Civil Society’s Role in Indonesia’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: Study of Indonesian Religious Organizations' Humanitarian Aid in the Crisis in Myanmar's Rakhine State Region (2012-2018)

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Abstract

Civil Society is considered as the third space outside the state and market where people can express their opinions and make certain contributions to create a condition in accordance with the certain values they profess. As the time progresses, with the development of information and globalization, the demand for bigger civic space is undeniable and the need for society to be able to contribute to an issue that occurs outside the border of their country is arising. This encourages the role of civil society to contribute to humanitarian diplomacy efforts where the role of the community and non-state actors is needed in solving transnational problems. This issue is exemplified by the role of various religious organizations in Indonesia through their contribution in helping to solve humanitarian problems in Rakhine State, of Myanmar between 2012 to 2018. Through a humanitarian diplomacy approach, these various religious organizations collaborated with the Indonesian government to send various types of assistance. This paper will explain why the role of religious organizations in Indonesia as the representation of civil society is significant in the humanitarian diplomacy effort of the Rakhine State Crisis. This paper will also provide a descriptive narrative related to how these contributions are channelled and delivered to the conflict-affected communities in Myanmar.

Keywords: Civil Society, Diplomacy, Humanitarian Crises.

Introduction

In recent periods, especially since the end of the Cold War, a new age has begun. The international world is facing major changes influenced by the wave of globalization and the development of technology and information. As a consequence, these developments facilitated the emergence of a new style of diplomacy. State actors that were previously considered to be the only actors who have the power to carry out the diplomatic process, are now getting pressured by other actors who also have their
interests in the foreign politics. This process is also marked by the development of democracy and freedom of expression that has occurred in many countries in the world. With democratization, Civil Society has more power and is increasingly influential in policy making, including policies related to the diplomatic process (Whall & Pytlak, 2014).

The evolution of civil society's role in policymaking is also linked to various events in the international world that have captured the attention of the international community. The humanitarian catastrophe in Myanmar's Rakhine State was one of the incidents that gained a lot of attention. Rakhine has long been thought to be a conflict-prone region. One of the causes is that Rakhine State is a multi-ethnic region populated by people of many ethnic backgrounds. The Rohingya people are one of the various ethnic groups of Rakhine State. Before the 2016-17 crisis, there were an estimated one million Rohingyas residing in Myanmar (Mahmood et al., 2017). Hundreds of thousands, however, have been displaced as a result of the ongoing crises in the region, and have been forced to travel to neighbouring countries such as Bangladesh. The Rohingyas have been labelled as one of the world's most persecuted minorities by the United Nations (UN) and Human Rights Watch (HRW). They claim that the conflict in Myanmar's Rakhine state is an ethnic cleansing campaign in which the 1982 legislation "essentially deny the Rohingya the right to nationality." Ethnic minorities are not recognized as "national indigenous races" under Myanmar law, and they are denied freedom of movement, state education, and civil service posts (Smith, 2013). Not only that, but the government used military force against the Rohingyas during the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State. According to Amnesty International, the Rohingyas were subjected to military repression in 1978, 1991-1992, 2012, 2015, and 2016-2017 (Frontières-Holland, 2002).

The world community paid close attention to the humanitarian crisis that erupted in Myanmar's Rakhine State from 2012 to 2018. With this case, Indonesia became one of the countries that is most concerned about the situation. In relation to the Rakhine State Crisis, Indonesia provided substantial political and logistical support to help with the handling of humanitarian situations in Rakhine State. Indonesia has provided 54 tons of humanitarian aid in response to the catastrophe. The assistance is coming not only from the Indonesian state authority, but also from Indonesian civil society, represented by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, as well as Indonesian civilians in general, whom had contributed to the logistical supports and support in social manners to the issue in Rakhine State.

The purpose of this article is to illustrate how civil society plays a part in international relations diplomacy. As previously said, during the Cold War, a new trend
evolved in which diplomacy was no longer solely dominated by elite (state) players, but also by a variety of new actors, especially civil society. In this situation, the civil society under discussion is represented by a religious civil society group, which has a sizable number of members and influence in Indonesia. The scope of this research focuses on the participation of various Indonesian religious civil society groups in responding to the Rakhine State crisis, which happened in Rakhine State Myanmar between 2012 and 2018.

