CH. S. PEIRCE’S PHANEROSCOPY AS EARLY COMMUNICOLOGY

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This article aims to show that the contribution of Charles Sanders Peirce to communicology is much earlier than the advent of epistemological integration of semiotics in communication studies, being phaneroscopy as a early form of communicology. This reflection is based on the study of the categorical degeneration theorized by Peirce, his influence on communicational thinking (especially on Gilles Deleuze’s cinema theory), as well as the conceptual link between degeneration and phenomenon from the philosophical point of view of quaternions.

Keywords: Charles Sanders Peirce, phaneron, phaneroscopy, phenomenology, communication, semiotics.

Introduction

Nowadays, we can affirm with historical cert- tainty that semiotics occupies a prominent role at the current epistemological field of commun- icology, the philosophy of communication. After all, the qualifying division of the field transformed itself after the paradigmatic inclu- sion of the studies of signs, as authors such as J. Paulo Serra (2007) presents.

Previously the classification made by Denis McQuail (2002) was predominant, with a classification of several theories from communi- nicology field (and sociology itself) into four paradigms: functionalist paradigm (objective science and social regulation) and the two radical paradigms, both in radical change of society: humanistic paradigm (subjective science) and structural paradigm (objective science).

But Mauro Wolf (1985), like many authors in this field, remove the epistemological con- cern of communicology away from the social mechanism and inserts into the mechanism of form and content through the proper insertion of semiotics. Thus, paradigms become three: informational, the semiotic-informational and semiotic-textual.

What we want to show in this article is that the contribution of Peirce to communicology is much earlier than the advent of epistemologi- cal integration of semiotics in communication studies. The central idea is that the first Peircean
phenomenological investigations characterized, since the notion of the doctrine of the categories, phaneroscopy as a early form of communicology.

And to understand this, it is necessary to reflect both on the doctrine of the categories and on the phaneron as its effects on philosophical theories of communication, such Gilles Deleuze (2009) to name one, to see how the phaneroscopy is a representative first paradigm in communicology that will trigger the semiotic arm present in epistemological classification made by authors such as Wolf (1985).

Categories and degeneration

In the broad project of semiotics, the cenopythagorean categories’ issue – namely Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness – is the beginning of theorizing about the sign, but also attempt made by Peirce to discuss the tradition posited by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Immanuel Kant, but mainly by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. In other words, we find ourselves in a search through the stages of thought, how the mind operates what is before it. In his own words, in a letter to William James, Peirce states that “by the phenomenon I mean whatever is before our minds in any sense. The three categories are supposed to be the three kinds of elements that attentive perception can make out in the phenomenon” (1958b: 265).

With this, we have a set of functions operating on a single point. From all the many definitions and descriptions of the cenopythagorean categories that Peirce gave, the most vivid are those given in the letter to Victoria, Lady Welby. But it is only in his lectures on pragmatism at Harvard that we found a systematic way to describe them.

The construction begins by Firstness that “is the Idea of that which is such as it is regardless of anything else. That is to say, it is a Quality of Feeling […]. Category the First owing to its Extremely Rudimentary character is not susceptible of any degenerate or weakened modification” (Peirce 1931a: 66–68).

Secondness “is the Idea of that which is such as it is as being Second to some First, regardless of anything else, and in particular regardless of any Law, although it may conform to a law. That is to say, it is Reaction as an element of the Phenomenon” (Peirce 1931c: 66).

At last, Thirdness “is the Idea of that which is such as it is as being a Third, or Medium, between a Second and its First. That is to say, it is Representation as an element of the Phenomenon” (Peirce 1931c: 66).

Quality, Reaction, Representation. It is this progression that the mind deals with the phenomena of the world. Thus, we could say, ultimately, that the three semiotic axes live in such conditions, basing semiosis’ very own way.

However, it is also these Harvard lectures that Peirce introduces the idea of degeneration. Degeneration would be supplemental trichotomy, as the cenopythagorean categories are a genuine trichotomy. Incidentally, the degeneration would be a consequence of the categorical interdependence. The Firstness exists in itself and also in the degenerate form in Secondness and in Thirdness. There is not Secondness in Firstness, but there is Secondness on Thirdness. Finally, the last phase of thinking, Thirdness, exists only in itself.

