Advancements in Natural Language Generation have raised concerns on its potential misuse for deep fake news. Grover is a model for both generation and detection of neural fake news. While its performance on automatically discriminating neural fake news surpassed GPT-2 and BERT, Grover could face a variety of adversarial attacks to deceive detection. In this work, we present an investigation of Grover’s susceptibility to adversarial attacks such as character-level and word-level perturbations. The experiment results show that even a singular character alteration can cause Grover to fail, affecting up to 97% of target articles with unlimited attack attempts, exposing a lack of robustness. We further analyse these misclassified cases to highlight affected words, identify vulnerability within Grover’s encoder, and perform a novel visualisation of cumulative classification scores to assist in interpreting model behaviour.

1 Introduction

Online disinformation has become a crucial issue in current society and has been the focus of extensive study in recent years (Buning, 2018; Fletcher, 2018; Zerback, 2020). Fake news, one form of online disinformation, can deceive people with intent of monetary gain, political slander, or entity discreditation (Quandt et al., 2019). While current sources of fake news are mainly derived from human hand, recent developments in Natural Language Generation (NLG) (Radford, 2018, 2019; Brown, 2020) have made it possible to produce neural fake news \(^1\) at scale. The key problem with this technology is that it is harder for humans to distinguish machine-generated text from human-produced text (Heaven, 2020; Hao, 2020).

To counter the rising threat of neural fake news, an automatic discriminator has been developed that can serve as a defence mechanism. In 2019, Grover (Zellers et al., 2019) (Generating aRticles by Only Viewing mEtadata Records), a neural fake news generator and discriminator, was released to the public. As a generator, it generates formal news articles, (including title, domain, authors, date) with given contextual metadata. As a discriminator, it detects the difference between machine and human-produced articles. By utilising articles produced by the generator, Grover’s discriminator achieved 92% accuracy while detectors based deep contextual language models including GPT-2 and BERT achieved 73% (Zellers et al., 2019).

Grover can be misused to mass produce plausible disinformation by adversaries. For example, Grover generated propaganda articles were rated as more trustworthy than human-produced ones of the same context by human judges (Zellers et al., 2019). Given this alarming ability, the capability to auto-detect the differences between machine and human-produced articles can reduce the risk of neural fake news spreading online.

Following the establishment of text-based perturbations by Jia and Liang (2017), studies on robustness interpretability through adversarial examples have grown rapidly through the Natural Language Processing (NLP) community (Vadillo, 2021; Zafar, 2021; Yuan, 2021). Since then, there have been several attempts to manipulate NLP models by character-level alterations on its input text. For example, Belinkov and Bisk (2017) demonstrated that synthetic and natural noise can cause state-of-the-art language translation models

\(^1\)From here on out, we will use ‘neural fake news’ and ‘machine-generated fake news’ interchangeably.
to fail. Gao (2018) also proposed DeepWord-Bug, a novel algorithm for small character perturbations causing drastic classification inaccuracies in tasks such as text classification, sentiment analysis, and spam detection. These studies conducted character-level perturbations to identify a lack of robustness within various mainstream language models.

In a similar manner, Grover, when acting as a defence mechanism against neural fake news, can face heavy adversarial scrutiny. Thus, following the direction of recent studies (Belinkov and Bisk, 2017; Gao, 2018), we conducted analyses through various adversarial attacks including character-level and token-level perturbations.

This paper presents an investigation of Grover to examine its performance change on various adversarial attacks. In our assessment, we find that Grover is highly susceptible to adversarial attacks with around 93% of target articles vulnerable to misclassification after alteration. Analysing the effects of successful perturbations, we identify a weakness within the model’s encoding framework which influences Grover’s classification scoring, with recorded score variations of 0.74 on average. In this work, we introduce our novel visualisation of cumulative classification score on various unaltered/altered articles and explore classification score polarity induced by adversarial attacks.

This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 accounts related work and Section 3 reports a general summary of Grover. Section 4 presents the experiments of adversarial attacks. Section 5 conveys the results of the experiments along with error analysis. Section 6 presents cumulative classification score visualisation and analysis on extreme polarity change. Finally, section 7 presents our concluding discussion.

