Labour market institutions and immigration policy attitudes: The moderated impact of economic vulnerability

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Abstract
Political debates about immigration provoke strong nation-alistic pushback from citizens, constraining the policymaking capacity of states. This paper investigates to what extent labour market policies shape economically motivated preferential divides among European citizens. On the one hand, I concentrate on prospective job loss threats indicative of economic grievances and assess the impact of unemploy-ment risk exposure on immigration policy attitudes. On the other hand, as the original contribution of the paper, I con-tend that, if such an economically motivated explanation holds, this relationship should vary based on the labour mar-ket institutions in each country. Multi-level analyses of 16 European countries over a decade since 2002 reveal a remarkably robust relationship between unemployment risks and more restrictive immigration policy attitudes. Importantly, more protective employment regulations seem to have a dampening effect on the impact of job loss threats on immigration policy attitudes. Conversely, there are larger attitudinal divides between the risk-exposed and the more secure workers in countries with generous and expansive unemployment compensation policies. Overall, the paper helps explain the cross-national variation in economically motivated cleavages about immigration policy attitudes in Europe.
KEYWORDS
economic nationalism, European Union/ European identity/ Europe, globalisation, immigration/migration, welfare state

1 INTRODUCTION

Immigration and ethnic diversity are two prevailing phenomena in Western democratic societies. Yet, in these times of increasing economic and cultural globalisation, nationalistic resentment towards immigration seems to be on the rise again (Grande et al., 2019; Hosking, 2016). The prominence of the current wave of ‘new nationalism’ advocating national sovereignty over the borders and strict control over immigration and citizenship policies crystallise an increasingly contentious terrain in migration policymaking (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2019; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018). Thus, managing the tension between sceptical attitudes towards foreigners and the reality of ongoing immigration flows has become one of the most challenging policy dilemmas. Addressing this matter, politicians and scholars alike have long been concerned with answering who opposes immigration and why (Billiet et al., 2014; Facchini & Mayda, 2009; Hanson et al., 2007). Studies show that both material threats stemming from the potential adverse economic impact of immigration and symbolic threats linked to the perceived cultural dissimilarity of immigrants beget adverse reactions to the admission of foreigners (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Heath et al., 2020; Lancee & Pardos-Prado, 2013; Manevska & Achterberg, 2013). Yet, whereas a cultural backlash explanation has been widely accepted as an accelerator of the rise of such nationalistic reactions (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Norris & Inglehart, 2019), in the past decade, both observational and experimental evidence has cast a long-standing doubt on the relevance of economic motivations when studying immigration policy attitudes (Gerber et al., 2017; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Sniderman et al., 2004).

Fortunately, there have been new efforts in uncovering the economic basis of immigration policy attitudes. Unlike earlier realistic group conflict studies (Jackson, 1993; Meuleman et al., 2009; Quillian, 1996), the consensus arising from this more recent body of work is that rather than merely focusing on the effects of immigration itself as the driver of attitudes, broader sources of economic vulnerability prevalent across the population need to be considered (Pardos-Prado & Xena, 2019; Pecoraro & Ruedin, 2016). Thus far, researchers have explored fears over prospective job loss threats caused by automation, offshoring and deindustrialisation as predictors of opposition to immigration (Dancygier & Walter, 2015; Kairiou & Im, 2020; Pardos-Prado, 2020; Polavieja, 2016). Therefore, even if concrete material vulnerabilities may have less to do with the economic impact of immigration directly, there appear to be substantive economic roots of what we observe in Western democracies regarding a nationalistic turn in support for closure in immigration policy (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2019; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018).

Extant studies, however, have not yet paid attention to whether labour market institutions shape the influence of such objective economic insecurities on immigration policy attitudes. Instead, when it comes to the contextual mitigators, macroeconomic conditions (such as unemployment rates and economic growth) and the demographic composition of host societies (such as the stock share of immigrants) have mostly been the centre of attention (Bearce & Roosevelt, 2019; Billiet et al., 2014; Polavieja, 2016). This gap is particularly troublesome because the extent to which economic vulnerabilities trigger polarised policy attitudes is shown to vary substantially between countries (Grande et al., 2019; Häuserman et al., 2020; Heath et al., 2020; Pardos-Prado, 2020). Furthermore, evidence from comparative political economy demonstrates that economic insecurities are substantively altered by the protective and compensatory social policy conditions in a country, such as unemployment replacement benefits and employment protection measures (Anderson & Pontusson, 2007; Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2019). Therefore, to understand the impact of job loss risks on immigration policy attitudes, it is essential to know more about whether and how institutions shape this relationship.
To address this gap, I put forward a micro–macro theoretical framework discerning the extent to which economically motivated grievances differ across European countries due to variation in labour market institutions. First, taking stock of the social policy attitudes literature, I apply a risk-insurance framework (Alt & Iversen, 2017; Rehm, 2016) and contend that more restrictive immigration attitudes of the risk exposed people can be thought of as indicative of preferences for receiving ex ante protection by the state to limit uncertainty (Kaihovaara & Im, 2020; Pardos-Prado & Xena, 2019). I argue that the more risk-exposed workers prefer less immigration to contain risks and preserve their prospective position and economic interests. In the second part, I add that if a risk-insurance logic can explain individual immigration policy positions, then differences in such attitudes should be altered by contexts that protect and compensate precisely against employment-related vulnerabilities (Anderson & Pontusson, 2007; Korpi & Palme, 1998; Vlandas & Halliopoulou, 2019). Here, I focus on two policies, ex ante protective and ex post compensatory, that is, employment protection legislation (EPL) and unemployment compensation insurance generosity (UCG), respectively, and their role in mitigating employment-related vulnerabilities. Employment regulation policies function as ex ante interventions, protecting workers from prospective unemployment. In contrast, unemployment replacement insurance compensates for the impact of unemployment ex post. Overall, both approaches signal a state’s ability to mitigate the effect of market volatilities on workers’ lives (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Moene & Wallerstein, 2001).

