CHAPTER 7

#decolonization2point0: Follow the Star

Abstract This chapter comparatively evaluates the cultural outcomes of the liberalization of television in Jamaica and Ghana using the PIEGO analytical framework. A case is made for a behavioral approach to the examination of the formation of cultures and their economic contexts. Through the “personification” of the CCI sector, “personality” trends and traits in the national media and audiovisual subsector are presented as a central tenet of the South Star model of cultural economy development, proposed for nations of the Global South.

Keywords Populism • Geostrategy • South South • Decolonization • Media • Transformation • Neoliberal policy • AV sector • Framework • Globalization • Governance • Audiovisual • Philosophy • Cultural economy • Ideology • Ideological Transformations • Economy • Principles • Consciencism • Africanness • Caribbeanness • Social Policy • Eras of Enlightenment • Industrialization • Independence and Development Era • Cold War • Spans of Subordination • Culturization • Digitization • Ethical Revolution • Neoliberalism’s liminality • Monetization • Standardization • Content format • Consumption • Convergence • Elitism • Global populism • Hegemony • Programmes • Commodification • Populism • Individualization • Policy Implementation • Media Mitigation • South Star Cultural Economy Model • Democracy • Culture Specificity • Colonial Incursion
A LESSON FROM GHANA

“We love ourselves in Ghana, no one will trouble you”. It was the simplest and most gently powerful loving-backhand-slap I had ever received. Taxi driver John whizzed me around Accra from the fabric market to Accra Mall and then for lunch of Groundnut Soup and Fufu at a community eatery. Signs of fast-paced development on the left and right in the form of new financial institutions stretched upward amid shiny new buildings and huge construction sites. Enormous cranes and other heavy equipment sat on every corner of the city center. It was an absolutely different place to the Accra I remembered from my visit a decade before in 2008. “Development” had been rapid and stark.

An ever-present culture of street-sellers peddled bottled water to Agouti meat. The throngs of brown children at every intersection were new, a fraction of the ever-increasing number of refugees from Cote D’Ivoire and Togo on the streets—begging, selling, sitting, playing, approaching the taxi with tiny caramel-colored hands outstretched. John engaged them in conversation, often sending them away, firmly but gently, “Don’t bother the Obruni Lady”, he told them in his tongue, protecting his “foreign” passenger.

Upon approaching a new round of refugees, I quickly put down the locks on the car doors on both sides and began to wind up the window with urgency. These were necessary actions at Jamaican intersections. Window wipers have been known to open doors, grab purses and act aggressively to commuters who stop between the red of the light and the green. John saw my anxiety as we approached the children. He smiled and said quietly, ever so gently, “No need to be afraid. We love ourselves in Ghana … no one will trouble you”.

“Therein lies the conclusion”, I thought, The ideas I had entertained came together in the conclusive space of John’s two sentences. “No need to be afraid. We love ourselves in Ghana … no one will trouble you”. The profundity of the difference between the Jamaican and Ghanaian personality, identity, character, psyche and their impact on their decisions and choices for liberalization became clearer in that moment. Marcia Weekes, director and producer of the first mid-budget transatlantic film Joseph, tells a story that bears out John’s position. Having shot her film in both Jamaica and Ghana, her experiences speak about a difference in self-love that is seen in a kind, respectful facilitating efficiency in Ghanaian production where, in her experience, the opposite largely held true in Jamaica. It is complex. It further pointed to the defining character and personality of the two media sectors, which is the focus of this chapter.
MEDIA: METAPHOR OF TRANSFORMATION

Television’s liberalization in Jamaica and Ghana became representative of enveloping neoliberalism in both former colonies. The simultaneous 1997 neoliberal policy implementation of the DCMS in Britain and the liberalization of Jamaican and Ghanaian television contextualized the transition from TV to AV, and from cultural institution to subsector of cultural economy. In the first 20 years of the millennium, the audiovisual (AV) sectors and their stakeholders had to relearn, recreate and reformulate themselves, in keeping with the globalized, liberalized zeitgeist that was occurring. During this period of adjustment for nations of the South, Nkrumah’s ethical revolution occurred. The change in global ideology towards neoliberalism had caused, for better or worse, the underlying ethical construct of the Jamaican and Ghanaian societies. The changes in their audiovisual sectors and sub-sectors were indicative and representative. Coming out of the decolonization movements of the 1950s to 1980s, globalization’s adjustments the changes seen were of a philosophical, ideological, economic, governance and operational nature in many developing societies. This philosophy, ideology, economy, governance and operations (PIEGO) construct has been used in this chapter to comparatively analyze change in the emerging cultural economies and their sectors and sub-sectors. The PIEGO construct is used to reveal distinctive elements of the national audiovisual footprints in Jamaica and Ghana (Table 7.1). This evaluation is meant to assist decision makers to assess the nature of cultural change in their societies and economies, and to use this information to facilitate decision making.

Table 7.1 The PIEGO analytical construct

| Antinomies of Culture | South Star Principles of Cultural Economy |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Philosophy            | Vision: Epistemology, identity formation, historiography, phenomenology |
| Ideology              | Interdependence: Balancing economic and development imperatives through ideological synthesis |
| Economy               | Decisiveness: Establishment of a clear, consistent economic model that reflects ideological synthesis and national vision |
| Governance            | Participatory government: Transparency, representation, participation, diversity, equity |
| Operations            | Independence: Rights and freedoms. Will. Decent Work |
Philosophical Underpinnings

The global liberalization movement responded to and disrupted mid-twentieth-century decolonization movements in the Global South. Both Jamaica and Ghana had accepted external mandates for structural adjustment to remedy economic challenges. The marked differences in the responses of the two countries to liberalization were based on their unique epistemological and ontological make-up. The level of intensity of conscientism’s grounding in either country characterized its processes of decision-making and revealed elements of their distinctive national “personalities”. Consciencism provided a barometer of intangible characteristics. Its egalitarian African societal traditions and aspirations of a new African philosophy nourished a sense of nationhood and regionalism seen in notions of nationality, “Africanness” and “Caribbeanness”. The nations’ defining factors emerged out of differences in their historical, philosophical and cultural grounding seen along their trajectories of transition and present as “soft” characteristics of their nationhood.

