Rumor Source Detection With Multiple Observations Under Adaptive Diffusions

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Abstract—Recent work, motivated by anonymous messaging platforms, has introduced adaptive diffusion protocols which can obfuscate the source of a rumor: a “snapshot adversary” with access to the subgraph of “infected” nodes can do no better than randomly guessing the entity of the source node. What happens if the adversary has access to multiple independent snapshots? We study this question when the underlying graph is the infinite $d$-regular tree. We show that (1) a weak form of source obfuscation is still possible in the case of two independent snapshots, but (2) already with three observations there is a simple algorithm that finds the rumor source with constant probability, regardless of the adaptive diffusion protocol. We also characterize the tradeoff between local spreading and source obfuscation for adaptive diffusion protocols (under a single snapshot). These results raise questions about the robustness of anonymity guarantees when spreading information in social networks.

Index Terms—Information diffusion, social networks, source detection, source obfuscation.

I. INTRODUCTION

Detecting the source of information diffusion on a network is an important problem in network science, with applications such as finding the source of a virus epidemic or finding the source of a rumor on Twitter. A prototypical graph on which source detection is studied is the infinite $d$-regular tree $T_d$ (with $d \geq 3$), which is our focus in this paper as well.

Rumor Source Detection. Perhaps the simplest and most natural model of information diffusion on a network is the susceptible-infected (SI) model, where the rumor is spread along each edge of the network at a constant rate, and once a node is infected it remains infected forever. Shah and Zaman studied detecting the source in this model [1], [2]. Formally, at time $t = 0$ a vertex $v^* \in T_d$ is “infected” and the information propagates on the network according to the SI model; one then observes the subset $V_t$ of infected vertices at time $t$, which consists of $N_t := |V_t|$ vertices. We assume that the underlying graph (in this case $T_d$) is known and hence the subgraph $G_t$ induced by the vertices in $V_t$ is also known. The goal is to find the rumor source $v^*$.

The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) $\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} := \arg\max_{v \in V_t} \mathbb{P}(G_t | v^* = v)$ has particularly nice properties in this setting [1], [2]. In particular, Shah and Zaman showed that it is computable in linear time and that it detects the source with constant probability. More precisely, they show (in [3]) that there exists a universal constant $\alpha_d > 0$ such that $\lim_{t \to \infty} \mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^*) = \alpha_d$ (when $d \geq 3$). Many results extend to more general settings such as random trees [3].

Wang et al. [4] studied rumor source detection in the same setting but now with multiple independent observations; that is, observing the infected nodes $V_t^{(1)}, \ldots, V_t^{(k)}$ of $k$ independent diffusions started from the same source $v^*$. They show that the detection probability increases with $k$ and that it goes to 1 exponentially as $k \to \infty$.

Rumor Source Obfuscation. The results above show that if information propagates according to the SI model, then the source can be found efficiently and with good probability (that is, with at least constant probability). In certain applications, such as anonymous messaging apps, this is undesirable. Motivated by these applications, Fanti et al. [9] asked whether it is possible to devise messaging protocols that can obfuscate the rumor source, while at the same time still spreading information widely and quickly.

They devised a family of messaging protocols, termed adaptive diffusions, for this purpose; see Section I-A for a detailed description. Their main result shows that a specific messaging protocol within this family achieves perfect obfuscation: under this spreading model a “snapshot adversary” can do no better than randomly guessing the source node:

$$\mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^* | N_t = n) = \frac{1 + o(1)}{n}. \quad (1)$$

Many results extend to more general settings such as irregular trees [10], [11].

Our results. We study the source obfuscation guarantees that adaptive diffusion protocols can provide, in a couple of settings. First, we do this in the context of the adversary having multiple independent observations. We show that when an adversary has access to two independent observations then a
weak form of obfuscation is still possible. However, when it has access to three or more independent snapshots, then source detection with constant probability is always possible, regardless of the adaptive diffusion protocol.

We also do this in the context of spreading information locally around the source. We introduce a natural quantitative measure of local spreading, and characterize the tradeoff between local spreading and source obfuscation for adaptive diffusion protocols (under a single snapshot).

Put together, these results raise questions about the robustness of possible anonymity guarantees when spreading information in social networks. In order to precisely state our results, we first describe in Section I-A the setting of information diffusion processes in general and adaptive diffusions in particular. We then state our results in Sections I-B and I-C.

A. Information Diffusion and Adaptive Diffusion

We define a (discrete time) information diffusion process on a graph \( G = (V,E) \) as a (potentially random) increasing sequence of subgraphs \( G_0 \subseteq G_1 \subseteq G_2 \subseteq \cdots \), where \( G_t = (V_t, E_t) \) is the subgraph induced by the vertices \( V_t \) who have the information at time \( t \). Throughout the paper we assume that \( G_0 \) consists of a single vertex \( \nu^* \in G \), which we term the source. We also assume that the information spreads along the edges of the graph and hence \( V_{t+1} \subseteq V_t \cup \partial G_t \), where \( \partial G_t := \{ v \in V : \exists w \in V_t : (v,w) \in E \} \) denotes the (outer) vertex boundary of \( G_t \), consisting of vertices that are not in \( G_t \) but which are connected to a vertex in \( G_t \).

A simple example is when every vertex who obtains the information spreads it to all its neighbors in the next time step. In this case \( G_t = B_t(\nu^*) \) for every \( t \geq 0 \), where \( B_t(\nu) := \{ u \in V : d_G(u, \nu) \leq t \} \) denotes the (closed) ball of radius \( t \) around vertex \( \nu \in V \) (here \( d_G \) denotes graph distance in \( G \)). The SI model mentioned above can be defined inductively as follows: given \( G_t \), let \( \nu_{t+1} \) be a uniformly randomly chosen vertex from \( \partial G_t \) and let \( V_{t+1} := V_t \cup \{ \nu_{t+1} \} \).

The source detection problem is the following: given the underlying graph \( G \), the distribution of the sequence \( \{ G_t \}_{t \geq 0} \) and a single observation \( G_t \) at some time \( t > 0 \), the goal is to estimate the source \( \nu^* \). This is also known as the “snapshot adversary” model, since we get to observe \( G_t \), a single snapshot in time.

Adaptive diffusion, introduced by Fanti et al. [9], is a family of information diffusion processes designed with source obfuscation in mind. We now introduce and define adaptive diffusion on \( \mathbb{T}_d : G \); we refer the reader to [11] for a comprehensive introduction more generally. The notation and definitions that follow match those in [9]–[11].

