In this article, I examine some metonymic aspects of the semantics of Croatian connectives introducing adverbial clauses of cause, condition, purpose, and concession. The analysis leans on the theory of conceptual metaphor and metonymy and, to a lesser extent, on cognitive grammar. It is also informed by grammaticalization scholarship within typological functionalism. I explore metonymic mappings between the categories of time and cause, manner and cause, cause and condition, purpose, cause and concession, condition and concession, time and condition, and metonymic mappings operating at the level of speech acts. The goal is to contribute to the growing, though still arguably small, body of cognitive linguistic research into the relevance of metonymy for the semantics of complex sentences, specifically the role it plays in subordination, and to expand this analysis to subordinate constructions in Croatian. Some attention is given to grammaticalization studies, where metaphor and metonymy are seen as two types of pragmatic inferencing facilitating interactions between the mentioned semantic categories in complex sentences.

**Key words:** metonymy; metaphor; adverbial clauses; adverbial connectives; grammaticalization; speech acts.

1. Introduction

This paper presents a cognitive linguistic account of adverbial subordination in Croatian. Specifically, the focus is on how far conceptual metonymy can be said to motivate aspects of form and interpretation of various subordinate constructions.

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The analysis cannot hope to be exhaustive due to the sheer amount of data that would need to be covered, but I will provide a fairly deep analysis of a reasonably wide swathe of subordinating constructions in Croatian with the following aims: (i) to contribute to the body of cognitive linguistic research into the effects of metonymy at the level of complex sentences (ii) to enrich our understanding of the roles of metaphor and metonymy in Croatian complex sentences (subordination), and last but not least (iii) to pay homage to Dubravko’s long-term infatuation with syntax (van der Auwera and Kučanda 1985; Kučanda 1992, 1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 1999b) and the beginnings of his search for what cognitive linguistics and specifically metonymy can bring to the table in “the joint venture of the cognitive and functionalist programmes” (Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez Hernández 2001: 323).

I will explore the correlations between form and meaning across various semantically related categories involved in subordination. 1 Specifically, the analysis will address links between the expressions of cause, concession, purpose, condition, conditional concession, 2 time, and space, including, to a small extent, manner. I do not promise a dedicated corpus-based quantitative analysis; however, all the examples used in the paper instantiate highly conventional constructions in Croatian, of which some have been culled from the Hrvatska jezična riznica corpus of the Institute for Croatian language and linguistics.

The plan of the article is as follows. Section 2 presents the background by discussing some issues in metonymy research, and briefly acknowledging its place in grammaticalization scholarship. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 ends the paper with a summary of the main findings and prospects for future studies.

2. Theoretical background: On metonymy (in grammar) and grammaticalization

Dynamic as the field of Cognitive Linguistics is, there is no denying that metonymy has still not caught up with metaphor in terms of the amount of scholarly attention each attracts. This is far from a novel realization. Claims to that effect have

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1 My view of subordination is rooted in the cognitive linguistic premise that grammar resides in conceptualization. Viewed from this angle, the prototype of subordination differs from the prototype of coordination in that the processes profiled by clauses linked by subordination are not equal in salience at the level of composite structure. Importantly, the different types of subordination are not equal in salience themselves, either (Langacker 1991, 1997, 2008, 2009a; Cristofaro 2003, 2014; cf. Belaj & Tanacković Faletar 2020 for Croatian complex sentences).

2 For more on conditional concessives and the alternative concessive conditionals see Section 3.4.
been made time and again (e.g. Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez Hernández 2001). Most recently, Brdar (2020: 258) tallied up the number of monographs, edited volumes, and articles with keywords metaphor and metonymy in four databases/bibliographies (as of 5 January 2020), and found that the gap still persists. A gap of sorts exists even within metonymy scholarship. Many studies seem to focus on the ins and outs of metonymy as a conceptual phenomenon and metonymy in nominal reference, leaving the impact of metonymy on grammar a still fairly unchartered area (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez Hernández 2001). As a result, one might get the impression that metonymy, unlike metaphor, has virtually no role to play in grammar (Nunberg 1979, 1995; Copestake & Briscoe 1995).

Encouraging, though, is that there has been a slow but steady stream of research into metonymy in grammar in the last two decades or so. Some of the earliest studies are Goossens (1999), Waltereit (1999), Panther & Thornburg (1999, 2000), Barcelona (2000), Brdar (2000), Ruiz de Mendoza & Perez Hernandez (2001), Brdar et al. (2001), Ruiz de Mendoza & Otal Campo (2002), and Brdar & Brdar-Szabó (2003). More recent ones include studies in Brdar (2007), Brdar & Brdar-Szabó (2013; 2017), and Panther et al. (2009) featuring metonymy-driven analyses of case semantics (Schultze), aspect (Panther and Thornburg), fictive motion constructions in architectural discourse (Caballero), generic reference in NPs (Rad- den), causative constructions (Ziegeler & Lee), etc. What is more, there are claims to the effect that metonymy is something of a general principle that underlies all grammar:

Grammar, in other words, is basically metonymic, in the sense that the information explicitly provided by conventional means does not itself establish the precise connections apprehended by the speaker and hearer in using an expression. (Langacker 2009b: 46)

Importantly, in the last two decades there has also been a growing recognition of the role of metonymy in the literature on grammaticalization in general. Grammaticalization processes are seen as largely driven by metaphor and metonymy, and especially in those parts of grammaticalization chains that involve further semantic extensions, i.e. the grammaticalization of already grammaticalized linguistic units:

… “grammaticalization” refers most especially to the steps whereby particular items become more grammatical through time. Grammaticalization in this sense is part of the wider linguistic phenomenon of structuration, through which combinations of forms may in time come to be fixed in certain functions. (Hopper & Traugott 2003: 1)
However, metaphor and metonymy are thought to play very important but different roles in the organization of grammar. Metaphorical extensions of various kinds are claimed to operate in practically all major areas of grammar (Sweetser 1990; Heine et al. 1991). On the other hand, Traugott & König (1991) treat metaphor and metonymy as involving different, though complementary kinds of pragmatic processes. The development of markers of tense, aspect, case etc. is associated with metaphoric inferencing, while the inferencing involved in the development of connectives like causals, concessives etc. involves strengthening of informativeness as conversational implicatures become conventionalized — a process considered by those authors as a type of metonymy. In other words, via the idea of “the strengthening of informativeness” as a type of metonymy, they extend the notion of metonymy to include not only specific conversational implicatures (corresponding in cognitive linguistics to referential, nominal, or lower-level metonymies) but also the more abstract cognitive contexts (corresponding in cognitive linguistics to higher-level metonymies). Metonymy is arguably associated with pragmatic contexts involving conventionalized inferences of a more abstract nature (e.g. the extension from temporal to causal meanings), unlike metaphors, which are associated with more specific inferences (e.g. the extension of spatial meanings to temporal meanings).

Comparing the status of metaphor and metonymy in grammaticalization theories of typological functionalism and in cognitive linguistics, the basic difference, in principle, is that in the former metaphor and metonymy are seen as one of the means of semantic change or as possible mechanisms of pragmatic inferencing, while in cognitive linguistics metaphor and metonymy play a key role in studying semantic-pragmatic relationships at all levels of linguistic analysis.

Details aside, it is noteworthy that metonymy (in whatever understanding thereof) has been found to play a central role in grammatical change.

We may observe the impact of metonymy on grammar by exploring the functional effects that accompany metonymic mappings in the grammatical system. It appears that metonymy can have two functions in grammar. In one case, metonymy allows a conceptual switch between two discrete grammatical states. In the other case, metonymy functions like a bridge (Goossens 1999). In the former case, we typically have a single metonymy, while in the other we have a metonymic chain in

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3 As far as grammaticalization scholarship goes, these pragmatic aspects have explicitly or implicitly been rooted in the neo-Gricean tradition of Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986). For more on differences in the treatment of metaphor and metonymy in Relevance Theory and cognitive linguistics, cf. Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez Hernández (2003) and Barcelona (2003).
which the target concept of one serves as the source concept for the other, and so on. This leads to a gradual step-by-step change, which may even be started by a pure incident in a single usage event, leading to the view of metonymy as an inference guiding mechanism, i.e. as the cognitive backdrop facilitating contextual reinterpretations and ultimately conventionalization of alternative meanings. In the analysis I will present some cases of such step-by-step grammaticalization of subordinating connectives in Croatian and submit proposals for how metonymy may have stimulated the polysemy of these connectives. I espouse two definitions of metonymy, both applicable to the issues addressed in this paper: the first by Rad- den & Kövecses (1999: 21), who define metonymy as “a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model. The second is Barcelona’s (2011: 52), which sees metonymy as “an asymmetric mapping of a conceptual domain, the source, onto another domain, the target. Source and target are in the same functional domain and are linked by a pragmatic function, so that the target is mentally activated”.

3. Analysis

In this section I analyze adverbial clauses, where metonymy operates, sometimes with metaphor, to navigate links between subordinate connectives expressing cause (3.1.), condition (3.2.), purpose (3.3.), and concession (3.4.). My analysis will largely corroborate König’s (1986) observation that the semantic categories involved in adverbial clauses are not discrete.

