In the year 1957 the Ministry of the Internal Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland decided to disband the Internal Security Corps (WSW KBW). This decision paved the way for the formation of the Military Interior Service of the Military Units of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs (WSW JW MSW) in the year 1973. The aim of this article is to shed light on the organizational and personnel structure as well as the scope of activity of this service in Przemyśl. The WSW JW MSW was responsible for the protection of military units subordinated to the Ministry of the Internal Affairs in the field of counterintelligence, prevention and detection of crimes, and prosecution of offenders. The tasks of the WSW JW MSW were carried out using specialized methods and techniques. The service was structured into local branches located in various cities, including Białystok, Chełm, Przemyśl, Kętrzyn, Krosno Odrzańskie, Kłodzko, Koszalin, Katowice and Warsaw.

**ABSTRACT**

The origin of the Military Interior Service of the Military Units of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs (WSW JW MSW) goes back to 1957, when pursuant to the Regulation No. 021/57 the Ministry disbanded the Information Division of the Border Guard Troops and the Information Department of the Internal Security Corps, later transformed into the Military Interior Service of the Internal Security Corps (WSW KBW) and the Border Guard Troops (WOP). In 1973, the Service of the Military Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (WSW JW MSW) was appointed. Subsequently, new local structures were created in Białystok, Chełm, Przemyśl, Kętrzyn, Krosno Odrzańskie, Kłodzko, Koszalin, Katowice and Warsaw as branches of the WSW JW MSW. This formation shielded military units subordinated to the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, i.e. the Border Guard Troops (WOP), the Vistula Military Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (JN MSW) and the Government Protection Bureau (BOR), in the field of counterintelligence protection, as well as prevention and detection of crimes in military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and prosecution of offenders subjected to the jurisdiction of military courts. When fulfilling their tasks, the WSW operational bodies subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs applied means, methods and forms of operational work, which were characterized by the specificity of activities and the diversity of the environment.

**KEYWORDS**

counterintelligence, Ministry of the Interior, Internal Military Service

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**Introduction**

The Internal Military Service of the Military Units of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs (WSW JW MSW) is a plane for the activities of the military security organs of the Polish People’s Republic (PRL), which is relatively poorly researched by historians. It is also important that its activity remains in the “shadow” of the functioning of the Internal Military Service of the
Ministry of National Defense (WSW MON) created after the liquidation of the information bodies of the Polish Armed Forces in January 1957\(^1\).

WSW was subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense was active until its liquidation in 1990 and the establishment of Military Information Services in its place. The other structure of WSW, i.e., the Department of the Military Interior Service of the Military Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (WSW JW MSW), operated similarly until the same year, although it was formed slightly later – in the 60s of the last century, as will be discussed later.

Paweł Piotrowski’s publications [1, 2] are one of the first scientific texts devoted to WSW JW MSW. Jacek Wygoda and Radosław Peterman took the next step in the research in question [3]. The findings made by J. Wygoda and R. Peterman inspired the author of this study to conduct further research on the activities of WSW JW MSW. The resulting article aims at presenting the activities of WSW JW MSW on the example of the Department in Przemyśl. This stems from the fact that the author’s scientific interests are related to the security apparatus, both civil and military, operating in the years 1944-1990 in south-eastern Poland. Moreover, he focused on discussing the geopolitical background of the region and Poland of the “decade” of Edward Gierek, as well as the period of Martial Law and the last years of the People’s Republic of Poland.

In the publication, the author mainly used source materials developed by WSW JW MSW and held by the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN). The conducted query of these sources creates a one-sided view of the operation of this formation. The unilateral nature of the materials suggests a fairly critical approach and a certain degree of difficulty in their assessment, since at the moment there are no scientific studies dealing more widely with the activities of WSW JW MSW, apart from those mentioned in the introduction to this article. Valuable information was obtained from accounts of ex-soldiers of WSW MON as a structure parallel to WSW JW MSW. In this case, the profile of opinions originating from the environment of former WSW soldiers as an open source should also be taken into account.

