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Infinitely Divisible Noise in the Low Privacy Regime

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Abstract
Federated learning, in which training data is distributed among users and never shared, has emerged as a popular approach to privacy-preserving machine learning. Cryptographic techniques such as secure aggregation are used to aggregate contributions, like a model update, from all users. A robust technique for making such aggregates differentially private is to exploit infinite divisibility of the Laplace distribution, namely, that a Laplace distribution can be expressed as a sum of i.i.d. noise shares from a Gamma distribution, one share added by each user.

However, Laplace noise is known to have suboptimal error in the low privacy regime for \( \varepsilon \)-differential privacy, where \( \varepsilon > 1 \) is a large constant. In this paper we present the first infinitely divisible noise distribution for real-valued data that achieves \( \varepsilon \)-differential privacy and has expected error that decreases exponentially with \( \varepsilon \).

Keywords: Differential privacy, federated learning.

1. Introduction

Differential privacy, a state-of-the-art privacy definition, is a formal constraint on randomized mechanisms for privately releasing results of computations. It gives a formal framework for quantifying how well the privacy of an individual, whose data is part of the input, is preserved. In recent years, differentially private algorithms for machine learning have been developed and made available, for example, in TensorFlow/privacy and the Opacus library for PyTorch. Using such algorithms ensures that the presence or absence of a single data record in a database does not significantly affect the distribution of the model produced.

Concurrently, the area of federated learning (McMahan et al., 2017) has explored how to carry out machine learning in settings where training data is distributed among \( n \) users and never shared. Cryptographic techniques such as secure aggregation are used to aggregate contributions, like a model update, from all users (Bonawitz et al., 2017). This setup is used, for example, in the federated learning system run by Google on data from Android phones.* A robust technique for making such aggregates differentially private is to exploit infinite divisibility of the Laplace distribution, namely, that a Laplace distribution can be expressed as a sum of \( n \) i.i.d. noise shares from a Gamma distribution, one share added to the input of each user (Goryczka and Xiong, 2017). That is, if user \( i \) holds \( x_i \in [0, \Delta] \), the input provided to the secure aggregation is \( x_i + \eta_i \), where \( \eta_i \) is sampled from a suitable Gamma distribution. Infinitely divisible noise is resistant to dropout, where some users never contribute to the sum, if we set \( n \) to be a lower bound on the number of fully participating users.

*https://ai.googleblog.com/2017/04/federated-learning-collaborative.html

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However, the Laplace noise needed for $\varepsilon$-differential privacy yields expected error $\Theta(\Delta/\varepsilon)$, which is not optimal in the “low privacy regime” when $\varepsilon \gg 1$. Geng, Kairouz, Oh, and Viswanath (2015) and Geng and Viswanath (2016a) presented the Staircase mechanism (see Lemma 30), which can be parameterized to obtain expected error $\Theta(\Delta e^{-\varepsilon/2})$ or variance $\Theta(\Delta^2 e^{-2\varepsilon/3})$, thus outperforming the Laplace mechanism for $\varepsilon$ larger than some constant. However, the noise distribution used by this mechanism is not infinitely divisible, so it cannot replace Laplace noise in federated settings.

In this paper we present the first infinitely divisible noise distribution for real-valued data that achieves $\varepsilon$-differential privacy and has expected error that decreases exponentially with $\varepsilon$. Our new noise distribution, the Arete* distribution, has expected absolute value and variance exponentially decreasing in $\varepsilon$, and thus comparable to that of the Staircase distribution up to constant factors in $\varepsilon$. Figure 1 illustrates the shape of each of the three distributions. The Arete distribution has a continuous density function implying that the privacy level decreases more smoothly with sensitivity, in contrast to the Staircase distribution (see discussion in Section 2).

The main part of this paper is devoted to the accuracy and privacy analysis of the Arete mechanism. Appendix A discusses applications in distributed private data analysis.

The Arete Distribution

For simplicity, we will limit ourselves to 1-dimensional setting. In order to deal with vectors (with $\ell_\infty$ sensitivity bounded by $\Delta$), we may simply add independent noise from the Arete distribution to each coordinate. Our goal is to approximate the staircase distribution with an infinitely divisible distribution, so it is instructive to understand the essential properties of the staircase distribution: Only probability mass $\exp(-\Omega(\varepsilon))$ is placed in the tails, which can be seen as a piece-wise uniform version of a scaled Laplace distribution. The majority of the probability mass is placed in a uniform distribution on an interval around zero of length $\exp(-\Omega(\varepsilon))$.

**Definition 1 (Arete distribution, informal)** Let independent random variables $X_1, X_2 \sim \Gamma(\alpha, \theta)$ and $Y \sim \text{Laplace}(\lambda)$. Then $Z := X_1 - X_2 + Y$ has Arete distribution with parameters $\alpha, \theta$ and $\lambda$, denoted $\text{Arete}(\alpha, \theta, \lambda)$. When the parameters $\alpha, \theta$ and $\lambda$ are understood from the context, we use $f_A(t), t \in \mathbb{R}$, to denote the density function of $Z$.

*The name Arete is inspired by the word arête (pronounced "ah-ray't"), which is a sharp-crested mountain ridge, while also a concept from Greek mythology, Arete (pronounced "ah-reh-'tay") referring to moral virtue and excellence: the notion of the fulfillment of purpose or function and the act of living up to one’s full potential (Wikipedia).
Since the $\Gamma$ and Laplace distributions are continuous and infinitely divisible, and the Laplace distribution is symmetric, it follows that the Arete distribution also has these properties. In Section 3.2 we show:

**Lemma 2** For any choice of parameters $\alpha, \theta, \lambda > 0$, the Arete($\alpha, \theta, \lambda$) distribution is infinitely divisible and has density $f_A(t)$ that is continuous, symmetric around 0, and monotonely decreasing for $t > 0$.

Next, we discuss the intuition behind the noise and privacy properties of the Arete distribution: For privacy parameter $\varepsilon > 0$ and sensitivity $\Delta > 0$ we concern ourselves with distributions $D$ with support $S$ and density function $f_D$ satisfying

$$e^{-\varepsilon} \leq \frac{f_D(t)}{f_D(t + a)} \leq e^\varepsilon, \quad \forall t, a \in \mathbb{R}, |a| \leq \Delta$$

(1)
as this property is sufficient to ensure differential privacy, which is our main goal. We will refer to the property (1) as the differential privacy constraint. In order to minimize the magnitude of the noise, the goal is to find a distribution with minimal expected (absolute) value while satisfying (1).

The difference of two $\Gamma$ distributed random variables can be parameterized to have similar tails and to “peak” in an interval around zero of the same width as the staircase distribution. But this does not provide differential privacy since the density function has a singularity at zero. To achieve differential privacy we add a small amount of Laplace noise that “smooths out” the singularity. In more detail, the $\Gamma(\alpha, \theta)$-distribution (see Definition 25) with shape $\alpha < 1$, has most of its probability mass on an interval $(0, O(\alpha))$. The difference of two $\Gamma$ distributions does not satisfy (1) for any choice of $\alpha < 1$, as the density tends to infinity for values going to zero. To fix this we need to “flatten the curve” of the density function in the neighborhood of 0. Consider $Z' := X + Y$ for independent $X \sim \Gamma(\alpha, \theta)$ and $Y \sim \text{Exp}(\lambda)$. The Exponential distribution, with a suitable choice of parameter $\lambda$, is used to flatten the density function of the $\Gamma$ distribution close to 0. In order to get a noise distribution that is symmetric around zero, we further consider $Z = X_1 + Y_1 - (X_2 + Y_2)$ for $X_1, X_2 \sim \Gamma(\alpha, \theta)$ and $Y_1, Y_2 \sim \text{Exp}(\lambda)$. Our definition of the Arete distribution follows from the fact that if $Y_1, Y_2 \sim \text{Exp}(\lambda)$, then $Y = Y_1 - Y_2 \sim \text{Laplace}(\lambda)$. We provide an explicit setting for the parameters $\alpha, \theta, \lambda$ in Lemma 3.

We note that the Arete distribution generalizes the Laplace distribution in the sense that we obtain $\text{Laplace}(\lambda)$ as the limiting distribution for $\alpha \to 0$. In this sense, the Arete distribution is suitable also for $\varepsilon$ close to zero, where it may simply be used to implement Laplace noise.

**Main Results**

Let the Arete distribution $\text{Arete}(\alpha, \theta, \lambda)$ be as in Definition 1 (and formally, Definition 9) with density function $f_A$. In Section 4.3 we show the following result:

**Lemma 3** For every choice of $\Delta \geq 2/e$ and $\varepsilon \geq 20 + 4 \ln(\Delta)$ there exist parameters $\alpha, \beta, \lambda > 0$ such that:

- For every choice of $t, a \in \mathbb{R}$ with $|a| \leq \Delta$, $e^{-\varepsilon} \leq \frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + a)} \leq e^\varepsilon$:

- For $Z \sim \text{Arete}(\alpha, \theta, \lambda)$, $E[|Z|] = O(\Delta e^{-\varepsilon/4})$ and $\text{Var}[Z] = O(\Delta^2 e^{-\varepsilon/4})$.

Parameters $\alpha = e^{-\varepsilon/4}$, $\theta = \frac{4\Delta}{\varepsilon}$ and $\lambda = e^{-\varepsilon/4}$ suffice.
The condition $\Delta \geq 2/e$ is not essential in the sense that we may always scale the noise by a factor $\Delta$, which means that it is enough to consider sensitivity 1. This also means that $\varepsilon \geq 20$ suffices if we use a scaled Arete distribution.

Figure 2 shows empirical cumulative distribution functions for Arete distributions derived from Lemma 3. The code for generating these plots, as well as all other plots in this paper, can be found on GitHub.†

The following corollary, shown in Section 3.2, says that adding noise from the Arete distribution gives an $\varepsilon$-differentially private mechanism. We refer to Section B.2 for details about differential privacy and the definition of the sensitivity of a query.

