THE ASSISTANCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

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Abstract

Purpose of the study: The study aims to show that name is a kind of social identification code, i.e., the names serve essential social and legal functions that contribute to identifying the person in society, allowing joining various social institutions. The functioning of personal names plays a significant role in the lives of every member of the community.

Methodology: The main methodological approaches are determined using domestic and foreign researchers' fundamental works in political, historical, and economic science. A comparative historical analysis was used to determine the main stages and trends in the development of relations between the main actors in the framework of the Karabakh crisis.

Main Findings: Kazakhstan’s diplomacy is able to solve the problem of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, thereby ensuring security in the region for further implementation of the policy of diversification of energy supplies to the European market. The difficulty lies in the fact that both Armenia and Azerbaijan are strategic partners of Kazakhstan.

Applications of this study: This research is scientifically and practically important. It contributes to developing the theoretical aspect of scientific research on the model of mediation policy of Kazakhstan and its application in achieving international stability in the South Caucasus region. The authors showed the consideration of the problems of the global efforts of Kazakhstan in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis.

Novelty/Originality of this study: This study fully reveals the understanding of Kazakhstan's activities and the extent to which the official Nur-Sultan uses diplomatic efforts to resolve the international conflict in the Caucasus. This study examines the conditions, means, methods, and tools adopted by Kazakh diplomats to achieve stability and peace in the region.

Keywords: Nagorno-Karabakh, Conflict, Kazakhstan, Mediation, Settlement.

INTRODUCTION

The development of the modern international relations system has entered a new phase, the manifestation of the dramatic events in the Middle East, North Africa, and no less critical processes in the former USSR.

Regional conflicts, particularly in the post-Soviet space, pose a severe threat to Kazakhstan's national security and sustainable development.

In terms of its political and humanitarian consequences, the conflict between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia around Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the earliest and largest among regional conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Several specific features distinguish the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the classical conflict resolution itself.

Kazakhstan is a country with equal relations with both conflicting parties, and assistance in resolving the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan will undoubtedly give the government an absolute authority in the world community's eyes as a successful mediator.

In the course of studying the foreign policy of the state and actions in the international arena (De Vattel, 1960; Wolor et al., 2019), guided by the national interests of Kazakhstan, the theory of political realism or neorealism was used. This school's principles made it possible to comprehensively consider the principles of state interests, political ideology, geopolitics, security, and interdependence. The research topic is considered from a systematic interdisciplinary approach, which includes a significant number of sources, allowing identifying the results of political, economic, historical research, as well as the prerequisites for the formation of peacekeeping in Kazakhstan.
The main reason for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the unresolved territorial problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The region of the Caucasus, in particular, its southern part, is a relatively "cramped territory" in which people with very different cultures and mentality live (Kaplan, 2014). It is often difficult for them to understand each other, put themselves in a neighbor's place, and look at the world through his eyes. It is effortless to annoy and create negative images of each other mutually. Azerbaijan and Armenians are culturally, psychologically, and religiously different from each other.

Attempts to resolve the Karabakh conflict began in the fall of 1991. By this time, the two main parties to the conflict are the Republic of Azerbaijan and the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. They had determined their political and legal guidelines for building their statehoods in the former Azerbaijan SSR territory. The danger of the conflict escalating to an open level and widespread military confrontation has become incredibly real. On September 20–23, 1991, as part of Russia and Kazakhstan's mediation mission, the heads of these states visited Stepanakert, Baku, and Yerevan.

A systematic approach will allow tracking the development of problematic issues, along with the strategic interests of international actors, which will more fully identify trends and, in particular, examine possible options for the development of the situation.

This study aims to analyze the policy of Kazakhstan in achieving peace and stability in the Caucasus through the use of diplomatic efforts and issues of the international, regional security system. Therefore, this study's central question is: to what extent are Kazakhstan's efforts to effectively achieve global stability in the South Caucasus region? From this issue, the following subtasks are divided:

1. What is the nature of Kazakhstan's mediation policy?
2. Can Kazakhstan continue to play the role of an international mediator?
3. What role will be played by the fact that Kazakhstan and Armenia are members of the CSTO, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan are members of the Turkic Union, and will this affect the other policy of Nur-Sultan?

