Determimistic Secure Direct Communication Using Ping-pong protocol without public channel

Qing-yu Cai

Laboratory of Magnetic Resonance and Atom and Molecular Physics, Wuhan Institute of Mathematics, The Chinese Academy of Science, Wuhan, 430071, People’s Republic of China

Based on an EPR pair of qubits and allowing asymptotically secure key distribution, a secure communication protocol is presented. Bob sends either of the EPR pair qubits to Alice. Alice receives the travel qubit. Then she can encode classical information by local unitary operations on this travel qubit. Alice sends the qubit back to Bob. Bob can get Alice’s information by measurement on the two photons in Bell operator basis. If Eve in line, she has no access to Bob’s home qubit. All her operations are restricted to the travel qubit. In order to find out which operation Alice performs, Eve’s operation must include measurements. The EPR pair qubits are destroyed. Bob’s measurement on the two photons in Bell operator basis can help him to judge whether Eve exist in line or not. In this protocol, a public channel is not necessary.

PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.Dd

The idea of quantum cryptography was first proposed in the 1970s by Stephen Wiesner [1] and by Charles H. Bennett of IBM and Gilles Brassard of The University of Montreal [5]. The motive that we build quantum-mechanical communications channels is not only to transmit information securely without being eavesdropped on but also to transmit information more efficiently. We consider that quantum channel is secure because that quantum physics establishes a set of negative rules stating things that cannot be done [2]: (1) One cannot take a measurement without perturbing the system. (2) One cannot determine simultaneously the position and the momentum of a particle with arbitrarily high accuracy. (3) One cannot simultaneously measure the polarization of a photon in the vertical-horizontal basis and simultaneously in the diagonal basis. (4) One cannot draw pictures of individual quantum processes. (5) One cannot duplicate an unknown quantum state. These characters of quantum physics let us have ability to exchange information securely.

As is well known, operations on one particle of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair cannot influence the marginal statistics of measurements on the other particle. Let’s suppose that Bob have two photons which are maximally entangled in their polarization degree of freedom

\[
|\psi^\pm > = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0 > \pm |1 >)
\]

These states are maximally entangled states in the two particle Hilbert space \(H = H_A \otimes H_B\). Each one of them is not polarized because the reduced density matrices of one photon, say A,

\[
\rho^+_A = Tr_B\{|\psi^+ pclt; \psi^+ >\} = Tr_B\{|\phi^+ pclt; \phi^+ >\}
\]

is complete mixture. Since \(\rho^+_A = \frac{1}{2}I_A\), no one can distinguish \(|\psi^+ > (or |\phi^+ >)\) only by using the information of photon A. Anyone who has these two photons can perform a measurement on both photons in Bell operator basis which can help him to distinguish the states \(|\psi^+ >,|\psi^- >,|\phi^+ >,|\phi^- >\) from each other. Suppose Bob has two photons in Bell states \(|\psi^+ > or |\phi^+ >\), he gives one of them to Alice and keeps another. Then Alice perform an operation which can be described by a unitary operator to the photon she obtained from Bob

\[
\hat{\sigma}^+_Z |\psi^+ > = |\psi^T >
\]

\[
\hat{\sigma}^+_Z |\phi^+ > = |\psi^T >
\]

where \(\hat{\sigma}^+_Z \equiv (\hat{\sigma}^+_Z \otimes I) = (|0 > <0| - |1 > <1|) \otimes I\). The local operation of Alice can be encoded in states \(|\psi^+ >\). So it becomes nonlocal information. We will give a secure communication protocol based on this. In order to realize the communication, first, Bob prepares an EPR pair photons (suppose in state \(|\psi^+ >\)). Then he sends one of them to Alice and keeps another. Alice receives the photon and perform an operation in order to encode her information. She can perform the operation \(\hat{\sigma}^+_Z\) to encode her information "1". Else, she performs the operation I (do nothing) to encode her information "0". Alice sends the encoded photon to Bob. Bob performs a measurement on both photons
in Bell operator basis to judge Alice’s operation. If the EPR pair in state $|\psi^+\rangle$, then he know that Alice perform an operation I, else, he know that Alice perform the operation $\hat{\sigma}_Z$. This is a ping – pong protocol [3]. Through this process, Bob can get one bit information from Alice. When Bob’s measurement with the result $|\phi^+\rangle$, he knows that there is Eve in the line and stops the communication. We will prove that if there is an Eve in the communication line, Bob can find it certain without any public channel.