**Definition 4 (The Arete mechanism)** Let $x \in X^d$ be an input and $q : X^d \to \mathbb{R}$ a query with sensitivity bounded by $\Delta \geq 2/e$. Given parameters $\alpha, \theta, \lambda$, the Arete mechanism $M_{\text{Arete}}(x)$ samples $Z \sim \text{Arete}(\alpha, \theta, \lambda)$ and returns $q(x) + Z$.

†https://github.com/rasmus-pagh/alt22-code
**Corollary 5** The Arete mechanism $\mathcal{M}_{\text{Arete}}$ with parameters as specified in Lemma 3 has expected error $O(\Delta e^{-\varepsilon/4})$ and is $\varepsilon$-differentially private.

**Discussion of Large Values of $\varepsilon$.** Values of $\varepsilon$ larger than one often appear in practice. Examples of deployments using large values of $\varepsilon$ include Google’s RAPPOR with $\varepsilon$ up to 9, Apple’s MacOS with $\varepsilon = 6$, iOS 10 with $\varepsilon = 14$ (Greenberg, 2017), and US Census Bureau with $\varepsilon$ up to 19.6.‡

These examples are not directly comparable to our setting since they deal with either local differential privacy (data of a single user), or with the release of many statistics (rather than a single aggregate). However, we note that mechanisms in the low-privacy regime can often be “boosted”, e.g. using sampling (Balle et al., 2018) or shuffling (Erlingsson et al., 2019), to obtain a mechanism with a better privacy parameter. If sampling is used to improve privacy we will of course get noise due to sampling error, and this will dominate the total error in most cases. One way to use our result (with secure aggregation) is to essentially match the error of estimating a sum from a sample, getting privacy almost for free when the sample is much smaller than the whole data set.

The lower bound on $\varepsilon$ in Lemma 3 is high, but we note that empirically we achieve differential privacy for significantly lower values of $\varepsilon$ (see Section 5).

2. Related Works

A fundamental question is what can be said about the tradeoff between error and privacy. Hardt and Talwar (2010) study this tradeoff for linear queries, showing a lower bound of $\Omega(1/\varepsilon)$ for worst case expected $\ell_2$-norm of noise (std. deviation) under the constraint of $\varepsilon$-differential privacy for small $\varepsilon$. Nikolov et al. (2013) extend the work of (Hardt and Talwar, 2010) to the tradeoff between error and $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy. For error that can be a general function of the added noise, Gupta and Sundararajan (2010) and Ghosh, Roughgarden, and Sundararajan (2012) introduced the Geometric Mechanism for counting queries (integer valued) with sensitivity 1, showing that the optimal noise has a (symmetric) Geometric distribution with error (standard deviation) $\Theta(e^{-\varepsilon/2})$. Brenner and Nissim (2010) extend these results, showing that for general queries there is no optimal mechanism for $\varepsilon$-differential privacy. In the high privacy regime, Geng and Viswanath (2016b) present a (near) optimal mechanism for integer-valued vector queries for $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy, achieving error (for single-dimensional queries) $\Theta(\min\{1/\varepsilon, 1/\delta\})$ for small $\varepsilon$ and $\delta$. Though the geometric mechanism yields optimal error in the discrete setting, and is infinitely divisible (Goryczka and Xiong, 2017), it does not seem to generalize to a differentially private, infinitely divisible noise distribution in the real-valued setting. Recently, Kairouz et al. (2021) studied a distributed, discrete version of the Gaussian mechanism, which has good composition properties. This mechanism is not aimed at the low privacy regime, and does not have error that decreases exponentially as $\varepsilon$ grows.

Generalizing to real-valued 1-dimensional queries with arbitrary sensitivity, Geng and Viswanath (2016a) introduced the $\varepsilon$-differentially private Staircase mechanism (see Lemma 30), which adds noise from the Staircase distribution – a geometric mixture of uniform distributions. The density function of the Staircase distribution, $f_{SC}$, is a piece-wise continuous step (or “staircase-shaped”) function, symmetric around zero, with geometrically decaying density as a function of the distance from zero. The staircase mechanism circumvents a lower bound of Koufogiannis et al. (2015) on “Lipschitz” differential privacy, which requires the privacy loss to be bounded by $\varepsilon|q(x) - q(y)|/\Delta$, by only bounding the worst case privacy loss for $|q(x) - q(y)|/\Delta \leq 1$.

‡https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2021/2020-census-key-parameters.html
Geng and Viswanath (2016a) prove that the optimal \(\varepsilon\)-differentially private mechanism for single real-valued queries, measuring error as expected magnitude or variance of noise, is not Laplace but rather Staircase distributed: while the Laplace mechanism is asymptotically optimal as \(\varepsilon \to 0\), the Staircase mechanism performs better in the low privacy regime (i.e., for large \(\varepsilon\)), as the expected magnitude of the noise is exponentially decreasing in \(\varepsilon\). Specifically, for sensitivity \(\Delta\) and for the parameter setting of \(\gamma\) optimizing for expected noise magnitude, the Staircase mechanism achieves error \(\Theta(\Delta e^{-\varepsilon/2})\). For the choice of \(\gamma\) optimizing for variance, the Staircase mechanism ensures variance of the noise \(\Theta(\Delta^2 e^{-2\varepsilon/3})\). We note that the \(\gamma\) optimizing for noise magnitude is not generally the same as \(\Delta\) for optimizing for variance. The Laplace distribution has expected noise magnitude \(\Theta(\Delta/\varepsilon)\) and variance \(\Theta(\Delta^2/\varepsilon^2)\). In comparison, the expected noise magnitude and variance of the Arete distribution is also exponentially decreasing in \(\varepsilon\), specifically \(O(\Delta e^{-\varepsilon/4})\) and \(O(\Delta^2 e^{-\varepsilon/4})\), respectively, for our choice of parameters. The expected error and variance mentioned here are for a single parameter setting for both Laplace and Arete mechanisms.

As we want a noise distribution that is implementable in a distributed setting, we limit our interest to noise distributions that are oblivious of the input data and the query output. A nice property of the Arete distribution is that the density function is continuous and so we get a more graceful decrease in privacy than the Staircase mechanism for inputs that are not quite neighboring. We can measure this using the worst case privacy loss, which is the logarithm of the largest ratio between the mechanism’s density functions on inputs \(x\) and \(y\). If \(|q(x) - q(y)| \leq \Delta\), inequality (1) implies that the worst case privacy loss is at most \(\varepsilon\). For inputs with \(|q(x) - q(y)| > \Delta\) this is no longer guaranteed, but it is still interesting to study how the level of privacy decreases as a function of \(|q(x) - q(y)|\). The Staircase mechanism is exactly fitted to the sensitivity of the query such that differential privacy is guaranteed for neighboring inputs, but as soon as \(|q(x) - q(y)| > \Delta\) the worst case privacy loss is immediately doubled. The privacy loss increases in a smoother fashion when applying the Arete distribution due to the continuity of the density function (See Figure 3).

Geng et al. (2015) extend the Staircase mechanism from (Geng and Viswanath, 2016a) to queries in multiple dimensions.

3. The Arete Distribution

This section introduces the Arete distribution and some of its properties. We refer to Appendix B for definitions of probability distributions and differential privacy. The following lemma is well-known from the probability theory literature:

**Lemma 6** If \(X\) and \(Y\) are independent, continuous random variables with density functions \(f_X\) and \(f_Y\), then \(Z = X + Y\) is a continuous random variable where the density is the convolution

\[
f_Z(z) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_X(x) f_Y(z - x) dx = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_X(z - x) f_Y(x) dx.
\]

The following distribution will be useful in defining the Arete distribution:

**Definition 7 (The \(\Gamma - \Gamma\) Distribution)** Let \(X_1, X_2 \sim \Gamma(\alpha, \theta)\) be independent and consider their difference \(X := X_1 - X_2\). We say that \(X\) has the \(\Gamma - \Gamma(\alpha, \theta)\) distribution and the density of \(X\) is

\[
f_{\Gamma - \Gamma(\alpha, \theta)}(t) = \int_{0}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma(\alpha, \theta)}(t + x) f_{\Gamma(\alpha, \theta)}(x) dx = \begin{cases} \int_{0}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma}(t + x) f_{\Gamma}(x) dx, & t \geq 0 \\ \int_{|t|}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma}(t + x) f_{\Gamma}(x) dx, & t < 0. \end{cases}
\]
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Figure 3: Worst case privacy loss of the Staircase and Arete mechanisms (the latter with \( \varepsilon = 6 \)) as a function of the difference between query outputs. As we have no closed form for the density of the Arete distribution, the plot on the right hand side is a numerical approximation computed by discretizing the involved \( \Gamma \) and Laplace distributions and computing the convolution of the discretizations. The privacy loss of the Arete distribution increases rapidly from distance 0 to about \( \Delta/2 \) and then increases more slowly from \( \Delta/2 \) to \( \Delta \) where it reaches \( \varepsilon \). As can be seen the Arete distribution has a smaller privacy loss than the staircase distribution for larger distances \(|q(x) - q(y)|\), suggesting that it in fact adds more noise than necessary.

where the integrals are reduced to the intervals where \( f_\Gamma(t + x)f_\Gamma(x) \) is non-zero.

Lemma 8 The \( \Gamma - \Gamma \) distribution is infinitely divisible: For 2n independent random variables \( X_i, Y_i \sim \Gamma(\alpha/n, \theta) \), we have \( X = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (X_i - Y_i) \sim \Gamma - \Gamma (\alpha, \theta) \).

Proof The result follows immediately from infinite divisibility of the \( \Gamma \)-distribution.

Definition 9 (The Arete distribution) Let \( X \sim \Gamma - \Gamma (\alpha, \theta) \) and \( Y \sim \text{Laplace}(\lambda) \) be independent. Define \( Z := X + Y \), then \( Z \sim \text{Arete}(\alpha, \theta, \lambda) \) for \( \alpha, \theta, \lambda > 0 \). The density of \( Z \) is

\[
f_{A(\alpha, \theta, \lambda)}(t) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma - \Gamma (\alpha, \theta)}(t - x)f_{L(\lambda)}(x)dx = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{L(\lambda)}(t - x)f_{\Gamma - \Gamma (\alpha, \theta)}(x)dx, \quad t \in \mathbb{R}.
\]

Lemma 10 The Arete distribution is infinitely divisible: For 4n independent random variables \( X_{1i}, X_{2i} \sim \Gamma(\alpha/n, \theta) \) and \( Y_{1i}, Y_{2i} \sim \Gamma(1/n, \lambda) \), we have \( X = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (X_{1i} - X_{2i} + (Y_{1i} - Y_{2i})) \sim \text{Arete} (\alpha, \theta, \lambda) \).

