A hierarchical Bayes approach to adjust for selection bias in before–after analyses of vision zero policies

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Abstract
American cities devote significant resources to the implementation of traffic safety countermeasures that prevent pedestrian fatalities. However, the before–after comparisons typically used to evaluate the success of these countermeasures often suffer from selection bias. This paper motivates the tendency for selection bias to overestimate the benefits of traffic safety policy, using New York City’s Vision Zero strategy as an example. The NASS General Estimates System, Fatality Analysis Reporting System and other databases are combined into a Bayesian hierarchical model to calculate a more realistic before–after comparison. The results confirm the before–after analysis of New York City’s Vision Zero policy did in fact overestimate the effect of the policy, and a more realistic estimate is roughly two-thirds the size.

Keywords Hierarchical Bayes · Before–after study · Vision Zero · Selection bias

1 Introduction

Researchers cite motor vehicle collisions as a leading source of preventable death in the United States (Mokdad et al. 2004). Thirty-five thousand Americans were killed by motor vehicles in 2013. That exceeds the number of fatalities by more controversial causes such as firearms (thirty-four thousand deaths) and alcohol (twenty-nine thousand deaths) (Xu et al. 2016). Yet gun and alcohol related deaths receive a significantly larger portion of the public’s attention.

The difference between collisions and guns or alcohol is that policymakers have historically considered collisions unavoidable. Traditional road design manuals explicitly recognized a tradeoff between safety and mobility. Engineers were instructed to
build roads to accommodate the projected traffic volume and reduce bottlenecks. For example, urban arterials were designed to achieve a traffic flow of 30–60 miles per hour (mph) (Aashto 2001). Policymakers then set speed limits to the 85th percentile speed of drivers observed in favorable operating conditions. This speed was thought to offer a reasonable balance between safety and mobility, and drivers were expected to reduce their speed only when unfavorable operating conditions produced increased risk (National Research Council (US). Transportation Research Board and Limits 1998).

An increasing number of American cities have found the traditional approach inadequate. Urban drivers are too often found unresponsive to the conditions that put more vulnerable road users, like pedestrians, at increased risk. In 2014, 15% of motor vehicle fatalities were pedestrians, and 78% of these occurred in urban areas (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2016). Twelve major American cities have since established comprehensive strategies that compel drivers to make safer decisions: Chicago, San Francisco, New York City, Boston, Los Angeles, Austin, Portland, Seattle, San Jose, San Diego, Washington D.C. and Denver. These strategies are collectively known as Vision Zero and have a stated goal of creating a road system with zero traffic fatalities.

The term Vision Zero is not mere rhetoric. It refers to a specific, long-term infrastructure investment strategy that rejects the traditional balance between safety and mobility. Vision Zero prioritizes safety over mobility by anticipating human error and then slowing vehicles to the safest feasible travel speed. Success is assured by physics: slower vehicles collide with less force and are less likely to kill a pedestrian. For this reason, citywide road redesign that physically slows vehicles is the basis of Vision Zero as originally conceived (Tingvall and Narelle 2000).

Although effective in theory, a complete redesign of roads has proven challenging to implement and sustain across an entire city. A pragmatic albeit less assured approach is to adopt countermeasures that encourage vehicles to reduce their speed. For example, cities often install signs, improve lighting and visibility of cross walks or direct police officers to prioritize enforcement of the traffic law. These countermeasures are effective when drivers behave as though the road had been redesigned. Needless to say encouragements without commensurate levels of design may not prevent fatalities if drivers have little incentive to change their speed in compliance.

Consider the posted speed limit. Vision Zero cities frequently encourage vehicles to reduce their speed by lowering the limit below the speed for which the road was originally designed. Such speed limit reductions are common because they can be implemented immediately and at relatively little cost, and the reduction ostensibly affects every road across an entire city (Leaf and Preusser 1999). However, the National Highway Safety Traffic Administration rates the countermeasure “reduce and enforce speed limits” only three out of five stars for improving safety because research indicates that actual vehicle speed declines by only a fraction of the reduced limit, typically 1–2 mph for every 5 mph reduced. It states that effectiveness requires the reduced limit be met with communications and outreach, enforcement and engineering changes (Goodwin et al. 2010).

Nevertheless, traffic safety advocates promised American cities reductions in fatalities when countermeasures are combined as part of a larger Vision Zero strategy.
Many cited European countries like Sweden, which pioneered the Vision Zero movement in the mid-1990s (Government Offices of Sweden and Investment Council n.d.). Sweden took steps such as reducing the posted speed limit, separating traffic lanes and erecting barriers. Fatalities fell 28%, from 6 to 4.7 deaths per 100,000 residents (Johansson 2009); meanwhile, the United States experienced 11 deaths per 100,000 residents in 2013. The advocates reasoned that American cities were capable of preventing a considerable number of fatalities by emulating Sweden. The policy question is whether pedestrian fatalities have been prevented by the Vision Zero strategies of major American cities, and if so, how many.

This paper demonstrates the utility of a hierarchical Bayes approach to address this question. The demonstration is arranged as follows. Section 2 establishes the major methodological problem that arises in evaluating the effect of Vision Zero strategies. The decision of which roads to select for the policy produces before–after comparisons that typically exaggerate the number of fatalities prevented, and New York City’s Vision Zero road prioritization strategy provides a real world example.

Section 3 reviews how selection bias is corrected by replacing the outcomes in the before period with their estimated expectation. A nonparametric empirical Bayes approach is mathematically appealing because it places no restrictions on how the expected number of fatalities varies across roads. But an empirical application overcorrects the before–after comparison, underestimating the effect of New York City’s Vision Zero strategy. A more realistic estimate requires additional data on road characteristics. Much traffic safety data is collected retrospectively, imposing sparsity and multicollinearity among the characteristics of the relatively small subset of roads actually observed. A hierarchical Bayes approach is proposed as a favorable alternative capable of handling these complications.

In Sect. 4, a hierarchical Bayes analysis is performed using data from the twelve major American cities that have established Vision Zero strategies. The posterior distributions of the model parameters are interpreted, and a brief discussion is highlighted. The results are then applied to the New York City example introduced in Sect. 2. It suggests the number of fatalities prevented from New York City’s strategy is two-thirds the amount implied by the before–after comparison. The paper then concludes in Sect. 5 with some final thoughts about the evaluation of Vision Zero policies.

An early version of the analysis presented in this paper was submitted to the American Statistical Association’s 2016 GSS Data Challenge (Amjadi and Martinez 2021). The authors were then invited to submit the current paper, which benefited from several rounds of review. Code and data for the final analysis presented here are available on GitHub.

2 Identifying selection bias in before–after analyses of vision zero policies

Before–after comparisons are commonly used to evaluate traffic safety policies. A before–after comparison examines an outcome before and after the implementation of a policy and attributes any change to the policy. The comparison can be made in a number of ways. Popular with traffic safety researchers are modification factors,
which calculate the ratio of the outcome after the policy to the outcome before. The AASHTO Highway Safety Manual uses modification factors to evaluate policy. This analysis considers the reduction factor, which calculates the difference between the before and after outcomes. Policymakers largely consult this measure.

Selection bias refers to the systematic misrepresentation of a policy that occurs when atypical units are chosen for the policy. This misrepresentation arises in a variety of contexts, but it is particularly common in before–after comparisons when triage is used to select units in lieu of randomization—the standard of experimental research. Since random selection is infeasible for large-scale traffic safety policies like Vision Zero, before–after comparisons misrepresent the number of fatalities that were actually prevented as a result of a Vision Zero strategy.