The algorithm for this protocol can like this: (1) Bob prepares two qubits in Bell states $|\psi^+\rangle$ or $|\phi^+\rangle$ randomly. (2) Bob sends one of the ERP pair to Alice and stores the other one. (3) Alice receives the one qubit, to perform her encoding operation. (4) Alice sends the qubit back to Bob. (5) Bob receives the back qubit and performs a basis measurement on both photons in Bell operator basis $\{|\phi^+\rangle, |\phi^-\rangle, |\psi^+\rangle, |\psi^-\rangle\}$. (6) Suppose Bob used $|\psi^+\rangle$ this time, after his measurement, if he finds the two photons in state $|\psi^+\rangle$, then he know that Alice has encoded ‘0’ in this process. If Bob find two photons in state $|\psi^-\rangle$, then he knows that Alice has encoded ‘1’ in this process. Then he will prepare next EPR pair and repeat this process. Else, if Bob finds the two photons are not in states $|\phi^\pm\rangle$, then he know that there is Eve in this communication line. The communication stops. (If Bob use $|\phi^+\rangle$ this time, after his measurement, if he finds the two photon in state $|\phi^+\rangle$, he knows that Alice has encoded ‘0’ in this process. If he finds the two photons in state $|\phi^-\rangle$, Bob knows Alice has encode ‘1’ in this process. If Bob finds the two photons in states $|\psi^\pm\rangle$, he knows Eve in line. The communication stops.) We will prove that this process is secure.

Security proof. Eve use all technique quantum mechanics laws allows. The aim of Eve is to find out which operation Alice performs. But Eve has no chance to access Bob’s home qubit. All her operations only can operator on the travel qubit. Bob select EPR pair in states $|\phi^+\rangle$ or $|\psi^+\rangle$ randomly with a probability $1/2$ every time. He send one of the qubit to Alice. The state of the travel qubit is complete mixed to Eve

$$\rho_A = Tr_B\{|\psi^+\rangle<|\psi^+\rangle\} = Tr_B\{|\phi^+\rangle<|\phi^+\rangle\} = \frac{1}{2}I_A. \quad (4)$$

To Eve, it seems that Bob sends a qubit in state $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$ with probability $1/2$ every time. If Eve want to distinguish what operations Alice operates, she needs to attack the travel qubit before Alice’s operation. After Alice’s operation, Eve needs to measure the back qubit. (This process is described in figure 1 and 2.) Eve can use all technique quantum mechanics allows. The most general quantum operation is a completely positive map

$$\varepsilon : S(H_A) \rightarrow S(H_A) \quad (5)$$

one the state space $S(H_A)$. Using the Stinespring dilation theorem [4], we know that any completely positive map can be realized by a unitary operation on a larger Hilbert space. We can use an ancilla space $H_E$ and an ancilla state $|\chi\rangle \in H_E$ and a unitary operation $\hat{E}$ on $H_A \otimes H_E$ to realize this completely positive map

$$\varepsilon(\rho_A) = Tr_E\{\hat{E}(\rho_A \otimes |\chi\rangle<|\chi\rangle) \hat{E}^+\} \quad (6)$$

where $\dim H_E \leq (\dim H_A)^2$. If Eve want to gain information about Alice’s operation, she should first perform the unitary operation $\hat{E}$ on the composed system, then let Alice perform her coding operation on the travel qubit. After Alice’s operation, Eve will finally perform a measurement to judge which operation Alice performs. The state of the travel qubit is a maximal mixture state

$$\rho_A = \frac{1}{2}|0><0| + \frac{1}{2}|1><1| \quad (7)$$

to Eve, which can be as a Bob sends the travel qubit in either of the states $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$ with equal probability $p = \frac{1}{2}$.

