Abstract—As multi-agent systems proliferate, there is increasing demand for coordination protocols that protect agents’ sensitive information while allowing them to collaborate. To help address this need, this paper presents a differentially private formation control framework. Agents’ state trajectories are protected using differential privacy, which is a statistical notion of privacy that protects data by adding noise to it. We provide a private formation control implementation and analyze the impact of privacy upon the system. Specifically, we quantify tradeoffs between privacy level, system performance, and connectedness of the network’s communication topology. These tradeoffs are used to develop guidelines for calibrating privacy in terms of control theoretic quantities, such as steady-state error, without requiring in-depth knowledge of differential privacy. Additional guidelines are also developed for treating privacy levels and network topologies as design parameters to tune the network’s performance. Simulation results illustrate these tradeoffs and show that strict privacy is inherently compatible with strong system performance.

I. INTRODUCTION

Multi-agent systems, such as robotic swarms and social networks, require agents to share information to collaborate. In some cases, the information shared between agents may be sensitive. For example, self-driving cars share location data to be routed to a destination. Geo-location data and other data streams can be quite revealing about users and sensitive data should be protected. However, this data must still be useful for multi-agent coordination. Thus, privacy in multi-agent control must simultaneously protect agents’ sensitive data while guaranteeing that privatized data enables the network to achieve a common task.

This type of privacy has recently been achieved using differential privacy. Differential privacy stems from the computer science literature, where it was originally used to protect sensitive data when databases are queried [1], [2]. Differential privacy is appealing because it is immune to post-processing and robust to side information [1]. These properties mean that privacy guarantees are not compromised by performing operations on differentially private data, and that they are not weakened by much by an adversary with additional information about data-producing agents [3].

Recently, differential privacy has been applied to dynamic systems [4]–[12]. One form of differential privacy in dynamic systems protects sensitive trajectory-valued data, and this is the notion of differential privacy used in this paper. Privacy of this form ensures that an adversary is unlikely to learn much about the state trajectory of a system by observing its outputs. In multi-agent control, this lets an agent share its outputs with other agents while protecting its state trajectory from those agents and eavesdroppers [4]–[7].

In this paper, we develop a framework for private multi-agent formation control using differential privacy. Formation control is a well-studied network control problem and can be robots physically assembling into geometric shapes or non-physical agents maintaining relative state offsets. For differential privacy, agents add privacy noise to their states before sharing them with other agents. The other agents use privatized states in their update laws, and then this process repeats at every time step. The private formation control protocol can be implemented in a completely distributed manner, and, contrary to some other privacy approaches, it does not require a central coordinator.

Beyond the privacy implementation, we develop guidelines for calibrating privacy in formation control. Specifically, we bound the quality of formation, or performance of the system, in terms of agents’ privacy parameters and connectedness of the network. We develop guidelines by using these bounds to trade off degraded performance for stricter privacy requirements and a less connected communication topology. This ultimately allows us to formulate privacy guidelines based on control-theoretic properties without requiring users to have an in-depth understanding of differential privacy. Furthermore, we develop necessary and sufficient conditions for when private formation control networks achieve a desired performance level.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives graph theory and differential privacy background. Section III states the differentially private formation control problem and Section IV solves it. Section V provides guidelines for calibrating privacy based on performance requirements for specific communication topologies. In Section VI, we analyze the sensitivity of system performance to changes in privacy and communication topology. Next, Section VII provides simulations, and Section VIII concludes the paper.

II. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES

In this section we briefly review the required background on graph theory and differential privacy.

A. Graph Theory Background

A graph $G = (V, E)$ is defined over a set of nodes $V$ and edges are contained in the set $E$. For $N$ nodes, $V$ is indexed over $\{1, ..., N\}$. The edge set of $G$ is a subset $E \subseteq V \times V$, where the pair $(i, j) \in E$ if nodes $i$ and $j$ share a connection and $(i, j) \notin E$ if they do not.
undirected, weighted, simple graphs. Undirectedness means that an edge \( (i,j) \in E \) is not distinguished from \( (j,i) \in E \). Simplicity means that \( (i,i) \notin E \) for all \( i \in V \). Weightedness means that the edge \( (i,j) \in E \) has a weight \( w_{ij} = w_{ji} > 0 \). Of particular interest are connected graphs.

