An Alternative Analysis of An introduction to Metaphysics by
Heidegger in Comparison with the Ethical Structure of the Kanun

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Abstract: The logic of Heidegger’s philosophy in An Introduction to Metaphysics has been analyzed alongside the ethical structure of the Kanun, and the mythological narrative of ultra-nationalism in prewar Japan. The comparative study reveals the structural similarities between them, which indicate that Heidegger told of the three pillars of the Kanun: the concept of a consanguine commune, the concept of continuity and growth of the consanguine commune, and the concept of filial piety and loyalty to the consanguine commune, in An Introduction to Metaphysics, Being and Time and other works, in another, his own language which look sometimes cryptic and enigmatic. When we analyze his discourse with the ethical structure of the Kanun and the mythological narrative of ultra-nationalism in prewar Japan in mind, a fine vase of Heidegger’s logic, i.e., the original ethics comes into our view.

Keywords: human, being-there, thinking, power, appearing, realm, the ought, original ethics

1. INTRODUCTION

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) said that An Introduction to Metaphysics was based on the lecture he delivered at the University of Freiburg in Breisgau in the summer semester of 1935 (Heidegger 1959: vi). While he made a discourse on the spatial aspect of humans’ being in An Introduction to Metaphysics, he discussed little on the temporal aspect of humans’ being, about which he discussed thoroughly in Being and Time. As if he realized that it was his mistake not to have fully discussed the spatial aspect of humans’ being as a fundamental phenomenon in Being and Time, he told in Letter on Humanism that he tried to make “the turning (die Kehre)” from “Being and Time” to “Time and Being” in the discourse on humans’ being, although he insisted that this turning was not a change in standpoint from Being and Time (Heidegger 1993: 217-265). When we notice that Heidegger had discussed almost exclusively about the spatial aspect of humans’ being after the publication of Being and Time in 1927 until his death in 1976, this “turning” suggests that he made a sharp turn in the direction of his research to the exploration of the spatial aspect of humans’ being. Heidegger himself told in the “Author’s Preface to the Seventh German Edition” of Being and Time that Being and Time, which appeared in the spring of 1927, was designated as the ‘First Half,’ suggesting that he planned to write a ‘Second Half,’ which never appeared, while he did imply that An Introduction to Metaphysics was designated as the ‘Second Half,’ indicating that An Introduction to Metaphysics was his most important work alongside Being and Time: the ‘First Half’ (Heidegger 1962).

A Japanese scholar Tetsuro Watsuji (1889-1960) described that although he was profoundly impressed by Heidegger’s discourse on humans’ being upon reading Being and Time in Berlin during the early summer of 1927, he felt that Heidegger seemed not to have fully discussed the spatial aspect of humans’ being in it (Watsuji 1971: v-vii). Watsuji, who intuitively realized that humans’ being had not only the temporal aspect as a fundamental phenomenon but the spatial aspect, launched his study...
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for elucidating the spatial and temporal aspects of humans’ being in comparison with the ethical value system of the Japanese, with which he had been familiarized since his childhood (WATSUJI 1996: 9-27). Previously, we discussed that Watsuji’s ethical concept was representative of the ethical value system which ordinary Japanese people had cherished from late in the Edo period till the end of World War II, which consisted of filial piety to their ancestors and loyalty towards the Emperor along with their original idea of national polity (kokutai) (YAMAMOTO 2008: 352-382). The Imperial Rescript on Education issued in 1890 by the Emperor Meiji played a crucial role to form the ethical value system of ordinary Japanese people until the end of World War II. The Imperial Rescript on Education assumes that Japan is a huge consanguine commune, presided over by the Emperor, who ascend the throne because of his blood relationship with the imperial ancestors. The imperial line is upheld by the continuation of imperial blood. As the imperial line is supposed to have originated in the divine obscurity of the Universe, loyalty to the Emperor is deemed an ethical act. The Japanese subjects belong to their own lineage with their ancestors. Since the ancestors of each lineage of all Japanese subjects are linked with the imperial ancestors, filial piety to parents is deemed equivalent to loyalty to the Emperor. The Imperial Rescript on Education ordains the subjects to seek to attain the continuity and growth of the consanguine commune through filial piety to the consanguine commune and loyalty to the Emperor. Watsuji’s logic has a structure similar to the Imperial Rescript on Education. Watsuji insists that Japan is a huge home consisting of the homes of the Japanese subjects, that is, a huge consanguine commune. Each home has its own gods, which are related to the god of the Ise Shrine. The Emperor has divine authority because of his kinship with the god of the Ise Shrine. The home of homes has the obligation to continue to exist in the international community. If the home of the homes is to meet with difficulties, the passion and enthusiasm for action would be engendered among the Japanese, who are willing to devote themselves to battle for its defense. This ethical value system seems to constitute the subterranean waters which underlie the value system of ultra-nationalism in prewar Japan (YAMAMOTO 2008: 352-382).

