SELF-OTHER DIALECTIC, HEGEL, AND THE CONTEMPORARY THEORY OF 'THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION' 

This paper approached the concepts of self-other dialectic and “the politics of recognition” from the aspect of Hegel's self-consciousness chapter in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Various authors attribute Hegel as a source and inspiration for the current theories of identity politics. This article is, therefore, focused on examining the implication of Hegel's idea of 'recognition' and 'self-consciousness' on the contemporary debates of identity politics. Hegel has an enormous contribution to the current debate on identity politics. This article shows that with specific reference to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel's understanding of 'recognition' in terms of the dialectic of consciousness is vital to see the contemporary theory of the politics of recognition in a broader epistemological and ontological basis. When it comes to the more practical and empirical political situation of these days, his idea of freedom and recognition has many important insights that support constitutional liberal system to handle 'needs' and 'demands' of recognition raised in identity politics. As Hegel has emphasised in many of his works, in the progress of human history, state (including the established institutions) is the Absolute Spirit that actualises the reciprocal freedom and mutual recognition of individuals in a broader political space. Based on these Hegelian insights, the study concluded that education, deliberative democracy, and institutions are substantial to handle competing 'needs' and 'demands' of recognition in identity politics without granting group rights and interests a constitutional recognition.

Key word: Hegel; Identity; Politics of Recognition; Recognition; Self-consciousness.

Introduction

These days, identity politics is becoming the main form of politics in the advanced industrial societies of the West, and other parts of the world (Burns, 2006; Fukuyama, 2018a). Francis Fukuyama took the current government of Hungary, USA following the election of Donald Trump, and the UK concerning BREXIT as some of the examples of the shift to identity politics and nationalism (Fukuyama, 2018ab). The rise of leftist political parties in Europe and other parts of the world has also made identity politics a master concept of political struggle and bargaining. Charles Taylor also mentioned Canada in Quebec case as an example of identity politics that comes from the politics of difference and multiculturalism (Taylor, 1994). After cold war and collapse of socialism, the ideological shift from Marxian ‘class consciousness’ to ‘identity consciousness’ has also contributed to the development of identity politics especially, in the post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa (Malsevic, 2005). Concerning this ideological change, the post-1991 Ethiopia is one of the examples in which the country’s constitution has provided recognition for group rights under the title of “the right of nations and nationalities” (FDRE Constitution, 1995). However, apart from conceptual analysis and objections against identity politics, several studies indicated that the growth of identity politics worldwide is not a positive development for democracy, national unity, and global political stability. Fukuyama warns, "unless liberal democracies can work their way back to more universal understandings of human dignity, they will doom themselves and the world to continuing conflict" (Fukuyama, 2018a).

The rise of identity politics is, in fact, a significant encounter to the overwhelming liberal politics of many countries in the West. The majority versus minority relationship, emigrant issues, political representations of emerging cultural groups related to gender and LGBs (lesbian, gay and bisexual movements) are significant challenges against the individualist liberal system or commonly called "conservative liberalism". The rise of populist nationalism and other movements enticed by collective interests and group rights are also becoming significant encounters of "libertarians" or the politics of liberalism in general. Charles Taylor described these kinds of challenges as "the need and the demand" for the politics of recognition (Taylor, 1994); whereas Fukuyama named it as the struggle for "identity politics" (Fukuyama, 2018a). According to Taylor, the "need" for the politics of recognition is a driving force behind nationalism movements in politics. On the other hand, the "demand" comes from the politics of difference or multiculturalism, which is linked with the supposed defining characteristics of human beings as a cultural group and the demand for political representations in the political space upon group or cultural rights and interests (Taylor, 1994).