Adaptive diffusion is defined via an auxiliary process, the path \( \{ v_{S_t} \}_{t \geq 0} \) of a so-called virtual source. This is a time-inhomogeneous Markov chain, which we now define. Initially, the virtual source is the same as the true source: \( v_{S_0} = \nu^* \). Next, it moves to a uniformly random neighbor of \( \nu^* \):

\[
\mathbb{P}(v_{S_{t+1}} = w) = \frac{1}{d(w,v^*)}.
\]

For the remainder of the path, assuming that \( v_{S_t} \) is given, \( v_{S_{t+1}} \) is defined as follows. If \( t \) is odd, then \( v_{S_{t+1}} = v_{S_t} \), that is, the virtual source stays put. If \( t \) is even, then the virtual source either stays put or it moves to one of its \( d-1 \) neighbors that it has not visited before; in the latter case, it chooses the neighbor to move to uniformly at random. Note that if the virtual source moves then it moves away from the source \( \nu^* \). The probability of choosing one action or the other is a function of time \( t \) and also the distance of \( v_{S_t} \) from \( \nu^* \) (hence the name adaptive). Specifically, let \( h_t := \delta_G(v_{S_t}, \nu^*) \) denote the graph distance between \( v_{S_t} \) and \( \nu^* \). Then

- with probability \( \alpha(t, h_t) \) we have that \( v_{S_{t+1}} = v_{S_t} \), that is, the virtual source stays put;
- and with probability \( 1 - \alpha(t, h_t) \) the virtual source moves to one of its \( d-1 \) neighbors that it has not visited before, chosen uniformly at random.

The probabilities \( \alpha(t, h_t) \in [0,1] \), with \( t \in \{2,4,6,\ldots\} \) and \( h 
\)
spreading over the same underlying network. If an adversary has access to a snapshot of each such diffusion, then they are in a much better position to find the source. Is it still possible to obfuscate the source with some form of information diffusion? We investigate this question in the context of adaptive diffusion protocols.

We show that when an adversary has access to two independent observations, a weak form of obfuscation is still possible with adaptive diffusion. However, when three or more independent observations are available, detection with constant probability is always possible, regardless of which adaptive diffusion protocol is used. This is the content of Theorems 1 and 2.

**Theorem 1 (Two independent observations):** Suppose that information is spread according to an adaptive diffusion protocol on $\mathbb{T}_d$, $d \geq 3$, and that an adversary has two independent observations of infected subgraphs, $G^1_{t_1}$ and $G^2_{t_2}$, started from a fixed source $v^*$. 

1. There exists a computationally efficient estimator $\hat{v}$, which is agnostic to the adaptive diffusion protocol, such that if $t_1, t_2 \geq 2$ then
   \[ \mathbb{P}(\hat{v} = v^*) \geq \frac{d-1}{d} \cdot \frac{2}{\min\{t_1, t_2\}}. \]

2. There exists an adaptive diffusion protocol such that the maximum likelihood estimator $\hat{v}_{\text{ML}}$ satisfies for all $t_1, t_2 \geq 1$ that
   \[ \mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^*) \leq \frac{d-1}{d} \cdot \frac{7}{\min\{t_1, t_2\}}. \]

A few comments are in order. First, the bounds in parts (1) and (2) above match up to a small constant factor, hence this is best possible within the family of adaptive diffusion protocols. Next, the detection probability in (2) still vanishes as $t = \min\{t_1, t_2\} \to \infty$, but only very slowly—exponentially more slowly than in the case of one observation (see (1) and recall that $\mathbb{N}_t \approx (d-1)^{t/2}$ is exponential in $t$). We also note that the adaptive diffusion protocol in part (2) is different from the one used by Fanti et al. [9] to achieve perfect obfuscation in the case of a single observation; in fact, if this latter adaptive diffusion protocol is used to independently spread two diffusions, then the estimator $\hat{v}$ in part (1) succeeds at finding the source with constant probability. Finally, we mention that the estimator in part (1) is essentially the same as the MLE in part (2) when $t_1$ and $t_2$ are both even—see Section III for details.

Figure 2 illustrates the basic idea behind the estimator in part (1) of Theorem 1; we refer to Section III for details.

Once the adversary has three independent observations, not even weak obfuscation is possible with adaptive diffusion. In fact, the detection probability converges to one exponentially quickly in the number of observations (see (3) below), extending the results of Wang et al. [4] for the SI model to the family of adaptive diffusions.

**Theorem 2 (Three or more independent observations):** Suppose that information is spread according to an adaptive diffusion protocol on $\mathbb{T}_d$, $d \geq 3$, and that an adversary has $k \geq 3$ independent observations of infected subgraphs, $G^i_{t_i}$ for $i \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$, started from a fixed source $v^*$.

When $k = 3$, there is a computationally efficient estimator $\hat{v}$, which is agnostic to the adaptive diffusion protocol, satisfying
\[ \mathbb{P}(\hat{v} = v^*) \geq \frac{(d-1)(d-2)}{d^2}. \]

More generally, there exists a computationally efficient estimator $\hat{w} = \hat{w}(k)$, which is agnostic to the adaptive diffusion protocol, such that
\[ \mathbb{P}(\hat{w} = v^*) \geq 1 - d \times \exp \left( -\frac{(d-2)^2}{2d^2} k \right). \]

Theorem 2 follows from basic symmetry properties of adaptive diffusion; the basic idea is illustrated in Figure 3 (see Section II for further details). Comparing Figure 2 and Figure 3
provides intuition into why the dramatic shift from two snapshots to three snapshots occurs.

We also note that Theorem 2 extends, with essentially the same proof, to adaptive diffusions on any irregular tree with minimum degree 3. This is because the proof in Section II is based on basic symmetry properties; we leave the details to the reader.

C. Results: Local Spreading vs. Source Obfuscation

It is often desirable to not only spread information widely and quickly, but also to spread it locally around the source. Indeed, the local neighborhood of the source typically consists of nodes that are closely related to the source, and the information that the source is spreading is often most relevant to this local neighborhood. In particular, this is true for scenarios where source obfuscation is relevant and important, for instance, spreading information about a local protest. At the same time, local spreading is at odds with source obfuscation. Here we introduce a natural way to quantify local spreading, and characterize the tradeoff between local spreading and source obfuscation for adaptive diffusion protocols (under a single snapshot).

Formally, define for an adaptive diffusion the quantity

\[ R_t := \max\{r \geq 0 : B_r(v^*) \subseteq G_t\} \]

In words, \( R_t \) is the radius of the largest ball of infected nodes centered at the rumor source at time \( t \). Since \( R_t \) is (in general) a random quantity, we may use \( \mathbb{E}[R_t] \) as a deterministic measure of local spreading of an adaptive diffusion protocol. Observe that \( 0 \leq R_t \leq t/2 \) and hence also \( 0 \leq \mathbb{E}[R_t] \leq t/2 \).

Ideally for local spreading we would like \( \mathbb{E}[R_t] \) to grow linearly with \( t \); at the very least, local spreading requires \( \mathbb{E}[R_t] \to \infty \) as \( t \to \infty \). However, the adaptive diffusion protocol that achieves perfect source obfuscation (see the end of Section I-A) does not have local spreading: in fact, \( \mathbb{E}[R_t] \leq 1 \) for all \( t \) and, moreover, \( \sup_t R_t \) is finite almost surely.

