A Perturbation-Constrained Adversarial Attack
for Evaluating the Robustness of Optical Flow
– Supplementary Material –

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A Experiment Configurations

Tab. A1 summarizes the experimental configurations for all experiments that were conducted with our PCFA implementation. Different visualizations or representations of the same experiment class are grouped together. If several cells contain multiple choices, the experiment was conducted for all possible combinations of those. The only exception are $\varepsilon_2$ and $\mu$, which should match by line. The attacks are evaluated on the networks FlowNet2 [2] (implementation from [9]), PWCNet [11], SpyNet [7] (implementation from [6]), RAFT [12] and GMA [3]. All network implementations use checkpoints that are not fine-tuned to the KITTI15 [5] data, other checkpoints and networks can easily be evaluated with our implementation (https://github.com/cv-stuttgart/PCFA).

B Additional Material

B.1 Run-time Complexity of PCFA Compared to Other Attacks

In our experiments, the final run-time mainly depends on the tested optical flow network. Hence it is reasonable to compare the number of backward passes for each attack. For image-specific perturbations, PCFA performs 10 backward passes per iteration (for one L-BFGS step), while I-FGSM needs a single backward pass. For universal perturbations trained with the same number of epochs and images and epochs, PCFA still performs 10 backward passes per iteration while the Patch Attack performs two. The more complex optimization of PCFA originates from the constrained optimization, which yields stronger adversarial perturbations than previous optical flow attacks, but requires a more sophisticated optimization routine.
Table A1. Parameters and Configurations for the experimental Results in Section 5. The evaluation- and test splits of the KITTI15 dataset [5] are denoted K15-te and K15-tr respectively; For the MPI-Sintel dataset [1] we use S-te and S-tr.

| Experiment | Attack | Network | $f^t$ | Loss | Box Counts | Postbox Type | $\varepsilon^2$ | Penalty | Optim. Steps | Batch Size | Dataset (train) | Dataset (eval) |
|------------|--------|---------|-------|------|------------|--------------|----------------|---------|--------------|------------|----------------|----------------|
| Tab. 2,A2  | PCFA   | RAFT    | 0     | AEE  | Clip, COV  | $\delta_{t, t+1}$ | $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ | $5 \cdot 10^5$ | 20      | 1            | 1  | K15-te        | K15-te        |
| Tab. 2,A2  | PCFA   | RAFT    | 0     | MSE  | Clip, COV  | $\delta_{t, t+1}$ | $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ | $5 \cdot 10^5$ | 20      | 1            | 1  | K15-te        | K15-te        |
| Fig. 1,3,A1| PCFA   | RAFT    | 0     | AEE  | Clip, COV  | $\delta_{t, t+1}$ | $1 \cdot 10^{-3}$ | $1 \cdot 10^4$ | 20      | 1            | 1  | K15-te        | K15-te        |
| Fig. 4,A2  | PCFA   | RAFT    | 0     | AEE  | Clip, COV  | $\delta_{t, t+1}$ | $1 \cdot 10^{-3}$ | $1 \cdot 10^4$ | 20      | 1            | 1  | K15-te        | K15-te        |
| Fig. 5, A3 | PCFA   | FlowNet2, PWCNet, SpyNet, GMA. RAFT | 0 | AEE  | COV | $\delta_{t, t+1}$ | $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ | $1 \cdot 10^5$ | 21      | 1            | 1  | K15-te        | K15-te        |
| Fig. 5, A3 | PCFA   | FlowNet2, PWCNet, SpyNet, GMA. RAFT | 0 | AEE  | COV | $\delta_{t, t+1}$ | $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ | $1 \cdot 10^5$ | 10      | 1            | 1  | K15-te        | K15-te        |
| Tab. 3, Fig. A4 | PCFA | FlowNet2, PWCNet, SpyNet, GMA. RAFT | 0 | AEE  | Clip | $\delta_{t, t+1}$ | $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ | $5 \cdot 10^5$ | 20      | 1            | 1  | K15-te        | K15-te        |
| Tab. 3, Fig. A4 | PCFA | FlowNet2, PWCNet, SpyNet, GMA. RAFT | 0 | AEE  | Clip | $\delta_{t, t+1}$ | $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ | $5 \cdot 10^5$ | 1        | 4            | 25 | K15-te        | K15-te        |
| Tab. A3    | PCFA   | FlowNet2, PWCNet, SpyNet, GMA. RAFT | 0 | AEE  | Clip | $\delta_{t, t+1}$ | $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ | $1 \cdot 10^5$ | 20      | 1            | 1  | K15-te        | K15-te        |
| Tab. A3    | PCFA   | FlowNet2, PWCNet, SpyNet, GMA. RAFT | 0 | AEE  | Clip | $\delta_{t, t+1}$ | $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ | $1 \cdot 10^5$ | 1        | 4            | 25 | K15-te        | K15-te        |
| Tab. 4, Fig. 6 | PCFA | FlowNet2, PWCNet, SpyNet, GMA. RAFT | 0 | Clip | $\delta_{t, t+1}$ | $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ | $5 \cdot 10^5$ | 1        | 4            | 25 | K15-te        | K15-te        |
| Tab. A4, Fig. A5 | PCFA | FlowNet2, PWCNet, SpyNet, GMA. RAFT | 0 | Clip | $\delta_{t, t+1}$ | $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ | $5 \cdot 10^5$ | 1        | 4            | 25 | S-te S-te    | S-te          |

