The goal of the article is to study the essence of hybrid warfare within the sociological aspect. The paper focuses on the essence of “soft power” as the basis of a certain social technology that comprises the system of means and methods of purposeful action on social processes, the life of people under a hybrid war. The essence of organisational weapons is highlighted in the sociological context. It is noted that organisational weapons are based on special technologies of organisational management reflexion, which are aimed at representatives of social groups and institutions who are directly or indirectly involved in the long-term and short-term regulation of the behaviour of the population. The mechanism of the organizational weapons impact on the value and semantic models of social reality perception is determined.

**Keywords:** hybrid warfare, “soft power”, social technology, organizational weapons, mass consciousness.
Problem setting. One of the key issues of modern sociology of warfare is the study of the features of a new stage of warfare – hybrid wars. It can be noted that while the military theorists of the early twentieth century discussed new forms of warfare focusing on the use of new technological developments of the armed forces, the focus was shifted to the use of information technologies at the beginning of the 21st century. Sociological concepts of modern wars emphasize the change in the subjects of military conflicts and strategies for establishing control. In the broadest sense, researchers define the new type of war as “nonlinear”, but today there is no single approach to the interpretation of this concept. International legal documents and doctrinal documents of the leading countries of the world do not define this concept officially [1, p. 49].

Recent research and publications analysis. M. Trebin is one of the first Ukrainian researchers who defined the hybrid warfare as the combination of a guerrilla fighting and a civil war, insurgency and terrorism, the main characters of which are irregular military formations, militants, criminal gangs, international terrorist networks, intelligence services of foreign states, private military companies, military contingents of international organizations [2, p. 366]. He thinks that that throughout the hybrid war, the greatest attention is paid to information warfare, where the main active participants are the media and the Internet; the information warfare carried out throughout the hybrid war is aimed at destroying the spiritual world of the nations and peoples against whom the war is being fought [2, p. 367-370].

The phenomenon of hybrid warfare, historical prerequisites and features of such a conflict, its components, and stages of development were first considered by F. Hoffman [3], who is thought to be the founder of the concept of hybrid warfare that is the problem studied by the modern political science. Scientific works by S. C. Williamson [4] and N. Frier, a professor at Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College [5], that focus on the analysis of the fourth generation wars and network-centric warfare, should also be mentioned. US Vice Admiral A. Cebrowski and J. Garstka [6] analyse hybrid threats and challenges in terms of US defence strategy in their works.

Considering modern warfare, the works of named researchers, politicians, historians, and theorists who study the issues of war and peace such as Z. Brzezinski, O. Bogdanov, L. Hart, V. Gorbulin, O. Dz’oban’, H. Kissinger, S. Kurginyan, V. Mandragelya, S. Mann, J. Nye, G. Pocheptsov, I. Ruschenko, M. Senchenko, V. Serebryannikov, V. Slipchenko, V. Smolyanyuk, A. Toffler, M. Trebin, and others should be mentioned. The main attention in these works is paid to the military and information aspects, however, the sociological aspects are not studied. Generally, it should be emphasized that scientific literature sources do not highlight the sociological aspects of modern hybrid wars. So, there is a need for further research of the hybrid warfare essence to develop effective strategies to counter such threats for Ukraine.
**Paper objective.** The goal of the article is to reveal some sociological aspects of modern hybrid warfare.

**Paper main body.** Modern wars are not declared and, in general, the lines between peace and war are becoming blurred. In such wars, the importance of non-military solutions increases, the ratio between non-military and military means during a hybrid war is 4-to-1. This actualizes the use of “soft power”, a fairly broad concept that is used to refer to various instruments of pressure on a sovereign country without the use of weapons.

J. Nye understands “the soft power” as the capability of a nation to achieve the desired results within the international relations by persuading, but not by forcing or imposing violence, which is typical for “hard power”. “Soft power” acts by encouraging others to follow (or seeking their consent to follow) certain standards of behaviour and institutions in the international arena, which results in achieving the desired result without actual forcing [7, р. 21].

Using “soft power” in modern international relations is advantageous because no weapons are used, which is much more prestigious and profitable for the state than using the tools of “hard power”. That is why even great states strive to include “soft power” in their arsenal. V. Gorbatenko notes that “soft power” has more flexible instruments that are directed at supporting various economic projects and opening new promising markets. Soft power covers the issues of energy and food security, problems related to global climate change, cooperation in the field of science and technology, cultural and humanitarian ties, support of compatriots abroad, programs of assistance to developing countries, and proving humanitarian aid [8, p. 27–28].

