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The Security Dimension and the Formation of Social Exclusion in the Border of Belu Regency, Indonesia

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ABSTRACT
Security is a key dimension of any Indonesian borderland development program. Apart from security, the Indonesian military must attend to sociopolitical requirements. The area of Belu Regency borderland is a case in point where many East Timorese refugees or “new citizens” have been settled. Sociopolitical tasks of the military are to assist the local government in overcoming any problems of the refugees. This article demonstrates a connection between the security dimension and social exclusion in the border area of Belu. The question of this study is how the security issue is related to social exclusion and how it takes place. The qualitative method is deployed to collect data, through in-depth interview with government and military institution informants, as well as at community levels, together with secondary data. The result of the study shows that the local government has used the Indonesian military to limit the movement and choices of these refugees, and to intimidate them. Therefore, the role of the institution contributes to initial stages of social exclusion, such as limiting the movement of the new citizens and the locals in terms of land and housing access, through intimidation, and limiting any signs of political aspirations.

KEYWORDS
border, security, military-institution, resettlement, refugees, social exclusion

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**Introduction**

The Security dimension is an important priority because Indonesia has several direct borders, albeit with a few neighboring countries. According to the Grand Design of Indonesia Borderland Development 2011–2025, the security dimension is a vital in order to maintain security for state and community as stated in the Badan Nasional Pengelolaan Perbatasan Indonesia or the National Authority for Borderland Management (BNPP Report, 2011).

One of the Indonesian borderlands is located in the Belu Regency, West Timor, which has a length of 149.1 km of direct borderland with East Timor, which gained independence in a 1999 referendum. As a result of the referendum, there were waves of refugees crossing over the border into Indonesia, settling nearby in the five sub-districts of the Belu Regency. It was estimated that the number of refugees was more than 27,120 family heads or 135,689 people in 1999, spreading around 200 refugee camps in Belu (Achmad, 2000). However, it went down to around 16,000 family heads or 80,000 to 100,000 people by 2016 in the Belu Regency (Dokumen Internal Forum Korban Politik Timor-Timur, 2016). Social conflict flared up in the borderland during the following years.

In order to tackle the issue of refugees, the central government of Indonesia approved Presidential Decree Number 03 2001, the establishment of the National Institution for Disaster and Refugee Coordination or the BAKORNAS PBB at the national level. There is a lower level of hierarchies until the regency level. In case of Belu, the military has been appointed as the voice of the refugees’ disaster management board, under the regent of Belu.

Generally, the problems faced by refugees in the border areas have been researched by several scholars, especially the issue of aid distribution and access to economic resources. The Working Paper of the International Refugee Rights Initiative (Who Belongs Where, 2010) have stressed that status and political rights have affected the refugees’ land access. Furthermore, Horstmann (2011) has analyzed humanitarian aid distribution in the same border area which has been manipulated by certain organizations there. Besides that, Moretti (2015) has conducted research on Burmese refugees on Thai-Myanmar border, stressing the need of refugees’ status as migrant workers in the host state because of their unsafe homeland.

The military tasks for security reasons in border areas are quite common, and this has worked when there is consultation with the community on certain goals. Datta (2018) argues that the importance of Indian military in protecting the Indian state’s interests in border area with the Bangladeshi border. Research on the issue of military roles in border areas has also also been made by Beehner (2018) on Myanmar’s border.

The result of the study has shown that the institution has applied its force to carry out an aggressive approach in maintaining the state’s consolidation of its boundaries as well gaining certain interests. It has been said that Myanmar’s civil-military relations has deteriorated, creating crises for the authority. Meanwhile, Frowd and Sandor (2018) write that the use of the military institution for various security, social, and political reasons can be found in border areas of the Sahel region in Africa.
According to Mann (quoted in Mabee & Vucetic, 2018) armed civilian groups are established in pursuit of the social and political goals of certain powerful actors. Therefore, the military approach has needed, to some extent, to secure Belu Regency. Besides that, the security institutions’ involvement with communities in multidimensional aspects of development, to a degree, may create social exclusion problems, where Hall et al. (2013) calls it as the power of forces. Hall et al. (2013) have found the common patterns that one of the causes of land exclusion, particularly land eviction, in the most of Southeast Asia countries, is the use of security institutions to achieve or maintain the interests of governments or other powerful actors.

In the context of Belu Regency, the involvement of security institutions has been found to act as the safeguard and sociopolitical contributor, particularly in the phases of refugee disaster management since 1999. It is believed that the only institution which could deal with the chaotic situation at the time was the military, because of civilian armed groups’ movements resorting to violence and creating tensions in many places in Belu.

