THERAPEUTIC POTENTIAL OF TRANSCENDENTAL INQUIRY IN THE HUSSERLIAN PHILOSOPHY¹

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The main purpose of the article is to reconstruct a therapeutic potential of phenomenology, in particular, within Edmund Husserl's and Eugen Fink's program of transcendental inquiry about time. However, the project of objective claims of phenomenology, which is presented in the *Logical Investigations* seems to exclude all therapeutic approach. Rather, the program postulates the striving for abstract “truths in themselves,” also it ignores the surrounding world, as well as intersubjectivity, and finally leads to the solitary life of a phenomenologist. How then is the therapeutic potential of phenomenology possible? The case of questioning plays the crucial role in the context of objective science. According to Husserl, each science which does not allow to ask “the most burning questions” is naïve, and therefore it limits the therapeutic potential. While focusing on propositions, objective phenomenology excludes all questions, indeed. In contrast to such a view, transcendental phenomenology allows to ask over and over again, and by doing so, it introduces the world, as well as intersubjectivity as horizons of phenomenological inquiry. Concluding, Husserl's collaboration with Fink presents such a communal effort into questioning about time. Therefore, “therapeutic potential” of phenomenology means precisely the methodological movement of the possibility for communal formulation of transcendental investigation.

Keywords: phenomenology, transcendentalism, reduction, questioning.

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Introduction

From the first formulation of the reformative program of philosophy in the *Logical Investigations*, phenomenology claimed to be science. From initial “misleading,” as Edmund Husserl put it in 1913 *Introduction* to second edition of the book (Husserl 2001b: 6), formulation of phenomenology as “descriptive psychology” (Husserl 2001b: 175), through the idea of “rigorous science” (Husserl 1965: 71–147), up to 

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to the concept of the “first philosophy” (Husserl 1956), phenomenological philosophy aimed at being comprehended as science. Therefore, it is not surprising that “Husserl's entire philosophical work moves within the magnetic field of the concept of science” (Bernet et al. 1993: 13). Husserl, however, was not interested in the formulation of the general program of sciences, but he pointed at the exposition of genuine science in particular. Since, in Husserl's view, genuine science has to found all other sciences, whether philosophical or natural, in such a way that a phenomenologist shall be able to distinguish genuine from non-genuine knowledge precisely from the phenomenological viewpoint. To go one step further, such a clarification leads us to understand phenomenology as a kind of foundationalism, in which all truths seem to be derived from the fundamental truths (Drummond 1990: 239). Nonetheless, while giving attention to science, fundamental truths and suspending each subjective belief, the phenomenologist strives for an abstract level. By doing so, however, is not he in fact naïve? After all, the phenomenologist seems to suspend questions which cannot be answered in an objective manner, and for this reason he suspends existential questions. Is this not the argument against the fundamental science which falls into the crisis?

As late as in 1934, in his last published book, Husserl considered the legitimacy of the “crisis of sciences” thesis in confrontation with the unquestionable success of the natural sciences. He asserted that scientific crisis and progress are not incompatible, while specifying that we should understand the crisis in a special sense. Hence, as James Dodd argues, “[t]hat [science's] very success does not preclude the possibility of crisis is a key insight of Husserl's; but it means that to talk of the crisis of science is, paradoxically, to talk of the crisis of a success” (Dodd 2004: 29). The success of sciences is accompanied by the naïveté of human attitudes, because the sciences exclude “ultimate and highest questions” (Husserl 1970: 9) from the field of investigation. As Husserl explained in the Crisis, the questions concern the problems of human life involving its sense: “[i]n our vital need […] science has nothing to say to us. It excludes in principle precisely the question which man, given over in our unhappy times to the most portentous upheavals, finds the most burning: questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence” (Husserl 1970: 6). Husserl's critique, then, did not involve each kind of science, but only the naïve one. Conversely, non-naïve, genuine phenomenology investigates “the most burning questions.” Genuine phenomenology does not lead towards the abstract world, but it involves the life-world, and thus it enables to consider problems of human life. Therefore, within phenomenology at least two general models of science can be sketched. On the one hand, science which claims to be objective and points at abstract essences, on the other, science concerning subjectivity. The main thesis of the article is that the former can be grasped as a point of departure for the formulation of the latter. Hence, what is particularly interesting is Husserl's idea that both models of science are essentially connected, rather than entirely separated. The therapeutic potential of phenomenology, in this article, denotes precisely this attempt to the reformulation of the first model, and the attempt to show how this methodological step transforms phenomenology into the second model. But, what precisely means “therapeutic”?

