The neuroscience of people watching: how the human brain makes sense of other people’s encounters

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Neuroscientific investigations interested in questions of person perception and impression formation have traditionally asked their participants to observe and evaluate isolated individuals. In recent years, however, there has been a surge of studies presenting third-party encounters between two (or more) individuals as stimuli. Owing to this subtle methodological change, the brain’s capacity to understand other people’s interactions and relationships from limited visual information—also known as people watching—has become a distinct topic of inquiry. Though initial evidence indicates that this capacity relies on several well-known networks of the social brain (including the person-perception network, the action-observation network, and the mentalizing network), a comprehensive framework of people watching must overcome three major challenges. First, it must develop a taxonomy of judgments that people habitually make when witnessing the encounters of others. Second, it must clarify which visual cues give rise to these encounter-based judgments. Third, it must elucidate how and why several brain networks work together to accomplish these judgments. To advance all three lines of research, we summarize what is currently known as well as what remains to be studied about the neuroscience of people watching.

Keywords: person perception; social cognition; social interaction; social neuroscience; third-person perspective

According to the social intelligence hypothesis, the ability to quickly detect and understand intricate social relations between other people may have facilitated the evolutionary development of unusually large brains in humans.¹ Despite this fascinating claim, cognitive neuroscientists have rarely studied the brain’s response to relations between people. Instead, much of their work has focused on the perception and evaluation of isolated individuals or their parts, such as a human face or body. Without doubt, this approach has resulted in numerous seminal insights. It has revealed, for instance, that brain regions, such as the fusiform face area (FFA) or the extrastriate body area (EBA), are specifically tuned for encoding the visual appearance of human faces and bodies.²,³ But it has not examined how the human brain analyzes scenarios involving multiple individuals, including their social interactions and relationships. This lack of systematic inquiry may seem surprising, considering that making sense of other people’s encounters is an important human capacity.⁴ As any avid people watcher can attest, observing strangers in each other’s company rapidly prompts numerous social judgments about how and why they have come together.⁵,⁶ In acknowledgment of this phenomenon, psychologists have long studied social impressions from so-called third-party encounters (TPEs). By contrast, neuroscientific research on the perception and interpretation of TPEs has largely been absent. During the last 5 years, however, photographs and video clips of social scenarios including two or more individuals (Fig. 1) have begun to feature regularly in studies using event-related potentials,⁷,⁸ functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),⁹,¹⁰ and transcranial magnetic stimulation.¹¹,¹² But what innovative insights, if any, have this new approach uncovered?
To address this question, we reflect on a growing body of work that explores the neural substrates involved in forming impressions of other people’s encounters. In so doing, we examine the human brain’s ability to analyze and interpret the appearance and actions of multiple individuals simultaneously in order to understand the social interactions and relationships between them. The reader is first introduced to encounter-based impressions from a psychological perspective. Subsequently, we discuss experimental studies that have traced neural responses to TPEs in various well-known brain networks. Finally, we summarize the initial attempts to understand neural variation in response to TPEs in clinical populations. By providing an overview of recent theoretical and empirical approaches on the neural substrates of encounter-based impressions, we aim to highlight their influential role in human social cognition.

In close adherence to our agenda, we do not address the formation of encounter-based impressions in response to hearsay (i.e., in response to verbal descriptions of human encounters received from other people\textsuperscript{13,14}) or the formation of anthropomorphic impressions in response to nonhuman entities (such as geometric shapes) purposefully made to interact in a human-like manner.\textsuperscript{15–18} Although both lines of research probe important variants of encounter-based impressions, they necessarily skip the role played by basic perceptual operations dedicated toward face and body encoding and how these operations determine the course and products of the impression-formation process—an issue that lies at the heart of the phenomenon known as people watching.\textsuperscript{19,20}

**People watching: a psychological perspective**

Over 50 years ago, psychologists began to study how the human mind makes sense of encounters between multiple individuals from a third-person perspective.\textsuperscript{5,21,22} This early work focused primarily on the perception and evaluation of person dyads, as it had been noticed beforehand that humans
gather primarily in sets of two in public places\textsuperscript{23} and spend about half of their social time in the company of just one other person.\textsuperscript{24,25} Besides acknowledging the importance of person dyads in human life, early research on encounter-based impressions was fueled by the realization that these impressions could directly affect the observers’ own behavior. It was demonstrated, for instance, that in busy streets most individuals refrain from penetrating the space between two people whom they consider a meaningful social unit.\textsuperscript{26,27} What was less clear at the time, and what remains a topic of contemporary debate, is the question of what exactly constitutes such a unit from an observer’s point of view.

