Cryptanalysis and Improvement of the Zhu et al.'s Authentication Protocol

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ABSTRACT
Zhu et al. recently have proposed an authentication protocol for RFID systems. In this paper, we analyze its security and explain its security drawbacks. More precisely, we present traceability attack against this protocol. In addition, we propose an improvement on the Zhu et al.'s to resists these security drawbacks. Finally, we investigate the formal security of the improved protocol based on the BAN logic method.

1. INTRODUCTION
The main application of an RFID system could be to identify tags to the reader over a wireless communication channel. This technology has diverse usages in wide range of areas such as logistics, retail, manufacturing, garment industry, medical, identification, traffic, aviation and so on. Nowadays, many applications use low-cost passive tags as the best alternative to barcodes, which are cheapest identifier [2], [3]. However, this type of tags are restricted by memory and power of calculation, thus designers are forced to utilize lightweight authentication protocols. Generally, RFID systems make up of three main components. The transponder or RFID tag, which is used to label each object, the transceiver or RFID reader, which is utilized for querying tags and the backend database or server, where the information of whole tags are verified.

Since the channel between the tag and the reader is not secure, the adversary may easily eavesdrop the transferred information in RFID system. Tags are divided into three classes: passive, semi-passive and active. A passive tag is cheaper, compared to the other types of tags, and has extremely limited computation and storage capability. Hence, it is not possible to use the conventional symmetric encryption algorithms to provide the desired security for these tags. Therefore, designing a lightweight authentication protocol which resists the known attacks in the context is a challenging task.

Recently, Zhu et al. [1] have proposed a forward-secure anonymous RFID authentication Protocol. This paper focuses on analyzing and finding a security drawback on it. In addition, we propose the improved version of the protocol which resists the attack suggested in this paper and other attacks in the context.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces related works, and section 3 reviews the Zhu et al.'s protocol. In section 4, we analyze and improve the Zhu et al.'s protocol. In Section 5, we give a formal proof based on BAN logic for the improved protocol. Finally, we conclude the paper in section 6.
2. RELATED WORK

Security and privacy are important concerns for RFID systems. Some researchers have attempted to resolve this problem; we refer interested reader to [2],[3],[4],[5],[6],[7],[8]. On the other hand, untraceability is an important property of RFID protocols which provide anonymity of the tag’s holder which is crucial to provide the user privacy. The protocol suffers from traceability property if adversary (A) is able to distinguish the tag (T) better than random guessing. The advantage of adversary is defined as follows:

\[
Adv_A = \left| pr[A \text{correct}] - \frac{1}{2} \right|
\]

Where \( pr[A \text{correct}] = pr[A = yes \mid T = \tilde{T}] + pr[A = no \mid T \neq \tilde{T}] \). If the probable advantage of the adversary is negligible, then protocol will be untraceable.

In 2006, Gene Tsudik [9] proposed a lightweight authentication, named YA-TRAP. This protocol is vulnerable to DoS attack to resist this attack, Chatmon et al. [10] Improvement YA-TRAP protocol. However, in WiCOM’09, He et al.[11] analyzed and found the security drawback to Chatmon’s protocol and then improved it. Latter, Zhu et al,[1] analyzed the He et al.’s protocol and found the security drawbacks of this protocol and improved it. The improvement of the He et al.’s protocol is more efficient than the original one. In this paper, we analyze the security of Zhu et al.’s protocol.

3. ZHU ET AL.’S PROTOCOL

Zhu et al. have analyzed the He et al.’s protocol and found its security drawbacks [1]. They have also proposed the improved version of this protocol. They have claimed that the improved protocol is more efficient than the He et al.’s protocol. The Zhu et al.’s Protocol works as follows (also see Figure 1.), where the notations are introduced in Table 1.:  

1) Reader broadcasts \((t_{sys}, r_{sys}) \rightarrow Tag\)

2) Tag calculate: \(\{\text{if } t_{sys} > t_{tag}, \ h_1 = H_K(0, t_{sys}, r_{sys}), \ 1, \ r_{tag} \}, \ \text{then } Tag \rightarrow Reader: h_1, r_{tag}\)

3) Reader → Server: \(h_1, r_{tag}, t_{sys}\)

4) The server authenticates the tag in two ways:
   - \(\text{If } \exists (K, K_p) \in K; (h_1 = H_K(0, t_{sys}, r_{sys}) \lor h_1 = H_K(1, r_{tag}, t_{sys}))\)
   - \(\text{Or } \exists (K, K_p) \in K; (h_1 = H_{K_p}(0, t_{sys}, r_{sys}) \lor h_1 = H_{K_p}(1, r_{tag}, t_{sys}))\)

Then, it computes \(h_2 = H_{K_p}(2, r_{tag}, t_{sys})\) and updates \((K, K_p)\) as \(K = H(K)\) and \(K_p = K\).

