Transition in Pakistani Political Norms of Society and Corruption

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The Messenger of ALLAH Almighty, the Holy Prophet MUHAMMAD (peace be upon him) has said "Ar-Rashi Wal Mursati Kila huma Finnar" that mean “the giver and taker of bribes (corrupt) will both go to the fire of hell”. This research analyzes corruption’s effect on existing social values in Peshawar region of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. A total of 150 respondents were selected as sample using stratified random sampling technique for study using Likert scale as measurement tool in interview schedule. The bi-variate and uni-variate analyses were made for reaching results. The existence of the effect of “corruption perception” as independent variable’s effects were assessed on the “social values in political institutions” as dependent variable by applying Chi-square test. Furthermore, Gamma (γ) statistics’ application was made for finding the bond and relationship’s direction. It was concluded that a significant association prevails regarding corruption perception with organized corruption alliance between government servants and politicians (P=0.002), politicians who are corrupt do safeguard corrupt interests (P=0.000) and favoured political environment (P=0.000). Moreover, posting candid politicians on significant government posts (P=0.000), removing political influence from bureaucracy (P=0.000), making politicians accountable to agencies related to stopping corruption (P=0.000), recompensing politicians of honesty (P=0.033), sensitizing politicians to be aware of corruption (P=0.000) and applying court’s judgements regarding reducing corruption (P=0.000) were found significantly associated with improving state of corruption.

Key Words: Corruption, Social, Values, Political and Politicians

Introduction

Corruption is “the integrity’s alteration during performance of public duties for
undue personal interests”. It is diagnosed by political researchers as something incorrect with the government’s political system (Awan, 2004). Global assessments express that almost 1 trillion US$ is given as bribe every year. Such a condition of corruption weakens societal social values, cause instability and insecurity for masses. Hence, significant struggle is needed for controlling corruption which can raise per capita income nearly 400 times. Economists consider corruption as significant the highest blockade to development and growth (World Bank, 2004). Political institutions are of immense importance in discharging government responsibilities through acknowledgement of rules and regulations prevalent within relative states. The political domain is composed of government service structures, legislative and judiciary bodies, all working towards the establishment of citizen behavior through implementation of laws. Any society with a relaxed administrative setup is often unable to prevent the corrupt practices (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997), and can result in government officials devising strategies whereby clients are increasingly forced to pay bribes. This becomes possible because of administrative delays, the design and practice of complicated procedures and ensuring that there are few, if any, contradictory regulations created to resist any reform. The degradation of social value systems in politics can result in an essentially criminalized political system where law-breakers become law-makers. This can be seen, for example, where young people are encouraged to follow politicians and media stars as role models, and where such role models are seen to exert corruptive power.

A model devised by Cadot, (1987) on corruption describes how government official involvement in granting of permits and how parliamentary candidates requesting such a permit have to pay for it. While bribery is a socially forbidden act, the involvement in bribery through exchange (rather than money) in carrying out different tasks by involving third party makes discerning this process more complicated. How to protect such interactions between beneficiaries involved in this practice has also become more sophisticated, as, for example, it has been recently noticed in Mexico (Lomnitz, 1988). A poor and weak government is liable to corruption, therefore the improvement in governance through strengthening of parliamentary processes, the executive and the judiciary becomes essential (Izzud-Din, 2009). The growth of strong ethical basis where role models and benchmarks guide society is the cry of the day (Vittal, 2005). World-wide decline in trust of public leadership and public institutions can be attributable not only to poor leadership but also to the perceived evolution of corruption and political dishonesty (Nye, 1997). Politicians usually ‘buy’ votes in elections by ‘trickling down’ varying types of favoritisms consisting jobs and subsequent government works once in a State. These favors are reciprocated from different classes of society (supporters) through preserving support to these politicians as a sign of faithfulness and subordination (Lomnitz, 1988). It has been argued that both the actors involved in this corrupt activity can then be influenced further, say, for example, by the
involvement of mafia activities, or in their capacity to pay illegal taxes for their help because of insecure property rights.

