Abstract: The return to democracy in Nigeria in 1999 ushered in some form of political reforms, particularly in the conduct of multi-party elections however political violence appears perverse. The objective of this study is to explore how the prevalence of political violence has undermined Nigeria's democracy. The analysis follows survey data to address the questions regarding democracy and political violence. The study draws from the frustration-aggression and group violence theories and provides a deepened analytic exploration. Based on some of the assumptions of democracy understood as freedom, equality, accountability, rule of law etc, the study argues that these assumptions obviously constitute a ‘universal pattern’ in democratic practice, which makes a critical evaluation of the Nigerian experience important. Consequently, our findings suggest that the prevalence of political violence is fundamentally an attribute of vested interests of the political elite. Some policy recommendations follow.

Keywords: Governance; Democracy; Political Violence; Development; Nigeria.

1 Introduction

Studies exploring the links between democracy and political violence, and in more specific terms, how political violence undermines democratization have been complex, leading to the need for a critical appraisal. Kaethe Weingarten (2004) argued that the definition of the term “political violence” remains contestable. It has been presumed that democracies are a more stable form of government since they do not, for the most part, go to war or promote violent practices (Mintz and Geva 1993).

However, recent studies demonstrate that democracies are just as prone to violence as other forms of government (Mearsheimer 1990; Cohen 1994; Spiro 1994; Macmillan 1996). ‘Democracy aims at the exclusion of violence, and theoretically should render violence unnecessary, since all groups and individuals should be able to express their views and interests through a process of rational deliberation. Yet this is obviously not always the case’ (Schwarzmantel 2010:1).

Post- Cold War studies on developing democracies of the global South adopt terms such as ‘new wars’ or ‘local conflicts’ to discuss the resurgence of internal conflicts within states (Kaldor 1999). Douglas Hibbs classified political violence as behavior that is (1) anti-system in character, (2) has political significance, and (3) involves collective or “mass” activity (Hibbs 1973). Such analysis includes, but is not limited to, incidents of rioting, militancy, terrorism, uprisings, separatist agitations, armed insurgency, politically motivated assassinations, arson, hooliganism etc.

In Nigeria, Africa’s largest Democracy, prior to political independence in 1960, colonial Nigeria experienced the ferment of gender agitation evidenced in the Aba women riot of 1929 (Matera, Bastia, Kingsley –Kent 2011). In 1945, there was the Jos riot in which northern politicians attacked and killed 200 Igbos living in Jos (Plotnicov 1971). Again, in 1953 the Kano riot broke out and several lives were lost in Sabongari area of Kano.

The immediate post-independence Nigeria witnessed the Tiv Riots from 1960 to 1964. This was necessitated by the resilience of the Tiv ethnic nationality against repressive rule of Native Administration (NA), Police Force and native...
courts by the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), dominated by the Hausa-Fulani and led by Alhaji Ahmadu Bello. The northern oligarchy had sought to subdue the Tiv who are mainly Christians, and largely belonged to a northern opposition party, the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) (Gbulie 1981; Anifowose 1982).

The 1962/63 Census crisis marked a turning point in Nigeria, as there were arguments and controversy regarding the exact census figure. Nigeria’s total population after enumeration was confirmed by the Census Board as 60.5 million (Offodile 1980). The South numbered slightly more than the North. Abubakar Balewa, the Prime Minister, outrightly rejected the figures and there were controversies between the North and south. This controversy led to violent crisis (Offodile 1980).

The Western regional Crisis of 1962 was aimed at weakening the West using the Western Premier, Chief S. L. Akintola, who had lost his Action Group popularity in the Western House and sought NPC support. The result was the Western Nigeria crisis which sent Chief Awolowo to jail and foisted Akintola who was sacked Premier back on the Western Region (Anifowose, 1982). This led to political violence and physical fight at the floor of the Western regional House.

Again, Nigeria’s first military coup of 1966 was bloody and claimed the lives of top military officers and political leaders. The aftermath was the Igbo genocide as several Igbos living in the northern part of Nigeria were massacred in a reprisal attack as the coup was termed Igbo coup.

Ethnic minority agitation gained momentum ahead of Nigeria’s political independence and became the brainchild of the Willinks’ Minority Commission of 1958. In 1966 minority agitation re-emerged leading to twelve days revolution by Isaac Adaka Boro in the Niger Delta (Tamuno 1970). A subsequent counter coup of 1966 ensued which resulted in the assassination of Nigeria’s first Military Head of State Major General Ironsi. This led to a thirty month civil war (1967-1970) (Orjiakor 1983).

In post-civil war Nigeria, there has been evidence of political violence largely attributed to military coups and counter coups. This includes the assassination of General Murtala Muhammed in a bloody coup led by Lt. Col. Buka Suka Dimka in 1976, repeated aborted coups such as the Maman Vatsa coup attempt of 1986 and the Major Gideon Okar coup of 1990 both against General Babangida’s administration.

Since the end of the Cold War, there appears to be a compelling need to study how Nigeria’s democracy has fared. The annulment of the June 12th, 1993 presidential election adjudged free, fair and credible resulted in chaos and violence in various parts of Nigeria particularly in Lagos as several pro-democracy groups agitated for the restoration of Abiola’s mandate.

There has been political violence arising from militia groups such as the defunct militant groups in the Niger Delta, South-South, Nigeria, Odua People’s Congress (OPC) in Western Nigeria, the Egbesu boys of Ijaw extraction in the Niger Delta. In South East Nigeria, the Movement for the Actualization of a Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) reignited separatist agitation against the federal government on the marginalization of the group that belonged to the defunct Biafra. In 2012, the emergence of a more radical separatist group namely the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) intensified the agitation.

In particular, oil related violence has been vicious in the Niger Delta and has taken divergent turns including communal clashes and internal displacement. In Ogoni, a community in the Niger Delta, there was the formation of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1992. In the mid 1990s, violent clashes led to the killing of nine Ogoni political leaders believed to be ‘vultures’ or saboteurs (pro federal government and oil multinationals), through massive youth uprising. The violent crisis resulted in the arrest and execution by hanging of Ogoni environmental activist Ken Saro Wiwa by the federal military government headed by General Abacha in 1995.