This shows that source obfuscation guarantees have to be relaxed in order to have local spreading. It turns out that it is still possible to have reasonable source obfuscation guarantees— we refer to this as “polynomial obfuscation,” see (4) below—and local spreading at the same time. The following theorem characterizes this tradeoff for adaptive diffusion protocols (under a single snapshot). For simplicity, we focus here on even times \( t \).

\[ \mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{ML} = v^*) \leq \frac{C}{N_t^\gamma} \]  

for some \( \gamma \in (0, 1) \) and \( C < \infty \), where recall that

\[ N_t = |V_t| = \frac{d}{d-2} \left( (d-1)^{t/2} - 1 \right) + 1 \approx (d-1)^{t/2}. \]

Then

\[ \mathbb{E}[R_t] \leq (1 - \gamma) \frac{t}{2} + \frac{\log(Ct)}{\log(d-1)} + 2. \]

(2) For every \( \gamma \in (0, 1) \) there exists an adaptive diffusion protocol that satisfies (4) with \( C = 2(d-1) \) and also

\[ \mathbb{E}[R_t] \geq (1 - \gamma) \frac{t}{2} \]

for all even \( t > 2/\gamma \) (and for all even \( t \leq 2/\gamma \) we have \( \mathbb{E}[R_t] = t/2 - 1 \)).

In particular, we see from Theorem 3 that the power \( \gamma \) in polynomial obfuscation (see (4)) and the speed \( (1 - \gamma)/2 \) of local spreading are directly related. This precisely quantifies the tradeoff between local spreading and source obfuscation guarantees: the faster local spreading is—that is, the smaller \( \gamma \) is—the weaker the source obfuscation guarantee.

D. Organization

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first prove Theorem 2 in Section II, since the proof relies only on a simple symmetry property of adaptive diffusion protocols on \( T_d \) and provides good intuition for the subsequent proofs. We then prove Theorem 1 in Section III; the proof of part (1) is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 in Section II, while the proof of part (2) requires understanding the maximum likelihood estimator in the case of two observations. (Some cases in the proof of part (2) of Theorem 1 are deferred to the supplementary material.) In Section IV we turn to studying local spreading and prove Theorem 3. Finally, we conclude in Section V by discussing some implications and limitations of our results.
how they relate to other works, as well as further questions for future research.

II. ADAPTIVE DIFFUSION WITH $k \geq 3$ INDEPENDENT OBSERVATIONS

In this section we prove Theorem 2. The main idea is simple and relies on a symmetry property of adaptive diffusion protocols on $T_d$: that they send the virtual source in a uniformly random direction. First, note that if we remove the source $v^*$ from the tree $T_d$ then it breaks into $d$ subtrees. The main observation is that the virtual source of an adaptive diffusion is equally likely to be in each subtree. This symmetry property alone guarantees a constant probability of detection when there are at least three independent observations, as we now explain.

Assume for now that $t_1, \ldots, t_k$ are even; the proof is cleaner in this case, though not much changes in the general case. Recall that for an adaptive diffusion protocol the infected tree $G_t$ is a ball with center $vs_t$ when $t$ is even. Hence from the infected tree $G_t$ we may determine the virtual source $vs_t$. We may thus assume that the adversary is given $k$ independent virtual sources $vs_1, vs_2, \ldots, vs_k$ (the time stamps of the virtual sources are not relevant for what follows). The main observation is that if $vs_1, vs_2,$ and $vs_3$ are in different subtrees, then $v^*$ is the unique vertex at the intersection of the three shortest paths connecting $vs_1$ and $vs_2$, $vs_1$ and $vs_3$, and $vs_2$ and $vs_3$; see Figure 3 for an illustration.

This immediately leads to a source detection algorithm: if the three shortest paths connecting $vs_1$ and $vs_2$, $vs_1$ and $vs_3$, and $vs_2$ and $vs_3$ intersect at a single vertex, then the algorithm outputs this vertex; if not, pick a vertex from the intersection uniformly at random. Since each virtual source is equally likely to be in each subtree, there is a constant probability that $vs_1, vs_2,$ and $vs_3$ are in different subtrees and therefore the algorithm successfully detects the source.

The proof that follows makes this formal and also presents an improved algorithm when the number of observations $k$ is large, in order to show that the detection probability goes to 1 as $k \to \infty$.

Proof of Theorem 2: We start with some notational preliminaries. For distinct nodes $x, y \in T_d$, let $T_d^y$ denote the subtree of $T_d$ away from $y$ in the direction of $x$. In other words, if $y$ were removed from $T_d$ then the tree would break into a forest of $d$ trees and $T_d^y$ is the tree that contains $x$. Formally, if $n_y$ is the neighbor of $y$ that is closest to $x$, then

$$T_d^y := \{ z \in T_d : \delta(z, n_y) < \delta(z, y) \}.$$  

We first assume, for simplicity, that $t_1, \ldots, t_k$ are all even; this simplifies the proof and we explain at the end what changes if some of these times are odd. Then for every $i \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$ we have that $G_{t_i}$ is a ball (of radius $t_i/2$) with center $vs_i$, the virtual source at time $t_i$. Thus we may assume that the adversary observes $k \geq 3$ independent virtual sources $vs_1, \ldots, vs_k \in T_d$; as the time indices do not play a role in what follows, we drop them for notational convenience. We first define an estimator $\hat{v}$ using only the first three samples ($vs_1, vs_2,$ and $vs_3$) and show that it detects the source with constant probability. For $i, j \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ let $P_{ij}$ denote the set of vertices in the unique path in $T_d$ between $vs_i$ and $vs_j$. If the three paths $P_{12}, P_{13},$ and $P_{23}$ intersect in a single vertex, let $\hat{v}$ be this vertex. If the intersection of $P_{12}, P_{13},$ and $P_{23}$ contains more than one vertex, let $\hat{v}$ pick a vertex from this intersection uniformly at random.

Consider the event $A$ where the three virtual sources take different first steps away from the source. By the construction of adaptive diffusion, this is the same as the virtual sources being in different subtrees for all positive times; that is,

$$A = \{ T_{vs_1}^v \cap T_{vs_2}^v = \emptyset \} \cap \{ T_{vs_1}^v \cap T_{vs_3}^v = \emptyset \} \cap \{ T_{vs_2}^v \cap T_{vs_3}^v = \emptyset \}.$$  

On the event $A$ we have that $P_{12} \cap P_{13} \cap P_{23} = \{ v' \}$ and, hence, $\hat{v} = v'$. That is, on the event $A$, the estimator correctly detects the source of the diffusion. Since the direction of the first step of a virtual source is uniformly random among the $d$ choices and the different samples are independent, we have that $\mathbb{P}(A) = \frac{(d-1)(d-2)}{d^3}$, which concludes this part of the proof.

