Can Quantum Cryptography Imply Quantum Mechanics?
Reply to Smolin

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Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson (CBH) have argued that quantum mechanics can be derived from three cryptographic, or broadly information-theoretic, axioms. But Smolin disagrees, and he has given a toy theory that he claims is a counterexample. Here we show that Smolin’s toy theory violates an independence condition for spacelike separated systems that was assumed in the CBH argument. We then argue that any acceptable physical theory should satisfy this independence condition.

INTRODUCTION

In a recent note, Smolin [4] has presented a toy theory that simulates some interesting cryptographic features of quantum mechanics. Most interestingly, Smolin’s toy theory satisfies the three cryptographic, or information-theoretic, axioms from which Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson (CBH) [1] have claimed to be able to derive quantum mechanics. So, Smolin argues that, contra CBH, QM cannot be derived from these three axioms.

We agree with Smolin that QM is not a logical consequence of the three information-theoretic axioms, taken in complete isolation from any theoretical context. In fact, we think that attempting such a derivation would be futile, as shown by the history of failed attempts (e.g., the quantum logic program) to derive QM from completely explicit, physically plausible axioms. When such attempts have not failed miserably, their partial successes have come at the expense of complicating the axioms to the point of destroying all physical insight.

The failure of attempts at theoretically-neutral derivations of QM does not undermine the importance of providing characterizations within some judiciously chosen framework of background assumptions — these assumptions might be explicit (as in CBH’s assumption that theories permit a C*-algebraic formulation), or they might be tacit (as, e.g., in Einstein’s assumption that spacetime is continuous and not discrete). For someone concerned with diachronic relationships between theories, it is an extremely interesting question to ask whether there is a framework that encompasses both the old and the new theory, and whether there are salient physical postulates that distinguish the two theories. CBH have answered this question in the affirmative for classical and quantum mechanics: the C*-algebraic framework encompasses both theories, and quantum mechanics is distinguished in terms of its satisfaction of the three information-theoretic axioms.

But to be more specific, we argue here that Smolin’s toy theory is so remote from classical or quantum mechanics that it holds little physical interest. In particular, we show that Smolin’s theory violates an independence condition for distinct systems that is taken for granted in both classical and quantum mechanics. We then argue that the failure of this independence condition leads to pathologies that are unacceptable in any physical theory.

AGAINST SERIAL NUMBERS

CBH argue that QM can be derived from three axioms: no superluminal information transfer via measurement, no cloning [7], and no bit commitment. Roughly speaking, the no cloning axiom says that there cannot be a machine that accepts arbitrary input states, and returns two copies of any state it receives. The no bit commitment axiom states that it is not possible for one observer, Alice, to send a bit value to a second observer, Bob, in such a way that Bob cannot access the bit value until Alice provides him with a key, and such that Alice cannot change her bit value after she has sent it to Bob. It is well-known that elementary QM satisfies these three cryptographic axioms. CBH claim that QM can also be derived from these three axioms, and so the conjunction of the axioms is equivalent to the claim that QM is true.

Smolin’s toy theory consists of symmetric pairs of lockboxes, where each pair of lockboxes has a unique serial number. Furthermore, each lockbox contains a bit value, which is accessible to inspection only when the lockbox is in the presence of its partner. For the details of how the lockbox theory satisfies the three axioms, we refer the reader to Smolin’s paper. But note that the assumption of unique serial numbers is needed to ensure that cloning is impossible.

Most of the details of Smolin’s lockbox theory are irrelevant to his argument against the CBH characterization
result. Indeed, in his final discussion Smolin claims that there is a trivial counterexample to the CBH result.

\[ \ldots \text{there is a trivial theory that satisfies the other axioms [i.e., the three axioms of the CBH characterization argument]. Namely, a theory with only one type of element, a box with a unique serial number and no bit value inside at all. Such a box cannot be cloned or broadcast, due to the serial number, cannot communicate superluminally, and cannot be used for bit commitment. (p. 4)} \]

To “make the question interesting,” Smolin proposes a fourth cryptographic axiom (viz., the possibility of unconditionally secure key distribution), and his lockbox theory is intended to show that QM does not follow from the four axioms. However, we maintain that neither the trivial theory nor the more sophisticated lockbox theory stand as counterexamples to the claim that QM can be derived — within a completely reasonable framework — from the three cryptographic or information-theoretic axioms. So, we will henceforth ignore the key distribution axiom.