These corruptive practices can act to embolden the existing leadership to continue with such practices, rather than working to achieve equity and an egalitarian society, and as Gambetta (1993) points out, with a situation which lingers with uncertainty can support corruption thereby favoring the leading elites in a society. There has also been Marxist modeling that highlights how the rulers and elites of corrupt regimes can be viewed as puppets of multinational companies and other, more powerful governments. In this sense they serve as tools for such governments in achieving their own interested aims (Blomström & Hettne, 1984). The concentration of power in few hands can be seen as the main cause of emergence of corruption, as a centralized power structure empowers the few to accumulate wealth and sustain political hegemony while keeping the poor classes focused on their concerns about day to day living. Any country without a democratic power sharing framework would most likely experience a high concentration of corruption as a political system devoid of democratic norms does carry in itself insufficient checks and balances in power, authority, answerability and transparency in institution and official procedure of governance. This becomes a highly authoritarian approach resulting in corruption beyond control of any institution such as of judiciary or police (Fatton, 1992; Enemu, 2000; Doig & Theobald, 2000; Anmundsen, 1999).

The civil service structure of society is of an essential importance (Verheijen & Dimitrova, 1997) as significant reason of corruption in civil services include lack of civil service law and policy, random organizational dislocation because of change in political leadership and non-existence of anticorruption frameworks based on ethical codes of conduct. The essential duties of a state are to provide an atmosphere of rule of law, transparency, justice, trust and honesty are values that reinforce democracy. Governments are also responsible to ensure that audit systems are in place and supported (Murray, 1997; Lui, 1986). Informal institutions in civil societies such as religious institutions can be used as tools to control potential class resistance amongst the poor. The ruling class permits local elites to maintain corrupt practices and thereby accumulate resources for both personal self-enrichment and for maintenance of the power structure. This approach can be then used widely to maintain corrupt state practices. Inappropriate employment of public servants, self-contradictory and complex rules of business, weak delivery of services and poor system of monitoring of administration appeal corruption (Khan, 2001). Since independence the corruption became a significant problem in Pakistan (National Accountability Bureau, 2007), having strong basis (Noman, 1988) graded as worse than average internationally (Mauro, 1995). Rose-Ackerman and Stone (1996) have said that economic development is obstructed by weak governance. In Pakistan, corruption phenomenon is displaying hassle,
harassment, delays and red-tapism in achieving legal jobs providing lesser incentives for good achievements (Murray-Rust & Velde, 1994).

**Significance of Research**

Corruption and malpractices cause a greater setback to process of growth and development in a country, particularly in developing countries like Pakistan. Usually, the state’s governance at large is in the hands of politicians that are legislators, ministers, institutional heads, who can affect the performance of institutions significantly. The politicians around the world are associated to certain political parties and groups, with their manifestos and ideological supporters, or motive supporters, therefore they could be influenced for political wins. Further to it, the contemporary political practices and norms has a lot to do with the political processes in a country, especially in Pakistan, wherein there are general corruption cases linked with politicians, who has a lot to do with and affect the political and governance scenario of the country. These all factors make the research study significant, for individuals, institutions, society, and for the state.

**Methods and Materials**

This research was conducted in Peshawar City. A technique devised by Sekaran (2003), sample sized of hundred and fifty (150) respondents was interviewed. It was assumed “leaders of a community may be tried to observe changes in that community”, the sample was categorized based on Academicians, Religious Scholars and Anti-Corruption staff; the guardians of vibrant authority and hence forecasting the social value of change of a particular community.

