The Changes and Enlightenment of China's Power Supervision Institutions: Based on Actual Observations Since 1978

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To cite this article:
Liu Yang. The Changes and Enlightenment of China's Power Supervision Institutions: Based on Actual Observations Since 1978. American Journal of Environmental and Resource Economics. Vol. 4, No. 2, 2019, pp. 65-72. doi: 10.11648/j.ajere.20190402.13

Received: March 2, 2019; Accepted: May 21, 2019; Published: June 15, 2019

Abstract: China's power supervision organization has experienced a change process of re-establishment, restoration, reform and innovation since the reform and opening up in 1978. In practice, China adopts a multi-agency model of power supervision to decentralize power and restrict power. By raising the level of the rule of law in power supervision, China has achieved full coverage of the power supervision of state organs and civil servants exercising public power. Through improving the anti-corruption strategic system combining education, system and supervision, the anti-corruption work has achieved remarkable results. However, there are also problems such as the imbalance of the functions of various power supervision subjects, the lack of effective restraint mechanisms for the "top leaders" of the Party committee, and the imperfect performance evaluation system for power supervision. It is suggested that the power balance mechanism should be further improved in the future, effective measures to prevent abuse of power and corruption within power supervision institutions should be explored, the discipline inspection and supervision organs should strengthen the supervision of the party committees and "top leaders" at the same level, and a trinity power supervision performance evaluation system of corruption prevention, punishment and control should be established.

Keywords: Anti-Corruption, Power Supervision, Institutional Mechanisms, Reform

1. Introduction

Alienation of public power is a common problem in the field of public management in various countries at present. Its main manifestation is "corruption of public power". Corruption damages the common interests of the public, arouses public dissatisfaction with agents of power, and also shakes the foundation of legitimacy of public power. Supervision and restriction of power means that the principal of power monitors, supervises, controls and restricts the agents of power by various necessary means, so that the exercise process and results of power conform to the will and interests of the principal of power [1]. Over the past 40 years, although China has set up various kinds of power supervision agencies, power corruption is still an important factor restricting China's economic and social development. As a concrete executive body against corruption, whether the establishment of the power supervision body is reasonable, whether the operation mechanism is smooth, and the level of work efficiency are directly related to the effectiveness of China's anti-corruption work. Taking the landmark events and important turning points of economic and social development such as the reform and opening up in 1978, the establishment of the socialist market economic system in 1992, and the party's 18th national congress in 2012 as nodes, this article reviews the change process of China's power supervision organization at various stages, summarizes and analyzes the problems existing in the power supervision work, and puts forward suggestions to improve China's power supervision work.

2. The Development and Changes of China's Power Supervision Institutions in the Past 40 Years

2.1. 1978-1992: Restoration and Strengthening of Power Supervision

In December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th
CPC Central Committee opened the curtain of China's reform and opening-up, which also had an important impact on China's anti-corruption work. Judging from China's domestic environment at that time, the reform and opening-up promoted China's transition from a planned economy to a socialist market economy, and China's economic, political and social systems had undergone drastic changes. Economic transition is the fundamental reason for the spread of corruption in China after 1978 [2]. In the early stage of the transition, due to the concentration of power and the shortage of economy, a large number of "rent-seeking" opportunities appeared, leading to the worsening corruption problem. A considerable number of cadres were corroded and involved in economic crimes. China was facing great pressure to fight corruption.

The second generation of the party's collective leadership, with comrade Deng Xiaoping at its core, made a profound reflection on the "Cultural Revolution". They absorbed the drawbacks of the previous lack of effective supervision and restriction of the highly centralized power of individual leaders in the party and state leadership system, and determined the ideological line of emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts. During this period, China had deepened the reform of its economic and political system, strengthened the construction of socialist democracy and legal system, and implemented the strategy of opening up to the outside world. Great importance had been attached to strengthening power supervision. The third plenary session of the 11th central Committee elected a new central discipline inspection Committee. After that, the central supervision Committee was re-established, and the discipline inspection, supervision, procuratorial and auditing organizations were successively restored. A series of wrongs during the "Cultural Revolution" were also corrected, the power supervision work, which had been destroyed before, was restored and gradually stepped onto the right track. The power restriction and supervision mechanism resumed its function.