The statement that a Vision Zero strategy prevented fatalities is understood to concern the causal effect of the strategy on the roads selected for the strategy after implementation of the strategy. For the selected roads, the policymaker directly observes the number of fatalities after implementation. However, the policymaker does not observe the number of fatalities that would have occurred had those roads not been selected for the strategy. The main assumption of the before–after comparison is that the before period reflects this unobserved outcome so that comparison with the after period captures the effect of the strategy as implemented.

This section demonstrates how the assumption is violated when policymakers select roads based on the number of fatalities in the before period. The fatalities considered “prevented” by the before–after comparison will not replicate in future years when the same policy is expanded to include roads with typical levels of fatalities in the before period. For this reason, the before–after comparison constitutes a tenuous basis for setting policy. Section 2.1 illustrates a scenario in which selection bias arises. Although perhaps simplistic, the scenario is useful for introducing the diagnostic and correction strategy used in the remaining analysis. Section 2.2 provides a real world example.

2.1 Selection bias results in before–after comparisons that typically overestimate the benefits of traffic safety policy

In practice, triage leads to the selection of roads with an atypically large number of fatalities in the before period. This causes before–after comparisons to overestimate the number of fatalities that would subsequently occur had the strategy never been applied. The number of fatalities is atypically large because selection favors roads with fatalities determined in part by erratic fluctuations that are unlikely to repeat themselves. It is the transient nature of these fluctuations that result in fewer fatalities on the selected roads in subsequent periods. Any decrease between the before and after periods is then partially an artifact of the selection process, and this artificial portion is often referred to as the regression to the mean or simply the regression effect (Freedman et al. 1998).

Among statistical artifacts, the regression effect is particularly pernicious in that large decreases in fatalities can occur on roads even when a policy has no effect whatsoever, and it is difficult to assess the extent to which a decrease is an artifact
of the selection process without knowing the population from which the roads were selected. The population affords the context necessary for determining how atypical the selected roads are, as illustrated with the following scenario.

Consider the following fictional city in which there are one hundred roads. Assume that in any year, each road independently experiences one fatality with a probability of 10% and no fatalities otherwise. Policymakers would expect ten of the hundred roads to have fatalities. Suppose that ten roads did in fact experience a fatality.

If the city selected these ten roads for study, but it did not implement any actual policy changes, there would be one fatality per road on the selected roads in the before period. Yet, only one of the selected roads would be expected to have a fatality in a subsequent after period. Suppose again that this is the case. The reduction factor on selected roads would show a 90% decline in fatalities, from 100 to 10%, even though no policy changes were made. The selected roads have “regressed” towards the mean.

 Readers familiar with causal inference might recognize selection bias as a violation of the unconfoundedness assumption, and the “mirror image” diagnostic in the previous paragraph as estimating the effect on pseudo outcomes (Imbens et al. 2015) or control outcomes (Rosenbaum 2017). To see this, let $B_s$ ($A_s$) denote the observed number of fatalities on the selected roads in the before period (after period). Let $B_u$ ($A_u$) denote the number of fatalities that would have been observed on the selected roads in the before period (after period) had they not been selected. Then the before–after comparison, $A_s - B_s$, can be decomposed as follows:

$$A_s - B_s = (A_s - A_u) + (A_u - B_u) + (B_u - B_s)$$

The first quantity, $(A_s - A_u)$, is the causal effect of the policy as defined in the beginning of this section. The before–after comparison represents the causal effect when both baselines $(A_u - B_u)$ and $(B_u - B_s)$ are zero. The first baseline reflects temporal stability. If zero, the number of fatalities would not have changed between periods had the selected roads not been selected. The second baseline reflects selection stability. If zero, the number of fatalities in the before period would not have been different had the selected roads not been selected. Selecting the roads with a large number of fatalities in the before period means $B_s$ is atypically large and $B_u$ is atypically small. It follows that $(B_u - B_s) < 0$ and $(A_u - B_u) > 0$.

In the fictional city described above, it is observed that $B_s = 10$ and $A_s = 1$. In practice, $B_u$ and $A_u$ are not observed. However, it can be surmised that $A_u = A_s = 1$, since the policy did nothing, and $B_u = 0$, since all roads with fatalities were selected. Therefore, $A_s - B_s = -9$, $A_s - A_u = 0$, $B_u - B_s = -10$ and $A_u - B_u = 1$. This last quantity accounts for the “mirror image” diagnostic. All roads are comparable in the before period because the fatality rate is assumed to follow the same distribution.
for all roads. The roads not selected for study by the fictional city represent what the selected roads would have looked like had they not been selected.

One way to adjust for selection bias is to replace the before outcomes with the average outcome across all roads in the before period. In the fictional city described above, the average number of fatalities in the before period is 10%. The before–after comparison of 10–10% gives the correct answer for both selected and unselected roads: no fatalities were prevented in this fictional city, and the observed decline is an artifact of the selection process.

This adjustment requires the expected number of fatalities to be the same across selected and unselected roads in the before period. Otherwise the average will not adequately reflect the future number of fatalities under the conditions of the before period. A model is often used to account for the disparity between the selected and unselected roads. In fact, the regression model derives its name from its description of the regression effect (Stigler 2016).

2.2 Before–after comparison overestimates the effect of New York City’s Vision Zero strategy

The real world example is a before–after comparison used to evaluate New York City’s Vision Zero strategy. In November 2014, New York City’s Vision Zero Committee reviewed the location of traffic fatalities and serious injuries between the years 2009 and 2013. In 2015, these locations were prioritized for Vision Zero engineering, enforcement and education countermeasures. A question facing the Committee was how many pedestrian fatalities were prevented in 2016 as a result of the changes on these roads (Taskforce 2017). Throughout this analysis, the term “fatalities” refers to pedestrian fatalities.

Using the road shapefile provided by the New York State GIS Program Office, it is estimated that 44,337 road segments, about 32% of New York City road segments, were selected for prioritization. These road segments made up roughly 70% of pedestrian fatalities between 2009 and 2013. The priority locations are visualized for midtown Manhattan in Fig. 1. The blue shaded region is the priority area, the blue lines are priority corridors and the blue triangles are priority intersections. Blue dots depict fatalities falling within priority locations. Red dots depict fatalities falling outside priority locations. Fatalities are displayed in the first panel of Fig. 1 for the last year of the review period, 2013, and in the second panel of Fig. 1 for the year 2016.

As outlined in Sect. 2.1, a decline in fatalities is expected among the roads selected for prioritization since the selection criteria favored locations with fatalities in the before period. In fact, a sizeable reduction was observed and is displayed in the first panel of Fig. 2. Over the 2009–2013 period, an average of 99 pedestrian fatalities occurred at priority locations throughout the city each year. In 2016, there were only 72 fatalities at these locations, a 27% decline. The committee’s question could be rephrased as asking what portion of the observed reduction was deaths prevented by New York City’s policy change and what portion was an artifact of the selection process.
Without additional analysis, any division of the observed reduction between actual prevention and selection bias is possible. On one hand, the 27% decline is nearly equivalent to the reduction experienced by Sweden after its implementation of Vision Zero. Moreover, a simple thought experiment using results from the traffic safety literature explains how this decline might have been achieved in New York City.