This study employs qualitative research methodologies to investigate and recognize the significance that certain individuals or groups of people place on social or human issues (Creswell, 2013). Data is extracted and evaluated for meaning and concept as a field-based phenomena, and then presented in a descriptive analytic style without numeric explanation because this approach stresses the process and extraction of meaning. This research is classified as library research since it relies on the collection of material from primary and secondary sources, such as interview scripts, books, newspaper articles, and conclusions from reports. However, it is also complemented by several direct works such as interviewing the representation of Indonesian Religious Organization that was represented by a project officer from Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center (MDMC) and the representative of Indonesia Government from the Indonesian Embassy in Yangon, Myanmar. The time scope of the study focused on the rise of religious populism in Indonesia from the 2014 presidential election till the intensification and the delivery of the humanitarian aid to the conflict area in 2018.

**Discussion**

*Civil Society in Diplomacy.*

It is vital to grasp the idea of civil society's participation in the diplomatic process before discussing the major thesis in this article. The social and political area where voluntary associations try to develop norms and policies for controlling public life in social, political, economic, and environmental dimensions is referred to as civil society.

Individuals and collective groups advocating and campaigning for the common good in a realm outside of government, family, and the market are referred to as civil society. Civil society plays a variety of roles in modern diplomacy, including research, outreach education, advocacy, and norm advancement; narrative; lobbying government agencies and intergovernmental organizations to adopt laws and courses of action; implementing programs and providing services and humanitarian aid; and monitoring the implementation of international commitments. Civil society is essential for bringing new issues to the fore
and affecting how those issues are perceived. Finally, they assist in the implementation of global agreements, with their widespread presence and loose networking proving to be a benefit in bringing global agreements to the local level (Cooper et al., 2013).

**Humanitarian Diplomacy**

In order to describe the role of humanitarian assistance by Indonesia’s civil society in the Rakhine crisis, we are going to explain it by the concept of Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD), a concept first introduced by Larry Minear and Hazel Smith. Humanitarian Diplomacy as a concept emerged in the early of 2000’s, has a broad range of definitions which emphasize on the new function in diplomacy especially in persuading decision makers to act in accordance with humanitarian principles (De Lauri, 2018). Several writings about the concept of Humanitarian Diplomacy try to separate first the concept of Diplomacy and Humanitarian first, which traditionally have opposite backgrounds to each other. Diplomacy as a concept, traditionally focused on state-oriented policy which focused on state interest and often characterized with a pragmatism approach. Otherwise, the Humanitarian principle stands on universal principle regardless of the interest of specific actors. Thus, HD as a new concept is seen as an incorporation of two existing concepts and of course affects the actors who participate, the motives and offers dynamic interaction between the core values of Diplomacy and Humanitarianism. Besides, De Lauri also mentions several values often faced by HD’s practitioners to remain faithful with humanitarianism values such as neutrality, humanity, impartiality and independence.

The interesting part is, when humanitarianism and diplomacy have quite opposite nature, HD as a concept highlighting new challenges such as shifting the focus of humanitarian activity which often focused on advocacy into diplomacy activities. In the context of HD, Diplomacy, an act which focused on pursuing others into the actor’s interest should compromise its values to be more selfless and open the possibility of non-state actors to participate in this activity such as civil society. Civil society as a new acknowledged actor in International Relations has several values which are surprisingly able to get along with humanitarianism principle, such its neutrality and interdependencies and peaceful approach. As stated by David Steinberg, the emergence of Civil Society also acknowledges the reduction of power of state, and being able to define new purpose and pursue new interest through group activities and by peaceful means”(Hewison, 2017a). It can be concluded that, HD as a concept is able to accommodate the role of non-state, including civil society to perform an act of diplomacy activities without losing its core values. HD also helps non-state actors to stand side by side with the state to pursue similar
objectives, and possibly gaining trust from conflict participants since HD strongly emphasizes impartiality and independence.

**Civil Society as the Agenda Setter for Indonesian Diplomacy Efforts**

The first function of civil society in Indonesia’s diplomatic efforts on the topic of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State is to define the diplomatic agenda, which pushes the Indonesian government to adopt diplomatic policies expressing its concern for the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State. Previously in the context of Humanitarian Diplomacy as stated by Lauri and Smith, civil society plays the role as a strategic hub between state-oriented policy and grassroot movement whom has universal and impartial character. Generally, civil society is positioned as a non-state actor whom responsible in maintaining ad promoting democratic values in society, as the emergence of civil society are in line with the development of capitalism and state power in society (Hewison, 2017b). When state power in maintaining its power toward citizen is waning, it should be filled with various role from society itself in ensuring democratic values is well-practices. The role civil society is further emphasized as “a key role in fostering democratic values in peaceful society”(Marchetti & Tocci, 2009). In conflict situation whom civil society mobilization is highly possible since these actors often promote impartiality and neutrality compared to states.