The comparative study on the ethical concepts between the Kanun and ultra-nationalism in prewar Japan along with the study on the ethical value system of ordinary Japanese people such as Watsuji, led us to find that the ethical value system of the Kanun had three pillars: the concept of a consanguine commune, the concept of continuity and growth of the consanguine commune, and the concept of filial piety and loyalty to the consanguine commune (YAMAMOTO 2008: 352-382). Upon reading Being and Time as well as An Introduction to Metaphysics, we noticed the structural semblance of the value system between Heidegger’s discourses on humans’ being, and the three pillars of the Kanun. Here, we will present an alternative analysis of Heidegger’s An Introduction to Metaphysics, as discussed within the perspective of the comparison with these three pillars.

2. HEIDEGGER’S LOGIC IN AN INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS

According to Heidegger, the essent of being was called physis in ancient Greek world (INTRODUCTION 13?). However, when physis was translated as natura in the Latin, the original meaning of the Greek word was thrust aside, resulting in the destruction of its actual philosophical force. People were cut off and alienated from the original essence of Greek philosophy, and the Roman translation was taken over by Christianity and the Christian Middle Ages (INTRODUCTION 13). The transformation in the meaning of physis started when physis was separated from logos by Plato and Aristotle, making logos a court of justice over being (INTRODUCTION 179). Heidegger called this transformation the end of Greek philosophy because it concealed the original meaning of physis (INTRODUCTION 179). He insists that originally physis meant the power that emerges and

* ‘INTRODUCTION 13’ designates the page 13 of An Introduction to Metaphysics (Heidegger, Martin, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Yale University Press, 1959). All citations are the same.
the enduring realm under its sway (INTRODUCTION 14). Physis is the process of a-rising, of emerging from the hidden, whereby the hidden is first made to stand. It denotes self-blossoming emergence, opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such unfolding and perseveres and endures in it (INTRODUCTION 14-15). In Heidegger’s metaphysics, humans’ being is nothing other than their being in this world as a share of physis. The realm of being as such and as a whole is physis, whose essence and character are defined as that which emerges and endures (INTRODUCTION 16).

In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger insists that humans’ being has two factors: the temporal and the spatial. There was a time when man was not. At the same time, it can be said that there is no time when man was not. At all times man was and is and will be, because time produces itself only insofar as man is (INTRODUCTION 84). Being in the sense of already-thereness was the perspective for the determination of time, while time was not the perspective specially chosen for the interpretation of being (INTRODUCTION 206). Time is not eternity and time fashions itself into a time only as a human, historical being-there (INTRODUCTION 84). He said that he discussed in Being and Time that the temporal aspect of Dasein had a “transcendental horizon,” as is defined in terms of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there (INTRODUCTION 18). As the emergence of the essent as an overcoming of nothingness, man should be being-there <Dasein>: “in every case mine,” which means that being-there is allotted to him or her so that his or her self should be being-there. The ecstatically manifested being of the essent should be “cared” by him or her who is aware of such being (INTRODUCTION 28). This care leads them to make efforts to guard their historical being-there, which includes their own future being-there in the totality of the history allotted to man (INTRODUCTION 41). History as happening is an acting and being acted upon which pass through the present, which are determined from out of the future, and which take over the past (INTRODUCTION 44). What is metaphysically historical opens up the process of human being-there in its essential relations (INTRODUCTION 44). If man is not aware of being as the ecstatically manifested being of the essent and does not care for, when the farthest corner of the globe is conquered by technology and opened to economic exploitation, time would cease to be anything other than velocity, instantaneousness, and simultaneity, and time as history would vanish from the lives of all peoples, resulting in the darkening of the world, the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth, the transformation of men into a mass and the hatred and suspicion of everything free and creative (INTRODUCTION 37-38). Thus, according to Heidegger one pillar of humans’ being is ‘time’ as defined the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there, which is metaphysically historical.

