Europeanization of good governance in Romania:
Where and why does it fail, and what can be done about it?

Martin Mendelski
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne
mendelski@mpifg.de

Abstract: What impact does the European Union (EU) have on good governance Romania? The analysis shows that EU-driven governance reforms improve substantive legality (the alignment of domestic legislation with international best standards), state capacity but weaken formal legality (the inner morality of law), many aspects of impartiality, efficiency-effectiveness and the coherence of state structures and policies. As a result, good governance is undermined. The persistence of bad governance is explained by three fundamental problems of Europeanization: 1. Focus on quantity instead of quality, 2. Partisan empowerment of change agents, 3. Biased assessment of reform progress. The main argument is supported by an indicator-based analysis and qualitative interviews with representatives from the EU and Romania.

Keywords: Good governance, rule of law, judicial reform, anti-corruption policy, EU conditionality, Romania

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1. Introduction
What impact does the European Union (EU) have on the development of good governance in Romania? Does EU conditionality facilitate or hinder the transition towards good governance? This brief policy-oriented paper argues (and shows empirically) that the EU’s promotion of good governance in Romania, leads to some selective progress, but overall to persistence of bad governance. In particular, the paper shows that Romania’s process of Europeanization has resulted in (1) some progress across three dimensions of governance (substantive legality, capacity, efficiency-effectiveness) but (2) regress in three others (formal legality, impartiality, coherence). In other words, reforms generate more substantive laws that are adapted to international/European standards (best practices), but at the same time the new laws become instable, incoherent (contradictory), hardly enforced and less general. In addition, reforms improve capacity (inputs) and partly efficiency (outputs) or effectiveness (outcomes), but undermine the procedural and structural aspects of government quality (impartiality, coherence), for instance through increased politicization and fragmentation of the state structures. One of the key findings of this contribution is that EU-driven rule of law, administrative and anti-corruption reforms tend to reproduce the existing mode of bad (fragmented) governance. Thus, it can be claimed that the EU has not only transformative but also “pathological power” (Mendelski 2015; Mendelski 2016a). This negative impact on governance is attributed to the EU’s questionable approach to reform, which is based on 1.) A focus on quantity instead on quality, 2.) partisan support of unaccountable reformers, 3.) Biased evaluation of governance.

2. What is good governance?
Good Governance is conceived as a multi-dimensional concept that relates to the legal, judicial, prosecutorial and administrative quality in a state, and in particular to (1) the existence of stable, coherent, general and enforced laws that are embedded in universal good governance standards, (2) capable, efficient, independent, accountable and non-fragmented state structures that are able to deliver effectively public goods and implement and prioritize (3) coherent policies. Governance consists of two main qualities and six distinct dimensions (see appendix, Figure 1). In particular I distinguish between de jure good governance (quality of laws), which consists of 1) formal legality and 2) substantive legality, and de facto good governance (quality of state structures/government), which consists of four additional dimensions 3) capacity, 4) impartiality 5) efficiency/effectiveness and 6) coherence (see Mendelski 2015; 2016b).
De jure good governance reflects the quality of formal rules and the way how these rules are created and enforced. It can be assessed both in terms of formal legality, that is, the technical or formal quality of laws, and in terms of substantive legality, for instance, whether laws are good laws, whether they promote certain values such as justice and fairness, and which are reflected in international best-practices of good governance (e.g. United Nations Convention against Corruption). De facto good governance, on the other hand, reflects the quality of the government, and in particular the impartial, efficient, coherent adoption and enforcement of rules, policies and reforms by state structures (e.g. legislative, judiciary, administration etc.). Particularly important is the presence of well-coordinated, coherent and integrated (autonomous) state units, structures and policies (OECD 1997). Incoherence, in contrast, is associated with fragmentation, overlap, duplication and detrimental competition within state structures (Mendelski 2013; 2016b).

Finally, all six dimensions of governance are interdependent. In order to create good governance, reformers must seek to improve all six dimensions in a balanced way. Achieving progress in one dimension and regressing in others does not necessarily enhance governance. For instance, aligning domestic legislation with international standards will not establish the rule of law if the new laws and regulations become unstable, incoherent or are not enforced. Similarly, creating efficient but not sufficiently impartial prosecutorial and judicial structures (and vice versa) will not necessarily improve the rule of law. Adapting to best practices through institutional transplantation without assuring coherence of state structures will undermine good governance. The next section shows that the EU (together with its domestic reformers) had precisely such an uneven effect across the six dimensions of governance. While substantive legality, capacity and efficiency improved, reforms undermined formal legality, impartiality and coherence.

