Specification and Verification of Context-dependent Services

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Current approaches for the discovery, specification, and provision of services ignore the relationship between the service contract and the conditions in which the service can guarantee its contract. Moreover, they do not use formal methods for specifying services, contracts, and compositions. Without a formal basis it is not possible to justify through formal verification the correctness conditions for service compositions and the satisfaction of contractual obligations in service provisions. We remedy this situation in this paper. We present a formal definition of services with context-dependent contracts. We define a composition theory of services with context-dependent contracts taking into consideration functional, nonfunctional, legal and contextual information. Finally, we present a formal verification approach that transforms the formal specification of service composition into extended timed automata that can be verified using the model checking tool UPPAAL.

1 Introduction

In [12] and [11], we introduced a formal framework, called FrSeC, that supports the specification, publication, discovery, selection, composition and verification of services with context-dependent contracts. The work reported in this paper is founded on this framework. We provide a formal specification of services with context-dependent contracts and their compositions. The composition theory of services takes into consideration the functional, nonfunctional, legal, and contextual aspects of services. We also present a formal verification approach that transforms the formal specification of service composition into UPPAAL [2] timed automata in order to verify service properties using model checking.

Service-oriented Architecture (SOA) is an emerging view of the future of distributed computing and enterprise application development [4]. However, current approaches for the specification, publication, discovery, selection, and provision of services fall short in important respects. First, the relationship between the service contract and the conditions in which the service can guarantee its contract has been ignored, however these are necessary in order to associate the context of the service provider and the context of the service requester. Second, contextual information [3] is not well represented and not rigorously applied in service discovery and service provision. Third, current composition approaches compose only service functionality and ignore nonfunctional requirements. Thus, service contracts, and context information that are part of services are left out of the composition, and verification. Fourth and the last, the published approaches do not use formal methods for the specification of services, contracts, contextual representation and application, and service composition. Without a formal basis it is not possible to justify through formal verification the correctness conditions for service compositions and the satisfaction of contractual obligations in service provisions. The work reported in this paper eliminates these shortcomings.

The basic building unit for SOA-based applications is service. It is normally understood that service is an autonomous and platform-independent software program, having its own distinct functionality and a set of capabilities related to this functionality. These capabilities are usually invoked by external consumer programs and are usually expressed via a published service contract. A service contract
establishes the terms of engagement with the service, provides technical constraints and requirements, and provides any semantic information the service owner wishes to make public. We reckon that a Service Provider will package service functionality with non-functional attributes, service contract, and context. So, we decided to deal with ConfiguredServices, which are formalized in Section 2. A Service Provider may choose to compose ConfiguredServices. The composition mechanism itself may be driven by the business model of the Service Provider. Keeping this point of view, we discuss in Section 3 a formal composition theory of services (ConfiguredServices). Section 4 presents an approach to formally verify service properties in service compositions. In Section 5 we briefly, yet critically, compare our work with related work. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of ongoing work.

2 ConfiguredService Definition

Services are defined by service providers in a contract first approach. That is, the contract is defined before the implementation of service. The service provider determines all the possible contracts that this service should satisfy. Then, the service provider defines the ConfiguredServices that represents those contracts. After that, the service provider develops the ImplementedService that implements the different ConfiguredServices that provide the same functionality with different contracts and contexts. A ConfiguredService is to be published in Service Registry and made available for discovery and selection. A ConfiguredService is a package in which service functionality, service contract, and service provision context are bundled together. The Service Provider publishes the ConfiguredService elements. The published elements should be sufficient for the discovery and selection of this service. The essential elements that make this happen are contract and context, as shown in Figure 1. The contract will include function, nonfunctional properties and legal issues. Trustworthiness features are included in the nonfunctional part of the contract and legal issues include business rules and other trade laws within the context.

- **Function**: A ConfiguredService provides a single function. The function definition will include the function signature, result, preconditions and postconditions. The signature part defines the function identifier, the invocation address, and the parameters of the function. Each parameter has an identifier and a type. The result part defines the returned data of the service function.
The preconditions define the conditions that should be true before the function invocation. The postconditions define the conditions that are guaranteed to be true after the function invocation.

- **Nonfunctional properties**: A ConfiguredService definition includes nonfunctional properties that it can guarantee. These properties are to be chosen carefully so that they are verifiable, and encompass both quality and quantity aspects of service. Trustworthiness and Price are examples. Trust itself is further divided into ConfiguredService trust and provider trust. These are explained in detail in the next section. ConfiguredService trust defines the trustworthiness properties that are related to service provision. It includes the features safety, security, availability, and reliability [15]. Safety defines the critical conditions that are guaranteed to be true by Service Providers, such as timing conditions. Security is a composite of data integrity and confidentiality. Availability can be defined as the extent of readiness for providing correct services. Availability is specified as the maximum accepted time of repair until the service returns back to operate correctly. Reliability is the quality of continuing to provide correct services despite a failure. It is defined as the accepted mean time between failures. Provider trust defines the trustworthiness properties that are related to the Service Provider. It may include recommendations from other clients, and lowest prices guarantees. There is no agreed upon definition for Provider trust. The main issue here is the inclusion of verifiable information that makes a seller trusted.

- **Legal Issues**: One of the essential elements of the ConfiguredService contract is the set of legal rules that constrain the contract. Business rules, such as refund conditions, interest and administrative charges, and payment rules, form one part of legal issues. Another part is the set of trade laws enforced in the context of service request and delivery. Examples of the later kind are service requesters rights, privacy laws, and censor rules. In the literature [16], no distinction was made between legal rules and nonfunctional requirements. We reckon that a clear distinction should be made between legal rules and nonfunctional properties. In many situations, if a nonfunctional property is ‘a soft’ requirement it may be ignored, however ignoring a legal rule is equivalent to ‘legal violation’, which might land in legal disputes and even lead to loss of entire business. In essence, not enforcing a legal rule prevents the execution of a contract.