What we have here is the sign’s development kickoff. Peirce’s theory involves the use of five principles:

“1. There is a single triadic set of categories in terms of which all phenomena are to be classified. A phenomenon is either a First, something in itself; a Second, an existent in dyadic relation to something else; or a Third, a mean inseparable from a law or purpose;

2. A triadically determined object exemplifies all three categories (Peirce 1931b: 238). Since a sign is defined as “something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (Peirce 1931b: 228), it is triadic in nature. By principles 1 and 2, one
obtains three divisions of signs: the sign in itself, the sign as related to its object, and the sign as interpreted to represent an object;

3. Each division is subject to all three categories (Peirce 1931b: 243). Accordingly, each division is trichotomous. For example, the sign as related to its object (the second of the three divisions) may be similar to, may be existentially connected with, or may be referred by means of a law to, its object;

4. Thirds have two degenerate forms, Seconds one degenerate form (Peirce 1931a: 365). The application of this principle to the three divisions yields ten divisions. By principle, the ten divisions yield the ten trichotomies;

5. Whatever is a First determines only a First; whatever is a Second determines a Second or (degenerately) a First; whatever is a Third determines a Third, or (degenerately) a Second or a First (Peirce 1931b: 235). The application of this principle to the three trichotomies yields ten classes of signs. The application of this principle to the ten trichotomies yields the sixty-six classes of signs” (Weiss, Burks 1945: 384).

Thus, sign development becomes just a matter of combinatorial trichotomies governed by the equation where the number of classes is equal to \((n + 1)(n + 2)/2\), where \(n\) is the number of trichotomies. Thus, in accordance with Paul Weiss’ and Arthur Burks’ consolidation, with 10 trichotomies, we have 66 signs. However, will this be the only way to understand the trichotomic reasoning designed by Peirce? Does it all lie in combinatorial analysis or are there more forms of mathematical intuition and imagination involved?

We know that 10 trichotomies generate 66 signs from the reasoning set by Peirce (1931b: 254–265), which cenopythagorean categories obeys 3 factors: (1) the factor A, signs in themselves, (2) the factor B, signs in relation to objects, and (3) the factor C, signs interpreted to represent. Thus, it generates the well-known below (see Table 1), as well as its graphical triadic progression (see Figs 1, 2), both by Peirce.

Typically, this graphical progression is referred to be a lattice. But, if we think closer to the order theory, or even algebraic logic, we can see that its construction is not binary, i.e.,

### Table 1. Cenopythagorean categories (source: Peirce 1931b: 254–265)

| A | B | C | Name of Sign | Example |
|---|---|---|--------------|---------|
| 1 | 1 | 1 | Qualisign (I) | A feeling of “red” |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | Iconic Sinsign (II) | An individual diagram |
| 2 | 2 | 1 | Rhematic Indexical Sinsign (III) | A spontaneous cry |
| 2 | 2 | 2 | Dicent Sinsign (IV) | A weathercock or photograph |
| 3 | 1 | 1 | Iconic Legisign (V) | A diagram, apart from its factual individuality |
| 3 | 2 | 1 | Rhematic Indexical Legisign (VI) | A demonstrative pronoun |
| 3 | 2 | 2 | Dicent Indexical Legisign (VII) | A street cry |
| 3 | 3 | 1 | Rhematic Symbol (Symbolic Rheme) (VIII) | A common noun |
| 3 | 3 | 2 | Dicent Symbol (Proposition) (IX) | Proposition |
| 3 | 3 | 3 | Argument (X) | Syllogism |

Fig. 1. Cenopythagorean categories’ triangle (source: Venancio 2017: 10)
the lattice $L$ does not follow the structure $L = (L, R)$ – that means, $L$ is partially ordered by $R$, a binary pair.

The logic developed by Peirce is triadic, but without being ternary. If we look deeply, we can see that triangle is form, in fact, by following of the movement of three triangles, namely: (1) the triangle of the classes that have at least a 1; (2) the triangle of the classes that have at least a 2; and (3) the triangle of classes that have at least a 3. Consider these three triangles separately (see Fig. 2):

These triangles are flanked by a segment of the classes that have not the chosen number. It is interesting to note that these external classes to triangles seem to mark them against a possible exterior. With a much more close analysis and counting the movement between the triangles, we can, indeed, associate them with degenerate cenopythagorean categories, namely Firstness of Secondness ($1'$), Firstness of Thirdness ($1''$) and Secondness of Thirdness ($2'$).

