The Influence of Public Service Reforms on the Quality of Service Delivery in Tanzania: Evidences from the Existing Literature

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Abstract: The last two decades of the 20th century were associated with significant changes in the paradigms and practices related to public service delivery. One of the important changes was the shifting of the service delivery roles from the government departments to semi-autonomous government agencies known as executive agencies. However, there is little certainty and objective proof that executive agencies would deliver better services compared to the government departments exists in both developed and developing world governments. This paper reviews the literature on the influence of public service reforms on the quality of services delivery focusing on executive agencies as a special arrangement for implementing the reforms in the delivery of public services. The review focuses on the conceptual understanding of executive agencies and their essence in public service management, the effect of the reforms on quality of service delivery (QSD) with a focus on executive agencies themselves, and the factors affecting the quality (QSD) in executive agencies. Based on the review, the need to assess the link between contextualized QSD indicators and public service reforms from the user viewpoint is insisted.

Keywords: Public Service Reforms, Executive agencies, Quality of Service Delivery, Tanzania

1. INTRODUCTION

The introduction and establishment of executive agencies has been one of the most provoking changes in the management of public services. Up to the mid-1980s and 1990s, the governments maintained their traditional roles one of which is the delivery of public good and services while the other functions were maintenance of law and order and making and implementing public policies. As part of the Public Service Reforms, the new experience has been a shrinking engagement of the governments in the direct delivery of public services and handling the service delivery responsibility to semi-autonomous agencies known as executive agencies or government agencies.

Agentification – as most referred in the literature, involves some kind of contractual relationship between the government and executive agencies. Closely resembling outsourcing and contracting out, agentification involves contracting out the services delivered functions of the government department or ministry. However, it is clearly contrasted from the two because the contracting out involves establishment of the agencies and recruiting well-trained and qualified technical executives who are contracted to manage the agencies to deliver specified contractual services. On top of that, the agencies and their executives enjoy some degree of autonomy as a result of their technical expertise, but they are practically responsible and accountable to the political executives in the parent departments or ministries. These pertinent features define agentification as distinct from other modern service delivery arrangements such as privatization, outsourcing, and total contracting out.

There is one important point that need to be noted when thinking about the implementation of the reforms in executive agencies. Executive agencies are not only a product of the reforms, but they are themselves a model of how the reforms should be framed and implemented. They are primarily established to operate in line with the New Public Management (NPM) principles, which include efficiency, cost effectiveness, and self-sustainability. Unlike government departments, which are highly regulated by constitutional principles, executive agencies are supposed to operate flexibly to
make sure that the services they are contracted to produce are sustainably available and accessible to the intended beneficiaries.

One interesting point regarding the position of executive agencies in the reform process has been that the executive agencies are themselves a product of reforms—agentification was itself a process of reforming public services delivery. On the other hand, executive agencies are a special place for modeling how best the reforms could be implemented successfully. This is because, the principles that guide the operations of executive agencies try to eliminate the weakness of the old Weberian bureaucratic models of public service management in favor of the best practices borrowed from the business world such as efficiency, customer focus, and flexibility. At the same time, agencies preserve some important traits of public administration such as accountability and control through political executives and representative organs of the state as well as exposure to public oversight and scrutiny to ensure the delivery of better services to the public. Before proceeding into the discourse on agentification and QSD, it is important to have an overview of the reforms in general and public service reforms in particular.

2. OVERVIEW OF THE REFORMS AND PUBLIC SERVICE REFORMS

The term reforms sounds relatively new. However, some scholars in public administration have argued that it is not a new phenomenon since the process of reforming governments and their functions has existed for centuries (LÊgreid, 2017). In the modern public administration and public management literature, the term reform refers to a systematic and planned change that seek to improve the functioning of the organizations or government and service delivery institutions (Graham & Richard, 1999). Supported by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), public sector reforms were adopted as structural and institutional support for the governments to make them capable of enhancing governance and service delivery (Pollitt, 2003). Therefore, in almost all the countries including both developed and developing countries took the reforms as a prescribed solution for enhancing the capacities of the governments to delivery better results throughout the 1880s and 1990s.