According to numerous behavioral studies, meaningful social units are usually detected on the basis of overt markers of interpersonal involvement between people, ranging from shared eye gaze, posture mimicry, close physical proximity, and movement synchrony to direct communicative gestures and speech acts.\textsuperscript{28,29} Yet, this prevalent approach of studying the observation and interpretation of human encounters has prioritized the assessment of momentary social interactions over other types of social relations. As a case in point, imagine two people who are waiting at the same bus stop but who are not currently interacting with or attending to one another. Despite this lack of direct involvement, witnessing both individuals together can elicit unique relational social insights. Both individuals may, for instance, look like they share a family resemblance, have a similar racial background, and/or support the same sports team.\textsuperscript{30} The similarity of their actions (e.g., waiting) may further reveal that they share a common goal or destiny (i.e., catching the bus). In short, observing people in each other’s company can prompt numerous inferences that go beyond mere judgments of direct interpersonal involvement.\textsuperscript{31}

In acknowledgment of this circumstance, contemporary psychologists describe and investigate encounter-based impressions as a multifaceted phenomenon that entails a wide range of perceptual, action, and social appraisals.\textsuperscript{4} In terms of perceptual appraisals, for instance, observers of TPEs seem to quickly assess whether co-occurring individuals display salient visual markers of interpersonal relatedness, such as mutual smiles, coordinated movement patterns, or shared social group memberships.\textsuperscript{29,32,33} In terms of action appraisals, they regularly examine whether TPEs entail individuals who engage in independent or joint actions\textsuperscript{34} (e.g., reading versus chatting), in goal-compatible or incompatible actions\textsuperscript{35} (e.g., collaborating versus competing), and/or in positive or negative actions\textsuperscript{36} (e.g., kissing versus pushing someone). In terms of social appraisals, finally, observers often speculate about a TPE’s momentary level of formality, intimacy, rapport, and subordination/domination,\textsuperscript{5,37,38} as well as about people’s overarching type of acquaintance\textsuperscript{39,40} (e.g., whether co-occurring individuals are strangers, colleagues, or friends).

Although it remains uncertain why TPEs prompt such a wide range of inferences in uninvolved bystanders, it has previously been argued that the human inclination to analyze TPEs in elaborate detail may have profited from evolutionary pressures.\textsuperscript{41,42} Considering that humans must interact with both kin and non-kin individuals to survive in the face of adversity,\textsuperscript{43} the careful analysis of TPEs may have helped individuals to decide who to choose as their own interaction partners\textsuperscript{44} (e.g., someone with a history of mutually beneficial social exchanges). Additionally or alternatively, TPEs may have offered (and remain to offer) a unique opportunity for observational learning, allowing those who witness them to widen their own behavioral repertoire without taking personal risks while doing so.\textsuperscript{45–48} Yet, regardless of which factors may ultimately have facilitated the emergence of encounter-based impressions in humans, their unique scope and nature makes these impressions undoubtedly a prevalent aspect of social cognition in present-day life. But what do we understand at this point about how the human brain implements these impressions? Have recent neuroscientific insights on encounter-based impressions helped to falsify or refine existing psychological theories\textsuperscript{49} about them? Or have such insights inspired an alternative view on how the human mind encodes and analyzes visual information about other people’s encounters?

**People watching: toward a neuroscientific perspective**

According to traditional neuroscientific investigations, three brain networks play pivotal roles when people observe and evaluate each other:\textsuperscript{19,50} the person-perception network (PPN), the action-observation network (AON), and the mentalizing
network (MTN). When watching isolated individuals, the PPN is believed to accomplish the visual analysis of other people’s faces and bodies,3,5 the AON is considered to decipher and predict other people’s actions,51,52 and the MTN is understood to infer other people’s invisible mental states (including their beliefs, desires, motives, or attitudes) and personality traits.53,54 Although numerous studies indicate that all three networks also play pivotal roles during the observation and interpretation of TPEs,53–58 their functional significance in the context of encounter-based impressions is less well understood.

