Minimum Energy Routing in Wireless Networks in the Presence of Jamming

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Abstract—The effectiveness and simple implementation of physical layer jammers make them an essential threat for wireless networks. In a multihop wireless network, where jammers can interfere with the transmission of user messages at every intermediate nodes along the path, one can employ jamming oblivious routing and then employ physical-layer techniques (e.g. spread spectrum) to suppress jamming. However, whereas these approaches can provide significant gains, the residual jamming can still severely limit system performance. This motivates the consideration of routing approaches that account for the differences in the jamming environment between different paths. First, we take a straightforward approach where an equal outage probability is allocated to each of the links along the path and develop a minimum energy routing solution. Next, we demonstrate the shortcomings of this approach and then consider the optimal outage allocation along paths by employing an approximation to the link outage probability. This yields an efficient and effective routing algorithm that only requires knowledge of the measured jamming at each node. Numerical results demonstrate that the amount of energy saved by the proposed methods with respect to standard shortest path routing, especially for parameters appropriate for terrestrial wireless networks, is substantial.

Index Terms—Wireless communication, energy-aware systems, routing protocols.

1 INTRODUCTION

Due to their broadcast nature, wireless networks are susceptible to many security attacks. Among them, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks can severely disrupt network performance, and thus are of interest here. In particular, jamming the physical layer is one of the simplest and most effective attacks, as any cheap radio device can broadcast electromagnetic radiation to block the communication channel [2].

A straightforward approach to combat adversaries that jam transmissions in the network, particularly in a system with transmitters and receivers capable of operating over a large bandwidth, is to employ physical-layer mitigation techniques. Prominent among these approaches are direct-sequence and frequency-hopped spread spectrum, each of which employs a significantly larger bandwidth than that required for message transmission in order to allow for interference suppression [3], [4]. These techniques allow a significant reduction in the impact of the interference, often on the order of the ratio of the system bandwidth to the data rate. However, the interference can still limit the performance of the system, or, stated differently, spread-spectrum might simply increase the cost of the jamming for the adversary, whom may still be willing to pay such a cost.

This motivates the consideration of routing approaches to avoid adversarial jammers if it can be justified from the perspective of minimizing total cost to the network. In this work, we consider wireless communication between a source and a destination in a multi-hop fashion in the presence of multiple physical layer jammers that are spread over the network area at arbitrary locations by the adversary. We define that cost to be the aggregate energy expended by the system nodes to reliably transmit a message from the source to the destination, with reliability measured by an outage constraint. The general routing problem has been studied extensively in the literature [5], [6], [7], [8]. Specifically, in [9] and [10], routing algorithms in the presence of multiple jammers are investigated, but the energy consumption of the network nodes is not considered. Excessive energy consumption quickly depletes battery-powered nodes, and causes increased interference, resulting in a lower network throughput; thus, it is essential to seek methods to reduce energy consumption of the network nodes [11]. There has been some study of energy-aware routing protocols in the literature [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], but only a few works considered minimum energy routing with security considerations [17], [18]. These works studied energy-aware routing in the presence of passive eavesdroppers; however, minimum energy routing in the presence of active adversaries (i.e. jammers) has not been considered.

In this paper, we formulate the minimum energy routing problem with an end-to-end outage probability constraint in a wireless multi-hop network with malicious jammers. For exposition purposes and the simulation environment, the jammers are assumed to be equipped with omni-directional antennas and to be able to propagate radio signals over the entire frequency band utilized by the nodes in the network. However,
it will become apparent that the proposed algorithms apply in a more general environment, relying only on the measured jamming at each of the nodes in the network and being agnostic of the manner in which that jamming was generated and the geographical locations of the jammers (i.e. the solution easily addresses jammers with directional antennas, etc.). We will consider both static jammers, which transmit the jamming signal continuously, and simple dynamic jammers that switch randomly between transmitting the jamming signal and sleeping mode.

A difficulty in solving this problem is deciding the local outage of the links that form a path from source to destination so that the path satisfies an end-to-end outage requirement. We begin our exploration of the multi-hop minimum energy routing problem in the presence of malicious jammers by considering a straightforward approach that allocates equal outage probability to each link along each potential path from source to destination, in such a way that the resulting end-to-end outage probability satisfies a pre-specified threshold. In this scenario, the search for the optimal path is complicated by a lack of knowledge of the number of hops in the optimal path a priori. After developing an algorithm to find the optimal path under this approach, we then analyze the potential weaknesses of the solution. In particular, if certain links along a path are subject to significant jamming relative to other links along that path, it may be more energy efficient to allow larger outage probabilities on those links subject to significant jamming. This motivates a more general approach to the problem where the end-to-end outage constraint is allocated optimally to the links along each path during the process of path selection. Unfortunately, the presence of jammers in combination with the end-to-end outage probability constraint makes it difficult to find an optimal path with minimum energy cost. Hence, we use a reasonable approximation to the outage probability on a given link, which allows us to greatly simplify the optimization problem. In particular, we are able to readily derive a fast and efficient algorithm that, importantly, does not rely on the detailed jammer characteristics (locations, jamming powers) but rather only the observed (and thus measurable) long-term average aggregate interference at each system node. Numerical results are then presented to compare in detail the performance of the various algorithms in terms of energy expended for a given network simulation scenario and end-to-end outage constraint for both single-flow and multiple-flow scenarios. Finally, we discuss how the proposed algorithm can be implemented in a distributed manner.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model. The minimum energy routing with equal outage per link is considered in Section III. The minimum energy routing with optimal outage per link in the presence of static and dynamic jammers is presented in Section IV. In Section V, the results of numerical examples for various realizations of the system are provided, and the comparison of the proposed methods to a benchmark shortest path algorithm is presented. Conclusions and ideas for future work are discussed in Section VI.

