Fast Adversarial Training With Adaptive Step Size

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Abstract—While adversarial training and its variants have shown to be the most effective algorithms to defend against adversarial attacks, their extremely slow training process makes it hard to scale to large datasets like ImageNet. The key idea of recent works to accelerate adversarial training is to substitute multi-step attacks (e.g., PGD) with single-step attacks (e.g., FGSM). However, these single-step methods suffer from catastrophic overfitting, where the accuracy against PGD attack suddenly drops to nearly 0% during training, and the network totally loses its robustness. In this work, we study the phenomenon from the perspective of training instances. We show that catastrophic overfitting is instance-dependent, and fitting instances with larger input gradient norm is more likely to cause catastrophic overfitting. Based on our findings, we propose a simple but effective method, Adversarial Training with Adaptive Step size (ATAS). ATAS learns an instance-wise adaptive step size that is inversely proportional to its gradient norm. Our theoretical analysis shows that ATAS converges faster than the commonly adopted non-adaptive counterparts. Empirically, ATAS consistently mitigates catastrophic overfitting and achieves higher robust accuracy on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and ImageNet when evaluated on various adversarial budgets. Our code is released at https://github.com/HuangZhiChao95S/ATAS.

Index Terms—Adversarial examples, fast adversarial training.

I. INTRODUCTION

ADVERSARIAL examples [1], [2] cause serious safety concerns in deploying deep learning models. In order to defend against adversarial attacks, many approaches have been proposed [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. Among them, adversarial training and its variants [7], [8], [10] have been recognized as the most effective defense mechanism. Adversarial training (AT) is generally formulated as a minmax problem

$$\min_{\theta} \max_{x_i \in B_{\leftarrow}(x_i, \varepsilon)} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \ell(x_i, y_i; \theta)$$

(1)

where $D = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^{n}$ is the training set and $\ell(x, y; \theta)$ is the loss function parametrized by $\theta$. $B_{\leftarrow}(x_i, \varepsilon)$ represents a $L_p$ norm ball centered at $x_i$ with radius $\varepsilon$. AT in Equation (1) boosts the adversarial robustness by adopting adversarial examples generated in the inner maximization. Despite the effectiveness of AT, solving the inner maximization requires multiple steps of projected gradient descent (PGD) [7], [11]. Therefore, AT is much slower than vanilla training (e.g., 10 times longer training time for AT in [11]), making it challenging to scale AT to large datasets such as ImageNet.

Currently, the typical solution to accelerate AT is to substitute multi-step attacks (e.g., PGD) with single-step attacks (e.g., FGSM). Several works have been proposed following this direction, including FGSM-RS [12], ATTA [13], etc. These methods achieve the best robust accuracy for fast AT. However, recent works [14], [15] demonstrate that the single-step method suffers from catastrophic overfitting, where the model’s robustness against PGD attack suddenly drops to nearly 0% while the robust accuracy against FGSM attack rapidly increases [12], as shown in Figure 1. This will completely destroy the robustness of the networks. It is worth noting that catastrophic overfitting is different from robust overfitting mentioned in [11]. The latter one refers to the generalization gap between training and test data while catastrophic overfitting means the overfitting to a specific type of attack that is irrelevant to the training and test set. Some works have been proposed to understand and alleviate the catastrophic overfitting [14], [15]. However, their solutions significantly increase the training time. For example, the gradient align regularizer

$$E_{\delta \sim \mathcal{U}([-\varepsilon, \varepsilon]^d)} \left[ 1 - \cos (\nabla_x \ell(x, y; \theta), \nabla_x \ell(x + \delta, y; \theta)) \right]$$

in [14] requires calculating the second order gradient and it is still 5 times slower than vanilla training, compared with 2 times in [12]. In addition, [15] needs to check several points within the $L_p$ norm ball, which needs several forward propagations and is still about 4 times slower than vanilla training. Therefore, existing methods are still unsatisfactory in terms of both training efficiency and robust performance.

In this work, we analyze catastrophic overfitting from the perspective of training instances. By taking the gradient norm $\|\nabla_x \ell(x, y; \theta)\|$ as an indicator, we find that different training instances have different probabilities of causing catastrophic overfitting. Instances with large gradient norms are more sensitive to adversarial noise and their loss landscape is less smooth. Thus, fitting them with FGSM is more likely to distort the loss landscape, resulting in catastrophic overfitting.
A small perturbation of the input significantly changes the prediction. Adversarial examples can be generated using the gradient of the input $x$. Fast Gradient Signed Method (FGSM) [19] approximates the loss function $\ell(x, y; \theta)$ with the first order Taylor expansion so that adversarial examples can be generated with one step of projected gradient $x^{\text{FGSM}} = x + \varepsilon \cdot \text{sgn}(\nabla x \ell(x, y; \theta)))$, where sgn is the sign function, $\varepsilon$ is the adversarial budget. Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [7] extends FGSM to multiple steps to strengthen the attack. With a step size $\alpha$, the adversarial example at the $t$-th step is $x^{t+1} = \Pi_{B_p(x, \varepsilon)}[x^t + \alpha \cdot \text{sgn}(\nabla x \ell(x^t, y; \theta))]$, where $\Pi_{B_p(x, \varepsilon)}$ means the projection onto $B_p(x, \varepsilon)$. Several stronger attacks are proposed to reliably evaluate the models’ robustness [18], [20], [21]. Among them, AutoAttack [18] stands out as the strongest attack.