The context part of the ConfiguredService will include the main parts ConfiguredService context and context rules. The ConfiguredService context defines the contextual information of the ConfiguredService. Context is formally defined in [19] using dimensions and tags along the dimensions. We illustrate context specification using the three dimensions WHERE, WHEN and WHO. The dimension WHERE is associated with a location, which may be one or more of {Point, Region, Address, Route, URI, IP}. The dimension WHEN is associated with temporal information, such as time and date. The dimension WHO is associated with subject identities, such as the names of Service Providers and Service Requesters. We can also use WHO dimension to associate information from job roles. The context rules define the contextual information related to the Service Requester that should be true for the Service Provider to guarantee the contract associated with the ConfiguredService. Rules are defined as constraints in a subset of Timed Computation Tree Logic (TCTL), the logic used in UPPAAL. In practice, constraints can be expressed as simple logical expressions within the first order predicate logic (FOPL), a subset of TCTL.

**Example 1** This example introduces a simplified case study [1], restricted to emergency road assistance service scenarios for automobiles. A typical scenario is the breakdown of a car on a highway, which requests for road-side assistance. The car sends information to the nearest road assistance center, which in turn will use the information received to identify the repair shop, tow truck and car rental companies in that zone. In this example we identify three ConfiguredServices, whose detailed definitions are shown in Figure 2.
2.1 Formal Notation

We use a model-based approach to formally specify ConfiguredServices. The models are built from set theory and logic. The model is built incrementally, according to the template in Figure 1.

Definition of Constraints: A constraint is a logical expression, defined over data parameters and attributes. Any well-formed formula built by using standard logical operators, quantifiers, and temporal operators allowed in TCTL [2] is a valid constraint. If \( C \) denotes the set of all such logical expressions, \( X \in C \) is a constraint. The following notation is used in our definition:

- \( T \) denotes the set of all data types, including abstract data types.
- \( Dt \in T \) means \( Dt \) is a datatype.
- \( v : Dt \) denotes that \( v \) is either constant or variable of type \( Dt \).
- \( X_v \) is a constraint on \( v \). If \( v \) is a constant then \( X_v \) is true.
- \( V_q \) denotes the set of values of data type \( q \).
- \( x :: \Delta \) denotes a logical expression \( x \in C \) defined over the set of parameters \( \Delta \).

Definition of Parameters: A parameter is a 3-tuple, defining a data type, a variable of that type, and a constraint on the values assumed by the variable. We denote the set of data parameters as \( \Lambda = \{ \lambda = (Dt, v, X_v) | Dt \in T, v : Dt, X_v \in C \} \).

Definition of Attributes: An attribute has a name and type, and is used to define some semantic information associated with the name. As an example, each ConfiguredService can be given a version number, which is defined as an attribute. The set of attributes is \( \alpha = \{ (Dt, v \alpha) | Dt \in T, v \alpha : Dt \} \).

Definition of Context: A context is formalized as a 2-tuple \( \beta = (r, c) \), where \( r \in C \), built over the contextual information \( c \). Context information is formalized using the notation in [19]: Let \( \tau : DIM \rightarrow I \), where \( DIM = \{ X_1, X_2, ..., X_n \} \) is a finite set of dimensions and \( I = \{ a_1, a_2, ..., a_n \} \) is a set of types. The function \( \tau \) associates a dimension to a type. Let \( \tau(X_j) = a_i, a_i \in I \). We write \( c \) as an aggregation of ordered pairs \( (X_j, v_j) \), where \( X_j \in DIM \), and \( v_j \in \tau(X_j) \).

Definition of Contract: A contract is a 3-tuple \( \sigma = (f, \kappa, l) \), where the service function \( f \), the set of nonfunctional properties \( \kappa \) and the set \( l \) of legal issues that bind the service contract are defined below.

- Service Function: A service function is a 4-tuple \( f = (g, i, pr, po) \), where \( g \) is the function signature, \( i \) is the function result, \( pr \) is the precondition, and \( po \) is the postcondition. A signature is a
In general, the trust domain, in which a set of attributes, illustrates the application of the above formal notation to the ConfiguredService will enable us to calculate simple averages, maximum, and minimum of a set of trust values. Example 2 and re property is essential in order to compare trust values of groups and compute minimum (maximum) among others. Putting these definitions together we arrive at a formal definition for ConfiguredService. The precondition \( pr \) and postcondition \( po \) are data constraints. That is, \( pr = \{y | y :: z, z \subseteq \Lambda \} \) and \( po = \{y | y :: z, z \subseteq \Lambda \} \).

