Religious Devotion to Political Secularism

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Abstract: By investigating the formation of Twelver Shi‘i theology, this article seeks to show that, despite being political and despite its advocacy of pure theocracy, living in the shadow of a secular state is part of Shi‘i religious doctrine. It is argued that existential threats against Proto-Twelver Shi‘ism during its formative centuries led to a messianic conception of the twelfth Imam, the only person whose direct leadership can enable a religiously legitimate state to be formed. Therefore, until his return—which is subject to the will of God—all rulers are usurpers and imposters on the right of the twelfth Imam. Shi‘i leaders are not allowed to seize the institution of government, and non-governmentalism is institutionalized as part of Shi‘i political theology. Instead of focusing on the characteristics of a legitimate ruler and how to form a legitimate government, the founding Shi‘i scholars were concerned with how to co-exist with a usurper. It will be demonstrated that these scholars had differing ideas about the scope and scale of engagement/disengagement with the institution of the state, but none of them discussed the possibility of forming a religiously legitimate government before the return of the twelfth Imam.

Keywords: twelve shi‘ism; political secularism; Shi‘i theology; theocracy; hidden imam; qā‘im; age of perplexity; hadith collection; founding Shi‘i scholars

1. The Theocratic Foundation of Political Secularism

Not much time has passed since the dominant view of religion among thinkers and policymakers was that it would gradually fade from the realm of human life. In addition to being a descriptive claim about what was thought to be happening, it was also a normative and prescriptive claim. In other words, secularization, in its broadest sense tended to be seen as a positive phenomenon, something to be both desired and hastened. It was according to this logic that in many Muslim countries, secularization was pursued as a top-down political project aiming to accelerate a seemingly inevitable and constructive process. However, the situation of religion in the United States and, more importantly, the backlashes to secularization projects in the Islamic world, called the secularization thesis into question. The various dimensions of secularization theory were then scrutinized, and the hypotheses of a causal link between modernity and secularization and the inevitability of the secularization process gradually lost their validity. The desirability and usefulness of secularization were also questioned. But aspects of this theory remain constructive and prescriptive, including the idea of the separation between the institution and authorities of religion from the institution and authorities of the state, which can be described as political secularism. The key claim of this article is that political secularism, in this specific sense, is embedded in Twelver Shi‘i theology.

This article employs the analytical framework proposed by Rajeev Bhargava. To measure the secular or theocratic nature of a political system, Bhargava suggests that the relationship between religion and government should be examined on three levels comprising the connection or disconnection at the level of the ultimate end, the level of institutions and personnel, and the level of law and public policy (Bhargava 2006). The first two levels exist in Shi‘i political theology. In other words, political secularism as it is considered in this article is a disconnection between religion and the state at the level
of the ultimate end and at the level of institutions and personnel. But at public policy level, this article does not seek to promote the privatization of religion as is advocated by the conventional secularization thesis. As José Casanova suggests, some religions have both public and communal identities, and for this reason, it is not possible to privatize them. The Shīʿa religion is a religion with strong public and communal identities, and limiting Shiʿism to the private sphere is neither possible nor desirable. Therefore, in the conceptual framework proposed in this article, there is no contradiction between political secularism and the role of religion in the public and political spheres. Of course, unlike the goal of political parties, the creation of a role for religion and religious leaders in the political sphere is not undertaken with the aim of such leaders taking over the institution of government, and their input will be limited to influencing public policy. As Casanova suggests, the most appropriate sphere for the religion to play a role is that of civil society (Casanova 1994). In talking about a religious commitment to secularism, therefore, I do not mean the advocacy of atheism or the exclusion of religion from the public or political spheres. Rather, I mean that the ultimate end of the institution of religion and the institution of state is not the same, and there is distance between religious authorities and government institutions and office holders.

The argument proposed in this article is at once descriptive as well as normative and prescriptive. My argument is descriptive in the sense that it conceptualizes one of the key elements of Shīʿa theology as political secularism. Another descriptive claim in this article is that this conceptualization describes the political behavior of more than a millennium of Shīʿa religious scholars/authorities before the emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini. As suggested in this article, Shīʿa clerics have a long history of involvement in politics. This involvement has been greater in some periods, and at times clerics have actually driven political developments. Obvious examples in this regard are the tobacco protest led by Mirza Shirazi and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, in which clerics played a decisive role on two opposing fronts. Clerics like Akhund Khorasani and Mirza Naini supported constitutionalism and Shaykh Fazlullah Nouri opposed constitutionalism. Ayatollah Khomeini’s involvement in politics in the years leading up to the 1979 revolution can be considered a continuation of the tradition of Shaykh Fazlullah Nouri. It is not without reason that a quote attributed to Shaykh Fazlullah Nouri (“Our politics is our religion and our religion is our politics”) is one of the key slogans of Iran’s clerical leadership. However, unlike Shaykh Fazlullah, who never conceptualized the idea of a government being taken over by clerics, Ayatollah Khomeini promulgated a specific politico-religious theory in which he introduced Shiʿism as a government-centered religion. According to Khomeini’s reading of Shiʿism, which can be called governmental-Shīʿism, clerics have the authority and responsibility to take over the state apparatus. Before Khomeini, a small number of scholars, such as Muḥammad Ḥusayn Kāshīf al-Ghīṭā (1744–1813) and Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Mahdī Nīrāqī (1771–1829), had used the concept of wilāyat-i faqīḥ and spoken about a greater role for clerics in the government system. But Khomeini was the first jurist who conceptualized clerics taking over the government apparatus as a part of the Shīʿa belief system. In addition to the innovation that Khomeini added to the history of Shīʿa political thought, he was also the first Shiʿa who in his political practice, overthrew the established political system entirely and, after doing so, assumed the position of the head of the state.

The argument of this article is also normative and prescriptive in the sense that it is presented in opposition to the theory of wilāyat-i faqīḥ. It offers a theoretical framework for regulating the relationship between religion and the state in the Shīʿa world that could lead believers towards accepting a secular political system. In offering a general description of Twelver Shīʿa theology, I will explain what I conceive of as Shiʿism’s religious commitment to political secularism.
2. Twelver Shi’i Theology

Politics is a key element of the identity of Twelver Shi’as. The seeds of the phenomenon of Shi’ism were sown in the claims about political leadership made after the death of the Prophet. The concept of the Imāmate distinguishes Shi’ism from the Sunni majority, a feature that attributes both religious and political authority to certain individuals chosen by God. These individuals number twelve, the first of whom was Imām ‘Alī, the Prophet’s son-in-law and cousin. ‘Alī’s two sons Hasan and Husayn are known as the second and third Imāms, and the remaining nine Imāms are Husayn’s descendants. Shi’as believe that all twelve Imāms were chosen by God and infallible, and possess both ‘ilm hadīth [divinely inspired knowledge] and ‘ilm ghaṣīr [knowledge of the unseen], so their understanding of religion is the ultimate and definitive understanding. The words and deeds of the twelve Imāms, along with the Qurʾān and the Sunna of the Prophet, are considered among the sacred and authoritative texts of Shi’ism. The twelfth Imām, known as the hidden Imām, is a messianic personage—considered the promised savior and the qa’im [the one who will rise up]. Shi’as believe that the twelfth Imām went into occultation in 329 AH/941 CE, is still alive, and will return on an unspecified future day to establish a government of justice and equity. If we were to use modern concepts to explain Shi’i political thought, we could say that the legitimate and ideal political system for Shi’as is pure theocracy. The convergence of religion and state is complete in Shi’i thought. The head of state is appointed directly by God, and the ultimate end of the state is the same as the ultimate end of religion, which is to facilitate the salvation of human beings, and the implementation of religious rulings is considered the fundamental mission of the state.

