Anonymous Three-Party Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Scheme for Telecare Medical Information Systems

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Abstract

Telecare Medical Information Systems (TMIS) provide an effective way to enhance the medical process between doctors, nurses and patients. For enhancing the security and privacy of TMIS, it is important while challenging to enhance the TMIS so that a patient and a doctor can perform mutual authentication and session key establishment using a third-party medical server while the privacy of the patient can be ensured. In this paper, we propose an anonymous three-party password-authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocol for TMIS. The protocol is based on the efficient elliptic curve cryptosystem. For security, we apply the pi calculus based formal verification tool ProVerif to show that our 3PAKE protocol for TMIS can provide anonymity for patient and doctor while at the same time achieves mutual authentication and session key security. The proposed scheme is secure and efficient, and can be used in TMIS.

Introduction

In the traditional medical diagnosis process, a patient goes to a hospital or clinic, and then consults a doctor. With the advancement of computer and network technologies, many countries and regions are establishing telecare medical information systems (TMIS), for making the medical diagnosis process more efficient, reliable and effective. With TMIS, patients can save time and have access to doctors and specialists more easily. Furthermore, patient records can also be exchanged between various hospitals and clinics. The system is also providing enhanced efficiency and effectiveness, especially on doing some basic diagnoses at patients’ home [1]. Furthermore, TMIS is also useful for cases where chronic patients are involved. For example, through TMIS, a hypertension patient or a diabetes mellitus patient could exchange his/her daily medical data collected by the patient at home and the medical advice from doctors or nurses directly without requiring the patient to pay a visit to a hospital or a clinic. For emergency patients, such those with angina pectoris, hyperpyretic convulsion and asthma attacks, the TMIS can help exchange the medical records of a patient in concern, for example, between the database of a family doctor and the ICU of a hospital.

In TMIS, patients, doctors and nurses can register onto a trusted medical server (TS) and use passwords to perform authentication or secure channel establishment with the TS. Once a patient needs to consult a doctor, the patient can contact a doctor, and communicate with the doctor through a secure communication channel. For achieving these objectives, anonymous three-party password-authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocols for TMIS should be addressed. The 3PAKE protocol is to achieve mutual authentication between a patient and a doctor with the aid of the TS, and at the same time, ensure that an adversary does not know the exact identities of both the doctor and the patient. Furthermore, 3PAKE helps establish a secure channel via generating jointly a session key, which is then used for building a secure channel between the patient and the doctor.

In 2007, Lu and Cao [2] proposed an efficient 3PAKE scheme. However, Guo et al. [3], Chung and Ku [4], Phan et al. [5] and Nam et al. [6] later showed that Lu and Cao’s scheme is vulnerable to undetectable on-line dictionary attack, off-line password guessing attack, and man-in-the-middle attack, respectively. In 2009, Huang [7] proposed another 3PAKE scheme, which was later shown by Yoon and Yoo [8] that it cannot defend against undetectable password guessing attack and off-line password guessing attack. In 2011, Lou and Huang [9] proposed a new 3PAKE scheme. The scheme is based on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) and is efficient. However, Xie et al. [10] recently showed that Lou and Huang’s scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack and partition attack. Xie et al. also proposed an improved scheme for solving these problems. In 2012, Yang and Cao [11] and Chen et al. [12] also proposed modular exponentiation based and ECC-based 3PAKE schemes, respectively. However, these schemes, when compared with other existing schemes, require heavier computation costs. In 2010, Wang and Zhao [13] proposed a three-party key agreement protocol based on chaotic maps. Later, Yoon and Jeon [14]...
showed that their scheme is vulnerable to illegal message modification attack, and then proposed an improved one. Unfortunately, both schemes require a reliable third party, which shares a different long-term cryptographic key with each participant, it is inconvenient that each participant should protect the long-term secret key. Furthermore, these schemes are not as efficient as previous 3PAKE schemes. In 2013, Xie et al. [15] proposed the first chaotic maps-based 3PAKE scheme without using timestamp.

