P = NP

The Kleene-Rosser Paradox

The Liar’s Paradox

&

A Fuzzy Logic Programming Paradox

⇒

SAT is (NOT) NP-complete

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What is a Turing machine?

Impeptuous Fire,
Syntactico-Semantical!
Ice and Desire,
Computation wags on...

[Turing à la “Romeo & Juliet”]

Abstract

After examining the P versus NP problem against the Kleene-Rosser paradox of the λ-calculus [94], it was found that it represents a counter-example to NP-completeness. We prove that it contradicts the proof of Cook’s theorem. A logical formalization of the liar’s paradox leads to the same result. This formalization of the liar’s paradox into a computable form is a 2-valued instance of a fuzzy logic programming paradox discovered in the system of [90]. Three proofs that show that SAT is (NOT) NP-complete are presented. The counter-example classes to NP-completeness are also counter-examples to Fagin’s theorem [36] and the Immermann-Vardi theorem [89,110], the fundamental results of descriptive complexity. All these results show that ZF⁺C is inconsistent.
1. Introduction and the Kleene-Rosser Paradox:

This paper examines well-known paradoxes against the fundamental question in complexity theory, i.e. the P vs. NP problem. The Kleene-Rosser paradox of the inconsistent λ-calculus discovered in 1935 and a computable formalization of the liar’s paradox which is well-known to happen in natural languages. The liar’s paradox formalization happens to be a 2-valued special case of a more general multi-valued one. The later being the case of the fuzzy logic programming paradox of the system in [90]. If the P versus NP problem was ever examined against any of those paradoxes, it would have soon been discovered that it is a straightforward counter-example to NP-completeness.

Let $L_\lambda$ be the language defined by the following function when combined with itself, thus $kk$:

$$k = (\lambda x. \neg(xx))$$

one then may deduce

$$kk = (\lambda x.\neg(xx))k = \neg(kk)$$

Obviously, the language $L_\lambda$ is decidable and in P. However, it is obvious $L_\lambda \not\leq_p \text{SAT}$, as how strings which are both “true” and “false” can be converted to strings which are either “true” or “false”. The counter-argument that a Turing machine cannot diagonalize against itself leads to the fact that $L_\lambda$ would be a counter-example to the the Church-Turing thesis instead of being a counter-example to NP-completeness. It is implausible to consider such a simply computable language as uncomputable. Also, writing $L_\lambda$ as a series of infinite non-halting computations simply ignores that it is programmably implemented and certainly halts. The following proof shows that this paradox results in NP-completeness undefinability when the language $L_\lambda$ is assumed to exist.

**Definition 1:** Let $LIAR_{Lang}$ be the class of all languages written in the LIAR logic system and $FLP_{Lang}$ be the class of all languages written in the FLP logic system (defined below), then the class $SySBPD = \{L_\lambda : L_\lambda \equiv \text{The Kleene-Rosser paradox}, L_\lambda \in LIAR_{Lang}, L_\lambda \in FLP_{Lang}\}$.

**Definition 2:** Let $M_\lambda$ be a program that checks for paradoxes, i.e. a paradox recognizer. A computation $M_\lambda$ on $w_\lambda \in L_\lambda$ prints “Yes” if $w_\lambda$ is an instance of a paradox, i.e. $w_\lambda = \text{“True”}$ iff $w_\lambda = \text{“False”}$ So:

1. $M_\lambda$ accepts $w_\lambda \in L_\lambda$ iff $w_\lambda$ is paradoxical, otherwise.

2. $M_\lambda$ rejects $w_\lambda \in L_\lambda$ iff $w_\lambda$ is satisfiable.
**Theorem 1.1:** (Main Theorem) SAT is NOT NP-complete.

The line of argumentation of the original proof of CNF SAT being NP-complete is as follows as in [21] and quoted from [37]:

“Let $A$ be a language in $\textbf{NP}$ accepted by a non-deterministic Turing machine $M$: Fix an input $x$. We will create a 3CNF formula $\phi$ that will be satisfiable if and only if there is a proper tableau for $M$ and $x$.”

**Proof:**

1. Let $M = M_\lambda, A = L_\lambda, x = w_\lambda$.
2. $\implies M_\lambda$ accepts $w_\lambda$.
3. SAT is NP-complete.
4. $\implies [\forall w_{\lambda} \in L_{\lambda} \exists$ a proper tableau for $M_{\lambda}$ and $w_{\lambda}] \iff [\phi$ is satisfiable].
5. $\implies \phi$ is satisfiable $\iff M_{\lambda}$ accepts $w_{\lambda}$.
6. But $w_{\lambda}$ is paradoxical, as a paradox.
7. $\implies \phi$ is satisfiable $\iff w_{\lambda}$ is paradoxical.
8. $\phi$ is satisfiable $\iff$ “False”.
9. $\phi$ is paradoxical.
10. $\overline{\exists} \phi : \phi$ is satisfiable.
11. SAT is (NOT) NP-complete. ■

**Theorem 1.2:** SAT is (NOT) NP-complete.

**Proof:**

1. SAT is NP-complete.
2. $\implies \forall w_{ij} \in L_i \exists f(w_{ij}) = w_{\text{SAT}} \in \text{SAT}$.
3. Let $w_{ij} = w_{\lambda j}$, then $\exists f(w_{\lambda j}) = w_{\text{SAT}_j}$.
4. $w_{\lambda j}$ is “true” iff “false” while $w_{\text{SAT}_j}$ is either “true” or “false”.
5. $\overline{\exists} f : f(w_{ij}) = w_{\text{SAT}} \forall w_{\lambda j}$.
6. SAT is (NOT) NP-complete. ■
Theorem 1.3: P = NP.

Proof:

1. SAT is (NOT) NP-complete.
2. \(\implies\) NP-complete = \(\emptyset\).
3. \(\implies\) P = NP.

Thus, the Kleene-Rosser paradox known as early as 1935 is sufficient to overturn all NP-completeness results. However, other logical languages may have paradoxical behavior as shown below. Note the misconception of a Turing machine cannot risk contradiction is due to considering it as an encoded integer with no regard to its semantics. Obviously, no integer can form a paradox. A paradox is an absolutely logical situation which is related to language. Some may transform the Kleene-Rosser paradox as an example of an infinite loop. Concealing this paradox into a physical Turing machine that does not halt would not eliminate it as it is in the language. The liar’s paradox which exists in natural language can be easily formalized as below leading to the same above result. Church’s \(\lambda\)-calculus is equivalent to Turing machines among other computational models.

The Syntactico-Semantical Bi-Polar Disorder Turing Machine Paradox

Since the P versus NP problem has all its roots in the mathematics foundation crisis in the early XX\(^{th}\) century, an attempt to examine the reason behind these (negative) results introduce the “Syntactico-Semantical Bi-Polar Disorder” explained below. The XX\(^{th}\) century most important results were re-organized as below:

1. Self-referential SySBPD:
   (a) Russell’s paradox.
   (b) The Liar’s paradox.

2. Gödel Completeness/Incompleteness SySBPD; note the relationship between the proof of his celebrated incompleteness theorem and the Liar’s paradox.

3. Turing Decidability/Undecidability SySBPD.
4. Finiteness/Infiniteness *SySBPD*: results in finite model theory that succeed infinitely and fail finitely. Most importantly, Gödel’s completeness theorem which is:

(a) *Positive*: Completeness/Incompleteness *SySBPD*.
(b) *Negative*: Finiteness/Infiniteness *SySBPD*.

All these *SySBPD’s* are instances of the “*Syntactico-Semantical Precedence/Principality Bi-Polar Disorder*”. Note that Gödel completeness theorem is considered a positive results in automated deduction and related areas while considered negative in finite model theory as it fails finitely.

1. Precedence: syntax definition precedes semantics:
   \[ \text{Syntax} \prec \text{Semantics} \]
   **Precedence**.

2. Principality: during computation the input takes various syntactic forms where semantics is principal over syntax in every computation step:
   \[ \text{Semantics} \prec \text{Syntax} \]
   **Principality**.

3. (1) & (2) \implies [Syntax] \lll [Semantics], i.e. Bi-Polar Disorder.