One might opine that this was the model that was implemented in Iran after the 1979 revolution. In the Islamic Republic, the clergy claims that the government’s goal is to guide and pave the way for the salvation of believers. It is also claimed that all government policy-making is formulated and implemented in accordance with Islamic law. Finally, not only the position of the head of state, the wali-yi faqīh, but the majority of key positions in the political system, are occupied by religious leaders. However, it cannot be said that the ideal political system of Twelver Shi’ism has been implemented in its entirety in the Islamic Republic. In fact, there has been a serious deviation from this ideal. The wali-yi faqīh is not understood by the Shi’as to have been chosen by God. As was mentioned earlier, the Shi’as have a very clear and unchangeable understanding in this regard: only twelve specific people have been chosen by God to be infallible Imāms. It is for this reason that many consider Ayatollah Khomeini’s conceptualization of Shi’i political theology as an innovation and serious deviation from orthodox Shi’ism (Haeri-Yazdi 1994; Kadivar 1997, 1999). The ideal model of governance in orthodox Shi’ism cannot be implemented in the absence of the twelfth Imām. Shi’i political theology was an ideal that was shaped by the power relations in the first few centuries of Islamic history. It was an ideal that was formed not with the goal of implementation but in response to the inconsistency between external reality and the defining element of Shi’i identity. This point can be addressed in detail through an examination of the genealogy of the formation of Twelver Shi’ism.

2.1. The Genealogy of Shi’i Theology

Shi’i theology was established in the middle of the 5th/11th century. The roots of Shi’ism are found in the controversy over the succession of the Prophet. Despite the claims of the Prophet’s son-in-law and cousin, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭalib, the majority of the fledgling Muslim community pledged allegiance to Abū Bakr. Imām ‘Alī eventually ruled as the fourth caliph for five years, from 656 to 661 CE. After his assassination, his eldest son Hasan, known as the second infallible Imām to the Shi’as, claimed the caliphate for about seven months, but due to the military superiority of another claimant to the position, Muʿawiyah I, was forced to renounce his claim and pledge allegiance to Muʿawiyah. After the death of Muʿawiyah I, his son Yazīd came to power, but Husayn, another son of Imām ‘Alī known as the third infallible Imām to the Shi’as, rebelled against him. Imām Husayn’s uprising was tragically crushed and failed. Until the time of Imām Ḥusayn, the Shi’i community,
which at that time was more commonly known as the family of the Prophet or the Imãmi community, was homogeneous and present in the political arena through the leadership of one person (Imãm 'Alî, Imãm Hasan and later Imãm Husayn). But after the tragedy of Karbala, during which Imãm Husayn and his family and companions were massacred, the Imãmis splintered off into different groups. Some took up arms to avenge the killing of Imãm Husayn while others distanced themselves from political activity. Based on their different political approaches, many branches of Shi’ism emerged and new sects were established, some of which, like the Zaydiyya and Isma’iliyyah, have survived to this day. Of course, there were other sects that disappeared in the first centuries of Islamic history. The sect that later became known as Twelver Shi’ism took a non-confrontational approach to politics. After the killing of Imãm Husayn, nine other people took on the leadership of this branch of the Imãmi community, all of whom gradually came to be considered as chosen by God, recognized to have superhuman characteristics and transformed into the sacred figures of Twelver Shi’ism. None of these nine Imãms instigated a revolt against the caliph of their time. In the period in which these nine individuals led the Shi’i community, various other Shi’as conducted uprisings against the ruler, including the relatives of the Imãms. But the Imãms themselves never publicly supported any of the uprisings and in many cases took a stand against them. Overall, the infallible Imãms of Shi’ism took no action to seize the caliphate. They eschewed opportunities that arose, showing no inclination towards political power. A clear example in this regard was the sixth Imãm, Imãm Ja’far al-Šâdiq (702–765), who rejected an invitation to lead an uprising to seize the caliphate during the decline of the Umayyads. Another example was Imãm ‘Alî b. Mûsã al-Râda (766–818), the eighth Imãm, who accepted the post of crown prince at the urging of the caliph at the time al-Ma’mûn, but on the condition that he would not play any part in government affairs:

I shall not command, and shall neither prohibit nor give legal opinions, nor judge nor appoint, and I shall not remove [people] from office nor alter any of the existing [arrangements], and you will excuse me from all these.

(Imãm Râda quoted in Tor 2001, p. 121)

The conservative approach of the infallible Imãms is not difficult to understand in the context of the power relations of the early centuries of Islam. The Proto-Twelver Shi’as, not only in relation to the governments of their time, but even in comparison with other Shi’i/Imãmi sects, were much too weak to countenance any attempt to seize political power. This realism is reflected in the words and deeds of the infallible Imãms. For example, at the time of the revolt of Zayd b. ‘Alî b. al-Hasan (75–121/694–740), the half-brother of Imãm Bãqir, the Imãm tried to dissuade him from carrying it out, warning him of the possible consequences (al-Kulaynî and Sarwar 1999a, pp. 507–8; Gleave 2018; Khiyabani 2007, p. 12; Kohlberg 2012; Lalani 2000, pp. 46–47). Another example was the response of the sixth Imãm, Imãm al-Šâdiq, to one of his followers Sadeyr who had wanted to rebel:

“O Sadeyr! Had there been for me Shi’as of the number of these goats, there would not have been leeway for the sitting back (not rising against the ruling authorities) for me”.

(al-Kulaynî and Sarwar 1999b, p. 393)

Sadeyr reports that the goats pointed to by Imãm al-Šâdiq numbered to 17. Despite the very weak position of the Twelver Shi’as, they could not abandon their claim to the legitimate right to govern, because that was the very reason for their existence. This claim was validated by the blood relationship of the infallible Imãms with the Prophet on the one hand, and the crisis of legitimacy faced by most of the caliphs on the other, despite its realization requiring a combination of factors lacked by the Proto-Twelver Shi’as.

Another important point to note about the Proto-Twelver Shi’as is that after the death or killing of each of the infallible Imãms, it was common for new sects to split off from the
community. For this reason, the Shi’as were constantly in crisis and survival was their main concern during the first few centuries of Islamic history. By the early 3rd/9th century, a number of key elements of Shi’i theology had taken shape and been established, including the fact that the Imāms are God-appointed, infallible individuals with ilm ladunnī, and therefore that their understanding of religion is ultimate and definitive. More importantly, at the core of Shi’i theology were the concepts of the messiah and qa’im, meaning that the Shi’as believed that eventually, one of the Imāms would rise up and assume power. However, the key element of Twelver Shi’i theology, from which the quality of political secularism claimed in this article stems from, was formed later on and in fact emerged from the even more critical situation faced by the Proto-Twelver Shi’as in the 4th–5th/10th–11th centuries. This key element was the messianic conception of the twelfth Imām.

2.2. Qa’im and Savior

With the martyrdom of the third Imām in 61/680, the Imāmi community split into several branches. Imām Husayn’s son, Imām Sajjād, maintained his distance from the government and pursued a policy of non-confrontation with the caliph. But other Shi’i groups were formed, such as the Tawwābins and Kaysāniyya, which took up arms to avenge Imām Husayn’s death. The insurrections were quickly suppressed and their efforts came to nothing, which in turn led to pessimism about armed struggle and the rise of messianic sects. Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, who was the half-brother of Imām Husayn, was the spiritual leader of the Kaysāniyya movement and died in the year 81/700. However, a significant number of members of the sect disseminated the belief that he was still alive and would return as their victorious leader (Al-Nawbakhtī and Kadhim 2007, pp. 76–79; Buhl 2007; Halm and Mousavi-Khalkhali 2005, pp. 49–83). This sub-sector within the Kaysāniyya movement became known as the Karbīyya. This group can be said to have been the first significant Shi’i messianic sect. From this point, messianic sects emerged in response to the death of a significant number of important and influential people across various Shi’i branches. The sect which later became known as the Twelver Shi’ism was no exception, and after the death of each Imām, a number of Shi’as tended to form a new sect and, believing that the deceased Imām was still alive, refused to pledge allegiance to the next one (Newman 2013, pp. 16–35). For example, the Bāqarīyya sect was formed after the death of the fifth Imām (Shahrastani 1984, pp. 142–43), and the Nāwūsiyya sect was formed after the death of the sixth Imām (Al-Nawbakhtī and Kadhim 2007, p. 123). Most of these sects disappeared very quickly, usually when the next Imām consolidated his position.

