also hold these aspirations. Several movements have even called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. However, there are also revivalist Islamic organizations that do not engage in collective action that aim to challenge the government.

Other Islamic revivalist organizations include *Jamaah Tabligh* (Preaching Community) and *Baitul Mal wat Tamwil* (BMT). *Jamaat Tabligh* is a nonpolitical Islamic movement whose main activity is *dakwah*: the call for Muslims to increase their individual piety (Ali 2003). BMT is a microfinance institution that offers financial services

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² *Ikhwanul Muslimin* is generally known as the largest and most influential Islamic movement in the Arab world. The movement was established in 1928 by an Egyptian Islamic intellectual named Hassan al-Banna. One of the movement’s main objectives is the enforcement of Sharia in the public sphere. For further detail, see Husaini (1956) and Mitchell (1969), among others.

³ *Jamaat al-Islami* was established in Lahore, Pakistan, in 1945 by an Islamic intellectual named Abul Ala Maududi. The movement gained popularity and influence in the Indian subcontinent. *Jamaat al-Islami* aims to establish a system of governance based on the Islamic law in Pakistan. For further detail, see Nasr (1994; 1996), among others.
to small and medium enterprises as well as the poor. The institution bases its operations on the principles of Islamic economy and finance (Sakai 2008). It is necessary to distinguish the fundamental difference between Islamic revivalist organizations that engage in collective action such as HTI, FPI, MMI, and FUI and those that do not participate in collective action, such as *Jamaah Tabligh* and BMT. The concept of social movements is employed in this research to explain these differences. The majority of scholars define the main characteristics of social movements as involvement in sustainable collective action directed at the government, political elites, and their opponents. These collective actions usually materialize in the form of mass demonstrations, meetings, rallies, and statements on media platforms, among others, and are extra-institutional or extra-parliamentary (Gamson and Mayer 1996, 283; Tarrow 1998, 4; Tilly 2004, 7).

The capacity to take part in sustainable collective action against the government, political elites, and oppositional groups differentiates Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI, FPI, MMI, and FUI from nonpolitical Islamic revivalist organizations like *Jamaah Tabligh* and BMT. This also differentiates them from Islamic political parties. One may categorize Indonesian Islamic political parties, like *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, which emerged from a *tarbiyah*-based campus organization and gained popularity among Muslim students in the 1990s, as an Islamic revivalist movement. This categorization is due to the structure and actors of political parties and social movements that often overlap, as demonstrated in the structure of the Green Party. However, even though these political parties may be regarded as social movements, this condition usually applies to parties that originate from social movements, such as the Labor Party. The majority of scholars agree that the main difference between social movements and political parties lies in the roles they play: while political parties’ main form of political activism takes place in formal political institutions, such as the DPR or legislature, social movements take part in activism outside of formal institutions (Diani 1992, 14–15; Goldstone 2003, 3).
HTI, FPI, MMI, and FUI are Indonesian Islamic revivalist movements that emerged after the fall of Suharto’s regime in 1998. Since they became established, they have engaged in various forms of collective action. HTI is known for its call for an Islamic caliphate. This demand is not only a slogan but also packaged as a solution to multidimensional problems that the country has faced since the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The crisis began with the depreciation of the Indonesian Rupiah to the US Dollar, which caused political and economic instability, rocketing commodity prices, mass unemployment, and prolonged ethnic and sectarian conflicts in several regions such as Maluku and Poso, Central Sulawesi. MMI is a movement that calls for the implementation of Islamic law (Sharia) in Indonesia. FPI actively participates in collective action that advocates the principle of amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (enjoining the good and forbidding the wrong) without calling for the establishment of the Islamic state in Indonesia. Similar to the previously mentioned movements, FUI campaigns for “NKRI Bersyariah” or “A Sharia NKRI,” which calls for the implementation of Sharia within the framework of Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI). There are specific differences between the methods of interpretation and implementation of Sharia that these movements employ, such as stances on the Shia community and electoral participation. However, they all generally agree on an urgent need to advocate for the interests of Islam and Muslims in Indonesia, as well as revitalize Islamic teachings and principles not only in the private sphere but also in public.

During their development, the demands of these Islamic revivalist movements created social tensions and even horizontal conflicts. For example, their agenda to disband the Indonesian Ahmadiyah organization by claiming that the organization had strayed from Islam incited a social conflict that led to the Monas Incident on June 1st, 2008. This incident became a subject of public scrutiny as the clash between the Islamic revivalist alliance and the alliance that opposed the disbandment of the Indonesian Ahmadiyah injured many people. Furthermore, other violent incidents incited by these movements, such as the unrest led by FPI in front of DKI’s DPRD building in 2012 and 2014 (Radja
2014) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (Tribun News 2012), cannot be easily forgotten by the public.