In general, we call science “therapeutic” if it is able to help a philosopher to consider human life as a concrete and individual subjective being. In particular, in regard to the phenomenological account, the science has to fulfil at least three conditions. Firstly, the science requires a non-solipsistic attitude. Otherwise, the phenomenologist will investigate merely abstract structures despite worldly and intersubjective character of these structures. Secondly, in consequence, the science focuses on communicative relations between subjects, rather than on the solitary life of the phenomenologist who presents ultimate theses about the reality. The fulfilment of such a condition
guarantees communal nature of inquiry. Finally, the therapeutic potential of phenomenology involves resignation from the studies of objective essences, and it considers life as being “in statu nascendi.” The latter condition for possibility of therapeutic science corresponds to the focusing on the subjectivity par excellence. The main purpose of the article is to examine how the Husserlian phenomenology is possible as such a therapeutic science. Let us emphasize that a leading clue of the article is the theme of question. In order to fulfill the purpose, thus, we will argue that the theory of questioning within the solitary life has to be reformulated as a communal praxis. Then, in the second part of the article, the idea of questioning about time is presented as therapeutic, namely, as the way of self-cognition. By introducing the problem of time we refer to Husserl’s collaboration with Eugen Fink. Moreover, questioning about time will achieve simultaneously a transcendental level. In result, we will bring to the fore final therapeutic implications of such a questioning.

From the solitary life towards a community – the case of questioning

The problem of questioning within the Husserlian phenomenology is relatively less known than, for example, the themes of intentionality, time, and intersubjectivity. Nonetheless, in order to present the therapeutic potential of phenomenology, we have to present the possibility of putting the question into the centre of the philosophy. Otherwise, while focusing on the objective being which excludes, or suspends all questions, phenomenological philosophy will be naive. In this part of the article, it will become clear that the problem of questioning makes evident the necessity of the methodological movement form focusing on the solitary life of the phenomenologist towards an embedding the investigations in a community of inquiring people.

Husserl’s Logical Investigations discusses with psychology as the program of logic, which by considering laws of thinking as empirical laws leads towards subjectivism (Mohanty 2008: 65–69). After all, empirical laws are accidental and for this reason – subjective. On the contrary, laws of logic cannot be subjective essentially. Otherwise, they cannot guarantee its main purpose, i.e., objectivity. For this reason, Husserl in his Investigations was heading for the formulation of an objectivist program of logic (Spiegelberg 1994: 70). In consequence, the program of logic becomes parallel to objective science in general. Objective science is defined by its method and object. The former denotes a description which guarantees the neutrality of investigation. The latter, according to Husserl, is the being “in itself” (Husserl 2001b: 223). Therefore, an objective scientist describes such a being and, consequently, he presents series of expressions referring to the being. Due to the reference, these expressions can be called true. The description of objective being as well as the reference are possible, because, as Husserl put it, “[i]ts [objective] being is a being definite in content, and documented in such and such ‘truths in themselves’” (Husserl 2001b: 223). Thus, the being is definite in its content, and for this reason it is possible to document it in an expression. However, the documentation implies a usage of a special kind of expressions. Inasmuch as the expressions are correlates of the being “in itself,” they must be true despite the person uttering them, time and the place of utterance. Thus, if and only if we can understand expressions regardless of the situations of uttering them, as well as regardless of person uttering them, then we are faced with objective expressions². But, again, if it is true that someone can understand the expressions regardless of empirical circumstances, then, precisely because of the independence, the expressions refer to the meanings which are ideal. Indeed, as it is

² “We shall call an expression objective if it pins down (or can pin down) its meaning by its manifest, auditory pattern, and can be understood without necessarily directing one’s attention to the person uttering it, or to the circumstances of the utterance” (Husserl 2001b: 218).
introduced in the *First Investigation*, an uttering person can repeat the same objective expression *in infinitum*, and the uttered expression will always have the same meaning. According to Husserl, this possibility belongs to the essence of the objective expressions, and occurs regardless of any empirical circumstances. Moreover, the expressions’ meaning is the very opposition to the empirical being. To phrase it differently, it is unchangeable. Because of meaning’s opposition to the empirical being, Husserl called the meaning of the objective expressions ideal3.