2 System Model

2.1 System Model

We consider a wireless network where the system nodes are located arbitrarily. In addition, malicious jammers are present in the network at arbitrary locations, and these jammers try to interfere with the transmission of the system nodes by transmitting random signals. We assume that each jammer utilizes an omni-directional antenna and can transmit over the entire frequency band; thus, spread spectrum or frequency hopping strategies improve performance via the processing gain, but are not completely effective in interference suppression.

One of the system nodes (source) chooses relays, with which it conveys its message to the destination in a (possibly) multi-hop fashion. Suppose the relays that the source selects construct a K-hop route between the source and the destination. The K-hop route is determined by a set of K links $\Pi = \{l_1, \ldots, l_K\}$ and $K + 1$ nodes (including source and destination) such that link $l_k$ connects the $k^{th}$ link transmitter $S_k$ to the $k^{th}$ link receiver $D_k$.

We denote the set of jammers by $J$ and consider both static jammers and dynamic jammers. In the case of static jammers, each jammer transmits white Gaussian noise with a fixed power. Since the jammers are active, we assume initially that the transmit power and the location of jammers are known to the system nodes; however, we will see that for our proposed method, the knowledge of the transmit powers and locations of jammers is not necessary; in fact, the system nodes can measure the average received jamming (averaged over the multipath fading) and use this estimate of jamming interference for efficient routing. In the case of dynamic jammers, each jammer switches between an “ON” state, when it transmits the jamming signal, and an “OFF” state or sleeping mode randomly and independently from the other jammers. These dynamic jammers are especially useful when the battery life of the jammers is limited and the adversary tries to cover a larger area, as the jammers in sleep mode can save significant energy.

We assume frequency non-selective Rayleigh fading between any pair of nodes: $h_k$ is the fading between $S_k$ and $D_k$ and $\{h_{j,k}\}_{j \in J}$ are the respective fading coefficients between jammers and $D_k$; thus, the channel fading power is exponentially distributed. Without loss of generality, we assume $E[|h_k|^2] = 1$, $\forall k$, and $E[|h_{j,k}|^2] = 1$, $\forall j, k$, and then work path-loss explicitly into (1) below. Also, each receiver experiences additive white Gaussian noise with power $N_0$. Hence, the signal received by node $D_k$ from node $S_k$ is

$$y^{(k)} = \frac{h_k \sqrt{P_k}}{d_k^{\alpha/2}} x^{(k)} + \sum_{j \in J} \frac{h_{j,k} \sqrt{P_j}}{d_{j,k}^{\alpha/2}} x^{(j)} + n^{(k)}; \quad (1)$$
where $P_k$ is the transmit power of node $S_k$, $P_j$ is the transmit power of the $j^{th}$ jammer, $d_k$ is the distance between $S_k$ and $D_k$, $d_{j,k}$ is the distance between jammer $j$ and $D_k$, and $\alpha$ is the path-loss exponent. If spread spectrum were employed, the model would obviously change to include the processing gain and further averaging of the fading, but the design process would be similar.

2.2 Path Outage Probability

Our goal is to find a minimum energy route between the source and the destination with optimum power allocation such that the desired end-to-end source-destination probability of outage is guaranteed. Hence, we need to find the set of relay nodes (links) with minimum aggregate power such that the end-to-end probability of outage $p^{SD}_{\text{out}} \leq \pi$, where $\pi$ is a predetermined threshold for probability of outage. Let $p_{\text{out}}^k$ denote the outage probability of link $l_k = (S_k, D_k)$; the source-destination outage probability in terms of the outage probability of each link is,

$$p^{SD}_{\text{out}} = 1 - \prod_{1 \leq k \leq K} (1 - p_{\text{out}}^k).$$

Implicit in our formulation is the end-to-end throughput of the path between the source and destination. Let $\lambda$ denote the required end-to-end throughput. Since throughput of a path is determined by the throughput of its bottleneck link, to minimize transmission energy of the path, it is necessary to achieve an equal throughput over each link of the path. Thus, in our formulation of minimum energy routing, the cost of each link is computed with respect to required throughput $\lambda$, as described in the following subsection.

2.3 Analysis of Link Outage Probability

Consider the outage probability of a link in the presence of the set of jammers. The outage probability of link $l_k$ given its fading gain $|h_k|^2$ and the fading gains between jammers and the receiver $\{ |h_{j,k}|^2 \}_{j \in J}$ is,

$$p_{\text{out}}^k = \mathbb{P} \left\{ \frac{P_k |h_k|^2 / d_k^\alpha}{N_0 + \sum_{j \in J} P_j |h_{j,k}|^2 / d_{j,k}^\alpha} < \gamma \right\},$$

where $\gamma$ is the required signal-to-interference ratio at the receiver. The value of $\gamma$ determines the link throughput. Specifically, for a desired throughput of $\lambda$, by applying the Shannon capacity formula, the threshold $\gamma$ is given by:

$$\gamma = 2^\lambda - 1.$$

Since the fading gain $|h_k|^2$ is distributed exponentially, conditioned on $\{ |h_{j,k}|^2 \}_{j \in J}$, we obtain that,

$$p_{\text{out}}^k = 1 - \exp \left( -\lambda \frac{N_0 + \sum_{j \in J} P_j |h_{j,k}|^2 / d_{j,k}^\alpha}{P_k / d_k^\alpha} \right).$$

