Delay-on-Squash: Stopping Microarchitectural Replay Attacks in Their Tracks

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MicroScope and other similar microarchitectural replay attacks take advantage of the characteristics of speculative execution to trap the execution of the victim application in a loop, enabling the attacker to amplify a side-channel attack by executing it indefinitely. Due to the nature of the replay, it can be used to effectively attack software that are shielded against replay, even under conditions where a side-channel attack would not be possible (e.g., in secure enclaves). At the same time, unlike speculative side-channel attacks, microarchitectural replay attacks can be used to amplify the correct path of execution, rendering many existing speculative side-channel defenses ineffective.

In this work, we generalize microarchitectural replay attacks beyond MicroScope and present an efficient defense against them. We make the observation that such attacks rely on repeated squashes of so-called “replay handles” and that the instructions causing the side-channel must reside in the same reorder buffer window as the handles. We propose Delay-on-Squash, a hardware-only technique for tracking squashed instructions and preventing them from being replayed by speculative replay handles. Our evaluation shows that it is possible to achieve full security against microarchitectural replay attacks with very modest hardware requirements while still maintaining 97% of the insecure baseline performance.

CCS Concepts: • Computer systems organization → Superscalar architectures; • Security and privacy → Side-channel analysis and countermeasures;

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Microarchitecture, side-channels, security, replay attacks

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1 INTRODUCTION
Due to the complexity of modern high-performance processors, there exists a large amount of microarchitectural state that can be abused by a malicious application to create side-channels,
with the intent of observing the behavior of security-sensitive applications and leaking sensitive data [33, 53]. This is the case even for trusted execution environments (also referred to as secure enclaves) that are designed to protect particularly sensitive applications from outside interference, including interference from a privileged context (e.g., the operating system (OS)). Although there has been extensive research in the field [17, 33], typical modern processors delegate the responsibility for defending against such side-channels to the software, as general-purpose hardware side-channel defenses usually incur large overheads [33]. Thankfully, side-channels often suffer from high noise and low reliability, which has made designing secure software without introducing large overheads possible, as an attacker has to perform the same attack several times before they are able to reliably leak sensitive information. This can be difficult for the attacker to achieve, especially if the application is running in a secure enclave, as in such cases not even a compromised OS can manipulate the execution of the application directly, making it impossible to repeat an attack. Although it is not hard to imagine cases where the attacker is targeting specific immutable data and the code can be arbitrarily triggered (e.g., to encrypt some data), in a lot of cases (e.g., Software Guard Extensions (SGX) implementations of Tor [1, 24], secure database implementations, or systems secured against rollbacks [34]), the attacker targets transient execution data (e.g., Tor traffic) and has only one single opportunity to perform the attack and leak information. In these cases, the majority of the available side-channels are not effective, as it is not possible to distinguish a single iteration of the attack from system noise [3, 33, 35].

MicroScope and microarchitectural replay attacks in general, as introduced by Skarlatos et al. [47], enable an attacker to “trap” the execution of an application and force it to re-execute specific regions of code ad infinitum. With MicroScope, which focuses on secure enclaves, this is achieved by abusing a combination of speculative execution and page fault handling, in cases where the latter is still delegated to the (malicious/compromised) OS. Under typical execution, if an address translation misses in the translation lookaside buffer (TLB), a page table walk is triggered. While the page walk is happening, the application is able to continue executing speculatively, as long as there exist instructions that do not depend on the faulting memory instruction. If during the page walk it is determined that the page is not available and that the OS needs to be invoked, then the speculatively executed instructions are squashed and execution restarts from the faulting instruction. This time another page walk might be needed, as the translation still does not exist in the TLB, but since the OS has now mapped the page, the page walk typically succeeds. MicroScope takes advantage of this behavior by having the OS signal that it has mapped the page without actually doing so. This traps the victim application in a loop where a memory instruction (referred to as “the handle”) misses in the TLB, triggers a page walk and continues executing speculatively, triggers a page fault, squashes the speculatively executed instructions, re-executes the faulting instruction, and misses in the TLB again. By triggering these loops at specific parts of the code, just before the instructions that cause the side-channel information leakage, the attacker can repeat the side-channel until all underlying noise is filtered out, making even the least reliable side-channels easy to exploit, regardless if the application is executing in a secure enclave or not.

Although MicroScope focuses specifically on the OS abusing the page handling mechanism found on some enclaves, other sources of speculation and re-execution can be similarly abused, in some cases even from an unprivileged context. For this reason, in this work we aim to solve the problem of microarchitectural replay attacks in general, not just MicroScope. Specifically:

- We generalize from re-execution brought on by page faults to re-execution brought on by any form of speculation in modern processors, some of which do not require a malicious OS.
- We also generalize the method developed by Skarlatos et al. to be applicable to cases where a single handle cannot by itself trigger a large number of re-executions, by introducing a method that utilizes multiple handles.
Finally, we introduce Delay-on-Squash, a solution to this critical issue of microarchitectural replay attacks, which can transparently provide protection for MicroScope and future attacks, while avoiding significant impact on performance, energy, area, and implementation complexity.

A very simple but naïve solution would be to simply disallow speculative execution after a page walk miss, but this would only protect against MicroScope itself and not against microarchitectural replay attacks that utilize other handle types or multiple handles (Section 3.2). At the same time, we cannot just disable speculation every time a squash happens, nor can we implement defenses for all possible side-channels, as that would be detrimental to the performance of the system (Section 7). Furthermore, speculative side-channel defenses that track the data dependencies of side-channel instructions, such as NDA [54], STT [58, 59], and others [5, 6, 15, 30], do not work in this context, because the side-channel instructions may actually be in the correct path of execution and can also be fed with non-speculative data coming from before the point of misspeculation that is used for replay. Broader defenses (not restricted to data dependencies) that could work in such a case, such as InvisiSpec [56], Delay-on-Miss [43, 44], and many others [2, 23, 25, 26, 41, 42, 49], not only focus on a small subset of side-channels but also incur much heavier penalties. Instead, Delay-on-Squash selectively delays the speculative execution of instructions when it detects that they might be used as part of a microarchitectural replay attack. We observe that if an attack requires microarchitectural replay to be successful, then we do not need to restrict all speculation but rather only repeating speculation interleaved with misspeculation. To achieve this, we use a lightweight mechanism, based on Bloom filters, that (i) tracks which instructions have been squashed and re-issued due to misspeculation, and (ii) prevents them from executing speculatively. We propose a method for clearing the Bloom filters that is based on the youngest seen handled (see Section 5.2), which assures that an instruction can only be squashed and re-executed once. Our evaluation shows that a fully secure configuration of Delay-on-Squash, requiring little storage and overall overhead, can achieve 97% of the performance of a baseline insecure out-of-order CPU.

