Chapter 4
Arab MENA States and Value Change: What Happens When Economic Globalization Is More Rapid Than Cultural Globalization

Abstract This chapter attempts to close a gap in the recent literature on Arab MENA countries economic development: how globalization affected human values in this part of the world.

First, we assess the overall picture of the degree of globalization according to the Zurich KOF-Index data series, affecting the MENA countries.

We then go on to use new comparable indices of global value development derived from the latest set of World Values Survey data and determine the Arab MENA countries’ place on a new factor analytical index of Global Civil Society, building on Grinin et al. (Islamism, Arab spring, and the future of democracy, Springer, Cham, 2018) and Solomon and Tausch (“The age of ignorance” and the civic culture of democracy: A multivariate analysis based on World Values Survey data. In: Islamism, crisis and democratization. Springer, Cham, 2020, pp 23–85). We relate these results (country factor scores) with macro-economic and social and political indicators, presented in Tausch and Heshmati (Globalization, the human condition and sustainable development in the twenty-first century: Cross-national perspectives and European implications. Anthem Press, London/New York/Delhi. https://doi.org/10.7135/UPO9780857286550. https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84939789242&doi=10.7135%2fUPO9780857286550&partnerID=40&md5=32618c3ba9b7101853ea357f86de2703, 2012a; Sociologia 44(3):314–347, 2012b) and Tausch (Jewish Polit Stud Rev 30(1–2):65–225. Available at http://jcpa.org/article/migration-from-the-muslim-world-to-the-west-its-most-recent-trends-and-effects/ (with data definitions and sources). Free data download available from https://www.academia.edu/37568941/Migration_from_the_Muslim_World_to_the_West_Its_Most_Recent_Trends_and_Effects, 2019a; Int J Heal Plan Manag, https://doi.org/10.1002/hpm.2781, 2019b), and the globalization indicators of the KOF-data series (Gygli et al., Rev Int Organ 14(3):543–574, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09344-2, 2019).

Our statistical calculations were performed by the routine and standard SPSS statistical program (SPSS XXIV), available at many academic research centres around the world, and we relied here on the so-called oblique rotation of the factors, underlying the correlation matrix. The SPSS routine chosen in this context was the
so-called promax rotation of factors, which in many ways must be considered to be the best suited rotation of factors in the context of our research. Our comparisons reveal that the Arab MENA countries would be well advised to further social globalization.

**Keywords** Globalization · Economic globalization · Cultural globalization · KOF Index · World values survey

### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to close a gap in the recent literature on Arab economic and social development: the effects of their globalization on their place on the maps of global economic, political and social values and how globalization affects these processes.¹

Based on the KOF-Index of globalization, we evaluate the relationship between globalization, as evidenced in the KOF data series, collected at the ETH Zurich in Switzerland, and value development and overall development patterns in a generalized global factor analytical model.

This chapter continues the debates about international development patterns in the framework of a rigorous, quantitative study about the interactions between development performance and value development (Tausch, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019a, b; Tausch and Heshmati 2012a, b, 2016; Tausch et al. 2014).

First, we assess the overall picture of the degree of globalization according to the Zurich KOF-Index data series, affecting the MENA countries.

Linking results from global value studies, based on representative opinion surveys with country national-level globalization indices, is a relatively new tendency in research and has been attempted, amongst others, by Abduljaber (2018), Ariely (2018) and Berggren and Nilsson (2015). There is also a recent research tendency to focus globalization processes and value change processes in conjunction (Bajo-Rubio and Yan 2019; Inglehart 2018).

This essay is well within this literature tradition and determines the Arab world’s place on a new measurement scale of Global Civil Society.

First, we debate the theoretical background, present an overview of the methods and data and then portray the most important empirical results. We discuss the results and then present the conclusions from our findings.

¹The choropleth maps of this chapter were drawn using the free software developed by Robert Mundigl, available at [https://www.clearlyandsimply.com/](https://www.clearlyandsimply.com/).
4.2 Background: Combining Globalization Research and Global Value Research

In the international literature on globalization and its supposed effects on human values, dramatic statements abound. Let us mention just two examples of this literature, Barber (1992) and Castells (2011).

Barber’s bleak prognosis, written not long after the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, sounded like this:

Just beyond the horizon of current events lie two possible political futures -- both bleak, neither democratic. The first is a retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened Lebanonisation of national states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe -- a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence, every kind of artificial social cooperation and civic mutuality. The second is being borne in on us by the onrush of economic and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world with fast music, fast computers, and fast food -- with MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's, pressing nations into one commercially homogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce. The planet is falling precipitately apart AND coming reluctantly together at the very same moment. (Barber 1992)

Castells, in 2011, writes

The 1970s, the birthdate of the information technology revolution in Silicon Valley, and the starting-point of global capitalist restructuring, had a different meaning for the Muslim world: it marked the beginning of the fourteenth century of the Hegira, a period of Islamic revival, purification, and strengthening, as at the onset of each new century. Indeed, in the next two decades an authentic cultural/religious revolution spread throughout Muslim lands, sometimes victorious, as in Iran, sometimes subdued, as in Egypt, sometimes triggering civil war, as in Algeria, sometimes formally acknowledged in the institutions of the state, as in the Sudan or Bangladesh, most times establishing an uneasy coexistence with a formally Islamic nation state, fully integrated in global capitalism, as in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, or Morocco. Overall, the cultural identity and political fate of almost a billion people were being fought for in the mosques and in the wards of Muslim cities, crowded by accelerated urbanization, and disintegrated by failed modernization. Islamic fundamentalism, as a reconstructed identity, and as a political project, is at the centre of a most decisive process, largely conditioning the world’s future. (Castells 2011)

