INTRODUCTION

Since 2004, the implementation of democracy values in Indonesia political system has brought up many transformations for many reasons. First of all, democracy put power into the hands of the people. In order to obtaining office chair, the candidate either party politic should be approaching common people to make sure their ballot submitted in vote acquisition of candidate. Secondly, media has been developed modern and sophisticated that able to reaching wider people so that political advertisement in media can be assumed as effective and efficient tools to influencing political preferential of people. Thirdly, in democracy system, there is not allowed to make intimidation or coercive action to people to enforce their ballot to submit in election. Candidate or party politic should be establishing mutual relationship within people in order to gaining their sympathy which converted vote. Therefore, general election was held in 2004 indicated political transformation from party centered-campaign to candidate centered campaign and labor centered campaign to capital centered campaign. It was concluded that general election in 2004 is decent interpreted capitalization of democracy wherein affinity and affiliation to candidate or political party even politics of image is pivotal key to maximizing vote from people.

ABSTRACT

This article aims to analyze the practice of pork barrel politics in the level of Indonesia legislature tiers and its political management campaign. Since 2004, electoral democracy already delegate to the common people to chosen their representation directly through general election in the level executive and legislative. Those conditions oblige politician and political parties to approaching the commons in order to obtain their vote and popularize both actors into public. The paradigm of research is a pork barrel politics. This paradigm supports to understand and analyze the corruption symptoms i.e. politico corruption in legislative tier and electoral-corruption in political-campaign which become chronic problems in this country. Result of research has showed populism is pivotal key which triggered up politician and parties to corruption in order to persist their political tenure and funding their political cost in pursuit to re-elect again in second office terms. No matter their corruption practice that implicate to budgeting fraud. Both actors take political favor to disguise within social aids following the governmental policy, so that, they hindered from corruption accusation. Finally, this paper wants to recommend legal improvement into our budgeting cycle wherein there are public participation to watch it and moral improvement to politician and parties to reducing their corruption if they wants to become truly populist politician figure into public.

KEYWORDS: pork barrel politics, political corruption, electoral corruption, populism, election.
general election. It is such as political engagement among politician and people to building credibility and reliability that ensure votes only distributed in specific candidate and political party. Populist policy can be classified as social aid which its characteristic sporadic and temporary to help people trouble. However, populist policy also can be realized pre-commit from parties and politician to their constituent to carry out certain policy actions if they take power and hold tenure as public officer. In this context, debate on budgeting as policy funding sources become crucial to discussed amidst rivalry of politic, people, and technocratic interest.

The meaning populist policy is susceptible to becoming hidden campaign project for candidate and parties. Because responsibility towards the use of budget reluctant to be announced to public. Both actors are always to obscuring objective and benefit of use of budget on behalf of people. The term “people” politicized to pushing through invisible budget which is actually to be corrupted in buying people vote in general election campaign. This practice is manifestation of political corruption practice which took place in a legal formal relation. The discussion about populist policy issued by regime is a form of dilemmatic values between process of politicization and technocratic. Politicization of budgeting was indicated politician and parties are attempting in pursue to re-elected again.

They want to take benefit from issue of populist policy to enhancing popularity in their constituent instantly and rapidly. As result, political benefit who gained by politician and parties were not involving technocratic process that formed through the state budget allocation. The logic of technocratic reason in built policy consensus is necessary one; because, implication of public policy needs to be analyzed and scrutinized to determine the impact to the people. Therefore, populist policy issued sporadically without deep analysis about this impact can be argued lack of responsibility and accountability to be accounted in legislative. Implementation of populist policy also not obviously its purpose and policy objective due to orientation of this policy is blurred. People seem do not find out about its policy whether this policy is officially from government vice versa. That is what makes populist policy abundantly rising up much critical from people due to misconceptions about its substance about this policy. It can be said that populist policy is blunder policy which this purpose and objective tend to be campaign tools for candidate or parties to boost their popularity in their constituent.

In particular within populist policy, they may become saint who helps people from difficulties of life with abundant funds; yet, they can promote their figures that induce common people to elect their in election. The politicians who hold tenure as incumbent and political party still become ruling party is very advantageous about this situation. They can disguise as formal officer to issuing and executing populist policy on behalf government programs. In dissemble true objective towards these policy what it was that won re-election, incumbent has many ways to hindered from accusation of black campaign which alleged from their political rivals. One way to avoiding these negative accusations toward populist policy by quoting legal basis that underlined towards policy issued. As expected, incumbent is freed from its accusations that bind him. The context of populist policy eventually only to be political cosmetic for
politician and parties to strengthened their image in common people as politician who took concerned about the people after all.

Politicians and parties tend to strive to cultivate personal reputations for delivering targeted individual or local benefits to constituents, which has fostered the development of personality figure who friendly by means spreading social aid (Shin, 2011). They emphasized social aid to remake his image artificially especially toward general elections. Therefore, social funds which obtained from national and local budgeting is urge and significant for candidacy in pursue political opportunity to be re-elect again in second term in public office. Candidate-centered campaigns, which usually make social aids from government as personality or campaign agenda always could potentially undermining budgeting allocation; because, these funding allocation of this programs can be seizing other allocation which should be prioritized.

The distortion of budgeting which used politician and parties were indicated by spending residual budget from past allocation to funding their programs. Residual funds should be deposited in renewal budget to replenish other allocation which presumably still less enough from its funding. The other parameter can be traced from budgetary markup practice which always used to politician from national budgeting to use his own as political campaign capital. The types of political spending from markup practice that are targeted will vary depending on whether the spending is elite-oriented or voter-oriented. It can be said as hush money as political gratification in formal arena. Politician needs to mobilize political support from their colleagues to secure his position as incumbent who hold public tenure, meanwhile; people as voter also should be empowered by spreading social funds to rebuild road, place of worship, public school, local clinic, and many other public place which is considered center of crowd people. The point of from causality between money, publicity, power, and populism are money as dependable to enhancing popularity which extracted within public power.