2 Related Work

Recent studies on adversarial attacks in NLP follow a white-box approach leveraging accessible information from within a model as surveyed by Zhang (2020). Many studies have utilised a white-box gradient-based approach for various attacks such as character-based alterations (Ebrahimi, 2017, 2018; Liang, 2017), word-based alterations (Cheng, 2020; Liang, 2017; Neckhara, 2018), and word-based concatenations (Wallace, 2019; Behjati, 2019). Blohm (2018) used white-box model attention to attack a reading comprehension model as well as a question answering model.

Contrary to the white-box approach, Wolff and Wolff (2020) adopted a black-box approach and performed homoglyph and misspelling attacks on a variety of neural text classifiers including GPT-2, GLTR, RoBERTa, and Grover. They conducted adversarial attacks on 20 samples of Machine articles to draw comparison between leading neural classifiers and Grover yet refrain from exploring the results of Grover’s classification in detail. Our work includes the attack concepts from Wolff and Wolff’s work (2020) but explore singular applications of the attacks, rather than multiple applications. We also focus our analysis solely on Grover, studying the effect of the attacks produced on Grover, and its potential fragile points within the framework.

Visualising a language model’s outcome to increase a model’s interpretability is another recent trend in NLP. Gehrmann (2019) introduced GLTR, a visualisation tool (using statistical methods) that can detect generation artifacts across a sample and display its findings through coloured annotation on the input to support a human’s fake text detection. Stemming from this concept, we propose a novel visualisation approach through the plotting of cumulative classification scores. Our visualisation method aims to help a user to interpret how Grover is affected at each word vector and highlight key alteration artifacts within an article.

3 Grover

Grover consists of two components: a generator and a discriminator.

![Figure 1: A diagram of Grover examples for article generation. Note ~ Fig 2 from ‘Defending Against Neural Fake News’ by Zellers et al., 2019.](image-url)
3.1 Generator

The generator component of Grover comprises a novel architecture with adapted components of GPT-2. Grover, as shown in Figure 1, can generate the domain, date, headline, body, or author of a news article, given any subsetted combination of these fields. The generator comes in three versions – Grover-Base, consisting of 12 layers and 124 million parameters, Grover-Large, consisting of 24 layers and 355 million parameters, and Grover-Mega, with 48 layers and 1.5 billion parameters matching GPT-2’s architecture; each trained on successively larger datasets (comprised of real news articles scraped from common crawl\(^2\)).

3.2 Discriminator

The discriminator component of Grover acts as a detector of neurally generated articles. Utilising articles produced by the generator, the discriminator is trained to differentiate between machine-generated articles and human-produced articles. Articles can be classified on their own or with additional metadata such as domain, date, headline, and author, that aids prediction strength.

4 Experiments

The functionality of Grover’s discriminator, given either machine-generated articles (labelled as Machine) or human-produced articles (labelled as Human), is to produce a classification label of ‘Human’ or ‘Machine’ on each article. Input articles contain the body of an article, with or without metadata (title, domain, date, or authors).

To assess Grover’s robustness, we conducted experiments on the discriminator’s classification accuracy when classifying altered (adversarial attacked) Machine articles. Minor alterations (altering only one character or one word in a whole news article) have been performed on a subset of Machine articles applying four methods of adversarial attacks including (1) upper/lower flip, (2) homoglyph, (3) whitespace, and (4) misspelling. After each attack, the altered articles were submitted to Grover’s discriminator for reclassification and the classification results were investigated.

4.1 Discriminator Setup

For experiments, the publicly available pre-trained Grover Mega discriminator was used; the set-up contains Grover Mega config file and necessary checkpoints\(^3\). We ran the discriminator in its GPU configuration.

4.2 Dataset

Grover provides a dataset containing 12,000 articles with metadata\(^4\); it consists of 8,000 Human articles (RealNews dataset\(^5\)), and 4,000 Machine articles, which were generated using Grover’s generator (Grover-Mega). Submitting this dataset to Grover’s discriminator, we gain the predictions seen in Table 1. From the prediction we obtain a total accuracy of 0.93, a precision score of 0.85, a recall score of 0.94, and a F1 score of 0.89.

| True Class | Machine n=4000 | Human n=8000 |
|------------|----------------|--------------|
| Predicted Class |              |              |
| Machine     | TP (3,751)    | FP (649)     |
| Human       | FN (249)      | TN (7,351)   |

Table 1: Confusion Matrix of 12,000 articles classified by Grover Mega discriminator. True Positives (TP), False Positives (FP), False Negatives (FN), True Negatives (TN).

