RELIGIOUS THOUGHTS AND PRACTICES OF THE KAUM MENAK:
STRENGTHENING TRADITIONAL POWER

Nina Herlina Lubis

ISLAMIC BANKING IN MALAYSIA:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

Joni Tamkin Borhan

VIOLENCE UNDER THE BANNER OF RELIGION:
THE CASE OF LASKAR JIHAD AND LASKAR KRISTUS

Sukidi Mulyadi

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Sukidi Mulyadi

Violence under the Banner of Religion:1
The Case of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus

Abstraksi: Gerakan kekerasan atas nama agama telah berkembang menjadi satu fenomena penting di Indonesia belakangan ini. Kasus kerusuhan Situbondo, Jawa Timur pada 1996, disusul kemudian kasus Tasikmalaya dan selanjutnya Ketapang di Nusa Tenggara Timur pada 1998, merupakan bukti dari kondisi demikian. Dalam rentang waktu yang tidak lama, sejumlah organisasi sosial-keagamaan tampil dengan agenda pemikiran dan gerakan yang mengambil cara-cara yang bisa disebut radikal. Perkembangan ini berlangsung makin kuat menyusul perubahan sistem sosial-politik yang mendasar di Indonesia. Suasana politik tidak menentu menyusul jatuhnya rezim Orde Baru pada 1999 telah memberi ruang makin lebar bagi gerakan-gerakan keagamaan radikal untuk berkembang di Indonesia.

Artikel ini menghadirkan kajian tentang dua contoh kasus tindakan kekerasan yang mengatasnamakan agama. Kedua contoh kasus tersebut adalah Laskar Jihad dan Laskar Kristus. Di samping mewakili kekerasan atas nama agama, kedua laskar tersebut sama-sama terlibat konflik di Ambon, Maluku. Atas nama agama, Islam dan Kristen, anggota kedua laskar tersebut bahkan terlibat dalam tragedi kemanusiaan yang menewaskan ratusan bahkan ribuan umat manusia di Ambon. Meski bukan satu-satunya faktor, melalui kedua laskar tersebut agama telah mampu memberikan sumbangan untuk memperbesar volume dan akselerasi kekerasan dan konflik sosial di Indonesia.

Laskar Jihad berdiri pada 30 Januari 2000, sebagai respon terhadap konflik yang melibatkan Muslim dan Kristen di Ambon sejak 1999. Laskar Jihad merupakan bagian atau sayap paramiliter dari Forum Komunikasi Ahlusunnah Wal-Jama'ah (FKAWJ), yang telah berdiri sejak 1998. Jafar Umar Thalib, ketua FAKAWJ, sengaja mendirikan Laskar Jihad sebagai wujud kepedulian terhadap nasib umat Islam yang menghadapi kekerasan oleh kaum Kristen di Ambon. Jafar Umar Thalib juga sekaligus bertindak sebagai komandan Laskar Jihad yang memimpin perjuangan para anggotanya di medan konflik. Didorong sentimen keagamaan sesama Muslim,
Jafar Umar Thalib berpandangan bahwa membantu Muslim di Ambon merupakan kewajiban, dan perjuangan di sana dimaknai sebagai jihad melawan kekuatan non-Islam.

Oleh karena itu, aspek keagamaan secara dominan mewarnai anggota Laskar Jihad, di samping tentu saja keterampilan militer. Jafar Umar Thalib senantiasa menekankan bahwa keberangkatan anggota Laskar Jihad untuk membantu Muslim di Ambon merupakan bagian dari tugas melawan kekuatan kafir. Dalam kerangka itulah, dia kemudian meminta fatwa pada sejumlah ulama di Timur Tengah guna memberi legitimasi keagamaan bagi perjuangan Laskar Jihad. Dan sejumlah ulama secara tegas memang mendukung langkah Jafar Umar Thalib dengan Laskar Jihad-nya. Tercatat setidaknya tujuh orang mufti dari Timur Tengah, tepatnya Saudi Arabia, yang telah mengeluarkan fatwa untuk berperang melawan kaum kafir di Ambon.

Bersamaan dengan itu, dari pihak kaum Kristen juga berdiri Laskar Kristus. Sebagaimana halnya Laskar Jihad, Laskar Kristus juga menggunakan simbol-simbol keagamaan untuk perjuangan mereka berperang melawan kaum Muslim. Laskar Kristus didirikan pada 1998, dua tahun sebelum Laskar Jihad. Diasumsikan, Laskar Kristus memiliki hubungan erat dengan—kalau tidak dikatakan berasal dari—Geraja Petra, tepatnya ketika ia mengorganisir Gerakan Maluku Berdo’a (GMB). Kegiatan itu dilakukan sebagai langkah penyelamatan terhadap nasib rakyat Maluku yang mulai terlibat konflik dan kekerasan dengan kaum Muslim. Dengan demikian, Laskar Kristus didirikan dalam rangka untuk membela iman Kristiani. Seperti halnya Laskar Jihad, maka laskar Kristus juga memahami peperangan dengan kaum Muslim sebagai memiliki makna keagamaan; bahwa ia merupakan satu panggilan agama. Oleh karena itu, segala bentuk tindak kekerasan—baik termasuk membunuh pihak Muslim—bukan hanya diperbolehkan secara agama, tapi bahkan dipahami sebagai tugas suci yang diperintahkan Tuhan.

Demikianlah, oleh beberapa kalangan, Laskar Jihad dan Laskar Kristus dianggap sebagai salah satu bentuk paling jelas dari upaya menjadikan agama sebagai landasan untuk tindak kekerasan. Baik para anggota Laskar Jihad maupun Laskar Kristus mendefinisikan mereka sebagai bagian dari komunitas keagamaan masing-masing. Begitu pula mereka pada saat yang sama menganggap komunitas agama lain sebagai “yang lain” (the other), yang sah diperangi dan juga dibunuh. Dipahami dalam kerangka demikian, sebagaimana diturunkan artikel ini, pada sejumlah bukti bahwa baik Laskar Jihad maupun Laskar Kristus telah menjadikan konflik dan kekerasan sebagai bagian tradisi yang memiliki makna keagamaan. Yang mengkhawatirkan, tradisi kekerasan seperti itu mulai diterunkan kepada generasi muda. Kedua laskar tersebut sama-sama melibatkan anak kecil dalam konflik dan tindak kekerasan atas nama agama.
Sukidi Mulyadi

Violence under the Banner of Religion: The Case of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus

EXPLANATION: The movements that use violence as a means of religiosity, commonly known as Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus, have become prominent in Indonesia. In 1996, they were part of a series of events involving religious conflicts in North Sumatra (Tasikmalaya) and East Java (Ketapang). Additionally, similar incidents took place in Nusa Tenggara Barat and East Nusa Tenggara.