As one can see, money and power be like two same coins cannot be separated each other. Both entities have relations to support political career. In this context, populist policy issued towards general election that it’s funding from budgeting sporadically and instantly can be called as pork barrel politics. This politics aims to creating populist figure rapidly based on spreading social funds abundantly to the people. In addition to create populism, pork politics used to draw sympathy from people so that their ballot can be increasing rapidly within a short time. However, pork barrel in positive perspective can be analyzed as critical way to banishing bureaucratic standoff in order to accelerating redistribution social aids to common people after all.

Thus, pork barrel politics in technocratic views able to categorized as de-bottlenecking bureaucracy procedure. Some people argued pork barrel may necessary one to reducing social gap even poverty that during all this time can’t be reached due to limitation of funding and apparatus. Therefore, politicians who are conducting pork politics to increasing their charisma as populist figure to the people as holder of supremacy power in democracy system always make substantial effort in at least two dimensions to stay in the office: establishing policy platform and expertise and providing constituency servicesto their districts such as pork barrel.
projects. Addressing to pork barrel politics as populism machine, neither politician nor parties have been concealed any potential suspicious from other colleagues who hold clean political spirit. They always have many political tricks to hold up pork barrel politics as the only solution to executing social aids more as effective as efficient.

In this paper, I would like to analyze pork barrel politics as primary political corruption at legislative body especially in political campaign management which wield pork barrel as their strategy to wielding ballot in ahead of general elections. Discussing about pork barrel that carried out dual function as political machine to enhancing popularity based on vote buying and political strategy to pursue political opportunity to re-elect again were urge and significant to be answered for many reasons. Firstly, pork barrel is manifestation of electoral corruption wherein politician insisted to preserve their patronage and client relation to commons throughout vote buying based on pork barrel policy. Second, pork barrel can be understood as budgeting corruption in our financial system. In this context, we must admit that all budgeting is about politics; most politics is about budgeting; and budgeting must therefore be understood as part of political game. Politician in the legislature chair will always to wielding their political influence to affect their political constituent through budgeting instrument.

As result from both premises noted above, have culminated become two legged-political corruption that can able proceed legally in two arena; legislature and political campaign arena. Its practice which can make this political corruption method is difficult to reveal due to absence of legal instrument to investigate these corruption. In realm of Indonesian legislative body and its political campaign management, pork barrel policy can be common political practice that conducted by politician to attract voter to submitting their ballot into their polling in both local and national election. It can be indicated from much news report about black campaign which always carried by local regional chief, legislature member, even president by spreading social aids to common people as political recipient in many regions. These pattern actually signed by approval from ruling party which subsequently creates unequal competes amidst other parties and politician who is yet become public officer in governmental chair. Incumbent either ruling party everlasting benefited towards this unequal competition that made unhealthy political competition. Therefore, populism in this context is urge and significant be discussed in order to understanding correlation populism and pork barrel policy.

Populism literally can be realized as political attempt to make someone become popular figure with accentuating kind personality who has good moral and strong commitment to prospering common peoples. Thus, populism have similarity to creating politics of image which during this time turn out compulsory provisions for politician either who want to pursuing their opportunity become regional local chief or legislature member and who want insist their chair as public officer and running the power in second terms in office. Populism can able to differ from its intent and purpose that branched become two classifications namely fake populism or real populism. In the sense of real populism, both politician and parties have strong commitment to engage in politics as manifestation of truly dedication for the people, so; pork barrels
politics is unnecessary due to their political wage as political aspiration to fulfilling basic needs of people. Meanwhile, fake populism is political effort to persuade commons as voter within spreading political money abundantly from local or national budgeting. Populism only turns out political mask to covering up their ignorance about plight of the people. Fake populism is political image for opportunist politician and parties to approaching commons temporary in order to pursuing public office.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents previously study of pork barrel policy in many nations as comparative perspective in analyzing Indonesian case and also elaborating a political pork barrel theory of legislative or governmental bargaining with budgetary and trade-off practice wherein mechanism of vote-buying have happened towards general elections. Sections 3 describe and elaborate implementation of pork barrel policy as ordinary political practice in Indonesia political realms, while Section 6 concludes the paper.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

1) PORK BARREL AS POLITICAL CORRUPTION

The term of pork barrel politics was came from history of budgeting in American politics since 1870. Its term derive from a practice of antebellum slaveholders; they would give a barrel of salt pork to their slaves most notably Negros, who scrambled and fought with each other for a share. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term acquired its political meaning in the early 1870s. In 1870, Edward Everett Hale used the term “pork barrel” as a homely metaphor for any form of public spending to the citizenry after American Civil War ended. The U.S Congress and Senate hence use its term to obtaining funds for popular projects in their home districts. Pork barrel actually mentioned earmark as form of official policy that issued from government and congress. Both had authorized pork in the form of $1,500 to complete a lighthouse in Maine, which was then part of Massachusetts. The expenditure had the active support of President George Washington and of Rep. George Thatcher of Massachusetts. On constitutional grounds, however, the same Congress rejected a bill to aid a glass manufacturer. Perhaps the second bill lacked presidential support. Naturally, political earmark is more official term instead “pork-barrel” in budgeting session in legislature are. In the end, pork barrel often used to address political distortion that practiced politician and parties by manipulating budget as their populism.