3.1. Metonymy and complex sentences featuring subordinate clauses of cause

There is ample cross-linguistic evidence that morphosyntactic expression of causes tends to be associated with the expression of relationships in time, the latter sometimes rooted themselves in relations in space (e.g. Geis & Zwicky 1971; Traugott 1985; Traugott & König 1991; Traugott & Dasher 2002), the expression of manner,

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4 The term idealized cognitive model (ICM), introduced by Lakoff (1987: 68–77), denotes configurations of cultural and experience-based knowledge, involving both conventionalized linguistic knowledge and encyclopaedic knowledge. ICMs represent the backdrop against which we conceptualize, process, and interpret linguistic expressions. Within the cognitive linguistic community, some other terms are current that correspond more or less to the idea of ICMs, e.g. domain (e.g. Langacker 1987; Croft 1993; Taylor 2002), script (Schank & Abelson 1977), frame (Fillmore 1982; 1985), scenario (Palmer 1996) or functional domain (Barcelona 2011).
topic, and givenness (Traugott 1985) and more abstract categories like condition (e.g. Dancygier 1993, 1998; Dancygier & Sweetser 2000) and concession (e.g. Kö nig 1985, 1986; Harris 1986, 1988). I discuss below how causal meanings can arise in connectives normally expressing time and manner. I also consider some cases where the expression of cause intertwines with that of condition and concession.

Causal connectives are among the most abundant in the system of connectives building complex sentences in Croatian. This is due to the close association between the meaning of cause and quite a few other semantic categories, like e.g. space, time, and manner, as well as more abstract ones like condition and concession – to which I return in the analysis of metonymic operations in conditional (Section 3.2.) and concessive (Section 3.4.) clauses.

Subordinate clauses of cause can be introduced by prototypically causal simple and derived connectives like jer ‘because’, budući da ‘being that’, zato što ‘because’, zbog toga što ‘because’ etc. They can also be introduced by various temporal connectives like kad(a) ‘when’, čim ‘as soon as’, dok ‘while’, nakon što ‘after’, pošto ‘after’; and manner connectives such as kako ‘how’, time što ‘by, in the manner that, by means of’ lit. that\textsubscript{DEM,instr} that\textsubscript{COMP}. This suggests a strong semantic association between the three categories. This association comes from the grammaticalization of the prototypical meanings of the subjunctors (\textsc{time} > \textsc{cause} / \textsc{manner} > \textsc{cause}) and is a result of metonymic mappings. Let me discuss first a few examples of temporal-causal subordinate clauses, cf. examples (1–4):

(1) *Nakon što je čuo njegove riječi, (onda) bijesno je izjurio iz kuće. > Bijesno je izjurio iz kuće jer je čuo njegove riječi.*

‘After he had heard his words, (then) he stormed out of the house in rage’ > ‘He stormed out of the house in rage because he had heard his words’

(2) *Pošto je uvidio u čemu grijehi, (onda) sam je sebi obećao da će to pokušati promijeniti. > Sam je sebi obećao da će to pokušati promijeniti jer je uvidio u čemu grijehi.*

‘After he realized what he was doing wrong, (then) he made a promise to himself that he would try to change that’ > ‘He made a promise to himself that he would try to change that because he realized what he was doing wrong’

\footnote{In most cases I will only provide the most plausible idiomatic English renderings of the Croatian connectives and examples generally; glossing will be used sparingly and selectively, i.e only where absolutely necessary for the argument at hand.}
Causality can be coded by temporal connectives because this is licenced by the metaphorical and metonymic mappings between the categories of space, time, and cause. The metonymy at issue is TEMPORAL SEQUENCE FOR CAUSAL LINK. This metonymy is of the general type PART FOR PART and it manifests within the “conceptual envelope” of the causation ICM as a whole. Still, a legitimate question arises, viz. why not consider the link between temporal and causal meanings metaphorical, specifically as a case of the CAUSE IS TIME metaphor, as in e.g. Heine et al. (1991: 166)? While the boundary between metaphor and metonymy may be precarious indeed, metonymic mappings, as a rule, involve concrete source domains, whereas this restriction does not seem to apply to metonymy. Thus, when it comes to mappings between two abstract domains, like cause and time, metonymy is a much more plausible motivating factor, as argued by Traugott & König (1991: 213). The same reasoning applies to the mappings between other abstract domains, i.e. other high-level metonymies as discussed further below. Note, as an aside, that there is no conceptual metaphor among those registered in the Croatian Metaphor Repository MetaNet.HR (Despot et al. 2019) where time would be featured as a source.

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6 Panther and Thornburg (2007: 255) attribute the link between time and cause to the metonymy TEMPORAL CONTIGUITY FOR CAUSAL LINK.

7 Radden & Kövecses (1999: 36) claim that PART FOR PART metonymies usually involve entities within action ICMs, i.e. relational ICMs, which is perfectly acceptable. Referential (nominal) metonymies in turn may cast some doubt on the plausibility of PART FOR PART metonymies, since such metonymies can be considered indirect metonymies, i.e. as results of the operation of the metonymic chain PART FOR WHOLE > WHOLE FOR PART > PART FOR PART (Ruiz de Mendoza and his coauthors 2000, 2002, 2003; Belaj 2005; Brdar 2020; Brdar-Szabó & Brdar 2021).
domain. This I believe lends weight to my argument about the non-metaphorical, i.e. metonymic basis of the time-cause link.

In each of the examples in (1–4), an anterior temporal relation – constituting a part of its causation ICMs – stands for the causal relation – constituting a different part of the same ICM. Underlying this configuration is the highly productive conceptual metaphor TIME IS SPACE and its specific elaboration A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN TIME IS A SEQUENCE OF PHYSICAL ENTITIES IN SPACE. The latter, in turn, is supported by one of the most fundamental image schemas – the orientational schema FRONT/BACK. In the next step, an even more abstract category, viz. that of a cause-effect event relation is associated, via the above mentioned metaphor, with a spatio-temporal relation. This is so because causes always precede effects in time, i.e. effects always follow causes. Ultimately, when considered within the envelope of the whole causation ICM, all of this opens up the possibility of seeing time and the cause-effect link as standing in a PART FOR PART metonymic relationship; their conceptual “contiguity” is licenced by their mutual association with the spatial domain (Figure 1).

Besides anteriority, the idea of simultaneity may also underlie the metonymic association between time and cause via the TEMPORAL SEQUENCE FOR CAUSAL LINK metonymy. Such subordinate clauses are introduced with the connective dok ‘while’, cf. (5)

(5) **Dok** si redovni student, imaš sva prava kao i zaposleni građani. > Imaš sva prava kao i zaposleni građani **jer** si redovni student.

‘**While** you are a full-time student, you have the same rights as the employed’ > ‘You have the same rights as the employed **because** you are a full-time student’

The association between cause and time in dok-subordinate clauses denoting simultaneity is not straightforward but lends itself to easy explanation. Such clauses underscore the idea that the duration of the effect is co-extensive with, and conditional on, the duration of the cause. Put differently, the effect will be in place for as long as the cause exists, which is why we might argue that these subordinate clauses of time-cause are of a habitual type.

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8 For more on the metaphorical relationship between the basic cognitive domains of time and space cf. Evans (2004), Moore (2006), Radden (2011), and Belaj (2013).

9 In various localist case theories (e.g. Anderson 1971; cf. Lyons 1977: 721; Belaj 2008, 2010, 2011; Belaj & Buljan 2016), the link between space and cause can also be established via the idea of ablativity and extralocativity (an aspect of ablativity).
In addition to functioning as a subordinator for temporal clauses denoting simultaneity with the main clause event, *dok* has also grammaticalized an adversative meaning (DOK<sub> TEMP. </sub> > DOK<sub> ADVERS. </sub>). As an adversative connective, *dok* actually links coordinate clauses and alternates with the prototypically adversative conjunction *a*. This is so because the connective *a* links (clauses coding) parallel adversative events, e.g. in (6a)

\[(6a) \quad \text{Ivan radi u trgovini, } a \text{ Marko (radi) u građevini.} / \text{Ivan radi u trgovini, } dok \text{ Marko radi u građevini.}\]

‘Ivan works in commerce, and Marko (works) in construction’ / ‘Ivan works in commerce, while Marco works in construction’
Because the events are construed as parallel, the clauses coding those events are reversible, cf.

(6b) Marko radi u građevini, a Ivan (radi) u trgovini. / Marko radi u građevini, dok Ivan radi u trgovini.

‘Marko works in construction, and Ivan (works) in commerce’ / ‘Marko works in construction, while Ivan works in commerce’

In contrast, the adversative connective ali ‘but’ (and the connective no ‘but’) cannot be substituted by dok. This is so because ali does not link parallel events; rather, it communicates “logical adversativity”,10 viz. concession, which cannot be expressed with the connective dok.11 Clauses denoting adversative events can always be replaced by subordinate clauses of concession featuring the connectives iako ‘although’ or mada ‘although, despite’. Unlike parallel structures featuring the connective a ‘and’, clauses expressing two logically adverse events are not reversible, cf.