This paper aims to analyze the religious movements that use violence as a means of religiosity. The study examines the cases of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus, which have become prominent in Indonesia. The authors discuss the historical context and the factors that have contributed to the rise of these movements.

The paper argues that the use of violence by religious movements is not limited to Indonesia but is a global phenomenon. The authors also consider the impact of religious movements on the political landscape of Indonesia and the world.

In conclusion, the authors suggest that the use of violence by religious movements is a complex issue that requires a multidisciplinary approach. The study provides a comprehensive analysis of the historical context and the factors that have contributed to the rise of these movements.

77 Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003
التي سبق أن أنشئت في 1998 م، وكان رئيس هذه الجمعية Wal-Jama'ah/FKAWJ) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) وهو جعفر عمر طالب (Ja'far Umar Thalib) هو...
Brief History of Religion and Violence

In the course of its history, religion has had a dual function in plural societies. Many scholars and religious leaders agree that religion has had a role in fostering peace, harmony and civility. However, other scholars see religion as a source of conflict and violence. The latter view is supported by numerous incidents of religious violence around the world. The work of Juergensmeyer, for example, clearly shows how violence has occurred and spread under the banners of all religions. In his introduction, Juergensmeyer writes:

The first half of the book contains chapters on Christians in America who supported abortion clinic bombings and militia actions such as the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building; Catholics and Protestants who justified acts of terrorism in Northern Ireland; Muslims associated with the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and Hamas attacks in the Middle East; Jews who supported the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the attack on Hebron’s Tomb of the Patriarchs; Sikhs identified with the killing of India’s prime minister Indira Gandhi and Punjab’s chief minister Beant Singh; and the Japanese Buddhists affiliated with the group accused of the nerve gas attack in Tokyo’s subway.2

This latest publication of the Concilium series, Religion as a Source of Violence, also confronts the issue of violence under the banner of religion by reference to cases of religious conflict in Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Bosnia, and Guatemala.3 Many other scholars, such as Rene Girard (1973),4 Bruce Lawrence (1989),5 Regina Schwartz (1997),6 have recognized the link between violence and religion.

The classic argument against violence under the banner of religion is that all religions hold sacred doctrines of non-violence and support for peace. Therefore, when religious violence takes place, the leaders often rhetorically refer to religious militants as the cause of these acts of violence. After analyzing many cases of religious violence, I assert that these two hypotheses above should be reexamined through violent aspects in religious doctrines and the abuse of religious doctrines by religious militants to justify violence. Both potentially cause violence. The first indicates a contribution of religion to the acts of violence and the latter refers to a culture of violence created by religious militants. To this end, and for specificity, I will carry out an analysis of religious violence in Indonesia.

Since 1996, violence under the banner of religion has been increasing in Indonesia. Besides small-scale religious violence, such

* STUDIA ISLAMIKA, VOL. 10, NO. 2, 2003
as that Situbondo, East Java (1996), Tasikmalaya, West Java (1996), and Ketapang, Jakarta (1998), much larger-scale religious violence between Muslims and Christians began on January 19, 1999, in Ambon, Maluku. The original cause of this conflict was a disagreement between a young Muslim from the village of Batumerah and a young Christian from the village of Mardika over the fare on a public minibus. However, it deteriorated into a mass conflict between hundreds of youths from the two villages and spread to damaging churches and mosques in the neighborhood.

The emergence of Laskar Jihad (the Jihad Paramilitary Force) was basically in response to the religious violence in Maluku. As I will describe below in more specific terms, Laskar Jihad clearly shows how Islamic paramilitary groups used religious doctrines to justify violence against Christians in Ambon. The emergence of Laskar Kristus (the Army of Christ in Ambon) came from the Petra Church and held a sacred mission to fight Muslims under the banner of Christ. Therefore, both Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus claimed the same mission: to fight one another under the banner of religion. It is interesting to see how Laskar Jihad, on the one hand, and Laskar Kristus, on the other, both use and regulate violence in the name of religious doctrines. Do religious doctrines support violence? Who masterminds a religious decree of violence? Do both of the Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus warriors actually show the same culture of violence from different religions? This paper will deal with these issues. I will first describe Laskar Jihad and then explain the rise of Laskar Kristus.

Laskar Jihad

Historical Background:

The Rise of Ja’far Umar Thalib and Laskar Jihad

Laskar Jihad was formed on January 30, 2000, specifically in response to religious violence between Muslims and Christians in Maluku. It is the paramilitary wing of the Sunni Communication Forum (the Forum Komunikasi Ahl al-Sunnah Wa al-jama’ah, FAKAJ) that was established two years earlier. The FAKAJ was formally established by the founder of Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar Thalib (40), when he and his followers held an important religious meeting (tabligh akbar) in Solo, Central Java, on February 14, 1998. The core mission of the FAKAJ was essentially to purify and spread Islam in terms of the beliefs of the first generation of followers of the
Prophet Muhammad. Robert W. Hefner called the FKAWJ and the Laskar Jihad movement a:

neo-fundamentalist or neo-Salafy, because it emphasizes extreme political views not associated with earlier variants of Salafism, including those still popular in Saudi Arabia. One such emphasis is the firm belief that the United States and Israel are leading a world-wide conspiracy to destroy Islam and the response by Muslims to this effort must be armed jihad."

As I will describe below, Thalib accused the United States, Israel, and Christians in general of being the mastermind behind religious violence in Ambon.

As a paramilitary wing of the FKAWJ, Laskar Jihad mirrors the formal structure of the Indonesian military, consisting of ‘brigades, battalions, companies, platoons, and teams, and it even has its own intelligence services.’ Appointed as a commander-in-chief of Laskar Jihad, Thalib was supported by a number of field commanders, including Ali Fauzi and Abu Bakar Wahid al-Banjari. Ja’far Umar Thalib is a central figure in designing the strategy of the Laskar Jihad movement. His religious background, as will be seen, clearly supports Islamic radical movements that became characteristic of Laskar Jihad. Born in Malang, East Java, in December 1961, Thalib is of Arab descent. His father, Umar Thalib, is known not only as a religious preacher from Yemen who initially came to Indonesia for business reasons, but also as an activist in the Islamic movement, known as the al-Irsyad movement in Malang. Unlike his wife, Badriyah Saleh, Umar Thalib, a veteran of the “November 10th War” in Surabaya, supported a strong military education for Ja’far Umar Thalib. When recalling his upbringing, Thalib stated, “study of the Arabic language with my father was similar to heavy-weight boxing.”

