Geopolitical Tensions, OPEC News, and Oil Price: A Granger Causality Analysis

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Abstract

To what extent geopolitical tensions in major oil-producer countries and unexpected news related to the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) affect oil price? What are the effects of non-market externalities in oil price? Are oil price forecasters aware or affected by such externalities when making their predictions? In this article, I analyse the influence of these events on oil price by means of Granger causality, using a unique measure of geopolitical events accounting for supply disruptions for the 2001-12 period. I found evidence favouring OPEC countries’-related news as an oil price driver jointly with supply disruptions influencing short-term forecasts, and reducing the consensus when unanticipated news are available. When considering separately OPEC news or other supply disruptions, the evidence is rather episodic.

JEL-Codes: C12; C22; E66; Q41.

Keywords: Oil-producer countries; OPEC; Oil price; Granger causality.

Highlights: → What are the effects of geopolitical tensions and non-market externalities in global oil price?

→ I found evidence favouring OPEC countries’-related news as an oil price driver jointly with supply disruptions influencing short-term forecasts, and reducing the consensus when unanticipated news are available.

→ When considering separately OPEC news or other supply disruptions, the evidence is rather episodic.
1 Introduction

In this article, I analyse the influence of geopolitical tensions and news related to the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) events on Brent oil price for the (monthly) period ranging between 2001.1 and 2012.3 using a unique *ad-hoc* variable—labelled $GT\&N$—specially built for these purposes. Despite all the machinery that has been used in regard to OPEC behaviour, I proceed considering one of the most striking time-series econometrics tools: Granger causality (henceforth, Gc; Granger, 1969; 1980; 2003). Note that as emphasised by Barrett and Barnett (2013), Gc is a tool designed to measure if an independent variable affects another dependent instead of testing for a specific mechanism.

Three hypotheses are examined. The first one analyses if the $GT\&N$ variable Gc oil price, and the opposite should not hold if $GT\&N$ already measures (exogenous) unexpected oil-production-related events. The second hypothesis analyses if $GT\&N$ Gc the oil-price forecasts released in the *Consensus Forecasts* (CF) monthly report; again, expecting that the opposite should not hold. A third hypothesis investigates if $GT\&N$ Gc the dispersion of mentioned expectations, as evidence of geopolitical tensions affecting the uncertainty surrounding future observations of oil-price realisations.

There are also proposed some robustness exercises. The first one underpins a baseline concept in regard to the use of forecasting CF outcomes (labelled as "auxiliary hypothesis"). This is, actual observations of oil price Gc its own expectations, but the opposite should be rejected. Hence, this result could be interpreted as evidence of CF survey as an efficient forecasting procedure in terms of the information used for making predictions.

Two natural extensions are also reported. The same set of hypotheses with the two components of $GT\&N$ series: (i) considering just OPEC-related news, and (ii) the baseline measure but excluding the events associated to OPEC. It is also included a recursive estimation of the validity of these hypotheses across time.

The results are in favour of OPEC-related news as an oil-price driver *jointly* with supply disruptions. There is evidence supporting this claim by finding the abovementioned directions of Gc for the four hypotheses. These results are obtained when considering all kinds of events in $GT\&N$ measure. When considering just OPEC-related news, the results show bidirectional Gc between $GT\&N$ and expectations dispersion. Finally, when considering the $GT\&N$ measure excluding the OPEC-related events, all results are spoiled out carrying inconclusive results. Hence, the finding of OPEC as an oil-price driver while statistically significant in the baseline specification could not be considered as a robust one. Some similar qualitative results are found in Smith (2005), Alhajji and Huettner (2000) for the 1973-94 period for OPEC behaviour, and Almoguera, Douglas, and Herrera (2011). There is a wide range of research analysing the oil market beyond the boundaries of Economics. Perhaps, oil uniqueness for the energy matrix of industrialised economies and their remotely located producers, attracts the attention of many fields with different viewpoints to analyse.

From an economic perspective, the understanding of any market relies hugely on the effect of agent’s behaviour on the equilibrium dynamics. Some specific cases, such as the oil market, would include issues concerning industrial organisation, natural resources sustainability, externalities, and other complexities affecting its evolution. In particular, the oil market is characterised as a market with big global players—in the supply and demand side—whose behaviour more than often threatens the world’s

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1 This approach has been also used for similar purposes in, for example, Gülen (1996) and Kaufmann et al. (2004). Another approach found in the literature is the *event study* as used, for example, by Demirer and Kutan (2010) and Lin and Tanvakis (2010).

2 This distinction is important since a huge literature focus on OPEC’s behaviour under several assumptions to indeed test a mechanism. This article goes one step beyond OPEC behaviour while still circumscribing to oil market. However, in order to proceed, I consider OPEC simply as one of many news generator devices without imposing any structure.
production chain and even political and financial stability. Moreover, big players from the supply side carry the unpleasant label of a worldwide recognised cartel (see Gülen, 1996; Griffin and Xiong, 1997; Jones, 1990; Kaufmann et al., 2004, and Brémond, Hache, and Mignon, 2012, for details).

Big oil producers, i.e., oil exporter countries, have taken a step further on their industrial organisation by creating the OPEC. Established in Baghdad, Iraq, and effective since January 1961, the main aim of OPEC is "to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries and ensure the stabilisation of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return on capital for those investing in the petroleum industry." (OPEC, 2012). The organisation includes, as for 2015, twelve countries primarily located in the Middle East and Africa, plus two Latin American members. As an organisation under statutes, each member has to continuously fulfil several requirements concerning production and operations data reporting; a full commitment towards OPEC policy mandates. This obviously leads to think of OPEC as a convenor into setting quotas, prices, or any other market distortion (Kaufmann et al. 2004).

A lot of attention has been attracted to a particular OPEC conference scheduled twice a year—in regular times—which outcome consists basically in a market quota setting for participant countries. There is a lot of speculation in the days surrounding these conferences as, in principle, could be the main price setting mechanism managed by OPEC. A long-standing research in this matter possibly begins with Griffin and Teece (1982), MacAvoy (1982), and Draper (1984), when analyse the effect of meeting outcome—decoded as an increase, no change, or decrease in quota—on oil-market based securities. A similar aim is extended in Deaves and Krinsky (1992), Wirj and Kujundzic (2004), Guidi, Russell, and Tarbert (2006), and Hyndman (2008) among others, plus some other OPEC issues such as reserves (Taylor and van Doren, 2005, and Considine, 2006). The results achieve certain consensus when quotas are reduced, and that the effect on price has been declined since mid-1980s. Strong evidence is found of OPEC as an oil price driver during the 1970s.

