Replay Attack Detection Based on Spatial and Spectral Features of Stereo Signal

RYOYA YAGUCHI1,a) SAYAKA SHIOTA1,b) NOBUTAKA ONO1 HITOSHI KIYA1

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Abstract: In this paper, we propose a replay attack detection (RAD) method that uses spatial and spectral features of a stereo signal. To distinguish genuine and replayed utterance, we focus on non-speech segments, in which a human does not emit sound, but a loudspeaker for replay attack might emit some recorded noise or its electromagnetic noise. The generalized cross-correlation (GCC) based spatial features capture this difference. To improve the robustness against the variety of recording environments, we combine the spatial features with spectral features. In particular, we fuse the output scores of GCC-based and spectral feature-based methods. In experiments, we confirm the effectiveness of the combination of spatial and spectral features.

Keywords: automatic speaker verification, replay attack, spoofing countermeasure, generalized cross-correlation

1. Introduction

Recently, biometric authentication systems have become popular for use in various areas such as banking protection and immigration control [1], [2], [3]. Automatic speaker verification (ASV), which uses voice as a biometric template, is one such technique. With voice templates, ASV systems can easily be linked with voice interface systems. However, it has been reported that spoofing attacks (e.g., replay and speech synthesis) have become a serious problem for ASV systems [4]. As a means of considering countermeasures for spoofing attacks, ASV Spoofing and Countermeasures (ASVspoof) challenges were held in 2015 [5], 2017 [6], and 2019 [7]. Through these challenges, many countermeasures using various acoustic features have been proposed [8], [9], [10].

The ASVspoof challenges assume two types of spoofing attacks. One is a physical access (PA) attack, and the other is a logical access (LA) attack. A block diagram of the PA attack is shown in Fig. 1. Since the ASVspoof database was recorded by using single-channel microphones, almost all proposed countermeasures assume a single-channel situation. Meanwhile, since recording with multi-channel microphones has become easy, replay attack detection (RAD) systems assuming multi-channel recording have also been proposed [11], [12], [13]. In Ref. [13], we use generalized cross-correlation (GCC) [14] of stereo signals for RAD. GCC-based systems focus on non-speech segments, in which no sound is emitted from humans, but loudspeakers tend to generate some noise and non-perceptual signals, and these signals can be easily captured in non-speech segments. GCC-based methods have achieved high performances in some primitive experiments. However, this performance needs to improve as the methods are situation-dependent. The GCC of stereo signals is regarded as a spatial feature, and it captures different characteristics compared with spectral features. To utilize the different aspects of these two features, we fuse the output scores of the GCC-based and spectral feature-based methods [15]. Additionally, a convolutional neural network (CNN)-based RAD system that was submitted to ASVspoof 2019 was compared and discussed with systems using the proposed method. In an experiment, one of the systems achieved a relative error reduction of 72.5% compared with a single-GCC-based method and a relative error reduction of 96.6% compared with the single-spectral-based system.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Related work on using cross-correlation methods is detailed in Section 2. Section 3 introduces spectral feature-based systems proposed in ASVspoof, and Section 4 provides the proposed score-fusion method that uses cross-correlation and spectral features. Section 5 describes the experimental setup and the results of detection tests. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.

2. GCC-based RAD Method

2.1 Characteristics of Loudspeakers in Non-speech Segments

Suppose that we record a speech by two microphones $a$ and $b$. 

