Comet: A VOEvent Broker

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Abstract

The VOEvent standard provides a means of describing transient celestial events in a machine-readable format. This is an essential step towards analysing and, where appropriate, responding to the large volumes of transients which will be detected by future large scale surveys. The VOEvent Transport Protocol (VTP) defines a system by which VOEvents may be disseminated to the community. We describe the design and implementation of Comet, a freely available, open source implementation of VTP. We use Comet as a base to explore the performance characteristics of the VTP system, in particular with reference to meeting the requirements of future survey projects. We describe how, with the aid of simple extensions to VTP, Comet can help users filter high-volume streams of VOEvents to extract only those which are of relevance to particular science cases. Based on these tests and on the experience of developing Comet, we derive a number of recommendations for future refinements of the VTP standard.

Keywords: VOEvent, Astronomical transients, Time domain astrophysics, Network protocol design

1. Introduction

Exploring the astrophysical time domain through timely follow-up observations of transient and variable sources offers the potential of many and varied scientific results. However, achieving these results requires a fast and reliable way of disseminating sufficient information about new transients to appropriate follow-up facilities.

Mechanisms for distributing news of transient events already exist: both the NASA Gamma-ray Coordinates Network [1] (GCN) and The Astronomer’s Telegram [2] have long track records of enabling transient astronomy. However, the next generation of large-scale survey telescopes such as Gaia, SKA and LSST promise an increase by several orders of magnitude in the rate of transients being reported. The sheer volume of events presents a scalability challenge: it is no longer practical for even large teams of astronomers to consider reading, understanding and responding to these notifications manually. Automation is essential. Furthermore, the diverse nature of these transient hunting facilities—covering not just electromagnetic gamut from low-frequency radio telescopes to space based X- and γ-ray monitors, but also other types of instrumentation such as gravitational waves detectors—means that a flexible and adaptable machine-readable mechanism must be adopted for describing transients.

The International Virtual Observatory Alliance (IVOA) has developed the VOEvent [3] standard to address these issues. VOEvent provides a standardized, machine- and human-readable way of describing a wide range of transient astronomical phenomena. An individual VOEvent document (or “packet”) describes a particular transient event, providing not only information about what has been observed and how the observations were made, but also making it possible for the author to include a scientific motivation for why this particular event is interesting. Furthermore, a VOEvent may cite other VOEvents, providing more information about a given transient or, if necessary, superseding or retracting an earlier message.

VOEvents are published as XML [4] documents which should be in compliance with schema [5] produced by the IVOA. Working in XML enables VOEvent to make extensive use of other relevant IVOA standards and enables convenient processing with a wide range of commercial and open-source software.

The VOEvent standard defines the structure and content of a VOEvent packet, but it does not describe a mechanism by which the author of a VOEvent may distribute it to potentially interested recipients. This transport agnosticism is provides the maximum possible flexibility for individual projects to disseminate events by whatever means best meets their science goals. However, a baseline specification for a simple transport protocol is of value in terms of providing a common starting point for building international VOEvent distribution networks [6]. The VOEvent Transport Protocol (VTP; [7]) is now seeing widespread adoption as such a baseline.

This manuscript describes Comet, an implementation of all the components necessary for interacting with VTP.
VTP defines the following network roles:

- **Author**: An author is responsible for creating and publishing one or more VOEvents.
- **Subscriber**: A subscriber receives the VOEvents generated by one or more authors.
- **Broker**: A broker receives VOEvents from other network entities and re-distributes them to one or more subscribers. In addition, a broker may perform “added value” services. These could be at the request of particular subscribers (e.g., to apply a filter to the event stream sent to that subscriber), or applied more generally to the event stream (e.g., to apply some annotation to all events processed).

Connections between these entities take place over TCP [Cert and Kahn, 1974]. The VTP standard defines three types of connection:

- **Author to Broker**: The author makes a TCP connection to the broker and transmits a VOEvent packet. On receipt of a syntactically valid message, the broker sends an acknowledgement. The connection is then closed; submitting a further VOEvent packet would require initiating a new connection.

- **Broker to Subscriber**: The subscriber opens a TCP connection to the broker, which remains open indefinitely. The broker and subscriber send periodic “heartbeat” messages over the connection to verify that it remains live. When the broker receives an event for distribution, it sends it to the subscriber over this connection. The subscriber replies with an acknowledgement.

- **Broker to Broker**: A broker may subscribe to the output of another broker. In doing so, it acts as a subscriber, and the relationship between them is as described in “Broker to Subscriber”, above.

Note that the broker-to-subscriber connection remains open at all times, even when a subscriber has recently received an event. The standard mandates that the subscriber must always be prepared to receive more events, even while a previous event is still being processed; otherwise, a backlog of events waiting to be sent to a particular subscriber could build up and overload the broker.

By causing brokers to subscribe to the output of their peers, it is possible to build extended networks of mutually-interconnected brokers. An author need only publish to one broker and ultimately their event will be distributed to all entities on the network. This is not only efficient, it is also robust: the failure of any given entity can only cause local disruption to the distribution system. The topology of such a network, and the path a VOEvent packet might take across it, is shown in Fig. 1.

In addition to passing VOEvent XML documents, VTP defines a “Transport” document type. Transport documents are used for the heartbeat messages between brokers and subscribers and for sending acknowledgement of event receipt. The documents are kept intentionally short, providing simply a timestamp, an indication of the originator,
and—in the case of an acknowledgement—the identity of the event being acknowledged.

VTP makes limited provision for securing access to the network: that is, for limiting the authors and subscribers which may connect to a given broker. The simplest, albeit least flexible, approach is for the broker to maintain a “whitelist” of the IP addresses of entities which are authorized to connect, and simply drop connections coming from elsewhere. Such a system is convenient and easy to implement for small networks, but can rapidly become unwieldy as the list of authorized users grows or as those users need to connect from multiple addresses. An alternative is therefore suggested in the standard based on cryptographically signed transport messages, which enable an entity to securely demonstrate its identity on connection. The means by which these signatures may be applied is not specified in the VTP standard, which rather refers to the systems proposed by Rixon (2005), Denny (2008) and Allen (2008). The application of cryptographic signatures to XML documents is a potentially complex topic, and one to which we return in §6.

3. The Design and implementation of Comet

Comet is a freely available, open source package which can fulfil any or all of the roles within a VTP network. It can receive events from remote brokers (the subscriber role), receive events from authors and distribute them to subscribers (the broker role) and it provides a tool which can publish a VOEvent to a remote broker (the author role). Comet aims both to act as a production-ready event distribution system, which projects can immediately start using to service their science goals, and as a convenient system for exploring the characteristics of VTP and prototyping future extensions to the protocol. The first of these goals has already been achieved, with Comet instrumental in low-latency follow up of gamma-ray bursts (Staley et al., 2013). Early results from the second goal are described in the subsequent sections of this manuscript.

Version 1.1.0 of Comet was released in February of 2014 and is current stable version at time of writing. Here, we specifically consider the implementation of this version, although there are currently no plans for major architectural changes in the future.

3.1. Twisted Python and event-driven programming

Comet is implemented in Python, and is built atop the Twisted networking engine[4]. Twisted enables an event-driven and asynchronous style of development which is extensively used throughout Comet.

Conventionally, we think of programs as being executed in order: the system executes the instructions described by the first statement, followed by the second statement, and so on until the process is complete. Of course, spreading a process across multiple threads of execution makes the precise ordering of statements non-deterministic (and, indeed, introduces a whole new level of complexity in the process; Lee, 2006), but the fundamental point remains: the aim is to execute the program as rapidly and efficiently as possible and then exit.

