The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Four Reasons of the Chinese Offensive - A Japanese View

Koichi Sato

College of Arts and Sciences, J. F. Oberlin University, Tokyo, Japan

ABSTRACT
This article introduced China’s four reasons of offensive to the Senkaku Islands: the first reason China’s natural resources demand; the second reason historical issues with Japan that have some relationship to Chinese people’s wartime memories; the third reason the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s internal power struggle; the fourth reason the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of CCP for China’s national integration. Some reasons of Chinese offensive have been intertwined with each other, though the first reason is the main issue and the origin of the Senkaku Islands Dispute. It seems that other three reasons are supportive reasons for the natural resources demand, and byproducts of the dispute between Japan and China. The author discusses the occurrence and changes of these four reasons and concludes that the third and fourth reasons will be more troublesome than the others because they are unpredictable.

KEYWORDS
Energy resources; fishery resources; historical issues; maritime militias; Chinese identity

1. Introduction

China’s maritime adventurism in the East and South China Seas has lately attracted considerable attention. Fifty percent of China’s claimed jurisdictional waters are competing with neighboring countries in the East Asia. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has named People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a maritime power in the 18th Party Congress in 2012 (People’s daily Online in Japanese, November 12 2012), and the PRC challenges Japan, the U.S. A., and the ASEAN countries. What happens in the East China Sea? China takes the maritime offensive against Japan. The author defines the word “offensive” not only the military means, but also the political, legal, economic, and psychological means to oppress the competitor. If so, the Chinese maritime offensive against Japan includes not only the actual maritime conflict in the East China Sea, but also the natural resources demand at the disputed waters, anti-Japan demonstration inside and outside of China, the sovereignty assertion in relevant to historical issues with Japan, CCP’s internal power struggle, and China’s national integration policy.
Regarding the actual maritime conflict, we cannot find the serious illustration in relevant to high-intensity conflict between China and the Japan–US Alliance. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) navy has provoked the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) several times in the East China Sea (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, February 5, 2013). They are relevant to the middle-intensity conflict. Still, the PLA never did challenge the Japan–US Alliance seriously, because it means all-out war including nuclear forces. If so, the most serious issue for Japan is the maritime confrontation between the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) patrol vessels and the China Coast Guard (CCG) patrol vessels & Chinese fishing boats in the sea area surrounding the Senkaku Islands (尖閣諸島; Diaoyu Islands [釣魚島] in Chinese). It is a kind of low-intensity conflict. It has continued since the Japanese nationalization of the Islands in September 2012 (Yomiuri Shimbun, September 11, 2012). The Chinese government has been claiming the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea against Japan since December 30, 1971. Why China (PRC) has a deep attachment to the Senkaku Islands, and what is the true state of affairs in the Senkaku dispute between Japan and China?

In this article, the author looks into the four reasons of Chinese offensive to the Senkaku Islands: the first reason China’s natural resources demand, the second reason historical issues with Japan which has some relationship to Chinese people’s wartime memories, the third reason the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of CCP’s internal power struggle, the fourth reason the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of CCP for China’s national integration. These four reasons appeared in chronological order, and they have made the Japan–China relations complicated. That is why the author has considered it for research.

This article is composed of seven parts. The first part is the introduction. The second part provides the basic information of the geography and history of the Senkaku Islands. The following four parts provide four reasons of Chinese offensive. The third part provides the first reason China’s natural resources demand, the fourth part provides the second reason historical issues with Japan which has some relationship to Chinese people’s wartime memories, the fifth part provides the third reason the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of CCP’s internal power struggle, and the sixth part provides the fourth reason: the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of CCP for China’s national integration. The seventh part draws the concluding remarks, providing some Japanese aspects from the observation of the above four reasons.

---

4National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Chugoku Anzenhosho Repoto 2011, 14.
5The Chinese government integrated four maritime law enforcement agencies: China marine surveillance, Fishery Law Enforcement Command, China Coast Guard of the Border Control Department, and Customs into the CCG in 2013. Li and Zhang, “Restructuring China’s Maritime Law Enforcement.”
6The Senkaku Islands was once named Senkaku Retto [尖閣列島] in Japanese in 1896, and the Japanese government renamed the Islands Senkaku Shoto [尖閣諸島] in 1900, though both names appeared in documents and books. The postwar Japanese government uses the Senkaku Shoto. See Nakayama, Chugoku ga Mimi wo Fusagu Senkakushoto no Futsugo na Shinjitsu, 28–32. Nakayama, Y., is a Mayor of Ishigaki City at present.
7China’s official claim was published on December 30, 1971, though People’s Daily denounced the Japan and U.S. governments plan to deprive the seabed resources of Senkaku Islands on December 29, 1970. Japanese translation of People’s Daily, December 29, 1970, People’s Daily, December 31, 1971, in Department of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, editorial supervision, Nichuun Kankei Kihon Shiryoushu 1970–1992 Nen, 31–32; 71–72.
8A former senior Japanese defense official kindly suggested me that China’s defense posture of the first island chain may also be relevant to their Senkaku claim.
2. Basic information of the geographic and historical facts of the Senkaku Islands

The Senkaku Islands are composed of five islands – Uotsurijima Island (3.6 km², Figure 1), Taishojima Island (0.04 km², Figure 2), Kubajima Island (0.87 km², Figure 3), Kitakojima Island (0.26 km², Figure 4), and Minamikojima Island (0.32 km²: Figure 4) – and three rocks – Okinokita-iwa Rock (0.05 km²), Okinominami-iwa Rock (0.01 km²), and Tobise-iwa Rock (0.02 km²). The Islands are located in the East China Sea about 170
km northwest of Ishigakijima Island, and they are also about 170 km from Taiwan, though they are 330 km from the Chinese mainland. If the Japanese fishermen use the fishing boat from Ishigakijima Island, it takes 5 ~ 7 hours.\textsuperscript{10} If the Chinese government dispatches their patrol vessels from the mainland China, it takes two days.\textsuperscript{11}

Uotsurijima Island is the biggest island (363 meters above sea level), and it has some mountain streams (freshwater resources).\textsuperscript{12} Some Japanese universities such as Ryukyu

\begin{figure}[h]
  \centering
  \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{kubajima_island}
  \caption{Kubajima Island (Photo: Koichi Sato).}
  \end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
  \centering
  \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{minamikojima_kitakojima}
  \caption{Minamikojima (left) and Kitakojima (right) (Photo: Koichi Sato).}
  \end{figure}

\textsuperscript{10} Nakayama, \textit{Chugoku ga Mimi wo Fusagu Senkakushoto no Futsugo na Shinjitsu}, 52.
\textsuperscript{11} Author’s interview from the Japan Coast Guard Officer on November 21 2012.
\textsuperscript{12} Takara, \textit{Senkaku Kenkyu Jo}, 237.
University and Kyushu University dispatched the study teams to the Senkaku Islands several times and let their teams do ecosystem investigation. Thanks to these scientific researches, the Japanese know that there are several rare animals including Senkaku Moles and Senkaku River Crabs in Uotsurijima Island (Sankei Shim bun, November 8 2010, Sankei Shim bun, July 15 2011). The Chinese government asserts that Diaoyu Islands belong to China from the ancient times, though China’s leaflet on Diaoyu Islands “Diaoyudao – Zhongguo Guyou De Lingtu” has no concrete description on its animals.  

As shown in Figure 1, most parts of Uotsurijima Island are slopes, and the level ground is limited. The Japanese government had once constructed the temporary heliport in Uotsurijima Island in 1979, though they abandoned it. It is clear that Uotsurijima Island is not suitable for the construction of the airstrip. How about the reclamation? Shintaro Ishihara, the former governor of Tokyo, suggested to construct a small breakwater for the Japanese fishing boats in 2012, and the Tokyo government office made a trial calculation and estimated the cost of a small breakwater for 20 billion yen and a time period of 5 years for construction, because the sea area surrounding Uotsurijima Island is very deep (Mainichi Shimbun, evening paper, February 5 2013). We understand that Uotsurijima Island is not suitable for reclamation too. If so, Uotsurijima Island is not so strategically valuable as the coral reefs of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

Tatsushiro Koga, a Japanese businessman who lived in Ishigakijima Island, explored the Senkaku Islands in 1884, and he found that the Islands were good for fishing and collection of the down of albatrosses and shell of hawks’ bill. He applied to the Japanese government for rent in 1885. The Japanese government made a research, and they concluded the Senkaku Islands as no-man’s-lands. The Japanese government incorporated the Islands into Okinawa Prefecture through a Cabinet decision in 1895, and they gave Koga approval for rent in 1896.

Koga and his family developed the fishing village, and plants for producing down of albatrosses and Katsuobushi (dried bonito) in the Senkaku Islands. Dried bonito is a Japanese famous preserved food. Then, the Japanese government disposed the Islands excluding Taishojima Island to Koga’s son Zenji Koga in 1932. Taishojima Island is a rock formation, and it is not suitable for human life (see Figure 2). The Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China (ROC) never complained about the Japanese ownership until the end of World War II. If so, the Senkaku Islands’ sovereignty issue is indifferent to the Japan-China War.

13 Guejia Haiyang Xinxi Zhongxin, Diaoyudao – Zhongguo De Guyou Lingtu. There is a strange description in this leaflet that shows the existence of cactuses [xianrenzhang] in Uotsurijima Island. Ibid.
14 Hagstrom, “Quiet Power: Japan’s China Policy in Regard,” 159–188.
15 Japanese Territory: Senkaku Islands. Accessed March 13, 2018. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/senkaku/qa_1010.html. It is said that the reason of abandonment was that the Japanese government wanted to avoid the provocation against China.
16 Midorima, Senkaku Retto, 98, 104. Mr. Koga’s first business in the Senkaku Islands is the collection of the down of albatross. It was said that about 10 million albatrosses were collected for down manufacturing. Okinawa Daigaku Chikii Kenkyusho, Senkaku Shoto To Okinawa, 239.
17 Midorima, Senkaku Retto, 104.
18 Midorima, Senkaku Retto, 106; Okinawa Daigaku Chiki Kenkyusho, Senkaku Shoto To Okinawa, 147; and Nakayama, Chugoku ga Mimi wo Fusagu Senakkushoto no Futsugo na Shinjitsu, 33. Taishojima Island has no space for human activities (See Figure 2).
19 Tatsushiro Koga dies in 1918, and his business was transferred to his son, Zenji Koga. Nakayama, Chugoku ga Mimi wo Fusagu Senakkushoto no Futsugo na Shinjitsu, 33.
The geological features of the Uotsurijima Island are quite different from the South China Sea Islands. Many of South China Sea Islands and their maritime features are composed of coral reef, but the geological bases of the Uotsurijima Island are Conglomeratic sandstone and Andesite.\(^2\) The coral reef attached surface of these rocks. That was a reason why building a wharf was a tough job for the fishermen. Koga’s men set dynamite in the crevasse of the coastal rock, and they blasted it.\(^2\) So that they could expand the crevasse and build a small wharf.\(^2\) The sea area surrounding the Senkaku Islands has been a good fishing ground until now, though few Okinawa fishermen had the power boats and cold storages in the 1890s.\(^3\) Koga’s company Koga Shoten could almost monopolize the fish catch in the Senkaku Islands, because they have enough money to construct the plant for dried bonito and fishermen’s houses in Senkaku Islands. They concentrated the dried bonito production for the markets of Osaka and Kobe.\(^4\)

The Senkaku Islands had a population of 248 (99 houses) in 1909, and Okinawa Mainichi Shimbun, an Okinawan newspaper reported that dried bonito produced in Senkaku Islands are almost 50% of the dried bonito production in Okinawa prefecture in 1910.\(^5\) Koga’s fishery business was successful, though it was stopped because of the shortage of the fuel for fishing boats during the World War II, and the Senkaku Islands became the uninhabited islands during the postwar period.\(^6\) Koga’s family maintained the ownership of Uotsurijima Island, Kitakojima Island, Minamikojima Island, and Kubajima Island, though the U. S. navy rented Kubajima Island and state-owned Taishojima Island for shooting targets.\(^7\) Koga’s family sold four of the Senkaku Islands to Kunioki Kurihara, an estate-owner in Saitama Prefecture in April 1978.\(^8\) The Japanese fishermen’s activities in the Senkaku sea area continued, and Ishigaki City Mayor Yoshitaka Nakayama stated that the total amount of fish catch in 1978 reached 1.5 billion yen.\(^9\)

The Senkaku Islands attracted attention after the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) of the United Nations conducted an academic survey in the autumn of 1968, which indicated the possibility of the existence of petroleum resources in the East China Sea.\(^10\) China and Taiwan (ROC) suddenly began to claim the Senkaku Islands as their own territory. Taiwan asserted that Diaoyotai Lieyu (Senkaku Islands’ Taiwan name) belonged to Taiwan on April 20, 1971.\(^11\) China asserted that Diaoyu Islands belonged to China on December 30 1971.\(^12\) If so, the energy (oil) resource issue may have been a main factor of contention at first.

