Clearing Payments in Dynamic Financial Networks *

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Abstract

This paper proposes a novel dynamical model for determining clearing payments in financial networks. We extend the classical Eisenberg-Noe model of financial contagion to multiple time periods, allowing financial operations to continue after possible initial pseudo defaults, thus permitting nodes to recover and eventually fulfil their liabilities. Optimal clearing payments in our model are computed by solving a suitable linear program, both in the full matrix payments case and in the pro-rata constrained case. We prove that the proposed model obeys the priority of debt claims requirement, that is, each node at every step either pays its liabilities in full, or it pays out all its balance. In the pro-rata case, the optimal dynamic clearing payments are unique, and can be determined via a time-decoupled sequential optimization approach.

Key words: Financial network, systemic risk, default risk, dynamic optimization

1 Introduction

The current global financial system is a highly interconnected network of institutions that are linked together via a structure of mutual debts or liabilities. Such interconnected structure makes the system potentially prone to “cascading defaults,” whereby a shock at a node (e.g., an expected incoming payment that gets cancelled or delayed for some reason) may provoke a default at that node, which then cannot pay its liabilities to neighbouring nodes, which in turn default, and so on in an avalanche fashion. The global financial crisis of 2008 is an example of such behavior, where the bankruptcy of Lehman-Brothers is identified as the watershed event that started the crisis. Since the consequences of these cascading events can be catastrophic, modeling and analyzing such behavior is of crucial importance. The seminal work Eisenberg & Noe (2001) introduced a simple model for studying financial contagion. In particular, they focused on defining a clearing procedure between financial entities. Clearing consists in a procedure for settling claims in the case of defaults, on the basis of a set of rules and prevailing regulations. In Eisenberg & Noe (2001), the authors showed that there exist a clearing vector which defines the mutual interbank payments, under certain assumptions. Among such assumptions, an important one is that the debts of all nodes of the system are paid simultaneously.

The basic model presented in Eisenberg & Noe (2001) has become a cornerstone in the analysis of financial contagion and it has been extended in various directions. In particular, non-trivial features were added in order to make the model more realistic. The models presented in Cifuentes et al. (2005), Shin (2008), for instance, consider also the liquidity risk. Instead, in Elsinger et al. (2009), Suzuki (2002) cross-holdings and seniority of liabilities are introduced. Other works take into account costs of default (Rogers & Veraart 2013), illiquid assets (Amini et al. 2016), mandatory disclosures (Alvarez & Barlevy 2015), cross-ownership of equities and liabilities (Fischer 2014), and decentralized clearing processes (Csóka & Jean-Jacques Herings 2018).

The vast majority of the works based on the Eisenberg-Noe model, however, considers the problem only in a static, or single-period, setting. This assumption is quite unrealistic, since it supposes that all liabilities are claimed and due at the same time. In addition, static models are only able to capture the immediate consequences of a financial shock. For these reasons, several works recently proposed time-dynamic extensions of the Eisenberg-Noe model. In Sonin & Sonin (2017) a continuous-time model of clearing in financial networks is presented. This work has later been extended by considering liquid assets (Chen et al. 2021), heterogeneous network structures over time and early defaults (Banerjee et al. 2018). Other works (Feinstein & Sojmark 2021) propose to combine the interbank Eisenberg-Noe model...
and the dynamic mean field approach. Instead, Feinstein (2020) uses a continuous-time model for price-mediated contagion.

A different line of research extended the Eisenberg-Noe model considering a discrete-time setting. In Capponi & Chen (2015), Ferrara et al. (2019) a multi-period clearing framework is introduced. Using a similar approach, Kusnetsov & Maria Veraart (2019) considers the case where interbank liabilities can have multiple maturities, considering both long-term and short-term liabilities.

In the present work, we focus on a discrete-time setting and introduce a multi-period model whereby financial operations are allowed for a given number of time periods after the initial theoretical default (named here pseudo default). This allows to reduce the effects of a financial shock, since some nodes may possibly recover and eventually fulfill their debts. We first consider the general case where payment matrices are unconstrained. This scenario has been introduced in the static case in Calafiore et al. (2021a,b), where its advantages over the proportional rule in terms of the overall system loss have been highlighted. Here, we prove in a dynamic setting that the optimal sequence of payment matrices satisfies the absolute priority of debt claims rule, hence the proposed method produces proper clearing matrices at each stage.

We then consider the situation in which a proportionality rule is enforced, whereby nodes must pay the claimant institutions proportionally to their nominal claims (pro-rata rule). We prove that under the pro-rata rule the optimal payments are again proper clearing payments, they are unique and, further, the multi-stage optimization problem can be decoupled in time into an equivalent series of LP problems.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some preliminary notions and the notation that will be used in the next sections. In Section 3 we introduce the Eisenberg-Noe financial network model. Then, in Section 4 we illustrate the proposed dynamic model, considering both the unrestricted case and the case with the pro-rata rule imposed. A schematic example is proposed in Section 5 in order to illustrate the proposed model. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6. For ease of reading, we collected the proofs of all technical results in an appendix.

2 Preliminaries and notation

Given a finite set $V$, the symbol $|V|$ stands for its cardinality. The set of families $(a_\xi)$, $a_\xi \in \mathbb{R}$, is denoted by $\mathbb{R}^\Xi$. For two such families $(a_\xi), (b_\xi)$, we write $a \leq b$ (b dominates a, or a is dominated by b) if $a_\xi \leq b_\xi$, $\forall \xi \in \Xi$. We write $a \leq b$ if $a \leq b$ and $a \neq b$. The operations min, max are also defined element-wise, e.g., $\min(a, b) = \min(a_\xi, b_\xi)_{\xi \in \Xi}$. These notation symbols apply to both vectors (usually, $\Xi = \{1, \ldots, n\}$) and matrices (usually, $\Xi = \{1, \ldots, n\} \times \{1, \ldots, n\}$).

Every nonnegative square matrix $A = (a_{ij})_{i,j \in V}$ corresponds to a weighted digraph $G[A] = (V, E[A], A)$ whose nodes are indexed by $V$ and whose set of arcs is defined as $E[A] = \{(i, j) \in V \times V : a_{ij} > 0\}$. The value $a_{ij}$ can be interpreted as the weight of the arc $i \to j$. A sequence of arcs $i_0 \to i_1 \to \ldots \to i_n$, constitute a walk between nodes $i_0$ and $i_n$ in graph $G[A]$. The set of nodes $J \subseteq V$ is reachable from node $i$ if $i \in J$ or a walk from $i$ to some element $j \in J$ exists; $J$ is called globally reachable in the graph if it is reachable from every node $i \notin J$.

A graph is strongly connected (strong) if every two nodes $i,j$ are mutually reachable. A graph that is not strong has several strongly connected (or simply strong) components. A strong component is said to be non-trivial if it contains more than one node. A component is said to be a sink component if no arc leaves it and a source component if no arc enters it. A strong component can be isolated, when it has neither incoming nor outgoing arcs, and thus it is both a source and a sink. Strong components of undirected graphs are always isolated.

Fig. 1. Strong components of a directed graph: (a) non-isolated; (b) isolated. In (a), $\{1\}$ is a (trivial) single source component, $\{11, \ldots, 15\}$ is a single sink component.

3 The Eisenberg-Noe financial network model

We start by considering the “static” case introduced in the seminal work of Eisenberg and Noe (Eisenberg & Noe 2001). In this setting, $n$ nodes, representing financial entities (banks), are connected via a complex structure of mutual liabilities. The payment due from node $i$ to node $j$ is denoted by $\bar{p}_{ij} \geq 0$, and such liabilities are supposed to be due at the end of a fixed time period. These interbank liabilities form the liability matrix $P \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$, such that $P_{ij} = \bar{p}_{ij}$ for $i \neq j = 1, \ldots, n$, and $P_{ii} = 0$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$.

Following the notation introduced in (Glasserman & Young 2016, Section 5), we let $c \in \mathbb{R}^n_+$ be the vector whose $i$th component $c_i \geq 0$ represents the total payments due to node $i$ from non-financial entities (i.e., from any other entity, different from the $n$ banks). Payments
from banks to the external sector are instead modeled by introducing a fictitious node that represents the external sector and owes no liability to the other nodes (the corresponding row of \( \bar{P} \) is zero).