Therefore, our triangles would be like those (see Fig. 3):

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**Fig. 2. Classes' groups at cenopythagorean categories' triangles** (source: Venancio 2017: 11)

**Fig. 3. Degeneration at cenopythagorean categories' triangles** (source: Venancio 2017: 12–13)
However, this does not seem enough, because we have not forgotten the classes involved. The difficulty of observing such consideration, coming from what we call in this article a complex approach, resides in the fact that we are considering these triangles in a two-dimensional condition. With the aid of complex numbers, the quaternions more specifically, it will allows us to see these 10 classes and their triangles in a three-dimensional condition.

A quaternion, thus, is an expansion of a complex number – those compound by \( a + bi \) where \( a \) and \( b \) are natural numbers and \( i \) is the imaginary unit, since \( i^2 = -1 \), that is, \( i \) is the square root of minus 1 –, so \( w \) is its real part or scalar and rest of the equation is its imaginary part or vector. As we can see, to expand \( a + bi \), in case \( w + ix \), William Rowan Hamilton (1844, 1846) introduces the imaginary units \( j \) e \( k \), transforming the imaginary part into a vector with the following assumptions: \( j^2 = -1; k^2 = -1; ijk = -1 \). In traditional way, we can reduce it on an assumption: \( i^2 = j^2 = k^2 = -1 \). It makes Hamilton (1844, 1846) conceive, in the quaternion, the idea of a noncommutative multiplication: \( ij = k; jk = i; ki = j \), but \( ji = -k; kj = -i; ik = -j \). Addition and subtraction follow the complex number’s rules and, like multiplication, those presupposes a complete separation between the real and imaginary parts.

However, there is one controversy regarding the nomenclature in a quaternion with a real part equal to zero – that is a quaternion as \( Q = ix + jy + kz \), also known as pure quaternion – can be thought of as a vector.

This was noticed by Hamilton (1844, 1846), who describes that quaternions can represent rotations. To this, we call it versor that is nothing more than a directed arc from a circle with radius 1, representing the path of a point that is rotated by an angle \( a \) in an axis \( r \). With this, a versor is \( U_q = \exp (ar) = \cos a + r \sin a \) where \( r^2 = -1 e a \in [0,\pi] \). The rotations performed by a quaternion can be placed such as those placed by Euler angles, however, with one difference: the angle must be halved.

Simplifying, we can notice that the rotation’s definition of vector \( v \) post by quaternion is calculated as \( qvq^{-1} \) where \( q^{-1} \) is the conjugate of the quaternion \( q \). This mathematical property of quaternions makes them ideal in the construction of algorithms for 3D computer graphics. Through \( qvq^{-1} \) and the actual condition to reduce the angle by half, those arcs gain equivalent negative arcs, so the rotation is calculated both in clockwise and counterclockwise manner. The result of these arcs is a hypersphere, a 3–sphere in 4-D space. A special form of the versor is the right versor where \( a = \pi/2 \). The major consequence is that they produce a scalar null and all vectors of imaginary part of size one. Thus, they form a sphere of square roots of \(-1\) in a three-dimensional space.

The right versor which transforms the scalar in a null one and makes all the vectors in imaginary part being \(-1\). We also said that they form a sphere of square roots of \(-1\) in a three dimensional space. Thus, this sphere becomes an example of how to calculate the square root of \(-1\) in the set \( H \) made of quaternions.

We conjecture that this sphere produced by the right versor is the best movement representation of semiotic degeneration, as well the best representation of classes of signs’ internal logic. This sphere is built on a zero scalar, which is the center of the sphere, with its large arcs build by its vectors. This is justified in semiotics because classes of signs need the *phenomenon*, which is the guarantee of realism as defended by Peirce (Peirce 1931c: 470, 1958b: 16–17). The sphere’s center (named here as \( O \)), the null scalar, is the anchoring of the *phenomenon* which, in turn, is the sphere as a whole.

