Abstract

We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their allocations. In the case of piecewise uniform preferences, we define a game that in the presence of strategic agents has equilibria that are not dominated by the allocations of any mechanism. We identify that the equilibria of this game coincide with the allocations of an existing cake cutting mechanism.
## Contents

1 Introduction  
   1.1 To Cut a Cake  
   1.2 Outline of this Work  
   1.2.1 Our Contribution  

2 A Framework for Cake Cutting  
   2.1 The Cake Cutting Situation  
   2.1.1 Restricted Preferences  
   2.2 Properties of Allocations  
   2.3 Mechanisms  
   2.3.1 Moving Knife Protocols  
   2.3.2 Robertson-Webb Protocols  
   2.3.3 Revelation Protocols  
   2.3.4 Behavioural Assumptions  

3 Literature Review  
   3.1 Origins  
   3.2 Envy Free Protocols  
   3.2.1 Summary  
   3.3 Query Complexity  
   3.4 Cutting Pies  
   3.5 The Price of Fairness  
   3.6 Truthful Mechanisms  

4 Efficiency of Allocations  
   4.1 Utilitarian Efficiency  
   4.1.1 Non-Existence of Mechanisms  
   4.2 Egalitarian Efficiency  
   4.2.1 Non-Existence of Mechanisms  

5 Strategic Cake Cutting  
   5.1 Two Non-Wasteful Mechanisms  
   5.2 Length Game and its Equilibria  
   5.3 Characterisations  


6 Conclusion

A Table of Mechanisms

B Robertson-Webb Formulations
1 Introduction

1.1 To Cut a Cake

The topic of cake cutting is a subset of fair division, having its origins in recreational mathematics. It is the problem of dividing a resource between a number of agents in a fashion that is “fair”, be it a cake between children or zoning rights between property developers.

What are the qualities of this resource? Well, a cake is not a bag of sweets. The resource is continuous, and any given piece can be subdivided into smaller pieces. A cake is not a mousse. The resource is heterogeneous, different agents can attach different values to different regions of cake. Finally, a cake is not meant to be eaten alone. No agent has exclusive right to the cake; it is a windfall good, its origin unimportant. We have a cake, and we must cut it.

To effect the division of the cake we need more than a kitchen knife. If there is any hope that the resulting allocation is to have the properties we desire of it, we need a mechanism: a clearly specified set of rules that incorporates whatever information it can evoke from the agents to find an allocation that best satisfies whatever criteria we require of it.

1.2 Outline of this Work

In Section 2 we introduce the mathematical framework in which we will work throughout the text. Section 3 we review the existing cake cutting literature, focusing on mechanisms and their properties. In Section 4 we look at the efficiency of allocations, and show that in general optimal allocations cannot be produced by any cake cutting mechanism. Part of this problem stems from the strategic behaviour of agents, so in Section 5 we will consider the equilibria induced by such in a restricted preferences model of cake cutting. We conclude in Section 6.

Appendix A summaries all mechanisms mentioned in this text and Appendix B gives pseudocode presentations of the Robertson-Webb protocols.
1.2.1 Our Contribution

Our main result is that the cake cutting mechanism of [CLPP10] attains an allocation that is undominated in terms of utilitarian efficiency. We achieve this with the help of a game whose equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to the mechanism’s outcomes, which better allows us to isolate the desired property.
2 A Framework for Cake Cutting

Problems in cake cutting have been approached by authors from Mathematics, Economics, Computer and Political Science. As such terminology is not standard; different papers use different terms to refer to the same concepts and sometimes the same terms to different concepts. We will therefore dedicate this section to introducing notation and definitions as they will be used in this text, which will allow us to use the same language throughout the literature review in Section 3.

2.1 The Cake Cutting Situation

Central to cake cutting is, of course, the cake. In general we take the cake to be the unit interval, $[0, 1]$, although we shall touch upon the slightly different context of pie cutting in Section 3.4. Cakes of higher dimensions do arise in the literature, but that is beyond the scope of the current work.

A cake cutting situation consists of the cake and a finite number of agents. If the number of agents is not explicitly specified, we will reserve $n$ for the number of agents. Every agent has a utility function on subsets of cake. We denote agent $i$’s utility function by $u_i$. We require that $u_i$ be:

- Normalised: $u_i([0, 1]) = 1$.
- Countably additive: $u_i(X \cup Y) = u_i(X) + u_i(Y)$, where $X$ and $Y$ are disjoint.
- Non-atomic: $u_i([a, a]) = 0$.
- Non-negative: $u_i(X) \geq 0$.

These requirements are standard. Occasionally (for instance, in [Su99]) an additional “hungry agents” condition is required:

- Non-zero: $u_i(X) = 0$ only if $X$ has zero measure.
Formally, we require that \( u_i \) be a probability measure defined on a \( \sigma \)-algebra of subsets of the cake. That is:

\[
u_i([a,b]) = \int_a^b t_i(x) \, dx
\]

for a probability density function \( t_i \). It should be noted that many papers on the subject do not make this explicit. For most purposes the exact form of the function is unimportant, it is sufficient that it satisfies the first four conditions above and that the agents are able to respond to certain queries regarding their utility; we shall encounter this when we define Robertson-Webb protocols. Authors that do give definitions tend to give conflicting ones. [Woo80], like us, defines a utility function as given by a probability measure, while in [DS61] any countably additive real valued function suffices.

A slice of cake refers to a continuous sub-interval of \([0,1]\). Non-atomicity of utility functions allows us to assume that all slices are closed. A portion is a union of one or more slices such that any two portions are disjoint, with the possible exception of boundary points. An \( n \)-tuple of portions, \( A = (A_1, ..., A_n) \), is an allocation, with portion \( A_i \) being allocation to agent \( i \). Agent \( i \) thus derives \( u_i(A_i) \) utility from allocation \( A \).

As slices and portions will be of greater interest to us than any other subset of cake, we will use \(|X|\) to refer to the length, rather than the cardinality, of \( X \). That is:

- \(|[a,b]| = b - a\)
- \(|X \cup Y| = |X| + |Y|\), for disjoint \( X, Y \).

If at any point we wish to refer to the cardinality of set \( X \), we will use \(#X\).

### 2.1.1 Restricted Preferences

While an arbitrary real valued density function is sufficient for many results in cake cutting, it leads to problems from the computational side. Almost all such functions have no finite representation (as there are uncountably many such functions, but only countably many representations), and accordingly many associated problems are uncomputable.

One way to circumvent such issues is to restrict the range of admissible functions. Three such restricted functions, as used in [CLP10] and [CLP11], are given below:

- **Piecewise uniform**: the cake can be partitioned into a finite number of intervals such that for some constant \( c \), \( t_i(x) = c \) or 0 over every interval. As utilities are normalised, \( c = 1/|P_i| \) where \(|P_i|\) is the total length of the cake that agent \( i \) has non-zero density over. For computational purposes, we require that the endpoints of these intervals be rational numbers.

- **Piecewise constant**: the cake can be partitioned into a finite number of intervals such that \( t_i \) is constant over every interval. In other words, \( t_i \) is an arbitrary normalised step function. For computational purposes, we require that the endpoints of the intervals and the values of \( t_i \) be rational numbers.
• Piecewise linear: the cake can be partitioned into a finite number of intervals such that $t_i$ is a linear function over every interval. For computational purposes, we require that the endpoints of the intervals, slopes and $y$-intercepts of $t_i$ be rational numbers.

Note that to specify piecewise uniform preferences it is sufficient to specify which intervals of the cake the agent has non-zero density over. In other words, the intervals the agent values. Due to this representational ease, we will often use piecewise uniform preferences in examples.

2.2 Properties of Allocations

As the term “fair division” suggests, an underlying motivation of cake cutting is the desire to cut the cake in some way that is “fair”. To speak formally of fairness, we need to define notions of equity. Taking $A = (A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ as an allocation, we give three of the more prominent definitions here.

• Proportionality: $u_i(A_i) \geq 1/n$ for all $i$.
• Envy Freeness: $u_i(A_i) \geq u_i(A_j)$ for all $i, j$.
• Equitability: $u_i(A_i) = u_j(A_j)$ for all $i, j$.

In words, a proportional allocation ensures each of $n$ agents feels that they received at least $1/n$th of the cake. An envy free allocation ensures that no agent likes the portion of another agent more than their own. Equitability ensures all agents derive the same utility from the allocation.

**Example 1.** Given an allocation, we can visualise the equity criteria via an $n \times n$ table. For instance, if $n = 3$ we construct:

|     | $A_1$  | $A_2$  | $A_3$  |
|-----|--------|--------|--------|
| $u_1$ | $u_1(A_1)$ | $u_1(A_2)$ | $u_1(A_3)$ |
| $u_2$ | $u_2(A_1)$ | $u_2(A_2)$ | $u_2(A_3)$ |
| $u_3$ | $u_3(A_1)$ | $u_3(A_2)$ | $u_3(A_3)$ |

The diagonal is precisely the utilities derived from $A$. Hence if all entries are at least $1/n$, $A$ is proportional. If the entries in the diagonal are greater than or equal to all other entries in their row, $A$ is envy free. If all the entries in the diagonal are equal, $A$ is equitable.

The reader may note that in any cake cutting situation a trivial envy free allocation is just $E = (\emptyset, \ldots, \emptyset)$. That is, envy can be eliminated by throwing the cake away. It would however be difficult to defend such a manner of attaining equity. As such in addition to equity criteria, certain concepts of efficiency are beneficial.
• Non-wastefulness: for every interval \( I \), if \( u_i(I) = 0 \) then \( I \subseteq A_i \) only if \( u_j(I) = 0 \) for all \( j \).

• Pareto efficiency: there is no allocation \( B = (B_1, \ldots, B_n) \) such that \( u_i(A_i) \leq u_i(B_i) \) for all \( i \) and \( u_j(A_j) < u_j(B_j) \) for some \( j \).

• Utilitarian optimality: there is no allocation with a higher utilitarian efficiency than \( A \). That is:

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} u_i(A_i) \geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} u_i(B_i) \tag{2.2}
\]

for all allocations \( B \).

Observe that the equity criteria do not, in general, imply each other. Consider these three examples:

**Example 2.** Consider three agents with piecewise uniform preferences. Agent one values \([0, 0.1]\). Agent two and three both value \([0.4, 1]\). We construct the allocation \((A_1, A_2, A_3) = ([0, 0.1], [0.4, 0.8], [0.8, 1])\). In other words:

|     | \( A_1 \) | \( A_2 \) | \( A_3 \) |
|-----|---------|---------|---------|
| \( u_1 \) | 1       | 0       | 0       |
| \( u_2 \) | 0       | 2/3     | 1/3     |
| \( u_3 \) | 0       | 2/3     | 1/3     |

This allocation is proportional as all the entries in the diagonal are greater than or equal to 1/3. It is not envy free because \( u_3(A_2) > u_3(A_3) \): that is, agent 3 envies agent 2. It is not equitable as the entries in the diagonal are not equal.

**Example 3.** Consider two agents with piecewise uniform preferences. Agent one values \([0, 0.5]\), agent two values \([0.5, 1]\). We construct the allocation \((A_1, A_2) = (\emptyset, [0.5, 1])\).

|     | \( A_1 \) | \( A_2 \) |
|-----|---------|---------|
| \( u_1 \) | 0       | 0       |
| \( u_2 \) | 0       | 1       |

The allocation is envy free, as the diagonal entries are the maxima of their respective rows. It is not proportional as \( u_1(A_1) < 1/2 \). It is not equitable as \( u_1(A_1) \neq u_2(A_2) \).