The social policy decisions of the Ghanaian society and its media sectors during the transitional period were directed by the strong influence of Ghana’s history and pre-history and interwoven principles of Africanism and “Africanness”. Social and economic philosophies of conscientism from the founding father of the Sub-Saharan nation, Kwame Nkrumah, permeated the psyche and processes of decision-making. He defined the “African personality” as the “cluster of humanist principles which underlie traditional African society” (Oruka 1990:246). The West African society’s ingrained awareness of its “Africanness” and its staunch, passive-aggressive resistance to Europe’s fifteenth-century colonization and re-culturization efforts through colonial incursion and occupation remained consistent through to the twentieth-century resistant groundswell of decolonization and insistence on political independence in spite of British denial and defiance. These were the precursors to twenty-first-century resistance to liberalization in Ghana that once again sought to re-culturize the economies and societies of the Global South in accordance with neoliberal ideals.

The decentralized audiovisual sector was an important tool and strategy to this end. Neoliberalism’s principles were largely opposite to the notions of conscientism engrained in the institutional values that had shaped the national psyches during the decolonization movement that led up to and beyond the struggles for political independence. These were altered, reversed or eliminated during the libertine lure. The changed philosophical grounding altered ideological, economic, governance and operations
in ways described in previous chapters. The conspiracy-laden question of whether neoliberal insistence on media divestment as a part of conservative structural adjustment programs was a strategic interventionist measure of disruption, destabilization and control remains unanswered.

Ostensibly, the impact of Jamaica’s enthusiastic broadcast divestment and Ghana’s liberalization shocked their systems. The liberalization of television in Jamaica and Ghana changed the audiovisual media sector materially and spiritually, disrupting the Jamaican and Ghanaian media sector’s ways of being, knowing and of understanding their roles and relevance along their development trajectories of nationhood. The changes were traumatic for many stakeholders and their audiences. Like in the post-emancipation period of apprenticeship in the Caribbean where extensive migration from rural to urban centers changed the national and social landscape, the Jamaican media divestment process forced the migration of television workers into new vocational areas and ways of operating; and viewers into new consumption and production patterns of identity-forming content. Like emancipation, separation occurred without preparation. Displaced PSB workers were forced to rethink their roles in the commercial sphere. Others embraced the opportunities the changes provided. Audiences, the societies at large, for the most part experienced metaphorical change blindness even as values metamorphosed. While competition buoyed sector growth, it also shape-shifted into a destructive, combative sensibility. Sectors remained stratified as described in previous chapters. The revolution had been televised.

It took 20 years for me to realize the true impact that the changing, liberalized media processes had on many trying to make sense of the broadcast sector and on my professional trajectory and choices. Displacement, disappointment and dislocation of many separated from the JBC went far beyond losing a job. For some it was like losing a limb, or a loved one, or a home. In the two decades of interviews, observation, conversations and analysis, interfacing with creatives through policy development came the realization that the trauma was significant and widespread.

The Ghanaian response was different. The audiovisual sector created a parallel hybrid structure and system of distribution, training, intellectual property and content development to existing Western ones—as passive resistance grounded in Africanness manifest. The Ghanaian progenitors welcomed the spirit of liberalization but not all its terms, actively working towards the realization of the policy ideals of equality, people empowerment, social justice and cultural authenticity. Jamaica welcomed the Western liberalization movement with the ambivalence of a
vulnerable Small Island Developing State (SIDS). The differences in the
reactions of the two nations to liberalization are represented by their
choices in redefining their audiovisual sectors. Often, a cultural audit is
overlooked in development planning. A clear comparison is seen in the
evaluation of nation language use in the process of media change. The
African nation’s distinct and consistent emphasis was on presenting cultur-
ally relevant programming in traditional languages. Ghana’s “Africanness”
was also represented in policy through the educational and epistemological
policies for its media sector through content development choices, ways
it commercialized, its demonstrable understanding of convergence and
the rationalization of its conduits seen in previous chapters. In Jamaica,
however, the extended emphasis on overseas produced programming into
the second decade of the millennium was a clear example of Jamaican
cultural ambivalence. Another existed in debates on language use in media
and society. The ambivalence about selfhood was seen in how its language
presented in Jamaican and Ghanaian broadcast media. While Jamaican
Patois became more widely spoken in media spaces by natural selection,
serious attempts to make Jamaican language official in 2019 were met
with staunch national resistance. This compares with national and official
encouragement of diverse language use in Ghanaian media.

Persistent ontological questions prevail. What, however, is clear of the
libertine period are the two distinct changes in ideological zeitgeist which
had a direct bearing on changes in media and society.

Ideological Transformation

Liberalization in the Global South is a hegemonic neocolonial manifesta-
tion, a contemporary civilizing mission meant to advance developing
countries along the stages of industrialization. Globalization’s village
promised liberalization of trade policy and throwing open of markets. Yet,
when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, borders were relaxed, but never
flung open for Southern access. The declaration of a global village gave a
cadre of “others” some access to the West. The Washington Consensus
was thereby designed for developing countries of the Global South. The
falling of the Berlin Wall, the Washington Consensus and Globalization
were the core of the five-decade-long neoliberal zeitgeist grounded in
capitalism. Colonizing nations presented these interventions as method-
ologies to civilize, free, protect provide independence for, aid-in the devel-
opment and grow the economies of the countries of the Global South.
The movements leading to the 1807 abolition of the trade in enslaved Africans, the cultural and political renaissance of the 1930s, the twentieth-century movements toward political independence and the decolonizing development agendas associated with the falling of the Berlin Wall, to the Washington Consensus and globalization were all seen to be prescriptions that were in the best interest of developing countries. Emerging technologies allowed “these others” unsettled in advanced industrial nations and those in developing countries alike, an opportunity to begin to tell their stories and share them globally.

Globalization promised a global village, but did not a community make. Borders of subordination were never downed. I argued in the first decade of the new millennium that a sense of ideological “liminality” prevailed at that time in many of the nations of the South that had suffered centuries of colonial invasion, occupation, enslavement and subordination through to the twenty first century (Hickling 2011:105) (Table 7.2).

