Conversation with Carlos Pereda in Mexico: not giving in to the post-truth temptation

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ABSTRACT
There have always been lies and deception. The current peculiarity of this reality is the vague generalized conviction that thought and discourse operate in a vacuum, that there is no world to which they can be compared. However, it is clear that truth continues to matter to us and that the instinct to trust, typical of the social nature of human beings, makes the media’s lack of reliability painful. A very pure or “binary” rationality does not offer any answers. A more integral vision of the knowing subject is necessary. This subject would not enter into relation with others if he or she were merely cognizant. Relation implies the mutual recognition, legitimization, and presupposition of goodwill. The climate created by post-truth requires an education for truth, which is not only for the formation of a critical sense, but also in order to learn to trust and believe, which are both deeply human acts.

Introduction
Carlos Pereda, born in Uruguay in 1944, has lived in Mexico since 1979. He is Professor Emeritus of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), at which he is a member of the Institute for Philosophical Research. His work on argumentation is internationally recognized, and it has mainly been developed in the books Conversar es humano [To Converse is Human] (Pereda 1991), Razón e incertidumbre [Reason and Uncertainty] (Pereda 1994a), Vértigos argumentales: una ética de la disputa [Argumentative Vertigos: An Ethics of Dispute] (Pereda 1994b), Critica de la razón arrogante [Critique of Arrogant Reason] (Pereda 1999), and in numerous articles, such as “¿Qué es un buen argumento?” [“What Is Good Argument?”] (Pereda 1996) and “The Practices of Arguing” (Pereda 2009b). In addition to these, his book Sobre la confianza [On Trust] (Pereda 2009a), is very relevant to the topic of this interview.

The idea of having a conversation with Pereda for the sake of an issue dedicated to post-truth came from the concern that, in 2019, we would be contributing more material to an already overflowing bibliography. The possible overload of discussions of
post-truth on readers made it necessary to have a specific emphasis, which, based on the character of our university and faculty, could reside in philosophical rigor accompanied by a sense of humanity, in the capacity to appeal to all of the faculties of the human person. That is why it seemed to us that Pereda’s work is endowed with a character that is especially apt because of his attention to the argumentative phenomenon that is not limited to its rational aspect, but, as Harada presents it, is a study of the phenomenology of the argumentative experience (Harada O 2010) that goes far beyond the pure argumentative reason, and which involves the person and the community of persons. That is why Zagal notes that this is about more than obtaining criteria for argumentation: he notes that it is not simply argumentation theory but the argumentative experience, it is a question of the formation of the criterion, which also involves attending to the moral character of the arguments and of the people arguing (Zagal 2013, 189). It is no coincidence that Pereda has dedicated a work to trust, which is a primary good belonging to the very constitution of the human animal as person (Pereda 2009a, 36), and the understanding of which is vital to its successful preservation in the age of deceptive communication.

**Doubting because of critical sense or because of confusion**

Post-truth is usually presented as a phenomenon in which facts are displaced by emotions …

For a long time, there have been two phenomena that were connected from a theoretical standpoint. One is the position that affirms that words have no reference, or at least that there is no direct reference.

**That there is no such thing as literal meaning, for example.**

That there is no such thing as literal meaning. This is a theory that post-structuralism brought to the forefront. It is a theory of critical thinking in relation to our capacity to trust references, a theory that tried to show that there are interpretations, biases, and prejudices between us and things. Now this other problem arises, completely from another side, but the two converge. This is the idea of “fake news,” and that it is impossible to distinguish genuine news from false news. The two ideas would seem to say the same thing, but the latter goes against the critical spirit of the former, because it is not about distrusting the reference, but about taking any linguistic symbol as valid. Strangely, the two traditions are connected, even though they have opposite purposes. To put it bluntly: Derrida supporters would feel uneasy if they were linked to Trump supporters. However, in both cases there is what could be called a religion of absence. There is no world with which you can compare what you think. Our speech and thought unfold in a vacuum. This speech and thought in a vacuum is what we might call post-truth.

