Unified Framework for Secrecy Characteristics with Mixture of Gaussian (MoG) Distribution
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Abstract—The mixture of Gaussian (MoG) distribution was proposed to model the wireless channels by implementing the completely unsupervised expectation-maximization (EM) learning algorithm. With the high convenience for density estimation applications, the focus of this letter is supposed to investigate the secrecy metrics, including secrecy outage probability (SOP), the lower bound of SOP, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNZ), and the average secrecy capacity (ASC) from the information-theoretic perspective. The above-mentioned metrics are derived with simple and unified closed-form expressions. The effectiveness of our obtained analytical expressions are successfully examined and compared with Monte-Carlo simulations. One can conclude that this letter provides a simple but effective closed-form secrecy analysis solution exploiting the MoG distribution.

Index Terms—Physical layer security (PLS), mixture of Gaussian distribution

I. INTRODUCTION

Physical layer security (PLS) is favored as a promising solution for guaranteeing secure communication. The absence of secret keys makes it outperform the conventional cryptography technique from the information-theoretic viewpoint. In recent decades, plenty of works have studied the PLS over various fading channels, e.g., Rayleigh [1], Rician (Nakagami-n) [2], Hoyt (Nakagami-q) [3], α – µ [4]–[6], cascaded α – µ [7], κ – µ [8], Lognormal [9], Fisher-Snedecor F [10], generalized-K [11], extended generalized-K (EGK) [12], α – τ – κ – µ [13], Málaga [14], etc.

To this end, we were motivated to seek a more general and flexible model, which can encompass or generalize most of the well-known fading channel models to a large extent. The mixture gamma (MG) distribution and the Fox’s H-function distribution were proved to be two promising candidates to fully examine and compare with Monte-Carlo simulations. One can conclude that this letter provides a simple but effective closed-form secrecy analysis solution exploiting the MoG distribution.

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Using the Fox’s H-function distribution was explored in [12], which provides a unified secrecy analysis framework, and the analytical results therein indicates that simple transformation of the fading channel characteristics in the manner of Fox’s H-function distribution can largely encompass the existing works [1], [5]–[7], [10].

As discussed earlier, both the MG and Fox’s H-function distributions are useful and beneficial, but limited to the scenario that all the channel characteristics, i.e., the probability density functions (PDFs) and cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of fading channel models are known. To the authors’ best knowledge, no work has ever considered the scenario that the PDFs and CDFs are not exactly known. A possible answer to such a concern is the mixture of Gaussian (MoG) distribution. Selim et al. in [16] proposed the MoG distribution to model the wireless channels, while unsupervised expectation-maximization (EM) learning algorithm was utilized to estimate the parameters of the MoG distribution. The findings of [16] shows that the MoG distribution is especially advantageous to approximate any arbitrarily shaped non-Gaussian density, and can accurately model both composite and noncomposite channels in a very simple expression. Motivated by [16], the main contributions of this paper are twofold.

1) Providing a simple but effective information-theoretic secrecy analysis solution under the condition of unknown fading channel characteristics. Specifically, highly accurate closed-form SOP, PNZ, and ASC expressions are derived with the aid of the MoG distribution;

2) Validating the tightness of our obtained results with Monte-Carlo simulations. The accuracy indicator, i.e., analytical error, further confirms our obtained results.

II. SYSTEM MODEL

Consider the Alice-Bob-Eve classic wiretap model, it is assumed that the instantaneous received SNRs \( \gamma_i = \bar{\gamma}_i h_i^2, i \in \{B, E\} \) at Bob and Eve, where \( \bar{\gamma}_i \) is the average received SNR, \( h_i \) is the channel coefficient and modeled as the MoG distributed random variables (RVs). The PDF and CDF of \( \gamma_i \) are respectively given by [16, Eqs. (23) and (45)]:

\[
f_i(\gamma) = \sum_{l=1}^{C_i} \frac{u_l}{\sqrt{8\pi \gamma_l \eta_l}} \exp \left( - \left( \frac{\sqrt{\gamma} - \mu_l}{2\eta_l} \right)^2 \right), \quad (1a)
\]

\[
F_i(\gamma) = \sum_{l=1}^{C_i} u_l \Phi \left( \frac{\sqrt{\gamma} - \mu_l}{\eta_l} \right)
= \sum_{l=1}^{C_i} \frac{u_l}{2} \left[ 1 + \text{erf} \left( \frac{\sqrt{\gamma} - \mu_l}{\sqrt{2}\eta_l} \right) \right], \quad (1b)
\]
where $C_t$ represents the number of Gaussian components, $w_l > 0$, $\mu_l$ and $\eta_l$ are the $l$th weight, mean, and variance with the constraint of $\sum_i C_l w_i = 1$, which can be evaluated using the unsupervised EM learning algorithm. $\gamma_i$ is the average SNR at the receiver. $\text{erf}(x)$ and $\Phi(x)$ are the error function and the CDF of the standard normal distribution. Step (a) is developed for the sake of simplifying the following derivations.