Advanced industrial nations largely continued to have favorable GDP, per capita income, levels of industrialization, infrastructure and comparatively higher levels of standard of living than the range of nations of the Global South. From least developed to middle income, many nations of the South remained vulnerable, highly indebted and susceptible to external shocks; with low levels of per capita GDP as a result of less productive sectors in comparison to advanced industrial nations. While nations of the South are far from monolithic they maintained some common characteristics—comparatively lower quality infrastructure and social services and undertake less formally recognized and resourced research and

| Time span     | Temporal eras                        | Spans of colonialism and postcolonial tensions (Jamaica and Ghana)                        |
|---------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1700s–1900s   | Eras of Enlightenment and industrialization | Slavery and colonization                                                                  |
| 1914–1940s    | World War years                      | Colonialism and decolonization                                                           |
| 1950s–1989    | Cold War, Civil Rights Movements      | Independence and development era                                                         |
| 1980s–2000s   | Globalization                        | Globalization                                                                             |
| 2006 and beyond | **You are here**                    | Globalization, Neoliberalism, Liminality of the present                                   |
innovation. On “the books”, they were said to offer fewer, less diverse opportunities and, in some instances, freedoms to their citizens and continued to develop in an unplanned manner with arbitrary, fragmented structures and regulatory mechanisms. The status quo remained intact. In this libertinist period, the legacy of colonialism’s spans of subordination dug deep, extending well beyond its four centuries of displacement, conquest, enslavement, imperialism and development to structural adjustment, liberalization, and globalization.

As established, the zeitgeist of liberalization changed Jamaican and Ghanaian media sectors materially. The egalitarian posture of television during the public service years had metamorphosed into market-facing industries following liberalization. Tradition and modernity, individuation and community, marketization and culturization were the dialectical tensions at the center of sector growth. Nkrumah’s “ethical revolution” had occurred. As public service television metamorphosed into commercial television, new values and processes influenced by globalization resulted in increasing privatization, digitization, monetization and standardization. Prevailing neoliberalism engendered wealth creation imperatives that begat individualism, commercialism and entrepreneurship. New content formats and methods, consumption patterns, commercial activity, increasing technical and disciplinary convergence emerged. Convergence took place in practice but not in policy; and the emphasis on intellectual property rights were modernized. Independent creative work burgeoned encouraged by an emphasis on entrepreneurship; but without decent work imperatives. Even as a prevailing apathy emerged, culturization pushed back in the early 2000s. The nation became shrouded in centrism reflected and represented through media coverage. These changing environments were characterized by privatization, digitization, monetization and standardization. In Jamaica and Ghana the stringency of structural adjustment with its attendant mindset-adjustment and ethical revolution created perennial states of cognitive dissonance in both nation-states. The challenge was grappling with interdependence, maintaining ideological balance and balancing economic and development imperatives. 

As the millennium entered its third decade, marked by the 2016 and 2017 general elections in the USA and the UK, creeping post global populism broke into a full trot. From Britain to Brazil, globalization’s nebulosity began to be replaced by the post global wave of populism, rendering the “liminality” thesis (Hickling 2011) of “liberalization
without preparation” moot. Twenty-first-century populist tenets took root, reversing the inclusionary principles of globalization. A new, unforeseen set of global challenges emerged characterized by increasing levels of elitism; income inequality; racial and ethnic tensions and “otherization”; self-interest; normalization of corruption; homogeneity and elitism of the media. Other populist characteristics included hyperinflation from characteristic increases in public spending; oversimplification of political challenges, opportunism; heightened expedience and the de-democratization that come with the increased homogeneity of the media; and “multiple equivalencies and lines of flight in the structuring of social relations” (Laclau 2015:14). A new span of subordination emerged (Table 7.3).

The fresh zeitgeist shift saw claims of and the actual circulation of fake news, questions raised regarding the existence of online filter bubbles; nuanced messaging: political undercurrents; media competing with their governments and the populace they serve for screen and air time, production and audiences. An already steady global decline in institutional trust worsened. The resulting erosion of trust was an understandable response to instances of abuse of trust by powerful people and institutions. It certainly generated the risk that the generalized crisis of trust in institutions, and in expertise more broadly, would become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Flew 2019:14).

Ambivalent to remnant principles of democratic socialism, and still responding to the impacts of neoliberalism, the Caribbean and Africa are yet to establish a clear and considered response to global populism as they grapple with the social and economic challenges that they present for the developing world. The changes in audiovisual media are representative of the transformation process during the libertine years (Table 7.4).

| Time span       | Temporal eras                              | Spans of colonialism and postcolonial tensions (Jamaica and Ghana)               |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1700s–1900s     | Enlightenment and industrialization        | Slavery and colonization                                                          |
| 1914–1940s      | World war years                           | Colonialism and decolonization                                                    |
| 1950s–1989      | Cold War                                  | Independence and development era                                                  |
| 1980s–2015      | Globalization                              | Neoliberalism’s liminality                                                        |
| 2015 and beyond | **Readjustment**                           | **Global Populism**                                                              |
Economic Transformation

Ghana’s era of coups and violently divisive political unrest in Jamaica in the 1960s to 1980s were followed by periods of readjustment and “growing pains” under liberalization. The economic and social recalibration in response to both periods of social unrest sought to realign their economies. The developing ecosystems required capitalization, financing structures as well as coordinated and targeted funding mechanisms to address the needs of their sectors and position them for growth in the short and medium term. Jamaica and Ghana approached liberalization and growth in different ways. Ghana’s inherent, centuries-old fist-clench of “Africanness” shaped a general cynicism for multilateralism. This was seen in language that raised “serious reservations about the relevance and/or adequacy of the kind of adjustment being foisted upon them by the BWIs”\(^1\) and bilateral agencies, described as “mostly formal colonial masters” (Mkandiawire and Soludo 2003:3). Despite some objection Jamaica more warmly returned its embrace amid “remarkably rapid global

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\(^1\) Bretton Woods institutions.
unification of policy around a neoliberal development model” (Klak and Myers 1998:108).