Charles Taylor associates identity politics with social institutions and the differential social roles and moral duties which individuals with their differential roles and positions constitute those social-political institutions (Taylor, 1994). Burns also describes identity politics in terms of its focus on the nature, allocation, and exercise of a basic form of power in any society or political community (Burns, 2006). In this way, identity politics is conceptualised with two approaches and political practices: con-
servative and radical identity politics. The conservative identity politics is an approach committed to defending the existing hierarchical social orders with its social institutions, their differential social roles, and their attendant inequalities of one kind or another. Conservative liberal traditions can be mentioned as an example of conservative identity politics. In contrast, radical identity politics rejects the existing social institutions with their differential social roles, corresponding social identities and framework of reciprocal rights and duties associated with them (Burns, 2006). Robinson divided this radical identity politics into four: cultural monists, radical fluid, fluid identities, and fluid-yet-fragile identities (Robinson, 2007). The politics of cultural liberalists and multiculturalists such as Charles Taylor and Will Kyamlika, who focus on group rights represents a radical form of identity politics. The divide between conservative and radical identity politics rests on the difference in interpretations of the formation of identity in the dialectical relation of Self-Other. As Grier argues, these interpretations include identity as dialectical development of Self over Others' difference; identity as self's relation to itself without any logical connection with Others; and identity as developing form, the mutual recognition of sameness and difference through relation to Other (Grier, 2007).

Research methods

Hegel's contribution to the current debate on identity politics can be conceived based on those earlier approaches to identity politics and discourses on the formation of self-identity. Those scholars (e.g. Tautzi, 2007; Winkiel, 2008 and others inspired by Michael Foucault) who focus on Hegel's Philosophy of Right and the Geography of World History consider Hegel as an advocate of conservative identity politics, but the critique of his approach was an inspiration for them to come up with their ideas concerning the radical form of identity politics. In contrast, those who focus on Hegel's account of the struggle for recognition in Phenomenology of Spirit consider Hegel as a source of theoretical inspiration for alternative theories and political practices critical to accommodate needs and demands related to the politics of recognition and identity (Burns, 2006; Ikâheimo, 2013). Hegel's contribution to the current debate on identity politics is seen in the light of these dualistic interpretations of his work at a different time. In either way of interpretations of Hegel's work, theories of recognition central to identity politics and communitarian political philosophies are all descendants of Hegel's understanding of the formation of identity (Douzinas, 2002).

Hegel's broader ideas on identity and recognition are viewed within the totality of his metaphysics of self and his social philosophy in all his works. Nevertheless, Hegel's idea of the struggle for recognition in the sphere of politics and identity is best captured in his conception of the dialectic of consciousness and self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. In this work, the idea of recognition remains central in his analysis of self-consciousness and the lordship and bondsman's relation. Hegel argues, "for all human beings everywhere self-consciousness exists 'when', and by the fact that it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being 'acknowledged' or 'recognised'" (Hegel, 1977). Hegel maintains that in the dialectical development of self-consciousness and the process being conscious of oneself as universal, 'recognition' reconciles the negation and opposition of self to itself, to things out there, and other fellow human beings in self's encounter with Others. In the first section, therefore, the article is focused on examining Hegel's idea of self-other dialectic and the concept of recognition in the "self-consciousness" chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel's discussion of the dialectic of mastery and slavery is intended to serve as an illustrative example of what Hegel has in mind about the development of self-consciousness (Burns, 2006). In connection with this, the article scrutinised self-consciousness and the struggle for recognition in the lordship and bondsman relationship. The subsequent section explored the implication of Hegel's idea of recognition on the contemporary debates of identity politics. The final part of the paper took insights from Hegel's idea of freedom and recognition and reflected on solutions for today's political crisis related to recognition and the struggle for identity politics.

Analysis, Result and Discussions

Self-Other Dialectic, Self-Consciousness, and the Notion of Recognition. In Hegel's idea, the "dialectical mediation" has an implication for the theory of identity and difference as well as for the theory of recognition (Grier, 2007). Hegelian dialectic has two dimensions. The first one is related to the dialectic and development of the identity of a person. This dimension is closely connected to Hegel's conception of consciousness and self-consciousness and the struggle for recognition. The second dimension is manifested in the general historical trajectory of people, society, institutions, morals, religions and all aspect of social existence and the historical contradictions and developments (Douzinas, 2002). In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel has presented the dialectical mediation in terms of the levels of consciousness. These levels include the awareness of objects in the environment with the force of primitive Desire; the immediate awareness of 'I' myself as 'I', and to the final stage of self-consciousness with the encounter of other self-conscious subjects (Hegel, 1977). On the other hand, in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, the dialectical mediation involves the development in the construction of difference and identity which includes logical progressions from the Logic of Being, to the Logic of Essence, and the Logic of Concept (Hegel, 2007). As William argues, for Hegel, 'difference is a negative moment of the dialectic, and it is an inherent contradiction in every step of dialectical development that propels the struggle for recognition and moves self to its unity and universality (Williams, 2007).

