THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS MODERATION ON THE RESILIENCE OF MUSLIM MINORITY IN BALINESE HINDUS

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Abstract: The Bali bombing around two decades ago has caused deep traumatic events in the world, not only psychological, socioeconomic, and multinational effects, but also serious impacts on the relationship between the two religions: Islam and Hinduism. This study documents how Muslims as a minority group in Bali attempted to survive amidst the Hindu majority and how these two ethnic-religious groups maintain harmonious relationship after the Bali Bombing incident. This study uses a case study methods with an interpretive paradigm and qualitative approach, the aim is to shows that social pressure and discrimination has not harm the relationship between the two in that the Muslim and Hindus cooperate in the economic sector and strengthen the relationship with kinship and marriage. This effort is a way for the Muslim-Hindus to rebuild the moderation of unity which was collapsed in Bali.

Keywords: Muslim-Hindus, Bali, majority-minority, relations
Introduction

Bali is a province in Indonesia which is known as the most beautiful tourist destination where tourists from all over the world come to Bali.¹ In contrast, Bali is also known as the most tragic city because it was the target of the execution of terrorist bombings² on 12 October 2002 and 1 October 2005. Two incidents that night witnessed how cruel the radical extremist action was to destroy Bali. The multi-layered psychological effects are felt by the directly affected victims or family members of the world disaster incident. It takes a very long time for psychological recovery and coping with the traumatic incident.³

Bali is a province in Indonesia which 83.46% of the majority were Hindus, and the other 13.37% were Muslims.⁴ Even it is regarded as the city of “Hindu Bali.”⁵ As result, the bloody incident affected the face of Islam negatively by a series of “slander” saying that Islam taught violence and created a dilemma of public perceptions of its adherents.⁶

Reuter (2008) in his research found that the process of religious revitalization after the Bali Bombings in 2002 and 2005 had a critical relationship between Muslims and Hindus.⁷ The heartbreaking incident 18 years ago still leaves deep wounds for the international community, and also harms Muslim-Hindu relationships in Bali. In the Hutchison study (2010)⁸, after the Bali bombing, the trauma affected the political, trading, and economical stability of international relations. Likewise, the tourism sector was collapse which indirectly had a significant impact on socio-economic decline,⁹ and above all, the tension between Muslim-Hindu relations in Bali; because adherents of the Islamic religion were generalized as terrorists and radicals.¹⁰

Based on the data from the ISIM Newsletter from Leiden University, he explained that the tension in Muslim-Hindu
relations in Bali had indeed been going on since 1958, but a climax emerged after the Bali Bombings. After that, Muslims in Bali became the target of government intervention and investigations so that Muslims at that time experienced “social isolation”. Up to these days, Hindus as the majority of the population of Bali are still wary of and Muslims as adherents of a religion that is terrorism; this is what makes the resilience and sustainability of Muslims in Bali suppressed in carrying out socio-religious and economic activities.

This article aims to further discuss the resilience of Muslims and their relationship with the Hindus amidst pressure as a minority in Bali in the context of religious moderation. The case study was conducted in Denpasar, the capital city of Bali, which is said to be an area that has a high religious level. In this paper, Muslim resilience is contextualized as an individual’s ability to adapt to the surrounding environment and survive being suppressed minorities after the Bali bombing tragedy. Resilience can also be said as managing emotions and regulating emotions to remain calm under pressure, being a minority in a majority group, different from other individuals, and so on.

**Methodology**

Even though the setting is full of issues of religious ethnic conflict, Bali as the object of strong Hindu nationalism and increasing Islamic militancy (shown by terrorism), this setting arises from divisions and builds relationships between ethnic religions that were initially at odds, which led to studies such as this still very unique.

Some of the questions answered in this study; *First*, how is the resilience of Muslim families in Denpasar Bali in socializing and their relations with Hindus which is the majority group in
Denpasar Bali. *Second*, how the resilience of Balinese Muslims in the economic sector where they are a minority but dominate. *Third*, what is the context of the kinship and marriage relations carried out by the two adherents of this religion. Most of the research had been conducted non-specifically and focused on the general social context of resilience, and ignored the context of Muslim minorities like in Bali. Therefore, this study contributes to the discussion about the resilience of Balinese Muslim minorities in the majority of the Hindus, and their relationship with Hindus after the Bali Bombing tragedy. Data collection was carried out at the end of February 2020 to the end of March 2020 by interviewing 10 random informants (4 from Muslim, 6 from Hinduism). Data analysis used mapping intending to map the symptoms of casuistic phenomena the resilience of the Muslim minority in Bali can survive and live side by side with the Hindus in the social suppression of the Hindus majority after the Bali Bombing tragedy.