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Genuine} & \quad \text{Open} \\
\text{Replay Attack Detection} & \quad \text{REC} \\
\text{Accept} \quad \text{Detect replay attacks} \quad \text{Reject}
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 1 Block diagram of replay attack detection and ASV systems.
For a genuine speaker, the recorded signals can be represented in the time-frequency domain:

\[ M_a(t, f) = H_a(t, f) S(t, f) + N_a(t, f), \quad (1) \]

\[ M_b(t, f) = H_b(t, f) S(t, f) + N_b(t, f), \quad (2) \]

where \( M_a(t, f) \) and \( M_b(t, f) \) are signals observed at each microphone, and \( S(t, f) \) is the sound source. \( H_a(t, f) \) and \( H_b(t, f) \) are transfer functions from a speaker to each microphone. \( N_a(t, f) \) and \( N_b(t, f) \) are background noises. In non-speech segments, the source signal \( S(t, f) \) is equal to 0. Thus, the signals observed in non-speech segments include only background noise:

\[ M_a(t, f) = N_a(t, f), \quad (3) \]

\[ M_b(t, f) = N_b(t, f). \quad (4) \]

In this case, they are not highly correlated because background noise is usually diffuse or the direction is not fixed. In comparison, the replay attack case is different. Let

\[ M_p(t, f) = H_p(f) S(t, f) + N_p(t, f) \]

be a speech signal recorded by a microphone, \( p \), for a replay attack. When this recorded signal is played by a loudspeaker, the signals observed by the two microphones are written as

\[ M_a(t, f) = H_a(f) M_p(t, f) + N_a(t, f), \quad (5) \]

\[ M_b(t, f) = H_b(f) M_p(t, f) + N_b(t, f), \quad (6) \]

where \( H_a'(f) \) and \( H_b'(f) \) are transfer functions, and \( N_r(t, f) \) represents electromagnetic noise generated by the loudspeaker. In non-speech segments, \( S(t, f) = 0 \) yields \( M_p(t, f) = N_p(t, f) \). Then, Eqs. (8) and (9) can be rewritten as

\[ M_a(t, f) = H_a'(f) N_p(t, f) + N_a(t, f), \quad (8) \]

\[ M_b(t, f) = H_b'(f) N_p(t, f) + N_b(t, f). \quad (9) \]

The equations mean that the recorded noise \( N_p(t, f) \) and the electromagnetic noise \( N_r(t, f) \) are still emitted even in non-speech segments. Then, the noise in non-speech segments can be localized, and GCC values become high. These characteristics help to distinguish spoofing attacks from genuine utterances. Let \( r_1(t, f) \) and \( r_2(t, f) \) be zero-mean signals captured by two microphones. Then, the GCC between them can be calculated as below:

\[ \phi_{\theta}(\tau, t) = \frac{1}{L} \sum_{f} \frac{r_1^*(t, f) r_2^*(t, f)}{|r_1(t, f) r_2(t, f)|} e^{\frac{2\pi j f \tau}{L}}, \quad (10) \]

where \( t = [1, \ldots, T] \) and \( f \) are the frame and the frequency index, respectively. \( \tau \) is the time difference, and \( L \) is the frame length. In a genuine-speaker case, the maximum GCC is low in non-speech segments because no sound is emitted from a genuine speaker [16]. In the case of a loudspeaker, since recorded or electromagnetic noises from loudspeakers can be emitted, the maximum GCC becomes high even in non-speech segments. Figure 2 illustrates an example of calculating GCC from a genuine utterance and spoofed one.

Figures 2(a) and (b) show the waveforms of a genuine utterance and a replayed one and the trajectories of the maximum GCC for each frame, respectively. The red boxes in Fig. 2(b) denote non-speech segments. According to these trajectories, the maximum GCCs were low for the genuine utterance, and those of the replayed utterance were high in the non-speech segments. Figure 2(c) shows the GCC of one frame in both a speech segment and non-speech one for the genuine and the replayed utterances. The red dots denote the maximum GCC in each frame. In the speech segments, the peak of both utterances had a high value. In the non-speech segments, the peak of the genuine utterance was low, whereas the peak of the replayed utterance was high. From this investigation, recorded background and electromagnetic noises could be an effective factor in spoofing countermeasures.