**Table 1. Power Supervision Institutions Restored at the Initial Stage of Reform and Opening up.**

| Time of establishment | Name of organization established                  |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| March 1978            | People's procuratorate                           |
| December 1978         | Central Commission for Discipline Inspection      |
| September 1983        | Audit Office of the People's Republic of China    |
| December 1986         | Ministry of Supervision of the People's Republic of China |
| August 1989           | Guangdong Provincial People's Procuratorate Anti-Corruption and Bribery Bureau |

**Table 2. Power Restriction and Supervision System Construction in the Initial Stage of Reform and Opening up.**

| Release time          | Name of laws and regulations                                      |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| February 1980         | Several Guidelines on Political Life within the Party            |
| August 1989           | Notice on Criminals Who Must Surrender and Confess within the Time Limit for Corruption, Bribery, Speculation and profiteering |
| November 1989         | Discipline for Procurators (trial)                              |
| December 1990         | Administrative Supervision Regulations of the People's Republic of China |

From the reform and opening-up to the early 1990s, China's power supervision institutions had gradually been restored and strengthened, the administrative supervision system had been restored and developed, and the auditing system had been initially established. Facing the severe corruption problem in China, China had made great efforts to crack down on corruption. However, on the whole, the anti-corruption measures were mainly moral education and investigation of cases. There were not enough measures to prevent corruption. In addition, the system construction was still relatively weak, and corruption was still in a period of frequent occurrence.

**2.2. 1992-2011: Formation and Development of China's Power Supervision System**

The 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China marked China's official transition to a socialist market economy. In the process of transition, due to a series of changes caused by the replacement of the old planned economy by the new modern market economy system, the normal order in the past was impacted and destroyed. The emergence of new economic actors and economic phenomena contributed to the occurrence of corruption. The party and the state attached great importance to the fight against corruption and took the punishment of corruption as a systematic project. Put forward policies and measures such as tackling both the symptoms and root causes, comprehensive management, combining punishment with prevention, and paying attention to prevention. Gradually, an anti-corruption system combining punishment with prevention had been established and improved.

**Table 3. Construction of Power Supervision Institutions from 1992 to 2011.**

| Time            | Category               | Institution building                                                                 |
|-----------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| January 1993    | Adjustment             | the central discipline inspection Committee and the supervision department co-operated |
| November 1995   | Newly established      | the General Administration of Anti-Corruption and Bribery of the Supreme People's Procuratorate |
| 2009            | Newly established      | Central Patrol Work Leading Group                                                   |
2.3. 2012-2018: Fully and Strictly Govern the Party and Further Promote the Reform of the National Supervision System

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has comprehensively promoted strict party management, strengthened the construction of a clean and honest party style, resolutely and severely punished corruption, and put forward that anti-corruption should be "free from forbidden areas, full coverage and zero tolerance" [3]. The fight against corruption has achieved remarkable results.

With regard to the construction of the power supervision organization and the adjustment of the operation mechanism, in 2013, the CPC Central Committee reformed the management of the accredited organization. The coverage of accredited agencies had expanded and their independence had increased. In November 2016, a pilot reform of the national supervision system was carried out in Beijing, Shanxi and Zhejiang provinces. The reform focused on integrating the functions of the procuratorate such as anti-corruption and bribery, anti-malfeasance and prevention of job-related crimes and related personnel to the supervision committee. The reform pilot work in the three regions had achieved good results and laid a good practical foundation for nationwide promotion. In October 2017, the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China made it clear that it would deepen the reform of the national supervisory system, pushed the pilot work across the country, and set up national, provincial, municipal and county supervisory committees to co-operate with the Party's discipline inspection organs to perform discipline inspection and supervision functions. At the national level, the State Supervisory Committee integrated the Ministry of Supervision, the Corruption Prevention Bureau, the Anti-Corruption and Bribery Bureau of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Anti-malfeasance and Infringement Bureau of the Supreme People's Procuratorate and other organs. It is independent of the state judicial organs, the state administrative organs and the state legislative organs and belongs to the political organs. The reform of the national supervision system has solved the defects of diversified and relatively scattered functions of the power supervision institutions in China. By integrating and optimizing the functions of relevant institutions, a power supervision system with unified leadership, centralized and unified leadership, high efficiency and full coverage of public officials has been formed.