\(^1\) For more about the origins of WSW see: L. Pawlikowski. **Tajny front zimnej wojny. Uciekinierzy z polskich służb specjalnych 1956-1964.** Warszawa: “Rytmy”; 2004; Z. Palski. **Informacja Wojska Polskiego 1943-1957.** Warszawa: Agencja Wydawnicza CB, Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk; 2016. More about the military security bodies also in: Z. Palski. **Agentura informacji wojskowej w latach 1945-1956.** Warszawa: ISP PAN; 1992; W. Tkaczew. **Powstanie i działalność organów informacji Wojska Polskiego 1943-1948. Kontrwywiad wojskowy.** Warszawa: Bellona; 1994; W. Tkaczew. **Organa informacji Wojska Polskiego 1943-1956. Kontrwywiad wojskowy.** Warszawa: Bellona; 2007; J. Pokuński. **“TUN” Tatar-Utnik-Nowicki.** Warszawa: Bellona; 1992; A. Paczkowski. **Aparat bezpieczeństwa w latach 1944-1945. Toktyka, strategia, metody. Cz. 2. Lata 1948-1949.** Warszawa: ISP PAN; 1996; A. Paczkowski. **Pół wieku dziejów Polski 1939-1989.** Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN; 1998; A. Świderski. **System kształcenia kadr oficerskich dla służb informacyjnych Wojska Polskiego w Oficerskiej Szkoły Informacji w latach 1945-1956 (a doctoral dissertation written under the supervision of Prof. Dr. hab. Romuald Geles).** Wrocław: University of Wrocław; 1999; P. Piotrowski. **WSW 1957-1989.** Biuletyn Historyczny IPN. 2002;6; P. Piotrowski. **Kufel i jego kompania.** Biuletyn IPN. 2005;5; P. Semków. **Informacja Marynarki Wojennej w latach 1945-1957.** Warszawa: IPN; 2006; B. Kapuściak (selection and preparation). **Instrukcje pracy kontrwywiadowczej WSW wraz z instrukcjami prowadzenia dokumentacji i ewidencji (1957-1990).** Kraków: IPN; 2010; A. Pietrzak. **Główny Zarząd Informacji wobec oflagowców.** Warszawa: Instytut Nauk Historycznych UKSW; Łomianki: LTW; 2011; B. Pacek, A. Rochkowski. **Pion porządkowy i dochodzeniowy WSW. Organizacja i zadania. Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy.** 2012;13(64);2(240); R. Terlecki. **Miecz i tarcza komunizmu. Historia aparatu bezpieczeństwa w Polsce 1944-1900.** 2\(^{nd}\) ed. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie; 2013; P. Pleskot. **“Tarcza partii i narodu”. Kontrwywiad Polski Ludowej w latach 1945-1956. Zarys struktur i wybór źródeł.** Warszawa: IPN; 2015.
The presented work has been developed in chronological and thematic terms. The author has kept the original terminology in the footnotes.

**The genesis and the outline of the activities of the WSW JW MSW Department in Przemyśl**

On September 13, 1945, a new formation – the Border Guard Troops (WOP) was formed by order No. 0245 of the Supreme Commander of the Polish Armed Forces. In 1946, the Przemyśl WOP Branch was numbered 8 and subordinated to the Military District in Krakow. By order of the Minister of National Defense of 20 March 1948, the Branches were transformed into Brigades. By order No. 205 of December 4, 1948, WOP passed under the Ministry of Public Security. On July 1, 1956, WOP was again subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense. These changes were in force until July 20, 1971, when WOP was again under the Ministry of the Internal Affairs [4].

Wygoda and Paterman see the background of the creation of WSW JW MSW in 1957, when the WOP Information Division and the KBW Information Department were disbanded under the order No. 021/57 by the Minister of the Internal Affairs, and then transformed into WSW KBW and WOP [3, p. 132]. According to the author of the article, the premises for the above hypothesis can also be found in W. Tkaczw’s publications [5. See also: 6].