The rest of the article is structured as follows. First, we will discuss side-channels and why several iterations of an attack are necessary (Section 2), followed by a discussion on how MicroScope comes into play and why it is an important security threat (Section 3). Then, with the background information out of the way, we will discuss our expanded microarchitectural replay attacks (Section 3.2) and our overall threat model (Section 4). We will present Delay-on-Squash (Section 5) and evaluate its performance energy overheads (Section 7). Finally, we will discuss other related work, including existing speculative and non-speculative side-channel defenses and why they cannot be used to effectively prevent all microarchitectural replay attacks (Section 8), as well as how Delay-on-Squash differs from Jamais Vu [48].

2 SIDE-CHANNELS

To provide compatibility across different hardware implementations, modern CPU architectures separate the visible architectural behavior and state of the system from the underlying microarchitectural implementation. For each visible architectural state, there exist one or more corresponding hidden microarchitectural states (μ-states) [36]. The users/applications interact with the architectural state but have limited or no access to the underlying μ-state. However, although it is usually not possible to observe the μ-state directly, it is possible to infer it based on observable side effects.

Microarchitectural side-channel attacks take advantage of the μ-state of modern CPUs to leak information under conditions where it is not possible to do so on the architectural level. For example, cache side-channels take advantage of the difference in timing between a hit or a miss in the cache to encode information [33, 39, 57], by indirectly manipulating and probing the state of the cache.
through normal memory operations. Similar timing side-channels can also be constructed in other parts of the system [17], such as by utilizing functional unit contention. Finally, non-timing side-channels are also possible, exploiting side effects of the execution such as power consumption [27] or EMF radiation [16]. As these side-channels are not purposely designed communication channels but rather side effects of the normal architectural and microarchitectural behavior of the system, they are inherently noisy and unreliable. For example, when using a cache-based side-channel, there is nothing that prevents the cache line(s) being used for the side-channel from being evicted by a third process in the system. Similarly, interrupts, context switches, and other interruptions in the application execution can also disrupt the side-channel. Since the system does not provide any architectural mechanisms for synchronizing the transmitter and the receiver during side-channel operations, these also have to be constructed using the side-channel itself or other mechanisms.

All of these issues make exploiting side-channels harder but not impossible. After all, these issues can be found in conventional communication channels as well, especially in the layers closest to the actual hardware and transmission mediums. Similarly to how modern communication protocols are designed with the underlying channel characteristics in mind, so can protocols for side-channels be designed. For example, noise on a side-channel can be filtered out using error detection and correction codes, combined with statistical methods [35]. The question then becomes not if a side-channel can be exploited but rather how easy, reliable, and fast the channel is. As many of the underlying issues can be resolved by simply repeating the transmission of information through the side-channel until successful, whether a side-channel can be practically exploited becomes a function of the delay between each retransmission (i.e., how fast can the side-channel be repeated) and the average number of retransmissions necessary (i.e., how many times the side-channel has to be repeated). Under the conditions described by Maurice et al. [35], both the transmitter and the receiver are under the full control of the attacker. This enables the attacker to not only control when the side-channel transmission takes place, to better synchronize the transmitter and the receiver, but to also repeat the transmission as many times as necessary. However, this is not always the case. For example, sometimes the transmitter is not a purposely designed application but a targeted victim, such as a cryptographic application running in a secure enclave. The attacker then uses side-channels to monitor the behavior of the application under normal execution and infer sensitive information, such as cryptographic keys. In some cases, the attacker is able to directly execute or otherwise trigger the execution of the victim application at will, repeating the execution as many times as necessary to extract the keys. This ability to replay the victim code multiple times is crucial in being able to reliably exploit the utilized side-channel, due to the issues we have already discussed. This is where MicroScope, a groundbreaking microarchitectural replay attack technique, comes into play.

3 MICROARCHITECTURAL REPLAY ATTACKS

Microarchitectural replay attacks, as introduced by Skarlatos et al. [47], are not by themselves a side-channel attack, speculative or otherwise. Instead, they can be seen as a tool to amplify the effects of side-channel attacks, enabling the attacker to mount a successful attack under conditions where it would not be possible otherwise. This is why microarchitectural replay can be so dangerous: even the smallest, most innocuous amount of information leakage can be amplified and abused. This is particularly dangerous when applied to secure enclaves, where the applications are security sensitive and the programmers are typically expected to manage the risk of side-channels. In addition, even though they exploit speculative execution, microarchitectural replay attacks are not the same as speculative side-channel attacks. Whereas the latter target the wrong execution path, effectively bypassing software and hardware barriers to access information illegally, microarchitectural replay attacks can amplify even the correct path of execution. This renders defenses that
stop speculative data transmission [54, 58, 59] ineffective, since a replay attack can also amplify side-channel instructions that are on the correct path.

3.1 MicroScope

Many modern CPUs offer secure execution contexts referred to as trusted execution environments (sometimes also referred to as secure enclaves) that protect the executed code from outside interference, including interference from the OS or the hypervisor. The characteristics of these enclaves differ for each architecture, but they typically include encrypted memory for applications running in the enclave, code verification to prevent malicious code from being executed in the enclave, and hardware-enforced isolation of the enclave from any other execution context in the system, including the OS. These measures are meant to protect sensitive code and data, such as cryptographic functions and their keys, from any attacker that might have compromised other parts of the system, including the OS or the hypervisor. MicroScope targets exactly this case, focusing specifically on Intel’s SGX enclave, although the underlying exploitable concept is not limited to SGX. MicroScope exploits the fact that under SGX, the page management of the application is still delegated to the OS, to capture the execution of the application and force the application to be re-executed as many times as necessary for the side-channel attack to be successful.

Specifically, MicroScope [47] takes advantage of how page faults are handled during execution and of the out-of-order capabilities of modern CPUs. When a memory load (referred to as the handle in MicroScope) misses in the TLB, a (typically) hardware page walker tries to resolve the miss by walking the page table residing in the main memory. While the page walker is trying to resolve the TLB miss, the victim application will continue its execution speculatively. By abusing this speculative execution mechanism and the squashing and re-execution caused by it, MicroScope is able to trap the execution of the victim application in a loop for an arbitrary number of replay iterations, until the attacker is able to reliably denoise the side-channel. A high-level view of this process can be seen in Figure 1(a), with \( H \) representing the load/handle that keeps missing in the TLB and \( S \) representing the information-leaking side-channel instructions that are being arbitrarily replayed by the attacker.

