Executive Summary

Technologies, especially the Internet, have transformed how consumers search for products and prices. Price search has become cheap and easy and, therefore, ubiquitous, for many products. Just as technologies have made price search easier, however, they have increased incentives that firms have to obfuscate, or make price search harder. In this article, we focus on these actions that firms take and their effects on market participants. We discuss empirical evidence on this phenomenon, as well as its welfare impacts in the context of theories of search and obfuscation. Finally, we offer a framework for thinking about policy interventions based on this welfare analysis and outline some of the challenges facing policymakers.

I. Introduction

Dating back to at least Stigler (1961) and Diamond (1971), it has been recognized that the existence of positive costs associated with consumers’ search for prices can lead to market prices well above competitive levels. Given that firms could benefit by raising prices above competitive levels if consumers bore a cost of price search, it stands to reason that firms might, collectively at least, have an incentive to raise those search costs. This phenomenon, which we term obfuscation, has been less extensively studied than price search, but bears careful consideration. In this article, we recap our initial paper on search and obfuscation, discuss some of the insights of subsequent theoretical and empirical literature, and provide thoughts on several types of anti-obfuscation policies that regulators or intermediaries could potentially implement.
Obfuscation can arise in many forms. Basically, any action by the seller that raises the cost of price (and attribute) search by potential customers can be thought of as obfuscation. One form of obfuscation is proliferating product varieties, even along dimensions that customers do not care about, so that comparing prices becomes a complicated and tedious process. Figure 1 shows the first nine products that Amazon offers with its default sort for “ibuprofen.” Sorting on price would be meaningless because these products, all with a chemically identical active ingredient, differ on so many dimensions, such as strength of tablet, size of package, and type of packaging.
Another form that obfuscation can take is making the price of a (necessary) add-on feature, such as shipping, difficult to find and compare. Yet another form would be for manufacturers to agree to give essentially identical products different model numbers for each retailer that carries it, thwarting comparisons across retailers. Figure 2 is a statement from an article on how mattress purchasing is complicated by this practice. Firms can also opt out of price-comparison sites or try to prevent scraping of their websites by shopbots to make comparisons by third parties more difficult.

These are all common and pervasive forms that obfuscation can take, but our focus will be on a particular type: add-on pricing. Let us start with a personal recollection. Several years ago, while shopping for a camera, we stopped in at a local store. This camera store had a reputation for good prices, and in fact advertised very low prices in the newspaper. We requested a particular model from the sales clerk, which he produced at the low advertised price. We then asked whether they carried spare batteries, carrying straps, and cases. “Of course,” the sales clerk replied. “We’d be crazy not to—that’s how we make our money.” This example is a good illustration of the phenomenon: we can think of add-on pricing as the practice of offering additional features, options, complementary products, and quality upgrades to a basic product. We will often take these additional features or options as voluntary, but one could also think of non-optional add-ons, like shipping, in this paradigm. Note that in addition to “add-on pricing,” one often hears the term “drip pricing,” which seems to be preferred in policy circles.

Firms have, of course, employed obfuscation techniques since the dawn of retail, and examples of them abound. The careful study of those techniques, however, may have taken on added urgency with the
growth of Internet retail and other technological advances in retailing. In fact, according to a survey commissioned by the *Times of London*, online shoppers pay up to 22% more in hidden charges than brick-and-mortar customers.\(^1\) Advances in retail technology can interact with obfuscation in interesting ways. There are three reasons why obfuscation (add-on pricing, in particular) may become more prevalent with technological innovation. First, technology, such as price search on the Internet, can create a setting with very intense price competition. In such a setting, firms have a stronger incentive to escape that intense competition, and one way might be obfuscation. Second, by holding fixed the characteristics and attributes of a group of products, technology might provide sellers the tools to more cheaply and effectively obfuscate the prices of these products. For instance, websites designed to convince customers to upgrade to a higher-quality version of a product can substitute for a highly trained sales staff that would have been necessary in a brick-and-mortar setting. Figure 3 exhibits repeated attempts by a travel website to convince one of us to buy trip insurance, for instance. Third, technologies such as handheld credit card readers and online micropayment facilities can allow for the proliferation of products, characteristics, quality levels, and so forth. In other words, if we think

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**Fig. 3.** Illustration of website designed to encourage add-on pricing

Source: www.expedia.com.
of the products themselves as endogenous, the ease with which sellers can offer add-ons and upgrades and accept payment can lead to more products in more varieties.

The market for video games is an interesting example of the third of these reasons. When video games were on physical media such as tapes and were sold in brick-and-mortar stores, the games tended to exist in one flavor and were sold for one price. As the technology of delivering the games and of receiving payment evolved, in-game purchases, unlocking new functionality, and purchasing various quality levels became not only feasible but also pervasive. Airline tickets have followed a similar trend, as airlines have become able to accept payments for early boarding, more legroom, and other amenities at unmanned kiosks in the airport, and credit card payments onboard for drinks and food. Figure 4 is an illustration of a video game in-game purchase.

