Crossing Boundaries: Diplomacy and the Global Dimension, 1700–1850

Jeroen Duindam

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Crossing Boundaries: Diplomacy and the Global Dimension, 1700–1850

Jeroen Duindam

ABSTRACT
This is a comment on the contributions to this special issue ('Intercultural Diplomacies') structured around the interactions of cultural zones across Eurasia, the role of intermediaries and networks, and, finally, processes of change 1700–1850.

KEYWORDS
Intercultural diplomacy; global history; comparative history

1. Three interacting zones

Diplomacy underwent two major transformations between 1700 and 1850. In a drawn-out process culminating in the Congress of Vienna, ideas about ranks, players, and procedures of exchange in the early modern European society of princes gradually crystallised into a set of rules dictating relations between states and their representatives. At the same time, European diplomacy was absorbing polities across Eurasia. By the end of the eighteenth century, following a series of military mishaps, the Ottoman empire sent its first resident embassies to Europe. A century later, the same sequence could be observed with Qing China. In both cases, shifting military balances engendered a process of adaptation. The divergence in terms of military and economic power enforced a convergence in the forms of diplomacy, predicated on redefined European standards.1

However, European diplomacy had not taken shape in splendid isolation. Christian Windler points out that conflict between the ‘competing universalisms’ of Christian Latinitas and the Islamic Arabic-Turco-Persian world rarely precluded contact. On the contrary: the shifting fault lines between these worlds were characterised by permanent exchange. Urgent religious and political strife with neighbouring principalities, moreover, often gained priority over the lasting conflict with the more distant ‘Other’: the zones organised around a universalist worldview were internally divided. French, English and Dutch missions – enemies of the Habsburgs – sought the support of the Ottoman sultan. The Safavids considered Venice a potential ally against the Ottomans, and sent twenty missions between 1500 and 1700.2 Contacts among leading protagonists of interzonal conflict were even more frequent: Maria Pia Pedani counts 178 Ottoman missions to Venice between 1384 and 1762, excluding those sent by provincial authorities.3

The ascendancy of Europe, moreover, did not introduce diplomacy into west and south Asia or China: it changed existing practice to fit emerging European standards. At the point in time defined by Garrett Mattingly as the origin of modern European diplomacy, we can ask ourselves whether any fundamental distinctions existed between the practices of exchange within the ‘competing universalisms’.4 Early modern Europe retained some of the characteristics of the
universalist Res Publica Christiana, and in this sense, it resembled the Islamic world. Neither the papacy nor the caliphate could pose as an unchallenged leader; among the worldly contestants, no single power stood out as hegemon. In each of these worlds, there were multiple contacts among princes, punctuated by conflicts involving status hierarchies as well as religious strife and wars of succession and conquest. Undoubtedly, Mattingly’s powerful book, concentrated mostly on Italy and England, overstated the modernity and orderliness of European Renaissance diplomacy. To date, however, no systematic attempt to compare the patterns of exchange within each of the interacting zones of the Eurasian continent has been carried out. This comment can only briefly hint at some of the parallels, contrasts and questions.

A web of exchanges can be found within west and south Asia. Major players repeatedly exchanged envoys and missions. The Mamluks and the Ottomans exchanged at least sixty-six missions in the century preceding the Ottoman conquest of Cairo (1517). In his memoirs, Mughal Padishah Jahangir (r. 1605–1627) frequently mentions ambassadors from his ‘brother’ Shah Abbas (r. 1588–1629), detailing the gifts he bestowed upon them. Shah Jahan (r. 1627–1658) sent missions to the Ottomans in 1637 and 1652, seeking support against the Safavids. A loose hierarchy of ambassadors (*ilci, elçi*) recruited in the upper echelons of office holders went on incidental missions to congratulate new rulers, attend festivities, or conclude alliances – usually bearing gifts and receiving rich rewards. There was far more going in these exchanges than the grudging accommodation of European traders and envoys situated in the margins of universalist empires and unwilling to recognise any peers. The exchange of *ilci* does not seem so far removed from contemporary European envoys; they were hardly always the permanent ambassadors who feature so prominent in Mattingly, and were likewise mostly recruited *ad hoc* from the upper layers.

