Hierarchical competitions subserving multi-attribute choice

Laurence T Hunt¹,², Raymond J Dolan¹ & Timothy E J Behrens¹,³

Valuation is a key tenet of decision neuroscience, where it is generally assumed that different attributes of competing options are assimilated into unitary values. Such values are central to current neural models of choice. By contrast, psychological studies emphasize complex interactions between choice and valuation. Principles of neuronal selection also suggest that competitive inhibition may occur in early valuation stages, before option selection. We found that behavior in multi-attribute choice is best explained by a model involving competition at multiple levels of representation. This hierarchical model also explains neural signals in human brain regions previously linked to valuation, including striatum, parietal and prefrontal cortex, where activity represents within-attribute competition, competition between attributes and option selection. This multi-layered inhibition framework challenges the assumption that option values are computed before choice. Instead, our results suggest a canonical competition mechanism throughout all stages of a processing hierarchy, not simply at a final choice stage.

When choosing between different options, it is often the case that one alternative is preferable on one set of attributes, but another is preferred on others. Such trade-offs are ubiquitous in decisions affecting consumers¹, foraging animals², social interactions³ and economic choice⁴. Although key aspects of multi-attribute choice behavior have been well characterized, their neural basis has not yet been systematically examined. This question is important not only in relation to the ecological validity of such decisions, but also because of the constraints they place on the implementation of choice in neural circuits.

When faced with such choices, human subjects dynamically construct their preferences online as opposed to merely revealing them¹. A common assumption in neurobiological studies of reward-guided choice is that preference construction depends first on combining attributes in each option into an integrated value, followed by a process involving value comparison⁵–¹⁰. This ‘integrate-then-compare’ strategy, a classic solution to the decision problem in the behavioral literature, holds the appeal of a normative approach to choice, albeit a computationally expensive one¹². Some expressions of choice behavior indicate that subjects do indeed integrate different features of an option to form a unitary value¹³.

However, anomalies in human decision-making indicate that this normative explanation cannot fully account for subjects’ choice behavior by itself. For instance, behavioral economic studies have highlighted preference reversals between two options when a third option is introduced. As this is critically dependent on the degree of similarity between alternatives on specific attributes, this raises the likelihood of a within-attribute comparison process¹⁴. Studies of information gathering during multi-attribute choice, containing multiple options and multiple features, have also suggested that evidence is acquired within-attribute, at least initially¹⁵. Such behavior is explained by several alternative accounts, and these depend on different combinations of within-attribute and within-option comparisons¹⁶–¹⁹.

The neural substrate of these alternative decision strategies remains unexplored, but is of great interest given that it violates the most common assumption in neural studies of decision-making—that values are integrated and then compared, or even that values are computed before choice. One obstacle to exploring this conundrum has been the difficulty of designing tasks in which there is transparent behavioral evidence for within-attribute comparison²⁰. In addition, there is a lack of a candidate neural mechanism by which this type of decision might be implemented.

Here we provide evidence that preference construction in multi-attribute choice may occur via a hierarchical competition process¹⁷–¹⁹. Such a model argues that because competition via mutual inhibition is a canonical feature of local neural circuits²¹, it should occur at all levels of representation. In this scheme, comparison would still occur at the level of option values⁵–¹⁰, but it also has additional features of comparison occurring at the level of the component attributes, as well as at the level of which attribute is most salient for guiding choice.

To test this mechanism, we combined behavioral analysis, functional imaging data and computational modeling in a novel multi-attribute choice task. Subjects were explicitly instructed to equally weight two different attributes in guiding choice. Crucially, the task was designed such that within-attribute comparisons might emerge naturally, even in a relatively simple (and experimentally tractable) three-option, two-attribute decision. Using this task, we found clear behavioral evidence for a within-attribute comparison strategy. Notably, on each trial, one or another of the attributes was more salient (relevant) for guiding behavior, allowing us to investigate how competition for attribute salience is implemented neurally. Our key findings, based on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data, were that intraparietal...
sulcus (IPS) signaled a competition over which attribute was the most salient for the current decision, whereas portions of medial frontal cortex reflected an ‘integrated’ value signal. Consistent with this functional architecture, IPS altered its functional connectivity with regions subserving lower level (within attribute) comparisons as a function of which attribute was currently most relevant for guiding behavior. Our results provide evidence for a canonical inhibitory competition mechanism that is general throughout all layers of a stimulus processing hierarchy and not simply present at a final choice stage.

RESULTS

A multi-attribute reward-guided decision task

We used a multi-attribute choice task, which forms the basis for our modeling and behavioral results. Subjects were trained on the relative likelihood of receiving a reward on a set of eight different images (not tied to any spatial location, hereafter referred to as stimuli; Fig. 1a) and a set of eight different button presses (tied to spatial locations onscreen, hereafter referred to as actions; Fig. 1b). Subjects learned action-reward probabilities (pA) and stimulus-reward probabilities (pS) separately from one another by performing pairwise choices between two randomly selected alternatives from each set. If they chose the better of the two options, they received positive feedback (a smiley face), and if they chose the worse, they received negative feedback (a sad face). Subjects received interleaved blocks of stimulus and action trials across a training session that lasted approximately 45 min, until they attained a preordained performance criterion.

Following training, subjects underwent fMRI scanning while performing a monetary reward task in which three stimuli were pseudorandomly paired with three actions (Fig. 1c). Subjects were instructed to apportion equal weight to each of the two sources of information so as to select the best option. Rewards were determined probabilistically, based on pO, a Bayesian combination of probabilistic information from the stimulus (pS) and action (pA) (Fig. 1d and Online Methods). The logic behind this rule for combining the pre-learned probabilities is straightforward; for example, two cues that both predict reward with probability of 0.5 combine to produce a net reward probability of 0.5, as would one cue with 0.8 probability combined with another cue with 0.2 probability. It also meant that the information provided by each of the two attributes was balanced; both stimulus and action provided equally relevant probabilistic information about reward likelihood. We adopted such an approach to avoid problems arising from subjects being biased to use each attribute differentially. The effectiveness of our approach was revealed in behavioral evidence that subjects were not (on average) biased toward using either stimulus or action attribute (Supplementary Fig. 1).

Subjects successfully deployed information learned in the initial phase of the experiment to guide their decisions inside the scanner. Based on the Bayesian integrated values (pO), subjects chose the best option on 79.0 ± 3.8% (mean ± s.d) of all trials. On more challenging ‘conflict’ trials, in which the best stimulus favored one option, but the best action favored a different option, this figure fell to 70.9 ± 4.6%. On 89.6 ± 4.8% of all of these more challenging trials, subjects selected

Figure 1 Experimental task design. (a) Outside of the scanner, subjects learned reward probabilities (pS) associated with eight stimuli via pairwise choices between stimuli. Subjects trained to reach a minimum performance criterion of 90% correct (choosing higher valued stimulus). (b) Subjects also learned reward probabilities (pA) associated with eight actions (finger presses) via pairwise choices between actions (dark gray squares indicate currently available actions; each action was tied to an onscreen spatial location). Subjects were trained to same criteria as for stimuli. Stimulus and action training was alternated in blocks of at least 70 trials, with an additional 40 trial refresher block immediately before the fMRI experiment. (c) Inside of the scanner, subjects performed a three-option choice task in which each option comprised one previously learned stimulus and one previously learned action. Subjects were instructed to weight stimulus and action information equally on each trial and select the best option to obtain points that subsequently converted into monetary reward (Online Methods). Reward was delivered probabilistically according to pO, the optimal combination of pS and pA (equation (1)), for the chosen option. (d) Two example trials. In trial 1, options A and B are of equal (integrated) value. The action attribute favors option A and so would be deemed relevant if A were chosen, and stimulus deemed irrelevant. The converse would be true if option B were chosen. Were option C chosen, the trial would be discarded from fMRI analysis. In trial 2, action would be deemed relevant if A were chosen, whereas stimulus would be deemed relevant if C were chosen. (e) Choice behavior. On trials where stimulus and action favor different options, the probability of choosing the option favored by the stimulus attribute (ordinate) is plotted as a function of the difference in probabilities on the two dimensions (abscissa). Data are presented as mean ± s.e.m. across 19 subjects.
either the best pS or the best pA. However, there was a relatively high proportion of challenging trials (22.6 ± 3.8%) in which subjects went with a high pS or pA when it was not the highest pO. Such choices accounted for the majority (78.2 ± 10.3%) of errors on challenging trials. Moreover, a substantial portion of these errors (42.2 ± 15.6%) were those in which the best individual attribute on the chosen option exceeded or was equal to the best attribute available on the best option. There were few trials (~5 per subject) in which the highest pO was neither the best pS nor the best pA.

