TOCP: A Dataset for Chinese Profanity Processing

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Abstract

This paper introduced TOCP, a larger dataset of Chinese profanity. This dataset contains natural sentences collected from social media sites, the profane expressions appearing in sentences, and their rephrasing suggestions which preserve their meanings in a less offensive way. We proposed several baseline systems using neural network models to test this benchmark. We trained embedding models on a profanity-related dataset and proposed several profanity-related features. Our baseline systems achieved an F1-score of 86.37% in profanity detection and an accuracy of 77.32% in profanity rephrasing.

Keywords: profanity detection, profanity rephrasing, Chinese profanity processing

1. Introduction

Abusive language is an important issue in the Internet. One of its major subclasses is profanity, which uses explicit profane words to express feelings or to insult other users (Ross et al., 2016; Waseem, 2016; Wulczyn, et al., 2017). Although profanity is not always abusive (Chen et al., 2012; Clarke and Grieve, 2017; Davidson et al., 2017) which can appear in positive expressions such as compliments (“This is fixxing awesome”), some readers might still feel uncomfortable thus it is not recommended.

Most of the available datasets nowadays are about abusive language. This issue is highly language-dependent, hence there have been many datasets built in different languages including English (Wassem and Hovy, 2016), German (Wiegand et al., 2018; Davidson et al., 2017), Dutch (Tulkens et al., 2016), Greek (Pavlopoulos et al., 2017), Arabic (Mubarak et al., 2017), Slovene (Fišer et al., 2016), and Indonesian (Alfina et al., 2017). It is essential for us native speakers to build datasets in Chinese by ourselves.

In our previous work (Su et al., 2017), we have built a small Chinese profanity dataset, which contains 2,044 sentences classified into 29 groups with profanity tagging and rephrasing information. As there are less than 100 sentences in each group, the amount of data is too few for machine learning or deep learning. This is the reason why we want to build a larger dataset.

Many proposed abusive detection systems were built by machine learning (Montani and Schüller, 2018; Tarasova, 2016) or deep learning (Park and Fung, 2017; Gambäck and Sikdar, 2017; Pavlopoulos et al., 2017; Badjatiya et al., 2017; Wiedemann et al., 2018). Besides word embeddings, two major types of features are often adopted.

The content-based features include keywords (Xiang et al., 2012), words (Warner and Hirschberg, 2012), character n-grams (Mehdad and Tetreault, 2016), word n-grams (Yin et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2012), POS n-grams (Davidson et al., 2017), and syntactic information (Burnap and Williams, 2014). We would like to see which features is useful for processing Chinese profanity, because Chinese text needs to be segmented but it is hard for a word segmentation system to recognized newly invented profane words.

Because Twitter is the most popular source for building abusive language datasets, another major class of features relates to user profiles or social media, such as gender (Wassem and Hovy, 2016), living place (Wassem and Hovy, 2016), user activities (Dadvar et al., 2013; Balci and Salah, 2015), and neighboring posts (Yin et al., 2009). We did not use these features because we could not have such information in the dataset or from the source websites.

According to our observations, we think that the main challenges of Chinese profanity processing are as follows:

1. Insufficient training data: larger datasets are beneficial to machine learning and deep learning.
2. High variety of Chinese profanity: nowadays the Internet users often invent new profane words with different characters with the same or similar soundings to bypass anti-harassment policy.
3. Profane words in Taiwanese (a dialect commonly spoken in Taiwan): they do not have formal surface forms yet and are often transliterated in many different ways.
4. Context-based rephrasing: a profane word may have more than one part-of-speech or meaning. Its rephrasing should take its contextual information into consideration.

The TOCP (National Taiwan Ocean University Chinese Profanity) dataset was built for developing Chinese profanity processing techniques. As stated in our previous work (Su et al., 2017), detecting and rephrasing profanity not only reduce the abusive language in the Internet, but also make the text more comprehensible than the simple masking method. Moreover, the users will be educated and more aware of what kinds of expressions are offensive to the others. These reasons make this work important.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of TOCP dataset. Sections 3 and 4 propose several baseline systems for profanity detection and rephrasing. Section 5 delivers the evaluation results, and Section 6 concludes the paper.

