Anaphora and Subjectification in Lexicalized Feminine Clitic Constructions*

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Abstract

In this paper I will examine anaphoric relationships in lexicalized feminine clitic constructions (dormirla [to sleep it off], pirárselas [to beat it], etc.). Lexicalized feminine clitic constructions have no syntactic reference for the clitic, but there is an implicit contextual semantic reference to an implicated and recognized concept. Given the diversity of lexicalized feminine clitic constructions, an attempt is going to be made to establish a growing speaker subjectification continuum depending on whether it is a contextual semantic reference from an accommodation in a singular context, in a multiple context, or we are faced with a conventional implication. We will also comment on other more complicated processes, either because the construction experiences changes in its meaning or because the analogy causes the presence of the feminine clitic.

Keywords: accommodation; analogy; anaphora; subjetification

Resum. Anàfora i subjectivació en construccions clítiques femenines lexicalitzades

En aquest treball analitzarem les relacions anafòriques en les construccions amb clític femení lexicalitzat (dormirla, pirárselas, etc.). Les construccions amb clític femení lexicalitzat no tenen referència sintàctica pel clític, però hi ha implicada una referència semàntica contextual a un concepte implicat i reconegut. Donada la diversitat de construccions amb clític femení lexicalitzat, establirem un continu creixent de subjectivació del parlant segons que es tracti d’una referència semàntica contextual a partir d’una acomodació en un context singular, en un context múltiple o es tracti d’una implicació convencional. Tenint en compte els diferents processos donats en les construccions amb clític femení lexicalitzat, comentarem també altres processos en els quals la situació és més complicada, bé perquè intervenen canvis de significat en la construcció, bé perquè l’analogia motiva la presència del clític femení.

Paraules clau: anàfora; acomodació; subjetivació; analogia

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1. Introduction: Lexicalized clitic verbal locutions

The Spanish Royal Academy (of the Language) [RAE for its initials in Spanish] (2009: 2649-2654) highlights that the numerous verbal locutions formed with transitive verbs include a group with unstressed personal pronouns, the referent of which is usually unspecified in most cases, that referent being given by the context instead. The clitics mentioned by RAE are lo [MASC.ACC.SING.], la [FEM.ACC.SING.] and las [FEM.ACC.PL.], i.e. lexicalized direct complements functioning as a direct object: dormirla [sleep-INF. it-FEM.ACC.SING. > sleep it off], deberla [owe-INF. it-FEM.ACC.SING. > owe], etc. According to RAE, these forms tend to be typical of the colloquial register.

Phraseology often mentions these locutions. By way of example, García Page (2008: 340-342) analyzes the direct object clitic locutions without an explicit nominal referent and points out how difficult it can prove to recognize the referent of such utterances synchronously and even to check that referent, even if it is intuited. García Page also emphasizes that most utterances adopt feminine forms, either in singular or in plural, which seems to be in tune with other locutions. Two reasons have been adduced in the attempts to explain this preponderance of the feminine: a) the transformation into the feminine plural of some Latin neutrals (Casares 1969: 240); and b) the grammatical value of the marked feminine term (Delbecque 1997).

Casares makes an interesting proposal, insofar as the examples of collectives adopting the singular feminine form are abundant and well known and, since the collective meaning does not become clearly evident, they seem to have favored the plural: for instance, boda [marriage], from uotum, plural uota, and in plural, bodas [weddings], seems to reestablish the whole idea. In fact, it is apparently Spitzer (1941: 352) that first referred to the relationship, additionally arguing that the familiar character (matching RAE’s idea of ‘colloquial’) stems from the ellipsis of the noun, because the speaker behaves as if the hearer knew the reference of those confidential pronouns.

Mariner, who has developed the previous idea, claims that the neutral indicates deindividualization in Romance languages (1973: 34), thus conveying the idea of indetermination, abstraction, collectivization, etc., as opposed to the individualization (determination, concretion, etc.) which characterizes masculine and feminine considered jointly. In other words, the neutral seems destined to designate the conceptual and abstract, which may be undetermined or not. Furthermore, according to Mariner (1968: 1304), being the marked term in the opposition to the masculine allows the feminine to express a new meaning in contrast to the masculine: indetermination; and this simply due to the lack of feminine terms that it can agree
with in the context. Mariner additionally stresses that the feminine turns out to be better suited to leave things in vagueness, since the neutral, despite referring to the conceptual, is concrete, as seen in the opposition *me lo pagarás* [you] *me* [MASC. DAT. SING.] *it* [MASC. ACC. SING.] *pay* [2ª p. SING. FUT.] > *you will pay me*] vs. *me las pagarás* [you] *me* [MASC. DAT. SING.] *it* [FEM. ACC. PL.] *pay* [2ª p. SING. FUT.] > *you will get me*.

The proposal made by Mariner introduces Delbecque’s approach. For Delbecque (1997), its marked character determines both the abundant presence of the feminine and its predominance over the masculine. In the opinion of Delbecque (1997: 217), a construction can only be considered a locution if the features of the pronoun depend on the context: the unmarked element (masculine) constitutes the expression by default in such a way that it will cover every predictable use; in the case at hand, the possibility for the clitic to take its reference through the agreement with the immediate syntactic environment. On the contrary, the marked element will be confined to the least foreseeable uses, thus making it possible to automatically highlight certain uses and consequently becoming the dominant trend for the function of locutions. As for the masculine / feminine opposition, the feminine clearly appears as the marked one, both formally and semantically, which is why it lends itself more easily to locutional uses. Similarly, the singular / plural duality unmistakably identifies the plural as the marked element. Therefore, when it does not imply plurality (due to the lack of coreference in our case), the plural morphology will signal some other semantic particularity. All of this obviously becomes enhanced in the feminine and plural combination. In conclusion, the feminine flexion, and even more so the feminine plural one, will stand out as one of the most favorable morphological combinatorial options for the consolidation of a construction as a locution. This is so because it provides not only an effective and economical indication but also a clear and concise mark that the meaning of the construction differs from the habitual usage in the language. They would somehow illustrate Horn’s division of pragmatic labor (1984: 22), included by Levinson in his M principle (2004: 214).

Delbecque also points out (1997: 217) that the direct complement clitic completes a functional position in the argument structure favored by the verb, so that its presence is expected and not marked/unmarked, its particularity lying in the fact that it does not update any specific reference of the immediate syntactic envi-

1. The use of a marked expression when an unmarked alternative expression is available tends to be interpreted as a way to convey a marked message (one which the unmarked alternative could not have conveyed).
2. *Speaker’s maxim*: It indicates an abnormal, non-stereotypical situation through the utilization of marked expressions that contrast with those you would use to describe the corresponding normal, stereotypical situation.
   *Recipient’s corollary*: What is said abnormally reveals an abnormal situation, or marked messages describe marked situations, more specifically:
   Where *S* has said “*p*” with a marked expression *M*, and an unmarked alternate expression *U* exists with the same denotation *D* which the speaker might have employed within the same sentence frame instead; then, where *U* would have implied *I*, the stereotypical or more specific subset *d* of *D*, the marked expression *M* will imply the complement of denotation *d*, namely *d* of *D*. 


ronment. It deserves to be highlighted that this is not always the case, though; for example, *pirárselas* [go-INF. him-DAT.SING. them-FEM.ACC.PL. > to beat it] is an intransitive verb of motion, which in principle excludes the possibility of combining with a direct complement clitic. This will consequently be another signal to mark the contextual meaning of the construction.

1.1. Formal aspects

Albano & Ghio (2013), and especially Garcia Page (2010), have organized the main formal characteristics of feminine clitic locutions.

1) The simplest constructional schema is ‘transitive verb + clitic’: e.g. *diñarla* [to snuff it], *palmarla* [to croak] or *cascarla* [to snuff it]. This schema can also develop other more complex schemata: a) clitic modification by a predicative: *cantarlas claras* [to sepak out], *hacerla buena* [to cok it up]; b) presence of a circumstantial or regime complement, with or without a predicative: *no tener-las todas consigo* [to be wary], *pagarla con alguien* [to be taking it out on]; c) clitic modification by a prepositive complement: *llevar las de ganar* [to be bound to win]; d) complementation by a relative: *estar a la que salta* [to never miss a trick]; and e) combination with an infinitive or gerund structure: *verlas venir* [to wait and see], *matarlas callando* [to go about things slyly].

2) ‘Transitive verb + clitic + indirect complement’: *pegársela* [to cheat on (some-one)], *debérsela* [to owe it (to someone)], *jurársela* [to swear vengeance], etc. The indirect complement expresses an argument and constitutes the addressee or goal of the referred action. A variant of this schema is one where the clitic acts as the theme and the subject is the cause of the state: *sudársela* [no to give a toss], *bufársela* [not to give a toss], etc.