**Definition 1 (Connected Graph):** A graph \( \mathcal{G} \) is connected if, for all \( i, j \in \{1, ..., N\}, i \neq j \), there is a sequence of edges one can traverse from node \( i \) to node \( j \). △

This paper uses the weighted graph Laplacian, which is defined with weighted adjacency and weighted degree matrices. The weighted adjacency matrix \( A(\mathcal{G}) \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times N} \) of \( \mathcal{G} \) is defined element-wise as

\[
A(\mathcal{G})_{ij} = \begin{cases} w_{ij} & (i,j) \in E \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]

Because we only consider undirected graphs, \( A(\mathcal{G}) \) is symmetric. The weighted degree of node \( i \in V \) is defined as \( d_i = \sum_{j,(i,j) \in E} w_{ij} \). The maximum degree is \( d_{\max} = \max_i d_i \). The degree matrix \( D(\mathcal{G}) \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times N} \) is the diagonal matrix \( D(\mathcal{G}) = \text{diag}(d_1, ..., d_N) \). The weighted Laplacian of \( \mathcal{G} \) is then defined as \( L(\mathcal{G}) = D(\mathcal{G}) - A(\mathcal{G}) \).

Let \( \lambda_1(\cdot) \) be the \( k \)-th smallest eigenvalue of a matrix. By definition, \( \lambda_1(L(\mathcal{G})) = 0 \) for all graph Laplacians and

\[
0 = \lambda_1(L(\mathcal{G})) \leq \lambda_2(L(\mathcal{G})) \leq \cdots \leq \lambda_N(L(\mathcal{G})).
\]

The value of \( \lambda_2(\mathcal{G}) \) plays a key role in this paper.

**Definition 2 (Algebraic Connectivity [13]):** The algebraic connectivity of a graph \( \mathcal{G} \) is the second smallest eigenvalue of its Laplacian and \( \mathcal{G} \) is connected if and only if \( \lambda_2(L(\mathcal{G})) > 0 \). △

Agent \( i \)'s neighborhood set \( N(i) \) is the set of all agents agent \( i \) can communicate with, \( N(i) = \{ j \mid (i,j) \in E \} \).

**B. Differential Privacy Background**

This section provides a brief description of the differential privacy background needed for the remainder of the paper. More complete expositions can be found in [4], [14]. Overall, the goal of differential privacy is to make similar pieces of data appear approximately indistinguishable from one another. Differential privacy is appealing because its privacy guarantees are immune to post-processing [14]. For example, private data can be filtered without threatening its privacy guarantees [4], [15]. More generally, arbitrary post-hoc computations on private data do not harm differential privacy. In addition, after differential privacy is implemented, an adversary with complete knowledge of the mechanism used to implement privacy has no advantage over another adversary without mechanism knowledge [1], [2].

In this paper we use differential privacy to privatize state trajectories of mobile autonomous agents. We consider vector-valued trajectories of the form \( Z = (Z(1), Z(2), ..., Z(k), ...) \), where \( Z(k) \in \mathbb{R}^d \) for all \( k \).

The \( \ell_p \) norm of \( Z \) is defined as \( \|Z\|_{\ell_p} = \left( \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \|Z(k)\|_p^p \right)^{1/p} \), where \( \| \cdot \|_p \) is the ordinary \( p \)-norm on \( \mathbb{R}^d \). Define the set

\[
\ell_p^d := \{ Z \mid Z(k) \in \mathbb{R}^d, \|Z\|_{\ell_p} < \infty \}.
\]

The set \( \ell_p^d \) only contains trajectories that converge to the origin. However, we want to privatize arbitrary trajectories, including those that do not converge at all. To do so, we consider a larger set of trajectories. Let the truncation operator \( P_T \) be defined as

\[
P_T[y] = \begin{cases} y(k) & k \leq T \\ 0 & k > T \end{cases}.
\]

Then we define the set

\[
\tilde{\ell}_p^d = \{ Z \mid Z(k) \in \mathbb{R}^d, P_T[Z] \in \ell_p^d \text{ for all } T \in \mathbb{N} \},
\]

and we will privatize state trajectories in this set.