**Example 4.** Consider two agents with piecewise uniform preferences. Agent one values \([0, 0.6]\), agent two values \([0.4, 1]\). We construct the allocation \((A_1, A_2) = ([0.5, 1], [0, 0.5])\)

|     | \( A_1 \) | \( A_2 \) |
|-----|---------|---------|
| \( u_1 \) | 1/6     | 5/6     |
| \( u_2 \) | 5/6     | 1/6     |

The allocation is equitable, as \( u_1(A_1) = u_2(A_2) \), but it is neither envy free nor proportional.
On the other hand, the efficiency criteria are of increasing strength.

Claim 1. An allocation is utilitarian optimal only if it is Pareto efficient and an allocation is Pareto efficient only if it is non-wasteful.

Proof. Suppose an allocation $A$ is utilitarian optimal but not Pareto efficient. Then there exists an allocation $B$ such that $u_i(A_i) \leq u_i(B_i)$ for all $i$ and $u_j(A_j) < u_j(B_j)$ for some $j$. But then:

\[
\sum_{i \neq j} u_i(A_i) \leq \sum_{i \neq j} u_i(B_i) \quad (2.3)
\]

\[
u_j(A_j) < u_j(B_j) \quad (2.4)
\]

\[
\sum_{i=0}^{n} u_i(A_i) < \sum_{i=0}^{n} u_i(B_i) \quad (2.5)
\]

which is impossible because $A$ is utilitarian optimal.

Suppose an allocation $A$ is Pareto efficient but wasteful. That means for some $i, j$ there exists an interval $I \subseteq A_i$ such that $u_i(I) = 0$ but $u_j(I) > 0$. But then we can attain a Pareto dominant allocation by giving $I$ to $j$, keeping everything else unchanged. \qed

Finally, though in general the equity criteria are independent, that is not the case if other requirements are imposed. A result that we will often implicitly invoke is that if the entire cake is allocated, then envy freeness implies proportionality.

Claim 2. Given an allocation $A$, if:

\[
\bigcup_{i=1}^{n} A_i = [0, 1] \quad (2.6)
\]

then $A$ is envy free only if it is proportional.

Proof. Suppose $A$ is not proportional. Then there exists some agent, $i$, such that $u_i(A_i) < 1/n$. Since utilities are additive and normalised, $\sum u_i(A_j) > (n - 1)/n$ for $j \neq i$. The average value of $u_i(A_j)$ is greater than $1/n$ and as utilities are non-negative, there must exist some $j$ such that $u_i(A_j) > 1/n > u_i(A_i)$, which is to say, agent $i$ envies this $j$. \qed

2.3 Mechanisms

To obtain an allocation, we use a cake cutting mechanism. A cake cutting mechanism is a game played by the agents, which effects a resulting allocation. We give no general definition of a cake cutting mechanism: one would necessarily be too broad to be useful. Instead we identify three classes of mechanisms and motivate them separately.
2.3.1 Moving Knife Protocols

Some of the earliest cake cutting mechanisms, such as those proposed in Aus82 and Str80, consist of one or more knives being moved continuously along the cake, stopping when some player yells “cut!” [DS61] say the following regarding these protocols:

“But their solution is more than a mere existence theorem. In fact, it provides an important practical method for effecting such a division”

This is a rather curious feature of cake cutting. While more than an existence theorem, a moving knife protocol is certainly less than an effective procedure in the algorithmic sense: the continuous movement of the knife cannot be captured by a finite protocol. Perhaps a close parallel are the Japanese and Dutch auctions; in theory price is raised or lowered continuously until a winner is determined, while in any practical application a discrete step size would have to be used, and the auction would only approximate the continuous solution.

A moving knife protocol consists of a finite number of rules with clearly specified rates and directions of movement, and rules for stopping the knives. An agent may be asked to move a knife based on information from their own utility function: for instance, in Aus82 an agent is asked to move two knives such that the region between them is worth a half of the cake in the agent’s estimation. However, an agent may not move a knife based on another agent’s estimation, as this information is deemed to be private.

2.3.2 Robertson-Webb Protocols

Robertson-Webb protocols, so named after the authors of RW98, offer a formalisation that covers most finite cake cutting mechanisms. Agents are treated as oracles, able to respond to the following two queries:

- \texttt{eval}(a,b): The agent evaluates the slice between $a$ and $b$. That is, agent $i$ returns \( u_i([a,b]) \).

- \texttt{cut}(a,x): The agent moves a knife from $a$ to the right until they measure out a slice they value at $x$. That is, agent $i$ returns a $b$ such that \( u_i([a,b]) = x \).

A Robertson-Webb protocol is thus an algorithmic procedure taking $n$ agent oracles as input and returning an allocation of the cake. Throughout the text we will present Robertson-Webb protocols in a high level, natural language fashion. Pseudocode formulations are included in Appendix B.

The elegance of this formulation is in its ability to circumvent the difficulties of dealing with real valued functions. Agents can be assumed to be hypercomputational entities if need be, able to manipulate their own utility function sufficiently to respond to the two queries allowed by the mechanism. Whether or not their utilities have finite representations is of no concern to the mechanism.
2.3.3 Revelation Protocols

There exist finite protocols, for instance in [CLPP11], [CLPP10] and [CLP11], which cannot be represented as a Robertson-Webb protocol. Instead they take the form of routines which take the agents’ utility functions as input (accordingly some finite representation is required). As agents are required to directly submit their preferences to the mechanism, these bear some resemblance to the direct revelation mechanisms of implementation theory. We will thus refer to them as revelation protocols.

Formally, a revelation protocol is a function mapping \((u_1, ..., u_n) \rightarrow (A_1, ..., A_n)\). That is, it takes an \(n\)-tuple of utility functions to an allocation. This function is not necessarily computable; we will in Section 3.6 see a mechanism for which no computable implementation is known. Such mechanisms we call non-constructive to distinguish them from mechanisms proper.

It may not be a priori obvious that it is not possible to simulate a revelation protocol using a Robertson-Webb protocol. We claim that this is indeed the case, based on the following observation:

**Claim 3.** There exist cake cutting situations with piecewise uniform preferences where a Robertson-Webb protocol cannot create a non-wasteful allocation.

**Proof.** Consider a cake cutting situation with two agents where both agents value the entire cake uniformly. A non-wasteful allocation in this case is any that allocates the entire cake.

We will show that after a finite number of Robertson-Webb queries there exists a different cake cutting situation that would generate the same responses to all the queries, but where some agent, without loss of generality 1, does not value the entire cake.

Suppose a finite number of eval and cut queries has been made. In order to construct the different situation we wish to divide the cake into intervals. These will be determined by the queries made.

Place a mark on the cake at 0 and 1, all \(a, b\) for every eval\((a, b)\) query to agent 1 and all \(a, b\) for every cut\((a, x)\) query for agent 1 that returns \(b\). Our desired intervals are between consecutive marks thus placed. We refer to them as pieces.

For every piece, \([i, j]\), in our new situation agent 1 will value \([i, p] \cup [q, j]\) such that \(\vert[i, p] \cup [q, j]\vert = \vert[i, j]\vert/c\) for some \(c > 1\). We refer to all \([p, q]\) so defined as holes.

We claim that the eval queries return the same values: every interval \([a, b]\) evaluated this way will consist of a finite number of pieces. We reduced the length of valued cake in every piece by a factor of \(1/c\), so the length of valued cake in \([a, b]\) will be reduced by the same factor. As pieces cover the entire cake, the total length of valued cake is likewise reduced by a factor of \(1/c\). As the utility derived from a slice of cake with piecewise uniform preferences is just the length of valued cake in the slice divided by the total length of valued cake, eval must return the same value.

We claim that the cut queries return the same values: every slice marked by a query consists of a finite number of pieces, and we have already seen that the utility derived from the pieces is the same in both situations.
Now suppose agent 1 is allocated $A_1$ by the mechanism. If $A_1$ has a hole in it, then this allocation is wasteful. If $A_1$ does not have a hole in it, then we can replace agent 1 with 2 in the above construction. Agent 2 is allocated $[0, 1] \setminus A_1$, which must then have a hole in it, thus creating waste.

In other words, a Robertson-Webb protocol cannot find the breakpoints between intervals an agent values and intervals an agent does not. No such problems occur with a revelation protocol, as agents simply submit these breakpoints to the mechanism.

On the other hand revelation protocols cannot, in general, be said to be stronger than Robertson-Webb protocols. If agents’ preferences have some finite representation then indeed we can simulate a Robertson-Webb protocol with a revelation protocol, but if we do not have this guarantee then we cannot run a revelation protocol, while a Robertson-Webb protocol functions equally well.

### 2.3.4 Behavioural Assumptions

A mechanism is a game, and games offer players a choice of strategies to maximise their utility. In the case of moving knife protocols, how to stop or move the knife. For Robertson-Webb protocols, whether to respond to the queries sincerely or otherwise. For revelation protocols, to submit one’s actual utility function or some other which may result in a preferable outcome.

The allocations produced by a mechanism, therefore, must be understood in terms of the behaviour the mechanism expects from the agents. A weakly truthful envy free mechanism faced with fully strategic agents may no longer produce envy free allocations.

We identify three classes of mechanism in the literature.

- Naïve mechanism: Agents are assumed to be sincere. When we say a naïve mechanism creates an allocation $A$, we mean that $A$ is the outcome if all the agents follow exactly the rules specified by the mechanism.

- Weakly truthful mechanism: Weak truthfulness was the norm in classical cake cutting mechanisms. The concept is aptly explained in [Ste48]:

  “It is easy to prove that the methods explained here secure to every partner at least a part equal in value to the $1/n$th of the whole. The greed, the ignorance, and the envy of other partners can not deprive him of the part due to him in his estimation; he has only to keep to the methods described above. Even a conspiracy of all other partners with the only aim to wrong him, even against their own interests, could not damage him.”

A weakly truthful mechanism, therefore, is one that guarantees every agent a strategy that will secure them either a proportional or an envy free portion, regardless of the strategies chosen by other agents. Weak truthfulness has little meaning outside of proportional or envy free mechanisms: equitability and the efficiency
criteria are essentially global, it makes no sense to say an agent is guaranteed an equitable portion regardless of the portions of others.

The behaviour that is expected by weakly truthful mechanisms, therefore, is one of extreme risk aversion. Agents will deviate from sincerity if they can do so without risk, but failing that will stick to the guaranteed proportional/envy free portion provided by the mechanism.

- **Truthful mechanism**: These are a recent development in cake cutting and offer strategy-proofness in the conventional sense - sincerity is a weakly dominant strategy, and an agent can never increase their expected utility by submitting an insincere strategy.

The first and last category is relatively sparse, both appearing in rather recent papers. The better part of the mechanisms we will survey are weakly truthful, so we will take it as given in Section 3 that if the behavioural assumptions of a mechanism are not explicitly specified, the mechanism is weakly truthful.
3 Literature Review

We present an overview of the historical developments in cake cutting. In many ways the core area in cake cutting was the development of mechanisms to procure envy free allocations and we look at the main results of this in Section 3.2. Subsequent sections examine selected themes, mainly those pertinent to efficiency or strategy. To motivate the subject, we look at a prehistoric fair division protocol and a generalisation of it presented in Steiglitz.

3.1 Origins

While the modern treatment of cake cutting can be traced from the middle 20th century, problems of fair division predate recorded history. Humans are social beings, sensitive to issues of equity, and means of ensuring it have been around as long as we have. In particular, our first mechanism is certainly too ancient to be attributed authorship.

Mechanism 1 (Cut and Choose). Given two agents, agent 1 cuts the cake into two slices, \( X \) and \( Y \) such that \( u_1(X) = u_1(Y) \). Agent 2 gets assigned a slice of their choice and agent 1 gets assigned the remaining slice.

Proposition 1. Cut and Choose produces an envy free and proportional allocation.

