Thomas Brodie's commentary on Genesis offers a new theological exposition of the book based on a synthesis of recent trends in the literary analysis of Genesis. B. argues that Genesis is a literary unity composed from a wide range of extant sources to give a portrait of human existence under the providence of God. The significance of B.'s interpretation will largely depend on the reader's evaluation of his arguments regarding the book's composition.

In contrast to the traditional scholarly understanding of the composition of Genesis, B. argues that the book was composed as a literary unity, consisting of 26 diptychs. He also argues that Genesis belongs to the larger unity of the Primary History (Genesis through Kings) and is thus a composition of the Persian period. In terms of its literary genre, Genesis and the Primary History are most closely analogous to the encyclopedic Greco-Persian historiographies of Hellanicus and Herodotus.

Many of the diptychs in Genesis are easily recognized, such as the two tales of creation (1:1–2:24) and the two tales of crime and punishment (2:25–4:16). However, the logic of other diptychs seems artificial, as in Abram's battle with the eastern kings (14) and God's covenant with Abram (15); or remains unclear, as in the story of Dinah's rape (34) and the story of Jacob's journey to Bethel, the birth of Benjamin, and the death of Rachel (35:1–20). Moreover, B.'s use of diptychs obscures other literary structures that do not correspond to the boundaries of the diptychs. For example, the 15th diptych, according to B., presents the account of Jacob deceiving (26:34–27:45) and being deceived (27:46–29:30). But this division of the text obscures another literary structure that details why Jacob journeys to Laban's house: In 27:1–45 Jacob flees to Laban's house, at Rebekah's command, to escape Esau's wrath, but in 26:34–35; 28:1–9 Jacob is sent to Laban's house by Isaac to find a wife. In the end, B.'s use of diptychs does not adequately support his argument for the compositional (as opposed to editorial) unity of Genesis.

B.'s interpretation of the composition of Genesis differs from traditional scholarly studies, and even from many recent studies that champion the unity of Genesis, by his rejection of any recourse to hypothetical sources such as J, E, D, and P primarily because they are hypothetical. Instead, he argues for a number of extant sources used by the author(s) of Genesis, foremost being the prophetic writings and Homer's Odyssey. There are indeed numerous correspondences between Genesis and the books of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, but the correspondence is often quite general, and thus the direction of dependence, if indeed there is dependence in each
case, is rarely clear. B.’s argument for Genesis’s dependence on the Odyssey, though admittedly tentative, is unconvincing—not because the Odyssey is “Western” or is an unsuitable source for Genesis, but because many of the correspondences marshaled by B. appear illusory, and others can be explained by shared “type-scenes” common to epic literature.

B. interprets the stories of Genesis from the perspective of his understanding of its composition. His interpretation of the text is synchronic, with the diachronic, historical dimension of the text eliminated under the guise of “unity.” For each diptych he outlines the basic story line, discusses the literary form of the text, and explains the complementarity of the two panels and their relationship to preceding diptychs. The primary themes of the passage are then highlighted and discussed, and the introductory aspects of the diptych conclude with a description of the structural units of the diptych. B.’s comments on the diptych focus on the theological exposition of the meaning of the text rather than on philological or historical-critical issues. He interjects a psychological dimension into his interpretations, emphasizing the common human condition of the biblical characters, and places emphasis on the spiritual world with which the biblical characters of Genesis engage. However, his analysis lacks a socio-historical dimension. We are not told, for example, how the biblical characters are Israelite, with their distinct social customs and values. In the end, the biblical characters lose their historical and social distinctiveness.

Creighton University, Omaha

Ronald A. Simkins

1 & 2 KINGS. By Walter Brueggemann. Smyth & Helwys Bible Commentary. Macon: Smith and Helwys, 2000. Pp. xxii + 645. $65.

I have long questioned whether the literary genre known as “the Bible commentary” has any future in the field of biblical criticism. The days are over when a single book purports to be an objective treatment of the whole of available information on a given text. For a commentary to be more than just a relic, the presence of the commentator and her/his perspective and opinion must come to the forefront of the narrative. This commentary, by internationally known and respected scholar Walter Brueggemann, succeeds on this point. His book introduces us not only to the imaginative world that the biblical books of Kings inhabit but also to the world that B. himself inhabits.

B. explains the biblical text by weaving together his deep erudition, spiritual passion, and left-leaning political commitment. He offers a careful, close reading with historical awareness and sensitivity to the tensions and dissonance within the narratives and dramatizes how the interplay of raw, crude politics becomes an arena for the unfolding of God’s purposes.

In B.’s deft hands, the commentary form becomes a kind of storyteller’s platform. B. joins his encyclopedic knowledge of the ancient world with a narrative structure—an explanation and expansion of the dynamics of plot
and character within Kings. This commentary exemplifies B.’s excellent scholarship, wide-ranging knowledge, and ability to stay current in most areas of biblical studies.

B. reads the text from the perspective of the marginalized, examining the power relationships between the haves and the have-nots. He considers the important role of women in Israelite society, both revealed and concealed in the biblical text, and uses the text as a means to reflect on contemporary democratic and human rights issues throughout the world. His reading of the political situation in the Middle East is especially compelling.

After a brief introduction, the work is arranged according to the chapters in 1 and 2 Kings. The main sections of each chapter are divided into three parts: (1) theological/political narratives, called commentary, and (2) connections (political and personal applications). Here B. occasionally refers to popular culture (“The Godfather” in one instance) and to selected 20th-century theologians. (3) As a third part of the commentary, he has placed throughout the text various sidebars, color-coded brown and linked to the main text, where sidebar key words are printed in brown. Some of the sidebars could well have been placed in the text and others left out or relegated to the back of the book where they would be less intrusive. They tend to be written less well than the main text. Additionally, B. often reports in the sidebars on more radical positions, but I found insufficient interaction between the opinions there expressed and the positions he takes in the body of the text.

The book contains pleasing and useful graphics and a fine collection of reprints of pre-20th-century art. However, the art could have been brightened to enhance the detail. The captions to the illustrations again demonstrate B.’s fine sensitivity of interpretation.

On the negative side, B. seems uncritically to accept the interpretation of the Deuteronomist (the putative author of Kings), who regards the competing perspective of the Phoenician religion (for instance) as a dramatic alternative to the Israelite religion. B. sees (for another instance) the polytheism of Philistia as inevitably flowing from and leading to an oppressive social system. There is good archeological and textual reasons for questioning this view.

B. implies that the Canaanite religion was distinct and inferior. He does not make clear whether he is here telling us what the royal theology defenders are saying, or whether this is for him an actual description of the differences between Israel and Canaan. He is too polemical on issues of Israelite syncretism, seeing it as uniformly harmful for Israel. This argument could have been considerably nuanced.

But this is a fine work, a fine journey into the world of monarchical Israel. It will forever change the reader’s view of the narratives in Kings and provides a model of how the genre of commentary can move into the 21st century.

University of St. Thomas, St. Paul

David Penchansky
The book presents an excellent description of passages (called “texts”) about the menstruant (niddah) culled from ancient rabbinic compilations (“classic rabbinic discourse”). The touchstone documents at issue, the Mishnah and the Talmud, are, of course, the fundamental documents of what emerged in the Jewish (i.e., rabbinic-based) religion in the fifth century C.E. Fonrobert duly notes (35–36; 230) the prevailing concern about menstruants in ancient Mediterranean societies and their gendered views of persons. However, in her view, the Ben Zakkaist tradition in the ethnocentric, patriarchal, and androcentric world of the rabbis dealt with this topic at all because it was the subject of two Torah directives. The first, in Leviticus 15:19–30, is in the context of the priestly system of purity and impurity, while the second, in Leviticus 18:19; 20:18, has to do with prohibited Israelite sexual relations.

F. is concerned with “developing a methodology of reading gender in talmudic literature” (84). To this end, statements about menstruants in this body of writings enable her “to make some of the rabbinic discussions accessible to students and scholars of feminist criticism, and to students of the complex interaction between cultural groups in late antiquity as well as scholars of rabbinic texts” (13). After an opening chapter setting the contemporary Jewish framework for the topic (“feminist criticism and its challenge to write and create a Jewish culture that does justice to women’s desire for spiritual and religious fulfillment,” 16), F. proceeds as follows: chapter 2 describes the metaphorical construction of women’s bodies as houses and as buildings; chapter 3 tells of the value of a woman’s own sensation in rabbinic considerations of women’s bodies; chapter 4 discusses rabbis as experts on the colors and stains of women’s bleeding, yet in need of information from women about it; chapter 5 reports about those women’s voices that the Babylonian Talmud integrates into its discussion, notably Abaye’s mother; and a final chapter 6 considers a passage in the Didascalia Apostolorum about Jesus-group women’s attitudes toward practices and rituals concerning menstruation.

F.’s point is that, while rabbinic discussions are patriarchal, androcentric observations of Israelite women’s experience of menstruation, carried on in rather abstract and object-oriented fashion, in fact the tradition attests to the presence of women’s personal, subjective role in the discussion. F. thus combines her mastery of traditional rabbinic lore with Western Jewish scholarship and feminist perspectives in order to discern feminist or gynocentric relevance in ancient rabbinic discussions about menstruants.

I have two difficulties with the enterprise. First, from the stance of a hermeneutic of suspicion, I am suspicious of feminists interpreting patriarchal, androcentric documents of the past. By feminist standards, one must obviously be a patriarchal, androcentric person to understand what
exactly is going on. When read with feminist eyes there is a radical distortion, an emphasis that never existed and conclusions that no one would draw in a nonpatriarchal social setting.

Second, rabbinic documents are essentially high-context lists (here called “texts” after 18th-century usage in preaching). In this, these documents are more like the unabridged *Oxford English Dictionary* rather than any other genre. The problem with lists is that they express thoughts, not meanings. Like sentences and words, they can be understood, but not interpreted, that is, situated in the context of some ancient, contemporary social system. Consider the complete thought, “She did so.” It is understandable, but not interpretable. Interpretation involves fitting a thought into the context of some broader social system wherein the thought contributes to meanings rooted in the speakers’/writers’ social system. Rabbinic documents do not provide that broader context. That context comes from the “Jewish magisterium,” the institution known as the Beit Midrash, with its ocean of meanings. As her versions of rabbinic passages indicates, F. knows this traditional context very well.

F. employs the discourse of feminist postmodern literary analysis. Hence she speaks of gendered discourse, gender politics, hegemony, emblematization, marginalization, and the like. These alternate with ingroup talmudic discourse that hypostatizes the Talmud and its “texts,” so that the Talmud “struggles,” “betrays its desire,” “is most astonished,” “activates principles,” and so on. To appreciate compilations of lists with personal attributes takes a bit of getting used to. Finally, given the step-level changes occurring in both Ben-Zakkaist and Jesus-groups in the period after Constantine, F.’s use of the labels “Jew,” “Jewish,” and “Christian” for groups antedating Constantine is historically and linguistically anachronistic. But this work is not intended for outgroups, as F. specifically notes. Given her aims, she succeeds very well.

*Creighton University, Omaha* 

BRUCE J. MALINA

**PAPAL LETTERS IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES.** By Detlev Jasper and Horst Fuhrmann. History of Medieval Canon Law. Washington: Catholic University of America, 2001. Pp. xiii + 225. $39.95.

This book comprises two original essays. The one by Jasper (3-133) treats the known collections of papal letters from Siricius to Stephen V and charts the reception of those letters in canonical collections down to Gratian. The one by Fuhrmann (137-95) provides a comprehensive résumé of his unrivaled knowledge of the four collections of material that are usually lumped together and called the “Pseudo-Isidorian Forgeries.” Exceptionally clear and helpful, this volume will be welcome to those who have no German or, even more, to those who have no time to plow through the massive literature on the emergence of decretals, the early history of the papal archives, the reception of early decretals in later collections down to Gratian, and the massive collection known as Pseudo-Isidore.
In the broadest terms, the questions to which this book provides answers turn around the awkward fact that the several thousand extant papal letters from Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages come down to us along a bewildering variety of tracks and paths. We have register fragments from Gregory I (a large one: 866 letters), Gregory II, Leo IV, and John VIII, for example, but nothing like the full papal archives. The letters which do survive, then, exist because someone—almost without exception someone outside Rome—decided to make a collection of a certain pope’s letters, or of papal letters on a particular theme or problem, or letters to a specific place.

How representative are the surviving letters of the totality of the papal correspondence? Given that the extant letters take different forms, how many forms were there, and how different in practical consequences was one form from another? How often did popes take initiative in dealing with issues and how often did they merely respond to questions? Did responses have specific or universal applicability? Jasper is especially good on the emergence of the papal correspondence, on the rise of decretals, and on the formation of collections of papal letters. Fuhrmann opens fascinating insights into the papal correspondence by exploring how clever forgers created papal letters whose forms and claims had plausibility.

Jasper begins with the first known decretal, that of Siricius I to Himerius of Tarragona (JK 255) on the rebaptism of Arian converts. He discusses what the emergence of decretals suggests about the growing self-consciousness of the papacy. He speaks about the form, style, and vocabulary of the documents, differentiates decretals from private letters, and discusses when and where the earliest collections of papal letters began to be made. The key element in this story is the rise of a papal legislative authority that equaled that of councils. Collections of papal rulings began to be collected in the fifth century because they were useful and authoritative. The great canonists of the eleventh and twelfth centuries excerpted the letters of 25 late antique and early medieval popes, with Leo I, Gregory I, and Nicholas I providing the largest number of citations. Because no complete, original, early medieval register survives, the reception of a pope’s letters in a canonical collection was often decisive in preserving that pope’s letters. Some letters survive for more serendipitous reasons. Most of those from Gregory II, Gregory III, and Zachary exist only in collections of Boniface’s letters. The vast majority of those of Stephen II, Paul I, and Hadrian I survive only in a single manuscript of the Codex Carolinus prepared on Charlemagne’s command in 791. Jasper is now a sure and concise guide to this material and its attendant problems. He also provides numerous suggestions for future research: The essay is full of dissertation topics.

Fuhrmann tells in brief compass what is to be found in everestian detail in his many articles and especially in his Einfluss und Verbreitung der pseudoisidorischen Fälschung, 3 vols. (1972–1974). A group of forgers, with still to be determined connections among themselves, prepared between 847 and 857 (but perhaps as early as 852), somewhere in the diocese of Reims,
four different sets of materials that combined authentic with forged and interpolated documents. The scale of the project may be grasped from just the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals. This collection contains more than 10,000 excerpts and exists in at least 115 manuscripts. It has long been recognized that the central theme of the whole collection of forgeries is the authority, almost the autonomy, of suffragan bishops vis-à-vis their metropolitans. Nevertheless, many questions remain in suspense. As with the papal letters, much work remains to be done on Pseudo-Isidore, and Fuhrmann is generously forthcoming in his identification of research topics.

University of Notre Dame

THOMAS F. X. NOBLE

WITH THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE: THE CHURCH’S WITNESS AND NATURAL THEOLOGY: BEING THE GIFFORD LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS IN 2001. By Stanley Hauerwas. Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2001. Pp. 256. $22.99.

Through a bequest made in his Last Will and Testament, Adam Gifford established the lectures named after him for “promoting, advancing, teaching and diffusing the study of natural theology, the knowledge of God, the Infinite, the All, the First and Only Cause . . . without reference to or reliance upon any supposed exceptional or so-called miraculous revelation” [Stanley Jaki, Lord Gifford and His Lectures (1986), 73–74]. Since the lectures began in 1888, the lecturers have come at the task in every conceivable manner, at times even putting the terms of the bequest into question. Thus, Hauerwas argues that the only full-blooded natural theology comes precisely in the special revelation through Jesus of Nazareth and the Church that gives witness to him.

No one familiar with H.’s other writings will be surprised that he argues via narrative, one intended to encompass the whole history of theology in the 20th century. This narrative is necessarily selective. To tell his story, H. picks three of his most illustrious predecessors among the Gifford lecturers—William James, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Karl Barth. Each had used his lectures to prepare a classic in modern religious thought: James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (1900–1902); Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (1938–1940); and Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God according to the Teaching of the Reformation (1937–1938). The ordering inverts the chronology of the last two because the essence of H.’s argument is that Barth succeeds where James and Niebuhr fail.

Although H. could have compared the three sets of Gifford Lectures directly, he provides us with a critical overview of the three thinkers, attending to their life-stories as well as to their writings. James’s interest in religion was “not God’s existence, but the significance of human existence” with the particular doctrines of the religions, particularly of Christianity, qualifying as so many over-beliefs without pragmatic justification (43, 71). And, while he acquired the reputation of a neo-orthodox theologian,
Niebuhr treated Christian beliefs as permanent myths capable of being “revived by plumbing them for insights into the human condition . . . to be validated through a James-like empirical testing” (111). The philosophical and theological implications of the method are ultimately Feuerbachian. In contrast, Barth gives us “an unflinching display of truthful Christian speech . . . a resource we literally cannot live without if we are to be faithful to the God we worship” (140). This truthful Christian speech contains in turn a natural theology insofar as it describes “all that is as God’s good creation” (142).

In his introduction, H. tells us that he took his title from John Howard Yoder’s claim that “it is the people who bear crosses who are working with the grain of the universe,” a belief one reaches “by sharing in the life of those who sing about the resurrection of the slain lamb” (17). Because Barth worked with the grain of the universe, he was able to give us a theology of nature not possible without a realization of God’s intention for creation. H. elaborates this theme in his concluding chapter, “The Necessity of Witness.” No Christian theology is possible without the witness of Christians united in community, a witness that will stand against the violence of the world and the culture of death. Along with Yoder and Barth, he cites the ideas and deeds of Dorothy Day and John Paul II as examples of the witness for which he calls. John Paul II receives the greatest attention as “the first post-Constantinian pope” (226), whereas the treatment of Yoder and Day are at the level of mentions.

H. has remarkable scholarly range and rhetorical power. It is well worth reading anything he writes, and the engagement with James, Niebuhr, and Barth in these pages is informative and enlightening. Nonetheless, I found myself disappointed with the book in a number of ways. My disappointment came mainly in the form of druthers. I would have preferred, above all, that H. had abbreviated the presentations of the other three thinkers and had developed his own thoughts at much greater length. Then he might have helped readers like me to deal better with our “epistemic affliction,” that is, with our insecurity in believing ourselves to move as Christians with the grain of the universe. I also had reservations about the selection of James and Niebuhr as the counterweights to Barth. Why none of the other Gifford Lecturers who had seen themselves as genuinely engaged in the enterprise of natural theology, something to which James and Niebuhr never aspired? Finally, for understanding and style, I would have preferred less of the argument conducted in the abundant and long footnotes. A better-balanced and more elegant consideration of many of the issues appears in The Hauerwas Reader (2001).

La Salle University, Philadelphia

MICHAEL J. KERLIN

MODERN RUSSIAN THEOLOGY: BUKHAREV, SOLOVIEV, BULGAKOV—ORTHODOX THEOLOGY IN A NEW KEY. By Paul Valliere. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000. Pp. x + 443. $42.

Those who bother to read this review should bother more to read the book, which could prove pivotal for engagement between Orthodox and
non-Orthodox theologians. Valliere provides a full, fair, and critical exposition of three major thinkers based on their untranslated Russian writings. Yet he does more than expound others’ ideas. Overtly in his introduction and conclusion (1–15, 373–403) and more indirectly elsewhere, he respectfully dissents from a “Neopatristic” school that sees the Church Fathers as “a singular and comprehensive tradition which provides the pattern for Orthodox theologizing” (376). The “modern Russian” school asserts that Orthodoxy needs to come to terms with Western Christianity, economic and social issues, and secular art and literature, and in this sense go “beyond” the Fathers. The key to going “beyond” lies in *bogochelovechestvo* or “the humanity of God” (11–15).

After the Bolshevik Revolution, creative theologizing became a recipe for cultural isolation, while patristic scholarship was an attractive option that linked Orthodox scholars with the larger university world (375). V. acknowledges the merits of such Neopatristics as Georges Florovsky (1893–1979), yet argues that the future of Orthodoxy lies in engagement with modernity, informed by the insights of the Russian school. “Reformers need landmarks” (6).

In differing ways Aleksandr Bukharev (1822–1871), Vladimir Soloviev (1853–1901), and Sergei Bulgakov (1871–1944) sought to overcome the spiritual-secular split that underlay modern Russian society. Bukharev (Archimandrite Feodor) could not print his criticisms of the Church due to censorship, but later succeeded when he was named a church censor (35). V. calls Bukharev “Russia’s, and Orthodoxy’s, first modern theologian” (106), because of his call for Russia to “multiply the talent” entrusted by God and not simply preserve it (22–23). Regarding freethinkers, Bukharev argued that the Lamb of God takes away the philosophical sins of the world (48), yet his study of the Apocalypse reflects Russian xenophobia: the “dragon” is papalism, the “beast” is the unbelieving West, “Babylon” represents the Ottoman Turks, and Russia saves the world (94–95). He renounced his monastic vocation and married in 1863, a step that V. explains in terms of Bukharev’s desire to serve God within the world (74).