We now explain how more samples can be used to achieve a detection probability that converges to 1 exponentially in $k$ as $k \to \infty$. For any vertex $v \in T_d$ and $w$ a neighbor of $v$, define

$$N_w(v) := \# \{ j \in [k] : vs_j \in T_w^v \}.$$  

That is, $N_w(v)$ counts the number of virtual sources in the sub-tree of $T_d$ away from $v$ in the direction of $w$. Using these quantities we define the following estimator:

$$\hat{w} := \arg \min_{v \in T_d} \max_{w,v \in E} N_w(v),$$  

provided that this is well-defined (i.e., the minimum is attained at a single vertex); if this is not well-defined, let $\hat{w}$ be an arbitrary vertex. Let $w_1, \ldots, w_d$ denote the neighbors of $v^*$ in $T_d$ and let $Y := (N_{w_1}(v^*), \ldots, N_{w_d}(v^*))$. We now argue that if $\|Y\|_{\infty} < k/2$, then $\hat{w} = v^*$, that is, the estimator correctly detects the source of the diffusion.

First, observe that $\max_{w,w',v \in E} N_w(v') = \|Y\|_{\infty}$, which is less than $k/2$ under the assumption. Second, if $w \neq v^*$, then there must exist $w'$ a neighbor of $v$ and $i \in [d]$ such that

$$T_w^v \supseteq \bigcup_{j \in [d] \setminus \{i\}} T_w^{v_j}.$$  

This implies that

$$N_{w'}(v) \geq \sum_{j \in [d] \setminus \{i\}} N_{w_j}(v') = k - N_{w_i}(v') \geq k - \|Y\|_{\infty} > k/2,$$

where we used that $\|Y\|_{\infty} = k$, as well as the assumption that $\|Y\|_{\infty} < k/2$. Consequently, $\max_{w,w',v \in E} N_w(v) \geq N_{w'}(v) > k/2$ and, hence, $\hat{w} \neq v$. We have thus shown that $\|Y\|_{\infty} < k/2$ implies $\hat{w} = v^*$.
To conclude, we estimate from below the probability that \( \|Y\| \geq k/2 \), or rather, we estimate from above the complementary event that \( \|Y\| \leq k/2 \). First, by a union bound and symmetry we have that \( P(\|Y\| \geq k/2) \leq d \times P(\|N_{w_1}(v^*)\| \geq k/2) \). Now since \( N_{w_1}(v^*) \sim \text{Bin}(k, 1/d) \), we have by a Chernoff bound that
\[
P(\|N_{w_1}(v^*)\| \geq k/2) = P\left( N_{w_1}(v^*) - \mathbb{E}[N_{w_1}(v^*)] \right) \geq \frac{d - 2}{2} \frac{k}{d}.
\]

Finally, we return to our simplifying assumption that the observation times \( t_1, \ldots, t_k \) are all even. If \( t_i \) is odd, then there are two cases. If \( G_{t_i}^1 \) is a ball, then it is a ball with center \( vs^1_{t_i} \), so the adversary can again determine the virtual source at time \( t_i \) and everything is unchanged. If \( G_{t_i}^1 \) is not a ball, then it is symmetric about the edge connecting \( vs^1_{t_i-1} \) and \( vs^1_{t_i} \). Thus the adversary can determine the set \( \{vs^1_{t_i-1}, vs^1_{t_i}\} \). Picking either element of the set as the virtual source, the remainder of the proof goes unchanged.

At first glance, it may appear that computing the estimator \( \hat{v} \) requires solving a minimization problem over the entire infinite tree \( T_d \), but this is not the case. For every vertex \( v \) that is not on a shortest path between two virtual sources we have that \( \max_{w, v} E[N_w(v)] = k \) and therefore \( \hat{v} \) must lie on a shortest path between two virtual sources. Moreover, the distance between any two virtual sources is at most \( 2 \max_{c \in [k]} t_c \). Thus the minimization problem in (5) is over a set of size \( O(k^2 \max_{c \in[k]} t_c) \). For each node \( v \) in this set, one can efficiently compute \( \max_{w, v} E[N_w(v)] \) as follows. For every virtual source \( vs^1 \), connect \( v \) and \( vs^1 \), and let \( w \) be the neighbor of \( v \) on this path. We then have that \( \max_{w, v} E[N_w(v)] = T_{w,v} \). By doing this for every virtual source, we can compute the quantities \( \max_{w, v} E[N_w(v)] \) and hence also the quantity \( \max_{w, v} E[N_w(v)] \). In short, the estimator \( \hat{\nu} \) can be computed efficiently.

III. ADAPTIVE DIFFUSION WITH TWO INDEPENDENT OBSERVATIONS

In this section we prove Theorem 1. We start with the proof of part (1) in Section III-A, which builds on similar ideas as the proof of Theorem 2 in Section II. Then, in order to prove part (2) of Theorem 1, we need to understand the maximum likelihood estimator—this is done in Section III-B. Due to the nature of adaptive diffusion, we have to deal with even and odd times separately. To focus on the key insights and computations, we first prove Theorem 1(2) when \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \) are both even—this is in Section III-C. The cases when one or both of \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \) are odd are similar but more complicated, while not adding anything conceptually—hence we defer the proof in these cases to the supplementary material.

A. Source Detection

The proof of Theorem 1(1) builds on similar ideas as the proof of Theorem 2 in Section II. Recall the notation that we introduced in Section II, which we use here.

Proof of Theorem 1(1): Assume first that \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \) are even; this simplifies the proof and we explain at the end what changes if either time is odd. Then for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \) we have that \( G_{t_i}^1 \) is a ball of radius \( t_i/2 \) with center \( vs^1_{t_i} \). The adversary can thus determine the two virtual sources \( vs^1 \equiv vs^1_{t_1} \) and \( vs^2 \equiv vs^1_{t_2} \).

By definition we always have that \( v^* \in V^1_{t_1} \cap V^2_{t_2} \); that is, the source \( v^* \) is contained in both sets of infected nodes. Let \( P_{12} \) denote the set of vertices that are on the path in \( T_d \) between \( vs^1 \) and \( vs^2 \), excluding \( vs^1 \) and \( vs^2 \). Furthermore, define the set \( S := P_{12} \cap V^1_{t_1} \cap V^2_{t_2} \). Let \( A_{12} \) denote the event that \( vs^1 \) and \( vs^2 \) are in different subtrees away from \( v^* \); that is,
\[
A_{12} := \left\{ T_{vs^1}^* \cap T_{vs^2}^* = \emptyset \right\}.
\]

Since the two diffusions are independent and the first step of the virtual source is to a uniformly random neighbor of \( v^* \), we have that \( P(A_{12}) = (d-1)/d \). The main observation is that, on the event \( A_{12} \), we have that \( v^* \in P_{12} \); see Figure 2 for an illustration. Consequently, on the event \( A_{12} \) we also have that \( v^* \in S \).

