Ālayavijñāna from a Practical Point of View

Nobuyoshi Yamabe

Abstract In 1987, Lambert Schmithausen published an important extensive monograph on the origin of ālayavijñāna (Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy). In his opinion, the introduction of ālayavijñāna was closely linked to nirodhasamāpatti, but it was not meditative experience itself that directly lead to the introduction of this new concept. Rather, according to Schmithausen, it was dogmatic speculation on a sutra passage about nirodhasamāpatti. My own hypothesis is that the introduction of ālayavijñāna was more directly based on meditative experiences. Focusing on the “Proof Portion” of the Viṇīścayasaṁgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi, the present paper examines this hypothesis. My examination reveals that ālayavijñāna is the physiological basis of the body, and as such it is correlated to the state of the body and mind. When one’s body and mind are transformed from an inert to a well-functioning state through meditative practice, the transformation seems to hinge on the transformation of ālayavijñāna itself. It appears that Yogācāra meditators intuitively realized this mechanism at the stage of darśanamārga. This paper also responds to some points raised by Schmithausen on my hypothesis in his recent monograph on early Yogācāra (The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda: Responses

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and Reflections, 2014). Through these discussions, this paper sheds light on the importance of the correlation between body and mind in meditative contexts and proposes that this was the key issue in the introduction of the ālayavijñāna theory.

Keywords ālayavijñāna · Yogācārabhūmi · dauṣṭhulya · praśrabdhi · ekayogakṣema · mind-body correlation

Introduction

In 1987, Lambert Schmithausen published an important extensive monograph on the origin of ālayavijñāna, entitled Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy (Schmithausen [1987] 2007, hereafter, Ālayavijñāna). In his opinion, the voluminous Yogācārabhūmi is a compilation of heterogeneous materials and can be roughly analyzed into three layers:

1) Parts of the “Basic Section,” in particular, the Śrāvakabhūmi, the Bodhisattvabhūmi, and the Vastusamgrahaṇī, which do not refer to ālayavijñāna.
2) The rest of the “Basic Section,” which sporadically refers to ālayavijñāna but not to the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra.
3) Viniścatvamasamgrahaṇī, which discusses ālayavijñāna in detail and presupposes the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. (Ālayavijñāna, §1.6.6, my paraphrase)

In this model, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra falls between layers two and three, so the oldest source that discusses ālayavijñāna is layer two, namely (portions of) the “Basic Section.” Thus, according to Schmithausen, the original context of the introduction of ālayavijñāna must be sought in layer two.

Schmithausen believes that a passage that shows the original context of ālayavijñāna must satisfy the following two criteria:

(1) It must show that the introduction of a new type of vijñāna became inevitable, or there must be clear evidence that such a new type of vijñāna was directly experienced.
(2) It must explain why the new vijñāna is called ālayavijñāna. (Ālayavijñāna, §1.7, my paraphrase)

In his opinion, such a passage, which he calls “the Initial Passage,” is found in the Samāhitā bhūmiḥ of the Basic Section of the Yogācārabhūmi.

niruddhāḥ samāppannasya cittacaitasikā niruddhā bhavanti / kathām vijñānam kāyād anapakṛntam bhavati / tasya hi rūpīśv indriye <śv avi >parinātēṣu pravṛttivijñānabījaparīṃhitam ālayavijñānam anuparatam bhavati āyatyāṃ

1 Corrected according to Genesis, §72. In what follows, I refer to Schmithausen (2014) as Genesis.
When [a person] has entered [Absorption into] Cessation (nirodha[saṃ- patti]), his mind and mental [factors] have ceased; how, then, is it that [his] mind (vijñāna) has not withdrawn from [his] body?—[Answer: No problem;] for [in] his [case] ālayavijñāna has not ceased [to be present] in the material sense-faculties, which are unimpaired: ālayavijñāna which comprises (/possesses/ has received) the Seeds of the forthcoming [forms of ] mind (pravṛttivijñāna), so that they are bound to re-arise in future (i.e., after emerging from absorption). (Ālayavijñāna, §2.1)

Schmithausen points out that this passage presupposes the Mūlasarvāstivāda version of the Dharmadinnāsūtra, which states that in nirodhasamāpatti, “vijñāna has not withdrawn from the body” (vijñānam cāsyā kāyād anapakrāṇtam bhavati). Since, however, nirodhasamāpatti is by definition an unconscious state, the vijñāna that remains in the body in nirodhasamāpatti cannot be one of the conventional six vijñānas or their associates. This problem necessitated the introduction of a new, subliminal type of vijñāna, namely, ālayavijñāna (Ālayavijñāna, §2.3). The “Initial Passage” also accounts well for what Schmithausen believes to be the original meaning of ālayavijñāna, “the mind sticking [in the material sense-faculties]” (ibid., §2.7, my paraphrase; note that the material sense-faculties as a whole constitute our sentient body).

According to Schmithausen, the original ālayavijñāna was merely a hypostatization of bijas of the pravṛttivijñānas and was not a veritable vijñāna endowed with cognitive functions (ibid., §2.13.1). It kept the body alive and retained bijas of the pravṛttivijñānas during nirodhasamāpatti so that the pravṛttivijñānas could re-arise later (ibid., §2.5). In other words, it functioned as a kind of “gap-bridger” (ibid., §2.13.6).

Thus, in Schmithausen’s understanding, the introduction of ālayavijñāna was closely linked to nirodhasamāpatti, but it was not meditative experience itself that directly triggered the introduction of this new concept. Rather, according to him, it was dogmatic speculation on the exegetical problem regarding the canonical sūtra, the Dharmadinnāsūtra, that made the introduction of this new concept inevitable (§7.4).

I cannot properly summarize the entirety of this very rich monograph here, but Schmithausen’s arguments in this book are definitely well documented and very solid. Not surprisingly, this work has prompted further investigations into the origin of ālayavijñāna by other scholars, most notably Matsumoto Shiro (2004) and Hartmut Buescher (2008). I myself have published a brief synoptic article on this matter in Japanese (Yamabe 2012).

Recently, Schmithausen published a voluminous and very detailed response to these arguments (2014, hereafter “Genesis”). Partly referring to this work, at the 17th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies held at the...
University of Vienna (August 18–23, 2014), I presented my own hypothetical view on the origin of ālayavijñāna, mainly based on Yamabe (2012) (which is just a preliminary presentation of my working hypothesis in Japanese) with more supporting materials. Due to time constraints, however, in that presentation I had to keep to a minimum my responses to Genesis. Since I was given more time at the international workshop held at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, entitled “Yogācāra Buddhism in Context: Approaches to Yogācāra Philosophy throughout Ages and Cultures” (June 19–20, 2015), I could present my view with more detailed responses to Schmithausen’s comments on Yamabe (2012). The present article is a revised and expanded version of the paper I gave at the Munich workshop.

Before entering into a substantial discussion, I have to admit that I have been heavily influenced by Schmithausen’s meticulous work for many years. Thus, my own view is not too radically different from his. I also think that meditation was behind the introduction of ālayavijñāna, and I further believe that the relationship between ālayavijñāna and the body was very important, as pointed out by him. Our main difference lies in my suspicion that the introduction of ālayavijñāna was more directly based on meditative experiences.

Another point made in Yamabe (2012) is that the Basic Section may not be the only portion of the Yogācārabhūmi in which the original context of ālayavijñāna could be located. “The Initial Passage” is rather “isolated” (in the sense that the surrounding portions do not discuss ālayavijñāna) and does not seem to me to reveal the full background of the introduction of this new concept. The oldest systematic discussion of this concept in the Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī (which Schmithausen calls the “Vin[iscaya-]S[am]gr[ahaṇī] ālay[avijñāna]. Treatise” [§1.5]) should be given more attention, even if it is later than the Basic Section. This is because the people who introduced this innovative concept might not have revealed everything they had in mind from the outset (see Yamabe 2012, p. 202). In Genesis (§8.2), Schmithausen agrees with my suggestion on this point.

4 I also gave a shorter version, entitled “Ārayashiki setsu dōnyū to zenjō no taiken tono kankei ni tsuite” アーラヤ識説導入と禅定の体験との関係について (On the Relationship between the Introduction of Ālayavijñāna and Meditative Experience), at the 32nd annual meeting of Waseda Daigaku Tōyō Tetsugaku Kai 早稻田大學東洋哲學會 (Association for Asian Philosophy, Waseda University) held at Waseda University on June 13, 2015.

5 See Yamabe (2012), pp. 194–195.

6 In Ālayavijñāna, Schmithausen says, “it is therefore the pertinent passages in this text [=Basic Section] that should be investigated first,” though he does not deny the possibility that later layers may also include some old materials (§1.6.7).

7 The “Initial Passage” (Samāhitā bhūmiḥ, Delhey ed., §4.1.3.4.3.3) is found in a series of questions and answers concerning nirodhasamāpatti. These questions and answers do not necessarily presuppose each other, and the “Initial Passage” could be removed without causing incoherence. However, as Schmithausen points out, this alone is not a sufficient reason to regard the “Initial Passage” as an interpolation. See Genesis, §§31.1-4. In the “Initial Passage,” the word pravṛttivijñāna is used without definition, but according to Schmithausen, the verb pra-vṛt- is used together with vijñāna already in pre-ālayavijñāna portions of the Basic Section of the Yogācārabhūmi. Therefore, according to him, the occurrence of pravṛttivijñāna in the “Initial Passage” does not necessarily mean that the passage presupposes the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, §V.4-5. See Genesis, §37.2 + fn. 159.
1 The Proof Portion

In the “VinŚg ālay. Treatise,” in particular in its first section, “the Proof Portion,”8 physiological maintenance of the body (upādāna, in Schmithausen’s translation, “biological appropriation”) is clearly the predominant function of ālayavijñāna.9 As Schmithausen has already shown, four out of the eight proofs (i, vi, vii, viii) concern this aspect of ālayavijñāna.10 Here, I discuss the first and the eighth proofs. The first proof is as follows:

(i) kena kāraṇenāśrayopādānām na yujyate / āha—pañcabhīḥ kāraṇāḥ / tathāḥi
(a) ālayavijñānam pūrvamsākārāhetukam11 / caṣṭurādi-pravrātivijñānam punar
vartāmānapratyayahetukam / yathoktam — indriyavisāyamanaskārvasād
vijñānānām pravṛttir bhavaṭṭī vistārena / idaṃ prathamaṃ kāraṇaṃ / (b) api
cā kusālakāsūlaḥ saḍ vijñānakāyā upalabhyaṃ / idaṃ dviṭīyaṃ kāraṇaṃ /
c(c) api ca sānām vijñānakāyānāṃ sā jātir nopalabhyaṃ yāvākyārtā vipāk-
samgrhitā12 syāt / idaṃ tṛṭīyaṃ kāraṇaṃ / (d) api ca pratimīyataśrayāḥ saḍ
vijñānakāyaḥ pravartate, tatra yena yenāśrayena yad vijñānam pravartate tad eva

8 Schmithausen points out that the “VinŚg ālay. Treatise” consists of the “Proof Portion” (i.e., the eightfold proof of ālayavijñāna), “Pravrātti Portion,” and “Nivrātti Portion” (Ālayavijñāna, en. 226).
9 According to the website of Organismal Biology Journal, “Human physiology seeks to understand the mechanisms that work to keep the human body alive and functioning” (http://www.omicsonline.org/organismal-biology-journal.php, accessed October 16, 2016). If human physiology is defined this way, it is very close to the mechanism of upādāna performed by ālayavijñāna. I have benefitted from private discussions with Professor Daniel Stuart on this matter.
10 In Ālayavijñāna, §9.2, Schmithausen classifies the eight proofs into the following four groups (my paraphrase).

A1: Proofs i (upātta), vi (kāyiko ‘mubhavaḥ), vii (acitte samāpatti), viii (cyuti)
These proofs are concerned with the “somatic” aspect of ālayavijñāna, namely appropriation of the body. All these functions are either already expressed in the Basic Section, or they are “organic developments.” These proofs do not presuppose the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra.

A2: Proof iv (bīja)
This proof is not concerned with the “somatic” aspect of ālayavijñāna but with its function as the Seed of ordinary forms of mind. It does not substantially go beyond what is already found in the Basic Section.

B1: Proofs ii (ādi), iii (spaṣṭatva)
These two proofs do not directly prove the existence of ālayavijñāna but rather the fact that several vijñānas can arise simultaneously, and this would presuppose the system of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra V.