It is obvious that this model does not map well to network based applications. Consider the “subscriber” role in a VOEvent network: it is not rushing to finish some particular task and then terminate, but rather it continues listening to the network indefinitely for the arrival of VOEvents, and takes appropriate action when a packet is received. Event-driven programming is the generalization of this concept: rather than a list of instructions to be executed sequentially, we define the actions that should be taken in response to possible events. Twisted provides an “event loop” which waits for events and calls the appropriate actions when they occur.

When talking to the network, Twisted provides the Protocol as an abstraction for managing events. A protocol defines the interaction that a particular component of the system has with the network. For example, Listing 1 shows a simplified version of the protocol for Comet’s VOEventReceiver.

```python
class VOEventReceiver(Protocol):
    TIMEOUT = 20  # seconds

    def connectionMade(self):
        setTimeout(self.TIMEOUT)

    def connectionLost(self):
        setTimeout(None)
        close_connection()

    def timeoutConnection(self):
        log.msg("Connection timed out")
        close_connection()

    def stringReceived(self, data):
        try:
            message = parse(data)
            if is_valid(message):
                log.info("Good message received")
                acknowledge(message)
                process_event(message)
            else:
                log.warning("Bad message received")
        except ParseError:
            log.warning("Message unparsable")
        finally:
            close_connection()
```

Listing 1: An example of an event-driven Twisted protocol, based on Comet’s VOEventReceiver.

and so on until the process is complete. Of course, spreading a process across multiple threads of execution makes the precise ordering of statements non-deterministic (and, indeed, introduces a whole new level of complexity in the process; Lee, 2006), but the fundamental point remains: the aim is to execute the program as rapidly and efficiently as possible and then exit.

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listens to the network for submissions from authors. Four separate events are handled by this protocol:

- When a new connection is initiated by an author, the broker sets a timer on the connection. If no traffic is received, the timer will eventually reach zero and the connection will be timed-out. The timer is initialized to the essentially arbitrary value of 20s; this may be refined (or made user-configurable) in light of practical experience in future Comet releases.
- When a connection is lost, the connection is closed and the timeout is aborted.
- When a connection times out, close it.
- When a string is received over the connection, parse it and see if it can be recognized as a valid VOEvent. If so, return an acknowledgement and process the newly received event (for example by re-distributing it to subscribers). If not, log a warning message. Finally, shut down the connection.

Similar, often more complex, protocols are defined for all of the other roles in the system: an author connecting to a broker (VOEventSender), a broker to a subscriber (VOEventBroadcaster), and an subscriber to a broker (VOEventSubscriber).

Event-driven programming provides a convenient abstraction for responding to network events. However, it does not address issues regarding concurrency. As described in §5, VTP requires that even immediately after receiving an event subscribers must be ready to accept another: there can be no delay while the event is ingested. Contrast this with the model described above and outlined in Listing 1 here, when an event is received, each of the functions parse(), is_valid(), acknowledge(), process_event() and close_connection() is called in turn. If these operations are not assumed to be instantaneous, we must wait for them to complete before proceeding. While waiting, new events cannot be received. We are thus in violation of the VTP standard.

Twisted addresses this problem through the use of Defers. A deferred is effectively a promise that processing is underway and that results will be available in future. We can then queue up other processing tasks (or “callbacks”) that will be executed when the result of the deferred is available. For example, we could define a version of parse()—call it deferred_parse()—that, rather than returning an object representing a parsed version of the VOEvent document, returns a promise to eventually parse the document in the future and then make it available for further processing. We can then queue up our other functions to run only when parsing is complete. For example, see Listing 2 in which we queue up a number of callbacks to be run when parsing is complete and also add an “errback” which handles logging a message if any of the callbacks fail to run successfully.

```python
def stringReceived(self, data):
    d = deferred_parse(data)
    d.addCallback(is_valid)
    d.addCallback(check_role)
    d.addCallback(acknowledge)
    d.addCallback(process_event)
    d.addCallback(log_failure)
    d.addCallback(close_connection)
```

Listing 2: A version of VOEventReceiver.stringReceived() (shown in Listing 1) based on deferred processing.

Finally, we must implement deferred_parse(). Simply returning a deferred from a function does not prevent it from blocking. Instead, we create a dedicated thread which is devoted to parsing the data, and have it run concurrently with the rest of the application. When that thread completes, the deferred fires with its result. Conveniently, Twisted makes it easy to apply this pattern to a blocking function such as our parse(): see Listing 3.

```python
from twisted.internet.threads import deferToThread

def deferred_parse(data):
    return deferToThread(parse, data)
```

Listing 3: The implementation of the non-blocking deferred_parse() function.

Although the examples presented in this section are only intended to be illustrative, they demonstrate the concepts of asynchronous, event-driven programming upon which Comet is built and are fundamental to understanding its operation.

It is worth emphasizing that the techniques described in this section are not unique to Twisted. Other frameworks such as gevent and asyncio provide implementations of similar capabilities in Python, and equivalent libraries are available for many other languages. However, the rich software ecosystem supported by Twisted, combined with its demonstrated ability to deliver acceptable performance, has provided an excellent platform upon which to develop Comet.

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[1] In practice, the implementation of some of these operations used in the Comet codebase can be assumed to be effectively instantaneous. This is safe so long as the time taken to parse is sufficiently short that no backlog of events waiting to be processed builds up and no network timeouts occur.

[2] http://www.gevent.org/

[3] Recently added to the Python standard library; https://docs.python.org/3.4/library/asyncio.html
3.2. Comet architecture

Comet is built around the four Twisted protocols discussed in §3.1. These enable it to take the part of either side in each of the three connection types discussed in §3.1. For the convenience of end users, these are made accessible under two distinct front ends. In this section, we first introduce those components and describe the relationship between them, and then discuss how Comet implements some specific requirements of VTP.

3.2.1. The components of Comet

The authorial component is comet-sendvo. This is a command-line tool which enables the user to submit a VOEvent to a remote broker. The user is expected to supply the VOEvent either on standard input or via a reference to the filesystem; comet-sendvo transmits it to the specified destination using the VOEEventSender protocol and shuts down.

Processing a single event and then exiting is an appropriate model for an author, but is not the behaviour required of a broker or subscriber. Rather, these tools must remain active, continuing to receive and process VOEvents until the user shuts them down. To support this mode of operation, Comet can run as a “daemon”, or background process. The Comet daemon can:

1. Accept submissions from authors (including, of course, comet-sendvo);
2. Subscribe to event streams from one or more remote brokers;
3. Distribute event packets received (whether by direct author submission or by subscription) to its own subscribers;
4. Execute arbitrary logic based upon the event packets received.

A single Comet daemon is capable of performing any or all of these actions, depending upon configuration: it is not necessary to start separate “broker” and “subscriber” daemons, for example.

Both comet-sendvo and the Comet daemon make extensive use of the facilities provided by Twisted for event-driven and asynchronous programming, as well as its support for logging and daemonization. They are exclusively command-line driven, and do not rely on configuration files.

3.2.2. Schema validation

It is possible to construct XML documents which claim to be VOEvents but which do not, in fact, adhere to the VOEvent XML schema. In some cases, the document may be completely unparsable; in others, it may be possible to extract some data, but with unpredictable results and no guarantee that the recipient receives the information the author intended.

Current versions of Comet insists that events being submitted to the broker by an author comply with the VOEvent 2.0 schema extending this to include later versions as they become available is straightforward. Schema validation is applied to the event before it is accepted for redistribution by the broker: if that validation fails, a nak message which indicates the problem is sent to the author and the event is dropped. It is to be hoped that a well-intentioned author will correct and re-submit the event.

When receiving events from an upstream broker (either as a broker itself or as a subscriber) Comet does not attempt to validate the event against the schema (although it is still required that the event must be parsable). This is because there is no way to indicate the failure to the author: any nak sent to the upstream broker will not be propagated further. The author cannot know that their event has been rejected, will not correct and re-send, and valuable scientific content may be lost.