But what are the real facts “on the ground”? What are the real effects of globalization on Middle Eastern values and development? Arguably, the so-called KOF-Index of globalization, developed at the ETH Zurich, is the most encompassing measurement approach to the phenomenon of globalization today. In the study by Potrafke, which is the most widely received article on the issue of the effects of globalization, measured by the KOF-Index of globalization, and which is based on the encompassing Zurich evidence, came to conclusion which is very different from the one maintained by Barber (1992) and Castells (2011). Potrafke declares that globalization has spurred economic growth, promoted gender equality and improved human rights. Moreover, globalization did not erode welfare state activities, did not have any significant effect on labour market
interaction and hardly influenced market deregulation. It increased, however, within-country income inequality. The consequences of globalization thus turn out to be overall much more favourable than often conjectured in the public discourse.

Thus, hard-core evidence on the relationships between the two phenomena, globalization and human values, is only beginning to emerge. In the largest database of journal literature in the world, Scopus, there are just two titles which directly combine the catch-words “KOF-Index” and “World Values Survey,” Heggem and Jakobsen (2016) and Schalembier (2016). But both studies do not reveal us any further clues about the dramatic scenarios, described by Barber (1992) and Castells (2011).

Linking results from global value studies, based on representative opinion surveys with country national-level globalization indices, is a relatively new tendency in research and has been attempted, amongst others, by Abduljaber (2018), Ariely (2018). There is also a research tendency to focus globalization processes and value change processes in conjunction (Bajo-Rubio and Yan 2019; Inglehart 2018).

If we look more deeply into existing electronic bibliographies such as the already mentioned data base Scopus, it emerges that Deutsch and Welzel (2016) in the single more widely received study that might be classified as directly answering our query about the relationship between globalization and human values maintained that emancipative values are linked to the diffusion potential of a society, and that emancipative values are indeed on the rise in world society. In the study, emancipative values are measured as a combination of liberating and egalitarian orientations in four domains: choice, equality, voice and autonomy. Each domain, according to Deutsch and Welzel, includes three questionnaire items that have been continuously included in the World Values Survey.

- “Choice” measures how much people value having freedom in lifestyle and reproductive choices, asking respondents how acceptable they think (1) divorce, (2) abortion and (3) homosexuality are.
- “Equality” refers to gender equality, asking respondents how much they agree with the statements that: (1) “education is more important for a boy than a girl”; (2) “when jobs are scarce, men should have priority over women to get a job”; and (3) “men make better political leaders than women.”
- “People’s voice” includes three items that measure postmaterialist values, asking the respondents if they give first, second or no priority to: (1) “protecting freedom of speech”; (2) “giving people more say in important government decision”; and (3) “giving people more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities.”

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2https://www.scopus.com/home.uri. The authors express thanks to the Department of Development Studies, Vienna University, https://ie.univie.ac.at/en/ for the opportunity to be able to use Scopus. On the comparative aspects of journal coverage in Scopus, Web of Science and Google Scholar, see Aksnes and Sivertsen (2019).
“Autonomy” is measured by asking the respondents whether they consider: (1) independence and (2) imagination as desirable qualities when raising a child but not (3) obedience.

To combine the 12 items, Deutsch and Welzel undertook a normalization between 0 and 1 (with fractions of 1 for intermediate positions) and then averaged the items into the four domain sub-indices. In a second step, the four sub-indices were averaged by the authors into the overall measure of emancipative values, providing a multi-point index between 0 and 1. Deutsch and Welzel also argue that the increase in emancipative values is more pronounced but not limited to societies that are democratically governed. Globalization increases the diffusion potential of emancipative values.

Abduljaber (2018) in his study, published in Russia, reports that increasing rates of modernization and globalization in the Arab world over the past half century have led to a moving away from religion, tradition and ethnocentrism to embracing more secular, liberal and egalitarian values. Ordinary citizens in today’s Arab world are more tolerant, Abduljaber maintains, towards non-Muslims, Americans and other Westerners more than before. They support, Abduljaber maintains, recognizing Israel as a state at a rate previously unprecedented in the region. Arabs, his arguments runs, are politically, socially and culturally more liberal than they have been in the twentieth century. Evidence from the World Values Survey and Arab Barometer clearly convey, Abduljaber 2018 says, this observable value change in the region. Underlying causes for this change are according to the study due to macro-, meso- and micro-level changes in peoples’ lives resulting from increased modernization and globalization compared to earlier periods. This confirms, according to Abduljaber (2018) earlier findings from Western Europe and North America, which propose that social transformation processes yield predictable changes in values amongst mass publics.