A further simple measure of subjects’ behavior is shown in Figure 1e. This measure focuses on the challenging conflict trials, showing the probability of using the stimulus attribute to guide behavior (that is, choosing the best stimulus) as a function of the within-attribute differences on stimulus and action attributes. When the within-attribute difference is much greater on the stimulus attribute than the action attribute, subjects became far more likely to select on the basis of the largest stimulus, and vice versa. In addition, because the point of subjective equivalence (P = 0.5) occurs when within-attribute differences are equal, this shows that subjects did not have any bias (on average) towards using one attribute over the other.

Hierarchical competition for multi-attribute choice
How might subjects solve such a task? The classical idea is that once the two attributes are integrated to form a unitary value (for example, by calculating pO for each option), the option values will then be compared with one another. One common model for comparison assumes a ‘softmax’ choice rule, in which the probability of choosing an option is a function of its value relative to other alternatives. To also capture subjects’ reaction times (RTs), comparison may be modeled as a dynamic process in which evidence is accumulated through time. There are several closely interrelated dynamical models17–19,21,22. One class assumes leaky, competing accumulators for each option that receive value-related inputs and compete via inhibition18,21.

Notably, softmax choice models and evidence accumulator models make firm predictions as to which factors should influence choices and RTs in multi-alternative and multi-attribute decisions. First, in the softmax choice rule, the relative frequency of choosing option 1 (p(C = 1)) over option 2 (p(C = 2)) is independent of any remaining values in the decision; that is, the integrated value of option 3 (pO3) does not affect the ratio of choosing between options 1 and 2

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p(C = 1) = \frac{e^{pO_1}}{e^{pO_1} + e^{pO_2} + e^{pO_3}}
\]

The softmax temperature parameter is omitted for clarity. Second, predictions of RTs and choices from accumulator models of decision-making suggest that they will principally be driven by variation in integrated values (pO) rather than the underlying constituents of these values (pA and pS).

However, several known effects in multi-attribute and multi-alternative choice violate these predictions. Many of these violations show that the value of a third option can influence the relative frequency of choosing between two options, serving as a ‘distractor’ from discriminating between options 1 and 2. One account of distractor effects appeals to a neural process of normalization by the set of choice alternatives on offer before comparison. This implies that high-valued third items prove to be more distracting than low-valued third items and so impair discrimination, matching empirical observations in humans and macaque monkeys23. Specific classes of distractor effects also occur in multi-attribute choice, such as ‘compromise’, ‘similarity’ and ‘attraction’ effects17. These necessitate comparison at the level of underlying attributes and not solely at the level of integrated values, and so have inspired models in which evidence accumulation and competition occur at multiple hierarchical levels17–19.

We propose a hierarchical competition model for our task (Supplementary Fig. 2). This is motivated by previous models, together with the idea that specific attributes are more influential or relevant on certain trials for guiding behavior, as evidenced by behavioral observations made below. Evidence accumulation and comparison occurs at multiple levels in the model: within-attribute, on integrated values, and between attributes (in a competition for attribute relevance). Normalization is also included in the model, but occurs at the initial input level of individual attributes rather than on integrated values (see Online Methods for detailed mathematical description of the model).

The most novel feature of the model is the competition for attribute relevance. Inputs to this competition (Supplementary Fig. 2), reflect the absolute difference between the best and second best option on each attribute, calculated instantaneously from currently accumulated evidence in each node. Attributes with a large within-attribute difference (where the best option is substantially better than the second best) dominate this competition and so become more relevant for guiding model choices. This is achieved via feedback connections that reweight the importance of each attribute as it projects forward to an ‘integrated’ value comparison. The output of the integrated value comparator is used to determine the model’s choice and RT, once activity in this node reaches a decision threshold.

Figure 2 Predictions of behavior from hierarchical model. (a–c) Distractor effects (see Fig. 3a–c). A distractor effect is when option 3 value affects choice probabilities between options 1 and 2, here assessed via logistic regression. The model shows a classic value-based distractor effect (a), but also a within-attribute distractor effect (b,c), as is found in subject behavior. (d) RT effects in model estimated via linear regression, comparable with those revealed in subject behavior in Figure 3e. The model is most heavily influenced by value difference on the relevant attribute, not the irrelevant attribute or integrated values. Data are presented as mean ± s.e.
Figure 3  Subject behavior (n = 19 subjects). (a) Value-based distractor effect. High values of option 3 make options 1 and 2 less discriminable. Data points show mean ± s.e.m. (across subjects) of logistic regression parameters for each of the 16 stimuli and actions on the probability of choosing option 1 versus option 2 (Online Methods). Trials have been split into those where the third option has a high value and those where it has a low value. Red points show effects when option 3 pO is high (in top 33% of values), blue points indicate when option 3 pO is low (in bottom 33%). Lines show average best fit to data points; the slope of this line was significantly different between high pO3 versus low pO3 (stimulus influence, T(18) = 3.17, P = 0.0053; action influence, T(18) = 2.45, P = 0.025). (b) When option 3 is split selectively on the stimulus attribute, the distractor effect remains on the stimulus discriminability of options 1 and 2 (T(18) = 2.51, P = 0.021), but not on the action discriminability (T(18) = 0.82, P = 0.42). (c) When option 3 is split selectively on the action attribute, the distractor effect remains on the action attribute (T(18) = 3.18, P = 0.0052), but not on the stimulus attribute (T(18) = 1.78, P = 0.092). (d) Analysis of trials in which evidence given by stimulus and action are equal and opposite. Probability of choosing option 1, on trials where pS1 > pS2, pA2 > pA1, and (pS1 – pS2) = (pA2 – pA1). On such trials, choosing on the basis of stimulus (plotted on ordinate) is equivalent to choosing option 1. Option 3 is always one of the two unchosen options. Data are presented as mean ± s.e. (across subjects). ***P = 8.5 × 10−4; paired t test between low and high pO3 (T(18) = 3.99) and P = 9.0 × 10−4, paired t test between low and high pS3 (T(18) = 6.11). Interaction in two-way ANOVA, F(1,72) = 16.62, P = 1.7 × 10−4. (e) RTs are more heavily influenced by the relevant attribute than the irrelevant attribute. Data are presented as mean ± s.e. (across subjects) of effects of value difference on subject RTs, estimated via linear regression (y axis is flipped, that is, higher value differences typically elicit faster RTs). ***P = 2.13 × 10−4; one-sample t test (T(18) = 4.62); **P = 0.0030, paired t test (T(18) = 3.43); n.s. = non-significant one-sample t test (P = 0.08 and P = 0.84).

Notably, there are several behavioral observations from our experiment predicted by this framework that appear to be inconsistent with alternative or previous models (Supplementary Figs. 3 and 4). These are a specific within-attribute distractor effect on subjects’ choices and a selective effect of value difference on the relevant attribute on subjects’ RTs. We examined these on the basis of observations made in subjects’ actual behavior. The exact same analysis was applied to both subject behavior and that of the hierarchical model.