2. Description of TOCP

We built the TOCP dataset in the similar way as our previous work (Su et al., 2017) but in a larger scale from different websites. As a result, more types of profanity and rephrasing were discovered in this dataset. Details are given in the following subsections.
2.1 Collecting Profanity Data

Most of the teams used crowdsourcing to prepare data annotation (Kolhatkar and Taboada, 2017; Wulczyn et al., 2017). Unfortunately, our main sources of Chinese profanity were text written by Taiwanese users, and we cannot find a popular crowdsourcing site where we could recruit enough annotators who were native speakers from Taiwan.

We considered PTT and Twitch as the source websites to collect profanity data. We recruited 10 undergraduate students to annotate profane expressions and provide rephrased expressions.

PTT Bulletin Board System

PTT is a famous BBS site in Taiwan. According to its report on Jan 2020, it has 251 boards related to diverse topics. A top-10 board can be visited by more than 1,000 or even 10,000 users at the same time.

Figure 1 shows an example of the webpage of a PTT post. The leading section shows some metadata about this post, followed by the content of the post, basically in text mode but with some styles of highlights or URLs linking to images in other websites. The title of the post in Figure 1 starts with “悚!” (Terrifying!) to express the author’s surprise about the low price of a lunchbox in a university. But someone in the comment section replied “悚三小” (Why the Relax is it terrifying) which was quite offensive.

Below each post, other users can vote and give comments with a label ‘推’ for like, ‘噓’ for dislike, or ‘→’ for a neutral opinion. Due to the restriction of the length of a line in the comment area, a long comment will be separated into several comment lines, but only the first line will show ‘like’ or ‘dislike’ while the other lines will be neutral. Note that a segmenting point is not necessary at the word boundary, which means the characters inside a Chinese word may be separated and appear in two different lines.

Moreover, if two or more users post comments at the same time, their lines may appear in an interleaving way.

Therefore, the comment lines should be preprocessed to restore the original sentences. Two comment lines were concatenated when (1) they were post by the same user and (2) the latter line was not labeled as ‘like’ or ‘dislike’.

The same as our previous work, we used Google Search to retrieve PTT posts by submitting the profane keywords with the option “site:ptt.cc” for several weeks. We set the searching option for the newest posts in recent one week in order to avoid duplication. Finally, 7,250 posts with 1,043,231 sentences were collected. Only 39,937 of the sentences contain profane keywords.

Twitch Live Streaming

Twitch is a live streaming platform mostly for video game playing. We considered the chatrooms of Twitch channels as a source of profanity, because haters often come to insult or harass the live streamers or the other users. Figure 2 shows an example of a Twitch live streaming channel. The main frame in the middle is the screen showing scenes of game playing, and the area in the right is the chatroom displaying real-time conversations among the viewers.

We monitored 17 streamers by a crawler for two weeks and collected 1,006,434 utterances in their chatrooms, where 14,950 of them contain profane keywords.

1 https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/index.html
2 https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/PttHistory/M.1581255677.A.F56.html
3 https://www.twitch.tv/
2.2 Data Annotation

Now we have collected 2,049,665 sentences from social media and 54,887 of them contain profane keywords. It is time-consuming to annotate all the 54 thousand sentences, not to mention checking the other 1.5 million sentences to see if there is any new type of profanity being missed.

As an alternative, we clustered the 54,887 sentences into groups according to the profane keywords and randomly selected sentences to a certain amount in each group. Totally 16,450 sentences were selected.

Ten undergraduate students were asked to annotate the real profane expressions in these sentences and provided one possible way to rephrase these expressions into less offensive ones. An annotation tool as shown in Figure 3 was developed for this purpose. If two annotators had different opinions, we would choose the more correct ones.

Finally, there were 17,578 profane expressions being identified in 14,285 sentences. As shown in Figure 4, each of the TOCP data contains an ID, an original sentence, its starting and ending positions, the text of this profane expression, and a rephrasing suggestion.