As technology advanced, the delivery of symbolic audiovisual products and services grew and improved exponentially. Sector structures changed. Cultural and creative classes also grew and diversified. The nature of work changed. It privileged independent, entrepreneurial activity and micro- and small-business development. The structures and processes through which content was produced metamorphosed. New firms entered the market. Professional organizations were largely disbanded and then reformed. Educational opportunities in the field expanded and with them new specializations and more and better training for the jobs market. As the libertine project manifest, in both instances the size, scope, number of activities and participants in the production and delivery of cultural products and services grew. Eventually perceptions of dynamism and opportunity in entrepreneurship came to exist alongside the primacy of a vibrant market.

What were once public service institutions of film and television became irregularly structured, hybrid audiovisual subsectors of the emerging cultural economies of Jamaica and Ghana. Jamaican and Ghanaian audiovisual firms grew under neoliberalism’s grand design. Independents emerged. Audiovisual marketplaces solidified. While formalization was being encouraged and enforced, culture “fought back”. Economic counter-cultures of “juggling”, “hustling” and “higglering” (Durant-Gonzalez 1983:7) in Jamaica and Ghana’s Kalabule sustained the informal economy alongside increasing formalization. Cultural activities in Jamaica and Ghana continued to be traditionally practiced within the informal economy, which has continued to be viewed and described diminutively as “clandestine”, “irregular” and “underground”. Specific efforts were made to enforce formalization including the insistence of tax records for financial transactions. Ghana moved more quickly than Jamaica in developing indigenous economic structures for the trade of its audiovisual products.

Economic transformation in both countries presented the contradictions of growth without development and genius without “value”—highly acclaimed cultural output without the processes, definition and declaration of clear “value structures”, tangible and intangible, monetary and intrinsic. This imbalance requires a contemporary approach that “balances the books while balancing people’s lives” (Simpson Miller), later refreshed by Jamaican Prime Minister Andrew Holness—“balancing lives and livelihood”. A reexamination of systems of governance is critical to this end.
Governance for Growth?

The question of the degree of policy and programmatic preparedness for and responsiveness to liberalization has been asked and answered in this volume through the evaluation of Jamaica and Ghana’s audiovisual sectors. The responses of the two former colonies to shape-shifting hegemony saw different outcomes. The media of both Jamaica and Ghana had evolved into unwieldy media structures with insufficient central support for growth via policy, financing or planning. Adjustments to competition, new rounds of structural adjustment, new ways of working, ongoing political gymnastics, mergers and takeovers and technical change were both cause and effect of the media changes that took place in either country. Behavior change became clear in both nations, punctuated by increased individuation, apathy and expedience. It also resulted in legislative maneuverings, heightened political tensions, fragmented policy responses and shifting economic models. Hegemonic principles at the core of the multilateral proposals for economic and fiscal policy reform called for the deliberateness of decentralization.

Having been disrupted by divestment, no clear policy mandate was provided to the broadcasters in the commercial era in either country. In Jamaica there did not seem to be a holistic sense of “creative direction” or policy or business planning. Jamaica continued to punch above its weight across disciplines and activities, in particular cultural and creative output and in sport. Yet, Jamaica has barely included the cultural economy in its economic or social mensuration. The emerging audiovisual subsector is the most organized and easily measured of its emerging cultural and creative subsectors; but is still disjointed and siloed. Up to 2019 there were no satellite accounts or standard indicators by which to measure the emerging cultural sector. Similar contradictions exist in Ghana. Macro indicators reveal economies bearing the fruit of structural adjustment and liberalization. Major systemic challenges continue to thwart social and cultural development in both countries. Movement of resources across and through the economy to their most marginalized remains at a trickle. Alternative economic means, systems and models are required to address at-risk youth, violent crime, corruption and the range of anti-social behaviors that continue to plague the countries, in particular the hungry, underemployed, sick, marginalized and hopeless. New social and economic directions were necessary for both countries.
The pace and alacrity with which a developing nation makes and implement plans to develop a holistic cultural economy and its sectors are statements, not only of a lack of resources but the absence of intrinsic confidence and political will. The acceleration of Ghana’s policy interest in culture as an economic driver became evident with its ‘Year of Return’ soft diplomacy and tourism programme. Yet, in Jamaica, cultures of expedience emerged. Liberalized Caribbean voices structurally adjusted into submission during the libertine period, retaining the inequities of traditional tourism as its mainstay. Jamaica, a once vibrant, vocal and vociferous part of the global decolonization and non-aligned movements and foundation members of the Pan-African movement, became over-run by cultures of expedience, doing “just enough” in order to demonstrate national, local or organizational progress or success, but insufficient effort and thought to develop and implement sustainable means of providing an enabling environment for their people.

In Jamaica, the ambivalence of perfection-as-the-enemy-of-the-good became endemic. Cost containment, profit maximization and monetization became prevailing buzzwords. Expedience included “just looking the other way” and “going slowly” as natural fallback operational positions, as described in case data for both countries. Political pronunciation from lecterns that were not followed by action demonstrated the desire for change without the accompanying will. The absence of demonstrable political will and increasingly present populism fueled the global crisis of trust. The quest for illusive participatory government, transparency, representation, participation and diversity continued even as democracy prevailed, a sure demonstration of cultures of ambivalence that restricted the delivery of both governance and growth. These cultures of ambivalence took different forms. In Ghana, analysts revealed that the widespread ‘culture of silence’ that impacted communication production, processes and content creation following the traumas of the twentieth century became ‘cultures of excessive noise’. It was a reaction formation to many years of repressive silence with underlying retentions that I believe impacted the ‘personality’ of the sector and the nation and its trajectory towards sector development. In Jamaica ‘cultures of expedience’ were heightened. These are cultural consequences of liberalization in Jamaica that result in the culture of ‘picking the lowest hanging fruit’ over long term, sustainable development options. It is a culture that satisfies immediate gratification needs and causes the phenomenon of the political willingness to do ‘just enough’ but ‘not sufficient’ to achieve holistic growth
and development. Within this frame exists the ambivalence that wrestles with the ironies of perfection-as-enemy-of-the-good in areas such as seeking cost containment, efficiency and ultimately profit, productivity and growth. Expedience includes ‘looking the other way’ and a ‘pop-off’ culture as natural behaviors in the politics of governance. ‘Pop off cultures’ involve cronism and nepotism in decision making and resource allocation, where connected parties get a ‘pop off’ from scarce state benefits and resources. Both the Ghananian and Jamaican cultures that presented in the twenty-first-century seem to be manifestation of the ethical revolution that began in the previous century.