But the Wāqifiyya sect, one of those formed after the death of the seventh Imām, Imām Mūsā al-Kāzim (127–183/745–799), was more significant than the other sects in two ways. First, the sect lasted for more than a century and a half, and second, its adherents were influential members of the Imāmi community and, unlike other messianic sects, produced extensive and powerful literature in support of their messianic theology. For this reason, this sect presented a more serious challenge to Twelver Shi’ism than the other sects could manage. Ironically, the Wāqifiyya made two significant contributions to the conceptual consolidation of Twelver Shi’ism. Firstly, in the process of defending its position against the Wāqifiyya, Proto-Twelver Shi’ism enhanced and clarified its own identity, in particular with regard to ideas about the Imāmate and occultation. In addition to this reactive impact, conceptualization of the notion of ghaybah [occultation] by Wāqifs provided Twelver Shi’as with invaluable material from which to conceptualize their own account of occultation. Amir-Moezzi’s path-breaking book on early Shi’ism is worth quoting at length to emphasize this point:

An examination of the isnād of the great compilations from the time after the Occultation turns out to be a fruitful endeavour. For example, we are able to see that fragments, sometimes even entire treatises, have been collected and inserted into systematic compilations. Such is the case, for example, of the Kitāb al-nūsra by the Wāqifīte ‘Alī b. Ahmad al-‘Alawi (d. circa 200/815), incorporated into al-shaykh al-Tūsī’s Kitāb al-ghayba; the author includes some forty ‘messianic’
traditions in which the number of Imāms stops at seven, as would be expected for one of Mūsā’s Waqifites. There is also the Kitāb al-hujja fi ibtā al-qā’im by Mūsā Bahr al-Ruhnī al-Shaybānī (second half of third/ninth century to the beginning of the following century, thus after 260/874), inserted by Ibn Bābyte into his Kamāl al-dīn, and by al-Tūsī into his Kitāb al-ghayba.

(Amir-Moezzi 1994, pp. 101–2)

This was not the only instance in which Twelver Shīʿa expropriated concepts from other sects. Proto-Twelver Shīʿa had from the very first century of Islam considered the Ghulāt [exaggerators] as its major foe. The Ghulāt were known to overstate the qualities of the Imāms and attribute superhuman characteristics to them. This was not the only instance in which Twelver Shīʿa expropriated concepts from other sects. Proto-Twelver Shīʿa had from the very first century of Islam considered the Ghulāt [exaggerators] as its major foe. The Ghulāt were known to overstate the qualities of the Imāms and attribute superhuman characteristics to them. The infallible Imāms and their close associates always opposed the Ghulāt, but gradually many of the claims that the Ghulāt had made about the Imāms found their way into Twelver Shīʿa beliefs. The same was true of the messianic character of the Twelfth Imām. For the first four centuries of Islamic history, the Proto-Twelver Shīʿa as had rebuffed the belief that the most recently deceased Imām was still alive, pledging allegiance to one of his sons. They believed that the Imāmāte line would continue until one of them rose up and established a legitimate government. It was for this reason that the Proto-Twelver Shīʿa rejected the Waqifiyya sect and their attribution of a longer than natural lifespan to the seventh Imām. For example, one of the key figures of Proto-Twelver Shīʿism, Abū Sahl al-Nawbakhti, who lived during the minor occultation, rejected the messianic conceptualization of Imām Mūsā proposed by the Waqifiyya. Shaykh al-Ṣadaq quotes the following text from the book Al-Tanbiyyah fi al-Imāmah by Abū Sahl:

Our belief and tenets of faith today, regarding the occultation of the Imam, does not in any way resemble the Waqifiya sect that believes in the occultation of Imam Musa bin Ja’far (a.s.), because the matter of his death is a well-known fact. His death and burial were witnessed by a multitude of people and more than 150 years have passed after that, but during this period no one has reported seeing him or having correspondence with him. . . . And in this claim of ours the Imām’s occultation is neither a refutation of a sighting or feeling nor is it an impossible claim. It is also not a claim that reason may deny and something that is opposed to normality. Regarding him there are still present some among his reliable and secret Shias who claim that only they are the means to reach him and a channel through which the Imām’s verdicts are conveyed to his Shias.

(Shaykh al-Ṣadaq quoted in Shaykh al-Ṣadaq and Rizvi 2011, p. 100)

About a century after Abū Sahl al-Nawbakhtī’s argument, the Proto-Twelver Shīʿa accepted the Waqifiyyas’ concept as part of their own religious beliefs, albeit with the difference that the messianic referent became the twelfth Imām rather than the seventh Imām. Of course, acceptance of this belief did not take place suddenly, and we cannot attribute its conceptualization to any particular person or a pre-planned strategy. Those who initially stated that the eleventh Imām had a son did not articulate their claim in a messianic context. It can be speculated that this claim was closely related to the interests of the late Imām’s circle of companions. With the death of the eleventh Imām, a complicated situation arose because it appeared Imām Ḥasan al-‘Askari had no child around whom the axis of the Shīʿ leadership circle could continue the extant Imāmat system. In addition, there was a claimant to the Imāmāte from outside the Shīʿ leadership circle. Ja’far b. ‘Ali b. Muhammad, the brother of Imām Ḥasan al-‘Askari, had claimed the right to the Imāmāte even during the latter’s lifetime (Khasibli [945] 1999, p. 320). After the death of the eleventh Imām, he pursued his claim in a more determined manner and asked to be allocated the remaining property of the eleventh Imām. Ja’far, who is known as Ja’far Kāṭab among the Shīʿas, took his claim to the point of bringing a complaint to the caliph demanding that the property of the eleventh Imām be transferred to him (Shaykh al-Ṣadaq
and Rizvi 2011, pp. 127–28). At this point in time, the payment of khums was established as a Shi’i religious duty, and it was collected through a representative organization called the wikāla network. For this reason, the Shi’i leadership circle had considerable wealth at their disposal, which they naturally did not want to hand over to someone outside their own circle. It was in this context that the mother and sister of the eleventh Imām, alongside some of the deceased’s closest associates, made the statement that the eleventh Imām had left a son who was in hiding due to fear of persecution, and that he, from this place of hiding, held the responsibility for leading the Shi’i community. Among the people who played key roles in this transitional period of Shi’i history, we can point to: ‘Uthmān b. Sa’īd ‘Amrī,5 Sūsan (the mother of Imām Hasan al-’Askārī, also known as Ḥadīth) and Ḥakīma Khāṭṭīn (the sister of Imām Hasan al-’Askārī), Ibrāhīm b. Mahzīr Ahmad b. Iṣḥāq Qumī (d. 263/876), Muḥammad b. Ahmad b. Ja’far Qatān Qumī, Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad Ḥamadānī, Dāwūd b. Qāsim b. Iṣḥāq (d. 261/874) Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Mutahīr (d. 261/874) and Abū Sahl ’Isa’sūl b. Iṣḥāq al-Nawbakhtī (d. 311/923). There was no messianic conceptualization in the claims of these people, who understood the absence of the twelfth Imām as a temporary phenomenon: he was presently in hiding, but would soon emerge, start an uprising and implement the ideal Shi‘ī government. This claim initiated a process that led to an epistemic transformation of Shi‘ī theology during the next one and a half centuries. However, before explaining this epistemic transformation, it is necessary to make brief reference to the period of the minor occultation, during which the early Shi‘īs faced an existential crisis.