These movements’ agendas to implement the Sharia and establish an Islamic caliphate have been criticized and opposed by other elements of Indonesian society. For example, a young intellectual from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Zuhairi Misrawi (2007), argued that the concept of a caliphate is not compatible with the concept of NKRI. Agreeing with Misrawi, a senior NU figure, Solahuddin Wahid (2008), stated that Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, NU, had agreed that the concept of NKRI is absolute. In other words, Indonesia’s Pancasila-based system of governance, which was agreed upon by the country’s founding fathers, cannot be altered. Opposition to the establishment of the caliphate and implementation of Sharia begs for an inquiry into Islamic revivalist movements’ concepts of democracy and the nation-state. The Islamic revivalist movements’ desire to implement Sharia tends to be accompanied by violence, which undermines political stability and security. Based on these contexts, this article aims to answer the question, “how do the four Indonesian Islamic revivalist movements (HTI, FPI, MMI, and FUI) perceive the concepts of democracy and the nation-state?” This research employs a qualitative approach to explore the concepts of social movements, Islamic revivalism, democracy, and the nation-state. This article argues that although all four of the Islamic revivalist movements agree on the implementation of Sharia in Indonesia, they differ in their attitudes to the concepts of the nation-state and democracy.

RESEARCH METHOD
This research employs a qualitative approach. Unlike quantitative research studies, qualitative research employs an interpretative paradigm that views social phenomena as social constructs and thus adopts an inductive method that aims to produce theories, not test or verify hypotheses. A case study, which is an intensive, holistic description and analysis of a single entity, phenomenon, or social unit (Merriam 1998; Creswell 2003), best serves the specific characteristics of this qualitative study.
This research is particularistic as it focuses on a specific phenomenon. In this research, four Indonesian Islamic revivalist movements—HTI, FPI, MMI, and FUI—are the focus of the study. Data on each movements’ daily activities were obtained through field research, where the author directly observed and interacted with members and leaders of these movements. Interviews were also conducted with members and leaders of the movements to obtain firsthand information that cannot be accessed through literature or media. A literature review was conducted to provide valuable information on certain aspects of this research. Data were therefore obtained through observation, literature review, and interviews, to complement and balance each other.

CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Social Movements

A large part of social movement study has focused on collective action, particularly research carried out in Western societies. Social movements are usually categorized as old social movements, such as the labor movement, and new social movements, such as feminism, ecology, and anti-war movement. The emergence of old social movements happened in the context of conflicting relations between capital owners vis-à-vis labor, as emphasized by orthodox Marxism. New social movements employ a different perspective from that of the economistic or materialist Marxist. While building a more comprehensive analysis of new social movements, scholars have set aside the classic determinism of the capital-labor conflict that has underpinned the framework of old social movements in postindustrialized economies since the 1960s. The main characteristics of the new generation of social movements differ from those of the old labor movements. New social movements pay more attention to social change or transformation than economic transformation (Buechler 1995, 453; Porta and Diani 1999, 11–13). Scott (1990, 16–17) attributes three characteristics to new social movements. Firstly, new social movements emphasize lifestyle and values rather than citizenship issues and political power. Secondly, they are an in-
separable element of civil society. Thirdly, new social movements aim to bring about social change through socialization into new social values and alternative lifestyles.

Although scholars may employ different emphases when defining social movements, their main focus has been on social movements during the postindustrial economic era. In contrast to Scott’s (1990) characteristics of social movements, other scholars have provided other descriptions of new social movements, with varying perspectives on typology, structure, and strategy. For example, the majority of scholars stress the most important elements of social movements, such as the capacity to take part in sustainable collective action against authorities, political elites, and opponents. Their collective action may include mass demonstrations, mass mobilization, petitions, and media statements usually by extra-institutional means (Gamson and Mayer 1996, 283; Tarrow 1998, 4; Tilly 2004, 7). Porta and Diani’s (1999, 13) definition places an emphasis on sustainable collective action or challenges as a necessary requirement. A similar definition is used by Oberschall (1993, 2) who defined social movements as a collective means to bring societal change that impacts human lives on a large scale.

**Islamic Revivalism**

As touched upon above in the introduction, the term “Islamic revivalism” refers to the means to revitalize Islamic teachings and principles in the public sphere through protests against authorities, political elites, and/or groups with opposing ideologies. Islamic revivalism involves the revitalization of Islamic teachings and principles across the Islamic world, manifested in an increase in piety and the implementation of Islamic principles. This spirit is reflected in the activisms of the Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt, the Jamaat al-Islami in Pakistan, and the transnational movement Hizbut Tahrir (HT), among others. They aim to implement a system of Sharia law and governance in their respective countries. This aspiration to implement Sharia is also shared by Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia and manifested in the continuous
call for the total implementation of Sharia and, to some extent, the establishment of an Islamic state (Esposito and Voll 2001, 39).

**Democracy and the Nation-State**

The broadly accepted definition of modern democracy is “a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions to their citizens, who have chosen and mandated political power to them through elections.” (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 114). The elements that make up democracy include the following: 1) citizens’ equal participation in politics; 2) popular sovereignty, or as said by the Latin phrase *Vox Populi, Vox Dei*, which translates to “the voice of the people is the voice of God”; and 3) guaranteed checks and balances between executive and legislative bodies (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 114). Many Islamic revivalist movements oppose the concept of democracy and view it as foreign to Islam.

