Inversions of New Hope

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Abstract:

First introduced as a new protocol implemented in Chrome Canary for the Google Inc. Chrome browser, New Hope is engineered as a post-quantum key exchange for the TLS 1.2 protocol. The structure of the exchange is a combination of elliptic curve enhancements along with revised lattice-based cryptography. New Hope incorporates the key-encapsulation mechanism of Peikert which itself is a modified Ring-LWE scheme. The closest-vector problem is generated with an intersection of tesseract and hexadecachoron which results in the 24-cell \( V \). With respect to the density of the Voronoi cell \( V \), the proposed mitigation against backdoor attacks proposed by the authors of New Hope only occurs against passive attacks. We show that a backdoor as an active attack, formalized as an inversion oracle, is successful.

Keywords:

Oracle inversion; New Hope; cryptanalysis; post-quantum cryptography
1 Introduction

New Hope is a novel encryption scheme based on lattice cryptography and offers post-quantum security within the key exchange. New Hope uses a Montgomery form to reduce cost of implementation in terms of computational speed. As a modification to elliptic curve cryptography New Hope instead reduces cost by sending an $x$-coordinate to compute the relative $x$-coordinate of any scalar [1]. Alkim, et al. implement a rounding function $\lfloor x \rfloor$ derived from the work of Peikert [2] to achieve equality with the floor function $\lfloor x + 1/2 \rfloor$. This floor function is an element of integers. New Hope employs $q = 12289$ and $n = 1024$ as constraints of lattice $D_4$, which results in a reduction of the modulus to $q = 12289 < 2^{14}$[1]. Peikert defines both the rounding and floor function of New Hope, using $\delta$ sub-Gaussian and zeta functions [2]. Peikert’s “canonical embedding” necessarily incorporates a homomorphic injective ring that maps $(K)$ to $\mathbb{C}$ which fixes pointwise $\mathbb{Q}$ [2].

The critical nature of an unbiased modular operation presents key values which are assumed to mitigate cryptanalysis. Peikert recommends the use of small noise values to achieve this result while cautioning against cross-rounding given the determinacy that may result [2]. Any such determinacy negates an otherwise unbiased result. It is here that New Hope diverges from its basis on Peikert’s work.

The creators of New Hope outline a sketch to create a backdoor based on the trapdoor functions of NTRU. The sketch outlined in New Hope is therefore a generalized example, rather than a proof of any such backdoor. Keeping in mind that the authors of New Hope have engineered a bare protocol aimed at mitigating passive attacks, we thus propose an active attack using the generalized form provided in [1]. Concerns of a backdoor capability extended to New Hope will now be addressed in detail, treating Alice and Bob as server and client, respectively, with malicious attacker, Oscar. We first begin with generalized parameters and functions associated with Alice.
2 Parameters

The parameter of \((a)\), fixed or otherwise, may potentially facilitate constructing a backdoor. The values of \((a)\) are a function of the initial setup with respect to the key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). For mildly small values of \((f, g)\) when \(f = g, f = 1 \mod p\) for some prime \((p \geq 4 \times 16 + 1)\) there is a point of weakness within the function \(a = g^{rac{1}{f}} \mod q\). With respect to \((a, b = as + e)\), it is possible to compute \([bf = afs + fe = gs + fe \mod q]\) such that \([bf = gs + fe \mod q]\). The KEM begins with a generator \((a)\) produced by Alice and encapsulation of \((a, b)\) by Bob. Alice sends a ring element as message \((b)\) to which Bob replies \((u, r)\). The reconciliation function denoted as \(\text{rec}(w, b)\) when applied to polynomials treats each coefficient independently.

For Oscar to succeed with inversion, he uses \(s(w)\) as the reconciliation function defined in [1], though treating \(w\) independent of \(b\). With small enough \((g, s, f, e)\), computing \(gs + fe \in \mathbb{Z}\) once \((s \mod q)\) is obtained proves the scheme is then corrupted. After establishing \(t = s + e \mod p\), with respect to coefficients of \((s)\) and \((e)\) smaller than \((16)\), values \((s, e)\) have sums within the range \((-2 \times 16, 2 \times 16)\). Knowing the values of \((s, e)\) within the range of \((-2 \times 16, 2 \times 16)\) in terms of \(\mod p \geq 4 \times 16 + 1\) is knowing them in \(\mathbb{Z}\).