- **Nonfunctional Property:** A nonfunctional property of a ConfiguredService is a composite property, written as a 6-tuple \( \kappa = \langle \rho, \varepsilon, \psi, \eta, p, tr \rangle \), where \( \rho \) is the safety guarantee, \( \varepsilon \) is the security guarantee, \( \eta \) is the availability guarantee, \( \psi \) is the reliability guarantee, \( p \) is the service cost and \( tr \) is a measure of the provider trust. The safety guarantee includes time guarantee \( \rho_t \) and data guarantee \( \rho_d \). We assume that \( \varepsilon = \{x | x \in H \} \) defines the extent of security binding the service. The reliability guarantee refers to the guaranteed maximum time between failures, and is defined as \( \psi = \{x | x :: time \} \). The availability guarantee refers to the guaranteed maximum time for repairs, and is defined as \( \eta = \{x | x :: time \} \). The price is defined as a 3-tuple \( p = \langle a, cu, un \rangle \), where \( a = \{x | x :: N \} \) is the price amount defined as a natural number, \( cu = \{y | y :: cType \} \) is currency tied to a currency type \( cType \), and \( un = \{z | z :: uType \} \) is the unit for which pricing is valid. As an example, \( p = \{100, \$ \text{, hour} \} \) denotes the pricing of 100$/hour. Provider Trust is defined as a 3-tuple \( tr = \langle ce, pg, re \rangle \), where \( ce \) is recommendations from other clients, \( pg \) is lowest prices guarantees and \( re \) is recommendations from independent organizations. Lowest price guarantee is represented by a flag \( pg = \langle a | a :: \text{Boolean} \rangle \). It is a Boolean that is true when a ConfiguredService can guarantee its price to be lower than the price of any other ConfiguredService providing the same functionality. Client recommendations and recommendations from independent organizations can be defined as sets of ordered pairs. In \( ce = \{(a, b) | a :: \text{CLIENT}, b \in \{\text{Low, BelowAverage, Average, AboveAverage, High} \} \} \), a pair \( (a, b) \) represents a client \( a \) whose recommendation is \( b \). Likewise, in \( re = \{(a, b) | a :: \text{ORGANIZATION}, b \in \{\text{Low, BelowAverage, Average, AboveAverage, High} \} \} \), a pair \( (a, b) \) represents an organization \( a \) whose recommendation is \( b \).

- **Legal Issues:** A legal issue is a rule, expressed as a logical expression in \( \mathbb{C} \). A rule may imply another, however no two rules can conflict. We write \( l = \{y | y \in \mathbb{C} \} \) to represent the set of legal rules.

Putting these definitions together we arrive at a formal definition for ConfiguredService.

**Definition 1** A ConfiguredService is a 4-tuple \( s = \langle \Lambda, \alpha, \beta, \sigma \rangle \), where \( \Lambda \) is a set of parameters, \( \alpha \) is a set of attributes, \( \beta \) is a context, and \( \sigma \) is a contract.

We remark that not all components of \( \kappa \) may be relevant for a service, as shown in many later examples. In general, the trust domain, in which \( ce \) and \( pg \) are defined, must be a complete lattice \([20]\). This property is essential in order to compare trust values of groups and compute minimum (maximum) among trust values. For the sake of simplicity, we assume in further discussion that trust values assumed by \( ce \) and \( re \) are whole numbers in the range 1...5, where 1 denotes Low and 5 denotes High. This assumption will enable us to calculate simple averages, maximum, and minimum of a set of trust values. Example 2 illustrates the application of the above formal notation to the ConfiguredService defined in Example 1.
Example 2 Let \( rs \) denote the ConfiguredService for providing a Repair Shop who provides the services described in Figure 2. The formal notation of ConfiguredService \( rs \) is \( s_{rs} = \langle \alpha_{rs}, \beta_{rs}, \sigma_{rs} \rangle \), where the tuple components are explained below:

- **parameters**: \( \alpha_{rs} = \{(Car\text{\_}Broken, \text{\_}bool), (deposit, \text{\_}double), (\text{Car\_Type}, \text{\_}string), (\text{failure\_Type}, \text{\_}string), (\text{Has\_Appointment}, \text{\_}bool), (\text{number\_Of\_Hours}, \text{\_}int) \} \)
- **attributes**: \( \alpha_{rs} = \Phi \).
- **context**: \( \beta_{rs} = \{ r_{rs}, c_{rs} \} \), where \( r_{rs} = \{(\text{membership} == \text{ca\_a})\} \) is the context rule and \( c_{rs} = \{(\text{Location}, (\text{Montreal}, \text{Canada}))\} \) is the contextual information of the emergency road service provider.
- **contract**: \( \sigma_{rs} = (f_{rs}, \kappa_{rs}, l_{rs}) \), where the elements of the 3-tuple are defined below:
  1. **contract functionality specification**: \( f_{rs} = \langle g_{rs}, i_{rs}, p_{rs}, p_{or_{rs}} \rangle \)
    1.1 **function signature**: \( g_{rs} = \langle n_{rs}, d_{rs}, u_{rs} \rangle \), where
      \( n_{rs} = (\text{Reserve\_RS}) \) is the name, \( d_{rs} = \{(Car\text{\_}Broken, \text{\_}bool), (\text{deposit}, \text{\_}double), (\text{Car\_Type}, \text{\_}string), (\text{failure\_Type}, \text{\_}string) \} \) are the input data parameters, and \( u_{rs} = (XXX) \) is the address.
    1.2 **function result**: \( i_{rs} = \langle m_{rs}, q_{rs} \rangle \), where
      \( m_{rs} = (\text{Result\_RS}) \) is the name and the set of output data parameters is
      \( q_{rs} = \{(\text{Has\_Appointment}, \text{\_}bool), (\text{number\_Of\_Hours}, \text{\_}int) \} \)
    1.3 **function precondition**: \( p_{rs} = \{(\text{Car\_Broken} == \text{true})\} \)
    1.4 **function postcondition**: \( p_{or_{rs}} = \{(\text{Has\_Appointment} == \text{true})\} \)
  2. **contract nonfunctional property specification**: \( \kappa_{rs} = \langle p_{rs} \rangle \), \( p_{rs} = \langle a_{rs}, c_{rs}, u_{nr_{rs}} \rangle \), where
      \( a_{rs} = (60) \) is the cost, \( c_{rs} = (\text{dollar}) \) is the currency, and \( u_{nr_{rs}} = (\text{hour}) \) is the pricing unit.
  3. **contract legal issue specification**: \( l_{rs} = \{(\text{deposit} = 300), (\text{Car\_Type} == \text{toyota})\} \), where
      the deposit amount is 300 and the car type is toyota.

