Quality of Service Games for Spectrum Sharing

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Abstract—Today’s wireless networks are increasingly crowded with an explosion of wireless users, who have greater and more diverse quality of service (QoS) demands than ever before. However, the amount of spectrum that can be used to satisfy these demands remains finite. This leads to a great challenge for wireless users to effectively share the spectrum to achieve their QoS requirements. This paper presents a game theoretic model for spectrum sharing, where users seek to satisfy their QoS demands in a distributed fashion. Our spectrum sharing model is quite general, because we allow different wireless channels to provide different QoS, depending upon their channel conditions and how many users are trying to access them. Also, users can be highly heterogeneous, with different QoS demands, depending upon their activities, hardware capabilities, and technology choices. Under such a general setting, we show that it is NP hard to find a spectrum allocation which satisfies the maximum number of users’ QoS requirements in a centralized fashion. We also show that allowing users to self-organize through distributed channel selections is a viable alternative to the centralized optimization, because better response updating is guaranteed to reach a pure Nash equilibrium in polynomial time. By bounding the price of anarchy, we demonstrate that the worst case pure Nash equilibrium can be close to optimal, when users and channels are not very heterogeneous. We also extend our model by considering the frequency spatial reuse, and consider the user interactions as a game upon a graph where players only contend with their neighbors. We prove that better response updating is still guaranteed to reach a pure Nash equilibrium in this more general spatial QoS satisfaction game.

Index Terms—Distributed spectrum sharing, game theory, Nash equilibrium, quality of service (QoS)

I. INTRODUCTION

The number of wireless devices such as smart-phones continues to increase rapidly in today’s market, while the amount of spectrum available for these devices remains limited. Moreover, many new wireless applications such as high definition video streaming and online interactive gaming are emerging, making the quality of service (QoS) demands of wireless users higher and more varied. Thus there is an urgent need to study the issue of how to efficiently share the limited spectrum to satisfy the QoS demands of as many users as possible.

There are two different approaches to address this issue. The first approach is a centralized approach, where a network operator optimizes the spectrum resources to meet the users’ QoS requirements. This approach puts most of the implementation complexity at the operator side, and wireless devices do not need to be very sophisticated. However, as the networks grow larger and more heterogeneous, this approach can become unsuitable for two reasons. Firstly, the QoS demands of wireless users are highly heterogeneous, which implies that the operator needs to gather massive amounts of information from users in order to perform the centralized optimization. Secondly, finding the system-wide optimal QoS demand satisfaction solution is computationally challenging—in fact we show that it is NP hard. It is hence difficult for the operator to compute the optimal solution to meet users’ real-time QoS demands. The alternative approach is a decentralized approach, where each wireless user makes the spectrum access decision locally to meet its own QoS demand, while taking the network dynamics and other users’ actions into consideration. This is feasible since new technologies like cognitive radio [1] give users the ability to scan and switch channels easily. The decentralized approach enables more flexible spectrum sharing, scales well with the network size, and is particular suitable when users belong to multiple network entities.

In this paper, we focus on the decentralized approach, and propose a new framework of QoS satisfaction games to model the distributed QoS demand satisfaction problem among the users. Game theory is a useful tool for designing distributed algorithms that allow users to self-organize, optimize their channel selections, and satisfy their QoS demands. Our QoS satisfaction game framework is developed, based on the theory of congestion games [2]. The central idea behind congestion games is that there are many players, each of which selects a resource to use. A player’s utility is a non-increasing function of the total number of players using the same resource. The distributed QoS satisfaction problem can be modeled using congestion games by thinking of the players as wireless users, while the resources represent different channels [3]. The satisfaction of a user’s QoS demand depends on its congestion level, i.e., how many users are competing for its channel. In our QoS satisfaction game, a player achieves a unit utility when its channel’s data rate is sufficiently high to satisfy its QoS demand. Otherwise, the player’s utility is negative and it is better off by switching channels (to improve the payoff) or turning off its transmitter (to receive a zero payoff).

A. Related Work

Rosenthal proposed the original congestion game model [2] for the scenario where different resources can have different utility functions associated with them (i.e., heterogeneous resources) but all players have the same utility function for any particular resource (i.e., homogenous players). This kind of system has a pleasing feature known as the finite improvement property - which means that when the system evolves because players asynchronously perform better response updates (i.e., the players selfishly improve their resource choices), the system is guaranteed to reach a pure Nash equilibrium in a
finite number of steps. A pure Nash equilibrium is a system state where no player has any incentive to deviate unilaterally.

However, the original congestion game is not general enough to model spectrum sharing, because it assumes that players are homogenous, whereas wireless network users are often highly heterogenous. The congestion games with player-specific utility functions considered in [4] are more appropriate for this modeling purpose. Authors in [3], [5]–[7], [9] have adopted such a game model for studying spectrum sharing problems. However, unlike classical congestion games, these games are not necessarily guaranteed to possess the finite improvement property.

Spatial reuse is another feature of wireless networks that the original congestion game model does not account for. In reality only nearby users on the same channel will interfere with each other. Users which are distantly separated will not cause congestion to each other. A congestion game on a graph can be used to realistically capture the spatial aspect of spectrum sharing. The idea behind such a system is that a user’s utility only depends upon the number of users of the same channel who are linked to them in the graph. In [3], we introduced a general class of congestion games on graphs that are appropriate for modeling spectrum sharing. Although there are many subclasses of these games which always admit the finite improvement property, we demonstrated that there exist congestion games on graphs that do not have any pure Nash equilibria. We have also further developed several more elaborate graphical congestion game models [9]–[12] applications to spectrum sharing.

A common assumption within most previous congestion game based spectrum sharing literature (e.g., [3], [5]–[7], [9], [12]) is that a user’s utility strictly decreases with its received data rate (and hence strictly decreases with the congestion level). This is true, for example, when users are running elastic applications such as file downloading. However, there are many other types of applications with more specific QoS requirements, such as VoIP and video streaming. These inelastic applications cannot work properly when their QoS requirements are not met, and do not enjoy any additional benefits when given more resources than needed. This kind of traffic is becoming increasingly popular over the wireless networks (e.g., mobile video traffic exceeded 50% percent of all wireless traffic in 2011 according to the report by Cisco [13]). This motivates the QoS satisfaction game model in this paper.

Rather than assuming that users wish to increase their data rates whenever possible, we assume that each user has a fixed QoS demand. If the demand is satisfied, then the user has no inclination to change his choice of resource. Our game model was inspired by the games in satisfaction form considered in [14]. In [14], the authors considered other games where players wish to satisfy demands, and the authors design algorithms to find satisfaction equilibria, which are strategy profiles where all users are satisfied. In our paper, we consider the more general case where some users’ QoS requirements may not be satisfied (given the limited spectrum resource). The case where a satisfaction equilibrium exists becomes a special case of our model. Moreover, we also take into account the issue of spatial reuse. This makes the modeling more practical for wireless communication systems. The generalizations considered in our model result in more challenges and significant differences in analysis.

When discussing the achievability of the equilibrium, we focus on dynamics where one player can perform a better response update each time. There are many alternative types of dynamics we could consider, such as smoothed best response dynamics and imitation dynamics [15]. We could also consider the replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory. Reference [16] showed that replicator dynamics can be used for spectrum sharing using appropriate message passing protocols. Replicator dynamics is most useful when the user population is large, and in which case the system will follow continuous (essentially deterministic) dynamics which normally converge to evolutionarily stable strategies. However, many techniques from evolutionary game theory rely upon the assumption the players are homogenous, while our wireless users are typically heterogenous. Another issue is that translating replicator dynamics into the spatial setting (i.e., a game on a graph) is quite difficult.

B. Contributions

Our main results and contributions can be summarized as follows:

- A general QoS satisfaction game framework: We formulate the distributed QoS demand satisfaction problem among wireless users as a QoS satisfaction game, which is general enough to capture the details of spectrum sharing over a wide range of scenarios, with heterogenous channels and users. Despite allowing for heterogenous channels, heterogenous users, and spatial interactions, we still obtain several significant analytic results.

- Remarkable convergence properties: We prove that every QoS satisfaction game has the finite improvement property. This is remarkable because many congestion games with heterogenous resources and players do not have this feature. More importantly, it enables us to design a distributed QoS satisfaction algorithm which allows wireless users to easily self-organize into a pure Nash equilibrium.

- Spatial generalization: We generalize the model by thinking of users as vertices, which are linked in a graph and can only interfere with their neighbors. We show that the resulting QoS games on graphs also possess the finite improvement property.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the QoS satisfaction game model and study its properties in Sections II and III respectively. We then generalize the game model with spatial reuse in Section IV. We then propose the distributed QoS satisfaction algorithm and evaluate its performance by simulations in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI. Most proofs are provided in the Appendix.

II. QoS Satisfaction Game

In this section we formally define the QoS satisfaction game model for spectrum sharing. Spectrum sharing is a
promising approach to address the spectrum under-utilization problem. Field measurements by Shared Spectrum Cooperation in Chicago area shows that the overall average utilization of a wide range of different types of spectrum bands is lower than 20\% [18]. In order to improve the overall spectrum utilization, several countries have recently reformed their policy (such as the FCC’s ruling for the TV white space [19]) and allow spectrum sharing, such that unlicensed users equipped with cognitive radios can access the channels which are tentatively not used by the licensed spectrum users. In this paper, we consider the spectrum sharing problem among multiple unlicensed users who run different applications and hence have heterogeneous QoS demands.