3. The Age of Perplexity and the Existential Crisis of Proto-Twelver Shi‘ism

As mentioned earlier, for the first few centuries of Islamic history, Proto-Twelver Shi‘ī as believed that the Imām’s line would continue until the right conditions were met and one of the Imāms would rise up and take over the government. The fact that no Imām from the fourth to the eleventh revolted led to recurring disappointment and caused the Proto-Twelver Shi‘ī as to face several crises. But a more serious crisis arose after the sudden death of the eleventh Imām. When he died, a small number of his close companions stated that he had left a son who was in hiding for fear of persecution. Unlike in the previous periods, there was no Imām at this time who was present and visible to all in flesh and blood. The acceptance of his existence depended on trust in a few close associates of the eleventh Imām, as well as the signs claimed by the leadership circle of Proto-Twelver Shi‘īsm. The statement that the twelfth Imām was hidden was not initially articulated in a messianic form. The understanding of the Shi‘īs as at that point in time was that the twelfth Imām had a physical presence, was hiding—in the literal sense of the word—somewhere, and would re-emerge in the not-too-distant future and rise up against the government. For a period of 69 years, which is known in Shi‘ī literature as the period of minor occultation (ghaybat al-ṣughrā), four people claimed to have direct contact with the hidden Imām and to act as his representatives. In Shi‘ī writings, these four people are known as the nawāb or ‘abā’ī [four deputies], and although they are not holy figures for Shi‘īs, they are nonetheless greatly respected. During this period, neither the messianic concept of the twelfth Imām was formulated nor the final number of Imāms determined. As the twelfth Imām’s period of absence became longer, especially after it exceeded that of a normal human lifespan at the time, serious doubt arose among the Shi‘īs about his existence. These doubts were so significant that in Shi‘ī literature this period is referred to as al-ḥayra, or the “age of perplexity”. During the age of perplexity, several books were written by scholars and leaders of the Shi‘ī community that include the word al-ḥayra in their titles (Modarressi 1993, p. 98).

In response to this crisis, it seems that the Shi‘ī leaders considered formulations that did not necessarily correspond to what was later established as Twelve Shi‘īsm. A good example in this regard was the proposal of Abū Sahl al-Nawbakhtī. As Ibn al-Nadīm reports in Kitāb al-fihrist:
Abū Sahl Ismāʿīl ibn ʿAli al-Nawbakht, one of the great shīʿa scholars... had theories about the Qāʿim of the family of Muhammad (peace be upon them) that no one has surpassed. He used to say: I believe that Muhammad ibn Ḥasan was the Imām who passed away in absence, and his successor to the Imāmate during the same absence was his son. And the other sons after him in the same way, until the command of God willing their appearance is executed.

(al-Nadīm and Tajaddod 2002, p. 330)

Modarressi also wrote that a number of Shīʿas in the age of occultation held the same belief (Modarressi 1993, p. 95). But the solution that made the Proto-Twelver Shīʿas’ survival possible and ensured their success in competition with other Shīʿa sects was the messianic conception of the twelfth Imām, which occurred, in the words of Foucault, through an epistemic transformation.

3.1. Epistemic Transformation

Many studies on the formation of Twelver Shīʿism have sought to identify specific events and particular individuals who writers identify as architects of key elements of Shīʿa theology. Hossein Modarressi, for example, introduces Ibn Qība Rāzī as the person who formulated the refined, straightforward, and defensible Shīʿa theory of the Imāmate (Modarressi 1993). Elsewhere, Muhammad b. Ibrāhīm b. Jaʿfar al-Nūmānī is described as the originator of the idea of the two periods of occultation and the first person to identify the number twelve for the number of Imāms. I do not intend to identify any individual instigator for two reasons. First, any claim in this area is both highly controversial and must be supported by extensive research that extends beyond the scope of this article. Second, it is of little import who formulated which part of Twelver Shīʿa political theology for my purposes here.

What is important is that in the age of perplexity, through the contribution of a number of religious scholars, including both narrators and theologians, the key elements of religious devotion to political secularism took shape.

This approach is based on the presumption that the formation of Shīʿa political theology was not the product of a grand design, and that the scholars who participated in the formation of this thought system were neither participants in a broad conspiracy nor acting out a master plan. Founding scholars who lived in different places and even at different points within the same time period participated in the process of completing and consolidating Shīʿa political theology. I must also acknowledge that by exploring what occurred in relation to Shīʿa scholarly work, I make no claim to have identified all the dispersed developments associated with this epistemic transformation. Notwithstanding, the epistemic transformation that will be discussed in the remaining part of this article is, in my opinion, is the most important element in the macro-level formation of Shīʿa political theology. In addition, one could mention elements such as the political atmosphere and the supportive role of the Būyids, the weakness of other sects, as well as the important contingency of certain events; each such element of course requires detailed and independent research that falls outside the scope of this article.

The ḥadīth sciences and theology were the epistemological figures that played the two most important roles in the evolution of Shīʿa epistemology in the age of perplexity.

3.2. Ḥadīth Collection

In Shīʿa scholarly literature, the word ḥadīth is used to refer to the words and deeds of the Prophet and the infallible Imāms (Ghorbani 1994, p. 20). For the Sunnīs, the concept of ḥadīth does not include the words or deeds of the twelve infallible Shīʿa Imāms; the Prophet is the only source of ḥadīth. After the Qurʾān, the ḥadīths are the most important authoritative source for Muslims. There are no writings attributed to the persons of the Prophet or the infallible Imāms, so what are known as ḥadīths comprise quotes from people who lived during their lifetimes. Given this lack of directly authored sources, every ḥadīth
has at least one narrator who has quoted its contents from someone else. The reporting and narration of the hadiths was prohibited from the Prophet’s death until the time of ‘Umar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, the eighth Umayyad caliph (r. 99–101/718–720) (Askari 1984, pp. 16–22; Shahrestani 2011). The second caliph, ‘Umar b. al-Khattāb, forbade some of the Companions of the Prophet from leaving Medina so that they would not spread narrations of the Prophet, and imprisoned some of them, including Ibn Masʿūd, Abū Darda’, and Abū Masʿūd al-Ansārī, on the charge of narrating a ḥadīth of the Prophet (Nasiri 2013, p. 85; Tabatabaei 2017, pp. 10–13). Numerous explanations have been proposed for the prohibition, including concern about the creation of any book that could have been placed alongside the Qur’an, fear of the possibility of the dissemination of invalid hadiths, and worries that people would become occupied with something other than the Qur’an (Diyari-Bidgoli 1999, pp. 13–20; Tabatabaei 2017). In comparison to Sunnī hadith collections, Shiʿī collections are more controversial. Part of the problem stems from the fact that for the Shiʿas, instead of one person (the Prophet) being the sole source of hadiths, their sources encompass the words and deeds of thirteen individuals who lived throughout the first three centuries of Islamic history. In addition, the systematic and comprehensive collection and compilation of Shiʿī hadiths took place about century later than the parallel Sunnī process.⁷

The first comprehensive and systematic collections of Shiʿī hadiths were compiled in the period after the presence of the Imāms. Shaykh al-Kulaynī’s (258–329/864–941) Kitāb al-kāfī [The sufficient book] was the first book of Shiʿī hadiths, and three other significant collections were compiled by the middle of the 5th/11th century, which are collectively known as the kutub arba’a [four books]. The other three books are Man lā yahdūrūhū al-faqīh [For he not in the presence of a jurist] compiled by Shaykh al-Ṣadūq (310–380/923–991) and two books by Shaykh Tūsī (385–460/995–1067), Tahdhīb al-akhbār fi sharh al-muqni’ah [Refinement of the rulings explaining the hidden] and Al-istībār fīmī ikhtalafa min al-akhbār [Insight into the differences in the reports]. These books are in fact the main repository of the hadiths cited in the later books and writings of the Shiʿas. Shaykh al-Kulaynī’s book includes 15,339 hadiths, more than 9000 are listed in Shaykh al-Ṣadūq’s collection and Shaykh Tūsī’s two works include 13,590 and 5511 hadiths respectively (Ma’arif 2018, pp. 329–64). Among the Sunnis, there are two compilations of hadiths comprising hadiths that are all considered valid, which is why the word saḥīḥ [correct] appears in their titles. These two books of hadith are Sahīḥ Bukhārī and Sahīḥ Muslim, both of which were written in the first half of the 3rd/9th century. On the other hand, the Shiʿas acknowledge that all their hadith collections contain some hadiths that are either partially or wholly fabricated. Ayatollah al-Khū’ī, for example, concludes from Shaykh al-Kulaynī’s introduction to Kitāb al-kāfī that even the compiler did not claim that all the hadiths he had collected were authentic (Al-Khū’ī 1993, pp. 25–26).

