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THE DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
AND NON-ABELIAN NILPOTENT GROUPS

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Abstract. In this paper we study a key exchange protocol similar to
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, using abelian subgroups of
the automorphism group of a non-abelian nilpotent group. We also
generalize group no.92 of the Hall-Senior table [16] to an arbitrary prime
p and show that, for those groups, the group of central automorphisms
is commutative. We use these for the key exchange we are studying.

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1. Introduction

In this paper we generalize the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol from
a cyclic group to a finitely presented non-abelian nilpotent group of class 2.
Similar efforts were made in [2, 3, 25] to use braid groups, a family of finitely
presented non-commutative groups [4, 10], in key exchange. We also refer
to [40, Section 3] for a formal description of a key exchange protocol similar
to ours. Our efforts are not solely directed to construct an efficient and
fast key exchange protocol. We also try to understand the conjecture, the
discrete logarithm problem is equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman problem in a
cyclic group. We develop and study protocols where, at least theoretically,
non-abelian groups can be used to share a secret or exchange private keys
between two people over an insecure channel. This development is significant
because nilpotent or, more specifically, p-groups have nice presentations and
computation in those groups is fast and easy [41, Chapter 9]. So our work
can be seen as a nice application of the advanced and developed subject of
p-groups and computation with p-groups.

The frequently used public key cryptosystems are slow and use mainly
number theoretic complexity. The specific cryptographic primitive that we
have in mind is the discrete logarithm problem, DLP for short. DLP is gen-
eral enough to be defined in an arbitrary cyclic group as follows: let \( G = \langle g \rangle \)
be a cyclic group generated by \( g \) and let \( g^n = h \), where \( n \in \mathbb{N} \). Given \( g \) and
\( h \), DLP is to find \( n \) [42, Chapter 6]. The security of the discrete logarithm

\[1\] The author expresses his gratitude to the referee for this reference.
problem depends on the representation of the group. It is trivial in $\mathbb{Z}_n$, but is much harder (no polynomial time algorithm known) in the multiplicative group of a finite field and even harder (no sub-exponential time algorithm known) in the group of elliptic curves which are not supersingular [5]. But with the invention of sub-exponential algorithms for breaking the discrete logarithm problem, like the index calculus and Coppersmith’s algorithm, multiplicative groups of finite fields are no longer that attractive especially the ones of characteristic 2.

The discrete logarithm problem can be used in many other groups like the group of elliptic curves, in which case a cyclic group or a big enough cyclic component of an abelian group is used. In this article we propose a generalization of DLP or more specifically the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol in situations where the group has more than one generator, i.e., in a finitely presented non-abelian group. Let $f$ be an automorphism of a finitely presented group $G$ generated by $\{a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n\}$. If one knows the action of $f$ on $a \in G$, i.e., $f(a)$, then it is difficult for him to tell the action of $f$ on any other $b \in G$ i.e., $f(b)$. We describe this in detail later under the name “the general discrete logarithm problem”. In this paper we work with finitely presented groups in terms of generators and relations and do not consider any representation of that group. Though that seems to be a good idea for future research.

Now suppose for a moment that $G = \langle g \rangle$ is a cyclic group and that we are given $g$ and $g^n$ where $\text{gcd}(n, |G|) = 1$. DLP is to find $n$. Notice that in this case the map $x \mapsto x^n$ is an automorphism. If we conjecture that finding the automorphism is finding $n$ then one way to see DLP, in terms of group theory, is to find the automorphism from its image on one element. This is the central idea that we want to generalize to non-abelian finitely presented groups, especially to a family of $p$-groups of class 2. This explains our choice of the name the general discrete logarithm problem.

To work with a finitely presented group and its automorphisms the following properties of the group are needed.

- A consistent and natural representation of the elements in the group.
- Computation in the group should be fast and easy.
- The automorphism group should be known and the automorphisms should have a nice enough presentation so that images can be computed quickly.

We note at this point that for a $p$-group the first two requirements are satisfied [31, Chapter 9].
2. Our Contribution in this Article

The central idea behind this article is to study a generalization of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) that we call the general discrete logarithm problem (GDLP). As a cryptographic primitive the concept of GDLP seems to be secure (see Section 4.1).

To use GDLP we use a Diffie-Hellman like key exchange protocol using finitely presented $p$-groups with an abelian central automorphism group. In this case the security depends not only on GDLP but also on GDHP (see Section 4.2) which turns out to be insecure in the specific case we are studying.

Section 8 of this paper contains a brief survey of all the group theoretic results necessary for a reader to understand the later part of this paper. However, a knowledgeable reader might choose to ignore Section 8 altogether and come back to it when required. In Section 10 we survey the existing literature for groups with abelian automorphism group and show that none of them are adequate for the key exchange we are studying.

We found no groups readily available in the literature, hence we had to develop a family of groups $G_n(m,p)$ with abelian central automorphism group (Section 10). This is a significant contribution to the theory of finite groups because $G_n(m,p)$ is a generalization of group no. 92 of the Hall-Senior table. We describe the group of automorphisms for this group and further prove that this group is Miller if and only if $p = 2$.

We do not claim that the key exchange protocol is secure. Rather, we show that the key exchange protocol is insecure for the particular family of groups that we picked. Our study raises two important questions which are of interest both mathematically as well as cryptographically.

a: Are there groups different from $G_n(m,p)$, with an abelian central automorphism group, for which the key exchange protocol is secure?

b: Does there exist any cryptographic protocol with reductionist security proof, where the security of the protocol depends only on the discrete logarithm problem? If one can find such a protocol using cyclic groups then that could be generalized using GDLP, and since we claim that GDLP is a secure primitive, this will give rise to a secure cryptosystem using non-abelian groups.

3. Some Notations and Definitions

We now describe some of the definitions and notations that will be used in this paper. The notations used are standard:

- $G$ will denote a finite group. $Z = Z(G)$ denotes the center of the group $G$ and will be denoted by $Z$ if no confusion can arise.
• $G' = [G, G]$ is the commutator subgroup of $G$.
• $\text{Aut}(G)$ and $\text{Aut}_c(G)$ are the group of automorphisms and the group of central automorphisms of $G$, respectively.
• $\Phi(G)$ is the Frattini subgroup of $G$, which is the intersection of all maximal subgroups of $G$.
• We denote the commutator of $a, b$ by $[a, b]$ where $[a, b] = a^{-1}b^{-1}ab$.
• The exponent of a $p$-group $G$, denoted by $\exp(G)$, is the largest power of $p$ that is the order of an element in $G$.

The following commutator formulas hold for any element $a, b$ and $c$ in any group $G$.

(a): $a^b = a[a, b]$

(b): $[ab, c] = [a, c][b, c]$ [it follows that in a nilpotent group of class 2, $[ab, c] = [a, c][b, c]$]

(c): $[a, bc] = [a, c][a, b]^c = [a, c][a, b][a, b, c]$ it follows that in a nilpotent group of class 2, $[a, bc] = [a, b][a, c]$

(d): $[a, b]^{-1} = [b, a]$

The proof of these formulas follow from direct computation or can be found in [23].

Definition (Miller Group). A group $G$ is called a Miller group if it has an abelian automorphism group, in other words, if $\text{Aut}(G)$ is commutative then the group $G$ is Miller.

Definition (Central Automorphisms). Let $G$ be a group, then $\phi \in \text{Aut}(G)$ is called a central automorphism if $g^{-1}\phi(g) \in Z(G)$ for all $g \in G$. Alternately, one might say that $\phi$ is a central automorphism if $\phi(g) = gz_{\phi,g}$ where $z_{\phi,g} \in Z(G)$ depends on $g$ and $\phi$. If $\phi$ is clear from the context then we can simplify the notation as $\phi(g) = gz_g$.