3.2.3. Event de-duplication

As described in §3.2.1 it is possible to build a mutually interconnected “mesh” of brokers to efficiently and reliably distribute VOEvent packets to a large number of subscribers. However, this runs the risk that events could continue “looping” on the network indefinitely, as two or more brokers which subscribe to each other’s feeds repeatedly exchange the same event. To avoid this problem, Comet refuses to process any given event more than once: if a newly received event is the same as one which has been previously seen, it is simply dropped without being further distributed.

In order for this approach to be effective, it is necessary to define what it means for two VOEvent documents to be “the same”. In particular, due to the nature of XML, it is possible for exactly the same information about an event (the “infoset”) to be encoded in multiple different, but all equally valid, XML documents. At the simplest level, this is because XML is (for the most part) white space agnostic—new lines or spaces can be inserted without changing the meaning of the document. The question becomes more complex, though, when we consider the various versions of the VOEvent standard. Version 2.0 (Seaman et al., 2011) is current, but the previous version (1.1; Seaman et al., 2006) is still in use by some systems. If the same information about the same astronomical event is encoded in a VOEvent 2.0 document and a VOEvent 1.1 document, are these “the same”?

This question is particularly pertinent because this situation is exactly that which exists in practice: since 2011 NASA GCN has issued both version 1.1 and version 2.0 VOEvents containing the same information. Seaman et al. (2011) requires that each VOEvent carry an IVORN which “will stand in for a particular packet”. It is this IVORN that is used to identify events in the

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9http://www.ivoa.net/xml/VOEvent/VOEvent-v2.0.xsd
10http://gcn.gsfc.nasa.gov/admin/voevent_version20_available.txt
11International Virtual Observatory Resource Name
context of references and citations, for example. There has been some debate as to whether IVORNs uniquely identify a particular infoset or a particular representation thereof: this is not currently well defined by the relevant documentation. In the case of the events issued by GCN, a single IVORN is used to describe both the version 1.1 and the version 2.0 VOEvent packets: this provide a de facto standard that the IVORN identifies the infoset.

VTP makes no distinction between the versions of VO-Events which it transmits: the same protocol may be used for version 1.1, or 2.0, or putative future versions. However, the consumer of a particular VOEvent may well have a toolchain that is tuned to work with one particular standard. In other words, authors may wish to use a VOEvent network to distribute multiple different versions of the same event, while subscribers may depend on receiving a specific representation of that event. If an author submits version 1.1 and version 2.0 representations of an event, it would not be appropriate for a broker to regard them as duplicates and discard one of them. The only possible conclusion is that the IVORN is not a suitable means of identifying unique packets for the purposes of de-duplication.

Comet therefore regards packets as duplicates only if they are bit-for-bit identical with a packet which has been seen before. This is determined by calculating the SHA-1 cryptographic hash of every packet which is seen by a Comet daemon and storing it, together with the time and date at which the packet was seen, in a DBM-style persistent database. When an event is received, its SHA-1 hash is calculated and compared against the contents of the database to establish if it has been seen before.

Each individual SHA-1 hash is stored as 40 bytes, plus a further 13 bytes are used to record the timestamp. The total storage requirement is therefore very modest. However, on a busy broker processing many events, the database could grow to a significant size, wasting resources and slowing down access. Therefore, Comet periodically removes all events older than 30 days from its database. Duplicates issued more than 30 days after the original event will therefore not be detected; however, an event loop with such a long period poses no threat to the integrity of the network. It may be appropriate to tune this timescale in future based on practical experience with large scale VTP deployments.

It should be noted that this de-duplication scheme requires that all entities on the network forward events unchanged: even an apparently inconsequential change to an event packet which results in a valid encoding the same SHA-1 hash for the event. The current VTP standard implies that the IVORN identifies the infoset.

3.2.4. Security and whitelisting

The released version of Comet described here (1.1.0; does not implement an authentication scheme based on cryptographic signatures as described in Work is ongoing on prototyping a scheme using Comet as a test-bed: this is described in.

When acting as a broker, Comet includes the ability to check authors submitting events against a whitelist of IP addresses. Multiple disjoint ranges of addresses to whitelist may be specified using CIDR notation, making the system very flexible.

Comet does not currently provide built-in whitelisting support for subscribers. However, equivalent functionality is available through the use of an operating system level packet filter.

3.2.5. Acting on events received

Just receiving a VOEvent and optionally re-distributing it is of limited practical value: ultimately, some recipient of the event will wish to take action based upon it. The algorithms which may be employed to determine whether a given event is worth of follow-up are dependent on the particular science goals of the recipient, are potentially complex, and are certainly outside the scope of this manuscript. Since it is not possible to anticipate the requirements of the end user in a universally applicable way, Comet rather seeks to be easily adapted to each particular use case. Two mechanisms are provided to make this possible.

The simplest option is that when a new event is received, Comet can spawn an external process and provide the text of the event packet to it on standard input. The process is run asynchronously, so that potentially lengthy processing jobs can be run on events without interrupting Comet’s regular operation. Comet monitors the execution of the process and logs a warning if it is unsuccessful (that is, if it exits with a status other than 0), but otherwise has no control over the processing performed.

In some circumstances, the user may wish for more control than is provided for by passing events to another process. Comet therefore makes it possible to write plugins, which can be loaded into the daemon at run time. Users write plugins in Python, implementing a standard interface. Plugins provide a __call__ method which is invoked with the contents of an event whenever one is received. An example is shown in Listing.

Comet automatically probes for all available plugins and makes them available as command line arguments, so the user can specify which plugins are required when the daemon is started. If required, plugins may also define configuration parameters implementing the IHasOptions interface; these are exposed as command line options.

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1. http://www.ivoa.net/pipermail/voevent/2012-March/002836.html
2. "DBM-style" databases provide mappings between “keys” and “values” in the manner of an associative array. Various libraries implementing this style of database exist; Comet uses Python’s anydbms interface, which automatically chooses a particular implementation based upon the platform on which it is running.

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1. Eastlake and Jones 2001
2. AT&T 1979
3. Fuller et al. 1993
4. Fuller et al. 1993
5. Fuller et al. 1993
6. Fuller et al. 1993
from zope.interface import implementer
from twisted.plugin import IPlugin
from comet.icomet import IHandler, IHasOptions

# A plugin implements the IPlugin
# and IHandler interfaces
@implementer(IPlugin, IHandler)
class ExamplePlugin(object):
    # The "name" attribute is used to refer
    # to the plugin on the command line.
    name = "example"

    # The "__call__()" method is invoked
    # when a new event is received.
    def __call__(self, event):
        print "Event received"

# The plugin must be instantiated before use.
example_plugin = ExamplePlugin()

Listing 4: A simple example of a Comet event handling plugin. This
plugin prints a message whenever a new event is received.

4. Filtering events

Next-generation telescopes such as LSST anticipate to
detecting and announcing transients using VOEvent at
rates of perhaps tens of millions of events per day (Kantor,
2014). It is unlikely that most individual subscribers will
have a use for all of these events. Winnowing that event
stream down so that each subscriber receives only those
events which are of direct relevance to them is both efficient
in terms of resource usage, as fewer events need to be
transported to and processed by the subscriber, but also
enables subscribers to deploy simple, well-targeted systems
that address the science goals, rather than attempting
to devise efficient ways to process millions of VOEvent
packets.

Efforts to develop intelligent systems for alerting users
only of those events which are of relevance to them are
ongoing, and will continue into the future (Williams et al.,
2009). Comet contributes to this effort by introducing a
powerful XPath (Clark and DeRose, 1999) based filtering
system.

4.1. XPath queries

XPath is a language for selecting parts of and computing
values over an XML document. XPath expressions may return
one of four different result types:

- A Boolean value;
- A floating point number;
- A textual string;
- A set of XML “nodes”, representing parts of the document.