In the east Asian ‘Sinosphere’, China, with its Confucian cultural code and classics, consistently remained a point of orientation. The Chinese emperor had no peer in his own realm and categorised peripheral peoples as tributaries and barbarians. From the first moment of Chinese unification under imperial rule, however, there were always major players on the horizon who needed to be taken seriously. Steppe outsiders in the guise of conquest dynasties or rival powers consistently formed part of the political setting, at least until the Manchu Qing dynasty and Russia conquered the steppe. Korea, Vietnam and Japan were strongly influenced by the Chinese Confucian example, but they were never mere tributaries. Japan no longer sent tributary missions to China under the Tokugawa shoguns; Korea and Vietnam continued their regular missions to Beijing, but did not see themselves as inferiors. Outside the first ring of tributaries, Burmese kings hardly pictured their envoys as bringing tribute, but rather, viewed the exchange of gifts as founded on a more equal basis. Timur received Ming missions and his successors engaged in dense exchange, but neither the founder nor his successors would have accepted the label of ‘tributary’, even though it was attributed to them in Chinese sources. Tribute was the form of contact preferred by imperial centres, yet it existed in many forms and was not necessarily accepted by the alleged tributaries. The treaties concluded with Russia in the early modern age, Nерchinsk (1689) and Kiakhta (1727), make it clear that China’s universalist stance should not be taken literally. Conversely, in 1792, the arrival of Lord Macartney’s embassy was still announced by the governor of Canton as an ‘outside barbarian’ (*waiyi*) arriving to ‘bring tribute’ (*jingong*).

It is not always easy to draw clear lines between subjects, tributaries, and independent foreign powers. In many cases, peripheral groups of subjects enjoyed privileges that set them apart from the inhabitants of core regions. Distant elites may have paid tribute or offered presents rather than regular taxes, and it was accepted that some governed their own territories. In Ming China, local chieftains (*tusi*) in the southwest enjoyed substantial autonomy; under the Qing, a separate institution (the *lifanyuan*) was founded by the Manchu elite to deal with the peoples of the northwestern steppe and Tibet, while contacts with the traditional tributaries of Han China remained under the responsibility of the board of rites (*libu*). In south Asia, envoys (*wakils*)
represented their princes at the Mughal imperial court and elsewhere – the status of a court could be inferred from the numbers of *wakils* present. Mughal princes and grandees were also represented by *wakils*. Typically, the leading governors in the Safavid, Mughal and Ottoman empires were expected to bring lavish presents when they paid personal visits to the paramount ruler: these presents (*piskes*) lay somewhere between a tribute paid by an inferior to his superior and a gift. 

Ottoman ‘*ahdname*’ treaties could cover a striking variety of ‘tributaries’, stretching from religious groupings and Kurdish *beyliks* in the Ottoman heartlands, to Muslim Mecca, North Africa, and the Crimea, to the Christian principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, Transylvania and Hungary, and finally encompassing European kingdoms and their trading communities. Until 1606, the Austrian Habsburgs paid tribute to the sultan; until the later seventeenth century, the Poles and the Russians were obliged to send presents to the Crimean Khan, who was himself an Ottoman vassal. The Ottoman conglomerate brings to mind European composite monarchies ruling a portfolio of territories holding different privileges. The neat bifurcation between rulers and subjects, stipulated by Jean Bodin and repeated in learned tracts from the seventeenth century onwards, never quite fitted actual practice in Europe or elsewhere. In Bodin’s day, the French king’s brother Anjou demonstrated his sovereignty by employing a secretary of state and a ‘*conducteur des ambassadeurs*’ in his household. Cities and trading companies were diplomatic actors in their own right. In many European kingdoms, leading nobles cherished their sovereign rights. 

Princes of the Holy Roman Empire obtained *Landeshoheit* rather than sovereignty after 1648, which they could claim only after 1806 – yet leading houses successfully sought to obtain royal crowns. Only on the threshold of the modern age did sovereignty switch from the personal quality of kings and noble grandees to states and nations. 