On June 24, 1965, the Ordinance No. 41 of the Prime Minister on changing the subordination of the Internal Forces entered into force. Pursuant to its provisions the following forces passed under the Ministry of National Defense: WOP without a border movement unit, KBW Units without the Vistula Brigade, KBW Signal Battalion, the Training Reserve Battalion of the Citizen Militia (MO), the Security Service (SB) and the independent air forces squadron of military units remaining in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Independent WSW Department of Military Units of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs was created in place of the Department of WSW KBW and WOP, which was liquidated in 1965. In 1971, according to the organizational Order No. 054 of September 18, 1971, issued by the Head of the General Staff, WSW JW MSW was created, to which the branches in Gliwice, Lubań Śląski, Szczecin, Nowy Sącz and Gdańsk were subordinated. After the formation of the WSW Branch by the Ministry of National Defense, it was transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as was the case with WOP [3, p. 135-7].

In 1973, another reorganization was carried out in accordance with the Ordinance No. 024 of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs; it was then the WSW JW Ministry of the Interior Ministry was appointed. Subsequently, new local structures of WSW JW MSW were established in Białystok, Chełm, Przemyśl, Kętrzyn, Krosno Odrzańskie, Kłodzko, Koszalin, Katowice and Warsaw [3, p. 138, 139].

At the beginning of the 70s of the last century, the manpower of the local WSW JW MSW Department envisaged fourteen posts, including eight for officers, two for warrant officers, two for privates and two for civilian employees [7, k. 16, 17].

In 1976, the WSW JW MSW Department in Przemyśl, attached to the WOP Bieszczady Brigade, had a staff of 27 people. The personnel included: Head of Department – Colonel/Lieutenant Colonel, the military specialty: 73-3-01 (counterintelligence); Deputy Head of the Department – Lieutenant Colonel, the military specialty: 73-3-10 (investigative-preventive);
Senior Officer – Lieutenant Colonel, the military specialty: 73-3-10 (investigative-preventive); two more Senior Officers – Major, the military specialty: 73-3-10 (investigative-preventive); Senior Forensic Technician – warrant officer, Head of the Office and Writer – Typist. In addition, a team of WSW soldiers was assigned to the Department [8, k. 18].

The Regulation No. 15/78 of the Minister of Internal Affairs of March 28, 1978 regulated the mode and rules of service of professional soldiers in units subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Under the Ordinance the Minister of Internal Affairs was to appoint the soldiers serving in WSW JW MSW to official positions [9, k. 7].

At the end of the seventies of the last century, the WSW JW MSW Department in Przemyśl comprised of 7 employees, including 5 officers, 1 private and 1 civilian employee. According to military ranks, the structure was as follows: Head of the Department – Lieutenant Colonel, Senior Officer – Lieutenant Colonel/Major, Senior Officer – Major, Senior Officer – Captain, Senior Administrative Officer – a civilian employee, Driver – Private [10, k. 2, 3].

According to Peacetime Establishment No. 99/056 the WSW JW MSW Department in Przemyśl received the identification number 9230485 and the name of the Military Unit No. 3048 [11, k. 39].

In 1983, the personnel on structure of this outpost provided for 5 posts for officers and 1 for a civilian employee. In fact, there were 4 posts for officers and 1 for a civilian employee [12, k. 56].

In 1986, the WSW JW MSW Department in Przemyśl had four officer positions in the ranks ranging from Captain to Lieutenant Colonel and one civilian post [13, k. 113].

In the first half of 1989, WSW JW MSW had 5 officer positions, including 1 vacancy, and 1 post for a civilian employee [14, k. 147]. Furthermore, due to the restructuring of WOP, the outpost in question was personally strengthened by raising one officer post to higher rank and completing the vacancy. It was imposed by the necessity of providing a shield for the newly formed WOP battalion in Chełm, subordinated to the WOP Bieszczady Brigade [15, k. 151]. An additional task for this outpost stemmed from the fact that it protected the 4th Bieszczadzki Motorized Regiment of the Vistula Military Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Kwaszenino [16, k. 89].

At the beginning of 1990, the manpower for the Department was raised to six positions for officers, all of which were filled, and the one civilian was left [17, k. 173].

The central and local WSW JW MSW outposts were subordinated to General Edward Tarała, who supervised the entire Armed Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, WOP and the Vistula Military Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as Government Security Bureau [2, p. 15].