XPath enables users to specify complex queries, includ-
ing testing the values of arbitrary elements or attributes
specified in the document and combining those tests with
Boolean logic. A complete reference is outside the scope of
this manuscript, but some examples may serve to illustrate
the possibilities.

Starting with string matching,

//Who/Author[shortName="VO-GCN"]

returns a set of all nodes in the document which list the
author’s “short name” as VO-GCN. More complex matches
can use functions, such as

//How[contains(Description, "Swift")]

which returns the set of all nodes which mention “Swift”
in the context of a describing how the data was obtained.
Numerical comparisons are also possible:

//Param[@name="Sun_Distance" and @value>40]

provides the set of all parameters called Sun_Distance
with a numerical value greater than 40.

These expression can be combined, so that for example

//How[contains(Description, "Swift")]
or
( //Param[@name="Sun_Distance" and @value>40]
  and //Who/Author[shortName="VO-GCN"] )

returns a Boolean value which is true if the event either
mentions “Swift” or both has a Sun_Distance param-
ter greater than 40 and originates from GCN, and false
otherwise.

4.2. Integration with Comet

Comet makes it possible for a subscriber to supply one
or more XPath expressions to a broker. When the broker
receives an event, it evaluates each expression over the
event, and only forward it to the subscriber if at least one
of the expressions evaluates produces a positive result.

Comet takes the result returned by XPath and applies
Python’s bool() built-in function to determine if the result
is “positive”. For example, the values True, 1 and "string"
(the Boolean true value, a non-zero number and a non-
empty string) as well as a non-empty node set are all
positive, while False, 0 and "" (Boolean false, the number 0
and an empty string) and the empty node set are “negative”
results.

VTP provides no standardized method for a subscriber
to send their filter preferences to the broker. Comet works
around this by overloading the Transport message system
provided by VTP and described in [2]. According to the VTP specification, it is legal for a subscriber to send a Transport message of class authenticationresponse and with arbitrary metadata embedded at any time during a VTP session. Comet looks for XPath expressions encoded in this metadata and installs them as filters for the subscriber; other brokers which comply with the protocol but do not support this form of filtering should simply ignore the message.

4.3. Alternative filtering systems

XPath provides a convenient, standardized and expressive language for accessing and performing simple calculations and comparisons based upon the contents of XML documents. Incorporating XPath based filtering into Comet was straightforward and doing so provides a powerful means of winnowing high-volume VOEvent streams.

However, XPath is not appropriate for meeting every possible use case. In particular, XPath expressions are evaluated over individual VOEvents, with no reference to their surrounding context. Consequently, XPath expressions cannot be used to draw scientific conclusions—or even perform rate-limiting—based on the evolving contents of a stream of events. Further, XPath provides no specialist astronomical or mathematical routines: it is impractical to use it for filtering based on operations beyond simple arithmetic and comparisons.

Given these considerations, it is likely that addressing some scientific goals will require a different approach to filtering than that currently supported by Comet. The VTP system explicitly allows for this by encouraging brokers to layer arbitrary “added value” services on top of the basic VTP system: a richer, more astronomically-focused and context-aware filtering system is an example of the possibilities. Indeed, such a service has precedent in the form of SkyAlert ([Williams et al., 2009]), which provides a Python-based interface to filtering events.

5. Performance

Comet not been designed primarily for performance: at time of writing, typical VOEvent brokers are processing perhaps a few hundred events per day, so the total computational and storage demands are extremely modest. However, it is informative to consider both how Comet and the VTP architecture scale to cope with the millions of events per night promised by future facilities such as LSST. In this section, we quantify both the number of events Comet is capable of processing, the latency which it introduces to the event stream, and the number of subscribers which a broker can conveniently service. We begin by describing the test system, move on to discuss the performance characteristics of the major operations which Comet performs when processing an individual VOEvent message, and then take a more holistic approach to consider the performance of a networked Comet broker under a variety of loads.

5.1. Test system configuration

The basic configuration of all tests below consists of one or more authors connecting to a broker and sending it events which the broker then distributes to one or more subscribers. The processes acting as authors, brokers and subscribers were all run on the same modest desktop system, based on an Intel Core i7 940 CPU and 8 GiB RAM. Storage was provided by two 7200 RPM magnetic disks configured as a RAID-0 array. The system was running Debian [15] GNU/Linux with kernel version 3.13.

In realistic scenarios, VOEvent authors, brokers and subscribers would not co-exist on the same system. However, providing many separate test systems was impractical, and exchanging events over the public internet (or even over a local network) introduces an extra layer of uncertainty in terms of network latency. Instead, the various processes being tested were run in isolated process containers using Docker [16]. Docker-based containers operate in much the same way as traditional virtual machines, except that they incur no virtualization overhead. They directly address the same kernel as the host system, but are only able to communicate with each other over (virtual) network interfaces. Within each container a minimal Ubuntu [14] Linux 12.04 system was installed, providing Python 2.7.3 and Twisted 11.1.0. All testing was carried out with Comet 1.1.0. The “Dockerfile” used to create exactly the system used for these tests, as well as all the benchmarking scripts and plugins described below, are available from the Comet repository [8].

5.2. Individual event processing

When an event is received from an author by the Comet broker for redistribution to subscribers it passes through five distinct processing stages. These are:

1. The XML document text is parsed into an internal data structure;
2. The VOEvent is checked for validity against the VOEvent 2.0 XML schema [3.2.2];
3. The SHA-1 hash of the document text is calculated;
4. The hash is compared against, and, if necessary, appended to the database of previously seen VOEvents [5.2.3];
5. Optionally, one or more XPath expressions are evaluated against the document before it is forwarded to each subscriber [4].

Most of these operations are likely to depend upon the particular VOEvent document being handled: a longer and more complex message will naturally require more effort to process (the exception is checking and recording the document against the event database, which involves processing

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§Four cores with two threads each running at 2.93 GHz.
13 http://www.debian.org/
14 http://www.docker.io/
15 http://www.ubuntu.com/
just the IVORN rather than the complete document). To best represent a real-world workload, the tests were carried out using a corpus of 16425 VOEvents harvested from currently operation VTP brokers between 5 and 15 July 2014. The VOEvents originated from a variety of sources, and include both notifications of astronomical phenomena and sundry utility and test messages. The longest document consisted of 9647 bytes; the shortest 635; the median length was 5002 bytes.

Sections 5.2.1–5.2.5 below, describe tests carried out to investigate the performance of each of these operations in turn. A summary of the results is presented in §5.2.6.

5.2.1. XML parsing

All 16425 VOEvent documents in the test corpus were read from disk and stored as textual data in memory. Each in turn was parsed into Comet’s internal VOEvent representation\(^{17}\). In order to confirm that parsing was successful, the Comet API was used to retrieve the version attribute from the parsed document and confirm that it was equal to “2.0”. The total time taken to parse and read the attribute from all of the events was measured.

5.2.2. Schema validation

All test VOEvent documents were read from disk, parsed, and stored in memory using Comet’s internal representation. The VOEvent 2.0 XML schema was also read from disk and parsed into an lxml \textit{XMLSchema} object, the same data structure as used by Comet for schema validation during normal operations. The total time taken to check all the events against the schema was measured. Two of the events failed validation.

5.2.3. SHA-1 calculation

All VOEvent documents in the test corpus were read from disk, parsed, and stored in memory using Comet’s internal representation. The total time taken to calculate the 40 byte hexadecimal SHA-1 hash for each event in turn was measured.

5.2.4. Event database operations

The contents of a particular VOEvent document are not relevant when working with the event database: the database operations only involve manipulating the arrival time of the VOEvent and it’s SHA-1 hash. For this test, therefore, we do not make use of the corpus of events described above. Instead, a series of test VOEvent packets of the form shown in Listing 5 was generated. Each packet was compliant with the VOEvent 2.0 schema, but carried a relatively small payload amounting to little more than a timestamp reflecting when the event was created.