Soloviev delved into gnosticism in his youth. He had a vision of the divine female, Sophia, while reading in the British Museum, and left for the Egyptian desert where he nearly perished from exposure (112–13). Soloviev’s “theosophy,” as he termed it, drew from esoteric sources and German philosophy (especially Schelling) as well as Orthodoxy. Soloviev’s Christology is weak, and V. even cites Florovsky’s judgment that Jesus is a “pale shadow in his system” (165). Rejecting Bukharev’s narrow nationalism (115), Soloviev sought a renewed Christian empire under the tsar and the pope. Leo XIII called it a fine idea, but one requiring a miracle (177–78.) In 1881, Soloviev argued against the death penalty for the assassins of Tzar Alexander II (173) and he opposed anti-Semitism. The “Jewish question” was really a Christian question: Jews followed their own laws in dealing with Christians, but would Christians do the same (192–203)? Soloviev’s late essay, “A Brief Tale of the Antichrist,” has been read either as
renouncing or as affirming his lifelong ecumenism, and V. takes the latter view (214–23).

Bulgakov, a priest’s son, abandoned the faith in his youth, became an economics professor and Marxist, and published a study of capitalism in Russia within a year of Lenin’s comparable book. Yet he discerned a contradiction between Marxist materialism and its historical purposiveness (228–36). After a stint in parliamentary politics, he returned to the Church and was ordained at the age of 48, later to emerge as a leading Orthodox dogmatician. V. outlines Bulgakov’s dogmatic theology (291–371; must reading for systematicians), his theory of the “humanization” of nature (253–66), and the controversial “Sophiology” (i.e., theory of divine wisdom) that asserts a human hypostasis within God (260–61). The Moscow Patriarchate ruled against Bulgakov in the “Sophia Affair” of 1935, and V. sees this episode as both procedurally dubious (395) and a “dramatization of Orthodoxy’s struggle to engage with the modern world” (271).

V. disclaims having written a full “history of the Russian school” (8), yet his argument presumes continuity. By way of criticism, one might say that this “school” is defined more by affinity than consanguinity. Bukharev is an exegete, Soloviev a philosopher, and Bulgakov a dogmatician. Bukharev is admittedly “pre-philosophic” in his understanding of the Incarnation (33), while Soloviev’s speculative Trinitarianism finds disfavor with Bulgakov (156, 270 n. 41). Perhaps Florovsky is right in asserting that “Russian culture is one of interruptions . . . and breaks” (Ways of Russian Theology, 1987, 2.287). Yet Florovsky’s other judgments regarding Bukharev’s “utopian” tendency, Soloviev’s “dreadful occult plan,” and Bulgakov’s “fatalism” (Ways, 2.120, 245, 274) need reexamining. V.’s book challenges the dominance of Florovsky’s interpretations, and that is no mean feat. More than that, it may signal that an intra-traditional debate is underway in Orthodox circles. East and West may have something in common after all.

Saint Louis University

MICHAEL J. MCCLYMOND

BOOK REVIEWS

849

L’INFAILLIBILITÉ ET SON OBJET: L’AUTORITÉ DU MAGISTÈRE INFAILLIBLE DE L’ÉGLISE S’ÉTEND-ELLE AUX VÉRITÉS NON RÉVÉLÉES? By Jean-François Chiron. Paris: Cerf, 1999. Pp. vii + 579. €37.96.

No higher praise can be accorded a scholarly book than to say that it compels all who ever worked on the topic to think again and that it leads them to the threshold of fresh questions. Such is the praise that Chiron’s work, originally a doctoral dissertation, deserves.

Throughout this monumental thèse, composed at the Institut catholique de Paris under the direction of Hervé Legrand (who provided a pointed preface), C. seeks to determine whether or not the authority of the infallible magisterium extends to nonrevealed truths. To find the answer, he examines the cases of Baius, Jansenius, and Fénelon (who first proposed the idea of “eclesiastical faith”); then he presents and comments on the
cautiously worded texts of Vatican I; then he scrutinizes the declarations of Vatican II on infallibility; finally he turns to some of the magisterial pronouncements of our postconciliar age: *Humanae vitae*, *Ordinatio sacerdotalis*, and *Ad tuendam fidelem*, all concerned with issues not directly addressed by revelation. C.’s thorough and critical investigation leads him to conclude that history does not yield enough evidence to affirm *as infallibly defined doctrine* that the authority of the infallible magisterium extends to truths not revealed. (Reviewer’s note: the criterion for infallibility is found in Canon 749 par. 3: “No doctrine is understood to be infallibly defined unless it is clearly established as such.”)

Yet, the magisterium did pronounce repeatedly and with authority on “dogmatic facts,” on issues of natural law, and on philosophical principles intimately connected with the safeguarding of revelation. By what authority did the magisterium do that? How far can we (must we) assume the special assistance of the Spirit? What ought to be the response of the faithful? Should it be an act of faith? Or some other form of acceptance?

In searching for the answers, C. (inspired by Congar) invokes the idea of the “indefectibility” of the Church as distinct from its infallibility. The latter is the ability to bear witness with utter fidelity to revelation; the former is the capacity to guide “unfailingy” God’s people through the vicissitudes of history. Such guidance is rooted in prudence enlightened by faith; its purpose is not to “define” any truth as an integral part of revelation but to safeguard the people from straying away from revelation, that is, from Christ. C. recalls briefly how the Council of Trent kept using the expression, “ecclesia non errat,” when the Fathers did not intend to define but wanted to give truly prudent guidelines, not excluding the possibility that some of their directions might eventually be subject to modification.

C. has done more than document the past: he has opened new vistas and led us to the threshold of new questions. Here are some sample questions (they are theological puzzles in the reviewer’s mind):

1. Does it make sense to speak of two distinct capacities (charismata?) in the Church, one to proclaim revelation faithfully (infallibility), the other to guide the people prudently (indefectibility)? In more particular terms, ought we assume that the Spirit assists the magisterium in two ways: first, by protecting it (in well-defined circumstances, cf. Vatican I and II) from errors concerning evangelical teaching; second, by preventing the magisterium from misleading the people in matters not in revelation but closely related to it? (The Church can never be substantially “deficient” in guidance.) While we believe that not an iota should be changed in the evangelical message, should we assume that prudential directions can be modified?

2. Could we, should we, say that when the people receive the evangelical message, they surrender to the truth with an act of faith, and when they respond to the practical guidance, they entrust themselves to the Church with an act of hope?

3. The theological virtue of faith is the created gift of an uncreated presence: it gives us the capacity to entrust ourselves to the divine persons,
Has the whole theology of faith shifted too much toward propositions and responses to the propositions? Are the different types of “faith” (divine, ecclesiastical) logical categories, results of excessive analyses, with little relation to a wholesome reality?

(4) Further, is there ever any need to define infallibly what is naturally known or can be historically ascertained?

These are tentatively articulated questions, but good enough to begin (or carry on) with a journey of discovery.

C.’s work contains a sobering lesson for all of us, “from the bishops to the last of the faithful” (Augustine, as quoted in Lumen gentium no. 12). The lesson is that a God-given mystery—in this case, the capacity of the Church to proclaim and preserve revelation and to guide the people to the Kingdom—is deeper than past theories and analyses have shown. There is still ample scope for “faith seeking understanding.”

Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C. LADISLAS ORSY, S.J.

THE GRACING OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATURE AND GRACE. By Donald L. Gelpi, S.J. Collegeville: Liturgical, 2001. Pp. xiv + 366. $34.95.

Christianity, wrote Josiah Royce, is a religion in search of a metaphysics, and Gelpi heartily concurs (ix). Much of his theological career has been devoted to developing a viable Christian metaphysics, and this book builds upon previous efforts in this vein including Varieties of Transcendental Experience: A Study in Constructive Postmodernism (2000). This new effort also revises and updates the theology of grace G. proposed in Experiencing God (1978) and Grace as Transmuted Experience and Social Process (1988) to reflect developments in his theology of conversion and his rethinking of the relation of human nature and the supernatural occasioned by his work on a christological trilogy.

G. begins with a historical survey of the theology of nature and grace in Christianity spanning the New Testament through contemporary process theology. The survey emphasizes the influence of metaphysics in each major epoch of Christian theology, and in every era G. finds that Christianity’s theology of grace has been distorted by flawed metaphysical presuppositions. While G. affirms some core principles of the theological tradition (e.g., the distinction of the order of creation and the order of grace articulated by Irenaeus, and the primacy of grace in all aspects of human salvation emphasized by Augustine), he finds that the tradition as a whole is marred by various forms of philosophical dualism, essentialism, nominalism, and rationalism. In addition, the tradition has courted both overly pessimistic views of the human condition (e.g., Augustine and the Reformers) and overly optimistic views (e.g., transcendental Thomism), while the dominant methodology of apriorism has hindered the formation of a viable and reformable metaphysic. G. offers the reader a broad panoramic vista of the history of theology, but as is often the case with historical surveys, this
portion of the book treats key figures with less nuance and contextualization than is ultimately their due.

The constructive heart of the book is G.'s discussion of the work of the North American pragmatists whom he believes can provide the basis for a viable metaphysics. The semiotic realism of Charles Sanders Peirce offers a holistic, embodied, social metaphysics honed by “contrite fallibilism,” the principle that metaphysics must be responsive to revision based on human experience and cross-disciplinary study. G. believes that Peirce’s approach is in fact corroborated and enhanced by the work of Josiah Royce, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Peter Berger, and Thomas Luckmann whose contributions he describes at length. Combining the work of these thinkers with the proposal of William James and Alfred North Whitehead that experience can serve as a root metaphor for reality, G. proposes a “metaphysics of experience” as a framework for reflection on nature and grace. “Experience,” he explains, can be defined “metaphysically as a process composed of relational elements called feelings” which interpenetrate one another at both conscious and unconscious levels (278). He describes various realms of human experience and discusses forms of human conversion at both the level of nature (experience prescinding from the historical self-communication of God [292]) and grace (experience rooted in faith [301]).

Unless one has prior knowledge of the philosophers G. invokes, his reflections may prove hard to follow, and there are some ambiguities in his theology. It is not entirely clear, for example, how his endorsement of Peirce’s position on the continuity of divinity and humanity (160) coheres with his pronounced distinction between natural and graced experience. The strength of G.’s approach, nonetheless, is his use of Peirce, Royce, and others to develop a theology of grace based on a “turn to community” as an alternative or complement to the “turn to the subject” of transcendental Thomism. As G. affirms, this approach coheres with the biblical portrayal of humanity as social, relational, and historical.

One would not suggest that this book should be any lengthier, and yet G. raises a variety of issues that invite further development. His embrace of Peirce’s views on the continuity of matter and mind, for example, offers possibilities for thinking about grace and redemption from a cosmic perspective that would transcend the anthropocentric character of much Christian theology. Another point with potential for further development is the contrite fallibilism that G. also takes from Peirce. This emphasis on the necessary openness and revision which any authentic metaphysics must undergo would be a fruitful principle for interreligious dialogue, and one wonders how G. might apply this principle in that context.

Xavier University, Cincinnati

ELIZABETH T. GROPPE

TRADITIONEN ÜBERSCHREITEN: ANGLOAMERikanische BEITRÄGE ZUR INTERKULTURELLEN TRADITIONSHERMENEUTIK. By Norbert Hintersteiner. Vienna: WUV-Universitätsverlag, 2001. €25.50.

The topic of tradition has received considerable attention over the last half century, motivated by dramatic cultural encounters and social changes.
The long-standing debates between Catholics and Protestants about the relation of Scripture and tradition, and the defense of the Christian tradition in the face of Enlightenment critiques, have now been superseded by efforts to understand communication between members of diverse cultural and religious traditions as the matrix for actualizing communal identity and mission.

The title of the book poses the issue: Traditionen überschreiten. How is one to face the challenges and opportunities of “crossing” the boundaries of cultural and religious traditions while honestly recognizing and avoiding the risks of “transgressing” these traditions? Can one even speak of “transcending” traditions, as if one could “go beyond” them? Surely the vitality of religious traditions thrives on maintaining and intersecting boundaries, but how can border crossings take place without violating the integrity of the identities of one’s own or alien traditions?

With the goal of exploring the feasibility of an intercultural hermeneutics of tradition, Hintersteiner offers an impressive analysis of a rich variety of social theories and theologies of tradition in the second half of the 20th century, concentrating on those that have emerged in the U.S. Part 1 traces the changing understanding and evaluation of tradition in the social sciences between the 1950s and 1990s. Tradition used to be treated in North American scholarship as a static vehicle transmitting past beliefs and practices often conceived as antithetical to modern reason and immune to social and cultural changes. More recently tradition is appreciated as beliefs and practices that stabilize, adapt, and assimilate in changing social and cultural contexts. H. also explores a cultural semiotic alternative, developed by Eastern European and Soviet scholars, that treats tradition as a system of signs, messages, grammars, customs, codes, and boundaries.

Part 2 analyzes Alasdair MacIntyre’s treatment of tradition: as a set of practices, like Aristotle’s virtues, embedded in narratives and embodied in institutions (in contrast to modern liberalism); and subsequently, as “an argument extended through time,” which highlights the tradition-constituted character of all rationality—including liberalism—and the tradition-constituted enquiry that influences the development of tradition. Against the backdrop of the debates about the incommensurability and untranslatability of different traditions, H. treats MacIntyre’s contribution to intercultural and interreligious exchanges, highlighting his insistence on the need to be culturally bilingual in the face of rival traditions. One cannot step outside the language of one’s tradition, but one cannot avoid comparing and evaluating other traditions and criticizing one’s own tradition.

Part 3 explores the contributions of George Lindbeck and Robert Schreiter. H. aptly describes Lindbeck’s approach as catechetical and confessional, based on a contextual and intratextual epistemology that has deep affinities with MacIntyre’s approach to tradition. “On the question of pluralism, both emphasize an exclusive unsurpassability or untranslatability of individual traditions as well as a bilingual appropriation of traditions as the way to agreement between traditions. Whether this . . . is adequate for an intercultural theological concept of tradition is questionable” (263).
Schreiter offers H. an appealing alternative to MacIntyre and Lindbeck that advances an intercultural hermeneutics based on a cultural semiotic approach. Crossing the boundaries of traditions "effects a reorganization of the semiotic domain and a transformation of the sign system [and] . . . a change of the relations of signs to their messages and codes" (285). The signs, messages, and codes that constitute tradition retain their constancy, but the vitality of dialogue at the borders can be clarified, Schreiter argues and H. agrees, by thinking of tradition in terms of the dynamic interplay among grammar, competence, and performance.

H. offers a perceptive and sobering assessment of the prospects for an intercultural hermeneutics of tradition. While appreciating MacIntyre's contribution, he rightly faults him for concentrating on epistemological conflicts and crises in intercultural encounters as a catalyst for critically evaluating traditions without giving sufficient attention to sympathetic recognition and collaborative exchanges between traditions. For MacIntyre, encountering the abiding foreignness of traditions and cultivating bilingual competence serve the interest of one's own developing tradition of discourse. Lindbeck shares these convictions and suffers from similar difficulties.

H. is correct that Schreiter's more expansive approach offers greater resources for the task ahead and that there is a need for continued development of theoretical models that can advance intercultural and comparative theologies. But commensurate attention must be given to the theological claims that provide the framework and orientations for such an intercultural hermeneutics of traditions. Here social, cultural, and philosophical theories of tradition must be assessed in the light of the deepest convictions of the Christian tradition, in order to foster a hermeneutic that is attentive and responsive to the identity and mission of the triune God and the Church in the world.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

Bradford E. Hinze

"Person" in Christian Tradition and in the Conception of Saint Albert the Great: A Systematic Study of Its Concept as Illuminated by the Mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. By Stephen A. Hipp. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge, vol. 57. Münster: Aschendorff, 2001. Pp. 565. €67.50.

The theological question behind this historical study is how to make the distinction between person and nature that is vital to the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation. The second of the book's three sections presents Albert the Great's answer to this question. The first section provides the context for the second by reviewing earlier answers given in the tradition between Albert and his conciliar and patristic sources. The closing section glances at Aquinas, Scotus, and the Thomistic commentators and suggests Albert's relevance for fresh reflection on the hypostatic union.
Preparing the context for the section on Albert is largely a matter of reckoning with Boethius, to whom more pages are devoted than to any other figure except Albert. After looking at the distinction between person and nature as it emerges in the conciliar decrees, the Cappadocians, and Cyril of Alexandria, Hipp presents a thorough analysis of Boethius’s definition of person within the setting of his *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium*, clarifying in particular the notions of substance and subsistence, and singling out individuality (as in “individual substance”) as the key to its theological potential. Appreciating “the substantial character of personality” was the first of Boethius’s two principal contributions to a theory of personhood; recognizing “the relative structure of personality” and the place of relative predication in God was the second. But H. leaves the topic of person and relation in Boethius undeveloped. His bibliography omits Henry Chadwick’s *Boethius* (1981). Considering that Richard of St. Victor was to reject Boethius’s language of individuality and propose incommunicability and singularity instead, it is interesting that Chadwick can cite (194) a passage in one of Boethius’s commentaries on Aristotle where person is distinguished by a quality *incommunicabilis* and *singularis*, implying that for Boethius these two terms are complementary if not equivalent to “individual.”

The chapters on Albert do not present his trinitarian teaching in the round but treat important technical questions related to the idea of person, such as how Albert sees the Boethian definition vis-à-vis rival definitions; in what sense the triple predication of person *in divinis* is analo
gical rather than univocal; how plurality of divine persons via plurality of relations in God compares with personal plurality in creatures; and what the unique personal *proprietas* is that constitutes for Albert every person as person. Even in advance of appreciating Albert’s distinctive position on these and other questions, the reader gets from H. a clear impression of the value of Albert’s work simply as clarification. In his work the numerous issues of conceptualization found in traditional trinitarian theory are sorted out and illuminated. Albert’s own metaphysics is doubtless a source of light and intelligibility here, but more evident in H.’s presentation is the benefit Albert was able to reap from the logical theory of signification and supposition of terms developed in the twelfth century. H.’s own skill in this area is impressive, and makes him a good interpreter of Albert.

Among the special contributions of Albert to the theory of person is his deepening of the notion of individuality as the *ratio personalis*. Neither the rational nature by itself, nor the perseity (being a *per se* existent) of subsistence, can constitute the ultimate specific difference for personhood. These may belong to the definition of person in general as constitutive differences, but do not function as constitutive differences of particular persons. This function belongs to what Albert calls the *proprietas personalis*, which confers the singularity and incommunicability by which each person is established in his or her distinct individuality. Albert has used Richard’s language to deepen the meaning of individuality in the Boethian definition. H. believes that there are implications here for understanding
the hypostatic union in a new way. Where individuality defines person, the human nature of Christ considered in itself is not individual because it is not a person, and the proprietas personalis of the Word himself, in whose individuality the assumed nature shares, takes on new ontological importance for the union.

It is curious that a work displaying such technical sophistication in the medieval modi significandi and modi supponendi should also display so many instances of failure to conform to the modes of speaking and writing that belong to good English. The volume abounds with dangling participles, solecisms, weird locutions, and other lapses from correct and idiomatic Anglophone usage. Consider “propone” for “propose,” “behindedness” for “to be behind,” “suite” for “what follows,” “intentionate” for “intend,” “smackingly precarious” (meaning unknown), and scores of similar examples, all of which oblige the reader to far more acts of translation than the Latin citations require. The author has not been well served by his editors.

Wollaston, Mass. FRANK VAN HALSEMA

FAITH SEEKING UNDERSTANDING: THE FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY, “SYSTEMATICS,” IN BERNARD LONERGAN’S “METHOD IN THEOLOGY.” By Matthew C. Ogilvie. Milwaukee: Marquette University, 2001. Pp. 319. $35.

The historian of the Oxford Movement, R. W. Church, once pinpointed the weakness of the Evangelical school in Victorian England as their lack of attention to the needs of human intelligence. As a result, “for lack of ideas the preaching got thinner and thinner,” the circle of themes contracted and the school never seemed to get beyond the “first beginnings” of Christian teaching. “It was nervously afraid of departing from the consecrated phrases of its school, and in the perpetual iteration of them it lost hold on the meaning they once had for it” (Church, The Oxford Movement [1904] 9–16).

Distinct from such preaching as a repetition of clichés, there is preaching rooted in what Lonergan called “the functional specialty of systematic theology.” Such theology, he notes, consists in “creative insight” into the mysteries of faith. It is the understanding that faith seeks. Vatican I spoke of it as “human reason, illuminated by faith and inquiring diligently, piously, soberly and so with God’s help, attaining to a fruitful understanding of the mysteries of faith, both from the analogy of what human reason naturally knows and from the interconnections of the mysteries with each other and with humanity’s ultimate end” (Neuner-Dupuis, The Christian Faith [1983] 132).

How to do this? In the present work Ogilvie explains Lonergan’s understanding of systematic theology as the human mind’s developing understanding of the mysteries of faith. This historically conscious view of theology is quite distinct from a classicist or deductivist view. “Method is not
a set of rules to be followed meticulously by a dolt. It is a framework for collaborative creativity” (Method in Theology [1972] xi). O. outlines Lonergan’s foundational intentionality analysis and its extension into the various “functional specialties” in theology. Only by taking these various specialties into account can we know precisely what we are doing when we are doing systematic theology.

