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ISIS Defeat In The Middle East: It's Impact On The Increase Of ISIS Power In The Southeast Asia
(Case Study: The Increasing Number Of ISIS Member In Indonesia)

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ABSTRACT
This study intended to discover on the increase of number of Islamic States and Syria (ISIS) member in Indonesia. Post ISIS defeat their existence in Middle East, it caused ISIS tried to expand their influenced and began to build other region, such as Southeast Asia as their base of struggle. This article has focused on how to impact the increasing of ISIS in the Philippines to Indonesia, especially is Marawi. We analyzed from border aspect because Marawi is the nearest border with Indonesia’s territory. The existence of ISIS in Indonesia was also inseparable from the strengthening of ISIS in Marawi, Southern Philippines. ISIS in Marawi is challenging to be paralyzed by the Philippine Government. Although President Duterte is going to crush ISIS in Philippine within a year, if Philippines prefer to fight ISIS by itself, without cooperation with another state in South East Asia region, it may lack on the probability of the mission tend to gain success. In fact, ISIS Philippines as a part of a group of which affiliated with the MNLF Movement (Moro National Liberation Front), MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) and Abu Sayyaf. They have bailed out at ISIS after the MNLF made several deals with the government and the Abu Sayyaf suffered a lot. There are some subsections in this paper, first, analyze on ISIS and factors caused the increase the number of ISIS member in Indonesia. Second, in regards the territorial border among Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia, we applied terms of cooperative security, to analyze to what extent this states could improve their strategy for strengthening border security to avoid ISIS spread their power in this territory.

Keywords: ISIS, Indonesia, Filipina, Cooperative Security

1. Introduction

In 2017, ISIS has many experiences on defeat in any war in the Middle East, but it does not mean that ISIS existence almost was gone. We knew that in Mosul Iraq and Syria Raqqa, as the ISIS Camp during their mission in the Middle East. But unfortunately, when US coalition troops defeated ISIS, we found that many members were killed and detained by the Iraqi and Syrian governments. As published on media, in fact, there were so many ISIS members came from Southeast Asia, mainly from the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Regarding the networking on ISIS Philippines, it strongly related with the ISIS in Marawi, Southern Philippines. In 2017, there was 1200 member of ISIS in Marawi, and their existence cannot defeat by Philippine's military army. The ISIS group in Marawi is very familiar with the Marawi terrain and uses the guerrilla system, Guerrilla system regarding
ISIS define as how their tactics from the forest to the corners and they have mastered the path. Related to Marawi’s case, we found that ISIS action is brutal, like beheading several civilian prisoners. Aside from Syrian combatants, ISIS Marawi is a member of the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) and Abu Sayyaf who support to ISIS Syria. The MILF is the most extensive rebel group in the southern Philippines. The MILF has formed after several members quit the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) in 1974. They initially demanded independence from the Philippine government. They turned soft and willing to accept individual autonomy. But the part of them did not receive the Front’s decision. One of them is the Abu Sayyaf group. Abu Sayyaf did not agree to some agreements with the government, so finally they joined ISIS.

The difference with ISIS Malaysia, they originated Darul Islam (DI-TII) from the period of Kartosoewirjo in 1949-1962. ISIS Malaysia also came from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which led by Abu Bakar Baasir, KMM (Mujahidin Malaysia Group). (Kamarulnizam bin Abdullah, 2009). Around dozens of Malaysians go to Syria for jihad. Upon their return from Syria, many baptized (bai’at) by ISIS. (Fealey Greg, 2016). For ISIS Indonesia, has not much difference from ISIS Malaysia, people whose did bai’at to ISIS in Indonesia also came from DI-TII (Darul Islam) led by Kartosoewirjo. Their organization has changed but the ideology will not change from Darul Islam (DI) continued with the establishment of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), NII (had grown back in the 1990s), MIT (Mujahidin East Indonesia), JAT (Jemaah Anshorutttauhid) to finally ISIS. The influence of the growing radical movement in Indonesia has caused many Indonesian citizens to go to Syria in the name of Jihad. Upon their return from Syria, they bowed to ISIS. Some instances of acts of terror carried out by ISIS. As happened in Sarinah Thamrin Jakarta in 2016, Kampung Melayu Jakarta in 2017 and some areas outside Jakarta. Some of the many Indonesians who have not returned from Syria. In 2017, there are 18 Indonesian returning from Syria. The majority of Indonesians deny their existence. The people are still traumatized by some of the terror events and the increasingly intolerant conditions in Indonesia.

From the previous explanation, we implied that the growth of radicalism in Indonesia came from the basis of ISIS ideology, and we could not separate it from the situation why ISIS easily entry the Indonesia territory. Even more, the case of ISIS Marawi mainly could be a serious effect on Indonesia’s security. Marawi is the nearest border by the sea with Indonesia’s territory so that Indonesia’s government has to improve strategy to strengthen
sea border security and develop specific military cooperation among other states, as part of counter-attack strategy from the increase of ISIS which comes from the Southern Philippines.

According to this paper, we focused on some studies, and there are: (1) what are the main factors which caused the increase the number of ISIS member in Indonesia? (2) Regarding border security between Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia, in which have contiguous territory border among each other, to what extent they build and strengthen their military cooperation and minimize the impact on the increase of many ISIS member in Indonesia?