According to [1], for one realization of $(\gamma_B, \gamma_E)$ pair, the instantaneous secrecy capacity over quasi-static wiretap fading channels is developed as follows:

$$C_s(\gamma_B, \gamma_E) = [\log_2(1 + \gamma_B) - \log_2(1 + \gamma_E)]^+, \quad (2)$$

where $[x]^+ \triangleq \max(x, 0)$.

### III. Secrecy Characterization

#### A. SOP Characterization

Secure communication can be guaranteed only when the secrecy rate $R_t$ is lower than the instantaneous secrecy capacity. The SOP is a pivotal and crucial secrecy indicator, and widely used to characterize the probability that perfect secrecy is compromised.

**Theorem 1.** The SOP is given by

$$P_{\text{out}} = \frac{C_E C_B}{k=1} \sum_{l=1}^{w_k w_l \left[ \frac{2}{3} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E \mu_k^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \right] + \frac{1}{6} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E (\mu_k + \sqrt{3} \eta_k)^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \eta_k } + \frac{1}{6} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E (\mu_k - \sqrt{3} \eta_k)^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \eta_k}.$$  

**Proof.** For a given target secrecy rate $R_t$, the SOP is mathematically defined as $P_{\text{out}} = \Pr(C_s \leq R_t)$ [6], and further developed as follows:

$$P_{\text{out}} = \int_0^\infty F_B(R_s \gamma + W) f_E(\gamma) d\gamma, \quad (4)$$

where $R_s = 2^{R_t}$, $W = 2^{R_t} - 1$. Next, plugging (1a) and (1b) into (4), we get

$$P_{\text{out}} = \frac{C_E C_B}{k=1} \sum_{l=1}^{w_k w_l \left[ \frac{2}{3} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E \mu_k^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \right] + \frac{1}{6} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E (\mu_k + \sqrt{3} \eta_k)^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \eta_k } + \frac{1}{6} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E (\mu_k - \sqrt{3} \eta_k)^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \eta_k}.$$  

**Step (b) is developed by applying the interchange of variables $y = \sqrt{\gamma_B}$.** Since $y$ is a normally distributed RV, i.e., $y \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_k, \eta_k)$, subsequently applying the result given in [9, Eq. (4)], the proof for $P_{\text{out}}$ is achieved.

The difficulty of deriving the exact closed-form SOP expression, the lower bound of the SOP $P_{\text{out}}^L$ is thereafter widely used to provide an asymptotic behavior of SOP for two scenarios: (i) $R_t \rightarrow 0$; and (ii) both $\gamma_B$ and $\gamma_E$ operate at high SNR regimes. As such, $P_{\text{out}}^L$ is developed as

$$P_{\text{out}}^L = \int_0^\infty F_B(R_s \gamma) f_E(\gamma) d\gamma, \quad (6)$$

next, substituting (1a) and (1c) into (6), and subsequently making the change of variables $y = \sqrt{\gamma_B}$, yields

$$P_{\text{out}}^L = \frac{C_E C_B}{k=1} \sum_{l=1}^{w_k w_l \left[ \frac{2}{3} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E \mu_k^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \right] + \frac{1}{6} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E (\mu_k + \sqrt{3} \eta_k)^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \eta_k } + \frac{1}{6} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E (\mu_k - \sqrt{3} \eta_k)^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \eta_k}.$$  

where

$$U = \int_0^\infty \exp \left( \frac{-\left( y - \mu_k \right)^2}{2 \eta_k^2} \right) \Phi \left( \sqrt{\gamma_B} \mu_k - \mu_l \right) dy.$$  

Next, applying [17, Eq. (3.462.1)] on $U$ and after some mathematical manipulations, $P_{\text{out}}^L$ is eventually derived as

$$P_{\text{out}}^L = \frac{C_E C_B}{k=1} \sum_{l=1}^{w_k w_l \left[ \frac{2}{3} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E \mu_k^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \right] + \frac{1}{6} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E (\mu_k + \sqrt{3} \eta_k)^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \eta_k } + \frac{1}{6} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E (\mu_k - \sqrt{3} \eta_k)^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \eta_k}.$$  

For the simplicity of following notations, let $\rho = \frac{\eta_k}{\gamma_E}$.

#### B. PNZ Characterization

The PNZ is regarded as another important secrecy metric to measure the existence of the positive secrecy capacity with a probability $P_{nz}$, mathematically speaking, it means that positive secrecy capacity can be achieved when $\gamma_B > \gamma_E$.