2. **Intermediaries, information, networks**

Within each of the three zones of the Eurasian continent, communication was facilitated by a scripted creed, at least one *lingua franca*, and a shared framework of cultural practices. The Mediterranean and central Asia can be seen as areas connecting the cultural zones; ongoing exchange here created ‘transimperial’ groups who could step in as intermediaries. The Mediterranean has long since been viewed as an area of interaction rather than a boundary; more recently, similar views have been extended to central Asia. Peoples of the steppe, long perceived only as the marginal population of the buffer zones between sedentary empires, have been re-established as important historical actors. In this volume, Gregory Afinogenov examines the ambivalent and inconsistent interpretations of subjecthood and dependency developed by Russia and the steppe peoples living under its authority. Afinogenov underlines how the Kazakh Ablai sultan could manipulate the two giants on his horizon, the Russian and Qing empires. Managing information about this area was apparently not easy even for the imperial centres. 

The thin trickle of travellers moving from Europe via the Islamic world to China in the later Middle Ages expanded from the late sixteenth century onwards. Notwithstanding the growing frequency of contact, the presence of increasing numbers of printed descriptions, and the expanding language capabilities of missionaries and scholars, interactions with China remained far more limited than the longer established contact between the contiguous zones of Europe and west Asia.

Matthew Mosca shows how the first explosion of knowledge about China and the Chinese language was followed by stagnation in the second half of the eighteenth century – at the very time that the vogue for *chinoiserie* peaked. No institutions within Europe enabled Europeans to
acquire adequate language capabilities: a protracted stay in China still was the only effective method. Scattered across several centres in Europe and including Calcutta, it was only after 1792 that the training of the five languages of the Qing Empire took a more stable form. The consequences of this hiatus become clear in Henrietta Harrison’s remarkable story of Li Zibiao, the ‘transimperial subject’ par excellence. Born into a Catholic Chinese family, he moved to Naples as a twelve-year-old boy and spent twenty years there studying to become a priest and missionary. Macartney badly needed interpreters and thus brought Li on his mission to China, hoping that the long sojourn aboard the ship would create mutual confidence. Li’s service was appreciated by Qing magistrates and the Qianlong emperor himself, as well as by Macartney. This allowed Li to take liberties, not only in how he rephrased Macartney’s wishes to obtain goals desired by the ambassador, but also in how he abused his master’s authority: in Macartney’s name, Li asked the Qianlong Emperor to grant freedom of religion to Chinese Christians. This demand was not accepted, but it created embarrassment for all parties involved.

Li’s semi-monopoly of information and his subsequent hijacking of Macartney’s authority would have been an unlikely scenario in the long-standing exchanges along the Mediterranean. Groups of intermediaries were available for all parties at most points of contact. In Istanbul, Phanariot Greeks commonly served the Ottomans as Grand Dragomans, whereas a mixed group of interrelated families acted as interpreters and translators for European embassies. Only gradually did the metropolitan centres of Europe develop adequate facilities for language training – and the local experience remained a key element in initiatives such as the 1551 Venetian school for giovani della lingua, J. B. Colbert’s 1669 école des jeunes de langue, and the 1754 Oriental Academy of Vienna. Even with these institutions in place, individual families and their networks remained important. David Do Paço mentions the Testa family and their connections in Pera as well as in Vienna; Pascal Firges refers to the Fonton family who served the French embassy.

Jan Hennings shows how the haphazard encounters of Russian ambassador Tolstoi, reinforced by the networks of predecessors and the patriarch of Jerusalem, established a mixed group of intermediaries. The Serbian-born Ragusan merchant Ragusinskii, another figure nimbly moving between the parties, became indispensable in the first phase of Tolstoi’s mission. By comparing several kinds of writing produced by the ambassador, Hennings demonstrates the gradual transformation of heterogeneous information, including gossip and hearsay, into authoritatively voiced reports. To be sure, ambassadors at most European courts relied on dubious sources to some extent, and frequently included unverified stories as facts in their reports. Yet the need for interpreters and translators heightened the risks of this common tendency. Contiguity and cultural proximity did not rule out manipulation and misunderstanding. However, a greater gap in languages and conventions increased the importance of and room for manoeuvre for the intermediaries.