This lack of understanding is largely due to the fact that existing neuroscientific studies on TPE processing vary substantially in their methods. In terms of stimuli, for instance, researchers have used various types of media to present TPEs over the years, ranging from still images58,59 to brief sequences of still images60,61 to dynamic video clips.55,62 Furthermore, still images have included color photographs,6,10 grayscale photographs,63,64 and black-and-white schematic drawings.65,66 Video clips have comprised realistic depictions of social interactions,67,68 digital animations of human-like avatars,57,60 and point-light displays and stick-figure displays of human movements.9,69 Finally, whereas many stimuli portrayed target individuals from head/neck to toe,10,12 others showed only people’s upper bodies,55,64 facial expressions,70 or hand movements.11,71

Each of these different sets of stimuli comes with its own limitation(s). Generally speaking, when forming impressions from static full-body photographs (Fig. 1B), observers can learn whether two (or more) target individuals look alike, are in close physical proximity, mimic each other’s expressions and postures, or engage in shared eye contact, interpersonal touch, or direct communication via gestures or speech. But only from dynamic portrayals can they extract the frequency, duration, and coordination of various nonverbal events (e.g., reciprocated smiles) and the degree of motion synchrony and turn taking between people. Given the diversity of stimuli used, it may not come as a surprise to learn that there has been little overlap in terms of brain activity during TPE exposure across studies. This lack of overlap suggests, however, that the presence (or absence) of certain visual markers fundamentally affects the impression-formation process and its corresponding neural signature. In further support of this claim, it has also been shown that the exact same social interactions can prompt rather different patterns of brain activity depending on whether the agents’ eye gaze is visible.64 In light of these findings, both neuroscientific and psychological theories on encounter-based impressions should strive to better define how various face, body, and motion cues that commonly characterize TPEs can affect the course and outcome of perceivers’ inferences.32

Aside from using various types of stimuli, existing neuroscientific studies on TPE processing have also differed substantially in terms of their experimental conditions of interest, including their so-called baseline condition. Whereas some scientists have compared the neural effects of TPEs with those elicited by nonsocial control displays,59,72,73 others have contrasted TPEs and depictions of single individuals11,12,74,75 or TPEs of jointly acting individuals with TPEs of independently acting individuals.56,67,76 Beyond these three major lines of research, various subtypes of joint actions (i.e., interactions) have been pitched against one another. Neural responses have been measured, for example, for interactions characterized by contingent or noncontingent movements between interaction partners,69 for interactions of positive or negative valence,58,77 and for interactions serving primarily instrumental or affiliative goals.6,7 Again, this varied approach has somewhat hindered accumulative insights into how the brain creates encounter-based impressions. Yet by trying to understand the neural effects of different kinds of TPEs, neuroscientists have begun to examine common properties of human encounters (e.g., their degree of instrumentality) that have gone largely unstudied by psychologists. As such, this work indicates that an inclusive theory on TPE processing must integrate both psychological and neuroscientific lines of research to derive a truly comprehensive taxonomy of encounter-based impressions.

In this context, it is also worth noting that the importance of perceivers’ processing goals during TPE observation has attracted more attention in recent neuroscientific studies than in traditional psychological studies. Specifically, neuroscientific studies have prompted their participants to judge TPEs along various different dimensions of relevance, such as their perceptual attributes.

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very little work has explored the PPN.\textsuperscript{55,58,62,76}

Is one individual helping the other?\textsuperscript{29,34}

Depending on which aspect of human bodies, these findings suggest that variations not only in people's actual observations but also in the goals that guide these observations shape the impression-formation process.

In summary, neuroscientific research on TPEs has progressed in many directions during the last 5 years. This progress has raised several important issues overlooked by prior psychological theorizing but has not yet inspired a coherent alternative neuroscientific framework. In particular, the diversity of stimuli used and impressions probed by contemporary neuroscientists make it hard to determine the extent to which the latest neuroscientific findings can be compared with one another and/or generalized to people watching in the real world. In consequence, further work is required to understand how people watchers integrate a wide range of visual cues during naturalistic observations of human encounters to form far-reaching impressions about them. To encourage more systematic research in the field, the effects of people watching on neural activity in the PPN, AON, and MTN are discussed in further detail below. By looking at the neural effects of TPE processing in well-established brain networks, we aim to discover initial patterns of converging evidence that can form a promising starting point for future investigations.