For our experiments, we sampled 100 articles with the highest true positive (TP) classification scores produced by the discriminator. This will be referenced as 100 Machine article subset. All articles selected have classification score over 0.49 where 0.5 is the maximum score an article could be assigned for a ‘Machine’ classification.

\(^{2}\)https://commoncrawl.org/
\(^{3}\)https://github.com/rowanz/grover/tree/master/discriminator
\(^{4}\)gs://grover-models/discrimination/generator=medium~discriminator=grover~discsize=medium~dataset=p=0.96/checkpoint
\(^{5}\)https://github.com/rowanz/grover/tree/master/realnews
4.3 Adversarial Attack Parameters

As news articles are written to a high level of coherency with minimal punctual mistakes or grammatical errors, an adversary would want to limit article alteration to preserve readability and ensure a human reader does not question the article’s credibility. To simulate this mindset, we limit the application of an attack to only a single change, such as one character or one-word alteration on an article, iterating the attack through the entirety of an article to assess all possible combinations for each attack’s relative application. As demonstrated in Table 2, the following four types of adversarial attacks were applied for the experiments:

1. **Upper/Lower Flip:** Uppercasing or lowercasing of a letter originally lowercased or uppercased respectively.

2. **Homoglyph:** Replacement of certain characters with their homoglyph equivalent from either the Greek or Cyrillic alphabet.

3. **Whitespace:** Removal of a space between adjacent words.

| Attack          | Alterations | Misclassifications (Proportion) | Affected Articles |
|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| U/L Flip        | 212,224     | 4,295 (2.02%)                   | 96%               |
| Homoglyph       | 157,532     | 6,914 (4.39%)                   | 97%               |
| Whitespace      | 46,036      | 1,447 (3.14%)                   | 85%               |
| Misspelling     | 43,789      | 4,281 (9.78%)                   | 94%               |

Table 2: Adversarial attacks and their respective change on an article. *The word ‘Fine’ in the homoglyph example contains Cyrillic ‘е’ ~ Unicode: U+x0435 compared to the regular Latin ‘e’ ~ Unicode: U+0065.

4.4 Adversarial Attack Results

We present the results from our adversarial attack experiments on Grover.

As shown in Table 3, character-level attacks (U/L Flip and Homoglyph) create a higher number of altered articles compared to word-level attacks (Whitespace and Misspelling). Based on the number of alterations, the Misspelling attack achieved the highest misclassification rates (nearly 10%) compared to the other three attacks which got a relatively lower rate of 2-4%.

Surprisingly, across the 100 Machine article subset, Homoglyph, U/L Flip and Misspelling attacks affected 97%, 96% and 94% of the target articles, respectively. Even the simplest attack, Whitespace attack, could affect 85% of the 100 target Machine articles. This suggests that Grover is highly susceptible to adversarial efforts.

Table 4 shows the ten most common words that affected (flipped the classification from ‘Machine’ to ‘Human’) Grover’s discriminator during adversarial attacks. Around 20% of...

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6We use 19 different Greek substitutions and 30 different Cyrillic substitutions. All substitutions can be found in the appendix.

7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Lists_of_common_misspellings/For_machines
misclassifications were caused by altering the words ‘that’, ‘the’ and ‘to’. Noticeably, the majority of the affected words are stop words.

4.5 Input Encoding

We observed in general which words were altered to elicit a misclassification. To assess how character-level perturbations affect Grover, we examined how the model interprets and scores a given input.

Grover uses a byte-pair encoder (BPE) to pre-process input data. BPE (Senrich et al., 2015) splits a given input into its largest subword units based on character co-occurrence frequency distribution and assigns each unit a pre-determined pairing ID. This turns a tokenised input into a vector of numbers.

Previously, BPEs have been found to be lacking in robustness when facing character-level perturbations (Heigold et al., 2017). In Table 5 we can see the effect that the upper/lower flip attack has on a particular sequence from one of the articles. The uppercasing of the letter ‘i’ in ‘hospital’ changes the subword unit allocation. Originally encoded as [4437], ‘hospital’ gets broken down into ‘hosp’, ‘It’, ‘al’ then encoded into [10497, 1027, 283].