While many methods [3], [4], [7], [8], [10], [22] have been proposed to defend adversarial attacks, adversarial training (AT) and its variants [7], [8], [10], [23], [24] are shown to be the most effective methods to train a truly robust network. AT can be formulated as a minimax problem in Equation (1). Finding solutions for minimax optimization has been a major endeavor in mathematics and computer science [25], [26]. Theoretically, the well-known Stochastic Gradient Descent Ascent (SGDA) finds an $\varepsilon$-approximate stationary point in $O(1/\varepsilon^2)$ iterations with averaging for convex-concave games [27]. However, it is not appropriate to formulate the optimization of AT as SGDA or SGDmax [28], since AT only updates a part of the coordinates in $x = [x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n]$ for the maximization. The inner maximization actually corresponds to the stochastic block coordinate ascent. Empirically, the neural network is non-concave with respect to the input, so perfectly solving the inner maximization is NP-hard [29]. It is usually approximated by a strong attack like PGD [7], which needs multiple steps of the calculation the gradients. Therefore, AT is much slower than vanilla training.

**B. Fast Adversarial Training**

There have been a series of work on accelerating AT [12], [14], [15], [24], [30], [31], [32], [33]. FreeAT [30] first proposes a fast AT method by simultaneously optimizing the model’s parameter and the adversarial perturbations by batch replaying. YOPO [31] adopts a similar strategy to optimize the adversarial loss function. Later on, single-step methods are shown to be more effective than FreeAT and YOPO [12]. FGSM with Random Start (FGSM-RS) [12] can be used to generate adversarial perturbations in one step to train a robust network if the hyperparameters are carefully tuned. ATTA [13] utilizes the transferability of adversarial examples between epochs, using adversarial example of the previous epoch as the initialization, optimizing the model parameters with

$$x^j_i = \Pi_{B_p(x, \varepsilon)}[x^{j-1}_i + \alpha \cdot \text{sgn}(\nabla x \ell(x^{j-1}_i, y; \theta))]$$

$$\theta = \theta - \eta \nabla \ell(x^j_i, y; \theta),$$

where $x^j_i$ means the adversarial examples generated for the $i$-th instance $x_i$ at the $j$-th epoch. ATTA shows comparable robust accuracy with FGSM-RS. SLAT [34] perturbs both inputs and the latents simultaneously with FGSM, ensuring more reliable performance.
As mentioned above, these single-step methods suffer from catastrophic overfitting, meaning the robustness against PGD attack suddenly drops to nearly 0% while the robust accuracy against FGSM attack rapidly increases. In order to prevent catastrophic overfitting, FGSM-GA [14] adds a regularizer that aligns the direction of the input gradient. SSAT [15] studies the phenomenon from the perspective of loss landscape, finding that catastrophic overfitting is a result of highly distorted loss surface. It proposes a new algorithm to resolve catastrophic overfitting by checking the loss value along the direction of the gradient. However, both algorithms require much more computation than FGSM-RS [12] and ATTA [13]. Compared with these works, we study catastrophic overfitting from the perspective of training instances and show that using adaptive step sizes in single-step methods prevents catastrophic overfitting. Our method achieves better performance with negligible computational overhead.

Appropriate initialization of fast adversarial training (AT) can effectively mitigate catastrophic overfitting, as demonstrated in the studies of FGSM-SDI [33] and FGSM-PGI [35]. These methods complement the adaptive step size studied in our paper and can be synergistically combined with ATAS to further enhance the performance of fast AT. In addition, NuAT [36] adds nuclear norm in the fast AT. SubAT [32] studies the relationship between parameter gradient norm and catastrophic overfitting.

Adaptive step sizes have been widely used in training neural networks such as AdaGrad [37], RMSProp [38] and ADAM [39], [40], [41]. However, our motivation is different, and to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce the adaptive step size in fast AT.

Several related studies explore adaptive adversarial budget techniques [23], [42], [43], [44] aimed at enhancing the robustness and trade-off capabilities of AT. However, these papers target at enhancing the robustness of standard adversarial training instead of accelerating adversarial training algorithms. Besides, some of these methods [43] may employ complex algorithms to determine the adversarial boundary, making it challenging for them to be efficiently applied in fast AT scenarios.

### III. Motivation

Catastrophic overfitting is interpreted as a result of highly distorted loss landscapes of the input [15]. For example, FGSM-RS [12] uses large step sizes in the inner maximization to generate adversarial examples. It may only minimize the classification loss near the boundary of the adversarial budget, while the loss inside the adversarial budget may increase, leading to a highly distorted loss landscape. Figure 1 gives an illustration.

Recalling that different inputs have different loss landscapes, they may result in different probabilities of causing catastrophic overfitting. Instances with large gradient norms are more sensitive to adversarial noise. Thus, the network may simply minimize the loss on the FGSM-perturbed examples near the boundary instead of the whole space within the adversarial budget. This leads to highly distorted loss landscapes and catastrophic overfitting. The following experiments verify our hypothesis of catastrophic overfitting in FGSM-RS and ATTA.

#### A. Metrics of Input Gradient Norm

To verify the hypothesis that instances with large gradient norms cause catastrophic overfitting, we divide the training instances into different subsets according to their gradient norms. Following the grouping method in [45], we also average the gradient norm across the training process to reduce the variance. Formally speaking, we perform FGSM-RS and ATTA to train a ResNet-18 (RN-18) on CIFAR10 for \( N = 30 \) epochs with \( \varepsilon = 8/255 \) and step size \( \alpha = 10/255 \). Catastrophic overfitting does not happen in this case. The average gradient norm \( GN(x_i) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \|\nabla_x \ell(x_i^j, y; \theta)\|_2^2 \) , where \( \tilde{x}_i^j \) is the initialization of \( x_i \) at the \( j \)-th epoch. For FGSM-RS, \( \tilde{x}_i^j \) adds random perturbation to \( x_i \). And for ATTA, \( \tilde{x}_i^j \) is the adversarial perturbation of \( x_i \) at the \( (j-1) \)-th epoch. We sort \( x_i \) according to \( GN(x_i) \) and define \( \text{rank}(x_i) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} 1(GN(x_i) < GN(x_j)) \) as the fraction of instances with smaller average gradient norm than \( x_i \). We divide the subsets according to \( \text{rank}(x_i): D_i^\ell = \{x_i \mid \frac{\text{rank}(x_i)}{n} \leq \frac{\ell}{n} \} \). The classes of each subset are balanced. The maximum and minimum proportion of one class in all subsets is 10.86% and 8.98% in CIFAR10. In the supplementary materials, we present a comprehensive characterization of the subset splits, demonstrating their consistency across various seeds and step sizes.