**RESULTS AND ANALYSIS**

**HTI’s Perception of the Concepts of Democracy and the Nation-State**

Nation-states are called “imagined political communities” that are limited and sovereign. Nation-states are limited because they have finite borders. Beyond those borders exist other nation-states. Nation-states are sovereign because the concept was born during the Age of Enlightenment and Revolution, which destroyed the legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchal dynastic realm. The “sovereign and limited” characteristic of the nation-state means that, unlike a monarch, no nation-state can claim sovereignty over other nation-states. Furthermore, the sovereignty of most modern nation-states is secular or does not originate from divine rule. The role of religion and its institutions has been radically eliminated and is regarded as a personal matter in the private sphere. These characteristics are incompatible with the concept of a caliphate. The concept of territorial borders used by a caliphate also differs from that of the nation-state. The caliphate can extend territorial
borders through annexation and seizures through concessions due to loss in war (Yoyok Tindyo, HTI’s public relations officer for the Yogyakarta chapter, December 3rd, 2008). Secularism also has no place in a caliphate’s system of law and governance, as a caliphate bases its laws on God’s orders, which regulate both the private and public spheres.

*The Islamic creed (aqidah) the foundation of the state. There shall be no government structure, accountability, or any governmental aspect that does not base itself on Islam. The Islamic creed is also the source of all state laws and the Sharia. There shall be no law or qanun that is not based on Islamic creed* (An-Nabhani 2002, 115).

A caliphate sits in stark contrast to a nation-state. The difference inevitably results in HTI’s disapproval of other concepts or ideologies such as nationalism and democracy that are regarded as foreign to Islam. For example, nationalism is generally viewed as a product of the nation-state and broadly understood as one’s sense of loyalty or sense of belonging to a nation-state. Nationalism is deemed necessary and will continue to exist as long as the nation-state. Only in nation-states are the concepts of shared history, myths, and legends found and instilled through mass socialization and media to promote attachment to the nation-state (Smith 1999; 2004). To HTI, the concepts of nation-state and nationalism are problematic. Not only is nationalism foreign to Islam, it has also been the source of conflicts between Muslims worldwide. The nation-state and nationalism divide Muslims into different political entities. This condition impedes the establishment of a single political entity that could unite the 1.6 billion Muslims around the world, named a caliphate.

In addition to opposing the concept of the nation-state and nationalism, HTI also opposes the concept of Western democracy. From the elements of democracy mentioned above, the second element that HTI disagreed with was the concept of popular sovereignty. To HTI, sovereignty should not originate from the people, but Sharia. To them, Islam has provided its followers with a set of rules and laws that encompass every aspect of life. HTI also views the practice of modern democracy
as equivalent to secularism, where almost every decision about public affairs is made by the people through their representatives in the parliament. In other words, the laws in democracies are not based on Sharia. On the contrary, these rules and laws are made by the majority. HTI authored a book that specifically critiqued the principles of democracy, which is regarded as a “kafeer system.”

*Democracy is a law system created by humans to rebel against monarchs who claimed divine right to rule and oppress the people. Democracy is founded by humans and thus has no relation to revelation nor religion* (Zalloom 1995, 5).

Despite its condemnation of the secular aspect of democracy, HTI did not view other elements of democracy, such as elections, as oppositional to HTI’s principles. This part analyzes HTI’s attitude toward participation in elections and why the organization never evolved into a political party that campaigned for votes in Indonesian elections despite the HT international umbrella organization’s status as a political party in the Middle East. Some scholars argue that the international HT actively chooses to remain as an extra-parliamentary movement (Mayer 2004, 22; Arifin 2005, 160; Karagiannis 2006, 266; Mandaville 2007, 111). However, HT nominated several candidates in the Jordanian elections in 1954 and 1956. The second leader of HT, Abdul Qadim Zallum, competed for a seat in parliament, albeit unsuccessfully. During the second election, Ahmad al-Daur was HT’s only candidate to win a seat in the Jordanian parliament (Cohen 1982, 209–210; Commins 1991, 196; Farouki 1996, 6–7; Lust-Okar 2001, 558; Moaddel 2002, 541).

Due to its unglamorous experience in the past elections and repressive measures by the state toward its members, HT shifted its stance on elections from participatory to nonparticipatory. In the Jordanian political landscape, the shift was evident when HT boycotted the country’s election in 1989, which was the country’s first election since the Jordanian government abolished all political parties in 1957. HT said

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4 The international HT states itself as a political party. See HT’s official website, “Hizb ut-Tahrir,” at http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info.
they did not perceive any benefit from participating in the elections and refused to acknowledge the Jordanian Constitution. This was also the main reason behind HT’s nomination of two candidates in the 1954 and 1956 elections and their boycotting of the 1989 elections. The country’s election laws that were passed in 1986 also became HT’s main reason for refusing to participate in the 1989 elections. The laws stated that every candidate in the election had to declare they had no affiliation with any political parties whose platform or ideology did not support the state’s laws. In the 1950s, HT was not subject to that restriction (Farouki 1996, 157; Lust-Okar 2001, 558).