Taking the expectation over the fading gain of jammers yields:

$$p_{\text{out}}^k = E \left[ 1 - \exp \left( -\gamma \frac{N_0 + \sum_{j \in J} P_j |h_{j,k}|^2 / d_{j,k}^\alpha}{P_k / d_k^\alpha} \right) \right]$$

$$= 1 - e^{-\gamma N_0 d_k^\alpha / P_k} \prod_{j \in J} E \left[ \exp \left( -\gamma P_j |h_{j,k}|^2 / d_{j,k}^\alpha \right) \right]$$

$$= 1 - \frac{e^{-\gamma N_0 d_k^\alpha / P_k}}{\prod_{j \in J} (1 + \frac{\gamma P_j / d_{j,k}^\alpha}{P_k / d_k^\alpha})}. \tag{5}$$

When the jammers are not present in the network, a closed form expression for the optimal path-cost can be obtained, based on which the optimal source-destination path using any classical shortest path algorithm can be found. On the other hand, in the presence of jammers, (5) is intricate, making it difficult to find a closed-form expression for the optimal path cost. In this case, the naive way to find the optimal source-destination path is to do a brute force search, which generally has exponential complexity as it needs to check all paths in the network. A straightforward approach to simplify the problem is to consider equal outage probability per-link such that the end-to-end outage probability is $\pi$, which is described in the next section.

3 MER-EQ: Minimum Energy Routing with Equal Outage per Link

A straightforward approach that will help to motivate our proposed algorithm is to assume that every link is found. On the other hand, in the presence of jammers,\(^\text{[5]}\) is intricate, making it difficult to find a closed-form expression for the optimal path cost. In this case, the naive way to find the optimal source-destination path is to do a brute force search, which generally has exponential complexity as it needs to check all paths in the network. A straightforward approach to simplify the problem is to consider equal outage probability per-link such that the end-to-end outage probability is $\pi$, which is described in the next section.
3.1 Network Expansion

Before running the routing algorithm, we pre-process the network to create an expanded network as described in Algorithm 1 In this algorithm, $s$ and $d$ denote the source and destination nodes. The algorithm works by adding $s$ to the expanded network. Since the longest path in a network of $N$ nodes will have at most $N-1$ hops, it adds $N-1$ replicas for each node $u$ to the expanded network. Then links are added to the expanded network such that a path from $s$ to $u(h)$ will have exactly $h$ hops.

3.2 Routing Algorithm

The following lemma establishes the relation between the shortest paths in the original network and the shortest paths in the expanded network.

Lemma 1. Every path from source $s$ to node $d(h)$ in the expanded network has precisely $h$ hops.

Proof: The proof follows from the fact that the $i$-th hop on a path from $s$ to $d(h)$ has to go from some node $u(i-1)$ to some node $v(i)$.

The routing algorithm is described in Algorithm 2. To compute the minimum cost path, first we find the shortest path for each $h$, $h = 1, \ldots, N-1$ hops in the expanded network by repeatedly employing Dijkstra’s algorithm (line 9). Then, the algorithm chooses the path with minimum cost from source to destination and returns the optimum path and its cost (lines 15 and 16).

Moreover, in order to find the optimal path we basically need to apply the shortest path algorithm $N-1$ times, which makes this approach not time efficient in large networks. Each application of the Dijkstra’s algorithm in the expanded network requires a running time of $O(N^2 \log N)$, and thus the algorithm MER-EQ takes $O(N^3 \log N)$ time to run. In the remainder of the paper, we present a minimum energy routing routing with optimal outage per link and demonstrate how using an estimate of the end-to-end outage probability leads to a fast and efficient algorithm that improves the energy efficiency of the network significantly.

4 MER-OP: Minimum Energy Routing with Optimal Outage per Link

In this section, we present our minimum energy routing algorithm with optimal outage per link by considering
the end-to-end outage constraint. From (5), the per-hop outage probability \( p^k_{\text{out}} \) is,

\[
p^k_{\text{out}} = 1 - \frac{e^{-\gamma N_0 \over P_k}}{\prod_{j \in J} \left(1 + \frac{\gamma P_j / d^{\alpha}_{j,k}}{P_k / d^{\alpha}_{k}}\right)} \\
\leq 1 - \frac{e^{-\gamma N_0 \over P_k}}{\prod_{j \in J} e^{\gamma P_j / d^{\alpha}_{j,k}}} \\
= 1 - {\sum_{j \in J} \frac{\gamma P_j / d^{\alpha}_{j,k}}{P_k}}. \tag{6}
\]

where the inequality is from the fact that \( e^x \geq 1 + x \) for \( x \geq 0 \).

The above upper bound is tight if \( \gamma P_k / P_j \ll 1 \) for every jammer \( j \), where \( P_k \) and \( P_j \) denote the average received power from relay \( S_k \) and jammer \( j \), respectively. Our goal is to ensure that the average SINR at relay \( D_k \) is above the threshold \( \gamma \). That is,

\[
\frac{\bar{P}_k}{N_0 + \sum_{j \in J} P_j} > \gamma,
\]

or,

\[
\gamma \frac{N_0}{P_k} \sum_{j \in J} \frac{P_j}{P_k} < 1.
\]

Thus, for a large number of jammers, we can assume that \( \gamma P_k / P_j \ll 1 \). When this bound is not tight, it is still reasonable to assume it will give us an advantageous route, as will be shown using simulations. From (6) we have,

\[
p^k_{\text{out}} \leq 1 - e^{-\gamma N_0 \over P_k(N_0 + J_k)} , \tag{7}
\]

where \( J_k \) is the expected value of the total received power at node \( D_k \) from jammers, i.e. \( J_k = \sum_{j \in J} P_j / d^{\alpha}_{j,k} \). Importantly, this approximation not only enables the development of an efficient routing algorithm, but it also simplifies the implementation of the algorithm in real networks. While the exact outage probability as given in (5) requires the knowledge of jammer powers and their locations, the approximation in (7) requires only the knowledge of the “average” jamming power at a node, which can be measured.