Recall, the basis of Vision Zero is the prioritization of safety by reducing vehicle speed. As part of its strategy, New York City lowered the default speed limit from 30 to 25 mph. Suppose for simplicity all vehicles traveled uniformly at 30 mph before the City reduced its speed limit. A 5 mph reduction of the speed limit typically reduces vehicle speeds by 1–2 mph so assuming every priority road achieved a 2 mph reduction in vehicle speeds, a new speed limit of 25 mph would correspond with vehicle speeds of 28 mph. According to the regression analysis of Rosén and Ulrich (2009), this 2 mph change in vehicle speed would produce a fatality reduction of 24%, three percentage points less than the reduction suggested by the before–after analysis. Attributing New York City’s 27% reduction entirely to the Vision Zero Strategy would therefore be possible if subsequent countermeasures, such as engineering changes, education and enforcement, led to above average compliance with the posted speed limit.

On the other hand, the second panel in Fig. 2 suggests a large portion of the 27% reduction in fatalities is driven by selection. It shows that from the 2009–2013 before period to the 2016 after period, fatalities at non priority locations increased 20%, almost the same magnitude as fatalities in priority locations decreased. It is implausible that the strategy caused a substantial number of fatalities on non priority roads. Instead, the mirror image behavior in Fig. 2 is evidence the procedure used to select priority roads accounts for a nontrivial portion of the observed reduction in the number of fatalities.
This figure displays the number of pedestrian fatalities in New York City in the before and after periods for both priority and non-priority roads. The roads selected for priority changes experienced a 27% drop in fatalities from an average of 99 over the 2009–2013 time period to 72 in 2016. However, fatalities on the remaining, non-priority roads increased 20%. This mirror image behavior is evidence of selection bias.

The portion of the observed reduction due to prevention can be separated from the portion due to selection by replacing the before values with their expectations as mentioned in Sect. 2.1. However, the sample average will not work in this example because the expected number of fatalities is not the same across selected and unselected roads in the before period. Dangerous roads were more likely to be selected. A more sophisticated approach is necessary to estimate the expectation, and this discussion is the subject of Sect. 3.

3 Correcting selection bias in before–after analyses of vision zero policies

Section 2 demonstrates how before–after comparisons exaggerate the benefit of a Vision Zero strategy when roads are selected based on the number of fatalities in the before period. The before period no longer reflects the number of fatalities one would expect in future periods had the selected roads not been selected. The before–after comparison is corrected by replacing the number of fatalities in the before period with its expectation, provided no significant change occurs between the before and after periods other than the policy. The expectation is estimable by jointly modeling the number of fatalities on the selected roads with the number of fatalities on the remaining, unselected roads.

This section develops a model to estimate this expectation. A nonparametric empirical Bayes analysis serves as a mathematically appealing starting point because it places no restrictions on how the expected number of fatalities might vary by road. Section 3.1 adjusts the before–after comparison using Robbins’ Formula. However, an application to New York City data underestimates the effect of the Vision Zero strategy. A more realistic adjustment is obtained by incorporating additional information on roads. Sec-
tion 3.2 presents a hierarchical Bayes regression model that allows for a large number of covariates. The model is modified to reflect the retrospective collection of important traffic safety data.

### 3.1 A nonparametric empirical Bayes approach without informative covariates overcorrects for selection bias

Recognition of the regression effect and selection bias more broadly lies at the foundation of modern statistical practice, established more than a century ago (Stigler 2016). Traffic fatalities, along with students’ test scores and parent/children heights, have long served as the prime examples. Despite this history, it remains perhaps the most common pitfall in the statistical analysis of data (Friedman 1992). It is no surprise then that multiple corrections have been offered. Among the most famous is Herbert Robbins’, who considered the exact problem of selection bias in before–after studies (Robbins and Cun-Hui 1998), and provides a principled starting point.

The outcome in the before period is described by the following hierarchical model. See Gelman (2005) for an introduction to hierarchical models and the accompanying notation:

\[
X_i \sim \text{Poisson}(\mu_i) \\
\mu_i \sim g(\theta)
\]

In the context of a Vision Zero strategy, \(X_i\) denotes the number of pedestrian fatalities that might occur on road \(i\) in the before period, \(i \in \{1, \ldots, I\}\). The rate parameter of each road, \(\mu_i\), is thought exchangeable and modeled i.i.d. \(g(\theta)\). The hierarchy is interpreted as describing how roads are constructed from a super population of roads that a city could build. From this perspective, the Bayes moniker is somewhat of a misnomer. The interpretation is closer to the random effects models of classical statistics than a full Bayes analysis. See Berger (2013) for a discussion of this distinction.

Let \(I_s < I\) be the number of selected roads. After observing the number of fatalities in the before period, the number of fatalities expected on these road had they not been selected is \(\hat{E}(\sum_{i=1}^{I_s} \mu_i | X_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{I_s} E(\mu_i | X_i)\). Each \(E(\mu_i | X_i)\) is estimable under the above model using Robbins’ Formula (Efron and Trevor 2016):

\[
\hat{E}(\mu_i | X_i = x) = (x + 1) \frac{\sum_{i'=1}^{I} \mathbb{1}(X_{i'} = x + 1)}{\sum_{i'=1}^{I} \mathbb{1}(X_{i'} = x)}
\]

Note that index \(i'\) ranges over all roads, \(I\), both selected and not selected. This estimate is considered to be a more realistic characterization of \(\mu_i\) than the road-specific mean, \(X_i\).

The Formula has a long history. Alan Turing originally proposed it as a solution to the related Missing Species Problem (Good 1953), but it was named after Herbert Robbins, who studied its properties extensively (Robbins 1995; Robbins and Cun-Hui 2000). Its appeal comes primarily from the fact that no restrictions are placed on the
Table 1  Application of Robbins’ formula to the New York City Vision Zero data

| Observed number of fatalities | 0   | 1   | 2   | 3   |
|------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Number of road segments      | 138,142 | 632 | 40  | 1   |
| Estimated fatality rate      | 0.0045 | 0.1266 | 0.075 | 4   |
| Number of priority segments  | 43,806 | 405 | 29  | 1   |
| Expected number of fatalities | 200  | 51  | 2   | 4   |

population distribution, \( g(\theta) \). That is, the estimate is derived without any restriction on how the expected number of fatalities might vary across each road.

Table 1 applies Robbins’ formula to the New York City data from Sect. 2.2. The first row, \(<1>\) displays the total number of road segments in New York City by the number of fatalities between 2009 and 2013. For example, there were 138,142 segments with no fatalities, 632 with one fatality and so on. These were plugged into Robbins’ Formula to get \(<2>\), the expected number of fatalities on each road segment had it not been selected, having observed the number of fatalities in the before period. This was then multiplied by \(<3>\), the number of road segments selected by the Vision Zero Committee as priority locations, yielding \(<4>\), the number of fatalities on priority road segments expected over a 5 year period if not selected. Summing and dividing by the number of years in the 2009–2013 period gives an average of 52 deaths. Thus despite observing an average of 99 deaths per year in priority locations over the 2009–2013 period, adjustment with Robbins’ Formula suggests only 52 fatalities are to be expected in the following year absent any policy change.

Note that the estimated fatality rate is lower for road segments with two fatalities than roads with one fatality. This is a known consequence of the Formula (Efron and Trevor 2016). While there are several possible corrections, road segments with two or more fatalities are sufficiently rare that adjustments to the estimated fatality rate do not significantly change the end result.