Thus, this spherical representation of classes of signs would have the following graphical representation (see Fig. 4).

The classes of signs form a prism inserted in the sphere of *phenomenon*, three corresponding to the three classes of signs’ triangles and one side corresponding to the excluded classes of signs in accordance with rules 4 and 5 by Peirce on the trichotomies. Let us recall them:
4. Thirds have two degenerate forms, Seconds one degenerate form (Peirce 1931a: 365). The application of this principle to the three divisions yields ten divisions. By principle, the ten divisions yield the ten trichotomies;

5. Whatever is a First determines only a First; whatever is a Second determines a Second or (degenerately) a First; whatever is a Third determines a Third, or (degenerately) a Second or a First (Peirce 1931b: 235). The application of this principle to the three trichotomies yields ten classes of signs. The application of this principle to the ten trichotomies yields the sixty-six classes of signs (Weiss, Burks 1945: 384).

Taking this spherical representation of classes of signs as a reference, we can think of the 66 classes of signs (and all others who fail in rules 4 and 5) while rotations in relation to the center of the sphere of *phenomenon* measured by such arcs. With this situation, we will can map out and build a more accurate model of the sign positioning, their interpenetration, as well as its relationship with the *phenomenon*.

But this *phenomenon*, for Peirce, was not like Husserl’s one. Here we found, in the center of the sphere, the *phenomenon* characterized as *phaneron*.

### Phaneron and phaneroscopy

In Peirce’s “Adirondack Summer School Lectures”, we can found that

“phaneroscopy is the description of the *phaneron*; and by the *phaneron* I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not” (1931a: 284).

Therefore, as André De Tienne points out,

“The *phaneron* is a continuum permeated with generality, and its individuality stems only from its being the conflation of a particular mind with the objective world. Each individual mind lives one *phaneron*, and there are as many *phanera* as there are individual minds (be they human or otherwise: animals, for instance, are also ‘phaneral beings’, even though their capacity to pass from self-presentation to other-representation appears more limited than ours)” (2004: 17).

Taking a 180º turn in Husserl’s thought, Peirce showed, by phaneroscopy, a negative type of phenomenology. If in Husserl, we found a René Descartes-like concern with rational universality, in Peirce, we can follow an empirical individualism. This kind of phenomenology opens itself to criticism of many orders like the one made by Christopher Hookway:

“There is a difficulty about coming to grips with Peirce’s phenomenological writings which reflects a fundamental feature of the discipline itself. He stresses that phenomenology does not issue in a body of accepted propositions; there is not a community of phenomenologists adding to the stock of shared knowledge, publishing reasoned conclusions, and so on. Each individual must be his own phenomenologist [...]. In line with this, Peirce’s own discussions are extremely allusive [...]. In the end, the
reader must decide for himself whether these hints enable him successfully to carry out a phenomenological inquiry and agree with Peirce’s categorial doctrine” (1985: 104–105).

But De Tienne, among others, counter-arguments those criticism with arguments which show that Peirce describes a different kind of science:

“To begin with, the fact Peirce did not call the science of the phaneron by the name of ‘phanero-logy’ (except in one fleeting instance), but by that of ‘phanero-scopy’, is certainly significant. The suffix – scopy introduces the idea of observation, while the suffix – logy introduces the idea of discourse, a corpus of systematized arguments. This distinction is crucial to understand the role of phaneroscopy, and is found in many different guises throughout the writings. For instance, Peirce says that ‘in Phenomenology there is no assertion except that there are certain seemings; […] Phenomenology can only tell the reader which way to look and to see what he shall see’ (Peirce 1931b: 197). Elsewhere he writes that phaneroscopy ‘does not undertake, but sedulously avoids, hypothetical explanations of any sort. It simply scrutinizes the direct appearances. […] The student’s great effort is […] to confine himself to honest, single-minded observation of the appearances’ (Peirce 1931a: 287). Phaneroscopy is a work of observation: it ‘studies’ what seems but does not ‘state’ what appears, does not make assertions. Assertions are judgments ‘about’ something, and they usually attribute to that something different qualities, such as reality or unreality, and truth or falsity. The phaneroscopist refrains from making such judgments. He only acknowledges the manifest qua manifest. The auxiliary verb of his assertions is not to be but to seem. There is ‘little reasoning’, for reasoning is a matter of reaching conclusions from premisses, and observation of the phaneron does not start from premisses. Peirce insists on the purity of that observation, which stems from the fact that phaneroscopists must make sure not to incorporate in their observation anything foreign to it, such as preconceived interpretations. Phanero-‘scopy’ must be ‘honest’ and ‘single-minded’, as well as direct and keen. This might sound pretty much Husserlian if it was not for the important difference that phaneroscopy has no interest in defining the intentional characteristics of different modes of consciousness, since for the phaneroscopist ‘there is no difference in the presentations themselves’ (Peirce 1958a: 644). Anything can be part of the phaneron, ‘in any sense or in any way’, because whatever the sense or the way, they are not the phaneroscopists’ business. They do not speculate about what self-presents: they merely observe it” (De Tienne 2004: 19).

