DETECTING MULTIPLE AUTHORSHIP OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT LEGAL DECISIONS USING FUNCTION WORDS

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This paper uses statistical analysis of function words used in legal judgments written by United States Supreme Court justices, to determine which justices have the most variable writing style (which may indicate greater reliance on their law clerks when writing opinions), and also the extent to which different justices’ writing styles are distinguishable from each other.

1. Introduction. This paper describes various statistical analyses performed on the texts of judicial opinions written by United States Supreme Court (USSC) justices.

Our primary motivation is to attempt to use textual analysis to explore issues of authorship. With respect to the USSC, we are interested in the extent to which justices rely on their clerks when writing opinions. According to legal scholar and jurist Richard A. Posner, “Americans... could not care less whether Supreme Court justices or any other judges write their own opinions or have their clerks write them, provided the judges decide the outcome” [Posner (1996), page 143]. While reasonable minds may disagree with Posner on either positive or normative grounds, it is clear that the content of judicial opinions matter, particularly at the USSC. Lower courts are bound by both the holding and the reasoning of USSC opinions, and litigants—actual and prospective—act in the shadow of these opinions [Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979)].

The issue of judicial authorship is important from an institutional and policy perspective. At the federal level, the expansion in the number of cases has significantly outpaced the increase in authorized judgeships. This trend is most pronounced at the USSC, where over the past fifty years the court’s caseload has steadily increased while the number of justices—and

Received December 2009; revised May 2010.

Key words and phrases. United States Supreme Court, law clerks, function words, stylometry, chi-squared distribution, variability statistics.

This is an electronic reprint of the original article published by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in The Annals of Applied Statistics, 2011, Vol. 5, No. 1, 283–308. This reprint differs from the original in pagination and typographic detail.
law clerks—has remained constant. Justices are asked to handle more work with the same resources. Given the public and Congressional scrutiny given to the selection of USSC nominees [Carter (1994)], it is daunting to consider that much of the Court’s work is done by “twenty-five-year-old law clerks fresh out of law school” [Posner (1986), page 567].

Given these increased demands, and heterogeneity in justices’ ability and effort, one would expect that justices differ in how they manage their workload. Some justices respond, as many have, by joining the “cert pool,” where justices work collectively to evaluate which cases to grant certiorari [Ward and Weiden (2006), page 117]. Some may delegate more of opinion writing, the primary output from the Court, to their law clerks. The degree to which the latter has occurred remains a topic of intense debate by journalists and scholars alike [Woodward and Armstrong (1979); Lazarus (1998); Toobin (2007)].

This debate has been motivated in part by the fact that justices, as Article III judges, enjoy lifetime tenure. Critics of lifetime tenure contend that justices often serve well beyond their productive years [Garrow (2000); Calbresi and Lindgren (2006)]. If true, one manifestation would likely be increased delegation of work to law clerks as justices’ ability and desire to do the work diminishes over time. Our methodology provides a credible statistical approach to examine the relationship between justices and their clerks, specifically how justices vary, both with respect to one another and over the court of their tenure on the USSC.

Our central intuition is that the greater the delegation in the opinion-writing process, the more heterogeneous the writing style. At the extremes, a justice who wrote his own opinions would presumptively have a more distinct writing style than another justice who relied heavily on his law clerks. This view is supported by recent scholarship analyzing justices’ draft opinions where available, finding that a justice who was more involved in the opinion-writing process produced more textually consistent opinions than a justice who delegated more of the work to his clerks [Wahlbeck et al. (2002), page 172]. The institutional design of USSC clerkships provides an additional exogenous mechanism to test this hypothesis: USSC clerkships are usually for a single term, from October through August of the subsequent year. Accordingly, the cohort for law clerks changes in predictable fashion, allowing an examination of justices’ writing style within and across terms.

Although this paper focuses on statistical methodology, the question of judicial authorship is an important one in both political science and law. USSC opinions reflect a principal–agent relationship between the justices and their clerks. As with any principal–agent relationship, the degrees to which the clerks’ interests correspond with the justices’ depend on their incentives and degree of oversight. But to even approach this question requires first a more complete understanding of judicial authorship. While it
may be possible to tackle this assignment by reading every Supreme Court opinion, our discussions with current USSC scholars suggest that differences in writing variability across justices may be too subtle to discern manually. Our paper provides a more systematic approach. [In a different direction, scholars have recently taken a textual analysis approach to the USSC in the context of oral argument; Hawes, Lin and Resnik (2009).]

For example, it is believed that within the current USSC, certain justices [e.g., Scalia; see Lazarus (1998), page 271] primarily write their own legal decisions, while others [e.g., Kennedy; see Lazarus (1998), page 274] rely more on their law clerks to do much of the writing. While anecdotes abound on these claims [Peppers (2006); Ward and Weiden (2006)], there are few hard facts about this and it is mostly a matter of speculation.

We attempt to verify this hypothesis by measuring the variability of writing style of the majority opinions written by various justices. We find, using the Kennedy–Scalia example, that Kennedy opinions have significantly greater variability than do those by Scalia, measured using various statistics involving the frequencies of various function words (as described below). Furthermore, using a bootstrap approach, we confirm that these differences are statistically significant at the 5% level. Given our assumption that greater reliance on clerks produces greater variability of writing style, this conclusion would appear to provide compelling evidence that Kennedy does indeed get more writing assistance from law clerks than does Scalia. We similarly find that Stevens and Souter have significantly more variability than Scalia, while Rehnquist and Breyer and Thomas have significantly less variability than Kennedy.

Our secondary motivation is to attempt to identify authorship, solely by use of word frequencies. Our informal enquiries with USSC constitutional scholars indicate that they do not believe they are able to do this. Nevertheless, in this paper we consider various approaches (naive Bayes classifier, linear classifier), and show using a cross-validation approach that such algorithms can indeed predict authorship in pairwise comparisons with accuracy approaching 90%. While this determination is superfluous for authored opinions, it does provide a clear measure of the extent to which justices have identifiably distinct writing styles from one another. Moreover, our approach has other relevant applications, such as identifying the likely author for per curiam opinions (for which no justice is listed as the author).

Our methodology thus appears to provide useful methods both for determining multiple authorship and for identifying the recorded authorship, solely using function words—at least for USSC decisions (and perhaps beyond). Our analysis required writing extensive software, which is freely available [Rosenthal (2009)] for purposes of reproducing or extending our results. Further details are given herein.
1.1. **Background on the United States Supreme Court.** The USSC is the highest court in the United States, providing the final word on all federal issues of constitutional and statutory law. It has a predominantly discretionary docket, granting *certiorari* only for “cases involving unsettled questions of federal constitutional or statutory law of general interest” [Rehnquist (2001), page 238]. While the USSC is not unique in issuing opinions or creating precedent, its position at the apex of the judicial hierarchy ensures that practitioners, legal scholars, and law students closely scrutinize its opinions.