Proof The result follows immediately from infinite divisibility of the Laplace distribution and Lemma 8.

Note 1 We remark that we are only interested in \( 0 < \alpha < 1 \). Furthermore, we do not explicitly state the density of the Arete distribution, as there is no simple closed form for the density of the \( \Gamma - \Gamma \) distribution. (It can, however, be expressed in terms of Bessel functions – see (Mathai, 1993).)
A similar intuitive way of defining our distribution would be to use a symmetric version of the \(\Gamma\)-distribution (two halved \(\Gamma\)-distributions put back-to-back at zero), instead of the \(\Gamma - \Gamma\)-distribution. An important property of our distribution is infinite divisibility such that we can draw independent noise shares that sum to a random variable following the Arete distribution. As opposed to our \(\Gamma - \Gamma\) distribution, it is not clear whether a symmetric \(\Gamma\)-distribution is infinitely divisible.

3.1. Symmetric Density Functions

We observe some simple properties of the Arete distribution.

**Lemma 11** For \(f, g : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\), that are symmetric around 0, i.e., \(f(x) = f(-x)\) and \(g(x) = g(-x)\), we have for any \(t \in \mathbb{R}\)

\[
\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x)g(t-x)dx = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x)g(|t| - x)dx.
\]

In particular, the convolution \(f \ast g\) is symmetric around 0.

**Proof** The statement is immediate for \(t \geq 0\), so suppose \(t < 0\). Then for any \(a, b \in \mathbb{R}\)

\[
\int_{-b}^{-a} f(x)g(t-x)dx = \int_{-b}^{-a} f(x)g(|t| + x)dx = \int_{b}^{a} f(-x)g(|t| - x)dx = \int_{b}^{a} f(x)g(|t| - x)dx
\]

where first step is by symmetry of \(g\), the second step follows from integration by substitution and the last step is by symmetry of \(f\). In particular, we may let \(a\) and \(b\) be \(\pm \infty\).

**Lemma 12** \(f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}\) is symmetric around 0.

**Proof** We prove that \(f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(t) = f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(|t|)\) for all \(t \in \mathbb{R}\). Clearly, this is the case if \(t \geq 0\), so suppose \(t < 0\). By Definition 7

\[
f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(t) = \int_{|t|}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma}(t+x)f_{\Gamma}(x)dx = \int_{|t|}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma}(x-|t|)f_{\Gamma}(x)dx = \int_{0}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma}(x)f_{\Gamma}(|t|+x)dx = f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(|t|).
\]

where the penultimate step follows from integration by substitution with \(x - |t|\).

**Corollary 13** \(f_{A}\) is symmetric around 0.

**Proof** The result follows directly from symmetry of the density of the Laplace distribution, \(f_{L}\), and Lemmas 11 and 12.
3.2. Properties of the Arete Distribution

We restate the lemma here for convenience:

**Lemma 14** For any choice of parameters $\alpha, \theta, \lambda > 0$, the $\text{Arete}(\alpha, \theta, \lambda)$ distribution is infinitely divisible and has density $f_A(t)$ that is continuous, symmetric around 0, and monotonely decreasing for $t > 0$.

**Proof** Symmetry of the density function $f_A$ is proven in Corollary 13 and infinite divisibility in Lemma 10. Since $f_\Gamma$ and $f_L$ are continuous, $f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}$ and $f_A$ are also continuous by Lemma 6. We prove that $f_A$ is monotonely decreasing, i.e., for $|t| \leq |t'|$ we have $f_A(t) \geq f_A(t')$. First, we argue that $f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}$ is monotonely decreasing. Recall Definition 7 and observe

$$f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(t) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma}(|t| + x)f_{\Gamma}(x)dx, \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{R}$$

which is immediate for $t \geq 0$ while for $t < 0$

$$f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(t) = \int_{|t|}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma}(|t| + x)f_{\Gamma}(x)dx = \int_{0}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma}(x')f_{\Gamma}(x' + |t|)dx'$$

where we substituted $x' := x - |t|$. So assume $|t| \leq |t'|$. Then, since $f_\Gamma$ is monotonely decreasing

$$f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(t) = \int_{0}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma}(|t| + x)f_{\Gamma}(x)dx \geq \int_{0}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma}(|t'| + x)f_{\Gamma}(x)dx = f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(t').$$

We prove that $f_A$ is also monotonely decreasing: Assuming that $|t| \leq |t'|$ we prove that $f_A(t) \geq f_A(t')$. Recall Definition 9 and observe

$$f_A(t) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(|t| - x)f_L(x)dx = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(x)f_L(|t| - x)dx$$

which is obvious for $t \geq 0$ and since for $t < 0$:

$$f_A(t) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(t - x)f_L(x)dx = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(|t| + x)f_L(x)dx = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(x')f_L(|t| - x')dx'$$

using that $f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}$ and $f_L$ are symmetric and a substitution with $x' := |t| + x$. A similar argument can be made if the convolution is flipped. We conclude that

$$f_A(t) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(|t| - x)f_L(x)dx \geq \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(|t'| - x)f_L(x)dx = f_A(t')$$

using that $f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}$ is monotonely decreasing.

We finally assume Lemma 3 and prove Corollary 5, restated here for convenience. The proof of Lemma 3 is given in Section 4.

**Corollary 15** The Arete mechanism $\mathcal{M}_{\text{Arete}}$ with parameters as specified in Lemma 3 has expected error $O(\Delta e^{-\epsilon/4})$ and is $\epsilon$-differentially private.
**Proof** The expected error bound follows directly from the bound on $\mathbb{E}[|Z|]$ in Lemma 3. For the claim of differential privacy, let $x, x' \in \mathbb{R}$ with $|x - x'| \leq 1$. We show that for any subset $S \subset \mathbb{R}$

$$\Pr[\mathcal{M}_{\text{Arete}}(x) \in S] \leq e^\varepsilon \Pr[\mathcal{M}_{\text{Arete}}(x') \in S]. \quad (2)$$

Let noise $Z \sim \text{Arete}(\alpha, \theta, \lambda)$ for parameters $\alpha, \theta, \lambda$ as in Lemma 3.

Define $S' := S - q(x) = \{s - q(x) : s \in S\}$, then:

$$\Pr[\mathcal{M}_{\text{Arete}}(x) \in S] = \frac{\int_{S'} f_A(z) dz}{\int_{S'} f_A(z + q(x') - q(x)) dz} \leq \frac{\int_{S'} f_A(|z|) dz}{\int_{S'} f_A(|z| + |q(x') - q(x)|) dz}$$

where we used symmetry of $f_A$, the triangle inequality, and the fact that $f_A(t)$ is decreasing for $t > 0$. By assumption $|q(x) - q(x')| \leq \Delta$. Lemma 3 says that $f_A(t)/f_A(t + a) \leq e^\varepsilon$ for all $t \in \mathbb{R}$ and $a \leq \Delta$, and so we get

$$\frac{\int_{S'} f_A(|z|) dz}{\int_{S'} f_A(|z| + |q(x') - q(x)|) dz} \leq \frac{\int_{S'} e^\varepsilon f_A(|z| + \Delta) dz}{\int_{S'} f_A(|z| + |q(x') - q(x)|) dz} \leq e^{\varepsilon}.$$

The first inequality in (2) follows by symmetry. \[Q.E.D.\]

### 4. Proof of Main Lemma

In the remaining part of this section we prove a number of theoretical lemmas, that will help prove our main result, Lemma 3. The bulk of the analysis is the proof of the first bullet point of Lemma 3, showing that the given parameters $\alpha, \theta, \lambda > 0$ suffice to bound $f_A(t)/f_A(t + a)$ for all $t, a \in \mathbb{R}$, $|a| \leq \Delta$. We break this part of the analysis down in this section. The intuition behind the structure is as follows: We first remark that (to the best of our knowledge) there is no simple expression for the density of the $\Gamma - \Gamma$ distribution (see Note 1). Hence, we will show upper and lower bounds for $f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}$ and use these to bound the ratio $f_A(t)/f_A(t + a)$. As discussed earlier, we have not optimized for constants, and as our proof includes several steps of bounding, our analysis may not be tight, thus leading to the high value of $\varepsilon$ required in Lemma 3. A tighter analysis is likely to allow for a better setting of parameters $\alpha, \theta, \lambda$ and a smaller $\varepsilon$. We give the proof of Lemma 3 in Section 4.3.

#### 4.1. Bounds on Density of $\Gamma - \Gamma$ Distribution

We first derive upper and lower bounds on the density function of the $\Gamma - \Gamma$ distribution (see Section B for definitions).

