Political and Military Turbulences in the International Arena: Cold War and the New-Cold War in the Context of the Security of the European Continent

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Abstract:

**Purpose:** This article presents the challenges and threats that determine Europe's security. While creating the catalogue the authors show the characteristics of the threats to the Cold War and New-Cold War realities. Historical and comparative analysis lead to conclusions and proposals that the authors formulate as a postulate of changes for Europe in the face of changes taking place in the contemporary security environment.

**Approach/Methodology/Design:** The adopted research methods, such as: critical analysis of literature, historical analysis, comparative analysis are focused on the Cold War and New-Cold War rivalry and its impact on the security of Europe. The aim of the research is possible to achieve by supplementing the above methods with the extrapolation method, which is a kind of bridge connecting the realities of the Cold War world and New-Cold war.

**Findings:** Research focused on historical analysis and extrapolation methods show changes in the subjectivity and objectivity of turbulences in Europe over the years (Cold War and New-Cold War). Cyclicality as the basic element of extrapolation shows many similarities and differences between the described periods and their impact on international security.

**Practical Implications:** The research diagnoses safety in Europe. The results of the comparative analysis show the differences between the era of the Cold War and the new Cold War, and the consequence is to show the reasons for the process of the new balance of power in Europe. The results of the work are a valuable explanation of what is happening in Europe - the weaker role of the USA, NATO’s capabilities and tasks, Russia’s new pact for Europe, actions in Ukraine and Belarus.

**Originality/Value:** The declaration of originality of the topic is an analysis of Europe's security from a comparative perspective of the Cold War and the new Cold War, and an indication of new methods, techniques and tools in the international security environment.

**Keywords:** International security, cold war, new-cold war, the United States, Russian Federation, North Atlantic Alliance, European Union, Europeanization, de-Europeanization.

**JEL classification:** F51, F52, F53, F54.

**Paper Type:** Research study.

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1. Introduction

It is assumed that the term "Cold War" was popularized by the American journalist Walter Lippmann and has been used in the media since 1947. On the other hand, the expression "cold war" was used for the first time by the 16th-century Spanish writer don Juan Manuel (McCauley, 2001). It was him who, observing the Christian-Islamic wars, stated that the difference between the hot and cold war lies in the way they end. He defined it by saying that a cold war being extremely violent and fought fiercely ends either with death or peace, while a cold war never ends with peace, nor does it bring honor to those waging it (Thorne, 1985).

Political and military events taking place on the European continent in the first decade since the end of World War II, testified to the fact that the existing allies recognized that the time of joint ventures had passed and that their particular interests, partly agreed upon during the Yalta conference, should be pursued (Bull and Watson, 1985).

From year to year, each party made each other responsible for the deteriorating political and military situation. The breakthrough was the events of the beginning of 1946, when Stalin informed the world about the concept of returning to what had not been realized in the 1920s, i.e., transferring the "torch of communism" to the West and Churchill set up an "iron curtain" dividing Europe in two. It can be said that a "flywheel" was activated in the area of mutual suspicion and unscrewing the spiral of armaments, not only conventional, but also nuclear ones. There appeared armed conflicts on a local scale, with the danger of turning them into regional conflicts as well as into global ones (Gaddis, 2007).

With the end of World War II, the foreign policy of the United States of America changed significantly. So far, the USA had consistently implemented a policy of isolationism towards European states. It was up-to-date with some exceptions from 1823. Events related to what happened in the world, and thus on the European continent, during World War II radically changed the current perception of foreign policy. Perhaps the "big US capital" felt it was time to do more with countries that were often far from their borders.