The problems inherent to the ḥadīths recorded, and their causes, are outside the scope of this article. But it is worth noting here that one of the main complicating factors was political motivation. As was recounted earlier, the first three centuries of Shiʿī history witnessed the emergence of numerous sects. These sects were formed by people who separated from the main group of Proto-Twelver Shiʿas, and they frequently quoted narrations from the Prophet or the last Imām they recognized to support their position. The extent of hadith forgery is such that in some cases it is probable that a considerable part or even the whole of a ḥadīth collection was fabricated, or even that its author never actually existed. An example of this is the book of Salīm ibn Qays Hilālī, which is also known as the Book of the Saqīfā (Kitāb al-saqīfā).⁸ Several aspects of this compilation are subject to debate, and doubts raised over whether the narrators were fabricated, or even that hadiths were also fabricated and then attributed to fabricated narrators. Among the critical works is an extensive study conducted by Alāma Askari, who suggests that 150 Companions of the Prophet mentioned in this collection were fabricated personalities, and that hadiths were attributed to them despite their never having actually existed (Askari and Sardarnia 2012).
In addition to all the issues with the veracity of the hadiths themselves, the phenomenon of collecting and compiling hadiths took place in the form of a vetting process from the late 4th/10th century. At this time, a large number of hadiths were sifted through systematically for the purpose of selection and ordered placement in collections to establish a particular system of thought. These collections were not gathered for purely scholarly or impartial purposes. The compilers themselves often acknowledge at the beginning of these works that their goal is to provide a collection that helps strengthen the faith of Proto-Twelver Shi‘a followers. For example, Shaykh al-Kulayni’s book describes his motivation for compiling Kitāb al-kāfī as arising from the request of a religious brother:

You have mentioned that you are confused in the issues of the verification of hadith due to the difference in variously narrated texts and that you know the reason for variation but you do not find reliable people to discuss with. You have said that you wish you had a book sufficient (Kafi) that would contain all issues of the religion. A book that would provide a student all the material that he would need is urgently needed. A book is needed that would help people to have proper guidance in the matters of religion to follow the correct instructions of the truthful people (Divine Supreme Covenant Body) and the prevailing Sunnah, the basis of practices . . . You have said, that you hope such a book would, Allah willing, help our brothers in faith to find the right guidance. . . . Allah, . . . has made the compilation of the book that you had wished for possible. I hope it will prove to be up to your expectations.

(al-Kulayni and Sarwar 1999a, p. 27)

The motivation for the compilation of another of the “four books”, namely Tahdīb by Shaykh Tūsī, has been cited as:

The book Tahdīb, despite being known today as comprehensive hadith collection, was not only compiled with the goal of collecting hadiths, but the Shaykh also aimed to strengthen the foundations of Shi‘ism and resolve the existing discrepancies between hadiths in order to eliminate the triggers of the ridicule of opponents; as a result, some have considered Shaykh Tūsī to have been the first scholar to rise in defence of Shi‘ism through criticizing hadiths and assessing conflicting narrations.

(Huijati 2015, p. 10)

In proposing a similar argument, Hassan Ansari proposes that one oft-overlooked factor in historical studies on the compilation of comprehensive hadith collections is the influence of the evolving and fluid nature of Shi‘ism at that time. He continues that by defining new boundaries between different Shi‘a sects:

[S]ome of the previous hadith sources became fragmented, parts were deleted and other parts were added, and this was the main reason for compiling the comprehensive collections: before the hadiths in previous works were collected in one comprehensive work, [the compilers] first acted as reviewers and a number of the sources were removed, and a number of hadiths were considered and proposed in response to doctrinal developments.

(Ansari 2017, pp. 137–38)

In addition to the four hadith collections of this period, which became the main repository of Shi‘a scholarly work throughout the ages, writings with a clear focus on the issue of occultation were also produced at this time. The most significant of these works include: Al-Imāma wa al-tabsīra min al-hayra [The Imamate and insight into the confusion] by ‘Ali b. al-Husayn b. Bābawiyyah al-Qum, Kitāb al-qhayba [The book of the occultation] by Muḥammad b. ʿIbrāhīm b. Ja`far Nu`mān, Kamāl al-dīn wa-tamām al-ni`mah [Perfection
of faith and completion of divine favour] by Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, two books Ṭarīqat al-ṣalātī fi al-ghayba [Four treatises on the occultation] and Al-fuṣūl al-‘ashara fi al-ghayba [Ten chapters on the occultation] by Shaykh al-Mufīd, Al-burhān ‘alā ṣaḥaḥ fil al-Imām ẓāhīr al-zamān [Proof of the authority of the Imām of the ages] by Muḥammad b. ‘Alī Karājūki, the two books Al-muqna‘a fi al-ghayba [The mystery of the occultation] and Mas ala wijza fi al-ghayba [A brief review of the question of the occultation] by Sharīf al-Murtadā, Al-ghayba [The occultation] by Shaykh Ṭūsī, Muṣṭafāb b. ʿAlī ‘al-ňaṣ ‘alā al-Imāma al-īthnā ‘asher [Brief impact of text on the twelve Imāms] by Ḥanīf ‘Abd al-Waḥīb al-Ḥanīfī, and the Kitāb kifaya al-‘athar fi al-ňaṣ ‘alā al-Imāma al-īthnā ‘asher [The book of sufficiency of the impact of text on the twelve Imāms] by Ṭūsī. Muḥammad Ḥanīfī Qumī. Shi‘a scholarly literature about the twelfth Imām and his occultation in the following centuries was primarily based on the narrative and argumentative content of these books.

3.3. The Formation of Theology

In addition to the compilation of ḥadīth collections, Shi‘a theology was also formed in the age of perplexity, offering a rational and logical basis for Twelver Shi‘ism’s belief system. While the infallible Imāms were present, the Shi‘a scholarly atmosphere was generally text-based. The prevailing belief among the Shi‘as was that the infallible Imāms had ‘iḥl laduʿn and that they had the most accurate answer to any religious question that arose. For this reason, ḥijāḥ and the use of logical reasoning had no place in Shi‘a scholarship during the age of the infallible Imāms. But when the infallible Imāms were no longer present, ḥijāḥ and reasoning became part of the scholarly work of the Twelver Shi‘a. Of course, their arguments were based on religious beliefs, not pure logic.

With the theological work of Shaykh al-Mufīd and his student al-Sharīf al-Murtadā, Shi‘a theology emerged and expanded in a systematic manner. As mentioned earlier, the Shi‘a were occupied with fundamental doctrinal issues during the age of perplexity. Therefore, the most significant issues discussed by theologians such as Shaykh al-Mufīd and al-Sharīf al-Murtadā were the fundamental beliefs of the Shi‘a faith. For this reason, the conceptualizations they presented and succeeded in establishing became part of the framework of Twelver Shi‘a beliefs, conceptualizations that remain part of the Shi‘a epistemological system to this day.

The key element of Shi‘a identity is the concept of the Imāmate. Some of the elements of the Imāmate were already more or less established before the time in question. One such element was the idea that Imāmate is related to nas [designation], which means that after the Prophet, God appointed a sequence of specific people to lead the Muslims, and that this matter was not one to be determined by the opinion of the people or the elites. Likewise, the Imāms’ infallibility and their ‘iḥl laduʿn was mostly accepted. Although there were some scholars who held different views, this disagreement did not pose a serious threat to the Shi‘a. Doubts about the existence of the twelfth Imām, and the matter of occultation, in particular the responsibilities of the believers, and the matter of politics during the time of occultation, were the issues that created an existential crisis for Shi‘ism. The theologians of the period were able to offer convincing and reasoned conceptualizations about these matters, which gradually became accepted by most of the Shi‘as and transformed into the foundations of faith and elements of the identity of Twelver Shi‘ism. Here, instead of addressing several issues in a cursory manner, I will restrict myself to focusing on one example of the Shi‘a theological arguments of the day, explaining it in detail. I have selected an issue that posed an existential threat to Twelver Shi‘ism during the age of perplexity: skepticism about the existence of the twelfth Imām.

