Abstract

It has become widely accepted that temporal asymmetry is largely a cosmological problem; the task of explaining temporal asymmetry reduces in the main to that of explaining an aspect of the condition of the early universe. However, cosmologists who discuss these issues often make mistakes similar to those that plagued nineteenth century discussions of the statistical foundations of thermodynamics. In particular, they are often guilty of applying temporal "double standards" of various kinds—e.g., in failing to recognise that certain statistical arguments apply with equal force in either temporal direction.

This paper aims to clarify the issue as to what would count as adequate explanation of cosmological time asymmetry. A particular concern is the question whether it is possible to explain why entropy is low near the Big Bang without showing that it must also be low near a Big Crunch, in the event that the universe recollapses. I criticise some of the objections raised to this possibility, showing that these too often depend on a temporal double standard. I also discuss briefly some issues that arise if we take the view seriously. (Could we observe a time-reversing future, for example?)
A century or so ago, Ludwig Boltzmann and others attempted to explain the temporal asymmetry of the second law of thermodynamics. The hard-won lesson of that endeavour—a lesson still commonly misunderstood—was that the real puzzle of thermodynamics lies not in the question why entropy increases with time, but in that as to why it was ever so low in the first place. To the extent that Boltzmann himself appreciated that this was the real issue, the best suggestion he had to offer was that the world as we know it is simply a product of a chance fluctuation into a state of very low entropy. (His statistical treatment of thermodynamics implied that although such states are extremely improbable, they are bound to occur occasionally, if the universe lasts a sufficiently long time.) This is a rather desperate solution to the problem of temporal asymmetry, however, and one of the great achievements of modern cosmology has been to offer us an alternative. It now appears that temporal asymmetry is cosmological in origin, a consequence of the fact that entropy is much lower than its theoretical maximum in the region of the Big Bang—i.e., in what we regard as the early stages of the universe.

The task of explaining temporal asymmetry thus becomes the task of explaining this condition of the early universe. In this paper I want to discuss some philosophical constraints on the search for such an explanation. In particular, I want to show that cosmologists who discuss these issues often make mistakes which are strikingly reminiscent of those which plagued the nineteenth century discussions of the statistical foundations of thermodynamics. The most common mistake is to fail to recognise that certain crucial arguments are blind to temporal direction, so that any conclusion they yield with respect to one temporal direction must apply with equal force with respect to the other. Thus writers on thermodynamics often failed to notice that the statistical arguments concerned are inherently insensitive to temporal direction, and hence unable to account for temporal asymmetry. And writers who did notice this mistake commonly fell for another: recognising the need to justify the double standard—the application of the arguments in question 'towards the future' but not 'towards the past'—they appealed to additional premisses, without noticing that in order to do the job, these additions must effectively embody the very temporal asymmetry which was problematic in the first place. To assume the uncorrelated nature of initial particle motions (or incoming 'external influences'), for example, is simply to move the problem from one place to another. (It may look less mysterious as a result, but this is no real indication of progress. The fundamental lesson of these endeavours is that much of what needs to be explained about temporal asymmetry is so commonplace as to go almost unnoticed. In this area more than most, folk intuition is a very poor guide to explanatory priority.)

One of the main tasks of this paper is to show that mistakes of these kinds

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1Not least of its problems is the fact that it implies that all our historical evidence is almost certainly misleading: for the ‘cheapest’ or most probable fluctuation compatible with our present experience will always be one which simply creates the world as we find it, rather than having it evolve from an earlier state of even lower entropy.
are widespread in modern cosmology, even in the work of some of the contemporary physicists who have been most concerned with the problem of the cosmological basis of temporal asymmetry—in the course of the paper we shall encounter illicit applications of a temporal double standard by Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking and Roger Penrose, among others. Interdisciplinary point-scoring is not the primary aim, of course: by drawing attention to these mistakes I hope to clarify the issue as to what would count as adequate cosmological explanation of temporal asymmetry.

I want to pay particular attention to the question as to whether it is possible to explain why entropy is low near the Big Bang without thereby demonstrating that it must be low near a Big Crunch, in the event that the universe recollapses. The suggestion that entropy might be low at both ends of the universe was made by Thomas Gold in the early 1960s.\footnote{See Gold (1962) for example.} With a few notable exceptions, cosmologists do not appear to have taken Gold’s hypothesis very seriously. Most appear to believe that it leads to absurdities or inconsistencies of some kind. However, I want to show that cosmologists interested in time asymmetry continue to fail to appreciate how little scope there is for an explanation of the low entropy Big Bang which does not commit us to the Gold universe. I also want criticise some of the objections that are raised to the Gold view, for these too often depend on a temporal double standard. And I want to discuss, briefly and rather speculatively, some issues that arise if we take the view seriously. (Could we observe a time-reversing future, for example?)

Let me begin with a very brief characterisation of what it is about the early universe that needs to be explained. There seems to be widespread agreement about this, so that if what I say is not authoritative, neither is it particularly controversial.\footnote{There is an excellent account of this in Penrose (1989), ch. 7.} The question of the origin of the thermodynamic arrow appears to come down to that as to why the early universe had just the right degree of inhomogeneity to allow the formation of galaxies: had it been more homogeneous, galaxies would never have formed; had it been less homogeneous, most of the matter would have quickly ended up in huge black holes. In either case we wouldn’t have galaxies as the powerhouses of most of the asymmetric phenomena we are so familiar with. For present purposes the latter issue—that as to why the universe is not less homogeneous—is the more pressing. This is because, as we’ll see, there are strong arguments to the effect that if the universe recollapses, the other extremity will be very inhomogeneous. So the homogeneity in the region of the Big Bang would appear to represent a stark temporal asymmetry in the universe as a whole.

The natural mistake

The contemporary cosmological descendant of the problem that Boltzmann was left with—the problem as to why entropy was low in the past—is thus the
question Why is the universe so smooth near the Big Bang? Now in effect this question is a call for an explanation of an observed feature of the physical universe, and one common kind of response to a request for an explanation of an observed state of affairs is to try to show that ‘things had to be like that’, or at least that it is in some sense very probable that they should be like that. In other words, it is to show that the state of affairs in question represents the natural way for things to be. Accordingly, we find many examples of cosmologists trying to show that the state of the early universe is not really particularly special. For example, the following remarks are from one of Paul Davies’ popular accounts of cosmology and time asymmetry: ‘It is clear that a time-asymmetric universe does not demand any very special initial conditions. It seems to imply a creation which is of a very general and random character at the microscopic level. This initial randomness is precisely what one would expect to emerge from a singularity which is completely unpredictable.’

The mistaken nature of this general viewpoint has been ably pointed out by Roger Penrose, however. Penrose asks what proportion of possible states of the early universe—what percentage of the corresponding points in the phase space of the universe—exhibit the degree of smoothness apparent in the actual early universe. He gives a variety of estimates, the most charitable of which (to the view that the early universe is ‘natural’) allows that as many as 1 in $10^{10^{30}}$ possible early universes are like this!

