Identity and interests: History of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy and the Middle Eastern Muslim States, 1947 to 1956

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Abstract: This study discusses Islam as a “strategic entity” in Pakistan’s quest for identity and interests, in its formative years, 1947 to 1956. The end of the post-colonial era not only re-defines the geography of the world but equally redistributes the power structures between the retired empires and the new states. The new players in the pursuits of identity and interests restarted the old game of gain according to their political paradigms. In subsequent events, Pakistan’s immediate neighbors created unfavorable conditions for its Identity and Security. Pakistan also wants to cease its immediate colonial past and to safeguards its territorial integrity. Islam suits Pakistan in all aspects, it got independence on the slogan of separate Muslim land, thus Islam became the cornerstone of its domestic and foreign policies. The primary investigation of this study is centered on Pakistan’s relationship with the Middle East Muslim countries. Islam was very much in the consciousness of Indian Subcontinent Muslims; therefore Pan-Islamism had a wider appeal for Indian Muslims and it dates back when they regarded Ottoman Caliphate as a symbol of religious unity and political Islam.

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PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

As the World became a global village, people, especially academics want to know what happening in other corners of the world. In this regard, the present work can provide its readers a very short introduction about Pakistan, its national identity processes and its relationship with its co-religion states (Muslim countries). The present civilized world is much concerned about Muslim extremism and its roots, which is connected with Muslim countries’ varying nationhood ideologies. The following study can give a glimpse of Pakistan’s search for identity in its early years as a new independent state from 1947 to 1956. This research comprehends Islam as a strategic choice for the successive Pakistani government to build its relationship with Middle Eastern Muslim States. Since its creation Pakistan somehow or others used Islam to fulfill its identity and interest needs while dealing with the Muslim countries, especially the Middle Eastern states.
After independence, Pakistan's Islamic character and cordial relationship with Middle Eastern Muslim states became an important and constant factor in the country's foreign policy. But, on contrary the often-reiterated metaphor of Pan-Islamism failed to impress Pakistan's other counterparts in the Muslim world.

Subjects: Asian Studies; South Asian Studies; Pakistan; studies of; International Politics; Foreign Policy; Regionalism; Political Philosophy; Security Studies - Pol & Intl Relns; Asian Politics

Keywords: Identity; interests; Pakistan; Middle Eastern Muslim Countries; Pan-Islamism

1. Introduction

Islamic episteme is the raison d'État of the State of Pakistan. Islam transformed the Politico-Religious desire of the Indian Muslim under the British Colonial Raj into State building endeavor. This was quite a different political struggle for national emancipation than other freedom movements, where ethnicity or language was the main driving force. On the contrary, in the Pakistan movement, religious orientation (two-nation theory) was the sine qua non. “Pakistan stood out in the community of nation-states as being a state formed solely based on religious identity-with neither ethnic nor territorial integrity.¹

During two hundred years of colonization, Muslim's fate in India was uncertain, their identity and Religious, Political, Social, and Economic interests all were at stake. Muslims’ identity and interests in India during the long British colonial rule were adjusted by the colonizer according to colonial paradigms and preferences. The British rule in the Indo-Pak subcontinent brought distinct new elements and stronger boundaries to Muslim identities. “The period of British rule, which eventually became the British Empire, brought distinct new strands, indeed firmer edges, to Muslim identities. There was a sharpening of the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim, which was in the part outcome of the impact of British understandings of India and part that of religious revivalism movements.² The Muslim community in the subcontinent was a minority among the predominantly Hindu majority, in their future homeland, Pakistan, they were not content with the domestic practice of Islam, but had to import this ideology.

The 1st constituent assembly of Pakistan emphasized Islamic credentials in the Objective Resolution that passed in 1949, this document is called Magna Carta in the constitutional history of Pakistan. Islam was further institutionalized with the country the first constitution promulgated in 1956, which declared Pakistan as an Islamic country. Instead Pakistan project Islam to extract its identity and to safeguard its interests, most urgently the physical integrity of the new state from its hostile neighborhood, India, and Afghanistan. This over ambitious quest to devise a pan-Islamic bloc started immediately with a meta-Islamic program to break all the ideological boundaries among the Muslim states.