Besides that, there have been several studies conducted at the community level which have mainly focused on the implications of the resettlement programs for East Timorese refugees. It is strongly believed the programs have not been implemented properly. On the contrary, a program has come to be the embryo of the initial forms of social exclusion of the both refugee and local communities. It can be seen through the development of sporadic resettlement which has caused conflict over land between the two communities (Messakh, 2003; Rame, 2004; Sianipar, 2016).

Moreover, recent studies on the issue of land access of the refugee community have been meticulously analyzed by Alkatiri (2018b), who argues that land exclusion experienced by the refugee’s community has been caused by the local cultural institution, or called the *Lembaga Adat*. The local institution has control of a vast area of productive land in Belu Regency, so to some extent, the refugees have been considered as “outsiders”. They have been banned from owning the communal land that they have been living on for many years. As a result, they cannot use the land freely for agriculture, making them powerless. In other literature, Alkatiri (2018a) also points out that there has been a conflict of interests among certain figures of the refugee community, who mobilize other refugees to speak up for particular local candidates in the local elections, using social and economically poor conditions as means to gain essential resources for private interests, such as land and housing access. This practice has trapped the majority of the refugees in the land exclusion chain of poverty. Another recent study based on the Indonesian views on the border security of Belu, has indicated that the border of Belu is considered as the hardest border because of East Timor’s internal situation, the border’s illegal economic activity, and East Timorese refugees who are settled in Belu Regency, so the role of the military institution is seen as crucial (Ulfa et al., 2018).

The use of the military institution by the Indonesian government in the disaster management phases in Belu has sometimes raised conflict between the institution
and the refugees. As a result, to some extent, it has created initial formations of social exclusion within both the refugees’ community and the local people. Although there have been a few studies showing that there has been a connection between social exclusion issues caused by violent actions and improperly policy responses, there is still insufficient literature analyzing the connection between the roles of the security institution in creating certain forms of social exclusion within the refugee community, particularly in the border and rural areas. Rodgers (1995) and Commins (2004) have argued that the issue of social exclusion has still rarely been studied in the context of rural areas. The social exclusion and security border issues have been seen separately and rarely analyzed as an integrated issue in much of the existing literature.

This article highlights the advent of social exclusion of East Timorese refugees caused by the security approach paradigm in the border area of Belu Regency. Therefore, in order to analyze the connections, this article is broken down into two main analyses. First, the influence of the military institution post reformation era and its implication on the issue of security paradigm approach in the border area of Belu during 1999 to 2007. Second, it analyzes the effects of the roles of the military institution in the phases of East Timorese refugees’ disaster management and its contribution to the formation of social exclusion for the refugees.

Research Method

This qualitative field research has been conducted from October 2016 to February 2017 in two refugee camps and three resettlements in Belu regency, West Timor. The selection of the locations is based on social exclusion experienced by the refugees and their frequent interactions with the military institution in the several locations of resettlement in Kabuna village, Fatuba’a village, Haliwen village, and Manleten village.

The data has been collected from 20 interviewees through in-depth-interviews and group discussions, consisting of refugees, local officials, the military institution, and local people. The interviews have based on structured and semi-structured questionaries, depending on whom the interview taken place. However, most of the refugees have been passive at the beginning of the interviews’ session because of two reasons, the traumatic background and military-civilian relation issues. Therefore, the roles of a guider or the former refugee coordinator have been necessary not only to guide researcher entering into refugee’s resettlements or camps, but also to make contact with the former armed civilian group leaders. The semi-structured interviews or open discussions have taken place in order to obtain as much as information. Moreover, provocative questions have been in the list in order to keep maintaining the interviews going on because of distrust toward outsiders.

In addition, secondary data has been used as a complementary source, specifically related to the issues of border security, particularly several documents from organization, government, military institutions, in order to obtain a global understanding of the border conditions.
Theoretical Perspectives

Border and security are two integrated issues at the present time. Border has become one of the most important parts of a state, and it is said that the border of a state is seen as a political process (Paasi, 1996). Ulfa et al. (2018) declare that a border needs to be properly managed. This is crucial. Moreover, Prokkola (2009) and Veronis (2013) argue that border is a place where national identity and citizenship are established. This relates to state governability. According to Newman and Paasi (1998), a border is established for important purposes, preventing a state from external and internal threats. Buchanan (cited in Ullah and Kumpoh, 2018) considers that the threats may impact on human life and political authority. Buzan et al. (cited in Hama, 2017) have classified border's threats into three categories: migration, horizontal competition, and vertical competition, which have placed border security as the most important issue for some states.