One immediate issue from a theoretical point of view is that firms may not have the incentive to unilaterally increase search costs, even if they would like search costs to be uniformly higher in their market. The “collective action” problem is the focus of a number of theoretical papers on obfuscation, and we will revisit it in later sections. In the mattress example above, for instance, the collective-action problem is solved essentially because the mattress manufacturer is complicit in the scheme to thwart price search and comparison.

Our plan is to discuss insights from our work on search and obfuscation in some detail, in section II. Section III talks more generally about
the theory of obfuscation, highlighting welfare issues and sources of inefficiency. We provide a brief discussion of related empirical work in Section IV.

Section V discusses possible anti-obfuscation policies that regulators could consider as potential means to reduce the sources of inefficiency highlighted in the theory section. We outline several quite different approaches. Each might work well in some circumstances and poorly in others. One of the important general lessons from modern industrial organization is that the characteristics and institutions governing markets matter and can vary a lot across markets; therefore, the relevant models and useful policies will also be market-specific. Our discussion covers several factors relevant to whether each type of policy is likely to work well. Regulators would need to understand various aspects of a specific market to think about what policies might work well. Finally, we want to emphasize that some markets may provide challenges to any policy lever.

In the conclusion, we bring the discussion back to technological change and how we see its role in the evolving use of obfuscation techniques.

II. A Recap of “Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet”

In Ellison and Ellison (2009), we study an online price search engine for computer components and electronics, pricewatch.com, and we focus on a small set of products sold through Pricewatch. The firms listing products on Pricewatch engage in a number of different obfuscation techniques, but the most salient is an add-on pricing, or upgrade, strategy. The firms aggressively promote and price low-quality versions of products, hoping that the low prices will attract customers to their website. Once there, the customers encounter vendors’ websites designed to encourage them to add on additional features to their chosen product, in other words, upgrade to a higher-quality (and higher markup) product. Requiring that customers upgrade would typically be considered an illegal business practice (bait and switch), but allowing for the possibility of customers upgrading is perfectly legal, and typically some fraction would.

Table 1 reproduces a figure from Ellison and Ellison (2009) showing a web page from a seller listing computer memory modules on Pricewatch. The right column describes a “low-quality” product that was
listed on Pricewatch at a price of about $50. Consumers who saw that listing and clicked on the link were taken to this page. The right column describes the product they can buy at the advertised prices in not very flattering terms, for example, “downgrade chips.” The middle column describes a higher-quality product that is being offered for $15 more. And the left column describes an even higher-quality product that is available at a $25 premium. The price premiums are not primarily due to cost differences. In fact, the product described in the middle column only costs the retailer $1 or $2 more. Hence, the retailer’s markups are much higher on these products. Various elements of the page—the left-to-right ordering, the use of words like “improved,” “hand picked,” “satisfaction,” and so forth—seem designed to entice consumers to buy the higher-quality products.

In the simplest perfect competition model of add-on pricing, firms would lower the price of their low-quality product below cost to attract customers to their websites. The prices of the low-quality product would be low enough, in fact, so that profits that firms make on the

| Memory Spec. Chart—PC3200 DDR 512MB (Select Your Memory Module) |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Samsung/Micron or Major 512MB PC3200 (ADD $25)               | Industry-Standard 512MB PC3200 (ADD $15) | OEM 512MB PC3200 |
| • CAS 2.5 Latency                                            | • CAS 2.5 Latency                        | • CAS 3 Latency |
| • Hand-Picked 5ns                                            | • Hand-Picked 5ns                        | • 4-Layer Module Board |
| • 6-Layer Low-Noise-Shielded PCB Board                       | • 6-Layer Low-Noise-Shielded PCB Board   | • 64 x 4 DRAM Type |
| • 32 x 8 DRAM Type                                            | • 32 x 8 DRAM Type                       | • OEM DRAM Downgrade Chips |
| • Samsung/Micron or Major Brands                             | • Industry-Standard DRAM Chips            | • 20% Restocking Fee According to the Market Value |
| • Return Shipping Paid                                       | • 7 Days No Restocking Fee               | • Verify Compatibility with Memory Configurator |
| • No Restocking Fee                                          | • Return Shipping not Paid               | • Return Shipping not Paid |
| • Satisfaction and Compatibility Guaranteed                  | • Improved Compatibility                | • Improved Compatibility |
| • Lifetime Warranty                                          | • Lifetime Warranty                      | • Lifetime Warranty |
| • 15 Days Full Refund                                         | • Aluminum Heat Sink—Cool Down the Memory up to 35% | • Aluminum Heat Sink—Cool Down the Memory up to 35% |
| • Memory Tested Before Ship Out                               | • 6-Layer Low-Noise-Shielded PCB Board   | • Aluminum Heat Sink—Cool Down the Memory up to 35% |
| • Copper Heat Sink—Cool Down the Memory up to 40%            | • 32 x 8 DRAM Type                       | • Aluminum Heat Sink—Cool Down the Memory up to 35% |

Source: Ellison and Ellison (2009).
customers purchasing upgrades are competed away with the below-cost pricing. Such a model suggests that there could be distributional consequences across different types of customers, but that firms are still earning zero profits. We realized, however, that in the market we studied, instead of re-creating this perfect competition in a slightly different form, firms were, instead, using this add-on pricing to soften competition and earn positive profits. In the example above, instead of the “low-quality” module being sold at a price well below cost, it tended to be sold at a price that was close to cost, while the firms earned substantial profits on the medium- and higher-quality products. With such prices, the distributional consequences across different types of customers would still exist, but firms would price above marginal cost on average, which yields positive profits for the firms and “deadweight losses” in social welfare.