3) ‘Pronominal verb + clitic’: *agenciárselas* [to come up with ways], *ganársela* [to be for it], etc. The presence of an agreed dative clitic is the determining feature in such constructions. This schema can also develop a subset, as is the combinatorial with a regime complement: *entendérselas con* [to come up with], *tenérselas con* [to come face to face with], etc.

4) ‘Intransitive verb + clitic’: *pirárselas* [to beat it], *guillárselas* [to beat it], etc.

In my opinion, the fact that some locutions can have different meanings depending on the contexts should be considered natural. For example, depending on the context in which the construction is inserted, *clavársela a alguien* may mean: ‘to hurt/do harm,’ ‘to score a goal,’ ‘to damage’ or ‘to copulate.’ Similarly, syntactic marks sometimes help to differentiate meanings: *cogerla alguien* [take-INF. it-FEM. SING.ACC. someone] means ‘getting drunk,’ but *cogerla con alguien* [take-INF. it-FEM.SING.ACC. with someone] means ‘turning that person into a target of aversion.’

Because our work focuses on European Spanish, we have not discussed many locutions that perhaps could enrich the previous formal characteristics. The expressive richness of such uses on either side of the Atlantic provides evidence about

3. Vid. specific studies such as Orduña (2011), Guio & Albano (2013) or Cordero & Leoni (2017).
the validity of the construction model which, incidentally, is not exclusive to the Spanish language; it appears in other Romance languages too.\(^4\)

In short, numerous verbal locutions arguably contain a direct complement clitic, whether in the singular or in the plural; and that clitic lacks a precise or determined reference, which means that it cannot be replaced or reconstructed by any previously uttered noun phrase. The reconstruction of the clitic may seem synchronously easy in some cases; for instance, when it refers to the male sexual organ (\textit{me la\textsuperscript{5} sudan [me-DAT.SING. it-FEM.ACC.SING. sweat-3SING.PRES. > I don’t care]}),\(^6\) but most often an impossibility exists to successfully restore the noun to which the pronoun refers; hence the need for a historical study to determine its provenance.

\subsection*{1.2. Objectives and proposal}

Our paper will examine anaphoric relationships in lexicalized feminine clitic constructions. The starting point to achieve that aim is going to be the historical analysis of some 100 lexicalized feminine clitic constructions (Cifuentes Honrubia 2018) which can help to explain the reasons for the presence of a feminine clitic in such constructions. The diversity of constructions will also result in a variety of explanations to account for the anaphoric relationships implied by the presence of a feminine clitic that, despite having no explicit syntactic antecedent, can be considered contextually; and those are the essential goals sought with our analysis.

The work schema developed is structured as follows: Section 2 will briefly present the concepts of subjectification and analogy which serve as a methodological tool to explain the processes in which the different lexicalized feminine clitic constructions originate. Subsequently, Section 3 will pay attention to the anaphoric relationships existing in lexicalized feminine clitic constructions: lexicalized feminine clitic constructions have no syntactic reference for the clitic, but there is an implicit contextual semantic reference to an implicated/implied and recognized concept. Given the diversity of lexicalized feminine clitic constructions, an attempt is going to be made to establish a growing speaker subjectification continuum depending on whether it is a contextual semantic reference from an accommodation in a singular context, in a multiple context, or we are faced with a conventional implication. We will also comment on other more complicated processes, either because the construction experiences changes in its meaning or because the anal-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{4} For example, García Benito (2009) for Portuguese.
\item \textsuperscript{5} Antecedent: male sexual organ.
\item \textsuperscript{6} This kind of construction could be linked to euphemism, but even accepting that most feminine clitic constructions could mean in an ‘uncourteous’ way, it seems to me that feminine clitic verbal locutions do not generally suppose any euphemistic resource, since no euphemistic intention underlies their use. We follow the tradition of Casas (1986) when considering the discursive definition of euphemism; hence the impossibility to say that a substitute is euphemistic; instead, it has a euphemistic use in a given context or situation. On the whole, it can be stated that feminine clitic verbal locutions do not entail euphemistic uses, since they do not ‘sweat’ anything at all. Proof of this is that many of these expressions will be classified by RAE as ‘vulgar’ or ‘colloquial,’ thus claiming that they are by no way used to ‘socially soften’ anything.
\end{itemize}
ogy causes the presence of the feminine clitic. Finally, Section 4 will summarize the conclusions drawn from our study.

2. Subjectification and analogy

2.1. Subjectification

Subjectivity appears as a key element in the meaning of feminine clitic locutions, inasmuch as the subjective or expressive meaning implies the recognition by the speaker that something move away from the norm, from what can be expected (the syntactic reference of the feminine clitic), and it provokes an explicit manifestation that this is the case: the contextual or implicit value of the feminine clitic and the meaning of the locution as a whole.

Traugott has developed a theory of semantic change based on the notion of subjectification: a semantic-pragmatic mechanism through which meanings change from the objective description of the external situation to the expression of the speaker’s internal perspective or the attitude about what is being said. Traugott distinguishes three different semantic-functional components in the language at a synchronic level (1982: 247-248): propositional (or ideational); textual; and expressive (or interpersonal).

While the propositional component has to do with the resources used to describe the speech event, the textual domain affects those devices which convey meanings that favor cohesion. As for the expressive component, it includes several phenomena of a subjective and intersubjective nature which reflect the speaker’s evaluation and attitude towards the proposition.

This original hypothesis about a diachronic increase in expressivity, or subjectivity, has gradually been defined in more detail by Traugott. She recognized in 1989 that the semantic changes identified in grammaticalization processes are not confined to grammaticalization and actually belong to a set of major tendencies in semantic change that seem to comprise a wide range of phenomena:

— Tendency I (Traugott 1989: 34): meanings based on the external situation described > meanings based on the internal situation described (evaluative / perceptual / cognitive). Such shifts include pejorative, meliorative changes, and a number of metaphorical extensions from concrete domains to abstract ones.
— Tendency II (Traugott 1989: 35): meanings based on the internal or external situation described > meanings based on the textual and metalinguistic situation. This shift becomes visible in the development of connectors which code textual cohesion, as well as in verbs of mental state that develop metalinguistic values.
— Tendency III (Traugott 1989: 35): meanings that tend to be increasingly based on the speaker’s belief state or subjective attitude towards the proposition. Illustrations of this tendency include shifts from temporal to concessive connectors, from verbs of motion to future markers, and from deontic modals to epistemic ones, which will come to be known as subjectification.

7. From the distinction proposed by Halliday and Hasan (1976).
According to Traugott & Dasher (2002: 97), Tendency III prevails over the other two, i.e. subjectification can be regarded as the major type of semantic change. For Traugott, the unidirectionality of grammaticalization processes causes a growing subjectivity of the unit or the linguistic construction, as a result of which the unit loses lexical content but achieves greater pragmatic value; in other words, the speaker originates the linguistic change through a gradual subjectification of his messages. It is thus possible (Traugott & König 1991: 198) to observe a tendency in the shifts, which goes from meanings based on extralinguistic situations that can be identified more or less objectively to meanings based on the speaker’s attitude or on his belief(s) about what is said. The gradual involvement of that speaker both in the description of the object and in that of the process increasingly pragmatizes the meaning, insofar as their repeated use in local syntactic contexts with specific, lexical and objective meanings, leads them to end up performing growingly abstract, pragmatic, interpersonal and speaker-based functions (Traugott 1995: 32, 2016: 379). This makes it possible for the discursive change to crystallize into a semantic one and even to trigger the syntactic change that culminates the grammaticalization process – what has come to be known as ‘subjectification.’

Therefore, subjectification can be understood as a kind of grammaticalization: the development of a grammatically identifiable item based on the speaker’s belief(s) or attitude about what is said (Traugott 1995: 32). Subjectification consequently provides evidence that certain elements or conventionalized constructions in the grammar of a language result from a linguistic shift that provides the grammar with pragmatic contents that code the perspective of the speaker about what has been communicated, such as the relationship with the addressee (what Traugott labels as ‘intersubjectification’). Expressed differently, subjectification shows how pragmatic meaning may end up becoming grammatical and, therefore, turning into a conventional construction (Company 2004: 1): pragmatic inferences often have to do with subjective evaluations (personal opinions or assessments) which force the hearer to interpret more than what is actually said; the hearer adequately infers what the speaker wanted to convey and assumes that the inferred subjective nuance represents an established value of the form or construction uttered by the speaker. This association is repeated and generalized until the subjective value becomes a part of the conventional meaning associated with the form or construction in question (Company 2003: 40). In other words, it is a metonymy which results in a new and more subjective coded meaning which will usually give rise to polysemy (Traugott 2016: 379).

