DISTINCTIVE CONTEMPORARY VOICE:
LIBERAL ISLAM THOUGHT IN INDONESIA
Giora Eliraz

RELIGION, POLITICS, AND VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA:
LEARNING FROM BANSER'S EXPERIENCE
Ihsan Ali-Fauzi

TOWARDS A MIDDLE WAY ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT
Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

ISSN 0215-0492
STUDIA ISLAMIKA
Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies
Vol. 15, no. 3, 2008

EDITORIAL BOARD:
M. Quraish Shihab (UIN Jakarta)
Taufik Abdullah (LIPI Jakarta)
Nur A. Fadhil Lubis (IAIN Sumatra Utara)
M.C. Ricklefs (Melbourne University)
Martijn van Bruinessen (Utrecht University)
John R. Bowen (Washington University, St. Louis)
M. Akho Mudzhar (IAIN Yogyakarta)
M. Kamal Hasan (International Islamic University, Kuala Lumpur)
M. Berly Hooker (Australian National University, Australia)

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF:
Azyumardi Azra

EDITORS:
Jaafar Burhanuddin
Saiful Mujani
Jamhari
Fu'ad Jabali
Oman Fathurahma

ASSISTANT TO THE EDITORS:
Setyadi Sulaiman
Testriono

ENGLISH LANGUAGE ADVISOR:
Cheyne Scott

ARABIC LANGUAGE ADVISOR:
Masri al-Mahsyar Bidin

COVER DESIGNER:
S. Prinka

STUDIA ISLAMIKA (ISSN 0215-0492) is a journal published by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta (STT DEPPEN No. 129/SK/DITJEN/P/PP/STT/1976). It specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies in particular, and South-east Asian Islamic Studies in general, and is intended to communicate original researches and current issues on the subject. This journal warmly welcomes contributions from scholars of related disciplines.

All articles published do not necessarily represent the views of the journal, or other institutions to which it is affiliated. They are solely the views of the authors. The articles contained in this journal have been refereed by the Board of Editors.

STUDIA ISLAMIKA has been accredited by The Ministry of National Education, Republic of Indonesia as an academic journal (SK Dirjen Dikti No. 23a/DIKTI/2004).
Religion, Politics, and Violence In Indonesia: Learning From Banser’s Experience

Abstraksi: Menyusul tumbangnya rezim Orde Baru pada 1998, Indonesia menyaksikan muncahnya kelompok-kelompok paramiliter yang terlibat dalam berbagai tindakan kekerasan. Dan salah satunya yang fenomenal adalah Barisan Ansor Serbaguna (Banser), sebuah organisasi paramiliter di bawah payung Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (GP Ansor), sayap pemuda Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Nama Banser mulai mencuat pada awal Februari 2001 ketika Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid, yang juga mantan Ketua NU, mengancam akan mengeluarkan dekrit bahwa negara dalam keadaan bahaya. Meski tanpa dukungan sebagian besar menteri di kabinet dan komandan militer, Wahid mengingatkan bahwa dia akan menggunakan Banser untuk mengamankan keputusannya. Pada Agustus di tahun yang sama, Wahid memenuhi janjinya. Namun keputusan ini gagal. Kekuatan oposisi yang menentang keputusan tersebut terlalu kuat untuk dihadapi kelompok paramiliter ini. Satu hal yang bisa dilakukan Banser adalah membentuk pengawalan penghormatan pada saat Presiden Wahid dan keluarganya meninggalkan istana.

Sejarah Banser bisa ditelusuri ke asal-usul organisasi payungnya, GP Ansor yang berdiri pada 1931. Dalam Kongres ke-9 NU pada 1934, Ansor Nahdlatul Ulama (ANU) diakui secara resmi sebagai bagian dari Departemen Pemuda NU. Dan, dalam Kongres ke-2 ANU pada 1934, Barisan Ansor Nahdlatul Ulama (Banu), yang menjadi cikal bakal Banser, diperkenalkan. Pada masa pendudukan Jepang, ANU menjadi elemen penting dalam Hizbullah, organisasi militer pemuda Muslim yang didirikan pada akhir 1944. Keterlibatannya dalam perang kemerdekaan berlanjut ketika Belanda melancarkan Agresi Militer I dan II (20 Juli 1947 dan 18 Desember 1948). Sementara sebagian anggotanya bergabung dengan Hizbullah, sebagian di antaranya terlibat mempertahankan NU melawan agitasi PKI selama Peristiwa Madiun 1948. Pada akhir 1949, ANU merestrukturisasi
organisasinya, dan kemudian (14 December 1949) berubah nama menjadi Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (GP Ansor).

Artikel ini menghadirkan kajian historis di balik pendirian Banser sebagai organisasi paramiliter dan kemudian bagaimana ia berkembang. Karakter institusional organisasi ini yang berpenampilan paramiliter berikut justifikasi agama membentuk berbeda dari organisasi paramiliter lain di Indonesia. Artikel ini juga mendiskusikan titik menentukan sejarah Banser melalui keterlibatannya dalam pembunuhan massal PKI dan sekiturnya pada 1965 dan 1966, juga peranannya dalam periode singkat masa jabatan Wahid, ketika Banser menjadi "tentara" loyalis Wahid.

Sejarah Banser memang memperlihatkan upaya untuk menggunakan kekerasan demi melayani kepentingan politik. Dalam konteks inilah, dua asumsi tentang relasi antara kekerasan, politik, dan agama, dibuat: kekerasan penting untuk mencapai tujuan politik; dan kekerasan dapat dikontrol secara agama.

Didirikan untuk mempertahankan, memperluas, dan menjadi garda depan bagi kepentingan kepentingan Muslim Indonesia sebagai pemimpin NU, keberadaan Banser terkait dengan para keamanan negara yang tak mampu atau tak mau memonomilli penggunaan kekerasan sehingga ada ruang dan kesempatan bagi organisasi paramiliter untuk beroperasi. Yang mengherankan, di banyak keterlibatan historisnya, penggunaan kekerasan oleh Banser tidak pernah dipertanyakan: alihat sebagai kebutuhan untuk mencapai tujuan-tujuan politik dan dianggap dapat dikontrol. Baru belakangan ini muncul suara dari beberapa pemimpin NU yang menganjurkan melarang Banser karena dianggap telah melestarikan subkultur kekerasan.

Sejalan dengan logika kekerasan yang tidak selamanya dapat dikendalikan, upaya untuk mengontrol Banser tidaklah selalu berhasil. Banser makin kuat saat kepentingan politik yang disandarkan padanya—dengan penggunaan kekerasan—senakin besar. Dan, akibatnya, Banser semakin dikontrol. Kini, Banser melampaui peran tradisionalnya sebagai pembela kepentingan NU, ia mentransformasikan dirinya ke dalam sesuatu yang lain, bahkan tidak jarang ke dalam kekuatan yang menjual jasa kekerasan.