Undoubtedly, this was the perception of this issue of the new world map, on which two nations could compete: the American and the Soviet. It is them who in the near future would build the world security system, including a number of countries, especially smaller ones, or those created in connection with the decolonization of the British and French spheres of influence, after the earlier arrangements of the late US president, with the above-mentioned countries. So the superpower race to expand the spheres of influence would begin, and thus the subordination of states, not only those closest to one or another superpower, but possessing rich mineral resources or strategic location.
2. Cold War

Many aspects of this strange war, known as the Cold War, were presented by Mark Trachtenberg (Trachtenberg, 1999). It is also worth mentioning the works of John Levis Gaddis or Robert McMahon (McMahon, 1995), which present to the reader what was happening then on the European continent, not only in the area of international security. At this point, it is reasonable to present the only correct definition of the concept of the Cold War. It is difficult because practically every politician or political scientist has tried or is trying to define this phenomenon according to their own criteria. The best definition cold war was used to describe the state of international relations, associated with open hostility, constant tension, politics from a position of strength, an arms race, sharp confrontation on the brink of war and a multidimensional, global struggle waged by two opposing socio-political systems (Neumann, 1995).

The beginning of the 1950s is a new situation on the international arena. The ANZUS Treaty (USA, Australia, New Zealand), known as the Pacific Security Treaty, was established (1951). An important event for Soviet-American relations was the implementation of the directive of the National Security Council of the NSC 68 of May 14, 1950, allowing the outbreak of a war with the USSR with the use of nuclear weapons at a time when other means of political and economic persuasion failed and the USSR's policy would continue to pose a threat to the US security (Hogan, 1987).

Incidentally, it was a validation of an earlier top-secret attack plan on the USSR, developed under the code name "Dropshot" in December 1949 by the Joint Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces, whose date of explosion was scheduled for 1957. According to McMahon, the plan was based on the assumption that the United States would be forced to war as a result of the aggression of the USSR and its satellites. The armed forces of the US and the allies, making a strategic offensive in Eurasia and a strategic defensive in the Far East, were to destroy the armed forces of the USSR and the armies of other countries referred to as "Soviet forces" and to break down the will to resist. The bombing would involve 300 atomic bombs and 250,000 conventional bombs. The prediction of the total nature of the war is proved by the planning to use other weapons of mass destruction, i.e. radiological, biological, chemical and bacteriological weapons (McMahon, 2003).

Another important document, issued by the American side, concerning a potential armed conflict was the doctrine of "mass retaliation", officially presented in January 1954. It provided for the use of both nuclear weapons in total and limited war (Gaddis, 2007).

In autumn 1954, the Paris Agreement comes into force (the relevant documents were signed on October 23, 1954 in Paris). According to it, the USA (Hoffmann, 1977)
and NATO members admitted the Federal Republic of Germany to the group of countries of the political and military alliance. Soviet diplomacy took a number of steps to convince the United States on an alternative solution to the issue of international security, consisting in the inclusion of the Soviet Union and socialist states in NATO structures. The final version was presented in 1955 during the Geneva conference.

According to the Soviet side, this formula of the alliance guaranteed international (European) security, including that of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. During the talks, the Soviet side suggested signing an agreement on building a security system in Europe until a new security treaty for the continent was generated. The United States and the European countries that made up NATO did not accept the proposals. It can be assumed that they feared a slow escalation of actions by the Soviet side, aimed at "carrying the torch of communism" to the countries of Western Europe and the countries of the Far East. Therefore, the decision to include the Federal Republic of Germany in the alliance was upheld (McCauley, 2008).

In response to this decision, the Soviet side and the socialist states had no choice but to organize several demonstrations in the capitals of socialist states, under slogans stigmatizing the revival of militarism in Western states. It was emphasized that Western states actively support the building of the military potential of the Federal Republic of Germany, thus contributing to the revival of revanchism, which could pose a threat to peaceful coexistence on the European continent in the future. Probably the resistance of the United States of America and the countries of Western Europe was a consequence of the changes that appeared in the views on communism in a growing number of American society and Western European countries.