Pork politic which was implemented by politician in this country less different if compared within U.S wherein social aids to common people categorized as political earmarks. A political earmark has been routinely political agenda for legislator or senate member which devoted to special specific project. US politician who has been legislature member have a moral task to prospering their home district exemplarily direct funds to their constituent as manifestation of aspiration aids. There are two political views to understanding political earmarks. First, political earmarks in positive political reason is compassionate practices whom want to be practiced from politician which during this time less so concerned about their home voter, so; earmark can be understood as ethic politics to recompense their ballot in general election. Secondly, earmark is mechanism of vote buying which carried out politician and parties as
by design and by product. In the terms of by design approach, political earmark as well as pork barrel is designed to hijacking other budgeting allocation to be own campaign budgeting. The understanding of political earmarks as by product can be analyzed as political aspiration grant from politician to their home district. However, there have always been several fundamental problems in the discussions surrounding pork-barrel. 1) The concept of “pork-barrel” has never been made clear, and thus the definition of the term is too narrowly interpreted. Pork barrel is a dilemmatic concept has trapped in political pitfalls between politicization of budgeting and corruption actions. 2) Pork barrel has not been sufficiently elaborated in campaign in political science. Pork barrel only assumed as phenomenology in political science to referring under-the-table political deals between the legislators and the President and an outcome of mutual interactions between the local politicians and the President. 3) Pork barrel seem to have failed to give a sufficient answer economic inefficiency of resource allocation involved in pork barrel politics have attracted very little attention. 4) Most political scientist rarely to analyzing political-corruption practice using this perspective due to pork barrel practice is very difficult to be evidenced. Its characteristic which is happens in gray area which not necessarily accessed by extra-parliamentary actors such as academia, activist, and others. The pork barrel actor will be afraid if other actor who have no interest within this practice also penetrating this secret area (Noda, 2011). This paper will elaborate pork barrel politics in both terms such as pork barrel as phenomenology of politico corruption practice and pork barrel as vote seeking mechanism.

2) PORK BARREL AS POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLE IN LEGISLATURE AREA

Pork barrel basically is chain series of politicization of budgeting in legislature realms. These practices have correlation within election cycle and fiscal policy which had implemented in 20 years. The assumption of macro-economic such as oil and gas lifting, fuel price, inflation rate, and economic growth always used politician to create his pork barrel programs. Because, politician wants to create good impression to their voter that pork barrel have issued due to stable performance of national economic. So, their voter can accepted pork barrel as generosity action from government (Farhan, 2013: 29). Thus, their practices subsequently developed become politics of image wherein politician was to be conceived as commons savior. However, pork barrel should be realized as budgeting corruption that implicates budgeting fraud. Political budget essentially a political game in budgeting session which politician who is become legislature member was benefited to affect specific budget allocation to be converted own political funds. Research study about pork barrel as political budget cycle was introduced Rogoff (1990), then had been developed Shi and Sevensson (2002), Brender and Drazen (2004), Streb, Lemaand Torrens (2005), and Alt and Lasssen (2005). According to Rogoff, political budget cycle was indicated within the posture of budget changes drastically, which cut taxes; increase spending and transfers are not as usual. These budget distortions can be happened due to politician wants to show himself as good politician who always working hard common’s wealth. Politician was used political trick to boosting governmental spending during previous years to crafting high rate economic growth.
Thus, politician can make his pork barrel policy to attract public sympathy by issuing popular policy such as job creation and declining fuel prices. Public unaware that politician pork barrel can be created high inflation due to popular policy has been raising public demand over than commodities supply. Therefore, asymmetric information have made a paradoxical effect wherein politician gain political support about his pork barrel, meanwhile; this practice make harmful effect to the budgeting allocation which then corrupted for political sake.

Other reasons about asymmetric information as base of pork barrel was came from Shi and Svensson. Both argued that asymmetric case was sourced from two things; moral hazard and rent-seeking practice. Moral hazard can be realized as political effort from politician to manipulate budgeting policy as political policy, meanwhile; rent seeking is political way to own fundraising based on manipulating budget allocations. These premises subsequently added by Brender and Drazen which argued the phenomenon of political budget cycle usually occurred in newly democratic nations due to lack of check and balances practice amidst politician and parties. They have concluded that populism in newly democratic nations built not via commoditization of political ideology, but; throughout spreading money politics and other social aids. Therefore, the issuing of pork barrel policy based on political budget cycle need strong political commitment among other legislature member to realizing this policy., discussing of cash outflow from budgetary cycle is urge and significant to be discussed in this context, which can be sought in this diagram.

(see diagram)

In the table below can be explained political budget cycle was initiated within submission of policy programs proposals which contained many pork barrel policies to the bicameral legislature tiers. Thus, these proposals eventually to be discussed among legislature member either lower house and upper house. During the process of discussion about its proposals, politician from both legislature member will be negotiated how much the portions of pork barrel that will be gained for

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**Stages of Pork Barrel Politics**

1. **Submission of Budget Proposals to DBM by Line-Agencies**
2. **Formulation of Budget Proposal under DBM**
3. **Congress: Committee on Appropriations / Other Committees**
4. **Congress: Approval of Budget**
5. **Bicameral Conference on Committee**
6. **Congress: Final Approval**
7. **President’s Veto Message**
8. **Disbursement**

**Sources:** Kohei Noda (2011:5)
their constituent. Their negotiations processes become significant to deciding budget allocation which should be allocated, included how much portion of rent that will be perceived from this pork barrel. Its practice what makes In the political budget cycle, executive only become political marker to signing pork barrel policy that issued by legislature members. The practice of political constipations from legislature member to issuing their pork barrel policy eventually impacted on distortions of budget allocation. The governmental spending was increasing so much rather than its income.

In this context, pork barrel politics is unethical budgeting practice which able categorized political-corruption actions in budgeting for the following reasons; 1) pork barrel project had waste million money of people taxpayer which previously should be used to fund many development projects. Both politician and parties have executed tax for their political agenda. They usually were targeting how much potency of tax or residual funds from budget in certain numbers. They already deceived many taxpayers who believe their tax is used from other people benefit, however; in reality, both actors spend million taxes as hidden campaign project. 2) The specific pork barrel projects are often trivial and unnecessary for commons people most notably school bag and education utilities for student, frying pan for midwife, even cigarette for male. It’s become ridiculous things wherein social aids do not touch the root of society real problems. Therefore, second reason had taught us that pork barrel project only segmented to special recipients which presumably considered as their loyal voter. 3) Pork barrel spending provides unfair advantages to incumbent politicians in elections (Walker, 2010). It will make other competitors envy towards political privileges which perceived by incumbent. Since pork barrel spending often funds projects in a legislator district, it often becomes a way for legislators to demonstrate their efficacy and value to district voters.