### 4.1 Optimal Cost of a Given Path

Let \( \pi \) denote the upper bound on the end-to-end outage probability. Our objective is to find the optimum path \( \Pi = \{l_1, \ldots, l_K\} \) and the minimum transmission power required to establish \( \Pi \) to satisfy the outage probability \( \pi \),

\[
\min_{k=1, \ldots, K} \sum_{l_k \in \Pi} P_k,
\]

subject to:

\[
p_{\text{out}}^{S\Pi} = 1 - \prod_{l_k \in \Pi} (1 - p^k_{\text{out}}) \leq \pi.
\]

From (7) the equivalent constraint is,

\[
\sum_{l_k \in \Pi} d^i_k \left( \frac{N_0 + J_k}{P_k} \right) \leq \epsilon = \frac{-\ln(1 - \pi)}{\gamma}. \tag{8}
\]

Since the left side of (8) is a decreasing function of \( P_k \) and our goal is to find the route with minimum cost, the inequality constraint can be substituted by the following equality constraint,

\[
\sum_{l_k \in \Pi} d^i_k \left( \frac{N_0 + J_k}{P_k} \right) = \epsilon. \tag{9}
\]

To find the optimal link costs, we use the Lagrange multipliers technique. Thus, we need to solve (9) and the following \( K \) equations simultaneously.

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial P_i} \left\{ \sum_{l_k \in \Pi} P_k + \lambda \left( \sum_{l_k \in \Pi} d^i_k \left( \frac{N_0 + J_k}{P_k} \right) - \epsilon \right) \right\} = 0, \quad i = 1, \ldots, K.
\]

Taking the derivative, we obtain that,

\[
1 - \lambda d^i_k \left( \frac{N_0 + J_i}{P_i} \right) = 0, \quad i = 1, \ldots, K, \tag{10}
\]

and thus,

\[
P_i = \sqrt{\lambda d^i_k(N_0 + J_i)}. \tag{11}
\]

On substituting \( P_i \) from (11) into (9), we have,

\[
\lambda = \frac{1}{\epsilon^2} \left( \sum_{l_k \in \Pi} d^i_k(N_0 + J_k) \right)^2. \tag{12}
\]

Hence, by substituting \( \lambda \) from (12) into (11), the optimal cost of each link is given by,

\[
P_i = \frac{1}{\epsilon} \sqrt{d^i_k(N_0 + J_i)} \sum_{l_k \in \Pi} \sqrt{d^i_k(N_0 + J_k)}, \tag{13}
\]

and the cost of path \( \Pi \) is given by,
\[ C(\Pi) = \frac{1}{\epsilon} \left( \sum_{j_k \in \Pi} d_k^q (N_0 + J_k) \right)^2. \] (14)

4.2 Routing Algorithm

The optimal path cost structure in (14) allows us to find the minimum energy route from source to destination as follows. First assign the link weight \( C(l_k) = \sqrt{d_k^q (N_0 + J_k)} \) to each potential link \( l_k \) in the network. Now apply any classic shortest-path algorithm such as Dijkstra’s algorithm. This path minimizes the end-to-end weight \( \sum_{l_k \in \Pi} \sqrt{d_k^q (N_0 + J_k)} \) and thus it will also minimize the source-destination path cost \( C(\Pi) \) in (14).

We note that the running time of this algorithm, referred to as MER-OP, is in \( O(N \log N) \) as it essentially invokes the Dijkstra’s algorithm once.

Now, each node in route \( \Pi \) transmits the message to the next node until it reaches the destination. The transmit power of each node is determined by (13) and the actual outage probability of each link can be obtained from (7).

Note that the end-to-end outage probability achieved by the proposed method is no greater than the target outage probability, as we used an upper bound in our calculations. In fact, the actual outage probability is usually substantially smaller than the target outage probability, \( \pi \), and hence the required transmission power is greater than what is needed to obtain the end-to-end outage probability \( \pi \). A heuristic approach to resolve this is to multiply the outage probabilities of each link in \( \Pi \) by a factor such that the end-to-end outage probability becomes \( \pi \).

4.3 Routing in the Presence of Dynamic Jammers

In this section, we consider the case of dynamic jammers, where each jammer alternates between jamming mode and sleeping mode. We model the probabilistic behavior of jammers by i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables \( \beta_j \), \( j \in \mathcal{J} \), such that \( p(\beta_j = 1) = 1 - p(\beta_j = 0) = q \). Using (4), the average outage probability of link \( l_k \) is:

\[
p^k_{\text{out}} = E \left[ 1 - \exp \left( -\gamma \left( N_0 + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} P_j \beta_j |h_{j,k}|^2 / d^q_{j,k} \right) \right) \right]
= 1 - e^{-\gamma N_0 d^q_{l_k} / P_k} \prod_{j \in \mathcal{J}} E \left[ \exp \left( -\gamma P_j \beta_j |h_{j,k}|^2 / d^q_{j,k} \right) \right]
= 1 - e^{-\gamma N_0 d^q_{l_k} / P_k} \prod_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \left( qE \left[ \exp \left( -\gamma P_j |h_{j,k}|^2 / d^q_{j,k} \right) \right] + (1 - q) \right)
= 1 - e^{-\gamma N_0 d^q_{l_k} / P_k} \prod_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \left\{ \frac{q}{1 + \gamma P_j / |h_{j,k}|^2} + 1 - q \right\}
\leq 1 - e^{-\gamma N_0 d^q_{l_k} / P_k} \prod_{j \in \mathcal{J}} e^{-\gamma P_j / |h_{j,k}|^2}, \tag{15}
\]

