Chapter 8
Hopes and Fears in a Pre- and Post-Brexit Britain

Sarah Harrison

Abstract In 2016, the surprise successes of the UK Vote Leave and Donald Trump’s Presidential campaigns defied most expectations. In different ways, both events have arguably transformed the political landscape with lasting effects. However, these electoral outcomes have also raised important questions about what has changed in the political psychology of voters and, indeed, of nations. In particular, the significance and intense emotionality of the unique EU membership referendum undoubtedly provide a fascinating insight into British citizens’ hearts and minds. This chapter presents the findings derived from a panel study of three consecutive mass surveys conducted with the same respondents prior to and then after the referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union that took place on 23 June 2016. Analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data is used to highlight the intricate complexities of this remarkable vote and the findings reveal that there is unprecedented polarisation and division within communities. This chapter concludes by discussing the wider implications of these findings within a similarly challenging context for the global political status quo.

1 Introduction

In 2016, the surprise successes of the UK Vote Leave and Donald Trump’s Presidential campaigns defied most expectations. In different ways, both events have arguably transformed the political landscape with lasting effects. However, these electoral outcomes have also raised important questions about what has changed in the political psychology of voters and, indeed, of nations. In particular, the significance and intense emotionality of the unique EU membership referendum undoubtedly provide a fascinating insight into British citizens’ hearts and minds.

This chapter presents the findings derived from a panel study of three consecutive mass surveys conducted with the same respondents prior to and then after the referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union that took place on 23
June 2016. The three-wave panel study included a representative sample of 3000 respondents, featured 300 variables, and was conducted at three critical time points during the referendum campaign (late April, late May, and the day after the referendum). Analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data is used to highlight the intricate complexities of this remarkable vote. The questions were designed to probe perceptions, expectations, and projections of the likely economic, social, and political consequences. There is substantial evidence of polarisation and division within communities on a level that is arguably unprecedented and has rarely been seen before on this level. This chapter concludes by discussing the wider implications of these findings within a similarly challenging context for the global political status quo.

Over the last 10 years, the research team of the Electoral Psychology Observatory at the London School of Economics and Political Science have conducted in-depth empirical research to gain a better understanding of citizen psychology during critical moments of an election campaign. Their research examines the psychological mechanisms that are triggered in voters’ minds during the campaign, at the very moment when citizens are casting their ballot, and after an election. Their findings have shown, for example, that in most elections, 20–30% of voters only make a final decision within a week of the vote, half of them on Election Day. Moreover, more than a quarter of citizens have cried because of an election (Bruter and Harrison 2017a, 2020). The increasingly important role of emotions in voting has also revealed widespread hostility among voters during the Brexit referendum and US Presidential election, not only towards politicians and the political system but also towards fellow voters (Bruter and Harrison 2020).

These findings have underlined how emotions can play a fundamental role in elections and that divisions within society are increasingly witnessed across established and emerging democracies. A case of example is presented by the 23 June UK Referendum on EU membership (which is now commonly referred to as Brexit). The highly fractious debate split the country into two visibly opposed camps. The unexpected result of a Leave victory has contributed to entrenched tension and presented more questions than it has answered with far-reaching implications not only within the UK and the European Union but also all across the world.

Throughout the course of this chapter, we will explore some of the key findings derived from a series of mass surveys we conducted during the campaign leading up to the Referendum and in the weeks following the vote.1 We will explore some of the striking observations that tell a story of division and polarisation within British society as a result of this vote. Moreover, one of the most interesting observations pertains to the fact that we have been able to track the endurance of these fractures

---

1The survey was designed by Michael Bruter and Sarah Harrison at the Electoral Psychology Observatory. It was conducted in collaboration with Opinium. The first wave of the panel study was fielded 22–28 April 2016 (3,008 respondents), and 17–19 May 2016 (2,111 respondents, i.e. 70.2% of the original sample), and a third wave on Referendum Night 23rd June 2016. More information on the methodology and other findings derived from this data can be found in the report ‘The Impact of Brexit on Consumer Behaviour’ https://opinium.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/the_impact_of_brexit_on_consumer Behaviour_0.pdf.
over time as we highlighted some additional insights from a series of surveys, we conducted during the UK General Election on June 8 2017.

