Representation of aversive prediction errors in the human periaqueductal gray

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Pain is a primary driver of learning and motivated action. It is also a target of learning, as nociceptive brain responses are shaped by learning processes. We combined an instrumental pain avoidance task with an axiomatic approach to assessing fMRI signals related to prediction errors (PEs), which drive reinforcement-based learning. We found that pain PEs were encoded in the periaqueductal gray (PAG), a structure important for pain control and learning in animal models. Axiomatic tests combined with dynamic causal modeling suggested that ventromedial prefrontal cortex, supported by putamen, provides an expected value–related input to the PAG, which then conveys PE signals to prefrontal regions important for behavioral regulation, including orbitofrontal, anterior mid-cingulate and dorsomedial prefrontal cortices. Thus, pain-related learning involves distinct neural circuitry, with implications for behavior and pain dynamics.

Both appetitive and aversive primary reinforcers—pleasure and pain—fundamentally shape learning and decision-making. Neural processes that signal appetitive value, including responses in the mesolimbic dopamine system, drive reward-pursuit responses. Pain and other aversive processes drive avoidance and escape. In spite of its importance, however, pain avoidance is poorly understood, and the nature of the cerebral processes underlying pain’s motivational functions is an important frontier 1,2.

Much progress in understanding motivational learning systems has come from the application of computational models of reinforcement learning to the analysis of animal brain circuitry3 and human fMRI data4. Such models posit that learning occurs in proportion to the magnitude of the prediction error (PE)—the discrepancy between the predicted value and experienced reward or punishment—evaluated after each action5. Reinforcement learning models have been used to identify reward PE signals—which reflect ‘better-than-expected’ outcomes—in midbrain dopamine neurons3, ventral striatum (VS) and medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). While fMRI activity in these and other areas correlates with parametric estimates of PEs, work examining such activity more carefully with respect to separate algebraic components of the PE6–8—or, in a related approach, testing activity against a set of axioms that together comprise the set of conditions that define a PE9—has so far validated only VS activity as satisfying all the criteria for appetitive PEs in humans.

Meanwhile, there has not yet been a similarly systematic decompositional of aversive PE-related activity. An emerging body of literature2,10–13 has identified several candidate regions that may encode aversive PE signals (worse-than-expected outcomes) in humans, including the amygdala12,14, VS2,15,16 and lateral OFC10,17. However, it remains unclear whether this activity reflects PEs or, rather, related signals such as pain expectancies or aversive responses. In addition, recent animal studies have identified neurons in a different region, the midbrain periaqueductal gray (PAG), with several aversive PE–like properties1, including elevated firing rates to unexpected versus expected punishment1,18 and habituation as painful shocks become expected1,18.

In this study, using a combination of computational modeling and axiomatic approaches with fMRI data, we sought to identify regions encoding aversive PE signals (worse-than-expected outcomes) and aversive value signals (pain expectancies). Participants (N = 26) performed a reinforcement-learning task during which they learned to avoid selecting the actions associated with a high probability of receiving pain. On each of 150 trials, participants chose between two options (Fig. 1a), each associated probabilistically with the delivery of painful heat (47.4 ± 1.7 °C). Probabilities for each option were governed by two independently varying random walks, so that participants learned to track the changing reinforcement values continuously throughout the task (Fig. 1b).

Our first objective was to identify brain regions that encode aversive PE signals and aversive value signals (pain expectancies), particularly in regions commonly thought to mediate PEs from human studies, including VS, and animal models (PAG). We reasoned that using an axiomatic testing approach could provide a stronger test for identifying aversive PEs and aversive value signals. We therefore considered whether (i) signals in PAG and VS correlate with PEs as predicted by a computational reinforcement learning model and (ii) they satisfy the three axiomatic properties that together define aversive PEs (ref. 9; see Results and Online Methods for a detailed description of the axioms).

Second, we sought to develop a brain-based model of how PE- and value-encoding regions interact during learning. The computational framework for reinforcement learning specifies dynamic interactions between brain regions encoding reinforcements, expected values and...
RESULTS

Behavioral results

As expected, participants switched options more frequently after receiving pain than no stimulus (40.5 ± 4.2% versus 6 ± 1.1% of trials, P < 0.0001). The effects of pain on switching also decayed exponentially with time, as evidenced by the results of logistic regressions assessing the effects of reinforcement history (pain delivered 1 to 6 trials back) on switches (P < 0.001 for one and two trials back; Fig. 1c).

We then used a standard temporal difference computational learning model to analyze subjects’ choices as a function of pain. The model comprised a learning rate parameter (\(\alpha\)), controlling the extent to which past feedback influences future predictions, and a softmax inverse temperature (\(\beta\)) parameter controlling the probability of selecting the most advantageous option. The analysis revealed learning rates (\(\alpha = 0.63 \pm 0.26\)), softmax inverse temperatures (\(\beta = 4.74 \pm 2.74\)) and model fits (negative log likelihood = 65 ± 21) comparable to those found in similar studies of reinforcement learning\(^9\). These results, along with the exponential form of the influences of previous pain (Fig. 1c), suggest that the temporal difference model captures pain avoidance learning in this task.

Aversive prediction error signals

Aversive PE signals should be phasically triggered at the moment when participants learn that punishment will be delivered and should correlate with computational model–derived PEs. Here we identified PE-correlated regions by regressing fMRI activity at outcome onset (see Supplementary Fig. 1) on model-derived PEs determined by fitting a temporal difference model to the individual’s choice behavior (see Online Methods). Activity correlating with model-based aversive PEs (greater activity for worse-than-expected outcomes) was found in several areas (Fig. 1d). These included the left anterior insula, anterior and mid-cingulate cortices (ACC and MCC, respectively), the right pre- and post-central gyri, the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and a large cluster in the midbrain encompassing the periaqueductal gray (PAG). Negative correlations with PE (greater activity for better-than-expected outcomes) were found in the entorhinal and parahippocampal cortices, right inferior frontal gyrus, right temporal pole and right lateral thalamus (Fig. 1d and Supplementary Table 1).