The expectation of 52 fatalities per year at the priority locations is substantially lower than the 72 fatalities actually observed in 2016 after the implementation of Vision Zero. If the adjustment is to be believed, more fatalities have occurred at priority locations than would be expected had the previous policy been maintained, not less, as suggested by the before–after comparison. Moreover, the increase is considerable. The percent increase in the number of fatalities as a result of the policy is estimated to be 38%.

Yet this 38% increase is potentially more pessimistic than a 27% decrease is optimistic. Nothing in the traffic safety literature implies that the countermeasures deployed would substantially increase the number of fatalities. While the before–after comparison failed to account for the fact that many non priority road segments were eligible for selection, Robbins’ Formula overcorrects by too readily comparing fatalities across priority and non priority road segments.

Additional criteria factored into the selection process, and a portion of the non priority road segments have characteristics that make them unlikely to experience a fatality and be selected. For example, Fig. 1 suggests that road segments on the
periphery of New York City were not prioritized, and perhaps the fatalities on these road segments should not be compared directly with the priority road segments that were selected. Doing so might make the priority road segments appear more atypical in the before period than they really are.

Generally speaking, road characteristics, such as the number of lanes or the existence of a protective median, inform a Vision Zero selection process and influence the fatality rate. These characteristics will be distributed disproportionately across selected and unselected roads. Inclusion of this information into a model ensures that the fatalities on the large, four lane roads with a protective median likely to be selected are not compared directly to the fatalities on the small one way roads unlikely to be selected. The better comparisons are made in the before period, the closer the estimated fatality rate in the before period represents what would have happened had a road not been selected, and the more accurate the estimated effect of the Vision Zero strategy.

Fortunately, a vast quantity of traffic safety data is available to identify similar roads. This data can be used to stratify roads into different types so that a more realistic estimate of the expected number of fatalities can be made for each road type. Section 3.2 discusses the general, methodological complications that arise when incorporating traffic safety data into the approach of this section. Section 4 considers data-specific complications.

### 3.2 A hierarchical Bayes approach allows for covariates informative of selection

The empirical Bayes analysis performed in Sect. 3.1 could be salvaged were the selection process for a Vision Zero strategy known to depend on a few observable factors. The data could be stratified by the factors, and an estimate could be made for the roads in each stratum. The remaining determinants of fatalities would be evenly distributed among roads within strata, allowing for a fair comparison of selected and unselected roads. Unfortunately, the selection process depends on a large number of factors and, while several databases are available to measure them, doing so introduces additional complications that preclude an empirical Bayes approach.

A hierarchical Bayes analysis can be viewed as an approximation of the nonparametric empirical Bayes approach from Sect. 3.1 that allows covariate information to inform the population distribution, \( g(\theta) \). Hierarchical Bayes compares favorably with nonparametric empirical Bayes, even without covariates. See Efron and Trevor (2016) and Berger (2013) for a comparison of the methods in general and Robbins’ Formula specifically.

Suppose traffic safety experts classified each of \( i \in \{1, \ldots, I\} \) roads into one of \( J \) types. Let \( j[i] \) denote the type of the \( i \)th road, \( j[i] \in \{1, \ldots, J\} \). A univariate hierarchical Bayes log-linear regression model describing fatalities in the before period can be written:

\[
X_i \sim \text{Poisson}(\mu_i) \\
\mu_i = \exp(\lambda_{j[i]}) \\
\lambda_j \sim \text{Normal}(\theta, \sigma)
\]
As in Sect. 3.1, \( X_i \) denotes the number of fatalities on road \( i \) in the before period. However, the log-rate parameter for each road type, \( \lambda_j \), is thought exchangeable and modeled i.i.d. Normal\((\theta, \sigma)\). The hierarchy is still interpreted as describing how roads are themselves chosen from a super population of roads that a city could build.

If the normal distribution were replaced with the arbitrary distribution, \( g(\theta) \), Robbins’ Formula could be calculated within covariate stratum as in Sect. 3.1. In fact, were experts able to easily classify all roads into one of \( J \) types, a number of empirical Bayes approaches would be possible. The negative binomial model is common in the traffic safety literature (Hauer 2005), where, in its simplest case, fatalities are assumed to follow a Gamma mixture of Poissons, and the hyperparameters are estimated from the data. In fact, the original application of the negative binomial was to model accident statistics (Greenwood and Yule 1920).

However, it will be the case that road types are themselves divisible into a large number of subtypes, and roads sharing multiple subtypes are more similar than roads sharing fewer subtypes. The univariate hierarchical Bayes log-linear regression model is easily extended to this multivariate case, although the notation established in this subsection must be augmented. Suppose traffic safety experts classified each road, \( i \), into one of \( j_k \in \{1, \ldots, J_k\} \) subtypes for \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \) groups. For example, the first group could describe physical road characteristics (e.g. the number of lanes: one lane, two lane, etc.), the second group could describe traffic patterns (e.g. the average volume per day: ten vehicles, a hundred vehicles, etc.), the third group could describe visibility (e.g. the amount of street lighting: no street lighting, street lighting, etc.), and so on. Two roads, \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \), are of the same type, \( j \in \{1, \ldots, J\} \), if \( j_{k_1}[i_1] = j_{k_2}[i_2] \) for all \( k \). The multivariate case can now be written:

\[
X_i \sim \text{Poisson}(\mu_i) \\
\mu_i = \exp\left( \theta + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha^k_{jk[i]} \right) \\
\alpha^k_{jk} \sim \text{Normal}(0, \sigma_k) \tag{1}
\]

The log-rate parameter for the \( i \)th road is now the sum of \( K \) subtype parameters, \( \alpha^1_{j_1[i]} + \ldots + \alpha^K_{j_K[i]} \), and the \( k \)th subtype parameter, \( \alpha^k_{jk} \), is thought exchangeable within group \( k \) and modeled i.i.d. Normal\((\theta_k, \sigma_k)\). Note the \( \theta_k \) are not identified, and only the sum, \( \theta = \sum_k \theta_k \), is included in the model above.

In the typical traffic safety study, the covariates that describe each subtype are collected for all roads regardless of the outcome, or control roads are carefully chosen for comparison. Neither designs are possible when evaluating Vision Zero due to the immense scope of these strategies. Prospective samples are available for only a minority of roads, and they are unlikely to contain enough fatalities to describe the potentially complex relationships between the subtype groups and the fatality rate. These relationships are better studied using retrospective data, collected in the event of a fatality on a road. Estimates obtained from retrospective data can then be weighted back to a Vision Zero city using a prospective sample.
The notation is augmented again to reflect these circumstances. Let $X_i$ denote the number of fatalities on road $i \in \{1, \ldots, I\}$. Suppose the roads are arranged in decreasing order of fatalities so that the first $I < I'$ roads had at least one fatality in the before period and traffic safety experts are only able to classify these roads into one of $j_k \in \{1, \ldots, J_k\}$ subtypes for each of the $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$ groups.

The typical number of fatalities on the first $I$ roads, $\mu_i$ for $i \leq I$, is estimable from the hierarchical model using the zero-truncated Poisson likelihood, $\text{Poisson}^+(\mu_i) = \frac{\mu_i^x}{(\exp(\mu_i)-1)x!}$, so that Eq. (1) simply becomes:

$$X_i \sim \text{Poisson}^+(\mu_i)$$

Values or distributions can be chosen for the hyperparameters, and statistical software can simulate $S$ samples from the posterior distribution of the parameters. After model validation, $\mu_i$ can be characterized by the quantiles of $\hat{\mu}_i(s)$ or by $\frac{1}{S} \sum_{s=1}^S \hat{\mu}_i(s)$, where $\hat{\mu}_i(s)$ is the $s$th simulation of the posterior distribution of $\mu_i$. The former corresponds to uncertainty intervals, and the latter corresponds to the posterior mean used in Sect. 3.1.