Family relations appear prominently in Tanja Bührer’s discussion of residents, munshis, and wakils in Mughal India. A friend reassured William Kirkpatrick after several career incidents that governor-general Cornwallis wanted to keep him ‘in his family’. Together, William and his brother James served as resident and assistant resident, while the brothers Azizullah and Amanullah acted as their first and second munshi. The juniors, moreover, both succeeded their seniors. Once James Kirkpatrick had become resident in Hyderabad, Azizullah did most of the actual negotiating with Hyderabad ministers, and even used his personal network to influence East India Company decisions. James married an elite local woman, converted to Islam and adopted local customs; upon his death, however, this trans-imperial subject in-the-making left his property to his brother William rather than to his Indian wife.

Status hierarchies and patronage networks stood at the heart of Europe’s société des princes, notwithstanding institutional differentiation and growing professionalism. David Do Paço outlines the succession of office holders related to the networks of Prince Eugene, Anton Wenzel von Kaunitz, and Philipp von Cobenzl. After 1753 and 1779 respectively, Kaunitz and Cobenzl faced the same challenge: ‘to replace the agents without disrupting the system’. They continued the
Vienna-Pera connection but pushed their own clients – a pattern repeated by their successors and extended through marriage alliances. Peter Herbert Rathkeal, with his mixed Irish-Jacobite and Albanian pedigree, his marriage alliance with the noble Collenbach family, and subsequent marriages of his daughters, offers a striking example of the entanglements of personal loyalty, office and family. Perhaps such aspects, characteristic for early modern Europe, were even more persistent where distance and the opacity of information put a premium on personal loyalty.

3. Status, ritual, changeover

Did the revolutionary epoch and the rebuilding of the diplomatic constellation at the Vienna congress fundamentally change the performative ritual aspects of diplomatic exchange? Miloš Vec has plausibly criticised the view that ‘symbolic’ forms were replaced by ‘technical’ procedures, arguing that symbolic and technical aspects persisted from the early modern into the modern age. Yet Vec confirms that the clarification of ranks and seniority of diplomats effected by the Vienna agreements ended the symbolic performance of inequality and underlined the equality of the participants. Negotiations about ‘rangs et séances’, a longstanding major obstacle preceding actual negotiations, were now no longer necessary, or in any case became relatively straightforward.25

Many contributions to this volume show that, in the decades around 1800, European powers profiting from more codified and straightforward diplomatic conventions became increasingly assertive in their contacts with relative outsiders. Tanja Bührer sees the new ‘dictatorial and suspicious environment’ moving to India under governor-general Richard Wellesley (1798–1805).26 Christian Windler underlines that the reconfiguration of European diplomacy contributed to an assertive and bullying posture vis-à-vis outsiders. Boosted by military and economic preponderance, a redefined European universalism became more dominant than any of its predecessors. Equality among the leading European players coexisted with increasingly unequal relationships with ‘uncivilised’ polities and peoples. In 1840, George Staunton, a junior member of the Macartney mission and one of the co-founders of the Royal Asiatic Society (1823), spoke in favour of military action against China.27 In this generation, unequal treaties would be the hallmark of European diplomacy.

Nevertheless, Pascal Firges sketches the reticence and pragmatism that prevailed among the agents of the French revolution and the dignitaries and the Ottoman state: both sides trod carefully. Christian Windler’s careful analysis of the performance of ritual at the court of the Tunisian bey underlines the manoeuvring of all sides. The French accepted a submissive posture because the bey still granted them priority over other Europeans. However, in 1819, when Mahmud Bey of Tunis, upon noticing the idea of reciprocity, suggested sending an agent to Marseille to further Tunisian commerce, his proposal was received coldly: reciprocity was for insiders only. Tanja Bührer cites the Nizam of Hyderabad demanding justice, urging the EIC to fulfil treaty provisions and proposing to send a wakil to London: these initiatives led to a treaty which effectively turned Hyderabad into a protectorate.28 The attempts by major and minor powers to be accepted on their own terms by European governments were doomed. Their best option was to accept, as juniors, the newly confirmed conventions of European diplomacy, a course followed by the Ottomans. Others who chose to send letters or missions noted, to their dismay, that they were not being taken seriously.29