2. Literature Review

This paper refers to some literature, namely first, Sten Rynning, in Cooperative Security and NATO’s Grand Alternatives, he explained about The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), cooperative security as an instrument that could offer peaceful cooperation. He mentioned that NATO reflected the complicated situation of the geopolitics among the alliance. Regarding his work, Sten explained that through NATO Strategic Concept, he examined three main pillars of this concept, namely collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. For the mutual defense, as the NATO defense clause (Article 5) defined about the area operation of NATO strictly focus on the Euro-Atlantic area. But post 9/11, since Al Qaeda attacked the United States, the issue of geography has changed and not relevance for Article 5. But what NATO did after tragedy 9/11 is still counted as NATO military engagement related to Article 4, which NATO can engage in security.

In the context of crisis management, NATO applied flexible policy such as how NATO build up its capacity in monitoring the international situation, how NATO organize proper management for civilian in crisis, also the ability of NATO to train the local army in the crisis situation. Finally, in the context of cooperative Sten mentioned that NATO aimed to establish global networking includes how NATO was strengthening its institutional capacity for coalition-building. (Sten Rynning, 2014, p.135). Sten also discusses how NATO commitment to new unconventional threats, how NATO can become flexible and open up for civil-military interaction.

Second, Ole Waever, Cooperative Security: A New Concept, he examined the NATO concept of cooperative security. Based on the classic notions of security such as collective security, security is related to protect from threats. He also mentioned that NATO Strategic
Concept in which adopted in November 2010 has classified on three core elements, such as collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security.

He found that cooperative security is a strategy and seems not hierarchical, so it could make NATO developed beyond its borders, and contribute actively widely. NATO also can build consolidation among actors in an international system, that may NATO could be entered within. Related to cooperative security, he showed impressive assessment of who can do what together with NATO, he describes NATO military mission in Eastern Europe, and recently how NATO leads international cooperation over new threats such as WMD and cyberwar.

He implied that cooperative security as an excellent idea for new security concept, in the context of NATO, historically NATO as the component which played a significant role to provide protection and consolidate their alliance. Post cold war system, cooperative security, and partnerships, correctly could be identified as the proper way to maintain security cooperation among nations. He added that basically in collective security has specific meaning about how to develop co-operation (and partnership) which is all countries have to come together from different perspectives and focused on solving the crisis, learning to listen and more cooperate with the others (Ole Waever, 2014, p.58-59).

In the third literature, we use a chapter written by Greg Fealey (2016) and published by USAID (United State Agency International Development), entitled “Indonesian and Malaysian Support For The Islamic State”. Greg explains more detail about ISIS in Indonesia and Malaysia. They are jihadis who return from Syria. Indonesian citizens who become ISIS in Indonesia are members of several radical organizations. The organization is a splinter group from Jemaah Islamiyah affiliated with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Interestingly, Jemaah Islamiyah difference in groups that support ISIS, because they have a different ideology with ISIS Syria, their coordination is very well and strengthens ISIS in Southern Philippines.

Here are some hard organizations in Indonesia that support to ISIS: (1) Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (Community of the Helpers of Monotheism (JAT), was founded in 2008 by former Jemaah Islamiyah emir, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. In 2010, JAT had many thousands of members and chapters across the archipelago. In the mid of July, these organization separated from Ba'asyir's support for ISIS. It was about 80 percent of JAT members left, and prefer to
affiliate with Jamaah Anshorut Syariah (Congregation of Islamic Law Helpers; JAS). JAT did facilitate recruitment for ISIS both members and sympathizers. (2) *Mujahidin of East Indonesia (East Indonesian Jihad Fighters, MIT).* Formed by a former JAT commander, Santoso (Abu Wardah al-Syarqi) in 2011. This MIT covers an array of jihadist cells in Central Sulawesi, Bima (West Nusa Tenggara) and East Kalimantan. Santoso was the first jihadist leader from Indonesia that declared allegiance to ISIS, in late 2013 and has many links to Syria and often features in the international jihadist media. (3) *Jamaah Tauhid wal Jihad (JTJ),* this organization was created by Aman Abdurrahman (Oman Rochman) in 2004. JTJ has a loose structure, and most of its activities are involved in terrorist operations. (4) *Ring Banten,* as a group split from Darul Islam, the Indonesia’s oldest jihadist organization. They get involved in Bali Blast in 2002 and Australia Embassy bombing in 2004. One of its leaders, Rois (Iwan Dharmawan), is now on death row for his role in the latter attack. Several of its members have joined ISIS in Syria. (5) *Gema Salam (contraction of Student Movement for Islamic Shariah, Students Movement for Islamic Law).* Gema Salam has strongly advocated for the ISIS, since 2013. Cause in many parts of Indonesia. It follows the teachings of Aman Abdurrahman and runs the Shoutussalam.org website, one of the most prominent pro-ISIS sites in Indonesia, that translated and published online of ISIS’s Dabiq journal in the Indonesian version. (6) *Mujahideen of West Indonesia (Western Indonesia Holy War Fighters; MIB)* that created in 2012, in West Java. This organization is a splinter group from a Darul Islam who led by Abu Umar, and have some members who have joined ISIS in Syria. (7) *FAKSI (Forum Sharia Islam Activist or Islamic Sharia Activists Forum).* This organization was created by Muhammad Fachry (real name Tuah Febriwansyah) who busy for recruitment new member of ISIS in Indonesia. The other is Bahrum Syam in early 2013, based on the militant al-Muhajirun group in Indonesia and growth faster as the primary source for media activity that pro-ISIS in Indonesia. He joined ISIS in Syria in May 2014, and as head of Katibah, his main site is al-Mustaqbal.com, promotes of ISIS ideology and is a significant platform for spreading the teachings of Aman Abdurrahman. This organization also organized many activities in which represent ISIS, and to gain mass supported. The organizations are undoubtedly dangerous for Indonesia. The Indonesian government must act decisively by closing the agencies and their relationship between countries, especially ISIS in the Southern Philippines, Malaysia, which influences the development of ISIS in Indonesia.
According to literature above, we found that cooperative security appropriate to adopt in our work. In this context, we found that the states might to rally their capacity with no fear or be afraid of intimidated because it only has the limited military capability. Such as the fundamental principle of cooperative security depends on the willingness of the state to achieve its objectives.