**TPE processing in the person-perception network**

Decades of neuroimaging research have revealed that simply looking at another person recruits a specific set of brain regions widely known as the PPN.\textsuperscript{82,83} The PPN generally allows humans to detect, encode, and analyze the complex visual information that constitutes a person's idiosyncratic appearance and way of movement. The network's key nodes (Fig. 2A) are primarily found in the brain's ventral visual processing stream and respond selectively to human faces,\textsuperscript{84} human bodies,\textsuperscript{85} and human motion.\textsuperscript{86} Depending on which aspect of a person is visible at any given time (i.e., a person's face and/or body at rest or in motion), activity increases in the PPN may be observed in the occipital face area (OFA), FFA, fusiform body area (FBA), EBA, and/or the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS; a region sensitive to dynamic facial and bodily input).

Despite abundant neuroimaging work on how the PPN extracts and recognizes a person's idiosyncratic appearance,\textsuperscript{87,88} very little work has explored the network's contribution to processing encounters among multiple people. Indeed, in comparison with the other two networks discussed in this review, the PPN may have received the least scrutiny in the context of TPEs. This is hardly surprising, considering that researchers interested in this network have just begun to explore how it integrates visual input extracted from different body parts (e.g., how it combines facial and bodily information\textsuperscript{89,90}). Under these circumstances, aiming to understand how visual information is integrated across multiple individuals (if at all) makes for a daunting prospect. At the same time, however, behavioral findings strongly suggest that detecting the presence of a person is facilitated when s/he is engaged in a meaningful interaction with another.\textsuperscript{29,34} These data indicate that even very basic aspects of person perception may be altered when multiple individuals are observed simultaneously.

This possibility raises a number of important questions. For instance, do the same brain regions that implement the visual analysis of isolated individuals also contribute to the perception of encounters between individuals? If so, to what degree (if at
all) is their activity affected by pivotal perceptual, action, and/or social attributes of the encounter itself (e.g., its degree of movement coordination, goal compatibility, and/or level of rapport)? Finally, do regions of the PPN process information from distinct individuals separately and require “higher-order” networks to combine this information or does the PPN itself show signs of integration of visual information across individuals? Although most of these questions remain unanswered, their relevance becomes apparent in light of findings showing that observing TPEs reliably activates the PPN.

Yet very few of the studies that found PPN activity in response to TPEs were explicitly designed to measure it. As a result, several of them compared the processing of scenes with multiple individuals to the processing of scenes without people at all, making it difficult to determine whether the obtained results reflect the observation of human encounters or of people per se. In addition, of those studies that explicitly contrasted portrayals of TPEs with portrayals of isolated individuals, none actually identified regions of the PPN with an independent localizer task. As such, it remains somewhat speculative whether the activations reported (e.g., in the fusiform gyrus or the superior temporal sulcus) are actually part of the traditional PPN. Despite these challenges, converging evidence has begun to indicate that the observation of TPEs, compared with the observation of isolated individuals, enhances activity in two well-defined regions of the PPN: the EBA and the pSTS. Further evidence suggests that observing multiple individuals who engage in joint actions (compared with individuals who engage in independent actions) also elicits an enhanced response in these two regions. In comparison, these types of contrasts have rarely resulted in modulations of activity in other regions of the PPN, such as the OFA, FFA, or FBA (but see Ref. 56 for fusiform activity toward joint actions).
For many neuroscientists, the prominent role of the pSTS during the observation of TPEs does not come as a surprise. The region is often described as part of the PPN, as well as the AON and MTN, and has been declared a hub of the social brain that not only implements the visual analysis of conspecifics but also contributes to interpreting their actions and internal mental states. Further support for the region’s involvement in TPE processing comes from a recent study that looked at brain activity in response to a 30-min movie excerpt. This study adopted a data-driven reverse correlation–analysis approach and found that, along with other regions, the cortex in and around both the left and right pSTS showed a preference for portrayals of multiple individuals over single-person scenes. Importantly, these findings closely resemble earlier results obtained with static line drawings and artificial avatars. Together, they support the notion that the pSTS directly contributes to the analysis of scenarios that involve multiple individuals.

What is less certain is whether activity in the pSTS is primarily sensitive to the number of people visible or to the actual interactions and relations between them. At least one study that localized the pSTS, for instance, did not manage to observe differential activity in this region for still pictures of person dyads that showed people either facing toward or away from each other (but see Ref. 58 for counter-evidence). Yet there is initial evidence that the pSTS distinguishes between dynamic portrayals of person dyads that comprise two people who engage in joint versus independent actions. Further work has revealed that interactions characterized by contingent rather than noncontingent actions elicit stronger pSTS activity and that pSTS responses may be increased in response to negative rather than neutral interactions.