In light of all the schemes mentioned above, we notice that none of them can support privacy protection, since anyone can obtain user’s identity from the authentication process. As we know, user’s privacy protection is very important in some applications, such as telecare medical information systems (TMIS). In 2012, Lai et al. [16] proposed a smart-card-based anonymous 3PAKE using extended chaotic maps. However, Zhao et al. [17] showed that the scheme is vulnerable to the privileged insider attack and the off-line password guessing attack, and proposed an improved one. In 2013, Lee et al. [18] proposed another anonymous 3PAKE scheme using Chebyshev chaotic maps, but their scheme is suffering from the man-in-the-middle attack once after an attacker gets the identity of each participant, which in practice is easy to obtain.

Based on the advantages of the elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC), that is, having shorter secret keys and faster computational speed, it is desirable if an ECC-based anonymous 3PAKE scheme can be built for TMIS. To the best of our knowledge, however, there is no ECC-based anonymous 3PAKE scheme is proposed in this paper, we propose the first ECC-based anonymous 3PAKE scheme, and show that it is efficient.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose an anonymous 3PAKE scheme. The security analysis of the scheme is given in Section 3. After that, other security discussions and the performance comparison are described in Sections 4. The paper is concluded in Section 5.

The Proposed Scheme

In this section, we propose an anonymous 3PAKE scheme. Some notations will be used in this paper are defined as follows.

\( E \): an elliptic curve defined over a finite field with large order \( n \).
\( P \): a generator on \( E \) with large order \( n \).
\( h(\cdot) \): a secure one-way hash function which maps to an integer.
\( A \): user \( A \), may be a patient.
\( B \): user \( B \), may be a doctor or nurse.
\( TS \): trusted medical server.
\( pw_A \): user \( A \)’s password, shared with \( TS \).
\( pw_B \): user \( B \)’s password, shared with \( TS \).
\( ID_A, ID_B, ID_{TS} \): identities of \( A, B \) and \( TS \), respectively.
\( (d,F = dP ) \): \( TS \)’s private-public key pair.
\( (E_k(\cdot), D_k(\cdot)) \): secure symmetric encryption/decryption functions with key \( k \).

The proposed anonymous 3PAKE scheme is described as follows. Algorithm 1 illustrates the proposed scheme.

**Step 1**: User \( A \) randomly chooses \( t_A \), and computes

\[
Q_A = t_A P, \quad F_A = t_A F = t_A dP = dQ_A, \quad V_A = h(pw_A, ID_A, ID_B), \quad Z_A = E_{h(F_A)}(ID_A, ID_B, V_A).
\]

Then sends \( \{ Q_A, Z_A \} \) to \( TS \).

**Step 2**: Upon receiving \( \{ Q_A, Z_A \} \), the trusted server \( TS \) computes \( F_A' = dQ_A \), and decrypts \( Z_A \) to obtain \( \{ ID_A, ID_B, V_A \} \), computes \( V_A' = h(pw_A, ID_A, ID_B) \) and verifies if \( V_A = V_A' \). If not, terminates. Otherwise, user \( A \) is authenticated. Thus, \( TS \) knows that user \( A \) wants to establish a shared session key and communicates with a user \( B \). \( TS \) randomly chooses an integer \( T_{TS} \), computes \( Z_{TS} = T_{TS} \oplus h(pw_B, ID_{TS}, ID_B) \), and sends \( \{ ID_{TS}, Z_{TS} \} \) to \( B \).

**Step 3**: Upon receiving \( \{ ID_{TS}, Z_{TS} \} \), user \( B \) computes \( T_{TS} = Z_{TS} \oplus h(pw_B, ID_{TS}, ID_B) \) and randomly chooses \( t_b \), computes

\[
Q_B = t_b P, F_B = t_b F, \quad V_B = h(pw_B, ID_{TS}, ID_B) \quad Z_B = E_{h(F_B)}(ID_B, V_B).
\]

Then sends \( \{ Q_B, Z_B \} \) to \( TS \).

