Age of Choice or Diversification? Brazil, Portugal, and Capacity-Building in the Angolan Armed Forces

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ABSTRACT
The role of South–South cooperation in peace and security has prompted new questions about how, and to what extent, these ties differ from responses implemented by traditional donor countries. However, little of this literature has taken a directly comparative approach, and few studies exist on the role of such cooperation ties in the security domain. This article helps to fill these gaps by contrasting the roles of Portugal and Brazil in capacity-building of the Angolan Armed Forces. Portugal has long held a central role in this domain. However, that centrality has been increasingly challenged by emerging South–South defense cooperation players that claim to offer different approaches. Brazil, in particular, made considerable inroads with Angola in recent years. How has Brazil engaged with the Angolan military, and how does its approach to compare with that of Portugal? We focus on the case study of the Angolan Navy against the backdrop of emerging maritime security issues while addressing the question of whether or not rising powers can break the restricted club of external security providers in Africa.

KEYWORDS
Brazil; Portugal; Angola; South–South cooperation; capacity-building

Introduction
In February 2016, a group of Angolan Navy officers finished training in the Admiral Wandenkolk Training Center in Rio de Janeiro. Although Brazil had offered this type of capacity-building to officers from Angola on previous occasions, this round of training took place within the broader context of intensifying and diversifying defense ties between the two countries. Far from occurring within a vacuum, these growing links have prompted new questions about the geopolitical dynamics and repercussions of emerging South–South defense cooperation, especially when compared to initiatives undertaken by donor countries.

In the case of Angola, the presence of an external actor is, in of itself, nothing particularly new. Like many developing countries, Angola has long
relied on external support for the structuring and formation of its military forces, from its independence in 1975 until the present postconflict context. Among other recurrent partners, like the United States, Russia, or China, Portugal has played a key role in transforming Angola’s Armed Forces. Over the past ten years, however, that position has increasingly been challenged by new players, including Brazil, who have sought new opportunities to expand their cooperation and influence abroad via defense cooperation, as illustrated by the training of Angolan officers in Rio de Janeiro.

Given that Brazil and Portugal share historical and cultural links and are both members of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (commonly referred to by its Portuguese acronym, CPLP), the two countries might be expected to cooperate, rather than compete, in their roles in Angola. Yet this has not been the case. Instead, Portugal has increasingly found itself in direct competition with Brazil in several dimensions of military cooperation, especially in naval affairs. At the same time, the economic downturn in Brazil, coupled with prolonged political turbulence, has also generated new uncertainties regarding Brazil’s ability to sustain its own cooperation ventures with Angola.

Is this incipient dynamic representative of a wider trend throughout Africa, suggesting growing competition for influence between rising powers and former colonial ones? Do “newcomer approaches” seek to loosen the lingering foothold of “old guard solutions,” or are they meant to complement and coexist? In order to extract more general lessons that can provide clues as to what may be happening elsewhere in Africa, we analyze the main points of convergence and departure in the case of Angola. Even though the pool of external actors present in Angola is wide and varied, we opt to focus on Brazil and Portugal exclusively, as two different cooperation providers usually neglected by the literature yet with presumably different approaches in this domain. We draw on official data and documentation to examine the changing configurations of Angolan defense cooperation in the naval domain with its two main Lusophone partners.

We argue that Brazil’s cooperation expansion with Angola reflects a growing willingness by “new” players to directly challenge established actors in terms of African security, stepping up their roles in capacity-building and providing South-South expertise to African military sectors. However, this engagement is subject to the same risks as those faced by traditional actors, particularly in the form of exposure to political and economic oscillations. In this respect, both Brazil and Portugal behave pragmatically, by filling a perceived void whenever the opportunity arises, given the constraints on their own material capacities.

The article is structured in the following manner. First, we provide an overview of how the ecology of external actors involved with African security issues has changed and diversified in the post–Cold War era as
well as a summary of the key transformations within the Angolan Armed Forces. Next, we compare and contrast Portugal’s and Brazil’s defense cooperation with the Angolan Navy, examining not only the main areas of involvement but also the various modes and styles of engagement with Angolan actors. The final section considers the implications of the findings for the broader study of external actors in African security, including via South–South cooperation, and suggests directions for further research.

Background

**African security: New age, more players**

Given the history of colonialism in Africa, the presence of actors from outside the continent is not a novelty. Indeed, the colonial enterprise was made possible only by the use of force by European powers, coupled with bureaucratic technologies and socioeconomic transformations imposed on African societies by external actors. Historical record also shows that non-European powers occasionally had a presence in Africa, as in the case of China and Middle Eastern caliphates. In the postcolonial period, many former colonial powers managed to maintain some presence and influence in their former territories, despite recurring contestation by some local actors. In addition to occasional military intervention and arms transfers, former colonial powers also retained their influence through noncoercive means, such as helping to shape African Armed Forces. However, the level of interest waxed and waned. For instance, at the end of the Cold War, external actors temporarily lost interest in Africa; it was only in the 2000s that the continent began seeing renewed external interest due to motivations that range from intensifying competition over natural resources to transnational security challenges.

At the same time that former colonial powers remained very much a presence in Africa’s security landscape, both directly and indirectly, other countries have become more relevant to African security. In some cases, these are not new actors but rather decades-long cooperation partners that began expanding their defense ties across the continent. For instance, the past ten years have brought about an intensification of China, India, and Brazil’s footprint in Africa. While this presence has been driven primarily by trade and corporate interests, these ties have become more strategic, and the political profile of these so-called rising powers has also increased around the continent. As the assets and influence of rising powers in Africa expand, they have also become more sensitive to insecurity in Africa and therefore have invested in the prevention of conflicts by contributing towards peacekeeping, mediation, and security sector reform (SSR).
Presumably, this diversification of actors has contributed to the military sector equivalent of what development specialists call the “Age of Choice”—that is, the broadening of the gamut of options in defense cooperation, at least insofar as some African governments are better able to leverage their increased choice of cooperation partners in order to negotiate better outcomes. However, as Ismail and Skons caution, the involvement of external actors also entails certain risks and challenges for African states, such as limitations on ownership and transparency.