Consider a network of \( N \) agents, where agent \( i \)'s state trajectory is denoted by \( y_i \). The \( k \)-th element of agent \( i \)'s trajectory is \( y_i(k) \in \mathbb{R}^n \) for \( n \in \mathbb{N} \). Agent \( i \)'s state trajectory belongs to \( \tilde{\ell}_p^d \).

Differential privacy is defined with respect to an adjacency relation. We provide privacy to single agents’ state trajectories (rather than collections of trajectories as in some other works), and our choice of adjacency relation is defined for single agents. In the case of dynamic systems, the adjacency relation gives a notion of how similar trajectories are and specifies which trajectories must be made approximately indistinguishable from each other.

**Definition 3 (Adjacency [5]):** Fix an adjacency parameter \( \ell \), denoted \( \ell \in \Omega \). The \( \ell \)-adjacency of agent \( i \) is the information leakage about agent \( i \) can be regarded as the information leakage agent \( i \) can be regarded as the information leakage agent \( i \) can be regarded as the information leakage

In words, two state trajectories of agent \( i \) are adjacent if and only if the \( \ell \)-norm of their difference is upper bounded by \( b_i \). This means that every state trajectory within distance \( b_i \) from agent \( i \)'s state trajectory must be made approximately indistinguishable from it to enforce differential privacy.

To calibrate differential privacy’s protections, agent \( i \) selects privacy parameters \( \epsilon_i \) and \( \delta_i \). These parameters determine the level of privacy afforded to \( x_i \). Typically, \( \epsilon_i \in [0.1, 1, 3] \) and \( \delta_i \leq 0.01 \) for all \( i \) [5]. The value of \( \delta_i \) can be regarded as the probability that differential privacy fails for agent \( i \), while \( \epsilon_i \) can be regarded as the information leakage about agent \( i \).

The implementation of differential privacy in this work provides differential privacy for each agent individually. This will be accomplished by adding noise to sensitive data directly, an approach called “input perturbation” privacy in the literature [16]. The noise is added by a privacy mechanism, which is a randomized map. We now provide a formal definition of differential privacy, which states the guarantees a mechanism must provide. First, fix a probability space \( (\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P) \). We are considering outputs in \( \tilde{\ell}_2^d \) and use a \( \sigma \)-algebra over \( \tilde{\ell}_2^d \), denoted \( \Sigma_{\tilde{\ell}_2^d} \) [17].

**Definition 4 (Differential Privacy):** Let \( \epsilon_i > 0 \) and \( \delta_i \in [0, \frac{1}{2}] \) be given. A mechanism \( M : \tilde{\ell}_2^d \times \Omega \rightarrow \tilde{\ell}_2^d \) \((\epsilon_i, \delta_i)\)-differentially private if, for all adjacent \( y_i, y_i' \in \tilde{\ell}_2^d \), we have

\[
P[M(y_i) \in S] \leq e^{\epsilon_i}P[M(y_i') \in S] + \delta_i \text{ for all } S \in \Sigma_{\tilde{\ell}_2^d}. \triangle
\]
The Gaussian mechanism will be used to implement differential privacy. The Gaussian mechanism adds zero-mean i.i.d. noise drawn from a Gaussian distribution pointwise in time. Stating the required distribution uses the \( Q \)-function, defined as \( Q(y) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_y^\infty e^{-z^2/2} \, dz \).

**Lemma 1 (Gaussian Mechanism [4]):** Let \( b_i > 0, \epsilon_i > 0, \) and \( \delta_i \in (0, \frac{1}{2}) \) be given, and fix the adjacency relation \( \text{Adj}_{ij} \). Let \( y_i \in \mathbb{R}^2 \). The Gaussian mechanism for \((\epsilon_i, \delta_i)\)-differential privacy takes the form \( \tilde{y}_i(k) = y_i(k) + \epsilon_i(k) \), where \( \epsilon_i(k) \) is a stochastic process with \( \epsilon_i(k) \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_i^2 I_n) \). Let \( \sigma_i \geq \frac{b_i}{2\epsilon_i}(K_{\delta_i} + \sqrt{K_{\delta_i}^2 + 2\epsilon_i}) \), where \( K_{\delta_i} = Q^{-1}(\delta_i) \). This mechanism provides \((\epsilon_i, \delta_i)\)-differential privacy to \( y_i \).

