Controllable Fake Document Infilling for Cyber Deception

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Abstract

Recent works in cyber deception study how to deter malicious intrusion by generating multiple fake versions of a critical document to impose costs on adversaries who need to identify the correct information. However, existing approaches are context-agnostic, resulting in sub-optimal and unvaried outputs. We propose a novel context-aware model, Fake Document Infilling (FDI), by converting the problem to a controllable mask-then-infill procedure. FDI masks important concepts of varied lengths in the document, then infills a realistic but fake alternative considering both the previous and future contexts. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on technical documents and news stories. Results show that FDI outperforms the baselines in generating highly believable fakes with moderate modification to protect critical information and deceive adversaries.

1 Introduction

According to the statement of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the scope and severity of cyber risks have dramatically increased, and constant vigilance is needed to protect against intrusion (Clayton, 2017). Cyber Deception is a cybersecurity defense practice (Masud et al., 2007; Tu et al., 2008; Akbar et al., 2022) that aims at protecting critical documents once intruders penetrate the network system (Yuill et al., 2004; Bowen et al., 2009). The goal is to deceive attackers by deploying decoys such as fake documents and thus increase their cost to identify critical information.

In this work, we aim at designing a novel fake document generator that combines Cyber Deception and Natural Language Generation (NLG) technologies to generate controllable, diverse, and believable fakes at scale to protect critical information and deceive adversaries. Although recent works in Cyber Deception develop strategies to generate complicated fake technical documents such as patents, few consider adopting pretrained contextual features to enhance scalability and generation quality. For example, FORGE (Chakraborty et al., 2021) generates fake documents by replacing the concepts of a technical document with semantically similar alternatives from an expensive prerequisite ontology. WE-FORGE (Abdibayev et al., 2021) eliminates the need for ontologies by using word embedding distances. However, it identifies potential replacements only for unigrams (especially nouns) based on unbalanced word embedding clusters in a context-agnostic manner, resulting in sub-optimal or inadequate alternatives.

Meanwhile, recent studies in NLG have been driven by pre-trained contextual language models (LMs), which can generate increasingly realistic but less-controllable text (Radford et al., 2019; Raffel et al., 2020; Lewis et al., 2019; Yang et al., 2019). Sub-fields such as controllable text generation (Keskar et al., 2019; Dathathri et al., 2020), story generation (Clark et al., 2018; Fan et al., 2018), and text infilling (Fedus et al., 2018; Donahue et al., 2020) further study how to leverage LMs to generate content with desired attributes. However, few methods offer fine-grained control over concept levels or provide an efficient, controllable fake text generation strategy.

We propose a novel context-aware model, Fake Document Infilling (FDI), by converting fake document generation into a controllable mask-then-infill procedure. Specifically, we select and mask essential concepts of varied lengths in a document. Then we infill the masked spans with realistic but fake alternatives based on contextualized knowledge from an LM. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a complete controllable mask-then-infill model and design a comprehensive evaluation scheme to study fake text generation.

To briefly demonstrate the motivation for this work, Table 1 illustrates the difference between an LM (i.e., GPT-2 finetuned on the target dataset...
A. Original Article Tomographic Image Reconstruction using Training images
We describe and examine an algorithm for tomographic image reconstruction where prior knowledge about the solution is available in the form of training images. We first construct a nonnegative dictionary based on prototype elements from the training images; this problem is formulated as a regularized non-negative matrix factorization. Incorporating the dictionary as a prior in a convex reconstruction problem, we then find an approximate solution with a sparse representation in the dictionary.

B. GPT-2: Generation given a prompt ...We describe and examine an algorithm for tomographic image reconstruction where prior knowledge about the solution is available in the form of training images. Instances were reconstructed from their images using image and pixel centroids. The concept of image reconstruction provides several advantages over previous techniques, such as indexing the solution to a representation with integral or submaximal number of cepstrates, ...

C. WEF-Replacing nouns ...We first construct a nonnegative dictionary based on prototype elements from the training images; this problem is formulated as a regularized non-negative matrix factorization. Incorporating the dictionary as a prior in a convex reconstruction problem, we then find an approximate solution with a sparse representation in the dictionary.

D. WEF-Generation ...We first construct a nonnegative sparsity based on prototype elements from the encoder-decoder images; this problem is formulated as a regularized non-negative matrix orthonormal. Incorporating the sparsity as a prior in a convex reconstruction problem, we then find an approximate strategy with a sparse representation in the sparsity.

E. FDI-Replacing n-grams ...We first construct a nonnegative dictionary based on prototype elements from the training images; this problem is formulated as a regularized non-negative matrix factorization. Incorporating the dictionary as a prior in a convex reconstruction problem, we then find an approximate solution with a sparse representation in the dictionary.