3. Where does the Europeanization of good governance fail?

3.1 Substantive legality: Considerable improvement

The first part of Table 1 presents the main a good governance treaty ratification indicator which measures the development of the substantive legality, and in particular Romania’s embeddedness in international good governance treaties. The indicator exhibits considerable progress. In a relative short period of time (2001-2004) Romania’s leaders signed and ratified
all 5 major good governance conventions. In addition, several *de jure* provisions to strengthen judicial independence, anti-corruption and integrity were introduced. This intensified alignment of domestic legislation with European and international standards can be attributed to EU conditionality which generated incentives for domestic reformers (e.g. Adrian Nastase) who were eager to gain legitimacy abroad and to obtain access to resources (EU funds, IMF credits). Romanian elites thus were able to fulfil most obligations imposed by external conditionality. However, while the *de jure* alignment with international standards was fairly easy and rapid, the same cannot be said for the second dimension of *de jure* good governance (formal legality) which experienced regress.

**Figure 1: Good governance treaty ratification**

![Graph showing good governance treaty ratification](image)

Sources: United Nations; Council of Europe.
Notes: This indicator consists of the proportion of the 5 more important anti-corruption conventions ratified by Romania (1. United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2. CoE Civil Law Convention on Corruption, 3. CoE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, 4. CoE Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, 5. Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime.)
3.2 Formal legality: Pathological development

Figure 2 presents data to measure legislative output and instability, as reflected in the number of yearly adopted laws in the parliament.\(^1\) Between 1995 and 2001 the number of adopted laws (legislative output) grew considerably in Romania, i.e. from 135 to 782 adopted laws per year. The “legislative explosion” occurred between 2000 and 2001 when the legislative output more than tripled and gradually declined afterwards. It seems also that the stability of legislation deteriorated during the pre- and post-accession period to the UE. This was particularly the case in the area of justice and anti-corruption. Law no. 92/1992 on the Organization of the Judiciary was modified 21 times between 1997 and 2005. Law no. 304/2004 on the judicial organization was amended 26 times between 2004 and 2013. Other frequently amended laws concerned the competencies of the Superior Council of Magistracy and relevant prosecutorial and administrative structures (e.g. DNA, DIICOT and ANI legislation). The legislative growth and instability has reflected in growing number of emergency ordinances, which increased from 13 to 290 (between 1996 and 2000) and of presidential decrees, which rose from 13 to 1063 (between 1996 and 2002). Accelerated (i.e. fast-track) legislative procedures during the pre-accession process to the EU were mis(used) in many accession or candidate countries (e.g. Poland, Slovakia, Czechia, Croatia, Serbia etc.), but comparative data on legislative output indicates that this reform pathology (of Europeanization) was especially grave in Romania (see Mendelski 2014). How to explain this deterioration of formal legality?

According to my interviews with several legal experts and judges, legal inflation/instability was directly or indirectly linked to Romania’s EU integration process. EU demands for legal approximation and reforms (which were often accompanied by coercive pressure from the World Bank and the IMF) account for a considerable percentage (approx. 30%) of the raising legislative output. In addition, Romania’s anti-corruption, judicial and legal reforms were accompanied by intensified political struggles between liberal change agents and reform opponents (Mendelski 2012), which resulted in a vicious cycle of reform counter-reform, increased politicization and the mis(use) of law as a political weapon. In sum, EU-driven reforms had an uneven effect. On the one hand, domestic laws were aligned with international/European laws and standards. On the other hand, laws became more instable, incoherent and less enforced (Mendelski 2014, 2015, 2016).