B2: Proof v (karman)
This proof also proves the simultaneity of several vijñānas, but in addition, it seems to directly refer to the cognitive function of ālayavijñāna itself. It presupposes the new manas and is close to the Pravrātti Portion.

These eight proofs should be compared with the four proofs of ālayavijñāna in the Pañcaskandha (16.11–17.4) and the Pañcaskandhakaviṣakhāsā (Kramer ed., 51b1–57b5) and the six proofs in the Mahāyānasamgraha, §§I.29–55. A helpful overview of these proofs is found in Kramer 2016, pp. 148–158.

11 Cf. ājīvendriyam punah kimpratayam / sa pūrvamsākārāpratayam ājīvendriyam ity avatarati / (Śrāvakabhāmi, Shōmonji Kenkyūkai ed., 92.10–11).

What conditions the life-force (ājīvendriya)? The [practitioner] realizes that the life-force is conditioned by prior karmic acts.

I owe this reference to Mr. Harada Wasō.

12 Hakamaya ed., yā ’vyākratvipākasamgrḥītā, but here I follow Yuga-gyō Shisō Kenkyūkai ed., 89.16.
tenopāṭtāṃ syād avaśiṣṭasyānupāṭtatetī na yujyate, upāṭtatāpi na yujyate
vijñānavirahitatayā / idaṃ caturthām kāraṇām / (e) api ca punaḥ punar
āśrayasyopādānadoṣaḥ prasajyate / tathāḥ caśakṣurviṃjāṇām ekadā pravartate
ekadā na pravartate evam avaśiṣṭāni / idaṃ pañcapamaṇ kāraṇām / … (Hakamaya
[1978] 2001, p. 328; here and below I omit the hyphenation.)

(Question:) For what reason is the appropriation of the body (āśrayopādāna) not reasonable [without ālayavijñāna]? Answer: For five reasons, namely: (a) Ālayavijñāna is caused by prior karmic acts (samaskāra) whereas the visual and other [types of] functional consciousness (pravṛttivijñāna) are caused by present conditions (pratīyā). As has been said: “Consciousness operates based on a sense faculty (indriya), cognitive objects (viśaya), and attention (manaskāra),” and so on. This is the first reason. (b) Further, the six groups of consciousness are observed to be wholesome or unwholesome. This is the second reason. (c) Also, among the six groups of consciousness, the kind that would be comprised in morally neutral maturation is not observed. This is the third reason. (d) In addition, the six groups of consciousness operate [based on] distinct bases. With regard to this, it is not reasonable that only the specific [basis] by which it operates is appropriated by that [consciousness] and that the remainder is not appropriated. Even if [the remainder] is appropriated, this is not reasonable, because [it is] separate from [that type of] consciousness [in question]. This is the fourth reason. (e) Further, the fallacy of repeated appropriation of the body will result [without ālayavijñāna], for the visual and other [types of sense]-consciousness sometimes operate and sometimes do not. This is the fifth reason. …

Regarding this proof, my interpretation is slightly different from Schmithausen’s. I shall discuss this point in detail later (§3). For now, suffice it to say that the main point of this proof is upādāna, which in this context, I believe, means physiological maintenance of the body. Particularly noteworthy in this proof is point (d), which clearly implies that ālayavijñāna maintains not only any particular sense faculty but also the whole body. On this last point, Schmithausen and I agree.

The eighth proof reads as follows:

(viii) kena kāraṇāḥ ālayavijñāne cyutir api na yujyate / tathāhi
cyavamāṇasya vijñānam ěrdhvadehaṁ vā šītikurvad15 vijahāti, adhodehaṁ

13 For the source, see Hakamaya ([1978] 2001), pp. 360–361.
14 Strictly speaking, this supplement is problematic from the point of view of grammatical gender. This point will be discussed later in this paper (§3.1).
15 Hakamaya’s edition reads śītikurvan, which is based on Tatia ed., §9B(xiii) [13.17]. However, in Tatia’s edition this compound is printed as sotiṣekurvan. Here, soti is clearly a misprint and should be read śiti. On the other hand, -kurvan is a masculine form, but its grammatical gender should agree with the preceding viṃjānam (neuter). Thus, Sakuma (1996), p. 8 suggests emending it to the neuter form, sītikurvad. Grammatically speaking, however, the correct form is śītikurvad (see Whitney 1889, §§1091-94 [pp. 401–403]). I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to this point. One might also take into consideration the fact that the manuscript of the Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya used by Tatia appears to be a little inattentive to grammatical genders. See the discussion in §3.1 of this paper below.
vā / na ca manovijnānam kadācin na pravartate / ato ’py ālayavijñānasayaiva dehopādānakasya vigamād dehaśītatā upa[laj]bhaye dehāpratisaṃvedanā ca / na tu manovijnānasya / ato ’pi na yuyjate // (Hakamaya [1978]2001, p. 337)

For what reason is death not reasonable without ālayavijñāna? This is because the consciousness of a dying person leaves the top or bottom of the body cooling down the respective portions, but it is not the case that manovijnāna ever fails to operate. For this reason also, because this very ālayavijñāna that appropriates the body leaves [it], the cooling and senselessness of the body is observed, not because manovijnāna [leaves the body]. Therefore, [death] is not reasonable [without ālayavijñāna].

The interpretation of the line na ca manovijnānam kadācin na pravartate is difficult. Tibetan translations of the Viśṇucayasamgrahaṇī and the Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya and Chinese translations of the Viśṇucayasamgrahaṇī, the Xīnnyāng shēngjiào lùn 显揚聖教論, and the Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya 阿毘達磨雜集論 support the double negation. Thus, it is difficult to doubt the Sanskrit text here.

In Yamabe (2012), p. 216: en. 52 I tried to read this double negation in the sense of partial negation ("It is not the case that manovijnāna never operates"). On the other hand, logically the point of this proof must be that "ālayavijñāna can leave the body little by little, while this is not possible for manovijnāna [in other words, partial negation is possible only with ālayavijñāna and not with manovijnāna]" (Yamabe 2015a, p. 159).

On this matter, I referred to Speijer ([1886]1973) in Yamabe (2016) (pp. [8]–[9]). Regarding repeated negations, Speijer makes the following observations: na tatā kaścin na babhūva tarpitāḥ (Rāmāyaṇa 2.32.46) means “there was no one there but was made content” ([1886]1973, §406), but in fn. 4 to the same section, he states, “nādya bhokṣye na ca svapṣye na pāṣye na kaḍācana [Rāmāyaṇa 3.47.8] is an instance of emphatic denial by means of repeating the negation, unless the reading be false and we must read na pāṣye ca kaḍācana.” Based on these observations, two opposite interpretations of the line in question seem possible, namely, strong affirmation, “it is, however, not the case that manovijnāna ever fails to operate,” or emphatic denial, “manovijnāna, however, never operates.”

In Yamabe (2016) (pp. [8]–[9]) I also referred to the following passage from the Chéng wéishí lùn 成唯識論:

又契經說：諸有情類受生命終必住散心非無心定。若無此識生死時心不應有故。謂生死時身心煩悩，如睡無夢極闇絕時，明了轉識必不現起。又此六種轉識行相續不可知故，如無心位必不現行。六種轉識行相續有必可知，如餘時故。 (T31:16c23-28 [No. 1585])

16 yid kyi rnam par shes pa ni nam yang mi byang ba ma yin pas / (Hakamaya [1978] 2001, p. 338).
17 yid kyi rnam par shes pa ni nam yang mi byang ba ma yin te / (Hakamaya [1978] 2001, p. 338).
18 皆彼意識有時不轉 (T30:579c19 [No. 1579]).
19 皆彼意識有時不轉 (T31:565c19-20 [No. 1602]).
20 皆彼意識有時不轉 (T31:702a1-2 [No. 1606]).
Scriptures also say: “When various types of sentient beings are born or die, they definitely stay distracted but conscious, not unconscious or concentrated.” If this [ālaya-]vijñāna did not exist, the mind at the moments of birth and death [mentioned in these scriptural passages] could not exist. Therefore, ālayavijñāna must exist. Namely, upon birth and death, the body and mind are unclear and, as in a dreamless sleep or in a complete faint, clear functional consciousness definitely does not operate. Also, in these moments, the modes of cognition (ākāra) and the cognitive objects (ālambana) of the six types of functional consciousness are unperceivable. Therefore, as in unconscious states, they definitely do not operate. The modes of cognition and the cognitive objects of the six types of functional consciousness must always be perceivable as in other states.

I believe the meaning is as follows: When one is about to be born or die, one’s cognitions are unclear. Thus, the six types of clear functional consciousness (including manovijñāna), whose cognitive functions are always perceivable, cannot arise. Therefore, what makes sentient beings “conscious” as stated in these scriptural passages must be ālayavijñāna. Since just after the quoted portion the Chéng wéishí lún mentions gradual cooling down of the body either from the top or bottom at the moment of death (T31:17a13–14), the context is the same as that of the eighth proof of the Viniścayasaṁgrahamāṇī. Thus, based on Speijer’s observation and the Chéng wéishí lún passage, I tentatively interpreted the line in question, na ca manovijñānaṃ kadācin na pravartate, as “but manovijñāna never operates” in Yamabe (2016) (pp. [8]–[9]) and in the original draft for the present article. 21

This interpretation, however, met with critiques of several scholars. 22 Ogawa Hideyo 23 pointed out that the Rāmāyana 3.47.8ab quoted by Speijer, nādyā bhokṣye na ca svapsye na pāsyē na kadācana, reads in Tokunaga Muneo’s electronic text (available at http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/2_epic/ramayana/ram_03_u.htm, accessed March 8, 2018) as nādyā bhokṣye na ca svapsye na pāsyē ‘ham kadācana (3.45.8ab in this version). Thus, Speijer’s reservation applies, and this line cannot be quoted as an example of emphatic denial by means of repeated negations.

On the other hand, Lambert Schmithausen 24 and Daniel Stuart 25 suggested the possibility of the following interpretation: “it is not the case that manovijñāna is sometimes inoperative” (i.e., it is always operative; this would agree with the first interpretation of Speijer). Schmithausen further pointed out that the Chinese

21 In Yamabe (2015a), pp. 157–158, I argued that the issue of cognitive objects is irrelevant in the eighth proof of the Viniścayasaṁgrahamāṇī, but considering the passage from the Chéng wéishí lún quoted above, this might not necessarily be the case. This point requires further investigation. (In addition, in the same article, spaṣṭavyam [p. 149, line 24] should be read spaṣṭātva, and spaṣṭavya [p. 161, line 17] should be read spaṣṭātva.)

22 Matsumoto Shirō in a response (dated April 29, 2016) to Yamabe (2016); Daniel Stuart in his comments (dated July 5, 2016) on an earlier draft of the present paper; Ogawa Hideyo in a response (dated September 9, 2016) to Yamabe (2016); and one of the anonymous reviewers of the original draft of this article.

23 See the previous footnote.

24 Personal communication (September 13, 2016).

25 Personal communication (July 5, 2016).
translations of the relevant line of the *Viniścayamgraṇaḥ* by Paramārtha (意識常在身, “manovijñāna is always in the body,” T 31:1019a22 [No. 1584]) and by Xuanzang (彼意識有時不轉, “it is not the case that this manovijñāna sometimes fails to operate,” see nn. 18–20 of this paper) both support this interpretation.

According to the detailed description of the process of death and rebirth in the *Manobhūmi*, manovijñāna seems operative just before death and throughout the process of reincarnation because the being sees various visions and also has emotional reactions (Yamabe 2013, pp. 612–654).

The *Chéng wéishí lún* also says (just after the passage quoted above):

第六意識不住身故, 境不定故, 遍寄身中恒相續故, 不應冷觸由彼漸生. (T 31: 17a17-18)

Because the sixth mental consciousness (manovijñāna) does not stay in the body, because its cognitive object is unfixed, and because it always continues to operate universally relying on the body, coldness should not be gradually experienced based on the [mental consciousness].

The statement that manovijñāna always continues to operate seems to contradict the above quotation from the same text (T31:16c23-28 [No. 1585]). Perhaps a clear manovijñāna does not operate but an unclear one keeps operating, or the *Chéng wéishí lún* has some internal inconsistency.

Not everything is clear, but many of the relevant passages strongly suggest that manovijñāna is always operative even in one’s dying process. Thus, in this article I would like to adopt tentatively the translation given above (“it is not the case that manovijñāna ever fails to operate”).