Warren H. Carroll (2008) rightly points out that the beginning and mid-1950s were the time of the most anti-communist sentiment in the West since the end of World War II. True anti-communist rhetoric was flowing, especially in the United States, including a loud and protracted debate over whether the policy of containment of communism, originally embodied in the Truman doctrine, should not be transformed into a policy of releasing from the communist loop (Carroll, 2008).

The appropriate indoctrination of the societies of the so-called people's democracy (on the other side of the so-called iron curtain, also invested in indoctrination), including Poland, led many intellectuals in publications to indicate NATO as a potential threat to European security. This was confirmed by, among others, assessment of this situation made by M. Leffler.

The Atlantic military bloc was created with the expenditure of enormous costs and material resources in the name of allegedly defending the ideals of the Western world "against" aggression from the east. The peaceful policy of the Soviet Union and socialist countries refuted these absurd myths from scratch, proved in their
entirety that the ultimate result of defending these "ideals" was the transformation of NATO countries in obedient US satellites, completely drawn into the current of Washington's dangerous Policy (Leffler, 1994).

At a time when international conferences aimed at reducing conventional and nuclear weapons were held, the two superpowers did not stop working on expanding their nuclear arsenals for a moment. Data from 1950 confirms this. At that time, the United States of America had 170 nuclear bombs, and the Soviet Union only 5. However, by the end of the 1950s, the USA had about 20,000. bombs, and the USSR - 1.7 thousand (Judt, 2008).

According to US military analysts, the threat was not their number, but the possession of the means to carry them. Even before 1957, the Soviet side had carried out a successful test with the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile at a distance of several thousand kilometers into the area of Siberia. They worked intensively on ballistic missiles launched from submarines, although in fact until the 1960s, using submarines that were surfacing, and their range was about 1000 km (Marples, 2006).

The US administration was shocked by the event in August 1957, when the Soviet Union made the first successful attempt with an ICBM. The answer was the decision of the NATO Council on December 19, 1957, to locate nuclear warhead warehouses on the European continent, in NATO countries, and to hand over a number of American medium-range missiles under the orders of the NATO commander in Europe. Thus, tactical nuclear weapons were handed over to US allies in Europe. Nevertheless, according to the agreement referred to as the so-called "double key", means of carrying nuclear loads were at the disposal of the authorities of individual countries, while the nuclear warheads were placed in warehouses on US military bases (Paterson, 1992).

At that time, many military analysts of the time recognized that the outbreak of a military conflict with the use of nuclear weapons would be the beginning of the end of civilization and the world would self-destruct (Gaddis, 2007).

Another "turmoil" in the international arena took place in the fall of 1958, when the so-called West Berlin problem appeared. While this crisis caused a significant increase in international tensions, it did not have serious consequences. According to many political scientists, including prof. Zbigniew Brzeziński, the stake in these actions was not Berlin, but the displacement of the United States from the European continent, which would allow the USSR to take control of Western Europe in a short time. The above-mentioned prof. Brzezinski said that both Berlin crises were the most obvious indication of the Soviet decision to sever security ties between America and Europe (McCauley, 2008).
The culmination of this event was the construction of the wall dividing Berlin (Cowley, 2009). The shooting down of an American U-2 reconnaissance plane led to a drastic "cooling down" of the US-USSR relationship.

A dangerous event was the so-called Cuban - US - Soviet conflict (Gaddis, 2008). Undoubtedly, the above crisis, known as the "Cuban Missile Crisis", was the most dangerous moment during the Cold War. This crisis was to be the final confrontation between East and West. In John Levis’ opinion it was the only accident after World War II in which all the most important areas of Soviet-American rivalry intersected. The crisis was a kind of funnel into which everything suddenly fell and mixed up.

Fortunately, there was no black hole on the other side. The shock caused by the crisis led to decisive action in the field of international disarmament and closer cooperation in the construction of the so-called trust measures, especially between the US and the USSR. The measurable effects were: 1) "Memorandum on the agreement between the USSR and the USA on the establishment of a direct line of communication" (colloquially referred to as the "hot line"), 2) the "Treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, outer space and under water signed on March 5, 1963 in Moscow (Gaddis, 2008).\n
The 1960s was a time when relaxation was replaced by an arms race, and emerging military doctrines increased mutual suspicion. The world once again faced the threat of a global armed conflict.