In the context of migration, Buzan et al. (quoted in Hama, 2017) have declared that society experiences potentials threats when outside migrants enter into a state, changing the composition of the population. The same view expressed by Claudia Aradau (quoted in Hama, 2017) who believes that migrants may produce threats which the refugee community fears. Hadiwinata (2009) and Mietzner (edited in Aspinall & Fealy, 2003) have stated that if conditions have dramatically shifted chaos and become threats to national interests, then the military institution has to be involved for any level of government to play again a significant role to establish stability. Despite looking at refugees as potential threats to national security, Kerwin (2016) and Hama (2017) underline that the rights of refugees have to be fulfilled by the host states.

Border security also becomes a more important aspect, as Kurki and Newman note (quoted in Ullah & Kumpoh, 2018) as the world's agenda discourses take place after 11 September 2001 attack. In other words, the border security has become a multidisciplinary research in its themes and policies (Prokkola, 2009; Stavrianakis & Stern, 2018), because it has not only related to the spatial fixity, but has been expanding dynamically by involving multidisciplinary debates in contemporary research (Cimadomo, 2017; Kolossov & Scott, 2013).

To do its duty, a state has to take responsibility for managing and securing its border. Brunet-Jailly and Dupeyron (2007, p. 4) have stated that managing the internal security is one of the most significant policies for any government. Therefore, Lindstedt (cited in Bruun, 2016) views that the participation of the military institution as a state's representation is needed in a proper manner to increase its controls and interests. Meanwhile, Siregar (2014) also states that border security is a crucial sector not only for protecting citizens who live around the areas. Sabarno also (cited in Rani, 2012) calls it is a part of a nation state building conception. He has pointed out that border security has become a strategic issue for any country which has direct borders with other states.

There have been many studies showing the unsuccessful outcomes of the institution in fulfilling its works. It may because of an isolated area where wars
take place (Martinez, 1994), or it is related to the border’s activities that tend to be complicated due to the multidimensional issues (Deliarnoor & Abidin, 2018, p. 25; Laine, 2015, p. 14).

The emphasis on Indonesian border security is needed to assist the government in tackling multidimensional issues. According to some Indonesian scholars, the underdeveloped border areas have occurred because of inward looking or backyard policy approaches from the central government (Arifin, 2013; Purnamasari et al., 2016; Subagiyo et al., 2017) as part of the old paradigm of border development approach. Sasongko (cited in Agung, 2013) declared that, in the old paradigm approaches, the border area had been managed through a militaristic approach.

However, in order to manage it properly, the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono regime established the national board for border management institution or the BNPP (Badan Nasional Pengelolaan Perbatasan or the National Border Management Board) in 2010, marking the new phase of the implementation of the new paradigm of border development management. There are several functions of the board, including determining development policies of the border territory and coordinating all related sectors to work based on the Grand Design of the Border Management (Batubara, 2017). However, the function of the board is limited and still needs to be improved further.

In the context of the border area of Belu, Wuryandari (2010) has agreed that the issue of border development of Belu can be analyzed by looking at R.J. May’s perspectives of border development. The perspectives are related to territorial, position, function, and resources. The territorial and the position perspectives have related to the agreed borderline between Indonesia and East Timor. Meanwhile, the function and the resource views are related to the function of the border as the territorial borderline and a place of struggle for resource access on the behalf of the interests of certain actors. Wuryandari (2010) believes that the four types of May’s perspectives can be used to understand the condition of the Indonesia–East Timor borders. However, the four perspectives have not actually been utilized in the analysis of the study because it did not discuss the connection of the security aspect with social exclusion.

Since the separation of East Timor from Indonesian territory in 1999, relationships on Belu’s border have been extremely tense. Records show that several physical and militaristic border incidents have led to serious discussions taking place. The military institution has been active in order to secure the border. According to O.J. Martinez (1994), this type of the border is categorized as alienated borderland where conflict still erupts. As a consequence, the military presence has taken place on the border, reflecting the challenges faced by these conflicts (Ulfa et al., 2018). It is well-known that the border of Belu Regency is considered as one of the most complex and underdeveloped borders in Indonesia. It has lacked human and natural resources (Mulyawan, 2013), as well as proper policies and development concepts (Efendi, Kurniati & Semium, 2013; Hariyadi, 2008).

