Effects of Federal Governance on Political Stability of Somalia

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Abstract

Although different researchers and authors focused on the federalism as a topic their findings have been primarily interested in whether the adoption of federalism is viable to Somali society and the understanding of the population toward the phenomenon. The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of federal governance on political stability in an enlightening way in order to gain the public perspectives on the issue as it is yet a newly practiced phenomenon. The specific objectives were to investigate Clan based Federalism and political stability, to determine the effect of applying federal system of governance on political stability; and finally, to analyze the challenges and opportunities of federal system of governance and political stability. Using non-mathematical sampling techniques the researcher selected a sample of 61 respondents to determine the effects of federal governance on political stability in Somalia. The researcher used SPSS to analyze data and interpret it to frequencies, percentages and tables. The study concluded that the constitution has been approved in 2012 and envisages the implementation of a federalist structure for the new Somali state, a solution that is facing a number of issues in the prickly Somali political environment and can help Somalia society tie together. Recommendations were derived as such In order for Somalis to reconcile their differences and build more legitimate, accountable and efficient states and governance, an inclusive bottom-up locally owned national peace building should be held inside the country to hammer out a comprehensive peace deal acceptable to all parties. Home-based conflict management mechanisms should be prioritized.

Key words: Federal Government, Federalism, Federal Policies, Political Stability

1. Introduction

Federations have been formed in a series of historical waves over the last two centuries. The first wave, from the late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries, saw the creation of new countries with formerly independent units coming together in a federal form. Switzerland and the United States initially came together as confederations: the American experiment with confederation lasted for only eight years, from 1781 to 1789, when the 13 states addressed a weakness at the center by forming the first modern federation; the Swiss confederation evolved over more than five centuries, but after a brief civil conflict it adopted, in 1848, a federal constitution modeled on the American example. The next significant wave came with new federations emerging from the collapse of communism. The communist Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia all had nominally federal constitutions, but were in reality a centrally controlled one-party regime. However, as they democratized, their federal structures took on real political significance (Anderson, 2016).

Where, one of the prominent federalism theory scholars defined federal government as “the method of dividing powers so that general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinated and independent.” Daniel Elazar further explained this concept and claimed that the federal structure is a system of “self-rule plus shared rule.” He went on to say that federalism “involves some kind of contractual linkages of presumably permanent character that (1) provides for power sharing, (2) cuts around the issue of sovereignty, and (3) supplements but does not seek to replace or diminish prior organic ties where they exist.

In Africa Federalism is unique in today’s states. The most populous federal countries in Africa are Nigeria (2001), Ethiopia (1994), South Africa (1990-94) and Somalia (2004- 2012). The federal system is often used as a way of uniting divided societies particularly where divisions are ethnic, linguistic, and religious, and develop African governance systems in order to move ahead from violence and conflict. Scholars define federalism in different ways; Heywood (2009), states that federalism is the division of law-making power between a central body and a number of territorial units; on the other hand Daniel, Harper & Row (1984) describe federalism as a system of shared power between two or more governments with authority over the same people and geographical area. Federalism is a way of organizing a nation so that two or more levels of government have formal authority over the same area and people (Ronald, 2018).

According to Albertini, federalism is a form of political rational conduct with both a “social basis” and an “historical reference”. France and Italy had also been active in the horn of Africa. The French had had similar agreements with the Afar and
Isse traditional clan leaders at Obok. Colonial administration which lasted until 1960 had totally altered the political and social structure of Somalia. The colonial masters had wrecked and destroyed indigenous local authorities and imposed 2 ruthless laws (1) the local Sultanates, and (2) were completely destroyed and British, Italian or French colonial powers had forcefully separated Somali domains that were ruled by customary tribal rulers. The southern part of Somalia was controlled by Italy until 1942, but having allied with Germany in the Second World War (WWII) they lost, the administration of the colony was transferred to British Military until 1950 (Farah, 2013).

Somalia became a magnet to the colonial powers in the 18th century due to its geographical location. The prelude to the European colonization of Somalia was an ever-expanding European interest in the Horn of Africa based on its trade and military strategic importance (Farah, 2013a). From 1885 the Italians, French and British gradually and steadily intrude on and colonized areas of Somalia eventually dividing the Somali nation into five spheres: Italian Somaliland; British Somaliland; French Somaliland; the other two Somali regions which switched back and forth between Britain and Italy were eventually annexed to Ethiopia and Kenya (Ladan, 2012).

2. Statement of the Problem

Since its last governments have collapsed in 1991, Somalia remains lacking a viable and functional government for over twenty years. The civil war, collapse of its central state, and now as armed rival factions continue to haunt the country (Ciment, 2015). While the genesis of the conflict lies with colonial legacy of Somalia’s inheritance of divided Somali territories in the horn, the collapse of the state and the civil war became the outcome as the country had fallen to their prey. United Somali Congress (USC), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and Somali National Movement that were all clan based rebel groups succeeded in ousting the regime of General Mohamed Siad Barre in January 1991 (Shillington, 2012). Following this the state collapsed, rebel’s groups ousted the regime, turn the fight on themselves, and full-scale civil war emerged. As a result of power- hungry warlords and politicians, the nation’s people were divided along clan segments and it has been all most impossible to reestablish functioning viable central state (Holihan, 2007).