---

\(^2\)Ryukyu Daigaku, *Senkaku Retto Gakujutsu Chosa Houkoku*, 9.
\(^3\)Okinawa Daigaku Chiki Kenkyusho, *Senkaku Shoto To Okinawa*, 122. The wharf is said to be built by 1908.
\(^4\)Ibid.
\(^5\)Ibid, 114.
\(^6\)Ibid, 104–105.
\(^7\)Ibid, 105, 112.
\(^8\)Nakayama, *Chugoku ga Mimi wo Fusagu Senkakushoto no Futsugo na Shinjitsu*, 33.
\(^9\)Midorima, *Senkaku Retto*, 115.
\(^10\)Kurihara, *Senkaku Shoto Urinmasu*, 40–48. H. Kurihara was younger brother of Kunioki Kurihara.
\(^11\)Nakayama, *Chugoku ga Mimi wo Fusagu Senkakushoto no Futsugo na Shinjitsu*, 47.
\(^12\)*Accessed January 2, 2014. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html*, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, 1–122.
\(^13\)*Urano, *Bunseki/Shiryo/Bunken Senkaku Shoto/Ryokyu/Zhugoku/Nicchu Kankeishi*, 235–236.
\(^14\)*Ministry of Foreign Affairs, editorial supervision, 71–72.*
3. China’s natural resources demand

The Chinese population showed an increase of 585 million people, 4.5 times of that of the Japanese population, from 1967 to 2010, and so China badly needed the energy resources and protein, though almost all of the profitable oil fields in the land area had already been developed, and rice crop production was a primary job for the land space. The Chinese government pursued the marine resources of the East and South China Seas. That is the reason why China claims the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea Islands.

3.1. Energy resources

A geophysical survey was conducted in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea between October 12 and November 29 1968 aboard R/V F. V. HUNT. Joint participation of scientists from the ROC, the Republic of Korea, and Japan with American scientists was provided through ECAFE. The ECAFE report in May 1969 describes, “Sediments beneath the continental shelf and in the Yellow Sea are believed to have great potential as oil and gas reservoirs. An area several times larger than Taiwan lies north of that island with sediment thickness exceeding 2 km, and perhaps reaching the 9 km thickness that underlies Taiwan.

Most of these sediments are believed to be Neogene in age, the same as the oil-producing strata on the island.” This report caused the sensation in East Asia, and Okinawa Reversion in 1972 was also published by the Heads of the United States and Japan in November 1969. Okinawa Reversion meant the transference on Okinawa administration from the United States to Japan. The oil resource report and the administrative transference moved China and Taiwan to begin the ownership competition of the Senkaku Islands, though the ECAFE report was based on an elementary seismic reflection with a 30,000-joule sparker, and not based on the full-scale investigation and boring.

The Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka asked the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai what they should do about the Senkaku Islands at the first Japan-China Summit Meeting in Beijing in September 1972. Zhou Enlai answered, “I don’t want to talk about the Senkaku Islands, this time. It is not good to discuss this now. It became an issue because of the oil out there. If there wasn’t oil, neither Taiwan nor the United States would make this an issue.” If so, it is right to say that the energy issue is the origin of the Senkaku Dispute.

The latest technology of the marine resources’ investigation gave the pessimistic prediction of the oil and gas deposit in the East China Sea, too. The Japanese government estimated the deposit of oil and gas in the Japanese area of the East China Sea (the Eastern side of the median line between Japan and China: Figure 5) to be 500 million

---

33 Ajia Keizai Kenkyusho, Ajia Doko Nenpo 1971, 98; Ajia Keizai Kenkyusho, Ajia Doko Nenpo 2011, 131.
34 The analyses of Energy and Fishery Resources issues are quoted from Sato, “China’s Pursuit of Marine Resources and Its Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies,” and Brown, Dare ga Zhugoku wo Yashinaunoka? – Semarikuru Shokuryo Kiki no Jidai.
35 “Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East,” 1–122.
36 “Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East,” 4.
37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Senkaku Islands Q&A, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Accessed November 8, 2015. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.
kiloliters (0.425 billion tons: 1ton = 1.176 kiloliters) in 1994. The Chinese oil specialist also shows the pessimistic data. Dan Hougun reported that two-thirds of the Chinese offshore oil production proceeded in the Bohai Sea area, and one-third proceeded in the

Figure 5. Sea areas of the Japan–China fisheries agreement.

38Minutes of the House of Councilors, 164th Diet Committee for Administrative surveillance, No. 4 [Japanese], Accessed January 5, 2014. http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangin/164/0016/16404240016004c.html. A Japanese specialist told that this is a thirtieth of the estimation in 1970 based on ECAFE report in 1969. Tamura, “Senkaku Shoto Shuhenkaiiki No Sekiyumaizoryo Ni Tsuite.” Accessed January 5, 2014. http://shiftm.jp/?p=51.
South China Sea, and the production in the East China Sea was said to be less than 0.01%. The Chinese offshore oil and gas production in 2010 was said to be beyond 50 million tons, and it is about 10% of the total Chinese oil consumption. China’s annual consumption of oil quantity is so huge, and we understand that currently we cannot expect too much for the oil deposit in the East China Sea.

### 3.2. Fishery resources

There was no major fishery incident caused by the Chinese fishermen in the East China Sea until April 1978 (see fifth part) because of their poor fishing technology and equipment. In February 1979, a nationwide work forum on aquatic products was held in Beijing in which the direction, mission, and policy for accelerating the development of China’s aquatic production industry were laid down. The Chinese government adopted the responsibility system to step up agricultural production, and it introduced the system to fishermen as well. The fishing equipment including boats and nets improved, and the appearance of Chinese fishing boats in the East China Sea become every day affair. The Chinese fishery statistics reported that the total fish catch was 14.98 million tons in 1999, and it was decreased to 13.28 million tons in 2016 (see Table 1). The total quantity of the marine fish farming exceeded the

| Year | South China Sea | East China Sea | Yellow Sea | Bohai Sea | All China | Marine Farming |
|------|-----------------|---------------|------------|-----------|-----------|---------------|
| 1999 | 3.50            | 14.98         | 9.74       |           |           | 9.74          |
| 2000 | 3.40            | 14.77         | 10.61      |           |           |               |
| 2001 | 3.38            | 14.40         | 11.32      |           |           |               |
| 2002 | 3.38            | 14.33         | 12.12      |           |           |               |
| 2003 | 3.56            | 14.32         | 12.53      |           |           |               |
| 2004 | 3.50            | 14.51         | 13.16      |           |           |               |
| 2005 | 3.64            | 14.53         | 13.84      |           |           |               |
| 2006 | 3.82            | 14.42         | 14.46      |           |           |               |
| 2007 | 3.21            | 4.18          | 2.88       | 0.99      | 11.36     | 13.07         |
| 2008 | 3.25            | 4.39          | 2.91       | 1.02      | 11.50     | 13.40         |
| 2009 | 3.26            | 4.42          | 3.03       | 1.05      | 11.79     | 14.05         |
| 2010 | 3.29            | 4.61          | 3.04       | 1.06      | 12.04     | 14.82         |
| 2011 | 3.39            | 4.92          | 3.04       | 1.05      | 12.41     | 15.51         |
| 2012 | 3.52            | 5.17          | 2.92       | 1.04      | 12.67     | 16.43         |
| 2013 | 3.46            | 5.02          | 3.18       | 0.97      | 12.64     | 17.39         |
| 2014 | 3.56            | 4.89          | 3.31       | 1.02      | 12.80     | 18.12         |
| 2015 | 3.75            | 4.99          | 3.35       | 1.03      | 13.14     | 18.75         |
| 2016 | 3.76            | 5.17          | 3.32       | 1.01      | 13.28     | 19.63         |

Source: Guo, Wenlu and Shuolin Huang. *Nanhai Zhengduan Yu Nanhai Yuye Ziyuan Quyu Hezuo Guanli Yanjiu* [The Research of Conflict and Regional Cooperation for Fishery Resource in the South China Sea], Haiyang Chubanshe Publishing, Beijing, 2007, 91, *Zhongguo Yuye Nianjian* [China Fisheries Yearbook], 2000–2017, Zhongguo Nongye Chubanshe, Beijing. The figures of the catches in the South China Sea from the year 1999 to 2005 summed up the catches of Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan provinces only. The figures of the catches in the South China Sea from the years 2006 to 2016 are the total catches in the South China Sea of all the provinces.

*The statistics excludes the fish catch of the pelagic fishing.

---

39Dan, “Chugoku no Kaiyo Kaihatsu Senryaku,” 82–83. It is said that the gas deposit is much bigger than the oil deposit in the East China Sea.

40Dan, “Chugoku no Kaiyo Kaihatsu Senryaku,” 82–83, author’s interview with the Japanese oil specialist on June 7 2013.

41Song, “China’s Ocean Policy,” 983–998.

42Ibid.
total quantity of the fish catch in 2006. The Chinese population in 1999 was 1,257.86 million, and it increased to 1,382.71 million in 2016.\(^{43}\) We are sure that China’s per capita fish catch quantity in a year decreased from 11.9 kg in 1999 to 9.6 kg in 2016.

The Japanese fishery statistics reported that the total fish catch was 3.92 million tons in 2004, and it decreased to 2.93 million tons in 2016 (see Table 2). The total quantity of the marine fish catches always exceeded the total quantity of the marine fish farming from 2004 to 2016. The Japanese population in 2004 was 127.73 million, and it decreased to 126.96 million in 2016. We can understand that the per capita marine fish catch in Japan is bigger than the per capita marine fish catch in China. Further, we shall take notice of the fact that both marine fish catches in China and Japan are declining in these 13 years (see Tables 1 & Table 2).\(^{45}\)

In 2016, China’s total quantity of its marine fish catch was 13.28 million tons, while the total quantity of its marine fish farming production was 19.63 million tons (see Table 3). The

---

**Table 2.** Marine Fish Catch of Japan 2004–2016 (unit: million tons)*.

| Year | Offshore | Coastal Sea | All Japan | Marine farming |
|------|----------|-------------|-----------|----------------|
| 2004 | 2.40     | 1.51        | 3.92      | 1.21           |
| 2005 | 2.44     | 1.46        | 3.90      | 1.21           |
| 2006 | 2.50     | 1.45        | 3.95      | 1.18           |
| 2007 | 2.60     | 1.28        | 3.89      | 1.24           |
| 2008 | 2.58     | 1.31        | 3.89      | 1.14           |
| 2009 | 2.41     | 1.29        | 3.70      | 1.20           |
| 2010 | 2.35     | 1.28        | 3.64      | 1.11           |
| 2011 | 2.26     | 1.12        | 3.39      | 0.86           |
| 2012 | 2.21     | 1.09        | 3.30      | 1.04           |
| 2013 | 2.17     | 1.15        | 3.32      | 1.00           |
| 2014 | 2.25     | 1.10        | 3.35      | 0.99           |
| 2015 | 2.05     | 1.08        | 3.13      | 1.07           |
| 2016 | 1.94     | 0.99        | 2.93      | 1.03           |

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery of Japan, http://www.maff.go.jp/j/tokei/kouhyou/kaimen_gyosei/index.html, accessed February 18 2019, http://www.maff.go.jp/j/tokei/sihyo/data/17.html, accessed March 15 2018.

*The statistics excluded the fish catch of the pelagic fishing.