Apart from inner automorphisms, central automorphisms are second best in terms of nice description. They are very attractive for cryptographic purposes, since it is easy to describe the automorphisms and compute the image of an arbitrary element.

Theorem 3.1. The centralizer of the group of inner automorphisms is the group of central automorphisms. Moreover a central automorphism fixes the commutator elementwise.

This theorem first appears in [13] which refers to [17] and [46].

Definition (Polycyclic Group). Let $G$ be a group, a finite series of subgroups in $G$

$G = G_0 \triangleright G_1 \triangleright G_2 \triangleright G_3 \triangleright \ldots \triangleright G_n = 1$
is a polycyclic series if $G_i/G_{i+1}$ is cyclic and $G_{i+1}$ is a normal subgroup of $G_i$. Any group with polycyclic series is a polycyclic group.

It is easy to prove that finitely generated nilpotent groups are polycyclic, hence any finitely generated $p$-group is polycyclic. Let $a_i$ be an element in $G_i$ whose image generates $G_i/G_{i+1}$. Then the sequence $\{a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n\}$ is called a polycyclic generating set. It is easy to see that $g \in G$ can be written as $g = a_1^{\alpha_1} a_2^{\alpha_2} \ldots a_n^{\alpha_n}$, where $\alpha_i$ are integers. If $g = a_1^{\alpha_1} a_2^{\alpha_2} \ldots a_n^{\alpha_n}$ where $0 \leq \alpha_i < m_i$, $m_i = |G_i : G_{i+1}|$ then the expression is a collected word. Each element $g \in G$ can be expressed by a unique collected word. Computation with these collected words is easy and implementable in computer, for more information on this topic see [41, Section 9.4] and also [15, polycyclic package].

4. Key Exchange

We want to follow the Diffie-Hellman Key exchange protocol using a commutative subgroup of the automorphism group of a finitely presented group $G$. The security of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol in a cyclic group rests on the following three factors:

- **DLP**: The discrete logarithm problem.
- **DHP**: The Diffie-Hellman problem.
- **DDH**: The decision Diffie-Hellman problem [6, 7, 14, 39, 44].

We have already described the discrete logarithm problem. The Diffie-Hellman problem is the following: let $G = \langle g \rangle$ be a cyclic group of order $n$. One knows $g$, $g^a$ and $g^b$, and the problem is to compute $g^{ab}$. It is not known if DLP is equivalent to DHP. The decision Diffie-Hellman problem is more subtle. Suppose that DHP is a hard problem, so it is impossible to compute $g^{ab}$ from $g^a$, $g^b$ and $g$. But what happens if someone can compute or predict 80% of the binary bits of $g^{ab}$ from $g^a$, $g^b$ and $g$, then the adversary will have 80% of the shared secret or the private key; that is most of the private key. This is clearly unacceptable. It is often hard to formalize DDH in exact mathematical terms ([7, Section 3]); the best formalism offered is a randomness criterion for the bits of the key. In DDH we ask the question, given the triple $g^a$, $g^b$ and $g^c$ is $c = ab \mod n$? But there is no known link between DDH and any mathematically hard problem for the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol in cyclic groups.

Clearly, solving the discrete logarithm problem solves the Diffie-Hellman problem and solving the Diffie-Hellman problem solves the decision Diffie-Hellman problem.

As is usual, we denote by Alice and Bob, two people trying to set up a private key over an insecure channel to communicate securely and Oscar an
In this paper the shared secret or the private key is an element of a finitely presented group $G$.

4.1. General Discrete Logarithm Problem. Let $G = \langle a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n \rangle$ and $f : G \to G$ be a non-identity automorphism. Suppose one knows $f(a)$ and $a \in G$ then GDLP is to find $f(b)$ for any $b$ in $G$. Assuming the word problem is easy or presentation of the group is by means of generators, GDLP is equivalent to finding $f(a_i)$ for all $i$ which in terms gives us a complete knowledge of the automorphism. So in other words the cryptographic primitive GDLP is equivalent to, “finding the automorphism $f$ from the action of $f$ on only one element”.

4.2. General Diffie-Hellman Problem. Let $\phi, \psi : G \to G$ be arbitrary automorphisms such that $\phi \psi = \psi \phi$, and assume one knows $a, \phi(a)$ and $\psi(a)$. Then GDHP is to find $\phi(\psi(a))$. Notice that GDHP is a restricted form of GDLP, because in case of GDHP one has to compute $\phi(\psi(a))$ for some fixed $a$, not $\phi(b)$ for an arbitrary $b$ in $G$. There is an interesting GDHP attack due to Vladimir Shpilrain. To mount this attack one need not find $\phi$ but finds another automorphism $\phi'$ such that $\phi' \psi = \psi \phi'$ and $\phi'(a) = \phi(a)$. Since $\phi(\psi(a)) = \psi(\phi'(a)) = \phi'(\psi(a))$, the knowledge of the $\phi'$ breaks the system. We will refer to this attack as the Shpilrain’s attack.

We now describe two key exchange protocols and do some cryptanalysis. We denote by $G$ a finitely presented group and $S$ an abelian subgroup of $\text{Aut}(G)$.

5. Key Exchange Protocol I

Alice and Bob want to set up a private key. They select a group $G$ and an element $a \in G \setminus Z(G)$ over an insecure channel. Then Alice picks a random automorphism $\phi_A \in S$ and sends Bob $\phi_A(a)$. Bob similarly picks a random automorphism $\phi_B \in S$ and sends Alice $\phi_B(a)$. Both of them can now compute $\phi_A(\phi_B(a)) = \phi_B(\phi_A(a))$ which is their private key for a symmetric transmission.

Step 1: Alice and Bob selects the group $G$ and an element $a \in G \setminus Z(G)$ in public. Notice that $G$ and $a$ are public information.

Step 2: Alice and Bob picks, at random, two automorphisms $\phi_A$ and $\phi_B$ from $S$ respectively. Notice that $\phi_A$ and $\phi_B$ are private information.

Step 3: Alice and Bob compute $\phi_A(a)$ and $\phi_B(a)$ respectively and exchanges them. Notice that $\phi_A(a)$ and $\phi_B(a)$ are public information.

Step 4: Both of them compute $\phi_A(\phi_B(a)) = \phi_B(\phi_A(a))$ from their private information; which is their private key.
5.1. **Comments on Key Exchange Protocol I.** Though initially it might seem that we do not have enough information to know the automorphisms \( \phi_A \) and \( \phi_B \), it turns out that if we are using automorphisms which fix conjugacy classes, like inner automorphisms, then the security of the above scheme actually rests on the conjugacy problem.

Let \( \phi_A(a) = x^{-1}ax \) and \( \phi_B(a) = y^{-1}ay \) for some \( x \) and \( y \). Then \( \phi_A(\phi_B(a)) = (yx)^{-1}a(yx) \). Since \( a, \phi_A(a) \) and \( \phi_B(a) \) are known, if the conjugacy problem is easy in the group then anyone can find \( x \) and \( y \) and break the system.

In the above scheme Oscar knows \( G \) and \( a \). If the automorphisms are central automorphisms, then he also sees \( \phi_A(a) = az_{\phi_A,a} \) and \( \phi_B(a) = az_{\phi_B,a} \). Oscar can compute \( z_{\phi_A,a} \) and \( z_{\phi_B,a} \). Now if \( G \) is a special \( p \)-group \( (G' = Z(G) = \Phi(G)) \) then \( Z(G) \) is fixed elementwise by both \( \phi_A \) and \( \phi_B \).