#### B. Loss Landscape

We train a new RN-18 using FGSM-RS and enlarge the step size to \( \alpha = 14/255 \) to cause catastrophic overfitting. Figure 2 shows the loss surface of the subsets with the smallest \( D_i^1 \) and the largest gradient norm \( D_i^{10} \) when the catastrophic overfitting happens. \( D_i^{10} \) first exhibits the catastrophic overfitting, where the loss surface of the input gets highly distorted and the loss function reaches its highest value in the middle of the adversarial budget. By contrast, the loss surface of \( D_i^1 \) is much less distorted. Figure 2 infers that
\section{Proposed Method}

From our analysis in Section III, the step size of the inner maximization plays an important role in the performance of the single step methods. Overly large step size draws all perturbed noise near the boundary, causing catastrophic overfitting and thus the robust accuracy under PGD decreases to zero. However, we cannot simply reduce the step size. As shown in Figure 4, increasing step size can strengthen the adversarial attack and improves the robust accuracy. To strengthen the attack as much as possible as well as avoid catastrophic overfitting, we advocate utilizing the instance-wise step-size. The analysis in Section III reveals that we should use small step sizes for instances with large gradient norms to prevent catastrophic overfitting, and large step sizes for instances with small gradient norms to strengthen the attack. Thus, we propose to use the moving average of the gradient norm

\begin{equation}
    v_j^i = \beta v_j^{i-1} + (1 - \beta) \| \nabla_{\tilde{x}_j} \ell(\tilde{x}_j, y_i; \theta) \|^2_2,
\end{equation}

to adjust the step size $\alpha_j^i$ for the $x_j$ at the $j$-th epoch. Here, $\tilde{x}_j$ is the initialization of $x_j$ and $\beta$ is the momentum.
For each instance, we use adaptive step size $\alpha_{ATAS}$ does not need large $\alpha$ current iteration. Combined with the previous initialization, obtained in the previous epoch as the initialization for the of adversarial examples and uses the adversarial perturbation previous initialization[13], which utilizes the transferability the adversarial budget reachable, we further consider the the attack strength. In order to make the whole space within perturbations for instances with small step sizes, weakening initialization in FGSM-RS may limit the magnitude of better adversarial robustness.

The comparison of FGSM-RS and FGSM-RS with adaptive step size is shown in Figure 5a. It can be observed that the factor stabilizing the step size. The step size $\alpha^j$ is inversely proportional to $v^j$:

$$\alpha^j = \gamma / (c + \sqrt{v^j}) ,$$

where $\gamma$ is a pre-defined learning rate and $c$ is a constant preventing $\alpha^j$ from being too large.

We conduct preliminary experiments to incorporate the adaptive step size $\alpha^j$ with FGSM-RS, which randomly initializes the perturbation at each inner maximization step. The comparison of FGSM-RS and FGSM-RS with adaptive step size is shown in Figure 5a. It can be observed that the catastrophic overfitting does not occur with adaptive step size. In addition, the average step size of adaptive methods are larger than FGSM-RS and ATTA ($\alpha = 8/255$), catastrophic overfitting does not occur in ATAS.

In addition, for the inner maximization, the random initialization in FGSM-RS may limit the magnitude of perturbations for instances with small step sizes, weakening the attack strength. In order to make the whole space within the adversarial budget reachable, we further consider the previous initialization [13], which utilizes the transferability of adversarial examples and uses the adversarial perturbation obtained in the previous epoch as the initialization for the current iteration. Combined with the previous initialization, ATAS does not need large $\alpha^j$ to reach the whole $\ell_p$ norm ball. For each instance, we use adaptive step size $\alpha^j$ and perform

the following inner maximization to obtain the adversarial examples:

$$x^j_i = \Pi_{B_j(x_i^j, \epsilon)}[x^j_{i-1} + \alpha^j_i \cdot \text{sgn}(\nabla x^j_{i-1} \ell(x^j_{i-1}, y_i, \theta))] ,$$

where $x^j_i$ is the adversarial example at the $j$-th epoch. Then the parameter $\theta$ is updated with $x^j_i$

$$\theta = \theta - \eta \nabla \theta \ell(x^j_i, y_i, \theta) .$$

The detailed algorithm of ATAS is shown in Algorithm 1. Figure 5b shows the comparisons of ATTA [13] and ATAS, where ATAS does not suffer from catastrophic overfitting. In contrast to previous methods [14], [15] that needs large computational overhead to resolve the problem of catastrophic overfitting, the overhead of ATAS is negligible, since the input gradient $\nabla x^j_{i-1} \ell(x^j_{i-1}, y_i, \theta)$ is already calculated in the attack step in Equation (5). Thus, calculating the pre-conditioner $v^j_i$ and the step size $\alpha^j$ does not need additional forward-backward passes of the network. The training time of ATAS is almost the same as ATTA [13] and FGSM-RS [12].

A. Theoretical Analysis of ATAS

We analyze the convergence of ATAS with $L_\infty$ adversarial budget. The proof is deferred to the supplementary material. Given the objective function

$$\phi(\theta, x) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \ell(x_i, y_i, \theta) ,$$

the minimax problem can be formulated as follows:

$$\min_{\theta} \max_{x^*} \phi(\theta, x^*) ,$$

where $x^*$ is the optimal adversarial example depending on $\theta$. We consider the minimax optimization in convex-concave and smooth settings. And the loss function $\ell$ satisfies the following assumptions.