HT’s decision to avoid participating in elections differed to HTI’s stance. During HTI’s international conference on the caliphate in Jakarta on August 12th, 2007, HTI’s spokesperson Ismail Yusanto stated that HTI does not refuse to participate in elections as the international HT itself nominated candidates during the 1950s’ Jordanian elections. HTI believes that Islam permits participation in elections (mubah) (Interview with Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, March 12, 2008). Ismail stated that electoral participation is a procedure compatible with the concept of wakaalah or representation in Islam. The concept consists of four elements: 1) wakil (representative), 2) muwaakil (the represented), 3) ‘amal (the deed carried out on behalf of the muwaakil, and 4) ‘aqad (contract or agreement between the wakil and muwaakil). From these four elements, Ismail emphasized ‘amal as a very important aspect because it determines the nature of the representation. If the deed is a good deed, thus the representation is good. Conversely, if the deed is bad, then the representation is bad. Ismail stressed that elections themselves cannot be regarded as right or wrong as they are merely methods for choosing one’s representatives, while the main duties of these representatives are to transform parliament into a place of dakwah, to monitor the executive, and, most importantly, to fully implement Sharia.5

5 For further detail on HTI’s mobilization strategy and rhetoric, see Osman (2010a; 2010b) and Munabari (2010), among others.
MMI’s Perceptions of the Concepts of Democracy and the Nation-State

MMI opposes the concept of democracy and views it as incompatible with Islamic teaching. Like HTI, this opposition is based on the belief that the concept is foreign to Islam and not in accordance with Sharia. However, MMI does not demand the establishment of a caliphate or an Islamic state in Indonesia as MMI prioritizes the full implementation of Sharia in Indonesia over the former. This stance is reflected in MMI’s campaigns, where the call for the enforcement of Sharia is always written on banners and leaflets and announced as its agenda. The use of the term “Islamic state” has never been the movement’s agenda (Shadiq 2016).

To MMI, democracy can be categorized into two definitions. The first definition is democracy as an ideology. As an ideology, democracy is viewed as incompatible with Islam. MMI regards those who ascribe to this ideology as musyrik, which is literally translated as those who worship a god other than the One God Almighty. The second definition regards democracy as a method that is permitted (mubah). Islam permits the use of this method to elect rulers or leaders. However, Muslims must use this method to fight for the interest of Muslims by choosing leaders who commit to the institutionalization of Sharia in Indonesia. Although democracy is permitted, MMI warns the public that democracy generally clashes with Islam.

As stated in the Holy Quran, democracy taints Islam and Muslims. It is the nature of those who practice democracy to eventually break their promises [to support Islamic interests and causes] (Arrahmah 2013).

MMI’s attitude toward participation in elections is similar to that of HTI. MMI regards democratic elections as a method for choosing a ruler. Thus, MMI views elections as permitted by Islam (mubah). This method, based on a form of consensus and voting, was also used during the era of Khulafaur Rasyidin. However, the status of elections as

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6 For further detail on MMI, see Bruiniessen (2002) and Fealy (2004), among others.
permitted in Islam does not translate into MMI encouraging its followers to vote in elections. Like HTI, MMI is concerned with several social and political factors that influence elections in Indonesia’s contemporary political context. These factors have resulted in MMI’s high level of distrust in the concept and practice of democracy in Indonesia. Furthermore, MMI objected to the decision made by the FUI coalition that MMI joined to explicitly support the nomination of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto as President and Vice President during the 2009 election. MMI’s dissatisfaction was due to FUI’s lack of consultation with MMI prior to announcing their support (Interview with Abu Jibril, December 19, 2013).

MMI released a press statement about its stance on electoral participation before the 2014 election. This press release further clarified MMI’s attitude toward elections. There are two reasons behind MMI’s refusal to participate in elections. Firstly, MMI points to the absence of Indonesian political parties that base their platform purely on Islam and aim to achieve the implementation of Sharia. Secondly, the participation and competition between political parties in elections are designed to embolden the system of *shirk* (the deification of other entities beside God), which renders the system incompatible with Islam. MMI deems the *shirk* system as equivalent to the secular democratic system that separates the state from religion. For these reasons, MMI calls for every Muslim to choose political parties whose ideology does not violate Sharia and vote for presidential and legislative candidates who unequivocally support the institutionalization of Sharia in Indonesia (Muttaqin 2014).

Like HTI, when MMI calls for Muslims to support political parties and legislative candidates who support the formalization of Sharia, this is mere rhetoric. There are no political parties nor members of the legislature who support the formalization of Sharia in Indonesia. Should MMI explicitly announce its oppositional stance to elections and call for abstention, MMI would violate the country’s election laws, which
prohibits individuals from encouraging other individuals to abstain in elections.\textsuperscript{7}

FPI’s Perceptions of the Concepts of Democracy and the Nation-State

Unlike HTI that campaigns for the full implementation of Sharia in Indonesia, FPI is not interested in the formalization of Sharia. FPI’s leaders believe that “enjoining the good and forbidding the wrong” (\textit{’amar ma’ruf nahi munkar}) is also a part of the call for Sharia.\textsuperscript{8} An FPI leader said that essentially Indonesia has implemented laws that are in accordance with Sharia, such as the laws on Islamic banking, Islamic marriages, and zakat. FPI believes that, although the implementation of Sharia in Indonesia is important, it needs to be implemented gradually. The complete formalization of Sharia is not FPI’s utmost priority. Furthermore, unlike HTI that urges the establishment of a caliphate or an Islamic state, FPI already regards Indonesia as an Islamic country due to 1) the majority of citizens being Muslim; 2) Muslims’ freedom to exercise their religion, and 3) the government’s current implementation of several Islamic laws.