Heidegger’s next step is to elucidate the spatial aspect of the essent of being. In order to achieve this, he tried to explore the primordial meaning of the Greek words such as peras, to telos, entelecheia, morphe, eidos or idea and ousia or parousia because he believed that the question of historical being-there involved us deeply into the question of language (INTRODUCTION 51, 59-61). Heidegger says that these words would reveal what the Greeks understood by being, which may be outlined with the expression such as erect standing-there, coming up and enduring (INTRODUCTION 59-60). These words are deemed to speak for the spatial aspect of what the Greeks understood by being. Heidegger insisted that though peras meant the limit, it was not something that comes to the essent from outside, but the hold that governs itself from out of the limit, wherein the enduring holds itself (INTRODUCTION 60). To telos, end, was not meant in a negative sense, but was ending in the sense of fulfillment. Aristotle’s word for being, entelecheia is construed to mean the holding (preserving)-itself-in-the-ending (limit). That which places itself in its limit, completing it, and so stands has a form, morphe, which must appear. The appearance of a thing was called eidos or idea in the ancient Greek world. Ousia or parousia meant <presence>, which designated an estate or homestead, standing in itself or self-enclosed. These words connote metaphysically that the ancient Greeks experienced being as physis, the emerging and arising, and the spontaneous unfolding that
lingers (INTRODUCTION 61). Physis, the power, first issues from concealment, which is unconcealment (aletheia) when the power accomplishes itself as a world (INTRODUCTION 61). In the process of unconcealment, conflict (polemos) occurs, which causes the realm of being to separate into opposites, giving rise to position, order and rank (INTRODUCTION 62). However, as this conflict rather constitutes unity than split or destroy unity, it is a binding-together (logos). In this meaning polemos and logos are the same (INTRODUCTION 62). The Greek view of the essence of being, a determinateness, has not just dropped on us accidentally from somewhere, but has dominated our historical being-there since antiquity (INTRODUCTION 92).

Heidegger thinks that the “being” uttered in “is” has diverse meanings such as really present, permanently there, takes place, comes from, belongs to, is made of, stays, succumbs to, stands for, has entered upon, has appeared (INTRODUCTION 91). He categorized these meanings into four: being and becoming, being and appearance, being and thinking and being and the ought (INTRODUCTION 93) and tried to achieve unity between those and being (physis), because the separation of those from being is considered to have concealed the essent of being, transforming the true meaning of those. He seems to have believed that he could clarify the essent of being through unearthing the original meanings of those, which would restore them to their own truth. Thus, the original unity between being and becoming, between being and appearance, between being and thinking and between being and the ought will be achieved, which would enable the essent of being to reveal itself. As a way to detect their original meanings, he resorted to examining ancient Greek literature such as Parmenides’ poem, Heraclitus’ saying and the Antigone of Sophocles, which would lead him to penetrating into the origin of the words, which are supposed to retain the unity with being in their original meanings.

Heidegger attempts to achieve the unity between being and becoming by examining the original meaning of Parmenides’ poem. According to him, the essence of being was called physis among ancient Greeks: self-blossoming emergence, opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such unfolding and perseveres and endures in it (INTRODUCTION 14). In opposition to the ordinary view that what is situated in becoming is no longer nothing and it is not yet that which it is destined to become, i.e., “no longer and not yet” (INTRODUCTION 114), he insisted that becoming was an appearance of being and that therefore becoming as “emerging” belonged to physis (INTRODUCTION 97). If becoming is taken in the Greek sense, it as coming-into-presence and going-out of it is being as an emerging, appearing presence (INTRODUCTION 114-115). It is customary to say that Western philosophy began from the opposition of Heraclitus’ doctrine of becoming to Parmenides’ doctrine of being. When becoming as “emerging” is understood to belong to physis, it becomes clear that Heraclitus and Parmenides said the same thing (INTRODUCTION 97).

According to Heidegger, being disclosed itself to the Greeks as physis, the realm of emerging and abiding, which is at the same time a shining appearing (INTRODUCTION 100-101). In a sense, being means appearing, which is the essence of being (INTRODUCTION 101). Appearing, which makes manifest, is the power that emerges, which causes to emerge from concealment (unconcealment). The essence of being is to come to light, to appear on the scene, to take one’s place and to produce something, while non-being is to withdraw from appearing, from presence (INTRODUCTION 102). For the Greeks, the mode of the highest being is glory, which means to show oneself, appear, to enter into the light (INTRODUCTION 103). This appearance is historical, and history is discovered and grounded in poetry and myth (INTRODUCTION 105). Man is perpetually compelled to wrest being from appearance and preserve it against appearance. In the enduring struggle (polemos) between being and appearance, the essent such as the gods and the state, the temples and the tragedy are carried in permanence and unconcealment (INTRODUCTION 105). Man who holds to being as it opens round him is to take over being-there in the radiance of being, bring being to stand, endure it in appearance and against appearance. He must wrest both appearance and being from the abyss of
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non-being (INTRODUCTION 110). The Sophists and Plato declared that appearance was mere appearance, and thus degraded. At the same time being, as idea, was exalted to a suprasensory realm, and a chasm between the merely apparent essent below and real being somewhere on high was created. It led to the interpretation that the lower was the created and the higher the creator, which turned against antiquity (as paganism) and so disfigured it (INTRODUCTION 106).