Empirically, I study 16 advanced European democracies from 2002 to 2012 using the European Social Survey (ESS). I combine this individual-level survey with national and occupational level data to measure my key explanatory concepts of interest. I use multilevel models and cross-level interaction terms to evaluate my hypotheses, given the hierarchical data structure. The results demonstrate a remarkably robust direct effect of economic risk exposure, captured by occupational unemployment rates of workers, on immigration policy attitudes. Notably, the host countries’ specific ex ante protective and ex post compensatory labour market institutions mitigate the relationship between risk and attitudes. When looking at the interaction between unemployment risk and employment protection policy, I find evidence suggesting that the impact of risk on more restrictive immigration policy attitudes is lower in more protected labour markets compared with countries with less employment protection. Turning to the mitigating effect of unemployment compensation policy, I find that the impact of economic risk is stronger in more generous and inclusive policy conditions. In such contexts, risk-exposed workers oppose further immigration far more than those who are relatively more secure due to fears over increasing users of scarce material resources.

2 | LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND IMMIGRATION POLICY ATTITUDES IN THE LITERATURE

Numerous studies have argued and showed that differently from the direct impact of immigration, economically motivated grievances driven by insecurity, labour market vulnerability and prospective job loss risks lead to anti-immigration positions (Kaihovaara & Im, 2020; Pardos-Prado & Xena, 2019). Yet, so far, scholars have scarcely focused on how this better-known effect of economic vulnerability operates under different welfare state and labour market policy conditions. Making matters more complicated, studies investigating the link between welfare states and immigration attitudes from a perspective of norms and social trust find that expansive welfare regimes are associated with more tolerance towards immigration (Boräng, 2015; Crepaz & Damron, 2009; Sainsbury, 2006). Conversely, highlighting the fiscal exposure of inclusive welfare states to newcomers, scholars suggested that precisely due to this generosity and openness, citizens develop aversion towards more immigration due to a nationalistic welfare chauvinism logic of competition over scarce economic resources (Gerber et al., 2017; Reeskens & van der Meer, 2019; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012). Therefore, if and how welfare state and labour market institutions alter the micro-foundations of immigration policymaking remains unanswered.
Nevertheless, institutions can shape individual-level outcomes by moderating a micro-level relationship’s strength or direction (Gingrich & Ansell, 2012; Heisig & Schaeffer, 2019). Although the direct impact of labour market institutions, such as the level of benefit generosity, are undetermined, they may still have indirect effects by dampening or further dividing risk-based differences in policy attitudes (Paskov & Koster, 2014). Importantly, segmentation in the labour markets, linked to workers’ economic insecurities, can further deepen and take an institutional form depending on the labour market structure in each country (Busemeyer & Kemmerling, 2020). This seems to be particularly true for regulatory and compensatory welfare state institutions (Gingrich & Ansell, 2012; Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2019), as they systematically shape the dualisation in the labour markets and job scarcity and the conditions of access and entitlement to social rights, respectively.

In their study, Vlandas and Halikiopoulou demonstrate that unemployment insurance policy, that is, replacement rates in case of job loss, and employment protection regulations that determine the flexibility of hiring and firing rules mitigate the impact of unemployment on voting for far-right parties (Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2019). Indeed, the unemployment experiences of people vary widely with the extent to which existing labour market policies can protect against economic risk, ex ante through employment protection, and can compensate, ex post through unemployment insurance, materially. Put together, by changing what it means to be unemployed in each country, these policies seem to have the ability to condition the link between employment insecurity and the support for political parties advocating anti-immigration positions. Overall, both ex ante protective and ex post compensatory welfare state interventions alter the effect of job loss threats when studying social policy attitudes and political behaviour. Yet, these logics may not be directly transferable to explaining immigration policy attitudes considering the contradictory findings in extant work and prospective economic threats for the employed workers. Thus, here, I develop a theoretical framework that considers the risk-mitigating roles of unemployment compensation and employment protection policies when studying the economic basis of immigration policy attitudes, which I outline in the next section.

3 | ECONOMICALLY MOTIVATED IMMIGRATION POLICY ATTITUDES IN CONTEXT: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

The theoretical framework is based on earlier work on the impact of labour market inequalities on mass politics in the past two decades (Häuserman et al., 2020; Kurer et al., 2019; Rehm, 2016; Rueda, 2008). Whereas some have concentrated on the preference cleavages as a consequence of socio-economic status differences from the perspective of skills, education levels, income and employment status (Rueda, 2005), others have used a prospective measure of risks involved in potential job losses (Rehm, 2016; Schwander & Häusermann, 2013). A common finding in both approaches is that the attitudinal divides between these distinct groups of workers are altered in significant part also due to the institutional context of each labour market (Busemeyer & Kemmerling, 2020).

In this paper, concentrating on the latter future-oriented approach, I focus on job loss risks as a key source of economic vulnerability because of their encompassing consequences on social status, income, benefit entitlements and health implications both in the long and short term of a citizen’s life cycle (Brand, 2015). First, unlike earlier approaches on realistic material conflict theory (Blalock, 1967; Jackson, 1993; Quillian, 1996), I hold that occupationally rooted unemployment risks, often unrelated to the economic impact of immigration itself, are critical in understanding the nationalistic turn in policy attitudes (Pardos-Prado & Xena, 2019; Pecoraro & Ruedin, 2016; Polavieja, 2016). Next, I propose that if there is a link between restrictive immigration policy support and exposure to higher unemployment risk, then it is insufficient to think of people abstracted from their national labour market contexts. I suggest that the relationship between risk exposure and immigration policy attitudes needs to be studied by understanding each worker’s position, given their home labour market conditions and institutions that frame such economic vulnerabilities.
3.1 | A risk-insurance logic of support for a less permissive immigration policy

The first part of my argument is based on an objective risk-insurance logic of supporting more restrictive immigration policies, that is, ex ante protection, meaning that those exposed to more risk than others in each country will be more reactive to permissive immigration. Thus, such support for a more restrictive immigration policy can be understood as a function of each worker’s objective interest in preventing uncertainty and economic risks by limiting further changes in the supply of workers. Moreover, the risks of admitting new immigrants are not limited to the changing balances in the labour markets. More foreign human capital is also associated with increasing the potential pool of shared public economic resource users. Therefore, workers exposed to relatively higher risks of job loss are doubly pressured by the possible entry of newcomers as they are also most likely users of state resources that compensate for market volatilities. In this respect, unemployment risks are critical for understanding for whom and where we can expect greater preferential differences in immigration policy attitudes.