The main channels for implementing the policy of “soft power” are public diplomacy, foreign cultural policy (foreign cultural strategy, cultural diplomacy, development of foreign cultural policy), information policy (including the use of social networks and other innovative media resources), international educational policy, networking humanitarian interaction (high humanitarian technologies, revolutions), financial and economic instruments (attracting investment into the country, access to the economic infrastructure of the recipient country), export of products for the masses (cinema, music, show business) [9, p. 203].

J. Nye defines public diplomacy as one of the most effective tools for building up the potential of soft power. The purpose of public diplomacy, first of all, is to promote the national interests of the state and ensure its national security by studying foreign public opinion, informing the external audience about their own policies, and influencing those who form this opinion [10].

“Soft power” is an important element in the foreign policy of many countries of the world – the USA, China, the countries of the European Union, Canada, Russia, Japan. Of course, each country has its own national approaches to the imple-
mentation of this element and uses different instruments of “soft power”, taking into account the political and economic conditions, as well as socio-cultural characteristics.

Researchers also believe that mass culture has the greatest influential potential in the context of soft power. Mass (popular) culture should be entertaining, accessible, and meet the needs of most people. Television and social networks are tools for promoting mass culture. It is through them that society receives information about the leading states and outsiders. Thus, the “soft power” of one state affects other countries due to the attractiveness of education, culture, values, language, religion, public diplomacy, and ideology [11, p. 113]. J. Nye believes that the campaign for hearts and minds in the global information age is becoming more burning than ever before. “Soft power” comes from the attractiveness of the culture, political ideals, and state policy of the country. When a country’s policy is recognized as legitimate, then its capacity for soft influence increases.

“Soft power” includes a whole range of tools of interdependence – the dynamism of the economy, the social cohesion of society, its focus on the perception of new information, inclusion in the system of international communications, the universality and attractiveness of the cultural and ideological values of a particular society and the professionalism of diplomats [12, p. 84].

From the point of view of sociological theory, the course of events at the stage of “soft power” contains the signs of social technologies of a certain type. The theory of social technology is a kind of special sociological theories, developed, of course, for the benefit of humanity. The idea was to effectively use sociological expertise to guide social processes. Over the past decades, there were a lot of theoretical works on the essence and ways of developing social technologies. I. Ruschenko says that “sociologists have always seen in this direction an opportunity to step from the acknowledgment of social reality to the construction of the social world. The hopes were quite “promising”, at least no one considered it possible to turn the idea of technology against the social order. Although, on the other hand, everything can be rationalized and technologized: war, crime, prostitution, corruption, and so on” [13, p. 37].

Social technologies are a set of means and methods of purposeful impact on social processes, people’s lives and actions, that enable obtaining the most significant results with a limited amount of social and economic resources, and ensuring the selection and implementation of the most optimal ways to streamline, harmonize, preserve or transform social objects according to the necessary parameters. Social technologies are used to manage people, social phenomena, social actions, and social systems. Depending on the hierarchy of social systems, actions, and phenomena, three groups of technologies are singled out as follows: macrotechnology (global) – managing society and its main spheres; mesotechnology – managing
regional structures, public institutions, organizations; microtechnology – managing small groups of people and self-organization of the individual [14, p. 73].

Social technology is the reasonable standardization of separate or corporate agents’ actions, which ensures the effective achievement of the set goals. The word “effective” is meant either as a definite (unconditional) achievement of the goal, or a reduction in costs, implementation time, or the maximum increase in the final effect. In practice, charitable or volunteer activities, admission to higher educational institutions, the electoral process, conscription, and much more aspects are technologized. Technology is an alternative to chaos, entropy, uncertainty. There are two forms of social development: the program containing stages, operations, procedures, means of activity; the activity built according to the program. If the program is hidden, the activity is visual and can be the object of analysis.

I. Ruschenko proposes to introduce into scientific circulation the concept of “disruptive social technology” (DST), which is a specific type of social technology aimed at creating “chaos” and artificially promoting the scenario of “para-revolution” on the enemy’s territory. DST should direct “soft power” to achieve tactical and strategic military goals and are built so that they can apply massive and a kind of “peaceful” protest actions against using weapons that stab in the enemy’s back, so to say [13, p. 37].

DST requires three types of resources: social resources – corporate subjects and individuals who are involved in mass actions and social processes on the appointed day; financing – money, most often in the form of cash, although today bank payment cards and other means of non-cash payments are used; organizational resources – “leaders”, prepared social networks, databases of people who can be quickly involved in planning actions, patterns of operational communication and notification, and so on. Media resource is constant “brainwashing” and psychological weaponry, it is of independent significance and is a compulsory DST component. The resource is needed to keep the mass consciousness on the “right toes”. Thus, taking over the media space is a strategic goal of hybrid warfare [13, p. 39].