2 Before the Vote: Apprehension and Uncertainty

The referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU was widely regarded as an incredibly important vote with far-reaching consequences not only within the UK but also to the extent that the result would likely impact countries far beyond the shores of Britain. In this respect, we asked respondents of the survey that we conducted prior to the vote to rank some recent elections from most to least important for the UK. Overall, Table 1 shows that a vast majority of respondents view the June referendum on EU membership as the single most important vote for the UK in a generation (54%). Over 80% see it as one of the top three votes to take place during recent years.

Whilst the vote itself was perceived to be historic, with notably important consequences for all concerned, it was also characterised by a very negative campaign from both sides of the debate. In terms of the messages and the tone of the campaigns, the Leave supporters played upon the perceived fears and insecurities that many citizens in the UK were feeling as a result of an extended period of austerity, high levels of unemployment, and failed immigration policies. The Remain campaign instead focused on the more ‘rational’ side of the arguments highlighting the more technical aspects of EU membership without really appealing to the more cultural value of this shared community. In order to illustrate, the opposing discourse of the two campaigns we used an open-ended question to capture the unprompted reactions of respondents. We asked participants to report the words that they spontaneously though of when imagining a Remain or a Leave outcome in June. These references are illustrated by a word clouds in Fig. 1. While both Remain and Leave outcomes attract a mixture of positive and negative spontaneous references, it is quite clear that a Leave victory feels significantly more threatening to respondents as a whole with two of the top three categories being negative and focusing on fear and danger. All of the negative elements associated with leaving the EU pertain either to the future state of the countries (risk, disaster, chaos, conflict, etc.) or implicitly perceived to be a

| The most important vote for our nation | Ranked top | In the top 3 |
|---------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| The 2016 EU Referendum                | 54         | 81          |
| The 2015 General Election            | 13         | 58          |
| The 1975 EEC Referendum              | 12         | 50          |
| The 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum | 9       | 48          |
| The 2016 Local Elections            | 7          | 31          |
| The 2011 Referendum on the electoral system | 5       | 31          |
criticism of the Leave voters (foolish, stupid). By contrast, negatives associated with remaining within the EU pertain to problematic policy issues (such as immigration) or negativity towards the politicians and elites who are perceived to be biased and untrustworthy.

It should, however, also be noted that on the whole, these references are far more positive compared with our findings of similar association questions in the context of UK General elections in 2010 and 2015 as well as the 2011 referendum on the proposal of an Alternative Voting electoral system. It is also particularly interesting to note contrary to the substantive messages of the official Remain campaign, citizens privilege references to the idea of the shared community more than the ‘technical’ benefits that are often associated with EU membership. Indeed, these overwhelmingly positive references highlight unity, being part of a community, strength, and solidarity are in fact significantly higher than references to prosperity, wealth, etc. which do not feature in the top 10 references. This suggests that perhaps the campaign led by the Remain camp grossly underestimated the shared cultural value and importance that British citizens feel for the European Union. In a way, the reliance of the Remain campaign on highlighting the more technical aspects of membership was largely misplaced as it failed to capture the hearts and minds of Britons who were inclined to vote Remain and that were just as emotionally involved in the referendum as their counterparts on the opposing side.

3 Electoral Identity in the Referendum: Two Alternative Roles of the Voter

A central theme in our analysis of the elections we have studied as part of the large scale electoral psychology project is a question that pertains to voters’ electoral identity (Bruter and Harrison 2020). We ask voters to imagine that the election in question is the final match of the football world cup (or whatever sport is deemed to be the national sport) and that the parties are the players of the teams competing to win the game, in this context we ask the voters whether they see themselves as referees or supporters. The two roles have quite different parts to play within the game and can influence how they perceive the election and their electoral identity.
### Table 2  Electoral identity: referees or supporters?

| Overall | By age group |
|---------|--------------|
|         | 18–39 | 40–64 | 65+ |
| Referees* | 15 | 20 | 12 |
| Supporters* | 42 | 35 | 44 |
| Neither/Both* | 43 | 45 | 44 |

**Notes** Referees represent the total of ‘mostly’ and ‘definitely’ a referee, Supporters the total of ‘mostly’ and ‘definitely’ a supporter and the Neither/Both total the total of those who answered ‘neither’ and ‘a bit of both’

In the context of this Referendum, Table 2 shows that a majority of voters see themselves as ‘supporters’ rather than ‘referees’. This finding contrasts to what we usually witness in General Elections, whereby a majority of voters see themselves as referees. This suggests that voters are typically have stronger preferences on the issue of whether we should be ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the EU compared with their stance towards political parties competing for their vote.