After finishing his formal education in Religious Teacher Education (Pendidikan Guru Agama, PGA) in Malang, 1981, Thalib continued his study at the Persis Islamic School in Bangil, East Java. However, he was unhappy with the school’s direction and decided to move to Jakarta. In 1983, he resumed his studies at the Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA), an institute funded by the government of Saudi Arabia. While a student at LIPIA, Thalib was a prominent activist and became a leader of the al-Irsyad student organization, which strongly opposed the ideology
of Pancasila. He only studied at the LIPIA for three years, failing to finish his program of study because of a dispute with his teacher. Awarded a scholarship by the Indonesian Council for Islamic Proselytism (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII), he continued his studies at the Maududi Institute in Lahore, Pakistan, beginning in 1986. After arriving in Peshawar, Thalib quickly realized that his knowledge on Islamic Salafy up to that point was very limited. In this region, Thalib had many friends from the younger generation of the Salafy movement who came from Suriah. He also learned of and read widely about the religious thought of Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt, and its leading figure of radical-Salafy, Sayyid Qutb. Thalib said, "I was really very impressed because I was an admirer of Sayyid Qutb before." He did not finish the program at the Maududi Institute in Lahore, Pakistan, again due to disagreements with his lecturer. He decided to fight in the war in Afghanistan in 1987, under the financial aegis of the Muslim World League (Rabithatul Alam al-Islami). "My struggle is merely based on Islamic solidarity," Thalib said of his fighting against the Soviet Union. He added, "I am the only Muslim who is concerned with their struggle in fighting against the Soviet invasion, and thus I decided to join the fighting in the Afghanistan war." In Afghanistan, as Hefner recorded,

Thalib met briefly with Osama Bin Laden. However, Thalib opted to join with a faction of the mujahidin with ties to a strict Salafy organization known as the Jama’at al-Da’wa ila al-Qur’an wa Ahlá’l Hadith. This Saudi-based organization is famous for, among other things, instructing its followers that rulers who fail to implement Islamic law are apostates and must be overthrown.

After returning to Indonesia in 1989, Thalib received a new religious mandate to improve the Al-Irsyad Islamic School in Salatiga, Central Java. He then left in 1991 to travel through the Middle East, where he broadened his insights on Salafy teachings from the great Salafy teacher, Syaikh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i in Dammaz in North Yemen. Syaikh Muqbil is well-known "for his connection with the conservative Islamist Islah party and the Saudi-funded Salafy-Wahhabi movement in Yemen." Hasan recorded:

During the pilgrimage (hajj) months, Thalib repeatedly went to Mecca and Medina to perform the hajj. While performing the hajj, he sought out and attended religious lectures held by a number of prominent Saudi

Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003
Violence under the Banner of Religion

Salafi-Wahhabi teachers, including Muhammad Nasr al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999) and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Abd Allah bin Baz (1912-1999).25

After returning to Indonesia in 1993, Thalib founded the Ihyā al-Sunnah Islamic Boarding School (Pesantren Ihyā al-Sunnah), located about 12 miles north of the Yogyakarta.26 In the school (pesantren), he spent a lot of time teaching Salafi doctrines, such as al-Uṣūl al-Ṣalāḥah and Syarḥ Kītb al-Tauḥīd, written by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhāb and al-‘Aqīdah al-Wasāḥiyah, written by Imām Ibn Taimiyah.27

Based on Thalib’s long historical background and his connection with the Salafi-Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia, his position as Salafi, or ‘Neo-Salafi’ in terms of Hefner’s category, is quite clear. An Indonesian Islamic historian at the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta, Azyumardi Azra, called this movement a ‘radicalization of radical-Salafi.’28 Azra uses this term for those who commit acts of violence and terrorism based on the concept or ideology that is commonly referred to as radical-Salafi.29

As I will describe below, Laskar Jihad’s connection with the radical-Salafi movement in Saudi Arabia contributed to the issue of a religious decree of jihad against Christians in Maluku. This connection can be traced to the establishment of Laskar Jihad in response to religious violence in Maluku. As International Crisis Group reported, ‘the massacre by Christians of over 400 Muslims at Tobelo in North Maluku during the last week of December, 1999, had enflamed Muslim sentiment throughout Indonesia.’30

On Thursday, April 6, 2000, six representatives of Laskar Jihad, including Ja’far Umar Thalib; vice-commander Ayip Syafrudin; brigadier general (ret). Rustam; the Ambon war commander Ali Fauzi; the Tidore war commander Abu Bakar al-Banjari and Tasrif Tuasikal were received by President Abdurrahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur) at the Merdeka palace.31 This group conveyed their harsh criticism of the President’s policy regarding the Maluku crisis and the idea of revoking TAP MPR S XXV/1996.32 While Gus Dur and the six representatives talked about the issues of the Ambon conflict, hundreds of the Laskar Jihad warriors demonstrated in front of the Merdeka palace.33 In mobilizing the Laskar Jihad warriors, Greg Fealy recorded that Thalib said,

I was merely doing my duty as a Muslim, because clearly the Abdurrahman Wahid government is unable or unwilling to protect the

Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003
Sukti Mulyadi

Islamic community. If the state can’t protect us (i.e. Muslims), then we must do it ourselves. He maintains that Wahid’s government is anti-Islamic: It is positioned to oppress Muslim interests and protect those of the infidels. FKAWI is committed to bringing it down.34

Laskar Jihad officials believed that Muslims in Ambon were getting the worst treatment and Thalib then coordinated and arranged for volunteers at a training camp near Bogor, West Java.35 The Laskar Jihad warriors trained in the camp numbered approximately 3,000, and Thalib said in his speech that in the second session, around 7,000 warriors would be trained to be sent to Maluku in the future.36 Thalib explained that the Laskar Jihad warriors would be trained by former members of the student regiment (resimen mahasiswa) from many universities in Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Bogor. He emphasized repeatedly that there was no Indonesian military involved in this training.37 In other interviews conducted by Budyono, a reporter for a web site in Jakarta, Thalib added that trainers also came from Afghanistan, Moro and Kashmir.38

In response to this plan, President Wahid prohibited paramilitary training, ordered their camp closed and prevented the Laskar Jihad warriors from traveling to Maluku. Unfortunately, Thalib had sent several thousand the Laskar Jihad warriors to Maluku shortly after April 2000.39 In his interview with The Jakarta Post, Thalib said:

Some 3,000 initial volunteers will go to Maluku (soon). Yet, our volunteers are basically religious preachers, armed with religious knowledge to preach to locals. An investigation team I chaired revealed recently that Muslims in Maluku are not only subject to physical suffering but also to spiritual suffering because of their lack of religious understanding. Spiritually, they have no idea how to overcome their problems. Based on this, and also because most Muslims’ solidarity movements for Maluku are focused more on handling the physical side of the problems, we decided to send preachers along with donations.40

Before traveling to Maluku, the Laskar Jihad warriors met at the Pesantren As-Sunnah on Jalan Kaliurang Km 15, Yogyakarta. Soon after final preparation, they traveled to Surabaya and boarded a ship for Maluku.41 Amazingly, when The Laskar Jihad warriors arrived at the port of Maluku, their arrival in the Jihad battlefield were greeted friendly by military men, who provided a number of military weapons, such as AK-47s, SS-14s, and so forth.42 The arrival of the Laskar Jihad warriors, therefore, escalated the religious conflict between Muslims and Christians in Ambon.

Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003
Evidence can be found suggesting the involvement of children in the Maluku war was a direct consequence of the Laskar Jihad warriors. These child warriors are known as *Acang*, a nickname for Hasan affiliated with an Islamic identity. Hasan Abdurrahman, an 8-year-old, wanted to join Laskar Jihad, *(Beta ingin jadi Laskar Jihad).* His hero is neither Superman nor Batman, but rather Ja'far Umar Thalib. In addition to Hasan, 14-year-old Ridwan Zaky had just returned from the Ambon war. In the village of Batumerah Dalam, Sirimau, Ambon, Ridwan was a member of the white warriors [*Pasukan Putih*], who fought alongside Islamic warriors. He told a reporter of Gatra, an Indonesian weekly magazine, that “I have become a ‘burn warrior’ *(Beta masuk Pasukan Bakar-bakar).*” This meant that his duty was to burn everything owned by his enemy. Muslims of all ages in Ambon know the story of Syamsul Bahri Sarfan. Fifteen-year-old Syamsul stood in the front-line during the Ambon war, wearing a red T-shirt with an inscription of verses of the Qur'an. Ask any Muslim in Ambon, adult or child, who became commander-in-chief of the child warriors, and they will answer, “Syam!” I will later explore how the involvement of children in the Maluku war as a direct consequence of Laskar Jihad became a means of transmission of a culture of violence in their everyday life.

**Religious Decree of Jihad**

Who became the mastermind of the religious decree of jihad in the Maluku war? Before fighting against Christians in Maluku, the Laskar Jihad warriors had been instructed with seven religious decrees (*fatwâs*) that were issued by the FKAWS. FKAWS itself received these religious decrees of jihad from seven religious scholars (*muftîs*). This was a result of the *salafi*-network between Thalib as the leader of the FKAWS and “*salafi-muftî*” from Saudi Arabia.

The first *muftî* was Shaikh Abdul Mukhsin al-'Abbâd, a Medina Salafy *muftî* and expert on *hadîth* of the Prophet of Muhammad. He instructed Muslims to go to Maluku in order to defend the Muslim brothers, so they are lawful in the name of Islamic law. To participate in Jihad, he required two conditions: traveling to Maluku should not be harmful to Muslims themselves and their position should be defensive, not offensive. His religious decree of jihad was based on the *hadîth* of the Prophet Muhammad, “Those who die defending..."
their wealth, shall be considered as martyrs. Those who die defending themselves, shall be considered as martyrs."51

The second mufti was Shaikh Ahmad An-Najmi, a member of Haiah Kibār al-`Ullamā’ al-Su‘ūdiyyah in Jizan, Saudi Arabia. He stated that an important obligation for Muslims is to help other oppressed Muslims. He added, "if you don't have a Muslim leader amongst holy war warriors, you must choose one to become a temporary leader in the battlefield."52

The third mufti was Shaikh Muqbil bin Hādi al-Wadi’i, a famous salafi-mufti in Yemen. He believed Indonesian Muslims had an individual obligation (wajib ‘ain) to help their Muslim brothers in the Maluku war and all Muslims had a collective obligation to do the same.53 For the jihad in Maluku, he noted six requirements: (1) Muslims have the capability of waging jihad against the infidels; (2) the Muslim capability of waging jihad does not cause conflict among Muslims themselves; (3) the capability of having Muslims in the battlefield is based purely on the intention of Allah; (4) Jihad must be based on the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad; (5) Jihad doesn’t divert Muslims from learning straightforward Islamic religion; (6) Jihad is not applied by Muslims to gain any political position or to get personal interest in this world.54

The fourth mufti was Shaikh Râbi’ bin Hādi al-Madkholi, a famous Salafy mufti who lives in Mekkah. His religious decree of Jihad was more obvious: he stated that it is an obligation of every Muslim to go to the Maluku war, since Muslim brothers were being attacked by Christians.55 This is a form of Jihad required of every Muslim who is being attacked for religious reasons.56

The fifth mufti, Shaikh Šālih al-Suhaimi, was a Salafy mufti in Medina. First, he said, "you should hold onto the methodology of salafi (manhaj salafi), and preach steadily to the Muslim community. If you can help Muslim brothers who were attacked by enemies, you must do it."57 In connection to the order of Jihad, he issued a religious decree of jihad stating, "jihad in the conflict area is compulsory for Muslims if they have a sufficient force to carry this out. If you don’t have sufficient force, you should strive for a peaceful agreement against the infidel (kāfir) like what the Prophet Muhammad did against an unbeliever (musyrik)."58

Shaikh Wahid al-Jabiri, the sixth mufti, was a Salafy mufti in Medina. He stated, "to defend Muslim brothers who are attacked by their enemies is lawful in the name of Islamic law. But, as to the
way to help the Muslim brothers in the battlefield, you should consider and discuss with religious leaders because you have better understanding than me about what really happens in your own country."59

The last mufti was Shaikh Muhammad bin Hādi al-Madkhālī. He is a Salafy mufti in Medina, Saudi Arabia. His religious decree of jihad was quite obvious. He stated that the three previous steps, including the religious meeting (tabligh akbar), the meeting with President Abdurrahman Wahid, and the paramilitary training near Bogor, were the right course of action. The prohibition of jihad in Ambon by President Abdurrahman Wahid was judged unlawful. He quotes a hadith of the Prophet Muhammad to justify his fatwa, "It is not permitted to comply with someone whom rebels against God."60

Based on these religious decrees, Thalib declared jihad in the Maluku war against Christians, who had attacked over 400 Muslims. The use of jihad to justify violence against the enemy began by labeling and stereotyping them as "the outsiders" who must be killed under the banner of religion.

**Islamic Justification for Violence: Defining Christians as "the Outsiders"**

In supporting a religious decree of jihad against Christians in Maluku, Thalib proclaimed the year 1421 of the Islamic Calendar (Hijriah) as "The Year of Jihad." Thalib has noted, "the declaration of the Year of Jihad shows our feeling of solidarity towards the human tragedy which befell the Muslims in Maluku."61 That is why jihad in Ambon, from Thalib’s point of view, became a duty for every Muslim. He quotes Ibn Taymiyah, one of the great Islamic teachers in the salafi-movement as saying, "should our enemy attack Muslims, to confront the attack would be an obligation incumbent on the Muslims who are being attacked and it would be compulsory for other Muslims to help them."62

To ensure a successful jihad against Christians in Maluku, Thalib began to define the Christians as "the outsiders" and "the enemies" that must be fought under the banner of Islam.