Reforms of the 1980s and 1990s in the public sector involved redefining the functions of the government and its institutions and the relationship between the government and its institutions on the first, hand and other actors in the society on the other. In connection with the delivery of public goods and services, public sector reforms were informed by the NPM approach, which place significant focus on minimizing the role of the government in the production and distribution of services and improving service delivery (Rugumyamheto, 2005; LÊgreid, 2017). Similarly, the regulatory role of the government, which traditionally involved vertical and hierarchical central command and control was gradually replaced by horizontal regulation. The suggested new mode, which was favored under the reforms involved regulation by autonomous agencies known as regulatory agencies (Christiansen, 2006). In this respect, the reforms entailed what came to be known as agentification of both service delivery and regulation in the public sectors.

Together with agentification, the reforms involved other different models of that entailed principal-agent relationship in service delivery. These models, which at different degrees sought to disengage the government from the day-to-day delivery of public services included privatization, outsourcing, contracting out the services (Lane, 1997; Warner &Heifetz, 2012). Unlike the three aforementioned arrangements, agentification which took a partial form of contracting out the management of public service delivery to professional executives (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994). Unlike privatization and complete contracting out, executive agency maintain some degree of powers and autonomy to decide how they should organize service delivery. This makes executive agencies relatively flexible, customer-oriented and more likely to focus on the cost effectiveness of the services (Overman & Thiel, 2015). However, they operate under close regulation of the political executives who are responsible for ensuring that government policies and priorities are effectively reflected in the delivery of services.

3. UNDERSTANDING AND MEASURING QUALITY OF SERVICE DELIVERY

Like most of the terms used in public administration and public services management, there is no single agreed definition of Quality of Service Delivery (QSD). However, many of the scholars seem
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to agree that the definition of QSD should closely relate to the way the services suitably meet the needs and expectations of the consumers (Asubonten, 1996; Wisniewski & Donnelly, 1996; Yang & Fang, 2004). However, an elusive paradox surrounding this definition remains the disagreement on what exactly are the needs and expectations of the consumers in different contexts. Overall, there is little agreement on what exactly constitute or forms the basis of the needs and expectations of the consumer as.

One of the most known framework that guide research on the QSD is the expectancy-disconfirmation framework, which defines quality in relation to the preconceptions of the consumer about the service. Under this framework, the consumers will either confirm or disconfirm the expected level at which the service meets the needs and expectations. In this respect, the quality of service delivery can be defined as a combination of the ways and extent to which the actual experiences of the service meet the needs and expectations of the customers. Guided by this framework, the quality of service delivery can be best assessed from a consumer perspective.

One of the best examples of the methods used to measure the QSD informed by the expectancy-disconfirmation framework is the SERVQUAL, a multidimensional research technique that employs a tool aiming to assess five specified aspects of service delivery from the consumer expectations point of view (Parasuraman, Zeithaml & Berry, 1988). The five aspects used are the reliability, assurance, tangibles, empathy, and responsiveness. Reliability means that if the organization promises to deliver the service in a certain way, it should actually deliver it in that way (Berry, Zeithaml & Parasuraman, 1990). Examples to this might relate to the specified working hours, contacts points, response duration, and the maximum time expected to complete the service. Assurance, which relates much to the capacity of people involved in the delivery of services explains the knowledge, courtesy, and ability to bear confidence and trust of the consumers or customers (Karyeija, 2012; Zeithaml, Berry & Parasuraman, 1996). The tangibles explain the extent to which the service and goods provided meet the actual standards that have been set to be reached. Empathy, which may substitute a narrow sense of customer care relates to the extent to which the service providers provide individualized and caring attention to the customers and potential consumers of the services. Responsiveness as the fifth aspect reflects the willingness to help the customers and potential consumers, and the readiness to attend them in a prompt way and listen them to make sure that the services are convenient and attuned to their needs (Parasuraman, Zeithaml & Berry, 1988).

Based on the framework, it is noted that the QSD should primarily be assessed and measured from a customer point of view, especially by considering how much the customers and potential users evaluate the service in terms of meeting their expectations (Parasuraman, Zeithaml & Berry, 1988). However, another point of contention is whether the QSD should be attributed to the efforts and behaviour of individuals who are engaged in the delivery of the services or the whole organizations. This is because of the lack of a clear cut between the role of the organization and individuals who are engaged in the delivery of the services (Fortuito, Haque, Shabnam, Bhuiyan, Krishna & Withana, 2016).