Each year the Court receives thousands of petitions for *certiorari* (requests to hear the case), for which it decides which cases to hear, and issue opinions. In the 2008–2009 term, for example, the Court received 8966 cert petitions, heard oral argument for 87 cases, and issued 86 opinions [Judicial Business of the United States Courts (2009), Table A1]. These figures reflect a historical trend in which the caseload demands of the Court has steadily increased.

The workload is considerable. Unlike the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, the USSC is administratively lean. The court itself consists of only nine justices. The chambers of each justice typically consist of one secretary and four law clerks.

Justices routinely serve on the USSC well past typical retirement age or after they vest in their pension (which usually occurs at age 65), often leaving only due to death or illness. Perhaps in part due to the Court’s tradition of longevity and hard work, Americans consistently rank the USSC as the most trusted branch of government [Jamieson and Hennessy (2007)]. Justice Louis Brandeis once commented, “[t]he reason the public thinks so much of the Justices of the Supreme Court is that they are almost the only people in Washington who do their own work” [O’Brien (1986), pages 12–13].

At the same time, the USSC remains one of the least understood branches. Unlike Congress, the USSC deliberates in private. The deliberations result in a single public document: the opinion itself. Accordingly, the process by which the USSC produces each opinion remains largely unknown. Prior to the 1950s, justices performed most of the substantive requirements of the job, including writing opinions [Peppers (2006), page 208], while law clerks performed mostly administrative tasks. As the job demands increased over time, however, without a corresponding increase in the number of justices, justices relied more on law clerks to prepare *certiorari* and oral argument memos, as well as draft and edit opinions [Peppers (2006), page 151]. While the prestige of a Supreme Court law clerkship is well accepted within legal circles [Kozinski (1999)], the clerks’ contribution to their respective justices remains largely anecdotal [Peppers (2006); Ward and Weiden (2006); Lazarus (1998); Woodward and Armstrong (1979)]. Some accounts of the USSC law clerks directly challenge Brandeis’s claim. Justice Thurgood Marshall, when told that his view of the right to privacy conflicted with one of
1.2. Statistical analysis via function words. Stylometry, the statistical analysis of texts, has a long history, including applications to the famous Shakespeare authorship question [see, e.g., Seletsky, Huang and Henderson-Frost (2007); Burns (2006); Wikipedia (2009), though much of the investigation has involved historical and other nonstatistical methods], the Federalist Papers [Mosteller and Wallace (1964)], and Ronald Reagan’s radio addresses [Airoldi et al. (2006, 2007)].

One challenge with statistical textual analysis is separating those writing features pertaining to writing style, from those pertaining to specific subject matter content. To deal with this, a number of authors [e.g., Fries (1952); Miller, Newman and Friedman (1958); Mosteller and Wallace (1964); Airoldi et al. (2006); Wyatt (1980); Argamon and Levitan (2005); see also the lengthy bibliography in Mosteller and Wallace (1964)] have made extensive use of so-called function words, that is, words such as all, have, not and than, whose usage frequencies are thought to be largely independent of the subject matter under discussion. Previous studies [Wyatt (1980); Argamon and Levitan (2005)] have found these function words to be of some use, albeit limited, in determining authorship of disputed writings. And, as summarized by Madigan et al. (2005), “The stylometry literature has long considered function words to be topic-free in the sense that the relative frequency with which an author uses, for example, “with,” should be the same regardless of whether the author is describing cooking recipes or the latest news about the oil futures market.” In any case, such function words appear to be a useful starting point for content-independent statistical analysis.

In particular, in their study of the Federalist Papers, Mosteller and Wallace [(1964), page 38, Table 2.5-2] produce a list of 70 function words, culled for their purposes from certain earlier studies [Fries (1952); Miller, Newman and Friedman (1958)]. This list provides the basis for our statistical analysis, though to improve stability we eliminated the seven function words (every, my, shall, should, upon, will, your) that occur with frequency less than 0.001
in the USSC judgments, leaving us with 63 function words (Table 1). (We also considered adding *while* and *whilst*, which Mosteller and Wallace also found to be very useful, but they too had frequency less than 0.001 in the USSC judgments. In any case, our results changed very little upon adding or removing these few words.)

Of course, it is also possible to consider larger-scale features (e.g., sentence length, paragraph length, multi-word phrases) and smaller-scale features (e.g., frequency of commas or semi-colons, or the letter ‘e’) and, indeed, our software [Rosenthal (2009)] computes some of these quantities as well. However, we have found that these additional quantities did not greatly improve our predictive power (since their frequencies tend to be similar for different judgments) and, furthermore, it is subtle (due to differing scales) how best to combine such quantities with function word frequencies into a single variability measure, so we do not use them here. [This decision is partially reinforced by Madigan et al. (2005), who tried 13 different feature sets for an authorship identification problem, and found that function words was tied for second-lowest error rate, just marginally behind a different “three-letter suffix” approach.] Hence, for simplicity and to allow for “cleaner” theory, in the present study we compute using function words only.

1.3. *Data acquisition.* Our data consisted of the complete text of judgments of the USSC from 1991–2009, as provided by the Cornell Law School web site [Cornell (2009)]. For consistency, we primarily considered the majority opinions written by the various USSC justices, though we do briefly consider dissenting opinions below as well. (While expansive, the Cornell data source occasionally introduces transcription errors and furthermore apparently does not contain quite every USSC opinion, e.g., those by Justice O’Connor are apparently missing. We assume, however, that such minor limitations in the data do not significantly bias our results.)

Although the judgment texts were publicly available [Cornell (2009)], it was still necessary to download all the data files from the web, convert them to simple plain-text format, remove extraneous header and footer text, sort the judgments by authoring justice and by court session, and index all the judgments by date written. The number of judgments to consider, well over 1000, required writing extensive software [Rosenthal (2009)], consisting of various C programs together with Unix shell-scripts, to quickly and automatically perform this task.

Using this software, we downloaded and processed and sorted all of the majority opinion judgments (and also separately the dissenting opinions) of various USSC justices. To avoid trivialities, judgments containing fewer than 250 words were systematically excluded. The resulting files were then used as data for all of our statistical work below.
2. Statistical analyses of word counts. We suppose that our function words are numbered from \( j = 1 \) to \( j = 63 \). We further suppose that a given justice has written judgments numbered from \( i = 1 \) to \( i = K \). Let \( w_i \) be the total number of words in judgment \( i \), and let \( c_{ij} \) be the number of times that function word \( j \) appears in judgment \( i \).

2.1. Word fractions. Since judgments can differ considerably in their length, the raw counts \( c_{ij} \) by themselves are not particularly meaningful. One approach is to instead consider the quantities

\[
f_{ij} = \frac{c_{ij}}{w_i},
\]

representing the fraction of words in judgment \( i \) which are function word \( j \). If the sample standard deviation \( \text{sd}(f_{1j}, f_{2j}, \ldots, f_{Kj}) \) is much larger for one justice than for another, this suggests that the former has a much more variable writing style.