The nominal cash in-flow and out-flow at a node \( i \) are, respectively,
\[
\phi_i^{\text{in}} \doteq c_i + \sum_{k \neq i} p_{ki}, \quad \phi_i^{\text{out}} \doteq \bar{p}_i \doteq \sum_{k \neq i} p_{ik}.
\]

In regular operations, the in-flow at each bank is no smaller than its out-flow (i.e., \( \phi_i^{\text{in}} \geq \phi_i^{\text{out}} \)), each bank remains solvable and is able to pay its liabilities in full. A critical situation occurs instead when (due to, e.g., a drop in the external liquidity in-flow \( c_i \)) some bank \( i \) has not enough incoming liquidity to fully pay its liabilities. In this situation, the actual payments to other banks have to be remodeled to lesser values than their nominal values \( \bar{p}_{ij} \). The clearing payments are a set of mutual payments which settle the mutual claims in case of defaults, by enforcing a set of rules (Csóka & Jean-Jacques Herings 2018, Eisenberg & Noe 2001), which are: (i) payments cannot exceed the corresponding liabilities, (ii) limited liability, i.e., the balance at each node cannot be negative, (iii) absolute priority (i.e., each node either pays its liabilities in full, or it pays out all its balance).

We let \( p_{ij} \in [0, \bar{p}_{ij}] \), \( i \neq j = 1, \ldots, n \), denote the actual inter-bank payments executed at the end of the period, which we shall collect in matrix \( P \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n} \). At each node \( i \), we write a flow balance equation, involving the actual cash in-flow and out-flow, defined respectively as
\[
\phi_i^{\text{in}} \doteq c_i + \sum_{k \neq i} p_{ki}, \quad \phi_i^{\text{out}} \doteq \bar{p}_i \doteq \sum_{k \neq i} p_{ik}.
\]

The cash balance represents the net worth \( w_i \) of the \( i \)-th bank, which is defined as
\[
w_i \doteq \phi_i^{\text{in}} - \phi_i^{\text{out}} = c_i + \sum_{k \neq i} p_{ki} - \sum_{k \neq i} p_{ik}.
\]

The limited liability rule (ii) requires that \( w_i \geq 0 \), \( \forall i \).

In vector notation, the vectors of actual and nominal in/out-flows and the vector of net worths are
\[
\phi = c + P^\top \mathbf{1}, \quad \bar{\phi} = c + \bar{P}^\top \mathbf{1} \quad (4) \\
\phi^{\text{out}} = p = P \mathbf{1}, \quad \bar{\phi}^{\text{out}} = \bar{p} = \bar{P} \mathbf{1} \quad (5) \\
w = \phi - \phi^{\text{out}} = (c + P^\top \mathbf{1}) - P \mathbf{1} \quad (6)
\]
where \( \mathbf{1} \) denotes a vector of ones of suitable dimension.

The above mentioned conditions (i), (ii) on the payments are written in compact vector form as \( 0 \leq P \leq \bar{P} \) and \( P \mathbf{1} \leq c + P^\top \mathbf{1} \), that is, the payment matrix \( P \) is restricted to belong to the following convex polytope
\[
P(c, \bar{P}) \doteq \{ P \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n} : 0 \leq P \leq \bar{P}, \ P \mathbf{1} \leq c + P^\top \mathbf{1}, \ P_{ii} = 0, \ i = 1, \ldots, n \}.
\]

A payment matrix \( P \in P(c, \bar{P}) \) is a clearing matrix, or matrix of clearing payments, if it complies with the absolute priority of debt claims rule (iii), that is,
\[
P \mathbf{1} = \min(\bar{P} \mathbf{1}, c + P^\top \mathbf{1}).
\]

It can be shown (Calafiore et al. 2021, Csóka & Jean-Jacques Herings 2018) that a clearing matrix can be found by solving an optimization problem of the form
\[
\min_{P} f(P)
\]
subject to: \( P \in P(c, \bar{p}) \)

where \( f \) is a decreasing function of the matrix argument \( P \) on \([0, \bar{P}]\), i.e., a function such that \( P \geq P^{(2)} > P^{(1)} \geq 0, P^{(2)} \neq P^{(1)} \). implies \( f(P^{(2)}) < f(P^{(1)}) \). It can be shown that for any choice of \( f \) the solution to (9) is automatically a clearing matrix, that is, (8) holds. Possible choices for \( f \) in (9) are for instance \( f(P) = \| \phi^{\text{in}} - \phi^{\text{out}} \|_1 \) and \( f(P) = \| \phi^{\text{in}} - \phi^{\text{out}} \|_2^2 \), where \( \phi^{\text{in}}(P) = c + P^\top \mathbf{1} \). The optimal solution of (9), however, may be non unique in general (Calafiore et al. 2021).

3.1 The pro-rata rule

In practice, payments under default are subject to additional prevailing regulations. A common one is the so-called proportionality (or, pro-rata) rule, according to which payments are made in proportion to the original outstanding claims. Denoting by
\[
a_{ij} \doteq \begin{cases} \frac{\bar{p}_{ij}}{\bar{p}_i} & \text{if } \bar{p}_i > 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } \bar{p}_i = 0 \text{ and } i = j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]
the relative proportion of payment due nominally by node \( i \) to node \( j \), we form the relative liability matrix \( A = [a_{ij}] \). By definition, \( A \) is row-stochastic, that is \( A \mathbf{1} = \mathbf{1} \). The pro-rata rule imposes the relations
\[
p_{ij} = a_{ij} p_i, \quad \forall i, j,
\]
where \( p_i \) is the out-flow defined in (2). In matrix notation, the pro-rata rule corresponds to a linear equality constraint on the entries of \( P \), that is \( P = \text{diag}(P \mathbf{1}) A \). Under pro-rata rule, the problem of clearing payments can be rewritten in terms of the total out-payments vector \( p = P \mathbf{1} \), which is said to be feasible if it belongs to
\[
P_{pr}(c, \bar{p}) \doteq \{ p \in \mathbb{R}^n : 0 \leq p \leq \bar{p}, p \leq c + A^\top p \}.
\]
where $\bar{p} = \bar{P} 1$. Among the feasible payment vectors $p \in P_{pr}(c, \bar{p})$, a vector of clearing payments, or simply clearing vector is a vector $p \in P_{pr}(c, \bar{p})$ such that
\begin{equation}
\begin{aligned}
p &= \min(\bar{p}, c + A^T p).
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}

A clearing vector $p^*$ can be found (Glasserman & Young 2016) by solving an optimization problem of the form
\begin{equation}
\begin{aligned}
\min & f(p) \\
\text{subject to:} & p \in P_{pr}(c, \bar{p})
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}

where $f : [0, \bar{p}] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is any decreasing function, that is, a function such that $p^{(1)}, p^{(2)} \in [0, \bar{p}]$ and $p^{(1)} \leq p^{(2)}$ imply $f(p^{(1)}) \geq f(p^{(2)})$, and the latter inequality is strict unless $p^{(1)} = p^{(2)}$. Possible choices for $f$ are for instance $f(p) = \|\phi_{in} - \phi_{in}(p)\|^2_2$, and $f(p) = \sum_{i=1}^n (\phi_{in}^i - \phi_{in}^i(p))$, where $\phi_{in}(p) = c + A^T p$. The following proposition holds.

**Lemma 1** (Calafiore et al. 2021b, Lemma 1) The solution $p^* = p^*[A, c, \bar{p}]$ to (13) exists, is unique and does not depend on the choice of $f$, provided that $f$ is decreasing. Additionally,
\begin{enumerate}
\item[(a)] $p^*$ satisfies (8a) (being thus a clearing vector);
\item[(b)] $p^*$ dominates any other admissible payment vector $p^*[A, c, \bar{p}] \geq p \forall p \in P_{pr}(c, \bar{p})$;
\item[(c)] each strongly connected component being a sink (without out-coming arcs) of graph $G[A]$ contains at least one node $i$ such that $p^*_i = \bar{p}_i$;
\item[(d)] $p^*$ is the unique solution of (8a) enjoying the property from statement (c);
\end{enumerate}

Lemma 1, in fact, is valid for every stochastic matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times V}$, because its proof (available in Calafiore et al. 2021b) does not rely on (10).

## 4 Dynamic financial networks

A key observation is that the default and clearing model discussed in the previous section, which coincides with the mainstream one studied in the literature (Glasserman & Young 2016) is an instantaneous one. By instantaneous we mean that the described process assumes that at one point in time (say, at the end of a day), all liabilities are claimed and due simultaneously, and that the entire network of banks becomes aware of the claims and possible defaults and instantaneously agrees on the clearing payments. On the one hand such an instantaneous model may be quite unrealistic, and on the other hand the implied default mechanism is such that all financial operations of defaulted nodes are instantaneously frozen, which possibly induces propagation of the default to other neighboring nodes, in an avalanche fashion, see, e.g. Massai et al. (2021).