If you ask me what the possibilities and dangers of post-truth are, I would say that there are only dangers. On one hand, it is true that when we speak and describe the world these descriptions carry our biases, traditions, prejudices, and predispositions, but in spite of all this we can somehow confirm or deny whether or not those descriptions are wrong. There are specific events that appear not to be important, but they
are. For example, if you tell me that Mexico is close to Rome, that is a falsehood. You may tell me that this is an isolated event that does not matter, but it can have repercussions. On the other hand, there is the idea of Quine about general descriptions, that sometimes (always, for him, but I disagree) our confirmations or falsifications are not isolated but global. In some way we always, fortunately, have that contact with reality; and—even though it’s true that at the level of great theories and great abstractions contact with reality becomes difficult—sooner or later reality says no.

Guillermo Hurtado has an article that I think is very important, titled “Why I am not a fallibilist” (Hurtado 2002). It sounds very reasonable for someone to say ‘any of my beliefs could be false’, but it is not sustainable, just as distrust cannot be a foundational principle.

Someone who would propose a theory of language in which he or she would have sense with no reference, would in practice trust many things. That brings us back to Hume’s old idea: ‘Theoretically, I can doubt everything; practically, I am here, sitting, with my friends, greeting them … I do not doubt that’. There is something like a principle of general trust that I cannot doubt. Strictly speaking, there will never be a post-truth era, because we are always going to keep asking: ‘but is that true?’

Truth still matters to us

Even if in a tangential way, could we not indicate as a good by-product of post-truth the fact that we are talking about the truth more than ever before, sometimes in a nostalgic way as if to say, ‘how can we not care!? For example, many statements and positions are attributed to Pope Francis. Sometimes, when I ask: ‘Where is this?, where was it published?’, or ‘When did he say it?’ they respond ‘But didn’t you like it? Didn’t you think it was good?’, ‘Yes…’ ‘Then what does it matter?’

It does matter! It was recently said here that Pope Francis had agreed to be a member of the national reconciliation forums of the new government of Mexico, and I think it was the spokesperson of the Vatican who said that this news was completely baseless (Morales 2018). That ties in a little bit with a story that happened in the United States. Fox News reported that there had been an act of terror in Stockholm, and Trump repeated the idea (Derespina 2017); apparently the Swedish ambassador said he had no such information, and Stockholm was actually at peace. Everything seems to point to the fact that the truth is still a regulative idea and that, however much we try to get rid of it, it would be like getting rid of reality. We cannot do away with it. That is why, in spite of all of our criticisms of the media, we criticize them precisely because we know that we greatly depend on them. It pains us that we cannot trust them, and yet we continue to trust. We know that part of what the media say is perhaps not totally false, but biased.

This reminds me of one of those horrible situations, which occurred at my university. During a long strike, a newspaper said that a certain professor had spoken in favor of it. I happened to know about this, and I knew that twenty professors had spoken out, and only one had spoken in favor. The news, while not being false, was misleading. That is to say, there is real news that leads to deception. I believe that we will always
live in this **chiaroscuro**, but while always looking to clarify something. We know that, in spite of the clarifications we make, we will always have new uncertainties, biases, prejudices, and problems.

That, among other things, is why rhetoric exists, according to Aristotle. He says that truth and justice are stronger than their opposites and that they win in the end (**Rhetoric**, I, 1, 1355a20). But when in the end? You have to help the truth emerge beforehand. There is always the possibility of deception and self-deception, of making mistakes unwittingly or even willingly. These are things that happen to us again and again. This means that the search is never over. Now, we often see that an attempt at clarification as an exercise in objectivity, ‘You, try to be objective, to see things as they are’, which is not as simple as it seems. Returning to that vague description of post-truth with which we began, here we feel the weight that emotions have, or tastes…

… or wishes…

… wishes, yes, there is a lot of wishful thinking (which is a type of self-deception). There is a lot of subjectivity in this, to which we tend to give an overly objective answer. I very much like how this appears in your two books about argumentation (**Pereda** 1994a, 1994b), in which the whole person is involved, for example, when distinguishing the types of reason. I think that this does a good job of freeing one from that too-pure objectivity. There is objectivity, but then there is also me, how I understand things, how others understand me, and there is a good of the person, an interest of the person, and this is not necessarily anti-objective, it is part of reality. How does one combine all of this?