This suggests a natural estimator: if \( S \neq \emptyset \), let \( \hat{\nu} = v^* \) be a uniformly randomly chosen node from \( S \) (note that \( S \) is a measurable function of \( G_{t_1}^1 \) and \( G_{t_2}^2 \)); if \( S = \emptyset \) (this occurs when \( \delta(vs^1, vs^2) \leq 1 \)), let \( \hat{\nu} \) be an arbitrary node. Then, given \( A_{12} \) and \( S \), the conditional probability that \( \hat{\nu} = v^* \) is \( 1/|S| \) (note that \( A_{12} \) implies that \( |S| \geq 1 \), as we argued above). We have thus shown that
\[
P(\hat{\nu} = v^*) \geq P(\hat{\nu} = v^* \mid A_{12})P(A_{12}) = E[1/|S| \mid A_{12}] d \frac{d-1}{d}.
\]

To conclude, it suffices to show that \( |S| \leq \min\{t_1/2, t_2/2\} \) whenever \( A_{12} \) holds. To see this, note that the intersection \( P_{12} \cap V^1_{t_1} \) contains at most \( t_1/2 \) nodes, since \( G_{t_1}^1 \) is a (closed) ball of radius \( t_1/2 \) centered at \( vs^1 \), the path \( P_{12} \) starts at the virtual source \( vs^1 \), and \( vs^1 \) is not included in \( P_{12} \). Thus \( |S| \leq |P_{12} \cap V^1_{t_1}| \leq t_1/2 \). Similarly, \( P_{12} \cap V^2_{t_2} \) contains at most \( t_2/2 \) nodes, and the claim follows.

Finally, we explain what changes when \( t_i \) is odd for \( i = 1 \) and/or \( i = 2 \). If \( G_{t_i}^1 \) is a ball, then its center is \( vs^1_{t_i} \), so the adversary can again determine the virtual source at time \( t_i \) and everything is unchanged. If \( G_{t_i}^1 \) is not a ball, then it is symmetric about the edge connecting \( vs^1_{t_i-1} \) and \( vs^1_{t_i} \). Thus the adversary can determine the set \( \{vs^1_{t_i-1}, vs^1_{t_i}\} \). Connecting both of these virtual sources with the other virtual source(s), we again obtain a path, where now at both ends of the path we have either one or two virtual sources. In any case, we can define \( P_{12} \) analogously, where again the known virtual sources are

4 The two virtual sources can indeed be excluded from \( P_{12} \) and we still have that \( v^* \in P_{12} \) on the event \( A_{12} \). This is because the virtual source can never be the true source, by construction. This assumes that \( t_1, t_2 \geq 1 \)—which holds, since we assume in the proof that \( t_1, t_2 \geq 2 \). In any case, if \( \min\{t_1, t_2\} < 2 \), then one of the observed snapshots contains at most two vertices, so a random guess succeeds in identifying the source with probability at least \( 1/2 \).

5 We note that the two virtual sources, \( vs^1 \) and \( vs^2 \), can be determined efficiently, and thus so can \( S \), and hence also the estimator \( \hat{\nu} \).
not considered as part of $P _ { 1 2 }$. The rest of the proof is unchanged.

B. Maximum Likelihood Source Estimation

In order to prove Theorem 1(2), we need to understand maximum likelihood source estimation. Here we discuss this for adaptive diffusions in general. Recall that an adaptive diffusion protocol is given by the probabilities $a(t, h) \in [0, 1]$, with $t \in \{2, 4, 6, \ldots \}$ and $h \in \{1, 2, 3, \ldots, t/2\}$, which determine the distribution of the path of the virtual source $\{v _ { s t} \}_{t \geq 0}$. Let $h_t := \delta(v _ { s t}, v')$ denote the graph distance between $v _ { s t}$ and $v'$, and let $p(t, h) := P(h_t = h)$ denote the distribution of $h_t$.

When determining the likelihood function $L(v) = \mathbb{P}(G_t | v = v)$ for even $t$; it is similar for odd $t$, but we leave this for later. First, we always have that $v' \in V \setminus \{v _ { s t} \}$, so $L(v) = 0$ if $v \not\in V \setminus \{v _ { s t} \}$. Next, since $G_t$ is a ball of radius $t/2$ with center $v _ { s t}$, it is fully determined by the position of the virtual source, together with the time $t$. It is important to note a key symmetry property of adaptive diffusion: all nodes at a particular distance from the virtual source are equally likely to have been the source. This is because the virtual source always moves to a uniformly randomly chosen neighbor away from the source. Thus the distribution of the virtual source is completely determined by the distribution of $h_t$. Altogether, since there are $d(d - 1)^{h-t}$ nodes at distance $h \geq 1$ from a particular vertex, we obtain that

$$L(v) = \frac{1}{d(d - 1)^h \mathbb{P}(v _ { s t} | v = v)} p(t, \delta(v, v _ { s t})) \mathbb{1}_{\{v \in V \setminus \{v _ { s t} \} \}}.$$  \hfill (7)

Now assume that we have $k$ independent observations of infected subgraphs, $G _ { i v} = (V _ { i v}, E _ { i v})$ for $i \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$, started from a fixed source $v'$. Assume also, for now, that all the times $t_1, \ldots, t_k$ are even. Then, by independence, the likelihood function is

$$L(v) = \left( \frac{d - 1}{d} \right)^k \times \prod_{i=1}^{k} p(t_i, X_i(v)) \cdot (d - 1)^{-X_i(v)} \mathbb{1}_{\{v \in V \setminus \{v _ { s t} \} \}} \{ v _ { s t} \setminus \{v _ { i 1} \} \}} \},$$

where we have introduced

$$X_i(v) := \delta(v, v _ { i 1})$$  \hfill (8)

for convenience (and recall that we can determine $v _ { s t}$ for $G _ { i v}$). By taking logarithms, we obtain that the MLE satisfies

$$\hat{v} _ { ML} \in \arg \max_{v \in \bigcap_{i=1}^{k} \{ v _ { s t} \setminus \{v _ { i 1} \} \}} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \{ \log p(t_i, X_i(v)) - X_i(v) \log (d - 1) \}.$$  \hfill (9)

We now turn to determining the likelihood function $L(v) = \mathbb{P}(G_t | v' = v)$ for odd $t$. This is similar to the case of even $t$, but there are slight differences. Specifically, there are two cases to distinguish: when $t$ is odd, the observed graph $G_t$ is either a ball or it is not (in which case it consists of two balanced rooted trees of depth $(t - 1)/2$, whose roots are connected by an edge).

The former case occurs when the virtual source does not move at time $t = 1$, that is, when $v _ { s t-1} = v _ { s t}$. In this case, we know that $G_{t-1} = G_t$, we know the likelihood of $G_{t-1}$ (which is given by (7) with $t$ replaced by $t - 1$), and in order to obtain the likelihood of $G_t$ we have to multiply this by the probability that $v _ { s t-1} = v _ { s t}$, which is $\mathbb{P}(v _ { s t} = v)$.