### 2.2 Spoofing Detection Using Maximum GCC in Non-speech Segments

The GCC-based method [13] focuses on the trajectories of the maximum GCC (max-GCC) in non-speech segments for spoofing detection. The max-GCC for each frame is defined as

\[ \phi_{\max}(t) = \max_{\tau} \phi_{\theta}(\tau, t). \quad (11) \]

As shown in Fig. 2(b), there were two types of non-speech segments: “short pauses” appeared during a speaking period, and “silent segments” appeared both before the start of speaking and after the end. Therefore, two scores are defined for calculating the detection score with the maximum GCC. One focuses on the minimum value from among the maximum GCCs for short pauses, which is called “GCC(min).” The other focuses on the average value of the maximum GCCs for silent segments, called “GCC(avg).” These definitions are expressed as:

\[ \text{GCC(min)}: \Phi_{\min} = \min_{t_i, t_o} \phi_{\max}(t). \quad (12) \]

\[ \text{GCC(avg)}: \Phi_{\text{ave}} = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{T_i < t < T_o} \phi_{\max}(t). \quad (13) \]

where \( t_i \) and \( t_o \) are the start and end points of an utterance, respectively, and \( K \) is the total number of frames in segment \( t \). Parameters \( T_i \) and \( T_o \) represent the start and end points for calculating GCC(avg), respectively. The value of these parameters can be set arbitrarily under the constraints \( 1 < T_i < t_o, t_o < T < T_o \), where the parameter \( T \) represents the end point of an utterance. In this paper, these methods were treated as the GCC-based methods.
3. Spectral Feature-based RAD Methods

3.1 ASVspoof 2019 Results

For the ASVspoof 2019 PA scenario, 50 systems were submitted [19]. Many countermeasures used DNNs such as the CNN, light-CNN (LCNN), and residual network (ResNet) as backend systems [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26]. For input features, spectrogram and phase information [22], [27], linear frequency cepstral coefficients (LFCC) [18], constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCC) [17], Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC), inverted MFCC (IMFCC) [28], and rectangular filter cepstral coefficients (RFCC) [29] were adopted. According to the results, the systems that obtained the lowest EERs used several kinds of DNNs for frontend or backend systems and adopted an ensemble of classifiers. As this paper mentioned, the ASVspoof 2019 database is composed only of single channel signals. And, almost all systems submitted to ASVspoof challenges used spectral features only.

3.2 Benchmark System for ASVspoof 2019

The ASVspoof 2019 challenge provided two benchmark systems that use a Gaussian mixture model (GMM)-based classifier. The GMM of each system is trained with spectral features, and a log-likelihood ratio (LLR) is calculated by using the GMMs. The features are extracted from input speech signals, effective spectral features. Thus, they were adopted as benchmark challenges, many countermeasures used CQCC and LFCC as effective. The GMM of each system is trained with spectral features, systems that use a Gaussian mixture model (GMM)-based classifier, and they correspond to whether spoof speech.

3.3 CNN-GRU for RAD Method

A lot of countermeasures using DNN have been proposed for ASVspoof 2019 [19]. One of these countermeasures used high-resolution spectrograms as input features, and CNN and gated recurrent unit (GRU) were used as a classifier, and this countermeasure was named CNN-GRU [20]. The DNN architecture of CNN-GRU is composed of convolutional layers, pooling layers, ResNet layers, and a GRU layer. For spectrograms that are used as input features, magnitude, phase spectrogram, power spectral density (PSD) are extracted. In the result of ASVspoof 2019, the EER of the CNN-GRU system obtained 2.45% that ranked 10th of all systems. The authors of CNN-GRU provided a GitHub URL about the single system that uses a high-resolution magnitude spectrogram as an input feature, and ResNet is used as a classifier. The EER of this ResNet system was 4.79% under the conditions of the ASVspoof 2019 PA scenario. In this paper, this single ResNet system was used as one of the spectral feature-based methods. In this system, the value calculated from the last node was directly used for a detection score which is referred to as “CS.” The training manner is the same as what they proposed in Ref. [20].