Besides the impact on the level, comprehensive literature also analyse the impact of OPEC news into oil price volatility. Some examples are Deaves and Krinsky (1992), Horan, Peterson, and Mahar (2004), Fattouh (2005), Lin and Tanvakis (2010), Aguiar-Conraia and Wen (2012), Cairns and Calificura (2012), Brémond, Hache, and Mignon (2012), López and Muñoz (2012), Schmidbauer and Rösch (2012), and Mensi, Hammoudeh, and Yoon (2014) among others.

OPEC’s effective power has been analysed thoroughly from an economic point of view by researches and policy makers (Pindyck, 1978; Salant, 1976; Teece, 1982; Moran, 1982; Hochman and Zilberman, 2015). Many diverse events have occurred since OPEC’s establishment—mainly wars and political instability—and there is no current consensus about the role of OPEC as price setter (Loderer, 1985; Smith, 2005; Fattouh, 2007). Most remarkably, Almoguera, Douglas, and Herrera (2011) suggest that the ability of OPEC to set prices since its creation is rather episodic. The authors find that during the period from 1974 until 2004, OPEC acts similar to a Cournot competition when sharing the global market with non-OPEC oil producers. Their empirical results, as the authors argue, are in favour of specific but non-time-robust price rises due to OPEC’s comparison to the competition price level.3

From the demand side, it is unlikely that big consumers were trying to confront deliberately the suggested OPEC behaviour. According to energy statistics from CIA World Factbook (2014), the ten major oil consumer countries are: United States, China, Japan, India, Russia, Brazil, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and South Korea. As the evidence on OPEC’s behaviour is inconclusive, neither of this diverse list of countries has been associated specifically against OPEC on a regular basis. 3

3The OPEC behaviour analysed plainly as a cartel is also a long-standing issue in the literature. See, for instance, Adelman (1982), Aperjis (1982), Teece (1982), Mabro (1986), Dahl and Yucel (1989), Gülen (1996), Alhajji and Huettner (2000), Adelman (2002), and Fattough (2007) among others. As above mentioned, the results are episodic and dependant on several assumptions previously made regarding OPEC’s held power.
basis (obviously excluding Saudi Arabia, one of the major OPEC oil producer), despite the United Nations World Trade Organisation (UN-WTO) surveillance for fair trade.

In terms of what extent OPEC sets prices and whether the effects of non-market externalities in oil spot price are questionable. It is also questionable if oil price forecasters being aware or affected by these externalities when making their predictions. All these questions are certainly important for a broad group of policymakers, from global-based organisations to specific central bankers fighting imported inflation. Moreover, oil price is of special interest since there has been found detrimental effects attached to large unexpected shocks affecting a number of stock indices (Hammoudeh and Eleisa, 2004; Hammoudeh and Li, 2004; Pollet, 2005; Malik and Hammoudeh, 2007; Driesprong, Jacobsen, and Benjiman, 2008; Balcilar, Gupta, and Miller, 2015), and associated even to recessions (Hamilton, 2003, 2009). Oil price also carry a substantial amount of information to different international prices indices affecting global inflation (see De Gregorio, Landerretche, and Neilson, 2007, Neely and Rapach, 2010, and Medel, 2015, for details).

However, it is a less clear cut if there are just OPEC news–as an organisation–the driver of oil price shocks, or if it is necessary to include a more ample spectrum of supply disruptions such as political instability, wars, or any other disruption due to non-market externalities. This is important since certain OPEC countries have been subject of substantial geopolitical risk not necessarily affecting organisation’s countries only. For that reason, the particular concern of this article is consider OPEC as one within many oil-market-based news-generator devices.

The remaining of the article proceeds as follow. In Section 2 it is presented the Hsiao (1981) version of the (augmented) Granger causality method, alongside the application to oil price and dataset. In Section 3 there are presented the results for the baseline alongside the two robustness exercises. Finally, Section 4 concludes.

2 Econometric setup

2.1 Granger causality

The notion of Granger causality is as simple as useful—and different to "ordinary" causality. It states that if lagged values of a variable $x_t$ predict current values of another variable $y_t$, and that forecast includes lags of $x_t$ as well as $y_t$ then $x_t$ Granger causality $y_t$ ($x_t \rightarrow y_t$). In this article, however, I make use of the Hsiao (1981) version of Granger causality. This extension could be straightforwardly described as a joint significance $F$-test of a whole set of parameters associated to the independent variable ($x_t$) that supposedly Granger cause the dependent variable ($y_t$). However, results derived from this baseline procedure may not be appropriate with $x_t$-variables with intermediate or short memory. Formally, this corresponds to test if all the lags of $x_t$ are jointly statistically significant in the following regression:

$$y_t = \mu + \sum_{i=1}^{p_y} \varphi_i y_{t-i} + \sum_{j=1}^{p_x} \theta_j x_{t-j} + \varepsilon_t,$$

where lags of $y_t$ controls for autocorrelation, $\{\mu; \varphi; \theta; \sigma_y^2\}$ are parameters to be estimated (with, say, ordinary least squares, OLS), and $\varepsilon_t \sim iid N(0, \sigma^2)$.

The autoregressive orders ($p_y, p_x$) in Equation (1) can be chosen according to an appropriate model selection criterion such as measures based in the Kullback-Leibler information criterion (i.e. Akaike or Schwarz), or the General-to-Specific (GETS) methodology. Statistical inference is carried out by testing the joint null hypothesis $NH : \theta_1 = \ldots = \theta_{p_x} = 0$ ($x_t$ do not Granger cause $y_t$). The vector that contains the restrictions is $F$-distributed.

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1The analysis of OPEC as an organisation composed by several countries with high war risk is not as large as OPEC’s analysis by itself. An exception is Bittlingmayer (2005). This article analyses whether country-level war risk affect both level and volatility of oil price alongside considering OPEC behaviour. The results reveal that these price movements affect stock prices. Hence, it gives a role to another kind of shocks despite those due to OPEC.
with \((px, T - (py + px + 1))\) degrees of freedom (where \(T\) is the sample size). For a simple and rather humorous example on the mechanics of \(Gc\), see Thurman and Fisher (1988). A formal treat can be found in Harvey (§8.7, 1990), Hamilton (§11.2, 1994), and Patterson (§8.5, 2000).

