Stealing Reality

Yaniv Altshuler, Nadav Aharony, Yuval Elovici, Alex Pentland, and Manuel Cebrian

Deutsche Telekom Laboratories, Ben Gurion University, Beer Sheva 84105, Israel
The Media Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA

In this paper we discuss the threat of malware targeted at extracting information about the relationships in a real-world social network as well as characteristic information about the individuals in the network, which we dub Stealing Reality. We present Stealing Reality (SR), explain why it differs from traditional types of network attacks, and discuss why its impact is significantly more dangerous than that of other attacks. We also present our initial analysis and results regarding the form that an SR attack might take, with the goal of promoting the discussion of defending against such an attack, or even just detecting the fact that one has already occurred.

I. INTRODUCTION

History has shown that whenever something has a tangible value associated with it, there will always be those who try to malevolently ‘game’ the system for profit. These days, the field of social networks is experiencing exponential growth in popularity while in parallel, computational social science [1] and network science [2–4] are providing real-world applicable methods and results with a demonstrated monetary value. We conjecture that the world will increasingly see malware integrating tools and mechanism from network science into its arsenal, as well as attacks that directly target human-network information as a goal rather than as a means. Paraphrasing Marshall McLuhan’s “the medium is the message,” we have reached the stage where, now, “the network is the message.”

Social networking concepts could be discussed both in the context of malware’s means of spreading, as well as in the context of its target goal. Many existing viruses and worms use primitive forms of ‘social engineering’ [5] as a means of spreading, in order to gain the trust of their next victims and cause them to click on a link or install an application. For example, ‘Happy99’ was one of the first viruses to attach itself to outgoing emails, thus increasing the chances of having the recipient open an attachment to a seemingly legitimate message sent by a known acquaintance [6]. Sometimes the malware’s originators use similar techniques to seed the attack. A more recent example is ‘Operation Aurora’, a sophisticated attack originating in China against dozens of US companies during the first half of 2009, where the attack was initiated via links spread through a popular Korean Instant Messaging application [7]. Nevertheless, the current discussion focuses more on the second context — in which the human network structure itself is the goal of the attack.

When discussing the goal of learning a network’s structure, it is important to distinguish between the “technical” topology of a digital network and the actual topology of the human network that communicates on top of it — which is what we are actually interested in. Technically, every phone or computer can reach nearly any other on the planet, but in practice it will only contact a small subset, based on the context of its user. Many existing network attacks gather information on the digital network topology, usually in order to leverage the attack itself. Some attacks, for example, make use of an email program’s address book or a mobile phone’s contact list to spread further. In the context of Stealing Reality, this method is not as useful, since a majority of peers would not be contacted on a routine basis. There is a great deal of information in the patterns of communication exercised by the user with his peers. These patterns are affected by many factors of relationship and context, and could be used in reverse — to infer the relationship and context. In addition the communication patterns, combined with other behavioral data that can be harvested from mobile devices, could serve to teach a great deal of information about the user himself — their age, their occupation and role, their personality, and a great deal more. This type of information could be summarized as a “rich identity” profile of a person [8], which is much more informative than direct demographic information which is currently used to profile users, and could be very valuable to advertisers and spammers, for example.

Expanding from an individual’s egotistical network, the social network as a whole has intricate relationships and topologies among cliques and sub-groups, which may be both overlapping as well as residing in multiple hierarchies. This is complicated even more by issues of like trust or influence. The fact that three people know each other does not necessarily mean that information received by one will propagate in the same format to the two peers, if at all. Computational social science has shown that many of these aspects of a social network could be learned and extracted from communication patterns [8].