5 Visual Analysis

Grover produces a classification score at each word vector, as it processes the input from left to right. If we successively and cumulatively feed Grover word vectors in sequential order, we can obtain a classification score at each step, allowing for a cumulative classification score to be recorded. Using the classification scores recorded at each increment as word vectors are appended to the accumulating input, we can visualise how these are perceived by Grover over the course of an entire input.

5.1 Cumulative Classification Score Visualisation

Human Articles: Figure 2 illustrates the cumulative classification score of five randomly selected Human articles from the original 8,000 Human article dataset. At the initial processing of the sequence, all articles start at a strong ‘Machine’ classification. As more of the respective input is processed, we see the articles’ classification scores increase toward ‘Human’ over time. It is observed that cumulative classification scores often plateau with greater encoded sequence lengths.

Table 4: Statistics of affected words from all misclassified inputs. POS is the part-of-speech tag for that respective word obtained from NLTK\(^5\). IN ~ Preposition, DT ~ Determiner, TO ~ To, CC ~ Coordinating Conjunction. Note we only take the top 10 most occurring words within the misclassified subset.

| Affected Word | Frequency | Proportion | POS |
|---------------|-----------|------------|-----|
| that          | 1639      | 8.92%      | IN  |
| the           | 1533      | 8.34%      | DT  |
| to            | 516       | 2.81%      | TO  |
| and           | 334       | 1.82%      | CC  |
| with          | 321       | 1.75%      | IN  |
| in            | 298       | 1.62%      | IN  |
| of            | 279       | 1.52%      | IN  |
| for           | 257       | 1.40%      | IN  |
| from          | 236       | 1.28%      | IN  |
| The           | 202       | 1.10%      | DT  |

Table 5: An original encoding sequence compared to the same encoded sequence after a single character alteration.

| Original Vector IDs | Altered Vector IDs |
|---------------------|--------------------|
| A 33 Romanian 34345 | Romanian 10497 hosp |
| hospital 4437      | It 1027 283 al     |
| will 482           | will               |
| face 1987          | face               |
| a 258              | a                  |
| fine 3735          | fine               |
| for 330            | for                |

\(^5\)https://www.nltk.org/
Machine Articles: Figure 3 shows the cumulative classification scores of five randomly selected Machine articles from our target dataset. As seen in the visualisation of Human articles, the beginning of each sequence starts at a strong ‘Machine’ classification. Over the early stages of the sequence, we see high classification score variance due to the limited word vectors processed. Over time, the selected Machine articles tend to return to a strong ‘Machine’ classification, plateauing toward the end of the encoded sequence.

False Negative (FN) Case: Figure 4 presents the cumulative classification score of one of the misclassified articles from our experiments. The red line indicates the location of the adversarial attack within the encoded sequence. In this example, the input word ‘that’ was transformed into ‘thaT’ by U/L Flip attack which uppercased the second ‘t’. At the point where Grover processed the altered word vector, the classification score of the article dropped dramatically, falling a total of 0.98. This large variation in classification score due to alteration will be discussed in terms of ‘Extreme Polarity Change’ in section 5.2.

True Positive (TP) Case: Figure 5 demonstrates the cumulative classification score of a Machine article that had its classification unaffected after an adversarial attack. Again, the red line indicates the location of the attack. In this example, the input word, ‘These’ was altered to ‘these’ by the U/L Flip attack which lowercased the first ‘T’. This alteration causes a very minimal change in classification score at the site of alteration.

5.2 Extreme Polarity Change

From visualising a FN case’s cumulative classification scores, we observed a large change in classification score at the point of an adversarial attack. To analyse whether all FN cases show a drastic variation in classification score, we took a random sample of 500 FN case articles and 500 TP case articles from each of the four adversarial attacks. In total, we examined the 4,000 articles’ classification score at each point of the adversarial attack. The average score variation of each subset is shown in Table 6.
The FN cases had a much higher average variation in classification score compared to the TP cases as shown in Table 7. This implies that particular alterations caused Grover’s classification score to drop dramatically (at the site of an attack) ultimately affecting the final prediction produced by Grover.