In our proof, first we suppose Bob selects the EPR pair in state $|\psi^+\rangle$. Second we suppose that Bob sends the travel qubit in state $|0\rangle$ to Alice. Eve adds an ancilla in the state $|\chi\rangle$ and performs the unitary operation $\hat{E}$ on both systems, which will results in

$$|\psi_{AE}^0\rangle = \hat{E}|0,\chi\rangle = \alpha|0,\chi_00\rangle + \beta|1,\chi_{01}\rangle \quad (8)$$

where $|\chi_0\rangle$, $|\chi_1\rangle$ are pure ancilla states uniquely determined by $\hat{E}$, and $|\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$. We change this equation into another form

$$d = |\beta|^2 = 1 - |\alpha|^2 \quad (9)$$
It has been proved in [3] that if Eve wants to get full information of Alice’s operation from the travel qubit, it must result in that \( d = \frac{1}{2} \). So equation (8) can be written as

\[
|\psi_{AE}^{0}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0, \chi_{00} \rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1, \chi_{01} \rangle
\]  

(10)

After Eve’s attack operations, the travel qubit will be sent to Alice. Suppose Alice performs an operation

\[
\hat{\sigma}_{Z}^{A}|\psi_{AE}^{0}\rangle = (|0\rangle < |0\rangle - |1\rangle < |1\rangle)(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0, \chi_{00} \rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1, \chi_{01} \rangle) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0, \chi_{00} \rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1, \chi_{01} \rangle.
\]  

(11)

to encode the information '1'. After Alice’s encoding operation, the joint system that includes Bob’s home qubit, the travel qubit and Eve’s ancilla space is in state

\[
|\psi_{BAE}^{0}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0_{A}, \chi_{00}, 1_{B} \rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1_{A}, \chi_{01}, 1_{B} \rangle = (\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0, \chi_{00} \rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1, \chi_{01} \rangle)|1_{B} \rangle
\]  

(1)

And the system including the travel qubit and Eve’s ancilla space is in the state

\[
|\psi_{AE}^{0}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0, \chi_{00} \rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1, \chi_{01} \rangle
\]  

(11)

After Alice’s measurement, the travel photon will be sent to Bob. Bob does not know whether Eve exists or not, so there is

\[
|\psi_{BAE}^{1}\rangle = (\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0, \chi_{00} \rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1, \chi_{01} \rangle)|1_{B} \rangle
\]  

(2)

and (11) should be written as

\[
|\psi_{AE}^{0}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0, \chi_{00} \rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1, \chi_{01} \rangle
\]  

(12)

At the beginning of our proof, we have supposed that Bob sends the travel qubit in state \(|0\rangle\). If Bob sends the travel qubit in states \(|1\rangle\), (11) should be written as

\[
|\psi_{BAE}^{1}\rangle = (\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0, \chi_{00} \rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1, \chi_{01} \rangle)|0_{B} \rangle
\]  

(3)

and (11) should be written as

\[
|\psi_{AE}^{0}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0, \chi_{00} \rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1, \chi_{10} \rangle
\]  

(3)

When Alice’s operation is \( \hat{\sigma}_{Z} \). And (11) should be written as

\[
|\psi_{BAE}^{1}\rangle = (\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0, \chi_{10} \rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1, \chi_{11} \rangle)|0_{B} \rangle
\]  

(4)

(11) should be written as

\[
|\psi_{AE}^{0}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0, \chi_{00} \rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1, \chi_{10} \rangle
\]  

(4)

When Alice’s operation is \( \hat{\sigma}_{Z} \). Eve can obtain information with certainty by measurement on the travel qubit in basis \( \{\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0, \chi_{00} \rangle + |0, \chi_{01} \rangle), \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0, \chi_{00} \rangle - |0, \chi_{01} \rangle), \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|1, \chi_{10} \rangle + |1, \chi_{11} \rangle), \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|1, \chi_{10} \rangle - |1, \chi_{11} \rangle)\} \). After Eve’s measurement, the travel qubit will be sent to Bob. Bob does not know whether Eve exists or not, so there is

\[
\rho_{AB} = \text{Tr}_{E}(|\psi_{ABE}^{0}\rangle < \langle \psi_{ABE}|).
\]  

(12)

He measures the two photons in Bell basis, then
\[ Tr(|\psi^+><\psi^+|\rho_{AB}) = \frac{1}{4} \]
\[ Tr(|\psi^-><\psi^-|\rho_{AB}) = \frac{1}{4} \]
\[ Tr(|\phi^+><\phi^+|\rho_{AB}) = \frac{1}{4} \]
\[ Tr(|\phi^-><\phi^-|\rho_{AB}) = \frac{1}{4} \] (13)