Legislator who takes part in pork barrel spending may do so only to bring benefits to themselves and their political careers, and not because they believe the projects they are fighting for are actually worth taxpayers money. In essence, legislators are using budget to buy themselves votes. It’s no wonder if amount of tax which perceived by state always stolen all of suddenly towards election. Pork barrel subsequently inherited in obligatory political practice that parties and politician must do it. There are some interesting premises that can conclude in discussing pork barrel theory. 1) The pattern of populism-seeking built throughout synergy between rent-seeking practice and vote-seeking practice. Rent-seeking can be conceived as primary sources of politico-corruption practice during this time. Thus, rent-seeking always happens in every tiers of governmental chair whether in legislature, executive, and judicative. Previous study about practice of pork barrel politics as primary politico-corruption sources had been showed urgency of this policy to enhance populism either politician and parties. This urgency can be stressed in two paths for redistributive pork barrel as political sympathy funds. In one perspective, pork barrel programs are “vote-buying” schemes that mediate electoral competitionamong political parties. The spending decision is centralized among party decision makers, with no role for individual legislators.

A key empirical prediction emerging from this
perspective is that spending will be allocated disproportionately towards swing districts where voters do not have a strong attachment to either the government or opposition parties. “Vote-buying” scheme has positioned party elites as kingmaker to determine how much allocation of budget that able converted hidden political campaign for each candidate. It’s what makes oligarchic rule in political party wherein candidate who have intimate relationship with higher officer can able prosecuted how much total budget as his pork barrel politics. In addition oligarchic rule as determiner pork barrel, their political cadre in grassroots also prosecuted national or local budget as their pork barrel on behalf acceleration of people welfare by entrusting proposal of funding assistance to their elite cadre who hold tenure as public officer. Indeed, higher officer will be granting national or local budget to their political underlings as obligatory discretionary. Many “wild” assistance proposals and oligarchic party addressed to legislature or executive officer already made disruption into allocation of budgeting. The most significant aspect from budget debauchery is budget spending for social aids policy bigger than other allocations. This condition usually happens towards elections wherein many wild proposals entrusted as political provisions. In spite of party elite hold legitimacy, the patron chief is real decision maker is more eligible to determine allocation of pork barrel funds.

3) PORK BARREL AS MECHANISM OF “LEGAL VOTE BUYING” IN GENERAL ELECTIONS

Characteristic of political voters in Indonesia dominated in both type; patronage voter and client voter. For those reasons, there are clash in institutionalizing of political party to be classified in clientelism and electoralism. The emergence of democratic that had recently enacted long-established traditions some sort: corruption, vote-buying, patronage, and patrimonialism quite well regarded as primary political strategy. Likewise, construction of electoralism politics seems not has better place when confronted with pragmatic voters which interprets money as political barter to gaining their vote in election (Zoelva, 2013:10).
Thus, particularly vote buying, these practices are obligatory strategies that can bind their voters involved issuing special policy to maintain political loyalty. However, voters often claim that they perceive money politics from many candidate but they eventually cast their vote independently parted from money politics that tied him from specific politician.

The rise of vote buying as political strategies to win on election can be analyses in some reasons. First, politician wants to manage their constituent in bargaining positions with patron adding their resources to their voter. Second, its practice contributed to the schema survival in the fittest in political realm, politician has been insisted and persisted to hold their political tenure as long as possible. Third, vote buying has been political habitus which has been taken for granted in political practice. It may be well as code of conduct amidst legislature member nowadays. Addressing to those practice, politician quite not to straightforward to admit himself to carried out the vote buying, although public aware that vote buying is routines political life toward general election.

Therefore, aspect political funding to be critical discussed in this context. Political adage which said money is not sufficient, but it is necessary for
successful campaign. Money is necessary because campaigns do have impact on election results and campaign cannot be run without it. It might be relevant to linking vote buying and corruption. These both entities have mutualism relations wherein politician needs huge money to be self-financing in general election and its donor need wide accessibility to entering economic policy arena through political influence from politician. However, in this context, pork barrel is necessary ones to be compulsory task for fund raising to their political funds. As noted above, pork barrel is part of vote-buying strategies to maintain patronage political machine which presumably can be assumed as vote-getting vehicle. For instance, pork barrel able to be implemented in fake project even giving social aids to commons in order to the politician take political wish to binding their voter so as they can re-elect again in general election as legislature member.

(see Table)

According to the table, pork barrel which issued in ahead of general elections can be understood as political attempt to create patron-client relations on constituent. Those schema has been depicted how political influence brings out artificial loyalty to their constituent involving pork barrel. To begin, in newly democratic nations like as Indonesia, implementing open-list proportional system wherein candidacy is most important figure to approaching constituent. This condition have enforced politician to remake him as kind-hearted figure in order to attract sympathy from voters. Therefore, pork barrel is part of politician effort to show him as populist one by utilizing pork barrel. In the end, public seems to return the favor towards politician’s pork barrel, so that; public directly submit their vote.

