ESTIMATING RESTRICTED MEAN JOB TENURES IN SEMI-COMPETING RISK DATA COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF DISCRIMINATION

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When plaintiffs prevail in a discrimination case, a major component of the calculation of economic loss is the length of time they would have been in the higher position had they been treated fairly during the period in which the employer practiced discrimination. This problem is complicated by the fact that one’s eligibility for promotion is subject to termination by retirement and both the promotion and retirement processes may be affected by discriminatory practices. This semi-competing risk setup is decomposed into a retirement process and a promotion process among the employees. Predictions for the purpose of compensation are made by utilizing the expected promotion and retirement probabilities of similarly qualified members of the nondiscriminated group. The restricted mean durations of three periods are estimated—the time an employee would be at the lower position, at the higher level and in retirement. The asymptotic properties of the estimators are presented and examined through simulation studies. The proposed restricted mean job duration estimators are shown to be robust in the presence of an independent frailty term. Data from the reverse discrimination case, Alexander v. Milwaukee, where White-male lieutenants were discriminated in promotion to captain are reanalyzed. While the appellate court upheld liability, it reversed the original damage calculations, which heavily depended on the time a plaintiff would have been in each position. The results obtained by the proposed method are compared to those made at the first trial. Substantial differences in both directions are observed.

1. Introduction. When plaintiffs prevail in a case involving hiring or promotion discrimination, courts need to estimate the economic loss (compensatory damages) they suffered. The problem arose in the reverse discrimination case Alexander v. Milwaukee (474 F. 3d 437, 7th Cir. 2007). The City of Milwaukee and its Board of Fireman and Police Commissioners were sued by seventeen Caucasian male members of the Police department for discrimination with respect to promotions from lieutenant to captain made during the seven years of Chief Jones’ tenure. At the trial, the jury found the defendants guilty of discrimination and ordered compensatory damages for each plaintiff. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgement with respect to liability, but reversed the
amount of damages awarded and remanded the case for recalculation using more accurate estimates of the plaintiffs’ “lost chances.” When there are more candidates than positions at the time one or several openings are available, the economic damages need to reflect the diminished probability of promotion that each plaintiff lost (Bishop v. Gainer, 272 F.3d 1009, 1015-16, 7th Cir. 2001; Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1205-07, 1996; Griffin v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 5 F.3d 186, 189, 6th Cir. 1993). Lost chances are the differences between the hypothetical promotion probabilities the White-male plaintiffs would have received absent of discrimination and the observed promotion probabilities.

Nonparametric [Tableman and Stahel (2009)] and Bayesian [Kadane and Woodworth (2004); Woodworth and Kadane (2010)] methods have been proposed to model employment data to determine liability. Their focus is the accurate estimation of the regression coefficient for the variable indicating the protected group membership. Our goal, however, is to make predictions of compensatory damages, which requires estimating the probabilities of having been promoted over time. Pan and Gastwirth (2009) used accelerated failure time models to estimate hypothetical job tenures of plaintiffs who were discriminated in hiring. Cox proportional hazards models [Cox (1972, 1975)] are utilized in this manuscript to predict promotion probabilities. Semiparametric models are superior in several aspects. The models are more flexible, as they only assume multiplicative covariate effects on the hazard function without forcing the baseline to follow any specific distribution. Second, when the time axis is set as calendar time, the risk set at each promotion is composed of the eligible candidates at that time. Therefore, the model is fitted by maximizing the probabilities of selecting the individuals who actually received promotion from the candidate pool. In this setting, the characteristics of the cohort at risk for promotion are fairly stable because new lieutenants replenish the group eligible for promotion and the seniority of the remaining lieutenants increases when senior members retire.

Another complication arises because discrimination in one aspect of employment may also affect other employment decisions. For example, the same supervisors would select employees for promotion or reduction in force. However, discrimination in layoffs is unlikely to occur in civil service jobs which are protected by a tenure-type system, especially when most incumbents have a fair amount of seniority. In the motivating case Alexander v. Milwaukee, the only form of termination is retirement and there were no claims against discrimination in processes other than promotion. Still, it is possible that retirement is affected by the discriminatory practice in promotions. For example, individuals with delayed or denied promotions due to discrimination might have less incentives to remain employed after they become eligible for retirement. Therefore, disparities in both the promotion and retirement processes need to be considered when estimating the economic damages. Promotion and retirement are semi-competing risks [Fine, Jiang and Chappell (2001)], as the occurrence of retirement terminates the promotion process, but retirements can be observed after promotions. Xu, Kalbfleisch and Tai
(2010) model such data structures with three hazard/transition functions—the transition from no-event status to the promoted status given that neither promotion nor retirement happened previously, the transition from no-event status to retired status given that neither events occurred, and the transition from the promoted status to retired status given the promotion time. In *Alexander v. Milwaukee*, the number of years since becoming eligible for retirement is the most important factor affecting retirement hazard. Conditional on the number of years since becoming eligible, the retirement pattern among lieutenants and that among captains are similar [*The New York Times, Goldstein (2011)*]. Thus, the retirement process is modeled regardless of the promotion status. Unlike competing risk data, the distribution of the retirement times is identifiable [*Peng and Fine (2007)*]. Furthermore, we model the promotion risk conditional on that retirement has not occurred. Similar to the cause-specific instantaneous rate of occurrence in competing risks [*Lin (1997)*] which requires that no event of any type has happened, the promotion hazard among nonretired employees is conditional on that neither promotion nor retirement has occurred. It is different from the promotion hazard conditional on that promotion has not occurred. In summary, we model two hazard/transition functions - the retirement process and the promotion process conditional on that retirement has not occurred, respectively. This can be viewed as the univariate event counterpart of *Cook and Lawless (1997)* approach modeling recurrent events in the presence of a terminal event, where the recurrent event mean/rate at time point \( t \) is conditional on that the terminal event time is larger than \( t \).

As the promotion and retirement probabilities are time-varying, a more concise summary of the processes is provided by the durations of time the plaintiff would be in each position. In biomedical studies, researchers are interested in the restricted mean lifetime during a specific period following the treatment, for example, 10 years, because the treatment effects will not last beyond 10 years. *Chen and Tsiatis (2001)* used the difference in restricted mean lifetimes as a measure of treatment effects. *Zhang and Schaubel (2011)* studied restricted mean lifetime subject to informative censoring. In the motivating example, lieutenants, captains and retired officers received different salaries or pensions. Therefore, we estimate the hypothetical restricted mean durations of the three statuses (not promoted, promoted, retired) during the period for which the plaintiffs deserve compensation, that is, from the beginning of the discriminatory practice to the cutoff time determined by the court.

This manuscript studies the estimation of hypothetical restricted mean job durations assuming that the discrimination did not happen for the purpose of compensating prevailing plaintiffs. The paper is organized as follows. The restricted mean duration estimator is constructed in Section 2. The asymptotic distribution is derived in Section 3. The accuracy of the estimator’s asymptotic properties in moderate size samples is examined by simulations in Section 4. The proposed estimator is applied to the motivating reverse discrimination case in Section 5. Additional issues in estimating compensation are discussed in Section 6.
2. Proposed estimators. The notation will be described in the context of the motivating example. There are \( n \) employees indexed by \( i, i = 1, \ldots, n \). The time axis is calendar time. When the \( i \)th employee reaches the rank of lieutenant, he or she becomes eligible for promotion to captain. Thus, the calendar date an officer becomes lieutenant is the date that individual enters the promotion process, denoted by \( P_{1i} \). The date, if any, when the \( i \)th employee is promoted to captain is denoted by \( P_{2i}^* \). Retirement terminates the promotion process and the data collection time censors both promotions and retirements. Denote the retirement date and the end of data collection for subject \( i \) as \( R_{2i}^* \) and \( C_i \), respectively. We observe
\[
P_{2i} = \min\{P_{2i}, R_{2i}^*, C_i\}
\]
and use \( \delta_i^P = I(P_{2i} = P_{2i}^*) \) to indicate an observed promotion event. Here \( I(A) \) is an indicator function which equals 1 when \( A \) is true and 0 otherwise. Similar notation is used for the retirement process. Police officers become eligible for retirement after 25 years of service in the department. Thus, they enter the retirement process on that day, \( R_{1i} \). The end of the retirement process, \( R_{2i}^* \), occurs when the policeman retires but is also censored at the time of data collection, \( C_i \). Thus, the observed time of the retirement process is
\[
R_{2i} = \min\{R_{2i}^*, C_i\},
\]
and \( \delta_i^R = I(C_i > R_{2i}^*) \) indicates whether \( R_{2i} \) is a retirement time or censoring time. The observed data consist of \( n \) independent and identically distributed vectors, \((P_{1i}, P_{2i}, \delta_i^P, X_i'(t), R_{1i}, R_{2i}, \delta_i^R, Z_i'(t))'\), where the covariates for the promotion process, \( X_i(t) \), and those for the retirement process, \( Z_i(t) \), include both fixed and time-varying elements. The covariate sets \( X_i'(t) \) and \( Z_i'(t) \) often overlap, as some factors may play a role in both promotion and retirement decisions.

