Design and Analysis of Coalitions in Data Swarming Systems

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Abstract—We design and analyze a mechanism for forming coalitions of peers in a data swarming system where peers have heterogeneous upload capacities. A coalition is a set of peers that explicitly cooperate with other peers inside the coalition via choking, data replication, and capacity allocation strategies. Further, each peer interacts with other peers outside its coalition via potentially distinct choking, data replication, and capacity allocation strategies. Following on our preliminary work in [18] that demonstrated significant performance benefits of coalitions, we present here a comprehensive analysis of the choking and data replication strategies for coalitions.

We first develop an analytical model to understand a simple random choking strategy as a within-coalition strategy and show that it accurately predicts a coalition’s performance. Our analysis formally shows that the random choking strategy can help a coalition achieve near-optimal performance by optimally choosing the re-choking interval lengths and the number of unchoke slots. Further, our analytical model can be easily adapted to model a BitTorrent-like swarm. We also introduce a simple data replication strategy which significantly improves data availability within a coalition as compared to the rarest-first piece replication strategy employed in BitTorrent systems. We further propose a cooperation-aware better response strategy that achieves convergence of the dynamic coalition formation process when peers freely join or leave any coalition. Finally, using extensive simulations, we demonstrate improvements in the performance of a swarming system due to coalition formation.

I. INTRODUCTION

There have been many recent studies on BitTorrent-like swarming systems, mainly via modeling, measurement, and simulation (see for example, [1], [3], [4], [6], [9], [14]). However, there is still a lack of significant understanding of cooperative behavior and its impact on swarming systems, except a very few studies viz. [7], [12], [18]. Following on our initial study in [18], we formally investigate cooperative peer behavior in swarming systems through analytical modeling, design and extensive simulations.

Similar to most existing works (e.g., [11]), we consider a swarming system where there is a content publisher (i.e., an initial seed) that never leaves the system and serves a file (divided into a set of pieces) to a heterogeneous population of peers with different upload capacities. Besides downloading from the publisher, peers also exchange pieces of the shared file among themselves. Since a basic functionality of a data swarming system is to let users download data, we investigate whether explicit cooperation among a group of peers can significantly reduce their file download completion time. Such a group is referred to as a coalition [18]. Each peer in a coalition cooperates with other peers inside the coalition via choking, data replication, and capacity allocation strategies. Further, each peer interacts with other peers outside its coalition via potentially distinct choking, data replication, and capacity allocation strategies. Our initial study [18] demonstrates that a coalition of peers not only significantly reduces the individual peer download completion times, but also yields performance benefits to the whole swarm. As mentioned in [18], the notion of coalitions differs from that of clusters studied in [8], which are formed as a consequence of the selfish nature of peers and the Tit-for-Tat strategy. Unlike a coalition, the lack of cooperation between peers in a cluster can degrade the performance of the peers in the cluster [4]. Another related but different notion is that of a buddy group proposed in [7]. However, we have shown in [18] that our coalition design significantly outperforms the choking strategy adopted by peers in a buddy group.

The present work differs from our initial work [18] in the following important ways:

1) We present an analytical model for investigating the random choking strategy used by peers in a coalition. Our model takes into consideration that a peer may concurrently download multiple distinct pieces, which is not considered in [18]. We also explicitly model the impact of re-choking interval lengths (i.e., the duration of time elapsed before a peer decides on a new set of peers to unchoke) and the number of unchoke slots on the coalition performance, whereas in [18], the impact of these two key parameters is only observed via simulations.

2) We then use the analytical model to optimally design a coalition. In particular, our model yields optimal values of the re-choking interval length and the number of unchoke slots in each re-choke interval. Such a model-based optimal design is an important distinction of this work from [18].

3) In order to improve data availability, we introduce a Peer-balance Rarest-first Piece Selection strategy for data replication in a coalition. Data availability has not been studied in [18].

4) Using extensive simulations on a data set of peer upload capacities collected from real-world swarming systems, we explore the impact of forming coalitions on the overall performance of a swarm, and investigate whether
coalitions can be dynamically reached in practice, as peers enter and leave the system. In [18], simulations are only conducted on synthetic data sets of two capacity classes of peers.

A. Main Results

We make the following important contributions in this paper.

1) We introduce a detailed analytical model of a coalition in data swarming systems. This analytical model can be easily adapted to study different choking strategies for coalitions, and even to a general BitTorrent-like swarm. Using our model, we analyze the impact of the length of re-choking intervals and the number of unchoke slots on the system performance. Further, these two parameters can be optimally chosen based on our model so as to minimize the average download completion time.

2) Using our analytical model, we observe that a coalition of peers adopting a simple random choking strategy as the within-coalition choking strategy exhibits near-optimal performance. This is particularly appealing since (i) the random choking strategy is simple and easily implementable in a distributed fashion by peers in a coalition, and (ii) finding an optimal choking strategy appears infeasible.

3) We further propose a data replication strategy and show that it significantly outperforms the conventional first-first strategy in terms of data availability in a coalition.

4) Using extensive simulations with a real-world data set of peer upload capacities, we show that coalitions improve the overall performance of a swarm if the majority of peers form a coalition. Furthermore, we propose an improved cooperation-aware better response strategy (from the scheme proposed in [18]) that achieves convergence of the coalition size (i.e., number of peers in the coalition), even when peers are allowed to freely join or leave any coalition.