From the perspective of rising powers, this expanded engagement with African security represents a number of opportunities, not only for profit but also for expanded influence and a greater say in international security issues. As China demonstrated in the 1970s, winning over African governments can prove a considerable advantage in multilateral circles, in part because the continent has so many states. Hence, rising powers that aspire to a permanent seat at the UN Security Council may be able to find widespread support for some of their stances by deepening ties to African states (54 countries as of 2018). On the other hand, this involvement also entails different risks, insofar as rising powers become more directly exposed to instability and to the extent that their cooperation initiatives may be viewed as ineffective or tainted by deep power asymmetries, in a repeat of the criticisms that are often leveled at former colonial powers.

Partly in order to mitigate these risks and promote their role as cooperation partners, these rising powers often invoke concepts such as solidarity with other developing countries and horizontality in the relations that structure cooperation. Their official discourse tends to stress that their cooperation initiatives in Africa are devoid of the historical baggage of postcolonial powers, therefore constituting a desirable and more compatible alternative to assistance from the donor states. The principles of respect for national sovereignty and the non-imposition of political conditionalities on the provision of cooperation are also frequently cited as advantages for African partners, including Angola.

**The transformation of the Angolan Armed Forces**

The current state of the Angolan Armed Forces reflects the country’s own struggle for independence and the civil war that immediately ensued. Generally put, the contemporary context is partially the result of the integration of the armed forces of the three political movements that fought against Portuguese rule: the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and its Exército Popular de Libertação de Angola (EPLA, People’s Army for the Liberation of Angola); the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA, National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and its Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola (EPLN, People’s Army for the National Liberation of Angola).
(ELNA, Army for the National Liberation of Angola); and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and its Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola (FALA, Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola).\(^5\)

After the 1975 Carnation Revolution in Portugal, the Alvor Agreement foresaw a power-sharing solution between all parties leading up to the independence of Angola. Yet previous divergences between each respective movement had already stoked internal confrontations, and as soon as independence was achieved, on November 11, 1975, the MPLA took control of the capital, Luanda, and became the prevalent political force. After gaining considerable recognition as the sole legitimate government, the MPLA’s armed wing, renamed Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (FAPLA, Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola), soon transformed into the official national armed forces. These were tasked with continuing the fight against UNITA, particularly after the FNLA lost its international backers and became a negligible actor in the wider dispute. Several external actors, each with different stakes on the opposing warring sides, also played a part in fueling the conflict. Both the USSR and Cuba supported the MPLA, and the United States and South Africa backed UNITA.\(^6\) In addition, several private military companies helped to prolong the war and ultimately to shape its outcome.\(^7\)

After the end of the Cold War, a military stalemate between the two warring parties ensued, especially after the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops. In this context, the 1991 Bicesse Accords represented a renewed attempt at peace, including a first effort to promote a comprehensive reform of the different Angolan military factions. As part of the deal, the MPLA and UNITA agreed to formally establish the new Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA, Angolan Armed Forces), based on a complex integration framework that aimed to not only demobilize most FAPLA and FALA combatants but also to bring all parts under a unified national chain of command.\(^8\) However, the resumption of hostilities in 1992, due to UNITA’s refusal to recognize the results of the country’s first multi-party elections, halted the peace and integration efforts. It was only after the 2002 death of UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, and the subsequent Luena Agreement that the civil war ended and the issue of military integration became once again the object of reform efforts.

As Angola transitioned toward a postconflict context, its military apparatus faced lingering issues as well as key adjustments to the new status quo. On the one hand, tensions over the Cabinda enclave, claimed by separatist group Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC, Front for the Liberation of the Exclave of Cabinda) required constant engagement over time.\(^9\) On the other hand, new challenges to the reorganization and sustainability of the existing military forces also began to emerge and needed to be
tackled. First, the reintegration process between the different warring sides had to proceed, yet without jeopardizing wider reconciliation efforts.¹⁰ That meant reforming the different command structures and investing heavily in new joint training institutions so as to foster a sense of national identity within the newly aggregated military forces. Second, in order to keep the barracks both content and available from an operational point of view, there was a need to develop a new purpose for the Angolan Armed Forces within the regional and international contexts. In turn, this goal entailed the possibility of playing a greater role in regional security affairs as well as in multilateral dynamics.¹¹

There were significant developments on both fronts. Internally, a new constitution, drafted in 2010, provided an updated legal framework for the Angolan military.¹² It also allowed new investments in higher military education institutions, such as the Escola Superior de Guerra (War College) and the Centro de Instrução de Operações de Paz (Peacekeeping Training Center). Nonetheless, in order to effectively implement those institutions, Angola continued to rely on external support. A series of high-level guidelines for the restructuring of the Angolan Armed Forces, issued in 2007, identified several countries that should be engaged in this domain. The list included only Russia, Israel, China, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Brazil, and Portugal.¹³ At the same time, enduring contrasts remained with regard to other existing militarized forces in Angola, including the presidential personal guard, often considered to be better equipped and trained than the other branches. Likewise, even though the incorporation of UNITA’s top echelons into the FAA is often considered a success story, the reintegration of the remaining demobilized rank and file troops into society did not fare as well.¹⁴

Externally, Angola also proved more willing to play a greater role in its regional neighborhood. In Guinea-Bissau, for instance, the Missão Militar Angolana na Guiné-Bissau (MISSANG, Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau), composed by more than 200 troops, was briefly deployed in 2012. Its close association with the unstable Guinean government, though, ultimately led to a new political-military crisis and prompted its shutdown.¹⁵ Nonetheless, this ill-fated experience did not stop other gestures of Angolan assistance to such countries as the DRC or Equatorial Guinea.¹⁶ Meanwhile, Angola also briefly considered contributing peacekeepers to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) after widespread violence broke out in that country in 2013. However, after an initial display of interest, the Angolan government subsequently retracted its offer due to a deteriorating scenario on the ground.¹⁷

Amid these developments, Angola’s maritime domains have attracted new interest in recent years. Although Angola has a shoreline of nearly
1,600 kilometers, its maritime boundaries with neighboring countries remain undefined. Adding to the complexity of this scenario are the country’s sizeable offshore oil reserves and their importance to Angola’s national revenues. Yet Angola soon found itself with poor naval capabilities and few legal assurances over the full extent of its maritime sovereignty. Recognizing this situation, Angola adopted a two-pronged approach. Externally, it opted to invest considerable political capital on the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) as the multilateral instrument of choice for dealing with maritime security issues, including increased piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. In that sense, Angola financed the organization’s headquarters in Luanda. Its effectiveness, however, has been curtailed due to the competition with an emergent web of overlapping regional organizations in Africa and the South Atlantic.¹⁸ At the same time, Angola has also opted to increase its involvement with the U.S.-led Obangame Express exercises in the area.