The semi-competing risk data is decomposed into the retirement process and the promotion process conditional on that retirement has not occurred. The corresponding hazard functions are defined as follows:
\[
d\lambda_i^P(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \to 0} \frac{\Pr(t \leq P_{2i}^* < t + \Delta t | P_{2i}^* \geq t, R_{2i}^* \geq t) \Delta t}{I(P_{1i} \leq t)},
\]
\[
d\lambda_i^R(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \to 0} \frac{\Pr(t \leq R_{2i}^* < t + \Delta t | R_{2i}^* \geq t) \Delta t}{I(R_{1i} \leq t)}.
\]
Notice we require \( P_{1i} \leq t \) and \( R_{1i} \leq t \) so that \( d\lambda_i^P(t) = 0 \) for \( t < P_{1i} \) and \( d\lambda_i^R(t) = 0 \) for \( t < R_{1i} \). The two hazard functions are modeled by two Cox proportional hazards models
\[
d\lambda_i^P(t) = d\lambda_0^P(t) \exp(X_i(t)'\beta_0),
\]
(1) 
\[
d\lambda_i^R(t) = d\lambda_0^R(t) \exp(Z_i(t)'\theta_0),
\]
(2) 
where \( d\lambda_0^P(t) \) and \( d\lambda_0^R(t) \) denote the unspecified baseline hazard functions over calendar time and the two vectors \( \beta_0, \theta_0 \) represent the true values of the regression coefficients. In the risk set of model (1), we do not differentiate lieutenants who are eligible for retirement and those who are not yet eligible because seniority is
a covariate and officers with the same seniority usually have similar promotion chances, regardless if eligible for retirement or not.

We assume

\[
\lim_{\Delta t \to 0} \Delta t^{-1} \Pr(t \leq P_{2i}^* < t + \Delta t | t \leq P_{2i}^*, t \leq R_{2i}^*, X_i(t), Z_i(t), R_{2i}^*) \\
= \lim_{\Delta t \to 0} \Delta t^{-1} \Pr(t \leq P_{2i}^* < t + \Delta t | t \leq P_{2i}^*, t \leq R_{2i}^*, X_i(t), Z_i(t)),
\]

\[
\lim_{\Delta t \to 0} \Delta t^{-1} \Pr(t \leq R_{2i}^* < t + \Delta t | t \leq R_{2i}^*, X_i(t), Z_i(t), P_{2i}^*) \\
= \lim_{\Delta t \to 0} \Delta t^{-1} \Pr(t \leq R_{2i}^* < t + \Delta t | t \leq R_{2i}^*, X_i(t), Z_i(t)).
\]

That is, conditional on \(X_i(t)\) and \(Z_i(t)\), \(d \Lambda^P(t)\) and \(d \Lambda^R(t)\) are assumed to be independent. This assumption would be violated in the presence of latent variables affecting both processes. However, models assuming latent variables would not be accepted in courts (King v. Acosta Sales and Marketing Inc., 678 F.3d 470 2012). Nevertheless, the sensitivity of the proposed estimators to moderate deviations from this independence assumption is studied in Table 2.

For any time point after \(P_{1i}\), there are three possible statuses for each subject—

- not retired and remaining a lieutenant, 
- not retired and being a captain, and 
- retired.

The probabilities for each of the three statuses are

\[
\Pr(P_{2i}^* > t, R_{2i}^* > t) = \Pr(P_{2i}^* > t | R_{2i}^* > t) \Pr(R_{2i}^* > t),
\]

\[
\Pr(P_{2i}^* \leq t, R_{2i}^* > t) = \Pr(P_{2i}^* \leq t | R_{2i}^* > t) \Pr(R_{2i}^* > t),
\]

\[
\Pr(R_{1i} \leq R_{2i}^* \leq t) = \Pr(R_{2i}^* \leq t).
\]

Again, we do not differentiate between \(t < R_{1i}\) and \(t \geq R_{1i}\) in the first two statuses. Therefore, the probability \(\Pr(P_{2i}^* > t, R_{2i}^* > t)\) is the probability of being a lieutenant and not retired where the officer is either eligible or ineligible for retirement, and \(\Pr(P_{2i}^* \leq t, R_{2i}^* > t)\) is the probability of being a captain and having not retired regardless of eligibility for retirement.

Notice that the probability of having been promoted to captain equals the sum of the probability of being a captain and not retired and the probability of having been promoted and retired. That is,

\[
\Pr(P_{2i}^* \leq t) = \Pr(P_{2i}^* \leq t, R_{2i}^* > t) + \Pr(P_{2i}^* \leq t, R_{2i}^* \leq t)
\]

for any \(t > P_{1i}\). Similarly,

\[
\Pr(P_{2i}^* > t) = \Pr(P_{2i}^* > t, R_{2i}^* > t) + \Pr(P_{2i}^* > t, R_{2i}^* \leq t),
\]

\[
\Pr(R_{2i}^* \leq t) = \Pr(R_{2i}^* \leq t, P_{2i}^* > t) + \Pr(R_{2i}^* \leq t, P_{2i}^* \leq t),
\]

\[
\Pr(R_{2i}^* > t) = \Pr(R_{2i}^* > t, P_{2i}^* > t) + \Pr(R_{2i}^* > t, P_{2i}^* \leq t).
\]
The three probabilities of interests, \( \Pr(P_{2i}^* > t, R_{2i}^* > t) \), \( \Pr(P_{2i}^* \leq t, R_{2i}^* > t) \) and \( \Pr(R_{2i}^* \leq t) \), can be estimated from models (1) and (2). But \( \Pr(P_{2i}^* \leq t, R_{2i}^* \leq t) \) and \( \Pr(P_{2i}^* > t, R_{2i}^* \leq t) \) are unidentifiable because the distribution of \( P_{2i}^* \) is unobserved after \( R_{2i}^* \) [Fine, Jiang and Chappell (2001); Xu, Kalbfleisch and Tai (2010)].

The expected lengths of time being a lieutenant (\( T^{\text{lt}} \)), a captain (\( T^{\text{cap}} \)) or retired (\( T^{\text{rt}} \)) restricted to \([t_0, t]\) are

\[
E(T^{\text{lt}}) = \int_{\max(t_0, P_{1i})}^{t_1} \Pr(P_{2i}^* > t > P_{1i}, R_{2i}^* > t) \, dt
\]

\[
= \int_{\max(t_0, P_{1i})}^{t_1} \Pr(P_{2i}^* > t > P_{1i} | R_{2i}^* > t) \Pr(R_{2i}^* > t) \, dt,
\]

(3) \[
E(T^{\text{cap}}) = \int_{\max(t_0, P_{1i})}^{t_1} \Pr(P_{2i}^* \leq t, R_{2i}^* > t) \, dt
\]

\[
= \int_{\max(t_0, P_{1i})}^{t_1} \Pr(P_{2i}^* \leq t | R_{2i}^* > t) \Pr(R_{2i}^* > t) \, dt,
\]

\[
E(T^{\text{rt}}) = \int_{\max(t_0, P_{1i})}^{t_1} \Pr(R_{2i}^* \leq t) \, dt.
\]

The restricted mean job duration calculation starts from \( t_0 \) or \( P_{1i} \), whichever happens later, because an officer could not be discriminated against promotion to captain until \( P_{1i} \) (date becoming a lieutenant) and \( t_0 \) (the time the discriminatory chief was appointed).