Despite its interest, the subjectification proposal is not trouble-free (De Smet & Verstraete 2006: 366): no suitable formal criteria exist to detect subjectivity in a particular item, i.e. to measure how and why the item relates to the speaker; and, diachronically speaking, there is often some confusion between the speaker’s role in the process of change and his eventual connection with the new semantic values derived from this process.

It is important in this respect to mention the work carried out by Company, strongly committed to examining the syntactic consequences of a(n) (inter)subjectification process, thus going against the predominant analysis of (inter)subjectification from a semantic-pragmatic perspective. For Company (2004: 2), any...
(inter)subjectification entails a series of restrictions in the syntactic behavior of the forms undergoing that shift which consist in the weakening and even cancellation of the syntactic capacity of the items concerned. Expressed differently, a syntactic isolation and cancellation of syntax takes place due to the nature of the (inter)subjectification process.

Company summarizes the syntactic effects caused by the (inter)subjectification process in three (to which a fourth semantic element would have to be added). These characteristics somehow reflect the adaptation of the features outlined by Ghesquière, Brems & Van de Velde to Spanish (2014: 139):

a) Attenuation, weakening or loss of control of the agent over the event. This weakening of the subject results in an attenuation or weakening of the sentence’s argument structure and, accordingly, of the relationships between the constituents of the (inter)subjective utterance, in such a way that it only admits a global interpretation, and not through the meaning of its individual constituents. That global meaning allows the speaker to express his own point of view about the event.

b) Extension of the predication scope: grammatical forms are usually placed on the left of the utterance, which means that they start it and their meaning influences the sentence as a whole, not some of its constituents.

c) Fixation, isolation and predicative autonomy. In other words, the syntactic effect of such a shift is a reduction of the relational capacity of the forms undergoing (inter)subjectification. This can even lead to the formation of fixed expressions.

d) Weakening of the original etymological referential meaning. It seems unanimously accepted that the forms cannot express (inter)subjective meanings without previously emptying the original etymological referential meaning to some extent, which causes new more abstract meanings to appear in contexts other than the original ones.

Company (2004) focuses primarily on analyzing item c) and trying to explain it. The hypothesis underpinning his paper is that forms become devoid of syntax when they are recharged with pragmatic subjective meanings, to such an extent that they often cancel the normal syntax shown by these forms in their objective behavior. Subjectification causes syntactic isolation (2004: 8), which adopts a variety of formats, amongst them isolation by pauses and autonomous construction (the forms cannot be substituted, or paraphrased, or take the usual complementation or modification). The dispensability of syntax in (inter)subjectification would be a further manifestation of the ‘parallel reduction’ effect that many grammatical shifts experience – proposed by Bybee-Perkins & Pagliuca (1994: chapter 4).

8. Subjectified items do not allow pronominal substitution; they cannot be brought under the scope of negation; they resist focusability, submodification, and gradability; they cannot be used predicatively; they are likely to diachronically undergo leftward movement and scope expansion; they resist agent control; they are banned from certain subordinate clauses; and they are typically non truth-conditional.
Company emphasizes the importance of the context in the conclusions drawn from his analysis: for a (inter)subjectification process to occur, there must not be an a priori grammatical value; instead, the item / construction should acquire its value in the context, so that the speaker can creatively manipulate the latter and deprive the forms of their original meaning, in order to enrich them with his own assessments. The analysis carried out by Company (2004) thus confirms the hypothesis according to which the constructions that undergo an (inter)subjectification process rigidify the syntax; however, this syntactic impoverishment is compensated to some extent with a strong pragmatic enrichment: the syntax is dispensable because the speaker has no interest in the descriptive semantics of the construction, what he wants to do is to provide his own view about the event. Hence, says Company (2004: 23), (inter)subjectification raises a shift from syntax to pragmatics, while traditional grammaticalization involves a shift from lexicon to syntax.

2.2. Analogy

The concept of analogy has a long tradition in linguistics, especially in the field of inflectional morphology, and it has to do with the influence that some forms can exert over others when it comes to the extension of specific patterns or schemata or the elimination of certain irregularities (Elvira 2010: 31). In other words, it is a process through which a linguistic form comes to resemble another due to an indirect association mediated by some higher-level generalization or pattern (Blevins & Blevins 2009: 4). The notion of analogy also enjoys great popularity in cognitive science because it influences the associative capacities of the human mind at the time of forming concepts and establishing links between them. The capacity for the human mind to establish analogies consists in the possibility to recognize and process similarities between things and the realities perceived through the senses (Elvira 2010: 32-33): based on the importance corresponding to use and frequency in the organization of linguistic schemata, analogy emphasizes the idea that linguistic capacities rest on more general cognitive skills, such as memory and the associative capacity of speakers. Therefore, analogy refers to a general cognitive process which transfers specific information or knowledge from one domain to another: sets of perceptions (visual images, auditory signals, experiences or dreams) are compared, and high-order generalizations are extracted and carried over to new sets (Blevins & Blevins 2009: 2).

Analogy has been overlooked in formalist studies about language. Formalist studies inspired in generativism have tended to think of rules as the basis for generalizations, reserving analogy for lexically restricted schemata; in fact, generativist studies ignored analogy because it could not be reduced to rules or restrictions (Fischer 2016: 240). However, a rule can be understood as a highly generic analogy (Blevins & Blevins 2009: 10) and no need exists to draw a qualitative distinction between general and restricted analogies, it being plausible to assume

9. Chomsky (1989: 32) seems to regard analogy as “simply an inappropriate concept”. Itkonen (2005: 67-76) critically debates the objections to analogy in UG.
that their differences lie in the specificity of the pattern that must be matched in order to sanction an analogical deduction. What is more, analogy has begun to be seen as one of the key mechanisms or principles that guide learning and linguistic change in recent years (Mattiello 2017: 3). The use of analogy to explain linguistic change has also been rejected on the grounds that it cannot predict when and how linguistic changes will take place. However, this is an unconvincing argument, since linguistic changes are unpredictable by nature and the corresponding explanations always come later: no theory can predict linguistic changes (Itkonen 2005: 75).

Analogical extension does not simply rely on a formal community (Elvira 1998: 151); instead, it can be reinforced by the presence of common semantic or functional features amongst the elements that experience a formal influence. In the words of Itkonen (2005: 13), analogy is relative to the context in which it is used, or to the point of view from which it is considered. Fischer (2010) goes one step further, pointing out that analogy is based on form as well as on meaning and constitutes a fundamental cognitive principle that plays a primary role in language acquisition – and in change too. Since the grammaticalization theory provides an explanatory model for language change, it must be concluded that analogy should also play a primary role in grammaticalization. However, analogy is not restricted to analogical extension, i.e. a formal mechanism usually recognized as one of the factors at work in grammaticalization; analogy also causes linguistic change (Fischer 2010: 182). We can change structures and paradigm contents by means of analogy, but it is also analogy that enables us to build abstract types or patterns. Expressed differently, analogy can affect form and meaning alike and therefore, the analogical process can only be explained from the forms and meanings that analogical structures have for speakers within their synchronous grammar system and within their communicative situation; nevertheless, it is analogy itself, together with frequency, that has helped to build this system (Fischer 2008: 368).

Based on Fischer’s proposal, Traugott and Trousdale (2013) have drawn a distinction between the analogy mechanism, which they call analogization, and analogical thinking, to avoid the ambiguity between the mechanism of change and its motivation. Analogical thinking may or may not result in change, however, analogization is a mechanism of change that affects similarities that did not exist before. Analogization implies the assignment of a new meaning or form, that is, a constructional change, and therefore implies reanalysis. Analogical thinking is therefore an important factor in the increase of productivity or schematicity.

We can change constructions by analogy, but it is also analogy, like analogical thinking, that causes us to construct more abstract kinds or schemata, as a cognitive principle in the mind of the speaker. The ability to combine and categorize things implies analogical thinking. Analogical thinking and reasoning precede many changes, in that they involve recognition by the speaker of the similarities between two constructions. Hence our emphasis on the fact that it hides a motivation for many changes but does not constitute change or any innovation, it is a precondition for change. In short, this distinction parallels that established by Fertig (2013: 12) between analogy in general and analogy sensu strictu.
Elvira (2010: 125) argues that the effect of analogy on grammaticalization can occur in two different ways at least: it can affect features of the behavior of the item being grammaticalized and promote increased productivity of the schema in the one that has been grammaticalized. This is an interesting debate (Booij 2010: 89): knowing if the formation of new elements can be considered analogy or it results from using symbolic schemata that generalize kinds of items. These two models are not exclusive, though, they can coexist (Booij 2010: 91). Mattiello distinguishes (in a gradual way) between: (a) surface analogy, that is, analogy in the traditional sense of local mechanism, where the model is restricted to a specific element, with a high degree of similarity between the elements affected in the analogical comparison and the very limited productivity of the process: and (b) analogy via schema, where a series of elements share the same formation, or a group of elements share the same basis of formation (2017: 64-74). Furthermore, analogy can be the first step for the development of a schema.