On average, the key factor allowing the sellers to price above marginal cost was that the customers choosing to upgrade were not a random sample of all customers, but rather a selected sample. In particular, the customers willing to upgrade tended to be the less price-sensitive ones. In equilibrium, then, firms do not want to cut the price on their low-quality product so low as to compete away the profits they make on their upgrading customers because doing so would attract a very price-sensitive, and therefore, upgrade-averse, mix of customers. They would rather price slightly less aggressively on their low-quality products and attract a less price-sensitive, and therefore less upgrade-averse, mix of customers. In equilibrium, add-on pricing can thereby dampen competition and result in positive profits.

Firms create an adverse-selection “problem” by adopting these add-on pricing strategies, but, of course, it is not a problem for them because it allows pricing above marginal cost. A simple numerical example may help illustrate this mechanism. Suppose that the costs to the firm of selling low-, medium-, and high-quality memory models are $50, $55, and $60, respectively. The pie charts below (figure 5) illustrate how the firm’s sales mix might differ depending on whether it set a relatively high price of $55 for its low-quality module or a more aggressive price below cost of $49. With a relatively high price for the low-quality product the firm does not attract many consumers, but those that it attracts are not very price sensitive and many can be talked into upgrading. At the lower price it gets so many more consumers, but its mix of customers is worse—in other words, less likely to upgrade. It more than doubles its sales of medium- and high-quality modules, but
this comes at a cost of taking on many, many, more consumers who cannot be talked into buying anything other than the low-quality product. If the firm were pricing well below its marginal cost for the low-quality product, losses from sales to these consumers could be overwhelming.

For a specific numerical example, suppose that the medium- and high-quality modules are priced at $15 and $25 above the price of the low-cost module, respectively. Suppose that the firm sells 30 low-, 30 medium-, and 20 high-quality modules when its low-quality module is priced at $55 (which means the others are $70 and $80). And suppose that sales increase to 300, 70, and 40 at prices of $49, $64, and $74. In this case, profits at the $55 price are $30 \cdot 5 + 30 \cdot 15 + 20 \cdot 20 = $1,000. Profits at the $49 price are slightly lower, $300 \cdot (–$1) + 70 \cdot 9 + 40 \cdot 14 = $930. And if the firm were to price even slightly more below cost, profits could be much, much lower. For example, if it goes to $48, it might sell 500 low-quality units at a loss of $2 per module, and this $1,000 loss could completely overwhelm any gains from selling a few more of the higher-quality products.

Our 2009 “Search and Obfuscation” paper provides striking empirical estimates showing that the adverse-selection effect described above is a real phenomenon and can be quite powerful. Table 2 reproduces a matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities that we found when estimating demand for low-, medium-, and high-quality memory modules sold through Pricewatch. For instance, the figure in the upper-left corner can be interpreted as meaning that a 1% increase in the price of the low-quality memory modules results in a 25% decrease in the sales of those modules. The off-diagonal elements are cross-price elasticities between different quality levels of otherwise identical memory modules. For instance, the figure in the middle of the left column can be interpreted as
meaning that a 1% increase in the price of the medium-quality module results in a 0.7% increase in the sales of the low-quality modules.

There are a number of interesting features about these estimates to highlight. First, note that the estimated demand of the low-quality module is remarkably elastic! Rarely does one see elasticities of that magnitude. Recall that the low-quality product is the one listed on the price search engine and, therefore, easily found and compared with similar products from other sellers. Such an elasticity could support only the slimmest of margins above marginal cost, likely too slim to allow a firm selling only this product to survive. This extreme elasticity is, therefore, a striking illustration of a point we made in the introduction: price search on the Internet has the potential to create very fierce competition.

Second, note that the own-price elasticities on the medium- and high-quality modules are much lower in magnitude. They, too, face elastic demand but much less elastic than the low-quality modules. These elasticities could support larger margins. In other words, firms facing these elasticities can raise prices somewhat above marginal cost without inducing lower profits.

Third, most of the cross-price elasticities are small and not very precisely estimated, but positive, as simple models of substitute products would suggest: if the price of one product goes up, customers will tend to shift to another similar and substitutable product.