Previous study which using this “vote-buying” perspective was came from Diana Evans (2004:159) in her books entitles Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions. Diana has describes that pork barrel as vote-buying mechanism occurs in legislature and political campaign. In legislature area, pork barrel used for issued a policy in house of representative and senate. Politician either from Republican and Democrat often realized pork barrel to minimize opposition
poll in order to policy issuing can be accelerated. It can be called as political bargaining amidst politician in legislature to be united each other to supporting governmental policy. They aware that pork barrel is a vote hijacking for legislature member which should be struggling commons aspirations rather than their own political sake. Pork barrel politics eventually become main instrument in legislature to issuing public policy. Meanwhile, in political campaign, vote buying presumably called money politics (Sulistyo, 2003). Politician or parties who want to re-elect again in second terms in office always prioritize money politic to enhance their ballot through spreading money envelope and funding assistance to their constituent. Another research within “vote buying” from Allen Hicken (2002: 35) that explained vote buying was a method of choice for many candidates as they sought to cultivate personal support network. The networks established within reliance from voter to their candidate upon money politics. It will be binding their loyalty and political support to parties and candidate.

An alternative perspective emphasizes the role of pork barrel programs in cementing bargains among individual legislators and in building cohesion within governing legislative coalitions. Alongstanding literature has investigated the political determinants of the allocation of governmentspending in the United States. In the standard view, parties play a relatively weak role in legislativematters, distributive politics is decentralized, and the seniority and committee assignments of individual legislators are decisive in the allocation of spending, while party electoral considerations matter correspondingly little. This premise opposite within “vote-buying” scheme which argued party elites have political authority to determine pork barrel budget. Politician gained his position as decision maker whom spending budget allocation as own pork barrel funds. In this context, implementation of proportional system based on open list had emphasized politician like political skipper which conducting parties. Therefore, politician is more popular than parties in pursue popularity by involving pork barrel campaign while political party experienced organizational degradation.

**RESEARCH METHOD**

The approach used in this study is a qualitative approach. It is mention that due to a qualitative approach to this study has characteristics such as having an actual setting, the researcher is the key instrument, the data are usually descriptive and narrative, the research aimed at acquiring the meaning of data description to describe the causality and characteristics of the studied units (Moleong, 2007). This research has used library research as research method in analyzing data and writing process. Library research is research method based on literacy activities wherein researcher take attempt to find answer from research question from relevant works that supporting his research (Zed, 2004). The writer gained information and data by extensive reviewing of relevant published materials (both printed and online) such as books, articles, journals, reports and other resources. All of data subsequently analyzed to find correlation from data then concluded in research answer in this paper. In this research, data collected from any relevant studies which contained pork barrel during 2009-2013, subsequently analyzed in causality between theory and empirical case.
RESULT AND ANALYSIS

1) BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF LONG-STANDING PORK BARREL POLICY IN INDONESIA POLITICAL SYSTEM

This paper focused pork barrel policy during 2009-2013 which implemented House of Representative. In this case, I would like to analyze pork barrel in this legislature tiers into two analyses branch; pork barrel as vote buying schema to win on general elections and pork barrel as political fraud in our budgeting system. However, prior to us been headed for the main discussion. It’s better to us to find out about long-standing history about this practice as comparative analyses to compare within recent pork barrel policy.

Politico-corruption is heavily ingrained in our local and national political system wherein this practice could not be removed. Long time ago before European colonization, merchants who come to Indonesia to trade (especially in Java), have to pay tribute to the ruler of the state he visited, as a guarantee that he would be protected by the ruler. Meanwhile, politico-corruption in Dutch era worsened in bureaucracies who were encouraged to corrupt due to they suffer low salaries. In addition to low salaries, politico corruption also happened in elite officer which building patronage relation throughout paying tribute fee to local royal member to guarantee economic investment in their area. It’s what makes rent-seeking and patronage politics are two ancestry sources in discussing political corruption in Indonesia.

Rent seeking can able to understood corruption habituation attempt in pursue enhancing added value for own wealth sake, whilst; patronage is political effort to looking for protection towards who have strong legitimacy in commons. In other words, patronage is mechanism of trade-off relations wherein money bartered with protection to ensure this dirty political corruption can’t be to proven. The patron benefited from political patronage within bribe portion from client. It will be complicated if the two ancestry of politico corruption in Indonesia can’t be eradicated in their roots. Politico corruption has networked in tries politico level which called nowadays as political bribery.

There is no doubt that the escalation of political corruption has increased since fallacy of New Order in 1998. According data from Transparency International (TI) in 2012, Indonesia corruption perception index stranded on lowest rank amidst other South East Asia nations within position 118th from 176 nations had surveyed. Singapore is becoming the best countries that have highest corruption perception index in Asia to be ranked in 5th. Meanwhile, Malaysia was ranked in 54th, Thailand and Philippines in 88th and 105th. The lowest corruption perception index which had suffered Indonesia sourced from sluggish regulation, rent bureaucracy, high cost of political funding activity, and manipulation on governmental project. In analysis of economic politic perspective, politico corruption was come from six symptoms; 1) the state plays a dominant role in which the public sector, while: private sector can’t able to access. 2) Pattern of economic development based on rent capitalism that implicated unhealthy economic rivalry. 3) Political intervention so much has great influence on economic project wherein many high officers in every economic institution is hold tenure as political cadre. 4) Too many inefficient and ineffective regulations abundantly in economic regulations, 5) bureaucracy has many discretion in
their task that create opportunity to finding other material source within sell power legitimacy. Lack of transparency and accountability due to limitation of watchdog spirit amidst bureaucracy to watching their colleagues (Arifianto, 2001).

As noted below, roots of politico-corruption built by synergy of rent seeking practice and patronage relation which have an impact on political and economic activity. In the era of Soekarno presidential era, politico corruption practice occurred in process of nationalization or take over the Dutch assets. In this case, military officer and political elites already joint to seize and grab Dutch asset as own treasury. Much business built on nationalization, however; regime has supreme control to decide economic actor who supposed capable in developing economic investment. As result, paying high tribute toward higher office either civil service or military is obligatory and necessary one. Thus, in Suharto era, politico-corruption was exaggerating which centralized in presidential families and his cronies. Both have politico privileges to accepting money granting from industries and corruption, regulate the economic tender, and participate actively as merchant. It's not surprising that many businessmen always negotiate with regime and become part of economic client. Politico corruption practice in Suharto era had initiated pork barrel era by issuing policy namely presidential assistance, presidential instruction, and presidential lotteries such as SDSB and Porkas which held by Ministry of Social Affairs to attract public sympathy and loyalty to regime.