Each DST has one or several critical points where there is a transition to a certain new phase of events. Prompt intervention in the chain of events, destruction of the aggressor’s plans at a critical point destroys the entire combination. Unlike revolutionary events, when the masses cross a certain limit of conformism, are abnormally excited and ready for self-sacrifice (this is one of the so-called mysteries of a real revolution), the tactics of “controlled chaos” [14] is based on artificially created temporary groups of activists; their fervour might end at any time when the pre-set scenario is faced with unforeseen circumstances or reasonable and vigorous resistance.

The aggressor considers the use of the “controlled chaos” tactics with the use of PST as a significant advantage over the tactics of earlier warfare generations.
Events take place on the enemy territory including in the deep rear, therefore, the influence of the government of the victim country is simultaneously paralyzed over vast territories; there exists an opportunity to enter the fortress without storming the walls, metaphorically speaking, but through the gate, opened by the “fifth column”. There is a real opportunity to use the human and economic resources of the regions that are not destroyed by military actions but captured with the help of “soft power” to continue the war including by military means. War is not declared but the thesis about the civil war is emphasized by the controlled media, which is a significant plus for the aggressor who supposedly respects international law and can even play the role of a “peacemaker”. The victim-country finds itself in a stalemate because it has to declare war even if it avoids it.

Expanding the ideas of I. Ruschenko, we can add that when using the technology of “controlled chaos”, significant success can be achieved when using organizational weapons [15].

In the context of the sociological aspect, the organisational weapons are based and made up of special technologies of the organizational management reflexion. They are ordered sets of methods (models, programs, strategies, procedures, forms) to implement constantly improving management decisions, to introduce innovations, support information, ideological and other necessary structural links, to recruit and train personnel, to plan, report, monitor, and so on.

Since the basis of any organizational system is made up of people whose activities are motivated by physiological, social, and informational needs, the productive, correctly calculated use of organisational weapons within a certain organizational environment (primarily by power structures) influence directly not only on the security level of the state organizational system but on its very existence. A long-term destructive massive informational and moral and psychological impact on the consciousness of each society member creates a real threat to the existence of the nation as a result of the transformation of the main worldview, cultural and ideological attitudes, that is, changes in the internal organizational environment that determines the country life system.

The action of organisational weapons is aimed at the representatives of social groups and institutions who directly or indirectly participate in long-term and short-term guidance of population behaviour. Managing elite, creative intellectuals, educators, teachers, well-known cultural and moral authorities of the state – they are the objects of organisational weapons impact.

People’s behaviour is significantly influenced not only by people who are promoted by the media but also by “shadow authorities” who also fall into the sphere of planning actions of organisational weapons. A separate area is creating new subjects to be used as organisational weapons in the form of subcultures, non-traditional confessions, alternative educational structures. Educational resources de-
serve special mention since they involve introducing new disciplines, reforming of curricula and syllabi in educational institutions and establishing new educational institutions in a target country to create a positive image of the country-aggressor. We earlier highlighted that educational means have increasingly been the subjects of organisational weapons since they can make a significant positive impact on the ideological orientation of the elite and society of a target country since the activities of the country-aggressor in the international arena might seem constructive [16].

Thus, using organisational weapons is a way of activating a pathological system within the functional system of the target state, where the pathological system absorbs the carrier resources to get developed. A feature of the pathological system (the use of organisational weapons) is that it affects the functional system of society, primarily from the outside, from a hierarchically higher power level of the systemic organization. Moreover, traditional forms of scientific observation cannot always notice the use of organisational weapons and cannot understand them within the framework of the traditional logic of everyday knowledge. Destruction as the influence of organisational weapons is aimed at achieving results that lie in the “value system” of the initiator of these resources usage.

The maximum effect of the use of organisational weapons is achieved in networked societies [17]. M. Castells understands the networked society as a dynamic and open system. The network in modern society acts as a building material for organizing people’s joint activities and also represents a structure that ignores boundaries. M. Castells thinks that “it is networks that constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and spreading the “network” logic greatly affects the course and result of processes related to production, everyday life, culture, and power” [18].

G. Voitovich emphasizes that a feature of the network, unlike all other forms of organizational structure, is that it does not have clearly defined centres and boundaries. It is the network as the main form of organization of the modern world order that is a flexible system of situational connections that are formed between the subjects of the global space, which makes it possible to establish a new social structure that characterizes the variability and mobility of the development of the modern world. That is, we are talking about the level of social self-organization, which ensures the internal integrity and consistency of the network, each of the elements of which is a component of a network system of a more general nature and exists within it on the terms of equal communication [19, p. 5].