The number of observed promotion and retirement events up to time point \( t \) are defined as \( N_i^P(t) = \delta_i I(P_{2i} \leq t) \) and \( N_i^R(t) = \delta_i I(R_{2i} \leq t) \), respectively. Let \( dN_i^P(s) = N_i^P(s) - N_i^P(s^-) \) and \( dN_i^R(s) = N_i^R(s) - N_i^R(s^-) \), then \( N_i^P(t) = \int_{t_0}^{t} dN_i^P(s) \) and \( N_i^R(t) = \int_{t_0}^{t} dN_i^R(s) \). The corresponding at-risk indicators are denoted by \( Y_i^P(t) = I(P_{1i} \leq t \leq P_{2i}) \) and \( Y_i^R(t) = I(R_{1i} \leq t \leq R_{2i}) \). The parameters \( \beta_0 \) and \( \theta_0 \) are estimated by \( \hat{\beta} \) and \( \hat{\theta} \), the solution to the partial likelihood score functions, \( U^P(\beta) = 0 \) and \( U^R(\theta) = 0 \), which are defined as

\[
U^P(\beta) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \int_{t_0}^{t_1} U_i^P(\beta) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \{ X_i(t) - \bar{X}(t; \beta) \} dN_i^P(t),
\]

\[
U^R(\theta) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \int_{t_0}^{t_1} U_i^R(\beta) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \{ Z_i(t) - \bar{Z}(t; \theta) \} dN_i^R(t),
\]

where

\[
\bar{X}(\beta; t) = \frac{S_{P}^{(1)}(t; \beta)}{S_{P}^{(0)}(t; \beta)},
\]

\[
\bar{Z}(\theta; t) = \frac{S_{R}^{(1)}(t; \theta)}{S_{R}^{(0)}(t; \theta)}.
\]
\[ S_p^{(k)}(t; \beta) = n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} Y_i^{P}(t)e^{\beta'X_i(t)}X_i(t)^{\otimes k}, \]

\[ S_R^{(k)}(t; \theta) = n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} Y_i^{R}(t)e^{\theta'Z_i(t)}Z_i(t)^{\otimes k}, \quad k = 0, 1, 2, \]

where \( X_i(t)^{\otimes 0} = 1, Z_i(t)^{\otimes 0} = 1, X_i(t)^{\otimes 1} = X_i(t), Z_i(t)^{\otimes 1} = Z_i(t) \) and \( X_i^{\otimes 2} = X_i(t)X_i(t)', Z_i^{\otimes 2} = Z_i(t)Z_i(t)' \). The Breslow–Aalen baseline hazard estimators, \( \hat{\Lambda}_0^P(t; \hat{\beta}) \) and \( \hat{\Lambda}_0^R(t; \hat{\theta}) \), are employed, where

\[ d\hat{\Lambda}_0^P(t; \beta) = n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} S_0^{(0)}(t; \beta)^{-1} dN_i^P(t), \]

\[ d\hat{\Lambda}_0^R(t; \theta) = n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} S_0^{(0)}(t; \theta)^{-1} dN_i^R(t). \]

The covariates \((X_i(t), Z_i(t))\) can be decomposed into \((X_i(t) = \{x_{i1}, X_{i2}(t)\}, Z_i(t) = \{z_{i1}, Z_{i2}(t)\})\), where \( x_{i1} = z_{i1} \) are indicators for White-male and \( X_{i2}(t), Z_{i2}(t) \) denote other factors considered in the promotion and retirement processes. We set

\[ \tilde{X}_i(t) = \{0, X_{i2}(t)\}, \]

\[ \tilde{Z}_i(t) = \{0, Z_{i2}(t)\}. \]

That is, the White-male indicator is set to zero while other covariates \((X_{i2}(t), Z_{i2}(t))\) remain the same. The goal is to estimate the promotion/retirement probabilities and restricted mean job tenures the plaintiffs would have received had they been treated the same as the nondiscriminated members of the department. This is achieved by using the hypothetical covariate values \((\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t))\) in estimating \( E(T^{\text{cap}}), E(T^{\text{lt}}) \) and \( E(T^{\text{rt}}) \).

The survival functions from models (1) and (2) for a subject with covariate values \((\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t))\) and entry times \( P_{i1}, R_{i1} \) are estimated by

\[ \hat{S}_P(t|\tilde{X}_i(t)) = \exp\left\{ -\int_{P_{i1}}^{t} d\hat{\Lambda}_0^P(r)e^{\hat{\beta}'\tilde{X}_i(r)} \right\}, \]

\[ \hat{S}_R(t|\tilde{Z}_i(t)) = \exp\left\{ -\int_{R_{i1}}^{t} d\hat{\Lambda}_0^R(r)e^{\hat{\theta}'\tilde{Z}_i(r)} \right\}, \]

where unknown parameters \( d\Lambda_0^P(t), d\Lambda_0^R(t), \beta, \theta \) are replaced by their maximum partial likelihood estimators. Furthermore, combining (3) and (4),

\[ \hat{E}(T^{\text{lt}}|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \]

\[ = \int_{\max(t_0, P_{i1})}^{t_1} \hat{S}_P(t|\tilde{X}_i(t))\hat{S}_R(t|\tilde{Z}_i(t)) \, dt \]
\[ \begin{align*}
&= \int_{\max(\tau_0, P_{1i})}^{\tau_1} \exp \left\{ - \int_{P_{1i}}^t d \tilde{\Lambda}_P^R(u) e^{\tilde{\beta}^i X_i(u)} \right\} \\
&\quad \times \exp \left\{ - \int_{R_{1i}}^t d \tilde{\Lambda}_R^R(u) e^{\tilde{\gamma}^i Z_i(u)} \right\} dt,
\end{align*} \]

\[ \tilde{E}(T_{\text{cap}}^\text{cap}|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \]

\[ \begin{align*}
&= \int_{\max(\tau_0, P_{1i})}^{\tau_1} \left\{ 1 - \tilde{S}^P(t|\tilde{X}_i(t)) \right\} \tilde{S}_R(t|\tilde{Z}_i(t)) dt \\
&= \int_{\max(\tau_0, P_{1i})}^{\tau_1} \left[ 1 - \exp \left\{ - \int_{P_{1i}}^t d \tilde{\Lambda}_P^P(u) e^{\tilde{\beta}^i X_i(u)} \right\} \right] \\
&\quad \times \exp \left\{ - \int_{R_{1i}}^t d \tilde{\Lambda}_R^R(u) e^{\tilde{\gamma}^i Z_i(u)} \right\} dt,
\end{align*} \]

Here, we use \( \tilde{S}^P(t|Z_i(t)) \) to estimate \( \Pr(P_{2i}^* > t > P_{1i}|R_{2i}^* > t) \) because the two processes being modeled are assumed to be independent given the covariates. Therefore, the probability of being a lieutenant among all nonretired employees equal that of subjects who are not retired by time \( t \).