Dari studi kasus Banser, upaya memisahkan agama dari politik tidaklah selalu berguna, jika bukan keliru. Alih-alih memisahkan kedua-duanya, Banser mengisyaratkan memperkuat hubungan agama dan politik. Dalam kasus Abdurrahman Wahid, misalnya, tidak akan pernah bisa dipisahkan secara jelas, dan kapan, seseorang adalah politisi yang menggunakan baju kiai atau sebaliknya. Sejarah Banser menunjukkan bahwa dalam campuran politisi dan agamaan, yang pertama senantiasa lebih menentukan dalam pembuatan keputusan dibanding yang terakhir.

*Studia Islamika*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2008
Religion, Politics, and Violence In Indonesia: Learning From Banser’s Experience

(excerpt)

In 1998, under the new government of Indonesia, various groups of the military and different types of violence appeared. These included activities from the "Ansor" movement, the Banten Barisan, and Barisan Ansor Serbaguna (Banser), which were formed by Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (GP Ansor), the Youth Movement of Ansor and the Nahdlatul Ulama (ANU).

In 1931, the ANU was established as a movement for the youth of Islam. In 1944, it became a party, which was later joined by the youth movement of Ansor. In 1945, the ANU阆Banten Barisan joint movement was formed, which later became the Barisan.

At the end of 1944, the Barisan took part in the military coup, which was led by the ANU. The movement was formed in 1956 as a result of the ANU's youth movement, which was formed in 1944 and was led by Ali-Fauzi.
Ihsan Ali-Fauzi

Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (GP Ansor) 

Anfasor atau Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (GP Ansor) 

Asosiasi pemuda Ansor 

Istilah ini merujuk pada suatu kegiatan yang dilakukan oleh GP Ansor, yang berpusat di Indonesia.

Menurut Ali-Fauzi, GP Ansor memiliki misi dan visi yang konsisten, dan telah terlibat dalam berbagai kegiatan sosial dan keagamaan, termasuk pendidikan, pemuda, dan pengembangan kebijakan.

Ali-Fauzi juga memberikan keterangan bahwa GP Ansor memiliki komitmen untuk membantu masyarakat, khususnya masyarakat miskin.

Ali-Fauzi berharap bahwa GP Ansor akan terus menghasilkan serta memberikan kontribusi bagi masyarakat.
We are so accustomed to thinking... only of politicians using religion for political ends, that it is extremely hard for us to understand what politics might look like if we could see it through religious eyes, or in a religious perspective, and thus imagine the possibility of religious people using politics for religious ends.¹

-- Benedict R. O’G. Anderson (1977)

Introduction

In early February 2001, the Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid threatened to suspend the constitution and declare a state of emergency. Such extreme measures were aimed at putting a halt to the collapse of his government. As almost none of his key cabinet ministers, including his army chief, supported his idea, Wahid warned that he would use the Banser to gain the support required. Banser stands for Barisan Ansor Serba Guna (Ansor Multipurpose Front), a paramilitary organization under the umbrella of the Ansor Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor or GP Ansor). This movement is a youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia, an organization formerly led by Wahid himself. In August of the same year, Wahid fulfilled went ahead and declared a state of emergency, but with little success. His loyalist Banser members tried their best to defend him, but the tide of opposition against the then president was far too strong to be handled by this paramilitary group. The best they could do was to form a guard of honor for the President on the day Wahid and his family left the the Presidential Palace for good.

It was not the first time the Banser has shown its force. In April, 2000, after the Speaker of the House Amien Rais said he would "twist Wahid’s ears" when the President presented his progress report to parliament in August of the same year, more than 100,000 Banser members gathered at a rally in Surabaya, East Java, as NU leaders gave speeches condemning Rais. "Banser’s duty is to defend NU," said Abdullah Faqih, a respected Muslim cleric in East Java. If the organization or its religious leaders (kyai) are offended, the Banser will rise, he added, "like bees run amok when their hive is disturbed."²

It’s hard to underestimate this paramilitary group, especially during the presidency of Wahid. For one thing, there are around 400,000 of them (and the NU itself has 45 million members). For another, they have friends in high places: President Wahid had been...
head of NU for 15 years. Although he and other high-ranking NU officials asked the members of Banser not to act violently, they are fanatically loyal to him, and if they wish they can spark violence at any time.

The recent appearance of this paramilitary group reminds people of Banser’s historical involvement in the turbulent years of 1965 and 1966, which made it abundantly well-known, not only in Indonesia but also around the world, as a major perpetrator of the mass killing of about 500,000 or more members or allies of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) especially in East Java. Although founded in the 1930s, this organization was re-established and peaked in popularity in the 1960s. Among its important founders was Yusuf Hasyim, Wahid’s paternal uncle. In a documentary entitled Indonesia’s Killing Field, Hasyim was recorded as acknowledging that the Banser was re-established to protect NU from attacks by the communist youth wing. What is disturbing, however, is his revelation of the inspiration he and his colleagues in those critical days got from Hitler:

To resist their pressure, we needed to set up a youth organization. In order to do this, we studied Mein Kampf by Hitler, to learn how he set up his youth organization. We set up Banser which would function a bit like a military. It got military training. All this was done with the knowledge of the military although they pretended that they didn’t know anything.3

My interest in writing about Banser was sparked by the group’s (re-)emergence after the fall of Suharto, especially during Wahid’s presidency. Why should a civilian President Wahid, who was also known for his frequent appeals for peace and non-violence, rely on such a violent and military way to settle the disputes between him and his political opponents? What is the historical context which necessitated Wahid’s uncle Hasyim, and NU leadership, to learn from Hitler and to set up a paramilitary organization? When Islam calls for the peaceful settlement of conflicts when possible, why should religious leaders turn to or set up organizations which tend to resort to violence?

If we take the history of Banser as our laboratory to examine Anderson’s statement above, what lessons can we learn from it? Can we, as Anderson implied, separate religion from politics, religious people from politicians, and religious ends from the political ones? In this paper I suggest that the answer is negative. What is Studia Islamika, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2008
Religion, Politics, and Violence in Indonesia: Learning From Banser’s Experience

Religious in one context could turn into political in another and vice versa. Instead of separating the two, we may be better to speak about the mixture of religion and politics, religion-cum-politics, with the deciding power more in the hands of politicians using religion for political ends than the other way around.

Banser’s history reflects an attempt by religiously minded people, namely the so-called traditionalist NU leaders, to use violence to serve their political interests. Two assumptions about the connection between violence, politics, and religion are: (1) that violence is necessary to achieve political ends; and (2) that violence is religiously controllable. When they finally agreed to establish Banser during the colonial era, NU leaders generally accepted these two assumptions and acted accordingly because they were, along with other parts of Indonesian society, struggling to win independence. While independence was indeed won, the same assumptions remain. This is because the state’s security apparatus is unable or unwilling to monopolize the use of violence, hence providing paramilitary organizations like Banser with the opportunity to operate. Thus Banser was able to operate quite freely in one of the darkest parts of Indonesia’s history when it was heavily involved in the mass killing of PKI members and its allies in 1965-1966. In such instances, Banser’s use of violence has never been questioned: it has been viewed as necessary for political ends. Furthermore, Banser’s use of violence has generally been perceived as controllable. It is only recently that some NU leaders, including Hasyim, a former Banser leader, suggested that Banser should be disbanded because it nurtures the subculture of violence, while the reason for its formation is no longer relevant.