In the latter case, when $G_t$ is not a ball, we know that the virtual source moved at time $t - 1$. Furthermore, we can determine the set $\{v _ { s t-1}, v _ { s t} \}$, as these two vertices are connected by the central edge of $G_t$. In order to obtain the likelihood of $G_t$, we have to multiply the expression in (7) (with $t$ replaced by $t - 1$ and $\delta(v, v _ { s t})$ replaced with $\min\{\delta(v, v _ { s t-1}), \delta(v, v _ { s t})\}$) with the probability that $v _ { s t-1} \neq v _ { s t}$, which is $1 - \mathbb{P}(v _ { s t} = v)$.

Altogether, when $t$ is odd we have that the likelihood function is

$$L(v) = \frac{1}{d(d - 1)^{X(v) - 1} \mathbb{P}(v, X(v))} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{\{v \in V \setminus \{v _ { s t} \} \}} \} \{ v _ { s t} \setminus \{v _ { i 1} \} \}} \},$$

where $X(v) := \min\{\delta(v, v _ { s t}), \delta(v, v _ { s t-1})\}$ (note that this definition of $X(v)$ works for both cases; when $G_t$ is a ball then $v _ { s t-1} = v _ { s t}$ and hence $X(v) = \delta(v, v _ { s t}) = \delta(v, v _ { s t-1})$).

C. Source Obfuscation — Even Times

We are now ready to prove Theorem 1(2). We first prove this when both $t_1$ and $t_2$ are even. This is done in order to highlight the key insights and computations. The remaining cases (when one or both of $t_1$ and $t_2$ are odd) are similar but more complicated and hence are deferred to the supplementary material.
Proof of Theorem 1(2) when \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \) are both even: We may assume in the following that \( t_1, t_2 \geq 4 \), since when \( \min\{t_1, t_2\} = 2 \) then the right hand side of (2) is greater than 1 and thus the statement is vacuously true.

Consider the adaptive diffusion protocol—which we term the uniform protocol \( \mathcal{U} \) for reasons to become clear—given by the probabilities

\[
\alpha_d(t, h) := \frac{t - 2h + 2}{t + 2}
\]

for \( t \in \{2, 4, 6, \ldots\} \) and \( h \in \{1, 2, \ldots, t/2\} \). This is the same protocol introduced by Fanti et al. [9] to achieve perfect obfuscation from a single snapshot on \( Z \)—the difference is that here we use this protocol regardless of the degree \( d \). The important property of this protocol is that the distance \( b_i := d(v_{si}, v^*) \) between the virtual source \( v_{si} \) and the true source \( v^* \) is uniformly distributed over the set of possible values \( \{1, 2, \ldots, t/2\} \), for all even \( t \). That is, for all even \( t \) we have that

\[
p_d(t, h) = \frac{2}{t} \cdot 1_{\{h \in \{1, 2, \ldots, t/2\}\}}.
\]

This can be shown by induction; we leave the details to the reader.

We now turn to analyzing the maximum likelihood estimator of the source, \( \hat{v}_{\text{ML}} \), given two independent snapshots \( G^1_{\text{ML}} \) and \( G^2_{\text{ML}} \). Recall that we assume now that \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \) are both even. The adversary can thus determine the two virtual sources \( v_{s1} \equiv v_{s1}^1 \) and \( v_{s2} \equiv v_{s2}^2 \). By plugging in (12) into (9), we obtain that the MLE satisfies

\[
\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} \in \arg\min_{(v_{s1}^1, v_{s2}^2) \in \{v_{s1}^1, v_{s2}^2\}} (X_1(v) + X_2(v)),
\]

where recall from (8) that \( X_i(v) = \delta(v, v_{s1}^i) \) for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \). In words, the maximum likelihood estimator minimizes the sum of the distances to the two virtual sources, over all nodes that were infected in both diffusions, excluding the two virtual sources.

To understand the MLE better we distinguish three cases, the last one being the most important:

1. If \( v_{s1} = v_{s2} \), then \( \hat{v}_{\text{ML}} \) chooses a neighbor of \( v_{s1} = v_{s2} \) uniformly at random.
2. If \( \delta(v_{s1}, v_{s2}) = 1 \), then \( \hat{v}_{\text{ML}} \) chooses a neighbor of the set \( \{v_{s1}, v_{s2}\} \) uniformly at random.\(^6\)
3. If \( \delta(v_{s1}, v_{s2}) \geq 2 \), then \( X_1(v) + X_2(v) \) is minimized when \( v \) is on the shortest path between \( v_{s1} \) and \( v_{s2} \). Let \( P_{12} \) denote the set of vertices that are on the shortest path between \( v_{s1} \) and \( v_{s2} \), excluding \( v_{s1} \) and \( v_{s2} \). Furthermore, define the set \( S := P_{12} \cap V_{t_1}^1 \cap V_{t_2}^2 \) and note that when \( \delta(v_{s1}, v_{s2}) \geq 2 \), then \( S \) is nonempty, because the vertex in \( P_{12} \) that is closest to \( v^* \) is always in \( S \). We have thus argued that the likelihood function is maximized at the nodes in \( S \) and thus the maximum likelihood estimator \( \hat{v}_{\text{ML}} \) chooses a node from \( S \) uniformly at random.

\(^6\) Here we use that \( t_1 t_2 \geq 4 \), to ensure that all neighbors of the set \( \{v_{s1}, v_{s2}\} \) are in \( V_{t_1}^1 \cap V_{t_2}^2 \). Note that \( \hat{v}_{\text{ML}} \) is (essentially) the same as the estimator \( \hat{v} \) introduced in the proof of part (1) of Theorem 1.

Let \( A_{12} \) denote the event that \( v_{s1} \) and \( v_{s2} \) are in different subtrees away from \( v^* \) (see (6)), and note that \( \mathbb{P}(A_{12}) = (d - 1)/d \). Observe that if the event \( A_{12} \) holds, then necessarily \( d(v_{s1}, v_{s2}) \geq 2 \), and hence the first two cases above imply that \( A_{12} \) does not hold. To compute the probability that the MLE \( \hat{v}_{\text{ML}} \) is correct, we may condition on whether or not \( A_{12} \) holds:

\[
\mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^*) = \mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^* | A_{12}) \mathbb{P}(A_{12}) + \mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^* | A_{12}^C) \mathbb{P}(A_{12}^C).
\]

Let us now turn to computing \( \mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^* | A_{12}) \). There are two cases when the MLE can be correct, given that \( A_{12} \) does not hold. First, corresponding to Case (1) above: if \( v_{s1} = v_{s2} \) and \( \delta(v^*, v_{s1}) = \delta(v^*, v_{s2}) = 1 \), then the MLE is correct with probability \( 1/d \). Second, corresponding to Case (2) above: if \( \delta(v^*, v_{s1}) = \delta(v^*, v_{s2}) = 1 \) or if \( \delta(v^*, v^*_1) = \delta(v_{s1}, v_{s2}) = 1 \), then the MLE is correct with probability \( 1/(2d - 2) \). If \( d(v_{s1}, v_{s2}) \geq 2 \) and \( A_{12} \) does not hold, then \( \hat{v}_{\text{ML}} \neq v^* \). Putting these together and using (12) we obtain that

\[
\mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^* | A_{12}) = \frac{2}{t_1} \cdot \frac{2}{t_2} \cdot \frac{1}{d} + 2 \cdot \frac{2}{t_1} \cdot \frac{2}{t_2} \cdot \frac{1}{2d - 2}
\]

\[
= \frac{4}{t_1 t_2} \left( \frac{1}{d} + \frac{1}{d - 1} \right).
\]