However, between countries, the distribution of such risks varies (Rehm, 2016, pp. 33–35). In some, the distribution of risks is homogenous, meaning that workers in various job groups are not so strikingly different from an average worker concerning their future economic security, such as in Denmark and Portugal (Rehm, 2016, pp. 100–102). Conversely, in others, risks are far more unevenly dispersed. Specific job groups have considerably worse material prospects given the dynamics of employment retentions at home, like in the United Kingdom and the United States, making them unequally threatened given the national economic performance. Additionally, in polarised systems, the economically vulnerably are not only in a more precarious position of needing more ex ante protection but are often entitled to less compensatory insurance because of their incomplete contributions despite their more likely needs compared with the other, less risk-exposed, workers in the country. This means that it is crucial to consider the unemployment risk exposure of a given worker and his/her attitudes for ex ante protection in relation to each country’s economic performance (Kurer et al., 2019). Therefore, when formulating a risk-insurance logic for supporting ex ante protection by limiting new admissions, it is pertinent to view the unemployment risk exposure of people both in terms of its level and the relational position compared with the country’s economic performance.

In sum, I expect that relatively higher unemployment risk exposed workers, due to lower prospective security and the potential need for compensation, hold more restrictive immigration policy attitudes. Hence, my first hypothesis, focusing on the individual-level direct relationship between risk and policy attitudes, is formulated as follows:

**Hypothesis 1.** Individuals exposed to relatively higher unemployment risks support more restrictive immigration policies.

3.2 | The mitigating role of EPL and unemployment compensation policy

The two welfare state institutions that I focus on influence the likelihood and terms of unemployment in the short and long term (Gingrich & Ansell, 2012; Hallikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2016). The first policy I investigate, the EPL, is an ex ante policy intervention with a prospective function that preserves economic status before job loss. The second policy I explore, that is, the unemployment compensation policy, can be characterised as an ex post policy that corrects for risks once the job loss has already occurred. Whereas the former operates as a regulatory control mechanism over the labour market employment conditions and segmentation, the latter enables the provision and distribution of social benefits and compensation in cases of unemployment.

I argued that within a risk-insurance framework, the attitudes of the more risk exposed for less immigration could be understood as a regulatory type of ex ante protective state intervention. Adding to this, I expect that EPL, as another ex ante regulation policy, dampens the link between economic insecurity and restrictive immigration policy by alleviating the role of incoming foreign labour as a source of uncertainty for workers’ economic security. Next, I do not expect the same logic for the compensatory ex post unemployment insurance. Instead, there is reason to
argue that the immigration policy attitudes of the economically secure and the insecure will be more divided in inclusive and expansive compensatory systems based on the potential competition for scarce ex post resources that increasing immigration implies, especially for those facing higher unemployment risks.

Starting with the EPL, looking at the studies on labour market dualisation and welfare attitudes, one might postulate that rigid EPL policy enhances cleavages within the workforce and deepens preferential divides between citizens (Rueda, 2008). This means that more protected labour markets may beget wider differences in policy attitudes between workers due to unemployment risks. Such a logic makes sense as strict employment protection is often seen as at odds with employment growth by creating worse conditions for re-entry into the job market and by amplifying the probability of longer-term unemployment spells (Boeri, 2011). Hence, less flexible hiring and firing rules intensify the economic impact of losing employment in the future. In such labour markets, re-entry to work becomes more complicated (Boeri & van Ours, 2008). Therefore, lack of flexibility due to strong EPL could be thought as to why an ex ante state intervention that prevents further uncertainty in the labour market, that is, restrictive immigration policy, may be a more critical choice for the more risk exposed.

However, in addition to the mixed evidence concerning the negative impact of employment protection on job growth and unemployment (Avdagic, 2015), there is another dimension of employment regulations when it comes to the prospective status of workers. More regulated labour markets protect workers from potential wage deflation and dismissal in case of economic shocks. Indeed, higher dismissal costs and fewer flexible contracts in the economy lower workers’ economic worries (Anderson & Pontusson, 2007). Consequently, risk-exposed workers may not fear and, thus, not perceive immigration as a direct challenge to their future status if they are already being protected by the EPLs (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2016). Put differently, an already strong protective ex ante state policy may alleviate the risk-based divisions among the workforce regarding immigration policy restrictions.

Furthermore, EPL policies also determine the availability and prevalence of lower-wage, short-term and more precarious jobs in the economy (Card et al., 1999). This is critical because immigrants are disproportionately employed with shorter-term and more flexible temporary employment contracts (Anderson, 2010; Kogan, 2011). However, such flexible work opportunities are markedly fewer in strongly regulated job markets. This means that in cases of rigid labour markets such as Italy, Portugal, Spain or Greece, where foreign labour is far more present in the informal economy, immigrants are less likely to obtain jobs in the formal economy even if they can enter the labour markets (Baldwin-Edwards & Arango, 1999; Pardos-Prado, 2020). Then, the risk-insurance based utility of restrictive immigration policy may be weaker as workers see immigration policymaking as less of a prospective economic security matter. By providing regulatory protection over potential risks born from incoming foreign labour, stronger employment protection can dampen risk-based attitudinal divides among the workforces. Based on this reasoning, the following conditioning hypothesis is formulated:

**Hypothesis 2.** Stronger employment protection legislation alleviates the effect of unemployment risk exposure on immigration policy attitudes.