Fig. A6

Table 3, Fig. A4

| Experiment | Attack | Network | $f^t$ | Loss | Box Counts | Postbox Type | $\varepsilon^2$ | Penalty | Optim. Steps | Batch Size | Dataset (train) | Dataset (eval) |
|------------|--------|---------|-------|------|------------|--------------|----------------|---------|--------------|------------|----------------|----------------|
| Tab. A3    | PCFA   | FlowNet2, PWCNet, SpyNet, GMA. RAFT | 0 | Clip | $\delta_{t, t+1}$ | $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ | $5 \cdot 10^5$ | 10      | 1            | 1  | K15-te        | K15-te        |

Fig. A6

Table 4, Fig. A5
Table A2. PCFA adversarial robustness AEE($\hat{f}, f$) for different loss functions, targets and box constraints on RAFT. Larger values indicate a bigger deviation between adversarial and initial flow.

|            | $f^t = 0$ | $f^t = -f$ |
|------------|-----------|-------------|
|            | AEE MSE CS | AEE MSE CS  |
| Clipping   | 29.12 22.96 0.00 | 44.11 29.09 81.35 |
| COV        | 29.31 25.88 0.00 | 47.99 31.94 40.19 |

B.2 Additional Results for PCFA on Specific Frame Pairs

To complement the configuration study for PCFA that reported the attack strength in Main Tab. 2, we additionally provide the adversarial robustness measures for the tested configurations in Tab A2. For the zero-flow target and the cosine similarity (CS) loss, no deviation between the initial and the adversarial

Fig. A1. Visual comparison of PCFA with zero-flow target on different optical flow methods for increasing perturbation sizes $\varepsilon_2$ on two exemplary scenes from KITTI15. White pixels represent the zero flow.
flow is induced, which shows that the cosine similarity does not train the perturbation towards the zero target. For the negative-flow target, it appears that greater deviations between adversarial and initial flow can be induced by the cosine similarity with clipping. However, a comparison to the target proximity in Main Tab. 2 clearly shows that the high deviation between adversarial and initial flow stems from a non-converging method, i.e. a very large distance to target, rather than from a strong targeted approach.

In the main paper we visualize the effect of increasingly large perturbations on the attacked flow in Main Fig. 1 and Main Fig. 3 for the networks FlowNet2, SpyNet and RAFT. The results for all networks and for an additional input frame pair are shown in Fig. A1. Similarly, Fig. A2 complements the reduced

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**Fig. A2.** Visual comparison of the result of PCFA with different targets on different optical flow methods. Choosing $\varepsilon_2 = 10^{-1}$ allows to come close to any target. Bamboo2-41 is a ground truth flow from Sintel final’s Bamboo2 sequence.
Adversarial robustness with zero-flow target over perturbation size, for PCFA (solid) and I-FGSM [4, 10] (dashed) on different flow networks. Larger indicates a greater distance of the adversarial from the initial flow.