Then

\[
\phi_A(\phi_B(a)) = \phi_A(az_{\phi_B,a}) = az_{\phi_A,a}z_{\phi_B,a}.
\]

Oscar knows \( a \) and can compute \( z_{\phi_A,a} \) and \( z_{\phi_B,a} \) and can find the private key \( \phi_A(\phi_B(a)) \). In the literature all examples of Miller \( p \)-group with odd prime \( p \) are special and the above key exchange is fatally flawed for those groups.

6. **Key Exchange Protocol II**

In this case Alice and Bob want to set up a private key and they set up a group \( G \) over an insecure channel. Alice chooses a random non-central element \( g \) and a random automorphism \( \phi_A \in S \) and sends Bob \( \phi_A(g) \). Bob picks another automorphism \( \phi_B \in S \) and computes \( \phi_B(\phi_A(g)) \) and sends that back to Alice. Alice, knowing \( \phi_A \), computes \( \phi_A^{-1} \) which gives her \( \phi_B(g) \) and picks another random automorphism \( \phi_H \in S \) and computes \( \phi_H(\phi_B(g)) \) and sends it back to Bob. Bob, knowing \( \phi_B \) computes \( \phi_B^{-1} \) which gives him \( \phi_H(g) \) which is their private key. Notice that Alice never reveals \( g \) in public.

**Step 1:** Alice and Bob set up the group \( G \). Notice that \( G \) is public information.

**Step 2:** Alice picks \( g \in G \setminus Z(G) \) and a random \( \phi_A \in S \). Then she computes \( \phi_A(g) \) and sends that to Bob. Notice that \( g \) and \( \phi_A \) are private but \( \phi_A(g) \) is public.

**Step 3:** Bob picks \( \phi_B \in S \) at random and computes \( \phi_B(\phi_A(g)) \) and sends that back to Alice. Notice that \( \phi_B \) is private but \( \phi_B(\phi_A(g)) \) is public.

**Step 4:** Alice computes \( \phi_A^{-1} \) and then computing \( \phi_A^{-1}(\phi_B(\phi_A(g))) \) she gets \( \phi_B(g) \).
Step 5: Alice now picks another random automorphism $\phi_H \in S$ and computes $\phi_H(\phi_B(g))$ and $\phi_H(g)$. She then sends $\phi_H(\phi_B(g))$ to Bob but keeps $\phi_H(g)$ private.

Step 6: Similar to Step 4, Bob computes $\phi_H(g)$. Now both Alice and Bob know $\phi_H(g)$ and it is their common key.

6.1. Comments on Key Exchange Protocol II. Notice that for central automorphisms, $\phi_A$ and $\phi_B$, $\phi_A(g) = g\phi_A.g$; since $g$ is not known Oscar doesn’t know $z\phi_A.g$ but if $G$ is special ($Z(G) = G' = \Phi(G)$) then $\phi_B(g\phi_A.g) = g\phi_B.g\phi_A.g$ from which $z\phi_B.g$ can be computed. Now $\phi_H(\phi_B(g)) = g\phi_B.g\phi_H.g$ is a public information; so using $z\phi_B.g$ one can compute $g\phi_H.g$, which is $\phi_H(g)$ and the scheme is broken. As one clearly sees, this attack is not possible if the group is not special.

The reader might have noticed at this point that all the attacks are GDHP. So certainly in some groups GDHP is easy, even though GDLP is hard.

As we know, any automorphism in $G$ can be seen as a restriction of an inner automorphism in Hol($G$) (see [29, 45] for further details on the holomorph of a group). Solving the conjugacy problem in Hol($G$) will break the key exchange protocols for any automorphism. On the other hand, operation in Hol($G$) is twisted so it is possible that the conjugacy problem in Hol($G$) is difficult even though it is easy in $G$. Since any cyclic group is a Miller group, success of the holomorph attack would prove insecurity in DLP. Therefore we believe that the holomorph attack will not be successful in many cases. Though more work needs to be done on this.

7. Key Exchange using Braid Groups

In [25] a similar key exchange protocol was defined, in this section we mention some similarities of their approach to ours. We also mention how our system generalizes their system which uses braid groups. See also [8].

We define braid group as a finitely presented group, though there are fancy pictorial ways to look at braids and multiplication of braids. An interested reader can look in [4, 10]. The braid group $B_n$ with $n$-strands is defined as:

$$B_n = \langle \sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_{n-1} : \sigma_i\sigma_j\sigma_i = \sigma_j\sigma_i\sigma_j \text{ if } |i - j| = 1, \sigma_i\sigma_j = \sigma_j\sigma_i \text{ if } |i - j| \geq 2 \rangle$$

In [25], the authors found two subgroups $A$ and $B$ of the group of inner automorphisms of $B_n$, Inn($B_n$), such that, if $\phi \in A$ and $\psi \in B$, then $\phi(\psi(g)) = \psi(\phi(g))$ for $g \in B_n$. Then the key exchange proceeds similar to the Key Exchange Protocol I above; with the restriction that Alice chooses automorphisms from $A$ and Bob chooses automorphisms from $B$. There is also a different approach to key exchange using braid groups as in [2, 8].
In the same spirit as [25] we can develop a key exchange protocol similar to the key exchange protocol I, where we take two subgroups \( A \) and \( B \) in \( \text{Aut}(G) \) such that for \( \phi \in A \) and \( \psi \in B \), \( \phi(\psi(g)) = \psi(\phi(g)) \) for all \( g \in G \). The use of inner automorphisms is only possible when the conjugacy or the generalized conjugacy problem (conjugator search problem) is known to be hard.

There are significant differences in our approach to that of the approach in [25]. In [25], the authors choose a group and then try to use that group in cryptography. On the other hand, we take the fundamental concept as the discrete logarithm problem, generalize it using automorphisms of a non-abelian group and then look for groups favorable to us. The fact that the central idea in braid group key exchange turns out to be similar to ours is encouraging.

It is intuitively clear at this point that we should start looking for groups with abelian automorphism group, i.e., Miller groups.

8. Some useful facts from group theory

The term Miller Group is not that common in the literature. It was introduced by Earnley in [11]. Miller was the first to study groups with abelian automorphism group in [34]. Cyclic groups are good examples of Miller groups. G.A. Miller also proved that no non-cyclic abelian group is Miller.

Charles Hopkins began a list of necessary conditions for a Miller group in 1927 [19]. He complained that very little is known about those groups. The same is true today. Except for some sporadic examples of groups with abelian automorphism groups, there is no sufficient condition known for a group to be Miller.

We now state some known facts about Miller groups which are available in the literature and which we shall need later. For proof of these theorems which we present in a rapid fire fashion, the reader can look in any standard text books, like [23, 36], or the references there.

**Proposition 8.1.** If \( G \) is a non-abelian Miller group, then \( G \) is nilpotent and of class 2.

**Proof.** It follows from the fact that the group of inner automorphisms commute and \( G/Z(G) \cong \text{Inn}(G) \).

Since a nilpotent group is a direct product of its Sylow \( p \)-subgroups \( S_p \), and \( \text{Aut}(A \times B) = \text{Aut}(A) \times \text{Aut}(B) \) whenever \( A \) and \( B \) are of relatively prime order, it is enough to study Miller \( p \)-groups for prime \( p \).

**Proposition 8.2.** If \( G \) is a \( p \)-group of class 2, then \( \exp(G') = \exp(G/Z(G)) \).


Proposition 8.3. In a $p$-group of class 2, $(xy)^n = x^ny^n[y,x]^{n(n-1)/2}$. Furthermore if $\exp(G') = n$ is odd, then $(xy)^n = x^n y^n$.

By definition, in a Miller group all automorphisms commute. Since central automorphisms are the centralizer of the group of inner automorphisms, we have proved the following theorem.

Theorem 8.4. In a Miller group $G$, all automorphisms are central.