In an interview with Robert W. Hefner in August 2001, Thalib first emphasized jihad as a means to 'ensure that unbelievers understand that their proper status in society must be that of protected minorities (dhimmī). A concept from classical Islamic

*Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003*
tradition, dhimmihood stipulates that non-Muslims not be allowed to exercise authority over Muslims.\textsuperscript{63} As Hefner suggests, 'unlike most of the Indonesian Muslim leadership, Ja'far makes clear that he believes that the equal citizenship sanctioned by the Indonesian constitution is utterly antithetical to Islam.'\textsuperscript{64}

Thalib also labeled Christians who were attacking Muslims in Maluku as "belligerent infidels (kāfir ḥarbi)."\textsuperscript{65} Labeling based on religious doctrines was very important in the struggle of the Laskar Jihad warriors. It would become clear that the process of prejudice and negative labeling of Christians as "the outsiders" contributed to the conflict and violence. As Greg Fealy noted, 'kāfir ḥarbi are seen as the most dangerous category of unbelievers and Islamic law obliges Muslims to wage war against them. In the case of Laskar Jihad, the constructing and labeling of Christians as kāfir ḥarbi gave a powerful religious license to kill.'\textsuperscript{66}

It is clear that religious doctrines were used by Thalib and his Laskar Jihad for two purposes: First, to justify acts of violence against Christians; and second, to support belief that the Laskar Jihad warriors who died in the Maluku war against kāfir ḥarbi would die as martyrs. The religious doctrine of martyrdom has encouraged the Laskar Jihad warriors to fight against Christians in Ambon. During an interview with one applicant of the Laskar Jihad volunteers, Hasan recounted, "the war in the Moluccas provides a golden opportunity to become a martyr, one who can look forward to being welcomed in heaven by angels. The Laskar Jihad fighters believe it is the time to conduct al-jihād al-akbar, the true Islamic jihad."\textsuperscript{67}

In the \textit{Bulletin of Laskar Jihad}, each martyr was portrayed in every edition. For example, one of the Laskar Jihad warriors, Abu Ulin, left his family to join the Laskar Jihad warriors in the Maluku war.\textsuperscript{65} In September 2000, his group was sent to the region of Suli to help Muslims fighting against Christians and the Republic of South Maluku (\textit{Republik Maluku Selatan}, RMS).\textsuperscript{69} He died in the Maluku war on September 19, 2000.\textsuperscript{70} Ulin was revered as a martyr who sacrificed his wealth and himself in struggling for and defending Islam.\textsuperscript{71} Another profiled martyr was Amin Susilo (31), a young man from Sragen, Central Java.\textsuperscript{72} At the end of September 2000, Muslims and Christians clashed in the village of Kelapa Dua, West Seram.\textsuperscript{73} Susilo died on the battlefield on September 27, 2000. Laskar Jihad believed that Susilo died as a martyr and there would be no

\textit{Studia Islamika}, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003
reward for him except heaven’s reward the next day.24 Being a martyr, from Laskar Jihad’s point of view, is lawful in the name of Islam. God would honor that standing in the after life.

This argument is similar to the confession of Abdul Aziz, known as Imam Samudra, one of the masterminds of the Bali bombing in Kuta, Bali, on October 12, 2002. Following the interrogation of Imam Samudra, the head of Indonesia’s detective division, Erwin Mappaseng, said that Samudra’s primary motivation in carrying out the bombings in Bali and other places in Indonesia was based purely on the Jihad.25 Samudra really wanted to wage jihad himself and told Iqbal, the man who carried the bomb into Paddy’s Club, that he would die as a martyr.26 Samudra even named the bomb a “martyr bomb.”27 These examples show how religious doctrines were abused and hijacked by radical Muslims, both the Laskar Jihad warriors and Imam Samudra himself, to justify acts of violence and war.

Finally, Thalib argues that Christians and the International community conspired to destroy the Muslim community in Maluku. He quotes the Qur’anic verse, “the Jews and Christians will never accomplish their mission until you (Muslims) follow their religion.”28 This statement clearly exhorts the Laskar Jihad warriors to fight against Christians in Maluku. Let me quote part of the text of Thalib’s declaration of war against Christians and the International conspiracy in Maluku:

.Listen, you accomplices of the United States. Listen, you accomplices of the World Church Council. Listen, you accomplices of Zionist evangelists. Listen, you Jews and Christians: We Muslims are inviting the US military to prove its power in Moluccas. Let us fight to the finish. Let us prove for the umpteenth time that the Muslim faithful cannot be conquered by over-exaggerated physical power.29

Thalib obviously believed that an international conspiracy was involved in destroying the Muslim community in Maluku and he based resistance against Christians and this International conspiracy on religious doctrines. Thalib uses religious sentiments against other religions to perpetuate hostility and violence. His religious words and those of Laskar Jihad are full of hatred and hostility that intrinsically lead to acts of violence.

Reading the above statements by Thalib and his Laskar Jihad shows how they often use Islamic doctrines as the basis for Islamic Jihad against Christians and other, perceived enemies. Moreover,

*Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003*
Thalib and his Laskar Jihad combined the language of otherness to portray Christians as outsiders and enemies, and fought against them and the West under the banner of Islam, which were identified by Regina Schwartz (1997) as acts of violence. In her book, *The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism*, Schwartz locates 'the origins of violence in identity formation, arguing that imagining identity as an act of distinguishing and separating from others, of boundary making and line drawing, is the most frequent and fundamental act of violence.' She argues that 'violence is not only what we do to the Other. It is prior to that. Violence is the very construction of the Other.' In the case of Laskar Jihad, violence is not only that Laskar Jihad fought against Christians in Maluku under the banner of Islam, but also includes the construction of 'the Other' as the kāfir dzimmī, kāfir ḥarbi, and other stereotypes.

**Closure of the FKAWJ and the Laskar Jihad**

The above conclusion is paralleled with the closure of the FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad. After an initial meeting between September 30 and October 2, 2002, followed by a second meeting between October 3 and 5, 2002, the executive board of the FKAWJ decided to disband the FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad based on the following considerations:

First, the primary goal of establishing the FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad was to wage Jihad in Maluku, based on the Qur'an, Sunnah and religious decrees from Salafy mufti.

Second, in waging Jihad, the FKAWJ and its Laskar Jihad always attempted to evaluate and correct themselves as advised and suggested by Salafy mufti.

Third, in assessing the Jihad, it appears weaknesses and a lack of ability of the FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad slowly resulted in some mistakes or deviations (my bold italics) from methodology and morality.

Fourth, we repent to Allah all our mistakes, deviations and errors (my bold italics) that made us fall in these situations.

Reading the above considerations, the acknowledgment of mistakes, deviations and errors written and released by the FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad prove the main thesis of violence of the Laskar Jihad warriors under the banner of Islam.