Proof. For envy freeness, observe that agent 1 cannot be envious because \( u_1(X) = u_1(Y) \). Agent 2 cannot be envious because if \( u_2(X) > u_2(Y) \) then they would choose and be assigned \( X \), if \( u_2(Y) > u_2(X) \) they would choose and be assigned \( Y \).

For proportionality, we invoke claim 2.

The idea behind Cut and Choose is simple. Agent 1 is not envious because they effect the allocation in such a manner that they are indifferent between any permutation of the portions, agent 2 is not envious because they determine which permutation is allocated.

Letting one agent choose which possible world to be in is a intuitively appealing way of eliminating envy for that particular agent. This approach has been known as far back as Hesiod:

‘Son of Iapetus, most glorious of all lords, good sir, how unfairly you have divided the portions!’
So said Zeus whose wisdom is everlasting, rebuking him. But wily Prometheus answered him, smiling softly and not forgetting his cunning trick: ‘Zeus, most glorious and greatest of the eternal gods, take which ever of these portions your heart within you bids.\(^1\)

As simple as the mechanism is, the strategic implications of Prometheus’ “cunning trick” illustrate well the distinction between the behaviour expected by truthful and weakly truthful mechanisms.

Cut and Choose is a weakly truthful mechanism. Regardless of the behaviour of agent 2, agent 1 can secure an envy free outcome for themselves by following the rules of the mechanism: if \(u_1(X) = u_1(Y)\), agent 1 is indifferent between the possible allocations. Likewise, no matter how agent 1 cuts the cake, agent 2 gets to pick the piece they value most, hence they have no reason to envy the other agent.

However, truthful behaviour is not a dominant strategy for agent 1. If agent 1 behaves sincerely they derive \(\frac{1}{2}\) utility from the allocation, while if \(u_2(X) \neq u_2(Y)\) agent 2 will attain more than \(\frac{1}{2}\). That is not to say agent 1 has the short end of the stick, however. By anticipating the decision of agent 2, agent 1 can cut the cake so that \(u_2(X) = u_2(Y) + \epsilon\) and \(u_1(X) < u_1(Y)\), agent 2 will pick slice \(X\) for slightly more than \(\frac{1}{2}\) utility, whereas agent 1 gets slice \(Y\) which they value more than the \(\frac{1}{2}\) they would have received had they acted sincerely. \([KS02]\) dedicates a section to the behaviour of an expected utility maximising agent under different information assumptions in the Cut and Choose scenario.

On the other hand, if agent 1 is fully strategic then Cut and Choose may fail to produce an envy free allocation. If agent 1 has imperfect knowledge of agent 2’s utility, then in trying to cut the cake so that \(u_2(X) = u_2(Y) + \epsilon\), agent 1 may underestimate \(u_2(Y)\) and agent 2 will pick \(Y\), leaving agent 1 with \(X\) and envy of agent 2’s portion. We thus reiterate the remark at the end of Section 2.3.4 that throughout the literature review if the behavioural assumptions of a mechanism are not specified, it is taken to be weakly truthful.

During the 1940s Steinhaus, Banach and Knaster sought to extend the Cut and Choose mechanism to an arbitrary number of agents. In \([Ste48]\) they present a proportional mechanism for \(n\) agents:

**Mechanism 2 (Last Diminisher).** Given \(n\) agents, the first agent cuts a slice \(X\) such that \(u_1(X) = \frac{1}{n}\). If there exists an agent \(i\) such that \(u_i(X) > \frac{1}{n}\), agent \(i\) trims \(X\) into \(X'\) such that \(u_i(X') = \frac{1}{n}\). The trimmings are returned to the cake. The process continues until no such \(i\) exists. The trimmed slice is allocated to the last agent to trim it, and the procedure recurses on the remaining agents and the remaining cake.

**Proposition 2.** Last Diminisher produces a proportional allocation.

**Proof.** It is clear that if an agent is allocated a slice, they perceive that slice to be at least \(1/n\) of the cake. It remains to show that the mechanism can always make such an

\(^1\)Theogony, ll. 543-558. Translated by Hugh G. Evelyn-White.
allocation. That is, after \( i \) agents have been allocated, the remaining cake is perceived to be at least \((n - i)/n\) of the original by the remaining agents. We proceed by induction.

Base case: without loss of generality, relabel the agents such that 1 be the first agent to be allocated a slice. Let \( X \) be the slice allocated to 1. We claim that \( u_j(X) \leq 1/n \) for all \( j \). Assume otherwise: that is, for some \( j \), \( u_j(X) > 1/n \). Then abiding by the rules of the protocol, \( j \) would have trimmed \( X \) to some smaller \( X' \) such that \( u_j(X') = 1/n \), and \( j \) would have been allocated the first slice instead of 1. As such, by the additivity of utility functions, \( u_j([0,1]\backslash X) \geq (n - 1)/n \) for all remaining \( j \).

Inductive case: relabel the agents such that 1,...,\( i \) are the first \( i \) agents to be allocated a slice. By the inductive hypothesis, \( u_j(R) \geq (n - i)/n \) for \( j \notin \{1, ..., i\} \) where \( R \) is the remaining cake. Let \( i + 1 \) be the next agent to be allocated a slice. Call it \( X \). Observe that \( u_j(X) \leq 1/n \) for all \( j \notin \{1, ..., i\} \) by the same argument as before. So by additivity, \( u_j(R \backslash X) \geq (n - i - 1)/n \) for all remaining \( j \).

We have thus established that for any \( i \), the remaining \( n - i \) agents view the remaining cake as at least \((n - i)/n\) of the original cake. As such the mechanism can always allocate an agent a slice they perceive to be at least 1/n of the cake.

Unfortunately, this mechanism fails to be envy free. While an agent can never envy those who have been allocated before them, it is entirely possible for them to envy some agent that gets allocated a slice later in the protocol.

**Example 5.** Consider three agents with piecewise uniform preferences. Agent 1 values the entire cake, agent 2 values \([2/5, 1]\), agent 3 values \([4/5, 1]\). Agent 1 will be allocated \([0, 1/3]\) first, then agent 2 \([5/15, 9/15]\), and agent 3 the remaining \([9/15, 1]\).

\[
\begin{array}{c|ccc}
 & A_1 & A_2 & A_3 \\
u_1 & 1/3 & 4/15 & 2/5 \\
u_2 & 0 & 1/3 & 2/3 \\
u_3 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
\end{array}
\]

So agents 1 and 2 envy 3. The envy of 2 towards 3 could be eliminated by using Cut and Choose once only two agents remain, but agent 1 would still envy 3.

As it turns out, the problem of finding envy free allocations is far more difficult.

### 3.2 Envy Free Protocols

To avoid dealing with uninteresting cases, for the duration of this section we will only consider mechanisms that allocate the entire cake, as this prevents the empty allocation from being a solution.

An envy free protocol for the three agent case was discovered by Selfridge, first published in [Woo80].

**Mechanism 3** (Selfridge’s Algorithm). Agent 1 cuts the cake into slices \( X, Y, Z \) such that \( u_1(X) = u_1(Y) = u_1(Z) \). Without loss of generality, we can relabel the slices
such that $u_2(X) \geq u_2(Y) \geq u_2(Z)$. Agent 2 trims slice $X$ into $X'$ and $T$ such that $u_2(X') = u_2(Y)$. Agent 3 picks whichever of $X'$, $Y$ and $Z$ they prefer, agent 1 picks one of the two remaining and agent 2 gets the last slice. It remains to divide $T$.

There are two cases in the division of $T$. If agent 1 chose slice $X'$ then $T$ is divided between 2 and 3 using Cut and Choose.

Otherwise let whichever of 2 and 3 chose slice $X'$ be $x$ and the other $y$. Agent $y$ cuts $T$ into $U, V, W$ such that $u_y(U) = u_y(V) = u_y(W)$. Agent $x$ picks whichever slice they prefer, 1 picks from the remaining two and $y$ is allocated the last slice.

**Proposition 3 ([Woo80]).** Selfridge’s Algorithm produces an envy free allocation.

It pays to note that while we have defined slices as distinct from portions, thus far the two notions have been used interchangeably. Selfridge’s Algorithm is the first we cover where an agents’ portion consists of more than one slice. As it turns out, this is not coincidental. While proportional mechanisms can and do allocate contiguous intervals to agents, envy free Robertson-Webb protocols need necessarily fragment the portions.

**Theorem 1 ([Str08]).** A Robertson-Webb protocol cannot produce an envy free allocation for more than two agents if the agents’ portions consist of a single slice each.

The above theorem hinges on the nature of such mechanisms, not of the nature of the cake. In fact, envy free allocations where portions consist of single slices always exist ([Str80]). This is not the first time we will run into mathematical existence and algorithmic impossibility: this should not be surprising as measure theory lives among the Reals, while algorithmics with the Integers. If we allow the mechanism to be non-algorithmic, there is no impossibility. In the same paper, a continuous mechanism is presented to effect such an allocation for three agents:

**Mechanism 4 (Four Knives).** A sword is moved continuously left to right across the cake, dividing it into left and right slices, $X$ and $Y$. Three agents move knives across $Y$ such that each agents’ knife splits $Y$ into what they consider two even slices, $Y_1$ on the left and $Y_2$ on the right. Whenever $u_i(X) = 1/3$, agent $i$ yells “cut!”. The cake is cut by the sword and the middle knife, splitting it into $X$, $Y_1$ and $Y_2$. Agent $i$ receives $X$. If the agent whose knife is nearest to the sword is not $i$, they take $Y_1$. If the agent whose knife is farthest from the sword is not $i$, they take $Y_2$. If the agent whose knife cut the cake is not $i$, they take whichever slice is left over.

**Proposition 4 ([Str80]).** Four Knives produces an envy free allocation.

Neither of these two mechanisms generalise to larger numbers of agents as Last Diminisher did. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that the proportionality of the portions allocated thus far will not be affected by whatever allocations the mechanism may make in the future. Once an agent is allocated a portion they perceive to be worth at least $1/n$, whatever portions the other agents receive will not alter the fact that the agent’s portion is a proportional one. This is not the case with envy free procedures; envy can rear its head at any stage of the allocation.
One approach to this difficulty draws on a moving knife procedure of [Aus82] that allows two agents to find an allocation where both agents consider either piece to be worth half the cake - what is called a perfect allocation, a concept to which we will return in Section 3.6.

**Mechanism 5** (Austin’s Scheme). A knife is moved from the left across the cake, separating it into $X$ and $Y$. When $u_i(X) = 1/2$, agent $i$ yells “stop”. Agent $i$ takes the knife, adds a new knife to the left edge of the cake and moves the two knives across in such a manner such that the region between the knives is always 1/2 of the cake in $i$’s estimation. When the region outside the knives is worth 1/2 in the second agent’s estimation, that agent yells “stop”. $i$ gets the slice between the knives and the other agent gets the rest of the cake.

**Proposition 5** ([Aus82]). Austin’s Scheme produces a perfect allocation.

By iterating Austin’s Scheme one can cut the cake into $2^n$ slices such that agents 1 and 2 think all slices are worth the same. This idea is used by [BTZ97] to create an envy free moving knife mechanism for four agents.

**Mechanism 6** (Four Agent Moving Knife). Agents 1 and 2 use Austin’s Scheme to cut the cake into $U$ and $V$, then use Austin’s Scheme on $U$ and $V$ to end up with four slices, $X, Y, Z, W$, such that 1 and 2 consider each of the slices to be 1/4 of the entire cake. Agent 3 trims the most valuable slice in their estimation, without loss of generality $X$, into $X’$ such that there exists a tie between $X’$ and the second most valuable slice.