For Husserl, the objective expressions are formed always in the same way. Namely, these expressions while presenting sentences which refer to “truths in themselves,” have the form of propositions: “A is B.” “In short,” as emphasized Donn Welton, “sentences are viewed only as propositions” (Welton 1983: 270). The proposition refers to a certain state of affairs, namely, to the state “that A is B” (Lampert 1995: 111). Precisely this reference is possible due to the ideal concept of meaning. Therefore, an uttering person through the meaning grasps the state, and by doing so, the person expresses “truth in itself” as well as refers to the being “in itself.” In other words, the uttering person understands the expression at the same time when he is uttering it. In general, at the moment of utterance immediately, following Husserl, “by way of an experienced sense-complex, the intuitive presentation, whether percept, imagination, representation etc., of an object, e.g. an external thing, arises” (Husserl 2001b: 213). Thus, according to the *Investigations’* semantic theory, unchangeable expressions are of peculiar significance, which are immediately connected with the being “in itself.”

Yet, all changeable expressions must be excluded from the field of investigation. But, then, are the unchangeable expressions achieved once and for all? Or rather are expressions essentially temporary, i.e., related to the situation and the person? Indeed, while communicating a certain expression to someone, the listening person understands the expression only with regard to the situation of utterance and to the uttering person. After all, how can we know that the listening person interprets our words correctly, or, on the contrary, how can we be sure that uttering person does not lie? Husserl wrote in this context about “unsuitability” and “untruthfulness” of speech, and he added that these two charges against communicative speech are decisive to exclude this kind of speech from the field of genuine science (Husserl 2001c: 325). In a word, communicative speech is inadequate. Although the expression functions as indication in communicative speech, the object of the expression cannot be intended; therefore, we cannot characterize pronounced expressions as true or false in general, because “truth here coincidence with sincerity” (Husserl 2001c: 334) in particular. Following Husserl, in his investigation the phenomenologist must exclude communicative speech and, additionally, he must focus on expressions of solitary life. The latter notion leads us to *terminus technicus* of phenomenology understood as objective science.

In the solitary mental life, uttering phenomenologist is able to grasp all ideal meanings immediately. Generally speaking, such a monologue guarantees immediate connection between the expression and the intended object. Indeed, while soliloquizing the phenomenologist can be sure what he means. Therefore, in the monologue expressions do not function as indications, because they are not marks or signs. We must clearly emphasize that in the monologue expressions simply mean something immediate4. In the *First Investigation*, Husserl asked rhetorically: “Shall one say that in soliloquy one speaks to oneself, and employs

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3 As Husserl wrote in the *First Investigation*: “Meaning is related to varied acts of meaning […] just as Redness *in specie* is to the slips of paper which lie here, and which all ’have’ the same redness” (Husserl 2001b: 230).

4 Cf. Husserl 2001b: 191, 321, note. As Mohanty put it: “For cases where the pronouncing function is entirely absent, Husserl directs us to the use of expressions in non-communicative speech, that is to say in monologues, *’im einsamen Seelenleben’*” (Mohanty 1964: 14).
words as signs, i.e., as indications, of one’s own inner experiences?”, and he answers immediately: “I cannot think such a view acceptable” (Husserl 2001b: 190).

Of course, what is scientifically valuable is that the soliloquizing phenomenologist can grasp the objective being. But, speaking metaphorically, for what price? The phenomenologist must exclude intersubjectivity, communicative speech, changeable world and, consequently, all questions which he could ask about his life. Finally, each sentence, except for the expressions in the monologue, is valueless for an objective scientist. A question seems to be such a sentence. In the Investigations, Husserl did not include question in the monologue indeed. Furthermore, in the last paragraph of the Sixth Investigation he even refused the legitimacy of such an inclusion. To quote Husserl’s words from the very paragraph: “[i]n a monologue a question is either of the form ‘I ask myself whether…,’ or relation to the subject vanishes entirely: the interrogative expression becomes a mere name, or not really even that” (Husserl 2001c: 332). In other words, although question as such can be reducible to a judgment, it cannot guarantee immediate connection with the related state of affairs. Hence, each question is reducible to the following form: “Whether A is B?”, and then it strives for the solution of the two-sided disjunction: either “Yes, A is B” or “No, A is not B”. This is the reason, why Husserl stated that the affirmation of the judgment, understood as the answer on the related question, would resolve initial doubt. Hence, a question is dependent on possible answers. Nonetheless, only an answer can express something; the question itself, on the contrary, does not express anything objective (Benoist 2002: 48), rather it expresses useless, at least from the perspective of objective science, subjective wish, which is reducible to the judgment. For this reason, according to Husserl, the question is not really even a name. Briefly, any question does not function on a theoretical level, i.e., it does not lead towards knowledge.

