Attacking Hardware AES with DFA

Yifan Lu
me@yifanlu.com

Abstract—We present the first practical attack on a hardware AES accelerator with 256 bit embedded keys using DFA. We identify the challenges of adapting well-known theoretical AES DFA models to hardware under attack from voltage fault injection and present solutions to those challenges. As a result, we managed to recover 278 real-world AES-256 keys from a secure computing system in a matter of hours with minimal cost.

I. INTRODUCTION

Although there is a wealth of work in differential fault analysis (DFA) attacks on AES [8] and it is well understood that such attacks works on hardware AES accelerators [10], there has been few practical attacks on real-world targets. In 2012, Sony released their second hand-held gaming console, the PlayStation Vita. Although it was not the runaway success of its predecessor [13], Sony thoroughly improved the software and hardware security features on their new console [13]. At the root of their secure boot system is a cryptographic accelerator (only accessible by a dedicated security CPU) that operates with keys embedded in the silicon which are not directly accessible by software. The keys can only be referenced through hardware protected key-slots. By obfuscating the keys this way, the designers hope that in the event that the system is compromised and attackers wish to use the device as a black-box to decrypt data, they can reference new key-slots in a firmware upgrade and re-secure the system. This works as long as both of the following points hold true:

1) The system is not compromised before it locks out the important key-slots. The Vita will always revoke the permission to use a key-slot when it is no longer needed. Unused key-slots are also locked down early in the boot process.
2) The keys themselves cannot be extracted by the attacker even if she compromises the secure processor. Otherwise, the permissions enforced by the cryptographic accelerator can be bypassed.

It has already been demonstrated [14] that assumption 1 is broken with fault injection attacks on the secure processor (called “F00D”) and therefore the security has already been defeated. However, we wish to go farther and break assumption 2 as well. We do just that with a DFA attack on the Vita’s cryptographic accelerator (which we nicknamed “Bigmac”).

A. AES

The Rijndael cipher [9], known more commonly as AES, is a substitution permutation based cipher that is widely used for encryption to ensure confidentiality of data. The cipher operates in N rounds where N is 10 for AES-128 and 14 for AES-256. In each round except the last, there are four operations performed on a 4×4 state matrix which is initialized before the first round by each plain-text byte XORed with the first round key. There are N + 1 round keys generated through a separate process not described here. The state operations are defined briefly:

1) SubBytes is the substitution step where a non-linear function is applied on the input byte.
2) ShiftRows performs a cyclic rotation on each row of the state.
3) MixColumns linearly combines the elements in each column. It can be represented as a multiplication of each column with a constant matrix. This step is skipped for the last round.
4) AddRoundKey ties the result to the key by XORing each element with an element from the current round key.

B. DFA

It would be remiss to not start with a reference to Boneh, Demillo, and Lipton’s 1997 paper [6]. The authors described how an incorrect RSA signature produced by faulty hardware can be used to retrieve the private key. Shortly thereafter, Biham and Shamir [5] discovered that faulty results from symmetric encryption systems like DES can also be used to extract the secret key. They called the attack Differential Fault Analysis because they used the information gleaned from related ciphertexts produced from good hardware and faulty hardware to find the secret key.

DFA can also be applied to AES [10]. According to Dusart et al., if the fault is modeled by a single unknown byte, ε, which is XORed into a specific element of the state matrix before MixColumns of round N − 1, then one can solve for four bytes of the round N key. The high level idea is that the non-linear structure of the S-Box can be abused to leak information about the state. As an example, Dusart presented the following system of equations for a fault ε at a fixed location in round N − 1:

\[
\begin{align*}
    s(x_0 + 2\epsilon) &= s(x_0) + \epsilon_0 \\
    s(x_1 + \epsilon) &= s(x_1) + \epsilon_1 \\
    s(x_2 + \epsilon) &= s(x_2) + \epsilon_2 \\
    s(x_3 + 3\epsilon) &= s(x_3) + \epsilon_3
\end{align*}
\]

(1)

The S-Box of SubBytes is represented as \( s(x) \) and the unknowns are \( x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, \epsilon \). The observed faulty ciphertext
difference are $\epsilon_0, \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \epsilon_3$. With each fault, we observe a different set of $\epsilon$ and assume a different unknown $\epsilon$ but $x$ does not change. After enough samples, we reduce the solution set to 1 and solve for $x$. Once the state bytes are revealed, it is easy to extract four bytes of the round $N$ key. Repeat the whole procedure with faults at different offsets, and it is possible to recover the entire round $N$ key and going from the round $N$ key to the original key is just a matter of reversing the key scheduling algorithm (which is not secret). Dusart et al. were able to extract an AES-128 key by "analyzing less than 50 ciphertexts."