In any case, when one reads this eighth proof in the *Viniścayamgraṇaḥ* in conjunction with the relevant passages from the *Manobhūmi* (see Yamabe 2013), the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §1.42, and the *Chéng wéishí lún* (T31:16a23-17a22), the point of this proof must be that when one is about to die, ālayavijñāna, not manovijñāna, leaves the body little by little, and the body becomes cold in the places that ālayavijñāna has already left. This again clearly indicates that in ordinary states ālayavijñāna physiologically maintains the whole body and keeps the body warm.

Thus, both the first and the eighth proofs seem to presuppose that ālayavijñāna pervades the whole body. This point is expressly stated in Yogācāra texts, including Sthiramati’s *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*:

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26 See also discussions in §3.4 of this article.
27 This was the possibility that I raised in Yamabe (2016), p. 10, fn. 15 and that Stuart also suggested (see fn. 21 above). The problem with this interpretation is that the first passage from the *Chéng wéishí lún* (T31:16c23-28 [No. 1585]) unconditionally states that the modes of cognition and the cognitive objects of the six types of functional consciousness must always be perceivable. Thus, this passage does not seem to presuppose the existence of an unclear manovijñāna.
28 See Yamabe (2015a), pp. 158–160.
29 Cf. *Ālayavijñāna*, §3.7.1; *Genesis*, §121.2.2. + fn. 662; §234 + fn. 1282. Yokoyama (1979), p. 131 also discusses this passage from the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (Tibetan version).
kāyō 'tra sendriyam śaʿrīram / samantām hi śaʿrīram vyāpyālayaviṣṇānam vartate / (Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā, Kramer ed., 106.11-12)

Here, “body” means the body endowed with sensory faculties, for ālayavijñāna operates pervading the whole body.

2 The Sixth Proof and the Meaning of “Bodily Sensations”

Another noteworthy statement is found in the sixth proof:

(vi) kena kāraṇenāsaty ālayavijñāne kāyiko 'nubhavo na yujyate / tathaḥ ekatyasya yonisov a'sōv a'sōv cintayato va anuvitarkayato va samāhitacetaso viṣṇārakārās te na bhaveyur upalabhyante ca / tasmaḥ apy ālayavijñānam //

(Hakamaya [1978]2001, pp. 335–336)

For what reason is bodily sensation not reasonable without ālayavijñāna? This is because various and multifarious bodily sensations arise in the body of a person who is thinking or pondering properly or improperly, whose mind is concentrated or not. These [sensations] would not exist or be observed [without ālayavijñāna]. For this reason also, ālayavijñāna exists.

This proof states that since there is ālayavijñāna, manifold bodily sensations are experienced regardless of the state of the conscious mind, which, in light of such expressions as “thinking” (cintayataḥ) and “pondering” (anuvitarkayataḥ), must primarily refer to manovijñāna.

2.1 Praśrābdhi

Here, what is particularly problematic is the compound samāhitacetasah (“for someone whose mind is concentrated”). According to the Abhidharma/Yogaśāstra system, kāyavijñāna does not operate from the second dhyāna upward, so the explanation of bodily sensations presents a difficulty. 31

30 na hi tat tayoh kāyikam yujyate / samāpamasya vijñānakāyabhāvat (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Samāpattinirdesa. Pradhan ed., 438.19-20).

“For it is unreasonable that the [pleasant sensation] in these two (i.e., the first and the second dhyānas) is bodily [sensation] because for a being who is in meditative absorption, the group of [five sense] viṣṇās do not exist.” (I have referred to Sakurabe, et al. 2004, p. 244).

Cf. 眼耳身識二界二地, 鼻舌兩識一界一地, 自類互作等無間縁. (Chéng wéishí lún, T31:40c7-8). “Visual, auditory, and tactile consciousness [operate] in two realms (kāma- and rūpa-dhātu) and two bhūmis (the first and the second dhyānas), and olfactory and gustatory consciousness in one realm (kāma-dhātu) and one bhūmi (kāma). Each [type of consciousness] functions as the samanantarapratyaya of [the subsequent moment of] the same [type of consciousness].”

31 The same problem is taken up in the Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya, §II.12 as well:

Because the five [types of sense] consciousness are not present [for] a concentrated one but because internal sensation will arise, … (T31:340a14-15 [No. 1597])
On this point, one might refer to the following line from the commentary on the sixth proof in the *Yúqiéshìdīlùn lǜezuàn* 瑜伽師地論略纂 by Cīè¯n 慈恩: 32

法師云，身受即輕安觸身起受. (T43:172b1-10 [No. 1829])

The Dharma Master says that the *bodily sensation* [here] means the sensation caused by *meditative ease* (*praśrabdhi*) in contact with the body.

This statement attributed to the “Dharma Master” (in this context, Xuanzang 玄奘) is noteworthy. Namely, if we follow this interpretation, ālayavijñāna is somehow linked to the feeling of ease (*praśrabdhi*) experienced in meditation. 33

Using a Chinese commentary for interpreting an Indian text might be somewhat problematic, but Xuanzang’s view may well have been based on the information he had obtained in India and should not be treated lightly. We should further note that, as Schmithausen has already pointed out, 34 a somewhat comparable statement is found in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya* as well, which actually is a quotation from the *Xiǎnyāng shèngjiào lùn* (T31:487a3-6; concerning the *prāti-sukha* in the first and second *dhyānas*): 35

**prītiḥ katamā / yā parivṛttāśrayasya pravṛttivijñānāśritā cittatūṣṭih cittaud-bilyam cittahārṣaḥ cittakalyātā sātaṁ veditaṁ vedanāgatam / sukham katamat / yah** 36 parivṛttāśrayasyālayavijñānāśritā āśrayāṅgraḥa āśrayāḥlādāḥ sātaṁ veditaṁ vedanāgatam iti / (Tatia ed., §61H(iii) [61.1-5], corresponding to Yugagyō Shisō Kenkyūkai ed., 409.11-15).

What is gratification? The satisfaction, delight, rapture, and soundness of *mind* based on the *pravṛttivijñānas* of [a practitioner] whose personal basis has been transformed. It is pleasant feeling subsumed under *vedanā*. What is bliss? The benefit and pleasure of the *body* based on the ālayavijñāna of [a practitioner] whose personal basis has been transformed. It is pleasant feeling subsumed under *vedanā*.

Here the expression *parivṛttāśrayasya*, “of [a practitioner] whose personal basis has been transformed,” indicates that this is a discussion of the state achieved through the practice of meditation. In the early model of āśrayaparivṛtti found in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, *daūṣṭhulya* is replaced by *praśrabdhi* in this way:

Footnote 31 continued

When none of the five [types of sense] consciousness is present in concentration in a material realm, internal sensation arises in the physical body.

32 A similar statement is found in the *Yuqiélùn jì* 瑜伽論記 (T42:595b16 [No. 1828]) by Doryun 道倫.

33 A similar view is found in Ālayavijñāna, §3.7.2 + 2:683–685. In this work, however, Schmithausen does not refer to the *Yuqiéshìdīlùn lǜezuàn* or the *Yuqiélùn jì*. He bases his argument on the Xiānyāng shèngjiào lùn quoted below. In his discussion of my argument in *Genesis*, Schmithausen takes these Chinese commentaries into consideration (see fn. 34).

34 Ālayavijñāna, en. 297.

35 喜者謂已轉依者依於轉識心悦心勇心適心調安適受所攝。樂者謂已轉依者依阿賴耶識能攝所依令身怡悅安適受所攝。See also Ālayavijñāna, §§5.4.2-3, where it is suggested that the *kāyiko 'mūbhavaḥ* in the Proof Portion may have something to do with *daūṣṭhulya* and *praśrabdhi*.

36 Tatia’s edition has *yad*. Corrected following the suggestion in Ālayavijñāna, en. 297.
In the [preceding passage], the extinction of the personal basis [means that] for a person engaged in the practice of preliminary meditation, the personal basis accompanied by inertness gradually disappears, and the personal basis accompanied by ease evolves.

In the Xiängyang shêngjiào lûn quotation in the Abhidharmasamuccayabhâsya, the word praśrabdhi does not appear. Nevertheless, prîtî and sukha there clearly refer to the meditative comfort one feels in mind and body respectively, and sukha is based on ālayavijñāna. If so, it is certain that in the Yogācāra School people somehow linked meditative comfort to ālayavijñāna.

In the Abhidharma and Yoga-śarā literature, āśraya without contextual specification often means “body.” In the Xiängyang shêngjiào lûn passage also, the āśraya juxtaposed with citta is most likely used in that sense. This also suggests that āśrayaparivṛtti is not only spiritual but also physical transformation.

However, as early as the Pravr̥tti Portion, ālayavijñāna is said to be associated only with neutral (aduhkhāsukha) sensation (Hakamaya [1979]2001: §1.2.(b)B.4.). If so, the link between “various and multifarious bodily sensations” (in the sixth proof) or sukha (in the Xiängyang shêngjiào lûn passage) and ālayavijñāna is problematic. Further, the mental functions associated with ālayavijñāna are considered very subtle, and thus any sensation associated with it might not be something a practitioner could be easily aware of, as Schmithausen points out (Genesis, §8.3).

2.2 Upādāna

Regarding the expression ālayavijñānāśrīta, “based on ālayavijñāna,” in the Xiängyang shêngjiào lûn passage, the explanation of the Chinese commentary, the Yûqiélùn jì 瑜伽論記 (T42:595c2-8 [No. 1828]), might give us some clue:

若在散心有思慮位，由有頜耶執持五根及五識相應身受種子，若遇外緣身受得生。言或處定心者，處有心定五識不行。若有外緣觸身，頜耶捨受於中領納，名爲身受。又由頜耶執持在定五根及五識相應身受種子，若有外緣觸身，五識身受依根而起。

If one is at a stage of distracted mind and [discursive] thought, since there is ālayavijñāna that appropriates (zhichi 執持) the five sense faculties and the

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37 Note also that in the commentary on this quotation of the Abhidharmasamuccayabhâsya, we find the expression prasrabdhisukha (Taaīa ed., §61(H)(iii) [61.7]; Yugagyô Shisô Kenkyûkai, ed., 409.17).

38 Note the expression āśrayopadāna seen in the first proof in the Proof Portion. Mental elements are usually not appropriated in the Abhidharma/Yogācāra system. An exception is found in the Trimsikāvijñaptibhâṣya, Buescher ed., 52.4-5: tatrādhyâtmaṃ upādānam parikalpiitasva-bhâvabhineśevâsānañī sadhisthânam indriyârâpam nãma ca. Here nãma refers to mental skandhas. See Genesis, §240.3.1-4. See also ibid., fn. 1529. For the meaning of āśraya, see also nn. 66–67 of this paper.
seeds of the bodily sensations associated with the five [sense] vijñānas, bodily sensations can arise if one encounters external objects. If one’s mind is concentrated, the five [sense] vijñānas do not operate in a conscious concentration (samādhi). If an external object is in contact with the body, the neutral sensation of ālayavijñāna perceives it there, and it is called bodily sensation. Also, since ālayavijñāna appropriates the five sense faculties in concentration and the seeds of bodily sensations associated with the five [sense] vijñānas, if an external object is in contact with the body, bodily sensations associated with the five [sense] vijñānas arise based on the sense faculties.

This is a fairly doctrinal argument and may not directly reflect actual practice. Nevertheless, the idea that ālayavijñāna “appropriates” (or, maintains [zhìchí 執持, *ā-dā-]) 39 the five sense faculties, and that based on these sense faculties bodily sensations arise is noteworthy. Unlike saṃprayukta, which is a technical term meaning the association between a vijñāna and its mental functions (citta, caitsā dharmāḥ), 40 āśrita may have a broader meaning. Therefore, if ālayavijñāna maintains the body, and if the maintained body makes the perception of meditative comfort possible, presumably that kind of indirect dependence could also be āśrita. At least that kind of understanding is suggested by this Chinese commentary. If we follow this interpretation, even if the meditative comfort is not directly associated with ālayavijñāna, it could still be “based on” ālayavijñāna in an indirect way.

Regarding the significance of (upa-)ā-dā-, we should further refer to the Abhidharmic definition of upātta, “appropriated.” 41

What does “appropriated” mean? [It means] something that is taken hold of as the [physical] basis [of a being] by [his/her] mind and its functions because [the physical basis and the mind and its functions] are consonant with each other in terms of benefit and harm. [This is] what is called “sentient” in the world.

See also a more directly relevant passage from the *Pañcavi-jñānakāyasamprayuktā-manobhūmi-viniscaya.