2.2 An application to the oil market

By means of \(Gc\) I provide evidence on the following hypotheses:

1. **NH1**: Do geopolitical tensions in major oil-producer countries and announcements concerning OPEC countries (the \(GT\&N\) variable) affect the Brent oil price \((P^{Oil})\)?

2. **NH2**: Do \(GT\&N\) affect oil price forecasts \((\mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}])\)? and

3. **NH3**: Do \(GT\&N\) affect the consensus \((\Delta \mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}])\) of market analysts forecasts of oil price?

It is expected that \(NH1: GT\&N \rightarrow P^{Oil}\) and \(NH2: GT\&N \rightarrow \mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}]\). But, in order to conclude about its reliability, the inverse should not be true for both assumptions. The inverse negative \(NH1, P^{Oil} \rightarrow GT\&N\), supposes that the current oil price does not drive disturbances in oil-producers countries. Also, if the expectations measure are orthogonal to oil producers’ information set, it should be follow that \(\mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}] \rightarrow GT\&N\). However, it is allowed for forecasters to consider actual values of oil price as an indicator of future values. Hence, the following auxiliary hypothesis emerges, \(ANH : P^{Oil} \rightarrow \mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}]\). Finally, associated with greater tensions is the uncertainty about future values of oil price. For that reason, it is expected that \(GT\&N \rightarrow \Delta \mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}]\), but the inverse should not hold. Bowles et al. (2007) and Atallah, Joutz, and Pierru (2013) proposed a similar series when measuring disagreement in ECB surveys’ respondents.

Basically, these hypotheses are posed to test if oil-producer countries’ geopolitical tensions and unexpected news affect oil price, its forecasts, and the consensus surrounding those forecasts. The analysis requires a reliable (and simple) quantitative measure of geopolitical tensions and news measuring unexpected shocks about OPEC countries; as the \(GT\&N\) variable already is. Some other simple measures specifically for OPEC meetings have been also used especially when using event study methodology.

Note that the analysis involves forecasters for two reasons. The first one is the truly interest in investigating to which extent they are affected by \(GT\&N\) in two typical dimensions: point and dispersion of forecasts. The second reason is to stress the reliability of the newly-proposed \(GT\&N\) measure.

Some other robustness exercises comprise the use of the \(GT\&N-O\) and \(GT\&N-NO\) variables. The former stands for purely OPEC-related news, while the latter for non-OPEC events. Hence, the base \(GT\&N\) variable is composed by adding up these two measures. Note, however, that given the geographical proximity of the majority of big oil-producer countries, and the nature of the businesses involved there (same exploited commodity with a very similar technology in a specific region), it is difficult to fully isolate both measures. Hence, it is not imposed an orthogonality condition between them, preserving the benefit of simplicity and easy-to-read results. This also supports the modelling procedure when incorporating more than one lags to control for autocorrelation. Hence, the first lag—the most important when using \(GT\&N\)—comes from a bias-reduced estimation.

2.3 Dataset

The analysis is made considering a time span ranging from 2001.1 until 2012.3 (135 observations); in monthly frequency. The \(GT\&N\) is constructed by considering the sum of ten daily binary variables, in which the value of one is assigned to an unexpected event. There are identified 188 events divided into the ten categories of Table 1.
Table 1: GT&N Components

| No. | No. events | Classification | Description |
|-----|------------|----------------|-------------|
| 1.  | [10]       | Non OPEC       | UN Oil for Food Program (1995-2003) |
| 2.  | [6]        | Non OPEC       | US relations with Libya and Iran (1996-2004) |
| 3.  | [24]       | Non OPEC       | Iraq War and post-war period (2003-2011) |
| 4.  | [10]       | Non OPEC       | Iran post Iraq War (start in 2005) |
| 5.  | [21]       | Non OPEC       | Terrorist attacks |
| 6.  | [8]        | Non OPEC       | Lebanon War (2006) |
| 7.  | [25]       | Non OPEC       | Arab Spring (2011) |
| 8.  | [2]        | Non OPEC       | Use of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve |
| 9.  | [16]       | Non OPEC       | New announcements on discoveries, and site exploration |
| 10. | [66]       | OPEC           | Purely OPEC announcements |

Source: Author's elaboration.

In brackets are shown the number of identified events during the sample span. The last listed category fully comprises the GT&N-O variable. When it is used the label "Non OPEC" means that not all nor the majority of the events related to that category are plainly associated to OPEC actions. A more detailed description of what kinds of events are included in each category can be found in Appendix A. Daily individual-level identification, however, can be found in Annex A of López and Muñoz (2012). The sources of these variables are Bloomberg, The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, and the US Energy Information Administration. These ten variables are added to make a monthly variable which contain an integer with the number of events and news. This variable is not transformed to a binary one to preserve intensity.

The oil price ($P_{Oil}$) corresponds to the annual percentage change of the Brent oil price, measured in USD per barrel (source: Bloomberg). The expectations ($\mathbb{E}[P_{Oil}]$) corresponds to the annual percentage change of the 12-months-ahead forecast contained in the monthly CF report. The point estimator reported in the CF report corresponds to the mean of the answers ranging 65-70 respondents. Each report also shows the maximum and the minimum point value reported by respondents ($\mathbb{E}[p_{High}]$ and $\mathbb{E}[p_{Low}]$, respectively). Hence, the difference $\Delta \mathbb{E}[P_{Oil}] = \mathbb{E}[p_{12}^{High} - p_{12}^{Low}] - \mathbb{E}[p_{0}^{High} - p_{0}^{Low}]$, where $\mathbb{E}[\cdot]$ is the forecast at $\ell$ months, measure the degree in which the consensus is achieved; the greater the uncertainty, the smaller the consensus achieved. Hence, it is expected that $GT\&N \rightarrow \Delta \mathbb{E}[P_{Oil}]$. Figure 1 describes graphically how the variable $\Delta \mathbb{E}[P_{Oil}]$ is built and what is measuring.