4. Score Fusion System

4.1 Motivation

It has been reported that GCC-based methods achieved high performances, especially in quiet situations [13]. However, this performance is situation-dependent. Thus, robustness must be improved for obtaining a stable performance. GCC-based methods focus on spatial characteristics in non-speech segments. Through the ASVspoof challenges, many approaches based on various kinds of acoustic features have been reported [8], [9], [10]. Since these spectral features are extracted from spectral characteristics, characteristics different from those of GCC-based methods can be utilized. Thus, it is expected that fusing the scores of spatial and spectral feature-based systems can enable the systems to compensate for each other, improving robustness.

4.2 Procedure

The procedure of the proposed score-fusion system is illustrated in Fig. 3. First, an input utterance is separated into speech and non-speech segments by voice activity detection (VAD). From all non-speech segments of the input utterance, the GCC scores are calculated and GCC-based methods can be utilized. Thus, it is expected that fusing the scores of spatial and spectral feature-based systems can enable the systems to compensate for each other, improving robustness.

5. Experiments

To evaluate the performance of the score-fusion system, experiments on replay attack detection were carried out.

5.1 Database

Figure 4 illustrates the testing flow of the experiments in both
The first database (DB1) was used for the comprehensive analysis of various situations in terms of the recording processes. For DB1, two types of microphones were used for spoof recording: AKG P170 (AKG) and TAMAGO-03 (TMG). The AKG is a condenser microphone and has strong directivity. The TMG has omnidirectional microphones with weak directivity to allow flexibility in terms of the speaker’s position. For the TMG, two of the eight microphone channels were used, whereas two AKGs were installed in parallel and facing in the same direction. For replay attacks, four different types of loudspeaker were used: Elecom LBT-SPP300 (Elecom), Apple iPhone 6s (iPhone), Sony SRS-ZR7 (Sony-S), and Creative Inspire 2.0 1300 (CI). The Sony-S is 300-mm wide, 86-mm deep, and 93-mm high. It generates a non-perceptual electromagnetic noise in silent segments of replayed attacks. The CI is comprised of two separate stereo loudspeakers. Each speaker is 99-mm wide, 131-mm deep, and 221-mm high. The Elecom is a portable loudspeaker and tends to generate an electromagnetic noise when in use. The iPhone features no distinctive electromagnetic noise but produces a slightly more muffled sound than the original sound. For all the data in DB1, the TMG was also used for the testing part.

For the second database (DB2), we assume that spoof recording was carried out secretly. Therefore, only noisy recordings for spoofing were prepared. For DB2, two types of microphones were used for spoof recording, a Sony C-357 (Sony-C, a condenser microphone) and the TMG. Two Sony-Cs were installed in parallel and facing the same direction. For replay attacks, four different types of loudspeakers were used: the Elecom, Sanwa Supply MM-SPL8UBK (SNW), JBL Professional Control 2P (JBL), and Huawei P20 Lite (Huawei). The SNW is a small loudspeaker powered by USB. The JBL is a desktop loudspeaker. It is 159-mm wide, 143-mm deep, and 235-mm high. The Huawei is a smartphone and has the same features as the iPhone. The TMG or the Sony-C was used for the detection test for DB2.

To analyze the effects on the combination of the environments, four situations were carried out:

- **(N-Q) Noisy-Quiet**: Spoof and test recordings carried out in noisy and quiet environments, respectively.
- **(N-N) Noisy-Noisey**: Both recordings carried out in a noisy environment.
- **(Q-Q) Quiet-Quiet**: Both recordings carried out in a quiet environment.
- **(Q-N) Quiet-Noisey**: Spoof and test recordings carried out in quiet and noisy environments, respectively.