**Lemma 16** For any $t \in \mathbb{R}$ and any $\zeta_\Gamma > 0$

$$f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(|t| + \zeta_\Gamma) c_{\zeta_\Gamma} \leq f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(t) \leq f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(|t|) \quad \text{where} \quad c_{\zeta_\Gamma} := \int_0^{\zeta_\Gamma} f_{\Gamma}(x) dx.$$

**Proof** Recall Definition 7 and Lemma 12 and let $t \in \mathbb{R}$. For the upper bound, we have

$$f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(t) = \int_0^\infty f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(|t| + x) f_{\Gamma}(x) dx < f_{\Gamma(\{|t|\})} \int_0^\infty f_{\Gamma}(x) dx = f_{\Gamma(\{|t|\})}.$$
For the lower bound we have for any $\xi > 0$

$$f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(t) = \int_0^\infty f_{\Gamma}(|t| + x)f_{\Gamma}(x)dx \geq \int_0^{\xi} f_{\Gamma}(|t| + x)f_{\Gamma}(x)dx \geq f_{\Gamma}(|t| + \xi)f_{\Gamma}(t)dx .$$

\[ \blacksquare \]

### 4.2. Bounds on Density of Arete Distribution

In this section we show that for $\Delta > 0$ and setting of parameters $\alpha, \theta, \lambda$ and for large enough $\varepsilon$:

$$e^{-\varepsilon} \leq f_A(t)/f_A(t + \Delta) \leq e^\varepsilon, \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{R}. \quad (3)$$

We remark that by monotonicity of the density of the Arete distribution, if we show (3) it follows that $f_A$ satisfies (1): Take any $a \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $|a| \leq \Delta$ and suppose without loss of generality that $f(t) \geq f(t + a)$ (if this is not the case, substitute $t' := |t| - a$, such that $f(t') \geq f(t + a)$). Then $e^{-\varepsilon} \leq f(t)/f(t + a)$. We prove that $f(t + a) \geq f(t + \Delta)$ ensuring $f(t)/f(t + \Delta) \leq e^\varepsilon$, which finishes the argument: by assumption $f(t) \geq f(t + a)$ and so $|t| \leq |t + a|$, further implying that $t \geq -a/2$. Hence, as $|a| \leq \Delta$ we have $|t + \Delta| \geq |t + a|$ and so we conclude that $f(t + a) \geq f(t + \Delta)$ as wanted.

Throughout the section we assume that $|t| \leq |t + \Delta|$ (and so $t \geq -\Delta/2$). For such $t$, $f_A(t) \geq f_A(t + \Delta)$ and so the first inequality in (3) is immediate. Hence, we put our focus toward proving the latter inequality. If $|t + \Delta| \leq |t|$, the result follows by symmetry of $f_A$ (Corollary 13).

We start with the following lower bound on the density $f_A$:

**Lemma 17** Let $\xi$ and $c_{\xi}$ be as in Lemma 16 and assume $\lambda \leq \Delta/\ln(2)$ for $\Delta > 0$. For $-\Delta/2 \leq t \in \mathbb{R}$

$$f_A(t + \Delta) \geq f_{\Gamma}(|t + \Delta| + \xi)c_{\xi}c_L \quad \text{where} \quad c_L := 1/4.$$  

**Proof** By Definition 9 and Lemma 16 we have

$$f_A(t + \Delta) = \int_{-\infty}^\infty f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(t + \Delta - x)f_L(x)dx \geq \int_{-\infty}^\infty f_{\Gamma}(|t + \Delta - x| + \xi)c_{\xi}f_L(x)dx$$

$$\geq c_{\xi}\int_{0}^{2(t+\Delta)} f_{\Gamma}(|t + \Delta - x| + \xi)f_L(x)dx \geq c_{\xi}f_{\Gamma}(t + \Delta + \xi)\int_{0}^{2(t+\Delta)} f_L(x)dx,$$

where we used that $f_{\Gamma}(|t + \Delta - x| + \xi) \geq f_{\Gamma}(|t + \Delta + x| + \xi) = f_{\Gamma}(|t + \Delta + x| + \xi)$ for $x \in (0, 2(t + \Delta))$ and that by assumption $t + \Delta \geq \Delta/2$ allowing us to remove the absolute value signs. Again using that $t + \Delta \geq \Delta/2$

$$\int_{0}^{2(t+\Delta)} f_L(x)dx \geq \int_{0}^{\Delta} f_L(\lambda x)(\lambda x)dx = \frac{1}{2}\int_{0}^{\Delta} f_{\text{Exp}(\lambda)}(x)dx \geq \frac{1}{4}, \quad \lambda < \Delta/\ln(2)$$

where we noticed that on the positive reals, the density function of the Laplace distribution is $1/2$ times the density function of the Exponential distribution, and used that the median of the latter is $\ln(2)\lambda$, so that the last inequality is true as long as $\ln(2)\lambda \leq \Delta$. Hence,

$$f_A(t + \Delta) \geq c_{\xi}f_{\Gamma}(t + \Delta + \xi)1/4.$$
Defining $c_L := 1/4$ finishes the proof. 

The following three lemmas are technical and give upper bounds for the ratio $f_A(t) / f_A(t + \Delta)$; first for large and small $|t|$ separately in Lemmas 18 and 19 (i.e., for $t$ close to and far from 0, where “close to/far from” is quantified by a parameter $\zeta_u$, which we will set in Lemma 21). We combine these results to an upper bound for general $t$ in Lemma 20 (still assuming $t$ is s.t. $f_A(t) \geq f_A(t + \Delta)$) and finally choose parameters to ensure an upper bound of $e^\varepsilon$ in Lemma 21, thus satisfying the second inequality of (3). Throughout the next three lemmas we make use the variables $\zeta_G$, $c_G$, (from Lemma 16) and $c_L$ (from Lemma 17), all of which will be handled in the proof of Lemma 21.

**Lemma 18** Let $\zeta_u > 0$ be given and assume $0 < \alpha \leq 1$. Let $\zeta_G$, $c_G$, be as in Lemma 16 and $c_L$ as in Lemma 17. Assume $1/\lambda - 1/\theta \geq 1/((\zeta_u + \Delta) + \zeta_G)$ and $\lambda \leq \Delta / \ln(2)$ for $\Delta > 0$. For $-\Delta/2 < t < \Delta/2$ such that $|t| \leq \zeta_u$ we have

$$
\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{e^{(\zeta_G + \Delta) / \theta}}{c_G} \left(1 + \frac{\Delta + \zeta_G}{\zeta_u}\right) + \frac{c_G}{2\lambda c_L} (\zeta_u)^\theta (\zeta_G + \Delta + \zeta_u)^{1-\alpha}
$$

where $c_G := 2 \int_0^{\zeta_u} f_G(x) dx$.

**Proof** The proof can be found in Appendix C.1.

**Lemma 19** Let $\zeta_u > 0$ be given and assume $0 < \alpha \leq 1$. Let $\zeta_G$, $c_G$, be as in Lemma 16 and $c_L$ as in Lemma 17. Assume $1/\lambda - 1/\theta \geq 1/((\zeta_u + \Delta) + \zeta_G)$ and $\lambda \leq \Delta / \ln(2)$ for $\Delta > 0$. For $-\Delta/2 < t \leq \zeta_u$ such that $|t| \leq \zeta_u$ we have

$$
\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{e^{(\zeta_G + \Delta) / \theta}}{c_L c_G} \left(\frac{\zeta_u + \zeta_G + \Delta}{\alpha} + \Gamma(\alpha)\theta^\alpha (\zeta_G + \Delta)^{1-\alpha}\right)
$$

**Proof** The proof can be found in Appendix C.2.

The following lemma combines Lemmas 18 and 19 to give an upper bound for general $t > -\Delta/2$:

**Lemma 20** Let $\zeta_G$, $c_G$, be as in Lemma 16 and $c_L$ as in Lemma 17. Assume $0 < \alpha \leq 1$, $\theta \leq \zeta_G + 1$, $\lambda \leq \min\{\theta / 2, \Delta / \ln(2)\}$ and $\Gamma(\alpha) \leq 1/\alpha$ for $\Delta > 0$. For $-\Delta/2 < t < \Delta/2$

$$
\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{2 e^{(\zeta_G + \Delta) / \theta} e^{\alpha(\alpha \theta + \zeta_G + \Delta)}}{\alpha c_G c_L \lambda}
$$

**Proof** The proof can be found in Appendix C.3.

**Note 2** The fact that $\Gamma(\alpha) \leq 1/\alpha$ for $0 < \alpha \leq 1$ follows from Euler’s definition of the Gamma function,

$$
\Gamma(\alpha) = \frac{1}{\alpha} \prod_{n=1}^{\infty} \left(1 + \frac{1}{n}\right)^{\alpha}
$$

since $(1 + \frac{1}{n})^\alpha \leq 1 + \frac{\alpha}{n}$ for any $n > 0$ and $0 < \alpha \leq 1$. 


We finally choose parameters $\alpha, \theta, \lambda$ ensuring that the ratio $e^{-\epsilon} \leq f(t)/f(t + \Delta) \leq e^\epsilon$ for $\epsilon$ large enough:

**Lemma 21** Suppose $\epsilon \geq 20 + 4 \ln(\Delta)$ for $\Delta \geq 2/e$. Let $\alpha = e^{-\epsilon/4}$, $\theta = \frac{4\Delta}{\epsilon}$ and $\lambda = e^{-\epsilon/4}$. Then for $t \in \mathbb{R}$

$$e^{-\epsilon} \leq \frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq e^\epsilon.$$

**Proof** The proof can be found in Appendix C.4.

**4.3. Putting Things Together**

We restate the lemma here for convenience:

**Lemma 22** For every choice of $\Delta \geq 2/e$ and $\epsilon \geq 20 + 4 \ln(\Delta)$ there exist parameters $\alpha, \beta, \lambda > 0$ such that:

- For every choice of $t, a \in \mathbb{R}$ with $|a| \leq \Delta$, $e^{-\epsilon} \leq \frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + a)} \leq e^\epsilon$:

- For $Z \sim \text{Arete}(\alpha, \theta, \lambda)$, $E[|Z|] = O(\Delta e^{-\epsilon/4})$ and $\text{Var}[Z] = O(\Delta^2 e^{-\epsilon/4})$.

Parameters $\alpha = e^{-\epsilon/4}, \theta = \frac{4\Delta}{\epsilon}$ and $\lambda = e^{-\epsilon/4}$ suffice.