Unfortunately, this analysis is not entirely independent of such factors as the length of judgments, the different justices’ different propensities to use different words, etc. For example, suppose for a given function word \( j \), a given justice has some fixed unknown propensity \( p_j \) for using the function word \( j \), independently for each word of each of their judgments. In this case, the distribution of the count \( c_{ij} \) of reference word \( j \) in judgment \( i \) is Binomial\( (w_i, p_j) \), so that \( f_{ij} \) has mean \( p_j \) and variance \( p_j(1 - p_j)/w_i \), which depend on the individual propensities \( p_j \) and judgment lengths \( w_i \). So, while we could consider calculating the sum of sample standard deviations

\[
V_1 = \sum_{j=1}^{63} \text{sd}(f_{1j}, f_{2j}, \ldots, f_{Kj}),
\]

and use that as a measure of the variability of writing style across judgments of a given justice, such a comparison would not be entirely satisfactory since it would be influenced by such factors as \( p_j \) and \( w_i \), so it would, for example, tend to unfairly assign smaller variability to justices who tend to write shorter decisions.

One approach to overcoming this obstacle is to adjust the fractions \( f_{ij} \) to make them less sensitive to \( p_j \) and \( w_i \). Specifically, \( f_{ij} - p_j \) has mean 0 and variance \( p_j(1 - p_j)/w_i \), so this is also approximately true for \( f_{ij} - \mu_j \), where

\[
\mu_j = \frac{c_{1j} + c_{2j} + \cdots + c_{Kj}}{w_1 + w_2 + \cdots + w_K}
\]

is our best estimate of \( p_j \). Hence, approximately, the quantity

\[
r_{ij} = w_i^{1/2} (f_{ij} - \mu_j)
\]
has mean 0 and variance \( p_j(1 - p_j) \), which is independent of the judgment length \( w_i \), suggesting the refined variability estimator

\[
V_2 = \sum_{j=1}^{63} sd(r_{1j}, r_{2j}, \ldots, r_{Kj}).
\]

Since \( p_j(1 - p_j) \) still depends on the unknown propensity \( p_j \), we could further refine the variability estimator to

\[
V_3 = \sum_{j=1}^{63} sd(q_{1j}, q_{2j}, \ldots, q_{Kj}),
\]

where now

\[
q_{ij} = \frac{w_i^{1/2}(f_{ij} - \mu_j)}{(\mu_j(1 - \mu_j))^{1/2}}
\]

have mean 0 and variance approximately 1, independent of both \( w_i \) and \( p_j \).

However, even these refinements are not entirely satisfactory, since the \( \mu_j \) are not perfect estimates of the propensities \( p_j \), and it is difficult to accurately take into account the additional variability from the uncertainty in the \( \mu_j \). In particular, if \( p_j \) is quite close to zero (as it often will be), then dividing by \( \mu_j \) might be rather unstable, leading to unreliable results. (In the most extreme case, if \( \mu_j = 0 \), then dividing by \( \mu_j \) is undefined; we fix this by simply omitting all terms with \( \mu_j = 0 \) from the sum, but this illustrates the instability inherent in \( V_3 \).) So, we now consider an alternative approach.

### 2.2. A chi-squared approach.

Since in our case the counts \( c_{ij} \) are exact, while estimates such as \( \mu_j \) are inexact, this suggests that we instead use the chi-squared statistic. Specifically, we consider the value

\[
chisq = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \sum_{j=0}^{63} \frac{(c_{ij} - e_{ij})^2}{e_{ij}},
\]

where again \( w_i \) is the total number of words in judgment \( i \), and \( c_{ij} \) is the number of times that function word \( j \) appears in judgment \( i \), and now \( c_{0i} = w_i - c_{1i} - \cdots - c_{K_i} \) is the number of words in judgment \( i \) which are not function words, and

\[
c_{ij} = w_i \left( \frac{c_{1j} + c_{2j} + \cdots + c_{Kj}}{w_1 + w_2 + \cdots + w_K} \right)
\]

is the expected number of times that function word \( j \) would have appeared in judgment \( i \) under the null hypothesis that the total number \( c_{1j} + c_{2j} + \cdots + c_{Kj} \) of appearances of reference word \( j \) were each equally likely to occur.
2.3. Variability results. We developed software [Rosenthal (2009)] to compute each of the above variability statistics $V_1$, $V_2$, $V_3$ and $V_4$ (among other statistics). We then applied our software to a variety of USSC justices’ judgments. The results are in Table 2. (Unless otherwise specified, the results are for majority judgments written by that justice. Also, “words/judgment” means the average number of words per judgment considered.)

Looking at these results, we see that Kennedy does indeed have higher writing-style variability than does Scalia, by each of the four measures, thus apparently confirming our original hypothesis (see also the next section re
statistical significance). The other justices mostly fall in between these extremes, though Souter and Stevens also have very high variability, while Breyer and Rehnquist have lower variability.

As for the dissenting judgments, we might expect them to have much smaller writing variability since they tend to be more focused and also more likely to be written by the justice alone. This is indeed confirmed by the measures $V_2$, $V_3$ and $V_4$, but not by $V_1$ which gets tripped up by the fact that dissents tend to be shorter and $V_1$ does not correct for this. So, this provides confirmation that dissent judgments tend to have more consistent writing style, and also further illustrates why $V_1$ is not an appropriate measure of variability. (By contrast, Thomas has greater variability than Scalia by all measures, even though his average judgment length is much shorter.)

**Remark.** Of course, the different $V_i$ are each on a different scale, so it is meaningless to, for example, compare the value of $V_1$ directly with the value of $V_2$. It is only meaningful to compare the same variability statistic (e.g., $V_4$) when computed for different collections of judgments.

**Remark.** In all cases the value of $V_4$ is much larger than it would be under the null hypothesis that the function words are truly distributed uniformly and randomly. For example, for Scalia, the \( \text{chisq} \) statistic is equal to \( 3.13 \times 63 \times (156 - 1) = 30,564.45 \); under the null hypothesis this would have the chi-squared distribution with \( 63(156 - 1) = 9765 \) degrees of freedom, for which the value 30,564.45 corresponds to a \( p \)-value of about \( \exp(-4834.5) \) which is completely negligible. So, the null hypothesis is definitively rejected. However, we still feel that \( \text{chisq} \) (or, in particular, the related quantity $V_4$) is the most appropriate measure of writing-style variability in this case, even though it no longer corresponds to an actual chi-squared distribution.

**Remark.** Of course, while a larger $V_i$ value indicates that one justice has a more variable writing style than another, it does not directly determine whether the justice relies more heavily on law clerks. Alternative explanations include that the justice edits his/her clerks work more carefully, or that some clerks are better than others at copying their justice’s writing style, or that some justices naturally have a more variable writing style even when writing entirely on their own. So, we view the $V_i$ measurements as one window into the reliance of justices on their clerks, but not a completely definitive one. This issue is considered further in the next section.