We now turn to computing \( \mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^* | A_{12}) \). Given \( A_{12} \) and \( S \), the conditional probability that \( \hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^* \) is \( 1/|S| \). We thus have that

\[
\mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^* | A_{12}) = \mathbb{E}[1/|S| | A_{12}]\).
\]

On the event \( A_{12} \), we can express \( |S| \) as a function of \( X_1(v^*) \) and \( X_2(v^*) \) as follows. First, the set \( S \) always contains \( v^* \) when \( A_{12} \) holds. Next, there are \( X_1(v^*) - 1 \) nodes on the path \( P_{12} \) between \( v^* \) and \( v_{s1} \). However, only the \( t_2/2 - X_2(v^*) \) nodes of these that are closest to \( v^* \) are in \( V_{t_2}^2 \) as well. Similarly, there are \( X_2(v^*) - 1 \) nodes on the path \( P_{12} \) between \( v^* \) and \( v_{s2} \), but only the \( t_1/2 - X_1(v^*) \) nodes of these that are closest to \( v^* \) are in \( V_{t_1}^1 \) as well. Altogether, on the event \( A_{12} \) we have that

\[
|S| = 1 + \min\{X_1(v^*) - 1, t_2/2 - X_2(v^*)\} + \min\{X_2(v^*) - 1, t_1/2 - X_1(v^*)\}.
\]

Recall from (12) that \( X_1(v^*) \) is uniformly distributed on \( \{1, 2, \ldots, t_2/2\} \), for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \). Moreover, \( X_1(v^*) \) and \( X_2(v^*) \) are independent. Both of these statements hold conditioned on \( A_{12} \). Therefore, plugging in (16) into (15) and writing out the expectation we obtain that
\[ \mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^* \mid A_{12}) = \frac{1}{st} \sum_{j=1}^{s} \sum_{t=1}^{t} \frac{1}{1 + \min\{j - 1, t - \ell\} + \min\{\ell - 1, s - j\}}. \]

where we have introduced \( s := \min\{t_1, t_2\}/2 \) and \( t := \max\{t_1, t_2\}/2 \) in order to abbreviate notation. With this notation, we can write \(|S|\) from (16) more succinctly by breaking things into three cases, as follows:

- If \( X_1(v^*) + X_2(v^*) \leq s + 1 \), then \(|S| = X_1(v^*) + X_2(v^*) - 1\).
- If \( s + 1 < X_1(v^*) + X_2(v^*) \leq t + 1 \), then \(|S| = s\).
- If \( t + 1 < X_1(v^*) + X_2(v^*) \), then \(|S| = 1 + s + t - (X_1(v^*) + X_2(v^*))\).

Accordingly, we can break the sum in (17) into three parts. Let \( I := \{(j, \ell) : 1 \leq j \leq s, 1 \leq \ell \leq t\} \) denote the index set over which we take the sum in (17). We can write it as the disjoint union \( I = I_1 \cup I_2 \cup I_3 \), where \( I_1 := \{(j, \ell) \in I : j + \ell \leq s + 1\}, \) \( I_2 := \{(j, \ell) \in I : s + 1 < j + \ell \leq t + 1\}, \) and \( I_3 := \{(j, \ell) \in I : t + 1 < j + \ell\} \). We now consider the index sets \( I_1, I_2, \) and \( I_3 \) separately.

First, suppose that \( m \in \{2, 3, \ldots, s + 1\} \). There are \( s - 1 \) pairs of indices \((j, \ell) \in I_1\) such that \( j + \ell = m \). For each such index pair, the fraction in (17) is equal to \( 1/(m - 1) \). Since there are \( s \) different values of \( m \), the sum over the index set \( I_1 \) is equal to \( s \).

Next, observe that \(|I_2| = s(t - s)\). For every \((j, \ell) \in I_2\), the fraction in (17) is \( 1/s \). Therefore the sum over the index set \( I_2 \) is equal to \( s(t - s)/s = t - s \).

Finally, suppose that \( m \in \{t + 2, \ldots, t + s\} \). There are \( s + t - m \) pairs of indices \((j, \ell) \in I_3\) such that \( j + \ell = m \). For each such index pair, the fraction in (17) is equal to \( 1/(1 + s + t - m) \). Since there are \( s - 1 \) different values of \( m \), the sum over the index set \( I_3 \) is equal to \( s - 1 \).

Putting together the previous three paragraphs, we thus have that

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{s} \sum_{t=1}^{t} \frac{1}{1 + \min\{j - 1, t - \ell\} + \min\{\ell - 1, s - j\}} = s + t - 1.
\]

Plugging this back into (17), and returning to the notation of \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \), we obtain that

\[
\mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^* \mid A_{12}) = \frac{s + t - 1}{st} = \frac{2t_1 + 2t_2 - 4}{t_1 t_2}. \tag{18}
\]

Putting together (13), (14), and (18), we have obtained that

\[
\mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^*) = \frac{d - 1}{d} \cdot \frac{2t_1 + 2t_2 - 4}{t_1 t_2} + \frac{1}{d} \cdot \frac{4}{t_1 t_2} \left( \frac{1}{d} + \frac{1}{d - 1} \right) \leq \frac{d - 1}{d} \cdot \frac{2t_1 + 2t_2}{t_1 t_2},
\]

where we used that \( 1/d + 1/(d - 1) < 1 \). Using that \( 2t_1 + 2t_2 \leq 4 \max\{t_1, t_2\} \), we obtain the bound in (2), when \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \) are both even.

IV. LOCAL SPREADING VS. SOURCE OBFUSCATION

In this section we prove Theorem 3. Recall the notation we introduced in previous sections, which we use here as well. In particular, \( h_t := \delta(v_{st}, v^*) \) denotes the graph distance between \( v_{st} \) and \( v^* \), and \( p(t, h) := \mathbb{P}(h_t = h) \). We will also use the elementary inequalities

\[
(d - 1)^{t/2} \leq N_t \leq \frac{d}{d - 2} (d - 1)^{t/2}. \tag{19}
\]

Proof of Theorem 3: Our starting observation is that, due to the definition of adaptive diffusion protocols, we have that

\[
R_t = \frac{t}{2} - h_t. \tag{20}
\]

Thus in order to understand \( R_t \), it is equivalent to understand \( h_t \).

