Empirically Studying Pakistan’s Democracy and its Political Maneuvering: A Study of 1970 General Elections

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Abstract
Empirical evidences reveal political fluctuation in Pakistan’s history. Almost, this political fluctuation is dominated by military regime(s). The military’s dominant role in Pakistan’s politics repressed for the first time in General Ayub Khan’s regime when publically accepted general elections of 1970s were held. The study empirically uncovers various political dynamics which fetched the political leadership to a hard standing while strengthening the country’s democracy. Nevertheless, the paper primarily focuses the repercussions of the so called free and fair elections of 1970s. Likewise, it also observes the political commitments of the politicians for establishing a sound political culture in the country during the period under review. Also, the paper views whether Pakistan People’s Party could be considered as main actor behind restoring the county’s democracy in the mentioned political epoch or not? It also skims findings of various researches conducted in the same academic manners.

Keywords: Political Epoch, Democracy, 1970 Elections, Pakistan People’s Party.

Introduction
The late epoch of the 20th century has seen as political reversal change in Pakistan’s political journey. This epoch (last few decades of the 20th century) has received important academic concentration from all the social scientists, particularly from political scientists. The main reason for starting this academic discourse was the political fluctuation in Pakistan’s history, observed after the Tashkent’s Declaration between Pakistan and India after 1965 war. This war was the turning point for Ayub Khan’s military regime in Pakistan. This regime, thus, rapidly started melting down. People from all corners of the country took part in serious agitations against the regime. Ayub realized the serious dissatisfaction of the people against himself only in October/November 1968 with the widespread protests and riots of the students and an attempt on his life in Peshawar. Ayub Khan’s regime dealt the opposition with iron hands and opposition leaders Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Wali Khan were arrested in West Pakistan (Jalal, 2014). It was in February 1969 that Ayub Khan decided to adopt a conciliatory policy and formally invited the opposition leaders for talks. As a result, the government decided on February 14, 1969 to lift emergency in the country. The detained op-position leaders, Bhutto, Wali Khan and some others were released. But Z. A. Bhutto and Maulana Abdul Hameed Khan Bhashani decided not to participate in the talks with military. Awami League also raised a condition to withdraw the Agartala Conspiracy Case and release Mujeeb ur Rehman and 34 others detainee in this case and the demand was fulfilled on February 22, 1969. To appease the public sentiments and facilitate the talks, Ayub Khan also ensured the opposition that he would not contest the presidential elections for the third term.

Both opposition leadership and Ayub Khan’s agreed to restore a federal parliamentary setup in the country and the MNAs and MPAs would be elected directly for national assembly and provincial Assemblies respectively. It was also agreed upon that the new parliament when formed would decide the issues of one unit scheme and principle of parity. However, the protests and riots at the streets did not decrease; possibly, the opposition did not want to miss the opportunity to bring Ayub Khan down. Some of the politicians were addressing large rallies to demonstrate their popular strength and demanded immediate resignation of Ayub Khan. Thus the circumstances had left Ayub Khan with no choice other than handing over of powers. As a result, Pakistan again went under the martial law on March 25, 1969 when Ayub Khan abdicated in favor of Yahya Khan (Malik, 2008).

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Besides the presidential system, the system of Basic Democracy which also failed to satisfy the urges of the people was scrapped.

**Methodology**

This study is based on qualitative tools for data collection. Descriptive method is used keeping in view the nature of the study. To collect relevant information both primary and secondary sources were consulted. Books written by those experts having candid view on the politics of Pakistan were also utilized. Relevant articles from reputed newspapers were also used for obtaining first-hand information.

**Empirical Evidences from 1970s Elections and General Yahya Khan’s Takeover**

Yahya Khan occupied the office of the President of Pakistan in the midst of the period that forced his guru Ayub Khan to resign the office. The collapse of Ayub regime was a burden which Yahya Khan had to shoulder as his soldier’s code of duty. This was a great test for Yahya Khan and he had to go through personal embarrassment (Ziring, 1974). As soon as Yahya Khan assumed office, he promised to restore democratic process and creating an environment conducive for the establishment of a constitutional and democratic government. He also pledged to surrender power in favor of those elected by people of Pakistan. Through an Ordinance, Yahya Khan presented a Legal Framework Order (LFO)\(^1\) (Legal Framework Order, 1970). It was intended to serve as a modus operandi for the approaching elections. The Legal Framework Order provided that the elections would be held on the basis of adult franchise and one man one vote. Thus, out of total three hundred and thirteen seats in contemplated National Assembly of East Pakistan got 169. The newly elected assembly would provide the country with a constitution within hundred and twenty days and the constitution would be drafted in the light of the principles of LFO (Gopinath, 1975).