For DB1, all four situations were carried out. The average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of DB1 was set to about 18 dB. For DB2, only N-Q and N-N were carried out. The average SNR of DB2 was set to about 14 dB. Comparing these situations with the ASVspoof 2019 settings, the room size for DB1 and DB2 was 5–10 square meters, which corresponded to ASVspoof 2019 EN-VIRONMENT\_ID S = b. The Talker-to-ASV distance for DB1 was 10–50 cm, which corresponded to ENVIRONMENT\_ID D\_s = a, and that for DB2 was 50–100 cm, which corresponded to ENVIRONMENT\_ID D\_s = b. The Attacker-to-ASV distance was about 10 cm for DB1 and DB2, which corresponded to AT-TACK\_ID D\_a = A.

DB1 consisted of 40 genuine speech samples uttered by two male and two female speakers and 640 spoofing attack samples obtained by replaying the genuine speech samples. DB2 consisted of 150 genuine speech samples uttered by three male and two female speakers and 2,400 spoofing attack samples obtained by replaying the genuine speech samples. For DB1, all speech samples were sampled at 16 kHz. For DB2, different recording conditions were used for each microphone for spoof recording. The samples recorded by TMG were sampled at 16 kHz, and those recorded by Sony-C were sampled at 48 kHz.

The ASVspoof 2019 database for the PA scenario contained three parts: training, development and test. From this database, only training data was used for training the ResNet system. The training set included 48,600 spoof utterances and 5,400 genuine utterances.

### 5.2 Comparison Methods

As a benchmark system, we used two GMM-based systems with CQCC and LFCC as spectral features, respectively. For the training of the benchmark systems, we used the same manner as defined in ASVspoof 2019 for 16-kHz sampled conditions and the parameter of the systems was simply tripled for 48-kHz sampled conditions. To train each GMM, we used 900 genuine utterances and 900 replayed utterances from the Voice Liveness Detection (VLD) database [11]. In Ref. [11], the proposed VLD method required stereo signals for a detecting genuine speech from a replayed one. All utterances in the VLD database were recorded through two AKGs, and the spoof utterances were replayed by a Bose 111AD loudspeaker. The mean and standard deviation scores for z-score normalization were calculated with the VLD database. In all experiments using the GCC-based methods, hand-labeled data was used for the start point \( t_s \) and the end point \( t_e \) of each utterance. For GCC(avg), the average time was 0.5
Table 1 System performance in terms of EER for DB1 and DB2 (TMG: 16 kHz, Sony-C: 48 kHz).

| Fusion system | Testing microphone | N-Q | N-N | Q-Q | Q-N |
|---------------|--------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| GC(min)-CQ    | Φmin + LLRCQ       | 5.00| 4.74| 7.61| 6.67|
| GC(min)-LF    | Φmin + LLRCQ       | 4.09| 3.89| 9.51| 5.50|
| GC(min)-RN    | Φmin + CS          | 10.50| 10.48| 10.48| 10.48|
| GC(avg)-CQ    | Φavg + LLRCQ       | 11.55| 8.40| 5.42| 7.88|
| GC(avg)-LF    | Φavg + LLRCQ       | 12.09| 8.20| 2.73| 7.00|
| GC(avg)-RN    | Φavg + CS          | 11.22| 9.55| 9.00| 12.20|
| GC(min)-GC(avg) | Φmin + Φavg     | 2.29| 2.86| 2.86| 4.33|
| CQ-LF         | LLRCQ + LLRF       | 37.66| 35.55| 39.24| 35.85|
| LF-LN         | LLRF + CS          | 41.52| 36.17| 38.46| 33.63|
| GC(min)-CQ-LF | Φmin + LLRCQ + LLRF | 10.00| 8.51| 11.18| 9.79|
| GC(avg)-CQ-LF | Φavg + LLRCQ + LLRF | 13.77| 12.67| 8.57| 10.52|
| GC(min)-GC(avg)-CQ | Φmin + Φavg + LLRCQ | 3.64| 1.67| 3.24| 3.33|
| GC(min)-GC(avg)-LF | Φmin + Φavg + LLRCQ | 2.22| 1.67| 1.82| 2.22|
| GC(min)-GC(avg)-RN | Φmin + Φavg + CS | 4.69| 4.41| 4.50| 5.36|
| GC(min)-GC(avg)-CQ-LF | Φmin + Φavg + LLRCQ + LLRF | 4.09| 2.78| 4.71| 3.75|
| GC(min)-GC(avg)-CQ-LF-RN | Φmin + Φavg + LLRCQ + LLRF + CS | 3.82| 3.41| 5.83| 4.48|