A within-attribute distractor effect in choice

We first assessed the hierarchical model’s predictions of distractor effects, where the value of option 3 affects discriminations between options 1 and 2. We analyzed model choices using binomial logistic regression. In this analysis, the presence or absence of a stimulus/action was denoted by an indicator variable. This allows the regression model to independently estimate the influence of each stimulus and each action on the probability of choosing the associated option, and so is agnostic to the probabilities assigned to each stimulus/action by the experimenter. It controls for the other attribute presented on the same option, as well as the attributes of the other option. As expected, better stimuli and better actions tied to a particular option led to a clear increase in the logistic regression weight for that option in the model’s choices (Fig. 2). This was also found to be true in subject behavior (Fig. 3a).

An important feature of this analysis was that it focused on just a pair of the options, including one chosen and one unchosen option at a time. By repeating this analysis on a subset of the data in which the third option, left out of the regression model, was high or low in value, we were able to examine its effects on the discriminability of these two options23,24 (third option here refers to any option that is unchosen; each trial is included twice in the analysis, with each unchosen option becoming the third option once). Crucially, when the left-out third option had a low pO, discriminations between the values of the remaining two options appeared to be better than was the case when the third option had a high pO (Fig. 2a). This was again found to be true in subject behavior (Fig. 3a), reflected by a significant difference in the slopes of the regression lines on both stimulus and action attributes (t test on difference of slopes between lines; stimulus: T(18) = 3.17, P = 0.0053; response: T(18) = 2.45, P = 0.025).

Notably, this effect replicates observations from a recent study of value-guided choice and can be explained in the context of divisive normalization23. However, it can also be seen in our hierarchical competition model, where divisive normalization is applied within-attribute rather than on integrated values. Moreover, the observed response pattern violates the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives and therefore could not be predicted by softmax or simple value accumulator models (Supplementary Fig. 3a). These data indicate that a comparison of different options is fundamentally dependent on what other alternatives are available to the subject.

We next split the third option not on the basis of its integrated value (pO), but instead on the basis of its stimulus value (pS; Fig. 2b) or its action value (pA; Fig. 2c). In doing so, we found that the distractor effect in the model’s choices was restricted to the same attribute used to perform the split. This within-attribute distractor effect is a consequence of a normalization applied at the level of within-attribute competition rather than at the level of integrated option values.
When the chosen value was higher, choices were made more rapidly explanatory variables. Unsurprisingly, RTs scaled with trial difficulty. of both model and subjects’ RTs, we entered integrated values (pO) as value of different options as independent variables. In a first analysis regression with the logarithm of RTs as the dependent variable and the We next sought to isolate a signature of hierarchical competition in our multi-attribute choice task. conclude that there is a contribution of within-attribute comparison action value difference on options 1 and 2 (Fig. 3d). We focused on trials in which stimulus value difference on options 1 and 2 (Fig. 3d). The probability of choosing the option with higher stimulus value (and hence lower action value) decreased when option 3 had a high stimulus value or low action value, but increased when option 3 had a high action value or low stimulus value (interaction in two-way ANOVA, [attribute * high/low]: F(1,72) = 16.62, P = 0.00017). The within-attribute distractor effect that we observed cannot be explained by models in which only integrated values are compared to solve the task. If such a model were true, then distractor effects would be spread equally across all attributes, irrespective of which attribute was used to parse the third option. Instead, the evidence highlights a dependence on comparisons being made within-attribute, shown formally by the comparison of the hierarchical model to alternative models (Supplementary Figs. 3 and 4 and Supplementary Note). We conclude that there is a contribution of within-attribute comparison in our multi-attribute choice task. RT is more influenced by one attribute than another We next sought to isolate a signature of hierarchical competition in both model and subject RTs. To enable this, we applied multiple regression with the logarithm of RTs as the dependent variable and the value of different options as independent variables. In a first analysis of both model and subjects’ RTs, we entered integrated values (pO) as explanatory variables. Unsurprisingly, RTs scaled with trial difficulty. When the chosen value was higher, choices were made more rapidly (model: β = −0.81 ± 0.01, mean ± s.e. across 10 simulations; behavior: β = −1.13 ± 0.12 across subjects; T(18) = −9.22, P = 3.06 × 10−8), whereas choices were slower when the best unchosen value increased (model: β = 1.10 ± 0.01; behavior: β = 0.31 ± 0.07; T(18) = 4.47, P = 2.96 × 10−4). Thus, RTs decreased when (pOchosen − pObest unchosen) increased (model: β = −1.91 ± 0.02; behavior: β = −1.46 ± 0.18; T(18) = −8.00, P = 2.44 × 10−7). The influence of the worst unchosen value on RTs was also significant (model: β = 1.42 ± 0.03; behavior: β = 0.22 ± 0.09; T(18) = 2.47, P = 0.024).

The above analysis is predicated on the idea that there is integration across attributes before comparison. In our task, however, this appeared to be inconsistent with the presence of a significant within-attribute distractor effect. On the basis of the hierarchical model, we hypothesized that on trials in which attributes conflict—that is, on trials in which pS values favor one alternative, but pA values favor another—the two attributes might compete with one another when guiding the choice, with one attribute becoming more relevant for guiding behavior. Although the relevant attribute would vary from trial to trial, we could nevertheless use the subject’s choice to disclose it. In trials in which pSchosen > pSbest unchosen and pAchosen < pAbest unchosen, we labeled stimulus as the ‘relevant’ attribute and action as ‘irrelevant’ (or strictly, less relevant). By contrast, if (pSchosen < pSbest unchosen and pAchosen > pAbest unchosen), we labeled action as relevant and stimulus as irrelevant. In the model, competition for relevance was realized by between-attribute competition (Supplementary Fig. 2).

The crucial question in this context is whether reward probabilities on the relevant attribute explain more variability in RT than on the irrelevant attribute, or instead whether RTs are better explained by the integrated value difference used in our initial analysis. We again applied multiple regression, but now all three forms of value difference competed for variance in explaining RTs (Online Methods). In the model, we found that the probability difference on the relevant attribute had a greater influence on RTs than the irrelevant attribute probability difference (Fig. 2d). Moreover, these two terms explained away the contribution of pO value difference to model RT (Fig. 2d).

Notably, these predictions were not made of simpler models of evidence accumulation (Supplementary Fig. 4).

We applied the same analysis to subjects’ RTs. Although the difference on reward probabilities on the relevant attribute influenced RTs (β = 1.46 ± 0.31, T(18) = −6.62, P = 2.13 × 10−4), neither the difference in probabilities on the irrelevant attribute (β = 0.68 ± 0.37, T(18) = −1.48, P = 0.08) nor the Bayesian integrated value difference (β = 0.06 ± 0.35, T(18) = −0.19, P = 0.84) had a significant effect (Fig. 3e). Consequently, the difference on the relevant attribute showed a significantly greater effect than the irrelevant difference (paired T(18) = −3.43, P = 0.003). To assess the robustness of this result, we applied Levene’s test and confirmed that there was no significant difference in variances between the two sets of parameter estimates (F1,36 = 0.12, P = 0.74). We also confirmed the effect...
Figure 5 IPS shows features of an attribute comparison signal, with opposing signs for relevant and irrelevant attributes. 
(a) Statistical parametric map of the contrast (chosen value – best unchosen value)relevant − (chosen value − best unchosen value)irrelevant at the time of making the decision, thresholded at Z > 2.3, uncorrected for display purposes (n = 19 subjects). A bilateral portion of IPS reflects this contrast, with the left IPS surviving whole-brain correction (FWE-corrected \( P = 0.0023 \); cluster-forming threshold \( Z > 2.3 \); peak \( Z = 3.65 \), MNI = −38, −42, 40 mm). (b) Time series analysis of this region, time-locked to decision phase, revealed negative correlates of (chosen value)relevant and positive correlates of (best unchosen value)relevant, but positive correlates of (chosen value)irrelevant and negative correlates of (best unchosen value)irrelevant (data are presented as mean (solid lines) i.e. (shaded areas) across subjects). To avoid circular analysis, a leave-one-out cross-validation approach was used for time series extraction (Online Methods).

remained (paired \( T(18) = −2.45, P = 0.02 \)) after normalizing all the regressors to account for any difference in their magnitude. In addition, these effects remained evident even when we considered alternative rules for constructing pO (mean, multiplication or sum; Supplementary Table 1).