There is another way to counter the suggestion that the smooth early universe is statistically natural, an argument more closely related to our central concerns in this paper. It is to note that we would not regard a collapse to a smooth late universe (just before a Big Crunch) as statistically natural—quite the contrary, as we noted above—but that in the absence of any prior reason for thinking otherwise, this consideration applies just as much to one end of the universe as to the other. In these statistical terms, then, a smooth Big Bang should seem just as unlikely as a smooth Big Crunch.

The fact that this simple argument goes unnoticed reflects the difficulty that we have in avoiding the double standard fallacies in these cases. It deserves more attention, however. Indeed, its importance goes beyond its ability to counter the tendency to regard a smooth early universe as ‘natural’, and hence not in need of explanation. As we shall see, it also defuses the most influential arguments against Gold models of the universe, in which entropy eventually decreases. It is common to find considerations concerning gravitational collapse offered as decisive objections the Gold view. However, what the objectors fail to see is that if the argument were decisive in one temporal direction it would also be

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4Davies (1977), 193-4.
5His most recent estimate is 1 in $10^{10^{120}}$; see Penrose (1989), ch. 7.
6Penrose himself makes a point of this kind; see Penrose (1989), 339. However, we shall see that Penrose fails to appreciate the contrapositive point, which is that if we take statistical reasoning to be inappropriate towards the past, we should not take it to be appropriate with respect to the future.
decisive in the other, in which case its conclusion would conflict with what we know to be the case, namely that entropy decreases towards the Big Bang.

In view of the importance of the argument it is worth spelling it out in more detail, and giving it a name. I’ll call it the *Gravitational Argument from Symmetry* (GAS, for short). The argument has three main steps:

1. We consider the natural condition of a universe at the end of a process of gravitational collapse—in other words, we ask what the universe might be expected to be like in its late stages, when it collapses under its own weight. As noted above, the answer is that it is overwhelmingly likely to be in a very inhomogeneous state—clumpy, rather than smooth.

2. We reflect on the fact that if we view the history of our universe in reverse, what we see is a universe collapsing under its own gravity, accelerating towards a Big Crunch. As argued in step 1, the natural destiny for such a universe is not the smooth one we know our own universe to have.

3. We note that there is no objective sense in which this reverse way of viewing the universe is any less valid than the usual way of viewing it. Nothing in physics tells us that there is a wrong or a right way to choose the orientation of the temporal coordinates. *Nothing in physics tells us that one end of the universe is objectively the start and the other end objectively the finish.* In other words, the perspective adopted at step 2 is just as valid as a basis for determining the natural condition of what we normally call the early universe as the standard perspective is for determining the likely condition of what normally call the late universe.

The lesson of GAS is that there is much less scope for differentiating the early and late stages of a universe than tends to be assumed. If we want to treat the late stages in terms of a theory of gravitational collapse, we should be prepared to treat the early stages in the same way. Or in other words if we treat the early stages in some other way—in terms of some additional boundary constraint, for example—then we should be prepared to consider the possibility that the late stages may be subject to the same constraint. Failure to appreciate this point has tended to obscure what may justly be called the *basic dilemma* of cosmology and temporal asymmetry. In virtue of the symmetry considerations, it seems that our choices are either to follow Gold, admitting reversal of the thermodynamic arrow in the case of gravitational collapse; or to acknowledge that temporal asymmetry is simply inexplicable—i.e., that the low initial entropy of the universe is not a predictable consequence of our best physical theories of the universe as a whole.

Later on I shall discuss a range of possible responses to this basic dilemma. First of all, however, in order to illustrate how thoroughly contemporary cosmologists have failed to appreciate the dilemma and the symmetry considerations...
on which it rests, I want to discuss two recent suggestions as to the origins of cosmological time asymmetry.

The appeal to inflation

The first case stems from the inflationary model. The basic idea here is that in its extremely early stages the universe undergoes a period of exponential expansion, driven by a gravitational force which at that time is repulsive rather than attractive. At the end of that period, as gravity becomes attractive, the universe settles into the more sedate expansion of the classical Big Bang. Among the attractions of this model has been thought to be its ability to account for the smoothness of the universe after the Big Bang. However, the argument for this conclusion is essentially a statistical one: the crucial claim is that the repulsive gravity in the inflationary phase will tend to ‘iron out’ inhomogeneities, leaving a smooth universe at the time of the transition to the classical Big Bang. The argument is presented by Paul Davies, who concludes that ‘the Universe ... began in an arbitrary, rather than remarkably specific, state. This is precisely what one would expect if the Universe is to be explained as a spontaneous random quantum fluctuation from nothing.’

This argument graphically illustrates the temporal double standard that commonly applies in discussions of these problems. The point is that as in step 2 of GAS we might equally well argue, viewing the expansion from the Big Bang in reverse, that (what will then appear as) the gravitational collapse to the Big Bang must produce inhomogeneities at the time of the transition to the inflationary phase (which will now appear as a deflationary phase, of course). Unless one temporal direction is already privileged, the argument is as good in one direction as the other. So in the absence of a justification for the double standard—a reason to apply the statistical argument in one direction rather than the other—Davies’ argument cannot possibly do the work required of it.

This is close to the point made in reply to Davies by Don Page. Page objects that in arguing statistically with respect to behaviour during the inflationary phase, Davies is in effect assuming the very time asymmetry which needs to be explained (i.e., that entropy increases). However, Davies might reply that statistical reasoning is acceptable in the absence of constraining boundary conditions. It seems to me there are two possible replies at this point. One might argue (as Page does) that initial conditions have to be special to give rise to inflation in the first place, and hence that Davies’ imagined initial conditions are in fact far from arbitrary. Or more directly one might argue as I have, viz. that if there is no boundary constraint at the time of transition from inflationary phase to classical Big Bang, then we are equally entitled to argue from the other direction, with the conclusion that the universe is inhomogeneous at this stage.

7For a general introduction to the inflationary model see Lindé (1987).
8Davies (1983), 398.
9Page (1983).
Davies himself argues that ‘a recontracting Universe arriving at the big crunch would not undergo “deflation”, for this would require an exceedingly improbable conspiracy of quantum coherence to reverse-tunnel through the phase transition. There is thus a distinct and fundamental asymmetry between the beginning and the end of a recontracting Universe.’ However, he fails to notice that this is in conflict with the argument he has given us concerning the other end of the universe, a conflict which can only be resolved either (i) by acknowledging that inflation is abnormal (and hence requires explanation, if we are to explain temporal asymmetry); or (ii) by arguing that although the coherence required for deflation looks improbable, it is in fact guaranteed by the reverse of the argument Davies himself uses with respect to the other end of the universe. But to accept (ii) would be to accept that entropy decreases as the universe recollapses, a view that as we shall see, Davies feels can be dismissed on other grounds. As it is, therefore, Davies is vulnerable to the charge that his own admission that collapse doesn’t require deflation automatically entails that expansion doesn’t require inflation. Again, this follows immediately from the realisation that there is nothing objective about the temporal orientation. A universe that collapses without deflation just is a universe that expands without inflation. It is exactly the same universe, under a different but equally valid description.