Related work. This paper follows on our initial study on coalitions in [18]. Modeling the swarm as a sequence of download stages or stations first appeared in Menasche et al [11]. Tian et al [17] study peer distribution as a function of the fraction of downloaded file. The models in [4] [6] also study the steady state of a swarming system. [5] attempts to minimize average finish time in P2P networks, but it assumes that the shared file is broken into infinitely small pieces such that there is no forwarding delay. Rafit et al [7] propose a buddy protocol for peers to form buddy groups (similar to coalitions). Basics of dynamic coalition formation and the cooperative game theory framework can be found in [16] [2] [10] [15]. Misra et al [12] studies cooperation in peer-assisted services, but their model is not applicable to the swarming systems of interest in this paper.

B. Organization of the Paper

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We outline the overall coalition design in Section II. In Section III, we introduce our analytical model that accurately predicts the file download time of a coalition and also yields the optimal parameter settings. In Section IV, we present our data replication strategy among peers in a coalition, and show that it improves data availability significantly. In Section V, using simulations we demonstrate that coalitions improve data swarming performance as a whole. Finally, we conclude in Section VI.

II. Preliminaries: Overview of Coalition Design

In this section, we briefly review the overall system design of a coalition (introduced in [18]). Throughout this paper, a coalition is defined to be a set of peers that cooperate with each other within the set and interact with peers not in the set, both according to a choking strategy, a piece selection strategy, and an upload capacity allocation strategy. Different from [18], we allow peers in a coalition to have different upload capacities. As for a coalition, we ideally would like to design the choking, capacity allocation and piece selection strategies so as to minimize the average file download completion time of the peers in a coalition. However, our focus in this paper is primarily on designing an efficient choking and piece selection strategies. Recall that the upload capacity allocation strategy specifies how a peer determines the fraction of its upload capacity that is allocated to each of its downloaders. As in [18], we assume that a peer does not allocate capacity to peers outside its coalition, and equally splits its upload capacity among all of its downloaders in the same coalition. A detailed study of more general capacity allocation strategies is a topic for future work.

For completeness, we describe preliminaries introduced in [18]. We also re-state our random choking strategy for a coalition, which will be analyzed in detail in subsequent sections.

A. Choking Strategy

In BitTorrent-like swarming systems, a peer unchokes a fixed number of peers at points in time spaced \( \delta_t \) units apart. This interval \( \delta_t \) is referred to as the re-choking interval. The choking strategy of a peer in a coalition determines the set of peers that this peer unchokes, and consists of two rules: one for dealing with peers in the same coalition, referred to as the within-coalition choking strategy; and the other for dealing with peers outside the coalition. The within-coalition choking strategy proposed in [18] is as follows. Each peer in a coalition uniformly at random unchoke at points in time spaced \( \delta_t \) time units. We refer to this strategy as the random choking strategy. In our previous work [18], the values of \( \delta_t \) and \( k \) were empirically chosen to minimize the average download completion time for a coalition. In this paper, we give a detailed analytical model that yields the optimal values for \( \delta_t \) and \( k \). A basic requirement is that the values of \( k \) and \( \delta_t \) should be chosen so that a peer can upload at least a complete piece to each of its data receivers. Regarding the rule to deal with peers outside a coalition, for simplicity, we assume in this paper that each peer chooses all other peers outside its coalition. Note that a peer in a coalition can still
receive data from peers outside the coalition when the peer is optimistically unchoked by other peers. Studying different strategies for interacting with peers outside a coalition is a topic for future investigation.

We now proceed to describe our analytical model of choking strategy for coalitions.

III. MODEL AND DESIGN OF CHOKING STRATEGY

We now introduce an analytical model that enables analysis of the random choking strategy. This model differs from the one in [18] in that this model explicitly models the impact of re-choking interval $\delta_t$ and the number of un choke slots $k$ on the performance of a coalition. As we will see, our model yields the optimal values of $\delta_t$ and $k$, which were observed only via simulations in our previous work [18].

A. Assumptions and Steady State Representation of a Swarm

As in [18], we assume that peers arrive to the system according to a Poisson process with rate $\lambda$, and each peer has an upload capacity of $u_0$. We use the random variable (r.v.) $N$ to denote the total number of peers in the system. We assume that all peers are interested in the same file, which is divided into $B$ pieces. There is an initial seed (or content publisher) with upload capacity $u_s$ in the system, and it never leaves the system. On the other hand, each peer leaves the system immediately after it has received all the pieces of the file. The data swarm can be modeled as a queuing system with $B + 1$ M/G/\infty queues. The $i$-th queue (with $i = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, B - 1, B$), also referred to as download stage $i$, consists of peers in possession of exactly $i$ pieces. Let r.v. $N_i$ denote the number of peers in the $i$-th queue and $N_i$ its expectation. Peers in the $i$-th queue jump in the $j$-th queue with rate $\beta_{ij}$. In steady state, $dN_i(t)/dt = 0$, i.e., the arrival and the departure rates of peers for a given queue are identical.

Let $\gamma_{ij} = \beta_{ij}/N_i$. In other words, $\gamma_{ij}$ denotes the transition rate of an arbitrary peer in $i$-th queue to $j$-th queue. The reason for introducing $\gamma_{ij}$ is because $\beta_{ij}$ depends on the downloading rates of individual peers in the $i$-th queue. In other words, once we know the downloading rates, we can easily calculate $\beta_{ij}$. Further, it is intuitive to relate an individual peer’s download rate to coalition parameters such as $\delta_t$ or $k$, as will become clear later in the section. To calculate $\gamma_{ij}$, we need to compute downloading rate of a peer and the fraction of time it actively downloads data in each queue.