It is against this backdrop that this paper seeks to achieve the central objective of providing a critical appraisal of the linkages between democracy and political violence in post 1999 Nigeria. This period is important as the return to democracy in two decades stimulates scholarly curiosity to interrogate the patterns and dynamics of political violence which appears not to have been given adequate research attention.

The specific objective of the paper is to ascertain whether democracy in post 1999 Nigeria has resolved the problems of political violence, or put differently, to understand how the prospects of political violence since the return to democracy in Nigeria have undermined democratic politics. The paper demonstrates that the paucity of policy response to the problems of political violence does not match the actual importance of democracy in Nigeria. It argues that since Nigeria’s nascent democracy, scant studies have critically examined perverse political violence which undermines the developing democracy and peaceful co-existence. To this end, the paper posits that the core ideals of democracy is
needed as a panacea to political violence. The paper examines existing viewpoints between 1999 and 2019 to provide a coherent and critical appraisal of democracy and political violence nexus.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: data and methods, theoretical framework, literature review, political violence in Nigeria since multi-party elections in 1999, data presentation, discussion of findings, conclusion and recommendations.

2 Data and Methods

Two hypotheses were formulated and tested using the chi square statistical tool.

*H₀*: There is no relationship between democracy and political violence in Nigeria since the start of multi-party politics in 1999.

*H₁*: There is a relationship between democracy and political violence in Nigeria since the start of multi-party politics in 1999.

The analysis follows survey data to address the hypotheses raised. The study provides a deepened analytic exploration building on multi-variate methods. The initial focus is on the most up to date data, which have not been analyzed in previous studies, in order to understand the prevalence of political violence in post 1999 Nigeria. Fig. 1 depicts political violence and absolute number of deaths between 2006 to 2017 using recent data from the Nigeria Watch, the seventh report on political violence in Nigeria, 2017. The Nigeria Watch is an authoritative national survey of violence conducted after each general election and, the 2017 data set is the most recent one containing the set of questions regarding political violence.

Further, the study adopts a longitudinal stance, comparing the previous and recent incidents of political violence with multiple qualitative data from earlier surveys; the 2000 Annual report on the Human Rights situation in Nigeria, and comparative survey of conflict and violence among Northeast, Northcentral, and South-South zones (Azad, Crawford and Kaila 2018).

Earlier data derived from the Human Rights Watch (1999) and the survey of political violence from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2000) were further reviewed. Methodological issues to consider in comparing these data over time include the timing of the various surveys, with some conducted in the wake of the Boko Haram violent insurgency, Nigerian general elections and others at the resurgence of ethnic violence and herdsmen/farmers crisis in the North Central or Middle Belt, Nigeria (Amadi, et al. 2018). While others captured the incidence of ethno-religious violence such as Shiite sectarian violence in parts of northern Nigeria and militancy and resource agitation in the Niger Delta (Amadi, et al, 2018). These are certainly factors to be mindful of when exploring the dynamics of political violence in Nigeria’s nascent democracy.

The core data for the analysis come from an array of items in which survey respondents were asked about their perceptions of democracy and political violence in Nigeria with a structured questionnaire titled; Democracy and Political Violence in Nigeria Questionnaire (DPOVIN) administered to 594 participants drawn randomly from some political and social actors: Political leaders (144), CSOs (290), women leaders (160). This included individuals that are experienced and knowledgeable on issues of democracy and political violence since the beginning of multi-party politics. Data were analyzed using the chi-square statistical analysis.

3 Theoretical Framework

An integrative theoretical framework that explores dynamics of intractable political violence will illuminate our understanding of the multidisciplinary correlates of democracy and political violence and, therefore, strengthens the application of core theoretical concepts that underlie the explanation of trends in post 1999 era in Nigeria.

Following recent discourses on democracy and political violence (Schwarzmantel 2010, 2011; Merklen 2012), the study situates theoretical analysis of political violence in Nigeria at both micro and macro levels. Two theoretical discourses were adopted to explain in sufficient detail the understanding of political violence and linkages with democratic politics namely frustration aggression theory and group violence theory. Both theories reflect some of
the core issues associated with political violence in relation to democratic governance in Nigeria today and provide contextual appraisal and interconnections.

Political violence at the micro level connotes violence at the level of the individual or group of individuals. It is a psychological approach to violence which could be associated with issues such as frustration, anger, greed, grievance or similar triggers of individual dissention at the micro level. In line with the frustration-aggression theory, an individual is aggressive when he is relatively deprived as a result of the disparity between what is sought or desired and what is obtainable in reality. In other words, aggression is a result of frustration (Dollard et al. 1939; Jepperson 1991; Amenta 2005).

Once an individual has needs that cannot be satisfied, he becomes aggressive. Thus, when a basic desire is thwarted, the individual is frustrated and directs his aggression towards perceived authorities standing in the way of his achieving or attaining his desire.

The Nigerian scenario has reflected such frustration since the 1990s as politics in Nigeria is riddled with promises made and unfulfilled as well as complex violence. First was in 1993 after decades of military dictatorship and misrule, then the June 12th, 1993 presidential elections adjudged as free, fair and credible was annulled. This triggered frustration and violent political agitation in Lagos and other parts of Western Nigeria.

Similarly, the Niger Delta scenario has also reflected the same frustration-aggression. Since 1958 the Willinks' Minority Report was released to allay the fears of the minority ethnic groups, minority question remains unresolved in Nigeria's democracy (Mustapha 2005; Ukiwo 2005; Amadi, Imohita and Obomanu 2016). This is evidenced by the inability of the Nigerian State to adopt the principle of derivation as the basis for revenue allocation leading to agitation on resource control. Again, the increasing poverty in the Niger Delta contrasts the oil wealth of the area and accounts for youth restiveness and aggression replicated in militancy and perverse rise in local cultism. Post amnesty Niger Delta had experienced further frustration as ex-combatants could not be effectively re-integrated or rehabilitated leading to a resurgence of post amnesty militant groups such as the Niger Delta Avengers (NDAs), Ugbesu Sea Lions among others.

Thus, violence is located within the feeling of dissatisfaction which arises from the comparison between what one is currently benefiting, what one ought to have benefitted and what is regarded as the ideal in the society. As with any other theory in the social sciences, the psychological explanation of frustration aggression is not without criticism. Amongst several others, it has been argued that frustration does not always lead to aggression. Experimental psychologists have observed that leaders can decide to be aggressive without being frustrated. Beyond that, the theory excessively focuses on the individual’s internal mechanism and discourages emphasis on the social context of individual action. More still, is the difficulty in operationalizing some of the concepts as frustration, aggression, satisfaction, etc.