Figure 2 exhibits all the variables considered in the analysis: oil price $P_{Oil}$, expectations $\mathbb{E}[P_{Oil}]$, dispersion $\Delta \mathbb{E}[P_{Oil}]$, and GT&N (as GT&N-O + GT&N-NO, in panel B). It is adverted a major number of disturbances during 2001 (due to 9/11 terrorist attacks), 2003 (Iraq War), mid-2005 (due to Lebanon War), and the 2011-12 period (due to Arab Spring). Note also that exogenous to all of these variables, it is noticed the effect of the financial crisis of 2008-9 initiated after the bankruptcy of Lehmann Brothers investment bank in the US.

Note also that the use of forecasting variables is made assuming that they are all the time minimising some distance measure to actual values. To assess how reliable these predictions are, in Figure 3 it is presented a birds-eye assessment of accuracy. In panel A, it is presented a scatter plot—in this case, the correspondence—between the actual and forecast values (labelled "Brent P(Oil)" and "CF P(Oil), h=12", respectively). Note that as the majority of observations lie close to the $y = x$ line without outliers, the forecasting accuracy could be considered of a good quality (Root Mean Squared Forecast Error: 8.835; in levels, full sample).

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Note that the GT&N variable is available from 1999. So, the limiting part of the dataset is CF starting in 2001.

This measure of geopolitical tensions differs substantially to that fancifully biased of World Bank (2015, p. 156).

See Annex A for more details.
The consensus variable corresponds to $\Delta \mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}] = [C - D] - [A - B]$. Source: Author’s elaboration.

In Figure 3, panel B, it is presented the cross correlation between actual and leads observations of the CF series. As the transformation used for both series corresponds to the annual percentage change, it is expected that the correlation between the current actual value and the current value of the forecast of the transformed series should exhibit a high correlation. The results indicate that in effect, the CF predictions are accurate for the target horizon plus a couple of periods, as a result of oil price persistence.

In Table 2 there are presented some descriptive statistics of the involved series for the analysed sample using the preferred stationary transformation. Note that according to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF), the transformations (when applied) deliver stationary series. Also, and in companion with Figure 2, oil price forecasts exhibit a smoother behaviour than actual values, which might contribute to both its accuracy and consensus.

3 Results

The results report the outcome of the $F$-test of global significance, comprising only the values $\theta_i$ of Equation 1. In concrete terms, it tests the joint null hypothesis $H_0 : \theta_1 = ... = \theta_{p_x} = 0$, for each $NH1$ and $ANH$ given one to six lags of the $x_t$ variable. The lag structure of $y_t$ is chosen according to the GETS procedure, allowing skipped terms. These results are reported in "Significant lags $(p_y)$" row of Table 2. The estimations are made with OLS using Newey and West (1987) HAC standard deviations.

There are also presented another type of results for robustness purposes. It could be raised as common knowledge that OPEC finding on influencing oil prices is episodic. For that reason, and circumscribing to the econometric methodology used in this article, it is also reported the $F$-test $p$-value of the six lags of the $NH1$ and $NH1$ Inverse in a recursive sampling scheme. The first estimation window sample comprises the first 60 observations (2001.1-2005.12) whereas the last includes the full sample (2001.1-2012.3; 135 obs.) and coincides with the figures reported in corresponding tables. Note that despite the valuable information that this exercise provides in terms of stability, it is always preferred for a finite-sample nonparametric-estimation the use of a greater number of observations.
Figure 2: Time series plot of involved variables

A: Brent Oil Price, CF P(Oil), and CF Dispersion

![Time series plot of involved variables](image)

B: Geopolitical Tensions and OPEC-related News

![Geopolitical Tensions and OPEC-related News](image)

Source: Author’s elaboration using data from Bloomberg, CF, and López and Muñoz (2012).

Figure 3: Graphical forecast accuracy assessment

A: Scatterplot

![Scatterplot](image)

B: Cross correlation

![Cross correlation](image)

Source: Author’s elaboration using data from CF.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the series (*)

| Transform. | $P^{Oil}$ | $E[P^{Oil}]$ | $\Delta E[P^{Oil}]$ | GT&N | GT&N-O | GT&N-NO |
|------------|-----------|-------------|---------------------|-------|--------|---------|
| Mean       | 18.84     | 16.26       | 7.03                | 1.39  | 0.49   | 0.90    |
| Median     | 17.28     | 11.58       | 5.00                | 1     | 0      | 0       |
| Maximum    | 86.55     | 80.50       | 31.00               | 13    | 4      | 10      |
| Minimum    | -54.65    | -39.88      | -29.00              | 0     | 0      | 0       |
| Std. deviation | 33.66 | 24.83       | 8.31                | 1.86  | 0.86   | 1.47    |
| Sign. lags ($p_y$) | {1;6} | {1;6}       | {1;12}              | {1;2} | {1;2}  | {1}     |
| ADF Statistic | -3.44 | -3.04       | -3.87               | -3.54 | -3.47  | -8.26   |
| p-value    | 0.011     | 0.034       | 0.003               | 0.008 | 0.010  | 0.000   |

(*) Sample: 2001.1–2012.3 (135 obs.). Source: Author’s elaboration using data from Bloomberg, CF, and López and Muñoz (2012).

3.1 Baseline results

The results are reported in Table 3. The first panel (NH1) shows that the first and fourth lags of GT&N Gc oil price are significant at 10%. If it is considered a 15% level of confidence, lags two and five turn significant, leaving just the third lag as not significant. Note that especially in this case, the first lag ($p_x=1$) represent the most relevant case. This is because GT&N measure has the property—by construction—of being a news shock variable. Hence, it is relevant to find that at least the first lag is significant (in the original Granger, 1969, sense), while greater lags may have a bounded impact afterwards news are available. Jointly with this result ($GT&N \rightarrow P^{Oil}$) it is found that $P^{Oil} \rightarrow GT&N$ for any analysed lag.

The second panel provides evidence that $GT&N \rightarrow E[P^{Oil}]$, say, geopolitical tensions affects oil-price expectations, for all considered lags and at 10% confidence level. The opposite hypothesis $E[P^{Oil}] \rightarrow GT&N$ result as non significant with one to six lags, suggesting that the considered oil-producers-related news are already exogenous to forecasters’ information set.