Turning to the unemployment compensation policy, it is clear that the terms and conditions of job loss look vastly different based on the governing rules, inclusiveness and expansiveness of the unemployment insurance regime in a country (Anderson & Pontusson, 2007; Gingrich & Ansell, 2012). Unemployment replacement policies provide the workers with the ex post insurance of livelihood regardless of market forces even if they lose their jobs, that is, decommodification, which varies widely across different capitalist democracies (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Substantial compensation in cases of job loss homogenises risks and reduces the role of unemployment risks in citizens’ lives (Korpi & Palme, 1998; Paskov & Koster, 2014). Moreover, the characteristics of the unemployment insurance schemes can also impact the extent to which existing segmentation and status inequalities are ameliorated or exacerbated due to access rules to compensatory rights. Thus, if ex post welfare state interventions are already widely compensating for unemployment risk differences in society, one can reasonably expect that then economic insecurities have less impact in shaping immigration policy preference divides.
And yet, precisely because of this inclusiveness and expansiveness, more generous unemployment compensation systems may not alleviate but amplify the preferential divides between workers based on their exposure to job loss risks. Because more generous unemployment compensation schemes are associated with less social categorisation and stratification in societies (Esping-Andersen, 1990), more inclusive institutions that treat citizens equally seem to be constrained in how restrictively and selectively states can treat foreigners (Kolbe & Kayran, 2019). Indeed, there is evidence showing that egalitarianism and broader access to compensation for citizens positively correlate with more inclusive social rights for foreigners (Römer, 2017; Sainsbury, 2006). Earlier work investigating the link between public finances and attitudes towards immigration (Jaime-Castillo et al., 2016) and the welfare chauvinism literature supports the expectation that citizens develop adverse reactions for allowing more immigration if foreigners can more easily access public resources (Gerber et al., 2017; Hanson et al., 2007). Furthermore, immigrants are not only viewed as the least deserving group when it comes to accessing social welfare benefits but also are seen as disproportionate users of these resources designed to protect against future unemployment (Reeskens & van der Meer, 2019; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012; van Oorschot & Uunk, 2007). Therefore, more dramatic differences in immigration policy attitudes may be observed in countries where unemployment risks are shared and socialised through inclusive compensation policies and where newcomer foreign workforce can get easier access to such public resources.

Overall, more risk-exposed workers in each country, who are more likely to need compensatory benefits in the future, may have a more adverse reaction to a more permissive immigration policy, which brings additional potential users of the ex post compensation. In this way, through a mechanism of a potential increase in competition for scarce resources, in more expansive insurance systems, risk-based immigration policy attitude divides may be starker. Based on this, the following conditioning hypothesis is formulated:

**Hypothesis 3.** More generous unemployment compensation policy heightens the effect of unemployment risk exposure on immigration policy attitudes.

Finally, there is one other matter worth discussing here. So far, I hypothesised relationships applicable to all workers regardless of their employment status. However, this approach is blind to precarity within societal groups precisely on such a basis (Marx & Picot, 2020). This issue is crucial because workers have systematically different benefit entitlements and work conditions based on their employment contract types, leading to conflicts of interest among these groups regarding policy preferences, as evidenced in the extant political economy literature (Rueda, 2005). For instance, workers in precarious jobs are often eligible for lower compensation rates and may be disproportionately vulnerable in rigid markets. Likewise, stronger regulation often benefits those in more secure and long-term contracts. And yet, I sustain that any worker can have a prospective contract type in such a framework of future risks rather than current status. Nevertheless, I concede that disregarding such potential differences can hide critical empirical implications. Therefore, in the analyses, I evaluate whether hypothesised conditioning effects vary based on employment contract not to overlook a potentially critical factor altering the relationships discussed here.

## 4 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY

I collect data from three different kinds of sources. First, I use the ESS to operationalise individual-level variables and my outcome of interest. Second, I use the European Labour Force Survey (ELFS) waves for each country over time, calculating the unemployment risk exposure for different occupational task groups (Eurostat, 2018). Third, I gather comparative longitudinal country-level data to measure unemployment insurance and employment protection policies. Combining these data, I end up with a pooled cross-sectional hierarchical dataset that includes 16 countries from Western, Northern and Southern Europe (see Figure 1). I exclude Central and Eastern European countries to ensure comparability on experience with immigration and labour market institutions. Temporally, the analysis is
restricted to six ESS waves from 2002 to 2012 (every 2 years), where all context-level covariates are lagged by 1 year to respect time ordering. The temporal scope is driven by practical limitations, detailed below, and I discuss how I attempted to maximise coverage (reported in the appendix). Overall, this leaves me with 76 country-year units. The number of observations at the higher level is also determined by the lack of ESS waves in certain years for some countries such as Austria and Italy and the lack of ELFS data in some years such as for France and Norway (see Table A1 for further details of the sample). The average number of individual-level observations in each country-year unit is 740. Given my theoretical focus on the risk of being unemployed instead of the unemployment status, the analysis is restricted to actively employed respondents similar to comparable work (Kaihovaara & Im, 2020; Polavieja, 2016).

4.1 | Measuring immigration policy attitudes

Data on my dependent variable come from the first six waves (2002–2012) of the ESS (ESS, 2020). ESS is well suited to measure immigration policy attitudes because it includes three questions available across all waves targeting this outcome of interest. These question items ask the extent to which the respondents prefer to allow ‘many’, ‘some’, ‘a few’ or ‘no’ immigrants into the country from the following groups: ‘people with same race or ethnic group as most of the country’, ‘people with a different race or ethnic group as most of the country’ and ‘people from the poorer countries outside Europe’. Following earlier work using these very strongly correlated items (Pardos-Prado, 2020; Polavieja, 2016), I construct an additive index variable ($\alpha = 0.904$). I scale the index to vary from 0 to 3, where higher values indicate support for less permissive immigration policy ($\bar{x}: 1.31, s: 0.76$).

Further details of this measure and a series of sensitivity checks are available in the appendix, see pp. 31–35. Notably, my results do not change if I use each item separately as my dependent variable (see Table A23). On
average, the lowest support for restrictive immigration policy is found in Sweden and Norway, whereas they are most substantial in Greece and Portugal (see Figure A12). Between 2002 and 2012, although within-country changes are limited, there is significant variation across job groups in different countries concerning average immigration policy attitudes, which is the crucial variation I investigate here (see Figures A13 and A14).

4.2 | Measuring economic risk exposure

I measure economic insecurity and the prospective vulnerability of respondents by using an objective risk-based measure of economic threats within each country, matching my theoretical framework. In the first step, I calculate occupational unemployment rates in each of the nine one-digit ISCO work categories at a given time point $t$. By now, this occupation-specific approach for capturing economic grievances has become commonplace in the literature (Pecoraro & Ruedin, 2016; Rehm, 2016). As a second step, I use the national unemployment rate as the benchmark to determine people’s relative risk exposure at any given country-year context similar to earlier work (Kurer et al., 2019). This transformation does not alter occupational differences in unemployment risks in absolute terms. Instead, it simultaneously provides a useful empirical tool for evaluating each group’s position within their own country, particularly important in this pooled comparative design. I divide each nine occupational unemployment rates (%) at time $t$ by the national unemployment rate (%) at $t$, obtaining the risk exposure for each occupation relative to the national performance. The relative unemployment risk exposure is continuous, where ‘1’ indicates no difference between the occupational and national unemployment rates. Values higher than ‘1’ mean that the worker is worse off than the average worker, and values lower than ‘1’ indicate that the worker is better off in terms of risk exposure ($\bar{x}$: 0.92, s: 0.45). Further discussion of the measurement validity of this variable is available in pp. 24–28 in the appendix.

