Indonesian Defense Diplomacy Strategy in Post the ATT Enforcement

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Abstract
The goal of this study is to examine the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) after its coming into effect in Indonesia using a defense diplomacy strategy. The research approach used in this study is descriptive analytic qualitative research. The data gathering approaches employed in this study were interviews and literature reviews. According to the findings of this study, every country has the right to access and develop weapons as well as to protect itself. Indonesia, on the other hand, is outside the ATT system since it has chosen to abstain. According to Article 5 of the ATT, Indonesia is not required to report on the feasibility assessment of the transfer of conventional weapons. Indonesia, on the other hand, can improve the conventional weapons regime and the UNPoA to prevent weapons from being circulated in conflict-prone areas.

1. Introduction
Arms trade transactions have taken place both legally and illegally in every region of the world. In global and national markets, the arms trade is practically on par with other commodities; an arms embargo against countries in conflict or division is merely a paper agreement. During a conflict, the demand for weapons supply prompts developed countries to boost their arms transfers as makers and exporters (Charles, 2015). Small arms and light weapon (SALW) transfer and production are considered extremely important. SALW makers had additional challenges in adjusting the production of weapons intended for the civil society
market at a time when other sectors of the military industry were failing (Alley, 2019). SALW surpluses from World War II were later used for unlawful deployment (Okoli, 2021). Since then, the rise of underground marketplaces (such as the black market, military weapons procurement system breaches, smuggling, and small-scale individual transactions) has become a global security concern (Dahari et al., 2019).

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2022), the largest exporters of major arms, namely the United States (39 percent), Russia (19 percent), France (11 percent), China (4.6 percent), and Germany (4.6 percent), have a global share of major arms exports from 2017 to 2022. (4.5 percent). The impact of SALW trade reveals that growing arms spending from major nations increases the number of human rights violations in the world, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights' Annual Report and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General (UNHR, 2020). The easy availability of conventional weapons among the general populace leads to an increase in crime rates. The civilian population suffers greatly from the misuse of other conventional weapons by state security forces, non-state armed organizations, and organized crime groups due to the lack of clear legal legislation regulating the arms trade. The United Nations (UN) decided to address the problem of unrestricted arms trafficking, which was generating a humanitarian disaster, by establishing an arms trading system. The Arms Trade Treaty is the name of the framework that governs the arms trade (Stavrianakis, 2016). The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is the first international agreement to regulate the establishment of global standards for trade in arms, ammunition, weapons components, and spare parts, with the goal of preventing violence, armed conflict, human rights violations, and violations of international humanitarian law (Kalinina & Kozyulin, 2010). The United Nations General Assembly approved this Treaty on April 2, 2013.

The ATT went into effect on December 23, 2014, and is now a part of international law. However, ATT has flaws when it comes to import-export activity (Maletta, 2021). As a result, ATT has a problem when it comes to controlling SALW export-import. There are no clear guidelines for imposing sanctions on countries that break these criteria. Export actions against Saudi Arabia in the United Kingdom do not breach the ATT's guidelines. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, uses weaponry made in the UK to carry out bombings that kill Yemeni people (Fachriana, 2021). On the basis of this case, it can be determined that the ATT's implementation is still lacking, as it opposes the agreement's goals. As a result, it is possible to conclude that ATT is ineffective (Witarti, 2014). In addition, Indonesia elected not to participate in the ATT. This is because Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT agreement say that before executing a transaction, the exporting state has the authority to analyze the importing state's security and the distribution of weapons delivered (Nave, 2019). This situation jeopardizes the national interest, as Indonesia continues to rely on arms exports to meet defense equipment needs because domestic producers have yet to establish themselves (Sazqya, 2022).

After Indonesia's withdrawal from the ATT, this paper tries to describe the alternative SALW trade diplomacy strategy. As a result, the realism perspective hypothesis can be used to explain why Indonesia rejects it. In addition, the intelligence function will be used to overcome policies pertaining to Indonesia's
ATT status. The realism perspective emphasizes competition between countries for greater influence and power than other countries. The realism perspective's basic assumptions, according to Viotti and Kauppi (2012), are: 1) The state is the main and most important actor in an anarchic international system; 2) The state is a unitary actor because every internal element of the state is integrated in the form of only one policy produced at a specific time regarding a specific issue; and 3) The state is a rational actor. Profit maximization and sacrifice minimization are the goals of rational policy; and 4) Given the anarchic structure of the international system, national/international security is the most pressing issue. According to realism, the state has a nature that is constantly concerned about its safety in competitive relationships with other countries. The state will focus on sustaining its existence (survival) in this situation, which is assessed by the amount of security (security). In addition, the role of defense diplomacy is critical in understanding Indonesia's stance on the ATT (Gumay et al., 2018). This is because diplomacy skills are a precondition for diplomacy involved in international politics that is used to obtain agreements, compromise, and settle difficulties in order to attain national goals. As a result, diplomacy is a means for states to work together and settle disputes without resorting to bloodshed (Rhasintya, 2020).