In line with this concept, the viewpoint of Indonesia's civil society was crucial. Increased Islamic movement actions, notably after the 2014 presidential election, proved this. This was complemented by the event of Governor Election of Jakarta that happened in 2017 which strengthened Muslim Civil Society unity in Indonesia. The support was extended not just to Indonesian Muslims, but also to Muslim community worldwide, particularly in light of the deaths of the Rohingya ethnic minority in Rakhine State. The Indonesian government is therefore pressured to develop a foreign policy that reflects Indonesian Muslims' sympathy towards Myanmar by giving humanitarian relief.

The role of public opinion in policymaking is becoming increasingly significant as the country's democratic process progresses, particularly in the post-New Order era. This is especially significant in the context of foreign policy. The policy, particularly diplomatic endeavours, in Indonesia can no longer be regarded solely the domain of policymakers. As a democratic country, Indonesia's foreign policy must reflect the aspirations of a larger civil society.

Domestic political influence is pretty massive in a democratic society with a high degree of accountability, since the people will actively monitor and urge the government to
pursue international affairs that may channel ethical ideas from the community itself. As a result, Indonesia's foreign policy must be adaptable enough to suit all of the nation's main components, including community leaders, religious leaders, businesses, community groups, and civil society. In strategic initiatives connected to Indonesia's foreign policy, the President of the Republic of Indonesia especially considers the people's roles, ambitions, and interests. The government of Indonesia aimed to play a worldwide role as a regional middle power, based on the ideals of democracy and moderate Islam as a country that promotes world peace, as a central goal of its foreign policy (Sukma, 2004).

Identity was among the most important components in building a sense of solidarity, which propels Indonesia's civil society to engage in voicing its opinion towards Myanmar's Rakhine state crises. As individuals get more involved in politics, the Muslim community in Indonesia becomes a domestic force that the government cannot ignore as a country with a Muslim majority and the world’s largest Muslim population. The importance of Islamic movements as a vehicle of expressing public sentiment in diplomacy is critical. Participation of Islamic-based civil society groups in the foreign policy discussion and in assisting with diplomacy implementation is always crucial and should be promoted in order to strengthen domestic support.

The Suharto Islamic depoliticism strategy, which only allowed Muslims to develop their cultural and religious elements without entering the political arena, oppressed the Islamic community in Indonesia throughout the New Order era. Because of this political constraint, there is no major political party, organization, or Islamic institution that able to unites all Indonesian Muslims (Sukma, 2004).

Following the collapse of the Suharto government, the Muslim community in Indonesia began to play a larger role. This was accompanied by the formation of radical Muslim organizations, which emerged out of dissatisfaction with the government’s failure to uphold the law and resolve ethno-religious tensions and corruption, as was the case in the past. Simultaneously, the breakdown of the New Order government increased the role of democracy in Indonesia, prompting policymakers to pay more attention to public opinion and bottom-up societal pressures. This also supports the establishment of greater political engagement in the community - in this case, political participation is defined as influencing the direction of government policy rather than just voting in elections (Sukma, 2004).

Despite the fact that the violence had no direct influence on the Indonesian people's daily life, the situation in Rakhine state enraged Indonesian civil society. Massive news coverage and opinion formation in both local and international mass media, which tended to expose the attempt to slaughter ethnic Rohingya Muslims, were the main causes of the
massive responses of the Muslim community in Indonesia to the crisis that occurred in Rakhine State. The intense media coverage, as well as the use of provocative words or phrases such as "The Killing of Muslims," "The Genocides," and "Ethnic cleansing," were interpreted as acts of violence against Muslim Community by Indonesians, who are predominantly Muslim, and collectively shifted mass opinion. The news regarding Indonesian government's passivity despite considered as a representative of the world's largest Islamic population caused the Indonesian people to demand that their governments take suitable measures in line with their identity (Satria, 2013). This was when the government begins to face pressures, particularly from the Islamic community, to pay attention to the interests of Islam in both domestic and foreign affairs.