Table 4. Construction of Power Restriction and Supervision System from 1992 to 2011.

| Release time | Name of laws and regulations |
|--------------|------------------------------|
| February 1995 | Provisional Regulations on the Selection and Appointment of Party and Government Leading Cadres |
| February 1995 | Law of the People's Republic of China on Prosecutors |
| October 1995 | Regulations on Letters and Visits |
| January 1997 | Several Guidelines for the Integrity of Party Members and Leading Cadres of the Communist Party of China (Trial) |
| March 1997 | Several Guidelines for the Integrity of Party Members and Leading Cadres of the Communist Party of China (Trial) |
| May 1997 | Administrative Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China |
| August 2003 | Notice on Cooperation between Discipline Inspection and Supervision Organs and Audit Organs in Investigating and Dealing with Cases |
| December 2003 | Regulations on Supervision within the CPC (Trial) |
| April 2004 | Interim Provisions on Resignation of Party and Government Leading Cadres |
| June 2004 | Regulations on Disciplinary Punishment of Prosecutors (Trial) |
| September 2004 | Regulations on the Protection of the Rights of Party Members of the Communist Party of China |
| January 2005 | Implementation Outline for Establishing and Perfecting a Corruption Punishment and Prevention System with Equal Emphasis on Education, System and Supervision |
| February 2006 | Interim Provisions on Reporting on Work and Honesty of Party Members and Leading Cadres |
| August 2006 | Law of the People's Republic on the Supervision of Standing Committees of People's Congresses at All Levels |
| March 2008 | Opinions of the CPC Central Committee on Deepening the Reform of Administrative Management System |
| May 2008 | Public Information Regulations of the People's Republic of China |
| July 2009 | Regulations on Patrol Work of the Communist Party of China (Trial) |
### Table 5. Construction of Power Restriction and Supervision System from 2012 to 2018.

| Release time | Name of laws and regulations |
|--------------|------------------------------|
| August 2015  | Regulations on Patrol Work of the Communist Party of China |
| August 2015  | Amendment (IX) to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China |
| October 2015 | Guidelines for Honesty and Self-discipline of the Communist Party of China |
| October 2015 | Regulations on Disciplinary Measures of the Communist Party of China |
| June 2016    | Regulations on Accountability of the Communist Party of China |
| October 2016 | Several Guidelines on Political Life within the Party under the New Situation |
| October 2016 | Regulations on Supervision within the Communist Party of China |
| November 2017| Regulations on Publicity of Party Affairs of the Communist Party of China (Trial) |
| December 2012| Eight Provisions |
| March 2018   | Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China |
| January 2019 | Regulations of the Communist Party of China on Political and Legal Work |
| January 2019 | Rules for Supervision and Enforcement of Discipline by Discipline Inspection Organs of the Communist Party of China |

Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, China has comprehensively promoted strict administration of the Party, improved the restriction and supervision system of power operation, further promoted the reform of the anti-corruption system and mechanism, built a power operation system that is scientific in decision-making, firm in implementation and strong in supervision, improved the system of punishing and preventing corruption, continuously promoted the construction of incorruptible politics, and achieved remarkable results in strict administration of the Party, as shown in Figure 1.

![Figure 1. Number of Cases Filed and Number of Penalties Disposed by National Discipline Inspection and Supervision Organs from 2013 to 2018.](image)

Data source: The author collates according to public statistics.

### 3. The Characteristics of the Development of China's Power Supervision in the Past 40 Years

Over the past 40 years, driven by the reform and innovation of the party and government and the active promotion of the public, the main characteristics of the development and changes of China's power supervision work are as follows.

#### 3.1. The Path of Power Restriction and Supervision Continues to Expand

Corruption is essentially the alienation, deterioration and abuse of power. The key to governing corruption is to strengthen supervision and control power [4]. China has adopted a multi-agency model to strengthen power supervision. Specialized agencies that undertake power supervision functions include Party discipline inspection committees at all levels, the National People's Congress, supervisory organs, procuratorial organs and their anti-corruption departments, courts, auditing organs and economic crime investigation departments of public security organs. In addition, the functions of inner-party supervision, legal supervision, mass supervision and public opinion supervision are brought into play. All kinds of supervision subjects cooperate with each other in the operation mechanism of corruption prevention and control, forming a joint force of supervision and fighting corruption, and reducing the chance of "rent-seeking" of power.