Another study, authored by Berggren and Nilsson (2015), tests the effects of the KOF measure of economic, social and political globalization on the willingness of parents to teach tolerance to their children. For the study, economic globalization has the potential to make parents more tolerant, either through internalization following numerous interactions perceived to be beneficial with people who are different or through the realization that openness to such interactions are in their self-interest. Tolerant parents are then likely to be willing to transmit tolerance to their children. The same goes, the authors argue, for altruistic parents, even if they are not tolerant, when they consider it to be in the interest of the children to be open to people who are different. For Berggren and Nilsson (2015), social globalization means that values and ideas are transmitted more easily, through media, the Internet, travel, migration and other personal contacts, and to the extent that these are broadly liberal in character (e.g. through a Western cultural dominance), this can affect parents’ tolerance and willingness to teach tolerance. They could also realize that it is in the best interest of their offspring to be able to be integrated with others who are different. Political globalization, Berggren and Nilsson (2015) argue, concerns how nations interact with other nations and is probably not as influential on individual
attitudes, but to the extent that parents notice how political ties and exchanges across borders are becoming more common and stronger, they could see this as a reason to install tolerance in their offspring, to equip them better for an integrated world. Thus, the expectation by Berggren and Nilsson (2015) was for positive effects of globalization. Their empirical study encompassing up to 59 countries confirmed the expectation of positive relationships: globalization seems to enhance the willingness to transmit tolerance to children in a robust manner. However, Berggren and Nilsson (2015) underline that there are differences between types of globalization. A cross-sectional analysis revealed that economic and social (but not political) globalization stand in a positive relationship to the outcome variable. A more detailed investigation showed that in terms of economic globalization, both trade flows and the absence of trade restrictions exert a positive influence, whereas cultural proximity, information flows and personal contacts all stimulate a willingness to teach tolerance from the social side. Moreover, a panel-data analysis and a first-difference analysis largely confirmed these findings. Despite using a panel-data and a first-difference specification, as well as lagging globalization with respect to the dependent variable, Berggren and Nilsson (2015) emphasize that some components of the KOF Index of Globalization could be affected by past or present levels of tolerance, generating an endogeneity problem with biased regression results. However, Berggren and Nilsson (2015) maintain that an instrumental-variable approach at least weakly suggested a causal relationship between globalization and the transmission of tolerance. The findings, Berggren and Nilsson (2015) say, lend support to a view of globalization as being able to bring about widely valued social effects, through influencing ideas about how to bring up children. These ideas seem to stem from an altruistic concern in parents, that instilling tolerance will equip children better for a future in a globalized world.

Salient recent contributions in the literature on MENA economic and social development have, in general terms, mostly rather neglected such aspects and highlighted such “innocent” and “technical” phenomena like energy consumption, urbanization, trade openness, industrial output, political stability and environmental degradation in the region (Al-Mulali and Ozturk 2015). MENA literature with a larger citation impact in such documentation services as “Scopus” also featured on matters of energy economics, the environmental Kuznets curve et cetera (Farhani et al. 2014; Omri 2015; Omri et al. 2015; Ozturk and Acaravci 2011; Sowers et al. 2011). Articles, featuring on the systematic study of human values in the MENA region, were rather scarce and were mostly written in debates about entrepreneurial motives of men and women, and the formation of social capital (Bastian and Zali 2016; Younsi and Chakroun 2016).

This comparative lack of systematic, MENA region focused value studies is all the more surprising, if we consider properly recent advances in survey-based multivariate analyses of human values in the Arab world and the Muslim world in general. Achilov (2013), Driessen (2018), Glas et al. (2018), Kposowa and Aly Ezzat (2019), Tausch (2009), Tausch et al. (2014), Tessler (2002, 2004), Ucal and
Günay (2019), and Wegner and Cavatorta (2019) all could already show the potentialities of multivariate analysis of the opinions of Arab publics/Muslim publics in several countries. This vast literature and the methodologies and data, used by it, has to be applied in the framework of MENA-countries centred research and in answering systematically the question whether globalization has led to value change in the region, and, if yes, to what extent and how.

There is also, on the globalization side of the debate, a very vast established tradition of research and data collection. Earlier measurements rather relied on the concept of multinational corporations and their presence in the host countries, as evidenced in the studies by Bornschier (1980, 1983), Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao (1978, 1979), Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985), updated by Müller and Bornschier (1988), see also Tausch (2012a, b, 2018, 2019a, b), Tausch and Heshmati (2012a, b, 2013). In the present study, we investigate the effects of globalization, now measured in a more encompassing way by the KOF-Index of globalization and its economic, social and political components on Arab value development, Arab overall development patterns and performance.

International literature on comparative global economic, social and political values already developed comparative frameworks possibly to be applied to the globalization data, covering a number of MENA Arab countries. The methodology and results of global value comparisons, derived from survey research, were reported, amongst others, in Norris and Inglehart (2011); furthermore in Davidov et al. (2011), Hofstede (2001), Hofstede and Minkov (2010), Hofstede et al. (2010), Minkov and Hofstede (2011, 2013), Schwartz (2006a, b, 2007a, b, 2009).

Drawing from these recent developments in the field of development accounting (see Tausch 2012a, b, 2018, 2019a, b; Tausch and Heshmati 2012a, b, 2013) and value development analysis (Tausch et al. 2014; Grinin et al. 2018), we attempt to pinpoint the positive and negative development assets of the Arab world, and logically also the Arab MENA countries in these respects. These analyses of the World Values Survey data derived the following factor analytical scales of a Democratic Civil Society, well compatible with a large social scientific literature (see also Grinin et al. 2018):

1. The non-violent and law-abiding society (Tyler and Darley 1999)
2. Democracy movement (Huntington 1993)
3. Climate of personal non-violence (APA 1993)
4. Trust in institutions (Alesina and Ferrara 2000; Fukuyama 1995)
5. Happiness, good health (Post 2005)
6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism (Huntington 2000)
7. Accepting the market economy (Elzinga 1999; Glahe and Vorhies 1989; Hayek 2012)
8. Feminism (Ferber and Nelson 2009)
9. Involvement in politics (Lipset 1959)
10. Optimism and engagement (Oishi et al. 1999)
11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics (Giorgi and Marsh 1990)