However, one of the major issues for the local government of Belu is East Timorese refugees’ influx since 1999. It is because of the unpreparedness of the
government to receive them. The local government has difficulties in organizing and managing the refugees’ needs because of insufficient resources, particularly during 1999 to 2007. This study has found that the complexity of the refugees’ issues in Belu have often made them subject to violent actions, either to defend themselves in difficult times from violence or to search for some resources for better living conditions. In fact, Riley (2007) has argued that many developing countries are not prepared to host refugee communities because of the fear of political and economic instability.

Besides facing the security issues, the border area of Belu has faced several forms of social exclusion. Silver (1994) has highlighted the importance of citizenship through social integration within a society, and as an important aspect to measure social exclusion, particularly the issue of citizens’ rights. In order to shape social integration, it is important to meet basic necessities, such as resources. Figueroa (1999) has underlined the importance of three types of asset, which are economic assets as sources of productive resources, political assets as related to rights of people, and then cultural assets referred to the social system.

By having those assets in place, to some extent, they can strengthen social integration as referred to in Hillary Silver’s solidarity paradigm (De Haan, 2000). Therefore, the rights and duties of citizens can be fulfilled, including accesses of basic needs for a refugee community such as land and housing have remained the most important issues for the community.

In order to fulfill citizens access to basic needs, it is important to guarantee the political process of participations of citizens. Hera (2016) states that the Silver’s solidarity paradigm has focused on one of the important themes of the paradigm, which is political rights and duties of the citizens through political participation. The United Nations 2016 report (United Nations, 2016) has stated clearly that the state as a political institution has to guarantee and promote the political participation of its citizens, including inclusive land ownership schemes. If the political participation and the rights are not fulfilled, then a person or a group will face social exclusion (Figueroa, 1999).

The study of land’s social exclusion has been conducted by Hall et al. (2013). In their studies, the issue of land exclusion has occurred because of four aspects of power, which are regulation, force, market, and legitimation. In the context of force, the use of the security institutions for the sake of certain actors is part of the power of force. According to Hall et al., the problem of land exclusion is the imbalance of the power relations between powerful actors and vulnerable groups, where the military institution is used to defend or achieve certain interests. The interest may be formally recognized through force of formal and informal regulations, and the state and other actors as the user of power of force may appoint the security institutions to achieve the government’s policies or certain interests.

The connection of the security and social exclusion issues are located in the roles of the security institutions, particularly the military, as the actor in the border which represents the state. In acting as the safeguard of the state, the institution may potentially create social exclusion, particularly in dealing with the refugee’s community who insists on their rights to land and better housing access Belu. Muddiman (1999)
has collected various studies on social exclusion, highlighting crime as a contributing aspect of social exclusion.

The condition of the majority of refugees in Belu who have limited access of land as an economic asset and housing standard, may lead to discomfort, crime, and conflict (Rodgers, 1995; Unruh & Williams, 2013). Therefore, any potential conflict and crime in the border area has to be overcome by the military institution approach that also may create other forms of social exclusion.

**Findings and Discussions**

**The Indonesian Military and Security Dimension of the Border of Belu Regency**

The performance of the military institution is considered important in Indonesia. Historically, it is the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or the Indonesian National Defence Force) which was previously known as the ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or the Armed Force of Republic of Indonesia), has been the key player of revolution from 1945 to 1949 against the Dutch and the Japanese (Crouch, 2007) and becoming national development actor since the Sukarno regime (Carnegie, 2010). O’Rourke (2002) and Beittinger-Lee (2009) explain that the institution had become the most powerful political institution in 1968, and the army had full control by 1970 under the regime of Suharto.

The institution has a strong tie in influencing Indonesian history and development through the *dwifungsi* or “dual functions” as adopted since 1960s as the central doctrine of the institution (Honna, 2003; Meitzner, 2006; O’Rourke, 2002; Widjajanto, 2007). The doctrine has been the basis for the institution to involve itself in the national security, extending into sociopolitical affairs to promote national development and stability, besides having full control of the economic sector through formal and informal business (Crouch, 2007; Dreisbach, 2015).

However, the dual functions’ doctrine has been replaced by the new paradigm, or called reformation, post the fall of Suharto’s regime in 1998 (Honna, 2003). It has led, to some extent, to dramatic change in Indonesia security sector (Mietzner, 2006, p. 1), changing its structural function based on the 2002 Law of State Defence and the 2004 Law of the TNI (Widjajanto, 2007), to be a professional defense force and establish better civilian-military relations (Honna, 2003; Widjajanto, 2007). In other words, the military institution has been reformatted post the fall of Suharto regime, insisting that it is to be professional and accountable. As a result, it is expected that the institution will have better relations with civilians.