In the reward domain, it has been shown that some signals that correlate with PE are better explained as relating to some other quantity, such as reward magnitude, that is intrinsically correlated with PEs\(^6,8,9,14\). Here, activity that tracked aversive PEs was similar to activity related to pain onset versus no-stimulus onset (see Supplementary Fig. 2 and Supplementary Table 1; note that both pain and no-stimulus trials were indicated by an identical change in the fixation cross to avoid temporal ambiguity). Thus, to ensure that the candidate PE-related fMRI signals truly integrate outcome and expectancy information into an aversive PE signal, we used an axiomatic approach\(^9\) (see Online Methods), which specifies a set of three conditions that together define a PE. In the context of our task, these were as follows. Axiom 1: activity should be higher for received than avoided pain, unless pain is fully expected. Axiom 2: activity should decrease in proportion to expected pain (that is, expected aversive value), for both pain and no-stimulus trials. Axiom 3: activity on pain and no-stimulus trials should be equivalent if the outcome is completely predicted.

Here the first two conditions correspond to tests of effects of outcome and expectancy, respectively, the conjunction of which constitutes the algebraic definition of PEs (\(r_t - V_s\)). These tests are analogous to those in other recent work\(^6,8,14\), while the third condition, less often explicitly examined, verifies that the magnitudes of these two separate and opposite effects are equivalent, so that fully predicted outcomes do not generate PE signals. Thus, the axioms as applied in our case reflect the requirements specified by the mathematical definition of an aversive PE.

Brain regions that satisfy all the axioms should show a distinctive profile of activity as a function of expectancy and pain delivery, whereas those that track only pain expectancy or delivery will show different patterns (Fig. 2a). Because axiom 3 depends on support for the null hypothesis, we conducted additional Bayesian analyses of the odds in favor of versus against the null hypothesis\(^21\).

Region of interest (ROI) analyses revealed that PAG, but not VS, fulfilled all the axioms for aversive PE signals (Fig. 2b). The PAG...
responded more strongly to pain trials than no-stimulus trials, holding pain expectancy constant (axiom 1; \( t(22) = 3.67, P < 0.05 \)).

It showed reduced responses to outcomes with greater pain expectancy, for both pain and no-stimulus trials (axiom 2; pain trials: \( t(22) = -2.05, P < 0.05 \); no-stimulus trials: \( t(22) = -1.98, P < 0.05 \)). And finally, it showed no difference between fully predicted pain and no-stimulus trials (axiom 3; \( t(22) = 0.13, P = 0.90 \); odds in favor of the null hypothesis = 5.48). The VS did not show any effect of pain expectancy (pain trials, \( P = 0.87 \); no-stimulus trials, \( P = 0.40 \)), violating axiom 2, and did not respond to pain versus no-stimulus outcomes (\( P = 0.62 \)), violating axiom 1.

To search for additional regions that might satisfy the axioms for aversive PEs, we conducted a whole-brain conjunction search for three relevant contrasts: (i) pain onset versus no-stimulus onset; (ii) expectancy effects—that is, parametric variation with the degree of model-based expectancy—on pain trials; and (iii) expectancy effects on no-stimulus trials (Fig. 3). Significant results in effect i satisfy axiom 1 and significant results for effects ii and iii satisfy axiom 2. A region of the PAG extending into the tectum (Fig. 3 and Supplementary Table 2) was the only region to show significant results in all three tests (\( P < 0.05 \), cluster-extent corrected). To test axiom 3, we compared activity within that cluster for highly expected pain and no-stimulus outcomes. There was no activity difference between pain and no-stimulus trials when outcomes were highly predicted (\( t(22) = 0.56, P > 0.4 \), odds in favor of the null hypothesis = 5.13), thereby confirming axiom 3.

Studies 2 and 3: monetary rewards and varying pain levels
In this study, we chose not to include rewarding events, in part because many studies have demonstrated reward-related PEs linked to VSP,22 and in part to avoid the complexity caused when participants directly compare rewarding and punishing events. However, to provide additional evidence on whether aversive and appetitive PEs are encoded in different brain circuits, we reanalyzed data from a published experiment23 that used a similar experimental design with monetary rewards (Supplementary Fig. 3), focusing on the VS and PAG. As expected, in contradistinction to the main study results, appetitive PEs to monetary rewards were tracked by activity in the VS (\( t(20) = 5.77, P < 0.001 \)), but not the PAG (PAG—appetitive: \( t(20) = 1.54, P = 0.14 \); see Supplementary Fig. 3). The signal-to-noise (SNR) ratios in the VS (171.13 ± 9.68) and PAG (163.20 ± 5.57) were not significantly different (\( P > 0.23 \)). However, we note that
the dissociation between aversive and reward PEs depends on null findings in the PAG in study 2 and other reward learning studies. It is possible that high-resolution and brainstem-optimized imaging (for example, refs. 24,25) could yield additional reward-related signals that remain to be discovered. Moreover, differences in field strength (3 T versus 1.5 T) and other scanning parameters could also have impacted the ability to identify appetitive PE signals in the PAG in study 2.