**Proof** The first bullet with the choice of parameters $\alpha = e^{-\epsilon/4}, \theta = 4\Delta/\epsilon$ and $\lambda = e^{-\epsilon/4}$ follow from Lemma 21 and monotonicity of $f_A$ (Lemma 2), as described at the beginning of Section 4.2. The second bullet also follows from Lemma 21, as the expected error of a random variable $Z = X + Y$, where $X \sim \Gamma - \Gamma(\alpha, \theta)$ and $Y \sim \text{Laplace}(\lambda)$, i.e., $Z \sim \text{Arete}(\alpha, \theta, \lambda)$, is

$$E[|Z|] = E[|X_1 - X_2 + Y|] \leq 2E[X_1] + E[|Y|] = 2\alpha\theta + \lambda = \frac{8\Delta e^{-\epsilon/4}}{\epsilon} + e^{-\epsilon/4} = O\left(\frac{\Delta}{\epsilon} e^{-\epsilon/4}\right)$$

where $X_1, X_2 \sim \Gamma(\alpha, \theta)$, and similarly, by independence

$$\text{Var}[Z] = \text{Var}[X + Y] = \text{Var}[X_1 - X_2 + Y] = 2\text{Var}[X_1] + \text{Var}[Y] = 2\alpha\theta^2 + 2\lambda^2 = 2\frac{16\Delta^2 e^{-\epsilon/4}}{\epsilon^2} + 2e^{-\epsilon/2} = O\left(\frac{\Delta^2}{\epsilon^2} e^{-\epsilon/4}\right)$$

with our choice of parameters. Finally, for $\epsilon \geq 1/\sqrt{2}$ (which is significantly smaller than the values of $\epsilon$ that we are interested in), we may simplify to

$$E[|Z|] = O\left(\Delta e^{-\epsilon/4}\right), \quad \text{Var}[Z] = O\left(\Delta^2 e^{-\epsilon/4}\right)$$

thus finishing the proof.
5. Conclusion

In this work we have seen a new noise distribution, the Arete distribution, which has a continuous density function, is symmetric around zero, monotonely decreasing for $t > 0$, infinitely divisible and has expected absolute value and variance exponentially decreasing in $\varepsilon$. The Arete distribution yields an $\varepsilon$-differentially private mechanism, the Arete mechanism, which is an infinitely divisible alternative to the Staircase mechanism (Geng and Viswanath, 2016a) with a continuous density function. The Arete mechanism achieves error comparable to the Staircase mechanism and outperforms the Laplace mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006b) in terms of absolute error and variance in the low privacy regime (for large $\varepsilon$).

Simulations suggest that the constant factors of the Arete mechanism, with parameters chosen as we have described, can be improved (see Figure 4). We leave open the question of finding an optimal (up to lower order terms), infinitely divisible error distribution for differential privacy in the low privacy regime.

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Appendix A. Applications

In differential privacy, two models are prevalent: the central model and the local model. In the central model of differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006a) all data is held by a single trusted unit who makes the result of a query differentially private before releasing it. This is often done by adding noise to the query result. The central model usually has a very high level of accuracy, but requires a high level of trust. Often, data is split among many players, we refer to these as data owners, and a trusted central unit is not available. This setting is commonly known as the local model of differential privacy (Kasiviswanathan et al., 2011; Warner, 1965; Duchi et al., 2013). In this model, each data owner must ensure privacy for their own data, and so applies a differentially private mechanism locally, which is then forwarded to an analyst who combines all reports to compute an approximate answer to the query. For many queries, the overall error in the local model grows rather quickly as a function of the number of players, significantly limiting utility. For example, while we can achieve constant error in the central model (Dwork et al., 2006b), a count query requires $O(\sqrt{n})$ error for
the same level of privacy as in the central model, where \( n \) is the number of players (Cheu et al., 2019). The local model is often attractive for data collection as the collecting organizations are not liable for storing sensitive user data in this model – a few examples of deployment include Google’s RAPPOR (Erlingsson et al., 2014), Apple (several features such as Lookup Hints, Emoji suggestion etc.) (Apple) and Microsoft Telemetry (Ding et al., 2017).

In order to bridge this trust/utility gap, we may imitate the trusted unit from the centralized setting with cryptographic primitives (Wagh et al., 2021), allowing for differentially private implementations with better utility than in the local model while having lower trust assumptions than in the centralized model. Cryptographic primitives ensure that all parties learn only the output of the computation, while differential privacy further bounds the information leakage from this output, and so the combination gives very strong guarantees. We limit our discussion to the problem of computing the sum of real inputs, which is a basic building block in many other applications. If we can divide the noise among all players we can obtain the same accuracy in a distributed setting as in the central model without the assumption of a trusted aggregator. Luckily, we can divide the noise between the players if the noise distribution \( D \) is infinitely divisible, and so the Arete distribution can be applied in this model.

We discuss differential privacy implementations with two cryptographic primitives: Secure Multiparty Aggregation and Anonymous Communication but note that such implementations come with assumptions about the computational power of the analyst, which are accepted by the security community, but limit the privacy guarantee to computational differential privacy (Wagh et al., 2021).

**Secure Multiparty Aggregation**

The cryptographic primitive secure multiparty Aggregation, rooted in the work of Yao (Yao, 1982), has often been combined with differential privacy to solve the problem of private real summation, see for example (Shi et al., 2011; Bonawitz et al., 2017; Chan et al., 2012). Goryczka and Xiong (2017) give a comparative study of several protocols for private summation in a distributed setting. These protocols combine common approaches for achieving security (secret sharing, homomorphic encryption and perturbation-based) while each party adds noise shares whose sum follows the Laplace distribution before sharing their data, in order to ensure differential privacy. Continuing their line of work, we may exchange the Laplace noise in (Goryczka and Xiong, 2017) with Arete distributed noise to achieve \( \varepsilon \)-differentially private protocols with error exponentially small in \( \varepsilon \).

**Anonymous Communication**

Another line of work that has received a lot of attention over the past few years is the shuffle model of differential privacy (Bittau et al., 2017; Cheu et al., 2019; Erlingsson et al., 2019). Along with Google’s Prochlo framework, Bittau et al. (2017) introduced the ESA (Encode Shuffle Analyze) framework where each data owner encodes their data before releasing it to a shuffler. The shuffler randomly permutes the encoded inputs and releases the (private) permuted set of data to an (untrusted) analyst, who then performs statistical analysis on the encoded, shuffled data. For recent work on the problem of summation in the shuffle model and a discussion of error/privacy-tradeoff, we refer to for example (Balle et al., 2019, 2020; Ghazi et al., 2020a, 2021, 2020b). Ghazi et al. (2021) propose an \((\varepsilon, \delta)\)-differentially private protocol for summation in the shuffle model for summing reals or integers where each user sends expected \( 1 + o(1) \) messages. The protocol adds discrete Laplace noise (also sometimes called Geometrically distributed noise) and achieves error arbitrarily
close to that of the Laplace mechanism (applied in the central model), but do not address the problem of achieving error exponentially decreasing in $\varepsilon$ in the shuffle model. The Arete distribution solves this open problem: as it is infinitely divisible, simply exchange the discrete Laplace noise (the “central” noise distribution in the protocol) with the Arete distribution. This yields:

**Corollary 23 (Differentially private aggregation in the shuffle model.)** Let $n$ be a positive integer, and let $\varepsilon, \delta$ be positive real numbers with $\varepsilon = O(\ln n)$. There is an $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differentially private aggregation protocol in the shuffle model for inputs in $[0, 1]$ having absolute error $\frac{1}{e^{\Omega(\varepsilon)\log n}}$ in expectation, using $O \left(1 + \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\log n}\right)$ messages per party, each consisting of $O(\log n)$ bits.

**Note.** By the post-processing property of differential privacy, we still achieve differential privacy if more than $n$ players participate, and so we only need to choose the noise shares based on a lower bound on the number of players in order to ensure differential privacy. Hence, it is not strictly necessary to know the exact number of players in advance.

### Appendix B. Basic definitions

**B.1. Probability Distributions**

In this section we state the definitions and basic facts that we need to analyze the Arete distribution. References to further information can be found in (Goryczka and Xiong, 2017).

**Definition 24 (Infinite Divisibility)** A distribution $D$ is infinitely divisible if, for any random variable $X$ with distribution $D$, then for every positive integer $n$ there exist $n$ i.i.d. random variables $X_1, ..., X_n$ such that $\sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i$ has the same distribution as $X$. The random variables $X_i$ need not have distribution $D$.

We recall the definitions of the distributions that we use to define the Arete distribution and give a formal definition of the latter. Whenever the parameters are implicit we leave them out and simply write $f_{\Gamma}, f_L, f_{\Gamma-\Gamma}$ and $f_A$ for the densities of the $\Gamma$, Laplace, $\Gamma-\Gamma$ and Arete distributions, resp.

**Definition 25 (The $\Gamma$ Distribution)** A random variable $X$ has Gamma distribution with shape parameter $\alpha > 0$ and scale parameter $\theta > 0$, denoted $X \sim \Gamma(\alpha, \theta)$, if its density function is

$$f_{\Gamma(\alpha, \theta)}(t) = e^{-t/\theta} \frac{t^{\alpha-1}}{\Gamma(\alpha)\theta^\alpha}, \quad t > 0.$$  

In the special case $\alpha = 1$, the random variable $X$ has Exponential distribution with parameter $\theta$.

The $\Gamma$-distribution is infinitely divisible: For $n$ independent random variables $X_i \sim \Gamma(\alpha_i, \theta)$, we have $X = \sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i \sim \Gamma(\sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i, \theta)$. Furthermore, for $X \sim \Gamma(\alpha, \theta)$ we have $\mathbb{E}[X] = \alpha \theta$ and $\text{Var}[X] = \alpha \theta^2$.

**Definition 26 (The Laplace Distribution)** A random variable $X$ has Laplace distribution with location parameter $\mu$ and scale parameter $\lambda > 0$, denoted $X \sim \text{Laplace}(\mu, \lambda)$, if its density function is

$$f_{L(\mu, \lambda)}(t) = e^{-|t-\mu|/\lambda} \frac{1}{2\lambda}, \quad t \in \mathbb{R}.$$  

If $\mu = 0$ we just write $\text{Laplace}(\lambda)$. 

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If \( X \sim \text{Laplace}(\lambda) \), then \(|X| \sim \text{Exp}(\lambda)\) and \( \mathbb{E}[X] = 0 \) while \( \mathbb{E}[|X|] = \lambda \). Similarly, \( \text{Var}[X] = 2\lambda^2 \) while \( \text{Var}[|X|] = \lambda^2 \).