where the expectations are computed over \( \{\beta_j\}_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \) and \( \{|h_{j,k}|^2\}_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \), respectively. The inequality is from the fact that for \( q \leq 1 \) and \( x \geq 0 \), \( e^{-qx} \leq \frac{q}{x+1} - q \), which is tight for \( x \ll 1 \).

Thus, the average outage probability for each link is given by,

\[
p^k_{\text{out}} \leq 1 - e^{-\gamma N_0 / \|h_{j,k}\|^2}, \tag{16}
\]

where \( J_k = q \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} P_j / |h_{j,k}|^2 \). The cost of an optimum path \( \Pi \) in this case can be found by a similar derivation as in Section 4.1,

\[
C(\Pi) = \frac{1}{\epsilon} \left( \sum_{j_k \in \Pi} \sqrt{d_k^q (N_0 + J_k)} \right)^2, \tag{17}
\]

where \( \epsilon = \frac{\ln(1-q)}{\ln(1-q)} \). Hence, by employing an estimate of the average jamming power obtained from recent channel measurements, assigning the link cost \( C(l_k) = \sqrt{d_k^q (N_0 + J_k)} \) to each potential link \( l_k \) in the network, and applying the routing algorithm discussed in the previous section, the optimal route can be found.

5 Simulation Results

We consider a wireless network in which \( n \) system nodes and \( n_j \) jammers are placed uniformly at random on a \( d \times d \) square. We assume that the closest system node to point \((0,0)\) is the source and the closest system node to the point \((d,d)\) is the destination.

Our goal is to find a minimum energy route between the source and the destination. We assume that the threshold \( \gamma = 1 \), noise power \( N_0 = 1 \), and the maximum transmit power of the system nodes is such that the network is always connected. To analyze the effect of propagation attenuation on the proposed algorithms, we consider \( \alpha = 2 \) for free space, and \( \alpha = 3 \) and \( \alpha = 4 \) for terrestrial wireless environments. For the benchmark routing algorithm, we consider a jamming oblivious shortest path routing (JOSP) algorithm from the source to the destination with end-to-end target outage probability \( \pi \). The JOSP algorithm is described in the Appendix. The aggregate transmit power of the JOSP in the presence of jammers is considered as the cost of this scheme.

Our performance metric is the energy saved due to the use of each algorithm. The energy saved is defined as the reduction in the energy consumption of the system nodes when each algorithm is applied with respect to the energy consumption when system nodes use the jamming oblivious shortest path between source and destination, i.e. JOSP.

A snapshot of the network when \( n = 30 \), \( n_j = 50 \), \( P_j = 1 \), \( \pi = 0.1 \), and \( \alpha = 2 \) is shown in Fig. 2. The MER-OP path, MER-EQ path, and JOSP path are plotted in this figure. The percentage of energy saved in this example for MER-OP is 63.57% and for MER-EQ is 54.47%.

In Fig. 3, the same settings as in Fig. 2 are considered. However, to see the effect of placement of the
Fig. 2. A snapshot of the network when \( n = 30 \) system nodes (shown by circles) and \( n_j = 50 \) jammers (shown by *\) are placed uniformly at random. The transmit power of each jammer \( P_j = 1 \), the target end-to-end outage probability \( \pi = 0.1 \), and the path-loss exponent \( \alpha = 2 \). The optimum route for MER-OP is shown by the dashed line (green), the optimum route for MER-EQ is shown by solid line (blue), and the JOSP route is shown by the dash-dotted line (red). The energy saved in this network for MER-OP is 63.57\% and for MER-EQ is 54.47\%.

Jammers on the network, it is assumed that the malicious jammers can intentionally be placed around the source-destination line to maximize the effect of the jamming signal. In this adverse situation, the percentages of energy saved compared to Fig. 2 are expected, are higher: 75.35\% for the MER-OP, and 72.24\% for MER-EQ.

The MER-EQ, MER-OP, and JOSP paths for the same placement of the system nodes and jammers as in the networks of Fig. 2 are shown in Fig. 3. For a higher path-loss exponent \( (\alpha = 4) \) are shown in Fig. 4. In this case, the energy saved for MER-OP is 93.54\% and for MER-EQ is 88.21\% . Note that although in this case the MER-OP path and the MER-EQ path are the same, the percentage of energy saved using the latter approach is smaller, because we force all links in the path to have the same outage probability. When all jammers are placed close to the source-destination line (Fig. 5), the percentage of energy saved for MER-OP is 99.98\% and for MER-EQ is 99.96\% .

In the sequel, we average our results over randomly generated networks. The performance metric is the average energy saved, where the averaging is over 100 random realizations of the network. We consider the effect of various parameters of the network on the average energy saved by using the MER-OP and MER-EQ algorithms.

5.1 Number of Jammers

The effect of the number of jammers on the average energy saved for different values of the path-loss exponent is shown in Fig. 6. It can be seen that the average energy saved is not sensitive to the number of jammers.