Pakistan was strategically located on the geopolitical juncture between the capricious West, South, and Central Asia that further elevated its neutral position as a non-Arab Muslim state to initiate a unity drive. Pakistan, therefore, was the natural protagonist of pan-Islamism. Pakistan regarded its independence as the outcome and encouragement for Muslim resurgence throughout the Muslim World. Because of this, immediately after its independence, Pakistan was the most vocal and ardent diplomat of the decolonization of Palestine, Sudan, Algeria, Morocco. “The scramble for Pakistan vested the future state with both colonial-era social structure and intermediaries’ powers, and Islamic universalism.³

This policy was very much emphasized by the country’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan who declared that “as Pakistan was created for the Muslims to live by Islamic teachings and traditions the state would, therefore, do more than merely leave them free to profess and practice their faith.⁴
But such advances were repulsed by the Arab states and claimed a sheer attempt from Pakistan to filch the Islamic leadership mantle from the more Arab Muslim states. Pakistan's overtures were cold-shouldered both by the Muslim governments and institutions.

At the time of Partition, Pakistan's government's paraphernalia was in tatters, the foreign office did not know how to handle the affairs of the new state. “In early 1949, the Iranian asked Pakistan's government for a “friendship treaty”, a request which Pakistan was fervent to comply with but unsure how to proceed in following circumstances Pakistan foreign Minister turned towards London and asked them to guide and provide them an educational note, how to draft a friendship treaty accord with Iran.” If the Pakistanis were unaware of procedure and protocol, the reservations on the Iranian side were even graver. Iran opted to go through London even though it was the Pakistanis it was attempting to befriend. Ultimately, Pakistan and Iran concluded a friendship treaty, and eventually, the Shah of Iran visited Pakistan. But Pakistan's wishes to cement its ties with the Arab world were shattered.

The Arab world was betrothed with regional disputes, leadership race, and engagement with the Western world over the issues of Oil's nationalization and the Suez Canal's rights. The whole region was adjusting itself in the aftershocks of the 2nd world war and flexing its muscles to face the cold war. But Pakistan's close association with the Western bloc to overcome its defense needs further doomed any chance of rapprochement with Muslim states in the Middle East.

2. Search for identity
During the British colonization of the subcontinent, Muslim's fate in India was indeterminate and undefined. Their identity and interests were in jeopardy under the British colonial rule and the Hindu majority's future government. While, Muslims of India were surrounded by a non-Muslim, which subscribed to highly receptive faith Islam was their only defense against the threatened loss of identity.

On 15th August Muslims of India, regained their “lost heaven” and now their vanished identity can be recovered with their special relationship with the Islamic world. Consequently, pan-Islamism suited the new country to become a part of the Islamic world to secure, its lost identity and interests. Therefore, Pakistan paid more attention to the affairs of the Middle East Muslim countries than the matters of the South Asia region due to its religious affinity with the Middle East. Owing to, religious commonality it considered itself as a fragment of the greater Middle East, than a part of the subcontinent.

This political cum geographical approach was modified with shifting interests and policies of Pakistan. “The shape of Pakistan's Middle Eastern relations, in general, may be seen in the context of Pakistan's security concerns and the need to adapt to changing political and economic realities both in South Asia and the Middle East.

But, Islam as a political force was not an issue in another Islamic world, especially in the Middle East for many reasons. They had recently got independence, protectorate and imperialism was scar for them, and they were in the fervour of Nationalism rather than old fashioned Pan-Islamism. Arabs were only used for territorial, racial, and linguistic nationalism. However, the task of Indian Muslims was more complicated and complex. They were not only fighting to get rid of British colonialism past but also contemplating how to escape Hindu supremacy in the region and future political alignment with the regional and global powers. To Muslims, Islam is a complete code of life, consequently, the very base and an essential part of nation-building, erect on the concept of Islam. In Iqbal's words, “Islam furnished them with those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups and finally transform them into very—defined people . . . India is perhaps the only country in the world where Islam, as a people-building force has worked its best.
Henceforth, after the partition, another basic question that haunted the Indian and Pakistani nations was, who is the legitimate heir of colonial India? “Again, Pakistan was an unfamiliar and possibly unstable complication on the map of Asia. Gandhi and Nehru were more known to the outside world than Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan.” Under the partition plan, different expert committees were formed to discuss the relevant departments and their future responsibilities in the new states. In this regard, a committee was constituted on foreign relations to ascertain the future goals and international obligations of the new states, Pakistan and India. This committee during its discussion argued that as a successor of British India, both India and Pakistan had equal international status as the Indian Independence Act of 1947, also guaranteed this, that, “to create two independent Dominions out of existing India.” But the majority of members of this expert committee decided that all international commitments of the Pre-Partition would be transferred to India. As a result, India on 15th August automatically became a member of UNO without any formal application and voting.