The arrival rate of peers to queue $i$ (where $i = 1, \ldots, B$) is given by

$$\lambda_i = \sum_{\ell=0}^{i-1} \beta_{\ell i} = \sum_{\ell=0}^{i-1} \gamma_{\ell i} N_\ell$$

and the departure rate of peers from queue $i$ (where $i = 0, 1, \ldots, B - 1$) is given by

$$\mu_i = \sum_{\ell=i+1}^{B} \beta_{\ell i} = N_i \sum_{\ell=i+1}^{B} \gamma_{\ell i}$$

Note that for queue $0$, we have $\lambda_0 = \lambda$, which is the arrival rate of peers to the coalition. Similarly, for queue $B$, we have $\mu_B = \infty$, as we assume that peers immediately leave the system once finish downloading.

In steady state, the arrival rate of peers to queue $i$ is equal to the departure rate of peers leaving from queue $i$. Thus,

$$\sum_{\ell=0}^{i-1} \gamma_{\ell i} N_\ell = \sum_{\ell=i+1}^{B} \gamma_{\ell i}$$

In the following, we model the transition rates $\gamma_{ij}$ and $N_i$ as functions of $\delta_t$ and $k$. As shown later, solving the set of equations given in (3) yields the optimal values of $\delta_t$ and $k$ that minimize the expected download completion time.

For simplicity, we use the following notational simplification in the remainder of this section. We use $P(X)$ to represent $P(X = 1)$, where $X$ is an indicator r.v.

B. Re-choking Interval $\delta_t$

Let $p_i$ and $p_j$ denote arbitrary peers in the $i$-th and the $j$-th queues respectively. Suppose that $p_j$ randomly unchoke $k$ other peers in each re-choking interval $\delta_t$. Let $U_j$ denote the average per-connection upload rate of $p_j$. Then, it takes $1/U_j$ seconds for $p_j$ to completely send one piece to each of its downloaders. Suppose that $p_i$ is unchoked by $p_j$ during a re-choking interval $\delta_t$. During this re-choking interval, $p_j$ continues to download data from other peers and may transit to another queue upon downloading one or more pieces. Let $D_{ij} = (\sum_{\ell=j+1}^{B} \gamma_{ij})$ denote its transition rate out of queue $j$. Then the effective time interval that $p_j$ unchokes $p_i$ (while $p_j$ is still in queue $j$) is given by $\min(\delta_t, 1/D_j)$. We can divide this effective time interval into $\varphi_j$ time slots, each long enough for $p_j$ to completely upload a piece to a downloader. More formally, $\varphi_j = \max(1, \min(\delta_t, 1/D_j)/(1/U_j))$.

C. $p_i$’s expected per-connection upload rate $U_j$

Let $B_{ij}$ be an indicator random variable that is set to 1 when $p_i$ is “interested” in $p_j$ in steady state i.e. $p_j$ has one or more pieces which $p_i$ does not. Assume that $p_j$ assigns one of the $\varphi_j$ slots to $p_i$ uniformly at random upon unchoking $p_i$. Let $B^t_{ij}$ be an indicator random variable that is set to 1 when $p_i$ is interested in $p_j$ if $p_i$ is in $\ell$-th slot unchoked by $p_j$, where $\ell = 1, \ldots, \varphi_j$. Note that $P(B^t_{ij})$ is a conditional probability. It follows that

$$P(B_{ij}) = \left( \sum_{\ell=1}^{\varphi_j} P(B^t_{ij}) \right) / \varphi_j$$

In Appendix VII, we describe the calculation of $P(B^t_{ij})$.

In [18], we assumed that in steady state, the data pieces that have been downloaded both by $p_i$ and $p_j$ are chosen from $B$ pieces independently and uniformly at random. In particular, we obtain

$$P(B_{ij}) = \begin{cases} 1 - \left( \frac{B-j}{B-1} \right)^i / \varphi_j, & \text{if } i \geq j, \\ 0, & \text{if } i < j. \end{cases}$$

However, in our current model, (5) is true only when $p_i$ is unchoked by $p_j$ and is assigned the first slot. Since $p_i$ can be assigned any of the $\varphi_j$ slots in a re-choking interval, (4) represents a more accurate calculation of $P(B_{ij})$, as compared to (5).
We assume that all $k$ out-connections of $p_j$ are assigned to other peers independently, and any out-connection is assigned uniformly at random to all other peers in the system. Let $\eta_j$ denote the probability that an out-connection of $p_j$ is active, i.e., there is ongoing data transmission over the connection. Note that an out-connection may not be active if the unchoked peer is not interested in the data possessed by $p_j$. Then, $\eta_j = \sum_{i=0}^{B-1} \tilde{N}_i \cdot P(B_{ij}) / \left( \sum_{i=0}^{B-1} \tilde{N}_i \right)$ (6)

We finally obtain the expected per-connection upload rate as $\bar{U}_j = \sum_{w=1}^{k} \frac{u_j}{w} \left( k \right) \eta_j^w (1 - \eta_j)^{k-w}$ (7)

D. The data transfer connection from $p_j$ to $p_i$

Let $S_{ij}$ be an indicator random variable that is set to 1 if the connection from $p_j$ queue to $p_i$ is active. Per the random choking strategy, each peer in the coalition unchokes another peer in the coalition chosen uniformly at random.

Let $A_{ij}$ be an indicator random variable that is set to 1 if $p_j$ unchokes $p_i$ in an rechoking interval $\delta_i$. It follows that $P(A_{ij}) = \sum_{w=1}^{k} (1 - p)^{w-1} p$ (8)

where $p = 1 / \sum_{\ell=1}^{B-1} \tilde{N}_\ell$.