3. Anaphoric relationships in lexicalized feminine clitic constructions

3.1. Anaphora and anaphoric relationships

One of the essential issues when analyzing pronouns (including the feminine clitics under study in our paper) is to determine how they establish referential relationships with different participants in the syntactic structure. The concept of anaphora commonly describes a relationship between two linguistic elements where the interpretation of one of them is in some way determined by the interpretation of the other (its antecedent). Lust (1986: 23) defines anaphora more explicitly as the relationship between a proforma, called anaphora, and another item, called antecedent. By matching anaphora with its antecedent, it repeats the reference or sense that the antecedent had already established. In any case, anaphora does not necessarily have to be a sentential phenomenon strictly speaking, it can also be considered from a discourse perspective, thus making it especially sensitive to the context of its utterance. Hence, the actual definition of anaphora has been extended by some authors as a reference to something mentioned or implied in the previous discourse (Green 1989), even redefining it as a relationship between a linguistic item and the mental representation/discourse status of the referent denoted by that linguistic item (Huang 2000: 1).

The definitions above seem to suggest the existence of a confrontation between two major approaches in this regard: a more formal one where the reference of a pronominal element is determined by its own morphosyntactic nature and the other elements integrated within the immediate syntactic domain; and another one, based on a pragmatic perspective, which suggests that restrictions on the reference of pronominal expressions must be interpreted according to pragmatic conditions, such as topicality or the existence of grammatical alternatives with other grammatical interpretations. Despite their opposition, both approaches share the understanding of the anaphorical relationship as a reference mechanism through which cohesive relationships arise between a grammatical unit (the pronoun) and a lexical unit (usu-
ally a noun phrase) on which it is referentially dependent. However, anaphora can be not only intrasentential – i.e. the anaphoric element and its antecedent appear in a simple or complex sentence – but also discursive, in which case the pronoun and its antecedent exceed the limits of the sentence. In any case, even limiting ourselves to intra-sentential anaphora, three main theoretical approaches are worth considering: syntactic; semantic; and pragmatic (Huang 2001: 231).

In the syntactic proposal, anaphora arises as a syntactic phenomenon and the references must be made according to essentially syntactic conditions and restrictions. This is the Chomskian approach: a morphosyntactic division exists between two types of pronominal items: pure pronouns; and anaphoras. These are different elements either because of their subjection to different syntactic principles or because their composition of features differs and forces the second type to agree directly with referential expressions within their same syntactic domain. From here, Chomsky enunciates the famous three principles of the binding theory:

A. An anaphora must have a local antecedent, i.e. within its same domain. Therefore, anaphoras must be linked in their governing category.
B. A pronoun cannot have a hierarchically higher local antecedent; it must be free in its governing category.
C. A referential expression cannot have an antecedent that precedes it, neither in its local domain nor outside it; it must always be free.

Binding in anaphoric expressions is defined in configurational terms, according to structural concepts such as command-c, rection, and locality.

In contrast to the syntactic approach, the semantic approach considers anaphora an essentially semantic phenomenon. Linkage is thus defined in terms of the argument structure. The theory of reflexivity postulated by Reinhart and Reuland (1993) belongs to this perspective. For these authors, reflexivity is not a property of nominal groups but of predicates. The binding theory does not seek to capture the distribution of anaphoras and pronouns, but rather to regulate the domain of reflexivity of a predicate. More specifically, the theory predicts that if a predicate is lexically reflexive, it cannot be marked by a morphologically complex anaphora; and if a predicate is not lexically reflexive, then it can only become reflexive by marking one of its arguments through an anaphora.

The pragmatic approach arises as an alternative to syntactic and semantic approaches, its most widespread example being the Neogricean pragmatic theory of anaphora developed by Levinson (2004) and Huang (2000). For this approach, the nature of anaphora is essentially pragmatic, even though its degree of pragmaticity may vary in typological terms. Consequently, anaphora can only be determined by the systematic interaction of some neo-Gricean principles, such as Levinson’s Q, I and M principles, according to the speaker’s knowledge about the set of acces-

10. (Q): What is not said, does not exist. Linked to the Gricean maxim make your contribution as informative as required.
(I): What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified. Linked to the maxim do not make your contribution more informative than necessary.
sible options in grammar and depending on the systematic or exceptional use of particular expressions or anaphoric structures on specific occasions. Any anaphoric interpretation generated through the application of Q, I, and M heuristics to the domain of anaphoric reference is subject to the general restrictions applicable to Gricean conversational implicatures. These restrictions include world knowledge, contextual information, and semantic relations.

At least from Halliday & Hassan (1976), it has been usual to draw a distinction between endophoric uses and exophoric uses. The difference has to do with the fact that the antecedent (including here also the case of cataphora, whose referential relationship appears after the pronominal element) lies within what is said or written, in the case of endophora, or falls outside what has been said or written, i.e. outside the context, in the case of exophora (Huang 2006: 231). Endophoric expressions consequently have their reference point in the text and express cotextual relationships, whereas exophoric ones imply a reference to the situation and express contextual relationships, thus allowing for the referred element to be retrieved from the verbal or nonverbal situation (Schmolz 2015: 29). For example, if I see my wife with a book in her hand that I had lost and could not find, I can perfectly say dámelo [give-2pers.imp. me-masc.dat.sing. it-masc.acc.sing. > give it to me], and the antecedent of the masculine accusative clitic adopts an exophoric expression.

Some authors (for example Mitkov 2002: 20) have even gone as far as to highlight that the pronoun would not be used anaphorically, but deictically, in this case. This exophoric use of anaphora would represent a leap from the intratextual relationship to the extralinguistic relationship of the communicative situation; in other words, it is a jump from anaphora to a deixis ad oculos¹¹ favored by a pronominal clitic. Therefore, the same as any other pronoun, the clitic has no autonomous referentiality and is interpreted with regard to its linguistic or extralinguistic antecedent. An antecedent exists, though, either in the intratextual relation or in the ad oculos situational relationship. Nevertheless, it is our theoretical understanding that it continues to be a case of anaphora – and not of deixis ad oculos – despite the signaling to the immediate situational context and not to an intratextual relationship. After all, deixis – in any of its uses – is defined by local-egocentric relationships,¹² and no such links of local-egocentric determination exist in anaphora, not even in situational anaphora. Consequently, clitics have no autonomous referentiality and are interpreted in relation to their antecedent, be it linguistic or cotextual, i.e. intratextual (endophoric uses), or extralinguistic / contextual (exophoric uses).

(M): What is said in an unusual way is not normal. Linked to the maxim be clear, avoid darkness and proximity in expression.

¹¹ Deixis ad oculos is characterized because both the speaker and the objects indicated by means of deictic expressions according to the origo are present in the enunciative situation. Hence the possibility to accompany the enunciations of deictics with visual and acoustic gestures (Cifuentes 1989: 98).

¹² According to Rauh (1983: 12), deictic determination constitutes an essential part of the symbolic or lexical meaning of deictic expressions: the way in which the speaker relates objects of different kinds to himself. This relationship has an egocentric nature because the encoder represents the orientation center, and it is localistic because an identification of the related objects follows criteria according to which local domains are differentiated in relation to the encoder (Cifuentes 1989: 96).
Exactly as cotextual or contextual anaphoric uses can be found, it is also possible to consider contextual and cotextual deictic uses. For example, the demonstrative *ese [that]* usually serves to illustrate uses of deixis *ad oculos*. Thus, in a specific communicative situation, two people talk, and one tells the other *dame ese [give me that]*. The referent is obviously contextual, but I see this is as an *ad oculos* deictic use different from the previous example (*dámelo*) – anaphoric (exophoric) – because the referential relationship has a localistic egocentric nature in this case. It can also have cotextual uses, though:\footnote{13} *Para conseguir su fin, el viento luchaba con el mar. Éste empujaba con mucha fuerza [to achieve its end, the wind struggled with the sea. The latter pushed very strongly].* The localistic egocentric relationship that indicates proximity to the speaker’s domain presented in the preceding example causes it to have the sea as its antecedent in a cotextual reference frame, not a contextual one. Therefore, my conclusion is that both anaphora and deixis can relatively often establish their referential relationship cotextually or contextually, even if anaphora seemingly does it more often in a contextual way and deixis preferably adopts a contextual reference.