3. **Asymptotic properties.** The following regularity conditions are assumed:

(a) \( (P_{1i}, P_{2i}, \delta_P^i, X_i^i(t), R_{1i}, R_{2i}, \delta_R^i, Z_i^i(t))' \) are independent and identically distributed;

(b) \( \lim_{\Delta t \to 0} \Delta t^{-1} \Pr(t \leq P_{2i}^* < t + \Delta t \mid t \leq P_{2i}^*, t < R_{2i}^*, t < C_i, X_i(t)) = \lim_{\Delta t \to 0} \Delta t^{-1} \Pr(t \leq P_{2i}^* < t + \Delta t \mid t \leq P_{2i}^*, t < R_{2i}^*, X_i(t)) \);

(c) \( \lim_{\Delta t \to 0} \Delta t^{-1} \Pr(t \leq R_{2i}^* < t + \Delta t \mid t \leq R_{2i}^*, t < C_i, Z_i(t)) = \lim_{\Delta t \to 0} \Delta t^{-1} \Pr(t \leq R_{2i}^* < t + \Delta t \mid t \leq R_{2i}^*, Z_i(t)) \);

(d) \( \int_{\tau_0}^{\tau_1} d \Lambda_P^P(t) < \infty, \int_{\tau_0}^{\tau_1} d \Lambda_R^R(t) < \infty; \)

(e) Elements of \( Z_i(t) \) and \( X_i(t) \) are bounded almost surely for \( t \in [\tau_0, \tau_1]; \)

(f) Positive-definiteness of the Hessian matrices, \( A^P(\beta) \) and \( A^R(\theta) \), where

\[ A^P(\beta) = E \left[ \int_{\tau_0}^{\tau_1} \left\{ X_i(t) - \bar{X}(t; \beta) \right\} \otimes^2 Y_i^P(t) e^{\beta^i X_i(t)} d \tilde{\Lambda}_P^P(t) \right], \]

\[ A^R(\theta) = E \left[ \int_{\tau_0}^{\tau_1} \left\{ Z_i(t) - \bar{Z}(t; \theta) \right\} \otimes^2 Y_i^R(t) e^{\theta^i Z_i(t)} d \tilde{\Lambda}_R^R(t) \right]. \]

Condition (a) is usually satisfied unless there are clustered or grouped subjects. Conditions (b) and (c) assume noninformative and independent censoring. Condi-
tion (d) and (e) requires the cumulative baseline hazard functions and the covariates to be bounded. Condition (f) guarantees the Hessian matrices are nonsingular and their inverses exist.

The asymptotic properties for \( \hat{E}(T_{\text{cap}}|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \) are summarized in Theorems 1 and 2. The details of the proofs are provided in the Appendix.

**Theorem 1.** Under conditions (a) to (f),
\[
\hat{E}(T_{\text{cap}}|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \xrightarrow{a.s.} E(T_{\text{cap}}|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)).
\]

**Theorem 2.** Under conditions (a) to (f), \( n^{1/2} (\hat{E}(T_{\text{cap}}|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) - E(T_{\text{cap}}|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t))) \) converges weakly to a mean-zero Gaussian process with variance \( E\left[\int_{t_0}^{T_1} \xi_i(t) dt\right]^2 \), where

\[
\xi_i(t) = \left\{ \hat{S}^R(t|\tilde{Z}_i(t)) \left( -\xi^P_{i1}(t) - \xi^P_{i2}(t) \right) + (1 - S^P(t|\tilde{X}_i(t)))\left( \xi^R_{i1}(t) + \xi^R_{i2}(t) \right) \right\},
\]

\[
\xi^P_{i1}(t) = -\hat{S}^P(t|\tilde{X}_i(t)) \int_{P_i} e^{\beta_0 \tilde{X}_i(u)} \{ \tilde{X}_i(u) - \bar{X}(u; \beta_0) \} d\Lambda^R_0(u; \theta_0) \times A^P(\beta_0)^{-1} U^P_i(\beta_0),
\]

\[
\xi^P_{i2}(t) = -S^P(t|\tilde{X}_i(t)) \int_{P_i} e^{\beta_0 \tilde{X}_i(u)} \frac{dM^P_i(u; \beta_0)}{s^P_0(u; \beta_0)},
\]

\[
\xi^R_{i1}(t) = -\hat{S}^R(t|\tilde{Z}_i(t)) \int_{R_i} e^{\theta_0 \tilde{Z}_i(u)} \{ \tilde{Z}_i(u) - \bar{Z}(u; \theta_0) \} d\Lambda^R_0(u; \theta_0) \times A^R(\theta_0)^{-1} U^R_i(\theta_0),
\]

\[
\xi^R_{i2}(t) = -S^R(t|\tilde{Z}_i(t)) \int_{R_i} e^{\theta_0 \tilde{Z}_i(u)} \frac{dM^R_i(u; \theta_0)}{s^R_0(u; \theta_0)},
\]

\[
s^P_0(u; \beta) = \lim_{n \to \infty} S^P_0(u; \beta),
\]

\[
dM^P_i(u; \beta) = dN^P_i(u) - Y^P_i(u)e^{\beta_0 \tilde{X}_i(u)} d\Lambda^P_0(u),
\]

\[
s^R_0(u; \theta) = \lim_{n \to \infty} S^R_0(u; \theta),
\]

\[
dM^R_i(u; \theta) = dN^R_i(u) - Y^R_i(u)e^{\theta_0 \tilde{Z}_i(u)} d\Lambda^R_0(u).
\]

Here, \( E[\int_{t_0}^{T_1} \xi_i(t) dt]^2 \) can be estimated by replacing parameters with their maximum likelihood estimates and expectations with sample averages. The asymptotic distributions of \( \hat{E}(T_{\text{lt}}|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \) and \( \hat{E}(T_{\text{rt}}|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \) are derived similarly.
4. Simulation studies. Data sets with \( n = 500 \) independent and identically distributed pairs of promotion among employees and retirement times are generated. Both processes start at time zero for all subjects. The hazard functions follow proportional hazards models,

\[
\begin{align*}
    dA^P(t|X_i) &= d\Lambda_0^P(t)e^{\beta_1 X_{i1} + \beta_2 X_{i2}}, \\
    dA^R(t|Z_i) &= d\Lambda_0^R(t)e^{\theta_1 Z_{i1} + \theta_2 Z_{i2}},
\end{align*}
\]

where \( X_{i1} = Z_{i1} \) (minority or unfavorable group indicator) is distributed as Bernoulli (0.5), and covariates \( X_{i2} \) and \( Z_{i2} \) follow Uniform (0, 10) and Normal (0, 4), respectively. Both baseline functions are constant over time where \( \lambda_0^P(t) = \frac{1}{10} \) and \( \lambda_0^R(t) = \frac{1}{60} \). The coefficients for \( X_{i1} \) are set to \( (\beta_1 = 0, \theta_1 = 0) \), \( (\beta_1 = -0.5, \theta_1 = 0.5) \) or \( (\beta_1 = -0.5, \theta_1 = 1) \). The coefficients for \( X_{i2} \) and \( Z_{i2} \) are \( \beta_2 = \theta_2 = 0.1 \). Censoring is uniformly distributed on \( (0, 200) \), which leads to approximately 36% censoring in the promotion process and 14% in the retirement process. Each data configuration is repeated 1000 times.

Table 1 lists the performance of \( \hat{E}(T^{\text{cap}}|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \) restricted to \([0, \tau]\). Various combinations of \( \tilde{X}_i, \tilde{Z}_i \) and two time points \( \tau = 5 \) and \( \tau = 10 \) are examined. In all these configurations, \( \hat{E}(T^{\text{cap}}|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \) is close to the true values obtained by numerical integration, and the average estimated asymptotic standard errors (ASE) agree with the empirical standard deviations (ESD). The empirical coverage probabilities (CP) are close to the nominal value of 0.95.