A. Game model

A QoS satisfaction game is defined by a tuple $(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{C}, (Q_n^c)_{n \in \mathcal{N}, c \in \mathcal{C}}, (D_n)_{n \in \mathcal{N}})$ where:

- $\mathcal{N} = \{1, \ldots, N\}$ is the set of wireless unlicensed users, also referred as the players.
- $\mathcal{C} = \{1, \ldots, C\}$ is the set of channels. Each unlicensed user may select one channel to access. Furthermore, we introduce the element 0 to represent the dormant state. Choosing the dormant state will be beneficial when an unlicensed user’s QoS demand cannot be satisfied due to limited resources. In such a case the user can choose the dormant state 0, which corresponds to ceasing its transmission to save power consumption. Now we use the term ‘dormant state’ instead of ‘virtual channel’ since it involves introducing less new concepts, and we no longer have to speak of “real” channels. In summary, each unlicensed user/player has a strategy set $\mathcal{C} = \{0, 1, \ldots, C\}$ which consists of all channels, together with the dormant state. The strategy profile of the game is given as $x = (x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N) \in \mathcal{C}^N$, where each unlicensed user $n$ chooses a strategy $x_n \in \mathcal{C}$.
- $Q_n^c(\cdot)$ is a non-increasing function that characterizes the data rate received by an unlicensed user $n$ who has selected channel $c$. Specifically, we have $Q_n^c(I^c(x)) = \theta_n^c B_n^c g_n^c(I^c(x))$, with $I^c(x) = |\{n \in \mathcal{N} : x_n = c\}|$ being the congestion level of channel $c$, i.e., the number of users who choose channel $c$. We detail the parameters in $Q_n^c$ as follows.
  - $\theta_n^c \in \{0, 1\}$ is the channel availability indicator. When channel $c$ is occupied by licensed users and not available for unlicensed user $n$, we have $\theta_n^c = 0$, in which case $Q_n^c(I^c(x)) = 0$ for any value of $I^c(x)$. For a limited period of time, the usage of spectrum by licensed users is assumed to be static (but can change in different periods). This is appropriate for modeling the TV spectrum, for example, where the activities of licensed users change very slowly. According to the most recent ruling by the FCC, unlicensed users can reasonably and accurately determine the spectrum availability within a short amount of time by consulting a database [19]. When channel $c$ is available for the spectrum access by an unlicensed user $n$ (i.e., $\theta_n^c = 1$), we have $Q_n^c(I^c(x)) > 0$.
  - $B_n^c$ is the mean channel throughput of user $n$ on channel $c$. We allow user specific throughput functions, i.e., different users may have different $B_n^c$ even on the same channel $c$. This enables us to model users with different transmission technologies, different coding/modulation schemes, different channel conditions, and different reactions to the same licensed user on the channel. For example, we can compute the maximum channel throughput $B_n^c$ according to the Shannon capacity as
    \[ B_n^c = W_c \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\eta_n z_n^c}{\omega_n^c} \right), \]
    where $W_c$ is the bandwidth of channel $c$, $\omega_n^c$ is the background noise power, and $z_n^c$ is the user-specific channel gain.
- $g_n^c(I^c(x))$ is the channel contention function that describes the probability that user $n$ can successfully grab the channel $c$ for data transmissions given the congestion level $I^c(x)$. In general, $g_n^c(I^c(x))$ decreases as the number of contending users $I^c(x)$ increases. For example, if we adopt the TDMA mechanism for the medium access control (MAC) to schedule users in the round-robin manner, then we have $g_n^c(I^c(x)) = \frac{1}{I^c(x)}$.
- $D_n \geq 0$ is the data rate demand of unlicensed user $n$. For example, listening to an MP3 online will require a large $D_n$, whereas watching a high definition streaming video requires a small $D_n$.

The utility of an unlicensed user $n$ in strategy profile $x$ is

\[ U_n(x) = \begin{cases} 
1, & \text{if } x_n \neq 0 \text{ and } Q_n^c(I^c_n(x)) \geq D_n, \\
0, & \text{if } x_n = 0, \\
-1, & \text{if } x_n \neq 0 \text{ and } Q_n^c(I^c_n(x)) < D_n.
\end{cases} \]

A satisfied user is an unlicensed user $n$ who chooses a channel $x_n \neq 0$ and receives a data rate $Q_n^c(I^c_n(x))$ not smaller than its QoS demand $D_n$. A satisfied user receives a utility of 1. A dormant user is an unlicensed user $n$ choosing the dormant state $x_n = 0$. Such a dormant user does not receive any benefit (as it achieves a zero data rate) or any penalty (as it does not waste any energy), and gets a utility of $U_n(x) = 0$. A suffering user is an unlicensed user $n$ who chooses a channel $x_n \neq 0$ but receives a data rate $Q_n^c(I^c_n(x))$ below its QoS demand $D_n$. Such a suffering user incurs cost without gaining any benefit, and so it gets a utility of $U_n(x) = -1$.

A suffering user can always increase their utility by becoming dormant without harming any other user. This suggests that rational (i.e., utility maximizing) players will eventually end up at strategy profiles which contain no suffering users. We
say that a strategy profile is **natural** if it holds no suffering users.

It is worth noting that we can easily generalize our model by allowing an unlicensed user \( n \) to receive a utility of \( u_n \) if it is satisfied, \( v_n \) if it is dormant, and \( t_n \) if it is suffering, where \( u_n > v_n > t_n \). Making this generalization does not affect the better response dynamics or the set of pure Nash equilibria discussed later on, because the preference orderings of the strategies in the generalized game are the same as in our current model.\(^2\) Our results about convergence (Theorem 1) and computational complexity (Theorem 2) also remain true for games with generalized utility functions. However, since the generalized games allow different players to receive different utilities when satisfied, our results about social optimality (Theorems 3 and 5) may not hold for the generalized games. In this paper, we will restrict our attention to the utility choices where we write the latter expression in terms of thresholds. The interference threshold transformation reduces the size of parameters by replacing \((Q_n^c, D_n)\) with \( T_n^c \). Moreover, the result in \(3\) ensures that the original game \( g \) is equivalent to the game \( g' \), since the utility \( U_n(x) \) received by player \( n \) in \( g \) is the same as that received by player \( n \) in \( g' \) for every strategy profile \( x \) and player \( n \). For the rest of the paper, we will analyze the QoS satisfaction game in the interference threshold form. Note that Equations \(2\) and \(3\) are equivalent. It is just that we write the latter expression in terms of thresholds.

### III. Properties of the QoS Satisfaction Game

Now we explore the properties of QoS satisfaction games, including the existence of pure Nash equilibria and the finite improvement property. We shall also describe the conditions under which a social optimum is also a pure Nash equilibrium.

#### A. Characterization of pure Nash equilibria

Each player is either satisfied or dormant when a game is at pure Nash equilibrium. To see this, consider a strategy profile \( x \) where a player \( n \) is suffering. Now the action where player \( n \) changes its strategy to the dormant state 0 is a better response update for this user. Since suffering users can always do better response updates, such a strategy profile \( x \) cannot be a pure Nash equilibrium.

Next we show in Theorem 4 that every QoS satisfaction game has the finite improvement property (which is a sufficient condition for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium).

**Theorem 1.** Every \( N \)-player QoS satisfaction game has the finite improvement property. Moreover, any asynchronous

\(\footnote{It is possible to set \( T_n^c \) to be any number greater than \( N \) while still satisfy condition \(3\). The reason of choosing \( T_n^c = N + 1 \) is to bound the differences between thresholds, which helps the proof of fast convergence of the distributed algorithm in Theorem 4.}
Let $\Xi$ be the set of strategy profiles of our game. Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of the more general result Theorem 1 in Section V of [21]. Theorem 1 is very important, because it implies that the general QoS satisfaction game (with heterogeneous channels and users) can self organize into a stable state effectively. This fact allows us to design the distributed QoS satisfaction algorithm in Section V-A, which has a fast convergent property. Although Theorem 1 shows that pure Nash equilibria can be found relatively easily, it does not offer any insight into how to select the most beneficial pure Nash equilibria. Equilibrium selection seems to be a difficult problem in the general case. However, we show how to find pure Nash equilibria which are social optimum for special cases in Subsections III-D and III-E.

**B. Finding a social optimum is NP hard**

Although Theorem 1 implies that pure Nash equilibria are easy to construct, it turns out that finding a social optimum can be extremely challenging.

**Theorem 2. The problem of finding a social optimum of a QoS satisfaction game is NP hard.**

The problem of finding a social optimum of a QoS satisfaction game has some resemblance to the Knapsack problem (where items have different weights and values, and the objective is to maximize the value of items chosen without exceeding a given total weight threshold). The key difference is that the thresholds in our problem are associated with the players/items we are choosing, and there are multiple channels/knapsacks to allocate our players to. Our proof (given in Appendix A) is based upon showing that the 3-dimensional matching decision problem (which is well known to be NP complete [21]) can be reduced to the problem of finding a social optimum of a QoS satisfaction game where thresholds $T^c$ are in $\{1, 3\}$ for each $n$ and $c$. Theorem 2 provides the major motivation for our game theoretic study, because it suggests that the centralized spectrum sharing problem is fundamentally difficult. It therefore makes sense to explore decentralized alternatives such as a game based spectrum sharing.

**C. Price of anarchy**

Although Theorem 2 suggests that finding an optimal strategy profile can be very difficult, we do know from Theorem 1 that pure Nash equilibria can be found with relative ease. This naturally raises the question of how the social welfare of pure Nash equilibria compare to the maximum possible social welfare. In other words, how much social welfare can be lost by allowing the players to organize themselves, rather than being directed to a social optimum?

To gain insight into this issue, we study the price of anarchy [22]. Recall that $C^N$ is the set of strategy profiles of our game. Let $\Xi \subseteq C^N$ denote the set of pure Nash equilibria of our game. Note that Theorem 1 implies that $\Xi$ is non-empty. Now the price of anarchy

$$\text{PoA} = \frac{\max \{\sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(x) : x \in \hat{C}^N\}}{\min \{\sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(x) : x \in \Xi\}},$$

is defined to be the maximum social welfare of a strategy profile, divided by the minimum welfare of a pure Nash equilibrium. The social welfare of a system at a pure Nash equilibrium can be increased by at most PoA times by switching to a centralized solution.