The backdoor relies on the pseudo-inverse of a polynomial \((p, P \in \mathcal{P})\), \(P * p * s \equiv s \mod q\) for any polynomial \((s \in \mathcal{P})\) such that \(s(1) \equiv 0 \mod q\). If the secret key equation can be modified to equal \(t \equiv hv + w \mod q\), it is feasible to apply a pseudo-inversion. For a detailed analysis of inversion oracles refer to the primary source of Mol and Yung [3]. Through implementing the attack developed in [3], it is possible to demonstrate a backdoor exists against New Hope. This occurs as an active attack by Oscar against Alice. We now turn to Alice’s ring element \((us = ass' + e's)\), and ring element \((v = bs' + e'' = ass' + es' + e'')\).
3 Inversion

Given the new secret key equation derived from [3], let the following hold. Let \((w = u - g), (v = F)\) for \(t \equiv u - p_q \ast h \pmod{q}\), and \((v = u - F), (w = g)\) for \(t \equiv p_q h + hu \pmod{q}\). In both cases, \((w, v)\) are binary. An oracle will output the correct key pair only when \(e \in E^{d \cdot r}_{q, h} \ [3]\). To apply this inversion the anti-derivative of the Peikert scheme used by New Hope must be established. Per the authors of New Hope, the implementation of the key encapsulation method (KEM) relies on pseudorandom ring elements exchanged between Alice and Bob which are then used to derive the session key [1]. The reconciliation function is \(\text{rec}(w, b)\) such that:

\[
\text{rec}(w, b) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } w \in I_b + E \pmod{q} \\ 1, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]

The authors of New Hope set as parameters of the polynomial ring \(\mathcal{R}_q = \mathbb{Z}_q [X] / X^n + 1\). The message sent by Alice is denoted as \((b)\), while Bob’s response is \((u, r)\) with each an element of the ring \(R_q\). The polynomial \(a \in \mathcal{R}_q\) is public and constant in NTRU schemes, though New Hope does not use fixed values. To generate the function which results in \((s \pmod{q})\), the algebraic manipulation itself is straightforward.

To begin deriving the necessary function to generate the secret key for an NTRU scheme, a pre-established value equal to \((s \pmod{q})\) is introduced:

\[
as - s \cdot \left(\frac{1}{a} - 1\right) = s \pmod{q}
\]

Via substitution, values of the variables \((a, b)\) already provided are used to calculate values of \(t\).

\[
(a, b) = as + e \\
as - s = b - t
\]

After trivial algebraic manipulations, the values of \(t\) can be equated to a set of equations, wherein the value of the constant \((a)\) can be substituted with previously afforded values given in [1], at which point they are no longer fixed.
\[ t = \begin{cases} -as + s + b \\ s + e \mod p \end{cases} \]

Returning to the equations used to calculate \( t \), new values of \( t \) are now substituted and the two previous equations are calculated as equal.

\[
\left( (as - s) * \left( \frac{1}{a} - 1 \right) \right) = \left( b - t \right) * \left( \frac{1}{a} - 1 \right)
\]

Where \( (a = fg^{-1} \mod q) \) it is then possible to assert \((as - s + t = b)\), which in turn produces the primary equation for solving the value of \( s \mod q \).