It follows that to show a group is not Miller, all we have to do is to produce a non-central automorphism.

Proposition 8.5. If the commutator and the center coincide then every pair of central automorphisms commute.

Proof. Let $G$ be a group such that $G' = Z(G)$. Then let $\phi$ and $\psi$ be central automorphisms given by $\phi(x) = xz_{\phi,x}$ and $\psi(x) = xz_{\psi,x}$ where $z_{\phi,x}, z_{\psi,x} \in G'$. Then

$$\psi(\phi(x)) = \psi(xz_{\phi,x}) = \psi(x)z_{\phi,x} = xz_{\psi,x}z_{\phi,x} = xz_{\phi,x}z_{\psi,x} = \phi(\psi(x)).$$

Definition (Purely non-abelian group). A group $G$ is said to be a purely non-abelian group (PN group for short) if whenever $G = A \times B$ where $A$ and $B$ are subgroups of $G$ with $A$ abelian, then $A = 1$. Equivalently $G$ has no non-trivial abelian direct factor.

Let $\sigma : G \to G$ be a central automorphism. Then we define a map $f_\sigma : G \to Z(G)$ as follows: $f_\sigma(g) = g^{-1}\sigma(g)$. Clearly this map defines a homomorphism. The map $\sigma \mapsto f_\sigma$ is clearly a one-one map. Conversely, if $f \in \text{Hom}(G, Z(G))$ then we define a map $\sigma_f(g) = gf(x), x \in G$. Clearly $\sigma_f$ is an endomorphism. It is easy to see that

$$\text{Ker}(\sigma_f) = \{ x \in G : f(x) = x^{-1} \}.$$  

Hence it follows that $\sigma_f$ is an automorphism if and only if $f(x) \neq x^{-1}$ for all $x \in G$ with $x \neq 1$.

Theorem 8.6. In a purely non-abelian group $G$, the correspondence $\sigma \to f_\sigma$ is a one-one map of Aut$_c(G)$ onto Hom$(G, Z(G))$

Proof. See [1].
where $\eta$ is the natural epimorphism.

Let $G$ be a $p$-group of class 2, such that $\exp(Z(G)) = a$, $\exp(G') = b$ and $\exp(G/G') = c$ and let $d = \min(a, c)$. Now from the fundamental theorem of abelian groups, let

$$G/G' = A_1 \oplus A_2 \oplus \ldots A_r$$

where $A_i = \langle a_i \rangle$

$$Z(G) = B_1 \oplus B_2 \oplus \ldots B_s$$

where $B_i = \langle b_i \rangle$

$r, s \in \mathbb{N}$ be the direct decomposition of $G/G'$ and $Z(G)$. If the cyclic component $A_k = \langle a_k \rangle$ has exponent greater or equal to the exponent of $B_j = \langle b_j \rangle$, then one can define a homomorphisms $f : G/G' \rightarrow Z(G)$ as follows

$$f(a_i) = \begin{cases} b_j & \text{where } i = k \\ 1 & \text{where } i \neq k \end{cases}$$

From this discussion it is clear that for $f \in \text{Hom}(G, Z(G))$, $f(G)$ generates the subgroup

$$R = \{ z \in Z(G) : |z| \leq p^d, \ d = \min(a, c) \}.$$

**Definition (Height).** In any abelian $p$-group $A$ written additively, there is a descending sequence of subgroups

$$A \supset pA \supset p^2 A \supset \ldots \supset p^n A \supset p^{n+1} A \supset \ldots$$

Then $x \in A$ is of height $n$ if $x \in p^n A$ but not in $p^{n+1} A$. In other words the elements of height $n$ are those that drop out of the chain in the $(n+1)^{th}$ inclusion.

For further information on height see [22].

For a class 2 group we have

$$\exp(G/G') \geq \exp(G/Z(G)) = \exp(G')$$

it follows that $c \geq b$. Hence if $d = \min(a, c)$ then either $d = b$ or $d > b$.

Let $\text{height}(xG') \geq b$, then $xG' = y^{p^b}G'$ for some $y \in G$. Then for any $F \in \text{Hom}(G, G')$, $F(yG')^{p^b} = 1$ implying $xG' \in F^{-1}(1)$. Conversely, let $\text{height}(xG') < b$. Then from the previous discussion it is clear that there is a $F' \in \text{Hom}(G/G', G')$ such that $xG'$ is not in the kernel, consequently there is a $F \in \text{Hom}(G, G')$ such that $x \notin \text{ker}(F)$. Combining these two facts we see that:

$$\mathcal{K} = \bigcap_{F \in \text{Hom}(G, G')} F^{-1}(1) = \{ x \in G : \text{height}(xG') \geq b \}$$

**Proposition 8.7.** $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \mathcal{R}$
Proof. In a class 2 group, if \( x \in K \) then \( xG' = y^{p^b}G' \) for some \( y \in G \) and \( \exp(G/Z) = b \) and \( G' \subseteq Z(G) \), hence \( x \in Z(G) \).

Let \( x \in K \), then \( \text{height}(xG') \geq b \), hence there is a \( y \in G \) such that \( y^{p^b}G' = xG' \) i.e., \( x = y^{p^b}z \) where \( z \in G' \) and \( y^{p^c} \in G' \) and \( c \geq b \). We have
\[
x^{p^c} = (y^{p^b})^{p^c} z^{p^c} = (y^{p^c})^b = 1
\]
Hence \( |x| \leq \min(p^a, p^c) \) which implies that \( x \in R \). 

\[ \tag*{•} \]

Proposition 8.8. For a PN group \( G \) of class 2, if \( \text{Aut}_c(G) \) is abelian then \( R \subseteq K \).

Proof. In a PN group, using Theorem 8.6 and the notation there, two central automorphisms \( \sigma \) and \( \tau \) commute if and only if \( f_\sigma, f_\tau \in \text{Hom}(G, Z(G)) \) commute. Then for any \( f \in \text{Hom}(G, Z(G)) \) and \( F \in \text{Hom}(G, G') \) we have that \( f \circ F = F \circ f = 1 \). Since \( f(G') = 1 \), clearly \( F \circ f(G) = 1 \) proving that \( R \subseteq K \). 

\[ \tag*{•} \]

Combining the above two propositions, we just proved that in a PN group \( G \) of class 2, if \( \text{Aut}_c(G) \) is abelian then \( R = K \). As discussed earlier there are two cases \( d = b \) and \( d > b \). Adney and Yen proves that:

Proposition 8.9. If \( G \) is a non-abelian \( p \) group of class 2, and \( \text{Aut}_c(G) \) is abelian with \( d > b \), then \( R/G' \) is cyclic.

Proof. See [1, Theorem 3]. 

\[ \tag*{•} \]

Theorem 8.10 (Adney and Yen). Let \( G \) be a purely non-abelian group of class 2, \( p \) odd, let \( G/G' = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \{x_iG'\} \). Then the group \( \text{Aut}_c(G) \) is abelian if and only if 
\[ \text{(i) } R = K \]
\[ \text{(ii) either } d = b \text{ or } d > b \text{ and } R/G' = \{x_1^{p^b}G'\} \]

Proof. See [1, Theorem 4]. 

\[ \tag*{•} \]

From the proof of Proposition 8.5 it follows that in a group \( G \) with \( Z(G) \leq G' \), the central automorphisms commute.

Theorem 8.11. The group of central automorphisms of a \( p \)-group \( G \), where \( p \) is odd, is a \( p \)-group if and only if \( G \) has no non-trivial abelian direct factor.