Another important issue is whether putative PE-related signals are related to pain intensity or merely the presence versus absence of an aversive reinforcer. In study 3 (n = 50; Supplementary Fig. 4), we sought to replicate aversive PE–related findings in the PAG and test for activation related to noxious stimulus intensity. This study used three intensities of painful stimulation in the noxious range (46 °C, 47 °C and 48 °C) and two independent manipulations of expectations about pain intensity: (i) a classical conditioning procedure and (ii) unreinforced placebo instructions designed to induce expectations of relief (see Supplementary Fig. 4). Activity corresponding to the axiomatic requirements for prediction errors was analyzed in the time window during which the three stimulus intensities were subjectively differentiated (4–10 s after stimulus onset; see Supplementary Fig. 4d).

In accordance with axiom 1, PAG activity within that time window increased with temperature (P < 0.001). In accordance with axiom 2, activity was higher during pain for low versus high pain conditioned cues (F(1,49) = 4.39, P < 0.05) and for the placebo versus control condition (F(1,49) = 16.03, P < 0.001). In both of these conditions, the stimulus was higher than expected on the basis of cues and verbal instructions, respectively. Finally, it was not possible to definitively test axiom 3 in study 3 because cues never fully predicted outcomes. Overall, results from this supplementary experiment replicated and extended the findings of pain-related aversive prediction errors in the PAG, demonstrating sensitivity to the level of painful stimulus intensity and sensitivity to verbal instructions as well as predictive cues.

**Expectancies and other learning-related variables**

Regions that track expected avoidance value—a contributor to aversive PEs—should show effects of the expected probability of pain but no effects of pain itself (Fig. 2a). In terms of neural effects, this translates into greater activity with low pain expectancy for both pain and no-stimulus trials, but no difference in activity between pain and no-stimulus trials. We identified clusters in the left putamen, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and right hippocampus in which activity fit this profile, consistent with expectancy effects. These regions displayed increased activity when pain was expected to be avoided (low pain expectancy) but did not respond differentially to pain versus no-stimulus outcomes (Fig. 3a). Post hoc analyses confirmed that no areas showed significant pain versus no-stimulus effects (left putamen: P = 0.43, Bayes factor in favor of the null hypothesis = 7.13; vmPFC: P = 0.93, Bayes factor in favor of the null hypothesis = 10.03; right hippocampus: P = 0.81, Bayes factor in favor of the null hypothesis = 9.44).

The conjunction analyses we conducted can identify regions that do not conform precisely to all elements of the reinforcement learning model but may nonetheless be important for guiding behavior and learning. Several regions identified in the conjunction analysis correlated with PEs only on pain trials (Fig. 3a), including the left OFC, anterior MCC (aMCC), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and a larger dorsal midbrain cluster comprising the PAG, tectum, nucleus cuneiformis (NCF), dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN) and red nucleus. Though there are several potential interpretations, we suggest that these areas reflect updating of the value of switching away from the punished option on the next trial, a decision participants only have to make after pain delivery.

Finally, follow-up ROI analyses of response patterns within these regions revealed that the midbrain showed a significant correlation with expected value on no-stimulus trials ([t(22)] = −1.82, P = 0.05, one-tailed) that did not meet the whole-brain threshold (Fig. 3b). Thus, findings in this larger midbrain cluster are consistent with aversive PE signals, though the dorsal PAG region was the only portion to survive whole-brain correction in all three contrasts. The other three regions showed little evidence for expectancy effects on no-stimulus trials (Bayes factors in favor of the null hypothesis: aMCC, 2.50; OFC, 4.07; dmPFC, 2.26) and thus are more likely to reflect avoidance value updating or other motivational processes. Finally, we note that although the current results relate signal in the PAG as a whole to aversive PEs, it is possible that high-resolution and brainstem-optimized imaging could reveal a finer-grained distribution of PAG subregions with functionally distinct response profiles24,26, including portions that respond only to expectancies. More broadly, our results do not imply that aversive PEs are the only signal represented in the PAG.

The previous analyses examined fMRI activity at pain onset, when PEs are generated. Brain regions that encode expected value should also be active earlier, when decisions are made and the expected value is computed. To identify such regions, we examined activity that parametrically tracked the expected probability of avoidance at the time of decision (Supplementary Fig. 5 and Supplementary Table 3). Positive effects (that is, greater activity with high avoidance value or low pain expectancy) were observed in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and in particular in the medial OFC and perigenual ACC. Conversely, negative activations were observed in the aMCC, lateral frontal pole, parietal operculum, cerebellum and visual cortex.

**Network dynamics underlying aversive PE signals**

To develop a brain-based model of the learning process, we used DCM to explore how the seven regions identified in the previous analysis (Fig. 3b; note that the larger midbrain cluster was not included in the DCM analyses) interact during learning. On the basis of the principles governing reinforcement learning models (Fig. 2a), regions that encode aversive PEs (PAG) should receive converging input from those that encode expectancies (vmPFC, putamen, hippocampus) and primary reinforcement (nociceptive) signals. Afferent nociceptive signals in PE-encoding regions should be cancelled out by expectancy-related information when those signals are fully
predicted\textsuperscript{1,18}. Regions important for action value and decision-making (aMCC, OFC, dmPFC) may receive converging PE and primary reinforcement signals.

As is increasingly common with DCMs, we tested a family of similar models to identify the most likely configuration of connections based on the data. This is conceptually analogous to optimizing parameter values (for example, in linear regression), except that we search over models, identifying the most likely pattern of connections given the data using Bayesian model selection\textsuperscript{27}. We defined a model limited to brain correlates of reinforcement learning model–based effects (PAG, vmPFC, putamen, hippocampus) and then extended the model to include other regions that may encode avoidance value and related properties, testing 72 plausible models in total (see Online Methods and Supplementary Figs. 6–9). Hence, the final model was jointly constrained by a priori theoretical constraints and the evidence in the data.