The Laplace distribution is infinitely divisible: For 2\( n \) independent random variables \( X_i, Y_i \sim \Gamma(1/n, \lambda) \), we have \( X = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\mu/n + X_i - Y_i) \sim \text{Laplace}(\mu, \lambda) \).

**B.2. Differential Privacy**

Informally, differential privacy promises that an analyst cannot, given a query answer, decide whether the underlying data contains a specific data record or not, and so differential privacy relies on the notion of neighboring inputs: datasets \( x, y \in \mathcal{X}^d \) are neighbors, denoted \( x \doteq y \), if they differ by one data record. The sensitivity of a query quantifies how much the output of the query can differ for neighboring inputs, and so describes how much difference the added noise needs to hide.

**Definition 27 (Sensitivity (Dwork et al., 2006b))** For a real-valued query \( q : \mathcal{X}^d \to \mathbb{R} \), the sensitivity of \( q \) is defined as

\[
\max_{x, y \in \mathcal{X}^d, x \doteq y} |q(x) - q(y)|.
\]

**Definition 28 (Differential Privacy (Dwork et al., 2006b,a))** Let \( \mathcal{M} \) be a randomized mechanism. For privacy parameters \( \varepsilon, \delta \geq 0 \), we say that \( \mathcal{M} \) is \((\varepsilon, \delta)\)-differentially private if, for any neighboring inputs \( x, y \in \mathcal{X}^d \) and all \( S \in \text{Range}(\mathcal{M}) \) we have

\[
\Pr[\mathcal{M}(x) \in S] \leq e^{\varepsilon} \Pr[\mathcal{M}(y) \in S] + \delta.
\]

If \( \delta = 0 \) we say that \( \mathcal{M} \) is \( \varepsilon \)-differentially private.

For more details about differential privacy, we refer the reader to (Dwork, 2008; Dwork and Roth, 2014; Vadhan, 2017).

**Lemma 29 (The Laplace Mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006b))** For real-valued query \( q : \mathcal{X}^d \to \mathbb{R} \) and input \( x \in \mathcal{X}^d \), the Laplace mechanism outputs \( q(x) + X \) where \( X \sim \text{Lap}(\lambda) \). If \( \Delta \) is the sensitivity of \( q \), the Laplace mechanism with parameter \( \lambda = \Delta/\varepsilon \) is \( \varepsilon \)-differentially private.

**Lemma 30 (The Staircase Mechanism (Geng and Viswanath, 2016a))** Let \( q : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R} \) be a real-valued query with sensitivity \( \Delta \). Let random variable \( X \sim \text{SC}(\gamma, \Delta) \) have Staircase distribution with parameters \( \gamma \in [0, 1] \) and \( \Delta > 0 \) such that the density of \( X \) is

\[
f_{SC}(t) = \begin{cases} 
    a(\gamma), & t \in [0, \gamma \Delta) \\
    e^{-\varepsilon} a(\gamma), & t \in [\gamma \Delta, \Delta) \\
    e^{-k \varepsilon} f_{SC}(t - k \Delta), & t \in [k \Delta, (k + 1) \Delta), k \in \mathbb{N} \\
    f_{SC}(-t), & t < 0
\end{cases}
\]

where \( a(\gamma) = \frac{1-e^{-\varepsilon}}{2\Delta(\gamma + e^{-\varepsilon}(1-\gamma))} \) is a normalization factor. Then for input \( x \in \mathbb{R} \), the Staircase mechanism which outputs \( q(x) + X \) where \( X \sim \text{SC}(\gamma, \Delta) \) is \( \varepsilon \)-differentially private.

For optimal parameter \( \gamma \), the Staircase mechanism achieves expected absolute error \( \Theta(\Delta e^{-\varepsilon/2}) \) and variance \( \Theta(\Delta^2 e^{-2\varepsilon/3}) \). We remark that the \( \gamma \) optimizing for expected magnitude of the noise is not the same as the \( \gamma \) optimizing for variance.
Appendix C. Omitted Proofs for Technical Results

Supporting lemmas

Lemma 31 Let $\zeta_\Gamma$ be as in Lemma 16 and $\Delta > 0$. Assume $0 < \alpha < 1$, $1/\lambda - 1/\theta \geq \frac{1}{\kappa + \Delta + \zeta_\Gamma}$. Then $\forall t \geq \kappa \geq 0$

$$\frac{(\zeta_\Gamma + \Delta + t)^{1-\alpha}}{e^{t(1/\lambda - 1/\theta)}} \leq \frac{(\zeta_\Gamma + \Delta + \kappa)^{1-\alpha}}{e^{\kappa(1/\lambda - 1/\theta)}}.$$

Proof The function

$$g(t) = \frac{(\zeta_\Gamma + \Delta + t)^{1-\alpha}}{e^{t(1/\lambda - 1/\theta)}}$$

maximized for

$$t^* = \frac{1 - \alpha - (1/\lambda - 1/\theta)(\zeta_\Gamma + \Delta)}{1/\lambda - 1/\theta} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{1/\lambda - 1/\theta} - (\zeta_\Gamma + \Delta), \quad 1/\lambda - 1/\theta > 0, \quad 0 < \alpha < 1,$$

and monotonely decreasing for $t \geq t^*$. By assumption

$$\kappa \geq \frac{1}{1/\lambda - 1/\theta} - (\Delta + \zeta_\Gamma) \geq t^*.$$

and so $g(\kappa) \leq g(t^*)$. Furthermore, for all $t \geq \kappa$

$$g(t) = \frac{(\zeta_\Gamma + \Delta + t)^{1-\alpha}}{e^{t(1/\lambda - 1/\theta)}} \leq \frac{(\zeta_\Gamma + \Delta + \kappa)^{1-\alpha}}{e^{\kappa(1/\lambda - 1/\theta)}} = g(\kappa).$$

C.1. Proof of Lemma 18

Lemma 32 Let $\zeta_u > 0$ be given and assume $0 < \alpha \leq 1$. Let $\zeta_\Gamma, c_\zeta$ be as in Lemma 16 and $c_L$ as in Lemma 17. Assume $1/\lambda - 1/\theta \geq 1/(\zeta_u + \Delta + \zeta_\Gamma)$ and $\lambda \leq \Delta/\ln(2)$ for $\Delta > 0$. For $-\Delta/2 < t < R$ with $|t| \geq \zeta_u$ we have

$$\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{e^{(\zeta_\Gamma + \Delta)/\theta}}{c_\zeta} \left( 1 + \frac{\Delta + \zeta_\Gamma}{\zeta_u} \right) + \frac{c_L \Gamma(\alpha)\theta^\alpha}{2\lambda c_L} e^{\zeta_u/\theta} (\zeta_\Gamma + \Delta + \zeta_u)^{-\alpha}$$

where $c_\zeta := 2 \int_0^{\zeta_u} f_\Gamma(x) dx$.

Proof [Proof of Lemma 18] Suppose $\zeta_u \leq |t|$. By Lemma 16

$$\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} = \frac{\int_{-\infty}^\infty f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(t - x)f_L(x) dx}{\int_{-\infty}^\infty f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(t + \Delta - x)f_L(x) dx} \leq \frac{\int_{-\infty}^\infty f_{\Gamma}(|t - x|)f_L(x) dx}{\int_{-\infty}^\infty f_{\Gamma}(|t + \Delta - x + \zeta_\Gamma|c_\zeta f_L(x) dx}. \quad (4)$$

Note that $|t + \Delta - x| \leq |t - x| + \Delta$ and

$$|t - x|^{\alpha - 1} = (|t - x| + \zeta_\Gamma + \Delta)^{\alpha - 1} \left( 1 + \frac{\Delta + \zeta_\Gamma}{|t - x|} \right)^{-\alpha}. \quad (5)$$
So filling in the density \( f_\Gamma \) and applying (5), we can write (4) as

\[
\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{t} e^{-|t-x|/\theta} f_L(x)dx + \int_{t+\zeta_u}^{\infty} e^{-|t-x|/\theta} f_L(x)dx}{e^{\Delta + \zeta \Delta} f_L(x)dx}.
\]

Since \( 1 + \frac{\Delta + \zeta \Delta}{|t-x|} \) is maximized for \( x \rightarrow t \), we can bound this term as long as \( x \) is not too close to \( t \). Hence, rewind to equation (4) and treat the cases where \( x \) is far from \( t \) and \( x \) is close to \( t \) separately by splitting the numerator from (4) at the intervals \( x \in (-\infty, t - \zeta_u) \cup (t + \zeta_u, \infty) \) and \( x \in (t - \zeta_u, t + \zeta_u) \) (these intervals are well-defined since \( \zeta_u > 0 \)):

\[
\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{t-\zeta_u} f_L(x)dx + \int_{t+\zeta_u}^{\infty} f_L(x)dx}{e^{\Delta + \zeta \Delta} f_L(x)dx} + \frac{f_{t-\zeta_u}^{t-\zeta_u} f_L(x)dx + \int_{t+\zeta_u}^{\infty} f_L(x)dx}{e^{\Delta + \zeta \Delta} f_L(x)dx}.
\]

where we in the last step again filled in the density function \( f_\Gamma \) and applied (5) in the first two terms and left the last term as it was. Note that the constant \( \Gamma(\alpha) \theta^\alpha \) from the density \( f_\Gamma \) cancels out in the fraction.