F. FDI-Generation ...We first construct a collection of missing patches based on images from the training images; this problem is formulated as a regularized non-negative matrix factorization. Incorporating the dictionary as a prior in the whole dictionary, we then find a similar estimate for missing patches in the dictionary.

Table 1: Comparison of strategies and generated samples from different models. We preserve the document’s head (the headline and the first sentence) and modify only the document’s body. GPT-2 generates a new body given the document’s head as a prompt. WE-FORGE (WEF) and FDI substitute certain concepts with alternatives.

(392x295) WE-FORGE (WEF), and our FDI in generating fake samples of the same document. We preserve the document’s head (the headline and the first sentence shown in A) and modify the document’s body. GPT-2 generates a new body (shown in red in B) based on the original head in a left-to-right manner. The output is fluent but less controllable and may gradually go off-topic. Besides, GPT-2 cannot control text length and wrapping, hindering its application when following a layout is strictly required.

Both WE-FORGE and FDI adopt the strategy of replacing specific concepts (shown in blue in C and E) in the original document with alternatives (shown in red in D and F). However, WE-FORGE suffers from three major limitations. First, WE-FORGE needs to train word-embeddings from scratch for every custom dataset, requiring large training corpora (Pennington et al., 2014; Mikolov et al., 2018). Second, its word-embedding-based clustering of concepts is unbalanced and sensitive to the initialization and hyper-parameters, resulting in limited replacements for some given concepts. Finally, WE-FORGE only replaces nouns and is agnostic to context, limiting the diversity and quality of the generated text.

In contrast, FDI provides many advantages over previous methods. First, instead of training word embeddings from scratch, FDI finetunes a pre-trained LM to generate human-like text with limited data. Furthermore, FDI replaces spans of arbitrary lengths, considering the document context (through the LM) to improve the outputs’ diversity and coherency. Finally, FDI implements strategies to select (mask) and find alternative concepts (infill), protecting essential details from original documents and producing realistic fake samples.

To validate the outperformance of FDI, we design an innovative set of experiments combining evaluation methods observed in distinct areas, i.e., cyber security and NLG. We collect reviews from more than 40 volunteers over 1.4k fake documents on technical and non-technical datasets. Finally, we compile the reviews to evaluate the model’s ability to generate natural text and its effectiveness in protecting the original information and deterring attackers. Our code is publicly available.\(^1\)

2 Related Work
Cyber Deception. Cyber Deception aims at deceiving attackers by misguiding them toward inaccurate information with deployed decoys in the network systems of enterprises. Early works generate decoy honey files (Yuill et al., 2004; White and Thompson, 2006; Bowen et al., 2009; Whitham, 2013) or simple documents with basic NLP methods (Voris et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2013) to entice attackers and improve intrusion and exfiltration detection. Recent works combine advanced NLP techniques to generate fake technical documents at scale while enhancing believability. These efforts...
include substituting words or concepts based on part-of-speech tagging (Whitham, 2017), prerequisite ontologies (Chakraborty et al., 2021), concept occurrences graphs (Karuna et al., 2021), or word embeddings (Abdibayev et al., 2021). Nevertheless, these methods are context-agnostic, limiting producing diverse and natural outputs. The only exception (Ranade et al., 2021) uses vanilla contextualized LMs on short technical documents.

**Controllable Text Generation.** Building costly conditional LMs for desired attributes, by either training from scratch (Zellers et al., 2019; Keskar et al., 2019) or back-propagating gradients (Dathathri et al., 2020), are extensively studied. The attributes are usually pre-defined by a list of control codes or keywords. Other lightweight alternatives are proposed by using discriminators or Bayes’ rules to control the attributes of generated text during the decoding time (Krause et al., 2020; Yang and Klein, 2021; Liu et al., 2021). A sub-field called Story Generation focuses on generating short stories given hints such as title, storyline, premise, entities, or rare words (Clark et al., 2018; Fan et al., 2018, 2019; Yao et al., 2019; Goldfarb-Tarrant et al., 2020; Rashkin et al., 2020; Tan et al., 2021; Ippolito et al., 2019, 2020b; Das and Verma, 2020). Specifically, Zellers et al. (2019) generate fake news stories conditioned on metadata from a list of propaganda websites. Nevertheless, these fields differ from our task. They mainly focus on non-technical domains (e.g., news and stories) and lack fine-grained control over concept levels.

**Text Infilling.** Text infilling is a generalization of the cloze task (Taylor, 1953) from single words to spans of varied lengths. Current works focus on correctly infilling the incomplete text for applications in text editing or ancient documents restoration (Fedus et al., 2018; Zhu et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2019; Zaidi et al., 2019; Donahue et al., 2020; Shen et al., 2020). However, the controllable mask-then-infill task addressed in this paper is more complex. It involves masking relevant concepts (text spans) in a document and infilling realistic yet misleading spans to replace such masks.

