Control-Flow Integrity at RISC:
Attacking RISC-V by Jump-Oriented Programming

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1 INTRODUCTION

RISC-V is an open Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) architecture mostly targeting embedded and real-time systems. While reduced instruction set architectures innately have a smaller attack surface than Complex Instruction Set Computer (CISC) architectures, many of them run critical systems, including Industrial Control Systems (ICS) or Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), whose failure may have dramatic consequences for the physical environment, including environmental disasters and loss of human lives.

Using a novel Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) brings several benefits. Beyond security advantages by taking into account the experience on the latest attacks, one major interest is its open status, where trust in the architecture relies on community review. This also enables national independence in microchip supplies, a very important feature as target systems may be strategical, and export restrictions become more common.

While most RISC-V architectures offer a satisfying level of security compared to similar classes of systems [17, 18], they will increasingly become the target to complex attacks as their relevance in the industrial and strategical field increases. Eventually, state-backed attackers are bound to try and attack them. In order to anticipate this threat, security researchers face the challenge to anticipate potential vulnerabilities and imagine suitable protection mechanisms.

Code-Reuse Attacks (CRA) and specifically Jump-Oriented Programming are amongst the most complex attacks to realize, but also to prevent. They can be very powerful when successful, as they allow the attacker to run an arbitrary sequence of instructions also to prevent. They can be very powerful when successful, as they can allow the attacker to run an arbitrary sequence of instructions also to prevent. They can be very powerful when successful, as they can allow the attacker to run an arbitrary sequence of instructions also to prevent. They can be very powerful when successful, as they can allow the attacker to run an arbitrary sequence of instructions also to prevent.

We summarize our contributions as follows:

- a first analysis of vulnerabilities to JOP attacks on RISC-V architecture;
- a description of how said vulnerabilities may be exploited in a JOP chain;
- a demonstration of feasibility by implementing and testing a JOP attack on a vulnerable RISC-V application.

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- a demonstration of feasibility by implementing and testing a JOP attack on a vulnerable RISC-V application.
Outline. Section 2 briefly presents existing work on Code-Reuse Attacks. Section 3 describes vulnerabilities with RISC-V instructions, extensions and Application Binary Interface (ABI). Section 4 explains how these vulnerabilities can be exploited to craft a JOP chain, while Section 5 describes an attack that we developed in order to corrupt a vulnerable RISC-V application. Section 6 compares our approach to other efforts related to RISC-V security, regarding either attacks or defenses. Finally, Section 7 provides a conclusion.

2 BACKGROUND ON CODE-REUSE ATTACKS

The aim of a Code-Reuse Attack (CRA) is to take control of an application execution through the use of existing functions and system calls within the target application, in order to perform unintended actions (typically, sabotage on Cyber-Physical Systems) or to leak secret information. Indeed, CRA may also be used as part of a more complex attack involving different exploits.

CRA is not in itself a primary attack, but relies on an earlier memory corruption, typically on the stack or the heap. Such attacks are well-known, but still prevalent in many systems [25]. The originality of CRA comparatively to regular code injection (e.g. shellcode injection) is that, instead of redirecting the execution flow toward injected code (generally in a buffer), it redirects the execution toward existing code in the application in order to obtain a malicious effect. A simple example of such attacks is return-to-libC [12], where the execution flow is redirected to a single function after manipulation of arguments within the stack of the corrupted function. The redirection is made by overwriting the return address, contained in the stack. More sophisticated attacks with the same principle of stack corruption have emerged, among which the most notorious being what is commonly called Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) [7, 21]. It consists in using gadgets chains, an assembly of code snippets found within the target application, and which finish by a linking instruction. In the case of ROP, the linker instruction will be a return to caller instruction, which will pop the corrupted stack and then redirect the flow to the next gadget, and so on. Using this approach, the attacker can run an arbitrary sequence of legit instructions, effectively running a malicious, potentially a Turing-complete [23] application within the application.

2.1 Countermeasures

Multiple methods were proposed and used in order to defend against return-to-libC and JOP. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) makes the attack more difficult to craft, as the attacker needs to guess the address of target function or gadgets. However its efficiency has been proven limited, especially in 32-bits architectures [22]. Stackguard [9] introduced the notion of canaries to protect the integrity of the management data (including the return address) in the stack, yet solutions relying on secrets depend much on the system entropy, and tend to decline as the system uptime increase – an important issue in embedded systems that can run for decades without reboot.