I think that it is important to return to what you said about rhetoric. In what sense? Perhaps at some point we wanted too much, especially in classical rationalism, when the question was above all: ‘is this rational?’ Perhaps now we have taken a step back, or a weaker step, but one that remains fundamental. The question is no longer ‘is it rational?’, but ‘is it reasonable?’ Since reasonableness rightly includes me, it includes us as intersubjectivity. That is important. As you said, very strong and very binary oppositions lead us astray. If we create a concept of objectivity that is too bare for us to access it, that can lead us to say (through a logic, or rather, through an all-or-nothing sophistry): if there is no pure, naked objectivity, then opinions are all that exist; there are only interpretations.

**Not separating the truth from people**

**René Girard**, in dialogue with Gianni Vattimo (**Girard and Vattimo** 2006), comments on Nietzsche’s thesis which says, “there are no facts, only interpretations” (**Nietzsche** 1956, 903), and he adds that Nietzsche said that because he was tired of hearing the positivists who talked about facts until they were blue in the face (**Girard and Vattimo** 2006, 82). Girard clarifies that Nietzsche himself did not intend to make a metaphysics with that: if we do not have facts, then we do not have interpretations either; there are facts and interpretations.
Precisely: we judge interpretations based on what we presume are facts. In that sense, I think it is important to distinguish literary interpretations (because the word “interpretation” is usually linked closely with art) from the interpretations we give outside of the arts. In my view, it is important to point this out again, against the post-structuralists, and perhaps against Vattimo, because I think that, if one takes a great poem, he or she can continue to interpret it ad infinitum, and there is no point at which one can say that the interpretation is finished. Those interpretations can be interesting or stupid; they can open pathways, or they can be silly.

But instead, it seems to me that we can give other criteria in another order of things. For example, if I told you that in World War II Belgium actually attacked Germany, you would tell me, ‘no, that is not true’. Or, to pose a famous example that Austin gave (Austin 1989, 143), if I tell you that France is a hexagon, which may do fine for a child, you could tell me ‘no, France is not exactly a hexagon’. It seems to me that interpretations have two completely different spheres. One is the sphere, so to speak, of fiction, where someone gives one interpretation after another, with no end; and another thing is when reality compels me, for example what we said today: if you told me, ‘I will come at five o’clock’, I could have interpreted that it was five o’clock in the morning or five o’clock in the afternoon; and obviously it only makes sense to think it is at five in the afternoon, because nobody comes to visit someone at five in the morning. That is to say: that is the reasonable thing.

Is Davidson’s principle of charity not applicable here?

It seems to me that the principle of charity is exactly the version, in analytic philosophy, of what the hermeneutic principle would be in that which the United States calls “continental philosophy.” In that sense, when I am interpreting something, I have to assume that the other is telling me the truth, until I begin to suspect things here and there. That is to say, the principle of charity or the hermeneutic principle does not mean that we have to be blind to counterexamples; on the contrary! Our trust has to be the starting point. The starting point in Davidson would be trust that others are telling the truth, and trust in the hermeneutic principle; in Gadamer, it would be trust in tradition and authority, but these confidences are in a sense equivalent. These kinds of trust do not imply that I should become a fool who believes anything. That is a misunderstanding, obviously.

Now, it seems to me that there are two elements. One is to presuppose that the interlocutor is speaking truthfully, or that he or she is intelligent; and the other is to presuppose that he or she has good intentions. Is that element not also included in the principle of charity?

Yes, but also in the hermeneutic principle. When I trust the other, I presuppose that he or she has goodwill. There was just a discussion between Gadamer and Derrida, in which Derrida says: ‘But how do I discover goodwill?’ And I think, if I remember correctly, that Gadamer replies: ‘I do not discover it, I presuppose it’. What I discover is whether the other has ill will. I start from the presumption that the other has goodwill and is speaking sincerely to me. Something like: I presume, at this moment, that you are using the words in the language [original conversation
in Spanish] the way I use them, and that is why we are understanding each other. This presumption is not a blind presumption. At some point, I may begin to think: actually, my interlocutor is using words in a different way from how I am using them, and that superficial understanding is nothing more than that: a superficial understanding.

There are very rich nuances of this type, which is what makes dialogue interesting, because the concepts are not identical, the contents of the concepts do not fully coincide between two people.

Of course, here too we need to avoid the all-or-nothing sophistry. They are not identical, but they do overlap. The two of us, for example (and this is a clear sign that we have a common language), may begin to see our differences if we start discussing various issues, but those differences are going to present themselves starting from our community, from our agreement. The disagreement is always later. That is why we must insist that falsehood is always later. We cannot start from post-truth. We must begin (and that brings us back to the beginning of our conversation) from the truth.