Defense diplomacy for defense capacities, on the other hand, is conducted to substantially increase defense capabilities, one of which is the purchase of defense equipment and other defense components (Sudarsono et al., 2018). Meanwhile, strategic collaboration between governments in weapons manufacturing, weapons development, research, licensing, defense industry investment, and technology transfer is carried out as part of defense diplomacy for the defense industry. Jonesti’s (2016) analysis demonstrates that abstaining is the best option for Indonesia. This is because upgrading weapons is critical to the national interest.

Meanwhile, Putranto (2015) stated that dialogues and negotiations are one of the tactics that can provide outcomes in diplomatic endeavors. Based on the foregoing context, Indonesia claims the right to possess conventional weapons in order to protect itself, and the authors are curious in learning more about the success of Indonesia’s diplomacy in achieving its ATT goals. As a result, this research examines the ATT’s post-entry into force defense diplomacy approach.

2. Methodology

The research approach used in this study is descriptive analytical qualitative research (Creswell, 2017). This study was carried out at the Ministry of Defense and the State Intelligence Agency in Jakarta (BIN). Qualitative research methods involve direct interaction between researchers and study subjects in order to acquire complete data for more in-depth and precise analysis. Interviews and a literature review were utilized to acquire data for this investigation. To collect reliable information to address research questions, interviews were performed with resource persons connected to study topics who were assessed as competent in their respective disciplines. The participants were chosen using the purposive sampling technique. Interviews were conducted with the Ministry of Defense’s Director of International Cooperation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Director of International Security and Disarmament (KIPS), the State Intelligence Agency’s Director of International Cooperation, and Defense Diplomacy Lecturers. The use of qualitative research observation and interview methodologies is supplemented by a literature review. The documents used in this study are both public and private.
ATT-related documents. A data triangulation validation technique was applied in the investigation (Creswell, 2017). The researcher employed the source and informant triangulation technique. Interviewing a variety of competent and reputable informants is used to triangulate sources (Bowen, 2009). The veracity of data from numerous informants relating to the problems studied was checked as part of the informant triangulation process. The goal is to analyze the veracity of the data provided by the sources in this study by comparing the opinions and perspectives of persons from various professional backgrounds and areas of expertise. Miles and Huberman's interactive model analysis was used to analyze the data in this study (1994). During the data mining process, there are three key components to the analysis process. The first is data reduction, which is a method of selecting and directing attention in order to eliminate irrelevant data or information that will be checked later. Then there’s the data presentation, which is a description of a set of organized data that allows you to draw conclusions and take action. The ultimate action of qualitative research is drawing conclusions or verification.

3. Result and Discussion

Indonesia offered an agreement to the ATT, which commenced in 2006. The agreement is about determining how participants will examine the feasibility of transferring conventional weapons. Indonesia suggests that an independent panel investigate the possibility of arms exports (Sazqya, 2022). Although Indonesia bears a moral obligation as a member of the world community, this does not preclude it from pursuing its own specific interests in defense. All international agreements in a strategic environment are conditional on desires/interests, which means that treaties, agreements, conventions, and laws are only arrangements that will be set aside if the provisions conflict with the state's interests and have an impact on the surrounding environment. Indonesia viewed the ATT as being detrimental to its national interests. This premise explains why Indonesia can refuse to ratify the ATT, despite the fact that it initially supported its formation (Rhasintya, 2020).

Indonesia actively supports the construction of ATT due to the presence of conflicts and the illicit trade of conventional weapons in sensitive areas. These issues of identity politics are, on the whole, long-lasting and extremely emotional. Conflicts that occur as a result of identity politics tend to last a long time. In armed separatism and political movements, vertical tensions arise between the state and society, posing a national threat. Indonesia has long struggled with vertical conflicts in Aceh and Papua, which have taken on all the dimensions and personalities of the current conflict (Lele, 2021). The two clashes are a result of regional frustration with economic inequalities as well as physical abuses in the form of repression. This breeds skepticism and contempt for the central government. Indonesia also stressed that the ATT must explain the state's right to territorial integrity, which allows it to safeguard its citizens from domestic conflicts. Conflicts that erupted in several parts of the country backfired on Indonesia. There is still the possibility of conflict in Indonesia, despite the fact that there is now no substantial violence.