Promotion among employees and retirement are assumed to be independent conditional on the covariates \( X_i(t) \) and \( Z_i(t) \). However, there might be unmeasured latent variables that affect both processes and lead to correlated residuals from the proportional hazards models (1) and (2). To test the robustness of the proposed restricted mean job duration estimators to unadjusted frailties, sensitiv-
ity analyses are carried out. Following the literature [Ye, Kalbfleisch and Schaubel (2007)], a gamma frailty is generated, which multiplies the hazard rates of both processes. The frailty terms are independent from $X_i$ and $Z_i$. Without loss of generality, we set the mean of the gamma random variable to be one and examine three values for the variance: 0.5, 1 and 2. The same parameter and covariate values used in the middle four rows in Table 1 are employed in the sensitivity analysis. The true values of $E(T_{cap})$ are obtained by integrating over the gamma frailty distribution and listed in column 10 of Table 2. The estimates of the regression coefficients from the two Cox proportional hazards models ignoring the frailty term are biased toward zero. The ASEs are close to the corresponding ESDs even in the presence of a frailty. Although constructed from the biased coefficients and baseline hazard estimates ignoring frailties, the restricted mean job duration estimates are not very different from the true values, where the magnitudes of most of the biases are less than 10% of the true values. The proposed variance estimates of $\hat{E}(T_{cap})$ are slightly smaller than the empirical ones, and the coverage probabilities range from 86% to 94%. In summary, the proposed methods are reasonably robust in making predictions in the presence of frailty terms. Unlike clinical trials, employees are not randomized into the protected and unprotected groups, so a latent variable may be distributed differently in the two groups. If such a confounder exists, the coefficient estimators $\hat{\beta}_1$, $\hat{\theta}_1$ and the mean restricted job duration estimators will be biased (results not shown).

5. Application. Officer Arthur Jones was the Police Chief of the City of Milwaukee from November 18th, 1996 to November 18th, 2003. During his tenure there were 112 White-male lieutenants and 34 female or non-White lieutenants who were eligible for promotion. He selected 21 White-males and 20 others for promotion, thus, White-males had a promotion rate of 19% in contrast to the 59% rate for females and non-White-males. Furthermore, among promoted individuals, the average length of time the White-male lieutenants served before becoming captain was 7.36 years, while the average length for the others was 3.02 years ($p$-value of the Wilcoxon test $< 0.001$). Seventeen White-male lieutenants brought a reverse discrimination case against the City of Milwaukee. At trial, a jury found the defendants liable for discrimination against the plaintiffs in promotion to captain. Compensatory damages for the plaintiffs’ economic loss in wages and pensions as well as punitive damages were ordered. The defendants’ motions to vacate both the liability and damages were denied by the district court judge and they appealed the decision. In January 2007, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision on liability but remanded the case for a more accurate calculation of lost pay. In its opinion, the 7th Circuit reiterated its recommendation that in cases where the number of eligible members of the protected group (White-males) exceeds the number of available positions, the lost chance doctrine, which originated in tort law, should be used, stating “Loss of a chance is illustrated by cases in which, as a result of a physician’s negligent failure to make a correct diagnosis, his patient’s cancer is not arrested, and he dies—but he probably would have died anyway. The
Table 2: Sensitivity of $\tilde{E}(T^{\text{cap}}|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t))$ to frailty. $\beta_0 = -0.5, \theta_0 = 0.5$

| Var | $\hat{\beta}_1$ bias | ESD | ASE | CP | $\hat{\theta}_1$ bias | ESD | ASE | CP | $\tilde{E}(T^{\text{cap}})$ true | bias | ESD | ASE | CP |
|-----|-----------------------|-----|-----|----|-----------------------|-----|-----|----|--------------------------------|-------|-----|-----|----|
| 0.5 | 0.056 | 0.117 | 0.116 | 0.923 | -0.125 | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.769 | 1.164 | -0.036 | 0.101 | 0.096 | 0.911 |
| 0.5 | 0.057 | 0.117 | 0.116 | 0.923 | -0.118 | 0.105 | 0.103 | 0.782 | 3.303 | -0.091 | 0.223 | 0.208 | 0.908 |
| 0.5 | 0.065 | 0.113 | 0.116 | 0.922 | -0.124 | 0.100 | 0.103 | 0.771 | 1.151 | 0.017 | 0.110 | 0.107 | 0.936 |
| 0.5 | 0.052 | 0.119 | 0.116 | 0.923 | -0.122 | 0.104 | 0.103 | 0.759 | 3.160 | 0.109 | 0.253 | 0.230 | 0.908 |
| 1   | 0.087 | 0.117 | 0.119 | 0.891 | -0.187 | 0.113 | 0.108 | 0.588 | 1.071 | -0.047 | 0.095 | 0.093 | 0.912 |
| 1   | 0.094 | 0.121 | 0.120 | 0.869 | -0.185 | 0.109 | 0.108 | 0.621 | 2.950 | -0.077 | 0.217 | 0.205 | 0.908 |
| 1   | 0.087 | 0.125 | 0.120 | 0.873 | -0.189 | 0.107 | 0.108 | 0.568 | 1.050 | 0.015 | 0.113 | 0.104 | 0.931 |
| 1   | 0.087 | 0.121 | 0.119 | 0.882 | -0.185 | 0.109 | 0.108 | 0.575 | 2.796 | 0.119 | 0.239 | 0.227 | 0.915 |
| 2   | 0.103 | 0.128 | 0.129 | 0.871 | -0.243 | 0.118 | 0.118 | 0.448 | 0.930 | -0.029 | 0.094 | 0.090 | 0.916 |
| 2   | 0.105 | 0.129 | 0.128 | 0.855 | -0.251 | 0.118 | 0.118 | 0.433 | 2.456 | -0.014 | 0.210 | 0.201 | 0.928 |
| 2   | 0.107 | 0.130 | 0.128 | 0.862 | -0.244 | 0.118 | 0.118 | 0.448 | 0.900 | 0.040 | 0.108 | 0.102 | 0.928 |
| 2   | 0.106 | 0.127 | 0.128 | 0.871 | -0.252 | 0.120 | 0.117 | 0.421 | 2.295 | 0.098 | 0.235 | 0.225 | 0.864 |
Table 3
Analysis of Alexander v. Milwaukee: Estimated regression parameters from proportional hazards models. The columns $e^{\hat{\beta}_k}$ and $e^{\hat{\theta}_k}$ are the hazards ratios.

| Covariate                              | $\hat{\beta}_k$ | $e^{\hat{\beta}_k}$ | p-value | $\hat{\theta}_k$ | $e^{\hat{\theta}_k}$ | p-value |
|----------------------------------------|------------------|----------------------|---------|------------------|----------------------|---------|
| White-male                             | -2.13            | 0.12                 | <0.001  | 0.18             | 1.20                 | 0.767   |
| Detective                              | -0.17            | 0.84                 | 0.611   | -0.23            | 0.79                 | 0.425   |
| Years before lieutenant                | -0.01            | 0.99                 | 0.856   | -0.10            | 0.90                 | 0.007   |
| Years since lieutenant                 | 0.41             | 1.51                 | 0.012   | –                | –                    | –       |
| Years since lieutenant$^2$             | -0.02            | 0.98                 | 0.089   | –                | –                    | –       |
| Years eligible for retire              | –                | –                    | –       | 0.12             | 1.13                 | 0.017   |

trier of fact will estimate the probability that the patient would have survived but for the physician’s negligence—say it is 25%—and will award that percentage of the damages the patient would have received had it been certain that he would have survived but for the negligence.” [Alexander v. Milwaukee , 474 F. 3d 437, 7th Cir. (2007).]

The plaintiffs filed the case on June 27th, 2003, however, the department would have known about the charge earlier. Although Chief Jones remained in the position until 11/18/2003, often employers change their employment practices after a charge has been formally filed [Freidlin and Gastwirth (2000)]. Therefore, the court decided to rely on data between 11/18/1996 and 5/31/2003 in both its liability determination and compensation calculations, which is also used in our analysis.