Hawking and the Big Crunch

Our second example is better known, having been described in Stephen Hawking’s best seller, *A Brief History of Time*. It is Hawking’s proposal to account for temporal asymmetry in terms of what he calls the *No Boundary Condition* (NBC)—a proposal concerning the quantum wave function of the universe. To see what is puzzling about Hawking’s claim, let us keep in mind the basic dilemma. It seemed that provided we avoid double standard fallacies, any argument for the smoothness of the universe would apply at both ends or at neither. So our choices seemed to be to accept the globally symmetric Gold universe, or to resign ourselves to the fact that temporal asymmetry is not explicable (without additional assumptions or boundary conditions) by a time-symmetric physics. The dilemma is particularly acute for Hawking, because he has a more reason than most to avoid resorting to additional boundary conditions. They conflict with the spirit of his NBC, namely that one restrict possible histories

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10 Davies (1983), 399.
11 All the same, it might seem that there is an unresolved puzzle here: as we approach the transition between an inflationary phase and the classical phase from one side, most paths through phase space seem to imply a smooth state at the transition. As we approach it from the other side most paths through phase space appear to imply a very non-smooth state. How can these facts be compatible with one another? I take it that the answer is that the existence of the inflationary phase is in fact a very strong boundary constraint, invalidating the usual statistical reasoning from the ‘future’ side of the transition.
12 This section expands on some concerns expressed in Price (1989).
13 Hawking (1988).
for the universe to those that ‘are finite in extent but have no boundaries, edges, or singularities.’

Hawking tells us how initially he thought that this proposal favoured the former horn of the above dilemma: ‘I thought at first that the no boundary condition did indeed imply that disorder would decrease in the contracting phase.’[14] He changed his mind, however, in response to objections from two colleagues: ‘I realized that I had made a mistake: the no boundary condition implied that disorder would in fact continue to increase during the contraction. The thermodynamic and psychological arrows of time would not reverse when the universe begins to contract or inside black holes.[15]

This change of mind enables Hawking to avoid the apparent difficulties associated with reversing the thermodynamic arrow of time. What is not clear is how he avoids the alternative difficulties associated with not reversing the thermodynamic arrow of time. That is, Hawking does not explain how his proposal can imply that entropy is low near the Big Bang, without equally implying that it is low near the Big Crunch. The problem is to get a temporally asymmetric consequence from a symmetric physical theory. Hawking suggests that he has done it, but doesn’t explain how. Readers are entitled to feel a little dissatisfied. As it stands, Hawking’s account reads a bit like a suicide verdict on a man who has been stabbed in the back: not an impossible feat, perhaps, but we’d like to know how it was done!

It seems to me that there are three possible resolutions of this mystery. The first, obviously, is that Hawking has found a way round the difficulty. The easiest way to get an idea of what he would have to have established is to think of three classes of possible universes: those which are smooth and ordered at both temporal extremities, those which are ordered at one extremity but disordered at the other, and those which are disordered at both extremities. If Hawking is right, then he has found a way to exclude the last class, without thereby excluding the second class. In other words, he has found a way to exclude disorder at one temporal extremity of the universe, without excluding disorder at both extremities. Why is this combination the important one? Because if we can’t exclude universes with disorder at both extremities, then we haven’t explained why our universe doesn’t have disorder at both extremities—we know that it has order at least one temporal extremity, namely the extremity we think of as at the beginning of time. And if we do exclude disorder at both extremities, we are back to the answer that Hawking gave up, namely that order will increase when the universe contracts.

Has Hawking shown that the second class of universal histories, the order–disorder universes, are overwhelmingly probable? It is important to appreciate that this would not be incompatible with the underlying temporal symmetry of the physical theories concerned. A symmetric physical theory might be such

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[14] Hawking (1988), 148.
[15] Hawking (1988), 150.
[16] Hawking (1988), 150.
that all or most of its possible realisations were asymmetric. Thus Hawking might have succeeded in showing that the NBC implies that any (or almost any) possible history for the universe is of this globally asymmetric kind. If so, however, then he hasn’t yet explained to his lay readers how he managed it. In a moment I’ll describe my attempts to find a solution in Hawking’s technical papers. What seems clear is that it can’t be done by reflecting on the consequences of the NBC for the state of one temporal extremity of the universe, considered in isolation. For if that worked for the ‘initial’ state it would also work for the ‘final’ state; unless of course the argument had illicitly assumed an objective distinction between initial state and final state, and hence applied some constraint to the former that it didn’t apply to the latter. What Hawking needs is a more general argument, to the effect that disorder–disorder universes are impossible (or at least overwhelmingly improbable). It needs to be shown that almost all possible universes have at least one ordered temporal extremity—or equivalently, at most one disordered extremity. (As Hawking points out, it will then be quite legitimate to invoke a weak anthropic argument to explain why we regard the ordered extremity thus guaranteed as an initial extremity. In virtue of its consequences for temporal asymmetry elsewhere in the universe, conscious observers are bound to regard this state of order as lying in their past.)

That’s the first possibility: Hawking has such an argument, but hasn’t told us what it is (probably because he doesn’t see why it is so important). As I see it, the other possibilities are that Hawking has made one of two mistakes (neither of them the mistake he claims to have made). Either his NBC does exclude disorder at both temporal extremities of the universe, in which case his mistake was to change his mind about contraction leading to decreasing entropy; or the proposal doesn’t exclude disorder at either temporal extremity of the universe, in which case his mistake is to think that the NBC accounts for the low entropy Big Bang.

I have done my best to examine Hawking’s published papers in order to discover which of these three possibilities best fits the case. A helpful recent paper is Hawking’s contribution to a meeting on the arrow of time held in Spain in 1991. In this paper Hawking describes the process by which he and various colleagues applied the NBC to the question of temporal asymmetry. He recounts how he and Halliwell ‘calculated the spectrum of perturbations predicted by the no boundary condition.’ The conclusion was that ‘one gets an arrow of time. The universe is nearly homogeneous and isotropic when it

17This loophole may be smaller than it looks. Hawking’s NBC would not provide an interesting explanation of temporal asymmetry if it simply operated like the assumption that all allowable models of the universe display the required asymmetry. This would amount to putting the asymmetry in ‘by hand’ (as physicists say), to stipulating what we wanted to explain. If the NBC is to exploit this loophole, in other words, it must imply this asymmetry, while being sufficiently removed from it so as not to seem ad hoc.

18Hawking (1993), Page references here are to a preprint version.

19Hawking (1993), 4.
is small. But it is more irregular, when it is large. In other words, disorder increases, as the universe expands.\footnote{Hawking (1993), 4.} I want to note in particular that at this stage Hawking doesn’t refer to the stage of the universe in temporal terms—start and finish, for example—but only in terms of its size. Indeed he correctly points out that the temporal perspective comes from us, and depends in practice on the thermodynamic arrow.

Hawking then tells us how he made what I now realize was a great mistake. I thought that the No Boundary Condition would imply that the perturbations would be small whenever the radius of the universe was small. That is, the perturbations would be small not only in the early stages of the expansion, but also in the late stages of a universe that collapsed again. ... This would mean that disorder would increase during the expansion, but decrease again during the contraction.