One motivation for the dynamic model we propose in this paper is that one may expect that if financial operations are allowed for a given number of time periods after the initial theoretical defaults, some nodes may actually recover and eventually manage to fulfill their obligations.

The overall system-level advantage of such strategy is that the catastrophic effects of avalanche defaults are possibly mitigated, as shown by examples in Section 5.

In our dynamic multi-period model described below, if a theoretical default condition (we shall call this a pseudo-default) happens at some time $t < T$, where $T$ is the final time, we do not freeze operations. Instead, we carry over the residual liabilities for the next period and let the nodes continue their mutual payments operations, and so on until the final time $T$. The key elements of this model are the following:

- $t = 0, 1, \ldots, T$, denote discrete time instants delimiting periods of fixed length (e.g. one day, one month, etc.);
- $T \geq 0$ denotes the final horizon;
- $c(t) \in \mathbb{R}^n \geq 0$ represents the cash in-flow at the nodes at the beginning of period $t$;
- matrix $P(t) = (p_{ij}(t)) \in \mathbb{R}^{n,n}$ describes the liabilities (i.e., the mutual payment obligations) among the nodes at period $t$, i.e., $p_{ij}(t)$ is the nominal amount due from $i$ to $j$ at the end of period $t$. $P = P(0)$ denotes the initial liabilities at $t = 0$;
- matrix $P(t) = (p_{ij}(t)) \in \mathbb{R}^{n,n}$ contains the actual payments from $i$ to $j$ performed at the end of period $t$;
- the vectors of actual and nominal in-flows and out-flows $\bar{p}_{in}(t), \bar{p}_{out}(t), \bar{p}_{in}(t), \bar{p}_{out}(t)$ at period $t = 0, \ldots, T - 1$, are defined similarly to (4) and (5);
- the net worth $w_i(t)$ of node $i$ at the beginning of period $t$ evolves in accordance with
\begin{equation}
w_i(t + 1) = w_i(t) + \phi_{in}^i(t) - \phi_{out}^i(t)
\end{equation}
or, in the equivalent vector form
\begin{equation}
w(t + 1) = w(t) + c(t) + P(t)^T 1 - P(t) 1.
\end{equation}

Similar to the single-period case discussed in Section 3, the limited liability condition requires that $w(t) \geq 0$ at all $t$. It may therefore happen that a payment $p_{ij}(t)$ has to be lower than the corresponding liability $\bar{p}_{ij}(t)$ in order to guarantee $w_i(t) \geq 0$. When this happens at some $t < T$, instead of declaring default and freezing the financial system, we allow operations to continue up to the final time $T$, updating the due payments according to the equation
\begin{equation}
\bar{p}_{ij}(t + 1) = \alpha (\bar{p}_{ij}(t) - p_{ij}(t)),
\end{equation}
where $\alpha \geq 1$ is the interest rate applied on past due payments. The previous relation can be written as
\begin{equation}
P(t + 1) = \alpha (\bar{P}(t) - P(t)), \quad t \in T.
\end{equation}
where $T \equiv \{0, \ldots, T-1\}$. The meaning of equation (17) is that if a due payment at $t$ is not paid in full, then the residual debt is added to the nominal liability for the next period, possibly increased by an interest factor $\alpha \geq 1$. This mechanism allows for a node which is technically in default at a time $t$ to continue operations and (possibly) repay its dues in subsequent periods. Notice that time-varying $P(t)$ depends on the actual payment matrices $P(0), \ldots, P(T-1)$. The final nominal matrix $P(T)$ contains the residual debts at the end of the final period. The recursions (15) and (17) are initialized with

$$w(0) = 0, \quad \bar{P}(0) = \bar{P},$$

where $\bar{P}$ is the initial liability matrix.

Vectors of external payments $c(t)$ are considered as given inputs, while actual payments matrices $P(t)$ are to be determined, being subject to the constraints

$$P(t) \geq 0, \quad P(t) \leq \bar{P}(t), \quad t \in T,$$  
$$P(t)1 \leq w(t) + c(t) + P(t)\top 1, \quad t \in T,$$  

where (19) represents the requirement that actual payments never exceed the nominal liabilities, and (20) represents the requirement that $w(t) + c(t) + P(t)\top 1$ remains nonnegative at all $t$. Conditions (19), (20) can be made explicit by eliminating the variables $w(t)$ and $P(t)$, which by using (15)–(18) can be expressed as

$$\bar{P}(t) = \alpha^t \bar{P}(0) - \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \alpha^{t-k} P(k),$$  
$$w(t) = C(t-1) + \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} (P\top (k) - P(k))1,$$  
$$C(t) = \sum_{k=0}^{t} c(k), \quad t = 0, \ldots, T.$$  

Conditions (19), (20) can thus be rewritten as

$$P(t) \geq 0,$$  
$$\sum_{k=0}^{t} \alpha^{t-k} P(k) \leq \alpha^t \bar{P}$$  
$$C(t) + \sum_{k=0}^{t} (P(k)\top - P(k))1 \geq 0$$  

$\forall t \in T$.

For brevity, we denote

$$[P] \equiv (P(0),\ldots, P(T-1)), \quad [c] \equiv (c(0),\ldots, c(T-1)).$$  

**Definition 1** We call a sequence of payment matrices $[P]$ admissible if conditions (24)–(26) hold. Let

$$\mathcal{P}([c],[\bar{P}]) \equiv \{ [P] : (24)–(26) \text{ hold} \}$$  

stand for the polyhedral set of all admissible matrix sequences $[P]$ that correspond to the given sequence of vectors $[c]$ and initial liability matrix $\bar{P}$.

The system-level cost that we consider is the cumulative sum of deviations of the actual in-flows at nodes from the nominal ones, that is

$$L([P]) \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\phi_{t}^{in}(t) - \phi_{t}^{in}(t)).$$  

From the definition (4) of in-flow vectors and from (21) we obtain that

$$L([P]) = \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} 1\top (\tilde{\phi}_{t}^{in}(t) - \phi_{t}^{in}(t)) = \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} 1\top (\bar{P}(t) - P(t))1$$  
$$= \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} 1\top (\alpha^t \bar{P} - \sum_{k=0}^{t} \alpha^{t-k} P(k))1$$  
$$= a_0 1\top \bar{P} 1 - \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} a_t 1\top P(t)1,$$

where the constants $a_0 > a_1 > \ldots > a_{T-1}$ are defined as

$$a_t \equiv \sum_{j=0}^{T-t-1} \alpha^j = \begin{cases} \alpha^{T-t-1}, & \text{if } \alpha > 1 \\ \frac{T-t}{\alpha-1}, & \text{if } \alpha = 1. \end{cases}$$  

The optimal payment matrices are thus obtained as a solution to the following optimization problem

$$\max_{[P]} \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} a_t 1\top P(t)1 \quad \text{s.t.: } [P] \in \mathcal{P}([c],\bar{P}),$$  

which is equivalent to minimization of the overall “system loss” $L([P])$ over the set of all admissible payment matrices.

Observe that, from a numerical point of view, finding an optimal sequence of payment matrices amounts to solving the linear programming (LP) problem (29). Notice also that in the case $T = 1$ the set $\mathcal{P}([c])$ reduces to the polytope of matrices (7), and the optimization problem (29) is a special case of (9), where $f(P) = -1\top P(0)1$.

We next establish a fundamental property of the payment matrices resulting from (29).

**4.1 The absolute priority rule**

Recall that in the static (single period) case the optimal payment matrix automatically satisfies the absolute priority rule (8). A natural question arises whether a counterpart of this rule can be proved for the dynamical model in question: is it true that a bank failing to meet the nominal obligation has to nevertheless pay the maximal possible amount? Mathematically, this means that for all $t = 0, \ldots, T-1$ the following implication holds:

$$\phi_{t}^{out}(t) < \tilde{\phi}_{t}^{out}(t) \implies \phi_{t}^{out}(t) = \phi_{t}^{in}(t) + w(t).$$  


The affirmative answer is given by the following theorem.