Perspectives formed in the Indonesian Muslim community were then expressed with a variety of actions aimed at demonstrating solidarity and encouraging the government to act in the best interests of the Muslim community by taking immediate and effective steps to resolve the conflict and protect the ethnic Rohingya Muslims. The acts of the Indonesian Muslim community were carried out by several civil society organizations, including by religiously motivated mass organizations. They held street demonstrations and fundraising events, and some parties even attempted to enlist jihadists to assist the Rohingya.

We can witness the vital involvement of religious based organizations in various acts taken out to show sympathy with the tragedy that occurred in Rakhine. The group has many different shapes and ideas, and its members come from all walks of life. As a response to the crisis's escalation in 2012, Indonesian Muslim organizations including the MER-C (Medical Emergency Rescue Committee), MER-C (Medical Emergency Rescue Committee), JAT (Jamaah Anshar Tauhid), FUI (Forum Umat Islam), Hilal Ahmar Society, DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia), Jamaah Muslim Hizbullah, FPI (Front Pembela Islam), and MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), gathered on July 2, 2012 to form a network of civil society organizations. The alliances officially issued a joint statement condemning the Government of Myanmar (bin Abdul Rahman & Baihaqie, 2017). Student groups such as the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unit (KAMMI) Semarang denounced the issue through demonstrations and other means. Simultaneously, the students requested the government to seek that the ASEAN Secretary-General withdraw Myanmar from the organization's membership, as well as to provide logistical support and medical specialists to the Rohingya ethnic groups. Some other organisation such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia released statements condemning the crisis and pressure on the government. The Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI), Indonesia’s biggest Muslim
clerical body, also denounced Myanmar’s government and prompted the Indonesian government to take strategic actions to prevent violence against Rohingya Muslims, as well as denounced Myanmar’s president’s statement regarding the unavailability of Rohingya’s National Citizenship Status, which was deemed to be a violation of basic human rights.

Religious organizations roles in coordinating activities and perspectives from Muslims in Indonesian society, especially in dealing with the Rakhine problem, cannot be overstated. Religious organizations have a considerable impact on human behaviour and attitudes, and they serve as a social force in the community (Boulding, 1990). Membership in a religious organization may be a product of tradition or habit, it may be tied to personal struggle, or it may serve as a method of understanding one’s own position in life and society. It assists the person in resolving conflicts and creates the illusion of control over one’s life in this latter role.

Seeing how enthusiastic the Indonesian people was in response to the humanitarian catastrophe in Rakhine state, the government was under a lot of pressure to respond and implement policies that would benefit Muslims in Indonesia. It was very important work to maintain the national stability in term of political and social conditions.

In 2016-2017, the situation erupted once more. At the same time, Indonesia had a new administration that was distinct from the previous government, which dealt with the previous Rohingya issue. Joko Widodo was acting as the Republic of Indonesia’s new president. Despite the fact that the leadership has changed, Indonesia’s desire to represent moderate Islam has remained a key priority in the new regime. Democracy and multilateralism approach were also still featured in Joko Widodo’s foreign policy strategic agenda. Following the 2014 election, the Islamic community in Indonesia increased pressure on President Joko Widodo, who was elected from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). His position was being criticized because of his inability to accommodate the Islamic Community interests in Indonesia (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2018).

The tumultuous political situation in Rakhine was also in parallel with the increasing voice of Islamic civil society in Indonesia. It was mainly in the time of the preparation for the 2017 Jakarta Election. Basuki Tjahaja Purnama as one of the candidates and at that time was still in office as the incumbent Governor of DKI Jakarta, was charged of blasphemy, eliciting heated protests from Muslims throughout the nation. The development of “212 Action,” an Islamist coalition organising huge rallies in late 2016 under the title of “Actions to Defend Islam,” to topple Basuki and take him to court, exemplified the situation.
This protest, however, has also been regarded as the conclusion of Muslims’ political discontent with Joko Widodo's administration, which was perceived as incapable of addressing Muslims' will and public interests.

The deepening of the Rakhine state crisis in the early months of 2017 coincided with the growing excitement of the Islamic solidarity movement following the "Actions to Defend Islam" event on December 12, 2016. Following that, Islamic coalitions that were part of the "212 Action" staged a series of further demonstrations aimed at pressuring the government to act in the Muslim community's best interests by responding forcefully to the humanitarian catastrophe in Rakhine. In response to the violence in Myanmar, the Islamic coalition held a series of solidarity rallies around the country. The protests were dubbed "Actions to Defend the Rohingya" (Aksi Bela Rohingya). A demonstration in front of the Myanmar embassy in Jakarta gathered an estimated 5,000 people on September 6, 2017. Several people set fire to Myanmar flags and Wirathu figurines in protest of the extreme Buddhist monk. After attempting to get through barbed wire, several of them got into a battle with the authorities. They requested the removal of Myanmar's ambassador from Indonesia and the termination of Indonesia's diplomatic relations with Myanmar. On September 16, 2017, "Action 169" was launched, with personalities who had played key roles in earlier "Action 212" becoming key initiators of the action.