The Likert scale was used while preparing list of questions. The “corruption perception” as dependent variable was indexed to measure the level of association with “political aspects of social values” as independent variable. This bi-variate level association was tested using Chi-square test defined by Tai (1978) shown below:

\[
(\chi^2) = \frac{\sum \sum (f_{ij} - F_{ij})^2}{F_i F_j F_{ij}}
\]

The assumptions for the \((\chi^2)\) test were that the samples for every segment were independently and randomly selected, these segments are independent, and each observation will meet requirements for only one segment. Furthermore, size of sample should be fairly big so that no probable frequency may be smaller to 5, for \(r \text{ and } c > 2\) or \(<10\), if \(r = c = 2\). These assumptions, hence, were disrupted many times during analysis and hence, the Fisher Exact Test which is also termed as Exit Chi-square Test has been applied in place of simple Chi-Square, for controlling disruption of Chi-Square expectations. The link developed by Fisher to cover such
deviance is provided in equation given by Baily (1982).

\[
\text{Fisher Exit Test Probability} = \frac{(a+b)! (c+d)! (a+c)! (b+d)!}{N! a! b! c! d!}
\]

**Gamma**

Gamma statistics has been utilized in measuring direction and strength of association between dependent and independent variables as devised by Nachmias & Nachmias, (1992).

\[
\text{Gamma (} \gamma \text{)} = \frac{\text{NS} - \text{ND}}{\text{NS} + \text{ND}}
\]

NS=Same order pair
ND= Different order pair

**Results And Discussions**

**Political Facets of Corruption**

Perception of corruption pertaining to political institutions, in this study, was limited to few statements, attributing to corruption in its association with protection of corruption, political favors, personal interest, corruption alliance of politicians and officials, hurdles to honesty etc.

**Table 1. Responses Regarding Corruption and Political Values (N=150)**

| Statements on Corruption and Political Values | Strongly disagree | Disagree | Uncertain | Agree     | Strongly Agree |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------|----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|
| Corruption is being safeguarded by corrupt politicians for their vested interests | 0 (0)             | 2 (1.3)  | 1 (0.7)   | 32 (21.3) | 115 (76.7)    |
| The favor seeking and political preference environment generate corruption | 0 (0)             | 1 (0.7)  | 2 (1.3)   | 51 (34)   | 96 (64)       |
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| Some groups of corrupt politicians and government servants organize corruption | 13 (8.7) | 6 (4) | 17 (11.3) | 45 (30) | 69 (46) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Politicians who reject corruption and bribe are facing problems from corrupt officers and colleagues | 0 (0) | 23 (15.3) | 14 (9.3) | 68 (45.3) | 45 (30) |
| Politicians having high ethical standards and are having significant positions in government can decrease corruption | 0 (0) | 1 (0.7) | 8 (5.3) | 58 (38.7) | 83 (55.3) |
| The government reward those politicians who reject corruption and bribe | 11 (7.3) | 73 (48.7) | 39 (26) | 15 (10) | 12 (8) |
| The accountability of politician toward anticorruption agencies can decrease | 1 (0.7) | 9 (6) | 14 (9.3) | 70 (46.7) | 56 (37.3) |
| The government service training oriented toward civil values for politicians can reduce corruption | 0 (0) | 3 (2) | 31 (20.7) | 107 (71.3) | 9 (6) |
| Removing political pressure from bureaucracy can reduce corruption | 1 (0.7) | 10 (6.7) | 27 (18) | 80 (53.3) | 32 (21.3) |
| The decisions of court against corrupt politicians should be ensured as values in culture | 0 (0) | 2 (1.3) | 32 (21.3) | 73 (48.7) | 43 (28.7) |

As shown in Table-1, majority (98%) respondents agreed that corrupt politicians protect corruption for their personal interest, 98% agreed with that the political preference environment causes corruption, 76% supported view that corruption occurs through groups of corrupt government servants and politicians, 75.3% acknowledged that politicians who reject bribe are obstructed by corrupt officers
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and colleagues, 94% held perception that the ethically good officers appointed at important positions in government can curb corruption, 56% disagreed that politicians that reject bribes are compensated by government, 84% agreed that by making politicians accountable to agencies of anticorruption can decrease corruption, 77.3% reinforced that government service training of politicians sensitize them regarding public values and could diminish corruption, 74.6% said that removing political pressure from bureaucracy can diminish corruption, 77.4% supported that court decisions against corrupt politicians may be enforced to reduce corruption.