Abadi et al. [1] propose a solution named Control-Flow Integrity (CFI), which consists in (1) analyzing the Control Function Graph (CFG) from the protected application and (2) check at runtime each jump and return instruction follows legit CFG edges. CFI makes theoretically all kinds of CRA nearly impossible to implement, and does indeed stops most ROP attacks if implemented with a shadow stack [6], although often leading to significant fall of performances [5]. Its efficiency, however, is limited against attacks on the forward edges of the CFG (as opposed to ROP which hijacks backward edges). The precision of the CFG also limits its efficiency, a weakness that was exploited to overcome this defense [6, 14]. This led to new classes of attacks: Call Oriented Programming (COP) and more generally, Jump Oriented Programming [2] (JOP). Specific solutions addressing return-to-libC and ROP attacks for RISC-V architectures have been proposed by using pointer authentication at hardware level [24], or by using an encrypted shadow stack in [4].

2.2 Overcoming CFI: Jump-Oriented Programming

Much like ROP, JOP consists in assembling code gadgets containing useful instructions in order to execute a malicious sequence of instructions present within the target application. The linking instruction allowing to chain these gadgets, however, is not the return instruction but any instruction performing an indirect jump (i.e. a jump on an address provided by a register). While in the case of ROP attacks the target gadgets’ addresses are stored in the stack, and the popping of these value is handled by the function epilogue, in the case of JOP it must be done by a specific gadget, named dispatcher gadget. This gadget will load the addresses of functional gadgets with a table in memory, generally injected into a buffer, and then jumps to said address. Each functional gadget must end with a jump to the gadget dispatcher, as illustrated in Figure 1. The most prominent example of JOP publicly known to this day is a complex rootkit targeting x86/Linux2.6, bypassing most recent defenses [8].

Assembling a JOP gadget chain is more complex than doing so for a ROP gadget chain, as (1) the combination in the choice of registers and (2) the side-effects in the gadget may break the gadget chain management, for instance by overwriting the registers containing the addresses of the dispatcher gadget or the gadget table. Since gadgets research and chaining is highly dependent on both ISA and ABI, feasibility in new architectures is not proven. In the next sections, we demonstrate the feasibility of JOP attacks on applications compiled for the RISC-V architecture.

3 RISC-V ATTACK SURFACE

JOP attacks rely on the ISA and ABI of the target, and as such they represent the attack surface of the target. In this section we present the RISC-V ISA and ABI elements and properties of interest for the realisation of JOB attacks.

Figure 1: Dispatcher gadget role in JOP
3.1 ISA: Instruction Set Definition

The RISC-V ISA defines multiple extensions to the base instruction set. Amongst these extensions, only the Base Integer ISA (RV32I) is mandatory in all RISC-V implementations. Depending on supported extensions, new registers will be available (e.g., floating registers). A 16-bits compressed version of Base Integer ISA is also available. Available registers in the target architecture will strongly impact its attack surface relatively to JOP attacks, as more gadgets will be eligible when more registers are present.

In our experiment, we had the most possible conservative approach by only considering the Base RISC-V ISA and the Base Integer ISA, thus exploiting a minimal attack surface. Any added extension will increase the likelihood of finding gadgets within the target application.

3.2 ISA: Instructions Alignment

The number of gadgets available is increased if the instructions are not aligned, since in the latter case, instructions may be loaded after their intended beginning, and thus interpreted with unintended opcodes and arguments [16]. Contrary to CISC architectures such as x86, RISC-V being a RISC architecture, RISC-V instructions have a fixed size. However, an extension providing compressed instructions (RV32C and RV64C) is defined in the standard, although not mandatory. RISC-V implementations supporting this extension may be target to instruction offset shifting attacks, where the attacker jumps after the begining of an instruction and thus execute unintended instructions.

3.3 ISA: Instructions of Interest

Designing a JOP attack relies on chaining functional gadgets. This chaining is performed by using control transfer instructions exploiting registers as jump target designator. In the RISC-V Base Integer ISA, there is only one instruction allowing such operation: the Jump-And-Link-Register instruction (JALR), as illustrated in Figure 2.