Agent 4 picks the slice they value most. If agent 4 did not pick $X’$, agent 3 is allocated $X’$. Otherwise, agent 3 picks the slice they value most. Agents 1 and 2 pick the remaining slices in any order. It remains to divide the trimmings.

Rename agents 3 and 4 into $x$ and $y$ where $x$ is the agent that picked $X’$. Agent $y$ and 2 use Austin’s Scheme on the trimmings to divide it into four slices they consider to be all worth the same, $T_1, T_2, T_3$ and $T_4$. Agent $x$ picks a slice of their choice, then 1, then $y$, then 2.

**Proposition 6** ([BTZ97]). Four Agent Moving Knife produces an envy free allocation.

What allows the mechanism to divide the trimmings without generating envy is that agents 1 and 2 have an ‘irrevocable advantage” over the player that chose $X’$. Even if that player were to be allocated the entirety of the trimming, 1 and 2 would not envy that player because that would only bring their portion back up to $X$, which 1 and 2 value as much as their own.

[BT95] capitalise on the idea of irrevocable advantage to create an envy free mechanism for any number of agents. Unfortunately the details of the mechanism are too complex to give here. The general procedure involves having one agent cut the cake into $n$ slices they consider equal, and a preliminary allocation of these slices made. Whenever this creates envy, a subroutine is run between the envied and the envier until the envier has an irrevocable advantage over the envied.
This mechanism is guaranteed to produce an envy free allocation in a finite number of steps, but this number is unbounded: for any $c$ there exists a cake cutting situation in which the mechanism will run for more than $c$ steps. No bounded Robertson-Webb protocol for four or more agents is known.

### 3.2.1 Summary

The mechanisms presented in this section do not represent the entirety of the envy free cake cutting literature, but they do cover all cases for which a solution is known.

| Robertson-Webb                        | Moving knife |
|---------------------------------------|--------------|
| 2 agents                              | Cut and Choose | [Aus82] |
| 3 agents                              | Selfridge, presented in [Woo80] | [Str80] |
| 4 agents                              | BT95 (unbounded) | BTZ97 |
| 5 or more                             | BT95 (unbounded) | None known |

Note that we did not cover any revelation protocols: these require that the agents have finitely representable utility functions and the core areas of cake cutting do not allow that assumption.

To date no bounded protocol, Robertson-Webb or moving knife, is known for five or more agents. While we did not explicitly state so, the reader can easily verify that all mechanisms presents before that of [BT95] do terminate in a bounded number of “steps”: queries in the case of Robertson-Webb protocols, cuts in the case of moving knife mechanisms. However the fact that this fails in [BT95] suggests that the query and cut complexity of mechanisms may be interesting in its own right. We examine this in the next section.

### 3.3 Query Complexity

The standard approach to measuring the complexity of procedures in Computer Science is to bound the growth of the running time with respect to the input. To do so in the context of cake cutting, we need a procedure that can run on an arbitrary number of agents. We have already seen such a procedure in Mechanism 2: Last Diminisher. A natural starting point is to inquire as to the complexity of this mechanism.

**Claim 4.** The query complexity of Last Diminisher is $O(n^2)$.

**Proof.** The reader may find the pseudocode formulation in Appendix B helpful.

There is a nested loop at play here: we have one agent cut a slice of cake, then all the remaining agents evaluate and possibly trim the slice. For every agent allocated we thus have at worst $2n$ queries, and as we allocate $n$ agents the upper bound is $O(n^2)$. [EP84] improve on this bound. They present a proportional mechanism that takes $O(n \log n)$ queries.
Mechanism 7. Have every agent mark the midpoint, rounding down in the case of an odd number of agents, of the cake in their own valuation. That is, agent \( i \) marks \( m_i \) such that \( u_i([0, m_i]) / u_i([m_i, 1]) = (n+1) / (n+1) \). Observe that such an \( m_i \) is just a real number, so we can define \( \prec \) as follows: if \( m_i < m_j \) set \( m_i \prec m_j \), if \( m_i = m_j \) break the tie arbitrarily. Let \( m_j \) be the \( \lfloor n/2 \rfloor \)th mark in this order. Recurse on two subroutines: one with agents \( i \) for \( m_i \preceq m_j \) and cake \([0, m_j]\) and the other on agents \( i \) for \( m_j \prec m_i \) and cake \([m_j, 1]\).

If only one agent is left in a subroutine, allocate them all the cake in the subroutine.

Proposition 7 ([EPS84]). Mechanism 7 takes \( O(n \log n) \) queries and produces a proportional allocation.

As it turns out this is the best we can do. While in the same paper [EPS84] present a randomised protocol that takes \( O(n) \) cuts on average, as far as worst case complexity goes a lower bound was proven by [EP06].

Proposition 8 ([EP06]). The lower bound on the query complexity of proportional Robertson-Webb mechanisms is \( \Omega(n \log n) \).

Given Mechanism 7, this bound is clearly tight. A lower bound for envy free mechanisms was given in [Pro09]. However as thus far no bounded, \( n \)-agent envy free procedures are known, the actual bound may well be higher.

Proposition 9 ([Pro09]). The lower bound on the query complexity of any envy free Robertson-Webb mechanism is \( \Omega(n^2) \).

3.4 Cutting Pies

The distinction between cakes and pies, in the eyes of a mathematician, is that cakes are square and pies are round. A pie is then identified with \([0, 1] \) where 0 and 1 are topologically identical. That is to say, \([0.9, 0.1] \) is a slice of pie, but not of cake.

Note that if we allow portions to consist of any number of slices, there is no difference between the two problems. \([0.9, 0.1] \) may not be a slice, but \([0.9, 1] \cup [0, 0.1] \) is clearly a portion, and given additive utilities it is valued the same. In this section, then, we take it that a portion can consist of only one slice.

Pies are of interest to us primarily because of two impossibility results.

Proposition 10 ([Str07],[Tho07]). There exist pie cutting situations where no allocation is both envy free and Pareto efficient.

Proposition 11 ([Tho07]). Truthful pie cutting mechanisms cannot produce Pareto efficient allocations.

To this point we have dealt solely with the equity side of the problem, so it is interesting that Proposition 10 suggests that issues of efficiency may be more closely intertwined with equity than first apparent. Proposition 11 hints that there are difficulties involved in inducing truthful behaviour, which we shall return to in Section 4.
3.5 The Price of Fairness

An important concept in Economics is the tradeoff between equity and efficiency. Cake cutting is no different, and the efficiency loss imposed by our equity criteria has been studied in [CKKK09] and [AD10]. The first paper is connected with utilitarian efficiency only, the second introduces the notion of egalitarian efficiency:

$$\text{UE}(A) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} u_i(A_i)$$ (3.1)

$$\text{EE}(A) = \min_i u_i(A_i)$$ (3.2)

The authors define the price of proportionality (respectively: envy freeness and equitability) with respect to utilitarian efficiency (respectively: egalitarian) to be the ratio of the utilitarian optimum to the proportional allocation with the highest utilitarian efficiency. The reader will note that this value will be different in different cake cutting situations. We are typically interested in the worst case: that is, the highest possible value of this instance. By picking extreme situations, therefore, this allows one to place bounds on the price of these criteria. We will present a result of [CKKK09] to demonstrate this procedure.

**Proposition 12 ([CKKK09]).** The price of proportionality is at least $\sqrt{n}/2$.

**Proof.** Consider a cake cutting situation with piecewise uniform preferences, where $n$ is a square. That is, $n = m^2$ for some $m \in \mathbb{N}$. For $i \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$, $i$ values $[\frac{i-1}{m}, \frac{i}{m}]$. All other agents value the entire cake uniformly. One can verify that the utilitarian optimum would involve allocating $[\frac{i-1}{m}, \frac{i}{m}]$ to $i$, and nothing to $i \notin \{1, \ldots, m\}$. The utilitarian efficiency of this allocation is $m = \sqrt{n}$.

Next, consider a proportional allocation. In order to maximise utilitarian efficiency we should minimise the amount of cake we give to agents $i \notin \{1, \ldots, m\}$. The least we could give each is $1/n$ of the cake, which would yield $(n - \sqrt{n}) \cdot 1/n = \frac{n - \sqrt{n}}{n}$ efficiency. For a large enough $n$ this is close to 1. This will leave us with $1/m$ of the cake to divide between the first $m$ agents. No means of doing this can give us more than 1 efficiency, so the total utilitarian efficiency is at most $2$.

The price of proportionality, therefore, is bounded below by $\sqrt{n}/2$. \qed

We summarise their results in a table:

| Price of: | Proportionality | Envy freeness | Equitability |
|-----------|-----------------|---------------|--------------|
| Countable portions | $\text{UE}$ | At least: $\sqrt{n}/2$ | $\sqrt{n}/2$ | $(n + 1)^2/4n$ |
| [CKKK09] | At most: $2\sqrt{n} - 1$ | $n - 1/2$ | $n$ |
| Single slice portions | $\text{UE}$ | At least: $\sqrt{n}/2$ | $\sqrt{n}/2$ | $n - 1 + 1/n$ |
| [AD10] | At most: $\sqrt{n}/2 + 1$ | $\sqrt{n}/2 + 1$ | $n$ |
| $\text{EE}$ | 1 | $n/2$ | 1 |
3.6 Truthful Mechanisms

The treatment of fully strategic behaviour in the literature is a recent development. Aside from the results of [Tho07] in the context of pies, there are two papers on the subject, giving us two mechanisms, one of which is non-constructive. Both of these are revelation protocols, thus require the additional assumption that agents’ preferences have some finite representation. In the case of Mechanism 9 this is guaranteed by piecewise uniform preferences, while in Mechanism 8 one must bear in mind that the mechanism may not function on an arbitrary cake cutting situation.

The non-constructive mechanism, discovered independently by [CLPP10] and [MT10], relies on the concept of a perfect allocation.

**Definition 1.** An allocation $A$ is perfect if $u_i(A_j) = 1/n$ for all $i,j$. That is, every agent thinks every slice is exactly $1/n$ of the cake.

Using our previous means of a table to visualise an equity criteria, a perfect allocation is where all the entries in the table are $1/n$.

|     | $A_1$ | ··· | $A_n$ |
|-----|-------|-----|-------|
| $u_1$ | $1/n$ | ··· | $1/n$ |
| $u_2$ | $1/n$ | ··· | $1/n$ |
| ··· | ··· | ··· | ··· |
| $u_n$ | $1/n$ | ··· | $1/n$ |

A result of [Alo87] guarantees the existence of perfect allocations. However this result is purely existential. In fact, such an allocation cannot be attained by a Robertson-Webb protocol, even for two agents [RW97]. If we could find such an allocation, however, we could use the following mechanism:

**Mechanism 8.** Given the agents’ preferences, construct a perfect partition, $(\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_n)$. Randomly assign $\pi_i$ to some agent. Remove that agent and recurse on the remaining agents.

**Proposition 13 ([CLPP10], [MT10]).** Mechanism 8 is truthful in expectation and produces a perfect allocation.

Such a solution leaves much to be desired. Even the non-constructive nature aside, the fact that this mechanism is only truthful in expectation means that it is not robust enough to handle risk seeking agents: a single agent willing to take a gamble on the outcome could submit an insincere utility function, thereby the partition constructed by the mechanism would not be perfect at all, and could well lead to loss of envy freeness and proportionality for the sincere agents.

Given piecewise uniform preferences, however, a deterministic mechanism which avoids these difficulties exists.

**Mechanism 9.** Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a subset of agents and $\mathcal{X}$ a subset of the cake. Let $D(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{X})$ be all the intervals of $\mathcal{X}$ that are valued by at least one agent in $\mathcal{A}$. Define:

$$\text{avg}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{X}) = \frac{D(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{X})}{\# \mathcal{A}}$$ (3.3)
An allocation is said to be *exact* with respect to $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{X}$ if it assigns to every agent in $\mathcal{A}$ a portion of $\mathcal{X}$ of length $\text{avg}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{X})$ consisting only of the intervals that the agent values.