Or \(\text{the server computes } h_2 = H_{K_p}(2, r_{tag}, t_{sys})\)

5) Server → Reader → Tag: \(h_2\)

6) The tag checks: if received \(h_2\) is the same as the calculated \(h_2 = H_{K_p}(2, r_{tag}, t_{sys})\), then sets \(t_{sys} = t_{tag} \text{ if } t_{sys} \geq t_{tag}\) and updates \(K = H(K)\)

![Figure 1. Zhu et al.’s protocol][1]

**Table 1. Notations**

| Notation | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| \(t_{sys}\) | System’s timesatamp generated by reader(system) |
| \(r_{sys}\) | Random number generated by reader(system) |
| \(t_{tag}\) | Timesatamp of tag |
| \(r_{tag}\) | Random number of tag |

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4. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF ZHU ET AL.'S PROTOCOL

In this section, we analyze the Zhu et al.'s protocol and show its security drawbacks. The untraceability property is one of the most important specifications of privacy for authentication protocol. In the Zhu et al.'s protocol, we can trace RFID tag, i.e. we can find a traceability attack for this protocol. Then, we improve the Zhu et al.'s Protocol to overcome this security drawback.

4.1 TRACEABILITY ATTACK

The communication between the tag and reader occurs over an insecure channel. Thus, adversaries can eavesdrop on this channel and save it. In traceability attack, the adversary can recognize either readers or tags which he or she has already seen. In other words, if the adversary can find the goal between two tags or readers with the probability of greater than half, he or she is successful traceability attack. We analyze the Zhu et al.'s protocol through traceability attack. This attack consists of the following phases:

Phase 1 (Learning):
Adversary eavesdrops one successful run of the protocol and stores the messages between the reader and the tag include $(t_{sys}, r_{sys})$.

Phase 2 (Traceability):
To trace the legitimate tag, the adversary waits after phase 1 upon received the reader requests from the tag, the tag upon receives the request, it replies to the reader with $r_{tag}$ and $h_1$. Now, we suppose that the adversary chooses a new $(t_{sys}, r_{sys})$ and sends to the tag. According to step one of the protocol, the tag responds with a new $h_1$ and a new $r_{tag}$ as $r_{tag}'$. In this phase the details are as follows:

1) The adversary chooses $(t_{sys}, r_{sys})$ and sends to the tag.
2) The tag receives the message and does as follows:
   a) Generates new $r_{tag}$ as $r_{tag}'$.
   b) Computes new $h_1$ as $h_1'$.
   c) Sends $r_{tag}'$, $h_1'$ to the adversary as the reader.
3) The adversary resends the same pair $(t_{sys}, r_{sys})$ to the tag.
4) The tag responds to the adversary according to the step 2 of the protocol.
5) The adversary again receives a new $h_1$ as $h_1''$, and there are two cases:
   a) If $t_{sys} > t_{tag}$, then $h_1'' = H_1(0, t_{sys}, r_{sys}) = h_1''$.
   b) If $t_{sys} < t_{adv}$, then $h_1'' = H_1(1, r_{tag}, t_{sys}) = H_1(1, t_{sys}, r_{sys}) = h_1''$.
   i) The adversary returns to the step (5-a) as follows:
      ii) Chooses $t_{adv}$ and increases $t_{adv} > t_{sys}$.
      iii) Sends twice $(t_{adv}, r_{adv} = r_{sys})$ to the tag and the tag responds with new $h_1''$.
6) If $h_1'' = h_1''$, the adversary is succeed to trace the tag. Otherwise, go to step 1 and chooses a new $t_{adv} > t_{adv}$.
As above mentioned, the adversary can trace the tag with only two runs of the protocol.

### 4.2 IMPROVEMENT OF ZHU ET AL.’S PROTOCOL

As we mentioned in the above, in the Zhu et al.’s protocol if the adversary sends several values of \(t_{tag}, r_{tag} = r_{335}\) to the tag, she can trace the tag. We can overcome this weakness with a few modifications in the Zhu et al.’s protocol. To provide untraceability, we improve the Zhu et al.’s protocol slightly in step 2. We suggest that through the calculating \(h_1\), the tag should use a random term in. Our improvement is as follows:

1) Reader broadcasts: \((t_{333}, r_{337}) \rightarrow \text{Tag}\)
2) \(\text{Tag} \rightarrow \text{Reader}\)
   \(\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
   \text{if } t_{335} > t_{tag}, \quad h_1 = H_K(0, t_{335}, r_{tag}), \quad r_{tag} \\
   \text{if } t_{335} \leq t_{tag}, \quad h_1 = H_K(1, r_{tag}, r_{335}), \quad r_{tag}
   \end{array} \right.\)

The rest of the protocol is the same as the Zhu et al.’s protocol [1].