3.2 Replay Attacks Beyond MicroScope

MicroScope only exploits page faults, but that does not mean that this is the only behavior that can be exploited. Specifically, under MicroScope, a single instruction that page faults is used as a handle to replay a set of instructions indefinitely (Figure 1(a)). This is possible because (i) page faults are a specific type of misprediction that can be repeated indefinitely, and (ii) there is nothing in the architecture that prevents an instruction from mispredicting several times in a row. However, it is conceivable that other forms of speculation can be used as handles. For example, in the short time since MicroScope has been released, Skarlatos et al. [48] have already described a potential attack using speculative load re-ordering. Even forms of speculation that cannot be repeated indefinitely, such as branch prediction, or even transactional memory, can be abused. Once a branch has been executed, the correct path is known and the incorrect path will not be mispredicted a second time. Similarly, transactions usually abort after a number of tries, at which point they follow a fallback path. By using multiple handles (\( H_1 \) and \( H_2 \) in Figure 1(b)), an attacker could extend the duration of the attack for each case [47, 48], especially if handles of different types are used together.

1 This is considered secure because the memory accessed under SGX execution is cryptographically encrypted and verified, preventing even the OS from accessing or manipulating it.

2 Transactional memory is not necessarily implemented as conventional speculative execution, confined within the reorder buffer, but it does have similar characteristics.
Fig. 1. Three different microarchitectural replay attack patterns. The instructions in the reorder buffer are marked with an ‘H’ for the replay handles, ‘S’ for the side-channel instructions, and ‘X’ for other instructions not specific to the attack. The currently acquired handles are denoted in bold/red.

In addition, if the system restricted the number of times each instruction is allowed to misspeculate and then be re-executed speculatively, for example, as a simple but naïve solution to Micro-Scope, an attacker would still be able to use multiple handles to force a finite but tangible number of replays.

We can see that multiple handles acquired and released one after the other can be abused by an attacker to bypass some of the restrictions posed by different kinds of speculation and system restrictions. However, using handles serially like this only allows for a limited number of replays, with the total number being the sum of the replays of each handle. In contrast, Figure 1(c) shows a way of nesting handles, where each handle (H1 in the figure) amplifies the number of replays of the next handle (H2). This works by (i) having the inner handle H2 cause as many replays as possible before releasing it (2 and 3 in Figure 1(c)), (ii) using the outer handle to squash and then re-execute the inner handle (1 and 4), (iii) re-acquiring the new (as far as dynamic instructions are concerned) inner handle, and (iv) repeating indefinitely. With this technique, the total number of replays is not the sum of each individual handle’s replays but instead the product, growing exponentially with each handle. This can make a huge difference in the number of replays. For example, if the attacker is able to acquire five handles and use each only once (i.e., one replay each), with the serial handles the total number of attack iterations would amount to 10, whereas with the nested handles it would amount to 32. Of course, nesting handles has its own challenges, including the fact that not all forms of speculation can be used; in some cases (e.g., page faults),
the misspeculation is not handled until after the instruction has reached the head of the **reorder buffer (ROB)**. However, modern microarchitectures allow branch prediction to go several levels deep, resulting in the possibility of multiple outstanding (unresolved) predictions at any one time. By arranging for older branches to depend on longer latency operations (e.g., misses deeper in the memory hierarchy) and thus resolve slower than younger branches, an effective nested multiple-handle attack can be mounted. Similarly, if closed nesting of transactions is supported [22], the same effect can easily be achieved by controlling the abort of the inner versus outer transactions. In closed nesting, an abort of the inner transaction does not abort the outer transaction, which will then proceed to repeat the inner transaction.

Our goal is not to simply stop the currently known attacks (namely MicroScope) but to secure speculative execution from as many present and future microarchitectural replay attacks as possible. The serial and nested attacks that we have developed currently have limited practical applications, but practical attacks with multiple handles and alternative handles have already been demonstrated in other works [47, 48]. Therefore, we claim that serial and nested handles cannot be safely ignored, and we have designed and evaluated our solution accordingly.

### 4 Threat Model

MicroScope, and microarchitectural replay attacks in general, only make sense under certain conditions. For example, in the specific case of MicroScope, the assumption is that the OS is restricted from accessing the victim’s execution state and memory. If this is not the case, then the OS can manipulate the victim directly, without the need for MicroScope. At the same time, even if direct manipulation is not possible, there are cases where it is possible to repeat the execution of the side-channel without using a microarchitectural replay attack. For example, a digital rights management (DRM) system that accepts encrypted data and decrypts them with a secret key could be fed the same data repeatedly by a malicious attacker, allowing for enough iterations to reliably leak the secret key. This is possible because, in this case, the secret is immutable, regardless of the input data. However, as a counter example, there exist applications where the secrets consist of transient data, such as SGX implementations of Tor [24] (where the sensitive data are arbitrary network packets) or applications where countermeasures against rollback attacks have been taken [34]. In such cases, the attacker has only a single opportunity to successfully leak the data. These are exactly the cases where microarchitectural replay attacks become useful, while also being the cases we expect to be the least protected against side-channel attacks, as, before MicroScope, they were very hard to exploit.

Although MicroScope focuses on secure enclaves, one can imagine how a microarchitectural replay attack can be performed from a non-privileged context as well. For example, if the branch predictor is abused to create handles, it is possible to do a microarchitectural replay attack from an unprivileged SMT thread. We observe that for a microarchitectural replay attack to be necessary, two conditions must apply:

1. The side-channel used in the attack is ineffective unless it is repeated numerous times, as otherwise there would be no reason to replay the attack code.
2. The information-leaking victim code is not repeated enough times, either by the program (e.g., in a loop) or by the attacker (e.g., by interfering with the victim’s execution), to let the attacker reliably deduce the leaked information.

These two conditions combined mean that it is completely safe, under our current threat model, to allow a single execution of a side-channel attack while under speculation (**transient leakage (TL)** of 1, Section 6), as it will not be effective. Any additional attempts will be blocked by our replay-blocking defense mechanism, Delay-on-Squash.
5 DELAY-ON-SQUASH

The principle behind Delay-on-Squash is simple: if an instruction is issued, then squashed due to a replay handle, and then re-appears in the pipeline, it is not allowed to be re-issued, as it might constitute part of a microarchitectural replay attack. We have split the description of the Delay-on-Squash mechanism into two subsections: First, we discuss the concept on a high level, with no regard for any implementation constraints (Section 5.1), then we discuss the practicalities of an actual implementation (Section 5.2).

5.1 Conceptual Description

To keep track of instructions that are issued, squashed, and then re-issued under the same handle, Delay-on-Squash needs to keep track of all potential handles in the ROB. Due to the serial and nested cases that we described in Section 3.2, it is not enough to keep track of only the handle that caused the last squash; instead, Delay-on-Squash takes into consideration all handles that affect each squashed instruction.