Such theology is not just doing history. Nor is it just the repetition of doctrines, which, as Aquinas noted, can be taken on authority but do not give a student an understanding of “why the mysteries might be what they are.” Nor is systematic theology the functional specialty of communications. This is particularly important today when all kinds of “theologies” have emerged out of various contemporary cultural concerns—feminist, liberationist, ecological, “communion theology,” etc. Such theologies are closely linked to concerns to communicate with various audiences. But if such theologies are really to enlighten people, they must present some understanding of why the mysteries might be what they are. For without an adequate systematic theology, communications “has nothing to say.” With such a theology one can with time and creativity find the words to teach and preach the Gospel to particular audiences in new ways.

O. takes a long time getting into his subject. He spends six chapters on Lonergan’s intentionality analysis and method before treating Lonergan’s understanding of systematics. Eventually, he gives an exhaustive account of Lonergan’s own systematic theologizing, particularly his Christology and trinitarian theology. Lonergan’s analogy for the processions of the Word and the Spirit from the Father, of course, was based on the created analogy of the processes of human knowing and loving. Such an imperfect understanding can shed light on how it is possible that the Son is both “from himself” and “not from himself,” and how the Son and the Spirit’s “not being from themselves” actually differ.

Similarly in understanding the mysterious fact of Jesus’ divine sonship, O. quotes Lonergan on the aim of his Christology: “If in earlier ages it was enough to adore the mystery, if from the medieval period some metaphysical account of person and nature were all that was sought, it remains that in our age of psychology and critical philosophy, of hermeneutics and history, something different and more exacting is required. We have to be able to say what it means for a divine person to live a fully human life” (A Third Collection [1985] 91).

My own understanding grew as I read the book. For example, in dealing with systematics as seeking “the interconnections of the mysteries with each other and with our last end,” O. asks: How are the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation related to what St. Paul calls “the great mystery” of Christ and the Church? And how are these mysteries related to the mystery of Christian marriage? O. points to Lonergan’s understanding of these interconnections in which the developing charity of husband and wife reflects “the divine-ecclesial love,” and husband and wife are called to advance together “from the level of nature to the level of the beatific
vision” (Collection [1988] 30). In other words—matter for a homily—husband and wife are called to help each other get to heaven.

Of course, since we are dealing with divine self-revelation, such insight is only indirect, analogous, and imperfect. Still, as Aquinas noted, “To be able to see something of the loftiest realities, however thin and weak the sight may be, is a cause of the greatest joy” (Summa contra gentiles 1, q. 8).

Seton Hall University, South Orange, N.J. Richard M. Liddy

Llamados a Servir: Teología del Sacerdocio Ministerial. By Miguel Ponce Cuéllar. Barcelona: Herder, 2001. Pp. 536. €21.96.

This massive volume results from years of teaching on the sacrament of order and involvement in formation work in the Archdiocese of Badajoz, Spain. It treats all three grades of the sacrament, although it emphasizes “ministerial priesthood,” including episcopate.

Ponce Cuéllar’s introduction summarizes the “crisis of ministerial priesthood” of recent decades. He observes that theologians like Küng, Schillebeeckx, and Boff propose a theology of ordained ministry that regards the Twelve as merely eschatological and symbolic, argues for the Spirit-inspired emergence of ordained ministry within concrete challenges of concrete communities, and points to new possibilities for the shape of ministry in today’s context.

Such proposals, however, call for a study of the scriptural and patristic sources, and so parts 1 and 2 look at these in detail, along with the data of later theological tradition and the Roman magisterium. To P., the election of the Twelve is key, for on them Jesus bestows the fullness of his own power: “Given that the exousia of Christ is eschatological and priestly, the apostolate of the Twelve—and of Paul—is equally so, since it now participates in Christ’s exousia. The apostolic function . . . has as a basic function the gathering of humanity in order to constitute the priestly people which Christ presents to his Father” (78). Paul’s—and others’—apostleship is foundational for ministry in the Church, but even this “second type” (78) of apostle exercises ministry only by communion with the original apostolic college of the Twelve. In fact, every ministry described in the New Testament depends on such apostolic connection (135–36). Apostolic ministry is priestly because it participates in the high priesthood of Christ. First Peter and Revelation speak of the entire community as priestly, but this general priesthood does not preclude the existence of various levels of participation. “If the whole building is priestly, its structure ought equally to be recognized as priestly . . . by a particular title that has a special link with Jesus Christ” (166).

P.’s study of theological and magisterial tradition is careful and informative, although he omits any mention of the 17th-century “French School” and its exalted image of priesthood. His treatment of Vatican II is accurate and detailed, as is his treatment of postconciliar documents. Re-
garding the admission of women to ordination, P. is clear: “The words of the formal declaration of the pope, the exact answer of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, . . . and the clarification of Cardinal Ratzinger end any discussion of the question” (333).

Part 4 offers reflection on several aspects of ministerial priesthood, among which are discussions of priesthood as sacrament of Christ, Head and Pastor of the Church; of sacramental character; and of the three grades that make up the one sacrament. P. wants to present a theological position that mediates between a “Christomonism,” whose danger is a static understanding in peril of clericalism, and an “ecclesiomonism,” whose danger is mere functionalism. He insists on a close connection between aspects of ordained ministry that emphasize consecration and aspects that emphasize mission. Both are necessary; one implies the other, although the former seems, in P.’s view, to tip the scales.

P.’s treatment of ministerial priesthood does not venture far from papal or magisterial approaches. Much of what he says is finely nuanced and carefully stated. He is very clear on the nature of ordained ministry as a call to service, and will tolerate not a whit of clericalism or romanticism. Only Christ is head and pastor of the Church; the ordained minister is a sacrament of that leadership, locating him both within and “in front of” the community. If the ministerial priest can be called alter Christus, so can every Christian by virtue of baptism (369). Ministerial priesthood is so called “because it is subordinated to the service of the priesthood of Christ and at the service of the common priesthood” (386).

Some reservations, however, need stating. P. might have been more faithful to current scholarship by starting with Jesus’ ministry to the reign of God rather than with the establishment of the Twelve. That the Twelve were constituted by Jesus himself is fairly certain; that he intended them to be the “seed of the ministerial priesthood” (360) is not. That the Eucharist was celebrated at Troas (Acts 20) is fairly clear; that Paul presided at it is not. P. seems to trivialize the roles of deaconess Phoebe in Cenchreae and the apostle Junia (106). It is unfortunate that P. cites neither Raymond Brown’s seminal Priest and Bishop (1970), nor the important history of priesthood by Kenan Osborne (1988), both of which come to different scriptural and theological conclusions than he.

This is an important book on ministerial priesthood, and it articulates the Roman magisterium’s position extremely well. However, it promotes a theology of ordained ministry that is still susceptible to many of the dangers that P. tries valiantly to avoid.

Catholic Theological Union, Chicago

STEPHEN BEVANS, S.V.D.

CHRIST THE LIBERATOR: A VIEW FROM THE VICTIMS. By Jon Sobrino. Translated from the Spanish by Paul Burns. Maryknoll: Orbis, 2001. Pp. vii + 376. $28.

Christ the Liberator is the companion to Sobrino’s Jesus the Liberator (1993). The latter concentrates on the life, mission, and death of Jesus. The
former reflects on the Church’s dogmatic tradition that reaches a summit with Chalcedon. Like many contemporary Christologies, it begins “from below.” For S., however, this not only means presupposing the content of the first volume, but adopting a specific method that interrogates faith in Jesus Christ from the perspective of history’s victims, the marginalized two-thirds of humanity that includes the “crucified people” of El Salvador. “The view of the victims helps us to read christological texts and to know Jesus Christ better. Furthermore, this Jesus Christ, known in this way, helps us to understand the victims better and, above all, to work to defend them” (8). The conviction that the perspective of the victims provides the greatest access to reality shapes S.’s hermeneutics and praxis of reality.

The book is arranged in three sections: (1) the Resurrection of Jesus, (2) the use of christological titles in the New Testament, and (3) the conciliar Christology of the patristic age. As Jesus the Liberator concludes with a profound examination of the death of Jesus, Christ the Liberator begins with an equally impressive study of his Resurrection. With a command of the vast literature and the complex debates on the Resurrection, S. organizes his reflections around three main concerns. First, he addresses the hermeneutical problem raised by the Resurrection, viewing the Resurrection not as an intrahistorical event, but as an eschatological action of God encountered in history. Second, he examines the historical questions surrounding the “reality” of the Resurrection, beginning with the New Testament accounts of the Easter experience and ending with the possibility of analogous Easter experiences in history. Third, he addresses the theological issues raised by the Resurrection. God is the God of justice who gives life anew to the one unjustly deprived of life. Jesus is the faithful mediator of the reign of God and the revealer of God’s definitive salvation. This salvation and reign of God belong to all, but appear first of all as Good News to the poor.

In part 2, S. studies the “reality of Jesus” which the New Testament summarizes by using christological titles. As this type of examination entails numerous pitfalls and limitations, S. proceeds cautiously, relying on a range of previous interpreters. Noting how the concern for salvation shapes all New Testament Christologies, he correlates five central aspects of the reality of Jesus with five important New Testament titles: the humanity of the high priest, the salvation brought by the Christ, the hope in history loosed by the Lord of history, Jesus’ personal relationship with God as Son (and with humanity as brother), and the sacramentality of the Word. S. shows how, in the light of the Resurrection viewed as justice for victims, these models provide believers with new approaches to questions of theodicy, unbelief, and idolatry, while redefining mercy, hope, discipleship, and faith. He concludes part 2 with a reflection on Jesus himself as “Good News” and in this light argues that theology ought to add a vibrant concern for orthopathy (“the correct way of letting ourselves be affected by the reality of Christ”) to its concern for orthodoxy and orthopraxis (210).

The consummate achievement of the book appears in part 3, which interprets the christological developments and doctrines of the conciliar
period. Drawing on a range of historical and critical studies of patristic theology, S. boldly notes the limitations of the christological achievements of this period, especially as they impinge on faith in Jesus Christ today. Above all, S. examines the implications of the fact that the key conciliar doctrines were formulated without due reference to what Jesus mediated, namely, the reign of God. Nevertheless, S. regards the major developments of this formative period with an appreciative eye. He reserves his highest praise for what he terms the triple-pathos (or passionate courage) of the patristic theologians: the pathos of audacity and honesty that insists on the divinity of a suffering Christ, the pathos of reality that insists on the humanity of a saving Christ, and the pathos of the whole that insists on the unity of Jesus Christ without conflating or confusing his two natures.

Throughout the work, S. asks what the view of the victims can contribute to an interpretation of the christological doctrines. “Basically, perhaps, just one thing: it can open our eyes to the relationship between God and what is small” (294). The book’s originality and brilliance appears over and over as a result of S.’s unwavering commitment to this perspective. Christ the Liberator stands not only as a watershed in liberation theology but as a great achievement among all contemporary essays in Christology.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology

KEVIN F. BURKE, S.J.

EVI L AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. By Gordon Graham. New Studies in Christian Ethics, vol. 20. New York: Cambridge University, 2001. Pp. xviii + 241. $64.65; $22.95.

In this timely book, Graham argues that our world is plagued by demonic, supernatural evil, against which Christianity alone offers credible grounds for hopeful moral endeavor. His argument builds around the seminal insight that contemporary secular thought—scientific and philosophical—lacks sufficient explanatory power to account for evil. This “signal failure” undercuts the capacity of modern thought to attest to the significance of morality and to sustain people in a commitment to moral living. As such, modern thought is “inadequate to its own purposes” (xv). G.’s remedy calls for a return to the premodern tradition of Christian moral theology and its interpretation of our moral universe as a battleground between supernatural forces of light and darkness wherein evil is defeated by the power of God.

To advance this recovery, G. examines the presuppositions of contemporary moral thought, both Christian and secular. He maintains that Christian ethicists, beholden to a concern for relevance, have reduced Christianity to a code for moral living within a pluralist world. But Christianity does not offer a distinctive ethics so much as it imparts meaning to our moral endeavor by locating it within the explanatory context of eschatological theology. This corrected view, which G. attributes to traditional moral theology, derives from the Gospels' depiction of Jesus as primarily an agent
of cosmic history and not as a teacher of morals. Thus, the moral significance of Christian faith has most to do with its claims about Jesus’ unique identity as the one from God who brings salvation through his victory over the powers of darkness.

G.’s critique of secular moral thought is the text’s provocative centerpiece. Employing a version of Kant’s moral proof of the existence of God, he argues that the modern explanatory structures of humanism and naturalism that underwrite today’s secular moral thought are less satisfying, philosophically, than the ancient ideas they were meant to displace. Here G. meticulously exploits an overlooked irony. Morality stands in need of a theoretical ground that can assure its reasonableness and serve as its guarantor. When its earlier ground (the concept of an omnipotent and benevolent God) perished—allegedly, on the sword of theodicy—morality was rerooted within the soils of humanism and naturalism. Considerations of evil, then, were crucial to the quest for a secular morality. Yet the thinking that funds this morality is famously unable to address evil in a helpful manner. Humanism, says G., is too closely aligned with subjectivism to take evil seriously; and naturalism, which informs scientific diagnoses of evil, cannot demonstrate that the hypothesis of human malfunctioning adequately accounts for the evidence gathered from recent killings and massacres. That evidence, G. argues, is better explained if we postulate a supernatural seducer who tempts willing victims to desire evil as such. And if this is our adversary, we do well to have faith in a God who is on our side.

Having delivered the reader to the doorstep of theology, G. concludes with a reexamination of evil in the context of the cosmic narrative whose hero is the Christus Victor. That narrative’s attribution of evil to spiritual realities enables us to take evil seriously in a way that modern thought cannot. Yet it is also generative of hope, for it casts our struggles against the transformative background of God’s sovereignty over Satan and faithfulness to humanity.

G.’s argument demonstrates rather ably that our cultural bewilderment in the face of evil is largely a function of the way we have learned to think about the good. Evil, it rightly attests, is a problem, but it is not the same kind of problem for all persons or communities. That insight is potentially liberating. While G. may fail to convince some readers that the limitations of the prevailing modes of moral reasoning warrant adherence to his specific theology, his text does, at the very least, deny the mind any facile satisfaction with purely secular thought.

G. is right that the recovery of practical reason issues an invitation for the development of a theology of morality. However, his own proposed theology is too narrowly shaped by his specific justificatory concerns regarding evil (a limitation he inherits from Kant). As such, he stresses cross and cosmic victory to the neglect of the wider implications of Incarnation and grace. Correlatively, his account of moral endeavor makes scarce reference to love even as it makes the case for hope. These nonfatal limitations can be instructive. Indeed, they signal that the sharing of theology for
the reinvigoration of morality entails due attentiveness to the complete trinitarian character of Christian faith.

The text’s style is somewhat disappointing. G. continually takes the reader on lengthy context-setting detours that attenuate the focus and concentrate excessively on quarrels within the sub-disciplines in philosophy and theology. Moreover, targets of his ground-clearing initiatives may not recognize themselves in his descriptions.

Loyola College in Maryland

WHO COUNT AS PERSONS? HUMAN IDENTITY AND THE ETHICS OF KILLING.
By John F. Kavanaugh, S.J. Washington: Georgetown University, 2001. Pp. xiv + 233. $24.95.

Rejecting both utilitarian and deontological methods exemplified by Mill and Kant in favor of what he calls the “intrinsic” approach of Aquinas (76), Kavanaugh argues that ethics must be grounded in the subject who does ethics. He posits that behind recent theorists’ talk of the end of the self, the death of the soul, and the end of humanism is “the disenfranchisement of the human person” (21). A substantial part of K.’s book is devoted to this human person, the subject who does ethics. He insists that “all rights talk, all talk of abomination, liberation, or resistance” can have no meaning at all “without the real existence of human persons as moral agents, without an understanding of what constitutes human persons, without seeing that human persons must have capacities for communication, interpretation, rational discourse, or self-creation” (23).

K. develops a definition of the human person in terms of embodied self-consciousness. Acknowledging that our integrated, self-conscious, embodied unity is fragile, that most of us only periodically realize ourselves fully, K. nevertheless argues that such realizations are defining moments for personhood: “To repeat, the act and endowment of pure reflexivity is not the ‘self,’ but a capacity of personal animals, empowering them to relate to their history and space as selves” (41). The self is not a given; the capacity to be a self is given in embodied self-consciousness. The self develops through the interaction of our embodied self-consciousness with other beings.

K. makes a persuasive case for this understanding of persons and for applying this understanding in decision-making about killing. Rejecting arguments that personhood is based in performance, contribution, or capacity to relate to others or any other functional capacity, K. points to the most damaged humans as having worth as persons because they possess an “I,” an embodied self-consciousness.

The argument becomes more ambiguous, however, when K. attempts to apply it to various situations in which the ethics of killing is debated. He does not debate cases; he states that persons will either be convinced by the principled argument or not convinced at all (140). But he does list the
situations in which he thinks this definition of human person prevents killing, with significantly more attention given to abortion. The appropriateness of his definition of personhood seems clear in the case of the terminally ill, the mentally retarded, the emotionally disturbed, and other humans clearly endowed with consciousness. But the aptness of his definition for banning killing in abortion, anencephalic infants, and patients in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) is less apparent. In these cases K. seems to be arguing not that humans persons are characterized by embodied self-consciousness, but by the potential for embodied self-consciousness. One might well argue that PVS patients are still human persons because they had a developed self-consciousness that well may endure in what only seems to others a permanent shutdown of consciousness. But anencephalic infants seem to lack the material basis that enables self-consciousness. In the case of abortion, it may well be true that fetuses have embodied self-consciousness, but very few would agree that this is present by the end of conception and probably not even when the primitive streak first appears. While K. is willing to allow that some morally serious persons might not see personhood present from the completion of conception as he does, he poses two weeks after conception as the outer limit to which radical personalists could admit. In the abortion case, it appears that there has been some slippage between the human person as embodied self-consciousness and the human person as one who has potential for embodied self-consciousness, a slippage of which there were earlier hints (23). In the case of anencephalic infants, the slippage seems even greater. The argument here appears to be that the human species is characterized by embodied self-consciousness, and so all members of the species should be assumed to have embodied self-consciousness, even if they lack the material foundation for consciousness. K. is aware that he will be charged with essentialism, but insists that the alternatives are infinitely worse.

The last part of the book is a compelling critique of contemporary society, which no one does better than K. He explains why it is that we find it so easy to tolerate and even defend killing: that our reality system is based on commodity fetishism and fear of death, on ultimately unsatisfactory substitutes for personal relationships. Imperfect humans remind us of our own imperfections, vulnerability and mortality. In rejecting them, we reject ourselves and our own humanity.

Florida International University, Miami

Christine E. Gudorf

BEYOND RETRIBUTION: A NEW TESTAMENT VISION FOR JUSTICE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT. By Christopher D. Marshall. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001. Pp. xx + 342. $24.

Marshall makes an important contribution to biblical and ethical scholarship on crime and punishment. He asserts that there is scriptural warrant for restorative justice, an emerging alternative to the dominant legal para-
digm of retributive justice; the latter defines crime as a violation of the state and its laws, the former as harm done to persons and their relationships. “The first Christians,” M. writes, “experienced in Christ and lived out in their faith communities an understanding of justice as a power that heals, restores, and reconciles rather than hurts, punishes, and kills, and . . . this reality ought to shape and direct a Christian contribution to the criminal justice debate today” (33). M. finds in both Paul and the Gospels an understanding of divine justice rooted in biblical Israel’s primary interest in the restoration of shalom even more than in the punishment of offenders. Paul understands the Cross and Resurrection as an occasion of reconciliation and restoration, not of substitutionary punishment, while the Gospel writers portray Jesus as embodying divine justice through his practice of forgiveness and nonretaliation.

The values of divine justice, however, do not preclude the necessity of punishment. M. acknowledges methodological problems in bringing distinctively Christian ethical teaching into the public arena—his assumption is that a Christian perspective on any ethical issue ought to be firmly rooted in Scripture without excluding other sources of moral wisdom. Drawing on legal and political philosophy, M. offers an enlightening survey of criminology’s rationales for punishment, including rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution, finding limited sanction in the New Testament for each. In analyzing scriptural texts concerning civil punishment, church discipline, and eschatological judgment, he finds that in none of these is divine or human punishment retributive rather than reparative or redemptive. Nonetheless, he notes, “the Western penal system, although a mixture of several theoretical perspectives, remains largely committed to retribution” (131). Despite its strengths, including the concepts of just deserts and proportionate punishment, M. says retributivism is marred by its redefinition of the victim “as the impersonal state, not the human being actually hurt by the crime” (119). Core Christian values are therefore best reflected in restorative justice, in which offenders take responsibility for their actions, and which emphasizes the dignity of the victim and the moral agency of the perpetrator.