One potential final concern is that hierarchical competition could be replaced by a simpler model that retained within-attribute comparison, but randomly selected a given attribute to become relevant on each trial. We tested such a possibility by running a formal model comparison on prediction of subjects’ choice behavior, comparing this simpler random attribute model with a hierarchical competition model (Supplementary Note). Model evidence favored the hierarchical model in 16 of 19 individual subjects, reflected across the population by a significantly lower Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) in the hierarchical model compared with a random attribute model (\( T(19) = −3.24, P = 0.0046; \) mean \( ± \) s.e. \( \Delta \)BIC = 19.56 ± 6.05).

Our behavioral findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that subjects equally weight both sources of information on each trial. They instead indicate that subjects rely more heavily on one source of evidence than another on each trial, which we term the relevant attribute. This is consistent with our model, in which competitions occur hierarchically.

IPS and attribute relevance competition
We used fMRI data to investigate which brain regions subserve multi-attribute choice, tying our analysis to the modeling framework described above. A unique feature of our model (absent from integrate-then-compare frameworks) is that the outputs of within-attribute competitions themselves form the inputs of a competition for which attribute becomes relevant in the current trial. By tying one attribute to stimuli and another attribute to actions, we capitalized on recent reported dissociations between neural structures encoding attribute to stimuli and another attribute to actions, we capitalized for which attribute becomes relevant in the current trial. By tying one attribute competitions themselves form the inputs of a competition node in our hierarchical model by simulating fMRI data directly from activity in this node (Supplementary Note). We used similar simplifying assumptions to those used in other studies, namely that activity would be greatest in the node while competition was still being resolved and that this competition would continue until a decision was reached18,29. We convolved the node’s total activity on each trial with a hemodynamic response function, added observation noise and then regressed the simulated data against pChrelevant, pBUnChrelevant, pChirrelevant and pBUnChirrelevant. All four elements of our contrast were found to affect the simulated fMRI signal in the direction specified by our attribute comparison contrast (Fig. 4). Hence (pChrelevant − pBUnChrelevant) was predicted to have a negative regression coefficient on fMRI data, but (pChirrelevant − pBUnChirrelevant) was predicted to have a positive regression coefficient. This is a consequence of competition between attributes being greater on trials in which (pChrelevant − pBUnChrelevant) is closer in value to (pChirrelevant − pBUnChirrelevant). It is analogous to the hypothesis that regions implementing a choice comparison process via evidence accumulation may exhibit greater activity when choice alternatives are closer in value18,29.
We therefore searched for brain regions that encoded the contrast \( (p_{\text{Ch,relevant}} - p_{\text{BUnCh,irrelevant}}) - (p_{\text{Ch,relevant}} - p_{\text{BUnCh,irrelevant}}) \). We found bilateral activation in the IPS correlated with this contrast, with the left IPS (peak \( Z = 3.65 \), MNI \( (46, -34, 42) \)) surviving whole-brain correction \( (P = 0.0023, \text{cluster-corrected}) \), and the right IPS showing a large, but sub-threshold, response in a similar location (Fig. 5a and Supplementary Table 2; unthresholded \( z \) statistic maps for all contrasts are available at http://neurovault.org). This was the only region to survive this contrast with whole-brain correction. A wider network of regions (notably including bilateral superior frontal sulcus) was present at an uncorrected threshold (Supplementary Fig. 6). Next, we extracted the time course from IPS with a method that controls for circularity in statistical inference \(^{30}\) by defining each subject’s region of interest for analysis from the remaining \( (n - 1) \) subjects’ data \(^{31}\). From this time course, it was apparent that all the necessary components of relevance competition were present in IPS signal. On the relevant attribute, IPS blood oxygen level–dependent (BOLD) fMRI signal correlated negatively with the value of the chosen option and positively with the value of the best unchosen option (Fig. 5b). This was shown formally by a negative effect of \( (p_{\text{Ch,relevant}} - p_{\text{BUnCh,relevant}}) \) \( (T(18) = -2.83, P = 0.011) \). This is similar to signals previously observed in IPS in value-guided choice tasks, in which only one attribute or integrated value was considered \(^{27,32}\). As predicted, however, this pattern was reversed on the irrelevant attribute: IPS signal correlated positively with the value of the chosen option and negatively with the value of the best unchosen option (Fig. 5b). This was again shown formally by a positive effect of \( (p_{\text{Ch,relevant}} - p_{\text{BUnCh,relevant}}) \) \( (T(18) = 2.50, P = 0.022) \). These effects are based on contrasts of parameter estimates from a general linear model (model 1, Online Methods), which partials out any covariance between irrelevant and relevant attributes. This signal profile would not be predicted for a region that compares integrated values, but is instead predicted for a region that selects which feature of a decision to attend.

In a further analysis, we also found a positive correlate of log(RT) in the same region, as is predicted by a dynamical model. Notably, however, the above effects (Fig. 5b) survived the inclusion of log(RT) as a co-regressor (Supplementary Fig. 7), as did predictions from the hierarchical model.

It is also notable the signed relative attribute difference is highly correlated with the absolute (unsigned) difference in within-attribute differences, that is \( |(p_{\text{Ch,relevant}} - p_{\text{BUnCh,irrelevant}}) - (p_{\text{Ch,relevant}} - p_{\text{BUnCh,irrelevant}})| \) \( (r \text{ values across subjects ranged from 0.91 to 0.99}) \). This mirrors an observation made previously in the context of value comparison \(^8\). Disambiguating this absolute contrast from our original contrast is therefore not possible with our study design.

Next, we reasoned that if IPS forms part of a hierarchical comparison process, then this should be reflected in its functional connectivity with other brain regions in a manner dependent on which attribute was currently relevant. To test this hypothesis, we used a psychophysiological interaction analysis \(^{32}\) that compared IPS functional connectivity with the rest of the brain as a function of whether the stimulus attribute was currently relevant, or whether the action attribute was currently relevant. On trials in which stimulus was relevant, IPS exhibited greater functional connectivity to a bilateral sector of anterior orbitofrontal/lateral frontopolar cortex (right peak \( Z = 3.52 \), MNI \( (36, 52, -10) \); left peak \( Z = 2.90 \), MNI \( (-38, 52, 10) \); Fig. 6a). This is a notable finding in that IPS has direct connections to OFC via the third branch of the superior longitudinal fasciculus \(^{34}\), and lesions to OFC are known to impair stimulus-based, but not response-based, value-guided choice \(^{12}\). By contrast, on trials in which action was relevant, IPS exhibited greater functional connectivity to bilateral putamen (left peak \( Z = -3.46 \), MNI \((18, 12, 2) \); right peak \( Z = -2.69 \), MNI \((26, 10, 0) \); Fig. 6b), a portion of striatum previously implicated in habitual action-guided choice \(^{25,26}\). The finding that both sets of activations occur bilaterally considerably reduces their probability of being false positives.

Finally, at the time of feedback, the ventral striatum encoded a classic reward prediction error, signaling reward outcomes positively and predictions of reward negatively (on both relevant and irrelevant attributes; Supplementary Fig. 8a,b). By contrast, the signal encoded in the IPS can also be interpreted as a prediction error, but acting on relevance rather than value or reward (Supplementary Fig. 8c,d). It encoded reward negatively, but the prediction of reward was encoded positively on the relevant attribute and the prediction of reward was encoded negatively on the irrelevant attribute. This signal can be construed as a prediction error on attribute relevance. If reward is greater than expected, more attention would be given to the relevant attribute on future trials and less attention to the irrelevant attribute. It should be noted that this IPS relevance prediction error is inverted in sign, in the sense that a more positive attribute prediction error elicits a greater deactivation at the time of outcome.