**Remark.** Values of \( \text{chisq} \) statistics can be less stable/useful when many of the expected cell counts are very close to zero. Despite having already eliminated from consideration those function words which have very low frequency in the USSC judgments, and those USSC judgments which are
extremely short, it is still true that in the judgments we consider, 4.48% of the expected cell counts (mean 28.91, median 9.96) and 7.55% of the observed cell counts (mean 28.91, median 10.00) are less than one (Figure 1). It may be possible to correct for this, for example, with Yates’ correction, but this is not without difficulties, as it may over-correct and also is usually used only for $2 \times 2$ tables. As a check, we experimented with recomputing our $V_4$ statistic omitting all cells with very small expected count, and found that this slightly reduced all the $V_4$ values but in a consistent way, and relevant comparisons such as bootstrap tests of significance (see next section) were virtually unchanged. So, overall we do not expect this small-cell issue to be a significant problem, and we leave the definition of $V_4$ as above.

3. Bootstrap test of significance. The question remains whether the results from the previous section (e.g., that Kennedy has larger writing variability than Scalia) are the result of mere chance or are actually illustrative of different amounts of writing-style variability. Since we have already rejected the null hypothesis (the null hypothesis that the function words are truly distributed uniformly and randomly), the quantity $V_4$ no longer follows a chi-squared distribution, so no simple analytic test of statistical significance is available.

So, to test significance, we perform a bootstrap test. Specifically, for each justice we shall select cases $a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{100}$ uniformly at random (with repetition allowed, though this could also be done without repetition). For each such choice of 100 cases, we shall compute the variability measure $V_4$ as above. We shall repeat this 1000 times for each justice, thus giving a list of
1000 different possible values of $V_4$, depending on which list of 100 cases was randomly selected.

If we do this for two different justices, say, for Kennedy and for Scalia, then this gives us $1000 \times 1000 = 1,000,000$ pairs of $V_4$ values. We then simply count the fraction of pairs under which the $V_4$ for Kennedy is larger than the $V_4$ for Scalia, to give us an estimate of the probability that $V_4$ for Kennedy is larger than $V_4$ for Scalia, for a randomly-chosen selection of their judgments. We also use the pairs to estimate the distribution function for the difference of the $V_4$ variabilities for Kennedy, minus that for Scalia, and then use this estimated distribution function to compute the 95% confidence interval for the difference of $V_4$ for Kennedy minus that for Scalia. If this confidence interval is entirely positive, this indicates that Kennedy judgments have a more variable writing style than Scalia judgments, and that this conclusion is robust and statistically significant, rather than merely the result of chance variation.

Note that this bootstrap setup has the additional advantage that, since the same number of judgments (100) are chosen for each justice at each step, any concerns about comparing different numbers of judgments are avoided.

### 3.1. Variability bootstrap results

We developed software [Rosenthal (2009)] to compare the $V_4$ bootstrap values as above, using 1000 bootstrap samples each of size 100. We then ran this software to compare Kennedy and Scalia in this manner, obtaining the following results:

| mean(Kennedy) | mean(Scalia) | $P(\text{Kennedy} > \text{Scalia})$ | 95% CI for Kennedy $-$ Scalia |
|--------------|--------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 4.06         | 3.08         | 0.99996                         | (0.48, 1.51)                    |

That is, this bootstrap test determines that the probability that a randomly-selected sample of Kennedy’s writings is more variable than a randomly-selected sample of Scalia’s writings is over 99.99%, a near certainty. Furthermore, the 95% confidence interval (0.48, 1.51) for the difference in variabilities is entirely positive. So, we can conclude with confidence that, based on the $V_4$ chi-squared test, Kennedy’s writings have more variable writing style than Scalia’s.

Similarly, when comparing Souter to Scalia, we obtain the following:

| mean(Souter) | mean(Scalia) | $P(\text{Souter} > \text{Scalia})$ | 95% CI for Souter $-$ Scalia |
|-------------|--------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 3.72        | 3.07         | 0.995                           | (0.15, 1.20)                    |

Or, comparing Kennedy’s majority opinions to Kennedy’s dissents, we obtain the following:

| mean(majority) | mean(dissent) | $P(\text{majority} > \text{dissent})$ | 95% CI for majority $-$ dissent |
|---------------|---------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 4.06          | 2.44          | 1.00                            | (1.14, 2.13)                    |

Or, comparing Scalia’s majority opinions to Scalia’s dissents, we obtain the following:
mean(majority)  mean(dissent)  P(majority > dissent)  95% CI for majority − dissent
3.08  2.43  0.9997  (0.29, 1.01)

Thus, we conclude with confidence that, as expected, both Kennedy’s and Souter’s majority opinion writing are more variable than that of Scalia, and, furthermore, Kennedy’s majority opinion writing is more variable than his dissent opinion writing (and similarly for Scalia).

Similarly, we can compare other justices to Scalia, as follows:

mean(Stevens)  mean(Scalia)  P(Stevens > Scalia)  95% CI for Stevens − Scalia
3.86  3.08  0.998  (0.25, 1.34)

mean(Ginsburg)  mean(Scalia)  P(Ginsburg > Scalia)  95% CI for Ginsburg − Scalia
3.59  3.07  0.988  (0.07, 0.99)

mean(Thomas)  mean(Scalia)  P(Thomas > Scalia)  95% CI for Thomas − Scalia
3.48  3.08  0.972  (−0.01, 0.82)

Thus, we can conclude that in addition to Kennedy and Souter, each of Stevens and Ginsburg also has greater writing variability than does Scalia, while Thomas may have greater writing variability than does Scalia but that assertion is not completely established. [The conclusion about Stevens may be surprising, since Stevens also has a reputation for doing his own writing; see Domnarski (1996), page 31. So, this result may indicate that Stevens actually relied on clerks more than is generally believed, though of course this evidence is not completely definitive.]

In the other direction, we conclude that in addition to Scalia, also Rehnquist, Breyer and Thomas each have statistically significantly less variability than Kennedy, while Ginsburg does not:

mean(Kennedy)  mean(Rehnquist)  P(Kennedy > Rehnquist)  95% CI for Kennedy − Rehnquist
4.06  3.17  0.9998  (0.37, 1.43)

mean(Kennedy)  mean(Breyer)  P(Kennedy > Breyer)  95% CI for Kennedy − Breyer
4.05  3.25  0.995  (0.19, 1.42)

mean(Kennedy)  mean(Thomas)  P(Kennedy > Thomas)  95% CI for Kennedy − Thomas
4.06  3.48  0.981  (0.03, 1.15)

mean(Kennedy)  mean(Ginsburg)  P(Kennedy > Ginsburg)  95% CI for Kennedy − Ginsburg
4.06  3.57  0.948  (−0.10, 1.06)
Table 3

Bootstrap results comparing the decades 1990s and 2000s

| Justice | mean(1990s) | mean(2000s) | P(1990s < 2000s) | 95% CI for 2000s − 1990s |
|---------|-------------|-------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| Kennedy | 3.78        | 4.15        | 0.875            | (−0.27, 0.96)            |
| Scalia  | 2.96        | 3.08        | 0.753            | (−0.25, 0.47)            |
| Souter  | 3.73        | 3.49        | 0.189            | (−0.79, 0.27)            |
| Stevens | 3.78        | 3.82        | 0.539            | (−0.57, 0.66)            |
| Breyer  | 3.37        | 3.05        | 0.138            | (−0.86, 0.28)            |
| Ginsburg| 3.30        | 3.69        | 0.948            | (−0.08, 0.86)            |
| Thomas  | 3.36        | 3.47        | 0.701            | (−0.29, 0.49)            |
| Rehnquist| 3.20        | 2.92        | 0.050            | (−0.64, 0.06)            |

3.2. Within-justice comparisons. It is possible to use this same $V_4$ bootstrap approach to compare different collections of judgments by the same justice.