**Adversarial augmentation.** This task aims at generating perturbed augmented samples to improve the robustness of NLP models by heuristic rules that replace words from WordNet or word embeddings (Alzantot et al., 2018; Jia et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2019; Wei and Zou, 2019), contextualized perturbations (Garg and Ramakrishnan, 2020; Li et al., 2020, 2021), or comprehensive frameworks (Ribeiro et al., 2020; Morris et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2021). Again, these random perturbation methods lack precise control over concepts, hindering their usage for our task.

3 Approach

3.1 Framework

We follow the same convention of fake document generation proposed in FORGE (Chakraborty et al., 2021): Given a real document $d$ as input, the model generates a set $D'$ of fake documents. Each fake document $d' \in D'$ is similar to $d$ to be believable, yet sufficiently different from $d$ to be inaccurate. We obtain $d'$ by replacing certain concepts $c$ of $d$ with alternatives $c'$. High-quality $d'$ is expected to cost the attacker much time to identify the real $d$ from the $|D'| + 1$ documents. Thus, a fake document generator needs to ensure believability by considering at least two aspects: (1) how to select the set of concepts $C$ to be replaced; and (2) how to choose replacement concept $c'$ for every $c \in C$.

We convert the formulation above into the controllable document infilling task. Given a document $d$, we first extract and mask text snippets of varied lengths expressing each important concept $c \in C$. Then, we use an LM to infill the masked spans with realistic but inauthentic alternatives $c'$, considering the context of these spans. FDI addresses these sub-tasks by designing (1) a controllable masking function to select concepts and (2) a decoding strategy to replace the masked spans.

Figure 1 shows the (a) training and (b) inference procedures of FDI. First, we apply the random masking approach to train a robust and flexible LM to fill various types of masks. Then, we use a curated strategy to precisely steer text generation during the inference step. Specifically for inference, we first use controllable masking to produce masked examples, protecting essential information of $d$. Then, we use the trained LM to replace each masked concept $c \in C$ with a sampled $c'$. To ensure the fakeness of the generated document, we introduce a penalization factor in the decoding step to avoid the model predicting the original concept (i.e., let $c' \neq c$). Finally, we obtain a completed fake document by infilling the input text with the predicted alternatives. We detail each component of FDI in the following subsections.
3.2 Training

The training step involves finetuning an LM to text infilling task, utilizing the random masking approach. Figure 1(a) illustrates three different training pairs. Each concatenates input $x$ and target $y$ by a separator token $[\text{sep}]$. $x$ is generated by a random masking function $f(d)$, which replaces specific spans $C = \{c_1, ..., c_n\}$ in document $d$ with special (blank) tokens, $y = c_1[\text{ans}]...c_n[\text{ans}]$ refers to the answers to the blanks concatenated with special tokens $[\text{ans}]$. We finetune $\text{LM}(\theta)$ to learn the distribution $p_\theta(y|x)$ by minimizing the cross-entropy loss between the target $y$ and the probability distributions of prediction $y'$. We design $f(d)$ to generate various masked examples with coarse control over the granularities. Similar to (Donahue et al., 2020), we use more special tokens instead of a universal blank to specify three granularities: words, $n$-grams, and sentences. For example, $x$ in Figure 1(a) becomes “FDI [\text{masked_word}] to fake [\text{masked_ngram}],” (we only show a universal blank “_” in the figure for simplicity). Next, we traverse the hierarchy of $d$ to sample each mask type randomly and obtain a masked token rate of 15% suggested in (Devlin et al., 2018; Donahue et al., 2020) (details in Appendix B). Finally, we generate various masked examples of each $d$ for training data augmentation.

3.3 Inference

The inference process (shown in Figure 1(b)) produces fake documents through the following steps: (1) extracting and selecting the appropriate set of concepts $C$; and (2) determining the fake replacement $c'_\text{'}$ for every $c \in C$, through decoding method. For each concept $c \in C$, we use the initialized score $Q_R(c)$ of the importance scores in Line 3. Long concepts often get higher RAKE scores than short concepts. For examples of each

3.3.1 Concepts Extraction and Selection

Concepts extraction and selection are essential components in fake document generators and vary in schemas. Therefore, we define the following settings: First, instead of expensive annotation (Chakraborty et al., 2021), we followed recent works to use automatical keywords (e.g., based on TF-IDF (Abdibayev et al., 2021)) as critical information for scalable evaluation. We chose RAKE (Rose et al., 2010) to score $n$-grams to extract concepts with varying lengths without additional cost. Second, we only revised the document body with the head unchanged, as illustrated in Table 1. Completely altering the head may let intruders skip the forged document quickly. We expect the fake samples to alter critical details without changing the topics. Besides, this setting enables us to compare naive GPT-2 that needs to initiate with a given prompt and is commonly used in NLG evaluation (Clark et al., 2021).