Hankamer & Sag (1998) were amongst the first to study two kinds of anaphora in the 1970s. A first kind of anaphora would be syntactically controlled and would have its antecedent in the linguistic cotext. A second kind of anaphora, similar to the exophoric uses of anaphora discussed above, has no linguistic antecedent and can be controlled by some aspect of the linguistic environment, in such a way that there is enough pragmatic information to allow an unambiguous determination of the referent considered – they label this use as *deep anaphora*. These authors subsequently modify (Sag & Hankamer 1998) their deep anaphora theory to some extent, and it is no longer a matter of establishing a relationship with a referent in the linguistic context; instead, the anaphoric element is determined by the interpretation of that extralinguistic reference, i.e. through an association with some object in a world model built by the interlocutor in the discourse, a model used to describe how discourses are represented, produced and understood. In any case, it seems to us that the existence of an anaphoric relationship with an element in the context has been verified. However, from what has been said so far, one could have the impression that such an anaphoric relationship is always established within a situational or *ad oculos* context. And this does not necessarily have to be the case.

An interesting case in this respect is the so-called *indirect anaphora* (Mitkov 2002: 15; Schwarz-Friesel 2007: 5).\footnote{14} In indirect anaphora, a nominal anaphoric group is interpreted from a non-coreferential textual element, thus making it possible to interpret the anaphoric expression normally through inferential processes. By way of example: *encontraron el coche en una zanja. Los neumáticos estaban pinchados [the car was found in a ditch. The tires were slashed].* The group nominal

\footnote{13. This is what some authors describe as ‘anaphoric use of deictic expressions’ (Levinson 2006: 111; Corazza 2011: 140).}

\footnote{14. Also known by other names, such as associative, bridging or inferible anaphora, with multiple references in this regard.}
los neumáticos\textsuperscript{15} involves an associative indirect anaphora, since it designates an element that must be inferred from a non-correferential element present in the previous sentence: el coche. The interpretation arrives through an inference of the type los coches tienen neumáticos \textit{[cars have tires]} based on a part-whole metonymic relationship. In the construction of the previous discourse, since the contextual knowledge of the world’s knowledge is activated in the interlocutor, no need exists for an element to be explicitly mentioned in the text so that it can become somewhat active in its knowledge during the understanding process. Expressed differently, in order to complete the semantic form of the text, the interlocutor automatically assigns a mental model of the textual world to the syntactic structure that incorporates both text information and information activated through conceptual instantiation and inferential processing. The main characteristics of indirect anaphora can be summarized as follows (Schwarz-Friesel 2007: 8):

a) There is no explicit antecedent to which the defined nominal group functioning as an indirect anaphora refers back. Instead, some element appears in the previous context in relation to which the indirect anaphora is interpreted.

b) There is no coreference relationship between the nominal group and the element to which it refers us back, but some other kind of semantic link or conceptual relationship.

c) Restrictions exist for coding indirect anaphora with pronouns or demonstratives.

d) The resolution of an indirect anaphora in textual comprehension goes far beyond a simple search and match procedure. A cognitive process that involves the activation of knowledge structures is required to achieve a full interpretation.

e) From the perspective of accessibility, indirect anaphora needs to be seen as a set of given and new entities resulting from the combination of activation and reactivation processes.

The anaphoric reference can therefore be established indirectly from idealized cognitive models:\textsuperscript{16} no reference to the object in the previous discourse is required to achieve a definite reference, the idea of an object evoked in some way would suffice (Blackwell 2003: 61).

Another interesting example of an exophoric relation not linked to the \textit{ad oculos} situational context is the one that Himmelmann (1996: 206) calls \textit{recognitional use} of demonstratives. In these cases, the demonstratives do not refer to elements of

\textsuperscript{15} The definite article directs the interlocutor’s attention to the text or context. The signaling function of the article consists in guiding the interlocutor towards the previous information, which remains valid (Cifuentes 1989: 121).

\textsuperscript{16} An idealized cognitive model is equivalent to frames, schemata, scenarios, mental models, mental spaces or cognitive domains – a particular organization of knowledge established as a prerequisite for our ability to understand the meanings of words. In other words, it is a kind of base knowledge or structured conceptual complex with regard to which a notion is characterized. All the given names refer to sets of branched structures able to code propositional information; they constitute attempts to provide a format to represent human knowledge in computational models of the mind, and this through conventional propositional structures according to the situations that can be understood (Cifuentes 1994: 38-55).
the previous cotextual discourse; they actually serve to indicate that the hearer can identify the referent based on the specific shared knowledge (Diessel 1999: 93). For instance: *no pude dormir anoche. Ese perro me despertó* [*I couldn’t sleep last night. That dog woke me up*]. This example includes a noun which appears with a demonstrative for the first time. The demonstrative does not refer to an entity of the previous discourse or the *ad oculos* contextual situation, it simply tells us that, in the speaker’s opinion, the hearer knows the referent. In other words, recognitional demonstratives mark information that is new in the discourse and known to the hearer (Diessel 1999: 106). The interlocutor might know something even if it has not been mentioned earlier: despite not being activated, such information is pragmatically presupposed. In addition, the information must not only be new in the discourse and known to the hearer but also private, or expressed differently, it would be information that the speaker and hearer share due to an experience that they both lived through in the past. It is consequently not general cultural information shared by all the members of a community (as in associative indirect anaphora, albeit metonymically in this case). The private nature can also prove useful to suggest emotional closeness, sympathy or shared beliefs (Diessel 1999: 107). What is more, it can even appear formally marked with a certain particular form (Diessel 1999: 109).

In short, we can conclude that a previous mention to the cotext is not a prerequisite to bring an entity to the addressee’s awareness. This can also happen without the cotext being previously mentioned due to the interlocutors’ familiarity with the entity or through its association with other entities mentioned or evoked in the discursive context (Blackwell 2003: 61): in the absence of an explicit antecedent, a pronominal form is likely to be used when the speaker believes that the considered referent has enough relevance in the interlocutor’s mind. Such referents may become accessible through an inference based on the processing of previous discourse or from a broader situational or cultural context (Cornish 1999: 147; Blackwell 2003: 63). Thus, the cotextual antecedent is not a must, what becomes necessary is the prior availability of a conceptual representation of the referent in the interlocutor’s mental discursive model. This is what Cornish (2006) calls *discourse anaphora*.

The discursive approach implies that not all referents need to be introduced through an explicit textual antecedent. Discourse anaphora is a way to use the representation of discourse built by the participants in the speech act from a relevant cotext and context. It is not only the anaphoric expression used that makes the anaphora but also the clause where it appears: this predicational context acts as a kind of pointer orienting the addressee towards the part of the discourse representation already cognitively activated and which will make it possible to extend in terms of an appropriate coherence relationship (Cornish 2006: 631). This discursive perspective accordingly sees the antecedent as a discourse unit and may be built either through a direct interpretation of the cotext (within its contextual framework) or in terms of the context alone in conjunction with relevant aspects of mutual knowledge, or also via inferences from either of the above (Cornish 2006: 633). Cornish offers a dynamic conception of the antecedent in which phoric elements
enrich the meaning not only with the semantic information of the antecedent but also with the discursive information added by the rest of the subsequent linguistic context and the pragmatic information that results from the interaction between the speaker’s knowledge and that of the addressee. In this way, the knowledge provided by the text and the encyclopedic and cultural background of the addressee intervene in the interpretation of the anaphora: the establishment of the reference is a cognitive operation that results from the cooperation between the participants in the communication, and the way in which the referents are introduced depends on the speaker’s assessment of the epistemic state of the addressee, and the assent or dissent that the latter makes about the presuppositions of the speaker.