Although the importance of Banser has been widely acknowledged, there is no scholarly work on this subject to the best of my knowledge. The only relatively comprehensive account available is Choirul Anam’s short and uncritical history of Ansor, the umbrella organization under which Banser exists, entitled Gerak Langkah Pemuda Ansor (1990). As a book written at the request of the organization itself, Anam’s work understandably leaves out any account of Banser’s involvement with violent actions. On this subject and its historical context, we fortunately are able to gather scattered information from the works of Robert Cribb and his collaborators, Hermawan Sulisty, Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko, Robert W. Hefner, as well as other scholars.
Using these and other sources, especially memoirs by and monographs on NU leaders such as K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim and Saifuddin Zuhri as well as newspaper and magazine reports on Banser’s activities in the last two decades, this paper will begin investigating the reasons behind the establishment of Banser as a paramilitary organization and how it has evolved. The institutional character of this organization, particularly its paramilitary performance and its religious justification, which makes it slightly different from other paramilitary organizations in Indonesia, will be scrutinized closely. This paper will also discuss Banser’s involvement in the mass killings of 1965 and 1966, as well as its role in the short period of Wahid’s term at office, when the organization became President Wahid’s loyalist army. However, as there was a kind of Banser before this well-known Banser, my investigation will first look at the pre-independence period, when the Ansor Nahdlatul Ulama (ANU) was established and joined the Hizbullah to defend the newly proclaimed Indonesian Republic.

The Dispute over Uniform: Banser’s Early History

Banser as we now know it is part of the GP Ansor; Banser’s history has to be traced back to the origin of this umbrella organization. To cut a long story short, it can be safely said that GP Ansor began when the Association of Nahdhatul Ulama Youth (Persatuan Pemuda Nahdlatul Ulama or PPNU) was established in 1931. This was the amalgamation of many Muslim youth groups in 1920s Java, such as the Call of the Youth (Da’watus Syubbān) and the Youth of the Nation (Syubbanul Wathan). Because of the federative connotation accentuated in the word “association,” this word was erased from the name and the organization was later called Nahdhatul Ulama Youth (Pemuda Nahdlatul Ulama or PNU). However, at the suggestion of K. H. Abdul Wahab, a respected NU leader in East Java, the name was again changed into Ansor of Nahdlatul Ulama (Ansor Nahdlatul Ulama or ANU). The ‘Ansor’ here was taken from the Arabic ansār, which means “those who help.” ANU was expected “to assist, to struggle, even to be the vanguard of the Indonesian Muslim community] in disseminating, enforcing and defending Islamic teachings.” As an integral part of NU, ANU was expected to assist NU in pursuing its main goal, that is “to preserve Islamic teachings according to the interpretation of Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah.”
Although this initiative to establish the youth wing of NU was generally welcomed by NU leadership, and ANU had established chapters in many parts of the country, it was only during the Ninth Congress of NU in 1934 in Banyuwangi, East Java, that ANU was officially recognized as a part of NU’s Department of Youth. For this reason 1934 is given as the year of ANU’s birth. However, it should be noted that this recognition was more formal than substantial. More detailed discussion and further policies concerning ANU only took place in 1935, when NU held its 10th Congress in Solo, East Java. Here a committee was set up to review the bylaws of ANU. A year later the committee accepted the bylaws and appointed H.M. Thohir Bakri and Abdullah Ubaid respectively as ANU’s first President and Vice President.

At first there was some reluctance to recognize ANU by some NU leaders. However, this reluctance only became public when ANU, in its first Congress in 1936 in Surabaya, East Java, decided to adopt uniforms and march in public. During NU’s 11th Congress in Banjarmasin, West Kalimantan, some NU leaders demanded a review of ANU. A year after that the Ansor Front of Nahdhatul Ulama (Barisan Ansor Nahdlatul Ulama or Banu), dressed in yellow uniforms, marched during the opening session of ANU’s 2nd Congress in Malang, East Java. This “show of force” by Banu was repeated two months after that, when NU held its 12th Congress in the same city. This time the show was supplemented by a demonstration of martial arts, including the traditional form of silat. Some NU leaders, however, were outraged by Banu’s use of a tie in its uniforms because it constituted a form of tasyābuh, that is, resembling the dress of the unbelievers (i.e. The Dutch).

This controversy colored NU’s discussion of ANU afterward. When NU held its 13rd Congress in Menes, West Java, in 1938, the discussion of the youth wing organization focused on two controversial subjects: (1) the use of a tie in the uniform and its tasyābuh implication; and (2) physical training or riyādhus badaniyah. There were two opinions on the first subject: some NU leaders said that the tie was a form of tasyābuh and hence ḥaraam (unlawful) according to Islamic law; while others viewed it as a normal cultural development that can be accepted (mubah) under the principle “to preserve the old that is good and to take the new that is better.” In the end ANU’s uniform was accepted without the tie; and ANU members, including Banu, were not allowed to wear ties when they served NU. On the second subject, ANU was instructed to follow
the definition of NU’s Great Chairman (Rais Akbar) K. H. Hasjim Asy’ari of riyādiḥah badaniyah, as follows: physical training should be in line with Islamic law, should be beneficial, and should not be harmful.12

In the years that followed, interest of the younger generation of NU in Banu far exceed their interest in its umbrella ANU. As a result, the national body of ANU was inundated by orders for Banu uniforms.13

What is the best way to explain this phenomenon? It can be suggested that the political and geostrategic environment at the end of 1930s and early 1940s was more favorable for Banu than its mother-organization ANU. This was the period when the Dutch were defeated at home by the Germans under Hitler and their colonial hegemony in the East Indies was about to be seriously challenged by the new rising power in Asia, Japan. During this critical situation, instead of enriching the younger generation’s minds with knowledge of NU or Islam, what was needed was a corps ready to defend and expand NU and the nation; this was the time for the use of otot (muscle) and not otak (brain). Support for Banu is evidenced by the 15th Congress of NU in Surabaya in 1940, when 35 NU ulama voted for military training, while only five voted against it.14

For the same political and strategic purposes, ANU young “diplomats” such as Saifuddin Zuhri established contacts with important national figures, such as Raden Sudirman, the leader of the Nation Party or Hizbul Wathan (who later on became the first Highest Commander of the Indonesian Army), and Raden Suprapto, leader of the Indonesian National Boy Scouts (Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia) who was killed in the so-called Gestapu Affairs of 1965 (see below).15 Through these contacts, ANU began to be recognized nationally and to take part in the national struggle for independence.

From this time onward, ANU was heavily politicized and militarized. During the Japanese occupation, Banu showed its support for its leader when Hasyim Asy’ari was put in the Bubutan Prison Camp in Surabaya.16 Members of ANU, as well as other NU leaders and their students, went to Surabaya and asked to be jailed along with their leader, which led to the release of their leader.