**Operational Changes**

Public service television in Jamaica and Ghana were originally intended as tools of post-independence social mobilization, the realization of liberty and identity reinforcement. The early broadcasting corporations sought to convey a sense of stability and calm and to build cultures of nationalism. Independence and the establishment of television followed a period of intensive decolonization in both nations. However, colonial retentions remained prevalent in both societies. Liberalization movements in the 1980s and 1990s led to further changes in sector philosophy, ideology, economic models and governance. This in turn caused transitioning structures, processes, output and operations. New content, formats methods, consumption patterns, commercial activity, increasing convergence; new conduits for production and distribution, emphasis on intellectual property rights and creative work emerged as a result of emergent operational processes and systems. The fabric of Jamaica’s and Ghana’s media adjustments were representative of national change. McLuhan (1964:7) said it best, “the medium is the message”. As seen in their broadcast media sector, Ghana gave up repressive cultures of silence for excessive noise and Jamaica gave up consciencism for commercial expedience. Their media reflected the changes in the transitioning, ambivalent societies.

Trauma seemed to have become a silent operational matter for consideration by the media sector. The absence of clear policy, sector plans, concepts, and the presence of inequitable business models led to insecurity, displacement, disorientation, liminality, and ambivalence within the sector. Even as production increased and diversified on the books in Jamaica, the rapid-fire changes in the media sector resulted in an underlying torrent of expedience, inequity, mistrust, exploitation and dependency.
Distribution of and trade in content were beset by two distinct -but-silent sectoral challenges. Poor salaries and the barriers associated with startup entrepreneurship caused economic uneasiness and defined global Decent Work principles. Internationally, studies showed that in broadcasting, behavioral indicators were being used to evaluate the media. Studies found that “bullying, poor mental health and a desire to leave the industry were contributing factors, while in distribution, anxiety... and feeling undervalued were common complaints. Within cinema and exhibition, respondents admitted to self-harm, suicidal thoughts and attempts” (Ravindran 2020). Surveys reveal a mental health crisis in the progenitor UK film and TV industry, with close to 90% of off-screen professionals experiencing mental health issues on the job, “significantly worse than the general population, in which 65% struggle with mental health at work”. Considering the unique forms of intergenerational trauma that existed in Jamaica and Ghana, and having to operate within the uncertainties of COVID-19 pandemic, a clear case can be made for behavioral and cultural perspectives to become associated with the formulation of inquiry, study and development plans for high-intensity cultural and creative sectors like the audiovisual subsector, particularly in postcolonial developing nations.

Amid perennial cries of “nutten nah gwan” phenomenal resilience and pockets of excellence shone through. The “nutting nah gwaan” syndrome in Jamaica is a popular lament that translates literally to “nothing is happening to advance the sector, or for me personally”. It was widely heard and felt within the cultural and creative sector. In Ghana, Chair of the board of NAFTI, Juliet Asante, in true Ghanaian euphemistic fashion, indicated in a television interview that the film sector is “in a hole” and “wants some sunshine”. Meanwhile, several audiovisual workers began on the road to building businesses and creating successful content. Systemic inequity, the absence of policy and scarce resources challenged equitable sector development even as financial sectors flourished. The inherent contradictions were stark.

Given the global zeitgeist shift in the second decade, there is need to establish a clear and considered response to global populism and to grapple with the social and economic challenges that they present. Consideration must also be given to answering persistent epistemological and ontological questions required for nation building and identity cementation. Addressing the challenges in Jamaica, Ghana and countries of the Global South requires holistic, systematic approaches. Developing
the cultural economies of these nations is central to this process as they address both sides of the spirit/matter dialectic. Cultural Economy approaches include intangible culture matters-of-spirit that form the character or “personalities” of communities, subsectors, sectors, economies and nations. They do not see as far-fetched the inclusion of matters such as the impact of intergenerational and existing trauma on low productivity levels, or the significance of postcolonial irony, hegemony and history in a nation, like Jamaica which had the pre COVID-19 distinction of having the best performing stock exchange in the world while struggling with negligible productivity.

Addressing the issues of development also requires asking the conspiracy-laden question of whether neoliberal insistence on media divestment as a part of conservative structural adjustment programs of the South was a strategic interventionist measure of disruption, destabilization and control. Is there a grand design in the “great unknown” in keeping with Laenui’s five steps of colonization—cultural denial and withdrawal; destruction and eradication of cultures; denigration, belittlement and insult; surface accommodation and tokenism; and transformation and exploitation (1999:2)? These may once have been deemed far-fetched questions. Countries of the Global South need to, at the very least, consider these and other questions to, at best, develop mitigating programs. I suggest a cultural economy development approach that seeks to “personify” societies of the South through culturization rather than disembody them through marketization. It privileges the notion of social enterprises and cooperative models of economy over neoliberal individualism. It also seeks to prepare societies of the South to respond proactively prepare for the onslaught of global populism. Its objective, like Sankofa, is to look back to retrieve core values and original principles and using these rooted principles and core values in contemporary application and development planning. It is societal reengineering through the focusing of the cultural economy movement. Its singular message is clear. Decolonization responds to the sometimes veiled, other times overt, subordination of developing countries under globalized capitalism. Decolonization requires the engagement of truths, reconciliation and conscience. Many nations of the South still are not fully aware of the contemporary value and power of cultural economy or have not demonstrated
knowledge of the value of their cultures in their development planning. Many are only just becoming increasingly aware that we live in an era in which the business of audiovisual art and content-making and the value and power of big data have superseded that of fossil fuels. Meanwhile, emerging generations of globalization’s migrant “others” and First Nations in the far reaches of the advanced industrial world are using creative tools, the cultures of their generation and bullet-speed information communication technology to revive subdued decolonization movements through the very insistence on diversity and representation. Globalization had encouraged the commodification, commercialization, privatization and marketization of converged sonic, audiovisual, design and performative goods and services. Now, post global populism and a Pandemic have given rise to tensions grounded in race and inequity that continue to be televised, live, globally.