Algorithm 1 illustrates theControllable Masking procedure for selecting and extracting concepts, which includes two main parts: (1) Lines 1-6 build the candidate pool of concepts from document $d$, consisting of sets $C$ (words or $n$-grams) and $S$ (whole sentences); and (2) Lines 7-17 generate $K$ masked examples $M = \{M_1, ..., M_K\}$ by sampling from the candidate pool. Each masked example $M_k$ results in various fake documents during the later decoding step. In this way, FDI can produce diverse examples which vary in masked locations and replacements of each mask.

In the first part of Algorithm 1, Line 1 splits document $d$ by stop-words and delimiters to create the initial set of concepts $C$. Line 2 computes the importance score of each concept $c \in C$ through the degree $\text{deg}(w)$ and frequency $\text{freq}(w)$ in its word co-occurrence graph of a term $w$ occurring in $c$, following (Rose et al., 2010). Next, we filter the concepts based on the quantile $Q_R(\cdot)$ of the importance scores in Line 3. Long concepts often get higher RAKE scores than short concepts. For
Algorithm 1: Controllable Masking

Input : document $d$, stop-words $W_{st}$, thresholds $q_{min}, t_s, \gamma$, masking probabilities $p_s, p_c$.

Output : list of masked examples $M$ of size $K$.

1. $C \leftarrow \text{splitConcepts}(d, W_{st})$
2. $Rc \leftarrow \{ r(c) : \sum_{w \in c} \deg(w)/\text{freq}(w) \text{ for } c \in C \}$
3. $C \leftarrow \{ c | r(c) \geq q_{min}(C, q_{min}) \text{ for } c \in C \}$
4. $C \leftarrow \text{concatDet}(C, d)$
5. $S \leftarrow \text{getSents}(d, C, t_s)$
6. $M \leftarrow [\emptyset]$
7. for $k$ in range ($K$) do
8.    $y_k \leftarrow \{\emptyset\}$
9.    do
10.       $y_k \leftarrow y_k \cup \{\text{randomSample}(S, p_s)\}$
11.       $y_k \leftarrow y_k \cup \{\text{randomSample}(C, p_c)\}$
12.    while maskedRate($d$, $y_k$) $< \gamma$
13.       $y_k \leftarrow \text{mergeCloseMasks}(y_k)$
14.       $x_k \leftarrow \text{getMaskedInput}(d, y_k)$
15.       $M \leftarrow M \cup (x_k, y_k)$
16.    return $M$

An example, in Figure 1 (b), “fake document infilling” gets a higher score than its member phrases. Therefore, we empirically set the lower bound $q_{min}$ to 40%, a trade-off between concepts’ importance and diversity (in terms of length).

A document’s head (e.g., the title and the first sentence) often contains topic words and summarizes the content. Thus, we ignore extracting these phrases to prevent generating entirely off-topic articles in Line 4, as discussed in the start of subsection 3.3.1. For instance, we remove the selected topic concept “tomographic image reconstruction” from the candidate set in Table 1 A.

RAKE removes masked phrases’ determiners and may result in obvious plural noun errors during infilling. For example, LMs infill “find an approximate solution...” to “find an similar estimate...” in Table 1 (E). The easiest solution to alleviate such errors is to replace the extracted span with its determiner as a whole, e.g., “find an approximate solution...”. Thus, we concatenate extracted spans with their determiners through function $\text{concatDet}(\cdot)$ in Line 5.

Besides candidate concepts $C$, we can optionally replace sentences with a high density of key concepts. In practice, replacing a whole sentence generally produces better results than densely infilling many blanks in the same sentence. Therefore, in Line 6, we collect the sentences from $d$ whose percentage of tokens belonging to any concept in $C$ is higher than the threshold $t_s$. Function $\text{getSents}(\cdot)$ returns such dense sentences to form the set $S$.

Once we obtain the candidate pool of concepts from $d$, we sample $K$ masked examples $M = \{M_1, ..., M_K\}$. Each $M_k$ includes input $x_k$ with special masked tokens, and the answer spans $y_k$ (as shown in subsection 3.2). In Lines 8-13, for each masked example, we collect $y_k$ by sampling the sets $S$ and $C$ with probabilities $p_s$ and $p_c$, respectively. We iteratively sample until we get enough non-overlapping concepts that reach a threshold of masked token rate $\gamma$.

We also merge short masked spans located closely within the same sentence into longer spans to reduce the number of masked spans in $M$ in Line 14. For example, we merge the two masked spans in “find an approximate solution with a sparse representation ..” to one span in Table 1 (E). We get the corresponding masked input $x_k$ by replacing spans in $y_k$ with special masked tokens in Line 15. We repeat the above sampling process to get our collections of $(x_k, y_k)$ pairs.