Therefore, after its creation, Pakistan had to labor significantly to get recognition as a new state and nation. It was very difficult for Pakistan to discuss treaties, arrange agreements, and established ambassadorial missions abroad. Pakistan’s economic and strategic problems were immense and the country was unnaturally divided into two parts, following unfavorable conditions further aggravated the situation. In the following situation, it was a herculean task for Pakistan, how to get recognition and present itself to the world? “During this period there developed in Pakistan, among Pakistani intellectuals, officials, and political leaders, the concept of a Muslim bloc standing between the communist powers and the West.”

Pakistan’s alliance with the West failed to address its apprehensions. Similarly, the Communist’s ideology was unacceptable with the beliefs of Islam. The country’s leadership found the solution to form a Muslim bloc as a panacea of country domestic and foreign problems. “Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of Sub-Continent wanted to build their lives according to the teaching and tradition of Islam because they wanted to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea to many diseases which have crept into the life of humanity today.”

Pakistan after assessing the situation tried to explore all available foreign policy platforms to assert its personality in the world community. Religion was an extra strategic entity for Pakistan to gather identity and legitimacy among its co-religionists. “As Pakistan searched for her identity, she was confronted with two possible approaches: either could base the country’s policies on Islam which had been the basis of its nationalism or it could follow a realist approach, Pakistan has tried both approaches in its foreign policy.” But in principle, Pakistan always portrayed its Islamic ideology in its dealing with the Islamic world. This idea was inherited by every successive Pakistani government as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. It is believed that “Ideology is an important determinant of foreign policy of the state of Pakistan. The substance of Pakistan’s external policy was set down by the country’s founding fathers on Islamic values. The first prime minister of Pakistan categorically asserted that Islam is and will be the source of inspiration for the new state. He further said that Pakistan’s ideology was based on the fundamental teachings of Islam, “no threat or persuasion, no material peril or ideological allurement can deflect’ Pakistanis from their chosen ideology.

Pakistan’s Islamic ideology not only gave stability to Pakistan but also provide religious and cultural links with Middle Eastern Muslim countries which would prove a stabilizing factor in Asia.” In the beginning, Pakistan tried to survive as a neutral state but soon unfolding regional and global events changed Pakistan priorities. Hence, Pakistan takes for granted the cause of pan-Islamism as the main line of its relationship with the Muslim world which also connected with the heyday of political Islam. One writer aptly analyze that to Pakistan “Islam itself is a nationality”

3. Securing the interests
Pakistan was born with fourfold geographical and demographic complexity. It was divided into two un-natural in-contiguous geographical parts, West and East Pakistan, additionally separated by
hostile India. Historically, diplomatic relations among the Muslim states have not only been determined by Islam but mostly by the other dynamics and determinants such as state behavior, the urgency of security, economic needs, ruling elite interests, and the search for prestige and influence in the Muslim as well internationally. The same was the situation of Pakistan when it emerged on the map of the world. According to the initial partition plan of the British Government, the Indo-Pak subcontinent was to be partitioned in 1948, but then independence date suddenly changed on 3 June 1947, and 15 August 1947 instead of 1948.

Only two months were not enough to prepare a comprehensive plan to run a new country and erect efficient government paraphernalia. The hostile geostrategic environment of the region and insecurity already overwhelmed Pakistan’s world view in its preliminary years. Pakistan is located in the area known as the “fulcrum of Asia” a region where the Soviet Union, China, India, and Pakistan meet. The politics of this region was a milieu of intra-regional conflicts, opposing ideologies, diverse national objectives, territorial disputes, and struggle of interests. Furthermore, the world’s superpowers were also trying to maintain their interests in the politics of the region.