Hegel's dialectical development represents the contradiction and synthesis inherent in the formation of identity and difference. Dialectic is a rule governing the development of consciousness and self-consciousness within the negation and unity of Self-Other. Here, recognition is central in the dialectic to resolve negations within consciousness. As Williams argues, for Hegel the process of recognition is driven by the existential necessity or the need to overcome this contradiction which the self finds itself in the process of consciousness and self-consciousness in (i.e. in relation with others, desire, desire to itself, and Other human subjects) (Williams, 2007). Thus, self-other dialectic for Hegel is the logical and temporal progression behind the process of consciousness and self-consciousness. Self-consciousness itself undergoes in the process of being "for itself" and "being for another". The struggle for recognition represents this process of contradiction until mutual recognition resolves the negation of self as being for itself and being for others.

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, its architectonic is systematically structured, and it shows the philosophical
parallelism that the conceptual logic governs the development of the object-Notion and the subject-Notion, and world-historical forces (Stewart, 1994). In the Phenomenology of Spirit, these levels of cognition represent consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason, each provided in a separate chapter. In the self-consciousness chapter, Hegel provided the conceptual logic governing the Subject-Notion. As Ikäheimo claims, the self-consciousness-chapter can be best captured into three sections: Desire, “recognitive” self-consciousness, and general self-consciousness. These parts of analysis represent the levels of consciousness and self-consciousness in man’s relation to himself as a “being” or identity in the form of unity and self-certainty (Ikäheimo, 2013). At the beginning of the chapter, Hegel claims that we cannot reach to the unified concept of the object through consciousness alone, which the consciousness that moves from immediate self-certainty to perception, and the “Force” and “Understanding”. He claims, “what the object immediately was in itself-mere being in sense-certainty [. . .] self the concrete thing of perception, and for the Understanding, a Force - proves to be in truth, not this at all; instead, this in-itself turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for another” (Hegel, 1977: §166). Instead, for Hegel, any account of knowledge must include an analysis of self-consciousness since, as he claims, we can only account for consciousness through self-consciousness. In self-consciousness, the knowing self-the subject moves from the knowing objects to the knowing self itself.

For Hegel, the first level of consciousness of the subject is consciousness through the object of desire. As a conscious being, the subject makes relations with Other objects in the environment through desire. At this level of consciousness, the Other and in the consciousness is the negative objects of desire. For Hegel, “self-consciousness is a desire in general” (Hegel, 1977: §167), and the movement of self-consciousness consists in satisfying desire by overcoming the difference between what is and what it desires in a unity between the subject and the object. Human being’s consciousness of the object will then be reflected on the human desire to certain self-the concrete thing of perception, and for the self, a Force - that proves to be in truth, this at all; instead, this in-itself turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for another” (Hegel, 1977: §166). Instead, for Hegel, any account of knowledge must include an analysis of self-consciousness since, as he claims, we can only account for consciousness through self-consciousness. In self-consciousness, the knowing self-the subject moves from the knowing objects to the knowing self itself.

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In the trial by death, each seeks the other's death at the cost of his own life. Although there is a chance for each person to recognize each other through the consciousness of the other mutually, in this primitive stage, death comes as the natural negation of consciousness (Hegel, 1977: §186). Everyone does not have equal power, and at this stage, it is impossible to establish lasting recognition through each as being a potential killer over others. As Hegel claims, death is a natural negation of consciousness. However, an attempt to affirm one's recognition through death is a negation without permanence. It does not last long and makes a person free and independent at the cost of the death of the other. Thus, the only way both subjects survive at this stage is when one submits to the will of the other. In the relationship, the one unyielding will be a master, and then the other yielding will be the slave. Both parties avoid death when the master is recognized as the acquisitive slave, but the slave is not recognized by the master and is dependent on the master. This relationship depicts Hegel's second stage of "recognitive" consciousness.