In the meantime, ANU members became an important element in Hizbullah, a military organization for Muslim youth established at the end of 1944. As Wahid Hasjim records, it was the military character of Hizbullah that attracted ANU members to join it.17

Studia Islamika, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2008
Under the leadership of Zainal Arifin, an NU leader in the umbrella Masyumi organization, these young people were trained to be soldiers. Later many members were included in the national army, such as Yusuf Hasyim, a future Banser leader. \(^{18}\)

This involvement in armed struggle didn’t end with the proclamation of Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945, but continued when the Dutch launched Police Actions I and II (July 20, 1947 and December 18, 1948). At the ANU headquarters in Surabaya NU’s well-known “Resolution of Jihad” (Resolusi jihad) was discussed and made public for the first time on October 22, 1945. \(^{19}\) The resolution said that it was a religious duty for every Muslim (fardl ‘ayn) to fight for Indonesia’s independence. With this fatwa (religious edict) of Wahid Hasjim, then the Chairman of NU, the young generation of NU became an important part of Bung Tomo’s army in the heroic battle of Surabaya November 10, 1945, against the Allied Forces. \(^{20}\)

**ANU Reactivated: The Birth of GP Ansor**

At the end of the Revolution in 1949, when the Dutch finally recognized Indonesian independence, the leadership of ANU began restructuring. It had been more a decade since the organization held a congress. On December 14, 1949, ANU was reactivated under a new name: Ansor Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor or GP Ansor) which remains unchanged to this day. This time, the organization was given the status of an autonomous body within NU. \(^{21}\)

When NU changed its status from a religious organization into a political party in 1952, the old tension between the leadership of NU and that of Ansor began to re-emerge. Anam’s description about the period leaves us with a rather inconclusive understanding of the source(s) of this tension, but it can be suggested that it was mainly caused by political considerations. At the root of this was NU’s rise as a major political party. In the national parliamentary elections in 1955, the first democratic election in Indonesia’s history, NU’s political strength was demonstrated when it became the third largest party, after the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia or PNI) and Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia or Masyumi), the modernist Muslim party. \(^{22}\) Soon after, during the period of Guided Democracy which ended with the rise of the New Order in 1965, NU’s political power grew even faster, especially after Masyumi was banned in 1960 because of its ties with the 1958 Revolutionary Government
of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or PRRI) rebellion in Sumatra. This left NU as the major Islamic party, whose support became the object of intense competition among the two power centers during this period, namely Sukarno and the army.23

In line with this new situation, Ansor became important politically. With this background in mind we can understand Anam’s account of GP Ansor during this period, which is characterized by two things: (1) ANU’s chairmanship was fought for by many factions; and (2) warnings and advice by NU national leadership for Ansor to follow and obey the NU’s policies was frequent. During its 1962 congress in Solo, East Java, Yusuf Hasyim, Moh. Saleh, and Chalid Mawardi, three top leaders of Banser, signed the “Solo Declaration,” which underlined the second point mentioned above. The declaration said: (1) GP Ansor will follow the PBNU in politics and will obey the PB Syuriah (“Legislative Body”) in any legal affair; (2) GP Ansor is a tool of NU in achieving its goals; and (3) As long as NU is led by ulama of Abl as-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah inclination, GP Ansor will obey and be loyal to NU.24

However, there was conflict within the PBNU itself, which made it impossible for the organization to come up with universally accepted policies. Some younger leaders were dissatisfied with NU’s close association with President Soekarno, especially during the period of Guided Democracy. Two main currents thus emerged within NU: a conservative one closer to Sukarno and a radical one was inclined towards the army. Kyai Wahab Chasbullah, then the NU’s General Chairman (Rais Am), was prominent in the first current, which was also called the “NU-Sukarno” orbit. Meanwhile, Subchan Z. E. (Zainuri Ehsan) was the most prominent figure at the opposite of the spectrum, which was called the “NU-Army” orbit.25

This rivalry ended up with the victory of the younger side (NU-Army orbit), which affected Ansor and Banser. Banser leaders were on the side of younger NU leaders, who brought them into a strategic alliance with the Indonesian Army to crush the PKI.

**Banser and the Killings of 1965-1966**

Before discussing Banser’s involvement in the anti-Communist killings, let me first of all lay out the rationale of or the event that preceded the killings, namely the so-called “G30S PKI Affair.” This is the most controversial issue in Indonesian history, and scholar’s
opinions have been deeply divided. However, here are some basic facts. Instigated by suspicion that the Council of Generals (Dewan Jenderal) would attempt to take power from Sukarno by force, the army Colonel Untung of Cakrabirawa led a group of people associated with PKI to kidnap and then kill seven army generals, including Achmad Yani, Army Chief of Staff on September 30, 1965. Untung said that this action was undertaken to save the republic and the president from ill-intentioned generals. This announcement was supported by PKI. Suharto, who was second in command after Yani, surprisingly enough to some scholars, was not on the list of generals to be killed. The following day he began to take actions to crush what he has called since then the Movement of September 30 (Gerakan 30 September or G30S, Gestapu), supposedly a coup attempt by the PKI. He won control of the army and people’s support. In the following months PKI members and sympathizers were massacred in many parts of the country.26

Banser played a major role especially in East Java in these killings of PKI members and its supporters. The role of Banser has been acknowledged by key figures, such as Yusuf Hasyim, and there are several detailed accounts of the killings that Banser was involved in. John Hughes, whose account was published a year after the killings, suggests that the killings were undertaken with “fanatical relish.”27

Instead of retelling these stories, I prefer to examine the other side of Banser’s roles, to highlight features that have more direct relevance to my subject, namely the controlled use of violence by religiously-minded people. But to give an overview of what happened I quote at length Harold Crouch, who summarizes the event in East Java and Banser’s role in them:

In East Java, where the NU’s resistance to the PKI had been turning into an offensive during the first nine months of 1965, the post-coup atmosphere provided Muslims with an opportunity to step up their pressure on the PKI. . . . [M]any of the demonstrations ended with attacks on PKI offices and the homes of local PKI leaders as well as Chinese shops. The main force behind the demonstrations was the NU’s youth organization, Ansor.

As Muslim violence against the Communists increased, the military authorities in Surabaya appeared to be more concerned with preserving order than in moving against the PKI. Although most of the officer corps was strongly anti-Communists, many important officers had little sympathy for the Muslims, whom they regarded as fanatics and troublemakers. . . .

As the army leadership in Surabaya hesitated to move against the PKI without clear orders from Jakarta, leaders of Ansor decided to take

Studia Islamika. Vol. 15. No. 3. 2008
the initiative. Meeting on about the tenth [of October], they decided to hold synchronized rallies at midday on the thirteenth at Kediri, Blitar, Trenggalek, and other towns, after which attacks would be made on PKI offices and PKI supporters would be deliberately killed. After local army officers considered sympathetic to their plans were informed, the demonstrations were held and, following a "Vigilance Rally of Godly People" at Kediri, eleven supporters of PKI were hacked to death as they tried to defend the besieged party office. On the eighteenth a large clash between PKI supporters and youths from Ansor, supported by the PNI's Pemuda Marhaen, occurred in South Banyuwangi on the eastern tip of Java. Some thirty-five corpses were discovered on the eighteenth and another sixty-two in mass graves a few days later. During the next few days a massacre broke out in which several thousands PKI supporters lost their lives in the South Banyuwangi area and, as the news of the killing spread, Muslim leaders in other parts of East Java, usually with the tacit or express support of local military officers, prepared for an onslaught against the PKI that was to last for several months.28