In this paper we discuss the ability to steal vital pieces of information concerning networks and their users, by a non-aggressive (and hence — harder to detect) malware agent. We analyze this threat and build a mathematical model capable of predicting the optimal attack strategy against various networks. Using data from real-world mobile networks we show that indeed, in many cases a “stealth attack” (one that is hard to detect, however, and steals private information at a slow pace) can result in the maximal amount of overall knowledge captured by the operator of this attack. This attack strategy also makes sense when compared to the natural human social interaction and communication patterns, as we discuss in our concluding section. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sections II and III expand on the motivation behind reality stealing attacks and their dangers. Section IV describes the threat model and its analysis, while Section V presents our preliminary empirical results. Concluding remarks are given in Section VI.
II. MOTIVATION FOR STEALING REALITY

Many commercial entities have realized the value of information derived from communication and other behavioral data for a great deal of applications, like marketing campaigns, customer retention, security screening, recommender systems, etc. There is no reason to think that developers of malicious applications will not implement the same methods and algorithms into future malware, or that they have not already started doing so.

There already exist secondary markets for resale of this type of information, such as infochimps.com, or black market sites and chat-rooms for resale of stolen identity information and other illegal data sets [9]. It is reasonable to assume that a social hub’s email address would worth more to an advertiser than an edge node. It is also reasonable to assume that a person meeting the profile of a student might be priced differently than that of a corporate executive or a homemaker. There are already companies operating in the legal grey area, which engage in the collection of email and demographic information with the intention of selling it [10]. Why work hard when one can set loose automatic agents that would collect the same if not better quality information? Wang et al. predict that once the market share of any specific mobile operating system reaches a computable phase transition point, viruses could pose a serious threat to mobile communications [11].

One might also imagine companies performing this types of attacks on a competitor’s customers (to figure out which customers to try and recruit), or even operations performed by one country on another. Finally, the results of an SR attack might be later used for selecting the best targets for future attacks or configuring the ‘social engineering’ components of other attacks.

III. WHY STEALING REALITY ATTACKS ARE SO DANGEROUS

One of the biggest risks of real world social network information being stolen is that this type is very static, especially when compared to traditional targets of malicious attacks. Data network topologies and identifiers could be replaced with the press of a button. The same goes for passwords, usernames, or credit cards. An infected computer could be wiped and re-installed. An online email, instant messenger, or social networking account could be easily replaced with a similar one, and the users’ contacts can be quickly warned of the original account’s breach.

However, it is much harder to change one’s network of real world, person-to-person relationships, friendships, or family ties. The victim of a “behavioral pattern” theft cannot easily change her behavior and life patterns. Plus this type of information, once out, would be very hard to contain. In addition, once the information has been extracted in digital form, it would be quite hard if not impossible to make sure that all copies have been deleted.

There are many stories in recent years of “reality” information being stolen and irreversibly be put in the open. In 2008, real life identity information of millions of Korean citizens was stolen in a series of malicious attacks and posted for sale [7]. In 2007, Israel Ministry of Interior’s database with information on all of the country’s citizens was leaked.
and posted on the Web [12]. Just these days, a court sill has to rule whether the database of bankrupt gay dating site for teenagers will be sold to raise money for repaying its creditors. The site includes personal information of over a million teenage boys [13]. In all of these cases, once the information is out, there is no way back, and the damage is felt for a long time thereafter. In a recent Wall Street Journal interview, Google CEO Eric Schmidt referred to the possibility that people in the future might choose to legally change their name in order to detach themselves from embarrassing “reality” information publicly exposed in social networking sites [14]. Speculative as this might be, it demonstrates the sensitivity and challenges in recovering from leakage of real-life information, whether by youthful carelessness or by malicious extraction through an attack.

For this reason, Stealing Reality attacks are much more dangerous than traditional malware attacks. The difference between SR attacks vs. more traditional forms of attacks should be treated with the same graveness as nonconventional weapons compared to conventional ones. The remainder of this document presents our initial analysis and results regarding the form that an SR attack might take, in contrast to the characteristics of conventional malware attacks.

IV. THREAT MODEL

In this section we describe and analyze the threat model. First, we define the attacker’s goals in the terms of our model, and develop a quantitative measure for assessing the progress in achieving these goals. Then, we present an analytical model to predict the success rate of various attacks. Finally, we provide an assessment for the best strategies for devising such an attack. We demonstrate both based on analytical models as well as using real mobile network data, that in many cases the best attack strategy is counterintuitive a “low-aggressiveness attack”. Besides yielding the best outcome for the attacker, such an attack may also deceive existing monitoring tool, due to its low traffic volumes and the fact that it imitates natural end-user communication patterns (or even “piggibacks” on actual messages).