3 Service Composition

Although service composition has been considered before by some researchers [4][18] no specific method has been put forth. In FrSec a service composition may be attempted either at design-time or at execution-time. The former, called **static composition**, is driven by Service Provider’s business goals. The later, called **dynamic** service composition, is driven by user’s demands at service provision contexts. In this paper, we focus only on static service composition. We present a few composition constructs, give their semantics and suggest a verifiable composition theory.

3.1 Composition Constructs

Defining a composite service includes defining the execution logic of the participant services. This section, inspired by [21], defines the composition constructs and informally motivates their execution logics.

- **Sequential composition construct** \( \gg \): Given two ConfiguredServices \( A \) and \( B \), the expression \( A \gg B \) (Figure 3(a)) defines the sequential composition of \( A \) and \( B \). The execution logic of this composite service is that ConfiguredService \( A \) is executed first, and its output may be used in the execution of ConfiguredService \( B \), in addition to any input that \( B \) may require. In general, the expression \( A_1 \gg A_2 \ldots \gg A_k \) denotes the execution of ConfiguredService \( A_{i+1} \) with the result of execution of \( A_i \) as an input, for \( i = 1, \ldots, k-1 \), in addition to other input that \( A_{i+1} \) might need.
Figure 3: a) Sequential, b) Parallel, c) Priority d) No order, e) Nondeterministic, f) Conditional, and g) Iteration Constructs

- **Parallel composition construct** $\parallel$: Given two ConfiguredServices $A$ and $B$, the expression $A \parallel B$ (Figure 3(b)) defines the parallel composition of $A$ and $B$. The parallel composition $A \parallel B$ models the simultaneous executions of ConfiguredServices $A$ and $B$. In general, the evaluation of the expression $A_1 \parallel A_2 \parallel \ldots \parallel A_k$ will create $k$ service execution threads, one for each ConfiguredService. The result of this composite service is the merging of their individual results in time order. That is, the execution of the composite service finishes only when all service executions terminate.

- **Priority construct** $\prec$: Given two ConfiguredServices $A$ and $B$, the expression $A \prec B$ (Figure 3(c)) defines that the service execution of $A$ should be attempted first, and if it succeeds, the service $B$ is to be discarded; otherwise, the execution of service $B$ should be attempted. In general, the expression requires that the service executions be attempted deterministically in the order specified until the first successful execution of service. The meaning of the expression $A_1 \prec \ldots \prec A_k$ is that the service that can be successfully executed is the result of the composition.

- **Composition with no order** $\triangleright$: Given two ConfiguredServices $A$ and $B$, the expression $A \triangleright B$ (Figure 3(d)) defines that services $A$ and $B$ should be executed by the receiver, however the order of their executions is not important. The result of the composition is the set of results produced by the executions of the ConfiguredServices $A$ and $B$. In general, the expression $A_1 \triangleright A_2 \triangleright \ldots \triangleright A_k$ defines the composition of services $A_i$, $i = 1, k$ when all of them may be executed in no specific order.

- **Nondeterministic choice construct** $\wr$: Given two ConfiguredServices $A$ and $B$, the expression $A \wr B$ (Figure 3(e)) defines the composition in which one of the services is executed nondeterministically. In general, $A_1 \ldots \wr A_k$ denotes the execution of a nondeterministically chosen service from the $k$ operands. If the service $A_i$ is the nondeterministic choice, the result from the evaluation of the service $A_i$ is the result of evaluating the composition $A_1 \ldots \wr A_k$. In using this composition it is understood that any service $A_i$ can be chosen for the intended purpose.

- **Conditional choice construct (if-else)** $\triangleright$: Given two service expressions $E_1$ and $E_2$, the composition expression $E_1 \triangleright c E_2$ (Figure 3(f)) states that if condition $c$ evaluates to true then expression $E_1$ is to be chosen for execution, otherwise expression $E_2$ should be executed.

- **Iteration construct (while)** $\triangleright$: The composition $E \triangleright c$ (Figure 3(g)) states that the service expression $E$ should be executed as long as $c$ evaluates to true.

**Construct Binding** All constructs have the same precedence, and hence a composite service expression is evaluated from left to right. To enforce a particular order of evaluations, parenthesis may be used.
Example 3 The execution logic of the composite service \((A \triangleright c_1 B) \triangleright (C || D) \triangleright F_{0,2}\), shown in Figure 4 is obtained by putting together the execution logics from Figure 3.

![Figure 4: Execution logic of \((A \triangleright c_1 B) \triangleright (C || D) \triangleright F_{0,2}\)](image)

3.2 Semantics of ConfiguredService Compositions

Every Service Provider has a business model. Motivated by the business rules and logic in the model, a Service Provider will determine the nature of composition for services. We want to emphasize that the meaning of a composition primarily rests on the chosen business goals and rules. Consequently, service compositions are very much unlike action compositions based purely on preconditions and postconditions. As an example, a Service Provider may form \(A \triangleright B\) because service \(B\) can be provided only after service \(A\) has been provided. That is, service \(B\) cannot be realized without first executing service \(A\). This is analogous to ‘bootstrapping’ before invoking any other system function in the domain of computing services. This implies that the precondition for invoking a system function includes the precondition for invoking ‘bootstrapping’, however it might require more conditions to be met. Moreover, the postcondition of ‘bootstrapping’ and the postcondition of the system function invoked after that are both observed. In some domains, it might happen that the precondition for invoking service \(B\) is exactly the same as the postcondition of the first service \(A\), and is not observable. Only the postcondition of \(B\), after \(B\) is completed, may be observable. Given such subtle scenarios, it is hard to give one ‘fixed’ semantics for service compositions. Below we give the semantics for sequential composition. An account of the full semantics can be found in [10]. The proposed semantics is appropriate for one kind of business logic, and our approach can be used to provide semantics for different business logics. By providing an approach to formal semantics for composition constructs we are motivating how a theory of composition can be developed.