On the specific path, power has been restricted by means of decentralization such as separation of the party and government, separation of government from enterprise, separation of government from society and decentralization of power. The quality and efficiency of supervision has been improved by enhancing the professionalism, independence and authority of specialized supervision institutions. The
construction of legal system and rule of law has been continuously strengthened to comprehensively promote the rule of law. The constitution and laws have been applied to restrict the behavior of the party, government and public officials. Through strengthening ideological and moral construction, the moral standard consciousness of the working team of the power supervision organization has been enhanced. In addition, through enriching and improving the publicity of party affairs and government affairs information, the party affairs and government affairs information has made more open and transparent. Information technology has been fully used to share information resources with the public and accept the supervision of the public.

### Table 6. Organization Chart of China's Current Power Supervision System.

| China's Power Supervision System | Legal Supervision          |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|
|                                 | National and local people's congresses at all levels and their standing committees supervise |
|                                 | Supervision by People's Procuratorates at All Levels |
|                                 | The CPC's organizations at all levels and discipline inspection committees at all levels supervise |
|                                 | The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and committees and their standing committees all over the country supervise |
|                                 | Supervision by the National Audit Office |
|                                 | Supervision by mass organizations |
|                                 | Supervision by public opinion |

Source of chart: self-made by the author.

### 3.2. The Level of China's Power Restriction and Supervision Under the Rule of Law Is Continuously Improving

China had learned the lessons of the "Cultural Revolution" period when the legal foundation was completely destroyed and the people's democracy and freedom were not guaranteed. The second generation of central collective leadership with comrade Deng Xiaoping at the core repeatedly stressed the importance of democracy and socialist legal system construction. Deng Xiaoping proposed that "we must rely on the legal system and make the legal system more reliable" and "In order to protect the people's democracy, we must strengthen the legal system. Democracy must be institutionalized and legalized" [5] and other important statements, and promoted the 1982 “Constitution of the People's Republic of China” to stated that "the party must act within the scope of the constitution and the law ". The third generation of central collective leadership with Comrade Jiang Zemin as its general secretary proposed that socialist market economy was a legal economy and that "the development of democracy must be closely combined with the improvement of the legal system and the rule of law must be implemented" [6], which for the first time clearly put forward the strategy of "ruling the country by law". The fourth generation of central collective leadership with Comrade Hu Jintao as its general secretary raised the rule of law to a more important position, emphasizing the promotion of administration according to law and the promotion of the socialist spirit of the rule of law. The construction of anti-corruption work should "focus on the restriction and supervision of power and improve the execution of the system" [7]. The new generation of central collective leadership with Comrade Xi Jinping as its general secretary has comprehensively promoted the rule of law. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee passed the "Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Several Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Promoting the Rule of Law", marking the new journey of the party's governance.

Several generations of Party Central Committee leadership had attached great importance to the rule of law, which promoted the continuous improvement and development of China's power restriction and supervision system, showing the characteristics of stability, continuity, professionalism and authority. It has ensured that China's power supervision has laws to follow, and that the scope of power exercise, operating procedures, guarantees and restrictions are more strict and standardized, and has achieved full coverage of state organs at all levels, public officials and other supervision objects.

### 3.3. The Anti-corruption Work of China's Power Supervision Agencies Has Achieved Remarkable Results

Since the reform and opening up, economic reform and economic transition had enlivened the economy on the one hand, impacted people's values on the other, and promoted the breeding and spread of corruption. Faced with pressure and challenges, the CPC Central Committee had paid enough attention to anti-corruption work and continuously improved the anti-corruption strategic system combining education, system and supervision.

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the CPC Central Committee has fully implemented strict party management, and has always maintained a high-pressure posture of punishing corruption. It has increased its investment in power supervision institutions and strictly regulated its management requirements. The professionalism, independence and authority of China's power supervision institutions have continuously improved, and the work results have been significantly improved. According to the work reports of the plenary sessions of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection over the years and other data, the author has counted 6,103,290 cases filed by discipline inspection and
supervision organs since the reform and opening up, giving 5,700,109 disciplinary sanctions to party and government officials, and 173,101 cadres above the county level who have been punished in the 21 years documented. See the table below for details.