Following this the state collapsed, rebel’s groups ousted the regime, turn the fight on themselves, and full-scale civil war emerged. As a result of power- hungry warlords and politicians, the nation’s people were divided along clan segments and it has been all most impossible to reestablish functioning viable central state (Holihan, 2007). State governance, the entire public services delivering system had seized to operate. The endless fighting forced the people to flee from their homes either to live as internally displaced persons (IDP’s) in their own country or to seek refuge in other countries. Life was not easy for those who remained in the land, as they were made to pay forced pay forced revenues and be exposed to the danger of repetitive fighting, to say (Holihan, 2007). The lawlessness situation that had prevailed in Somalia gave an access to international terrorists, criminal groups and piracy, among others. Some of the warmongers got an agreement with some foreign firms to allow Somali coasts to be used as a dumping spot for radioactive and toxic nuclear wastes. War profiteers imported shipments of expired medicine and foods with no one to control them. Not only abovementioned groups have benefitted from this condition of turmoil and instability. Various reconciliation and peace building efforts have largely failed to end the conflict for the last 25 years. However, under international pressure in 2004 warring factions agreed on transitional federal charter and transitional federal government (TFG) was established. In the place of the TFG, a permanent Somalia federal government (SFG) emerged in 2012. However, despite this positive progress towards political stability, the country remains ridden by conflicts and lacking effective state governance. Therefore, the study sought to investigate the effects of federal governance on political stability of Somalia.

3. Study Objective

The main objective of the study was to determine the effects of federal governance on political stability of Somalia.

4. Review of Literature

4.1 Theoretical Framework

4.1.1 Social Conflict Theory

Social conflict theory is a Marxist-based social theory which argues that individuals and groups (social classes) within society have differing amounts of material and non-material resources (such as the wealthy vs. the poor) and that the more powerful groups use their power in order to exploit groups with less power. The two methods by which this exploitation is done are through brute force usually done by police and the army and economics. Earlier social conflict theorists argue that money is the mechanism which creates social disorder. The theory further states that society is created from ongoing social conflict between various groups. There are other theories of deviance, such as the functionalist theory, the control theory and the strain theory. It also refers to various types of positive social interaction that may occur within social relationships.

A social conflict theory puts change in perspective. Social conflict is the “heat” generated from the friction between contending parties in the processes of social change. All substantial social change involves social conflict. A realistic social conflict theory is an understanding of the positive role of social conflict in serving the common good.
Social conflict theory plays a positive role, when properly understood, in promoting groups to find common ground, form alliances, define core values, identify differences in viewpoint, set group boundaries, and inform strategies for achieving desired change. Understanding these functions of social conflict in the context of a social conflict theory is an essential process in positive social change. To understand social conflict theory, it must be known that in a democratic society no one group should dominate all other groups. The power of all groups, and especially of large institutions, is limited by force of law and by social compact, social tradition, and custom. Within that frame of reference, various interest groups and institutions compete, negotiate, compromise, and work out changes in socioeconomic arrangements, generating social conflict in the process.

Coleman points out that historically, the Realist paradigm has been the dominant perspective for the study of war and peace in history, politics and international affairs. Essentially a political metaphor, it views protracted conflicts as dangerous, high-stakes games that are won through the strategies of domination, control and counter-control. Thus, intractable conflicts such as the conflict in Somalia are thought to result from rational strategic choices made under the conditions of “real politics” of hatred, manipulation, dominance and violence in the world. However, and most importantly, Realism deals mainly with inter-state conflicts, whereas the conflict in Somalia is primarily an intra-state conflict.

4.1.2 Trait Theory of Leadership

Leadership trait theories attempt to explain distinctive characteristics accounting for leadership effectiveness. Early leadership studies were based on the assumption that leaders are born, not made. The trait approach focuses almost entirely on the physical and personality characteristics (Gerber, Nel & Van 1996). The list of traits was to be used as a prerequisite for promoting candidates to leadership positions (Lussier & Achua, 2011). The basic assumption that guided the trait leadership studies was that leaders possessed certain traits that other people did not possess. These traits included emotional intelligence; having an extrovert personality (charisma); masculinity and conservatism and being better adjusted than non-leaders (Senior, 1997). Numerous studies identified emotional intelligence as a critical element for the success of a leader and as a vital source for any group (Senior, 1997). By identifying specific traits or characteristics of leaders, one could distinguish a leader from a follower (Hughes, 2005).