Finally, $P(S_{ij}) = P(A_{ij})P(B_{ij})$

E. Transition Rates $\gamma_{ij}$

Consider an arbitrary peer $p_i$ in queue $i$. Depending on the number of active download connections of $p_i$, it can transit to any queue $j$, where $i < j \leq B$. Let $q_{ij}^\ell$ denote the probability that $p_i$ has $\ell$ active download connections (each of which is downloading a distinct piece), and let $D_{ij}^\ell$ denote the download rate per piece. Assuming that all $\ell$ connections complete their piece transfers at the same time, then $p_i$ will jump to queue $i + \ell$ with transition rate $q_{ij}^\ell D_{ij}^\ell$. The exact calculation of $q_{ij}^\ell$ and $D_{ij}^\ell$ is computationally very expensive, as it involves an exponential number of combinatorial terms. For instance, consider the case when $\ell = 3$. We need to consider all possible combinations of queues that originate these 3 active connections. As an example, the probability of the event that the connections are from queues 2, 3, 4 is given by $P(S_{i,2})P(S_{i,3})P(S_{i,4})$. Further, the active connections have data rates $\bar{U}_2, \bar{U}_3, \bar{U}_4$. Since the exact computation of download rates of peers is not practical, we approximate the transition rates as follows.

Let $\tilde{N}_{up}$ denote the expected number of peers uploading data in the system in steady state. Then, $\tilde{N}_{up} = \sum_{j=1}^{B-1} \tilde{N}_j$ (9)

We exclude peers in queue 0 from the calculation of $\tilde{N}_{up}$, since these peers do not have a complete piece yet.

Recall that $P(S_{ij})$ denotes the probability that peer $p_i$ has an active in-connection from $p_j$, an arbitrary peer in queue $j$, and is a function of $i$ and $j$. We approximate the system by assuming that all peers in various queues have identical probabilities of their upload-connections being active when attempting data transfer to $p_i$. Let $P(S_i)$ denote this probability, which is given by $P(S_i) = \left( \sum_{j=1}^{B-1} \tilde{N}_j \cdot P(S_{ij}) \right) / \tilde{N}_{up}$ (10)

Remarks. Note that (10) represents the probability that an arbitrary in-connection of $p_i$ is active, whereas (6) represents the probability that an arbitrary out-connection of $p_j$ is active. (10) is simply an approximation to the system, while (6) follows immediately from the random choking strategy.

Let $\bar{U}$ denote the expected (steady-state) per-connection upload rate averaged over all peers in the system. Then, $\bar{U} = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{B-1} \tilde{N}_i \bar{U}_i \right) / \tilde{N}_{up}$ (11)

Let $W_i$ denote the the number of active in-connections of $p_i$. If $W_i = w$, then $p_i$ will transit from queue $i$ to queue $i + w$. Thus, we have $i + 1 \leq i + w \leq B$ and $w \leq \tilde{N}_{up} - 1$. Let $W_i$ denote the upper bound on $W_i$. It is easy to see that $W_i = \min(B-i, \sum_{\ell=0}^{B-1} \tilde{N}_\ell - 1)$. Therefore, $W_i$ follows a truncated binomial distribution with parameter $(\tilde{N}_{up}, P(S_{ij}))$ with an upper bound given by $W_i$. Thus, the probability that $w$ in-connections are active is given by $P(W_i = w) = \binom{\tilde{N}_{up}}{w} P(S_i)^w (1 - P(S_i))^{\tilde{N}_{up} - w} / \sum_{\ell=1}^{B-1} \tilde{N}_\ell P(W_i = \ell)$ (12)

Assuming that the $w$ connections start and complete piece transfers at the same time, $\gamma_{i,i+w}$ can be calculated as $\gamma_{i,i+w} = \left( \bar{U} \cdot P(W_i = w) \right) / \sum_{\ell=1}^{B-1} \tilde{N}_\ell P(W_i = \ell)$ (13)

Let $P(i, i + w)$ denote the probability that $p_i$ directly transit from queue $i$ to queue $j$ in one hop, i.e., $P(i, i + w) = P(W_i = w)$ (14)

Remarks. Note that our model assumes that a peer has the same expected per-connection download rate when in different queues in steady state. However, different peers are allowed to have different departure rates when they are in different queues. For an arbitrary peer in $i$-th queue, its departure rate is given by $\sum_{\ell=i+1}^{B} \gamma_{i\ell}$, and the time it spends in the $i$-th queue is exponentially distributed with mean $1 / \sum_{\ell=i+1}^{B} \gamma_{i\ell}$.

F. Download completion time

Based on the analysis in Sections III-B, III-C, III-D, III-E, we can now solve the set of equations given in (3) to find:

- the expected number of peers in each queue in steady state,
- the probability that a peer in $i$-th queue is concurrently downloading $w$ pieces, i.e., $P(i, i + w)$, $\forall i$ and $1 \leq w \leq B - i$,
- the expected transition rates $\gamma_{ij}$ with $i = 0, 1, ..., B - 1$ and $j = i + 1, ..., B$.

We can then compute the expected download completion time of a peer in steady state as follows.
Let $T_i$ denote the expected remaining download completion time of a peer in the $i$-th queue. The expected time that a peer stays in the $i$-th queue is given by $1/\sum B_{i+1} \gamma_{\ell,i}$. We can now compute $T_i$ recursively as follows:

$$T_i = (1/\sum_{\ell=i+1} B_{i+1}) \gamma_{\ell,i} + \sum_{\ell=i+1}^{B_{i+1}} P(i, \ell) \cdot T_\ell$$

(15)

$$T_{B-1} = (1/\gamma_{B-1,B})$$

(16)

Thus $T_0$ gives us the expected download completion time of a newly arrived peer. $T_0$ can be efficiently computed using dynamic programming.

Note that a special case of this model occurs when a peer makes exactly $B$ transitions during the downloading process, i.e., visits each queue exactly once. This case has been considered in the simple model for coalition choking strategy in our previous work [18].