The Indonesian border has been underdeveloped for many years. It is well-known that the border of Belu regency is considered as one of the complex and underdeveloped borders in Indonesia. Moreover, Sasangko (cited in Agung, 2013) sees that the development of the area has lacked adequate regulation and integration at the institutional level. It has also lacked human and natural resources (Santri et al., 2005), and lack of proper policies and development concepts (Efendi, Kurniati & Semiun, 2013; Hariyadi, 2008) at least until 2014 where the issue of land and housing distribution came to the fore (Alkatiri, 2018a).
It is believed that the security aspect as one of the main contributing aspect of underdevelopment of Belu regency. The central government has given a special priority to the sector as maintained in the old border development approach. It is because of the dynamics of the Indonesian and East Timor border. Hariyadi (2008) states that the security sector is considered extremely important in the border of Belu Regency, particularly since East Timor has become an independent nation. The border now receives greater attention as result of the historical background of the two nations. Therefore, the role of military institution has been dominant, although the reformation in the military institution has been progressing post the fall of the Suharto’s government (Hariyadi, 2008).

As stated earlier, re-formation of the military has been a work in progress. However, the nuances of the dual functions’ doctrine are still in place. The military institution has still been invited to work on infrastructure projects, maintain sociopolitical order, and so on, back to the old paradigm approach. Therefore, the involvement of the institution in the development of the resettlement for the refugees in Belu is no surprise (Philpott, 2000).

According to Plowright (2008) the influences of the institution have not been easily wiped out from the national development agenda, although the re-formation began in 1999. On the contrary, the military influence has regained its status under the leadership of Megawati and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono government to some extent. In addition, as cited in the national newspaper, the Kompas, the Minister of Politics, Law, and Human Rights under the Joko Widodo’s regime, Mr. Wiranto, has asked for additional soldiers to be placed to fulfill their duty to safeguard the state and the protect the society in the border area (Wiranto..., 2019).

There are few reasons why there is a demand for additional soldiers. Hariyadi (2008) has recorded several potential security problems that may threaten the border, such as illegal trading and border crossings, unresolved sections of the border, political instability in East Timor, the effect of disintegration of other provinces, as well as East Timorese’s refugees and armed civilian groups in Belu. Nainggolan (2008, p. 97) has pointed out that such security problems are related to the unsolved issues of the refugee community and that are only resolved through the security approach.

In order to fulfill the refugees’ needs, the local government of Belu has called for the military institution support, pointing to the institution as the voice of the refugees’ management board or called SATLAK PBP at Belu regency. At the level of the military institution representation is by the KODIM 1653 Belu under the regent of Belu.

The main duty of the institution was to support the local government to overcome any issues related to East Timorese refugees in Belu, later becoming Indonesian citizens, known as “the new citizens” of Belu (Alkatiri, 2018a; Datta, 2018; Sianipar, 2016). However, the assistance of the military institution in the phases of disaster management in 1999–2007, the issue of the refugee community has been complicated, especially the social and economic needs, including land and housing access. In fact, the involvement of the military institution has created other social exclusion issues. In political and legal theory, citizenship refers to the rights and duties of the members of a nation state (Scott & Marshall, 2009). Citizenship has
traditionally referred to a particular set of political practices involving specific public rights and duties with respect to a given political community (Bellamy, 2008).

The Roles of the Military Institution and The Formation of Social Exclusion of the Refugee

As it is well-known that the border of Belu has been settled by lots of East Timorese refugees since 1999, spreading out into almost 200 camps. Therefore, the military institution was appointed to assist the local government to secure the camps and also to become involved actively in the social assistance distributions until 2007. Achmad (2000) has declared that the involvement of the institution has indicated that the local government to be incapable of managing the issue because the number of refugees was under estimated.

The result of this study shows that the roles of the Indonesia military in Belu are perceived pro and contra by several parties, including the refugees’ group. For certain groups of people, the involvement of the military institution in disaster management phases has been important. There are some reasons why the military institution has become involved in the period of disaster management. According to Nainggolan (2008), the housing project construction has been built by the military institution, which has also delivered social services for the local government at this time.

The former regent of Belu from 2003 to 2013, who has formulated government’ policies on the refugee issues, has stated that the local government was not prepared for the influx of refugees. The local government believed that the situation post-referendum East Timor would be smooth going without any conflict. It is believed that the referendum would bring a victory result for the pro-Indonesian option. If this were the case, the number of refugees would be insignificant and they would be easily managed. To be faced with more problems meant that the local government had no other choice except to involve the military institution for assistance.