Recent progress in AES DFA theory since then has been in reducing the number of needed ciphertexts as well as relaxing the fault model to handle more faults (or earlier faults). There has also been attacks targeting the key schedule rather than the round states. In practical attacks, AES DFA has been shown to work on ARM processors, on FPGA, and on an ASIC. Our work is closest in design to Selmane's for a smart-card. Their target was also a dedicated AES accelerator running alongside a CPU. They also used Piret’s model for performing the DFA attack. The method for inducing the faults was timing violations. However, one key difference is that they created the timing violations by under-powering the smart-card such that the AES operations will be faulty but the CPU can still operate correctly. Our method for creating timing violations is from voltage glitching. Under-powering does not work for us because the global critical paths are not inside Bigmac. When we try to under-power the device, the F00D security processor will not execute code, and we cannot control Bigmac. Additionally, by using a voltage fault injection, we can create precise glitches that target specific AES rounds. This is important for reducing the number of needed faulty ciphertexts.

We used Piret’s model of a single fault between the MixColumns of round $N - 3$ and $N - 2$ (which itself is an extension of the original model from Dusart described above). This model only requires two faulty ciphertexts and the correct ciphertext to recover the final round key. We used an implementation of the attack on this model called phoenixAES. This tool was developed as a way of attacking white-box AES, but we find that it can also process hardware generated faults without any modification.

Because it is not possible to characterize each faulty ciphertext as "good" or not (i.e. fits the assumptions of the model) without knowing the key, we developed a brute force approach to try every pairing of ciphertexts. We believe this is similar to an approach taken by Riscure but was unable to verify this because they did not go into details about their implementation.

### II. Fault Injections

Piret’s fault model requires exactly one byte of the AES state to be corrupted between the MixColumns operation of round $N - 3$ and $N - 2$. To recover the round $N$ key, we need two different single-byte corruptions of this type. The first practical challenge is to create fault injections that can meet this requirement. We used voltage glitching to inject the fault because of previous success in voltage glitching the F00D processor on the same target. Specifically, we applied the crowbar voltage glitching technique because of its low cost and high applicability.

#### A. Hardware AES

Although we do not know the exact design of Bigmac’s AES implementation, we can reasonably assume that it is optimized in some way. We know that SubBytes and MixColumns (as well as their inverse) are the most expensive operation and therefore it is highly likely that the critical paths are within those operations. This means that with the right timing, we can achieve a glitch that only affects one operation and that it is possible to meet the requirement for a one byte corruption.

From a software perspective, Bigmac has a simple command interface. It has memory-mapped registers accessible only by the F00D security processor at physical address 0xE0050000. The ARM based application processor cannot see this address range at all and must interface with F00D to use Bigmac indirectly. Only TrustZone on the ARM processor can communicate with F00D. Bigmac has support for AES block modes CBC, ECB, and CTR, with key-sizes of 128, 192, and 256. In addition, it also supports AES-CMAC, HMAC-SHA, SHA, memcpy, memset, and generating random numbers. To perform a Bigmac operation, F00D passes in a source and destination address, the length of the data, the operation, and (when required) the address of the IV. For keyed operations, Bigmac accepts either a fixed key written to a set of input registers directly or the index of a key-slot. It is also possible to set the output destination to a key-slot instead of a memory address in some cases.

Each key-slot has a permission bit associated with it. Some key-slots are only allowed to encrypt data to another key-slot. We call these “master” key-slots. It is normally not possible to directly observe ciphertext produced by encrypting with a master key. There are 30 master keys in the PlayStation Vita, some of which are device unique and others which are common to all Vita devices. There are 250 additional non-master key-slots (some device unique) not derived by software that we can directly observe the ciphertext. Finally, the remaining key-slots are either derived from the master keys.