G. Model Validation

We next validate our analytical model by comparing its numerical results with extensive simulations of a coalition using the random choking strategy. Throughout our simulations, we model the arrival of peers to the swarm as a Poisson process with an arrival rate of 20 peers/minute. Both the initial seed’s and peers’ upload capacities are set to 0.5 pieces/second. The seed’s duration of re-choking interval is set to 10 seconds, and we vary the re-choking interval from 10 – 30 seconds. We consider a file with $B = 60$ pieces. Each simulation lasts a duration of 4000 seconds, and we obtain data from the steady state (3000 – 4000 seconds) when the number of peers in the system is stabilized.

Figure 1 compares the numerical results computed from our model with the simulation results. Figure 1 shows that for a given value of $\delta_i$, there indeed exists an optimal value of $k$, the number of unchocking slots. For example, when $\delta_i = 10$ seconds, the optimal value of $k$ is around 4. We find that our model results in general matches well with the simulation results.

Figure 2 shows the numerical results of our model for different re-choking interval lengths. We see that when the number of unchoke slots is around 5, the expected download completion time is the lowest for $\delta_i = 20, 30$ seconds, and close to the lowest for $\delta_i = 10$ seconds. Note that in Figure 2, the lower bound for download completion time is 120 seconds, as the file size is $B = 60$ pieces and $u_p = 0.5$ piece/second. When $k$ is small (less than 4), the expected download completion time is shorter when $\delta_i = 10$ seconds than $\delta_i = 20, 30$ seconds. This is because that longer re-choking interval can lead to decreased interestedness of a downloader in its data uploaders, i.e., $P(B_{ij})$ decreases with increasing $\delta_i$. However, as $k$ gets larger, the decreased interestedness can be compensated for by an increased probability that a peer is unchoked by some other peer, i.e., $P(A_{ij})$ increases with $k$. This is apparent in Figure 2 where the expected completion times across different re-choking intervals approach each other when $k$ is large.

In the extreme case when the number of unchoke slots is very small (less than 1 second), the optimal value of $\delta_i$ is shorter when file size is larger, the decreased interestedness can be compensated for by an increased probability that a peer is unchoked by some other peer. For example, when $\delta_i = 10$ seconds, and the second plot is for $\delta_i = 20$ seconds. The boxplots show the simulation results, where the line in each box represents the median, and the upper and lower edges of each box correspond to the 25th and 75th percentiles respectively, and each ‘*’ mark shows the average download completion time. The diamonds show numerical results from our model.

H. Extensions of The Model

We note that our model can be generalized to other BitTorrent-like swarming system. For example, in our previous work [18], we find $P(S_{ij})$ (probability of the connection from $p_j$ to $p_i$ being active) and $U_j$ (per-connection upload rate from
$p_j$ for a BitTorrent swarm. If we plug these equations into our model, we can analyze the performance of a BitTorrent swarm. Second, for a coalition of peers with heterogeneous upload capacities, we can simply use the average capacity over all the peers in the coalition as the $u_p$ in our model. A more correct analysis would involve dividing the coalition into multiple capacity classes, each class consisting of peers with approximately the same upload capacities, and then treat each queue as a system of multiple queues, each corresponding to a capacity class. We can then apply the analytical machinery described in this section to analyze the system. Nevertheless, our simulations in Section V show that a coalition with heterogeneous peers can also significantly improve performance.

IV. PIECE SELECTION STRATEGY IMPROVES DATA AVAILABILITY OF COALITION

A. Strategy Design

In this section, we propose a piece selection strategy (for data replication in a coalition) to improve the data availability within a coalition. This strategy is referred to as Peer-Balance Rarest-First Piece Selection strategy. This strategy specifies that, a peer in a coalition first finds the set $S$ of pieces which are the rarest across the whole coalition (i.e., those pieces are possessed by the least number of peers in the coalition), when requesting pieces from other peers. Furthermore, when a peer finds that there is more than one piece in $S$, then for each piece $k \in S$ and among all peers missing $k$, this peer identifies the peer with the least number of pieces, denoted by $m_k$. Then, the peer selects a piece $b^* \in S$ for request to download, where $b^*$ satisfies $m_{b^*} = \min_{k \in S} m_k$. Intuitively, this strategy gives the highest priority to the rarest piece (among all pieces in the rarest set) which is not possessed by the peer (denoted by $p_{b^*}$) that possesses the smallest number of pieces. Thus, $p_{b^*}$ will be more likely to find an available piece to download in future. In contrast, in BitTorrent’s rarest-first policy, a peer arbitrarily chooses a piece to request from among all pieces in the rarest set.

We illustrate our strategy using the following example. Table I depicts matrix $V$ whose rows represents piece of the file, and the columns represent the peers. $v_{ij}$ (the $(i,j)$-th entry of $V$) is set to 1 if peer $i$ has piece $j$, and 0 otherwise. Assume that peer 5 is unchoked by peer 6, peer 5 finds that the two rarest pieces are piece 1 and 3, both only replicated twice in the swarm. The peers that do not have piece 1 are peers 2, 3, 4, and 5, each with 3, 2, 3, and 2 pieces respectively. Among these peers, the peer with the least number of pieces are peers 3 and 5, each in possession of 2 pieces, i.e., $m_1 = 2$. However, we find $m_3 = 1$, as peer 1 misses piece 3 (a piece in the rarest set) but peer 1 only owns one piece. If peer 5 selects piece 3 to request for download (from peer 6), then the poorest peer (i.e., peer 1) in the system now has one more available piece that it can request in future. However, if peer 5 requests for piece 1, which peer 1 is not interested in, then the total number of pieces that are of interest to peer 1 does not increase. Thus, our strategy is “socialist” with the objective of helping the poorest peers first in order to increase the overall data availability.

|      | peer 1 | peer 2 | peer 3 | peer 4 | peer 5 | peer 6 |
|------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| piece 1 | 1      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 1      |
| piece 2 | 0      | 1      | 1      | 1      | 0      | 0      |
| piece 3 | 0      | 0      | 1      | 0      | 0      | 1      |
| piece 4 | 0      | 1      | 0      | 1      | 1      | 0      |
| piece 5 | 0      | 1      | 0      | 1      | 1      | 0      |

Table I: Matrix $V$ for the example for piece selection strategy.