In the second stage of the struggle for recognition, one member-the lordship is self-sufficient, living only for himself, and the other-the bondsman is dependent, living entirely for another. Hegel analyzed this relationship in terms of the existence of two opposed shapes of consciousness. The one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to live or to be for another. The former is lord, and the other is bondsman (Hegel, 1977: §189). The lord depicts the consciousness that exists for itself which is mediated with itself through another consciousness, i.e. through a consciousness whose nature it is to be bound up with an independent at the cost of the death of the other. Thus, she is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is to live or to be for another. Here the lord is independent vis-a-vis the slave, but the consciousness the master has at this stage is like the consciousness of thinghood. Though the master is conscious of himself as independent, he is not self-conscious based on the recognition of the slave as an 'equal' conscious being. Hegel explains the relation of the master and the bondsman as follows:

The lord relates himself mediately to the bondsman through a being [a thing] that is independent, for it is just this which holds the bondsman in bondage; it is his chain from which he could not break free in the struggle, thus proving himself to be dependent, to possess his independence in thinghood. But the lord is the power over this thing, for he proved in the struggle that it is something merely negative; since he is the power over this thing and this again is the power over the other [the bondsman], it follows that he holds the other in subjection (Hegel, 1977: §190).

At the second stage of recognition, the relationship of the master and the slave lacks a recognition proper. In other words, it lacks the mutual recognition of the two as one sees others in the way he/she sees himself. Hegel argues, "the moment is lacking that what the lord does to the other he also does to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself he should also do to the other. The outcome is a recognition that is one-sided and unequal" (Hegel, 1977: §191). As Burns claims, in Hegel's idea, there are two prerequisites for self-consciousness. Firstly, the individual is conscious of himself as a concrete self which possesses a fixed social position-individual selves see themselves as others see them or the society see them as possessing a determinate social identity. However, in the second prerequisite individuals must also possess universal characteristics of rationality and freedom, which is necessarily shared by all human beings (Burns, 2006).

For Hegel, to be conscious of oneself in one's particularity or as possessing of a determinate social identity is a necessary condition for seeing oneself as universal and vice versa. Thus, for Hegel, the identity of oneself from the label in society is to have a determinate social identity in a society. However, this relationship and labelling of one's identity as a slave and master in a social position is not based on self-consciousness and the consciousness of others as free and equal beings. As a result, this relationship between the master and slave is subject to dialectic and negation. Of course, the identity of oneself in a social position as a slave and master is a precondition for the development of self-consciousness- a consciousness of oneself as a free being whose freedom is acknowledged by others with a significant encounter of the self with others. Thus, for Hegel, the dialectic and negation of consciousness move to the final level of self-consciousness. This stage, as Ikäheim claims, is the level of "concrete freedom", the subject realizes his/her real freedom by knowing him/herself within an independent Other. All subjects are conscious of themselves in the Other in the sense of being affirmed by Other's recognition. Ikäheim claims that in this stage, neither is trying to subsume the other under one's egocentric perspective (the first negation or moment of difference); yet, somehow neither of them "differs" herself/himself from the other (the second negation or moment of unity). The unity with oneself is formed with a new form orientation of subjectivity as intersubjectivity (Ikäheimo, 2013). In the self-consciousness chapter and the reason chapter, Hegel envisioned this kind of relations, a relation of full equality based on mutual recognition as a necessary condition of authentic self-consciousness.

If we take this goal and this is the Notion which for us has already appeared on the scene-in its reality, viz. the self-consciousness that is recognised and acknowledged, and which has its own self-certainty in the other free self-consciousness and possesses its truth precisely in that 'other'; in other words, if we look on this still inner Spirit as a substance that has already advanced to the stage of having an outer existence, then in this Notion there is disclosed the realm of ethical life. For this is nothing else than the absolute spiritual unity of essence of individuals in their independent actual existence, it is an intrinsically universal self-consciousness that takes itself to be actual in another self-consciousness, in such wise that this has complete independence, or is looked on as a Thing, and it is precisely therein that the universal self-consciousness is aware of its unity with it, and only in this unity with this objective being is it self-consciousness (Hegel, 1977: §349).