In this situation, Pakistan has to devise its foreign policy that can guarantee its defense needs from the perspective of geostrategic realities and competing priorities of the superpowers towards the South Asian region. In the subsequent environment of insecurity and uncertainty, Pakistan moved to co-religionist countries as a choice for closer ties and security. A separate identity from the colonial past, security, and assistance for its economic and defense needs were the major urgencies of Pakistan. Although Pakistan and India were the members of the commonwealth in their preference, the commonwealth always preferred India over Pakistan either it was Kashmir issue or any other dispute between the two states. Mr. Churchill, opposition leader in the British Government reported to the king that “the most important is to keep India within the commonwealth.” Such partialities that were given to India limited the diplomatic space for Pakistan.

Pakistan was soon disappointed by Western Countries, due to the latter’s response towards Pakistan’s genuine concerns and its defense and economic needs. “From 1947 to 1954, Pakistan tried to make use of its position as the fifth largest country in the world and the world’s largest Muslim state to develop closer ties with other Muslim countries.” In the subsequent events, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, after his disappointment from Commonwealth and British government to mediate or solve Pakistan’s issues with India, especially on Kashmir problem said that “If Commonwealth is not to some extent a power bloc, it is not of great value to Pakistan.” He further reiterated his stance and said that “if it could not or would not take initiative in attempting to solve problems among member, then it was a nebulous and impotent sort of association.” He makes realized the UK tilt towards India by saying that “The United Kingdom should not take Pakistan for granted.”

Liaquat, from his journey from London to home after attending the commonwealth prime ministers’ conferences, stopped in Cairo to extend his contact in the Arab world. While criticizing Britain, he repeated that “Britain had long since dropped its policy of exploitation and domination, but this was not always relished in the Middle East. This suspicion could be overcome only by a large gesture such as only a great power could make.” In the next step, he traveled to Cairo then to Baghdad and Tehran to grab the favor and audience in the Middle East. On his return from this extended tour, while talking with the Journalists he claimed that “his tour had been interesting and happy and he had been received in the Muslim countries as though he was one of them.”

Before these overtures towards the Middle East Muslim states, the founder of Pakistan also sent Feroz Khan Noon as a special representative there in November 1947 to assess the situation for a diplomatic relationship but it was in 1948 when the first-time foreign relationship was established with the Middle East countries. In the light of following enthusiasm Liaquat Ali Khan, prime minister of Pakistan on the eve of Eid-ul-Fitr shared his feeling with the masses and said, “If the
Western Democracies can enter into pacts and protects their way of life if the communist countries can form a bloc on the basis that they have an ideology, why cannot the Muslim peoples get together to protect themselves?  

He further stated that “To us, in Pakistan, nothing is dearer than the prospect of the strengthening of the world-wide Muslim brotherhood. Any endeavor, from whatever direction it made, to bring the Muslims of far-flung countries together and to stimulate in them brotherly feelings of mutual affection, understanding, and cooperation readily find an echo in the hearts of Muslims of Pakistan. . . . [Indeed,] part of the mission which Pakistan has set before itself [is] to do everything in its power to promote closer fellowship and co-operation between Muslim countries. Similarly, he also laid stress on the need for unity among Muslim states and warned that “We are all passing through perilous times. The drama of power politics that is being staged in Palestine, Indonesia, and Kashmir should serve as an eye-opener to us [in the Muslim world]. It is only by putting up a united front that we can make our voice felt in the councils of the world.”

Pakistan described and claimed itself as an extension of the Middle East. Pakistan always supported the Muslim cause and left no stone unturned in trying to highlight those issues. On its cause list, Palestine and Kashmir were the common and constant problems yet to be solved. Palestinian issue was the offspring of two contradictory promises made by the British during the first world war, one with Jewish people stranded around the World and the other one with Arabs, if they helped it against Ottoman. There were many similarities between Palestine and Kashmir’s problems, both were created out of British mismanagement and ill intention. Pakistan during the following years in UNO time and again vociferously fought for Palestinian self-determination.

Zafarulla Khan, Pakistan’s first Foreign Minister was the champion of this Palestinian cause, he lucidly and logically defended the Palestinian. Pakistan also wants that Middle East Muslim countries should support its Kashmir cause, which to Pakistan was a matter of identity and security. Pakistan strived to champion the cause of Muslim unity by hosting various conferences for a permanent organization of the Muslim world. Pakistan’s government made a futile attempt to persuade Muslim leadership under a common umbrella to discuss the mounting issues that were recently confronted by the Middle Eastern countries. Pakistan’s permanent representative in UNO Zafarullah Khan during the 1951 session of the UNO General assembly tried his best to convince the Muslim leaders to conduct a conference of prime ministers of Muslim countries to discuss various issues and draw a unified action to solve those problems. In his first step, Zafarullah Khan visited, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt to motivate their leaders, but he was accused and said that these plans were made at the Western countries’ instigation. Only Turkey agreed to “four power proposals” for the defense of the Middle East.