The question: “Are the XXth the only *SySBPD’s*” led to the discovery of all recent results. Now, we have the Syntactico-Semantical Bi-Polar Disorder Turing machine NP-completeness Paradox as:

\[ \text{SAT is NP-complete} \iff \text{SAT is (NOT) NP-complete} \]

which is simply because:

\[ w \text{ is paradoxical} \iff \text{M accepts } w \iff A(w) \text{ is satisfiable} \]

where \( A(w) \) [21]:

\[ A(w) = B \land C \land D \land E \land F \land G \land H \land I \]

and because \( P_{s,t}^i \) are propositional variables in \( A(w) \)

\[ P_{1,1}^i \land P_{2,1}^i \land \ldots \land P_{n,1}^i \text{ is satisfiable iff } w \text{ is paradoxical} \]

The reason for the paradox is that Cooks’s theorem is still true despite all the results above and below of *SAT* being (NOT) NP-complete. Recent results were obtained solely via logical syntactico-semantical proofs. On the other hand
Cook’s proof mixes the physical world with the mental world. The formula $A(w)$ in [21] consists of propositional symbols which refer to the physical nature of the Turing machine to prove a property of the set of strings it processes. While the formula is satisfiable from a physical point-of-view, it is not always the case from a logical point-of-view. It is clear that the proof in [21] does not make an account of the meaning of the string $w$ when there is a reference of a computation $M$ on input $w$. $A(w)$ is derived from the machine physical nature during the computation. An example of those physical facts is that if the machine tape head is at the location $k$, then the next computation must be either $k + 1$ or $k - 1$. This - among many other similar thing - while being a true (physical) property of the machine itself, it may not have implications on the properties of the language being processed. This is the “Syntactic-Semantical Bi-Polar Disorder Turing machine NP-completeness Paradox” which can be stated more clearly as:

“A logically satisfiable formula $A(w)$ can always be constructed from the logically paradoxical string $w$”

The source of this contradiction is $w$ has no connection with physics, while $A(w)$ does have. They both meet in the realm of “Syntax” while they never do in the realm of “Semantics”, hence a syntactico-semantical paradox, which is an irreparable disorder of computation and mathematics. It is possible for a semantic proof to overturn a syntactic one, but not in this case when the proof derives from the physical properties of the non-deterministic Turing machine itself. Obviously, no proof (syntactic or semantic) can overturn any physical fact, e.g. that if the Turing machine head is at location $k$, then the next computation step must be either at location $k - 1$ or at $k + 1$. This is a physical fact. The propositional symbols constructed in the proof are mostly derived in this way.

2. The Liar’s Paradox:

The following theorem proves a formalization of the Liar’s paradox in a Prolog style programming language. Thus, self-referential paradoxical languages can be represented in a programming language as well as in the above inconsistent λ-calculus (recursion vs. self-reference). It is to be noted that self-reference has been removed from first-order logic deliberately a priori in order to avoid such contradictions. However, its elimination does mean that those contradictions do not exist in the languages (elements) of $P$ and $NP$. Consider:

$$P = \{L_1, L_2, L_3, \ldots, L_i, L_j, L_k, \ldots\}.$$ 

Obviously, $L_\lambda$ exists as some language in $P$ as well as other paradoxical languages like $L \in LIAR$ below. It is of no help to preclude them.

**Theorem 2.1:** The Liar’s Paradox $\equiv \{\text{English}(\text{John}, \text{False})\}$.

**Proof:**
1. The Liar’s Paradox $\equiv \{\text{This sentence is False}\}$.

2. $\Rightarrow \{\text{This sentence is False}\} \equiv \{A = A \text{ is False}\}$.

3. $\Rightarrow \{\text{English(John,False)}\} \equiv \{A = A \text{ is False}\}$.

4. $\Rightarrow \{\text{This sentence is False}\} \equiv \{\text{English(John,False)}\}$.

5. $\Rightarrow$ The Liar’s Paradox $\equiv \{\text{English(John,False)}\}$. ■

The LIAR logic system has the same FLP [90] syntax and semantics but with truth constants restricted only to two values. Its formulas would look like: $P(f(t), false)$, where $f$ is a recursive function over the recursive term $t$. Simply, the Prolog atom: English(John,False) would be a statement that asserts its own falsehood if and only if it is true, hence a paradox. The first question to address is such statements do exist or do not exist. The liar’s paradox do exist in natural language and is well-known for more than two millennia. To assume it is not formalizable in any computable form would never mean that it does not exist. Such an assumption would not stand the test of time against a self-referential question such as P vs. NP which is itself a question in NP. The deliberate elimination of self-reference that may have helped the development of logic would hinder the progress of attacking this question. The reason is that in the development of a logical language, or a class of languages in a logic system, no such a question of whether an infinite class is equal/or not to another infinite class is addressed. Further, in a logical language one is interested to remove any inconsistency a priori. In attacking P vs. NP, one cannot assume the Kleene-Rosser paradox above does not exist nor ignore its implications. Logical programming languages with paradoxes can be developed like formalizing the Liar’s paradox above which happens to be a 2-valued instance of the multi-valued fuzzy logic programming paradox below.

3. The Fuzzy Logic Programming Paradox:

There is a vast literature with large number of results in both “Mathematical Fuzzy Logic” and “Fuzzy Logic Programming”, (see the references). Mathematical fuzzy logic systems were developed by Hajek [50-87], Esteva [26,29-35], Godo [37-49] and others. Systems like BL, Lukasiewicz, Gödel and Product logics have been formulated with various rigorous properties and have become standard. Fuzzy logic programming and possibilistic logic programming systems in the works of Godo and Alsinet et al. [1-18], Vojtas et al. [111-115] were developed with large number of soundness and completeness results with interesting properties. Variations as the multi-adjoint logic programming was developed by
Medina et al. [98-101]. The huge number of results is clear and of course this is not an exhaustive listing.

The first use of truth constants in the language syntax first appeared in Pavelka’s logic [106] as early as 1979. Before that, truth was expressed only in the language semantics as in Łukasiewicz and Kleene many-valued logics. Pavelka extended Łukasiewicz logic with rational truth constants. Novak [102-105], in his weighted inference systems developed a syntax of pairs: (formula, truth value). Expansions of other logics with truth constants in Esteva et al. 2000, and recently in Esteva et al. 2006 [23-25,27], and Savicky et al. 2006 [108]. In 2007, truth constants appeared in Esteva et al. [28]. The work of Straccia et al. [19,20,96,107,109] in fuzzy description logics employed truth constants as well. So, the idea of having a truth constant in the language syntax is well-established.

A counter-example to the NP-completeness property written in FLP [90] language is presented. A class of infinite number of languages is characterized - SySBPD: the syntactico-semantic bi-polar disorder class including all paradoxical languages of FLP as well as that of the liar’s paradox and $\lambda$-calculus. Each element in this class constitutes a counter-example as well. A one-step computation $L$ is introduced to motivate the presentation. Theorem 3.1 establishes the paradox and theorem 4.1 shows that $L$ is decidable and $L \in P$. Theorem 4.2 establishes the counter-example and shows that SAT is NOT NP-complete using the same proof of the Kleene-Rosser paradox.

First, we recall the fact the syntax of FLP is absolutely classical. All the well-formed formulas of FLP are well-formed formulas of classical logic. However, FLP uses non-classical semantics for the same classical syntax. First, the classical definition of an Herbrand interpretation and an Herbrand model are recalled. Second, it is shown that if truth constants are allowed in the language syntax in the sense of [90], then every Herbrand interpretation of any FLP language is a model iff it is not a model, when the case of FLP collapses to classical logic, i.e. $\mu = "0"$ or $\mu = "1"$; the FLP paradox is the liar’s paradox. This is the “Syntactico-Semantical Bi-Polar Disorder FLP Paradox”. All LIAR well-formed formulas are FLP well-formed formulas. This is why refuting the FLP paradox necessitates refuting its special 2-valued version which is the liar’s paradox. It is not easy to refute the liar’s paradox nor to show that it is impossible to be formalized in a programming language resulting in the above discussed consequences.

**Definition 3.1:** Let $L$ be a language over an alphabet $\Sigma$ containing at least one constant symbol. The set $U_L$ of all ground terms constructed from functions and constants in $L$ is called the Herbrand universe of $L$. The set $B_L$ of all ground atomic formulas over $L$ is called the Herbrand base of $L$. 
Definition 3.2: The Herbrand interpretation $I_L$ for a language $L$ is a structure $I_L \equiv < I_c, I_f, I_p >$ whose domain of discourse is $U_L$ where:

1. $\forall c \in L : c$ is a constant:
   
   $$ I_c(c) = c $$

2. $\forall f \in L : f$ is a function symbol of arity $n$, and $t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n$ are terms:
   
   $$ I_f(f)(t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n) = f(I(t_1), \ldots, I(t_n)) $$

3. $\forall p \in L : p$ is a predicate of arity $n$:
   
   $$ I_p(p) : B_L \rightarrow \{0, 1\} $$

Definition 3.3: The Herbrand interpretation $I_L$ for a language $L$ is a model iff $I_L : B_L \rightarrow \{1\} \land B_L \not\rightarrow \{0\}$.  