In reaction to the worsening of the conflict in 2017, we discovered a number of measures taken by Islamic hardliners who pushed the government to do more to help resolve the issue in Rakhine state. In fact, they openly stated that if the government did not send troops to Rakhine quickly, they would go there voluntarily to carry out jihad. Ustadz Sobri Lubis, the FPI's acting secretary general, suggested that if the Indonesian military did not engage in Rakhine, it should at least supply FPI members with military training and weaponry so that they could go support fellow Muslims (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2018).

However, not all of the actions taken by members of the Islamic coalition or Islamic hardliners were negative in nature. Even though they gave harsh replies and tended to be radical in their responses to the Rakhine state issue and Indonesian government policy in reacting to the crisis, they also sent constructive and proactive humanitarian aid to victims of the disaster. For example, PKS, a conservative Islamic political party and one of Joko Widodo's primary opponents, began fund-raising in late August and September as part of its Rohingya solidarity rallies, and channeled its donations through Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) and Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat (PKPU). The "169 Action" protest, which many suspected of being politically motivated were able to collect up to
Rp.3.8 billion rupiah, which was subsequently routed via several NGOs to support victims of the Rakhine catastrophe. Even some organizations that being considered as islamic fundamentalist organizations actively gathered donations to assist disaster victims. As for example Front Pembela Islam via its humanitarian wing called Hilal Merah Indonesia (HILMI) claimed to have been involved in humanitarian work in Cox’s Bazar, using at least Rp. 2 billion (US $ 145,306) in donations. They also claimed to have directly sent their members to the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar in order to oversee the situation and distribute relief packages at refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar.

Still reacting to the 2017 crisis, the two major Islamic groups in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, both expressed their displeasure with the humanitarian catastrophe and Indonesia’s response towards the crisis. Muhammadiyah, speaking on behalf of conservative audiences, urged the Indonesian government to reconsider its passive approach toward Myanmar, which had plainly failed to stop the massacre, and to suspend Myanmar's membership in ASEAN. It further demanded that Aung San Suu Kyi’s Nobel Peace Prize be withdrawn and that the International Criminal Court pursue those guilty for atrocities. The organization also further requested that the government consider establishing an emergency housing for Rohingya migrants, similar to what was done on Pulau Galang for refugees from the Vietnam War a few decades earlier. Although they took to the streets on several occasions in various acts of solidarity (including some of their figures who were involved in the "212" movement), their actions were more politically free than those carried out by Islamic coalitions led by opposition Islamic political parties or hardliner groups. On the other hand, the more liberal Nahdlatul Ulama focused their response on ensuring that Indonesia’s Buddhists were not used as a proxy for displeasure over Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya. They did, however, express unhappiness with the Myanmar government and Aung San Suu Kyi for failing to put an end to the fighting, albeit they emphasized the need of the Indonesian government acting as a mediator to resolve the problem (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2018).

The significant number of pressures for the government to react strongly towards Rakhine Crisis giving the government no choice but to accommodate the interest of the community. As a result, the government reacted by pursuing diplomatic attempts to assist with the humanitarian situation in Myanmar's Rakhine State, thus preserving domestic social and political stability. It was in line with an understanding that a head of government in any political system is motivated by two identical goals: retaining political power while concurrently forming and sustaining policy alliances (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2018).
A Voice for Diplomatic Negotiation.

Various diplomatic measures carried out by Indonesian diplomatic authorities with the Myanmar government expressed the pressure from Indonesian civil society on the Humanitarian Crisis in Rakhine State. Two vital messages were delivered: asking the Myanmar government to end violence against a specific ethnic minority and allowing humanitarian aid to reach victims of the Rakhine State humanitarian catastrophe.

After the re-emergence of the crisis in 2017, Indonesian officials dispatched their foreign minister to Myanmar for urgent consultations on the current events in Rakhine state. As part of its endeavor to resolve the humanitarian issue in Rakhine state, Indonesia has proposed the "4 + 1 plan." The 4 + 1 proposal has four points: restore security stability, refrain from using violence, protect the community regardless of ethnicity or religion, and provide humanitarian help (Dwitama, 2018).