I use broader one-digit ISCO task group aggregation of occupations to maximise data availability across countries over time and to ensure comparability of risk exposure levels before and after 2010 (ISCO-88 series are not used after 2010, and instead, ISCO-08 categories were created; see Tables A4 and A5 for details). Nevertheless, I calculate risks in two-digit more fine-grained occupational job categories and report that the choice between one-digit and two-digit ISCO codes is inconsequential to the main findings presented (see Tables A16 and A17). Figure 1 illustrates the nine occupations I consider here. Manual workers and lower-skilled jobs are exposed to the highest unemployment risk levels. Service sector workers and clerical jobs also seem to be doing worse off in the past decades. Importantly, there is variation in the distribution of the unemployment risks across job categories in different countries. For instance, unskilled workers are far more disproportionately risk exposed in Italy, about twice as much as an average worker. This is far less striking in cases such as the Netherlands and Norway. Next, average risk exposure is lower for workers in managerial positions and for business, educational or scientific professionals requiring more education and training. Yet, these differences vary also between countries. For example, higher-skilled occupations are relatively less shielded in Switzerland and the United Kingdom than in other countries.

4.3 | Measuring unemployment insurance and employment protection policies

I measure employment protection policy using the OECD’s EPL indices for regular and temporary contracts (2018). The EPL index for regular contracts captures the procedures and costs involved in dismissals; the index for temporary workers covers temporary work regulations concerning the types and duration of such non-permanent contracts (further details of the indices are available in the appendix, pp. 21–23). I combine these two indices for permanent and temporary contracts creating an average employment protection policy measure similar to previous work (Gingrich & Ansell, 2012; Mau et al., 2012). Higher values on the index reflect stronger EPL ($\bar{x}$: 1.99, s: 0.73). Given
my theoretical emphasis on prospective positions, a comprehensive measure of EPL is more fitting to capture regulations for both types of employment across the sample. Nevertheless, I replicate my models by including the two EPL indices separately and for relevant subsamples of temporary and permanent workers ruling out that this aggregation strategy drives my results (see Table A13).

I measure unemployment insurance policy using the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (Scruggs et al., 2017). This dataset provides a uniquely suitable measure for this study, capturing insurance policy with an unemployment compensation generosity (UCG) index composed of five items: the generosity of replacement rates, qualification conditions, entitlement duration, waiting period before the benefit reception and the share of the workforce covered. Higher values on the index mean that the institutions are more compensatory and expansive (x̄: 10.87, s: 2.02). This measure has been widely used and validated as an indicator of the programmatic aspects of social insurance policy (Crepaz & Damron, 2009). One drawback of using this data is its temporal coverage - only until 2011. However, other datasets of welfare policies do not allow this measure to be constructed comparably. In the appendix, pp.19–21, I detail the justification of this measurement strategy further and report that the results do not change when an alternative, but not substitutive, measure, that is, aggregate social expenditure, is used to extend the temporal scope of the analysis (see Table A12).

Whereas there are decisive cross-national differences, there is limited over time variation for both policies (see Figure 2). Compensation policies seem to be rather stable from 2000 to 2012, except for Sweden and Denmark, where the strength of UCG is lower after 2008. Likewise, EPL is slow moving apart from countries with higher baselines such as Greece, Portugal and Italy, converging towards the regional average. Thus, present data have undesirable qualities in temporal scope and variance characteristics of EPL and UCG, which does not allow analyses and conclusions regarding the dynamic effects on institutions that change within country. Although I am primarily interested in testing risk-based preference divides at different labour market institutional conditions in each country, this modest temporal variation and the design’s 10-year temporal scope are less concerning. Looking at the two policies together, Norway seems to be a case of simultaneously strong EPL and generous UCG. In contrast, liberal welfare

FIGURE 2  Variation of EPL and UCG over time, 2000–2012. Note: The solid line graphs visualise EPL scores, whereas the dashed line graphs visualise UCG
regimes, that is, Ireland and the United Kingdom, have weaker compensation and less regulation. It is important to note that high UCG and low EPL also co-exist, such as in Switzerland and vice versa in Greece, where there is stronger employment protection with markedly lower compensatory policies.

4.4 | Empirical strategy

I run two-level hierarchical linear regression models with a random-slope specification where individuals are nested in 76 country-year units. The variance partition coefficient indicates that quite a substantial portion of the variance, about 12%, in immigration policy attitudes is due to differences between country-years. Next, I choose a random-slope specification allowing the coefficient of unemployment risk to vary in each country-year. Assuming one coefficient for risk across the sample for all country-years fails to consider the hypothesised policy-mitigated effects, resulting in a mismatch between theory and testing as well as anti-conservative bias in estimates (Heisig & Schaeffer, 2019). Hence, the most significant advantage of using country-year units at the higher level is to maximise the number of Level 2 observations, reducing potential Type II errors. This is particularly salient because I am interested in testing cross-level interaction terms. However, not specifying country and year levels separately can bias my estimates (Schmidt-Catran & Fairbrother, 2016). Considering both approaches, I still favour two-level analyses in my main models. Nonetheless, I specify three-level hierarchical models (individuals nested in countries and years) and four-level models (individuals nested in occupations, countries and years), revealing substantively the same results (see Tables A27 and A28). Additionally, I check the sensitivity of my findings by resampling country-years and use bootstrapped and jack-knife standard errors (see Tables A39–A44). All models pass relevant diagnostic tests for the multi-level cross-level interaction models. For further discussion of the empirical strategy, see pp. 39–42 in the appendix.

4.5 | Model specification

I start my analysis by adding individual covariates and then contextual-level variables to my models and evaluating the direct effect of unemployment risk on attitudes. Next, I add the interaction terms testing each conditioning hypothesis one at a time. At the respondent level, I control for whether respondents hold a permanent employment contract as opposed to having a temporary contract, considering the importance of this factor on economic status. Next, I account for several theoretically influential factors (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014) such as education, sex, religiosity, whether the respondent is a trade union member and respondents’ age distinguished in three categories: ‘between 18 and 34 years old’, ‘between 35 and 50 years old’ and ‘between 51 and 65 years old’. Because my sample includes naturalised citizens, I control for whether the respondents have an immigration background.