Given the set of agents $\mathcal{A}$ and the cake $[0, 1]$, find $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathcal{A}$ such that $\mathcal{A}$ minimises the value of $\text{avg}(\mathcal{A}, [0, 1])$. Produce an exact allocation with respect to $\mathcal{A}$ and $[0, 1]$. Recurse on $\mathcal{A} \setminus \mathcal{A}$ and $[0, 1] \setminus D(\mathcal{A}, [0, 1])$.

**Proposition 14.** Mechanism $\mathcal{A}$ is truthful and produces an envy free allocation.

To date no extensions to more complicated preferences are known.
4 Efficiency of Allocations

We examine the notions of utilitarian and egalitarian efficiency, asking what it means for an allocation to be optimal in either of these measures. We place bounds on their values and discuss the conditions for their existence. In both cases we demonstrate that such allocations cannot, in general, be produced by cake cutting mechanisms if the agents are allowed to be strategic.

4.1 Utilitarian Efficiency

We recall the notion of utilitarian efficiency:

\[ UE(A) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} u_i(A_i) \] (4.1)

A utilitarian optimal allocation is therefore one which attains the highest possible utilitarian efficiency. It is easy to put bounds on this value, but due to the flexibility of a cake cutting situation these aren’t very interesting:

**Proposition 15.** The utilitarian efficiency of a utilitarian optimal allocation is bounded above by \( n \), below by 1, and these bounds are tight.

**Proof.** For the upper bound, we observe that the maximum utility attained by any one agent is 1 due to normalisation. A sum of \( n \) terms, each bounded by 1, is bounded by \( n \). To see that this bound is tight, consider a cake cutting situation with piecewise uniform preferences where agent \( i \) values \( \left[ \frac{i-1}{n}, \frac{i}{n} \right] \). That is, all preferences are disjoint, so we can allocate every agent a portion that they value as much as the entire cake.

For the lower bound, \( u_i([0,1]) = 1 \) for any \( i \), so we can always give the entire cake to one agent. To see that this is bound is tight, consider a cake cutting situation with piecewise uniform preferences where all agents value the entire cake. That is the utility derived from any portion by any agent is precisely the portion’s length, \( u_i(A_i) = |A_i| \). As no allocation can allocate portions with combined length exceeding that of the cake, the utilitarian efficiency cannot exceed 1.

Another simple, yet important, result concerns the existence of utilitarian optimal allocations.
Theorem 2. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a utilitarian optimal allocation is that it be possible to divide the cake into a finite number of slices, $S_i$, such that for all $i$, for some $j$, for every sub-interval $S'_i \subseteq S_i$, for all $k$, $u_j(S'_i) \geq u_k(S'_i)$.

Proof. Suppose this condition is not satisfied. Let $A$ be any allocation. There must be some slice, $S$, in some portion, $A_i$, such that for some sub-interval $S' \subseteq S$, $u_j(S') > u_i(S)$ for some $j$. Then the allocation obtained by moving $S'$ to $A_j$ and keeping all else equal will have a higher utilitarian efficiency. As it is always possible to create an allocation with a higher utilitarian efficiency, there can be no maximum.

Suppose this condition is satisfied. We claim that the allocation produced by allocating $S_i$ to the $j$ so defined is optimal. Suppose otherwise. This would mean that it is possible to improve on this allocation by giving the interval $I \subseteq [0, 1]$ to some other agent. We consider two cases.

Case one: $I \subseteq S_i$ for some $i$. In this case $I$ is already allocated to a $j$ such that $u_j(I) \geq u_k(I)$ for all $k$. As preferences are additive, giving $I$ to any other agent cannot increase the utilitarian efficiency.

Case two: $I \subseteq \bigcup S_i$ where $i \in X$ for some $X$. We split $I$ into $I_i$, such that $I_i = I \cap S_i$. Given additivity of preferences, allocating each $I_i$ to the agent that values it most will yield at least as much utility as allocating all of $I$ to some agent. With $I_i$ so defined, we can return to case one.

Theorem 2 may seem to merely restate what a utilitarian optimal allocation is, rather than provide the conditions for its existence. However this circumlocution is necessary, and allows us to prove that cake cutting situations with piecewise linear preferences always admit utilitarian optimal allocations.

Proposition 16. Given a cake cutting situation with piecewise linear preferences, a utilitarian optimal allocation exists.

Proof. We will divide the cake into a finite number of slices, $S_i$, satisfying the hypotheses of Theorem 2.

Recall that with piecewise linear preferences, the cake can be partitioned into a finite number of intervals such that $t_i$ is linear over every interval. We will refer to these intervals as pieces. Mark a point on the cake wherever:

- A piece of some $t_i$ begins or ends, or
- $t_i(x) = t_j(x)$ for $i \neq j$. That is, wherever the density functions of two agents intersect.

Observe that this constitutes a finite number of marks: we have a finite number pieces for each of a finite number of agents, and as $t_i$ is linear over every piece it can only intersect other $t_j$ a finite number of times.

Let $S_i$ then be the slice between the $i$th and $(i + 1)$th mark, taking the mark at 0 to be the first. Observe that there exists a $j$ such that $t_j|_{S_i}(x) \geq t_k|_{S_i}(x)$ for all $k$. For if not, then either some $t_k$ must intersect $t_j$ over $S_i$, or there are two pieces of $t_k$ in $S_i$.
such that over one piece $t_j$ is larger, over the other $t_k$. But neither of these is possible, because we placed marks at every intersection and every piece endpoint, so over every slice we only have non-intersecting, linear functions.

As agent $j$’s density therefore is greater over all of $S_i$, it is easy to see that for every sub-interval $S_i′ \subseteq S_i$, $u_j(S_i′) \geq u_k(S_i′)$.

**Corollary 1.** Given a cake cutting situation with piecewise constant or piecewise uniform preferences, a utilitarian optimal allocation exists.

**Proof.** Either of the two can easily be seen to be a special case of piecewise linear preferences.

Piecewise linear preferences are extremely general and can be used to approximate a wide range of utility functions, so it may well be the case that for every non-pathological case a utilitarian optimum exists. However, the cake cutting framework is general enough to admit pathologies where one does not. It is not terribly difficult to construct such an example using density functions which oscillate an infinite number of times over the unit interval.

**Example 6.** Consider a cake cutting situation with two agents, their density functions given by $t_1(x) = \alpha(\sin(\frac{x}{2}) + 1)$ with normalisation constant $\alpha \approx 0.744391$, and a constant $t_2(x) = 1$.

For any partition of the cake into a finite number of slices, we can always improve on the allocation by splitting a slice on the right of the cake into two, and allocating each to whichever agent derives more utility from it.

While an infinitely oscillating function is necessary for a counter example, it is not sufficient. If we replace $t_2$ in the above example with a piecewise defined:

$$
t'_2(x) = \begin{cases} 
0 & : x \in [0, 0.5) \\
2 & : x \in [0.5, 1]
\end{cases}
$$

Then an optimum allocation clearly exists: give $[0, 0.5]$ to agent 1, $[0.5, 1]$ to agent 2.

The problem arises from the fact that in some situations we can always increase efficiency by making a finer division of the cake. As such we speculate that the problem would disappear if the agents’ portions were a fixed number of slices.

**Conjecture 1.** A utilitarian optimal allocation always exists in the context where the agents’ portions are restricted to a constant $c$ number of slices.

### 4.1.1 Non-Existence of Mechanisms

We round off our discussion of the utilitarian optimum by observing that such allocations are, in general, unattainable.

A utilitarian optimal allocation will generally require a very precise partition of the cake, and Robertson-Webb protocols cannot obtain enough information about the agents’ utility functions to do so.
Corollary 2. Robertson-Webb protocols cannot always produce utilitarian optimal allocations.

Proof. By Claim 3, Robertson-Webb protocols cannot always produce non-wasteful allocations, so by Claim 1 they cannot produce utilitarian optimal allocations. 

More generally, a utilitarian optimum may be against the interests of individual agents. As such it should be no surprise that mechanisms fail in the face of strategic agents.

Claim 5. There is no cake cutting mechanism that attains a utilitarian optimal allocation in every cake cutting situation if the agents are strategic.

Proof. Consider two situations with three agents with piecewise uniform preferences. In the first agent 1 values $[0, 0.5]$, agent 2 $[0.5, 1]$, agent 3 $[0, 1]$. In the second agent 1 values $[0, 0.5]$, agent 2 $[0.5, 1]$, agent 3 $[0.4, 0.6]$.

Observe that in the first situation the unique utilitarian optimal allocation is $A_1 = ([0, 0.5], [0.5, 1], \emptyset)$ while in the second $A_2 = ([0, 0.4], [0.6, 1], [0.4, 0.6])$.

Suppose a mechanism, given the second situation, produces $A_2$. When faced with the first situation, agents 1 and 2 have the same preferences as before, and as such will respond to the mechanism in the same manner. Agent 3 has different preferences, but that information is not available to the mechanism. As agent 3 derives more utility from $A_2$ than $A_1$, they can pretend to value $[0.4, 0.6]$ instead of $[0, 1]$ and the mechanism would be unable to distinguish between the two situations and would produce a suboptimal allocation in one of the cases.

We can also show that there exists no mechanism that always attains a greater or equal utilitarian efficiency than any other mechanism. This suggests that a better candidate for the “best possible” mechanism may be one that is never dominated, rather than one that always dominates - we return to this in Section 5.3.

Claim 6. There is no mechanism that in every cake cutting situation produces an allocation with utilitarian efficiency greater or equal to that produced by any other mechanism, if the agents are strategic.

Proof. Take an arbitrary allocation, $A$, and consider the mechanism that always allocated $A$, regardless of the situation it is in. If $A$ is non-empty, we can always find a cake cutting situation in which $A$ is actually utilitarian optimal, so the mechanism will produce a utilitarian optimal allocation in at least one situation.

Clearly we can define such a mechanism for every possible allocation. If there existed a mechanism that did at least as well as all of these, it would necessarily produce a utilitarian optimal allocation in any cake cutting situation, but if the agents are strategic this is impossible.
4.2 Egalitarian Efficiency

Recall that egalitarian efficiency was defined in [AD10] as:

\[ \mathcal{EE}(A) = \min_i u_i(A_i) \] (4.3)

As with utilitarian efficiency, we can define an egalitarian optimal allocation as one which maximises this value and likewise prove bounds on it.

**Proposition 17.** The egalitarian efficiency of an egalitarian optimal allocation is bounded above by 1, below by 1/n, and these bounds are tight.

**Proof.** It is easy to see that for any allocation \( A \),

\[ n \cdot \mathcal{EE}(A) \leq \mathcal{UE}(A) \] (4.4)

In particular, if \( A \) is utilitarian optimal then for any \( B \),

\[ n \cdot \mathcal{EE}(B) \leq \mathcal{UE}(A) \] (4.5)

as otherwise the utilitarian efficiency of \( B \) would have been higher than of \( A \).

With Proposition 15, this immediately gives us the upper bound. To see that it is tight, consider again the case of pairwise disjoint piecewise uniform preferences.

For the lower bound, we can create an allocation with egalitarian efficiency of at least \( 1/n \) by running Last Diminisher or any other proportional mechanism. To see that it is tight, we invoke (4.5) and Proposition 15.

In both situations used in the proof, we in fact had a stronger relation than that of (4.5). The egalitarian efficiency of the egalitarian optimum was equal to \( 1/n \) of the utilitarian efficiency of the utilitarian optimum. One may ask if this is always the case. The answer is no.