According to additional data, however, comparing negative and positive encounters does not necessarily result in differential pSTS activity and that pSTS responses may be increased in response to negative rather than neutral interactions. According to additional data, however, comparing negative and positive encounters does not necessarily result in differential pSTS activity and that pSTS responses may be increased in response to negative rather than neutral interactions.

In conclusion, although initial findings suggest that at least some nodes of the PPN are vitally involved in processing TPEs, work investigating this phenomenon is still in its infancy. To draw stronger conclusions about whether and how specific nodes in the PPN are involved in the analysis of other people’s encounters, future work should aim to identify these regions in each participant’s brain using standardized localizer tasks before testing their response to various kinds of TPEs. These TPEs should be carefully controlled for low-level visual differences across experimental conditions (e.g., the visibility of facial expressions, full-body shapes, and the level of implied or actually portrayed motion), and participants should be prompted to process each encounter with a standardized processing goal in mind. Finally, researchers should begin to investigate whether the PPN response to various kinds of human encounters can be predicted by an unweighted or weighted sum of the response to the constituent individuals and/or whether it shows nonadditive properties.
TPE processing in the action-observation network

When observing a person in action (i.e., during the exhibition of intentional motor behavior) rather than at rest, not only is the PPN recruited, but also the AON.\textsuperscript{100–103} The AON is widely considered a brain network dedicated to action understanding, and its key nodes include the inferior parietal lobe (IPL), the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and the ventral premotor cortex adjacent to the IFG\textsuperscript{104–106} (Fig. 2B). Though the network’s role during TPE processing also requires further examination, there is initial evidence that dynamic portrayals of TPEs compared with equivalent portrayals of isolated individuals enhance activity in the right IFG and the right premotor cortex.\textsuperscript{57,62,76} As such, there is reason to believe that the AON systematically distinguishes between human actions that involve one or multiple actors.

There is further evidence that watching TPEs of multiple individuals who engage in joint actions recruits the IFG more strongly than observing TPEs of independently acting individuals\textsuperscript{55,56,64} (Fig. 3). These data support the assumption that the IFG is particularly involved in understanding the coordination of actions between individuals. Additional findings substantiating this claim have revealed that the IFG carefully tracks changes in people’s motor behavior in the context of TPEs\textsuperscript{60} and responds particularly strongly whenever two people display directly contingent rather than noncontingent movements.\textsuperscript{69} Initial data even suggest that the IFG analyzes joint actions in terms of their overarching goals. Activity increases in the region have been

Figure 3. Point-light displays showing person dyads that engage in (A) joint actions versus (B) independent actions. To help to distinguish the human form in this illustration, the dots have been linked by full lines. (C) Significant activations in response to watching dyads that engage in joint rather than independent actions in the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the right premotor cortex (PM), the right anterior superior temporal sulcus (aSTS), the left posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), and the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ) (reprinted from Ref. 56. under the Creative Commons Attribution License).
reported, for instance, whenever joint actions serve the completion of an explicit instrumental goal (e.g., carrying a heavy box together) rather than mere affiliation (e.g., hugging each other). In contrast to the IFG, the role of the IPL during TPE processing is less well understood. Though some studies have reported increased IPL activity in response to TPEs of negative compared with neutral or positive valence, others have found no effect of valence or reported the opposite result (i.e., enhanced IPL activity toward positive relative to negative interactions). Interestingly, these conflicting findings may be related to another intriguing observation. At least two studies suggest that IPL activity systematically increases whenever two people enter each other’s personal space. In other words, the IPL may analyze whether two people get physically close enough that they could directly touch (i.e., caress or hit) each other. Given that prior work on valenced TPEs has rarely accounted for potential variations in interpersonal distance across experimental conditions, future investigations are needed to disentangle the relative contributions of variations in valence and interpersonal space on IPL responses. Future work should also examine the dominant view that the AON enables action understanding through simulation. According to this theory, observers make sense of others’ actions by mapping these actions onto their own motor systems. This simulation of other people’s actions is often declared a hallmark of human social cognition. However, when observing scenarios that involve two (or more) individuals, it is uncertain whose actions (if any) observers would map onto their own motor systems. Initial work on the topic suggests that simulation does not disappear in the face of TPEs (as could be intuitively assumed). Instead, motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) indicative of motor stimulation have been found to increase whenever people observe joint rather than individual actions in others (e.g., a person throwing a ball to a partner versus throwing a ball against a wall). However, the work tracking MEPs in response to TPEs has generally portrayed asymmetric encounters between two people in which one (active) individual acts upon another (passive) individual. Given that observers may intuitively take the perspective of the active agent when witnessing such types of TPEs, further research is needed to clarify motor simulation(s) in response to encounters that involve two active partners (e.g., two people greeting each other, carrying a box).