In all the writings of the Shi‘a theologians of the time, including those of Shaykh al-Mufīd and al-Sharīf al-Murtadā, the first issue that the writers considered necessary to discuss and verify was that Imām Ḥasan al-Askarī had a son named Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Askarī. By juxtaposing a ḥadīth and a doctrinal principle, theologians proposed an argument that would, alongside the hadiths compiled in the ḥadith collections, create a rational basis for the existence of the twelfth Imām. The narration used by these theologians
states that at no time can the earth lack a hujja [proof] of God. Another doctrine that was prevalent among the Shi‘ as of the time was that the transfer of the Imāmate is vertical, i.e., it is transferred from the father to the eldest son. The progression of the argument went that since the earth cannot be void of a proof of God (an Imām): therefore, an Imām must exist. Since Imām Ḥasan al-‘Askarī was the eleventh Imām and only his son could be the next Imām: therefore, he must have had a child.

Another argument that was developed by theologians such as Shaykh al-Mufīd and al-Sharīf al-Murtadā to prove the existence of the twelfth Imām was based on the “principle of lutf” [God’s favor]. According to the rule of lutf, God is duty-bound to send prophets and codify laws to guide His servants towards the right path (McDermott 1978, p. 77). In applying this principle, shī‘ī scholars argued that the presence of the Imām to guide and help the believers confirms the lutf of God to His servants, and that as God does not deprive believers of His lutf, there must always be an extant Imām to direct them towards the right path (Latifi 2002; Rabani-Golpayegani 2003; Yousefiyan 2016).

Al-Sharīf al-Murtadā (355–466/965–1044) argues that it is God’s lutf that causes the existence of the Imām, so that through his management, appropriate conditions will be brought into being to guide believers towards righteousness and away from evil:

As any rational person who is familiar with the purpose and method of logic is aware and clearly acknowledges that whenever there is a competent and skillful leader of a society, who prevents oppression and transgression and defends justice and virtue, more appropriate social conditions are brought about for the expansion of virtue and goodness, and distancing from oppression and evil. Or at least compared to a situation in which such leadership does not exist, [such a society] will enjoy conditions more conducive to the avoidance of evil and transgression. This can be nothing but the lutf of God, because lutf is something that through its realization, makes the obligated turn to obeyance and virtue and away from evil and ruin, or at least places them in more appropriate conditions for doing so. Thus, the Imāmate and leadership are granted through the lutf of God to the obligated, because they lead them to perform their rational duties and abandon evil, and the requirement of divine wisdom is that the obligated not be deprived of it [lutf].

(al-Sharīf al-Murtadā 1990, p. 409)

Shaykh al-Mufīd made an argument based on a similar premise, stating that God has afforded this lutf to His servants and has done what was necessary by sending the twelfth Imām; however, it was the shortcomings of the servants who neglected to follow him that led to the Imām’s absence (Shaykh al-Mufīd 1993a, p. 45).

Of course, from an extra-religious point of view, many serious questions can be raised in connection with the principle of lutf and its use to prove the Imāmate; the argument may even be rejected in its totality. However, this is not my concern here. What is important from the point of view of discourse analysis is that the audience of these arguments accepted the principles on which they were based, and therefore such arguments were convincing and acceptable, and became part of the Twelver Shi‘ī regime of truth.

Shī‘ī scholars also referred to historical experience in order to argue that the Shī‘ī claims were not without precedent. For example, Shaykh al-Mufīd suggested that many births had been concealed over the course of history for a variety of reasons, and that the eleventh Imām was not the only person to keep secret the birth of his son (Shaykh al-Mufīd and Khalesi 1998). Theologians also referred to common and Qur’ānic stories, for example arguing that given the long lifespans of Khidr and Noah, the unnaturally long lifespan of the twelfth Imām was not without precedent (Al-Nu‘manī 1953) 2003; Shaykh al-Mufīd and Khalesi 1998). The justification of the twelfth Imām’s long lifespan was also accompanied by a number of other conceptualizations, such as the concept of qa‘im, awaiting and fixing the number of Imāms at twelve.
Throughout the first few centuries of the Islamic history, the concept of the qā’im and the idea of intizār [awaiting], the revolt and formation of a just government by one of the Imāms found a central place in the political discourse of the Proto-Twelver Shi‘as. During this early period, the prevailing notion of the qā’im and the concept of awaiting were at their core bound to temporal proximity; every generation of Shi‘as expected the uprising post-haste. However, in parallel to the twelfth Imām becoming the last Imām and a messianic figure, he was no longer expected to rise immediately and could be awaited indefinitely, and the concept of the qā’im became an apocalyptic concept.

Another important change that took place was in relation to religious and political authority. The belief that the infallible Imām possessed ultimate authority in both spheres continued to define Shi‘i identity. However, coming to terms with the fact that the twelfth Imām was not present, and was not going to be present any time soon, led in practice to the delegating of both political and religious authority, albeit in a modified form, to religious scholars. They were thus assigned political authority outside the sphere of the governmental apparatus in a manner limited to the execution of certain public affairs, as well as specified religious authority to answer questions about the sharī‘a obligations of believers and responsibility for the performance of religious rites.

Thus, legitimacy to rule was reserved exclusively for the twelfth Imām from a religious perspective, and until such time as his appearance, all rulers were known as ja‘ir [usurper] rulers. Under these circumstances, another key question that the founding Shi‘i scholars addressed was: what would be the duties of the Shi‘as in the political arena during the occultation of the twelfth Imām?

4. Politics in the Era of Occultation

The type of political behavior developed by the founding scholars of Twelver Shi‘ism for the era of occultation, which was established and institutionalized as the element of political theology in Shi‘i religious beliefs, was living in the shadow of a secular state. Two key facts are testament to this claim. The first is the absence of discussion about the characteristics of the legitimate ruler in the Shi‘i scholars’ writings during the period, and the second is the particular attitude reflected in their writings towards the incumbent ruler.

The most central political question in the Islamic world has always revolved around the characteristics of the ruler. But the founding Shi‘i scholars did not engage in this debate, because in their view the only legitimate ruler from a religious point of view was the twelfth Imām. His unique and transcendental characteristics, and position and legitimacy to rule, could be matched by no other person. Instead of contemplating the characteristics of a legitimate ruler, the political debate among the founding scholars of Shi‘ism concerned how to interact with the incumbent ruler, who they referred to as the usurper (ja‘ir). In this regard, there were somewhat different opinions expressed by the scholars. In particular, differences can be observed between the perspectives of scholars of the Qum school and those of the Baghdad school.

The scholars of the Qum school, such as Shaykh al-Kulaynī and Shaykh al-Ṣadīq, were textualists and generally opposed to ijtihād and the use of logical reasoning. Because most of the remaining hadiths of the infallible Imāms had advised against relations with the rulers, these scholars rulings advised the same. Based on his study of the hadiths quoted in Shaykh al-Kulaynī’s Kitāb al-kafi, Andrew Newman states that in these hadiths, there is “a strict line against such entanglements.” Newman continues that in a chapter of the same book titled “Working for the sultan and their gifts,” Shaykh al-Kulaynī quotes 15 hadiths from the Imāms in which the Shi‘as were asked to refrain from working for rulers. One of such narrations, reported from Imām Ja‘far al-Ṣadīq, states:
WHOEVER humbled himself to a sâhib sultan or to someone opposed to his own faith “to seek after what is in his hand of the world, Allah will silence him.” If he did acquire something of the world, the Imâm stated, “Allah almighty will take it from him and he will not be recompensed on the basis of anything he spent on the pilgrimage, manumission [of slaves] or piety”.

(qutoed in Newman 2000, p. 174)

Shaykh al-Šadûq, another influential scholar of the Qum school, also narrates hadîths that suggest the jâ’îr ruler should be avoided. Shaykh al-Šadûq quotes Imâm Ālî in his book Khisâl: “Those who oppress, those who facilitate oppression, and those who applaud oppression, are three partners” (Shaykh al-Šadûq and Kamarei 1998, p. 126). Shaykh al-Šadûq also quotes a hadîth attributed to Prophet Muhammad, according to which: “No servant of God approaches an oppressive sultan unless he has turned away from God” (quoted in Mirali 2016, p. 133). He also refers to a narration from Imâm al-Šâdiq, which states that:

Do not let one of you shî’a bring someone to the ruler for litigation, but look among yourselves for he who is familiar with the rules and manner of our government and choose him to resolve the hostility and to arbitrate, so bring the matter to him, and accept his arbitration and judgment, and I will also appoint him as your judge and arbiter.