4.3 Data and Methods for Our Comparisons

This chapter – as Chaps. 3, 6 and 8 of this book – was written in the tradition of macro-quantitative development research. For reasons of space, we refer interested readers to the description of the methodologies underlying this research approach (Babones 2014; Holland and Campbell 2005; Tausch et al. 2014). As in Chaps. 3, 6 and 8, general datasets, used in the present analysis, were:

- **KOF Globalisation Index.** Data definitions and free download available from: `https://kof.ethz.ch/prognosen-indikatoren/indikatoren/kof-globalisierungsindex.html`.
- **UNDP Human Development Data.** Data definitions and free download available from: `http://hdr.undp.org/en/data`
- **UTIP Inequality Index.** Data definitions and free download available from: `https://utip.lbj.utexas.edu/data.html`
- **World Bank Open Data.** Data definitions and free download available from: `https://data.worldbank.org/`

In addition to the data, used in Chap. 3, we refer our readers also to more recent databases, integrating dependency and world system approaches with conventional economic theories and the sociology of world values research:

- Tausch 2019a. [Migration from the Muslim world to the West: Its most recent trends and effects.](http://jcpa.org/article/migration-from-the-muslim-world-to-the-west-its-most-recent-trends-and-effects) (with data definitions and sources). Free data download available from `https://www.academia.edu/37568941/Migration_from_the_Muslim_World_to_the_West_Its_Most_Recent_Trends_and_Effects`
- Tausch and Heshmati 2013 [Globalisation, the human condition, and sustainable development in the twenty-first century: cross-national perspectives and European implications.](https://www.academia.edu/35044095/Globalization_the_human_condition_and_sustainable_development_in_the_21st_Century._Cross-national_perspectives_and_European_implications_Codebook_and_EXCEL_data_file)

This essay firmly shares the established methodology of *World Values Survey* – based comparative opinion research (Davidov et al. 2008; Inglehart 2006; Norris and

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3Data definitions for the current version of the KOF Index are available from: `https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/dual/kof-dam/documents/Globalization/2018/Definitions_2018_2.pdf`. 

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Inglehart 2015; Tausch et al. 2014). Our methodological approach is thus well within a more general framework to study Arab values with the methodology of comparative and opinion-survey based political science (Norris and Inglehart 2015).

We are of course well aware of many past valuable attempts to arrive at theologically and socially scientifically well-founded comparisons of global values. However, our methodology of evaluating the opinions of global publics from the World Values Survey data is based on recent advances in mathematical statistical factor analysis (Tausch et al. 2014). Such studies are based on existing comparative opinion survey data, which allow to project the underlying structures of the relationships between the variables.

Our statistical calculations were performed by the routine and standard IBM-SPSS statistical program (SPSS XXIV), available at many academic research centres around the world and relied on the so-called oblique rotation of the factors, underlying the correlation matrix (Tausch et al. 2014). The SPSS routine chosen in this context was the so-called promax rotation of factors (Tausch et al. 2014), which in many ways must be considered to be the best suited rotation of factors in the context of our research. Since both our data and the statistical methods used are available around the globe, any researcher can repeat our research exercise with the available open data and should be able to reproduce the same results as we did.

In each comparison, based on the national factor scores for each of the factors, resulting from our research (for surveys of the factor analytical method see Tausch et al. 2014), we evaluated the democratic civil society commitment of the overall population of the respective Arab and non-Arab countries.

The roll-out of the data, freely downloaded from the WVS website, was: G:\Analyses 2016\WVS_Longitudinal_1981_2014_spss_v2015_04_18.sav. We took great care in assuring that the variable names reflect the highest numerical values in the questionnaire and thus they might differ from the original variable label in the WVS. In the following, we shortly present our main research results.

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4https://www.ibm.com/analytics/spss-statistics-software. The authors express thanks to the Department of Political Science, Innsbruck University, https://www.uibk.ac.at/politikwissenschaft/index.html.en for the opportunity to be able to use the software (https://www-01.ibm.com/software/at/analytics/spss/).

5Older approaches often assumed that there is no correlation between the factors, best representing the underlying dimensions of the variables. But for example, in attempting to understand the recent pro-Brexit vote in the United Kingdom it would be ridiculous to assume that, say, there is no correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and anti-European Union attitudes.
4.4 Results: The Process of Globalization in the Arab Countries and the Arab MENA Countries by International Comparison

We first report our results about the real degree of globalization of the region. The KOF Index combines data about economic, social and political globalization. It distinguishes between de facto and de iure globalization. Details about the index construction are easily available to global publics (https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/dual/kof-dam/documents/Globalization/2019/KOFGI_2019_structure.pdf) so we rather concentrate on those components which are of immediate relevance for our research:

**Financial Globalisation, de facto 50.0**
- Foreign direct investment 27.3
- Portfolio investment 16.9
- International debt 25.7
- International reserves 3.2
- International income payments 26.9

**Cultural Globalisation, de facto 33.3**
- Trade in cultural goods 28.0
- Trade in personal services 24.3
- International trademarks 11.1
- McDonald's restaurants 20.9
- IKEA stores 15.7

**Cultural Globalisation, de jure 33.3**
- Gender parity 26.2
- Human capital 41.2
- Civil liberties 32.6

If we look at the development of financial globalization, de facto (combining foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, international debt, international reserves and international income payments); cultural globalization de facto (trade in cultural goods, personal services, international trademarks, McDonald’s restaurants and IKEA stores); and cultural globalization, de jure (combining gender parity, human capital and civil liberties), we find ample evidence about the rise of globalization in the Arab world and the Arab MENA countries since the 1970s (see Graph 4.1).