**Theorem 1** Suppose that \( [P] = (P(t))_{t=0}^{T-1} \) is an optimal solution of (29), and let \( (P(t))_{t=0}^{T-1} \) be the corresponding sequence of nominal liability matrices, defined in accordance to (17). For a given bank \( i \), let \( t_* = t_*(i) \) be the first instant when \( i \) pays its debt to the other banks

\[
p_{ij}(t_*) = \bar{p}_{ij}(t_*) \quad \forall j \neq i
\]

(if such an instant fails to exist, we formally define \( t_* = T \)). Then, either \( t_* = 0 \) (the debt is paid immediately) or

\[
\phi_i^{out}(t) = \phi_i^{in}(t) + w_i(t) \quad \forall t = 0, \ldots, (t_* - 1).
\]

(31)

In particular, the implication (30) holds for any optimal sequence of payments matrices \([P]\). Furthermore, for each \( t \geq 1 \) the graph \( \mathcal{G}[P(t)] \) contains no directed cycles.

A proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix A.2.

**Remark 1** Implication (30) implies that each bank pays its nominal liability at the earliest period \( t \) when such a payment is possible: \( w_i(t) + \phi_i^{in}(t) \geq \phi_i^{out}(t) \). The requirement of minimal system loss prevents unnecessary deferral of payments and pushes the banks towards paying the claims as early as possible. Since the payment matrices resulting from the solution of (29) satisfy the rules (i), (ii), (iii) from Section 3, they are guaranteed to be proper clearing matrices at each stage.

\[\Box\]

4.2 A sub-optimal sequential approach

Looking at the objective function in problem (29), we observe that this function is linear and separable in the \( P(t) \) variables, \( t = 0, \ldots, T - 1 \). Also, looking at the constraints of (29), given by (24)–(26), we see that at each \( t = 0, \ldots, T - 1 \) the variable \( P(t) \) is constrained as

\[
0 \leq P(t) \leq \bar{P}(t), \quad w(t) + c(t) + (P^T(t) - P(t)) 1 \geq 0,
\]

where

\[
\bar{P}(t) = \alpha^t \bar{P} - \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \alpha^{t-k} P(k)
\]

(32)

\[
w(t) = C(t - 1) + \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} (P^T(k) - P(k)) 1,
\]

(33)

and \( \bar{P}(t), w(t) \) depend only on the variables \( P(0), \ldots, P(t-1) \) and external payments \( c(0), \ldots, c(t-1) \) at periods preceding \( t \). This suggests the following recursive relaxation of problem (29) where, at each \( t = 0, \ldots, T - 1 \), we solve a problem in the \( P(t) \) variable only

\[
P^*(t) = \arg \max_{P(t)} \quad 1^T P(t) 1
\]

s.t.: \( w^*(t) + c(t) + (P^T(t) - P(t)) 1 \geq 0, \quad 0 \leq P(t) \leq \bar{P}^*(t-1) \),

(34)

where \( \bar{P}^*(t), w^*(t) \) are given by (32), (33) evaluated at the previous optimal values \( \bar{P}^*(0), \ldots, \bar{P}^*(T - 1) \), and initialized so that \( w^*(0) = 0, \bar{P}^*(0) = \bar{P} \).

It is clear by construction that any optimal sequence of solutions \( \bar{P}^*(0), \ldots, \bar{P}^*(T - 1) \) of (34) is feasible for problem (29). However, this “greedy” sequential solution is in general not optimal for problem (29), as highlighted by the following example.

**Example 1.** Consider a group of four banks with initial liability matrix \( \bar{P} \) and liability graph shown in Fig. 2.

We assume that \( \alpha = 1 \) and consider a time horizon \( T = 2 \), with external payments \( c(0) = (1, 0, 0, 0)^T, \quad c(1) = (0, 1, 0, 0)^T \). The unique optimal strategy in (29) can be easily found: at stage 0, node 1 pays its maximum possible to node 3, i.e., \( p_{13}(0) = \bar{p}_{13} = 1 \), and node 3 transfers it to node 4: \( p_{34}(0) = \bar{p}_{34} = 1 \). Node 2 receives and pays nothing at period \( t = 0 \), while at \( t = 1 \) node 2 receives an external payment and hence pays its liability to node 4: \( p_{24}(1) = \bar{p}_{24} = 1 \). This optimal strategy leads to the optimal loss \( L = 3 \), and at the end of the time horizon only node 1 is in default (owing 1 to node 2).

If we consider the sequential approach instead, we see that the objective function (34) at \( t = 0 \) is \( p_{12}(0) + p_{13}(0) + p_{24}(0) + p_{34}(0) \), hence it is insensitive to how node 1 divides its asset \( c(1)(0) = 1 \) between nodes 2 and 3. An optimal solution to (34) at \( t = 0 \) is for instance \( \bar{p}_{12}(0) = \bar{p}_{13} = 1, \bar{p}_{24}(0) = \bar{p}_{34} = 1 \). With this solution in place, problem (34) at \( t = 1 \) leads to a network in which no further payments can be made (i.e., \( \bar{p}_{ij}(1) = 0 \) for all \( i, j \)), and the loss function under this sub-optimal solution is \( L = 4 \), with two defaulted nodes at the end of the horizon: node 1, which still owes 1 to node 3, and node 3, which still owes 1 to node 4.

![Fig. 2. A four-node liability network.](image-url)
The point here is that the correct choice at \( t = 0 \) cannot be made in general unless one knows the future external payments at all nodes and at all \( t > 0 \). The sequential solution hence remains sub-optimal, since it does not exploit this information (it only uses, at each \( t \), the observed external payments \( c(k), k = 0, \ldots, t, \) up to that \( t \)). On the one hand, this fact highlights that the solution to the “full” problem (29) is in general superior in terms of optimal loss to the solution of the sequential problem. On the other hand, however, it also underlines that the whole stream of future external payments must be known at \( t = 0 \) in order to being able to solve (29).

If, at each \( t \), one has total uncertainty about the future payments \( c(\tau), \tau > t \), then the full approach is not viable while the sequential approach still is.

4.3 Dynamic networks with pro-rated payments

The pro-rata rule discussed in Subsection 3.1 can be introduced also in the dynamic network setting. Here, we let the pro-rata matrix be fixed according to the initial liabilities, that is the A matrix is given by (10) with \( P = \bar{P}(0) \). Then, the pro-rata rule is nothing but a linear equality constraint on the payment matrices, that is

\[
P(t) = \text{diag}(P(t)1)A, \quad t = 0, \ldots, T - 1.
\]

(35)

In view of the definition of \( A \), one has \( \bar{P}(0) = \text{diag}(\bar{P}(0)1)A \). Using induction on \( t \) and equation (21), it can be easily shown that (35) entails the equations

\[
\bar{P}(t) = \text{diag}(\bar{P}(t)1)A, \quad t = 0, \ldots, T.
\]

Hence, payment matrices \( P(t) \) and \( \bar{P}(t) \) are uniquely determined by the actual and nominal payment vectors

\[
p(t) = P(t)1 = \phi^{\text{out}}(t), \quad \bar{p}(t) = \bar{P}(t)1 = \bar{\phi}^{\text{out}}(t).
\]

(36)

Also, it holds that \( \phi^{\text{in}} = P^T(t)1 = A^T p(t) \). Conditions (19), (20) can be now rewritten as

\[
\sum_{t=0}^T \alpha^{t-k} p(k) \leq \alpha^t \bar{p} \quad \forall t \in T.
\]

(38)

\[
C(t) + \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} (A^T p(k) - p(k)) \geq 0
\]

(39)

Definition 2 We call a sequence of payment vectors \([p] = (p(0), \ldots, p(T-1))\) admissible (under the pro-rata requirement) if conditions (37)–(39) hold.

Optimization problem (29) can be now rewritten as

\[
\max_{[p]} \sum_{k=0}^{T-1} a_k 1^T p(k) \quad \text{s.t.:} \quad [p] \in \mathcal{P}_A([c], \bar{p}).
\]

(40)

This is again an LP problem, which may be solved numerically with great efficiency. The pro-rata rule drastically reduces the number of unknown variables (each zero-diagonal payment \( n \times n \) matrix reduces to \( n \)-dimensional vector). Furthermore, unlike the original problem (29), the optimization problem (40) admits a unique maximizer \([p^*] \). Also, the solution abides by the absolute priority rule (30). These properties are summarized in the following theorem.