The trait theory was found to produce confusing results because a combination of traits proved effective in some groups of leaders while they were ineffective in others. Therefore leadership requires more than just study of people but also study of situations (Hughes, 2005). Mullins (2008) observed that there is a bound to be subjective judgment in determining who is regarded as a “good” or a “successful” leader. Also the list of possible traits would be very long and there is not always agreement on the most important traits. Even if it were possible to identify an agreed list of more specific qualities, this would provide little explanation of the nature of leadership. It would do little to help in the development and training of leaders (Mullins, 2008). The trait theory therefore identifies the traits that an effective leader should possess for the purpose of influencing the performance and productivity of employees.

4.2 Discussion of Key Study Variables

4.2.1 Clan Federalism

Somalia’s ‘state failure’ has been falsely attributed to clannism; rather its failure is a function of the post-colonial state’s arrangement in terms of a federal system incompatible with the Somali clan system. Clannism in Somalia is perceived as a nuanced form of the general African phenomenon of tribalism which is essential to many of Africa’s political disputes. Much of the literature on Somalia emphasizes the primordial identity founded by membership to the Somali clan system (Elmi, 2010). The perceived centrality of clannism to Somali culture has led to suggest its culpability in Somalia’s “state failure” (Luling, 2015). Jones (2016) holds that “it is widely accepted that the ‘failure’ and ‘collapse’ of the Somali state rests on two key factors: a history of bad leadership, with a particular focus on the individual figure of Siad Barre; and the Somali culture characterized by clannism.” The lack of sovereign power for a period exceeding two decades has been attributed at one level or another to the Somali clan structure. The thesis maintains that Somalia’s continuous lack of a functional state is due to the implications an overarching Hobbesian sovereign holds for the Somali clan structure. In order to accommodate the sovereignty requirements of the Somali clan families, government must undertake a confederal arrangement.

The term clannism henceforth refers to the political ideology engendered by the Somali clan system. It is based on two principles, kinship ties acquired through lineage and social contracts which are publicly negotiated by the Somali clan families. The thesis maintains that Somalia’s political theme is shaped by Somalis allegiance to the clan system which imbes a need to preserve clans hegemony at the inter clan level relations. The use of the term federal state henceforth denotes a government system in which the central state is considerably strong, however, shares powers with the sub-divisional governments. Federalism is, nowadays, an instrument to weaken nation-centric efforts intended to revive state institutions, hence, strengthening the so called clan interests found in clan federalism. There are two separate camps in the Somali Parliament and in the wider society: Federalists and Anti-federalists. In reality, the so-called federalists are, in fact, confederalists that believe in separate and co-sovereign branches of the government.
Somalia’s fault lines have always fallen on clan borders. Jubbaland has ignited a polarized form of clan federalism. Accordingly, it attracted unprompted reaction from Digil and Mirifle instigated regional administration recently announced in Baidoa claims of six regions, Lower Shebelle, Bay, Bakool, Lower & Middle Juba regions and Gedo. Similar claims already exist in the disputed regions of Sool, Sanaag between Somaliland and Puntland states of Somalia. That disputed area has now become Khatumo state of Somalia which is independent from both contesting administrations (Jama, 2016).

Mohamud (2012) in support of Uluso emphasizes that what is uniquely alarming about these new federal states is the inherent desire of their governing entities to maintain clan hegemony, prestige, and domination over others, as well as the absence of grassroots consultation and the exclusion of women and local minorities. Additionally, Abow (2017) emphasizes that Somali style federalism prevents the formation of a national unitary and centralized government, leads to a lack of accountability because clan federalists segregate minority clans within its territories. He contends further that, clan federalism instigates confrontation, and dispute of clan boundaries. Proponents of centralized governance argue there are no clearly marked borders of provinces that are going to form the federation.

Moreover, Hussein (2012) argues that federal member states based on clan allegiances would potentially erode the very foundation of national unity, territorial integrity and it would sanction the country in a condition of clan enclaves. In such a specter, it’s easy to foretell that they would be elected office-holders will have to come from the bigger clan(s) of the major clan-family of a given region. This would mean that the political and economic powers would come to be concentrated, in perpetuity, in the hands of a small but powerful clan-oligarchy, thus bringing about what detractors of the centralized system were supposedly trying to forestall. Worse yet, there can be little or no chance for the mid-sized and/or minor clans/sub-clans to get their fair share of the political dispensation.

Although there are more issues that unite the Somali people than just the clan affiliation, over the years, clans have become the bane of Somalia. Clans, in Somalia, are culturally a consensual identity inherited from patriarchal ancestors and clannism, as a political ideology, determines everything else in the country - power, resource distribution, expansion of territory and even recruitment to positions of influence. Though clans existed even before colonialism, the colonial institutional legacy cemented this through the West state import, enhancing the clan divide and rule tactics.