\[
A \quad TS \quad B
\]

\[
Q_A = t_A P, F_A = t_A F, \quad V_A = h(pw_A, ID_A, ID_B) \quad Z_A = E_{h(F_A)}(ID_A, ID_B, V_A)
\]

\[
\rightarrow \quad \{ Q_A, Z_A \}
\]

\[
F_A' = dQ_A \quad D_{h(F_A')}(Z_A) = \{ ID_A, ID_B, V_A \}
\]

\[
V_A = h(pw_A, ID_A, ID_B) \quad Z_{TS} = T_{TS} \oplus h(pw_B, ID_{TS}, ID_B)
\]

\[
\rightarrow \quad \{ ID_{TS}, Z_{TS} \}
\]

\[
T_{TS} = Z_{TS} \oplus h(pw_B, ID_{TS}, ID_B) \quad Q_B = t_b P, F_B = t_b F, \quad V_B = h(pw_B, ID_{TS}, ID_B) \quad Z_B = E_{h(F_B)}(ID_B, V_B)
\]

\[
\rightarrow \quad \{ Q_B, Z_B \}
\]

\[
\leftarrow \quad \{ R_A \}
\]

\[
D_{h(F_A)}(R_A) = \{ Q_B, ID_A, ID_B, F_A \} \quad D_{h(F_B)}(R_A) = \{ Q_A, ID_B, ID_A, F_A' \}
\]

\[
F_A' = F_A \quad F_B = F_B \quad sk = h(t_A Q_B, ID_B, ID_A)
\]

Session key: \( sk = h(t_A Q_B, ID_B, ID_A) \).
Step 4: Upon receiving \(\{Q_B, Z_B\}\), TS computes \(F_B' = dQ_B\), and decrypts \(Z_B\) to obtain \(\{ID_B, V_B\}\). Then TS computes \(V_B = h(Q_B, ID_T S, ID_B, T_T S)\) and verifies if the decrypted \(V_B\) is correct or not by \(V_B = V_B\). If not, terminates. Otherwise, user B is authenticated.

TS computes and sends \(R_B = E_{h(F_A')}(Q_A, ID_B, ID_A, F_B')\) to B, computes and sends \(R_A = E_{h(F_A)}(Q_B, ID_B, ID_A, F_B)\) to A.

Step 5: Upon receiving \(R_A\) or \(R_B\) from TS, A decrypts \(R_A\) and gets \(\{Q_A, ID_B, ID_A, F_A'\}\). Then A checks the validity of \(F_A'\), and computes \(sk = h(t_a Q_A, ID_B, ID_A) = h(t_a h P, ID_B, ID_A)\) as the session key. At the same time, B decrypts \(R_B\), and gets \(\{Q_A, ID_B, ID_A, F_B'\}\). After checking the validity of \(F_B'\), B computes \(sk = h(t_b Q_A, ID_B, ID_A) = h(t_b h P, ID_B, ID_A)\) as the session key shared with A.

Security Analysis

In this section, we use applied pi calculus [19] based formal verification tool ProVerif [20] to show that the proposed scheme satisfies anonymity, authentication and security. ProVerif is an automatic cryptographic protocol verifier in the formal model and supports automatic and effective security analysis of many cryptographic primitives such as symmetric and asymmetric encryption, digital signature, hash function, Diffie-Hellman key agreements, etc [21].

3.1 Authentication and security

We model the protocol steps according to the message sequences shown in section 2. In particular, public channel ch1 is used for the communication between user and the trusted medical server TS, and public channel ch2 is used for the communication between user B and TS.

\[ \star \star \star \text{channel} \star \star \star \]

ch1: communication channel between A and TS

ch2: communication channel between B and TS

free ch1: channel

free ch2: channel.

We then define two variables SKA and SKB, which are the session keys calculated by A and B, respectively.

\[ \star \star \star \text{shared keys} \star \star \star \]

free SKA: bistring [private].
free SKB: bistring [private].

The constants IDA, IDB and IDTS denote the identities of A, B, and TS, and PWA and PWB denote the passwords of A and B shared with TS, respectively. The constant P is the base point of group E.

\[ \star \star \star \text{constants and variables} \star \star \star \]

free SKA: bistring [private].
free SKB: bistring [private].
const IDA: bistring.
const IDB: bistring.
const IDTS: bistring.
const PWA: bistring [private].
const PWB: bistring [private].
const P: bistring.
free d: bistring [private].

