Chhoyhopper: A Moving Target Defense with IPv6

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ABSTRACT
Services on the public Internet are frequently scanned, then subject to brute-force and denial-of-service attacks. We would like to run such services stealthily, available to friends but hidden from adversaries. In this work, we propose a moving target defense named "Chhoyhopper" that utilizes the vast IPv6 address space to conceal publicly available services. The client and server to hop to different IPv6 addresses in a pattern based on a shared, pre-distributed secret and the time-of-day. By hopping over a /64 prefix, services cannot be found by active scanners, and passively observed information is useless after two minutes. We demonstrate our system with SSH, and show that it can be extended to other applications.

KEYWORDS
IPv6, Moving target defense, SSH

1 INTRODUCTION
Services on the public Internet are frequently scanned, then subject to brute-force and denial-of-service attacks. IPv4 scanning has been possible for more than a decade [6] and recent tools allow scanning all of IPv4 in minutes [1, 5]. Regular scanning is done by many parties [14]. We would like to provide stealthy services on the public Internet, available to friends but hidden from adversaries.

IPv6 provides a huge address space in which we can hide services. In spite of attempts to discover active addresses, when every LAN has 2^{64} addresses (or more), active discovery of services on intentially obscure addresses is intractable (see §3). With /48s as the recommended minimum size of publically routable prefix [13], and /56s recommended for homes [9], even with a million devices in a home, quintillions of addresses remain unused on every network.

The contribution of our paper is to propose a moving target defense, Chhoyhopper\(^1\), that uses the vast IPv6 address space to conceal publicly available services. The client and server to hop to different IPv6 addresses in a pattern based on a shared, pre-distributed secret and the time-of-day. By hopping over a /64 prefix, services cannot be found by active scanners, and passively observed information is useless after two minutes. We demonstrate our system with SSH, and show that it can be extended to other applications.

\(^1\)Chhoy is the number "six" in Bengali, since we hop in IPv6.

Related work: Our work builds on ideas in privacy-preserving IPv6 address assignment [3, 4], but while that work proposes updating addresses daily with a fixed pattern, we accelerate hopping each minute to service as an active defense against scanning. Our work is similar to port knocking [2, 7], but it hides in IPv6 rather than requiring "wake-up" packets. Closest to our work is IPv4-based port-hopping [8]; we take advantage of much larger IPv6 space (2^{64}) compared to the quite limited IPv4 port space (2^{16}).

Availability: Our implementation is freely available at https://ant.isi.edu/software/chhoyhopper/.

2 CHHOYHOPPER DESIGN
Our goal is to allow the client to rendezvous with the server on a public, but temporary IPv6 address. By allocating the temporary address from a large space (2^{64} addresses), scanning is impractical, as we show in §3. By changing the address frequently, reuse of a passively observed temporary address is only possible for a very brief window of time. The hopping pattern is cryptographically secure, so prior active addresses reveal nothing about future addresses.

Figure 1 shows the components of our system, and we describe them next: selection and lifetime of the temporary address, hopping on the server, and hopping by the client.

Address Hopping Pattern: The client and server must follow the same hopping pattern to rendezvous. We assume they share a pre-distributed secret key, which may be distributed by several means, such as face-to-face sharing ahead-of-time, through a secure channel such as encrypted e-mail. Our requirement for this secret means Chhoyhopper cannot be used for anonymous clients to discover a server, since scanners could exploit any discovery process.

The server and the client compute the same temporary address by computing a cryptographic hash of the shared secret, a salt value, and the current time in minutes. We use the
We assume the server’s secret key and the salt are known and can vary by service or deployment.

We compute the IPv6 address in two parts. We take the DNS name of the service address and look up a full IPv6 address, but replace the low 64-bits of the address with the top 64-bits of the hash result. Use of DNS allows the service to move in the Internet and provides a user-friendly name. DNSSEC should be used to ensure that the DNS lookup of the top IPv6 address bits is not subject to a person-in-the-middle attack. We discuss the potential of collisions in §3.

Server-Side Hopping: The server tracks its current address, changing it every minute. To avoid problems with clock skew, the server listens to two addresses, one for the current minute and the other for the nearest adjacent minute.

It is cumbersome for server software to change its service address every minute, and we would rather not modify server software. We therefore operate the server on a fixed address that is firewallled from the public Internet. A daemon then uses network address translation to map the currently active addresses through the firewall to the internal fixed address. NAT translation also ensures that once a connection is established it continues to operate, even after the server moves to other addresses for new connections.

To summarize server processing in Figure 1: (i) new flows to the current and prior address are detected by NAT rules and establish new connection state before being passed to the internal server address, (ii) existing flows are detected by NAT and pass through to the internal address, (iii) Any other addresses, including external traffic sent to the “internal” server address, are dropped by the server’s firewall.

Our NAT-manipulation daemon is a simple Python program modifying Linux iptables. The daemon assigns the NAT rules to a particular external interface on the server.

Hopping at the Client: The client must compute and use the server’s current IPv6 address to begin a new connection. We assume the server’s secret key and the salt are known to the client, so the client does the same hash computation as the server. As with the server, the client looks up an IPv6 address from DNS and replaces the low-64 bits with the current temporary hash.

Our client implementation for SSH uses a simple Python program which invokes the native client with appropriate arguments. We also plan to provide a Chhoyhopper client as a patch to OpenSSH.

Other Applications: To date we have only implemented Chhoyhopper for SSH. In principle it can apply to any connection-based application. We have considered, but not yet implemented, an implementation for HTTP.

The main challenge in supporting an application is to transparently interpose between the client and the server. Since our implementation requires no server-side changes, supporting new servers is easy.

Our client implementation for SSH requires the users to employ a new SSH front-end when they start the connection. A client for HTTP is more difficult since a web browser regularly creates many new connections. We have considered two approaches: a browser-side plugin could detect and rewrite outgoing connections to hosts that match servers with Chhoyhopper support. Second, an HTTP proxy could handle this mapping. Both approaches are potential future work.

3 ANALYSIS

Risk of Discovery: To estimate the difficulty of brute-force scanning, consider a scanner scanning at 100Gb/s looking for a server hopping in one /64 with 64B TCP SYNs. At that rate (scanning $2 \times 10^8$ addresses per second) the expected time to discover one server is about 3000 years, at which point the adversary will have at most two minutes to exploit it. Since the address space is huge compared to the scanning rate, we are confident that brute-force scanning is impractical. Since the address is hopping randomly, intelligent scanning is not possible.

Risk of Collisions: When multiple servers share the same /64 address prefix, it is possible that they could collide and hop to the same address. A concerned operator should assign a unique IPv6 address every minute that is not used by any other server. However, we suggest that odds of collision is so low that collision avoidance is unnecessary.

Collisions of hopping addresses is equivalent to the well-known Birthday Problem, but rather than $n$ people in 365 days of the year, we have $k$ servers in $2^{64}$ addresses. Using a simplified approximation, the probability of a hash collision in any given minute is $1 - e^{-\frac{k}{2^{64}}} \approx e^{-\frac{k}{2^{64}}}$. [11]. Using this formula, the probability of an address mapped into the $k$ of 1 million addresses is only 1 in 37 million. As we generate an address every minute, we can expect a collision with these million servers once in every 70 years. This failure rate is considerably less than DRAM failures due to cosmic radiation [12].

4 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we provide an implementation of a moving target defense named “Chhoyhopper” to provide security utilizing the huge IPv6 address space. Using our system, a service will hop over different IPv6 addresses, and a client needs to find the current IPv6 address to connect. We implement our approach for SSH application, and in future we plan to provide support for other applications.
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