3. New-Cold War

The extrapolation method is the starting point for the process of falsifying some of the assumptions of F. Fukuyama and S. Huntington. The first of the authors in his thesis on the end of history pointed to liberal democracy as the absolute of political systems, giving it the meaning of "the end of history". The American political scientist pointed out two determining factors - lustful (human needs) and timothey - which, according to the author, lead to the introduction of and then preserving democracy as the pinnacle of the regime (Migalski, 2020).

Extrapolation shows the cyclical nature of events - in relation to F. Fukuyama's thesis it is the appearance of populist moods, which take the form of repetition. M. Migalski describes the above phenomenon stating that a few months after F. Fukuyama published his famous essay on liberal democracy as the end of history, Seiji Ogawa for the first time used functional magnetic resonance to study the brain (J.B. and M.Z - fMRI). Had he known the results of the research that saw the light of day in the following decades, he would never have formulated a thesis that brought him worldwide fame (Migalski, 2020).

The second author, S. Huntington, argued that the wars for the territory and raw materials would end, and the most important field of wars and conflicts would
become civilization and human civilization predilection. The example of the annexation of the Crimean peninsula, tensions in the Arctic, growing threats related to water deficit (JB and MZ - the waterstress phenomenon) is an exemplification that resources and territory are still an imperative for contemporary disputes and take the form of cyclical events that can be found on the timeline of international relations. In the dynamically changing security environment, tendencies leading to the division of the world into two poles are visible. The similarities and some parallels to the turbulences of the Cold War described in this article should be limited to the division of the world into two camps, which would be centered around two leaders.

In the new Cold War, however, it would be the United States and China, whose rivalry for primacy (Huat, 2017).

The above parallel appears in this article to show the meaning of extrapolation. Graham Allison in his analysis takes us to the 4th century BCE to compare the Peloponnesian War with the contemporary American-Chinese rivalry. In the literature on the subject, "Thucydides' trap" should be presented as a phenomenon of a security dilemma, which means uncertainty as to the intentions of other countries, there is a phenomenon of distrust and a lack of a sense of security. If the mistrust is mutual, we are dealing with a situation where the lack of a sense of security in one country creates the same situation in another.

This phenomenon is known as the "security dilemma". The security dilemma understood in this way constitutes a significant barrier to cooperation between states, as they do not trust each other and are afraid of engaging in such cooperation. The above phenomenon is determined by the desire for superpower, and achieving it, which J. Mearsheimer shows in his thesis, claiming that by becoming the most powerful state of the system you can feel completely safe (Williams, 2012).

Allison (2018) implements the above term and shows an extrapolation embedding a comparison between the 5th century BC and the second and third decades of the 21st century AD. According to the author, the concept of Thucydides' trap refers to the natural and inevitable sense of surprise and frustration that arises when an aspiring competitor begins to threaten the position of the current leader. Today, this trap is driving the two world powers towards a catastrophe that they do not want but may not be able to prevent (Allison, 2018).

The historical analysis of the Cold War realities included in this article, focused on the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, shows the intensification of threats between the two blocs. Nowadays, an increase in tension is also noticed - analogous to the one described in historical analysis - between powers.

The explanation of the conclusions of the research carried out can be based on the famous speech by W. Putin at the Munich Security Conference on February 10,
2007. During his speech, the President of the Russian Federation announced that he would break up with a unipolar world for a multipolar world. Multilateralism, which has dominated the modern security environment, is one of the key determinants of the production of new-cold-war conditions (similarity is visible in the description of the Cold War realities of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s - J.B. and M.Z.) (Friedman, Oskanian, Pardo, 2013).