In the seventeenth century, the upstart Dutch Republic obtained honores regii, which most notably included the right to send and receive ambassadors. This promotion would have been unthinkable without the striking military and economic successes of the Republic. Nevertheless, préséance would still follow the age and dignity of titles: the Dutch came behind the kingdoms, and had to battle for their ranking below that supreme level. Moreover, Dutch diplomats, mostly patricians and lesser nobles, were vulnerable in the company of their fellow ambassadors, who
were often scions of leading noble houses. Technically, such inequalities disappeared with the arrangements agreed upon during the Vienna Congress. However, the consolidation of European diplomatic practice left those outside the inner circle of interacting and competing European states on the losing end on two scores: the relative decline of their military power, and Europe’s waxing sense of cultural-racial superiority. The integration of outsiders into the European constellation of equal sovereigns was predicated on the submission of the exotic newcomers.

Did the advent of modernity reduce or even end the symbolic and performative dimensions of diplomacy? Vec reminds us that ‘symbolic’ should never be equated with ‘empty’. Thus, acquiring a royal crown was a major boon for any ruling house. The Prussian ‘Soldier-King’ Frederick-William II, who criticised his father in many respects, grudgingly granted him this key accomplishment. Titles provided the basis for public performance of status during meetings and ceremonies. They strengthened the reputation of princes internally, and allowed their ambassadors to enforce préséance over rivals. Violent clashes conspicuously demonstrated shifting power balances to a wider public, who were unlikely to carefully examine treaty texts. Ceremonial conflict could lead to sabre rattling and public apologies – the Spanish recognition of French préséance following the famous 1661 London clash was broadcast in paintings, prints and medals.

This is all intimately connected to what we would now call ‘credibility’: failing to respond to a slight or threat can be perceived as lack of resolve by friend and foe alike. While diplomacy is now often seen largely in terms of behind-the-scenes negotiation, leaders have emerged as actors in the public arena. We no longer recognize the minutiae characteristics of early modern ceremony, yet modern televised encounters between leaders will involve the situational details of meetings, and greetings and posture will signify power balances and mutual perceptions. Status and credibility remain of immense importance today, and to some extent, they are influenced by the performance of key players and the representation of their actions to the wider world. Modern debates, elections and encounters include oft-repeated conventions of the type we tend to picture as ‘ritual’ in premodern societies. Arguably, the media-circus of the modern world inflates performance and interaction to levels that were unknown in earlier ages.

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Notes

1. Japan fits this description only in part – the first unequal treaties were signed after the show of force by Perry in 1852–1854; after the Meiji restoration the new government sent an ambitious mission to Europe and the United States – and Japan would soon show its own military successes. On rankings and conflicts and the gradual emergence of a tripartite hierarchy in Europe see Milos Vec, ‘Technische gegen symbolische Verfahrensformen? Die Normierung und Ausdifferenzierung der Gesandtenränge nach der juristischen und politischen Literatur des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts’ in Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger (ed), Vormoderne politische Verfahren (ZHF Beiheft 25) (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 559-590; on the term diplomacy and the changes in early modern exchange see Christian Windler, ‘Afterword. From social status to sovereignty — practices of foreign relations from the Renaissance to the Sattelzeit’ in Tracey A. Sowerby/Jan Hennings (ed), Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World c.1410–1800 (London/New York: Routledge 2017), 254-265.

2. See Giorgio Rota, ‘Safavid Envoys in Venice’ in Ralph Kauz/Giorgio Rota/Jan Paul Niederkorn (ed), Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im mittleren Osten in der frühen Neuzeit (Vienna; Verlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2009), 213-249, at 213-15; Willem Floor/Edmund Herzig (ed), Iran and the World in the Safavid Age (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015).

3. Maria Pia Pedani. ‘Ambassadors’ travels from the East to Venice’, Annali di Ca Foscari, 48, 3 (2009), 183-197, at 184 cites 178 Ottoman missions to Venice between 1384 and 1762 to Venice, excluding those sent by provincial authorities. See an extended list in Suna Suner, ‘The General Index of the Ambassadors to and
from the Ottoman Empire’ in Don Juan Archiv Wien online: http://archive.donjuanarchiv.at/go/bot/ (last visited 7 August 2017).

4. Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Publishing Co., 1955).