39 The Yúqiélùn jì is a Chinese commentary but is obviously based on the Indian text, the Yogācārabhūmi, in which zhìchí 執持 in general corresponds with ā-dā-. (Yokoyama and Hirosawa 1996, p. 444, s.v. shūju 執受). Needless to say, ā-dā- and upa-ā-dā- are closely connected.

40 According to the Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā bhūmiḥ, for citta and caitsā dharmāḥ to be samprayuktā, they must satisfy the following four conditions:

sahāyāh katamah / tatsahabhūsamprayuktās caitasā dharmāḥ / … te punar (1) ekālambanā (2) anekākārāḥ (3) sahabhuvāsa (4) caikaikavṛttauṣa ca / (Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā bhūmiḥ [Yogācārabhūmi, Bhattacharya ed., 5.12–15])

What are the accompaniments? Mental elements that are coexisting and associated with the [visual consciousness]. … Also, they share (1) the same cognitive object but not (2) the cognitive mode. They are (3) coexisting and (4) operating one by one.

41 See Yokoyama (1979), pp. 128–129.
de la rnam par shes pa gnas pa dang mi gnas pa ni zin pa'i gzugs gang yin pa
de ni ram par shes pa gnas pa zhes bya ste / de yang ram par shes pa dang '
dres pa grub pa dang bde ba gcig pa'i don gyis42 'jug pa gang yin pa dang /
tshor ba rnam skye ba'i rten43 du gyur pa gang yin pa'o // de las bzlog pa ni
ma zin pa yin par rig par bya'o 44 / (Pek. Sems-tsam, Zi 41b1-2; D. Sems-tsam,
Zhi 39a4-5)45

Within that [rūpa-skandha], [there are] inhabited by vijñāna and not
inhabited by vijñāna. Regarding this [distinction,] appropriated rūpas are
called [rūpas] inhabited by vijñāna. These [rūpas] are those that are mingled
with vijñāna and arise in the manner of sharing the same destiny [with vijñāna]
(ekayogakṣema) and those that become the basis for generating sensations
(vedanā). Contrary to those should be understood to be the uappropriated
[rūpas].

It is likely that the sixth proof in the Viniścayasamgrahanī presumes this kind
of system. Since the mind “appropriates” (upa-ā-dā-) the body, the body remains
sentient and becomes the basis for generating sensations.46 If so, the interpretation
of the Yūqiélùn jì is in agreement with Indian sources. The sixth proof does not
necessarily mean that ālayavijñāna itself directly experiences (or is associated with)
various sensations. Rather, it may merely mean that since ālayavijñāna physiologically
maintains the body and keeps it sentient, various bodily sensations become
indirectly possible.

2.3 Ekayogakṣema

Another noteworthy point of these quotations is that they consider the states of
the body and mind to be correlated. This mind-body correlation in terms of benefit and
harm (anugrahapaghāta) is referred to as ekayogakṣema or anyonyayogakṣema in
Yogācāra texts.47 In the following example, anugrahapaghāta and anyonyayo-
gakṣema are clearly connected.48

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42 Pek. gyi.
43 D. don.
44 Pek. om. 'o.
45 The corresponding Chinese version is as follows: 識執不執者, 若識依執名執受色, 此復云何. 謂識
    所託安危事同和合生長. 又此依能生諸受. 與此相違非執受. (T30:593c28-594a2).
46 Cf. 有說, 於彼剄破裂時, 生苦痛捨捨名有執受. 與此相違名無執受. (*Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā
    阿毘達磨大毘婆舍論, T27:712c9-11 [No. 1545]).
Somebody maintains: [A body that] generates pain and makes one throw away a shoulder pole
[inadvertently] when cut, stabbed, or burst is called an “appropriated [body].” Otherwise, it is called an
“unappropriated [body].”
47 See Yokoyama 1979, pp. 131–136; Genesis, §§126-129.2.5.
48 See also the well-known early occurrence of ekayogakṣema in the Sandhinirmocanasūtra, §V.3:
    *ālayavijñānam ity apy ucayte, yaduta tasyāsmān kāya ālayanapralayatām upādāya ekayo-
gakṣemārthena (Reconstruction by Schmithausen, Genesis, §122.1). The Mahāyānasamgrahanabhāsyā,
    §II.12 (Pek. Sems-tsam, Li 173b7-8; T31:340a16-18) is also relevant.
cittavaśena (citta=ālayavijñāna) ca tan (=kalala-rūpaḥ) na pariklidyate, tasya ca anugrahopaghātāc cittacaittañām anugrahopaghātah / tasmāt tad anyonyayogakṣemam ity ucayate / (Quoted from Ālayavijñāna, en. 184, corresponding to Manobhūmi [Yogācārabhūmi, Bhattacharya ed., 24.16-17])

By the power of the mind (ālayavijñāna), that [body of the kalala] does not decay, and due to the benefit and harm of that [kalala], the benefit and harm of mind and its functions [are brought about]. Therefore, they are said to share the same destiny.

In this passage, the context is a description of an embryo just after conception. Thus, it has no direct relevance to meditation. However, in some contexts, anugraha is expressly linked to praśrabdhi.

anugrahāhikā prasrabdhiḥ, tayā kāyacittānugrahakaraṇāt / (Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya, Tatia ed., §92(iv)(b), p.87; Yugagyō Shisō Kenkyūkai ed., 565.6; T31:740a22-23)49

“What benefits” means meditative ease, because [meditative ease] benefits the body and mind.

Also, regarding upaghāta (or a similar word), we can find this statement (though this one is less clear than the previous line):

顚重差別者，謂欲界中顚重顚而損害. (Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn, T31:484c28)

In regard to the classification of dauṣṭhulya, in kāmadhātu, dauṣṭhulya is gross and harmful.

Both praśrabdhi and dauṣṭhulya have explicitly practical connotations. Recall also that in the Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn (cited in the Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya) passage on prīti and sukha quoted above, meditative sukha was defined as āśrayānugraha, “benefit to the body.” Thus, it is likely that anugraha and upaghāta shared by the body and ālayavijñāna can refer to meditative ease and non-meditative inertness.50 I suspect that this mind-body correlation is relevant to the mind-body transformation in the process of āśrayaparivṛtti.

2.4 Dauṣṭhulya and Praśrabdhi

Accordingly, my understanding is that ālayavijñāna physiologically maintains the body and keeps it sentient and thus indirectly makes various bodily sensations possible. I think if we understand the relevant passages this way, it also solves Schmithausen’s question. As I have briefly mentioned (§2.1), he argues that

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49 This passage appears in the context of bhāvanā.

50 I am not arguing that anugraha and upaghāta always correspond to praśrabdhi and dauṣṭhulya. Ekayogakṣema is a term signifying the body-mind interrelationship in general, but I understand that the body-mind interrelationship in meditative context is also included in this concept. I gave a separate paper on the body-mind interrelationship in Yogācāra at an international symposium, entitled “Mārga: Paths to Liberation in South Asian Buddhist Traditions” held at Austrian Academy of Sciences, Viena, on December 17–18, 2015 and now this paper is being reviewed for publication.
according to the Śrāvakabhūmi, praśrabdhi becomes intensive and easily perceivable as meditation progresses, as seen in this passage:

tasyaivam ātāpino viharato yāvad vinīya loke <'>bhidyādaurmanasyām pūrvam eva samyakprayoga<sa>mārambahākleŚ sūkṣmā <cittaikāgratā kāya>cittapraśrabdhir [ca]Ś durupalakṣyā pravartate / yā tatra śamathamŚ vā bhāvyātā vipāyitamŚ vā prasvasthacittatā prasvasthakāyatā cittaikāgyakarmanatā, iyam atra kāyacittapraśrabdhīḥ / tasya saiva sūkṣmā cittaikāgratā cittākāyapraśrabdhīś cābhivardhamānā audārikām sūpalakṣyām cittaikāgratām <cītta>kāyapraśrabdhīṁ āvahati, yaduta hetupārampyādānayogenaŚ tasya nacirasyedānām audārikā cittaikāya-praśrabdhīś cittaikāgratā ca sūpalakṣyotpatsyatītī ... (Śrāvakabhūmi, Sakuma 1990b, Part 2, 26.3-27.1 [§G.2], referred to by Schmithausen [Genesis, §8.3, fn. 30])

For the [practitioner who is] thus eagerly practicing, when he first undertakes the correct preliminary practice as soon as he has removed desire and dejection with regard to the world, subtle mental concentration [and] not easily perceivable meditative ease of the body and mind arise.Ś There, the soundness of the body and mind, namely the well-functioning stateŚ of the mind and body of [the practitioner] who is practicing calming or contemplation, is the meditative ease of the body and mind here. The same subtle mental concentration and the meditative ease of the mind and body of the [practitioner], while increasing, bringŚ about intensive and easily perceivable mental concentration and the meditative ease of the mind and body. Namely, in the manner of successive causality, intensive and easily perceivable meditative ease of the mind and body and mental concentration will now arise for him shortly.

According to Schmithausen, this description does not fit well with ālayavijñāna, “which is essentially subtle and hard to perceive, inaccessible to a person who has not yet seen the Truth(s)” (Genesis, §8.3).Ś

As we have discussed above, however, this does not create a problem, since, in my understanding, ālayavijñāna by itself does not necessarily perceive various sensations.Ś As Schmithausen points out, the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī states that

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51 Sakuma ed., -arambha-.  
52 See Sakuma (1990b, Part 2, p. 26, fn. 161).  
53 Sic. Sandhi not observed.  
54 Sic. Sandhi not observed.  
55 Perhaps -ādāna- should be emended to -adāna-. See Sakuma (1990b), Part 2, p. 26, fn. 169.  
56 Note that the original pravartate has a singular form.  
57 This is how I understand karmanatā. For this word, see also Abe (2008).  
58 The original āvahati has a singular form.  
59 See the Pravṛtti Portion (Hakamaya [1979]2001, §I.1.B.1.) and the Nivṛtti Portion (ibid., §I.5.(b)B.2.).  
60 One might notice here a discrepancy between practitioners’ actual experience and the doctrinal requirements that the five sense vijñānas should not operate in meditative states and that ālayavijñāna should be associated only with neutral sensations.
ālayavijñāna is not accessible for those who have not seen the Truth(s). My suspicion is that what practitioners realize at darśanamārga is not merely the comfortable sensations in their body and mind, but also the existence of a hidden physiological basis that makes the bodily and mental sensations possible. I shall come back to this point later.

This passage from the Mahāyānasamgraha is also relevant here:

yang gnas ngan len gyi mtshan nyid dang / shin tu sphyangs pa’i mtshan nyid do // gnas ngan len gyi mtshan nyid ni nyo mongs pa dang nye ba’i nyo mongs pa’i sa bon gang yin pa’o / shin tu sphyangs pa’i mtshan nyid ni zag pa dang beas pa’i dge ba’i chos kyi sa bon gang yin pa ste / de med du zin na rnam par smin pas⁶¹ gnas kyi las su mi rung ba dang / las su rung ba’i bye brag mi rung bar ’gyur ro / (Mahāyānasamgraha, §1.61A [Nagao 1982, pp. 54–55])

*punar dausthulyalaksanām praśrabdhipraśrabdhi / kleśopakleśābīja / praśrabdhipraśrabdhi / sāsravakusāladharmābījaṃ⁶² / tasminn avidyamāne vipākāśrayasya karmanyākarmanyāviśeṣa na yujyate / (Reconstruction by Aramaki Noritoshi [Nagao 1982, p. 55]; partly emended by the present author)

Also, [there is ālayavijñāna] characterized by inertness and ease. [Ālayavijñāna] characterized by non-meditative inertness (dausthulya) is that which holds the seeds of primary and secondary defilements. [Ālayavijñāna] characterized by meditative ease (praśrabdhi) is that which holds the seeds of defiled wholesome dharmas. If this [distinction] does not exist, the distinction between the well-functioning (karmanya) and not well-functioning (akarmanya) [states of the] maturation-body is not reasonable.

Thus, the akarmanya and karmanya states of the body are based respectively on the dausthulya and praśrabdhi phases of ālayavijñāna. Since akarmanya and karmanya must be very concrete states of the body that are commonly experienced, this seems to be a concrete statement based on practitioners’ actual experience.