However, M. says too little about related phenomena such as the demand for “victims’ rights.” The use of victim-impact statements in the penalty phase of capital cases, for instance, has been criticized as a veiled form of vengeance that devalues the conception of law as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments. In extolling restorative justice’s focus on the victim, M. fails adequately to consider how restorative justice must balance the subjective and objective aspects of penal justice. Moreover, he uses the term “retribution” throughout the book rather than “revenge,” though he clearly identifies one with the other. There is need for more nuance here. While retribution can resemble vengeance, the two are distinct: revenge, the desire to cause only harm to a person who has caused harm to another, is retribution without moral limit. Finally, while M.’s otherwise persuasive treatment of capital punishment ties together his biblical exegesis and social analysis, he uses outdated statistics from 1930 to
1967 to demonstrate the death penalty’s racial bias, for example, and he takes insufficient account of the shifting grounds of recent public debate in the U.S. about the death penalty as arbitrary and error-prone. More reliable and timely data would strengthen M.’s argument.

A provocative reflection on Christian forgiveness as the consummation of justice concludes the book. M. defines forgiveness as a dynamic, multi-step process in which victims forego repaying their offenders in kind, leading to the cultivation of reconciliation. While forgiveness is “a matter about which Christians have something special to say,” M. emphasizes that it is a common human experience, “accessible to different traditions and indispensable to the proper functioning of all human relationships” (262–63). But M. could more explicitly incorporate a theory of virtue to undergird his description of forgiveness as a discipline to be acquired and mastered through lifelong practice. Forgiveness can serve as the heart of a reformed system of criminal justice that embraces practices of restorative justice rather than purely retributive measures, i.e., that offers an asymmetric response to criminal violence. “Many of the punishments employed in the current penal system, such as long periods of incarceration,” he contends, “are far from restorative; they are inherently destructive” (142). In discussing forgiveness last, the book’s structure reflects the proper caution not to talk of forgiveness prematurely. In the face of vicious criminals, moral outrage must have its day, but M.’s excellent study urges society to look beyond punishment rooted in vengeance to punishment that serves the goal of reconciliation.

Boston College  
THOMAS P. BOLAND, JR.

MORAL DISCOURSE IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD. Daniel Vokey. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame, 2001. Pp. ix + 373. $45.

The book is a helpful contribution to ongoing conversations about whether and how persons from very different moral traditions may argue productively about moral issues across cultural and religious gulfs. Such conversations are increasingly important in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and Vokey’s work is a challenge to those (moral skeptics) who believe that persons within rival moral traditions are unable rationally to resolve issues that divide them. V. argues that indeed we can have rational dialogue to determine the strengths and limitations of moral positions and practices across traditions, though he understands “rational” as what is opposed to manipulation or coercion rather than as an abstract, disembodied form of argument that excludes emotions or concrete experience. In fact, V.’s approach to ethics stands in contrast to a purely intellectual/theoretical approach that rejects or subordinates the role of human experience in moral judgment.

Alasdair MacIntyre’s work serves as V.’s starting point. He analyzes, criticizes, and reconstructs MacIntyre’s account of the rationality of tradi-
tions, focusing on what can be learned from him about the practice of dialectical debate through which rival and incommensurable moral points of view may be assessed. He expands on MacIntyre’s account of dialectical argument, offering an account of nonfoundational justification in terms of a search for “wide reflective equilibrium” among a community’s beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, interests, norms, priorities, and practices (92–93). He claims that the choice of one perspective over others may be justified insofar as it most closely approaches wide reflective equilibrium in relation to its rivals. His account of nonfoundational justification as the search for this equilibrium is combined with a Mahayana Buddhist metaethics in order to establish “a philosophical framework within which the possibility of reaching agreement across incommensurable viewpoints can be affirmed” (273).

V. ultimately argues that MacIntyre’s ethics of virtue will “fall short of its own criteria of success” (171) because it neglects an experiential dimension of moral development and discourse essential to sound practical judgment and effective moral education. He claims that MacIntyre’s work is limited by an intellectual bias that “contributes to a widespread uncertainty about the nature of intrinsic moral value and so presents a serious obstacle to the project of assessing rival moral points of view” (173). His criticisms of MacIntyre’s bias and corresponding dualisms and hierarchies will likely resonate with feminist and liberation theologians. The search for wide reflective equilibrium in moral inquiry, on the other hand, avoids a purely intellectual approach by appealing to moral values that are apprehended in the depth and quality of human experience. V.’s response to the apparent intellectual bias within MacIntyre’s account of the rationality of traditions hinges on V.’s characterization of intrinsic moral value and its apprehension, which he develops by drawing on the conceptual resources of Mahayana Buddhism.

Chapter 6 summarizes some fundamental teachings of Mahayana Buddhism that provide a philosophical framework for discussing what V. calls, after Pascal, “reasons of the heart.” This is the most original and interesting part of the book. In essence, V.’s reasons of the heart are nondualistic, immediate, cognitive-affective responses that help identify what is intrinsically good or bad; they occur in a state of “unconditioned awareness” prior to conceptions or dualisms. If I interpret correctly, V.’s reasons of the heart are not unlike Schillebeeckx’s negative contrast experiences: in both cases, human experience (what moves us in a positive or negative way) can help us identify what is intrinsically good (what is of God and leads to human flourishing) and what is intrinsically bad (what is sinful and thwarts flourishing). Further, our immediate apprehensions of intrinsic value are ethically motivating: they can lead us to sound moral judgment which affirms the good, independently of self-oriented desires.

V. thoughtfully tries to find middle ground between objectivism and relativism, with the hope of furthering the cause of peace and justice in the world through conversation. I am more optimistic than he about the ability of those within so-called rival traditions to agree on basic, concrete goods
necessary for the material, social, and spiritual welfare of human beings. We already do this quite well, as Lisa Cahill argues [Theological Studies 65 (2002)]. Still, the book is helpful to ongoing debate on these matters, and V.’s concluding discussion of criteria for productive discourse is a good foundation for further conversations about how we might come to agreements about vital moral issues while standing within different traditions.

Overall, V.’s determination to define terms in the interest of clarity makes for slow and difficult reading; a glossary might have been helpful. Readers should be prepared for the density of the text. Not recommended as an undergraduate text, graduate readers interested in moral discourse may find it worthwhile.

St. Norbert College, De Pere, Wis. Bridget Burke Ravizza

The Ethics and Economics of Assisted Reproduction: The Cost of Longing. By Maura A. Ryan. Moral Tradition Series. Washington: Georgetown University, 2001. Pp. viii + 183. $44.95.

Rarely does a work engage the reader from the very first paragraph of the preface. Ryan’s prelude serves as a platform to state her objective: “to ask whether a just society is obliged to help people overcome infertility” (v), and to establish her “credentials” as a theologian and a woman who has been through the process of assisted reproduction. For a reader engaged daily by the challenges posed by reproductive technology (in my case from the perspective of Maternal-Fetal Medicine), R.’s first words offer a promise of insightful reflection based on real experience.

The body of R.’s work fulfills the promise. In an introduction and five succinct and cogent chapters she examines assisted reproduction from a fresh viewpoint for Catholic moral theology: that of social justice. She begins by setting the context of her arguments in the contemporary dialogue about assisted reproduction in modern American medicine. She outlines the diverse and conflicting viewpoints of infertile couples, reproductive specialists, insurance providers, moralists, feminists, and government. Is assisted reproduction a right to which all are due access, or is it an expensive luxury that drains resources from the more needy? Is it a violation of natural law or a medical advance with the potential to relieve suffering? Is it a means of helping human beings reach fulfillment, or simply another means of exploiting women by limiting their role to bearing children? R. confronts these concerns in asking whether and how a just society should consider assisted reproduction in the ordering of priorities.

R. begins with an examination of the economics of infertility. The medications and procedures used to diagnose and treat infertile couples carry an impressive price tag. The question of who pays has moved assisted reproduction into the arena of social justice. Many third party payers argue that reproduction is not a health necessity and refuse to cover the costs or severely limit what they will support; thus, assisted reproduction has been
cast into the realm of luxury items accessible only to those who can afford to pay. Making medicine a commodity has serious implications. Perhaps the most disturbing of these is that “unacknowledged social worth criteria are smuggled into medical judgements. That is, inequalities of access mask social judgements about who is fit to reproduce” (33).

R. draws on the excellent work of Lisa Sowle Cahill and Daniel Callahan to build an argument for a justice-based approach to reproductive technology. Citing Cahill, she brings the ethical arguments about assisted reproduction out of the realm of individual choice and into the context of the common good. In this context one must weigh the right to human fulfillment in reproduction against the good of the whole community; thus, assisted reproduction becomes a legitimate concern for Catholic social justice theology. R. effectively employs Callahan’s challenging arguments that we are fueling the health care crisis by expecting too much from medical science, as she contends that we should seek from medicine only the means to live a good, mortal life. The implications of this argument are far-reaching and complicated, but R. limits her considerations to the matter at hand. Assisted reproduction is a medical resource that can help humans flourish individually and contribute to the common good, yet this resource is not limitless and must be used in the context of social justice to promote “well-being within a common good” (93).

Reproductive technology can be an important means to human flourishing in the community and should not be considered a mere luxury. R. draws on Catholic social teaching to contend that it is a mark of a just society to be willing to guarantee broad access to the means of human fulfillment. We must begin to undertake the task of deciding how to distribute the benefits of reproductive medicine in a way that assures equal access to those who need it as opposed to those who can afford it.

In the final chapters R. begins the task of exploring the practicalities of determining just distribution of reproductive technologies for the well-being of individuals in the context of the common good.

I congratulate R. for bringing Catholic moral theology back to the table in the everyday clinical world of reproductive medicine by approaching these issues from an area of great strength in the Catholic moral tradition, social justice teaching (as opposed to its weaker area of sexual ethics). This book is an important contribution to the discussion of what we expect from medicine and how we allocate its resources. I will recommend it to my colleagues in ethics and in medicine.

Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston

Michael W. Gallagher

Methods in Medical Ethics. Edited by Jeremy Sugarman and Daniel P. Sulmasy, O.F.M. Washington: Georgetown University, 2001. Pp. xiv + 314. $39.95.

Sugarman and Sulmasy have provided those responsible for health care decisions an important tool for future deliberations. The book delivers
eleven essentially different ways of looking at the questions that decision-makers face when confronted with medical technologies of novel, questionable, or experimental use. These eleven ways arise from distinct scholarly disciplines, each of which has contributed to debates on the legitimate use of various medical technologies over the past 40 or more years. S. and S. take as their cue Wallace Stevens’s metaphor-rich poem, “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird,” to frame their collection (the two introductory chapters round out the eleven distinct disciplines to 13 views). They argue, “neither the methods employed by philosophy nor theology nor anthropology nor history nor law nor any other methods that contribute to scholarship in medical ethics describe the blackbird called medical ethics in its entirety. But by examining a moral question from the vantage point of several different methods, one gains a richer understanding of that moral question, and a better grasp of an answer” (4–5). As the various authors introduce the methods of their disciplines the reader is rewarded with that understanding.

To facilitate comparison and insight, each chapter presents material in a set pattern: an introduction to the discipline, an outline of at least one of the methods proper to the discipline (with examples of use), followed by a critique, concluding comments, and, perhaps most valuable for further study, “Notes on Resources and Training.” Readers of this journal will be familiar with the methods of philosophy, theology, and physician codes: logic and rhetorical argumentation and principlism (DeGrazia and Beauchamp); autonomous, dialectical, and continuous theological paradigms (Sowle Cahill); and the teleological authority of behavioral codes (Pellegrino). Many readers will also recognize the contours of casuistry, but Jonsen highlights the importance of prudence and the virtues for the estimation of circumstances and topics, maxims and principles, paradigms and analogies proper to each case. The methods of law, history, qualitative and quantitative theories, ethnography, experimental research, and economics and decision science provide insight into the point of departure as well as the reasoning these other disciplines follow—a better grasp of the questions and answers the editors promised.

The methods of law (Hodge and Gostin) clarify cases, establish precedents, and set legislation to instruct, debate, and reform, thereby newly to inform studies of values clarification. The historian’s craft (Amundsen) reminds us of the multiple contexts recognized by the humanities that influence health, medical practices, and research that would expose the possibly oppressive or artificial effects of these contexts. Qualitative empirical research methods (Chandros Hull, Taylor, and Kass) confirm the impression of experiences that the public, the medical profession, or other relevant subgroup has of particular realities, such as breast cancer. These methods yield statistically significant descriptions of general understanding, daily expectations, or psychological processes that may be used to support work in other disciplines (useful for complementing, for example, a theology of the body). Ethnographic methods (Loomis Marshall and Koenig) employing thick description can expose cultural biases as well as
provide necessary correctives in understanding peoples from minority cultures. Quantitative survey methods (Pearlman and Starks), by the sheer mass of data collected, challenge established thinking and practices of how inquiries should be initiated into values assignments and how to recognize potentially contradictory perceptions between patient/family and professional. Experimental methods (Danis, Hanson, and Garrett) not only justify the continued use of intervention, but they may also yield—where the intervention is of an educational nature—data for interpretive studies on values and behavior modification. Finally, economics and decision science methods (Asch) bring to the fore, on the one hand, the fiscal realities of possible medical interventions and, on the other hand, the permutations of decisions that may be made when an intervention is proposed (these results potentially confront opposing values that more readily are resolved by the insights of philosophy and theology). The concluding chapters apply these methods broadly to the matter of physician-assisted suicide (Sulmasy) and genetic diagnosis (Henderson).

The text succeeds in introducing readers to many of the disciplines that have thus far contributed to the discussions and debates that modern medical technologies have occasioned. Some of the tables, however, are misnumbered, and more explicit working examples would have been welcome. Further, passing references to the critiques of feminisms, racism, and sexism do not remedy a glaring omission. Recommended for library holdings and graduate students and professors across disciplines that focus on medical ethics and bioethics.

Barry University, Miami Shores, Fla.  

MARY JO IOZZIO

AMERICAN EXORCISM: EXPPELLING DEMONS IN THE LAND OF PLENTY. By Michael W. Cuneo. New York: Doubleday, 2001. Pp. ix + 314. $24.95.

Cuneo, of Fordham University’s Department of Sociology and Anthropology, presents a thoroughly researched study of the rise in interest in exorcism and deliverance in popular culture during the past 30 years in the United States. While the popular tone of this book can be misleading, the content raises important theological questions: Is there a reality to spiritual evil? If so, what is the exact relationship between mental illness and spiritual affliction/possession? Do exorcism and deliverance facilitate healing per se, or is it simply a matter of a placebo effect?

C.’s thesis is that the mainstream Christian denominations in America have neglected the basic questions concerning the actual existence of spiritual evil, oppression, and demonic possession. Meanwhile, Hollywood and other media have ignited popular curiosity on the subject. The premier example of this is the movie version of William Peter Blatty’s The Exorcist (1973). Its depiction of the priest as exorcist-hero was so successful that Cardinal John O’Connor, addressing the issue nearly 20 years later, recommended the movie to his congregation as a paradigmatic portrayal of the reality of spiritual evil (60).
If the success of *The Exorcist* contributed to a rise in marginal Catholic and Protestant exorcism-deliverance ministries, the publication of Malachi Martin’s *Hostage to the Devil* (1976) became a guide for would-be exorcist and deliverance ministers. C.’s research in this area is most provocative. An interview with the renowned psychiatrist, M. Scott Peck (*People of the Lie*, 1983) reveals that Peck collaborated with Martin on several exorcisms. (One finds it peculiar that Peck would give credence to the reclusive, eccentric author of such controversial works as *The Jesuits*, 1987.)

Throughout the body of the book, C. conducts a thorough review of exorcism and deliverance ministries in charismatic, evangelical, and Catholic circles. The study is enriched by C.’s firsthand interviews with prominent figures in the field and his own eyewitness accounts of exorcism/deliverance ministries in action.

The overwhelming success of the *The Exorcist, Hostage to the Devil*, and the primordial archetypes these stirred within the popular religious psyche provoke the question: Why is Hollywood and popular culture taking the phenomenon of exorcism and the possibility of evil spirits seriously while mainstream churches are seemingly avoiding these issues? Theologians such as Richard McBrien, for example, dismiss “the very notion of a personal devil as ‘premodern and precritical’ ” (60). In many ways McBrien’s position represents the general attitude of Catholic intellectuals in North America. C. observes: “Mention the idea of demonic possession and exorcism to a gathering of Catholic academics, and you’ll likely as not be rewarded with knowing snickers or mutterings of disbelief” (267). Many theologians dismiss the question of ontological spiritual evil because it is seen as archaic or because they are concerned (perhaps rightly) that it promotes a “devil-made-me-do-it” morality that avoids human culpability. Moreover, the modern medical sciences and psychiatric explanations have supplanted premodern explanations for mental illness.

C. has his own reservations concerning the reality of spiritual evil, but his well-intentioned healthy scepticism at times boarders on reductionism. Perhaps his scepticism illustrates one of the main problems concerning this topic, i.e., a common bias in the intellectual community that refuses to take these matters seriously. While I agree that a healthy skepticism is important when addressing these issues, we must not become reductionists in the process. Perhaps we underestimate how much of our current theology is still heavily influenced by the Enlightenment. After all, if Aquinas is correct and pride is one of fundamental sins of the fallen angels, might it not follow that the denial of Satan’s existence makes him more determined to prove his existence? In the midst of the crises and religious strife in which the three Abrahamic traditions are currently embroiled, one wonders sometimes if the devil may be getting his due amidst all the turmoil.

The issues C. raises are complex. They call for a balanced, integrated, and open-minded view, although one should not be so open-minded, as Chesterton warned, that one’s brains fall out. On this account, perhaps Cardinal Suenens was wise to caution against the charismatic extremists
who were caught up with “demonomania” (140). Such extremism promotes a sort of paranoia that is contrary to a life of faith.

All told, a hope resides in C.’s research in the dramatic healing of evil and in the presentation of the priest as exorcist-hero. These are refreshing themes to glean from this study, which may enrich a theology of ministry and priesthood.

Regis College, Toronto

JOHN D. DADOSKY

REDEEMING MEMORIES: A THEOLOGY OF HEALING AND TRANSFORMATION. By Flora A. Keshgegian. Nashville: Abingdon, 2000. Pp. 280. $23.

In the Jewish ritual of remembrance, the Passover Seder, there is a sung litany called the Dayenu (“it would have been enough”). It gives thanks for beneficent acts: “Had God brought us out of Egypt and not supported us in the wilderness—It would have been enough! Had God supported us in the wilderness and not given us the Sabbath—It would have been enough!” Keshgegian’s book prompts this style of reciting.

If K. had only introduced the fruits of the new field of trauma studies into theological reflection, she would have done theology a great service. But she goes beyond this methodological step into a synthesis of pastoral experience, psychological expertise, historical scholarship, and constructive theological reflection.

The book’s first section presents the three-part context for reflection on the nature of memory, the status of suffering, the role of witness, and the hard path toward hope: the experiences of survivors of sexual abuse, whom K., an Episcopal priest, encountered as a chaplain and faculty member at Brown University; the legacies of the Armenian genocide, which her family survived, and of the Jewish Holocaust; and recent efforts at retrieving the histories of women and of African Americans. This well-footnoted section will be especially helpful to those unfamiliar with the movements K. covers or with the controversies they have generated.

The second half of the book examines the themes of remembrance and witness introduced in the first section and their relation to Christ, Redemption, and Church. K. proposes “to remember, from the perspectives of those who have been victimized, in such a way that we might re-member Christianity and society.” At stake is not just what theology may emerge from this reflection on history and memory, but the status of Christianity, which has repeatedly jeopardized itself by its complicity in the “regimes of domination that have perpetrated abuse, persecution, and violence” (17).

This book is part of a wave of works by women theologians addressing in the past decade the cluster of issues related to suffering, evil, soteriology, and Redemption. These writings include Emilie Townes’s A Troubling in My Soul (1993), Delores Williams’s Sisters in the Wilderness (1993), Kathleen Sands’s Escape from Paradise (1994), Kristine Rankka’s Women and the Value of Suffering (1998), Rosemary Radford Ruether’s Women and...
Redemption (1998), Cynthia Crysdale’s Embracing Travail (1999), Rita Nakashima Brock and Rebecca Parker’s Proverbs of Ashes (2001), and Nancy Pineda-Madrid’s essay “In Search of a Theology of Suffering, Latinoamente” (2001).

K. reminds us repeatedly that memory is a complex, multif orm, and ongoing process. These repetitions, though noticeable, perform a critical function: K. makes much of the ways we are led to avoid the hard remembering that brings to mind and heart the traumas of our history. This passionate book also gives due credit to ambiguity. In fact, one of its concerns is the ambiguity not only of memory, but of knowing itself.

While K. emphasizes the utter necessity of remembering trauma, she stresses equally the need for communities and individuals not to be defined by victimhood, to go beyond survival into reintegration and new life. This is easier said than done. There is no cheap grace in this book.

Plumbing the meanings and practices—always plural—of memory, K. locates her work within the traditions of political, liberation, and feminist theologies. She begins with the complicated task laid upon her by her family and the Armenian American community: “Why were we to remember the past, what past were we to remember, and in what sense was it for the sake of the future? What relationship was ‘right’ between the practice of remembering and my own life choice and practices? What did it mean, as a person of faith, to remember for salvation’s sake?” (15) These questions could well be asked not only in history or theology classes, but also in liturgical studies.