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\(^1\) The legislative growth indicator can be seen as a proxy indicator for legislative instability because many new laws have been introduced through amendments of the legal framework.
3.3 Capacity: Considerable progress

Figure 3 presents the main indicator (judicial budget p.c.) to measure (judicial) capacity. The indicator shows that the budget of the Romanian judicial system grew considerably (from 7.8 to 35.0 EUR, p.c.). Improved (judicial) capacity has been the outcome of higher salaries, increased computerization and infrastructural reforms (e.g. investment in court building), creation of new state structures (DNA, DIICOT, ANI), which more than often resulted from demands and support by the EU and international donors (and in particular USAID, Council of Europe). The progress on this indicator suggests an overall beneficial potential impact of EU-driven reforms. Surely, alternative explanations added to this positive trend, such as beneficial domestic economic conditions until 2008 (interrupted only briefly by the international financial crisis).
3.4 Impartiality: No improvement, except for judicial independence

Figure 4 gives an overview of several impartiality indicators for the period between 2002 and 2014. In contrast to the progress of judicial capacity, the three indicators of impartiality did not experience a similar positive trend. The indicators Favoritism in decision making (-0.4) and Diversion of public funds (-0.2) experienced some decline. The judicial independence indicator improved (+0.9), but experienced a fluctuating trend and remains at a median level. Progress can be most probably attributed to the EU’s insistence on judicial self-organization through judicial councils and the general trend towards judicialization. Fluctuation of the indicator suggests that the judiciary has not been able to avoid politicization by the executive despite the strengthening of legal safeguards and the empowering of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Overall, the three indicators of impartiality indicate that despite selective progress, EU-driven reforms have not been able to achieve transformative change at this dimension.
3.5 Coherence: Towards increased fragmentation

Figure 5 offers an overview of several agency and process-related indicators of coherence. First, the elite factionalization indicator by the Fund for Peace shows a decline (-1.4), suggesting the domestic elites in Romania became more divided over reforms and policies. Second, the BTI party system indicator regressed from 8.0 to 7.0 between 2004 and 2014, suggesting that the party system in Romania became more fragmented polarized and instable. Third, the BTI policy coordination indicator, which measures the ability of the government to coordinate conflicting policy objectives, shows a fluctuating and declining development (-2.0) between 2004 and 2014. Lack of potential policy coordination is also reflected in the fragmentation of the executive which consists of 22 ministries. The executive has also experienced constant tensions between the president and the prime minister. In addition, structural incoherence/heterogeneity is reflected the fragmented nature of governance which has been reinforced by the introduction of “islands or enclaves of excellence” (e.g. 1. Anti-Corruption Directorate, DNA, 2. National Integrity Agency, ANI, 3. Organised Crime and Terrorism Department, DIICOT) that undermine the coherence of the prosecutorial (administrative) system. This process of fragmentation began already in the 1990s, with the transplantation of several autonomous organs from abroad (e.g. Ombudsman, Superior Council of Magistrates, Constitutional Court, Central Bank, regulatory agencies etc.). The problem here is not autonomy or pluralism (of different units) per se, but the lack of unity
(corporate ethos, unitary judicial and political decisions), cooperation and coordination of activities between the different government structures (state agencies, within ministries, judicial structures etc.) which results more than often in fragmentation, frictions, quarrels over competency and inefficiency of the governance system. Overall, the trends in the coherence indicators indicate the continuing divisions between political elites, fragmentation of state structures and the lack of policy coordination.

Figure 5: Selected indicators of coherence

![Graph showing indicators of coherence over time](image)

Sources: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI).
Notes: Scale:1 (worst) to 10 (best)

3.6 Efficiency-effectiveness: Selective progress within broad stagnation

Figure 6 presents one indicator of government efficiency and two indicators of government effectiveness. The indicator of **Wastefulness of government spending**, which indicates how efficiently the government spends public revenue, experienced a small decrease from 2.9 to 2.5. Two indicators of the government’s effective provision of public goods show mixed development. While the **quality of overall infrastructure** improved by +1.1, the **quality of the educational system** declined by -1.4. Overall, no clear tendency can be identified and more indicators would be needed to assess the impact of reforms in the public sector. The mixed development at the efficiency/effectiveness dimension can be attributed to a mixture of improved economic conditions (until 2009), EU and international donor conditionality.
Overall, good governance developed unevenly across its six dimensions, suggesting a differential/uneven impact of the EU-driven reforms in Romania. With regard to the *de jure* good governance, SEE experienced progress in substantive legality and a regress in formal legality. Thus, while laws became more similar to European and international standards, they became at the same time less stable. As regards the *de facto* good governance, capacity was considerably improved but this was not always reflected in indicators of impartiality, coherence, and efficiency-effectiveness which mainly stagnated or declined. Thus, EU conditionality did not lead to transformative change in most dimensions of good governance. The reasons for this unexpected lack of progress are explored in the next section.