(7a) Padala je kiša, ali smo ipak otišli na izlet. / *Ipak smo otišli na izlet, ali je padala kiša.

‘It was raining, but we still went on a field trip’ / ‘We still went on a field trip, but it was raining’

(7b) *Padala je kiša, dok smo ipak otišli na izlet. > Ipak smo otišli na izlet iako / mada je padala kiša.

*‘It was raining, while we still went on a field trip’ > ‘We still went on a field trip although it was raining’

The reason why a and dok can be substituted for each other, i.e. why dok can be used as an adversative connective is because, as a temporal subordinator, dok also links parallel events, i.e. events running in parallel or simultaneously. Thus, I argue that the use of dok as an adversative connective is licenced by metonymy. Specifically, the metonymy involved is of the general PART FOR WHOLE type since the

10 This does not mean, of course, the a cannot also express concession, cf. Padala je kiša, a ipak smo otišli na izlet ‘It was raining and we still went on a field trip’ / Ipak smo otišli na izlet, a padala je kiša. ‘We still went on a field trip and it was raining’.

11 Herein lies a key difference between Croatian and English. In English, the prototypical meaning of temporal simultaneity in the connective while (the counterpart to Croatian dok) has progressed further in grammaticalization, i.e. by metonymic processes it has come to acquire a concessive meaning (Traugott & König 1991; Kortmann 1997: 321–322).
TEMPORAL PARALELISM OF THE PROFILED EVENTS stands as a part for the ABSTRACT PARALELISM OF CONTRASTING EVENTS as a whole.

I exemplify below (8–10) the type of complex sentences featuring subordinate clauses of time-cause introduced with the connectives čim ‘as soon as’, dok ‘while’ and kad(a) ‘when’:

(8) Čim je ovakva sparina, sigurno će biti tuče. > Sigurno će biti tuče jer je ovakva sparina.

‘Since (lit. as soon as) it is this humid, it’s surely going to hail’ > ‘It’s surely going to hail because it is this humid’

(9) Dok se okupilo ovoliko ljudi, vjerojatno će biti dobar koncert. > Vjerojatno će biti dobar koncert jer se okupilo ovoliko ljudi.

‘Since (lit. while) so many people showed up, the concert will probably be good’ > ‘The concert will probably be good because so many people showed up’

(10) Kad je ovako hladno, oni sigurno neće doći. > Oni sigurno neće doći jer je ovako hladno.

‘Since (lit. when) it’s this cold, they will surely not come’ > ‘They will surely not come because it’s this cold’

Like the previous examples, those in (8–10) also rely on the metonymic relationship between TEMPORAL SEQUENCE and CAUSAL LINK as parts of the same ICM. However, these examples also express causality of a generic associative-situational type, whereby the speaker associates an effect with its cause based on his own subjective experience. Due to this subjective element, the effect expressed in the main clause tends to be qualified by some modal expression, like vjerojatno ‘probably’, sigurno ‘surely’, bit će ‘presumably’, etc. (Kovačević 1988: 133; Belaj & Tanacković Faletar 2020: 227). One could claim that the recognition of the causal event results from inductive reasoning, i.e. that knowledge of the causal nature of the event comes from generalizing over a series of individual prior events that had produced similar effects. When construed in this way, this type of cause-effect constructions may be said to involve schematization, i.e. reconstruals of instances into types. In other words, a common and general understanding of how an event unfolds maps onto an individual instance of the event via a WHOLE FOR PART metonymy, specifically the metonymy TYPE FOR INSTANCE or GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC.

Traugott & König (1991: 195–197) claim that temporal connectives in English are more frequently in the service of expressing a temporal association when both
clauses code events. On the other hand, when one or both clauses code a state, the interpretation is causal (state1 relevant to state2). This claim is valid for Croatian too, as clearly illustrated with examples (8–10). However, what is the cause for this distribution? I argue that the reason most probably lies with the fact that causes are always factual. This makes causes compatible with the factuality profiled by a state, the latter being stable compared to events (events are characterized by sequentiality and therewith instability). In other words, that which is subject to change over time is also less factual than that which results from an antecedent event. This is arguably what motivates the expression činjenično stanje ‘factual state’, a term that has spread from legal discourse into common, everyday language.

Subordinate clauses of cause are also often introduced with the manner connective kako ‘how’, cf.

(11) **Kako nisi bio tamo, nisi ni mogao vidjeti što se dogodilo.**

‘Seeing as (lit. how) you were not there, you can’t have seen what happened’

This is yet another instance of grammaticalization effected by metaphorical and metonymic mappings. The link between cause and manner is established via the path image schema (Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987; Lakoff & Turner 1989; Smith 1985, 1987, see also in Lyons’s overview of localist theories 1977: 718–724). This image schema underlies the metaphors **MANNER IS PATH** (TRAVERSED WHEN EXECUTING AN ACTION) and **CAUSE IS PATH** (TRAVERSED WHEN MOVING FROM THE SOURCE DOMAIN TO THE TARGET DOMAIN IN AN ACTION CHAIN). These two metaphors, in turn, license the activation of the metonymy **MANNER FOR CAUSE** within the causation ICM. Thus, as in the metonymy **TEMPORAL SEQUENCE FOR CAUSAL LINK**, the metonymy involved here also links two conceptually contiguous parts, and is, therefore, an instance of the general type **PART FOR PART** (Figure 2).12

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12 Unlike temporal-causal clauses, which arguably profile time and cause in roughly equal measure, here, only the target concept of cause is rendered salient, as indicated with heavier lines in Figure 2. Profiling the target concept is indeed one of the basic functions of any metonymy, with rare exceptions like Lakoff & Johnson’s (1980: 38) examples of the controller for controlled metonymy Nixon bombed Hanoi and Napoleon lost at Waterloo. In these two examples, the source concepts Nixon and Napoleon are profiled, not the target concepts pilots and French soldiers. For more on this, cf. Panther (2005: 371–373). Of course, from a purely synchronic stance, it stands to reason that the metonymic source concept is always present in the interpreter’s mind, at least to some small degree.
Manner and cause also share ground in subordinate clauses of manner-cause introduced by *time što* ‘by, in the manner that, by means of’ lit. thatDEM.INSTR thatCOMP (12). Such clauses are deserving of the label “manner-cause” because of the ease with which they lend themselves to paraphrase by constructions featuring prototypical manner and cause connectives (12a–12b):

(12)  *Sve je u životu postigao time što je naporno radio.* (manner-cause)
‘He accomplished everything in life by (lit. thatDEM.INSTR thatCOMP) working hard’

(12a) *Sve je u životu postigao tako što je naporno radio.* (manner)
‘He accomplished everything in life by (lit. such thatCOMP) working hard’
(12b)  Sve je u životu postigao *jer je naporno radio*. (cause)
‘He accomplished everything in life because he worked hard’

The semantic bridge between manner and cause is established by an abstract, verbal non-inherent instrument,\(^{13}\) which is semantically associated with both manner and cause. For this reason, I propose here a PART FOR PART metonymy within the causation ICM (this ICM includes an agent and an instrument as participants in the source domain, and a patient or theme participant in the target domain within the causal event structure. The event structure, of course, also includes a manner component), where A(N) (ABSTRACT) INSTRUMENT stands for both MANNER and CAUSE. We are witnessing here, in fact, a double metonymy, viz. INSTRUMENT FOR MANNER and INSTRUMENT FOR CAUSE, and indirectly the metonymy MANNER FOR CAUSE. Compare Figure 3, where *naporan rad* ‘hard work’, as an abstract instrument inherent to the agent, is represented by dashed lines, the energy transfer from the source domain of the event chain (AG) to the theme entity (T) in the target domain is indicated by a solid arrow, and bold solid ovals marking manner and cause indicate the interpretation of the subordinate clause as one of manner or cause.\(^{14}\)

Let me round off the overview of subordinate clauses of cause by looking at clauses that are formally causal, but mean concession, as in (13)

(13)  *Ovaj krevet nije manje udoban jer nema naslon.* > *Ovaj krevet nije manje udoban iako nema naslon.*
‘This bed is no less comfortable because it does not have a headrest’ > ‘This bed is no less comfortable although it does not have a headrest’

Examples like (13) rest on the PART FOR WHOLE metonymy CAUSE FOR CAUSATIVE CONCESSION. Causes are constituent parts of factual causative-concession clauses in much the same way that conditions are constituent parts of hypothetical conditional concessives within the concession ICM (cf. Figure 6). It should be noted that causal and concessive subordinate clauses can only alternate (as in 13) when the main clause proposition is negated, cf. (13a):

\(^{13}\) For more on noninherent instruments on the one hand; inherent means on the other, and generally on the syntax and semantics of the instrumental in Croatian cf. Belaj & Tanacković Faletar (2017: 208–220) and Brač (2019).

\(^{14}\) For simplicity, the figure does not represent the main and the subordinate clause separately.
Figure 3. Indirect manner-to-cause metonymic mappings within causation ICM

(13a)  Ovaj je krevet manje udoban jer nema naslon. > *Ovaj je krevet manje udoban iako nema naslon.