Let $L$ be the classical logic program consisting of the single (ground) fact:

$$ p(c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_n) \leftarrow $$

and let $c_n = \mu \in C \subseteq [0, 1]$ be a truth constant. If $I_L$ is an Herbrand interpretation for $L$, then $I_L$ is a model iff it is not a model. $I_L$ interprets the predicate symbol $p$ (classically) as a relation between the domains from which the n-tuple $(c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_n)$ is extracted. The last member of the tuple $c_n$ is a real number in a countable $C \subseteq [0, 1]$. When constant symbols are interpreted in classical semantics, it banishes an argument of a predicate to be the truth constant of the same predicate. FLP non-classical semantics enforces an argument of a predicate to be a truth constant of the same predicate. Semantics of formal languages are enforced in the same way as in natural languages. Since the string “main” over the Latin alphabet is interpreted differently in English and French (the word “main” in French means “hand”). Obviously,

$$ Oxford(main) \neq Larousse(main) $$

$$ I_{L_{\text{Classical}}} (p) \neq I_{L_{\text{FLP}}} (p) $$

Neither the English people may ask the French to follow Oxford dictionary, nor the French may ask the English to follow Larousse. Forbidding arguments of a predicate to be the truth constant of the same predicate is equally unacceptable. Moreover, in the case of the P vs. NP question, the entire scientific community is pre-occupied with ANY set of strings (a language) that may separate the two
classes. Usually, a set of strings in \( \text{NP} \) and not in \( \text{P} \), hence the question is settled. Let alone the self-referential nature of the question, i.e. \( \text{P} \) vs. \( \text{NP} \) is a question in \( \text{NP} \). So, if \( X \) is the decision problem \( X \equiv \text{P} =? \text{NP} \), then \( X \in \text{NP} \). But classes are (forbidden) to be elements, so such an argument is a metamathematical/philosophical one (\( X \) is not a valid mathematical object). Just consider an analogy of the question: \( x? = y, x \in N, y \in R \). Obviously, this later question is an ill-posed one.

For the above considerations, the author is not deterred to enforce such semantics on the same syntax of classical logic, then examine the consequences. Forbidding such semantics won’t help because both classes contain infinite number of languages. Any method to forbid such semantics can obviously be eliminated with a counter-part to enforce whatever semantics to examine its implications to this long outstanding question. In other words, a counter-argument against \( \text{FLP} \) non-classical semantics should prove that such languages don’t exist at all. The fact that it leads to paradoxical and inconsistent computations never means that these computations are wrong or meaningless. The attached two meta-interpreters work quite well meaningfully from a practical engineering point-of-view. The reason for this is that in a logic programming system, the user is interested in answer substitutions rather than logical consequences as in automatic theorem proving. Cantor’s set theory has its famous paradoxes, one can never argue it is wrong, though initially it was controversial. The following theorem proves that languages written in \( \text{FLP} \) can have interpretations consisting of paradoxical structures.

**Theorem 3.1:** Let \( L \) be the classical logic program consisting of the single (ground) fact:

\[
p(c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_n) \leftarrow
\]

and let \( c_n = \mu \in C \subseteq [0, 1] \) be a truth constant. If \( I_L \) is an Herbrand interpretation for \( L \), then \( I_L \) is a model iff it is not a model.

**Proof:**

1. \( I_L \equiv < I_c, I_f, I_p > \equiv < I_c, I_p > \).
2. \( \Rightarrow I_c(c_1) = c_1. \)
3. \( \Rightarrow I_c(c_2) = c_2. \)
4. \( \cdots \)
5. \( \cdots \)
6. \( \cdots \)
7. ⇒ $I_{c_{n-1}} = c_{n-1}$.
8. ⇒ $I_c(\mu) = \mu \in [0, 1]$.
9. ⇒ $I_p \in \{0, 1\}$.
10. ⇒ $I_L \equiv < I_c, I_p >$.
11. ⇒ $I_L \equiv < I_c \in [0, 1], I_p \in \{0, 1\} >$
12. ⇒ $\forall I_c \in [0, 1], I_L$ is a model iff it is not a model ■

4. The FLP Counter-Example to NP-completeness:

Consider an FLP program (when FLP is mentioned in this paper, it is meant as defined in [90]). The definition of a fuzzy atom in FLP is:

$$p(t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n, \mu)$$

Where $\mu \in [0, 1]$ is the truth constant. This atom is a classical one despite the weight attached to it. Consider the FLP program consisting of one fact:

$$\text{Age-About-21(John,0.9)} \leftarrow$$

The syntax of this program constitutes a well-formed formula of classical logic programming. Consider the goal:

$$\leftarrow \text{Age-About-21(John,\mu)}.$$ 

This goal succeeds with two contradictory truth values, namely “1” and “0.9”. In computation theory terms, this logic program is a Turing machine $M$ that codes the input string “John” with both “Yes” and “No” at the same time. One for the truth value $\mu = “1”$ and the other for $\mu = “0.9”$, and vice versa. In other words, if the Turing machine halts in the $q_{\text{accept}}$ state, its tape symbols imply that it is in the $q_{\text{reject}}$ state. On the other hand, if it halts in the $q_{\text{reject}}$ state, its tape symbols imply that it is in the $q_{\text{accept}}$ state. This is the $SySBPD$ “Syntactico-Semantical Bi-Polar Disorder” paradox. Since the atom in FLP is a classical one despite the weight attached to it, it is both classical and fuzzy. So, the $SySBPD$ paradox is due to the fact that: “$p$ is fuzzy iff $p$ is not fuzzy”, or “$p$ is two-valued iff $p$ is many-valued” where $p$ is an atom of FLP. The syntax/semantics dichotomy is bi-polarity, and the paradox is the undesirable disorder.

**Theorem 4.1:** Let $L$ be the language defined by the above program, then $L$ is decidable and $L \in P$.

**Proof:**

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As in [21], \( t_M(w) \) denotes the number of steps in the computation of \( M \) on input \( w \), and \( T_M(n) \) the worst case run time of \( M \):

\[
T_M(n) = \max\{t_M(w) | w \in \Sigma^n\}
\]

where \( \Sigma^n \) is the set of all strings over \( \Sigma \) of length \( n \). Let \( M \) be the Turing machine associated with the one step computation defined above, clearly:

1. \( T_M(n) = m \in \mathbb{N} \).
2. \( \Rightarrow t_M(w) \neq \infty \).
3. \( \Rightarrow L \) is decidable.
4. \( T_M(n) = m \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow L \in \mathsf{P} \). □

The computation \( M \) on any input to the above program certainly halts and \( L \in \mathsf{P} \).

**Theorem 4.2: SAT is NOT NP-complete.**

Let \( L \) over an alphabet \( \Sigma \) be the language defined by the FLP program above, then \( L \) can NEVER be reduced to \( \mathsf{SAT} \), hence \( \mathsf{SAT} \) is not NP-complete. The same proof of theorem 1.1 applies.

**Proof:**

1. \( \mathsf{SAT} \) is NP-complete.
2. \( \Rightarrow L \leq_p \mathsf{SAT} \).
3. \( \Rightarrow \exists f : \forall x \in L \iff f(x) \in \mathsf{SAT} \), [22].
4. \( x \in L \Rightarrow \forall x, \) \( x \) is both accepted AND rejected by \( M \).
5. \( y \in \mathsf{SAT} \Rightarrow \forall y, \) \( y \) is either accepted OR rejected by \( M \).
6. \( \Rightarrow \not\exists f : f(x) = y \).
7. \( \Rightarrow L \) can NEVER be reduced to \( \mathsf{SAT} \).
8. \( \Rightarrow \mathsf{SAT} \) is NOT NP-complete. □

**5. Why SAT is NOT NP-complete**

Let \( L \) be the following Prolog program consisting of the single-fact:

\[
\text{Age} \leftarrow \text{About}(\text{John}, 0.9)
\]

Running this program with any ground goal MUST generate contradictory truth values:
1. Semantic: “1”, or “0”.

2. Syntactic: “0.9”.

There are only two possibilities that have no third:

1. $L$ has an associated Turing machine $M$, or:

2. $L$ does not have one; the counter-argument that it is impossible for a Turing machine to diagonalize against itself.