Two very clear-cut tendencies emerge: overall globalization increased considerably since the end of the Cold War, but it levelled off or even diminished over the most recent period, and the cultural aspects of globalization lagged behind the economic and financial aspects of globalization.

Map 4.1 informs our readers about economic globalization, de facto, in the MENA region by international comparison. Combining economic and financial de facto globalization is based, we highlighted already above, on trade in goods, trade in
services, trade partner diversity, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, international debt, international reserves and international income payments. The documentation of the data sources is easily available and does not need to be repeated here (https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/dual/kof-dam/documents/Globalization/2019/KOFGI_2019_variables.pdf).

**Economic Globalisation, de facto 33.3**
Trade Globalisation, de facto 50.0
Trade in goods 38.5
Trade in services 45.1
Trade partner diversity 16.4

Map 4.2 highlights the already well-advanced social globalization, de facto, in many parts of the Arab world. Social globalization, de facto, is defined in the KOF Index as follows:

**Social Globalisation, de facto 33.3**
Interpersonal Globalisation, de facto 33.3

International voice traffic 20.0
Transfers 21.8
International tourism 21.2
International students 20.4
Migration 16.6
Map 4.1 Economic globalization de facto

Informational Globalisation, de facto 33.3

Used internet bandwidth 43.2
International patents 23.6
High technology exports 33.2

Cultural Globalisation, de facto 33.3

Trade in cultural goods 28.0
Trade in personal services 24.3
International trademarks 11.1
McDonald's restaurant 20.9
IKEA stores 15.7
These data yield the following Map 4.2.

In the Arab world however, social globalization, de iure, did not keep pace with de facto social globalization. Social globalization, de iure, is defined in the KOF Index as follows:

**Social Globalisation, de jure 33.3**
- Interpersonal Globalisation, de jure 33.3
- Telephone subscriptions 40.6
- Freedom to visit 32.4
- International airports 27.0

**Informational Globalisation, de jure 33.3**
- Television access 35.7
- Internet access 42.0
- Press freedom 22.3
Cultural Globalisation, de jure 33.3
Gender parity 26.2
Human capital 41.2
Civil liberties 32.6

These data yield the following Map 4.3.
Graph 4.2 highlights these divergent development trends over time for the MENA region.
See note to Graph 4.1, above.
Again, both types of globalization in the MENA region levelled off in the most recent period. Our Table 4.1 highlights the global ranks of the MENA countries and the Arab world in general according to the different aspects of social globalization. In terms of social globalization, the Arab countries are ranked in the lower parts of world society, reflecting the isolationism which is combined in the social globalization – de iure index. Table 4.1 suggests real deficits in terms of
Table 4.1 The ranks of the MENA countries and the Arab World in the global process of social globalization

| Country                  | Social globalization, overall, rank | Social globalization, de facto, rank | Social globalization, de iure, rank |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Israel                   | 16                                   | 11                                  | 48                                |
| Qatar                    | 65                                   | 16                                  | 127                               |
| Kuwait                   | 71                                   | 27                                  | 119                               |
| Bahrain                  | 72                                   | 29                                  | 117                               |
| United Arab Emirates     | 73                                   | 6                                   | 133                               |
| Oman                     | 80                                   | 50                                  | 113                               |
| Saudi Arabia             | 84                                   | 30                                  | 131                               |
| Jordan                   | 88                                   | 60                                  | 110                               |
| Lebanon                  | 100                                  | 61                                  | 130                               |
| Morocco                  | 110                                  | 92                                  | 122                               |
| Tunisia                  | 111                                  | 122                                 | 88                                |
| Egypt, Arab Rep.         | 126                                  | 127                                 | 107                               |
| Iran, Islamic Rep.       | 133                                  | 150                                 | 103                               |
| West Bank and Gaza       | 137                                  | 158                                 | 74                                |
| Algeria                  | 150                                  | 154                                 | 136                               |
| Syrian Arab Republic     | 151                                  | 141                                 | 157                               |
| Iraq                     | 185                                  | 197                                 | 167                               |
| Yemen, Rep.              | 188                                  | 180                                 | 189                               |
Interpersonal Globalization

- Telephone subscriptions
- Freedom to visit
- International airports

Informational Globalization

- Television access
- Internet access
- Press freedom

Cultural Globalization

- Gender parity
- Human capital
- Civil liberties

These data must also be compared to those of the State of Israel, the only country with a high Human Development Index in the entire region. Israel’s HDI value for 2018 is 0.906 – which put the country in the very high human development category – positioning it at 22 out of 189 countries and territories. The rank is shared with Korea (Republic of).⁶

At this point, we must conclude that a considerable economic globalization of the region notwithstanding, the Arab world is characterized by a relatively low social globalization, caused by gaps in the international rankings of Telephone subscriptions, Freedom to visit, International airports, Television access, Internet access, Press freedom, Gender parity, Human capital and Civil liberties.

4.5 Globalization, Values and Development: A Meta-factor Analysis

Our following analysis presupposes some prior look into the reality which determines rather a host of other societal processes and variables – the degree to which the female population of a country had a chance to receive a secondary education. In Europe, Portugal, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Turkey belong to the global league of poor performers on this scale. Except for Libya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, Map 4.4 portrays the harsh realities of the deficits of most of the MENA region on this indicator, sharing these deficits with the poorest country of Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa (except Southern Africa) and the countries of South Asia.