Please note that the types of Chinese profanity targeted in this paper belong to the following categories.

1. Terms related to "sexual intercourse"
2. Terms related to sexual organs or substances
3. Terms related to "bxtch"
4. Terms related to "hxll"
5. Terms in the pattern of "someone's relative's", a special pattern of profanity in Chinese

All 16,450 sentences are collected in the TOCP dataset provides, including those sentences not containing any profane expressions.

3. Profanity Detection

In this section, we proposed several baseline models to detect profane expressions with different embedding models and features.

3.1 Character-Based Sequence Labeling

The task of profanity detection is to identify profane expressions appearing in an input sentence. However, we think that word-based models may fail due to the limited ability of a Chinese word segmentation system to recognize profane words, especially when these words have many variants and a lot of them are out of vocabulary.

Therefore, we treated the profanity detection problem as a character-based sequence labeling task. Each Chinese character in an input sentence will be tagged with a label of BIO by the classifier to denote if this character is at the beginning (B), inside (I), or outside (O) of a profane expression. The final output of a profanity detection system are substrings in the input sentence tagged with consecutive BI labels.

Figure 5 shows an example of profanity detection by one layer of BiLSTM. The input “他是個機歪的人” (He is a bxtchy guy) is a Chinese sentence with 7 characters. Since the string “機歪” is a profane expression, the correct prediction should be a ‘B’ label for the character ‘機’, an ‘I’ label for ‘歪’, and ‘O’ labels for the other characters.

We tried 1 to 4 layers of BiLSTM, combining with 0 to 2 layers of ConvolutionalNN. Dropout rate was set at 0.5 to avoid overfitting. We also tried different sets of parameters.

3.2 Character Embedding

For embedding, one choice is to use pre-trained embedding models such as Google nllm-zh-128 model4 (Bengio et al., 2003). It is a 128-dimension character embedding model trained on Chinese Google News 100B corpus.

However, these available Chinese character embeddings may not meet our needs. The main reason is that the training corpora for these models were general text which did not contain many profane expressions, not to mention those out-of-vocabulary profane words written in the same or similar sounding characters invented by Internet users to bypass anti-harassment policy.

For this reason, we proposed two methods to train profane-related embedding models. The first method was self-training which used one-hot encoding to learn embeddings.

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4 https://tfhub.dev/google/nllm-zh-dim128-with-normalization/2
from the training data directly. In order not to create high-dimensional vectors, we only took characters in the profane expressions and their context (up to 4 characters) into consideration, plus one dimension for “others”.

Our second approach was to train an embedding model based on a profane-related corpus. We used PTT sentences which were not selected into the TOCP dataset to train the profane-related embedding model with a dimension of 100. Training tools were Word2Vec (Mikolov et al., 2013) and fastText (Bojanowski et al., 2016) developed by Facebook AI Research Lab.

3.3 Character Features

Besides embeddings, text itself also provides important features for profanity detection. We designed several features as follows.

**Profanity Keywords**

The profanity detection rules introduced in Sec 5.1 consist of several sets of profanity keywords. For example, the rule “YOU + [RL] + [RL]” (your relative’s) represents a special pattern of profanity in Chinese, where YOU is the set of the word “you” (你, 你…), and RL is the set of terms for relatives or acquaintances such as 老师 (mother) or 老师 (teacher). We use two sets of Boolean features. One represents if a character belongs to any of the 45 profanity keyword sets. The other represents if a character belongs to a keyword set in the 24 profanity groups (cf. Sec 5.1).

**Dictionary Common Terms**

A Chinese character appearing in a profane word may also appear in a common word. For example, the character “幹” has many meanings other than “fxxk”, such as “幹活” (working) or “樹幹” (tree stem). In order to avoid false alarm, we use a Boolean feature to denote if the substring containing the target character is a dictionary common term.

**Pronunciation (Pinyin)**

Because Internet users often write profane words in different characters with the same or similar soundings to bypass anti-harassment policy, the pronunciation features (Pinyin hereafter) were designed to identify these variants. We use two sets of Boolean features, 21 for consonants and 63 for vowels, to represent a character’s pronunciation, and an additional integer feature for the tone of the target character (because Chinese is a tonal language).