**III. PROBLEM FORMULATION**

In this section we state and analyze the differentially private formation control problem.

**Problem 1:** Consider a network of \( N \) agents with communication topology modeled by the undirected, simple, connected, and weighted graph \( \mathcal{G} \). Let \( x_i(k) \) be agent \( i \)'s state at time \( k \), \( N(i) \) be agent \( i \)'s neighborhood set, \( \gamma > 0 \), and \( w_{ij} \) be a positive weight on the edge \((i, j) \in E\). We define \( \Delta_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}^n \) for all \((i, j) \in E\) as the desired relative distance between agents \( i \) and \( j \).

i. Implement the formation control protocol

\[
y_i(k + 1) = y_i(k) + \gamma \sum_{j \in N(i)} w_{ij}(y_j(k) - y_i(k) - \Delta_{ij}),
\]

in a differentially private manner.

ii. Analyze the relationship between network performance, privacy, and the underlying graph topology.

We will solve Problem 1 by bounding the performance of the network in terms of the privacy parameters of each agent and the algebraic connectivity of the underlying graph. This will allow us to analyze the relationship between performance, privacy, and topology.

**Remark 1:** We consider formation control in \( \mathbb{R}^n \), which is equivalent to running \( n \) independent scalar-valued formation controllers. Therefore, for simplicity we analyze the scalar case.

Before solving Problem 1, we give the necessary definitions for formation control. First, we define agent- and network-level dynamics. Then, we detail how each agent will enforce differential privacy. Lastly, we explain how differentially private communications affect the performance of a formation control protocol and how to quantify quality of a formation.

**A. Multi-Agent Formation control**

The goal of formation control is for agents in a network to assemble into some geometric shape or set of relative states. Multi-agent formation control is a well researched problem and there are several mathematical formulations one can use to achieve similar results [18]–[24]. We will define relative distances between agents that communicate and the control objective is for all agents to maintain the relative distances to each of their neighbors. This approach is similar to that of [20] and the translationally invariant formations in [24].

For the formation to be feasible, \( \Delta_{ij} = -\Delta_{ji} \) for all \((i, j) \in E\). The network control objective is driving \( \lim_{k \to \infty} (y_j(k) - y_i(k)) = \Delta_{ij} \) for all \((i, j) \in E\). It is important to note that there is an infinite set of points that can be in formation; the formation can be centered around any point in \( \mathbb{R}^n \) and meet the control requirement, i.e., we allow formations to be translationally invariant [24].

Now we define the agents’ update law. Let \( \{p_1, ..., p_N\} \) be any collection of points in formation such that \( p_j - p_i = \Delta_{ij} \) for all \((i, j) \in E\) and let \( p = [p_1^T, ..., p_N^T]^T \in \mathbb{R}^{nN} \) be the network-level formation specification. We consider the formation control problem in Equation (1). As noted in Remark 1, we analyze convergence of Equation (1) at the component level. Thus, while \( y_i \in \mathbb{R}^n \), we select an arbitrary \( l \in \{1, ..., n\} \) and provide analysis for

\[
x(k) = (y_{i,l}(k) \ldots y_{N,l}(k))^T \in \mathbb{R}^n,
\]

i.e., each agent \( l^{th} \) component, which proceeds identically for each \( l \in \{1, ..., n\} \). Below, we also use the vector of \( l^{th} \) components of \( p \), denoted

\[
q = (p_{1,l} \ldots p_{N,l})^T.
\]

Let \( \bar{x}(k) = x(k) - q \). Then we analyze

\[
\bar{x}(k + 1) = (I - \gamma L(\mathcal{G})) \bar{x}(k).
\]

Letting \( P = I - \gamma L(\mathcal{G}) \), we may write \( \bar{x}(k + 1) = P \bar{x}(k) \).