JALR computes the target address for the control transfer by adding a 12-bits signed immediate to the rs1 register, then setting the least-significant bit of the result to zero, allowing to reach +/- 2 ko from the source address. Reachable addresses can be further extended by using the Add Upper Immediate to PC (AUIPC) instruction, which add 20 bits to the memory, effectively making all the physical memory addressable with the immediate. In the case of a JOP attacks, exact target addresses are stored registers are stored into the dispatch table and loaded directly into rs1 (one register argument), so immediate is set to zero and thus no AUIPC instruction is needed by the attacker.

3.4 ABI: Registers of Interest

JOP attacks exploit instructions allowing jumping to an address stored within a register. The Base Integer ISA from RISC-V defines 32 generic registers usable in user mode:

- a global pointer addressing different symbols (functions, global variables) within the application;
- a return register containing the return address of the last caller function;
- a stack pointer;
- a thread pointer;
- 8 argument registers, used to pass arguments to functions;
- 6 temporary registers, used to store intermediary results;
- 12 save registers, used by compiler to optimize access to non-volatile values accessed from different functions.

Table 1 shows the registers mnemonics and usage purpose as defined by the RISC-V specification ABI. As shown in the table, the ABI states that return, argument and temporary registers are the only registers saved by caller functions.

3.5 ABI: Convention on Function Calls

Convention on RISC-V function calls favors passing arguments by registers when possible. Eight integer registers are saved for this purpose in the RV32I. When no register is available, arguments are stored in the stack.

As mentioned in Section 2, CRA in general and JOP in particular consist in using existing functions and system calls within the target application. Since the behaviour of these functions and system calls is controlled by their parameters, those will be the favorite targets for an attacker. Two information in particular are interesting regarding argument passing: (1) assignment of registers and (2) layout of parameters’ values within these registers. In the next subsections, we use the XLEN term to describe the registers size in bits (32 or 64 according to the RISC-V architecture).
3.6 ABI: Argument Registers Allocation
Arguments with a size equal or less than XLEN are assigned to registers according to their position within the function’s signature, e.g., first argument is assigned to first argument register (a0), second argument is assigned to second argument register (a1) and so on. Arguments with a size greater than 2*XLEN are passed by reference (so they occupy a single register). Finally, arguments with a size greater than XLEN and less or equals to 2*XLEN use a pair of registers. Hence in the case of manipulation of data belonging to the latter group (such as long long in a RV32I), more arguments registers than actual arguments will be used. This makes the application more likely to use upper argument registers. Since the number of argument registers used in the application is a strong limitation in the attacker ability to find gadgets due to our approach (see 4), this pattern increases its vulnerability against JOP.

3.7 ABI: System Calls
In RISC-V system calls are performed through the ecall instruction. Each system function has an integer identifier allowing identification during the call. This identifier must be set into the last argument register (a7) before call execution. If any arguments are necessary to the system call, they must be passed through the other argument registers (a0-a7).

While it is possible to manipulate a7 to change any syscall to the desired one, we found that there was no many occurrences of manipulation of a7 outside of setting of syscalls and without of adversary side-effects on lower argument registers. Hence, we rather identified within the application the system call of interest, which was easy in our case, since we target the commonly used write syscall.

4 CRAFTING A JOP CHAIN FOR RISC-V APPLICATIONS
As mentioned in Section 3.1, we adopted a conservative approach regarding our selection of registers of interest. We used the same approach regarding their exploitation: we defined a subset of registers of interest to be reserved registers, that are used by the attack to store addresses necessary to the continuity of the attack. These registers are:

- a3, the gadget dispatcher address (which can consists in one or two addresses, depending on the kind if gadget dispatcher);
- a4, the current entry in the dispatch table.

We did not consider in our experiment the possibility to save and restore these registers’ values, so any writing on the registers by any gadget after the gadget initialization will interrupt the attack. To find a way to save/restore these registers (either through memory or through direct register copy) would considerably ease the finding of gadgets and the crafting of the JOP chain.

4.1 JALR Instruction
The Jump-And-Link-Register instruction may be generated by the compiler when the code tries executing a function pointer. The specific case of JALR performed on a parameter happens when said function pointer was passed to the parent function through arguments – in that case, JALR will jump to the address contained in the related argument. Hence manipulating this argument allows modifying the execution flow.