Fourth, quite strikingly, two of the cross-price elasticities are large in magnitude (although not as large as the low-quality, own-price elasticity), statistically significant, and negative. These two cross-price elasticities are of the sales for the medium- and high-quality modules with respect to the price of the low quality, and they are, in fact, strong evidence of two important aspects of the add-on pricing mechanism. First, the reason that the cross-price elasticities of such similar products are

| 128MB PC100 Modules | Low | Mid | High |
|----------------------|-----|-----|------|
| \( P_{\text{Low}} \) | -24.9* | -12.5* | -7.2* |
| \( P_{\text{Mid}} \) | 0.7 | -6.7* | 2.4 |
| \( P_{\text{High}} \) | 0.2 | 2.7 | -4.8* |

Source: Ellison and Ellison (2009).
* Denotes statistical significance.

Table 2
Price Elasticities from Ellison and Ellison (2009)
negative is that when the price of the low-quality module goes down, more customers are attracted to the website that sells it, and some will upgrade to the medium or high quality. In other words, the low-quality product’s price is being used to advertise all quality levels the seller offers. Second, the reason that these elasticities are smaller in magnitude than the low-quality, own-price elasticity is that the effects on the medium- and high-quality modules are not as large as the effects on the low quality.

This adverse selection mechanism, based on a correlation between the customers likely to be initially attracted to the lowest-priced products and those unlikely to upgrade or add on, might be strong in certain markets and weak or absent in others. The implications for social welfare are clear. In markets where the adverse-selection mechanism is weak, add-on pricing strategies are not likely to raise average prices and firm profits very far above competitive levels. In markets where the adverse-selection effect is strong, average prices could be significantly above competitive levels, leading to increased profits, decreased consumer surplus, and deadweight loss.

In any case, there will be distributional effects across customers of add-on pricing strategies. The ones who choose not to upgrade will receive low prices, perhaps even below marginal cost, whereas the customers who upgrade will pay significant increments above marginal cost.

III. Theory of Obfuscation

To think about the potential welfare consequences of obfuscation, it is useful to start from the classic perfect competition model in which markets are fully efficient. The perfect competition model does not specify how the outcomes it predicts come about. Informally, we can think of it as a model of situations in which: (a) consumers are fully informed about the prices and attributes of all goods without needing to spend any resources on information; (b) consumers perfectly optimize their consumption given prices and product attributes; and (c) intense competition, sometimes referred to as “Bertrand competition,” leads firms to price at marginal cost.

Our search and obfuscation paper identified two main channels through which firms appeared to have altered the market to depart from the perfect competition ideal. First, obfuscation prevents consumers from being fully informed. Second, obfuscation can create an
adverse-selection problem that softens competition. The subsequent theory literature has developed coherent models explaining why each effect of obfuscation might arise in an unregulated market and providing insights on the welfare consequences.

A. Prevents Consumers from Being Fully Informed

First, our work suggested that firms had worked to make it more difficult, time consuming, or both for consumers to find the products they wanted. Classic papers by Stigler, Diamond, and others noted long ago that even small departures from costless search can lead to dramatic differences in market outcomes. Diamond’s classic (1971) model in which all firms produce identical goods and all consumers must incur an incremental search cost to learn each firm’s price brings out this insight simply and clearly. In the model, moving from zero search cost to any positive search cost shifts the equilibrium all the way from competitive pricing to monopoly pricing. Intuitively, if consumers expect all firms to set the monopoly price, then there is no reason to shop around—consumers will simply purchase from the first firm they visit, even if it is charging the monopoly price. And if all consumers behave this way, there is no reason for a firm to charge anything less than the monopoly price. It is a striking observation, albeit one that clearly we cannot take all that seriously due to the special assumptions involved in the model.

Many subsequent authors have noted that making the model more realistic, for example, adding heterogeneity in consumer-search costs or tastes leads to more robust and intuitive results. Price levels tend to increase smoothly as consumer-search costs are increased. Given this result, we can think of welfare as being reduced when consumer-search costs increase for three reasons. First, consumer utility is directly reduced when the consumers expend resources on search instead of leisure and consumption. Second, consumers may choose not to gather all available information, which can lead them to choose a consumption bundle that they like less than another bundle that they overlooked. Third, with prices set above marginal cost there is “deadweight loss”—consumers refuse to buy products that they would enjoy consuming (and firms lose out on profits they could have made selling to these consumers) because prices are not tailored to the consumer’s willingness to pay.

In most models of consumer search, the firms collectively benefit
from moderate increases in consumer-search costs. (When search costs get too large, consumers will not bother to search, and a market collapse hurts firms as well as consumers.) While it is less obvious that firms will individually want to increase consumer-search costs, several papers, including Wilson (2010) and Ellison and Wolitzky (2012), note that there is not necessarily a collective-action problem here. The mechanism highlighted in Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) is that a firm that makes it more arduous for consumers to learn everything they want to know about its product may deter consumers who make it to the end of the process from deciding to investigate another firm. One reason is that it can just make consumers tired of searching if they have already expended so much time. A second is that consumers’ beliefs about the cost associated with additional searches could change, leaving them to think that they will also be arduous.2

Obfuscation of this variety is a concern for regulatory authorities. Social welfare losses occur for all three reasons highlighted at the start of this section. Consumers waste resources learning about products and their prices. Consumers end up with products they like less than other products they could have bought. And prices rise, creating dead-weight loss.