Below we let \(A = \langle \Lambda_A, \alpha_A, \beta_A, \sigma_A \rangle\), and \(B = \langle \Lambda_B, \alpha_B, \beta_B, \sigma_B \rangle\) denote two ConfiguredServices, where \(\beta_A = \langle r_A, c_A \rangle, \beta_B = \langle r_B, c_B \rangle, \sigma_A = \langle f_A, \kappa_A, i_A \rangle, \sigma_B = \langle f_B, \kappa_B, i_B \rangle, f_A = \langle g_A, i_A, pr_A, po_A \rangle, f_B = \langle g_B, i_B, pr_B, po_B \rangle\), \(g_A = \langle n_A, d_A, u_A \rangle, g_B = \langle n_B, d_B, u_B \rangle, i_A = \langle m_A, q_A \rangle, i_B = \langle m_B, q_B \rangle\), \(\kappa_A = \langle \rho_A, \epsilon_A, \psi_A, \eta_A, p_A, tr_A \rangle\), and \(\kappa_B = \langle \rho_B, \epsilon_B, \psi_B, \eta_B, p_B, tr_B \rangle\). For the sake of simplicity we assume that the currency type \(cType\) and the unit type \(uType\) are the same for all services.

3.2.1 Sequential composition \(A \triangleright B\)

The sequential composition of the ConfiguredServices \(A\) and \(B\) is the tuple \(\langle \Lambda_A \triangleright B, \alpha_A \triangleright B, \beta_A \triangleright B, \sigma_A \triangleright B \rangle\), whose components are defined below.

- **Parameters**: \(\Lambda_A \triangleright B\)
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Input parameters: \( \Lambda_{\text{input}(A \gg B)} = \Lambda_{\text{input}(A)} \cup (\Lambda_{\text{input}(B)} \setminus \Lambda_{\text{output}(A)}) \), defined as the union of the input parameters of \( A \), and input parameters of \( B \) that are not output parameters of \( A \).

Output parameters: \( \Lambda_{\text{output}(A \gg B)} = \Lambda_{\text{output}(A)} \cup \Lambda_{\text{output}(B)} \), defined as the union of the output parameters of \( A \) and \( B \).

- **Attributes:** \( \alpha_{A \gg B} = \alpha_A \cup \alpha_B \)

- **Context:** For ConfiguredServices \( A \) the context is \( \beta_A = \langle r_A, c_A \rangle \). This means that \( r_A \) is true in context \( c_A \) in order that \( A \) may be provided. Once the service \( A \) has been provided, the context and rules that are true in that context should be computed. Letting these rules \( r_A' \) and the context \( c_A' \), we need to merge them with \( r_B \) and \( c_B \), \( \beta_B = \langle r_B, c_B \rangle \) to arrive at \( \beta_{A \gg B} \). With this rationale, we define \( \beta_{A \gg B} = \langle r_{A \gg B}, c_{A \gg B} \rangle \), \( r_{A \gg B} = r_A' \cup r_B \), and \( c_{A \gg B} = c_A' \cup c_B \), the smallest closure of contexts \( c_A' \) and \( c_B \). It is expected that \( c_A' \supseteq c_B \) holds for most of the applications, because anything outside of \( c_B \) can be ignored. The semantics of context union (\( \bigcup \)) and sub-context (\( \subseteq \)) and a detailed discussion of context calculus can be found in [19].

- **Contract:** \( \sigma_{A \gg B} = \langle f_{A \gg B}, \kappa_{A \gg B}, l_{A \gg B} \rangle \), where

  1. **function:** \( f_{A \gg B} = \langle g_{A \gg B}, i_{A \gg B}, pr_{A \gg B}, po_{A \gg B} \rangle, g_{A \gg B} = \langle n_{A \gg B}, d_{A \gg B}, u_{A \gg B} \rangle, i_{A \gg B} = \langle m_{A \gg B}, q_{A \gg B} \rangle \),

     \[
     \begin{align*}
     g_{A \gg B} &: \quad n_{A \gg B} = n_A \cup n_B \\
     d_{A \gg B} &= d_A \cup d_B \quad \text{combine input data parameters} \\
     u_{A \gg B} &= \{u_A, u_B\} \quad \text{both function addresses are necessary}
     \end{align*}
     \]

     \[
     \begin{align*}
     i_{A \gg B} &: \quad m_{A \gg B} = m_A \cup m_B \\
     q_{A \gg B} &= q_A \cup q_B \quad \text{combine output parameters}
     \end{align*}
     \]

     \[
     \begin{align*}
     pr_{A \gg B} &= pr_A \cup (pr_B \setminus po_A) \quad \text{if } B \text{ requires more constraints} \\
     po_{A \gg B} &= po_A \cup po_B \quad \text{if } po_A \text{ is observable} \]

     \[
     \begin{align*}
     po_{A \gg B} &= po_B \quad \text{if } po_A \text{ is not observable}
     \end{align*}
     \]

  2. **Nonfunctional Properties:** \( \kappa_{A \gg B} = \langle \rho_{A \gg B}, \epsilon_{A \gg B}, \psi_{A \gg B}, \eta_{A \gg B}, p_{A \gg B}, tr_{A \gg B} \rangle \), where,