Summing up, the objective perspective on questioning leads to the exclusion of questions from the field of investigation necessarily. Rather phenomenologist, who claims to build objective science, has to focus on the monologue as an universal methodological device in order to express the “truths in themselves.” In a word, questions do not express anything for him. However, as it was introduced above, science which excludes questions is naïve and this involves the crisis of sciences in general. Therefore, by contrast, genuine science must redefine its own field of investigations. But, inasmuch as “the necessary point of departure […] is the natural-naïve attitude” (Husserl 1989: 416), as Husserl clearly emphasized in the Epilogue to the English translation of the first book of Ideas, initial exclusion of questioning is also necessarily. Only while excluding questioning, the philosopher sees it clearly, that every question expresses human astonishment and as such the question is the beginning of philosophy5. In a word, without questioning there is no philosophy at all, and thus we cannot speak about the therapeutic potential of phenomenology. Conversely, questioning begins our philosophizing and, moreover, it introduces intersubjectivity. Finally, our speech is requesting to somebody (Husserl 1973: 474). Husserl’s theory of the solitary life makes it evident that the solipsistic philosopher while excluding questions excludes also his intersubjective world.

**Communal inquiry about time**

The “in statu nascendi” phrase seems to indicate the very opposition of the being “in itself.” Husserl assigns the meaning connected with time to phrase “in statu nascendi.” Husserl’s Bernau manuscripts play the crucial role in this

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5 “In turning towards the existent with astonishment, man is as it were primevaly open to the world once again, he finds himself in the dawn of a new day of the world in which he himself and everything that is begins to appear in a new light. The whole of the existent dawns upon him anew” (Fink 1981b: 24).
context (Husserl 2001a: 102, 134). According to phenomenological investigations, consciousness is temporal in its essence. To phrase it differently, a consciousness’ object is always in an absolute flow of temporal modifications. Hence, every phase of the flow is given in a primal presentation, and then in protentions and retentions. For this reason, the object is constituted in the flow, thus, it is precisely “in statu nascendi.” What does it mean: “consciousness is temporal in its essence”? After all, “essence” seems to be “in itself,” and – for this reason – timeless. Therefore, it simply cannot be “in statu nascendi.” Nonetheless, we can question, what does it mean to ask about consciousness’ “essence?” Why does Husserl used the phrase “in statu nascendi” in order to name the essence? Furthermore, what kind of inquiry can explore the field of time?

The problem of time, which is “the most difficult phenomenological problem” (Husserl 1994a: 416), as Husserl called the problem in his letter to Dietrich Mahnke from the 5th of September 1917, was being defined by Husserl over and over again, without any conclusive answer. Moreover, when Husserl returned to the problem of time, he suspended earlier arrangements, striving for the formulation of new problems, rather than the decisive theses. Following Alexander Schnell, Husserl worked in such a way in 1917 and 1918, when (during his new time analyses) he completely ignored or, rather, he “forgot” intentionally about his arrangements from the first decade of the twentieth century (Schnell 2002: 90). In a text form the Bernau manuscripts collected in *Husserliana XXXIII* as Text no. 5, Husserl posed the problem of grasping the time. “How,” he asked, “can the succession of consciousness become the consciousness of succession?” (Husserl 2001a: 96) At the margin of the question, he noted that it is the correct question about the consciousness of succession, and of the flow. Nonetheless, he continued asking about time: “How the consciousness of succession is possible? How the possibility of this consciousness is understood?” (Husserl 2001a: 97) While revisiting the manuscripts form Bernau in the 1930s, in C-manuscript, Husserl once again defined question about the constitution of time as the “ultimate” question (Husserl 2006: 408). Is it possible that Husserl left phenomenological “ultimate” question without any answer? Why the question is so important? Why did Husserl make such an effort to construct the correct question about time? Of course, time is something that is not really present at all7. Again, then, how is it possible to ask about something which is not present?