**Results and Discussion**

**The Impact of the Post-Bali Bombing and the Fate of Minority Muslims in Denpasar Bali**

Bali is known as a “paradise” for tourism, culture, and beautiful natural resources. However, it turned into a “hell” city because of the Bali Bombing incident in 2002 and 2005. This terminology is used to describe Bali after the bombing terror, as Suryani (2009) calls it “suicide in Heaven,”¹⁴ Lewis (2006) calls Bali a “polluted paradise”, while McDonald (2017) considers that the world still questions the status of security in Bali after the bombing incident.¹⁵

This perception also makes foreign tourists feeling “insecure” about the current condition of Bali and try to restore the good
name of Bali as a tourism destination as it was in the past because after all the incidents left deep wounds and trauma which caused the image of Bali to be a tourism crisis since a great number of foreign tourists were reluctant to visit Bali anymore, thus the Indonesian government executed investigation toward this crisis after disaster recovery.

Besides the impact of psychological trauma, the bloody incident had an impact on Indonesia’s national security in particular and economic, social, and political stability in Asia and the European Union. Lewis’s study above voices the aspirations of the local Balinese people to the government to restore the image of Bali as a tourism island by considering the recontextualization of policies and agendas that are in line with Bali’s current conditions.

The immediate effect on Balinese society is the long-term impact on health and well-being after the Bali Bombing, and negative stigma against Muslims in Bali. However, the extreme long-term impact is the stigmatization of Islam after the Bali Bombing, considering that religion is the main link in acts of terrorism. The invitation to “jihad” in the paradise land of Bali had become the main persuasion of how religion is a vessel to legitimize the false truth behind the tendencies of certain group interests.

Especially Islam as a minority religion in Bali can cause social-psychological effects where its adherents must survive in the discrimination of the majority of the Hindus. Harmony and discrimination are two contrasting things that must be experienced by Muslims as a minor population and Hindus as a major population, even among fellow Muslims this reality occurs. In this aspect, religious identity is the main issue in life together.
Socially, Muslims as religious minorities were facing discrimination after the Bali Bombing incident. Islam is considered the most responsible for this bloody act of why there is radicalism in its teachings, even though this assumption is not completely accepted because in fact Islam does not teach nuances of violence; only certain groups consider radicalism as a way to scorch something contrary with religion. Any religion does not teach terrorism at all as part of the climax form of crimes against humanity. Of course; this is a trigger for social conflict massively affecting the existence of Muslims in Bali. The pressures in living side by side with Hindus became more intense after the bloody incidents of 2002 and 2005.

**Minority Muslims and Discrimination in Denpasar, Bali**

A total of 13.37% of the Muslim population inhabiting the province of Bali are spread across various districts and form Muslim villages, one of which is the Kampung Bugis, a Muslim community village located in Serangan village and Kepaon village, Denpasar.

By the seventeenth century, the Bugis Muslim community expanded to Bali via sea routes led by the Bugis ‘ulamâ’, namely Syekh Haji Mukmin or known by the Bugis community as *Puwak Matoa*. This Bugis Muslim Diaspora occurred because they did not want to be colonized by the Dutch. A group of Muslim Bugis people who made the voyage arrived in the area of Serangan Island, which at that time was under the control of King Cokorda Pemecutan III of the Badung Kingdom. Islam was accepted in the village of Serangan Denpasar by King Cokorda Pemecutan III because of the hospitality of the Bugis Muslims and their help when the Badung Kingdom was attacked by its enemies. Because of the goodness of the Bugis Muslims, until King Cokorda Pemecutan III gave away 2.5 hectares of land for
the residence of the Bugis Muslim community. Not only that, whenever Bugis Muslims came to Puri Pemecutan, they face the King not like ordinary people, but instead face the King like a best friend.29

The relationship between Bugis Muslims and Hindus at the Denpasar Bali attack were well-established, until the Bali Bombing I on October 12, 2002, and the Bali Bombing II on October 1, 2005 happened, which raised Hindus’ distrust of Muslims and eventually sparked religious racist sentiments towards all Muslims in Bali and other Islamic symbols.

This sentiment created discrimination in the form of Hindus pressure on every Muslim and Islamic symbols, such as prohibiting Muslim women from wearing face coverings for Muslim women (such as the Hijab, Hijab, and Niqâb) in government institutions and shopping centers, the expulsion of bearded Muslims and their wives from wearing Niqâb, prohibiting permits to build mosques or prayer rooms, Islamic educational institutions such as Madrasah Ibtidaiyah, Islamic Kindergartens (TK Islam), and to use speakers in for the call to prayer, and Muslim burial sites.