However, since dausthulyalaksanā and praśrabdhilaksanā are tied here to kleśopakleśābīja and sāsravakusāladharmābīja respectively, this may seem to be a doctrinal statement rather than a practical description.⁶³

Here, it is important to note that bīja as a technical term does not refer to some sort of material grain found in our body. It refers to the overall state of our personal (especially physical) existence. When our body is regulated by meditation and is

⁶¹ Sic, but should be read pa’i?
⁶² Original reconstruction: sāsravām kuśaladharmābījaṃ.
⁶³ Sometimes the bījas of kleśas are also called dausthulya:

de (=nyon mongs pa) nyid kyi sa bon ma spangs shing yang dag par ma bcom pa ni bag la nyal* (anusāya) zhes bya ste / gnas ngan len (dausthulya) kyang de yin no // (*Savitarkasavicārādi-bhūmi-viniścaya, Pek. Sems-tsam, Zi 118b2; T30:623a22-23; D. Sems-tsam, Zhi 113a6-7).
*D. adds ba.

The seed of the [kleśa] that is not abandoned or severed is called anusāya, and it is also dausthulya. This passage is quoted in Ālayavijñāna, en. 482. See also ibid., en. 495.
well functioning (karmanya), it does not give rise to kleśas, but when it is still uncontrolled and not well-functioning (akarmanya), it does produce kleśas, as stated in this passage:

… etac caiva katham bhaviṣyatye esām prahīṇah kleśa esām aprahīṇa iti / prāptau satyām etat sidhyati tadvigamāvigamāt / āśrayaviśeṣād etat sidhyati / āśrayo hi sa āryānām dārśana-bhāvanāmārgasāmarthāyāt tathā parāvrtyto bhavati yathā na punas tat-praheyaṇām kleśānām prarohasamartho bhavati / ato ’gnidagdhavṛihivad64 abijibhūte65 āśraye kleśānāṃ prahīṇakleśa ity ucyate / (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Pradhan ed., 63.17-20; see also Yamabe (1997), pp. 197–198; 444, en. 26)

[Question: If there is no prāpti (acquisition) as one of the cittaviprayuktasamskāras,] how [do you explain] the distinction between those who have abandoned defilements (kleśa) and those who have not? If prāpti exists, [the distinction] is made in terms of the association with or separation from the [prāpti].

[Answer:] This [distinction between noble and ordinary ones] is made in terms of the distinct states of the “bases” (āśrayaviśeṣa). [This distinction is possible] because the “basis” (āśraya) of noble ones is transformed (parāvrtya) by the power of the paths of seeing and practice (dārśanabhāvanāmārga), so that [the “basis”] is no longer capable of generating the defilements to be abandoned by the [paths of seeing and practice]. Therefore, when one’s “basis” has ceased to be the seed of defilements (abijibhūte āśraye kleśānām), like a grain of rice consumed by the fire, [that basis] is called that which has abandoned defilements.66

As I have already mentioned, “basis” (āśraya) without contextual specification frequently refers to the body.67 If so, I believe these passages show that Buddhist

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64 Text, -brihi vat.

65 Text, -avij-.  

66 As Hyōdō (1980), pp. 68–75 points out, in the system of the Abhidharma kośabhāṣya, bīja and bijabhāva have distinct meanings. As I shall discuss in the following footnote, bīja is identified with āśraya and nāmarūpa, namely the totality of a sentient being (centering on the body). On the other hand, bīja is defined as follows: What is this bijabhāva? It is the capacity of the body (ātmabhāva) that is engendered by kleśas and can give rise to kleśas (Pradhan ed., 278.20-21). The following chart shows this structure:

bīja=āśraya=nāmarūpa
bijabhāva=sakti

According to Ogawa (2005), p. 109 and Unebe (2015), p. 301, in Indian Grammatical treatises, bhāva refers to the existence (bhāva) of an attribute (guna) so that a word is applied to a certain entity (dṛavya). In the system of the Abhidharma kośabhāṣya, āśraya/nāmarūpa would be called bīja when it has the attribute (capacity) of giving rise to kleśas. I thank Professo Ogawa Hideyo for his assistance with the Indian Grammar.

67 In a portion just after the passage quoted above (Pradhan ed., 63.18-20), the Abhidharma kośabhāṣya states as follows: “What is this bīja? It is nāmarūpa capable of giving rise to fruits immediately or indirectly (after the passage of some time)” (Pradhan ed., 64.4-5). In the passage quoted in the main text above (Pradhan ed., 63.17-20), bīja is identified with āśraya (capable of giving rise to kleśas), and in the passage quoted in this footnote (Pradhan ed., 64.4-5), bīja is equated to nāmarūpa. Thus, this seems to imply the following equation: bīja=āśraya=nāmarūpa. If so, it follows that mental elements (nāma) are
meditation is not merely a mental practice. It is to a large degree a bodily practice as well.

The above passage from the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya would not presuppose ālayavijñāna, but in the system of Yogācāra, in which ālayavijñāna is closely linked to āśraya and maintains it, the transformation of āśraya is naturally inseparable from the transformation of ālayavijñāna.

2.5 On the Problem of “Direct Perception”

In a former article (Yamabe 2012, p. 204), I referred to the following passage from the Nivrūti Portion:

de de ltar zhugs shing nyan thos kyi yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la zhugs sam / byang chub sens dpa’i yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la zhugs te chos thams cad kyi chos kyi dbings rtogs par byed pa na / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa yang rtogs par byed de / der kun nas nyon mongs pa thams cad la yang dag par ’dus par bta zhis / de nang gi so so’i bdag nyid la phyi rol gyi mtshan ma’i ching ba dang / nang gi gnas ngan len gyi ’ching bas bdag nyid bcings pa rtogs par byed to // (Nivrūti Portion, §I.5.(b)B.2. Hakamaya [1979]2001, p. 405)

*sa evaṃ praviṣṭah śrāvakasyamaktyavijñāṇaṃ vāvakrāmya bodhisattvasamaktyavijñāṇaṃ vā sarvadharmadharmadhātum pratīvidhyatā ālayavijñānāṃ ca pratīvidhyati / sa ca tatra sarvān saṃkleśān samastatāḥ paśyati pratītātmanāḥ / ātmanāḥ bāhyanimittabandhanena caḥāyātmaṃdausthulyabandhanena ca baddham pratīvidhyati / (Reconstructed in collaboration with Aramaki)

Thus having realized [the truths], [the practitioner] attains the certitude of the supreme good (i.e., darśanamārga) for śrāvakas or for bodhisattvas and intuitively sees the Dharmadhātu of all the elements and ālayavijñāna. There, he in person sees all the defiled elements comprehensively. He intuitively sees himself to be bound by external bonds of cognitive appearances and internal bonds of non-meditative inertness (dausthulyabandhana).

Footnote 67 continued also included in āśraya. In addition, the Tīrīṅṅāṇapīṭihāṣīya has the following line: “āśraya means ātmabhāva, namely the physical sensory faculties with their bases and the mental elements (āśraya ātmabhāvac sādhīṣṭhānaṃ indriyāraṃ nāma ca)” (Buescher ed., 52.14-15). Here, āśraya, ātmabhāva, and sādhīṣṭhānaṃ indriyāraṃ nāma ca are equated (see Ālayavijñāna, p. 329, en. 372). In the case of āśraya-parivṛtti/-parāvṛtti also, as the Xīnyáng shēngjiào lùn passage quoted in the Abhidharmaśamucyayabhāṣya (cited above in the main body of this article [§2.1]) indicates, what is transformed is clearly the totality of the body and mind. “Personal basis (consisting of body and mind)” may be a more suitable translation of āśraya. Perhaps āśraya means “body” in its narrower sense and “the totality of personal existence” (i.e., body and mind) in its wider sense. In this article, depending on the context, I sometimes translate the word āśraya as “body” and sometimes as “personal basis,” but it should be noted that this distinction is not always clearcut. Nevertheless, as many passages quoted in this article show, it remains true that āśraya is often closely associated with the bodily side of human existence in the relevant texts.

68 To save space I do not quote the Chinese version here, but this reconstruction is based not only on the Tibetan but also on Paramārtha’s and Xuanzang’s Chinese versions. See also Ālayavijñāna, §10.1.
Schmithausen notes the following points regarding this passage. In the Nivr̐tti Portion, ālayavijñāna is defined as duḥkhasatya in the present life, what causes samudayasatya in the present life, and what causes duḥkhasatya in the future life. If so, since darśanamārga is traditionally defined as the first direct comprehension of the four āryasatyas, it is natural that the Nivr̐tti Portion states that ālayavijñāna is directly perceived at darśanamārga. Thus, he suspects that this statement was a prescriptive one based on the doctrinal framework of the Nivr̐tti Portion, rather than a description of actual experience (Genesis, §8.3).

Considering the usage of praśrabdhi and dauṣṭhulya in the Yogācāra literature, however, I have a contrary impression. I feel that this Nivr̐tti Portion passage was a description of practitioners’ actual experience. The passages I have discussed in this paper indicate rather strongly that praśrabdhi and dauṣṭhulya were something practitioners experienced directly in their practice. To be sure, praśrabdhi and dauṣṭhulya themselves were well-known from early on and nothing novel, but, in my opinion, what the Yogācāra practitioners realized anew was that the root of the praśrabdhi and dauṣṭhulya that they experienced was in a latent physiological substratum supporting their body and mind.

2.6 Meditative Comfort Pervading the Whole Body

The fact that some of the eight proofs presuppose that ālayavijñāna pervades the entire body might be connected with the old notion that pīti (prīti) and sukha pervade the whole body in meditation. For example, the Kāyagatāsatisutta states:

Puna ca paraṁ, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vivicc’ eva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkam savicāram vivekajam pītisukham pathamajjhānam upasampajja viharati. So imam eva kāyaṃ vivekajena pītisukhena abhisandeti parisandeti paripūreti parippharati, nāsa kiñcī sabbāvato kāyassa vivekajena pītisukhena apphutam hoti. (Kāyagatāsatisutta, Majjhima-Nikāya, No. 119, PTS ed., 3:92.23-28)

Further, monks, a monk, having been separated from lusts and unwholesome dharmas, attains and stays in the first [stage of] meditation endowed with gross and subtle thought, arising from the separation, and accompanied by gratification and bliss. He makes the gratification and bliss arising from the separation flow round, permeate, fill, and pervade his body. No part of his whole body is not pervaded with gratification and bliss arising from the separation.

As Anālayo (2014) has pointed out, the physical aspect is very important in the four stages of dhyāna. In this context, the body clearly plays a positive role. We should also note that the Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn passage (quoted in the Abhidharmanasamuccayabhāṣya) that ties sukha to ālayavijñāna is a discussion of the prīti-sukha in the first and second dhyānas. I think the experience of prīti-sukha filling the body in meditation may well have been behind the idea that ālayavijñāna fills the whole body.
3 The First Proof Reexamined

Finally, let us return to the interpretation of the first proof. Schmithausen analyzes the first proof into these three portions (Ālayavijñāna, §9.2, my paraphrase):

i.a-c: Appropriating the body at the moment of conception.
i.d: Keeping it appropriated as a whole.
i.e: Keeping it appropriated throughout life.

Namely, Schmithausen understands the first three arguments of this proof in the context of reincarnation.

On the other hand, in earlier articles (Yamabe 2012, pp. 186–187; Yamabe 2015a, pp. 139–145), I have expressed a view that the first proof does not concern conception. In my opinion, pūrvasamśkāraḥetuka, “caused by prior karmic acts,” does not refer to the process of reincarnation from the former life to the present life. It merely shows that the basic nature of ālayavijñāna is predetermined by one’s previous karma, and thus it does not change much throughout this life.

Schmithausen disagrees with my view (Genesis, fn. 1277[1]). In his opinion, since the eighth (last) proof concerns death, it is natural that the first proof concerns conception. Also, since one of the present conditions for “the traditional set of vijñānas” (pravruttiviññānas), namely indriya, is missing at the moment of pratisandhi, the argument (i.a) fits perfectly well with the moment of conception.

3.1 Material Supporting Schmithausen’s View

Schmithausen quotes the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā (Kramer ed., 107.3-6) and points out that this proof was understood in the context of pratisandhi by Sthiramati (Genesis, fn. 1277[2,]). Table 1 juxtaposes the relevant passages from Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī and Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā.

Undoubtedly, the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā here presupposes the entirety of the first proof in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī. It is also clear that portion (a) of the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā links argument (a) of the first proof to the moment of conception. This passage from the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā would indeed support Schmithausen’s argument.

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69 Cf. Table 1 (f) of this article.