B. Creates Adverse Selection

The second effect of obfuscation highlighted in our previous research is the adverse selection induced by add-on pricing, first identified in Ellison (2005). Implementing add-on pricing also involves altering the characteristics of the goods, but in a very particular way: the firm sells both a (inefficiently) low-quality version its product at a low price and a high-quality version at a substantially higher price. One of the main observations of Ellison (2005) is that there is an important dichotomy between voluntary and mandatory add-on charges. Traditionally, competition authorities have regarded mandatory add-on charges (such as a “fuel cost surcharge” added to every airline ticket) with great suspicion and been less concerned with add-ons that are clearly voluntary (such as checked bag fees). The paper argues that this concern may be misplaced—there are reasons to be more concerned with voluntary add-on charges than with mandatory ones.

In particular, mandatory add-on charges are not harmful in equilibrium if they are fully understood to exist. For example, if truth-in-advertising laws were modified to allow firms to charge consumers up
to $17 more than the price they had advertised, then we would reach a
new equilibrium where all products are advertised at exactly $17 less
than current prices. Consumers would get charged $17 more than the
advertised price at the point of sale, but this would simply re-create the
current equilibrium because they anticipated the surcharge perfectly.
Advertising simply becomes a language issue without any economic
consequence. We can think of sales taxes in the United States in this
context. American consumers are not surprised when sales tax is added
on at the register, and they do not feel tricked or fooled.

In contrast, Ellison (2005) shows that voluntary add-ons need not be
neutral. They can lead to higher equilibrium prices when they create
an adverse-selection problem for firms that cut prices. For example, the
consumers who decide to switch to a less convenient flight because it
is $5 cheaper may be “cheapskates” who are much less likely than an
average consumer to pay extra to reserve an aisle seat, receive expedi-
dited security screening, board earlier, or check luggage. In this case,
the normal incentive of firms to slightly undercut rivals can be reversed
as firms are also tempted to slightly overcut rivals to dump less profit-
able consumers on their rivals and save their seats for higher-margin
consumers. In equilibrium, obviously, firms cannot want to either raise
or lower their prices. The result of adverse selection is that equilibrium
prices end up higher.

The base model of Ellison (2005) is a fully rational model in which
consumers suffer both from inefficient product selection and high
prices. There are two types of consumers, “high-value” ones who are
willing to pay extra for both the base good and the quality upgrades or
add-ons relative to the “low-value” ones. Note that these “high types”
could be thought of as high-income consumers. Indeed, the model sug-
gests that both low- and high-income consumers may both be worse
off than they would be if add-on pricing were prohibited. High-income
consumers are worse off because equilibrium prices have increased.
Low-income consumers are worse off because they buy a good of in-
efficiently low quality. In a more general model there will be dead-
weight loss both from consumers who do not buy any version of the
good, and from consumers who do not buy upgrades. The magnitudes
of these losses depend primarily on two parameters: the incremental
quality that firms have been able to move from the base good to the
add-on, and the strength of the adverse-selection relationship between
price levels and the fraction of consumers who buy add-ons.

In some markets, regulation will not be necessary to prevent inef-
ficient add-on pricing. Add-on pricing can be disrupted in a fully rational model if one firm can simultaneously switch to a product lineup in which add-ons are priced more reasonably, and cheaply advertise this fact to consumers. Ellison (2005) notes, however, that in practice, one substantial obstacle to this mechanism would be if some fraction of consumers are boundedly rational consumers and are not fully aware of how much they will end up paying for add-ons and get “tricked” into buying something they will regret ex post. When such consumers are present, a two-pronged case for regulation appears: one wants to protect the boundedly rational consumers, and also protect rational consumers from the add-on pricing that the presence of boundedly rational consumers facilitates. Hence, the likelihood that there are some such consumers is one factor that should be weighed in thinking about whether there is a strong case for trying to rein in add-on prices via regulation.

One other paper we would mention is Athey and Ellison (2011), which develops a model of search engines as intermediaries that help consumers search more efficiently. It focuses on “sponsored link” advertisements, noting that they can make consumer search more efficient both by providing a list of sites at which consumers are likely to find products that meet their need and by ordering the list so that searching in that order is more efficient than examining the products in a random order. Regulators seeking to create more efficient search can learn from companies like Google: they want to ensure that information is presented to consumers in the manner that makes the more detailed search that consumers will need to do as efficient as possible.

IV. Empirical Evidence on Obfuscation and Its Effects

Not surprisingly, a literature on add-on pricing exists in marketing, although much of this takes on the form of documenting the practice and how it alters customers’ beliefs. In other words, it is not focused on questions of welfare and consumer surplus and typically does not seek to understand mechanisms with rational actors through which firms can raise prices in equilibrium through these practices. Ahmetoglu, Furnham, and Fagan (2014) provides a comprehensive and useful review of this literature. Note that two of the categories of pricing that they discuss, drip pricing and bait sales, are formally similar or identical to the phenomenon we discuss here. Although the economics literature documenting and analyzing obfuscation strategies is still
nascent, we mention here a number of empirical papers that serve as recent examples. Hackl, Kummer, and Winter-Ebmer (2014) document firm pricing strategies, which are consistent with obfuscation and that exploit boundedly rational consumers. Li and Dinlersoz (2012) find that the design of shipping menus of Internet book retailers is consistent with an add-on-pricing-style obfuscation. McDonald and Wren (2014) study the online auto insurance market. They find brand proliferation and patterns of pricing across brands within firms that are consistent with search obfuscation.