The fluctuations in this figure are due to the random generation of the network. On the other hand, the effect of the path-loss exponent on the average energy saved is dramatic. For terrestrial wireless environments \((\alpha = 3) \) and \((\alpha = 4) \), the average energy saved by using MER-OP and MER-EQ is substantially higher than free space wireless environments \((\alpha = 2) \), since in the environment with a higher path-loss exponent, the effect of the jamming signal is local and thus the jamming aware routes can take detours to avoid the jammers and obtain much higher energy efficiency. Because of the constraint on the outage probability of each hop, the energy saved by using MER-EQ is always smaller than the energy saved by using MER-OP.

5.2 Jamming Power

The effect of jamming power on the average energy saved is shown in Fig. 7. As the jamming power increases, the percentage of the energy saved by using the jamming aware algorithms increases. Clearly, when the jamming power is higher, the impact of jamming on communication is greater, and thus bypassing the jammers can lead to more energy efficiency of the routing algorithm.
Fig. 4. A snapshot of the network with the same system node and jammer placement as in Fig. 2. Transmit power of each jammer $P_j = 1$, target outage probability $\pi = 0.1$, and transmission in a lossy environment is considered ($\alpha = 4$). The MER-OP path is shown by the dashed line (green), the MER-EQ path is shown by the solid line (blue), and the JOSP path is shown by the dash-dotted line (red). The energy saved in this network for MER-OP is 93.54% and for MER-EQ is 88.21%.

5.3 Size of Network

The average energy saved versus the size of the network is shown in Fig. 8, where the area of the network changes from a $1 \times 1$ square to a $10 \times 10$ square. The average energy saved for terrestrial wireless environments is nearly 100%. When free space parameters are used ($\alpha = 2$), the percentage of the energy saved by using the optimum paths is higher for smaller network areas. In a smaller network, the effect of jamming on the communication is higher and thus taking an optimum path that bypasses the jammers helps more to improve the energy efficiency of communication.

5.4 Outage Probability

In Fig. 9 the percentage of average energy saved versus the outage probability is shown. For $\alpha = 3$, and $\alpha = 4$, the average energy saved is always very close to 100%. For $\alpha = 2$, as the outage probability increases, more outages in the communication are acceptable, and thus lower power is needed to mitigate the effect of a jammer close to the communication link. Hence, when the outage probability is greater, the percentage of energy saved by using a better path is less than when the outage probability is smaller.

5.5 Power Histogram

To further investigate the enormous gains in average energy for higher values of $\alpha$, the histograms of the number of network realizations versus the total cost of transmission (aggregate power) for (a) JOSP algorithm, (b) MER-OP algorithm, and (c) MER-EQ algorithm for $10^3$ realizations of the network are shown in Fig. 10. In this figure $\alpha = 4$, $\pi = 0.1$, $n = 20$, and $n_j = 30$. For the JOSP, it can be seen that the values of the total cost are scattered, and the average energy is dominated by a few bad realizations. On the other hand, when MER-OP and MER-EQ are used, the values of the total cost are concentrated around a central value (here $10^4$). This explains the large gains in average energy shown in
probability of outage. The system nodes and the jammers are placed uniformly at random over a square. The transmit power of each jammer $P_j = 1$, $n_j = 20$ number of jammers, $n = 20$ system nodes, and end-to-end target probability of outage $\pi = 0.1$ are considered. The system nodes and the jammers are placed uniformly at random over a $10 \times 10$ square.

Fig. 7. Average energy saved vs. jamming power of each malicious jammer for different values of the path-loss exponent. $n_j = 20$ number of jammers, $n = 20$ system nodes, and end-to-end target probability of outage $\pi = 0.1$ are considered. The system nodes and the jammers are placed uniformly at random over a $10 \times 10$ square.

Fig. 8. Average energy saved vs. area of the network for different values of the path-loss exponent. The transmit power of each jammer $P_j = 1$, $n_j = 20$ number of jammers, $n = 20$ system nodes, and end-to-end target probability of outage $\pi = 0.1$ are considered.

Fig. 9. Average energy saved vs. end-to-end outage probability ($\pi$) for different values of the path-loss exponent. The transmit power of each jammer $P_j = 1$, and $n_j = 20$ jammers and $n = 20$ system nodes are considered. The system nodes and the jammers are placed uniformly at random over a $10 \times 10$ square.

Fig. 10. The histograms of the number of network realizations versus cost of transmission (aggregate power) for (a) JOSP, (b) MER-OP, and (c) MER-EQ are shown. The system nodes and the jammers are placed uniformly at random over a $10 \times 10$ square, where $\alpha = 3$, $\pi = 0.1$, $n = 20$, and $n_j = 50$. For the benchmark, the values of the total cost are scattered, and the average energy is dominated by a few bad realizations, while for (b) and (c), the values of the total cost are concentrated around a central value (here $10^4$).

previous sections, and also indicates that the MER-OP and MER-EQ are robust against changes in the system node and jammer placements.

5.6 Network Throughput

When MER-OP is used, we expect the network can achieve a higher throughput, since the transmit powers of the nodes in the optimal path are smaller, and thus more nodes can transmit their messages simultaneously. To study network throughput, in this section, we simulate multiple concurrent flows in the network and implement scheduling in addition to routing. The maximum throughput for a given number of concurrent flows can be obtained as follows.