A twenty-first-century wave of culturalization endorsed by the United Nations through its Convention on Cultural Diversity and the 2006 re-badging of the cultural industries were early indicators of an emerging decolonization movement to counter the colonial circumstances that Laenui describes. At a more extreme level, “The Arab Spring”, “Occupy Wall Street” and other activist causes promulgated through social media were early representations of the defiance of decolonization on Middle Eastern and Western mainlands. Small pockets of marginalized peoples, particularly those in nations of the North, bolstered by global cultural/creative economy policy facilitation began using artistry and academia to react to the most recent manifestation of bruising intergenerational distress and trauma seen in the emergence of global populism. Culture, creativity, content making and digital arts, science and distribution became central to these contemporary decolonization movements. The perpetuation of the global emphasis on diversity in cultural policy continues to respond to emerging populism. Audiovisual media, content production and distribution techniques, artistry and digitization are the tools engaged.

Activist classes in many developing nations were slower to respond with postcolonial fervor. Although globalization and neoliberalism were, ironically, accompanied by political and economic marginalization (Klak 1998:13), despite cultural histories of resistance, the “others” of the Global South—who live in the South—were much less involved in the contemporary decolonization movement. They were less organized or motivated. The literature of contemporary decolonization methodology reveals a huge gap in discourse on the Caribbean and, to a lesser extent,
Africa. The Caribbean was the most marginal of marginal peoples, even in the decolonization movement. Many developing nations had been liberalized and structurally adjusted into submission, silence and cultures of expediency. Some of these nations and their artists scrambled for an invitation to the Western table from places of supplication; a far cry from the vociferous voices that once demanded that the world adhere to the non-aligned principles they espoused just decades before. Expediently, through the expansion of media the language moved instead to the narrative of the nation as brand. Progenitors of enslaved peoples retain the intergenerational memory of a brand as a mark burned into the flesh of livestock, criminals and slaves that identify them as assets on a plantation. The individual and the nation as brand presented the subconscious with a neocolonial, neoliberal notion of “ownership” of nations and people trading of and in cultures. The conceptual antecedence existed in conquest and delusion grounded in colonial thought and practice. The application of the practice of personal and nation branding in postcolonial nations “works to reinscribe the colonial legacy and reaffirm colonial power relations” (Mehta-Karia 2012:1). Branding was but one of the tools of individualization that advanced the neoliberal agenda as media, communication, art and artistry became increasingly liberalized and commercialized into a decentralized vacuum of trauma, tension and desperation.

In these contexts, the rhetoric of cultural and creative industries development policy and implementation, grounded in neoliberalism, remained ten years behind that of advanced industrial nations. Opportunity cost and looming developmental priorities remained real considerations in developing economies. There seemed to be a desire to respond to the myriad issues that affected their societies but not the will—political or private sector. A subtle, global version of the postwar Red Scare marked by anxiety, fear and rejection of progressive ideas and politics was perpetuated by commercial media and government policy. The libertine way was projected as the only route to development. The regions remained at cultural crossroads for two decades with a seeming unwillingness to confront their own liminality.

Paradoxically, it was also a period of promise. The adjustment of economic structures brought some positive fiscal movement to compliant nations of the Global South but often at the risk of social instability, rising inequity and reactive, antisocial behaviors. As creeping populism manifest in the second millennial decade, Western intensification of the deportation movement, immigration’s scrutiny, incarceration of children at Western
borders, and stated intentions to re-erect walls that were intended broken down during globalization began to directly affect the people of countries of the South. Varying levels of political interference by the Global North into the domestic matters of nations of the Global South were unmasked as plays in geopolitical chess games that brought populism to the Southern doorstep.

In this context, for the Caribbean the history of slavery remains “a legacy shouldered daily by millions of blacks who toil for little in the blazing heat of an impoverished paradise” (Beckles 2007:1). African nations suffered “dependent development” that left many nations “structurally disarticulated because they had been developed as aggregations of enclaves, each linked to the metropolitan economy but not necessarily to one another” (Ake 1996:19). These historical legacies of dependency on external authorities, suppliers, markets and geopolitical agendas (Klak 1998:6)—that continue to afflict Caribbean and African regions and contributed to variable levels of social and political unrest, economic strife and compromised social structures—have now been compounded by the contemporary global zeitgeist shift and emergent wave of creeping global populism and hypercommercialism. Brexit, geopolitical conflict in NAFTA, multilateral aid fatigue, Chinese intervention in developing nations, and the long reach of Russia as provocateur, a crushing global pandemic and escalating racial tensions globally, demand counter-sensibilities of cultural primacy, diversity, sovereignty, rights and freedoms, and a clear geostrategy from the South if they are to counter these populist effects.

**Media Mitigation**

The cultural economy with media at its core has long been established as a critical modality for societal change and development. The changing zeitgeist from globalization to populism occurred at a time when developing countries had begun to advance their cultural and creative sector planning and policy processes. Strengthening media industries is central to the contemporary decolonization movement. #decolonization2point0 (#d2k) as methodology presents a geostrategic logic for nations of the Global South. Through principles of behavioral and reparatory economics it seeks to equip them with cultural sector strategies to provide sustained, equitable development. #d2k calls for the balance of “culturization of economic life” (Cunningham 2005; du Gay and Pryke 2002; Hickling 2011; Lash and Urry 1994; Flew 2005, Tepper 2002), with the polar and
contradictory neoliberal phenomenon of “marketization of cultural life” (Hesmondhalgh 2007). Culturization’s response to the prevailing libertine end-game of marketization, national positioning and monetization integrated opportunities to advance the development agenda.

Cultural economy development and in particular an emphasis on audiovisual sector growth are identified as a central tools for the #decolonization2point0 movement and for advancing beyond the challenges of neoliberalism while countering the effects of global populism on countries of the Global South. Many nations still continue to use models developed and implemented in nations of the North. #d2k proposes a culturally specific, holistic approach to cultural economy planning. Economic, social and cultural engineering and re-engineering with cultural economy principles at their core are proposed to address the culturally specific impact of zeitgeist changes on individual nation-states in the Global South. The #d2k conceptual framework begat a ‘South Star model’ (SSM) of cultural economy development for nations of the Global South. This responds to the question of the impact that polarizing ideologies have had on already traumatized and subordinated regions of the South. As convergence principles began to reshape the very conceptualization of the global cultural economy, cultural and creative industries concepts have burgeoned beyond the marketized, individualist focus of cultural and creative industries policy that are still the focus in some countries of the South. Broader, culturized, holistic considerations of cultural and creative economy are proposed through #d2k and its South Star model. SSM acknowledges that the COVID-19 pandemic saw an explosion of spontaneous audiovisual content, revealing the importance of information technologies in the next global zeitgeist. How then can regions of the South shift focus from the individualism of creative entrepreneurship and decentralization of sectors and their clusters to new and necessary, dynamic, converged, cooperative models of content production to simultaneously shape nationhood and build economy?

