Diffusion Multi-unit Auctions with Diminishing Marginal Utility Buyers

Extended Abstract

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ABSTRACT

We consider an auction design problem where a seller sells multiple homogeneous items to a set of connected buyers. Each buyer only knows the buyers she directly connects with, and the seller initially only connects to a few buyers. Our goal is to design an auction to incentivize the buyers who are aware of the market to invite their neighbors to join the auction. Meanwhile, the auction should also guarantee that the seller never runs a deficit. In this paper, we design the very first multi-unit diffusion auction that satisfies all these properties for buyers with diminishing marginal utility.

KEYWORDS

Auction Design; Invitation Incentive; Social Networks.

ACM Reference Format:
Haolin Liu*, Xinyuan Lian*, and Dengji Zhao. 2023. Diffusion Multi-unit Auctions with Diminishing Marginal Utility Buyers. Extended Abstract. In Proc. of the 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2023), London, United Kingdom, May 29 – June 2, 2023, IFAAMAS, 3 pages.

1 INTRODUCTION

Multi-unit auctions refer to auctions where multiple homogeneous items are available for sale in a single auction. A common feature of these markets is that the participants are known in advance, and the seller can hold the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [2, 3, 15] to get good social welfare and revenue. To further improve social welfare and revenue, an intuitive method is to advertise the sale to involve more buyers. However, the seller normally needs to pay for the advertisements and if the ads can’t attract enough valuable buyers, the seller’s revenue may decrease. To solve this problem, diffusion mechanism design has been proposed in recent years [7, 10, 20, 21]. Diffusion mechanisms utilize the participants’ connections to attract more buyers. Every participant who is aware of the market has incentives to invite all her neighbors. The rewards to buyers who do effective invitations are carefully designed to ensure the seller has revenue improvement.

Li et al. [10] first modeled the single-item diffusion auction setting and proposed the information diffusion mechanism (IDM) to incentivize buyers to invite each other. GIDM [22] and DNA-MU [5] extended the setting to multi-unit-supply and unit-demand cases. However, an error in the proofs of GIDM has been found [14]. In the full version of this paper, we show that DNA-MU is also problematic [11]. Thus, there is no satisfactory diffusion auction mechanism even in multi-unit-supply and unit-demand settings yet. Takanashi et al. [14] also studied the multi-unit-demand settings but they focus on efficiency approximability and cannot guarantee the seller is profitable.

In this paper, we design the very first incentive-compatible diffusion auction in multi-unit-supply and multi-unit-demand settings that has satisfactory revenue guarantees. We propose the layer-based diffusion mechanism (LDM). LDM first converts the given network into its breadth-first search tree and computes allocations and payments layer by layer in the tree. When computing for one layer, all potential competitors of this layer are removed to avoid buyers’ misreports. By doing so, we also removed many buyers who are not competitors of the layer, which will reduce the social welfare and revenue.

In addition to extending diffusion auctions to more general settings, single-unit diffusion auctions have also been extensively studied. For single-unit diffusion auctions, following IDM, Li et al. [9] gave a general auction class; Zhang et al. [17] proposed a fairer reward scheme; Li et al. [8] further characterized the conditions to achieve incentive compatibility. Beyond auctions, diffusion incentives can also be introduced to other classical settings, such as the buyer-centric market for procurement [12, 13], redistribution mechanisms [18], house allocation [6, 16], two-sided matching [1] and cooperative games [19]. Comprehensive surveys on diffusion mechanism design are given in [4, 20, 21].

2 THE MODEL

We consider an auction where a seller $s$ sells $K \geq 1$ homogeneous items via a network. In addition to the seller, the social network consists of $n$ potential buyers denoted by $N = \{1, \ldots, n\}$. Each $i \in N$ has a private marginal decreasing utility function for the $K$ items which is denoted by a value vector $u_i = (v_i^1, \ldots, v_i^K)$ where $v_i^1 \geq v_i^2 \geq \cdots \geq v_i^K \geq 0$. Let $v_i(m) = \sum_{k=1}^m v_i^k$ be the valuation of $i$ for receiving $m \geq 1$ units and assume $v_i(0) = 0$. Each buyer $i \in N$ has a set of neighbors $r_i \subseteq N \cup \{s\}$ and $i$ does not know the existence of the others except for $r_i$. The seller is also only aware of her neighbors $r_i$ initially. Let $\theta_i = (\theta_{i1}, \theta_{i1})$ be the type of buyer $i \in N$ and $\theta = (\theta_{1}, \ldots, \theta_{n}) = (\theta_{i1}, \theta_{i1})$ be the type profile of all buyers where $\theta_{i1}$ is the type profile of all buyers except for $i$. We want to design auction mechanisms that ask each buyer to report her valuations and invite her neighbors to join the mechanism. This is mathematically modeled by reporting her type. Let $\hat{\theta}_i = (\hat{\theta}_{i1}, \hat{\theta}_{i1})$ be buyer $i$’s type report where $\hat{\theta}_{i1} \subseteq r_i$ because $i$ can not invite
someone she does not know. Let \( \hat{\theta} = (\hat{\theta}_1, \ldots, \hat{\theta}_n) = (\hat{\theta}_1, \hat{\theta}_{-1}) \) be the report type profile of all buyers. Given a report type profile \( \hat{\theta} \), if a buyer \( i \) and the seller \( s \) are connected, then we say \( i \) is valid in the auction. Let \( Q(\hat{\theta}) \) be the set of all valid buyers given \( \hat{\theta} \).