And phaneroscopy must have a method which is totally different of the one put forward by Husserl and other phenomenologists. After all, as Peirce noted, the very nature of phaneron as a phenomenon is different from the Husserlian one:

“What phenomenology does is to distinguish certain very general elements of phenomena, render them distinct, and study their possible modes. […] The work of discovery […] consists in disentangling, or drawing out, from human thought, certain threads that run through it, and in showing what marks each has that distinguishes it from every other (Peirce 1976: 196). [T]he results of phenoscopy are obtained by the mere observation, generalization, and analyses, of matters of common experience, always present to us. These are as capable of repetition, comparison, etc. as are the operations of mathematics” (RL 427: 10, CSP–C. A. Strong, 25 July 1904) (De Tienne 2004: 20).

So, phaneroscopy become a possibility of an analytic counterpart of phenomenology with a method which dialogs with the philosophy of its time like logical atomism or even the mathematical tradition in philosophy within the Vienna Circle.
“These operations can only be conducted through the medium of a diagram. This is exceedingly important, as far as phaneroscopy is concerned. Observing a phaneron is not a matter of introspection. It needs to be projected, as it were, in a form that is least likely to disrupt or betray it. Such a form can only be iconic, but iconic in a sophisticated fashion. Peirce's work on existential graphs convinced him that these graphs furnished the best conceivable model of diagrammatization. He was so convinced of this that at times he spoke as though existential graphs as he defined them were the very diagrams needed to analyze and describe the constituents of the phaneron. It appears to me, however, that what Peirce really meant was that phaneroscopy had to come up with diagrams that mimicked the existential graphs while remaining distinct from them. His argument to that effect was by analogy. Just as the Sheet of Assertion can be used by the logician to diagram the contents of the logical Quasi-Mind, in the same way a Sheet of Description can be used to diagram the contents of the Phaneron, the Phaneron being defined as the ‘collective whole of all that could ever be present to the mind in any way or in any sense’” (De Tienne 2004: 22).

However, we want to show in this essay is that the ideas of Peirce were best demonstrated as a philosophy of communication in authors such as Deleuze that end up putting the position of phaneron as communication. The theory that Deleuze builds around the film shows the theoretical possibilities of phaneroscopy and categorical degeneration, turning it in a conjunct of early elements of communicology.

**Looking into Deleuze**

Deleuze believed that cinema is a way of philosophy where there is conceptual thinking, made by images. Roberto Machado (2009) states that Deleuze's first major thesis was to develop a cinematographic image classification. After all, if cinema thinks in images, it must be in movement-images and time-images, the first featuring the classic film, the second being the modern cinema.

For this task, Deleuze uses of Peirce’s classification to develop his concepts taken from a phenomenological reflection grounded in Henri Bergson's movement thesis, whom Deleuze intended to share fatherhood of both movement-image and time-image.

Thus, the movement-image – which is what is relevant due to the nature of the filmic object of reflection – receives characteristics Peirce's doctrine of the categories that are, as said, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.

The Firstness of the movement-image to Deleuze is the image-affection. An image-affection is, for example, a scene that shows just a face or the scene of a cliff. Deleuze (2009) explains it with a scene made by G. W. Pabst where there was the brightness of the light on the knife, the knife edge under the light, terror and resignation of Jack the Ripper, the mildness of Lulu. For Deleuze, this scene are pure qualities or natural potential, pure “possibility”.