Network structures are foundations, means of communication, mass media, transnational corporations, banking structures, public, religious, non-governmental, and non-profit organizations, political organizations, special services of different states, editorial offices of newspapers and magazines, and amateur publications or blogs, which are engaged in a conflict by one of the parties of the conflict. These
can be associations or clubs of hunters, philatelists, or antiques collectors who have connections with other similar clubs in different parts of the world, whose members periodically come to general meetings or forums. A network is a medium through which a certain signal can be sent, which will be perceived, transmitted further, and implemented. Thus, new ideas, different strategic models, alien logic are easily perceived in a networked society, which means that it can be conquered.

The consequences of the use of organisational weapons are the replacement of the system of basic values and meanings of the target state with values and meanings of the aggressor state since they are presented as more promising ones. G. Pochepstov states that meanings are governed by assessments and values of the past and which are not invented today, they are borrowed ready-made from the arsenal of semantic weaponry and are located around two poles – good and evil. “Our” concepts will always be approaching to good while “alien” – to evil. Organisational weapons in this context are characterized by the process of rethinking facts and values in favour of the aggressor [20].

Any sign system has two sides – meaning and sense. A technocratic industrial society, preferring the practical meaning of things, underestimates the role of senses. Technocrats usually look down on the humanitarians, but in recent years they are increasingly losing to them. The semantic aspect of organisational weapons can change existing goals into necessary or unnecessary ones, diminishing or exaggerating the existing meaning of things and actions, and legalizing the forbidden and tabooed things. Such impacts imply the use of a completely different toolkit. The facts fade into the background. The credibility of the fact is not as important unlike in the information space. If the audience does not perceive a fact, another one can be suggested. A fact is secondary, the primary one is a necessary image or meaning. A. Kharitonenko notes that semantic diversions “start” from an image, a metaphor, or an aptly chosen cliché to which actual facts are tailored. The enemy in this war “works with the image and fact separately, they make the desired image bright while the unwanted fact – muddy and controversial” [21, p. 161]. In this case, the main methods are reinterpretation, “conceptual translation”, mythologization of consciousness and ritualization of behaviour.

Scientists agree that the current hybrid war is taking place with the help of narratives that, to one degree or another, create and maintain the level of socio-political and psychological tension, influencing individual actions, decisions, and other activities of participators in a conflict [22, p. 114]. Narrative as a tool of hybrid war contains a twisted hybrid paradigm, which is designed to legitimize the actual state of the aggressor’s actions and shift correct accents to the wrong ones while explaining the existing picture of the world, sacred symbols, missions, and cause-and-effect relations that exist in such a hybrid world.
Thereby, the components affect the mass consciousness since they represent a rather simplified view of events associated with outright armed aggression. In the context of social development, the mass consciousness is a set of ideas of different social groups about the phenomena of the surrounding world (economic, political, cultural, which affect their social interests and the nature of their life as members of society.) Regarding the content, knowledge, ideas, norms, values, and patterns of behaviour shared by any group of individuals (mass) reflect in the mass consciousness [23, p. 58].

In the context of the global crisis of societies, the mass consciousness experiences transformational influences caused by information flows and the simulacra created by them, the hyperreality created by mass media, and so on. Thus, this results in the fact, as some researchers note, that people are a priori ready to trust tendentious interpretations of events in media reality rather than look for reliable facts of objective reality. They are mostly satisfied with the version of events that they receive from the media. Actually, the media narrative creates patterns, norms, clichés, and filters of the outlook of the masses as a combination of sensual, verbal, and semantic patterns [24, p. 62].

The media environment and the phenomena of fakes generated by it, post-truths along with clip thinking and perception, which originate from mass culture, now have the greatest influence on the methods of cognition, perception, and thinking under the conditions of colossal generation of information.

A feature of today is that the mass consciousness perceives problems from the point of view of immediate vital interests and the most common experience and the figurative representations based on it. This perception is somewhat limited, which poorly reflects the probable prospects and consequences of current events [23, p. 58].

In the context of influence on mass consciousness, narratives are mental and psychological constructs that shape and determine the life of society. Therefore, in the context of information confrontation, the narrative becomes, to a certain extent, a part of the general rhetoric in the policy of the aggressor country and an integral part of information propaganda. The narrative as a part of hybrid aggression includes myths and mythologemes since these are the most ancient archaic forms of thinking, and they encourage the rapid assimilation and comprehension of reality and appropriately presented information.