Guided by the framework, the consumers are assumed to have the capacity to evaluate not only the process of delivering the service to them but also the people who are engaged in the delivery of the service and their behaviour. The consumers can also evaluate the technology used to deliver the service, as well as the physical settings in which service delivery occurs (Rasul & Rogger, 2018). This is because as Peters, Korthaus & Kohlbom (2018) argue, service delivery is a complex process that is influenced by different factors that may range from the actors, techniques, resources, time, and space. However, the interaction between all these factors and resources is expected to result in a certain kind of quality, which can be qualitatively assessed in terms of the extent to which the services meet the needs and expectations of the consumers. Being the case, it may be noted that all these consumers related factors may affect the perceived quality of service. Therefore, the literature suggests that the most feasible approach to measuring QSD is by looking at it from a consumer point of view. The next subsection will focus on agentification as a way of improving the QSD.

4. AGENCIES AND AGENTIFICATION: A SPECIAL CASE FOR IMPROVING THE QSD

Executive agencies and agentification have become an area of great interest in the scope of topics related to government reforms and the general NPM movement in governments. This is basically due
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to some pertinent features that define executive agencies and set them aside as providing a special model of public services delivery. These features seek to maximize efficiency without undermining the public orientation of the agencies in terms of regulation and being driven by changes in the policies of the government (Osborne, 2013). First, while the services delivered by executive agencies are presumed to be taken away from the core domain of the government departments and thus somehow involving reducing the control of the government over the day-to-day service delivery operations, this is compensated by increased control of the beneficiaries on the ways the services are designed and delivered (Hewson, 2010). Unlike privatized organizations, which strive to gain customer preference and acceptability while reducing the control of the customers, executive agencies apply market principles to increase legitimacy, but at the same time entailing legitimate and authoritative control by the clientele.

Pollitt & Bouckaert (2004) identify three main features that define agentification, which are disaggregation, autonomization, and contractualization. Disaggregation involves a relative structural separation of the functional unit from its parent organization. A disaggregated structure maintains limited autonomy in the sense that it will be subjected to the control of the parent organization, a ministry or local council for instance (Overman & Thiel, 2015). Autonomization involves allowing the newly created organizations or units to make independent arrangements and choices on how they should internally operate to reach their goals. While respecting existing laws, identified organizations have some degree of discretion on how to manage their day-to-day operations to meet the goals (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). Contractualization as the third and last defining feature of executive agencies involves identification, setting, and agreeing on performance goals, expectations and demands between the parent organization such as a ministry and an agency (Pollitt, Bathgate, Caulfield, Smullen & Talbot, 2007). These contractual obligations and expectations are explicitly stated and agreed upon. Overall, agentification is unique since it involves a parallel mix of both regulation and discretion within a single entity and at the same time, which tend to collide against one another.

Due to the aforesaid reasons and their position in the reform process, executive agencies form a model for the best architect on how the reforms should be successfully implemented. At least two to three main reasons make executive agencies hold a special position in the implementation of the reforms. First, executive agencies borrow some important principles from the business model of organization and management (Ngowi, 2008). This include a strong focus of satisfaction of customer needs and wants, operational efficiency, and a strong desire to operate cost effectively and sustainably (De Araújo, 2001). Second, executive agencies are modeled towards balancing between the effects of regulation and deregulation (Andrews & Anwar, 2005). Whereas they are left to operate flexibly and thus entail invention, innovation, and creativity; the top managers in executive agencies are kept under a close watch and control to ensure that public interests are placed at the top (Kiragu, 2012; Pollitt, 2006). This makes executive agencies retain the feature of operating under public gaze and scrutiny despite the relative autonomy that allows them to manage their internal operations and have a primary focus on what they are mandated to deliver rather than maintaining strong hierarchical structures and procedures.

5. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF AGENTIFICATION

Based on the literature, one can observe that the influence of public sector reforms in executive agencies can be approached from different theoretical angles. However, two theoretical strands namely the principal-agent and public choice theories are dominantly used across the literature. These two theories have some relatively different points of focus and assumptions regarding both the relationship between the government departments, their agencies, and the public who are the potential beneficiaries of public goods and services, which executive agencies provide. Also, the theories try to cast light on the possible risks that may arise due to service delivery management arrangements between government departments and executive agencies. Figure 1 summarises the questions and risks that the two theories put forward in the attempt to understand service delivery in executive agencies.
The principal-agent theory, to start with, its core focus is on the nature of the relationship between government departments and executive agencies as they interact in a principal-agent relationship. The relationship between the principal and the agent is contractual in nature where the principal has a general goal to fulfill and thus contract the agent who has the best capacities to plan how the goals would be best achieved (Alchian, 1972). In this case, the principal delegates responsibilities to the agent, which is to produce and deliver quality health services to the identified clientele, and the principal has a duty of creating environment for the agent to operate successfully (Ross, 1973). Apart from the clear terms and agreement on the goals, the required inputs, and desired outcomes; the agent has to retain process related autonomy in the sense that interference by the principal need to be minimized in favour of the innovation and focus on the needs of the clientele (Alchian, 1972). However, the oversight of the principal to ensure that there is convergence between the goals of contracting parties is important.

In connection with the operational relationship between the principal and the agent, the principal-agent theory recognizes some potential risks that are likely to arise as part of the principal agent relationship. According to the theory, the agent is more likely to be guided by personal interests, which in the long run will rule over public interests. Goal conflict is identified as a common outgrowth that arises to correct for inefficiency that comes as a result of agent’s performance (Delreux & Adriaensen, 2017). This is especially due to the assumption that the agent will have a wealth and utility maximizing focus that will override service provision. Given this, the principal will, by any means distrust the agent and seek to exercise firm control over the agent. This will accordingly result in the failure of the agent to execute its proper mandate in a flexible, innovative, and
autonomous way and thus making the relationship between the principal and agent naturally conflictual.

The other problems associated with principal-agent relationship include information asymmetry and moral hazard. Information asymmetry relates to the varying capacity of the principal and the agent to obtain, analyze, and understand the information relating to the service where the principal is presumed to be less informed compared to the agent. This for instance would result into incidents where the principal and its clientele has to purchase a product of low quality at high cost (Delreux & Adriaensen, 2017). Moral Hazard on the other hand is associated with the loss of track from being virtuous and focused on public interests and serving personal interests as well as self-aggrandizement and corrupt intent. With this behaviour, the decline in the cost of service delivery would rather benefit the agent instead of placing more efforts to improving the quality of services (McCubbin & Weingast, 1989). These two problems make the principal-agent relationship a game of mistrust and doubt friendship. Despite the failure to recognize the role that power play in the principal-agent relationship and neglecting the possibility of personal commitment that executives have demonstrated in organizational settings (Perrow, 1986), the theory provides a good understanding of the risky and unforeseen effects within agentification that need to be studied and remedied for successful agentification of public service delivery.

The public choice theory, on the other hand, focuses on the provision of public services in public organizational settings as opposed to market organizations. Its primary assumption is that politically organized societies are made of self-interested individuals who unite around organized interests. Therefore, individuals join with other self-seeking individuals to acquire access to public resources (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). The theory offers a coherent explanation for seemingly non-rational decision-making by governments, which are more directed towards competing interests of individuals. Shaped by power and political relationship, the delivery of public services will seek to fulfill public choices at large rather than technical efficiency. This will accordingly determine how executive agencies should behave as they are operating to address public interests and are not independent of the political processes within their parent ministries. This increases the need to assess the service quality in terms of how the services are evaluated by the users rather than technical and operational efficiency within the service delivery systems. Therefore, the theory has some relevance in explaining how the decisions of the agencies can be affected by power relations with the parent ministries.

In connection with this study, the appropriate framework needs to be informed by both of the theories. This means that the relationship between the agencies and their parent ministries on one hand and the conflicting connection between the public orientations on the other hand need to be examined in terms of how they influence the QSD in the executive agencies. Despite the fact that the principal-agent theory could best be used to understanding the forces that affects performance quality in the agencies, the political nature of the processes through which decisions are arrived at and successfully implemented are highly affected by the structure of power and informational relationship between the agencies and political executives. The agencies’ attempt to be autonomous and design better services would potentially be undermined by the attempt of the political executives to keep the agencies politically controlled (Piven & Friedland, 2017). However, a broad range of the factors that affect the efforts of the agencies to use the available organizational resources to deliver quality services are described in detail in the conceptual framework, which the next section proceeds to.

6. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF REFORMS

Public sector and public service reforms have, to the present, been adopted and implemented in different parts of the world. Despite the fact that in each of the countries attempting to reform public institutions and public service delivery there have been some recognized improvements in the delivery of public services, the effects have not demonstrated the same depth in all the countries (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). More important, the effects of the reforms appear to have received varying observations not only across regions, continents, and countries but also across the sectors within the same jurisdictions, countries, and public services.

One of the commonly suggested ways to understand the variations across the globe and their effect on the adoption and implementation of public sector and public service reforms is by using the ecological perspective. Scholars who subscribe to the ecological perspective argue that the response of
administrative structures and processes to the changes in administrative models, paradigms, and technologies will depend more on the ecology of public administration in which the country exists (Riggs, 1963). In the early work by Riggs (1964), politically organized societies are classified into three types, especially modern, transitional (or prismatic), and traditional societies. The prismatic society, as suggested by Riggs (1964) explain the institutional behaviour of developing countries. These countries of which Tanzania is one, are characterized by existence of a gap between theory and practice. While the reforms are an enticement in theory, the practices in public institutions and public service delivery are thought to reflect the features of traditional society (Ikeanyibe, 2017). As a result of this, the pace of success in reform programs in different sectors including health care and health promotion has been found to suffer at the stage of implementation (McLeroy, Bibeau, Steckler, &Glanz, 1988) and therefore fail to attain the primary foreseen goals and outcomes.

If the ecological perspective is applied to understanding the adoption and implementation of public service reforms in the context of Tanzania and other developing countries, the need to compare the contexts of such reforms in developing and developed countries arises. In cases where African public services are taken as sharing some pertinent ecological features (Ikeanyibe, 2017), The Tanzanian experience needs to be treated as a representative of developing countries and thus distinguished from developed countries such as the US and UK. Unlike developed countries, which have institutional stability resulting into certainty during implementation, developing countries suffer from institutional weaknesses, which make both implementation and measuring the results difficult (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2015). Also cited has been the issue of insufficient capacities in terms of both technical and resource capacity. Comparative studies point out that despite the ambition to reach the stage that has been attained by developed countries, developing countries have been dependent on developed countries in terms of both technical knowhow and resources throughout the designing, planning, and implementation of the reform programs (Analoui&Danquah, 2017; Ikeanyibe, 2017). As a result of limited innovations and inventiveness, many of the architects of the public service reforms tend to end up without a fair attention paid to implementation gaps and how they can be successfully addressed.

6.1. Factors Affecting Quality of Service Delivery in Executive Agencies

There are different views across not only the theoretical literature but also empirical research on both the effect and ways in which public sector reforms have affected service delivery and the general performance of public sector organizations. Studies on the effect of public sector reforms on quality of service delivery appear to have inconsistent and mixed findings for both developed and developing countries. For instance, the study from Korea, which involved 44 executive agencies found a significant correlation between management and human resources autonomy and effective implementation of the human resource management initiatives on one hand and the performance and delivery of quality services on the other (Kim & Cho, 2015). Based on such findings, the assumption could be that effective implementation of agentification reforms, especially the ones that entail increasing financial and human resources autonomy would necessarily improve service delivery. However, the study by Overman & Thiel (2015) on a related topic found no relationship between agentification and both performance and efficiency in service delivery.

Romzek (2000) conducted a study on public sector reforms in the European governments. As also revealed by the study by Cheung (1997), the findings revealed a significantly increasing interest in accountability and responsiveness and outcome-based rather than rule-based management of public services. There was also increased operational discretion and flexibility, which enhanced administrative efficiency. However, the findings, also, revealed the shortcomings arising from the de-emphasis the process and outcomes while forgetting those inputs (Romzek, 2000). Therefore, the failure to create desirable behaviour among employees who participate in direct service delivery leaves the reforms short of enhancing the delivery of quality services in public agencies.