A. Network Model

We shall model the network as an undirected graph $G(V, E)$. The difficulty of learning the relevant information of the network’s nodes and edges may be different for different nodes and for different edges. In general, we denote the probability that vertex $v$ was successfully “learned” or “acquired” by an attacking agent that was installed on $v$ at time 0.
FIG. 3: An observational study of the overall amount of data that can be captured as a function of $\rho$ — the attack’s aggressiveness. Notice the local maximum around $\rho = 0.5$ that is outperformed by the global maximum at $\rho = 0.04$.

As $p_V(u, t)$. Similarly, we shall denote the probability that an edge $e(u, v)$ was successfully learned at time $t$ by an agent installed on it at time $0$ as $p_E(u, t)$. We shall denote the presence of an attacking agent on a vertex $u$ at time $t$ by the following Boolean indicator:

$$I_u(t) = 1 \text{ iff } u \text{ is infected at time } t$$

Similarly, we shall denote the presence of an attacking agent on an edge $e(u, v)$ at time $t$ as:

$$I_e(t) = 1 \text{ iff either } u \text{ or } v \text{ or both are infected at time } t$$

For each vertex $u$ and edge $e$, let the times $T_u$ and $T_e$ denote their initial time of infection.

### B. Attacker’s Goal: Stealing Reality

As information about the network itself has become a worthy cause for an attack, the attacker’s motivation is stealing as much properties related to the network’s social topology as possible. The percentage of vertices-related information acquired at time $t$ is therefore:

$$\Lambda_V(t) = \frac{1}{|V|} \sum_{u \in V} I_u(t) \cdot p_V(u, t - T_u)$$

Similarly, the percentage of edges-related information acquired at time $t$ is:

$$\Lambda_E(t) = \frac{1}{|E|} \sum_{e \in E} I_e(t) \cdot p_E(e, t - T_e)$$

As an extension in the spirit of Metcalfe’s [15] and Reed’s Law [16], a strong value emerges from learning the “social principles” behind a network. Understanding essence behind the implied social network is more valuable (and also requires much more information in order to learn) as the information it encapsulates is greater. For example, let us imagine the following two mobile social networks:

1. For every two users $u_i, u_j$, the users are connected if and only if they joined the network on the same month.
2. For every two users $u_i, u_j$, the users are connected in probability $p = \frac{1}{2}$.

It is easy to see that given a relatively small subset of network 1, the logic behind its social network can be discovered quite easily. Once this logic is discovered, the rest of the network can automatically be generated (as edges are added exactly for pairs of users who joined the network at the same month). Specifically, for every value of $\epsilon$ we can calculate a relatively small number of queries that we should ask in order to be able to restore the complete network with mistake probability of $1 - \epsilon$. However, for network 2 the situation is much different, as the only strategy for accurately obtaining the network is actually discovering all the edges it comprised of.

Let us denote by $K_E$ the Kolmogorov Complexity [17] of the network, namely — the minimal number of bit required in
order to “code” the network in such a way that it could later be completely restored. As the number of vertices $|V|$ is assumed to be known, the essence of the network is coded in its edges. Dividing the number of edges learned $|E|\Lambda_E(t)$ by the number of “redundant edges” $|E| - K_E$ yields the amount of information learned at time $t$. Following a similar logic of Reed’s Law we shall evaluate the benefit of the learning process proportionally to the number of combinations that can be composed from the information learned. Normalizing it by the number of edges, we shall receive the following measurement for the social essence learned:

$$\Lambda_S(t) = 2 \frac{|E|\Lambda_E(t) - |E|}{|E| - K_E}$$

The attacker in interested in maximizing the values of $\Lambda_V(t)$, $\Lambda_E(t)$ and $\Lambda_S(t)$. The evolution of the $\Lambda_S$, the social essence of the network, as a function of the “complexity hardness” of the network is illustrated in Figure 1.