⁶http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/ISR.pdf
In a very clear-cut way, this indicator reveals the harsh realities of gender development deficits across the globe at a single stroke.

Our present meta-factor analysis of globalization indicators and factor analytically derived results from the *World Values Survey* builds on a recent thorough
reconsidering of global value research and has been presented at length in Grinin et al. (2018). The country factor scores from this analysis were then entered into a meta-factor analysis, using KOF data and the data from Tausch and Heshmati (2013).

The 39 World Values Survey variables, used in the analysis, were the following:

1. Not important in life: Family
2. Not important in life: Friends
3. Not important in life: Leisure time
4. Not important in life: Politics
5. Not important in life: Work
6. Not important in life: Religion
7. Feeling of unhappiness
8. State of health (bad) (subjective)
9. Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people
10. Reject neighbours: People who speak a different language
11. Reject: men make better political leaders than women do
12. University is not more important for a boy than for a girl
13. No interest in politics
14. Supporting larger income differences
15. [Private vs] state ownership of business
16. Competition [good or] harmful
17. Hard work does not bring success
18. No confidence: The Press
19. No confidence: The Police
20. No confidence: The Government
21. No confidence: The United Nations
22. Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.
23. Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws.
24. Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections.
25. Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression.
26. Democracy: Women have the same rights as men.
27. Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal
28. Importance of democracy
29. Justifiable: claiming government benefits
30. Justifiable: Stealing property
31. Justifiable: Parents beating children
32. Justifiable: Violence against other people
33. Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport
34. Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
35. Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife
36. I don’t see myself as a world citizen
37. Insecurity in neighbourhood
38. Gender (female)
39. Age
The salient factor loadings, explaining 10 percent or more of a variable, were already mentioned in Grinin et al. (2018). The country values, derived from these factors, based on the list of the above 39 variables, were entered into a meta-factor analysis of globalization and value development with the KOF-globalization data and global development performance data.

The indices were:

An overall 35 variable development index, presented in Tausch and Heshmati (2012a, b)

Arab League membership

MENA region

Economic Globalisation, de facto index

Economic Globalisation, de jure index

Social Globalisation, de facto index

Social Globalisation, de jure index

So, according to Grinin et al. (2018), we have the following factors:

The Violent and Lawless Society

0.796 – Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport
0.765 – Justifiable: Stealing property
0.760 – Justifiable: claiming government benefits
0.732 – Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
0.560 – Justifiable: Violence against other people
0.451 – Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife

Democracy Movement

Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression – 0.753
Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections – 0.738
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men – 0.704
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor – 0.493
Importance of democracy – 0.493
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal – 0.448

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7 http://arableague-us.org/wp; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_League; https://www.britannica.com/topic/Arab-League; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15747941; and https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/organisations/arab-league.html
8 https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena
9 https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html
10 https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html
11 https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html
12 https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html
Climate of Personal Violence

Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife – 0.846
Justifiable: Parents beating children – 0.795
Justifiable: Violence against other people – 0.786
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe – 0.604
Justifiable: Stealing property – 0.587

Lack of Trust in Institutions

No confidence: The Government – 0.776
No confidence: The Police – 0.717
No confidence: The Press – 0.715
No confidence: The United Nations – 0.637

Unhappiness, Poor Health

State of health (bad) (subjective) – 0.771
Feeling of unhappiness – 0.716
Age – 0.440
I don’t see myself as a world citizen – 0.405
Insecurity in neighbourhood – 0.364

Redistributive Religious Fundamentalism

Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws. – 0.687
not important in life: Religion – –0.596
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal – 0.460
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor – 0.389

Rejecting the Market Economy

Competition [good or] harmful – 0.760
Hard work does not bring success – 0.733
[Private vs] state ownership of business – 0.353

Feminism

Reject: men make better political leaders than women do – 0.717
University is not more important for a boy than for a girl – 0.682
Gender (female) – 0.555

Distance to Politics

No interest in politics – 0.849
not important in life: Politics – 0.837
Nihilism

not important in life: Friends – 0,690
not important in life: Leisure time – 0,669
not important in life: Work – 0,495
not important in life: Family – 0,478

Welfare Mentality, Rejection of the Calvinist Work Ethics

Supporting larger income differences – –0,677
not important in life: Work – 0,467
not important in life: Religion – 0,400
Democracy: The state makes people’s incomes equal – 0,395

In Grinin et al. (2018), the following weighting of our factor scores by the Eigenvalues of the model was used to arrive at an Overall Civil Society Index (see Table 4.5):

1. The non-violent and law-abiding society [The violent and lawless society –4,263]
2. Democracy movement: 2,574
3. Climate of personal non-violence [Climate of personal violence –2,260]
4. Trust in institutions [Lack of trust in institutions –1,929]
5. Happiness, good health [Unhappiness, poor health –1,864]
6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism [Redistributive religious fundamentalism –1,554]
7. Accepting the market economy [Rejecting the market economy –1,434]
8. Feminism 1,245
9. Involvement in politics [Distance to politics –1,197]
10. Optimism and engagement [Nihilism –1,141]
11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics [Welfare mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics –1,075]

Already in Grinin et al. (2018), it was highlighted that the spread in the performance of Arab countries with complete data is really amazing. Whilst we might be hopeful about the development of future democracy in Qatar and most probably the United Arab Emirates, for which WVS are lacking, the data suggest pessimistic tendencies for Lebanon, Bahrain, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and the Westbank and Gaza.