**Education for truth**

This presupposition of goodwill and truth, as long as there is no reason to think otherwise, is parallel to the trust itself. Trust, as you say in your book (Pereda 2009a), is universal, I cannot begin from a universal distrust. Distrusts are localized. They are discovered and delimited, they grow, they shrink, I fall into error for having unduly trusted, but then I learn. It seems to me that this is part of a possible education for truth.

I really like that expression, “education for truth,” because it seems to me that the truth is somewhat difficult at times. Especially when we have had too many disappointments in life, bitterness tends to make us distrustful, even when we should not be. And then, I think resisting this bitterness is part of the training that would be what you have called “education for truth,” and that is complicated.

This deals with something more dynamic and much more effective than the postulated remedy: that is, systems that detect fake news. Something can be done, but it will always be very localized. There will always be false news reports that are presented as true, for which there are no formal grounds for suspicion.

Moreover, we have to start from the fact that over 80% or 90% (I do not know how to quantify it) of things I know, I know through testimony. That is to say, I cannot access the evidence of most things, and if I could, I could not understand it. That is, most of what I hold true is belief by testimony, belief by trust.

What is the difference between trust and belief?

I would say that belief comes after trust. It is when, in a way, I put a checkmark or a star on what I trust and say, ‘I believe this’, or ‘I have this belief’.

And what must one do in order to not confuse trust with a hope in the most elementary sense, or an expectation …?
Trust is a doxastic phenomenon, in the sense that it features beliefs, and at the same time is a more primitive phenomenon; it is an emotional phenomenon.12 I do not believe that this table is in front of me: I have trust that it is in front of me. I do not believe I am talking to a robot: I trust that I am speaking with a person, and I have no reason to doubt it. That is to say, belief is a more delimited and stronger trust. When I say: ‘I believe that Rome is the capital of Italy’, you can ask me, ‘but why?’; and I will respond that I have seen it on maps, and there are people who have traveled to Italy who can give an account of Rome, and I can tell a set of related stories. Trust is something more primitive and even, I would say, more animal. Descartes distinguishes between cognitio and science13 and points out that cognitio is a more animal relation with the world, while science is when I give reasons to believe what I believe. That is why some people have said that it is a false interpretation of Descartes to say that he is a foundationalist,14 because he is actually a foundationalist at the level of science but not at that of cognitio, which is what somehow sustains us in the world, makes it possible for us to live in the world.

I do not know how to interpret the animal aspect of trust. I rather thought of trust as one of the manifestations of man’s social nature. Deriving from this nature there is an element of trust that involves critical thinking. It would seem that trust and critical thinking are mutually opposed, but they are not, because if I rely on what others tell me, then it is because I have reasons to do so. I am not abdicating my reason. I have reasons to know that he knows and that I can therefore trust him.15 Moreover, as a child I needed trust just to survive.

That is why I spoke to you about trust as an animal attitude, in the sense that I have already trusted a great deal before I had my first doubts. And no matter how many doubts there are, the doubts are always going to be specific in relation to my general trust. Perhaps we can go back—because of your interest in post-truth—and say: why does that idea of post-truth make us feel so uneasy? Because it would seem that in a way, they are taking away the world, which is why I said at the beginning that it is a religion of absence. That world we both inhabit, with many other people, our intersubjective world—it would seem that they are taking it away from us. And it would seem that I no longer have the capacity to distinguish between truth and falsehood.

**Trust and autonomy**

Now, in this effort (sometimes overly rational) to be precise, to say ‘let’s clarify things’, I very much like that way of presenting two types of reason which is in your two books on argumentation: austere reason and emphatic reason. Put in a very synthetical way, there is univocal and deductive reason on the one hand, and the one that accepts analogy, probability and contingency on the other.16 I think it is equivalent to other distinctions, such as that of Marcelo Dascal, who calls them “hard reason” and “soft reason” (Dascal 2004, 241). I especially like the idea that the defense of reason is done by defending the emphatic reason (Pereda 1994b, 320–321), because the emphatic reason is capable of understanding the austere reason, and not the other way around. Austere reason is much more immediate: there
are some things that can be known and managed with exact calculation, and others that cannot. However, I do not understand metaphor by going from calculation, while someone who operates in metaphors understands calculation.\textsuperscript{17} Couldn’t this be a very central part of education for truth? I mean to be aware of it, because sometimes we want to cling to univocity, to calculation, because that is ‘what makes me more precise’ …

But of course, if one wants to cling to calculation, to univocity, because of this all-or-nothing sophistry, when we discover that we cannot hold on, we can no longer cling to anything, and then we fall victim to that false dilemma. We cannot have the whole truth, but we can have some truths.