‘This bed is less comfortable because it does not have a headrest’ >
*‘This bed is less comfortable although it does not have a headrest’

This is so because, as already pointed out, concession belongs to the more general domain of adversativity. Note that every causative-concession clause can be paraphrased by a coordinate adversative clause, cf. (14), and negation is always compatible with contrasting the content of one clause against the content of the other, cf. (15)
(14) **Ovaj krevet nije manje udoban iako nema naslon. > Ovaj krevet nema naslon, ali zato nije manje udoban.**

‘This bed is no less comfortable although it does not have headrest’ >
‘This bed does not have a headrest, but is no less comfortable for it’

(15) **Došao sam, ali nisam želio. / Nisam želio, ali sam (ipak) došao. /*Došao sam, ali sam želio.**

‘I came, but I did not want to. / I did not want to, but I (still) came’ /*‘I came, but I wanted to’

Besides formally appearing as a subordinate clause of cause, the concessive meaning of this type can also surface as a subordinate clause of condition, cf. (16)

(16) **Ovaj krevet nije manje udoban ako nema naslon. > Ovaj krevet nije manje udoban iako nema naslon.**

‘This bed is not less comfortable if it doesn’t have a headrest’ > ‘This bed is no less comfortable although it doesn’t have a headrest’

This is so because, as argued above, cause and condition are both parts of the concession ICM. However, unlike (13), where there is a direct mapping between cause and concession in the metonymy CAUSE FOR CONCESSION, in (16) the mapping is not direct since a conditional connective cannot be understood as the causative-concessive *iako* ‘although’. To achieve the metonymic switch between conditional and causative concession clauses, the condition must first map onto the cause by virtue of the metonymy CONDITION FOR CAUSE, and only then can the cause come to stand for the causative concession. Put differently, in (16) we are witnessing the workings of the metonymic chain CONDITION FOR CAUSE (PART FOR PART) > CAUSE FOR CAUSATIVE CONCESSION (PART FOR WHOLE), cf. (16a) and Figure (4).

(16a) **Ovaj krevet nije manje udoban ako nema naslon > Ovaj krevet nije manje udoban jer nema naslon > Ovaj krevet nije manje udoban iako nema naslon.**

‘This bed is not less comfortable if it doesn’t have a headrest’ > ‘This bed is not less comfortable because it doesn’t have a headrest’ > ‘This bed is not less comfortable although it doesn’t have a headrest’
3.2 *Metonymy and complex sentences featuring subordinate clauses of condition*

Let me preface the discussion in this subsection with a quick look at the difference between the real conditional sentences\textsuperscript{15} in (17–18) and (19–20):

\textsuperscript{15} *Real* conditionals are those where the fulfilment of the condition in the protasis leads to the fulfilment of the event in the apodosis; *hypothetical* conditionals are those where the possible fulfilment of the condition in the protasis makes the fulfilment of the event in the apodosis possible; *counterfactual* conditionals express the non-fulfilment or the impossibility of fulfilment of the condition in the protasis, which consequently makes the event in the apodosis unfulfilled or unfulfillable too.
(17) *Ako budete kuhali špagete, obavezno mi javite!*
    ‘If *you cook*\text{\textsubscript{FUTII}} spaghetti, be sure to let me know’\textsuperscript{16}

(18) *Ako bude padao snijeg, odgodit ćemo putovanje.*
    ‘If *it snows*\text{\textsubscript{FUTII}}, we’ll postpone the trip’

(19) *Ako ćete kuhati špagete, obavezno mi javite!*
    ‘If *you cook*\text{\textsubscript{FUTI}} spaghetti, be sure to let me know’

(20) *Ako će padati snijeg, odgodit ćemo putovanje.*
    ‘If *it snows*\text{\textsubscript{FUTI}}, we’ll postpone the trip’

In the protases of (17–18) the predicator is marked for Future II tense; the predicators in the protastes of (19–20) are in Future I tense form. The difference is that the first pair expresses only the condition and does not assume the speaker’s knowledge about the likelihood of its fulfilment. The second pair communicates an expectation, based on some prior knowledge, that the protasis will be realized. Belaj & Tanacković Faletar (2020: 262) refer to the latter as *expective conditional clauses*. The difference is best observed in the following paraphrases (17a–20a):

(17a) *Ako budete kuhali špagete, obavezno mi javite!* > *Ako (kojim slučajem) budete kuhali špagete, obavezno mi javite!*
    ‘If *you cook*\text{\textsubscript{FUTII}} spaghetti, be sure to let me know’ > ‘If (by any chance) you do cook spaghetti, do let me know’

(18a) *Ako bude padao snijeg, odgodit ćemo putovanje.* > *Ako (kojim slučajem) bude padao snijeg, odgodit ćemo putovanje.*
    ‘If *it snows*\text{\textsubscript{FUTII}}, we’ll postpone the trip’ > ‘If (by any chance) it does start snowing, we’ll postpone the trip’

(19a) *Ako ćete kuhati špagete, obavezno mi javite!* > *Ako ćete kuhati špagete (kao što znam da ste najavili), obavezno mi javite!*
    ‘If *you cook*\text{\textsubscript{FUTI}} spaghetti, be sure to let me know’ > ‘If you cook spaghetti (which I know you said you would), do let me know’

\textsuperscript{16} Note that (17–18) and (19–20) feature different future tense forms. The former examples include Future II tense (built from the present tense of the auxiliary *be* and -participle of the main verb (in Croatian *glagolski pridjev radni*), the latter feature the Future I form, built from the present form of the auxiliary *have* and the main verb in the infinitive. Functionally, Future II is a relative tense, i.e. in most cases it denotes a future action that precedes another future action and as such is always substitutable for the present tense; rarely, it denotes two simultaneous future events. Future I, in turn, marks absolute future exclusively.
Examples (17–18) feature plain, neutral conditionals, which Sweetser (1990: 115–117; 1996) refers to as content conditionals. The expective conditionals in (19–20) are called epistemic conditionals and are considered metaphorical extensions of content conditionals. In Cognitive Grammar parlance (e.g. Langacker 1987: 128–132; 1991: 89–95; in Croatian cf. Belaj & Tanacković Faletar 2014: 133–134), the difference between the two types of real conditionals could be interpreted as a difference in the degree of subjectivization of the speaker (conceptualizer) as a ground element. A higher degree of speaker subjectivization entails that the speaker is distanced (subjectivized, drawn into himself) from the object of conceptualization, which represents the objective scene, i.e. the scope of predication (OP). Therefore, the ground (G) and the scope of predication (SP) are at some distance from each other. A lower degree of speaker subjectivization makes him, to some extent, a part of the scope of predication, i.e. a participant.

Thus, epistemic conditionals or expective conditional clauses involve a lower degree of the speaker’s (S) subjectivization – given his involvement, as a ground element (G) in the scope of predication due to his having some knowledge about the development of the event in the protasis (Figure 5b). Neutral or content conditionals assume a higher degree of subjectivization, i.e. a greater distance between ground and scope of predication (Figure 5a).

More precisely, we are concerned here with the association of main and adverbial clause events at content and epistemic levels. Besides these two types of conditionals, Sweetser (1990) also discusses conditionals at illocutionary level, i.e. illocutionary conditionals. In this case, there is no direct relationship between the hypothetical cause in the protasis and the effect in the apodosis. Instead, the condition bears indirect, or potential relevance relative to main clause content, as in Ako večeras nemaš što raditi, u kazalištu je na programu jedna izvršna predstava (‘If you have nothing better to do tonight, there is an excellent play in the theatre’). Proof that this is a case of the pragmatic function of a conditional clause is that, unlike others, such conditionals cannot be replaced by their factual counterpart, viz. by a clause of cause. Cf. Ako večeras nemaš što raditi, u kazalištu je na programu jedna izvršna predstava (‘If you have nothing better to do tonight, there is an excellent play in the theatre’) > *U kazalištu je na programu jedna izvršna predstava jer večeras nemaš što raditi (‘There is an excellent play in the theatre because you have nothing better to do tonight’).
Unlike Sweetser, Barcelona (2009: 382) sees the difference between content and epistemic conditionals as a case of metonymic extension. This is the view I espouse as well. In epistemic conditionals I propose a variant of the WHOLE FOR PART metonymy, viz. POTENTIAL CAUSE-EFFECT RELATION BETWEEN PROTASIS AND APODOsis FOR IMPLICIT EPISTEMIC SUBRELATION.18

The following type of metonymically motivated conditional sentences is exemplified in (21–23):

\[\text{Ako bude padao snijeg, odgodit ćemo putovanje.} > \text{Ako (činjenično stanje bude takvo) da pada snijeg, (smatram / zaključujem) da bismo trebali odgoditi putovanje. ‘If it snows, we’ll postpone the trip’ > If (the facts turn out to be such that) it snows, (I thing/conclude that) we should postpone the trip’}.\]

Therefore, it can be also claimed that the G-participant is not in profile in neutral conditionals whereas it is profiled in epistemic conditionals.