The following variables were entered into our meta-factor-analysis. In each case, we indicate whether the variable is based on aggregate country statistical data or on factor scores derived from the World Values Survey (WVS) project (Table 4.2).

The R^2 of the entire model is 77,345 percent and thus pretty large. Based on the loadings of the factor structure matrix with the variables of our analysis, we decided to name the new meta-factors as follows (Table 4.3):
Table 4.2 The variables of our factor analysis about globalization and values

| Variable                                                                 | Explained variance (0 to 1, i.e. 0% to 100%) |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Overall 35 variable development index (based on aggregate statistical country data analysis) | 0.818                                         |
| The non-violent and law-abiding society (based on factor analysis of WVS data) | 0.750                                         |
| Democracy movement (based on factor analysis of WVS data)               | 0.703                                         |
| Climate of personal non-violence (based on factor analysis of WVS data) | 0.628                                         |
| Trust in institutions (based on factor analysis of WVS data)           | 0.813                                         |
| Happiness. good health (based on factor analysis of WVS data)          | 0.700                                         |
| No redistributive religious fundamentalism (based on factor analysis of WVS data) | 0.685                                         |
| Accepting the market economy (based on factor analysis of WVS data)    | 0.830                                         |
| Feminism (based on factor analysis of WVS data)                        | 0.890                                         |
| Involvement in politics (based on factor analysis of WVS data)         | 0.499                                         |
| Optimism and engagement (based on factor analysis of WVS data)         | 0.757                                         |
| No welfare mentality. acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics (based on factor analysis of WVS data) | 0.815                                         |
| Arab League membership (country grouping in world society)             | 0.917                                         |
| MENA region (country grouping in world society)                        | 0.917                                         |
| KOF-Index Economic Globalisation. de facto index (based on statistical country data analysis) | 0.677                                         |
| KOF-Index Economic Globalisation. de jure index (based on statistical country data analysis) | 0.747                                         |
| KOF-Index Social Globalisation. de facto index (based on statistical country data analysis) | 0.883                                         |
| KOF-Index Social Globalisation. de jure index (based on statistical country data analysis) | 0.894                                         |
Table 4.3  Factor loadings of globalization and values (factor structure matrix)

| Factor Loadings | Benefits of social globalization | MENA patriarchy | Pro Market | Trust in institutions and involvement | Non-violent and law-abiding society |
|-----------------|----------------------------------|----------------|------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Overall 35 variable development index | 0.855 | -0.523 | -0.100 | -0.322 | 0.001 |
| The non-violent and law-abiding society | 0.107 | 0.102 | 0.168 | -0.106 | 0.814 |
| Democracy movement | 0.343 | -0.519 | -0.100 | -0.578 | 0.628 |
| Climate of personal non-violence | 0.587 | -0.493 | -0.025 | -0.563 | 0.425 |
| Trust in institutions | 0.006 | -0.087 | -0.357 | 0.742 | 0.043 |
| Happiness. good health | -0.148 | -0.003 | 0.416 | 0.638 | -0.169 |
| No redistributive religious fundamentalism | 0.753 | -0.579 | -0.228 | -0.267 | 0.110 |
| Accepting the market economy | -0.325 | 0.144 | 0.879 | -0.071 | 0.056 |
| Feminism | 0.645 | -0.796 | 0.184 | -0.452 | 0.017 |
| Involvement in politics | 0.008 | 0.361 | 0.091 | 0.610 | -0.294 |
| Optimism and engagement | -0.004 | -0.053 | 0.701 | -0.009 | 0.453 |
| No welfare mentality. acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics | -0.330 | 0.334 | 0.839 | 0.170 | -0.182 |
| Arab League membership | -0.258 | 0.921 | 0.160 | 0.143 | -0.023 |
| MENA region | -0.258 | 0.921 | 0.160 | 0.143 | -0.023 |

(continued)
Table 4.3 (continued)

| Component - correlation | benefits of social globalization | MENA patriarchy | Pro Market | trust in institutions and involvement | Non-violent and law-abiding society |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|------------|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Economic Globalisation. de facto index | 0.650 | 0.134 | -0.288 | 0.163 | 0.222 |
| Economic Globalisation. de jure index | 0.833 | -0.222 | -0.211 | -0.076 | 0.309 |
| Social Globalisation. de facto index | 0.875 | -0.086 | -0.314 | 0.030 | 0.151 |
| Social Globalisation. de jure index | 0.916 | -0.499 | -0.098 | -0.411 | 0.170 |

Table 4.4 Factor correlations in our model of globalization and values

| Component - correlation | benefits of social globalization | MENA patriarchy | Pro Market | trust in institutions and involvement | Non-violent and law-abiding society |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|------------|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| benefits of social globalization | 1.000 | -0.374 | -0.169 | -0.235 | 0.188 |
| MENA patriarchy | -0.374 | 1.000 | 0.048 | 0.376 | -0.127 |
| Pro Market | -0.169 | 0.048 | 1.000 | -0.055 | -0.052 |
| trust in institutions and involvement | -0.235 | 0.376 | -0.055 | 1.000 | -0.197 |
| Non-violent and law abiding society | 0.188 | -0.127 | -0.052 | -0.197 | 1.000 |

- Benefits of social globalization
- MENA patriarchy
- Pro-market attitudes
- Trust in institutions and involvement
- Non-violent and law-abiding society
Table 4.4 lists the factor correlations. Our following choropleth maps (Maps 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9) portray the results of our meta-factor analysis on a global scale.