These feature vectors would be concatenated with the word embedding vectors to form the input of a neural network.

4. Profanity Rephrasing

We treated the profanity rephrasing problem as a sequence-to-sequence problem. Figure 6 shows a common sequence-to-sequence model by using LSTM. The left part is an encoder which takes a sequence of characters as input, like “機歪” (bxtch) in the figure. The right part is a decoder which generates a sequence of characters as output, like “機歪” (a milder term for ‘bxtch’) in the figure.

Commonly the input of a sequence-to-sequence model is the text to be rephrased. However, in our observation, contextual information is also important for rephrasing. For example, the character “屌” has many meanings (where the original meaning is “pxnis”) as follows:

5 https://fasttext.cc/
Several neural network models have been tested, including 1 to 4 layers of bidirectional LSTM combining with 0 to 2 layers of Convolutional NN. The CNN layers were added in front of the BiLSTM layers. Dropout rate was set at 0.5 to avoid overfitting.

Table 3 shows the evaluation results of different NN-based profanity detection systems. We can see that the best systems were a 2-layer BiLSTM with or without a preceding CNN layer.

Table 1. Performance of Rule-Based Profanity Detection

| Group | #Sents | R   | P   | F1  |
|-------|--------|-----|-----|-----|
| 1.0   | 854    | 51.99 | 58.12 | 54.88 |
| 1.1   | 2214   | 90.61 | 87.87 | 89.22 |
| 1.2   | 264    | 96.59 | 97.90 | 97.14 |
| 2.0   | 2760   | 84.75 | 59.07 | 69.61 |
| 3.0   | 1040   | 83.94 | 72.87 | 78.02 |
| 4.0   | 582    | 95.70 | 87.72 | 91.54 |
| 4.1   | 75     | 74.67 | 83.58 | 78.87 |
| 5.0   | 660    | 90.61 | 86.04 | 88.27 |
| 5.1   | 46     | 65.22 | 63.83 | 64.52 |
| 6.0   | 3716   | 87.65 | 95.77 | 91.53 |
| 7.0   | 337    | 92.28 | 92.01 | 92.15 |
| 8.0   | 37     | 97.30 | 46.75 | 63.16 |
| 9.0   | 24     | 100.00 | 58.54 | 73.85 |
| 10.0  | 21     | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 11.0  | 139    | 100.00 | 97.20 | 98.58 |
| 11.1  | 227    | 60.35 | 44.19 | 51.02 |
| 12.0  | 685    | 95.62 | 91.35 | 93.44 |
| 12.1  | 2      | 100.00 | 25.00 | 40.00 |
| 13.0  | 268    | 99.25 | 97.79 | 98.52 |
| 14.0  | 36     | 36.11 | 19.40 | 25.24 |
| 15.0  | 1016   | 78.64 | 62.08 | 69.39 |
| 15.1  | 836    | 99.88 | 96.64 | 98.24 |
| 15.2  | 576    | 86.46 | 85.42 | 85.94 |
| 15.3  | 76     | 50.00 | 86.36 | 63.33 |
| Other | 1087   | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Total | 17578  | 80.72 | 78.47 | 79.58 |
| Apply | 16491  | 86.04 | 78.47 | 82.08 |

Table 2. Performance of Rule-Based Profanity Rephrasing

The performance of rule-based profanity rephrasing is shown in Table 2. The overall accuracy was 71.13%, or 88.12% if the expressions were applicable with the new rules.

5.2 NN-Based Profanity Detection

Several neural network models have been tested, including 1 to 4 layers of bidirectional LSTM combining with 0 to 2 layers of Convolutional NN. The CNN layers were added in front of the BiLSTM layers. Dropout rate was set at 0.5 to avoid overfitting.

Table 3 shows the evaluation results of different NN-based profanity detection systems. We can see that the best systems were a 2-layer BiLSTM with or without a preceding CNN layer.