Based on the questions of the problem under study, the following hypothesis was formulated:

Changes in the international policy environment (in particular, sanctions against Russia) significantly affect Kazakhstan's policy in the framework of its peacekeeping activities. It will be difficult for Kazakhstan's diplomacy to continue playing the role of a mediator and, at the same time, maintain neutrality. Kazakhstan's further actions will be based on the situation in the region and its geopolitical goals.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and regional forces

Iran. There are several acute problems between Azerbaijan and Iran. The main one of which is Iran’s approach to the definition of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Bennigsen & Wimbush, 1985). Referring to the norms of international law, the Islamic Republic of Iran recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Still, on the other hand, guided by geopolitical preferences, official Tehran has close contact with the Armenian side (Human Rights Watch, 1994). It makes Iran not an ally of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement (Norden, 2003). Iran did not actively show its position in the framework of the Karabakh conflict, but the issue related to ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran, who often demonstrate a desire for absolute independence, clearly does not favor official Baku and Ankara (Stepanov, 2000).

Therefore, Iran fears that after resolving the problem with Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan and Turkey may play the role of a catalyst in creating United Azerbaijan. Iran's policy on Karabakh does not have a clear line; such inconsistency complicates and makes Iran's mediation impossible in the framework of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But Tehran's support for the Armenian side is not a promising area of Iran's diplomacy. Indeed, along with the Armenian problem, the situation around the Armenian and other diasporas in northern Iran may aggravate (Achievements of Soviet Nagorno-Karabakh in 40 years in numbers, 1963).

That is why Iran does not take a particular position and does not want to act on the verge of balancing in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Feigl, 1991).

Turkey. Turkey is not only an ardent ally for Azerbaijan, but also considers Baku a “little brother”. Turkey is actively developing relations with Azerbaijan. Baku also shares Ankara’s priority geostrategic and economic interests and believes that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey should play a leading role in regional development, influencing the political, economic, and cultural environment of not only Azerbaijan but the entire Caspian region (Aykan, 1996).

Turkey, at the doctrine level, seeks to become a world-class power. However, even if one does not strictly approach the definition of world power, it is unlikely that he will succeed in the framework of the updated idea of the US junior partner in the Middle East - an old game with new rules (Yermekbayev et al., 2019).
There are apparent disagreements regarding Turkey, and Armenia related to the “Armenian incident” of 1915, during which, according to several states, the ethnic genocide of the Armenians took place (Altstadt, 1988). Official Ankara does not recognize the fact of genocide, which is one of the critical factors exacerbating bilateral relations (Aklayev, 2008).

To maintain a balance of power in the region (Walker, 1991), Azerbaijan has strong ties with Turkey at bilateral and multilateral levels. Political leaders in both countries often portray bilateral relations as “one nation, two states”. It should be noted that Turkey and Azerbaijan have a common history, culture, religion, and values, and most importantly, Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan. Turkey always assists Azerbaijan in improving conditions for refugees and internally displaced persons (Degoyev, 2003).

Russia. Russia seeks to maintain its traditional influence in the South Caucasus and is developing violent peacekeeping activities, striving to become the guarantor of peace (Bammate, 1991). In the ’90s of the last century, post-Soviet Russia was a country with a very vague and biased policy, which was especially evident in the post-Soviet space (Yermekbayev et al., 2019). Simultaneously, in addition to general considerations that the world in Transcaucasia should be under Russia’s auspices (Nolyain, 1994; Mnatsakanyan, 2020), Russia does not seem to have other transparent enough ideas about what this world should be. The "ideological sympathies" of the leadership of Russia are also obviously divided. On the side of Armenia are the sympathies of "democrats" and "liberal democrats" as well as the simple consideration that Armenia (German, 2012), which does not border with Russia and is in conflict with its neighbors, is Russia's natural geopolitical ally in the Caucasus (Ibragimov, 2018). At the turn of 1992-1993, the military-political situation around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has undergone a significant change (Dragadze, 1989). It was based on general advances in Russian politics, the growth of power trends, the reanimation of the traditional southern vector of Russian geopolitical expansion (Swietochowski, 1995).