(Shaykh al-Šadûq 1988, p. 3)

Unlike their counterparts in Qum, the scholars of the Baghdad school were less strict in their rulings on dealings with the oppressor. Shaykh al-Mufîd, a pioneer in the use of rationality and reasoning, was among many Baghdad thinkers who “changed the customary norm about the impermissibility of cooperation with the jâ’îr ruler and made cooperation permissible and even obligatory in certain circumstances (Gahramannezhad et al. n.d., p. 104). He puts forward two basic conditions for the legitimacy of interacting with a usurper, first that such interaction does not harm the believers, and second that most of a person’s deeds in collaboration with the usurper are not sinful and lead primarily to good outcomes (Shaykh al-Mufîd 1993b, pp. 120–21).

Shaykh al-Mufîd allowed believers to refer to the government judicial procedures (Shaykh al-Mufîd 1991, p. 537), even permitting a Shî’i to hold the position of judge in a jâ’îr apparatus. Nonetheless, he points out that the latter should judge according to the Shî’i rules of jurisprudence except in the case of facing the risk of financial or mortal harm (Shaykh al-Mufîd 1991, pp. 811–12).

Another of the influential theologians of the Baghdad school was al-Sharîf al-Murtadâ (355–436/965–1044), who wrote an independent treatise on the subject of relations with the usurper. Like Shaykh al-Mufîd, al-Sharîf al-Murtadâ rejected the general ban on working with the jâ’îr ruler, outlining four possible situations in which such cooperation could be permitted:

This [tenure of office on behalf of the usurper] may be of several kinds: obligatory (and it may exceed obligatoriness toward compulsion), licit, and evil and forbidden. It is obligatory if the one accepting office knows, or considers it likely on the basis of clear indications, that he will through the tenure of the office be enabled to support a right and to reject a false claim or to order what is proper and to forbid what is reprehensible, and if it were not for this tenure, nothing of this would be accomplished . . . It reaches the level of compulsion when he is forced with the sword to accept the office or when he considers it likely that, if he does not accept it, his blood will be shed . . . . It is licit when he fears for some property of his or is afraid of some harm befalling him the like of which can be borne.

(al-Sharîf al-Murtadâ and Madelung 1980, pp. 24–25)
al-Sharīf al-Murtadā considers that the existence of expediency makes the acceptance of a government post in an oppressive ruler’s administration permissible. In addition to rational arguments, al-Sharīf al-Murtadā also refers to the first Imām, who accepted council membership from ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, as well as to the action of Prophet Yusef (Joseph) in accepting a post from ʿAzīz of Egypt—a usurper—to give historical context and precedent to his argument (al-Sharīf al-Murtadā and Madelung 1980). It is no surprise that Sharīf al-ʿAḍī and al-Sharīf al-Murtadā themselves held official government positions. The two brothers, both leaders of the Shīʿī community at the time, each accepted ʿAbbāsid caliphate appointments. Their responsibilities included supervising the niqābat[12] of the ʿAlids, serving on the court of mazālim (a court of appeal which also heard complaints against government officials), and managing pilgrim’s affairs and the two cities of Mecca and Medina (Nasr 2000; Shahsavan and Nasiri 2016). Of course, this was not the first time that a Shīʿī leader had occupied an official position in the caliphate. In previous eras, many prominent Shīʿī families had enjoyed proximity to the caliphate and some of their members had attained senior positions including at the level of minister, such as Abuʾl-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muhammad b. al-Furāt (231–312/846–924), Abū al-Ḥafṣ Fadl b. Jaʿfar (d. 327/939), and Barīḍ (d. 332/944). Most intriguingly, Ḥusayn b. Ruh. al-Nawbakhtī (d. 326/937–938), who had attained senior positions including at the level of minister, such as Abuʾl-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muhammad b. al-Furāt (231–312/846–924), Abū al-Ḥafṣ Fadl b. Jaʿfar (d. 327/939), and Barīḍ (d. 332/944). Most intriguingly, Ḥusayn b. Ruh. al-Nawbakhtī (d. 326/937–938), who was the third deputy of the twelfth Imām, held concurrent responsibility for the caliphate’s property assets at some point in time (al-Jahshiyari 1987, p. 300). It is important to note that their geographical locations as well as the balance of power in the two cities of Baghdad and Qom caused differences in the type of thinking that took shape in Qom and Baghdad. In Baghdad, the Būyids, who were Ẓaydīs as, had a friendly and supportive attitude towards the proto-Twelver shīʿī as. The Būyids’ friendly approach led to the formation of close relations between shīʿī leaders and the government apparatus. It was with the support of the Būyids that the shīʿa enjoyed the opportunity to hold mourning ceremonies on ʿĀshūrā and celebrations for the event of Ghadir Khumm. The shrines of the Imāms were also rebuilt during this period and the shīʿa were able to visit them on pilgrimages. The call to prayer in the shīʿī style was also permitted during this period. Notable advancements for shīʿī scholarship included the establishment of numerous libraries and the presence of the shīʿī ʿulama in scholarly discussions and debates convened by Būyid rulers. This support extended even to ʿAḍūd al-Dawla (ruled 338–372/949–983) ordering ten mann of bread and five mann of meat be sent to the discussion sessions convened by Shaykh al-Mufīd. It is further reported that ʿAḍūd al-Dawla was so close to Shaykh al-Mufīd that he visited him personally (Elhami 2000; Faqīhi 1994, p. 136; Khosrobagi and Jalilian 2013; Kraemer 1986).

Qom, on the other hand, had relatively unique political conditions. From the first century of Islamic history, a semi-autonomous city-state emerged in Qum due to the influence and power of the Ashʿariyya family. Many members of the Ashʿariyya family were companions of the infallible Imāms and had close ties with them. This meant that the Ashʿariyya played a substantial role in narrating the ḥadīths and an equally prominent one in shaping shīʿī religious scholarship. In addition to their impact on religious scholarship, the influence and power of the Ashʿariyya in terms of political equations in Qum was also decisive. It was the influence of the Ashʿariyya family that made Qum a shīʿī base, and for this reason the city always had problematic relations with the central government. The semi-independent situation of Qum caused the thinkers of the Qum school, unlike their counterparts in Baghdad, to be supported more by the influential Ashʿariyya family than the central government. As Newman points out, this situation influenced the writings of the Qum scholars. Especially in relation to issues of government and relations with the usurper ruler, the thinkers of the Qum school generally prescribed the keeping of distance from the usurper (Davtalab 2010; Farshchian 2005; Haidar-Sarlak and Mehrizi 2012; Hajji-Taqi 1997; Newman 2000, pp. 32–49).

The commentaries on the matter of rebellion against the ruler also demonstrate the attitude of the Shīʿīs towards governance during the era of occultation. Generally, Shīʿī scholars did not recommend uprising or seeking to overthrow the ruling system. In the
era of the presence of the Imāms, with the exception of the third Imām, no other Imām attempted rebellion personally nor supported any of the uprisings of their time. For this reason, there are many hadiths prohibiting any uprising prior to the return of the twelfth Imām. For example, in the introduction of al-Ṣaḥīfah al-sajjādīyah, a hadith attributed to Imām al-Ṣādiq is quoted as saying:

Before the rise of our Qa’im not one of us Folk of the House has revolted or will revolt to repel an injustice or to raise up a right, without affliction uprooting him and without his uprising increasing the adversity of us and our partisans.

(Imam Zain ul Abideen 1988, p. 40)

In another hadith, Imām Bāqir forbids one of his followers from joining anyone carrying out an uprising before the coming of the mahdī [messiah]: “Know that the Umayyads have a strong rule that people can not stand against . . . . Know that no group rising to resist oppression or to defend faith unless death is the end” (Al-Nu’mani [953] 2003, p. 192).