Indonesia also continues to play a diplomatic role at the international level, urging the international community to assist in the Rakhine problem-solving process. The Indonesian foreign minister stated this during an interlocutory meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Contact Group on Rohingya at the United Nations' 72nd General Assembly in New York. In addition, in accordance with Indonesia's 4 + 1 formula, the UN Secretary General emphasized the three immediate measures that the Myanmar government should take, including ceasing military operations, allowing humanitarian aid to enter Myanmar, and returning Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to Myanmar (Dwitama, 2018). The UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has also acknowledged and explicitly commended the contribution of Indonesian diplomacy both bilaterally and multilaterally. The United Nations, through its secretary general, requested that Indonesia continue to cooperate to address the crisis in Rakhine State involving Rohingya Muslims. Indonesia stresses attempts to resolve the situation as quickly as possible, as well as the development of an inclusive and permanent peace, in all of its diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar's Rakhine state.

Diplomatic talks were necessary to persuade Myanmar that the help offered by Indonesia was impartial and did not discriminate against beneficiaries, in the sense that Indonesia sent emergency assistance to all Rakhine survivors regardless of race or religion. This was critical in maintaining Myanmar's trust so that aid could continue to be delivered. For this reason, the Indonesian government persuaded Myanmar's social affair ministry, which was in charge of humanitarian and social welfare concerns in Rakhine state, to form a cooperation in providing aid and promoting long-term development in the
region. Furthermore, the Indonesian government was in charge of bureaucratic procedures with the Myanmar government, including immigration issues such as visas for relief team officers and customs taxes on the relief items they supplied (Murthias, 2018).

As part of a collaboration between organizations and the government, the Indonesian government offered recommendations to Indonesian NGOs, both those who had already carried out their operations and those who planned to do so in the future, to work together to provide further relief aid. Fourteen Indonesian Islamic NGOs agreed to the plan. The adoption of the idea made it easier for Indonesians to gain access and support. The Indonesian Humanitarian Alliance for Myanmar (Aliansi Kemanusiaan Indonesia untuk Myanmar, AKIM) was formed as a result of the collaboration, with a total pledge of USD2,000,000 in humanitarian aid. In the context of coordinating both humanitarian aid and community development projects, the forging of this cooperation was critical.

Furthermore, the Indonesian government was in charge of overseeing humanitarian aid to ensure that the coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) did not discriminate against recipients when doing humanitarian actions in Rakhine state. It is very important to keep the neutrality and inclusivity in delivering the assistances. To preserve confidence and prevent bias among donation receivers, neutrality is required. This is critical for the long-term viability of these humanitarian operations. To speed the peace process, inclusivity is required. It is intended that through being inclusive, intensive conversations would take place, reducing prejudice between opposing parties in the conflict and strengthening the relationships.

For example, according to Dr. Rachmawati Hussein, a project officer at the Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Centre, schools and public infrastructures created in Rakhine are not just committed to ethnic Rohingya and Muslim students. He said that Muhammadiyah's school will subsequently be able to help the whole Rohingya population, which is still suffering from an education crisis (Hussein, 2018). This statement was also emphasized by the Coordinator of Muhammadiyah Aid, Bachtiar Dwi Kurniawan, who stated, as quoted by the Anadolu Agency news agency, that the public infrastructure established by Muhammadiyah Aid is expected to be a means of interaction between Muslims and Buddhists, thereby healing the wounds of conflict (Idrus, 2018). The alliance’s name, ‘for Myanmar’ (for Myanmar), demonstrates this endeavour, since it refers to the entire country rather than just Rakhine state or the Rohingya Muslim refugees. With these efforts, the organization was able to continue its work while avoiding potentially tricky problems resulting from the worries of some Myanmar government officials.
Implementing the Diplomatic Agreement

By sending humanitarian aid to Rakhine State, civil society played a larger role in implementing the diplomatic accord between Indonesia and Myanmar. The provision of Indonesian aid to Myanmar's Rakhine state was carried out in two ways. The first was through government channels, and the second was through independent channels, which were mostly organized by civil society, particularly religious based NGOs. Despite the fact that NGOs could not be completely separated from the system due to the need to go through complex bureaucratic processes, their position as an independent means for Indonesian civil society to funnel their solidarity to survivors of the humanitarian crisis while trying to encourage the government to take proactive measures in the Rakhine state crisis was critical.