| Time period                        | Number of cases filed (pieces) | Number of cases closed (pieces) | Number of Persons Subject to Party and Government Discipline | The number of cadres above the county level |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| 1982 - April 1983                  | 131000                         | vacancy                         | 38500                                                       | vacancy                                   |
| 1983 - May 1987                    | vacancy                         | vacancy                         | 67613                                                       | vacancy                                   |
| 1987-1992                          | 874690                         | vacancy                         | 733543                                                      | vacancy                                   |
| October 1992 - June 1997           | 731000                         | vacancy                         | 669300                                                      | 17648                                     |
| October 1997 - September 2002      | 861917                         | 679846                          | 846150                                                      | 22046                                     |
| December 2002 - June 2007          | 677924                         | (Cases Not Settled Before the 16th National Congress) | 518484                                                      | vacancy                                   |
| November 2007 - June 2012          | 643759                         | 639068                          | 668429                                                      | vacancy                                   |
| November 2012 - June 2017          | 1545000                        | vacancy                         | 1537000                                                     | 72340                                     |
| January 2018 - December 2018       | 638000                         | vacancy                         | 621000                                                      | 29551                                     |
| Total                              | 6103290                        | 2831774                         | 5700019                                                     | 173101 (21 years)                         |

Source: The author collated the data according to the work reports of the CPC over the years.

4. Problems and Deficiencies in China's Power Supervision Institutions

Over the past 40 years, China's power supervision institutions have undergone a series of changes and developments, and anti-corruption work has achieved certain results. However, there are still some deficiencies in China's power supervision work at present. These problems have affected the effectiveness of China's power supervision work to some extent.

4.1. There Is Still a Certain Imbalance in the Function of Each Power Supervision Body

Judging from the working mechanism of the power supervision organization, there is still a certain imbalance. Discipline inspection and supervision have strong professionalism and authority and occupy an extremely important position in the power supervision system. Audit institutions, courts, procuratorates and other departments exercise audit supervision and judicial supervision on behalf of the state. They have strong professionalism, independence and authority and play an important role in the power supervision system. In contrast, other supervision subjects play a limited role in the practice of power supervision due to the lack or imperfection of relevant legal systems. For example, the Constitution clearly defines the supervisory duties of the National People's Congress, but the National People's Congress lacks specific special legal protection in specific practice. The supervision of the democratic parties and the Chinese people's political consultative conference is based on policy documents, but they also lack corresponding legal support when actually performing their duties. In addition, the supervision of public opinion, citizens and social organizations also affect the exercise of their power supervision due to the lack of necessary laws to protect the rights of publication and freedom of speech.

4.2. It Is Difficult for Discipline Inspection and Supervision Organizations to Supervise Party Committees at the Same Level, Especially "Top Leaders"

As the main person in charge of the party Committee, the "top leader" of the party Committee plays a leading, directing, decision-making and coordinating role in the leading group. "Top leader" often holds a larger power, has a more obvious voice and has a greater influence on decision-making. The centralization of power objectively forms the absolute authority of the "top leader" of the Party committee. The supervision from the lower level and the same level exists in name only, while the higher level lacks sufficient information channels and cannot supervise, thus creates a vacuum for the "top leader" to supervise power [8]. According to public data, corruption cases of "top leaders " are characterized by large number, high proportion and great harm in recent years. With the reform of the national supervision system, the independence and authority of the discipline inspection and supervision organs have been greatly improved, but the supervision of the discipline inspection and supervision organs to the party committees at the same level, especially to the "top leaders", still has great difficulties in concrete practice. For example, the existing dual leadership system makes the actual supervision work not smooth enough, and the supervision methods and measures are not complete enough. Due to certain limitations in understanding, the supervision will be not strong enough, resulting in the discipline inspection and supervision organs not having enough supervision and restriction on "top leaders", especially the prevention in advance and the supervision in progress are not in place enough.

4.3. The Performance Evaluation System of Power Supervision is not Perfect

In 2013, the Ministry of Supervision of the Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection pushed forward the institutional reform focusing on the main anti-corruption business, optimized the internal institutions, abolished the performance room, which was not the core function of integrity government and anti-corruption, and transferred the corresponding performance evaluation and management work to the establishment committee. Obviously, the main function of the establishment committee was the establishment of the institution, which was not professional enough, not experienced enough and not well qualified in performance evaluation and management. This caused the government performance evaluation reform to stagnate and wander due to system obstruction [9]. With the development of economy and society, China has taken a series of effective measures in the prevention, punishment and control of corruption, and has made certain achievements in anti-corruption work. However, compared with the goals and requirements of the party and the government for corruption control and the expectations of the people, there is still much room for improvement. The system of prevention, punishment and control of corruption is not perfect, and the evaluation of power supervision needs to be further improved.