In addition to these hadiths, Shi‘ī theologians also failed to offer any argument in favor of revolt against the usurper or of overthrowing the established regime. One of the issues related to that of action against the usurper is the issue of enjoining good and forbidding evil. The key question in this regard is, to what extent and by what means is the believer obliged to demand the ruler do good and reproach them for doing wrong? In this case, too, plurality can be seen in the views of Shi‘ī thinkers, but none recommend armed or any other action aimed at ousting the ruler. Shi‘ī theologians consider various stages for enjoining good and forbidding evil, the first stage relating to the heart and the second to the tongue. The third stage of enjoining good and forbidding evil involves the use of force and weapons. Most Shi‘ī thinkers are very cautious about the third stage, and consider it especially necessary to ensure that this stage does not lead to societal chaos and unrest. Among the founding thinkers of Shi‘ism, Shaykh al-Mufid is especially cautious and even suggests that the second (verbal) stage be subject to certain conditions, including that (a) the enjoinder or condemnation must be addressed to someone who cannot distinguish good from evil, and (b) there must be a high level of certainty that the making of a statement is expedient. Shaykh al-Mufid considers physical action to enjoin good and condemn evil as falling exclusively within the powers of the infallible Imām or someone assisting or given permission by the Imām (Shaykh al-Mufid 1993b, p. 119). At the same time, the Shi‘as’ claims to be justice-seeking and willing to speaking out against oppression have a significant place in Twelver Shi‘ī discourse. Despite the two principles of belief that (1) Shi‘ism is pro-justice and anti-oppression, and (2) all leaders are oppressors, Shi‘as have neither taken steps to rebel against the government nor recommended such a course of action in their theological scholarship. The explanation for this contradiction is that the Shi‘as ruled out the possibility of establishing a government of justice and equity, and the overthrow of one jā‘ir ruler meant replacing it with another, and therefore did not advise rebellion against the usurper, instead elucidating how believers should live in the shadow of a religiously illegitimate government.

5. Conclusions

In the literature on the relationship between religion and politics, the politicization of religion is generally considered synonymous with opposition to political secularism and the secular state. In this article, I attempted to draw attention to a religious tradition that, despite being political and despite its advocacy of pure theocracy, incorporates political secularism into its theology. Not only did Twelver Shi‘ism emerge on the basis of a claim to political leadership, but Shi‘ī leaders have been involved in politics in various ways throughout history. However, because the legitimate right to rule is reserved exclusively for the twelfth Imām, Shi‘ī religious leaders cannot entertain the goal of seizing the institution of government. In other words, Twelver Shi‘ī doctrine mandates living in the shadow of a secular state until the return of the twelfth Imām. In this article, I have focused solely on
the circumstances during which traditional Twelver Shi'i political theology was established. Throughout the centuries, this approach has dominated Twelver Shi'as' attitudes towards the state apparatus. Prior to the emergence of Khomeini's governmental-Shi'i discourse, no Shi'i scholar had either theorized about taking over the institution of government or taken any practical steps to form a government.

Although Shi'as have followed a non-governmental pattern in both theory and practice throughout history, this way of thinking and behaving has not been theorized, neither in the Shi'i seminary nor in university Shi'i studies departments. In the existing literature, the political behavior of Shi'i leaders prior to the emergence of Khomeini’s governmental-Shi'ism discourse is conceptualized as apolitical and quietist. In this article, I have sought to show that these concepts are inaccurate and cannot adequately represent the political thinking or behavior of traditional-Shi'ism. The Twelver Shi'as, while political, have always remained non-governmental.

Of course, it should be noted that Khomeini presented an innovative conceptualization of Shi'ism which both supported revolt against the usurper and considered possible the formation of a legitimate government in the absence of the twelfth Imām. But Khomeini's conceptualization and his success in forming a Shi'i state should not be seen as the product of a fundamental change in Shi'i thought. Khomeini’s discourse was the product of the revolutionary conditions of the 1960s and 1970s and, as is widely acknowledged, the doctrine of wilayat-i faqih was unprecedented and failed to meet the standards of the Shi'i seminary. After nearly half a century of dominance of the governmental-Shi'ism discourse, and despite significant investment by the ruling clerics of Iran, the fundamental Shi'i belief that the twelfth Imām is the only one with the legitimate right to rule has not changed. For this reason, the conceptualization presented in this article can contribute to regulating the relationship between religion and the state in the likely tomorrow of Iran without the Islamic Republic.

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**Notes**

1. The expression wilayat-i faqih refers to the doctrine and also the official post in the Islamic Republic, while wali-yi faqih refers to the person who holds this post.
2. In Shi'i writings, the incompatibility of the political behavior of most of the infallible Imāms with the fundamental political beliefs of the Shi'as is explained using the concept of takīyya. The concept of Takīyya (dissimulation) means refraining from expressing, concealing or even acting in conflict with one’s true beliefs in order to avoid harm, particularly the loss of life or property. Referring to the principle of takīyya, Shi'as contend that while all the infallible Imāms accepted their divine right to rule, they did not put this right into practice because there was potential harm in doing so. For further discussion about takīyya see (Kohlberg 1975; Strothmann 2012; Torbatinejad 2016).
3. For further discussion of the Ghulāt, see (Asatryan 2017; Moosa 1987).
4. This book has been destroyed and no copy of it remains, but parts of it remain in the form of quotations in Shaykh al-Ṣadūq’s book.
5. In the case of some individuals, no birth and death dates are listed; this indicates that such details are unknown.
6. For a more detailed discussion of the concept of hadith and its history in Shi'ism, see (Kazemi-Moussavi 2003; Kohlberg 1983).
7. Al-Muwatta was the first comprehensive collection of Sunni hadiths, compiled by Mālik ibn Anas, the Imām of the Mālikī religion (79–179/711–795) in the 2nd/8th century. Musnad Aḥmad, written by Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (164–241/780–855) and Ṣaḥīḥ Bukhārī by Muḥammad Bukhārī (194–256/810–870) are among the other prominent collections of Sunni hadiths.
8. It is said that this book was the first Shi'i book, written during the lifetime of Imām ʿAlī, the first Imām, by one of his companions. The contents of this book mainly comprise the virtues of the asl al-bayt [family of the Prophet] and the events after the death of the Prophet, as well as the subject of the Imāmate. It has been widely used and referred to in Shi'i scholarship throughout the centuries. However, as mentioned, considerable doubt exists about its authenticity. For further discussion on this book and its contents, see (Āmīr-Moezzi 2015; Bayhonom-Daou 2015; Gleave 2015; Šobhani 1996).
9. Notwithstanding, mentioning the name of the twelfth Imām was forbidden in many narrations. In Shi'i sources, various reasons have been mentioned for this, including safeguarding the safety of the twelfth Imām. For further discussion, see (al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī and Mirzaie-Tabrizi 2007; Mir Dāmād Astarābādī 1988; Mirdamadi 2004).
This hadith has been narrated from the Prophet and there are several narrations in Shi’i sources about this and it is generally known as a mutānatūr [reported by a large number of narrators] hadith. However, there have also been challenges to the validity of this hadith. For example, Mohsen Kadivar states that a total of 18 narrations were included in Kābul al-kāfi about this hadith, of which only one can be considered valid. Kadivar concludes that this narrative must be considered a khabar al-wāḥid [reported by one narrator] and that “a principle of belief cannot be based on a khabar al-wāḥid” (Kadivar 2014; Mohsen Kadivar Official Website n.d.).

This belief was very effective in countering the claim of Ja’far, the brother of Imam Hasan ′Askari, to the Imamate. Modarressi argues that Ibn Qiba Rāzī in particular played a significant role in establishing the theory of nāy in the Shi’i school Modarressi (1993).

Niqābat was an official post created by the ’Abbāsids in the second half of the third/ninth century to deal with the affairs of the ’Alīd family. The main duties of the niqābat included recording the births, deaths and marriages, lineage and employment of the sādāt. For more details on this post and the history of its formation and eventual abolition, see (al-Māwardi 2000; Elahizadeh and Sirusi 2010; Modarressi 1979).

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