K. probes Johann Baptist Metz’s “dangerous memory,” a term, she notes, that is much quoted, heavily used, and ill-defined. Acknowledging her debt to Metz and to feminist theologians Elizabeth Johnson, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Sharon Welch, and Rita Nakashima Brock, three of whom use and expand Metz’s term, K. also differentiates her work from theirs.

I read this book when it was first published and then again this past year after the September 11 attacks, in the wake of the clergy sexual abuse crisis and its dynamics of silence and power, and during one of the worst episodes of violence in the land where Jesus walked. Even if K. had not written the book in these times, it would have been enough. What it gives us now, as the three traumas remain with us, is a profoundly helpful resource as we seek to make theological sense of them. It also presents an ecclesiological challenge: how will the Church live into hope as a community of remembrance?

Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley

Jane Carol Redmont

Creative Spirituality: The Way of the Artist. By Robert Wuthnow. Berkeley: University of California, 2001. Pp. x + 309. $27.50.

Well known as a cultural analyst of American religion, Robert Wuthnow has long been interested in alternative ways of thinking. One fertile source
of such considerations consists of people engaged in artistic activity. Indeed, W. suggests throughout this book that artists are considered, even by some religious leaders, as “the theologians of our time” (139), as “spiritual leaders” (266), and as the persons to whom many Americans “are now turning. . . for spiritual guidance” (10). The book is W.’s attempt to harvest insights from this sampling.

The difficult task, of course, is to retain the variety and “wildness” of viewpoints from over 100 individuals interviewed while still providing some identifiable insights to relieve such a wide diversity. W. accomplishes this by grouping the interviews according to topics—chapters for main subjects and subtitles for different approaches to the relevant theme. Chapter 4, for instance, is “Art as Spiritual Practice.” Some subtitles for this chapter are “Chanting,” “Art Equals Spirituality,” “Thanking the Blessed Mother,” “Performing in Service to God,” “Spending Time,” and “The Role of Mentors.” “Spiritual Practice” itself stands at an opposite pole from “shopping around,” which is to seek out a predigested form of spirituality instead of “doing something that is fresh, expressive, and worthwhile” (273). On the other hand, to practice is to engage in a regular pattern of activities to deepen one’s understanding and experience of the sacred and to establish a closer connection with the ultimate ground of being (127).

Under each subheading W. treats one or two artists in detail, relating each artist’s life in its many aspects, especially the parts that pertain to spiritual experience and art. Thus, Ann Biddle (“Chanting”) is a dancer who uses daily devotional practices to express both spirituality and artistic endeavor. She grew up in Thailand with great curiosity about God. Her parents’ divorce when she was twelve was a personal trauma for her, and there were further devastating tragedies. Although she had gone to a Quaker school, she did “shop around” for spiritual answers—rebirthing, past-life regression, psychic healing, yoga, and Tarot to name a few. The Buddhist routine of morning and evening chanting and meditation, learned through a Jewish friend, answered her need. Ann summarizes her practice now as “learning how to live your life creatively” (111). We receive such detail about each artist.

Some artists come from a Christian or even Catholic background (as Lydia García in “Thanking the Blessed Mother”), but by no means all. Meridith Monk, a composer, singer, filmmaker, choreographer, and director, for instance, was raised in Judaism, encountered Christianity at a Quaker high school, but now practices Shambala (181). Pauline Oliveros, a composer who teaches “deep listening,” was affected by Tibetan Buddhism. David Dunn, a musician, has been deeply influenced by living in close proximity with American Indians.

W. avoids the language of erudition or scholarship. He is a good writer, able to portray individuals in vivid and effective prose. Indeed, the reader might be warned to maintain attention to the organization and sub-organization of the book, since the sheer number of effective mini-stories can otherwise numb the senses. Even so the narratives do indeed create a valuable impression of how these subjects approach their lives, their work,
and their questions about human life itself—whether these concern God or
some other form of spiritual entity.

Two methodological questions arise. The first is about “settled” religion.
If creativity is “the capacity to see and think about things in innovative
ways” (268), then established paths of spirituality must perforce be uncre-
ative. Has W.’s exclusive choice of artists subtly weighted his study toward
exploration and away from received teaching? Discernment is needed on
the part of the reader. Second is the thorny question of whether it matters
at all what artists say about their work. If the maxim is true that artists draw
from a source within themselves that is too deep to express except in the
work of art itself, then no descriptive book can get at the most important
living experience of spirituality artists have to offer: their art. Comments
about their lives are interesting, but perhaps not more so than about an-
other sampling of people.

Even given these limitations of method, the book is well worth reading.
By this reviewer’s lights, W. does in fact give a vivid impression of the state
of religion and spirituality in the United States today. Spirituality is not
gone, nor is the dogged pursuit of it, but confusion and disenchantment
have had their way. Perhaps the search is, in fact, now more important than
the finding. Organized religions will do well to pay attention to this view-
point.

St. Louis University

JOHN B. FOLEY, S.J.

THE ONE AND THE MANY: A CONTEMPORARY THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS. By
W. Norris Clarke, S.J. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2001. Pp.
viii + 324. $24.

Besides having written numerous books and articles on various topics in
the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas for over 50 years, Norris Clarke has
always maintained a lively and serious interest in contemporary philosoph-
ical and scientific movements as well. These interests are nicely incorpo-
rated in the work under review. Written as an advanced textbook, it
presents C.’s own interpretation of the central themes of traditional
Thomistic metaphysics within the context of our contemporary scientific
and cultural worldview. In a number of ways the book will be of interest to
the philosopher, the teacher, and the student interested in the metaphysics
of Aquinas.

First, both students and teachers will benefit from a highly readable
account of major themes in Aquinas’s metaphysics. The material is pre-
sented in a way accessible to those unfamiliar with the formidable Aristo-
telian apparatus usually presumed in textbook presentations of Aquinas. C.
divides his book into short, easily digestible chapters, each devoted to
topics ranging from traditional issues such as causality, analogy, and the
problem of the one and the many to more contemporary philosophical
issues about our scientific understanding of time and evolution. Each chap-
The philosopher will appreciate this work as an interpretation of Aquinas’s metaphysics that not only takes into account much recent scholarship but uses themes and insights from other philosophical traditions as well. C.’s interpretation of Aquinas’s metaphysics of substance in the light of contemporary philosophies of intersubjectivity is a case in point. Modern philosophy has variously identified “substance” as Descartes’s self-enclosed thinker, Locke’s inert, unknowable substratum, or the chimera of a Humean distinct and separable impression. This identification has led many contemporary philosophers to reject the notion of substance altogether in favor of relation as the fundamental category of the human person. Acknowledging the influence of 20th-century philosophies of intersubjectivity on his own thinking, C. responds to the modern rejection of substance in favor of relation by teasing out the relational and interpersonal significance of Aquinas’s metaphysical analysis. According to that analysis, there are two fundamental acts of the substance of any living being: its individual act of existing and its operation with other beings in the world. As this second act or operation naturally flows from and perfects the first, the perfection of substance for Aquinas must be understood as possible only in interaction with other substances in the world. (Curiously, C. does not in this context mention Aquinas’s metaphysical analysis of all finite substance as existentially dependent on the causal activity of God. This is puzzling since such an appeal would strengthen C.’s interpretation of Aquinas, for now not only must the second act of substance be seen as dependent on others but its first act as well.) This metaphysical view of substance, C. argues, provides the basis for a genuine philosophy of being as relational and for a philosophy of human nature as interpersonal. Because human substances are personal, the perfection of human beings depends on their interaction with each other.

In addition to an interpersonal philosophy of human nature, this metaphysical view of substance, and specifically human substance, has profound implications for the subject of metaphysics itself. If the starting point of metaphysics is the intellectual acknowledgement of reality as one and many, such acknowledgement is now understood to arise in dialogue. We know being as one and many in our knowledge of each other in communication. The epistemological implications of this experience are profound. The typically egocentric starting point of “the self” in modern philosophy and the inevitable dichotomy between subject and object in the modern view of knowledge with all its attendant epistemological conundrums can now give way to a philosophy that has as its starting point the intellectual realization of a “we” in communication, where the subject-object dichotomy is displaced by the judgment of the other as a “Thou” and oneself as “I” in that communication. Our certitude in knowing the reality of each other in our interaction as agents is practical rather than logical.

The relational character of substance in the metaphysics of Aquinas and
its implications in our understanding of reality is but one of many stimu-
lating insights C. offers and but one reason for recommending this work
from an eminent philosopher, teacher, and student of Aquinas for over half
a century.

Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles  THOMAS P. SHERMAN, S.J.

REENCHANTMENT WITHOUT SUPERNATURALISM: A PROCESS PHILOSOPHY OF
RELIGION. By David Ray Griffin. Ithaca: Cornell University, 2001. Pp. x +
426. $55; $24.95.

As the book’s subtitle clearly states, this is a major, ambitious process
philosophy of religion based on Griffin’s years of reflection on the con-
temporary philosophic and theological movement arising from the work of
Alfred North Whitehead and some of his most famous disciples such as
Charles Hartshorne. The reader is constantly reminded of Whitehead’s
view that narrowness of vision is the hobgoblin of adequate, coherent, and
comprehensive philosophic vision.

G. has (at least) three major goals. First, following Whitehead’s advice
about breadth of vision, he demonstrates how a process-based philosophy
of religion can address all the diverse topics normally included in the
modern study of religion. Moreover, he clearly hopes that his work can
serve as an introduction for philosophers of religion who have not previ-
ously considered a process option in the study of religion. This difficult task
is probably the weakest part of an otherwise very strong book. The prob-
lem stems from G.’s focus on questions arising from debates between and
among contemporary philosophers of religion. He is, therefore, caught in
the bind that entangles so many process philosophers and theologians: he
is forced to move back and forth between exegesis of key Whiteheadian
themes to explain them sufficiently to an audience unfamiliar with White-
head’s philosophy and the concomitant need to remain focused on the
current debates in the philosophy of religion. G. does as well as anyone can,
but I am left wondering what the uninitiate will make of his more specialist
expositions of the more arcane elements of process philosophy and theol-
ogy.

Second, G.’s main goal is to demonstrate how his version of process
discourse can provide a full-fledged theistic philosophy that is at the same
time a robust naturalism. He is convinced that many philosophers of reli-
gion wrongly reject as incoherent any stout theistic theories because they
believe that theism must somehow be wedded to a supernatural view of
God and the cosmos. As G. moves though his thematic discussion of topics
such as religion and science, human perception, the debate about free will,
the mind-body problem, evolution, evil, eschatology, theories of language,
morality, common sense, civilization, and truth, he takes pains to show how
Whitehead and company can provide a way to talk about a form or con-
ceptualization of theism that is both adequate for religious sensibilities and
does not need to appeal to supernatural mechanisms of divine efficacy. To use an Islamic metaphor, G.’s God works within the present constraints of the cosmos and yet is closer to us than our jugular veins because God is the supreme exemplar of the laws of nature rather than a supernatural exception to them.

As to developing his unique contribution to process thought, G. devotes considerable effort to explaining his neologism, “panexperientialism”—quite successfully, for those willing to follow his complex of clarifications. Really at stake is G.’s consistent claim that we cannot understand a process philosophy of religion without recourse to a theory of relations as both internal and external to the emergence of the world’s creatures. In short, panexperientialism is a careful restatement of the profound role that relativity as relationship rather than epistemological scepticism plays in Whitehead and Hartshorne. Regarding how panexperientialism relates to the divine reality, G. sides with Hartshorne in defining God as an organized society rather than as a single actual entity, which was Whitehead’s doctrine. Although Hartshorne and G. depart from the explicit teaching of the master, they gain coherence in explaining how God can relate to the world in resolutely naturalistic terms by making God social, that is, panexperiential, social, and relative to all that was, is, and can be.

Although not a major concern to G., he also recognizes that any contemporary philosophy of religion needs to engage more than merely Western ideas. He demonstrates how this is so and, in fact, that any adequate modern philosophy of religion must be able to speak to non-Western ideas. A naturalist process philosophy of religion, therefore, will be a comparative philosophy with implications for comparative theology as well.

The more that G. writes, the more I look forward to further explorations of related topics. This is a major work that serves as a prolegomenon for future process-related philosophies of religion.

Boston University School of Theology

JOHN BERTHRONG

PHENOMENOLOGY AND LOGIC: THE BOSTON COLLEGE LECTURES ON MATHEMATICAL LOGIC AND EXISTENTIALISM. By Bernard Lonergan, S.J. Edited by Philip J. McShane. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 18: Toronto: University of Toronto, 2001. Pp. xxiv + 419; $26.95.

These two sets of lectures, given consecutively to an audience of Scholastic philosophers in the late 1950s, document Lonergan’s assimilation of 20th-century developments in logic and phenomenology that have posed serious challenges to Scholasticism. They should be of great interest to Scholastically trained philosophers still struggling to understand the relationship of mathematical to Aristotelian logic and of the metaphysical beginning of Scholasticism to the phenomenological starting-point in subjectivity. They will also provide some assurance to philosophers and theologians already immersed in these new orientations that they need not
break entirely with their Scholastic pasts. These lectures are illuminating studies of two of the five shifts of emphasis marking the transition from the classicist to the modern worldview: from logic to method and from an abstract account of the metaphysical soul to a concrete interest in the existential subject.

In the first set of lectures L. affirms the technical superiority of mathematical to traditional logic. But for him the fundamental issue is the ambivalence of the technique itself. “The ambivalence of the technical achievement is an ambivalence that arises when you consider the human attitude towards the achievement” (97). “When one becomes immersed in these symbolic techniques the meaning of rationality can become simply the technique” (100), and it is taken for granted that a language is equivalent to a logical calculus plus a vocabulary (91). Then the metaphysical issues contained in the logical connectives are “hidden” in the logical calculus and go unquestioned (91–92). “Rational” is taken to mean “symbolic and technical,” nothing more. An objectification of mind, a logic, comes to be identified with the mind itself. “With the objectification of mind, what counts, what is ultimate, is the technique” (100). A truly rational commitment to truth, which entails a qualified acceptance of the truth of mathematical-logical systems, is displaced by “a non-rational, pragmatic acquiescence in the fact of talk” (97). De facto, in the absence of explicit thematization of the philosophic issues embedded in the employment of logical connectives, the use of the technique becomes distorted by empiricist and pragmatist philosophic assumptions (117). The question of the true foundations of mathematical logic has to be raised anew, and L. finds these foundations objectified in the three levels of Aristotle’s explanatory syllogism. The three-level structure has its ground in the dynamic structure—empirical, intellectual, rational—of cognitive intentionality. This dynamic structure constitutes the foundation upon which logic is built and from which any logic is judged to be adequate or inadequate (108–9). This first set of lectures concludes with a nuanced discussion of the question, Could Scholasticism be expressed as an axiomatic system?

The second set of lectures deals with the emergence of phenomenology and its skeptical aftermath. L. argues that the phenomenologist’s own concern for “evidence” has escaped the thematic treatment it would have received if Husserl’s project had included a phenomenology of the phenomenologist (275). The rational intentionality of reflective inquiry, grasp of the virtually unconditioned, and judgment is the “real basis” of Scholastic thought, and this basis, L. argues, remains unobjectified in Husserl. L. relies primarily upon Husserl’s Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (1936). His criticism may be blunted by the appearance of portions of the Husserlian corpus which appeared in English translation after 1957, such as Experience and Judgment (1973). Nevertheless, L. imports his own phenomenology of rational judgment, from Insight (1957) and argues that it grounds a critique of Husserl’s ideal of rigorous science, of his failure to discover the complementarity of doxa and episteme, of his linkage of the sciences to the evi-
dence and procedures of the _Lebenswelt_, and of the putative ultimacy of the transcendental reduction which accords the subject unqualified priority (260–65). L. concludes with a discussion of Heidegger and existentialism and the problem, still outstanding in Husserl, of determining “the true horizon.” L. argues that Heidegger “did not find anything normative, anything common to all subjects, on which he could determine which is the true horizon or pick out what is the horizon that is coincident with the field [of being] and account for mistaken horizons” (315).

These lectures, though almost a half-century old, clarify considerably the major issues raised for those who wish to reconcile the Scholastic tradition with recent innovations. The volume contains five appendixes, including an edited transcription of question sessions following the lectures, a lexicon of foreign words and phrases, and a thorough index. The editor’s notes to the lectures on logic connect L.’s position to developments since 1957 and suggest strongly the perduring relevance of L.’s analysis.

_Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles._

_MARK D. MORELLI_
HIDDEN GOSPELS: HOW THE SEARCH FOR JESUS LOST ITS WAY. By Philip Jenkins. New York: Oxford University, 2001. Pp. vii + 260. $25.

For many years we have become accustomed to popular media accounts about how the once “hidden Gospels” have changed the traditional understanding of Jesus and Christian origins. Jenkins, distinguished professor of history and religious studies at Pennsylvania State University, contends that the “hidden Gospels” (including the Gospel of Thomas, other Nag Hammadi texts, New Testament Apocrypha, the sayings source Q, and the Dead Sea Scrolls) reveal very little of solid significance about Jesus and the Apostles. He does, however, regard these documents as important sources for what the popular enthusiasm for them tells us about the interest groups who seek to use them today, about the mass media and how religion is packaged as popular culture, about how canons shift their content to reflect the values of the reading audience, and about changing directions in contemporary American religion.

This book is both a sober critique of developments in the study of Christian origins and a sharp analysis of how religious ideas are popularized today. Jenkins succeeds in exposing the scholarly weaknesses of inflated claims regarding the significance of the “new” texts for Christian origins. He shows that similar claims were made in the 19th and early 20th centuries, questions whether Thomas and Q can be used to found an alternative version of earliest Christianity, criticizes attempts at very early datings for the “hidden Gospels,” and counters claims about the late emergence of the New Testament canon and the mainline Church.

But the most novel and interesting parts of the volume probe the reasons for popular enthusiasm for the hidden Gospels and the theological claims often associated with them: New Age religiosity, the emergence of religious seekers within and outside the churches, distaste for orthodoxy and the institutional Church, feminist ideology, developments in higher education and scholarly societies, the media’s acceptance of quirky academic ideas as serious trends in scholarship, the desire of publishers to promote controversial books, and self-promotion by members of the Jesus Seminar and other scholars.

DANIEL J. HARRINGTON, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology
This fourth in a projected six-volume series on the sermons of Pope Leo the Great features 20 sermons, most of them preached at the end of Lent between the years 441 and 454. In a meticulous and masterful introduction of over 120 pages, Cavalcanti and Montanari discuss text-critical aspects of the material (e.g., the coherence of this collection and the stemma) as well as its historical and theological dimensions (e.g., the dating of Easter and the Christology of the sermons).

C. and M. offer a critical edition that is intended to supplant the recent edition of these texts in the Brepols series (CCL 138). This new edition features numerous if slight changes in the preferred reading of the text. Facing the original Latin is an accurate and limpid Italian translation that includes notes on scriptural references made within the sermons. Unfortunately, no index is provided for these references. In fact, the book has no indexes at all. But this is a relatively small matter, for in addition to the substantial introduction and the lengthy text and translation, the book also features about 100 pages of learned notes. These include references to comparable passages in other Fathers or to relevant modern scholarship. If the book had included indexes, desirable as they would be, it would probably have grown to an unwieldy size.

The book is a thoroughly impressive scholarly accomplishment. Its splendid features guarantee its importance for students of fifth-century theology and indeed of patristic Christology. The work of C. and M. on the sermons of Leo, once completed, will enhance the distinguished reputation that Biblioteca Patristica already enjoys.

A. M. C. Casiday
Cambridge University

Recent historiography demonstrates that the interest in witchcraft and demonology continues to be strong. This work differs from most studies with its emphasis on the locus of possession, which Maggi argues is found in the mind. M. takes as his starting point a concept of Pope Leo the Great (not quoted in the book): “Through sin man has fallen beneath the sway and bondage of the devil; he listened to the latter’s misleading advice, and has on that account been drawn into the rebellion of the wicked angels against God” (Serm. 22 in Nativ. c. 3). The book describes how the devil “talks” and the human “listens.” M.’s analysis is complex and steeped in semiotic interpretation—a rollicking ride for those who may feel more comfortable standing on the terra firma of social history complete with its demographic studies or more descriptive accounts of sabbats.

This study goes beyond standard works dealing with demonic possession, such as the Malleus malleficarum (ca. 1486) and considers four 16th- and 17th-century texts presenting either the eradication of possession or a description of a possessed person. M. depicts a way of thinking about demonic possession compatible with the way early modern ecclesiastics believed how the spiritual permeates the consciousness. Spiritual direction was the art of moving the soul toward God through conversation with a guide; M.’s work can therefore be read as a type of “anti-direction” performed by the devil within the minds of those he wishes to direct.