The Legal Framework Order promulgated in March 1970, declared that the future constitution would preserve five fundamental principles i.e., an Islamic ideology, territorial integrity, free elections plus independence of judiciary, a federation securing and ensuring provincial autonomy as well as adequate administrative, legislative and financial powers for the federal government (Syed, 1992) and full opportunities and chances should be given to all the people to participate in national affairs. It was also clear that the final authority rested with the President of the country to approve or reject the constitution drafted by the Assembly (Meenakshi, 1975). Yahya Khan announced the breakup of One Unit in July 1970 and thus he demonstrated his respect for the sentiments of the people of Pakistan. The nature of federation was, however, to be studied and finalized by the newly elected national assembly. The stage was ready for the first ever general elections of 1970 (Meenakshi, 1975).

Unlike Ayub Khan, Yahya recognized the necessity of both political parties and politicians and started conciliatory policies towards political parties and politicians. Yahya Khan was a ray of hope for the aggrieved common man as he could not ignore the aspirations of the masses and promised an early return to democratic rule. Unlike his predecessor, Yahya Khan did not muzzle politicians nor opted for measure such as Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO) of Ayub and pledged to play a role of referee among the various competing political groups (Kushik, 1985). The credit goes to Yahya Khan for holding the first ever general elections in Pakistan. But actually, the military junta appeared to have assumed that 1970 elections would bring a factionalized parliament and the dominant position of the civil-military bureaucracy would continue where the military would have a chance to hold the de facto balance of power. Contrary to the military supposition, the elections did not bring the parliament as desired by Yahya and his comrades and all the hopes of military junta shattered when the results were announced (Adeney, 2009).

**Competing Political Parties in 1970 Elections**

Despite strong misgiving against Legal Framework Order (LFO), the political parties decided to participate in the elections and issued their manifestos. The political activities began in January, 1970 (Shah & Khan, 2012). About twenty political parties took part in the 1970 elections. In East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujib-Ur-Rahman’s Awami League was the main political party which led election campaign.

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\(^1\) The Legal Framework Order, 1970 (LFO) was a decree issued by then President of Pakistan Gen. Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan that laid down the political principles and laws governing the 1970 general election, which were the first direct elections in the history of Pakistan. The LFO also dissolved the “One Unit” scheme of West Pakistan, re-establishing the four provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province.
In West Pakistan, among the various political parties campaigning for the election Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led by Z. A. Bhutto was the leading party. National Awami Party (NAP) led by Wali Khan, Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), Council Muslim League, Convention Muslim League, Qayyum Muslim League, Jamaat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan also took part in the elections from Western Pakistan (Rizvi, N.D.) Certainly, the six points program of Awami League was the most controversial issue in the elections campaign. The military junta considered it a form of secession while Mujib ur Rehman consistently used six points in his electoral campaign (Ziring, 1980).

**Campaigning and Politicians Maneuvering in eve of Elections**

The 1970 elections were held not in normal but in critical conditions. The country was ruled by Martial Law regime and the elections were held under Martial Law regulations. The elections were meant for resolving certain issues which were heat generating of constitutional nature which revolved around the division of the country into two wings. That was first experience of general elections on the basis of adult franchise. PPP leadership caught masses imaginations by raising the slogan of Roti, Kapra and Makan. The campaign for the 1970 elections went for one whole year (Malik, 1977).