In summary, though the role of the AON during TPE processing requires further investigation, initial findings indicate that the network is highly responsive to coordinated actions between multiple individuals, in particular if these actions unfold between people who are in close physical proximity to each other. What seems unclear, at this point, is whether and how TPE processing in the pSTS and the IFG differ from each other. Though these two regions are traditionally discussed in the context of different networks of the social brain, initial findings suggest that they may show rather similar response patterns in the context of TPEs (see also Fig. 3). Thus, future work is needed to describe commonalities as well as differences between the two in order to enhance our understanding of their unique functional contributions during TPE processing.

**TPE processing in the mentalizing network**

When trying to understand the actions of others, humans frequently rely on attributing invisible mental states (such as desires, motives, intentions, or beliefs) to them. These attributions are widely referred to as mentalizing, and hundreds of neuroimaging studies have explored their underlying neural substrates. Collectively, this work supports the notion of a core network for mentalizing that is activated across a wide range of stimuli and tasks. Its key nodes (Fig. 2C) include the ventral and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC and dMPFC), the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the precuneus (PrC), and the anterior temporal lobe (aTL). For some researchers, the amygdala—a brain region that is structurally and functionally connected with many nodes of the MTN—also forms part of the network (but see Ref. 110 for counter-evidence).

Importantly, in the context of TPE processing, the MTN (including the amygdala) is certainly the network that has attracted the most scientific attention. Numerous studies indicate enhanced activity across all nodes of the MTN toward TPEs compared with nonsocial controls, as well as compared with portrayals of isolated individuals. On the basis of these findings, there remains little doubt that the MTN is particularly tuned toward analyzing the mental states that underlie encounters between multiple individuals. There is further
evidence that activity in the network is strongly modulated by variations in TPEs that concern people’s actions and/or social relationships. The PrC in particular, but also the DMPFC and the aTL, has repeatedly been found to distinguish between person dyads that engage in joint rather than independent actions. Further findings that emerge across different studies are less common. For example, comparing TPEs of positive and negative valence has mainly revealed contradictory results. Even though at least three studies have found enhanced DMPFC activity in response to negative compared with neutral or positive encounters, others have reported null findings or the opposite result. Recent work on the detection of intentional harm in human encounters indicates, however, that simply distinguishing between positive and negative encounters may not suffice to decipher meaningful neural responses. Specifically, converging evidence from fMRI studies and intracranial recordings suggests that the amygdala rapidly responds to the occurrence of intentional harm in interpersonal encounters. Importantly, this change in activity is found even when different types of harmful interactions are contrasted, suggesting that it does not reflect a simple valence effect but the detection of harm that was intentionally caused.

The finding reminds us that the MTN is generally believed to be involved in analyzing other people’s actions in terms of their intentions, desires, and beliefs. Yet very few studies have explicitly manipulated these mental states in the context of TPEs. Furthermore, of those that tried, several may be affected by confounds, as their experimental conditions have rarely been matched in terms of lower-level perceptual attributes (e.g., the frequency of direct touch between individuals) and/or action properties (e.g., behavior valence). Nevertheless, we want to briefly mention some of the work in order to highlight pivotal dimensions along which TPEs can differ once internal mental states are taken into consideration. For instance, early work on human encounters revealed that interactions between people who differ in terms of their authority (e.g., between a boss and an employee) compared with encounters in which such a difference is absent (e.g., between lovers or siblings) elicited enhanced activity in the aTL. Further work indicates that encounters that primarily serve people’s affiliative needs, rather than a well-defined instrumental goal, elicit enhanced activity in the VMPFC and DMPFC. Additionally, there is initial evidence that witnessing changes in a person’s body posture that are accompanied by mental changes (e.g., a father looking up from his newspaper to learn that his son received a bad grade) enhances activity in the aTL, DMPFC, and bilateral TPJ.