\textit{In essence, the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia is unnecessary as Indonesia is already an Islamic country. Indonesia has already implemented several laws that are in accordance to the Sharia such as the law on Islamic banking, the law on Islamic marriages, and zakat. It is correct that the complete implementation of the Sharia is important, but it is something that we should implement gradually} (Interview with Jafar Shodiq, November 4, 2013).

In contrast to HTI, FPI views supporting candidates in presidential or regional elections as an effective method to “enjoin the good and forbid the wrong.” However, this support is conditional, in that the elected candidate must support “enjoining the good and forbidding the bad”

\textsuperscript{7} See Election Law (\textit{Undang-Undang Pemilu}) No. 10 2008 that stipulates any action or means to prevent an individual from casting their vote as illegal and subject to punishment.

\textsuperscript{8} For further detail on FPI, see Jahroni (2008) and Ng (2005), among others.
and fight for FPI's programs, such as eliminating bad deeds (disobedi-
ence in Islam) from society, and disbanning the allegedly astray Indo-
nesian Ahmadiyah organization. An example of this support was FPI's
endorsement of Juruf Kalla dan Wiranto during the 2009 presidential
election. FPI also supported several gubernatorial candidates in several
regions, such as Fauzi Bowo and Nachrowi Ramli in the 2012 DKI
Jakarta gubernatorial election, Ahmad Heryawan and Deddy Mizwar
in the 2013 West Java gubernatorial election, and Anies Baswedan and
Sandiaga Uno in the 2017 DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election. Prior to
officially deciding and announcing their support for certain candidates,
FPI usually holds meetings with the candidates and asks if they are will-
ing to support FPI’s “anti-bad-deeds” programs. If the candidates agree,
FPI then calls upon their members and followers to support and vote
for the candidates. In many circumstances, FPI not only releases state-
ments in support of the candidates but also mobilizes its members and
followers to aid the candidates’ victory (Interview with Novel Bamuk-
min, November 29, 2013; Interview with Muhsin Al-Attas, December
28, 2013). Sometimes, FPI decides not to support any candidate if no
candidates agree to support FPI’s programs, as seen during the 2009
Depok regional election. FPI believed that no candidates were willing
to disband the Indonesian Ahmadiyah during this election (Burhani
2009).

FPI’s willingness to endorse candidates in elections shows that FPI
does not view modern democracy as incompatible with the interests
of Indonesian Muslims. Unlike HTI that opposes elections, FPI re-
gards elections as a means to facilitate the realization of “enjoining the
good and forbidding the wrong,” so long as the candidates commit to
supporting the principle. This condition explains why the agreement
between FPI and electoral candidates takes place prior to FPI’s official
endorsement of them. Although not every candidate supported wins
the election, FPI’s attitude toward elections in Indonesia during the
Reformation era shows that not every Islamic revivalist movement
has supported the implementation of Sharia since the Suharto era has
the same characteristics as the transnational HTI. Despite many of
FPI’s mass demonstrations being mobilized to protest against the government, FPI also works with the government to conduct humanitarian and social work, disaster relief programs, and social development. For example, FPI signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) along with the Ministry of Social Affairs in 2012 to conduct the “Renovation of Inhabitable Houses” that aimed to renovate housing in areas of poverty (Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia 2012).

On a practical level, FPI has two congruent yet oppositional roles. The first role is to criticize its opponents, such as the Indonesian Ahmadiyah organization and the government, both at the local and national levels. The second is to provide social services to people in need. The realization of the second role is supported by the formation of specific institutions for the purpose within FPI’s structure, such as the Hilal Merah Indonesia (HILMI) division that was specifically formed to assist victims of natural disasters and provide humanitarian and social services to those in need.

When we conduct mass protests towards the government, it does not mean we loathe them. In contrary, we are aiming to correct their policies. We support the government if they implement the right policies. In reality, we work with the government to revitalize houses for the poor. In addition to that, our activities do not only revolve around “forbidding and preventing the wrong.” We also help assist the victims of natural disasters through HILMI (Interview with Slamet Maarif, November 21, 2013).

Woodward, Yahya, Rohmaniyah, Coleman, Lundry, and Amin (2014, 153) argued that FPI has both a “civil” and “uncivil” face. The civil face portrays FPI as the government’s partner in restraining movements that are perceived to have gone astray, such as the Indonesian Ahmadiyah, and help assist people in need, such as the victims of natural disasters. It is difficult to deny that these two contrasting “faces” reflect FPI’s activism in the public sphere. However, regardless of the categorization of its two faces, FPI views all their collective action as a manifestation of “enjoining the good and forbidding the wrong.” FPI equates the
“prevention of wrong” as “enjoining the good,” as both are viewed as inseparable elements of its ideology. It is important to bear in mind that what is valued by FPI may not always be treated as such by the public. Similarly, when HTI claimed the establishment of a caliphate as a good that needs to be supported, the general public perceived the campaign as absurd. The majority of Indonesians view HTI as a threat to Indonesia and regard it as a transnational movement that challenges the concept of the nation-state and nationalism.