The findings could feature regarding existence of a meager political system i.e. the politicians are rarely made accountable for misconducts they made. The practice of implementing punishment and reward by institutions, especially by courts is too meager. It is appeared that either courts have not significantly performed regarding discharge of their duties in controlling political behavior or bureaucracy highhanded with other forces in making judiciary ineffective. There remains always dire need of ensuring constitutional supremacy in all angles of morality which may ultimately strengthen institutions. The institutional structure grounded on consistently framing laws can ensure a mechanism in politics and economy of check and balance in order to control corrupt practices. The matching findings were reached by Amundsen (1997) i.e. the politicians that are the core recipients of government systems are not serious in changing systems that are based on corruption, and elimination of corruption in prevailing condition do works mere as political statements, missing firm intention from government’ side. Lomnitz (1988) expressed that the resources are trickled down from those of superior status to those of inferior status in political corruption. And in response it is expected that they will get affiliation of long-lasting nature with voters, political support, loyalty, and votes grows ensuing a long-term group of supporters, which is utilized for getting and preserving status and political power. Fatton (1992) argued that in poor autocratic states the governments became inimitable, possessed by overriding class overriding weaker classes. Through corruption the resources are accumulated for which coalitions are formed with informal groups in community. Vittal (2005) argued that due to social values downfall the politicians are turned into criminals executing system through media and their allies support.

Gambetta (1993) said that dishonest governments and its establishments loot masses, particularly in war hit regions, leadership neither take interest in bringing stability nor fight to conquer. In this condition corruption will appear as mafia reinforced by corrupt people to meet their unlawful personal benefits utilizing its machinery. Klitgaard (1988) necessitated effectiveness of monitoring of governmental agencies for uplifting its performance. Enemu (2000) proclaimed that in a centralized power mechanism the class in power do exploit resources while keeping people in problems and worries for their rudimentary needs. The condition pushes for governmental transparency that makes illegal acts hard to
happen and may enhance the social pressure’s efficiency that may curb dishonesty. Mookherjee and Png (1995) argued that in order to assess corruption’s cost both the features are important to mention i.e. possibility for detecting corruption that is linked to firmness of monitoring system and the volume of penalty that is related to judicial and law enforcement systems. Izzud-Din (2009) stated that hopes of getting better from a meager and corrupt government are useless. There is necessity of improving governance by solidification of parliament, judiciary and executive. Pope (1997) argued that government programs, law enforcement, government reforms, awareness rising, community responsiveness, formation and trainings of organization for stopping corruption are essential for modifying attitude at all levels.

**Association between Corruption and Political Values**

For testing association of political norms and values with corruption, perception of these variables was restricted to few particular statements. Data on association in Table-2 is described below.

**Table 2. Association between Corruption and Political Values**

| Political Angles of Social Values | Attitude | Corruption Perception | Total | Statistics (P Value) |
|----------------------------------|----------|-----------------------|-------|---------------------|
|                                  |          | Strongly disagree | Disagree | Uncertain | Agree | Strongly Agree |       |                     |
| Corrupt politicians safeguard corruption in their personal interest | Disagree  | 1 (0.7) | 0 (0) | 1 (0.7) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 2 (1.3) | $\chi^2 = 93.825$ (0.000) |
|                                  | Uncertain | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 1 (0.7) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 1 (0.7) | $\gamma = +0.562$ |
|                                  | Agree     | 0 (0) | 1 (0.7) | 9 (6) | 16 (10.7) | 6 (4) | 32 (21.3) |  |
|                                  | Strongly Agree | 0 (0) | 1 (0.7) | 12 (8) | 91 (60.7) | 11 (7.3) | 115 (76.7) |  |
| Environment of political         | Disagree  | 1 (0.7) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 1 (0.7) | $\chi^2 = 167.64$ |
## Preference and Favor Causes Corruption