Proof. See [37, Theorem B] and its corollary.

\[ \tag*{•} \]

At this point we concentrate on building a cryptosystem. We note that Miller groups in particular have no advantage over groups with abelian central automorphism group. It is hard to construct Miller groups and there is no known Miller group for an odd prime, which is not special. So we
now turn towards a group $G$ such that $\text{Aut}(G)$ is not abelian but $\text{Aut}_c(G)$ is abelian. We propose to use $\text{Aut}_c(G)$ rather than $\text{Aut}(G)$ in the key exchange protocols described earlier.

9. Signature Scheme based on conjugacy problem

Assume that we are working with a group $G$ with commuting inner automorphisms.

Alice publishes $\alpha$ and $\beta$ where $\beta = a^{-1} \alpha a$ and keeps $a$ a secret. To sign a text $x \in G$ she picks an arbitrary element $k \in G$ and computes $\gamma = k\alpha k^{-1}$ and then computes $\delta$ such that $x = (\delta k)(a\gamma)^{-1}$. Now notice that

$$x\alpha x^{-1} = (\delta k)(a\gamma)^{-1} \alpha ((\delta k)(a\gamma)^{-1})^{-1}$$
$$= (\delta k) \gamma^{-1} a^{-1} \alpha a \gamma k^{-1} \delta^{-1}$$
$$= \delta \gamma^{-1} a^{-1} k\alpha k^{-1} a \gamma \delta^{-1} \quad \text{Inner automorphisms commute}$$
$$= \delta \gamma^{-1} a^{-1} \gamma a \gamma \delta^{-1}$$
$$= \delta a^{-1} \gamma a \delta^{-1}$$
$$= \delta (k \beta k^{-1}) \delta^{-1} \quad \gamma = k\alpha k^{-1} \Rightarrow a^{-1} \gamma a = k \beta k^{-1}$$

So to sign a message $x \in G$ Alice computes $\delta$ as mentioned and sends $x, (k \delta)$. To verify the message one computes $L = x\alpha x^{-1}$ and $R = \delta k \beta (\delta k)^{-1}$. If $L = R$ then the message is authentic otherwise not.

There is a similar signature scheme in [24], where they exploit the gap between the computational version (conjugacy problem) and the decision version of the conjugacy problem (conjugator search problem) in braid groups. We followed the El-Gamal signature scheme closely [42, Chapter 7].

9.1. Comments on the above Signature Scheme. If one can solve conjugacy problem in the group then from the public information $\alpha$ and $\beta$ he can find out $a$ and our scheme is broken. Conjugacy problem is known to be hard in some groups and hence it seems to be a reasonable assumption at this moment. There is another worry: if Alice sends $k$ and $\delta$ separately then one can find $a$ from the equation $x = (\delta k)(a\gamma)^{-1}$, since $\gamma$ is computable. However, this is circumvented easily by sending the product $\delta k$ not $\delta$ and $k$ individually and keeping $k$ random.

10. An interesting family of $p$-groups

It is well known that cyclic groups have abelian automorphism groups. The first person to give an example of a non-abelian group with an abelian automorphism groups is G.A. Miller in [34] which was generalized by Struik in [43]. There are three non-abelian groups with abelian automorphism
group in the Hall-Senior table [16], they are nos. 91, 92 and 99. Miller’s example is no. 99. In [20], Jamali generalized nos. 91 and 92. His generalization of no. 91 is in one direction, it increases the exponent of the group.

Jamali in the same paper generalizes group no. 92 in two directions, the size of the exponent and the number of generators. His generalization was restrictive in that it works only for the prime 2. There are other examples of families of Miller $p$-groups in the literature, the most notable one is the family of $p$-groups, for an arbitrary prime $p$, given by Jonah and Konisver in [21]. This was generalized to an arbitrary number of generators by Earnley in [11]. There are other examples by Martha Morigi in [35] and Heineken and Liebeck in [18]. All these examples of Miller groups given in [11, 18, 21, 35] are special groups, i.e., the commutator and the center are the same. For special groups the key exchange protocols do not work as noted earlier. So there is no Miller $p$-group, readily available in the literature, for arbitrary prime $p$ which can be used right away in construction of the protocol. The only other source are groups nos. 91, 92 and 99 in the Hall Senior table [16] and their generalizations, notice that these groups are not special but are $2$-groups. Of the three generalizations, the generalization of no. 92 best fits our criterion because it is generalized in two directions, viz. number of generators and exponent of the center and moreover it is not special; $Z(G) = A \times G'$ where $A$ is a cyclic group. So once we generalize it for arbitrary primes, it has “three degrees of freedom”, the number of generators, exponent of center and the prime; which makes it attractive for cryptographic purposes.

In the rest of the section we use Jamali’s definition in [20] to define a family of $p$-groups for arbitrary prime. So this family is a generalization of Jamali’s example and assuming transitivity of generalizations, ultimately a generalization of group no. 92 in the Hall-Senior table [16]. We study automorphisms of this group and show that the group is Miller if and only if $p = 2$, but this family of groups always have an abelian central automorphism group which is fairly large. We then attempt to build a key exchange protocol as described earlier using the central automorphisms. We start with the definition of the group $G_n(m,p)$.

**Definition.** Let $G_n(m,p)$ be a group generated by $n + 1$ elements \{a_0, a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n\} where $p$ is a prime number and $m \geq 2$ and $n \geq 3$ are integers. The group is defined by the following relations:

\[
a^p_1 = 1, \quad a_2^p = 1, \quad a_i^p = 1 \quad \text{for} \quad 3 \leq i \leq n, \quad a_{n-1}^p = a_0^p.
\]

\[
[a_1, a_0] = 1, \quad [a_n, a_0] = a_1, \quad [a_{i-1}, a_0] = a_i^p \quad \text{for} \quad 3 \leq i \leq n.
\]

\[
[a_i, a_j] = 1 \quad \text{for} \quad 1 \leq i < j \leq n.
\]
We state some facts about the group $G_n(m, p)$ whose proof is by direct computation (see [30, Section 2.9]).

a: $G_n(m, p)$ the derived subgroup of $G_n(m, p)$ is an elementary abelian group $\langle a_1, a_{3^1}, \ldots, a_{3^n} \rangle \simeq \mathbb{Z}_{p}^{n-1}$.

b: $Z(G_n(m, p)) = \langle a_{2}^{p} \rangle \times G'$.

c: $G_n(m, p)$ is a $p$-group of class 2.

d: $G_n(m, p)$ is a PN group.

**Proposition 10.1.** $G_n(m, p)$ is a polycyclic group and every element of $g \in G_n(m, p)$ can be uniquely expressed in the form $g = a_{0}^{\alpha_{0}}a_{1}^{\alpha_{1}}a_{2}^{\alpha_{2}}a_{3}^{\alpha_{3}} \cdots a_{n}^{\alpha_{n}}$, where $0 \leq \alpha_i < p$ for $i = 0, 1$; $0 \leq \alpha_i < p^m$, $0 \leq \alpha_i < p^n$ for $i = 3, 4, \ldots, n$.

**Proof.** Define $G_0 = G_n(m, p) = \langle a_0, a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n \rangle$, $G_1 = \langle a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n \rangle$ and similarly $G_k = \langle a_k, a_{k+1}, \ldots, a_n \rangle$ for $k \leq n$. Since $G_1$ is a finitely generated abelian group, it is a polycyclic group [11, Proposition 3.2]. It is fairly straightforward to show that

$$G_1 \triangleright G_2 \triangleright \ldots \triangleright G_n \triangleright \langle 1 \rangle$$

is a polycyclic series and $\{a_1, \ldots, a_n\}$ a polycyclic generating sequence of $G_1$.