A similar view has been expressed by some prominent refugees who have worked closely with the military institution. They have stated that the appointment of a military institution to be actively taking part in the disaster management phases had been the correct decision. It is because the institution has been well-trained to face any situations and has enough equipment to assist the local government in the troubled situation. The former regent of Belu, the period of 2003–2010, has said that the military is the only institution trusted to assist refugees, particularly handling armed civilian groups that scare them as well as the local people. According to Huntington (cited in Tornquist, 2013), if any group of society has no capacity to overcome the discontent of a group of people, then the military institution may take control of it because of its solid organization.

An interview with a top official of the military institution in Belu, who has involved in the mobilization process of refugees to several resettlement during 1999 to 2003, reveals that the influx of refugees has pushed the local government to involve the military institution with the main purpose being to stabilize the social and political conditions at the time. As soldiers, they have received and obeyed order from the top military leader from Jakarta to work and assist the local government.
The top official military has continuously argued that the purpose of the involvement of the institution is preventing social conflict, and securing and accompanying the refugees’ presence in the resettlement locations in order to avoid rejection by locals. In other words, the presence of the institution in resettlement, to some extent, is not only to prevent objection or protest from the refugees, but also to prevent the rejections by the local people or the owners of the land. Thus, it seems to be a “time boom” for the two communities.

The collected data has shown that, the local people or tribes’ members have to accept forcibly or negotiate their land with the government for resettlement development purposes. As a result, some of them have to negotiate with government. Other tribes and local people have handed over their land “forcibly” to the refugees. As a result, they have been excluded from their own land.

According to one prominent refugee figure who is a member of the Local Assembly Representative of Belu Regency, the issue of security has become a crucial aspect during the phases of management because of the activities of the members of militia groups, sporadically intimidating and acting violently towards other refugees. This is mainly due to misinformation fed to the suspicious members of East Timorese pro-independence groups who entered unintentionally or forcibly migrated into Indonesian territory for security reasons. Furthermore, the assistance of the military also needed to prevent conflicts between the refugee community and the local people mostly in regards to the illegal land occupation issues. Therefore, the refugee community and the local people needed to be accompanied and controlled. Hadiwinata (cited in Wuryandari, 2009) has argued that the potential conflict around the border area could occur because of the huge number of the refugees, social integration failure with the local people, and insufficient attention from the Indonesian government in tackling the social and economic life of the refugees.

On the other hand, several informants have expressed their disagreement, to some extent, of the involvement and over roles of the military institution in the development of border area and the refugee’s disaster management phases. This has led to several other problems, including social exclusion of the refugee community.

By performing its main duty and additional tasks, the military institution is seen to have an excess of power (Alkatiri, 2018a; Pusat Pengelola Pendapatan Umum, 2007). The institution has dominated and overlapped its duty with that of other institutions’ functions in the regency. As a consequence of the militaristic priority, the majority of area in the regency has not been multidimensionally developed by the government, becoming an isolated and underdeveloped area (Patriadi, 2010; Wuryandari, 2009; Wuryandari 2010). In fact, Pamungkas (cited in Wuryandari, 2009) has argued that it has been intentionally created making the border insecure, so that it can have a legitimacy to fully control the border based on the old paradigm perspectives. In fact, the situation of the border area has been quite safe because the Indonesians and East Timorese people who live in the border have similar social and cultural backgrounds.

Another consequence of the excess of the power was highlighted in the 2007–2008 report of LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia – Indonesian Institute of Sciences) that some people felt insecure doing their activities in the border area.
because of the militaristic presence, having experienced pressure and intimidation from the members of the institution (Wuryandari, 2009; Wuryandari & Noor, 2009).

Furthermore, several figures of the refugee community who have close ties with the military institution have explained that the institution has been used by the local government to pressure and intimidate the refugee community, particularly from 1999 to 2001. To some degree the refugees have been forced to take the repatriation program in order to reduce the burden of the local government; however, the majority of the refugees have decided to live in Indonesia.

It is difficult for majority of the refugees to return home because of their involvement in civilian armed groups, their nationalistic perceptions, and the non-acceptance by East Timorese society have seen as barriers. They are not welcome in East Timor anymore because of their previous involvement in human rights issues. Therefore, it is difficult for majority of the East Timorese people to accept them back home.

According to a prominent leader of the group, they have struggled to realize the victory of the first option of the referendum, strongly maintaining East Timor as part of the Indonesian territory, defending what they called “Red and White Flag” or “Garuda” as the symbol of the Indonesian state. They have shown their nationalist and patriotic stance. Therefore, they thought that they should have been treated as the “hero” because of their struggle on behalf of Indonesian interests. To some extent, this thought has led them to various demands on the government as a consequence of their choice leaving their homeland and their consistency of the struggle. However, not all demands have been fulfilled because of the local government resource limitations.