In the final, most likely model (Fig. 4), vmPFC projects most directly to PAG among value-encoding regions, and avoidance value is most closely related to the putamen, which transmits value information to vmPFC. Then PE and expected value signals from the midbrain and putamen are transmitted to OFC and aMCC, with effects on dmPFC mediated by OFC. Nuisious input had direct effects on PAG, in keeping with the known anatomy of the ascending spino-mesencephalic nociceptive pathway\textsuperscript{28} and modulatory effects on ascending putamen-to-OF, putamen-to-aMCC and midbrain-to-aMCC connections. These modulatory effects are plausible given that the spino-thalamic tract and other pathways provide separate channels of ascending nociceptive input that are distinct from spino-mesencephalic inputs to the PAG.

**DISCUSSION**

**Toward a neural systems model for aversive PEs**

Pain has obvious motivational functions, both shaping and being shaped by learning, but we still know very little about the basic neural processes underlying its influence on human behavior. Using a combination of reinforcement learning computational models, axiomatic tests and DCM models, we identified a candidate system that allows humans to avoid actions associated with pain. In this model, a system of interconnected forebrain regions including the putamen, hippocampus and vmPFC encodes expected value signals. Expectations are then compared with primary nociceptive inputs in the PAG to generate aversive PE signals. These signals shape expectations maintained in medial prefrontal-temporal-striatal systems and are also conveyed to forebrain structures involved in behavioral decisions and choice (aMCC, dmPFC and OFC).

Our data and connectivity models identify the PAG as a primary site for aversive PEs, in contrast to previous neuroimaging findings and theories that a single system drives appetitive and aversive PEs\textsuperscript{29}. The centrality of the PAG for aversive PEs is consistent with both anatomical and neurophysiological evidence in animals. The PAG receives monosynaptic inputs from both nociceptive spinal projection neurons\textsuperscript{28} and top-down projections from the vmPFC\textsuperscript{30}, positioning it as a potential comparator of bottom-up aversive sensations with expectations. It also sends monosynaptic, reciprocal projections to the vmPFC—which is essential for value updating in the reinforcement learning framework and likely for behavioral choice as well\textsuperscript{51}—and to aMCC\textsuperscript{32}, OFC and other areas involved in determining action value and coordinating defensive behavior\textsuperscript{18,33}. The aMCC in particular is critical for pain avoidance\textsuperscript{18} and is heavily connected to motor and premotor centers.

The central role of the PAG in aversive PEs is also consistent with several prominent animal models of aversive learning\textsuperscript{34}. These models suggest that the PAG is critical for integrating expectations with ascending nociceptive information. Though animal studies have not formally tested the axioms that satisfy aversive PEs directly, as we have here, several functional properties of the PAG in animals are consistent with PE signaling\textsuperscript{1}, such as higher firing rates to unexpected versus expected punishment\textsuperscript{1,18}. These expectancy effects seem to be mediated by inhibition of ascending nociceptive inputs through the release of endogenous opioids in the PAG\textsuperscript{1}, which blocks nociceptive responses when pain is expected. This converging animal evidence suggests that opioidergic modulation of the PAG may be a critical element of aversive PEs.

**Overlap in systems for reward and aversive PEs**

The nature and degree of overlap between appetitive and aversive learning is intensely debated. On the one hand, some proponents of a unitary system for reward and aversion have stressed the close coexistence of neuronal populations signaling appetitive and aversive value in structures including the striatum and ventral tegmental area\textsuperscript{35}. Other arguments in favor of a unitary system come from neuroimaging studies showing that a common set of regions activates (vmPFC, striatum) or deactivates (ACC, insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) parametrically with increasing outcome value across both appetitive (monetary losses) and appetitive (monetary gains) domains\textsuperscript{36,37}. However, these findings may be caused by framing of the outcomes as relative gains or losses compared to the alternative and hence not truly reflect categorical similarities between appetitive and aversive learning systems. That is, losing endowed money may not engage learning systems adapted for primary punishments like pain, and both the nature of the reinforcer (primary versus secondary) and the specific type of reinforcement (thermal pain versus loss) may be important.

On the other hand, imaging studies using primary aversive reinforcers such as pain have converged on a set of candidate regions that are potentially specific to aversive learning, including the brainstem, amygdala, OFC, insula and ACC\textsuperscript{2,10,12,14,38}, but the results across studies have also been mixed. Part of this variability could be due to heterogeneity in the response properties of different neuronal subpopulations\textsuperscript{39}, but also to the fact that latent variables derived from reinforcement learning models, such as PEs, are by definition correlated with related signals, such as expected values or outcome information. As a result, PE signals within a given voxel can be highly correlated with expected values or outcome information. In the case of our study, regions tracking parametric estimates of aversive PEs strongly overlapped with regions signaling pain onsets (Supplementary Fig. 2), making them indistinguishable without more fine-grained tests.

Here the use of axiomatic tests allowed us to dissociate regions tracking aversive PEs from similar, intrinsically correlated signals such as expectancy and nociception or pain. Only the PAG showed consistent evidence for aversive PEs in all axiomatic tests. By contrast, activity in a VS ROI previously shown to fulfill all axiomatic requirements for an appetitive PE signal\textsuperscript{5} showed no evidence for aversive PE signals, although it encoded appetitive PEs to monetary rewards in a separate experiment using a similar design. Conversely, activity in the PAG did not correlate with appetitive PEs to monetary rewards, suggesting that there is at least partial segregation between aversive and appetitive systems at the level of PEs. Indeed, the functional neuroanatomy of the PAG strongly indicates it is highly specialized in the treatment of intrinsically aversive stimuli\textsuperscript{26,40}. Among other primary aversive reinforcers, PAG is activated by painful events\textsuperscript{41}, aversive images\textsuperscript{24,42} and social threats\textsuperscript{43}. By contrast, a recent meta-analysis of over 200 neuroimaging studies found no reliable reward-related signal in the PAG\textsuperscript{44}.