Smolin’s trivial, one lockbox theory is a special case of the following construction: consider any classical theory \( T \), with any finite number of physical objects, and where all objects travel subluminally. Since \( T \) has no ambiguous mixtures, \( T \) does not allow bit commitment. However, in the absence of further constraints, \( T \) permits cloning of arbitrary pure states [1, Theorem 2]. So, we modify \( T \) by stipulating that cloning is impossible; we can do this by adding a law which states that there is at least one object that has a property which no other object can have. (In Smolin’s theory, \( P \) is the serial number of a lockbox pair.) Let’s call the resulting theory \( T' \).

The theory \( T' \) satisfies the three axioms of the CBH argument, but \( T' \) is clearly not quantum mechanics. It would be natural, then, to conclude that the failure of the CBH theorem to rule out \( T' \) is due to the further assumption that physical theories permit a \( C^* \)-algebraic formulation. Although this may be true, we shall show that \( T' \) violates a more fundamental independence condition for distinct systems, and so should not be taken seriously as a physical theory.

**The Schlieder Condition**

Let \( A \) and \( B \) denote, respectively, Alice and Bob’s systems, and let \( AB \) denote the composite. At present, we make no assumptions concerning the mathematical structure of Alice and Bob’s state spaces, or about the means for constructing the state space of \( AB \) from the state spaces of \( A \) and \( B \). Consider now the following three independence conditions:

1. **(Schlieder Condition)** For any states \( x \) of \( A \), and \( y \) of \( B \), there is a state \( z \) of \( AB \) with marginals \( x \) and \( y \). (This is a well-known condition from axiomatic field theory; see, e.g., [2].)

2. **(Duplication of a Known State)** For any state \( x \) of \( A \), there is a machine \( M_x \) that prepares a state \( z \) of \( AB \) with marginals \( x \) and \( x \). (Note the order of the quantifiers.)

3. **(Independent Preparation)** Alice’s ability to prepare states is independent of the state of Bob’s system.

It is clear that all three of these conditions are satisfied by the standard Cartesian product representation of composite systems in classical mechanics, as well as by the standard tensor product representation of composite systems in quantum mechanics. CBH also assume a version of the Schlieder condition (viz., \( C^* \)-independence) in their derivation of QM [1, p. 1574]. However, Smolin’s theories violate each of these conditions. In particular, although there is a state of \( A \) in which Alice has a pair of lockboxes with serial number \( s \), and there is a state of \( B \) in which Bob has a pair of lockboxes with serial number \( s \), these states are mutually incompatible.

The failure of the Schlieder condition entails that Alice can acquire information about Bob’s system just by determining her own state (even if she has no prior information about their joint state). In particular, if Alice determines that her state is \( x \), and if \( y \) is one of Bob’s states that is incompatible with \( x \), then Alice knows that Bob’s system cannot possibly be in state \( y \). But if \( A \) and \( B \) are distinct (e.g., if they are spacelike separated), then information about the state of \( A \) should not, by itself, provide information about the state of \( B \). So, there is reason to think that in Smolin’s theory, we are not really dealing with distinct physical systems.

The failure of the Independent Preparation condition entails that there will be mysterious constraints on which states Alice and Bob can prepare. For example, if there is no state with marginals \( x \) and \( y \), and if Alice’s system is in state \( x \), then Bob will be frustrated in his attempts to prepare \( y \). Once again, however, if \( A \) and \( B \) are independent systems (e.g., if they are spacelike separated), what physical mechanism could explain Bob’s inability to prepare \( y \)?

The failure of the Duplication Condition entails that there are states that no experimenter can duplicate, even if he is supplied every bit of information about that state, and even if he has unlimited physical resources. For example, in Smolin’s theory, it is impossible to duplicate a lockbox pair — although we are given no explanation of what would prevent the experimenter from achieving this goal. This prohibition on the duplication of states is much stronger than the ordinary quantum mechanical prohibition on cloning unknown states. In QM, while
there is no machine that duplicates arbitrary (unknown) input states, there is, for each fixed state $x$, a machine $M_x$ that duplicates $x$. (Let $y$ be the ready state of the machine, and let the operation of the machine be given by the mapping $I \otimes U$, where $U$ is a unitary operator mapping $x$ to $y$.) Thus, cloning is impossible in QM for a very different result from why cloning is impossible in Smolin’s theory — in QM, the no cloning theorem is a non-trivial result, whereas in Smolin’s theory it results from an $ad$ hoc stipulation that states cannot be duplicated.

Finally, the failure of the Schlieder condition also raises problems for giving an account of measurement interactions. In particular, suppose that $Q$ is an observable that can take finitely many values $q_1, \ldots, q_n$, and suppose that $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ are states in which $Q$ definitely has the corresponding value. An ideal measurement of $Q$ is normally defined as an interaction that perfectly correlates the states $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ of the object with states $y_1, \ldots, y_n$ of some measuring apparatus. However, if the Schlieder condition fails, then there is no guarantee that the posterior states exist, and it becomes unclear how to formulate a general notion of measurement.