The latter result deserves particular attention. It was previously proposed that only the right TPJ is selectively recruited for the attribution of mental states. In the context of TPEs, however, TPJ recruitment is often observed bilaterally and/or specifically in the left hemisphere. In consequence, it has been proposed that the left TPJ is particularly involved in understanding multiple intentions simultaneously. In support of this idea, a recent study that compared neural responses toward human–human interactions (HHI) with interactions that involved only a single intentional agent (i.e., human–robot interactions) revealed significantly enhanced activity toward HHI in exactly one region of the MTN—the left TPJ (Fig. 4). This finding strongly confirms the region’s pivotal role in analyzing interacting minds. Intriguingly, the reverse contrast revealed enhanced activity in the VMPFC and the PrC, illustrating that various nodes of the MTN can respond very differently to the same set of TPEs.

Taken together, as is the case for the PPN and AON, the role of the MTN during TPE processing requires further scientific scrutiny. Initial findings indicate, however, that several nodes of the MTN are particularly responsive toward the mental states of co-occurring individuals. To examine this claim more systematically, future work should manipulate observers’ impressions about the mental states of interaction partners more directly in order to understand their neural consequences.

**Findings in clinical populations**

Accumulating evidence indicates that people with disorders that affect social cognition, such as autism and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, are less accurate at forming encounter-based impressions than typical participants. These findings suggest that differences in people’s encounter-based impressions may capture sociocognitive deficits that accompany various psychological and neurological disorders. Such findings are noteworthy,
considering that there has been little progress to capture these deficits with traditional person-perception tasks. Despite 20 years of research, for instance, it remains uncertain which aspects of face perception (if any) are altered in autism,\textsuperscript{116} including whether the recognition of basic facial expressions of emotions is disturbed.\textsuperscript{117} As such, probing typical and atypical sociocognitive functioning with TPEs promises to provide a particularly fertile avenue for future research.\textsuperscript{118}

Indeed, behavioral paradigms that asked participants to view and assess both static and dynamic encounters between others have already been used to better define the nature of sociocognitive differences in neurodevelopmental disorders, such as autism spectrum disorder,\textsuperscript{114,119,120} fragile X syndrome,\textsuperscript{121} Williams syndrome,\textsuperscript{122,123} and schizophrenia.\textsuperscript{124} Such paradigms have also proven their utility in helping to demonstrate specific social perception and cognition deficits in a few neurodegenerative disorders, including amyotrophic lateral sclerosis\textsuperscript{115} as well as Alzheimer’s disease and frontotemporal dementia.\textsuperscript{125} In combination, these studies suggest that our understanding of a wide range of clinical disorders may ultimately improve by being able to test disorder-specific variations in people watching.
Despite this potential clinical benefit, few neuroimaging studies have studied TPE processing in clinical populations. Those that have, however, have generally focused on differences between the clinical group and a control group in the MTN. Changes in MTN activity during TPE exposure, for instance, have been demonstrated in schizophrenia,\textsuperscript{55,76} forensic psychopathy,\textsuperscript{111} and posttraumatic stress disorder.\textsuperscript{68} Most recently, however, it was shown that idiosyncratic patterns of brain activity during TPE processing throughout the brain can signal substantial deficits in sociocognitive functioning. Specifically, participants with autism spectrum disorder and age- and IQ-matched controls were asked to freely watch a television episode that depicted “constant social interactions that often required perceiving and interpreting subtle, rapidly changing, nuances of facial expressions, body language, and dialogue” (p. 5839) while undergoing fMRI.\textsuperscript{126} This task revealed less consistent correlations in neural activity patterns during television consumption across individuals of the autism group, an effect that depended mainly on the activity seen in five individuals in this group. Additional analyses demonstrated that these five individuals also struggled more than the remaining participants with understanding the interpersonal motives and intentions of the depicted TV characters.

To the best of our knowledge, the above finding is the first to directly link neural abnormalities during TPE processing to specific sociocognitive deficits. On the basis of this seminal result, it seems rather uncontroversial to assume that gaining a better understanding of the brain regions involved in perceiving and understanding TPEs will aid researchers in their attempt to understand common sociocognitive deficits that characterize numerous clinical disorders. At the same time, pinpointing differences in brain activity and/or structure that accompany deficits (or strengths!) in social perception and cognition promise to also directly inform our understanding of the typical structure and function of the social brain.