Case (1): $L$ has an associated Turing machine $M$

1. **SAT Decision Problem:**

   The **SAT** decision function is $R(F, x)$, assigning a truth value $x$ for a Boolean formula $F$.

   (a) Input: Boolean Formula.

   (b) Output: “1” or “0”.

2. $L \in LIAR$ and $L \in FLP$ Decision Problems:

   Both decision problems form a relation that is *not* a function $R(F, x, y)$, assigning two distinct truth values, $x$ (AND) $y$ for an $FLP$, or $LIAR$ formula $F$. One truth value is syntactic “0.9” written above in the program. The other is semantic. Any basic knowledge of logic is sufficient to view both contradictory truth values.

   (a) Input: $FLP$ or $LIAR$ Formula.

   (b) Output:

   i. “1”, $FLP$ semantical truth-value; AND (not or):

   ii. “0.9”, syntactical truth-value; or “0” in the case of the 2-valued $FLP$, i.e. $L \in LIAR$.

   Those two values are not only irreconcilable, but also irreducible into a (single) truth value.

Now, the problem is how to write the reduction function $f$ to reduce $L$ to **SAT**:

$$L \leq_p SAT$$

This is a counter-example argument that can be refuted by experiment. If the reader gets angry at this, neither Einstein nor Popper (i.e. “Testability”) would. Who finds himself angry should present the reduction function $f$ reducing $L$ to
\textbf{SAT} as a refutation to this counter-example. Obviously, this counter-example is just a member of the SySBPD class (\(\lambda\)-calculus, \textit{FLP}, \textit{LIAR} and potentially more) of infinite number of languages having the same property.

Case (2): \(L\) does not have an associated Turing machine, but \(L\) is computable on the von Neumann machine. Then, this is a counter-example to the Church-Turing thesis. The situation becomes:

\[ L \in \mathbb{P} \iff L \notin \mathbb{P} \]

1. \(L \in \mathbb{P}\), as it is a one-step computation.

2. \(L \notin \mathbb{P}\), the class \(\mathbb{P}\) is defined only on Turing machines.

The claim that \(L\) does not have an associated Turing machine should be proved (physically) by building the machine and demonstrating its incapacity compared to the von Neumann machine, i.e. \(L\) is not Turing-computable. The skeptic should make a public demonstration of a Turing machine that he claims to be capable of computing everything in history except the above example. In other words, Prolog is (NOT) programmable on Turing machines. Obviously, the above program can be written in all Prolog versions. Thus, he has to prove (experimentally) that PROgramming in LOGic is impossible. A mathematical proof that a Turing machine cannot compute the above program is irrelevant to the physical phenomenon of computation. It would be certainly interesting for everybody to see this machine in public. Of course, not only for the scientific community, but for the whole world.

Then something must be wrong somewhere. If the Turing machine definition as a tuple in [22] \(<\Sigma, \Gamma, Q, \delta>\), then the counter-argument that it is impossible for a Turing machine to diagonalize against itself definitely assumes that the transition \(\delta\) function may not be a logical one. The Turing SySBPD machine introduced below emphasizes computable logical functions by assigning logical properties to \(\delta\), i.e. \(<\Sigma, \Gamma, Q, p(\delta, \mu)>\). It is easy to see that if a Turing machine cannot risk contradiction (as claimed above), then the Turing SySBPD may. However, both machines are equivalent with Turing SySBPD emphasis of possible logical contradiction.

6. Another Proof:

This proof is entirely independent of Turing machines. It is easy to see the possibility of such an approach since the SAT problem (as well as \textit{FLP}) are logical problems that exist independent of complexity theory. First, the SAT and \textit{FLP} decision problems are defined, then followed by the proof.
**Definition 6.1:** The SAT Decision Problem.
Let $F$ be a SAT formula, the SAT computation on $F$ assigns a function $h$ to $F : h(F) \in \{0, 1\}$, thus $h$ is a pair. Either $h = (F, 0)$ or $h = (F, 1)$. In other words, input string are coded either “Yes” or “No”.

**Definition 6.2:** The FLP Decision Problem.
Let $G$ be an FLP formula, the FLP computation on $G$ assigns a relation $r$ to $G : r(G)$ is a triple $r(G) = (G, x, y)$, $x \in [0, 1]$, $y \in \{0, 1\}$ both $x, y$ are non-empty, $x = y$ only when $x, y \in \{0, 1\}$, otherwise $x \neq y$; where:

1. $x$: syntactic FLP truth value.
2. $y$: semantic FLP truth value.

In this case, input strings are coded both “Yes” and “No”.

**Theorem 6.1:** SAT is (NOT) NP-complete.

**Proof:**

1. SAT is NP-complete.
2. $\implies \forall L \text{ written in } FLP, L \in P, \text{ SAT is NP-complete } \implies L \leq_p \text{ SAT}$.
3. $L \leq_p \text{ SAT } \implies r$ is not a relation, but a function, i.e. when the triple must become a pair.
4. $r$ is a relation $\implies L \not\leq_p \text{ SAT}$, contra-positive of 3.
5. $r$ is a relation, by Definition 6.2.
6. $\implies \text{ SAT is (NOT) NP-complete. }$ ■

It is easy to see that infinite-valued FLP is not necessary for the above result and it can be arrived at via only 3-valued FLP as well as 2-valued FLP, i.e. the system LIAR. The following section presents example programs to demonstrate the invalidity of the counter-argument of the impossibility to write such type of programs.

**7. The SySBPD Class of Counter-Examples**

The language $L$ above constitutes a counter-example for the NP-completeness property. In fact, there is not only one such language but an infinite class of languages, recalling examples in [90] in the context of this paper:

**Example 7.1** [90]:

Mature-Student(x,µ) ← Student(x),Age-About-21(x,µ)
Age-About-21(John,0.9)←
Age-About-21(Peter,0.4)←
Student(John)←
Student(Peter)←

Here, we have three predicate symbols, namely, Student, Mature-Student and Age-About-21. The n-ary predicate symbol becomes an n-ary+1 if the predicate is a fuzzy one. This is to allow for the µ indicating the membership value. Obviously, Mature-Student and Age-About-21 are fuzzy predicates. Now, we consider the goal ← Mature-Student(John,µ). This will unify the head of the first rule with unification (x = John, µ = µ). Thus, resulting into two subgoals, the first Student(John) which succeeds. The other subgoal is Age-About-21(John,µ) which succeeds with the value µ = 0.9 for John. It is obvious that the predicate Mature-Student leads to the same SySBPD paradox as the Age-About-21 did above.

Example 7.2 [90]:

Potential-Customer(x,µ1) ← Customer(x),µ1 ≥ 0.7
Top-Potential-Customer(x,µ2) ← Customer(x),µ2 ≥ 0.9
Good-Credit-Customer(x,µ3) ← Balance-level(x,y,µ3), µ3 ≥ 0.7
Customer(John) ←
Balance-Level(John,400,0.7)←
Customer(Richard)←
Balance-Level(Richard,500,0.8)←
Consider the goal ← Good-Credit-Customer(Richard,µ)

It is obvious that the predicate Good-Credit-Customer leads to the same SySBPD paradox as the Age-About-21 did above.

Example 7.3 [90]:

R1: p(x,y,µp1) ← q(x,µq1), r(y,µr)
R2: p(x,y,µp2) ← q(x,µq2), s(y,µs)
R3: q(m,0.3)←
R4: r(x,µr) ← t(x,µt)
R5: s(n,1)←
R6: t(n,0.4)←

Consider the fuzzy goal ← p(m,n,0.3) which unifies with the first fuzzy rule giving the two fuzzy sub-goals, where the success of each leads to the SySBPD paradox:

1. ← q(m,µq1), µq1 ≥ 0.3,
2. $\leftarrow r(n, \mu_r), \mu_r \geq 0.3.$

The fuzzy subgoal (1) unifies with R3 and succeeds while the second fuzzy subgoal unifies with R4 and results with another two fuzzy subgoals with the second being $\mu_r \geq 0.3$ resulting in the goal $\leftarrow (t, 0.3)$ which succeeds when unifying with R6. As a result, the original goal $\leftarrow p(m, n, 0.3)$ succeeds as far as matching with rule R1 is considered. When matching with rule R2, two fuzzy subgoals are generated, they are (where the success of each - again - leads to the SySBPD paradox - and this situation recurs):

1. $\leftarrow q(m, \mu_{q_2}), \mu_{q_2} \geq 0.3,$
2. $\leftarrow s(n, \mu_s), \mu_s \geq 0.3.$

The first successfully matches with R3 and the second as well with R5. So, the original fuzzy goal succeeds in this case.