In this form, we have the following convergence result.

**Lemma 2 ([23], Theorem 2):** If \( \mathcal{G} \) is connected, \( P \) is doubly stochastic, and \( \gamma \in (0, \frac{1}{\max\lambda_{\mathcal{G}}}) \), then the protocol in Equation (2) reaches consensus asymptotically and \( \bar{x}(k) \rightarrow \frac{1}{n} 1^T \bar{x}(0) 1 \).

Because the protocol in Equation (2) reaches consensus over \( \bar{x} \), it solves the translationally invariant formation control problem [24]. Using \( \delta_{ij} \) to denote the state offset between agents \( j \) and \( i \) in the appropriate dimension, the node-level protocol in Equation (1) can be rewritten for a single component as

\[
x_i(k + 1) = x_i(k) + \gamma \sum_{j \in N(i)} w_{ij}(x_j(k) - x_i(k) - \delta_{ij}),
\]

which we use below.

**B. Private Communications**

When agent \( j \) transmits \( \bar{x}_j(k) \) to the agents in \( N(j) \), it is potentially exposing its state trajectory, \( x_j \), to them and adversaries or eavesdroppers. Agent \( j \) therefore sends a differentially private version of \( \bar{x}_j(k) \) to its neighborhood.

Agent \( j \) starts by selecting privacy parameters \( \epsilon_j > 0, \delta_j \in (0, \frac{1}{2}) \), and adjacency relation \( \text{Adj}_{ij} \) with \( b_j > 0 \). Agent \( j \) then privatizes its state trajectory \( x_j \) with the Gaussian mechanism. Let \( \bar{x}_j \) denote the differentially private version of \( x_j \), where, pointwise in time, \( \bar{x}_j(k) = x_j(k) + v_j(k) \), with \( v_j(k) \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_j^2 I) \) and \( \sigma_j \geq \kappa(\delta_j, \epsilon_j) b_j \). Thus agent \( j \) keeps the trajectory \( x_j \) differentially private. Agent \( j \) then shares \( \bar{x}_j(k) = \hat{x}_j(k) - q_j \), which is also differentially private because subtracting \( q_j \) is merely post-processing [14].

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C. Private Formation Control

When each agent is sharing differentially private information, the node-level formation control protocol becomes

\[ x_i(k+1) = x_i(k) + \gamma \sum_{j \in N(i)} w_{ij}(\tilde{x}_j(k) - x_i(k)), \]

where agent \( i \) uses \( \tilde{x}_i \) rather than \( \tilde{x}_j \) because it always has access to its own unprivatized state. The stochastic nature of this protocol implies that agents no longer exactly reach a formation, and, in particular, the states will never exactly converge to a steady-state value.

To analyze performance, let \( \beta(k) := \frac{1}{N} \mathbb{1}^T x(k) \mathbb{1} + q - \frac{1}{N} \mathbb{1}^T q \mathbb{1} \), where the state vector the protocol in Equation (2) would converge to with initial state \( x(k) \) and without privacy. Also let \( e(k) = x(k) - \beta(k) \), which is the distance of the current state to the state the protocol would converge to without differential privacy. To quantify the effects of privacy on the network as a whole, let \( e_{agg}(k) := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} E[e_i^2(k)] \) be the aggregate error of the network, and let

\[ e_{ss} := \limsup_{k \to \infty} e_{agg}(k) \]

be the steady-state error of the network.

Problem 1 requires us to quantify the relationship between privacy, encoded by \( (\epsilon_i, \delta_i) \); performance, encoded by \( e_{ss} \); and topology, encoded by \( \lambda_2 \). These quantitative tradeoffs are the subject of the next section.

IV. Differentially Private Formation Control

In this section we solve Problem 1. First, we show how the private formation control protocol can be modeled as a Markov chain. Then, we solve Problem 1 by deriving performance bounds that are functions of the underlying graph topology and each agent’s privacy parameters.