However, $\mu_i$ cannot be reliably estimated reliably for the remaining $I' - I$ roads with no fatalities and therefore unobserved subtypes. These roads cannot be ignored. While the first $I$ roads likely constitute the most dangerous roads in a city and the remaining $I' - I$ roads likely have low fatality rates, $I' - I$ will be much larger than $I$ for most cities. It is possible the latter contributes more to the expected number of fatalities in the before period. That is, $\sum_{i=I+1}^{I'} \mu_i \gg \sum_{i=1}^I \mu_i$.

The summand of $\sum_{i=1}^I \mu_i$ is reweighted to represent the population of roads before the Vision Zero strategy. Let $\mathbb{1}(i \leq I)$ denote whether the $i$th road was observed in the retrospective data. Note that $\sum_{i=1}^I \mu_i = \sum_{i=1}^{I'} \mathbb{1}(i \leq I) \mu_i$ and $E(\mathbb{1}(i \leq I)) = P(X_i > 0)$, where $E$ is taken over hypothetical replications of the before period. Inverse probability weights, $\frac{1}{P(X_i > 0)}$, can be estimated from a prospective sample to ensure the weighted sum, $\sum_{i=1}^{I'} \frac{\mu_i}{P(X_i > 0)}$, is representative of all roads in a city:

$$E \sum_{i=1}^I \frac{\mu_i}{P(X_i > 0)} = E \sum_{i=1}^{I'} \frac{\mu_i \mathbb{1}(i \leq I)}{P(X_i > 0)} = \sum_{i=1}^{I'} \mu_i P(X_i > 0) \frac{E(\mathbb{1}(i \leq I))}{P(X_i > 0)} = \sum_{i=1}^{I'} \mu_i P(X_i > 0) = \sum_{i=1}^I \mu_i$$

The combination of hierarchical Bayes and reweighting is common in the model-based inference of surveys. For example, see multilevel regression and poststratification (Gelman and Little 1997; Gelman and Hill 2006; Yajuan et al. 2015). The retrospective data can be viewed as a convenience survey that oversamples roads with covariates predictive of fatalities. The prospective sample readjusts the estimates to reflect the desired population of roads. For evaluating...
Vision Zero strategies, the population of interest is the set of selected roads in a city.

4 Fitting the hierarchical Bayes model to traffic safety data from the before period

Section 3 motivates a general hierarchical Bayes model that describes fatalities using covariates informative of selection into a Vision Zero strategy. The model is a compromise between the before–after comparison, which incorrectly ignores the fatalities on the unselected roads, and the nonparametric empirical Bayes adjustment, which incorrectly compares the fatalities on the unselected roads directly with the selected roads. The hierarchical Bayes model provides the correct adjustment if it properly accounts for the covariates informative of selection. The remaining determinants of fatalities would balance across the selected and unselected roads, enabling a fair comparison and a representative estimate of the fatality rate in the before period.

Yet it is not clear how to properly account for the covariates informative of selection from the data alone. The general hierarchical Bayes model described in Sect. 3.2 allows outside information to determine how information is pooled across roads, while the strength of the pooling is determined by the data. This section highlights the specific considerations that arise when fitting the model to police reports from the twelve major American cities that have declared Vision Zero policies. The model could be fit with data from a variety of other sources, and the additional complications that may arise are discussed in Sect. 5.

The data presented in this subsection is obtained primarily from two National Highway Traffic Safety Administration sources: the National Automotive Sampling System (NASS) General Estimates System (GES) and the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). GES is a nationally representative probability sample selected from the more than five million police-reported crashes that occur annually. It is collected prospectively and measures a large number of covariates detailing the road, vehicle and persons involved. The prospective nature of the dataset is useful for drawing conclusions representative of the unobserved population. The drawback is that the sample size is too small to reliably estimate the fatality rate for each road type. Key geographic information is also missing.

FARS is a retrospective census of fatalities containing a large number of covariates in common with GES. Unlike GES, however, FARS includes geographic coordinates that permit the estimation of the traffic and pedestrian density. Section 4.1 describes the combination of FARS with additional data using these coordinates. A large amount of information is obtained for each road, producing sparsity and multicollinearity among some covariates and requiring additional regularization for interpretability. Section 4.2 demonstrates model interpretation and presents select findings from the fitted model. ANOVA plots, described in Gelman (2005), provide a graphical representation of variable importance. Section 4.3 discusses the weighting of the results with the GES and applies them to the real world example introduced in Sect. 2.2.
4.1 The combination of multiple datasets results in sparsity and multicolinearity among the covariates

Several datasets are combined with FARS to create the complete, retrospective dataset used in this analysis. Missing New York City speed limit data in FARS is imputed from a NYC DOT shapefile of posted speed limits. The pedestrian population on each road is estimated as recommended by the Census Bureau using the Census Tract Flows (TPP) and the Census Planning Database (PDB). Average annual daily traffic is estimated from the Highway Performance Monitoring System (HPMS).

The combined dataset contains 2404 fatalities as determined by the KABCO scale. It includes every pedestrian death in the twelve major American cities with Vision Zero policies between 2010 and 2015 for which there was no missing covariate information that could be reliably estimated with additional resources. Missing fatalities are assumed to result from unintentional oversight and considered missing at random. The year 2009 is dropped because of compatibility issues between GES and FARS, and the year 2015 is withheld for model validation.

The nearly twenty-five hundred observations in the dataset are relatively small compared to the numerous ways roads can differ. The retrospective dataset contains the following eight covariate groups describing the road on which the fatality took place: the weather and surface condition (COND), the city (CITY), the year (YEAR), the posted speed limit (SLIM), the presence of various signs or signals (SIGN), the time and lighting (LGHT), the physical road characteristics or built environment (BLTE) and the annual average traffic density (TFFC). However, these eight covariates are themselves batches of hundreds of subtypes that determine the fatality rate and potentially inform selection into a Vision Zero strategy. Table 2 displays the first six observations of the dataset where numbers denote the various qualitative subtype categories. One quantitative variable, the number of pedestrians exposed to the road (EXPR), is also displayed.

The decision to combine covariates in this way came from conversations with experts, who indicated that the subtypes in a group represent similar amounts of information about a road a priori. For example, CITY denotes which of the twelve cities contains the road, and it is expected the contribution of the fatality rate due to the city containing the road to vary systematically about the average city level. Interactions between groups is also informative, but the same conversations suggested that their importance is second order.

Table 3 shows the number of observations with the most common subtypes for each covariate grouping. A few groupings possess a large number of subtypes. COND, LGHT and BLTE have 25, 36 and 111 respectively, and most of these are well represented. For example, New York City (12) had around 800 roads, and many roads are observed in weather condition 2 (clear weather, dry road surface). But while the marginal counts of each subtype can be large, the number of observations for any specific road type is small, where road type refers to the interaction of subtypes as defined in Sect. 3.2.

Low counts within combinations of subtypes can lead to interpretability issues if the covariate groups become highly associated. Association of the eight covariate groups
is summarized using Cramer’s V statistic in Fig. 3. No two groups, aside from city
and traffic density, are found to be highly associated. It was decided to replace TFFC
with the covariate ROUT, indicating the road’s major function (e.g. whether the road
segment is a local road, highway, etc).