He goes on to say how he was persuaded that this was a mistake, as a result of objections raised by Page and Laflamme. He came to accept that

When the radius of the universe is small, there are two kinds of solution. One would be an almost euclidean complex solution, that started like the north pole of a sphere, and expanded monotonically up to a given radius. This would correspond to the start of the expansion. But the end of the contraction would correspond to a solution that started in a similar way, but then had a long almost lorentzian period of expansion, followed by a contraction to the given radius. ... This would mean that the perturbations would be small at one end of time, but could be large and non linear at the other end. So disorder and irregularity would increase during the expansion, and would continue to increase during the contraction.\footnote{Hawking (1993), 6.}

Hawking then describes how he and Glenn Lyons have ‘studied how the arrow of time manifests in the various perturbation modes’. He says that there are two relevant kinds of perturbation mode, those that oscillate and those that don’t. The former ‘will be essentially time symmetric, about the time of maximum expansion. In other words the amplitude of perturbation will be the same at a given radius during the expansion as at the same radius during the contraction phase.\footnote{Hawking (1993), 6.} The latter, by contrast, ‘will grow in amplitude in general. They will be small when they come within the horizon during expansion. But they will grow during the expansion, and continue to grow during the contraction. Eventually they will become non linear. At this stage, the trajectories will spread out over a large region of phase space.\footnote{Hawking (1993), 6-7.} It is the latter perturbation modes which, in virtue of the fact they are so much more common, lead to the conclusion that disorder increases as the universe recontracts.
Let us focus on the last quotation. If it is not an objective matter which end of the universe represents expansion and which contraction, and there isn’t a constraint which operates simply in virtue of the radius of the universe, why should the perturbations ever be small? Why can’t they be large at both ends, compatibly with the NBC?

I have been unable to find an answer to this crucial question in Hawking’s papers. However, in an important earlier paper by Hawking and Halliwell, the authors consistently talk of showing that the relevant modes \textit{start off} in a particular condition. Let me give you some examples (with my italics throughout).

First from the abstract: ‘We ... show ... that the inhomogeneous or anisotropic modes \textit{start off} in their ground state.’

Next from the introduction:

We show that the gravitational-wave and density-perturbation modes obey decoupled time-dependent Schrödinger equations with respect to the time parameter of the classical solution. The boundary conditions imply that these modes \textit{start off} in the ground state. ...

We use the path-integral expression for the wave function in sec. VII to show that the perturbation wave functions \textit{start out} in their ground states.

How are we to interpret these references to how the universe \textit{starts off}, or \textit{starts out}? Do they embody an assumption that one temporal extremity of the universe is objectively its start? Presumably Hawking and Halliwell would want to deny that they do so, for otherwise they have simply helped themselves to a temporal asymmetry at this crucial stage of the argument. (As I have noted, Hawking is in other places quite clear that our usual tendency to regard one end of the universe as the start is anthropocentric in origin, though related to the thermodynamic arrow—in virtue of their dependence on the entropy gradient, sentient creatures are bound to regard the low entropy direction as the past.) But without this assumption what is the objective content of Hawking and Halliwell’s conclusions? Surely it can only be that the specified results obtain when the universe is small; in which case the argument works either at both ends or at neither.

We have seen that in reconsidering his earlier views on the fate of a collapsing universe, Hawking appears to be moved by what is essentially a statistical consideration: the fact that (as Page convinced him) most possible histories lead to a disordered collapse. However, the lesson of GAS was that in the absence of any prior justification for a temporal double standard, statistical arguments defer to boundary conditions. (The fact that the Big Bang is smooth trumps any general appeal to the clumpiness of the end states of gravitational collapse.) Accordingly, it would apparently have been open to Hawking to argue that Page’s statistical considerations were simply overridden by the NBC, treated as a sym-

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metric constraint on the temporal extremities of the universe. Given that he does not argue this way, however, he needs to explain why analogous statistical arguments do not apply towards (what we call) the Big Bang.

Thus it is my impression that Hawking did indeed make a mistake about temporal asymmetry, but not the mistake he thought he made. Either the mistake occurred earlier, if he and Halliwell have illicitly relied on the assumption that the universe has an objective start; or it occurred when Hawking failed to see that in virtue of the fact that the Hawking-Halliwell argument depends only on size, it does yield boundary conditions for both temporal extremities of the universe, and hence excludes the possible histories which Page and Laflamme took to be problematic for his original endorsement of the time-reversing collapse. And if he didn’t make either of these mistakes, then at the very least he has failed to see the need to avoid them, for otherwise he would surely have explained how he managed to do so.

The basic dilemma, and some ways to avoid it

The above examples suggest that even some of the most capable of modern cosmologists appear to have difficulty in grasping what I called the basic dilemma of cosmology and time asymmetry. To restate this dilemma, it is that apparently have to accept either (option 1) that entropy decreases towards all singularities, including future ones; or (option 2) that temporal asymmetry, and particularly the low entropy condition of the Big Bang, is not explicable by a time-symmetric physics.

The writer who has done most to bring to our attention the force of this dilemma is Roger Penrose, who chooses option 2. (We shall look later at his reasons for rejecting option 1.) Accordingly, Penrose suggests that there is an additional asymmetric law of nature to the effect that initial singularities obey what amounts to a smoothness constraint. In effect, he is arguing that it is reasonable to believe that such a constraint exists, because otherwise the universe as we find it would be wildly unlikely. Penrose’s use of the term initial singularity might itself seem to violate our requirement that the terms initial and final not be regarded as of any objective significance. However in this case the difficulty is clearly superficial: Penrose’s claim need only be that it is a physical law that there is one temporal direction in which the Weyl curvature always approaches zero towards singularities. The fact that conscious observers inevitably regard that direction as the past will then follow from the sort of weak anthropic argument we have already mentioned.

\[27\] It might be thought that the dilemma only arises if the universe recollapses. Perhaps the universe is bound to be such that it doesn’t recollapse. (This is predicted by some inflationary models.) But even if the universe as a whole never recollapses to a singularity, it appears that parts of it do, as certain massive objects collapse to black holes. The dilemma arises again with respect to these regions. This point is made for example by Penrose (1979), 597-8.

\[28\] See Penrose (1979), and particularly Penrose (1989), ch. 7.

\[29\] It seems to me that Penrose himself misses this point, however. For example in discussing
Notice however that even an advocate of the time-symmetric option 1 might be convinced by Penrose’s argument that the observed condition of the universe can only be accounted for by an independent physical law—the difference would be that such a person would take the law to be that the Weyl curvature approaches zero towards all singularities. Before we turn to the various reasons that have been offered for rejecting option 1, let me mention some possible strategies towards the third option, which is somehow to evade the dilemma altogether.

The first possibility is the one mentioned above in our discussion of Hawking’s proposal. We noted that it is possible that a symmetric theory might have only (or mostly) asymmetric models. This may seem an attractive solution, at least in comparison to the alternatives, but two notes of caution seem in order.

First, as was pointed out earlier a proposal of this kind needs to distance itself from the accusation that it simply puts in the required asymmetry ‘by hand’. It is difficult to lay down precise guidelines for avoiding this mistake—after all, if the required asymmetry weren’t already implicit in the theoretical premisses in some sense, it couldn’t be derived from them—but presumably the intention should be that asymmetry should flow from principles which are not manifestly asymmetric, and which have independent theoretical justification.