Meanwhile, there were also internal changes. In 2006, the Comissão Interministerial para a Delimitação e Demarcação dos Espaços Marítimos de Angola (CIDDEMA, Inter-ministerial Commission for the Delimitation and Demarcation of Maritime Spaces of Angola) was created, with the Ministry of National Defense as its main coordinator. The CIDDEMA’s central goal consisted in carrying out the Projecto de Extensão da Plataforma Continental de Angola (PEPCA, Project of the Continental Shelf Extension of Angola) and submitting it to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Then, in 2009, Angola announced the Sistema Nacional de Vigilância Marítima/Sistema de Autoridade Marítima (SNVM/SAM, National Maritime Surveillance System and Maritime Authority System), later framed under the wider project Pró-Atlântico. This broad framework has since then languished amid multiple other governmental initiatives, due to conflicting priorities between political and military elites.

Bureaucratic hurdles notwithstanding, the government’s growing recognition of Angola’s maritime potential contrasted with the poor state of the country’s navy. Despite the formal launch of the Programa de Desenvolvimento do Poder Naval de Angola (PRONAVAL, Angolan Naval Build-up Program), the navy accounts for little over 1 percent of the total budget for the Angolan Armed Forces, and the country’s main vessels are still operated by the Ministry of Fisheries.¹⁹ This scenario is further accentuated by the different maritime security issues to which Angola is exposed. Unsurprisingly, the protection of oil platforms, natural gas wells, and shipping lanes, which make up the main source of national revenue, takes center stage. But occasional skirmishes in Cabinda, near the DRC, are also brought up as a continuous source of concern. Cases of illegal fishing and illegal immigration stemming through the Congo River also figure high as potential security risks. However, something of a turning point came with the January 2014 attack on the Greek tanker Kerala in Angolan waters. According to
some external actors, it was an act of piracy, but it was later classified by the Angolan Navy as a minor case of organized crime/oil bunkering.\textsuperscript{20} The incident made the Angolan Navy’s equipment gaps more apparent and reinforced a perception of vulnerability to security threats coming through the sea. In turn, this provided the necessary political-military coverage to engage with additional outside support to build up Angola’s maritime capacity, thus facilitating the deepening of ties with countries like Portugal and Brazil.

**Brazil and Portugal in Angola**

**Background on Portugal–Angola relations**

Following the protracted decolonization process, Portugal’s relations with newly independent Angola were immediately affected by the civil war that broke out. Angolan perceptions over political preferences in Lisbon for each warring side ultimately dictated the pace and direction of bilateral relations. However, given Portugal’s growing involvement with the international attempts at peace in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the country also began to play a bigger role in the efforts to unify the different armed forces and create the FAA, under the Bicesse Accords. This goal was pursued through the Comissão Conjunta para a Formação das Forças Armadas Angolanas (CCFA, Joint Commission for the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces), which essentially worked under Portugal’s coordination, with the assistance of the UK and France. Even though the bulk of these efforts were reversed with the lapse into war, they resulted in the first organizational guidelines for integrated national armed forces, which were fully adopted starting in 2002.\textsuperscript{21}

Meanwhile, Portugal began contributing to multilateral peace efforts in Angola. As shown in Table 1, even though Portugal skipped the first UN Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM) (1988–1991), its armed forces and military police actively participated in the successive operations, namely UNAVEM II (1991–1995) and III (1995–1997) as well as in the Missão de Observação das Nações Unidas em Angola (MONUA, UN Observer Mission in Angola) (1997–1999).\textsuperscript{22}

**Table 1.** Portuguese contributions to international peacekeeping missions in Angola (1988–1999).

| Participants |  |
|-------------|---|
| Mission     | Military (including observers) | National Republican Guard |
| UNAVEM I    | — | — |
| UNAVEM II   | 4 | — |
| UNAVEM III  | 616 | 31 |
| MONUA       | 546 | 93 |

*Source: Branco 2015, 119, 122.*
The final element of the Portugal–Angola defense partnership was a joint technical–military agreement signed in 1996. The agreement provided the first formal framework for further bilateral activities, including collaboration between their respective armed forces for training and logistics under humanitarian operations, possible opportunities for joint defense industrial ventures, support for the internal organization of the different Angolan military branches and the local ministries of defense, and even the creation of Angola’s National Defense Institute.23

Portugal’s current cooperation with Angola

Portugal’s military cooperation with its Lusophone partners is structured around multiannual plans and has followed a consistent path over the years. At its core lies the linking of security and development, as emphasized by the 2009 Portuguese National Security and Development Strategy, which aimed for greater efficiency in the country’s engagement in fragile situations with partner countries, especially with Lusophone countries. Most international defense initiatives have been led by the Ministry of Defense, with specific technical subdivisions helping to ensure some continuity across political cycles. Portuguese cooperation mechanisms range from assistance in the definition of defense policies; the adoption of codes of conduct that adhere to international law, human rights, and international humanitarian law; the reorganization of the armed forces; military training and instruction; and support for the partner countries’ insertion in multilateral organizations.24

However, the 2010 financial crisis that hit Portugal, and the international bailout program that ensued, seemed to threaten the sustainability of these foreign assistance programs and led Portuguese authorities to readjust the country’s approach. New emphasis was placed on co-ownership and cost-sharing with international partners, both for general cooperation and for more specific initiatives within the defense cooperation framework.25 Despite these programmatic changes, relations with Angola were not deeply affected, with the number of Portuguese instructors assigned to the country remaining more or less constant, as shown in Table 2.

More important, and following a similar trend with regard to other Lusophone partners, Portuguese officials sought to complement the previous emphasis on army-related initiatives and to adapt the existing cooperation to

| Year | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| No.  | 74   | 84   | 83   | 88   | 94   | 100  | 113  | 103  | 73   | 90   | 85   |

Source: Portugal, Ministério da Defesa.
new priorities and threats, with a focus on the maritime domain. The naval component of Portugal’s defense cooperation with Angola thus became more prominent. This dimension included technical support to the joint chiefs of staff of the navy and to the overall development of national maritime surveillance structures. Portugal also began helping with the organization and functioning of Angola’s naval training facilities. This last element became a clear priority, as displayed in Table 3. Multiple training opportunities were offered in both Portugal and in Angola, with Angolan military institutions such as the Escola de Fuzileiros Navais (Marine Academy) and the Academia Naval (Naval Academy) receiving the bulk of on-the-ground assistance.