A professor at Turin and former student of Vattimo, but very far from his positions, Franca D’Agostini (I borrowed the expression “education for truth” from her [D’Agostini 2017]), has a book called \textit{Introduction to the Truth}, in which, among other things, she says that there is a lot of misunderstanding about this notion (D’Agostini 2011, 13–20). Some arguments that supposedly conclude that there is no truth, should actually conclude that the truth is difficult. It is oftentimes difficult to reach, and in some cases, we may never know it; but that does not mean that there is no truth. The all-or-nothing sophistry also applies here. We have to know that we are not going to have the whole truth. The whole truth, for example, about a person—because therein lies the mystery of the person: we cannot exhaust him or her—or about a work of art.

But it is not just that I cannot exhaust other people: I cannot exhaust myself! Sometimes I surprise myself with what I do.

\textbf{Plato says that it is easier to get to the truth in community.}\textsuperscript{18} It is the wealth that is mentioned in your book about trust: the disparity of the material that we receive from other people (Pereda 2009a, 22).

Of course. Sometimes the interlocutors who we like least can tell us: ‘you forgot about this aspect, and you have to consider it’. And to me, that seems fundamental. That is why the Socratic dialogues have been the example for all research, in both science and the humanities. There can always be an interlocutor who ends up surprising us with his or her questions, which tells us that the path is difficult, risky, etc., but it is a path after all. There is a truth at the end of the road, even though I cannot say exactly what it is.

\textbf{I do not want to conclude without a review of the various areas of trust, as they are found in your book. That could enlighten us so that we become aware of the trusts we do have. I very much like the expression that was the title of an interview: “We Are Inevitably Trusting” (Pérez Colomé and Patricio 2009). What are those areas of trust?}

First of all, we start from general trust: this trust in which we have never thought to doubt, our living in the world, which is to live with others. Then there are exceptions to that general confidence, when we distrust certain areas.\textsuperscript{19} I know that, unfortunately, there are dangerous parts of Mexico City or of the country, and so I do not go to any of these areas at eight o’clock at night. These “cuts” that I make in my trust, specific
cuts, I make them theoretically. For example, I do not trust in what certain sources tell me. One time, in the United States, I took a taxi and the driver asked me if aliens had ever taken me to another planet, because they had taken him several times. Obviously, I then thought it would be a good idea to get out of that taxi as quickly as possible. One adjusts, that is the point. We are adjusting our levels of trust. There is something like, not antinomy, but tension between trust and autonomy, and it is a difficult tension to maintain. I believe that the tradition of the moderns (of which Descartes and Kant would be two heroes) is a tradition of autonomy, and somehow trust was seen as a conservative aspect, but we cannot do without it. Indeed, we need both. It is something like when children are offered two wonderful toys and say, ‘I'll have both’. It seems to me that in the case of trust and autonomy, one must keep both.

Notes

1. “Post-truth. Adj. Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (Oxford Dictionary 2019).

2. During the work of editing this interview came the news of the death of Professor Marcelo Dascal, whom we quote later in the conversation. In homage to his very rich philosophical and linguistic work, we would like to mention here a pertinent text, which is an important piece of the bibliography for the subject: “Defending Literal Meaning” (Dascal 1987). Likewise, because of its relevance in the dialogical sphere, for the analysis of which the author relies on the living nature of thought, we would like to mention “Colonizing and Decolonizing Minds” (2009).

3. In Derrida and in deconstructionist philosophy in general, the role of absence is very apparent. George Steiner, in order to show what supports “any coherent understanding of what language is and how language performs, […] any coherent account of the capacity of human speech to communicate meaning and feeling” (Steiner 1991, 3), writes precisely Real Presences, and calls the opposing position precisely “the deconstructionist and post-structuralist counter-theology of absence” (122).

4. This is the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis, “according to which a scientific hypothesis does not have its own circumscribed scope of empirical consequences through which it can be controlled, since each hypothesis is directly or indirectly connected to more or less vast portions of the theory to which it belongs, or even to other theories, from which it follows that empirical control concerns the whole of the same theory” (Enciclopedia Treccani (2010); our translation).