For example, as justices age, their writings might get less variable (since they develop a more consistent style) or more variable (if they come to rely more on their law clerks). To test this, we perform $V_4$ bootstrap tests, as above, except now comparing a justice’s majority opinions from the 1990s decade, to the same justice’s opinions from the 2000s decade. Our results are in Table 3.

Looking at these results, there is no clear pattern. None of the decade differences are statistically significant. Rehnquist is nearly significantly more variable in the 1990s than the 2000s, and Ginsburg is nearly significantly more variable in the 2000s than the 1990s, but since this does not conform to any obvious interpretation or “story,” we are inclined to regard these slight differences as mere chance events.

Another way to compare a justice’s writing is to look at those judgments which were in the first half of a session (i.e., September through March) versus those judgments in the second half (i.e., April through August). The reason why judgments early in a session may appear different from those later in a session is because law clerks rotate annually; thus, writing variability over the course of a session may increase if a given justice delegates more work to his clerks, or may diminish if clerks better learn the preferences of their justice. That is, increasing variability may indicate a justice’s increased trust, and therefore increased delegation or lower oversight to the clerk; conversely, decreasing variability could reflect increased understanding by the clerks of their justice’s preferred writing style.

Our results for this comparison are in Table 4.

This time, it appears that Kennedy, Souter and Rehnquist are somewhat more variable in the second half of court sessions, which is consistent with the hypothesis that they let their clerks write more opinions once they have
Table 4
Bootstrap results comparing the first and second halves of court sessions

| Justice  | mean(first) | mean(second) | P(first < second) | 95% CI for second − first |
|----------|-------------|--------------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| Kennedy  | 3.68        | 4.25         | 0.964             | (−0.05, 1.21)             |
| Scalia   | 3.04        | 3.05         | 0.521             | (−0.40, 0.41)             |
| Souter   | 3.39        | 3.91         | 0.955             | (−0.08, 1.08)             |
| Stevens  | 4.04        | 3.61         | 0.094             | (−1.07, 0.20)             |
| Breyer   | 3.15        | 3.21         | 0.602             | (−0.49, 0.59)             |
| Ginsburg | 3.57        | 3.47         | 0.340             | (−0.55, 0.35)             |
| Thomas   | 3.42        | 3.44         | 0.530             | (−0.38, 0.41)             |
| Rehnquist| 3.01        | 3.28         | 0.935             | (−0.08, 0.62)             |

more work experience. Meanwhile, Stevens leans slightly in the opposite direction, with more variability in the first half of court sessions. However, none of these results are statistically significant, so we refrain from drawing clear conclusions from them.

4. Further investigation of the “$V_4$” statistic. Since the “$V_4$” quantity is central to our conclusions about text variability and multiple authorship, it seems appropriate to better understand the performance of this quantity in other circumstances, as we do now.

4.1. Randomly-generated text. As a simple first experiment, we randomly generated 200 pseudo-documents each consisting of 2000 independent randomly generated words. (Specifically, each word was chosen to be a non-function word with probability 70%, or uniformly selected from the list of function words with probability 30%.) For such randomly-generated text, the $V_4$ statistic should approximately equal 1. In fact, we repeated this experiment 10 times, obtaining a mean $V_4$ value of 1.004622, with a standard deviation of 0.01701969, consistent with having a true mean value of 1.

4.2. Historical trend. It is generally believed that USSC justices rely more on their clerks in the modern era than they did in earlier times [Ward and Weiden (2006); Peppers (2006)]. If so, and if larger $V_4$ values are indeed a good indicator of increased authorship, then $V_4$ values should be generally increasing with time.

To test this, we extended our software [Rosenthal (2009)] to also download USSC cases from the Justia.com web site [Justia (2009)], and used this to analyze cases from previous eras. We then computed the $V_4$ score for all cases, by all justices, on a decade-by-decade basis from 1850 onward (i.e., for all cases decided in 1850–1859, and for all cases decided in 1860–1869 and so on). The results, plotted against decade midpoint together with a line of best fit, were as follows (Figure 2).
This graph shows that the $V_4$ scores have a general trend upward, increasing by just over 0.005 per decade (and this increase is statistically significant, $p = 0.0105$). This upward trend is accelerated in the modern era (1950–2009) to 0.020 per decade ($p = 0.0087$), corresponding to the period of increasing clerk activity [Peppers (2006)]. These observations are consistent with the supposition that $V_4$ scores increase with increased delegation of authorship, and that this delegation (through the greater reliance on law clerks) has increased over the years.

4.3. Combining justices. Another way to test whether the $V_4$ statistic increases with multiple authorship is to combine various collections of judgments together in ways which would appear to increase the total number of authors, and see if the $V_4$ scores rise. We select judgments that we believe to be homogeneous in their authorship, namely, majority judgments of Scalia, Rehnquist and Breyer, and dissenting judgments of Scalia and Kennedy. Our results are in Table 5.

This table shows that, while the effect is not overwhelming, nevertheless, there is a modest increase in the values of $V_4$ when two or three different justices (each believed to author their own judgments) are combined together, as compared to the $V_4$ scores for individual justices. (Furthermore, this effect appears to be reasonably robust to subselection. For example, we divided the Rehnquist and Breyer opinions into two subcollections and measured the $V_4$ score for the four possible pairings, obtaining values of 3.37, 3.43, 3.52 and 3.60, all significantly more than the individual $V_4$ scores of 3.13 and 3.22.) Thus, we believe that this provides modest further support for the hypothesis that increased $V_4$ scores corresponding to additional authors.

4.4. Essays of known authorship. Yet another way to test whether the $V_4$ statistic increases with multiple authorship is to take documents of known authorship outside the judicial realm (where clerks are not a factor) and combine them in different ways.
We considered the following historical essays: *Walden* by H. D. Thoreau (hereafter “Walden”); *The Communist Manifesto* by K. Marx and F. Engels, in English translation (“Manifest”); *On the Origin of Species* by C. Darwin (“Species”); and *On Liberty* by J. S. Mill (“Liberty”). We divided Walden and Liberty into discrete 2000-word chunks (discarding any leftover words), divided Manifest into discrete 1000-word chunks (since it is shorter), and left Species as the 15 separate chapters in which it was written. We then tried combining them in different ways. Our results are in Table 6.