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18 We leave aside here Barcelona’s (2009: 382) view that all conditional clauses involve some epistemic attitude on the part of the speaker, i.e that the speaker – with some sort of epistemic attitude – is at least somewhat included in the scope of predication. In neutral conditionals this may well be so, but to a far lesser degree than in epistemic conditionals; still, they too can be paraphrased roughly as in: \[\text{Ako bude padao snijeg, odgodit ćemo putovanje.} \] > \[\text{Ako (činjenično stanje bude takvo) da pada snijeg, (smatram / zaključujem) da bismo trebali odgoditi putovanje. ‘If it snows, we’ll postpone the trip’ > If (the facts turn out to be such that) it snows, (I thing/conclude that) we should postpone the trip’}\]. Therefore, it can be also claimed that the G-participant is not in profile in neutral conditionals whereas it is profiled in epistemic conditionals.
(21) Ako ćemo iskreno, to nije bilo dobro. > Ako ćemo iskreno govoriti, to nije bilo dobro.

‘If I am honest (lit. honestlyADV), that wasn’t good’ > ‘If I speak honestly, that wasn’t good’

(22) Ako ćemo pošteno, nisi to zaslužio. > Ako ćemo pošteno reći, nisi to zaslužio.

‘If I am fair (lit. fairlyADV), you didn’t deserve this’ > ‘If I speak fairly, you didn’t deserve this’

(23) Ako ćemo pravo, dobro si postupio. > Ako ćemo pravo govoriti, dobro si postupio.

‘If I am true (lit. trulyADV), you did well’ > ‘If I speak truly, you did well’

Considered in the light of the pragmatic typology of metonymy (Thornburg & Panther 1997; Panther & Thornburg 1998, 1999; Panther 2005) these examples lend themselves to explanation in terms of two propositional metonymies, which, in all fairness, are not typical of conditional clauses, but are still more frequent in conditionals than in any other type of subordinate clauses in Croatian.

The first metonymy is the predicational propositional metonymy MANNER FOR LINGUISTIC ACTION (Brdar et al. 2001; Brdar & Brdar-Szabó 2003, 2004; Brdar 2007: 175–181; Panther 2005: 376–377), which may be construed as a variant of both PART FOR PART and PART FOR WHOLE metonymy. On the first interpretation, iskreno ‘honest (lit. honestly)’, pošteno ‘fair’ (lit. fairly), pravo ‘true’ (lit. truly) and similar manner adverbials represent one propositional content that stands for verbs of linguistic action like reći ‘say’, govoriti ‘speak’, etc. as the second piece of propositional content. On the second interpretation, we have a kind of a formal metonymy where the adverb is a PART (iskreno ‘honest (lit. honestly)’, pošteno ‘fair’ (lit. fairly), pravo ‘true’ (lit. truly)) that stands for the WHOLE adverbial syntagma (iskreno govoriti ‘speak honestly’, pošteno reći ‘speak fairly’, pravo govoriti ‘speak truly’).

Moreover, in such constructions the adverb can be replaced by an adjective (24–25):

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19 This typology postulates propositional and illocutionary metonymies, whereby propositional metonymies are further classed into predicational and referential metonymies.
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(24) Ako ćemo biti *iskreni, to nije bilo dobro. > Ako ćemo *iskreno govoriti, to nije bilo dobro.

‘If I am honest (lit. honest_ADJ), it wasn’t good’ > ‘If I speak honestly, it wasn’t good’

(25) Ako ćemo biti *poštieni, nisi to zaslužio. > Ako ćemo *pošteno reći, nisi to zaslužio.

‘If I am fair (lit. fair_ADJ), you didn’t deserve this’ > ‘If I speak fairly, you didn’t deserve this’

Here, I propose the metonymy PROPERTY FOR LINGUISTIC ACTION, which too can be interpreted as a case of PART FOR PART or PART FOR WHOLE metonymy.

On the second interpretation, the constructions in (21–23) and (24–25) may be interpreted as referential propositional metonymies of the type PART FOR PART within the Production ICM. In that case, the SPEAKER as one part of the ICM, specifically, the initiator of the metonymic process, i.e. a reference point (Langacker 1993, 2000, 2009a), stands for THE UTTERANCE as the second part, i.e. the result or product of linguistic action (26–27):^20

(26) Ako ćemo *iskreno / Ako ćemo biti *iskreni, to nije bilo dobro. > Ako će moje *riječi biti iskrene, to nije bilo dobro.

‘If I’m honest / If I’m going to be honest, that wasn’t good’ > ‘If my words are going to be honest, that wasn’t good’

^20 That is why Brdar-Szabó & Brdar (2021: 221) claim that this type of propositional referential metonymy may be subsumed under a more general and more ubiquitous metonymy PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT. Incidentally, I fully endorse Panther’s (2005: 374–377) stance that the interpretation involving predicational propositional metonymy is the more logical and far more plausible one. This can be confirmed by the syntactic tests of anaphoric binding, coordination of syntactically equal NPs and modification by a manner adverb denoting intentionality. Thus, for instance, if the construction *Ivan je bio iskren, ali nije zvučao uvjerljivo ‘Ivan was sincere, but he did not sound convincing’ were interpreted by evoking a referential metonymy, then the construction featuring an anaphoric personal pronoun coreferential with ričima ‘words’ as the target concept in the first clause would have to be grammatical, which is not the case, cf. *Ivan (>Ivanove riči), je bio iskren, ali one, nisu zvučale uvjerljivo (*‘Ivan (> Ivan’s words), was sincere, but they did not sound convincing). If, in turn, the same construction *Ivan je bio iskren, ali nije zvučao uvjerljivo is interpreted with the help of predicational metonymy, Ivan can be interpreted literally, while the adjective iskren ‘sincere’ becomes subject to metonymic interpretation, allowing the construction to do well on the test of anaphoric binding, cf. Ivan, je bio iskren, ali nije (on), zvučao uvjerljivo (*‘Ivan, was sincere, but (he), did not sound convincing).
(27) Ako ćemo pošteno / Ako ćemo biti pošteni, nisi to zaslužio. > Ako će moje riječi biti poštene, nisi to zaslužio.

‘If I’m fair / If I’m going to be fair, you didn’t deserve this’ > If my words are going to be fair, you didn’t deserve this’

Finally, these examples featuring conditional clauses can also be interpreted as illocutionary metonymies. The conditional clause as a HYPOTHETICAL COMMISSIVE SPEECH ACT stands for the FACTUAL COMMISSIVE SPEECH ACT. As such it could be considered an instance of a high-level metonymy POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY (Panther & Thornburg 1999), which in turn could alternatively be defined as HYPOTHETICAL STATE FOR FACTUAL STATE, cf. (28–29):

(28) Ako ćemo iskreno / Ako ćemo biti iskreni, to nije bilo dobro. > Bit ću iskren, to nije bilo dobro.

‘If I’m honest / If I’m being honest, that wasn’t good’ > ‘I will be honest, that wasn’t good’

(29) Ako ćemo pošteno / Ako ćemo biti pošteni, nisi to zaslužio. > Bit ću pošten, nisi to zaslužio.

‘If I’m fair / If I’m being fair, you didn’t deserve this’ > I’ll be fair, you didn’t deserve this’

The metonymy POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY / HYPOTHETICAL STATE FOR FACTUAL STATE also underlies the following construction type (30). Specifically, we may speak of its variant CONDITION FOR CAUSE.

(30) Ako je znanstveno dokazano i ako se već stoljećima zna da je Zemlja okrugla, onda je besmisleno tvrditi suprotno. > Budući da je znanstveno dokazano i da se već stoljećima zna da je Zemlja okrugla, onda je besmisleno tvrditi suprotno.

‘If science has proven and if it has been know for centuries that the Earth is round, then it is ludicrous to claim otherwise’ > ‘Since science has proven and since it has been know for centuries that the Earth is round, then it is ludicrous to claim otherwise’

This is an example of pseudo-conditional clauses (Belaj & Tanacković Faletar 2020: 237).
The subordinate clause has a conditional form but its meaning is causative.\textsuperscript{21} This is possible because causes and conditions are two poles of the same category, differing only in terms of their factual/hypothetical nature. Therefore, this metony-

\textsuperscript{21} Pseudo-conditionals and epistemic conditionals differ mainly in the degree of the factual/hypothetical nature of the protasis. In pseudo-conditionals, its degree of factuality is higher, which allows pseudo-conditionals to be more readily rendered as clauses of cause. Epistemic conditionals rank lower in factuality. For instance, in the epistemic conditional in (19a) \textit{Ako čete kuhati špagete (kao što znam da ste najavili), obavezno mi javite!} (‘If you cook spaghetti (which I know you said you would), do let me know’) all the speaker can be claimed to know is that the “spaghetti-cooking” had been announced, not that it would actually happen. This makes the protasis less factual than pseudo-conditional constructions like that in (30), featuring indisputable widely known facts.
my falls under the general type PART FOR PART within the whole of the causation ICM. This is shown in Figure 6, where the hypothetical nature of the condition is indicated by a dashed line.