By contrast, vmPFC activity seems to reflect expected positive value in a variety of contexts and paradigms\textsuperscript{45}, including reward...
METHODS

Methods and any associated references are available in the online version of the paper.

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COMPETING FINANCIAL INTERESTS

The authors declare no competing financial interests.

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ONLINE METHODS

Participants. Twenty-six healthy, right-handed participants completed the study (mean age = 26.7 ± 7.6 years, 14 females). The sample consisted of 52% Caucasian, 20% Asian, 16% Hispanic and 12% African-American participants. All participants provided informed consent. The study was approved by the Columbia University Institutional Review Board. Preliminary eligibility was assessed with a general health questionnaire, a pain safety screening form and an fMRI safety screening form. Participants reported no history of psychiatric, neurological or pain disorders. Three participants were excluded from the analysis because of poor performance on the task (see section on reinforcement model-based analysis below).

Thermal stimulation. Thermal stimulation was delivered to the volar surface of the left (nondominant) inner forearm using a 16 × 16 mm Peltier thermode (Medoc). To minimize the effects of peripheral sensitization/habituation, the thermode was moved to a new skin spot after each run. Each stimulus lasted 9 s with 2.5-s ramp-up and ramp-down periods and 4 s at target temperature. Temperatures were individually calibrated to be at a level 7 on a continuous scale ranging from 0 to 8 (0, no sensation; 1, nonpainful warm; 2, low pain; 5, moderate pain; 8, maximum tolerable pain) during a practice session performed on a separate day before the imaging session. On the basis of this procedure, a single temperature level was selected within each participant’s tolerance limit. The average temperature of the stimuli was 47.4 ± 1.7 °C.

Experimental task. The pain avoidance instrumental learning task comprised 150 trials (divided in 6 runs of 25 trials), during which subjects had to select the option with the lowest probability of being followed by a painful thermal stimulation. The probabilities associated with each option were independent of one another and varied from trial to trial according to pairs of random walks. Four pairs of random walks were selected on the basis of the criterion that they must cross (reverse) at least one time (see Supplementary Fig. 10); each participant was randomly administered one of the four pairs.

Each trial (see Fig. 1a) started with the presentation of the two options (circle or square, randomly displayed to the left or right) for 1,800 ms, during which participants had to enter their decision by pressing the left or right button of the response unit. If the participant did not have time to make a choice (<1% of trials), the computer randomly selected a response for them. After a feedback period of 200 ms and an anticipation period of 4,000 ms, the fixation point changed from an asterisk (*) to a cross (+) that stayed on the screen for 9,000 ms to mark the period during which participants could receive a painful thermal stimulation. After that stimulation period, the fixation point changed back to an asterisk for a jittered inter-trial interval of 6,600, 7,800, 9,000, 10,200 or 11,400 ms. On a day before the imaging session, participants performed a practice session with a different pair of random walks and options (diamond and triangle) from the ones they received during the imaging session. During that practice session, they were carefully instructed about all aspects of the experiment, except the actual probabilities of pain that they had to infer. Participants provided on-line continuous ratings of pain (0, no sensation; 1, nonpainful warm; 2, low pain; 5, moderate pain; 8, maximum tolerable pain) for the practice, but not imaging, session.

fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing. Data acquisition. Whole-brain fMRI data were acquired on a 1.5-T GE Sigma TwinSpeed Excite HD scanner (GE Medical Systems) at the Functional MRI Research Center at Columbia University. Functional images were acquired with a T2*-weighted, two-dimensional gradient echo spiral in/out pulse sequence26 (repetition time (TR) = 3,000 ms; echo time = 30 ms; flip angle = 84°; field of view = 224 mm; 64 × 64 matrix, 3.5 × 3.5 × 2.2 mm voxels, 64 slices). To maximize signal in the vmPFC, slices were tilted by 30° from AC–PC axis, resulting in a loss of coverage in dorsoposterior parietal areas, including S1 in the arm area. We were therefore unable to assess the contribution of S1 in pain avoidance learning. Each run lasted 10 min 20 s (206 TRs). Stimulus presentation and data acquisition were controlled using E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools). Responses were made with the right hand via an MRI-compatible response unit (Resonance Technologies). Visual stimuli were presented through goggles positioned on the scanner head coil (Avotec).

Preprocessing. Before preprocessing, global outlier time points (that is, ‘spikes’ in BOLD signal) were identified by computing both the mean and the s.d. (across voxels) of values for each image for all slices. Mahalanobis distances for the matrix of slice-wise mean and s.d. values (concatenated) × functional volumes (time) were computed, and any values with a significant $\chi^2$ value (corrected for multiple comparisons based on the more stringent of either false-discovery-rate or Bonferroni method) were considered outliers. Less than 1% of images were outliers. The output of this procedure was later used as a covariate of noninterest in the first-level models.

Functional images were slice-acquisition–timing and motion corrected using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK). Structural T1-weighted images were registered to the first functional image for each subject using an iterative procedure of automated registration using mutual information co-registration in SPM8 and manual adjustment of the automated algorithm’s starting point until the automated procedure provided satisfactory alignment. Structural images were normalized to MNI space using SPM8, interpolated to 2 × 2 × 2 mm voxels, and smoothed using a 6-mm full-width at half maximum Gaussian kernel.

