Application of multi-agent games to the prediction of financial time-series

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Abstract

We report on a technique based on multi-agent games which has potential use in the prediction of future movements of financial time-series. A third-party game is trained on a black-box time-series, and is then run into the future to extract next-step and multi-step predictions. In addition to the possibility of identifying profit opportunities, the technique may prove useful in the development of improved risk management strategies.

1 Introduction

Agent-based models are attracting significant attention in the study of financial markets\cite{1}. The reasoning is that the fluctuations observed in financial time-series should, at some level, reflect the interactions, feedback, frustration and adaptation of the markets' many participants ($N_{tot}$ agents). Here we report on our initial results concerning the application of multi-agent games to the prediction of future price movements\cite{2}.

Figure 1 illustrates the extent to which a multi-agent game can produce the type of movements in price and volume which are observed in real markets. Our game is based on the Grand Canonical Minority Game which we introduced and described in earlier works\cite{3}. Each agent holds $s$ strategies and only a subset $N = N_0 + N_1$ of the population, who are sufficiently confident of winning, actually play: $N_0$ agents choose 0 (sell) while $N_1$ choose 1 (buy). If $N_0 - N_1 > 0$, the winning decision (outcome) is 1 (i.e. buy) and vice versa\cite{3}. If $N_0 = N_1$ the tie is decided by a coin-toss. Hence $N$ and the excess demand
\[ N_{0-1} = N_0 - N_1 \] provide, to a first approximation, a ‘volume’ \( N(t) \) and ‘price-change’ \( \Delta P(t) \) at time \( t \) [3]. Here we just assume knowledge of the resulting price-series \( P(t) \); we do not exploit any additional information contained in \( N(t) \). Agents have a time horizon \( T \) over which virtual points are collected and a threshold probability (‘confidence’) level \( r \) for trading. Active strategies are those with a historic probability of winning \( \geq r \) [3]. We focus on the regime where the number of strategies in play is comparable to the total number available, and where \( r \approx 0.5 \). In addition to producing realistic dynamical features such as in Fig. 1, this regime yields many of the statistical ‘stylized facts’ of real markets: fat-tailed price increments, clustered volatility and high volume autocorrelation[3].

Exogenous events, such as external news arrival, are relatively infrequent compared to the typical transaction rate in major markets - also, most news is neither uniformly ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for all agents. This suggests that the majority of movements in high-frequency market data are self-generated, i.e. produced by the internal activity of the market itself. The price-series \( P(t) \) can hence be thought of as being produced by a ‘black-box’ multi-agent game whose parameters, starting conditions (quenched disorder), and evolution are unknown. Using ‘third-party’ games trained on historic data, we aim to generate future probability distribution functions (pdfs) by driving these games forward (see Fig. 2). Typically the resulting pdfs are fat-tailed and have considerable time-dependent skewness, in contrast to standard economic models.
2 Next timestep prediction

As an illustration of next timestep prediction, we examine the sign of movements and hence convert $\Delta P(t)$ into a binary sequence corresponding to up/down movements. For simplicity, we also consider a confidence threshold level $r = 0$ such that all agents play all the time.

Figure 3 shows hourly Dollar $$/Yen exchange-rates for 1990-9, together with the profit attained from using the game’s predictions to trade hourly. A simple trading strategy is employed each hour: buy Yen if the game predicts the rate to be favourable and sell at the end of each hour, banking any profit. This is unrealistic since transaction costs would be prohibitive, however it demonstrates that the multi-agent game performs better than random ($\sim 54\%$ prediction success rate). Also shown is the profit in the case when the investment is split equally between all agents who then act independently. Acting collectively, the $N$-agent population shows superior predictive power and acts as a ‘more intelligent’ investor. As a check, Fig. 4 shows that the game’s success returns to 50% for a random walk price-series[4].
3 Corridors for future price movements

We now consider prediction over several (e.g. ten) future timesteps. As an example, we will try to predict the large movement in Fig. 1 starting around \( t = 4796 \). As in the case of real prices\[5\], it seems impossible that this drop could have been foreseen given the prior history \( P(t) \) for \( t < 4796 \). Even if complete knowledge of the game were available, it still seems impossible that subsequent outcomes should be predictable with significant accuracy since the coin-toss used to resolve ties in decisions (i.e. \( N_0 = N_1 \)) and active-strategy scores, continually injects stochasticity. We run \( P(t) \) through a trial third-party game to generate an estimate of \( S_0 \) and \( S_1 \) at each timestep, the number of active strategies predicting a 0 or 1 respectively. Provided the black-box game’s strategy space is reasonably well covered by the agents’ random choice of initial strategies, any bias towards a particular outcome in the active-strategy set will propagate itself as a bias in the value of \( N_{0-1} \) away from zero. Thus \( N_{0-1} \) should be approximately proportional to \( S_0 - S_1 = S_{0-1} \). In addition, the number of agents taking part in the game at each timestep will be related to the total number of active strategies \( S_0 + S_1 = S_{0+1} \), hence the error (i.e. vari-
Fig. 4. Moving average of the multi-agent game’s success rate for the real price-series of Fig. 3 (top left) and a random walk price-series (top right). Bottom: histogram of individual agents’ time-averaged success rate.

ance) in the prediction of $N_{0−1}$ using $S_{0−1}$ will be approximately proportional to $S_{0+1}$. We have confirmed this to be true based on extensive simulations. We then identify a third-party game that achieves the maximum correlation between the price-change $ΔP(t)$ and our explanatory variable $S_{0−1}$, with the unexplained variance being characterized by a linear function of $S_{0+1}$. The predicted pdf for an arbitrary number $j$ of timesteps into the future, is then generated by calculating the net value of $S_{0−1}$ along all possible future routes of the third-party game.

Figure 5 shows the ‘predicted corridors’ for $P(t)$, generated at $t = 4796$ for $j = 10$ timesteps into the future. Remarkably $P(t)$ subsequently moves within these corridors. About 50% of the large movements observed in $P(t)$ occur in periods with tight predictable corridors, i.e. narrow pdfs with a large mean. Both the magnitude and sign of these extreme events are therefore predictable. The remainder correspond to periods with very wide corridors, in which the present method still predicts with high probability the sign of the change. We checked that the predictions generated from the third-party game were consistent with all such extreme changes in the actual (black-box) time series $P(t)$, likewise no predictions were made that were inconsistent with $P(t)$.
4 Conclusion

Our initial results are encouraging. We are currently performing exhaustive statistical studies on real financial data in order to quantify the predictive capability of multi-agent games over different time-scales and markets.

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References

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