---

**Table 3.** Comparison of the fishery productions of China and Japan in 2016 (unit: million tons).

|                             | China (%) | Japan (%) |
|-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Marine fish catch           | 13.28 (19.2) | 2.93 (67.2) |
| Marine fish farming         | 19.63 (28.4) | 1.03 (23.6) |
| Fish catch of the Pelagic fishing | 1.98 (2.8) | 0.33 (7.5) |
| Freshwater fish catch       | 2.31 (3.3) | 0.03 (0.6) |
| Freshwater fish farming     | 31.79 (46.0) | 0.04 (0.9) |
| Total fishery production    | 69.01     | 4.36      |

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery of Japan, http://www.maff.go.jp/j/tokei/sihyo/data/17.html, accessed March 15 2018, Zhongguo Nongyebu, Yuye Nianjian 2017.

---

\(^{43}\) Accessed March 15, 2018. http://ecodb.net/exec/trans_country.php?type=WEO&d=LP&c1=IN&c2=JP&c3=CN&c4=US.

\(^{44}\) Ibid.

\(^{45}\) The decrease of total marine fishery production in Japan from 2011 to 2012 may be relevant to the damage of the Great East Japan Earthquake.
total quantity of its freshwater catch was 2.31 million tons, and its total freshwater fish farming production was 31.79 million tons. To compare, that same year, Japan’s total quantity of marine fish catch was 2.93 million tons, and its total quantity of marine fish farming was 1.03 million tons. The total quantity of Japan’s freshwater catch was 0.03 million tons, and its total freshwater fish farming production was 0.04 million tons.

China’s total fishery production quantity in 2016 was 69.01 million tons, and Japan’s total fishery production quantity in the same year was 4.36 million tons; Japan’s total fishery production quantity was just 6.31% of that of China’s. We can easily understand the hugeness of the China’s appetite for the fishery production. The statistics also show the massiveness of the quantity of China’s fresh water fish farming. It occupies 46.0% of the Chinese total fishery production, in comparison with Japan’s 0.9%. These data let us guess at the serious pollution damage done to Chinese coastal waters for marine fish farming. China’s Ocean Development Report supported our guess. It reported on the severe marine pollution in the Chinese coastal areas including the South and East China Seas, especially the sea area at the mouth of the Zhu Jiang (Pearl River) in 2009.\(^{46}\) It reported that there are sedimentations of cadmium, copper, petroleum oil waste, arsenic, dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane, and polychlorinated biphenyl on the seabed of Chinese coastal areas.\(^{47}\) Red tides were reported 82 times in China in 2007, including 60 times in the East China Sea.\(^{48}\)

A recent report disclosed the grade of the contamination and the quantity of the contaminant, too. China’s Ocean Development Report 2014 reported a part of the details (see Table 4). China’s Ocean Development Report 2017 also reported that the coastal waters’ pollution was still serious.\(^ {49}\) If the Chinese government fails in the prevention of marine and river pollution in the future, China’s coastal waters will soon die. Chinese fishing boats would go fishing in the East and South China Seas to cover the huge demand of fishery products, and this is the reason that China has a deep attachment to the Senkaku Islands and their sea areas. The conflicts of Chinese fishing boats and CCG’s patrol vessels with those of Japan and the ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, would escalate.

The Japan–China fisheries agreement was made on November 11, 1997.\(^ {50}\) The agreement divides the East China Sea into five sections, namely, Japanese and Chinese respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), Japan–China Intermediate Zone, Japan–

| (unit) | COD 10,000tons | Ammonia nitrogen 10,000tons | Oil waste Tons | Phosphorus Tons |
|--------|---------------|-----------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Bohai Sea | 0.7           | 0.1                         | 35.8           | 90.8           |
| Yellow Sea | 5.4           | 0.4                         | 102.5          | 674.7          |
| East China Sea | 12.3         | 0.9                         | 614.5          | 1,206.6        |
| South China Sea | 9.6          | 0.3                         | 273.2          | 948.7          |
| Total | 28            | 1.7                         | 1,026.0        | 2,920.8        |

Source: Guojia Haiyangju, Zhongguo Haiyang Fazhan Baogao 2014, 228.

\(^{46}\) Guojia Haiyangju, Zhongguo Haiyang Fazhan Baogao 2009, 286–287.

\(^{47}\) Ibid., 287–288.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., 290.

\(^{49}\) Guojia Haiyangju, Zhongguo Haiyang Fazhan Baogao 2017, 159.

\(^{50}\) Nicchu Gyogyou Kyotei no Gaiyoto [Summary of the Japan-China Fisheries Agreement], Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Japan. Accessed March 16, 2018. http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/press/kokusai/161118_26.html.
China Provisional Measures Zone, and Zone South of Latitude 27 North (Figure 5). Japan and China decide each partner’s quantity of fish catches in their respective EEZs. The Japanese and Chinese fishermen can freely operate in Japan–China Intermediate Zone. Japan and China cooperate on the management of the fish catch in Japan–China Provisional Measures Zone, and there is no regulation on fish catch in the sea area surrounding Senkaku Islands: South of Latitude 27 North, because Japan and China have not yet settled the territorial issues of the Senkaku Islands.\footnote{A former senior officer of Japan Coast Guard, interview by author, Tokyo, October 3 2016.}

The Chinese fishing boats rush to the Senkaku Sea Areas. The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) only drives out or detains the Chinese fishing boats when the Chinese fishing boats enter the territorial waters of Senkaku Islands. If Japan will leave the free operation of these Chinese fishermen in the sea area of the Senkaku Islands, the fishery resource will be drained in the near future. The Japanese and Chinese governments should cooperate on the management and maintenance of fishery resource in the sea area of Senkaku Islands, and both nations should alleviate the environmental degradation of the East China Sea.

### 4 Historical issues of the Senkaku islands

China has begun to suggest two historical reasons to claim the Senkaku Islands after the publication of ECAFE report in 1969. We understand that these historical reasons are to defend and support China’s natural resources demand. First, China asserts that the Senkaku Islands had been part of Taiwan, which was deprived by Japan at the Treaty of Shimonoseki at the end of the First Japan-China War in 1895. Second, China asserts that the Senkaku Islands have belonged to China since ancient times. China uses these two reasons, denounces Japan, and urges Japan to resolve the issue through negotiations.

#### 4.1. The Senkaku Islands as part of Taiwan?

The Chinese claims that the Senkaku Islands had been part of Taiwan, which were seized by Japan as a result of the First Japan-China War. The then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s comment at the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 28 2012 was provocative. He said, “The moves taken by Japan are totally illegal and invalid. They can in no way change the historical fact that Japan stole the Diaoyu Island and affiliated islands and that China has sovereignty over them.”\footnote{Quinn and Eckert, “U.S. call for ‘cool heads’ in China-Japan island disputes goes unheeded,” Reuters, September 28, 2012, Accessed May 15, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan-usa/u-s-call-for-cool-heads-in-china-japan-island-dispute-goes-unheeded-idUSBRE88Q1ZL20120928.} Japan then exercised its right to reply. The then Japan’s Deputy U. N. Ambassador, Kazuo Kodama, restated Tokyo’s position that no sovereignty dispute existed and that Japan began surveying the islands a decade before deciding to incorporate them in 1895, and there exists no evidence that the islands belonging to China.\footnote{Ibid.} He said, “It has only been since the 1970s that the government of China and the Taiwanese authorities began making their assertions on territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Before then they did not express any objections.”
Which is right? There are many pieces of evidence that support Japan’s point. First, when shipwrecked fishermen from the ROC were washed ashore on a Uotsurijima Island in 1919 and were rescued by Japanese citizens who lived on Ishigakijima Island, the Chinese government sent four letters of gratitude to the Ishigakijima Islanders including Zenji Koga, stating in no unclear terms that the Senkaku Islands were Japanese territory.\(^{54}\) Two of them are preserved in Yaeyama Museum in Ishigaki City (Ryukyushimpo, November 28 2010). A letter (Figure 6) was addressed to the then Ishigaki Village Mayor Zenza Toyokawa and other letter was addressed to the then Ishigaki village official Sonban Tamayose.

Second, China asserts that the Cairo declaration of 1943 said territory acquired by Japan from Qing Dynasty “shall be restored to the Republic of China (ROC), and Japan later accepted the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, which called for implementation of the Cairo Declaration, therefore, the Senkaku Islands belong to China” (Asahi Shimbun, September 27 2012). The Japanese have two logics to rebuff this argument. Firstly, the ROC government never recognized the Senkaku Islands as their territories as aforementioned. Secondly, the Japanese government uses the legal logic. The Japanese government document said, “the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration were documents that stipulated the basic postwar settlement policy of the Allied powers.”\(^{55}\) It says as follows: There is no evidence that shows that the Allied powers, including the ROC, recognized that the Senkaku Islands were included among “the islands appertaining to Formosa (Taiwan)” as stated in the Cairo Declaration in these declarations. In any event, the disposition of territories as a result of a war is ultimately settled by international agreement such as peace treaties. In the case of World War II,

---

\(^{54}\) Midorima, *Senkaku Retto*, 108, 180–181. The letter of the Chinese government described the island, Wayojima Island, the alias of Uotsurijima island.

\(^{55}\) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Q&A on the Senkaku Islands*, Accessed January 12, 2014. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html).
the San Francisco Peace Treaty legally defined the territory of Japan after war. Neither “the Cairo Declaration nor the Potsdam Declaration had the ultimate legal validity on the treatment of Japanese Territory.”

Further, the then PRC leaders also never recognized the Senkaku Islands as part of the deprived Chinese territories from Japan. Both ROC and PRC were not invited to the San Francisco Peace Conference on September 8 1951 because of the issues of Chinese representation. But they had some chances to assert the sphere of the deprived Chinese territories. The then Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai asserted that “the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and the Pratas Islands (the South China Sea Islands) were the China’s territories, though he never mentioned the Senkaku Islands” on August 15 1951. He also refused the efficiency of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the statement on September 8 1951, though he never mentioned the Senkaku Islands.

Third, an article of People’s Daily dated January 8 1953 introduced that “the Ryukyu Islands which consist of seven groups of islands: the Senkaku Islands, the Sakishima Islands, the Daito Islands, the Okinawa Islands, the Oshima Islands, the Tokara Islands, and the Osumi Islands,” indicating that China (PRC) recognized the Senkaku Islands as part of Okinawa. It is clear that China did not recognize the Senkaku Islands as part of Taiwan in 1953. The Chinese maps and Taiwanese maps before 1971 also described the Islands as the Senkaku Islands, and they did not use the Chinese name Diaoyu Islands.

Fourth, Taiwan’s territorial status itself was unclear among the party cadre of the CCP before the end of World War II. At its Second Congress in 1922, the CCP called for the unification of China, but did not mention Taiwan as part of the territory to be included within its borders. In an interview with Edgar Snow in 1936, Mao Zedong made the same point more explicitly. Likening Taiwan to Korea, Mao said that both territories should become independent states following the defeat of Japan, rather than being reattached to China. However, the CCP’s policy toward the island changed after the relocation of the Nationalists to Taiwan in 1949. The CCP began to call the reunification of Taiwan with the rest of China.