### 3.3.2 Decoding

We design a penalized decoding strategy based on Top-p% sampling (Holtzman et al., 2019) to generate natural yet fake texts. The training step minimizes the cross-entropy loss between the answers and prediction probabilities to retrieve the original document. However, the inference uses sampling instead of greedy search to get various outputs that are unlikely to be identical to the original document. Furthermore, we discount the scores of the tokens for the correct answers to encourage fake outputs during the inference, similar to the mechanism for discouraging repetition (Keskar et al., 2019).

Specifically, we first get a subset of tokens $A$ from the correct answers $y$ of each $M$ by filtering out too-short tokens, probably stopwords or insignificant sub-words such as prefixes. Then, given the input $x$, the probability distribution over the next possible token being word $i$ in the vocabulary $V$ is the softmax:

$$p(y = i | x) = \frac{\exp(z_i / (T \cdot I(i \in A))}{\sum_j \exp(z_j / (T \cdot I(j \in A))},$$  

(1)

where $T$ is the temperature parameter and $z_i$ is each $i$’s score. $I(\cdot) = \delta$ if true else 1, and $\delta$ is the penalty parameter. A high $\delta$ discourages generating correct answers but also produces errors. Thus, we set $\delta = 1.2$ in our experiments based on our empirical observation. Finally, following (Holtzman et al., 2019), we sample from the most probable tokens whose cumulative probability comprises the top-95% of the entire vocabulary.
One concern of the inference step is to control the fakeness of the output. Substituting concepts with similar semantic replacements fails to protect critical information. Due to its unbalanced and unvaried candidate pool, WE-FORGE often suffers from replacing a noun concept with its synonyms, such as substituting “solution” with “strategy” in Table 1 C and D.

In contrast, FDI controls fakeness efficiently by masking various spans from words to sentences, significantly improving the diversity and thus reducing the chance of getting similar outputs. Moreover, FDI infills fake samples conditioned on the incomplete context hiding critical information. Even for the exact phrases that occur in different places, we do not replace them with an identical replacement. Instead, the LM decodes their plausible replacements based on different contexts. This infilling and sampling process favors common, safe, but lossy answers. For example, the document with masked concepts in Table 1 E can result in various outputs with the same structure but distinct details. Later, the sampled answers like “images” and “the whole dictionary” in Table 1 F seem natural but uninformative - they hide the critical information expressed in the original document. Finally, the penalty mechanism in Equation 1 also encourages the model to infill a fake answer.

4 Experiments

4.1 Datasets

Following previous cyber deception works, we conducted experiments on two technical datasets: the CS (Donahue et al., 2020) and the patent abstracts dataset (PAT)\(^2\). The first consists of abstracts from computer science papers on arXiv. The latter covers topics such as Electrical, Chemistry, and Biology. Additionally, we experimented on a non-technical dataset by crawling and filtering a subset of news from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Table 2 summarizes three datasets’ statistics, document lengths, and training sequence lengths we chose.

### Table 2: The datasets used in our experiments.

| Dataset | Train / dev / test | # tokens | seq-len |
|---------|--------------------|----------|---------|
| CS      | 409,555 / 8,547 / 8,498 | 205 ± 70 | 400     |
| PAT     | 16,000 / 4,000 / 5,743 | 132 ± 58 | 256     |
| WSJ     | 40,862 / 2,270 / 2,270 | 292 ± 78 | 512     |

4.2 Comparison Scheme

We considered various possible competitors discussed in section 2 as baselines. We first selected word-embedding-based WE-FORGE, the state-of-the-art fake document generator for Cyber Deception. Thus, we ignored other cyber deception and adversarial augmentation models using word embeddings. Instead, we chose EDA (Wei and Zou, 2019) as a typical context-agnostic adversarial augmentation baseline. We also compared GPT-2 small model (which serves as FDI’s base model) to validate the advantage of the proposed mask-then-infill strategy. We finetuned it and FDI on each training set (details in Appendix A). Finally, we ignored other controllable text generators or contextual perturbation models (Li et al., 2021). These methods are neither computationally efficient or show a clear advantage over the selected models on fine-grained control over concepts for this task.

4.3 Evaluation Design

We sampled documents from each test sets with similar lengths (e.g., 180 to 200 tokens for CS dataset) and generated their fake versions using 4 models. We combined NLG and Cyber Deception evaluation methods to design our experiments. We collected reviews from more than 40 computer science students. Our experiments consist of Quiz-1 Detection and Quiz-2 Evaluation.

### Quiz-1

We followed a similar human evaluation schema utilized in cyber deception (Chakraborty et al., 2021; Abdibayev et al., 2021) and machine-generated text detection (Liu et al., 2016; Van Der Lee et al., 2019; Ippolito et al., 2020a; Zellers et al., 2021; Clark et al., 2021) to evaluate whether the fake samples can deter hackers. Reviewers were asked to identify the original document among three fake copies generated by a single (unknown) model in each example set (1 true + 3 fake). Each reviewer analyzed 4\(h\) example sets (i.e., 4\(h\) \times (1+3) documents) to evaluate all four models \(h\) times. Finally, we computed each model’s average detection accuracy and evaluation time.