**Theorem 3. Consider a QoS satisfaction game $(N, C, (T^c_n)_{n \in N, c \in C})$, where $T^c_n \geq 1$ for each player $n$ and each channel $c$. The PoA of this game satisfies**

$$\text{PoA} \leq \min \left\{ N, \frac{\max \{t^c_n : n \in N, c \in C\}}{\min \{T^c_n : n \in N, c \in C\}} \right\}.$$

The proof is given in Appendix B. The constraint $T^c_n \geq 1$ insures that some player will be satisfied in every pure Nash equilibrium of the game, and avoid the possibility of the PoA involving “division by zero”. Theorem 3 implies that the performance of every pure Nash equilibrium will be close to optimal when the minimum threshold of a user-channel pair is close to the maximum threshold of a user-channel pair. This is a very significant result, when one considers that pure Nash equilibria can be easily reached by better response updates (Theorem 1) while finding social optima is NP hard (Theorem 2). Motivated by Theorem 3 we next study two special cases of QoS satisfaction games with homogenous settings, i.e., homogeneous users and homogenous channels. In both cases, the social optimum can be actually achieved at a pure Nash equilibrium.

**D. QoS satisfaction games with homogenous users**

We first study the case of homogeneous users. We say that a QoS satisfaction game has **homogeneous users** when $T^c_1 = T^c_2 = \ldots = T^c_N$ for each $c \in C$ (i.e., each player has the same threshold for any channel $c$). This corresponds to the case that all users have the same data rate function $Q^c_n$ on the same channel $c$ (but they may have different data rates on different channels) and the same demand $D_n$. For example, spectrum sharing in a network of RFID tags in a warehouse may correspond to such a QoS satisfaction game, because every device experiences the same environment and requires a similar data rate to operate.

When discussing QoS satisfaction games with homogenous users, we drop the subscripts and use $T^c$ to denote the common threshold of all players on channel $c$. Since users are homogenous, we only need to keep track of how many users choose each channel in order to describe the game dynamics. Next we will show that any pure Nash equilibrium in a QoS satisfaction games with homogenous users is also a social optimum.

**Theorem 4. Let $x$ be a strategy profile of a QoS satisfaction game with $N$ homogenous users and $C$ channels, with thresholds $T^1, T^2, \ldots, T^C$. The following three statements are equivalent:**
1) $x$ is a pure Nash equilibrium;
2) There are no suffering users in $x$ and the number of satisfied users is $\min\{N, \sum_{c=1}^{C} T^c\}$.
3) $x$ is a social optimum.

The proof is given in Appendix C. Theorems 1 and 4 together imply that any sufficiently long asynchronous better response updating sequence will converge to a social optimal in polynomial time when the game has homogenous users. Moreover, Theorem 4 implies that when $\sum_{c=1}^{C} T^c \geq N$, there exists a satisfaction equilibrium where all the players can be satisfied.

**E. QoS satisfaction games with homogenous channels**

We next consider the case that the channels are homogenous. We say a QoS satisfaction game has homogenous channels when $T^1_n = T^2_n = \ldots = T^C_n$, for each user $n$ (i.e., all channels have the same threshold from any player’s perspective). This corresponds to the case that each user $n$ has the same data rate function $Q^c_n$ on all the channels, but different users may have different demands $D_n$. QoS satisfaction games with homogenous channels are highly relevant, because technologies such as frequency interleaving can been adopted in many wireless systems such as IEEE 802.11g networks to make channels homogenous (i.e., having the same bandwidth and experiencing frequency flat fading).

When discussing QoS satisfaction games with homogenous channels, we drop the superscripts and use $T_n$ to denote the common threshold of player $n$ for all channels. The update process can reach a pure Nash equilibrium according to Theorem 1.

We next discuss the optimality of pure Nash equilibria. Firstly note that, a pure Nash equilibrium may not be a social optimal. For example, let us consider a game of six users, with thresholds $T_1 = T_2 = 2$, $T_3 = T_4 = T_5 = T_6 = 4$, and two channels. The game has a pure Nash equilibrium $x = (0, 0, 1, 1, 2, 2)$ with four satisfied users, which is not a social optimum. The strategy profile $y = (1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2)$, where all six users are satisfied, is a social optimum.

Second, a social optimum may not be a pure Nash equilibrium. We take the game with six users and thresholds $T_1 = T_2 = 2$, $T_3 = T_4 = T_5 = 3$, $T_6 = 4$, and two channels as an example. The game has a social optimum $x = (1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 0)$ (with five satisfied users), which is not a pure Nash equilibrium because user 6 can do a better response update by switching to channel 1.

Surprisingly, there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium that is a social optimum for a game with homogenous channels. Moreover, we present an algorithm (Algorithm 1) that always generates a social optimum which is a pure Nash equilibrium. The key idea of the algorithm is to prioritize channel allocation according to users’ thresholds (i.e., the more severe congestion a user can tolerate, the higher priority it will get in channel allocation).

Algorithm 1 is a centralized algorithm that demonstrates the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium which is a social optimum. The distributed algorithm that globally converges to a Nash equilibrium (not necessarily socially optimal) will be discussed in Subsection V-A. Algorithm 1 begins by making all players dormant. The players are then updated one by one in the order of descending thresholds. When a player is updated, it changes to the lowest indexed channel which will satisfy it. If there are no channels that can satisfy this player, then the algorithm will not further change players’ channel choices, since all higher indexed players will not be able to find channels to satisfy them as they have even lower interference thresholds.). Figure 1 illustrates a particular example of Algorithm 1 running. We show in Theorem 5 that Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to generate a pure Nash equilibrium that is also a social optimum.

**Theorem 5.** Algorithm 1 has a complexity of $O(CN^2)$ and generates a strategy profile that is both a social optimum and a pure Nash equilibrium of a QoS satisfaction game with $C$ homogeneous channels and $N$ users.

We provide the proof of Theorem 5 in Appendix D. Next, Theorem 6 gives a sufficient condition for the existence of
a strategy profile where all players are satisfied, in a QoS satisfaction game with homogeneous channels (please refer to Appendix E for the proof).

**Theorem 6.** If \( T_n \geq \left\lceil \frac{N}{C} \right\rceil \) holds for every user \( n \) in the QoS satisfaction game with \( C \) homogeneous channels and \( N \) users, then there is a strategy profile \( x \) within which every user is satisfied (which is a pure Nash equilibrium).

**IV. Spatial QoS Satisfaction Game**

In all the games considered so far, we have assumed that every pair of users are close enough to cause congestion to each other, when they use the same channel. However, in reality only nearby users of the same channel will cause congestion to one another, and distantly spaced users may access the same channel without degrading each other’s QoS. This is known as spatial reuse – where the same piece of spectrum can be used by many distantly separated users without detrimental effects.

The protocol interference model [24] is a commonly used model to approximate how the positions of users affect their communication performance. The idea behind the protocol interference model is to construct an interference graph, where vertices represent players (wireless users), and an undirected edge connecting two players represents that these two players are within interference range of one another (hence they can generate interference to each other if transmitting on the same channel). By using an interference graph \( G \) to represent which vertices are close enough to interfere with each other, one may view the spectrum sharing problem as a game on a graph.

In this game, one may determine whether the QoS demand of a user is satisfied by counting the number of neighbors it has, which are using the same channel as itself. This corresponds to a generalization of the QoS satisfaction game where we account for the spatial positioning of the users.

Let us define a spatial QoS satisfaction game to be a quadruple \( (N, C, (T_n)_{n \in N, c \in C}, G) \) where:

- \( N \), \( C \), and \( T_n \) are the set of players/users, channels, and thresholds, respectively, which are the same as those introduced in Section II-C
- \( G = (N, E) \) is an undirected and unweighted graph, with a vertex set equal to the set of players \( N \), and an edge set \( E \). We refer to \( G \) as the interference graph. The interpretation of \( G \) is that there is an edge \( \{n,m\} \in E \) if and only if users \( n \) and \( m \) are close enough to cause congestion to each other when transmitting on the same channel. We can apply the interference estimation methods in [23], [26] to obtain the interference graph.

As before, a strategy profile \( x = (x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N) \) is where each player \( n \) chooses a strategy \( x_n \in C \). Let us define the neighborhood of player \( n \), to be \( Ne(n) = \{m : \{n,m\} \in E \} \cup \{n\} \). In other words Ne(n) is the set of all players which are linked to, or identical to \( n \). We let the neighborhood of a player contain the player itself just for the notational convenience.

Let use define the local congestion level of channel \( c \) for player \( n \) in strategy profile \( x \) to be

\[
I_n^c(x) = |\{m \in Ne(n) : x_m = c\}|
\]

**Theorem 7.** Every \( N \)-players spatial QoS satisfaction game has the finite improvement property. Moreover, any asynchronous better response update process will reach a pure Nash equilibrium within \( 4N + 3N^2 \) asynchronous better response updates (irrespective of the initial strategy profile, or the order in which the players update).

The proof is given in Appendix E. Theorem 7 is the most powerful result in this paper, for it implies that every spatial QoS satisfaction game, with heterogenous players and heterogenous channels has the finite improvement property. The type of QoS satisfaction games we defined in Section II can be considered as special cases of spatial QoS satisfaction games within which the interference graph is a complete graph. For this reason Theorem 7 can be considered to be a corollary of Theorem 6. Theorem 7 shows that spatial QoS satisfaction games are a remarkable class of congestion games on graphs, because they may have heterogenous channels and users, and yet they always have the finite improvement property. If one considers the slightly more general class of congestion games on graphs with arbitrary non-increasing utility functions, then one can easily find example games which do not even have pure Nash equilibria -never mind the finite improvement property. For example, a congestion game on a graph with 5 players and 3 resources, without any pure Nash equilibria is exhibited in [3].

**V. Distributed Algorithm and Simulations**

**A. Distributed QoS satisfaction algorithm**

In this section we propose a distributed QoS satisfaction algorithm for achieving pure Nash equilibria of general (spatial) QoS satisfaction games. The key idea is to utilize the finite improvement property and let one user improve its channel selection at a time. In order to describe the QoS satisfaction game purely in terms of channel selection, we may regard the dominant state 0 as an addition virtual channel, which always gives users a utility of 0.