Based on the analysis of source materials, it was established that the following soldiers of this formation: Lieutenant Colonel Jerzy Wosinek, Major Edward Andrijszyn, Lieutenant Jerzy Michałowski, Lieutenant Sławomir Sławiński, and Lieutenant Waldemar Kłaniecki served in WSW JW MSW in Przemyśl in the mid-1980s. Moreover, there was one civilian employee – Krystyna Januszewska [18, k. 162; Cf. 19, k. 31]. Additionally, Captain Sylwester Zalewski [20, k. 16] augmented the staff of this outpost A year later, the Department was reinforced by another man – Second Lieutenant Zbigniew Witkowski appointed as a senior officer in the investigation and prevention group. The mentioned soldier was moved to Przemyśl from the WSW JW MSW Department in Warsaw [21, k. 106]. In 1989, Major Witold Czerwonka was
sent to the Department and assigned to a position a Senior Officer (the military specialty: 73-5-10) [22, k. 143].

Until 1986, Major Wojciech Szczepanik held the position of the Head of the Department [23, k. 164]. He was appointed to this position in 1983 [24, k. 39]. The last Head of the Przemyśl Department of this service was Lieutenant Colonel Bronisław Maryńczak in the years 1986-1990 [25, k. 226; Cf. 26, k. 122]. The author of the article has not been able to find source materials concerning people commanding this institution in the seventies of the last century.

For the entire period of its activity, the WOP Bieszczady Brigade supplied the WSW JW Department in Przemyśl in the medical, financial, material and technical terms [27, k. 39].

The legal regulations introduced at the beginning of the 1980s indicated that the organizational units of the WSW JW MSW were composed of the Department of the WSW JW MSW being the management and control body, and the local branches and departments of the WSW JW MSW. The service was established for:

1) counterintelligence protection of military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
2) prevention and detection of crimes in military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and prosecution of perpetrators of offenses subject to the jurisdiction of military courts [28, k. 3, 4].

The main task of WSW JW MSW was:

1) combating espionage activity against the military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the interests of the People’s Republic of Poland,
2) prevention – disclosure and elimination of premises conducive to the emergence of crime, in particular acts of subversion, sabotage, terror, creating illegal relationships, attacks on equipment, weapons and other military property, as well as the seizure of weapons and ammunition, economic harm, significant violations of the principles of performing border and security service and detecting perpetrators of these crimes,
3) prophylactic work in cooperation with the commanders and party and the political apparatus aimed at protecting state and official secrets, as well as counteracting manifestations that have a negative impact on military readiness of military units,
4) conducting preparatory proceedings in criminal cases in the scope and on the principles set out in the provisions on criminal proceedings and the Instruction on Conducting Investigations in the Armed Forces,
5) issuing opinions on the acceptance of military and civilian employees to secret and special duties, when nominating for specific positions in connection with going abroad,
6) securing military exercises and other special actions within the military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in terms of counterintelligence as well as prosecution and investigation,
7) providing information on soldiers of military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and persons employed in these formations at the request of competent authorities [28, k. 4, 5].

Heads of the local WSW JW MSW in the scope of their tasks were obliged to:

1) combating espionage activities of foreign intelligence against military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the interests of the People’s Republic of Poland,
2) preventing acts of subversion, terror, sabotage, hostile and other criminal activity, as well as detecting and prosecuting the perpetrators of these crimes,

3) conducting preventive work in the field of protection of the state and official secrets as well as counteracting manifestations and phenomena that have a negative impact on the combat readiness of military units,

4) initiating preparatory proceedings in cases subject to the jurisdiction of military courts based on procedural rights and procedural duty under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Instruction on Conducting Investigations in the Armed Forces,

5) counterintelligence protection and prosecution – investigation service of exercises conducted by military units of the Ministry of Ministry of Internal Affairs or with their participation,

6) close cooperation with the unit commanders and party and the political apparatus in the field of soldiers’ upbringing, prevention and removal of premises and reasons conducive to the occurrence of crimes, extraordinary incidents, violations of law and other negative phenomena,

7) maintaining the combat readiness of the subordinate state and cooperating with the unit’s command in planning its mobilization development,

8) performing other tasks ordered by superiors [28, k. 8, 9].