**Theorem 2.** The PNZ is given by

$$P_{\text{nz}} = \frac{C_E C_B}{k=1} \sum_{l=1}^{w_k w_l \left[ \frac{2}{3} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E \mu_k^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \right] + \frac{1}{6} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E (\mu_k + \sqrt{3} \eta_k)^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \eta_k } + \frac{1}{6} \Phi \left( (R_s \gamma_E (\mu_k - \sqrt{3} \eta_k)^2 + W) / \gamma_B - \mu_l \right) \eta_k}.$$  

**Proof.** Revisiting the definition of $P_{\text{nz}}$ [12], i.e., $P_{\text{nz}} = \int_0^\infty F_E(\gamma) f_B(\gamma) d\gamma$, then following the same procedure as the proof of $P_{\text{out}}^L$, the proof is finished. (9b) is obtained by using

$$\Phi(x) = \frac{1}{2} (1 + \text{erf} \left( \frac{x}{\sqrt{2}} \right)).$$  

**C. ASC Characterization**

The ASC is another secrecy metric that quantifies the maximum achievable secrecy rate.

**Theorem 3.** The ASC is given by (10), shown at the top of next page, where $G_B(x, \gamma_B, \mu, \eta, \rho) = \log_2(1 + \gamma_B x^2) \Phi \left( \frac{\sqrt{\gamma_B} - \mu}{\eta} \right)$ and $G_E(x, \gamma_E, \mu, \eta, \rho) = \log_2(1 + \gamma_E x^2) \Phi \left( \frac{\sqrt{\gamma_E} - \mu}{\eta} \right)$.
\[ C_s = \frac{C_B}{6} \sum_{k=1}^{C_B} \sum_{l=1}^{C_B} w_l w_k \left[ \frac{2}{3} G_B(\mu_l, \gamma_B, \mu_k, \eta_k, \rho) + \frac{1}{6} G_E(\mu_l + \sqrt{3} \eta_l, \gamma_B, \mu_k, \eta_k, \rho) + \frac{1}{6} G_E(\mu_l - \sqrt{3} \eta_l, \gamma_B, \mu_k, \eta_k, \rho) \right] + \frac{2}{3} G_E \left( \mu_k, \gamma_E, \mu_l, \eta_l, \frac{1}{\rho} \right) + \frac{1}{6} G_E \left( \mu_k + \sqrt{3} \eta_l, \gamma_E, \mu_l, \eta_l, \frac{1}{\rho} \right) + \frac{1}{6} G_E \left( \mu_k - \sqrt{3} \eta_l, \gamma_E, \mu_l, \eta_l, \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \] + \frac{C_E}{6} \sum_{k=1}^{C_E} w_k \left[ \frac{2}{3} \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma_E \mu_k^2}{\gamma} \right) + \frac{1}{6} \log_2 \left( 1 + \gamma_E (\mu_k + \sqrt{3} \eta_k)^2 \right) + \frac{1}{6} \log_2 \left( 1 + \gamma_E (\mu_k - \sqrt{3} \eta_k)^2 \right) \right]. \]

**Proof.** By averaging (2) over \( \gamma_B \) and \( \gamma_E \), the ASC is mathematically expressed as [12, Eq. (6)],

\[ I_{\lambda} = I_1 + I_2 - I_3, \]

where

\[ I_1 = \int_0^{\infty} \log_2 \left( 1 + \gamma_B \right) f_B(\gamma_B) E(\gamma_B) d\gamma_B, \]

\[ I_2 = \int_0^{\infty} \log_2 \left( 1 + \gamma_E \right) f_E(\gamma_E) d\gamma_E, \]

\[ I_3 = \int_0^{\infty} \log_2 \left( 1 + \gamma_E \right) f_E(\gamma_E) d\gamma_E. \]

Next, substituting (1a) and (1b) into \( I_1 \), yields

\[ I_1 = \sum_{i=1}^{C_B} \sum_{l=1}^{C_B} w_l w_k \int_0^{\infty} \log_2 \left( 1 + \gamma_B \right) \Phi \left( \frac{\sqrt{\gamma / \gamma_B} - \mu_l}{\eta_l} \right) \exp \left( - \left( \frac{\sqrt{\gamma / \gamma_B} - \mu_l}{2 \eta_l^2} \right)^2 \right) d\gamma \]

\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{C_B} \sum_{l=1}^{C_B} w_l w_k \left( \frac{2}{3} G_B(\mu_l, \gamma_B, \mu_k, \eta_k, \rho) + \frac{1}{6} G_E(\mu_l + \sqrt{3} \eta_l, \gamma_B, \mu_k, \eta_k, \rho) + \frac{1}{6} G_E(\mu_l - \sqrt{3} \eta_l, \gamma_B, \mu_k, \eta_k, \rho) \right), \]

step (c) is developed by using [9, Eq. (4)]. Similarly, \( I_2 \) and \( I_3 \) can be obtained. After some simple mathematical manipulations, the proof of \( C_s \) is finished.

**IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS**

In this section, the accuracy of our derived analytical results is validated by performing the Monte-Carlo simulations over \( \kappa - \mu \) fading channels. Assuming that the main channel and wiretap channel undergo the same fading conditions, herein \( \kappa = 3, \mu = 1 \), where the estimated parameters for the MoG distribution are adopted from [16, Table. IV].

In order to encompass more fading models, we also plotted the SOP over Rayleigh, Nakagami-\( m \), Weibull, and \( \alpha - \mu \) fading channels in Fig. 1. (b). The SOP, PNZ, and ASC are respectively plotted and compared in Figs. 1-4 with Monte-Carlo simulations. Apparently, one can observe that there exist excellent agreements between our analytical and simulated results.

![Fig. 1: \( P_{out} \) against \( \gamma_B \) when \( R_t = 0.5 \) over (a) \( \kappa - \mu \) fading channels; and (b) Rayleigh, Nakagami-\( m \), Weibull, and \( \alpha - \mu \) fading channels [6] with \( \gamma_E = 5 \text{dB} \).](image1)

![Fig. 2: \( P_{out} \) against \( R_t \) over \( \kappa - \mu \) fading channels when \( \gamma_B = 8 \text{ dB} \).](image2)

**A. Numerical Results**

Figs. 1 and 2 plot the SOP, \( P_{out} \), and the lower bound of SOP, \( P_{out} \). The increase of \( \gamma_E \) means an increasingly improving quality of the received SNR at Eve, it physically says secure communication gradually confronts high risks. Besides, the lower bound of SOP gradually shows a tight approximation to the exact SOP when (i) \( R_t \) goes to 0, i.e., observing from (4) and (6), as \( R_t \to 0 \), it means \( \mathcal{W} \to 0 \), resulting in diminishing the gap between \( P_{out} \) and \( \mathcal{W} \).

Practically speaking, Alice adopts no transmission rate; and (ii) \( \gamma_E \) locates at the high SNR regime, i.e., it can be physically interpreted that Eve is close to Alice.

Fig. 3 depicts the PNZ, as shown in (9a). In continuation...
with $P_{\text{out}}$, higher $\bar{\gamma}_E$ values leads to lower $P_{\text{nz}}$, performance, it means Eve is largely capable of wiretapping the legitimate link. Fig. 4 shows that the analytical ASC, as in (10), demonstrates an increasing tendency with regard to $\rho$. Larger $\rho$ illustrates bigger gap between $\bar{\gamma}_E$ and $\bar{\gamma}_E^*$, and thereafter resulting in higher $C_s$.

Conclusively speaking, inspired by [8], [16], the MoG distribution is feasible and applicable in cellular device-to-device, vehicle-to-vehicle and on-body communications.

B. Accuracy Analysis

Observed from Figs. 1-4, our analytical results present an excellent match with Monte-Carlo simulations. For the purpose of illustrating the tightness of the analytical results, a useful measure, namely analytical error, is used as the accuracy indicator [9]

$$\text{analytical error} = 1 - \frac{\text{analytical results}}{\text{simulation results}} \times 100\%.$$  \hfill (13)

As shown in Table I, the analytical errors for the PNZ and ASC are considerable small, within $\pm1\%$. The analytical error for the SOP gradually increases as $\rho$ increases, but within $\pm3\%$. Conclusively speaking, our derivations are highly accurate.

V. CONCLUSION

In this letter, the feasibility of the MoG distribution on the PLS analysis was explored. The secrecy metrics, including $P_{\text{out}}$, $P_{\text{out}}^L$, $P_{\text{NZ}}$, and $C_s$, are respectively derived with simple and closed-form expressions. The accuracy of our analytical results are further successfully validated by performing Monte-Carlo simulations. This letter offers a unified and effective framework when analyzing physical layer security over fading channels. The MoG approach is beneficial when the main channel and wiretap channel confront different type of fading conditions, e.g., mixture of composite and non-composite fading channels.

### Table I: Analytical error against $\rho$ (dB) when $\bar{\gamma}_E = 0$ dB

| $\rho$ | 0 | 4 | 8 | 12 | 16 |
|-------|---|---|---|----|----|
| $P_{\text{out}}$ | 0.03% | -0.25% | -0.14% | 0.45% | -2.40% |
| $P_{\text{nz}}$ | 0.09% | -0.09% | -0.03% | -0.03% | 0.01% |
| $C_s$ | 0.63% | -0.41% | 0.27% | -0.21% | -0.008% |

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