To contrast Fig. 3, association of three-way interactions between select covariate
groups is displayed in Fig. 4. The high associations indicate that interactions must
either be included judiciously in the model or heavily regularized. Judicious inclusion
may better promote interpretability. However experts disagree on which variables are
most important and their exact relationship with each other. It was decided to include
all two-way interactions in the model, and their effects are penalized more strongly
than the marginal effects.

### 4.2 Results from the hierarchical Bayes approach are consistent with previous
vision zero findings

Section 4.1 describes the covariates that inform selection into a Vision Zero strategy.
These covariates partition the roads observed in the before period into \( J \) types. Since
many factors inform selection, \( J \) is large. However, road types with common covariates
are thought to have similar fatality rates. The covariates are arranged into \( K \) groups
of subtypes, chosen to reflect similar information about each road.

Let \( X_i \) denote the number of fatalities on the \( i \)th road, and let \( j[i] \) denote the type
of the \( i \)th road. As in Sect. 3.2, \( j[i_1] = j[i_2] \) for any two roads, \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \), if they have
all subtypes in common. That is, \( j_k[i_1] = j_k[i_2] \) for all \( K \) groupings.

It is computationally convenient—and without loss of information—to aggregate
the number of fatalities across roads of the same type. The offset term, EXPR, ensures
the aggregates remain comparable. Let \( Y_j = \sum_{i: j[i] = j} X_i \) denote the total number
of fatalities on all roads of type \( j \), and let \( \text{EXPR}_j \) denote the total number of pedes-
trians exposed to all roads of type \( j \). The notation \( j_k[j] \) refers to the subtype, \( j_k \),
of the \( k \)th group for all roads of type \( j \). For example, the first group of road sub-
types is the speed limit, and all roads of the first type have \( j_{\text{SLIM}}[j] = j_1[j] =
“road type j has a 30 mph limit”. Note the \( k \)th group can be denoted by either a four
letter code (e.g. SLIM) or a number (e.g. 1).
Table 3 Summary of covariate groups

| COND | CITY | YEAR | SLIM | SIGN | LGHT | BLTE | TFFC |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| SUBTYPE n | SUBTYPE n | SUBTYPE n | SUBTYPE n | SUBTYPE n | SUBTYPE n | SUBTYPE n | SUBTYPE n |
| 2    | 1708  | 12   | 721  | 1    | 354  | 7    | 768  | 1    | 1423  | 21   | 335  | 6    | 530  | 1    | 55    |
| 23   | 223   | 8    | 505  | 2    | 356  | 8    | 523  | 4    | 397   | 8    | 298  | 18   | 405  | 2    | 1332  |
| 9    | 202   | 6    | 239  | 3    | 408  | 6    | 351  | 3    | 313   | 34   | 223  | 14   | 147  | 3    | 769   |
| 24   | 54    | 9    | 159  | 4    | 406  | 10   | 150  | 7    | 69    | 29   | 217  | 7    | 114  | 4    | 120   |
| 3    | 27    | 3    | 110  | 5    | 369  | 14   | 127  | 10   | 23    | 1    | 189  | 8    | 103  |      |       |
| 18   | 12    | 10   | 101  | 6    | 383  | 9    | 127  | 2    | 18    | 25   | 135  | 13   | 93   |      |       |
| Other | 50   | Other | 441  |      | Other | 230  | Other | 33   | Other | 879  | Other | 884  |      |       |
Fig. 3 This figure exhibits the marginal association of the eight covariate groups using Cramer’s V statistic. A value of 0 indicates no association, and a value of 1 indicates complete association. From this figure it is observed that nearly all of the covariates are moderately associated, aside from city and traffic density.

When aggregated, the hierarchical Bayes model outlined in Sect. 3.2 describes a high dimensional contingency table and is written:

\[
Y_j \sim \text{Poisson}^+(\mu_j) \\
\mu_j = \exp(\theta + \alpha_{\text{SLIM}j} + \alpha_{\text{CITY}j} + \alpha_{\text{YEAR}j} + \alpha_{\text{COND}j} \\
+ \alpha_{\text{SIGN}j} + \alpha_{\text{LGH}j} + \alpha_{\text{BLTE}j} + \alpha_{\text{ROUT}j} \\
+ \beta_{\text{SLIM x CITY}j} + \beta_{\text{SLIM x COND}j} + \ldots + \beta_{\text{BLTE x ROUT}j}) \\
+ \epsilon_j + \rho \cdot \log(\text{EXPR}_j))
\]

\[
\alpha_{jk} \sim \text{Normal}(0, \sigma_k) \\
\beta_{jl} \sim \text{Normal}(0, \sigma_l) \\
\sigma_l < \sigma_k \\
\epsilon_j \sim \text{Normal}(0, \sigma_\epsilon)
\]

All \(8 \choose 2\) interactions between the covariates in Table 2, excluding EXPR, are included in the model, although only three are written out above. The standard deviation of the interaction parameters are constrained to be a fraction of the standard deviation of the main effects, and as a result the interactions each explain less variation than the marginals. The specification of this model is complete with an error term, \(\epsilon\) (referred to as “cell” error), and diffuse normal priors are placed on \(\mu, \rho, \sigma_k, \sigma_l\) and \(\sigma_\epsilon\), as recommended by the Stan Prior Choice Wiki.

A large number of samples are drawn from the posterior distribution of the parameters given the data, excluding all fatalities in 2015, which are removed from the dataset for validation. RStan (Stan Development Team 2016) is used to run four chains of two thousand iterations each. This yields four thousand posterior draws after discarding...
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**Fig. 4** This figure exhibits the marginal association of select interactions between covariate groups using Cramer’s V statistic. A value of 0 indicates no association, and a value of 1 indicates complete association. From this figure it is observed that all of the interactions are strongly or completely associated.

**Fig. 5** This figure exhibits two thousand posterior predictions of the number of pedestrian fatalities in New York City in the held out year 2015 for all road segments that experienced a fatality between 2010 and 2014. The actual number of fatalities observed in 2015 is represented by the dotted line. The proportion of predictions exceeding the number of fatalities observed is 12%.

the first thousand warm-up iterations of each chain. The Stan code is provided on Github.

In the Stan generated quantities block, the finite sample standard deviations of each covariate group is calculated (Gelman 2005). The number of fatalities of each road type in the dataset in the year 2015 is also predicted for the purpose of checking the validity of the posterior distribution. An example predictive check is displayed in Fig. 5 for New York City. Posterior predictions of the number of fatalities in the held out test set (the histogram) covers the number actually observed (the dashed line), providing confidence in the before–after adjustment computed in Sect. 4.3. Roughly 12% of simulated predictions exceed the number of fatalities observed in 2015.

Many results are consistent with the experience of traffic safety stakeholders. This consistency also adds confidence in the before–after adjustments. Figure 6 displays an Analysis of Variance using the inner 50 and 90% intervals of the finite sample standard
deviations calculated in the generative quantities block. The standard deviations are interpreted as a measure of variable group importance. The fat line represents the inner 50% range, and the thin line represents the inner 90% range. Throughout this analysis, the uncertainty intervals are interpreted as corresponding to the likely and plausible locations respectively.