Scheduling problem. Consider a subset $S \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ of the links. We call $S$ a “transmission set” if all links in $S$ can be scheduled concurrently. Moreover, $S$ is a “maximal” transmission set if it cannot be grown further. Let $\mathcal{S} = \{S_1, \ldots, S_M\}$ denote the set of all maximal transmission sets of the network. A schedule is specified by a set of weights $\alpha = \{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_M\}$, where each weight $0 \leq \alpha_i \leq 1$ specifies the fraction of time for which the maximal transmission set $S_i$ is scheduled. It follows that $\sum_{i=1}^{M} \alpha_i = 1$ for a feasible schedule. In general, there is an exponential number of maximal transmission sets in a network and finding them is an NP-hard problem [19].

Maximal transmission sets. To obtain a practical approximation, we can use only a subset of all maximal

1. We assume a time slotted system where each time slot is of unit length. The weights $\alpha_i$ specify the fraction of time each set $S_i$ is scheduled in a time slot using a TDMA scheduler.
transmission sets. As we increase the number of maximal transmission sets, the accuracy of the approximation increases. Algorithm 3 is used repeatedly to obtain a subset of all maximal transmission sets.

**Algorithm 3 Maximal Transmission Sets**

1: \( S \leftarrow \{\} \)
2: while \( \mathcal{L} \neq \{\} \) do
3: Choose \( \ell_i \in \mathcal{L} \) at random
4: \( \mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \setminus \{\ell_i\} \)
5: if \( \ell_i \) is schedulable with \( S \) then
6: \( S \leftarrow S \cup \{\ell_i\} \)
7: end if
8: end while
9: return \( S \)

**Throughput.** Suppose there are \( L \) flows in the network denoted by \( \mathcal{F} = \{f_1, \ldots, f_L\} \). Let \( x_i \) denote the rate of flow \( f_i \) and \( \lambda = \{x_1, \ldots, x_L\} \). The optimal path computed for flow \( f_i \) is denoted by \( \Pi_i \). Our goal is to compute the maximum flow rate in the network. Let \( \lambda \) denote the capacity of link \( \ell_k \), which is a constant for every link in the network (this is ensured by our power allocation algorithm).

- The total flow rate that passes through link \( \ell_k \) is given by,
  \[
  \sum_{f_i \in \mathcal{F}: \ell_k \in \Pi_i} x_i
  \]
- The total capacity of link \( \ell_k \) adjusted for scheduling is given by,
  \[
  \lambda \cdot \sum_{\forall S_i \in S: \ell_k \in S_i} \alpha_i
  \]

To compute the maximum throughput, one has to solve the following optimization problem:

\[
\text{max} \sum_{f_i \in \mathcal{F}} x_i \\
\text{subject to:} \\
\sum_{\forall f_i \in \mathcal{F}: \ell_k \in \Pi_i} x_i \leq \lambda \cdot \sum_{\forall S_i \in S: \ell_k \in S_i} \alpha_i \\
\sum_{\alpha_i \in \alpha} \alpha_i = 1 \\
\alpha_i \geq 0
\]

(18) (19) (20) (21)

Since the constraints as well as the objective function are linear, the above problem is a convex optimization problem if the routes \( \Pi_i \) and maximal transmission sets \( S_i \) are known. We used Matlab to solve this optimization problem and compute the total throughput. The throughputs versus the number of concurrent flows for MER-OP and for JOSP are shown in Fig. 11. The end-to-end outage probability is \( \pi = 0.2 \), and \( n = 10 \) system nodes and \( n_j = 20 \) jammers are present. As expected, the MER-OP can achieve higher throughput than the JOSP algorithm. Energy per bit. In order to obtain the throughput shown in Fig. 11, the energy per bit versus the outage probability for MER-OP and JOSP are shown in Fig. 12. Energy per bit is obtained by dividing the total power consumed by the system nodes divided by the maximum throughput of the network for a given number of flows. In this figure, the maximum throughput when five concurrent flows exists in the network, where \( n = 10 \) system nodes and \( n_j = 20 \) jammers are present, is plotted. As expected, in both algorithms for higher outage probabilities less energy per bit is required. Also, the amount of energy per bit MER-OP uses is about two orders of magnitude less than JOSP.

**5.7 Dynamic Jammers**

In this section, we investigate the effect of the number of dynamic jammers on the average energy saved when
employing MER-OP. The average energy saved versus number of jammers for probability of a jammer being “ON”, \( q = 0.3 \) and \( q = 0.7 \), and for various values of the path-loss exponent, \( \alpha = 2, 3, 4 \), are considered in Fig. 13. The simulations are done over 100 random realizations of the network. As can be seen, the average energy saved is again insensitive to the number of jammers (the fluctuations in this figure are due to the randomness of the network realizations). For \( \alpha = 2 \), the percentage of energy saved is higher when \( q \) is greater, since the effect of jammers on the network is greater and thus, by using MER-OP algorithm and bypassing the jammers, a higher energy efficiency can be gained. For terrestrial wireless environments, i.e. for \( \alpha = 3 \) and \( \alpha = 4 \), the average energy saved by using MER-OP is always substantial and close to 100%.

5.8 Distributed Implementation

It is useful to mention that distributed implementation of the algorithms presented in this paper is straightforward. The link costs introduced in previous sections can be calculated locally by using the average of the total jamming signal at each node, and this information can be passed to neighboring nodes. Then, any distance vector routing technique can be used to find the minimum energy path.

6 Related Work

Spread Spectrum and Beamforming. Traditional methods to combat jamming attacks include spread spectrum and beamforming \([3, 4, 20, 21, 22]\); however, these approaches are only a partial solution in the case of broadband jammers, jammers with directional antennas, or multiple jammers, and, as discussed in the Introduction, these methods often simply increase the cost of jamming. Nevertheless, our routing algorithms can be used in conjunction with these techniques to increase the robustness of the system against jamming attacks.