The above weaknesses notwithstanding, the frustration aggression theory is useful and could be employed in explaining political violence in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular.

Specifically, the Nigerian politics is a game of promises. These unfulfilled promises has potentials for frustration and could or has always led to violence.

The group violence theory on the other hand holds that in order to understand violence, one must look beyond the individual. The theory contends that to understand violence is to understand the social context of a society (Strom, Myhre, Wentzel-Larsen and Thoresen 2017). Proponents of the critical mass or mass action suggest that group violent action leads to popular uprisings involving civil society such as the Arab Spring (Amadi 2012) and the October, 2020 “end SARS” protest in Nigeria as a result of accumulated oppression, victimization and violation of human rights by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS).

Thus, group violence such as mass action (Patten and Arboleda-Flórez 2004; Haque 2005; Amadi 2012; Simpson, Willer and Feinberg 2018), inter-ethnic conflicts, wars, crisis, violent demonstrations or uprisings, separatist agitation, religious crisis, etc has implications for democracy. Adil Ahmad Haque (2005) argued that group violence could emerge as a form of retribution. It is further held that political violence is first and foremost the product of socio-structural configuration. Simpson, et al. (2018) adopted a theory of public reactions to on activist violence and argued that violent protest may not likely attract public support even ‘when used against a widely reviled group’. Thus, to comprehend violence, such issues as; legitimacy, coerciveness of a regime, political and economic stability etc. cannot be held in isolation. The group violence school therefore recognizes the socio-structural milieu, the level of industrialization, urbanization, economic and social changes arising from the advancement of a society or community (Simpson, Willer and Feinberg 2018).
The group violence hypothesis emphasizes the role of power struggle amongst various groups in the society in understanding the source of violence (Rummel 1976). These groups are identified along ethnic, religious, race, ideological and other plural lines. The major assumption of this school of thought is that group action in addition to social context is very important in appreciating political violence in any society.

These theoretical explorations are suitable as recent discourses regarding political violence have not been adequately linked to both individual and state responses to violent actions that threaten, or seem to threaten, the individual or undermines state hegemony (Primoratz 2004; Meggle 2005; Franks 2006). Responses to such violence are usually motivated by, and thus strongly correlated with, the level of threat acceptable to maintain regime control relative to the violence experienced (or perceived to be experienced).

4 Literature Review

There is a wide range of literature in the broad fields of political violence and democracy (Krain 1998; Schwarzmantel 2011; Merklen 2012). Morrison and Stevenson (1971) provided definitional exploration of political violence and argued that political violence is defined as behavior characterized by the physical injury or subjection of persons or property with intent to bring about an alteration in the structure of the political system. In his seminal work on political violence, Ted Robert Gurr draws attention to the definitional distinctions between types of violence labeled; “physical,” typified by the use of force, and “structural,” characterized by more general patterns of denial.

Some scholars have linked certain ‘predetermined’ activities against a regime to political violence. Edward Muller (1972) argues that political violence is “violence directed against the regime (the structure of political authority) and/or against particular authorities occupying positions in the regime.”

However, political violence is not often targeted at the ‘government or its ‘authorities’ alone. Following the classification of political violence as micro and macro levels of violence, it is discernible that political violence such as assassination, electoral fraud etc. are not directly targeted at the government or its agencies, while macro violence such as terrorism is largely targeted at the government or its agencies. Alex Schmid (2004) provides a number of understandings of terrorism which aptly overlaps with political violence as terrorism is largely politically motivated.

Discourses on political violence has largely focused on state responses to violent actions that could threaten the state (Cavanaugh 2012). Some of the responses by the state could be repressive, leading to the suppression of legitimate movements (Earl 2017). Dominant debates about political violence include violence between State and non-state actors which may directly or indirectly undermine state legitimacy. Political violence within the state includes internal crisis while inter-state political violence includes civil wars or border disputes among one state and the other. While internal political violence may not directly undermine the legitimacy of the state, it may contribute to general intrastate instability (Zambakari 2017).

On the other hand, inter-state political violence can undermine state legitimacy like civil wars. Beyond the state centric notion of political violence there is the micro (individual) level analysis of political violence, this includes violence that directly or indirectly impacts the individual, namely electoral violence, cultism, militancy, assassination etc.

The understanding of triggers and consequences of political violence in most developing democracies have attracted recent scholarly interest (Hoelscher 2015). This is partly because of the notion of the third wave democracy (Huntington 1991) which swept across most developing societies in the 1990s.

The increasing debate on political violence is an indication of its relevance in both governance and policy making, thus a chronological exploration of Nigeria’s political history reveals that Nigeria’s politics have been replete with violence at both micro and macro levels each reflecting and corroborating the various schools of thought earlier expounded (HRW 2003; Falola, 2009).

Anifowose (1982) posits that political violence involves the use or threat of physical acts carried out by an individual or individuals within a political system aimed at causing injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to property which has political significance. He demonstrates that such violent act tends to modify the behavior of others in the existing arrangements of power structure and has some consequences for the political system.
The above argument implies that violence occurs when there is physical threat carried out by an individual or group of individuals in a political system. More than that, it must have a political undertone. In other words, for violence to be ‘political’ (as opposed to any other kind of violence), there must be the intent of affecting the political process. Fischer (2002) captured this essence aptly and argued that political violence as any random or organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay or to otherwise influence the political process. The political process being considered as the system of distribution of values carried out by specific individuals within specific institutions. Thus, instances of political violence include but are not limited to riots, military coup, guerilla warfare, civil war, terrorism, militancy, insurrection, uprising, ethnic agitation, electoral violence etc.

While a lot has been written about political violence (Dudley 1973; Collier 2010), the more recent travails of political violence in developing democracies such as Nigeria, are yet to be broadly captured (HRW 2003; Falola 2009; Kwaja Onubogu and Verjee 2018). Although both democracy and political violence exemplify the pattern and dynamics of a social space created by the liberal order, transformation of developing democracies within violent free contexts have been largely ignored by both state, non-state actors and similar stakeholders. This is a major research gap that this study seeks to fill within the post 1999 political trajectories of Nigeria. Specifically, there is urgent need to redress the prevailing practice where Nigeria’s democracy is confronted with complex political violent issues notably the ongoing Boko Haram terrorism, persistent electoral violence, the aggrieved oil minority areas and their violent agitations, the post-civil war agitation of the defunct Biafra, are all antithetical to the ideals of democracy, leading to contestation on challenges of transforming and deepening democracy.