In the proposed MEDO plan, UK, France and, the USA were included as the main partners of the alliance, Arab countries out rightly rejected any such proposal. After this embarrassment, much has been said from Pakistan’s side to dispel misunderstanding but failed to find keen hears from Arab states. Zafarullah Khan during a press conference in Cairo tried to clear Pakistan’s stance over the proposed plan and said that “nothing more than that, it was an invitation that we should get together for a common interest.”

In retrospect, a communiqué was released from the Turkish government in vague terms that “Turkey and Pakistan were unanimously in agreement as to the necessity for the different countries to live free from all pressure and threat and honorable and peaceful life with its basis inequality.” At that time any hope for conducting such a meeting was declined by the Pakistani side. In November 1952 during Pakistan’s constituent assembly proceedings spokesperson ruled out organized any such conference. But this did not mean that the pan-Islamic phase was over because some commonalities and common issues are still alive. Pakistan “Still, it was closely associated with Islam as identity and would in time serve to mobilize it.” Table 1 can elaborate on Pakistan’s efforts to bring harmony among the Muslim world, by hosting various conferences.
Table 1. Pakistan's Hosted conferences, from 1949 to 1955*

| Name of the Conference                        | Year | Held in | Result                                                                 |
|-----------------------------------------------|------|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| International Islamic Conference (IIC)        | 1949 | Karachi | Two sessions were conducted but without any concrete follow-up.        |
| Motamar-I-Isami (World Muslim Congress)       | 1949 | Karachi | The first two meetings were held in Karachi, with very few achievements, then suspended for eleven years, to resurface in 192. |
| The International Economic Conference (IIEO)  | 1949 | Karachi | It also fails to make any consensus for an economic joint venture among Muslim states. |
| The International Economic Conference (IIEO)  | 1951 | Karachi | The conference further created a cleavage between different schools of thought. |
| The International Assembly of Muslim Youth   | 1955 | Karachi | It also failed to achieve the goals.                                  |

*Data compiled by the Author from different sources.

4. Divergence of interests between Pakistan and the Middle Eastern Muslim States

But soon, unfolding circumstances made it realized to Pakistan’s leadership that the Middle East Muslim states themselves are engaged in internal and regional issues and they have no inclination in pan-Islamism and Muslim bloc. Divergence of interests widened the cleavages of any such overtures of unity. Pakistan’s disappointment leads it to ally with the West that could better fulfill its defense and economic needs further weakened its relationship with the Middle East. Pakistan required the favor of the West especially American support to build its army and industry. To make a closer link with America, the role of Turkey to help to secure this link was very significant. Turkey was an important ally of America, a big country to hold back USSR intervention into Europe, West consider, Turkey as the first defense line of their strategy.

To make a formal alliance with America, it was decided that first Pakistan should make a friendship pact with Turkey, and then America will assist Pakistan in this context. So, “Accordingly, a joint communiqué’ was released simultaneously in Karachi and Ankara, on 19 February 1954, declared that Pakistan and Turkey had agreed to study methods of closer collaboration in the political, economic, and cultural spheres, as well as ways of strengthening peace and security in their interest is also in that of all peace-loving nations.” Pakistan’s Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra lauded this agreement with his nation as “the first concrete major step towards strengthening the Muslim World.”

On 22 February 1954, Pakistan’s Prime Minister in a press conference said that Pakistan has formally requested the USA for military assistance under the mutual security signed by both countries. Only two days after this request, US President Eisenhower announced that for the interests and to increase stability in the Middle East, the US will favorably respond to Pakistan’s request. The Baghdad Pact was designed after the USA, France, Turkey, and the UK failed an attempt for a joint Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO). But the Middle East Nations had no interest to build such alliances, and more so because they have no trust in Western Powers.