Next Heidegger explored the original unity between physis and logos. He insists that when logos was separated from physis, the original meaning of logos was lost and a distinct logos, logos in the sense of reason and understanding, appeared on the scene (INTRODUCTION 123). Noticing that legein (speak) had originally meant “to gather,” he found that logos retained an original meaning in the sense of “relation of the one to the other,” leading to the meaning of logos as “collection” or “to collect” (INTRODUCTION 124-125). Through interpreting Heraclitus’ fragments, Heidegger concludes that logos, when united with being, means “permanent gathering” (INTRODUCTION 128). Logos is the steady gathering, the intrinsic togetherness of the essent, i.e., being. In this context, physis and logos are the same (INTRODUCTION 130-131). Because physis as logos is basic gathering, rank and domination are implicit in physis. If physis is to disclose itself, it must itself have and maintain a rank (INTRODUCTION 133). Gathering is not a mere driving-together or heaping-up but it maintains in a common bond the conflicting and that which tends apart. In maintaining a bond, logos has the character of permeating power, of physis (INTRODUCTION 134). Language is considered logos, collection, because the essence of language is found in the act of gathering within the togetherness of being, language as everyday speech comes to its truth only when speaking and hearing are oriented toward logos as collectedness in the sense of being (INTRODUCTION 172-173). Word preserves what was originally collected and so administers the overpowering power. Logos intrinsically requires violence to ward off mouthing and dispersion (INTRODUCTION 174). Through violence, through acts of power, the overpowering is made manifest and made to stand (INTRODUCTION 171). Standing and active in logos, which is ingathering, man is the gatherer (INTRODUCTION 172). To be a man means to take gathering upon oneself, to undertake a gathering apprehension of the being of the essent, the sapient incorporation of appearing in the work, so to administer unconcealment, to preserve it against cloaking and concealment (INTRODUCTION 174). Where being prevails, apprehension prevails and happens with it. Apprehension, the receptive bringing-to-stand of the intrinsically permanent which manifests itself, ensures man to be a particular mode of being amid the essent as a whole because the particularity of being-human will grow from the particularity of its belonging to being as dominant appearing (INTRODUCTION 139). Apprehension is rather a process in which man first enters into a historical being (INTRODUCTION 141). When man knows appearance as historical being through apprehension, he is defined as the rational animal (INTRODUCTION 141-142). Man is a self only as historical being. Man’s selfhood means that he must transform the being that discloses itself to him into history and bring himself to stand in it. Selfhood does not mean that he is primarily an “ego” and an individual but no more than he is a we, a community (INTRODUCTION 143-144).

In the process of analyzing the chorus of Sophocles’ Antigone, Heidegger explored the essence of man. He focused on one word deinotaton in the chorus of Antigone, which means the strangest. According to Antigone, man is to deinotaton, the strangest of the strange (INTRODUCTION 149). To be the strangest of all is the basic trait of the human essence, within which all other traits must find their place (INTRODUCTION 151). Deinon means the powerful in the sense of one who uses power, who not only disposes of power <Gewalt> but is violent <gewalt-tätig> insofar as the use of power is the basic trait not only of his action, but also of his being-there (INTRODUCTION 149-150). Where the power irrupts, it can hold its overpowering power in check. Man is the violent one, not aside from and along with other attributes, but solely in the sense that in his fundamental violence he uses power
against the overpowering (INTRODUCTION 150). The violent one, the wielder of power, is he who breaks out and breaks up, he who captures and subjugates (INTRODUCTION 157). Time and time again the violent ones must shrink back in fear from the use of force and yet they are unable to forego it (INTRODUCTION 176). All violence shatters against one thing, death, which is an end beyond all consummation, a limit beyond all limits. Here there is no breaking-out or breaking-up, no capture or subjugation. When man comes to die, he is without issue in the face of death. Insofar as man is, he stands in the issuelessness of death (INTRODUCTION 158).