In summary, at the time of the decision, IPS carried signals that implicate it in selecting which attribute is relevant and changed its functional connectivity in accordance with an upregulation of lower-level competition. At the time of outcome, IPS showed a (inverted) prediction error signal suggestive of a role in relevance learning. These data provide evidence for a role for the IPS in selecting which attribute to attend to on any given trial.

**Medial prefrontal cortex and integrated value comparison**

If the IPS carries a signal that reflects a competition for attribute relevance, then do any other brain regions reflect a more traditional integrated value competition? This can be tested by looking at a different contrast: \( (p_{\text{Ch,relevant}} - p_{\text{BUnCh,relevant}}) + (p_{\text{Ch,relevant}} - p_{\text{BUnCh,relevant}}) \). This contrast correlated negatively with BOLD fMRI signal in the dorsal medial frontal cortex (dMFC), in the vicinity of preSMA/paracingulate sulcus (peak \( Z = -3.85 \), MNI \((0, 38, 42) \); Fig. 7a and Supplementary Table 3). This is in close proximity to a locus previously implicated in a comparison of integrated values during action selection \(^{8,35}\). Notably, this region is frequently co-activated with the IPS; both IPS and dMFC are recruited more strongly by
features of an option into a single value, so that values can be compared with one another in a common currency. Such a decision schema has obvious appeal, not least because it can support comparison of incommensurable items\(^1\), but it cannot explain several key behavioral observations. Among these are the effects of within-attribute similarity on choice, suggesting that some forms of comparison are enacted before integration, as well as the effects of relevance of a particular attribute modulating RTs. Subject behavior in our multi-attribute decision task showed both these effects, most notably via a previously undescribed within-attribute distractor effect.

To explain our data, we adopted a fundamentally different approach to value comparison, suggested previously in the behavioral literature\(^{16-19}\), but notably absent from many neuroscientific studies. In this scheme, competition (via mutual inhibition\(^{10,21}\)) occurs not just at the higher level of integrated values, but also at lower levels (within attribute) and between levels (attention toward attributes). This was necessary to capture all key features of our behavioral data, which were not captured by more simple models of evidence accumulation. Apart from successfully explaining behavioral data, our model gained extra validity by explaining task-related neural activity as well as functional interactions between brain regions involved in supporting value comparison, indexed via fMRI.

Hierarchical competition invokes the notion of a canonical computation performed across multiple brain regions, and it is implicit that competition in different brain regions occurs in different frames of reference. Such hierarchies mirror those proposed in the domain of rule-based action selection, or tasks requiring cognitive control\(^{38}\). In our task, the IPS carries a signal reflecting competition in an attribute frame of reference, whereas medial prefrontal structures carry signals reflecting competition in a frame of reference of options. Such a clear dissociation between computations in IPS and dMFC has not been described previously and it is notable that these areas have typically coactivated in studies of decision-making\(^{8,29}\), particularly where there is increased choice difficulty (decreased value difference). The portion of IPS that we identified is ideally placed, in terms of anatomical connectivity to prefrontal cortex\(^{34,39}\) and its established role in attentional reorienting\(^{40}\), to compute which attribute to attend on a particular trial. Indeed, in number comparison tasks in which the relevant and irrelevant dimensions are explicitly cued rather than internally generated, IPS only reflects value differences in the relevant, and not the irrelevant, competition\(^{41}\). When information is presented from two different sources whose distributions can be formally specified, fMRI signal in IPS reflects the Kullbeck-Leibler divergence (or degree of competition) between these two sources of information\(^{42}\).

However, we do not argue that IPS performs a general role of arbitrating between attributes at the top level of hierarchical competition. In our experiment, subjects had to trade a competition that occurred in stimulus space in the OFC against a competition that occurred in action space in the motor system. IPS is ideally placed to resolve such a competition as a result of its monosynaptic projections with both structures. It is clear that, unlike OFC or vmPFC, IPS has access to values selective for spatial locations, for specific actions and specific stimuli. Notably, in circumstances in which both attributes can be represented in stimulus or goal space, deficits in attribute comparison can be induced by lesions to vmPFC\(^{43}\). We therefore argue that attribute comparison is not a unique process with a single cortical focus, but an example of a general rule of competition in cortical processes. The critical neural substrate will depend on the relevant features of the decision at hand.

Similarly, the frames of reference and functional roles of other brain regions contributing to task performance reflect both their anatomical

**DISCUSSION**

It is commonly assumed that a key step in how the brain supports value-guided choice is through an integration of the different

trials in which values are close together, and so correlate negatively with the value of the chosen option minus the unchosen option\(^{8,29}\). It is therefore particularly notable in our study that, although dMFC and IPS encode variables in the same direction on the relevant attribute, they do so in the opposite direction on the irrelevant attribute (Figs. 5b and 7b).

Finally, we asked what signals are encoded in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), a region commonly recruited in studies of value-guided choice\(^{46,37}\), but in which different studies have observed different task variables\(^{8,27}\). We found that VMPFC encoded a chosen value signal selectively for the relevant, but not irrelevant, attribute (Supplementary Fig. 9).

**Figure 7** dMFC shows an integrated value difference signal, with the same sign for both relevant and irrelevant attributes. (a) Statistical parametric map of the contrast (chosen value − best unchosen value)\(^{\text{relevant}}\) + (chosen value − best unchosen value)\(^{\text{irrelevant}}\), at the time of making the decision, thresholded at Z < −2.3, uncorrected for display purposes. A portion of dMFC reflects this contrast (FWE-corrected, \(P = 0.0054\), cluster-forming threshold Z < −2.3; peak Z = −3.85, MNI = −2, 34, 46 mm). Other regions surviving whole-brain correction are detailed in Supplementary Table 3 (\(n = 19\) subjects). (b) Time series analysis of this region, time-locked to decision phase, revealed negative correlates of (chosen value)\(^{\text{relevant}}\) and (chosen value)\(^{\text{irrelevant}}\), and positive correlates of (best unchosen value)\(^{\text{relevant}}\) and (best unchosen value)\(^{\text{irrelevant}}\) (data are presented as mean ± s.e. across subjects), slightly delayed in time relative to attribute comparison signal in IPS (compare with Fig. 5b). As before, cross-validated ROIs were used for time series extraction (Online Methods).
connectivity and functional specialization. For example, lateral OFC is likely to be involved in competition between stimuli given that it receives a highly processed sensory input\(^4^4\) and is critical for tasks involving stimulus, but not action, comparison\(^4^2\). In keeping with this formulation, we observed increased functional connectivity of OFC with IPS on trials in which stimulus probabilities became relevant. By contrast, a dorsolateral portion of the striatum is likely to be involved in competition between actions, given evidence that it possesses anatomical connectivity with motoric structures\(^4^5\) and is implicated in habitual action selection\(^2^5,2^6\). This region showed increased functional connectivity to IPS on trials in which action probabilities became relevant. Finally, both dMFC and ventral medial frontal cortex are implicated in competition between values\(^8,1^0,1^1,2^7,2^8,3^5\). Here, integrated value comparison signals were particularly prominent in dMFC at the time of choice and, similar to the IPS, this region has monosynaptic connections to both OFC and motoric structures.