Assumption 1: The training loss function $\ell$ satisfies the following constraints:
1. $\ell$ in convex and $L_0$-smooth in $\theta$; $\theta$ and the gradient of $\theta$ are bounded in the $L_2$ norm balls

$$\|\theta - \theta^*\|_2 \leq D_{\theta,2}, \quad \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \|\nabla_\theta \ell(x^i, y^i; \theta)\|_2^2 \leq G_{\theta,2}^2,$$

where $\theta^* = \arg\min_{\theta} \max_{x \in B_{\infty}(x, \varepsilon)} \phi(\theta, x)$.

2. $\ell$ in concave and $L_1$-smooth in each $x_i$, $x_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$ is bounded in an $L_\infty$ norm ball with $D_{x,\infty} = 2\varepsilon$. For any $x$ and $x'$, $\|x - x'\|_\infty \leq D_{x,\infty}$, and the gradients of the inputs also satisfy

$$\|\nabla_{x_i} \ell(x^i, y^i; \theta)\|_2^2 \leq G_{x,i}^2, \quad \sum_{i=1}^{n} \|\nabla_{x_i} \ell(x^i, y^i; \theta)\|_2^2 \leq G_{x,2}^2.$$

We average the trajectory of $T$ steps $\bar{\theta}^T = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \theta^t$ and $\bar{x}^T = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} x^t$ to get the near-optimal points. It is a standard technique for analyzing stochastic gradient methods [37]. The convergence gap $\max_{x \in B_{\infty}(x, \varepsilon)} \phi(\bar{\theta}^T, x^*) - \max_{x \in B_{\infty}(x, \varepsilon)} \phi(\theta^*, x^*)$ is upper bounded by the regret $R(T)$

$$R(T) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \max_{\theta^t} \phi(\theta^t, x^*) - \min_{\theta^*} \max_{x^*} \phi(\theta^*, x^*) \leq \frac{R(T)}{T}.$$

**Lemma 1:** For $\ell$ satisfying assumption 1, the objective function $\phi$ defined in Equation (7)

$$\max_{x \in B_{\infty}(x, \varepsilon)} \phi(\theta^T, x^*) - \min_{\theta^*} \max_{x^*} \phi(\theta^*, x^*) \leq \frac{R(T)}{T}.$$

**Adaptive Stochastic Gradient Descent Block Coordinate Ascent (A-SGD_{BCA}):** ATAS can be formulated as A-SGD_{BCA}, which randomly picks an instance $x_k$ at the step $t$, applying stochastic gradient descent to the parameter $\theta$ and adaptive block coordinate ascent to the input $x$. Unlike SGDA [28], where all dimensions of $x$ get updated in each iteration, A-SGD_{BCA} only updates some dimensions of $x$. A-SGD_{BCA} first calculates the pre-conditioner $v_i^k$ as

$$v_{i,k}^{t+1} = \begin{cases} \beta v_{i,k}^t + (1 - \beta) \nabla_{x_i} \ell(x^i_k, y^i_k; \theta^t) & i = k \\ v_{i,k}^t & i \neq k \end{cases}$$

$$\hat{v}_i^{t+1} = \max(v_{i,k}^{t+1}, v_{i,k}^t).$$

Then $x, \theta$ are optimized with

$$x_{i,k}^{t+1} = \begin{cases} x_{i,k}^t + \frac{\eta_i}{\sqrt{\hat{v}_i^{t+1}}} \nabla_{x_i} \ell(x^i_k, y^i_k; \theta^t) & i = k \\ x_{i,k}^t & i \neq k \end{cases}$$

$$\theta^{t+1} = \theta^t - \eta_\theta \nabla_\theta \ell(x_{i,k}^{t+1}, y_k; \theta^t).$$

The difference between A-SGD_{BCA} and ATAS is $\hat{v}_i^t$. To prove the convergence of A-SGD_{BCA}, the pre-conditioner needs to be non-decreasing. Otherwise, ATAS may not converge like ADAM [41]. However, the non-convergent version of ADAM actually works better for neural networks in practice [40]. Therefore, ATAS still uses $v_{i,k}^t$ as the pre-conditioner.

Theorem 1 (Regret Bound for A-SGD_{BCA}: Under Assumption 1, with $\eta_\theta = \frac{D_{\theta,2}}{G_{\theta,2}^2 T}$ and $\eta_x = \frac{\sqrt{n}D_{x,\infty}}{T(1 - \beta)^{1/4}}$, the regret of A-SGD_{BCA} is bounded by:

$$R^{A-SGD_{BCA}}(T) \leq G_{\theta,2}^2 D_{\theta,2} \sqrt{T} + D_{x,\infty} \frac{n}{n(1 - \beta)^{1/4}} + dL_x \frac{D_{x,\infty}^2}{2n}.$$

Comparison with the Non-adaptive Version (SGD_{BCA}): The non-adaptive version of ATAS reduces to ATTA [13], which can be formulated as the Stochastic Gradient Descent Block Coordinate Ascent (SGD_{BCA}):

$$x_{i,k}^{t+1} = \begin{cases} \Pi_{B_{\infty}(x, \varepsilon)}[x_{i,k}^t + \eta_i \nabla_{x_i} \ell(x^i_k, y^i_k; \theta^t)] & i = k \\ x_{i,k}^t & i \neq k \end{cases}$$

$$\theta^{t+1} = \theta^t - \eta_\theta \nabla_\theta \ell(x_{i,k}^{t+1}, y_k; \theta^t).$$

Theorem 2 (Regret Bound for SGD_{BCA}: Under assumption 1, with constant learning $\eta_\theta = \frac{D_{\theta,2}}{G_{\theta,2}^2 T}$ and $\eta_x = \frac{\sqrt{n}D_{x,\infty}}{G_{x,2}^2 \sqrt{T}}$, the regret $R^{SGD_{BCA}}(T)$ of SGD_{BCA} is bounded by:

$$R^{SGD_{BCA}}(T) \leq G_{\theta,2}^2 D_{\theta,2} \sqrt{T} + G_{x,2}^2 D_{x,\infty} \sqrt{T} + dL_x \frac{D_{x,\infty}^2}{2n}.$$