It is easy to see from the relations of the group that $G_1$ is normal in $G_0$ and $G_0/G_1$ is cyclic. It is also straightforward to show that $\langle a_iG_{i+1} \rangle = G_i/G_{i+1}$ and $|a_iG_{i+1}| = |a_i|$ and hence any element of the group has a unique representation of the above form. We would call an element represented in the above form a collected word. See also [11, Chapter 9, Proposition 4.1].

**Computation with $G_n(m, p)$:** Our group $G_n(m, p)$ is of class 2, i.e., commutators of weight 3 are identity, computations become real nice and easy. Let us demonstrate the product of two collected words $g = a_{0}^{\alpha_{0}}a_{1}^{\alpha_{1}}a_{2}^{\alpha_{2}}a_{3}^{\alpha_{3}}a_{4}^{\alpha_{4}}$ and $h = a_{0}^{\beta_{0}}a_{1}^{\beta_{1}}a_{2}^{\beta_{2}}a_{3}^{\beta_{3}}a_{4}^{\beta_{4}}$. To compute $gh$ we use concatenation and form the word $a_{0}^{\alpha_{0}}a_{1}^{\alpha_{1}}a_{2}^{\alpha_{2}}a_{3}^{\alpha_{3}}a_{4}^{\alpha_{4}}a_{0}^{\beta_{0}}a_{1}^{\beta_{1}}a_{2}^{\beta_{2}}a_{3}^{\beta_{3}}a_{4}^{\beta_{4}}$ and note that $a_i$’s commute except for $a_0$ hence one tries to move $a_0$ towards the left using the identity

$$a_ia_0 = a_0a_i[a_i, a_0] = \begin{cases} a_0a_i \alpha_{i+1} & \text{for } 1 \leq i < n \\ a_0a_1a_i & \text{for } i = n. \end{cases}$$

Further note, since commutators are in the center of the group, $a_i^{p}$ or $a_1$ can be moved anywhere. Once $a_0$ is moved to the extreme left the word formed is the collected word of $gh$. This process is often referred to in the literature as collection. Computing the inverse of an element can be similarly done.

We now prove that the group of central automorphisms of the group $G_n(m, p)$ for an arbitrary prime $p$ is abelian. For sake of simplicity we
denote $G_n(m,p)$ by $G$ for the rest of the article, and use notations from Theorem 10.1.

**Lemma 10.2.** In $G$, $\mathcal{R} = Z(G) = \mathcal{K}$.

**Proof.** Using the notation from Theorem 10.1, we see that in $G$, $a = m - 1$, $b = 1$ and $c = m$ hence $d = m - 1$. Clearly, $\mathcal{R} = Z(G)$ hence $\mathcal{K} \subseteq Z(G)$.

Let $x \in Z(G)$, if $x \in G'$ then height$(xG') = \infty$ and we are done. If not, then $x = z_1z_2$ where $z_1 \in \langle a_2^p \rangle$ and $z_2 \in G'$. Then $xG' = z_1G'$ and hence height$(xG') \geq 1$.

It is easy to see that $\mathcal{R}/G' = Z(G)/G' = \langle a_2^p G' \rangle$ and hence from Theorem 10.1 we prove the following theorem:

**Theorem 10.3.** $\text{Aut}_e(G)$ is abelian.

10.1. **Automorphisms of $G_n(m,p)$**. In this section we describe the automorphisms of groups of this kind. The discussion is, in more than one way, an adaptation of the work of Jamali [20] and generalizes his main theorem.

**Lemma 10.4.** Let $x = a_0^{\beta_0}a_1^{\beta_1}a_2^{\beta_2} \ldots a_n^{\beta_n}$, where $\beta_i$, $i = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, n$ are integers be an element of $G$. If $p = 2$ then $\beta_0$ is 1 and

- $x^2 = a_0^{\beta_0}a_1^{2\beta_1}a_2^{\gamma_2} \ldots a_n^{\gamma_n}$ for $p = 2$. Where $\gamma_i = 2(\beta_i - 1)$.
- $x^p = a_0^{p\beta_0}a_1^{p\beta_1}a_2^{p\beta_2} \ldots a_n^{p\beta_n}$ for $p \neq 2$.

**Proof.** For the case $p = 2$ we just collect terms and use the relation $a_n^{2} = a_0^2$.

For $p \neq 2$ using Proposition 8.3 we have

\[
x^p = (a_0^{\beta_0}a_1^{\beta_1}a_2^{\beta_2} \ldots a_n^{\beta_n})^p
= (a_0^{\beta_0})^p(a_1^{\beta_1}a_2^{\beta_2} \ldots a_n^{\beta_n})^p
= a_0^{p\beta_0}a_1^{p\beta_1}a_2^{p\beta_2} \ldots a_n^{p\beta_n}
\]

Using the relation $a_n^{p} = a_0^p$ we have

\[
a_0^{p\beta_0}a_2^{p\beta_2}a_3^{p\beta_3} \ldots a_n^{p\beta_n} = a_2^{p\beta_2}a_3^{p\beta_3} \ldots a_n^{p\beta_n}
\]

For the group $G$ we note that $H = \langle a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots a_n \rangle$ is the maximal abelian normal subgroup of $G$ and is characteristic. It follows that the $H^p$ is also characteristic. Following [20], we define two decreasing sequences of characteristic subgroups $\{K_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1}$ such that

\[
K_0 = H \text{ and } K_i/K_{i-1}^p = Z(G/K_{i-1}^p) \quad (1 \leq i \leq n - 1)
\]
and \( \{ L_i \} \) such that
\[
L_0 = H \text{ and } L_i = \{ h : h \in H, h^p \in [G, L_{i-1}] \} \quad (1 \leq i \leq n - 1)
\]

It follows easily that
\[
K_i = \langle a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{n-i}, a_{n-i+1}^p, \ldots, a_n^p \rangle \quad 1 \leq i \leq n - 1
\]
\[
L_i = \langle a_1, v, a_3, \ldots, a_n \rangle
\]
where \( v = a_2^{p^{m-1}} \). For \( 3 \leq i \leq n \) we have
\[
K_{n-i} \cap L_{i-2} = \langle a_1, v, a_3^p, \ldots, a_{i-1}^p, a_i, a_{i+1}^p, \ldots, a_n^p \rangle = \langle v, a_i, G' \rangle.
\]

Also \( K_{n-2} \cap L_0 = \langle a_2, G' \rangle \).

Since \( \langle v, a_i, G' \rangle \) and \( \langle a_2, G' \rangle \) are characteristic, for any \( \theta \in \text{Aut}(G) \),
\[
\theta(a_2) = a_2^{k_2} z \quad \text{where } z \in G' \text{ and } k_2 \in \mathbb{N}
\]
\[
\theta(a_i) = a_i^{k_i} v^r z \quad \text{where } z \in G'; \quad k_i \in \mathbb{N}; \quad i = 3, 4, \ldots, n; \quad 0 \leq r_i < p.
\]

It is clear that not all \( k_2 \) and \( k_i \) will make \( \theta \) an automorphism. To begin with, if \( \theta \) is an automorphism then \( \text{gcd}(k_i, p) = 1 \) for all \( k_i \), and we may choose \( k_i \) such that \( 0 < k_i < p \) for \( i = 3, 4, \ldots, n \).

Let \( \theta(a_0) = a_0^{\beta_0} a_1^{\beta_1} a_2^{\beta_2} \ldots a_n^{\beta_n} \). Since \( \theta(a_0^p) = \theta(a_{n-1}^p) = \theta(a_{n-1})^p = a_{n-1}^{p\beta_{n-1}} \), from Lemma 10.4
\[
a_{n-1}^{p\beta_{n-1}} = a_2^{p\beta_2} a_3^{p\beta_3} \ldots a_{n-2}^{p\beta_{n-2}} a_{n-1}^{p\beta_{n-1}+p\beta_0} a_n^{p\beta_n} \quad \text{for } p \neq 2
\]

implying \( \beta_0 + \beta_{n-1} \equiv k_{n-1} \mod p, p^{m-1}\beta_2 \) and \( p\beta_i \) for \( i = 3, 4, \ldots, n-2, n \).