3. Research Method

The data study collection in this work by using primary and secondary data, by searching relevant literature study of ISIS not only in Indonesia but also in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Philippines. We used data from previous research, security database in Indonesia, and information from the official institution. We also interviewed with Deputy Director of Strategic Studies of University of Indonesia, Benny Mamoto. He is also a former interrogator of bombers Bali I and II.

This work referred terms of cooperative security, started from the idea when states tend to behave upon their national interest and tried to pursue their interest include in conflict or peace situation. So that, when the countries face the critical condition such as war, conflict or crisis, there is a tendency for the state to maintain its security and interests. Under certain circumstances, state prefers to join or build an alliance, working together with other countries to defend itself from attacks.

Post-Cold War era, terms of security became expanded, and cooperative security as the prominent sense when all states with their common interests compromised to reduce tensions during cold war conflict, they agreed to dispute and build cooperation through economic development also maintain regional stability. Cooperative security could be interpreted as strategy how states behave through the collaboration dealing with other by considering security or additional interest and initiate to cooperate to prevent conflict or unexpected situation in the future (Michael Moodie, 2000, p.5).

Heinz Vetschera referred the definition of cooperation security accord to J.E. Nolan et al., The Concept of Cooperative Security, mentioned that it as a strategic principle that prefers to put institutional way rather than put threats of material or coercion to achieve their purposes (Heinz Vetschera, p.33). Mainly, the concept of cooperative security more characterized by finding solutions for security problems in cooperation even with potential
competitors. This strategy tends to provide among the actors could achieve their purposes with minimum losses by cooperating with each other.

Heinz explained that in the context of cooperative security required the willingness each party to cooperate, the specific reason in collective security needs availability among actor that involved in agenda to have ready for assisting if they reject to work so that it might lose a chance to succeed (Heinz Vetschera, p.40). He argued that cooperative security is aimed to reduce failure, misunderstanding about this strategy, a tendency to the willingness of all parties to cooperate as the prominent component to achieve a compromise. For example, in the context of this paper, we applied to prevent an attack of ISIS, as the potential enemy, if the counter-ISIS as the commitment among states, so they have to establish and willing to ready for compromise. As Heinz mentioned in the previous explanation, that cooperative security has the potential developed strategy against the situation if it could be into unintended escalation.

Moreover, related to terms of cooperative security, Richard Cohen in his work *Cooperative Security: From Individual Security to International Stability* described this term become idealistic approach as the response to the changing international environment. He argued that cooperative security model as security approach in which proposed global harmony and cooperation and has reflected the ideal perspective of world security in the future. He mentioned this model scope consists of what he called as rings of security.

He explained that cooperative security offers states have initiated to create a collective commitment to promoting stability, he saws that NATO as the proper sample to operate four rings of this model (Richard Cohen, p. 1). This cooperative security required all members had to provide fundamental liberal democratic values, proactive and prepared to engage in collective diplomatic, also military action in specific areas that may be a threat by outsiders (Richard Cohen, p. 2).

The attractive elements of cooperative security are the existence of two dimensions that not covered in collective security or collective defense. Namely (a) Individual Security, or popularized as “Human Security” focused on citizens protection for their freedoms and became the international concerns; (b) the Active Promotion and Projection of Stability. For detail, cooperative security required the state involvement to promote stability outside their boundaries actively. It was a remarkable aspect, mainly when neighboring states became
instability, so it may affect or threat the territory and also become dangerous. Even though stability may be interrupted by internal conflict within the state or conflict among nations, we have to consider that the countries within the cooperative security system intend to more concerned with the stability of the world around them. So that, when their neighboring state in the severe attack or danger, it could sharply bring impact for instability or threat to their countries, such as in Kosovo, Rwanda, East Timor (Richard Cohen, p. 9).

In practice, he argued that as the strategic system, so that cooperative security allows liberal democratic states openly linked with broader network both formal or informal alliances because this model suggests shared values and practical cooperation. In a Cooperative Security system, individual states’ national security objectives linked by four rings of security.

For detail, four rings of security consist of (a) individual security, emphasize on how to promote and protect fundamental individual rights within their territory; (b) collective security, focused on how to maintain peace and stability in their region. (c) mutual defense, related to joint protection towards outsiders (threats); (d) promoting security, based on assumptions that conflict it may cause instability in broader aspects, and also military (Richard Cohen, p. 10).