Second, we should not be misled into expecting a solution of this kind—predominantly asymmetric models of a symmetric theory—by the sort of statistical reasoning employed in step 1 of GAS. In particular, we should not think that the intuition that the most likely fate for the universe is a clumpy gravitational collapse makes a solution of this kind prima facie more plausible than a globally symmetric model of Gold’s kind. The point of GAS was that these statistical grounds are temporally symmetric: if they excluded Gold’s suggestion then they would also exclude models with a low entropy Big Bang. In effect, the hypothesis that the Big Bang is explicable is the hypothesis that something—perhaps a boundary condition of some kind, perhaps an alternative statistical argument, conducted in terms of possible models of a theory—defeats these statistical considerations in cosmology, with the result that we are left with no reason to expect an asymmetric solution in preference to Gold’s symmetric proposal. On the contrary, the right way to reason seems to be something like this: the smoothness of the Big Bang shows that statistical arguments based on the character of gravitational collapse are not always reliable—in the one case (out of a possible two!) in which we can actually subject them to observational test. Having discovered this, should we continue to regard them as reliable in the remaining case (i.e., when oriented towards the Big Crunch)? Obviously not, at least in the absence of any independent reason for applying such a double standard.

the Weyl curvature hypothesis (Penrose (1989), 352-3), he gives us absolutely no indication that he regards the fact that some singularities are initial and others final as of anything other than objective significance.

30See footnote 17.
It is true that things would be different if we were prepared to allow that the low entropy Big Bang is not explicable—that it is just a statistical ‘fluke’. In this case we might well argue that we have very good grounds to expect the universe to be ‘flukey’ only at one end. However, at this point we would have abandoned the strategy of trying to show that almost all possible universes are asymmetric, the goal of which was precisely to explain the low entropy Big Bang. Instead we might be pursuing a different strategy altogether. Perhaps the reason that the universe looks so unusual to us is simply that we can only exist in very unusual bits of it. Given that we depend on the entropy gradient, in other words, perhaps this explains why we find ourselves in a region of the universe exhibiting such a gradient.

I am not going to explore this anthropic idea in any detail here. Let me simply mention two large difficulties that it faces. The first is that it depends on there being a genuine multiplicity of actual ‘bits’ of a much larger universe, of which our bit is simply some small corner. It is no use relying on other merely possible worlds. So the anthropic solution is exceedingly costly in ontological terms. (This would not matter if the cost was one we were committed to bearing anyway, of course, as perhaps in some inflationary pictures, where universes in our sense are merely bubbles in some grand foam of universes.)

The second difficulty is that as Penrose emphasises, there may well be much less costly ways to generate a sufficient entropy gradient to support life. Penrose argues that the observed universe is still vastly more unlikely than life requires. However, it is not clear that inflation does not leave a loophole here, too. If the inflationary model could show that a universe of the size of ours is an ‘all or nothing’ matter, then the anthropic argument would be back on track. The quantum preconditions for inflation might be extremely rare, but this doesn’t matter, so long as (a) there is enough time in some background grand universe for them to occur eventually and (b) when (and only when) they do occur a universe of our sort arises, complete with its smooth boundary. Hence it seems to me that this anthropic strategy is still viable—albeit repugnant to well brought up Occamists!

The case against the Gold universe

To choose the first horn of the basic dilemma is to allow that our universe might have low entropy at both ends, or more generally in the region of any singularity. Of course, the issue then arises as to why this should be the case. One option, perhaps in the end the only one, is to accept the low entropy of singularities as an additional law of nature. As we saw, this would be in the spirit of Penrose’s proposal, but it would still be a time-symmetric law. True, we might find such a law somewhat ad hoc. But this might seem a price worth

31 Unless in David Lewis’s sense, so that ‘actual’ is simply indexical, and denotes no special objective status. See Lewis (1986).
32 Penrose (1979), 634.
paying, if the alternative is that we have no explanation for such a striking physical anomaly.

In suggesting the symmetric time-reversing universe in the 1960s, Gold was attracted to the idea that the expansion of the universe might account for the second law of thermodynamics. He saw that this would entail that the law would change direction if the universe recontracts. Thus the universe would enter an age of apparent miracles. Radiation would converge on stars, apples would compose themselves in decompost heaps and leap into trees, and humanoids would arise from their own ashes, grow younger, and become unborn. These humanoids wouldn’t see things this way, of course. Their psychological time sense would also be reversed, so that from their point of view their world would look much as ours does to us.

However, by now it should be obvious that such apparently miraculous behaviour cannot in itself constitute an objection to this symmetric model of the universe, for reasons exactly analogous to those invoked in GAS. Perhaps surprisingly (in view of his tendency to appeal to a double standard elsewhere) this point is well made by Davies. After describing some ‘miraculous’ behaviour of this kind, Davies continues: ‘It is curious that this seems so laughable, because it is simply a description of our present world given in reversed-time language. Its occurrence is no more remarkable than what we at present experience—indeed it is what we actually experience—the difference in description being purely semantic and not physical.’ Davies goes on to point out that the difficulty really lies in managing the transition: ‘What is remarkable, however, is the fact that our ‘forward’ time world changes into [a] backward time world (or vice versa, as the situation is perfectly symmetric).’

What exactly are the problems about this transition? In the informal work from which I have just quoted, Davies suggests that the main problem is that it requires that the universe have very special initial conditions.

Although the vast majority of microscopic motions in the big bang give rise to purely entropy-increasing worlds, a very, very special set of motions could indeed result in an initial entropy increase, followed by a subsequent decrease. For this to come about the microscopic constituents of the universe would not be started off moving randomly after all, but each little particle, each electromagnetic wave, set off along a carefully chosen path to lead to this very special future evolution. ... Such a changeover requires ... an extraordinary degree of cooperation between countless numbers of atoms.

Davies here alludes to his earlier conclusion that ‘a time-asymmetric universe does not demand any very special initial conditions. It seems to imply a

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33These considerations apply as much to Penrose’s asymmetric proposal as to its symmetric variant. Note also that the proposal might seem less ad hoc if attractively grounded on formal theoretical considerations of some kind, as might arguably be true of Hawking’s NBC.

34Davies (1977), 196.

35Davies (1977), 195-6.
creation which is of a very general and random character at the microscopic level. However, we have seen that to maintain this view of the early universe while invoking the usual statistical arguments with respect to the late universe is to operate with a double standard: double standards aside, GAS shows that if a late universe is naturally clumpy, so too is an early universe. In the present context the relevant point is that (as Davies himself notes, in effect) the conventional time-asymmetric view itself requires that the final conditions of the universe be microscopically arranged so that when viewed in the reverse of the ordinary sense, the countless atoms cooperate over billions of years to achieve the remarkable low entropy state of the Big Bang. Again, therefore, a double standard is involved in taking it to be an argument against Gold’s view that it requires this cooperation in the initial conditions. As before, the relevant statistical argument is an instrument with two possible uses. We know that it yields the wrong answer in one of these uses, in that it would exclude an early universe of the kind we actually observe. Should we take it to be reliable in its other use, which differs only in temporal orientation from the case in which the argument so glaringly fails? Symmetry and simple caution both suggest that we should not!