At the same time, however, we should also note that even more than in traditional elections, respondents demonstrate a clear perception that a responsibility is weighing on their shoulders. This is notably observed when we asked them about their main fear in the context of the vote using an open-ended question, and a very significant proportion of the people whom we surveyed replied that they were very worried about making the wrong decision.

As a consequence of this burden of responsibility, the Referendum was also perceived to be largely concerned with socio-tropic projections. In this sense, the Table 3 shows below when arbitrating between the decisions associated with voting for what they believe will be best for them and what will be best for the country, the latter clearly took precedence.

This is true both when we ask the question directly (as above) and when we measure it indirectly by checking which of the perceived best result for the individual or the perceived best result for the country is the best predictor of a respondent’s voting intention. The majority of people would likely think about other people (versus themselves) the rest of the country when making their decision (73%), children (68%), and the poor (59%). Just over half of the respondents (55%) report they will

### Table 3  Socio-tropic versus ego-centric evaluations

| British people | Children | British companies | The poorest | Yourself | The elderly | The world | Europeans |
|----------------|----------|-------------------|-------------|----------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| Main concern/a lot | 73 | 68 | 61 | 59 | 55 | 48 | 41 | 33 |
| A little/not at all | 27 | 32 | 39 | 41 | 45 | 52 | 59 | 67 |
vote according to what they believe is best for themselves These findings reveal the weighted sense of responsibility and burden on people’s shoulders to ‘make the right decision’ in this historic referendum that would influence and shape the path of the country forever. In particular, voters give greater emphasis to the generation of today’s children than to their own or the elderly (68% for the generation of today’s children and only 48% for the elderly). This finding is also echoed by the finding that respondents typically reported that remaining in the EU would be better for younger people than for older ones, whilst a Leave result would be a more favourable outcome for older citizens than for young people.

We have seen from the findings highlighted above that the decision on how to vote in the referendum is an extremely important choice and is influenced by highly emotional and projective considerations. In the next section, in order to better understand the implications of these evaluations, we discuss the various aspects that respondents would miss if the UK were to leave the EU.

4 Aspects of EU Membership that British Citizens Would Miss if the UK Were to Leave the EU

We find that European identity is largely focused on a daily practice of citizenship rather than more abstract attributes of European integration. While many politicians speak of peace (positive) or bureaucracy (negative), prosperity (positive) or inefficiencies (negative), the vast majority of citizens see the European Union through the rights and duties that it gives them and the way in which it impacts upon their everyday life.

With this in mind, we asked respondents which aspects of being European citizens they would or would not miss if Britain chose to leave the European Union in June. The most interesting aspect of this question is that it reveals two different layers of rights and privileges:

- A series of secondary citizenship rights, typically more social or practical (medical coverage, consumer protection, right to freely carry goods within the EU, etc.) and which are largely reported to be important across age groups;
- A series of more intense primary citizenship rights (living, working, or studying anywhere in the EU, being part of a political community, EU passport), which would be particularly missed by the younger voters, but much less so by older voters.

From these findings displayed in Table 4, we can see that young people aged 18–39 place the highest emphasis on potentially missing the right to live anywhere in the EU, work or study anywhere in the EU, and three-quarters of them would also miss having a European passport or being part of a unified human community of Europeans. However, less than 50% of those aged 55 and over would miss any of these aspects of EU membership.
Table 4  Aspects of EU membership that UK citizens would miss in the case of a Leave victory

| Aspect                                                                 | 18–24 | 25–39 | 40–54 | 55–64 | 65+  |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| The right to live in another EU country                                | 86    | 78    | 56    | 45    | 44   |
| Being able to bring back anything when travelling within the EU         | 84    | 77    | 61    | 52    | 50   |
| No mobile phone roaming surcharge across the EU                        | 84    | 77    | 56    | 47    | 44   |
| The possibility to make large purchases anywhere in the EU             | 83    | 72    | 53    | 44    | 43   |
| Benefitting from EU consumer protection                                | 82    | 81    | 67    | 59    | 55   |
| The right to medical treatment anywhere in the EU                      | 80    | 84    | 68    | 65    | 66   |
| The right to work or study in another EU country                       | 77    | 78    | 51    | 39    | 36   |
| Holding a European Union passport                                      | 77    | 72    | 44    | 35    | 32   |
| Feeling part of a large human community                                | 76    | 71    | 53    | 42    | 42   |
| The ability to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights            | 75    | 78    | 57    | 53    | 47   |
| The right to vote in local elections anywhere you live in the EU       | 72    | 67    | 43    | 35    | 32   |
| The presence of nurses and waiters from other EU countries             | 71    | 71    | 52    | 52    | 58   |
| The right to vote in European Parliament elections                     | 67    | 64    | 42    | 34    | 29   |
| Symbols like the flag, anthem, etc.                                    | 55    | 55    | 31    | 22    | 23   |