The whole of the Department’s work was directed by its commander. The analysis of the Regulation No. 01/83 of August 31, 1983, of the Head of the WSW JW MSW shows that it determined a wide range of rights and duties of the Head of the Branch/Department.

In accordance with the above cited normative act, the Head of the Branch/Department managed the work of this organizational unit within the limits set by the legal provisions on the organization and scope of activities of the WSW JW MSW, and was fully responsible for the results of the work. He reported directly to the head of the WSW JW MSW and his deputies. In general matters he shaped the proper moral and ideological – party attitude of the composition of the subordinate staff, and he was responsible for the state of the discipline, training and combat capability. He presented the necessary conclusions regarding personnel matters, such as promotions, reassignments, proposed appointments for higher positions and military grades, referral for training, courses, studies, penalties, distinctions, etc.

He prepared and submitted for approval the plans of the Branch/Department’s work, reports and information. He supervised cooperation with commanders of protected military units, SB, Citizen’s Militi, Prosecutor’s Office, WSW MON and local authorities in the field of operations of the subordinate facility. He supervised and organized preventive work resulting from the applicable legal provisions as part of the division of tasks agreed with the commanders, the party-political apparatus and appropriate military prosecutors. He organized and supervised the performance of mobilization works, controlled the subordinate personnel for the observance of the provisions regulating the mode and scope of in terms of counterintelligence and prosecution – investigation work, supervised the operation of the secret registry and the compliance with provisions on the protection of state secrets and dealing with documents. Moreover, he controlled the organization of training and self-education of the soldiers of the Branch/Department [29, k. 7, 8].

In the counterintelligence work, the Head of the Branch/Department planned and organized the entire operational work based on current needs resulting from the situation in the
protected units, developed the main directional objectives of counterintelligence work, and
provided necessary guidance to subordinate officers. He made decisions and approved docu-
ments within the limits of the powers specified in the relevant provisions, organized and could
personally conduct the reconnaissance of the counterintelligence situation in the protected
military units and major operational matters in the necessary extent. He supervised the con-
duct of the operating records provided for by separate regulations. He analyzed operational
materials so that he could determine the right directions of actions and procedures, as well
as gave guidelines for operational cases and preliminary materials [29, k. 9].

In the scope of prosecution and investigation work, the Head of Division/Department made
decisions in accordance with procedural rights on initiating preparatory proceedings or refusing
to prosecute, approved investigation plans and investigative measures, and reviewed the most
important criminal cases to assist the investigator. He supervised the ongoing proceedings in re-
spect of compliance with applicable laws and the proper use of means of technology securing all
evidence gathered. What is more, he submitted relevant applications to the prosecutor’s offices
supervising the criminal proceedings conducted by his subordinate organizational unit [29, k. 9].

In practice, the prosecution and investigation work was supervised by the Deputy Head of
the Branch/Department. He presented proposals to the Head of the Branch/Department for
approval or replaced him in this scope of duties [30, k. 51].

Deputy Head of the Branch/Department of WSW JW MSW was subordinated directly to the
Head of the Branch/Department and was co-responsible for the proper organization and re-
results of the work of this organizational unit. His duties included developing work plans, prob-
lem information and other documents generalizing the issues occurring in the operational
and investigation work. He supervised the conduct of operational matters and explanation
of preliminary materials (counterintelligence signals). He conducted personal work with op-
erational sources of information in the most important organizational cells of the military
unit. The Deputy Head did not protect the facility under the rules applying to object officers.

Subsequently, he supervised criminal proceedings and held all responsibility for the overall
organization of the investigation work, thus ensuring its efficiency. He developed training
programs for professional staff and soldiers of the compulsory military service and was re-
sponsible for their proper implementation. He supervised the supernumerary duty and con-
voy service, controlled the technical condition of operating and forensic equipment and its
proper use. He prepared programs for briefings and working meetings within the branch and
carried out other tasks ordered by his superiors [31, k. 13, 14].