The Arab countries principally denied taking part in the proposed arrangements. Furthermore, almost all major states had some disputes with these big powers, Iran has an oil dispute with the UK, while Egypt had the Suez Canal issue with France, and above all, they felt badly cheated by these powers in case of Palestinian’s cause. Pakistan was an enthusiastic partner of the Baghdad pact because allying with the Muslim World was its un-cherished dream which at last came true. But it appears very difficult for Pakistan to appease the entire Arabs world with its policy on Baghdad Pact because there were many differences among the Arab states. For Example, what
was acceptable to Cairo might be anathema for Baghdad, and what was good for Riyadh must be a denunciation from Tehran. But the Muslim countries failed to respond positively to the Baghdad pact initiative, due for many reasons. They were at loggerheads with each other, and in the Middle East, raising Arab, Turk, Iranian nationalism and not last but the least Arab Ba'ath forces were against Pan-Islamic ideal. “The Islamic countries were quite weak and, in any event, were not responding to Pakistan's suggestions for an Islamic bloc (Table 2).”

Although, the idea of Pan-Islamism was born in the Middle East, developed an ideology during Ottoman Empire against Western powers encroachment in the Middle East, but it raised the tide of Nationalism in Arab and Non-Arab parts of the Middle East. For Muslims of India, who were living under British imperialism and surrounded by the Hindu majority, pan-Islamism was the hope of salvation. But Pakistan failed to grasp the Arab's sensitivity towards their past, under Ottoman rule, even both Ottoman and Arabs were Muslims but Arabs considered Turks as a colonizer. Arabs were yearning for Arab nationalism and territorial nationalism rather than for Pan-Islamism. Therefore, there developed the idea that only Arab unity is the prerequisite of Muslim Unity. “It is not possible for any sane person to imagine union among, Cairo, Baghdad, Tehran, Kabul, Hyderabad, and Bukhara.”

In Pakistan’s foreign policy, the Middle East Islamic countries have a special symbol and importance. Pakistan associates itself as a part of the Middle East, which it often ascertains to the Western world to get more attention. Likewise, Pakistan was an important player and future partner of the Western bloc, owing to its contiguity with the oil-rich Gulf and neighborhood with communist Russia. “Apart from Pakistan's physical proximity to the Middle East and the Soviet Union, it was regarded as an important Muslim country enjoying considerable interaction with other Muslim countries of the Middle East.” In the USA’s cold war strategy about the Middle East, Pakistan became an important partner of CENTO (later Baghdad pact). The basic inspiration of the Baghdad Pact was to escape any Korean War dilemma in the future and to improve allies’ capacity as much as possible and to “Build up instead the indigenous fighting capabilities of countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq-the Front line states.” The Arab states never recognized Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan as a part of the Middle East, to them they were Muslim states but not Arabs, and always felt of them as Western powers agents in the region. Arabs blamed the following three countries who divided the Arab's unity by coaxing Iraq to follow them under western tutelage. Such perceptions further depreciated the Arabs state’s relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan’s cost

| Country | Year       | Nature of Agreement                                                                 |
|---------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Egypt   | 22 May 1949| Pakistan-Egypt Trade Agreement: Karachi.                                             |
|         | 14 November 1953 | Pakistan-Egypt Agreement on Culture: Karachi.                                     |
| Syria   | 29 August 1950 | Treaty of Friendship between Pakistan and the Syrian Republic: Karachi.          |
| Lebanon | 16 January 1953 | Pakistan-Lebanon Treaty of Friendship: Beirut.                                    |
| Yemen   | 8 April 1952 | Pakistan-Yemen Treaty of Friendship: Cairo.                                        |
| Iraq    | 2 February 1950 | Pakistan-Iraq Treaty of Friendship: Baghdad.                                       |
|         | 20 June 1950 | Pakistan-Iraq Agreement on Air Services: Baghdad.                                |
|         | 31 March 1951 | Pakistan-Iraq Trade Agreement: Karachi.                                            |
|         | March–April 1952 | Pakistan-Iraq Agreement on the reduction of visa fees concluded by the          |
|         |             | exchange of notes.                                                              |
| Iran    | 18 February 1950 | Pakistan-Iran Treaty of Friendship: Tehran.                                      |
|         | 25 June and 14 October 1950 | Agreement between the Governments of Pakistan and Iran concerning the abolition of visa fees. |

*Information compiled by the Author from Pakistan Treaty Series 1947–53, VOL-1, Editor: Riaz Ahmed Syed, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Research Division) Islamabad, 2006.
of becoming a part of the Western alliance was very high in terms of its relationship with the Muslim World.