By contrast, while such elements as consumer protection, being able to bring back goods from anywhere in the EU and medical protection across the EU territory are of less concern to the younger generation of voters, they would be missed by all generation. This is particularly true of EU-wide medical protection which would be missed by two-thirds of the voters aged 55 and above. It is also worth mentioning that a majority of all age groups, including the oldest ones, would also miss the presence of waiters or nurses from all over the EU in their daily life, which is in interesting contrast with the generally negative views expressed towards immigration as a generic concept.

It is also interesting to note that when we disaggregate the results by intended vote, a majority of those who are unsure of how they will cast their ballot on 23 June would typically miss most existing EU citizenship rights at least to some extent, which seems to bring them closer to EU supporters on the value of existing EU-related rights.

With the country divided on the issue of the whether to Leave or Remain in the EU, the Referendum result would determine which side would be de facto victorious. However, the fact that the debate had split the country along divisive lines, meant that there were explicit concerns that whichever way the result would go, the implications of leaving the EU would be far-reaching and affect every detail of daily life. The next section looks at precisely this issue by asking respondents about who they would perceive to be the expected winners and losers of the Referendum.
Table 5 Winners and losers in the case of a leave victory

| Category         | 18–24 | 25–39 | 40–54 | 55–64 | 65 + |
|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| People like me   | −26   | −15   | 0     | +3    | +20  |
| Young people     | −26   | −13   | −1    | +10   | +16  |
| Unemployed       | −18   | −7    | +1    | +3    | +12  |
| Middle class     | −17   | −10   | 0     | +3    | +12  |
| UK Business      | −14   | −15   | −8    | −3    | +7   |
| Elderly          | −11   | −7    | 0     | +1    | +9   |

5 Perceived Winners and Losers of the Referendum

Table 5 shows that in terms of the losers and winners of the Referendum, quite unsurprisingly, respondents tend to rationalise their predictions with their expected vote, so that the most pro-Remain generational group, 18–24 year old’s tend to think that everybody would lose out in the case of a Brexit, whilst the most pro-Brexit demographic category, over 65 year old’s believe that every category of British people would in fact be winners.

What is more paradoxical, however, is that when hierarchy between categories, the more individual categories are seen by young voters as standing to lose from a Brexit outcome, the more it is claimed that they would gain from it by elderly voters. In that sense, for 18–24 year old’s, the main losers would be—in that order—people like the respondent, young people, the unemployed, and the middle class, and these categories, in the exact same order would actually be the main beneficiaries of a Brexit vote according to 65 year old’s and over.

In summary, it was clear from the findings derived from the surveys we conducted prior to the referendum that citizens were fully aware of the importance of this vote and there was a sense that nothing will be the same after the vote (whichever way the result went). This perceived ‘weight of responsibility’ was acutely reflected in the responses and underlines the fluidity and intensity in the emotions, divisions, and future projections of the UK electorate.

6 The Unexpected Outcome

As we have seen from the above discussion, this Referendum was unique in its importance for the future of Britain’s place not only within the European Union but also its standing on the global stage. With polls predicting a result too close to call, the stakes were extremely high, and all eyes were watching to see which way the result would swing. As a result, the atmosphere of Election Day was electrifyingly tense with expectation and apprehension. The sense of the weight of responsibility that
most voters felt was almost tangible. The fractious campaign had split the country into two opposed camps, and it was now time to see which side would be victorious.

The result was 52% versus 48% in favour of Leaving the European Union. The victory of the Leave camp was largely unexpected, and reverberations of this shock were felt all across the world. Turnout was particularly high at 72% illustrating that the nation fully acknowledged and recognised the importance of this momentous occasion. On the whole, Leave won the majority of votes in England and Wales, while every council in Scotland saw Remain majorities. Striking geographical divisions were illustrated by further analysis of the results. Many large urban cities led the vote to Remain, whilst many suburban and rural areas preferred to vote Leave. London exemplifies this trend. The capital was depicted as ‘an island of Euro-enthusiasm amid a south-east that was mostly resolved to quit’ (The Guardian 2017). The majorities for Remain in some inner-London boroughs were overwhelming: for example, 75% of the vote in Camden and 78% in Hackney. Outside of the city, to the south, Sutton voted 54% for Leave, as did Barking and Dagenham, where 63% voted to Leave (The Guardian 2017). In addition, in cities where universities are dominant—Norwich, Bristol, Brighton, and especially Oxford and Cambridge, the Remain vote was arch-dominant with votes often reaching over 70%. In the North of England, the picture was less clear cut, several big cities—including Leeds, Manchester and Liverpool—voted largely to Remain, while the Leave vote was significantly dominant in smaller cities and towns like Wigan, St Helens, Doncaster and Barnsley.