To begin the discussion, it is important to consider how Banser was reactivated. According to Yusuf Hasyim, a former Banser leader, Banser was reactivated in response to the intensifying political conflict, especially in East Java, between NU and PKI in the early 1960s. NU leaders felt threatened by PKI-led initiatives at land reforms, which involved their lands, and the inability of the security forces to stop the violence. Banser was reactivated to protect the interests of these religious leaders.29 In the aftermath of the G-30-S incident, this local initiative paralleled the army’s effort at the national level to mobilize many sectors of the Indonesian population against the PKI. After a meeting with General Sucipto on October 4, 1965, the Action Unit for Destroying the September 30 Movement (Kesatuan Aksi Pengganyangan Gestapu or KAP-Gestapu) was formed, in which NU's Subchan Z. E. served as Chairman. Members of Banser were trained by and worked with the army. The US embassy in Jakarta reported back to the State Department in a cable of November 4:

In Central Java, Army (RPKAD) is training Muslim Youth and supplying them with weapons and will keep them out in front against the PKI. Army will try to avoid as much it can safely do so, direct confrontation with the PKI. Army is letting groups other than Army discredit them [the PKI] and demand their punishment.30

The general assumption is that Banser was merely a puppet manipulated by the army. This assumption was supported by a list of PKI members to be killed, which was said to have been provided
to NU leaders by the army. However, as Sulistyo has convincingly argued, “In most cases ... the vigilante groups needed no lists; they personally knew the ‘candidate’ to become the next victims.” For example the Banser group led by Rusdi in Tjoekir, East Java, “knew PKI activists such as Kamin and Suroso, in a neighboring village.”

In other words, regardless of what the army wanted them to do, Banser leaders had their own reasons to kill PKI. The atmosphere was intense. Yusuf Hasyim recalled: “For members of Ansor, there was no choice, to kill or be killed. Of course, we choose to kill.”

This feeling “we are at war” was also strong among the second rank of the decision makers in Banser. Their motto was “crush first, and solve problems later” (kepruk dulul, persoalan belakangan). They also shared the view that, in Sulistyo’s words, “You win, you get a flower necklace; you lose, you get a hanging rope.”

The second feature that I would like to highlight is the Islamic justification of Banser’s killings of PKI members. First of all, for Banser, as for many other Muslim groups, the fight against the Communists was considered an aspect of jihād, the “Holy War” against the enemy of Islam. Referring to the murder of the generals on the morning of 1 October 1965, a Muslim informant in Boland’s study said: “On October 1st, 1965, we see how far people can go who no longer have any religion!” Meanwhile, in Kediri, an unspecified eminent kiyai told his followers that “by killing Communists they were serving both the state and Islam.”

Another interesting and disturbing feature of the killing was the use of ilmu (knowledge) and amalan (action). Here is what Rusdi, a Banser member in Kediri, said about the importance of his ilmu and amalan:

I liked to show off. I would knock down any crude person. I had studied this ability for a long time. Since the war, while my friends studied hard at school, I only studied this physical might. I did only ousatan, or physical training. I always asked my older brother to take me to mighty kiyais to get their ilmu. I could do that because I did the amalan, or recitation to be physically mighty. Now, I lost that power, because there’s no need to keep it. After the PKI’s era, why should we ask for foes and enemies? But I was not a smart guy; all I know is how to fight.

The killings also needed a fatwa – and the fatwa was not only on whether this killing was justifiable religiously but also on how to do it in a manner sanctioned by religion. In Kediri, for example, K. H. Mahrus Aly argued that the killing of PKI would only be justifi-
able if done with respect for victims. For example, an executioner should use a sharp knife or sword. He came to this conclusion using an analogy to Islamic teachings on slaughtering animals. He was reportedly outraged over the Banser vigilante who cut off their victim’s ears or fingers before slaughtering them.37

Yet another function of kiyais was to control the executioner, algajo. This is illustrated in Sulistyo’s account of an incident in the village of Nyawangan, Kediri:

An executioner went wild. He ordered dozens of PKI members to lie down in line, altogether making a human chain of over a hundred feet. He started to execute them one by one while screaming loudly.

News of this reached Ma’roefin and Anwar Zein, the mayor of Kediri. Off they went, only to find this algajo, or executioner, still going wild after “finishing the line,” threatening to kill anyone approaching him. Kiyai Mahfud was one of the respected kiyais from whom this man apparently sought to receive his physical power. Kiyai Mahfud was picked up from his house; he arrived, accompanied by a truck full of soldiers dispatched from Brigif 16. The kiyai calmed the executioner down, and put him under his control. The authorities and Ansor’s group then drove back to Kediri without taking any action against the executioner.38

It is imperative to mention that Banser (or Ansor and NU) was not the major faction involved in the killings. The modernist Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic organization in the country, was also involved as we can infer from a statement issued at the Muhammadiyah emergency meeting on November 9th, 1965, in Jakarta, which was published in Suara Muhammadiyah (November 9, 1965). Under the heading “Religious Duty and Holy War,” this statement explained that the action on September 30th, 1965, was to be regarded as an extension of the Madiun Affair and that “The extermination of the PKI and the Nekolim is a religious duty.” This religious duty “is not (only) recommended (sunnat) but...an individual obligation (wajib ‘ain, i.e. an obligation for each Muslim personally).”39

Non-Islamic organizations were also active perpetrators. In East Java, especially Kediri, the Nationalist PNI’s Student Movement (Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia or GSNI) and members of the Christian Youth were active participants.40 Both groups were also very active in Central Java, where they collaborated with Banser. Together they organized their youth fighting forces. It is said that platoons of as many as thirty people were stationed in each village,
and their enthusiasm for fighting the enemy was heightened by Kyai Mawardi from Boyolali, who was brought in to preach them. The Nationalists, who were supported by the PNI, formed a special unit known as the All-Purpose Wild Bull Unit (Pasukan Banteng Serta Guna). There were also Christian youth who called themselves the Guards of Jesus Brigade (Barisan Pengawal Yesus), whose main aim was to protect churches from Communist attacks. Meanwhile, from the studies of Robinson and more recently Ryter, we also know that many other groups played roles no less significant than that of Banser in the killings, especially in Bali and North Sumatra.

Finally, it is also important to note that Banser members were also among the victims. On October 18, 1965, for example, the PKI in Banyuwangi regency, with its army supporters, killed 64 Ansor youths. From reports submitted to the Ansor Regional Board in East and Central Java on February 1969, Choirul Anam estimates that 135 members of Banser died, 669 were wounded, and two were listed as “missing.”

From Pesantren to Palace: Banser during the New Order and Wahid’s Presidency

When order was finally restored in the country by the rise of the New Order under the leadership of Suharto, who was officially sworn in the country’s President in 1968, Banser began losing its significance in national politics. Banser returned to its traditional role as the security guard of NU. Banser’s main function in this period was to assist the official security forces in guarding NU meetings. Banser, for the most part, hung up its uniform.