A batch of 10000 such test messages was generated and stored in memory. The total time taken to both verify that each VOEvent was not initially present in the event database and then record it in the event database was recorded\(^{18}\). Comet does not provide an interface to the event database which does not involve calculating a SHA-1 hash; the time measured therefore includes hash calculation for each event.

The experiment described was initially performed with the event database stored on magnetic disk. The mean time taken to check and record an event in the database is shown in Tab. 1. Note that this is orders of magnitude above the times measured for the other processing steps. This is, perhaps, unsurprising: accessing disk storage involves significant overhead. To mitigate this, memory-based filesystem was created based on \textit{tmpfs} (Kerrisk et al., 2014) and both broker and subscriber were configured to store their event databases here. This storage is entirely RAM-based, so avoids the extra delays in writing to disk.

The experiment was repeated with the database stored on the \textit{tmpfs} filesystem; the result was a factor of 25 improvement in the time taken to process each event, as shown in Tab. 1.

As per §3.2.3 Comet stores hashes of the VOEvents received for 30 days. On a busy VOEvent network, this could involve generating a much larger database than the 10000 events tested, which may impact performance. The previous experiment was therefore repeated 1000 times using the same databases stored on \textit{tmpfs}, resulting in a database containing 10\(^7\) hashes in total. The lowest mean processing time per event was measured when processing batch 155, at an average of 0.000491 s per event; the highest when processing batch 855, at an average of 0.000502 s per event. There was no systematic increase in processing time with event database size. Testing with a significantly larger database was impossible due to the available memory.

5.2.5. XPath evaluation

The time taken to evaluate an XPath expression over a VOEvent document depends not only on the complexity of the document being processed but also on the XPath expression itself. A detailed discussion of the performance characteristics of XPath is outside the scope of this work; instead, we take the example queries given in §4.1 as representative of a typical workload.

All test VOEvent documents were read from disk, parsed, and stored in memory using Comet’s internal representation. Each of the XPath expressions in turn was parsed into an lxml \textit{XPath} object, as used by Comet for XPath filtering during normal operations. The total time taken

\(^{17}\)All documents claiming to comply with the VOEvent 2.0 schema which were distributed by any of \url{voevent.phys.soton.ac.uk}, \url{voevent.dcc3.com}, \url{voevent.swinbank.org}, \url{208.199.97.285}, \url{209.208.78.170} or \url{50.116.49.68} were collected. The three numerical IPv4 addresses are used by NASA GCN and do not have DNS PTR records.

\(^{18}\)In version 1.1.0 of Comet, as tested, checking and recording an event are distinct operations. Later versions combine these to form an atomic check-and-record operation, which is both improves performance and avoids a race condition.
Listing 5: An example of the form of VOEvent used for benchmark testing. The ivorn attribute of the VOEvent element and the Date element were automatically generated and reflect the time at which the packet was created.

Table 1: Timing results for each stage of Comet’s processing of a VOEvent document. All results except the check against the event database were based on a corpus of 16425 genuine VOEvent documents; the check against the event database was performed using synthetic test data. Each test is described in §5.2.

| Operation                | Total (s) | Per event (s) |
|--------------------------|-----------|---------------|
| XML parsing              | 1.625465  | 0.000099      |
| SHA-1 calculation        | 0.152024  | 0.000009      |
| Event database operations |           |               |
| Magnetic disk            | -         | 0.013331      |
| tmpfs                    | -         | 0.000499      |
| Schema validation        | 1.385420  | 0.000084      |
| XPath evaluation         |           |               |
| Expression 1            | 0.218424  | 0.000013      |
| Expression 2            | 0.221899  | 0.000014      |
| Expression 3            | 0.579474  | 0.000035      |
| Expression 4            | 0.283376  | 0.000017      |

*Also includes SHA-1 calculation.

Expressions as defined in §4.1.

to check all events against each expression in turn was measured.

5.2.6. Results

The total time for operating on all messages being tested (where applicable), as well as the mean time per event, for each of the tests above is recorded in Table 1. Note that the results recorded for XPath filtering are not directly comparable to those for the other tests described. All the other operations are performed once per event received by the broker. In contrast, potentially several different XPath expressions are evaluated per subscriber for every event received. Thus, even though the time recorded for evaluating the XPath expressions is substantially less than that recorded for event parsing or schema validation, the total time spent on XPath processing may, in fact, be greater in a deployed system.

Leaving aside XPath, of the individual operations performed once per event interacting with the event database dominates: even when using a tmpfs-backed database the time taken to check and record the event hash is more than twice that spent on the other operations combined, and is compounded by a further factor of over 25 when magnetic disks are used. Future performance-focused development of Comet should investigate ways to mitigate this issue.

5.3. Latency

For certain science cases, maximizing the scientific relevance of follow-up observations requires extremely rapid response. For example, identifying precursors of fast radio bursts (Thornton et al., 2013) would require action on a timescale a tens of milliseconds. It is therefore important that the VOEvent transport system does not introduce excessive latency to the dissemination of event notifications.

For the purposes of this discussion, we define the “latency” of a VOEvent as the time elapsed between its creation by an author and the instant at which it has been received by a subscriber and that subscriber is in a position to take action (using the strategies described in §3.2.5) based upon it.

In this test, we measure the latency introduced by passing a VOEvent from an author through a Comet broker and on to a Comet-based subscriber.

5.3.1. Test setup

A script was used to generate 3000 individual VOEvent packets of the form shown in Listing 5 and submit them to a broker at intervals of 0.3 seconds.
A plugin (§3.2.5) was written which, whenever an event of the form described above is received, compares the timestamp in the event with the current time, and saves the difference to a log file. This plugin was enabled on a subscriber, which was then connected to the broker.

Both the benchmarking script and the plugin described are available from the Comet repository (§8).

5.3.2. Results
The distribution of latencies among the received events when this test was run in the default configuration is shown in the top panel of Fig. 2. The mean latency was 0.022 s with a standard deviation of 0.011 s; the longest recorded latency for any event was 0.171 s.

As described in §3.1, Twisted provides an event-driven framework. The core of this framework is the “reactor”, which provides a uniform interface to event handling across platforms upon which Twisted can run. The internal implementation of the reactor itself can vary from platform to platform to most efficiently take advantage of the facilities available to it.

The default reactor implementation used by Twisted on the system used for testing is based on the epoll() system call (IEEE and The Open Group 2013). However, modern Linux systems provide the alternative epoll() call (Kerrisk et al. 2014) which provides a more efficient alternative. Twisted provides a reactor which is based upon epoll(). The same experiment was therefore repeated, but with both broker and subscriber based on this alternative reactor. The results are shown in the central panel of Fig. 2. This provided a somewhat improved mean latency of 0.019 s with a standard deviation of 0.011 s, and a reduced maximum latency of 0.130 s.

Section 5.2.4 established that the event database operations take an average of 0.013 s when the database is stored on magnetic disk, as it was in this default configuration: this is some 70% of the measured event latency. The same section demonstrated a 25-fold improvement when the database was stored in RAM using the tmpfs filesystem. This performance improvement comes at some cost: RAM technologies typically used in modern systems are inherently volatile, and the event database would not survive if the system were powered down or rebooted. Further, the 10⁷ event database described in §3.2.4 consumed around 1 GiB of storage; given a database retention period of 30 days (§3.2.3) and potentially multi-million-per-day event rates from next generation facilities, memory capacity may be a limiting factor.

These considerations notwithstanding, the database was re-created on a tmpfs filesystem and the test repeated. The results are shown in the bottom panel of Fig. 2. Not only are these latencies lower (mean 0.0063 s, maximum 0.013 s) than those based on magnetic disks, but they are also much more consistent than the previous tests (standard deviation 0.0003 s).