---

1It should be noted that more than a decade of work has taken place since Piret’s results and there exists many AES DFA models that have lesser requirements on the required faults. However, we were unable to find any open-source implementation of the newer ideas. Because we can control precisely where the fault takes place, we can make use of this constrained model and it saves us the time of implementing our own DFA tool from scratch.

2Ideally we can glitch only for the duration of one operation, but optimized AES implementations typically perform all four operations of a round in one or two cycles. However, because we know that the path length for each operation is not equal, we do not run into the awkward situation of faults occurring in multiple operations, which does not meet our requirement for a single byte fault.
along with data from the firmware or loaded directly from software decrypted by Bigmac. Key-slots can also be disabled such that they cannot be used until the next reset. Most keys including all master keys are disabled early in boot before the operating system is loaded.

The results of this paper include the procedure we devised to obtain 248 non-master keys and all 30 master keys by leveraging DFA, code execution through voltage glitching, a hardware vulnerability, and the computation power of about 500 core-hours.

B. Glitch Parameters

The effects of crowbar voltage glitching depends largely on two factors: when the crowbar circuit is activated and how long it stays activated. To reduce the variance in our measurements, we replace the target’s external clock input with our own clock running at $f = 12 \text{ MHz}$. Bigmac runs with a clock derived from the external clock with frequency $f_c$. From measurement of Bigmac’s AES timing, if we assume that one AES round takes one clock cycle, then $f_c = f$. Our glitching hardware also runs with a clock derived from the same source with frequency $f_g = 4f$. When we refer to “cycles”, it is in units of $1/f$.

Since we are dealing with AES-256, it is necessary to retrieve two round keys in order to recover the full key [10]. This means we need to find two sets of parameters: $n_{N-2}, m_{N-2}$ and $n_{N-3}, m_{N-3}$. We define $n$ to be the offset from a fixed trigger signal before the AES engine starts to the crowbar activation and $m$ to be the duration of the crowbar activation. Since we are applying Piret’s model, this means we have to target round $N - 2$ and round $N - 3$.

III. SETUP

Boot time code execution is a prerequisite for interfacing with Bigmac before the target key-slots are disabled. We reproduce the setup described in [14] to achieve this. As such, we make use of the ChipWhisperer Lite, an open source hardware fault injection and side channel analysis tool. We designate, through a series of scripts, two separate modes of operation. In boot mode, we configure the ChipWhisperer to perform the previously described voltage glitch attack on F00D to gain early boot execution. Once that succeeds, we load an RPC payload that interfaces with the ChipWhisperer through UART serial and enter DFA mode. In DFA mode, we send the plaintext through the serial port and use the RPC interface to set up Bigmac and toggle a GPIO pin before starting the AES operation. Then we perform a voltage glitch using ChipWhisperer by waiting $n$ cycles after a GPIO toggle to activate the glitch circuit and turn it off after $m$ cycles. The device will then return the output ciphertext through the serial port. The same glitching hardware is used with different configurations for the two modes. We will only describe our setup for DFA mode.

A. Reducing Capacitance

To minimize the impact of the power distribution network (PDN), we make a couple of modifications to the PCB. First, we trace and remove every decoupling capacitor to the core 1.1V voltage domain. Figure 4 shows the capacitors that were removed.

Next, we introduce a $10 \Omega$ shunt resistor by cutting the trace from the device’s own power management chip to the main SoC (figure 5). We designed a simple board (figure 6) that contains the shunt resistor, a filter capacitor, and ports for an external power supply, a measurement probe, and a SMA connector to the ChipWhisperer to perform the voltage glitch.

B. Measurements

On the target device, we use our RPC interface to toggle a GPIO pin and immediately start the Bigmac AES operation. Using a CW501 differential probe for ChipWhisperer sampling at $f$, we capture the power trace triggered by the GPIO pin. Using these traces, we can get a rough idea of when the AES operation takes place. Figure 4 shows what the traces look like.