Hence \( \theta(a_0) = a_0^{k_0} a_{n-1}^{p\beta_{n-1}} v^r z \) where \( 0 \leq r < p \). We changed \( \beta_0 \) to \( k_0 \) to maintain uniformity in notations.

Notice the relation \( [a_i, a_0] = a_i^{p^{k_{i+1}}} \) for \( i = 2, 3, \ldots, n \) implies that
\[
[\theta(a_i), \theta(a_0)] = \theta(a_{i+1})^p = a_{i+1}^{p\beta_{i+1}}.
\]

It follows that \( [a_i^{k_i}, a_0^{k_{n-1}}] = a_{i+1}^{p\beta_{i+1}} \) which is the same as \( [a_i^{k_i}, a_0^{k_0}] = a_{i+1}^{p\beta_{i+1}} \), which implies that \( [a_i, a_0]^{k_0 k_i} = a_{i+1}^{p\beta_{i+1}} \). Recall that \( G \) is a \( p \)-group of class 2 and \( a_{n-1} \) commutes with \( a_i \) for \( i \geq 2 \). From these we have a recursive formula for \( k_i \), (also see [31 Theorem 2.9.7]): choose \( k_0 \) such that \( 0 < k_0 < p \) and \( k_2 \) such that \( 0 < k_2 < p^m \) and \( \text{gcd}(k_2, p) = 1 \) and then define \( k_{i+1} = k_0 k_i \mod p \) for \( i = 2, 3, 4, \ldots, (n-1) \); and \( k_1 = k_0 k_n \mod p \). In [20 Proposition 2.3] Jamali proves that for \( p = 2 \), all automorphisms of \( G \) are central. We have just proved that for \( p \neq 2 \) there is a non central automorphism, take \( k_0 > 1 \); the following theorem follows from Theorem 8.4.

**Theorem 10.5.** The group \( G_n(m, p) \) is Miller if and only if \( p = 2 \).
10.2. **Description of the Central Automorphisms.** Notice that $G$ is a PN group, so there is a one-one correspondence between $\text{Aut}_c(G)$ and $\text{Hom}(G, Z(G))$. Since it is known from our earlier discussion that $Z(G) = \langle a_2^p \rangle \times G'$, $\text{Hom}(G, Z(G)) = \text{Hom}(G, \langle a_2^p \rangle) \times \text{Hom}(G, G')$. It follows: $\text{Aut}_c(G) = A \times B$ where

\[
A = \{ \sigma \in \text{Aut}_c(G) : x^{-1}\sigma(x) \in \langle a_2^p \rangle \}
\]

\[
B = \{ \sigma \in \text{Aut}_c(G) : x^{-1}\sigma(x) \in G' \}
\]

Elements of $A$ can be explained in a very nice way. Pick a random integer $k$ such that $k = lp + 1$ where $0 \leq l < p^{m-1}$ and a random subset $R$ (could be empty) of $\{0, 3, 4, \ldots, n\}$, and then an arbitrary automorphism in $A$ is

\[
\sigma(a_1) = a_1
\]

\[
\sigma(a_2) = a_2^k
\]

\[
\sigma(a_i) = \begin{cases} 
  a_i & \text{if } i \notin R \\
  a_i \left(a_2^{p^{m-1}}\right)^{r_i} & \text{if } i \in R 
\end{cases}
\]

(2)

We use indexing in $\{0, 3, 4, \ldots, n\}$ to order $R$ and $0 < r_i < p$ is an integer corresponding to $i \in R$. Conversely, any element in $A$ can be described this way. It follows from the definition of $A$ that

\[
|A| = p^{m-1} \times p^{n-1} = p^{m+n-2}.
\]

The automorphism $\phi \in B$ is of the form

\[
\phi(x) = \begin{cases} 
  a_1 & \text{if } x = a_1 \\
  a_iz & \text{if } x = a_i, \ i \in \{0, 2, 3, \ldots, n\} 
\end{cases}
\]

(3)

where $z \in G'$.

We note that $\frac{G}{Z(G)}$ is an abelian group and hence $\text{Inn}(G)$ is abelian and hence $\text{Inn}(G) \subseteq \text{Aut}_c(G)$. We further note from the commutator relations in $G$ that $\text{Inn}(G) \subseteq B$.

10.3. **Using these automorphisms in key-exchange protocol I.** Let us briefly recall the key-exchange protocol described before. Alice and Bob decide on a group $G$ and a non-central element $g \in G \setminus Z(G)$ in public. Alice then chooses an arbitrary automorphism $\phi_A$ and sends Bob $\phi_A(g)$. Similarly Bob picks an arbitrary automorphism $\phi_B$ and sends Alice $\phi_B(g)$. Since the automorphisms commute, both of them can compute $\phi_A(\phi_B(g))$, which is their private key. The most devastating attack on the system is the one in which Oscar, looking at $g$, $\phi_A(g)$ and $\phi_B(g)$, can predict what $\phi_A(\phi_B(g))$ will look like, i.e., a GDHP attack.
**Definition** (Parity condition for elements in $G$). If $g = a_0^{\beta_0}a_1^{\beta_1}a_2^{\beta_2}a_3^{\beta_3} \ldots a_n^{\beta_n}$ is an arbitrary element of $G$, i.e., $0 \leq \beta_0 < p$, $0 \leq \beta_1 < p$, $0 \leq \beta_2 < p^2$ and $0 \leq \beta_i < p^i$ for $3 \leq i \leq n$. Then the vector $v := (\beta_0, \beta_3, \beta_4, \ldots, \beta_n)$ is called the parity of $g$. Two elements $g$ and $g'$ are said to be of the same parity condition if $v = v'$ mod $p$, where $v'$ is the parity of $g'$.

**Lemma 10.6.** If $\phi: G \to G$ is any central automorphism then $g$ and $\phi(g)$ have the same parity condition for any $g \in G$.

**Proof.** Notice that an automorphism $\phi$ either belongs to $A$ or $B$ or is of the form $\phi(g) = g f_{\phi}(g) g_{\phi}(g)$ where $f_{\phi} \in \text{Hom}(G, Z(G))$ and $g_{\phi} \in \text{Hom}(G, G')$. So we might safely ignore elements from $A$, since they only affect the exponent of $a_2$. Also note that $a_1$ being in the commutator remains fixed under any central automorphism.

So we need to be concerned with elements of $B$, from the description of $B$, and each commutator is a word in $p$-powers of the generators and from the fact that $G' \subset Z(G)$, the lemma follows.

Now let us understand what an element in $A$ does to an element $g \in G$.

We use notations from Equation 2.

**Lemma 10.7.** Let $g = a_0^{\beta_0}a_1^{\beta_1}a_2^{\beta_2}a_3^{\beta_3} \ldots a_n^{\beta_n}$, $\phi \in A$ and if $\phi(g) = a_0^{\beta'_0}a_1^{\beta'_1}a_2^{\beta'_2}a_3^{\beta'_3} \ldots a_n^{\beta'_n}$ then $\beta_i = \beta'_i$ for $i \neq 2$ and $\beta'_2 = k \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i$ mod $p^m$.

**Proof.** Notice that from Equation 2 it is clear that elements of $A$ only affect the exponent of $a_2$, so $\beta'_i = \beta_i$ for $i \neq 2$ follows trivially. From the definition of $A$ and simple computation it follows that $\beta'_2 = k \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i$ mod $p^m$.