Theorem 2 For each sequence \([c]\), the optimization problem (40) has a unique solution \([p^*]\). Furthermore, at each period \( t = 0, \ldots, T - 1 \), the optimal vector \( p^*(t) \) is the unique solution of the LP:

\[
p^*(t) = \arg \max_p 1^T p
\]

s.t.: \( 0 \leq p \leq \bar{p}^*(t), p \leq c(t) + \omega^*(t) + A^T p, \)

where \( \omega^*(0) = 0, \quad \bar{p}^*(0) = \bar{p}, \) and, for \( t = 1, \ldots, T - 1, \)

\[
\bar{p}^*(t) = \alpha^t \bar{p} - \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \alpha^{t-k} p^*(k)
\]

(43)

\[
w^*(t) = C(t-1) + \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} (A^T p^*(k) - p^*(k)).
\]

(44)

In particular, \( p^*(t) \geq 0 \) obeys the absolute priority rule

\[
p^*(t) = \min(p^*(t), c(t) + \omega^*(t) + A^T p^*(t)).
\]

(45)

The proof of Theorem 2 is based on Lemma 1, and it is detailed in the Appendix A.3.

Remark 2 A few observations are in order regarding Theorem 2. First, we observe that the “full” multi-period problem (40) is equivalent to the sequence of problems (41). Therefore, in the pro-rata case the sequential approach is optimal, and not only sub-optimal, as it instead happened in the case with unrestricted payment matrices discussed in Section 4.2. Thus, the system-level objective in the full optimization problem (40) is minimized by finding regular clearing payments at each step \( t \), whereby the liabilities among nodes are updated at each step by considering the residual payments due to pseudo-defaults at the previous step.

Further, we observe that, for each \( t \), problem (41)-(42) has the same structure as problem (13), with \( c = c(t) + \omega^*(t) \). Hence, in view of the maximality of the vector \( p^*(t) \), we have that the objective (41) can be replaced by any other increasing function of \( p \). In view of Lemma 1, the relations (41),(42) can be rewritten as follows

\[
p^*(t) = p^*[A, c(t) + \omega^*(t), \bar{p}^*(t)],
\]

(46)

which also entails (45) due to Lemma 1, statement (a).
5 Numerical illustration

We consider a variation on the simplified network given in Glasserman & Young (2016). This network, displayed in Figure 3, contains $n = 5$ nodes (including the fictitious sink node representing the external sector), with initial liability matrix

$$P = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 180 & 0 & 0 & 180 \\ 0 & 0 & 100 & 0 & 100 \\ 90 & 0 & 0 & 100 & 50 \\ 150 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 150 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix},$$

where the last row refers to the sink node. We first discuss the static case, comparing pro-rata based results obtained by solving (13) with those obtained using an unrestricted payment matrix resulting from the solution of (9). Suppose there is a nominal scenario where external cash flows are given as

$$c = c_{\text{nom}} = [120, 20, 150, 200, 0]^\top.$$

It can be readily verified that in the nominal scenario all the nodes in the network remain solvent, and the clearing payments coincide with the nominal liabilities. Consider next a situation in which “shock” happens on node 3, so that this in-flow reduces from 150 to 120, that is

$$c = c_{\text{shock}} = [120, 20, 120, 200, 0]^\top.$$

Under the pro-rata rule, the clearing payments, resulting from the solution of (13), are shown in smaller font below the nominal liabilities in the left panel of Figure 3: all nodes in the network default in a cascade fashion due to initial default of node 3. The total defaulted amount (the sum of all the unpaid liabilities) is in this case 53.66.

Then, we dropped the pro-rata rule, and we computed the clearing payments according to (9). The results in this case are shown in the right panel of Figure 3: only node 3 defaults, while all other nodes manage to pay their full liabilities. Notice that, if we used the pro-rata rule, thus solving the multi-step problem (40), we would obtain a different set of (pro-rata) clearing payments, leading to a final situation of default at all nodes, with a total defaulted value of 21.07.

6 Conclusions

In this paper we explored dynamic clearing mechanisms in financial networks, under both pro-rata payment rules and unrestricted matrix payments. In both cases, we proposed to compute the clearing payments as optimal solutions to suitable multi-stage linear optimization problems, namely problem (29) for the unrestricted case, and problem (40) in the pro-rata case. Theorem 1 establishes some fundamental properties of the solution to the unrestricted case stating, in particular, that payments are
not unnecessarily delayed when they are feasible (absolute priority of debt claims), so that the solutions are indeed clearing matrices at each stage. Unrestricted optimal payments, however, are possibly non-unique and need be computed in a centralized way, since knowledge of the whole network structure is necessary. Theorem 2 establishes instead key properties of the optimal pro-rated payments. The key fact is that the solution is in this case unique and, moreover, it can be computed by solving sequentially a series of LP problems (41)-(42). In turn, in under mild hypotheses (for instance, when graph $G[A]$ has a unique and globally reachable sink node), the LP solutions coincide with the solution of a series of fixed-point equations of the form (45). These equations are uniquely solvable, see the discussion in Calafiore et al. (2021b), and their unique solution can be found by means of a decentralized algorithm known as the fictitious default algorithm of Eisenberg & Noe (2001). Hence, the optimal multi-stage payments in the pro-rata case can be obtained by decentralized iterations among neighboring nodes. Numerical investigations, see, e.g., Calafiore et al. (2015), suggested that proportional payments may lead to severely suboptimal clearings, and may be a concurring cause of cascaded defaults: removing the pro-rata rule, both in the static and in the dynamic case, generally improves the high-level objective of reducing the systemic effects of defaults.

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Fig. 3. Clearing payments in the example network. Left panel (a) shown the payments under pro-rata rule, Right panel (b) shown the unrestricted clearing payments.
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A Appendix: proofs

A.1 Technical preliminaries

We start with some auxiliary material, which will be used in the proofs.

The following proposition follows, e.g., from (Harary et al. 1965, Corollary 4.3a’).

Proposition 1 Each graph contains at least one sink component. Any strongly connected sink component with at least one of the sink components by a path. We will also employ several technical propositions, dealing with substochastic matrices.

Proposition 2 Let $A = (a_{ij})_{i,j \in \mathcal{V}}$ be a stochastic matrix and $\mathcal{V}' \subseteq \mathcal{V}$. Then, submatrix $A' = (a_{ij})_{i,j \in \mathcal{V}'}$ is not Schur stable if and only if $\mathcal{V}'$ contains all nodes of some strongly connected sink component of $\mathcal{G}[A]$.

PROOF. The “if” part is obvious. If $\mathcal{V}' \subseteq \mathcal{V}$ is the set of nodes of some sink component, then $A^{0} = (a_{ij})_{i,j \in \mathcal{V}'}$ is a stochastic matrix and $A$ is decomposed as

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} A^{0} & 0 \\ * & * \end{pmatrix},$$

(A.1)

where $O$ is the block of zeros and symbols $*$ denote some submatrices. Therefore, $A$ has eigenvalue 1 and is not Schur stable. The “only if” part is implied by (Calafiore et al. 2021b, Lemma 6). Thanks to this lemma, $A'$ is not

1 A nonnegative square matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{V \times V}$ is substochastic if $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} a_{ij} \leq 1 \forall i \in \mathcal{V}$.

Schur stable if and only if $\mathcal{V}' \subseteq \mathcal{V}$ exists such that $A^{0} = (a_{ij})_{i,j \in \mathcal{V}'}$ is a stochastic matrix, which also implies that $A$ is decomposed as in (A.1). In other words, the set of nodes $\mathcal{V}' \subseteq \mathcal{V}$ is “closed”: each arc of $\mathcal{G}[A]$ starting in $\mathcal{V}'$ ends also in $\mathcal{V}'$. Hence, strong components of graph $\mathcal{G}[A^{0}]$ are also strong components of $\mathcal{G}[A]$, and (due to Proposition 1) at least one of them is a sink. □

Proposition 3 Suppose that a substochastic matrix $A = (a_{ij})_{i,j \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{V}'}$ is Schur stable, where $\mathcal{V}' \cap \mathcal{V}'' = \emptyset$. Then a vector $\xi \geq 0$ exists such that

$$\xi_{i} - (A^{\top} \xi)_{i} \begin{cases} \geq 0, & i \in \mathcal{V}', \\ = 0, & i \in \mathcal{V}''. \end{cases}$$

PROOF. If $A$ is Schur stable, then $(I - A)^{-1} = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} A^{k} \geq 0$ exists. Choosing an arbitrary vector $e$ such that $e_{i} > 0 \forall i \in \mathcal{V}'$ and $e_{i} = 0 \forall i \in \mathcal{V}''$, the vector $\xi = (I - A^{\top})^{-1}e$ is thus also nonnegative. By construction, $(\xi - A^{\top} \xi)_{i} = e_{i} > 0$ if and only if $i \in \mathcal{V}'$. □

We also need a special form of the Perron-Frobenius theorem.