**Example 7.** Consider a cake cutting situation with piecewise uniform preferences with three agents where agents 1 values \([0, 0.5]\), agent 2 values \([0.5, 1]\) and agent 3 values the cake uniformly. The unique utilitarian optimal allocation is \(([0, 0.5], [0.5, 1], \emptyset)\), with utilitarian efficiency of 2. The egalitarian optimum, however, is \(([0, 0.25], [0.75, 1], [0.25, 0.75])\) with egalitarian efficiency of only 1/2.

4.2.1 Non-Existence of Mechanisms

Observe that to attain an egalitarian efficiency higher than \(1/n\) is to give every agent a portion they value at more than \(1/n\) of the cake. This coincides with an equity criterion examined in [DSG1].
Definition 2. An allocation $A$ is super proportional if $u_i(A_i) > 1/n$ for all $i$.

[DS61] prove the existence of super proportional allocations, provided at least two agents have different utility functions. However [MT10] present an impossibility result for attaining such allocations.

Proposition 18 ([MT10]). There is no mechanism that produces a super proportional allocation in every cake cutting situation if the agents are strategic.

Corollary 3. There is no mechanism that produces an egalitarian optimal allocation in every cake cutting situation if the agents are strategic.

Proof. If a situation has two agents with different utility functions, a super proportional allocation exists. Any egalitarian optimum, therefore, must be super proportional. \qed
5 Strategic Cake Cutting

Motivated by the existence result of Proposition 16, we ask whether we can construct mechanisms to find utilitarian optimal allocations in the simplest case - that of piecewise uniform preferences. It turns out that as far as naïve mechanisms go the problem is trivial, which leads us to consider strategic behaviour.

5.1 Two Non-Wasteful Mechanisms

As we saw in Claim 1, a necessary condition for an allocation being utilitarian optimal is it being non-wasteful. As such given Claim 3 we can exclude Robertson-Webb protocols from consideration, and in the interests of keeping our mechanisms conventionally computable we will also exclude moving knife protocols. This leaves us with revelation protocols, which suits us well as given our definition of piecewise uniform preferences we are guaranteed to have a finite representation: an agent need only submit the end points of every interval they value.

Since for the duration of this section we restrict our attention to piecewise uniform preferences, we no longer need the generality of our previous definition of a utility function. We will denote by $P_i$ the preferences of agent $i$: that is, the union of all the slices agent $i$ values. A cake cutting situation with piecewise uniform then is completely specified by the $n$-tuple $(P_1, ..., P_n)$. A mechanism will be a function $(S_1, ..., S_n) \mapsto (A_1, ..., A_n)$, where $S_i$ is the strategy of agent $i$: a union of slices, not necessarily equal to $P_i$. The utility an agent attains from an allocation can be seen to be just:

$$u_i(A_i) = \frac{|A_i \cap P_i|}{|P_i|}$$

Non-wastefulness is not an onerous condition, but it is sufficient for the most obvious of trivial solutions - give all the cake to one agent - to fail. If the agent does not value the entire cake, there may be waste where they receive some slice from which they derive no utility, but some other agent would have. We need to be a bit more sophisticated, but not by much.
Mechanism 10 (Lex Order). Form a linear order, $\prec$, over the agents. Allocate every agent $i$:

$$A_i = S_i \setminus \bigcup_{j< i} S_j \quad (5.2)$$

In other words, Lex Order simply gives every agent what they asked for, minus what was already given to agents coming earlier in the order. It’s easy to see that Lex Order is a truthful mechanism: agents’ payoffs are determined solely by the order, which is exogenous. Submitting some $S_i$ where $|P_i \setminus S_i| \neq 0$ would certainly not help agent $i$: it will only reduce the chance of them getting some of the cake that they value. Submitting some $S_i$ where $|S_i \setminus P_i| \neq 0$ likewise cannot increase their utility. However in this case it cannot decrease it either. Being truthful in this respect is only weakly dominant. Unfortunately pretending to value some of the cake that one does not can potentially harm the welfare of other agents. If the first agent in the order claims to value $[0, 1]$ while they only value $[0, 0.1]$ Lex order may no longer be non-wasteful. This leads us to define a behavioural restriction.

**Definition 3.** Agents are said to be well behaved if $S_i \subseteq P_i$ for all $i$.

We will generally assume agents are well behaved. This involves the implicit assumption that ceteris paribus, agents have a bias in favour of truthfulness and derive no misanthropic pleasure from causing harm to others. If need be, this behaviour could be enforced by, for instance, imposing an $\epsilon$ cost on the length of an agent’s strategy. If $\epsilon$ is small enough it should not deter the agent from choosing a strongly dominant strategy if one exists, but faced with multiple equivalent strategies will choose the smallest - which would be in accord with well behavedness.

We observe that if one had some prior knowledge of the agents’ preferences, one could easily construct $\prec$ such that Lex Order would produce a utilitarian optimal allocation: simply order the agents by the length of their preferences. The question, then, is how one should behave in the absence of such information. The obvious approach would be to ask the agents, and that is what we will consider.

### 5.2 Length Game and its Equilibria

We modify Lex Order to construct $\prec$ based on the lengths of the agents’ strategies.

**Mechanism 11** (Length Game). Form a linear order $\prec$, over the agents such that if $|S_i| < |S_j|$, $i \prec j$. If $|S_i| = |S_j|$ order the two in any order. Allocate agent $i$:

$$A_i = S_i \setminus \bigcup_{j < i} S_j \quad (5.3)$$
Proposition 19. With sincere agents, Length Game produces a utilitarian optimal allocation.

Proof. Given situations $P$, let $A$ be the allocation produced by Length Game and $A'$ a different allocation. That is, there must be some interval $I \subseteq A_i$ such that $I \subseteq A'_j$ for $i \neq j$. Observe that $i \prec j$, otherwise $I$ would have been in $A_j$. This means $|P_i| \leq |P_j|$. The efficiency gained from $I$ in both cases is then:

$$\frac{|I \cap P_i|}{|P_i|} \leq \frac{|I \cap P_j|}{|P_j|}$$

(5.4)

because $|I \cap P_i| = |I \cap P_j| = |I|$. As such $A'$ cannot improve on the utilitarian efficiency of $A$. □

The more interesting question, of course, is what happens if the agents strategise. That is, we want to find the equilibria of Length Game. To proceed we need some more terminology. An $n$-tuple of strategies, $(S_1, ..., S_n)$, submitted to Length Game as input we shall call a profile. The region of the cake valued by agent $i$ and only agent $i$, $P_i \setminus \bigcup P_j$, is agent $i$'s uncontested region. Given a profile $(S_1, ..., S_n)$ and the resulting allocation $(A_1, ..., A_n)$, if $S_i = A_i$ for all $i$, we say the profile is reduced.

We use the standard notion of a pure strategy equilibrium: resistance to deviation by a single agent.

Definition 4. Let $S = (S_1, ..., S_n)$ be a profile and $A = (A_1, ..., A_n)$ the resulting allocation. We say that $S$ is in equilibrium if there is no $i$ for which there exists a $S'_i$ such that the profile $S' = (S_1, ..., S'_i, ..., S_n)$ produces an allocation $(A'_1, ..., A'_n)$ where $u_i(A'_i) > u_i(A_i))$.

An allocation is an equilibrium if it is produced by an equilibrium profile.

Reduced profiles are convenient because they simplify the strategic considerations of the agents. If an agent sees a region of cake they could get by claiming it, they should claim it, without paying heed to the other agents.

Example 8. Consider three agents, $P_1 = [0, 0.5]$, $P_2 = [0, 0.6]$, $P_3 = [0.5, 1]$. Consider the non-reduced profile, $([0, 0.4], [0.1, 0.5], [0.5, 1])$, where the tie is broken in favour of agent 2. That is, the allocation is $([0, 0.1], [0.1, 0.5], [0.5, 1])$. It is not entirely clear what agent 2 should do. They could claim some of $[0.5, 0.6]$ and get it allocated to them instead of 3, but by doing so they will lose their tie with 1 and the cake associated with it.

On the other hand, suppose the profile is $([0, 0.1], [0.1, 0.5], [0.5, 1])$. Now agent 2 has a clear incentive to claim $[0.5, 0.6]$ as there can be no loss in utility from doing so.

As such we would like to restrict our attention to reduced profiles. We need two lemmata to show that there is no loss of generality in doing so.
Lemma 1. Given any profile of Length Game, there exists a reduced profile producing the same allocation.

Proof. Let \( S = (S_1, \ldots, S_n) \) be a profile and \( A = (A_1, \ldots, A_n) \) the resulting allocation. Construct \( S' = (S'_1, \ldots, S'_n) \) such that \( S'_i = A_i \).

As portions are disjoint, so must be all \( S'_i \). Thus regardless of the order constructed by Length Game, given \( S' \) the mechanism would simply allocate \( S'_i \) to agent \( i \), as \( |S'_i \setminus S'_j| = 0 \) for all \( j \). Then \( S' \) is a reduced profile producing \( A \).

Lemma 2. A Length Game profile is in equilibrium only if the associated reduced profile is in equilibrium.

Proof. Let \( S \) be a Length Game profile and \( S' \) the associated reduced profile. Observe that \( |S_i| \geq |S'_i| \) for all \( i \).

Suppose \( S' \) is not an equilibrium profile. Then some agent \( i \) has an available strategy, \( M_i \), such that \( u_i(A^*_i) > u_i(A_i) \), where \( A^* \) is the allocation produced by \( (S'_1, \ldots, M_i, \ldots, S'_n) \).

As \( u_i(A^*_i) > u_i(A_i) \) there must be some sub-interval \( I \subseteq A^*_i, I \not\subseteq A_i \). There are two cases to consider.

If \( I \) is not allocated to anyone in \( S \), then clearly agent \( i \) has incentive to claim \( I \) in \( S \), so \( S \) is not an equilibrium profile.

If \( I \subseteq A_j \), it follows that \( I \subseteq S'_j \), so if \( i \) is allocated \( I \) by playing \( M_i \) it must be the case that \( |M_i| \leq |S'_j| \). Since \( |S'_j| \leq |S_j| \), \( |M_i| \leq |S_j| \), and \( i \) has incentive to play \( M_i \) in \( S \), so it is not an equilibrium profile.

With reduced profiles, we can clearly see that an agent has no incentive to leave their uncontested region unclaimed.

Lemma 3. A reduced Length Game profile with well behaved agents is in equilibrium only if every agent’s strategy includes their uncontested region.

Proof. Since agents are well behaved, no other agent would claim \( i \)’s uncontested region, so \( i \) can always increase their utility by claiming it.

This gives us all the tools we need to characterise the equilibrium.

Proposition 20. A well behaved reduced Length Game profile is in equilibrium if and only if:

1. \( \bigcup_{i=1}^{n} P_i \subseteq \bigcup_{i=1}^{n} S_i \) (All the valued cake is allocated).

2. Whenever \( |S_i \cap P_j| \neq 0 \) for \( i \neq j \), \( |S_i| \leq |S_j| \).

Proof. For the if direction, assume 1 and 2 hold. Assume, for contradiction, that the profile is not in equilibrium: some agent \( i \) by submitting \( S'_i \neq S_i \) can force the allocation \( A' \), where \( u_i(A'_i) > u_i(A_i) \). Thus there is some \( I \subseteq A'_i, I \not\subseteq A_i \). I cannot be in \( i \)’s uncontested region, by Lemma \( 3 \) we know that \( I \subseteq S_i \), and since the profile is reduced
\( S_i = A_i \). Therefore \( I \subseteq P_j \cap P_i, j \neq i \). We can choose this \( j \) such that \( |A_j \cap I| \neq 0 \): by 1 we know that \( I \) is allocated, and by well behavedness we know that it is allocated to agents that value it. Since \( A_j = S_j \), we have that \( |S_j \cap P_i| \neq 0 \). By 2, we have that \( |S_j| \leq |S_i| \).