According to the explanation about cooperative security above, we implied the most crucial aspect of collective security is the initiative and willingness of individual states in a region mainly neighboring country to cooperate and concerned about security stability within their territory in whole and also their neighboring states. It derives from the view if conflict or security threat in an area (specifically in neighboring states) will have a severe impact such as interrupt the stability other countries, direct or indirect attack for individual security within the region or other states. Regarding the context of this work about ISIS in Southeast Asia, we tried to analyze it by using terms of cooperative security as a strategic preference for Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to avoid or reduce ISIS influence in neighboring territory.

4. Results And Discussion

As mentioned in previous explanation, for the results we divide into several parts, there are three subsections. First, ISIS in Indonesia consists of ISIS Indonesia-Philippines and analyzed how ISIS Enter Indonesia’s territory through sea line, and also how Indonesia’s
enter Marawi. Second, the factors caused the increase the number of ISIS member in Indonesia. Third, in regard among neighboring countries Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia, so by using cooperation security, we would like to analyze to what extent they able to build and strengthen military cooperation and minimize the effect of an increase of some ISIS member in Indonesia.

4.1 ISIS (Islamic State and Syria) In Indonesia

The ideology of IS (Islamic State) in Indonesia actually began in the DI-TII (Darul Islam) on August 7, 1949 by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo in Malangbong, Tasik Malaya, West Java (Kibtiah, 2015). Kartosuwrirjo's thinking is influenced by HOS Cokroaminoto. He met Cokroaminoto while serving as his personal assistant in “Fajar Asia” Newspaper. He uses the term "hijra" in his political movement in PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia). Unfortunately, this political movement was responded negatively by the PSII so that Kartosoewirjo took a stepping up of the revolution to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia (NII) with the ranks of TII (Indonesian Islamic Army) which he recruited from the youth of West Java. (Al-Haidar, 1999.)

Karto's struggle was backed by Daud Beureuh in Aceh in 1950. Those who recognized Kartosoeuwrjo's leadership did not need a direct leader figure. Karto's struggle did not last long. On September 4, 1962, Kartosoewirjo was executed for alleged rebellion. But the death of the figure of DI Kartosoewirjo does not make the ideology of the concept of the Islamic state is dead. Before his death, Karto held a “Cisayong conference”. The contents of the conference are to discuss the constitution and how to expand the territory of an Islamic state. Finally, a structure of the state of Islam, known as Qanun Azazi (Awwas S Irfan, 2008) was formulated. There are state articles, laws and powers, imamate councils, regional divisions, flags, languages, education, defense and security and others. The Qanun azazi is the foundation of a radical movement in Indonesia including ISIS. (Al-Chaidar, 1999). The destruction of DI (Darul Islam) does not mean that this ideology is really dead. Their progress continues even now, though in secret. In the 1970s, this movement reappeared. This action was first carried by Ujang Baharudin former DI-TII Command Jihad member who was arrested in 1978.

After it, Ujang met Ajengan Masduki in Cianjur, West Java, to revive DI-TII cells. Ajengan Masduki is a person who was close to Kartosuwrirjo. On November 4, 1987, there was a
grand session that decided Ajengan Masduki as imam or NII leader. Several other names emerged including Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who later these two men became leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The NII continued to race in the 1990s with a recruitment system of students. The movement emerged along with the flow of transnationalism in the Islamic movement with the entry of HTI (Hizbut Tahrir) whose ideological base one frame with the Muslim Brotherhood (The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict / IPAC, 2017).

In 1988, there was a split between Ajengan Masduki and Abdullah Sungkar. Due to DI / NII's internal consolidation failure regarding organizational rules. This situation is heating up because many Afghan alumni prefer to join Abdullah Sungkar than with Ajengan Masduki. In 1992, Abdullah Sungkar and his followers came out of the NII and in 1993, then Sungkar formed JI with a division of Mantiqi territory covering Malaysia led by Hambali, Mantiqi Dua covering Kalimantan, Ambon, Sulawesi and Papua led by Ibn Tayyib aka Abu Faith. Mantiqi three covering Malaysia and Mindanao led by Imron Baihaqi alias Mustafa and Mantiqi Empat include Australia and Papua led by Abdurrahman Ayyub. (Al-Chaidar, 2015). JI continues to grow under the leadership of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir after Abdullah Sungkar died until finally Bali Bomb I and II occurred.

Although JI was successfully paralyzed by the Government of Indonesia and assisted by many countries due to the large number of foreign nationals who were victims of the bombing, the ideology of this organization could not be lost. A declaration of ISIS (Islamic State and Syria) emerged in Indonesia. According to BNPT data, in 2014, there was an ISIS declaration with Malaysians called Katibah Nusantara. The form of this organization comes from JI slices evolved into ISIS Indonesia to MIT (Mujahidin East Indonesia) led by Santoso and JAT (Jamaah Anshoruttauhid) led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Ba'asyir from prison declared himself that his JAT officially joined ISIS in Syria.

4.1.1 ISIS Indonesia-Philippines

The beginning of this ideology is derived from DI-TII which continues to evolve in all its forms. This doctrine established the ASEAN Network (Association of South East Asia Nations) very strongly. Indonesia's discourse will be the basis of ISIS, Mindanao, Southern Philippines. Since the time of JI (Jemaah Islamiyah), Indonesia has become the center of the movement of this organization. Due to the Moro Tribe in Mindanao. Moro itself is a term
from Spain for Muslims in the Southern Philippine Region. Moro became the motivational network of ISIS Indonesia-Philippines.