To capture the economic well-being of respondents concerning their income, I use self-reported evaluations. The question asks how respondents feel about living with their current income, ranging from ‘very difficult’ to ‘living comfortably’. Alternating this measure with the objective household income makes no difference in the results (see Table A29). Finally, I control for the type of residential area that the respondents live in with the following options: ‘big city’, ‘suburbs’, ‘small city’, ‘village’ or ‘in the countryside’. I do not include potentially endogenous subjective attitudes in the main models presented here. However, their inclusion does not change the results, which I discuss in the robustness checks below. Summary statistics of the individual-level covariates are in Table A2.

Because I am primarily interested in the cross-national policy variation between countries instead of the impact of within-country policy changes over time, I avoid including country and year fixed effects, which would take away the variance that I aim to capture in my models. Instead, at Level 2, I add two relevant covariates using the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al., 2020); see Table A3 for summary statistics. I control for economic growth measured as the gross domestic product (GDP) growth from the previous year. Next, I measure the share of
immigrant stock at the country-year level as a percentage of the total population indicative of demographic heterogeneity (OECD, 2018). Overall, I estimate the following model and alternate my model specification for testing each of the cross-level interaction terms, respectively:

\[
\text{Immigration policy attitudes}_{ij} = \beta_1 \text{risk}_{ij} + (\beta_2 + \beta_{10} \text{Level} - 1 \text{Covariates}_{ij}) + \beta_{11} \text{EPL}_j + \beta_{12} \text{UCG}_j \\
+ (\beta_{13} + \beta_{14} \text{Level} - 2 \text{Covariates}_{ij}) + \beta_{15} \text{risk} \times \text{EPL}_j + u_0 + u_{ij} \text{risk} + e_{ij}
\]

Hypothesis 1 is evaluated by the individual-level direct coefficient of risk on attitudes. Concerning how I test my second and third hypotheses, it is worth emphasising that the effect of EPL and UCG on attitudes are estimated in two ways. First, the direct effects of policies are represented by coefficients predicting the average impact of each policy on all citizens (\(\beta_{11}\) and \(\beta_{12}\)) based on EPL or UCG. Yet, these coefficients are not the central relationship of interest in this paper. Instead, indirect effects are estimated in the cross-level interaction terms (such as \(\beta_{15}\)), evaluating the conditional impact of EPL and UCG on attitudes as hypothesised. Finally, I should reiterate that the paper does not make causal or dynamic arguments within countries, given the research design and the observational nature of the data. Instead, it investigates how economic motivations predict immigration policy attitudes at different welfare and labour market policy conditions.

5 | EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

Table 1 displays the coefficients of theoretical interest estimated from a series of multilevel linear models (see Table A6 for full results). Model 1 is specified only with individual-level covariates, whereas Model 2 adds EPL and UCG, and Model 3 includes all Level 2 variables. Model 4 and Model 5 add interaction terms, one by one, between ‘risk and EPL’ and ‘risk and UCG’ to the fully specified models, respectively.

5.1 | Direct effects of unemployment risk and policy context

Is there evidence for a risk-insurance based logic of immigration policy attitudes? The results in Model 1 through Model 3 reveal a consistent positive relationship between unemployment risk exposure and more restrictive immigration policy attitudes. Higher risk exposure is positively associated with less permissive immigration policy attitudes at \(p < 0.001\) level, finding robust evidence for Hypothesis 1. Holding all other covariates at means, there is a predicted difference of about 0.2 points on attitudes when comparing respondents at one standard deviation above and below average (\(\bar{x} \pm 0.45\)) relative unemployment risk exposure variable (see also Figure A1 for an illustration). Because the dependent variable is on a scale from 0 to 3, this seems to be a non-negligible difference. Notably, I confirm that the slope of risk varies substantially by country-years (see Figure A2 visualising the slope of risk by country-years).

When looking at the direct effect of policies, Model 2 and Model 3 reveal that, on average, neither EPL nor UCG systematically predicts differences in immigration policy attitudes at conventional levels of significance (see Table 1). This result is unsurprising given the mixed evidence in existing literature concerning the impact of labour market institutions on immigration attitudes. Table 1 also corroborates much of the conventional wisdom in the literature, revealing that women, younger citizens, union members, those who live in urban areas, more educated, perceiving less hardship regarding their income and citizens with an immigration background are systematically less sceptical towards open immigration policies (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). One finding of note here is that those with permanent employment contracts are more pro-restriction than temporary workers. The disproportionate presence of older and male workers in permanent contracts can be thought to explain this positive coefficient (Schwander & Häusermann, 2013).
|                                | Model 1          | Model 2          | Model 3          | Model 4          | Model 5          |
|--------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Relative unemployment risk     | 0.19*** (0.011)  | 0.19*** (0.011)  | 0.19*** (0.011)  | 0.26*** (0.029)  | 0.05 (0.051)     |
| Permanent contract             | 0.02* (0.008)    | 0.02* (0.008)    | 0.02* (0.008)    | 0.02* (0.008)    | 0.02* (0.008)    |
| Woman                          | −0.02** (0.006)  | −0.02** (0.006)  | −0.02** (0.006)  | −0.02** (0.006)  | −0.02** (0.006)  |
| Age (ref: 18–34 y/o)           |                  |                  |                  |                  |                  |
| 35–50 y/o                      | −0.01 (0.007)    | −0.01 (0.007)    | −0.01 (0.007)    | −0.01 (0.007)    | −0.01 (0.007)    |
| 51–64 y/o                      | 0.03** (0.008)   | 0.03** (0.008)   | 0.03** (0.008)   | 0.03** (0.008)   | 0.03** (0.008)   |
| Education                      | −0.03*** (0.001) | −0.03*** (0.001) | −0.03*** (0.001) | −0.03*** (0.001) | −0.03*** (0.001) |
| Union member                   | −0.05*** (0.007) | −0.05*** (0.007) | −0.05*** (0.007) | −0.05*** (0.007) | −0.05*** (0.007) |
| Foreign-born                    | −0.12*** (0.013) | −0.12*** (0.013) | −0.12*** (0.013) | −0.12*** (0.013) | −0.12*** (0.013) |
| UCG                            | −0.02 (0.011)    | −0.02 (0.011)    | −0.02 (0.011)    | −0.02 (0.011)    | −0.04** (0.013)  |
| EPL                            | 0.06 (0.030)     | 0.04 (0.032)     | 0.10* (0.039)    | 0.04 (0.033)     |                  |
| Economic growth                | −0.01 (0.008)    | −0.01 (0.008)    | −0.01 (0.008)    | −0.01 (0.008)    | −0.01 (0.008)    |
| Share % of foreign-born        | −0.01 (0.005)    | −0.01 (0.005)    | −0.01 (0.005)    | −0.01 (0.005)    |                  |
| EPL * relative risk            |                  |                  |                  | −0.04** (0.014)  |                  |
| UCG * relative risk            |                  |                  |                  |                  | 0.01** (0.005)   |
| Constant                       | 1.53*** (0.038)  | 1.65*** (0.142)  | 1.73*** (0.147)  | 1.61*** (0.153)  | 1.93*** (0.164)  |
| Number of respondents          | 56,207           | 56,207           | 56,207           | 56,207           | 56,207           |
| Number of country-years        | 76               | 76               | 76               | 76               | 76               |
| Within country-year variance   | 0.4624           | 0.4624           | 0.4624           | 0.4624           | 0.4624           |
| Between country-year variance  | 0.0716           | 0.0591           | 0.0552           | 0.0550           | 0.0537           |
| Log likelihood                 | −58,271          | −58,267          | −58,266          | −58,262          | −58,262          |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
5.2 The conditioning effects of EPL and UCG on risk-based attitude differences