The tensions and strains that were experienced during the campaign followed through to Election Day and the days that followed the vote. It was undoubtedly one of the most emotional votes of recent memory. One of the most remarkable findings derived from our survey captured this emotionality. We found that one-third of Brits claimed they had tears in their eyes when they discovered the result of the Referendum (Bruter and Harrison 2020). We often presume as political scientists that citizens do not care about elections and that many who do turnout on election day are dutifully carrying out their civic responsibilities, but this result perhaps sheds some substantial doubt on this assumption. People who do not care do not cry (Bruter and Harrison 2017b). With this striking result in mind, we move on to the next section to discuss the consequences that could be observed in the days and weeks after the result in order to better understand the complexities of this historic vote.

7 The Aftermath of the Vote

Usually in elections, we observe a ‘honeymoon’ period after an election, when the various groups that campaigned get together and there is a general sense of consensus that emerges between winners and losers that the national interest should be served and that unity and cohesion should be prioritised. Yet, in the case of the Brexit referendum, there has been no ‘healing’, no coming together of the groups, the Leavers and Remainers are still distinct groups with very different and opposed views on how the future should be directed. The divisions remain and the hostility
expressed towards one another during the campaign strikingly, our findings show that 51% of respondents confessed to feeling anger towards people who had voted differently from them, and 46% even expressed some disgust (Bruter and Harrison 2020). This is obviously a concern but also reinforces this perception of emotionality of the vote and how much people do care about voting and political issues. Perhaps even more worryingly, is the fact that 12 months after the vote, there is evidence that this polarisation within society is not subsiding (Van der Eijk and Rose 2017). These fracture lines are evident across generations (particularly the difference in the way the young voted predominantly to Remain whilst the older generation voted to Leave) but can also be seen across geographic locations too, with many large urban cities leading the vote to Remain and many suburban and rural areas preferring to vote Leave. Whilst anti-elite sentiment has been an almost constant theme within the campaigns of populist parties and this has often filtered through into the discourse of citizens alike, it is perhaps a new and even alarming prospect that these fractures and divisions have been translated into hostility against other citizens.

Moreover, these divisions within society were also observable across generations. This generational divide was highlighted by a series of questions that we included in a survey that we conducted in collaboration with Opinium that probed implicit and explicit associations with the EU (Bruter and Harrison 2017b). We found that when asked to compare the EU to an animal, older Brits chose a representation of an elephant, whilst younger respondents preferred to associate the EU with a lion. When asked to compare the EU to a painting, older Brits chose Guernica and the young a Dance by Matisse. Similarly, when we asked for a human trait, the top answer amongst the old was stupidity and amongst the young intelligence. The symbolism of these contrasted visions should not be dismissed as they offer a real insight into the juxtaposed visions that British citizens hold. These connotations of the EU shed some fascinating light upon the divisions within British society and how different the younger and older generations perceive the EU.

These generational differences were also explicit in the voting behaviour of younger and older voters in the recent December 2019 UK General Election. An insight into the motivations of the young voters has revealed that young citizens between the ages of 18 and 24 years old—were significantly more motivated by a desire for change, a rejection of the vision of Brexit that the Government was promoting, and frustration with the current political climate than the rest of the voting population (Harrison 2020a). Those differences have also given rise to broader senses of electoral hostility between citizens (Bruter and Harrison 2020), and also, ultimately of a growing sense of democratic frustration amongst citizens (Harrison 2020b).
8 Implications of Brexit Further Afield: A Message to Heed?

For many years, various groups within our societies feel ‘left behind’ as they struggle to grasp the volatile and unpredictable political, economic and social context. Within Europe, populist parties and their politicians have won electoral gains due to their platforms that address these concerns and have seen this a political opportunity to push their vision of socio-political transformation. Indeed, many of those who voted for Brexit will be the first victims of inflation, the first victims of disenfranchisement of the UK from EU law, and of the tax changes that Brexeters are threatening to use in retaliation for what they call a ‘bad deal’ for the UK.