Lemma 2 Let $A \in \mathbb{R}^{V \times V}$ be a stochastic matrix and $\mathcal{V}^{0}$ be the set of nodes of some sink component in $\mathcal{G}[A]$. Then, vector $\pi \in \mathbb{R}^{V}$ exists such that

$$A^{\top} \pi = \pi, \quad \pi^{\top} 1 = 1, \quad \pi_{i} \begin{cases} > 0, & \forall i \in \mathcal{V}^{0}, \\ = 0, & \forall i \notin \mathcal{V}^{0}. \end{cases}$$

(A.2)

PROOF. The special case where $\mathcal{G}[A]$ is a strongly connected graph (A is irreducible) and $\mathcal{V}^{0} = \mathcal{V}$ is immediate from Perron-Frobenius theorem for irreducible matrices (Berman & Plemmons 1994, Ch.2, Th. 1.3). Otherwise, matrix $A$ has structure (A.1), where $A^{0} = (a_{ij})_{i,j \in \mathcal{V}^{0}}$ is irreducible (graph $\mathcal{G}[A^{0}]$ is strongly connected by the definition of a strongly connected component). Introducing the Perron-Frobenius eigenvector $\pi^{0} > 0$ of matrix $A^{0}$, vector $\pi$ can be defined as follows:

$$\pi_{i} = \pi_{i}^{0} \forall i \in \mathcal{V}^{0}, \quad \pi_{i} = 0 \forall i \notin \mathcal{V}^{0}.$$ 

Lemmas 1 and 2 have a simple corollary, which will be used in the proof of Theorem 2.

Corollary 1 Given a stochastic matrix $A$ and nonnegative vectors $c, \bar{p} \geq 0$, consider the maximal payment vector $p^{*} = p^{*}[A, c, \bar{p}]$ from Lemma 1. Suppose that graph $\mathcal{G}[A]$ has a strongly connected component with set of nodes $\mathcal{V}^{0} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$, which is a sink (no arc leaves it) and is such that $p_{i} > 0 \forall i \in \mathcal{V}^{0}$. Then $p_{i}^{*} > 0 \forall i \in \mathcal{V}^{0}$.

PROOF. Choosing $\pi$ as in (A.2), one has $\varepsilon \pi_{i} \in \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{G} \setminus \mathcal{V}}(c, \bar{p})$ for $\varepsilon > 0$ small enough (so small that $\varepsilon p_{i} < p_{i} \forall i \in \mathcal{V}^{0}$). Since $p^{*}$ is the maximal element of $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{G} \setminus \mathcal{V}}(c, \bar{p})$, we have $p_{i}^{*} \geq \varepsilon \pi_{i} > 0 \forall i \in \mathcal{V}^{0}$.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1

We introduce the following notation: for a pair of banks $i, j \neq i$ let
\[ \delta_{ij}(t) = \bar{p}_{ij}(t) - p_{ij}(t) \geq 0, t \in T \]
be the amount bank $i$ owes to bank $j$ before period $t + 1$. In view of (16), $\bar{p}_{ij}(t + 1) > 0$ if and only if $\delta_{ij}(t) > 0$.

The proof is based on a simple transformation, which we call the transformation of advanced payment (TAP). Let $J$ be a subset of arcs in graph $G[P(t_0)]$, where $1 \leq t_0 \leq T$, and $\epsilon > 0$. For $(i, j) \in J$, one has $\bar{p}_{ij}(t_0) \geq p_{ij}(t_0) > 0$ and, thus $\delta_{ij}(t_0 - 1) > 0$. The TAP with parameters $(t_0, \epsilon, J)$ modifies matrices $P(t_0 - 1)$ and $P(t_0)$ as follows:

- at time $t_0 - 1$, payment on each arc from $J$ is increased
  \[ p_{ij}(t_0 - 1) \rightarrow \bar{p}_{ij}(t_0 - 1) + \alpha^{-1}\epsilon \bigvee (i, j) \in J; \]
- at time $t_0$, payment on each arc from $J$ is decreased
  \[ p_{ij}(t_0) \rightarrow p_{ij}(t_0) - \epsilon \bigvee (i, j) \in J; \]
- all other entries of $P(t_0 - 1)$ and $P(t_0)$ and remaining matrices $P(t), t \neq t_0 - 1, t_0$ remain unchanged.

Obviously, this transformation increases the objective function (29) by $(\alpha^{-1}a_{t_0 - 1} - a_{t_0})[J]/J > 0$. For $\epsilon > 0$ being sufficiently small, the TAP transformation preserves constraints (24): it suffices to choose $\epsilon < \min \{p_{ij}(t_0) : (i, j) \in J\}$. Conditions (25) also retain their validity, provided that $\epsilon < \alpha \min \{\delta_{ij}(t_0 - 1) : (i, j) \in J\}$. Notice that the nominal payment matrices $\bar{P}(0), \ldots, \bar{P}(t_0)$ remain unchanged, and hence the condition $P(t) \leq \bar{P}(t)$ (equivalent to (25)) holds for all $t \leq t_0$. For $t \geq t_0$, the sum in the left-hand side of (25) is invariant under the TAP transformation, so the constraint is also not violated. Finally, constraints (26) (equivalent to $w_i(t + 1) \geq 0$) also hold for all $t$ except for, possibly, $t = t_0 - 1$ and $t = t_0$, because other matrices $P(t)$ remain unchanged.

In view of the optimality of sequence $[P]$, the TAP transformation with parameters $(t_0, J, \epsilon)$, where $\epsilon > 0$ is sufficiently small, violates (26) at $t = t_0 - 1$ or at $t = t_0$.

Step 1. We first prove the last statement of Theorem 1. Assume that this statement is not valid and a cycle $i_1 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow i_s \rightarrow i_1$ exists in $G[P(t_0)]$, where $t_0 \geq 1$. Choosing the set of arcs $J = \{i_1 \rightarrow i_2, \ldots, i_{s-1} \rightarrow i_s, i_s \rightarrow i_1\}$, the TAP transformation with parameters $(t_0, J, \epsilon)$ (with $\epsilon > 0$ small enough), obviously, leaves the vectors $\phi_{\text{out}}(t) - \phi_{\text{in}}(t) = P(t)1 - P(t)1$ unchanged, and thus constraints (26) are not violated, which leads one to a contradiction with the optimality of $[P]$.

Step 2. Suppose now that $t_* = t_*(i) \leq T$ is defined as described in Theorem 1 yet (31) fails to hold at some period $0 \leq t < t_*$. Let $t_+ < t_*$ be the last period when (31) fails, that is, the maximum of $t < t_*$ such that $w_i(t + 1) = \phi_{\text{in}}^i(t) + w_i(t) - \phi_{\text{out}}^i(t) > 0$.

Notice first that $t_+ < T - 1$. Otherwise, one would have $w_i(T) > 0$ and $t_* = T$, in particular, $\delta_{ij}(T - 1) > 0$ for some $j \neq i$. Increasing $p_{ij}(T - 1)$ by a sufficiently small value $\epsilon > 0$, one could obviously preserve all constraints and also increase the objective function.

Denoting for brevity $t_0 = 1 + t_+ \leq t_*$, one thus has $t_0 < T$. The definition of $t_+$ and $t_0$ implies that $\phi_{\text{out}}^i(t_0) > 0$. Indeed, if $t_0 = t_*$, then one has $\phi_{\text{out}}^i(t_0) = \phi_{\text{out}}^i(t_*) > 0$ by definition of $t_*$. Otherwise, $\phi_{\text{out}}^i(t_0) = \phi_{\text{out}}^i(t) + w_i(t_0) \geq w_i(t_0) = w_i(1 + t_+)$ due to the choice of $t_0$.

We know that graph $G[P(t_0)]$ contains no cycles and, in particular, all its strongly connected components are trivial (single-node) graphs. Since $\phi_{\text{out}}^i(t_0) > 0$, node $i$ is not a sink node. Proposition 1 ensures that $i$ is connected to a sink node $k$ by a path $i \rightarrow j_1 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow j_s \rightarrow k$ (all nodes $i, j_1, \ldots, j_s, k, s \geq 0$ are mutually different). Let $J$ be the set of arcs in this path. The TAP with parameters $(t_0, \epsilon, J)$ (with $\epsilon > 0$ small enough, obviously, preserves (26) (equivalent to $w_i(t + 1) \geq 0$) at $t = t_0 - 1$ or at $t = t_0$. Indeed, the TAP leaves the components $w_i(t_0)$, $w_i(t_0 + 1)$ for each $j \neq i, k$ invariant. The component $w_k(t_0)$ increases (becoming thus positive), and hence $w_k(t_0 + 1)$ is also positive (recall that $\phi_{\text{out}}^k(t_0) = 0$). The TAP transformation decreases $w_i(t_0)$ by $\alpha^{-1}\epsilon$ (providing that $w_i(t_0) > 0$ for $\epsilon$ being small), however, $\phi_{\text{out}}^i(t_0)$ is decreased by $\epsilon$, so that $w_i(t_0 + 1)$ is increased by $(1 - \alpha^{-1})\epsilon \geq 0$, and inequality $w_i(t_0 + 1) \geq 0$ is preserved. Hence, constraints (26) are not violated, and we arrive at a contradiction with optimality of $[P]$.