3.2. Lexicalized feminine clitic constructions as discourse anaphoras

Lexicalized feminine clitic constructions could be considered an example of discourse anaphora. While speaking about exophoric uses, we mentioned a jump from the intratextual anaphoric relationship to the situational anaphoric relationship – common in whatever use of pronominal clitics – but all of them reveal a clear anaphoric relationship with an explicit or specific antecedent (either in the cotext or in the ad oculos situational context). In lexicalized feminine clitic constructions, there is no explicit or specific antecedent, neither in the linguistic context nor in the ad oculos situational context. All constructions can be described as a clear case of (inter)subjectification, insofar as a change occurs from the objective description of the external situation to the expression of the speaker’s internal perspective. More precisely, there is a change from the syntactic reference of the feminine clitic to the semantic-pragmatic reference based on the communicative situation: the clitic does not agree with any previous element belonging to the linguistic or ad oculos extralinguistic context. The agreement of the clitic with a feminine noun phrase does not take place, it must be understood from the communicative situation, which explains why the reference of the feminine clitic can be understood from the speaker’s perspective about the utterance; it is a pragmatic meaning of the feminine clitic reference. A need exists to infer what the speaker means from the communicative situation, even though the reference of the clitic never appears explicitly. Therefore, all these cases exemplify a very clear process of subjectification, since a feminine clitic appears without a reference to any noun phrase whatsoever, the reference to the interpretation of the communicative situation being implicit. Needless to say, subjectification does not happen in exactly the same way in every case.

There are processes in which the feminine clitic has no syntactic reference, but a contextual semantic reference is implicitly made to an implied and recognized concept. For example, the use of meterła [put-INF. it-FEM.ACC.SING > put it in] does not need any syntactic reference whatsoever for the feminine clitic in sporting contexts, since it becomes crystal-clear that the conceptual element ball is always contextually involved. Likewise, dormirla [sleep-INF. it-FEM.ACC.SING > sleep it off] will allow no anaphoric syntactic relationships between the clitic and any noun phrases; nevertheless, the reference to a generic concept similar to ‘drunkenness’ is implied from the context, and the speaker recognizes that contextual relationship. Whenever
someone la duerme [it-fem.acc.sing. sleeps-3sing.pres.], duerme [sleeps] conveys a concept that can be assimilated to ‘drunkenness’ and is lexically expressed in a variety of ways, and not only with the word borrachera (examples include mona and cogorza, to quote but two). In other words, we no longer find ourselves before a specific (sporting) context, but rather before a general or multiple one. On some occasions, the concept involved has a somewhat more complex nature, as in deberla [owe-inf. it-fem.acc.sing > owe], because a contextual semantic allusion is actually made to a generic concept of (moral, emotional or intellectual) debt, even if no syntactic reference can be seen anywhere. This concept is not so ‘accurate’ as that of ‘borrachera’ or ‘cogorza’ [drunkenness]; in fact, it has a much more undetermined meaning. As a result, the addressee must identify the concept to which the feminine clitic refers from the situation and thus update what is being expressed by the speaker. Furthermore, a defining characteristic of cases such as meterla [put in] or dormirla [sleep it off] becomes visible as well, namely that it is possible to find the construction with the nominal group syntactically explicit: e.g. meter la pelota [put the ball], dormir la mona, borrachera [sleep the cute, drunk > sleep it off], etc.

We could outline what is shown along the following continuum, in a process that leads to an increasing subjectification of the speaker:

1. Intratextual or cotextual anaphoric reference: Ya han llegado las ventanas. Las están colocando [the windows have already arrived. They (the workers) are placing them] The feminine clitic refers to a previous noun phrase that permits to establish the recognition of the reference.

2. Ad oculos situational anaphoric reference: a communicative situation where the speaker’s partner appears with a book in his hand that he/she knows the speaker was looking for. The speaker sees him/her and says dáme lo [give it to me]. The clitic refers to an element of reality that can be easily identified as the antecedent thanks to the ad oculos situation. This would be a typical example of exophora such as those mentioned above.

3. Phantasmagorical or representational anaphoric reference: a communicative situation in which speakers are talking about a context where the objects mentioned are not present in the ad oculos communicative situation. It is always a specific and determined context. By way of example, a sports program in which journalists are commenting on a certain football match which has already taken place and, referring to a certain player, they say: Griezmann está teniendo muchos problemas para meterla [Griezmann is having a lot of trouble putting the ball in]. The feminine clitic refers to an established element of the phantasmagorical or representational context which helps us to easily recognize

17. Phantasmagoric deixis is characterized by the fact that the orientation center (though not the related objects) forms part of the enunciation situation. Identifying the related objects through acoustic or visual gestures is not possible in this kind of deixis utilization. As for representational deixis, it characteristically excludes the orientation center as well as the related objects from the expression situation. The speaker removes his real center of orientation and imagines himself located within an imagined space or a space of memory. He establishes an orientation center with which he relates the objects of that imagined space (Cifuentes 1989: 98-99).
the antecedent. The *meterla* locution conveys a meaning where the feminine clitic always alludes to *ball* when it comes to the sporting contexts in which this instrument is present. *Meterla* may have other values (a sexual one, for instance) in other particularized contexts, though. Polysemy highlights the need for an established context. This is obviously not a case of associative indirect anaphora nor does it entail a use of recognition with private information.

4. Anaphoric reference to a given specific concept known in the speaker’s cultural or encyclopedic context: A says to B: *Váyase usted a dormir*la [go to sleep it off]. The meaning of this construction no longer depends on a specific context but can be applied to a variety of situations. The locution *dormir*la conveys a meaning where the feminine clitic always refers to an identifiable concept with words such as *borrachera* or *cogorza*, *[drunkenness]*, amongst others. Actually, both the locution referred to in the previous item and this one allows constructions in which the verb can combine with a noun identifying the same construction content: *váyase usted a dormir* la *mona*; *metió la pelota por toda la escuadra* [go to sleep it off: he shot the ball into the corner of the net and scored].

5. Reference to a given indeterminate concept known in the speaker’s cultural or encyclopedic context: A says to B: *Te dejo pasar, pero me la debes* [I let you pass, but you owe it to me]. The same as in the previous point, despite not depending on a specific context, the meaning of the construction can be applied in a variety of situations. The construction *deber*la has a meaning in which the feminine clitic always refers to an indeterminate concept which cannot be exactly identified using any specific word of the Spanish lexicon. However, it generically expresses some kind of moral, emotional or intellectual debt derived from some kind of insult or offense. This conceptual indeterminacy prevents the verb from combining with any noun phrase pointing to a synonymic relationship equivalent to that given in the locution: *me debes la afrenta* [you owe me the debt for the affront].

It is obviously the last three examples that raise the most interest when it comes to analyzing lexicalized feminine clitic constructions. The first goal we must set ourselves is to discern whether the link to the different kinds of contexts mentioned can imply a scalar connection with particularized and generalized conversational implicatures and conventionalized implicatures, respectively. Thus, the anaphoric reference where the feminine clitic refers to an element of the established imagined context which makes it easy to recognize the antecedent, as in *Griezmann está teniendo muchos problemas para meter*la [Griezmann is having many problems to put it in], could represent a particularized conversational implicature, since we are saying something in a specific context; in other words, the reference would decisively depend on a particular context. Secondly, the anaphoric reference to a given specific concept in the speaker’s cultural or encyclopedic context exemplified by *váyase usted a dormir*la [going to sleep it off] could be a case of generalized conversational implicature, insofar as the meaning of the construction no longer depends on a specific context. Finally, the reference to a given indeterminate con-
cept in the speaker’s cultural or encyclopedic context – e.g. *Te dejo pasar, pero me la debes* [I let you pass, but you owe it to me] – would be a conventional implicature by means of which the construction *deberla* transmits a conventional meaning where the feminine clitic always alludes to an indeterminate concept which, despite being impossible to identify exactly with any specific word of the lexicon, generically suggests some kind of moral, emotional or intellectual debt derived from some kind of insult, offense, debt, etc.

In the latter case, the adequacy of the comparison seems clear, conventional implicature: the agreement of the feminine clitic with the nominal feminine group does not exist and must be understood from the communicative situation, which means that there is a conventionalized pragmatic meaning corresponding to the reference of the feminine clitic: we must infer what the speaker means from the communicative situation, and that inference becomes conventionalized in such a way that this subjective value comes to form part of the conventional meaning associated with the construction in question. However, the consideration of the other two examples as cases of conversational implicatures (particularized and generalized) is highly debatable, or rather, is not correct, although a connection exists with particular contexts and general contexts respectively. Without needing to analyze all the characteristic properties of conversational implicatures in detail, we can resolve the matter considering their possible cancellability: conversational implicatures can be canceled (Grice 1975: 57-58), either adding to the utterance a clause that explicitly invalidates them or issuing that utterance in a context which clearly shows that the principle of cooperation is being flagrantly violated.