70 On the discussion of ālayavijñāna in the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā, see Matsuda (2010).

71 Schmithausen further refers to Tsong-kha-pa’s Yid dang kun gzhi’i dka’ ’grel (and its commentary by Ke’u tshang) to support his argument (Genesis, fn. 1277[3,]). Tsong-kha-pa’s view seems to be in line with the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā passage quoted above and is probably based on Indian Yogācāra literature such as the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā itself. In this paper I limit the scope of my argument to Indian texts.
(a) pravartante, tatra
karmic maturation
kind that would be comprised in
morally neutral
Also, among the six groups of consciousness, the
reason.

(b) api ca
wholesome or unwholesome
observed to be
Further, the six groups of consciousness are
observed to be wholesome or unwholesome. This is
the second reason.

(c) api ca
Also, among the six groups of consciousness, the
kind that would be comprised in morally neutral
carmic maturation is not observed. This is the third
reason.

(d) api ca
In addition, the six groups of consciousness operate
[based on] distinct bases. With regard to this, when a
certain [type of] consciousness operates [based on its]
individual basis, it is not reasonable that only that [type of consciousness] is appropriated by that
[basis] and that the remainder is not appropriated. Even if [the remainder] is appropriated, this is not
reasonable, because [it is] separate from the
consciousness. This is the fourth reason.

(a) tac ca yat pravartante, tatra
karmic maturation
kind that would be comprised in
morally neutral
Also, among the six groups of consciousness, the
reason.

(b) na ca
In that situation, mental consciousness other [than
ālayavijñāna] cannot be what has been caused by
prior karmic acts, because it is either wholesome or
unwholesome. What has been caused by karmic acts is
always neutral, because it is karmic maturation.
And karmic maturation is understood to be
uninterrupted unlike the visual and other [types of consciousness].

(c) na ca
And no exclusively morally neutral type, which is
considered to be the consciousness of karmic maturation, can be observed other than
ālayavijñāna.

(d) api ca
In addition, because the six groups of consciousness
operate [based on] distinct bases, and because their
operation can be interrupted, it follows that the
whole personal basis cannot be appropriated.
Namely, when a certain [type of] consciousness operates [based on its]
individual basis, only that [particular basis] would be appropriated by that
[type of consciousness] but the remainder would be
unappropriated because [it is] separate from [that
type of] consciousness.
We should further note that there is a problematic line in argument (d) of the Viṇiścayasaṃgrahāṇī noted by Hakamaya ([1978]2001, pp. 355–356, en. 49; 359):

tad eva tenopāṭham syād, which literally would mean that vijñāna (neuter) is appropriated by āśraya (masculine).72 However, it is a standard tenet that vijñāna appropriates āśraya, and it is difficult to reverse this relationship (Yamabe 2002, p. 366; 2015a, p. 169, nn. 9-10). Moreover, if we interpret the line as “vijñāna is appropriated by the āśraya,” the word “remainder” (avaśīṣṭa) in the following line (avaśīṣṭasyaṇupāṭtateti na yujyate, upāṭtatēpi na yujyate vijñānavirahitatatayā) must logically refer to “the other vijñānas.” This amounts to saying, “The other vijñānas are separate from vijñāna,” which does not seem reasonable.73 In the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā, on the other hand, this line reads: sa eva tenopāṭhaḥ syāt, which should mean that āśraya (masculine) is appropriated by vijñāna (neuter). Obviously the latter reading makes better sense.74 Either the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā retains the original reading, or Sthiramati rectified the inattention to gender in the Viṇiścayasaṃgrahāṇī. In either case, Sthiramati’s statement is definitely significant.

72 See also Yamabe (2002), p. 366; Yamabe (2015a), p. 169, nn. 9-10.

73 It might be possible to interpret it as, “the other vijñānas are separate from the vijñāna in question,” however.

74 This was already pointed out by Matsumoto (2015), p. 390, fn. 29. In Yamabe (2015b), pp. 128–129, I overlooked Matsumoto (2015) (which appeared a little before I submitted the final draft) and noted the same point without referring to Matsumoto’s article. I apologize to Professor Matsumoto for my oversight.
3.2 Material Supporting Yamabe’s View

My own interpretation (Yamabe 2012, p. 214, en. 27; see also Yamabe 2015a, pp. 142–143) was based on the passage from the Chéng wéishí lùn 成唯識論 shown in the middle column of Table 2).

This Chéng wéishí lùn passage also shares a few key expressions with the first proof and thus is definitely relevant. What is characterized as vipāka in this passage is the neutral sensation associated with ālayavijñāna, but since ālayavijñāna and the associated mental functions share the basic characteristics, the same characterization also applies to ālayavijñāna itself. Vipāka is of course determined by one’s former karma, but I believe the main point of this passage is not the karmic continuity between the former and present lives, but the unchanging, stable nature of the sensation associated with ālayavijñāna (and of ālayavijñāna itself). Once a determinative karma (ākṣepaka-karma) has brought about its maturation (vipāka), its nature does not change throughout a person’s lifetime. On the other hand, pravṛttivijñānas depend on present conditions and thus are constantly changing and unstable. It seems to me that the point of the first proof of the “Proof Portion,” is that such unstable vijñānas cannot maintain the body throughout a lifetime. Only the stable ālayavijñāna is capable of that function.

We should further note that the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā itself also includes a similar statement, as shown in the right column of Table 2. Here, Sthiramati states that since ālayavijñāna is caused by former karmic acts, it is always vipāka only and is morally neutral. This is close to my view that the expression pūrva(karma) samskārahetuka refers to the stability of its fruition rather than the karmic continuity between the previous and present lives.

Thus, I believe that these later testimonies are equivalent. There is, indeed, a passage that supports Schmithausen’s interpretation, but my interpretation is also supported by the tradition. Therefore, we cannot decide conclusively based on these later interpretations. We need to return to the original text, the Viniścayasamgrahani, itself.

3.3 Two Types of Upādāna

Before discussing the first proof itself, I shall review some key concepts. As shown in the Mahāyānasamgraha, §I.5, there are two types of upādāna in the Yogācāra system:

ci’i phyir len pa’i rnam par shes pa zhes bya zhe na / (a) dbang po gzugs can thams cad kyi rgyu yin pa dang / (b) lus thams cad nye bar len pa’i gnas su gyur pa’i phyir te / ’di ltar (a) tshe ji srid par rjes su ’jug gi bar du des dbang po gzugs can lnga po dag ma zhig par nye bar gzung ba dang / (b) nying mtshams sbyor ba sbrel ba na yang de mngon par ’grub pa nye bar ’dzin pa’i phyir lus

75 See Chéng wéishí lùn, T31:12b1-5.
76 It should also be noted that in the subsequent portion of the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā, conception is mentioned. This point will be discussed later (Table 3).
(a) ālayavijñāna is caused by prior karmic acts whereas the visual and other [types of] functional consciousness are caused by present conditions. As has been said:

“Consciousness operates based on a sense faculty, cognitive objects, and attention,” and so on. This is the first reason. (b) Further, the six groups of consciousness are observed to be wholesome or unwholesome. This is the second reason. (c) Also, among the six groups of consciousness, the kind that would be comprised in morally neutral maturation is not observed. The mode of cognition (ākāra) of this [ālaya-]vijñāna is extremely unclear. It cannot discriminate the modes of favorable and unfavorable objects and subtly and coherently continues to operate. For this reason, [ālayavijñāna] is only associated with neutral sensation (upekṣā vedanā). This associated sensation is also karmic maturation (vāpāka) only. It operates following the determinative karma (ākeśa-karma) in a former life and does not depend on present conditions. Because it operates following the power of [former] wholesome and unwholesome karma, it is only neutral sensation. Unpleasant and pleasant sensations are derivatives of karmic maturation (vēpākajāta) and are not genuine karmic maturation. Because they depend on present conditions, they are not associated with this [ālayavijñāna]. Also, because this [ālaya-]vijñāna is always free from transformation, sentient beings always take it to be their inner self. If it is associated with unpleasant and pleasant sensations, it has transformation. Why can [sentient beings] take it to be [their] self? Therefore, it is only associated with neutral sensation.

The text has zhi 注 here, but based on the variant reading shown in fn. 1 on T31:12 and the Shindo 新尊 edition of Čcheng weishi lün 3:4-7, I emend it to rèn 任.

As shown in the subsequent explanation, the purport of this argument should be as follows: Pleasant and unpleasant sensations depend on present conditions and thus are not predetermined solely by the karma in a previous life. Therefore, they cannot be pure karmic maturations.

The First Proof (loc. cit.) Čcheng weishi lün (T31:11c29-12a8 [No. 1585]) Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā (Kramer ed., 93.1-6)

| ālayavijñāna | ālaya-vijñāna | ālayavijñāna |
|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| prārtvavijñānām | prārtvavijñānām | prārtvavijñānām |
| pārvasamarāhatakām | pārvasamarāhatakām | pārvasamarāhatakām |
| caksurādiprārvitvijñānam | caksurādiprārvitvijñānam | caksurādiprārvitvijñānam |
| punar vartamanapratyayāhetukām | punar vartamanapratyayāhetukām | punar vartamanapratyayāhetukām |
| yathoktam – indriyavijñānam akṣara vijñānaṁ pravṛttir bhavati vistarena idam prayatnam kāraṇam | yathoktam – indriyavijñānam akṣara vijñānaṁ pravṛttir bhavati vistarena idam prayatnam kāraṇam | yathoktam – indriyavijñānam akṣara vijñānaṁ pravṛttir bhavati vistarena idam prayatnam kāraṇam |
| (a) | (a) Ālayavijñāna is caused by prior karmic acts whereas the visual and other [types of] functional consciousness are caused by present conditions. | Functional consciousness [belongs to] the wholesome, defiled, or neutral class, but ālayavijñāna [belongs to] one class. There, in the first place, ālayavijñāna is associated only with the five omnipresent (sarvatraga) mental functions, namely attention (manaskāra), contact (sparśa), sensation (vedanā), ideation (saṃjñā), and volition (cetanā). Since ālayavijñāna, together with its associates, is caused by karmic acts in a previous [life], it is invariably karmic maturation only and [belongs] only to the neutral class. |
gzung ba yin te / de lta bas na de len pa’i rnam par shes pa zhes bya’o / (Mahâyânasamgraha, §I.5 [Nagao 1982, p. 11])

*[kim kâraṇam ādânavijñânam ity ucyaṭe / — (a) sarvarûpîndriyopâdânatvena (b) sarvâtmabhâvopâdânâśrayatvena ca / tathâhi (a) tena pañca rûpîndriyâny upâdiyante ’vinâśya yâvad âyur anuvartate / (b) pratisamdhibandhe ca tadabhînhirvrttyupâdânatvenâtma-bhâva upâdiyate / evâm tad ādânavijñânam ity ucyaṭe / (Reconstruction by Aramaki found in Nagao 1982, pp. 11–12, slightly modified by the present author)]

[Question:] For what reason is [ālayavijñâna also] called ādânavijñâna?
[Answer:] (a) [Ālayavijñâna is called ādânavijñâna] because it appropriates all the material sense faculties, and (b) because it is the basis for appropriating all [types of] bodies. Namely, (a) the five sense faculties are appropriated by it so that they do not perish throughout the duration of life, and (b) at [the moment of] conception, the body is appropriated by means of appropriating its actualization. Thus, it is called ādânavijñâna.

Namely, (a) the appropriation of the body throughout life, and (b) the appropriation of a [new] form of existence at the moment of conception. Here, the second type of appropriation refers to the crucial moment of pratisandhi at which a new form of existence is assumed. In that sense it is different from the first type of upâdâna, which refers to the maintenance of the body one has attained at the moment of conception.