For Hegel, consciousness has three levels: consciousness through the object of desire; consciousness of itself in itself; and self-consciousness within the recognition of Others. In the contemporary philosophical and anthropological theories identity, these levels of consciousness represent three kinds of interpretations of the formations of identity. The first signifies the formation of identity as a practical manner of achieving the identity with the different Others. Here, the identity of individual and community's sameness is conceived as dialectical development of Self over Others' difference. The alterity of self from others is considered to be the identity of self. The second conception is the understanding of the identity of self to itself without any logical connection with Others. In a more metaphysical sense, this discourse on identity can be connected to the 'cartesian model of the rational subject'- "I think; therefore, I am". The third conception, however, goes beyond the two discourses and observes identity essentially as a developing form, the mutual
recognition of sameness and difference through relation to Other (Grier, 2007). Hegel's conception of authentic identity rests on the third interpretation of identity. However, for Hegel, identity is constructed as a developing form that passes through various stages of consciousness and self-consciousness. Thus, for Hegel, the first and second interpretations of identity do not describe the formation of genuine identity; instead, they are levels of consciousness in the development of authentic identity. Recognition for Hegel has an ontological/anthropological, and political contents. While the ontological/anthropological content of recognition signifies the formation of identity, its political content rests on recognition of self by others and by legal and social institutions. The more political sense of the connection between self-consciousness and struggle for recognition is vividly seen in Hegel's analysis recognition at institutional societal levels.

In his other works, Hegel translated the idealist movement of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit into the history of state and society, and he analyzed struggles at family, institutional and state levels. While at the family level, the underlying force of recognition is love, at the institutional and state level, recognition is institutionally and socially mediated and actualised in the forms of customs, laws, and rights. As Douzinas in light of Hegel's Philosophy of Rights argues, rights (legal, human, or political rights) are the result of the continued struggle for recognition of a non-recognition (Douzinas, 2002). Jon Stewart, in his latest publication, also looks human rights in terms of philosophical anthropology and the existence of the concept with some historical circumstances. With both aspects of the origin of human rights, Stewart believes that Hegel's theories of philosophical anthropology and philosophy of history are essential to ground human rights in a fundamental philosophical and historical foundation. The author argues that the modern idea of human rights could only come about at a specific point in time when the anthropological conception allowed for it. Stewart further claims that human rights emerged when humans came to be regarded as having an inward sphere of subjectivity and being capable of exercising their freedom. In this case, Hegel's idea of the Phenomenology of Spirit is essential to ground human rights under the broader philosophical anthropology (Stewart, 2019). Thus, Hegel's idea on "recognitive" consciousness and philosophical anthropologies in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Rights is vital to broadly comprehend human rights and the contemporary debates on the politics of recognition.

The politics of recognition or identity politics is a struggle for rights. It goes beyond the usual struggle for respect as an individual. It instead aims at realising collective or group needs and demands for being acknowledged by some other people or groups. So, the struggle for recognition arises amidst of the society or community as a background where recognised, and non-recognised groups do no longer co-exist as one dependent group on another or as one is free, but the other is not. In fact, from the aspect of history, human rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s, and political struggles and nationalisms movements during and after socialism are all popular struggles against non-recognitions. The underlying demand and need behind the movements were what Hegel has presented in the form relationship of non-recognition between the lord and bondsman. Likewise, contemporary political movements such as minority rights, the rights of women, rights associated with emigrants, LGBs and other collective interests enticed by cultural rights are all extensions of the struggle for recognition of human and political rights to the 'excluded groups'. In this regard, it is right to claim that today's ideas and theories concerning the politics of recognition are philosophically grounded in what Hegel has presented in the form of the dialectic of consciousnes.

The Contemporary Theory of the Politics of Recognition and Hegel. The politics of recognition or identity politics as an alternative political theory is motivated epistemically and ontologically with the critique of liberalism of Hobbes, Locke, and Kant (among others). Liberalism is rooted in the "cartesian" model of the rational subject as central to the political philosophy. However, as Toddington based on Hegel's critique of the then liberalism, this conservative liberalism has a dialectical deficiency rooted in the atomistic view of self. Toddington took the idea of Hegel, and he argues that the "atomistic" perspective in liberalism appears to be an obstacle to accommodate liberty and equality and entertain mutual recognition between subjects (Toddington, 2015). The politics of recognition stands from this grand Hegelian critique of individualism and individualist conception of justice the political philosophy of liberalism. Thus, the politics of recognition has ontological and anthropological foundation going back to the idea of Hegel. As Procyshyn & Wenning presented, the transformation in the social ontology of the struggle for recognition (Procyshyn & Wenning, 2019). In a more philosophical-theoretical sense, the ontological basis of the politics of recognition lies within every man's search for his/her being, and autonomy in one's cultural community in the broader societal space. The politics of recognition also has a practical-political interest centring at the advocacy for justice which 'liberal individualism' is critiqued as it lacks with its prime focus on the individual self and associated goods or rights.