The third panel states that for lags one to three there is evidence suggesting that $GT&N \rightarrow \Delta E[P^{Oil}]$, implying an uncertainty effect into oil-price forecasts. Note that for the opposite hypothesis it is found Gc with six lags only; a result that should be read carefully. As the first three lags of GT&N Gc dispersion, and since six lags of dispersion Gc GT&N the effect can be understood as the time required for forecasters (3 months) rejoining consensus in their forecasts after gathering news information in a 3-months period. Hence, the first round effect can still be associated to $GT&N$ affecting $E[P^{Oil}]$.

The fourth panel exhibits the result for the auxiliary hypothesis $P^{Oil} \rightarrow E[P^{Oil}]$ and $E[P^{Oil}] \rightarrow P^{Oil}$. As expected, and in conjunction with Figure 3, CF survey forecasts "behaved well" in terms of accuracy and expectations formation. Note that these are robust results, with full lags significance in one direction and full rejection in the opposite.

The recursive p-value estimation for $p=1$ in panel A of Figure 4 reveals that these estimations are robust. As above mentioned, the unexpected nature of these data generating process suggests that the first lag is the most relevant. However, with the remaining lags of panels B-D, there is some evidence supporting the NH1 especially for the period between 2006 and 2010. After 2010 the relation with more lags is presumably lost because some other external forces are affecting the oil price, for instance, a global liquidity contraction due to global activity recovery as argued by Ratti and Vespignani (2013).
Table 3: Granger causality testing results: all events (*)

Baseline model: \( y_t = \mu + \sum_{i=1}^{p_y} \phi_i y_{t-i} + \sum_{j=1}^{p_x} \theta_j x_{t-j} + \varepsilon_t, \varepsilon_t \sim iidN(0, \sigma^2_t) \)

\( \theta_1 = \ldots = \theta_{p_x} = 0 \) \( (x_t \rightarrow y_t) \)

### NH1: GT\&N \( \rightarrow \) \( P^{Out} \)

| Lags \( (p_x) \) | F-stat. | p-value | \( R^2 \) | Reg. | Infrac. |
|---------------|--------|---------|--------|------|---------|
| 1             | 3.006  | 0.060   | 0.826  | →    | →       |
| 2             | 1.988  | 0.141   | 0.826  | →    | →       |
| 3             | 1.342  | 0.263   | 0.825  | →    | →       |
| 4             | 2.027  | 0.094   | 0.825  | →    | →       |
| 5             | 1.813  | 0.114   | 0.824  | →    | →       |
| 6             | 1.547  | 0.167   | 0.824  | →    | →       |

| Lags \( (p_x) \) | F-stat. | p-value | \( R^2 \) | Reg. | Infrac. |
|---------------|--------|---------|--------|------|---------|
| 1             | 4.434  | 0.037   | 0.898  | →    | →       |
| 2             | 4.020  | 0.020   | 0.899  | →    | →       |
| 3             | 2.704  | 0.048   | 0.898  | →    | →       |
| 4             | 2.480  | 0.047   | 0.900  | →    | →       |
| 5             | 1.979  | 0.086   | 0.899  | →    | →       |
| 6             | 1.639  | 0.142   | 0.898  | →    | →       |

### NH2: GT\&N \( \rightarrow \) \( \mathbb{E}[P^{Out}] \)

| Lags \( (p_x) \) | F-stat. | p-value | \( R^2 \) | Reg. | Infrac. |
|---------------|--------|---------|--------|------|---------|
| 1             | 3.049  | 0.083   | 0.160  | →    | →       |
| 2             | 2.451  | 0.090   | 0.176  | →    | →       |
| 3             | 2.280  | 0.082   | 0.172  | →    | →       |
| 4             | 1.716  | 0.150   | 0.167  | →    | →       |
| 5             | 1.398  | 0.229   | 0.162  | →    | →       |
| 6             | 1.614  | 0.149   | 0.173  | →    | →       |

### NH3: GT\&N \( \rightarrow \) \( \Delta \mathbb{E}[P^{Out}] \)

| Lags \( (p_x) \) | F-stat. | p-value | \( R^2 \) | Reg. | Infrac. |
|---------------|--------|---------|--------|------|---------|
| 1             | 8.354  | 0.004   | 0.918  | →    | →       |
| 2             | 16.151 | 0.000   | 0.933  | →    | →       |
| 3             | 12.219 | 0.000   | 0.934  | →    | →       |
| 4             | 9.810  | 0.000   | 0.934  | →    | →       |
| 5             | 7.959  | 0.000   | 0.933  | →    | →       |
| 6             | 6.721  | 0.000   | 0.934  | →    | →       |

### Auxiliary NH: \( P^{Out} \) \( \rightarrow \) \( \mathbb{E}[P^{Out}] \)

| Lags \( (p_x) \) | F-stat. | p-value | \( R^2 \) | Reg. | Infrac. |
|---------------|--------|---------|--------|------|---------|
| 1             | 8.354  | 0.004   | 0.918  | →    | →       |
| 2             | 16.151 | 0.000   | 0.933  | →    | →       |
| 3             | 12.219 | 0.000   | 0.934  | →    | →       |
| 4             | 9.810  | 0.000   | 0.934  | →    | →       |
| 5             | 7.959  | 0.000   | 0.933  | →    | →       |
| 6             | 6.721  | 0.000   | 0.934  | →    | →       |

### NH1 Inverse: \( P^{Out} \) \( \rightarrow \) GT\&N

| Lags \( (p_x) \) | F-stat. | p-value | \( R^2 \) | Reg. | Infrac. |
|---------------|--------|---------|--------|------|---------|
| 1             | 0.000  | 0.989   | 0.117  | →    | →       |
| 2             | 0.104  | 0.901   | 0.112  | →    | →       |
| 3             | 0.073  | 0.974   | 0.105  | →    | →       |
| 4             | 0.444  | 0.777   | 0.103  | →    | →       |
| 5             | 0.382  | 0.861   | 0.098  | →    | →       |
| 6             | 0.326  | 0.922   | 0.091  | →    | →       |

### NH2 Inverse: \( \mathbb{E}[P^{Out}] \) \( \rightarrow \) GT\&N

| Lags \( (p_x) \) | F-stat. | p-value | \( R^2 \) | Reg. | Infrac. |
|---------------|--------|---------|--------|------|---------|
| 1             | 0.712  | 0.400   | 0.120  | →    | →       |
| 2             | 0.395  | 0.675   | 0.116  | →    | →       |
| 3             | 1.166  | 0.326   | 0.119  | →    | →       |
| 4             | 1.379  | 0.245   | 0.117  | →    | →       |
| 5             | 1.145  | 0.341   | 0.109  | →    | →       |
| 6             | 1.372  | 0.231   | 0.119  | →    | →       |