An overhead of no more than around ten milliseconds is comparable to that which might be expected from network delays over short links, and is unlikely to be of significance in all but the most demanding of astronomical applications. Note, however, that this figure was measured on an otherwise unloaded system: while it sets a lower bound on the latency added by Comet, a production system under load is unlikely to perform at the same level.

For the rest of the tests presented in this manuscript, we continue to adopt the epoll() and tmpfs configuration described here.

5.4. Number of subscribers
In order to meaningfully act as a distribution, rather than simply a forwarding, system, and certainly in order to enable the construction of extended networks of interconnected brokers, it is necessary that a single Comet broker be able to serve many subscribers simultaneously. Here, we measure how latency increases as more subscribers are connected to the the broker.

5.4.1. Test setup
Using the same script as described in §5.3.1, 1000 test events were submitted to a broker. The number of clients connected to that broker was increased at logarithmic intervals (1, 2, 4, ...). Each client recorded the latency of each event received to a log file.

Each Comet process takes approximately 32 MB of memory, used to hold the Comet code itself, the associated
libraries, the Python interpreter, and the overhead associated with the Docker container. The test system contained 8 GB RAM. When testing with 256 subscribers, the machine ran out of memory and started to swap to disk. This set an upper bound on the number of subscribers which could be tested.

5.4.2. Results

The latency increases gradually with increasing subscriber count, from a mean of 0.0063 s for a single subscriber to 0.0931 s for 256 subscribers, the highest number tested: even at this level, the mean latency was less than 0.1 s. The maximum latency rose to a peak of 0.49 s. A latency of around 0.1 s is comparable to a long range (e.g. transatlantic) network round trip times and is at a level where it may start to impact on time-critical astronomical applications.

The scaling of latency with subscriber count is shown in Fig. 3. Note that the scaling is better than linear across the range of subscriber counts tested: ingestion of new events into the broker, rather than distribution to subscribers, dominates.

Other than a slowly increasing latency, the Comet system showed no ill effects of handling a large number of subscribers: neither memory nor CPU usage of the broker showed excessive growth. If the latency were acceptable for the science application, there would be no difficulty in serving 256 subscribers in a production mode using this hardware.

For servicing extremely large numbers of clients while minimizing latency, a tree-like structure could be established. For example, serving 8 subscribers introduced a mean latency of 0.0093 s. If each of those 8 subscribers redistributed the event to a further 8 clients, we might expect a total latency on the order of 0.02 s to reach 256 clients; if the tree were extended to ten levels we might expect to reach $8^{10} (\sim 10^{9})$ subscribers with 0.1 s latency.

5.5. Total throughput

Next-generation facilities will announce transients at rates far outstripping those seen at present. Notably, LSST is predicted to reach an average rate of $10^{8}$ events per night: assuming those events are evenly spaced over a 12 hour period, this is equivalent to over 230 events per second. This is the output from just a single instrument, albeit a prolific one, and takes no account of the cascade of follow-up packets that a significant transient would likely generate. Here, we measure how the event rate processed by the Comet broker running on the test system.

5.5.1. Test setup

A script was used to generate 10000 individual VOEvent messages, which were stored in RAM. After all of the events had been generated, the author started submitting them to a Comet broker which had a single subscriber attached. The total time taken by the author from the start of the submission of the first event to the closing of the connection after the submission of the last event was measured by recording its running time. The total time from the receipt of the first event to the receipt of the last event by the subscriber was measured by taking the difference between the latest and the earliest timestamps recorded in the event database (§3.2.3). These times are then converted into an per-second event rate.

The number of concurrent connections between the author and the broker was varied logarithmically. For each number of connections, the experiment was repeated 10 times.

5.5.2. Results

Figure 4 shows the how the event rate measured at both author and subscriber varies with the number of concurrent connections. With a single connection a rate of 283.7 events/second at the author and 283.8 events/second at the subscriber is achieved. This increases to a peak of 519.2 events/second at the author and 534.2 events/second at the subscriber with 64 concurrent connections; after this, increasing he number of connections causes the overall throughput to drop. The standard deviation of the measured rate is also plotted: the throughput is relatively stable at low connection counts, but substantial variations are seen with 256 and 512 concurrent connections.

At the highest connection counts, the rate is not only seen to drop substantially, but also some events are lost in transit: at the end of the test, the subscriber had received fewer than 10000 VOEvent packets. Since the throughput was lower at these rates, and since reliable transmission is essential, concurrency levels higher than 512 connections were not investigated.

These results may be explained by considering the balance between the per-connection overhead and the compute load on the broker. Since each event is delivered by making a new connection to the broker (as per the protocol described in [2]), there is a per-event overhead due to creating
Figure 4: At top, the mean throughput of events as transmitted by the author and as received by the subscriber as a function of number of concurrent connections from author to broker. The central panel shows the standard deviation of the measured rates. The number of events which were not successfully received by the subscriber is shown at the bottom.

and tearing down the connection (§5.6 discusses some of the overheads in managing TCP connections). At low connection counts, this latency dominates; as the concurrency increases, the throughput is dominated by the broker load.

At the highest connection counts, the configuration of the Linux kernel’s networking stack comes in to play. Large numbers of short lived connections are a relatively uncommon phenomenon, and the standard configuration of the Linux kernel is not optimized to handle them efficiently. Indeed, at very high connection counts, the kernel logged warnings that it was under a “SYN flood” attack [Computer Emergency Response Team 1996]. Under this load, connections may be dropped or rejected by the kernel, leading to events never reaching their destination, as seen in the lowest panel of Fig. 4. Many options within the kernel may be tuned to improve its performance under these network loads. However, since the peak throughput was already limited by Comet’s CPU requirements at lower connection counts, they were not investigated here.

It is worth noting that, at low connection counts, the throughput from author to broker and from broker to subscriber were effectively identical, but they began to diverge as the concurrency increased. This is again due to the per-connection overhead: since the connection from the broker to the subscriber is permanently kept open, it is significantly more efficient, and provides a continuously-available high bandwidth connection. At high connection counts, the latency involved in servicing many connections means that such high bandwidth cannot be achieved here when submitting events.

Without special tuning, a throughput of over 500 events per second is more than twice that required to service the average event rate predicted from LSST. Further, this test was limited by CPU performance on desktop-class hardware that will be substantially more than a decade old before LSST is commissioned. In these terms, then, servicing an LSST-scale event stream with a VTP based broker seems plausible, although there are a number of caveats:

- This calculation takes no account of follow-up traffic generated in response to the events;
- These events did not carry a scientific payload, and hence are likely to be significantly smaller than those which might be transmitted in practice;
- Although the mean event rate from LSST will be around 250 events/second, this will be transmitted in short bursts of much higher rates. Averaging the event traffic over time reduces the instantaneous traffic to a manageable level, but introduces significant additional latencies.

5.6. High-latency connections

Astronomical observatories are frequently located in remote locations: in deserts, on mountain tops, and so on. The geographic isolation of these facilities often results in their having poor internet connections. Even if high-bandwidth networking is arranged specifically to service the observatory, network latencies are likely to be high.

One might imagine that some preliminary data analysis for such an observatory would be performed on-site, rather than attempting to ship large volumes of raw data out of a remote location. Further, it would not be practical for large numbers of external clients to connect inwards to a VTP broker running at the observatory. Therefore, for the purposes of this discussion, we we assume that the events are generated by a VOEvent author on site, then shipped using VTP to a remote broker for public distribution.

Assuming 10 million alerts are issued by the observatory per night and each event has a size of around 10 kib, a total of 100 GiB of event data might be created. Given that long range multi-gigabit per second connections are widely available, the total amount of data to be transmitted is unlikely to be intractable.