The violent wrests being from concealment into the manifest as the essent with the aid of techne, i.e., the initial and persistent looking out beyond what is given at any time. At the same time, the violent is to be manifested in dike <Fug>, which is the directive which the overpowering imposes on its reign, the governing structure which compels adaptation and compliance. The violent confront one another. In this confrontation, techne bursts forth against dike, which in turn, as Fug, the commanding order, disposes of all techne. The reciprocal confrontation is insofar as the strangest thing of all, being-human, is actualized, insofar as man is present as history (INTRODUCTION 159-161). Every violent curbing of the powerful is either victory or defeat. Both, each in its different way, fling him out of home, and thus, each in its different way, unfold the dangerousness of achieved or lost being. Both, in different ways, are menaced by disaster (INTRODUCTION 161). Man is forced into such a being-there, hurled into the affliction of such being, because the overpowering, in order to appear in its power, requires a place, a scene of disclosure (INTRODUCTION 162-163). The strangest (man) is what it is because, fundamentally, it cultivates and guards the familiar, in order to break out of it and let what overpowers it break in. The violent one knows no kindness or conciliation. He cannot be mollified or appeased by success or prestige. To him disaster, the downfall into the issueless and placeless, is the deepest and broadest affirmation of the overpowering. In the shattering of the wrought work, in the knowledge that it is mischief and a dunghill, he leaves the overpowering to its order <Fug> (INTRODUCTION 163). The essent of being disclosed itself only insofar as the structure <Fug> is guarded and preserved. Dike is the key to the essent in its structure (INTRODUCTION 166).

Physis as emerging power is an appearing, i.e., that which gathers itself, which brings-itself-to-stand in its togetherness and so stands. That which, already standing-there, presents a front, a surface, offers an appearance to be looked at. Appearing in the sense as bringing-itself-to-stand in togetherness involves space, which it first conquers. As its stands there, it creates space for itself, produces space and everything pertaining to it (INTRODUCTION 182-183). Appearing in the first sense opens up space, and in the second sense merely circumscribes and measures the space that has already been opened (INTRODUCTION 183). Opening space is emerging-into-unconcealment. Apprehension and gathering govern the opening up of unconcealment for the essent, the space being created for the appearing of the essent. Unconcealment is to preserve its full momentum by repeating, drawing once again more deeply than ever from its source, leading to ousia, being in the sense of permanent presence, already-thereness (INTRODUCTION 190-191, 193). In order to be permanently present, we must go back to in comprehending and producing: the model, the idea as well as we must go back to in all logos, statement. It is what lies-before (INTRODUCTION 193). Physis, the power that emerges and discloses, discloses itself as idea (INTRODUCTION 197).

In the final stage of his inquiry, Heidegger explored the unity between being and the ought. The issue of the unity between being and the ought is foreshadowed by the designation of the on <the essent, that which is> as agathon <the good> (INTRODUCTION 95). Plato said that the supreme idea was the idea of the good (idea tou agathon). Heidegger interprets that the “good” does not mean the morally proper but that, which accomplishes and can accomplish what is appropriate. The agathon is the standard as such, that what first endows being with power to become a prototype (INTRODUCTION
196). Being itself, interpreted as idea, brings with it a relation to the prototypical, the exemplary, the ought (INTRODUCTION 197). When the ought <Sollen> is exalted as value, the value as the ought is in need of bolstering up. To this end, a being is attributed to the values themselves. And this being means neither more nor less than the presence of something already-there. Thus, history came to be regarded as a realization of values (INTRODUCTION 198). In the final conclusion, Heidegger indicated that man should be understood, within the question of being, as the site which being requires in order to disclose itself. Man is the site of openness, the there. The essent juts into this there and is fulfilled. The perspective for the opening of being must be grounded originally in the essence of being-there as such a site for the disclosure of being (INTRODUCTION 205).

3. The Kanun and the Three Pillars of its Ethical Value System

The ethical structure of the Kanun is a cultural apparatus which represents ethics and social order in a society without state power (YAMAMOTO 2008: 230-259). Its fundamental concept is blood. In a society without state power, the blood relationship is the most important tie which makes it possible for the people to group together intimately. At the same time, the act of revenge which the offended party carries out on the offending party is the ultimate force of justice, enabling society to keep peace and social order (YAMAMOTO 2008: 230-259). A society without state power is not one consisting of individuals, but one consisting of consanguine groups, which are the transcendental commune comprising the past, the present and the future, i.e., the dead, the living and the offspring. Those living in a consanguine commune must maintain their honor in the society and worship their ancestors. The living are under the obligation to guard the existence of their consanguine commune in the society and to secure its growth.