M.’s conclusion recapitulates the book’s subtext: the homosexual/sodomite and the Church’s reaction to this state of life. Using the text of the recently revealed third secret of Fatima, M. rereads the papacy’s understanding of this text as an exultation of papal power, a type of exorcism-like manifestation that removes demons from the body of the Church. M. cites evidence of
this renewed papal vigor and power in its attempt to stop the gay rights parade in Rome during the Jubilee 2000. This textual comparison between Renaissance demonic rhetoric and 20th-century gay rights controversies requires greater elaboration. So does M.’s claim that the Church hates women, homosexuals, and Jews (95).

MICHAEL W. MAHER, S.J.
Saint Louis University

CATHOLIC REVIVAL IN THE AGE OF THE BAROQUE: RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN SOUTHWEST GERMANY, 1550–1750. By Marc R. Forster, New Studies in European History. New York: Cambridge University, 2001. Pp. xiii + 268. $59.95.

In this examination of Catholicism in southwest Germany, Forster attempts to fill in some gaps in the historiography of early modern Germany. Dominated on the one end by the Reformations of the 16th century and on the other by the Enlightenment with its secularization, the historiography of the period has often overlooked the realities of religious life in the two centuries covered by this study. In spite of a diverse landscape and political fragmentation, two factors unified the region: Austrian political dominance and the diocese of Constance, to which almost the whole territory belonged. F. takes issue with current historiography that emphasizes Trent and the process of confessionalization in the shaping of early modern Catholicism.

This study’s special significance lies in its clear and conclusive demonstration that religious change in the territories examined was a product of negotiation and compromise between the various factions, political, clerical, and popular. F. is especially good at explicating the institutional conflicts unleashed by calls for reform and at describing the tensions between reformation agenda, popular religious sentiment, and tradition as they played out episodically in rural parishes. But his interest in challenging the dominant scholarly approaches of the Council of Trent and confessionalization sometimes clouds his vision. He argues that diocesan officials sacrificed enthusiasm for reform because of their “obsessive concern with jurisdictional issues” (42), but surely reform from above required clear and undisputed authority. In the same way, while he de-emphasizes the significance of Trent, he admits that by the second half of the 17th century, the behavior and pastoral work of parish clergy approached Tridentine standards. Whatever the success of Tridentine-inspired reform efforts, what else than the power of a Tridentine ideal can account for this remarkable feat, especially without an effective diocesan seminary and clear oversight and with widespread clerical concubinage in the late 16th century? Nonetheless, F. has given us a highly readable, engaging, and convincing account of Catholicism in southwest Germany that is a must read for students of the period.

D. JONATHAN GRIEser
Furman University, Greenville, S.C.

KIERKEGAARD’S CHRISTOCENTRIC THEOLOGY. By Timothy Rose. Burlington, VT.: Ashgate, 2001. Pp. viii + 193. $69.95.

The book is a vectorial treatment of themes to produce a rich landscape of Kierkegaard’s Christology. Rose begins with irony and moves from absolute paradox to sign of contradiction, offense, incarnation, kenosis, Christ as prototype and Redeemer, suffering, conceptions of God, and finally to faith and rationality. He concludes that Kierkegaard’s Christology is much closer to Luther’s theology of the cross than to kenotic Christology, that Kierkegaard subordinates trust in God to the other two notes of Lutheran orthodoxy: knowledge and assent. What distinguishes this study from similar ones is (1) that it relies heavily on Kierkegaard’s Journals, some of his later works, and the writings by Climacus who, R. contends, is “polemically against truth” by distancing himself from his subject; and (2) the way R. theologically mines the themes. For example, he links Kierkegaard’s understanding of absolute paradox and the Church Fathers—Athenaeus, Hilary,
and the definitions of Chalcedon. His discussion of faith and rationality includes Hume, Coleridge, Hamman, Pascal, and Wittgenstein.

A definite undercurrent for R. is to defend Kierkegaard from the charge of irrationality by redefining reason/rationality so that it falls within the scope of faith—reason illuminated by faith. But is regenerated reason, now defined by absolute paradox, still reason? Here, R. cannot resist the craving to give a rational explanation for letting God be God. The epistemological component, which he sees as a property of faith, is a matter of doctrine intended for theological reflection and not what is dear to Kierkegaard: faith as “existence-communication.” Unquestionably useful and insightful in matters of detail, R.’s study is not without its shortcomings. Why did some reforms work and others not? This book looks at reform moments in church history, owning their complexity while mining their lessons.

First, B. asks in each historical period whether the focus of reform was personal, institutional, aimed at inculturation of the Church in a new historical period, or some combination of the three. Second, he examines the interplay between reform from above (in capite) and from below (in membris). Third, he notes the conditions in the culture that provide impetus for reform or that hinder it. These three lenses are combined throughout his analysis. He argues, for example, that the humanism of the 12th-century Renaissance served as a source of evangelical awakening in membris, which in turn was a complement, corrective, and challenge to medieval reform in capite and its creation of the curia, college of cardinals, and canon law. While these institutional reforms in principle were to create a return to the moral order of the primitive Church, they would never have trickled down to the body of the Church without the centerpiece of the Renaissance and its spirit of personal renewal. On the other hand, reforms from below can prove ineffective unless they are eventually translated into legislation and action (111). B. argues that institutional malaise from above does not always translate into popular malaise. In difficult times, people can still maintain a spirit of reform. B.’s conclusions are general and perhaps weaker than the book’s argument; however, he provides an important overview of church history from the perspective of reform.

Abraham H. Khan
Trinity College, University of Toronto

Renewing Christianity: A History of Church Reform from Day One to Vatican II. By Christopher M. Bellitto. New York: Paulist, 2001. Pp. xii + 233. $18.95.

Bellitto provides a historical overview of efforts toward church reform from apostolic times to Vatican II. What traditionally is termed “reform” turns out throughout the text to be a mixture of three movements: the attempt to correct “mistakes,” the movement to retain the Church’s essentials in changing circumstances, and the sustained efforts of the Church to adapt itself to changing times. Why did some reforms work and others fail? This book looks at reform moments in church history, owning their complexity while mining their lessons.

Judith A. Merkle, S.N.D.deN.
Niagara University

A History of Christian Higher Education: Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox Perspectives. By John L. Elias. Malabar, Fla: Krieger, 2002. pp. xv + 285. $34.50.

This relatively brief book, drawn from the author’s lectures to graduate students, attempts to cover a great deal of ground—from Clement of Rome through Paulo Freire, in monasteries,
day schools, and in Sunday schools; at
the elementary, secondary, and tertiary
levels. Little is said about seminary edu-
cation, but already Elias paints on a big
canvas.
At times the book reads more like an
overview of Christian thought and theo-
logians, but E. is careful to focus on
their pedagogical ideas, philosophies,
and priorities. As a broad overview, it is
most suitable for undergraduate or
graduate courses in the philosophy of
education, but would be useful to many
other interested readers.
The book’s structure is chronological,
although Orthodoxy is covered in a
closing chapter that gives special atten-
tion to 20th-century efforts to recognize
the centrality of liturgy to Orthodox
pedagogy.
Not surprisingly, the book’s breadth
also marks a shortcoming, since E. is
forced to deal with complex subjects in
a paragraph or even a sentence. In gen-
eral, he does so with admirable clarity,
although the summaries often left me
wanting much more information. E. of-
ten quotes from primary sources on ed-
cational philosophies, but draws pri-
marily on secondary works. I sometimes
found myself pining for historical in-
sight on what the classroom experience
was like for students in a Pietist or
Quaker or Montessori school. Answers
to questions like, what did students
read? how were they drilled? where did
the arts fit in? could have enriched the
book enormously.
Seldom critical of the perspectives he
chronicles, E. sidesteps evaluative or
larger interpretive goals for the descrip-
tive overview. He gives short shrift to
the contributions of women to peda-
gogy and teaching and focuses almost
exclusively on Anglo and American
sources, making no reference, e.g., to
pedagogy in the Black churches.
As a history of key figures and phi-
losophies of Christian education, this
book serves a helpful and unique func-
tion, though like any good text it will
require further explication to fill in the
whole story.

THOMAS M. LANDY
College of the Holy Cross,
Worcester, Mass.

GOD, EVIL, AND INNOCENT SUFFERING: A
THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION. By John E.
Thiel, New York: Crossroad, 2002. Pp.
xi + 179. $19.95.
Thiel aims to be “congruent” with
Catholic teaching that God is omnipo-
tently good and predestines none to hell
(92), but differs over dominant concep-
tions of death as divine retribution for
original sin. God does not will dispro-
portionate suffering or sentence people
to death for others’ acts (59, 85). Scylla
makes God unjust. Charybdis denies
relatively innocent suffering (55). Test
cases are the Jewish Holocaust and
child abuse. Both sets of victims no
more morally warranted their fate than
those who escaped (15, 19).
Philosophically abstract theodicies ar-
gue for the best of all possible worlds
(Leibnitz, Hick, Swinburne, 35, 40–46)
or the best of all possible Gods (process
theologies from Whitehead to Griffin,
47–53). Postmoderns see providence in
general situations, not individual for-
tunes (Lakeland on Job, 23–27). Hick’s
Irenaean apologetic is as unsatisfactory
on innocence as Anselm is (150–56).
Against Anselm and Abelard, T.
adopts Thiemann’s narrative logic of
apocalyptic promise (82–85) and com-
mends Aulen’s patristic reading of
Christ as God’s champion, battling sin,
death, and the devil (88–90), revealing
divine solidarity with innocent victims,
healing “the suffering and death of his-
tory” through transforming resurrection
(94).
Traditional theology incoherently has
God both willing death and promising
from eternity to abolish death (86). T.
simply admits ignorance about the ori-
gin of death. Regarding it as natural,
with God bringing good out of evil,
again minimizes the scandal of innocent
suffering (96–97). Regarding inherited
guilt, Augustinian dualists miss the
spirituality of healthy sexuality (118).
T. fails to notice (144 n. 2) how much
Schillebeeckx is on his side (see Chris-
t, 724) and understates Hick’s influence.
How rhetorical force reflects current so-
cial contexts shows in T.’s insistence on
contemporary experience of suffering as
opposed to traditional conceptions of
tribal/species solidarity. He does not
discuss merciful death and misconstrues
Augustine’s argument from concupis- cence: the concern was not with sex but loss of rational control after the Fall. A welcome theological discussion of God and evil, detailed yet concise, accessible to undergraduates and seminarians.

Peter Slater
Trinity College, Toronto.

Christian Contradictions: The Structures of Lutheran and Catholic Thought. By Daphne Hampson. New York: Cambridge University, 2001. Pp. xi + 323. $59.95.

Hampson’s purpose is to explain how “Catholic and Lutheran thought are differently structured” (1). Basically, Catholic is “linear,” while Lutheran revolves around a “dialectic.” H. believes that structures of thought, “the way in which different doctrines are arranged in relation to one another” (1), “are of fundamental significance in theology” (285). Doctrines can be comprehended only in relation to the structure where they are found. H. analyzes carefully the structure of Luther’s theology and Tridentine thought and sketches the history of Catholic misinterpretations of Luther’s *simul iustus et peccator*. The failure of understanding is “astonishing in its breadth and depth” (97). After describing the similarly “extraordinary” (144) misreading of Anders Nygren by English Anglo-Catholics, she examines the difficulties in formulating the recent Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification.

As a secondary concern, H. also assesses the viability of traditional structures vis-à-vis modernity. She sees in Rudolf Bultmann’s thought an exciting modern version of Lutheran theology and endorses Søren Kierkegaard’s inclusion of a more active understanding of the self, but her reservations remain. Questions germane to the central theme arise out of her own rejection of Christian faith.

The book never strays very far from its primary objective. Each discussion extends or deepens one’s understanding of the central comparison. H. never tires of calling attention to Catholics who do not understand the structure of Lutheran thought, occasionally in language that seems overly dismissive. E.g., “Dulles has no clue as to the structure of Lutheranism” (195). Often she exhibits a refreshing candor. After reviewing the list of “differences which remain” in a joint statement from the 1980s, she remarks, “If these are differences yet to be solved, one wants to ask in exactly what the consensus consists” (204).

The major significance of the book is its examination of divergent structures and the numerous examples it assembles. It may not cover all that needs to be said on the subject, but it provides a helpful reminder of the difficulty of reconciling different structures and the extent to which these differences have thus far been insufficiently acknowledged. Until that happens, she believes, Roman Catholics and Lutherans will lack a solid basis for ecumenical understanding.

Darrell Jodock
Gustavus Adolphus College, St. Peter, Minn.

In Search of Ecumenical Vision. By Aram I. Antelias, Lebanon: Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia, 2000. Pp. xii + 318.

His Holiness Aram I (Keshishean), Catholicos of Cilicia, was one of the founding members of the Middle East Council of Churches (MECC) and was elected in 1983 member of the Standing Conference of the Faith and Order Commission of the World Council of Churches (WCC) and Moderator of its Central and Executive Committees, the first Oriental Orthodox and the youngest person ever named to those responsibilities. This volume is a remarkable collection of addresses, sermons, and reports that he composed between the WCC’s general assembly in Canberra in 1991 and the assembly held in Harare in 1998.

K. has divided this work into three sections: (1) eleven short contributions on “Ecumenism in Search of Identity”; (2) seven essays on the WCC’s process of self-understanding and self-articulation; and (3) eight more comprehen-
sive studies on emerging ecumenical priorities that are reports he prepared for the WCC’s Central Committee, all previously published in The Ecumenical Review. This third section of the book has been published simultaneously in French under the title L’Église face aux grands défis (2001). K.’s membership in one of the several branches of the Oriental Orthodox Churches, that family of Christians often identified as non-Chalcedonians (or inappropriately “Monophysite”) makes this especially gratifying reading to destroy the myth of sameness among the Eastern churches. Of the 26 essays, the two I found most illuminating were the historical and theological account of the Oriental Orthodox Churches (17–27) and a remarkably comprehensive study “Towards a Full Koinonia” (143–61). The volume helpfully expands ecumenical theology beyond the predominance of Reformation perspectives.

MICHAEL A. FAHEY, S.J.
Marquette University, Milwaukee

CROSS PURPOSES: THE VIOLENT GRAMMAR OF CHRISTIAN ATONEMENT. By Anthony W. Bartlett. Harrisburg, Penn.: Trinity Press International, 2001. Pp. 277. $30.

To René Girard’s conclusion, that the crucified Jesus marks a historic break with scapegoating as society’s attempt to contain primordial violence, Bartlett adds that Christianity itself became acculturated to the ethos of mimetic violence. From Tertullian and Clement through Augustine to Luther and beyond, atonement theories so melded gnostic redeemer, Roman penal, and apocalyptic revenge motifs that “prevailing Western accounts of the meaning of Christ’s death” became “untenable” on biblical grounds (223). Substitutionary thinking, combining preses- tinarian logic with medieval chivalry, culminated in Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo, written in the context of the Crusades and the beginning of European persecution of the Jews (73–122). Anyone who thinks theology can be done in ignorance of social history should read these pages.

Bartlett queries Girard’s confidence in science and natural theology. An- selm’s error, reflected by such critics as Nietzsche and Derrida, was to construe as necessary exchange what a Kierkegaardian account of repetition characterizes as the double contingency of faith in the crucified Messiah, reflecting the abyss of Jesus’ compassion in free, non-violent response to the evil abyss of judicial murder (15, 39–41, 138–161; the “abyss” image is from Dostoyevsky, 167). Secular, postmodern, theological anthropology, following Bonhoeffer, should embrace the rhetoric of testimony, not essentialistic ontologies, and uphold Abelard against Anselm, especially in today’s global marketplace (12–16, 86–87, 222–40). Surprising rhetorical testimony comes from Oscar Wilde (173–75) as well as from Dostoyevsky. The biblical warrants for such a reading of the kerygma follow the hermeneutics of N. T. Wright and others, not those of the Jesus Seminar (164, 185–90, 207–17). Reading violence in divine being out of biblical talk of God’s “wrath” is mistaken anthropomorphism (204–5). To bolster his case, B. tends to caricature Augustine and Barth, but his documentation is thorough, citing Greek, Latin, and Hebrew sources. Clear exposition is occasionally marred by jargon. While an important contribution to soteriology, the Bartlett/Girard thesis depends on some questionable assump- tions. All history may not have been driven by “violent grammar.” A Hebraic and Catholic sense of sacrifice as offering may read cult as grace, not propitiation; and acculturation should not be confused with inculturation (112 n. 46).

PETER SLATER
Trinity College, Toronto

THE GENEALOGY OF VIOLENCE: REFLECTIONS ON CREATION, FREEDOM, AND EVIL. By Charles K. Bellinger. New York; Oxford University, 2001. Pp. xii + 157. $35.

Bellinger asks for the origin of violence, including the political violence of the 20th century and thinks there are hitherto unassembled materials for an
answer in Kierkegaard. Secondarily, he invokes René Girard. As it were, Kierkegaard deals with the decisive, vertical dimension of the answer, our broken relation with God; Girard explains how this broken vertical dimension finds expression in the horizontal dimension of human relations.

B. insists on the insufficiency of non-theological answers to the question about violence. He can be congratulated for bringing Kierkegaard and Girard together and showing their sometimes surprising similarities. He is a successful expositor.

Violence is the expression in human relations of an individual’s refusal to let God finish the work of creation (“creation” here meaning the completion of the person via human freedom cooperating with God). When we resist becoming persons in and before God, we kill one another. Why? Resisting change, resenting the call to change and completion, but feeling badly about ourselves nonetheless, we need a scapegoat; we turn outward, especially in the company of the Kierkegaardian “crowd,” and murder not just one another, but especially the good, especially the messengers of God, especially Christ. Theologically, the crucifixion is the event sufficient unto itself in which to read an account of violence—all violence anticipates, repeats, or participates in the violence of the cross.

How does Girard fit in? Failing to want the self that God wants, we can learn to want only what others want—that is, Girard’s theory of the mimesis of desire is true for fallen humanity. Thence follows the sacrificial order of society and the murder of the scapegoat.

Does B. succeed in providing a satisfactory answer to his question and according to his own criterion, which demands explanation and not just re-description? This will depend on what one thinks of the appeal to “projection.”

The book contains a spirited attempt to capture Kierkegaard and Girard for an Anabaptist reading of Christian history. The contention that Kierkegaard has a social and political theory (and not just relevance) will not be accepted by all.

GUY MANSINI, O.S.B.
Saint Meinrad School of Theology,
St. Meinrad, Ind.

THE CONCEPT OF GOD, THE ORIGIN OF THE WORLD, AND THE IMAGE OF THE HUMAN IN THE WORLD RELIGIONS. Edited by Peter Koslowski. Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2001. Pp. viii + 161. $59.

This is the first of five projected volumes resulting from the Discourse of the World Religions on the occasion of the World Exposition 2000 in Hanover, Germany. Five scholars devote a chapter each to the notions of creation, God, and the human person in Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam respectively. Two additional chapters offer a synthesis of the five traditions and themes first from the perspective of Buddhism, then from the perspective of Christianity.

The five studies vary in depth, comprehensiveness, originality, and perspectives. S. Balasubramanian’s chapter on Hinduism is the most comprehensive but sectarian enough to give centrality to the Vedanta. S. Ueda, representing the Kyoto school of Zen, offers a creative but idiosyncratic view of the three themes in Zen Buddhism. The Jewish tradition includes Talmudic and Kabbalistic Judaism with reference to Maimonides’s qualification of these themes. M. Welker’s chapter on Christianity is one of the most innovative, drawing primarily on contemporary theology, yet leaving behind much of the historical tradition. On the other hand, the study of Islam is too broad in tracing the themes in popular religion, the philosophical-theological tradition, and Islamic mysticism. However, each chapter is an engaging piece of scholarship and will benefit the reader, whether specialist or generalist.

The two concluding chapters attempting a synthesis of the five studies from both a Buddhist and Christian perspective suggest methodological and hermeneutical problems involved in comparative work. They acknowledge that there is no reality as the concept of God, the
concept of creation, or the concept of the human person in any one of the five traditions. Each tradition has a vast array of concepts, images, and metaphors in its long history of expression. Comparative studies by a group of scholars should specify and limit by either author, text, or subject whatever is brought into comparison.

WILLIAM CENKNER
Catholic University of America, D.C.

GOD AND THE EXCLUDED: VISIONS AND BLIND SPOTS IN CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY. By Joerg Rieger. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001. Pp. xi + 241. $20.

Rieger maintains that theology is beset by a challenge that strikes at the heart of theological method as well as at models of doctrine and Church. The problem, he argues, is that theology has in effect become a handmaiden to the structures of globalization. Theology is often the enclave of an educated middle class who, despite their best efforts, fail to embrace the “other” in their projects because they are unwittingly caught up in the dominant discourses of power. Even liberation theology is distanced from a range of human experiences, especially those of the economically silenced and culturally hidden (e.g., the new slaves). Postmodernism’s emphasis on pluralism does not in itself guarantee a bona fide inclusion of the normally excluded; even feminist thought can overlook voices, such as those of Pentecostal women. The result is a crisis for theology. It must find a way out of this impasse lest it be properly judged irrelevant to the deep pluralism that marks current reality.