3.4 Paul Griffiths’ Interpretation

Regarding the first proof of the Viniścayasaṅgrahaṇī, Paul Griffiths (1986, p. 98) says (emphasis added):

Yet if this is true, and if a complete account of conscious experience (the ‘functioning consciousnesses’) can be given without reference to past events, then no place is allowed for the causal efficacy of karma, of actions performed in the past. And this in turn would mean that no account could be given of why a particular individual ‘appropriates’ or takes on a particular body, rather than some other, when reborn, since the event of being reborn cannot involve any of the six functioning consciousnesses and thus has to be explained by the causal efficacy of past actions. And it is here that the store-consciousness

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77 Here and below, I have converted the text into the Wylie transliteration system.
78 The original reconstruction: pañcarûpîndriyâny.
79 See Nagao (1982), p. 85; Sasaki (1982), pp. 186, 192; Genesis, §273. Sasaki links this second type of appropriation to sopâdânavijñâna, which, according to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, etc., takes hold of existence in the next life. On the other hand, in the pratîyasaṅputpâda passages, largely identical in the Savitarkasavicärâdi-bhûmi and the Vâstusamgrahaṇī, we find the expression hetuvijñânapratyayam pratisandhiphalavijñâna (Harada 2004, p. 144; I thank Mr. Harada for drawing my attention to this passage). Sopâdânavijñâna in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, etc., probably corresponds to the hetuvijñâna in the pratîyasaṅputpâda passages of the Yogacârabhûmi. It appears that at the moment of conception, the consciousness is already phalavijñâna.
comes in as an explanatory category, for it is the store-consciousness, caused as our text says by ‘prior karmic formations,’ which can provide a locus for karmic effect\(^\text{80}\) and thus an explanation of how the rebirth process occurs.

Thus, in his opinion the point of this proof is the causal link between the past life to the present one. In his understanding, the explanation of the causal link between the past karma (cause) and the new existence (effect) is impossible without ālayavijñāna. Once a being has entered the womb, no alteration of the type of existence is possible. So, clearly he understands that this proof discusses the moment when a new type of existence is taken hold of. In other words, in his understanding, this proof refers to the second type of upādāna of the Mahāyānasamgraha, §I.5.

As Schmithausen points out while discussing Matsumoto’s argument, in the first proof of the Viniścayasamgrahani, at least points (d) “appropriation of all the sense faculties” and (e) “continuous appropriation” of the first proof clearly refer to the first type of appropriation in the Mahāyānasamgraha, §I.5 (the appropriation of the body throughout life [Genesis, §233\(^\text{81}\)]). It is strange that Griffiths does not consider this possibility at all.\(^\text{82}\) As I have pointed out, it is noteworthy that the word pratisandhi, or any similar expression, does not appear at all in the first proof (see Yamabe 2012, p. 187).

Also, Griffiths argues that “the event of being reborn cannot involve any of the six functioning consciousnesses,” but according to the detailed description of the process of rebirth in the Manobhūmi of the Basic Section of the Yogācārabhūmi, at least manovijñāna and cakṣurvijñāna are operative during the period of antarābhava. See the following quotations:

\[
tasya ca diya\text{cakṣur i}va ca\text{c}ṣur na vyāhanyate yāvad upapattyāyatanāt / (\text{Manobhūmi [Yogācārabhūmi, Bhattacharya, ed.], 19.9; Yamabe (2013), p. 619})
\]

His eyes, which are like divine eyes, reach as far as the place of his [future] rebirth without being obstructed.

\[
saceta\text{ t}ṣrī bhavitukāmo bhavati puruṣe saṃrāgaḥ saṃväsecchotpadyate / sacet pu\text{ruṣo bhavitukāmo bhavati tasya striyām saṃrāgaḥ saṃväsecchotpadyate / tatas tatsamīpaṃ ca gacchi\text{t} / striyāś ca s\text{tryapagamanecchotpadyate pu}rūṣas\text{asya ca pu}rūṣāpaganecchā / (\text{Manobhūmi [Yogācārabhūmi, Bhattacharya, ed.], 23.6-9; Yamabe (2013), p. 641})
\]

\(^{80}\) I understand that “karmic effect” is equivalent to “causal efficacy of past actions” mentioned just above.

\(^{81}\) “… what is at stake here is hence not the taking hold of a new existence or basis-of-existence (ātmabhāva) in the sense of the whole psycho-physical personality but the ‘biological’ appropriation ….”

\(^{82}\) Griffiths interprets even point (d) as “appropriation of a new physical body at the moment of a new birth.” However, here “the moment of a new birth” must be meant to be the moment of conception. If so, it does not make sense to appropriate the indriyas that have not been formed yet at the stage of conception.
If [the being to be reborn] desires to become female, *passion* driving to intercourse arises toward the man. If [it] desires to become male, *passion* driving to intercourse arises in it for the woman. Thereupon, it approaches them, and for [a being who would become] female, the wish to be away from the woman arises, whereas for [a being who would become] male, the wish to be away from the man [arises].

Here, the first passage clearly shows that a being sees things during the period of *antarābhava*, while the second one states that the being develops passion (*samrāga*) just before entering the womb, which means that its *manovijñāna* is operative then. Thus, we cannot simply assert that *pravṛttivijñānas* are not involved in the process of rebirth. The role of *pravṛttivijñānas* in the process of rebirth is not entirely clear, but in any case Griffiths’ attempt to understand the entirety of the first proof in the context of causal link in the process of rebirth would be difficult for the reasons stated above.

### 3.5 Lambert Schmithausen’s Interpretation

Meanwhile, Schmithausen’s argument needs to be treated separately from Griffiths’, but he also understands that the first half of the first proof (arguments a-c) refers to the situation just after conception. As we have seen, such an interpretation did exist in later Yogācāra tradition in India, but a different interpretation also existed. Therefore, we cannot determine the interpretation of the first proof based on these later interpretations and need to come back to the first proof itself. When I reread the first proof keeping Schmithausen’s comments in mind, I still do not think that it refers primarily to the process of reincarnation or the moment of conception.

First, as I have already stated, *pratisandhi* is not mentioned at all in this proof. This point should not be treated lightly.

Then, regarding argument (a) of the first proof, it would be a matter of course that the surface layers of mind (i.e., *pravṛttivijñānas*) are not (at least, fully) operative in early stages of pregnancy because the sense faculties are still not formed.\(^{83}\) If so, obviously *pravṛttivijñānas* cannot physiologically maintain the body. To my mind, it does not make much sense to discuss something self-evident. On the other hand, in the context of daily cognition after birth, it is meaningful to compare *pravṛttivijñānas*, which depend on present conditions and are changeable, and *ālayavijñāna*, which is predetermined by past karma and is unchangeable. If we interpret argument (a) this way, we can easily understand that such *pravṛttivijñānas* change their moral nature depending on present conditions (argument [b]) and are often interrupted (argument [e]), again depending on present conditions. Thus, we can understand the entirety of the first proof coherently.

In addition, Schmithausen understands arguments (b) and (c) also as referring to the situation just after conception. Here also, since (at least most of) the *pravṛttivijñānas* are not operative yet, it does not seem reasonable to discuss the moral nature of something nonexistent, or to discuss whether or not it is karmic maturation. It makes much better sense in the daily context after birth, in which *pravṛttivijñānas* routinely arise.

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83 Perhaps *kāyavijñāna* and *manovijñāna* may be exceptions. See Yamabe (2013), pp. 650, 654.
Considering these points, I believe the most natural interpretation of the first proof is that it compares the functions and characteristics of the pravṛttivijñānas and ālayavijñāna during one’s lifetime after birth. In this way, we can understand the entirety of the first proof in one context, namely physiological maintenance of the body throughout life (primarily after birth), and the arguments of this proof can be understood coherently. The fact that this proof is the first of the eight proofs does not necessarily mean that it is connected to the first moment of life. It does not seem to me that the eight proofs are arranged in such a systematic way.

I should add, however, that my statement in Yamabe (2012) was primarily directed at Paul Griffiths. I cannot agree with his interpretation for the reasons stated above. However, we cannot treat Schmithausen’s argument in the same way. Schmithausen translates the second type of appropriation in the Mahāyānasamgraha, §I.5 as “taking hold of a new existence/body,” “appropriating a new body” (Genesis, §130.2.3; §202; §233) and so forth, but in Genesis, fn. 1277 under discussion, he uses the expression, “biological’ appropriation of the body.” Thus, it is certain that he understands all parts of the first proof as discussions of the first type of appropriation in the Mahāyānasamgraha, §I.5. (This point is expressly stated not only in §233, quoted above, but also in §23584 of Genesis).85

If I can understand Schmithausen’s argument this way, it may not fundamentally contradict my own view. Once a vijñāna has merged with the (still undeveloped) body (i.e., the embryo), the same basic mechanism of physiological maintenance would operate, and this mechanism lasts until the moment of death. I have no theoretical reason to rule out this interpretation. Thus, though I understand the first proof primarily to refer to the mechanism of upādāna after birth, theoretically it should be possible to extend the same mechanism to the embryonic stage as well. In that sense, my understanding might not be so radically different from Schmithausen’s.

84 “Thus, this argument of the ‘Proof Portion’ is concerned with ‘biological’ appropriation only, …”
85 However, there is one point of Schmithausen’s argument that is unclear to me. On the one hand, he states:
According to the first reason, this cannot be achieved by the six pravṛttivijñānas—visual awareness, etc.—because they originate from present conditions, viz., from a sense faculty, an object, and an act of attention (manaskāra). This would seem to mean that they presuppose the ‘linking up’ (pratisandhi) of the new life and hence the ‘appropriation’ of its basis as having already taken place. (Genesis, §231, emphasis added [similarly below])
On the other hand, he states:
I would find it quite unnatural if this important aspect were not also taken into account, and the place where it would naturally be expected is surely at the very beginning, just as the death argument is placed at the very end. Actually, the very first reason of the first proof (i(a)) is perfectly appropriate for this purpose: the traditional set of vijñānas results from present conditions, among which at least one, the sense faculty, is lacking at the moment of ‘linking up’, because it exists only in a living, sentient organism and hence presupposes that ‘biological appropriation’ has already taken place. (Genesis, fn. 1277 [1.1])
In the first statement, he seems to be thinking that the first reason of the first proof presupposes that the body has already been appropriated (i.e., conception has already taken place). In the second statement, he says that the sense faculty is missing at the stage of conception and that it exists only in an organism that has already been appropriated. This seems to imply that the first reason of the first proof concerns the stage at which “biological appropriation” has not taken place yet (i.e., before conception). Thus, these two statements seem contradictory to me, but this may simply be a matter of my insufficient comprehension. Therefore, I refrain from further argument on this point here.
I believe the same interpretation is also supported by the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.35, which clearly discusses a situation after reincarnation.

nyin mtshams sbyor ba sbrel zin pa rnam kyi dbang po gzugs can ’dzin par byed pa yang de las gzhan mam par smin pa’i rnam par shes par mi ’thad de / de ma yin pa’i rnam par shes pa gzhan rnam ni (i) gnas so sor nges pa dang (ii) mi brtan pa’i phyir ro // rnam par shes pa med pa’i dbang po gzugs can ni mi rung ngo // (Nagao 1982, p. 38 [numbering added, also to the following two paragraphs])

*baddhapratisamdhīnām ca rūpindriyasamparigrāhakāṃ vipākaviṃśānād anjan nopapadyate / (i) pratiniyatāśrayatvād (ii) adhruvatvāc ca tadanyaviṃśānānām / na ca rūpindriyānī avijñānāni yuṣyante / (Aramaki’s reconstruction in ibid.)

For those who have already been reincarnated, [a *vijñāna*] other than the *vipākaviṃśāna* that takes hold of the material sense faculties is not possible, (i) because the other *vijñānas* have distinct bases and (ii) are unstable. Material sense faculties without *vijñāna* are not reasonable.

Here, the two italicized reasons seem to presuppose respectively arguments (d) and (e) of the first proof, and thus this passage also likely presupposes the first proof. In the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, the process of transition from *antarābhava* to conception is discussed in the preceding §I.34, and the interdependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* in the subsequent §I.36. Thus, both the context and the content of §I.35 itself clearly show that this section concerns conception. However, since this is a discussion “for those who have already been incarnated,” conception has already taken place. This cannot be a discussion of the moment of taking hold of a new existence. Because the process from *antarābhava* to *pratisandhi* is already explained in detail in §I.34, the context does not require a discussion of the same issue in §I.35. Therefore, we cannot interpret §I.35 in the sense of the second appropriation of §I.5 (acquisition of a new existence).

Vasubandhu’s commentary on this portion is concise but clear:

**nying mtshams sbyor ba sbrel zin pa** zhes bya ba ni bdag gi lus rab tu thob pa’o / de las** gzhan** zhes bya ba ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ma yin pa ni gzhan pa ste / gzhan rnam par shes pa drug po rnam ni gnas so sor nges pa dang g.yo ba’i phyir ro / ji ltar mig gi rnam par shes pa gnas so sor nges pa yin pa**89 bzhin du rna ba’i rnam par shes pa la sogs pa lhag ma rnam kyi yang ma ba la sogs pa dbang po gzugs can rnam ni rten yin no / des na gal te rnam par

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86 Perhaps based on this passage Schmithausen does not take these items of the first proof as referring to the situation just after conception. Cf. *Genesis*, §234.