The main reason for this is the nature of the regime that Suharto led. The principal foundation of New Order authoritarianism was the triangle of military, bureaucracy, and Functional Group (Golongan Karya or Golkar), the government party that dominated all elections since 1971. On the peak of this triangle was Suharto who controlled almost any crucial decision in the country. With the assistance of the army and Western-educated economists, Suharto managed to bring about economic growth during most of his presidency. This does not mean that Suharto did not use any paramilitary group. He used a paramilitary group called the Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pancasila or PP).

The first public “beyond NU” reappearance of Banser was reported by the national press in late 1998, when many NU teachers were killed in Banyuwangi, East Java. This is another terrifying sto-
ry of violence in Indonesia (described by the Indonesian press as the “Banyuwangi Killing Fields”), for which explanation has yet to be provided to replace rumors and conspiracy theories. It is generally agreed, nevertheless, that NU teachers were among the victims. For this reason Banser emerged again to show its strength.

When Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as Indonesia’s fourth President in 1999, Banser played a significant political role as the unofficial vanguard of the President. More importantly, having their “man” in the palace, Banser expanded its territory from guarding in the pesantren to the palace.

The most telling example of this was Banser’s attack on the Surabaya-based newspaper Jawa Pos. On May 6, 2000, the paper published a report suggesting that NU Chairman Hasyim Muzadi, a close associate of the President, had received a payoff of more than $4 million from a government agency. That same day, hundreds of Banser members gathered at the paper’s office. They surrounded the building, shouted slogans, prevented staff from entering, and blocked publication for a day. In the end, they left the office after Jawa Pos management agreed to publish an apology. While most commentators condemned the Jawa Pos episode as an attack on press freedom, Wahid the President defended Banser and accused the paper of bias. “The press is one-sided in many ways,” he told Indonesian reporters. “Part of it is controlled by people who are against the government. ... It wasn’t the Banser who told them to stop publishing, they did it themselves, to gain sympathy from the rest of the press.”

At the same time Banser began selling its protection services to Chinese businessmen in huge trading complexes such as Glodok, in the capital city. Banser members became security guards at night clubs and restaurants. In addition to its close connection to the man in power, Banser was chosen for its Islamic appearances. This was crucial since some Islamic organizations in Jakarta, such as the Islamic Defence Front (Front Pembela Islam or FPI), demanded such places as night clubs be closed during Ramadhan. Tatang Hidayat, the Commander of Banser in Jakarta, openly acknowledged Banser’s new role, saying that he worked in coordination with the official security apparatus and “with the money from our own pockets and from the kyais.” In places beyond Jakarta, we find the same pattern: in Jombang, Banser became security guards of Jakarta landowners who were afraid that trees were being cut down and stolen by thieves. In Semarang, Banser’s muscle was used by local businessmen to stop worker’s demonstration in factories.
Following this expansion of Banser’s role, voices condemning Banser’s use of violence began emerging among NU leaders. Hasyim, who was one of the founders of Banser, suggested that Banser began nurturing what he called “the culture of violence” (budaya kekerasan). After the incident at the Jawa Pos office, he appealed for Banser to “return to its main purpose (khittah) as a place where the youth of NU learn how to organize, struggle and to work for the Muslim community (umat),” as the emergency situation and the physical threat to NU no longer existed. Sahal Mahfudh, NU General Chairman and one of the most respected kyais in East Java, asked Banser to “distance itself from any political party.”

Unfortunately Banser and, more importantly, politicians at the palace were politically deaf to this appeal. Wahid’s presidency was under heavy criticism even from his inner circle of power, but Banser had obvious interests to secure the presidency. It all came to an end in August 2001, however, when Wahid decided to leave the palace and Banser provide an honor guard for him and his family. Wahid’s call for a state of emergency was a grand failure, his presidency was constitutionally dissolved, and Banser could do nothing to stop the process.

Conclusion

Let me conclude this paper by making some comments on the lessons we can learn from the history of Banser. First of all, Banser has a long history, which began with Banu’s march at ANU’s Second Congress in 1934. This organization was established to defend, expand and become the vanguard of the interests of Indonesian Muslims as interpreted by NU leaders. During the colonial period and the revolution, it served NU in the struggle for Indonesian independence, along with other parts of Indonesian society. After independence, it was transformed into Banser as it is known in the present day. Given this long history, analysis that traces the emergence of Banser to the authoritarian system of the New Order, such as that of Arbi Sanit, should be rejected as ahistorical. Banser in fact helped the rise of Suharto and the New Order in a significant way by taking part in the killing of members of the PKI, the arch enemy of the Indonesian army. It was only in the last days of Suharto’s presidency that Banser functioned in the way that Sanit suggests, namely to oppose the repression of the state’s apparatus by safeguarding the kyais.

Studia Islamika, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2008
Secondly, in its long history, we have seen the fortunes of Banser wane. One thing is clear: it played major roles only during times of crisis, when otot was more important than otak. In a way, Banser has functioned as NU’s “firefighters”, whose uniforms have to be hung up when the fire has been put out. This, as well as its outward paramilitary appearance, shows that Banser was given permission to use violence when it was needed. In this way a “subculture of violence,” to use Yusuf Hasyim’s term, was nurtured within NU. There were efforts to regulate violence in a way that is religiously justifiable, which made Banser different from paramilitary organizations such as Pemuda Pancasila, which played a dominant role during the New Order.

Thirdly, the reluctance of some NU leaders to recognize ANU when it was still in its initial stage of foundation and the suggestions to disband Banser reflects the fact that attempts to control this subculture of violence were not always successful. Recall that in the last days of Wahid’s presidency, when Banser began selling its services to some businessmen, it started to be viewed as “the lost boys,” or the children who no longer obey their fathers. I suggest that this is so because violence has its own logic and, at a certain point, it can no longer be controlled. This is especially true when the element of violence is coupled with political power that backs the use of force.

Fourth, the emergence of Banser and other paramilitary organizations shows the incapacity of the Indonesian government or its lack of political will to exclusively control the use of violence. The 1965-1966 killing, when Banser collaborated with the Indonesian army to eliminate the PKI, illustrates this. In the last days of the Suharto era, when it appeared that official security forces were unable to defend NU leaders, Banser showed its usefulness by safeguarding the lives of their leaders. However, during Wahid’s presidency, as its power began growing, Banser became a sort of “violence entrepreneur.” Here Banser functioned in a way similar to the Pemuda Pancasila during the Suharto era.

Lastly, from the analytical point of view, to separate religion from politics as Anderson suggested is not always useful, if not misleading. This is especially true in Indonesia, where religion has always played a significant role in politics. As we can see in the case of Abdurrahman Wahid, former NU leader and president, we can rarely clearly distinguish whether, and when, someone is a politician using a kyai mantle or the other way around.
Endnotes

1. Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, “Religion and Politics in Indonesia since Independence,” in Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, Mitsuo Nakamura, and Moham-mad Siswanto (eds.), Religion and Social Ethics in Indonesia (Clayton, Australia: Monash University, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1977), p. 22.

2. “Wahid’s Army of Loyal Believers,” Time Asia, July 3, 2000.