We consider a time-slotted system. Each time slot \( t \) consists of the following two parts:
Algorithm 2: Distributed QoS satisfaction algorithm

1. initialization: each user $n$ chooses channel $x_n = 0$.
2. for each user $n$ and each time slot $t$ do
   3. access the chosen channel $x_n$.
   4. compute the set of best response channel selections $B_n(x)$.
   5. if $B_n(x) \neq \emptyset$ then
      6. contend for the channel update opportunity.
      7. if win the channel update contention then
         8. choose a channel $c^* \in B_n(x)$ randomly for next time slot.
         9. broadcast the updated channel selection $c^*$ to other users.
      10. else
         11. choose the original channel $x_n$ for next time slot.
   12. else
      13. choose the original channel $x_n$ for next time slot.
   14. update the channel selections $x_{-n}$ of other users once an updating message is received.

1) Spectrum Access: each user $n$ contends to access the chosen channel $x_n$ according to some medium access control (MAC) mechanism. For the initialization, we assume that all users are dormant, and use strategy 0.

2) Channel Update Contention: We exploit the finite improvement property by having one user carry out a channel update at each time slot. In this part, we let users who can improve their channel selections compete for the channel update opportunity in a distributed manner. More specifically, each user $n$ first computes its set of best responses (which is the set of strategies which maximize (and increase) $n$’s utility).

   \[
   B_n(x) = \{c^* : c^* = \arg \max_{c \in \mathcal{C}} U_n(c, x_{-n}) \text{ and } U_n(c^*, x_{-n}) > U_n(x)\},
   \]

   If $B_n(x) \neq \emptyset$ (i.e., user $n$ can improve), then user $n$ will contend for the channel update opportunity. Otherwise, user $n$ will not contend and will adhere to the original channel selection $x_n$ at next time slot.

   For the channel update contention, for example, we can adopt the backoff-based mechanism by setting the time length of channel update contention as $\tau^*$. Each contending user $n$ first generates a backoff time value $\tau_n$ according to the uniform distribution over $[0, \tau^*]$ and waits until the backoff timer expires. When the timer expires, if the user has not received any updating messages from other users yet, the user will randomly select a channel $c^* \in B_n(x)$ and broadcast an updating message over the common control channel to indicate that it will update its channel selection to $c^*$ at the beginning of the next time slot.

   According to the finite improvement property in Theorem 4, the algorithm will converge to a pure Nash equilibrium of a general spatial QoS satisfaction game in polynomial time.

B. Numerical Results

We now evaluate the proposed distributed QoS satisfaction algorithm by simulations. We consider a spectrum sharing network of $C = 4$ vacant channels, with the mean data rates $B_n^c$ of $6, 9, 12, 18$ Mbps, respectively, which are standard operating data rates in IEEE 802.11g systems [23]. Multiple users are randomly scattered over a $100 \text{ m} \times 100 \text{ m}$ region (see Figure 3 for an illustration). In the interference graph, a pair of users are linked by an edge when they are within 50 m (the interference range) of each other (i.e., when they can generate interference to each other). We adopt the TDMA mechanism for the medium access control (MAC) and the data rate of user $n$ choosing a channel $c$ is given as $Q_n^c(x) = \frac{B_n^c}{I_n^c(x)}$, where $I_n^c(x)$ is the number of users of channel $c$ that are linked to $n$ upon the interference graph. We consider the scenario where users are running two different multimedia applications corresponding to two types of QoS demands: low demand type $D_n = 0.125$ Mbps (i.e., listening to an online MP3 song [27]) and high demand type $D_n = 3.5$ Mbps (i.e., watching an online video with a resolution of 1080p [27]).

We first implement a simulation with $N = 50$ users, and let the fraction of users with a high QoS demand vary from $0\%$ to $100\%$. We implement the distributed QoS satisfaction game solution in Algorithm 2. Figure 4 shows the dynamics of users’ throughputs, which demonstrates that the proposed distributed QoS satisfaction algorithm can converge to a pure Nash equilibrium. As a benchmark, we also compute the social optimum by the centralized optimization using Cross Entropy method, which is an advanced randomized searching technique and has been shown to be efficient in solving complex combinatorial optimization problems [28]. The results are shown in Figure 5. The x-axis is the fraction of users having a high QoS demand, and y-axis describes how many users are satisfied at the solutions of pure Nash equilibria and social optima. Note that a QoS satisfaction game may have multiple pure Nash equilibria, and Algorithm 2 will randomly select one pure Nash equilibrium (since a random user will be chosen for channel selection update). We run the algorithm 20 times for each game instance and plot the number of satisfied users at the obtained pure Nash equilibria. Figure 5 shows that both the performances of social optima and the best and the worst pure Nash equilibria decrease as the fraction of users of a high QoS demand increases. This is because that given the constant spectrum resources less users can be satisfied when more users have higher demands. Compared with the social optima, the performance loss by the best pure Nash equilibria and the worst pure Nash equilibria by Algorithm 2 are at most 7\% and 20\%, respectively (not shown in the figure). This demonstrates the efficiency of the pure Nash equilibria of QoS satisfaction games.

We implement another simulation with the number of users $N = 50, 55$, and 60 with half of the users having a high QoS demand. Upon comparison, we also implement the social optimum solution by centralized optimization and the decentralized spectrum access solution by Q-learning mechanism proposed in [29]. We observe that the distributed QoS satisfaction algorithm can achieve up-to 32\% performance
gain over the Q learning mechanism. Compared with the centralized optimization, the performance loss of the distributed QoS satisfaction algorithm is at most 10%. This demonstrates the efficiency of the proposed distributed QoS satisfaction algorithm. We next evaluate the convergence time of the distributed QoS satisfaction algorithm. Figure 7 shows that the average convergence time increases linearly with the number of users. This shows that the distributed QoS satisfaction algorithm scales well with the network size. This is critical since computing the social optimum of general QoS satisfaction games is NP-hard.

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we proposed a framework of QoS satisfaction games to model the distributed QoS satisfaction problem among wireless users. The game based solution is motivated by the observation that the centralized optimization problem of maximizing the number of satisfied users is NP hard. We have explored many aspects of QoS satisfaction games including the pure Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy. Our results reveal that selfish spectrum sharing can be a very effective way to allow users to meet their QoS demands. In particular, we have shown that our systems can always reach a pure Nash equilibrium in polynomial time, simply by having the users perform better response updates.

There are many other issues we wish to explore in the future. In particular, we wish to extend many of our results (such as those regarding the price of anarchy) to spatial QoS satisfaction games. We also wish to explore the generalized QoS satisfaction games where different players receive different utilities for being satisfied.

APPENDIX

A. Proof of Theorem 2

In the following, we call the problem of finding a social optimum of the QoS satisfaction game as the QoS satisfaction problem for short. Before discussing the computational complexity of the QoS satisfaction problem, we first introduce the definition of 3-dimensional matchings.

Definition 6. Let $X, Y,$ and $Z$ be three finite disjoint sets, and let $T$ be a subset of $X \times Y \times Z$. That is, $T \subseteq \{(x, y, z) : x \in X, y \in Y, z \in Z\}$. Now $M \subseteq T$ is a 3-dimensional matching if the following holds: for any two distinct triples $(x_1, y_1, z_1) \in M$ and $(x_2, y_2, z_2) \in M$, we have $x_1 \neq x_2$, $y_1 \neq y_2$, and $z_1 \neq z_2$. 
We shall refer to an element \((x, y, z)\) ∈ \(T\) as an edge. The 3-dimensional matching decision problem is as follows. Suppose that the set sizes satisfy \(|X| = |Y| = |Z| = I\). Given an input \(T\) with \(|T| \geq I\), decide whether there exists a 3-dimensional matching \(M \subseteq T\) with the maximum size \(|M| = I\). The 3-dimensional matching decision problem is a well-known NP-complete problem \([10]\). We then prove that the QoS satisfaction problem is NP-hard, by showing that given an oracle for solving the QoS satisfaction problem, the 3-dimensional matching decision problem can be solved in polynomial time.

From an instance of 3-dimensional matching \(((X, Y, Z), T)\) with \(|X| = |Y| = |Z| = I\) and \(|T| = J \geq I\), we can create an instance of QoS satisfaction problem as follows. The set of channels is \(T\) (i.e., each edge \((x, y, z)\) ∈ \(T\)) is a channel with the total number of channels is \(|T| = J\). Let set \(\psi = X \cup Y \cup Z\). We regard each element \(n \in \psi\) as a user \(n\). We also introduce a new user set \(\phi\) that consists of \(J - I\) additional users. The total number of users in both \(\psi\) and \(\phi\) is \(3I + J - I = 2I + J\). Then we define the threshold value \(T_n^m\) as follows. For a user \(n\) in set \(\psi\) on a channel \(m = (x, y, z)\), we set \(T_n^m = 3\) if \(n\) is an element of an edge \(m\) in \(T\) (i.e., one of the following cases is true: \(n = x\), or \(n = y\), or \(n = z\)), and we set \(T_n^m = 1\) otherwise. For a user \(n\) in set \(\phi\) on a channel \(m = (x, y, z)\), we set \(T_n^m = 1\). Clearly, 3 users can stay in a channel and satisfy their QoS demands simultaneously if and only if they forms an edge in \(T\). Since each user can only select one channel, according to Definition \([6]\) given a channel allocation solution, the set of channels, each of which has 3 satisfied users, hence correspond to a 3-dimensional matching in \(T\). In this case, the QoS satisfaction problem has the optimal solution that all the users are satisfied (i.e., the number of satisfied users on \(J\) channels is \(3I + J - I = 2I + J\) including \(I\) channels with each channel having 3 satisfied users and \(J - I\) remaining channels with each channel having 1 satisfied user), if and only if there exists a 3-dimensional matching \(M \subseteq T\) that has the maximum size \(|M| = I\).