|                      | Uncertain | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 2 (1.3) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 2 (1.3) | (0.000) | $\gamma = +0.423$ |
|----------------------|-----------|-------|-------|---------|-------|-------|---------|---------|------------------|
| Agree                | 0 (0)     | 1 (0.7)| 12 (8) | 31 (20.7)| 7 (4.7)| 51 (34) |
| Strongly Agree       | 0 (0)     | 1 (0.7)| 9 (6) | 76 (50.7)| 10 (6.7)| 96 (64) |

### Corruption Organized in Groups of Corrupt Politicians and Public Servants of Various Cadres Needing Better Rewards

|                      | Uncertain | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 4 (2.7) | 13 (8.7) | 0 (0) | 17 (11.3) | $\chi^2 = 36.944$ (0.002) | $\gamma = -0.120$ |
|----------------------|-----------|-------|-------|---------|---------|-------|-----------|-----------------------------|------------------|
| Strongly disagree    | 0 (0)     | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 13 (8.7) | 0 (0) | 13 (8.7) |
| Disagree             | 1 (0.7)   | 0 (0) | 2 (1.3) | 3 (2.0) | 0 (0) | 6 (4) |
| Uncertain            | 0 (0)     | 0 (0) | 4 (2.7) | 13 (8.7) | 0 (0) | 17 (11.3) |
| Agree                | 0 (0)     | 1 (0.7) | 7 (4.7) | 29 (19.3) | 8 (5.3) | 45 (30) |
| Strongly Agree       | 0 (0)     | 1 (0.7) | 10 (6.7) | 49 (32.7) | 9 (6) | 69 (46) |

### Politicians that Reject Bribe Are Hurdled by Corrupt Colleagues and Officers

|                      | Uncertain | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 3 (2.0) | 19 (12.7) | 0 (0) | 23 (15.3) | $\chi^2 = 13.017$ (0.368) | $\gamma = +0.016$ |
|----------------------|-----------|-------|-------|---------|---------|-------|---------|-----------------------------|------------------|
| Disagree             | 1 (0.7)   | 0 (0) | 3 (2.0) | 19 (12.7) | 0 (0) | 23 (15.3) |
| Uncertain            | 0 (0)     | 0 (0) | 3 (2.0) | 9 (6) | 2 (1.3) | 14 (9.3) |
| Agree                | 0 (0)     | 1 (0.7) | 12 (8) | 44 (29.3) | 11 (7.3) | 68 (45.3) |
| Strongly Agree       | 0 (0)     | 1 (0.7) | 5 (3.3) | 35 (23.3) | 4 (2.7) | 45 (30) |

### Politicians with Good Ethical Standards and at Important Positions in Government Can Reduce Corruption

|                      | Uncertain | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 5 (3.3) | 2 (1.3) | 1 (0.7) | 8 (5.3) | $\chi^2 = 173.55$ (0.000) | $\gamma = +0.401$ |
|----------------------|-----------|-------|-------|---------|---------|-------|-------|-----------------------------|------------------|
| Disagree             | 1 (0.7)   | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 1 (0.7) |
| Uncertain            | 0 (0)     | 0 (0) | 5 (3.3) | 2 (1.3) | 1 (0.7) | 8 (5.3) |
| Agree                | 0 (0)     | 0 (0) | 13 (8.7) | 38 (25.3) | 7 (4.7) | 58 (38.7) |
| Strongly Agree       | 0 (0)     | 2 (1.3) | 5 (3.3) | 67 (44.7) | 9 (6) | 83 (55.3) |