However, the world of Firstness, the world of movement-images made exclusively by image-affection, is an idealistic world that does not match what many call “fascism of the form”. After all, to Walter Benjamin (1987), the “fascism of the form” is the movement where every effort to aestheticize policy converge to a point. This point, for Benjamin, is the war.

This war is highlighted in its technical character, just aesthetic view of the world of deadly machines. This is exemplified by the phrase of Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, cited by Benjamin (1987), that defines that war is beautiful thanks to the gas masks, the scary megaphones, the flamethrowers and the tanks. It founds the supremacy of man on subdued machine.

In this way of thinking, war is beautiful because it opens the dream-metallization of the human body. The cinema, somehow, made the man-machine visible.
It is this reaction to Firstness, that arises the action-image. Now the action-image is simply the Secondness of image-movement. And we must understand Secondness, as Anderson Vinicius Romanini (2006) states, as any irrational experience of the world, where an object appears poignantly, regardless of our will or expectation. It is pure shock, without qualification. It is pure individuality. It is the \textit{hic et nunc} of experience.

Interestingly Deleuze (2009) identifies the documentary as a fertile field for the development and predominance of filmic action-image. The example is here in \textit{Nanook of the North} (1922) where the eskimo and the seal are in the same plane.

For Deleuze (2009), this law of binomial plane no longer concerns situation and another situation (SS') or situation and action (SA), but A, action by itself. The duel is not in fact a single, located moment of action-image. The passage of the situation for action is therefore accompanied by a dueling between each other.

Here was the reference to a basic form assembly in cinema: the SAS' i.e., situation-action-another situation. This is what the movement-image, namely Secondness, causes. The filmic frame became a hypertrophy of action, as in Western of duels, or even the appearance of what Deleuze calls a "small form": ASA' action-situation-other action.

Here again, brute force, individualized action, restores Secondness by the movement-image. Deleuze exemplified that through Laurel and Hardy's films (1926–1945).

Laurel and Hardy, for Deleuze (2009), are the action-image, the perpetual duel with matter, with the environment, with women, with others and with one another; they knew decompose the duel, breaking all the simultaneity in space to replace it with a succession in time, a blow to one, then a punch to the other, so that the duel propagates to infinity and its effects increase by bids on growing rather than abated by fatigue. It remains to Stan Laurel, the affective representative of the duo, the role that triggers the practical catastrophe, but endowed with an inspiration that allows him to pass through the pitfalls of matter and the environment; whereas Hardy, man of action, is so flawed of intuitive appeal, is so abandoned the raw material, which falls on the pitfalls and shares responsibility.

However, there is also the field of Thirdness. We know that Thirdness embraces, as Romanini (2006) says the representation of ideas, mediation, order, generality, law, habit, necessity and intelligence. His relationship with the other categories establishes a kind of dialectic in Deleuze's conception.

Thus, in the scope of the movement-image, such as action-image establishes a statement before the image-affection. So, the movement-image of Thirdness will do the same on action. At this point, Thirdness will transform the movement-image as mental-image. An example of this, for Deleuze (2009), occurs in the Marx Brothers' films (1935–1949).

The three brothers divided up in such a way that Harpo and Chico are almost always together, emerging Groucho Marx turn to enter a kind of alliance with the other two. Taken indissoluble all three, Harpo Marx, for Deleuze, is Firstness, the representative of the celestial affections, but now also of hellish impulses, greed, sexuality, destruction.

In his way, for Deleuze, Chico Marx is Secondness, he is in charge of the action, it is the initiative, the duel with the environment, the effort and the resistance strategy. H. Marx hides in its immense gabardine the most disparate objects, parts and pieces that can be used for any action; but only makes them an affective or fetishistic use and is Ch. Marx that turns them into means to an organized action.

Finally, in Deleuzian thought, G. Marx is Thirdness, the man of interpretations of symbolic acts and abstract relations. G. Marx takes the art of interpretation to its ultimate degree, because he is the master of reasoning, arguments and syllogisms that will find no nonsense pure expression.
It is this dimension of reasoning, argument and syllogism we find this phenomenological situation of the movement-image. And, with that, film image becomes the argument. Not only the argument understood as a general idea (or even script) the documentary, but also a semiotic argument.