Statistical tests for potential discrimination in sequential employment decisions, for example, hiring, promotion or termination, are discussed by Gastwirth (1984), Kadane (1990), Gastwirth and Greenhouse (1995) and Finkelstein and Levin (2001, pages 245–249). In Alexander v. Milwaukee, officers at the Sergeant rank for at least a year were eligible to be promoted to lieutenant when an opening on the lieutenant rank became available. The average length of time for a newly hired police officer to become a lieutenant in our data is 18.21 years in White-males and 15.76 in non-White-males (p-value = 0.4058). No claims of discrimination were filed for promotion to lieutenant and this issue was not mentioned in the legal decisions. Had there been evidence of discrimination at lower ranks, the plaintiffs’ lawyer would probably have expanded the class of plaintiffs in the case. Therefore, it is doubtful that the discriminatory practices affected that position.

First, both the promotion process and the retirement process are modeled through Cox models. Seniority in the promotion process is measured by the number of years the subject has served as a lieutenant. The functional form for this time-varying covariate is quadratic. The number of years since becoming eligible for retirement, which is also time-varying, is used in the retirement model. Both these two time-varying covariates are essentially the follow-up times in the two
processes, which usually cannot be used as covariates. However, because our time
axis is calendar time, people enter the processes on different calendar dates and
candidates in the risk set have different follow-up times on the same calendar date.
Therefore, we are able to estimate the effects of number of years since lieutenant
and number of years since becoming eligible for retirement. Three time-invariant
covariates are also considered: membership in the protected group (White-male or not),
position (detective vs. police), number of years served in the police force
before becoming a lieutenant. While in some cases measures of performance and
disciplinary issues might have been considered, neither the district nor the appel-
late court opinions mentioned any analysis incorporating these factors. The defend-
ant did not submit any data about them, so it is unlikely they would differ much
in the two groups. The proportional hazards assumption between White-males and
others is examined by the parallel pattern of the log-cumulative-baseline-hazards
functions. The outputs of the two Cox models are given in Table 3. In the model for
the promotion risk among employees, the White-male factor is highly significantly
negative ($p$-value < 0.001), demonstrating that White-male lieutenants had much
lower promotion chances than non-White-male employees with similar seniority
and job assignment. The length of time served as a lieutenant is also significant.
The coefficient for its square term is negative, which indicates that the promo-
tion chance among lieutenants initially increased with years of service, but then
reached a peak and declined afterward. In the retirement data, 64 of the 112 indi-
viduals became eligible for retirement during the period. Of them, 45 retired and
19 remained on the job as of May 31st, 2003. Only three non-White-male officers
retired in the period and the White-male factor is not significant in the retirement
process. Each additional year after reaching eligibility increases the retirement
hazard by 13% ($p$-value = 0.017), holding the protected group membership, job
assignment and number of years before lieutenant constant. Also, the number of
years served before lieutenant is negatively correlated with retirement (Hazards
Ratio = 0.90, $p$-value = 0.007). There were two lieutenants on Leave of Absence
(LOA), a Black male hired on 7/24/1978 and a White female hired on 7/30/1979,
which were treated as censored. The results in Table 3 are robust when the two
LOA cases were deleted or treated as terminations.

The compensation estimates are based on the hypothetical scenario of no
discrimination, where the plaintiffs would have been treated the same as non-
White-males. The distributions of the three covariates in the White-male and
non-White-male groups overlap. The ranges of the numbers of years before and
after lieutenant in the plaintiffs are (10.97, 26.83) and (1.93, 12.88). The cor-
responding ranges in the non-White-male group are (8.90, 26.60) and (0.21,
8.90). Therefore, there were non-White-male members with similar qualifications
as the plaintiffs. The estimated probabilities of being a captain and not retired,
$\hat{S}^R(t | \tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t))\{1 - \hat{S}^P(t | \tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t))\}$, for the 17 plaintiffs are plotted in Fig-
ure 1. The probabilities of being a captain and not retired peak at around 5 years
after becoming a lieutenant. The promotion probabilities for plaintiffs 14, 15, 16
and 17 who were lieutenants for less than two years never exceeded 0.5 during
FIG. 1. Probability of being a captain and not retired, \( \text{Pr}(P_{2i}^* \leq t, R_{2i}^* > t) = \tilde{S}^R(t|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \times (1 - \tilde{S}^P(t|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t))) \), for the 17 plaintiffs in the period [11/18/1996, 5/31/2003].

the period. In contrast, plaintiffs who became lieutenants in 1996 and 1997 (e.g., plaintiffs 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9) have probabilities over 0.8 by May 2003. The probabilities for plaintiffs 3 and 4 peak around 2000 and then decrease because their retirement probabilities increase after 2000.

Then, we estimate the expected lengths being a lieutenant, being a captain and being retired restricted to the period [11/18/1996, 5/31/2003] for each plaintiff in Table 4. Consistent with the finding of discrimination, the expected length of time one would remain a lieutenant \( \hat{E}(T_{\text{lt}}) \) is always smaller than the observed length \( T_{\text{lt}} \). The expected number of months being a captain are nonzero for every plaintiff, as they all lost some chance of being a captain, although their observed months of being a captain during the period are zero. Some plaintiffs have zero expected months of being retired because they never became eligible for retirement during the period. The sum of the expected months as a lieutenant, captain or in retirement equals the sum of the corresponding observed months for each plaintiff.

The compensatory damages proposed by the District Court were calculated according to a set of specific instructions. For each plaintiff the jury selected one date for the possible promotion of each plaintiff along with an estimated probability
that the plaintiff would have been promoted that day. Contrary to the time-varying probability estimates in Figure 1 which incorporate relevant covariates, the probabilities used in the District Court were either 0.50 (plaintiffs 1 and 10) or 0.80 (all other plaintiffs). The retirement dates for each plaintiff used in the jury’s calculation were the observed ones (if the plaintiff retired during the period) or the first day he became eligible (if the plaintiff did not retire during the period). Table 5 compares the estimated numbers of months that plaintiffs 1 to 13 would have served in different levels (Lieutenant, Captain and retirement) obtained from the proposed method and those determined by the original jury. The jury’s estimates for Plaintiffs 13 to 17 were not available to us. Although the estimates are close in a few cases (plaintiffs 1 and 10), there are a number of substantial discrepancies (plaintiffs 2, 6, 7, 8, 9) and noticeable ones (plaintiffs 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13).

6. Discussion. This paper provides a method for estimating the length of time plaintiffs who were discriminated against would have been in a higher position. In the motivating example the promotion process was of primary interest and retirement terminates an employee’s eligibility for further promotion. Estimators of the mean durations for remaining at the lower position, being at the higher position and being retired, restricted to the relevant time interval, are obtained. The asymptotic distributions of the restricted mean life time estimators are derived and shown
to perform well in finite samples in our simulation studies. The proposed compensation estimators are obtained by assuming a non-White-male counterpart with similar qualifications for each plaintiff. The methodology is applied to obtain the three restricted mean job durations absent discrimination and their standard errors for each plaintiff in *Alexander v. Milwaukee*.