The disciplinary force that preserves social order in a society without state power is the violence of revenge (YAMAMOTO 2008: 230-259). The ethical structure of the Kanun incorporates the urge for committing violence into the ethical value system, converting the violence of revenge into a sacred force, supposedly wielded by the gods (YAMAMOTO 2008: 230-259). The act of revenge is closely linked to the fear that their own existence could be jeopardized if the offense is not neutralized properly. The disappearance of the consanguine commune is tantamount to the destruction of the divine order of the Universe for the people in a society without state power. When one generation dies, the next generation inherits the commune. This succession is deemed to be the continuation of blood, which symbolically represents the repetition of the primordial events of the lineage. The exorbitant happiness, enormous honor or deep trauma which one generation has experienced is purified and sublimated into myth, epic and narrative, and then is orally transmitted to the following generations. Experience transmitted beyond generations through myth, epic and narrative is the resource which makes up and perpetuates the identity of the commune. A consanguine commune sustained by the continuation of blood is not the commune of the historical world, but of the mythological one. In this regard, a society without state power is full of the symbolism of the mythological world (YAMAMOTO 2008: 352-382). Thus, we can find in the ethical structure of the Kanun the three pillars: the concept of a consanguine commune, the concept of continuity and growth of the consanguine commune, and the concept of filial piety and loyalty to the consanguine commune.

4. Comparative Analysis of Heidegger's Logic with the Kanun

4.1. The Concept of a Consanguine Commune

According to Heidegger, humans’ being has two attributes: the temporal and the spatial. In terms of time, the basic attribute of physis, i.e., the power that emerges and endures in the realm under its sway, is the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there. Physis manifests itself from the hidden, perseveres and endures. Physis has not just dropped on us accidentally from somewhere but has dominated our historical being-there since antiquity. The existential-ecstatic temporality of human
being-there is historical on account of the fact that language that speaks myths or poetry (logos) of a we, a community, enables humans to gather and maintain a bond, leading to their permanent gathering. History as happening is an acting and being acted upon which pass through the present, which are determined from out of future, and which take over the past. The realm under the sway of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there has a shining appearance. The existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there is secured by the “care” which man who is aware of his history takes.

When this logic is dissected in terms of the ethical structure of the Kanun, the following structure is developed. It can be safely assumed that there was no intimate human bond other than the blood relationship in ancient times. Heidegger acknowledged that he was discussing the primordial humans’ being (LETTER 247). If we apply these understandings to our research on Heidegger’s logic, it can be said that the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there means no more or less than an temporal enduring existence of a consanguine commune in the world. The history as the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there has features of the present, the future and the past, which seem to parallel the concept of a consanguine commune which comprises the dead, the living and the offspring found in the ethical structure of the Kanun. The consanguine commune, which is made possible to manifest by logos, is to be preserved by the care which men of the commune take. Thus, Heidegger’s logic has a feature, which is apparently similar to the concept of a consanguine commune found in the ethical structure of the Kanun.

4.2. The Concept of Continuity and Growth of the Consanguine Commune

Heidegger insisted that physis, i.e., the power that emerges and unfolds had to endure, keeping a shining appearance. This being is no more or less than the presence of the already-there (the past). Appearing in the sense as bringing-itsel-to-stand in togetherness involves space, which it first conquers. Appearing means opening up space, in which the power keeps an enduring appearance. Apprehension and gathering govern the opening up of unconcealment, i.e., the space being created for the appearance. Unconcealment is to preserve its full momentum by repeating, drawing once again more deeply than ever from its source, leading to ousia, a permanent presence, already-thereness. In this context, ousia, a permanent presence may be construed to represent the temporal and spatial existence of a consanguine commune in the world, which is to be preserved by the care of man in the commune. Being interpreted as idea brings with it a relation to the prototypical, the exemplary, the ought. Man of the consanguine commune is expected to circumscribe and measure the space that has already been opened. It is “good” and appropriate for man to make it possible for what first endows being with power to become a prototype, i.e., for him to make every effort to keep the temporal as well as spatial presence of the consanguine commune in the world. Thus, it is apparent that Heidegger’s logic has a feature, which is in parallel with the concept of continuity and growth of the consanguine commune found in the ethical structure of the Kanun.

4.3. The Concept of Filial Piety and Loyalty to the Consanguine Commune

In the process of unconcealment, i.e., the power manifesting itself and enduring in the realm under its sway, conflict occurs, which causes the realm of being to separate into opposites, giving rise to position, order and rank. Man is the strangest of the strange: one who uses power, who not only disposes of power but is violent on account of the fact that the use of power is the basic trait not only of his action, but of his being-there. He is the violent one, the wielder of power who breaks out and breaks up, who captures and subjugates. The violent wrests being from concealment into manifest

* ‘LETTER 247’ designates the page 247 of Letter on Humanism (Heidegger, Martin, “Letter on Humanism,” Basic Writings, Routledge, pp. 217-265, 1993). All citations are the same.
through the use of power. The violent confront one another. The reciprocal confrontation is actualized insofar as man is present as history. At the same time, this conflict rather constitutes unity than splits or destroys unity, because through violence and acts of power, the overpowering is made manifest and made to stand, creating the commanding order (dike or Fug). The overpowering imposes the directive on its reign, the governing structure which compels adaptation and compliance. Thus, power of the violent is curved, resulting in either their victory or defeat. The commanding order maintains the conflicting and that which tends apart in a common bond.