**C. Attack Analysis**

We assume that the learning process of vertices and edges follows the well-known **Gompertz** function, namely:

$$\forall e_t \in E, \quad p_E(e, t) = e^{-\alpha e - r_i(t)}$$

$$\forall u_t \in V, \quad p_V(u, t) = e^{-\beta e - r_i(t)}$$

with $\alpha$ and $\beta$ representing the efficiency of the learning mechanism used by the attacker, as well as the amount of information that is immediately obtained upon installation. $r_i$ denotes the learning rate of each edge vertex, determined by the activity level of the edge vertex (namely — accumulation of new information). Variable $r_i$ is also used for normalizing $\alpha$ and $\beta$. Hence, the attack success rates can now be written as follows:

$$\Lambda_V(t) = \frac{1}{|V|} \sum_{u_i \in V} I_{u_i}(t) \cdot e^{-\beta e - r_i(t)}$$

$$\Lambda_E(t) = \frac{1}{|E|} \sum_{e_i \in E} I_{e_i}(t) \cdot e^{-\alpha e - r_i(t)}$$

Attacking agents spread through movements on network edges. Too aggressive infection is more likely to be detected,
causing the accumulation of information concerning the network to be blocked altogether. On the other hand, attack agents that spread too slowly may evade detection for a long period of time, however, the amount of data they gather would still be very limited. In order to predict the detection probability of attacking agents at time $t$ we shall use Richard’s Curve, for as follows:

$$p_{detect}(t) = \frac{1}{(1 + e^{-\rho(t-M)})^{\frac{1}{2}\sigma}}$$

where $\rho$ is the probability that an agent would copy itself to a neighboring vertex at each time step, $\sigma$ is a normalizing constant for the detection mechanism, and $M$ denotes the normalizing constant for the system’s initial state. Let $N_t$ denote the number of infected vertices at time $t$. Assuming that vertices infection by their infected neighbors is a random process, the number of infected vertices vertex $u$ would have at time $t$ is:

$$N_t \cdot \frac{deg(u)}{|V|}$$

The probability that vertex $u$ would be attacked at time $t$ equals therefore at least:

$$p_{attack}(u, t) = 1 - e^{-N_t \cdot \rho \cdot \frac{deg(u)}{\sum_{v \in V} deg(v)}}$$

and the expected number of infected vertices is:

$$N_{t+\Delta t} = |V| - \sum_{v \in V} \prod_{i=0}^{t} (1 - p_{attack}(v, i))$$

The number of infected nodes therefore grows as:

$$N_{t+\Delta t} = |V| - \sum_{v \in V} \prod_{i=0}^{t} e^{-N_t \cdot \rho \cdot \frac{deg(v)}{2|E|}}$$

From $N_t$ we can now derive the distribution of the Boolean infection indicators:

$$p[I_u(t) = 1] = \frac{N_t}{|V|}$$

$$p[I_v(t) = 1] = 2 \frac{N_t}{|V|} - \frac{N_t^2}{|V|^2}$$

And the attack probability can now be given as follows:

$$p_{attack}(u, t + \Delta t) = 1 - e^{\frac{deg(u)}{2|E|} \left(-|V| + \sum_{v \in V} \prod_{i=0}^{t} (1 - p_{attack}(v, i))\right)}$$

This expression can now be used for calculating the distribution of initial infection times of vertices and edges. Note that information is gathered faster as infection rate $\rho$ increases. However, so does the detection probability. The optimum can therefore be derived by calculating the expectance of the total amount of information obtained (in which the only free parameter is $\rho$):

$$\Lambda_E = \int_0^\infty \left( \frac{\partial \Lambda_E(t)}{\partial t} \cdot (1 - p_{detect}(t)) \right) dt$$

$$\Lambda_V = \int_0^\infty \left( \frac{\partial \Lambda_V(t)}{\partial t} \cdot (1 - p_{detect}(t)) \right) dt$$