C. Encrypt vs Decrypt

When we targeted the AES-ECB-256 encrypt operation, we ran into issues with the corrupted ciphertext that we suspect was due to both the AES state operation and the key scheduling being faulted at the same time. It is likely that the key scheduling was taking place in parallel with the encrypt operation. When we target the AES-ECB-256 decrypt operation, the issues we observed dramatically decreased, which confirms our hypothesis. As a matter of convention, we will continue to refer to the AES engine output as the “ciphertext” and the round number in reference to the encryption round even though our fault injection was on the decrypt operation.

3 Originally we attempted to do a DPA attack but gave up after a couple of months without any results. We believe that because the AES engine was designed for power efficiency, the SNR was too low to get accurate measurements for this device and $10 \Omega$ was the highest shunt we can choose that still allows the device to operate. The same shunt resistor was used for the DFA attack because it was already in place. There is no solid evidence that the shunt resistor is needed for DPA, but empirical results show that without the shunt resistor in place, the minimum width of the glitch needs to be about 3x as much for the system to show any faulty behavior.

4 Another reason for the low SNR that made DPA difficult was due to the fact that the DMA reads and writes dominates the spikes we see (not AES rounds). We confirmed this by running AES-ECB and AES-CBC and noticed that two extra spikes appear for reading and writing the IV from memory. After setting the destination to a key-slot (instead of SRAM), we observe half as many spikes.

5 Our simple analysis fails if the key schedule was also faulty.
D. Simple Analysis

By injecting faults at offsets \(240 < n < 280\) and width \(m = 1\) we were able to observe faulty ciphertexts. However, most of the faulty texts were not at the right round and therefore cannot be used for Piret’s DFA model. Normally, this would not be an issue as we can just throw out results that fail the attack, however for reasons that will be made clear later, it is to our advantage that we maximize the probability that each faulty ciphertext could be “useful.” To do this, we need to constrain \(n\) more and identify the precise round that each \(n\) value affects. Following the idea in [25], we setup Bigmac with a known key and then perform a faulted decrypt operation. Then we try to encrypt (the inverse operation) the faulty ciphertext with the same key and identify the first step where the state got corrupted.

More specifically, we design an analysis script that performs two AES encrypt operations in parallel: one on the expected ciphertext and one on the faulty ciphertext. After each step, we count the number of bits that differ in the state, and return the round and step that has the least number of different bits. This works with high probability because AES is designed to have diffusion, so each step after the fault would, on average, be more different from the step before it. Table I shows some example output from this analysis. Figure 2 shows the distribution of where the fault was seen and figure 3 shows the distribution of the number of bits corrupted.

We notice that for certain value of \(m\) (such as the ones shown in table I), we are able to cause faults in the MixColumns of a specific round the vast majority of the time. This is evidence that our glitching setup is robust and precise enough to perform Piret’s DFA attack.

### Table I

| Decrypt Output | Corrupted Bit Mask | \(m\) | Round | Operation |
|---------------|-------------------|------|-------|-----------|
| 9BBDEBB1E1CF27208912BB325CF6E7F | 00000000000000000000000000000000 | - | - | - |
| 5F5D6AADFF59481F4F9B56AEB5F1 | 00000000000000000000000000000004 | 3 | MixColumns |
| 6D139A0F75A4C5F8E6C2B8B126B | 00004000000000000000000000000000 | 4 | MixColumns |
| F38414E2564CF5B1D7CE101C6A3 | 00142302000020200000000000000020 | 7 | MixColumns |
| 9D7CEFB389E222FAE826D61B6C6C3 | 00140000000000000410120000000060 | 7 | MixColumns |
| A1A64EFB05B90D7CIC1892E5F2BD | 00140000000000000000000000000000 | 7 | MixColumns |
| 621A9AE2F689F316DC1CBA85F794C | 00040000000000000000000000000000 | 10 | MixColumns |
| 53BAE3688166424E7ACEFBDB8357 | 00021209000000000000000000000020 | 11 | MixColumns |
| 48E02E3AB37E70158129385089F61E | 00000000000000000000000000000000 | 13 | MixColumns |

Selected sample analysis results from AES-256 decrypting input 0x00000000000000000000000000000000 with key-slot 0x3FF. The first row is the expected output while the remaining rows are results from a fault at offset \(m\) with width \(n\). The mask shows which bits in the AES state was corrupted. The round and operation is the step where the AES state was corrupted.