5. Conclusion and Suggestions

5.1. The Main Conclusion

In the past 40 years, China's power supervision institutions have experienced multi-body parallel operation, partial coincidence and unification. After the reform and opening-up in 1978, China's administrative supervision system was resumed and developed, and the auditing system was initially established. At the beginning of the transition to a socialist market economy system in the 1990s, the Central Discipline Inspection Committee and the Ministry of Supervision are co-located and the Procuratorate set up an Anti-Corruption and Bribery Bureau. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012, China has continuously improved the power operation restriction and supervision system. With the "Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China" promulgated in 2018 as the symbol, China has comprehensively promoted the reform of the national supervision system, centralized and unified the decentralized power into one organization, and has achieved full coverage of supervision. These changes reflect China's practice of continuously exploring effective ways to restrict and supervise power. Although China's power supervision work has achieved certain results in the construction of the rule of law and reform practice, the severe corruption situation in China in recent years also shows that there is still much room for improvement in the effectiveness of China's power supervision. The main functions of each power supervision body are not balanced, there is no effective restraint mechanism for the "top leaders" of the Party committee, and the performance evaluation system of power supervision work is not perfect, etc. These problems need to be solved as soon as possible. On this basis, this paper further discusses suggestions on strengthening and improving China's power supervision.

5.2. Suggestions on Strengthening China's Power Supervision

5.2.1. To Explore Effective Measures to Prevent Corruption Within the Power Supervision Institutions

The reform of the national supervision system has further strengthened the centralization of power, but the more centralized the power is, the easier it is to breed corruption. Under the condition of undeveloped rule of law supervision and democratic supervision, relying too much on the supervision, discipline and accountability of specialized supervision agencies will reduce work efficiency while promoting power centralization [10]. Therefore, in order to continuously improve the mechanism of checks and balances of power and form a closed loop of power supervision, it is necessary to further study and explore how to prevent abuse of power, prevent corruption within power supervision institutions, and further play the role of various forms of social supervision.

5.2.2. To Strengthen the Discipline Inspection and Supervision Organs of the Party Committees at the Same Level and the "Top Leaders" of the Supervision

For a long time, the discretion of officials has been one of the important reasons for corruption. If the supervision is unfavorable or the system is not perfect, it is easy to cause corruption of "top leaders". Some scholars believe that in order to reduce corruption, especially the corruption of "top leaders", the power of "top leaders" should be restricted from the source, which is the institutional basis of anti-corruption [11]. In the future anti-corruption work, discipline inspection and supervision organs should further strengthen the supervision of the party committees and "top leaders" at the same level in fulfilling their decision-making and enforcement powers, clarify the power and responsibility boundaries of "top leaders", improve the incentive and restraint mechanisms of "top leaders", strengthen supervision efforts, prevent the occurrence of decision-making mistakes and corruption, and promote the formation of mutually coordinated and mutually restricted power operation mechanisms.

5.2.3. To Establish the Corruption Prevention, Punishment and Control of the Trinity of Power Supervision Performance Evaluation System

In the aspect of corruption prevention, more attention should be paid to raising the awareness of corruption prevention, making a good strategic plan for corruption prevention, optimizing the system design for preventing corruption in advance, improving the implementation mechanism of the system, reducing the motivation of "want corruption" from the system level, reducing the opportunity of "being able to corrupt" and increasing the cost of "daring to corrupt". In the aspect of corruption punishment, taking both the symptoms and root causes as the guidance, we should not only do a good job in evaluating the effectiveness of
punishment for the main body of corruption, but also do a good job in evaluating the effectiveness of deterrence for the main body of potential corruption. In terms of corruption control, under the imperfect market environment, anti-corruption measures should be formulated in stages according to the actual situation. At the initial stage, appropriate tolerance strategies can be adopted, and anti-corruption measures should be intensified when the social output level reaches a certain level [12]. We should optimize the corruption monitoring mechanism, improve the state's ability to monitor corruption, pay attention to important indicators such as incubation period of corruption cases, improve the probability of corruption being discovered, and give full play to the important role of social supervision.

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