To track all of the handles, Delay-on-Squash utilizes a FIFO queue where all of the dynamic instructions that can cause misspeculation and squashing are inserted during dispatch. While in the queue, these instructions are considered as potential handles and, by definition, are considered as “unsafe.” Instructions can only be removed from the head of the queue and only if it can be determined that they are “safe” (i.e., that they can no longer act as a handle), which happens only when they have moved outside the window of speculation. The instructions remain in the queue even if the instructions themselves are squashed in the ROB. For an instruction to be classified as safe, it first needs to appear at the head of the queue. Then, two scenarios are possible. In the first scenario, the instruction was on the wrong path of execution and is never seen again. For this case, the instruction sits at the head of the queue until a full worth of ROB instructions have been committed, thus assuring that all older handles have left the ROB. In the second scenario, the instruction is dispatched again and the instruction will exit the head of the queue once it becomes non-speculative, but for now let us assume that this happens once the instruction is committed. We will discuss the exact conditions as when an instruction is no longer speculative, and thus no longer a potential handle, in Section 5.2.2. As the queue is a FIFO, and handles can only be removed from the head of the queue, for a handle to become safe all older handles need to also become safe. This is a very important condition, as it prevents the serial and nested replay patterns presented in Section 3.2.

With this queue of potential handles, it is now possible to keep track of squashed instructions on a per-handle basis. Specifically, every time a misspeculation occurs and instructions are squashed, Delay-on-Squash records the program counter (PC) for all instructions that have been issued and are now being squashed. The youngest handle (in ROB order—in contrast, the Clear-on-Retire variant of Jamais Vu [48] tracks the oldest handle) is retrieved from the queue and is associated to the squashed PCs. These PCs then remain stored until their corresponding handle is determined to be safe (i.e., until the handle is removed from the queue). Using the youngest handle, instead of the actual misspeculating instruction that caused the squash, is important, once again, to prevent the serial and nested replay patterns. Essentially, by storing the PCs of the squashed instructions until the youngest (at the point of the squash) handle is safe, Delay-on-Squash ensures that the record of the squashed PCs will remain stored until all handles that were present in the window of speculation during the squash have left the window and are thus safe. With this guarantee, all that remains is to check these records before issuing an instruction. If an instruction PC matches one of the stored records, it means that this instruction has previously been issued and squashed, and that the handles that preceded it are still in the ROB and are still considered unsafe. Such instructions are prevented from being issued until the relevant handles are deemed to be safe, and the records...
are removed. To prevent interference from other contexts, this information needs to be stored and restored on a context switch, much like the rest of the execution state (e.g., registers).

With this mechanism in place, we can instantly detect when an instruction has been issued, squashed, and then re-issued, even for complex cases, such as when the attacker might be utilizing nested handles. This enables us to detect and prevent replay iterations of the code, instantly stopping any microarchitectural replay attacks in their tracks. This mechanism does have one disadvantage: the pattern of "issue, squash, and re-issue" can also happen under normal speculative execution (i.e., when not under attack), for example, when a load is squashed due to a memory order violation, as in such cases the execution path remains the same. In addition, if we are executing a loop that is small enough to fit several loop iterations in the window of speculation, a squash in one of them will cause all iterations that follow (within the window) to be delayed, as the instructions at each iteration all share the same PC. Fortunately, as we will see in the evaluation (Section 7), the actual number of cases affected by this are very small and come at a negligible performance cost (1%).

5.2 Efficient Implementation

Although the Delay-on-Squash mechanism, as conceptually described in the previous section, can be implemented as an actual hardware solution, it would require large storage and expensive content addressable memories for keeping exact sets of squashed PCs. This would lead to prohibitively large area, latency, and energy overheads. Instead, we use Bloom filters [9] to represent the sets of PCs (of squashed instructions) that are temporarily prevented from being issued speculatively. With this approach, we can store the PCs of tens of squashed instructions with only a few bits of storage.

5.2.1 Bloom Filters. Bloom filters are hash-based, probabilistic data structures used to test if an element (in our case, a PC) is part of a set. A basic Bloom filter consists of a fixed-length bit vector that is initially set to “zero.” A new element is inserted into the filter by first hashing the element with a number of hash functions. Each hash is then used to index into the bit vector and the bit is set to “one.” To check if an element is present in the filter, the same hash functions are used and the bit indicated by each hash is checked. If all bits, as indicated by the hashes, are set to “one,” then the element is assumed to be present in the filter. Although it is possible to get a false positive when checking the filter, it is not possible to get a false negative, which is an important property for us, as false negatives would lead to unsafe replay iterations. False positives, however, only manifest as reduced opportunities for speculation, in our case causing a negligible performance overhead. The Bloom filter’s property of never resulting in a false negative and its relative simple implementation have inspired computer architects to use it for various cases where filtering is beneficial, such as to filter memory access in cache coherence protocols [38, 60] or set-associative caches [18].

**Bloom filter implementation.** In Delay-on-Squash, we use the simplest, most efficient form of binary Bloom filters where the only way of erasing elements from the filter is to clear the whole filter by bulk-resetting it. Other approaches also exist [10, 13], but they come at increased overheads, and they would not offer significant performance benefits for our use case. For our implementation, we assume that all hash functions of the PC of a particular dynamic instruction are precomputed during dispatch and kept in its ROB entry. Efficient hash functions can be created by only using XOR gates [51]. For each bit in the hash, a small set of bits from the PC are XORed together. The precomputed hash functions are then used (in the case of a squash) to index the Bloom filter and set the corresponding “ones,” in parallel with multiple other ROB entries. We also assume that the whole process is hidden behind the back-end recovery latency following a squash [20].

**Why binary Bloom filters?** In addition to false positives, Bloom filters have another property that we need to account for when designing the Delay-on-Squash implementation: removing
individual elements (PCs) from a Bloom filter is expensive. To do that, we need to resort to counting Bloom filters (or one of their many varieties), significantly increasing our cost. Moreover, updating a counting Bloom filter entails several (as many as the hash functions) read-increment-write operations per PC. Parallelizing the insertion of multiple PCs in the Bloom filter becomes problematic, as we have to watch out for conflicts and serialize conflicting PCs. That can be too expensive to do (either in cycles or in read/write ports) when we need to store tens of PCs on a squash. In contrast, a simple binary Bloom filter can be updated much faster by just setting all of the new “ones” in place.

**Clearing the Bloom filters.** In the conceptual description, for each squash, we associate each set of squashed PCs with a handle. Observe, however, that in the case of a replay attack, the set of PCs would hardly change from squash to squash. Maintaining the same redundant information across multiple Bloom filters is, clearly, a waste of resources. Instead, we could consolidate the information in a single Bloom filter spanning several squashes, holding all PCs of all squashed instructions. For each squash, we insert the squashed PCs in the filter, then we associate the Bloom filter with the PC of the youngest handle in the handle queue (i.e., the entry of the tail). Although this is an effective way of keeping all of the information we need to prevent replay attacks, it makes the clearing of the Bloom filter difficult. Recall that we have opted for a simple binary Bloom filter, where it is not possible to erase individual instructions. In addition, we only associate the youngest seen handle with the Bloom filter, since it is not possible to remove individual PCs anyway. Finally, the condition for clearing the Bloom filter is when the associated handle leaves the window of speculation and becomes safe (i.e., all PCs in the Bloom filter are safe). As at each squash we re-associate the Bloom filter with the youngest handle during the squash, the lifetime of the filter can be extended an arbitrary number of times and the clearing can be deferred for an arbitrarily long time.