Following preliminary discussions held in 2010, Portugal and Angola signed a memorandum of understanding the following year that foresaw the exchange of experiences and consultations with the Estrutura de Missão para a Extensão da Plataforma Continental (EMEPC, Portuguese Task Group for the Extension of the Continental Shelf), designed to support the execution of the Angolan PEPC. This initiative, in turn, involved the subcontracting of a private Portuguese company, Subacoustics, tasked with processing the hydrographic data from the Angolan continental shelf. Further support was also provided through Portugal’s Mar Aberto (Open Seas) Initiative, which was launched in 2008 with the purpose of fostering maritime security capabilities of Lusophone partners by sending Portuguese vessels on goodwill visits. Ships such as NRP Bartolomeu Dias (2014, 2015), NRP Figueira da Foz (2015), and NRP Vasco da Gama (2016) paid regular port call visits to Luanda, providing additional capacity-building opportunities to Angolan personnel.

Finally, Portuguese authorities also attempted to meet some of the growing local demands for military equipment. Recognizing the existing market niche and the possibility of maximizing efforts, in 2013 public defense holding EMPORDEF proposed a naval construction package to the Angolan Navy, which would include three coastal speedboats and two oceanic patrol vessels at a total cost of €60 million. This initiative would be accompanied by two other industrial-related projects, one in local military communications and another involving the construction of a maintenance center, to be used by every branch of the FAA. However, a highly publicized spat over the alleged prosecution of Angolan officials by Portuguese courts over corruption charges led the negotiations to come to a halt. Those bilateral

| Year | Country | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 |
|------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|      | Training in Angola | 471 | 51 | 284 | 179 | 1318 | 479 | 654 | 123 | 654 | 1781 | 1514 | 516 | 797 |
|      | Training in Portugal | 9 | 13 | 11 | 19 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 15 | 17 | 8 | 9 | 4 | 0 |

Source: Portugal, Ministério da Defesa.
developments, in turn, opened the door to other external actors to step in and explore their own cooperation with Angola.

**Background on Brazil–Angola relations**

Contemporary relations between Brazil and Angola began with the former’s swift recognition of Angolan independence in 1975. Brazil had previously supported Portugal’s position at the UN opposing self-determination for its colonies, and that policy change led to favorable relations with the MPLA from the start. The deepening of ties also allowed for considerable Brazilian private investments in Angola, mostly focused on infrastructure and energy, which helped to maintain bilateral relations afloat during the subsequent period.\(^{28}\)

There were also bursts of Brazilian defense cooperation with Angola along two lines. On the one hand, and much like Portugal, Brazil participated in the different international peacekeeping missions deployed in Angola, as shown in Table 4. In fact, Brazil held the command of the military observers of the first two UNAVEM while sending a considerably significant contingent for the third mission. Moreover, Brazil’s participation in UNAVEM III sparked Angola’s interest in having a Brazilian Technical Military Cooperation Mission on the ground. Following the visit of Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to Luanda in 1996, discussions began the following year over a general agreement to install an engineering company from the Brazilian Army along with a military health component and a permanent liaison office for a total budget of under R$38 million.\(^{29}\)

However, once again, the resumption of hostilities in Angola brought the cooperation to a standstill.

At the same time, Brazil made some inroads with arms procurement, as Brazil’s defense industry sought to secure new markets overseas for its products. That expansion included, for example, the sale by EMBRAER, the Brazilian airplane company, of two EMB-11 MP aircraft and eight EMB-312 Tucano trainer aircraft to Angola in 1986 and 1998, respectively. But these advances also entailed a significant number of light weapons and ammunitions. Between 1992 and 2002, as demand during the war skyrocketed, Brazil sold Angola material worth nearly US$11.7 million.\(^{30}\)

### Table 4. Brazilian contributions to international peacekeeping missions in Angola (1988–1999).

| Mission     | Military (including observers) | Police officers |
|-------------|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| UNAVEM I    | 16                             | —               |
| UNAVEM II   | 77                             | 39              |
| UNAVEM III  | 4174                           | 48              |
| MONUA       | 35                             | 39              |

*Source: Fontoura 2005, 216–217.*
Brazil’s current cooperation with Angola

Amid its wider strategy for Africa, devised during the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva government (2003–2010) and followed, to some extent, by his successor, Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016), Brazil pushed for an extensive defense cooperative agenda framed under a renewed conceptualization of the South Atlantic within its foreign and defense policies. This agenda included a series of new defense cooperation agreements, joint exercises, training opportunities, and the overseas promotion of Brazil’s national defense industry with multiple partners along the Atlantic coastline. Much like other rising powers, Brazil promoted these initiatives as driven by South–South solidarity and horizontality in order to present itself as a desirable alternative to other cooperation actors. However, most of these initiatives remained dispersed between the Ministry of Foreign Relations (known as Itamaraty)—and more specifically its Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC, Brazilian Cooperation Agency), the Ministry of Defense, and the different branches of the armed forces.

For Brazil, Angola was a coveted cooperation partner due to previous historical-cultural linkages, the country’s mineral wealth, and its strategic location in Africa. In addition, in the 2000s Angola was experiencing considerable economic growth and represented an expanding regional market. Accordingly, after the signing in 2010 of a strategic partnership and its accompanying defense cooperation agreement, new developments in the defense domain picked up speed. Brazil began placing a new emphasis on training opportunities for foreign officers and troops in its military institutions. Even though data are scarce given the large number of Brazilian military institutions involved, official estimates indicate that, between 2001 and 2011, up to twenty-two Angolans received naval training in Brazil.