### Politicians that Reject Bribe Are Rewarded by Government

|                      | Uncertain | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 2 (1.3) | 6 (4) | 3 (2.0) | 11 (7.3) | $\chi^2 = 27.898$ (0.033) | $\gamma = -0.251$ |
|----------------------|-----------|-------|-------|---------|-------|-------|---------|-----------------------------|------------------|
| Strongly disagree    | 0 (0)     | 0 (0) | 2 (1.3) | 6 (4) | 3 (2.0) | 11 (7.3) |
| Disagree             | 1 (0.7)   | 1 (0.7) | 3 (2.0) | 64 (42.7) | 4 (2.7) | 73 (48.7) |
| Uncertain            | 0 (0)     | 1 (0.7) | 11 (7.3) | 20 (13.3) | 7 (4.7) | 39 (26) |
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### Making politician answerable to anticorruption agencies can reduce corruption

|                      | Agree | Strongly Agree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree | Uncertain | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|----------------------|-------|----------------|----------|-------------------|-----------|-------|----------------|
|                      | 0 (0) | 0 (0)          | 5 (3.3)  | 9 (6)             | 1 (0.7)   | 15 (10)| 42.528 (0.000)|
| **χ²**               |       |                |          |                   |           |       |                |
| **γ**                |       |                |          |                   |           |       | +0.144         |

### Public service training of politicians oriented toward civil values can reduce corruption

|                      | Agree | Strongly Agree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree | Uncertain | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|----------------------|-------|----------------|----------|-------------------|-----------|-------|----------------|
|                      | 0 (0) | 0 (0)          | 1 (0.7)  | 1 (0.7)           | 1 (0.7)   | 0 (0) | 3 (2.0)        |
| **χ²**               |       |                |          |                   |           |       | 70.917 (0.000)|
| **γ**                |       |                |          |                   |           |       | -0.099         |

### Making bureaucracy independent of political pressure can reduce corruption

|                      | Agree | Strongly Agree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree | Uncertain | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|----------------------|-------|----------------|----------|-------------------|-----------|-------|----------------|
|                      | 0 (0) | 0 (0)          | 1 (0.7)  | 1 (0.7)           | 0 (0)     | 0 (0) | 26 (17.3)      |
| **χ²**               |       |                |          |                   |           |       | 44.935 (0.000)|
| **γ**                |       |                |          |                   |           |       | +0.230         |

### Court verdicts against corrupt politicians should be diffused as cultural values

|                      | Agree | Strongly Agree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree | Uncertain | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|----------------------|-------|----------------|----------|-------------------|-----------|-------|----------------|
|                      | 0 (0) | 0 (0)          | 1 (0.7)  | 1 (0.7)           | 0 (0)     | 0 (0) | 2 (1.3)        |
| **χ²**               |       |                |          |                   |           |       | 121.69 (0.000)|
| **γ**                |       |                |          |                   |           |       | -0.205         |

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A positive ($\gamma = +0.401$) and significant ($P=0.000$) linkage exists between appointing of fair politicians significant public posts and corruption perception. The sustenance for relationship is stemming society’s adherence toward honesty which is a main trait in political culture. Analogous association is found in removing political influence from bureaucracy and corruption perception ($P=0.000$ and $\gamma = +0.230$). It is deducted from association that political pressure influence bureaucracy and consequently support corruption. Due to this reason the bureaucracy should be brought out of political pressure and made independent for augmentation of corruption perception and decreasing corruption. Likewise, the association between accountability of politicians toward agencies of anticorruption and corruption perception was significant and positive ($P=0.000$ and $\gamma = +0.144$). Findings advances that masses believe in accountability of all regardless of social status’ consideration, which will consequently diminish corruption. Nye (1997) credited global reduction of confidence and trust of public leaders, emergence of poor leadership and, increase of dishonesty and corruption in politics. Vittal (2005) declared high level desirability that every association of professional nature should endorse code of conduct and ethics, and may create role models and standards for directing society. Izzud-Din (2009) forwarded significance of stabilizing judiciary and parliament for enhancing governance for controlling corruption otherwise people will experience stress with corruption. Lomnitz (1988) mentioned political favoritism arguing that by expectation of elongated term relationship, politicians use assets unlawfully. In addition to purchasing votes during election, politicians try to maintain long-lasting linkage with voters, by pouring different types of favours, which include public works, employment and different commodities which are in their control. Reciprocally the political support, loyalty, votes and political support flow up resulting in establishing durable association used for attaining and sustaining political power, status and in many cases supporting activities of corruption.