The existence of ATT makes these weapons subject to international rules. However, it is possible to remain in the problem at the point of humanity. It is considered that the rules of war are only intended to justify the conditions of
human death in war. (Results of the Interview with the Director of International Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense, December 2021).

On December 24, 2014, the ATT officially entered into force or had come into force. However, several states continued to abstain because it was judged that ATT had not accommodated their interests, especially in the defense sector. Several things in the ATT are considered to be flow in nature, which causes Indonesia not to join the ATT regarding our rights as importers and are controlled by exporters. (Results of the Interview with the Director of International Security and Disarmament (KIPS) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 2021).

According to the Director of the Ministry of Defense's International Cooperation, Government Regulation No. 43 of 2012 governing defense states that Indonesia is forbidden from acquiring conventional weapons if political conditions exist. As a result, it is regarded legal for Indonesia to explore for alternatives to other states that still sell a lot of defense equipment if there are states that link ATT as a prerequisite in purchasing defense equipment from that state. Aside from that, Indonesia is inextricably linked to commerce; looking at countries like the United States and Russia, where AK-47 rifles have spread over Africa and are even used by tiny children, they have turned into small fighters to defend their country (Saramifar, 2018). Export and import activities carried out by producing states are believed to increase the state budget and carry out defense in these cases. Furthermore, the occurrence of infractions by the importing state is outside the agreement prior to the use of weapons.

Indonesia, through Pindad company, sells SSI weapons to the Philippines; Indonesia has made a legal agreement with the government so that it is not misused for humanitarian violations. However, SSI weapons will be distributed to Filipino rebels in Mindanao by the Philippine Army. (Results of the Interview with the Director of International Security and Disarmament (KIPS) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 2021).

A system to manage Indonesia's interests in generating conventional weapons is required. There have been no barriers in bilateral military diplomacy between Indonesia and governments that support the ATT at the UN General Assembly since the passage of the ATT in 2014. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that there is no serious threat to Indonesia from abstention. According to the results of the interviews, Indonesia has interests, including the need to regulate the arms trade and defense interests. Indonesia's interests in defense diplomacy are divided into three categories: Confidence Building Measures (CBM), defense capacity, and defense industry.

Indonesia is interested in regulating international conventional weapons to ensure world peace and security in defense diplomacy for CBM (Chotimah et al., 2019). Conflict, criminality, and terrorism have all been exacerbated by the lack of regulation governing the trade in conventional weapons. Indonesia's goal in the defense industry and defense capabilities is to gain imported conventional weapons as well as the right to collaborate in the development of conventional weapons. The partnership between Indonesia and South Korea has continued after the ATT came into force. In April-September 2015, the activities included negotiating Work Share and Cost Share. Even though South Korea is a party to the ATT, it is considered that this has no bearing on cooperation in the development of
conventional weapons with Indonesia, despite Indonesia's abstention from the treaty following its coming into force.

**The Effectiveness of Indonesia's Abstaining Attitude Against ATT to Maintain Indonesia's Position in ATT**

Diplomacy theory describes how Indonesia's diplomacy was carried out throughout the development of the ATT, and strategy theory serves as a framework. Based on Indonesia's various methods at ATT, which included communication and offer deals. Indonesia falls into the group of dealmakers/negotiators, in which the attainment of interests is accomplished by entering into an agreement, which is always preferable to nothing at all if the arrangement is undesirable. Indonesia expressed its opinions on the provisions of the newly created forum. Furthermore, the ATT formation process includes making an offer of an agreement to mediate in the ATT. Indonesia agreed to implement a plan that would have an independent panel review the feasibility of arms exports. As a result of most European Union governments rejecting this, the ATT was not accommodated, and Indonesia chose to abstain from ratifying the treaty.

Indonesia's stance on the ATT is that it elected to support it at the outset of its establishment, but then chose to abstain in 2013. Aside from Indonesia's participation in ATT for the sake of interest, it is also the international community's responsibility to address the issue of no rules in the arms trade. Furthermore, the ATT was established to combat the illegal trafficking in conventional weapons. This indicates that, despite its support for the formation of ATT, Indonesia continues to underline its national security concerns.