The elections campaign started on first January 1970 when Yahya Khan allowed political activities which were restricted earlier. Politicians started their political activities but there was no match for Bhutto’s charisma and mass appeal. Previously drawing room negotiations and bargaining were the part of electoral politics in Pakistan. People were approached usually through intermediaries such as revenue officials, police men, and important persons in villages and also through caste and clan elders. But this time, the modes of contacting the masses were different because of the political strategy and style of PPP leadership. The yearlong election campaign was dominated by public meetings, processions, rallies, slogan chanting teams with fitted loudspeakers in vehicles, posters and handbills. Politicians from all political parties visited cities and towns and delivered emotional speeches; some like Bhutto also approached peasants and addressed them. This was, of course, a different scenario where people participated enthusiastically (Syed, 1992).

People also flew flags on the top of their houses and shops were made attractive with portraits of their favored politicians. The common and illiterate masses became so involved in political activities that formal education appeared irrelevant to political participation (Ahmad, 1976). Tensions built up and political polarization was everywhere. The political environment was full of intolerance and violence. Supporters of all political parties tried to eliminate the viewpoint of others. This situation was created by some elements that were close to Martial Law Administrator. This group had made Yahya Khan’s mind to fish in the troubled water of politics for his survival. And that is why he kept hobnobbing most of the time with different parties leadership and even some were supported with money. Yahya Khan and his group were convinced that in the tense and polarized environment, no single party would be able to emerge as a strong party and challenge his authority. So, he would be able to play one against the other and himself occupy a dominant position (Malik, 1977).

Bhutto welcomed support from each and every side before elections. Print media gave a cordial and favorable coverage to Pakistan Peoples Party. Except a few pro-Islam papers, the whole press extended its support to PPP campaign. The Nusrat (ed. Hanif Ramay) and the Shahab (ed. Kausar Niazi) two independent weeklies were almost converted into Peoples Party papers. On the political platform, there was no match for Bhutto to compete in oratorical tactics. He would address a dozen of meetings in a day. Besides, Bhutto also activated his strong networking that he had established earlier when he was a part of Ayub Khan’s government to promote his party influence. He had close friends among the military leadership and also some of the civil servants who subscribed to his views on different issues extended their help to Bhutto and his party. These contacts also kept Bhutto informed of the government policies and thinking which helped him to plan for the upcoming elections. Many, suspected of working against Bhutto, were threatened. Bhutto himself criticized his opponents and used abusive and objectionable words against them but government turned a deaf ear and took no notice (Afzal, 1998).

PPP leadership succeeded in mobilizing the masses against the dictatorial regime of Ayub Khan. The people became more involved in politics because of PPP’s progressive and secular calls. Neither Yahya Khan nor Ayub Khan could damage the PPP’s reputation and growing popularity. PPP was the first opposition party which succeeded in persuading the military leadership to hold general elections in the country and give the reins of government in civilian hands, later on. The PPP
manifesto for the first general elections in Pakistan reflected radical and revolutionary postures which annoyed the orthodox and conservative segments of society. In both wings of the country, the Ulema (Sunni and Shia) violently attacked PPP’s radical program and declared it disgusting and repugnant to the principles of Islam (Kushik, 1984). In February 1970, socialism was declared as the greatest of all dangers to the security and wellbeing of the country by 113 Ulema. The Ulema also urged all Muslims to rise against this “accursed” ideology (Syed, 1992). They strongly criticized and opposed Bhutto’s socialism and perceived Bhutto as kafir (infidel) and his socialist program anti-religious (Shafqat, 1988). The Ulema declared that those who practiced socialism were rebels against Allah and His Book and it would be morally wrong and wicked for all those who support or vote for them (Zafar, 1973). The Islamic parties and the Muslim League presented the election as a contest between Islam and its enemies. They condemned Bhutto’s association with Ayub Khan’s regime and called him a drinker and a womanizer (Syed, 1992). The Fatwa of about 113 Ulema, initiated by Deobandi’s Ulema appeared in the press against Bhutto’s socialism (Ahmad, 2009) but it could not stop or even prevented the attractiveness of Bhutto (Shah, 1996).