4.2.2 Federal Government

According to Dr. Yahye, going back briefly to the two African countries that are currently applying the federal system, i.e., Ethiopia and Nigeria. In Ethiopia, the country is divided into nine ethnically based states as well as two special city administrations, namely, those of Addis Ababa (the national capital) and Dire Dawa (whose ownership is apparently being disputed over by some ethnic groups). The 9 states are sub-divided into zones, districts and sub-districts. In Nigeria, the country is made up of 36 ethnicity-based states plus the Federal Capital (Abuja) as a separate entity. In both of these two countries, each state is headed by its own elected Governor or President and has a House of Assembly (or State Parliament). On the other hand, all their constituent states are envisaged to fund all their activities through their own internal resources. In reality, however, most of these states cannot afford to achieve this lofty but unrealistic goal and they largely depend on the federal (central) government to bail them out. In other words, putting federalism into proper application is much easier said than done.

Someone may argue that federalism is a more democratic system, because it is based on a highly decentralized system of government. This may be true, but it also comes at a very high price. He/she may also give the autonomous region of Puntland (in north-eastern Somalia), which was established nearly nine years ago, as a good example for a successful application of federalism in that country. (Unlike the self-declared “Republic of Somaliland”, Puntland had opted for being a state within a federated Somali Republic). But Puntland was created under exceptional, desperate circumstances at the height of Somalia’s disastrous civil war. Furthermore, some of its claimed constituent units, like the regions of Sol and Sanag are seriously contested - at times with fierce militarily clashes - with Somaliland - essentially for clannish reasons.

If the above-cited two African countries (Ethiopia and Nigeria) which are much bigger, more stable and much richer than Somalia cannot fully implement a federal system, what do you expect of a totally ruined failed state like Somalia that has been undergoing a civil strife in the past 17 years? Suppose, for the sake of argument, that two of its regions like, say, Galgudud and Hiran or Bay and Bakol decide to form their own federal states. Can they fund all their required state activities alone? The simple answer is no. The other negative aspect of federalism, as I alluded to earlier, is that it will fan the flames of tribal rivalry and its natural consequence of hatred and animosity – something that had heralded the current tragedy in Somalia and had resulted in the total destruction of its state institutions. What will be the most rational criterion for establishing each state? And who will demarcate the borders between these fledgling states in a country like Somalia where one of its major clans is today claiming that almost three-quarters of the country belongs to its tribesmen? My considered opinion is that the introduction of the federal system in Somalia will make a bad situation more complicated and much worse. As the famous American economist, Mr. Milton Friedman is reported to have once remarked – referring rather sarcastically to USA, the richest country in the world and it’s most successful in terms of applying federalism: “If you put the federal government in charge of the Sahara Desert, in five years there will be a shortage of sand.”
At Garowe II, the President of Puntland made a significant speech intended to inform both the Somalis as well as the International Community about Puntland’s desire for Federal Government and the type of federalism that Puntland was seeking: “The type of federalism we would like to see for Somalia is a system where power and resources is divided between the states and the federal level. Gone are the days when power and resources was unfairly concentrated in a single city-state. Expectedly, when Somalia’s central government collapsed in 1991, the nation-state collapsed with the fall of Mogadishu – a city-state under successive administrations since independence. This historic disaster should never be repeated and the Somali federation should provide space for political stability and economic development at the local and state levels, to ensure sustainable stability even if the center is threatened or falls. This is how government is managed – at the local level where people play the most important role and can solve and manage”. 

According to Kay (2014) as the new federal map of Somalia emerges, with proto-federal member states taking shape in south, south-west and central Somalia, the intensity and complexity of political negotiation is remarkable since it involves a number of different actors with differing interest. But trust between actors is very low. Kay (2014) argues that after so many years of state failure, the clan has become a dominant feature of Somali people’s political and security issues. The voice of traditional elders carries great weight. They are able to help people understand that settlements must benefit everyone and that winners cannot and should not “take all”.

The oppressive rule of the Siad Barre in 1969-1991 and the subsequent civil war had the effect of many Somalis seeing federalism as the solution today. However, federalism continue to be most debated issues by the Somali people at the present, with one section of community to support the idea, where another section is opposed to it. The argument for pro federalism revolves around that federalism would emancipate the country from tyranny and excessive use of power by the center. Whereby, the anti-federal camp would see it as a foreign-driven agenda aimed to weaken the unity and the national integrity of Somalia. Moreover, Federalism, according to them, is meant for multi-ethnic and heterogeneous societies but not for Somalis who share language, culture, religion, feature etc. (Somalianews.com, 2015).

2.4.3 Federal Policies

Clearly there are many challenges facing the establishment of a Federal political system and Government in Somalia, but there are also opportunities to take advantage of the current momentum whereby current political leaders can solve the outstanding issues within the constitution while continuing the peace and reconciliation processes. Finalization of the Federal Constitution and support for the establishment of the remaining Federal Member States are vitally important. These are not easy tasks but must be a priority so long as the constitution is respected and adhered to. Adhering to the Federal Constitution and working within its framework will help overcome the existing problems. However, it must be understood that a federal political system is not the magic bullet that can solve all Somalia’s problems. Rather, the Somalis are, period. Under this Federal political system Somalis are the architects of their future.