Reinforcement model-based analysis. Participants’ decisions were modeled as a function of previous choices and rewards using a temporal difference algorithm. Specifically, the predicted value for options “square” and “circle” ($V_{\text{square}}$ and $V_{\text{circle}}$) were updated in the direction of the obtained reward using a delta rule with learning rate $\alpha$ whenever that option was chosen ($V_{\text{chosen option}(t+1)} = V_{\text{chosen option}(t)} + \alpha \times (r_t - V_{\text{chosen option}(t)})$), where $r_t$ is the reward (pain = −1; no stimulus = 0) obtained at trial t. The probability of choosing option i over j at trial t was determined by a softmax distribution, where the inverse temperature parameter $\beta$ controls the strength of the competition between the two options: $p(\text{choice}) = \text{“square” [ } V_{\text{square}(t)} - V_{\text{circle}(t)} + \exp(\beta V_{\text{square}(t)})/\exp(\beta V_{\text{square}(t)}) + \exp(\beta V_{\text{circle}(t)})\text{]}$. Model fits were estimated by negative log likelihoods (smaller values indicate better fit).

The temporal difference model could not be fitted or gave aberrant $\alpha$ or $\beta$ values ($\alpha = 1$ or 0; $\beta = 0$) for three subjects. This was caused by complete reliance on a win-stay, lose-shift strategy (one subject), frequent switches in choice following absence of pain, which was caused by use of an irrelevant strategy (one subject) or numerous missing responses (20% missing; one subject). These three subjects were excluded from further analyses because their choices revealed that they were not behaving in accordance with the experience-based, incremental type of learning under study5. The average $\alpha$ and $\beta$ values for the remaining participants were then used to estimate their trial-by-trial expected values ($V_{\text{square}(t)}$ and $V_{\text{circle}(t)}$) and prediction errors ($r_t - V_{\text{chosen option}(t)}$). Note that the temporal difference model does not make any assumption about participants’ conscious expectations. Rather, expected values estimates reflect latent variables that are necessary for learning to avoid pain, but the conscious or unconscious nature of this learning process remains unspecified.

Logistic regression model. Participants’ choices were also analyzed with a logistic regression model predicting the chances of switching choices as a function of pain delivered over the six previous trials.

fMRI data analyses. Model-based PE analysis. Statistical analyses were conducted using the general linear model framework implemented in SPM8. In a first model, boxcar regressors, convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function, modeled periods of decision (onset of decision period to response; mean reaction time = 732 ± 251 ms), anticipation (4 s), outcome onset (1 s) and outcome period (8 s). The decision to use the first 1 s of the stimulation as representing the onset of the stimulation was based on continuous pain ratings obtained in the first, pre-scan session suggesting that this is the moment when subjects begin to feel the thermal stimulation (see Supplementary Fig. 1). Outcome (pain = 1, no stimulus = −1) and aversive PE estimates were added as parametric modulators on all regressors (SPM orthogonalization option turned off). The inter-trial interval was used as an implicit baseline. The six runs were concatenated for each subject. A high-pass filter of 180 s was used. Other regressors of non-interest (nuisance variables) included (i) dummy regressors coding for each run (intercept for each run); (ii) linear drift across time within each run; (iii) the six estimated head movement parameters ($x$, $y$, $z$, roll, pitch and yaw), their mean-zeroed squares, their derivatives and squared derivative for each run (total 24 columns); and (iv) indicator vectors for outlier time points identified on the basis of their multivariate distance from the other images in the sample (see above).
Results were cluster-corrected (P < 0.05, FWER, two-tailed) with cluster-defining thresholds of P < 0.001, P < 0.01 and P < 0.05 using AFNI's alphasm.

ROI axiomatic response profile analysis. In a second set of analyses aiming to characterize the profiles of activation across outcomes and expected probability of pain, trials within each type of outcome were binned into quartiles of expected probability of pain, resulting in 8 types of outcomes: 2 outcomes (pain or no stimulus) × 4 quartiles (from least to highest expected probability of pain). Mean activity was then extracted for each of the 8 regressors within either a priori PAG and VS ROIs, or ROIs defined by the conjunction analysis (see below). The PAG a priori ROI was constructed by aligning three overlapping 6-mm spheres along the central aqueduct (in mm [0 –24 –4; 0 –26 –6; 0 –29 –8]) and closely matched the findings of a recent meta-analysis on pain processing in the PAG49. The VS ROI was based on the Rutledge et al. (2010)37 nucleus accumbens ROI and comprised three 5-mm spheres for each hemisphere (in mm [8 13 –3; 12 13 –8; 9 13 –7; –8 13 –3; –12 13 –8; –9 13 –7]).

To test whether or not activity profiles in the PAG and VS ROIs integrate outcome information with prior expectations into an aversive PE signal, we used an axiomatic approach initially developed to test necessary and sufficient activity for a broad class of PE models. Because our objective was to identify regions that encode aversive PEs, we specialized these axioms for the case of an aversive prediction error and a learned, continuously graded punishment expectancy by making particular assumptions about the sign and monotonicity of effects. This approach reduces the quite general axioms to more familiar neural tests, notably separate tests for magnitude and expectation effects, which correspond to the two algebraic components of PEs (PE = magnitude – expectation; see also refs. 6,8 for a similar approach). Moreover, in addition to the reward and expectancy components tested in those studies, we also test a third axiom, which specifies that expectation and magnitude effects are properly registered to one another, resulting in identical response amplitudes when outcomes are fully predicted. Finally, one difference between our axiomatic approach and the one specified that expectation and magnitude effects are properly registered to one another, resulting in identical response amplitudes when outcomes are fully predicted. This axiom was tested by a simple t-test of the difference between averaged values for the four pain and four no-pain quartiles. Axiom 2 (consistent lottery ordering: the outcome effect) stipulates that activity for pain outcomes should be higher than for no-stimulus outcomes. This axiom was tested by a simple t-test of the difference between averaged values for the four pain and four no-pain quartiles. Axiom 2 (consistent lottery ordering: the outcome effect) stipulates that activity should decrease with increasing expected probability of pain. This axiom was tested by separately testing the slopes of regressions lines passing through the four quartiles for pain and no-pain trials, using a nonparametric multilevel sign permutation test (1,000 bootstrap samples). Finally, axiom 3 (no surprise equivalence: that the expectancy and outcome effects have the correct relationship to one another) stipulates that completely predicted outcomes should generate equivalent responses. This axiom was tested by a simple t-test comparing activity for the highest quartile of expected pain for pain trials and lowest quartile of expected pain for no-pain trials. We note that pain adaptation processes such as sensitization and habituation can cause pain itself to behave like PEs in some respects; for example, both pain and aversive PEs may decrease across trials and vary inversely with the intensity of prior pain51, causing a stronger partial overlap between aversive PE signals and pain itself. However, this effect explains only some of the effects tested in axiom 2 (those on pain trials). It does not account for the effects tested under axiom 1 or axiom 3, or effects on no-pain trials tested under axiom 2. In addition, it does not account for experimental effects such as effects of placebo instructions, tested in study 3. Thus, the axiomatic tests provide a strong test of aversive PE-related signal properties.