While reworking the Bernau manuscripts, Fink considered the possibility of asking such questions. He asked: “[h]ow the question about time can be asked in general?” (Fink 2008: 425). Such a questioning requires a special kind of question – the philosophical one, which has a paradoxical character. After all, following Husserl’s collaborator, “[p]hilosophical questions [are understood] as questions, where there are no more questions” (Fink 2008: 403). Therefore, the question about time cannot have a naïve form of the objectifying (i.e., reducible to the proposition) question. Rather, it aims at the ground of the objectifying act, hence, it aims at the transcendental life of ego. In a research manuscript form August 1931, Husserl noted shortly, “[t]he riddle of primal being – my primal riddle, [he] who is asking in a transcendental manner – my primal phenomenal stream of temporalization” (Husserl 1973: 201). To phrase it differently, transcendental question shows questioner as questioner, i.e., as the “stream of temporalization.” Hence, while questioning the phenomenologist grasps his own being. Or, following Husserl’s clearer remark from his C 2 manuscript, “[a]ll transcendental questions […] lead in the end […] to this primal being or

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6 Husserl uses “in statu nascendi” phrase according to his analyses of reduction (Husserl 2002: 71), emphasizing a dynamic character of cognition.

7 In the manuscript from Bernau, Husserl emphasized this idea in the following way: “Time itself is not and it was not and it will not be present” (Husserl 2001a: 181).
primal happening of particular living transcendental stream of consciousness, and [to] the I living in it, the I of all transcendental acts, of all transcendental activities” (Husserl 2006: 6).

Paradoxical structure of the transcendental question involves asking about obvious issues. As early as during the 1905 lectures on the consciousness of internal time, it was evident for Husserl that despite its whole triviality the question about time is still unknown. At the very beginning of mentioned lecture series, he stated: “[n]aturally, we all know what time is; it is the most familiar thing of all,” nonetheless, “[w]e may still say today with Augustine: si nemo a me quaerat, scio, si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio” (Husserl 1991: 3). In order to understand Husserl’s motives to ask about time we must take his general point of view on philosophy into consideration. According to Husserl’s project of philosophy sketched during his 1922–1923 Einleitung in die Philosphie lecture series (Husserl 2003: 476, 646), as well as in the Cartesian Meditations (Husserl 1960: 157), philosophy is the process of acquiring self-cognition, and self-knowledge. No other is the aim of the question about time. Just as the question of self-cognition presupposes that ego is unknown, the problem of time asks also about the unknown ground of the self (Husserl 1997: 171, 243). Fink strictly emphasized that “[w]hen we are standing in the face of the question about the essence of time, we understand immediately a broad sense of this question, inasmuch as what the question points out is known, however, what, right now should be questioned according to this knowledge, this is defined at least not clearly” (Fink 2008: 427). Despite possible answers, phenomenologist shall question permanently, because only while questioning questioner stands opposite his own being.

The questioner recognizes the self only while questioning, because it is an absolute life, an absolute performance, and as such it is still performing, and redoing reduction. In his Sixth Cartesian Meditation, while considering the problem of reduction (transcendental questioning), Fink posed the following problem: “[b] ut does self-reflection, which of course begins as reflection on the part of a human individual coming to self-questioning about himself and his being in the world, necessarily have to shift over into transcendental self-cognition as self-knowledge progresses?” (Fink 1995: 31). Fink’s answer is here paradoxical: transcendental subjectivity can cognize itself on the transcendental, i.e., on the non-worldly level, however, the subjectivity cannot leave the world, and it “enworlds” (verweltlicht) (Fink 1995: 99) itself in the end. Of course, this structure of self-cognition anticipates the structure of questioning and reducing.