It is also important to consider the admission of Ahmadi, a member of Laskar Jihad. He stated that the closure of the FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad came because of a religious decree issued by
Syaikh Muqbil bin Hadi Al-Wadi’i in Saudi Arabia. Muqbil is one of the seven religious scholars (mufti) who issued the religious decree of Jihad in Ambon. According to Muqbil, there was not sufficient reason to wage jihad in Ambon. FAKWJ and Laskar Jihad officials discussed this religious decree and decided to disband Laskar Jihad. This information shows clearly the radical-Salafy connection between FAKWJ-Laskar Jihad in Indonesia and salafi-mufti in Saudi Arabia.

**Laskar Kristus**

*Historical Background*

Information on the rise of Laskar Kristus (the Army of Christ) can be found in the Presidential Decree (*Keputusan Presiden*, No. 38/2002) concerning the Establishment of the National Independent Investigation Team for the Maluku Conflict (*Pembentukan Tim Penyelidik Independen Nasional untuk Konflik Maluku*). This team, headed by I Wayan Karya, was required to investigate, among other things, the incident that occurred on January 19, 1999, the Maluku Sovereign Front (Front Kedaulatan Maluku), Republic of South Maluku (*Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS*), Christian Republic of South Maluku (*Kristen RMS*), Laskar Jihad, *Laskar Kristus*, coercive religious conversion and human rights violations.

*Tabloid Adil*, a journal in Jakarta, reported the story of Laskar Kristus from Petra Church in Maluku. After witnessing religious violence between Muslims and Christians in Ambon, the Petra Church organized the Maluku Prayer Movement (*Gerakan Maluku Berdo’a, GMB*) as part of the Church community’s response to the safety of people in Maluku. On Friday, November 9, 2001, religious services of GMB consisted of baptizing a member of Laskar Kristus. The priest delivered a sermon entitled: “To Become a Model of Faith, You Should Be Loyal Unto Death” (*Menjadi Pahlawan Iman, Hendaklah Engkau Setia Sampai Mati*). According to Ahmad Mansur Suryanegara, a historian at the University of Padjajaran, Bandung, West Java, Christian here refers to Protestant.

Laskar Kristus was established in April, 1998. According to Thamrin Amal Tomagola, a sociologist at the University of Indonesia [UI], Laskar Kristus was already in existence before the outbreak of religious violence in Ambon on January 19, 1999. This information supports the observations of the Rev. Willem
Hekman, a Protestant pastor who visited Ambon with a friend, Daniel from November 28 to December 2, 1999. Pastor Hekman described his visit:

The morning of December 1, 1999 at 10 a.m. Daniel and I had the privilege to meet with and encourage about 100 Christian leaders who had gathered in the Salvation Army Church in Ambon. First Daniel shared and then I shared from Colossians, Chapter 1. It was a privilege to meet with these servants of God who are going through much suffering and to encourage them to be steadfast and not loose their faith in the Lord. We had a wonderful season of prayer at the close of the service. Nearly all rose to their feet to make a full surrender to the Lord Jesus Christ. Pastor Arnold led the prayer of dedication of these God’s choice servants from the Protestant churches, Baptist, Pentecostal, Bethel Church, Salvation Army and others. Praise the Name of the Lord.

The above information proves the existence of the Salvation Army Church before the outbreak of religious violence in Maluku on January 19, 1999. Though the Salvation Army has a long history in the United States, stretching back nearly a century, there is not enough information to show whether or not the Salvation Army Church is another form of Laskar Kristus. At least, the above information can prove the existence of the Army of Christ and also support the possibility that Laskar Kristus was already in existence before the rise of Laskar Jihad.

The Laskar Kristus Warriors

Like the Laskar Jihad warriors, there were also many Laskar Kristus warriors defending the Christian faith. One of the war commanders of Laskar Kristus was Agus Wattimena, described by The Economist as ‘a latter-day Jesus with his wiry frame and long flowing locks.’ He was a well-known Ambonese leader who claimed to be the leader of approximately 20,000 members in Ambon. Moreover, he said, “Ambonese are traditionally strong fighters. If we are attacked, and the enemy is not strong, we counterattack. This is a real war. We have to protect ourselves.” In an interview with Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, Wattimena said, “Go back to America and tell Christians that they must help us here.” On March 20, 2001, Wattimena was shot and killed.

One of the self-acknowledged of the Laskar Kristus warriors was Roy Pontoh, a 15-year-old. When he died in the village of
Hila, Ambon, on January 20, 1999, his last statement was “I am Laskar Kristus.” It is believed that Pontoh’s death made him a martyr of Christ. Clergyman Timotius Arifin delivered a similar story of Laskar Kristus on August 13, 2000, in the Church Birthday Anniversary. Arifin recounted the testimony of a martyr of Christ in Ambon, who also proclaimed “I am Laskar Kristus...!” (Beta Laskar Kristus...).

There was also frequent involvement of children as a direct consequence of the Laskar Kristus warriors in the Christian fight against Muslims in the Maluku war. As reported by Paddock:

The Christians, often outnumbered and outgunned by the Muslims, use boy warriors as an integral part of their military force on Ambon. The youths, Roman Catholic and Protestant, form disciplined fighting units that are headed by adults and given specific assignments in battle. They are known as the Agas, after a sand fly with an especially nasty bite.

These units were also called “Obet”, and fought alongside other Christian warriors. It is quite interesting to note the involvement of children in Laskar Kristus warriors. The Christian children warriors were commonly referred as “agas” or “gnat.” Gatra Magazine reported many stories of Agas warriors, who were involved in acts of violence and killing under the banner of religion. Herry Penturi, a 16-year-old Christian, was known as “small commander,” because he was often involved in fighting against Muslims. Herry and his family were affiliated with the Bethabara Church community in Ambon. Although only 16, he was clever enough to make and detonate bombs. He joined the battle because he wanted to save the Christian community. His mother, Maria Penturi, a 52-year-old, always allowed him to go to the battlefield, because, in her belief, God had a plan for him. She explained, “If I don’t permit him to go to the battlefield, then I oppose the plan of God.” In this context, we can see how the holiness of God was misinterpreted by Maria to allow children to commit acts of violence and killing against Muslims on the battlefield.

Another story of Christian warriors was also reported by Paddock. In his account, he described “Arjun Unawekla, a 14-year-old Protestant who has been shot in the wrist and foot since he began fighting at age 12.” He recounts Unawekla’s statement, ‘my job is to throw bombs and burn houses. I didn’t set out to kill, but because they started first, I have to kill them.’

*Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003*
"one young fighter, Bertie Aurisah, doesn't know when he was born but believes he is 13. He began fighting on his own two years ago after Muslims burned his village and his uncle died." Paddock quotes Bertie himself as saying, "a lot of my people were killed, so I felt very angry. I just went into the Muslim village and attacked them. I burned the Muslim houses with gasoline and matches. I also threw bombs at the Muslim people." Paddock added:

Now, as a member of the Agas, Bertie often fights alongside a detachment of older soldiers. The boys carry two to five homemade bombs each, which they throw from behind the relative safety of walls and buildings. As he hurls his bombs, Bertie said, he yells, Blood of Jesus!