5. See a recent critique by Isabella Lazzarini, Communication and Conflict. Italian Diplomacy in the Early Renaissance, 1350–1520 (Oxford, 2015), 30-31, 217-218, 372, 549-550, 553 and more generally John Watkins, ‘Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe’, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 38, 1 (2008) 1-14.

6. Elias I. Muhanna, ‘The Sultan’s New Clothes: Ottoman-Mamluk Gift Exchange in the Fifteenth Century’, Muqarnas, xxvii (2010), 189-207.

7. Wheeler M. Thackston (ed), The Jahangirnama: memoirs of Jahangir, Emperor of India (Oxford/New York/Washington: Oxford University Press, 1999) for example on Yadgar Ali at 121-129; 143, 148 etc. On Mughal diplomacy see Naimur R. Farooqi, ‘Diplomacy and Diplomatic Procedure under the Mughals’, The Medieval History Journal, vii (2004) 59-86; Naimur R. Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations: A Study of Political & Diplomatic Relations between Mughal India and the Ottoman Empire, 1556–1748 (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1989).

8. Farooqi, ‘Diplomacy and Diplomatic Procedure’, 66.

9. Joshua A. Fogel, Articulating the Sinosphere. Sino-Japanese Relations in Space and Time (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

10. See David C. Kang, East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), particularly chapter 4 on the tribute system with details on Vietnamese, Korean and Japanese attitudes towards Ming and Qing China; Fogel, Articulating the Sinosphere, includes appendices listing Japanese missions to Tang and Ming China; on Korea see Hae-Jong Chun, ‘Sino-Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch’ing Period’ in John K. Fairbank (ed), The Chinese World Order. Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 90-111. Recent critical revisions of the tributary system: Peter C. Perdue, ‘The Tenacious Tributary System’, Journal of Contemporary China, 24 (2015), 1-13 and Dittmar Schorkowitz/Chia Ning (ed), Managing Frontiers in Qing China: The Lifanyuan and Libu Revisited (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2016).

11. On Birma see Sylvie Pasquet, ‘Quand l’empereur de Chine écrivait à son jeune frère, empereur de Birmanie... Analyse d’une correspondance diplomatique sur “feuilles d’or” (XVIIIe siècle)’, Journal asiatique, 300, 1 (2012), 265-313; on the early Ming and Timur see Ralph Kauz, ‘Hofzeremoniell und Politik bei den Timuriden: die Gesandschaften aus China’ in Kauz/Rota/Niederkorn (ed), Diplomatisches Zeremoniell, 349-365, at p. 364 20, citing twenty missions between early Ming and Timurids.

12. Pierre Henri Durand, ‘Langage bureaucratique et histoire. Variations autour du Grand Conseil et de l’ambassade Macartney’, Études chinoises, 12, 1 (1993), 41-145; terms quoted at 56. I understand these translations can be questioned; but the main point Durand stresses is that leading dignitaries would present Macartney to the Qianlong Emperor as the ‘bringer of tribute’.

13. Schorkowitz/Ning (ed), Managing Frontiers in Qing China.

14. Barbara N. Ramusack, The Indian Princes and Their States (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 53; Munis D. Faruqui, Princes of the Mughal Empire, 1504–1719 (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 239, 244. On vakils/wakils see also in this volume the contribution by Tanja Bührer.

15. Rhoads Murphey, Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty: Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800 (London: Bloomsbury, 2008), 136, 194; Ann Lambton, ‘Pishkash: Present or Tribute?’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 57, 1 (1994), 145-158; see also Kim Siebenhüner, ‘Approaching Diplomatic and Courteous Gift-Giving in Europe and Mughal India’, The Medieval History Journal, 16, 1 (2013), 525-546. See Christian Windler in this volume on the consuls at the court of the Tunisian bey and their tribute paying or ‘free’ gift giving.

16. Gábor Kármán, Lovro Kuncvec (ed), The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013), see particularly the two comments complicating the boundaries between inner and outer tributaries by Sandor Papp, ‘The System of Autonomous Muslim and Christian Communities, Churches, and States in the Ottoman Empire’ (375-419) and by Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, ‘What is Inside and What is Outside? Tributary States in Ottoman Politics’ (421-432).

17. Jeroen Duindam, Vienna and Versailles. The Courts of Europe’s Dynastic Rivals 1550–1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 52.