Now consider the fuzzy goal $\leftarrow p(m, n, 0.2)$ when matching with R1, two fuzzy subgoals are generated, namely:

1. $\leftarrow q(m, \mu_{q_1}), \mu_{q_1} \geq 0.2,$
2. $\leftarrow r(n, \mu_r), \mu_r \geq 0.2.$

The first fuzzy subgoal of (1) $\leftarrow q(m, \mu_{q_1})$ unifies with R3 giving $\mu_q = 0.3$ and as a result the second fuzzy subgoal $\mu_q \geq 0.2$ succeeds. For the second fuzzy subgoal $\leftarrow r(n, \mu_r), \mu_r \geq 0.2,$ we have only rule R4 which unifies successfully resulting in the goal $\leftarrow (t, 0.2)$ which succeeds when unifying with R6. As a result, the original fuzzy goal $\leftarrow p(m, n, 0.2)$ succeeds. When matching with R2, two fuzzy subgoals are generated, namely:

1. $\leftarrow q(m, \mu_q), \mu_q \geq 0.2,$
2. $\leftarrow s(n, \mu_s), \mu_s \geq 0.2.$

The first subgoal matches with R3 and succeeds. The second fuzzy subgoal matches with R5 and succeeds. Now consider a fuzzy goal with a variable $\mu$, i.e. $\leftarrow p(m, n, \mu),$ matching with R1, we get:

1. $\leftarrow q(m, \mu_q), \mu_q \geq \mu,$
2. $\leftarrow r(n, \mu_r), \mu_r \geq \mu.$

The first matches with R3 and $\mu_q = 0.3$, thus solving $\mu \leq 0.3$. The second will unify with rule R4 then rule R6 returning $\mu \leq 0.4$. The original goal succeeds with $(\mu \leq 0.3) \land (\mu \leq 0.4)$. Thus $\mu \leq 0.3$. When matching with rule R2, two fuzzy subgoals are generated:
1. $q(m, \mu_q), \mu_q \geq \mu,$

2. $s(n, \mu_s), \mu_s \geq \mu.$

The first matches with R3 giving $\mu \leq 0.3.$ The second matches with R5 giving $\mu \leq 1.$ The original goal succeeds with $[(\mu \leq 0.3) \land (\mu \leq 1)] \lor [(\mu \leq 0.3) \land (\mu \leq 0.4)].$ Thus, $\mu \leq 0.3.$ Thus, the SySBPD paradox is generated and re-generated in this simple program.

8. SySBPD Implemented:
8.1 An FLP Meta-Interpreter: Sun-Unix (IC-Prolog)

In this section, a meta-interpreter is presented to the SySBPD class. The meta-interpreter is implemented in IC-Prolog. Given the rule:

$$< p_1(x), \mu_{p_1}> \leftarrow < q_1(x), \mu_{q_1}>.$$  

It can be read declaratively or procedurally:

1. The declarative reading states that: for a certain value of the variable $x,$ $p_1$ should be true to a level $\mu_{p_1} \geq \mu_{q_1}.$

2. The procedural reading states that: for a fuzzy goal $\leftarrow < p_1(m), 0.3 >$ to succeed, the fuzzy subgoal $\leftarrow < q(m), 0.3 >$ must succeed. Further, for the fuzzy goal $\leftarrow < p(m), 0.4 >,$ the fuzzy sub-goal $q(m, 0.4)$ must succeed.

So, as far as execution is concerned, both values of $\mu$ are instantiated in the fuzzy rule with the same constant level in the goal and then attempt succeeding the fuzzy sub-goal. Then, using the meta-interpreter, the rule is rewritten as follows:

$$R1 : < p_1(x), \mu_{p_1}> \leftarrow < q_1(x), \mu_{q_1}>$$

as

$$R1' : p1(X, Mp1) : -q(X, Mp1).$$

Now, consider the fuzzy goal $\leftarrow < p_1(m), V >,$ where $V$ is a variable. Now, the system is queried to what maximum level this fuzzy goal can be satisfied. This is done via the meta-interpreter predicate $solve(A)$ which becomes $\leftarrow solve(p_1(m, V)).$ The system predicates functor and arg are used.

When rewriting the fuzzy logic programs in IC-Prolog or standard Prolog, care should be taken as the semantics associated with fuzzy logic programs are different than that of standard Prolog. For instance, given the fact $< q(m), 0.3 >$, in fuzzy logic programming, it is considered as a fuzzy fact. $q$ is said to be true to a level $\mu$ where $0 < \mu \leq 0.3.$ In standard Prolog, the goal $\leftarrow q(m, 0.25)$ would return the answer “No”. So, to write a fuzzy fact in Prolog, it should be written as:

$$q(m, Mq) : -(Mq \leq 0.3), (Mq > 0)$$
During execution within the Prolog model, the answers conform to the given semantics. Now, the extended rules are extended with a factor \( f \in [0, 1] \) doubting the rule:

\[
< p_1(x), \mu_{p_1} > \leftarrow (0.9) - < q(x), \mu_q > .
\]

For the goal \( \leftarrow < p_1(x), 0.3 > \) to succeed, the fuzzy goal \( \leftarrow q(x, \mu_q) \) must succeed at least with the value 0.3/0.9. To do this in standard Prolog, the fuzzy fact and the fuzzy rule are rewritten as follows:

\[
p_1(X, Mp1) : -q(X, Mp1).
\]
\[
q(m, Mq) : -(Mq \leq 0.3/0.9), (Mq > 0).
\]

which will lead to the intended meaning.

Now, if the predicate \( q \) happens to be in the body of two fuzzy rules with different \( f \) factors, a different rewriting of the facts is required. For instance, one obtains the following two rules and two facts:

\[
R1 : < p_1(x), \mu_{p_1} > \leftarrow (0.9) - < q(x), \mu_q > .
\]
\[
R2 : < p_2(x, y), \mu_{p_2} > \leftarrow (0.7) - < q(x), \mu_q > , < s(Y), \mu_s >.
\]
\[
Fact1 : < q(m), 0.3 > \leftarrow
\]
\[
Fact2 : < s(n), 0.4 > \leftarrow
\]

If this fuzzy logic program is rewritten in Prolog, one gets:

\[
R1' : p1(X, Mp1) : -q(X, Mp1).
\]
\[
R2' : p2(X, Y, Mp2) : -q(X, Mp2), s(Y, Mp2).
\]

and the two fuzzy facts:

\[
Fact1' : q(m, Mq) : -(Mq \leq 0.3/0.9), (Mq > 0)
\]
\[
Fact2' : s(n, Ms) : -(Ms \leq 0.4/0.7), (Ms > 0).
\]

If a fuzzy goal matches with \( R1' \), then \( Fact1' \), this would be fine. But if a fuzzy goal matches with \( R2' \), the \( q \) fuzzy subgoal must have \( f = 0.7 \) not 0.9. Thus, given the same predicate occurring in the body of two fuzzy rules with different \( f \) factors, it should be renamed when rewriting. As a result, the predicate \( q \) is renamed in \( R2 \) to \( h \), and one obtains two fuzzy facts \( Fact1'' \) and \( Fact2'' \) corresponding to \( Fact1 \) in the original program:

\[
R1' : p1(X, Mp1) : -q(X, Mp1).
\]
\[
R2' : p2(X, Y, Mp2) : -h(X, Mp2), s(Y, Mp2).
\]
\[
Fact1' : q(m, Mq) : -(Mq \leq 0.3/0.9), (Mq > 0).
\]
\[
Fact1'' : h(m, Mh) : -(Mh \leq 0.3/0.7), (Mh > 0).
\]
\[
Fact2' : s(n, Ms) : -(Ms \leq 0.4/0.7), (Ms > 0).
\]

In the following, a code listing for the meta-interpreter is presented and a rewritten fuzzy logic program in IC-Prolog that was tested with the results expected from the semantics for fuzzy logic programming. The \([0, 1]\) interval has been assumed as \([0,100]\), i.e. one hundred increments.

\[
p1(X, Mp1) :- q(X, Mp1).
\]
\[
p2(X, Y, Mp2) :- q(X, Mp2), s(Y, Mp2).
\]
p3(X,Y,Z,Mp3):- s(Y,Mp3),t(Z,Mp3),q(X,Mp3).
q(m,Mp2):-(Mp2=<4/9),(Mp2>0).
s(n,Mpr):-(Mpr=<3/7),(Mpr>0).
t(l,Mpr):-(Mpr=<1/2),(Mpr>0).
solve(A,0).
solve(A,X) :- X>0, functor(A,F,N),F=A, arg(N,A,H), arg(N,A,X), A, !.
solve(A,X) :- X>0, Z is X - 1, solve(A,Z).
solve(A) :- solve(A,100).
nt(A):-solve(A), functor(A,F,N), arg(N,A,H), Y is 100-H, write(Y).