     - Safety (timeliness): \( \rho_{A \gg B} = \rho_A + \rho_B \).
     - Safety (data): \( \rho_{A \gg B} = \rho_A \cup \rho_B \).
     - Security: \( \epsilon_{A \gg B} = \epsilon_A \cup \epsilon_B \).
     - Availability: \( \eta_{A \gg B} = \eta_A + \eta_B \).
     - Reliability: \( \psi_{A \gg B} = \text{Min}(\psi_A, \psi_B) \).
     - Price: \( p_{A \gg B} = \langle a_{A \gg B}, cu_{A \gg B}, un_{A \gg B} \rangle \), where \( cu_{A \gg B} = cu_A = cu_B, un_{A \gg B} = un_A = un_B \), and

       \[
       a_{A \gg B} = \begin{cases} 
       a_A + a_B & \text{normal pricing} \\
       \max\{a_A, a_B\} & \text{promotional} \\
       \min\{a_A, a_B\} & \text{special sale}
       \end{cases}
       \]

     - Provider Trust: Let \( tr_{A \gg B} = \langle ce_{A \gg B}, pg_{A \gg B}, re_{A \gg B} \rangle \). Given a set \( s_t \) of trust values, it should be possible to define \( \text{avg}(s_t) \), \( \text{choose}(s_t) \), \( \text{glb}(s_t) \), and \( \text{lub}(s_t) \) which respectively computes the average, selects randomly one value, and computes the least and greatest values from the set \( s_t \). Any one of these functions may be used by the Service Provider in
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ConfiguredService rs (repair shop) and tt (tow truck) are defined in Example 1. The formal notation of composite services.

The sequential composition rule is applied to compute rs

Example 4

• The function signature is \( g_{rs} \Rightarrow tt = (n_{rs} \Rightarrow tt, d_{rs} \Rightarrow tt, u_{rs} \Rightarrow tt) \), where the name is \( n_{rs} \Rightarrow tt = (ReserveRS&TT) \), the address is \( u_{rs} \Rightarrow tt = (XXXYYY) \) and the input parameters are \( d_{rs} \Rightarrow tt = \{(Car\text{Broken}, bool), (deposit, double), (CarType, string), (failureType, string), (Request\text{Truck}, bool)\} \).
A service composition consists of multiple interacting ConfiguredServices that provide a functionality to meet a specific set of requirements. It is essential to verify that the functional behavior of the service composition meets the requirements of the service requesters while taking into consideration the nonfunctional, legal and contextual conditions. Instead of defining a new verification tool to verify the service composition we follow a transformation approach. In this approach, a formally defined service composition can be automatically transformed into a model understood by an available verification tool that can then be used to perform the formal verification. The goal in our research is to use different verification tools in order to verify a wide range of properties and target different kinds of systems. This is because different verification tools differ in their requirements and abilities. In this paper, we define the transformation rules to generate a model that can be verified using UPPAAL [2] model checking tool.

A full account of UPPAAL language and tool can be found in [2]. In essence, UPPAAL extends the definition of timed automata (TA) with additional features. The features that are relevant to this paper are (1) **Templates** that represent TAs with optional parameters and local variables; (2) **Global variables and user defined functions**, that are introduced in a global declaration section, and shared by all templates; (3) **Binary synchronization** that forces two TAs to have a synchronized transition caused by an event; (4) **Channel** that models an input event (labeled with ?) or an output event (labeled with !) in a synchronous transition; (5) **Committed Location** that models a state where time is not allowed to pass, and allowed to have an outgoing edge; (6) **Expressions** that include guard expressions involving variables and clock variables to restrict transitions, assignment expressions, which are used to set values of clocks and variables, and invariant expressions, which are defined at locations to specify conditions that should be always true; and (7) **Edges** denoting transitions between locations. An edge specification consists of the four expressions 1) Select, which assigns a value from a given range to a defined variable, 2) Guard, an edge is enabled for a location if and only if the guard is evaluated to true, 3) Synchronization, which specifies the synchronization channel and its direction for an edge, and 4) Update, an assignment statement that resets variables and clocks to required values. UPPAAL can check safety, reachability, and liveness properties that are expressed in TCTL [3].

### 4.1 Transforming the Service Composition into UPPAAL TA

This section presents the rules for transforming a service composition into a UPPAAL TA. Let \( S = \{s_1, \ldots, s_n\} \) be the set of ConfiguredServices to be composed. Let \( \Upsilon \) be the execution flow defining the composition, and \( SC = (S, \Upsilon, \Lambda, \alpha, \beta, \sigma) \) be the resulting composition. Let \( TA = (L, L_0, K, A, E, I) \) be the...
definition of a UPPAAL TA, where \( L \) is a set of locations denoting the states, \( L_0 \) is the initial state, \( K \) is a set of clocks, \( A \) is a set of actions that cause transitions between locations, \( E \) is a set of edges, and \( I \) is a set of invariants. The transformation rules will construct \( T = \{ ta_1, ..., ta_n \} \), a set of UPPAAL templates. The first step is to define the following in the global declaration section in UPPAAL.