**South Star Cultural Economy Model**

The South Star model is grounded in a holistic development approach to cultural economy development in the Global South (Fig. 7.1).

The iconography of the Black Star of Africa, also known as the lodestar of African Freedom, symbolizes Africa and her diaspora in Pan-African discourse and makes postcolonial reference to the continent as the cradle
of civilization and cultural origins. The progenitory relationship of the African Star with nations of the Global South grounds the geostrategic relationships among Africa and its global diaspora. Each point on the star represents one of five units of analysis used in the model—philosophy, ideology, economy, governance and operations (PIEGO).

The points of the star relate to philosophy as insight, epistemology, mores and historiography, where cultural specificity is determined by tracing the trajectory of transition of each cultural economy. Ideology refers to the political economy concepts of interdependence; shared space and equity. Reference to economy examines a nation’s outlook on economic models and independence in keeping with its ideological positioning in space and time; while governance relates to its national commitment to participatory governance and democracy. For operations, notions of independence, rights and freedoms in operational implementation are considered. Each one is a principle used to frame practical exercises in planning, policy and program development using the South Star, cultural
economy model. Each point of the star matches, in praxis, practical activities with the nuanced, qualitative national “spirit” of the cultural policy and cultural and creative economy formulation for nations of the Global South.

The star represents a guiding principle to ground elements of the policy formulation of the cultural economy of South South states. Postcolonial reference to the African continent as the cradle of civilization and cultural origins grounds the relationship with its diaspora. This approach is applicable for structuring cultural and creative economies, sectors, subsectors and industries as part of contemporary decolonization movements.

The South Star model of cultural economy development is a means of focusing the cultural economy movement on culturally specific development processes. Finding synthesis in the dialectical yet complementary UNESCO mantra “Protecting Our Heritage and Fostering Creativity” by balancing the emphasis on both through economic and intangible means, privileging both spirit and matter to “lay the foundations for vibrant, innovative and prosperous knowledge societies” (UNESCO Website). SSM further references the United Nations Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions and the Strategic Development Goals. This reflects the need for balance in economic growth and sustainable development imperatives in the crafting of cultural economy policy and processes.

At the core of the SSM are the unique histories, characteristic developmental stages and idiosyncratic diversity of nations of the South. With their unique personalities, challenges and opportunities, the phenomenon standing between many nations of the Global South and sustainable formulation and implementation of a holistic, culturally—specific cultural economy policy are the balance of hindsight and foresight. In addition to the mandates, commitment and action of which Tull speaks, (2017:296) the primary missing piece has been the “insight” that can be provided through the development of culturally specific, cultural economy policy models (Hickling 2015), in accordance with four primary objectives:

1. Articulation of a cooperative geostrategy for the Global South, in particular Africa and the Caribbean, that focuses on cultural economy as an ecosystem.
2. Emphasis on developing a mix of content-based goods and services and content-making skills.
3. Engineer a paradigm shift of considering cultural and creative professions including the audiovisual media as leisure and recreation. Reframing the cultural economy as a central tool of development, emphasizing the role of content creation in Big Data growth and development.

4. Optimize converged audiovisual processes, systems and platforms; develop plans and policies; and move briskly toward creating quality jobs, informing, educating and training their nations and achieving sustainable development goals through cultural and creative sectors.

**Cultural Specificity**

The extent of specific similarities and differences in the emerging AV sectors of Jamaica and Ghana, while significant, is of less importance than the recognition that both marketplaces and practices have culturally specific, characteristic “concepts, constructs and models that are specific to certain cultural groups in terms of its role in explaining and predicting behaviour” (Walsh and Osipow 1995:144). Cultural specificity plays a role in explaining and predicting industry and national behaviors that must be addressed in order to optimize efficiencies and output. Developing nations can assert or retrieve power lost under hegemonic circumstances by privileging their own cultural specificity through their cultural economies. This increases their comparative and competitive advantage; their collective esteem and cultural confidence. The realization of policy ideals including equality, people empowerment, social justice and cultural authenticity requires self-confidence and creative courage (Nettleford 2003:112). The absence of a clear, up-to-date policy roadmap for media and culture in Jamaica and Ghana is a case in point. The choices they made along their trajectory of transition are indicators of their cultural confidence.

The ideological positioning of each nation of the South is a telling representation of differences in its levels of the collective esteem, that is, the collective manifestation of the perception of a nation-state’s sense of worth, regard and integrity. It is also an indicator of its cultural confidence and maturity—its susceptibility to hegemonic influence due to its relative age, immaturity, displacement, partially formed philosophical base and creolized influences. This difference/similarity dialectic is at the core of cultural specificity discourse. In the case data, comparative confidence levels are seen in differences between an existing Gold Coast/West African society with millennia of history, that was “re-culturized” by colonial
incursion; and a “new” Jamaican/Caribbean society, “re-created” following colonial capture.

Considering cultural specificity in policy planning is important because cultural/creative industries are products of their cultures. The consideration of concepts, constructs and models that are specific to particular cultures explains and predicts behaviors and should form a basis for policymaking. Chevannes suggests that the consideration of social issues that are “culturally normative” is a “fruitful” approach to optimizing growth and development (2003:114). Developing nation-states are urged to consider the specificities of their cultures as they make political, economic and policy decisions for the development of their cultural/creative economies. Prevailing social, economic and political models have not brought required levels of growth or development and inequality still prevails. By their very nature, many economies in the South have not achieved the levels of industrialization and development as their Northern counterparts. Many continue to adopt and adapt the cookie-cutter cultural economy models and methodologies of the North instead of developing models that acknowledge their fundamental differences in approach, cultural specificity and specificity of circumstance. Cultural incongruities in belief systems have been identified as the pivotal elements around which development or underdevelopment continues to occur in the South. It stands to reason that if prevailing challenges are cultural, specific and culturally specific, then the responses must be culturally specific. This is the basis of the decolonization movement and #decolonization2point0.