However, Quiz-1 ignores the effects of distinct generation patterns and amounts of fake content. For example, a generated sample with minor modifications (e.g., adding or deleting a few stopwords or replacing synonyms) is less distinguishable. Yet, it does not protect any original document’s information for the cyber deception purpose.
Quiz-2 To overcome Quiz-1’s limitations, we designed Quiz-2 to evaluate fake samples’ quality and effectiveness. Each question set includes one known original document and four fake copies generated by four models in an unknown order. Reviewers were asked to evaluate five metrics for the fake samples based on a 4-point Likert scale: (1) fluency of the article; (2) coherency of the article; (3) expert knowledge (expertise) required to identify the article is fake; (4) fakeness of the article; and (5) the overall preference in the articles.

The above scores combine standard NLG metrics (fluency and coherency) and metrics we design for cyber deception. Specifically, fakeness indicates the amount and the effectiveness of modification applied to the original document to deceive the adversary and protect certain essential facts. We define four fakeness categories: 1-inadequate, 2-marginal, 3-moderate, and 4-excessive. We do not use overlap-based metrics such as BLEU (Papineni et al., 2002) as they are inappropriate for evaluating many realistic infills without word-level overlap (Donahue et al., 2020). See Appendix C for more details of our questionnaire.

4.4 Results

Table 3 shows statistics of experimented evaluation sets. Specifically, we evaluated 384 example sets in Quiz-1 (96 sets per model and 1,152 fake examples overall. For Quiz-2, we tested 82 example sets, including 328 fake samples. These samples come from the same 30 articles and their 360 fake copies. In addition, each evaluated set was evaluated by at least two students.

Table 4 shows the mean detection accuracy and the average time taken for participants to review one example in each scenario in Quiz-1. Compared with other context-agnostic baselines, GPT-2 and FDI get lower accuracy and longer time. The results indicate that examining texts generated by current LMs requires more effort than a superficial judgment based on fluency-related quality aspects (Clark et al., 2021). Although time metrics are relatively similar for these models, FDI's superiority varies across domains. It presents lower accuracy (i.e., better at misleading humans) in CS and PAT but higher in WSJ.

Table 5 compiles the reviews of Quiz-2 for a more comprehensive analysis of the generated fake documents. We illustrate the fakeness metric separately in Figure 2 due to its particularity (higher fakeness doesn’t mean superiority). Table 5 shows that EDA achieves the worst fluency and coherency due to its random perturbation strategy. GPT-2 generates the most fluent output with contextual knowledge in the unrestricted left-to-right manner. However, its output lacks fine-grained control and gradually goes off-topic, thus affecting its coherency. WE-FORGE and FDI preserve the article’s logical and consistent relation by replacing specific snippets. Yet, WE-FORGE results in unstable performance due to its unigram replacement based on unbalanced word embeddings clusters. In contrast, FDI combines improved replacement strategies and contextual features, consistently reporting superior coherency and fluency.

| Data | Metric | EDA | WEF | GPT | FDI |
|------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| CS   | Acc    | 0.93| 0.93| 0.65| **0.60** |
|      | Time   | 1.53±1.0| 2.53±1.5| 3.31±0.3| **3.53±1.3** |
| PAT  | Acc    | 1.00| 0.86| 0.77| **0.64** |
|      | Time   | 2.91±2.2| 4.03±2.5| **4.41±2.5**| 4.17±2.0 |
| WSJ  | Acc    | 0.82| 0.82| **0.62**| 0.74 |
|      | Time   | 2.21±1.7| 2.45±1.7| **3.98±1.3**| 3.86±1.3 |
| avg. | Acc    | 0.91| 0.88| 0.67| **0.66** |
|      | Time   | 2.22±1.6| 3.00±1.9| **3.90±1.5**| 3.85±1.4 |

Table 4: Mean accuracy and time taken (in minutes) by participants to review one example in Quiz-1.

Table 5: Mean scores of fluency, coherency, expertise, and preference in Quiz-2.
Figure 2: Distribution of the samples’ fakeness. Most of FDI’s samples (61.0%) have moderate fakeness.

The expertise score refers to the level of expert knowledge required for the reviewer to identify whether the article is fake or not. Given the low fluency and coherency, EDA’s fake samples require lower expertise to be recognized. WE-FORGE prunes out all words other than nouns because such terms are unlikely to contribute to the content of a technical document (Abdibayev et al., 2021). Yet, this method hinders its outputs’ diversity in a news story with fewer important nouns such as technical terms but more essential verbs. As a result, it may generate easily identifiable fake samples such as replacing “President Joe Biden” with “President Joe Trump”. Therefore, WE-FORGE is competitive with GPT-2 in CS and PAT but performs poorly in WSJ. In contrast, GPT-2 avoids the above issues caused by replacing unigram, which also explains its superiority in accuracy and expertise score in WSJ. FDI addresses WE-FORGE’s issue by replacing n-grams respecting both the preceding and the following context. Thus, its errors related to reviewers’ knowledge are more subtle. Although we focus on technical datasets, these results suggest that FDI generalizes well in other domains.