The reasons for coding the meaning of cause with a conditional form as in (30) and in similar constructions, are pragmatic. By opting for this coding option, the speaker intends to achieve a stronger illocutionary-perlocutionary effect; he transforms the more neutral causal form into the more expressive conditional form, thereby adding to the suspense and uncertainty of the argument and catching the listener’s attention.

The constructions in (31–32) can also be considered pseudo-conditional:

(31) Ako se dobro sjećam, i ti si bio tamo.
    ‘If I remember well, you were there too’

(32) Ako se ne varam, i ti si prije tako mislio.
    ‘If I’m not mistaken, you used to be of the same opinion’

However, unlike (30), (31–32) exemplify a different type of pseudo-conditionality. These constructions are not pseudo-conditional because they mean a cause (cf. *I ti si bio tamo jer se dobro sjećam *‘you were there too because I remember well’, *I ti si prije tako mislio jer se ne varam *‘You used to be of the same opinion because I’m not mistaken’). They are pseudo-conditional because their sole function is pragmatic; the speaker wants to boost the factuality of the apodosis by assuming a quasi-hypothetical stance. In that way, the speaker assumes a tentativeness about his assertion despite being certain of its veracity. It could be claimed that such complex sentences involve the illocutionary metonymy HYPO-THETICAL DECLARATIVE SPEECH ACT FOR FACTUAL DECLARATIVE SPEECH ACT. After all, constructions like Ako se dobro sjećam, i ti si bio tamo ‘if I remember well, you were there too’ and Ako se ne varam, i ti si prije tako mislio zapravo ‘If I’m not mistaken, you used to be of the same opinion’ actually mean Dobro se sjećam, i ti si bio tamo ‘I remember well, you were there too’ and Znam, i ti si prije tako mislio ‘I know, you used to be of the same opinion’. This metonymy can also be considered a PART FOR PART metonymy operating within the ICM of declarative speech acts as a whole.

Close to the prototypical pseudo-conditional clauses such as that exemplified in (30) are constructions of the type exemplified in (33):

(33) Ako rezultate svih prošlih parlamentarnih izbora uspoređimo s ovima,
    jasno je da je došlo do ozbiljnoga pomaka u stavu biračkoga tijela.
'If we compare the results of all the previous parliamentary elections to the current ones, it is clear that there has come to a major shift in voter opinion.'

Still, these constructions do not so much profile the undeniable link between a cause and its effect as they profile a person’s realization that a situation is the way it is (a realization that comes from having verified the nature of the situation). In (33) this means that there has indeed come to a serious shift in public opinion but what is profiled instead is the realization of this fact on the part of the person who has made the multiple comparisons. For this reason, this construction can always be paraphrased by a connective coding habituality, as in (34–35):

(34) Kad god se rezultati svih prošlih parlamentarnih izbora uspoređuju s ovima, jasno je da je došlo do ozbiljnoga pomaka u stavu biračkoga tijela

‘Whenever one compares the results of all previous parliamentary elections with these results, it is clear that there has come to a major shift in voter opinion’

(35) Tko god rezultate svih prošlih parlamentarnih izbora uspoređuje s ovima, jasno mu je da je došlo do ozbiljnoga pomaka u stavu biračkoga tijela.

‘Whoever compares the results of all previous parliamentary elections with these results, it is clear that there has come to a major shift in voter opinion’

Therefore, one might propose that constructions of the type shown in (33) involve a metonymic interpretation, viz. the metonymy GENERIC (HABITUAL) FOR SPECIFIC. In this type of pseudo-conditional clauses, one might also consider an interpretation based on the illocutionary metonymy HYPOTHETICAL DIRECTIVE SPEECH ACT FOR FACTUAL DIRECTIVE SPEECH ACT because the construction in (33) may also be interpreted as in (36):

(36) Usporedite / Usporedimo rezultate svih prošlih parlamentarnih izbora s ovima, pa će vam biti jasno da je došlo do ozbiljnoga pomaka u stavu biračkoga tijela.

‘Compare /let’s compare the results of all previous parliamentary elections with these results, and you will find that there has come to a major shift in voter opinion’

This is also a PART FOR PART metonymy, but unlike (31–32), which are interpreted against the background of the declarative ICM as a whole, in this case the whole is a directive ICM.
As a last note on conditional clauses, let us consider how condition and time intersect in hypothetical (37) and counterfactual (38) conditional clauses introduced with the connective *kad(a) ‘when’.*

(37) *Kad bi se više trudio, uspjeh ne bi izostao.*

‘If (lit. when) you tried harder, success would follow.’

(38) *Kad u svijetu ne bi bilo korumpiranih političara, ljudi bi imali više povjerenja u vladajuće strukture.*

‘If (lit. when) there were no corrupt politicians in the world, people would have more trust in their governments’

The relationship between time and condition rests on the same principles as the relationship between time and cause. Underlying this relationship is the general conceptual metaphor **TIME IS SPACE** and its variant **SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN TIME IS A SEQUENCE OF PHYSICAL ENTITIES IN SPACE** (itself rooted in the orientational image schema **FRONT/BACK**), which allows the connective’s temporal meaning to grammaticalize into the conditional (**TIME > CONDITION**). Thus, construed against the background of the causation ICM, we are looking here at a **PART FOR PART** metonymy (**TIME FOR CONDITION**). This analysis is plausible since the condition expressed in the protasis always precedes in time the hypothetical effect expressed in the apodosis. In other words, the only difference between the two metaphorical-metonymic configurations (i.e. cause and condition) is in the factual/hypothetical opposition.

### 3.3. Metonymy and complex sentences featuring subordinate clauses of purpose

In this subsection I explore the working of metonymy in the subordinate clauses of purpose, which tend to be introduced with prototypical connectives *da ‘to, so that’ and kako ‘so as to, lit. how’, cf. (39–40):*

(39) *Svratili su usput do trgovine da kupe kruh.*

‘On the way, they stopped by the store to buy (lit. so that they buy) bread’

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22 We should note here that crosslinguistically, various temporal forms are among the most robust sources for grammaticalization into conditional connectives (cf. e.g. Traugott 1985).

23 In addition to the prototypical purpose connectives *da and kako*, Croatian adverbial clauses of purpose can also be introduced by the more marked, marginal connectives *li, eda and neka*, but these are not relevant for the discussion at hand.
(40) Zamolili su ih da odu *kako bi mogli nasamo razgovarati.*
   ‘They were asked to leave *so (lit. how) we might talk in private*’

The purpose clause explicitly codes the goal – as a type of consequence – but
the consequence is always hypothetical. Thus, the goal may be defined as a hypo-
thesetical consequence.\(^{24}\) Such a goal always implies, or better still comprises, a fac-
tual cause of a desiderative type, since a desire – an internal effector – actually rep-
resents an actualized cause that incites the agent to pursue some goal-directed ac-
tion. This can be observed if we paraphrase purpose clauses with desiderative caus-
ative clauses (39a–40a):

(39a) *Svratili su usput do trgovine *jer su željeli kupiti kruh.*
   ‘They stopped by the store *because they wanted to buy bread*’

(40a) Zamolili su ih da odu *jer su željeli razgovarati nasamo.*
   ‘They were asked to leave *because they wanted to talk in private*’

In light of that, we could propose that the interpretation of purpose clauses also
proceeds against the backdrop of the causation ICM, as a case of PART FOR WHOLE
metonymy. Thus, for instance in (39) the goal explicated in the purpose clause (*da kupe kruh ‘to buy bread’*), triggers a metonymic operation, i.e. it stands for the
whole purpose-causative event structure (*jer su željeli kupiti kruh / da kupe kruh ‘because they wanted to buy bread / to buy bread’*). In other words, it stands for
both the source (factual desiderative causative action *jer su željeli ‘because they
wanted’) and the target (hypothetical consequence *kupiti kruh / da kupe kruh ‘to
buy bread’) domain of the action chain.