The South Star model of cultural economy identifies culturally specific and characteristic concepts and principal constructs and models in each nation of the South to explain and predict behavior and plan for the future. For Ghana, principles of Adinkra symbology is applied and, in Jamaica, five prevailing thematic tropes seen in the music developed by the Jamaican society are used to conceptualize approaches to the formulation of cultural economy policy (Table 7.5).

The details of this application will be articulated in other work.

**Thematic Approach Versus Picking Winners**

The SSM has been formulated in clear contradistinction to the Western, advanced-industrial policy modeling tradition of picking culture-sector winners for development. The British DCMS and concentric circles models differentiate between sectors through the prioritization of specific
Table 7.5  Culturally specific principles for cultural economy formulation—Jamaica and Ghana

| Antinomies of culture | South Star principles Ghana | South Star principles Jamaica |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Philosophy            | Sankofa                     | Redepmption                   |
|                       | The philosophy of the      | Emancipation from “mental     |
|                       | identity formation          | slavery”; freedom of thought; |
|                       | grounded in historiography  | inevitability per Bob        |
|                       |                             | Marley’s “Redemption         |
|                       |                             | Song”                        |
| Ideology              | Ese Ne Tekrema              | Resistance                    |
|                       | Teeth and tongue play       | Ideological positions        |
|                       | interdependent roles in the| based on good neighbor       |
|                       | mouth. They may come        | positions and principles.    |
|                       | into conflict but they need| Grounded in proclivity       |
|                       | to work together.           | to resistance of injustice— |
|                       |                             | global and domestic.         |
|                       |                             | Proactive, independent       |
|                       |                             | formulation of ideological   |
|                       |                             | positions “Get Up Stand Up”  |
| Economy               | Funtunfunefu                | Reparation(s) and Repatriation|
|                       | Denkyemfunefu               | Notion of repairing broken   |
|                       | The Siamese crocodiles      | economies and prevailing     |
|                       | share one stomach yet they  | arguments for reparatory     |
|                       | fight over food; a reminder  | justice to build out cultural |
|                       | that infighting and         | economies.                   |
|                       | tribalism are harmful to    | Identifying new markets of   |
|                       | all who engage in it.       | the South “Leaving to Zion”  |
| Governance            | Wo Nsa Da Mu A              | Black Uhuru                  |
|                       | If your hands are in the    | Representation and            |
|                       | dish, people do not eat     | Reliability (trust)          |
|                       | everything and leave you    | Repairing fissures between   |
|                       | nothing.                    | governance and citizenry.    |
|                       |                             | Engendering trust.           |
|                       |                             | Third World’s “Human        |
|                       |                             | Marketplace”                 |

(continued)
sectors and subsectors for investment. SSM is grounded in African notions of cultural expression—dance, music, media and art—as natural elements of traditional African life, which are not considered “separate” activities in a work/leisure paradigm. It argues that philosophical essence of the society is transmitted through folk tales, often historical tales, which reveal profound philosophies that underlie the activities and regulations of African society and express beliefs, values and feelings. They are naturally converged. Due to the inevitability of creolization, and the pervasiveness of neoliberal values in economies of the global South, the South Star methodology is realistic and pragmatic. The development of cultural sectors in the South acknowledges the Western influence while embracing the organic nature of Africanness. Instead of focusing on separating sectors for development, the South Star model has identified ten functional areas of focus for programmatic implementation across cultural and creative sectors, subsectors and industries in order to provide an equitable platform and enabling environment across sectors.

The South Star model also addresses the implementation and operational deficits in a cultural economy formulation in the Global South. It proposes a holistic examination of the creative ecosystem and environment in each country. SSM uses an all-of-government approach rather than focus on specific sectors. The alternative, holistic development approach seeks to provide a centralized structural support across the breadth of creative sectors in ten foundational areas. Ten growth propellants have been

| Antinomies of culture | Operations | South Star principles Ghana | South Star principles Jamaica |
|-----------------------|------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Independence          | Fawohodic Ene Obre Na enam<br>Independence comes with responsibilities. | Resilience (Religiosity, Rastafari, Reggae as representative)<br>Production of goods, services and symbolic expression grounded in the resilience of its people.<br>Quest for equity, rights and freedoms.<br>Bob Marley’s “Zimbabwe” |
identified for even application across cultural and creative sectors of the cultural economy—research and development; education and training; institutional strengthening and marketing (Fig. 7.2).

It also focuses on regional and international trade; incentives and taxation; governance structures; business development and finance; intellectual property rationalization; facilities; infrastructure and processes across cultural sectors, creating an equitable foundation for all.

Fig. 7.2 The South Star Cultural Economy Model with ten enabling environment components
SSM requires the centralized rationalization of their cultural and creative ecosystems. Developing countries are urged to design holistic strategies. *South Star’s* focus on these ten growth propellants balances business-forward approaches with equitable development in order to provide an enabling environment across the cultural economy of the nation of the South, its sectors and subsectors.

**Policy: Interference or Intervention?**

There is an argument that policy and planning are not required for the development of cultural and creative economy development and that ‘the market’ should define the direction. The simple response to that comes in four parts. The first is Keith Nurse’s notion is that many cultural and creative enterprises are operating at capacity and require interventions to move them to the next phase of development. The second is, for the private sector to lead on cultural economy development, the public sector would need to put in place the structures, capacity and agility to respond to the market’s movements. This brings us to the third and fourth notions. There are some elements of cultural economy development that only governments can lead on; among them are bilateral and multilateral arrangements, incentives and economy formalization (satellite accounts and financial structures). Daniel Thwaites put it best: “all the right fiscal numbers won’t produce the numbers we want if the governance remains crap-poor” (2019).

The audiovisual media subsectors of Jamaica and Ghana were used as proof of concept for the application of the d2k methodology and South Star model. Using this methodology and model, recommendations for the Jamaican audiovisual sector are proposed in the next chapter to help determine whether we “love ourselves” enough to invest in our development by making the necessary national choices.

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