This pressure did not only affect religious identity but also economic areas, such as the prohibition of selling Bakso (meatballs) and other halal food for street vendors and Muslim culinary businesses. Hindus were reluctant to buy products and food sold by Muslims as a discriminatory reaction to the primitive beliefs of their religion. Due to this action, Muslims sellers had to survive and even “went bankrupt” and some returned to their respective areas.30 Muslims must “rack their brains” to switch to other endeavors to survive in Bali, such as Balinese souvenirs, furniture, and online drivers (such as Grab, Gojek, and Uber).

After the Bali Bombings I and II, the atmosphere of sentiment towards Muslims was very pronounced. Hindus and foreign
tourists considered that Islamic identity is always associated with the Hijab, Hijab, and Niqâb. Thus whenever a Muslimah who wore this attribute was seen as part of and who supports terrorists, especially when the Muslim’s soul is seen wearing “celana cingkrang” and a beard, they were labeled as terrorists, and that the person concerned was expelled from his village. For example, in Buleleng, a man and his family were welcome to leave Bali. Hijab, and Niqâb are the most powerful symbols in visualizing Islam which is known globally as a stereotypical marker of radicalism. In Bali, the wearing of these three clothes is considered a symbol of religious extremism in socializing.

Discrimination against Muslimah also occurred in several malls such as Ramayana Mall Denpasar and Level 21 Mall which prohibit Mall employees from wearing headscarves and hijabs. This decision was based on the principle of a sense of comfort and serenity for visitors to the Mall after the Bali Bombing. The two cases were the most striking because the attribute of religion is considered a representation of a religious belief, as revealed by Shirazi and Mishra (2010). As immigrants who have also settled in Bali, Muslims must comply with the ethics set by traditional leaders and local governments in Bali. Several informants we interviewed said that since then many Muslims did not maintain beards and have minimized all forms of striking religious attributes as an effort to resilience social life with residents.

Repressive actions against minority Muslims in Denpasar are also felt in Islamic educational institutions such as Madrasah Ibtidaiyah, Islamic Kindergarten (TK Islam). After the Bali Bombing, these two types of institutions were prohibited from being established and even threatened to be closed, because the situation in Bali which was not conducive to Islamic education institutions was seen as a place to “poison” children’s minds to
take radical actions, although some authorities have temporarily closed Islamic education institutions as a preventive measure to counter the beliefs that could damage Bali’s image as an “Pulau Dewata” (Island of the Gods). As a resilience effort, several Islamic schools have to negotiate with local leaders and the surrounding environment about what is taught in schools such as Madrasah Ibtidaiyah, Kindergarten (TK Islam). Several teachers in schools revealed how they had to survive in the onslaught of discrimination and negative stigma against Islam that had an impact on Islamic educational institutions.

As a consequence of that, the people of Hindus prohibited permitting burial sites for Muslims. This discrimination is based on the sentiment of rejecting Balinese people in general and Hindus in particular because Islam is considered to be the “destroyer of the Bali Earth”, it is not appropriate for them to be buried on Bumi Bali which strongly condemns this cursed act. Even though they were banned, Muslim leaders engaged in religious dialog with an attitude of openness that prioritized humanity. This prohibition of permitting public burials for Muslims did not take too long, but at that time after the second Bali bombing, there were Muslims who volunteered to donate their land for Muslim burial.

However, five years after the second Bali bombing, this atmosphere of discrimination had disappeared. Even Lene Pedersen (2014) in her research she was surprised to see women wearing the hijab in Bali. The “anti-Islam” fanaticism that has been echoed since the bloody incident occurred, Muslim minorities in Bali have returned to mingle with the Hindus, even though in fact the sense of trauma and sentiment is still there. Since then, Muslims have returned to build good relationships with Hindus through brotherhood and kinship relations as explained in the next sub-discussion.
Rebuilding Tolerance Shattered: The Principle of Religious Moderation of Two Religions (Islam-Hindu)

In Bhagavadgita Adhyaya V Sloka 18, it is stated that Hindu teachings assess religious moderation as:39 “A wise human will consider all other people the same, whether he is a brahmana who is kind-hearted or a despicable person without kasta”.

While in Islam it is known as al-Taʿāruf which means knowing each other with all humans on earth, as enshrined in al-Qur’ān (Surah al-Hujjāt: 13).40 Before the word taʿāruf was preceded by a sentences “inna khalaqnâkum min dhakar wa untâ wa jaʿalnâkum shuʿûba wa qabâʿila”, this means that God created human beings in pairs of male and female types so that from the result of the marriage, gave birth to people in groups, different nationalities, and tribes as a result of taʿāruf in the form of inter-ethnic relations and relations ethnicity, between religions, between different and diverse groups of people.