A. Formation Control as a Markov chain

Problem 1 takes the form of a consensus protocol with Gaussian i.i.d. noise perturbing each agent’s state, which has been previously studied in [18]. We begin by expanding \( \tilde{x}_j(k) \) in Equation (3), which yields

\[ \tilde{x}_i(k+1) = \tilde{x}_i(k) + \gamma \sum_{j \in N(i)} w_{ij}(\tilde{x}_j(k) + v_j(k) - \tilde{x}_i(k)). \]

For the purposes of analysis, we will consider equivalent network-level dynamics given as follows.

**Lemma 3:** Let agents use the communication graph \( G \) with weighted Laplacian \( L(G) \). Then Equation (4) can be represented at the network level as \( \dot{x}(k+1) = P \dot{x}(k) + z(k) \), where \( P = I - \gamma L(G) \) and \( z(k) \sim \mathcal{N}(0, Z) \) where \( Z = \text{diag}(s_1^2, \ldots, s_N^2) \), with \( s_i^2 = \gamma^2 \sum_{j \in N(i)} w_{ij}^2 \sigma_j^2 \).

**Proof:** See Lemma 3 in [25].

For analysis, we use the network-level update law \( \dot{x}(k+1) = P \dot{x}(k) + z(k) \). The main result of this paper uses the fact that a stochastic matrix \( P \) can serve as the transition matrix of a Markov chain and the properties of the Markov chain can be used to analyze the network dynamics.

B. Solving Problem 1

Now we state the first of our main results: a bound on performance in terms of agents’ level of privacy and underlying graph topology.

**Theorem 1:** Consider the network-level private formation control protocol \( \dot{x}(k+1) = (I - \gamma L(G)) \dot{x}(k) + z(k) \). If \( \gamma \sum_{j \in N(i)} w_{ij} < 1, \gamma \in \left(0, \frac{1}{\lambda_{max}}\right), G \) is connected and undirected, and \( \sigma_i \geq \kappa(\delta_i, \epsilon_i) b_i \) for all \( i \), then \( e_{ss} \) is upper-bounded by

\[ e_{ss} \leq \gamma(N-1)^2 \max_i \kappa(\delta_i, \epsilon_i)^2 b_i^2. \]

**Proof:** See [25, Theorem 1].

We can simplify Theorem 1 when each agent has the same privacy parameters. Next, and from this point on, we consider the case where \( \sigma = \kappa(\delta, \epsilon) b \) so that each agent adds the minimum amount of noise needed to attain \( (\epsilon, \delta) \)-differential privacy.

**Corollary 1 (Homogeneous Privacy Parameters):**

Let each agent in the network have the privacy parameters \( \epsilon \) and \( \delta \) and the adjacency parameter \( b \). Then \( e_{ss} \leq \frac{\gamma \kappa(\delta, \epsilon)^2 b^2 (N-1)^2}{N \lambda_2(L(G)(2 - \gamma \lambda_2(L(G)))}. \)

The rest of the paper focuses on the homogeneous case presented in Corollary 1, though all forthcoming results are easily adapted to the heterogeneous case by considering minima and maxima over all agents where appropriate.

V. Network Design Guidelines

In this section we give guidelines for designing a differentially private formation control network. The goal is to design the network so that \( e_{ss} \) does not exceed a given limit \( e_R \). The question of interest is: Given a specific communication topology, how much privacy is each agent allowed to have for \( e_{ss} \leq e_R \)? As noted in Remark 1, we do this for each dimension of formation control individually. A smaller value of \( \epsilon \) corresponds to being more private. Therefore an upper bound on \( e_{ss} \), which is the measure of system performance, implies a lower bound on \( \epsilon \), each agent’s privacy parameter.

We derive an impossibility result and sufficient conditions in terms of \( \epsilon \) for \( e_{ss} \leq e_R \) for specific networks. We consider connected graphs \( G \) with uniform weights, where \( w_{ij} = w \) for all \( (i, j) \in E \). By construction, the graphs we consider in this paper are weight-balanced, which implies that for any weights, the protocol in Equation (2) will converge to the unweighted average as seen in Lemma 2. Throughout this section we fix \( \delta \) to be some small number and let \( \epsilon \) vary to tune the level of privacy, which is common in differential privacy implementations [26].