Conjunction analysis. To specifically test for the expected probability of pain within pain and no-stimulus trials (axiom 2), we modeled separately pain and no-stimulus trials and included expected probability of pain as parametric modulators for pain and no-stimulus trials. We then looked at the conjunction between the three relevant contrast maps (pain > no stimulus, expected probability of pain within pain trials, expected probability of pain within no-stimulus trials), which were cluster-corrected (P < 0.05, FWER, one-tailed) with a cluster-defining threshold of P < 0.05 using AFNI’s alphasm.

Dynamic causal models. To explore how the seven different regions identified in the previous analysis (aversive PE; PAG; pain-specific PE: aMCC, OFC, dmPFC; expected value: vmPFC, putamen, hippocampus) interacted to generate aversive PE signals, we compared several probable dynamic causal models (DCMs) with a Bayesian model selection procedure27. On the basis of the principles governing reinforcement learning models (Fig. 2a), regions that encode aversive PEs (PAG) should receive converging input from those that encode expectancies (vmPFC, putamen, hippocampus) and primary reinforcement (nociceptive) signals. Regions important for action value and decision-making (aMCC, OFC, dmPFC) may receive converging PE and primary reinforcement signals.

Because of the large number of possible models, we began by defining a model limited to brain correlates of reinforcement learning model–based effects (PAG, vmPFC, putamen, hippocampus). We constrained this model by making two assumptions: (i) primary nociceptive afferents directly project to PAG28, and (ii) expected avoidance utility is conveyed to the PAG through one or more of the three expected value structures (green in Fig. 3). We used Bayesian model selection to evaluate 32 plausible models, which varied systematically in their projections to the midbrain and connections among expected value-related regions (see Supplementary Fig. 6), and tested the most likely model against seven close variants27 (see Supplementary Fig. 7). Overall, the most likely configuration given our data is shown in Figure 4 (black and green portions only). In this model, vmPFC projects most directly to PAG, and avoidance value is most closely related to the putamen, which transmits value information to vmPFC. Though this procedure cannot definitively isolate causal relationships among regions, this model provides a plausible working model considering the direct anatomical projections from vmPFC to PAG28.

We then extended the model to include other regions that may encode avoidance value and related properties. On the basis of existent animal models of fear conditioning1,18, we posited that these regions receive the PE signals generated in PAG. Moreover, on the basis of known anatomical projections of the PAG, we constrained the space of possible models by assuming that PE signals could be directly conveyed to the OFC and aMCC22, and indirectly to the dmPFC through either aMCC or OFC. However, as the sources of expected value signals to these regions are less informed by the existent literature, we allowed these regions to be functionally connected to any of the three regions encoding expected value signals (that is, vmPFC, putamen and hippocampus). Within these constraints, we evaluated 27 models that systematically varied connections among avoidance updating–related regions (blue) and relationships with expected value–related regions (green; see Supplementary Fig. 8) and 16 additional models closely related to the best-fitting model and including modulatory nociceptive inputs (see Supplementary Fig. 9). The best model overall (Fig. 4) included (i) direct connections from both putamen and midbrain to OFC and aMCC, with dmPFC effects mediated by OFC, and (ii) modulatory effects of noxious input to putamen → OFC, putamen → aMCC, and midbrain → aMCC connections.

Study 2: comparison with reward prediction errors. Participants. Twenty-one participants (mean age, 19.3 years; range, 18–28; ten female) took part in the study. Informed consent was obtained in a manner approved by the New York University Committee on Activities Involving Human Subjects.

Monetary reward task. In the experimental task (Supplementary Fig. 3a,b; see also ref. 23), on each of 300 trials, participants chose one of four presented face stimuli and then received monetary feedback. Participants then received binary reward feedback, a $0.25 ‘win’ outcome represented by an image of a quarter-dollar and a $0.00 ‘miss’ outcome represented by a phase-scrambled image of a quarter-dollar. Participants were instructed that each face option was associated with a different probability of reward, that these probabilities could change slowly, and that their goal was to attempt to find the most rewarding option at a given time to earn the most money. Across the 300 trials in the experiment, the reward probabilities diffused gradually according to Gaussian random walks, so as to encourage continual learning. Unbeknownst to the participants, the faces were grouped into equivalent pairs.
Imaging procedure. Whole-brain imaging was conducted on a 3.0-T Siemens Allegra head-only MRI system at NYU’s Center for Brain Imaging, using a Nova Medical NM-011 head coil. Functional images were collected using a gradient echo T2*-weighted echoplanar (EPI) sequence with BOLD contrast (TR = 2,000 ms, TE = 15 ms, flip angle = 82, 3 × 3 × 3 mm voxel size; 33 contiguous oblique-axial slices), tilted on a per-participant basis approximately 23 degree off of the AC–PC axis to optimize sensitivity to signal in the orbitofrontal cortex and the medial temporal lobe. The task was scanned in four blocks each of 310 volumes (10 min 20 s).