Starting from the establishment of MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), Abu Sayyaf to the latest development is the ISIS declaration in the Southern Philippines under the leadership of Isnilon Hapilon. Isnilon Hapilon is the leader of the Abu Sayyaf who bowed to ISIS in Syria. In the 21-minute video declaration, Indonesian, Filipino and Malaysian citizens were involved in the creation of a video allegedly made in Syria. The intersection between ISIS Indonesia-ISIS Southern Philippines took place at the time of the establishment of JI in Indonesia.

There are several JI areas divided among them are the three Mantiqi which include Indonesia-Mindanao. The relationship between them is getting closer from time to time. WNI alumni of Afghanistan (JI) many who joined in Mindanao and involved cases of conflict in Indonesia. The Poso case is related to Camp Hubaidiyah Mindanao. (Interview with Deputy Director of Strategic Studies of University of Indonesia, Benny Mamoto). In Poso, the Mujahideen Military alumni in Afghanistan and instructors at Camp Hudaibiyah Mindanao, Southern Philippines, taught spiritual propagation about faith and the belief that Islam is based on jihad *fisabilillah*. Some names from Mindanao go to Poso to explain the concept of jihad. Among them, Abdul Hakim entered from Mindanao to Poso in 2000 as a teacher who taught in Team 10 about martial arts or kung fu. There are also Abu Assad, Ustadz Toha, Ustadz Hamzah, Abu Qital, Ustadz Haizam, Ustadz Nasir Abbas. All of them are Indonesian citizens who are involved in Mindanao and enter Poso except Nasir Abbas from Malaysia (Karnavian Tito, 2008).

MIT under Santoso's leadership in Poso has links with the MILF in the Southern Philippines. The MIT group gets a supply of weapons from Anshorut Khilafah, Philippines. (Interview with Deputy Director of Strategic Studies of University of Indonesia, Benny Mamoto). Group Leader Maute Omar Khayam invites Muslims in the archipelago (Southeast Asia) to join ISIS in the Philippines including from Indonesia via Facebook's social media network. Isnilon Hapilon, Chairman of ISIS, South Philippines, reaffirmed Omar Khayam's call for Muslims in the Southeast Asian region to emigrate or join ISIS Mindanao, Southern Philippines. There are 22 ISIS groups in the Southern Philippines. But the strongest in 5 categories. One of the Maute groups is still part of the MILF. The group is predicted to have 100 members and get supplies of weapons from foreign militias. Maute
has a headquarters in Butig Town, Lanao del Sur, Mindanao. Maute is known to be close to JI in Indonesia (Tempo.co).

Based on an interview with the Deputy Director of Strategic Studies of The University of Indonesia Benny Mamoto, traced the existence of MILF in the territory of Indonesia Talaud, North Sulawesi. This district is the result of the expansion of Sangihe and Talaud in 2000. This region is the northernmost region in eastern Indonesia directly neighboring to the South Philippines. MILFs from the southern Philippines have been in this area for years, and the Government of Indonesia is unknown. (Interview with Deputy Director for Strategic Studies of University of Indonesia, Benny Mamoto, 2017).

4.1.2 How ISIS Enter Indonesia’s territory Through Sea Line

The ISIS declaration in Indonesia is not known precisely. But a number of mosques in Jakarta, Bogor, Tanggerang, Bekasi) declared joining ISIS in Syria and Iraq namely Assyuhada Mosque, Central Jakarta, Al-Fataa Menteng Jakarta. (bbc.com). Members are part of previous radical movements ranging from DITII, JI, JAT, MIT to get to ISIS. ISIS in Indonesia is getting stronger along with their entry through some border areas of Indonesia. For examples in Bitung City, North Sulawesi Province and Morotai Island, North Maluku Province (Kompas.com). Based on information from ISIS Mindanao member from FNI, Faisal Abu Bakar and Ali Misron who were arrested in Sandakan, Malaysia, their gathering point before going to Marawi is Malaysia. This system was built by Mahmud Ahmad, an essential Malaysian and assistant Amir of ISIS Southeast Asia, Isnilon Hapilon. Mahmud was given the task by Isnilon Hapilon to finance them including Indonesian citizens who crossed into Zamboanga. ISIS shipping lines are also via Semporna or Lahad Datu. The ship departs at night from Semporna, East Coast of Sabah, then lands on Sarangani Island that has entered the Southern Philippines Region. Another more accessible route could be through Tawi-Tawi, continuing through Jolo and stopping at Basilan. Based on the tirto.id investigation, before the war exploded, all members who have bound to ISIS Mindanao including Indonesian citizens, gathered in Basilan, crossing to Mindanao via Zamboanga. But after the war broke out, Zamboanga guarded by the marines. Finally, ISIS from Indonesia or vice versa, will pass the sea lane and directly stop in Malabang. The city becomes an essential access because it is close to Lake Lanao. The condition of ISIS in Marawi is already under siege. The only access to help is from Lake Lanao with the help of a boat (tirto.id).
South Philippines is the basis of ISIS Southeast Asia because it is adjacent to Indonesia which in fact is the world's largest Muslim country. Thus, marine recruitment from the Indonesian state is expected to continue to strengthen the position of ISIS in the Southern Philippines. Those who return to Indonesia can establish ISIS in Indonesia. So that, showing their relationship created since the conflict between Ambon and Poso between 1998-2000 between rebel militias in Mindanao and Indonesia.