4. Why does Europeanization of governance fail?

Why did EU-driven good governance reforms not result in transformative progress and even in deterioration in several key dimensions of good governance? This section identifies three fundamental problems of EU conditionality (Europeanization), which explain why well-intended reforms do not lead to the establishment of good governance.
4.1 The problem of valuing quantity over quality

The first fundamental problem of Europeanization is reflected in the EU’s quantitative approach to good governance promotion, which follows essentially a “the more the better” mindset. The EU’s approach emphasizes reforms which stress quantitative outcomes (more laws, more resources, more convictions, more arrests etc.) over the quality of reform processes and procedures (i.e. how laws, arrests or convictions are made). The EU’s approach can be criticized for creating quantitative perverse incentives for reformers by stressing quantitative “track records” to evaluate progress, such as: the number of prosecuted high level corruption cases, regular indictments of senior politicians and civil servants, number of projects, number of assets frozen and recovered, number of convictions (number of corruption cases brought to conclusion), number of laws adopted/amended, number of conflict of interests detected, number of judges and prosecutors trained, number of best practices successfully exchanged and applied, number of working groups established etc. These indicators to measure progress have been reflected in the EU’s progress reports, several twinning projects, and the main reform good governance strategies.²

However, by relying on a ‘more is better’ mindset, the EU (together with domestic actors) has produced and reinforced legal pathologies which have undermined the rule of law and good governance in general. The demand for more transplanted laws and adaptation to international standards has improved the substantive legality but at the time has fostered legal inflation and instability. The demand for more regulations has increased discrepancy between formal rules and informal practice (see Slapin 2015). The call for more judicial independence has resulted in more independent but less accountable judicial councils, anti-corruption structures and courts (Transparency International 2012; Mendelski 2016a). The demand for a “solid track records” in fighting high-level corruption cases has increased the number of convictions (efficiency), but has undermined the procedural quality of anti-corruption policies (Mendelski 2016a). The demand for more judicial capacity has created expensive information and court administration systems (based on Western

² For instance, annex no. 5 to Romania’s anti-corruption strategy (2016-2020) mentions mainly quantitative indicators to measure reform progress, among others: 1. Number of persons which were dismissed due to potential conflicts of interest. 2. Number of complaints received from third parties regarding conflict of interests, 3. Number of indictments / convictions regarding conflicts of interest, 4. Number of public meetings 5. Number of complaints received regarding the breach of legal provisions, 6. Number of complaints filed in the court 7. Numbers the sanctions imposed by the courts.
technology and software) which expensive to maintain and relies on continuous foreign assistance. Finally, more material resources (in the form of EU funds) have resulted in more opportunities to engage in corruption and rent-seeking (Mungiu-Pippidi 2014). Overall, the EU’s quantitative approach with its perverse incentives has produced or reinforced several legal and political pathologies which have undermined crucial aspects of good governance.

4.2 The EU’s partisan empowerment and evaluation of change agents
The second fundamental problem reflects the EU’s selective and partisan empowerment and support of selected, reformist, “liberal” change agents (associated with the PNL), to the detriment of so-called “illiberal” reform opponents (associated with the PSD). Partisan empowerment was for instance visible, when the EU selectively supported reformist political change agents (e.g. Monica Macovei, Traian Basescu, Klaus Iohannis) and key actors in newly created or empowered state structures (e.g. DNA, ANI, DIICOT, CSM, Constitutional Court). Most of these autonomous enclaves were created under the pressure of EU conditionality during the pre-accession process and were initially weak but from 2005 onwards considerably empowered. But why should selective empowerment of reformist change agents be detrimental for the development of good governance? Eventually change agents would propel required reforms and achieve desired outcomes (e.g. judicial and prosecutorial independence, checks on politicians, integrity, reduction of corruption and organized crime). This is however wishful thinking. The partisan support of reformers is a double-edged sword. It may result in some formal changes but at the same time reduce external accountability over them, potentially leading to the accumulation and misuse of power.