Graph 4.3 summarizes the results of our analysis for the effects of the different types of globalization on value development. There is a stronger negative effect from de iure social globalization on MENA patriarchy, substantiating the analysis of patriarchy in Chap. 5 of this book. Modern societies, characterized by high de iure social globalization, are however societies where trust is eroding (Tausch et al. 2014). *Ceteris paribus*, economic globalization, de facto, interestingly enough is associated with MENA patriarchy, the lack of support for pro-market attitudes, but is slightly and positively associated with trust and non-violent attitudes.
4.6 Conclusions

Looking at the development of financial globalization, de facto (combining foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, international debt, international reserves and international income payments); cultural globalization de facto (trade in cultural goods, personal services, international trademarks, McDonald’s restaurants and IKEA stores); and cultural globalization, de jure (combining gender parity, human capital and civil liberties), we found in our analysis more than ample evidence about the rise of globalization in the Arab world and the Arab MENA countries since the 1970s.

Map 4.6 Arab patriarchy
Two very clear-cut tendencies emerged: overall globalization increased considerably since the end of the Cold War, but it levelled off or even diminished over the most recent period, and the cultural aspects of globalization lagged behind the economic and financial aspects of globalization. We highlighted the already well-advanced social globalization, de facto, in many parts of the Arab world. In the Arab world however, social globalization, de iure, did not keep pace with de facto social globalization. Both types of globalization in the MENA region levelled off in the most recent period.

In terms of social globalization, the Arab countries are ranked in the lower parts of world society, reflecting the isolationism which is combined in the social globalization – de iure index. We compared these data to those of the State of Israel, the only country with a high Human Development Index in the entire region. We concluded that a considerable economic globalization of the region notwithstanding,
the Arab world is characterized by a relatively low social globalization, caused by gaps in the international rankings of Telephone subscriptions, Freedom to visit, International airports, Television access, Internet access, Press freedom, Gender parity, Human capital and Civil liberties.

Our promax factor analysis clearly established the close relationship between social globalization, de iure and overall positive development performance. The factor “benefits of social globalization” has factor loadings >0.500 with:

- Social Globalisation, de jure index
- Social Globalisation, de facto index
- Overall 35 variable development index
- Economic Globalisation, de jure index
4.6 Conclusions

The factor correlations (Table 4.4) clearly establish the negative effects wielded by MENA patriarchy on the benefits of social globalization, substantiating the analysis of patriarchy in the region in the present book (see Chap. 5).

In the present Chapter, we also could show that there is a stronger negative effect from de iure social globalization on MENA patriarchy. Modern societies, characterized by high de iure social globalization, are however societies where trust is eroding. Ceteris paribus, economic globalization, de facto, is associated with MENA patriarchy, the lack of support for pro-market attitudes, but is slightly and

- No redistributive religious fundamentalism
- Economic Globalisation, de facto index
- Feminism
- Climate of personal non-violence

Map 4.9  Non-violent and law-abiding society
positively associated with trust and non-violent attitudes. The bitter lesson for Arab decision makers wishing to increase economic globalization, but wanting to keep patriarchy intact is that if you want to enjoy the benefits of the globalization process, you have to permit a higher social globalization de iure. The risk that they are taking, though, is that such fully “modernized” societies, societal trust can erode. We think that a functioning democracy will be the best guarantee against such an erosion.

On an overall basis, one can maintain that the certain optimism, corresponding to the economic and human rights data, emerging from the Arab world, is reflected also in our Index of the Development of Civil Society. As we already mentioned above, the Overall Civil Society Index was already presented in Grinin et al. (2018), and was based on a weighting of the factor scores by the *Eigenvalues* of the factor analytical model presented in Grinin et al. (2018).

There is some hope for the Arab world, and a more egalitarian development and a decisive step away from the hitherto existing high indices of Human Inequality would accelerate this positive scenario. Table 4.5 lists these results.
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| Country               | Gallup poll about satisfaction: Overall life satisfaction index | Overall Civil Society Index |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Algeria               | 42.5                                                          | 89.8                       |
| Bahrain               | 60.8                                                          | 91.5                       |
| Comoros               | 90.8                                                          | xx                         |
| Djibouti              | 78.4                                                          | xx                         |
| Egypt                 | 85.6                                                          | 88.1                       |
| Iraq                  | 70.6                                                          | 86.4                       |
| Jordan                | 55.6                                                          | 59.3                       |
| Kuwait                | 26.8                                                          | 69.5                       |
| Lebanon               | 75.2                                                          | 94.9                       |
| Libya                 | 40.5                                                          | 61.0                       |
| Mauritania            | 69.9                                                          | xx                         |
| Morocco               | 60.1                                                          | 57.6                       |
| Oman                  | 15.7                                                          | xx                         |
| West Bank and Gaza    | xx                                                            | 83.1                       |
| Qatar                 | 17.0                                                          | 15.3                       |
| Saudi Arabia          | 21.6                                                          | xx                         |
| Somalia               | xx                                                            | xx                         |
| Sudan                 | 74.5                                                          | xx                         |
| Syria                 | 99.3                                                          | xx                         |
| Tunisia               | 76.5                                                          | 40.7                       |
| United Arab Emirates  | 9.2                                                           | xx                         |
| Yemen                 | 88.2                                                          | 64.4                       |
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