The same, studies from Africa have identified the public sector reforms with both success and challenge stories. While some studies show that public sector reforms have contributed to improvement in the quality of service delivery in executive agencies and government departments, other studies in the same countries report that reforms have not contributed to the improvement in quality of service delivery. A good example is provided by Botswana, which is identified as a success study in the implementation of public sector reforms (Kiragu & Mutahaba, 2006). However, service
quality studies in the same countries have report that the service quality remains less improved, especially in terms of the gap between the user’s expectations and the actual delivery of services (Pansiri & Mmereki, 2010). This implies that the ecology and context that surrounds the implementation of the reforms need to be taken into accounts (Mutahaba, Baguma & Halfani, 1993; Adamolekun, 1999). The main reason is that, even the quality of services is subjectively experienced differently by different people in different nations. Therefore, countries at different levels of development could be expected to deliver services at different levels of user satisfaction, which shape how the users will assess the quality of services.

Based on comparative analysis of the recent studies, it is revealed that public sector reforms have contributed to relative improvement in service delivery. However, when one talks about the quality of services, there is much to be desired both in executive agencies and other government institutions Koprić&Wollmann, 2018). While some improvements have been revealed in some countries in terms of adopting improved technologies (Breidahl, Gjelstrup, Hansen & Hansen, 2017), in others there are some appreciation regarding accountability and responsiveness of the organizations to service users (Schwab, Bouckaert&Kuhlmann, 2017). Overall, there is no single study that report that the implementation of public sector reforms was ultimately associated with significant improvement in the quality of service delivery in executive agencies. As Pollitt (2007) emphasizes, the hypothesized benefits of agentification were not realized in most of the public sectors. In nearly all the studies, some improvements have been reported, but the reforms are identified as falling short of meeting the expectations of the users in terms of improving the quality of services. In this respect, the need arises to understand the key factors that constrain the quality of service delivery.

6.2. Factors Constraining the Effects of Reforms in Executive Agencies

Different studies have identified different factors, which constrained the quality of service delivery in reformed public organizations, particularly the executive agencies. The study by De Araujo (2001), for instance, on the citizen shop model of agentification noted that the citizen shop stores, despite operating semi-autonomously had inherited hierarchical and centralized bureaucracy that undermined innovation and flexibility in service delivery. In the study by Cameron (2009), the tendency by trained experts to rush into newly created executive agencies seeking higher pay, lack of diligence, the failure to effectively set and implement performance management systems affected the capability of executive agencies to deliver the expected quality of services in South Africa.

Some of the studies on the effect of reforms on public service quality in executive agencies pay attention to the pertinent deadlocks commonly associated with agentification. One important feature has been that service quality in reformed executive agencies was constrained by the mismatch of the implementation efforts at institutional and behavioral level. This is especially revealed by Romzek (2000) who found that the changes implemented under the reforms did not stretch down to transform behaviour of lower level employees. While the agencies expressed a strong mission to deliver quality services, the employees who were engaged in the day-to-day service delivery had a limited motivation to serve to the users’ expectations. Christensen &Lægreid (2007) characterize executive agencies with fragmentation, which affects the possibility of implementing joined up efforts across the relevant government departments as a result of purpose specification and structural decentralization.

The results across the empirical literature show that the effect of reforms in both the public sector in general and specifically the executive agencies differ across the countries and organizations. One notable observation has been the lack of clear cause-effect measure to ascertain that the quality of service delivery in any organization should be associated with the extent to which the organization is committed to the implementation of the principles that guide public sector reforms such as flexibility, innovation, customer focus, and autonomy; which are also thought to be paramount defining features of executive agencies. This, also, implies the possibility of facing difficulties when one wants to assess the aggregated improvement of quality service delivery across the public sector. To address this backdrop, it would be more efficacious to assess quality of service delivery for each individual executive agency and the extent to which such a quality can be objectively associated with the implementation of reform measures within the agencies or not.
7. CONCLUSION

This paper has reviewed the literature on the effect of public sector reforms on the quality of service delivery in public sector organizations paying attention to the reforms in executive agencies. It has been revealed that there is disagreement and thus a continuing discourse on whether reforming public service delivery in the form of agentification would necessarily improve the quality of service delivery and how the quality of service delivery should be approached. Most of the available studies present mixed findings where reforms in both executive agencies and government departments reveal partial success in terms of improving performance and quality of service delivery. However, there is a growing consensus that approaching the QSD from the client or user perspective provides the best ground for contextualizing the influence of public sector reforms on QSD in the context of executive agencies. Given the important and possible influence of the context on the findings across the literature, the conclusion emphasize the need for case studies on individual executive agencies in Tanzania, which should take into account the contexts of both the agencies and their relationship with their parent departments.

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