However, Azerbaijan also believes that Russia is the strongest player in the region, but the development of relations between Azerbaijan and Russia can be best described as a "zigzag". It should be noted that Azerbaijan is the first country in the region that demanded that the Russian army leave its territories (Smeets, 1995; Papava, 2019). At first, relations with Russia did not develop well. It was due to Russia's approach to the problem of the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Russia opposed all the contracts that Azerbaijan signed in the Caspian Sea, declaring them to violate international law principles. At the same time, Russia supported Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Pustilnik, 1995). However, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia gradually returned to normal, especially after Vladimir Putin came to power (Yermekbayev et al., 2019). A change in the country's approach to the Caspian Sea status is one example of improving relations. Kazakhstan, Russia, and Azerbaijan signed an agreement on the northern part of the Caspian Sea division in September 2003 (Kaluyuzhnyy, 2003).

Russian oil companies are now participating in the energy contracts that Azerbaijan has signed, and they are given rates in oil deals (Kechichian & Karasik, 1996). According to unofficial estimates, more than 2 million Azerbaijanis work in Russia. This factor in itself indicates the interdependence of the two countries (Amin et al., Wallerstein, 1982).

The authors tried, to some extent, outline the positions of their neighbors. In the authors' opinion, with all their violent peacekeeping activity, these neighbors, unfortunately, are not an exact peacekeeping force. The uncertainty of their position, their lack of sufficiently clear principles based on which their peacekeeping activities could go, their sympathies and antipathies most likely contribute not to the preservation of the ceasefire that was achieved between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but to the continuation of the conflict (Wallerstein, 2004; Purworini & Santoso, 2019).

**METHODOLOGY**

As part of the study and to achieve the intended goals, we used a comprehensive scientific and methodological approach consisting of:

1. The method of political analysis that allowed us to study and analyze Kazakhstan's diplomatic efforts in the process of achieving political stability in the Caucasus.
2. The historical method tracks and reveals Kazakhstan's policy of achieving political peace and political stability in the region in a historical context (Akmadiyeva et al., 2018).
3. The method of modeling and forecasting allowed us to project the further development of the conflict and reveals new threats and risks in the escalation of the conflict.

This issue focuses on Azerbaijan's efforts to achieve political stability by initiating peace processes.

**Conflict history**

The conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh, which arose at the end of the last century in the USSR's political space, after the collapse of the Union, automatically turned into the most critical problem of relations between two new independent states - the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia (Desheriyev, 1995). Moreover, because of this problem, both newly-formed states were involved in a bloody armed conflict from the very moment of gaining independence. According to many estimates, this conflict claimed more than 40 thousand people (Abbasov & Khachatryan, 2004).
The conflict broke out with renewed vigor on February 26, 1988, when rumors spread among Azerbaijanis about Armenians' alleged attempt to organize pogroms, accompanied by violence in Stepanakert, which resulted in the death of one Azerbaijani, a clash occurred between Azerbaijanis and Armenians. Most interesting, the Allied authorities did not take active measures against the rioters. The situation was aggravated due to the lack of objective information. Any information voiced by one side or another served as an excuse to exacerbate the problem. Deputy Prosecutor General Katushev, speaking on Azerbaijani radio, reported on the "death of two residents with Azerbaijani names". It was followed by retaliatory violence in Sumgait, where the Armenian pogroms occurred.

During which calls were often made to avenge the Armenians for the death of Azerbaijanis. At the very beginning of spontaneous unrest, they had a local character. The situation was aggravated after rumors about a meeting between the Armenian leadership and the Central authorities in Moscow and about the allegedly existing issue of full support for Armenians' actions in Moscow. "Anyway, but the next three days a pogrom takes place in Sumgait - hooligans prey on Armenians, set fire to and destroy their homes. The officially recognized number of victims during the three days of unrest, from February 27 to 29, was 32 killed (26 Armenians and 6 Azerbaijan)".

Acting in the spirit of ideological propaganda, the Armenian and Azerbaijani sources naturally exaggerated the number of victims for their part several times. As was noted above, complete inaction on the part of the central authorities was especially noticeable when the Soviet army units and internal troops located in the vicinity did not make efforts, they only calmly watched from the side (Tsutsiyev, 2006). According to Nolyain (1994), the Soviet authorities not only did not intend to prevent bloodshed but also sought to create a conflict between the two ethnic communities. It was carried out with the help of control over the media - exaggerated and provocative messages spread from both sides. Besides, according to him, to initiate the pogrom, criminals were specially released on detention places in Sumgait. It is an unsolved issue to know. But no matter the nature and extent of Moscow's intervention, it is retrospectively clear that it was not worth the effort to kindle the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, and this conflict quickly reached a stage at which it could no longer be regulated by Moscow (Cornell, 2004).