The literature on democratic governance presupposes that a democratic government promotes non-violence. This has been part of the fundamental thesis of proponents of democracy in developing countries (Diamond, Jonathan, Linj and Lipset 1999; Collier and Vicente 2014). Thus, some of the core issues associated with democratic governance is linked to freedom and violent free polity. This provides the basis for contextual appraisal of the relationship between democracy and political violence.

Democracy is concerned with freedom, equality, participation and consent in politics or governance (Joseph 1997; Bratton 2007). Scholars of democracy in plural societies provide influential justification which puts democracy ahead of all other forms of government (Lijphart, 1977). The expansion of modern governance was perceived to have been confronted with different opinions on the verity of particular system of government and structural patterns of power sharing among various contending spheres of opinion and interests, wavering between “unity” in racially or ethnically divided societies. Thus, the issues of race, origin, ethnic identity, religion etc, were all commonly raised concerns to justify the suitability of a liberal democracy and to win the confidence of various opinions, groups, classes, religion and distinct social affinities.

Thus, democracy reflects certain fundamental ideas and practices about inclusive and participatory governance and hence the interrogation of the question of political violence. Among scholars there are various explorations of democracy partly because of its divergent uses and meanings between practitioners. Macpherson (1973) puts forward a lucid understanding of liberal democracy which in his view is an “additive” to democracy which he argues has increasingly been a core distinguishing factor from non-Western democracies.

Held (1972) disaggregated various models of democracy to provide broader elucidation of democracy. Crawford Young argues that democracy in most developing countries, particularly Africa, has been largely contradictory. Ryan (2012) sees liberal democracy in terms of conceptual generality and provides more persuasive insights on the making of modern liberalism, while Joseph (1997) contends that democracy has been largely ‘infertile’ in Africa. Despite its manifold constraints in Africa, some theoretical perspectives contend that democracy is a universal construct (Bakan 1994; Sen 1999).

The critical exploration presented in our arguments suggests the basis to re-examine the concept of democracy and political violence linking both to the broader elucidation of Nigeria’s experience. The aim is to understand the assumptions of democracy and how this within the stipulated period of our study (1999 to 2019) could be used to provide a coherent theoretical exploration of the complexities of political violence in a democratic setting. Axtmann (2013) stresses that democracy has a history which is not a contentious claim as the ‘beginnings of democracy are found in the ‘assembly democracy’ of Athens in ancient Greece with the ‘invention’ of the political and the participation of the citizens of the polis in the shared exercise of rule’ (p.118).
Robert Dahl contends that ‘democracy can be independently invented and reinvented whenever the appropriate conditions exist’ (Dahl 1998:9–10). This debate reinforces the theoretical and practical lacuna in Nigeria’s democracy, where ‘the appropriate conditions do not exist’. Charles Tilly sees ‘negotiated consent to collective decisions’ as central to a democracy (Tilly 2007: 29). The question regarding equality forms a fundamental strand of the democratic theory as ‘the goals of every adult citizen of a republic are to be accorded equal value in determining government policies’ as citizens participate equally in decision making on policies to be pursued (Dahl 1998:32).

The foregoing review is both specific and distinct. This review has been made to convey useful insights on the linkages between democracy and political violence in Nigeria; and provides the understanding of the contexts in which our argument fits into the overall study. Following the assumptions and ingredients of both the frustration-aggression and the group violence theories, does Nigeria’s variant fall within the basic democratic model? Ake (1996) argued that Africa (Nigeria inclusive) should evolve a democracy radically different from the Western model. How has Nigeria’s pattern of democracy provided a viable and violent free model? These are some of the questions that will guide the rest of the argument.

5 Political Violence in Nigeria Since Multi-Party Elections in 1999: The Contexts

The plausibility of our theoretical model is further reinforced within the context of exploration of the causal linkages and motivations for post 1999 political violence which is what this section partly seeks to do. Violence or the threat of violence is a universal phenomenon. Individuals and groups throughout history have, in one way or another, resorted to violence or its potential use as a tactic of political action. Violence has been used by groups seeking power, by groups holding power and by groups wanting to retain power. Violence has been pursued in the defense of order by the privileged, in the name of justice by the oppressed, and in the fear of displacement by the threatened (The Global Human Rights Regime, 2012). Thus, there are various causes as well as different motivations for political violence.

Since 1999, following the return to democracy in Nigeria, the complex patterns of political violence and the question regarding possible causes, motivations, dynamics of transformation and changes brought about by democracy have not been adequately captured. In what contexts have political violence occurred and what new changes had emerged following nascent democracy? To capture ongoing trends, as well as the effects of political violence on Nigeria’s democracy, it is necessary to examine the various factors which trigger political violence and how such violence could be transformed for democracy to flourish in Nigeria.

In expounding the causes of political violence, it is apt to argue that the root causes of violence have been complex and contentious. Arnold Forster (1966) probably represents the majority view among contemporary scholars when he considers political violence as being beyond any simple causation. The causes of political violence have been so numerous and complex that some scholars have even argued that the very uniqueness of each conflict defies effort to formulate cross-national hypothesis. Thus, a very large number of factors have been given by scholars to explain political violence. This, however, does not imply that a general hypothesis cannot be drawn from the wide variety of political violence that have incurred in recent years.

Thus, the discourse on the causes and motivation for political violence point to various dimensions such as poverty (Henriques and Zwitter 2008), greed and grievance (Collier and Hoeffler 1998), and relative deprivation (Gurr 2011), which contends that deprivation triggers violence. Gurr (2011) identified deprivation as central to war in his treatise on “why men rebel”, social anomy such as local cultism, protests and mass violence (Amadi 2012). The incidence of political violence in Nigeria presupposes the existence of widespread marginalization, violation of democratic norms, relative deprivation leading to frustration among a substantial number of individuals and groups in society among other causes.