But, we must remember that the argument for Peirce is the third correlate of the tenth class of signs, the maximum representative of Thirdness. Romanini (2006) show us that the argument is a logical set made up of premises together around the principle fundamental guide of logic. In this way, the argument, Romanini (2006) says is, therefore, a super-order coordinating the synthetic process of semiotic, the ability to produce meanings (propositions) and habits (inductions), causing information increases with the passage of time.

This is what also comes with mental-image. As Deleuze states, we continue to make cinema like classic film, but with cinema reaching Thirdness, the argument, the art became soulless. After all, the soul of cinema requires more thought. We can see further and notices thought begins to undo the system of actions, perceptions and affections that cinema had fed its soul until then.

The history of cinema and its consolidation, from early films to modern cinema, is the quest for Thirdness for Deleuze. In this way, Deleuze draws a conclusion that every media must complete what we called in this essay as the “sphere of phenomenon”. And here, media is phenomenon itself, therefore phaneron.

It was all set for communicology

The traditional philosophical reasoning leads us to believe that the phenomenological investigations made by Peirce, well represented by phaneroscopy, were crucial for the development of semiotics, especially with the advent of the doctrine of the categories. However, the achievements of phaneroscopy cannot be summarized only that way.

By treating the phenomenon as phaneron, Peirce made possible the research of conceptual elements that require introspection to build themselves as a theory. The phaneroscopy was the beginning of communicology through a first construction of its epistemological foundations. The example of Deleuze with his film theory only shows the potential of this theoretical look promoted by phaneroscopy present in those texts.

Now to Peirce, phaneroscopy should be put in motion with theorizing mechanisms similar to those used in the mathematical language, something well represented by the existential graphs in Peircean writings. Therefore, we can see the strength provided by mathematical logic in the communicology even before his first theories. If nowadays communicology is divided by theories from sociology against concepts from continental philosophy, phaneroscopy show us the analytic way.

This demonstrates a strength of Peirce's ideas beyond the semiotics in the field of philosophy. The search for increasingly detailed studies of its phenomenology is the field that needs more focus and study. The philosophy of communication, and even more we can say, the broad field of epistemological philosophy, can, by phaneroscopy, find the much desired balanced union between existence and logic.

Conclusions

The present work demonstrated, through a reflection posed by analytical philosophy, that the beginning of the studies of the communication can be traced from a philosophical reading, distancing itself from the traditional sociological way. Thus, communicalogy may pay a different attention to Peirce: semiotic thinking is not only in the discussions of form and content, but also in the epistemological foundations. Normally treated as a minor author within analytic philosophy and studied only by semiotic circles, Peirce’s works need to be searched in epistemological terms beyond semiotics.
From the reflection put forward here, it is important to note that communicalogy can be an interesting path for this, especially thinking of its links with the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language.

The communicational process is, first of all, a process of perception. It is rooted in a phenomenological conception of the world. Peirce’s phaneroscopy is one way of understanding this process. Even if this reflection comes with processes that are more similar to the logic and philosophy of mathematics.

Serra (2007) affirms that the systematic unity of knowledge is only possible from a rational idea or concept that determines what will be the whole and the place of each of its parts – and without such unity, knowledge can not be. But rather an “aggregate” or a “rhapsody” of knowledge that is piling up next to each other, disconnected and unrelated. Usually communicalogy is seen in this way and the solution to this is the return to Peirce.

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Šiame straipsnyje siekiama parodyti, kad Charleso Sanderso Peirce'o indėlis į komunikologiją yra gerokai ankstesnis nei epistemologinės semiotikos, jai integruojantis į komunikacijos studijas: faneroskopija laikytina ankstyvąja komunikologijos forma. Ši įžvalga grindžiama Peirce'o teoretizuotu kategorinės degeneracijos tyrinėjimu, jo padaryta įtaka komunikaciniam mąstymui (ypač Gilles'o Deleuzė'o kino teorijai), taip pat konceptualia sąsaja tarp degeneracijos ir fenomeno kvaternių filosofinių požiūrių.

**Keywords:** Charlesas Sandersas Peirce'as, faneronas, faneroskopija, fenomenologija, komunikacija, semiotika.