Consider \( |S'_i| \). We know that \( A'_i \subseteq S'_i \), and \( u_i(A'_i) > u_i(A_i) \), so with (5.1) we can derive that:

\[
\frac{|A'_i \cap P_i|}{|P_i|} > \frac{|A_i \cap P_i|}{|P_i|} \quad (5.5)
\]

hence \( |A'_i| > |A_i| \), and \( |S'_i| > |S_i| \geq |S_j| \). But if \( |S'_i| > |S_j| \), \( j \) will come before \( i \) in \( \prec \), and be allocated \( I \). This gives the desired contradiction.

For the only if direction, first assume 1 fails. Then there is some cake valued by some \( i \) that is not allocated to any \( j \). Agent \( i \) can claim that cake and increase their utility, so the profile is not in equilibrium. Next, assume 2 fails. Then there exist some \( i,j \) such that \( |S_i \cap P_j| \neq 0 \) but \( |S_i| > |S_j| \). Agent \( j \) can claim some of \( |S_i \cap P_j| \) and be allocated it because \( |S_i| > |S_j| \), so the profile is not in equilibrium.

Note that with reduced profiles, we can use \( S_i \) and \( A_i \) interchangeably: that is, Proposition 20 also states the requirements for an equilibrium allocation.

Barring pairwise disjoint preferences, equilibria are non-unique. In fact, there are infinitely many of them. However, from a utilitarian point of view this is largely irrelevant as all well behaved equilibria are identical in terms of payoffs.

**Definition 5.** Two allocations, \( A \) and \( B \), are utilitarian equivalent if \( u_i(A_i) = u_i(B_i) \) for all \( i \).

Before we prove that all well behaved equilibria are utilitarian equivalent we need an auxiliary result, which is interesting in its own right.

**Proposition 21.** All well behaved equilibria of Length Game are Pareto efficient.

**Proof.** Let us first observe that we cannot allocate more cake than is available. Equivalently, we cannot allocate more valued cake than we have. Thus for any allocation \( A \):

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} |A_i \cap P_i| \leq \bigg| \bigcup_{i=1}^{n} P_i \bigg| \quad (5.6)
\]

If \( A \) is a Length Game equilibrium, we can strengthen the above into an equality; we have seen in Proposition 20 that all the valued cake is allocated.

Now, suppose that \( A' \) is a Pareto improvement on \( A \). That is, for all \( i \), \( u_i(A'_i) \geq u_i(A_i) \) and for some \( j \), \( u_j(A'_j) \geq u_j(A_j) \). Invoking (5.1):

\[
\frac{|A'_i \cap P_i|}{|P_i|} \geq \frac{|A_i \cap P_i|}{|P_i|} \quad (5.7)
\]
for all $i$, and:

$$\frac{|A'_j \cap P_j|}{|P_j|} > \frac{|A_j \cap P_j|}{|P_j|}$$

(5.8)

for some $j$.

Multiplying out the denominators this is equivalent to $|A'_i \cap P_i| \geq |A_i \cap P_i|$ and $|A'_j \cap P_j| > |A_j \cap P_j|$, and thus:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} |A'_i \cap P_i| > \sum_{i=1}^{n} |A_i \cap P_i| = \left| \bigcup_{i=1}^{n} P_i \right|$$

(5.9)

which gives us an impossibility.

Proposition 22. All well behaved equilibria of Length Game are utilitarian equivalent.

Proof. Let $S$ and $S'$ be two reduced, well behaved equilibrium profiles that are not utilitarian equivalent. Let $W$ be the set of all $i$ such that $u_i(A'_i) > u_i(A_i)$. From Proposition 21 we know that there is also a non-empty set $L$ consisting of agents $j$ where $u_j(A'_j) < u_j(A_j)$. All other agents will constitute the set $N$.

Recall that in equilibria the entire valued cake is allocated, giving us the identity:

$$\sum_{i \in W} |A'_i| + \sum_{i \in N} |A'_i| + \sum_{i \in L} |A'_i| = \sum_{i \in W} |A_i| + \sum_{i \in N} |A_i| + \sum_{i \in L} |A_i|$$

(5.10)

$$\sum_{i \in W} |A'_i| + \sum_{i \in L} |A'_i| = \sum_{i \in W} |A_i| + \sum_{i \in L} |A_i|$$

(5.11)

$$\sum_{i \in W} |A'_i| - \sum_{i \in L} |A_i| = \sum_{i \in L} |A_i| - \sum_{i \in L} |A'_i|$$

(5.12)

We claim that both sides of (5.12) must be positive. If not, this would mean that all agents in $L$ attain less utility in $A'$ despite the fact that they have at least as much cake between them as they did before. This is only possible if some agent receives some cake that they do not value, but this cannot be the case because well behaved equilibria of Length Game are not wasteful.

Consider a $j \in L$. As $u_j(A'_j) < u_j(A_j)$, there exists an interval $I \subseteq P_j$ such that $I \subseteq A_j, I \not\subseteq A'_j$. However $I$ is valued, so $I \subseteq A'_k$ for some $k$. As $S'$ is an equilibrium, $|S'_k| \leq |S'_j|$. As $S$ is an equilibrium, $|S_j| \leq |S_k|$. Given that the profiles are reduced and $u_j(A'_j) < u_j(A_j)$, we complete the chain to get $|S'_k| \leq |S'_j| < |S_j| \leq |S_k|$. $|S'_k| < |S_k|$, hence $u_k(A'_k) < u_k(A_k)$, hence $k \in L$. Thus the agents in $L$ do not lose any cake to agents outside of it, and as allocations are not wasteful at least one agent in $L$ must be no worse off in $A'$ than in $A$, giving us a contradiction. □
5.3 Characterisations

Having shown that all well behaved equilibria of Length Game have the same payoffs, we know wish to ask what these payoffs are. An important result is that from a consequentialist perspective, this mechanism is not new. In equilibrium it produces the same payoffs as Mechanism 9.

**Proposition 23.** Consider a cake cutting situation with piecewise uniform preferences \((P_1, ..., P_n)\). Let \((A_1, ..., A_n)\) be the allocation produced by Mechanism 9. Then \((A_1, ..., A_n)\) is a well behaved equilibrium profile of Length Game given the same preferences.

**Proof.** It suffices to show that \(S = (A_1, ..., A_n)\) satisfies the hypotheses of Proposition 20. Recall that a subroutine of Mechanism 9 takes a subset of agents, \(A\), and of cake, \(\mathcal{X}\) as input. \(D(A, \mathcal{X})\) is all the regions of \(\mathcal{X}\) valued by at least one agent in \(A\) and:

\[
\text{avg}(A, \mathcal{X}) = \frac{|D(A, \mathcal{X})|}{\#A}
\]  

(5.13)

To see that all the valued cake is allocated, consider an arbitrary interval \(I \subseteq P_i\) for some \(i\). Consider the subroutine on \(A, \mathcal{X}\) where \(i \in A\). Let \(I' \subseteq I\) be the part of \(I\) that was not yet allocated. That is, \(I' = I \cap \mathcal{X}\). As \(I' \subseteq P_i, I' \subseteq D(A, \mathcal{X})\). So after this subroutine \(I'\) will certainly be allocated to some agent.

To see that whenever \(|A_i \cap P_j| \neq 0\) for \(i \neq j\), \(|A_i| \leq |A_j|\), we consider two cases:

Case one: there is a subroutine on \(A\) and \(\mathcal{X}\) such that \(i, j \in A\). The mechanism allocates all agents in \(A\) a portion of length \(\text{avg}(A, \mathcal{X})\), so \(|A_i| = |A_j|\).

Case two: there are subroutines on \(A', \mathcal{X}'\) and \(A^*, \mathcal{X}^*\) such that \(i \in A'\) and \(j \in A^*\). Suppose \(|A_i \cap P_j| \neq 0\). Then the subroutine on \(A', \mathcal{X}'\) must be executed first, because all of \(P_j\) would be allocated after the subroutine on \(A^*\). Since subroutines are executed in order of increasing \(\text{avg}(A, \mathcal{X})\), \(\text{avg}(A', \mathcal{X}') \leq \text{avg}(A^*, \mathcal{X}^*)\). So \(|A_i| \leq |A_j|\). 

**Corollary 4.** All well behaved equilibria of Length Game are envy free.

**Proof.** Mechanism 9 produces an envy free allocation which is also a well behaved equilibrium. Proposition 22 establishes that all well behaved equilibria of Length Game are utilitarian equivalent, so they must all be envy free.

**Corollary 5.** Mechanism 9 is Pareto efficient.

**Proof.** Proposition 22 and 21.

This gives us two mechanisms which produce different allocations with sincere agents, but have the same equilibria given strategic behaviour. One mechanism induces truthful behaviour in agents, the other admits a dominant strategy equilibrium. This should be reminiscent of a result from implementation theory:

**Theorem 3** (Revelation Principle). Given a cake cutting situation with finitely representable preferences, if a mechanism \(M_1\) has dominant strategy equilibria, there exists a truthful mechanism \(M_2\) that produces utilitarian equivalent allocations.
Proof. This is a well known result in Economics. See, for instance, [Mye83].

The idea behind the construction is that $M_2$, termed the direct revelation mechanism, takes the utility functions of the agents as input. It then simulates the behaviour of the agents given $M_1$ and thus produces the allocation.

In our case Length Game is the naïve mechanism, and Mechanism 9 is the direct revelation equivalent. This is akin to the contrast between first and second price auctions: with sincere agents the first price auction generates higher revenue, while its equilibrium is equivalent to that of the strategy-proof second price auction. Within auction theory, the Revenue Equivalence theorem suggests that this is the best one can hope to achieve.

We prove a similar result with respect to the utilitarian efficiency of piecewise uniform cake cutting situations.

Theorem 4. If a mechanism produces an allocation with a higher utilitarian efficiency in some piecewise uniform situation than Mechanism 9 there is a situation in which it produces an allocation with a lower utilitarian efficiency.

Proof. The key in this proof is that if a mechanism produces allocation $(A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ in situation $(P_1, \ldots, P_n)$, then in any situation of the form $(P_1', \ldots, P_n')$ agent $i$ can force allocation $(A_1, \ldots, A_i, \ldots, A_n)$ by casting the same strategy they would have cast had their preferences been $P_i$.

Suppose that in situation $P = (P_1, \ldots, P_n)$ Mechanism 9 produces allocation $A = (A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ while mechanism $M^*$ produces allocation $A^* = (A_1^*, \ldots, A_n^*)$ such that $\mathcal{UE}(A^*) > \mathcal{UE}(A)$. There must therefore be some $i$ such that $u_i(A_i^*) > u_i(A_i)$. Given Proposition 21, there is also a $j$ with $u_j(A_j^*) < u_j(A_j)$. If there is more than one such $j$, pick one with the largest $|P_j|$. We consider two cases.

Case one: $|P_j| < 1$. Consider the situation $P'$ where $P'_i = [0, 1]$, $P'_k = P_k$ for $k \neq i$. Under mechanism 9 the allocation produced is $A'$. Observe that $|A_i'| \leq |A_i|$: agent $i$ can force allocation $A$, and since they do not it must be because they have no incentive in doing so. Since $|A_i^*| > |A_i|$, $|A_i^*| > |A_i'|$. To achieve this, agent $i$ must be given some cake by $M^*$ that Mechanism 9 gave to $j$ instead. There is some interval $I \subseteq A_j^*$, $I \subseteq A_i^*$. Observe that giving $I$ to $i$ raises $i$’s utility by $|I|$, but lowers $j$’s by $|I|/|P_j|$, $|P_j| < 1$. Since we picked $j$ to have the largest $|P_j|$, we can afford to lose all agents that lost utility, this means that $\mathcal{UE}(A^*) < \mathcal{UE}(A')$.