The ideal fake samples should have moderate fakeness, neither too close nor too far away from the original text. Figure 2 illustrates that 61.0% of FDI’s generated samples have moderate fakeness, achieving the best trade-offs. In contrast, EDA is ineffective in protecting critical information because 57.3% of its samples have marginal or inadequate fakeness. WE-FORGE applies more effective modification than EDA. Yet, the near-uniform distribution of WE-FORGE’s fakeness is consistent with its unstable performance. GPT-2’s samples tend to introduce excessive fakeness, substantially diverging from the original documents.

In the final question of Quiz-2, we asked the reviewers to rank their favorite fake articles from score 4 to score 1. Then we calculate each model’s average results as the preference scores. Table 5 shows that FDI is the overall best model. Based on the participants’ feedback, various factors influence their decision-making. For example, some reviewers like the most fluent samples, while others prefer those with realistic modification. Therefore, we analyze the relationships between these metrics in Figure 3, which illustrates that all the scores other than fakeness show strong positive correlations. The results are as expected as we prefer fluent, coherent fake documents that require expert knowledge to identify. In contrast, we observe weak positive correlations between fakeness and the other metrics.

To understand the human preference in fakeness, Table 6 summarizes the mean preference scores of the samples of different fakeness types. And it shows that the reviewers favor the samples with moderate fakeness. The above observation again validates a trade-off between the amount of fake content and the superiority of the fake samples. It also indicates that fakeness is a relatively independent metric from the other evaluation metrics. Thus, it is necessary to include fakeness in the future cyber deception study.

4.5 Parameter Study

Due to the extensive time and efforts associated with human-driven experiments, we used the same hyperparameters for all datasets based on evaluation results on small validation sets (details in Ap-
Appendix B). A key hyperparameter is max masked rate $\gamma$, as shown in Algorithm 1. Samples with low $\gamma$ (e.g., 10\%) are likely to be labeled as inadequate fakeness. In contrast, high $\gamma$ results in excessive fakeness and errors because the model needs to fill in more blanks given less context. As moderate fakeness is desired in cyber deception work, we set $\gamma = 20\%$. Yet, users can specify their preferred $\gamma$ in custom datasets. Besides $\gamma$, many parameters provide randomness in the samples but do not significantly affect the human evaluation result.

5 Conclusion and Future Work

We propose a novel fake document generator, FDI, for network intrusion defense and intellectual property protection. FDI relies on a complete mask-then-infill process with a curated strategy for fake documents generation. Our experiments explore “how easily the original documents are identified” and “how critical information is protected” with more fake samples and generation patterns. FDI shows consistent superiority in generating realistic fake samples while protecting the information and deceiving the hackers.

While human evaluation remains the gold standard for evaluating various NLG applications, future work can explore automatic detection methods (Zellers et al., 2019; Gehrmann et al., 2019; Bakhtin et al., 2019; Schuster et al., 2020) to alleviate human efforts. Besides, this work focuses on technical documents and shows generalization in news stories. Future work can also extend its applications to other critical domains, such as political science (Parolin et al., 2022, 2021; Hu et al., 2022; Skorupa Parolin et al., 2022; Hu and Khan, 2021).

6 Limitations

Due to the expensive human evaluation, we empirically selected some configurations on small validation sets. Besides, we reduced the overlaps between the reviewers to cover more samples and reduce the randomness. Although at least two reviewers evaluated each article set, the overlap was small to calculate Kappa. We were aware that evaluators might calibrate the metrics differently without training, a commonly reported issue in NLG tasks (Ippolito et al., 2020a; Clark et al., 2021). However, pre-evaluation training on fakeness introduced bias because the reviewers may judge only based on the distinct patterns of different models (as shown in Table 1). Thus, we didn’t intervene in the evaluation. Instead, we extensively analyzed reviewers’ choices in Figures 2, 3, and Table 6. More work needs to be done by (1) designing simple but unbiased instructions to help reviewers score more consistently. (2) More overlapping experiments between reviewers to calculate Kappa.

Second, FDI is not flawless and suffers from similar weaknesses as all LMs. Text infilling models may generate repetitive text, incomplete words, or unmatched parenthesis, resulting in a high infilling failure rate (Shen et al., 2020). Therefore, we designed several heuristic steps in Lines 5, 6, and 14 of Algorithm 1 to simplify the infilling tasks and reduce errors. We believe a more powerful LM, such as GPT-3 (Brown et al., 2020), can improve the performance further. Besides, GPT-2 is originally pretrained for left-to-right text generation. Some alternative LMs, such as T-5 (Raffel et al., 2020) and BART (Lewis et al., 2019), have already learned elementary text-infilling tasks during the pretraining. Future work should also explore how these models perform in our framework.