The sobering reality is that both political change agents and reform opponents are embedded in the same environment of bad governance (i.e. legal and political instability, state fragmentation, informality, politicization, clientelism, lack of effective oversight etc.) from which they can hardly escape (only if they leave the country). Thus, change agents often lack the appropriate incentives, norms and skills to conduct reforms in a non-politicised, impartial and inclusive way. In a situation of detrimental political competition between elites, both liberal and liberal political elites, instead of respecting the rule of law, may (mis)use the law and the judicial system as a weapon against each other. In Romania, different competing factions (i.e. both change agents and reform opponents) have repeatedly instrumentalized the
law, resorted to informal practices and secret deals which undermined the separation of powers, transgressed their competencies and politicized the reform process (Mendelski 2012, 2015, 2016b). However, despite these structural deficiencies, the EU has selectively supported the liberal-reformist camp in Romania, thus giving them in many instances a free hand (discretion) in conducting reforms without the necessary restrictions. The partisan empowering of change agents thus resulted in new possibilities to accumulate and abuse power. Once reform opponents from the PSD came to power, they tried to launch a protective counter-movement by weakening oversight structures (e.g. at ANI, DNA, Constitutional Court, the CSM) through emergency ordinances or replacing their heads/members with their own protégés. The result of these political power struggles have been recurrent vicious cycles of reform and counter-reform with detrimental effects for the rule of law and good governance (in particular for legal stability, state coherence and the creation of impersonal, impartial and accountable state structures) (Mendelski 2015).

4.3 Biased evaluation of progress in good governance

The third fundamental problem of EU conditionality is reflected in biased evaluation of good governance (and particularly the rule of law). The EU’s lack of a coherent and objective monitoring and evaluation methodology of the rule of law and anti-corruption policies (see Dimitrov et al. 2014; Toneva-Metodieva 2014), which I have termed elsewhere the “EU’s rule of law evaluation deficit” (Mendelski 2016a), opens doors for ad-hocness, leeway, partisanship and double standards. The EU’s assessment deficit has been reflected in the several problematic issues (see Mendelski 2016a):

1. Politicized progress reports (e.g. European Commission 2012) which contained positive information about change agents and include negative assessments of reform opponents.\(^3\) Especially, the newly created and empowered state structures (e.g. DNA, ANI, High Court of Cassation and Justice, CSM, Constitutional Court etc.) have been repeatedly praised and evaluated positively when they were stuffed with reformist “change agents”, but negatively assessed when they were under control of reform-opposing “veto players”.

\(^3\) <http://www.nineoclock.ro/the-report%E2%80%99s-dangerous-omissions/>. See letter by former president Constantinescu to the European Commission: <http://www.nineoclock.ro/former-president-emil-constantinescu-writes-to-ec-president-jose-manuel-barroso/>.
2. One-sided, harmful rhetoric by members of EU institutions during “inter-institutional conflicts” in Romania. Here can be mentioned the exaggerated “rule of law crisis” and “coup d’état rhetoric” by leading representatives of the EU during the Romanian constitutional crisis from 2012. By invoking the concept of the rule of law to support change agents, the EU risks transforming this core fundamental value into a politicized and instrumental buzzword, rather than strengthening it as an impartial principle and constraint valid for all actors.

3. A reactive “problem-based approach” which relies on the ringing of ‘alarm bells’ by Western-financed NGOs and a well-connected legal, liberal epistemic expert community, which however avoids ringing the alarm bells in the case of liberal, reformist governments.

4. One-sided reliance on liberal advisors, and experts that have a liberal -constitutionalist perspective which emphasizes only selective aspects of the rule of law (e.g. independence of Constitutional Courts and judicial councils) to the detriment of accountability of these bodies and a systemic assessment of the rule of law as a socially, politically and historically embedded concept.

Why should this lack of objective evaluation be a bad thing? One main argument is that the selective and inconsistent evaluation methodology of EU conditionality cannot function as an impartial external accountability mechanism and can no longer discipline change agents. In fact the EU risks becoming an accomplice who turns a blind eye on the transgressions of change agents within newly created state structures which themselves may become 1.) politicized, captured, or controlled by influential and dominant politicians, transnational coalitions or informal and hidden networks, or 2.) that these autonomous state structures become so independent and powerful that they are no longer accountable to the law, democratic oversight and public scrutiny.