All these accusations were of no effect as the results of the elections showed it later. All the three Islamic parties raised the slogan “Socialism Kufr Hai” (Socialism is Un-Islamic) while campaigning for the elections. Sensing the growing criticism among Islam Pasand and right wing political parties, Bhutto shrewdly introduced modifications in PPP’s manifesto. Bhutto, in order to gain mass support, modified PPP’s election manifesto and Socialism was portrayed as Islamic socialism (Kushik, 1984). He also pledged to base Pakistan’s society on egalitarianism as mentioned in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W). Masawat-e-Muhammadi was also added to the PPP program (Mukherjee, 1972). The PPP members and supporters ran a folksy and colorful campaign for the elections. Portraits of Zulf-iqar Ali Bhutto were displayed everywhere in meetings and processions. Catching slogans were shouted in rallies and processions (Adeeb, 1972).

**Election Results and Political Maneuvering of Bhutto**

The following three different centers of power emerged after elections results were announced: Awami league lead by Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman in East Pakistan, the Pakistan Peoples Party in the two bigger provinces of Sindh and Punjab, National Awami Party and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam in NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan (Khan, 2012). In the Eastern Wing, Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman party secured majority losing only two seats of National Assembly. The Awami League gained a massive victory winning 167, out of 169 seats allocated for that province. While in Western part it badly failed and was unable to secure even a single seat. It was PPP under Z. A. Bhutto leadership which gained a sweeping victory by capturing 81 seats out of total 144 seats from the West Pakistan (Ziring, 1980). The performance of the rightist parties was disappointing (Baxter, 1971). Similarly the performance of the leftists was even more unsatisfactory (Rizwan, 2014).

The Sheikh Mujib’s party performed tremendously well in the elections. No one expected it to be in such a powerful position. The common prospect was of a factionalized parliament but such sort of state of affairs created a stalemate. Z. A. Bhutto whose party had won the elections in the West Pakistan demanded a share was reluctant to allow Awami League form a majority government. Then again, Awami League leadership was unwilling to allow Bhutto such a role (Adeney, 2007). As Awami League secured an overall majority so it had to be allowed to form the government but it did not happen. The military junta hesitated to call upon Mujib as his party had no representation in the western wing. There was a need for a mutual understanding between Bhutto and Mujib which sadly didn’t take place. As Bhutto sensed that Awami League leadership was in the bad books of the

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2 The Fatwa declared socialism as the greatest of all dangers to the security and well-being of Pakistan and called upon all Muslims to rise against this “accursed” ideology. The ulema declared that individuals and groups who preached socialism were rebels against God and His Book, and that it would be gravely sinful for any Muslim to aid, or vote for them. In fact, they claimed that “Islamic Socialism” was a distorted exploitation and abuse of Islam by shrewd and power-hungry politician who was a non-practicing Muslim and who had never cared to study Islam carefully. More important was the fact that there existed no unity among religious or Islam pasand Parties

3 For example: “Bhutto Sada Sher Hai, Buqi Hayr Pher Hai” (Our Bhutto is truly a lion while the rest are merely devious); “Valika Tha, Amrika Tha, Bhutto Wah, Wah, Wah” (Valika, the industrialist, is down, America is down, cheers for Bhutto); “Sada Bhutto Awe-i-Awe” (Our Bhutto is bound to come to power); “Bhutto Jiye Hazar Sal” (May Bhutto live a thousand years). “
military leadership so he turned down to discuss terms and reach an agreement with Sheikh Mujib unless he could agree, at least, to dilute if not publically renounce his six points program. On the other hand, Mujib and his colleagues in the Awami League were firm that the future constitution must be in accordance with the Mujib’s 6 point formula. Of course, this was a difficult situation for Yahya but an opportunity for PPP leadership (Ziring, 1980).