The two principles in Hindusm and Islam show how the two religions are very pro towards religious moderation. Tat Tvam Asi is me or us; Atmavat Sarva Bhutani which means humans must treat and position others as they treat themselves41. In al-Qur’ān Allah describes that whoever kills people not because of killing other people or doing damage on earth (such as committing acts of terrorism), it is as if he has killed all humans in the elements of life in the world; and whoever maintains human life, it is as if he has taken care of the lives of all humans (Surah al-Mâʿidah/5: 32).42

These two religions highly uphold the values of religious moderation and strongly condemn acts of destroying the earth (terrorism). The consequence of Surah al-Hujjāt/49: 13 and Surah al-Mâʿidah/5: 32 makes the Hindu Puri Pemecutan community in Denpasar welcome the Muslim community from the Bugis islands.
There is an interesting thing that King Pemecutan XI was often invited to religious events in Serangan such as the “Maulid Nabi” (Prophet’s birthday), weddings, Islamic holidays such as the month of Muharrom, the month of Suro, welcoming the holy month of Ramadan, and others. The King who was “low-profile” sometimes didn’t hesitate to hug the Bugis Muslims and greet each other; this was what amazed the Bugis Muslims and had great respect for the King Pemecutan XI.  

Besides that, the King also allowed Muslims to carry out Salah and gave a plot of land to Muslims as a place to live and a location for a mosque. When Muslims were invited to state events, the King also provided halal food to Muslims. On the anniversary of the two religions, religious moderation is shown by cooperation with one another, for example during Islamic Holidays (PHBI) such as Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, the Prophet’s birthday (Maulid Nabi), Isra’ Mi’raj, and breaking the fast together during the month of Ramadhan, Muslim invited King Pemecutan XI to attend these events. Furthermore, on Hindu Holidays (PHBH), such as Galungan, Kuningan, and others, Muslims helped Hindus and attended the event as a food carrier who carried the food on his head or carried on a parade, as well as helped other needs in events.  

The King’s high tolerance for Bugis Muslims attracted Hindus and Muslims to continue maintaining good relations in Denpasar, Bali. This good relationship is maintained and preserved until now, even Muslims in Bali are known as nyama Slams (Balinese brothers and sisters) even though the Bali Bombing tragedies left deep wounds for Balinese Hindus and also subjected Muslims in Bali to the pressure of discrimination.
Muslim-Hindus Relations

After the Bali Bombing (after 2002 and 2005) communal violence has relatively disappeared in Bali, even though there are seeds of ethnic conflict as explained by Tambiah in 1997 where ethnic conflicts emerged on minority issues in Bali.46 What Hindus felt was the declining economic impact, especially the tourism sector and small and medium enterprises (UMKM) as a result of the bombings and felt pressured by the arrival of Muslim immigrants as workers, tourists, and immigrant status. This phenomenon increases when the escalation of Muslim immigrants take parts in economic spaces when stereotypes of terrorism are pinned to Islam.47

The highlight of this research is that Bali, especially Denpasar as the capital of Bali Province, can withstand the pressure of the majority of the Hindus as an endemic victim of terrorism by the accused Muslim subjects, and to rebuild tolerance and moderation in unity through the relations built by these two religions after the bombing.

Minority yet Dominates: Muslim-Hindu Relations in an Economic Context

The first established relationship is from an economic perspective. As stated by Barth (1998), previously Muslims came to Bali to work as laborers who were described as “slaves”, but over time minority Muslims occupied many economic sectors independently in Bali so that their status changed to “owners” rather than labor.48 This means that there is social dependence of the Hindus on Muslims in the economic chain.

Ni Made Sukerti said 70% of the vendors range from micro-businesses in local markets in Denpasar to home businesses are owned and managed by Muslims. Apart from trading in
various products, Muslim minorities also control livestock production businesses such as chickens and cattle. In some of the Hindus informants we encountered, Muslims were more agile and skilled than the most local Balinese in terms of the business mentioned above. In fact, in some cases, Hindus study the production methods of these businesses by observing Muslim migrants.

Indirectly there is an symbiotic-mutualism effort between Hindus-Muslims.

There are several economic spaces that Hindus do not enter, in contrast, it seems that they support Muslim businesses openly. Muslims in Bali play a key role in the economy of Hindu religious rituals even though Muslims in this context are a minority, such as the Muslims-made Hindu’s ritual trinkets. Even in our observation, some Hindus spend most of their income on buying Muslim products.