The key to any analysis of violent politics is the question of power. The firmly entrenched rent-seeking and patrimonial politics prevalent across Africa, where political leaders increasingly cling onto political power and formally allocate public resources to allies against constitutional provisions, remain a key trigger of tension. Scholars of ‘logic of political violence’ argue that political violence is largely an attribute of ‘weak institutional polities’ (Besley and Persson, 2010).
The starkest manifestation of such weak institution is poor arms control leading to persistent violence and armed conflict in the form of civil war, insurrection, proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) etc (Asuni 2009).

Ethnicity has been frontal in violent conflicts. In deeply divided societies such as Nigeria palpable ethnic tension could trigger political violence (Nnoli 1978; Okpu 1989; Egwu 1998; Mustapha 2005). Kathleen Cavanaugh has provided such “interpretations” of political violence within ethnically divided societies. The particular case with Nigeria is interesting as Nigeria is a country of about 235 ethnic groups (Otite 1990). Ethnic violence and conflicts have been on the increase. This takes various dimensions such as inter and intra ethnic rivalry which increasingly contradicts democratic norms.

Motivations for ethnic violence is informed by attachment to ethnic or sectional identity rather than nationalistic affinity (Nnoli 1978). This has been another core trigger of political violence in Nigeria. Patterns of political appointments and structural inequality in representation of various ethnic groups have been another trigger of political violence (Mustapha 2005),

In the early 2000s within the Niger Delta area, ethnic minority agitation was necessitated by resource agitation as the power holders treat oil resource bearing communities in the region with levity. In essence, the youths from these communities took to the creeks as militants and waged war against the Nigerian State.

Essentially, the historical depiction of ethnic minority agitation which, resulted in militancy in the Niger Delta in post 1999 politics, suggests that these youths were local street cult boys initially deployed by the political elite as thugs to achieve their political ends but dumped thereafter (HRW 2008). These youths subsequently became agitators and armed insurgents that took to the creeks, leading to resurgence of militancy in the early 2000s. Examples of these youth organizations are the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF), the Outlaws etc. Although the militants were granted amnesty by the federal government in 2009, it appears that the ethnic minority militia agitation has not ebbed as the Niger Delta Avengers (NDAs), a post amnesty militia group has emerged.

A critical dimension of political violence in the Niger Delta since the late 1990s is linked to the resurgence of local cultism. The most popular of such cult groups include Deebam and Deewell whose inter cult rivalry and similar violent activities have been a threat to human security in the Niger Delta (Wellington, 2007; Amadi and Ndu 2014).

Another cause of political violence is communal crisis. This is common across Nigeria and takes various forms such as land/border dispute, chieftaincy title etc. In Nigeria there are well known communal crises such as the Ife and

Figure 1: Political Violence and absolute Number of Deaths 2006 to 2017. 
Source: Nigeria Watch, Seventh Report on Political Violence in Nigeria, 2017
In a comparative analysis between North East, North Central and South- South on the causes of the most recent violent conflict event that affected a household member by zone in Nigeria between 2010-2017, Fig. 2 provides a number of causes of political violence within these geopolitical zones in Nigeria. The data suggest that terrorism ranked highest in the North East with a 73% prevalence rate. Others are land and resource access which recorded 7%, while cultism had 1.5% incidence rate. In the North Central land resource access was a major cause of political violence with a 55% prevalence rate, terrorism recorded 21%, cultism or criminality had 1.6%. In the South, South cultism or criminality was

Table 1: Ethnic Composition of National Assembly 1999 to 2003.

| Ethnic Group     | % in population (1963 Census) | % in Senate | % in House of Representatives |
|------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|
| Hausa/Fulani     | 29.5                          | 28.4        | 30.3                          |
| Igbo             | 16.6                          | 14.7        | 13.8                          |
| Yoruba           | 20.3                          | 20.1        | 21.3                          |
| Southern Minorities | 15.1                      | 15.6        | 13.8                          |
| Northern Minorities | 18.5                     | 21.2        | 20.8                          |

Sources: Information on National Assembly members computed from data on 109 Senators and 356 Members of the House of Representatives, in Chris Anyanwu, The Law Makers, Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999-2003, Starcraft International, 1999. Mustapha, 2005

Table 2: Some Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.

| Date             | Type   | Nature of Conflict                                          | State                      |
|------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| May 30 to June 9 1999 | Ethnic | Oodua People's congress and Hausa traders clashed in Sagamu | Ogun                       |
| July 18, 1999     | Ethnic | Communal clash between Oodua People's Congress and Hausa   | Ogun                       |
| November 25, 1999 | Ethnic | Communal clash in Brass Local Government Area              | Rivers                     |
| Jan 25 1999       | Ethnic | Communal clash in Etseko Local Government                  | Edo                        |
| February 2, 2000  | Ethnic | Sharia Riots                                               | Akwa Ibom & Cross River    |
| February 21, 2000 | Religious| Religious Riots in Aba reprisal killings from the Kaduna mayhem | Abia                      |
| Feb, 28, 2000     | Ethnic | Ife-Modakeke war of attrition                              | Osun                       |
| March 5, 2000     | Ethnic | Renewed hostilities between the people of Eleme and Okrika  | Rivers                     |
| March 16, 2000    | Religious| Religious Riot in Damboa                                     | Borno                      |
| March 28, 2000    | Religious| Communal clash in Ovia South Local Government               | Edo                        |
| April 8, 2000     | Ethnic | Local farmers and Fulani herdsmen clash in Saki             | Oyo                        |
| May 18, 2000      | Religious| Renewed religious riot in Kaduna                             | Kaduna                     |
| May 23, 2000      | Religious| Epoch of the Owo mayhem                                       | Ondo                       |
| June 5, 2000      | Ethnic | Communal clash in Isoko north local Government              | Edo                        |
| June 12, 2000     | Ethnic | Communal clash between the people of Ikot Offiong and Oku   | Cross River                |

Sources: 2000 Annual report on the Human Rights situation in Nigeria, Tell Magazine, September 24, 2001 and the Nigeria Tribune September 19, 2001, the Punch November 22, 2002:14, Yunusa (2010).
the highest cause of political violence with 36% prevalence rate. Other causes of violence included personal disputes which had a 32% incidence rate, land or resource access had a 19% prevalence rate while ethnicity recorded 9%.