To Pakistan, it looks at its relationship with the West as a success in its languishing in search of all-weather, friends. Mutual Assistance Agreement, SEATO, and Baghdad pacts for Pakistan were its biggest triumph in foreign policy to overcome its identity and interest requirements. Being a part of the American alliance, security arrangements assured Pakistan's defense objectives and economic agenda. While, as a member of the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan's fulfilled its long-time desire to be a part of Muslim Ummah to ascertain its Muslim identity. Pakistani's Prime minister envisioned the Baghdad pact as a future commonwealth of the Muslim Nation.

But to the greater Arab World it was a conspiracy to divide the Arab world. All major Arab countries ranging from Egypt to Saudi Arabia condemned the Baghdad pact and criticized Pakistan's membership at every forum. Cairo radio in its broadcast said, “the Turku-Pakistan agreement would be a catastrophe for Islam … the first stab in our back”. The next one will probably occur when Iraq joins the plot. The Arab world at that was badly split into varying groups and aspiring for an Arab leadership role. Egypt's stance was more radical among others. As it is obvious from an editorial of the Egyptian Government-owned Newspaper, Al-Gamhouria, stated that “the military alliance between Pakistan, Turkey, and the West would be a sword serving ties between Pakistan and the Arab World”. Although, Pakistan tried its best to repair the damage done by its leadership's statements but failed to impress them. Pakistan also refused to become a part of the Suez Canal Users Association Alliance for a goodwill gesture. Pakistan also offers to send its army as a UNO peacekeeping mission in Egypt, but this offer was flatly by Nasser. In more so, Nasser preferred the presence of the Indian force on its land rather than Pakistan's forces.

Another blow to Pakistani prestige and relationship was the Egyptian attitude and response when Egypt postponed an already scheduled meeting between Pakistan's Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy and Egypt's president Nasser. After this un-Diplomatic stance Pakistani newspaper Dawn wrote about Nasser as “Cairo's Modern little Pharaoh and this act as a turbulent egoist.” This tirade continued for several months between the two countries. These statements serve for nothing but further created many cleavages between Pakistan and the Arab world. The Suez Canal issue proved the last nail in the coffin of Pakistan's relationship with the Middle Eastern Muslim states. This crisis started when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company that was running the affairs of the canal. In 1956, the nationalization of the Suez Canal jeopardized France and Britain's interests associated with the Canal. As the canal was the main supply line of import and exports of every Indian Ocean country this decision of nationalization was a setback for these countries' economies. About the total exports of Pakistan 57% and 49% of the total import passed through the Suez Canal. Pakistan was naturally anxious about the un-certainty prevailing after Egypt's decision. Public opinion in Pakistan was running high in favor of Egypt than the Government's stance on the issue. In East Pakistan, Awami League celebrates the “Suez Day” while a big rally was organized in Lahore, where more than 3,00,000 people participated.

Pakistan did not leave any stone untouched to repair the damages with the Muslim brethren. During his address to the Canal users Association in London, Pakistan's Foreign minister refused to become a part of this association and also warned that suggested that in case Egypt did not accept viable terms then the matter should be taken into UNO. Similarly, Prime Minister Suharwardy sent a special envoy to America, UK, and France and demanded the withdrawal of their forces from Egypt. He categorically told the British representative if the occupation of the canal persisted any longer Pakistan will quit the Baghdad pact.

On the other side, Pakistani media condemned the aggression with all possible manners; Dawn in its editorial symbolized this attack as “rebirth of Hitler in Europe” Muslim League parliamentary committee proposed the Government to withdraw from the commonwealth. But Egypt was not satisfied with Pakistan's stance over the Suez crisis; Nasser hit back on Pakistan and declared that “Suez is as dear to Egypt, as Kashmir to Pakistan.” Pakistan Prime
Minister, Surhwardy’s statement about Arabs “zero plus zero” statements was the main prey of the Arab Media. Although he clarified on the floor of the National Assembly that ‘in calling Muslim countries zeros, he was referring for their (Arabs) military potential and not their position in the international world’ but he was named as the “tail of colonialism” and a greater lover of Britain and America than the Britain and America themselves. It was stated in the newspaper that ‘Pakistan must be cowed down before Egypt could handle the West effectively.’ In reprisal, Pakistan’s prime minister on the floor of the Assembly reminded the Egypt and Arab world that Egypt who claimed as the harbinger of Arab nationalism has a dearest relationship with India. He further alleged that ‘Egypt from day first was against the partition of India and the independence of Pakistan and favored Pakistan’s reunion with India, and even declared Kashmir as an integral part of India.’ Egypt was not the only major Arab Muslim country that condemned and criticized Pakistan’s inclusion in the Baghdad pact, Saudi Arabia was no exception also. On the eve of Pakistan’s joining the Pact, in an unusual diplomatic step, the Saudi embassy in Pakistan issued a hand-out on Mecca radio broadcast, urging Pakistan to “return to the Right Path”. The broadcast also said the act of Pakistan “a stab in the heart of Arab and Muslim states” it further claimed that Saudi always felt proud of Pakistan as an Islamic country but she joined the hand with Turkey, ‘who feels honored by co-operating with the Jewish state.’