### NH3 Inverse: \( \Delta \mathbb{E}[P^{Out}] \) \( \rightarrow \) GT\&N

| Lags \( (p_x) \) | F-stat. | p-value | \( R^2 \) | Reg. | Infrac. |
|---------------|--------|---------|--------|------|---------|
| 1             | 1.007  | 0.317   | 0.128  | →    | →       |
| 2             | 1.657  | 0.195   | 0.125  | →    | →       |
| 3             | 1.238  | 0.299   | 0.119  | →    | →       |
| 4             | 1.093  | 0.363   | 0.117  | →    | →       |
| 5             | 1.076  | 0.376   | 0.112  | →    | →       |
| 6             | 4.307  | 0.001   | 0.154  | →    | →       |

### Auxiliary NH Inverse: \( \mathbb{E}[P^{Out}] \) \( \rightarrow \) \( P^{Out} \)

| Lags \( (p_x) \) | F-stat. | p-value | \( R^2 \) | Reg. | Infrac. |
|---------------|--------|---------|--------|------|---------|
| 1             | 0.569  | 0.452   | 0.843  | →    | →       |
| 2             | 0.932  | 0.396   | 0.843  | →    | →       |
| 3             | 0.646  | 0.587   | 0.841  | →    | →       |
| 4             | 0.466  | 0.760   | 0.844  | →    | →       |
| 5             | 0.836  | 0.526   | 0.844  | →    | →       |
| 6             | 0.715  | 0.638   | 0.844  | →    | →       |

(*) OLS estimations with Newey-West HAC standard errors. Sample: 2001.1–2012.3 (135 obs.). p-value: bold<10%; italics>10%. Source: Author’s elaboration.

Nevertheless, Figure 5 for NH1 Inverse is bolder about to not reject the underlying hypothesis of non-significant parameters; in some sense playing in favour of NH1.
Figure 4: Recursive estimation of NH1 $p$-value: all events (*)

A: First Lag

B: Second Lag

C: Third and Fourth Lag

D: Fifth and Sixth Lag

(*) Horizontal line: $p$-value=10%. Source: Author’s elaboration.

Figure 5: Recursive estimation of NH1 Inverse $p$-value: all events (*)

A: First Lag

B: Second Lag

C: Third and Fourth Lag

D: Fifth and Sixth Lag

(*) Horizontal line: $p$-value=10%. Source: Author’s elaboration.
3.2 Robustness results

3.2.1 Purely OPEC news

The results using the purely-OPEC version of the $GT\&N$ variable—$GT\&N-O$—are presented in Table 4. The first and second panel show that there is no Granger causality (GC) from $GT\&N-O$ to $P^{Oil}$ and to $\mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}]$ at conventional levels of confidence. Nevertheless, the evidence is inconclusive as there is no GC in reverse direction also.

The third panel, however, indicate bidirectional GC between $GT\&N-O$ and $\mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}]$ for all considered lags at conventional levels of confidence. This result supports the claim—at least, do not reject it—that $GT\&N-O$ already measure unexpected news of OPEC oil production. These news will forecast dispersion as well as uncertainty in future oil prices lead to significant disruptions in OPEC’s countries’ oil production.

Table 4: Granger causality testing results: OPEC events (*)

| NH1: $GT\&N-O \rightarrow P^{Oil}$ | NH1 Inverse: $P^{Oil} \rightarrow GT\&N-O$ |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Lags ($p_x$) | $F$-stat. | p-value | $R^2$ Reg. | Infrc. | Lags ($p_x$) | $F$-stat. | p-value | $R^2$ Reg. | Infrc. |
| 1 | 1.818 | 0.180 | 0.826 | $\rightarrow$ | 1 | 0.154 | 0.695 | 0.051 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 2 | 1.130 | 0.326 | 0.825 | $\rightarrow$ | 2 | 0.163 | 0.850 | 0.046 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 3 | 0.896 | 0.445 | 0.824 | $\rightarrow$ | 3 | 0.261 | 0.853 | 0.041 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 4 | 0.686 | 0.603 | 0.823 | $\rightarrow$ | 4 | 0.325 | 0.861 | 0.037 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 5 | 0.585 | 0.712 | 0.822 | $\rightarrow$ | 5 | 0.284 | 0.921 | 0.030 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 6 | 0.496 | 0.811 | 0.821 | $\rightarrow$ | 6 | 0.243 | 0.961 | 0.023 | $\rightarrow$ |

| NH2: $GT\&N-O \rightarrow \mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}]$ | NH2 Inverse: $\mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}] \rightarrow GT\&N-O$ |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Lags ($p_x$) | $F$-stat. | p-value | $R^2$ Reg. | Infrc. | Lags ($p_x$) | $F$-stat. | p-value | $R^2$ Reg. | Infrc. |
| 1 | 1.330 | 0.251 | 0.897 | $\rightarrow$ | 1 | 0.063 | 0.802 | 0.052 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 2 | 0.841 | 0.434 | 0.896 | $\rightarrow$ | 2 | 0.183 | 0.833 | 0.053 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 3 | 0.556 | 0.645 | 0.896 | $\rightarrow$ | 3 | 1.436 | 0.235 | 0.065 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 4 | 0.456 | 0.768 | 0.895 | $\rightarrow$ | 4 | 1.552 | 0.191 | 0.064 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 5 | 0.504 | 0.773 | 0.895 | $\rightarrow$ | 5 | 1.639 | 0.155 | 0.065 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 6 | 0.762 | 0.601 | 0.895 | $\rightarrow$ | 6 | 1.397 | 0.222 | 0.083 | $\rightarrow$ |

| NH3: $GT\&N-O \rightarrow \Delta \mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}]$ | NH3 Inverse: $\Delta \mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}] \rightarrow GT\&N-O$ |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Lags ($p_x$) | $F$-stat. | p-value | $R^2$ Reg. | Infrc. | Lags ($p_x$) | $F$-stat. | p-value | $R^2$ Reg. | Infrc. |
| 1 | 5.477 | 0.021 | 0.181 | $\rightarrow$ | 1 | 7.976 | 0.005 | 0.086 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 2 | 3.326 | 0.039 | 0.200 | $\rightarrow$ | 2 | 7.099 | 0.001 | 0.088 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 3 | 3.689 | 0.014 | 0.197 | $\rightarrow$ | 3 | 4.576 | 0.004 | 0.083 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 4 | 2.878 | 0.025 | 0.195 | $\rightarrow$ | 4 | 5.361 | 0.001 | 0.098 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 5 | 2.816 | 0.019 | 0.193 | $\rightarrow$ | 5 | 5.014 | 0.000 | 0.100 | $\rightarrow$ |
| 6 | 3.459 | 0.003 | 0.220 | $\rightarrow$ | 6 | 3.502 | 0.003 | 0.107 | $\rightarrow$ |