4.2. The Senkaku Islands have belonged to China since ancient times?

The Chinese government officials always assert that the Senkaku Islands have belonged to China since ancient times, though the PRC’s territory is not equivalent to many of the ancient Middle Kingdoms. The descriptions of the uninhabited islands and rocks in the old maps are not effective evidence for the territorial claim, either. The old Chinese dynasties had a habit to dispatch the envoys to acknowledge the enthronement of kings of tributary
countries including Ryukyu Kingdom (Okinawa). Their records several times described the Senkaku Islands as the navigational guide from the old Chinese Dynasty to Ryukyu in the premodern days, though there were no evidence that the Chinese citizens’ life in the islands.\textsuperscript{64}

According to the study of Chen Kan’s Personal Record of the Ming Dynasty’s Envoy to Ryukyu (Shiliuqiulu), the crew of envoy’s vessel, a kind of Junk, needed the pilot, or a pilot boat of Ryukyu Kingdom, because the Chinese crew were not familiar with the navigation to Ryukyu through the Senkaku Islands.\textsuperscript{65} Professor Sakae Midorima, author of the study, concluded that personal record of Chen Kan is not suitable for the evidence of Chinese sovereignty, though the PRC government utilizes it as the evidence.\textsuperscript{66} The historical statistics support Midorima’s conclusion. The Chinese envoys’ vessels went to Ryukyu Kingdom 22 times from 1372 to 1866 for the enthronements’ approvals, and the Ryukyu’s tributary trade missions visited China 171 times in Ming Dynasty’s period from 1372 to 1644.\textsuperscript{67} The Ming Dynasty prohibited its people from ocean trade with foreign countries (Kaikin in Japanese: Haijin in Chinese), and they did not have many chances of navigation to the Senkaku Islands.\textsuperscript{68}

Two Chinese scholars, Li Guoqiang and Zhang Haipeng, published the provocative article in \textit{People’s Daily} (\textit{People’s Daily}, May 8 2013). They asserted that Okinawa’s territorial status had not been defined, and they said that China could begin the revision of not only the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Senkaku Islands, but also the Ryukyu annexation process of 1872–1879. It seemed to be a kind of “Restore Ryukyu” movement with the Chinese expansionist emotion.\textsuperscript{69} The Japanese government made a protest to the Chinese government about this issue, and the two authors explained their assertion as the refutation against Prime Minister Abe’s “irresponsible comments” on the Sino-Japanese historical issues (\textit{Asahi Shimbun}, May 29 2013). Some Japanese analysts suggest that their logic is a kind of “three warfares.”\textsuperscript{70}

Li Guoqiang and Zhang Haipeng said, “Regarding this article, we had no instruction from any Chinese government’s bureaus. Further, we are surprised to hear the protest from the Japanese government, because we know Japan is a democratic country and anti-governmental opinions should be accepted” (\textit{Asahi Shimbun}, May 29 2013). Several Japanese government officers consider that their logic of “Ryukyu as TBD (to be decided) Attribution” are relevant to the Chinese government’s will to instigate the Ryukyu Independence Movement in Okinawa and to divide the Japanese public opinion.\textsuperscript{71} It may be in accordance with the

\textsuperscript{64}Midorima, \textit{Senkaku Retto}, 58–66, Nishizato, Kiko. “Zhuryu Kankeishi Karu Mita Senkaku Shoto” [Senkaku islands, Viewpoints from the China-Ryukyu-Japan Relative History], in Okinawa Daigaku Chiiki Kenkyusho, \textit{Senkaku Shoto To Okinawa}, 30.

\textsuperscript{65}Midorima, \textit{Senkaku Retto}, 49–57.

\textsuperscript{66}Ibid.; and Guojia Haiyang Xinxi Zhongxin, \textit{Diaoyudao – Zhongguo De Guyou Lingtu}, 5.

\textsuperscript{67}Sakuda, \textit{Ryukyu Oukoku No Rekishi}, 30; Takara, \textit{Aja no Naka no Ryukyu Okoku}, 60.

\textsuperscript{68}“Kaikin” [Prohibition of Ocean Trade], Yamakawa Shuppansha Publishing, 127.

\textsuperscript{69}We do not know when the Chinese nationalists began to use the “Restore Ryukyu” slogan, though it was said that they used it in demonstration in 2005 and 2010. “Umi wo Yuku Kyoryu: Tenkanki no Anpo 2010, Chugoku de ‘Okinawa Kaese’ no Koe (Sono 1)”[Huge Dragon navigates Sea: Changing Nature of the Japanese Security in 2010, Restore Ryukyu Slogan in China], \textit{Mainichi Shimbun}, April 18, 2005, 1–2, “Shasetsu: Hannichi Demo Chuugoku No Teiyou Wa Shinshoku Da” [Editorial: Anit-Japanese Demonstration, China’s undercurrent is serious], \textit{Mainichi Shimbun}, October 19, 2010, 5.

\textsuperscript{70}Watanabe, \textit{Zhugoku Jinmin kaihogun No Zenbo}, 43–44. The three warfares are composed of media, psychological, and legal warfares. “Three warfares,” \textit{NIDS China Security Report 2010}, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, March 10, 2011. Accessed January 2, 2019. \url{http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/chinareport/index.html}.

\textsuperscript{71}“Ryukyu Kizoku Mikaiketsuron’wo Teiki shi, Okinawa deno Yoronkeisei wo Hakaru Chugoku Chogoku,” [China suggested “Ryukyu’s TBD Attribution Logic,” and instigated Okinawa’s Public Opinion], \textit{Naigai Josei no Kaiko to Tenbo} [Annual Report 2016 Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations], Public Security Intelligence Agency, 23.
“three warfare” logic. The Japanese think that these Chinese works are not successful, because many Okinawan people complained about the concentration of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa to the Japanese Central Government, though they still consider themselves as the Japanese nation.\(^\text{72}\) The Chinese government and Chinese academics might overestimate the cultural and historical influences of the premodern middle kingdom to Okinawa.\(^\text{73}\)

We should state, “if China has the confidence on legal grounds for their claim on the East China Sea or Okinawa, the Chinese government should bring suits against the Japanese government for settlement at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).” We only can settle the issues of territories peacefully on the basis of modern international laws including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982. It seems that China has no will to bring suits against Japan for settlement at the ITLOS. It means that China is unable to find an effective legal move.

It is also said that some Chinese and Taiwanese scholars asserted that the Senkaku Islands were the Diaoyutai Lieyu (Diaoyutai Islands) in the old Chinese book Taihaishichalu.\(^\text{74}\) Associate Professor Nozomu Ishi of Nagasaki Junshin Catholic University found the Taiwan government geographic materials which identified that Diaoyutai Islands were the islands which were located due Southeast of Taiwan. The Senkaku Islands are located due northeast of Taiwan, and so Diaoyutai Islands seemed to be the different islands. We also shall confirm the island name: “Diaoyutai” is a common noun, or a proper noun. If it is a common noun, Diaoyutai means just a fishing spot, and there may be some other Diaoyutais in China and Taiwan.\(^\text{75}\)

5. The Senkaku Islands dispute as a tool of CCP’s internal power struggle

The delegation of the Japan-China Friendship Association visited China, and they met the then Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping on October 3 1974.\(^\text{76}\) Deng Xiaoping told the head of Japanese delegation, Mr. Hisao Kuroda, a Japanese Diet member of the House of Councilors that, “we should promote the negotiation of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty though some logistical agreements are still in the process. The Senkaku Islands Dispute should be shelved, because if we insist on solving this issue, we cannot solve it forever.” The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs never admitted that they accepted the

\(^{72}\)Okinawa Times published the result of research of public opinion on Okinawa Reversion to 896 Okinawa citizens in April 2017, and 82% of the respondents supported Okinawa reversion to Japan. “[Nihon ni Fukki Shite Yokatta?] Okinawa 82% ga Koutei, Wakai Sedai Hodo Takaku Kenmin Ishiki Chosa” [Is Reversion to Japan, good? Eighty two Percent respondents Supported Okinawa Reversion, Especially Younger Generation: Result of Public Opinion Research], Okinawa Times, Accessed July 3, 2018. http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/97097.

\(^{73}\)It is true that Former Okinawa Prefectural Governor Hirokazu Nakaima is an offspring of Fujianese immigrants in Kume village in fourteenth century, but he was a more cooperative governor to the Japanese Central Government than many other Okinawa Prefectural Governors, and he made a great effort to get the higher Okinawa Promotion Budget for the people of Okinawa. He was also the first Okinawa Prefectural Governor to observe the Senkaku Islands. He observed the Senkaku Islands by the JMSDF P-3C anti-submarine surveillance plane on April 2011. Takenaka, Okinawa wo Utta Otoko, 22–23, 147. This book is an excellent record of Nakaima Administration’s struggle with the U.S. base issues and local economic development, though its title is misleading.

\(^{74}\)Senkaku Shoto no Shiryou, Nagasaki Junshin Catholic University’s Associate Professor pointed the inconsistency of Sino-Taiwanese Assertion], Asahi Shim bun electric edition, November 17, 2017, Accessed May 12, 2018.https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASKCKQ7WCKKF00N.html.

\(^{75}\)It is a pity that the most famous Diaoyutai is not in the East China Sea, it is located in Beijing. “Diaoyutai Guobinguan Jianjie” [Diaoyutai Guest House Introduction]. Accessed May 15, 2018. http://www.chinadyt.com/cn/about/intro.html.

\(^{76}\)Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, editorial supervision, 143.
suggestion of Deng to shelve the Senkaku Islands Dispute, because the Japanese foreign ministry considered that China could not claim the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, historically and legally, as aforementioned. But, anyway, Japan agreed not to negotiate the Senkaku Islands Dispute with China as a pre-condition of the peace and friendship treaty.

One hundred eight Chinese fishing boats suddenly entered the sea area of the Senkaku Islands on April 12 1978, early in the morning, and 16 of them entered the Japanese territorial waters (Asahi Shimbun, April 13 1978).77 The JCG patrol vessel “Yaeyama” (350 tons) warned these fishing boats to leave the Japanese territorial waters, but nine Chinese fishing boats besieged “Yaeyama” and showed the JCG crew the wooden board with Chinese characters “This is Chinese territory, we have a right to navigate and fish” (Asahi Shimbun, April 13 1978). A part of the boats installed machineguns, and the crew drew the cabin wall and plates with the slogan: “Diaoyu Island is the Chinese territory, we never permit any foreigner’s invasion” to the JCG patrol vessels (Figures 7–10). The PLA navy base at Yantai and the PLA navy port at Amoi controlled these vessels by the ship radio. The JCG dispatched three patrol vessels including “Yaeyama” to the Senkaku sea areas, and they ordered the Chinese fishing boats to leave the Japanese territorial waters (Asahi Shimbun, evening paper, April 13 1978). The Japanese government asked the Chinese government through the Japanese Embassy in Beijing to withdraw the fishing boats from the Senkaku sea areas in the morning on April 14 1978 (Asahi Shimbun, evening paper, April 14 1978).

The total number of the Chinese fishing boats which illegally entered the Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands from April 12 to May 14 is 357, and 123 fishing boats did the illegal fishing in the sea areas of the Senkaku Islands.78 Many of these fishing boats armed with machineguns and automatic rifles and some of the Chinese crew aimed at “Yaeyama” with the automatic rifles (Asahi Shimbun, April 15 1978). The Japanese government was embarrassed by their behaviors because Vice-Premier Deng said that China had no intention to suggest the issues of Senkaku Islands

Figure 7. A Chinese fishing Boat installed a Machinegun (Photo: Japan Coast Guard).

77Late Nobuyuki Sugimoto, a Japanese diplomat who coped with the Senkaku incident in 1978, wrote the number of the Chinese fishing boats was about 200. Sugimoto, Daichi no Hokoh, 56–58.
78The 11th Maritime Security District, “Kaijo Hoan No Genkyo” [Current Situation of the Maritime Security], July 9, 1979, Accessed March 20, 2018. http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo/shiryo/senkaku/detail/s1979070000103.html.
on the diplomatic table, and the Japanese and Chinese governments were right in the middle of the negotiation for the peace and friendship treaty. The then Chinese Vice-Premier Geng Biao told the Japanese politicians’ delegation led by Hideo Den, “it was an accident, and the Chinese fishermen have no ill-intention toward Japan” on April 15 1978 (Asahi Shimbun, April 16 1978).

The JCG increased the number of patrol vessels, and it came to six, and dispatched a YS11 surveillance plane to the sea areas of the Senkaku Islands (Asahi Shimbun, April 17 1978). They confirmed that the 137 Chinese fishing boats were in the sea areas on April 16 1978 (Asahi Shimbun, April 17 1978). The Chinese fishing boats suddenly left the Senkaku territorial waters at the evening on April 16 1978, though they still stayed in the contiguous zones of the Senkaku Islands. Majority of these Chinese fishing boats

Figure 8. A Machinegun installed on the deck of a Chinese Fishing boat (Photo: Japan Coast Guard).