### Table II

| Glitch Parameters | AES-128 | AES-256 Non-master Slot | AES-256 Master Slot |
|-------------------|---------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| \(n_{N-2}\) | 270.75 | 271.5 | 282.25 |
| \(n_{N-3}\) | 270.25 | 225.25 | 281.5 |

Offsets found for three kinds of operations: AES-128 encrypt with a fixed key (only used for debugging our setup), AES-256 decrypt with a non-master key-slot, and AES-256 decrypt with a master key-slot. Glitch width is \(n = 1\) for all cases.
byte, then we are good. However, it is clear that not every faulty ciphertext has the bit flips confined to a single byte.

Fortunately, this is an easy problem to solve. The DFA attack will fail (no solution to the equations) if the wrong faulty ciphertexts are used. Therefore, if we collect \( M \) faulty ciphertexts, we can just attempt the DFA attack with all \( \binom{M}{2} = O(M^2) \) possible pairings.

B. Using multi-byte corruptions

The above works well, and we were able to recover a many key-slots with enough samples. For the remaining key-slots which we were unable to find a pair of required faulty ciphertexts after hours of sampling. We have to improvise another workaround.

First, notice from table [2] that the mask of corrupted bits show some bits are more likely to be flipped than others—even if the fault happens in different rounds. The explanation for this phenomenon is the physical hardware data path for each bit of the state is not equal. We mentioned previously that certain operations (such as MixColumns) are more likely to fault because the data paths are longer than those of other operations and that makes a timing violation more likely. However, even within MixColumns, there are differences in the data path for each bit of the state.

Given a collection of faulty ciphertexts, we define a “static fault” to be any bit corruption that is common to all the ciphertexts and a “dynamic fault” to be the bit corruption(s) that only occur in only some faulty ciphertexts.

1) Second Order DFA: We claim that any number of static faults do not affect the results of DFA. Taking any existing AES DFA technique and it is possible to relax the requirement for a “correct” ciphertext to that of one that only contains static faults.

We prove this claim for Dusart’s example DFA attack on round \( N - 1 \). Let matrix \( S_{r,Op} \) be the correct state at round \( r \) with operation \( Op \) and let \( F_{r,Op} \) be the faulty state matrix. Matrix \( Z \) contains the static faults (up to 16 bytes) and \( A_0 \) is the matrix constant for MixColumns.

\[
Z = \begin{pmatrix}
\zeta_1 & \zeta_2 & \zeta_3 & \zeta_4 \\
\zeta_5 & \zeta_6 & \zeta_7 & \zeta_8 \\
\zeta_9 & \zeta_{10} & \zeta_{11} & \zeta_{12} \\
\zeta_{13} & \zeta_{14} & \zeta_{15} & \zeta_{16}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
A_0 = \begin{pmatrix}
2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 2
\end{pmatrix}
\]

Let \( \epsilon \) be a single dynamic fault at byte 0. We show the effect of the faults in the last two rounds:

\[
F_{N-1, \text{ShiftRows}} = S_{N-1, \text{ShiftRows}} + Z + \begin{pmatrix}
\epsilon & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
F_{N-1, \text{MixCol}} = S_{N-1, \text{MixCol}} + A_0 \cdot Z + A_0 \cdot \begin{pmatrix}
2\epsilon & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\epsilon & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\epsilon & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
3\epsilon & 0 & 0 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
F_{N-1, \text{AddKey}} = S_{N-1, \text{AddKey}} + A_0 \cdot Z + \begin{pmatrix}
\epsilon_0' & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\epsilon_3' & 0 & 0 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
F_{N, \text{SubBytes}} = S_{N, \text{SubBytes}} + \begin{pmatrix}
\epsilon_0' & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \epsilon_1' & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \epsilon_2' & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & \epsilon_3'
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
F_{N, \text{ShiftRows}} = S_{N, \text{ShiftRows}} + \begin{pmatrix}
\epsilon_0' & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \epsilon_1' & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \epsilon_2' & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & \epsilon_3'
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
F_{N, \text{AddKey}} = S_{N, \text{AddKey}} + \begin{pmatrix}
\epsilon_0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \epsilon_1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \epsilon_2 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & \epsilon_3
\end{pmatrix}
\]