**Table 5**
Variability statistics when combining different justices together

| # judgments | $V_4$ |
|-------------|-------|
| Scalia      | 156   | 3.13  |
| Rehnquist   | 127   | 3.22  |
| Breyer      | 121   | 3.31  |
| Scalia + Rehnquist | 283 | 3.29  |
| Scalia + Breyer | 277 | 3.44  |
| Rehnquist + Breyer | 248 | 3.49  |
| Scalia + Rehnquist + Breyer | 404 | 3.46  |
| Scalia dissent | 108  | 2.46  |
| Kennedy dissent | 42   | 2.51  |
| Scalia dissent + Kennedy dissent | 150 | 2.56  |

**Table 6**
Variability statistics when combining different essays together

| # units | $V_4$ |
|---------|-------|
| Liberty | 23    | 1.799 |
| Manifest| 17    | 1.814 |
| Walden  | 57    | 2.255 |
| Species | 16    | 2.999 |
| Liberty + Manifest | 40  | 2.412 |
| Liberty + Walden    | 80   | 2.505 |
| Liberty + Species   | 39   | 3.830 |
| Manifest + Walden   | 74   | 2.548 |
| Manifest + Species  | 33   | 3.152 |
| Walden + Species    | 73   | 3.793 |
| Liberty + Manifest + Walden | 97  | 2.737 |
| Liberty + Manifest + Walden + Species | 113 | 3.580 |
Once again, we see clear evidence that combining multiple authors leads to larger $V_4$ scores, consistent with the hypothesis that larger $V_4$ scores indicate additional authors. Indeed, in every case, the combined $V_4$ is larger than any of the individual $V_4$ scores.

Again, this finding is fairly robust to subsampling. For example, considering just units #1–9 of each collection (denoted by “9”), we obtain in Table 7.

Even with this subsampling, the combined collections always have larger $V_4$ scores than the individual collections, usually substantially so. Also, the results for the subsampled collections are generally quite similar to the corresponding results for the full collections (though Walden9 is rather less variable than Walden for some reason), thus confirming that $V_4$ is largely unaffected by the size of a collection but rather concentrates on the writing variability itself.

4.5. Fictional novels. For completeness, we also consider some famous historical fictional novels (www.gutenberg.org), namely: *Oliver Twist*, by C. Dickens (hereafter “Oliver”), *The Three Musketeers* by A. Dumas (“Three”), *Pride and Prejudice* by J. Austen (“Pride”), *A Study in Scarlet* by A. C. Doyle (“Scarlet”), and *Alice in Wonderland* by L. Caroll (“Alice”). Each novel was chopped into 2000-word units (again discarding any leftover). The results are in Table 8.

Once again, the $V_4$ scores for the combined collections are larger than the individual $V_4$ scores (with one exception: Oliver + Scarlet), sometimes substantially so. Of course, it could be argued that fictional writing is more free-form and thus has different stylometric properties from such serious and formal writing as USSC judgments. Nevertheless, these results do provide some sort of further support to the hypothesis that larger $V_4$ scores indicate additional authors.

### Table 7

*Variability statistics when combining different essays together and subsampling*

|          | # units | $V_4$  |
|----------|---------|--------|
| Liberty9 | 9       | 1.717  |
| Manifest9| 9       | 1.735  |
| Walden9  | 9       | 1.760  |
| Species9 | 9       | 3.240  |
| Liberty9 + Manifest9 | 18 | 2.388  |
| Liberty9 + Walden9  | 18 | 2.133  |
| Liberty9 + Species9 | 18 | 3.873  |
| Manifest9 + Walden9 | 18 | 2.568  |
| Manifest9 + Species9| 18 | 3.262  |
| Walden9 + Species9  | 18 | 3.847  |
Table 8
Variability statistics when combining different fictional novels together

|                | # units | $V_4$  |
|----------------|---------|--------|
| Pride          | 60      | 1.730  |
| Alice          | 13      | 1.815  |
| Oliver         | 78      | 1.847  |
| Scarlet        | 21      | 2.041  |
| Three          | 114     | 2.058  |
| Pride + Alice  | 73      | 2.233  |
| Pride + Oliver | 138     | 2.326  |
| Pride + Scarlet| 81      | 2.160  |
| Pride + Three  | 174     | 2.310  |
| Alice + Oliver | 91      | 2.025  |
| Alice + Scarlet| 34      | 2.388  |
| Alice + Three  | 127     | 2.306  |
| Oliver + Scarlet| 99   | 1.949  |
| Oliver + Three | 192     | 2.191  |
| Scarlet + Three| 135     | 2.179  |

In the interests of fair reporting, we note that we also experimented briefly with the novel *War and Peace* by L. Tolstoy, broken up into 281 different 2000-word chunks. We found that this collection had a surprisingly high $V_4$ score, 2.675, which did not significantly increase (in fact, it sometimes even decreased) when combined with other collections. So, these results went against the hypothesis that additional authors always leads to larger $V_4$ scores, perhaps due to the unusually high variability of this novel itself.

Despite this caveat, overall we feel that the results of this section provide modest additional support for the use of the $V_4$ statistic when considering issues of multiple authorship.

5. **Authorship identification.** A related question is whether it is possible to identify which justice is the (recorded) author of a judgment, based only on the writing style. We posed this question to a small number of USSC constitutional scholars. The consensus was that while they could perhaps identify authorship based on the case name or known passages, they could not do so by writing style alone. We now consider the extent to which this identification can be done by appropriate computer algorithms. This question is thus similar in spirit to the Shakespeare authorship question [Seletsky, Huang and Henderson-Frost (2007); Burns (2006); Wikipedia (2009)], and also to the Federalist Papers authorship question [Mosteller and Wallace (1964)] and the Reagan radio address analysis [Airoldi et al. (2006); Airoldi, Fienberg and Skinner (2007)]. Of course, there is one important difference here: in most instances the recorded authorship of USSC judgments
is known. However, we still view this as a useful test of the extent to which
different USSC justices have identifiably distinct writing styles.

We shall consider both naive Bayes classifiers and linear classifiers, and
shall see that each performs quite well at this task, achieving success rates as
high as 90%. (Other possible approaches include neural networks, support
vector machines, etc., but for simplicity we do not consider them here.)

In each case, we shall consider a particular pair of justices (say, Justices
A and B). We shall consider the collection of all USSC judgments whose
recorded author is either A or B, and shall partition this collection into a
disjoint training set and testing set. Using only the training set, we develop
a model for classifying judgments as being authored by A or B. We then
test to see if our model classifies authorship correctly on the testing set.

5.1. Naive Bayes classifier. We begin with a naive Bayes classifier. More
specifically, we assume that conditioned on the recorded author being Justice
A, the conditional distribution of the fraction $f_j$ of function word $j$ appearing
in the judgment is normally distributed. (Of course, the normal distribution
is not the only choice here, and the “true” distribution is presumably a
rather complicated mixture, over the total number of words, of multinomial
distributions normalized by the total number of words in each judgment. But
the normal distribution appears to be a good enough approximation for our
purposes.) We further assume that the corresponding mean and variance are
given by the sample mean and variance of all judgments by Justice A in the
training set. In addition, we assume (since we are being “naive”) that these
different fractions $f_j$ (over different function words $j$) are all conditionally
independent.