By facing these conditions and living under pressure, the refugee community have very little to choose from, except accepting any offers from the government of Indonesia, either repatriation, transmigration, or local resettlement. Moreover, these conditions have led to manipulation of information and social fictive reports towards them. An interview has taken place with a prominent local official of the government of Belu who has not denied that local government, organizations, and security institutions, have used the issue of refugees for certain interests or as well-known in local terms as “political commodity”. Those institutions have competed with each other in order to achieve resources on behalf of refugees’ disaster management. They thought that the more complicated the refugees’ issues, the more they will obtain and control financial supports from international and national donors. If there is protest from the refugees, then the security institution can be used to stop the protesters.

An official of the local government said that the national and international donors have provided a lot of social aid; however, the majority of the aid has been taken by prominent leaders, government, and security institutions. Pamungkas (2009) also has generally indicated in his study that the refugees have been treated as a “project” for certain people.

Some donations have been implemented in the form of projects or social aid supports through various institutions. This study has found that the involvement of the military institution can be seen through various projects, such as mobilizations of refugees, resettlement and housing construction projects, and other forms of social assistance.
There are lots of refugees mobilized to many different resettlement locations, including the resettlement of Taeksoruk, in the Fatuba’a village. According to the refugees, they have been mobilized into the resettlements without having proper information about the resettlement, including the status of the land and the condition of the house, all they have had to do is to follow the instruction of the local government and the military institution. The refugees have no opportunity to obtain information because the mobilization is militaristically nuanced, so they are afraid to question. As a result, they have ended up in the communal land or traditional land that is not clear about the access and ownership of land. According to the chief of the refugees in resettlement of Taeksoruk, they have been left there without any further information and attention from the government.

The head of the village and several members of tribes in Fatuba’a village, have explained that the refugees have suffered because their condition has been so poor. They are witnesses to the abandonment of the refugees without any social or economic support, so they have been the party who assisted the refugees, including handling the land for refugees as agreed between them and the local government. However, the intimidation and conflict of land access has been recorded a few times between the refugees and the members of tribe because it is believed that the land should be owned by the refugees. The refugees have insisted that the land belongs to them because they have lived there for more than 16 years. However, they have been not allowed to actually own it. In fact, according to the central government program, the land of resettlement and transmigration does belong to refugees as the program shows.

Besides that, a huge conflict of land access and ownership registered in the resettlement of Sirani, the village of Umaklaran between the refugees and the local people in 2005. In the resettlement, there were 450 houses built by the military institution. However, the land belonged to the local owners and used for 3 years only as agreed to with the local government. But the refugees lacked the information in regards to the land status; what they knew was that the land belonged to them. As a consequence, conflict was inevitable, the local people started to intimidate and burn down the houses, pushing them to move to another location without any compensation.

Data from the Center for Internal Displaced Persons report (2011) have also shown that there were more than 12 huge resettlements since 1999. The military institution was also appointed as contractor for the resettlement construction project in many places, including the resettlement of Taeksoruk and Aitaman. However, the quality of housing of the resettlement has been questioned by the refugees and even the donors. It has been seen that the quality of the houses for resettlement did not tally with the allocated budget and had not met the quality standards.

The low quality and condition of the resettlement has been explained by a prominent figure of the Planning and Development Board of Belu Regency: the construction has been taking place without having any monitoring from any proper institution, because the main purpose was to achieve the construction target as fast as it could. Almost all informants have agreed that the resettlement projects constructed by the military institution are below standard quality, and the refugees have been
fearful and have no power to question the quality of any military construction project. It has been strongly indicated that the financial supports have been misused funding for other interests. The majority of the houses of the resettlement have not lasted more than 1 year, and others have lasted not more than an average of 2 years. The housing here has been categorized as the lowest housing standard, with a budget of 14,000,000 rupiah per unit, although local organizations and the refugees have believed that the total price of the house was much lower than that based on the price of the building materials and the quality of the house.

According to the prominent figure of the refugees’ community in the resettlement of Aitaman, the local government have mobilized them into the location since 2002. The resettlement has not well-constructed, without having basic public facilities such as clean water, health and education facilities, proper road, and so on. Besides that, the electricity facility had just been constructed in 2017. Pamungkas (2009) has stated that the resettlements have been built by the government without meeting the basic conditions needed by the refugees.