Theorem 1 and 2 shows that A-SGD_{BCA} converges faster than SGD_{BCA}. When $T$ is large, the third term of the regret in both SGD_{BCA} and A-SGD_{BCA} is negligible. Consider their first terms are the same, the main difference is the regret bound about $x$ in the second term: $G_{x,2}^2 D_{x,\infty} \sqrt{T}$ and $dL_x \frac{D_{x,\infty}^2}{2n}$. The ratio between them is

$$\text{Ratio} = \frac{1}{(1 - \beta)^2} \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} G_{x,i}^2}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} G_{x,i}^2}} \frac{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n} G_{x,i}^2}}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n} G_{x,i}^2}}.$$

The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality indicates the ratio is always larger than 1 for $\beta = 0$. The gap between A-SGD_{BCA} and SGD_{BCA} gets larger when $G_{x,2}$ has long-tailed distribution, which demonstrates the relatively faster convergence of ATAS than the non-adaptive counterparts. We show the empirical
TABLE I
ACCURACY AND TRAINING TIME OF DIFFERENT METHODS ON CIFAR10, CIFAR100 AND IMAGE NET. ATAS IMPROVES THE ROBUST ACCURACY UNDER VARIOUS ATTACKS INCLUDING PGD10, PGD50 AND AUTOATTACK (AA). THE METHOD “PGD10” REFERS TO THE STANDARD AT USING PGD10 FOR THE INNER MAXIMIZATION. NOTE THAT, WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH COMPUTATIONAL RESOURCES TO PERFORM STANDARD AT AND SSAT ON IMAGENET BECAUSE OF COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY. BE SIDES, WE ARE UNABLE TO TRAIN THE RESNET-50 ON IMAGE NET WITH FGSM-GA AS ITS MEMORY REQUIREMENT EXCEEDS THE MAXIMUM GPU MEMORY OF OUR DEVICES (I. E. NVIDIA TESLA V100). FOR CIFAR10 AND CIFAR100, THE TRAINING TIME IS EVALUATED ON A SINGLE GPU. WE USE TWO GPUs TO TRAIN THE MODELS FOR IMAGENET. WE USE DEFAULT STEP SIZE FROM THE ORIGINAL PAPERS FOR THE BASELINES SO THAT CATASTROPHIC OVERFITTING SELLD HAPPENS IN THESE METHODS

(a) CIFAR10 with $\epsilon = 8/255$. The accuracy with $\epsilon = 12/255$ and $16/255$ is in the supplementary material.

| Methods     | Clean | PGD10 | PGD50 | AA    | Time(h) |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|
| FreeAT      | 78.37 | 40.90 | 39.02 | 36.00 | 0.33    |
| YOPO        | 74.72 | 37.51 | 35.79 | 33.21 | 0.28    |
| FGSM-RS     | 83.99 | 48.99 | 46.36 | 42.95 | 0.22    |
| FGSM-GA     | 80.10 | 49.14 | 47.21 | 43.44 | 0.57    |
| SSAT        | 88.83 | 42.31 | 38.99 | 37.06 | 0.61    |
| ATTA        | 82.16 | 47.47 | 45.32 | 42.51 | 0.30    |
| NuAT        | 76.68 | 49.36 | 48.13 | 45.96 | 0.35    |
| SubAT       | 77.43 | 46.29 | 45.03 | 41.49 | 0.41    |
| FGSM-SDI    | 78.15 | 48.79 | 47.52 | 42.02 | 0.48    |
| FGSM-PGI    | 67.27 | 46.47 | 45.98 | 39.22 | 0.38    |
| ATAS        | 81.22 | 50.03 | 46.18 | 45.38 | 0.30    |

| Methods     | Clean | PGD10 | PGD50 | AA    | Time(h) |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|
| FreeAT      | 74.08 | 28.03 | 27.23 | 23.04 | 1.32    |
| YOPO        | 50.56 | 20.57 | 18.54 | 15.09 | 0.33    |
| FGSM-RS     | 51.55 | 20.56 | 18.54 | 15.09 | 0.33    |
| FGSM-GA     | 59.35 | 26.40 | 24.29 | 19.73 | 0.21    |
| SSAT        | 50.61 | 24.48 | 20.47 | 19.42 | 0.57    |
| ATTA        | 71.03 | 9.79  | 8.40  | 1.09  | 0.62    |
| NuAT        | 57.21 | 25.76 | 24.90 | 21.03 | 0.28    |
| SubAT       | 24.96 | 17.10 | 16.93 | 13.31 | 0.32    |
| FGSM-SDI    | 44.16 | 21.81 | 21.37 | 16.95 | 0.45    |
| FGSM-PGI    | 53.03 | 25.42 | 24.79 | 20.33 | 0.50    |
| ATAS        | 55.49 | 27.68 | 26.60 | 22.62 | 0.31    |

(b) CIFAR100 with $\epsilon = 8/255$. The accuracy with $\epsilon = 4/255$ and $12/255$ is in the supplementary material.

| Methods     | Clean | PGD10 | PGD50 | AA    | Time(h) |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|
| FreeAT      | 54.00 | 21.05 | 20.67 | 18.54 | 15.09 | 0.33 |
| YOPO        | 51.55 | 20.56 | 18.54 | 15.09 | 0.33 |
| FGSM-RS     | 59.35 | 26.40 | 24.29 | 19.73 | 0.21 |
| FGSM-GA     | 50.61 | 24.48 | 20.47 | 19.42 | 0.57 |
| SSAT        | 71.03 | 9.79  | 8.40  | 1.09  | 0.62 |
| ATTA        | 57.21 | 25.76 | 24.90 | 21.03 | 0.28 |
| NuAT        | 24.96 | 17.10 | 16.93 | 13.31 | 0.32 |
| SubAT       | 44.16 | 21.81 | 21.37 | 16.95 | 0.45 |
| FGSM-SDI    | 53.03 | 25.42 | 24.79 | 20.33 | 0.50 |
| FGSM-PGI    | 40.07 | 21.14 | 20.81 | 16.51 | 0.40 |
| ATAS        | 55.49 | 27.68 | 26.60 | 22.62 | 0.31 |