There is an opportunity to correct the past political mistakes and look into the future. So far much has been achieved. In addition to this, Somali political leaders are already not abiding the Constitution. A case in point is the illegality of the way the current President was elected on 10 September 2012(BBC, 2012). While this is what the Federal Constitution says, there is as yet no Upper House. Inquiring about when the Upper House will be established, people in the Federal Government informed me, to my surprise, that it would take a long time to establish the Upper House, as it is not the priority of the Federal Government. If that is true, which I have no reason to doubt, what about the existing State to take the lead in establishing the Upper House, since it represents the interest of the States, as stipulated by Article 71 of the Federal Constitution.

To bypass all these sections of the Constitution, and elect a new president, the Federal Parliament hastily amended Articles 89(1-4) of the Constitution (Election of the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia.). This is the first illegality that the Federal Parliament committed, as they don’t have the authority to amend any section of the Federal Constitution without going through the proper process stipulated by Articles 133 and 134. The constitution allows for amendments, and there are strict processes and procedures provided within the constitution for this process. For instance, there are two periods in which amendments can be made to the constitution: before the expiry of the first term of the Federal Parliament (Articles 133 and 134); and after the expiry of the first term of the Federal Parliament (Article 132). For this reason this paper is mostly interested in the period before the first term of government expires, because that is a very important period.

Traditionally, the term of a Parliament begins immediately after the members of the Parliament are sworn in to assume their responsibilities under the constitution. In this case, the Somali Federal Parliament first term began when the Members of Parliament were sworn in on 20 August 2012. From then on until the end of the term, in 2016, any amendment that is going to be made should strictly followed Articles 133 and 134 as stated by the Constitution, rather than the President or the Parliament.

Articles 133 and 134 state that before the current Constitution becomes permanent through public referendum, any amendment will be prepared by an Independent Provisional Constitution Review and Implementation Committee consisting of 5 persons. This committee, when established, will work under another committee called the Provisional Constitution Review and Implementation Oversight Committee. This Committee will consist of an equal number from the two Houses of the Federal Parliament as well as 1 member from each Federal Member State. These two committees prepare amendments and then put them before the Federal
Parliament for approval by 2/3rds majority. After all that is done, the amendment will be put before the citizens of the country to accept or reject it in a public referendum. In the case of amending Article 89, none of the above processes took place. Sadly, neither the States nor the other stakeholders even protested about it. Without a doubt this will establish a precedent and the Federal Parliament may try to illegally amend other articles they might not like. Nevertheless, this is a clear example of how Somali political leaders are undermining their own constitution, and in consequence their future. There is an opportunity to reflect on the mistakes of the past and rectify them by adhering to the Federal Constitution, immediately establishing the Upper House and help and positively contribute the establishment of the remaining Federal Member State.

It is disturbing news, recently reported by Somali websites, of the President’s intention to amend the Somali Federal Constitution. It was reported that the President told members of Parliament, “the government and the parliament must work together to change the provisional constitution, as Somalia needs time to implement federalism.” The President went on to say that; "no system can be imposed on Somalia by the international community or military forces or a small group of people in secret meetings. No system can be imposed without the people’s support." If his intention is to make amendments within the procedural framework established by the constitution, then the processes are working, as they should. If the President continues down a path of constitutional amendments that are simply voted on by the MPs, then the government is heading the wrong direction in fulfilling its obligations within the Constitution.

Another problem with the Constitution concerns whether the constitution is secular or religious based. The Federal Constitution states that the constitution is based on the foundation of the Holy Quran and the Sunna (the teachings of Prophet Mohamed)—sees Article 3(1). Further, Article 4(1) states, “after the Shari’ah, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia is the supreme law of the country. The question here is whether the intention is to have a secular State or Religious State? To me this is clear-cut: Islamic law is higher than the Constitution. The constitution therefore, must adhere to Islamic law, whether it is criminal, contract, family and business law or any other laws. I understand that the Constitution was drafted this way to satisfy the religious groups, such as Al-Shabab. But, there is an opportunity to redraft and amend this article so it will read in a way that could satisfy all concerned groups.

There are also opportunities to discuss issues concerning the powers that could be allocated to the Federal Government by the Federal Member States and those powers that the Federal Member States want to retain. Currently there appears to be a misunderstanding about the sovereign authority of the Federal Member States to keep some powers and delegate others to Federal Government. This is a fundamental issue that needs to be understood by the stakeholders because Somalis want a bottom up process, rather than top down process. They do not want a form of government imposed from above by a remote authority; they want a process whereby their local concerns become regional concerns, which in turn become state concerns and ultimately federal concerns. Any process that tries to establish a sovereign state of Somalia starting in Mogadishu is bound to fail. Somalis are reluctant to return to a situation whereby all powers are vested in a remote and seemingly uninterested authority, they want their say in which powers they retain at a more local level and which powers they are happy for the Federal government to exercise on their behalf. It is vitally important that the existing States should collectively, or even separately, engage with the Federal Government on this matter, because the sooner this matter of establishing the remaining Federal Member States is resolved the quicker Federalism makes significant progress in Somalia.