D. Obtaining the Social Essence of a Network

Recalling the expression that represents the progress of learning the “social essence” of a network, we can see that initially each new edge contributes $O(1)$ information, and the overall amount of information is therefore kept proportional to $O(\frac{1}{e})$. As the learning progresses and the logic principles behind the network’s structure start to unveil, the amount of information gathered from new edges becomes greater than their linear value. At this point, the overall amount of information becomes greater than $O(\frac{1}{e^2})$, and the benefit of acquiring the social structure of the network starts to accelerate. Formally, we can see that this phase is reached when:

$$\Lambda_E(t) > O \left(1 - \frac{|E| - K_E}{|E|} \ln(|E|)\right)$$

Let us denote by $\Lambda_E$ the Critical Learning Threshold, above which the learning process of the networks accelerates, as described above (having each new learned edge contributing an increasingly growing amount of information concerning the network’s structure), to be defined as follows:

$$\Lambda_E \triangleq 1 - \frac{|E| - K_E}{|E|} \ln(|E|)$$

Consequently, in order to provide as strong protection for the network as possible, we should make sure that for every value of $t$:

$$\sum_{e \in E} I_e(t) \cdot e^{-\alpha e^{-r_e(t-T_{\alpha})}} < |E| - (|E| - K_E) \ln(|E|)$$

Alternatively, the attack would prevail when there exist a time $t$ for which the above no longer holds.

Notice that as pointed out above, “weaker” networks (namely, networks of low Kolmogorov complexity) are easy to learn using a limited amount of information. Generalizing this notion, the following question can be asked: How
“simple” must a network be, in order for it to be “easily learnable” (namely, presenting an superlinear learning speed, starting from the first edges learned)?

It can be seen that in order for a network to be easily learnable, its critical learning threshold \( \hat{\Lambda}_E \) must equal \( O(1) \). Namely, the network’s Kolmogorov complexity must satisfy:

\[
1 - \frac{|E| - K_E}{|E|} \ln(|E|) < O(1)
\]

We must obtain the following criterion for easily learnable networks:

\[
K_E < |E| - \frac{|E|}{\ln(|E|)}
\]

The notion of an easily learnable network is illustrated in Figure 2, presenting the critical learning threshold \( \hat{\Lambda}_E \) for networks of 1,000,000 nodes, as a function of the network’s Kolmogorov complexity.

V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

We have evaluated our model on aggregated call logs derived from a real mobile phone network, comprised of approximately 200,000 nodes and 800,000 edges. These tests have clearly shown that in many cases, an “aggressive attack” achieves inferior results compared to more subtle attacks. Furthermore, although sometimes the optimal value for the infection rate revolves around 50\%, there are scenarios in which there is a local maximum around this value, with a global maximum around 4\%. Figure 3 demonstrates the attack efficiency (namely, the maximal amount of network information acquired) as a function of its “aggressiveness” (i.e. the attack’s infection rate). A global optimum both for the vertices information as well as for the edges information is achieved around 4\%, with a local optimum around 52\%.

A more extensive simulation research was conducted for an arbitrary sub-network of this mobile network, containing 7,706 edges and 17,404 edges. In this research we have extensively studied the success of a Stealing Reality attack using numerous different sets of values (i.e. \( \alpha, \beta, \rho, r, \sigma \) and \( M \)). Although the actual percentage of stolen information had varied significantly between the various sets, many of them had displayed the same interesting phenomenon — a global optimum for the performance of the attack, located around a very low value of \( \rho \). Some of these scenarios are presented in Figure 4.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we discussed the threat of malware targeted at extracting information about the relationships in a real-world social network as well as characteristic information about the individuals in the network, which we name “Stealing Reality”. We present Stealing Reality (SR), explain why it differs from traditional types of network attacks, and discuss why its impact is significantly more dangerous than that of other attacks. We also present our initial analysis and results regarding the form that an SR attack might take. We have evaluated our model on data derived from a real mobile network. Our results clearly show that an “aggressive attack” achieves inferior results compared to more subtle attacks. This attack strategy also makes sense when comparing it to natural human social interaction and communication patterns. The rate of human communication and evolution of relationship is very slow compared to traditional malware attack message rates. A Stealing Reality type of attack, which is targeted at learning the social communication patterns, could “piggyback” on the user generated messages, or imitate their natural patterns, thus not drawing attention to itself while still achieving its target goals.

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