A very different sort of objection to the time-reversing model is raised by Penrose in the following passage:

Let us envisage an astronaut in such a universe who falls into a black hole. For definiteness, suppose that it is a hole of $10^{10}$ [solar masses] so that our astronaut will have something like a day inside [the event horizon], for most of which time he will encounter no appreciable tidal forces and during which he could conduct experiments in a leisurely way. ... Suppose that experiments are performed by the astronaut for a period while he is inside the hole. The behaviour of his apparatus (indeed, of the metabolic processes within his own body) is entirely determined by conditions at the black hole’s singularity ...—as, equally, it is entirely determined by the conditions at the big bang. The situation inside the black hole differs in no essential respect from that at the late stages of a recollapsing universe. If one’s viewpoint is to link the local direction of time’s arrow directly to the expansion of the universe, then one must surely be driven to expect that our astronaut’s experiments will behave in an entropy-decreasing way (with respect to ‘normal’ time). Indeed, one should presumably be driven to expect that the astronaut would believe himself to be coming out of the hole rather than falling in (assuming his metabolic processes could operate consistently through such a drastic reversal of the normal progression of entropy).

This objection seems to me to put unreasonable demands on the nature of the

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36Davies (1977), 193.
37Davies (1974), 199.
38Penrose (1979), 598-9.
temporal reversal in these time-symmetric models. Consider Penrose’s astronaut. He is presumably a product of $10^9$ years of biological evolution, to say nothing of the $10^{10}$ years of cosmological evolution which created the conditions for biology to begin on our planet. So he is the sort of physical structure that could only exist at this kind of distance from a suitable big bang. (What counts as suitable? The relevant point is that low entropy doesn’t seem to be enough; for a start, the bang will have to be massive enough to produce the cosmological structure on which life depends.)

All this means that our astronaut isn’t going to encounter any time-reversed humanoids inside the black hole, any unevolving life, or even any unforming stars and galaxies. More importantly, it means that he himself doesn’t need to have an inverse evolutionary history inside the hole, in addition to the history he already has outside. He doesn’t need to be a ‘natural’ product of the hole’s singularity. Relative to its reversed time sense, he’s simply a miracle. The same goes for his apparatus—in general, for all the ‘foreign’ structure he imports into the hole.

Notice here that there are two possible models of the connections that might obtain between the products of two low entropy boundary conditions: a ‘meeting’ model, in which any piece of structure or order is a ‘natural’ product of both a past singularity and a future singularity; and a ‘mixing’ model, in which it is normally a product of one or the other but not necessarily both. (See Figure 1.) Penrose’s argument appears to assume the meeting model. Hawking also seems to assuming this model when he suggests that the astronaut entering the event horizon of a black hole wouldn’t notice the time reversal because his psychological time sense would reverse. As I say, however, this seems to me to place a quite unnecessary constraint on the time-reversal view. The appropriate guiding principle seems to be that any piece of structure needs to explained either as a product of a past singularity or as a product of the future singularity; but that no piece needs both sorts of explanation. The proportions of each kind can be expected to vary from case to case. In may well be that in our region of the universe, virtually all the structure results from the Big Bang. This might continue to be the case if in future we fall into the sort of black hole which doesn’t have the time or mass to produce much structure of its own. In this case the experience might be very much less odd than Penrose’s thought experiment would have us believe. The reverse structure produced by the black hole might be insignificant for most of the time we survived within its event horizon.

What if we approach a black hole which is big enough to produce interesting structure—the Big Crunch itself, for example? Doesn’t Penrose’s argument still apply in this case? It seems to me that the case is still far from conclusive, so long as we bear in mind that our structure doesn’t need a duplicate explanation from the opposite point of view. It is true that in this case we will expect

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39 Hawking (1985), 2490.
eventually to be affected by the reverse structure we encounter. For example, suppose that our spacecraft approaches what from the reverse point of view is a normal star. From the reverse point of view we are an object leaving the vicinity of the star. We appear to be heated by radiation from the star, but to be gradually cooling as we move further away from the star, thus receiving less energy from it, and radiating energy into empty space.

What would this course of events look like from our own point of view? Apparently we would begin to heat up as photons ‘inexplicably’ converged on us from empty space. This inflow of radiation would increase with time. Perhaps even more puzzlingly, however, we would notice that our craft was re-radiating towards one particular direction in space—towards what from our point of view is a giant radiation sink. Whether we could detect this radiation directly is a nice question—more on this below—but we might expect it to be detectable indirectly. For example we might expect that the inside of the wall of the spaceship facing the reverse star would feel cold to the touch, reflecting what in our time sense would be a flow of heat energy towards the star. These phenomena would certainly be bizarre by our ordinary standards, but it is not clear that their possibility constitutes an objection to the possibility of entropy reversal. After all, within the framework of the Gold entropy-reversing model itself they are not in the least unexpected or inexplicable. To generate a substantial objection to the model, it needs to be shown that it leads to incoherencies of some kind, and not merely to the unexpected. Whether this can be shown seems to be an open question. More on this in the next section.

Penrose himself no longer puts much weight on the astronaut argument. In recent correspondence he says that he now thinks that a much stronger case can be made against the suggestion that entropy decreases towards singularities. He argues that in virtue of its commitment to temporal symmetry this view must either disallow black holes in the future, or allow for a proliferation of white holes in the past. He says that the first of these options ‘requires physically unacceptable teleology’, while the second would conflict with the observed smoothness of the early universe. However, the objection to the first option is primarily statistical: ‘it would have to be a seemingly remarkably improbable set of coincidences that would forbid black holes forming. The hypothesis of black holes being not allowed in the future provides “unreasonable” constraints on what matter is allowed to do in the past.’ And this means that Penrose is again invoking the old double standard, in accepting the ‘naturalness’ argument with respect to the future but not the past. Once again: the lesson of the smooth past seems to be that in that case something overrides the natural behaviour of a gravitational collapse; once this possibility is admitted, however, we have no non-question-begging grounds to exclude (or even to doubt!) the

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40Though it appears as recently as Penrose (1989), 334-5.
41Penrose (1991).
42Penrose (1991).
hypothesis that the same overriding factor might operate in the future.\footnote{Cf. the argument in Davies (1974), 96, based on the work of Ress. This too is effectively a statistical argument, for the point is that ‘in the normal course of events’ radiation will not reconverge on stars. In the normal course of events it wouldn’t do so in the reverse direction either, but something seems to override the statistical constraint.}

Is a reversing future observable? Is it consistent?

Now to return to the issues we deferred above, concerning the observability and hence the coherency of the Gold model. To give the enquiry a slightly less speculative character, let us locate our observers on Earth. Suppose that the actual universe were a Gold universe, and a terrestrial telescope was pointed in the direction of a reverse-galaxy—i.e., a galaxy in the what in our time sense is the contracting half of the universe. What effect, if any, would this have on the telescope and its environs?