By producing an equation that results in a required value for a backdoor attack against some NTRU lattice-based cryptography, the equation of \( (as - s) * \left( \frac{1}{a+1} \right) = s \mod q \) generates the final steps to calculating the secret \( s \). Using substitution yet again, but this time of the variable \( a \) being no longer fixed, one derives:

\[
\left( (fg^{-1} \mod q)s - s \right) * \left( \frac{1}{fg^{-1} \mod q - 1} \right) = s \mod q
\]

By simplifying this equation, we then produce:

\[
\frac{(fg^{-1} \mod q)s - s}{(fg^{-1} \mod q) - 1} = s \mod q
\]

Stating the division in an alternate form, one then has:

\[ s = s \mod q \]

The value of the variable \( (q) \) is itself equivalent to \( 1 \mod 2n \). Bearing in mind that \( n = 1024 \), it is known that \( q \equiv 1 \mod 2048 \). The anti-derivative, or indefinite integral pertinent to our analysis is defined as the variable \( a \) which is equal to \( fg^{-1} \mod q \), resulting in the equation:

\[
\int \left( \frac{fg^{-1} \mod q}{fg^{-1} \mod q - 1} \right) dg = gs + \text{constant}
\]

Returning to the exchange between Alice and Bob, Alice uses the equation \((us = ass' + e's)\) to send Bob a message, while Bob uses the equation \((v = bs' + e'' = ass' + es' + e'')\) to reconcile the pair. If
the equation of \( s = s \mod q \) can be shown to equal \( t \equiv hv + w \mod q \), then an oracle output to break the encryption is feasible. The further constraint of \( (e \in E_{q,h}^{d_r}) \) is also required. Returning to the values produced by \( (t) \), let \( (t) \) remain equal to the following:

\[
t = \begin{cases} 
-as + s + b \\
(s + e \mod p)
\end{cases}
\]

To satisfy the constraint of the variable \((e)\) as a member of \((E_{q,h}^{d_r})\) and with the value of \((q)\) known, one can substitute for \((e)\) accordingly. Where \((d_r)\) corresponds to the Hamming weights to produce an inversion oracle against NTRU [3], New Hope employs a weight value of \( \exp \left( \frac{-x^2}{2\sigma^2} \right) \) to all integers \((x)\) such that there is no fixed value for \((a)\), but rather each coefficient of \((a)\) is chosen uniformly at random from \( \mathbb{Z}_q \) [1]. The discrete Gaussian distribution \((D_{\mathbb{Z},\sigma})\) is parametrized by the Gaussian parameter \((\sigma \in \mathbb{R})\) defined by the previously mentioned weight of all \((x)\). The values of \( \mathbb{Z}_q \) for an integer \( q > 1 \) must be within the quotient ring \( \frac{\mathbb{Z}}{q\mathbb{Z}} \) such that \( \mathcal{R} = \frac{\mathbb{Z}[X]}{X^n + 1} \) is the ring of integer polynomials modulo \( X^n + 1 \) where each coefficient is reduced modulo \((q)\).

4 Analysis

With the intersection Voronoi \( \mathcal{V} \) 24-cell treated as a convex polytope, the 16-cell \( \ell_1 \)-ball is a simplicial polytope while the \( \ell_\infty \)-ball together with the 16-cell are the only regular Euclidean 4-space tessellations. Given these parameters, the 24-cell constructed as a Voronoi tessellation having center at \( D_4 \) for any point \( x \) is expressed as:

\[
x_i \in \mathbb{Z}^4; \sum_i x_i \equiv 0 \mod 2
\]

If, for any \( x_i = s \) there is some point where \( s(1) \equiv 0 \mod q \), the introduction of an inversion oracle is then verified.

Treating the lattice \( \tilde{D}_2 \) as a binary field extension of the approximate \( x \)-coordinates, the binary field characteristic is thus two given the use of a Montgomery form for optimization of [1]. This characteristic of two implies that the binary field extension has order \( 2^n \) for \( n \). Given \( q = 12289 \) is
equivalent to \( q \equiv 1 \mod 2n \), any treatment of the Voronoi cell in terms of the reduced lattice \( \widetilde{D}_2 \) must necessarily commute to the lattice in 4 dimensions. This occurs within any Boolean ring of characteristic two. Bearing in mind that once an attacker can compute:

\[
((b - t) \times (a - 1)^{-1} = (as - s) \times (a - 1)^{-1})
\]

the attacker can then recover the secret key. We believe we have demonstrated such a calculation of \( s \mod q \), leaving only the treatment of \( e \) to be demonstrated.