Since, in step 2 of the improved protocol the response of the tag depends on a random variable, the adversary cannot trace the tag.

As just mentioned, for the proposed improvement on the Zhu et al.’s Protocol the modification is minor. Thus the performance and efficiency of the improved protocol is the same as the Zhu et al.’s protocol.

### 4.3 SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE IMPROVED PROTOCOL

1. Mutual authentication: it is trivial that the proposed protocol satisfies this property.
2. Untraceability/Anonymous: our protocol uses an increasing timestamps and update keyed hash to provide tracking-resistance. Even if the adversary can sends the same value several times to the tag, then it is unable to obtain any information from key and cannot distinguish between two tags. Therefore, the adversary cannot trace the tag, since the value of \(h_1\) is dependent on the random \(r_{tag}\) in any run of the protocol.
3. Replay attack: all variables used in the protocol are different, thus the adversary cannot mount replay attack.
4. Forward security: in every round of the protocol the secret key is updated by a one-way hash function \(K = H(K)\). Thus, the adversary cannot reveal any information about the tag.
5. De-synchronization attack: an adversary can intercept the message in step 5 of the protocol such that \(h_2\) is not received by the tag, and then the tag’s secret key is not updated, whereas the key in the server is updated. Therefore the legitimate tag next time would not pass the authentication and de-synchronization is happened. This problem is resolved in step 4 of the protocol.

Table 2 shows the efficiency and security comparison of the improved protocol and other related protocols.

| Protocols        | Tsudik[4] | Chatmon et al.[6] | He et al.[5] | Zhu et al.[1] | Our protocol |
|------------------|-----------|------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| Anonymity        | \(\checkmark\) | \(-\) | \(-\) | \(-\) | \(-\) |
| Mutual Authentication | \(-\) | \(\checkmark\) | \(\checkmark\) | \(\checkmark\) | \(\checkmark\) |
| DoS Resistance   | \(-\) | \(\checkmark\) | \(\checkmark\) | \(\checkmark\) | \(\checkmark\) |
| Replay Resistance| \(-\) | \(\checkmark\) | \(\checkmark\) | \(\checkmark\) | \(\checkmark\) |
| Forward security | \(-\) | \(\checkmark\) | \(\checkmark\) | \(\checkmark\) | \(\checkmark\) |
| De-syn. Resistance| - | - | \(\checkmark\) | \(\checkmark\) | \(\checkmark\) |
| Server complexity | \(O(\eta)\) | \(O(\eta)\) | \((N_T - N_D + 1)O(\eta)\) | \(O(\eta)\) | \(O(\eta)\) |
| Tag complexity   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Tag storage      | \(t_{tag}, K\) | \(t_{tag}, r_{tag}, K\) | \(t_{tag}, r_{tag}, K, N_T\) | \(t_{tag}, r_{tag}, K\) | \(t_{tag}, r_{tag}, K\) |

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5. BAN LOGIC

Any authentication protocol is based on the exchanging of messages between participants A and B. If a protocol’s security passes a formal security analysis based on a logic method, it gives an extra about the protocol functionality. A logical calculation based on an agreed set of deduction rules about authentication protocols is called logical authentication. Logical methods provide at least three advantages which are correctness, efficiency and applicability respectively. An important logical method to verify the security of a protocol was introduced by Burrows, Abadi and Needham [10], called BAN logic method. The basis of BAN logic is the belief. Formalization of every protocol using the BAN logic method includes three phases: assuming goals as formulas with symbolic notation, transforming the protocol into symbolic notation and applying a set of deduction rules.

Some of concepts that are used in BAN logic are as follows:

- **Belief,** when an agent or principal is persuaded of the truth of a formula, means that the principal believes it. For example, if the principal be P and formula be X, we write "P believes X" and show with symbols "P |\(\equiv\) X ".
- **Sees,** the principal P receives a message X which is encrypted. Since P can decrypt this message, thus P can to extract X from the message. The term "sees" means that observe only formula. If the principal be P and formula be X, we write "P sees X" and show with symbols "P \(\triangleright\) X ".
- **Said,** when principal P have sent a message containing X, we write "P said X" and show with symbols "P |\(\sim\) X ".
- **Controls,** when the principal P has jurisdiction over X, we write "P controls X" and show with symbols "P \(\triangleright\) X ".
- **Fresh,** if message X has not been sent in previous message before the current run of the protocol. This is concept of nonce, that is, the X generated for the purpose of being fresh. It writes "Fresh(x)" and shows with symbol "\(#(X)\)".
- **Shared key,** if two principals P and Q use the shared secret key K to communicate and show with symbols "P \(\leftarrow\) K \(\rightarrow\) Q ".
- **Encrypted X,** the formula X is encrypted under the key k. and show with symbols "\{X\}K ".