Therefore, if we have an oracle to find the optimal solution for QoS satisfaction problem, we can then check whether the number of satisfied users is \(2I + J\). In this case, we can decide in a polynomial time \(O(1)\) whether there exists a 3-dimensional matching \(M \subseteq T\) such that \(|M| = I\). That is, 3-dimensional matching decision problem is polynomially reducible to the QoS satisfaction problem, and hence the QoS satisfaction problem is NP-hard.

\[ \square \]

**B. Proof of Theorem** \([5]\)

Before proving the main result about price of anarchy, let us establish a useful lemma. Let \(B(x)\) denote the number of satisfied users in a strategy profile \(x\).

**Lemma 1.** Suppose that \(x^*\) is a social optimum, and \(y^*\) is a pure Nash equilibrium of a QoS satisfaction game. The following statements are true:

1. There are no suffering users in \(x^*\) (i.e., \(x^*\) is natural).
2. We have \(\sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(x^*) = B(x^*) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(x^*)\).
3. There are no suffering users in \(y^*\) (i.e., \(y^*\) is natural).
4. We have \(\sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(y^*) = B(y^*) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(y^*)\).

**Proof of Lemma** \([7]\) Statement 1) holds because the social welfare of any strategy profile with a suffering user can be increased by making the suffering user dormant.

Statement 1) implies that for any \(n\) we have \(U_n(x^*) \in \{0, 1\}\). Also we have \(U_n(x^*) = 1\) if and only if user \(n\) is satisfied in \(x^*\). It follows that \(\sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(x^*) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(x^*)\) is the number of satisfied players in \(x^*\). Moreover, since every non-dormant user is satisfied under \(x^*\), and \(\sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(x^*)\) equals the number of non-dormant users under \(x^*\), we must have \(\sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(x^*) = B(x^*)\). This finishes the proof of Statement 2).

To see that Statement 3) holds, note that any suffering user can do a better response update by becoming dormant. Since \(y^*\) is a pure Nash equilibrium, we must have that no players can perform better response updates in \(y^*\), this proves Statement 3).

The proof of Statement 4) is similar to the proof of Statement 2), and is hence omitted. \(\square\)

Next we prove the main Theorem \([5]\) using Lemma \([1]\)

Let \(x^*\) be a social optimum of the game. Let \(y^*\) be a pure Nash equilibrium of the game which minimizes the social welfare among all pure Nash equilibria (note that Theorem \([1]\) implies that such a pure Nash equilibrium \(y^*\) exists for our game). Clearly the four statements in Lemma \([1]\) hold in this scenario. Also Equation \([5]\) gives

\[ \text{PoA} = \frac{\sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(x^*)}{\sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(y^*)}. \] (7)

Now we shall prove statements \([8] - [11]\) on by one:

\[ B(x^*) \in \{1, 2, \ldots, N\}. \] (8)

\[ B(x^*) \leq C \max\{T_n^c : n \in N, c \in C\} \] (9)

\[ B(y^*) \in \{1, 2, \ldots, N\}. \] (10)

\[ \text{If } B(y^*) < N, \text{ then } B(y^*) \geq C \min\{T_n^c : n \in N, c \in C\} \] (11)

Consider the strategy profile \(z^*\) where user \(n = 1\) uses channel \(c = 1\), and all the other users are dormant. User \(n = 1\) must be satisfied in \(z^*\) since \(I^1(z^*) = 1 \leq T_1^1\), and so the social welfare of \(z^*\) is \(\sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(z^*) = 1\). Since \(x^*\) is a social optimum, its social welfare \(\sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(x^*)\) must be greater than or equal to that of \(z^*\), and so

\[ \sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(x^*) \geq \sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(z^*) = 1. \] (12)

Now combining Statement 2) of Lemma \([1]\) with Inequality \([12]\) gives \(B(x^*) \geq 1\). Also clearly \(B(x^*)\) is an integer less than or equal to \(N\), hence we have proved Statement \([8]\).

Let \(c^* \in \{1, 2, \ldots, C\}\) be one of the channels with the most users under \(x^*\) (i.e., \(I^c(x^*) = \max\{I^c(x) : c \in C\}\)). Now Statement 2) from Lemma \([1]\) implies

\[ B(x^*) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(x^*) \leq \sum_{c=1}^{C} \left(I^c(x^*)\right) = CI^c(x^*). \] (13)

Now Statement \([8]\) gives \(1 \leq B(x^*)\), and combining this with Inequality \([13]\) gives us that \(1 \leq CI^c(x^*)\). Since \(I^c(x^*)\) is an
integer we must also have \( 1 \leq I^c(x^*) \). It follows that there must be some user \( n' \) of channel \( c' \) under \( x^* \) (i.e., \( x^*_{n'} = c' \)). Now from Statement 1) of Lemma [1] we have that \( n' \) is satisfied with using \( c' \) under \( x^* \), and so it follows that

\[
I^c(x^*) \leq T^c_{n'} \leq \max\{T^c_{n} : n \in N, c \in C\}.
\]

Combining Inequality (13) and Inequality (14) yields \( B(x^*) \leq CI^c(x^*) \leq C \max\{T^c_{n} : n \in N, c \in C\} \), and so we have proved Statement (9).

We can prove \( B(y^*) \geq 1 \) by contradiction. If \( B(y^*) \geq 1 \) were false, then we would have \( B(y^*) = 0 \), and no channel would have any active users. However, in this case user \( n = 1 \) could do a better response update by changing to channel \( c = 1 \), because \( T^c_{n} \geq 1 \). This contradicts our assumption that \( y^* \) is a pure Nash equilibrium, hence we must have that \( B(y^*) \geq 1 \). Also it is clear that \( B(y^*) \leq N \), hence we have proved Statement (10).

To prove Statement (11), suppose that \( B(y^*) < N \). This implies that there are users which are not satisfied under \( y^* \). Also Statement 3) from Lemma [1] implies that every user which is not satisfied under \( y^* \) is dormant, and so it follows that there must be some user \( n^* \) that is dormant in \( y^* \). Since \( y^* \) is a pure Nash equilibrium, we have that player \( n^* \) cannot do a better response by switching to use a channel \( c \). It follows that, for each channel \( c \in \{1, 2, \ldots, C\} \), we must have that

\[
I^c(y^*) \geq T^c_{n^*} \geq \min\{T^c_{n} : n \in N, c \in C\}.
\]

Now combining Statement 4) from Lemma [1] with Inequality (15), we have \( B(y^*) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(y^*) \geq \min\{T^c_{n} : n \in N, c \in C\} = C \min\{T^c_{n} : n \in N, c \in C\} \), which proves Statement (11).

Now we can prove Theorem 3 By taking Equation (7) and using Statements 2) and 4) from Lemma [1] one obtains \( \text{PoA} = \frac{B(x^*)}{B(y^*)} \). Statement (8) gives \( B(x^*) \leq N \), Statement (10) gives \( B(y^*) \geq 1 \), and so we must have \( \text{PoA} \leq N \).

Next consider two cases. In the first we have \( B(x^*) = B(y^*) \), and so we have \( \text{PoA} = 1 \). Now since \( 1 \leq \min\{T^c_{n} : n \in N, c \in C\} \), Theorem 3 clearly holds in this case. Consider the second case where \( B(x^*) \neq B(y^*) \). In this case we must have \( B(x^*) > B(y^*) \), because \( x^* \) is a social optimum. Moreover, Statement (8) implies that \( N \geq B(x^*) \) so \( N > B(y^*) \). It follows from Statement (11) that we must have

\[
B(y^*) \leq C \min\{T^c_{n} : n \in N, c \in C\}.
\]

Since \( \text{PoA} = \frac{B(x^*)}{B(y^*)} \), we have that Inequality (16) implies

\[
\frac{B(x^*)}{\text{PoA}} \geq C \min\{T^c_{n} : n \in N, c \in C\}.
\]

Now rearranging Inequality (17), and combining with Inequality (9) gives

\[
\text{PoA} \leq \frac{C \max\{T^c_{n} : n \in N, c \in C\}}{C \min\{T^c_{n} : n \in N, c \in C\}}.
\]

C. Proof of Theorem 2

Let \( B(x) = |\{n \in N : U_n(x) = 1\}| \) denote the number of satisfied users in a strategy profile \( x \). We will show that Statement 1) implies Statement 2), which in turn implies Statement 3), which in turn implies Statement 1).

1) Statement 1) \( \Rightarrow \) Statement 2): Suppose Statement 1) holds, and \( x \) is a pure Nash equilibrium. Now Lemma [1] implies that there are no suffering users in \( x \), and Lemma [1] also implies that

\[
B(x) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(x) = \sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(x).
\]

Since there are no suffering users under \( x \), we must have that \( I^c(x) \leq T^c \), for each \( c \in \{1, 2, \ldots, C\} \). It follows that \( B(x) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(x) \leq \sum_{c=1}^{C} T^c \). Since we also have \( B(x) \leq N \), it follows that

\[
B(x) \leq \min\left\{ N, \sum_{c=1}^{C} T^c \right\}.
\]

Next consider two cases. In the first case with \( B(x) = N \), clearly Inequality (9) implies that \( B(x) = N \leq \sum_{c=1}^{C} T^c \) and so \( x \) satisfies Statement 2) of Theorem

Now let us consider the second case where \( B(x) < N \). In this case there exists at least one user \( n^* \) that is not satisfied. We know that \( n^* \) must be dormant, since \( x \) contains no suffering users. Since \( x \) is a pure Nash equilibrium, we know that user \( n^* \) cannot perform any best response updates. This implies that \( I^c(x) \geq T^c \), for each \( c \in \{1, 2, \ldots, C\} \). It follows that we must have

\[
\sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(x) \geq \sum_{c=1}^{C} T^c.
\]

Combining Equation (13) and Inequality (9) gives us that

\[
B(x) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(x) \leq \sum_{c=1}^{C} T^c.
\]

and combining Inequality (21) with Inequality (20) yields

\[
B(x) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(x) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} T^c.
\]

Since we have assumed \( B(x) < N \) in this second case, we have \( B(x) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} T^c = \min\{N, \sum_{c=1}^{C} T^c \} \). This shows that Statement 1) implies Statement 2).