More formal evidence—testing models of obfuscation or demonstrating evidence of the benefits of these strategies—has been more scarce. In addition to Ellison and Ellison (2009), two other papers in this mold are Seim, Vitorino, and Muir (2016a, 2016b). They collected detailed data on auto driving schools in Portugal, a setting where standardized reporting of prices is rare, and issues such as price search and obfuscation might loom large. They estimate a model of demand where consumers have limited price information and where, in fact, their degree of price information is a function of measures of price complexity and search costs. In one paper, they find that consumers are willing to pay a significant premium for price transparency, on the order of 11% of the transaction. In the other paper, they find results consistent with complexity significantly limiting consumer price information, suggesting that price complexity obfuscates.

Finally, Kalayçı and Potters (2011) offer a different type of evidence of the effects of price obfuscation. They carry out a lab experiment in which sellers decide on the number of attributes of their good and then set prices. The number of attributes of the good affects neither the cost to the sellers nor the value to the buyers, but simply makes prices more complex (and more difficult to compare). In this stylized setting of a lab, they find that buyers make more suboptimal choices and that prices are higher when the number of attributes of the goods is higher. This result is consistent with our informal observation in the introduction that sellers might benefit from proliferating product varieties as a means of obfuscation.

V. Some Thoughts on Policy Levers

Antitrust authorities in the US Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, and the European Competition Authority, among others,
have shown significant interest in the issue of obfuscation generally, and add-on, or drip pricing, specifically. For instance, in 2012, the FTC organized “A Conference on the Economics of Drip Pricing,” inviting researchers who had done theoretical and empirical work in the area. Also, a number of actions have been brought against firms for drip pricing by various authorities, notably in the markets for air travel and lodging. Finally, agencies are engaging in their own research: Sullivan (2017) is a study of the causes and likely effects of hotel “resort” fees, or compulsory add-ons to hotels rooms to cover services such as Internet and exercise room access, issued by the FTC.

Using this interest in policy circles as a backdrop, we recall our discussion in the theory section. There we highlighted three potential ways in which obfuscation can reduce welfare relative to the perfect competition benchmark: consumers expend resources to search, consumers may never find the consumption bundle that is best matched to their preferences, and deadweight loss results from higher equilibrium prices.

This taxonomy can help guide our thoughts about potential regulation, suggesting areas that policies could target. In particular, we can think of regulations as having at least one of the following goals: First, they could be designed to reduce the search costs that consumers expend in equilibrium. We think of these search costs as the time costs of investigating prices and offerings. Second, they could promote efficient consumer choice, that is, choosing the products that are best matched to their tastes. If consumers are rational, these first two goals should be closely aligned, but promoting efficient choice could be a separate important consideration if many consumers are boundedly rational. Third, they could be designed to encourage efficient pricing. This type of regulation could encompass the pricing of both the base good and any add-ons, encouraging marginal cost pricing of both.

In practice, an important issue for a regulator interested in mitigating this type of obfuscation is whether there are feasible policies that will make it easier for consumers to obtain price and product information. While most models take the set of available products as given, an important element of obfuscation can be that firms invent many variants of their products with different attributes. This product proliferation can make it time consuming for consumers to understand the meaning of an advertised price, and it can create a substantial search problem if consumers wish to find a product with other attributes.

One may also be concerned about the distributional impacts of ob-
fuscation and of regulations designed to address them: policies may affect sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers differently, and this issue can be particularly concerning if sophistication is correlated with socioeconomic status. There will not, however, be any simple formula for achieving these goals. What, if anything, works well will depend on the nature of the products and their markets.

With these thoughts in mind, let us first consider a simple case: a product that has a well-defined standard version that most consumers want. In this case, all that one needs to do to make competition efficient is to ensure that prices for the standard version are visible. For example, most trucks use no. 2 diesel fuel. Requiring that diesel prices be prominently posted should be an effective way to inform truckers about prices. Intermediaries such as price-comparison sites may also naturally arise to help truckers compare prices at stations in different locations.

In most markets, however, products are more complex and firms will naturally want to offer multiple varieties to better match consumers' tastes. For example, consumers will display different preferences over credit cards with different terms, some preferring no annual fee, generous rewards, and a high interest rate, while some others have a strong preference for the lowest interest rate and are willing to pay the high annual fee to obtain it. Likewise, some consumers care a lot about the speed of their Internet access and will naturally be willing to pay more for plans with high speed, whereas others will not. Regulation is more difficult in such markets, both because different consumers are interested in prices for different products and because there is more scope for firms to obfuscate by manipulating their set of offerings. Several approaches to price regulation can be considered:

- **Scoring rules.** One can think of such a rule as a formula for quality-adjusting prices so that consumers can more easily compare similar but nonidentical offerings. For instance, firms advertising loans are typically required to disclose a loan’s annual percentage rate (APR). Similar approaches might be available in other markets.