The context of legal cases is different from the causal inference widely used in epidemiologic studies and clinical trials [Rubin (1974); Haviland and Nagin (2005)]. First, our ultimate goal is not to derive the causal relationship between the White-male factor and promotion risks. As emphasized by Judge Easterbrook in *Biondo v. City of Chicago* (382 F.3d 680, 7th Cir. 2004), the purpose of awarding damages is to put the plaintiffs in the position they should have been in during the period of time they deserve compensation. The “gold standard” for determining the compensation due a White-male lieutenant who suffered discrimination in promotion is based on the promotion and retirement probabilities of a similarly qualified non-White-male lieutenant during the period of discrimination. Second, the standard of proof in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence or “more likely than not.” It is less stringent than the criteria scientific research uses to determine a causal relationship. Third, only characteristics which were actually considered as promotion criteria (e.g., seniority, performance, education, exam scores...) will be considered as potential confounders. For a hypothetical example, suppose there had been another covariate—accent in speaking English—that was significantly correlated with the White-male factor and the promotion risks. However, as long as accent was not used as a criterion in the promotion process, we should not adjust for it as a confounder. Fourth, if there are other potential confounders that were

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### Table 5

*Analysis of Alexander v. Milwaukee: Comparison of the proposed job and retirement duration estimates and the previous estimates reversed by the circuit court (months)*

| Plaintiff | Lieutenant |  |  | Captain |  |  | Retired |  |  |
|-----------|-----------|---|---|---------|---|---|---------|---|---|
|           | $\widehat{E}(T_{\text{proposed}})$ | $\widehat{E}(T_{\text{jury}})$ | $\widehat{E}(T_{\text{proposed}})$ | $\widehat{E}(T_{\text{jury}})$ | $\widehat{E}(T_{\text{proposed}})$ | $\widehat{E}(T_{\text{jury}})$ | $\widehat{E}(T_{\text{proposed}})$ | $\widehat{E}(T_{\text{jury}})$ |
| 1         | 39.16     | 30.64 | 30.84 | 32.38 | 3.42 | 10.39 |
| 2         | 13.48     | 52.83 | 64.96 | 25.58 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 3         | 15.52     | 39.78 | 30.44 | 38.63 | 32.48 | 0.00 |
| 4         | 19.17     | 31.13 | 40.47 | 47.28 | 18.81 | 0.00 |
| 5         | 32.68     | 26.70 | 45.76 | 51.72 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 6         | 29.85     | 70.95 | 48.59 | 7.46  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 7         | 34.03     | 52.83 | 44.42 | 25.58 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 8         | 31.13     | 44.98 | 19.86 | 32.55 | 26.56 | 0.00 |
| 9         | 41.39     | 51.42 | 31.56 | 21.50 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 10        | 39.45     | 43.63 | 23.61 | 22.62 | 3.22 | 0.00 |
| 11        | 32.42     | 36.16 | 22.36 | 18.58 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 12        | 18.90     | 15.75 | 4.34  | 7.46  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 13        | 31.04     | 41.65 | 19.13 | 10.09 | 1.61 | 0.00 |
used as promotion criteria, presumably the defendant would include them in their analysis. Indeed, once a plaintiff submits a reasonable statistical analysis incorporating the main covariates, the defendant cannot simply suggest another omitted variable that might explain the disparity. Rather the defendant should incorporate subject-level information on that factor into their analysis. Last, in contrast to areas employing causal inference (e.g., clinical trials), where one wishes to generalize the results to a much larger population, the disparity estimated between White-male and non-White-males in the Milwaukee Police Department in the period under study is not generalizable to other departments or other time periods.

When the wages and pension benefits are stable over time, the compensatory damages can be calculated as $\text{Wage}_{lt} \hat{E}(T_{lt}) + \text{Wage}_{cap} \hat{E}(T_{cap}) + \text{Pension} \hat{E}(T_{rt})$ minus the plaintiffs’ actual earnings. However, wages and pensions often change over time. Then one can calculate the weighted average of the lieutenant wage, the captain wage and the retirement pension, at each time point, where the weights are the probabilities of being a lieutenant, a captain and retired. These weighted averages are integrated over time, that is, $\int_{t_0}^{t_1} \{\text{Wage}_{lt} \Pr(lt) + \text{Wage}_{cap} \Pr(cap) + \text{Pension} \Pr(rt)\} \, dt$. This type of compensation calculation incorporating salary information is described in Pan and Gastwirth (2013), in a simpler context where only point estimates are given.

The time period over which the economic damages will be paid depends on the specific facts of each case because compensation ends when the effect of the discriminatory practices ceases and is determined by the court. If seniority has a major role as in Alexander v. Milwaukee, the time when the discrimination effect on a particular plaintiff ends may depend on the promotions and retirements of more senior plaintiffs. Thus, for the purpose of compensation, it is desirable for courts to require employers to provide pay data beyond the period of discrimination used in the liability stage.

Although the problem addressed here arose in the context of a legal case, predicting the durations before and after the event of interest in the presence of a terminating event occurs in other applications. For example, when banks merge, the value of the bank being taken over depends on the expected durations of the existing accounts. Each account may remain at the same level, be upgraded to a higher type or be closed. The latter two correspond to the promotion and retirement in our motivating example. In the academic job market, people are often interested in the length of time individuals spent as a postdoc before obtaining a regular position. Some postdocs eventually opt to take a job outside the subject of their doctoral degree, which is the terminating event.

**APPENDIX**

**A.1. Plot of hypothetical scenarios of the promotion and retirement processes.** For the plot of hypothetical scenarios for the promotion and retirement processes, see Figure 2.
A.2. Proofs of the theorems. Under conditions (a) to (f), the almost sure convergence of $\hat{\beta}$ to $\beta_0$ and $\hat{\theta}$ to $\theta_0$ holds from the Empirical Central Limit theorem [Pollard (1990)]. Furthermore, $\hat{\Lambda}_0^P(t; \beta_0) \xrightarrow{\text{a.s.}} \Lambda_0^P(t)$ and $\hat{\Lambda}_0^R(t; \theta_0) \xrightarrow{\text{a.s.}} \Lambda_0^R(t)$ for all $t \in [\tau_0, \tau_1]$ [Andersen and Gill (1982)]. By the continuous mapping theorem [Sen and Singer (1993)],

$$\int_{\tau_0}^{\tau_1} \{1 - \hat{S}^P(t|\tilde{X}_i(t))\} \hat{S}^R(t|\tilde{Z}_i(t)) \, dt \xrightarrow{\text{a.s.}} E(T^{\text{cap}}|\tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)).$$

To derive the variance, $n^{1/2}\{\hat{S}^P(t|\tilde{X}_i(t)) - S^P(t|\tilde{X}_i(t))\}$ is decomposed into two parts:

$$n^{1/2}\{\hat{S}^P(t|\tilde{X}_i(t)) - S^P(t|\tilde{X}_i(t))\}$$

(8)

$$= n^{1/2}\{\hat{S}^P(t; \hat{\beta}, d\hat{\Lambda}_0^P(t)|\tilde{X}_i(t)) - \hat{S}^P(t; \beta_0, d\hat{\Lambda}_0^P(t)|\tilde{X}_i(t))\}$$

$$+ n^{1/2}\{\hat{S}^P(t; \beta_0, d\hat{\Lambda}_0^P(t)|\tilde{X}_i(t)) - S^P(t|\tilde{X}_i(t))\}.$$  

Apply a Taylor expansion to the first term on the right side of (8) around $\beta_0$. As $n \to \infty$,

$$n^{1/2}\{\hat{S}^P(t; \hat{\beta}, d\hat{\Lambda}_0^P(t)|\tilde{X}_i(t)) - \hat{S}^P(t; \beta_0, d\hat{\Lambda}_0^P(t)|\tilde{X}_i(t))\}$$

(9)

$$= \frac{\partial \hat{S}^P(t; \beta, d\hat{\Lambda}_0^P(t)|\tilde{X}_i(t))}{\partial \beta} \bigg|_{\beta = \beta_0} n^{1/2}(\hat{\beta} - \beta_0)$$
\[ \begin{align*}
= & -\hat{S}^P (t; \beta_*, d \hat{\Lambda}_0^P (t) | \tilde{X}_i(t)) \\
& \times \int_{P_{i}} [e^{\beta_0 \tilde{X}_i(u)} \{ \tilde{X}_i(u) - \bar{X}(u; \beta_*) \}] d \hat{\Lambda}_0^P (u; \beta_*)] n^{1/2}(\hat{\beta} - \beta_0),
\end{align*} \]

where \( \beta_* \) lies between \( \hat{\beta} \) and \( \beta_0 \). Furthermore, another Taylor expansion of the score function \( U^P (\hat{\beta}) \) around \( \beta_0 \) yields

\[ n^{1/2}(\hat{\beta} - \beta_0) = \{ A^P (\beta_0) \}^{-1} n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} U_i^P (\beta_0), \]

where \( U_i^P (\beta) = \int_{0}^{T_i} (X_i(t) - \bar{X}(t; \beta)) d N_i^P (t). \) Combining (9) and (10) yields

\[ n^{1/2} \{ \hat{S}^P (t; \hat{\beta}, d \hat{\Lambda}_0^P (t) | \tilde{X}_i(t)) - \hat{S}^P (t; \beta_0, d \hat{\Lambda}_0^P (t) | \tilde{X}_i(t)) \} \]

\[ = n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \xi_i^P (t), \]

where \( \xi_i^P (t) = -\hat{S}^P (t | \tilde{X}_i(t)) \int_{P_{i}} [e^{\beta_0 \tilde{X}_i(u)} \{ \tilde{X}_i(u) - \bar{X}(u; \beta_0) \}] d \hat{\Lambda}_0^P (u; \beta_0)] \times \{ A^P (\beta_0) \}^{-1} U_i^P (\beta_0). \]