We begin by treating \( e \) over the range of \( x \)-coordinates. For \( b = as + e \), we easily derive \(-e = \frac{as}{b}\). For the characteristic two, any element is also its additive inverse, thus \( e = \frac{as}{b} \). Substituting the value of \( e \) for Voronoi coordinates \( x \), we then find \( x = \frac{as}{b} \) is equivalent to \( x = \frac{(as + e)s}{as + e} \) as previously demonstrated. This trivially reduces to \( x = s \), but more importantly results in \( x - s = 0 \). Using the property of additive inverse again, we then rephrase the equation as \(-s - s = 0\). Thus, \(-2s = 0\).

Returning to mod \( q \), as derived, we may reduce the equation \(-2s = 0\) with respect to modulo \( q \). The inversion constraints of \((v = u - f)\) and \((w = g)\) with respect to \( t \equiv hv + w \mod (q), (w, v)\) are adjusted via substitutions of \( w \) for \( g \), and \( v \) with \( u - f \). We then return to the equivalent form of \( s \mod q \) and derive:

\[
\frac{(fw^{-1} \mod q)s - s}{(fw^{-1} \mod q) - 1}
\]

To continue we replace \( u - f \) with \( u - f = u - f \) and then simply subtract \( u \) from each side, leaving \(-f = -f\). By additive inverse, we then have \( f = f \) and may proceed as before. Using the pseudo-inverse polynomial \((P, p)\) we proceed by using the expression \( s \mod q \) congruent to \( P * p * s \).

Allowing the polynomial \( p \) as an element of the ring \( R_q \), and deriving \( u \) via substitution of \( v = u - f \) as done for \( f \) we may begin constructing the expression congruent to \( t \) by adding \( p_q \) and \( u \).
We now must demonstrate recovery \((s, e)\) with respect to the range \(p \geq 4 \times 16 + 1\). Having isolated \(x\) equal to \(s\) and then showing \(-2s = 0\), we apply the additive inverse to produce \(-s - s = s + s\).

We now have \(s + s = 0 = s(1 + 1)\). For a coefficient of \(x\) resulting in \(e \mod p\), the weight of \(\exp\left(-\frac{x^2}{2\sigma^2}\right)\) then satisfies the constraint of \(e \in E^d_{q, h}\). Knowing \(t = s + e \mod p\), and with knowledge of public key \(h\), we then compute \(hv + w \mod q\).Allowing \(q = 2\), per the constraint of values \(\mathbb{Z}_q\) for \(q > 1\) with respect to \(f = 1 \mod p\), let \([s = s \mod q \equiv s \mod 2]\). Using \(\text{rec}(w, b)\) as a function of \(s\), \(s(w): l_b + E(\mod q)\), assume a zero is returned. The function \(s(w)\), for any instance in which the output is not zero then results in a value of 1 being returned for \(s(w)\) during reconciliation. Having shown \(x = s\), and with knowledge of \(b\) as values of \((a, s, e)\) we may substitute values as demonstrated in this work to isolate: \(s(1) = s = s \mod q = s \mod 2 \equiv 0 \mod 2\).

6 Conclusion

With the values of \((e, s)\) available to Oscar and leveraged against Alice, Oscar can maintain persistence within the network. New Hope largely avoids any issues this may cause by specifically using ephemeral \(a\), but does allow temporary caching of \(a\) with respect to Alice should the costs of generating unique \(a\) become too great [1]. Considering this, it should be stated that if Oscar’s inversion succeeds, his ability to access Alice’s cached \(a\) hinges on knowing when caching occurs, and what value of \(a\) is required. This continues to present a significant challenge.

The anti-derivative provided opens the possibility to manipulate the secret \(s\) while simultaneously using the variable \((g)\) substituted for \((x)\) in addition to some constant. This constant added to the variables \((s, g)\) based upon the traditionally fixed value of NTRU, though applied against New Hope facilitates an inversion of the scheme. The vectors of \((x)\) and relative approximate coordinates are shown equivalent to \(e\) for known \(s\). Under this model, Oscar can compromise the generation of \((e, s)\), and use these values to introduce an arbitrary constant.
References

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