Behavioral analysis. Participants' choices were analyzed with a similar temporal difference model to the one used for the analysis of pain-related aversive PEs, with the exception that an additional parameter accounted for the generalization of learned values from one face of a pair to the other.

Imaging analyses and results. Preprocessing and data analysis was performed using Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM5; Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). After realignment and normalization, images were resampled to 2-mm cubic voxels, smoothed with an 8-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel, and filtered with a 128-s high-pass filter. To identify the structures encoding appetitive prediction errors, activity at outcome delivery was correlated with the trial-by-trial reward PE estimates derived from the computational temporal difference model. Finally, we extracted the mean activity related to these appetitive PEs in the periaqueductal gray (PAG) and ventral striatum (VS) regions of interest (ROIs) used in previous analyses (see Fig. 2) and compared it to pain-related aversive PE signals (see Supplementary Fig. 3) extracted from the same ROIs.

Study 3: comparison of different pain levels. Participants. Fifty healthy participants completed the study (mean age = 25.1, range = 18–52 years; 27 females). All participants gave informed consent and the experiment was approved by the institutional review board of the University of Colorado Boulder.

Thermal stimulation. Thermal stimulation was delivered to the volar surface of the left inner forearm using a 16 × 16 mm Peltier thermode (Medoc). Each stimulus lasted 11 s with 1.75-s ramp-up and ramp-down periods and 7.5 s at target temperature. Stimulation temperatures were 46, 47 and 48 °C, and in between stimuli the thermode maintained a baseline temperature of 32 °C.

Experimental task. This pain-learning task consisted of 6 runs of 8 trials each and alternated between placebo and control runs (in counterbalanced order). In the placebo runs, the thermode was placed on a skin site that had been pretreated with a placebo analgesic cream. In the control runs, the thermode was placed on a skin site that had been pretreated and alternated between placebo and control runs (in counterbalanced order). In the high and the low cue. The computer's selection was shown for 3 s and was followed by a 47 °C (medium pain) or a 48 °C (high pain) thermal temperature was contingent on the computer's—not the participant's—cue selection. The high and the low cue by a 47 °C (medium pain) or a 48 °C (high pain) thermal temperature was contingent on the computer's—not the participant's—cue selection.

Each trial started with the presentation of the two cues randomly displayed at the left and right side of the screen for 4 s, during which participants selected the cue that they thought was predictive of the least pain, by means of a left or right button press. One to 3 s later the computer selected a cue, alternating between the high and the low cue. The computer's selection was shown for 3 s and was immediately followed by a thermal stimulation. Note that the stimulation temperature was contingent on the computer's—not the participant's—cue selection. Nine to 13 s after the thermal stimulation, a pain-rating scale was presented for 6 s, and participants rated their experienced pain using a trackball. The rating period was followed by a 9–13 s inter-trial interval. During the stimulation, post-stimulation and inter-trial intervals, a fixation cross was presented at the center of the screen.

Imaging procedure. Whole-brain fMRI data were acquired on a Siemens 3-T Trio scanner at the Center for Innovation and Creativity (CINC) in Boulder. Functional images were acquired with an echo-planar imaging sequence (TR = 1,300 ms, TE = 25 ms, field of view = 220 mm, 3.4 × 3.4 × 3.0 mm voxels, 26 slices). Each run lasted 394 s (303 TRs).

Imaging analyses and results. The preprocessing procedure was identical to the one used in the main experiment (see above). Boxcar regressors, convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function, were constructed to model (i) the periods in which visual stimuli other than the fixation cross were presented (that is, the cues and the rating scale), (ii) participants’ cue-selection times, and (iii) participants’ pain-rating times. Because the onset of the stimulation is uninformative of the pain level participants received, we used continuous pain ratings for three levels of thermal stimulations of identical durations (11 s; 46.5 °C, 47.5 °C, 48.5 °C) to identify the time at which the different temperatures could be clearly distinguished. We identified the period between 4 and 10 s as the one conveying information about the pain level received, and we therefore modeled thermal stimuli as three successive time-windows: (iv) onset (0–4 s), (v) middle (4–10 s) and (vi) offset (10–11 s) (see Supplementary Fig. 4d).

We then extracted mean activity in the PAG ROI (see Fig. 2 and Supplementary Fig. 4c) during this middle, pain-informative window for the three different levels of temperature, the two different levels of predictive cues and the placebo versus control condition. To test whether the PAG also encoded aversive PEs in an intensity-dependent manner, we adopted study 1 axioms by making the additional assumption that more intense noxious stimulus intensities should be more aversive (that is, monotonicity of aversiveness with stimulus intensity).

To test axiom 2, we looked more specifically at activity in response to the medium temperature, which could be preceded by either low or high predictive cues. Axiom 2 requires that aversive PEs should be higher when less pain is predicted. In the current experiment, this should translate into higher activity for low versus high cues. Moreover, if PEs are also sensitive to explicit predictions about pain, PEs should be higher during the placebo versus control condition (see Supplementary Fig. 4b).

Finally, axiom 3 stipulates that there should be no difference in signal strength between fully expected outcomes of different intensities. Unfortunately, this axiom cannot be fully tested here because the outcome is never fully predicted by the cue (50%–50%), and the nonlinear relationship between temperature and pain makes it difficult to precisely estimate expectations. Minimally, there should be a partial overlap between low and high cue lines allowing certain temperature levels to be associated with equivalent prediction error signals, which again entails that responses to the medium temperature should be higher for low versus high cues.

A Supplementary Methods Checklist is available.