Consequently, there were at least three reasons the government represented by the Ministry of Social Affairs for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) term agreed to sign the MoU with FPI to renovate housing for the poor. First, FPI does not aim to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia and has taken concrete actions to assist victims of natural disasters in several areas. This has opened a further opportunity for the government to cooperate with FPI. Prior to the disbandment of HTI by President Joko Widodo’s administration on July 19th, 2017, the prospect of SBY’s administration partnering with FPI was higher than if it was with HTI because the latter is a transnational movement. Any action taken by HTI aimed at delegitimizing the government to pave a way for the establishment of a transnational caliphate, which clearly challenges Indonesia’s ideological framework. Working with FPI was a more viable option than working with HTI. The government also realized that, unlike HTI, FPI’s activism, although sometimes inciting violence, does not challenge the legitimacy of the state.

Second, the government acknowledges that FPI programs do “enjoin the good” (‘amar ma’ruf) and thus tried to co-opt FPI not only to control its violent tendencies but also to help realize its development programs. The former Minister of Home Affairs, Gamawan Fauzi, encouraged governors and mayors to involve FPI in the development of their localities and regions (Aritonang 2013). FPI’s response to the offer was positive. It expressed its willingness to work with the government in key areas that benefit society (Rafie 2013).

Third, FPI is one of Indonesia’s largest Islamic revivalist organizations with many chapters across the country. Furthermore, the majority
of the organization’s followers are loyal to their leaders and hold them in high regard. This condition is deemed valuable, as FPI can mobilize its followers in support of its programs. By engaging with FPI to implement development programs, such as the “Renovation of Inhabitable Houses,” the government benefited from FPI’s volunteers who helped renovate houses for the poor in various regions across the country and assisted victims of natural disasters.

**FUI’s Perception of the Concepts of Democracy and the Nation-State**

Similar to HTI, FUI believes that democracy is against Islamic teachings. The key difference between HTI and FUI’s perception of democracy does not lie in democracy’s definition as a concept or idea: both agree that the concept is foreign to Islam. The difference lies in their views on electoral participation. While HTI avoided becoming a political party that competes for seats in the parliament or voting in elections, FUI is not opposed to supporting political parties or presidential candidates. FUI formally supported Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto in the 2009 presidential election and Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno in the 2019 presidential election (Persada 2018). According to FUI, one of the most important reasons behind their support was the candidates’ commitment to support FUI’s agenda, such as the disbandment of the Indonesian Ahmadiyah (Interview with Muhammad al-Khatthath, November 11, 2013). 9

Al-Khatthath said that HTI does not prohibit participation in elections. He stated that when he held the position as the Chairman (mu’tamad) of HTI in the early 2000s, al-Khatthath asked international high leader Abdul Qadeem Zallum about HT’s stance on electoral participation. The answer al-Khatthath received was that elections are permitted (mubah) in Islam. This answer was similar to that of HTI’s spokesperson, Muhammad Ismail Yusanto. In principle, elections are merely a method for choosing a ruler or leader.

9 For further detail on FUI’s history, strategies, and dynamics, see Munabari (2017; 2018; 2019).
HTI has never announced its stance on abstention. As previously explained, this attitude is due to Indonesia’s election law that stipulates preventing individuals from casting their votes is illegal and subject to criminalization.

HTI has a strong influence on FUI’s development of mobilization and support-seeking strategies. There are several reasons behind HTI’s influence over FUI: first, HTI was the founder of FUI and provided a significant part of FUI’s organizational resources before HTI’s withdrawal from the organization in 2008, not long after the Monas Incident on June 1st, 2008. Second, those who organize and develop FUI’s programs are essentially HTI’s former leaders and members. Not only do they inherit HTI’s mobilization and support-seeking strategies but also their ideology, including the urgent implementation of Sharia in Indonesia. However, this ideology has been revised during al-Khadthathath’s term and those of other FUI leaders.

The main characteristics of a caliphate include the state’s Islamic ideology, Sharia as the only and absolute source of law, and unlimited territorial borders, which is antithetical to the nation-state. Unlike a caliphate, modern nation-states are bound by territorial borders, which separate them from other sovereign nation-states. Furthermore, most nation-states have developed according to secular laws, with a small number of them implementing Islamic laws. To HTI, none of the Islamic countries today can be categorized as an Islamic state (dar al-Islam), including Saudi Arabia. This argument is based on the reality that none of these countries implement Sharia and are thus categorized as un-Islamic states (dar al-kufr).