The solve predicate finds the threshold if the goal contained variables. For a negated goal not containing variables the built-in not predicate would produce the right answer. If the negated goal contained variables, the nt predicate above gives the threshold.

8.2 Meta-Interpreter: PC:Win-Prolog

The following are three clauses which form the program in question. The meta-interpreter will run in conjunction with this program. This program can be changed and edited each run while the meta-interpreter is re-usable across different programs.

p1(X,Mp1):- q(X,Mp1).
p2(X,Y,Mp2):-q(X,Mp2),s(Y,Mp2).
p3(X,Y,Z,Mp3):- s(Y,Mp3),t(Z,Mp3),q(X,Mp3).

The following are clauses to establish the allowable ranges for truth values in a Prolog syntax.

q(m,Mp2):-(Mp2=<4/9),(Mp2>0).
s(n,Mpr):-(Mpr=<3/7),(Mpr>0).
t(l,Mpr):-(Mpr=<1/2),(Mpr>0).

Here starts the meta-interpreter: three different predicates:
solve(A) unary predicate, solve(A,X) binary predicate and nt(A)

Base predicate to pass the value of zero level without attempting recursive calls
solve(A,0).

Base predicate to pass values greater than zero
solve(A,X) :- X>0, functor(A,F,N), F=A, arg(N,A,H), var(H), arg(N,A,X), A, !.

Recursive calls to determine the exact levels
solve(A,X) :- X>0, Z is X - 1, solve(A,Z).

Initial run of the goal unifies with this clause head
solve(A) :- solve(A,100).

To produce results for a negated goal:
nt(A):-solve(A), functor(A,F,N), arg(N,A,H), Y is 100-H, write(Y).

9. On the avoidability of the Complexity Class:“SySBPD”: 
Overall, the $SySBPD$ languages would constitute a reduction obstruction. Obviously, reduction is of central importance in computability and complexity theories. This new complexity class $SySBPD$ would overlap virtually every complexity class. Its effect is not confined to obstructing reduction only. It would propagate to many results of descriptive complexity. Fagin’s theorem [36] as well as the Immermann-Vardi theorem [89,110] are examined after the discovery of this class. However, the second $FLP$ paradox (appearing when considering the cardinality of the valid formulas of the underlying paradoxical system) has far-reaching implications in mathematics outside complexity theory. It turns out that this paradox *proves* the existence of a transfinite cardinal, hence the “Continuum Hypothesis” & the “Axiom of Choice” are false and $ZFC$ is inconsistent [92]. Clearly, this inconsistency result affects all of mathematics and mathematical disciplines: physics, computer science, etc, apart from inconsistency results due to NP-completeness and descriptive complexity.

In fuzzy logic applications, clearly the paradoxical feature of $FLP$ is undesirable. Perhaps that system was never adopted, unless from a practical point-of-view. Theoretically, it is certainly paradoxical. Practically, the meta-interpreter presented above could be used in “fuzzy expert systems” without any problems. Moreover, fuzzy logic programming can compute even more computable functions. However, its theoretical paradox is avoidable, see [91] and other $FLP$ systems in the references below. Nevertheless, this paradoxical class of languages is (unavoidable) in complexity theory. The reason is that complexity theory is a theory that studies the computational complexity of classes of infinite number of languages. So, even if $FLP$ is ignored, it does not mean that it does not exist. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the 2-valued $FLP$ paradox is precisely the liar’s paradox which is inevitable in natural languages. Perhaps more interestingly, the paradoxical $FLP$ relation occurs in nature. It reconceptualizes the relation between space and time making a quantum theory of gravity possible, the long outstanding question of theoretical physics [93]. As such, a substantial class of paradoxical languages does exist within the robust class $P$. One has the four new computational complexity classes:

1. $P_{Sys} = \{L : L \in P \cap SySBPD\}$
2. $P_{NonSys} = \{L : L \in P, L \notin SySBPD\}$
3. $NP_{Sys} = \{L : L \in NP \cap SySBPD\}$
4. $NP_{NonSys} = \{L : L \in NP, L \notin SySBPD\}$

Related to the conventional $P$ and $NP$ as follows:

1. $P = P_{Sys} \cup P_{NonSys}$; $P_{Sys} \cap P_{NonSys} = \emptyset$
2. \(NP = NP_{Sys} \cup NP_{NonSys}, NP_{Sys} \cap NP_{NonSys} = \emptyset\)

The NP-completeness property for \(\text{SAT}\) could be revised in the light of the discovery of the new class as the language which is complete to the new computational complexity class \(NP_{NonSys}\):

**Empirical Observation:** \(\text{SAT}\) is \(NP_{NonSys}\)-complete.

\(\forall L \in NP_{NonSys} \ L \leq_p \text{SAT} \implies \text{SAT is } NP_{NonSys}\)-complete.

Other complete languages for other classes should be appropriately modified to exclude any language in the \(SySBP\) class, as it cannot be reduced to such a complete language. For instance \(\text{HP}\) is (NOT) \(c.e.\)-complete with similar considerations. Answering any of the following questions, answers the \(P =? NP\) question:

1. \(P_{Sys} =? NP_{Sys}\).
2. \(P_{NonSys} =? NP_{NonSys}\); the old question.

**Observation:** \(\text{SAT} \in P_{NonSys} \implies P_{NonSys} = NP_{NonSys}\).

10. **Descriptive Complexity:**

Fundamental results of descriptive complexity must be examined against the \(SySBP\) computational paradoxes. Similar arguments as to NP-completeness can be demonstrated as below.

10.1 **Fagin’s theorem** \([36]\): \(NP = \text{SO}\).

**Theorem 10.1:** \(NP \neq \text{SO}\).

**Proof:** Let \(L\) be a one step paradoxical \(FLP\) computation as above.

1. \(L \in P\).
2. \(L \in NP\).
3. \(L \notin \text{SO}\), \(L \in \text{SO} \iff \exists p(t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n, \mu) \in L\).
4. \(NP \neq \text{SO}\) ■

**Observation:** \(NP_{NonSys} = \text{SO} - \text{FLP}\)

By the notation \(\text{SO} - \text{FLP}\), it is meant that atoms of the form \(p(t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n, \mu)\),
\( \mu \in [0,1] \) are forbidden, i.e. only purely classical atoms. This observation is a restatement of the old result excluding paradoxical SySBPD languages. \( \text{NP}_{Sys} =? \text{SO} \) remains an open question.

**Immermann-Vardi theorem** [89,110]: \( P = \text{FO} + \text{LFP} \).

**Theorem 10.2:** \( P \neq \text{FO} + \text{LFP} \).

**Proof:** Let \( L \) be a one step paradoxical FLFP computation as above.

1. \( L \in P \).
2. \( L \notin \text{FO} + \text{FLFP}, L \in \text{FO} + \text{FLFP} \iff \exists p(t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n, \mu) \in L \).
3. \( P \neq \text{FO} + \text{LFP} \) ■

**Observation:** \( P_{\text{NonSys}} = [\text{FO} - \text{FLP}] + \text{LFP} \). The question \( \text{P}_{Sys} =? \text{FO} + \text{LFP} \) remains open. Similar arguments hold for other descriptive complexity results over the computational complexity hierarchy.