Local pogroms quickly grew into an active phase and led to hostilities, which it was difficult to stop only by May 1994, with Russia's active mediation. However, a political solution to the conflict has not yet been reached—both parties' efforts to the conflict and numerous international mediators.

The current situation resembled a conflict freeze or a "neither war nor peace" problem, and there are no diplomatic relations between the two countries, the common border between Armenia and Azerbaijan turned into a solid front line, as a result of which transport and other communications were blocked, not only between themselves but and with third countries (Hoch, 2020). Since some of the most influential states have different positions regarding the Karabakh conflict, it has also become a noticeable factor in tension in the region, sometimes turning into a bargaining chip of world powers' geopolitical and economic interests, primarily the USA and Russia.

Conflict always has some specific and rational reasons (Tsygankov, 2004). It always starts because of something. Let's try, having abandoned the traditional ideas of the "great" and "base", to outline the logic, dynamics, and cause of the Karabakh conflict.

Outwardly, everything seems very simple. NKAR, the majority of whose population are Armenians, but territorially part of Azerbaijan (The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: a Collection of Articles, 1990). The primary role is played by the immediate, most influential neighbors, such as Russia, Turkey, and Iran. And, first of all, of course, Russia, which in its previous incarnations - the Russian Empire and the USSR.

After the conflict began, all neighbors vied for peace, offering themselves in the role of mediators and guarantors of this world, and conducting endless negotiations. But do neighbors want peace in Karabakh, and do their actions contribute to peace? The official position of the Azerbaijani and Armenian leadership and the available scientific studies suggest the following.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has become one of the critical problems for the peacekeeping potential of the OSCE. In February 1992, at a meeting of the OSCE Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), the report of the Organization's observer mission on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh was discussed. The CSO proposed the parties to begin negotiations within the framework of the OSCE. To guarantee security in the conflict zone, a recommendation was made to the Chairman of the OSCE Ministerial Council to participate in the negotiations in person (Dogan, 1990). The conflict's aggravation prompted the CSO to insist on holding an extraordinary meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, which was held in Helsinki on March 24, 1992. At the meeting, it was decided to convene a separate group of mediators to prepare negotiations on the Karabakh conflict at the Minsk Conference (Avetisyan, 2011).

When the OSCE initiated the event, which later became known as the Minsk process, it was planned that a conference on the settlement of the Karabakh conflict would be held in Minsk in the spring of 1993 to finalize the details of the peace agreement. The OSCE hoped that the conference would only have to determine the technical issues. By that time, the preparatory body's main work would already be done - the Minsk Group of the Organization.
The UN in the Karabakh conflict remained on its periphery, limiting its role to Security Council resolutions condemning hostilities in general and affirming the territorial integrity of "all states in the region," without indicating an aggressor (Yilmaz, 2017). The UN entrusted all work to resolve the conflict to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The OSCE (CSCE changed its name to OSCE, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, in 1994) is the only institution taken seriously, although mostly unsuccessful, steps towards a political settlement of the conflict. Already in March 1991, the OSCE formed a committee of 19 members to resolve the conflict. During this period, it searched for its new role after the end of the Cold War and believed that the settlement of conflicts in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union could become its serious task. The OSCE had an organizational structure in which all member states were equal. Within its framework, the veto power of the great powers was absent (Ilyin, 1995).

The mediation process can be divided into five phases. The first refers to 1992 and is characterized by OSCE mediation's dominance over independent attempts by individual countries to negotiate. The second phase is associated with Russia's assertion of its interests, which led to a decrease in the influence and role of the OSCE (Kolosov & Zotova, 2020). From December 1994 to the end of 1996, the third phase is characterized by increased cooperation and increased trust between the OSCE and Russia. However, this did not lead to any positive results in terms of resolving the conflict. During the fourth phase, correlated generally with 1997, France and the United States, together with Russia, became co-chairs of the Minsk Group, which marked increased international attention. The fifth phase is direct negotiations between the presidents of the two countries, in which the OSCE moves aside.

Suppose within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, it will be possible shortly to take real steps to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In that case, this will increase the Organization's credibility, called upon to be one of the elements of the new European security architecture.