For example, a generic comparison function would take as arguments 2 structures to be compared, and a pointer on a comparison function. The two structures will occupy registers a0 and a1 (supposing they fit in), and the comparison function address will be stored in register a2. When calling the comparison function, the generic comparison function will use a JALR (depending on compiler options) and branch to register a2, as illustrated in Figure 3. The generic function is a good candidate for chaining JOP gadgets, as it allows taking control of execution flow with the assumption that the arguments are already controlled by the attacker.

4.2 Dispatcher Gadget
The dispatcher gadget is an essential part of any JOP attack. Its behaviour is similar to an instruction pointer, as it allows (1) loading an address in the dispatch table, (2) jumping to said address and (3) moving to the next gadget table entry. The dispatch table is typically injected in the application through the buffer that was used to initiate the attack. The execution order of gadgets is generally sequential, but it may be more complex, according to available dispatcher gadget candidates in the application. In any case, it is defined by the dispatch table layout which is crafted by the attacker during the weaponization phase of the attack (as defined in Lockheed Martin cyber kill chain²).

While its expected behaviour is simple, to find an ideal dispatcher gadget is a difficult task. In the case of a RISC-V application, the attacker must find the following pattern:

- one instruction to increment a1 (supposing the dispatch table was stored there);
- one instruction loading a2 from a1 (were a2 will contain the next address to be jumped to);
- one instruction to perform an indirect jump (JALR) to the address stored in a2.

While other instructions may be interlacing with the instructions above, they must not tamper with either a1 or a2 (neither any registers used in further operations, such as the one containing the address of the gadget dispatcher itself). While this issue may be solved by using other registers than argument registers, another solution to address this issue is to use a 2-stage gadget dispatcher, as proposed by [3]. In that case, the first "stage" of the dispatcher

²https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html
The dispatcher gadget is only useful if it can address the functional gadgets. They allow reading and writing values from/into memory, important gadget in any attack scenario – second only to system call gadgets. Memory access gadgets are the most useful gadget allowed to write in the reserved registers.

4.3 Functional Gadgets

The dispatcher gadget is only useful if it can address the functional gadgets needed to perform the attack. There are different families of functional gadgets, as described for ROP attacks by [2]:

- arithmetic and logic gadgets
- memory access gadgets
- function call gadgets
- system call gadgets
- branching gadgets

Even in ROP attacks, one or more gadgets of each of these families need (e.g. memory access will require a loader and a saver gadget) to be present in order to achieve Turing-completeness [8]. In the case of JOP attacks were more than one register may be exploited to chain the gadgets, the number of gadgets needed may increase even further.

Reaching Turing-completeness however, although intellectually satisfying, is often not needed to perform an actual attack – hence the question whether there is enough functional gadgets available in an application to perform an attack is hard to answer, particularly since the attacker may adapt the attack to available gadgets. In our experiment we did not aimed for Turing-completeness, so we did not need all the gadgets types listed above. We needed, and were able to find (or rather to generate in our vulnerable application) (1) arithmetic gadgets, (2) memory access gadgets and (3) system call gadgets.

In addition to these functional gadgets, we also needed a initializing gadget, which is a one-shot functional gadget used to configure the registers containing the dispatcher gadget and the dispatch table addresses. While it is actually a memory access gadget in literature, its specific role makes it unique, as it will be the only gadget allowed to write in the reserved registers.

4.3.1 Arithmetic and logic gadgets. As suggested by their name, arithmetic and logic gadgets are used to perform arithmetic and logic operations on registers’ values. During our experiment, we focused on argument registers, thus one need to find a gadget performing the needed operations on the current function parameters. An example of AND operation executed on arguments of a function is provided in Figure 5.

4.3.2 Memory access gadgets. Memory access gadgets are the most important gadget in any attack scenario – second only to system call gadgets. They allow reading and writing values from/into memory, and are always necessary to parametrize said system calls, but also more generally to access sensitive data. One simple example is to write in memory the name of a sensitive file in file system (e.g. /etc/shadow in a Linux context) and then calling the syscall open, allowing tampering of said file (providing the target application has root privilege) and thus allowing the attacker to modify users’ passwords.

Memory access gadgets can be found, amongst other places, in functions manipulating structures. As these structures’ size is typically greater than XLEN*2, they are passed by reference, and then a memory read will be performed. Conversely, modification on the values of the structure parameters will be performed through memory writings.