HTI’s campaign to establish a caliphate has drawn opposition from many Islamic organizations in Indonesia, including NU and Muhammadiyah, the two largest Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia that are moderate in perspective. They have labeled HTI an anti-nationalist movement and a threat to NKRI. For example, when HTI held its international conference on establishing a caliphate on August 12th, 2007, in Jakarta, which championed the slogan “It is Time for the Caliphate to Lead the World,” several leaders of the country’s moderate
Islamic organizations condemned the campaign to establish a caliphate in Indonesia. One of these figures was Solahudin Wahid, a respected leader of NU. Solahudin believed that *Pancasila*, Indonesia’s ideology, was compatible with Islam and that the call for the establishment of a caliphate was inappropriate (Wahid 2008). Zuhairi Misrawi, another Muslim intellectual from NU, said that a caliphate is an unideal form of governance and there is no command in Islam for Muslims to establish it (Misrawi 2007).

Due to the many opposing views, former members of HTI in FUI, coordinated by Muhammad al-Khatthathath, tried to revise their strategy for framing the caliphate that they used previously in HTI. After his dismissal from HTI, al-Khatthathath said that a new group that he formed in late 2008, called *Hizbud Dakwah Islam* (HDI), employed a similar ideology to HTI. However, he claimed that, while HTI was led by an international leader from the Middle East, HDI was led by al-Khatthathath in Indonesia (Interview with Muhammad al-Khatthathath, November 11, 2013). This reality shows that, despite the ideological similarity between FUI and HTI, al-Khatthathath revised HTI’s ideology to adapt to Indonesia’s contemporary social-political context. Due to the organization’s limited resources, al-Khatthathath decided not to focus on the development of HDI. Rather, he chose to develop FUI and make the organization more effective at engaging with other Islamic groups to promote Sharia in Indonesia. Al-Khatthathath believed that the establishment of a caliphate was important for implementing Sharia (Interview with Muhammad al-Khatthathath, November 11, 2013). Unfortunately, al-Khatthathath attracted other movements’ disapproval of his concept of a caliphate. FPI was FUI’s largest member after HTI withdrew itself from FUI in 2008. Since then, FPI provided most of FUI’s organizational resources, which helped sustain FUI’s collective action. Consequently, the call for the establishment of a caliphate no longer appeared in FUI’s campaigns. Al-Khatthathath then developed a new slogan, “NKRI Bersyariah.” The term “NKRI” is short for *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*, which literally translates to The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, while “bersyariah” means “in accor-
dance with Sharia.” Thus, “NKRI Bersyariah” can be contextually understood as The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia that abides by or is in accordance with Sharia.

**Variation of Islamic Revivalist Movements’ Attitudes and Backgrounds**

| Islamic Revivalist Movement | Implementation/ Enforcement of Sharia | Concept of Democracy | Concept of Nation-State | Details |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|---------|
| HTI                         | Agree                                 | Disagree             | Disagree                | - The current practice of democracy is perceived as incompatible with Islam.  
- The concept of the nation-state is perceived as incompatible with the Islamic caliphate that HTI wishes to establish. |
| FPI                         | Agree                                 | Does Not Disagree    | Does Not Disagree       | - Democracy is compatible with Islam as long as it benefits Muslims.  
- FPI regards the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia as unnecessary, as Muslims in Indonesia already enjoy the freedom to exercise their religion and the country already applies laws in accordance with Islam, such as Sharia-based banking and zakat. |
| MMI                         | Agree                                 | Disagree             | Does Not Disagree       | - Like HTI, MMI views the current practice of democracy as against Islamic teachings.  
- MMI prioritizes the full or complete implementation of Sharia in Indonesia, but not necessarily the establishment of a caliphate. |
| FUI                         | Agree                                 | Does Not Disagree    | Does Not Explicitly Disagree | - Similar to FPI, FUI supports democratic mechanisms, such as elections, to fulfill the aspirations of Muslims in Indonesia.  
- FUI actively conceals its desire for the establishment of the caliphate and prioritizes its “NKRI Bersyariah” campaign. |

*Source: Compiled by author from related sources*

Although four of these Islamic revivalist movements strongly aspire to implement Islamic norms, their attitudes to the nation-state and de-
mocracy vary. As laid out in the table above, HTI clearly opposes the concept of the nation-state and democracy due to its perception of the concepts as incompatible with Islam. HTI’s stance contrasts with FPI’s, who do not oppose the concept of democracy and the nation-state. HTI and MMI hold similar views on democracy but disagree on their stances on the nation-state. Meanwhile, FUI, although its formation was led by HTI, revised HTI’s ideology on establishing a caliphate. Unlike HTI, FUI no longer regards democratic procedures, such as elections, as opposed to Islam. FUI agrees with HTI’s concept of the caliphate but stopped campaigning for it due to strong resistance from various segments of Indonesian society. As explained previously, the concept that FUI endorses is “NKRI Bersyariah,” which focuses on the implementation of Sharia in Indonesia. This slogan also portrays FUI as non-oppositional to NKRI and nationalism, which has been an accusation made of HTI.