Step 3. The proof of implication (30) is now straightforward. Suppose that $\phi_{\text{out}}^i(t) < \phi_{\text{out}}^i(t)$ at some period $t \in T$. Then, obviously, $t < t_*(i)$, and hence $\phi_{\text{in}}^i(t) + w_i(t) - \phi_{\text{out}}^i(t) = 0$ due to (31). □

A.3 Proof of Theorem 2

In the proof, we will use a transformation of advanced payment (TAP), which is similar to the transformation used in the proof of Theorem 1. The TAP is determined by time instant $t_*$, scalar $\epsilon > 0$ and non-negative vector $\zeta \geq 0$; it replaces sequence $[p]$ by the sequence $[\bar{p}]$, where

\[ \bar{p}(t) = \begin{cases} p(t), & t \neq t_*, t_+ + 1, \\ p(t_* + \epsilon \alpha^{-1} \zeta), & t = t_*, \\ p(t_*) - \epsilon \zeta, & t = t_+ + 1. \end{cases} \quad (A.3) \]

In other words, some payments are transferred (taking into account the interest rate $\alpha \geq 1$) from period $t_* + 1$ to the previous period $t_*$.

If $[p]$ satisfies constraints (37)-(39), then $[\bar{p}]$ also obeys all constraints, except for, possibly: 1) constraint (37) at $t_+ + 1$ (at other periods, $p(t_*) \geq p(t)$); 2) constraint (38) at $t = t_*$ (at other periods, the left-hand side of (38)
remains invariant under the TAP); 3) constraints (39) at periods $t = t_*, \ldots, T - 1$ (for $t < t_*$, the left-hand side of (39) remains invariant under the TAP). Also, for any $\zeta \neq 0$ and $\varepsilon > 0$ the TAP always increases the value of the objective function (40), because $a_{\pi_0} > a_{\pi_0 + 1}$.

For the optimal sequence of payment vectors $[p^*]$, we are going to prove that $p^*(t)$ (at each $t$) is a maximizer at problem (41), (42), or, equivalently, (46) holds, via backward induction on $t = T - 1, T - 2, \ldots, 0$. Here $w^*(t)$ is the net worth (22) corresponding to $p^*(t)$.

The induction base $t = T - 1$ is obvious, recalling that constraints (42) are equivalent to (38), (39). If $p^*(T - 1)$ were not a maximizer in (41), (42) with $T - 1$, the value of objective function in (40) could be increased.

The induction step. Suppose that our statement has been proved for $t = t_* + 1, \ldots, T - 1$. In particular, at each $t > t_*$ vector $p^*(t)$ obeys the equation (45). We are now going to prove that (46) holds at $t = t_*$. The proof is based on Lemma 1 and is performed in two steps.

Step 1. We first show that each strongly connected sink component of $G[A]$ contains node $i$ such that $p^*_i(t_*) > p^*_i(t_*)$. Suppose that the statement is not correct and consider such a sink strong component of $G[A]$ with the set of nodes $V^0 \subseteq V$ that $p^*_i(t_*) > p^*_i(t_*) \forall i \in V^0$, or, equivalently, $p^*_i(t_*) > 0 \forall i \in V^0$. Applying Corollary 1 to $p = p^*(t_*)$ and recalling that (46) holds at $t = t_* + 1$, one has $p^*_i(t_*) > 0 \forall i \in V^0$.

Introducing the eigenvector from Lemma 2, consider the TAP (A.3) with $p = p^*$, $\zeta = \pi$ and $\varepsilon > 0$ sufficiently small. Since $\zeta = A^T \zeta$, the left-hand side of (39) remains invariant under the TAP, and hence $[\bar{p}]$ obeys constraints (39). Since $\zeta_i = \pi_i = 0$ for $i \notin V^0$ and $p^*_i(t_*) > 0 \forall i \in V^0$, constraint (37) at $t = t_* + 1$ is also preserved by the TAP when $\varepsilon > 0$ is so small that $\bar{p}_i(t_*) = p^*_i(t_*) > 0 \forall i \in V^0$. Finally, constraint (38) at $t = t_*$ can be rewritten as $p^*_i(t_*) = \bar{p}_i(t_*)$.

Recalling that $\zeta_i = \pi_i = 0$ for $i \notin V^0$ and $p^*_i(t_*) < \bar{p}_i(t_*)$ for $i \in V^0$, it is obvious that the TAP does not violate this constraint for $\varepsilon > 0$ sufficiently small. As has been noticed, the remaining constraints are always preserved by the TAP. The new sequence of payment vectors $[\bar{p}]$ thus satisfies all the constraints (37)-(39) and corresponds to a larger value of the objective function, which leads to a contradiction with the optimality of $[p^*]$. The contradiction shows that inequality $p^*_i(t_*) < p^*_i(t_*)$ is violated for at least one index $i \in V^0$.

Step 2. In view of Lemma 1, statement (d) (applied for $p = p^*(t_*)$ and $c = c(t_*) + w(t_*)$), to prove (46) at $t = t_*$ it remains to prove (45) at $t = t_*$. Assume that (45) fails to hold, that is, index $s \in V$ exists such that $p^*_i(t_*) < p^*_i(t_*)$ and $p^*_i(t_*) < c_i(t_*) + w^*_i(t_*) + (A^T p^*(t_*)$. We are going to show that this leads to a contradiction with the assumption that sequence $[p^*]$ is optimal, using the TAP (A.3).

We first define the following sets of indices. Let $V^0 \neq \emptyset$ consist of such nodes $i$ that $p^*_i(t_*) = p^*_i(t_*)$ (at Step 1, we have shown every strongly connected sink component of $G[A]$ contains an element from $V^0$) and $\bar{V} = V \setminus V^0$. Obviously, $s \in \bar{V}$. We introduce the submatrix $\bar{A} = (a_{ij})_{i,j \in \bar{V}}$ and the corresponding graph $\bar{G} = G[\bar{A}]$. Let $V^1$ stand for all nodes $i \in V$, $i \neq k$ that $i$ are not reachable from $s$ in $\bar{G}$, $V^2$ stand for all nodes $i \in \bar{V}$, $i \neq s$ that $i$ are reachable from $s$ in $\bar{G}$.

Step 2a. We first show that $p^*_i(t_*) > 0$ for all $i \in V^2$.

By construction, $p^*_i(t_*) = c_i(t_*) + w^*_i(t_*) + (A^T p^*(t_*))_s - p^*_i(t_*) > 0$. Recalling that (45) holds at $t = t_* + 1$, one shows that $p^*_i(t_*) > 0$. If node $\ell \in \bar{V}$ is directly accessible from $s$ (that is, $a_{s,\ell} > 0$) in $\bar{G}$, then (45) at $t = t_* + 1$ implies that $p^*_i(t_*) > 0$, because $(A^T p^*)_s \geq a_{s,\ell} p^*_i(t_*) + 0$. Similarly, if a path $s \rightarrow \ell \rightarrow m$ exists in $\bar{G}$, then $p^*_i(t_*) > 0$ due to (45), because $a_{s,\ell} p^*_i(t_*) > 0$, and so on: via induction of the length of the path connecting $s$ to $i \in \bar{V}$, one shows that $p^*_i(t_*) > 0$ for all $i \in V^2$.