The location of writing and reading depends on the structure address, passed through a register. Manipulating this register allows arbitrary reading or writing within the memory (e.g. the dispatch table).

4.3.3 System call gadgets. As mentioned in Section 3.7, system calls following the RISC-V ABI use argument register a7 to pass the ecall identifier. Since argument registers are assigned lower index first, finding functions manipulating a7 out of system libraries is possible, yet very likely to lead to side effects on lower argument registers. In our research, we did not found gadgets manipulating a7 without overwriting one of the reserved registers. Hence performing system calls practically means branching into related primitives in system libraries while ensuring a configuration of registers that will trigger the kernel action expected by the attacker.

Practically, that means we exploit entries into the Procedure Linkage Table (PLT). This table and related functions are generated by the Linker during the linking phase and points towards used functions in the libraries linked to the application. From these addresses, we have an entrypoint to functions of interest (e.g. open in libc), and then we can jump up to a fixed offset of the function with the instruction of interest (in our case, the instruction setting a7), and then executing the syscall.

5 EXPERIMENTATION ON OPERATIONAL APPLICATION

In order to experiment the feasibility of JOP attacks in the RISC-V architecture, we designed an application emulating the behaviour...
of a sensor network application running in an Industrial Control System (ICS).

The experiment prototype aims at monitoring the temperature of a real-time critical system. In order to do so a pair of connected thermometers send periodically encrypted payloads to the ICS. All sensors share the same encryption key – an existing architecture in an industrial system. The aim of the attacker in our scenario is to steal the encryption key. With this key, the attacker can perform malicious actions such as forging payloads to attack the ICS.

We developed the target the application in C code and compiled it for RISC-V 32bits, using gcc, disabling both Position-Independent Execution (PIE) and stack protections (canaries), and with an optimization level of 1 for both application and libraries. The target application was executed and validated on a RISC-V CV32A6 soft-core design\(^3\) [26] deployed on a Genesys2 FPGA running Linux.

In the following sub-sections, we explain how we were able to steal the key within the application in the ICS using exclusively JOP.

### 5.1 Performing the Attack

#### 5.1.1 Attack Model

The attack we realized in our experiment relies on a memory vulnerability, for instance a buffer overflow, allowing to hijack the execution flow of the target application. We did not activate memory randomization nor stack protections techniques such as StackGuard\(^{[10]}\) on the target application, since the former can be bypassed by different techniques \(^{[22]}\), and the latter is ineffective against JOP attacks.

We also made the hypothesis that, during the reconnaissance phase of the attack, the attacker is able to access an exact twin of the target application (either by rebuilding it with the same options and environment, or by acquiring an device running said application), and run it with a debugger. Thus, potential anti-debug, anti-reverse or anti-tampering measures are not considered within the scope of our experiment.

#### 5.1.2 Attack overview

The crafting of the attack consists in five steps divided between the two first stages of the cyber kill chain: reconnaissance and weaponization.

The three steps involved in the reconnaissance stage are:

- identification of a memory vulnerability;
- identification of gadget codes available in the application;
- definition of the attack aim.

The two steps involved in the weaponization stage are:

- crafting of the JOP chain;
- crafting of the malicious payload.

As a first step the attacker must identify a memory vulnerability allowing to hijack the execution flow toward the gadget initializer. This step is not covered in detail in this document, but many techniques and tools exists in order to identify such vulnerabilities \(^{[25]}\).

In our experiment, we inserted a vulnerability with the target application, allowing a buffer overflow in the heap space. In order the vulnerability to be exploitable for JOP attack, the buffer was collocated with a structure containing functions pointers. The buffer overflow allows the overwriting of said pointers, thus triggering an execution flow hijacking when they will be called by the application

\(^3\)https://github.com/openhwgroup/cva6

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\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure6.png}
\caption{Identifying gadgets}
\end{figure}---

so not necessarily just after the buffer writing. Standard canaries techniques will not be able to block such exploit, since they only protect the stack.

#### 5.1.3 Identifying gadgets

The identification of available gadgets in the application is the most important stage in the attack, as it decides which assets can be targeted by the attack. Too few, or not diverse enough gadgets will restrict the range of available targets. While in our experiment the gadgets were deliberately inserted in the application, in a more realistic attack crafting the attacker would need to find them by himself, which would indeed add a level of difficulty, although history of gadget chain attacks suggests that tools for automated gadget detection may emerge in a close future.