As in the earlier case, a first step is to consider matters from the reverse point of view. To an astronomer resident in the reverse-galaxy, light emitted from that galaxy appears to be being collected and eventually absorbed by the distant telescope on Earth. This astronomer will therefore expect appropriate effects to take place at the back of our telescope: a black plate there will be heated slightly by the incoming radiation from the astronomer’s galaxy, for example. But what does this look like from our point of view? Our temporal sense is the reverse of that of the distant astronomer, so that what she regards as absorption of radiation seems to us to be emission, and vice versa. Apparent directions of heat flow are similarly reversed. Thus as we point our telescope in the distant galaxy’s direction, its influence should show up directly in a suddenly increased flow of radiation from the telescope into space, and indirectly as an apparent cooling in the temperature of the black plate at the rear of our telescope. The plate will apparently seem cooler than its surroundings, in virtue of the inflow of heat energy which is to be re-radiated towards the distant galaxy.

As in normal astronomy, the size of these effects will naturally depend on the distance and intensity of the reverse-source. Size aside, however, there seem to be theoretical difficulties in detecting the effects by what might seem the obvious methods. For example, it will be no use placing a photographic plate over the aperture of the telescope, hoping to record the emission of the radiation concerned. If we consider things from the point of view of the distant reverse-observer it is clear that the plate will act as a shield, obscuring the telescope...
from the light from this observer’s galaxy. Thus from our point of view the light will be emitted from the back of the plate: the side facing away from the telescope, toward the reverse-galaxy.

The important thing seems to be that the detector effect be one that from the reverse point of view does not depend on any very special initial state—since that would be a special final state from our point of view, which accordingly we couldn’t ‘prepare’. Unfogging photo plates perhaps won’t work for this reason, for example. We can’t guarantee that the plate finishes in an unfogged condition (in the way that we can normally guarantee that it starts that way). Provided this requirement for a ‘non-special’ boundary state is satisfied, we appear to be entitled to assume that the detector will behave as we would expect it to if the boot were on the other foot, so to speak: in other words, if we were transmitting towards a detector belonging to the inhabitants of the reversing-future.

Let us now look at this behaviour in a little more detail. If we shine a light at an absorbing surface we expect its temperature to increase. If the incoming light intensity is constant the temperature will soon stabilise at a higher level, as the system reaches a new equilibrium. If the light is then turned off the temperature then drops exponentially to its previous value. Hence if future reverse-astronomers shine a laser beam in the direction of one of our telescopes, at the back of which is an absorbing plate, the temperature change they would expect to take place in the plate is as shown in Figure 2a. When the telescope is opened the temperature of the plate rises due to the effect of the incoming radiation, stabilising at a new higher value. If the telescope is then shut, so that the plate no longer absorbs radiation, its temperature drops again to the initial value.

Figure 2b shows what this behaviour looks like from our point of view. As explained above, both the temporal ordering of events and the direction of change of the apparent temperature of the plate relative to its surroundings has to be reversed. One of the striking things about this behaviour is that it appears to involve advanced effects. The temperature falls before we open the telescope, and rises before we close it. This suggests that we might be able to argue that the whole possibility is incoherent, using a version of the bilking argument. Couldn’t we adopt the following policy, for example: *Open the telescope only if the temperature of the black plate has not just fallen significantly below that of its surroundings*. It might seem that this entirely plausible policy forces the hypothesis to yield contradictory predictions, thus providing a *reductio ad absurdum* of the time-reversing view. However, it is not clear the results are contradictory. Grant for the moment that while this policy is in force it will not happen that the temperature of the plate falls on an occasion on which we might have opened the telescope, but didn’t actually do so. This leaves the possibility that on all relevant trials the temperature does not fall, and the telescope is opened. Is this inconsistent with the presence of radiation from the future reverse-source?

I don’t think it is. Bear in mind that the temperature profile depicted in
these diagrams relies on statistical reasoning: it is inferred from the measured
direction of heat flow, and simply represents the most likely way for the temper-
ature of the absorbing plate to behave. But one of the lessons of our discussion
has been that statistics may be overridden by boundary conditions. Here, the
temperature is constant before the telescope is opened because our policy has
imposed this as a boundary condition. A second boundary condition is provided
by the presence of the future reverse radiation source. Hence the system is sta-
tistically constrained in both temporal directions. We should not be surprised
that it does not exhibit behaviour predicted under the supposition that in one
direction or other, it has its normal degrees of freedom. It is not clear whether
this loophole will always be available, though my suspicion is that it will be.
If nothing else, quantum indeterminism is likely to imply that it is impossi-
ble to sufficiently constrain the two boundary conditions to yield an outright
contradiction.

A consistency objection of a different kind to the Gold universe has been
raised by Hartle and Gell-Mann.\textsuperscript{44} Hartle and Gell-Mann point out that assum-
ing the present epoch is relatively ‘young’ compared to the epoch of maximum
expansion, it is to be expected that the conversion of matter to radiation in stars
will raise the ratio of the energy density of radiation to that of non-relativistic
matter considerably by the time of the corresponding epoch in the recollapsing
phase. Hartle and Gell-Mann estimate an increase by a factor of the order of
$10^3$. By symmetry the same should apply in reverse, so that at our epoch there
should be much more radiation about than is actually observed. (Indeed, the
effect should be accentuated by blue-shift due to the universe’s contraction.)
As Davies and Twamley put it, ‘By symmetry this intense starlight background
should also be present at our epoch ..., a difficulty reminiscent of Olbers’ para-
dox.’\textsuperscript{45}

One thing puzzles me about this argument: if there were such additional
radiation in our region, could we detect it? After all, it is neatly arranged to
converge on its future sources, not on our eyes or instruments. Thus imagine a
reverse-source in direction $+x$ is emitting (in its time-sense) towards a distant
point in direction $-x$. We stand at the origin, and look towards $-x$. (See Figure
3.) Do we see the light which in our time sense is travelling from $-x$ towards
$+x$? No, because we are standing in the way! If we are standing at the origin
(at the relevant time) then the light emitted from the reverse-galaxy falls on
us, and never reaches what we think of as the past sky. When we look towards
$-x$, looking for the radiation converging on the reverse-galaxy at $+x$, then the
relevant part of the radiation doesn’t come from the sky in the direction $-x$ at
all; it comes from the surface at the origin which faces $+x$—i.e., from the back
of our head.

The issue as to whether and to what extent the influence of the low entropy

\textsuperscript{44}Reported in Davies and Twamley (1993), p. 4 in preprint.

\textsuperscript{45}Davies and Twamley (1993), p. 4 in preprint.
condition of one end of a Gold universe might be expected to be apparent at the other is clearly an important one, if the Gold view is to be taken at all seriously. The main lesson of these brief comments is that the issue is a great deal more complicated than it may seem at first sight. The more general lesson is that because our ordinary (asymmetric) habits of causal and counterfactual reasoning are intimately tied up with the thermodynamic asymmetry, we cannot assume that they will be dependable in contexts in which this asymmetry is not universal. To give a crude example, suppose that an event B follows deterministically from an event A. In a Gold universe we may not be able to say that if A had not happened B would not have happened; not because there is some alternative earlier cause waiting in the wings should A fail to materialise (as happens in cases of pre-emption, for example), but simply because B is guaranteed by later events.