Several factors that have distinguished HTI from other Islamic revivalist movements, especially on the concept of the nation-state, including the following: firstly, HTI was an inseparable branch of the international HT in the Middle East. HTI is the only Islamic revivalist movement in Indonesia that is led by an umbrella organization in the Middle East that also coordinates many branches around the world. HT applies a strict organizational structure and ideology to its branches. HTI’s main objective is the reestablishment of an Islamic caliphate, like that of the Ottoman, Abbasid, and Umayyad caliphates, which were glorious during their time. This objective is promoted and championed by HT’s branches around the world, including HTI. Secondly, although HTI’s executive board and members are Indonesian citizens, HT’s ideology was first introduced to Indonesia in the early 1980s, not by an Indonesian citizen, but by a Jordanian HT member Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi who later resided in Australia.

10 For further detail on the international Hizbut Tahrir network’s history, organization, and ideology, see Farouki (1996).
11 For further detail on the history of HTI’s arrival to Indonesia, see Rahmat (2005).
to HT’s ideology and principles. This condition is starkly different from other Islamic revivalists, such as FPI. The initiators or founders of the movement are Indonesian citizens who ascribe to the religious traditions of NU.\textsuperscript{12} NU is the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, which is also known to be ideologically moderate. The organization is also famous for its support for the Pancasila-based NKRI, as established by the country’s founding fathers. As a consequence, FPI does not desire a caliphate in Indonesia, although the movement commits to “forbid and eliminate the wrong” from society.\textsuperscript{13} FPI’s stance on democracy, unlike that of HTI and MMI, views the system as an opportunity to promote the aspirations of Muslims in Indonesia through supporting candidates who are willing to fulfill Islamic ambitions and “forbid the wrong” in society.

MMI emerged from a preaching community called \textit{Badan Koordinasi Pemuda Masjid} in the 1990s that held a congress in Yogyakarta in 2000 with a former \\textit{Jamaah Islamiyah} leader Abu Bakar Baasyir as its chairman. Abu Bakar Baasyir is known as a figure at Pondok Pesantren Al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Solo, who left for Malaysia due to his refusal to acknowledge Pancasila during the New Order in the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{14} Baasyir’s refusal was based on the belief that Islam should be the state’s ideology. Unlike the FPI, the characteristics of MMI members and figures do not follow the NU’s religious tradition and thus are not obliged to employ a moderate stance on democracy. Even though several of its figures, like Abu Bakar Baasyir, state that ideally the Islamic state should be regional or transnational, the movement does not call for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia and only focuses on the full implementation of Sharia.

Despite being initiated by HTI, FUI’s political thought has evolved since the dismissal of its General Secretary Muhammad al-Khatthath after the Monas Incident on June 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2008, from its original movement,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} For further information on \textit{Nahdlatul Ulama}, see Fealy and Barton (1996) and Bush (2009), among others.
\item \textsuperscript{13} For further detail on FPI’s history, organization, and ideology, see Ng (2005) and Jahroni (2008).
\item \textsuperscript{14} See Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (2001).
\end{itemize}
HTI. The most important aspect that differentiates HTI from FUI is its stance on democracy due to Muhammad al-Khatthath’s position as FUI’s ideologist. If democracy is referred to as a method to choose one’s leader, unlike HTI, al-Khatthath believes that elections are permitted. Furthermore, in line with FPI’s stance, al-Khatthath nominated himself as a Partai Bulan Bintang candidate in the 2014 legislative elections and was unsuccessful at gaining a seat in the legislature. Meanwhile, as mentioned above, although FUI believes that the establishment of an Islamic caliphate is an obligation, it chooses to not vocalize the aspiration to avoid resistance or conflict with other Islamic organizations in Indonesia.  

CONCLUSION

This study aimed to answer the question, “how do the four Indonesian Islamic revivalist movements (HTI, FPI, MMI, and FUI) perceive the concept of democracy and the nation-state?” This research employed a qualitative approach and obtained data through conducting observations, interviews, and a literature review. The results of this research show that, although the four Islamic revivalist movements studied agree that Sharia should be implemented in Indonesia, their stances on the concept of the nation-state and democracy differ. For example, HTI criticizes both of the concepts. HTI argues that the ideal state and system of governance in accordance with Islam is a caliphate. To FPI, Indonesia is an Islamic country, and thus, there is no need to call for an Islamic state. FPI also supports democratic mechanisms, such as elections, under the condition that they can be used to secure the interests of Muslims in Indonesia. Similar to FPI, FUI also does not campaign for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia and may also support certain electoral candidates as long as they are willing to further the aspirations of Muslims. Meanwhile, MMI employs a similar stance to HTI. MMI disagrees with the concept of democracy, but it does not call for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate.

15 For further information on FUI’s history, strategy, and dynamics, see Munabari (2017; 2018; 2019).
Although not the main focus of this study, several things can be used to explain the differences between the four revivalist movements. Their differences may be attributed to the origins of the movements (i.e., whether they originate from Indonesia or not) and their founders and initiators. Differences attributed to the origins of the movements can be seen in FPI and HTI, while the founders or initiator factors are a visible difference between FPI, MMI, and HTI. The differences in religious ideology or thought may be attributed to the movements’ origins and founders. Further research on which factors influence each movements’ perceptions and attitudes to Sharia and democracy is encouraged to determine the extent or degree of influence these aspects have on each movement’s ideology and strategy.

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