Other Jamming Evasion Techniques. When the system nodes are able to move, they can simply leave the jammed area to a safe place. This is the basis of the spatial retreat technique, in which the system nodes move away from a stationary jammer \([23, 24]\). Another jamming evasion technique is channel surfing, where the system nodes basically change their communication frequency to an interference-free frequency band when necessary \([25]\). These approaches, however, are orthogonal to the problem considered here which deals with static nodes.

One-Hop Communication in the Presence of Jamming. Several works consider one-hop energy aware communication in the presence of one jammer \([26, 27, 28, 29]\). It is usually treated as a game between a jammer and two system nodes. The objective of the jammer is to increase the cost (energy) of communication for the system nodes, whereas the objective of the system nodes is increasing the cost of jamming for the jammer and conveying their message with a minimum use of energy. Unlike these approaches, in this work we consider multi-hop communication in the presence of many jammers.

Energy Aware Routing. In order to minimize energy consumption in wireless networks, numerous energy-efficient routing algorithms have been studied \([12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 30]\). For instance, in \([30]\) minimum energy routing with a minimum end-to-end probability of error is considered. Instead of the total energy usage of the network nodes, some works consider the battery usage of each node, or balanced energy dissipation in the network as their criteria \([31, 32, 33]\). For example, in \([31]\), instead of choosing one source-destination path, the algorithm chooses several paths and uses them alternatively to avoid quick energy depletion of each path. While minimum energy routing has been studied extensively, a few works (e.g. see \([17, 18]\)) considered energy aware routing. However, unlike our work, they considered routing in the presence of passive eavesdroppers, which is different from the problem considered in this work with active jammers.

7 Conclusion and Future Work

In this paper, we have considered minimum energy routing in a quasi-static multi-path fading environment and in the presence of multiple static and dynamic malicious jammers. The outage probability equation considering the jammers is intricate; thus, we established an approximation for the outage probability, based on which we developed an algorithm to obtain a minimum energy path between a single source and a single destination with an end-to-end outage probability constraint. The algorithm requires only the knowledge of the total
average power received from the jammers at each system node over a long time period.

By performing simulations using various network parameters, we compared the energy cost of our algorithms to that of a jamming oblivious shortest-path routing, and showed that our algorithms achieve significantly better energy efficiency. In particular, it is shown that the energy saved by using our algorithms compared to the jamming oblivious scheme, especially in the case of terrestrial wireless networks with path-loss exponent $\alpha > 2$, is substantial. The consideration of more sophisticated dynamic jammers with or without eavesdropping capabilities is a topic for further research.

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APPENDIX

JOSP: JAMMING OBLIVIOUS SHORTEST PATH ROUTING

The outage probability of link $l_k$ given its fading gain $|h_k|^2$ is,

$$P_{\text{out}}^k = \mathbb{P} \left\{ \frac{P_k |h_k|^2}{N_0 d_k^\alpha} < \gamma \right\}.$$  

Since the fading gain follows an exponential distribution,

$$P_{\text{out}}^k = 1 - \exp \left( -\frac{\gamma N_0 d_k^\alpha}{P_k} \right). \quad (22)$$

Our goal is to find a path $\Pi$ that solves the following optimization problem:

$$\min \sum_{l_k \in \Pi} P_k,$$
subject to:

$$P_{\text{out}}^{SD} = 1 - \prod_{l_k \in \Pi} (1 - P_{\text{out}}^k) \leq \pi. \quad (23)$$

From (22) and (23), the equivalent constraint is,

$$\sum_{l_k \in \Pi} \left( d_k^\alpha \frac{d_k^\alpha}{P_k} \right) \geq \frac{-\ln(1 - \pi)}{\gamma N_0}.$$

Using the Lagrange multipliers technique we obtain,

$$P_k = \frac{1}{\epsilon} \sqrt{d_k^\alpha} \sum_{l_k \in \Pi} \sqrt{d_k^\alpha}.$$ 

Therefore, the cost of path $\Pi$ is given by,

$$C(\Pi) = \frac{1}{\epsilon} \left( \sum_{l_k \in \Pi} \sqrt{d_k^\alpha} \right)^2.$$ 

Hence, we assign the link cost $C(l_k) = \sqrt{d_k^\alpha}$ to each potential link $l_k$ in the network and apply a shortest-path algorithm, such as the Dijkstra’s algorithm, to find a shortest path route. Then, by substituting $P_k$ in (22), the outage probability of each link $p_{\text{out}}^k$ can be calculated.

Now, let us consider jamming and find the cost of transmission (required power) over each link in the presence of jammers. Since the channel gains between jammers and system nodes are exponentially distributed, the average outage probability at each receiver node of route $\Pi$ is,

$$p_{\text{out}}^k = \mathbb{E} \left[ 1 - \exp \left( -\gamma \left( N_0 + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} P_j |h_{j,k}|^2 / d_j^\alpha \right) \right) \right]$$

$$= 1 - e^{-\frac{\gamma N_0 d_k^\alpha}{P_k}} \prod_{j \in \mathcal{J}} E \left[ \exp \left( -\frac{\gamma P_j |h_{j,k}|^2 / d_{j,k}^\alpha}{P_k / d_k^\alpha} \right) \right]$$

$$= 1 - e^{-\frac{\gamma N_0 d_k^\alpha}{P_k}} \prod_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma P_j / d_{j,k}^\alpha}{P_k / d_k^\alpha} \right). \quad (24)$$

Hence, the relationship between the outage probability of each link and the actual cost of each link (in the presence of jammers) is