Meanwhile, the two governments also launched discussions over possible cooperation on maritime delimitation efforts, following the exploratory contacts that had started in 2004. The result was the signing, in April 2011, of a Technical Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the framework of the Survey and Extension of the Angolan Continental Shelf. The purpose of this agreement was threefold: to provide assistance over the delimitation of Angola’s continental shelf, to help identify untapped natural resources in the surrounding oceanic area for future exploration, and to train Angolan specialists in Brazilian institutions. The first two goals were entrusted to the Brazilian public defense company EMGEPRON, which then subcontracted Brazilian consultancy company Mar, Ambiente e Geologia to carry out the technical coordination and execution of PEPCA as well as the interpretation of the data. Simultaneously, four post-graduate positions in geology and maritime geophysics at Universidade Federal Fluminense, in Rio de Janeiro state, were made available for Angolan officials,
while a series of training seminars were organized in Angola to build capacity among CIDDEMA’s staff.

These efforts were then reinforced by port call visits paid by Brazilian vessels Barroso (V-34), Apa (P-121), and Araguari (P-122) to Luanda in 2010, 2014, and 2016, respectively. Likewise, operational planning began for the multinational exercise code-named ATLANTIC TIDINGS, which sought to bring together the navies of such countries as Angola, Brazil, the DRC, Namibia, and South Africa along the African coastline. Yet, as the bilateral relations intensified, focus was also placed on the creation of a local defense industry in Angola as an integral part of the wider defense cooperation drive with Brazil. In 2013, the idea warranted a specific declaration of intent by both countries’ Ministers of Defense, which recognized such a goal as a “factor of development and generator of employment as well as of reduction of the Angolan Armed Forces foreign dependence on the acquisition of equipment and logistical means” (our translation).

The most significant purchase occurred in September 2014. Following a technical memorandum of understanding signed between the two defense ministries, both countries laid the ground for the implementation of Angola’s PRONAVAL. At an estimated cost of US$170 million, the construction of seven 500t Macaé-class patrol vessels was formalized, with the first four to be built in Brazil and the remaining three in Angola, in a new local shipyard also included in the deal. Furthermore, Brazil committed itself to providing the training and qualifications that Angolan Navy personnel would need to operate and maintain the acquired vessels.

This entire agenda, however, began to unravel in 2015 as Brazil’s economic woes began to deepen and the country entered into a recession, coupled with considerable political turbulence and an anti-corruption drive (the Lava-Jato, or “Carwash” Operation) that affected major Brazil-based corporations operating abroad. Some with a significant presence in Angola, like construction conglomerate Odebrecht, went as far as to admit long-standing bribery practices with local Angolan officials. In this context, Brazil’s defense cooperation overtures started to retract. By early 2016, for instance, the lauded shipbuilding deal with Angola had broken down entirely due to the lack of logistical capacity from Brazilian shipyards to fulfill the agreed-on delivery schedule.
Similarities, variation, and bargaining

The Portuguese and Brazilian defense cooperation approaches demonstrate considerable similarities. Even if this convergence is the product of uncoordinated actions and takes place in a nondeliberate fashion, the reliance on similar tools of engagement is striking. For instance, both countries heavily emphasize capacity-building, especially training, in tandem with efforts to meet Angolan demands for military equipment. Moreover, both countries work to enhance their respective visibility in Angola and to signal their willingness to support change within the FAA through recurrent visits by naval vessels. Finally, both countries follow the same modus operandi with regard to technical–scientific cooperation by subcontracting private companies to do the bulk of the work.

We can advance three noncompeting explanations for this state of affairs. First, it is possible that these two actors are essentially emulating best practices or that their initiatives in Angola simply reflect the most common patterns of engagement by external powers in the military sector, regardless of whether they are a former colonial power or an emerging one. Indeed, it is not uncommon for external security providers to rely on similar tools and venues that may herald longer-term dividends. In other words, Portugal and Brazil hardly prove innovators in this particular domain and mostly follow international cooperation standards.

Second, there may be a degree of interaction between external providers through multilateral platforms that also fosters an institutional isomorphism among defense cooperation practices. In this case, both Brazil and Portugal actively contributed to the peacekeeping efforts during the Angolan civil war and thus gained key insights over the local environment. But perhaps more important, the defense cooperation configuration of the CPLP in itself has also provided steady exchange opportunities, whether through the semi-regular FELINO joint exercise or through annual meetings between defense ministers, armed forces, and navy chiefs of staff. Hence, it does add substance to the argument that when brought together these countries might indeed “speak the language of security” and therefore opt for common modes of engagement.

Third, Brazil and Portugal have long cooperated bilaterally in the military sector and have thus accumulated considerable experience in the exchange of experiences and approaches. For instance, between 2001 and 2011, Brazil had twenty-one navy officials assigned to various joint training missions with Portugal. Moreover, in 2010, a joint Portuguese–Brazilian team explored the possibility of trilateral cooperation projects in São Tomé and Príncipe concerning military infrastructure. These recurrent interactions may partially explain the convergence of approaches seen in Angola. Or, to put it differently, competition for niche opportunities in the same targeted countries
does not necessarily compose a zero-sum game and might instead be subsidiary or accessory to previous partnerships.

Some slight differences, however, can be found in the specific contents of the training opportunities made available to Angolan military outside of Angola. Even though Portugal does not offer a distinct navy course for allied nations, it does provide access to a standard course for Portuguese Navy officers, namely the *Curso de Promoção a Oficial Superior da Marinha* (CPOS) at the Military University Institute in Lisbon. Running 1,500 hours, it is essentially aimed at higher-ranking officers, with an emphasis on naval strategy, maritime sciences, and maritime law. Inversely, Brazil offers a specific navy course for foreign military personnel, namely the *Curso de Formação de Oficiais para Marinhas Amigas* (CFOMA) at the Admiral Wandenkolk Training Center in Rio de Janeiro, which runs longer (2,380 hours) and is more tailored for low-ranking officers. It also provides a heavy technical-professional component and, unlike the Portuguese course, offers an “embedded option” using its own vessels.