I argued that the *ex ante* protective and *ex post* compensatory labour market interventions mitigate the relationship between economic insecurity and restrictive immigration policy attitudes. As formulated in Hypotheses 2 and 3, the models should return statistically significant interaction terms between risk and EPL in Model 4 and risk and UCG in Model 5. The results in Table 1 seem to show just that. There is a statistically significant negative interaction term between EPL and risk and a significant positive interaction term between UCG and risk (both at $p < 0.01$ level). Figure 3 visualises the average marginal effects (AMEs) of risk across different EPL and UCG policy conditions to interpret these interaction terms substantively. The left panel (Figure 3a) presents the AMEs of unemployment risk exposure on immigration policy attitudes conditional on EPL and the right panel (Figure 3b) visualises the same for UCG. The histogram plots present the distribution of EPL and UCG values in my sample.²

What is the role of EPL when it comes to shaping economically motivated immigration policy attitudes? Figure 3a visualises the conditional effect of risk by EPL, revealing that the impact of risk on more restrictive policy attitudes is weaker as we go from less regulated to more regulated labour markets. When comparing EPL policies in the lower (EPL = 1.71) and upper quartiles (EPL = 2.54) of the sample, the AME of unemployment risk goes down from 0.197 to 0.168 points. This means that in countries with more protective employment policies, the impact of unemployment risk on immigration policy attitudes is smaller in line with Hypothesis 2. For instance, when EPL is less strict, such as in Switzerland or Ireland, risk-based differences in immigration policy attitudes are steeper than in the high EPL conditions, such as in Spain or France.

Next, do more expansive UCG policies deepen or dampen the risk-insurance logic of resistance to immigration? Figure 3b displays that the effect of risk is stronger in more compensatory contexts, where policies are

![Figure 3](image-url)

FIGURE 3 AMEs of risk on immigration attitudes conditional on policy contexts, 95% CIs
more open and generous. When comparing UCG policies in the lower (UCG = 9.5) and upper quartiles (UCG = 11.9) of the sample, the AME of unemployment risk on more anti-immigration attitudes goes from about 0.172 to 0.204 points. Thus, there is a more considerable objective economic insecurity effect where there are more generous unemployment benefits in line with Hypothesis 3. This means that exposure to relatively higher unemployment risk in a country with a more generous and compensatory unemployment insurance system, such as the Netherlands or Belgium, has a bigger impact on the politics of immigration when compared to living in one with less UCG, such as Greece or Italy.

5.3 | Robustness checks

I perform a series of robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of my results. First, occupational risks are blind to insecurity differences due to other sources of vulnerability, namely, the employment contract status, which may confound my results. Using three-way interaction terms between contract type, risk and policies (as well as sub-sample analyses of temporary and permanent workers), I confirm that there is no evidence suggesting that the contract type influences the risk-insurance-based logics tested here (see pp. 15–18 in the appendix). Second, there may be unobserved variation at the individual level concerning attitudes towards immigration that can confound the relationships I study. Thus, I replicate my models by adding socio-tropic attitudes concerning the national economy, individual-level predictors of partisanship and attitudes towards redistribution (see Tables A29 and A30).

Third, I check whether more risk-exposed workers indeed view immigration as a threat against their economic interests even if the roots of such objective unemployment risks are not directly resulting from immigration (see Table A18). In line with earlier work (Helbling & Kriesi, 2014; Lancee & Pardos-Prado, 2013; Polavieja, 2016), the economically insecure are far more sceptical towards the economic effects of immigration on the welfare state, labour markets and the overall economy in line with paper’s argument. Furthermore, I include such pre-existing perceptions of the economic impact of immigration in my models. Even when controlling for views on the economic effects of immigration, there is evidence to support an objective risk-based link to attitudes. Focusing on the objective economic job competition effects due to immigration, I calculate occupation-specific immigrant employment rates using OECD’s DIOC database and add to my model specification, reporting that the results do not change (see Tables A31 and A32).

Fourth, although a longitudinal study is better for ruling out confounding factors at the country level, I exclude such a design due to my theoretical interests, data limitations and the slow-moving nature of the policy variables. Nevertheless, I replicate my results using country and year fixed effects, revealing that the results are robust to removing all such unobserved variation (see Table A25). My results are also robust to the addition of theoretically relevant Level 2 covariates in my models, such as the unemployment rate, union density, government partisanship, budget deficit, economic openness, existing immigration policy characteristics (see Tables A33–A36) and the shape of the distribution of unemployment risks in each country (see Table A38).