Case two: $|P_j| = 1$. Consider the situation $P''$ as above: agent $i$ with preferences $[0, 1]$ pretends to value $P_i$ to force allocation $A^*$ in $M^*$. Suppose $j$ pretends to value $|P_j''| < 1$. If this will yield them a larger slice, then $A^*$ is not an equilibrium. If this does not, then we fall back to case one and in the situation $(P_1', \ldots, P_j', \ldots P_n')$, $M^*$ would attain a lower utilitarian efficiency than Mechanism 9. \[\square\]
6 Conclusion

We have summarised the main results in the history of cake cutting, placing our focus on the mechanisms themselves, rather than measure theoretic existence results. This has revealed that concerns of efficiency and truthfulness are relatively new developments in the field.

As we have seen there may be good reasons for this: impossibility results abound when optimal allocations are concerned. The general cake cutting model is too broad to allow such allocations to be effected. Even if the desired optimum exists, obtaining it may be impossible if it is against the interests of the agents to do so.

We have, however, found a candidate for the “next best” solution in the case of piecewise uniform preferences: a mechanism that is never dominated by another, first presented in [CLPP10] and given a superficially different, but equivalent, characterisation here.

While the number of unresolved questions is vast, perhaps the most pertinent one here is whether there are similar results for piecewise constant preferences. Likewise, do non-trivial truthful mechanisms exist in such a case? The restriction to piecewise uniform preferences allowed us to sidestep a plethora of issues that would arise in such a situation. In fact, we conjecture that given the simplicity of the preferences Mechanism 9 is in some sense unique: perhaps all envy free, non-wasteful mechanisms must produce allocations which coincide with the equilibria of Length Game.

In a more general setting, even with the combined tools of Mathematics, Economics and Computer Science at our disposal it would seem that further progress will be no cakewalk.
## A Table of Mechanisms

| Mechanism                         | Comments                  | Introduced in | Page |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------|------|
| Cut and Choose                    | 2 agents, R-W, Pr, EF, WT | Prehistoric   | 12   |
| Last Diminisher                   | R-W, Pr, WT               | *Ste48*       | 13   |
| Selfridge’s Algorithm             | 3 agents, R-W, Pr, EF, WT | *Woo80*       | 14   |
| Four Knives                       | 3 agents, MK, Pr, EF, WT  | *Str80*       | 15   |
| Austin’s Scheme                   | 2 agents, MK, Pr, EF, Eq, WT | *Aus82*   | 16   |
| Four Agent Moving Knife           | 4 agents, MK, Pr, EF, WT  | *BTZ97*       | 16   |
| Mechanism 7                       | R-W, Pr, WT               | *EP84*        | 18   |
| Mechanism 8                       | RP, Pr, EF, Eq, Tr        | *CLPP10*, *MT10* | 20 |
| Mechanism 9                       | RP, Pr, EF, Tr            | *CLPP10*      | 20   |
| Lex Order                         | RP, Tr                    | Present work  | 29   |
| Length Game                       | RP, Nv                    | Present work  | 29   |

**Legend**

- **R-W**: Robertson-Webb protocol
- **MK**: Moving knife protocol
- **RP**: Revelation protocol
- **Pr**: Proportional mechanism
- **EF**: Envy free mechanism
- **Eq**: Equitable mechanism
- **Nv**: Naïve mechanism
- **WT**: Weakly truthful mechanism
- **Tr**: Truthful mechanism
B  Robertson-Webb Formulations

In this appendix we give Robertson-Webb formulations of mechanisms that appear in this text. Recall that the allowed queries are \( \text{eval}(a,b) \) and \( \text{cut}(a,x) \). We will use subscripts to indicate the agent queried. That is, \( \text{eval}_i(a,b) \) would query agent \( i \) to evaluate the slice \( [a,b] \). If it is understood that \( X = [x_1,x_2] \) is a slice, we may write \( \text{eval}_i(X) \) instead of \( \text{eval}_i(x_1,x_2) \). As before, \( A \) is the allocation and \( A_i \) is the portion of agent \( i \) in \( A \). \( \#A = n \).

Mechanism 1: Cut and Choose

\[ a = \text{cut}_1(0,0.5) \]
\[ \text{if } \text{eval}_2(0,a) > \text{eval}_2(a,1) : \]
\[ A_1 = [a,1], A_2 = [0,a] \]
\[ \text{else:} \]
\[ A_1 = [0,a], A_2 = [a,1] \]
\[ \text{return } A \]

Mechanism 2: Last Diminisher

\[ s = 0 \]
\[ l = 1 \]
\[ \text{while } A \neq \emptyset \]
\[ \text{for } i \text{ in } A : \]
\[ \text{if } \text{eval}_i(s,1) > 1/n : \]
\[ \text{last} = i \]
\[ \text{if } \#A > 1 : \]
\[ l = \text{cut}_1(s,1/n) \]
\[ A_{\text{last}} = [s,l] \]
\[ s = l \]
\[ l = 1 \]
\[ A = A\setminus\{\text{last}\} \]
\[ \text{return } A \]
Mechanism 3: Selfridge’s Algorithm

\[ a = \text{cut}_1(0, 1/3) \]
\[ b = \text{cut}_1(a, 1/3) \]
\[ X = \text{argmax} \{ [0, a], [a, b], [b, 1] \} \]
\[ Z = \text{argmin} \{ [0, a], [a, b], [b, 1] \} \]
\[ Y = [0, 1] \setminus X \cup Z = [y_1, y_2] \]
\[ v = \text{eval}_2(Y) \]
\[ c = \text{cut}_2(x_1, Y) \]
\[ X' = [x_1, c] \]

if \( \text{eval}_3(X') \geq \text{eval}_3(Y) \) and \( \text{eval}_3(X') \geq \text{eval}_3(Y) \):

\[ A_3 = A_3 \cup X' \]

Case = 1

if \( \text{eval}_1(Y) \geq \text{eval}_1(Z) \)
\[ A_1 = A_1 \cup Y \]
\[ A_2 = A_2 \cup Z \]

else:
\[ A_1 = A_1 \cup Z \]
\[ A_2 = A_2 \cup Y \]

else if \( \text{eval}_3(Y) \geq \text{eval}_3(X') \) and \( \text{eval}_3(Y) \geq \text{eval}_3(Z) \):

\[ A_2 = A_3 \cup Y \]

if \( \text{eval}_1(Z) \geq \text{eval}_1(X') \)
\[ A_1 = A_1 \cup Z \]
\[ A_2 = A_2 \cup X' \]

Case = 2

else:
\[ A_1 = A_1 \cup X' \]
\[ A_2 = A_2 \cup Z \]

Cut and Choose({2, 3}, [c, x_2])

else:
\[ A_3 = A_3 \cup Z \]

if \( \text{eval}_1(Y) \geq \text{eval}_1(X') \)
\[ A_1 = A_1 \cup Y \]
\[ A_2 = A_2 \cup X' \]

Case = 2

else:
\[ A_1 = A_1 \cup X' \]
\[ A_2 = A_2 \cup Y \]

Cut and Choose({2, 3}, [c, x_2])

if Case == 1:
\[ u = \text{eval}_2([c, x_2]) \]
\[ d = \text{cut}_2(0, 1/3 \ast u) \]
\[ e = \text{cut}_2(d, 1/3 \ast u) \]
if $\text{eval}_3(c,d) \geq \text{eval}_3(d,e)$ and $\text{eval}_3(c,d) \geq \text{eval}_3(e,x_2)$:

$A_3 = A_3 \cup [c,d]$

if $\text{eval}_1(d,e) \geq \text{eval}_1(e,x_2)$

$A_1 = A_1 \cup [d,e]$  
$A_2 = A_2 \cup [e,x_2]$
else:

$A_1 = A_1 \cup [e,x_2]$  
$A_2 = A_2 \cup [d,e]$
else if $\text{eval}_3(d,e) \geq \text{eval}_3(c,d)$ and $\text{eval}_3(d,e) \geq \text{eval}_3(e,x_2)$:

$A_3 = A_3 \cup [d,e]$

if $\text{eval}_1(c,d) \geq \text{eval}_1(e,x_2)$

$A_1 = A_1 \cup [c,d]$  
$A_2 = A_2 \cup [e,x_2]$
else:

$A_1 = A_1 \cup [e,x_2]$  
$A_2 = A_2 \cup [c,d]$
else:

$A_3 = A_3 \cup [e,x_2]$

if $\text{eval}_1(d,e) \geq \text{eval}_1(c,d)$

$A_2 = A_2 \cup [c,d]$  
$A_3 = A_3 \cup [e,x_2]$
else:

$A_1 = A_1 \cup [e,x_2]$  
$A_3 = A_3 \cup [d,e]$
else:

$u = \text{eval}_3([c,x_2])$

d = \text{cut}_3(0,1/3*u)$

e = \text{cut}_3(d,1/3*u)$

if $\text{eval}_2(c,d) \geq \text{eval}_2(d,e)$ and $\text{eval}_2(c,d) \geq \text{eval}_2(e,x_2)$:

$A_2 = A_2 \cup [c,d]$  
if $\text{eval}_1(d,e) \geq \text{eval}_1(e,x_2)$

$A_1 = A_1 \cup [d,e]$  
$A_3 = A_3 \cup [e,x_2]$
else:

$A_1 = A_1 \cup [e,x_2]$  
$A_3 = A_3 \cup [d,e]$
else if $\text{eval}_2(d,e) \geq \text{eval}_2(c,d)$ and $\text{eval}_2(d,e) \geq \text{eval}_2(e,x_2)$:

$A_2 = A_2 \cup [d,e]$  
if $\text{eval}_1(c,d) \geq \text{eval}_1(e,x_2)$

$A_1 = A_1 \cup [c,d]$  
$A_3 = A_3 \cup [e,x_2]$
else:

$A_1 = A_1 \cup [e,x_2]$
\[ A_3 = A_3 \cup [c, d] \]

\textbf{else}:
\[ A_2 = A_2 \cup [e, x_2] \]
\[ \text{if } \text{eval}_1(d, e) \geq \text{eval}_1(c, d) \]
\[ A_1 = A_1 \cup [d, e] \]
\[ A_3 = A_3 \cup [c, d] \]
\textbf{else}:
\[ A_1 = A_1 \cup [c, d] \]
\[ A_3 = A_3 \cup [d, e] \]

\textbf{return } A

\textbf{Mechanism 7}

\textbf{Subroutine}(A, [0, 1])
\textbf{return } A

\textbf{Subroutine}(\mathcal{A}, [s, t]):
\textbf{if } \#\mathcal{A} = 1
\[ A_i = [s, t], \ i \in \mathcal{A} \]
\textbf{break}
\textbf{for } i \text{ in } \mathcal{A}:
\[ v = \text{eval}_1(s, t) \]
\[ m_i = \text{cut}_1(s, 1/2*v) \]
\textbf{Form array } L \text{ where } L[i] \in \mathcal{A} \text{ and } m_{L[i]} < m_{L[j]} \text{ implies } i < j.
\textbf{for } j \leq \#\mathcal{A}/2:\n\[ \mathcal{A} = \mathcal{A} \cup \{L[j]\} \]
\textbf{Subroutine}((\mathcal{A}, [s, m_{\#\mathcal{A}/2}])
\textbf{Subroutine}((\mathcal{A} \setminus \mathcal{A}_1, [m_{\#\mathcal{A}/2}, t]))
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43