1. Two channel variables are defined for each \( s_i \). The first represents the request and the second represents the response.
2. A Boolean variable is defined for every precondition and input parameter in \( SC \) and assigned to \( true \). These variables are used to verify if preconditions and input parameters exist before execution.
3. A Boolean variable is defined for every postcondition and output parameter in \( SC \) and assigned to \( false \). These variables are used to verify if postconditions and output parameters exist after execution.
4. A typed variable is defined for every parameter in \( SC \). The type can be any simple type, such as \( int \), or a structured data type.
5. The following variables of type \( double \) are defined and assigned to 0 for each composition flow:
   - \( PathPrice \), which represents the total price of the composition flow.
   - \( PathAvailability \), which represents the availability of the composition flow.
   - \( PathReliability \), which represents the reliability of the composition flow.
   - \( PathTime \), which represents the safety time guarantee of the composition flow.
6. Boolean variables representing the elements of the legal issues are defined. These variables are used in defining the Legal issues as Boolean statements.
7. A UPPAAL structure that represents the contextual information of the service requester is defined. The structure contains dimensions and associated tag values.

4.1.1 Transformation Rules

The transformation rules are divided into two sets. The first set defines the rules to transform an individual \( ConfiguredService \) into a TA. The second set defines the rules to transform the composition flow into a TA. Each \( ConfiguredService \) can be mapped to a UPPAAL template in a one to one manner. A \( ConfiguredService \) \( s_i = \langle \Lambda_i, \alpha_i, \beta_i, \sigma_i \rangle \) is mapped to a template \( ta_i = \langle L_i, L_{0i}, K_i, A_i, E_i, I_i \rangle \). Following are the transformation rules to generate \( ta_i \) for each \( s_i \).

1. For each \( ta_i \), create two locations \( L_i = \{ l_1, l_2 \} \), and set the first location as the initial state \( L_{0i} = \{ l_1 \} \).
2. Create two edges in \( E_i = \{ e_1, e_2 \} \) in \( ta_i \), with edge \( e_1 \) directed from \( l_1 \) to \( l_2 \) and edge \( e_2 \) directed from \( l_2 \) to \( l_1 \).
3. Define an action for each \( s_i \) and add it to \( A_i \).
4. Add to edge \( e_1 \) the following expressions:
   (a) Add to guard the condition that all \( s_i \) preconditions are equal to true.
   (b) Add to guard the condition that all \( s_i \) input parameters are available.
   (c) Add to guard the condition that the \( s_i \) contextual rules are satisfied.
   (d) Add to guard the condition that the \( s_i \) legal rules are satisfied.
   (e) Add to Sync the channel variable corresponding to \( s_i \) request and follow it with ?.
5. Add to edge $e_2$ the following expressions:
   (a) Add to update the statement that assign all $s_i$ postconditions variables to true.
   (b) Add to update the statement that assign all $s_i$ output parameters variable to true.
   (c) Add to Sync the channel variable corresponding to $s_i$ responses and follow it with !.

The steps described above generates a TA for each ConfiguredService. The next step is to generate the main TA that maps to the composition execution flow. Before generating this TA, the composition flow should be flattened to contain only sequential composition construct $\gg$. In essence, every composition flow can be flattened into a set of sequential composition flows of ConfiguredServices [10].

**Example 5** The composition $(A\bowtie_{c_1} B) \gg (C||D) \gg F_{c_2}$ defined in Example 3 can be flattened into 8 composition flows, where $X_c$ indicates that $X$ is associated with condition $c$. These are: (1) $A_{c_1} \gg C \gg D$, (2) $A_{c_1} \gg C \gg D \gg F_{c_2}$... $\gg F_{c_2}$, (3) $A_{c_1} \gg D \gg C \gg F_{c_2}$... $\gg F_{c_2}$, (4) $B_{\neg c_1} \gg C \gg D$, (5) $B_{\neg c_1} \gg C \gg D \gg F_{c_2}$... $\gg F_{c_2}$, (6) $A_{c_1} \gg D \gg C$, and (7) $B_{\neg c_1} \gg D \gg C \gg F_{c_2}$... $\gg F_{c_2}$.

The main TA will contain an idle state. For each flattened composition flow, a path of states is created in the main TA starting from this idle state according to the following rules.

1. For each ConfiguredService create two states. The first represents the request for the ConfiguredService and the second represents the completion of the execution.
2. For each ConfiguredService, if it contains a safety time constraint, create a new clock and add the timing constraint as an invariant on the location. Exception: if the sequential construct resulted from parallel flattening $X \gg Y$, only add the invariant to the state with the highest time constraint of $X$ and $Y$, and make the other state a committed state.
3. For each ConfiguredService create two edges. The first connects the state representing the previous ConfiguredService in the flow, except for the first ConfiguredService where it connect idle state, to the first state defined in rule 1. The second connects the first state to the second state of rule 1.
4. If the ConfiguredService is associated with a condition (conditional choice or iteration condition), add this condition as a guard statement on the first edge of rule 3.
5. If the ConfiguredService has a safety data conditions, add this condition as a guard statement on the first edge of rule 3.
6. If the ConfiguredService has a price, add to the second edge of rule 3 an update statement that adds the price to the path price variable.
7. If the ConfiguredService has an availability nonfunctional property, add to the second edge of rule 3 an update statement that adds the availability to the path availability variable.
8. If the ConfiguredService has a reliability nonfunctional property, add to the second edge of rule 3 an update statement that adds the reliability to the path reliability variable. Exception: if the sequential construct resulted from parallel flattening, the update statement is only added to the edge with the highest reliability time.

A reasoned justification for the transformation steps is given in [10].

### 4.2 Verification

Using UPPAAL editor, the ConfiguredServices and their composition are specified as UPPAAL templates following the automatic transformation rules defined in Section 4.1. UPPAAL verifier can be used to verify the following properties.
• **Context:** The context rules are not contradictory, and are met for each `ConfiguredService`.

• **Functionality:** The behavior of the composition is correct with respect to functionality, which includes verifying.
  – The preconditions of each participating `ConfiguredService` are met before invocation.
  – The input parameters of each participating `ConfiguredService` are available before invocation.
  – The composition generates the required postconditions and output parameters.