The examples considered above do not show any cancelability in the anaphoric reference to a particular or general context, though. In a sports radio talk show, the utterance *Griezmann está teniendo muchos problemas para meterla*, where the feminine clitic does not need an antecedent to establish the anaphoric relationship with ‘ball’ or something cannot possibly be canceled. The only existing option would be to establish another context (sexual, for example) to contextually determine another antecedent for the feminine clitic: *Griezmann está teniendo muchos problemas para meterla, y no me refiero a la pelota*… [*Griezmann is having many problems to put it in, and I do not mean the ball …*]. In this case, one may unconsciously think about a sexual context with the male member as the contextual antecedent of the feminine clitic; however, no implicature is canceled: one context is replaced by another and that makes possible the referential determination of a different antecedent for the feminine clitic. Of course, there may also be cases in which the hearer does not share the context that makes possible the referential concretion of the feminine clitic antecedent, but then no implicature is canceled either, simply an indeterminate expression remains. The same holds true about some word plays that allow several alternative contexts, such as the famous construction *los negros no saben meterla* [*blacks do not know how to put it in*], where you play with two contexts – sports and sex. Polysemy is exploited instead of disambiguating the expression, thus encouraging confusion. But no cancelability exists, it is simply a matter of contextual indetermination that prevents the concretion of the feminine clitic antecedent.
As for anaphoric relationships with a given specific concept known in the speaker’s cultural or encyclopedic context, as in **váyase usted a dormir** [go to sleep it off], there is no cancellation either. Some hearer could certainly try to find a different antecedent for the feminine clitic, with some construction that showed ignorance about the contextual reference of **dormirla** [go to sleep it off], e.g. ¿**dormirla a quién?** - ¿a mi hija? [put whom to sleep? - my daughter?] But this would be the same case of referential indeterminacy that might arise when the contextual antecedent for the feminine clitic is unknown. Expressed differently, there would be no cancelability in any case; ignorance of the contextual antecedent could exist, but not cancelability.

The contextual – particular and general – anaphoric references of feminine clitic constructions where the joint co-appearance of a referent for that clitic can occur (**meterla** / **meter la pelota**; **dormirla** / **dormir la mona** [put in it / put in the ball, sleep it off]) are difficult to explain from the traditional proposal of conversational implicatures. An alternative explanation might be found in another perspective: *accommodation*.

### 3.3. Accommodation

Lewis (1979) conceived accommodation as a repair strategy: the hearer recognizes that something is wrong, sees how to solve it by adding the missing presupposition and proceeds to adjust it. Accommodation can be explained as something that is done in deference to someone else’s wishes: these are adaptations made to enhance communicative success (Beaver & Zeevat 2007: 503-504). Accommodation implies an adaptation by the hearer of the assumptions that the speaker has made, which cannot obviously be derived using arguments based on Grice’s maxims. If accommodation takes place in response to the assumptions made by the speaker, then we can expect anything which indicates that something has been assumed to trigger accommodation. However, accommodation is only possible in contexts where the explicit addition of the accommodated material would produce a felicitous discourse, and result in a text which lacked the original presupposition (Beaver & Zeevat 2007: 510). Only in this ‘accommodative’ way is it possible to find a context which allows an antecedent for the feminine clitic.

Accommodation consequently fills a gap and occurs because something is missing from the context (this is the current intuition since Lewis 1979). Accommodation should cause presupposition to spring into existence, repairing the context and replacing whatever was missing (Beaver & Zeevat 2007: 523). Some presuppositions do not form part of common ground knowledge. The concept of accommodation arises as a way to repair these cases: if the speaker takes for granted certain information not included in the common ground, the hearer will be forced to assume it. The possibility exists to insert a presupposition in the conversation even if it was not a prior background assumption, i.e. without needing to state the inserted presupposition explicitly. In such cases, the conversational participants recognize that the existing context does not satisfy the presuppositional requirements of the utterance but accommodate to the speaker by adding the infor-
mation required to bring the context into harmony with the presuppositional rule (Kripke 2009: 369). Speakers use this process when they think that the required information will be accepted and unquestioned by all parties. Speakers routinely presuppose things that have not always been established as part of the common ground. By doing so, they are implicitly asking the other discursive participants to accommodate that information, adding it to the common ground or at least adding to the common ground that the speaker is publicly committed to that information for interaction purposes (Potts 2015: 175).

Thomason (1990: 332) exemplifies the above with the accommodation to solve the problem of adjusting the reference of anaphoric items which do not have an antecedent at the beginning of a conversation. Such cases make it necessary to adjust the conversational exchange to eliminate obstacles for the hearer’s detected plans. Although Thomason’s example cannot be put on a level with the feminine clitic constructions that we have been commenting on, it does show that if a necessary presupposition is not present, the context will need to be adjusted. The default option consists in adding the presupposition so as to make the utterance interpretable. Accommodation is a repair strategy, and not simply an addition of information to the propositional content (Van der Sandt 1992: 340-341): it serves to repair the utterance context for the purpose of obtaining an interpretation of the sentence being processed. Accommodation is thus better understood as a kind of preprocessing of an utterance meant to adjust contextual parameters with the aim of creating an auxiliary content where it can be interpreted.

The two previous examples of feminine clitic constructions compatible with syntagmatic combinations of the clitic reference (Griezmann está teniendo problemas para meterla y váyase usted a dormirla / Griezmann está teniendo problemas para meter la pelota y váyase usted a dormir la mona [Griezmann is having trouble putting it in and go to sleep it off / Griezmann is having trouble putting the ball in and go to sleep it off]) in contexts without an antecedent for the feminine clitic are clear cases of accommodation. In the example of meterla, even despite the lack of a reference to the clitic, the sporting context where the expression is inserted impels the hearer to accommodate the expression in such a way that it seeks an antecedent for the clitic. This antecedent arises automatically in such sporting context – it is clearly the concept of ‘ball.’ If it were another context, a sexual one, for example, the hearer would accommodate the possible antecedent for the feminine clitic to another kind of concept. The example of dormirla illustrates a similar accommodation, but here the contextual variation of possible antecedents for the feminine clitic no longer takes place. On this occasion, the hearer is once again forced to accommodate a contextual antecedent for the feminine clitic in any kind of use and circumstance and understands that it must be a concept similar to la mona [drunkenness].

Kadmon (2001: 20-21) establishes two restrictions on accommodation: 1) Consistency: when we have firm beliefs about the evaluation context or the expression context, we are reluctant to drop them. Therefore, we also resist accommodating assumptions which are inconsistent with what has already been assumed. The assumptions to be accommodated tend to be uncontroversial and unsurprising. Thus, if we find ourselves in the context of a sports radio talk show, the logical
thing to do is to understand the feminine clitic of *meterla as accommodating “consistently” with that context rather than with any other possible one. 2) Bridging: the new material added to the common ground must be related to material already included in it. There needs to be a bridge between the newly added material and what is already there. In the case of *dormirla, even without the need for a consistent context of drunkenness, a bridge may exist between the antecedent of the feminine clitic and the (previous or present) situation relating to the state and consciousness of the person identified by the action, thus providing evidence of its fullness. In other words, the negative assessment made about his attitude serves as a bridge to the negative evaluation entailed by the ‘drunkenness’ antecedent accommodated to the female clitic of *dormirla.

Therefore, the case of *meterla requires an accommodation according to a singular context which is going to establish the possibility of an antecedent for the feminine clitic, even without being present, since that singular context, i.e. determined and specific (sport or sex, for example), will permit to accommodate a non-explicit antecedent to the clitic. As for *dormirla, it needs an accommodation according to multiple contexts, since it will no longer depend on a specific context to carry out the accommodation: accommodation will actually have as its aim to find a contextual antecedent for the clitic in any context, as long as the possibility exists to establish a bridge between the negative information associated with the concept of ‘drunkenness’ and the referred situation.

We have consequently verified the existence/provided evidence of several/three possibilities in the process of subjectification that feminine clitic constructions involve, namely: a) an accommodation according to a singular context (*meterla); b) an accommodation according to a multiple context (*dormirla); and c) a conventional implicature (**deberla**). The existence of morphosyntactic reflexes constitutes a good sign, because it suggests that grammaticalization is taking place. In that sense, the co-occurrence of a possible referent for the feminine clitic is the first proof of greater grammaticalization in the case of **deberla**, since it excludes that possibility of a noun phrase appearing explicitly (*me la debes / *me debes la afrenta). Similarly, an accommodation according to a multiple context implies a higher level of grammaticalization than one which is dependent on a singular context, as greater fixation obviously exists in the former.

3.4. Anaphoric relationships and something else

Other cases reflect more complicated situations in which the subjectification processes described above do not account for the determination of the referent. In addition to being highly diverse, such situations could be influenced by changes of meaning through metaphorical or metonymic relationships or via analogical connections with other similar constructions.