2) Statement 2) \( \Rightarrow \) Statement 3): Now we assume Statement 2) holds. If \( B(x) = N \), then \( x \) is clearly a social optimal and so Statement 3) follows in this case. Suppose instead that

\[
B(x) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} T^c < N.
\]

Since \( x \) has no suffering users, we must have

\[
B(x) = |\{n \in N : x_n \neq 0\}| = \sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(x) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(x) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} T^c.
\]

(24)
Let $z$ be a social optimum of our game. From Lemma 1 we have
\begin{equation}
B(z) = \sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(z) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(z).
\end{equation}

Since Lemma 1 implies that $z$ holds no suffering users, we must have $I^c(z) \leq T^c$ for each $c \in \{1, 2, \ldots, C\}$, and it follows that
\begin{equation}
\sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(z) \leq \sum_{c=1}^{C} T^c.
\end{equation}

Combining Equation (25), Inequality (26), and Equation (24) yields
\begin{equation}
\sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(z) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} I^c(z) \leq \sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(x).
\end{equation}

Inequality (27) implies that the social welfare of x is no less than the social welfare of the social optimum $z$. This implies that $x$ is a social optimum, which proves Statement 3).

3) Statement 3) $\Rightarrow$ Statement 1): Now we assume that Statement 3) holds, and $x$ is a social optimum. In this case, Lemma 1 implies that there are no suffering users under $x$. Next we will show that $x$ is a pure Nash equilibrium by contradiction.

Suppose $x$ is not a pure Nash equilibrium. There must exist a player $n^* \in \mathcal{N}$ that can perform a better response update. This means that $n^*$ must be dormant, because $x$ contains no suffering users. It follows that $U_{n^*}(x) = 0$, and there must exist some channel $c^* \neq 0$ such that $I^{c^*}(x) < T^{c^*}$ (which $n^*$ can do a better response update by switching to). Let
\begin{equation}
y = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n^*-1}, c^*, x_{n^*+1}, \ldots, x_N)
\end{equation}

be the strategy profile obtained by allowing player $n^*$ to switch to channel $c^*$. We shall have $I^{c^*}(y) = I^{c^*}(x) + 1 \leq T^{c^*}$, so the users of channel $c^*$ will still all be satisfied in $y$. This implies that $\sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(y) = 1 + \sum_{n=1}^{N} U_n(x)$, which contradicts our assumption that $x$ is a social optimum. This shows that Statement 3) implies Statement 1). $\square$

D. Brief sketch of the proof to Theorem 5

We order the users so that $T_1 \geq T_2 \geq \ldots \geq T_N$. We use $x^n$ to denote the strategy profile produced by the $n$th iteration of Algorithm 1. Also $B(x)$ is the number of satisfied users in $x$. We say a strategy profile $y$ is reachable from strategy profile $x$, if for any $x_p \neq 0$ (for a player $p \in \mathcal{N}$) we have $y_p = x_p$. In other words, $y$ is reachable from $x$ if each player who is not dormant in $x$ uses the same channel in $y$ as it does in $x$. Let $\beta(y)$ denote the maximum value of $B(y)$ such that $y$ is a natural strategy profile reachable from $x$. Let $D(x)$ denote the set of dormant users in the strategy profile $x$.

The key idea of the proof is to show that a social optimal is reachable from the strategy profile $x^n$, $\forall n \in \{1, 2, \ldots, N\}$ (here $x^n$ is the strategy profile outputted by the $n$th iteration of Algorithm 1). This can be achieved by showing $\beta(x^0) = \beta(x^1) = \ldots = \beta(x^N)$. The reason is that $\beta(x^0)$ is the number of satisfied users at a social optimum (since all strategy profiles can be reached from $x^0$).

Since a (natural) social optimum is reachable from $x^N$ and since we can show[3] that the only natural strategy profile that is reachable from $x^0$ is $x^N$ itself, we have that $x^N$ is a social optimum. By checking that users have no incentive to change, we can then show that the social optimum is also a pure Nash equilibrium.

In order to prove that a social optimal is always reachable from $x^n$, we use induction to prove that $x^{n-1}$ satisfies various conditions for each $n \in \{1, 2, \ldots, N\}$. In particular, we show that if a value $n \in \{1, 2, \ldots, N\}$ is such that there exist a channel $c$ with the property that $I^c(x^{n-1}) < T_n$, then $x^{n-1}$ satisfies the following conditions:

1) $x^{n-1}$ is natural.
2) $\beta(x^{n-1}) = \beta(x^0)$.
3) $D(x^{n-1}) = \{n, n+1, \ldots, N\}$.
4) $\{c \in C : I^c(x^{n-1}) < T_n\} \neq \emptyset$.
5) Let $c^* = \min\{c \in C : I^c(x^{n-1}) < T_n\}$. Then for each channel $c$, we have (i) if $c < c^*$, then $I^c(x^{n-1}) \geq T_n$,
(ii) if $c = c^*$, then $I^{c^*}(x^{n-1}) < T_n$, and (iii) if $c > c^*$, then $I^c(x^{n-1}) = 0$.

We now provide the more details of the proof as follows.
Let $B(x) = \{|n \in \mathcal{N} : x_n \neq 0|\}$ denote the number of satisfied players in strategy profile $x$. We say a strategy profile $y$ is reachable from strategy profile $x$ when $x_n \neq 0$ implies $y_n = x_n$, for each $n \in \mathcal{N}$. In other words $y$ is reachable from $x$ when $x$ can be converted to $y$ by allocating real channels to dormant users. Let $\beta(x)$ denote the maximum number of satisfied users in a strategy profile reachable from $x$.

Algorithm 1 works by initializing all users with the off channel, and then having each player switch onto the most congested (and lowest indexed) channel they can benefit from using. Our proof of the validity of Algorithm 1 works by showing that, at any stage, a social optimal is reachable from the current profile considered. In particular, our algorithm initiates from the strategy profile $x^0$ were all users are ‘off’. Every strategy profile is reachable from this initial condition, and so $\beta(x^0)$ is equal to the maximum number of satisfied users in any strategy profile of the game. For brevity, se shall refer to social optima simply as ‘optima’ or ‘optimal strategy profiles’.

The following lemma is the critical part of our proof of the validity of Algorithm 1, for it essentially asserts that $\beta(x^{n-1}) = \beta(x^n)$ for each $n \in \{1, 2, \ldots, N\}$. In other words, as one iterates the algorithm, the $n$th profile generated, $x^n$, has just as beneficial strategy profiles that can be reached from it, as the $(n-1)$th profile $x^{n-1}$ had. This result can be used with induction to show that $\beta(x^0) = \beta(x^N)$. Moreover $\beta(x^N) = B(x)$ is the number of satisfied users in the outputted strategy profile because once $x^N$ has been generated, we either have that all players have been allocated a real channel (in which case $x^N$ is the only strategy profile reachable from $x^N$), or all dormant users cannot benefit from using a real channel because their thresholds are less than or equal to the congestion level of each active channel (in
which case every strategy profile reachable from $x^N$, other than $x^N$ has suffering users). We shall state and prove this critical lemma before we continue with our proof.

**Lemma 5.5**

Let $g$ be a QoS satisfaction game with $C > 1$ channels (which are homogenous) and $N$ players, with thresholds $T_1 \geq T_2 \geq \ldots \geq T_N$. Suppose $x$ satisfies the following conditions:

1. We have that $k(x) := \{ n \in \mathcal{N} : x_n \neq 0 \}$ is non-empty, and $n^* \in N : T_{n^*} = \max \{ T_n : n \in k(x) \}$ is a player with maximal threshold in $k(x)$.
2. We have that $\exists F \in \{ 0, 1, \ldots, C - 1 \}$ such that for each $c \in \{ 1, 2, \ldots, C \}$ we have $c \leq F \Rightarrow \Gamma'(x) \geq T_{n^*}$, and $c > F \Rightarrow \Gamma'(x) < T_{n^*}$ and $c > F + 1 \Rightarrow \Gamma'(x) = 0$.
3. We have $\forall n, m \in \mathcal{N}$ that if $n \not\in k(x)$ and $m \in k(x)$ then $T_n \geq T_m$.
4. We have that $x$ has no suffering users (i.e., $x$ is natural).

Let $y$ denote the strategy profile obtained by taking $x$ and having player $n^*$ change their channel to $F + 1$. Now $\beta(y) = \beta(x)$.

**Proof of Lemma 5.5**

We shall construct a strategy profile $\Omega$ that is reachable from $x$ and such that $\Omega_{n^*} = F + 1$ and $B(\mathcal{N}) = \beta(x)$. Since $\Omega$ is reachable from $y$ we shall then have $\beta(x) = B(\mathcal{N}) = \beta(y)$.

We construct $\Omega$ by starting with a natural strategy profile $z$ that maximizes the number of benefitting users amongst those profiles reachable from $x$. Then we modify $z$ to make another strategy profile $w$. Then we modify $w$ to make $\Omega$.

Let $z : B(z) = \beta(x)$ be a strategy profile that is reachable from $x$. Suppose this profile $z$ has the maximum number of satisfied users amongst all strategy profiles reachable from $x$. Also, suppose that $z$ has no suffering users.

Now note that $B(z) > B(x)$, to see this note that points (1) and (2) above imply that, from $x$, user $n^*$ can beneficially start using channel $F + 1$ without causing any other player to cease satisfied. It follows that $x$ there are strategy profiles (such as $z$) with more satisfied users, that are reachable from $x$.