Another more significant divergence between these cooperation arrangements concerns the time period over which the initiatives were developed. More specifically, while Portugal’s cooperation goes back to 1996, in the Brazilian case inroads were made much more recently and very rapidly. There is little doubt, as can be inferred from Figure 1, that 2010 and 2011 saw a surge in Brazilian military cooperation with Angola, as measured in expenses incurred through training of Angolan officers. In fact, in 2011 alone the amount spent with the training of Angolan military officials in Brazilian military institutions reached over €434,000, surpassing Portuguese figures.\(^{42}\)

However, this temporal analysis demands three caveats. First, there are important differences in data. Namely, the Brazilian numbers cited represent only budget estimates and not the actual amounts spent. In fact, of the nearly €709,000 allocated for training opportunities in Brazil between 2010 and 2013, only around €280,000 was effectively spent due to insufficient numbers of Angolan participants (meaning that some slots remained unfilled) and other bureaucratic constraints. Second, unlike Brazil’s cooperation, which is primarily offered through Brazilian military institutions, Portugal’s initiatives in the sector are not limited to training slots in Portuguese institutions but instead heavily favor training in-country, as shown in Table 3. Despite the lingering effects of an international bailout package granted to Portugal, the country still managed to spend €1.13 million in 2013 alone, in multiple technical-cooperation activities throughout Angola, following a similar pattern of previous years. And third, claims of an apparent rise of Brazilian defense cooperation with Angola need to take into account the budgetary retraction already exhibited in recent years, as also shown in Figure 1.

That last factor points to an understated similarity between the existing modes of engagement of rising and former colonial powers, namely the
shared risk of exposure to economic crises, which can threaten previously established relations (in the case of Portugal) or curtail previously announced initiatives (in the case of Brazil). Regardless, the amounts shared previously demonstrate that the levels of investment by these countries are not yet comparable. In 2011, with less than the amount spent by Brazil, Portugal trained nearly as many Angolan officers in its military institutions as its Brazilian counterparts did over a decade. This retraction calls into question the hype surrounding recent Brazilian cooperation in the Angolan military sector, since the funding failed to match the plans and ambitions expressed by Brazilian and Angolan leaders during the Lula years in particular. This might partly explain why, in early 2018, new Defense Minister Salviano Sequeira only highlighted Russia, China, Cuba, and Portugal as Angola’s current main strategic defense partners.\(^{43}\)

However, economic crises can also showcase degrees of unexpected endurance in cooperation flows. Indeed, Portugal managed to maintain the bulk of its cooperation projects with Angola under the worst economic duress in recent years. Despite the previously mentioned logistical woes, it is not inconceivable that Brazil might achieve a similar feat, as the case of its long-standing partnership with the Namibian Navy attests.\(^{44}\) In fact, between 2011 and 2016, a further 87 Angolan officers were already trained in Brazilian Navy institutions, nearly four times more than in the previous decade.\(^{45}\) This provides tentative evidence of an institutional resilience and operational autonomy amid the official structures of external security providers, seemingly impermeable to exogenous shocks, that also need to be taken into consideration.
These tentative inferences may prompt the question of whether Africa is indeed facing an “Age of Choice,” which implies the ability to choose among different approaches, or merely just an “Age of Diversification,” in which more external actors compete but offer similar cooperation packages. In the case of Angola, Brazil and Portugal are not on equal footing in terms of the scope and scale of what they are able to offer. Regardless, Angola bargains between both countries in order to reap better outcomes while seeking to address the military needs it has identified in recent years. Two examples illustrate this dynamic. The first concerns Angola’s program for the expansion of the continental shelf, which received support from both Brazil and Portugal. Despite aiming for the same end result, neither partner officially collaborated. However, that was never Angola’s primary goal, as it was focused on obtaining much needed technical expertise, regardless of how many external partners contributed to the final outcome. With the bulk of the work finished in 2012, the country was then able to file its formal submission to the CLCS the following year.

The second example concerns the competition to resupply the Angolan Navy with new hardware. Despite Portugal’s bid, Brazil eventually secured the coveted contract in 2014. However, as stated, as soon as Brazilian internal woes began to jeopardize the deal, Angola pulled the plug and started searching for alternatives. This, in and of itself, was not entirely a novelty; previous unsuccessful military bids had followed the same route. In 2011, for instance, negotiations began with Germany for six to eight patrol vessels, ranging between €10 and €25 million each, but the deal eventually fell through. This was followed by a new contract, totaling €122 million, with Italy, in December 2015 for maritime surveillance equipment and two speed-boats. Finally, in September 2016, the entire process of reequipping the Angolan Navy took yet another abrupt turn when Angola formally announced that it had contracted another seventeen military patrol and transport vessels to a Middle Eastern shipbuilding group under a €495 million package. Angola’s “shopping around” illustrates how a country may try to secure a better bargain by playing the field of potential partners.

However, Angola’s behavior is not entirely explained by the “Age of Diversification” effect alone. Rather, the umbilical connections between political and economic interests, which have characterized most public tenders in Angola over the past twenty-five years, also need to be considered, particularly given that state procurement bids tend to offer ample possibilities for private gains by key politically connected individuals. On the other hand, the country’s own economic downturn—partly a result of the drop in the price of oil (which represents one-third of the country’s GDP) starting in mid-2014 and its impact on Angolan revenues—has also played a part in the somewhat erratic announcements about military cooperation deals, especially hardware acquisitions. Recent data show that the Angolan defense budget
went from US$6.85 billion in 2014 to US$4.44 billion in 2015 and further downward to US$2.97 billion in the following year. Although 2017 witnessed a slight rebound (US$3.23 billion), the sector remains heavily contingent on the economy picking up again. These internal variations, and not just the drivers in external actors, must be also taken into account.

**Conclusion**

While the role of external actors in African military sectors is far from a novelty, in the past decade there has been a broadening of the spectrum of actors involved in reforming the armed forces of African states. In particular, alongside former colonial powers and established assistance providers, rising powers have made inroads in some parts of the continent. Their claims to provide a more horizontal and solidary modality of cooperation are designed to underscore the presumed differences between their initiatives and those of the first group. These claims have also contributed toward the perception of an “Age of Choice” in which African actors may be able to leverage the wider array of cooperation partners so as to negotiate the best deals according to their demands.

In the case of Angola, the government has tried to proceed with major acquisitions, reforms, and external outreach in order to both keep the barracks calm in a still ongoing posttransition context while substantiating the country’s regional leadership aspirations. The presence of both Portugal and Brazil provides an opportunity to contrast the actual practices of a “traditional” and rising power donor, beyond their discursive claims. The comparison shows that there is considerable convergence among their institutional frameworks, training efforts, equipment provision offers, and also in their exposure to economic downturns. Portugal has experienced some decrease in its involvement in Angola but maintains an important role within the overall transformation of the Angolan armed forces. As for Brazil, even though its efforts have been curtailed by the economic slowdown and political turbulence that began in 2015, it still made significant headways as a newcomer in this domain.