Romania is an unfortunate example where the newly created network of autonomous structures (controlled by externally-empowered change agents) turned into unaccountable, instrumentalized and politicized “state enclaves” (see Transparency International 2012). In the course of reform, many of the new structures became autonomous but unaccountable and disembedded. The EU, together with US representatives, parts of the “liberal” civil society (including reformist journalists), have continued to support and evaluate their “islands of (pathological) excellence” in a positive way, despite increasing evidence of deficient functioning, such as: 1. Non-transparent and personalized stuff selection procedures in key judicial and anti-corruption structures (e.g. through interviews, arranged voting, bargains
between elites etc.) which have undermined the principle of merit-based selection. 2. A deficient fight against corruption, which includes abuse of fundamental rights and procedural aspects (e.g. misuse of wire-tapping, disrespect of immunity of judges, problematic pre-trial detention, non-transparent selection methodology of cases etc.), allegations of fabricated/invented files and deals with prosecutors, reported pressure and intimidation of judges by DNA prosecutors, inconsistent notion of the “abuse in office”, potential hidden influence by informal networks and secret service structures and a focus on perverse, quantitative indicators (track records) which undermine procedural quality (see Mendelski 2016a; Clark 2016). By turning a blind eye on the transgressions of reformist, “anti-corruption fighters”, the EU (together with several partisan Western diplomats/politicians) has reduced external and domestic accountability over them, therefore undermining the procedural and democratic functioning of anti-corruption policy in Romania.

5. Conclusion: What can be done about it?

Does the EU enhance or undermine good governance in Romania? This study suggests that EU-driven reforms improve some aspects of governance (1. substantive legality, 2. capacity) but undermine several other ones (3. formal legality, 4. impartiality, 5. coherence and partially also 6. efficiency-effectiveness). Overall, the analysis suggests that there is no transition towards good governance in Romania, despite selective progress. This sobering result is reflected in the deficient functioning of autonomous but unconstrained accountability structures (e.g. DNA, ANI, CSM) which do not function in an impartial, impersonal, transparent and accountable way. Reform failure can be attributed (among other factors) to EU conditionality (CVM) which develops into a pathological form when applied in an institutional context of bad governance (particularism). What can be done to improve external promotion of good governance in Romania and beyond?

First, the EU should refrain from partisan empowerment of reformist, liberal change agents, particularly when they instrumentalize the law, disrespect procedural aspects and human rights and misuse their prerogatives to fight competitors. The EU’s empowerment strategies are probably helpful to push reforms and to attain certain geopolitical goals, but they also undermine the establishment of the rule of law (and good governance). Rather than focusing on a small group of selected liberal change agents, the EU should reward elites and movements who have gained domestic legitimacy, foster domestic consensus and unity and regard the law as a necessary constraint rather than a tool. By supporting a small minority of
delegitimized and abusive change agents, the EU may further reinforce the polarization of the Romanian polity and society.

Second, EU conditionality should be re-focused from quantitative outcomes towards qualitative processes. In particular, the EU should not link conditionality to specific reform outcomes or benchmarks (e.g. bringing war criminals before the court, increasing the number of high-level corruption cases, adoption of specific laws or one-size-fits-all solutions). Rather, the EU should link conditionality to the reform process itself which underlies these outcomes. This process-related and qualitative approach should pay attention to formal legality, coherence of state structures and interdependencies between dimensions of governance.

Third, the EU needs to improve the currently flawed and inconsistent methodology of governance (rule of law) evaluation, which opens the doors to bias and double standards. An enhanced approach requires a more objective, qualitative and multiplicative methodology, which pays attention to reform and policy processes. In addition, the EU’s (CVM) progress reports should contain more detailed references and all relevant sources of information in a large appendix (e.g. containing original screening reports by experts, documented interviews, opinions of the respective government and opposition etc.) More objectivity and validity through triangulation and transparency of the evaluation methodology could help to diminish the “EU’s evaluation deficit” and the pathological effects it generates.

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