HAECCEITIES AND TELEPORTATION

A theory is haecceitist if it stipulates that each object has a certain unique ‘thisness’ or haecceity that distinguishes it from all other objects — over and above the totality of its properties that specifies its ‘whatness’ or quiddity. (We borrow this terminology from metaphysics; see, e.g., [2].) So, for example, Smolin’s toy theory is haecceitist because lockbox pairs have unique serial numbers. We are unaware of any successful physical theory in the past, say, 400 years that has been haecceitist in this sense. But rather than appeal to history, we can rule out haecceitistic theories by noting that, in a haecceitistic theory, either teleportation is excluded by fiat because states with unique haecceities or identifying properties cannot be prepared (they are simply declared to be ‘read only’), or superluminal signaling is possible. Since we assume that superluminal signaling is impossible, we rule out haecceitistic theories because we wish to consider theories in which teleportation is at least prima facie possible — i.e., we want to come to an understanding of the physical grounds for the possibility or impossibility of teleportation.

To see that haecceitist theories cannot satisfy both teleportation and no superluminal signaling, consider first a theory in which particles can be created. Then Alice and Bob can agree to the following protocol for sending a bit of information superluminally: Alice and Bob start out together and note the unique identifying properties $P$ and $Q$ of two particles. Alice goes off with these particles while Bob tries, alternating once every second, to create a particle with property $P$ (respectively, property $Q$). In order to signal value 0 to Bob, Alice destroys her $P$ particle, and Bob becomes aware of this fact within one second, because he can create a particle with property $P$. In order to signal value 1 to Bob, Alice destroys her $Q$ particle, and again Bob becomes aware of this fact within one second.

Suppose now that particles cannot be created. Then if Bob is holding a particle with unique identifying property $P$, the only way for Alice to obtain a particle with property $P$ is for Bob to send his particle to her. So, either the particle must travel superluminally, or the particle’s state cannot be teleported. Therefore, regardless of whether or not particles can be created, haecceitist theories cannot have teleportation without superluminal signaling.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that Smolin’s theory violates the Schlieder condition, and so has a number of physical pathologies: Alice can gain information about Bob’s system by making measurements on her system; there will be inexplicable constraints on Alice and Bob’s ability to prepare states; and it is impossible to duplicate known states. But even if we ignore these pathologies, Smolin’s theory could be ruled out by requiring that the theories under consideration should not include assumptions that, in the context of the information-theoretic axioms, preclude the possibility of teleportation. We conclude from all of these facts that Smolin’s theory is so different from the theories we know (viz., classical and quantum mechanics) that it need not be taken as a serious physical possibility.

Recently, Spekkens [3] has constructed a toy theory — for a different purpose — which could also be used to challenge the CBH argument. In particular, Spekkens’ toy theory satisfies the three cryptographic axioms of the CBH argument, but it admits a local hidden variable model, and so is inconsistent with QM. But, unlike Smolin’s theory, Spekkens’ theory does satisfy the Schlieder condition (see pp. 37, 20). We can conclude (by applying the contrapositive of the CBH theorem) that Spekkens’ theory does not admit a $C^*$-algebraic formulation. In fact, a stronger claim is proven in [3]: neither the state space of Spekkens’ theory (which does not allow arbitrary mixtures), nor the convex extension of the Spekkens state space, is the state space of a Jordan-Banach algebra. The $JB$-algebraic framework is more general than the $C^*$-algebraic framework and includes a very broad class of theories in which the state space has a convex structure. But we do not think that representability within the $C^*$-algebraic framework or $JB$-algebraic framework is a necessary condition for physical possibility; and so the status of Spekkens’ toy theory $vis a vis$ the CBH characterization argument should be examined.
in more depth to settle this issue.

[1] R. Clifton, J. Bub and H. Halvorson, “Characterizing quantum theory in terms of information theoretic constraints.” Foundations of Physics 33, 1561–1591 (2003).
[2] R. Cross, “Medieval theories of haecceity,” Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-haecceity/
[3] H. Halvorson, “A note on information-theoretic characterizations of physical theories,” quant-ph/0310101
[4] J. A. Smolin, “Can quantum cryptography imply quantum mechanics?” quant-ph/0310067
[5] R. Spekkens, “In defense of the epistemic view of quantum states,” manuscript.
[6] S. J. Summers, “On the independence of local algebras in quantum field theory,” Reviews in Mathematical Physics 2, 201–247 (1990).
[7] More precisely, no broadcasting, which reduces to no cloning for pure states.