Recent studies have examined distractor effects in value-guided choice tasks with multiple options, but from a different perspective to that examined here. One study\(^2^3\) isolated distractor effects in subjects who chose between rewards of different value. As in our study, high value distractors impaired discrimination between two alternative options. The authors proposed a divisive normalization of values during choice. In our model, divisive normalization captured distractor effects (Supplementary Figs. 3 and 4), but, given the within-attribute distractor effect, we placed it at the level of attributes instead of the level of integrated values. Indeed, normalization may also reflect a canonical mechanism operating at all levels of a processing hierarchy\(^4^6\). Future models may unify the processes of competition and normalization in a single framework. Another study\(^4^7\), in a task in which decisions were made under time pressure, reported a distractor effect that operates in the opposite direction, where high-valued third options are less distracting than low-valued third options. In this task, distractors are made transiently available and then removed from the decision\(^4^7\). Such an effect can be explained by the increased pulse of inhibition introduced into a competitive decision-making network by high-value distractors, resulting in slowing of a decision that renders it more accurate. We found a similar (albeit weak) effect in our study, complicating accumulator models when divisive normalization is switched off, and competition between options is high (Supplementary Fig. 3b). The conditions under which normalization occurs during competition remain debated\(^4^8\), but one hypothesis is that divisive normalization occurs over a different time course than competition via mutual inhibition, and may not occur when one option is removed shortly after decision onset. Finally, the within-attribute distractor effect may mirror the well-known similarity effect in multi-attribute choice, in which introducing a new option reduces the probability of choosing options that are similar on multiple attributes to those that are dissimilar\(^4^9\). In our model, similar options (with small within-attribute differences) are down-weighted by the attention competition relative to dissimilar options (with large within-attribute differences). Future work could directly test the ability of the model to reproduce this effect, alongside other known effects in multi-attribute choice such as the attraction and compromise effects\(^4^7\).

In summary, we propose that instead of competition being an isolated ‘component process’ in value-guided decision-making, it occurs at multiple, distributed levels of representation. This hierarchical competition account of decision-making reconciles conflicting behavioral observations that suggest that comparison occurs within-attribute, as well as on integrated values. Our account also explains observations in which competition is observed in different frames of reference in different brain structures, as well as how interactions between brain regions are modulated during a task\(^3^0\). More broadly, the findings imply that competition via mutual inhibition represents a canonical computation\(^2^1,4^6\) that suberves distributed decision-making processes throughout the brain, rather than a process occurring solely at a single comparator node.

**METHODS**

Methods and any associated references are available in the online version of the paper.

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**AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS**

All of the authors contributed to study design and preparation of the manuscript. L.T.H. acquired the data and built the model. L.T.H. and T.E.J.B. analyzed data.

**COMPETING FINANCIAL INTERESTS**

The authors declare no competing financial interests.

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ONLINE METHODS

Experimental task. 24 human volunteers (age range = 20–49 years, 13 female, 11 male, recruited from a subject pool at University College London) participated in the experiment. Inclusion criteria were based on age (minimum = 18 years, maximum = 50 years), and screening for history of neurological or psychiatric illness. The sample size was based on similar sample sizes in recent fMRI studies of decision-making and methodological recommendations in the literature. Two subjects failed to reach the requisite learning criterion during training; three subjects showed excessive head motion during fMRI (based on the motion correction report in FSL version 6.00). These subjects were excluded, leaving 19 subjects in all subsequent behavioral and neural analysis. The experimental protocol was approved by the University of College London local research ethics committee, and informed consent was obtained from all of the subjects included.

Training. Subjects learnt that certain stimuli and certain responses were more predictive of reward by performing pairwise choices within-attribute (that is, stimulus versus stimulus, action versus action). In each action training trial, two locations from eight were highlighted onscreen and the subject aimed to select the better of the two actions to receive positive feedback (smiley face). Each spatial location was tied to a button press with a specific forefinger on a keyboard. In each stimulus training trial, two stimuli from eight were presented in random spatial locations (either side of a fixation point), and subjects aimed to select the better of the two stimuli. Subjects performed four training blocks outside the scanner (two stimulus, two action, each consisting of a minimum of 70 trials and terminating once subjects had reached a performance criterion of 90% correct responses). Stimuli and actions were counterbalanced across subjects.

During training, feedback was delivered deterministically, according to whether the subjects chose the better of the two options. Deterministic feedback ensured subjects learnt equally about both the selected and unselected options throughout training (which would not be the case if reward was delivered probabilistically on the selected option). The rank of the best through to the worst options was translated into a probability of receiving reward (termed pS for stimuli, pA for responses) in the main experiment, scaled from worst to best as (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9). These probabilities are almost perfectly collinear (r = 0.99) with the experienced frequency of reward in the training phase (Supplementary Fig. 10).

Main experimental task. Inside the scanner, subjects performed 200 trials of a three-option choice task in which stimuli were pseudorandomly paired with different actions. Subjects were instructed to weight both stimulus and action attributes equally in making their choice. It was never the case that the same stimulus (or action) was available on more than one option. Trials were selected such that key variables of interest for neural (and behavioral) analysis were decorrelated (as far as possible) in the design. In this schedule, as expected by chance, the best stimulus and best action suggested conflicting responses on 66% of trials. In these trials, only infrequently (5% of trials) did the best pO occur for options with neither the best pS nor pA; instead, the best pO typically aligned with the best pS or best pA (59% and 36% of trials, respectively). Across all trials, this meant that the best pO aligned with the best pS on 73% of trials, and with the best pA on 58% of trials. Despite this slight asymmetry between best pA and pS being coincident with best pO, subjects showed no systematic bias toward using best pA on 58% of trials. Despite this slight asymmetry between best pA and pS (59% and 36% of trials, respectively). Across all trials, this was repeated on subsets of data points: where the third (left-out) option was either high (>67th percentile) or low (<33rd percentile) in integrated value (Figs. 2a and 3a), high or low in stimulus probability (Figs. 2b and 3b), or high or low in action probability (Figs. 2c and 3c). The data points in these figures show the mean ± s.e. (across subjects) of the contrasts of parameter estimates from the logistic regression.

RT regression (Figs. 2d and 3e). We assessed the influence of reward probabilities on RTs using multiple linear regression. Log(RT) was used as the dependent variable as this approximates a normal distribution. In a first analysis, we only investigated the role of integrated values on RT. Four regressors were included: the integrated value of the chosen option (pOchosen), the integrated value of the best unchosen option (pObest unchosen), the integrated value of the worst unchosen option (pOworst unchosen), and a constant term.

In a second analysis, we investigated the separable contributions of value difference on the relevant attribute, the irrelevant attribute, and the integrated value, on trials in which relevance could be defined (where stimulus and action conflicted, and subjects either selected the best stimulus or the best response). Ten regressors were included in total: a constant term, the chosen, best unchosen and worst unchosen values on the relevant attribute, the chosen, best unchosen and worst...
unchosen values on the irrelevant attribute, and the chosen, best unchosen and worst unchosen integrated values. Contrasts of parameter estimates were used to calculate the influence of the value difference on chosen and best unchosen values on RT (that is, [1 − 1] contrast on chosen and best unchosen values). Complete anonymous behavioral data sets and MATLAB analysis scripts are provided in the Supplementary Data.

Computational model. We implemented a hierarchical leaky, competing accumulator model to capture behavioral and neural effects observed in our multi-attribute choice task. In the main model (Figs. 2 and 4), we assumed that evidence accumulated and competed on each attribute (within-attribute competition), there was competition over which attribute to attend (between-attribute competition), and there was competition on integrated values to select the winning option.

Within-attribute evidence accumulation was modeled using a dynamical equation

\[
E^i(t + dt) = E^i(t) + S^i E^i(t) dt + C M dt + CN(0, \sigma^2 dt); E^i(0) = 0
\]

where \( E^i(t) \) is a 3 × 2 matrix (superscripted with \( i \) to denote lower-level of hierarchical model), containing accumulated evidence on each option (row) and attribute (column) at time \( t; M \) is a 3 × 2 matrix, containing the within-attribute probabilities, divisively normalized within-attribute (that is, the columns of \( M \) sum to 1); \( S^i \) is a 3 × 3 matrix, containing off-diagonal elements that determine competition \( (k_i) \), and on-diagonal elements that determine the rate of self-decay \( (d_i) \); \( C \) is a 3 × 3 contrast matrix that subtracts the mean of all other alternatives from the firing rate of each element (on-diagonal elements set to 1, off-diagonal elements set to −0.5); \( N(0, \sigma^2 dt) \) is a 3 × 2 matrix containing Gaussian noise, with each element drawn from the normal distribution with mean 0 and variance \( \sigma^2 dt \); \( 0 \) is a 3 × 2 matrix of zeros.