18. See e.g. André Krischer, Reichsstädte in der Fürstengesellschaft. Politischer Zeichengebrauch in der Frühen Neuzeit (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006); Christina Brauner, ‘Connecting Things. Trading Companies and Diplomatic Gift-Giving on the Gold and Slave Coasts in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, Journal of Early Modern History 20 (2016), 408-428.

19. David Parrott, ‘A prince souverain and the French crown: Charles de Nevers, 1580-1637, in Robert Oresko, et al. (ed.), Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 149-187; Jonathan Spangler, The Society of Princes: The Lorraine-Guise and the Conservation of Power
and Wealth in Seventeenth-Century France (London: Routledge, 2009); on newly promoted princes of the Empire see Thomas Winkelbauer, Fürst und Fürstendiener Gundaker von Liechtenstein, ein österreichischer Aristokrat des konfessionellen Zeitalters (Munich: Oldenbourg/Böhlau, 1999).

20. See e.g. David Christian, ‘Silk Roads or Steppe Roads? The Silk Roads in World History’, Journal of World History, 11 (2000), 1-26; Stephen Kotkin, ‘Mongol Commonwealth? Exchange and Governance across the Post-Mongol Space’, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 8 (2007), 487-531; Christopher I. Beckwith, Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011).

21. E. Natalie Rothman, ‘Dragomans and “Turkish Literature”: The Making of a Field of Inquiry’, Oriente Moderno, 93 (2013), 390-421; for the term trans-imperial subjects: Rothman’s Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

22. See Frédéric Hitzel, ‘L’École des Jeunes de langue de Péra, une école modèle de l’apprentissage des langues orientales?’ in Hasan Anamur et al. (ed), International Colloquium of Translation. Translation in all its aspects with Focus on International Dialogue (Istanbul, 21–23 oct. 2009) (Istanbul, 2009), 224-229.

23. Tanja Bührer, in this volume.

24. David Do Paço, in this volume.

25. Vec, “Technische” gegen “symbolische” Verfahrensformen?.

26. Tanja Bührer, in this volume.

27. See his speech in Corrected Report of the Speech of Sir George Staunton: On Sir James Graham’s Motion on the China Trade, in the House of Commons, April 7, 1840 (London, 1840).

28. Tanja Bührer, in this volume.

29. Michael H. Fisher, ‘Indian Political Representations in Britain during the Transition to Colonialism,’ Modern Asian Studies, 38, 3 (2004), 649-675; Henrietta Harrison, ‘The Qianlong Emperor’s Letter to George III and the Early-Twentieth-Century Origins of Ideas about Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. The Qianlong Emperor’s Letter to George III’, The American Historical Review, 122, 3 (2017), 680-701, concentrating on the anachronistic interpretation of the letter and the exaggeration of the kowtow incident in historiography.

30. Vec, “Technische” gegen “symbolische” Verfahrensformen?; Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, ‘Honores Regii. Die Königswürde Im Zeremoniellen Zeichensystem Der Frühen Neuzeit’ in Johannes Kunisch (ed), Dreihundert Jahre Preußische Königskrone. Eine Tagungsdokumentation (Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, N.F., Beiheft 6) (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 2002), 1-26; Lucien Bély/Géraud Poumarède (ed), L’incident diplomatique (XVIe–XVIIIe siècle) (Paris: Éditions A. Pedone, 2010).

31. Text on Jean Mauger’s 1662 medal: jus praecedendi assertum./hispanorum excusatio coram xxx. leg. pr. m.dc.lxii.

32. On the public role of monarchs in the nineteenth century see Johannes Paulmann, Pomp und Politik: Monarchenbegegnungen in Europa zwischen Ancien Régime und Erstem Weltkrieg (Paderborn/München: F. Schöningh Verlag, 2000); on ‘secret’ diplomacy and the role of public opinion and public encounters, see e.g. the brief but succinct introduction by Gordon Craig/Alexander George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); on symbolic and performative aspects in modern international relations see e.g. Naoko Shimazu, ‘Diplomacy As Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955’, Modern Asian Studies, 48,1 (2014), 225-252.

ORCID

Jeroen Duindam http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7175-5545