Kazakhstan’s assistance in resolving the conflict

It is worth noting that already in 1991, Kazakhstan and Russia took the first steps in an attempt to resolve the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In this regard, in September 1991, the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan, B. Yeltsin, and N. Nazarbayev, together with government departments’ representatives, visited Baku, Yerevan, and Stepanakert. As a result of these visits, on September 23, 1991, in Zheleznovodsk, the heads of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Armenia signed a "Joint Communiqué on the Results of the Intermediary Mission of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin and the President of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev", which announced the list of problems requiring a solution (Gurushkin, 2009). The peacekeeping mission of the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan in 1991, with the international support of the United States of America, marked the beginning of forming a system of regional and international cooperation to resolve the conflict. It developed at subsequent stages within the framework of such an international organization as the OSCE.

However, the Zheleznovodsk communiqué did not address the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, although it contained provisions on a ceasefire and withdrawal of troops from the conflict zone (Zheleznovodsk process, 2016). After many years, Kazakhstan, which took over the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010, again had the chance to demonstrate its mediation skills and move the process of resolving this conflict from a dead point. Then the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, acting at that time, Kanat Saudabayev, conveyed President Nazarbayev's initiatives to Armenia and Azerbaijan’s leaders (Olcott, 2019). In the first month of Kazakhstan's chairmanship in the OSCE alone, three attempts were made to resolve the problem. During telephone conversations with Baku and Yerevan, President Nazarbayev's wish was personally conveyed to the conflict zone. In vain, then it was hoped that the parties to the conflict would come to an absolute consensus. Then the leadership of Armenia and Azerbaijan were skeptical about the possibilities of Kazakhstan in resolving the conflict.

The current format of the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement, in which the guarantees of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Putin and Nazarbayev's authority play a key role, suits both Baku and Yerevan (Babayev, 2020). Even in the long run, the problem has no other solution than the one implemented now. It is talking about freezing the conflict. Of course, some provocations cannot be ruled out, but there is no reason to say that the Caucasus is on the eve of a major war (Shikhaliyev, 2020).

Despite close ties with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan's leadership will maintain a neutral position, avoiding steps that can be regarded as support for one of the parties to the conflict. Several years ago, Nursultan Nazarbayev "played" on the side of Azerbaijan, but further actions by Nur-Sultan showed that she would not take sides. I believe that such a neutral and constructive line will be characteristic of Kazakhstan's diplomacy in the future.

During the aggravation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2016, Kazakhstan's policy was regarded as biased and sympathetic to the Azerbaijani side. A few days before the appointed summit, the Kazakh side initiated the transfer of this event from Yerevan to Moscow (Astanaproposes to move the summit from Yerevan, 2016). The actions of official Nur-Sultan provoked protests in Armenia, where even one of the villages decided to rename Nazarbayev Street. A corner of Kazakhstan was curtailed in the village library, after which all exhibits displayed in the corner,
including flags and portraits, were sent to the Kazakh Embassy in Yerevan (Nazarbayev "leaves" Armenian Harich, 2016). Armenian leadership did not make any official statements on this issue.

Why did Kazakhstan, which had previously acted from a neutral position, changed its focus to Azerbaijan. Several factors can explain this, firstly, Azerbaijan is more attractive for Kazakhstan from an economic point of view, multimillion-dollar contracts are connected with Azerbaijan, and the possibility of an alternative option for transporting Kazakhstani hydrocarbons to the European market (Manykina, 2009). Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are also members of the Turkic Council, Kazakhstan in 2009 initiated this kind of association at the summit in Nakhchivan (Gadzhiev, 2001).

Secondly, this is the international political situation on the continent; a little earlier in November 2015, a military incident occurred between Russia and Turkey in the sky over Syria (1960). The Kazakh side did not take certain positions then, confining itself to the traditional call for dialogue between Moscow and Ankara (Yermekbayev et al., 2020).

When armed clashes took place in early April, Ankara sharply condemned the actions of Armenia and declared its readiness to provide support to Azerbaijan. The Russian Federation condemned the statements of Ankara, condemned Baku's actions, and warned of the possible negative consequences of this step for Azerbaijan. Kazakh diplomacy played a game here; earlier in November 2015, Nazarbayev, in an interview with reporters, stated that the Russian plane did not pose a clear threat to Turkey and that Ankara's actions were an occasion to aggravate relations (Daly, 2016). The adoption of Moscow's side by Kazakhstani politics contradicted the nature of Kazakhstani politics, which is traditionally based on the principles of multi-vector. Nazarbayev and Erdogan's friendly handshakes amid the refusal of the first to come to Yerevan can be assessed as an attempt of a political maneuver to preserve the Turkic union (1995).