In order to analysis the protocol using BAN logic method, at the first the protocol should be written in the language of BAN logic, this step called idealized. Next one should write assumptions about the initial state. The third step is postulate and deductions rules and lastly interprets the statements.

5.1 CORRECTNESS PROOF BY BAN LOGIC METHOD

Without loss of generality, the reader and the server of the protocol can be assumed unique. So, the proposed protocol is idealized as Figure 2:

![Figure 2: the simplified protocol](image)

**a) General type of protocol**

Message 1:  S \(\xrightarrow{t_{sys}, r_{sys}}\) T  
Message 2:  T \(\xrightarrow{h_1, r_{tag}}\) S,  Message 3:  S \(\xrightarrow{h_2}\) T  

**b) Idealized protocol**

Message 2:  T \(\xrightarrow{}\) S: \(r_{tag}, H(T \xleftarrow{K} S, t_{sys}, r_{tag}, r_{sys})\)  
Message 3:  S \(\xrightarrow{}\) T: \(H(T \xleftarrow{K} S, t_{sys}, r_{tag})\)  

**c) Initial Assumptions:**

In this protocol, the tag and the server have shared a secret key in each round. In any round of the protocol the key is updated, thus the key is fresh. The initial assumptions are as follows:
The goals of the protocol:

\( S \equiv T \vdash S \leftarrow K \rightarrow B \) and \( T \equiv S \vdash S \leftarrow K \rightarrow B \)

Verification:

From the message 2: \( S \vdash H(T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S, \text{tag} ) \), therefore, we have: \( S \equiv T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S \)

According to the message interpretation rule:

\[ P \equiv Q \leftarrow K \rightarrow P, \ P \vdash (X \leftarrow K \rightarrow X) \Rightarrow P \equiv Q \vdash X \]

We can deduce:

\[ S \equiv T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S, \ S \vdash H(T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S, \text{tag} ) \Rightarrow S \equiv T \vdash \text{tag} \]

Using the hash rule:

\[ P \equiv Q \vdash H(X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_n) \ P \vdash X_1, \ldots, \ P \vdash X_n \Rightarrow P \equiv Q \vdash (X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_n) \]

Server can see:

\[ S \vdash t_{sys} , S \vdash r_{sys} , S \vdash \text{tag} , S \vdash (T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S) \]

\[ S \equiv T \vdash H(T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S, t_{sys}, \text{tag}, r_{sys}) \quad S \vdash t_{sys}, S \vdash t_{sys}, S \vdash r_{sys}, S \vdash r_{sys}, S \vdash t_{sys} \leftarrow K \rightarrow S \]

\[ \Rightarrow S \equiv T \vdash H(T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S, t_{sys}, \text{tag}, r_{sys}) \Rightarrow S \equiv T \vdash (T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S) \ (1) \]

We can deduce from the assumption that:

\[ S \equiv (S \leftarrow K \rightarrow T ) \ (2) \]

From (1) and (2), we can deduce the first goal of the protocol:

\[ S \equiv T \vdash \#(T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S) \]

For the second goal of the protocol:

\[ T \vdash H(T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S) \quad \text{and} \quad T \equiv (T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S) \]

According to the interpretation rule:

\[ S \equiv T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S, \ S \vdash H(T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S, \text{tag} ) \Rightarrow S \equiv T \vdash (\text{tag}) \]

We can deduce that:

\[ T \equiv S \vdash H(T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S), T \vdash (t_{sys}, r_{sys}, \text{tag}, T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S) \Rightarrow T \equiv S \vdash (T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S) \ (3) \]

From the assumption:

\[ T \equiv \#(k) \]

Given the freshness rules, we can deduce:

\[ T \equiv S \vdash \#(T \leftarrow K \rightarrow S) \]

Therefore, the second goal has been proved.

6. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we analyzed the security of an RFID authentication protocol proposed by Zhu et al [1]. Our analysis is a passive attack which can trace a legitimate tag. The cost of this attack is only eavesdropping one session of the protocol. In addition, we proposed a suitable solution to overcome this threat. In this solution, we improved Zhu et al.’s protocol by a little modification on the original protocol. The improved protocol provides the desired security against the attacks on the context. More precisely, the security analysis was
shown that the improved protocol provides mutual authentication, untraceability/anonymity. Finally, we verified the security of the protocol formally based on BAN logic method.

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