Complex sentences with purpose clauses are special not only because the subor-
dinate purpose clause marries two meanings – a wish as a factual cause and a hypo-
thesetical consequence as the goal. They are also special in that the consequence is
also expressed in the main clause. However, that consequence is factual (unlike the
goal, which is a hypothetical consequence). One might say that the purpose clause
– as a hypothetical consequence, or more accurately as a combination of the factual
desiderative cause and the hypothetical consequence (goal) – represents the desid-

\(^{24}\) Note in this respect Croft (2001: 352), who makes the interesting claim that in the consecutive
chain or C-chain, itself constituted by the main and purpose clause, one may assume with a fair de-
gree of certainty the realization (factuality) of the second event coded in the purpose clause. Of
course, as Croft himself admits, due to the grammatical constellation this realization cannot be
claimed to be a matter of absolute certainty. But, should we assume that to be the case, we might
argue that, context allowing, purpose clauses are motivated by the metonymy POTENTIALITY FOR
PROBABLE ACTUALITY.
enerative cause of the realized (factual) consequence in the main clause. Therefore, the same event structure can be coded with complex sentences featuring any of the three subordinate clauses shown in (39–39b):

(39)  **Svratili su usput do trgovine da kupe kruh.** (purpose clause)  
‘They stopped by the store to buy bread’

(39a)  **Svratili su usput do trgovine jer su željeli kupiti kruh.** (causative clause)  
‘They stopped by the store because they wanted to buy bread’

(39b)  **Željeli su kupiti kruh, tako da su usput svratili do trgovine.** (consecutive clause)  
‘They wanted to buy bread, so that they stopped by the store’

The category of purpose clauses also includes some constructions that are semantically akin to the conditional constructions featured in (21–25), cf. (41–42):

(41)  **Da ti budem iskren, nisam ništa o tome čuo.**  
‘To be honest, I haven’t heard anything about it’

(42)  **Da budemo pošteni, nisi tako mislio.**  
‘To be fair, you did not mean it like that’

This is a marginal type of purpose clauses where purpose has grammaticalized further to the speech act level. In (42) honesty is not the goal concept in the structure of main clause content, but it is the goal of the very uttering of that content (Cristofaro 2003: 163; Belaj & Tanacković Faletar 2020: 397). Such constructions of purpose, like the analogue conditional constructions exemplified by Ako ćemo biti iskreni,... ‘If I’m honest …’, Ako ćemo biti pošteni... ‘If I’m fair …’, can be seen as results of the propositional predicational metonymy PROPERTY FOR LINGUISTIC ACTION (41a–42a):

(41a)  **Da ti iskreno kažem, nisam ništa o tome čuo.**  
‘To tell you honestly, I haven’t heard anything about it’

(42a)  **Da pošteno kažemo, nisi tako mislio.**  
‘To tell you fairly, you didn’t mean it like that’

And again, as with conditional clauses, this metonymy can be considered a variant of both PART FOR PART and PART FOR WHOLE metonymy. It can also be considered an instance of the propositional referential metonymy SPEAKER FOR UTTERANCE, which is, essentially, yet another manifestation of the PART FOR PART metonymy within the Production ICM as a whole (41b–42b):
(41b) *Da moje riči budu iskrene, nisam ništa o tome čuo.*

‘To be honest (lit. so that my words are honest), I haven’t heard anything about it’

(42b) *Da moje riči budu poštene, nisam ništa o tome čuo.*

‘To be fair (lit. so that my words are fair), I haven’t heard anything about it’

Conditional and purpose clauses of this type are also close because they allow factoring into their interpretation the illocutionary metonymy HYPOTHETICAL COMMISSIVE SPEECH ACT FOR FACTIVE COMMISSIVE SPEECH ACT as a variant of the high-level illocutionary metonymy POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY (41c–42c):25

(41c) *Da ti budem iskren, nisam ništa o tome čuo.* > *Bit ću iskren, nisam ništa o tome čuo.*

‘To be honest, I haven’t heard anything about it’ > ‘I’ll be honest, I haven’t heard anything about it’

(42c) *Da budemo poštani, nisi tako mislio.* > *Bit ću pošten, nisi tako mislio.*

‘To be fair, you didn’t mean it like that’ > ‘I’ll be fair, you didn’t mean it like that’

Any yet, conditional and purpose clauses are not equivalent in that regard because purpose clauses also include a desiderative cause. Therefore, a more accurate rendering of the construction in (41) is (41d):

(41d) *Želim biti iskren (pa ti zato kažem da), nisam ništa o tome čuo.*

‘I wish to be honest (and so I tell you that), I haven’t heard anything about it’

Thus, the metonymy HYPOTHETICAL COMMISSIVE SPEECH ACT FOR FACTUAL COMMISSIVE SPEECH ACT could be recast into the following metonymic chain: HYPOTHETICAL COMMISSIVE SPEECH ACT FOR DESIDERATIVE CAUSAL COMMISSIVE SPEECH ACT > DESIDERATIVE CAUSAL COMMISSIVE SPEECH ACT FOR FACTUAL COMMISSIVE SPEECH ACT.

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25 To be clear, when we use the term factuality in this context, we mean that Future I tense (*Bit ću iskren/pošten… ‘I’ll be honest/fair’*) is a tense form expressing that which is going to happen in future, i.e. that whose realization is always certain, regardless of the fact that future is in and of itself always uncertain, i.e. hypothetical.
3.4. Metonymy and complex sentences featuring subordinate clauses of concession

In this subsection I discuss the interplay of metonymy with two types of concessive clauses: (i) clauses which I refer to as unconditional concessive bilo da- clauses with bilo da ‘whether … or’ and (ii) clauses which I call counterfactual conditional concessive clauses with the connective da i / i da ‘even if’. Let me first comment on the term conditional concessive. Haspelmath & König (1998) consider these constructions to be conditional rather than concessive, hence the term concessive conditionals. They also postulate three types of concessive conditionals: scalar, alternative, and universal. There is no denying that the meaning of conditionality underlies such constructions. Haspemath & König provide some arguments for the primacy of conditional semantics, such as the equivalence of tense and mood marking in concessive conditionals and ordinary conditionals. Another argument is the paraphrasability of the concessive clause by two conditional clauses, as in Whether we get any financial support or not, we will go ahead with our project > If we get some financial support we will go ahead with our project and if we do not get any financial support we will (still) go ahead with our project (Haspelmath & König 1998: 565). Notwithstanding the underlying conditional semantics, I argue that these clauses are primarily concessive and therefore advocate the term conditional concessives (as in e.g. Quirk et al. 1985: 1099, 1101). Specifically, using the cognitive grammar parlance, we may argue that the conditional meaning constitutes the unprofiled conceptual base, and the concessive meaning stands in profile against this base. One could draw a parallel here with deverbal nouns, where a schematic [PROCESS] constitutes a defocused conceptual base for the profiled [THING], i.e. for the profiled trajector or landmark of the process (depending on whether agent or patient nouns are involved). The only difference is that in conditional concessive clauses we are concerned with the relationship between two processes – the profiled concessive process and the backgrounded conditional process. The term conditional concessive is the more apt one for two more reasons: (i) if tagged as primarily as concessive, a distinction can be drawn between semi-factual conditional concessives – where only the main clause is factual, and bifactual, real, or causal concessives where both clauses are factual; (ii) an argument that rests on postulating two or more conditional clauses is akin to two-level syntactic models, which is unacceptable within the realm of cognitive linguistics. Let me now return to un-
conditional concessives (43) and counterfactual conditional concessives, as in (44):26

(43) **Bilo da si zdrav, bilo da si bolestan, oni te više neće posječivati.**

‘**Whether you’re healthy or you’re sick,** they’ll no longer be paying you any visits’

(44) **I da me na koljenima moliš, ne bih to napravio.**

‘**Even if you begged me on your knees,** I wouldn’t do it’

Unconditional concessive clauses communicate that the main clause event is going to be fulfilled regardless of the unfavorable condition(s) expressed in the subordinate clause, i.e. regardless of any unfavorable condition. Since they involve a juxtaposition of extreme values for the relevant conditions, and subsume any other less extreme condition conceivable, such clauses arguably rest on the metonymy EXTREME POINTS OF THE SCALE FOR THE WHOLE SCALE. This would be another instance of the general PART(S) FOR WHOLE metonymy operating against the backdrop of the Scale ICM (Radden & Kövecses 1999: 31–32). The chaining inherent to unconditional concessive clauses is effected by deploying two connectives, i.e. the combination of the disjunctive connective *bilo* ‘whether’ and the general subordinator *da* ‘that’. In Croatian, complex connectives cannot be built by combining coordinators and subordinators. The contribution of the disjunctive connective *bilo* is to effect the coordination of two or more equi-functional expressions into a local constructional complex. Only then does this constructional complex, as a composite whole, enter into a subordinative relationship with the main clause. This last step is the functional contribution of the general subordinator *da* ‘that’. In addition to functioning as a disjunctive coordinator, *bilo* always has an additional intensifying function because it only ever appears in a correlative form. I argue that any such correlative duplication always results in intensification. Here, I propose another high-level metonymy, specifically a high-level metonymic chain, as follows:

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26 What I refer to as *unconditional concessive clauses* corresponds to Haspelmath & König’s (1998) *alternative* constructions. Similarly, my *counterfactual concessives* correspond to Haspelmath & König’s *scalar* constructions. Belaj & Tanacković Faletar (2020: 280–286) introduced the term *bezuvjetnodopusne klauze* ‘unconditional concessive clauses’ into Croatian syntax. Palić (2018) refers to these clauses as *alternativne bezuvjetne klauze* ‘alternative unconditional clauses’ and considers them a special structural-semantic type of subordination. For more on this type of concessive clauses cf. Kovačević (2006: 332–360) and Pranjković (2016: 149–156).
INTENSIFICATION FOR EXHAUSTIVENESS >

*Bilo da si zdrav, bilo da si bolestan, oni te više neće posjećivati = Bilo da si x, bilo da si y,..., bilo da si n, oni te više neće posjećivati*

‘Whether you’re healthy or you’re sick, they’ll no longer be paying you any visits’ = *Whether you are x or you are y, ..., or you are n, they’ll no longer be paying you any visits’

EXHAUSTIVENESS FOR UNCONDITIONALITY >

*Bilo da si x, bilo da si y,..., bilo da si n, oni te više neće posjećivati = Bilo kako se osjećao (U bilo kakvom stanju bio), oni te više neće posjećivati*

‘Whether you are x or you are y, ..., or you are n, they’ll no longer be paying you any visits’ = ‘*However* you feel (regardless of your condition), they’ll no longer be paying you any visits’

UNCONDITIONALITY FOR HABITUALNESS

*Bilo kako se osjećao (U bilo kakvom stanju bio), oni te više neće posjećivati = Kako god se osjećao (U kakvom god stanju bio), oni te više neće posjećivati / Ma kako se osjećao (Ma u kakvom stanju bio), oni te više neće posjećivati*

‘*However* you feel (in whatever condition you may be in), they’ll no longer be paying you any visits’ = ‘*However* you feel (in whatever state you may be), they’ll no longer be paying you any visits’ / ‘*Regardless of how you feel* (no matter your condition), they’ll no longer be paying you any visits’.