- **Price disclosure mandate for a standard version.** A second approach to facilitating consumer comparisons is to require firms to post prices for a standard version. Gasoline is a good example. It is not quite as simple as diesel fuel because different consumers prefer different grades of gasoline, but one imagines that competition will work fairly well if stations post just their price for the lowest-grade gasoline. Poli-
cies encouraging similar competition could be considered in other in-
dustries. For example, airlines could be required to prominently post
the price for a flight that includes one checked bag and a standard size
carry-on bag. Online merchants could be required to post prices that
include shipping with arrival within seven days.

• **Standardized menu display.** Such a rule would require posting
prices for a variety of different product options in a format common
across retailers, perhaps dictated by regulators. A familiar example of
a similar standardized display is the required window stickers on new
cars that display price, fuel economy, and crash-test ratings. In the case
of a product offered in many varieties at different prices, one could
adapt this idea so that firms would be required to report all prices for a
set of particular varieties. For an online retailer, for instance, the prices
inclusive of seven-day, two-day, and one-day shipping would be listed
in a standard format. A similar rule might be applied to checking ac-
counts or credit card offers.

• **Direct regulation of add-on prices.** If regulators understand a market
well enough to know the costs of add-ons, they can use this knowl-
edge to directly regulate prices. For example, regulation could limit
the fees that banks are allowed to charge when consumers make debit
purchases that overdraw their accounts. The price search engine we
studied in our previous research required that firms charge no more
than $11 for ground shipping. Mandating that add-ons are priced at
marginal cost could serve two purposes: it leads consumers to purchase
efficient varieties, and it eliminates the adverse-selection mechanism
that can raise aggregate markups.

The effects and even feasibility of these policies will depend on the
product and market under consideration. There is no easy answer, and
regulators would need a good understanding of any market about
whether an anti-obfuscation policy would be effective and not create
other problems. We will note a few of these considerations relevant to
these proposed policies in the discussion below.

Scoring rules can come in at least two different varieties: one where
regulators use knowledge of consumer preferences to choose the
weights that various attributes will have in the score, and one where
the weights are determined by market behavior. As a concrete example,
consider a bank advertising a checking account. It could be required to
report the monthly fee + two times the ATM fee + 1/2 of the bounced
check fee + 1/4 of the wire transfer fee + 1/4 of the cashier’s check fee.
Alternatively, it could be required to report the total fees paid every month on average by a customer with such an account, which is similar to the above, but where the weights are determined by actual customer behavior. These rules are most effective if consumers can then treat the score as a quality-adjusted price. In particular, if consumers do not have very strong ex ante preferences over the relative sizes of ATM fees, wire transfer fees, bounced check charges, and so forth, they might be willing to treat an average revenue per consumer or an arbitrary weighted sum of fees as a price that could be compared. In other cases, however, it may be difficult to create a score that captures what all consumers care about and is not subject to manipulation. In these cases, scoring rules would be limited and might have only moderate effects on market functioning. They become something more like the search assistance discussed in Athey and Ellison (2011), where a sorted list can provide consumers with guidance on where to search first, but where consumers will still need to incur search costs to investigate each product. Note, though, that a guided search, or any mechanism to lower search costs, is a welfare improvement over an unguided search. Hence, such should often be some benefit even if it is not very large.

Mandating that price be disclosed for a standard version is an option that could be particularly effective when two conditions are met: (1) it is possible to describe some version of the good sufficiently so that firms cannot create a significantly inferior version that meets the standard description, and (2) the standard version will meet the needs of many consumers. When these conditions are true, posted prices for the standard version can both promote competition for the standard version and be a strong constraint on what firms can charge on other varieties. A regulation of this type could be useful when the product is sufficiently complex or regulators know little about the importance of various attributes to make scoring rules and menus infeasible. The details of mandating price disclosure, however, would need to be tailored to the market to ensure that the standard version is sufficiently well defined. Simply mandating price disclosure of an airline ticket plus one checked bag, say, may not be an effective countermeasure for obfuscation, for example, if airlines can charge large fees for reserving a seat and force non-upgraders to board later and have no room for their carry-on bag.

In some cases, consumers have quite heterogeneous preferences over product attributes. In such a case, it would be difficult to post a relevant
quality-adjusted price through a scoring rule, and posting just a price for a standard variety might be ineffective. If the number of attributes that consumers care about is small, one feasible alternative that might work well is requiring firms to post price menus in a standard form. Again, such a regulation must be tailored to the market to reflect the primary attributes that matter to consumers. Such policies are possible considerations for markets such as those for cellular phone service and Internet access, where a few attributes like speed, capacity, and over-quota charges are typically what consumers care about, but their preferences over them vary. In many applications, however, it could be difficult to identify a small number of attributes to be disclosed in the menu. As with other policies, it is also a challenge to keep up with a changing retail environment and prevent firms from inventing products that are damaged in some way that does not appear in the price menu (perhaps forcing consumers to pay more for an upgrade).