The Analysis of Variance indicates that the city (CITY) and the built environment (BLTE) explain a large proportion of variation in fatalities as expected. However, nearly as important is weather and surface condition (COND) and time of day and lighting (LGHT). Conversations revealed these variables capture the varying use of roads each day (e.g. commuting, tourism, dinner, nightlife, etc.). There is relatively less variation of the fatality rate within type (cell) and years (YEAR) suggesting that, through the other covariates, major sources of variation have been accounted for within subtype groups and between the same subtype groups across years.

The individual effects were also interpretable. For example, Fig. 7 shows the largest LGHT effects, which indicate that the time period of 4:00 p.m.–10:00 p.m. and the weekend contain a disproportionate amount of information about fatalities. Conversations revealed that this time period had also been identified by researchers as important, for example by the New York City Vision Zero committee (Taskforce 2017).

Other results were suspected by experts but had not been quantified and the magnitude of the effects were surprising. For example, Fig. 8 shows that a lot of the city variation originates from two cities: Los Angeles and New York City. New York City has an average effect of around 1, which is roughly 2.7 times the average city. Meanwhile, Washington D.C. has an average effect of around −0.25, which is roughly 78% of the average city. Boston was identified in conversation as a city with an abnormally large fatality rate. However, Boston does not appear at relatively high risk after adjusting for covariates like the weather and built environment.

Select interaction effects between CITY and COND are displayed in Fig. 9. There is evidence of variation across these categories. For example, weekends from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. in New York City and cloudy days in San Diego are disproportionately

![Diagram](image_url)
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Fig. 7 This figure exhibits inner 50 and 90% intervals for the largest time of day and lighting effects. Effects are interpreted as the log of the expected multiplicative increase in the fatality rate holding all else constant.

Fig. 8 This figure exhibits inner 50 and 90% intervals for city effects. Effects are interpreted as the log of the expected multiplicative increase in the fatality rate holding all else constant.

represented in the data. These interactions could reflect city-specific trends, such as the popularity of brunch or the quick advancement of dense fog. While there is too much uncertainty to speculate over the plausibility of these specific explanations, plots of the interactions, such as in Fig. 9, can be used to generate hypotheses that are evaluated in future studies.

4.3 The hierarchical Bayes approach provides a realistic adjustment for selection bias

This subsection concludes the discussion of selection bias in the before–after comparison of New York City’s Vision Zero road prioritization strategy. Sections 2 and 3 present two different estimates for the number of pedestrian fatalities prevented as a result of the strategy. A before–after comparison gives a 27% decline in fatalities, while
adjustment with Robbins’ Formula gives a 38% increase. However, both estimates are unrealistic because selected roads were chosen based on the number of fatalities in the before period, and both estimates made unreasonable assumptions about the selection process.

The before–after comparison assumed the selected roads had a representative number of fatalities in the before period. This was unreasonable because New York City deliberately used the number of fatalities to inform the selection process. Conversely, adjustment with Robbins’ formula assumed all roads were eligible for selection, and this was unreasonable because additional information, such as the function of the road, presumably governed its eligibility for selection. Both estimates are extreme, and the actual effect likely resides somewhere in the middle. A better estimate could be achieved using additional information governing selection eligibility to compute a different adjustment for each road type.

The importance of determining the type of each road can be seen in Fig. 10, which displays the expected number of fatalities for all New York City segment types fit with the model described in Sect. 4.2. These densities are not weighted by the number of road segments represented by each type and therefore reflect only the New York City road segments on which there was at least one fatality between 2010 and 2013. The density is over point estimates, and does not reflect uncertainty in the expected number of fatalities.

A large amount of separation between the road types predictive of fatalities on priority and non priority road segments is observed. The separation suggests that priority locations do in fact possess covariates more predictive of fatalities than non priority locations and thus have higher expected fatality rates than estimated by Robbins’ formula in Table 1. This explains why adjustment by Robbins’ formula gave an increase in the number of fatalities and not the decrease indicated in the traffic safety literature.

To compute the hierarchical Bayes adjustment for New York City’s Vision Zero strategy, samples from the model described in Sect. 4.2 are combined with the GES sampling weights to calculate the expected number of fatalities on priority road seg-
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Fig. 10 This figure exhibits the variation in the estimated expected number of fatalities across different road types in New York City on which there was a fatality between 2010 and 2013. Priority road types have been shaded red while nonpriority road types have been shaded blue (color figure online).

ments over the 2010–2013 before period as described in Sect. 3.2. Let \( i \in \{1, \ldots, I\} \) denote a New York City priority road segment observed in the combined, retrospective dataset of Sect. 4.1, and \( j[i] \) the corresponding road type, \( j \in \{1, \ldots, J\} \). Similarly, let \( i' \in \{1, \ldots, I'\} \) denote a report in GES on a road of the same type so that \( j[i'] = j[i] \). That is, \( \{i' : j[i'] = j[i]\} \) is the set of all GES reports occurring under similar conditions as the fatality on road \( i \). As in Sect. 3.2, suppose the GES reports are arranged in decreasing order of fatalities so that the first \( I'_f < I' \) reports resulted in at least one fatality. The probability of a fatality is estimated from the GES as:

\[
\hat{P}(X_i > 0) = \sum_{i' : j[i'] = j[i]} \frac{w_{i'} I (i' \leq I'_f) + 1}{w_{i'} + 1}
\]

The \( w_{i'} \) are computed from the sampling design as follows. Nationally representative weights are constructed in GES by its three stage, stratified sampling design: \( \frac{1}{w_{i'}} = P(PAR | PJ) P(PJ | PSU) P(PSU) \), where PAR is the event that a Police Accident Report is sampled as observation \( i \), PJ is the event that the Police Jurisdiction containing the PAR is sampled and PSU is the event that the Primary Sampling Unit containing the PJ is sampled. The target population is a combination of police jurisdictions, and its weight, \( w_{i'} \), is obtained after multiplying the nationally representative weights, \( w_{i'}^n \), by the probability a sampled report would be in a PJ in the target population as described in the GES documentation (Shelton 1991). Additive smoothing—the addition of 1 to the numerator and denominator—ensures no road is assigned a zero probability of a fatality.

Estimates of the expected number of fatalities on priority and non priority road segments, had the Vision Zero strategy never been implemented, are computed for the three largest Boroughs in New York City: Brooklyn, Manhattan and Queens and displayed in Fig. 11. The estimates were computed using the weights described above in the manner outlined at the end of Sect. 3.2. First, the expected number of fatalities

\[\text{Springer}\]
Fig. 11 This figure exhibits the expected number of fatalities in the New York City Boroughs of Brooklyn, Manhattan and Queens. The red lines mark the average number of fatalities observed on priority and non-priority road segments over the 2009–2013 before period. The black lines represent 50 and 95% uncertainty intervals of the expected number of fatalities in the before period from the Hierarchical Bayes model. The blue lines mark the observed number of fatalities in 2016 (color figure online)

for each road segment observed in the retrospective data was determined from the fitted model described in Sect. 4.2. Then, the weighted average was taken using the inverse probability of inclusion as determined by the above formula. Estimates are only computed for Brooklyn, Manhattan and Queens, and not Staten Island and the Bronx, because the latter two Boroughs were not actually sampled in the GES. However, since all boroughs were eligible to be sampled, the estimates can be scaled to reflect the entire City.