The speech was aggressive and indicated a revival of Cold War resentments in a new version (Flockhart, 2016). The New-Cold War is a change in the subjective and objective dimensions. The above change takes place in the form of new-old actors - the contemporary axis of the dispute is between the US and China (and its allies). The above process of emerging a new actor - a competitor for the USA described by P. Khanna, who states that when the West was involved in waging and winning the Cold War, Asia started catching up. Over the past forty years, it has achieved the largest share in world economic growth, and Westerners, especially those belonging to the middle class, are the smallest (Khanna, 2020).

The above trend, the peak of which is 2017 (then representatives of 68 countries from around the world launched the project "Belt Initiative and the Trail", which is the greatest ennoblement of the Chinese civilization and economic leap - J.B and M.Z.) is the beginning of the modern Thucydides trap. The analysis conducted by P. Khanna is an imperative for the research and conclusions presented in this article. P. Khanna presenting China as a global player - rival of the United States in the new Cold War. However, he builds his thesis on science and conclusions drawn from history, stressing that the historical outline gives the reader a context to understand current events.

Henry Kisinger writes about the complexity of the new conditions, at the same time showing the similarities and analogies to the events of the Cold War (especially the period described in this article). He points out the conclusion for a state focused around the transatlantic area by saying that to play a responsible role in the evolution of the 21-st century world order, the United States must know what it wants to prevent and how to do it (Kissinger, 2017).

Drawing conclusions on the Cold War rivalry, on their foundation to build a strategy that takes into account the bridge for those events of the New-Cold War (James, Wasser, Connable, Grand Clermont, 2017). Permanent tension between the two blocks takes place today, as it characterized the relations between the enemy camps during the Cold War. The subjective criterion becomes the source of a new division - new blocks, new actors.

However, apart from the subjective criterion, one should also notice the changes taking place in the subject area. A number of new threats appear, which arise from hybrid activities, information activities (both offensive and defensive ones) - differing from the realities of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. Changes in the subject
dimension are described by R. Shirreff and O’Hanlon, who indicates that preparations for a new type of war began. Not military, but equally severe, as you can see from the results. Hybrid warfare is part of this phenomenon. And it lasts all the time (Shirreff, 2017; O’Hanlon, 2017).

Transformations in the modern world on which the character of the new-cold war is built was defined by M. O’Hanlon as new architecture in global security in the 21st century (O’Hallon, 2017). The last dozen or so years have seen a rapid development of civilization, dominated by megatrends, manifested by technological progress and the widespread use of it in everyday life. According to military thought, it is stated that the nature of military operations depends directly on the era in which they are conducted (Bartels, Kellner, and Optenhogel, 2017).

In terms of technological progress, network-centric activities are gaining in importance, and it is around them that the strategy of fighting in the realities of the new-cold-war is being built.

The Network Centric War (NCW) relies mainly on the information advantage, which will lead to an advantage in combat operations. In connection with the development of civilization and technology, the modernization of the armed forces is also required in this area in order to increase military capabilities. This is related to an increase in the effectiveness of military operations and a quantitative reduction in the armies of most countries.

Despite the fact that the terminology in this topic is wide and the terms "network centric combat", "network centric actions", "network centric operation", "network war" or "dimensional fight" are used alternately, all these terms refer to the information advantage that will be used in order to achieve the desired effect (Olczyk, 2019).

In general, the concept of network-centric activities is a source of controversy, and there is no definition yet acceptable to all professionals. To some Network Centric Warfare is a concept while to others a method of military operations. Despite the differences of opinion, it can be safely stated that in times of such IT development, Network-centricity is the concept that best describes the ways of organizing and conducting military operations. The above-mentioned threats are exemplified by the report of the American cybersecurity company Crowdstrike, according to which hackers from China, Russia and North Korea are leaders in cyberattacks and conduct new-cold-war activities aimed at Western countries.