4.2 The Factors That Caused of the Increasing of ISIS in Indonesia

4.2.1. The Rise of Radicalism After the Collapse of the New Order

The number of Indonesian citizens who are interested in joining ISIS Mindanao is inseparable from the condition of the people of Indonesia who was hit by a strong religious spirit. Unfortunately, the soul is more inclined to fundamental understanding. Since the fall of the Soeharto era in 1998, the condition of radicalism in Indonesia has increased sharply. There are several organizations such as FPI, HTI, JI, JAT, MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), Laskar Jundulloh, Laskar Jihad and others. This prediction derives from political
conditions became openly and the weakness of the Government to face the democratic climate after the fall of Soeharto.

Although they indirectly contribute to the rise of ISIS in Indonesia, their understanding of religion, feeling righteous, hateful, intolerant, rejecting democracy, provides an opportunity to justify the ISIS ideology. Based on data from the Wahid Foundation in 2016, intolerance increased in Indonesia by about 38.4%, tolerant 40%, neutrally tends to 3.1% intolerant, neutral tends to tolerance of 18.1% (http://www.wahidfoundation.org/).

Based on BNPT data, about 700 Indonesians traveled to Syria because of jihad against the Shiite regime of Bashar al-Asad. They partly joined ISIS; others joined other groups such as the Jabat al-Nushra group. Digital era to help Indonesian citizens in Syria to continue to recruit Indonesian citizens in the country. Indonesians traveling to Syria continued to rise from time to time before the ISIS defeat in some districts of the Middle East Region. During the conflict in the Middle East, caused many Indonesians became victims. There are names such as Salim Rasyidi from Bantul Central Java who joined ISIS Syria in 2014, Wildan Mukhollad of Lamongan East Java who joined ISIS in Syria and conducted the suicide bombing in Iraq, Muhammad Ridwan Abdurrahman joined ISIS and died in Idlib Syria on in 2015. Many other names that can not be detected by the Indonesian Government because of their departure to Syria also illegally (tempo.com).

4.2.2 The Return of Jihadists from the Middle East

Since ISIS defeat in the Middle East caused Indonesians, who joined ISIS and are still alive, opting to return to their homeland. New problems facing the government began. They have the potential to increase fundamental understanding in Indonesia and not even close the possibility of participating in disseminating ISIS in Indonesia. Ideology is difficult for erasing with a fairly short time. The Indonesian government through BNPT conducted a deradicalization program on 18 Indonesians returning from Syria on August 11, 2017, by providing national, religious and psychological guidance. They leave in the Year 2015. There are eight women and the rest men (bnpt.go.id).

All ISIS combatants claim to be sorry and explain ISIS’s atrocities in Syria. In September 2017, they were released back to the community. But many people doubt their presence again because it related to several bombs exploding in the country and recognized by ISIS that they are the perpetrators, such as bombs in North Sumatra Police, Thamrin bombs, and
also Kampung Melayu Jakarta, Police Station in East Java, Cicendo bombs, Medan Catholic Church and Samarinda. So that, this situation provides fairness for society, but time by time, the number of people who fear partly because they are also experts in bomb-making and weapons-making. Also, Indonesians also learn from the history of the return of jihadists from Afghanistan who carried out the Bali bombings and caused hundreds of lives to die. Based on BNPT data, jihadist combatants released from prisons numbered 250 people spread in 77 jails and one prison. Former terrorism prisoner there are 600 people but the known existence there are 184 people, the rest is not known for its presence.

4.3 Cooperative Security Among Neighboring States (Indonesia, Malaysia, Phillipines) to Minimize the Effect of ISIS Movement to Indonesia

4.3.1 The Importance of Cooperative Security as Strategy for Neighboring States Against ISIS in Marawi

In regard geographical position among neighboring states Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia, by using terms of cooperative security, we would like to analyze to what extent they able to build and strengthen military cooperation and minimize the effect on the increase of the number of ISIS member in Indonesia. Marawi situation has massive influence for neighboring states. We analyzed this case in some aspects; (a) geographical position, considered Marawi, or the other island of Philippines, Mindanao, as the basis center for Islamic militant to spread their movement. Indeed, it has threatened Philippine territorial and political integration in particular, and generally it could be new threats to the border security and territory sovereignty of neighboring states like Indonesia or Malaysia. Indonesia has the outer islands that under North Sulawesi provinces, such as Marampit Islands, Miangas Island, and Marore Island. That islands are located on the Sulawesi Sea and near Philippine border; (b) the existence on the militant group in Marawi, since May 2017 domestic political situation in Marawi, caused the threats for individual security especially citizens who lived in that area. Marawi, in the Southeast Philippines territory, was lived the crisis zone under the militant group, especially since Marawi successfully fallen under Abu Sayyaf Group which is affiliated with the Islamic States in the Philippines. Alex Barnes Gavin Greenwood mentioned in his report that the Philippine Army spent amount the US $25.31 million during a conflict and for defense amount the US $ 48–58 million (Alex, 2017, p.1).
Refers to Michael Moodie defines that cooperative security as strategy how states behave through the collaboration dealing with other by considering security or additional interest and initiate to cooperate to prevent conflict or unexpected situation in the future. So that, if we applied this term in the context of the threat of ISIS in Marawi to neighboring states Phillipines like as Indonesia or Malaysia, as individual states, includes Phillipines have to a willingness to collaboration dealing to secure their border based on consideration to prevent massive the spread of ISIS movement into their territory. Mainly, Indonesia, because in North Sulawesi, Indonesia has three territorial as neighboring border with southern Philippine.