The ontological demand for recognition is more of an existential demand for psychological self-affirmation. However, this demand is followed by practical-political interests. Observing the past political history and activist struggle for the politics of identity, this practical political interest is manifested in the 'demand' and the 'need' for group or communal representations of individuals in the constitution and the political space upon group rights or cultural rights and interests. In his recent interview on The Economist, Fukuyama has identified the ground of the recent shift to identity politics, which from his explanation, the foundation has an ontological basis. He associates this shift with the re-thinking of modern identity, which is built around self-esteem, and the increasing association of the cause of low self-esteem of some groups with marginalisation by some other people. For Fukuyama, the struggle for the politics of recognition is like a 'therapeutic turn'. It is a struggle of people who feel they are marginalised by others and want to regain their self-esteem. As Fukuyama claims, this turn has coincided with great social movements of the 1960s (Fukuyama, 2018b). So, the underlying factor for the recent shift in identity politics lies in the re-orientation of politics and political-social positions in light of self-other dichotomy and the demand for communal representations in the political space.

Robinson described the politics of recognition as the urgency to move towards cultural liberalism, a politics that advocates for justice to cultural, national, ethnic, or societal groups than individuals. He argues, "justice to be properly understood, requires liberal-democratic conceptions of justice that equates equal treatment with identical treatment to be modified, or even transformed, to facilitate the accommodation of cultural groups" (Robinson, 2007).
When we look at the history idea of the theory of recognition, most of the authors on the politics of recognition agree on the centrality of social/cultural justice. Nevertheless, there is a difference among authors concerning political solutions to the demand and needs for recognition in identity politics. For instance, Will Kymlicka argues that the individual based liberal principles could respect for cultural communities through the entitlement of “special” rights. These rights are interests and goods, a specific group or cultural society enjoys on the ground of their ‘differences’ and ‘special advantages’. Thus, as he claims, without changing the general liberal principles, the rights of specific cultural groups can be accommodated by granting them exclusive constitutional rights (Kymlicka, 1995). Different from Kyamlika, J. Habermas (1994) argues in defence of the applicability of constitutional liberalism. However, for liberal constitutionalism to function well and to accommodate the needs and demands associated with the politics of recognition, Habermas appeals to a ‘reorganised public sphere’ (Habermas, 1994). On the contrary, Taylor argues that proper respect for cultural differences and acceptance requires a move away from liberal principles of individualism to cultural liberalism (Taylor, 1994).

The philosophical background of the idea of politics of recognition is connected within re-thinking of identity and ‘autonomy’ of humans given in the forms of pure Cartesian dualism, or a psychical-ethical individual essence of human beings in the enlightenment. Instead, it observes identity and ‘dignity’ humans in the community and the broader political space. For instance, unlike the individual liberals, cultural liberalists (e.g. Taylor and Kyamlika) justify the need and the demand for recognition based on the significant role the community plays on self-identity and communal justice. However, one approach’s failure is that both individual liberalists and cultural liberalists did not explicitly differentiate the multiple normative contexts or social spaces a person in his/her everydayness is situated as a member of a particular cultural community and the state politics. Individual liberalists conceive self-identity in terms of legal and moral personalities alone. In light of this conception, when it comes to the handling of cultural differences and related identity questions and rights in the political space, they put a promise on capitalism and stick to the principle of difference - blindness as the cornerstone of justice. However, this may be against the dignity, interest, and rights of individuals by the reason that cultural community may play a significant role in one’s identity whenever individuals choose it as a manifestation of their personality and political life. Besides, when it comes to compensation of the historical injustice and inequalities, the theories seem ineffective to entertain a sense of equity at the absys of justice.