3. Quoted in “1965 Massacre: Suharto must be Indicted,” Tapol Bulletin, No. 153 (July 1999), p. 3.

4. My main sources for this section is K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, “Gerakan Pemuda NU,” in Sedjarah Hidup K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Ter-siar, ed. by H. Aboebakar (Djakarta: Panitya Buku Peringatan alm. K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957), pp. 547-559; and Choirul Anam, Gerak Langkah Pemuda Ansor: Sebuah Percikan Sejarah Kelahiran (Surabaya: Majalah Nahdlatul Ulama AULA, 1990).

5. Here Anam uses the old spelling system “Oelama” instead of “Ulama.” Hence the short is ANO, Ansor Nahdlatul Oelama, instead of ANU as I use here. See his Gerak Langkah, pp. 17-47.

6. In Islamic history, Anshahr (the plural of nashir) refers to the Medinan helpers of the Prophet Mohammad when he moved from Mecca and arrived in Medina in A.D. 622.

7. Anam, Gerak Langkah, p. 20. Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah (abbreviated to Aswaja) literally means “people of the sunnah and the [orthodox] community.” The NU leaders most commonly use this term to distinguish themselves from the reformist Muslims, whom they view as deviating from the sunnah, the tradition of the prophet Muhammad. The latter, however, firmly claim that they themselves are the true Aswaja and point out that there are many beliefs and practices of NU that have no precedent in the prophetic tradition. See Martin van Bruinessen, “Traditions for the Future: The Reconstruction of Traditionalist Discourse Within NU,” in Greag Barton and Greg Fealy (eds.), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Clayton, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), p. 166.

8. Sedjarah Hidup K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, p. 557; Anam, Gerak Langkah, pp. 19-20.

9. Sedjarah Hidup K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, pp. 556-557; Anam, Gerak Langkah, pp. 26-27.

10. This is one of NU’s traditional stances in Islamic law. Here it is its original Arabic version: al-muhajazah: ‘alā al-qadīm al-shalih wa al-ahdžz bi‘al-jadīl al-ashlāti.” On this principle, see M. Ali Haidar, Nahdatul Ilmu: dan Islam di Indonesia: Pendekeinan Fikih dalam Politik (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1994), p. 318.

11. Anam, Gerak Langkah, p. 29.

12. Anam, Gerak Langkah, p. 27-28.

13. Anam, Gerak Langkah, p. 31.

14. Anam, Gerak Langkah, p. 35.

15. Saifuddin Zuhri, Berangkat dari Pesantren (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1987), p. 113.

16. Anam, Gerak Langkah, pp. 39-40.

17. Sedjarah Hidup K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, p. 558.
18. Hizbullah began training in February 1945, and it was said to have 50,000 members at the end of the war. See M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200*, 3rd edition (London: Palgrave, 2001), p. 257. On Yusuf Hasyim, I refer to Hermawan Sulistyow, “Historiografi tentang Resolusi Jihad NU,” in Marzuki Wahid, Abd. Moqsith Ghazali, and Suwendi (eds.), *Geger di “Republik” NU: Pembaruan Wacana, Tafsir Sejarah, Tafsiran Makna* (Jakarta: Penerbit Harian Kompas Bekerjasama dengan Lakpesdam-NU, 1999), p. 228.

19. Anam, *Gerak Langkah*, p. 45.

20. *Sejarah Hijaz K.H. A. Wahid Hasjim*, pp. 477-478. On the historiography of this “Jihad Resolution,” refer also three articles debating this issue written by Hairus Salim HS, “50 Tahun Resolusi Jihad NU,” Hermawan Suliyo, “Historiografi tentang Resolusi Jihad NU,” and Mohammad Fajru Falaah, “NU dalam Dua Resolusi Jihad,” all are included in Wahid, Ghazali and Suwendi (eds.), *Geger di “Republik” NU*, pp. 223-226; 227-230; and pp. 231-235.

21. *Sejarah Hijaz K.H. A. Wahid Hasjim*, p. 558.

22. These three parties won 22%, 21%, and 19% of the vote respectively. The fourth-ranked party was the PKI, which won 17%. See Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 256.

23. See Howard M. Federspiel, “The Military and Islam in Sukarno’s Indonesia,” *Pacific Affairs*, 46:3 (Autumn, 1973), pp. 407-420, and Allan A. Samson, “Army and Islam in Indonesia,” *Pacific Affairs*, 44:4 (Winter, 1971-1972), pp. 545-565.

24. Anam, *Gerak Langkah*, pp. 70-71.

25. See Andrée Feillard, “Traditionalist Islam and the Army in Indonesia’s New Order: The Awkward Relationship,” in Barton and Fealy (eds.), *Naladatat Llama*, pp. 50-52.

26. For a rather neutral presentation of this bloody incident, see Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978), especially Chapter 4, pp. 97-134.

27. John Hughes, *Indonesian Uprisings* (New York: David McKay Company Inc., 1967), p. 154. Beside this work and the work of Harold Crouch that I quote below, the scholarly account on the role of Ansor/Banser in the killings can be found in these works: Robert Cribb (ed.), *The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali* (Clayton, Vic.: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990); Robert W. Hefner, *The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990); Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko, “The Destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI): A Comparative Analysis of East Java and Bali,” PhD. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1992; and Hermawan Sulistyow, *Pulu Arti di Ladang Tebu: Sejarah Pembantuan Massal yang Terlupakan (1965-1966)* (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2000). Sulistyow’s work is the Indonesian translation of his “The Forgotten Years: The Missing History of Indonesia’s Mass Slaughter (Jombang-Kediri 1965-1966),” PhD. Dissertation, Arizona State University, 1997. (For unclear reason, the names of important people and all appendices in the dissertation are omitted in the published Indonesian version.) For a more general overview of this subject, see also Robert Cribb, “Unresolved Prob-
lems in the Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966,” Asian Survey, XLII:4 (July/August 2002), pp. 550-563.
28. Crouch, The Army and Politics, pp. 145-147.
29. See “Barisan Serba Guna,” Gatra, May 20, 2000, pp. 38-39. See also Zuhri, Berangkat dari Pesantren, p. 508.
30. Quoted in Hilmar Farid, “The Army’s Masks and Myths,” Indonesia Alert!, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Spring 2001), pp. 7-8 and 16.
31. Sulistyo, “The Forgotten Years,” p. 188.
32. Quoted from Sulistyo, “The Forgotten Years,” p. 188.
33. Sulistyo, “The Forgotten Years,” p. 216.
34. Boland, The Struggle of Islam,” p. 146.
35. Sudjatmiko, “The Destruction,” p. 204.
36. Quoted from Sulistyo, “The Forgotten Years,” p. 191.
37. See Sulistyo, “The Forgotten Years,” p. 196.
38. Sulistyo, “The Forgotten Years,” p. 194-195.
39. Boland, The Struggle of Islam, p. 126.
40. Ken Young, “Local and National Influences in the Violence of 1965,” in Cribb (ed.), The Indonesian Killings, p. 82, and Sudjatmiko, “The Destruction,” p. 207.
41. Center for Village Studies, Gadjah Mada University, “Rural Violence in Klaten and Banyuwangi,” in Cribb (ed.), The Indonesian Killings, p. 133.
42. See Geoffrey Robinson, The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Loren Ryter, “Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto’s Order,” in Benedict R. O’G. Anderson (ed.), Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2001), pp. 124-155.
43. Sudjatmiko, “The Destruction,” p. 199.
44. Anam, Gerak Langkah, p. 93.
45. On this paramilitary group, see Ryter, “Pemuda Pancasila,” pp. 124-155.
46. See Jason Brown, “The Banyuwangi Murders,” Inside Indonesia, No. 62 (April-June 2000), pp. 34-35.
47. “Pesan Politik Gaya Banser,” Forum Keadilan, No. 7, May 21, 2000, pp. 13-16.
48. “Tangan-tangan yang Menawarkan Keamanan,” Forum Keadilan, no. 8, May 28, 2000, p. 23.
49. “Banser di mana-mana,” Gatra, April 8, 2000.
50. “Barisan Serba Guna,” Gatra, May 20, 2000, pp. 38-39.
51. K.H. Yusuf Hasyim, “Sebaiknya Banser Ditiadakan saja,” interview, Forum Keadilan, no. 7, May 21, 2000, p. 18.
52. See also “Pesan Politik Gaya Banser.”
53. “Barisan Hijau Hitam,” Gatra, July 8, 2000, p. 43.
54. Arbi Sanit, “Satgas,” Forum Keadilan, no. 7, May 21, 2000, p. 11.