Instead, we use two Bloom filters and switch between them periodically. At each point in time, one of the filters is designated as active, whereas the other is inactive, waiting to be cleared. On a squash, the PCs of the squashed instructions are inserted in the currently active filter, and the filter is associated with the youngest handle. Meanwhile, the inactive filter is waiting for its associated handle to leave the window of speculation to be cleared with a bulk-reset. As soon as the inactive filter is cleared, it can take over the role of the active filter, letting the previous active filter become inactive and eventually be cleared as well. Of note here is that a squashed handle might never appear again as it might have appeared on a wrong path of execution. In such cases, the handle will remain at the head of the handle queue until as many instructions as can be stored in the ROB have been committed, delaying the clearing of any Bloom filters. This is motivated by the fact that speculative replay attacks require the handle and side-channel transmitting instructions to be within the same ROB window of speculative instructions. Thus, once as many instructions as can be stored in the ROB have been committed, it is ensured that all previous handles have also been committed. Of importance here is that instructions that are about to be issued need to check both filters, the active and the inactive, to see if they can be issued safely. The approach can naturally be extended to a cyclical list of several Bloom filters, out of which one is active and the rest are inactive. A high-level overview with just two filters can be seen in Figure 2. As the instructions at the head of the ROB are committed successfully and the ROB window moves in time, the older Bloom filter is cleared and moves to become the next active filter, with the old active filter no longer being marked as inactive.

The Bloom filters are context specific—that is, each execution context has its own set of filters, which is securely stored and reloaded on a context switch. This prevents other contexts, including the OS, from saturating or otherwise manipulating Delay-on-Squash.
Fig. 2. An abstract visualization of the window of speculation and how it moves with the instruction stream. Handles are represented with ‘H,’ whereas other instructions are represented with ‘X.’ Once the handle associated with the filter is resolved, the filter is marked as inactive, to be reused later.

A working example. Figure 3 contains a step-by-step example of how Delay-on-Squash tracks handles and how the Bloom filters ($BF_A$ and $BF_B$ in the figure) are used, when the following code is executed:

```plaintext
1  y = (secret & 0x1) * pi    // Not shown in the illustration
2  _ = load(x)                 // ld
3  if (cond1) { X } else { Y } // br1
4  if (cond2) { X } else { Y } // br2
5  sqrt(y)                     // S
6  store(z)                    // st
```

We have marked the potential handles in red, the side-channel instruction in blue, and the rest of the instructions in gray. Under this example, the attacker intends to first use $br_1$ and $br_2$ sequentially (one replay for each) by forcing each of them to mispredict once, causing a squash, and then use $ld$ to squash everything and re-use $br_1$ and $br_2$ (nested attack). Branches cannot be used more than once sequentially, as once a branch is executed, the correct target becomes known. However, when the attacker triggers the $ld$ handle, it is possible to re-train the branch predictor, as the victim will be stalled while the page fault is being handled. The X and Y for the if/else conditions are simply to show different paths of execution (i.e., first a mispredicted path and later the correct path). The $sqrt(y)$ instruction is used to illustrate a simplified contention-based attack, since $y$ will either be 0 or $pi$, with $pi$ taking significant longer time to execute. A second thread can then perform square-root operations to determine the value of secret. The purpose of the attack is to execute the $sqrt(y)$ operation as many times as possible. Note that handles based on page faults have to always be the outermost handle, as page faults are not handled speculatively, unlike branch-based handles, which are speculated early in the pipeline. For simplicity, we show the same instructions being squashed and fetched many times, as showing how instructions are tracked when the execution diverges between squashes (as is usually the case with branch mispredictions) would make the example overly complicated:

1. The ROB contains three potential handle instructions, $ld$, $br_1$, and $br_2$, which are inserted in the handle queue ($HQ$) in order.
2. The attacker has set up the microarchitectural state so that $br_1$ (which is mispredicted) is resolved first. This can be achieved by manipulating the branch predictor and other microarchitectural state that the branch condition (e.g., cached cache lines) depends on. When
the misprediction has been detected, the instructions that follow \( br_1 \) will be squashed. The squashed instructions are inserted into the active Bloom filter \( BF_A \), which in turn is tagged with the youngest potential handle (\( br_2 \)).

(3) As execution restarts from the squashed branch, the instructions in the reconvergent path are once again dispatched in the ROB. The PCs that have been seen before (i.e., the ones that hit in the Bloom filters (marked with a gray background)) will be delayed by Delay-on-Squash. As intended, Delay-on-Squash prevents \( S \) from being replayed. Here we also assume that a new instruction is dispatched, \( st \), which is also a potential handle.

(4) For brevity, we do not show \( br_2 \) being used as a sequential handle. It is also worth noting though that \( br_2 \) has already been squashed once and is prevented from being issued and
further used as a handle. Next, we consider the nested part of the attack. When the load page faults, execution will be squashed and all issued instructions will be added to the Bloom filter. Here we assume that we want to switch to a new filter, namely $BF_B$, which is tagged with the youngest potential handle, $st$.

(5) When execution resumes, all instructions that have been seen before are, once again, delayed by Delay-on-Squash. This includes the side-channel instruction $S$, which is still in $BF_A$.

(6) Once all of the older handles ($ld$, $br_1$, and $br_2$) have been resolved, $BF_A$ can be cleared and the side-channel instruction $S$ can now finally be executed. Note how $br_2$ has not yet been retired, but it is considered as resolved once it has been executed and verified that it has not been mispredicted.

For simplicity, we show $ld$ remaining in the ROB when squashed but in practice, loads that page fault are typically squashed and re-dispatched. In some cases (e.g., on a context switch), it is possible that after squashing the handle queue is left empty, as all instructions are either squashed or otherwise deemed safe. In such cases, we can run into a corner case where the Bloom filters are cleared before the squashed handles (e.g., $br_1$) have been re-introduced into the window of speculation, enabling the attacker to perform several replay iterations. We handle such cases conservatively by delaying the clearing of the Bloom filters by the length of the dynamic instruction window, which is the longest window for any handles to be re-introduced. This happens very rarely, only affects instructions that hit in the Bloom filters, and has no measurable effect on performance.

### 5.2.2 Handles and the Window of Speculation

We have talked about handles that can cause mis-speculation and squashing, and when such handles can be considered as safe. In the most naïve approach, we can consider handles to be safe when they reach the head of the ROB and are retired, but this is awfully pessimistic. Instead, we draw from the existing research on speculative execution [4, 7, 42–44, 56, 62] and consider handles as safe when they can no longer cause squashing, regardless of their position in the ROB. Specifically, we have adopted the approach of using speculative shadows by Sakalis et al. [42–44], a mechanism for detecting the earliest point at which an instruction is no longer speculative. Although these shadows are designed to work with speculative side-channel defenses, which do not necessarily work against microarchitectural replay attacks (Section 8), the underlying principle can still be used.