In addition to Main Fig. 5, Fig. A3 visualizes the distance between adversarial and initial flow that is induced by perturbations with increasing size generated with PCFA and I-FGSM [4, 10]. For large perturbation sizes ($\varepsilon_2 \geq 10^{-2}$), it appears that I-FGSM can cause the adversarial robustness (Fig. A3) to degrade to a similar extent than PCFA. However, comparing to the target proximity in Main Fig. 5 again shows that the target proximity that is reached for I-FGSM is not as good as the one reached by PCFA. Consequently, I-FGSM perturbs the flow away from the initial flow, but does so in an untargeted manner as it fails to resemble the target flow. Meanwhile, PCFA has mostly converged to the zero flow for large perturbations and hence does not induce a further strong change, which explains why the distance between adversarial and initial flow does not increase further. Therefore, these results support that PCFA is a stronger method, and better suited than I-FGSM to generate perturbations that induce a desired target flow.

**B.3 Additional Results for Joint and Universal Perturbations**

**Joint and Universal Perturbations.** Tab. A3 extends the results in Main Tab. 3 by approximating the negative-flow target instead of the zero-flow. Both tables show the corresponding target proximity for different perturbation types generated with PCFA. Because the trend in Tab. A3 agrees with Main Tab. 3, where joint universal perturbations reach a better target resemblance than disjoint ones, both results suggest that the greater effectiveness of joint over disjoint universal perturbations is not related to the used target. A possible explanation for the better performance of the universal joint perturbations is that the batched training of universal perturbations tends to overfit on the batches, and may therefore not be able to learn better generalizing perturbations. In contrast, training one joint perturbation for both images explicitly incorporates a type of generalization (over input frames) into the optimization.
Table A3. Negative-flow target proximity for different universal perturbations.

| Perturbation Type | FlowNet2 | SypNet | PWCNet | RAFT | GMA |
|-------------------|----------|--------|--------|------|-----|
| Frame-Specific    |          |        |        |      |     |
| \(\delta_t, \delta_{t+1}\) | 14.73    | 15.33  | 13.36  | 19.86| 16.74|
| \(\delta_{t,t+1}\) | 19.07    | 18.54  | 15.60  | 30.35| 20.48|
| Universal         |          |        |        |      |     |
| \(\delta_t, \delta_{t+1}\) | 44.97    | 29.93  | 40.50  | 61.04| 59.82|
| \(\delta_{t,t+1}\) | 43.06    | 29.64  | 39.39  | 60.15| 58.35|

**Fig. A4.** Different perturbations types (joint and universal) for RAFT and SpyNet on an exemplary KITTI frame pair, generated with PCFA \(\varepsilon_2 = 5 \cdot 10^{-3}\), AEE loss, clipping box constraint.

Transferability of Adversarial Perturbations. Tab. A4 shows the transferability of samples for the Sintel final dataset, and complements Main Tab. 4, which shows the same evaluation on KITTI. Again, universal joint perturbations were trained on the training set for a specific network (top row), and then applied to the test set and tested on all available networks (first column). On the Sintel dataset we observe clear trends among the networks in terms of robustness, where state-of-the-art networks like RAFT and GMA exhibit a consistent vulnerability to adversarial perturbations, while SpyNet’s output is least distorted;
Table A4. Transferability of Sintel universal perturbations between training and test dataset and between different networks, measured as adversarial robustness $\text{AEE}(\tilde{f}, f)$. Large values denote a better transferability, smaller values indicate higher robustness.

| Eval. | FlowNet2 | SpyNet | PWCNet | RAFT | GMA |
|-------|----------|--------|--------|------|------|
| Train. | 3.11 | 2.54 | 2.47 | 1.35 | 1.28 |
| SpyNet | 0.99 | 2.05 | 0.87 | 0.79 | 0.72 |
| PWCNet | 2.28 | 2.25 | 3.38 | 1.22 | 1.11 |
| RAFT | 7.78 | 6.79 | 6.86 | 8.44 | 8.18 |
| GMA | 6.77 | 5.72 | 5.79 | 7.28 | 7.22 |

irrespective of the network that was used to train the perturbation. Fig. A5 visualizes best universal perturbations for the Networks PWCNet and GMA, complementing the selection of networks from Main Fig 6.