The ProVerif code for non-logical constants and the corresponding equational theory is giving below:

\[ \star \star \star \text{constructor} \star \star \star \]

fun h\(\text{bistring}\): bistring, //\*Hash function
fun senc\(\text{bistring}\), bisttring: bisttring, //\*Symmetric encryption
fun xor\(\text{bistring}\), bisttring: bisttring.

Anonymous 3PAKE Scheme for TMIS

The core message sequences for the proposed scheme are given below. QA, ZA, ZTS, QB, ZB, RA and RB in these messages are computed by corresponding senders before they are transmitted.

\[ \star \star \star \text{messages} \star \star \star \]
Message 1:A\(\rightarrow\)TS: \(\{QA, ZA\}\)
Message 2:TS\(\rightarrow\)B: \(\{IDTS, ZTS\}\)
Message 3:B\(\rightarrow\)TS: \(\{QB, ZB\}\)
Message 4:TS\(\rightarrow\)A,B: \(\{RA, RB\}\)

The proposed protocol consists of the parallel execution of three processes: the user A, UserA, the trusted server TrustSever and another user B, UserB. The processes are the core of protocol model, which define the behavior of each participant in applied pi calculus. The process UserA defines the behavior of user A, who computes QA, FA, VA and ZA, and sends message (QA, ZA) through a public channel. After that, user A receives message RA and computes SKA. The process of UserA is modeled as below:

\[ \star \star \star \text{UserA's process} \star \star \star \]

let UserA =
    new ta: bistring;
event UserStarted(IDA);
let QA = mult(ta, P) in
let FA = mult(d, QA) in
let VA = h([[PWA, IDA, IDB]]) in
let ZA = senc([[IDA, IDB, VA]], h(FA)) in
out(ch1, (QA, ZA));
in (ch1, RA': bistring);
let (QB', bistring, IDA', bistring, IDB', bistring) = sdec(RA', h(FA)) in
if FA'' = FA then
    let SKA = h([[mult(ta, QB'), IDB, IDA']]) in
    0;

The process TrustSever defines the behavior of TS during authentication, it computes FA' and ZTS, and sends message (IDTS, ZTS) to UserB through a public channel2 when it receives message (QA, ZA) through a public channel1. After that, TrustSever receives message (QB, ZB), computes RA and RB, and sends RA and RB to UserA and UserB through public channel1 and channel2, respectively. The process of TrustSever is modeled as follows.

\[ \star \star \star \text{TrustSever's process} \star \star \star \]

let TrustSever =
in(ch1, (QA': bistring, ZA': bistring));
let FA' = mult(d, QA') in
let (IDA': bistring, IDB': bistring, VA': bistring) = sdec(ZA', th(FA')) in
let VA'' = h([[PWA, IDA', IDB']]) in
if VA'' = VA' then
    new TTS: bistring;
    let ZTS = xor(TTS, h([[PWB, IDTS, IDDB]])) in
    out (ch2, (IDTS, ZTS));
in (ch2, QB': bistring, ZB': bistring);
let FB' = mult(d, QB') in
let (IDB': bistring, VB': bistring) = sdec(ZB', h(FB')) in
let VB'' = h([[PWB, IDTS, IDDB, TTS]]) in
if VB'' = VB' then
    let RB = senc([[QA, IDA, IDB, FB']], h(FB')) in
    let RA = senc([[QB, IDA, IDB, FA']], h(FA')) in
    out(ch1, RA);
    out(ch2, RB);
The process UserB defines the behavior of user B during authentication, who computes \( TTS' \), QB, FB, VB and ZB, and sends message (QB, ZB) back to TS through a public channel. After that, user B receives message RB and computes SKB. The process of UserB is modeled as follows:

\[
\text{let UserB} = \\
\text{in(ch2, (IDTS', ZTS'): bitstring)}; \\
\text{let TTS' = xor(TZS', h([PWB, IDTS', IDB]))} \text{ in } new \text{ tb: bitstring}; \\
\text{let QB = mult(tb, P)} \text{ in } new \text{ th: bitstring}; \\
\text{let FB = mult(d, QB)} \text{ in } let \text{ VB = h([PWB, IDTS', IDB, TTS'])} \text{ in } let \text{ ZB = senc(h([IDB, VB]), h(FB))} \text{ in out(ch2,(QB,ZB));} \\
\text{in(ch2, RB':bitstring);} \\
\text{let (QA':bitstring,IDB':bitstring,IDA':bitstring,FB':bitstring) = sdec(RB', h(FB)) in } \\
\text{if FB' = FB then } new \text{ d:bitstring; } \\
\text{event UserAuthed(IDA'); } \\
\text{let SKB = h([mult(th, QA'), IDB, IDA])} \text{ in } 0. \\
\]

The protocol is modeled as the parallel execution of the above three processes:

\[
\text{process UserA | !TrustSever | !UserB} \\
\text{The session key security is formalized by the following two queries for checking by ProVerif:} \\
\text{(*-------------------UserB's process-------------------*)} \\
\text{query attacker(SKA). } \\
\text{query attacker(SKB).} \\
\text{The Authentication of the protocol was modeled as a correspondence relation between two events: UserStarted and UserAuthed, which are inserted into the processes of UserA and UserB, respectively:} \\
\text{event UserAuthed(bitstring). } \\
\text{event UserStarted(bitstring).} \\
\text{query id: bitstring; inj-event(UserAuthed(id)) = = > inj-event (UserStarted(id)).} \\
\]

We perform the above process in the latest version 1.85 of ProVerif and the performance results show that (1) the session key in the proposed scheme is secure under Dolev-Yao model; and (2) the authentication property is satisfied.

### 3.2 Anonymity

In ProVerif, strong anonymity is defined as follows [22]. Let \( P = \text{new } n \cdot (\{R_1\} \cdots \{R_p\} \cdots \{R_p\}) \) be a \( p \)-party protocol in its canonical form where \( R_i = \text{new id}_i \cdot \text{new m}_i \cdot (\text{new s}_{\text{main}}) \cdot (\text{new s}_{\text{init}}) \cdot (\text{new s}_{\text{init}}) \cdot (\text{new s}_{\text{main}}) \) for any \( i \in \{1, \ldots , p\} \). \( \forall i \in \{1, \ldots , p\} \), we build the protocol \( P^R \) as:

\[
P^R = \text{new } n \cdot (\{R_1\} \cdots \{R_p\} \cdots \{R_p\}) \cdot \text{where } \{R_v = \text{new m}_v \cdot (\text{id}_v/ \text{id}) \cdot (\text{new s}_{\text{main}}) \cdot (\text{id}_v/ \text{id}) \).
\]

The identity \( \text{id}_v \) of the agent playing role \( R_v \) is a public name, not under any new restriction in \( P \), \( P \) is said to preserve strong anonymity of \( R_v \) if \( P \approx P^R \). Informally, this means that the adversary cannot distinguish a situation where the role \( R_v \) with known identity \( \text{id}_v \) was executed from one in which it was not executed at all [23]. Going back to our proposed protocol, strong anonymity requires a system in which a user (A or B) with publicly known identity IDV executes the protocol to be indistinguishable from a system in which it is not present at all. We formally define user A and user B as follows:

\[
\text{let UserA} = \\
\text{in(kc, xPKTS: bitstring);} \\
\text{!new ta: bitstring; } \\
\text{let QA = mult(ta, P) in } let FA = \text{mult}(ta, xPKTS) \text{ in } let VA = h([pwa, IDA, IDB]) \text{ in } let ZA = \text{senc}(h(FA), [IDA, IDA, IDB, VA]) \text{ in out(c, (QA, ZA)); } \\
\text{!new xRA: bitstring);} \\
\text{let UserB} = \\
\text{in(kc, xPKTS: bitstring);} \\
\text{!new tb: bitstring; } \\
\text{let (xIDA:bitstring,IDB':bitstring,IDA':bitstring,FB':bitstring) = sdec(RB', h(FB)) in } \\
\text{if FB' = FB then } new \text{ d:bitstring; } \\
\text{let SKB = h([mult(th, QA'), IDB, IDA])} \text{ in } 0. \\
\]