With \( s(x) \) being the AES S-Box, we can find the following equations (on \( x, x_1, x_2, x_3, \epsilon \))

\[
s(x_0 + 2\epsilon + 2\zeta_1 + 3\zeta_5 + \zeta_9 + \zeta_{13}) = \]
\[
s(x_0 + 2\zeta_1 + 3\zeta_5 + \zeta_9 + \zeta_{13}) + \epsilon_0' = \]
\[
s(x_1 + \epsilon + \zeta_1 + 2\zeta_5 + 3\zeta_9 + \zeta_{13}) = \]
\[
s(x_1 + \zeta_1 + 2\zeta_5 + 3\zeta_9 + \zeta_{13}) + \epsilon_1' = \]
\[
s(x_2 + \epsilon + \zeta_1 + \zeta_5 + 2\zeta_9 + \zeta_{13}) = \]
\[
s(x_2 + \zeta_1 + \zeta_5 + 2\zeta_9 + \zeta_{13}) + \epsilon_2' = \]
\[
s(x_3 + 3\epsilon + 3\zeta_1 + \zeta_5 + 2\zeta_9 + 2\zeta_{13}) = \]
\[
s(x_3 + 3\zeta_1 + \zeta_5 + 2\zeta_9 + 2\zeta_{13}) + \epsilon_3' = \]

The trick here is that all the \( \zeta \) terms are constant and with a change of variable, we get Dusart’s original equations.

\[
s(x_0' + 2\epsilon) = s(x_0') + \epsilon_0' \]
\[
s(x_1' + \epsilon) = s(x_1') + \epsilon_1' \]
\[
s(x_2' + \epsilon) = s(x_2') + \epsilon_2' \]
\[
s(x_3' + 3\epsilon) = s(x_3') + \epsilon_3' \]

The upshot is that any implementation of Dusart’s attack as well as Piret’s improvements (which is what we used) can be applied unmodified on ciphertexts with static faults. This means we can make use of a greater number of faulty ciphertexts without having to keep sampling and changing the input until we hit a lucky 1 byte fault. Since we do not know

\[\text{In this attack, it is no longer true that invalid candidates will yield no solution. We ran into this issue on a small percentage of key-slots we attacked.}\]
which faulty ciphertext has only static faults, we try every possible combination of 3(3^1) groupings with one candidate as the static-only faulty text. With this one weird trick, we were able to fully recover the remaining non-master key-slots.

C. Targeting master key-slots

Up until this point, we focused on non-master key-slots. Recall that master key-slots have an additional level of obfuscation: the engine does not directly reveal the ciphertext output. Instead, the engine writes the output ciphertext to another key-slot (which is not readable) to be used as a new key. Luckily, this security measure has already been cracked by David “Davee” Morgan [17] who found a hardware vulnerability in Bigmac. The last ciphertext is not cleared from the engine’s internal state and the next invocation of the engine with an input of size < 16 bytes will “borrow” the remaining bytes from the ciphertext of the last successful operation. We can extract the ciphertext output of a master key operation with the following steps:

1) Perform a faulty AES-256 decrypt using the master key-slot and any slave key-slot as the destination. Due to the vulnerability, a copy of the faulty ciphertext will remain in the AES engine’s internal state.
2) Using a known fixed key, AES-128 encrypt a buffer of 4 bytes of 00 to memory. Save the resulting ciphertext, C_3.
3) With the same fixed key, AES-128 decrypt C_3, which restores the internal state.
4) Repeat steps 2-3 with 8 bytes and 12 bytes of 00 to produce C_2 and C_1.
5) Finally, use the slave key-slot to encrypt 16 bytes of 00 to produce C_4.

We can then do a 2^{32} brute-force on C_1 to find the first 4 bytes of the faulty ciphertext (since we used a fixed key, and we know that 12 bytes of the input are 00). Then we can use the 4 known bytes and C_2 to find the next 4 bytes and repeat with C_3 to find the next 4 bytes. Finally we brute force the “key” used to produce C_4 with the first 12 bytes we found and a 2^{32} brute-force of the remaining 4 bytes. This gives a worst case of 4*2^{32} = 2^{34} AES operations to retrieve a single faulty ciphertext.