These actions of the Kazakh side can be regarded in different ways. The main reason is not to give preference to any side; if the summit was held in Yerevan and Nazarbayev took part in it, this could be regarded as a gesture of solidarity with Armenia's position.

Today, the situation in the zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has taken the traditional stage of freezing (Furman & Asenius, 2019). Still, the situation may worsen at any time, but there are shifts in the international situation. The confrontation between Russia and Turkey has been replaced by the desire of both to avoid confrontation. In Kazakhstan, which seeks to play a crucial role in Eurasian integration, there was a transit of power. The new Kazakhstani leadership maintains the previous line's continuity, the new president of the country, Tokayev, has repeatedly stated this (Tokayev met with Putin in Moscow, 2019).

The Nagorno-Karabakh problem slows down Eurasian integration processes, but it is also the subject of debate between Moscow and Ankara (Blahova, 2018). Russia and Turkey have conflicting points of view in resolving the Karabakh problem. In this situation, Kazakhstan can play the role of mediator in the conflict, despite the above facts. Moscow and Ankara, striving to maintain a delicate balance in relations between themselves, are likely to seek to freeze the conflict to exclude the repetition of autumn 2015. Nazarbayev's election to the post of Honorary Chairman of the Council of Turkic States at the end of 2019 can be regarded as Turkey's attempt to nominate Kazakhstan to a leading position in the Council, thereby allowing Akorda to prove herself (Nazarbayev, 2016). The candidacy of Kazakhstan as an international mediator in the conflict affecting Russia and Turkey's interests suits both Moscow and Ankara (Osmanova, 2020). Without peace in the south of the Caucasus, the development of Turkic integration is also impossible. During the years of confrontation, Moscow used Armenia as a counterweight or a barrier to Turkic integration. Without solving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, it is impossible to talk about a full-fledged communication between the Turkic Union countries.

CONCLUSION

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in the coming years can be difficult to resolve since neither side can compromise.

Nur-Sultan stands for a peaceful settlement in conflict zones by international law to adopt existing international mechanisms. High recognition of the role of Kazakhstan as a regional mediator in the modern world was the chairmanship of the country in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, as well as support by the world community for the initiative of President Nursultan Nazarbayev to convene a Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICMA). Besides, Kazakhstan is known as the author of effective regional initiatives. You may recall that the Kazakhstan summits on the Iranian nuclear issue were able to move that negotiation process off the ground. At the time of the meetings in Almaty and Nur-Sultan, the difficult dialogue between the six international mediators and Iran was objectively at an impasse. They urgently needed a new site where they could calmly negotiate. The Kazakhstan meetings did not attract such increased attention from the international community, which probably allowed the parties to come closer to a compromise. He eventually escalated into the 2015 nuclear agreement, which was a severe diplomatic breakthrough.

In general, Kazakhstan remains committed to the principles of the multi-vector nature of its foreign policy. Simultaneously, depending on the influence of individual factors, for example, geopolitical impact, which determines the format of relations with individual foreign policy partners in the long term, or the need to solve short-term market
problems, this multi-vector approach is often subject to certain corrections. In this regard, the general political priority has a bias towards Russia. For example, through international cooperation in the energy sector, relations with China have recently prevailed. Although on the other hand, it cannot be said unequivocally that Kazakhstan’s foreign and foreign economic policy is entirely in line with the interests of these or any other “players” in the international arena.

LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD

This research is limited by the areas of Kazakhstan and South Caucasus. The Republic of Kazakhstan contributes to further reducing the severity of the confrontation, neutralizing the likely adverse effects of extra-regional forces on developing the situation in the region, and allowing it to maintain. The prospect of strengthening in the future is its presence in the traditional quality of a benevolent cartridge.

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AUTHORS CONTRIBUTION

Akerke Raiymbekova is the author of the article, and she designated goals and direction of research, has implemented a guide to the analysis and research methodology. Adilbek Yermekbayev conducted data analysis, historical analysis, and prioritization of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. Aiym Shukyzhanova analyzed sources in a foreign language, comparing copyright ideas with opinions on such issues of previously published (published) sources of scientists. Nassyrova Madinym processed and used empirical data. Zhansaya Zhabina structured the research data into one overall composition.

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