And formally define TS as follows:

\[
\text{let TS} = \\
\text{new e:bitstring; } \\
\text{!let F = mult(d, P) in out(kc, F)} \\
\text{|} \\
\text{!} \\
\text{new TTS: bitstring; } \\
\text{new rand: bitstring; } \\
\text{let FA = mult(d, xQA) in } let VA = h([pwa, IDA, IDB]) \text{ in } if VA = xVA then let ZTS = \text{senc}(h([pwb, IDTS, IDB]), rand, TTS) \text{ in out(c, (IDTS, ZTS)); } \\
\text{let FB = mult(d, xQB) in } let (xIDA:bitstring, xDB:bitstring, xVA: bitstring) = sdec(h(FA), xZA) \text{ in } let VB = h([pwb, IDTS, IDB, TTS]) \text{ in if VB = xVB then let RB = \text{senc}(h(FB), [xQA, IDA, IDA, FB]) in let RA = \text{senc}(h(FA), [xQB, IDA, IDA, FA]) in out(c, RB); } \\
\text{out(c, RA});} \\
\]

For verification, we use randomized symmetric encryption to conceal the random integer \( T_{TS} \) instead of using the exclusive-or. The proposed protocol is formally defined as:

\[
\text{process ((UserA) | (UserB) | (TS)} \\
\text{Anonymity of users A and B is proved separately as follows. In order to show A's anonymity, the proposed protocol is required to be observational equivalent to the augmented protocol defined as follows:} \\
\text{process ((UserA) | (UserB) | (TS)} \\
\text{The observational equivalence can be translated into the following ProVerif bi-process:} \\
\text{process ((UserA) | (UserB) | (TS)} \\
\text{new ID: bitstring; } \\
\text{let IDA = choice([ID, IDV]) in ((UserA) | (UserB) | (TS))} \\
\]

The right hand side of the choice represents a system where a user with public identity IDV can run the protocol. The proposed protocol is simulated using the latest version 1.85 of ProVerif and simulation outcome shows that the scheme achieves the anonymity for user A. The anonymity of user B can be simulated and shown in a similar way.
Security Discussions and Performance Comparison

In this section, we discuss some other aspects related to security, and then evaluate the performance of the scheme.

4.1 Discussions

4.1.1 Offline password guessing attack. Suppose an adversary eavesdrops the communication between A, B, and TS, and gets all the transmitted messages \(\{\{Q_A, Z_A\}, \{ID_{TS}, Z_{TS}\}, \{Q_B, Z_B\}, R_A, R_B\}\). To launch the offline password guessing attack, the adversary may choose a trial password \(pw_A'\) and compute \(V_A' = h(pw_A', ID_A, ID_B)\). Even if the adversary knows \((ID_A, ID_B)\), the adversary still cannot compute \(E_h(f_{Q_A}) = (ID_A, ID_B, V_A')\) and therefore, cannot verify if \(Z_A = E_h(f_{Q_A}) = (ID_A, ID_B, V_A')\) since the adversary does not know \(F_4 = t_o F = t_o d P\). Therefore, the adversary cannot verify if his guessed \(pw_A'\) is correct or not.

If the adversary guesses B’s password \(pw_B'\), and computes \(T_{TS} = ZTS \oplus h(pw_B', ID_{TS}, ID_B)\), \(V_B' = h(pw_B', ID_{TS}, ID_B, T_{TS})\), the adversary still cannot verify if \(Z_B = E_h(f_{Q_B}) = (ID_B, V_B')\) without knowing \(F_2\). That is, the adversary cannot determine if his guessed \(pw_B'\) is correct or not.

Therefore, the proposed scheme can resist off-line password guessing attack. If an adversary launches on-line password guessing attack, TS may detect the attack since it needs to verify the correctness of \(V_A\) and \(V_B\).

4.1.2 Perfect forward secrecy. In the proposed scheme, the session key is \(sk = h(t_o A, P, ID_B, ID_A)\), where \(t_o A\) and \(t_o B\) are nonces chosen by user A and user B, respectively. Even if an adversary can get TS’s secret key \(d\), A and B’s passwords and identities, the adversary cannot compute the previous established session key due to the intractability of CDH problem.