This policy is concurrently with floating mass policy which aimed to depoliticize public political aspiration and keep up nation stability. Pork barrel in the New Order era had been executed by legal formal frameworks, so that; political corruption aura can be diminished and disguised neatly. Pork barrel policy during New Order era has been came from state-owned enterprise, national budget. According to Sidel, the practice of pork barrel politics in New Order had been exercised effective discretion over the disbursement of pork barrel funds for public works and the appointment of local police commanders, district engineers and teachers of schools, provincial fiscals, treasurers, and assessors, judges of the court of first instance, and local agents of the Bureau of Lands. Therefore, its policy have pervasive effect into public who supposed as passive object which always indoctrinated by legal pork barrel. It's not surprising if regime has wide populism from their pork barrel policy. Meanwhile, pork barrel politic just erases their political rival such as Indonesia Democratic Party or Party of Unity Development to gain much ballot in the general election.

Thanks to “legal” pork barrel, Golongan Karya (Functional Group) the regime political party always wins in every general election from 1971 until 1997. Public as voter automatically recognize so much party regime and Suharto figure as popular figure even so people savior. As evidenced, either presidential assistance or presidential grant can be effective mechanism of legal “vote buying” from people to regime party. In this context can be said that, pork barrel is manifestation of monetization in people. Therefore, there is no formal succession in New Order era, regime harmlessly continuing rulership without any protest and sharp critical from commons (King, 2003). Public already obtained their pork barrel such as presidential assistance such as social security aids, cheap basic stuff, and many more which driven political incen-
tive to supporting regime stability of power. The fallacy of New Order Era in 1998 has adopted democracy as main instrument to driving the state. It’s called Reformation era who hold strong commitment to eradicate politico-corruption practice which flourished during New Order era. However, strong commitment been challenged with reorganization of old elite to persist their rule in democracy era. It was indicated within informal legitimacy from politician and parties that pork barrel is becoming political habituation which inherited in political activity. Pork barrel as habituation means its practice of budget fraud that both actors carried out in local or nation budgeting allocation. Democracy has put commons people as least becomes holder of supreme power which has authority to chosen politician or parties will be public office in this state. Consequently, approaching commons is urge and significant to attract their support and loyalty that able converted become ballot. Both politician and parties should be more listening and more compassionate to their people in order to gaining their voter. Its have implication to the rising of political cost that spent in commons.

Thus, schema of pork barrel politics during New Order which emphasized in social assistance policy as vote buying towards people was all much same within contemporary era. Either politician or parties take political attempt to popularize him and strengthen their patronage relations to their constituent. In Indonesia democracy realms, commoditization of political idea and political ideology which prevailed in western democracy to attract people is inapplicable. Because, the characteristic of political voter in Indonesia is parochial voter that usually tend to be pragmatic and passive. They inclined to preserve status quo of political and economic stability like as new Order done, so that, political ideology as political bargaining to constituent only become political junk.

Moreover, since 2004, peoples have been become as supreme mandate holder. Indonesia voter preferred to be approached within economic material rather than political promises. That pragmatically democracy condition eventually has driven our politician and parties become pragmatic and opportunist political actors. Both actor take political justify any means to be elected in general election. Its political behavioral then conclude to using the classic way as well as New Order to preserve their reign by spreading populist policy and money politics to binding their constituent politically. Furthermore, high cost of direct electoral democracy also supposed politician and parties been spent much money during political campaign in order to attract public votes. Therefore, during implementation of direct electoral era since 2004 until present, practice of budgeting fraud is compulsory task to our politician and parties to funding and popularizes him into public. It’s not surprising, according to KOMPAS, the rising of political cost during 2004 until 2013 have estimated 44, 1 trillion rupiahs wherein its details concluded according their political campaign. Spending of political cost such as campaign, socialization, or spreading social aids is varied for each other that depend on their political target. In the end, pork barrel re-known again in democracy realm as effective political method to obtain public vote.

2) PORK BARREL POLITICS AS POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLE AND POLITICAL FRAUD IN BUDGETING SYSTEM 2009-2013

Fake Populism or Real Populism: Pork Barrel Policy as Political Corruption in House of Representative During 2009-2013 / WASISTO JATI / http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2013.0015
Discussing about pork barrel in this section focused in social aids project which usually issued towards general election. Politicians who hold tenure as public officer together with ruling party usually considering those political project is necessary ones to enhance their popularity in public. They been aware that social aids will be feeding up many funds from state budget wherein its funds have allocated to others government subsidiary programs to public basic needs. However, it seems they apathetic with the swelling of the state budget to funding their social aids. Thus, both political actors only finds out that their social aids project from extraordinary budget from state budget which recently already known as SILPA. SILPA is abbreviation from leftover budget spending in our budgeting system denoted budgeting residue which should be submitted in state allocation to strengthen state budget next years.

In spite of to do, legislature feels to take political favor toward this budget residue to own funds. That political fraud can be looked in difference of SILPA from legislature and State Audit Board in 2009-2013 which always oppose claims each other, margin of difference number ranged 50-100 billion rupiah. Legislature members hence still pretended that difference is unproblematic due to state budget will not be stolen, even public officer who have full accessibility to access state budget. Public funding program for social grants program in theBudget of 2009 reached 64,788,513,384,000 rupiahs wherein portion of social aids from politician is largest one (ICW, 2012)Suspected indication about political fraud has been occurred in correlation between national budgeting within election-winning project. It was indicated from improvement of budget allocation in the 2009 state budget, particularly in social aids spending from central government. As we can see in this table, improvement of social aids spending tends to increasing rather than other budgeting allocation.