The religious perspective holds that religion has been a major motivation for political violence in Nigeria (Abu-Nimer 2000; Achunike 2008). The case against religious violence suggests that the northern oligarchy seeks to Islamize Nigeria. This notion often creates tension in Nigeria. In the year 2000, the Sharia crisis became perverse in the aftermath of May 1999 as President Olusegun Obasanjo assumed office leading to violence and the loss of several lives. A section of northern Nigeria declared themselves a “sharia state’ with strict observance of the Sharia Penal Code (Egede 2007). This triggered violence among Christians and non-devotees of the sharia practice.

Religious fundamentalism has been a major trigger of political violence in Nigeria (Achunike 2008). This includes the Shiite protests and clashes with security agencies in parts of northern Nigeria and the Boko Haram (Jama Atu Ahlis Sunnalidda Anatinal Jihad) terrorism in Northeastern states of Nigeria; Borno, Gombe, Adamawa, Yobe etc. Casualties and internally displaced persons are largely concentrated in Bama, Kala/Balge, Damboa, Dikwa, Gwoza, Jere, Konduga Kukawa, Mafa, Maiduguri and Ngala Local Government Areas. Maiduguri, the state capital witnesses incessant deadly attacks (Nigeria Watch 2017).

In 2015, it pledged loyalty to Al Qaeda and ISIS, the global terrorist groups. This has posed a threat to Nigeria’s democracy with several attacks, killings and internally displacing people since the early 2000s. The Boko Haram insurgency is largely considered to be driven by both religious and political issues (Nigeria Watch, 2017). As a consequence, in 2019, Nigeria ranked third most terrorised nation in the World by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI 2019) – a position it has retained since 2015 as the 2019 GTI ranking shows.

Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou (2018) foreshadows the imminent political violence posed by Islamist fundamentalism in the global order, pointing out the misconceptions and complexities of global terrorism. Related political violence is experienced with the ongoing Fulani herdsmen and killing of rural farmers in several parts of rural Nigeria (Amadi and Anokwuru 2017). Despite the complexity of the conflicts, Abu-Nimer (2000) provides a model of inter-religious conflict resolution linked to peace building.

There is evidence of state terrorism that led to political violence in Zaki-Biam in the Benue State Middle Belt, Nigeria and the Odi killings in Bayelsa State during the Obasanjo administration and the Gbaramatu killings in Delta State by the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) during President Yar’Aduah’s administration. This triggered violence as it unleashed terror on innocent citizens.

Equally, post-civil war resurgence of separatist agitation by the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) took a more fierce turn as State repression was evident following the clamp down on the group and its subsequent proscription by the Federal Government in 2017.

Importantly, elections have been one the most frequent triggers of political violence since 1999. Such events have been documented (HRW 2016). Election is an integral component of democracy. However, the conduct of elections since 1999 has been largely inadequate. Electoral violence is classified as pre, during and post -election violence. These are associated with fatalities either among party men or along political party lines. This includes the use of political thugs, carting away of ballot boxes, shooting and mass killing of the electorates, party officials, adhoc staff,
abduction and politically motivated assassinations of high-ranking political figures and their supporters, rigging and similar irregularities. The Human Rights Watch (2016) reports that Nigeria’s elections since 1999 have been marred by various forms of violence, either pre, during or post-election violence. These have all combined to fuel the persistence of political violence.

In effect, election results are contested in the court of law by tribunals. The Human Rights Watch (2016) reports that Nigeria’s elections have been marred by violence and irregularities. The data from Fig. 4 shows that less than 50% of deaths occur during general elections in Nigeria. The chart reveals that between 2006 to 2014 there have been incidences of party related fatalities of varying degrees.

In many states in Nigeria, the Presidential, Gubernatorial and National Assembly elections are marred largely by violence. Suberu (2006) argued that electoral competition is generally pursued as a zero-sum game. Political opponents are subjected to intimidation, harassment, violent displacement and even death. That the winner of an election gets to control nearly every aspect of the state system raises the spectre of violent contestation of electoral outcomes. As Onimisi and Tinuola (2019) noted, ‘the 2019 general election in Nigeria witnessed one of the most violent post-electoral processes ever witness in the history of the country, as over 70 persons lost their lives during and after the exercise’.
He adds that ‘beside the loss of lives recorded during and after the general election, ballot box snatching, burning of properties including the Independent National Electoral Commission offices housing sensitive and non-sensitive materials meant for the election, burning of houses of top political aspirants and people affected with varying degrees of injuries characterized the elections…and supplementary elections.’

A number of factors account for the high level of political violence associated with the electoral process in Nigeria, including deeply entrenched informal patronage systems, politics of exclusion, poor governance, anxiety to remain in power, weak electoral institutions, election fraud and the general non transparency of elections and rules governing the electoral process, trigger all sorts of violence in Nigeria’s democracy.

Corruption is at the center of political violence. Since 1999 Nigeria has ranked high among corrupt nations in the world. Corruption can trigger political violence in various ways. This includes lack of transparency and accountability in which a marginalized group could rise against the government. This has been evident in the Niger Delta.

The Transparency International 2019 Report ranked Nigeria 146 out of a total of 180 countries, which presents a gloomy picture (Transparency International 2020).
Poverty is another trigger of violence. In 2018, Nigeria was named the world poverty capital by the Brookings Institute. This takes various forms, from armed robbery and looting to abduction. Much of this violence has been largely an attribute of leadership failure.

Against the general lack of clear leadership committed to patriotism and nationalism, political violence had persisted. On several accounts, those who are culpable are hardly prosecuted by law. This is evident in herder’s attacks and the killing of farmers in Benue state Middle Belt, Nigeria between 2017 and 2019 where the herdsmen were neither arrested nor prosecuted. Thus, political violence is widespread and perpetrated by both the State (state security agencies) and non-state actors such as groups or individuals. The foregoing is instructive of the fact that the ‘third wave democracy’ has been contradictory as the promises of transformational democracy remains opaque.

6 Data Presentation

Our survey involved 594 respondents drawn randomly from some political and social actors; Women Leaders (144), Political Leaders (160), CSOs (290). The analysis and discussion aim to determine whether democracy has transformed political violence or not.