(*) OLS estimations with Newey-West HAC standard errors. Sample: 2001.1–2012.3 (135 obs.). p-value: **bold** <10%; *italics* >10%. Source: Author’s elaboration.

Note that, following the description of the $GT\&N$ variable in Annex A, the events purely related to OPEC are particularly related to oil production in contrast to the remaining dummies accounting for political instability and other externalities. The fact that results are robust to the whole set of hypothesis using the combined measure, indicates that the joint interaction of these unexpected events shape the forces that utterly influence oil price.
Figure 6: Recursive estimation of NH1 p-value: OPEC events (*)

(*) Horizontal line: p-value=10%. Source: Author’s elaboration.

Figure 7: Recursive estimation of NH1 Inverse p-value: OPEC events (*)

(*) Horizontal line: p-value=10%. Source: Author’s elaboration.

The recursive p-value estimations are presented in Figure 6 for NH1. In this case, it is found a plain
The results using the non OPEC version of the GT&N variable—GT&N-NO—are presented in Table 5. Except for two isolated cases (NH2: \( p_x = 2 \) and NH3 Inverse: \( p_x = 6 \)) there is not found Gc in any direction at conventional significance levels. This finding reinforces the hypothesis that OPEC in conjunction with geopolitical tensions affects oil price, but not any of these two variables by itself.

### Table 5: Granger causality test results: non-OPEC events (*)

| NH1: \( GT&N-NO \rightarrow P^{Oil} \) | NH1 Inverse: \( P^{Oil} \rightarrow GT&N-NO \) |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Lags \((p_x)\) | \( F\)-stat. | \( p\)-value | \( R^2\) Reg. | Infr. | Lags \((p_x)\) | \( F\)-stat. | \( p\)-value | \( R^2\) Reg. | Infr. |
| 1 | 1.858 | 0.175 | 0.825 | \( \rightarrow \) | 1 | 0.043 | 0.877 | 0.090 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 2 | 1.162 | 0.816 | 0.825 | \( \rightarrow \) | 2 | 0.658 | 0.519 | 0.086 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 3 | 0.766 | 0.515 | 0.824 | \( \rightarrow \) | 3 | 0.454 | 0.715 | 0.080 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 4 | 1.294 | 0.275 | 0.824 | \( \rightarrow \) | 4 | 0.770 | 0.546 | 0.077 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 5 | 1.820 | 0.113 | 0.823 | \( \rightarrow \) | 5 | 0.812 | 0.543 | 0.073 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 6 | 1.692 | 0.127 | 0.823 | \( \rightarrow \) | 6 | 0.677 | 0.668 | 0.065 | \( \rightarrow \) |

| NH2: \( GT&N-NO \rightarrow \mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}] \) | NH2 Inverse: \( \mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}] \rightarrow GT&N-NO \) |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Lags \((p_x)\) | \( F\)-stat. | \( p\)-value | \( R^2\) Reg. | Infr. | Lags \((p_x)\) | \( F\)-stat. | \( p\)-value | \( R^2\) Reg. | Infr. |
| 1 | 2.722 | 0.102 | 0.898 | \( \rightarrow \) | 1 | 1.795 | 0.183 | 0.099 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 2 | 2.905 | 0.059 | 0.899 | \( \rightarrow \) | 2 | 1.064 | 0.348 | 0.090 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 3 | 1.896 | 0.134 | 0.898 | \( \rightarrow \) | 3 | 1.428 | 0.238 | 0.086 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 4 | 1.946 | 0.107 | 0.898 | \( \rightarrow \) | 4 | 1.277 | 0.283 | 0.080 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 5 | 1.668 | 0.148 | 0.897 | \( \rightarrow \) | 5 | 1.032 | 0.402 | 0.073 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 6 | 1.446 | 0.203 | 0.897 | \( \rightarrow \) | 6 | 1.396 | 0.222 | 0.067 | \( \rightarrow \) |

| NH3: \( GT&N-NO \rightarrow \Delta \mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}] \) | NH3 Inverse: \( \Delta \mathbb{E}[P^{Oil}] \rightarrow GT&N-NO \) |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Lags \((p_x)\) | \( F\)-stat. | \( p\)-value | \( R^2\) Reg. | Infr. | Lags \((p_x)\) | \( F\)-stat. | \( p\)-value | \( R^2\) Reg. | Infr. |
| 1 | 1.099 | 0.296 | 0.139 | \( \rightarrow \) | 1 | 0.316 | 0.575 | 0.094 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 2 | 1.725 | 0.182 | 0.142 | \( \rightarrow \) | 2 | 0.433 | 0.649 | 0.090 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 3 | 1.165 | 0.326 | 0.138 | \( \rightarrow \) | 3 | 0.353 | 0.787 | 0.062 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 4 | 0.900 | 0.466 | 0.131 | \( \rightarrow \) | 4 | 0.304 | 0.875 | 0.075 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 5 | 0.728 | 0.604 | 0.126 | \( \rightarrow \) | 5 | 0.334 | 0.891 | 0.068 | \( \rightarrow \) |
| 6 | 0.668 | 0.676 | 0.122 | \( \rightarrow \) | 6 | 2.903 | 0.011 | 0.109 | \( \rightarrow \) |

(*) OLS estimations with Newey-West HAC standard errors. Sample: 2001.1–2012.3 (135 obs.). 
\( p\)-value: \textbf{bold}<10%; italics>10%. Source: Author’s elaboration.