B. Data Availability

We next show how our piece selection strategy helps improve the data availability in a coalition. Consider a flash crowd scenario (e.g., in data publishing phase) in which peers in a coalition request data from an external source before all distinct pieces have been disseminated into the coalition. Initially, there is no data piece in the coalition and peers request and download data from the seed. Once a peer receives a complete piece, it shares it with other peers in the coalition. Note that only the seed can provide a new piece to the coalition over time. Thus, in terms of the cumulative number of distinct pieces that can be received by the coalition, the best scenario occurs when the seed’s upload capacity is entirely used to upload distinct pieces to the coalition. Let $t^*$ denote the time when the coalition receives all distinct pieces in this scenario, and let $N_c(t)$ denote the number of distinct pieces received by peers in a coalition at time $t$ in the best scenario, with $t \in [0,t^*]$. Note that $N_c(t)$ serves as an upper bound for available distinct pieces in the coalition at time $t$.

Since our data replication strategy always selects a piece that is missing across the whole coalition, our strategy can achieve $N_c(t)$. However, it is interesting to note that the rarest-first strategy (even globally within the coalition) cannot achieve this upper bound $N_c(t)$. To quantify this difference, we introduce a metric referred to as availability loss.

Let $N_d(t)$ denote the number of distinct pieces in the coalition at time $t$ when rarest-first strategy is adopted by peers in the coalition. We define availability loss, denoted by $L(t)$, as follows.

$$L(t) = (N_c(t) - N_d(t))/N_c(t), \quad t \in [0,t^*]$$

And define average availability loss as

$$\bar{L} = \int_0^{t^*} L(t^*)/t^*$$

We next use simulations to show that the rarest first strategy can lead to a high average availability loss under certain conditions. Consider 40 homogeneous peers (with same upload capacity) that start downloading from an initial seed uniformly at random in the first 20 seconds of the simulation. The initial seed's upload capacity is 1 piece per second (i.e., 0.025 piece per second per peer). The durations of both re-choking and optimistic unchoking intervals are set to 40 seconds. Since the number of peers is large, a peer $i$ will equally likely unchoke or choke other peers during each re-choking interval. In other words, any other peer is equally likely to appear in peer $i$'s unchoke set (which has 5 peers). Thus, on average, each peer is roughly unchoked by 5 other peers and its downloading rate equals to the upload capacity of a single peer.

We consider a global (i.e., within coalition) rarest first
algorithm. That is, a peer selects the rarest piece that has the least copies among all 40 peers in this swarm. All peers have the same upload capacity, ranging from 0.0001 to 100 pieces per second. For each upload capacity, we run 10 simulations with different random seeds and calculate the average availability loss (defined earlier). As shown in Figure 3, we observe that if the peers’ upload capacity is high, there is almost no availability loss; on the other hand, if the peers’ upload capacity is low, the availability loss is very low. But, when the peers’ upload capacity is of the same order as the seed’s upload capacity, the availability loss is large (more than 50 percent).

The large availability loss observed appears counter-intuitive at the first glance. However, it can be explained by peers’ piece selection behavior. In BitTorrent-like file sharing, a peer always requests a piece (from the seed or other peers) that is in its partially finished set and not being actively downloaded. Thus, at the time when a peer selects a piece to request from the seed, if this peer still has a partially finished but not a currently downloaded piece, then this peer does not choose a new piece that has not been disseminated into the swarm, even though it employs the rarest-first policy.

More specifically, let $P_i(t)$ denote the partial set containing pieces that are partially downloaded by peer $i$ at time $t$. Let $D_i(t)$ denote the set containing pieces that peer $i$ is downloading at time $t$. Clearly $D_i(t) \subseteq P_i(t)$. Peer $i$ requests pieces in $P_i(t) \setminus D_i(t)$, because it wants to finish partially downloaded pieces first. Since the set $P(t) \setminus D(t)$ of peers are often non-empty, peers will frequently request the seed for pieces that the seed has already sent to other peers in the coalition. The reason for the non-emptiness of set $P(t) \setminus D(t)$ is due to the periodic choking and unchoking behavior. Let $\overline{E}_{PD}$ denote the average number of empty $P \setminus D$ sets when peers select pieces to request from the initial seed. We plot $\overline{E}_{PD}$ in Figure 4, and find that $\overline{E}_{PD}$ is negatively correlated with $L$, which is consistent with our conjecture. We show further evidence in support of our conjecture by comparing the number of times that peers have non-empty sets $P_i(t) \setminus D_i(t)$ and the number of received distinct pieces every 10 seconds. A cross-correlation analysis of the two time series shows that the maximum lag (with correlation coefficient > 0.9) between them is 40 seconds which is the average downloading time from the seed by a single peer. Due to space limits, we present this result in a technical report. Part of our ongoing research is to understand why the peak availability loss occurs when the ratio of peer capacity to seed capacity attains a specific value.

V. IMPACT AND STABILITY OF COALITION

In this section, we investigate the impact of coalition on the performance of a swarm, and unlike [18], we investigate whether stable coalitions result in a swarm where peers have heterogeneous capacities. Further, our simulations here employ data sets collected from real-world swarming systems [13], unlike [18] which simulates a swarm with two capacity classes.