Accumulation of evidence integrated across attributes was then modeled using

\[
E^h(t + dt) = E^h(t) + S^h E^h(t) dt + E^i(t) \theta^{-1} dt; E^h(0) = 0
\]

where \( E^h(t) \) is a 3 × 1 matrix (superscripted with \( h \) to denote higher-level of hierarchical model), containing accumulated evidence on each option at time \( t; S^h \) is a 3 × 3 matrix, containing off-diagonal elements that determine competition \( (k_h) \), and on-diagonal elements that determine the rate of self-decay \( (d_h) \); \( \theta(t) \) is a 2 × 1 vector, whose elements sum to 1 and are 20, that determines the relative weight assigned to each lower level attribute; \( 0 \) is a 3 × 1 matrix of zeros.

Finally, the weight assigned to each attribute is assumed to be calculated instantaneously by applying a softmax transformation to the within-attribute difference of the best and second best option on each attribute (as suggested by the signal observed in the intraparietal sulcus at the time of making the decision)

\[
w_i(t) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\beta(Ediff_i - Ediff_{i-1})}}
\]

\( Ediff_i \) refers to the difference between the highest value in \( E^i(t) \) and next highest value in \( E^i(t) \) for the \( i \)th attribute. \( \beta \) is a free parameter that determines the influence of within-attribute differences on attention. When \( w_i(t) \) is close to 0.5, both stimulus and action have an influence on guiding choice; when it is close to 1, then \( w_i(t) \) will be close to 0, and only the \( i \)th attribute will have influence on choice.

A decision was made when any value of \( E^h \) exceeded a decision threshold \( \theta \). The \( RT \) of the model was the time at which this occurred plus a non-decision time, \( t_{ND} \).

The model has eight free parameters. We assumed that the dynamics of the leaky, competing accumulators were the same both within- and between-attributes (that is, \( k_h = k_i \) and \( d_h = d_i \)), reducing the parameter space to six parameters. We performed a grid search across parameter space to fit basic properties of subject behavior—namely, the distribution of RTs and the error rates of an average subject. The fit parameters are listed below. However, it is important to note that the key behaviors of the model—that is, the within-option distractor effect and the effect on RTs—are qualitative rather than quantitative features of the model. These properties did not change fundamentally as a function of the parameter fit.

Model parameters were as follows (search grid resolution and limits specified in square brackets): decay rate, \( d_i = d_h = \pm 0.1 \) [−0.5:0.1:0]; inhibitory competition, \( k_h = k_i = -0.05 \) [−0.08:0.01:0]; non-decision time, \( t_{ND} = 300 \) ms [100:100:500]; threshold, \( \theta \) = 200 [100:100:1100]; input noise, \( \sigma \) = 1 [0:1:10]; between-attribute competition softmax temperature, \( \beta \) = 0.1 [0.1:10, logarithmically spaced in 10 bins].

All modeling was implemented in MATLAB (Mathworks); MATLAB code for models is available on request. For comparison with alternative models, and details of fMRI simulations, see Supplementary Figures 3 and 4 and Supplementary Note.

fMRI data. Whole-brain T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) data were acquired using a Siemens Trio 3T scanner, using a 32-channel headcoil. The sequence chosen was selected to minimize dropout in both orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala52. Each volume contained 43 slices of 3-mm isotropic data; echo time = 30 ms, repetition time = 3.01 s per volume, echo spacing of 0.5 ms, slice tilt of −30° (T > C), Z-shim of −1.4 mT/m ms, phase oversampling of 13%, ascending slice acquisition order. The mean number of volumes acquired per subject was 815 (the total number of volumes acquired varied depending on participants’ RTs). The first five volumes of each data set were discarded to account for T1 saturation effects, and so the experiment was not started until these five volumes had been acquired.

Structural data. Whole-brain T1-weighted structural data were acquired using a 3D MDEFT routine with sagittal partition direction, 176 partitions, field of view = 256 × 240, matrix = 256 × 240, 1-mm isotropic resolution, TE = 2.48 ms, TR = 7.92 ms, flip angle 16°, inversion time = 910 ms. Total acquisition time was 12 min 51 s.

Field maps. Whole-brain field maps (3-mm isotropic) were acquired to allow for subsequent correction in geometric distortions in EPI data at high field strength. Acquisition parameters were 10-ms/12.46-ms echo times (short/long respectively), 37-ms total EPI readout time, with positive/up phase encode direction and phase-encode blip polarity −1.

fMRI analysis. fMRI data processing was carried out using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) Version 6.00, part of FSL (FMRIb’s Software Library, http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl)52. Region-of-interest time series analysis was performed using custom-written scripts in MATLAB (Mathworks).

Preprocessing. The following pre-statistics processing was applied in FSL; motion correction using MCFLIRT; unwarping of B0 slice-timing correction using Fourier-space time-series phase-shifting; non-brain removal using BET; spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 7.0 mm; highpass temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma = 50.0 s).

First-level general linear model. Time-series statistical analysis was carried out using FILM (FMRIb’s Improved Linear Model) with local autocorrelation correction. Two event-related models were specified: model 1 with solely task-based regressors (Figs. 5 and 7, Supplementary Figs. 6–9, and Supplementary Tables 2 and 3), and model 2 to specify the psychophysiological interaction (Fig. 6).

Model 1 contained 14 regressors in total. The first eight were related to the decision phase of the trial; the next two were related to the response; the final four were related to feedback. DECIDE_ONSET: 1 during decision (from decision until response), 0 outside decision.

DECIDE_RELATT_CHPROB: Same timings as DECIDE_ONSET; parametric regressor for probability of the chosen option being rewarded on relevant attribute (chosen pS for stimulus relevant trials, chosen pA for action relevant trials).
Only trials in which stimulus and action attributes had different best options (and where one of these was selected) were included in this regressor.

\(DECIDE\_RELATT\_BEST\_UNCHPROB: As DECIDE\_RELATT\_CHPROB, containing probability of best unchosen option on the relevant attribute.

\(DECIDE\_RELATT\_WORST\_UNCHPROB: As DECIDE\_RELATT\_CHPROB, containing probability of worst unchosen option on the relevant attribute.

\(DECIDE\_IRRELATT\_CHOSEN\_PROB: As DECIDE\_RELATT\_CHPROB, containing probability of chosen option on irrelevant attribute.

\(DECIDE\_IRRELATT\_BEST\_UNCHPROB: As DECIDE\_RELATT\_CHPROB, containing probability of best unchosen option on irrelevant attribute.

\(DECIDE\_IRRELATT\_WORST\_UNCHPROB: As DECIDE\_RELATT\_CHPROB, containing probability of worst unchosen option on irrelevant attribute.

\(DECIDE\_EASY: Same timings as DECIDE\_ONSET; value 1 on easy decisions in which both stimulus and action indicate the same best option, 0 on other trials.

\(RESPONSE\_ONSET: Value 1 during the 4–8-s period when the response was onscreen, 0 outside this period.

\(RESPONSE\_RIGHT\_LEFT: Value 1 when a button was pressed with the right hand; −1 with the left hand; 0 outside this period. Stick function lasting 1 s, time-locked to response.

\(FEEDBACK\_ONSET: Value 1 during 3–s period when reward was onscreen, 0 outside this period.

\(FEEDBACK\_REWARD: Same timings as FEEDBACK\_ONSET, value 1 if reward was delivered and 0 otherwise.

\(FEEDBACK\_RELATT\_CHPROB: Same timings as FEEDBACK\_ONSET; parametric regressor containing probability of chosen option on relevant attribute. Only included for same trials as DECIDE\_RELATT\_CHPROB.