4.2.4 Political Stability

It appears from the Federal Government’s activities, none of these issues will be resolved unless the Federal Executive and the Parliament work overtime, open dialogue with the existing States, and support all the efforts to establish the remaining would-be federal Member States. Without a strong commitment from the Federal Government, the Federalism will not flourish in Somalia. Therefore, for Federalism to work in Somalia both the Federal Government and State Governments should inform the people of the importance of the system; how it works and the benefits it brings. It is not enough for States or the Federal Government to claim they have a federal system without actually adhering to the system. Nor is it enough for one level of government to adhere in only areas of the Constitution that suits it. In fact the State of Puntland, which has invested much more in this process, needs not only to educate its people about the federal political system, but also behave like one, by delegating effective and sufficient powers to the districts.

Another very important issue that the current government has an opportunity to try solving is the issues concerning the secession claims of the northwestern regions, now calling itself Somaliland. As mentioned above, the Somaliland people seceded from the rest of Somalia in 1991. Their government held a referendum in 2001 asking its people whether or not to secede. Allegedly most people voted to secede (Mar., 2013). As David Kenning stated “in Somaliland the absence of a central government in Mogadishu has led to the creation of decentralized, regional governments supported by traditional leaders and civil society groups that are helping to rebuild their country from the ground up.”(Kenning 2012) Now, there is a very strong and substantial peace and political progress that is taking place in Somaliland, having political parties, two houses of parliament, and holding two one-man one-vote elections as well as local government elections. All these have been achieved within the last twenty years, and the people and their successive governments should be commended on these progress. One of the greatest challenges for Federalism is how to bring Somaliland back to Somalia when a large part of Somalia, excluding Puntland, is still mired in violent confrontation, which Somaliland and Puntland have successfully sought to distance themselves from.
5. Research Methodology

The research study was a descriptive case study, which sought to investigate the effects of Somali federal structure on national political stability in Somalia. Participants will be questioned using a questionnaire. The technique enables collection of information from a representative sample of the participants. This method is chosen because it assists the researcher in securing both qualitative and quantitative information from the respondents.

The study selected a population of 77 respondents. The target population was government officials, politicians, and intellectuals. Sample size determination is the act of choosing the number of observations or replicates to include in a statistical sample. The sample size is an important feature of any empirical study in which the goal is to make inferences about a population from a sample (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The total sample size for this study was obtained using the formulae developed by Cooper and Schinder, (2013) together with (Kothari, 2014).

| Respondent        | Target Population | Sample Size |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|
| Government Officials | 24                | 20          |
| Politicians       | 28                | 24          |
| Intellectuals     | 20                | 17          |
| Total             | 72                | 61          |

The sample size selected was 61 as shown below:

\[ n = \frac{N}{1 + N(\alpha)^2} \]

Where:

- \( n \) = the sample size,
- \( N \) = the sample frame (population),
- \( \alpha \) = the margin of error (0.05%),

\[ n = \frac{72}{1 + 72(0.05)^2} = 61 \]

6. Data Analysis and Results

6.1 Descriptive Statistics

6.1.1 Clan Based Federalism and Political Stability

| Table 2 Clan Based Federalism and Political Stability |
|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|
| N               | Mean            | Std. Deviation |
| Clan federalism serves for clan interests | 61              | 3.55          | 1.489        |
| Clan federalism creates hatred among people | 61              | 4.20          | 1.579        |
| Clan federalism inhibits co-existence of people living in different federal member states | 61              | 3.20          | 1.55         |

Majority of respondents agreed that Clan federalism serves for clan interests. This evidenced by a mean score of 3.55 and standard deviation of 1.489. On whether Clan federalism creates hatred among people, respondents agreed and responded with a mean score of 4.20 and standard deviation of 1.579. The respondents were asked that Clan federalism inhibits co-existence of people living in different federal member states and strongly agreed that this always true with this statement as shown by a mean of 3.20 and standard deviation of 1.55.