Table 3. Performance of NN-Based Profanity Detection

| Model               | R   | P   | F1  |
|---------------------|-----|-----|-----|
| BiLSTM              | 84.77 | 80.92 | 82.80 |
| BiLSTM*2            | 85.54 | 82.17 | 83.82 |
| BiLSTM*3            | 85.05 | 81.00 | 82.97 |
| BiLSTM*4            | 84.02 | 80.98 | 82.47 |
| CNN + BiLSTM        | 79.36 | 78.04 | 78.69 |
| CNN + BiLSTM*2      | 85.43 | 82.31 | 83.84 |
| CNN*2 + BiLSTM      | 74.71 | 69.90 | 72.22 |

Table 4. Comparison of Combinations of Embeddings and Features in Profanity Detection

We also tested different combinations of embedding models and features described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Embedding models include one-hot encoding (character-based, word-based, and pinyin-based), Google nnlm-zh-128 model, and our character embedding models trained on PTT sentences by Word2Vec (CBOW model) or fastText (Skip-gram model). Features include pinyin, profanity keywords (KW), and dictionary common terms (Dict).

The experimental results were shown in Table 4 where all systems were built with 2 layers of BiLSTM. The best system was achieved an F1-score of 86.37% by the character embedding trained by fastText combining with the keyword and dictionary-term features. The performance shown in these tables were measured after parameter tuning.

Some conclusions can be drawn from the results in Table 4: (1) The fastText-trained embedding achieved better performance than one-hot encoding, Google nnlm-zh-128, and Word2Vec-trained embedding; (2) The keyword and dictionary-term features improved the performance more than the pinyin feature; (3) The performance of the word-based one-hot encoding was poor, which supported our assumption that incorrect word segmentation would decrease the ability of profanity detection.

Moreover, all NN-based systems outperformed the rule-based detection system either in recall or precision. In the future, we would like to propose hybrid systems which can take advantages from these two kinds of approaches.

5.3 NN-Based Profanity Rephrasing

Our baseline systems for profanity rephrasing mainly differ in the contextual information. Besides using no context, we also took one character or one word preceding or following the target profane expression as context. All systems were built with LSTM models.
We are now building another dataset for abusive language in Chinese. We will observe the similarity and difference between these two datasets.

7. Acknowledgements

This research was funded by the Taiwan Ministry of Science and Technology (grant: MOST 107-2221-E-019-038).

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| Word-Based | Char-Based |
|------------|------------|
|            |            |
| Left       | Right      | Acc  | Left | Right | Acc  |
| 0          | 0          | 74.83| 0    | 0     | 73.15|
| 0          | 1          | 76.11| 0    | 1     | 74.12|
| 1          | 0          | 77.32| 1    | 0     | 74.43|
| 1          | 1          | 76.47| 1    | 1     | 74.42|

Table 5. Performance of NN-Based Profanity Rephrasing

| Batch | One-Hot | Word2Vec | fastText |
|-------|---------|----------|----------|
| 32    | 76.92   | 75.71    | 77.28    |
| 64    | 77.00   | 75.48    | 77.06    |
| 128   | 77.32   | 75.21    | 76.61    |
| 256   | 76.71   | --       | --       |
| 512   | 64.21   | --       | --       |

Table 6. Comparison of Embeddings and Batch Sizes in Profanity Rephrasing

The choices of embeddings of the target profane expression and the context were the same as the ones in the detection experiments, only that the word-based models were trained on machine word-segmented data.

Table 5 shows the performance of NN-based profanity rephrasing. The systems not using contextual information were the worse systems. Word-based context was better than character-based context. The best system only considered one preceding word and achieved an accuracy of 77.32%, better than the rule-based rephrasing system.

In fact, we also tried to use the whole sentence as context, but the performance was too bad so we did not show the result here.

Table 6 shows the comparison of different embeddings and batch sizes for the best system in Table 5. Because one-hot encoding slightly outperformed the pre-trained word embedding models, it seems that the surface information is as useful as the semantics in profanity rephrasing.

6 http://nlp.cse.ntou.edu.tw/resources/TOCP/
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