According to Sakalis et al., any speculative instruction that can cause squashing is referred to as a “shadow-casting” instruction. Depending on the type of speculation, Sakalis et al. [42, 43] have defined different types of shadows (e.g., “E-Shadows” are cast by instructions that might raise an exception, as is the case with the page faults in MicroScope), but these can be extended to include other types of speculation as well, such as the transactional memory case described earlier. Once an instruction (i) is no longer shadowed by another instruction and (ii) no longer casts any shadows itself (i.e., when there is no reason for said instruction to be squashed), the instruction is considered non-speculative. At this point, the instruction has left the window of speculation, and assuming that the instruction was a potential handle, it can be considered as safe. The advantage of this approach is that it is possible for potential handles to reach the safe state a lot earlier than if we were waiting for them to retire. In addition, Sakalis et al. [43] also describe a hardware implementation to track speculation based on a FIFO queue, where younger shadow-casting instructions are only resolved once all older shadow-casting instructions have also been resolved. This design fits well with Delay-on-Squash, as the handle queue has similar characteristics.

Note that while using the speculative shadows is not necessary and the use of alternative methods is possible (e.g., using the head and tail of the ROB), doing so in a naïve manner can lead to significant performance degradation [42, 62].
5.2.3 Software Support. Delay-on-Squash can operate transparently to the user and does not need any library, compiler, or OS support to work. However, a mechanism to inform the program being executed of continuous replay attempts would enhance both security and usability, allowing the program to implement custom security routines for such cases. In addition, if an attack holds a handle for a long period of time, constantly preventing the application from making forward progress, the CPU should interrupt the program, once again allowing it to handle the security threat using custom security routines.

6 SECURITY ANALYSIS

Delay-on-Squash is not intended to protect against attacks where the sensitive code is replayed by the application itself, such as in cases where a loop accesses the exact same sensitive data in each iteration. In such cases, microarchitectural replay is not even necessary. As discussed in Section 4, Delay-on-Squash only guarantees security with respect to the amplification of a side-channel and does not block the first use of a side-channel while under speculation. Sometimes, it is possible to leak information with a single iteration of an attack, although this is rare and not easy to achieve [3, 33, 35], especially when the attacker does not have full control of the victim. Delay-on-Squash does not protect against such attacks, as they are indistinguishable (and are, in fact, part of) normal execution. Instead, if such protections are required, Delay-on-Squash can be combined with other defense mechanisms, such as traditional defenses against side-channel attacks (Section 8). With Delay-on-Squash offering low overhead protection against many side-channel attacks (as most attacks require multiple iterations [3, 33, 35]), the additional defenses need only to focus on the remaining cases, lowering the complexity and overhead needed. Specifically:

- For TL side-channels, as defined by Skarlatos et al. [48], that require microarchitectural amplification to leak information, Delay-on-Squash stops speculative execution of all instructions that have been squashed once in the instruction window. The TL of Delay-on-Squash is always 1 (only one iteration is allowed), as Delay-on-Squash always waits until all possible handles in the ROB have been resolved. In comparison, the hardware-only version of Jamais Vu, Clear-on-Retire [48], can have a TL of up to ROB-1, depending on the number of handles that can be found in the ROB.

- However, non-transient leakage (NTL) side-channels that require no microarchitectural amplification to leak information fall outside the scope of Delay-on-Squash and information leakage remains the same with or without Delay-on-Squash. For security against such attacks, some other defense would be needed in parallel. The benefit of Delay-on-Squash in these cases is that it relieves us from having to defend against both TL and NTL side-channels and allows us to concentrate on NTL, for which much more efficient defenses have been proposed (Section 8).

In addition to preventing microarchitectural replay attacks, we also want to ensure that Delay-on-Squash does not introduce any new side-channels into the system. As already discussed, the state kept by the mechanism (Bloom filters, etc.) needs to be kept isolated from other contexts and stored/restored on a context switch. This prevents the attacker from manipulating Delay-on-Squash either to “make it forget” a replayed instruction or to introduce unnecessary overheads in the victim application. At the same time, the attacker cannot in any way probe the information that the Delay-on-Squash mechanism has of the victim, as that would allow the attacker to ascertain which instructions the victim has executed. These can be enforced by the hardware by isolating the mechanism between contexts and storing it in an encrypted manner on a context switch, much like the rest of the context (e.g., the register file) is already stored.
Table 1. Simulated System Parameters

| Parameter                      | Value                  |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| Technology node               | 22 nm @ 3.4 GHz        |
| ROB size                      | 192                    |
| Issue/Execute/Commit width    | 8                      |
| Cache line size               | 64 bytes               |
| L1 private cache size         | 32 KiB, 8-way          |
| L1 access latency             | 2 cycles               |
| L2 shared cache size          | 1 MiB, 16-way          |
| L2 access latency             | 20 cycles              |
| Number of Bloom filters       | 2                      |
| Number of bits, hash functions per filter | 128, 2 |
| Hash width                    | lg(128) = 7 bits       |
| Hash function                 | 1 Xor-gate per hash bit|

Finally, as Delay-on-Squash prevents instructions from executing under certain conditions, it raises whether it can be used to mount a Denial-of-Service attack on the victim. Although Delay-on-Squash can affect the performance of the victim negatively, as long as instructions are being committed from the head of the RO (which is never delayed by Delay-on-Squash) then execution will not stall. Execution can only stall if the victim is caught into an execute-squash-replay loop (due to a microarchitectural replay attack), in which case no forward progress would have been made even if Delay-on-Squash was not present. In practice, when execution is slowed down for any significant amount of time, due to an attack, the hardware should be designed to notify the software, allowing it to take appropriate measures to prevent the leakage and ensure that the system does not stall.

7 EVALUATION

We use the gem5 simulator [8] together with the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite [11] for the performance evaluation, combined with McPAT [31] and CACTI [32] for the energy evaluation. We generate simpoints with ScarPhase [46] and, for each simpoint, start with a 1 billion instruction warmup (990 million fast memory warm up and 10 million detailed pipeline warm up) followed by a 100 million instruction detailed simulation. The main parameters of the simulated system can be seen in Table 1. We have not performed an extensive evaluation of the most efficient hash function implementation. We have used a hash function that is based on one 2-input Xor gate per bit in the hash (i.e., two bits of the PC are Xored together). The delay of a single Xor gate is negligible and can easily be performed in parallel with other operations in the pipeline.