Modern means of communication and information propaganda and impacts practically build and use neo-myths that are understood as “ready-made” cliché schemes, to which the content expected by society is embedded and with the help of which certain needs are satisfied. The main thing in the structure of the neo-myth is the idea around which the cliché scheme is based. Such neo-myths in the system of narrative are a kind of imaginary construction that is linked to the fundamental values of the community. A neo-myth is neither real nor unreal but unfolds in ac-
cordance with the laws of the imagination and aims to demonstrate the essence of
cosmic and social phenomena [22, p. 18].

Thus, a special dimension of aggressive behaviour is involved in a hybrid war,
 motived by the creation of a parallel social reality as a combination of elements
of actual reality and an imaginary one. The new quality of war consists of a radical
shift in the emphasis of motivation to the level of constructing an imaginary
pseudo-reality. The value-semantic model organizes the perception of reality as an
integral complex of facts and phenomena with an appropriate assessment of their
significance. Everything that does not fit into the general model of the world is
designated as peripheral and hostile, capable of destroying reality, therefore, people
need to defend themselves against it by certain heroic actions [25].

Conclusions of the research. Summing up the above, it should be noted that in
the sociological aspect, the sublevels of social technologies are one of the most
important elements of hybrid warfare, the purpose of which is to program the opinions
or aspirations of the masses, the mental state of the population, and so on [26,
p. 108-110]. The ultimate goal of such efforts is control over the population, its
governability and obedience, the historical memory (or discourse of historical
memory) that is formed on the one hand, as a construct of mythological, folklore,
literary-artistic, traditional forms of social thinking, and on the other hand, with the
help of ideologemes. Disruptive social technologies are based on global narratives,
which in the information space and at the level of mass consciousness form alterna
tive views and a hybrid meta reality that get the functions of a true, genuine social
reality [27, p. 20-27]. Under the conditions of hybrid social reality, value-semantic
models of local significance are used, which are modified under the influence of
manipulative technologies and may have different value-informational content.

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Панфілов Олександр Юрійович, доктор філософських наук, професор, професор кафедри соціології та політології, Національний юридичний університет імені Ярослава Мудрого, м. Харків, Україна

Савченко Ольга Олександрівна, кандидат філософських наук, доцент, професор кафедри іноземних мов, Харківський національний університет Повітряних Сил імені Івана Кожедуба, Україна

СОЦІОЛОГІЧНИЙ АСПЕКТ У ЗМІСТІ СУЧАСНОЇ ГІБРИДНОЇ ВІЙНИ

Метою статті є подальше дослідження сутності гібридної війни в соціологічному аспекті. У рамках дослідження розглянута сутність «м’якої сили» як основи певної соціальної технології, що поєднує систему засобів і методів цілеспрямованої дії на суспільні процеси, життєдіяльність людей у ході ведення гібридної війни.
З соціологічного погляду розкрито сутність організаційної зброї, основу якої складають спеціальні технології рефлексії організаційного управління, що спрямована на представників соціальних груп і інститутів, які прямо або опосередковано беруть участь у довгостроковому і короткостроковому регулюванні поведінки населення. Розкрито механізм впливу організаційної зброї на ціннісно-смислові моделі сприйняття соціальної реальності.

Ключові слова: гібридна війна, «м’яка сила», соціальні технології, організаційна зброя, масова свідомість.

Панфілов Александр Юрьевич, доктор філософських наук, професор, професор кафедри соціології і політології, Национальний юридичний університет імені Ярослава Мудрого, г. Харків, Україна

Савченко Ольга Александровна, кандидат філософських наук, доцент, професор кафедри іноземних язиків, Харківський національний університет Воздушних Сил імені Івана Кожедуба, Україна

СОЦІОЛОГІЧЕСКИЙ АСПЕКТ В СОДЕРЖАНИИ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ ГИБРИДНОЙ ВОЙНЫ

Целью статьи является дальнейшее исследование сущности гибридной войны в социологическом аспекте. В рамках исследования рассмотрена сущность «мягкой силы» как основы социальной технологии, объединяющей систему средств и методов целенаправленного воздействия на общественные процессы, жизнедеятельность людей в ходе ведения гибридной войны. С социологической точки зрения раскрыта сущность организационного оружия, основу которого составляют специальные технологии рефлексии организационного управления, направленные на представителей социальных групп и институтов, прямо или косвенно участвующих в долгосрочном и краткосрочном регулировании поведения населения. Раскрыт механизм влияния организационного оружия на ценностно-смысловые модели восприятия социальной реальности.

Ключевые слова: гибридная война, «мягкая сила», социальные технологии, организационное оружие, массовое сознание.

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