The 1970 elections were the first ever general elections after independence and it was the start of a democratic process. But unfortunately, in 1970 when this right was given to Pakistanis, a large number of citizens did not cast their votes. Of all the registered voters, only 58% used their right to vote while 42% refrained. It was the combined responsibility of both the Awami League and PPP to get rid of Martial Law and establish parliamentary democracy in Pakistan by ensuring a peaceful shift of authority to the civilian hands (Ahmad, 1988). The Awami League and PPP had promised the masses of a better future. The official name of the party was Pakistan Awami League but the party was concentrating on East Pakistan only and got overwhelming victory in the province (Ahmad, 1988). Not even a single PPP’s candidate was contesting the elections from East Pakistan, despite its election manifesto wherein it is mentioned that if a party which seek to be a parliamentary party has to secure 5% of the total votes cast in both parts of the country, so that it could be rightly called a national party (Ahmad, 1988). Thus the Awami League emerged as a representative party of East Pakistan and PPP as a representative of the West Pakistan only (Ahmad, 1988). Once the election results were announced, the League’s leadership declined any option of making any amendment in the six point formula. Awami League’s leadership declared that the people of East Pakistan have voted for six point’s formula in the elections and it is now the property of the people and he or his party has no authority to amend the said formula (Pakistan Observer, 1971). Bhutto threatened to stay away from the National Assembly if Mujib didn’t yield. Thus he included himself in the ruling body. Sheikh Mujib observed the alliance between Bhutto and military junta and claimed that his party has been given a popular mandate to take the reins of government. He reiterated that the masses had opted for Awami League and therefore the only justifiable government would be the one formed by it (Ziring, 1980).

Initially, when the talks failed, the PPP’s leadership adopted a strict attitude to counter the Awami League’s pressure and to force its leadership for some concessions in the six point formula. In February 1971, the PPP’s leadership informed the press of its decision of not attending the National Assembly session which was due on March 3, 1971, unless and until he was satisfied that PPP’s fairly good suggestions and demands were accommodated (Rizvi, 1986). Bhutto also issued threatening statements. He was not ready to tolerate session of the assembly without PPP’s participation (Dawn March, 1971). He stated, ‘I cannot put my party men in a position of double jeopardy (by sending them to Dhaka),’ he said and threatened ‘a revolution from Khyber to Karachi,’ if the Peoples Party was left out.” (Ahmad, 2004). He also started issuing threats and warning to the western wing politicians not to attend the National Assembly session. He threatened the politicians from West Pakistan of dire consequences if they tried to attend the session (Siddiqua, 2007). The undemocratic and defiant attitude of PPP leadership caused Yahya Khan to announce the postponement of the National Assembly session scheduled for 3rd March 1971 (Rizvi, 1986).

Such sort of situation led the military leadership denied to hand over power to Mujibur Rahman without revision of Awami League’s six point program. He later announced to hold the National Assembly session on 25th March. Sheikh Mujib considered this act against the autonomy of the Bengali and reacted brutally and challenged the decision of the postponement of the National Assembly session and started street protests. Meanwhile Yahya Khan asked both parties to meet him and sort out a solution. Yahya and some other political figures from West Pakistan visited Dhaka and met Mujib. Bhutto, however, refused to do so. It was, of course, a time of grave national crisis and mutual understanding was inevitable. Yahya and Mujib met for six days and discussed the matter and it appeared that Yahya agreed to most of the Bengali demands (Ziring, 1980).

Yahya Khan once again asked PPP leadership to join the talks. This time Bhutto agreed and went to Dhaka, where Yahya informed him that only Pakistan Peoples Party’s acceptance of the draft declaration was needed for the settlement (Ziring, 1980). All this proved fruitless because, on the one hand, if Sheikh Mujib was not ready to accept any change in the formula then; on the other hand, PPP’s leadership responded in the same tone and said that all the 6 points cannot be accepted (Bhutto, 1971). Bhutto discussed the documents with his advisors and refused to support the draft declaration
because, in his judgment, it would lead to the dismemberment of the country. In fact, Bhutto and his high command had prepared a formula for a compromise settlement which was very close to the one agreed to by Yahya and Mujib but Bhutto vetoed that one as well (Ziring, 1980).

Neither Bhutto nor the military junta could deny Mujib’s firm and strong claim but they were not ready to transfer power to Mujib. Bhutto’s negative response to attend the National Assembly meeting scheduled in Dhaka meant not accepting the mandate of the winning party which was very much against the fundamentals of democracy, while the Awami League leadership grew more unbending after securing an overwhelming majority in the elections (Rehman, 2011). Not accepting the mandate of the Awami League and using undemocratic language to warn or coerce the politicians on the part of a national leader, shows his commitment to seat of power and disrespect for democratic norms and values. This was something against the norms of democracy which Bhutto so loudly spoke about during his election campaign. The strict and rigid stance of Mujib on the six point formula too was undemocratic.