4.1.3 Replay attack. Suppose that an adversary impersonates A and replays A’s message \(\{Q_A, Z_A\}\) to TS, the adversary cannot compute \(sk = h(t_o A, P, ID_B, ID_A)\) without knowing \(t_o A\). On the other hand, if an adversary impersonates B and replays B’s message \(\{Q_B, Z_B\}\) to TS, \(Z_B\), the adversary cannot pass the authentication checking by TS as TS is a new nonce chosen by TS in each new session. The same reason applies if an adversary replays TS’s message \(\{ID_{TS}, Z_{TS}\}, R_A\) and \(R_B\). The replayed message cannot pass the verification performed by TS and A, as \(t_o A\) and \(t_o B\) are new nonces chosen by A and B, respectively, and \(F_4, F_6\) are refreshed in each new session.

4.1.4 Forgery attack and impersonation. In our scheme, if an adversary attempts to impersonate A (or B, or TS) and sends messages to TS (or B, or A), but these messages cannot pass the verification process of TS (or B, or A) as the adversary does not know the password or secret key \(d\).

4.1.5 Man-in-the-middle attack. If an adversary attempts to launch the man-in-the-middle attack, the adversary has to generate and send the forgery messages to TS and has to pass the verification performed by the TS, before the adversary can obtain the session key shared with A and another session key shared with B. However, it is infeasible as the adversary does not know \(d\) or \(pw_A\) or \(pw_B\).

4.2 Performance Analysis

Let \(T, D, H\) and \(M\) be the time for performing a Chebyshev polynomial computation, a symmetric encryption/decryption, a one-way hash function, and a scalar multiplication on elliptic curve, respectively. Li et al. [24] and Li et al. [25] showed that it needs 0.0005 second for completing one hash operation, 0.0087 second for one symmetric encryption/decryption, and 0.063075 second for one elliptic curve scalar multiplication operation, respectively. Kocarev and Lian [26] showed that it needs 0.07 second for a Chebyshev polynomial computation. As we know, these computation costs may vary due to different computational configurations and settings. However, in general, the elliptic curve scalar multiplication operation and the Chebyshev polynomial evaluation are slower than a symmetric key based encryption/decryption or a one-way hash function operation. The performance comparison between the scheme proposed in this paper and three other recently proposed ones [16–18] is given in Table 1.

From Table 1, we can see that all schemes are efficient, but Lai et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to the privileged insider attack and offline password guessing attack, while Lee et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack once after the adversary gets to know the identities of at least two users, which in practice, is feasible.

Table 1. Performance comparison.

| Schemes               | User A | User B | Server | Total    | Rounds | Estimated Time (s) |
|-----------------------|--------|--------|--------|----------|--------|--------------------|
| Lai et al. [16]       | 3T+6H  | 3T+6H  | 2T+8H+2D | 8T+20H+2D | 5      | 0.5847             |
| Zhao et al. [17]      | 3T+6H+1D | 3T+5H+1D | 2T+8H+2D | 8T+19H+4D | 5      | 0.6043             |
| Lee et al. [18]       | 3T+4H  | 3T+5H  | 2T+7H+4D | 8T+16H+4D | 4      | 0.568              |
| Our scheme            | 3M+4H+2D | 3M+5H+2D | 2M+7H+4D | 8M+16H+8D | 4      | 0.5822             |

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Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed the first anonymous three-party password-authenticated key exchange scheme based on elliptic curve cryptosystem. Anonymity, authentication and security of the proposed scheme are validated using the applied pi calculus based formal verification tool ProVerif. The proposed scheme is secure and efficient, and is suitable for applications in telecare medical information systems.

Author Contributions

Conceived and designed the experiments: QX. Performed the experiments: QB. Analyzed the data: BH ND. Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: BH ND DSW. Wrote the paper: QX BH DSW. Designed the scheme and wrote the paper: QB. DSW. Proved the authentication, security and anonymity of the proposed scheme: BH. Verified the authentication, security and anonymity of the proposed scheme in the latest version 1.83 of ProVerif: ND.
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