• **Nonfunctional and trustworthiness properties:** The behavior of the composition is correct with respect to nonfunctional properties, which includes verifying.
  – The composition price is greater than or equal the price of any possible execution flow.
  – The composition safety time constraint is greater than or equal the time constraint of any possible execution flow.
  – The composition availability time is greater than or equal to the availability time of any possible execution flow.
  – The composition reliability time is greater than or equal to the reliability time of any possible execution flow.

• **Legal issues:** The legal rules are not contradictory, and are met for each `ConfiguredService`.

**Example 6** Applying the transformation rules defined above to the service composition `RepairShop ≫ TowTruck ≫ CarRental` introduced in Example 7, the composition is transformed into 4 TA’s mapped to 4 UPPAAL templates, a template for each `ConfiguredService` and a template for the composition flow. The TA mapped to the `ConfiguredService` `RepairShop` is `trsp = ⟨Lrs, L0rs, Krs, Ars, Ers, Is⟩`, as seen in Figure 5(a), where the tuple components are explained below:

- The set of locations is `Lrs = {idle, RepairShopProcessing}` and the initial location is `L0rs = idle`.
- The set of clocks is `krs = Φ` and the set of invariants is `Irs = Φ`.
- The set of actions is `Ars = {ScheduleApt, AptConfirmed}`.
- The set of edges is `Ers = {(idle – RepairShopProcessing), (RepairShopProcessing – idle)}`.
- The edge connecting 'idle' to 'RepairShopProcessing' has the following statements, where 'parameterB' indicates the variable indicating the availability of the parameter 'parameter':
  – Guard: `(RequesterContext.membership==1)&&(CarBroken==true)&&(carType==toyota)&&(carTypeB)&&(failureTypeB).
  – Synchronous: ScheduleApt?.

The edge connecting `RepairShopProcessing` to `idle` has the following statements:

- Update: `HasAppointment=true, NumOfDaysB=true, Deposit=Deposit +300`.
- Synchronous: AptConfirmed!.

The TAs mapped to the `ConfiguredServices` `TowTruck` and `CarRental` are created in the same manner. Figure 6 shows the generated main TA. UPPAAL is used to verify several properties listed below. The notations `M.i` and `M.Final_1` are used to denote the initial and final states of the TA `M`.

- The composition does not contain any contradiction and can be executed. If the UPPAAL statement `E<> M.Final_1` is verified it implies that it is possible to reach the final state of the composition flow. Reaching the final state indicates that all conditions are met and no contradictions exist.
The context rules are met. For each context rule an UPPAAL verification condition is generated and verified. For example, $A[i] M. i \implies \text{RequesterContext}.age \geq 21$ is the condition to be verified to assert that the requester is older than 21. Here, RequesterContext is the UPPAAL structure holding the contextual information of the service requester.

The composition input parameters are defined before executing the composition flow. For example, $A[i] M. i \implies \text{failureTypeB}$ is the condition to be verified in order to assert that the car failureType parameter is available before execution. Here, failureTypeB is a Boolean variable representing the availability of the parameter failureType.

The composition output parameters are defined after executing the composition flow. For example, $A[i] M. i \implies \neg \text{NumOfDaysB}$ is the condition to be verified in order to assert that the number of days needed to fix the car are not known before executing the composition. The statement $A[i] M. i \implies \neg \text{NumOfDaysB}$, if verified, asserts that the number of days is known after executing the composition. The parameter NumOfDaysB is a Boolean variable representing the availability of the parameter NumOfDays.

The preconditions are met before executing the composition and the postconditions are met after. For example, $A[i] M. i \implies \text{NeedCar} == \text{true}$ will have to be verified to assert that the precondition “NeedCar” is true at the initial state.

The composition of nonfunctional properties are correct. For example, $A[i] M. \text{Final}_1 \implies \text{firstPathPrice} \leq 600$ will have to be verified to assert that the price of the composite service is less than 600, where 600 is specified as the price of the service composition.

The composition result of the legal rules are correct. For example, $A[i] M. \text{Final}_1 \implies 400 \geq \text{Deposit}$ will have to be verified to assert that the deposit is less than 400, if the legal rule
states that “The service requester should deposit 400 before requesting the service composition”.

5 Related Work

Many researchers, such as [7], [5], [9], [6] and [17], have investigated the formal models automata, Petri-net and process algebra as service models and used a transformation approach to arrive at the formal models from service descriptions in one of the languages BPEL [14], WS-CDL [22] or Orc [13]. However, these formal languages can model only the functional behavior of services. Hence, the transformation approaches practiced so far are restricted to only the functionality in composite services, while the nonfunctional, legal and contextual constraints are ignored. As a consequence, the known verification processes cannot be applied to construct composite services in our model. The merit of our work is twofold. One is the introduction of a variety of compositions which can be tailored to the semantics of a business logic, and the other is the ability to combine functional and nonfunctional behavior together with legal and contextual constraints in model checking.

6 Conclusion

Our research aims to define a formal framework for managing and providing service with context-depended contracts. As part of this framework, in this paper we have presented an approach for the formal specification and verification of services with context-dependent contract. We presented a formal definition and a formal composition theory of ConfiguredServices. Finally, we presented a formal transformation approach to transform service composition into extended timed automata that can be verified using UPPAAL tool. Currently, we are working on defining a dynamic composition approach that automates the service composition process at execution-time. We are also investigating dynamic reconfiguration issues arising out of defaults and dynamic compositions of services. Finally, we are currently developing a set of tools that automate the composition and verification process.

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