Agus Wattimena, the commander of the Laskar Kristus warriors, recognized the involvement of Christian children warriors fighting against Muslims. He claimed, "There are 200 child fighters in the Agas, virtually all of them boys."

From the above information, it can be argued that Christ was used by Christians to justify acts of violence and killing in the Maluku war. There are many battlefield slogans, such as Yesus [Jesus], Saya Cinta Yesus [I Love Jesus], Yesus Raya [Jesus is Victorious], and so forth, used by Christians to support the psychology of war among the Laskar Kristus warriors. On January 20, 1999, a large group of Christian soldiers left the Rehoboth Church. Most of them repeatedly sang the following:

We don't want to go back (three times)
We had won with the Blood of Christ
We had won with His blood.

Furthermore, the song below has been translated into Bahasa Indonesia and spread through Ambon.

Onward Christian Soldiers (Kidung Jemaat 339)

Onward, Christian soldiers! marching as to war,
Looking unto Jesus, who is gone before.
Christ, the Royal Master, leads against the foe;
Forward into battle see His banners go.
Ref:
Onward, Christian soldiers! marching as to war,
Looking unto Jesus, who is gone before.
At the name of Jesus Satan’s host doth flee;

_Study Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003_
On then, Christian soldiers, on to victory!
Hell's foundations quiver at the shout of praise:
Brothers, lift your voices, loud your anthems raise!
Like a mighty army moves the church of God:
Brothers, we are treading where the saints have trod;
We are not divided, all one body we —
One in hope and doctrine, one in charity.
Crowns and thrones may perish, kingdoms rise and wane;
But the church of Jesus constant will remain:
Gates of hell can never 'gainst that church prevail.
Onward then, ye people, join our happy throne:
Blend with ours your voices in the triumph-song;
Glory, praise, and honor, unto Christ the King,
This through countless ages men and angels sing.117

The following is the Indonesian version of the song,

Maju, Laskar Kristus
(Kidung Jemaat 339)

Maju, Laskar Kristus, lawan kuasa gelap!
Ikut salib Yesus, sungguh dan tetap!
Rajamu sendiri jalan di depan;
Majulah, iringi panji cemerlang!
Ref:
Maju, Laskar Kristus, lawan kuasa gelap!
Ikut salib Yesus, sungguh dan tetap!

Saat dianjungkan panji Penebus,
Kuasa Iblis mundur, dikalahkan terus.
Goncangkanlah neraka, karena mendengar
Sorak soraimu nyaring menggegar.

Bagai laskar jaya Gereja maju terus
Di jejak teladan saksi yang kudus.
Kita satu tubuh yang kudus dan am;
Satu pengharapan, satu pun iman.

Kuasa duniawi timbul tenggelam,
Tapi Gereja Kristus takkan terbenam!
Alam maut tak sanggup menjatuhkannya;
Kristus memenuhi isi Janji-Nya.

Karena itu, maju! Ikut salib terus,
Turutlah memuji Raja Penebus:
"Hormat, kemuliaan, Tuhan, terimalah!"
Insan dan malaikat sujud menyembah.118
The original story of the above song is connected to Whitmonday, which is commemorated as a festival day for school children. On that day, the children parade toward the villages nearby carrying crosses and banners. In 1864, Pastor Sabine Baring-Gould desired a new hymn to support the children in the parade. In 15 minutes, he translated a hymn titled, "Onward Christian Soldiers," although at that time it was titled "Hymn for Procession with Cross and Banner." This hymn, however, was misused by Laskar Kristus warriors and Christians in general to justify acts of violence against Muslims in Ambon.

Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus: Similarities and Differences

It is interesting to look at the similarities and differences between Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus. There are at least two similarities.

First, both Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus carry out the same mission to fight each other in the Maluku war under the banner of religion. The doctrine of Jihad was used by Laskar Jihad to justify violence against Christians in the name of Islam. Conversely, the sacredness of Christ was abused by Laskar Kristus to justify violence against Muslims in the name of Christian belief. Both Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus fought each other in the belief they would die on the battlefield as martyrs. The doctrine of martyrdom itself, in their belief, is lawful under the banner of religion and God would reward them in Heaven the next day. This is the similar theological foundation from two different religions used for legitimizing violence and killing.

Second, the involvement of children was a direct consequence of ritualized violence by both Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus. One disturbing thing about such involvement is that the culture of violence ritualized by Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus has been transmitted to the children's behavior in everyday life. From infancy, the children have been accustomed to acts of violence and killing.

Beyond these similarities, the main point of difference between Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus is that the former is more organized than the latter in terms of institution-building, networking, and media-performance. While Laskar Kristus can be characterized as an unorganized civil movement, Laskar Jihad can be categorized as an organized civil movement. Laskar Jihad has official offices

*Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003*
in Yogyakarta, Jakarta and Solo, with a further 24 branches throughout the provinces. The institutional and intellectual networking of the Laskar Jihad movement is also more sophisticated than Laskar Kristus. Unlike the Laskar Kristus warriors, who did not pay much attention to the importance of institutional and intellectual-linking, Laskar Jihad were fully aware of using institutional and intellectual networking among Salafy-radical Muslims in Saudi Arabia. From these connections Laskar Jihad received the religious decrees issued by seven muftis to wage jihad against Christians in Ambon. In addition, the success of the jihad movement in Maluku can not be separated from the influence of Thalib as commander-in-chief of Laskar Jihad. In this context, the influence of Ja'far Umar Thalib to stir up the Laskar Jihad movement was stronger than the influence of Agus Watimmena among Laskar Kristus.

A further distinction between Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus lay in the use of technology and print media. On this issue, Laskar Jihad was the more advanced. While Laskar Kristus does not have a specific website or other media to keep in touch with other warriors, Laskar Jihad established a web site, http://www.laskar-jihad.or.id, and published a monthly bulletin, Buletin Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah, in order to provide news and up-to-date information on the Maluku war, spread religious decrees of Jihad, feature profiles of the Laskar Jihad warriors and martyrs, and also to release speeches of Ja'far Umar Thalib in connection with the situation in the Maluku war. The use of new technology and print media was really to the advantage of the Laskar Jihad. This use of technology bears similarities to Imam Samudra, who allegedly used the Internet and cellular phones to keep in touch with other Islamic radical members leading up to the act of terrorism in Bali.