It is crucial that we now start to recognise that citizens feel more European than elites give them credit for, but also that their very Europeanness is a major challenge for the EU because it makes citizens far more critical, and also far more legitimate in their criticism. Europeans—especially young Europeans—do not feel European simply because it has ‘benefits’. They feel European because they are, and because they feel a sense of belonging and ownership of the project it represents. If you are German, Hungarian, or Portuguese, you can perfectly disagree with—even be furiously critical—of the policies carried out by your Government without questioning the nation they apply to. European citizens may have indeed reached a point where precisely because they have appropriated the EU political system, they also want the accompanying right to be increasingly critical of the actions of those who lead the European Union. Leaders, be they national or European, can no longer hide behind the fact that they protect European integration to ask for a blank cheque to lead it the way they want any more. Citizens are demanding more democratic accountability from the EU and it needs to respond if it is restoring faith and trust in the project.

Perhaps, we may see that in the forthcoming years, Brexit may paradoxically provide an opportunity to engage with the challenge and allow it to commit to such a reinvention. In fact, the ‘counter-revolutions’ witnessed in Austria, the Netherlands, and France, have reinforced the appetite of citizens for a Europeanised and inclusive political reinvention rather than a national-populist one. French President Emmanuel Macron has clearly unequivocally staked out his position and placed the EU at the heart of his political project, which has been endorsed by a large majority of French voters both during the campaign and after his election with confirmation of his vision in the legislative elections.

However, given the complexities of the series of economic, social, migration, and currently the Covid-19 crises, that have confronted the EU, it is increasingly evident that the European project is perhaps facing a critical test of solidarity. The fractures that have been evidenced in British society throughout the Referendum campaign could also feature in other European nations with equal strength and drama, posing a risk of isolating many people, not least young people and those who live in large urban areas—to feel as forgotten as their counterparts who voted to leave the EU. The challenge to simultaneously reassure both sides, whilst providing optimistic hope for the future is overwhelming. The shockwaves that were triggered by Brexit will
continue to reverberate on the global stage as the uncertainty over how the process
will be implemented has not diminished but in fact in some respects has increased.
The geopolitical consequences of Brexit have been felt in countries from the USA
to Australia and everywhere in between. Meanwhile, the Brexit saga continues to
dominate political life and the continued volatility that is now characteristic of the
British electoral system.

References

Bruter, M., & Harrison, S. (2017a). Understanding the emotional act of voting. Nature Human
Behaviour, 1(1) 1–3.
Bruter, M., & Harrison, S. (2017b). The impact of Brexit on consumer behaviour. Retrieved April
30, 2020, from https://opinium.co.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/the_impact_of_brexit_on_con-
sumer_behaviour_0.pdf.
Bruter, M., & Harrison, S. (2020). Inside the mind of a voter: A new approach to electoral psychology.
Princeton University Press.
Harrison, S. (2020a). A vote of frustration? Young voters in the General Election 2019.
Parliamentary Affairs, 73, 4.
Harrison, S. (2020b). Democratic frustration: Concept, dimensions and behavioural consequences.
Societies, 10(1), 19.
The Guardian. (2017). Retrieved May 02, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/
jun/24/eu-voting-map-lays-bare-depth-of-division-across-britain.
Van der Eijk, C., & Rose, C. (2017). Is the country coming together after the Brexit Referendum?
Retrieved April 30, 2020, from https://nottspolitics.org/2017/04/25/is-the-country-coming-tog-
ether-after-the-brexit-referendum/.

Sarah Harrison is an Assistant Professorial Research Fellow in the Department of Government
at the LSE, and the Deputy-Director of the Electoral Psychology Observatory. Her recent publica-
tions include ‘Inside the Mind of a Voter’ (2020, Princeton University Press with Michael Bruter),
several articles in Comparative Political Studies, American Behavioural Scientist and Parliamen-
tary Affairs, and she was guest editor of a special issue of Societies on Electoral Psychology. Her
research has received prestigious awards and honourable mentions from the Economic and Social
Research Council, the Michael Young Award, and the political psychology section of the Amer-
ican Political Science Association. She has also advised multiple Electoral Commissions world-
wide and worked as an expert or authored reports for multiple prestigious international organi-
sations including the European Commission, Council of Europe, the Committee of the Regions,
the British Council, and the All Parties Parliamentary Group on the Vote at 16 in the British
Parliament.