Figure 9. A Chinese fishing Boat “Yanyu 237” installed a machinegun (Photo: Japan Coast Guard).
began to return to China, though a small number of them continued to come and enter the Senkaku territorial waters intermittently until May 14 1978.\(^7^9\) The incident was beyond the international common sense, and the Japanese people could not understand China’s inside story until June 22 1978. A Hong Kong newspaper Mingbao reported the contents of the wall newspapers posted on the wall of the building in Shanghai City, and it was translated and reported in Japan by Asahi Shimbun (Asahi Shimbun, June 23 1978). It suggested the internal power struggle among the CCP senior cadre on their policy toward Japan and the Senkaku Islands, and the fishing boats’ crew were maritime militias, though they did not wear military uniforms. The Asahi Shimbun (June 23 1978) says as follows:

There was a fishermen and islands meteorological reporters’ meeting in Shanghai in April 1978, and Chen Jinhua: Vice Chairman of the Shanghai City Revolutionary Committee, denounced the Soviet Russia and Japan that deprived the Chinese people of their marine resources. He also stressed that the Chinese people had been persecuted by the Imperial Japanese navy. We understand that Chen Jinhua used the two reasons of offensive: the natural resources demand and historical disputes with Japan for political agitation. In response to his leadership, the meeting decided the slogan: Develop Ocean, Increase Marine Production, and Defend China against Invasion!” The Fishery bureau of Shanghai City ordered the fishing boats’ crew to go to the sea areas of Senkaku Islands northwest 90 miles, and they instructed by radio, “Diaoyu Islands are China’s territories. If anyone attack Chinese fishing in the Chinese territories, you should make a counterattack.

Niu Haiteng, the deputy head of the Chinese maritime militias gave his crew orders for preparation for combat against the Japanese and told them, “Defend Chinese territories at the risk of your lives! We are pleased to make the world bright with our

Figure 10. A Chinese Fishing Boat with the Slogan “Diaoyu Island is the Chinese territory, we never permit any foreigner’s invasion” on the cabin wall (Photo: Japan Coast Guard).

\(^7^9\)The 11\(^{th}\) Maritime Security District, Current Situation of the Maritime Security, July 9, 1979.
blood.” The Chinese maritime militias’ spirits soared, and they shouted, “Let the Japanese see the Chinese People’s Tradition of Anti-Imperialist Struggle!” They were willing to collide into the Japanese gunboats by their wooden fishing boats. But the CCP Shanghai branch suddenly ordered them to withdraw and leave the Senkaku sea areas immediately, and they had no choice to return to China.

Late Nobuyuki Sugimoto, a Japanese diplomat, asserted that the militias were brought up by the Gang of Four led by Jiang Qing, wife of Chairman Mao, and he guessed that the internal power struggle of CCP was caused by the remnants of the Gang of Four against Deng Xiaoping, an initiator of Japan-China Peace and Friendship treaty, though there was no convincing evidence.\(^8^0\)

Professor Akio Takahara made a thorough investigation of the situation in 1978 and finally concluded that the internal power struggle of the CCP was caused by the sect of the PLA navy: Admiral Su Zhenhua against Deng Xiaoping.\(^8^1\) A missile destroyer of the South Fleet of PLA navy was blown up and sank in the beginning of April 1978, and Deng strictly criticized the leaders of the PLA navy, and Admiral Su, the first commissar of the PLA navy, expressed his disapproval of Deng’s criticism to the then paramount leader Hua Guofeng, and he had an impression that Hua sympathized with the PLA navy leaders’ disapproval against Deng. Admiral Su immediately dispatched his sect’s members including Chen Jinhua\(^8^2\) to Shanghai City to instigate the maritime militias: the crew of the fishing boats, and they appeared in the sea areas of Senkaku Islands to disturb Deng’s proposal of the Japan–China cooperation. They were persuaded by the CCP leaders by radio, and the fishing boats withdrew from the Senkaku waters in the evening of April 16 1978.

The Japan-China Summit Meeting between Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping was held on October 25 1978 for the conclusion of the Peace and Friendship Treaty between Japan and the PRC.\(^8^3\) Vice Premier Deng stated: “There exist a variety of disputes between our two countries; for example, there is the dispute of what is called the Diaoyu Islands in China, and the Senkaku Islands in Japan. At this time, there’s no need to raise subjects like this at a meeting like ours. As I expressed this to Minister for Foreign Affairs: Sunao Sonoda in Beijing, there’s probably insufficient wisdom to resolve the dispute in our generation, but with the next generation likely to be savvier than us, they will probably be able to find some resolution to the dispute. It is essential to look at this dispute with a broad perspective.” Deng won the power struggle against Hua in the end of 1978, and no more maritime militias appeared in the Senkaku Sea areas until 2000s. Anyway, it was clear that the Senkaku Islands Dispute became a tool of the CCP’s internal power struggle, and we can safely say, this is a dangerous byproduct of it.

It was the first time that the Chinese maritime militias appeared in the sea areas of the Senkaku Islands. It was said that the Chinese maritime militias were established under the strong influence of “People’s War” theory of Chairman Mao in late 1950s.\(^8^4\) The PLA navy

\(^{8^0}\)Sugimoto, Daichi no Hokoh, 63–64.

\(^{8^1}\)Takahara, “Gendai Chugokushi No Saikentou,” 36.

\(^{8^2}\)Chen Jinhua was one of the close comrades of Admiral Su. Chen and Su’s relation was described in “Sirenbang Yudangfumieqian, Zhongyang Gongzuo Zhankai Yichang ezhan” [Central Work Committee fought a tough fight against the gang of four], Renminwang, May 10, 2012. Accessed January 2, 2019. http://history.people.com.cn/BJG5/205396/17853342.html.

\(^{8^3}\)Senkaku islands Q&A, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

\(^{8^4}\)The Chinese Red Army’s militia was established in 1940, and once abolished, though it was revitalized as the PLA’s assistance force in 1957. Ueda, “Minpei,” 406–408; and Hiramatsu, Yomigaeru Zhugoku Kaigun, 56–65.
was established in April 1950, and its first commander Xiao Jingguang planned to construct the modern navy with the support of Soviet Russia, but Chairman Mao preferred the naval strategy of the maritime guerrilla warfare with the small gunboats and torpedo boats.\textsuperscript{85} The Chinese maritime militias were established as the assistant force for the PLA navy’s maritime guerrilla warfare, and they were the product of Chairman Mao’s “People’s War” theory.

China’s militias were defined in its military service law: article 36 & 37.\textsuperscript{86} The number of maritime militias was unknown. Professor Satoshi Amako quoted Chinese source, and he stated the number of Chinese militias to be 8 million in 2011.\textsuperscript{87} Other Japanese source estimated the number of maritime militias to be 300,000 in 2016 (Sankei Shimbun, August 17 2016). Captain Katsuya Yamamoto described that “the maritime militias are recruited from the fishermen, the islanders, shipping agents, port servicemen.\textsuperscript{88} The militias on duty shall wear the military uniforms with militia’s emblem: MB (abbreviation of Ming Bing).”\textsuperscript{89}

The maritime militias got the basic training for weapons operation, logistics, reconnaissance, civil-engineering, espionage activities, and so on.\textsuperscript{90} If China utilizes the maritime militias again and many times for the maritime offensive against Japan in the East China Sea, it will be a difficult issue for the Japanese government, because the activities of the maritime militias are the grey-zone operations between war and peace.

6. The Chinese National Integration and its relevance to the Senkaku Islands dispute

It is said that Sun Wen, a symbolic leader of the Chinese Revolution in the beginning of the twentieth century, lamented the difficulty of Chinese national integration and said, “the Chinese are like a sum of sand on the tray, it will disperse when we grasp it.”\textsuperscript{91} The difficulty of the Chinese national integration is still a big issue in the Post-Cold War Era. Originally, the Chinese have been classified into several dialect groups. All the groups have utilized the Chinese characters, though they have different pronunciations of the Chinese characters among them. That is the reason that the ROC and PRC have utilized mandarin: standard Chinese as a lingua franca for the national integration. The PRC has used the mandarin and socialist policy as the tools for the Chinese national integration after the civil war in 1940.

The PRC’s national integration policy seems to be rather successful for the time being, though it has a long way for the completion, and many peripheral integration issues such as

\textsuperscript{85}Many of the Chinese gunboats being constructed from late 1950s to 1960s are with displacement from 75 tons to 100 tons. Fang, Yang, and Wei, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Hajiun 60 Nian (1949–2009), 115; and Hiramatsu, Yomigaeru Zhugoku Kaigun, 56–65.

\textsuperscript{86}China’s first military service law was established in 1955. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Bingyifa [China’s military service law]. Accessed July 22, 2018. http://www.mod.gov.cn/policy/2009-09/15/content_4088017.htm; and Ueda, “Minpei,” 406.

\textsuperscript{87}Amako, 2018, 117.

\textsuperscript{88}Yamamoto, “Boei Chuzaikan No Mita Zhugoku (Sono13) – Kajo Minpei To Zhugoku No Gyomin.” Accessed May 25, 2018. http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/navcol/SSG/topics-column/col-056.html.

\textsuperscript{89}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{90}Megha Rajagopalan, “China trains ‘fishing militia’ to sail into disputed waters,” Reuters, May 1, 2016. Accessed May 29, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china-fishingboats-idUSKCN0XSORS; and Ueda, “Minpei,” 406, author’s interview with a Chinese scholar on September 3, 2015, author’s interview with the senior Philippine Armed Force officer on November 11, 1995. A retired Brig. General of Philippine Armed Force told the author on November 13, 1995, “Chinese fishermen wearing military uniforms constructed the concrete structures on Mischief Reef.”

\textsuperscript{91}Okabe. “Higashi Ajia ni Okeru Seiji Tougou to Bunka”; and Hirano, Yamakage, Okabe, and Tsuchiya, 119.
the Guangdongnese issue, Hong Kong Chinese issue, Taiwanese issue, and the ethnic Chinese issues in the world are left. The Guangdongnese attached importance to their Guangdongnese dialect, and they protested against the abolishment of Guangdongnese dialect program of Guangzhou TV in July 2010 (Yazhou Zhoukan, August 8 2010). The Hong Kong Chinese attach importance not only to Guangdongnese dialect but also to English. They share the anti-communist feeling and the historical background of British Colony.

The Hong Kong Chinese had long enjoyed the laissez-faire economic policy under the British Authority from 1842 to 1997. They hated communist China and some of them had a strong political intention of the autonomy: Gangren Zhigang (Hong kongnese Administration of Hong Kong), though many Hong Kong Chinese were the businessmen who were investing China. The PRC government recognized the effect of the direct investment of Hong Kong Chinese to PRC’s economic development. It has permitted Hong Kong, the status of the Special Administrative Region in 1997, though it has never permitted the full democratization of the Hong Kong government. Some Hong Kong Chinese emigrated from Hong Kong to the foreign countries at the Chinese political turbulence such as the Tiananmen Square Incident in June 1989. If so, we can safely say that the Hong Kong Chinese are the fence-sitters on the psychological border of the PRC (Figure 11). Hong Kong residents' political orientations are still various and fragmental.

Figure 11. Overview of the Multi-layered Chinese Identity.
Source: Amako, Chugoku wa Kyoi ka?

92 These are also many ethnic minority issues in China, though the author does not mention them because they are irrelevant to the Senkaku Islands.
93 Tanigaki, “Dai 10 Shou Hong Kong Henkan,” 240–266.
94 Wakabayasi and Tanaka, eds., Genten Zhugoku Gendaishi 7 Taiwan, Hong Kong, Kakya & Kajin, 210–211; and Tanigaki, “Dai 10 Shou Hong Kong Henkan,” 240–266. Accessed January 2, 2019. http://www.jetro.go.jp/world/asia/cn/basic_03/. The amount of the direct investment from Hong Kong to China is always top in the China's statistics.
95 Li, “The Rise and Fall of Chinese Immigration to Canada,” Accessed January 14, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2005.00324.x.
The Taiwan Chinese composition is more complicated. More than 80% of the Taiwan Chinese population is indigenous people. They attached importance to their Taiwanese dialect, and they shared the historical background of the Japanese Colony, and they had no experience of the twenty century’s Chinese National Revolution. They prefer Taiwan independence. The other Taiwan Chinese (about 13%) are the Nationalist Party member mainlanders and their offsprings. They attached importance to the Mandarin, and they controlled the ROC government in Taiwan from 1949 to 1988. The indigenous Taiwan Chinese and the mainlanders have shared the anti-communist feeling, though their relations had been not fraternal until the democratization of presidential election in 1996. The first indigenous Taiwan President Lee Tenghui (1988–2000) paid great effort for democratization and political integration. He created the concept Xintaiwanren (New Taiwanese) for the rapprochement between indigenous Taiwan Chinese and the mainlanders, though his policy had some taste of pro-independence. Some indigenous Taiwan Chinese maintain a political dream of Taiwan independence until now, though they never declare it clearly. If Taiwan declares independence from China, the PRC government would open a civil war, because the PRC government asserts Taiwan as a part of China. We can safely say that some Taiwan Chinese prefer independent Taiwan, some prefer the ROC, and many of them keep quiet, so the Taiwan Chinese are the fence-sitters on the psychological border of the Political Chinese (see Figure 11).