**Theorem 2 (Impossibility Result):** Given a network of \( N \) agents with specified \( \epsilon, \delta, b \), and \( e_R \), compute \( \lambda_2(G) \). Then \( e_{ss} < e_R \) cannot be assured if \( \epsilon < \frac{2b \kappa \lambda_2(L(G))}{N \sum_{i=1}^{N} \lambda_2(L(G))} \), where \( z_1 = \frac{\gamma(N-1)^2}{2 - \gamma \lambda_2(L(G))} \).

**Proof:** See Theorem 2 in [25].

We now derive necessary and sufficient conditions for assuring \( e_{ss} \leq e_R \) for common graphs: the complete graph, line graph, cycle graph, and star graph. These conditions
TABLE I: Comparison of the lower bounds on \( \epsilon \) for various communication topologies and numbers of agents. This table illustrates that more-connected graphs accommodate privacy better when the network size grows, because they allow \( \epsilon \) to be smaller, which gives stronger privacy protections.

| G  | 10   | 100  | 1,000 | 10,000 |
|----|------|------|-------|--------|
| Complete | 0.0074 | 0.0081 | 0.0084 | 0.0116 |
| Cycle | 0.0380 | 1.3514 | 199.35 | 15959.1 |
| Line | 0.7533 | 3.2127 | 714.70 | 63575.2 |
| Star | 0.0235 | 0.0820 | 0.2661 | 0.8849 |

Corollary 2 (Complete graph): The complete graph has algebraic connectivity \( \lambda_2(L(G)) = wN \) [27]. Consider a network of \( N \) agents with specified \( \epsilon, \delta, \gamma, b, w, \) and \( e_R \), and communication topology modeled by the complete graph. The network can be shown to satisfy \( e_{ss} \leq e_R \) if and only if \( \epsilon \geq \frac{2b}{{2}^\gamma N} - \frac{w}{(N-1)^2} \). 

Proof: See Corollary 2 in [25].

Corollary 3 (Cycle Graph): The cycle graph has algebraic connectivity \( \lambda_2(L(G)) = 2w(1 - \cos \left( \frac{2\pi}{N} \right)) \) [27]. Consider a network of \( N \) agents with specified \( \epsilon, \delta, \gamma, b, w, \) and \( e_R \), and communication topology modeled by the cycle graph. The network is assured to satisfy \( e_{ss} \leq e_R \) if and only if \( \epsilon \geq \frac{2b_{2\gamma}}{Nw(1 - \cos \left( \frac{2\pi}{N} \right))} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{z_2w(1 - \cos \left( \frac{2\pi}{N} \right))}} \), where \( z_2 = \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 - \gamma w(1 - \cos \left( \frac{2\pi}{N} \right))}} \).

Corollary 4 (Line Graph): The line graph has algebraic connectivity \( \lambda_2(L(G)) = 2w(1 - \cos \left( \frac{\pi}{N} \right)) \) [27]. Consider a network of \( N \) agents with specified \( \epsilon, \delta, \gamma, b, w, \) and \( e_R, \) and communication topology modeled by the line graph. The network is assured to satisfy \( e_{ss} \leq e_R \) if and only if \( \epsilon \geq \frac{2b_{2\gamma}}{Nw(1 - \cos \left( \frac{\pi}{N} \right))} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{z_3w(1 - \cos \left( \frac{\pi}{N} \right))}} \), where \( z_3 = \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 - \gamma w(1 - \cos \left( \frac{\pi}{N} \right))}} \).

Corollary 5 (Star Graph): The star graph has algebraic connectivity \( \lambda_2(L(G)) = w \) [27]. Consider a network of \( N \) agents with specified \( \epsilon, \delta, \gamma, b, w, \) and \( e_R \), and communication topology modeled by the star graph. The network is assured to satisfy \( e_{ss} \leq e_R \) if and only if \( \epsilon \geq \frac{2b_{2\gamma}}{Nw(1 - \gamma w)} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{z_4w(1 - \gamma w)}} \), where \( z_4 = \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 - \gamma w(1 - \gamma w)}} \).