Comparing the Patch Attack and PCFA. In Main Tab. 5, we compare the Patch Attack by Ranjan et al. [8] and our PCFA in terms of distance between the original and perturbed prediction. In both cases, the universal perturbations are trained on the Sintel final training set, and evaluated on test. For the networks listed in the original publication, we use the patches from [8]. As RAFT and GMA are not included in the original publication, we use the official code with standard settings to generate them, i.e. a learning rate of $10^{-3}$, 40 epochs, 100 images per epoch, two SGD steps per image. In the following we discuss to what extend and under which assumptions the reported adversarial robustness numbers for PCFA and the Patch Attack [8] are comparable.

Estimation of the per-pixel $L_2$ norm of Patch Attack. To roughly estimate the per-pixel $L_2$ norm for Patch Attack [8], we use the following assumptions. First, we assume the patch to introduce an additive distortion in the patch area, while adding zero in every location outside the patch $P$. Further, we assume the patch is contained in the image area $P \subset I$. And finally, we assume that the distortion adds a fixed value $\bar{b}$ to every location $p$ within the patch $P$ instead of

Fig. A5. Normalized universal perturbations for different network architectures learned from the respective training datasets. Top row: KITTI. Bottom row: Sintel.
individual values $b_p$. Please note that this is a very conservative assumption, since among all additive distortions that have a mean absolute value $\bar{b} = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{p \in P} |b_p|$ within the patch $P$, the constant distortion $b_p = \bar{b}$ has the smallest $L_2$ norm. Hence, in practice, the $L_2$ norm of Patch Attack will be larger than our estimate. The three aforementioned assumptions allow us to estimate the per-pixel $L_2$ norm of the patch distortion as

$$\varepsilon_2 = \frac{\|\delta P\|_2}{\sqrt{I}} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{p \in P} b_p^2 + \sum_{p \notin P} 0^2}{I}} \leq \sqrt{\frac{P \bar{b}^2}{I}} = \sqrt{\frac{P}{I} \|\bar{b}\|}.$$ (1)

In our comparison to the patch-based method of Ranjan et al. [8] we consider a patch of a 102 pixel diameter, which corresponds to approximately 8171 pixels. For a typical KITTI frame with a resolution of $I = 1242 \times 375$, this results in a perturbation of about 1.75% of all pixels. Given that the patches have colors which are rarely present in a typical KITTI frame, we conservatively estimate that the average additive perturbation $b_{\text{joint}}$ per patch is about 3 - 30% of the valid color range. With Eq. (1) this translates to an average color change over the whole frame of 0.40 - 3.97%. We compare the Patch Attack to PCFA with an $L_2$ bound of $\varepsilon_2 = 5 \cdot 10^{-3}$, which translates to an average change of 0.50% of the color range per pixel. This is at the lower end of our conservatively estimated range for the Patch Attack. Evidently, comparing two methods with different underlying concepts is difficult. However, with our calculations above, we aimed for a comparison that is as fair as possible under the methodological constraints.

B.4 Additional Results for Quality and Robustness with Multiple Attacks

Finally, we provide additional results for the joint quality and robustness evaluation on the KITTI15 dataset, where the robustness is also evaluated by taking the strongest configurations of FGSM and the Patch Attack in Fig. A6. Please note that the quality scores do not change, since the evaluation strictly separates quality from robustness. From the figure it becomes apparent that the networks
appear more robust if they are evaluated with the weaker Patch Attack (empty markers) or FGSM (semi-transparent markers), hence PCFA (full markers) is a good choice if the robustness should be thoroughly assessed.

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