Step 2b. As has been shown at Step 1, set $\bar{V}$ does not contain any strongly connected sink component of $G[A]$, and hence matrix $\bar{A}$ and all its submatrices are Schur stable (Proposition 2). Applying Proposition (3) to $V' = \{s\}$ and $V'' = V^2$, a vector $\zeta \in \mathbb{R}^{V''(s)}$ exists such that

$$\begin{align*}
\zeta &\geq 0 \text{ and } \zeta_i - \sum_{j \in V^2 \cup \{s\}} a_{ij} \zeta_j > 0, i = s; \\
&\quad i = 0, i \in V^2. \tag{A.4}
\end{align*}$$

Define the vector $\zeta$ as follows: $\zeta_i = 0$ for $i \in V^0 \cup V^1$ and $\zeta_i = \xi_i$ for $i \in V^2 \cup \{s\}$. Then,

$$\begin{align*}
\zeta_s - (A^T \zeta)_s &> 0 \\
\zeta_i - (A^T \zeta)_i &> 0 \quad \forall i \in V^1 \cup V^2. \tag{A.5}
\end{align*}$$

Indeed, for $i \in V^2 \cup \{s\}$ one has

$$\begin{align*}
(A^T \zeta)_i &= \sum_{j \in V^2 \cup \{s\}} a_{ji} \zeta_j + \sum_{j \in V^0 \cup V^1} a_{ji} \zeta_j \leq \zeta_i
\end{align*}$$

due to (A.4), which inequality can be strict only when $i = s$. Obviously, if $i \in V^1$ and $j \in V^2 \cup \{s\}$, then $a_{ij} = 0$ (otherwise, $i$ would be reachable from $s$ in graph $\bar{G}$, contradiction to the definition of $V^1$). Thus,

$$\begin{align*}
(A^T \zeta)_i &= \sum_{j \in V^2 \cup \{s\}} a_{ji} \zeta_j + \sum_{j \in V^0 \cup V^1} a_{ji} \zeta_j = 0 = \zeta_i
\end{align*}$$

for all $i \in V^1$. 

12
In view of (A.6), for every such index the sequence $\hat{\epsilon}$ has been already shown, we have $\hat{\epsilon} > 0$ being small. Hence, $\hat{p}_i(t_0 + 1) > 0$. Hence, $\hat{p}_i(t_0 + 1) = \hat{p}_i^*(t_0 + 1) - \hat{\epsilon}_i \geq 0 \forall i \in V$ for $\hat{\epsilon} > 0$ being sufficiently small.

Constraint (38) has to be tested only at $t = t_*$. For each $i \in V^2 \cup \{s\}$ one has $0 < \hat{p}_i(t_0) - \hat{p}_i^* = \alpha^t \hat{p}_i - \sum_{k=0}^{t_*} \alpha^{t_*-k} \hat{p}_i^*(k)$, which inequality, obviously, remains valid also when $p^*$ is replaced by $[\tilde{p}]$ (provided that $\hat{\epsilon} > 0$ is small enough). On the other hand, for $i \in V^0 \cup V$,

$$0 \leq \alpha^t \hat{p}_i - \sum_{k=0}^{t_*} \alpha^{t_*-k} \hat{p}_i^*(k) = \alpha^t \hat{p}_i - \sum_{k=0}^{t_*} \alpha^{t_*-k} \hat{p}_i^*(k).$$

Hence, $[\tilde{p}]$ satisfies constraints (38) if $\hat{\epsilon} > 0$ is small.

Finally, we have to check constraints (39) for all $t \geq t_*$. Recall that $w(t + 1) = C(t) + \sum_{s=0}^{t} (A^s p(k) - \hat{p}(k))$ due to (22) and (35), and (39) is equivalent to the inequality $w(t + 1) \geq 0$. Denoting the net worth vectors corresponding to $[\tilde{p}]$ by

$$\hat{w}(t + 1) \equiv C(t) + \sum_{s=0}^{t} (A^s \hat{p}(k) - \hat{p}(k)) = \hat{w}(t) + c(t) + A^s \hat{p}(k) - \hat{p}(t),$$

our goal is to show that $\hat{w}(t + 1) \geq 0$ for $t = t_*, \ldots, T - 1$ and $\hat{\epsilon} > 0$ being small.

By assumption, for each $i \in V^0$ and each $t \geq t_*$ one has $\hat{p}_i(t) = p^*_i(t) = 0$ (node $i$ pays full debt at period $t_*$). As has been already shown, we have $\hat{\hat{p}}(t) \geq 0$ for all $t \geq 0$. In view of (A.6), for every such index the sequence $\hat{w}_i(t)$ is non-decreasing as $t = t_*, t_* + 1, \ldots, T - 1$:

$$\hat{w}_i(t + 1) = \hat{w}_i(t) + c_i(t) + (A^t \hat{p}(k))_i - \hat{p}_i(t) \geq \hat{w}_i(t) \quad \forall t \geq t_*, \forall i \in V^0.$$ 

On the other hand, $\hat{\hat{p}}(t_*) \geq p^*(t_*)$ and $\hat{p}_i(t_*) = p^*_i(t_*) \forall i \in V^0$, whereas $p^*(t) = \hat{p}(t)$ for $t < t_*$. In view of this, $\hat{w}_i(t_0 + 1) = w^*_i(t_0 + 1) \geq 0 \forall i \in V^0$, which shows that $\hat{w}_i(t + 1) \geq 0$ for $t = t_*, \ldots, (T - 1)$ and $i \in V^0$.

On the other hand, (A.3) entails that

$$\hat{w}(t + 1) - w^*(t + 1) = \begin{cases} 0, & 0 < t < t_* \\ -\alpha^{-1} \hat{\epsilon}(\zeta - A\zeta), & t = t_* \\ (1 - \alpha^{-1}) \hat{\epsilon}(\zeta - A\zeta), & t > t_* \end{cases}.$$ 

Since $1 - \alpha^{-1} \geq 0$, inequalities (A.5) entails that $\hat{w}(t + 1) \geq w^*_i(t + 1) \geq 0$ for $i \in V^1 \cup V^2 \cup \{k\}$ and $t > t_*$. Furthermore, $\hat{w}_i(t_*) + 1 = w^*_i(t_*) + 1 \geq 0$ for $i \in V^1 \cup V^2$. Finally, by assumption $w^*_i(t_0 + 1) > 0$ entails that $\hat{w}_i(t_0 + 1) > 0$ provided that $\hat{\epsilon} > 0$ is small enough. We have demonstrated that $\hat{w}(t + 1) \geq 0$ (equivalently, $[\tilde{p}]$ satisfies (39)) for $t = t_*, \ldots, (T - 1)$, provided that $\hat{\epsilon} > 0$ is chosen sufficiently small.

The assumption about the existence of index $s$ such that $p^*_s(t_0) \in [\hat{p}]^*_s(t_0)$ and $p^*_s(t_0) \leq c_s(t_0) + w^*_s(t_0) + \sum_{k=0}^{t_*} \alpha^t \hat{p}^*(k)$ has led us to the contradiction with optimality of sequence $[\tilde{p}]$, because the new sequence $[\tilde{p}]$ satisfies all constraints and corresponds to a large value of the objective function. Therefore, (45) should hold at $t = t_*$, which, along with the statement proved at Step 1 and Lemma 1, ensures that (46) holds at $t = t_*$. This finishes the proof of induction step.

The uniqueness of the optimal solution is now trivial. Lemma 1 ensures the uniqueness of $p^*(0)$, which is the maximizer at (41),(42) with $t = 0$ (and depends only on $c(0)$). Similarly, $p^*(1)$ (depending on $c(1)$ and $p^*(0)$) is uniquely found as the maximizer at (41),(42) with $t = 1$, and so on; using induction on $t = 0, \ldots, T - 1$, one shows that $p^*(t)$ is defined uniquely and depends on $c(t)$ and $p^*(0), \ldots, p^*(t - 1)$. □

### A.4 A remark on the structure of the cost function

Note that the proofs in the previous subsections do not use the representation of coefficients $a_l$ in (29) and (40). The constants (28) can be replaced by any positive numbers $a_{01}, \ldots, a_{T - 1}$ such that $a_{i - 1} > a_{i} \forall t = 1, \ldots, T - 1$.

In particular, instead of minimizing the loss function (27), one may minimize a more general function

$$J([\tilde{p}]) = (1 - \eta) L([\tilde{p}]) + \eta \mathbf{1}^T \hat{P}(T) \mathbf{1},$$

where $\eta \in [0, 1]$. The loss function (27) corresponds to $\eta = 0$: the weight $\eta > 0$ corresponds to the additional penalty on unpaid liabilities (recall that $\hat{P}(T) = 0$ if and only if there is no default at the terminal time). To minimize the cost function (A.7), one has to maximize the function (29) (or, in the case of pro-rata payments, (40)) with the weights

$$a_t = \eta \alpha^{T - t} + (1 - \eta) \sum_{k=0}^{T - t - 1} \alpha^k.$$ (A.8)

Theorems (1) and (2) retain their validity, replacing the coefficients (28) by (A.8).