**Theorem 10.3:** ZFC is inconsistent.

**Proof:**

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{[Cook’s Theorem [21] \land Theorems 1.1, 4.2, 6.1]} \\
&\lor \\
&\text{[Fagin’s Theorem \land Theorem 10.1]} \\
&\lor \\
&\text{[Immermann-Vardi Theorem \land Theorem 10.2]} \\
&\implies \\
&\text{ZFC is inconsistent} \quad ■
\end{align*}
\]

**SySBPD Implications**

**The P versus NP Problem**

The problem certainly survives the SySBPD class of counter-examples to the NP-completeness property. However, a polynomial-time algorithm for SAT no longer implies \( P = \text{NP} \). Nor the non-existence of such an algorithm would imply \( P \neq \text{NP} \). In its basic informal definition: “Whether easy recognition of a solution implies easy finding one”, the problems survive as it always had been. However, the precise definition of the class \( P \) is divided into two (disjoint) classes \( P_{\text{SySBPD}} \) and \( P_{\text{NonSySBPD}} \), written simply as \( P_{\text{SyS}} \) and \( P_{\text{NonSyS}} \):
\[ P = \{L|L = L(M) \text{ for some Turing machine } M \text{ which runs in polynomial time}\} \]

\[ P = P_{SyS} \cup P_{Non_{SyS}} \]

\[ P_{SyS} = \{L|L = L[M] \text{ for some Turing machine } M \text{ which runs in polynomial time}\}, \text{ where } L[M] \text{ denotes } M \text{ accepts } L \text{ iff } M \text{ rejects it.} \]

\[ P_{Non_{SyS}} = \{L|L = L(M) \text{ for some Turing machine } M \text{ which runs in polynomial time}\}, \text{ where } L(M) \text{ denotes } M \text{ accepts } L \text{ and strictly does not reject it.} \]

The \textit{SySBPD} could have members across the entire arithmetic hierarchy. Since the fuzzy logic programs [90] are classical, they have the complete Turing hierarchy computational capability. The usual hierarchy nicely presented in [87] MUST be augmented with the class \textit{SySBPD}, resulting in lots of class separation questions. It is obvious that the counter-example to the NP-completeness property is also a counter-example to c.e.-completeness. The same proof above showing SAT not to be NP-complete can be used to prove that HP is NOT c.e.-complete. However, it is undecidable. The new complexity hierarchy - incorporating the \textit{SySBPD} class describes computable languages on the \textbf{Turing SySBPD} machine. While the Turing machine had only two halting states: \textit{qaccept} and \textit{qreject}, the \textbf{Turing SySBPD} machine is a Turing machine that has the following halting states:

1. \textit{qaccept}: \textit{M} halts in \textit{qaccept} and only \textit{qaccept}, i.e. no paradoxical halting.
2. \textit{qreject}: \textit{M} halts in \textit{qreject} and only \textit{qreject}, i.e. no paradoxical halting.
3. \textit{qSySBPD}. \textit{M} halts in the state \textit{qSySBPD} when it halts in \textit{qaccept} iff it halts in \textit{qreject}, i.e. \textit{M} halts paradoxically.

The above (reviewed) definition of the class \textbf{P} is on the \textbf{Turing SySBPD} machine. The question \textbf{P =? NP} has the following possibilities:

1. \textbf{P = NP}.
2. \textbf{P \neq NP}.
3. \textbf{P = NP} \land \textbf{P \neq NP}.
4. Formally Independent.
5. Both Independent and Dependent.
However, the empirical non-existence of polynomial-time algorithms for the used to be NP-complete problems would still associate the property with intractability. Nevertheless, the existence or non-existence of such algorithms would not resolve the $P$ vs. $NP$ problem.

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A Spatio-Temporal Bi-Polar Disorder
Quantum Theory of Gravity
A Fuzzy Logic Programming Reconciliation

\[ SySBPD \leftrightarrow SpTBD \]

Rafee Ebrahim Kamouna

What is Gravity?
Impeptuous Fire,
Space-Temporal!
Ice and Desire,
The Universe wags on...
\[\text{[Einstein à la “Romeo & Juliet”]}\]

What is a Turing machine?
Impeptuous Fire,
Syntactico-Semantical!
Ice and Desire,
Fuzzy Logic Programming goes on...
\[\text{[Einstein meets Turing]}\]

Abstract
A theory of quantum gravity founded on fuzzy logic programming \( FLP \) \([1]\) is presented. The connection between space and time of general relativity is re-examined from a logical point-of-view. A one-to-one correspondence between the space/time dichotomy and syntax/semantics of logic was discovered. The Syntactico-Semantical Bi-Polar Disorder nature of \( FLP \ (SySBPD) \) naturally expresses the space/time relationship as well as unifying it with quantum mechanics particle/anti-particle dichotomy. The Spatio-Temporal Bi-Polar Disorder \( (SpTBD) \) theory makes new predictions that can be tested by experiment, formulates new hypotheses as well as shedding light on previously unexplained observed phenomena, e.g. “CP violation” and the 720 degrees instead of 360 for an electron to return to its state.

Introduction:
Einstein’s general relativity is the most accepted theory of gravity confirmed by experiments and observations. It is mathematically expressed as tensor equations whose solution is Lorentzian manifolds of curved spacetime (Riemannian/Pseudo-Riemannian space). Dirac’s equation is the experimentally-verified relativistic
quantum mechanics theory that successfully unified quantum mechanics and special relativity (flat spacetime - Minkowski space) whose solution is a wave function. Establishing a theory of quantum gravity remains (undoubtedly) as the theoretical physics outstanding problem for decades [3]. The standard model of particle physics unified all nature fundamental forces except gravity. Having a unified theory of all fundamental forces of nature is obviously a goal longtime sought after. Einstein had famously spent quite a long time in search for a “Unified Field Theory”. This paper presents a fuzzy logic programming (FLP) reconciliation of the theory of general relativity (Einstein’s field equations) and relativistic quantum mechanics (Dirac’s equation). This problem can be formulated as: “If general relativity regards gravity as spacetime and quantum mechanics provides a wave function (Ψ - Dirac’s equation) evolution in time, it seems impossible for those two theories to be (mathematically) unified. Attempts include unsuccessful perturbative quantum gravity, string theories culminating in M-Theory but with neither experimental results nor observations [3].

It was found that the language of “Fuzzy Logic Programming FLP” [1] can naturally do the job. This is done via re-examination of the logical relationship between space and time. The discovery of a one-to-one correspondence between the space/time dichotomy and that of syntax/semantics made FLP a naturally appealing candidate for this intractable reconciliation; SySBPD vs. SpTBPD.

Philosophical Foundation:

\[ E = mc^2 \] implies that \( E \) and \( m \) are different (manifestations) “essences” of the same “existence”. The “Principalitity” of the existence over the essence should be obvious. There can be no “Principality” for \( E \) over \( m \) nor vice versa. This can be called “Energy/Mass” Principality Bi-Polar Disorder; to render the term connotating and its meaning connotated to!

More importantly, the lessons of general relativity dictate that if the Earth gets into the event horizon of a black hole, space and time would swap positions. This implies that space and time are different manifestations “essences” of the same “existence”. It should be self-evident that there is no “Principality” outweigher for neither space nor time over one another. This is the “Space-time/Timespace Principality Bi-Polar Disorder”. \( SpTBPD \) exploits \( R_{E,m}(E, m) \) vs. \( R_{SpT}(space, time) \), where \( R_{E,m}(E, m) \) means energy and mass can swap positions in special relativity and \( R_{SpT}(space, time) \) means space and time swap positions in general relativity.

It is easy to see that space and time are always swapping positions but only completely within a black hole. Solutions to Einstein’s field equations are spacetimes which are Lorentzian manifolds. The tangent vector at any point in the manifold
is classified as spacelike (swapping positions spacewise) or timelike (swapping positions timewise) according to the negative/positive value of the manifold’s metric \([4]\). If \((M, g)\) is a Lorentzian manifold (so \(g\) is the metric on the manifold \(M\)) then the tangent vectors at each point in the manifold can be classed into three different types. A tangent vector \(X\) is:

1. **timelike** if \(g(X, X) > 0\)
2. **null** if \(g(X, X) = 0\)
3. **spacelike** if \(g(X, X) < 0\).

General relativity \([5]\) is understood as spacetime tells matter how to move, then in \(SpTBPD\) so should timespace. And if matter tells spacetime how to curve in general relativity, then in \(SpTBPD\) it should tell timespace too. The difference between spacetime and timespace:

1. For a single observer at one point, they are identical.
2. For two observers \(A, B\) at two different locations \(X, Y\), we have:
   - Spacetime\((A, X) = \) Timespace\((B, Y)\)
   - Timespace\((A, X) = \) Spacetime\((B, Y)\)

That is to say, they are reciprocal. This is a corollary of the Space/Time Principality Bi-Polar Disorder. So, \(SpTBPD\) Quantum Theory of Gravity regards gravity as reciprocal spacetime/timespace and quantum mechanics as reciprocal wave functions \(\Psi\)-particle)/\(\Psi_{BPD}\)-anti-particle. \(SpTBPD\) regards spacetime geometry as given by the Einstein Field Equations is a result of a fermion spin-like angular motion (in a Hilbert space) of flat spacetime and flat timespace. This would justify the dynamic spacetime geometry. This philosophical interpretation of spacetime geometry could extend (potentially reconciling) von Neumann mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics to general relativity. This is a new hypothesis. Another one is quantum interpretation of the Big Bang as well as the expansion of the universe. This is due to the particle/anti-particle view of spacetime/timespace. Spacetime (in-order) is identical to timespace (disorder). The difference is a matter of state. The Pauli exclusion principle could be extended from quantum mechanics to gravity in \(SpTBPD\).