**Concluding remarks and future directions**

To conclude, people watching entails the continuous analysis of multiple human faces, bodies, and movements in order to understand the course and purpose of social interactions and relations. By describing what is currently known about the neural effects of people watching in three central networks of the social brain, we aimed to emphasize that making sense of multiple individuals frequently differs and goes beyond forming impressions about isolated individuals. While studying many different portrayals of human encounters in the past has elucidated the wide range of visual signals observers can use to form impressions about others, we advocate for a more systematic (i.e., theory-driven and data-driven) approach in future research.

Moving forward, we believe, the field must aspire to use naturalistic portrayals of human encounters more frequently in order to understand the relevance and interplay of various visual markers that determine the type of impressions observers form when witnessing others.\textsuperscript{93} At the same time, however, the field should also carefully manipulate these markers in order to learn how exactly they affect observers’ psychological and neural responses toward TPEs\textsuperscript{64} and control the tasks that people perform during TPE exposure\textsuperscript{53} in order to delineate which patterns of neural activity generalize across or depend on certain kinds of perceptual, action, or social judgments.

We are further convinced that future research could greatly profit from the use of well-established localizer tasks to better understand how various types of TPEs recruit previously defined brain networks (such as the PPN, AON, and MTN). By localizing brain regions of prior theoretical relevance, neuroscientists could not only determine the degree to which the observation and evaluation of TPEs relies on well-known neural structures but also whether their processing engages additional neural substrates.\textsuperscript{79} For instance, numerous papers, as discussed in this review, seem to have come across unexpected yet prevalent activation of the middle temporal gyrus during TPE exposure.\textsuperscript{10,56,65,66,76,77} This finding acts as an important reminder that observing and understanding human encounters may recruit neural substrates that the current review has failed to address.

In acknowledgment of this concern, the development of new localizer tasks that capture the most common brain activity during TPE processing in a standardized manner may also be helpful. Bespoke localizer tasks can certainly facilitate the comparison of neuroscientific findings across individuals and studies,\textsuperscript{127} yet their purpose must be clearly defined. For those interested in learning more about
the perceptual encoding of TPEs, for instance, a simple n-back detection task resembling a standard face localizer\textsuperscript{128} but presenting images of isolated person targets and images of (interacting and noninteracting) person dyads and their scrambled controls may be a good starting point. By contrast, for those interested in examining encounter-based inferences (e.g., social impressions), a categorization task that prompts participants to explicitly classify the same set of person dyads according to their social qualities (e.g., low versus high dyadic intimacy) as well as action properties (e.g., joint versus independent actions) may be more fitting.\textsuperscript{81} As such, the development of useful TPE localizers poses an interesting challenge for the field.

Equally relevant is the challenge of applying ongoing methodological advances in the neurosciences to the study of encounter-based impressions.\textsuperscript{129} In terms of fMRI-based research, for example, it seems crucial to expand the repertoire of analyses beyond standard approaches (such as univariate whole-brain contrasts). Additional methods, such as effective connectivity analysis\textsuperscript{118} or multivariate pattern analysis,\textsuperscript{90} are likely to reveal not only which brain regions are co-active during a given task but also which of these regions form functional networks, by directly aligning their activity and/or representations over time. Furthermore, intersubject correlation methods promise to be particularly important in discovering developmental or clinical changes in encounter-based impressions. By being able to assess how idiosyncratic an individual’s brain response during TPE exposure actually is,\textsuperscript{126} such methods promise to lend themselves well to answering pressing questions like “how adult-like is a person’s brain response at a specific age?” “how typical is a person’s brain response compared with a relevant control group?” and “how predictive of specific social skills is a person’s brain response?”

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that much prior work on TPEs, as well as this review, has focused almost exclusively on the processing of human encounters between two individuals. While we believe that understanding the psychological and neural processes involved in the processing of person dyads is of particular importance in the context of human social cognition,\textsuperscript{130} forming impressions of even larger human gatherings also deserves further investigation.\textsuperscript{131–133} By establishing whether systematic differences in brain activity exist based on observing social units of different sizes, important boundary conditions for the different neural networks (or their interplay) may be discovered.

In conclusion, we suggest that, by learning more about how the human brain transforms mere perceptual signals of multiple individuals into far-reaching impressions about them, we may not only develop a neuroscientific framework of people watching that helps to advance psychological insights on the topic, but also improve our ability to assess and predict sociocognitive deficits in numerous psychological and neurological disorders. It is this promise, after all, that turns a seemingly mundane everyday activity like people watching into a fascinating topic of multidisciplinary inquiry.

Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.

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