R. takes the reader through four modes of mostly Protestant theological discourse: Schleiermacher and liberal religion, Barth’s neo-orthodox protest against it, Lindbeck’s postliberal attempt to resettle theology and faith in language, and the feminist project representing liberationist discourses. All four fail to deliver fully on the current challenge to theology. For R., a rather rhetorical invocation of Lacanian theory provides the heuristic structure of a new theological paradigm that would include all four discourses but also uncover heretofore hidden voices.

The chapter on Barth, whom R. sees as a proto-postmodernist, poses a salutary challenge to those who would miss the great protest against middle class religious complacency and its social consequences that drives his theology. On the other hand, R.’s criticisms sometimes seem strained, as when he complains (anachronistically) that Barth did not use inclusive language. And for a book that criticizes theology’s preoccupation with method, there is plenty of it here. Still, I would recommend this book to any serious theologian who is concerned about the relevance of Christian theology to our age.

PAUL CROWLEY, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology

WE HAVE THE MIND OF CHRIST: THE HOLY SPIRIT AND LITURGICAL MEMORY IN THE THOUGHT OF EDWARD J. KILMARTIN. Jerome Hall, S.J. Collegeville: Liturgical, 2001. Pp. xix + 164. $24.95.

Kilmartin’s death in 1994 left incomplete his project of developing a trinitarian theology of Christian worship that would integrate lex credendi into lex orandi and systematically relate the various truths of faith to each other. He left behind a store of manuscripts and notes for articles never written. In the last months of his life he shared these papers and much of his time with Hall, suggesting the topic for this book as well.

The book systematically and synthetically introduces Kilmartin’s work, situating it within the context of the liturgical reform movement of the 20th century and focusing on the debate over the notion of the “mystery presence,” i.e., the relationship between the liturgical memorial of Christ’s saving acts and Christ’s presence in the liturgy. Through this focal point H. brings into view many of the theologians who influenced Kilmartin, providing a concise overview of an important principle of liturgical theology. One name missing is Cesare Giraudo. Given that a significant part of the book discusses the re-
integration of lex orandi with lex credendi, it is surprising to find no mention of the person who, by Kilmartin’s own acknowledgment in The Eucharist in the West (1998), strongly influenced his thinking on this subject.

In the discussion of liturgical memory, H. addresses another current concern: the presence of Christ in the assembly which, according to Kilmartin, is the central liturgical symbol. Through the active participation of the assembly—singing, praying, listening, and ministering—the Spirit of Christ’s faith is actualized. Juxtaposed to the assembly, Kilmartin argues, is the presider, whose role of in persona ecclesiae, maintains the dialogical character of the Christian life. This dialogue provides one more example of what H. terms Kilmartin’s “relentless trinitarian understanding” (160).

The book was written as a dissertation (Catholic University of America), but H. presents it here in a style that will appeal to Kilmartin scholars and graduate students of liturgy.

THOMAS J. SCIRGHI, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley

THOMAS’S 16 QUESTIONS ON EVIL dealt with a wide variety of topics: sin, original sin, venial sin, capital vices, avarice, envy, anger, gluttony, vainglory, lust, spiritual apathy, devils, and human choice. Brian Davies provides an extended introduction placing the De malo in the context of Thomas’s extraordinary achievements. Wisely, he dates its writing as concurrent with the writing of the Pars secunda of the Summa theologiae, that is, during his second tenure at Paris, 1269–1272. Here D. also presents Thomas’s method as well as his central themes. Later he also provides a selected bibliography and a glossary of 23 terms and nearly 50 authors and works cited in Thomas’s text.

The translation derives from the new (1982) authoritative edition by the Leo-nine Commission. Regan’s facing-page translation is as felicitous and faithful as can be. For instance, he translates “culpa” as “moral wrong” instead of “fault” or “guilt,” in order to capture Thomas’s meaning of the objective defect of morally evil acts.

D. and R.’s work together is splendid. Not only do they offer us an important translation upon which researchers can readily rely, but by editing and presenting it as they do, they propose that we turn to these disputed questions in order to understand and convey more accurately the maturity of Thomas’s thought in philosophy and theology, in ethics and morality. In the light of the exceptional advances being made in Thomistic scholarship these years, this volume will direct contemporary scholars to a renewed consideration of Thomas’s views on sin and vice. A must for every academic library and for any serious scholar of Thomas. “Invaluable” will be the word associated with this particular edition.

JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology

THE DE MALO OF THOMAS AQUINAS.
Edited by Brian Davies. Translated from the Latin by Richard Regan. New York: Oxford University, 2001. Pp. xiv + 986. $150.

SOWING JUSTICE, REAPING PEACE: CASE STUDIES OF RACIAL, RELIGIOUS, AND ETHNIC HEALING AROUND THE WORLD.
By Michael K. Duffey. Franklin, Wis.: Sheed and Ward, 2001. Pp. xix + 216. $18.95.

The book tells stories of practices, faith commitments, and struggles on behalf of peace, justice, and reconciliation. Chapters 1–3 examine the legacy of colonialism in Central America, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. Chapter 4 turns to nonviolent campaigns for socio-political reform in Poland, East Germany, and the Philippines. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the Balkans and the Middle East. Chapters 7 and 8 examine present day race dynamics in the U.S. and oppression of women in the world. Each chapter supplies historical background from the perspective of those engaged in the struggle for liberation. An appendix provides discussion questions, significant terms or names, and additional resources for undergraduate
education in social studies, history, religion, or ethics.

In addition to the excellent historical background, Duffey’s book provides three major services. First, readers encounter institutions and faith communities that take the side of the oppressed: transformation is not only the work of charismatic individuals. Second, readers meet real people who effected change in the political, economic, and social spheres through discipline, skill, and persistence: institutions are not immutable. Third, the role of organized religion is the formation of faith communities steeped in rituals, beliefs, narratives, and practices: specific teachings are less effective tools of justice and nonviolence than formation into faith communities.

As I finished reading the book, however, I found myself wishing for some specific analysis about how faith-based communities actually form people of justice and nonviolence. What is the role of the Scriptures in their formation? Do faith communities find principles for their convictions in Catholic social teachings? Do shared rituals fuel outrage at injustice? Exploring these questions may enable faith communities to effectively address situations crying out for racial, religious, and ethnic healing today.

MARY ELSBERND
Loyola University, Chicago

VERANTWORTUNG—ENDE ODER WANDLUNGEN EINER VORSTELLUNG? ORTE UND FUNKTIONEN DER ETHIK IN UNSERER GESELLSCHAFT. Edited by Karl-Wilhelm Merks. Studien der Moraltheologie, vol. 14. Münster: LIT, 2001. Pp. 298: £25.46.

The notion of responsibility has been a central tenet of modernity’s conception of morality. Modern discourse reflects an optimism and confidence in freedom's ability to set the standards by which we can fashion our world and our lives in a humanly meaningful way. The experience of fragmentation and plurality, however, has exposed modernity’s conceit in moral progress. Postmodernity has put the idea of moral responsibility in jeopardy.

The contributors of this book take up the challenge to provide a more adequate understanding of responsibility in a postmodern world. They see the emergence of a global village through media and technology (R. Neudeck, F. Vosman), the recognition of cultural and religious diversity (H. Okano, J. D’Arcy May), the changing political landscape in Europe (A. Dylus), and the introduction of women’s voices to moral discourse (C. Schnabl), requiring a notion of responsibility that balances an optimism in freedom’s abilities with a realism that accompanies the recognition of freedom’s necessary limitations (J. Römelt).

As a moral theologian, Römelt sees this more nuanced notion of responsibility already present in the well-known debate surrounding the proprium of Christian ethics. On the one hand, the autonomous nature of Christian ethics rebukes any heteronomous authority that might diminish human responsibility. On the other hand, moral norms will reflect our experience of God as the deepest and most authentic experience of ourselves. This theological understanding of freedom, however, cannot remain at an abstract or speculative level but must be embodied in the concrete struggles for justice that continually test the adequacy of our normative assumptions that guide the legitimate expectations of freedom.

D’Arcy May’s contribution on interreligious dialogue underlines the risk that such a radicalized understanding of responsibility will entail. He reminds us that, in a postmodern context, consensus is not given a priori but is a continual historical accomplishment. That is, consensus is achieved through dialogue. Dialogue, which results from the conversion to nonviolent praxis, constrains unfounded claims to universality and eschews unbridled celebrations of plurality.

THOMAS KOPFENSTEINER
Fordham University, New York
Christian morality centers on how we love and order our loves. Schlabach explores the clash of loves in the contradictory imperatives of self-love and self-denial. As he admits, this is not strictly a historical study, but “a conversation with historical texts” (xxiii). While his conversation is mostly with Augustine, other partners are also at the table: notably, Anders Nygren who narrowly defined Christian love as a self-denying, self-sacrificing agape; and recent feminist critics who resist Nygren’s hegemony and insist that making self-sacrifice the benchmark of Christian love distorts the lives of those whose selfhood has been shattered or oppressed.

S. finds Augustine’s “theocentric” doctrine of love both “coherent and tantalizing,” a “gestalt vision of love-as-a-whole-in-coordination-with-its-parts” (59). Chapter 2 maps out the structure of Augustinian caritas, how Augustine understood and ordered four basic loves: of God, neighbor, temporal goods, and self. Here S. explores two contemporaneous texts: Confessions 4, where Augustine meditates on a childhood friend’s death; and On Christian Teaching 1, where he sets out his classic distinction between “use” and “enjoyment.” S. also stresses that Augustine saw love at the heart not simply of personal relations but of the whole of human history: In the City of God he charted history as a tale of two cities created by and distinguishable from one another by their ways of loving.

Chapter 3 on “the grammar” of Augustinian continence is the most striking and original. S. shows that just as concupiscience refers not simply to sexuality but to a broader lust for power and acquisition, so its opposite and antidote, continence, “is the operative mode of Augustinian caritas” (58) and is “Augustine’s reply . . . about how to love God” (61). S. makes clear that, for Augustine, sexual continence is simply one “instantiation of a ‘higher continence’ of the heart” (64).

At the close, S. sets out theses arguing for an evangelical self-denial tempered by and oriented to “the joy set before us” (148). This study offers fresh perspectives on perennial questions. It is a valuable exercise in ressourcement, finely balancing historical scholarship with pastoral engagement.

WILLIAM HARMLESS, S.J.
Spring Hill College, Mobile

THE MORAL CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY. By Walter J. Schultz. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law. New York: Cambridge University, 2001. Pp. xii + 144. $50.

In this stimulating book, Walter Schultz offers a novel, purely theoretical, critique of perfect competition, exploring the implicit but unacknowledged assumptions of moral behavior needed to make the theory of efficient, value-neutral markets work. S. begins by restating the First Theorem of Welfare Economics, carefully outlining its standard assumptions. The organizing insight of the book is that the “strict rational egoists” of economic models, who care only about their own consumption and follow only externally enforced moral rules, cannot support an efficient market outcome, even in theory. S.’s central thesis is that even the most rudimentary market must rely on a set of moral commitments among its participants: commitments to property rights, to truthfulness, to the autonomy of others, and a commitment to take into account the external effects of one’s actions. Moreover, these moral commitments must be internal; this is not a demonstration of the efficacy of externally imposed respect for rights.

The most interesting part of the book is the chapter on the relationship between externalities and moral norms. Economics’ assumption of no externalities (effects imposed on others without compensation) ignores the crucial role of morality in reducing both the effects of externalities and the transaction costs that make externalities difficult to address.

The book opens up an interesting line of criticism of invisible hand theories
but claims too much in two important places. New developments in the theory of perfect competition, which rely more on competitive bargaining and less on fictional “auctioneers,” undercut the need for internally generated norms of honesty in markets, while giving a more plausible account of competition. In addition, S.’s repudiation of theories of “spontaneous order,” which rely on repeated interaction in markets to generate moral norms, is not convincing. He appears to assume that the egoists of economic models will never find it in their interests to follow moral rules voluntarily, but does not say why.

ANDREW YUENGERT
Pepperdine University, Malibu, Calif.

FAITH, MORALS, AND MONEY: WHAT THE WORLD’S RELIGIONS TELL US ABOUT MONEY IN THE MARKETPLACE. By Edward D. Zinbarg. New York: Continuum, 2001. Pp. 182. $22.95

This book is the fruit of three careers. Its author has been a professor of finance for 15 years at City University in New York and has held positions for 35 years at Prudential Insurance Company including chief administrative officer. At the age of 60 he retired to pursue a doctorate in religious studies from Drew University. The strength of the book is Zinbarg’s familiarity with the three fields the book touches on, business, ethics, and religions. For him it was always axiomatic that people understand the difference between right and wrong from their religious upbringings. He is impatient, therefore, with the approach to business ethics that ignores religion and proceeds philosophically to think ethics. Religions, he reasons, supply the energies people need to “behave well.”

While a welcome addition to the still too small literature that attempts to connect the ethics of the faiths to the business of business, the book raises several questions in my mind. Z. describes himself as “a religious pluralist” (173) rather than an adherent of any particular faith. He was satisfied that his studies enabled him to find many correlations in the ethical teachings of many faiths that could be used for dealing with the ethical dilemmas and problems that business faces today. This correlations approach has some value, but I am not sure that Z.’s findings would motivate an individual business person who is a member of one of these religions. This “type of moral bricolage” (11) which he constructs is probably more interesting to those who delve into comparative religion than to business persons.

Another question the book raises is whether Z. underestimates natural law, which would not dichotomize faith and reason but would have them work together in a mutuality and so come to light about ethical questions in business. Catholic social thought, which goes in this third direction, is briefly and fairly treated by him but he does not plumb its rationale.

JOHN C. HAUGHEY, S.J.
Loyola University, Chicago

ENCHIRIDION DELLA VITA CONSACRATA DALLE DECRETALI AL RINNOVAMENTO POST-CONCILIARE (385–2000). Edited by Erminio Lora and Giovanni Zaccherini. Translated from the Latin by Giovanni Zaccherini. Edizione bilingue. Milan: Ancora, 2001. Pp. xvi + 3465 + 152. €113.62

This text on the consecrated life contains an anthology of magisterial documents arranged in chronological order under the appropriate pontificates. The collection spans more than 16 and a half centuries beginning with a decretal letter of Pope Siricius in A.D. 385 and terminating with the homily of Pope John Paul II during the Eucharistic celebration of the Jubilee of Consecrated life, February 2, 2000. The tome presents the documents in both Latin and Italian, the publishers assuring a careful translation. The two languages run side by side in numbered paragraphs throughout the book so as to afford an easy read and ready reference to the Latin original.
Following a brief prefatory overview of the history of consecrated life in both East and West, the text is divided into three sections: (1) from Pope Siricius (384–399) to Benedict XV (1914–1922), approximately 656 pages; (2) from the Code of Canon Law (1917) and Pope Benedict XV (1914–1922) to Pope John XXIII (1958–1963), approximately 1167 pages; (3) from the Vatican II and Pope Paul VI (1963–1978) to Pope John Paul II (1978–2000), approximately 1665 pages.

The wide variety of formats in which the pronouncements appear offers evidence of their legislative strength or import. Papal (from apostolic constitutions to allocutions), conciliar (from constitutions to statutes), synodal (from decrees to propositions), and Roman dicasterial (from general decrees to replies) documents afford rich insights not only in the structural and procedural complexities of consecrated life, but also in the development and style of the legal tradition in the Church.

While the almost 4,000-page text is rather formidable, the five indexes (incipits, biblical references, fonts, word references, and general index) direct the reader to appropriate paragraph numbers enabling one to search the tome with ease. The book is a treasure trove for university, seminary, novitiate, and scholasticate libraries. Likewise, it is an invaluable reference for theologians and canonists, particularly those researching or teaching in the area of consecrated life.

ROSE MCDERMOTT, S.S.J.
Catholic University of America, D.C.

A TASTE FOR THE SECRET. By Jacques Derrida and Maurizio Ferraris. Edited by Giacomo Donis and David Webb. Translated from the French and Italian by Giacomo Donis. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2001. Pp. viii + 168. $19.95.

“The form of the systematic, encyclopedic, circular book is impossible; and in Of Grammatology I start off by saying: that’s it, no more books” (81).

Faithful to Jacques Derrida’s pronouncement, A Taste for the Secret is the collation of two performances: the first, which gives the title to the whole text, is by Derrida; the second, devoted to a quasi-epistemological inquiry about “What Is There?” is by Maurizio Ferraris, an Italian philosopher working on issues of hermeneutics, ontology, and phenomenology of perception. D.’s disavowal of the need for books is honored throughout both essays.

D.’s performance is in fact the transcription of an ongoing interview/conversation between D. and F. that takes place over the years. In the last section of the exchange, Gianni Vattimo, a prominent Italian philosopher, joins in to engage D. in the most serious discussion of philosophical issues throughout the entire first essay. The rest of the exchange between D. and F. is simply the recapitulation of D.’s position on the issues under discussion. Despite the somewhat expository character of the conversation, the essay is didactically helpful and worthy of appreciation for the linearity and directness of its presentation.

F.’s essay retains a systematic character in both form and content. After having explored such concepts as thing, matter, form, name, concept, imagination, speech, and writing, F. concludes with a brief discussion of the “absolute” as “the bondless bond that in Speech and Phenomena (pp. 101–2) D. sums up in the principle that infinite difference is finite” (156), that is, in the principle of “absolute finitism.” For F., however, unlike D., such an absolute finitism (“thinking what is”) involves “privileging synthesis with respect to disjunction” (158).

What is the secret for which this text has a taste? For D. and F. it is what deconstruction uncovers as the remnant present while being hidden in every text. For us readers, though, it is the somewhat accidental link that holds the two essays together in a book whose nature seems to be dictated mainly by editorial concerns.

SILVIA BENSO
Siena College, Loudonville, N.Y.
REMEMBERING THE END: DOSTOEVSKY AS PROPHET TO MODERNITY. By P. Travis Kroeker and Bruce K. Ward. Radical Traditions. Boulder: Westview, 2001. Pp. xii + 280. $30.

The book largely examines Fyodor Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov and its "Grand Inquisitor" (reprinted as chapter 2). Kroeker and Ward argue that, for his time, Dostoevsky's religious thought and literary art were a prophetic critique of modernity and of the atheism and totalitarianism that would eventually envelope Russia and the West.

The work begins with Dostoevsky's understanding of eschatology and liturgical memory, of life being rooted in the eternal. The initial chapters contrast two basic visions of the meaning of history and of the responses to the question of theodicy. Ivan Karamazov and his "Inquisitor" are personifications of aspects of modernity, while Alyosha represents Dostoevsky's understanding of Christianity, influenced specifically by Russian Orthodoxy and monasticism. Simply put, the Inquisitor has lost faith in God because Christ had failed to miraculously eradicate suffering and injustice in this world. In his metaphysical rebellion against God, the protagonist Inquisitor has replaced the love of God by a love for humanity (a humanism).

The final sections seek the implications of modernity in the realm of political society, again touching upon themes of justice, ethics, and immortality. K. and W. show how Dostoevsky prophetically foresaw modern atheism's advocating a political rebellion against society and its promotion of a totalitarian state as a cure for the evils of injustice. The alternative vision, analyzed in these chapters, is one rooted in Christ, whose kingdom awaits its definitive fulfillment not in history, but in eternity. The failure of the Inquisitor's vision was that he neglected to see the Redemption offered through the kenosis and Resurrection of Christ, and that love includes not only one's neighbor, but also must include God.

Interwoven among this analysis of modernity is an original comparison of Dostoevsky's thought with, among others, Hegel, Heidegger, and Nietzsche, the latter of whom had praised Dostoevsky's response to secular humanism and the religious meaning of atheism (although the two ultimately arrived at different conclusions). The book is thus a very penetrating and detailed analysis of Dostoevsky's religious thought and his critique of modernity.

JAROSLAV Z. SKIRA
Regis College, University of Toronto

FROM GENESIS TO GENETICS: THE CASE OF EVOLUTION AND CREATIONISM. By John A. Moore. Berkeley: University of California, 2002. Pp. xvi + 223. $27.50.

Moore, professor emeritus of biology, offers another survey of the evolution-Christianity conflict in the U.S. Half of the book is a competent and readable presentation of Darwin's theory and the Neo-Darwinian synthesis. The other half is a discussion of the Genesis stories and the reception of Darwinism in the U.S. M.'s discussion of Genesis, including the P and J accounts, their dating, and the possible sources in Mesopotamian and Babylonian creation stories is relatively solid. And he does respectably well in surveying the debates in the U.S.—the Scopes trial, the rise of creation science, and its most recent mutation, intelligent design. All of this is sound, but it has been done better by Michael Ruse in Can a Darwinian Be a Christian? (2000) and The Evolution Wars (2000), and by Ronald Numbers in Darwinism Comes to America (1998)—both Ruse and Numbers know some theology. Aside from his serviceable treatment of the Genesis stories, M. gives no indication of familiarity with contemporary theology.