Lastly, considering that in more dualised labour markets, some workers are excluded from the compensatory and protective functions of the welfare state, there could be a three-way interactional way in which these two institutions may operate on how they influence economically motivated attitudes. To check for this, I estimate a three-way interaction term between EPL, UCG and risk, confirming that there is no evidence of a three-way conditional relationship that alters the evidence presented here (see Table A11 and Figure A6).

6 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This paper assessed how unemployment risk-based economic vulnerabilities divide people’s attitudes over immigration policy permissiveness and whether labour market institutions influence such cleavages. My analyses from a
sample of 16 European countries observed over a decade from 2002 to 2012 suggest strong evidence for a link between relatively higher unemployment risk exposure and more restrictive immigration policy attitudes. Importantly, the findings indicate that whereas stronger ex ante protection dampens risk-based cleavages between workers, generosity and expansiveness of ex post compensation further divides immigration policy attitudes between the relatively more or less risk exposed. The article adds to the debates in comparative political economy and advances the study of migration policy and public opinion in three ways.

First, the findings provide evidence in line with studies suggesting a non-negligible economic basis of immigration policy attitudes focusing on prospective status in labour markets (Dancygier & Walter, 2015; Kaihovaara & Im, 2020; Pardos-Prado & Xena, 2019; Pecoraro & Ruedin, 2016). Contributing to such debates, I suggested that less immigration may be desirable for the relatively more risk exposed as it provides an ex ante damper on stopping further uncertainty. Furthermore, immigration policy plays a protective role in risk-prone labour markets through its gatekeeping function, which can be altered by labour market institutions operating within such a risk-insurance framework, as shown here. In such a way, the logic has less of a resemblance to a cultural backlash against immigration but rather highlights the substantive need for economic insurance among citizens due to the economic transformations and labour market changes.

Yet, this is not to downplay the symbolic and culturally motivated grievances that contribute to scepticism about further immigration and what we observe in the rise of the appeal of ‘new nationalism’ across advanced democracies (Ausserladscheider, 2019; Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2019). Instead, the paper underlines that although both material and cultural concerns no doubt have a role to play when shaping policy attitudes, the evidence here counters some of the claims made by previous work, relegating the importance of economic motivations (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Manevska & Achterberg, 2013; Sniderman et al., 2004). Therefore, moving beyond the empirical tests of economic and cultural explanations on the demand side, future studies should concentrate on the supply-side processes of such immigrationisation of economic insecurity in politics (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2021). Further research is needed on the interplay between the demand-side factors and the supply side of the presentation of the immigration issue. Thus, it would be fruitful to uncover how political and discursive contexts influence the negative polarisation in the politics of immigration.

Second, the study makes an important contribution by investigating the conditioning effects of unemployment benefit generosity. I find that the impact of risk exposure is stronger in more compensatory countries in line with the arguments from the welfare chauvinism literature (Reesksens & van der Meer, 2019; Reesksens & van Oorschot, 2012; van Oorschot & Uunk, 2007) and supports earlier evidence suggesting a resource competition threat when it comes to how natives view immigration (Gerber et al., 2017; Hanson et al., 2007). Because more immigration implies more potential users in inclusive and expansive compensation policy regimes, such competition heightens insecure workers’ economically motivated immigration scepticism. Thus, labour market institutions are not just sources of fiscal concern over immigrant use at a given time but also have precise mitigating influence over perceived future needs linked to how newcomers can gain access to benefits such as unemployment insurance.

Finally, the study adds to the literature on the dualisation and inequality in the labour markets. At the individual level, the analyses show that the political consequences of labour market divides and economic vulnerability are far-reaching, going beyond their implications of redistributive and social policy areas. Prospective job threats predict employed individuals who hold more restrictive positions towards further immigration, arguably indicative of their attitudes to ensure protection ex ante to preserve their status, resembling a risk-insurance logic of attitudes in extant labour market dualisation literature (Alt & Iversen, 2017; Gingrich & Ansell, 2012; Schwander & Häusermann, 2013). In this way, the analyses bridge existing knowledge in immigration attitudes’ literature on the one hand and labour market inequality studies on the other. Considering the implications of the shape of the inequality distribution for welfare attitudes (Rehm, 2016), this study highlights a more complex picture in the design of social welfare access conditions for immigrants, particularly in systems with expansive and more encompassing social provisions. Future research should explore the contextual implications of the distribution of unemployment risks and its interplay with labour market institutional configurations on political attitudes.
Overall, the paper’s findings suggest that in more segmented and regulated labour market systems, worker cleavages due to prospective risks are smaller when it comes to immigration policy attitudes. Putting these results together, the risk-attenuating role of more exclusive, that is, more protective and less expansive compensatory, contexts adds another layer to understanding why negative politicisation of immigration based on economic grievances has been more successful in some instances from Western and Northern Europe as opposed to the Southern European countries. This is in line with work showing that higher ethnic job competition on more restrictive attitudes is conditioned by the dualisation levels in the labour markets (Pardos-Prado, 2020). Nevertheless, future studies should focus on extending the geographical and the temporal scope of this analysis using research designs and empirical strategies that can precisely gauge the causal implications of institutional designs for mitigating differences in the impact of economic vulnerability, leveraging within-country variations in policy using longitudinal data.

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST
None.

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ENDNOTES
1 See Marx and Picot (2020) for a detailed discussion of the variety of vulnerability indicators and their respective advantages and limitations.
2 The theoretical framework refers to the position of each worker’s unemployment risk vis-à-vis the national unemployment rate and where this puts them compared with other workers and not the overall shape of the distribution of unemployment risks at the country level.
3 The questions do not specify immigrant type or skill characteristics. Although these differences are not central here, see pp. 35–36 in the appendix for a discussion about its implications for this analysis.
4 Although the clustering of each country-year unit at Level 2 maximises the observations at the higher level, independent country cases in the analysis are restricted to 16. To ensure that the results are not driven by case inflation, I conduct further checks by dropping 1 year at a time from the sample (Tables A40 and A41), estimating the coefficients in different time periods (Table A42), and use systematic resampling checks (Tables A43 and A44). These additional tests all provide substantively the same results as in the manuscript.
5 Applying restricted maximum likelihood estimation adjusting for small Level 2 sizes do not change the results (see Table A26).
6 I replicate my results by restricting the sample to citizens without an immigration background to observe preferential divides between native citizens more narrowly (see Table A37).
7 See Figure A3, illustrating the predicted relationship between risk and immigration policy attitudes at different conditions.
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