In Fig. 11, black lines represent inner 50 and 90% intervals for the expected number of fatalities as determined using the posterior simulations of the fitted model as described in Sect. 4.2. The red lines represent the average number of observed fatalities from 2009 to 2013 and the blue lines represent the number of observed fatalities in 2016. The regression to the mean effect is apparent in the figure: for both priority and non priority road segments, the number of fatalities after Vision Zero moves towards the average number predicted from the model. Notice the blue line for non priority roads is located roughly between the black lines, and therefore the model is consistent with the number of fatalities in the after period. By this measure, the model accounts for the selection effect. However, the blue line for priority roads is lower than what was expected from the model, and this discrepancy is interpreted as reflecting the number of fatalities prevented by the implementation of Vision Zero strategy.

There may be too much uncertainty to quantify the exact number of fatalities prevented by Vision Zero to the satisfaction of policymakers. The 50% uncertainty interval in Fig. 11 indicates that there was an average reduction in fatalities between 15 and 31%, and the 90% uncertainty interval indicates an average reduction anywhere between 1 and 40%. At the 95% uncertainty level, it is impossible to completely rule out that the policy prevented no fatalities or that it reduced fatalities to the maximal attainable reduction suggested in Sect. 2.2.

More nuanced statements can be evaluated using the posterior distribution. For example, the before–after comparison, which suggested a 27% reduction on priority
roads in New York City (or for Brooklyn, Manhattan and Queens, a 30% decline), underestimates the actual number of fatalities prevented in 25% of posterior simulations. That is, after looking at the data, the model gives a 75% chance the expected number of fatalities prevented is as low or lower than the amount suggested by the before–after comparison. Conversely, it is estimated that there is a 4% chance that the policy led to no change or an increase in fatalities.

The median reduction for New York City is roughly 18%, two-thirds the size of the before–after comparison. This estimate is considered a realistic summary of the effect size of the Vision Zero strategy because the median increase on the non priority roads is negligible. It is also three-quarters of the 24% reduction predicted by Rosén and Ulrich (2009) and Goodwin et al. (2010) when posted speed limits are enforced commensurately.

5 Discussion

Over the past decade, major American cities have implemented Vision Zero strategies aimed at preventing pedestrian fatalities. The policy question now facing cities is to what extent these strategies have actually prevented fatalities. This paper made two main points regarding the before–after comparisons commonly used to answer this question.

First, it demonstrated how selection bias produces before–after comparisons that exaggerate the effect of a Vision Zero strategy. A theoretical explanation of this exaggeration was provided, followed by a real world example identifying selection bias in a before–after comparison used to evaluate New York City’s Vision Zero road prioritization strategy. As predicted by theory, the before–after comparison overestimated the effect anticipated by the traffic safety literature and could not explain a massive increase in fatalities on the roads not selected for the strategy.

Second, this paper demonstrated how a hierarchical Bayes adjustment provides a more realistic estimate. This adjustment augmented a simpler nonparametric empirical Bayes analysis, which proved unrealistic when applied to the New York City data. Traffic safety experts interpreted the proposed hierarchical Bayes adjustment, and when it was applied to the same data, it produced an estimate consistent with the traffic safety literature—and roughly two-thirds the size of the unadjusted before–after comparison. It also corrected the statistical artifact present in the unadjusted before–after comparison in which a massive increase in fatalities was observed on the roads not selected for the strategy.

This paper was streamlined in order to make these two points most effectively. It deliberately overlooked some potential sources of confounding and uncertainty. Yet despite this streamlining, significant effort was still required to identify and correct selection bias in a before–after comparison that is popular precisely because it is simple. Moreover, the estimate contains a substantial amount of uncertainty.

Some might conclude the effort of adjustment is not worth the reward and that it is easier to avoid selection bias in the first place. For example, policymakers might compute a before–after comparison on all roads in a city, regardless of whether they were selected for the strategy. While this may avoid selection bias, it does not answer
the question to what extent a Vision Zero strategy was effective on the selected roads, and it cannot be used to determine whether the strategy should be continued in future years or expanded to additional roads.

Answering the policy question of interest may mean embracing uncertainty. More accurate measurements, such as better police records, might not be feasible, and additional data sources can introduce more uncertainty than they reduce. For example, the exposure variable was constructed from the Census Tract-level population to represent the number of pedestrians eligible for a fatality. Although admittedly broad, a more accurate count of pedestrians on the street may not provide a better measure of the true exposure if dangerous behavior, such as j-walking or being distracted, is not evenly distributed among the pedestrian population. Furthermore, a count from observational or administrative data may introduce confounding if the collection process differs substantially over space or time.

Future work could better quantify uncertainty in the proposed adjustment. This analysis may have understated uncertainty because the covariates and probability weights described in Sects. 3 and 4 were treated as fixed constants. However, traffic safety data is prone to measurement error and missingness may be informative. Jointly modeling these quantities in the hierarchical Bayes model would produce an even more realistic adjustment. In addition to modeling the probability weights, a more robust weighting strategy could be employed. Yajuan et al. (2015) discuss the advantages of Bayesian nonparametric weights in comparison to the inverse probability weights used in this analysis.

The primary concern of this paper was to compute a point estimate for the number of fatalities prevented as a result of implementing a Vision Zero strategy, including both the countermeasures deployed and all subsequent changes that typically occur in cities. No attempt was made to separate a countermeasures’ direct impact from its context or execution. It did not adjust for the actual change in traffic conditions, human behavior or other intervening factors.

This point is worth stressing due to the differing positions on what is meant by a “causal effect”. For example, taken literally, the effect of lowering the posted speed limit could refer only to the consequence of legislatures putting words on a page and have no meaningful impact on fatalities in and of itself. Drivers would have to be educated about the law, or the law would have to include provisions on redesigns and enforcement. If taken mechanistically, the effect of lowering the posted speed limit could refer to the physical state of the road. Vehicles traveling at a lower speed may be able to better maneuver and collide with less force. The effect then pertains to vehicles that comply perfectly with the reduced limit. In this paper, the effect of a countermeasure, such as lowering the posted speed limit, referred to the policy change and all subsequent actions to educate drivers and enforce it with road redesigns, traffic tickets and other countermeasures.

Policymakers should consider multiple effects of Vision Zero policy. In theory, Vision Zero differs substantially from the traditional approach to traffic safety policy, and future work may seek to understand how drivers change their behavior as a result of specific policies. For example, traditional traffic safety improvements often widen roads and crosswalks to aid evasive maneuvers that reduce collisions, while Vision Zero advocates improvements that narrow them, much like the road “diets” of
Goodwin et al. (2010), to force drivers to decrease their vehicle speed. Consequently, reducing fatalities under the Vision Zero approach may actually increase the number of collisions. For details see Johansson (2009).

In considering these additional effects, a variety of methodological hurdles will come to light. Selection bias is just one of a litany of statistical issues that commonly arise in the estimation of causal effects, along with interference, temporal confounding and collision bias. Readers are referred to Hauer (2005) and Davis (2000) for a general discussion of the methodological challenges that arise in the evaluation of traffic safety policy.

This paper makes no policy recommendations. Triage may be the most sensible way to implement a Vision Zero strategy, but any subsequent evaluation must be performed with care. The U.S. Department of Transportation directs its offices to assign human life a value of roughly ten million dollars when conducting analysis that carries implications for public safety (Transportation 2016). The investment of billions of dollars over the lifetime of a strategy would then be considered effective if it were to save hundreds of lives. When making these and similar comparisons, it is important for policymakers to understand how to identify and adjust for selection bias. Failure can make an ineffective policy appear effective when perhaps a different strategy could prevent a greater number of fatalities or at a significantly reduced cost.

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