(c) IMAGENET with $\epsilon = 2/255$. The accuracy with $\epsilon = 4/255$ is available in the supplementary material.

| Methods     | Clean | PGD10 | PGD50 | AA    | Time(h) |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|
| FreeAT      | 58.80 | 35.36 | 34.78 | 31.77 | 0.04 |
| YOPO        | 47.69 | 28.50 | 28.10 | 25.22 | 48.22 |
| FGSM-RS     | 55.26 | 37.33 | 36.98 | 33.28 | 43.46 |
| FGSM-GA     | 37.01 | 24.15 | 24.05 | 19.98 | 182.7 |
| ATTA        | 58.32 | 39.62 | 38.32 | 36.08 | 45.83 |
| NuAT        | 51.98 | 21.52 | 19.35 | 16.08 | 46.53 |
| SubAT       | 31.38 | 20.95 | 20.90 | 18.27 | 64.18 |
| FGSM-SDI    | 60.07 | 40.23 | 40.13 | 37.16 | 63.21 |
| FGSM-PGI    | 50.83 | 37.28 | 37.26 | 31.31 | 44.82 |
| ATAS        | 61.20 | 40.84 | 39.86 | 37.25 | 43.70 |

V. EXPERIMENTS
Baselines: We compare ATAS with the SOTA fast AT algorithms including FreeAT [30], YOPO [31], FGSM-RS [12], FGSM-GA [14], SSAT [15], NuAT [24], SubAT [32], FGSM-SDI [33], FGSM-PGI [35] and ATTA [13]. We also compare ATAS with standard AT whose inner maximization is solved by PGD10, providing a reference for the ideal performance.

Attack Methods: We consider three attacks: PGD10, PGD50 [7] and AutoAttack (AA) [18]. Square Attack, a black-box attack, is included in AutoAttack to eliminate the effect of gradient masking.

Experimental Settings: ATAS uses the techniques proposed in ATTA [13]: the adversarial perturbations are transformed according to the data augmentation and get reset every several epochs. The previous initialization is stored in the GPU memory and thus brings negligible storing latency to ATAS. We consider adversarial attacks with the $\ell_\infty$-norm budget. We evaluate fast AT algorithms on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100

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with WideResNet-28-10 (WRN-28-10) [46] and ResNet-18 (RN-18), and on ImageNet [17] with ResNet-18 (RN-18) and ResNet-50 (RN-50). In this study, we have adhered to the default splits for all the datasets employed. Specifically, for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, our training set consists of 50,000 images, while 10,000 images are reserved for evaluation purposes. As for ImageNet, we utilized an extensive collection of 1,281,167 training instances spanning across 1000 distinct classes, and our testing was conducted on the 50,000 images from the validation set. While early stopping is widely used in the standard AT [11], the computational overhead to perform PGD attack on a separate validation set is large. Besides, considering the small budget of training time in fast AT, even if early stopping is applied to terminate the training before catastrophic overfitting occurs, the training is far from convergence, resulting in poor performance [14]. Therefore, we follow the previous works [12], [13], [14] and do not use early stopping. We set $\beta = 0.5$ and $\gamma / c = 16/255$, which is close to the adversarial budget. And we set $c = 0.01$ for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 and $c = 0.1$ for ImageNet. More detailed experiment settings are in the Appendix, and additional experiments are deferred to the supplementary materials.

A. Convergence

Figure 7 shows the curve of the training loss $\max_{x^* = [x_1^*, \ldots, x_n^*]} \in B_{\infty}(x, \epsilon) \phi(\theta, x^*)$ on CIFAR10 with different network architectures and different adversarial budgets, where $x^*$ is approximated by PGD10 and the objective function $\phi$ is approximated by mini-batches of training instances at each step. ATAS achieves smaller robust training loss at the end of training, demonstrating the faster convergence of ATAS than ATTA and other baselines.

In Table III, we show the relationship between the Ratio in Equation (10) and the convergence gap $\ell_{\text{ATTA}} - \ell_{\text{ATAS}}$ and convergence ratio $\ell_{\text{ATTA}} / \ell_{\text{ATAS}}$ in the last epoch of training. Here, $\ell$ is the loss of each method. The ratio is obtained from Figure 6b for CIFAR10 with ResNet-18. It shows that

| Methods  | CIFAR10 ResNet18 | CIFAR10 ResNet18 | ImageNet ResNet18 |
|----------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|
|          | $\epsilon = 4/255$ | $\epsilon = 4/255$ | $\epsilon = 4/255$ |
| FreeAT   | 37.75            | 37.75            | 37.75             |
| ATTA     | 36.00            | 34.62            | 33.80             |
| ATAS     | 35.75            | 31.20            | 31.05             |
| **ATAS** | **35.75**        | **31.20**        | **31.05**         |
larger Ratio (more long-tailed distribution) leads to larger convergence gap between ATTA and ATAS.

B. Robust Accuracy

We provide our main results in Table I, showing the robust accuracy of CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and ImageNet, respectively. Table II shows the robust accuracy under AutoAttack for different adversarial budgets.