Taking this abstention stance is quite good because Indonesia, in the position of a producer, is still not 100% ready for rocket-missile weapons; we still depend on foreign states, with a note that we did not take long to abstain, for now, we have to concretize domestically produced weapons (Interview with the Director of International Cooperation Agency State Intelligence, December 2021)

Meanwhile, Indonesia's abstention from ratifying the ATT after it enters into force can be extremely successful because arms interests can be accommodated, and imports and weapons development collaboration tend to continue. Indonesia can suppress the illicit trade in conventional weapons so that they do not circulate in conflict zones in Indonesia by using other international regimes, such as the United Nations Program of Actions (UNPoA), as an alternative to being able to serve the aims of regulating armaments. Indonesia's vote against the ATT is part of a strategy to keep Indonesia's present UN status. This means that Indonesia is not part of the ATT system and is still waiting to see what the consequences will be. However, Indonesia may need to be watchful against non-state actors attempting to escalate the crisis in the country by smuggling weapons. This is a source of concern for local communities that feel threatened when non-state actors intervene. After all, as a citizen, your primary concern is your safety. National and international security are the most significant issues, according to Viotti and Kauppi's (2012) realism perspective. As a result, the Indonesian government issued a policy related to the conventional arms trade by issuing Law No. 16 of 2012 concerning the Defense Industry, which is subject to strict supervision by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Customs; if there is a violation of the transfer of weapons, the purchase must be under military supervision. Furthermore, the state is the most powerful player in the international system. As a
result, the Indonesian government employs a diplomatic strategy employing negotiators and intelligence agents in discussions. This conference was convened to provide analysis, input, and recommendations on the steps that must be followed, as well as to foresee the risk of loss as a result of Abstain Indonesia's ATT attitude. On the other hand, our study supports Gumay et al. (2018)'s assertion that defense diplomacy is one of the diplomacy techniques. Furthermore, intelligence is involved not only in holding meetings but also in securing state policies and offering feedback on how government policies are being implemented in the field. Intelligence executes its tasks, which include conducting investigations, ensuring security, and raising funds, in order to support government policies. In addition, in order to ensure national security, manufacturing and consuming countries must continue to cooperate in the development of weapons. Because this study demonstrates the importance of state security in terms of armaments.

In the case of a conflict or a violation of the illegal use of weapons by non-state actors, Indonesia still has to renew weapons to carry out defense in the field of national security. The existence of a record of military embargoes in Indonesia is thought to pose a threat to weapon development, as every state has the right to renew and import legitimate conventional weapons to safeguard Indonesian territory's security. As a result, Indonesia must be vigilant in maintaining security, particularly in war zones where criminal activities to sell conventional weapons (particularly SALW) would emerge (Dahari et al., 2019). The government has used a dealmaker/negotiator method to deal with the transfer of conventional weapons in various ways. To boost the power of diplomacy and increase the state's foreign exchange to renew weapons and sustain national security, Indonesia must strengthen and continue to develop weapons independently. To resolve domestic conflict issues and provide opportunities for Indonesia to produce conventional weapons independently while prioritizing national interests, combining cooperation between the Indonesian national army (TNI), police in the Republic of Indonesia intelligence, BIN, and related ministries is critical.

4. Conclusion

For the time being, Indonesia's defense diplomacy policy of abstaining from international trade accords has proven to be extremely effective. This is bolstered by the fact that Indonesia has homework to complete, such as forbidding the use of imported weapons unless they are used to enforce the law against abuses of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, as well as internal disputes in the country. The ATT has neither resolved the problem of non-state actors illegally transferring conventional weapons, nor has it resolved Indonesia's internal conflict. Although abstention is very effective at the moment, it is hoped that this will not be the case in the future. Indonesia must be prepared to accept or reject future offers. Then it is Indonesia's job to maintain security stability in order to limit the risk of conflict and receive a positive evaluation from the exporting country. If Indonesia refuses, it will have to rely on imports to meet its defense demands. Intelligence plays an important part in assisting defense diplomacy efforts by gaining a better knowledge of intelligence. Intelligence plays a role in protecting state policies and providing input on how those policies are being implemented in the field.

Intelligence executes its tasks, which include conducting investigations, ensuring security, and raising funds, in order to support government policies. In addition, in order to sustain national security, producing and consuming states
must continue to cooperate in the development of weapons. It is recommended that the Indonesian government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs convene numerous international forums, particularly in the ASEAN region, to address conventional arms trade through foreign policy diplomacy and defense diplomacy in order to achieve national goals and interests. Intelligence is required to provide analysis, make recommendations based on investigations, and gather information about objective field circumstances. In every negotiation, Indonesian negotiators (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) must seek to advance Indonesia's interests. BIN can work with the Indonesian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Finance to construct a state defense industry by creating technologies for the production of conventional weapons that can be used by other government agencies to support national security and generate income. The findings of this study suggest that Indonesia's withdrawal from the ATT after its coming into force has no ramifications for the import of conventional weapons from countries that have signed the treaty. Further research, according to the researcher, should go more into the issue of defense diplomacy strategy for dealing with situations of violations of conventional weapons transfers.

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