6.1.2 Federal Government and Political Stability

Majority of respondents agreed that Federalism brings services to those who are from the central government. This evidenced by a mean score of 3.55 and standard deviation of 1.489. On whether Federalism enhances the prospects of state rebuilding from a political perspective and to end the clan conflicts and possible secession. Respondents agreed and responded with a mean score of 4.20 and standard deviation of 1.579.
Table 3 Federal Government and Political Stability

|                                           | N  | Mean | Std. Deviation |
|------------------------------------------|----|------|----------------|
| Federalism brings services to those who are from the central government | 61 | 3.55 | 1.489          |
| Federalism enhances the prospects of state rebuilding from a political perspective and to end the clan conflicts and possible secession. federalism spreads power to sublevels facilitating the delivery of services to citizens | 61 | 4.20 | 1.579          |

The respondents were asked that federalism spreads power to sublevels facilitating the delivery of services to citizens and strongly agreed that this always true with this statement as shown by a mean of 3.20 and standard deviation of 1.55.

6.1.3 Federal Policies and Political Stability

Table 4 Federal Policies and Political Stability

|                                           | N  | Mean | Std. Deviation |
|------------------------------------------|----|------|----------------|
| Federalism tends to produce economic Development, because any state governments can independently manage its economy | 61 | 3.55 | 1.489          |
| In general federalism allows Somali people to participate in politics and administration Federalism enhances the love of regional governments rather than the nation (patriotism), dividing Somali people by clan, because every clan establishes their own state. | 61 | 4.20 | 1.579          |

Majority of respondents agreed that Federalism tends to produce economic Development, because any state governments can independently manage its economy. This evidenced by a mean score of 3.55 and standard deviation of 1.489. On whether In general federalism allows Somali people to participate in politics and administration and to end the clan conflicts and possible secession. Respondents agreed and responded with a mean score of 4.20 and standard deviation of 1.579. The respondents were asked that Federalism enhances the love of regional governments rather than the nation (patriotism), dividing Somali people by clan, because every clan establishes their own state and strongly agreed that this always true with this statement as shown by a mean of 3.20 and standard deviation of 1.55.

6.1.4 Political Stability

Table 5 Political Stability

|                                           | N  | Mean | Std. Deviation |
|------------------------------------------|----|------|----------------|
| Politically stable state can achieve the desired ends. | 61 | 3.30 | 1.45           |
| Political stability can create opportunities for country’s development | 61 | 3.35 | 1.229          |
| Political stability reduces corruption and enhances transparency and the rule of law | 61 | 3.26 | 1.358          |

Majority of the respondents agreed with a mean score of 3.30 and standard deviation of 1.45 that politically stable state can achieve the desired ends. Respondents agreed that Political stability can create opportunities for country’s development with a mean score of 3.35 and standard deviation of 1.229. Respondents agreed that Political stability reduces corruption and enhances transparency and the rule of law with a mean 3.26 and standard deviation of 1.358.

6.2 Inferential Statistics

6.2.1 Coefficient of Correlation

Pearson Bivariate correlation coefficient was used to compute the correlation between the dependent variable (political stability) and the independent variables (clan federalism, federal governance and federal policies). According to Sekaran, (2015), this relationship is assumed to be linear and the correlation coefficient ranges from -1.0 (perfect negative correlation) to +1.0
(perfect positive relationship). The correlation coefficient was calculated to determine the strength of the relationship between dependent and independent variables (Kothari and Gang, 2014).

### Table 6 Pearson Correlation

|                      | Political Stability | Clan Federalism | Federal Government | Federal Policies |
|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Political Stability  | 1                   | .149            | .122              | .187            |
| Clan Federalism      | .149                | 1               | .053              | .305**          |
| Federal Government   | .122                | .053            | 1                 | .531**          |
| Federal Policies     | .187                | .305**          | .531**            | 1               |

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

In trying to show the relationship between the study variables and their findings, the study used the Karl Pearson’s coefficient of correlation (r). This is as shown in Table 6 below. According to the findings, it was clear that there was a positive correlation between the independent variables, clan federalism, federal governance and federal policies and the dependent variable political stability. The analysis indicates the coefficient of correlation, r equal to 0.149, 0.122, and 0.187 for clan federalism, federal governance and federal policies respectively. This indicates positive relationship between the independent variable namely clan federalism, federal governance and federal policies and the dependent variable political stability.

#### 6.2.2 Coefficient of Determination ($R^2$)

Table 6 above shows an overall P-value which was less than 0.005 (5%). This shows that overall regression model is significant at the calculated 95% level significance. It further implies that the studied independent variables namely; gender stereotypes, family responsibilities, advanced education, and organizational culture have significant effect on women leadership in secondary schools education in Benadir region. The regression model summary indicates the coefficient determination $R^2$ square as 0.39. This means that at 39% of the relationship is explained by the identified four independent variables. The rest of 61% is explained by other factors not studied in this research.

### Table 7 Model Summary

| Mode | R    | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
|------|------|----------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| 1    | .624*| .390     | .381              | .32556                     |

a. Dependent Variable: Political Stability
b. Predictors: (Constant), Clan Federalism, Federal Governance, Federal Policies

#### 6.2.3 Analysis of Variance

The study used ANOVA to establish the significance of the regression model. In testing the significance level, the statistical significance was considered significant if the p-value was less or equal to 0.05.