In order to manually identify or confirm the presence of gadgets in the target application, we used simple tools for machine to assembly language translation such as objdump from the GCC suite. Since it is not necessary for gadget identification to have a deep understanding of the application behaviour, the use of tools that enable observation of the application at runtime (such as debugger) is not mandatory at this stage. Figure 6 illustrates the result of objdump on the target application binary. The first line displays address and name (if the binary is not stripped) of the disassembled function. Following lines consists in 3 columns:

- instruction address;
- translation of the instruction opcode and arguments in assembly language.

The attacker will focus on addresses, opcodes and arguments. The latter two allow to identify code snippets of interest, that is the functional part of the gadget. It must be followed by a chaining mechanism allowing to branch to the gadget dispatcher address, through minimum register manipulation. In our reserved registers approach where said gadget dispatcher is always stored into the same register (a3), it means a JALR operation with said register in argument.

The addresses will be used in the JOP chain crafting step to build the dispatcher table.

#### 5.1.4 Definition of attack objective

The objective of the attack is to be decided from (1) system assets accessible by the application and (2) available functional gadgets identified. The first part requires acquiring a deep understanding of the application with techniques

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such as runtime observation (e.g. through debugging, resource use, etc.) or static analysis of the binary. Investigation on proprietary or domain-specific protocols (quite prevalent in the industry) are also likely to be needed. The second part typically requires domain-specific expertise (e.g. avionics, railway, energy...), and knowledge of the technical environment (e.g. hardware, middleware, connected devices...), especially in case of sabotage intent.

In our experiment, our objective is a AES256 secret key used for group communication in the target sensor network system. Knowing this key allows a third party to (1) read any message within the network and (2) forge fake messages. The latter option makes sabotage action in the target ICS possible. Leaking said secret key requires (a) arithmetic and logic gadgets, (b) memory access gadgets and (c) system calls gadgets. These gadgets need to be consistent in the registers use and free of side-effect on reserved registers. This hypothesis is very conservative, and may be relaxed if register switching was possible.

5.1.5 Design of the JOP chain. Once the functional gadgets are identified and the objective of the attack is defined, the actual gadget chain can be crafted. We proceeded in reverse order to the attack: from the last operation of the attack, we inferred the needed context in terms of registers and memory setting, and then choose the gadgets allowing to set up this context.

The final operation of the attack will be a syscall (ecall instruction in RISC-V) of type write, taking three arguments as parameters: register a0 containing the target file descriptor, register a1 containing the source buffer address (the data to write), and register a2 containing the size of the data to write.

In order to set up such a syscall, we had two main challenges: (1) find the syscall address and (2) set up its parameters.

In our experiment we simply printed the key on the monitor, so a0 had to be set to the stdout or stderr value. More realistic and useful attacks may target an already-open file or socket. In order to achieve our goal, a gadget setting a0 to 1 (the stdout file handler identifier) was used. We used a gadget available from the reading operation in order to set a1 to the address of the secret key. Finally, specifying the size of the writing was the most tricky part, since no gadget was setting the literal value 256 into a2 – the literal was actually not present in the application. Thus, in order to implement the setting of a2, we used two gadgets: one for the initialization of a2 to 0 and a second one to increment of a2 to a literal value which was a divider of 256 (in our case, 32). By calling the latter gadget multiple times (8 times), the final value of a2 was 256. These gadgets chaining is illustrated in Figure 7.

Regarding the syscall address, we could find it by computing offline its offset with an actually used function in the libc. This last snippet of code is particular, as it does not need to branch back to the gadget dispatcher, since the attack is already performed.

5.1.6 Initialization of the attack. Once the chain has been designed, the attack can be encoded in the dispatch table. We use a sequential table, which address all the gadgets, including repetitions of the same gadgets like in the case of incrementing of a2. The initializer gadget allows setting a3 and a4, which contains respectively the address of the gadget dispatcher and the address of the dispatch table. Finally, both the dispatch table and the initial diversion to the gadget initializer will be embedded into a payload to be sent through the attack vector. In our experiment, we targeted a non-protected buffer contained within a structure in the in the heap, followed with a function pointer.