As late as 1935, after almost thirty years after first formulation of the theory of reduction in The Idea of Phenomenology lecture series, in his letter to Émile Baudin, Husserl emphasized that in the attitude of epoché the phenomenologist encounters “[a]n endlessness of never asked questions” (Husserl 1994b: 16). Speaking metaphorically, questioning is the alpha and omega of the transcendental inquiry in such a way that “questioning-about” (“in-Frage-stellen”) is universal character of the transcendental inquiry and reduction (Husserl 1956: 270). Reduction, however, we must understand not only as a methodological device. As Fink emphasized in his letter to Felix Kaufmann from the 17th of December 1932, “[t]he presentation of phenomenological reduction – as it were presented in Ideas and in The Idea of Phenomenology as well – WP] – cannot be maintained today any more. (Not because of its falsity, but because of incomprehension of its sense as the reduction on the immanent sphere)” (Fink 2008: 462). According to Fink, the concept of reduction should be redefined, because its technical mean-

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8 Cf. Fink 2008: 413.

9 About Husserl’s thesis about the reduction as “questioning-about,” and as “transcendental question”, see his marginal note to text about reduction from 1926, in Husserl’s texts on reduction (Husserl 2002: 512), and Husserl’s remarks in the Encyclopaedia Britannica article (Husserl 1997: 172).
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ing (reduction on the immanent sphere) did not comprehend its whole significance. Therefore, it was too hasty to see in reduction “the moment of non-acceptance in the method of epoché above all else, i.e., that suspension of the previous world-theme and throwing off the initial ‘naïveté” (Fink 1981a: 62).

Fink suggested that reduction is seen as the first level or the first step towards phenomenology; as such reduction allows us to see the naïveté, rather than it excludes the latter. Only due to the reduction the phenomenologist is able to see his naïve attitude. If so, only when the phenomenologist performs the reduction, his naïveté becomes evident for him. But inasmuch as while reducing the phenomenologist accepts discovered initial naïveté in the transcendental attitude, reduction is never done; rather, it must be redone all the time. Following Dorion Cairns, in a conversation from the 20th of November 1931, Husserl “repeated what Fink had told me before, that the phenomenological reduction is something which must be continually repeated in phenomenological work” (Cairns 1976: 43). As such, therefore, reduction is an attitude, rather than a single act. It restores the world in the “universality of questions” (Husserl 2002: 485). Apart from answering the question, reduction makes it possible to construct the method on a higher level and in a non-naïve manner, namely, as transcendental questioning. This is the context in which we should understand, on the one hand, Fink’s assertion that the aim of transcendental phenomenology is “not only the formulation of the question but the development of the question which astonishes as well” (Fink 1981b: 25), and on the other hand, Husserl’s remark that “[t]o ask question means already to answer to it” (Husserl 1958: 180)11.

To sum up, we sketched above how questioning about time is an equivalent for self-cognition. As such, this process is endless, rather than it leads the questioner to the objective answer. In turn, the answer completely overlaps with naïveté. Permanent questioning, as Husserl did this, on the contrary, confronts questioner with his own being – the flux of performances and questions becoming as “in statu nascendi.” But, let us remind that questioning is requesting to somebody (Husserl 1973: 474). For this reason, the realisation of the self-cognition process takes place not in solitary speech, in spite of the philosophers’ community, but rather within such a community. In other words, philosophers must “co-philosophise.” It was exactly Fink who saw that Husserl’s phenomenology is not “any argumentative hypothesis,” (Fink 1988: 178)12 but rather a communal effort into researches.

Ronald Bruzina (1996) made a valuable remark, when he proposed to grasp Husserl’s collaboration with Fink as practicing “questions and answers.” It is precisely questioning which overcomes the solitary life, and at the same time it overcomes the non-worldly character of the transcendental being, because questioning must return to the world and to the community. After all, any question has no meaning at all, it expresses just the need for any answer. Hence, questioning is senseless without another listening person. Phenomenology is here not only a theory; rather it is a communal effort into inquiring about the endless (as we could suppose) field of philosophical problems. Therefore, Husserl’s collaboration with Fink presented phenomenology as “philosophia perennis.” Hence, to quote Bruzina once more, “[b]eyond any single philosopher’s position, or indeed any philosopher’s living thought, philosophy had to be perennis. Such was the reality of the work of Husserl and Fink, and such was the intrinsic nature of the task that governed them” (Bruzina 1989: 306).

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10 As Ronald Bruzina noted, Fink saw his aim in building “the ‘idea of transcendental philosophy’ as questioning beyond being into the space in which ‘transcendental relations’ are at play” (Bruzina 2004: 67).