Conclusion: The Culture of Violence and Religious Violence

The Culture of Violence

From the information mentioned above, the phenomena of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus both represent manifestations of a culture of violence from different religions. Both have perpetrated acts of violence and killing under the banner of religion. They did not intend to stop violence and killing regulated in the Maluku war. This can be seen in their refusal of a peace

Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003
agreement arranged by the Indonesian Government in Poso on December 19-20, 2001, known as the Malino Declaration. Ja'far Umar Thalib, commander-in-chief of Laskar Jihad ignored the Malino Agreement.122 Agus Wattimena himself, as commander-in-chief of Laskar Kristus complained, “Christians and Muslims are talking about reconciliation. Okay, but the Muslims fight and shoot Christians. Until today, we don’t believe they mean it.”123 This implies that they did not want to stop the violence, and they also intended to continue and transfer the culture of violence into the next generation in Ambon.

The effect of the violence perpetrated by Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus between 1999 and 2002 has produced a culture of violence and this culture has been transmitted to the children in Maluku. Even from early childhood, violence has become commonplace in children’s everyday behavior.

First, they are, for example, accustomed to playing with objects that symbolize violence, such as guns, revolvers and imitation swords (pedang-pedangan).124 Shinto B. Adelar, a psychologist at the University of Indonesia [UI], explained that when the children in Ambon were asked to draw pictures, their pictures always related to war. They often drew pictures of houses, churches, and mosques, which were burned down. Their color pictures were often filled with black, red, and orange often symbolizing anger. Psychologists did not find green and blue, symbolizing calm and peace, in their pictures. Adelar concludes that these children will grow up as a generation that easily takes offense and reacts with anger.125 This is often the beginning of a culture of violence.

Second, the culture of violence can also be seen in the revenge ritualized by the children in Ambon.126 Sri Aminah, pediatrician of Medical Emergency Rescue Committee (MER-C) and the Hospital of Sardjito, Yogyakarta, witnessed that the children in Ambon have ritualized the culture of revenge and intimidation in their everyday life.127 She asked one child, “what are your hopes for the future?” The child answered quickly, “I want to be a soldier in order to kill the enemies.”128 Moreover, Aminah said the children have admitted to threatening others from different religions.129 When the Christian children are playing games, one of them yells, “Kill Acan!”, a nickname for Muslim children in Ambon. Conversely, when Muslim children play games together, their cry is “Kill Obet!”, a nickname for Christian children in Ambon.130 The culture of revenge was
also witnessed by a Gatra reporter when he met and asked the child Karman, “when you meet Obet in the street, what should you do?” Karman answered quickly, “Beta takes wood to beat him to death.” It therefore seems a culture of revenge been transmitted to and ritualized by the children of Ambon. One of many factors that caused this vengefulness in Ambon is that if a family member was a victim in the Maluku war, the children would take revenge on the outside group from the other religion. Because of the psychological trauma, they ritualized revenge toward the outside group. The culture of revenge then strengthened a culture of violence. Ayip Syafruddin, vice-commander of Laskar Jihad, acknowledged this pattern of behavior, stating, “The culture of violence is recorded in their minds, and they imitate and apply that to their daily life.” In this context, the culture of violence has become one of the social values practiced and ritualized by the children in everyday life.

Religious Violence: Between Religious Militants and Religious Doctrines

Beyond this explanation of a culture of violence, the phenomena of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus also represent religious violence between Islam and Christianity. When religious violence breaks out in Indonesia, most religious leaders tend to refer to religious militants as the cause of violence. I had never before heard of religious doctrines as the source of violence in modern discourse of religious conflict in Indonesia. After reading of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus, I identified felt both religious militants and religious doctrine itself were the causes of violence.

First, religious militants in this context were represented by Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus. They tended to be militants in terms of religious expression. In this context, I have used the definition of ‘militant’ in the Oxford English Dictionary as an individual who is “engaged in warfare” or a social organization “in which efficiency in war is the primary object aimed at.” Both Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus, as individuals and social organizations, are completely represented in this category. They became militants to fight those from different religions. They labeled one another as outsiders, infidels, and enemies that must be killed under the instruction of religion. People were clearly either enemies or friends. Actions were good or bad. There was a
tendency to see one another in “red and white” terms, Laskar jihad labeled Christians as “red,” while Laskar Kristus labeled Muslims as “white.” This process of labelization with prejudiced terms, practiced by both Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus, exacerbated the inter-religious conflict.

Second, both Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus have perpetrated violence under the banner of religion. In this context, religious doctrines can be either the source of violence or used by both sides to justify violence. Laskar Jihad used a violent interpretation of jihad in terms of physical struggle with sword and warfare. Jihad literally means “struggle and strive.” It was originally related to personal struggle against the source of self-anger in human beings. Starting with this context, many religious scholars divided jihad into two categories: “the greater jihad (al-jihād al-akbar) and the lesser jihad (al-jihād al-aghar), with the former representing the struggle against the self and only the lesser jihad referring to warring in the path of God.” In the opinion of Laskar Jihad, there is only one way of defining Jihad, namely the lesser jihad, with the sword. Laskar Jihad has ignored much of the meaning of Jihad, such as an internal struggle of the heart, as an intellectual struggle against injustice, as a self-struggle against the anger in every human being, and so forth. In another hadith, the Prophet Muhammad said, “the best form of jihad is to speak the truth in the face of a tyrannical and oppressive ruler.” So it is clear there are many variations of interpreting Jihad, which were ignored by the Laskar Jihad.

In the case of Laskar Kristus, I only found the sacredness of Christ and other Christian songs used by Laskar Kristus and Christians in general to justify acts of violence in Ambon. The sacredness of Christ, heard in such slogans as Yesus [Jesus], Saya Cinta Yesus [I Love Jesus], Yesus Raya [Jesus is Victorious], Darah Yesus [Blood of Jesus], Martir Kristus [Martyr of Christ], was abused by Laskar Kristus and other Christians during the war in Ambon. Most clearly the hymn, Onward, Christians Soldiers, [Maju, Laskar Kristus, Kidung Jema‘at 339], originally a festival-day song for school children, was translated into Indonesian and then misused by Laskar Kristus and Christians to support the psychology of war against Muslims in Ambon.

Finally, the doctrine of martyrdom believed in and ritualized by both Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus warriors clearly shows
us that religious violence can arise from religion itself. In the name of martyrdom, warriors on both sides died in the Maluku war as martyrs of God. Many scholars believe the doctrine of martyrdom is related to the basic element of religiosity: self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice was practiced by Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus warriors in Ambon as martyrs of God in order "to become holy (sacrificium)." By using Juergensmeyer's argument, "Like all religious images of sacrifice, martyrdom provides symbols of a violence conquered—or at least put in its place—by the larger framework of order that religious language provides." In the case of religious violence in Ambon, use of the doctrine of martyrdom believed in by Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus warriors represents an act of violence and killing under the banner of religion. The culture of violence, combined with religious doctrines based on violence, has strengthened violence in Indonesia.
Endnotes
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Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003
Violence under the Banner of Religion

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