We found that both Indonesia and Philippine have to find the proper solution to against ISIS movement further to their territory, even Marawi as a sample of the area which is has fallen under Abu Sayyaf Group and ISIS in Philippine. As Heinz Vetschera the main characteristics of cooperative security is built among states to finding solutions for security problems so that in this context to minimize the effect of increasingly of ISIS in this region. Cooperation requires willingness among nations, without comparing their military with potential competitors. This strategy tends to provide among the actors could achieve their purposes with minimum losses by cooperating with each other.

According to Richard Cohen, practically, individual states’ national security objectives linked by four rings of security. As part of security approach that proposed harmony and cooperation in the future, so that, concerning cooperative security, there were some elements beside of states willingness to cooperate that required to fulfill to success the strategy. Each strategy in the scheme of cooperative security from Indonesia-Philippines and Malaysia as neighboring states which is the face of ISIS threats, have to concern in:

(a) Individual security, emphasize on how to promote and protect fundamental individual rights within their territory; We knew that ISIS behaves extremely danger and could threat individual citizens safety. For Philippine cases, in Marawi, post-ISIS and Abu Sayyaf Group govern this area, as individual states the Philippines could be categorized as failed to protect and promote individual security. So, Philippine needs to build the new coalition to secure and protect their citizens even they now live under the militant's governance.

(b) Collective security focused on how to maintain peace and stability in their region. Responding to military cooperation between Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia, the
author considers the approach of realism through collective defense among states. As we knew that the underlying assumptions of the realists are pessimistic views of human nature, international relations are fundamentally conflictual and inter-state problems are solved only by way of war, upholding the values of national security and the survival of the state. (Jackson Sorensen, 1999). So that, regarding case on ISIS in the Philippine, we categorized the threats as externally caused because of security and political instability in the Philippines, so that has the impact on neighboring states. Even though Philippine during the periods of conflict strictly siege towards the militants but as individual states, Phillipine has created instability and regional insecurity, particularly for Indonesia, because Indonesia has the outer islands near the Philippines.

(c) Mutual defense, related to joint protection towards outsiders (threats); Basic assumptions started when neighboring states became unstable because of internal conflict; it may create an adverse effect or bring new threat around the territory. Nowadays, we can not deny that individual stability states both in politics and security often unpredicted. It may always interrupt by internal conflict within the country or disputes among nations. By commit in the cooperative security system, it would intend to more concerned with the stability of the territory around them. So that, when their neighboring state in the severe attack or danger, it could sharply bring impact for instability or threat to their countries. All member states under the cooperative system without calculating to what extent they could carry their military weapons, deploy their troops, they will be focused on how to resolve the threats. In the context of ISIS Marawi, in addition to establishing APSC within ASEAN, the three countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines) that ISIS has proven to be infiltrated must have military cooperation to protect the border from militant attacks.

(d) Promoting security, based on assumptions that conflict it may cause instability in broader aspects, and also military. We implied the most crucial element of collective security is the initiative and willingness of individual states in a region mainly neighboring country to cooperate and concerned about security stability within their territory in whole and also their neighboring states. It derives from the view if conflict or security threat in an area (specifically in neighboring states) will have a severe impact such as interrupt the stability other countries, direct or indirect attack for individual security within the region or other states. This strategy is the challenges for neighboring states to built cooperative security as a strategic preference for Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to avoid or
reduce ISIS influence in their territory. Also measuring to what extent the commitment among neighboring states to fulfill what required in the cooperative security for their collective commitment to promoting stability in their area and region. This strategy could be potentially developed against the situation if it could be into an unintended escalation in the future.

4.3.2 What Should Indonesia Do?

a. Indonesia Have to Strengthen The Border

According to the map of sea border above, consider security border as dangerous concerned for Indonesia, as a good choice, if Indonesia willing to destroy the ISIS power chain from Mindanao, Southern Philippines to prevent their access from entering the outer islands of Indonesia territory which is near Phillipines sea. The Indonesian government must cooperate with the Philippine military on the border which is used as the ISIS entry point to the Indonesia territory. Three countries, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines have agreed to do military cooperation to strengthen the border region. The three nations are conducting air and sea patrols in the Sulu Sea. The partnership is called Trilateral Maritime Patrol Indomalphi. TNI ships are also based in Nusa North because this place is directly adjacent to the Philippines. Four Lands are placed in the legal Territory of the Indonesian Waters; Marore, Gorontalo, Palu, and Balikpapan. As for the security of the Air Area, fighter aircraft from North Sulawesi Regional Squadron placed by the Indonesian military.
Coordination continues to be carried out by the TNI with the Philippine military, especially those serving on the outer islands such as Miangas, Marore, Marampit close to the Philippines. Miangas was once hit by a negative issue that the island uses Tagalog Language and Peso currency as a medium of exchange. This condition facilitates the migration of ISIS Philippines to Indonesia (lipi.go.id). The Satal territory is also a concern of the Indonesian military in connection with this place is often used as the outflow of Filipinos looking for fish. The maritime patrol will crack down on any Filipino violating the sea border. Several local governments such as the Sangihe Regent are on alert to anticipate the entry of ISIS of the South Philippines by sea. The local government imposed the rule to detect new people.