Network latency, however, presents a further problem. As described in §2, each event must be submitted by the author initiating a new connection to the broker, submitting the event, waiting for an acknowledgement, and then closing the connection. Sending the event and waiting for acknowledgement involves a network round-trip. However, data is transmitted over TCP [Cert and Kahn 1974], we use the standard TCP mechanisms for creating and
terminating connections, each of which involves another network round trip. This process is illustrated in Fig. 5: the complete transaction involved in submitting a single event to the broker, given a network round trip time of \( t_{RT} \), takes \( 3t_{RT} \). In practice, after transmitting the final FIN packet, the author may assume that the connection is closed without waiting for a response, and hence initiate a new connection, so the figure of \( 2t_{RT} \) describes the interval between connection attempts. Assuming that events are sent in sequentially, and given a round trip time of, say, 500 ms, this would limit the rate at which events can be sent to 1 per second, or 43200 in a 12 hour period. This is far short of the throughput discussed in \( \S \) 5.5, and certainly inadequate for the putative 10 million alerts per night discussed above. This is a significant flaw in the VTP system. It is to be hoped that future revisions can address the issue; for further discussion, see \( \S \) 7.5.

Until and unless this problem is addressed, it is necessary to consider alternative approaches. As discussed in \( \S \) 5.5, it is possible for the author for an author to submit multiple events simultaneously by opening more than one TCP connection to the broker. Here, we investigate to what extent this can mitigate the issue.

5.6.1. Test setup

Events were generated, sent to the broker, and thence onward to a single subscriber as per \( \S \) 5.5.1, and was carried out as described in that section. Connection counts were again increased logarithmically. Given the relative stability of the throughput (at least for modest connection counts) shown in Fig 5, a single set of 10000 events was sent for each level of concurrency.