We first turn to part (a) of the theorem. We described the likelihood function in Section III-B, see (7) in particular, from which it follows that

\[
\mathbb{P}(\hat{v}_{\text{ML}} = v^*) = \max_{1 \leq h \leq \lfloor t/2 \rfloor} \frac{p(t, h)}{(d - 1)^{h - 1}}. \tag{21}
\]

The assumption (4) thus implies that

\[
p(t, h) \leq \frac{Cd(d - 1)^{h - 1}}{N_t^{h - 1}} \leq Cd(d - 1)^{h - \gamma t/2 - 1} \tag{22}
\]

for all \( 1 \leq h \leq t/2 \), where in the second inequality we used (19). Now define

\[
m_t := \frac{\gamma t}{2} - \frac{\log(Ct)}{\log(d - 1)} - 1.
\]

We then have that

\[
\mathbb{P}(h_t \leq m_t) \leq \sum_{h=1}^{m_t} \frac{Cd(d - 1)^{h - \gamma t/2 - 1}}{d - 2} \leq \frac{Cd(d - 1)^{m_t - \gamma t/2 - 1}}{d - 1} \cdot \frac{1}{t} \leq \frac{2}{7}.
\]

In particular, we thus have that \( \mathbb{P}(h_t > m_t) \geq 1 - 2/t \). Therefore

\[
\mathbb{E}[h_t] \geq m_t \mathbb{P}(h_t > m_t) \geq m_t \left( 1 - \frac{2}{t} \right).
\]
Now using (20) we have that
\[ \mathbb{E}[R_t] = \frac{t}{2} - \mathbb{E}[h_t] \leq (1 - \gamma) \frac{t}{2} + \frac{\log(C_t)}{\log(d - 1)} + 1 + \gamma, \]
which concludes the proof of part (a) of the theorem.

We now turn to part (b) of the theorem. Consider the adaptive diffusion protocol defined as follows:
- For \( t \leq 2/\gamma \), let \( \alpha(t, h) = 1 \) for all \( 1 \leq h \leq t/2 \).
- For \( t > 2/\gamma \), let \( \alpha(t, h) = 1 \) if \( \lceil yt/2 \rceil = \lceil yt/2 + 1 \rceil \)
  and \( \alpha(t, h) = 0 \) otherwise.

This construction guarantees that for all even \( t \) we have that \( h_t = 1 \) if \( t \leq 2/\gamma \), while for even \( t > 2/\gamma \) we have that
\[ h_t = \lceil yt/2 \rceil \]
deterministically. Thus by (20) we have, for all even \( t \) satisfying \( t > 2/\gamma \), that
\[ R_t = t/2 - h_t = t/2 - \lceil yt/2 \rceil \leq (1 - \gamma)t/2. \]

On the other hand, by (21) we have, for all even \( t \) satisfying \( t > 2/\gamma \), that
\[ \mathbb{P}(\tilde{v}_{ML} = v^*) = \frac{1}{d(d - 1)^{(d/2) - 1}} \leq \frac{1}{d(d - 1)^{d/2 - 1}}. \]

From (19) it follows that \((d - 1)^{-t/2} \leq (d/(d - 2))/N_t\) and so
\[ \mathbb{P}(\tilde{v}_{ML} = v^*) \leq \frac{(d - 1)^{t/2 - 1}}{d} \frac{1}{d/(d - 2)} \frac{1}{N_t} \leq \frac{2(d - 1)}{N_t}, \]
where in the second inequality we used that \( \gamma \leq 1 \) and in the third inequality we used that \( d \geq 3 \).

V. DISCUSSION

The main message of this work is that while adaptive diffusion protocols can help hide the source from a snapshot adversary, they are ineffective when the adversary has access to multiple independent snapshots. The main question raised by our work is whether there exist other diffusion protocols that can obfuscate the source against such an adversary.

We make several simplifying assumptions in this work, which are important to discuss and study further. First, we assume throughout that the underlying graph is the infinite \( d \)-regular tree \( T_d \) (with \( d \geq 3 \)), which is not a realistic model of real-world (social) networks. It is therefore important to study the questions we consider here on other underlying graphs, for instance, on more realistic models as well as on real-world social networks. We conjecture that our qualitative conclusions will carry over to more realistic settings, which motivates studying such a simplified setting.

We also assume that the adversary observes multiple independent snapshots. Previous work has considered multiple sequential snapshots (in time): Wang et al. [4] show that additional sequential snapshots cannot improve detectability under the SI model, while Fanti et al. [11] show that they can improve the detection probability at most logarithmically for adaptive diffusions. On the other hand, Cai et al. [12] show that multiple sequential snapshots can help detection when the spreading rates are heterogeneous, both theoretically and on Twitter data. As mentioned before, Wang et al. [4] show that multiple independent snapshots help significantly with detection under the SI model, and our results extend this to the family of adaptive diffusions. An interesting question is what happens in between, when the adversary observes multiple correlated snapshots (that are not necessarily sequential observations of the same diffusion). In particular, can spreading protocols take advantage of correlation in order to obfuscate the source against an adversary who observes multiple snapshots?

This question is related to local spreading as follows. An adversary who observes multiple snapshots can always use the following simple source estimator: pick a node uniformly at random among those which are infected in each snapshot. The probability of success of this estimator is the inverse of the size of the set of nodes which are infected in each snapshot. To minimize this, a spreading protocol should aim to maximize the size of this set. This can be done by having highly correlated snapshots, or by having a large amount of local spreading (which we have discussed in Sections I-C and IV). In any case, we conjecture that if there is a reasonable amount of independence among the observed snapshots, then the results will be qualitatively similar to those which we have obtained.

There are also many natural variations on what information the adversary has access to. For instance, Fanti et al. [11, 13] consider a spy-based model, where a fraction of nodes are corrupted and continuously monitor metadata such as message timestamps; they also consider a mixed model using both spies and a snapshot. Other information models include having a snapshot and additional relative information about the infection times of a fraction of node pairs [14], having partial infection timestamps [15], and having a noisy time series of observations [16, 17]. Understanding how our results change under these different information models of adversaries is a natural question for future work.

Further avenues to explore related to our work include game-theoretic formulations [18], optimal sensor/spy placement [19], confidence sets for the source [20], and multiple rumor sources [21]. We refer the reader to the position paper by Fanti and Viswanath [22] for further discussion of anonymous communication over networks.

We also note the importance of validating the main message of this work via real-world data sets. While obtaining data from anonymous messaging apps (such as Whisper [5], Blind [6], Yik Yak [7], or Secret [8]) is likely not feasible, an alternative option is to take a graph from an online social network (such as Facebook) as the underlying graph and to run simulations of adaptive diffusions and detection algorithms. We leave this for future work.

In conclusion, most results in this space—including ours in this work—are positive in terms of rumor source detection, and thus highlight major difficulties with guaranteeing anonymity for the source of a message in a social network. As
surveillance techniques grow ever more prominent in society, this emphasizes the need for further research, with the hope of ultimately providing robust anonymity guarantees.

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