Studia Islamika, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2008
Bibliography

“1965 Massacre: Suharto must be Indicted,” Tapol Bulletin, No. 153 (July 1999).

Anam, Choirul, Gerak Langkah Pemuda Ansor: Sebuah Percikan Sejarah Kelahiran (Surabaya: Majalah Nahdlatul Ulama AULA, 1990).

Anderson, Benedict R. O’G., Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1972).

--------, “Religion and Politics in Indonesia since Independence,” in Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, Mitsuo Nakamura, and Mohammad Slamet (eds.), Religion and Social Ethos in Indonesia (Clayton, Australia: Monash University, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1977), pp. 20-34.

-------- (ed.), Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2001).

“Barisan Hijau Hitam,” Gatra, July 8, 2000, p. 43.

“Barisan Serba Gunung,” Gatra, May 20, 2000, pp. 38-39.

Boland, B. J., The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).

Bruinessen, Martin van Bruinessen, “Traditions for the Future: The Reconstruction of Traditionalist Discourse Within NU,” in Greag Barton and Greg Fealy (eds.), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Clayton, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), pp. 156-175.

Brown, Jason, “The Banyuwangi Murders,” Inside Indonesia, No. 62 (April-June 2000), pp. 34-35.

Center for Village Studies, Gadjah Mada University, “Rural Violence in Klaten and Banyuwangi,” in Robert Cribb (ed.), The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali (Clayton, Vic.: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), pp. 101-127.

Cribb, Robert (ed.)., The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali (Clayton, Vic.: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990).

--------, “Unresolved Problems in the Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966,” Asian Survey, XLII:4 (July/August 2002), pp. 550-563.

Crouch, Harold, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978).

Falaakh, Mohammad Fajrul, “NU dalam Dua Resolusi Jihad,” in Marzuki Wahid, Abd. Moqisith Ghazali, and Suwendi (eds.), Geger di “Republik” NU: Pererbutan Wacana, Tafsir Sejarah, Tafsiran Makna (Jakarta: Penerbit Harian Kompas Bekerjasama dengan Lakpesdam-NU, 1999), pp. 231-235.
Federspiel, Howard M., "The Military and Islam in Sukarno’s Indonesia," Pacific Affairs, 46:3 (Autumn, 1973), pp. 407-420.
Feillard, André, "Traditionalist Islam and the Army in Indonesia’s New Order: The Awkward Relationship," in Barton and Fealy (eds.), Nahdlatul Ulama, pp. 45-64.
Haidar, M. Ali, Nahdatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia: Pendekatan Fikih dalam Politik (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1994).
Hasjim, K. H. A. Wahid, "Gerakan Pemuda NU," in Sedjarah Hidup K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar, ed. By H. Aboebakar (Djakarta: Paniyta Buku Peringatan alm. K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957), pp. 547-559.
Hasyim, K.H. Yusuf, "Sebaiknya Banser Ditiadakan saja," interview, Forum Keadilan, no. 7, May 21, 2000, p. 18.
Hefner, Robert W., Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001).
---------, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990).
Hughes, John, Indonesian Upheavals (New York: David McKay Company Inc., 1967).
Kahin, George Mc. T., Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952).
Ricklefs, M.C., A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).
Robinson, Geoffrey, The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
Ryter, Loren, "Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Man of Suharto’s Order?" in Benedict R. O’G. Anderson (ed.), Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2001), pp. 124-155.
Salim HS, Hairus, "50 Tahun Resolusi Jihad NU," in Marzuki Wahid, Abd. Moqsith Ghazali, and Suwendi (eds.), Geger di “Republik” NU: Perebutan Wacana, Tafsir Sejarah, Tafsiran Makna (Jakarta: Penerbit Harlan Kompas Bekerjasama dengan Lakpesdam-NU, 1999), pp. 223-226.
Samson, Allan A., "Army and Islam in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs, 44:4 (Winter, 1971-1972), pp. 545-565.
Sanit, Arbi, "Satgas," Forum Keadilan, no. 7, May 21, 2000, p. 11.
Stanley, "Opening that Dark Page," Inside Indonesia, No. 63 (July-September 2000), pp. 23-31.
Sudjatmiko, Iwan Garsono, “The Destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI): A Comparative Analysis of East Java and Bali,” PhD. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1992).
Sulistyo, Hermawan, “Historiografi tentang Resolusi Jihad NU,” in Marzuki Wahid, Abd. Moqsith Ghazali, and Suwendi (eds.), Geger di “Republik” NU: Perebutan Wacana, Tafsir Sejarah, Tafsiran Makna (Jakarta: Penerbit Harian Kompas Bekerjasama dengan Lakpesdam-NU, 1999), pp. 227-229.

--------, Palu Arit di Ladang Tebu: Sejarah Pembantaian Massal yang Terlupakan (1965-1966) (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2000).

--------, “The Forgotten Years: The Missing History of Indonesia’s Mass Slaughter (Jombang-Kediri 1965-1966),” PhD. Dissertation, Arizona State University, 1997.

“Tangan-tangan yang Menawarkan Keamanan,” Forum Keadilan, no. 8, May 28, 2000, p. 23.

“Wahid’s Army of Loyal Believers,” Time Asia, July 3, 2000.

Wahid, Marzuki, Abd. Moqsith Ghazali, and Suwendi (eds.), Geger di “Republik” NU: Perebutan Wacana, Tafsir Sejarah, Tafsiran Makna (Jakarta: Penerbit Harian Kompas Bekerjasama dengan Lakpesdam-NU, 1999).

Young, Ken, “Local and National Influences in the Violence of 1965,” in Robert Cribb (ed.), The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali (Clayton, Vic.: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), pp. 77-96.

Zuhri, Saifuddin, Berangkat dari Pesantren (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1987).

Ihsan Ali-Fauzi is a lecturer at Paramadina University, Jakarta.

Studia Islamika, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2008