11 In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl stressed that “the question’ itself pertains to the field of transcendental science” (Husserl 1969: 15).

12 In Bruzina’s translation quoted fragment runs as follows: “This means above all that transcendental idealism is not a hypothesis resting on arguments” (Fink 1995: 159).
Conclusion

To sum up our investigation, let us remind that phenomenology as therapeutic science must fulfil three conditions. Firstly, the science requires a non-solipsistic attitude. Secondly, it focuses on communicative processes between subjects. Thirdly, the phenomenologist must consider life as being “in statu nascendi.” In the *Logical Investigations*, as we have seen, it is impossible to present the program of science, which can fulfil these conditions. While examining Husserl’s and Fink’s account of questioning about time, however, it has become clear that it is possible to reformulate this initial program of the objective investigation. Finally, we have sketched phenomenology as science which focuses on questioning, and for this reason it cannot be naïve. But, one can ask, what exactly therapeutic implications does this science have for an individual? Again, what phenomenology can contribute to real human life?

The answers can be found in Fink’s research manuscripts. In the context of the problem of “the situation of reduction,” he wrote: “[p]henomenological reduction is no method which cannot be taught once for all, but inasmuch as […] [philosophical – WP] telos is human freedom, [reduction – WP] is the task of philosophy. Philosophy wants to exist only for freedom. The motivation of the reduction is only the will to freedom” (Fink 2006: 222). Thus, for Fink, freedom is the ultimate task of questioning, because while asking the questioner discerns himself as the subject of presuppositions. Presuppositions enslave a man, however, to quote Fink once again, “[a] man is enslaved essentially. And only because he is not free, he might be free” (Fink 2006: 222). This is precisely the context in which we should understand Fink’s assertion that “[a] man exists as a paradox. He combines in himself matters, which seem to be contradictory. He understands the being in original strangeness and original confidence” (Fink 1958: 30). In other words, the man lives in the natural attitude, but the very heart of this life is unknown, because he forgets about himself necessarily. Only when, the man starts questioning, he will be able to see himself as an acting person and in consequence he will become free. In a word, due to questioning the questioner establishes himself. This is the key insight offered by Husserl and Fink: phenomenology opens human being for the world and for the community permanently. To use Husserl’s appropriate remark, in phenomenology the implication of the world changes to the explication (Husserl 2002: 231), or, to refer to Fink’s comment, asking about the world equals asking about oneself (Fink 2008: 43). For this reason, today, more than one hundred years after Husserl’s first formulation of the project of phenomenology in the *Logical Investigations*, so-called phenomenological movement is still fruitful proposition of philosophizing, showing its therapeutic potential.

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TERAPINĖS TRANSCENDENTALIOJO TYRIMO GALIMYBĖS
HUSSERLIO FILOSOFIJOJE

Witold Płotka

Pagrindinis šio straipsnio tikslas yra terapinių fenomenologijos galimybių rekonstrukcija, būtent E. Husserlio ir E. Finko transcendentaliosios laiko analizės programoje. Tačiau objektyvių fenomenologijos pretenzijų projektas, pristatytas Loginiuose tyrinėjimuose, atrodo, pašalina bet kokią terapinę prieigą. Ši programa veikiau postuluoją abstrakčių „tiesų savyje” siekį, taip pat ignoruodama mus supantį pasaulį, kaip ir intersubjektyvumą, o galiausiai suponuoja atsiskyrėlišką fenomenologo gyvenimą. Kaip tuomet galimas terapinis fenomenologijos potencialas? Klausinėjimo būdas vaidina lemną lemną ir vietos objektyvaus mokslo kontekste. Pasak Husserlio, bet kuris mokslo, kuris nesuteikia progos iškelti „karščių klausimų”, yra naivus, todėl riboja terapines galimybes. Priešingai tokiam požiūriui, transcendentaliosiosiosio tyrimo horizontą. Taigi Husserlio bendradarbiavimas su Finku išreiškia kolektyvines pastangas klausia apie laiką. Todėl fenomenologijos „terapinės galimybės” reiškia būtent metodologinę slinkį link kolektyvinės transcendentaliojo tyrimo formulotės galimybės.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: fenomenologija, transcendentalumas, redukcija, klausinėjimas.

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