4. Conclusion

The new cold war and its character that brings changes in the subjective dimension and subject matter, is a valid reason for formulating questions about the condition of the United States as a superpower and its role in the context of shaping European
security. The North Atlantic Alliance, and above all its leader, the United States, are facing new challenges focused on the changes taking place in the contemporary security environment. M. O’Hanlon describing the current trends in more detail, points to the factor of weakening conventional threats in favor of unconventional threats, which will take newer forms (O’Hanlon, 2017).

Among the most important factors are disinformation and actions in cyberspace and the use of asymmetric combat tools *vide*, use of private military companies. The role and importance of information security and modern technologies used in the armed forces is well diagnosed by analysts of the North Atlantic Alliance, which was reflected in in the preparation of the NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) koncept (O’Halon, 2017).

Research focused on historical analysis, historical analysis and extrapolation methods show changes in the subjectivity and objectivity of turbulences in Europe over the years (Cold War and New-Cold War). Cyclicity as the basic element of extrapolation shows many similarities between the described periods. The last aspect should be added to the above-mentioned differences - which, however, is the starting point for the conclusions and postulates put forward by the authors in the process of building international security in the times of the new-cold-war.

The above aspect is the different role of the United States, which in the described historical analysis was the undisputed leader, a power with a precisely defined strategy and tactics. Today, the United States, as the leader of the North Atlantic Alliance, is a model for other members of this organization. They are also a kind of motivator and a driving force for the entire NATO, in line with the assumptions of the American pillar of the Alliance, which took over a significant part of the responsibility for European security (Bartels, Kellner, and Optenhogel, 2017).

The dangerous trend of reducing financial outlays may cause anxiety within the Treaty. The uncertainty of NATO members is reinforced by the statements of the president of the United States, who suggests to members questioning the idea of increasing contributions that failure to meet this condition may result in the lack of security guarantees from the United States.

To recapitulate, the thesis of B. Buzan should be quoted, who argued that the lower presence of the United States in Europe, the greater resistance of the Old Continent to the prevailing turmoil. A leading security scientist, however, formulated this thesis in the realities of the Cold War.

Today, the United States will be forced to partially relinquish its military influence in Europe due to economic and geopolitical issues. According to the calculations of the US Congressional Budget Office, the path of US GDP growth is estimated, which will be subject to a negative correction in real dollars by 8 trillion dollars by
2030. A reasonable parallel is the comparison of the presented scale with the nine annual US military budgets (Bartosiak, 2020).

On the other hand, the reorientation of perceptions and actions towards the Pacific region is the result of the trend described in this article as the "age of Asia" in P. Khanna's analysis. Thus, the new-cold-war becomes a challenge because the turmoil in Europe must wait for the responses of the Old Continent countries - with weaker support or a firm withdrawal of the United States. Therefore, a question that is a paraphrase of B. Buzan's thesis from years ago becomes justified - is Europe stronger when the US involvement is weaker? (Miller and Fontaine, 2017).

According to Ruszkowski, the period of the new-cold-war is characterized by an institutional threat, which manifests itself in the *spill-back* mechanism (Ruszkowski, 2019). According to Lindberg, *spill-back* occurs when actors withdraw from mutual obligations (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970).

The spill-back mechanism, i.e., reversing the integration processes, and the situation of "turning around", and thus a certain stagnation, is visible in the crisis of both the North Atlantic Alliance and, above all, the crisis of the European Union. The authors' postulate, which results from the analyzes carried out and constitutes a key element of the results and discussions in this article, concerns the two most important organizations - the European Union and NATO.

On their forum there should be a reconfiguration of activities that will adapt to the challenges of the 21st century - the time of the new-cold-war. Learning a lesson from the experience of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s (which are the backbone of historical analysis), the postulate of megatrends, led by the technological revolution, should be placed on the agenda. The above actions constitute an effective and necessary response to the challenges that pose a challenge in the new-cold-war rivalry.

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