Examples like sudársela a alguien [*sweat-INF. him-DAT.SING. it-FEM.ACC.SING. > I don’t care*] show the feminine clitic being contextually identifiable and referring to the male member. It is a situation that reminds us of item 4 in the subjectification schema offered in Section 3.2. What is more, one can even syntagmatically
find the combinatorial verb and a noun phrase developing the same meaning as the locution (*me suda la polla* [(**it-PRO me-DAT.SING. sweat-3ªpres. the dick**)]. Now, the construction does not have any sexual meaning with the virile member as an object (Cifuentes 2018): a metaphorical change of meaning takes place from making the virile member sweat – i.e. making the virile member ejaculate – to the meaning of ‘indifference.’ The metaphor stems from traits such as humiliation or contempt that the activity can bring on the person who performs the action of masturbating the other person, since the owner of the male member concerned enjoys a position of superiority over the other person. Contempt precedes indifference. Without a doubt, the new meaning can no longer possibly refer to a virile member.

A different case can be found in *pasarlas* [**spend-INF. them-FEM.ACC.PL. > happen**] (Cifuentes 2018), which often combines with a negative element that qualifies the referent of the subjectified feminine clitic (*moradas [purple], negras [black], putas [whore], canutas [terrible], buenas [good], duras [hard], malamente [bad(ly)], muy mal [very bad(ly)], etc. > have a shitty time, have a rotten time, have a tough time of it, have a rough time of it, suffer something rotten, etc.). Regardless of their respective idiosyncrasies, the same subjective element is valid for all of them as in *pasar las de Caín* [**spend-inf. suffer those of Cain > go through hell**]: painful experiences. Expressed differently, a generalization of meaning occurs from an unfortunate life like that of Cain, and other similar situations, such as exclusively living on purple olives, to the idea of living in a painful way and living in general, without any reference to the original olives or to Cain’s life.

A final example worthy of mention is *pelárselas* [**shave-inf. him-DAT.SING. them-FEM.ACC.PL. > very fast**] (Cifuentes 2018), which in principle shows a situation where the feminine clitic refers to a specific noun phrase, the beard(s), meaning a situation characterized by anger or irritation in general. *Pelarse las barbas [shave off one’s own beard(s)]* was an old and very common type of structure used to convey the idea of ‘pulling one’s beard(s) off when faced with a situation of great anger.’ The construction subsequently experienced a slight change of meaning, going on to generalize the meaning of ‘doing something very vehemently.’

The role of analogy as a motivating principle for feminine clitic constructions is essential too. In many constructions, the presence of the feminine clitic is not motivated by any referential relationship with an element given in context; instead, it results from analogy, considering the semantic and syntactic similarity between the constructions involved. The case of *pirárselas* [**go-inf. him-DAT.SING. them-FEM.ACC.PL. > to beat it**] stands out in this regard because it exemplifies a clearly incongruous option: an intransitive verb of motion combining with a feminine clitic of a direct object. The explanation would have to be taken from the construction *tomar las calzas de Villadiego* [**take the breeches of Villadiego**], which metonymically and metaphorically acquires the meaning of motion, and later, through a process of subjectification as that described in item 4 of the continuum schema, is transformed into *tomarlas* [**take-INF. them-FEM.ACC.PL. > to beat it**]. This construction had little success in the history of the Spanish language and disappeared from its usage shortly after its consolidation. However, the expressiveness of the term causes other verbs of motion to gradually acquire the presence of the feminine
clitic in an analogical way. That will be the case of *pirárselas*, which, by analogy with *tomarlas,* especially through *afufarlas* [to beat it] and *guillárselas* [to beat it] especially, makes the feminine clitic construction possible.

In the construction *allá se las haya alguien* [here someone self them-FEM. ACC.PL. has someone > you can get himself out of it], documented from the early seventeenth century, the speaker disregards the position of the syntactic subject and his ability to resolve conflicts. The construction of this schema includes, on the one hand, the deictic *allá* [there], which usually expresses distance from the speaker to the syntactic subject. On the other hand, despite the confrontational value of the construction being initially updated as well, rather than ‘confrontation,’ the meaning conveyed will essentially be the ‘problem’ that the syntactic subject has with the person (or thing) introduced by the prepositional complement with *con.* To which must be added that the prepositional complement may eventually disappear, and the notion conveyed would simply refer to the *distance* that the speaker establishes on the syntactic subject’s ability to adequately deal with a conflict, whether the latter is made explicit or not. No subjectification of any referent for the feminine plural clitic exists at the origin of the construction. From the fifteenth century, the construction *allá se lo haya* [there he-pro self him-masc. ACC.SING has-3pers.sing.subj. > you can get himself out of it] is attested with the same meaning, and the masculine clitic refers to a previous action, which means a certain *indifference* thanks to the *distance* expressed by the local deictic. Although this structure will coexist with *allá se las haya* until the early twentieth century, the plural feminine clitic construction is more frequent since the eighteenth – and especially the nineteenth – century. The appearance of the feminine clitic in *allá se las haya alguien* comes as a result of analogy with *habérselas con* [have-INF. him-DAT.SING. it-FEM.ACC.SING. with > have to fight with], and also by the analogical influence that the construction *allá me las den todas* [there me-dat.sing. them-FEM.ACC.PL. give-3pers.pl.ind. all-fem.pl. > all – fem.pl.] – with an equivalent meaning – could have favored. The plural feminine clitic of this construction is subjectified, insofar as it does not refer to any noun syntactically identifiable in the context; however, it is contextually implied by referring to the concept of *bofetadas* [slaps] (Cifuentes 2018). The analogy with *allá se las haya* has actually allowed the appearance of other constructions such as *allá se las campanee* [bell], *avenga* [avenue], *entienda* [understand], *componga* [compose] or *arregle* [arrange].

4. Conclusions

Lexicalized feminine clitic constructions in Spanish appear as a specific kind of syntactic structure characterized by marking an object (the direct object) negatively. In the same way, all constructions are also marked sociolinguistically; they all respond to social uses that range from the colloquial or familiar to the vulgar or rude. In other words, they constitute a mark of proximity that the speaker establishes with the hearer. That closeness, along with the knowledge that the hearers express, lies at the base of feminine clitic constructionalization.
The feminine clitic construction involves several steps. The first necessary and sometimes sufficient one consists in the subjectification of the direct object, the reference of which is contextually involved. All these constructions represent a clear case of subjectification, since a change occurs from the objective description of the external situation to the expression of the speaker’s internal perspective, or more precisely, there is a change from the syntactic reference of the feminine clitic to the semantic pragmatic reference based on the communicative situation: the clitic does not agree with any element of the previous or subsequent linguistic context or ad oculos extralinguistic context. The agreement of the clitic with a feminine noun phrase does not exist; it must be understood from the communicative situation, which means that the reference of the feminine clitic is understandable from the speaker’s perspective about what has been communicated. Therefore, it is a conventionalized pragmatic meaning corresponding to the feminine clitic reference. We must infer what the speaker means from the communicative situation and the reference of the clitic is never explicit. The second step, not always necessary, is a change in the meaning of the event. Finally, the third step – an unnecessary one too which sometimes also combines with the change of meaning – is analogy.

Lexicalized feminine clitic constructions could be considered an example of discourse anaphora. A feminine clitic appears without reference to any noun phrase at all times, thus leaving the reference to the interpretation of the communicative situation implicit. Three possibilities arise in this regard:

a) An anaphoric relationship from an accommodation according to a singular context (as in meterla), which will establish the possibility of an antecedent for the feminine clitic, even even in the absence of that antecedent, since that singular context, i.e. determined and specific, will allow to accommodate an unexpressed antecedent to the clitic.

b) An anaphoric relationship based on an accommodation according to multiple contexts (as in dormirla), since it will no longer depend on a specific context to make the accommodation: the accommodation will be made with the aim of finding a specific contextual antecedent for the clitic in any context, as long as the possibility exists to establish a bridge between the negative information implied by the concept and the situation concerned.

c) An anaphoric relationship based on a conventional implicature (as in deberla). The agreement of the feminine clitic with a feminine nominal group does not exist and must be understood from the communicative situation. It is therefore a conventionalized pragmatic meaning of the feminine clitic reference: we must infer what the speaker means from the communicative situation, and that inference becomes conventionalized in such a way that this subjective value comes to form part of the conventional meaning of the construction in question. The antecedent is not a specific item available in the lexicon, but rather a given indeterminate concept in the cultural context of speakers.

These three options for the discursive anaphoric relationship may be determined by changes of meaning or analogy-based relationships. All the above has also
allowed us to provide evidence that certain grammatical rules related to anaphora have their origin in the use of language.

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