Manipulation of fiscal policy by legislature members showed in political budget cycle. Its practice indicated through mark-up certain allocation to be own social aids. Politicians have been looking for the political momentum to seek political fissure in budgeting system. Mark up can be explained as budgeting effort to enhance money portion to other allocation instantly and sporadically. Manipulation practice canbe discovered in specific allocation which used as own pork barrel. Asymmetries relations within judicative, that make political bribery flourished in legislature tiers, so that, they can easily to enhance fund portion to funding own social aids. Its political bribery sourced from own social aids based on mark-up policy. Its political bribery presumably is result of political consensus among legislature member to redistribute the social aids fund as their political funds. Political demands of the party to donate their bribery as operational funds has enforced politician to exploit state budget. It’s not surprising when portion of state spending always deficit due to politico-corrupt habits from our politician in legislature tiers.

In this context, there are relationship between the state budget and budget for pork barrel which can be argued in two primary reasons. Firstly, both entities should be understood as political game amidst legislative members and executive. Arrangement of state budget which composed based on macro-economic assumptions which been prevailed in next year. However, legislature member hold much better political bargaining power rather than
executive during arrangement process. They can stipulate their own budgeting policy which adjusted within governmental policy for specific purposes. Therefore, relationships have been built in that “politic of adjustment” wherein pork barrel programs have been disguised securely into governmental projects. The legislature demand can be denied by the executive due to their ability to threaten the suspension of budgetary discussions as a political marker. Those conditions usually occur towards general elections wherein many legislators attempt to succeed their pork barrel programs funded by state budget schemas. Legislators will direct their own pork barrel to constituents in their districts. Secondly, budget for pork barrel enables to be enhanced concomitantly with the increasing prospect of macro-economic assumptions. Its condition which encouraged many legislators to manipulate the number of macro-economic assumptions in order to replenish their own pork barrel programs as well as their political costs. Consequently, asymmetric information would like to be primary data to arrange budgeting allocation.

As noted above, the improvement of social aids based on sources from state budget has flourished in every year. This condition triggered up within political attempts from politicians to manipulate fiscal policy in order to strengthen their political funds. Swelling of state budget also contributes significantly to the budget deficit. This deficit is caused by the rising of political consumption such as banners, short flags, or stickers. Those conditions usually occurred in political years, previous years before elections. The rising of political demand subsequently within state budget, its deficit has implicated into budgeting deficit. In 2009, improvement of social aids in legislation tiers supposed as primary deficit sources in state budget which contributes 1-2 percent. That is what makes budgeting fraud wherein political spending is higher rather than state income. Nowadays, classic pattern seems to be repeated in this year.

The increasing trend of social assistance also showed a significant increase between the 2013 budget drafts before the House discussed the 2013 budget after the House of Representatives discussed. Social assistance increased from 69 trillion rupiah in 2013 to 73.6 trillion. Many trillion in budget 2013 is manifestation of an increase of 14.5
trillion rupiah. It may be an increase in social assistance is the result of legislative intervention during the discussion of the budget to get a piece rents that can be used as a tool campaigns.

3) PORK BARREL AS MECHANISM OF “VOTE BUYING” IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGN

In early discussion already had explained that vote buying is political attempt to preserve loyalty through patronage relations. It was indicated during political campaign in ahead of elections wherein many money politics spreads to common public in order to submit the vote and elect him (Andreas, 2013: 120). This practice usually called as political dawn syndrome due to money spreading to the public when the sun has yet to show its light.

In this section, I would like emphasize pork barrel analysis in aspiration funds from House of Representative. The issuing of aspiration fund can be explained not only vote buying but also candidacy buying. The policy of aspiration funds which initiated in 2009 and still going on actually oddly. Because, legislature member already to have political wealth abundantly from their wage and allowance. Those practices which raised suspicion that aspiration funds is new modus to political practice in legislature tiers.

The emergence of aspiration funds which enacted since 2010. It had outrage much regulation such as Act No. 17 of 2003 on State Finances, Act No.1 of 2004 on State Treasury, Act No.32 of 2004 on Local Administration, and Act No. 15 of 2004 on State Management and Financial Arrangements. The House did not given political legitimacy to directing own budget policy to their constituent because those legitimacy is governmental political side. In addition to unlawful, its legislature policy also becoming new source to wasting state budget and might to be corrupted. Aspiration funds hence turn out controversial policy wherein its policy have absorbs trillion rupiah from state budget. In this case, legislature seems to abusing his tenure which they should be abdicate and dedicate him to common interest. However, politician seems to fulfilling own political sake either individual or party throughout its aspiration funds.

Therefore, we must critical to interpret aspiration words in this policy with questioning: aspiration for whom? Who is benefited? Indeed within aspiration funds, politicians who become legislature member more benefited than politician extra-parliamentary due to aspiration funds can be political tools to strengthen and widening their political basis. Firstly, aspiration fund has been remake budget posture be unequal an unbalance due to its policy fed much fund from other budget allocation. As we can see in this table, aspiration funds intop three positions after special autonomy funds. However, in order to disguise their pork barrel policy in budgeting session. Legislature members in House of Representative tend to namely their aspiration policy as adjustment fund to hindering any suspiscious.

As noted above, we can see adjustment fund as disguise form for pork barrel routinely increasing in recently years. Although, allocation for adjustment fund has been fluctuated, meanwhile; its fund will be increasing rapidly towards general elections. Therefore, from these budgeting sessions, each legislature member has obtained 15 million rupiah that calculated within total of legislature member reached 560 persons. So, there are 8, 6 billion rupiah must be allocated for this
policy. However, the meaning of aspiration funds in this context is harmful. Because truly meaning of aspiration funds is one of budget allocation between executives and legislative which conclude in amount of state budget which reached 1500 trillion rupiah. That is what makes this policy becoming absurd, if we see working performance from legislature members during all this time not full-hearted to abdicate himself as public servant. In spite of raised many critical, The House has insisted and persistent to issuing their budget policy to their constituent on behalf common interest even though its fund only manifestation from return of political investment to recharge their political campaign and vote-buying.