A. Impact of Coalition On Data Swarming Performance

We now study the impact of coalitions on a population of peers with heterogeneous upload capacities taken from real-world data swarms [13]. The distribution of upload capacities is shown in Figure 5. The figure shows that majority of the peers in a swarm are low capacity peers. The lowest capacity is 42.96KBps. 90% of peers have capacity below 391.45KBps, while very few peers have capacity more than 10MBps.

In our simulations, peers arrive according to a Poisson process with an arrival rate of 20 peers/minute. If a peer is not in a coalition, the peer uses the regular BitTorrent algorithms with $\delta_t = 10$sec and $k = 5$ (4 slots for Tit-for-Tat and 1 for optimistic unchoke). There is one coalition in the system, and peers in the coalition use the random choking strategy with $\delta_t = 10$ seconds and $k = 5$, the optimal values as determined by our model. The upload capacities of peers are sampled from the empirical distribution given in Figure 5. The seed’s upload capacity is set to 0.5 pieces/second with $\delta_t = 10$ seconds. The shared file has $B = 80$ pieces. In our simulations, individual peers significantly improve their performance by joining the coalition compared to the case when they do not. These results are not reported here due to space limits and we choose to focus on the swarm performance instead.

![Fig. 3. Average availability loss](image1)

![Fig. 4. Number of empty sets](image2)

![Fig. 5. Empirical upload capacity distribution](image3)

1) Coalition formed by low capacity peers: We first investigate whether a coalition formed by low capacity peers improves performance. We let peers with capacity below the 50-th percentile (i.e., in the range [42.96, 77.40]KBps) in Figure 5 form a coalition. We also consider the 70-th and 90-th percentiles, corresponding to capacities about 112.87 KBps and 391.45 KBps respectively, for forming coalitions.

In Figure 6, we plot the boxplots of the steady state download completion times for different coalition sets, and compare them with the case with no coalition. We can see that coalition significantly improves the overall performance of the swarm. For example, if peers with capacity below the 90-th percentile join the coalition, the average download completion time is reduced by over 20% compared to the case when
there is no coalition. In addition, the variance of download completion times of the whole swarm is also significantly reduced when peers with capacity below the 70-th or 90-th percentiles form a coalition.

2) Coalition of randomly chosen peers: A newly arrived peer joins the coalition with probability $p_{\text{join}}$. We vary $p_{\text{join}}$ as $\{0, 0.1, 0.5, 0.9, 1.0\}$, and for each value of $p_{\text{join}}$, we record the file download completion time of peers that join and complete their downloads during steady state. In Figure 7, we plot the boxplots of the steady state download completion times. We see that the overall system performance is significantly improved even when peers randomly join the coalition. It is interesting to note that the best performance occurs when 90% of peers join the coalition, instead of 100%. This can be explained as follows. When all peers join the coalition, the coalition has more low capacity peers, which leads to a worse performance than the case when $p_{\text{join}} = 0.9$. Even then, it significantly outperforms the case with no coalition. Note that the extra 10% (= 100% − 90%) of the peers are mainly low capacity peers, as can be seen from Figure 5.

![Fig. 6. Boxplots show the median and percentiles (25, 75). Diamonds show the average. Four cases: no coalition, and coalitions of users with capacity below the 50-th, the 70-th, and the 90-th percentiles.](image)

**Fig. 6.** Boxplots show the median and percentiles (25, 75). Diamonds show the average. Four cases: no coalition, and coalitions of users with capacity below the 50-th, the 70-th, and the 90-th percentiles.

**Fig. 7.** Boxplots show the median and percentiles (25, 75), and diamonds show the average download completion time. The labels on x-axis represents different $p_{\text{join}}$.

**Remarks.** If we compare the fourth boxplot (from the left) in Figure 7 with the boxplots in Figure 6, we see that a coalition of randomly chosen peers yields better overall swarm performance than the coalition composed only of low capacity peers. This is because a few of the high capacity peers join the coalition when peers are randomly picked to join the coalition.

We also investigate the case when there are multiple coalitions in the swarm. Specifically, we simulate two coalitions in a swarm with peer capacities chosen according to the empirical distribution in [13]. A newly arriving peer with capacity below the $q_{\text{low}}$-th percentile of the distribution will join coalition 1, but if its capacity is above the $q_{\text{high}}$-th percentile of the distribution, it will join coalition 2. We vary $q_{\text{low}}$ as $\{10, 50, 90\}$ when $q_{\text{high}} = 10$, and vary $q_{\text{low}}$ as $\{10, 50, 70\}$ when $q_{\text{high}} = 30$. Again, we find that in each scenario, forming two coalitions significantly improves the whole swarm’s performance.

**B. Dynamic Coalition Formation**

Similar to [18], we next study whether coalition size converges to a fixed value when peers use the cooperation-aware better-response strategy proposed in our previous work [18]. We improve the strategy in [18] to allow a peer to join any coalition regardless of its capacity class.

1) Improved cooperation-aware better-response strategy: Suppose that there are multiple coalitions in the swarm. The basic idea of this strategy is that a peer always attempts to join the coalition with maximum rate, but will not change membership if its own rate is no less than its coalition average rate (discounted by a non-cooperation factor, denoted as $\beta$). The larger the $\beta$, the more non-cooperative a peer is. Specifically, peer $j$ makes a decision every $r \cdot \delta$ time units, where $\delta$ is the re-choking interval length, and $r > 0$ is referred to as the patience factor. A larger $r$ implies that the peer makes decisions of whether to remain in the coalition or not over a longer time period. When making a decision, the peer compares its own download rate with the average download rate of its own coalition (if it is in a coalition), and the maximum average download rate across all coalitions. All three rates are averaged over the last $r \cdot \delta$ time units. The average download rate of a coalition is discounted by $\beta$. If a peer is currently not in any coalition and its own rate is less than the maximum rate, then it joins the coalition with the maximum rate. If a peer is currently in a coalition and its own rate is no less than its coalition’s average rate, then it stays in the coalition; otherwise if its own rate is less than its coalition rate and less than the maximum rate, then it joins the coalition with maximum rate (if not in it yet). A peer leaves its coalition if its rate is less than its coalition’s rate and its coalition is the one with maximum rate. In the following, we report our results on a swarm consisting of only one coalition and on a swarm with two coalitions.