A Senior Officer (Officer) in the division of the Branch/Department reported to his supervisor
and was responsible for direct counterintelligence protection of the military unit/military
facility with regard to organizing and conducting prevention, detection and recognition of
criminal (hostile) activities. He accomplished the entrusted tasks through activities related to
counterintelligence protection of a military unit or other military facility, determination and
elimination of premises conducive to hostile activity – especially of a political nature, revealing
the secret, committing desertion, theft of arms and ammunition or the formation of other
negative events affecting the state of the combat readiness of a protected military unit. He
selected, developed, acquired and operated operational sources of information for securing
the protected military unit/facility, checking signals and explaining preliminary materials, as
well as conducted operational matters. He systematically recognized the personnel of the
military unit/facility with particular attention to suspicious contacts between soldiers, civilian employees and their families with criminal elements, foreigners and persons (institutions) from capitalist countries. He was liable for counterintelligence protection of military exercises, reporting to the command group of the Branch/Department on situations and extraordinary cases, the state and results of counterintelligence work. He kept the documentation provided for in separate regulations and carried out other tasks ordered by supervisors [31, k. 28, 29].

In this way, a Senior Officer (Officer) fulfilled tasks within the WSW JW MSW related to the counterintelligence protection of the Polish Armed Forces in the field of recognition of foreign intelligence activities of capitalist states, protected the Polish Armed Forces against propaganda of foreign ideological centers, or detected crime – especially of political nature – in the Armed Forces [32, k. 6].

A Senior Officer (Officer) of the prosecution and investigation division carried out tasks in the field of conducting verification proceedings and other official explanations, as well as procedural steps within legal assistance for other authorities. He conducted preventive work in the military units protected by the Branch/Department and held responsibility for the recording of investigation work and for forensic equipment and its technical condition. He took part in major court hearings in cases in which the preparatory proceedings were conducted by the Branch/Department. He evaluated operational materials before making the decision to initiate criminal proceedings and cooperated with the counterintelligence officer during the preparatory proceedings. He could also provide the counterintelligence officer with other information relevant to the operational work [31, k. 27-9].

At this point, a few words should be devoted to the methodology of operational work in WSW JW MSW.

According to Piotr Piotrowski, probably the first and, as it seems, the only normative document in this respect is “Instruction on Counterintelligence Activity in Military Units of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs” constituting an annex to the Regulation No. 0014/85 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of February 20, 1985. The document specified in detail the methods and forms of the operational work in WSW JW MSW, which significantly differed from the methodology of the operational work of the Security Service, and were analogous to those practiced in WSW MON.

The Instruction defined two groups of the so-called personal sources of information: counterintelligence personnel that included secret collaborators and unofficial employees. In addition, this document mentioned the category of trusted people.

According to the Instruction, secret collaborators were obtained for detecting and recognizing criminal activity, or as it was defined – destructive activities, in the Armed Forces and the activity of “anti-socialist forces” targeted against the Polish Armed Forces (in the 1980s – the author’s note). Their task was also to detect the operations of foreign special services or “centers of ideological diversion” for preventive purposes, i.e. to recognize the premises of such activities and to secure the implementation of special projects. In line with this Instruction, people such as generals, officers at generals’ posts, military unit commanders at the level of regiment and above, political officers, prosecutors and judges, and secretaries of party instances could not be recruited. However, PZPR members could be obtained on grounds of ideological and political motives, i.e., the principle of voluntariness, and material/personal interest, i.e., on the substantive principle.
The so-called unofficial employees were obtained exclusively on a voluntary basis in order to coordinate the work of secret collaborators and to carry out the tasks provided for informal collaborators (TW).

In contrast, trusted people were a specific category in the military security organs. They were obtained from among the personnel of protected military units and their surroundings so as to ensure the flow of information about occurrences of interest of counterintelligence, which did not require engaging a secret collaborator to obtain it. They could not be persons with whom official contacts were maintained, e.g., military unit commanders [1, p. 415, 416].