**The Indestructible Relationship: Muslim-Hindus Relations in the Context of Kinship and Marriage Relationships**

The second relationship is kinship and marriage. What is interesting in this study is that the Bali Bombing incident did not break the cycle of good relations between Muslim-Hindus in Bali, which several previous studies did not reveal why good relations were still maintained between these two groups despite the strong ethnic and religious contact.

A total of 10 random informants interviewed (4 from Muslim, 6 from Hindus), 7 of them said that they had kinship ties, both from the Muslim side have relatives with Hindus and vice versa. The informants admitted that they had family ties between the two ethnic religions.

There are 3 types of kinship relations: (1) kinship through children and grandchildren; it means that their grandfather
and their parents came from one religion (either from Islam or Hinduism) and then among them chose one of the two religions which was different from the religion of their grandfather and parents. (2) the kinship of interfaith intermarriage; these cases occur frequently so that they become a unique phenomenon that does not occur in other regions in Indonesia; Marriage relations can occur from the factor of meeting when establishing cooperation in the trade sector or when the relationship becomes an institutional partner, although there is a prohibition in Islam to marry a man who is not Muslim. (3) the kinship of an illegal marriage; In some cases in Bali, kinship is formed because of marriage outside of legal marriage. What is interesting in the findings of this study is that there is a traditional culture in Bali “dikumpuli sak durunge married”, which many cases are marriages between the 2 religions. In this case, although this relationship is not legitimized, for Balinese culture, this relationship is still recognized.

This interfaith marriage has been going on for a long time in Bali since before the Dutch colonial era in Indonesia. More precisely, the marriage happens between the Muslim Sasak people and the Balinese Hindu. The case that has occurred is the marriage of royal blood between the King of Bali Anak Agung Gde Ngurah Karangasem and a royal-blooded Muslimah named Denda Aminah. The marriage combined elements of mixing two ethnicities and two different religions for royal politics to be closer.

What is interesting is that this marriage brings such a strong relationship between Muslims in Lombok and Hindus in Bali. This mixture of two ethnicities and two religions tolerates each other and maintains their beliefs (does not influence each other). The King paid respect to his wife and Muslim people by building a Mushalla and a hall for meetings with tokoh adat
and ‘ulamâ’ in the kingdom. The result of this marriage is the grandson of the King of Bali and Ratu Denda Aminah who chose Islam as his religion and attended the al-Qur’ân training at the palace.53

This kind of relationship shows that interfaith marriage is a strong foundation for maintaining religious moderation in intimidation of divisions through radicalism and terrorism. Although it is customary for the marriage model mentioned above, the wife must follow the religion of her husband, but once again we have found that it is not uncommon for men who embrace Hinduism to marry Muslimah, and vice versa. This phenomenon shows that the Muslim-Hindus relations have been established for a long time with a strong structure and pattern for diversity.

Conclusion

Bali, which is known as “Tourism Heaven”, must be tainted by the bloody incidents of the Bali Bombing (in 2002 and 2005), and turned into “Tourist Hell”. It is not only the psychological, socio-economic and multinational effects that are felt around the world, but also seriously affects the relationship between two religions (Islam and Hinduism). Terrorism carried out by a group of irresponsible people in the name of religion (Islam) as a trigger to legitimize the truth that Bali must be destroyed, which of course this radical opinion has polluted Islam and its adherents. Muslims must experience some pressures, discrimination, and social intimidation from the majority. Hindus believe that calm and peace are the keys of Hinduism. After the incident, the relationship between the two religions experienced disintegration, even though historically, they had maintained good relations for hundreds of years. After the Bali Bombing for approximately
two decades, Denpasar Bali as the capital of the Province has improved and built a badly polluted area in the world in various ways, one of which is to rebuild religious tolerance between adherents of the two religions that collapsed due to the explosion of terrorism.

This article describes the opposite, where after the incident, the adherents of these two religions worked hand in hand to build religious moderation with Muslim-Hindus relations in an economic context as indicated by the persistence of Muslim minorities in Denpasar on controlling the economic system, and the majority of Hindus as supporters of Muslim efforts to keep economy activities running in Denpasar. Meanwhile, the second established relationship is from kinship and marital relations which are the main factors in the strengthening of the relationship between the two religions in Bali. The argument obtained in this research is that the resilience of Muslims as a minority is very strong even though the terrible onslaught of terrorism became the most violent crime in the world, but because of the principles of the two religions that are pro to religious moderation and the long-established relationship has made Muslim-Hindus relations in Bali survive until now.

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