**Mathematical Formulation: \(SySBPD\) vs. \(SpTBPD\)**

The following equations relate two solutions of Einstein’s equations with another two of Dirac’s. Einstein’s solutions are two \(BPD\)-conformally related Lorentzian
manifolds (as defined below). Both are related by a $SySBPD FLP$ predicate $Gravity$. Dirac’s two solutions are two wave functions, for particles and anti-particles. Both are related by another $SySBPD FLP$ predicate $Quantum$. The two manifolds with both wave functions are related by $\kappa$, the Universe Bi-Polar Disorder Constant, the prediction of $SpTBPD$.

1. $Equal(\mu_\Psi, |\Psi| - |\Psi_{BPD}|) \leftarrow Quantum(\Psi, \Psi_{BPD}, \mu_\Psi)$

2. $Equal(\mu_{gravity}, \kappa, \mu_\Psi) \leftarrow Gravity(Lorentz, Lorentz_{BPD}, \mu_{gravity})$.

Where $Gravity$ and $Quantum$ are tertiary $FLP$ predicates as in [1], and $Equal$ is a binary non-fuzzy predicate whose meaning is obvious. $Lorentz$ and $Lorentz_{BPD}$ are any two $BPD$-conformally related Lorentzian solutions of Einstein’s equations. Let $g$ be the Lorentzian manifold metric and $\hat{g}$ Lorentz$_{BPD}$ manifold metric, they are conformally related if $\hat{g} = \Omega^2 g$ (standard definition [3]) and $BPD$-conformally related if $\hat{g} = -\Omega^2 g$ (new definition). So, $\mu_{gravity} = \Omega^2$.

From [3], and for the paper to be self-contained: “Two metrics $g$ and $\hat{g}$ are conformally related if $\hat{g} = \Omega^2 g$ for some real function $\Omega$ called the conformal factor. Looking at the definitions of which tangent vectors are timelike, null and spacelike we see they remain unchanged if we use $g$ or $\hat{g}$. As an example suppose $X$ is a timelike tangent vector with respect to the $g$ metric. This means that $g(X, X) > 0$. We then have that $\hat{g}(X, X) = \Omega^2 g(X, X) > 0$, so $X$ is a timelike tangent vector with respect to the $\hat{g}$ too. It follows from this that the causal structure of a Lorentzian manifold is unaffected by a conformal transformation.”

A solution to Dirac’s equation is the wave function $\Psi$ associated with the quantum system particles and $\Psi_{BPD}$ is the wave function associated with the corresponding anti-particles. It is to be noted that the above $FLP$ rules/equations are not equivalent to their algebraic counterpart:

$$\Omega^2 = \kappa \cdot \mu_\Psi = \kappa \cdot |\Psi - \Psi_{BPD}|$$

The interpretation of the predicate $Gravity(Lorentz, Lorentz_{BPD}, \mu_{gravity})$ is that for two $BPD$-conformally related spacetimes, for them to be in-order they have to be in disorder. Non-fuzzy $Gravity$ implies identical manifolds while fuzzy $Gravity$ admits different manifolds. So, “$p$ is fuzzy iff $p$ is not fuzzy” reads dynamic perpetual oscillations (gravitational waves) of spacetime. These waves are continuous and perpetual and obviously much easier to phrase logically. They continue like this perpetually as the lessons of general relativity dictate a dynamic geometry of spacetime. Space and time lose order the more the speed approaches...
speed of light when they swap positions. $SySBPD$ is expressed as “$p$ is fuzzy iff $p$ is fuzzy”, where $p$ as in [1]: $p(t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n, \mu)$. Or, “$p$ is an atom of classical logic iff it is not an atom of classical logic”. This is the $SpTBPD/SySBPD$ space/time vs. syntax/semantics mathematically representing the dynamic nature of space-time as well as unifying it with quantum mechanics. $\kappa$ is the “Bi-Polar Disorder Universal Constant” which can be observed by experiments relating gravitational waves to quantum ones.

Where the $FLP$ equations above predict a Bi-Polar Disorder dichotomy rather than the usual symmetry interpretation. $SpTBP$ naturally explains “CP violation” as well as the 720 degrees for an electron to return to its state rather than 360 degrees (either in-order state or disorder, thus Bi-Polar Disorder). This explanation cannot be provided by the algebraic equation which only gives the mathematical prediction. The meaning of this formula that the two Lorentz manifolds (perpetually) oscillate between two states. Once they are identical (classical logic programming), the other with the deficit $\mu_{gravity}$ ($FLP$). It is impossible to formulate this sort of oscillation as a wave against time; as usual in physics. This new logical formulation resolves the problem. Lorentz and Lorentz$_{BPD}$ metrics describe two curved spacetimes (spacetime and timespace) in $BPD$, thus (potentially) explaining ripples in spacetime geometry. The final paradox is that $SySBPD$ is highly undesirable for computer science wouldn’t be at all for physics.

**Discussion & Conclusion:**

The following questions are addressed:

1. Can $SpTBPD$ be tested by experiment?
2. Does it make new predictions?
3. Does it generate new hypotheses?
4. Does $SpTBPD$ provide new explanations for strange observations?
5. $SySBPD$ implications to physics is $SpTBPD$ compared to late awakening to Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem [1930-2002!!!]; in [2].
6. Is it a proposal for final theory?

No theory is considered to be apodictically true unless supported by experimental results and observations. $SpTBPD$ is founded on general relativity and relativistic quantum mechanics. So it is obvious that the prediction of a “Universe Bi-Polar Disorder Constant $\kappa$” relating spacetime/timespace from one side to $\Psi$ (particle)/$\Psi$ (anti-particle) from the other can be tested by experiment. In addition, several new hypotheses/new explanations have been (naturally) generated:
1. *SpTBPD* regards gravitational waves (spacetime/timespace Bi-Polar Disorder) in curved spacetime as a result of fermion spin-like angular motion (in a Hilbert space) of flat spacetime and flat timespace.

2. The mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics (Hilbert spaces) could be unified with that of general relativity. The view of two Lorentzian manifolds in Bi-Polar Disorder (*BPD*-conformally related) can be restricted to two flat spacetime/timespace at quantum level. So, space/time dichotomy (spacetime vs. timespace) at both the super-galactic and the sub-atomic levels.

3. A quantum interpretation of the Big Bang and the expansion of the universe due to the new dichotomy of particle/anti-particle vs. spacetime/timespace.

4. Extending the Pauli exclusion principle from the sub-atomic level to the super-galactic.

5. When the (poor) author first learnt of the 720 degrees for an electron to return to its original state, it was no surprise unlike many others. This is a natural *SpTBPD* quantum view of *in-order* and *disorder* states.

6. When the (poor) author learnt that “CP violation” is not complete symmetry, he felt that was absolutely normal and consistent with *SpTBPD*. *SpTBPD* predicts Bi-Polar Disorder in nature rather than symmetry. But in order to maintain the order, there has to be disorder (from the Big Bang to the expansion of the Universe), resulting whenever the symmetry attempts to become complete, it could recur somewhere else incomplete.

The answers are positive for *SpTBPD*: It makes a new prediction $\kappa$ that can be found by experiment and it provides new hypotheses. Not only this, but also it provides (natural) and consistent explanations for unexplained phenomenon. The story about the implications of the celebrated Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem is indeed a sad one as detailed in the paper by Reverend Father Professor Stanley L. Jaki [2]. A more bizarre story is expected for *fuzzy logic programming* where new dichotomies have been identified and mathematically related to well-established ones: Syntax/Semantics vs. Spacetime/Timespace vs. Particle/Anti-particle vs. Wave/Particle Bi-Polar Disorder, not Wave/Particle duality!

Whether it is a proposal for a final theory, the answer is simply “No”. In [2], it has been confirmed that even after considering Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem’s implications to physics, a final theory is possible; but it is not possible to prove this fact rigourously. But Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem was for Peano’s arithmetic, i.e. natural numbers. Physics must employ real numbers. So, if
Peano’s arithmetic has infinite number of axioms, the author presents the hypothesis that a final theory wouldn’t need only infinite number of axioms, but also a mathematical language whose alphabet is infinite!

References:

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4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causal_structure.

5. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki; keywords: “Introduction to General Relativity” and “General Relativity”.