The questions and responses are provided in a tabular form as follows;

Table 1: To determine the various contexts political violence exist in post 1999 Nigeria.

| Q1 | Respondents | Yes | No | Not Sure | Total |
|----|-------------|-----|----|----------|-------|
| Are there evidence of ethno-religious violence, insurgency, militancy, arson in post 1999 Nigeria? | Women Leaders | 120 | 7 | 17 | 144 |
| | Political Leaders | 140 | 3 | 17 | 160 |
| | CSOs | 200 | 60 | 30 | 290 |
| Total | | 460 (97%) | 70(11.79%) | 64(10.77%) | 594(100%) |

Source: Field Survey (2020)

Table 2: To identify the ways in which democracy has failed to transform political violence.

| Q2 | Respondents | Yes | No | Not Sure | Total |
|----|-------------|-----|----|----------|-------|
| Are there electoral violence, human rights violation, gender inequality in post 1999 federal, state and local government elections in Nigeria? | Women Leaders | 102 | 6 | 36 | 144 |
| | Political Party Leaders | 144 | 4 | 12 | 160 |
| | CSOs | 210 | 40 | 40 | 290 |
| Total | | 456(76.77%) | 50(8.42) | 88(14.87) | 594(1005) |

Source: Field Survey,(2019)

Table 3: To ascertain the persistence of arms race which results in political violence.

| Q3 | Respondents | Yes | No | Not Sure | Total |
|----|-------------|-----|----|----------|-------|
| Are there proliferation of arms in post 1999, such as post amnesty militancy, Shiite sectarian violence, Boko Haram insurgency? | Women Leaders | 99 | 15 | 30 | 144 |
| | Political Party Leaders | 151 | 3 | 6 | 160 |
| | CSOs | 220 | 30 | 40 | 290 |
| Total | | 470(79.12%) | 48(8.08%) | 76(12.80%) | 594(100%) |

Source: Field Survey(2019)
Table 4: To determine whether effective political violence mitigation measures have been put in place by the government.

| Q4                                                                 | Respondents          | Yes | No  | Not Sure | Total  |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-----|-----|----------|--------|
| Effective counter violence measures and regulatory instruments have not been adopted to mitigate political violence in post 1999 Nigeria | Women Leaders        | 70  | 40  | 34       | 144    |
|                                                                   | Political Party Leaders | 135 | 10  | 15       | 160    |
|                                                                   | CSOs                 | 225 | 20  | 45       | 290    |
| **Total**                                                          |                      | 430 | 70  | 94(15.82%) | 594(100%) |

Source: Field Survey (2019)

Table 5: To ascertain how political violence has undermined democratization and democratic outcome in Nigeria.

| Q5                                                                 | Respondents          | Yes | No  | Not Sure | Total  |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-----|-----|----------|--------|
| Incidence of ethno-religious violence, small arms and light weapons proliferation, electoral violence etc have increasingly undermined democratization and democratic outcome in Nigeria | Women Leaders        | 65  | 45  | 34       | 144    |
|                                                                   | Political Party Leaders | 139 | 10  | 13       | 160    |
|                                                                   | CSOs                 | 227 | 15  | 48       | 290    |
| **Total**                                                          |                      | 429 | 70  | 95(15.99%) | 594(100%) |

Source: Field Survey (2020)

Table 6: Chi Square statistical analysis.

| Fo | Fe  | Fo-fe | (fo-fe)² | (fo-fe)²/fe |
|----|-----|-------|----------|-------------|
| 65 | 104 | -39   | 1,521    | 14.62       |
| 45 | 28.04 | 786.24 | 46.35 |
| 34 | 10.97 | 120.34 | 5.22 |
| 137 | 21.45 | 460.10 | 3.98 |
| 10 | 8.85 | 78.32 | 4.15 |
| 13 | -12.58 | 158.25 | 6.18 |
| 227 | 17.56 | 308.35 | 1.47 |
| 15 | -19.17 | 367.48 | 10.75 |
| 48 | 1.62 | 2.62 | 0.05     |
| **Total** | | | | |

Source: Field (2020)

Interpretation of formular

Formula: \( \chi^2 = \sum (fo - fe)^2 / fe \)

Where: \( fo = \) observed frequency
\( fe = \) expected frequency
\( \Sigma = \) summation
\( Df = 4 \)

Significance level = 0.05

Table value = 9.488

Decision Rule: when chi square calculated is greater than the table value, the null hypothesis is rejected.
7 Discussion of Findings

From Table 1, the responses on the various contexts in which political violence exist in post-1999 Nigeria showed that 77.44% affirmed that there are various contexts in which political violence exists; 11.79% had a negative view while 10.77% were not sure.

Table 2 above showed that 76.77% of the respondents affirmed that democracy has failed to transform political violence, 8.42% had a negative view while 14.81% were not sure.

Table 3 showed that 79.12% of the respondents accepted that there is a persistence of arms race which results in political violence, while 8.08% had a contrary opinion and 12.80% were not sure.

The result from Table 4 revealed that 72.40% of the respondents agree that effective political violence mitigation measures have not been put in place by the government, 11.78% had a negative view while 15.82% were not sure.

The responses from Table 5 showed that 72.22% of the respondents believe that political violence has undermined democratization and democratic outcome in Nigeria, 11.79% of the respondents hold a contrary view while 15.99% were not sure.

Following the result of the chi square calculation, 92.77 is greater than the table value of 9.488. This implies that the null hypothesis, $H_0$, which states that there is no relationship between democracy and political violence in Nigeria since multi-party politics in 1999 is rejected. The alternate hypothesis which states that there is a relationship between democracy and political violence in Nigeria since multi-party politics in 1999 is accepted.

The findings are consistent with a number of recent studies which suggest the persistence of political violence in Nigeria such as the Niger Delta region (Utebor 2014). The findings further reveal the various contexts in which political violence manifest both at the individual and group levels, which have taken various forms despite democracy. One would have envisaged that the transition to democracy would have ushered in a violent-free society. Democracy is based on the notion that the potential for participation and responsiveness which it offers will make possible the resolution of violent conflicts. Consequently, where large scale violence or coercion does appear, democracy is fundamentally threatened.

What are the implications of such violence to democracy based on some of the assumptions of democracy understood as freedom, equality (including equal opportunities), accountability, rule of law etc? Democracy presumes adequate representation of people through the means of peaceful electioneering and equitable socio-political engineering. Democracy, therefore, abhors violence and rather fosters consensus building, articulation and aggregation of diverse interests. This therefore poses the following questions. Firstly, can a civil rule or civilian regime be said to be democratic? Secondly, can democracy be violent-free?