The ethnic Chinese in the world may divide into two categories, firstly, overseas Chinese (華僑), some of them maintain the nationality of PRC or ROC, and some of them are stateless. Most of them speak the mandarin or its dialects. We can safely say they are culturally still Chinese. Secondly, the Chinese citizens of the foreign nationality (華人), such as the Singaporean Chinese, the Malaysian Chinese, or the Thai Chinese, some of them are localized and mixed with local ethnic groups because of the inter-marriage, and many of them have no knowledge of mandarin. Two categories’ distinction is rather ambiguous, because they often have been related to each other by blood, though we can safely say that the ethnic Chinese are Chinese businessmen: economic Chinese. We can understand the multilayered structure of Chinese identity (Figure 11).

The Chinese government always aims at utilizing these “various Chinese” for the promotion of the patriotism and national integration policy for the PRC government. The anti-Japanese sentiment based on the memories of Japan-China War and the territorial issues of the Senkaku Islands are the precious resources for these purposes. For instance, 53.6% of the Hong Kong Chinese blamed the wartime Japanese responsibility, and 82.4% of the Hong Kong Chinese believed that the sovereignty of the

---

96 Wakabayashi, "Dai 6 Sho Taiwan Minshuka to Chutai Kankei no Kincho," 163–178. They include some Hakka Chinese.
97 Other Taiwanese residents are indigenous minorities: 2.3% of total population in 2014. "2014 Nenmatsu no Taiwan Senjuminzoku Jinko wa Yaku 54 Man nin’’ [Indigenous Taiwanese population in the end of 2014 is 540 thousands, Majority is ethnic Ami], ROC Economic & Cultural Representation Office, Accessed June 30, 2018. https://www.roc-taiwan.org/jp_ja/post/26575.html.
98 Ogasawara, "Dai 5 Sho Minshuka, Taiwanka Suru Seiji Taisei," 135–160.
99 Lee, “Shintaiwanjin toha Nanika.” Accessed May 16, 2018. https://www.roc-taiwan.org/jp_ja/post/12763.html.
100 Professor Leo Suryadinata defines the ethnic Chinese, “people of Chinese descent in Southeast Asia regardless of their nationality and degree of acculturation.” Leo, China and the ASEAN States: the Ethnic Chinese Dimension, 4.
101 The China Daily purchased two pages of the New York Times as advertisement for China’s assertion of the sovereignty of Senkaku Islands. China Daily, Diaoyu Islands Belong to China, The New York Times, September 28, 2012, pp. A18–A19. Not only the New Yorkers, but also all the Chinese residents in the U.S.A. could see it.
Senkaku Islands belonged to the PRC, though more than 49.1% of them did not trust the PRC government in 1995.  

The Japanese nationalist political party Nihon Seinen-sha built lighthouse at Uotsurijima Island in August 1978 and rebuilt the broken lighthouse in 1988, and it made the PRC and ROC government angry. Taiwan army secretly ordered its parachute troop to establish the special platoon to destroy the lighthouse built by Nihon Seinen-sha and raise the ROC flag at Uotsurojima Island in October 1990 (Asahi Shimbun, December 5 2012, Yazhou Zhoukan, November 11 2012). The Taiwan army code-named their operation Exercise Hanjiang (Chinese Territory) and trained 45 soldiers for landing operation from the hovering helicopters. Forty-five soldiers were all mainlanders’ off-springs. They were ordered to drop from 3 m height (Asahi Shimbun, December 5 2012). But this was not the order of the then President Lee Tenghui. Finally, President Lee knew the plan of the secret operation of the army, and he ordered to stop it. We are not sure that who ordered Exercise Hanjiang. Some reporters guessed that it was the then Prime Minister Hao Bocun, though he keeps silence. Prime Minister Hao Bocun had been a General of ROC Army and was born in Jiangsu province in 1919, so his mainlanders’ identity may be different from the indigenous Taiwanese President Lee Tenghui.

Nihon Seinen-sha built the lighthouse at Kitakojima Island in July 1996, and they rebuilt the broken one in September 1996. The PRC government made a protest to the Japanese government about these activities and let Zhongguo Minjian Paodiao Lianhehui (the China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands) establish on September 8 1996 in China. Paodiao Xingdong Weiyuanhui (the Action Committee for Defending The Diaoyu Islands) in Hong Kong and some similar entity in Taiwan were also established in September 1996. The PRC government did not permit the China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands to navigate to the Senkaku Islands, though Hong Kong and Taiwan activists succeeded in landing Uotsurijima Island in October 1996, after the drowning of David Chan Yuk-cheung. The PRC government attitude toward the Senkaku Islands was rather moderate and restrained in 1996.

Nihon Seinen-sha member landed Uotsurijima Island with Shinto priest on April 20 in 2000, and they built a small shrine Senkaku Jinja (Senkaku Shrine). The PRC

---

102 Tanigaki, “Dai 10 Shou Hong Kong Henkan,” 251–260. The figure is the total of “very untrustworthy (12.5%)” and “untrustworthy (36.6%).”

103 Nihon Seinen-sha homepage. Accessed April 29, 2014. http://www.seinensya.org/main.html. The members of Nihon Seinen-sha also released one pair of goats. It is said that the number of goats increased to several hundreds in 2001. Ishigakishi Tonoki 2392 Bancchi No Genzai, Accessed November 9, 2015. http://www.seinensya.org/undo/ryodo/ senkakushoto/020823isinagaki.htm; Senkakushoto Uotsurijima no Yaseika Yagi Mondai ni Kansuru Shitsumonshuisho, Accessed November 9, 2015. http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_shitsumon.nsf/html/shitsumon/a151036.htm.

104 Urano, Bunseki/Shiryo/Bunken Senkaku Shoto/Ryokyu/Zhugoku/Nicchu Kankeishi, 168–170l; and Kase, Wareware Nihonjin ga Senkaku wo Mamoru, 33–66.

105 They could not land their helicopters at the Uotsurijima Island, because most parts of Uotsurijima Island are slopes, and the level ground is limited, as I aforementioned.

106 Shimizu, Hao Bocun, Amako, Ishihara, Shu, Tsuji, Hishida, and Murata, eds., Iwanami Gendai Zhugoku Jiten, 122–123.

107 Accessed April 29, 2014. http://www.cfdd.org.cn/html/6-n-6.html. This homepage is currently not accessible from Japan.

108 Accessed May 16, 2018. http://www.diaoyuislands.org/featured-events.php.

109 Ibid.

110 Accessed May 1, 2014. http://www.seinensya.org/undo/ryodo/senkakushoto/030616ayumi.htm; Urano, Bunseki/Shiryo/Bunken Senkaku Shoto/Ryokyu/Zhugoku/Nicchu Kankeishi, 193.
government denounced it. It was provocative enough to the PRC government. The PRC government tacitly admitted the China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands to navigate to the Senkaku Islands. Seven activists succeeded in landing Uotsurijima Island and broke Senkaku Shrine down on March 24 2004. The Chinese demonstrators burned Hinomaru (Japanese national flag) in front of the Japanese Embassy on March 25 2004 (Asahi Shimbun AERA, April 12 2004). The PRC government also tolerated the anti-Japanese demonstrations at the Chinese cities including Beijing and Shanghai in April 2005, and it led to the riots and tumults. Twelve thousand Hong Kong Chinese joined the anti-Japanese demonstration too. The Chinese government asserted that the Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine and the issues of the inspection of history textbook caused the violent demonstration and the destructions of Japanese shops. It is safe to say that the Chinese government utilizes the Senkaku Islands Dispute as one of the tools to mobilize the Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment, and it gives the Japanese government psychological pressure. Further, the Chinese government tries to utilize this Chinese sentiment for CCP’s authorization and China’s national integration policy toward the various Chinese. If so, this is another byproduct of the Senkaku Islands Dispute.

7. Concluding remarks

This article introduced China’s four reasons of offensives to the Senkaku Islands: the first reason China’s natural resources demand, the second reason historical disputes with Japan which has some relationship to Chinese people’s war-time memories, the third reason the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of CCP’s internal power struggle, and the fourth reason; the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of CCP for China’s national integration. Some reasons of Chinese offensive have been intertwined each other, and they may compose the structure of the Sino-Japanese Dispute on the Senkaku Islands, though the first reason natural resources demand is the main issue and the origin of the Senkaku Islands Dispute. The other reasons are to support the first reason or byproducts of the Senkaku Islands Dispute. Are there any changes in these reasons? Are there any materials to alleviate the tense of the dispute? We shall consider these two points in the last part.

First, China’s natural resources demand, especially energy resources demand, is huge as mentioned in Part 3.1, and this is the origin of the Senkaku Islands dispute between Japan and China in the late 1960s. The Chinese government deploys the mobile offshore drilling units (rigs) in the East China Sea, and it is said that China operates 14 wellhead platforms near the median line in 2018. But the production represents

---

111 Urano, Bunseki/Shiryo/Bunken Senkaku Shoto/Ryokyu/Zhugoku/Nicchu Kankeishi, 193.
112 Iijima, Koizumi Kantei Hiroku, 328–329.
113 Most of Japanese newspapers never reported the destruction of Senkaku Shrine, though Okinawa Times reported. “Senkaku Joriku No Zhugokujin Taiho: Unlawful landing Chinese activists Arrested,” Asahi Shimbun, March 25, 2004, “Shichi Zhugokujin Wo Kyosei Sokan: Seven Chinese Repatriated,” Okinawa Times. March 27, 2004.
114 Matsumoto, “Zhugoku,” 150.
115 Aija Doko Nenpo 2006, 182.
116 Husseini, “From drillships to warships.” Accessed January 2, 2019. https://www.offshore-technology.com/features/drillships-warships-increasing-tensions-east-china-sea/.
just 1% of China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)’s total production and the East China Sea area accounts for 2.8% of CNOOC’s total reserves for 2017. To date, no production has been reported from field on the Japanese side of the border. If so, we cannot expect much for the energy resources in the East China Sea, and Sino-Japanese dispute on energy resources will be political, and not economic one.

As far as fishery resources are concerned, there was no major fishery incident caused by the Chinese fishermen in the East China Sea before the 1970s, because of their poor fishing technology and equipment. The Chinese government adopted the responsibility system to step up agricultural production in 1979 and 1980, and it introduced the system to fishermen as well. The fishing equipment including boats and nets improved. Currently, the fish catch in the East China Sea increases almost every year (see Table 1), though China’s coastal sea area has been polluted seriously. What is the reason that increases the fish catch? It is said that the high catches in the Western Central Pacific including China have probably been maintained through the expansion of the fisheries to new areas. China is likely to dispatch a large number of the fishing boats to the East China Sea including the sea area of the Senkaku Islands in the near future. It may add the fuel to the Chinese offensive’s fire. Japan and China Coast Guards shall avoid the conflict like Cod Wars between Britain and Iceland.

Second, China’s two historical issues to claim the Senkaku Islands are not effective, because China’s assertions are legally not significant. The Senkaku Islands are not part of Taiwan, and China has no clear evidence for the territorial claim of the Senkaku Islands, as mentioned in Parts 4.1 and 4.2. China may use their logic as the supportive logic to the natural resources demand, and anti-Japanese propaganda, though they have no intention to bring suits against the Japanese government for settlement at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. If so, this is a propaganda war, though Chinese people’s anti-Japanese sentiment being caused by the historical memory is not easily erased.