Using the c5.18xlarge instance on Amazon Web Services EC2 which provides 72 CPU cores [3], each faulty ciphertext retrieval takes an average of 15 seconds and the worst case of under a minute. After obtaining the faulty ciphertexts, we can perform the same DFA attack on the master slots as with other slots.

D. Results

With the phoenixAES library implementation of Piret’s attack along with our brute-force enhancements, we able to use our round N − 2 faults to obtain the round N key and then use the round N − 3 faults to obtain the round N − 1 key.

Combining both gives us the full AES-256 key.

We were able to carry out the attack successfully on all 278 key-slots we have access to (including all 30 master key-slots). There are two key-slots, used for the device unique eMMC full-disk-encryption, that are locked out before we can gain code execution. In theory, it should be possible to perform the same attack by writing to the eMMC with our RPC (the FDE is done in hardware and is transparent to software) and dumping the result with an external flasher. However, we do not attempt this because of the extra overhead involved and the fact that the keys are device unique and therefore not useful to have.

V. Conclusion

We have demonstrated that AES DFA attacks do work well in practice, although some extra work was required. It is particularly attractive for devices like the PlayStation Vita where the software has been security-hardened. The entire cost of this attack was surprisingly low. ChipWhisperer Lite and CW501 differential probe costs about $300. The custom boards and components for glitching and triggering costs less than $10 total. 500 core-hours of partials busting on AWS EC2 costed us about $10. Even including the extra equipment used during the development and debugging such as a 100 MHz oscilloscope and extra Vita motherboards, the entire cost of the attack was easily under $1000. We believe that all modern SoC should, if they do not already, defend against DFA attacks because these attacks are not just theoretical. The PlayStation Vita used hardware AES keys as a way of protecting the software, but because they did not also protect the hardware as well, all their defenses crumble with a precisely timed voltage spike.

Availability

All our work are available as open source projects.

1) The F00D RPC payload and ChipWhisperer scripts to run the RPC and collect faulty ciphertexts: https://github.com/TeamMolecule/f00dsimpleserial/
2) AES fault analysis script for finding where the fault occurs given a known key: https://github.com/TeamMolecule/f00dsimpleserial/tree/master/scripts/analysis
3) DFA attack script based on phoenixAES including the second order DFA enhancements: https://github.com/TeamMolecule/f00dsimpleserial/tree/master/scripts/dfa_crack
4) Master key-slot ciphertext brute force with AES-NI support (thanks to “Davee”): https://github.com/TeamMolecule/f00d-partial-buster

With the round N key, we can reverse a single round of AES for the correct ciphertext along with every faulty ciphertext. Then we just run the same DFA attack with the new sample set to get the round N − 1 key.
REFERENCES

[1] Sk Subidh Ali, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, and Michael Tunstall. *Differential Fault Analysis of AES: Towards Reaching its Limits*. 2012.

[2] Subidh Ali, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, and Michael Tunstall. *Differential Fault Analysis of AES using a Single Multiple-Byte Fault*. 2010.

[3] Amazon EC2 Instance Types. URL: https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/.

[4] Ro Barenghi et al. "Low voltage fault attacks to AES and RSA on general purpose processors." Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2011/130. 2010.

[5] Eli Biham and Adi Shamir. *Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems*. 1997.

[6] Dan Boneh, Richard A. Demillo, and Richard J. Lipton. “On the Importance of Checking Cryptographic Protocols for Faults”. In: Springer-Verlag, 1997, pp. 37–51.

[7] Joppe W. Bos et al. *Differential Computation Analysis: Hiding your White-Box Designs is Not Enough*. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/753. https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/753. 2015.

[8] Jakub Breier and Dirmanto Jap. *A Survey of the State-of-the-Art Fault Attacks*. 2014.

[9] Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen. *AES Proposal: Rijndael*. 1999.

[10] P. Dusart, G. Letourneux, and O. Vivolo. *Differential Fault Analysis on AES*. 2002.