### Table 8 ANOVA

| Model     | Sum of Squares | df   | Mean Square | F    | Sig.  |
|-----------|----------------|------|-------------|------|-------|
| Regression| 970.090        | 3    | 242.523     | 33.312| .000* |
| Residual  | 655.236        | 57   | 7.280       |      |       |
| Total     | 1625.326       | 60   |             |      |       |

a. Dependent Variable: Political Stability
b. Predictors: (Constant), Federal Policies, Federal Government, Clan Federalism
The significance of the regression model is as per Table 8 below with P-value of 0.00 which is less than 0.05. This indicates that the regression model is statistically significant in predicting factors of corporate financial performance. Basing the confidence level at 95% the analysis indicates high reliability of the results obtained. The overall Anova results indicates that the model was significant at F = 66.135, p = 0.000.

4.6.2 Regression Analysis

| Model                | Unstandardized Coefficients | Standardized Coefficients | t    | Sig. |
|----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------|------|
|                      | B             | Std. Error   | Beta |      |      |
| (Constant)           | 5.659         | 3.213         | 2.761 | .002 |
| Clan Federalism      | .156          | .105          | .105 | 2.486 | .004 |
| Federal Government   | .489          | .089          | .460 | 5.488 | .000 |
| Federal Policies     | .109          | .109          | .095 | 2.998 | .003 |

a. Dependent Variable: Political Stability

The regression equation was:

\[ Y = 5.659 + 0.156X_1 + 0.489X_2 + 0.109X_3 \]

Where:

- \( Y \) = the dependent variable (Political Stability)
- \( X_1 \) = Clan Federalism
- \( X_2 \) = Federal Government
- \( X_3 \) = Federal Policies

The regression equation above has established that taking all factors into account (political stability as a result of clan federalism, federal governance and federal policies respectively) constant at zero peace building was 5.659. The findings presented also shows that taking all other independent variables at zero, a unit increase in clan federalism will lead to a 0.156 increase in the scores of Political Stability; a unit increase in federal government will lead to a 0.489 increase in Political Stability; a unit increase in federal policies will lead to a 0.109 increase in the scores of Political Stability; This therefore implies that all the three variables have a positive relationship with federal government contributing most to the dependent variable. From the table we can see that the predictor variables of Political Stability as a result of namely clan federalism, federal governance and federal policies got variable coefficients statistically significant since their p-values are less than the common alpha level of 0.05.

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

7.1 Conclusions

Federalism is a decentralized form of government in which two or more autonomous states or regions agree to form and share a central federal government and institutions while constitutionally retain some powers. The federal state is mostly premised on ‘geographical devolution with guarantees for the autonomy of the units.’ Federal constitution defines and distributes powers and functions between the central state and the constituent states with the necessary guarantees.

From 1960 to 1969 Somalia had applied a centralized unitary of government based on a western style liberal democracy. This type of centralized liberal democratic unitary government worked fairly well from 1960-1969. Subsequently, tribalism, nepotism, and corruption paralyzed then system which eventually caused socio-political and economic decline that in turn gave rise to popular discontent and yearning for change. Nonetheless, the constitution that approved in 2012 represents an opportunity for Somalia to re-establish a central government which has been absent for the last two decades, and reach a stability that its society lacks since the pre-colonial era. The constitution envisages the implementation of a federalist structure for the new Somali state, a solution that is facing a number of issues in the prickly Somali political environment.

7.2 Recommendations

The study recommended the following:

i. In order for Somalis to reconcile their differences and build more legitimate, accountable and efficient states and governance, an inclusive bottom-up locally owned national peace building should be held inside the country to hammer out a comprehensive peace deal acceptable to all parties. Home-based conflict management mechanisms should be prioritized. Somali leaders should prioritize peace and general interest of the country instead of maximizing their personal, myopic and parochial interests.
ii. The absence of clear rules of federalization process is major problem facing federalism in Somalia. In consultation with key stakeholders, including existing and emerging federal units, the Federal Government should continue the consultation with principal stakeholders in order to set clear and agreeable rules for federation.

iii. Federal boundaries should be based on pre-existing provinces, separately or together. New boundaries are likely to deepen hostilities between clans. Clan-based boundaries have the double effect of infringing upon the citizenship rights of the non-majority residents. The rights of citizens in federal units should be constitutionally protected. Any boundary issue or questions should be solved peacefully with the involvement all concerned clans.

iv. If the process of Federalization is not managed properly through dialogue, public consultations and spirit of reconciliation it may engender a renewed civil war. It is also very important that all parties, including the Federal Government upholds and respects the all principles relevant to the formation of civil administrations including the ongoing federation within the framework of the Provisional Constitution.

v. The state of the Somali union and stability can be strengthened by the collective understanding that a divided and clan-based Somalia will not usher in a new era of peace and tranquility so badly needed in the region. Somalis community desperately needs a solid social compact and genuine reconciliation

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