Finally, direct regulation of add-on prices could be a useful policy lever because it helps consumers buy the efficient variety of the good. To the extent that regulation results in identical prices for add-ons, it can also simplify the search, allowing consumers to focus on prices for the base good. Of course, the requirements for a regulatory body to enact such a policy are steep: too-aggressive regulation could destroy the market for an add-on that is valuable. In some markets, intermediaries can institute such rules obviating the need for government intervention. For example, we noted above that Pricewatch was able to limit shipping fees for firms who chose to list on their comparison site. Indeed, intermediaries like travel websites may be in a better position than the government to enact such policies because they do not need legal authority to exclude firms from participating if they are not willing to comply with add-on pricing rules, and can monitor what consumers end up paying relative to the initially viewed price.

Table 3 provides a quick summary of the above discussion.

One issue addressed in Sullivan (2017) is the legality of mandatory add-ons such as “resort fees” at hotels, or fees with tax-like names added to cellular phone and Internet-service bills. Mandatory fees obviously cannot play a useful role in allowing different consumers to purchase different versions of a product. Accordingly, their main effect is to make consumer search more costly and lead some consumers to make mistakes in purchasing. Prohibiting such fees or requiring that they be included in advertised prices could, therefore, be a policy op-
tion. It is, however, worth emphasizing that if these fees are well known and anticipated by consumers, their welfare effects should be minimal, making policy interventions unnecessary.³

It is worth saying a little more about intermediaries at this point. We have noted in a few instances that platforms, market mediators,
or third parties have entered and performed some or all of the func-
tions that a regulator might perform. Indeed, our discussion of possible anti-obfuscation policies could also serve as a summary of policies that intermediaries—who face many of the same challenges as regulators—could consider adopting.

Intermediaries have both advantages and disadvantages relative to regulators, as well as facing many of the same challenges that regulators face. As we noted directly above, intermediaries, such as a price search engine, do not need legal authority to exclude firms from participating if they are not willing to comply with transparency rules they set. Furthermore, these intermediaries might have very detailed information about consumer behavior, better helping them to tailor these rules to help consumers. Relative to regulators, though, intermediaries have at least one distinct disadvantage: they might compete with other intermediaries. StubHub’s attempt to require transparent, all-in pricing is an interesting illustration of this phenomenon. After the rule change was implemented, consumers who visited their website were immediately put off by the high prices they were shown, and they abandoned StubHub for other ticket platforms that did not require all-in pricing. StubHub’s experiment was short lived.4

Recall also that implementing effective anti-obfuscation can be quite a challenge for regulators. Intermediaries would also encounter the same challenges of product, add-on, and quality proliferation as regulators would. They potentially would need to alter transparency rules and search categories every time a firm develops a new add-on or a different dimension of quality.

VI. Conclusion

Technology that makes price search and product proliferation cheap and easy can have large consumer benefits, to be sure. Downward pressure on prices in many markets has conferred enormous benefits on consumers, and the ease with which firms can create new products in new varieties has ushered in a new era of consumer choice. Both of these benefits to consumers, however, have come with a caveat. Easy price search can lead not only to intense price competition, but can also give firms strong incentives to obfuscate. Markets that have been transformed by easy price search include those for airfares, hotel stays, and electronics. It is not a coincidence that obfuscation has become more central to those markets since they moved online, and that those mar-
kets have become the focus of policy scrutiny. Likewise, innovations in payment technologies that make add-on options, upgrades, and product proliferation easy have offered, for instance, video gamers almost infinite variety in their gaming experiences, but could raise policy questions in those markets as firms become more sophisticated at raising prices for their products above marginal cost through obfuscation techniques. As we emphasized in our earlier work, new technologies can have unintended and unforeseen consequences on the markets where they are adopted. Whether technological innovation in retailing will tend to increase or decrease consumer welfare is not clear ex ante, which suggests careful study of individual markets by researchers and policymakers alike.

Finally, we want to emphasize that, although thinking about general policy remedies to address the issue of obfuscation seems overly ambitious and perhaps counterproductive, we do think that market-specific policies could have scope to help mitigate some of the welfare effects of obfuscation, if applied with an eye toward the specific characteristics and institutions of that market. We hope that this consideration of market specifics, combined with the discussion we have offered for thinking about welfare generally, can suggest a framework for considering and assessing policy interventions.

Endnotes

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1. New York Times, January 6, 2010.
2. The opportunity cost of time spent searching will be convex in a standard time-allocation problem, and consumers’ beliefs about how time consuming it will be to conduct additional searches also naturally increase in models with uncertainty about the fundamental difficulty of conveying information.
3. Sullivan (2017) raises an additional question regarding mandatory fees and intermediaries. If, in fact, the transfer from the firm to the intermediary for listing its product is a percentage of the advertised price, mandatory fees added later will lower the transfer to the intermediary, and could, perhaps, mitigate double marginalization.
4. Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2015.

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