When we see Heidegger’s discourse from the viewpoint of the ethical structure of the Kanun, it becomes apparent that it is comprised of a concept similar to the concept of filial piety and loyalty to the consanguine commune. Heidegger insisted that the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there, i.e., humans’ historical being as a we or a community is to appear in the world and endure there. The world where the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there is present is full of violence, confronting one another because violence is the basic trait of man, which is linked with the being of man. In order to secure being-there, man must struggle to open and maintain space for the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there in the world, which is under the sway of the customary code. In the process of securing temporal and spatial being in the world, they must remain both filial and loyal to the already standing-there. When it is in danger, they must defend its appearance and secure its endurance through violence if necessary. In this contest, to be filial and loyal to the prototypical, the exemplary is deemed to be the ought. Thus, we can find in Heidegger’s discourse a concept similar to the concept of filial piety and loyalty to the consanguine commune found in the ethical structure of the Kanun.

5. DISCUSSION

One of the issues, which should be solved first when analyzing Heidegger’s logic is what Heidegger really means by the words such as temporality and time. A clue to solve it may be the “primordial” mode of temporality. Heidegger said that he explored the meaning of Being as determined primordially in terms of time called “Temporal” determinateness (BEING AND TIME 40’), as ontological inquiry should be primordial (BEING AND TIME 31). He thought that time needed to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being (BEING AND TIME 39). When we try to explicate time primordially, we must go into remote antiquity when humans’ perception of time was quite different from that in modern ages. It may be safely assumed that there was no principal bond other than blood relationship in ancient times which could unite people and categorize people into distinct groups, while there was no political power which could unite people beyond the blood relationship. It should be also surmised that in ancient times, time was perceived longitudinally in terms of the continuous presence of a consanguine commune with endless repetition of blood (generations), i.e., the past was understood as the times of ancestors and the future as the times of offspring (those yet to be born). Heidegger himself indicated that one’s own past which always means the past of one’s ‘generation,’ was not something, which follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it (BEING AND TIME 41) and that time, in the sense of ‘being in time,’ functioned as a criterion for distinguishing realms of Being (BEING AND TIME 39). These discourses when combined would lead us to the concept that Being determined primordially in terms of time is the temporal enduring existence of a consanguine commune, which is supposed to have originated in the divine clearing of the world.

If it is possible to explicate that Heidegger’s “the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there” is a concept similar to the concept of a consanguine commune on account of our earlier
discourses, his logic which sometimes looks cryptic (SCHMIDT 2001: 225-270) becomes much easier for us to comprehend what he really meant in his sayings. It is clear that there is no “world” (Being or physis) in which humans achieve being without everything spatial and all space-time (LETTER 237). Language makes it possible for everything spatial and all space-time to manifest, therefore called the house of Being (LETTER 217). Because plants and animals are lodged in their respective environments but are never placed freely in the clearing of Being, i.e., “world.” they lack language (LETTER 230). We may say that when humans acquired the language “blood” for the first time, they really began to discern the existential-ecstatic temporality of being-there, which opened the “world” to humans, thereby making them true humans. The thought of holiness appears along with the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there, and from the thought of holiness, the thought of divinity emerged, resulting in the appearance of the word “god” (LETTER 253).” The familiar abode of man, the “ecstatic dwelling” of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there is the open region for the presencing of god (LETTER 258). Man as a spiritual-ensouled-bodily being (LETTER 233), who is called from the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there into its preservation and endurance, is the shepherd who should take care of it. Man who is thrown in the “ecstatic projection” of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there must guard the ecstatic dwelling through action if necessary (LETTER 241, 246). In this context, whole “world” is deemed to be the aggregate of the ecstatic dwelling of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there, which may either confront one another or reconcile. At the same time, this world is permeated with Nomos, the assignment contained in the dispensation of ecstatic dwelling for the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there. Nomos is not merely something fabricated by human reason, but the directives which are capable of dispatching man into the ecstatic dwelling of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there (LETTER 262). Ethos means abode or dwelling place in the saying of Heraclitus. This abode, the open region in which man dwells, allows what pertains to man’s essence, and what in arriving resides in nearness to him, to appear (LETTER 256). Into this ecstatic dwelling of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there, gods sometimes come into presence as guests (LETTER 256-258). “Ethics,” in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ethos, would ponder the abode of man (LETTER 258). Only out of such dispatching man into the ecstatic dwelling of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there, supporting and obligation were engendered, thereby the original ethics was born (LETTER 258, 262). The original ethics is deemed to have been for assigning and guarding the ecstatic dwelling of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there. The ethics would ordain that the act of guarding, defending and securing the ecstatic dwelling of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there is ethical, while the act of damaging, spoiling and wrecking it is unethical. In other words, it is “humanism” that man makes utmost efforts to guard and secure the ecstatic dwelling of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there, i.e., the continuity and growth of a consanguine commune in the “world.” When the ecstatic dwelling of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there is guarded and secured in the “world” through confrontation and reconciliation, “healing” is to be achieved. If it is not guarded and secured, the raging appears, nihilating other ecstatic dwellings of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there, because Being itself (world or physis) is what is contested (LETTER 260-261). Being is not to be thought in the sense of absolute actuality as unconditioned will that wills itself and does so as the will of knowledge and of love. It has a will to power. Dasein in no way nihilates as a human subject who carries out nihilation in the sense of denial. Dasein nihilates a human inasmuch as it belongs to the essence of Being. Being nihilates-as Being (LETTER 261). Healing would be granted ascent into grace when the ecstatic dwelling of the existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there is guarded and secured, while raging would be compelled to malignancy when it is not. Thinking conducts the humanitas of homo humanus into the realm of the resurgence of healing (LETTER 260-261).
Heidegger’s logic in “An Introduction to Metaphysics” has been analyzed from the viewpoint of comparing it with the three pillars found in the ethical structure of the Kanun: the concept of a consanguine commune, the concept of continuity and growth of the consanguine commune and the concept of filial piety and loyalty to the consanguine commune. Our discourse on Heidegger’s logic indicates that his seemingly cryptic discourse on humans’ being has a structure similar to that of the three pillars. Previously, we referred to the mythological narrative of ultra-nationalism in prewar Japan as follows (YAMAMOTO 2008: 352-382).