Since many organizations believe that the government's role is too sluggish, they try to catch up by delivering humanitarian relief on their own. Several religious-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have supplied assistance before the Indonesian government established the AKIM as a platform for giving humanitarian aid. They adopted a variety of strategies to reduce their reliance on the Indonesian government. The first was to work with a number of foreign organizations, and the second was to give direct aid to refugee camps in Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar in order to keep them away from the Myanmar government.

Humanitarian assistance was given directly with minimal coordination with the government by several conservative Islamic organizations in Indonesia, including the PKS, which directed their aid through the Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation (DDII) and the Community Care Justice Post (PKPU), which then collaborated with Bangladesh's Cooperation for Humanity NGOs and Global Peace Mission, a Malaysian group, to send the aid they gathered from the solidarity action directly to Bangladesh. Another example was FPI's assistance. As Islamic conservative organizations with a long history of mistrust of the government, they claimed to have been active in humanitarian assistance in Cox's Bazar, utilizing at least Rp.2 billion (US $ 145,306) in donations (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2018).

The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as the representatives of the civil society in providing credibility, expertise, and networks that governments cannot offer is valued highly. Furthermore, they are viewed as being more successful in developing long-term partnerships by promoting cross-cultural diplomacy, collaborations, and branding. In 1945, the United Nations described non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
as organizations that were non-official and impartial in their performance of international obligations. Since then, the term has expanded and is now utilized for social reasons that are not governed by the government. The four primary tasks of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are resource mobilisation, public services, community governance, and awareness campaigns (Leonard et al., 2002).

Although there were options for taking action independently, some Indonesian religious oriented NGOs believed that providing help through the AKIM process was the best option. AKIM had the accountability factor because it was an alliance of fourteen Indonesian humanitarian institutions working in partnership with the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the broader Indonesian population. As a result of AKIM, aid was provided with a sense of accountability to the community for gifts that were disbursed. Furthermore, support could be delivered on time to those who need it through a scheduled procedure. The Indonesian Humanitarian Alliance for Myanmar (AKIM) developed a program called Humanitarian Assistance for Sustainable Community Development to help the community in Rakhine State with the execution of assistance (HASCO). Humanitarian aid would be provided in the form of education and health development for the afflicted community through this initiative, which would last for two years with the option of an extension if needed.

For both NGOs and the Indonesian government, the founding of the AKIM is a win-win situation. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) benefit from access to the bureaucratic process in order to provide assistance. The government, on the other hand, has the advantage of collecting public money and distributing humanitarian assistance. This is owing to AKIM's founding, which was prompted by the Indonesian government's lack of a framework for collecting public donations and disseminating them in the form of international aid, but it was also an effective method of defection of political opposition.

The religious-based NGOs make up the majority of AKIM's membership. As a result, we can see that the desire of Muslims in Indonesian civil society to actively execute the social ethic that they maintain is growing. One of the major concepts of the Muslim faith is humanism. Giving money or assisting someone in need is not a free choice for the believer, but rather an obligation, similar to the obligation to pray. Numerous Quranic verses and Prophetic sayings advocating for humanitarian action, as well as defining and regulating it, may be discovered. Thanks to numerous religious incitements, the intimate link between humanitarian action and religious practice ensures widespread public adherence and the longevity of donations and resources (Hussein, 2018)
The religious organization has the responsibility to be able to channel the will of their follower to collect funds and send donations as a form of their faith obligation. As a party with a mechanism for collecting resources from the community, they have a responsibility to channel the obtained resources in accordance with the norms and dimensions of their respective faiths. People want the money they collect to be invested in accordance with their ideas. In this case, because the Islamic religious organization has a large following, they may be trusted to route contributions from a specific community group.

*The Important of Keeping the Consistency, Inclusivity, and Neutrality in Humanitarian Diplomacy Process: Study Case of Muhammadiyah.*

One of the most prominent examples of the religious civil society role in addressing the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State is the Muhammadiyah's acts. Muhammadiyah, being one of Indonesia's largest Muslim organizations, bears a significant responsibility for raising finances and channelling them as humanitarian relief from the country's estimated 40-50 million Muslim followers in accordance with their religious beliefs. Through their LAZISMU institution, which focuses on fundraising, and the Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Centre (MDMC), which focuses on humanitarian assistance and has a lot of experience distributing humanitarian aid both at home and abroad, Muhammadiyah has a structured humanitarian relief distribution system (Hussein, 2018).