A general auction mechanism consists of an allocation policy \( \pi = (\pi_i)_{i \in N} \) and a payment policy \( p = (p_i)_{i \in N} \). Given a report type profile \( \hat{\theta}, \pi_i(\hat{\theta}) \in \{0, 1, \ldots, \mathcal{K}\} \) is the number of items \( k \) receives and \( \sum_{i \in N} \pi_i(\hat{\theta}) \leq \mathcal{K} \) if \( p_i(\hat{\theta}) \) is the payment that \( i \) pays to the mechanism. If \( p_i(\hat{\theta}) < 0 \), then \( i \) receives \( |p_i(\hat{\theta})| \) from the mechanism. Given \( \hat{\theta} \), for mechanism \( (\pi, p) \), the social welfare is defined as \( \sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i(\hat{\theta}) \). A diffusion auction mechanism \( (\pi, p) \) is an auction mechanism that only runs among valid buyers \( Q(\hat{\theta}) \) and the output is independent of buyers in \( N \setminus Q(\hat{\theta}) \). Given a buyer \( i \) of type \( \hat{\theta}_i = (\hat{\theta}_i, \hat{\theta}_{-i}) \) and a report type profile \( \hat{\theta} \), the utility of \( i \) under a diffusion auction mechanism \( (\pi, p) \) is defined as \( u_i(\pi_i(\hat{\theta}), \hat{\theta}_i) = \pi_i(\hat{\theta}_i) - p_i(\hat{\theta}) \).

Definition 2.1. A diffusion auction mechanism \( (\pi, p) \) is individually rational (IR) if \( u_i(\pi_i(\hat{\theta}), \hat{\theta}_i, \hat{\theta}_{-i}) \geq 0 \) for all \( i \in N \), all \( \hat{\theta}_i \), and all \( \hat{\theta}_{-i} \).

Definition 2.2. A diffusion auction mechanism \( (\pi, p) \) is incentive compatible (IC) if \( u_i(\pi_i(\hat{\theta}), \hat{\theta}_i, \hat{\theta}_{-i}) \geq u_i(\pi'_i(\hat{\theta}), \hat{\theta}_i, \hat{\theta}_{-i}) \) for all \( i \in N \), all \( \hat{\theta}_i \), and all \( \hat{\theta}_{-i} \).

Given a report type profile \( \hat{\theta} \), an undirected graph \( G(\hat{\theta}) = (V(\hat{\theta}), E(\hat{\theta})) \) can be constructed where \( V(\hat{\theta}) = \{i| i \in Q(\hat{\theta})\} \). For each \( i \in V(\hat{\theta}) \) and each \( j \in V(\hat{\theta}) \), there is an edge \( (i, j) \in E(\hat{\theta}) \). For each buyer \( i \in Q(\hat{\theta}) \), let \( d_i(\hat{\theta}) \) be the shortest distance in \( G(\hat{\theta}) \) from the seller \( s \) to \( i \). Let \( L_d(\hat{\theta}) \) be the set of valid buyers whose shortest distance to the seller is \( d \). Theorem 3.1. In LDM, \( R(\hat{\theta}) \) contains all buyers who potentially have positive utilities. We divide those buyers into two parts: buyers who diffuse information to potential winners and buyers who are potential winners. In our design, for each \( i \in L_1(\hat{\theta}) \), the first part corresponds to \( \mathcal{C}_i^W(\hat{\theta}) = \{j| j \in C_i(\hat{\theta}), C_j(\hat{\theta}) \neq \emptyset \} \subseteq C_i(\hat{\theta}) \) who are the children of \( i \) who have also children. The second part corresponds to \( \mathcal{C}_i^W(\hat{\theta}) \) who are the top \( \mathcal{K} + \mu - |\mathcal{C}_i^W(\hat{\theta})| \) ranked buyers in \( C_i(\hat{\theta}) \setminus \mathcal{C}_i^W(\hat{\theta}) \) according their valuation reports for the first unit, where \( \mu \) is a constant with \( |\mathcal{C}_i^W(\hat{\theta})| \leq \mu \). We assume \( \mu \) is prior information to the seller which only depends on the network structure. Taking the union of all these sets, the final definition of the removed set \( R(\hat{\theta}) \) is \( \left( \bigcup_{i \in L_1(\hat{\theta})} C_i^W(\hat{\theta}) \right) \cup \left( \bigcup_{1 \leq d \leq d_{\max}} L_d(\hat{\theta}) \right) \). Theorem 3.1 summarizes all the properties of LDM. The proof is given in the full version of this paper [11].

Theorem 3.1. The LDM is individually rational (IR) and incentive compatible (IC). The social welfare and revenue of LDM are no less than the social welfare and revenue of running the VCG mechanism among \( r_s \).
Acknowledgement. This work is supported by Science and Technology Commission of Shanghai Municipality (No. 23010503000 and No. 22ZR1442200) and Shanghai Frontiers Science Center of Human-centered Artificial Intelligence (ShangHAI).

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