Next we claim that there must exist some player $m \in k(x)$ such that $z_m \in \{ F + 1, F + 2, \ldots, C \}$. To see that $B(z) > B(x)$ implies that there is some $m \in k(x) : z_m \neq 0$ and since $m$ must be satisfied in $z$, and $m \in k(x)$ implies $T_m \leq T_{n^*} \leq F'(x) \forall c \in \{ 1, 2, \ldots, F \}$ we must have $z_m \in \{ F + 1, F + 2, \ldots, C \}$.

If $z_m \neq 0$ then similarly we have $z_m \in \{ F + 1, F + 2, \ldots, C \}$, and in this case we let $w = z$. Now, alternatively suppose that $z_m = 0$. In this case, let $w$ be the strategy profile obtained by taking $z$ and interchanging the strategies of $n^*$ and $m$. In other words, $\forall n \in \mathcal{N}$ we have $w_n = z_n$ if $n \not\in \{ n^*, m \}$, and $w_n = z_m$ if $n = n^*$ and $w_n = z_n$ if $n = m$.

Clearly $w$ is reachable from $x$. Also, note that $w$ (like $z$) has no suffering users. To see this, we just have to note that $w$ is just like $z$ except that we have replaced the real channel user $m$, with the user $n^*$, on the same channel. Now since $m \in k(x)$ and $n^*$ has the maximum threshold of any user in $k(x)$ we must have that $T_{n^*} \geq T_m$. Now, since $m$ was satisfied in $z$ it follows that, when we replace $m$ with player $n^*$ (using the same channel), we shall have that $n^*$ is satisfied in the resulting strategy profile $w$. The reason is that $n^*$ incurs exactly the same congestion level in $w$ as $m$ incurred in $z$, and $T_{n^*} \geq T_m$. Also $B(w) = B(z)$, since the operation we use to obtain $w$ from $z$ preserves the number of users of real channels.

So now we have that $w$ is reachable from $x$ and $B(w) = B(z) = \beta(x)$. If $w_{n^*} = F + 1$ then let $\Omega = w$, and we are done. Now instead suppose $w_{n^*} \neq F + 1$. We shall describe how to construct $\Omega$ in this case.

If $I^{F+1}(w) \geq I^{w_{n^*}}(w)$ then we construct $\Omega$ by taking $w$ and swapping around the channels of $n^*$ and the member $m'$ of $R : \{ n \in \mathcal{N} : w_n = F + 1 \neq x_n \} \subseteq k(x)$ with the highest threshold. In other words, for each $n \in \mathcal{N}$ we have $n \not\in \{ n^*, m' \}$ implies $\Omega_n = w_n$ and $n = n^*$ implies $\Omega_n = w_{n^*}$ and $n = m'$ implies $\Omega_n = w_{n^*}$.

The player $m'$ in $R$ which changes their channel from $F + 1$ to $w_{n^*}$ under this operation will not stop being satisfied, since they end up in ($\Omega$) using a channel $w_{n^*}$ that is no more congested than the channel $F + 1$ they were using in $w$. Also, player $n^*$, who changes their channel from $w^*$ to $F + 1$, will not stop being satisfied since they end up in ($\Omega$) with the same congestion level as $m'$ had in $w$, but they have a threshold that is greater than or equal to that of $m'$. It follows that $n^*$ and $m'$ (and each other user of a real channel) will be satisfied in $w$. This shows $\Omega$ is natural, and $B(\mathcal{N}) = B(w)$. Also, $\Omega$ is clearly reachable from $x$ since it can be obtained by taking $z$ and altering the actions of some users from $k(x)$ who were “off” in $x$.

Now let us consider how to define $\Omega$ in the final case, where $w_{n^*} \neq F + 1$ and $I^{F+1}(w) < I^{w_{n^*}}(w)$. In this case we get $\Omega$ by having the $I^{w_{n^*}}(w) - I^{F+1}(x) \forall c \in \{ 1, 2, \ldots, F \}$ players with the highest thresholds that are using $w_{n^*}$ under $w$, change their channels to $F + 1$, whilst (simultaneously) each player from $R$ changes their channel from $F + 1$ to $w_{n^*}$. Let us be more precise. Let us name the users of $w_{n^*}$ under $w$ by writing $\{ n \in \mathcal{N} : w_n = w_{n^*} \} = \{ e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_M \}$. Here we have given the players names $e_i$ in such a way that $e_1 = n^*$ and $T_{e_1} \geq T_{e_2} \geq \ldots \geq T_{e_M}$. Now in this case, $\Omega$ is defined such that $\forall n \in \mathcal{N}$ we have $n \not\in R \cup \{ e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_{I^{F+1}(x)} - I^{F+1}(x) \}$ implies $\Omega_n = w_n$, and $n \in R$ implies $\Omega_n = w_{n^*}$, and $n \in \{ e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_{I^{w_{n^*}}(w) - I^{F+1}(x)} \}$ implies $\Omega_n = F + 1$.

Now clearly $\Omega$ is reachable from $x$ since it is obtained but taking $w$ and only altering the channels of users from $R$, $\{ n \in \mathcal{N} : w_n = w_{n^*} \} \subseteq k(x)$. Now we will show that $\Omega$ has no suffering users.

Firstly, the players in the set $R$ that change their channels from $F + 1$ to $w_{n^*}$ will still be satisfied in $\Omega$. The reason is that the congestion level these players experience in $\Omega$ will be $I^{F+1}(x) + |R|$, which is the same as the congestion level that they incurred in $w$.

Players sticking on $w_{n^*}$ in $w$ and $\Omega$ experience a congestion level $I^{w_{n^*}}(\Omega) = I^{F+1}(x) + |R| = I^{F+1}(w) < I^{w_{n^*}}(w)$ in $\Omega$ that is less than the congestion level that they incurred in $w$, so these players will still be satisfied in $\Omega$.

Players in the set $\{ e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_{I^{w_{n^*}}(w) - I^{F+1}(x)} \}$ that change their channels from $w_{n^*}$ to $F + 1$ will still be satisfied in $\Omega$, since the congestion level $I^{F+1}(\Omega) = I^{F+1}(x) + I^{w_{n^*}}(w) -$
$I^{T+1}(x) = I^{n^*}(w)$ that these users experience in $\Omega$ will be the same as the congestion levels they experienced in $w$.

Also, the players \( \{ n \in \mathcal{N} : x_n = F + 1 \} \subseteq \mathcal{N} \setminus k(\mathbf{x}) \) which stick upon channel $F + 1$ in $w$ and $\Omega$ each have thresholds greater than or equal to each player in $k(\mathbf{x})$ (according to point 3) and so, since the players \( \{ e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_{I^{n^*}(w) - I^T(x)} \} \subseteq k(\mathbf{x}) \) are satisfied upon channel $F + 1$ in $\Omega$, it follows that the players \( \{ n \in \mathcal{N} : x_n = F + 1 \} \) are also satisfied in $\Omega$.

So we have shown that each user of $w_{n^*}$, or $F + 1$ is satisfied in $\Omega$. Now since $w_{n^*}$ or $F + 1$ are the only channels that have different user sets in $\Omega$ and $w$, we have that $B(\Omega) = B(w) = B(z) = \beta(\mathbf{x})$ and $\Omega$ has no suffering users. Also note that $\Omega$ is reachable from $x$. Also, since $\Omega_{n^*} = T + 1$, we have that $\Omega$ is reachable from $y$. From this it follows that $\beta(y) = B(\Omega) = \beta(\mathbf{x})$.

Now we have proved Lemma 5.5, we shall continue our proof of Theorem 5.

Algorithm 1 runs so that we begin with all players using the zero-channel and then we update the players in order of descending threshold. \forall n \in \{1, 2, \ldots, N\}, we obtain the strategy profile $x^n$ during the $n$th iteration of our algorithm. Here $x^n$ is obtained from $x^{n-1}$ by updating player $n$ (who has the $n$th highest threshold). To update player $n$ we check if there are any channels available, that have low enough congestion levels to satisfy user $n$. If such channels exist then player $n$ starts using the one $c^*$ with the lowest index, and this action produces the strategy profile $x^n$. Otherwise, if there is no channel with a low enough congestion level for player $n$ to benefit from using, then we say that $x^n$ is “full”. In this case we will have that $x^n = x^{n+1} = \ldots x^N$ because every subsequent update will involve getting a user $n' > n$, with a threshold $T_{n'} \leq T_n$ and checking if there is a channel with a congestion level below the threshold $T_{n'}$ (i.e., stage 3 of the algorithm), and there will be no channel with congestion level below $T_{n'}$, because there was no channel with congestion level below $T_n$. So it follows that once our algorithm hits a full $x^n$, it will output $x^N = x^n$ eventually.

We say a state $x$ has property $(F, n^*)$ when the following conditions hold:

1. We have that $k(\mathbf{x}) := \{ n \in \mathcal{N} : x_n \neq 0 \}$ is non-empty, and $n^* \in \mathcal{N} : T_{n^*} = \max\{T_n : n \in k(\mathbf{x})\}$ is a player with maximal threshold in $k(\mathbf{x})$.
2. We have that $\exists F \in \{0, 1, \ldots, C - 1\}$ such that for each $c \in \{1, 2, \ldots, C\}$ we have $c \leq F \Rightarrow I^c(x) \geq T_{n^*}$ and $c > F \Rightarrow I^c(x) < T_{n^*}$, and $c > F + 1 \Rightarrow I^c(x) = 0$.
3. We have $\forall n, m \in \mathcal{N}$ that if $n \notin k(\mathbf{x})$ and $m \in k(\mathbf{x})$ then $T_n \geq T_m$.
4. We have that $x$ has no suffering users.

Clearly $x^0$ has property $(0, 1)$ since $c > 0 \Rightarrow I^c(x^0) = 0 < T_1$ and $k(\mathbf{x}) = \{1, 2, \ldots, N\}$.