The above discussion makes it clear that Bhutto’s point of view was utterly against democratic norms and values. One of the reasons for Bhutto’s undemocratic and unyielding stand was, undoubtedly, his support from military, bureaucracy and feudal class in the West Pakistan. Although Yahya Khan drawn in Awami League headship in the discussion but in reality that was a plan just to hunt for legitimacy for him. It was a dual endeavor of the military leadership and Bhutto to prevent Mujib ur Rehman from coming into power (Kushik, 1985). The military junta sided with Bhutto who, according to Haqqani and Siddiqa, supported military’s anti- India agenda (Siddiqa, 2007).

**Failure of Dhaka Negotiation and Perils for Democracy**

Bhutto had to talk and negotiate with one of the two power centers. Although there were possibilities of risks in both cases, his first priority was to reach a settlement with the Awami League’s leadership on the basis of a democratic alternative to military rule. Bhutto approached to Mujib from a position of strength rather than weakness; he portrayed himself as a leader of the Western part of the country, and ruled out any possibility of either framing of the constitution or forming government at the center without the cooperation of his party. On December 20, 1970, in his speech to the Punjab Assembly members, Bhutto stated it clearly not to occupy the opposition benches in the National Assembly. PPP's leadership was not ready to occupy opposition benches and wait for another five years. It wanted to get into power for the realization of its pledges to the masses (Jones, 2003). He stressed that his party had won the elections in two provinces of Punjab and Sindh where the real power existed, so it is not acceptable to keep it out and form a government at the center by Awami league (The Pakistan Times, December 21, 1970).

On December 21, 1970 Bhutto turned down the idea of deciding the issue of autonomy for East Pakistan by the force of majority in the National Assembly. With a view that framing of the constitution for West and East Part of the country would be justifiable. To halt future division between two parts of the country both major parties should inter into a grand coalition in the house so that both the parties would be able to fulfill their promises to their people (The Pakistan Times, December 21, 1970). Unfortunately, this idea could not be materialized and dissenting interests poled apart both the major political parties. The Great Strategy discussed this phase (Bhutto, 1971). The fall of Dhaka was mainly associated with Bhutto stubborn attitudes. All the political parties, except PPP, were of the view that Bhutto did play a major role in the failure of tripartite (Yahya, Mujib and Bhutto) dialogue (Usmani, 2015).Yahya had also sensed the discontent in the military high ranks and he, therefore, sided with his colleagues and Bhutto. As the writ of the government became ineffective in most of the Eastern Pakistan, the military regime of Yahya Khan launched a major security operation and unleashes forces to contain the uprising led by Awami League under the command of Tikka Khan who was infamous for mercilessness (Ziring, 1980). In his interview with Fallaci, Bhutto stated that he was not involved in the campaign of Yahya Khan against Bengalis. He condemned (Fallaci, 1976) the way the operation was carried out.

Sensing the failure of the Mukti Bahini to achieve the objective, India hurriedly attacked Eastern province and a full-fledged war started on November 22, 1971. On December 16, 1971 military leadership admitted defeat and Pakistani forces surrendered. Two days later, fierce protests started throughout West Pakistan. On December 19, military officers in General Head Quarters (GHQ), Rawalpindi also resorted to vocal revolt which compelled Yahya Khan to resign. Thus Bhutto
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got the opportunity to be sworn in as the President of the country on December 20, 1971 (Rehman, 2011). The general elections of 1970 proved the shortest way for Bhutto to get into power. Bhutto too was of two minds as far as democracy is concerned. During his good days i.e., when he was minister in Ayub’s cabinet Bhutto was supporting Ayub’s anti-democratic actions and when out of power i.e., when parted ways with his mentor he became anti-Ayub and pro-democracy. Bhutto’s attachment to democracy depended on his position in the power structure (Kapur, 2002).