[11] N. Floissac and Y. L’Hyver. “From AES-128 to AES-192 and AES-256, How to Adapt Differential Fault Analysis Attacks on Key Expansion”. In: *2011 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography*. Sept. 2011, pp. 43–53. DOI: 10.1109/FDTC.2011.15.

[12] Chong Hee Kim. “Differential fault analysis of AES: Toward reducing number of faults”. In: *Information Sciences* (2012), pp. 43–57.

[13] Matt Kim. *PS Vita Production in Japan Will End in 2019, No Successor Planned*. URL: https://www.usgamer.net/articles/ps-vita-will-cease-production-in-japan-in-2019-no-successor-planned.

[14] Yifan Lu. *Injecting Software Vulnerabilities with Voltage Glitching*. 2019.

[15] Yifan Lu. *Why hacking the Vita is hard (or: a history of first hacks)*. URL: https://yifan.lu/2013/09/10/why-hacking-the-vita-is-hard-or-a-history-of-first-hacks/.

[16] Amir Moradi, Mohammad T. Manzuri Shalmani, and Mahmoud Salmasizadeh. “A Generalized Method of Differential Fault Attack against AES cryptosystem”. In: *IN CHES*. 2006, pp. 91–100.

[17] David Morgan. *Extracting keys from F00D Crumbs*. URL: https://www.lolhax.org/2019/01/02/extracting-keys-f00d-crumbs-raccoon-exploit/.

[18] C. Nalini et al. “Compact Designs of SubBytes and MixColumn for AES”. In: *2009 IEEE International Advance Computing Conference*. Mar. 2009, pp. 1241–1247. DOI: 10.1109/IADCC.2009.4809193.

[19] Colin O’Flynn. “Fault Injection using Crowbars on Embedded Systems.” In: *IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive* 2016 (2016), p. 810.

[20] Gilles Piret and Jean-jacques Quisquater. “A Differential Fault Attack Technique Against SPN Structures, with Application to the AES”. In: *and KHAZAD,”Fifth International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES 2003)*, Volume 2779 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*. Springer-Verlag, 2003, pp. 77–88.

[21] N. Selmane, S. Guilley, and J. Danger. “Practical Setup Time Violation Attacks on AES”. In: *2008 Seventh European Dependable Computing Conference*. May 2008, pp. 91–96. DOI: 10.1109/EDCC-7.2008.11.

[22] Philippe Teuwen. *phoenixAES: a tool to perform differential fault analysis attacks (DFA) against AES*. 2016. URL: https://github.com/SideChannelMarvels/JeanGrey/tree/master/phoenixAES.

[23] Michael Tunstall, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, and Subidh Ali. “Differential Fault Analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard Using a Single Fault”. In: *Information Security Theory and Practice, Security and Privacy of Mobile Devices in Wireless Communication*. Ed. by Claudio A. Ardagna and Jianying Zhou. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011, pp. 224–233. ISBN: 978-3-642-21040-2.

[24] Marc Witteman. *Practical DFA on AES*. 2013. URL: https://www.riscure.com/uploads/2017/09/Practical-DFA-on-AES.pdf.

[25] L. Zussa et al. “Power supply glitch induced faults on FPGA: An in-depth analysis of the injection mechanism”. In: *2013 IEEE 19th International On-Line Testing Symposium (IOLTS)*. July 2013, pp. 110–115. DOI: 10.1109/IOLTS.2013.6604060.
A. PCB Modifications

Figure 4. The decoupling capacitors for the core 1.1V voltage domain removed are boxed in red. The two external clock input pads are boxed in yellow (the clock synthesizer chip is removed).

Figure 5. The back of the board where the 1.1V supply trace is cut in order to isolate the regulator from the SoC.
Figure 6. The psvcw board glued to the under-side of the Vita motherboard. SMA connector goes to ChipWhisperer glitch module. The left pins go to an
external 1.1V supply. The right pins go the differential probe. On the bottom of the board are two wires that are soldered to ground and the top portion of
the cut trace. The shunt resistor is 10Ω and the bypass capacitor is 10µF. Boxed in orange is the GPIO output from the device used as a trigger.