Association between organized corruption by formation of alliance between politician and government servants, the perception of corruption was found negative and significant ($P=0.002$ and $\gamma = -0.120$), expressing that emergence of alliances of influential groups for corruption purposes is a foundation of dispersal of corrupt practices that is ignored by society greatly, as evident from negative Gamma value. Linkage of recompensing politicians with honesty and perception of corruption was similar i.e. ($P=0.033$ and $\gamma = -0.251$). The motivations and rewards are contributors in ensuring lucidity in corruption perception hence negative value met in research express that system of motivation and reward to loyal politicians is either insufficient or non-existing to be used as a mark of curbing corruption. Vittal (2005) assured that downfall of social values outlaw the
The corruption is systematized through some groups consisting of dishonest politicians, public servants and mass media that together carry on such systems. It is significantly desired that each professional association must sustain morals and code of conduct, and thence evolve benchmarks and role models to guide society. Gambetta (1993) exhibited that corrupt organizations and government loot people. Murray (1997) emphasized for public responsibilities of building an atmosphere of rule of law, justice, trust and transparency. In an egalitarian society, in order to be successful the government is required to take people into trust.

A positive ($\gamma = +0.562$) and very significant ($P=0.000$) relationship was reached between the variable that “corrupt politicians defend corruption” and the “corruption perception”. Therefore, politicians are entangled in deeds that are entirely damaging the social system’s working. In addition, association between privileged political environment for corruption with corruption perception was very positive and significant ($P=0.000$, and $\gamma = +0.423$). An insignificant, hence, a slight positive ($\gamma = +0.016$) association was proven between impediments were created for truthful politicians and corruption perception. The findings are matched with findings of Lomintz (1988) who argued that during their turn the politicians in-state their representatives in public services in a firmly prearranged custom for having paybacks when not in government, furthermore the corrupt politicians’ these representatives hinder fair politicians from evenhandedness.

Training for politicians for acquaintance regarding corruption and consequently avoiding it was greatly suggested by society, evident through a significant ($P=0.000$) association, hence a negative association ($\gamma = -0.099$) shows its absence as the need of time. It was also reinforced that court decisions regarding stopping corruption be ensured in modern culture for proliferation and discouragement as shown highly significant ($P=0.000$) association with perception of corruption, hence the negative value ($\gamma = -0.205$) indicates toward its non-prevalence or slackening by the system.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

Political system is a macro level variable influencing social values and corruption. It is concluded that the masses in research area do have a vibrant visualization regarding corruption and weakening social order in political institutions. The political system is biased regarding benefits distribution for favouring political beloveds. In their wicked plans of corruption, the politicians were supposed to influence bureaucracy and making firm relations with corrupt officers consequently making corruption series further unbreakable and efficient, that made truthful hurdled to perform efficiently. The respondents perceived that the politicians were considering themselves beyond rules and were not held answerable for their misdeeds. The courts’ decisions regarding corruption and bad
governance were lesser seen to be implemented. Lesser care was given to formal training of politicians and minimum preparation was made in order to revive ethics and social values. Moreover, this was found that both unfair and fair practices were fairly evident to people. The society anticipated higher moral behaviour from political figures and public servants to which they did not meet. The corrupt persons may be guilty conscious hence were intentionally and compellingly exposed to corruption. In this scenario the social pressure is not sufficient to curb corruption, hence if augmented by stern law enforcement then it can reduce corruption. Scientific methods of investigating corruption, transparency and accountability in political system, strict and fair law enforcement and community involvement in anticorruption activities were recommended for policy making.
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