To avoid mixing different energy models, we estimate the energy expenditure of the additional handle and squash tracking structures as existing similar structures in McPAT that we size appropriately. Specifically, the handle/shadow-tracking mechanism is modeled as an additional ROB structure, the Bloom filters as register files, and the hash functions for the Bloom filters as an additional integer arithmetic unit. Each hash function consists of seven bits, and with each bit requiring one Xor gate, the total gate count for a single hash is seven. With an issue width of eight and two hash functions per instruction the total number of Xor gates for all hash functions is 112. In comparison, a single 64-bit parallel adder, such as Kogge-Stone, has 128 Xor gates and significantly many more And and Or gates. We have also tried to directly use bits from the PC to index into the Bloom filter, achieving similar performance results. This indicates that it might be possible
to completely eliminate the hash functions and instead use already available bits associated with each instruction to populate the Bloom filter. We leave such optimizations as future work.

We evaluate the following configurations in detail:

- **Baseline**: The insecure out-of-order CPU in gem5.
- **Delay-All**: A lower-bound, non-speculative configuration where all instructions are delayed until no unsafe handles precede them. To make the comparison with the Delay-on-Squash configurations fair, Delay-All utilizes the same handle-tracking mechanism as Delay-on-Squash to detect when a handle is safe (Section 5.2.2).
- **Delay-on-Squash (Perfect)**: The ideal implementation of Delay-on-Squash, as described in Section 5.1. We assume that we have unlimited space for storing all squashed instructions for as long as necessary.
- **Delay-on-Squash (Bloom)**: The actual implementation of Delay-on-Squash with Bloom filters, as described in Section 5.2, with the Bloom filter parameters seen in Table 1. We chose these parameters empirically to balance performance, area, and energy usage.

In each case, the defense being evaluated is enabled for the whole duration of the execution.

### 7.1 Performance

Figure 4 contains the number of instructions per cycle (IPC), normalized to the insecure out-of-order baseline. In addition, it also contains the baseline number of squashes per 1,000 instructions (SPKI). Overall, implementing Delay-All, which we are only including as a lower-bound configuration, would lead to 40% lower performance, when compared to the baseline. However, implementing Delay-on-Squash with a perfect filter would eliminate almost all performance cost, reaching 99% of the baseline performance. Only one application has any perceptible performance degradation, sphinx (−11%), which misspeculates and squashes more often than average. In some cases, the same static instructions exist in the ROB in multiple dynamic instances, such as when a loop is dynamically unrolled in the ROB (Section 5.1). If a squash happens in such a situation, all instances of the static instructions will be conservatively treated by Delay-on-Squash, as potential replay attacks and speculation will be restricted in a large part of the dynamic instruction window. In contrast, applications like cactusADM and lbm, which rarely misspeculate, are not affected at all. However, the amount of misspeculation in the application is not the only parameter that affects its performance with the perfect filter, and in fact, there is no correlation between the SPKI and the performance. Instead, the application’s sensitivity to instruction-level parallelism and memory-level parallelism (MLP) is also important. Restricting the speculative execution of an application that relies on instruction-level parallelism and MLP to achieve high performance can lead to more severe performance penalties, when compared with an application that does not rely on either [19, 44].
Finally, we have the realistic Delay-on-Squash implementation, based on the Bloom filters, with the parameters described in Table 1. Alongside the IPC, in Figure 5 we can also see the false-positive rate of the applications (i.e., the number of false positives in the Bloom filter over the number of instructions executed). On average, we observe one false positive every 210 instructions (a rate of roughly 0.5%), but this number differs significantly between all applications. The application that has the highest false-positive rate (mcf) also has lower performance, but that is not true for the application with the second highest rate (omnetpp). Once again, we see that the false-positive rate of the filter does not necessarily affect the performance of the application. In fact, the application whose performance is affected the most is libquantum (−16%), which is not one of the applications with the highest false-positive rates. Instead, libquantum is a streaming benchmark that relies heavily on MLP, so it is heavily affected by any restrictions to parallelism. At the same time, libquantum has the highest SPKI (42) out of all applications, although once again there is overall no clear correlation between the SPKI and the benchmark behavior.

Overall, for Delay-on-Squash with the Bloom filters, we observe a mean performance of 97% of the baseline, 2 percentage points lower than the ideal version. Given that secure enclaves already exchange performance for higher security guarantees, a 3% performance degradation is insignificant.

Table 2 compares Delay-on-Squash against several state-of-the-art speculative side-channel mitigation techniques that can (partially) prevent microarchitectural replay attacks. To be noted, the table only shows the types of side-channels that they protect against and the reported performance, without considering the precise threat model or the complexity of the proposed techniques, such as required modifications to the core, caches, and coherence protocol, among others. Several proposed techniques hide [2, 23, 42, 56], delay [44, 49], or undo [25, 41] the microarchitectural state of
speculative load instructions. Such techniques (partially) protect the memory hierarchy but leave it harder to exploit side-channels unprotected for improved performance. At the same time, side-channels that exploit the memory hierarchy often use persistent state that is only changed once evicted by other operations, resulting in relatively reliable side-channels, hence microarchitectural replay attacks might not even be necessary to begin with. Techniques that protect against all speculative side-channels, such as the most restrictive version of context-sensitive fencing (CSF) [49], incur high performance overheads. Jamais Vu’s [48] Clear-on-Retire has a similar performance as Delay-on-Squash but allows more replays to be performed for serial and nested microarchitectural replay attacks.

7.2 Energy Usage

The energy usage of the different configurations can be seen in Figure 6. Each bar in the figure is split into four parts, representing (from bottom to top) dynamic, static, DRAM, and overhead energy. The overhead contains both the dynamic and static energy usage of the squash tracking mechanism and the Bloom filters, and is only included in the Bloom filter configuration, as that is the only configuration where we have a realistic hardware design.

Overall, there are two factors that affect the energy usage in the various configurations: the number of executed instructions and execution time. Although we simulated all checkpoints to the same number of committed instructions, the number of (dynamically) executed instructions varies depending on the amount of speculation and squashing. Specifically, instructions that are executed speculatively and are squashed still require energy, but this energy is not used for useful work. For this reason, the dynamic energy usage of the applications is reduced in the strict Delay-All version.

However, although restricted speculation improves the dynamic energy usage, the static and DRAM energy usage are instead increased, because both depend on the execution time, which is increased. Specifically, unless power- or clock-gated, the CPU has the same amount of leakage regardless if instructions are executed or not. Then, the longer the CPU has to be active, the more the static energy increases. Similarly, DRAM cells need to be refreshed at regular intervals, so the DRAM energy increases with the execution time. Overall, these effects overshadow the energy gains provided by the reduced misspeculation, so the Delay-All version has an overall energy usage that is 20% higher than the baseline.
In contrast, Delay-on-Squash, with a perfect filter, is identical to the baseline. The performance difference between the two versions is very small, so there are no significant differences in the static and DRAM energy, and speculation is not restricted enough to lead to any energy usage reductions. As we are not modeling the filter mechanism, there is no overhead, but it is important to note that storing and accessing all squashed instructions in the window of speculation would introduce very large overheads.