CIFAR10 and CIFAR100: As shown in Table Ia, the robust accuracy of FreeAT and YOPO is much lower than the other methods. While FGSM-RS maintains non-trivial robust accuracy when using RN-18, it suffers from catastrophic overfitting when using large networks such as WRN-28-10. The regularizer in FGSM-GA prevents catastrophic overfitting. However, it may over-regularize the network so that the clean accuracy and the robust accuracy decrease on WRN-28-10. In addition, the regularizer also brings computational overhead: FGSM-GA needs nearly double the training time compared with other methods. ATAS achieves the best robust accuracy among all fast AT algorithms while keeping the training time nearly the same. Furthermore, for small networks like RN-18, the performance of ATAS is on par with standard AT (PGD10) but needs only one-fifth of the training time.

ImageNet: ATTA and ATAS need to memorize the adversarial noise for the whole training set. Since frequently loading and storing from the disks significantly lowers the training speed, all perturbations should be stored in the memory. Thus, we utilize the local property of the adversarial examples [47] and only store the interpolated perturbation in the memory. We resize the perturbations from $224 \times 224$ to $32 \times 32$ for storage and up-sample it back when used as the initialization for the next epoch. The detailed algorithm is available in the Appendix. Table Ic shows the robust accuracy on ImageNet on $\varepsilon = 2/255$. Although both FGSM-SDI and FGSM-PGI achieve higher robust accuracy for PGD50, it is important to note that ATAS demonstrates higher robust accuracy when subjected to the strongest AutoAttack. As the robustness should be calculated based on the worst-case accuracy, this result showcases the superior true robustness of ATAS compared to all the baseline methods. FGSM-GA needs to calculate the second-order gradient of the parameters, which needs a huge amount of GPU memory. Thus, we could not train a big network such as ResNet-50 on ImageNet.

Robust Accuracy at Different Adversarial Budgets: Table II shows the robust accuracy of fast AT algorithms under AutoAttack on different datasets, network architectures and adversarial budgets. The robust accuracy decreases when enlarging the adversarial budget, but ATAS always outperforms all the baselines for different adversarial budgets, datasets and network architectures. This demonstrates that the improvement of ATAS is consistent.

Repeated Training of ATAS: Figure 8 shows the five times repeat of ATAS and FGSM-RS [12]. All five experiments show that catastrophic overfitting occurs in FGSM-RS with WRN-28-10 while ATAS is a stable method that does not suffer from catastrophic overfitting.

Ablation Study: Table IV provides the ablation study on hyperparameters, showing that ATAS is not sensitive to them. Besides, as the only difference between ATAS and ATTA is the step size, the superior performance of ATAS over ATTA forms an ablation study to demonstrate the effectiveness of the adaptive step size.
Fig. 9. Loss landscape of ATAS on CIFAR10 with ResNet-18 and \( \varepsilon = 8/255 \) for 3 random instances.

Fig. 10. The input gradient norm and step size for CIFAR10 with \( \varepsilon = 8/255 \) after 5 epochs on WideResNet-28-10.

Fig. 11. The histogram of the norms of the adversarial noise for CIFAR10 with \( \varepsilon = 8/255 \) in the last epoch of ATAS.

C. Understanding of ATAS

**Landscape of ATAS:** Figure 9 shows the loss landscapes of 3 random instances after training of ATAS. ATAS does not have distorted loss landscapes, which means it does not suffer from catastrophic overfitting.

**Steps size and Gradient Norm:** Figure 10 plots the changes of gradient norm and step size for ATAS after 5 epochs. We divide CIFAR10 into 10 subsets according to their gradient norm and plot the gradient norm and step size for \( D_1 \), \( D_5 \) and \( D_{10} \), which has the smallest, medium and largest input gradient norm among 10 subsets. The figure shows that the input gradient norm and step size is relatively stable for each subset along the training process. It shows that the input gradient norm is more like a property of training instances themselves, which is consistent with our motivation. It is worth noting that the sudden changes in gradient norm are the result of the initialization reset used in ATTA.

**Diversity of Adversarial Noises:** Figure 11 shows the level of adversarial noise stored in ATAS in the last epoch. As there exist some pixels that reach the \( \ell_\infty \) boundary for each instance, the \( \ell_\infty \) norms of nearly all instances’ perturbations are 8/255. However, the \( \ell_2 \) norm, which can measure whether all pixels reach the \( \ell_\infty \) boundary, is diverse for different instances. It shows that ATAS lowers the adversarial at different regions within the adversarial budget instead of only forcing robustness near the boundary.

**Supplementary materials:** include 1) the proof of Lemma IV.1, Theorem 1, and Theorem 2; 2) additional experimental results including the robust accuracy under more evaluated adversarial budgets on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and ImageNet, the convergence curve of ImageNet, and catastrophic overfitting in FGSM-RS with more evaluated step sizes.

VI. Conclusion

In this paper, we investigate catastrophic overfitting from the perspective of training instances and show that instances with large gradient norms are more likely to cause catastrophic overfitting in the single-step fast AT methods. This finding motivates the adaptive training method, ATAS, which applies the adaptive step size of inner maximization inversely proportional to the input gradient norm. We theoretically analyze the convergence of ATAS, showing that our method converges faster than the non-adaptive counterpart especially when the distribution of input gradient norm is long-tailed. Extensive experiments on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and ImageNet with different network architectures and adversarial budgets show that ATAS mitigates catastrophic overfitting and achieves higher robust accuracy under various strong attacks.