To strengthen the position of the TNI in safeguarding the border, the Government of Indonesia must draft a new law, not revise the number 15 of terrorism law of 2003 because the TNI is guarding the perimeter and eradicating rather than law enforcement. The government must also implement emergency conditions if the situation is hazardous through the Perpu substitute Perpu Number 23 of 1959 (cnnindonesia.com).

b. Cooperation of CBOs and the Improvement of Domestic Institutions

The maritime border as not only the focused on the Indonesian government to prevent the entry of ISIS to the NKRI Region but also had to anticipate the increase of ISIS in the country. By cooperating with government institutions, the military, such as the Ministry of Information (Keminfo), intelligence and community organizations (CSOs), for example, cooperation with the Keminfo was conducted to prevent the spread of ISIS to Indonesia via the internet.

In 2015, Keminfo blocked 22 radical websites that provoked Indonesian citizens to wage jihad (Bakti, 2016). The spread of ISIS ideology is very spread efficiently over the internet. The government currently has law Number 19 of 2014 about the internet content negatively charged. Also, there are laws Number 11 of 2008 (Undang-Undang ITE) regarding information and electronic transactions in which regulate the crime of information. (Bakti, 2016). But there is nothing specific about terrorism.

Cooperation with the BIN (State Intelligence Agency) is essential because BIN is one of the government institutions that maintain state security. The role of intelligence gives a warning (early detection and early warning system) about matters relating to the threat of the state from within and outside. By Law No. 17 of 2011 chapter 5, the purpose of state intelligence
is to detect, identify, assess, analyze, interpret and present intelligence data to provide early warning to anticipate potential threats to the safety and existence of the nation. In connection with terrorism in Indonesia, the intelligence participates in preventing, overcoming and combating terrorism. Bits of Intelligence authorizes Densus 88 / AT to make arrests. The intelligence function within its organizational structure has operational supporting pillars at Sub-Detachment (Sudden) level, i.e., Sub-Action, Sub-Investigation, and Sub-Assistance. The terrorist group moves in secret. So to read these mysteries, it takes the ability of intelligence and counter-intelligence. Of course, required intelligent and competent intelligence officers so that the action is adequate and appropriate (jurnalintelijen.net).

However, BIN often has many difficulties in combating terrorism. We found that the first challenge of terror groups tend to spread in small cells, they prefer not to use modern infrastructure that typically used to threaten state security. So, it made difficult for intelligence to know what their group wants. For the second, difficulty is experiencing deficiencies in human knowledge. While human intelligence is the foundation for facing terrorism. The third pressure usually the group of terror is rarely preceded by tactical imposition making it difficult for intelligence to measure and anticipate the level of threats encountered. The last difficulty is that data often underestimate intelligence analysis and is more concerned with the process of gathering information from the various counter-terror gained from covert intelligence operations (Erik J Dahl, 2005). These difficulties must continue to be minimized by providing a larger budget for combating terrorism.

Cooperation with CSOs is also crucial. The government must communicate with NU (Nahdatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah as the largest mass organizations today. Both organizations are the closest to the community. Ideological-based terrorism should be approached with ideology again. Muhammadiyah and NU can make a soft approach in the face of terrorism. Currently, the government involves the two organizations through BNPT. Komjen Suhardi Alius involved NU and Muhammadiyah in the process of deradicalization. As an important about the issue of FTF (Foreign Terrorist Fighter). ISIS in Syria is keen to recruit Indonesians to go to Syria and join them. Muhammadiyah and NU are also expected to provide understanding to the public about the concept of jihad in Islam. They must reinforce the ideology of society, so it is not easily affected by the ISIS ideology.
Muhamadiyah plays through the educational institutions they have. NU provides a correct understanding of jihad through NU pesantren (www.bnpt.go.id).

5. Conclusion

This work has shown that the strength of ISIS in Southeast Asia, especially in the Mindanao region of the Southern Philippines was growth. They were initially a Moro tribe in Mindanao that was Muslim. They want to separate themselves from the Spanish colonial era. But when the effort did not work, they set up MNLF. From MNLF it continues to grow to affiliate with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and JI (Jemaah Islamiyah) in Indonesia. Their strength increased when declared the existence of ISIS Southeast Asia based in Mindanao, South Philippines.

This endangers Indonesia's position directly adjacent to the Southern Philippines. The high religious spirit of Indonesian society will facilitate ISIS in the Southern Philippines to recruit Indonesian citizens (WNI). They use the sea route for human movement. The Indonesian and Philippine governments should strengthen military cooperation, especially on the border of the waters of the two countries. So far there have been members of MNLF living in Talaud, the boundary of Indonesia-Southern Philippines.

For the result, this work found that there are several factors as the main factors that caused of the increasing of ISIS in Indonesia the use of radicalism after the collapse of the New Order and the return of Jihadists from the Middle East. As part of security approach, we concerning in cooperative security, we found this strategy is proper to be implemented. Indonesia-Philippines and Malaysia that face of ISIS threats, have to willingness to cooperate that required to fulfill to success the strategy.

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