Indeed, Figure 3 illustrates a consequence of this kind. We had a choice as to whether to interpose our head and hence our eye at the point 0. Had we not done so, the light emitted (in the reverse time sense) by the reverse-galaxy at +x would have reached -x, in our past. Our action thus influences the past. Because we interpose ourselves at 0, some photons are not emitted from some surface at -x, whereas otherwise they would have been. Normally claims to affect the past give rise to causal loops, and hence inconsistencies. But again it doesn’t seem to me to be obvious that this will happen in this case, for reasons similar to those in the telescope case.

These issues clearly require a great deal more thought. Let me therefore conclude this section with two rather tentative claims. First, it has not been shown that the reversing-universe view leads to incoherencies. And second, there seems to be some prospect that the contents of a time-reversing future universe might be presently observable, at least in principle. The methods involved certainly look bizarre by ordinary standards; but in the end this is nothing more than the apparent oddity of perfectly ordinary asymmetries having the reverse of their ‘usual’ orientation. And the main lesson of this paper is that unless we have learnt to disregard that sort of oddity, we won’t get anywhere with the problem of explaining temporal asymmetry.

Conclusions

What then are the options and prospects for an explanation of the observed cosmological time-asymmetry? Let us try to summarise.

It might seem that the most attractive solution would be the possibility mentioned in our discussion of Hawking’s NBC, namely a demonstration that

\footnote{The required experiment should not be confused with a well-known test of some cosmological implications of the Wheeler- Feynman absorber theory of radiation. A prediction of that theory was that a transmitter should not radiate at full strength in directions in which the future universe is transparent to radiation. Partridge (1973) performed a version of this experiment with negative result. The present discussion does not depend on the absorber theory (which seems to me misconceived; see Price (1991)), and predicts a different result, namely increased radiation in the direction of future reverse-sources.}
although the laws that govern the universe are temporally symmetric, the universes that they permit are mostly asymmetric—mostly such that they possess a single temporal extremity with the ordered characteristics of what we call the Big Bang. But it cannot be over-emphasised that the usual statistical considerations do not make this solution intrinsically more likely or more plausible than the Gold time-symmetric cosmology. With double standards disallowed, the statistical arguments concerned are simply incompatible with the hypothesis that the Big Bang itself is explicable as anything more than a statistical fluke. So if anything it is the Gold view which should be regarded as the more plausible option, simply on symmetry grounds—at least in the absence of properly motivated consistency objections to time-reversing cosmologies. And failing either of these approaches, the main option seems to be an anthropic account. True, there is also Penrose’s view, but here the asymmetry is rather ad hoc. If we are going to invoke an ad hoc principle, we might as well have a symmetric one, at least in the absence of decisive objections to the Gold cosmology.

However, it should be emphasised that none of these alternatives is immediately attractive. As we saw, the anthropic approach involves an enormous ontological cost—it requires that the universe be vastly larger than what we know as the observable universe. (If we take Penrose’s calculation as an indication of how unlikely the observed universe actually is, and assume that it is more or less as likely as it can be, consistent with the presence of observers, then we have an estimate of the size of this ontological cost: our universe represents at best 1 part in $10^{10^{30}}$ of the whole thing.) And as for the Gold universe, it is no magic solution to the original problem, even if consistent. We still need to explain why singularities are of low entropy. Unless it can actually be shown that a generic gravitational singularity is of this kind, some additional boundary constraint will again be required. Although in the Gold case this additional constraint need not be time-asymmetric, it may still appear somewhat ad hoc. As noted earlier, however, this might seem preferable to having no explanation of what would otherwise seem such a striking physical anomaly. Explanatory power and theoretical elegance are the traditional antidotes to apparent ad hocery. A proposal of sufficient formal merit—perhaps the original symmetric version of Hawking’s NBC, for example—might seem a very satisfactory theoretical solution.

What would have to be established to avoid the need for such an additional boundary constraint altogether? To answer this, recall that the heart of GAS was the observation that any gravitating universe still looks like a gravitating universe when its temporal orientation is reversed. It follows that if increasing entropy were the inevitable result of gravitational relaxation, any gravitating universe would look like an entropy-maximising universe from both temporal viewpoints. It was the inconsistency between this conclusion and the observed low entropy Big Bang that showed us that statistical reasoning is untrustworthy in this cosmological context—that undercut our grounds for thinking that gravitational relaxation inevitably or ‘normally’ produces an increase in
entropy.

I want to close by noting that in principle there seem to be two ways to reconcile statistics and low entropy boundary conditions. (I don’t mean to suggest that either of these alternatives should necessarily be taken seriously; I am simply interested in sketching the logical structure of the problem.) One way would be to make cosmological entropy, like gravitation, a viewpoint-dependent matter. We have already noted that in whichever temporal orientation one regards the universe, it appears to be gravitating—i.e. subject to the influence of an attractive gravitational force. It is therefore an orientation-dependent matter as to which temporal extremity we take to involve the state of greatest gravitational relaxation (or lowest gravitational potential energy). One way to preserve a strong link between entropy and gravitation would be to suggest that entropy is similarly frame-dependent, and hence that entropy appears to increase monotonically from both temporal viewpoints.

The second way would be show that gravitational collapse does not naturally lead to a high entropy singularity at all—in other words, to find within one’s theory of gravity an argument to the effect that entropy naturally decreases in gravitational collapse. In this connection it is interesting to note a recent paper by Sikkima and Israel\(^{47}\) claiming to show that a low entropy state may indeed be the ‘natural’ result of gravitational collapse. In one sense this seems to be just the sort of thing that would have to be established, if the boundary conditions are not to require an independent law. However, Sikkima and Israel do not see the argument as supporting the time-symmetric view. For one thing, they say that in a cyclical universe entropy will increase from cycle to cycle. So the old puzzle would re-emerge at this level: How can such an overall asymmetry be derived from symmetric assumptions?

The two approaches just described sought to reconcile statistical arguments in cosmology with the low entropy Big Bang. An alternative would be to dispense with the statistical considerations altogether. It might be argued that any such appeal to statistics relies on the assumption that the system in question has the freedom to choose its path from among a range of equally likely futures. Perhaps the root of our dilemma simply lies in this assumption—in the fact that the assumption is itself incompatible with the neutral atemporal perspective we must adopt if we are to explain temporal asymmetry. That is, perhaps we should restore the balance not by seeking a ‘natural’ endpoint in both directions, but by curing ourselves of our lingering attachment to the idea of natural evolution itself. Perhaps in thinking that low entropy endpoints are anomalous we have been misled by a form of reasoning which is itself grounded in the temporal asymmetry; hence a form of reasoning we should be prepared to discard, in moving to an atemporal viewpoint. This would be a more radical departure from our ordinary ways of thinking than anything contemplated in this paper. All the same, a possible conclusion seems to be that the project

\(^{47}\)Sikkima and Israel (1991).
of explaining temporal asymmetry is a hopeless one, unless we are prepared to contemplate a radical departure of some such kind.

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The ‘meeting’ model

The ‘mixing’ model

Figure 1. Two models for a Gold universe
Figure 2. Two perspectives on a telescope to look into the future
Figure 3. How not to see the light?