Contrary to the assumptions of cultural liberalists in the politics of recognition, the extent and value of cultural community for the individuals’ self-identification and recognition is an existential concern than collective matter determined by a collective communal agency. Moreover, unlike cultural liberalists, identity is not pre-given, absolute and static—identity changes with the change in time and space within the change in every selves’ lives. The same thing works for the issues we demand to be recognised: it changes with time and space. Thus, we can claim that there is no static group identity and group right that would be tagged to individuals permanently, nor can we take any of collective categories to represent groups interests or rights permanently in the political space. The demand for recognition in light of communal cultural factors or elements, group interests and rights are all at its basis shaped by an existential necessity to be free or to express oneself with them in our relationship with other groups or cultural communities. So, the one who claims recognition is not the abstract society or cultural group, but it is the concretely existing self or the individual who asks for it and struggle to have it. Even though these demands seem to have a collective overtone as it is entertained in the politics of identity, at its basis, the demand and interest come from the individual’s existential necessity to be identified or associated with a particular group or collective categories. The same is true for rights; even though rights such as the right to language, the right to express oneself with one’s own culture appear to be group rights, it is the concretely exiting individual who asks for these rights and enjoys them in the broader public political space. Of course, these rights emerge in the point of struggle for recognition amidst of the non-recognised social contexts. Accordingly, a political approach that considers the reciprocal freedom and mutual respect of the need and the demand for recognition is imperative to handle questions of identity politics. In this case, Hegel’s conception of freedom and recognition offers philosophical and anthropological insights to devise practical political solutions to the crisis related to identity politics.

Conclusions

Hegel has an enormous contribution to the current debate on identity politics. With specific reference to Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel's understanding of recognition in terms of the dialectic of consciousness is vital to see the contemporary theory of the politics of recognition in a broader epistemological and ontological basis. When it comes to Hegel, he emphasises the dynamic aspect of these days, Hegel's conception of freedom and recognition mainly, in his early Jena works, has many important insights that support liberal constitutionalism to handle ‘needs’ and ‘demands’ in the politics of recognition. As Hegel has emphasised in many of his works, state (and the established institutions) is the absolute Spirit that actualises the recognition of individuals in a broader political space. Based on these Hegelian insights, education, deliberative democracy, and institutions are substantial to handle competing demands of recognition of group rights and interests without granting constitutional recognition for group rights. In this case, unlike the cultural liberalist interpretations of Hegel (such as Charles Taylor and Will Kyamlika), a particular reading of Hegel suitably modified by Jurgen Habermas and John Dewey offers promising normative accounts of social and political institutions that could help to handle the current political crisis related to identity politics. Both Hegel and Habermas propose an intersubjective recognition account of freedom. However, when it comes to more practical politics, Habermas appeals to the open public sphere and deliberative democracy instead of Hegel's most abstract sense of universality through reason (Habermas, 1985). Dewey was also influenced by Hegel, especially in his early works. Like Habermas, Dewey emphasises the role of deliberative democracy and open public space to address political and public policy issues. However, in a more pragmatic manner, Dewey emphasises the role of education to build democracy, and democratic institutions, and to bring the overall growth of the society.

Dewey contends that education emancipates individuals from social dependence. Education enhances individual and collective efficacy through liberation and the
ДИАЛЕКТИКА «СВІЙ-ІНШІЙ», ГЕГЕЛЬ І СУЧАСНА ТЕОРІЯ «ПОЛІТИКИ ВИЗНАННЯ»

Стаття присвячена переосмисленню сучасної концепції «політики визнання» в контексті діалектики «свій-інший», поданої Гегелем у «Феноменології духу». Цікаво слушно Гегель вважається передтечою і натхненником для сучасних теорій політики ідентичності. Метою статті є доведення ідейного зв'язку між гегелівським вченням про «визнання» та «самосвідомість» і сучасними уявлами про зміст політики ідентичності. Доводиться, що Гегель має величезний вплив на чинні дискусії щодо політики ідентичності. Посилаючись на «Феноменології духу», автор статті демонструє, що розробка Гегелем поняття «визнання» з точки зору діалектики свідомості є необхідною передумовою для розуміння більш широких
онтологічних і гносеологічних засад сучасної політики визнання. Обґрунтовується думка, що гегелівська ідея свободи і визнання підтримує існуючу конституційну ліберальну систему для задоволення «потреб» та «вимог» визнання, на яких будується теорія ідентичності. Як підкреслював Гегель у багатьох своїх працях, у ході історії людства, Держава (включаючи створені інститути) - це Абсолютний Дух, який актуалізує взаємну свободу та взаємне визнання людей у більш широкому політичному просторі. Відстовхуючись від цих гегелівських тез, автор статті дійшов висновку, що освіта, дорадча демократія, інститути громадянського суспільства є інструментами для вирішення конкуруючих «потреб» та «вимог» визнання в політиці ідентичності, які не торкаються конституційного визнання соціальних прав та інтересів.

Ключові слова: Гегель; ідентичність; політика визнання; визнання; самопізнання.