It is expedient to argue that there is a marked disparity between democracy and civil rule. Democracy indeed, is beyond civil rule. Put differently, democracy is superior to civil rule. The essence of any democracy is that “it provides the conditions for the full and free development of the essential human capabilities of all the members of the society.” (Macpherson 1973:36). Where these conditions are lacking, the phrase- *undemocratic civil rule*- would be a most appropriate description. With respect to the second question raised above, it does appear that democracy is not a sufficient condition for the eradication of political violence. Several scholars have argued along these lines (Mintz and Geva 1993; Cohen 1994; Spiro 1994; Macmillan 1996; Cavanaugh 1997; Amadi 2012). This study concurs that no democracy can be completely violent-free. However, the removal of the predisposing conditions for such violence and its effective management when it does occur are themselves prerequisites for a democracy.

8 Conclusion

This study concludes that without resolving the persistent political violence or its predisposing conditions, the prospects for sustainable democracy in Nigeria will remain bleak. The transformation of political violence is thus, central to democratization in Nigeria. Institutional overhaul and new orientation are therefore a sine qua non. One of the major concerns has been how to foster unity in diversity and strengthen the ethos of a violent free political system through the internalization of democratic ideals. There have been several constitutional dialogues and review of the Electoral Act in this regard. Despite efforts at enthroning a more violent free political order, Nigeria continues to experience complex political violence as our analysis of the post 1999 experience suggests.
From the foregoing, to ensure the sustainability of democracy, conscious and strategic efforts must be made to eschew violence. This strategic effort must be reinforced through institutionalization of good governance structures where the state is determined against all odds to protect and safeguard the interest and welfare of its citizenry in all ramifications. It is only when the state has failed in this basic duty that individuals/groups tend to be violent and somewhat authoritarian as this study suggests. The Niger Delta crisis riddled with state marginalization and disempowerment of the people is a clear case in point.

9 Recommendations

It is against this background that Ake (1996) advocated for the transformation of the state as a necessity for democratization in Africa. Furthermore, Ake (1996) advocates for a democratization that is based on the popular empowerment of the masses. The “democracy of empowerment” which addresses the social and economic spheres as well as the political and offers concrete rights. Because it is driven by the interests of ordinary people, it is more conducive to the democratic transformation of the state and also to the social and economic upliftment of the masses, including their incorporation into decision making. This is quite different from the ‘electoral democracy’ which the African elites and the international community are advocating.

The major strength of ‘democracy of empowerment’ is that it does not conflict with development nor demand the priority of one over the other. However, as a matter of necessity, it gives priority to investment in health, education and productivity of people to enhancing their self-esteem and making them more competitive in every sphere. These ‘democratic priorities’ inform the basis for transformation of political violence.

In this regard, to re-moralize the political elite who deploy pretexts such as political power acquisition, youth empowerment, marginalization, minority (in the case of the Niger Delta) to ferment political crisis and violence which undermine democracy is essential. It is suggested that institutional reform and a new discourse of politics should be important elements of such a response for a sustainable democracy (Schwarzmante 2010; Amadi and Alapiki 2012).

Nigeria has experienced increasing political violence of complex trajectories which stimulates scholarly interest and urgent policy attention. From arson, hooliganism, shooting, thuggery to politically motivated assassinations. Political violence thus fuels feelings of insecurity and vulnerability which increasingly point-out that an end to such violence is inevitable for Nigeria’s democracy to thrive. In particular, complex political violence has become common place across Nigeria within the dialectics of the quest for power acquisition or related social questions leading to all forms of violent crisis. This is evident in the nature and conduct of elections in Nigeria.

It is germane to stress that the blockade of the avenues of public expression, public opinion, lack of access to popular participation, decision making, gross violation of fundamental human rights, the travesty of Nigerian Federalism and its mono-cultural capitalist economy have all aggravated the incidence of political violence in Nigeria. As a multi-ethnic society, inclusive political reform agenda that could accommodate the disparate groups has been a persistent problem. This accounts for the question regarding restructuring Nigeria’s federal system including fiscal federalism. The aim is to meet the demands of the marginalized groups in the country.

There is a need for equitable political resources, distribution and control. This means that the regimes/governments must offer political resources to all citizens. Political resources here mean comprehensive education, health care system and equitable distribution of the nation’s wealth. Minority consideration suggests that for sustainable democracy to thrive, the minority views, problems and prospects should be equitably considered. It is the lack of this fair consideration that has led to tension and violence in various segments of the country which are made manifest in gross negligence, economic strangulation, and political marginalization; The Tiv crisis, Ogoni crisis, Odi crisis and the Niger Delta crisis in general are incidents of violence arising from gross neglect, marginalization and insensitivity.

Proper management of inter and intra ethnic relationship is important. The increasing ethnic fractionalization within the Nigerian State is a potential time bomb for political violence and a strong challenge to democratic practice in Nigeria. It is recommended that creation of states should not be based on geographical expression but on nationalities or ethnic identity and affiliations.
Guaranteeing the fundamental human rights of the citizenry will douse political violence. There should be adequate protection of the fundamental human rights of all citizens, the respect for the rule of law, social, economic and political justice at all levels.

Effective public administration will strengthen commitment to good governance and check political violence. Public Administration in Nigeria appears moribund. This sector must be made alive and sustained. There has to be transparency, accountability, efficiency and expertise at all levels of governmental administration. Sound policies must be evolved in order to ensure the macroeconomic stability requisite for investment, saving as well as structural reform. There has to be effective training, research and development that will boost technological advancement and diversification of the economy and reduce over dependence on foreign capital/technical aids.

There is a dire need to evolve a shared vision on economic growth, national development and progress, which seems to be lacking in almost all the regimes. Development aspirations ought to be a product of ideological synergy by a vast majority of the members of the society. The National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy; The Economic Recovery and Growth Plan and similar development strategies represent more of the eccentricities of the West than of Nigerians. If this continues unabated, the result would be a colossal policy failure as the needed input from the masses, as critical stakeholders, would be missing. A departure from or reconstruction of occidental rationalism is therefore requisite in order to foster sustainable homegrown development thought.

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