Now (still leaving the last term alone), for the first two terms upper bound the factor

\[
(1 + \frac{\Delta + \zeta \Delta}{|t-x|})^{1-\alpha} \leq \left( 1 + \frac{\Delta + \zeta \Delta}{\zeta_u} \right)^{1-\alpha}
\]

and pull out \( e^{\Delta + \zeta \Delta}/\theta \) from the denominator, to see that

\[
\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq e^{(\Delta + \zeta \Delta)/\theta} \left( 1 + \frac{\Delta + \zeta \Delta}{\zeta_u} \right)^{1-\alpha} \left( \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{t-\zeta_u} e^{(t-x)/(\theta)} f_L(x)dx + \int_{t+\zeta_u}^{\infty} e^{(t-x)/(\theta)} f_L(x)dx}{e^{\Delta + \zeta \Delta} f_L(x)dx} \right) + \frac{\int_{t-\zeta_u}^{t+\zeta_u} f_L(x)dx}{e^{\Delta + \zeta \Delta} f_L(x)dx}.
\]

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where in the last step we upper bounded the fraction in the first term by $1/c_{\zeta}^L$ and removed the $(1 - \alpha)$-exponent for simpler notation. The following claim handles the last term and finishes the proof:

**Claim 1** Let $\zeta_\nu > 0$ be given. Let $\zeta^L, c_{\zeta}^L$ be as in Lemma 16 and $c_L$ as in Lemma 17. Assume $|t| \geq \zeta_\nu, |t| \leq |t + \Delta|, \lambda \leq \Delta / \ln(2)$ and $1/\lambda - 1/\theta \geq 1/(\zeta + \Delta + \zeta)$. Then

$$\frac{\int_{t-\zeta}^{t+\zeta} f^L(|t - x|) f_L(x) dx}{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f^L(\zeta + |t + \Delta - x|) f_L(x) dx} \leq \frac{c_{\zeta_\nu} \Gamma(\alpha) \theta^\alpha}{2\lambda c_L} e^{(\zeta + \zeta_\nu + \Delta) / \theta (\zeta + \Delta + \zeta_\nu)^{1-\alpha}}$$

where

$$c_{\zeta_\nu} := 2 \int_0^{\zeta_\nu} f^L(x) dx.$$

**Proof** [Proof of Claim] As $|t| > \zeta_\nu$, $\{0\} \not\ni (t - \zeta_\nu, t + \zeta_\nu)$ and so $f_L(x)$ is maximal at

$$x = \min\{|t - \zeta_\nu, |t + \zeta_\nu|\} = \min\{|t| + \zeta_\nu, |t| - \zeta_\nu\} = |t| - \zeta_\nu.$$

Hence

$$\int_{t-\zeta}^{t+\zeta} f^L(|t - x|) f_L(x) dx \leq f_L(|t| - \zeta_\nu) \int_{t-\zeta}^{t+\zeta} f^L(|t - x|) dx = f_L(|t| - \zeta_\nu)c_{\zeta_\nu}$$

(6)

where we defined

$$c_{\zeta_\nu} := \int_{t-\zeta}^{t+\zeta} f^L(|t - x|) dx.$$  

Now, consider

$$\frac{\int_{t-\zeta}^{t+\zeta} f^L(|t - x|) f_L(x) dx}{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f^L(\zeta + |t + \Delta - x|) f_L(x) dx}.$$  

Recalling the assumptions $|t| \leq |t + \Delta| \lambda \leq \Delta / \ln(2)$, apply Lemma 17 in the denominator and (6) in the numerator, we get

$$\frac{\int_{t-\zeta}^{t+\zeta} f^L(|t - x|) f_L(x) dx}{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f^L(\zeta + |t + \Delta - x|) f_L(x) dx} \leq \frac{f_L(|t| - \zeta_\nu)c_{\zeta_\nu}}{f^L(\zeta + |t + \Delta|) c_L e^{(\zeta + \zeta_\nu + \Delta) / \theta (\zeta + \Delta + \zeta_\nu)^{1-\alpha}}} \leq \frac{c_{\zeta_\nu} \Gamma(\alpha) \theta^\alpha}{2\lambda c_L} e^{\zeta_\nu / \lambda} e^{(\zeta + \Delta) / \theta (\zeta + \Delta + |t|)^{1-\alpha}}$$

where we at (*) filled in the density functions $f^L$ and $f_L$ and used that $|t + \Delta| \leq |t| + \Delta$. In the last step, recall $|t| > \zeta_\nu$, so $|t| - \zeta_\nu > 0$. Applying Lemma 31 (recall $0 < \alpha < 1$ and the assumption $1/\lambda - 1/\theta \geq 1/(\Delta + \zeta + \zeta_\nu)$) with $\kappa = \zeta_\nu$, we get

$$\frac{\int_{t-\zeta}^{t+\zeta} f^L(|t - x|) f_L(x) dx}{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f^L(\zeta + |t + \Delta - x|) f_L(x) dx} \leq \frac{c_{\zeta_\nu} \Gamma(\alpha) \theta^\alpha}{2\lambda c_L} e^{\zeta_\nu / \lambda} e^{(\zeta + \Delta) / \theta (\zeta + \Delta + \zeta_\nu)^{1-\alpha}}$$

$$= \frac{c_{\zeta_\nu} \Gamma(\alpha) \theta^\alpha}{2\lambda c_L} e^{(\zeta + \zeta_\nu + \Delta) / \theta (\zeta + \Delta + \zeta_\nu)^{1-\alpha}}.$$  

\[\square\]
C.2. Proof of Lemma 19

Lemma 33 Let \( \zeta_0 > 0 \) be given and assume \( 0 < \alpha \leq 1 \). Let \( \zeta_\Gamma, c_\zeta_\Gamma \) be as in Lemma 16 and \( c_L \) as in Lemma 17. Assume \( 1/\lambda - 1/\theta \geq 1/(\Delta + \zeta_\Gamma) \) and \( \lambda \leq \Delta/\ln(2) \) for \( \Delta > 0 \). For \(-\Delta/2 < t \in \mathbb{R} \) such that \( |t| \leq \zeta_0 \) we have

\[
\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{e^{(\zeta_\Gamma + \Delta)/\theta}}{c_L c_\zeta_\Gamma \lambda} \left( \frac{\zeta_0 + \zeta_\Gamma + \Delta}{\alpha} + \Gamma(\alpha) \theta^\alpha (\zeta_\Gamma + \Delta)^{1-\alpha} \right)
\]

Proof [Proof of Lemma 19] Suppose \( |t| < \zeta_0 \). By Lemmas 11 and 16 we have

\[
f_A(t) = f_A(|t|) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(x) f_L(|t| - x) dx \leq \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma}(|x|) f_L(|t| - x) dx.
\]

Note that \( f_L(|t| - x) \leq f_L(t) \) when \( |t| - |x| \geq |t| \), which is satisfied whenever \( x \not\in (0, 2|t|) \).

\[
f_A(t) = f_A(|t|) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma - \Gamma}(x) f_L(|t| - x) dx \leq \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma}(|x|) f_L(|t| - x) dx
\]

\[
= \int_{-\infty}^{0} f_{\Gamma}(|x|) f_L(|t| - x) dx + \int_{0}^{2|t|} f_{\Gamma}(|x|) f_L(|t| - x) dx + \int_{2|t|}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma}(|x|) f_L(|t| - x) dx
\]

\[
\leq f_L(t) \left( \int_{-\infty}^{0} f_{\Gamma}(|x|) dx + \int_{0}^{\infty} f_{\Gamma}(|x|) dx \right) + \int_{0}^{2|t|} f_{\Gamma}(|x|) f_L(|t| - x) dx
\]

\[
\leq 2f_L(t) + 2 \int_{0}^{2|t|} f_{\Gamma}(|x|) f_L(|t| - x) dx
\]

\[
= 2f_L(t) + \frac{2}{\Gamma(\alpha) \theta^\alpha 2\lambda} \int_{0}^{2|t|} e^{-x/\theta} x^{\alpha-1} e^{-|t|-x/\lambda} dx
\]

\[
= 2f_L(t) + \frac{1}{\Gamma(\alpha) \theta^\alpha} e^{-|t|/\lambda} \int_{0}^{2|t|} e^{2(1/\lambda - 1/\theta)x^{\alpha-1}} dx
\]

\[
\leq 2f_L(t) + \frac{1}{\Gamma(\alpha) \theta^\alpha} e^{-|t|/\theta} \int_{0}^{2|t|} x^{\alpha-1} dx
\]

\[
= 2f_L(t) + \frac{1}{\Gamma(\alpha) \theta^\alpha} e^{-|t|/\theta} \frac{|t|^{\alpha}}{\alpha}
\]

At (*) we use that \( f_{\Gamma}(|x|) \) is smaller on \((t, 2t)\) than on \((0, t)\). In the last step we used that

\[
\int_{0}^{\kappa} x^n dx = \frac{\kappa^{n+1}}{n+1}, \quad n \neq -1.
\]

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Recalling the assumptions $|t| \leq |t + \Delta|$ and $\lambda \leq \Delta / \ln(2)$, apply Lemma 17 to get

\[
\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{2f_L(t) + \Gamma(\alpha)\theta^\alpha e^{-|t|/\theta}|t|^\alpha}{c_Lc_G \Gamma((\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|))} = \frac{1}{c_Lc_G} \left( \frac{2f_L(t)}{\Gamma((\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|))} + \frac{1}{\Gamma(\alpha)\theta^\alpha \lambda} e^{-|t|/\theta}|t|^\alpha \right)
\]

\[= (\ast) \frac{1}{c_Lc_G} \left( \frac{2e^{-|t|/\lambda\Gamma(\alpha)\theta^\alpha}}{2\lambda e^{-|t - \zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)/\theta(\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)^{-1}} + \frac{\Gamma(\alpha)\theta^\alpha}{\Gamma(\alpha)\theta^\alpha \lambda e^{-|t - \zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)/\theta(\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)^{-1}}} \right)
\]

\[= (**) \frac{e^{(\zeta_G + \Delta)/\theta \lambda}}{c_Lc_G} \left( \frac{e^{-|t|/\lambda\Gamma(\alpha)\theta^\alpha}}{e^{-|t - \zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)/\theta(\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)^{-1}}} + \frac{e^{-|t|/\theta(\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)^{-1}}} {e^{-|t - \zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)/\theta(\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)^{-1}}} \right)
\]

where we at (*) filled in the density functions and at (**) used that $|t + \Delta| \leq |t + \Delta|$. Using the identity $|t|^\alpha = |t|/|t|^{-1-\alpha}$ we see that

\[
\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{e^{(\zeta_G + \Delta)/\theta \lambda}}{c_Lc_G} \left( \Gamma(\alpha)\theta^\alpha \frac{(\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)^{-1-\alpha}}{e^{\theta |t|/\theta(\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)^{-1}}} + \frac{|t|}{\theta(\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)^{-1}} \right)
\]

\[\leq \frac{e^{(\zeta_G + \Delta)/\theta \lambda}}{c_Lc_G} \left( \Gamma(\alpha)\theta^\alpha \frac{(\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)^{-1-\alpha}}{e^{\theta |t|/\theta(\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)^{-1}}} + \frac{(\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)^{-1}}{\theta(\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)^{-1}} \right)
\]