Together with the uniform prior distribution on whether the author is
Justice A or B, this gives the log-likelihood for a given judgment being
authored by Justice A, namely,

$$
\text{loglike}(A) = C - \sum_{j=1}^{63} \left( \frac{1}{2} \log(v_j) + \frac{(f_j - m_j)^2}{2v_j} \right)
$$

for some constant $C$, where $f_j$ is the fraction of words which are reference
word $j$ in the test judgment under consideration, and where $m_j$ and $v_j$ are
the sample mean and variance of the fraction of words which are reference
word $j$, over all judgments in the training set authored by A.

Similarly, we can compute $\text{loglike}(B)$. The model then classifies the test
judgment as being authored by A if $\text{loglike}(A) > \text{loglike}(B)$, otherwise it
classifies it as being authored by B.
5.2. **Linear classifier.** Another approach is a linear classifier. Specifically, let $\mathcal{T}$ be a training set consisting of various judgments by $A$ or $B$, with $|\mathcal{T}| = n$. We consider the linear regression model

$$ Y = x\beta + \varepsilon, $$

where $\varepsilon$ is an $n \times 1$ vector of independent zero-mean errors. Here $Y$ is an $n \times 1$ vector of $\pm 1$, which equals $-1$ for each judgment in the training set authored by $A$, or $+1$ for each judgment in the training set authored by $B$. Also, $x$ is the $n \times 64$ matrix given by

$$ x = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & f_{1,1} & f_{1,2} & \cdots & f_{1,63} \\ 1 & f_{2,1} & f_{2,2} & \cdots & f_{2,63} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & f_{n,1} & f_{n,2} & \cdots & f_{n,63} \end{pmatrix}, $$

where $f_{i,j}$ is the fraction of words in judgment $i$ (in the training set) which are function word $j$. For this model, the usual least-squares estimate for $\beta$ (which corresponds to the MLE if the $\varepsilon_i$ are assumed to be iid normal) is given by

$$ \hat{\beta} = (x^T x)^{-1} x^T Y. $$

Once we have this estimate $\hat{\beta} = (\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_1, \ldots, \hat{\beta}_n)$, then given a fresh test judgment having function word fractions $g_1, g_2, \ldots, g_{63}$, we can compute the linear fit value

$$ \ell = \hat{\beta}_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{63} \hat{\beta}_j g_j. $$

Then, if $\ell < 0$, we classify the test judgment as being authored by $A$, otherwise we classify it as being authored by $B$.

Below we shall consider both the linear classifier and the naive Bayes classifier. We shall see that, generally speaking, the linear classifier outperforms the naive Bayes classifier, sometimes significantly so.

5.3. **Testing accuracy via cross-validation.** To test the accuracy of our model, we use leave-one-out cross-validation. That is, for each judgment by either $A$ or $B$, we consider that one judgment be the test set, with all other judgments by either $A$ or $B$ comprising the training set. We then see whether or not our model classifies the test judgment correctly. Finally, we count the number of correct classifications, separately over all judgments by $A$, and over all judgments by $B$. 
Table 9

| Justice A     | Justice B                  | success(A) | success(B) |
|---------------|---------------------------|------------|------------|
| Scalia        | Kennedy                   | 133/156 = 0.853 | 129/147 = 0.878 |
| Scalia        | Souter                    | 132/156 = 0.846 | 119/143 = 0.832 |
| Scalia        | Stevens                   | 130/156 = 0.833 | 120/148 = 0.811 |
| Scalia        | Rehnquist                 | 139/156 = 0.891 | 101/127 = 0.795 |
| Kennedy       | Souter                    | 139/147 = 0.946 | 121/143 = 0.846 |
| Kennedy       | Stevens                   | 122/147 = 0.830 | 113/148 = 0.764 |
| Kennedy       | Rehnquist                 | 124/147 = 0.844 | 97/127 = 0.764 |
| Souter        | Stevens                   | 118/143 = 0.825 | 124/148 = 0.838 |
| Rehnquist     | Breyer                    | 111/127 = 0.874 | 105/121 = 0.868 |
| Rehnquist     | Stevens                   | 76/127 = 0.598 | 113/148 = 0.764 |
| Rehnquist     | Thomas                    | 76/127 = 0.598 | 94/140 = 0.671 |
| Scalia        | Scalia dissent            | 140/156 = 0.897 | 72/108 = 0.667 |
| Stevens       | Stevens dissent           | 122/148 = 0.824 | 124/205 = 0.605 |
| Scalia        | Stevens dissent           | 141/156 = 0.904 | 118/205 = 0.576 |

5.3.1. Results: Naive Bayes classifier. We ran software [Rosenthal (2009)] to perform the cross-validation test using the naive Bayes classifier, for various pairs of justices A and B. Our results are in Table 9.

We see from these results that our naive Bayes classifier performs fairly well on majority opinions, often achieving a success rate over 80%. (This is fairly consistent across all pairings, not just those shown in Table 9: in particular, the success rate for majority opinions is over 70% for all $\frac{8 \times 7}{2} = 28$ possible pairings except for five: Scalia–Thomas, Souter–Stevens, Rehnquist–Stevens, Stevens–Thomas and Rehnquist–Thomas.) This appears to be quite a good performance, especially considering the minimal assumptions that have gone into the model. (Presumably a more sophisticated model could achieve even higher success rate.) So, we see this as evidence that USSC judgment authors can indeed be distinguished by their writing style, in fact just by the pattern of fractions of function words used.

We also note that there is some variability concerning which justices’ writing styles are most easily distinguished. For example, Rehnquist and Breyer are apparently relatively easy to distinguish from one another, while Rehnquist and Thomas are rather more difficult.

The algorithm does not perform as well on the dissenting opinions, presumably because they tend to be shorter and thus less clearly representative of their author’s writing style. In fact, when comparing dissent to majority opinions, the algorithm tends to classify too many judgments as being from the majority collection, and this weakness remains whether the majority and minority collections are from the same justice or from two different justices.
Remark. Our results above show some asymmetries, for example, there is much greater success distinguishing Stevens’ opinions from Rehnquist’s (0.764) than vice-versa (0.598). This may seem counterintuitive but it provides no contradiction. For a simple illustration, if there were just one function word, and A’s function word distribution had mean 5 and standard deviation 1, while B’s function word distribution had mean 5 and standard deviation 1.1, then A’s likelihood function would usually be above B’s (Figure 3), and about 70% of opinions would be classified as A’s regardless of which distribution they came from.

5.3.2. Results: Linear classifier. We also ran software [Rosenthal (2009)] to perform the cross-validation test using a linear classifier, again for various pairs of justices A and B. Our results are in Table 10.

Comparing these results with those from the previous subsection shows that the linear classifier performs even better than the naive Bayes classifier, with success rates often close to 90%. (This is again fairly consistent across all pairings; in particular, the success rate is above 80% for all possible majority opinion pairings with the exception of Rehnquist–Stevens and those involving Thomas.) This provides further, even stronger evidence that it is indeed possible to distinguish between different USSC justices’ judgments solely on the basis of writing style.