2) Only one coalition in a swarm: In this scenario, a newly arrived peer joins the coalition with a fixed probability $q_{\text{init}}$, taking values 0.1, 0.5, 0.9. Peers update their coalition membership three re-choking intervals after their arrival, using the above mentioned cooperation-aware better-response strategy. We consider different values of $r$ and $\beta$, viz, $r = 1.5$, or 10, and $\beta = 0.1, 0.5$, or 1.0. In our simulations, the coalition size is always stable after 2000 seconds into the simulation. For example, Figure 8 shows that the number of peers in coalition set is stable in steady state when $r = 10, \beta = 0.5, q_{\text{init}} = 0.1$. Even though a newly arrived peer joins the coalition with low probability 0.1, eventually the coalition is attractive enough such that more than 50% of the peers end up in a coalition on average. [18] shows the dynamic stability of coalitions, but each coalition only consists of peers with the same capacity. Our results here show that the coalition size stabilizes in steady state, even if the coalition consists of peers with heterogeneous capacities.

We compare the average fractions of peers that are in the coalition in steady state across all different combinations of $\beta, r$, and $q_{\text{init}}$. Similar to the two capacity class scenario considered in [18], we observe that as $\beta$ increases, the coalition sizes decreases, as peers become less cooperative. Also the coalition size increases as $r$ increases (peers are more patient). And, when $\beta < 0.5$, regardless of values of $q_{\text{init}}$ and $r$, the coalition is always able to keep more than 50% peers (out of the whole swarm) in the coalition.
investigate the upload capacity allocation strategy of peers to be reached and remain stable if peers adopt an enhanced model for coalitions in a swarming system. Our model yields below the 0.01 percentile initially joins coalition 1. We observe stable coalitions in each scenario. Figure 9 shows the number of peers in swarm when β = 0.5 and r = 1.

VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Based on the encouraging preliminary results in our previous work [18], we proposed a detailed yet flexible analytical model for coalitions in a swarming system. Our model yields optimal parameter settings for the random chocking strategy for a coalition. We also proposed a piece selection strategy to improve the data availability for a coalition. We demonstrated that coalitions yield significant performance improvement for the whole swarm, and we further showed that coalitions can be reached and remain stable if peers adopt an enhanced cooperation-aware better-response strategy when they dynamically join or leave a coalition. For future work, we plan to investigate the upload capacity allocation strategy of peers in a coalition, and formally analyze the dynamic stability of coalitions.

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VII. APPENDIX: FIND P(B)

Case where \( i \geq j \). If \( \ell > j \), we always have \( P(B^\ell_{ij} = 1) = 0 \). We also assume that \( P(B^1_{ij} = 1) = 1 - (\frac{b_{ij}}{B})^\ell \). In \( \ell \)-th slot with \( 2 \leq \ell \leq \varphi j \) and \( \ell < j \),

\[
P(B_{ij} = 1; B^1_{ij} = 1; B^\ell_{ij} = 1) = 1 - \frac{1 - \left(\frac{B}{B^{-(\ell-1)}}\right)\left(\frac{B^{-(\ell-1)}}{B^1_{ij}}\right)\left(\frac{B^{-(\ell-1)}}{B^1_{ij}}\right)}{1 - \left(\frac{B}{B^{-(\ell-1)}}\right)\left(\frac{B^{-(\ell-1)}}{B^1_{ij}}\right)\left(\frac{B^{-(\ell-1)}}{B^1_{ij}}\right)}
\]

Case where \( i < j \). If \( \ell > j \), we always have \( P(B^\ell_{ij} = 1) = 0 \). In the \( \ell \)-th slot where \( 1 \leq \ell \leq \varphi j \) and \( (\ell - 1) < j - i \) and \( \ell \leq j \), we have \( P(B^\ell_{ij} = 1) = 1 \). At the beginning of this slot, \( p_i \) has \( i + \ell - 1(< j) \) pieces, thus, \( p_i \) is always interested in \( p_j \).

In the \( \ell \)-th slot where \( 1 \leq \ell \leq \varphi j \) and \((\ell - 1) \geq j - i \) and \( \ell \leq j \). These are the cases that the probability of \( p_i \) being interested in \( p_j \) is less than one. At the beginning of this slot, \( p_i \) has \( i + \ell - 1(< j) \) pieces, thus, \( p_i \) has more pieces than \( p_j \), but they have \( \ell - 1 \) common pieces.

\[
P(B^\ell_{ij} = 1) = P(B^1_{ij} = 1)P^{\ell-1}_{ij} = 1)P^{\ell-1}_{ij} = 1)
\]

\[
P^{\ell}_{ij} = 1) = 1 - P^{\ell}_{ij} = 0)P^{\ell-1}_{ij} = 1)
\]

\[
= 1 - \left(\frac{B}{B^{-(\ell-1)}}\right)\left(\frac{B^{-(\ell-1)}}{B^1_{ij}}\right)\left(\frac{B^{-(\ell-1)}}{B^1_{ij}}\right)
\]

(18) Here, since \( \ell - 1 \geq j - i \), thus, \( i - (j - (\ell - 1)) > = 0 \).