\(FEEDBACK\_IRRELATT\_CHPROB: As FEEDBACK\_RELATT\_CHPROB, but containing probability of chosen option on irrelevant attribute.

All regressors were convolved with FSL’s canonical gamma hemodynamic response function, and temporally filtered with the same high-pass filter applied to the fmri time series. Temporal derivatives of all regressors were included to account for variability in the hemodynamic response function.

The following contrasts of parameter estimates were constructed, and reported in the main text.

Regions encoding value difference differentially across relevant and irrelevant attributes (Fig. 5): \((DECIDE\_RELATT\_CHPROB – DECIDE\_IRRELATT\_BEST\_UNCHPROB) – (DECIDE\_RELATT\_CHPROB – DECIDE\_IRRELATT\_BEST\_UNCHPROB).

Regions encoding value difference commonly across relevant and irrelevant attributes (Fig. 7): \((DECIDE\_IRRELATT\_CHPROB – DECIDE\_RELATT\_BEST\_UNCHPROB) + (DECIDE\_IRRELATT\_CHPROB – DECIDE\_IRRELATT\_BEST\_UNCHPROB).

Regions encoding a traditional reward prediction error, tied to the relevant attribute (Supplementary Fig. 8a): (FEEDBACK\_REWARD – FEEDBACK\_RELATT\_CHPROB).

Regions encoding an ‘attribute prediction error’ (Supplementary Fig. 8c): (FEEDBACK\_RELATT\_CHPROB – FEEDBACK\_IRRELATT\_CHPROB).

Model 2 contained 17 regressors in total. The first two regressors comprised the psychological component of the psychophysiological interaction; the next regressor comprised the physiological component; the next two regressors made up the key interaction contrast. The remaining 12 regressors modeled other elements of the task (regressors of no interest).

\(DECIDE\_WENT\_W\_STIM: 1 during decision period (that is, lasting from decision onset until response), 0 outside decision period, on trials where stimulus was relevant attribute.

\(DECIDE\_WENT\_W\_RESP: 1 during decision period (that is, lasting from decision onset until response), 0 outside decision period, on trials where action was relevant attribute.

\(IPS\_TIMECOURSE: The mean timeseries (after preprocessing) extracted from a region of interest based on analysis from model 1. The mask used is described below.

\(IPS\_WENT\_W\_STIM\_INTERACTION: Interaction of DECIDE\_WENT\_W\_STIM and IPS\_TIMECOURSE; following the procedure outlined in Supplementary Fig. 9.

\(IPS\_WENT\_W\_RESP\_INTERACTION: The interaction of DECIDE\_WENT\_W\_RESP and IPS\_TIMECOURSE; DECIDE\_WENT\_W\_RESP had zero center and IPS\_TIMECOURSE had zero mean.

\(IPS\_WENT\_W\_RESP\_INTERACTION: The interaction of DECIDE\_WENT\_W\_RESP and IPS\_TIMECOURSE; DECIDE\_WENT\_W\_RESP had zero center and IPS\_TIMECOURSE had zero mean.

The following two regressors did not include any feedback term: RESPONSE\_ONSET; RESPONSE\_RIGHT\_LEFT; FEEDBACK\_ONSET; FEEDBACK\_REWARD; DECIDE\_NOBRAINER; DECIDE\_WENT\_W\_NEITHER (as regressor DECIDE\_WENT\_W\_STIM, but on trials where neither the best stimulus nor best action was chosen), and six parametric regressors for the values of the best, second best and worst response, and best, second best and worst stimulus, all at the decision phase.

The key contrast of parameter estimates (Fig. 6) was therefore: \((IPS\_WENT\_W\_STIM\_INTERACTION – IPS\_WENT\_W\_RESP\_INTERACTION).

A region significantly greater than zero for this contrast was showing greater functional connectivity with IPS on trials where stimulus was relevant, whereas a region significantly less than zero for this contrast was showing greater functional connectivity with IPS on trials where action was relevant.

Intersubject registration. Registration to high resolution structural images was carried out using FLIRT (FMRIB’s Linear Image Registration Tool). Registration from high resolution structural to standard space was then further refined using FNIRT nonlinear registration.

Second-level general linear model and statistical inference. For both models 1 and 2, higher-level analysis was carried out using FLAME (FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects) stage 1. A group mean was fit to contrasts of parameter estimates from the first-level analysis, and T statistics were estimated at each voxel to test whether this mean was significantly different from zero. For model 1 (main task GLM), Z (Gaussianised T) statistic images were thresholded using clusters determined by \(Z > 2.3\) and a (whole-brain corrected, family wise error) cluster significance threshold of \(P = 0.05\). (This was except for prediction error signals at feedback time, where the clusters extent determined by a threshold of \(Z > 2.3\) were too large to make sensible inference. Hence, a more stringent cluster-forming threshold of \(Z > 3.1\) was used). For model 2 (PPI GLM), Z (Gaussianised T) statistic images were thresholded using clusters determined by \(Z > 2.3\) and clusters exceeding 100 voxels in predefined regions of interest were reported. Clusters formed at this threshold were also tested for whole-brain significance using Monte Carlo simulation of a Gaussian random field, using the AlphaSim software released as part of AFNI version 1014, using a whole-brain significance threshold of \(P < 0.05\); the degree of smoothing for this analysis was estimated using the FSL tool smoothv2.1.

Region of interest analysis. Time series for ROI plotting and PPI analyses were determined by: (i) thresholding Z statistic images from the second level analysis reported above; (ii) binarizing this thresholded image to form a mask; (iii) applying the inverse of each individual’s registration, calculated during intersubject registration, to project this mask from single-subject space back to the 3-mm\(^3\) isotropic space in which EPI data were acquired; (iv) thresholding (at 0.3) and re-binarizing this back-projected mask; (v) extracting the mean time series within this region of interest from the pre-processed EPI data. We adopted a leave-one-out approach to ROI construction\(^{31}\), in which the mask used to extract each subject’s data was based upon a group analysis containing all the remaining \((n – 1)\) subjects, and then tested in the independent left-out subject.

To plot effects of individual regressors through time, the timeseries was upsampling, then time-locked to decision onset (Figs. 5b and 7b, and Supplementary Fig. 9) or feedback onset (Supplementary Fig. 9b,d) of each trial. This creates a data matrix with dimensions nTrials * nTime points. Each time point was regressed against explanatory variables of interest for each subject. The mean ± standard error (across subjects) of parameter estimates from this regression is plotted. A full description of this approach is given in ref. 53.

The masks for timeseries analysis and PPIs were determined as follows.
IPS mask for Figure 5b, attribute-based prediction error (Supplementary Fig. 8d), and PPI analysis: all voxels with $Z > 2.8$ for contrast (i) in GLM 1 that lay within an anatomical mask of the parietal cortex.

Nucleus accumbens/VMPFC mask, feedback phase (Supplementary Fig. 8b): all voxels with $Z > 3.1$ for contrast (iv) in model 1, described above, that lay within an anatomical mask encompassing the nucleus accumbens and VMPFC. A more stringent threshold was used for ROI generation than in IPS/dMFC to enable increased anatomical specificity; similar results could be obtained irrespective of exact threshold used.

Cingulate/paracingulate cortex mask for Figure 7b: all voxels with $Z < -2.8$ for contrast (ii) in GLM 1 that lay within an anatomical mask of the cingulate and paracingulate cortices.

Ventromedial prefrontal cortex mask, decision phase (Supplementary Fig. 9): an 8-mm sphere placed at a location consistent with findings from a recent meta-analysis of value-related activations.

A Supplementary Methods Checklist is available.

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Corrigendum: Hierarchical competitions subserving multi-attribute choice

Laurence T Hunt, Raymond J Dolan & Timothy E J Behrens
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In the version of this article initially published, a minus sign was missing before the coefficient $\beta$ in equation (3), Online Methods. The error has been corrected in the HTML and PDF versions of the article.