The recursive \( p\)-value results for NH1 are presented in Figure 8. It is basically found the same situation across the different lags: significance through mid-2010 to then rise above the 10% confidence level threshold. This finding supports the view that at least between 2006 and 2010 non-OPEC events may play a role into determining oil prices. This situation may be reinforced when analysing the results of Figure 9 especially with the first and second lag, clearly showing a no rejection the NH1 Inverse. The results with the full sample suggest that especially since mid-2010, non-OPEC news are not influencing oil price separated to OPEC’s behaviour.

These results are in line with the findings of Bittlingmayer (2005) obtained for a previous sample, when suggesting that war risk is enough to cause price disruptions since traders mark up price to
cover expectation of possible scarcity.

Figure 8: Recursive estimation of NH1 p-value: non-OPEC events (*)

(*) Horizontal line: p-value=10%. Source: Author’s elaboration.

Figure 9: Recursive estimation of NH1 Inverse p-value: non-OPEC events (*)

(*) Horizontal line: p-value=10%. Source: Author’s elaboration.
4 Concluding remarks

To what extent geopolitical tensions in major oil-producer countries and unexpected news related to the OPEC affect global oil price? By means of Gc I provide evidence favouring OPEC countries’-related news as an oil price driver jointly with supply disruptions, influencing short-term forecasts, and reducing the consensus when unanticipated news are available.

These results are obtained when considering all kinds of events in \(GT&N\) measure: geopolitical tensions and OPEC-related news. When considering just OPEC-related news, the results show bidirectional causality between \(GT&N\) and expectations dispersion only. Moreover, when considering the \(GT&N\) measure excluding the OPEC-related events, all results are spoiled out carrying inconclusive results. Hence, the finding of OPEC as an oil-price driver while statistically significant in the baseline specification may not be considered as a robust one. Some similar qualitative results are found in Smith (2005), Alhajji and Huettner (2000) for the 1973-94 period for OPEC behaviour, and Almoguera, Douglas, and Herrera (2011). The fact that results are robust to the whole set of hypothesis using the combined measure and whole sample, indicates that the joint interaction of these unexpected events shape the forces that utterly influence oil price.

These results are important since oil has been long-standing important commodity worldwide for an incommensurable number of reasons. Large fluctuations of its price are associated with detrimental welfare effects for both producers and consumers. Further research may consider a forecasting model for the \(GT&N\) variable (and its components) alongside an analysis of a more ample spectrum of news that may indirectly affect oil market. A special candidate series are those related to politic developments surrounding OPEC members, and other oil producers such as Russia and the US.

This article suggests that in order to keep track of price dynamics, it is recommended to follow geopolitical tensions and the coordinated actions of the associated major producers. This task is easier said than done, since it relies on non-market signals and other externalities that are not necessarily based on a purely economics-based logic.

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A  \textit{GT\&N} variable description

In this annex, there are provided some extended descriptions of the ten dummy variables used into the construction of the \textit{GT\&N} couple of variables. It basically constitutes a redefinition and translation of the database description provided in López and Muñoz (2012) (there are provided some Wikipedia entries links for reference). A graph of the ten variables is presented in Figure A1.

1. UN Oil for Food Program (1995-2003). Programme developed by UN established in 1995 as a response to Iraqis citizen claims affected by economic sanctions imposed in the aftermath of Gulf War in 1991. The programme allows to Iraq sell petroleum in world markets in exchange of food, medicines, and other humanitarian help, aiming to bind Iraqi military capacity. The programme finishes in 2003. The events referred to this programme are UN resolutions on Iraqi global oil market quotas, similar to the impact of new discoveries (Wikipedia).

2. US relations with Libya and Iran (1996-2004). Events considered in this category are related to sanctions act imposed to Iran and Libya promulgated in 1996. This act imposes economic sanctions for entrepreneurial-kind relations with Iran and Libya. The programme constitutes a response to the nuclear agenda and support provided to Iran to certain terrorist associations (Hezbollah, Hamas, and Jihad). In 19 December, 2003, Libya announces its intention to leave the nuclear programme as well as massive destruction weapons development and the beginning of a new era of cooperation with the US (Wikipedia: Libya and Iran).

3. Iraq War and post-war period (2003-2011). News related to the US invasion to Iraq in March 2003, and Saddam Hussein capture in December 2003. Also includes events related to the installation of the provisional government in Iraq and reestablishment of Iraq’s international affairs (Wikipedia).

4. Iran post Iraq War (start in 2005). Accounts for events related to justified hearsays of the re-establishment of a nuclear career during the administration of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad starting in August 2005 (Wikipedia).

5. Terrorist attacks. Constitutes events referred to terrorist attacks to productive installations in the Middle East, or terrorist targets. 9/11 attacks are included within this category (Wikipedia).

6. Lebanon War (2006). Also referred as Israel-Hezbollah War or July War, is a 34-days-long conflict occurred in Lebanon spanning from 12 July to 14 August, 2006; after a ceasefire statement of the UN. The conflict has a de facto end in 8 September, 2006 when Israel unblocks maritime restrictions over Lebanon (Wikipedia).

7. Arab Spring (2011). Constitute waves of anti-government demonstrations and strikes in Arab countries starting in 18 December, 2010 in Tunisia. Governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and
Yemen were overthrown. Civilian demonstrations were performed in Bahrain and Syria; massive movements strikes in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Oman; minor events were adverted also in Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Western Sahara (Wikipedia).

8. **Use of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve.** The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is world’s greatest for-emergency reserve of oil, which capacity achieves more than 700 millions of barrels. This variable accounts for the US announcements on sales with stabilisation purposes or domestic emergencies. An in-depth and up-to-date analysis in regard of the use of SPR can be found in Demirer and Kutan (2010) (Wikipedia).

9. **New announcements on discoveries, and site exploration.** News related to oilfields discoveries, explorations, and strategic alliances between firms in order to exploit Middle East oilfields.

10. **Purely OPEC announcements.** Announcements on OPEC’s quotas reassignment or major maintenance works. This variable by itself constitutes the $GT&N-O$ measure. In contrast, the sum of the previous nine constitutes $GT&N-NO$.

Figure A1: $GT&N$ variable composition: all events

**A: Geopolitical Tensions and OPEC-related News**

Source: Author’s elaboration using data from López and Muñoz (2012).