**Algorithm 2 ATAS for ImageNet**

**Input:** Training set \( \mathcal{D} \), The model \( f_\theta \) with loss function \( \ell \), Adversarial budget \( \varepsilon \), Hyperparameters \( \gamma, \eta, c, N \)

**Output:** Optimized model \( f_\theta^* \)

1: \( u_i^0 = 0 \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, n \)
2: \( \delta_i^0 = \text{Uniform}(-\varepsilon, \varepsilon) \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, n \)
3: Resize \( \delta_i^0 \) to 32 \( \times \) 32 for \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) and store them.
4: for \( j = 1 \) to \( N \) do
5: \( \text{for } x_i, y_i \in \mathcal{D} \) do
6: \( \text{Resize } \delta_i^{j-1} \text{ to } 224 \times 224 \)
7: \( x_i^{j-1} = x_i + \delta_i^{j-1} \)
8: \( \nu_i^j = \beta \nu_i^{j-1} + (1 - \beta) \| \nabla_{x_i^{j-1}} \ell(x_i^{j-1}, y_i; \theta) \|_2 \)
9: \( \alpha_i^j = \gamma/(c + \sqrt{\nu_i^j}) \)
10: \( x_i^j = \Pi_{B}(x_i, \varepsilon) [x_i^{j-1} + \alpha_i^j \cdot \text{sgn}(\nabla_{x_i^{j-1}} \ell(x_i^j, y_i; \theta))] \)
11: \( \theta = \theta - \eta \nabla \ell(x_i^j, y_i; \theta) \)
12: \( \delta_i^j = x_i^j - x_i \)
13: \( \text{Resize } \delta_i^j \text{ to } 32 \times 32 \) and store it.
14: end for
15: end for
TABLE V

HYPERPARAMETER \( \lambda \) FOR FGSM-GA

| (a) CIFAR100 | (b) ImageNet |
|-------------|--------------|
| \( \varepsilon \) | 4/255 | 8/255 | 12/255 | 2/255 |
| \( \lambda \) | 0.2 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 0.005 | 0.01 |

APPENDIX B
DETAILS FOR THE EXPERIMENTS

As we focus on fast AT, we reduce the training epochs like [12], [14]. For single-step methods FGSM-RS, FGSM-GA, ATTA and ATAS, the training lasts for 30 epochs on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, and 90 epochs on ImageNet. For FreeAT and YOPO, we keep the number of the forward-backward passes the same as the single-step methods so that the total training time of these methods will be similar. We use two kinds of learning rate scheduler: piece-wise decay used in [13] and cyclic learning rate used in [12], and choose the best scheduler for each method.

FreeAT: We use the default hyperparameters from [30] except training epochs to make fair comparison between different methods. We select the best number of batch replaying from [30]. For CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, we use Free-8 in their paper (Free-\( m \) means the number of batch replaying is \( m \)) and train the network for 10 epochs. For ImageNet, we use Free-4 and train the network for 45 epochs.

YOPO: We use YOPO-5-3 in [31] as it achieves the best performance. The training lasts for 12 epochs for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100. For ImageNet, the training lasts for 36 epochs to make the training time similar to other methods. Other hyperparameters are the same as the original paper [31].

FGSM-RS: We directly download the code from the official repository.\(^1\) The training lasts for 30 epochs for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, and 90 epochs for ImageNet. Following the hyperparameters in the paper, the step size \( \alpha = 1.25 \varepsilon \). Other hyperparameters are the same as their paper.

FGSM-GA: We directly download the code from the official repository.\(^2\) The training lasts for 30 epochs for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, and 90 epochs for ImageNet. Other hyperparameters are the same. For the experiments not involved in their paper, we keep them same as the experiments of CIFAR10 except for the hyperparameter \( \lambda \) balancing the gradient align regularizer, which also varies for different datasets and adversarial budgets in their code. \( \lambda \) for CIFAR10 is provided in their code. For CIFAR100 and ImageNet, we run several experiments and provide the result with best \( \lambda \). These \( \lambda \) are provided in Table V.

SSAT: We directly download the code from the official repository.\(^3\) The training lasts for 30 epochs for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100. And we use the check points \( c = 3 \), which achieves the best performance in their paper.

ATTA: We follow the hyperparameters setting for ATTA-1 in [13] and set the step size \( \alpha = 4/255 \). We reduce the number of training epochs to 30 for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100. And the epochs of piece-wise learning rate are rescheduled accordingly.

\(^1\)https://github.com/locuslab/fast_adversarial
\(^2\)https://github.com/tml-epfl/understanding-fast-adv-training
\(^3\)https://github.com/Harry24k/catastrophic-overfitting

The learning rate \( \eta \) starts at 0.1 and decays to 0.01 and 0.001 at the 24th and 28th epochs. The training of ImageNet lasts for 90 epochs and the learning rate also starts at 0.1 and decays to 0.01 and 0.001 at the 50th and 75th epochs. The weight decay is \( 5 \times 10^{-4} \) for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100. For ImageNet, it is \( 1 \times 10^{-4} \). The batch size is 128 for all the experiments. Other hyperparameters are the same as their paper.

NuAT and SubAT: We download the directly download the code from the official repository. We only alter the epochs of training and fix other hyperparameters as the same.

FGSM-SDI and FGSM-PGI: To ensure a fair comparison among various methods, we standardized the number of epochs to 30 for both CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets. Additionally, for the ImageNet dataset, we set the batch size to 128, aligning it with the same number of steps used in prior experiments. All remaining hyperparameters were kept consistent with those outlined in the provided code.

ATAS: The hyperparameters \( \gamma \) and \( c \) are used to control the minimum and maximum step size for the training instances. When the moving average of gradient norm \( \nu_i \rightarrow 0 \), the step size \( \alpha_i = \gamma / c \). We choose \( \gamma / c = 16/255 \), which is close to the adversarial budget. And \( c \) should be close to the magnitude of \( \nu_i \). As the gradient norm increases with the dimension of the inputs, \( c \) should be larger for ImageNet. Therefore, we set \( c = 0.01 \) and for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 and we let \( c = 0.1 \) for ImageNet. Momentum of gradient norm \( \beta \) is set to 0.5 for all the experiments. ATAS is not sensitive to the choice of hyperparameters. Other hyperparameters are the same as ATTA.

Environments of the Experiments: All the training time is evaluated on a machine with Intel Xeon 8255C and NVIDIA Tesla V100. For CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, we use a single GPU. For ImageNet, we use two GPUs. We run all the experiments with Pytorch 1.4.

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