This convergence suggests that, rather than an “Age of Choice” characterized by the availability of external actors offering very different approaches, Africa is instead presented with an “Age of Diversification,” in which there are more external actors but not necessarily widespread innovation in military sector transformation practices. However, this conclusion is tentative, as the ability to generalize from the Angolan case is limited by a number of factors. First, we do not sufficiently account for other external actors in Angola like the United States, Russia, or China, who are also engaged in their own defense overtures. Second, there is noticeable a lack of systematized data on Brazilian capacity-building practices, which hampers a more
in-depth evaluation of its full impact on the Angolan security sector. And third, the country’s political economy and its fast-changing dynamics need to be more actively brought to the forefront of analysis. When combined, these restrictions underscore the lack of more regular observation of the efforts undertaken in this domain throughout Africa, in general, and Angola in particular. But above all, they further stress the need for future research to examine more intensively the nature and contours of the new dynamics heralded by rising powers in the wider capacitation of African armed forces.

Notes

1 Olawale Ismail and Elisabeth Skons (eds.), Security Activities of External Actors in Africa (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014).
2 Elling Tjonneland, “Rising Powers and the African Security Landscape” (Chr. Michelsen Institute Report, no. 4, 2014), http://www.cmi.no/publications/5271-rising-powers-and-the-african-security-landscape (accessed April 10, 2017).
3 Romilly Greenhil, Annalisa Prizzon, and Andrew Rogerson, “The Age of Choice: Developing Countries in the New Aid Landscape” (Overseas Development Institute Working Paper, no. 364, January 2013), https://www.odi.org/publications/7163-age-choice-developing-countries-new-aid-landscape (accessed April 10, 2017).
4 Ismail and Skons (eds.), Security Activities of External Actors in Africa.
5 Ana Leão and Martin Rupyia, “A Military History of the Angolan Armed Forces from the 1960s Onwards—As Told by Former Combatants,” in Evolutions and Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa, edited by Martin Rupyia (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute of Security Studies, 2005), 7–42.
6 Vladimir Shubin and Andrei Tokarev, “War in Angola: A Soviet dimension,” Review of African Political Economy 28, no. 90 (2001): 607–18; Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2013).
7 Sean Cleary, “Angola—A Case Study of Private Military Involvement,” in Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies, edited by Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1999), 141–74.
8 Leão, Rupyia, “A Military History of the Angolan Armed Forces from the 1960s Onwards,” 28–31. Luis Bernardino, A Posição de Angola na Arquitectura de Paz e Segurança Africana: Análise da Função Estratégica das Forças Armadas Angolanas (Coimbra, Portugal: Almedina, 2013).
9 “Angola admite que situação em Cabinda ainda apresenta riscos,” Agência Lusa, May 14, 2018, https://www.dn.pt/lusa/interior/angola-admite-que-situacao-em-cabinda-ainda-apresenta-riscos-9337957.html (accessed June 20, 2018). For a review of the Cabinda peace process, see Miguel Bembe, “Análise do Processo de Paz no Enclave de Cabinda,” Caderno de Estudos Africanos, no. 20 (2010): 27–54.
10 For an account of the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) challenges that Angola faced in a postconflict context see, João Gomes Porto and Imogen Parsons, “Sustaining the Peace in Angola: An Overview of Current Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration,” Bonn International Centre for Conversion Paper, no. 27, March 2003.
11 Assis Malaquias, “Angola’s Foreign Policy: Pragmatic Recalibrations.” South African Institute of International Affairs Occasional Paper, no. 84, May 2011, http://www.saiia.
This desired regional role, however, was initially subdued due to the legacy of previous Angolan incursions in its neighborhood, including in the former-Zaire and afterward in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as in the Congo-Brazzaville all throughout the 1990s. Likewise, it had to contend with South Africa’s recurrent claims to regional leadership. See, for example, Luis L. Schenoni, “The Southern African Unipolarity,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 36, no. 2 (2018): 207–28.

However, the revision of the 2003 Strategic Concept of Defense and Security is yet to be finalized, while a new National Defense and Armed Forces Law, approved by the Angolan Parliament in 2012, is also yet to be fully implemented.

Presidência da República, Directiva do Presidente da República e Comandante em Chefe, sobre a Reedificação das Forças Armadas Angolana—Luanda, 30 de Julho de 2007. (Luanda, Angola, Presidência da República, 2007), 29.

Alex Vines and Bereni Orutemeka, “Bullets to Ballots: The Reintegration of UNITA in Angola,” Conflict, Security & Development 8, no. 2 (2008): 241–63, at 253–56.

Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Magnificent and Beggar Land: Angola since the Civil War (London, UK: Hurst & Company, 2015), 181–2.

These efforts have included over the years the training of several hundred Equatorial-Guinean policemen in Malabo as well as over 14,000 Congolese soldiers, mostly in the Kitona base, Western DRC. See, respectively, “Policia Nacional formou cerca de 300 operacionais da Guiné Equatorial,” Agência Lusa, February 10, 2015, http://www.redeangola.info/policia-nacional-forma-cerca-de-300-operacionais-da-guine-equatorial/ (accessed April 10, 2017); “Angola Seeks Stability in DRC,” cable from U.S. Embassy in Luanda, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09LUANDA760_a.html (accessed April 10, 2017).

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Adriana Erthal Abdenur, “Security and Cooperation in the South Atlantic: The Role of Regional Organizations,” in Atlantic Currents: An Annual Report of Wider Atlantic Perspectives and Patterns (Washington, DC, and Rabat: German Marshall Fund of the U.S. and OCP Policy Center, 2014), 98–112.

That includes an estimated twenty-one patrol and coastal vessels. The Military Balance, “Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa,” The Military Balance 118, no. 1 (2018): 429–98 at 445. Amid a series of unconfirmed navy equipment deals, reports also surfaced in 2013 over a possible Angolan interest on the then-to-be retired Spanish air carrier, Príncipe das Astúrias, even though the purchase never concretized.

Svati Kirsten Narula, “Pretend Pirates and the Case of a Missing Oil Tanker,” The Atlantic, January 27, 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/01/pretend-pirates-and-the-case-of-a-missing-oil-tanker/283355/ (accessed April 10, 2017).