GC: GCC, CQ: CQCC, LF: LFCC, RN: ResNet

5.3 Results

Table 1 shows the EERs of each spoofing detection system for DB1 and DB2. First, the results of DB1 are discussed. Comparing situation N-Q with N-N or Q-Q with Q-N, it can be seen that the EERs of the GCC-based single systems were higher in the noisy recording for testing than those in the quiet recording. While most of the single GCC-based systems obtained low EERs, the EERs of CQCC, LFCC, and ResNet were comprehensively high. One reason was the mismatches between the training data and the test one. The domain of ASVspoof 2019 fairly differs from our databases (DB1 and DB2). Although the VLD database was recorded with stereo signals, the recording conditions and the other details were not same from DB1 and DB2. As considering the spectral feature-based methods were compared as shown in Table 1. The equal error rate (EER) was used for an evaluation measurement. Since the GCC-based methods require stereo signals, the score-fusion systems cannot be evaluated with the ASVspoof database. Instead of adopting the ASVspoof 2019 database for the systems, the ResNet system was used with the evaluation data of this experiment. The authors of Ref. [20] provided the software for a single ResNet system on GitHub. For training the ResNet system, the ASVspoof 2019 database was used. Since the ASVspoof 2019 database was sampled at 16 kHz, the data recorded by SONY-C was downsampled from 48 kHz to 16 kHz only for the ResNet system.

The results with DB2 in Table 1 are discussed. In the case of using TAMAGO for test recording, all score-fusion systems had lower performances than the single GCC(avg). For the TAMAGO recording, the SNRs of almost all test utterances were lower than the average SNR. In Ref. [13], it was also discussed that a test recording requires a sufficient enough SNR in order for GCC-based methods to perform well. This means that when SNRs are low, it is difficult to detect spoofing attacks as well as CQCC and LFCC-based methods and ResNet system. In contrast, in the case of using Sony-C for test recording, fusion systems GC(min)-GC(avg)-LF yielded the lowest EERs compared with the single GC(avg) the same as in the results with DB1. In this case, the SNRs were almost the same as those of DB1. From these results, if the quality of the testing microphone is high and
In future work, the proposed methods will also be combined with other spoofing countermeasures. Additionally, we will consider to use more complicated models such as a DNN-based modeling approach for the GCC-based method, and evaluation tests will be performed under a large amount of data.

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Hitoshi Kiya received his B.E and M.E. degrees from Nagaoka University of Technology, in 1980 and 1982 respectively, and his Dr.Eng. degree from Tokyo Metropolitan University in 1987. In 1982, he joined Tokyo Metropolitan University, where he became a Full Professor in 2000. From 1995 to 1996, he attended the University of Sydney, Australia as a Visiting Fellow. He is a Fellow of IEEE, IEICE and ITE. He served as President of APSIPA, and as Regional Director-at-Large for Region 10 of the IEEE Signal Processing Society from 2016 to 2017. He was also President of the IEICE Engineering Sciences Society from 2011 to 2012, and he served there as a Vice President and Editor-in-Chief for IEICE Society Magazine and Society Publications. He was Editorial Board Member of eight journals, including IEEE Trans. on Signal Processing, Image Processing, and Information Forensics and Security, Chair of two technical committees and Member of nine technical committees including APSIPA Image, Video, and Multimedia Technical Committee (TC), and IEEE Information Forensics and Security TC. He has organized a lot of international conferences, in such roles as TPC Chair of IEEE ICASSP 2012 and as General Co-Chair of IEEE ISCAS 2019. He has received numerous awards, including ten best paper awards.