5.2 Results and Limitations

By using the techniques presented in this section, we were able to steal the key embedded into the application’s memory. Nevertheless we found a limitation in our current approach: due to the flushing of the arguments registers by system calls, we were not able to make more than one system call. While it was enough for our attack objective, a more ambitious objective may need to chain more than one function call – for instance to read a file, and then modify its content. This could be addressed by finding a way to systematically store arguments before performing system calls, and restore them after.

5.3 Next Steps

In our approach, we had a very conservative view on the surface attack, exploring only manipulations of the arguments registers. Exploiting more registers – such as temporary registers – may allow to find more available gadgets. Exploring commonly used extensions may also be a new source of vulnerabilities. Using compressed instructions would also allow shifting instructions and thus create new available gadgets. Finally, finding a mechanism allowing to store and restore registers would also increase the number of available gadgets, as some side effects can be overcome.

Our works proved that gadgets allowing JOP attacks can exist in RISC-V architecture. One important step now is to evaluate how prevalent these gadgets are in real-life applications, particularly in embedded systems. Furthermore, considering the complexity of building gadget chains, automating the process will be necessary.

6 RELATED WORKS

6.1 Experimentations on CRA attacks for RISC-V

Brizendine et al. [3] proposed and implemented a method allowing building JOP gadgets chains for the x86 architecture. Similar effort could – and most certainly will – be done for RISC-V architectures.
Gu et al. [13] identified a specific pattern of instructions allowing linking functional gadgets in RISC-V architectures, introducing the concept of “self-modifying gadget chain” to save and restore registers value in memory. They also demonstrated the Turing-completeness of their solution. Adapting self-modifying gadget chain to JOP is indeed a promising solution to increase our capacity to build effective gadget chains. Jaloyan et al. [16] reached the same result by abusing compressed instructions (overlapping).

6.2 Defenses from CRA for RISC-V

Austin et al. [15] published the MORPHEUS II solution to RISC-V. This hardware-based solution aims at defeating memory probes trying to bypass address randomization by providing a reactive, fine-grain, continuous randomization of virtual addresses, as well as encryption of pointers and caches. This solution, while having a low overhead in terms of energy consumption and area, is quite intrusive in the hardware and may require efforts for certification in critical applications. While authors make no claim about stopping JOP attacks, probe-resistant ASLR may be difficult to bypass for an attacker.

Palmiero et al. [19] proposed a hardware-based adaptation of Dynamic Flow Information Tracking (DIFT) for RISC-V, with the ability to detect most function pointers overwriting, whether direct or indirect, and in any memory segment, thus allowing blocking the attack at its initialization stage. Although this approach seems indeed powerful, it implies modification of RISC-V instructions behavior (in extensions RV32I and RV32M), as well as in the memory layout (by adding a bit every 8 bits of memory). Such modifications, in addition to draining from RISC-V ABI, are likely to make certification difficult, a serious drawback in critical industrial systems.

De et al. [11] implemented a chip compliant to RISC-V, including a Rocket Custom Coprocessor (RoCC) which extends the RISC-V ISA with new instructions allowing safe operation on the heap. The authors ensure heap size integrity and prevent use-after-free attacks, at the cost of an increase of 50% of average execution time on authors benchmarks – which is half than same solutions implemented at software level.

7 CONCLUSION

Anticipating security vulnerabilities for RISC-V systems in order to identify and prevent possible attacks is an important challenge. In this article, we demonstrated the feasibility of JOP attacks on RISC-V by exploiting vulnerable patterns in an application. Since we were conservative in our selection and usage of registers, the exploited patterns are likely to be a subset of actually vulnerable patterns. While we conducted a simple attack that performs only a single system call, extending the scope of exploited registers may allow bypassing this limitation in the future. Register swapping or register saving techniques are also likely to be useful for that matter. These techniques would indeed increase the complexity of crafting a consistent gadget chain. Thus, automated gadget detection and assembling techniques for RISC-V will be required, similarly to JOP Rocket tool [3]. With these tools and techniques — all within the domain of reasonable in short-term — an attacker would be able to perform arbitrarily complex and possibly stealthy attacks, as it would be possible to reset registers to a legit value after the exploit was performed.

In order to face these threats, security researchers need to devise solutions to address JOP attacks. Analyzing attack patterns, as we did in this experiment, was a first, mandatory, step. Providing efficient, innocuous and low-overhead solutions suitable for critical embedded and real-time systems will be the next step.

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