The Consanguine Commune of the Japanese: Japan is the consanguine commune presided over by the Emperor. He is qualified to be the sovereign because he inherits the blood of the ancestors who grew out of the divine obscurity of the Universe. The Japanese belong to their consanguine commune, which has its own ancestors. If the Japanese ascend their family tree, their blood would join the blood of the imperial line. The Emperor accepts his ancestor as a guest-god at the Great Food Offering Ritual upon ascending the throne. He offers the guest-god food and hospitality. The guest-god utters blessings in return for the hospitality, which ensures Emperor’s divinity and the prosperity of his bloodline. The Emperor presides over the consanguine commune of the Japanese as the supreme priest with divine power.

The Continuity and Growth of the Consanguine Commune: Japan is an ethical commune because it is a consanguine commune which originated from the divine obscurity of the Universe. At the same time, it is the transcendental commune which comprises the dead, the living, and those yet to be born. The ethical and transcendental commune, originating from and comprised of the divine world, has the obligation to continue to exist in the world forever. The extinction of this consanguine commune is the highest violation of the divine law, tantamount to the denial of the ethics and order of the Universe.

Filial Piety and Loyalty: When the consanguine commune of the Japanese is in peril, its members are to stand up for its defense. If the consanguine commune has insoluble conflicts with another commune, it could thus annihilate the obstructing commune in order to secure its existence. Any act defending or improving the consanguine commune is ethical, while any act damaging or negating it is unethical. Its members swear an oath that they would remain loyal to the commune. If any member breaks the oath, he is to be expelled from the commune. The soul of the member who remains loyal and dies in battle for the commune could go to Heaven where it would mingle with the dead. The dead of the consanguine commune of the Japanese who dies in wars are worshiped as gods, and are soothed by the rituals performed by the supreme priest of the commune: the Emperor.

When we posit Heidegger’s logic alongside the mythological narrative of ultra-nationalism in prewar Japan, we cannot but notice their structural similarities, suggesting that Heidegger told of the three pillars in Being and Time, An Introduction to Metaphysics and other works, in another, his own language, which look sometimes cryptic and enigmatic. When we analyze his discourse with the ethical structure of the Kanun and the mythological narrative of ultra-nationalism in prewar Japan in mind, a fine vase of Heidegger’s logic, which can be called the original ethics (LETTER 258, SCHMIDT 2001: 225-270), will come into our view. He seems to have broken a fine vase of his logic into pieces and assigned them in a seemingly randomized, cryptic manner. Without the clue of the etheval structure of the Kanun and the mythological narrative of ultra-nationalism in prewar Japan, it seems difficult to put the pieces together into the original form of the vase, which then becomes viewable for the appreciation of its beauty. The fact that the ethical structure of the Kanun and the mythological narrative of ultra-nationalism in prewar Japan enable us to piece together the fragments into a fine vase, even if it may look peculiar, is a piece of the proof, which would make our discourse plausible.
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