Link-level network latency was simulated using NetEm [Hemminger 2005], the network emulation functionality available as part of the Linux kernel. Given a (virtual, in this case) network device named vethXXX, a delay of \( YYY \) ms may be added to each packet sent through it by running:

```
Note that this delay applies only to packets sent through the interface: no delay is applied to packets received by the interface. To simulate a symmetric network delay using this approach, it would therefore be necessary to add a latency of \( t_{RT}/2 \) at both the author and the subscriber interfaces. However, this is complicated in the test system since the subscriber also communicates with the broker over its interface. Therefore, instead the whole delay was applied to the output of the author. Given the symmetric nature of Fig. 5, the observed effect is identical.

5.6.2. Results

Figure 6 shows how the throughput varies with the number of concurrent connections for a variety of network round trip times. As expected, at low concurrencies, the throughput is extremely low: the network round trip time completely dominates the transmission rate. However, this is substantially mitigated by increasing the concurrency: with a round trip time of 100 ms, using 256 concurrent connections provides a rate of 500 events/second, which
approaches the peak rate achieved in \[\text{5.5.2}\]. At higher concurrencies, though, the rate begins to diminish as the load incurred in managing connections dominates, as seen in \[\text{5.5.2}\].

A similar pattern is seen for other round trip delays: increasing the number of connections can mitigate the effects of network-induced latency. However, attempting to initiate more than 512 connections always resulted in a large number of events getting dropped in transit, as the kernel refused to service so many simultaneous network connections. Thus, the peak rates achieved at the higher round-trip times were always suppressed relative to the throughput measured with no latency. As discussed in \[\text{5.5.2}\], appropriate tuning of the kernel networking stack could be used to help overcome this issue; however, a better approach would be to address it at the protocol level, an idea to which we return in \[\text{7}\].

6. Authentication

For many applications involving VOEvents, it is important to be certain of the authenticity of the event. That is, to be able to guarantee that the event genuinely describes the results of observations by its supposed author. This is important both for event authors, to protect their reputation for issuing high quality, trustworthy events, and to subscribers, who cannot run the risk of using expensive facilities chasing phantoms. While the overt motivation for forging events is low—there is no obvious way to exploit a VOEvent for monetary gain, for example—the potential for mischief-makers to play havoc with event networks cannot be ignored.

Two approaches may be taken to securing an event distribution system. The first is to authenticate the transport layer using a technology such as TLS \citep{DierksRescorla2008}. In this way, each entity involved would be able to verify both the integrity of a VTP connection and the identity of their remote peer. A subscriber could therefore be certain of the identity of the broker from which it receives a particular event. However, that broker was not itself the originator of the event, but rather it received it either from the author directly or from another broker: it is now incumbent upon that broker to not only to verify the identity of the sender but also to satisfy the subscriber that this has been done with sufficient diligence. If the event has traversed a length path through multiple brokers before reaching the subscriber, this task becomes prohibitively complex. As such, this is not a mechanism which VTP supports.

The alternative is to authenticate individual VOEvent packets. This can be done by applying a cryptographic signature to the event using a technology such as OpenPGP \citep{Callas2007} or XML Digital Signatures \citep{Bartheletal2008}. The recipient of an event can then verify that it is identical to the event to which the signature was originally applied.

Work has already been carried out on applying XML Digital Signatures to VOEvents \citep{Allen2008} outside the framework of VTP. However, the implementation is relatively complex: not only is there a paucity of libraries providing a convenient implementation of the standard, but even the library the authors chose to use \citep{XMLSec2008} required source-level modification to meet their requirements.

On the other hand, both commercial and open-source implementations of OpenPGP are widely available both as stand-alone tools and with programming language interfaces. Furthermore, \citep{Denny2008} describes a mechanism for attaching an OpenPGP signature to a VOEvent with specific reference to VTP. For these reasons, a prototype version of Comet with OpenPGP support has been made available for testing.

6.1. Implementation considerations

The OpenPGP standard itself is widely used and tested: the basic cryptographic guarantees it provides are as close to unimpeachable as it is reasonable to ask for. However, there are three key hurdles which must be overcome before it can be directly used in the context of VOEvents and VTP.

6.1.1. Bitstream immutability

Section \[\text{3.2.3}\] discussed whether two VOEvent packets can be regarded as “the same” and the motivated the requirement that entities participating in a VTP network should transmit events unchanged. When considering cryptographic signatures, this requirement becomes absolutely fundamental. The signature is applied to a particular collection of bits, with no semantic understanding of what those bits represent. If a single bit is changed, the signature is invalidated, even if that change does not alter the information content of the document and however inconsequential the change might be.

Beyond its direct requirements on the transport layer, this could have implications for various uses to which VOEvents may be put. For example, when storing an event in an archival database, it would not be adequate to simply extract the information from the packet and store that, re-serializing it to XML if and when required. Rather, it would be necessary for the archive to store the exact bitstream to which a signature had been applied.

6.1.2. Event formatting

The original proposal described by \citep{Denny2008} makes use of the OpenPGP cleartext signature framework. However, as \citep{Callas2007}\[\text{7}\] makes clear, the cleartext signature framework “is not intended to be reversible”: in other words, applying such a signature may modify the contents of the event packet itself. Such modifications are generally insignificant (primarily concerning the way in

\text{XMLSec:\ http://www.aleksey.com/xmlsec/\[20\]}.\)
which lines starting with a “-” — the “hyphen-minus” character, Unicode code point U+002D — are handled), but, nevertheless, we regard any mutation of the event data as unacceptable.

To avoid these proposals, we suggest adopting a modification of Denny’s proposal based on a detached signature (Callas et al., §11.4) which is bundled with the VOEvent. It is this modified proposal which is implemented in Comet.

6.1.3. Trust model and key infrastructure

Any entity can generate an OpenPGP key with whatever identifying name they please and use it to apply a signature to a document. The recipient of the document has a strong guarantee that the document was genuinely signed by the given key, but has no particular reason to trust that the key was in the possession of a reputable entity at the time the signature was made. At level, subverting the system by signing VOEvents with valid-but-worthless keys becomes a trivial exercise.

The most direct solution is for the owner of a key to directly provide it to likely recipients in person or by some other tamper-proof means of transmission. The recipient then knows that this particular key belongs to that particular entity, and can take this into account when deciding whether a signed event is genuine.

OpenPGP adopts extends this approach to the “web of trust” model. Here, entities who have received a copy of the key directly from its owner can themselves sign and redistribute it. The recipients can then verify whether they believe the intermediary to be trustworthy to warrant the identity of the owner. The recipients may sign and distribute the key further, eventually building up a web of certified keys.

The same model may be applied to event packets themselves. Rather than simply checking for a valid signature made by the author of the event, a legitimate approach would be to check for a valid signature by any entity which the recipient regards as trustworthy to guarantee the packet’s authenticity. This could include, for example, intermediate brokers or event aggregators. However, this scheme is not provided for in the note by Denny, and has the significant downside of much increased management overhead, particularly when automatic response to genuine events is required: the recipient must indicate which entities they trust to sign events from which authors.

6.2. Usage in Comet

The released version of Comet at the time of writing does not include support for OpenPGP based event authentication. However, there is an experimental version available which may be used for experimenting with these technologies. See §5 for information on how to obtain both released and experimental versions of Comet.

Comet provides comprehensive support for all the modes in which event authentication may be used within VTP. Specifically:

- When submitting to a broker, comet-sendvo can apply a signature to the event being sent;
- When receiving an event from an author, the Comet can be set to only accept events which are appropriately signed;
- When receiving an event from a broker, Comet can be set to only act upon and redistribute events which are appropriately signed.

Comet also supports subscriber authentication by applying the same signing mechanisms to Transport documents (§9). Using this technique:

- On receiving a connection from a subscriber, Comet can request that the subscriber authenticate themselves by means of a signed Transport message, and will then only distribute events to subscribers which provide trustworthy signatures.
- When subscribing to a remote broker, Comet can provide a signed Transport message in response to an authentication request.

Comet’s OpenPGP support is based upon GnuPG. Comet does not provide any mechanism for managing the configuration of GnuPG: instead, the standard GnuPG tools should be used for this, and Comet inherits the configuration and key database from them.

Of course, generating and verifying a cryptographic signature requires some numerical calculation. Furthermore, for security reasons, directly linking GnuPG as a library in application code is not supported. Handling cryptographic operations in-process is therefore not possible. Instead, it is necessary to fork a separate GnuPG process, incurring additional overhead. Therefore, the impact of OpenPGP support on Comet’s performance must be considered.

In practice, the overhead of signing an event is insignificant: any one author is likely to be generating only a limited number of events, and, even if that number is large, they can trivially spread the load across multiple machines. However, the Comet broker must check the signatures of all events received: it is here that performance issues become critical.

A simple test was performed to measure the time taken to check the signature on a VOEvent packet. 1000 distinct VOEvent packets of the form shown in Listing 5 were generated and signed using the Comet codebase. Each signature in turn was then checked for validity. The total time taken to check all signatures on the system described in §5.1 was 22.90 s, or around 0.023 s per event. This is broadly comparable to values which might be expected due to network latency, and is a factor of ~ 3.6 greater than the latency introduced by the Comet broker when not checking a signature (§5.3.2). While not prohibitively expensive, then, the overhead introduced by this technique cannot be ignored by administrators of heavily-loaded brokers.

\[^{21}\text{http://gnupg.org/}\]
7. Future VOEvent and VTP revision

This manuscript has described both VTP itself and the issues that have arisen when developing a specific implementation of it. From these considerations, five specific recommendations for future evolution of the VOEvent and VTP standards can be drawn. Some of these will be incorporated into a revised version of VTP which will be submitted for IVOA standardization at a later date.

7.1. Event identity

Section 3.2.3 discussed the question of the identity of a VOEvent. In particular, it considered whether two events encoding identical information but in with a different (perhaps only marginally) serialization could be regarded as the same event. This is not well defined by the current VOEvent standard (Seaman et al., 2011).

As discussed, the question of the identity of events is important to the implementation of VTP networks. However, it is also of wider relevance: the VOEvent identifier provides a convenient means to refer to a particular celestial transient in a variety of context, but can only be reliably used as such if it is unambiguously defined.

7.2. Packet immutability

It is an implicit requirement of VTP and of event authentication techniques based on OpenPGP signatures that the bitstream of a packet must be unchanged by the process of transmission over VTP. This requirement goes beyond the straightforward requirement that the information contained within an event must be unchanged. The more stringent requirements of VTP are not explicit in the current version of the protocol definition.

7.3. Event de-duplication

Section 3.2.3 described de-duplication to avoid loops on a VTP network. This requirement is not explicit within the current VTP definition. Comet has demonstrated an effective approach to this problem building upon §7.1 and 7.2.

7.4. Filtering

Section 4 demonstrated that the design of VTP is easily extensible to accommodate relatively complex broker-side filtering capabilities. However, the implementation of these filters in Comet requires a non-standard extension to the protocol. Future VTP revisions should consider a formalized means of enabling brokers to advertise what filtering capabilities they are capable of providing, if any, and for subscribers to specify any filters required.

7.5. Bulk event submission

Section 5 demonstrated that Comet was capable of receiving and distributing large numbers of events with relatively low latency. However, §5.5 and 5.6 demonstrated that the major limiting factor on performance, in particular in the case of high network round trip times, is the requirement that each individual event submission by an author take place over a new TCP connection.

Two approaches should be considered to this flaw in the protocol. The first is simply to drop the requirement that the connection should be closed between each submission. Not only would this reduce the total transaction time per event by removing the need to repeat the TCP handshake (see Fig. 5), it would also be possible to interleave transactions: the author could begin the submission of further events before having received an acknowledgement of the first.

The alternative approach is to group batches of events into a single data structure (a “container”), and transmit that over VTP in a single transaction. The definition of a container format for VOEvents is already under discussion in the context of the IVOA.

8. Availability

Comet is freely available, open source software released under a two-clause BSD-style license. It includes a comprehensive test suite and documentation. It is developed using a public code repository; contributions and bug reports are actively solicited. Further details, including download and installation instructions, are available from the project website.

All materials used to generate this manuscript, including the Docker configuration, benchmarking scripts, and latency measurement plugin are available from the Comet repository.

9. Conclusions

The VOEvent Transport Protocol is an intentionally minimal mechanism for distributing notifications of transient celestial events in the form of VOEvent messages. Comet has been developed to implement all the core aspects of VTP. It is production-ready software, and is freely available and ready to be integrated into a variety of scientific projects.

This manuscript has described how Comet has been designed to meet the requirements of VTP based upon an asynchronous, event-driven style of programming. This has made it possible to provide a robust, high-performance and easily extensible implementation of the protocol. The
development of Comet cast light on a number of areas of the protocol and of the wider VOEvent infrastructure where additional clarity and specification is required.

Using Comet as a test-bed, we have investigated the performance characteristics of VTP under a variety of conditions. Our results demonstrate that VTP is broadly capable of meeting the anticipated requirements of the next generation of large scale transient survey projects. However, there are deficiencies in the design of the protocol which adversely affect its performance. We have discussed how future revisions of VTP could address these problems. We have also shown a prototype of a highly-configurable event filtering system which will enable end users to sift through high-volume event streams and receive only those events which are of relevance to their own scientific goals.

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Both Comet itself and the tests described herein rely on a number of open source software packages. Python\(^\text{25}\) provides both a convenient development platform and a rich variety of libraries upon which to build; it is these, notably Twisted, lxml, zope.interface\(^\text{26}\) and ipaddr-py\(^\text{27}\) which have made the development of Comet possible. Additionally, the support for event authentication described \(^\text{28}\) makes use of GnuPG and PyGPGME\(^\text{29}\). Docker is an invaluable aid to testing, benchmarking and deploying Comet.

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