5. Unlike the skeptic, who doubts all knowledge, the fallibilist maintains that it is possible to know, but he or she puts the possibility of error into each and every instance of knowledge. For practical purposes, there is no difference between the two positions. Bridging the gap, this phenomenon can illustrate what the Presbyterian theologian Scott Hahn experienced when trying to clarify what determines the set of books of the Bible. It being the case that each is infallible since it is revealed, Hahn sought to know where it is revealed what they are. When going to a teacher, Hahn received the following response: “All we can have is a fallible collection of infallible documents” (Hahn and Hahn 1993, 75).

6. Here, Pereda uses the terminology of Gottlob Frege (1892), where sense (Sinn) is the way in which a term presents a thing, and reference (Bedeutung) is the thing itself. Two concepts that can help explain this, although they are not completely identical, are those of connotation and denotation, respectively.

7. See, for example, the conclusion of the first book of A Treatise of Human Nature (Hume 2007, 171–178).
8. The interview took place on September 1st, exactly three months after the presidential elections. The new president, although not yet in office, had spoken of a “peace process”. It is not out of place to add that someone has pointed out that this is “the first post-truth president of the history of the country” (Espino 2019).

9. “Charity as a matter of finding enough rationality in those we would understand to make sense of what they say or do, for unless we succeed in this, we cannot identify the contents of their words and thoughts. Seeing rationality in others is a matter of recognizing our own norms of rationality in their speech and behavior” (Davidson 2005, 319. Note the express mention of our interviewee in the title of the text). The name “principle of charity” comes from Neil L. Wilson, but it is usually credited to Donald Davidson for the developments that he has made to it. See, for example, Davidson 1985, 196–197.

10. This was in a meeting that took place at the Goethe Institute in Paris in April of 1981. A relevant publication on this debate is Michelfelder and Palmer (1989).

11. This idea could also be called, “education in the pursuit of truth.” We are borrowing the more succinct expression from Pope Francis, who said in a message for World Communications Day on January 24, 2018, “education for truth means teaching people how to discern, evaluate and understand our deepest desires and inclinations, lest we lose sight of what is good and yield to every temptation.” The same choice of terms can be seen, for example, in Abram (2019).

12. Emotion is understood here in the sense of philosophical anthropology: a vital dimension, which is common with other animals, of the individual’s relationship with his or her surroundings.

13. For example, in the *Meditaciones de Prima Philosophia*: in the first (Descartes 1983, 22) and more clearly in response to the second objections (141, 144–145).

14. In the sense that he seeks to identify some beliefs of absolute certainty in order to support other beliefs in a systematic way.

15. “The acquisition of autonomy is a difficult achievement because it consists in discovering the best reasons for believing and acting in *each* situation” (Pereda 2009b, 133 [our translation]). L. X. López Farjeat (2013) examines this point deeply.

16. “Our author proposes substituting the enlightened culture of the rigorist variety (which thinks from austere reason, without uncertainty) that has predominated in Western modernity for an *illustrated culture of an argu* mental variety (that starts from emphatic reason, with uncertainty), because this change will make us gain freedom and the capacity for movement.” (Harada O 2010 [our translation]; the author makes reference to Pereda 1994a, 258).

17. “Eliminating from reason such attributes as ‘precise, fixed, and general criteria’, or ‘ultimate beliefs as foundations’ as necessary requirements, and linking it to the delicate adventure of the argumental cycles dismisses an austere concept of reason, a reason certain of itself as singular, homogeneous, and demarcated, with exclusively necessary relations. But it does not dismiss reason. On the contrary, it welcomes an emphatic concept of reason and invites us to live with its uncertainty, to constantly face it” (Pereda 1994b, 10 [our translation]).

18. See, for example, the *Seventh Letter*, or Chapter 5 of The Republic.

19. Along with this diachronic exposition, Pereda offers a taxonomy of trust: interpersonal trusts, with respect to acquaintances or strangers, including declared and undeclared enemies, and the corresponding processes of breach of trust; as well as institutional trust, in relation to private or public institutions, and communicative trust, especially trust in language. The last types he analyzes are trust in oneself and trust in nature (Pereda 2009a, 57–113).

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