The above resulted from recommendations for the cooperation of military counterintelligence officers with the cadre of the protected units/military facilities aimed at joint ventures designed to prevent events and phenomena adversely affecting combat readiness of the troops, and especially as it was then called “ideological-political content” and exchange of information [32, k. 40].

In accordance with the provisions of the Instruction of 1985, the following categories of operational matters were kept: operational cards and preliminary materials. However, operational inquiries were conducted in the form of the operational clarification of a case, the operational recognition of a case, and the operational search of a case [1, p. 416].

Operational inquiries were initiated on the basis of preliminary materials subsequently reclassified to a specific procedure. In this case, a specific sequence of events was applied: information – preliminary materials – the procedure initiated3.

A Military Counterintelligence Officer was responsible for the effective counterintelligence protection of military units and institutions stationed in the area of executive responsibility. Countering espionage was always a priority. For this purpose, it was necessary to organize a network of appropriately selected, properly placed, well-trained and effectively used personal information sources3.

A Counterintelligence Officer of the WSW JW MSW carried out his tasks through receiving information from various sources about interesting occurrences, facts and people. He analyzed and evaluated it, and was obliged to undertake further activity on their basis [33, k. 89].

When performing their tasks, WSW operational bodies subordinated to the Ministry of the Internal Affairs applied means, methods and forms of operational work, which were characterized by the specificity of activities and the diversity of the environment [33, k. 3].

In the second half of the 1970s, Poland was characterized by the emergence of opposition forces organizing groups of new origin, opposing the excessive influence of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) on the power and the entire political and social system of the state [34, p. 439].

Military units and institutions of a stationary nature executed their tasks as before the imposition of Martial Law. During the Martial Law, military counterintelligence officers performed their tasks in protected units and military institutions under the existing terms and conditions4.

2 The relation by Maj. A.P. as of 3 March 2017 (Maj. (ret.) A.P., former WSW officer serving in the years 1973-1990 in Rzeszów and Przemyśl – personal data held by the author).
3 The relation by Maj. K.L. as of 3 May 2017 (Maj. (ret.) K.L. former WSW officer serving in Rzeszów and Przemyśl – personal data held by the author).
4 The relations by Maj (ret.) K.L. as of 01 May 2017.
The dominant reactions to the introduction of Martial Law were surprise, confusion, anxiety and anticipation of the further development of the situation. There was a widespread belief that interned people had been sent to Siberia. Strikes and protests in many regions of the country and the accompanying interventions of militia and the Armed Forces were talked about. People slowly got used to Martial Law. The daily inconvenience was checking documents and inspecting vehicles by patrols of militia and Armed Forces. Many people, even associated with the power apparatus, under the influence of information provided in the media became convinced that the introduction of Martial Law had put an end to the further deterioration of the situation [35, p. 408].

The authorities of WSW JW MSW monitored the social situation in the country during the above-mentioned period, both in military and civilian environments. Among the military personnel the opinions about the possible date of the abolition of Martial Law prevailed, which was supposed to affect the stabilization of the situation in the country [36, k. 36].

The progressive drop in social tension did not change the very bad social mood. In the vast majority of cases, the mood in the society was affected by the strains of everyday life. The increases in the prices of food and goods that were lacking in stores only added to the state of depression [35, p. 410, 411].

On the other hand, the process of forming a political opposition in Poland resulted in developing methods and forms of combating it by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. In the 1980s there was a political struggle between the authorities and the underground “Solidarność” („Solidarity”). The second half of this decade is the time of many initiatives undertaken by the communist authorities. The formation of the political opposition in Poland was closely watched by the decision-making party circles and by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. The August strikes in 1980 and the emergence of “Solidarność” led to a situation in which the role of the Ministry of Internal Affairs became more significant, and substantial personnel changes took place in the structures of the Ministry and PZPR [2, p. 9, 10].

During the events of the years 1980-1981, people became convinced that they could organize and act together according to their will, and not necessarily according to the will of the authorities. The self-rule and independence of “Solidarność” were treated as the essential prey, and therefore the opposition against the state authorities despite the threat of the application of the penalty was expressed quite commonly [37, p. 442].