The responsibility for December 1971 debacle has to be ascribed to political leadership and Gen. Yahya Khan’s junta as well. As noted by Askari, Prof Wayne Wilcox of the Southern Asian Institute of Columbia University was of the view that “the three parties engaged in the last-minute negotiations in Dhaka in March 1971 were all negotiating from a position of weakness and none of the three leaders, Yahya Khan, Mujib and Bhutto could accept what would have had to be a “major, visible compromise without being rejected by their followers”. Wilcox says, “Mujib ur Rehman was left with the position of ‘national hegemony or provincial secession’, Bhutto, with the position of ‘shared national power or West Pakistan secession’, and the army with ‘adequate support for national unity and defense or civil war’. And as a result, each group made its irreconcilable demand and committed all of its resources in the hope that they would be enough (Rizvi, 1990).

In fact, the military leadership and politicians from the Western Pakistan did not show any respect for the election results. Their undemocratic attitude and the unfriendly reaction from Eastern Pakistan and particularly the adamant stand of Sheikh Mubij ur Rehman on six points program, led to a stalemate. The political intolerance and short sightedness of the political leadership resulted into the disintegration of the country (Siddiqa, 2007). Yahya could not deal the situation rightfully. Yahya wanted to become the president of the country. Mujib stressed on the implementation of six points and Bhutto was not ready to accept the points. Thus the mismanagement of the army and mistakes on the part of political leadership did play its role in the fall of Dakha (Interview with Khan, 2015). Both Sheikh Mujib-Ur-Rehman and Bhutto could not sort out the solution which resulted in the disintegration of the country. One cannot say that Sheikh Mujib wanted to keep the country united and Bhutto was wholly responsible for disintegration. Actually politicians had their own priorities, but adjustment is very much essential. This is very clear that Sheikh Mujib should have been allowed as his party was voted to power. Here the question arises that if the 1973 Constitution was framed by the National Assembly’s elected members under 1970 elections, then why Mujib was not allowed to form the government, whose party had won majority of seats and majority of votes in the same elections? PPP’s leader was going to be opposition leader and had also chances of becoming a deputy Prime Minister. It was a matter of bargaining. He then formed his government on the basis of PPP majority and with support of other groups.

PPP’S leadership took over the reins of power after the breakup of Pakistan in December 1971. The army humiliation and the disorder in its ranks also provided Bhutto a chance to become chief martial law administrator. President of the country as well Chief martial law administre made him all powerful as wished by Bhutto. Thus Z. A. Bhutto became the undeniable and powerful leader of the remaining Pakistan after the dismemberment (Ziring, 1997).

The first elected government of PPP for examining the reasons of political crisis that led to army humiliation and tragedy of East Pakistan debacle agreed to appoint a commission. The commission under the headship of Chief Justice of Supreme Court, Hamood-Ur-Rehman, had to fix responsibility on those found accountable. The report of the commission was not made public, perhaps, because it had recommended the trial of some high ranking officers. If on one hand PPP’s leadership wanted to strengthen his position vis-a-vis the most military, then on the other hand, was trying to win sympathy by not releasing the report of the Commission. Had he presented report of the commission to the public and let the military bear the responsibility for what they had done in East Pakistan, they might not be able to impose another martial law in future. Moreover, despite assurance that all the copies of the Report were destroyed, a copy was recovered from Z. A. Bhutto’s residence two days before his execution (Arif, 1995).

Conclusion
Empirical review of this study vibrantly reveals a hard standing change in the political/democratic journey of Pakistan during 1970s general elections. Although, the political professionalization of the country’s politicians (in comparison to other unseen powers) was unintended but still the general elections of 1970s sparked as a democratic success in the country. Nevertheless, the said elections not
only turned the country’s political culture but also stopped the non-elected actors for a long period of time while holding government offices.

Likewise, the review also presents a paramount incident (in shape of the fall of Dhaka) while academically expressing the political development in Pakistan. The Dhaka fall and persistent involvement of the enemy across the border weekend the democratic process in Pakistan. The review asserts that non-political professionalism of the politicians from both the wings created unnecessary political space. While not compromising on his six point agenda, Sheikh Mujeeb Ur Rehman produced an unwanted space between the people of both the wings. On the other part, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with his persistent political behavior was not ready to leave this political upheaval. The review sum up that as result of the uncompromising stances of both the leadership, not only disorganized the political order of the country, however, these sparked in terms of political division of united Pakistan.

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