Third, the Senkaku Islands Dispute may become a tool of CCP’s internal power struggle at any time, because the CCP’s internal power struggle is an everyday occurrence. The CCP members’ anti-Japanese sentiment and the Senkaku Islands Dispute are likely to be connected, and they may be utilized as the tool for an internal power struggle in the same way as the case of the armed fishing boats’ incident in 1978.

The author gives an example. President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda agreed to the Japan-China joint development of the East China Sea Resources in June 2008. Former Vice-Foreign Minister of Japan Mitoji Yabunaka told that “the PLA officers strongly opposed this agreement, because the sea area of the joint development was based on the median line between Japan and China (Figure 5). There was China’s

117Ibid.
118See note 41.
119Wang, “Resolution to Fishery Disputes,” 1–16; and Hayton, The South China Sea, 241–242.
120A Chinese fishing boat fled with about 10 officials of Japan’s Fishery Agency on board on November 5 2018, after the officials boarded the boat to conduct an on-the-spot inspection on suspicion of illegal fishing in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. “Chinese boat suspected of illegal fishing fled with 10 Japanese officials on board,” The Japan News, December 28 2018, Accessed January 3, 2019. http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0005447658.
121“Cod Wars,” The Cabinet Papers, Accessed February 2, 2019. http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/cod-wars.htm.
122Japan-China Joint Press Statement: Cooperation between Japan and China in the East China Sea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 18, 2008, Accessed April 19, 2018. http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000091726.pdf.
Chunxiao oil and gas field beside the median line. ”

It seems that they were afraid of Japanese intervention to the China’s oil and gas project. Some foreign reporters suggested that the Fujian trawler’s captain who collided his trawler into the JCG patrol vessels in September 2010 (Figure 12) was the Chinese maritime militia, and the scholars of the U.S. Naval War College supported this supposition, though the captain did not wear military uniform. If so, it is possible that the Fujian trawler’s collision incident with the JCG patrol vessels in the sea area of Senkaku Islands in September 2010 was planned by the PLA senior officers to suspend the Japan-China joint

Figure 12. Fujianese Trawler: Minjinyu 5179 collided into the JCG Patrol Vessel: Yonakuni on September 7 2010 (Photo: Japan Coast Guard).

Figure 13. The Japan Coast Guard’s rescue operation of the Chinese fishermen in August 2016 in the East China Sea (Photo: Japan Coast Guard).

123Yabunaka, Sekai Ni Makenai Nihon, 137–143.
124Wong, “Chinese Civilian Boats Roll Disputed Waters,” New York Times, October 5, 2010, Accessed April 18, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/world/asia/06beijing.html; and James Kraska and Michel Monti, The Law of Naval Warfare and China’s Maritime Militia, International Law Studies: U.S. Naval War College, Vol. 91, 2015, 453.
125Kaijo Hoan Cho (Japan Coast Guard), Kaijo Hoan Repoto 2011, 21.
development project led by President Hu. Further, this incident was a start of the current “CCG vessels’ patrol” in the sea area of the Senkaku Islands. President Xi Jinping’s Maritime Power Slogan may add fuel to the anti-Japanese flame too.

Fourth, the Senkaku Islands Dispute is a tool of CCP for China’s national integration. As the author explained in Part 6, China’s national integration is still not yet completed. The CCP is likely to utilize anti-Japanese sentiment of the nation for the national integration and authorization of the CCP. The Senkaku Islands Dispute is a convenient tool for it. If so, it may become a tool of CCP for China’s national integration, again and many times in the future, and it is possible that the Senkaku Islands Dispute will lead to be big and unpredictable issue. We may not know whether the Chinese government can control the violent anti-Japanese demonstrators in the Chinese cities or not. The third and fourth reasons are the byproducts of the Senkaku disputes, though they will give the Japanese relentless troubles for long.

We cannot compromise our sovereignty of the Senkaku Island. If so, what the Japanese can do for the alleviation of the tense of the Sino-Japanese dispute? If Japan-China agreement on the joint development of the energy resources, the joint development of the fish farming, and the cooperation for preventing marine pollution, are reached, it is ideal, but it may take time to obtain the concrete results. The current efforts for the confidence-building measures (CBMs) between Japan Self-Defense Force and the PLA, and the CBMs between the JCG and CCG are urgent tasks (Yomiuri Shimun, May 10, 4). The Japanese government shall publicize the JCG’s search and rescue operation for the Chinese fishermen in the East China Sea too. It is said that JCG rescues some 100 Chinese fishermen every year. The JCG is not the enemy of Chinese fishermen!

Acknowledgements

The author would like to express his gratitude to the Japan Coast Guard, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and to Yaeyama Museum for the photos and materials. He also would like to express gratitude to Professor Satoshi Amako, Professor Rumi Aoyama, Professor Akio Takahara, Professor Tse-Kang Leng, Professor Ji You, and Dr. Tran Truong Thuy for the support and comments on his research.

Notes on contributor

Koichi Sato is a Professor of Asian Studies, College of Arts and Sciences, J. F. Oberlin University. He received his Ph. D. in International Studies from Waseda University. Served as Research Fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and Lecturer of the Tokyo University

126 “Senkaku Niramiai, Kaiho 5 Seki, Chugoku kanshisen ni Pitari” [Confrontation at Senkaku, 5 JCG patrol vessels closely monitor the Chinese Fishery Law Enforcement Command patrol boat, Asahi Shimun, September 29, 2010, 39. The first entrance of the Chinese patrol vessels in the Senkaku territorial waters was December 8 2008. Kaijo Hoan Cho, Kaijo Hoan Repoto 2009, 8 & 61.

127 “Tuidong Haiyang Qiangguo Jianshe Buduan Qude Xinchengjiu Jin Yibu Guanxin Haiyang Renshi Haiyang Jinglve Haiyang” [Promote the construction of maritime power. Get new achievement continuously. Advance your attention to the ocean. Recognize the ocean. Acquire the ocean!, People’s Daily, August 1, 2013.

128 It is not only Chinese problem. Currently, most of the demonstrators of the world utilize internet facilities, so it is difficult for the Ministry of Public Security to predict their number.

129 The efforts of the Sasakawa Japan-China friendship Fund for the CBMs between JSDF & PLA and JCG and CCG is also valuable. Accessed January 29, 2019. https://www.spf.org/publication/detail_16076.html.

130 Comment of former Head of JCG on October 28, 2016.
of Foreign Studies. Concurrently serves as Lecturer of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Staff College, Lecturer of National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), and Policy Adviser to Japan Coast Guard. His research interests include Southeast Asian Studies, Issues of East & South China Seas, and Chinese Foreign Policy.

Bibliography

Amako, S. Chugoku wa Kyoi ka [Is China Threat?]. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1995.
Amako, S. Chugokuseiji no Shakai Taisei [Social Mode of Chinese Politics]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2018.
Barber, E. “79 Days That Shook Hong Kong.” Time. http://time.com/3632739/hong-kong-umbrella-revolution-photos/.
Brown, L. R. “Dare ga Chugoku wo Yashinaunoka? – Semarikuru Shokuryo Kiki no Jidai.” Who Will Feed China? Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet. Tokyo: Dayamondo-sha, 1995.
Cho, K. C. Naigai Josei no Kaiko to Tenbo [Annual Report 2016 Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations]. Tokyo: Koan Chosa Cho, 2016.
Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Duiwai Guanxi Wenjianji [Documents of the People’s Republic of China Diplomatic Relations], no. 2, 30–32. Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1958.
Dan, H. G. “Chugoku no Kaiyo Kaihatsu Senryaku – Keizaishakai No Jizoku Kanosei wo Motomete” China’s Maritime Development Strategy. Tokyo: Gaiko, Vol. 13 (2012): 82–83.
Department of China, Bureau of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, editorial supervision. Nicchuu Kankei Kihon Shiryoshu 1970–1992 Nen [Basic Material of Japan-China Relation 1970–1992]. Tokyo: Kazankai, 1993.
“Diaoyutai Guobinguan Jianjie.” [Diaoyutai Guest House Introduction]. http://www.chinadyt.com.cn/about/intro.html.
“Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, United Nations, Committee for Co-ordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral resources in Asian Offshore Areas.” Technical Bulletin, Vol. 2 [Tokyo, Geological Survey of Japan], May 1969.
Erickson, A. S., and C. M. Kennedy. “China’s Maritime Militia.” 2016, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/chinas-maritime-militia.pdf#search=%27China%27s+Maritime+Militia%27
Fang, G. L., X. J. Yang, and X. Wei. Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Haijun 60 Nian (1949–2009) [People’s Liberation Army: Navy 60 Years 1949 – 2009]. Qingdao: Qingdao Chubangshe, 2009.
Gong, J. H., and L. J. Li. Zhongguo Haiyang Zhengzhi Zhanle Gailun [Introduction of Chinese Maritime Political Strategy]. Beijing: Haiyang Chubanshe Publishing, 2015.
Green, M., K. Hick, Z. Cooper, J. Schaus, and J. Douglas. “Counter-Coercion Series: East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Accessed May 24, 2018. https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-east-china-sea-adiz/
Guojia Haiyangju. Zhonggu Haiyang Fazhan Baogao 2009 [China’s Ocean Development Report 2009]. Beijing: Haiyang Chibanshe Publishing, 2009.
Guojia Haiyangju. Zhongguo Haiyang Fazhan Baoguo 2014 [China’s Ocean Development Report 2014]. Beijing: Haiyang Chubanshe Publishing, 2014.
Guojia Haiyangju. Zhonggu Haiyang Fazhan Baoguo 2017 [China’s Ocean Development Report 2017]. Beijing: Haiyang Chubanshe Publishing, 2017.
Guo, W. L., and S. L. Huang. Nanhai Zhengduan Yu Nanhai Yuye Ziyuan Quyu Hezuo Guanli Yanjiu [The Research of Conflict and Regional Cooperation for Fishery Resource in the South China Sea]. Beijing: Haiyang Chubanshe Publishing, 2007.
Guojia Haiyang Xinxin Zhongxin. Diaoyudaodai – Zhongguo De Guyou Lingtu [Diaouyu Dao – Chinese specific territory]. Beijing: Haiyang Chubansha publishing, 2012.
Hagstrom, L. “Quiet Power: Japan’s China Policy in Regard to the Pinnacle Islands.” Pacific Review 18, no. 2, (June 2005): 159–188. doi:10.1080/09512740500162923.
Harding, H. “The Concept of ‘Greater China’: Themes, Variations and Reservations.” China Quarterly, no 136 (December 1993). doi:10.1017/S030574100003229X.

Hayton, B. The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia. Yale University Press, 2014.

Hiramatsu, S. Yomigaeru Zhugoku Kaigun [Revived Chinese Navy]. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo Publishing, 1991.

Huang, M. J. “Guojun Baodiao Hanjiang Dizhentui Xueleishi Puguang” [ROC Army Diaoyu Island Assault Platoon’s Bitter Tears History Disclosed].” Yazhou Zhoukan 11, (November 2012): 22–27.

Husseini, T. 2018. “From Drillships to Warships: Increasing Tensions in the East China Sea.” Offshore-technology, November 26. https://www.offshore-technology.com/features/drillships-warships-increasing-tensions-east-china-sea/.

Iijima, I. Koizumi Kantei Hiroku [Secret Record of Prime Minister Koizumi’s Office]. Tokyo: Nihonkeizaishinbunsha Publishing, 2006.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The Military Balance 1978–1979. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1978.

Jia, C. Z. “Haiyang Yuqi Ziyuan Yu Shengchan Qianjing.” [Prospect for Offshore Oil & Gas Resource and Production]. Zhongguo Haiyang Yuqi Zhanlve Yantaohui Ziliao Huibian [Strategic Research Workshop for Chinese Offshore Oil & Gas Infrastructure]. Wuxi: Zhongguo Gongye Jingji Lianhuhui [Chinese Industrial Economy Association], December 2008.

Kase, H. editorial supervision, Wareware Nihonjin ga Senkaku wo Mamoru [We, The Japanese Defend Senkaku Islands]. Tokyo: Takagi Shobou Publishing, 2012.