In terms of activeness and aid mechanisms, Muhammadiyah set an example for other groups providing assistance in Myanmar. This was due to Muhammadiyah's extensive experience in offering aid both domestically and overseas. Aside from the Rakhine issue, MDMC Muhammadiyah was involved in various humanitarian situations, including the Typhoon Haiyan natural disaster in the Philippines in 2013 and the earthquake in Nepal in 2015. Facts demonstrating that aid beneficiaries in earlier humanitarian crises aided by the Muhammadiyah were not exclusively from Muslim groups should serve as a suitable model for the adoption of non-discriminatory policies in giving assistance in Rakhine state.

The aspect of Islamic political issues, which has become the background of a lot of Indonesian people's support for the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state, was not a primary priority for groups like Muhammadiyah, which has a progressive procedure for awarding humanitarian relief. Even when interviewed, Rahmawati Husein of MDMC (Hussein, 2018), who had been directly involved in Muhammadiyah and AKIM humanitarian action in Rakhine state, vehemently denied any link between Muhammadiyah's humanitarian
assistance and domestic political issues, despite the fact that the rise of the Islamic movement coincided with the crisis' escalation in 2017. Giving religious aid based on universal religious and social ideals is considerably more essential to them than temporal political considerations. As a result, as long as Muhammadiyah followers and Muslims in Indonesia respect these norms, they will continue to provide help as a means of channelling Indonesian sympathy to the Rakhine state's humanitarian situation.

Muhammadiyah has acted long before the Indonesian government had a direct part in building the AKIM alliance, providing humanitarian aid to victims of the Rakhine state humanitarian catastrophe. When the government eventually formed AKIM, Muhammadiyah, which had previously distributed humanitarian aid in a variety of emergencies, including the Rohingya crisis, became a significant member of the coalition. Muhammadiyah was supposed to be able to share its knowledge with other groups.

Muhammadiyah always strives to be inclusive when offering such help and support, partnering with local NGOs and empowering the affected communities, especially when providing direct assistance in Rakhine state, where Muhammadiyah should cater both Rohingya and Rakhine Muslims in order to ensure long peace and stability. Inclusion was achieved by periodic development in the form of markets (economics), hospitals (health), and schools using monies collected by Muhammadiyah totalling 12.5 billion rupiahs. The endeavour to restore a market, for example, can allow the Rakhine community's involvement. This site was planned to be a meeting point for conflicting parties, such as the Rohingya people and other ethnic groups, or the people and the Myanmar government, in order to build sustainable peace (Hussein, 2018).

As a religious organization with Indonesia's largest network of hospitals and educational facilities, Muhammadiyah provided assistance to those affected by the Rakhine state crisis in the form of not only goods and infrastructure, but also professionals in health and education. Muhammadiyah Aid dispatched three doctors, nine nurses, and supervision people to assist the sufferers in improving their circumstances. When a diphtheria outbreak and illness caused by a lack of cleanliness occurs in the Rohingya refugee camp on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border at the end of September 2017, the health worker plays a crucial role in delivering health services. In addition to providing health care, Muhammadiyah professionals provide education to children in Rohingya refugee camps, with information taught in the form of letter and number recognition, body parts, and memorizing small letters of the Koran.

With the rise of religious-based organizations in Indonesia, and the society's willingness to stream sense of unity based on the social ethics, it is expected that
Indonesian religious organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, will play a larger role in the distribution of humanitarian aid in various conflicts in the future. This is essential in order for society, particularly Muslims in Indonesia, to channel their sympathy into productive activities and convince the government to take humanitarian problems seriously in the future.

Conclusion

The existence of civil society is becoming increasingly vital as the diplomatic process progresses. Civil society has a significant impact on the diplomatic agenda, has a significant influence on the negotiation process, and is a key player in the implementation of accords. A democratic government, such as Indonesia’s, must increasingly incorporate civil society in the execution of its diplomacy in order to handle problems more effectively.

The involvement of Indonesian religious civil society organizations through AKIM is proof that the role of civil society organizations is vital in the diplomatic process. It can also be considered as a way of conveying the interest of the Indonesian people to an international issue. Civil Society organizations provide many advantages that cannot be owned by the government, such as a mass base, sources of funds, and a strong ideology basis. Nonetheless, the civil society group must be capable of maintaining the continuity, inclusion, and impartiality of humanitarian activities with the purpose of creating long-term peace in conflict area.

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