If Eve does not exist, which means \(d = 0\), we can see when Alice performs operation I, there is
\[ Tr(|\psi^+><\psi^+|\rho_{AB}) = 1 \]
\[ Tr(|\psi^-><\psi^-|\rho_{AB}) = 0 \]
\[ Tr(|\phi^+><\phi^+|\rho_{AB}) = 0 \]
\[ Tr(|\phi^-><\phi^-|\rho_{AB}) = 0 \] (14)

When Alice operator \(\hat{\sigma}_Z^A\), Bob’s measurement result should be
\[ Tr(|\psi^+><\psi^+|\rho_{AB}) = 0 \]
\[ Tr(|\psi^-><\psi^-|\rho_{AB}) = 1 \]
\[ Tr(|\phi^+><\phi^+|\rho_{AB}) = 0 \]
\[ Tr(|\phi^-><\phi^-|\rho_{AB}) = 0 \] (15)

We can see that we have supposed that Bob used the EPR pair in state \(|\psi^+\rangle\rangle\) in this process. It is apparent that when Eve exist, Bob will find his measurement result will be in the states \(|\phi^\pm\rangle\rangle\) with probability \(\frac{1}{2}\). In another word, when Bob uses an EPR pair in states \(|\psi^+\rangle\rangle\) in the communication but he find his measurement result is in states \(|\phi^\pm\rangle\rangle\), he knows Eve is in line. The communication stops. For the same reason, when Bob select an EPR pair in state \(|\phi^+\rangle\rangle\) to communicate with Alice but he finds his measurement result is in the state \(|\psi^\pm\rangle\rangle\), he knows that Eve is in line. The communication stops.

If Bob only uses EPR pair in state \(|\psi^+\rangle\rangle\) in the communication, Eve can perform a measurement in her attack operations to determine whether Bob sends the travel qubit in states \(|0\rangle\) or \(|1\rangle\). After her measurement gained Alice’s operation information, she can prepare the travel qubit in the states \(|0\rangle\) or \(|1\rangle\) as it is at the beginning. When Bob selects EPR pair in states \(|\psi^+\rangle\rangle\) or \(|\phi^+\rangle\rangle\) randomly with a probability \(p=\frac{1}{2}\), Eve can not determine which states Bob select by her measurement on the travel qubit. We have proved that this communication protocol is secure.

We can see that when Eve wants to gain full information in each attack, the ping-pong protocol provides a detection probability \(P = \frac{1}{2}\). If Eve exists, after 1000 bits have been transmitted, the probability that Eve was not detected becomes \(D \approx 9.33e^{-302}\), which means Eve has already been detected. In fig. 3, we have plotted the eavesdropping sucess probability with \(d = \frac{1}{2}\).

In our method, every travel photon can get one bit information back from Alice without Eve in line. Bob’s measurement on the two photons in Bell operator basis not only can help him to get information from Alice, but also can help him to determine whether Eve is in line or not. Obviously, there is no public channel in our method. In BB84’s protocol [5], the states some photons have to be publicized to verdict the communication is secure. In the ping-pong protocol [3], some EPR pair photons have to be publicized to judge whether Eve exist in line or not through the public channel. In a secure communication protocol, first, an additional public channel is not economical. On the other hand, a public channel means all information through the public channel is open to Eve. The more information Eve gains, the more difficult the secure communication becomes.
1. References:

[1]. S. Wiener, then at Columbia University, was first to propose ideas closely related to QC in the 1970s. Since it is difficult to find his revolutionary paper, we reproduce his abstract here: The uncertainty principle imposes restrictions on the capacity of certain types of communication channels. This paper will show that in compensation for this ‘quantum noise,’ quantum mechanics allows us novel forms of coding without analogue in communication channels adequately described by classical physics.

[2]. Nicolas Gisin, Grégoire Ribordy, Wolfgang Tittel, and Hugo Zbinden, Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[3]. Kim Bostrom and Timo Felbinger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002).
[4]. W. F. Stinespring, Proc. Am. Math. Soc. 6, 211 (1955).
[5]. C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, 1984, in proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalor, India, (IEEE, New York), pp. 175-179.
This figure "eve.jpg" is available in "jpg" format from:

http://arxiv.org/ps/quant-ph/0301048v1
This figure "fig1.jpg" is available in "jpg" format from:

http://arxiv.org/ps/quant-ph/0301048v1
Fig. 3. Eavesdropping success probability as a function of \( d = 0.5 \).