Counterfactual conditional concessives (cf. 44) also rely on the same metonymy type for their interpretation. However, the metonymy involved is not EXTREME POINTS OF THE SCALE FOR THE WHOLE SCALE, but AN EXTREME POINT OF THE SCALE FOR THE WHOLE SCALE. Here, only one extreme case stands for all cases. There is the understanding that, if the content of the main clause were to come true despite the extremely unfavorable condition expressed in the subordinate clause, then it must also come true despite all the less extreme adverse circumstances. This extreme point on the scale can be brought into prominence with intensifiers like čak ‘even’, or taman ‘even’. The intensifiers’ function of triggering the said metonymy is especially evident in constructions where the extreme point of the scale is not lexically coded, as in (44), cf. (45)

27 For more on the syntax and semantics of this type of conditional concessive clauses, and generally on the relationship between concession, conditionals, and causation in English, cf. König (1986); for a typological perspective see Haspelmath & König (1998).
Čak / Taman i da ga lijepo zamoliš, mislim da to ne bi uradio.
‘Even if you asked him nicely, I don’t think he’d do that’

König (1986: 238), following Ducrot (1972: 171), discusses one more interesting type of relationship between conditionals and concessives, specifically in interrogatives featuring conditional clauses, cf. (46)

(46) Hoćeš li ići autom ako bude poledica?
‘Will you take the car if the roads are icy?’

The concessive interpretation of the conditional form is beyond doubt and can be proven by paraphrasing such interrogatives by concessive i da-clauses (‘even if’ clauses), as in (46a) or concessive adverbials (46b)

(46a) Hoćeš li ići autom čak i da bude poledica?
‘Will you take the car even if the roads are icy?’

(46b) Hoćeš li ići autom i unatoč poledici?
‘Will you take the car despite the icy roads?’

In examples like (46) I postulate the metonymy CONDITIONALITY FOR CONDITIONAL CONCESSIVENESS. This metonymy falls under the general type PART FOR WHOLE. The concessive interpretation stems from encyclopedic knowledge shared by the interlocutors about relationships that obtain in various situations. Thus, in this example, there is a discrepancy between the event of leaving by car and the road and weather conditions that are adverse to safe driving. The meaning of adversativity, as already pointed out (Section 3.1.), blends well with concession in both causal concessive and conditional concessive constructions (47–47c):

(47) Ići ćemo na izlet iako pada kiša. >
‘We’ll go on a field trip although it is raining’

(47a) Pada kiša, ali ćemo (ipak) ići na izlet. /
‘It’s raining, but we’ll (still) go on a field trip’

(47b) Ako i bude padala kiša, ići ćemo na izlet. >
‘Even if it rains, we’ll go on a field trip’

(47c) Možda će i padati kiša, ali ćemo (ipak) ići na izlet.
‘It may well rain, but we’ll (still) go on a field trip’

The same can be observed in the following exchange:

X: Hoćeš li ići na put autom?
‘Are you going to travel by car’
Y: Hoću.  
‘Yes’

X: Ali najavili su poledicu!  
‘But they forecast slippery roads’

Y: Bez obzira.  
‘No matter’

Figure 7. The relationship between concession and adversative ICM
Figure 7 shows a Concession ICM, which consists of three types of concessive clauses: causal concessives, conditional concessives, and unconditional concessives. All three types rest on cancelling out the unfavorable causes or conditions (marked by crossed out arrows). In other words, the main clause event comes to be realized despite the adverse causes or conditions coded in the subordinate concessive clause. For that reason, it could be argued that concession falls within the broader but implied field of the Adversative ICM (marked by dotted lines in Figure 7).

4. Concluding remarks

In this paper I discussed various aspects of metonymic mappings in Croatian complex sentences featuring causal, conditional, purpose, and concessive subordinate clauses. I proposed as the main motivating factors various elaborations of the three basic metonymic types, viz. WHOLE FOR PART, PART FOR WHOLE, and PART FOR PART. I discussed metonymic mappings operating between causes and time, and causes and manner in causal, temporal-causal, and manner-causal clauses, i.e. the impact of metonymy on the grammaticalization of temporal and manner subordinators. I also explored some possibilities and limits on associations between the meanings of cause, condition, and concession (Section 3.1.).

Section 3.2. looked at some differences between real conditionals featuring two Future Tense constructions (so-called Future I and Future II), and argued for a three-pronged metonymic interpretation of structures like Ako ćemo iskreno, to nije bilo dobro (‘If I’m honest, it wasn’t good’) – involving a propositional predicational, referential, and illocutionary metonymy. Due attention was given to two types of pseudo-conditional clauses and their reliance on the illocutionary metonymy POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY, as well as to the metonymic aspects of the grammaticalization of the temporal connective kad(a) ‘when’ in hypothetical and counterfactual conditional clauses. Section 3.3. was dedicated to exploring purpose clauses, and how the WHOLE FOR PART metonymy may play into their interpretation; viz. every purpose clause is a hypothetical consequence in the target domain of an action chain, and as such may also stand for the factual, desiderative cause in the source domain of the action chain. The analysis also included a discussion of the metonymic underpinnings of marginal types of purpose clauses in the speech act domain, as in Da ti budem iskren, nisam ništa o tome čuo ‘To be honest, I haven’t heard anything about it’. These types of clauses were also argued to be expli-

28 For simplicity, Figure 7 does not represent the unconditional concessive meaning.
cable in terms of the predicational and referential propositional metonymy, but also illocutionary metonymy. Section 3.4 explored the workings of the metonymy EXTREME POINTS OF A SCALE FOR THE WHOLE SCALE and proposed a metonymic chain to interpret so-called unconditional concessive clauses with the correlative connective *bilo da...bilo da* ‘whether … or’. In the same section, the metonymy EXTREME POINT OF A SCALE FOR THE WHOLE SCALE also made an appearance in the analysis of counterfactual conditional concessive clauses introduced with the connectives *i da / da i* ‘even if’ as did the metonymy CONDITION FOR CONDITIONAL CONCESSION in some clauses featuring the connective *ako* ‘if’. The foregoing sections have hopefully shown that metonymy is one of the key conceptual mechanisms involved in interpreting the meanings of Croatian adverbial clauses, i.e. in interpreting the semantic extensions triggered by the grammaticalization of adverbial subordinators. It stands to reason that, in addition to the complex sentences with adverbial clauses, metonymy also has a hand in other types of subordination in Croatian, specifically in complement, relative, and non-finite clauses, as well as in some types of coordination. However, for space reasons this must await further research.

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**Author’s address:**

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Osijek University
Lorenza Jägera 9, Osijek
E-mail: bbelaj@ffos.hr

**METONIMIJA I HRVATSKIE ADVERBIJALNE KLAUZE**

U radu se metodologijom teorije konceptualne metafore i metonimije i u manjoj mjeri kognitivne gramatike te pristupa gramatikalizaciji u okvirima tipološkoga funkcionalizma analiziraju metonimijijski aspekti u prvom redu veznih sredstava hrvatskih uzročnih, uvjetnih, namjernih i dopusnih klauza. Analiziraju se metonimijijska preslikavanja između kategorija vremena i uzroka, načina i uzroka, uzroka i uvjeta, uzroka i koncesivnosti, uvjeta i koncesivnosti, vremena i uvjeta te metonimijijska preslikavanja koja uključuju govorne činove.

Cilj je rada doprinijeti još uvijek skromnom obimu kognitivnolingvističkih istraživanja o utjecaju, važnosti i ulozi metonimije u analizi složenih rečenica na razini subordinacije te kognitivnu perspektivu proširiti na analizu hrvatskih subordiniranih struktura. Nešto se pozornosti pridaje i raspravama o gramatikalizaciji u okvirima tipološkoga funkcionalizma, u kojima metafora i metonimija kao dva vida pragmatičke inferencije također imaju vrlo važnu ulogu u analizi suodnosa navedenih kategorija u složenorečeničnim strukturama.

**Ključne riječi:** metonimija; metafora; adverbijalne klauze; veznici adverbijalnih klauza; gramatikalizacija; govorni činovi.