87 以取後身 (*Buddhasānta*, T31:99b27 [No. 1592]; 復次若衆生已託生 (*Paramārtha*, T31:116b19-20 [No. 1593]); 復次結生相續已 (*Xuanzang*, T31:136a13 [No. 1592]). The Chinese versions other than *Buddhasānta*’s indicate that the conception has already taken place. So does *zin* in the Tibetan version. See Yamabe (2015a), p. 170, en. 28.

88 D. nas.

89 Pek. ba.
shes pa de dag gi rang rang gi gnas blangs par gyur la / rnam par shes pa de rnam s ’gags par gyur pa na thob pa’i mig la sogs pa rnam s rul par ’gyur ro // (Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya, §I.35, Pek. Sems-tsam, Li 159b7-160a2; D. Sems-tsam, Ri 135b2-4)

释曰。結生相續已者，謂已得自體。若離異熟識者，謂離阿賴耶識，其餘識別各別依故。不堅住故者，謂餘六識各別處故，易動轉故。且如眼識眼為別依，如是其餘耳等諸識，耳等色根為各別依。由此道理，如是諸識但應執受自所依根，又此諸識易動轉故，或時無有。若離阿賴耶識，爾時眼等諸根無能執受，便應爛壞。(T31:332a18-25 [No. 1597])

“One who has already been reincarnated” means one who has acquired an ātmabhāva. As for the phrase “other than,” [vijñānas] other than ālaya-vijñāna are “others,” because the other six vijñānas have distinct bases and are changeable. As visual consciousness has its distinct basis, for the remaining auditory and other types of consciousness, material sense faculties like ear are the bases. Therefore, if these types of consciousness appropriate their own respective bases, when these types of consciousness cease, the sense faculties appropriated [by them] will perish. (Translated from the Tibetan version)

Thus, “distinct bases” refer to the caksus corresponding to caksurviñāna, śrotra corresponding to śrotraviñāna, and so forth (as the Upanibandhana points out, manas is not physical, so what is at issue here must substantially be the relationship between the five vijñānas and the five indriyas). “Unstable” means that these five vijñānas can be interrupted. Here, since the five indriyas are not formed in the early stages of pregnancy, the five sense vijñānas naturally do not arise. Since what has not arisen in the first place cannot be interrupted, if we follow these commentaries, the discussion in §I.35 must mainly refer to the stage in which the five indriyas have already been formed (primarily after birth), even if the starting point is just after conception.

About this, Nagao states: “After an embryo is conceived, whether it is in the womb or is already born, there is a physical body, which is represented by the five sense faculties (five indriyas)” (1982, p. 199). This understanding is basically

90 The corresponding portion of Asvabhāva’s Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandhana (Pek. Sems-tsam, Li 259a2; D. Sems-tsam, Ri 211a5) has simply lus, but Xuanzang has ziti 自体 for both the Bhāṣya (T31:332a18) and the Upanibandhana (T31:393a14). The original Sanskrit must have been ātmabhāva for both commentaries. “Acquisition of an ātmabhāva” is an expression used in the Mahāyānasamgraha, §I.5 as a definition of conception. But Xuanzang’s version of the Bhāṣya (T31:332a18) and the Upanibandhana (T31:393a14) both have yide ziti 已得自體 in §I.35. From the context also, conception must have already taken place.

91 Cf. Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya, Tatia ed., §47(1)(iv); Sasaki (1982), p. 183.

92 dbang po gzugs can zhes bya ba ni yid ma gtos pa’o / (Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandhana, Pek. Sems-tsam, Li 259a3; D. Sems-tsam, Ri 211a6)

“Material sense faculties” means [faculties] except for manas.

93 The Upanibandhana expressly says that they can be interrupted.

94 As seen above (fn. 83), kāyaviñāna might be an exception.
Table 3  The fourth proof in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* compared with the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*

| The fourth proof of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* | *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (Kramer, ed.) |
|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| kena kāraṇena bijatvam na saṃbhavati saṃnām⁴ vijñānakaśyānām anonyam / | santānānuvṛtti⁵ ca / atra hy ālayavijñānaṃ nikāyasabhāgāntaresu pratisandhim upādāya⁶ yāvac cyuṭim tāvat kṣanaprabhandhapravāhena vartate, na tv antarāntarā vicchidyate, pravṛtti-vijñānavat / (93.7-9) |
| For what reason can the six groups of vijñānas not be the seeds of one another? | “[Ālayavijñāna] operates continually.” Because, having been conceived in another [new] category of beings (nikāyasabhāga), ālayavijñāna operates continually as a series of moments until death. It is not interrupted occasionally unlike functional consciousness. |
| tathāhi caśuṣṛvijñāna-anantarāṃ śrotādivijñānāny utpadyante, śrotāvijñāna-anantarāṃ caśuṣṛdivijñānāni / evam ghrāṇādvijñānāntaraṃ iti vistareṇa vācyam / (93.9-12) |
| For example, auditory and other types of consciousness arise just after visual consciousness, visual and other types of consciousness just after auditory consciousness. Likewise, it should be said that just after olfactory and other types of consciousness, and so forth. |
| tathāhi kuśalānaṅtaraṃ akusālam utpadayate, akusālanantaṅtaraṃ kuśalam, tadubhavayānantaraṃ avyākṛtam, hīnadhūtakāntaraṃ madhyadhūtakān, madhyadhūtakāntaraṃ pranīṭadhūtakān, evaṃ pranīṭadhūtakāntaraṃ yāvad dhīnadhūtakān, sāsravāṅtaraṃ anāsravāṅtaraṃ pranīṭadhūtakān, anāsravāṅtaraṃ sāravāṅtaraṃ lokottaraṅtaraṃ lokottaraṃ / sa ca tesiḥ tathā bijatvam yujyate / dhīrghakālasamucchinnāpi ca śaṃtatiś cireṇa kālena pravartate, tasmād api na yujyate / |
| This is because an unwholesome [element] arises just after a wholesome [element], a wholesome [element] just after an unwholesome [element], a neutral [element] just after both [wholesome and unwholesome elements], what belongs to the middle realm just after what belongs to the inferior realm, what belong to the superior realm just after what belongs to the middle realm. Similarly up to what belongs to the inferior realm just after what belongs to the superior realm. A pure [element] just after a defiled [element], a defiled [element] just after a pure [element], a supramundane [element] just after a mundane [element], a mundane [element] just after a supramundane [element]. These [elements] in this manner cannot be the seeds of one another. Even if interrupted for a long time, a stream resumes even after a long interval. For this reason also, this is not reasonable. |
| tathāhī kuśalānantaraṃ akusālam utpadayate, akusālanantarāṃ kuśalam, tadubhayānantaraṃ avyākṛtam hīnadhūtakāntaraṃ madhyadhūtakān, madhyadhūtakāntaraṃ pranīṭadhūtakān, pranīṭadhūtakāntaraṃ apranīṭadhūtakān, apranīṭadhūtakāntaraṃ madhyadhūtakān iti vistareṇa vācyam / nāpy ekāṃ dravyām ā maranād anuvartata iti // (93.12-16) |
| Likewise, it should be said that an unwholesome [element] arises just after a wholesome [element], a wholesome [element] just after an unwholesome [element], a neutral [element] just after both [wholesome and unwholesome elements], what belongs to the middle realm just after what belongs to the inferior realm, what belong to the superior realm just after what belongs to the middle realm, what belongs to an inferior realm just after what belongs to a superior realm, what belongs to a middle realm just after what belongs to an inferior realm, and so forth. It is not the case that one substance continues until death. |

⁴Text, saṃnām, but Tatia ed. §9B(iv) has saṃnāṃ.
⁵Kramer ed., saṃtānānuvṛtti.
⁶Cf. *Trimśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*, Buescher ed., 48.17-19.
accurate,\textsuperscript{95} and Schmithausen expresses a similar view (\textit{Genesis}, §234\textsuperscript{96}). On this point, I have no objection.

I would like to reiterate, however, that the \textit{Mahāyānasamgraha}, §I.35 does not discuss the process of rebirth from \textit{antarābhava} to \textit{pratisandhi}. If, as I understand, this portion is closely tied to the first proof in the \textit{Viniścayasamgrahāṇī}, Griffiths’ understanding is not tenable for this reason also.

Finally, I juxtapose the portion of the \textit{Paṇcaskandhakavibhāṣā} that immediately follows the portion quoted above (in Table 2) with the fourth proof in the \textit{Viniścayasamgrahāṇī} in Table 3.

The purport of the \textit{Paṇcaskandhakavibhāṣā} here is that ālayavijñāna keeps operating without interruption from conception till death. According to argument (e) of the first proof in the \textit{Viniścayasamgrahāṇī}, this is a prerequisite for the physiological maintenance of the body. Therefore, this passage from the \textit{Paṇcaskandhakavibhāṣā} is in line with what we have already seen.

What is noteworthy here is the last portion. Here the \textit{Paṇcaskandhakavibhāṣā} very likely refers to the fourth proof of the \textit{Viniścayasamgrahāṇī}. The purport of the fourth proof, however, is that the \textit{pravṛttivijñānas} cannot be the seeds of one another, but the main point of the \textit{Paṇcaskandhakavibhāṣā} here is the continuous operation of ālayavijñāna. Clearly the contexts are different. This example suggests that Sthiramati does not always faithfully convey the original meaning of the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi}. If so, his statement may not always be an authoritative standard for interpreting the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi}.

3.6 My Interpretation of the First Proof

Based on the foregoing discussions, my interpretation of the first proof is as follows. I understand that the first proof of the \textit{Viniścayasamgrahāṇī} compares the functions and characteristics of the \textit{pravṛttivijñānas} and ālayavijñāna primarily in a daily context after birth and argues that only ālayavijñāna can physiologically maintain the body. What is at issue here is not the causal link between the previous life and the present one. Neither the content of the first proof itself nor the interpretations of later Yogācāra literature supports Griffiths’ interpretation.

Nevertheless, once ālayavijñāna is merged with the body, basically the same mechanism of physiological maintenance of life should operate for both an undeveloped embryo and a developed body after birth. Therefore, it is possible that the situation just after conception is also implied by the first proof, and it is presumably for this reason that the \textit{Mahāyānasamgraha}, §I.35 reflects such an understanding. Since the \textit{Mahāyānasamgraha} was truly an influential text in Indian Yogācāra, similar interpretations seem to have been inherited by the \textit{Paṇcaskandhakavibhāṣā} and later by Tsong-kha-pa. If so, Schmithausen’s and my views on this matter may not be as radically different as they seem.

\textsuperscript{95} However, as mentioned above, one should note that the five \textit{indriyas} have not been formed in early stages of pregnancy.

\textsuperscript{96} “[A]ppropriation of the physical sense faculties (\textit{dbang po gzung can, *rūpūndriya}) after conception (i.e., throughout life).”
Tentative Conclusions

In the foregoing discussions, I have made the following observations:

(1) Ālayavijñāna physiologically maintains the whole body and keeps it sentient. Ālayavijñāna pervades the whole body.
(2) Ālayavijñāna is somehow linked to meditative ease (praśrabdhi) and non-meditative inertness (dauṣṭhulya) in the body and mind.
(3) Ālayavijñāna and the body are correlated in terms of benefit (anugraha) and harm (upaghāta).
(4) This correlation is observable in meditative context as well.
(5) When the āśraya (body) is transformed, it no longer gives rise to kleśas.
(6) The transformation of the body from the akarmanya phase to the karmanya phase seems to be based on the transformation of ālayavijñāna from the dauṣṭhulya mode to the praśrabdhi mode.
(7) Ālayavijñāna is unperceivable unless one enters darśanamārga.
(8) Ālayavijñāna is directly perceived at darśanamārga in conjunction with dauṣṭhulyabandhana.

Taking all these points together, I strongly suspect that ālayavijñāna is not only a subconscious layer supporting the surface mind but also a latent physiological basis supporting the body. When the body and mind are transformed, this transformation is based on and linked to the transformation of that physiological basis. The transformation of body and mind from a state of dauṣṭhulya to a state of praśrabdhi was well known from early on. What Yogācāra practitioners discovered anew was that behind this transformation, there is a subconscious and physiological root that makes the transformation possible.

The passages collected in this paper seem to me to point to that direction. Needless to say, this is just a preliminary hypothesis, and much more research will be required to examine its validity.

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