For the second term on the right side of (8), when \( n \to \infty \),

\[ n^{1/2} \{ \hat{S}^P (t; \beta_0, d \hat{\Lambda}_0^P (t) | \tilde{X}_i(t)) - S^P (t | \tilde{X}_i(t)) \} \]

\[ = n^{1/2} \left[ \exp \left\{ - \int_{P_{i}} \frac{d \hat{\Lambda}_0^P (u; \beta_0) e^{\beta_0 \tilde{X}_i(u)}}{S_p^0(u; \beta_0)} \right\} - \exp \left\{ - \int_{P_{i}} \frac{d \Lambda_0^P (u) e^{\beta_0 \tilde{X}_i(u)}}{S_p^0(u; \beta_0)} \right\} \right] \]

\[ = -S^P (t | \tilde{X}_i(t)) n^{1/2} \int_{P_{i}} \frac{d \Lambda_0^P (u; \beta_0)}{S_p^0(u; \beta_0)}, \]

while

\[ n^{1/2} \{ d \hat{\Lambda}_0^P (u; \beta_0) - d \Lambda_0^P (u) \} \]

\[ = n^{-1/2} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{d N_i^P (u)}{S_p^0(u; \beta_0)} - d \Lambda_0^P (u) \right\} \]

\[ = n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{d M_i^P (u; \beta_0)}{S_p^0(u; \beta_0)} \]

\[ = n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{d M_i^P (u; \beta_0)}{S_p^0(u; \beta_0)} \]

\[ + n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ S_p^0(u; \beta_0) - S_p^0(u; \beta_0) \right] d M_i^P (u; \beta_0), \]
where \( s_P^{(0)}(u; \beta) = \lim_{n \to \infty} S_P^{(0)}(u; \beta) \) and \( dM_i^P(u; \beta) = dN_i^P(u) - Y_i^P(u) \times e^{\beta X_i(u)} d\Lambda_0^P(u) \). The second term
\[
n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ S_P^{(0)}(u; \beta_0) - S_P^{(0)}(u; \beta_0) \right] dM_i^P(u; \beta_0)
\]
converges to zero, by the strong convergence of \( S^{(0)}(r; \beta_0) \) to \( s^{(0)}(r; \beta_0) \), the continuous mapping theorem and the uniform strong law of large numbers. Therefore, as \( n \to \infty \),
\[
n^{1/2} \left\{ d\widehat{\Lambda}_P(t; \beta_0) - d\Lambda(t)^P \right\} \approx n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{dM_i^P(t; \beta_0)}{S_P^{(0)}(u; \beta_0)}
\]
\[
n^{1/2} \left\{ \hat{S}_P(t; \beta_0, d\widehat{\Lambda}_0^P(t)|\bar{X}_i(t)) - S_P(t|\bar{X}_i(t)) \right\} = n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \xi_{i2}^P(t),
\]
where
\[
\xi_{i1}^P(t) = -S_P(t|\bar{X}_i(t)) \int_{R_{1i}} e^{\beta_0^0 \bar{Z}_i(u)} dM_i^P(u; \beta_0) / s_P^{(0)}(u; \beta_0).
\]
In summary, combining (11) and (12), when \( n \to \infty \),
\[
(12) \quad n^{1/2} \left\{ \hat{S}_P(t|\bar{X}_i(t)) - S_P(t|\bar{X}_i(t)) \right\} = n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left\{ \xi_{i1}^P(t) + \xi_{i2}^P(t) \right\}.
\]
Similarly,
\[
(13) \quad n^{1/2} \left\{ \hat{S}_R(t|\bar{Z}_i(t)) - S_R(t|\bar{Z}_i(t)) \right\} = n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left\{ \xi_{i1}^R(t) + \xi_{i2}^R(t) \right\},
\]
where
\[
\xi_{i1}^R(t) = -\hat{S}_R(t|\bar{Z}_i(t))
\]
\[
\times \int_{R_{1i}} e^{\beta_0^0 \bar{Z}_i(u)} \left[ \bar{Z}_i(u) - \bar{Z}(u; \theta_0) \right] d\widehat{\Lambda}_0^R(u; \theta_0) \left[ A^R(\theta_0)^{-1} \right] U_i^R(\theta_0)
\]
\[
\xi_{i2}^R(t) = -S_R(t|\bar{Z}_i(t)) \int_{R_{1i}} e^{\beta_0^0 \bar{Z}_i(u)} dM_i^R(u; \theta_0) / s_R^{(0)}(u; \theta_0).
\]
Combining (12) and (13), we get
\[
n^{1/2} \left\{ (1 - \hat{S}_P(t|\bar{X}_i(t)))\hat{S}_R(t|\bar{Z}_i(t)) - (1 - S_P(t|\bar{X}_i(t)))S_R(t|\bar{Z}_i(t)) \right\}
\]
\[
= n^{1/2} \left\{ (1 - \hat{S}_P(t|\bar{X}_i(t)))\hat{S}_R(t|\bar{Z}_i(t)) - (1 - S_P(t|\bar{X}_i(t)))\hat{S}_R(t|\bar{Z}_i(t)) \right\}
\]
\[
+ n^{1/2} \left\{ (1 - S_P(t|\bar{X}_i(t)))\hat{S}_R(t|\bar{Z}_i(t)) - (1 - S_P(t|\bar{X}_i(t)))S_R(t|\bar{Z}_i(t)) \right\}
\]
\[ n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ \hat{S}^R(t \mid \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \{ -\xi^R_{i1}(t) - \xi^R_{i2}(t) \} \right. \\
\left. + \{ 1 - S^P(t \mid \tilde{X}_i(t)) \} \{ \hat{\xi}^R_{i1}(t) + \hat{\xi}^R_{i2}(t) \} \right]. \]

Integrating over \([\tau_0, \tau_1]\),
\[ n^{1/2} \{ E(T^{\text{cap}} \mid \tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) - E(T^{\text{cap}} \mid \tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \} = n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \int_{\tau_0}^{\tau_1} \xi_i(t) \, dt, \]
where
\[ \xi_i(t) = \left[ \hat{S}^R(t \mid \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \{ -\xi^P_{i1}(t) - \xi^P_{i2}(t) \} \right. \\
\left. + \{ 1 - S^P(t \mid \tilde{X}_i(t)) \} \{ \hat{\xi}^R_{i1}(t) + \hat{\xi}^R_{i2}(t) \} \right]. \]

By the empirical process theory [Pollard (1990); Van der Vaart and Wellner (1996)], \( n^{1/2} \{ E(T^{\text{cap}} \mid \tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) - E(T^{\text{cap}} \mid \tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \} \) converges weakly to a mean-zero Gaussian process with variance \( E[\{ \int_{\tau_0}^{\tau_1} \xi_i(t) \, dt \}^2] \), which can be estimated by replacing parameters with their empirical estimates and expectations with sample averages. The asymptotic distributions of \( \hat{E}(T^{\text{lt}} \mid \tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \) and \( \hat{E}(T^{\text{rt}} \mid \tilde{X}_i(t), \tilde{Z}_i(t)) \) can be derived similarly.

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