It is well-known that the transmigration or resettlement program of the Indonesian government provides land, better public facilities access and land ownership for the refugees; however, it has not realized in the context of the refugees in Belu. In fact, the local government have entered into several agreements with different tribes, arranging the period of the land use for the refugees and the rights of the locals or tribes’ members on social assistance to eliminate social jealousy. However, in many cases in Belu, the refugees have had conflicts with the local people or tribes because of land accesses, affecting the process of the social integration program.

Besides having mobilization and construction project issues, the members of military institution have been acting violently towards the refugees in the phase of resettlement construction projects; it has occurred in Kabuna village, particularly in the resettlement of Weliurai and resettlement of Salore. Several refugees have reported that the members of the institution have intimidated and beat them just because of misunderstandings in terms of different characteristics between militaristic and cultural approaches. The refugees had late to assist the soldiers to build the resettlement’s houses due to their personal duties at home or attitudes that may not be understood properly by the soldiers. As a result, some refugees have been beat and preferred not to return to the project construction site.

Besides that, the repressive attitude of the security institution has limited the refugee community’s freedom to express their opinions. The refugees have faced the military and police institution every time a protest has taken place. The protests were made to express their opinions because they have not been paid adequate attention by the government, particularly on the issue of land access and ownership as well as housing conditions, and including other social issues. The protests often have taken place from 2001 until 2005 in the central office of the local government and the DPRD Belu or the Local Assembly Representatives. However, the government has used the security institution to stop the protest, and even the several prominent refugee leaders have been jailed. These repressive approaches have been taken because the refugees’ protests sometimes tended to be violent if their voices were not heard or
addressed. According to Stewart et al. (2005), social exclusion may generate conflict, and usually economic and political exclusion are the main contributing aspects.

According to the prominent leaders of the refugees, their movement to protest for their rights has been manipulated by some persons of the local government as a subversive movement, wanting to establish a new state called the “Great Timor State”. This movement is seen as illegal and a threat to national security, particularly in the border areas. This has given legitimacy to the military and police institution to act repressively, limiting their rights to express their opinion and even affecting the social integration of the refugees into the local community.

The accusations on the refugees as “troublemakers” has given a huge space to the military institution to act repressively on behalf of the border security threats. This pattern of the security approach has been improper. Seran (as cited in Pamungkas, 2009) argued that this approach may create oppression potentially towards the refugees. What is lacking from this relationship between refugees as civilians and the military institution are common history, and mutual recognition that they should share to establish a strong relationship (Al-Murshed, 2013). In fact, the refugees have close cultural and social ties with the local people.

To some extent, the involvement of the military institution in the formation of social exclusion can still be seen today, although the new paradigm of border development began to be implemented in 2010. The issue of land status and ownership have been unclear since the refugees were mobilized into their resettlement since 2001. These issues have a huge impact on their life, activities, and their agriculture. As a result, they live in uncertainty and easily make conflict with the local people or tribes, particularly in the resettlement of Taeksoruk and the resettlement of Aitaman.

Furthermore, the land access and ownership question, an isolated area of resettlement, and low quality of housing standards built by the military institution has forced some refugees to move out from their resettlements, going back to the camps and staying in the poor conditions there. As a result, they are trapped in a circle of social exclusion and poverty. This is believed as one of the main contributing factors which refugees in Belu have great difficulty to overcome, and creates social exclusion. The influence of the militaristic approach is still strong in the border area, although the military institution has been reforming and improving.

Conclusion

The involvement of security institutions in the border area is something inevitable, for the sake of the national security interests and citizens protections. The reformation of the military institution has been ongoing, trying to be professional and transparent institution after the fall of Suharto’s regime. However, it is not easy to remove the institution from sociopolitical and economic interests. In the Belu context, the military institution has been working hard to fulfill its duty, serving the interests of the state as well as protecting the citizens’ rights from external and internal threats.

However, there have been other forces at play between the military institution and the East Timorese refugees in the disaster management period from 1999 to
2007. This is due to the situation of the border and the movement of refugee groups. The institution has been used by the local government to mobilize refugees' settlements with an unclear land status, homes constructed below standard, and denial of the freedom of expression to the refugees. To some extent, it has led the majority of refugees into social exclusion, forcing them to accept the improper government policies, shaping the initial stages of social exclusion during the disaster management period. However, for many refugees, land access and housing problems have been the most important issues that still affected their livelihood until the present time.

The overload of duty and roles of the security institution in the border lands shows that there is a strong connection between the security aspect as a contributing factor to the formation of social exclusion in the border area.

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