The relationship between Pakistan and Saudi-Arabia deteriorated further when during his trip to Jadda Nehru was greeted with the slogan of “Marhaba Rasool al slam”. This slogan produced severe public resentment in Pakistan because in Islam “rassol” has significance and trait of the prophet, and cannot be associated with anyone. Later, Saudi Embassy in Pakistan hurriedly issued a press release that the slogan meant, Welcome Messenger of Peace and not “Welcome Prophet of Peace”. But following clarification did not impress the Pakistanis, Dawn the leading Newspaper of Pakistan, appropriately covered the sentiments of the countryman. The two main benefits that were in mind When Pakistan, before joining the Western’s defense alliance, failed to materialize. One forecast was that the new alignment with the West will be a step ahead towards strengthening Pakistan’s relationship with the Muslim world, but in reality, Pacts with the West further degenerated Pakistan’s relationship with the Arab world. The other claim was also proved opposite that Western military alliance will make Pakistan a stronger nation, but in fact, it multiplied the defense budget of Pakistan from Rs.6, 532 lakhs in 1953–54 to Rs.10, 435 lakhs in 1959–60, which was a burden on its poor economy.

5. Conclusion
Undeniably, inter-Muslim solidarity between Pakistan and the Middle Eastern Muslim States during 1947–1956 was neither ideological nor indeed based on any principle but that was purely a strategic and utilitarian move. There was no hypothetical religio-cultural homogeneity visible in that maneuvering from both sides and not even a common policy about collective security of the Muslim world was in consideration. It also did not devise any mechanism of conflict prevention among the Muslim states.

Leaving aside the thorny issues, like, disputes between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Nasser’s Egyptian republic and Arab’s Monarchs, Arab and non-Arab Muslim states, and last but not the least, Turkey’s current relationship with Arab’s countries under the shadow of its Ottoman past. These were the futile attempts from Pakistan, to formulate a bridge to the gap between trans-Islamic states, combined perspectives on different international issues, and to formalize a collective mouthpiece of contemporary pan-Islamism. But this effort ultimately ended in a coalescent rhetorical group on Islamic and international matters.

The overall outcome was very dismal due to many reasons. The ambivalent positions of Pakistan and the Middle Eastern Muslim states on Islamic universalism and territorial centralization were the major hindrances for any combined efforts. Again the reconciliation between pan-Islamism and national aspirations was impossible. Many Muslim leaders from the Arab world came forward
to renounce pan-Islamism. 1956 marked the end of Pakistan's euphemism and activism on the part of its association with the Middle Eastern Muslim countries.

After that Pakistan paid lip service in matters and cause of Islamic solidarity. In reality, Pakistan's foreign policy orientation in its first decade was based on holy idealism that gradually transformed into realism. But even then, Pakistan did not shelve Islam, over time it became less seductive and dormant. Pakistan continued its pan-Islamic credentials for future maneuvering with regards to issue sensitivities and always connected it, with cost-benefit reckoning. Although, ahead of its time, (The Pan-Islamic dream materialized in 1969, with the establishment of OIC) but Muslim bloc was a novel and alternative approach in the new politics of Islam, the fusion of identity and politics in international relations.

Funding
The authors received no direct funding for this research.

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Citation information
Cite this article as: Identity and interests: History of Pakistan's Foreign Policy and the Middle Eastern Muslim States, 1947 to 1956, Farrukh Faheem, Wang Xingang, Muhammad Wasi, & Sajjad Hussain, Cogent Social Sciences (2021), 7: 1967567.

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