However, the Bloom filter version has a 4% energy overhead over the baseline, out of which half (2 percentage points) is due to the increase in execution time and half is due to the overhead of the mechanism. Increasing the size of the Bloom filters (to decrease the performance overhead) would lead to an overall increase in the energy overhead, as the gains (due to the small reduction in the execution time) would be overshadowed by the increased overhead due to the larger structures.

8 RELATED WORK

Jamais Vu. There exists only one other comprehensive solution to the problem of microarchitectural replay attacks, Jamais Vu [48], which requires compiler support to offer a good balance between security and performance. It comes with three main variants:

- **Clear-on-Retire**, a hardware-only solution that is only effective against attacks utilizing a single handle while having similar performance overheads to Delay-on-Squash.
- **Epoch**, a combined software and hardware solution that requires compiler support to protect against attacks that utilize multiple handles, or even attacks that go beyond the ROB, but at higher overhead. As we have explained in our threat model (Section 4), we consider such attacks outside the scope of microarchitectural replay. For comparison, instead of having compiler-defined epochs that can span whole loops, Delay-on-Squash can be thought of as having hardware autodetected epochs that span the window of speculation.
- **Counter**, a conservative approach where instructions are never removed from the replay filters, which has the worst performance overhead when compared against the other two variants (23%, as reported by Skarlatos et al.).

The critical difference between Delay-on-Squash and Jamais Vu is that Delay-on-Squash is designed to protect against attacks where replay is achieved through purely microarchitectural methods, whereas Jamais Vu also considers replay iterations due to the software architecture. We consider such attacks to not be microarchitectural replay attacks, as the replay is not done using microarchitectural methods (Section 4). Because of this insight, we are able to offer a solution that does not require any software modifications, does not introduce any additional overheads, and is more secure (lower TL) than the equivalent hardware-only variant of Jamais Vu. However, it is also possible to combine the two methods, with Delay-on-Miss relieving some of the higher overhead mechanisms pressure of Jamais Vu, allowing for wider security with lower overheads.

Other related enclave attacks and defenses. Controlled-channel attacks [55] and Sneaky Page Monitoring (SPM) [52] use the fact that the page management is delegated to the OS to monitor the access patterns of the victim directly and leak information. As the OS has full control over the page system, such attacks can have low to zero noise and do not need to be repeated several times, so no microarchitectural replay is necessary. CacheZoom [37] is another attack that uses fine-grained control to perform a side-channel, but it only targets cache side-channels. As per our threat model (Section 4), we consider such attacks outside the scope of our work, as when such attacks are possible, there is no reason for an attacker to employ microarchitectural replay. We will, however, note that there exist solutions for such side-channel attacks, such as Klotski by Zhang et al. [61], but they come with steep performance and area overheads (up to 10× in execution time, depending on the configuration, for Klotski). There also exist speculative side-channel attacks that
abuse speculative execution to gain access to SGX data, such as Zombieload [45] or TLBleed [21]. Such attacks are affected from the same noise issues as any other side-channel attack, and they can in fact benefit by microarchitectural replay.

**Side-channel defenses.** There are numerous works on side-channel attacks and defenses [17], particularly when it comes to cache side-channels [33]. Examples include disruptive prefetching or cache partitioning to hide the cache access patterns [12, 14, 28, 40] or oblivious RAM to hide memory access patterns [61]. Each of these solutions tries to prevent or limit the creation of specific side-channels and comes with different costs and limitations. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no published work evaluating the total cost of implementing all of the different solutions that would have been necessary to prevent all of the side-channels that microarchitectural replay attacks, such as MicroScope, can amplify. In addition, only perfect solutions would be effective, as otherwise even the smallest observable side effects can be amplified by MicroScope. However, with Delay-on-Squash in place, a system would only need defenses against the limited range of attacks that do not require microarchitectural replay, making it possible to offer comprehensive security with reasonable complexity and overheads.

**Speculative side-channel defenses.** There is a critical difference between microarchitectural replay and speculative side-channel attacks: the latter abuse speculative execution to illegally gains access to information during the wrong execution path, whereas microarchitectural replay attacks can amplify the correct path and leak information that has been accessed legally. Defenses and optimizations that only try to block the wrong execution path [29, 50, 62] will not work against MicroScope or other microarchitectural replay attacks. Furthermore, during a speculative side-channel attack, there is a data dependence chain between the illegal access and the information-leaking instructions, whereas in a microarchitectural replay attack, the handle and the side-channel instructions have to be independent. State-of-the-art defenses that block the transmission of speculative accessed data to potential side-channel instructions, such as NDA [54], STT [58, 59], and others [5, 6, 15, 30], are ineffective in this context, because, under microarchitectural replay, the side-channel instructions may actually be in the correct path of execution and can also be fed with non-speculative data. At the same time, other defenses that are not restricted to data dependencies, such as InvisiSpec [56], Delay-on-Miss [43, 44], and many others [2, 23, 25, 26, 41, 42, 49], only focus on specific side-channels, under the assumption that not all side-channels can be exploited as easily. However, the effectiveness of microarchitectural replay attacks comes precisely from the fact that they can be used to amplify and successfully mount attacks that are hard to exploit, making these speculative side-channel defenses also unfit for our purposes. Even so, with Delay-on-Squash as the base (similar to the non-speculative side-channels), some of these defenses can be modified to only cover the cases not covered by Delay-on-Squash, offering better overall security with lower overheads.

9 CONCLUSION

Microarchitectural side-channel attacks rely on observable $\mu$-state changes caused by the victim application under attack. Such observations are commonly noisy, for example, due to the extremely short lifetime of transient $\mu$-state or due to system interference that causes a persistent $\mu$-state to change. To successfully launch an attack, the side-channel has to be amplified and denoised by being repeated several times. This is the specific purpose of MicroScope and microarchitectural replay attacks, which trap the victim application in a loop, causing it to execute the side-channel over and over again. MicroScope specifically has proven to be successful in leaking information from secure enclaves, but microarchitectural replay attacks, in general, may have broader applicability. At the same time, although these attacks do abuse speculative execution, existing speculative side-channel defenses are unable to mitigate them.
We make the observation that such replay attacks rely on repeated squashes of replay handles, and that the instructions causing the side-channel must reside in the same ROB window as the handles. Based on this observation, we propose Delay-on-Squash, a hardware-only technique for tracking squashed instructions and stopping them from being replayed. We further describe that Delay-on-Squash can be efficiently realized using Bloom filters and speculative shadow tracking [43].

We evaluate several configurations with different parameters, and we show that a fully secure system against microarchitectural replay attacks (according to the threat model) comes at a mere 3% performance degradation when compared to a baseline, insecure out-of-order CPU while also keeping the energy cost low, at 4% over the baseline.

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