Once again, there is some variability concerning which justices’ writing styles are most easily distinguished. For example, success rates for distinguishing Rehnquist from Breyer are over 90%, while those for distinguishing Rehnquist and Thomas are in the 60s.

On dissenting opinions, the linear classifier appears to be less prone to incorrectly classifying almost all judgments as being from the majority opinion collection. Rather, it is better balanced between the two collections. However, it still finds the dissenting opinions to be challenging, with success rates ranging from 84% (quite good) down to 67% (rather poor).
Remark. It is possible to examine the regression coefficients to see which words are most used to distinguish justices. For example, when comparing Kennedy to Scalia, the regression coefficient for the function word now is $-540$, while that for such is $+204$. And, indeed, Kennedy’s judgments use now over twice as frequently as Scalia’s, but use such less than half as frequently.

5.4. Outlier detection. Finally, we briefly note that the above naive Bayes approach can easily be adapted to the issue of outlier detection. Suppose a collection of $n$ judgments is given, and it is believed that they were all written by the same author with one exception (e.g., perhaps a justice allowed his clerks to write just one of his opinions each term, something we may explore more fully in separate work). That is, there are $n-1$ “decoy” judgments all written by the same author, plus one unknown “test” judgment having different authorship. In this case, for each individual judgment, we proceed by excluding that judgment, computing sample means $m_j$ and variances $v_j$ for each reference word $j$ based on the other $n-1$ judgments, and then computing a log-likelihood for the individual judgment as in (1). The higher this log-likelihood value, the better the individual judgment “fits in” with all the other judgments. We can then rank all the individual judgments from 1 to $n$ in terms of their log-likelihood scores, from smallest log-likelihood (i.e., most likely to be the outlier) to largest log-likelihood (i.e., least likely to be the outlier).

To score the performance of such outlier detection, suppose our algorithm gives the true outlier a rank of $i$. If $i = 1$, the algorithm has performed

| Justice A | Justice B | success(A) | success(B) |
|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|
| Scalia    | Kennedy   | 135/156 = 0.865 | 135/147 = 0.918 |
| Scalia    | Souter    | 137/156 = 0.878 | 123/143 = 0.860 |
| Scalia    | Stevens   | 125/156 = 0.801 | 126/148 = 0.851 |
| Scalia    | Rehnquist | 137/156 = 0.878 | 108/127 = 0.850 |
| Kennedy   | Souter    | 138/147 = 0.939 | 132/143 = 0.923 |
| Kennedy   | Stevens   | 135/147 = 0.918 | 128/148 = 0.865 |
| Kennedy   | Rehnquist | 133/147 = 0.905 | 110/127 = 0.866 |
| Souter    | Stevens   | 122/143 = 0.853 | 131/148 = 0.885 |
| Rehnquist | Breyer    | 121/127 = 0.953 | 110/121 = 0.909 |
| Rehnquist | Stevens   | 88/127 = 0.693 | 118/148 = 0.797 |
| Rehnquist | Thomas    | 77/127 = 0.606 | 92/140 = 0.657 |
| Scalia    | Scalia dissent | 131/156 = 0.840 | 77/108 = 0.713 |
| Stevens   | Stevens dissent | 99/148 = 0.669 | 151/205 = 0.737 |
| Scalia    | Stevens dissent | 125/156 = 0.801 | 164/205 = 0.800 |
perfectly, while if $i = n$, then the algorithm has completely failed. So, we can convert this to a score from 0 (worst) to 100 (best), by the simple linear transformation

$$score = \frac{n - i}{n - 1} \times 100.$$  

(2)

To test this algorithm, we averaged the score (2) over a collection of test judgments, to compute a final average score between 0 (worst) and 100 (best). We used the following collections: Scalia’s 156 judgments considered herein; Kennedy’s 147 judgments considered herein; Rehnquist’s 127 judgments considered herein; the 24 judgments from Volume 8 (1807–1808) of the USSC (obtained by extending our software [Rosenthal (2009)] to download older USSC judgments from the Justia (2009) web site); and the 114 segments of *The Three Musketeers* (“Three”) as discussed in Section 4.5. Our results are in Table 11.

We see that the algorithm can very easily distinguish the fictional work *The Three Musketeers* from such serious writings as Scalia’s USSC judgments. Furthermore, it can easily pick out an old Volume 8 judgments from a sea of modern Scalia judgments. Interestingly, this last result is highly asymmetric (even more so than that suggested by Figure 3), that is, the algorithm is much worse at picking out a single Scalia judgment from a sea of Volume 8 judgments. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the algorithm has less success picking out a single Scalia judgment from a sea of Kennedy judgments, or vice versa. Indeed, its scores, near 65, are only moderately better than pure chance guessing (which would produce an average score of 50). For Scalia versus Rehnquist—two justices who apparently write their own opinions—the scores are not much better. This illustrates that it is easier to identify judgment authorship when given two large collections, than when given a single large collection with just one outlier.

| Test collection | Decoy collection | Average score |
|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Scalia          | Three           | 99.44         |
| Three           | Scalia          | 99.87         |
| Scalia          | Volume 8        | 58.55         |
| Volume 8        | Scalia          | 99.71         |
| Scalia          | Kennedy         | 64.41         |
| Kennedy         | Scalia          | 65.72         |
| Scalia          | Rehnquist       | 57.75         |
| Rehnquist       | Scalia          | 71.11         |
6. Summary. In this paper we have presented methodology and software for investigations of USSC judgments by using statistical properties of function words.

First, we have investigated the variability of writing style over various collections of judgments, in particular, of majority decisions written by different justices. We have seen that it is possible to uncover statistically significant evidence that one USSC justice (e.g., Kennedy) has greater writing-style variability than another justice (e.g., Scalia), which may indicate that the first justice relies on law clerk assistance to a greater extent than does the second justice.

Second, we have investigated the extent to which unknown authorship of USSC judgments can be determined based solely on function word statistics. We have seen that both naive Bayes classifiers and linear classifiers perform fairly well at this task, achieving cross-validation success rates approaching 90%. While authorship is typically known for all USSC opinions, our approach reveals that justices—even with contributions by clerks—have writing styles which are distinguishable from one another. (In a different direction, one could perhaps use function words to identify authorship for the handful of *per curiam* decisions in which the Court does not reveal authorship, though we do not pursue that here.)

Of course, our approach—or any textual analysis—can provide only circumstantial evidence of collaborative authorship, not definitive proof. A low $V_4$ score can reflect that a justice does her own writing, that the justice closely edits her clerks’ work, or that the clerks are all highly effective at mimicking their justices’ writing style; these states of the world are observationally equivalent. However, we do believe that our results provide compelling evidence that justices over time are indeed relying more on their law clerks, and that justices vary considerably from one another in this regard.

Overall, we hope that the methodology and software [Rosenthal (2009)] presented here will provide useful insights into USSC writings, as well as a helpful starting point for other statistical investigations into other bodies of writing in other contexts.

Acknowledgments. We thank the editors and referees for very helpful comments that greatly improved our manuscript.

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