Finally applying Lemma 31 (recall $0 < \alpha < 1$ and the assumption $1/\lambda - 1/\theta \geq 1/(\Delta + \zeta_G)$) with $\kappa = 0$ finishes the proof:

\[
\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{e^{(\zeta_G + \Delta)/\theta \lambda}}{c_Lc_G} \left( \Gamma(\alpha)\theta^\alpha (\zeta_G + \Delta)^{-1-\alpha} + \frac{\zeta_G + \Delta}{\theta(\zeta_G + |t + \Delta|)^{-1}} \right)
\]

C.3. Proof of Lemma 20

**Lemma 34** Let $\zeta_G, c_G$ be as in Lemma 16 and $c_L$ as in Lemma 17. Assume $0 < \alpha < 1$, $\theta \leq \zeta_G + 1$, $\lambda \leq \min\{\theta/2, \Delta / \ln(2)\}$ and $\Gamma(\alpha) \leq 1/\alpha$ for $\Delta > 0$. For $-\Delta/2 < t \in \mathbb{R}$

\[
\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{2e^{(\zeta_G + \Delta)/\theta \lambda}}{\alpha c_G c_L \lambda}
\]

**Proof** We first give the intuition behind the proof: Lemmas 18 and 19 give upper bounds on the ratio for certain values of $t$, assuming $1/\lambda - 1/\theta \geq \max\{1/(\zeta_G + \Delta), 1/(\zeta_G + \Delta)\} = 1/(\zeta_G + \Delta)$. 

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An upper bound on both of these bounds simultaneously gives us a bound on the ratio, which holds for general $t > -\Delta/2$. We note that

$$1/\lambda - 1/\theta \geq 1/(\zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta) \iff \lambda \leq \frac{\theta}{\zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta} + 1,$$

so if $\theta \leq \zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta$, then $\lambda \leq \theta/2$ suffices. Hence, our assumptions $\lambda \leq \theta/2$, $\lambda \leq \Delta/\ln(2)$, $\theta \leq \zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta$ and $t > -\Delta/2$ ensure that we can use Lemmas 18 and 19.

So, by Lemmas 18 and 19 we have for $-\Delta/2 < t \in \mathbb{R}$

$$\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{e^{(\zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta)/\theta}(\zeta_u + \zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta)}{c_{\zeta_{\Gamma}}} \max \left\{ \frac{1}{\alpha c_L \lambda}, \frac{1}{\zeta_u} \right\} + \frac{e^{(\zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta)/\theta} \Gamma(\alpha)\theta^\alpha}{\lambda c_L} \max \left\{ (\zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta)^{1-\alpha}, \frac{c_{\zeta_u} e^{\zeta_u/\theta}}{2}(\zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta + \zeta_u)^{1-\alpha} \right\}.$$

As, by assumption, $\theta \leq \zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta$, we see

$$\theta^\alpha(\zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta)^{1-\alpha} < \theta^\alpha(\zeta_u + \zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta)^{1-\alpha} < \zeta_u + \zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta$$

and so we may simplify to

$$\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{e^{(\zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta)/\theta}(\zeta_u + \zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta)}{c_{\zeta_{\Gamma}}} \left( \max \left\{ \frac{1}{\alpha c_L \lambda}, \frac{1}{\zeta_u} \right\} (\zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta) + \frac{\Gamma(\alpha)(\zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta + \zeta_u)}{\lambda c_L} \max \left\{ 1, \frac{c_{\zeta_u} e^{\zeta_u/\theta}}{2} \right\} \right).$$

Let $\zeta_u = \alpha \theta$ (i.e., the mean of the $\Gamma$-distribution). Recalling that by definition $c_L = 1/4$ and by assumption $\lambda \leq \theta/2$, so $\alpha c_L \lambda \leq \alpha \theta/8 < \alpha \theta = \zeta_u$:

$$\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{e^{(\zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta)/\theta}(\alpha \theta + \zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta)}{c_{\zeta_{\Gamma}}} \left( \frac{1}{\alpha c_L \lambda} + \frac{\Gamma(\alpha)}{\lambda c_L} \max \left\{ 1, \frac{c_{\zeta_u} e^{\zeta_u/\theta}}{2} \right\} \right),$$

where the last step follows from the observation that $1 \leq c_{\zeta_u} \leq 2$ (recall $c_{\zeta_u}$ was defined in Lemma 18) and $e^\alpha > 1$ for $\alpha > 0$.

By assumption $\Gamma(\alpha) < 1/\alpha$, then

$$1/\alpha + \Gamma(\alpha)e^\alpha \leq \frac{2e^\alpha}{\alpha}$$

and so we conclude

$$\frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + \Delta)} \leq \frac{2e^{(\zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta)/\theta}e^\alpha(\alpha \theta + \zeta_{\Gamma} + \Delta)}{\alpha c_{\zeta_{\Gamma}} c_L \lambda}.$$
C.4. Proof of Lemma 21

Lemma 35 Suppose ε ≥ 20 + 4 ln(Δ) for Δ ≥ 2/e. Let α = e−ε/4, θ = 4Δ/ε and λ = e−ε/4. Then for t ∈ R
\[ e^{-ε} \leq \frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + Δ)} \leq e^{ε}. \]

Proof Suppose |t| ≤ |t + Δ|. The first inequality is satisfied as \( f_A(t) \geq f_A(t + Δ) \). Let \( ζ_Γ \) be as in Lemma 16. We turn to prove the latter inequality: In order to apply Lemma 20 we make the following assumptions:
\[ θ \leq ζ_Γ + Δ, \quad λ \leq θ/2, \quad λ \leq Δ/\ln(2) \quad \text{and} \quad Γ(α) ≤ 1/α. \tag{7} \]

We choose parameters satisfying these assumptions towards the end of the proof.

If \( ζ_Γ \) is at least the median of the Γ-distribution then \( c_ζ_Γ \geq 1/2 \). So let \( ζ_Γ = αθ \) be the mean of the Γ-distribution (the mean is an upper bound on the median of the Γ-distribution (Chen and Rubin, 1986)), to see
\[ \frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + Δ)} \leq 2e^{(Δ+ζ_Γ)/θ}e^{ε(αθ + ζ_Γ + Δ)} ≤ \frac{2 \cdot (2αθ + Δ)}{1/2 \cdot 1/4} \cdot \frac{e^{Δ/θ}e^{2α}}{αλ}. \tag{8} \]

Suppose \( α \leq 1/2 \) and recall by assumption \( θ \leq ζ_Γ + Δ = αθ + Δ, \) so \( θ \leq Δ/(1 − α) \). Then \( θ \leq Δ/(1 − α) \leq Δ/α \) and so \( αθ \leq Δ \). We revise our set of assumptions, to also ensure that \( αθ \leq Δ \), and so our set of assumptions is:
\[ θ \leq \frac{Δ}{1 − α}, \quad λ \leq \min\{θ/2, Δ/\ln(2)\}, \quad α \leq 1/2 \quad \text{and} \quad Γ(α) ≤ 1/α. \tag{9} \]

Under these assumptions we have \( 2αθ + Δ \leq 3Δ \) and inserting into (8), we conclude
\[ \frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + Δ)} \leq 48Δ \cdot e^{Δ/θ} \cdot e^{2α} \]
Now define
\[ α = 1/e^{ε/k_α}, \quad θ = kθΔ/ε \quad \text{and} \quad λ = 1/e^{ε/k_λ} \]
Observing \( 2α \leq 1 \) and \( \ln(48e) < 4.9 \)
\[ \frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + Δ)} \leq 48e^{2αΔ}e^{ε(1/kθ + 1/kα + 1/kλ)} < e^{ε(1/kθ + 1/kα + 1/kλ) + 4.9 + \ln(Δ)}. \]

Hence, we ensure that
\[ \frac{f_A(t)}{f_A(t + Δ)} \leq e^{ε} \]
when the assumptions in (9) are satisfied and
\[ ε(1/kθ + 1/kα + 1/kλ) + 5 + \ln(Δ) \leq ε \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad 1/kθ + 1/kα + 1/kλ \leq 1 - \frac{5 + \ln(Δ)}{ε}. \tag{10} \]
Let \( k_\alpha = k_\lambda = k_\theta = 4 \). It is easy to check that the assumptions on \( \theta \) and \( \alpha \) in (9) are satisfied simultaneously for, \( \varepsilon \geq 4 \ln(2) \) (and we can check that \( \Gamma(\alpha) \leq 1/\alpha \) numerically). Furthermore, for \( \varepsilon \geq 4 \ln(2) \), we require \( \lambda \leq \Delta \min\{2/\varepsilon, 1/\ln(2)\} = 2\Delta/\varepsilon \) and so the assumption on \( \lambda \) is satisfied when \( \Delta \geq \varepsilon\lambda/2 = \varepsilon e^{-\varepsilon/4}/2 \). Observing that \( \Delta \geq 2/\varepsilon \geq \varepsilon e^{-\varepsilon/4}/2 \), we conclude that the assumptions in (9) are satisfied for \( \varepsilon \geq 4 \ln(2) \) and \( \Delta \geq 2/\varepsilon \). The inequality in (10) is satisfied for

\[
3/4 \leq 1 - \frac{5 + \ln(\Delta)}{\varepsilon} \quad \leftrightarrow \quad 20 + 4 \ln(\Delta) \leq \varepsilon.
\]

Finally, observe that if \( |t| \geq |t + \Delta| \), the result follows by symmetry of \( f_A \) (Corollary 13). \( \blacksquare \)