The decade 1980-1990, which proved to be the most revolutionary one in the whole period, has become a symbol of the deviation from totalitarianism. The movement of renewal was going through all segments of society, not coinciding with any religious or ideological orientation. Already at the beginning of the decade, a clear polarization was visible in the Polish society, which became the catalyst for the great movement embodied by the multi-directional NSZZ “Solidarność”. Radical tendencies were revealed in various political camps. The last decade of the People's Republic of Poland announced new times and the elimination of anachronistic ideological forms [38, p. 7].

Recognizing the reasons for social apathy, the authorities were not willing to change their policy, at most trying minor and apparent steps that could not satisfy anyone [39, p. 87].

The analysis of documents produced by WSW JW MSW indicates that in the new political and social realities created in 1990 the leadership of this formation made a desperate attempt to adapt to the new reality.
The WSW JW MSW Department made efforts to recognize activities of foreign special services of the countries neighboring Poland, which had begun the operating activities and the creation of the agent network in Poland. At the same time, according to the data of WSW JW MSW, foreign special services in the framework of official contacts maintained by their officers in Poland initiated efforts to continue them and transfer them to the social sphere. These contacts were to concern Polish officers of institutions subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces and civilian employees of the state administration. WSW JW MSW obtained information about attempts to recruit people for cooperation with foreign services for material benefits such as facilitations in trips to neighboring countries for private and commercial purposes.

In the opinion of the Department of WSW JW MSW, soldiers of WOP units were a category particularly exposed to aggressive activities of foreign special services. In addition, it was considered that the recruitment among national minorities and people of Polish nationality living in a cross-border belt was conducted. Foreign local smugglers and people with nationalist views were also mentioned as interesting environments for foreign services.

In connection with the above, the Head of the Department of WSW JW MSW recommended increasing operational and service recognition of the nature of official contacts maintained by WOP soldiers with representatives of border services of neighboring countries. Moreover, the Head recommended examining the background of unofficial contacts between WOP soldiers and people living in neighboring countries. What is more, he ordered to remain the operational control over persons suspected of illegal smuggling conducted under the guise of commercial activity, which could be used by foreign special services as a platform for the recruitment of information sources [40, k. 1, 2].

Despite performing tasks in another environment, the bodies of WSW JW under the MSW carried out analogous forms and methods of operational and investigation work as the Department of WSW of the Ministry of National Defense. They were an integral part of the military security apparatus, in this case responsible for working out the personnel of military units subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The analysis of the source materials indicates that the WSW JW MSW officers, similarly to the WSW MON officers, devoted a significant part of their operational activities to the identification of “anti-socialist forces” in the protected military units. The counterintelligence profile of this formation is questionable, and the assessment of its operation is directed towards the repressive nature of the activity. In addition, through the profile of the staffing and organizational structure of the WSW JW MSW Department in Przemyśl, attention should be paid to the strong manning of the prosecution and investigation division. It dominated the number of officers with counterintelligence specialties. As far as this trend was maintained in other local departments of this service, one can come to the conclusion about the primacy of investigation work over operational one. This in turn indicates the repressive – police character of this formation, and shows counterintelligence in the background.

**Conclusion**

The author presented the activity of one of the organizational units for the reasons mentioned in the introduction to this article. However, when analyzing the source materials, it
should be noted that WSW JW MSW implemented the same methods and forms of operational and investigation work at the central level, i.e., the department, and at the level of local branches. It protected military units subjected to the Ministry of Internal Affairs displaced in the area, at the same time taking account of the specificity of the region in which the given branch of WSW JW MSW was located. In the case of the Department in Przemyśl, it was crucial because the facility functioned in specific physiographic conditions and at the point at which the borders of three countries meet (tripoint of Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR).

The author did not manage to find archival materials, e.g., personal information sources of the Department of WSW JW MSW in Przemyśl, which would allow for the assessment of additional directions of this institution’s operation. An interesting thread is to investigate the cooperation between WSW JW MSW and the civil security authorities. The author makes similar presumption as to the cooperation between WSW JW MSW and the reconnaissance of WOP.

Thus, the subject of “forgotten security organs” is an attractive field for further inquisitive research and historical disputes.

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