Naturally, aspiration fund hold pivotal key for politician to re-popularize him again in their constituent. In ahead of election, they usually establishes house of aspirations as political place to spreading their pork barrel policy such as basic needs, money politics, or infrastructure funds. House of Aspirations will be new modus of political image for politician to re-elect again which always ready anywhere and anytime to serve commons interest. Vote buying usually happened in previous days before Election Day by approach charismatic figure in public as their campaign agent. Thus, charismatic figure will be persuading their public to re-elect specific politician whilst introduce its politician and spreading pork barrel as political gratification. As a result, through charismatic figure and aspiration funds, patronage relation to constituent has been established in political campaign. Voter as client-voter will be directly to

TABLE IV: COMPARISON OF BUDGET POSTURE

| Source: (Kumorotomo, 2012) |
|---------------------------|
submit their vote to the politicians. With the 15 trillion in pocket and making cooperation relation within charismatic figure, politician eventually can save their political cost to fund him during political campaign.

Therefore, aspiration funds in the context of voting buying significantly have been correlated within huge cost political spending for legislature candidate who ranged from 250 million rupiahs until 20 billion rupiahs, which depend on their popularity in commons people. Artists who during this time always broadcasted by media lastly spend 250 million- 1 billion, party cadre spent 600 million-8 billion, and businessman spent 1 billion until 20 billion rupiahs. The large amount of political cost that must be spent indicated monetization in struggle for attract voter from commons. Monetization in this sentence can be explained as political attempt to popularize himself based on spreading money to commons in order to people known him as well. If the political campaign has been corrupted by monetization, it’s not surprising when politico-corruption is very difficult to be eradicated in political campaign. Populism which built based on monetization usually not sincerely to approaching commons as democracy partner. It’s called namely fake populism wherein populism only become political visor to performs politician and parties which ones have truly sincerely to commons people artificially. Thus, they only suppose commons as political commodity which their vote can be converted within money. Therefore, this practice is not differing so much within mechanism of vote buying during New Order era, however; populism in those Order not only established on monetization, but also repressive and coercive practice from state apparatus who strictly command to the people in order to loyal to the regime.

Pork barrel politics in the post-Suharto era actually had been succeeding with same mechanism since New Order. Its policy usually issued toward general election event when politician who become incumbent still desires to re-elect again in second terms in office. These political desires has sacrifice national or local budget as their political victim which resulted in budgetary fraud. This fraud thus converted to funding artificial social aids which it’s characteristic have contained political aura to crafting populism instantly and effectively with its objective to make public recognize the candidate. Nowadays, pork barrel politic sourced from social aids and social assistance was allegedly derived practice of budgetary fraud. Incumbent politician and ruling parties usually using this practice to enhancing their popularity in the commons; so that; they have political chance to re-elect again. The propagation of its policy aimed to the poor commons communities and villagers who are presumably is easy to persuade their political preferences. In addition to persuade, both social aids and social assistance also used a way to retrench political cost. Prior to previous sentenced already said that political cost has been consume large amount of money. Politician who holds tenure as public office was benefited to politicize national or local budget as their hidden pork barrel politics. Although they never admitted to politicize, public already known that the social assistance and social aids which issued sporadically is a manifestation of money politics towards general election events. In spite of pork barrel politics actually used as mechanism of vote buying, however; the case of pork barrel politics in Indonesia...
just indicated there are of number of violations in implementing social aids particularly the amount of social aids which sudden reduced to funding political campaign. Its practice can be said that pork barrel in Indonesia also functioned as practice of fundraising for political cost.

According to data from FITRA can be concluded that the amount of pork barrel politics in local and national level reached trillions of dollars. In national level, pork barrel politics is realized in ministerial and presidential tiers, meanwhile; in local arena, pork barrel is implemented in agency tiers. Executive who came from political party cadre usually have vital role to scattering pork barrel to popularize and make philanthropy image to the people. Legislature tiers only becoming political marker to boosting pork barrel practice can be realized and executed. In this case, I want to said that pork barrel politics as politico-corruption practice has been inherited and networked in our political system. Public already knew this dirty practice, however, they also passive and silenced about this practice. In democracy realms, public have been transformed as pragmatic voter wherein they only submitting their vote if their vote have valued large amount of money. Its practice makes pork barrel is difficult to be eradicated.

CONCLUSION

Based on this research, implementation of electoral democracy through directly general election has been generating paradoxically effect in Indonesia political system. Public which during New Order only become passive political actors, recently holding supreme mandate of political sovereignty in this country since 2004. Those condition enforced politician and parties to serve aspirations from public in order to elected in general elections. However, behind its democratic realm, politico corruption and then electoral corruption hence been flourished in democracy realms. Both corruption practices associated in political attempt to popularize him into public through economic-material power. Public seems to be approached within money rather than ideology. Therefore, patronage culture still has been persistent in our democratic era wherein political loyalties have built through top-down mechanism via pork barrel.

Pork barrel in this paper can be argued as political strategy in political campaign and funding strategy to replenish political cost. In this paper already explained that causality between corruption and election lied on the high pretension to gathering political vote as well political cost to the fullest. This condition which caused that issuing of pork barrel policy is compulsory and obligated among politician and parties. Finally, pork barrel is not aimed to helping commons, but; be campaign tools which used to popularize both politician and parties instantly and sporadically. Pork barrel can be eradicated if our politic actors realize that this practice is very detrimental. Hopefully, our politician can be engage in politics wholeheartedly.

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