Kaijo Hoan Cho. Kaijo Hoan Repoto 2009 [JCG Annual Report 2009]. The Japan Coast Guard, 2009.

Kaijo Hoan Cho. Kaijo Hoan Repoto 2011 [JCG Annual Report 2011]. The Japan Coast Guard, 2011.

Kenkyusho, A. K. Ajia Doko Nenpo [Annual Report of the Asian Countries 1971]. Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, 1971.

Kenkyusho, A. K. Ajia Doko Nenpo [Annual Report of the Asian Countries 2006]. Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, 2006.

Kenkyusho, A. K. Ajia Doko Nenpo [Annual Report of the Asian Countries 2011]. Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, 2011.

Kraska, J., and M. Monti. “The Law of Naval Warfare and China’s Maritime Militia.” International Law Studies: U.S. Naval War College 91 (2015): 450–467.

Kurihara, H. Senkaku Shoto Urimasu [Senkaku Islands on Sale]. Tokyo: Kousaido Shuppan Publishing, 2012.

Lee, T. H. “Shintaiwanjin Toha Nanika.” [What is all about New Taiwanese]. https://www.roctaiwan.org/jp_ja/post/12763.html.

Leo, S. China and the ASEAN States: the Ethnic Chinese Dimension. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985.

Li, M. J., and H. Z. Zhang. “Restructuring China’s Maritime Law Enforcement: Impact on Regional Security.” RSIS Commentaries, No. 050/2013, 1–3, April 1, 2013.

Li, P. S. “The Rise and Fall of Chinese Immigration to Canada: Newcomers from Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China and Mainland China, 1980–2002.” International Migration 43, no. 3 (2005). doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2005.00324.x.

Matsumoto, H. “Zhugoku: Taigai Kankei” [China’s Foreign Relations]. Ajia Doko Nenpo 2006 [Annual Report of the Asian Countries 2006], 150–158. Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, 2006

Midorima, S. Senkaku Retto [Senkaku Islands]. Naha: Hirugi-sha Publishing, 1998.

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries of Japan. “Kaimen Gyogyou Seisan Toukei Chosa.” [Marine Fish Catch of Japan]. http://www.maff.go.jp/j/tokei/kouhyou/kaimen_gyosei/index.html.

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery of Japan. “Gyogyo Shussangaku.” [Marine Fish Catch of Japan]. Accessed March 15, 2018. http://www.maff.go.jp/j/tokei/sihyo/data/17.html.
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery of Japan. “Nicchu Gyogyou Kyotei No Gaityo.” [Summary of the Japan-China Fisheries Agreement]. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries of Japan. http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/press/kokusai/161118_26.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, editorial supervision. Nicchuu Kankei Kihon Shiryoshu 1970–1992 Nen [Basic Material of Japan-China Relation 1970–1992]. Tokyo: Kazankai, 1993.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan. “Q&A on the Senkaku Islands.” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan. “Senkaku Islands Q&A”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Nakayama, Y. Chugoku ga Mimi wo Fusagu Senkakushoto no Futsugou na Shinjitsu [The Senkaku Islands: Undesirable Facts for China]. Tokyo: Wanibooks Publishing, 2012.

National Institute for Defense Studies. Chugoku Anzenhosho Report Soukango [NIDS China Security Report 2010, the First Issue]. Ministry of defense, Japan, Tokyo.

National Institute for Defense Studies. Chugoku Anzenhosho Repoto 2011 [NIDS China Security Report 2011]. Ministry of Defense, Japan, Tokyo.

Nihon Seinen-sha Homepage. http://www.seinensya.org/main.html

Noguchi, K. “Senkaku Mogura wo Mamoru Kokkaigii no Kai.” [Diet Members Association on Preserving Senkaku Moles]. http://www.noguchi-ken.com/M/2014/10/post-620.html.

Nongyebu, Z. Zhongguo Yuye Nianjian [China Fisheries Yearbook]. Beijing: Zhongguo Nongye Chubanshe, 2000–2017.

Ogasawara, Y. “Dai 5 Sho Minshuka, Taiwanka Suru Seiji Taisei” [Chapter 5: Democratization and Taiwanization of Political Regime]. In Chugoku/Taiwan [China/Taiwan], edited by S. Amako and R. Asano, 135–160. Kyoto: Minerva Shobo Publishing, 2008.

Okabe, T., Hirano, K., Tsuchiya, K., Yamakage, S. “Higashi Ajia ni Okeru Seiji Tougou to Bunka.” [Hirano, Yamakage, Okabe, and Tsuchiya]. In Ajia ni Okeru Kokumin Tougo Rekisi/Bunka/Kokusaikankei [A Study of National Integration in Asian Countries, History, Culture, and International Relations]. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1988.

Okinawa Daigaku Chiiki Kenkyusho. Senkaku Shoto To Okinawa [Senkaku Islands and Okinawa]. Tokyo: Fuyo-Shobo Publishing, 2013.

Paodiao Xingdong Weiyuanhui. [Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands]. http://www.diaoyuislands.org/featured-events.php.

Renminwang. 2012. “Sirenbang” Yudangfumieqian, Zhongyang Gongzuo Zhankai Yichang ezhnan.” [Central Work Committee Fought a Tough Fight Against the Gang of Four], Renminwang, May 10.

ROC Economic & Cultural Representation Office. “2014 Nenmatsu No Taiwan Senjuminzoku Jinko Wa Yaku 54 Man Nin.” [Indigenous Taiwanese Population in the end of 2014 is 540 Thousands, Majority is Ethnic Ami]. ROC Economic & Cultural Representation Office. https://www.roc-taiwan.org/jp JA/post/26575.html.

Ryukyu Daigaku. Senkaku Retto Gakujutsu Chosa Houkoku [Academic Survey Report of the Senkaku Islands] Ryukyu Daigaku, July 1971.

Sakuda, S. Ryukyu Oukoku No Rekishi [A Histroy of Ryukyu Kingdom]. Naha: Gekkan Okinawasha Publishing, 2013.

“Sangii Kaigiroku Jouhou dai 164 Kai Kokkai Gyosei Kanshi Linkai Dai 4 Gou.” [The House of Councilors 164th Diet Administrative Monitoring Committee 4]. http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangii/164/0016/16404240016004c.html.

Sato, K. “China’s Pursuit of Marine Resources and Its Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies.” Paper presented at the 5th International Workshop on The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development, Ha Noi, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and Vietnamese Lawyers Association, November 11–12, 2013.
Sato, K. 2014. “Multilateral Issues on Senkaku Islands in the Shadow of Strong Maritime Power.” Paper presented at the IPSAS Workshop on Rise of China and East Asian International Relations, Taipei, Academia Sinica and Waseda University, May 30.

Sato, K. 2015. “The Senkaku Islands Dispute: A Japanese View on the Various Factors of the Chinese Offense in the East China Sea.” Paper presented at the International Conference on Managing Asian Maritime Conflicts, Macau, University of Macau, December 11–12.

Shimizu, U. H. B., S. Amako, K. Ishihara., K. E. Shu., K. Tsuji, M. Hishida., and Y. Murata, eds. Iwanami Gendai Zhugoku Jiten [Iwanami Encyclopedia of Modern China], 122–123. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1999.

Shugiin. “Senkakushoto Uotsurijima no Yaseika Yagi Mondai ni Kansuru Shitsumonshuisho.” http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_shitsumon.nsf/html/shitsumon/a151036.htm.

Song, Y. H. “China’s Ocean Policy: EEZ and Marine Fisheries.” Asian Survey XXIX, no. 10, (October 1989): 983–998. doi:10.2307/2644793.

Shugiin. Senkakushoto Uotsurijima no Yaseika Yagi Mondai ni Kansuru Shitsumonshuisho.

Sugimoto, N. Daichi no Hokoh [Roaring of the Earth]. Tokyo: PHP publisher, 2006.

Takagi, S. “Daiyonsho: ‘Kakushinrieki’ron No Tenkai To Zhugokugaiko.” [Chapter 4, Debating on “Core Interest” and Chinese Diplomacy]. Azia (Tokuni Minamishinakai/Indoyo) ni Okeru Anzenhosho [Asian Security Order, Especially South China Sea & Indian Ocean], 67–81. Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 10 June 2013.

Takahara, A. “Gendai Chugokushi No Saikentou.” [Review of the Modern Chinese History], 32–40. Tokyo: Toa, No. 495, September 2008.

Takara, K. Ajia no Naka no Ryukyu Okoku [Ryukyu Kingdom in Asia]. Tokyo: Yoshikawakobunkan Publishing, 1998.

Takara, T., ed. Senkaku Kenkyu Jo [Senkaku Kenkyu: Research Report on Senkaku Islands: Jo]. Naha: Senkakushoto Bunkenshiryo Hensankai, 2007.

Takenaka, A. Okinawa wo Utta Otoko [A Man Who Sold Okinawa]. Tokyo: Fusosha Publishing, 2017.

Tanigaki, M. “Dai 10 Shou Hong Kong Henkan” [Chapter 10: Hong Kong Restoration]. In Chugoku wa Kyoi ka [Is China Threat?], edited by S. Amako, 240–266. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo Publishing, 1997.

The 11th Maritime Security District. “Kaijo Hoan no Genkyo” [Current Situation of the Maritime Security], July 9, 1979. http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo/shiryo/senkaku/detail/s197907000103.html.

Ueda, A. “Minpei.” In Chugoku Gunji Yougo Jiten [Dictionary of the Chinese Military Affairs], edited by I. Kayahara, 406–408. Tokyo: Soso sha Publishing, 2006.

Uran, T. Bunseki/Shiryo/Bunken Senkaku Shoto/Ryokyu/Zhugoku/Nicchu Kankeishi [Analysis, Materials, Bibliography; Senkaku Islands, Ryukyu, China: Japan-China Relations Analysis]. Tokyo: Sanwa Shoseki Publishing, 2005.

Wakabayashi, M. “Dai 6 Sho Taiwan Minshuka to Zhutai Kankei no Kincho”. [Chapter 6: Taiwan’s Democratization and the Sino-Taiwan Tension]. In Chugoku wa Kyoi ka [Is China Threat?], edited by A. S. Tokyo, 163–178. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo Publishing, 1997.

Wakabayasi, M., M. Tanigaki, and K. Tanaka, eds. Genten Zhugoku Gendaishi 7 Taiwan, Hong Kong, Kakyo & Kajin [Original Materials Chinese Modern History 7: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Overseas Chinese & Ethnic Chinese]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten Publishing, 1995.

Wang, K. H. “Resolution to Fishery Disputes in the South China Sea through Regional Cooperation and Management.” Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. http://nghiencuubien.dong.vn/en/conferences-and-seminars/-the-third-international-workshop-on-south-china-sea/666-resolution-to-fishery-disputes-in-the-south-china-sea-through-regional-cooperation-and-management-by-kuan-hsiung-wang.

Watanabe, Y. Zhugoku Jinmin kaihogun No Zenbo [All About People’s Liberation Army]. Tokyo: Fusosha Publishing, 2018.
Wu, W. “Guangzhou Wanren Shangjie hanwei Guangzhouhua.” [Ten thousands Guangzhou People stand up for Defending Guangdong Dialect TV Program]. *Yazhou Zhoukan* [Asiaweek], 46–47. Hong Kong, August 8, 2010.

Yabunaka, M. *Sekai Ni Makenai Nihon* [Formidable Japan]. Tokyo: PHP Publishing, 2016.

Yamakawa Shuppansha Publishing. “Yamakawa Sekaishi Shojiten.” [Yamakawa Encyclopedia of World History]. Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha Publishing, 2004.

Yamamoto, K. “Boei Chuzaikan no Mita Zhugoku (Sono13) – Kaijo Minpei to Zhugoku no Gyomin.” [Defense Attache’s View on China, No. 13, Maritime Militias and Chinese Fishermen], JMSDF Command and Staff College, December 8, 2014. [http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/navcol/SSG/topics-column/col-056.html](http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/navcol/SSG/topics-column/col-056.html).

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guofang Bu. *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Bingyifa* [China’s Military Service Law]. [http://www.mod.gov.cn/policy/2009-09/15/content_4088017.htm](http://www.mod.gov.cn/policy/2009-09/15/content_4088017.htm).