Gonçalves Aranha, “Cooperação Técnico-Militar, uma das Vertentes Externas da Política de Defesa Nacional,” Nação e Defesa, no. 72 (1995): 15–69 at 35–49; Bernardino, A Posição de Angola na Arquitectura de Paz e Segurança Africana, 347–69.

Carlos Branco, “A participação Portuguesa em missões de paz da ONU,” Relações Internacionais 47 (2015): 101–26 at 104.
Even though the first official initiatives began soon after the signing, the agreement was only ratified by the Portuguese Parliament in 2009.  

Instituto Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento, *Uma Visão Estratégica para a Cooperação Portuguesa* (Lisbon, Portugal: IPAD, 2006), 26; *Estratégia Nacional sobre Segurança e Desenvolvimento* (Lisbon, Portugal: Governo de Portugal, 2009).  

For a more recent take on the future priorities of Portuguese defense cooperation abroad, see José Azeredo Loped, “Uma nova ação externa da Defesa Nacional,” *Observador*, May 12, 2018, https://observador.pt/especiais/uma-nova-acao-externa-da-defesa-nacional/ (accessed June 20, 2018).  

Pedro Seabra, “A Case of Unmet Expectations: Portugal and the South Atlantic,” *Portuguese Journal of Social Sciences* 13, no. 3 (2014): 331–46.  

Ana Dias Cordeiro, “Três figuras próximas de Eduardo dos Santos sob investigação em Portugal,” *Publico*, November 10, 2012, https://www.publico.pt/2012/11/10/politica/noticia/tres-figuras-proximas-de-eduardo-dos-santos-sob-investigacao-em-portugal-1571956 (accessed April 10, 2017); Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, “Cash-rich Angola Comes to Cash-strapped Portugal,” *Politico*, February 10, 2015. http://www.politico.eu/article/cash-rich-angola-comes-to-cash-strapped-portugal-colony-oil-santos-luanda-lisbon (accessed April 10, 2017). The apex of these hurdles in the bilateral relation were manifested in an official speech by President José Eduardo dos Santos to the National Assembly, in which he seemingly dropped Portugal from the list of Angola’s “special partners” abroad. See Soares de Oliveira, *Magnificent and Beggar Land*, 192–7. Following the swearing-in of dos Santos’s successor, João Lourenço, in 2017, and a similar period of political-judicial tensions, official relations have since then stabilized.  

Jerry Dávila, *Hotel Trópico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950–1980* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).  

Paulo Roberto Campos Tarrise Fontoura, *O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção de Paz das Nações Unidas* (Brasília, Brazil: Fundação Alexandre Gusmão, 2005), 271–2.  

Data available at http://aliceweb.mdic.gov.br.  

Adriana Erthal Abdenur and Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto, “O Brasil e a cooperação em defesa: a construção de uma identidade regional no Atlântico Sul,” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 52, no. 1 (2014): 5–21.  

However, unlike their Angolan counterparts, the Brazilian Congress has yet to ratify the Defense Cooperation Agreement. This situation is not unique to Angola but rather extends to the other defense cooperation agreements Brazil signed during this period and has not impeded overall cooperation from moving forward.  

Ministério da Defesa do Brasil, *Livro Branco de Defesa* (Brasília, Brazil: Ministério da Defesa, 2012), 106.  

Christiano Sávio Barros Figueirôa, *Limites Exteriores da Plataforma Continental do Brasil conforme o Direito do Mar* (Brasília, Brazil: Fundação Alexandre Gusmão, 2014), 254.  

However, despite the exercise being first scheduled for September 2013, it was eventually “cancelled by the lead nation, Angola, due to capacity challenges” and since then repeatedly postponed. Department of Defence of South Africa, *Annual Report FY 2013/2014* (Cape Town: Department of Defence, 2014), 80.  

Ministério da Defesa do Brasil, “Declaração de Intenções Brasil-Angola sobre o Lançamento das Indústrias de Defesa em Angola–Rio de Janeiro,” *Ministério da Defesa*, April 11, 2013, http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2013/pronunciamentos/comunicados_conjuntos/decl_conj_brasil_angola.pdf (accessed April 10, 2017).
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38 Roberto Lopes, “Angola desiste de esperar pelos NaPaCos classe Macae prometidos pela EMGEPRON e compra lanchas de ataque na Itália,” *Plano Brasil*, January 06, 2016, http://www.planobrazil.com/exclusivo-angola-desiste-de-esperar-pelos-napacos-classe-mace-prometidos-pela-emgepron-e-compra-lanchas-de-ataque-na-italia/ (accessed April 10, 2017).

39 Ismail and Skons (eds.), *Security Activities of External Actors in Africa*.

40 Rodrigo Tavares and Luís Brás Bernardino, “Speaking the Language of Security: The Commonwealth, the Francophonie and the CPLP in Conflict Management in Africa,” *Conflict, Security & Development* 11, no. 5 (2011): 607–36.

41 Ministério da Defesa do Brasil, *Livro Branco de Defesa*, 107.

42 Values for Brazilian defense cooperation only became available in a systematic format from 2010 onward. For the purpose of comparison with Portuguese cooperation, they were converted and rounded from dollars into euros.

43 João Dias, “Ministro destaca cooperação,” *Jornal de Angola*, February 05, 2018. http://jornaldeangola.sapo.ao/politica/ministro_destaca_cooperacao (accessed June 20, 2018).

44 Pedro Seabra, “Defence cooperation between Brazil and Namibia: Enduring relations across the South Atlantic,” *South African Journal of International Affairs* 23, no. 1 (2016): 89–106.

45 Vinicius Mariano de Carvalho, “Defence diplomacy and its potential for Brazil,” *Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval* 22, no. 3 (2016): 503–16 at 512.

46 Internal criticism from several German political parties to the government’s plans likely contributed to scuttle the deal. Andreas Rinkle, “German Patrol Boat Offer to Angola Sparks Criticism,” *Reuters*, July 13, 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article/germany-angola-idUKL6E7ID2NZ20110713 (accessed April 10, 2017).

47 Soares de Oliveira, *Magnificent and Beggar Land*; Paula Cristina Roque, “Reform or Unravel? Prospects for Angola’s Transition,” *ISS Southern Africa Report*, no. 8, May 2017.

48 The Military Balance, “Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa”: 445.

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