M. suggests (by what he does not cover) that the only issue that evolution raises for Christian theology is the conflict between the Genesis stories and evolution. This, in fact, is the most trivial of the issues raised by evolution and the one most easily resolved. The conflict exists only for biblical literalists. Give up biblical literalism and the problem disappears. But there are other se-
rious issues for Christian theology raised by evolution: how God acts in an evolutionary universe, the notion of soul and the uniqueness of human beings, the purpose of the universe, and the waste and suffering that seem to be an essential part of the evolutionary process. For an excellent and fresh treatment of these issues, see John Haught’s *God after Darwin* (2000). Twice (xi, 147) M. repeats the thoroughly discredited claim that Christianity for centuries defended the flat earth theory (see Jeffrey Burton Russell, *Inventing the Flat Earth*, 1991). Read M.’s book for its elegant presentation of Darwin’s theory and the Neo-Darwinian synthesis. Turn to Ruse and Haught for the theological implications.

EUGENE E. SELK
Creighton University, Omaha

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES

Abella, Josep. *Salmi e letteratura sapienziale: Pregare Dio nella vita*. Parola Missione, vol. 6. Bologna: Dehoniane, 2002. Pp. 519. €36.40.

Anderson, Robert T., and Terry Giles. *The Keepers: An Introduction to the History and Culture of the Samaritans*. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2002. Pp. xvi + 165. $29.95.

Arnold, Kenneth. *Night Fishing in Galilee: The Journey Toward Spiritual Wisdom*. Cambridge: Cowley, 2002. Pp. xvi + 143. $12.95.

Bauckham, Richard. *Gospel Women: Studies of the Named Women in the Gospels*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. xxi + 343. $22.

Bellinger, Jr., W. H. *Leviticus, Numbers*. New International Biblical Commentary, vol. 3. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2001. Pp. x + 338. $11.95.

Bellis, Alice Ogden, and Terry L. Hufford. *Science, Scripture, and Homosexuality*. Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2002. Pp. 128. $12.

Bergamini, Augusto. *Cristo Parola del Padre nella storia*. Bologna: Dehoniane, 2002. Pp. 160. €11.88.

Bovon, François. *Luke 1: A Commentary on the Gospel of Luke 1:1–9:50*. Hermeneia. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002. Pp. xxxvi + 441. $59.

Brueggemann, Walter. *David’s Truth in Israel’s Imagination and Memory*. 2d ed. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002. Pp. xx + 153. $15.

Bryan, Steven M. *Jesus and Israel’s Traditions of Judgment and Restoration*. Society for New Testament Studies: Monograph Series, vol. 117. New York: Cambridge University, 2002. Pp. xv + 278. $60.

Das, A. Andrew. *Paul, the Law, and the Covenant*. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2001. Pp. xix + 342. $24.95.

Foskett, Mary F. *A Virgin Conceived: Mary and Classical Representations of Virginity*. Bloomington: Indiana University, 2002. Pp. viii + 238. $35.

Gerstenberger, Erhard S. *Theologies in the Old Testament*. Trans. John Bowden. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002. Pp. x + 358. $30.

Goldingay, John. *Isaiah*. New International Biblical Commentary, vol. 13. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2001. Pp. x + 397. $11.95.

Goulder, M. D. *Paul and the Competing Mission in Corinth*. Library of Pauline Studies. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2001. Pp. xiv + 303. $24.95.

Harrissville, Roy A., and Walter Sundberg. *The Bible in Modern Culture: Baruch Spinoza to Brevard Childs*. 2d ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. xiii + 349. $25.

Holladay, William L. *Unbound by Time: Isaiah Still Speaks*. Cambridge, Mass.: Cowley, 2002. Pp. xx + 188. $12.95.

Instone-Brewer, David. *Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. xi + 355. $26.
JOBLING, J’annine. Feminist Biblical Interpretations in Theological Context: Restless Readings. Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Theology & Biblical Studies. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2002. Pp. vi + 180. $69.95.

LANG, Bernhard. The Hebrew God: Portrait of an Ancient Deity. New Haven: Yale University, 2002. Pp. x + 246. $32.50.

LOADER, William R. G. Jesus’ Attitude towards the Law: A Study of the Gospels. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. x + 563. $50.

LONG, Gary A. Grammatical Concepts 101 for Biblical Hebrew: Learning Biblical Hebrew Grammatical Concepts through English Grammar. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2002. Pp. xvii + 189. $19.95.

NICHOLSON, Sarah. Three Faces of Saul: An Intertextual Approach to Biblical Tragedy. Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, vol. 339. London: Sheffield Academic, 2002. Pp. 276. $105.

O’KANE, Martin, ed. Borders, Boundaries, and the Bible. New York: Sheffield Academic, 2002. Pp. xii + 358. $125.

PEARSON, Brook W. R. Corresponding Sense: Paul, Dialectic, and Gadamer. Biblical Interpretation Series. Boston: Brill, 2001. Pp. xxiv + 370. $131.

PORTER, Stanley E. Paul in Acts. Library of Pauline Studies. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2001. Pp. ix + 233. $24.95.

PORTER, Stanley E., and Dennis L. Stamps, ed. Rhetorical Criticism and the Bible. Journal for the Study of the New Testament. New York: Sheffield Academic, 2002. Pp. 571. $165.

REIS, Pamela Tamarkin. Reading the Lines: A Fresh Look at the Hebrew Bible. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2002. Pp. x + 227. $24.95.

RILLET WOOD, Joyce. Amos in Song and Book Culture. Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series. New York: Sheffield Academic, 2002. Pp. 249. $95.

SALEVAO, Iutisone. Legitimation in the Letter to the Hebrews: The Construction and Maintenance of a Symbolic Universe. New York: Continuum, 2002. Pp. viii + 448. $145.

SCHABERG, Jane. The Resurrection of Mary Magdalene: Legends, Apocrypha, and the Christian Testament. New York: Continuum, 2002. Pp. 379. $35.

SCHREINER, Josef, and Rainer Kampling. Il prossimo lo straniero il nemico. I Temi Della Bibbia, vol. 3. Bologna: Dehoniane, 2002. Pp. 159. €14.90.

SHELLARD, Barbara. New Light on Luke: Its Purpose, Sources, and Literary Context. New York: Continuum, 2002. Pp. 340. $115.

SMITH-CHRISTOPHER, Daniel L. A Biblical Theology of Exile. Overtures to Biblical Theology. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002. Pp. xiv + 209. $20.

STANTON, Graham. The Gospels and Jesus. 2d ed. Oxford Bible Series. New York: Oxford University, 2002. Pp. xii + 324. $24.95.

STIEBERT, Johanna. The Construction of Shame in the Hebrew Bible: The Prophetic Contribution. Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, vol. 346. New York: Sheffield Academic, 2002. Pp. x + 196. $95.

VIA, Dan Otto. What Is New Testament Theology? Guides to Biblical Scholarship. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002. Pp. v + 148. $15.

WHEDBEE, J. William. The Bible and the Comic Vision. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002. Pp. xii + 315. $20.

HISTORICAL

BALMER, Randall, and Lauren F. Winner. Protestantism in America. Columbia Contemporary America Religion Series. New York: Columbia University, 2002. Pp. xiii + 295. $35.

BARMANN, Lawrence F., and Harvey Hill, ed. Personal Faith and Institutional Commitments: Roman Catholic Modernist and Anti-Modernist Autobiography. Scranton: University of Scranton, 2002. Pp. vii + 187. $27.95.

BESHONER, Jeffrey B. Ivan Sergeevich Gagarin: The Search for Orthodox and Catholic Union. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2002. Pp. xi + 321. $39.95.
Blancy, Alain, and Maurice Jourjon. *Mary in the Plan of God and in the Communion of Saints: Toward a Common Christian Understanding.* Trans. Matthew J. O’Connell. New York: Paulist, 2002. Pp. vii + 162. $18.95.

Bowd, Stephen D. *Reform before the Reformation: Vincenzo Querini and the Religious Renaissance in Italy.* Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought. Boston: Brill, 2002. Pp. xvi + 267. $86.

Brown, Robert E. *Jonathan Edwards and the Bible.* Bloomington: Indiana University, 2002. Pp. xxi + 292. $35.

Buckley, Thomas E. *The Great Catastrophe of My Life: Divorce in the Old Dominion.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2001. Pp. xi + 346. $59.95; $19.95.

Chenu, Marie-Dominique. *Aquinas and His Role in Theology.* Collegeville: Liturgical, 2002. Pp. viii + 149. $15.95.

Foley, Michael P., and Douglas Kries, ed. *Gladly to Learn and Gladly to Teach: Essays on Religion and Political Philosophy in Honor of Ernest L. Fortin, A.A.* Applications of Political Theory. Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2002. Pp. xvi + 323. $75.

Gondreau, Paul. *The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Beiträge Zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge, vol. 61. Münster: Aschendorff, 2002. Pp. 516. $62.

Howells, Edward. *John of the Cross and Teresa of Avila: Mystical Knowing and Selfhood.* New York: Crossroad, 2002. Pp. xi + 212. $39.95.

Kaplan, Dana E., ed. *Platitudes and Prayer Books: Theological and Liturgical Perspectives on Reform Judaism.* Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. Pp. xii + 317. $29.95.

Köpf, Ulrich, ed. *Theologen des Mittelalters: Eine Einführung.* Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002. Pp. 109. $29.90.

McEntegart, Rory. *Henry VIII, the League of Schmalkalden, and the English Reformation.* Royal Historical Society Studies in History, vol. 25. Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press, 2002. Pp. ix + 244. $75.

Meck, Donald E. *The Quest for Celtic Christianity.* Edinburgh: Handsel, 2000. Pp. viii + 273. £9.95

Miner, Robert C. *Vico: Genealogist of Modernity.* Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2002. Pp. xvi + 215. $37.50.

Morrow, Diane Batts. *Persons of Color and Religious at the Same Time: The Oblate Sisters of Providence, 1828–1860.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2002. Pp. xii + 336. $49.95; $19.95.

Naugle, David K. *Worldview: The History of a Concept.* Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. xxii + 384. $26.

Neuner, Peter, and Gunther Wenz, ed. *Theologen des 19. Jahrhunderts: Eine Einführung.* Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002. Pp. 242. $29.90.

———, ed. *Theologen des 20. Jahrhunderts: Eine Einführung.* Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002. Pp. 239. $29.90.

Pauw, Amy Plantinga. *The Supreme Harmony of All: The Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan Edwards.* Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. x + 196. $22.

———, ed. *The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Volume 20: The “Miscellanies,” 833–1152.* New Haven: Yale University, 2002. Pp. xi + 569. $85.

Phan, Peter C. and the Synod of Asian Bishops. *The Asian Synod: Texts and Commentaries.* Maryknoll: Orbis, 2002. Pp. xiii + 352. $60.

Pieper, Josef. *The Human Wisdom of St. Thomas Aquinas: A Breviary of Philosophy from the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas.* San Francisco: Ignatius, 2002. Pp. 109. $10.95.

Pope, Stephen J., ed. *The Ethics of Aquinas.* Moral Traditions Series. Washington: Georgetown University, 2002. Pp. xv + 496. $39.95.

Raum, Elizabeth. *Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Called by God.* New York: Continuum, 2002. Pp. 184. $21.95.

Shannon, William H., Christine M. Bochen, and Patrick F. O’Connell. *The Thomas Merton Encyclopedia.* Maryknoll: Orbis, 2002. Pp. xix + 556. $50.

Snyder, James D. *The Faith and the Power:
The Inspiring Story of the First Christians and How They Survived the Madness of Rome. Jupiter, Fla.: Pharos, 2002. Pp. xv + 415. $19.95.

Starkloff, Carl F. Common Testimony: Ethnology and Theology in the Customs of Joseph Lafitau. Studies on Jesuit Topics. Saint Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2002. Pp. xii + 218. $18.95.

Twyman, Susan. Papal Ceremonial at Rome in the Twelfth Century. London: Boydell, 2002. Pp. xii + 251. $70.

van de Sandt, Huub, and David Flusser. The Didache: Its Jewish Sources and Its Place in Early Judaism and Christianity. Compendium Rerum Iudaicarum Ad Novum Testamentum. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002. Pp. xviii + 431. $58.

Wills, Garry. Why I Am a Catholic. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002. Pp. viii + 390. $26.

SYSTEMATIC

Aguti, Andrea. La questione dell’ermeneutica in Karl Barth. Scienze Religiose. Bologna: Edizioni Dehoniane, 2001. Pp. 306. €18.08.

Barbour, Ian G. Nature, Human Nature, and God. Theology and the Sciences. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002. Pp. x + 170. $15.

Barth, Karl. Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its Background and History. New ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. xx + 652. $45.

Braaten, Carl E., and Robert W. Jenson, ed. The Last Things: Biblical and Theological Perspectives on Eschatology. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. ix + 169. $16.

———. The Strange New Word of the Gospel: Re-Evangelizing in the Postmodern World. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. viii + 176. $23.

Cartledge, Mark J. Charismatic Glossolalia: An Empirical-Theological Study. Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Theology & Biblical Studies. Burlington, VT.: Ashgate, 2001. Pp. xvi + 253. $64.95.

Clack, Beverley. Sex and Death: A reapraisal of Human Mortality. Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2002. Pp. vii + 159. $24.95.

Colson, Charles W., and Richard John Neuhaus, ed. Your Word Is Truth: A Project of Evangelicals and Catholics Together. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. x + 168. $20.

Cummings, Owen F. John Macquarrie, a Master of Theology. New York: Paulist, 2002. Pp. vii + 152. $14.95.

Eigo, Francis A., ed. Themes in Feminist Theology for the New Millennium (I). Villanova, PA: Villanova University, 2002. Pp. xi + 204.

Everist, Norma Cook, ed. The Difficult but Indispensable Church. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002. Pp. xxi + 261. $18.

Fischella, Rino. La Rivelazione: Evento e credibilità. Corso di Teologia Sistematica, vol. 2. Bologna: Dehoniane, 2002. Pp. 638. €41.

Frosini, Giordano. La risurrezione inizio del mondo nuovo. Bologna: Dehoniane, 2002. Pp. 324. €24.

Fuellenbach, John. Church: Community for the Kingdom. American Society of Missiology Series. Maryknoll: Orbis, 2002. Pp. 324. €24.

Frosini, Giordano. La risurrezione inizio del mondo nuovo. Bologna: Dehoniane, 2002. Pp. 324. €24.

Froshini, Giordano. La risurrezione inizio del mondo nuovo. Bologna: Dehoniane, 2002. Pp. 324. €24.
Hodgson, Peter C., and Robert H. King, ed. *Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks*. Updated ed. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994. Pp. xiii + 400. $24. *Readings in Christian Theology*. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1985. Pp. xiii + 400. $26. A two-volume set with CD-ROM included.

Hoffman, Joshua, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz. *The Divine Attributes*. Exploring the Philosophy of Religion. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002. Pp. viii + 204. $24.95.

Hopkins, Dwight N. *Heart and Head: Black Theology—Past, Present, and Future*. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Pp. xiv + 222. $26.95.

Hoffman, Joshua, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz. *The Divine Attributes*. Exploring the Philosophy of Religion. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002. Pp. viii + 204. $24.95.

Hoffman, Joshua, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz. *The Divine Attributes*. Exploring the Philosophy of Religion. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002. Pp. viii + 204. $24.95.

Hoffman, Joshua, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz. *The Divine Attributes*. Exploring the Philosophy of Religion. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002. Pp. viii + 204. $24.95.

Hoffman, Joshua, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz. *The Divine Attributes*. Exploring the Philosophy of Religion. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002. Pp. viii + 204. $24.95.

Hopkins, Dwight N. *Heart and Head: Black Theology—Past, Present, and Future*. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Pp. xiv + 222. $26.95.

Hoffman, Joshua, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz. *The Divine Attributes*. Exploring the Philosophy of Religion. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002. Pp. viii + 204. $24.95.

Hoffman, Joshua, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz. *The Divine Attributes*. Exploring the Philosophy of Religion. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002. Pp. viii + 204. $24.95.

Hoffman, Joshua, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz. *The Divine Attributes*. Exploring the Philosophy of Religion. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002. Pp. viii + 204. $24.95.

Hoffman, Joshua, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz. *The Divine Attributes*. Exploring the Philosophy of Religion. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002. Pp. viii + 204. $24.95.

Hoffman, Joshua, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz. *The Divine Attributes*. Exploring the Philosophy of Religion. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002. Pp. viii + 204. $24.95.
the Natural Law Tradition. Washington: Catholic University of America, 2002. Pp. x + 228. $49.95.

Kreeft, Peter. Three Approaches to Abortion: A Thoughtful and Compassionate Guide to Today’s Most Controversial Issue. San Francisco: Ignatius, 2002. Pp. 133. $9.95.

Lakoff, George. Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think. 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2002. Pp. xv + 471. $22.

Marín-Porquéres, Francisco J. La moral autónoma: Un acercamiento desde Franz Böckle. Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 2002. Pp. 291. €16.35.

Moe-Lobeda, Cynthia. Healing a Broken World: Globalization and God. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002. Pp. xiv + 236. $20.

Pinches, Charles R. Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. x + 237. $25.

Pullinger, David J. Information Technology and Cyberspace: Extra-Connected Living? Ethics & Theology. Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2001. Pp. viii + 168. $18.

Waters, Brent. Reproductive Technology: Towards a Theology of Procreative Stewardship. Ethics & Theology. Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2001. Pp. vii + 148. $16.

---

PASTORAL, SPIRITUAL, AND LITURGICAL

Aden, LeRoy, and Robert G. Hughes. Preaching God’s Compassion: Comforting Those Who Suffer. Fortress Resources for Preaching. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002. Pp. xii + 176. $18.

Amorth, Gabriele. An Exorcist: More Stories. San Francisco: Ignatius, 2002. Pp. 203. $14.95.

D’Arcy, Paula. A New Set of Eyes: Encountering the Hidden God. New York: Crossroad, 2002. Pp. 134. $16.95.

Dennis, Marie, and John A. Swanson. Saint Francis. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2002. Pp. 120. $25.

Escobar, Samuel E. Changing Tides: Latin America and Mission Today. The American Society of Missiology Series. Maryknoll: Orbis, 2002. Pp. xv + 206. $28.

Fiand, Barbara. In the Stillness You Will Know: Exploring the Paths of Our Ancient Belonging. New York: Crossroad, 2002. Pp. 175. $16.95.

Gerosa, Libero. The Canon Law. Handbooks of Catholic Theology, vol. 2. New York: Continuum, 2002. Pp. iv + 274. $29.95.

Goudey, June Christine. The Feast of Our Lives: Re-Imagining Communion. Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2002. Pp. ix + 198. $20.

Hauser, Richard J. Finding God in Troubled Times. Chicago: Jesuit Way, 2002. Pp. xi + 200. $13.95.

Jones, James W. Terror and Transformation: The Ambiguity of Religion in Psychoanalytic Perspective. New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2002. Pp. viii + 130. $19.95.

Kennedy, Eugene C. 9–11: Meditations at the Center of the World. Maryknoll: Orbis, 2002. Pp. 110. $10.

Kunzler, Michael. The Church’s Liturgy. Handbooks of Catholic Theology. New York: Continuum, 2001. Pp. iv + 512. $69.95.

Lazareth, William H., ed. Hope for Your Future: Theological Voices from the Pastorate. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. xvii + 223. $16.

McClure, John S. Other-Wise Preaching: A Postmodern Ethic for Homiletics. St. Louis, Mo.: Chalice, 2001. Pp. xi + 175. $26.99.

Sellner, Edward C. Mentoring: The Ministry of Spiritual Kinship. Rev. and exp. ed. Cambridge: Cowley, 2002. Pp. xii + 198. $12.95.

Sheldrake, Philip. Spaces for the Sacred: Place, Memory, and Identity. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2001. Pp. ix + 214. $15.95.

Taylor, Brian C. Becoming Christ: Transformation through Contemplation. Cambridge: Cowley, 2002. Pp. xi + 234. $14.95.

Wadell, Paul J. Becoming Friends: Worship, Justice, and the Practice of Christian Friendship. Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2002. Pp. 186. $14.99.

Williams, Paul. The Unexpected Way: On Converting from Buddhism to Catholicism. New York: T. & T. Clark, 2002. Pp. xx + 240. $22.95.
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER DISCIPLINES

Baydawi, ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar, and Mahmud ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Isfahani. Nature, Man, and God in Medieval Islam: ‘Abd Allah Baydawi’s Text, Tawali ‘al-Anwar Min Matali ‘al-Anzar, along with Mahmud Isfahani’s Commentary, Matali ‘al-Anzar, Sharh Tawali ‘al-Anwar. 2 vols. Ed. and trans. Edwin E. Calverley and James W. Pollock. Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Science. Boston: Brill, 2002. Pp. xiv + 1183. $232.

Beiser, Frederick C. German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781–1801. Cambridge: Harvard University, 2002. Pp. xvi + 726. $59.95.

Chretien, Jean-Louis. The Unforgettable and the Unhoped For. Trans. Jeffrey Bloechl. Perspectives in Continental Philosophy. New York: Fordham University, 2002. Pp. xxii + 135. $35; $20.

Estanek, Sandra M. Understanding Student Affairs at Catholic Colleges and Universities: A Comprehensive Resource. Franklin, Wis.: Sheed & Ward, 2002. Pp. xiv + 208. $24.95.