Finally, we designed a simple penalized decoding strategy based on Top-$p\%$ schema to encourage diverse fake generations. Yet, it also generated errors like other constrained decoding methods. Future work should optimize the decoding algorithm and post-processing methods.

7 Ethical Considerations

We acknowledge that similar mechanisms may be abused to generate disinformation, such as fake news (Zellers et al., 2019). Besides, language models have been shown to encode biases from the training data (Barberá et al., 2021). Thus, we remove controversial and sensitive news samples to mitigate these issues during our evaluation. With the rapid evolution of Cyber Deception and NLG technologies, we believe this work creates more value than risks on balance.

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A Implementation

We used the implementation of EDA from (Morris et al., 2020). We set the word swapping rate to 20%. For WE-FORGE, we learnt word-embeddings per dataset using Word2Vec (Mikolov et al., 2013). Based on silhouette scores and empirical observations on the validation sets, we set $k = 100$ for K-means and the number of Concept-Importance-Bins as 5 for all datasets.

For GPT-2 and FDI, we implemented the models with Huggingface API (Wolf et al., 2020) and monitored the training with Wandb (Biewald, 2020). We used Adam optimizer (Kingma and Ba, 2014) with a learning rate of 2e-5 and a batch size of 16. We chose proper sequence lengths for each dataset shown in Table 2. It took 1 to 2 days for these models to converge on the validation sets using a V-100 GPU.

B Other hyperparameters of FDI

For random masking in training, we traversed the document’s hierarchy. We randomly masked sentences and then words with 5% probability. We then extended each selected word to a non-overlapped $n$-gram with a 50% probability. For controllable masking in inference, we set quantile lower bound $q_{min}$ to 0.4, masking sentence’s probability $p_s$ to 0.7, masking concept’s probability $p_c$ to 0.5, sentence selection threshold $t_s$ to 0.7, and max masked rate $\gamma$ to 0.2 for all datasets.

C Questionnaire

Table 7 explains our quiz’s instructions and questions. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show our designed user interfaces using Google Forms. Figure 6 and Figure 7 shows one example set of Quiz-1 and Quiz-2 in Google Forms, respectively.

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**Quiz-1** Assume you are a hacker. Can you distinguish the true document from the below 4 examples? Please choose the most likely option Top-1 and the 2nd possible option Top-2.

*Quiz-2* Assume you are a cyber security expert. The ideal fake documents should be realistic and provide scalable protective coverage. They are “close enough” to the original to make the fakes believable, but sufficiently “far enough” to hide and protect private and confidential information. Now compared with the true document, would you evaluate the fakeness of the rest four fake samples? Below are the questions in details:

Q1. How do you rate the fluency of the article?
4. Overall flawless, with only minor typos.
3. Non-native, with minor but apparent errors.
2. Unnatural/synthetic, the apparent errors affect my reading.
1. Incomprehensible, with a lot of corrupted text.

Q2. How do you rate the coherency of the article? Does it make sense?
4. Coherent. There is a logical and consistent relation among the facts presented along the article.
3. Partially coherent, I can’t understand what the author means in certain places.
2. Somehow confusing, with most parts of the document are confusing.
1. I have no (or almost no) idea what the author is trying to say.

Q3. Expert knowledge is required to identify this article is fake.
4. Agree, non-expert will find it difficult to distinguish if it is fake.
3. Partially agree, expert knowledge may help and speed up this process.
2. Somewhat disagree, expert knowledge might not be necessary.
1. Disagree, general audience can easily identify it is fake.

Q4. Is the sample “fake enough”? Does it apply necessary modifications (e.g., insert, replace and delete) to deceive the adversary and protect some essential facts? Note: High scores of fakeness do not mean superiority.
4. Excessive. The article may introduce too many changes, substantially diverging from the original topic/fact.
3. Moderate. The article introduces important changes, preserves the coherence, and seems realistic.
2. Marginal. The article introduces changes. However, considerable modifications do not significantly change facts presented in the original document.
1. Inadequate. Only insignificant modifications.

Q5. Based on your previous evaluation, how would you rank the fake documents? A good fake copy should look similar to the original document. But what’s more important is that it also protects essential information and misleads hackers. Please rank your preference. (Top-1 the best to Top-4 the worst)

Table 7: The instructions and questions in the Quiz.
Figure 4: Quiz-1’s user interface

Figure 5: Quiz-2’s user interface

Figure 6: A Quiz-1’s example set consists of 1 true + 3 fake articles generated by an unknown model.

Figure 7: A Quiz-2’s example set includes 1 known true document + 4 fake samples generated by 4 models in an unknown order.