### Table 6: Average classification score variation at the point of an attack within an input.

| Attack          | TP Subset | FN Subset |
|-----------------|-----------|-----------|
| U/L Flip        | 0.12      | 0.76      |
| Homoglyph       | 0.17      | 0.81      |
| Whitespace      | 0.04      | 0.70      |
| Misspelling     | 0.21      | 0.69      |
| **Average**     | **0.14**  | **0.74**  |

6 Discussion

In this study, the robustness of Grover’s discriminator was assessed through various adversarial attacks. We found that even a singular character change can cause the model to fail. Through analyses of successful perturbations, it was found that Grover’s encoder is highly sensitive to selected perturbations, causing downstream effects in classification assignment.

We conducted a broad implementation of adversarial attacks and identified vulnerabilities in single alterations on certain types of words. These results outline potential dependencies within Grover’s language modelling which could be potentially extorted by adversaries through implementation of multiple instances of an adversarial attack across an article or an adversary targeting and affecting more than one key word outlined in Table 4.

To the best of our knowledge, the proposed visualisation of cumulative classification scores are novel, allowing interpretation of model behaviour, as it gives a user the ability to visually understand the effects that each word vector has at its relative point of inference as well as the effects that alterations may produce on the classification prediction.

Our findings open various paths for further exploration. Our adversarial attacks’ focus was exclusively directed onto the body of an article. One path for future work could consist of focussing adversarial attacks on the metadata of an article.

Further exploring Grover’s robustness. Our visualisation of cumulative classification scores highlighted the effects some character-level alterations had on the classification score of an article. The large score variations noted could allow for work to be done in the field of adversarial attack detection. Finally, the nature of our assessment was broad and based on a black-box approach. Furthering our work, the undertaking of a white-box approach could be performed to explore model interpretability.

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**Supplementary Material**

**Appendix A:** Full list of Latin characters with their respective Greek and Cyrillic substitutions and all respective character Unicode.

| Original (Basic Latin) Letter ~ Unicode | Greek Letter ~ Unicode | Cyrillic Letter ~ Unicode |
|----------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| A ~ U+0041 a ~ U+0061                  | A ~ U+x0391            | A ~ U+x0410 a ~ U+x0430   |
| B ~ U+0042 b ~ U+0062                  | B ~ U+x0392            | B ~ U+x0412 b ~ U+x044C   |
| C ~ U+0043 c ~ U+0063                  | C ~ U+x2CA3 c ~ U+x03C2| C ~ U+x0421 c ~ U+x0441   |
| E ~ U+0045 e ~ U+0065                  | E ~ U+x0395            | E ~ U+x0415 e ~ U+x0435   |
| F ~ U+0046                             | F ~ U+x03DC            |                          |
| H ~ U+0048 h ~ U+0068                  | H ~ U+x0397            | H ~ U+x041D h ~ U+x04BB   |
| I ~ U+0049 i ~ U+0069                  | I ~ U+x0399            | I ~ U+x0406 i ~ U+x0456   |
| J ~ U+004a j ~ U+006a                  | J ~ U+x0408            | J ~ U+x0458               |
| K ~ U+004b                             | K ~ U+x039A            | K ~ U+x041A               |
| M ~ U+004d                             | M ~ U+x039C            | M ~ U+x041C               |
| N ~ U+004e                             | N ~ U+x039D            |                          |
| O ~ U+004f o ~ U+006f                  | O ~ U+x039F o ~ U+x03BF| O ~ U+x041E o ~ U+x043E   |
| P ~ U+0050 p ~ U+0070                  | P ~ U+x03A1            | P ~ U+x0420 p ~ U+x0440   |
| S ~ U+0053 s ~ U+0073                  | S ~ U+x0405            | S ~ U+x0455               |
| T ~ U+0054                             | T ~ U+x03A3            | T ~ U+x0422               |
| V ~ U+0056 v ~ U+0076                  | v ~ U+x03BD            | V ~ U+x0474 v ~ U+x0475   |
| w ~ U+0077                             |                        | w ~ U+x0461               |
| X ~ U+0058 x ~ U+0078                  | X ~ U+x03A7            | X ~ U+x0425 x ~ U+x0445   |
| Y ~ U+0059 y ~ U+0079                  | Y ~ U+x03A5            | Y ~ U+x04AE y ~ U+x0443   |
| Z ~ U+005a z ~ U+007a                  | Z ~ U+x036             |                          |