Remark 2: Fix \( \delta = 0.01, b = 5, w = 1, \gamma = 10^{-4} \), and \( e_R = 100 \). The lower bounds on \( \epsilon \) found in Corollaries 2-5 were calculated numerically for networks with a varying number of agents, the results of which are in Table I.

VI. SENSITIVITY RESULTS

Theorem 1 and Corollaries 2-5 show that performance of a network is a function of the network topology, each agent’s privacy parameters, adjacency relationship, step size, and the number of agents. Some of these parameters are global, in that the parameter depends on the entire network, and some are local, in that the parameter can change at the agent level. For example, the network communication topology is a global parameter while each agent’s privacy parameter, \( \epsilon \), is a local parameter.

Consider the following example: Given a network that is not performing as desired, one option is to change the network’s topology and allow more agents to communicate, while another option is to loosen the agents’ privacy requirements. Depending on design constraints, it may be more effective to allow more agents to communicate or to relax privacy requirements. It is useful to understand when changing \( \epsilon \) is more effective than changing the network topology and vice versa. In this section we therefore analyze how sensitive network performance is to local changes in privacy and global changes in topology.

**Theorem 3:** Let \( \eta_1 = \frac{2e^2 + \gamma K^2 + 2}{\gamma \delta} \) and \( \eta_2 = \frac{2e^2 + 2 \gamma K^2}{\gamma \delta} \). The results presented in Theorem 3 can be instantiated for specific graphs. For example, consider the following.

**Corollary 6:** Let \( \delta = 0.00135 \), such that \( K_3 = 3 \), and let \( \epsilon = 0.01 \). Let \( \gamma = \frac{1}{100} \). The network’s performance is more sensitive to the network topology than \( \epsilon \) when \( \lambda_2 > 5.55134 \).

To illustrate these results, consider the following. The star graph over \( N = 10 \) nodes has \( \lambda_2 = 1 \), which implies that the network’s performance is more sensitive to changes in the privacy parameter \( \epsilon \). The complete graph over \( N = 10 \) nodes has \( \lambda_2 = 10 \), which implies the network’s performance is more sensitive to changes in the network topology.

VII. SIMULATION RESULTS

In this section, we present private formation control simulation results. Consider a network of \( N = 5 \) agents running a differentially private formation controller. Agents \( i \)'s state at time \( k \) is \( y_i(k) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \), and every agent’s state trajectory is in \( E_j \). The agents’ communication topology is modeled by the star graph over 5 nodes with weights \( w_{ij} = 1 \) for all \( (i, j) \in E \). The network’s algebraic connectivity is \( \lambda_2 = 1 \). The formation specification is

\[
\mathbf{p} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & -20 & 20 & 20 & -20 \\ 0 & 20 & -20 & -20 & 20 \end{bmatrix}^T
\]

where row \( i \) denotes agent \( i \)'s desired location in the formation. Thus \( \mathbf{p} \) specifies a formation where agents 2-5 will form a square with agent 1 at the center.
We consider the homogeneous case where each agent has identical privacy parameters, $(\epsilon_i, \delta_i) = (\ln 3, 0.00135)$ for all $i$ and every agent also has an identical adjacency parameter $b_i = 2$ for all $i$. Let $\gamma = \frac{1}{2}$. Let $e_{11}$ denote the error of the first element of agent 1’s state. The protocol in Equation (3) was run for 100 time steps.

Figure 1 shows $e_{11}$ at every time step as well as the upper bound found in Theorem 1, where we see that $e_{11}$ never converges to 0 due to the stochastic nature of the protocol, but remains in some neighborhood of 0. The bound on $e_{ss}$ presented in Theorem 1 is on the expected steady state value of square aggregate error, though we see that this bound also holds point-wise in time for $e_{11}$ in this simulation. These results were typical throughout numerous simulation runs.

**VIII. Conclusions**

In this paper, we have studied the problem of differentially private formation control. This work enables agents to assemble formations while only sharing differentially private output data with a bounded steady state error. We developed guidelines for calibrating privacy under different control-theoretic requirements. The tunable parameters in this work are the privacy parameters and the topology itself, balancing the corresponding trade-offs is a subject of future work.

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