Now we claim (***) that $\forall n \in \{1, 2, \ldots, N - 1\}$ that if $x^{n-1}$ has property $(F, n)$ and $x^n$ is not full then the strategy profile $x^n$ presents upon the next iteration of our algorithm will have property $(F', n + 1)$, for some $F'$.

To see this note that if $x^{n-1}$ has property $(F, n)$ and $x^n$ is not full then $c^* = \min\{c \in \{1, 2, \ldots, C\} : I^c(x^{n-1}) < T_n\} = F + 1$ and $x^n$ is the strategy profile obtained by having player $n$ start using channel $F + 1$.

This move will not cause any of the previous users of channel $F + 1$ to cease satisfied (since all their thresholds are at least as large as $n$’s threshold). Also, $n$ will clearly be satisfied in $x^n$. It follows that $x^n$ has no suffering users. Also, it follows that $k(x^n) = k(x^{n-1}) - \{n\} = \{n + 1, n + 2, \ldots, N\}$, where $n + 1$ is the player with the maximum threshold in $x^n$ that is not satisfied.

Now either $I^c(x^{n-1}) + 1 < T_{n+1}$ in which case $x^n$ has property $(F, n + 1)$, since $F = c^*$ is still the channel that $n + 1$ is destined to switch to, or $I^c(x^{n-1}) + 1 \geq T_{n+1}$, in which case $x^n$ has property $(F + 1, n + 1)$, since $F + 1 = c^* + 1$ is the channel that the $n + 1$ is destined to switch to.

Now since the initial condition $x^0 = (0, 0, \ldots, 0)$ has property $(F, n^*)$ for some $F$ and $n^*$, we can use induction to show that every time $x^n \neq x^{n-1}$ (i.e., every time the system is not full) we have that $x^n$ has property $(A, B)$ for some $(A, B)$.

If $x^i$ has the property with respect to $(A_i, B_i)$ then Lemma 5.5 implies that $x^{i+1}$ has the property that $\beta(x^i) = \beta(\mathbf{x}^+)$.

Now if the system never gets full then we have that $x^1, x^2, \ldots, x^{N-1}$ each $x^i$ has the property, for some pair $(A_i, B_i)$. It follows that $\beta(x^1) = \beta(x^2) = \ldots \beta(x^{N-1}) = \beta(x^n) = B(x^n)$, where $x^n$ is the output. The reason $\beta(x^n) = B(x^n)$ is because every user is satisfied in $x^n$ in this case, so $x^n$ is the only strategy profile reachable from $x^n$.

Similarly, if the system gets full up on time step $j$ then we have, for each $i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, j\}$ that $x^i$ has the property, for some pair $(A_i, B_i)$. It follows that $\beta(x^i) = \beta(x^j)$. Moreover since $x^j$ is full, we have $x^j = x^{j+1} = \ldots = x^N$, and so $\beta(x^j) = \beta(x^N)$. Also, since $x^N$ is full, no more users can be made to benefit from $x^N$ and so $\beta(x^N) = B(x^N)$.

And so we have shown that the maximum number of satisfied users that can be obtained in any strategy profile, which is $\beta(x^0)$, is equal to the number of satisfied users in the strategy profile $x^n$ outputted by our algorithm. This shows that the output $x^N$ is an optimum strategy profile of the game.

Now we just have to show that $x^N$ is a pure Nash equilibrium. To see this note that if a user in $x^N$ did want to switch channels, then they would want to benefit. This would only be possible if the system has reached a full state previously (since if the algorithm never hits a full state then its output is optimal, and unsatisfied users do not exist). So there must have come some earlier time when the system became full. From this point on, we have that each channel has an congestion level too high for any user of an off channel to benefit from switching to them, and so in fact it is impossible for the final state $x^N$ to have any users which are not satisfied that can increase their utilities by increasing channels.

Individual executions of stages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the algorithm can be performed in $O(N), O(1), O(C), O(C), O(N), O(1), O(1)$ and $O(1)$ time respectively. Only stages 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are repeated. Each of these stages can be performed once in $O(CN)$ time. These procedure where each of these stages are performed once is repeated $N$ time. The complete procedure/loop (that is initiated on stage 2) this takes $O(CN^2)$ time. This $O(CN^2)$
term dominates the execution times of all stages outside this loop, and so the total run time of the system is \(O(CN^2)\).

E. Proof of Theorem 6

Let \(x\) be the strategy profile where \(x_n = 1 + (n \mod C)\), \(\forall n \in N, \forall c \in C = \{1, 2, \ldots, C\}\) (i.e., where the users are spaced as evenly across the channels as possible). For such a strategy profile, we have \(I'(x) \leq \left\lfloor \frac{N}{2} \right\rfloor \leq T_n, \forall c \in C\), and so every player is satisfied.

F. Proof of Theorem 7

Let us define the function \(\Phi\) (which maps strategy profiles to real numbers) such that for each strategy profile \(x\) we have \(\Phi(x) = \left(\sum_{n \in N; x_n \neq 0} T_n^c\right) - \sum_{c=1}^{C} \left\lfloor \frac{\left\{ \{n, m\} \in E : x_n = x_m = c \} \right\rfloor}{2} \right\rfloor\). Here \(\{\{n, m\} \in E : x_n = x_m = c\}\) is the number of edges linking users playing channel \(c\), and \(\left\{ \{n \in N : x_n = c\}\right\}\) is the number of players using channel \(c\). In other words, \(\Phi(x)\) is equal to [the sum of the thresholds which the non-dormant users associate with their channels] minus [the number of edges linking users of the same channel] minus [half the number of non-dormant users].

Suppose player \(n'\) does a better response update by changing their strategy from \(c' \in \{0, 1, \ldots, C\}\) to \(d' \in \{0, 1, \ldots, C\}\), and this has the effect of changing the strategy profile from \(x\) to \(y = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n'-1}, d', x_{n'+1}, \ldots, x_N)\).

Next we will show \(\Phi(y) \geq \Phi(x) + \frac{1}{2}\) in each of the three possible cases:

1. \(c' = 0, d' \neq 0\) (i.e., when \(n'\) stops being dormant).
2. \(c' \neq 0, d' = 0\) (i.e., when \(n'\) becomes dormant).
3. \(c' \neq 0, d' \neq 0\) (i.e., when \(n'\) switches from one channel to another).

In case 1), where \(c' = 0, d' \neq 0\), we have \(\Phi(y) = \Phi(x) + T_n^d - T_n^{c'} - \frac{1}{2}\), because the action where player \(n'\) switches to channel \(d'\) increases the number of edges linking users of \(d'\) by \(I_n^d(x)\) and decreases the number of players using resource \(d'\) by \(T_n\). Also, since our move is a better response update, we have \(U_n(x) = 0\) and \(U_n(y) = 1\), and so \(T_n^c \geq I_n^c(x) + 1\). It follows that \(\Phi(y) - \Phi(x) = T_n^d - I_n^{c'}(x) - \frac{1}{2} \geq \frac{1}{2}\).

In case 2), where \(c' \neq 0, d' = 0\), we have \(\Phi(y) = \Phi(x) - T_n^{c'} + I_n^{c'}(x) - 1 + \frac{1}{2}\), because the action where player \(n'\) leaves channel \(c'\) decreases the number of edges linking users of \(c'\) by \(I_n^c(x) - 1\) and decreases the number of users of resource \(c'\) by \(1\). Also, since our move is a better response update, we have \(U_n(x) = -1\) and \(U_n(y) = 1\). It follows that \(T_n^{c'} \leq I_n^{c'}(x) - 1\). It follows that \(\Phi(y) - \Phi(x) = I_n^{c'}(x) - 1 - T_n^{c'} + \frac{1}{2} \geq \frac{1}{2}\).

In case 3), where \(c' \neq 0, d' \neq 0\), we have \(\Phi(y) = \Phi(x) + T_n^{d'} - I_n^{c'} + I_n^{d'} - T_n^{d'}\), and so \(T_n^{d'} \geq I_n^{d'}(y)\). Also, since our move is a better response update, we have \(U_n(x) = -1\) and \(U_n(y) = 1\). It follows that \(\Phi(y) - \Phi(x) \geq 1\).

Without loss of generality, we can suppose that \(-1 \leq T_n^c \leq N + 1\), \(\forall n \in N, \forall c \in \{1, 2, \ldots, C\}\), since thresholds less than \(-1\) induce the same kind of behavior as thresholds equal to \(-1\) (i.e., they can never be satisfied) and thresholds greater than \(N + 1\) induce the same kind of behavior as thresholds equal to \(N + 1\) (i.e., they are always satisfied). For any strategy profile \(x\) we have \((-1)N \leq \left(\sum_{n \in N; x_n \neq 0} T_n^c\right) \leq (N + 1)\). It is also true that \(0 \leq \sum_{n \in N; x_n \neq 0} T_n^c \leq \frac{N(N+1)}{2}\). From these inequalities, it follows that \(N \leq \Phi(x) \leq (N + 1) + \frac{CN(N+1)}{2} + \frac{CN}{N} = N + 3N^2\).

When we start to evolve our system, the value of \(\Phi\) for the initial strategy profile cannot be less than \(-N\). Also, the value of \(\Phi\) will increase by at least \(\frac{1}{2}\) with every better response update. Now suppose we have performed \(t\) better response updates (i.e., we have run the system for \(t\) time slots) and arrived at strategy profile \(y\). We must have \(-N + \frac{1}{2} \leq \Phi(x) + \frac{1}{2} \leq \Phi(y) \leq N + \frac{3N^2}{2}\), because the value of \(\Phi\) increases by at least \(\frac{1}{2}\) on each time step. This implies \(t \leq 4N + 3(N^2)\).

So far we have shown that it is impossible to run the system (with asynchronous better response updates) for more than \(t = 4N + 3(N^2)\) time slots. This implies that when we evolve the system under asynchronous better response updates, we must reach a strategy profile \(z\) from which no further better response updates can be performed, within \(4N + 3(N^2)\) time slots. Such a strategy profile \(z\) must be a pure Nash equilibrium by definition. □

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