In the key exchange protocol I, we will only use automorphisms from $A$. As noted earlier there are two kinds of attack, GDLP (the discrete logarithm problem in automorphisms) and GDHP (the Diffie-Hellman problem in automorphisms). We have earlier stated that GDLP is equivalent to finding the automorphism from the action of the automorphism on one element. It seems that for one to find the automorphism discussed in the previous lemma, one has to find $k$, $R$ and $r_i$. Notice that $\beta'_2 = k \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i$ mod $p^m$, is a knapsack in $\beta_2$ and $p^{m-1}$. Solving that knapsack is not enough to compute the image of any element, because $R$ is not known so $\beta'_i$'s are not known. We shall show in a moment that the security of the key exchange

\[\text{In light of Lemma 10.6, we believe that adding automorphisms from } B \text{ is not going to add to the security of the system.}\]
protocol depends on the difficulty of this knapsack, but solving this knapsack does not help Oscar to find the automorphism, just partial information about the automorphism comes out.

Next we show that though it seems to be secure under GDLP, but if the knapsack is solved then the system is broken by GDHP. This proves that GDHP is a weaker problem than GDLP in $G_n(m,p)$. Let $g = a_0^\beta_0 a_1^\beta_1 a_2^\beta_2 a_3^\beta_3 \ldots a_n^\beta_n$, then as discussed before for $\phi, \psi \in \text{Aut}_c(G)$, with notation from Equation 2 and $k_i \in \mathbb{N}$ for $i = 3, 4, \ldots, n$:

\begin{align*}
\phi(g) &= a_0^{\beta_0} a_1^{\beta_1} a_2^{k_2 \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i} a_3^{\beta_3 + k_3 p} \ldots a_n^{\beta_n + k_4 p} \\
\psi(g) &= a_0^{\beta_0} a_1^{\beta_1} a_2^{k_2' \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R'} r_i' \beta_i} a_3^{\beta_3 + k_3' p} \ldots a_n^{\beta_n + k_4' p} 
\end{align*}

From direct computation it follows that the exponent of $a_2$ in $\phi(\psi(g))$ is

$$k_2 \left( k_2' \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R'} r_i' \beta_i \right) + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i$$

where $k_2 = lp + 1$ and $k_2' = lp' + 1, 0 \leq l, l' < p^{m-1}$. The exponent of $a_0, a_1$ stays the same and the exponent of $a_i$ will be $\beta_i + (k_i + k_i')p \mod p^2$ for $3 \leq i \leq n$. As mentioned before since we are using only automorphisms from $A$, i.e., $\phi$ and $\psi$ are in $A$ hence $k_i = k_i' = 0$ for $i = 3, 4, \ldots, n$.

Notice that $g$, Equations 4 and 5 are public, so Oscar sees those. Since the exponents of $a_0, a_1, a_3, \ldots, a_n$ are predictable, the key Alice and Bob want to establish is the exponent of $a_2$ in $\phi(\psi(g))$, which is given by Equation 6. Since Oscar sees Equations 4 and 5 if he can compute $k_2$ from $k_2 \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i \mod p^m$, then he can compute $p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i$ and the scheme is broken. But, $k_2 = lp + 1$ for some $l \in [0, p^{m-1})$ hence

$$k_2 \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i \mod p^m$$

reduces to

$$\beta_2 + lp \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i \mod p^m.$$  

Since $\beta_2$ is public, Oscar can compute $lp \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i \mod p^m$. Notice that finding $k_2$ is equivalent to finding $l$, hence one of the security assumptions is that there is no polynomial time algorithm to find $l$ from

$$lp \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i \mod p^m.$$  

Let us write

$$M = lp \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i \mod p^m,$$  

$$20$$
then
\[ M = lp\beta_2 \mod p^{m-1}. \]

Now, if \( lp < p^{m-1} \) and \( \gcd(\beta_2, p) = 1 \), then one can find \( lp \) from the above equation and the scheme is broken. So the only hope of making a secure cryptosystem out of key exchange protocol I and the group \( G_n(m, p) \) is to take \( l = kp^{m-2} \) where \( k = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, (p-1) \). In this case, if we set \( l = lp^{m-2} \) and \( l' = l'p^{m-2} \) in Equation 5, then the key will be

\[
(1 + lp^{m-1}) \left( (1 + l'p^{m-1})\beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R'} r'_i \beta_i \right) + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i \\
= (1 + lp^{m-1} + l'p^{m-1}) \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R'} r'_i \beta_i + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i \mod p^m \\
= \left( (1 + lp^{m-1}) \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i \right) + l'p^{m-1} \beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R'} r'_i \beta_i \mod p^m
\]

Now the information in the last equation is easy to compute from the public information, Equations 4 and 5; so the Key Exchange Protocol I is broken for automorphisms from \( A \) of \( G_n(m, p) \) when \( \gcd(\beta_2, p) = 1 \).

Now if \( \gcd(p, \beta_2) \neq 1 \), i.e., \( \beta_2 = kp^i \) for some \( i \in [1, m) \) and \( 1 \leq k < p \), then an attack similar to the above breaks the system. The insight behind these attacks is that any solution to Equation 8 can be thought of as the image of \( g \) under an automorphism \( \phi' \in A \). We are talking about a solution to Equation 8, which is easy to find, for which \( \phi'(g) = M \) and then Shpilrain’s attack breaks the system.

11. Implementation

There is not much reason left to go into the details of an implementation. We briefly mention that this cryptosystem can be implemented without any reference to the group \( G_n(m, p) \). Once the element \( g = a_0^{\beta_0}a_1^{\beta_1}a_2^{\beta_2} \ldots a_n^{\beta_n} \) is fixed, Alice can send Bob \( k_2\beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i \mod p^m \) and similarly Bob can send Alice \( k_2'\beta_2 + p^{m-1} \sum_{i \in R} r'_i \beta_i \mod p^m \). Since Alice and Bob know their own \( k_2, \sum_{i \in R} r_i \beta_i \) and \( k_2', \sum_{i \in R'} r'_i \beta_i \) respectively, they can both compute the private key or the shared secret. Since the only operation involved in computing the private key is multiplication and addition \( \mod p^m \), there can be a very fast implementation of this cryptosystem.

12. Conclusion

In this paper we studied a key exchange protocol using commuting automorphisms in a non-abelian \( p \)-group. Since any nilpotent group is a direct product of its Sylow subgroups, the study of nilpotent groups can be reduced
to the study of p-groups. We argued that our study is a generalization of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and is a generalization of the discrete log problem. Other public key systems like the El-Gamal cryptosystem which uses the discrete logarithm problem is adaptable to our methods. This is the first attempt to generalize the discrete logarithm problem in the way we did.

We should try to find other groups and try our system in terms of GDLP and GDHP. As we noted earlier, GDHP is a subproblem of the GDLP, and we saw in $G_n(m, p)$, GDHP is a much easier problem than GDLP. Our example was of the form $d > b$ in Theorem 8.10. The next step is to look at groups where $d = b$. We note from Theorem 8.11 if a p-group G is a PN group then Aut$(G)$ is a p-group and since p-groups have nontrivial centers; one can work in that center with our scheme. In this case we would be generalizing to arbitrary nilpotentcy class while still working with central automorphisms.

Lastly we note that, if we were using some representation for this finitely presented group G, for example, matrix representation of the group over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$, then security of the system in $G_n(m, p)$ becomes the discrete logarithm problem in a matrix algebra. Since the discrete logarithm problem in matrices is only as secure as the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields, there is no known advantage to go for matrix representation, but there might be other representations of interest.

There is one conjecture that comes out of this work and we end with that.

**Conjecture 12.1.** If G is a Miller p-group for an odd prime p, then G is special.

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