Pakistan represents a society which is plural in nature with different ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic identities. Since its inception Pakistan has been facing a number of issues but the issue to manage various religious and ethnic minorities emerged as more significant and intricate one. After independence ruling authority started to assert Islam in such a way that religious minorities started to feel themselves insecure in Pakistan. Shia Hazara community is also one among those religious minorities which have been facing various sectarian conflicting situations. The main objective of this paper is to explain comprehensive historical account of sectarianism in Pakistan and reasons of persecution of Shia Hazara community of Quetta. This article is a constructive addition in the existing knowledge related to sectarianism and its impact on society of Pakistan. Researcher has conducted this research by using the historical and descriptive research methods to analyze the issue and to draw a conclusion.

Introduction

The emergent orthodoxy with reference to the traditional Islam in Pakistan is closely linked with the rise of militancy, sectarian tendencies and religious othering. In early years, the founding father of Pakistan; Mohammad Ali Jinnah as a progressive political leader professed the goals of religious pluralism and constitutional democracy for newly born state. Jinnah while delivering the very first address to the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan advocated equal citizenship irrespective of class, color, creed and religion. Keeping in view the plural nature of Pakistani society and its ethnic diversification, Jinnah declared that in this regard that Pakistani state would be religiously neutral.
This religious sect of Islam can be further identified by various ethnic groupings in Pakistan. The repeated incidents of violence, political and social oppression in Pakistan are largely caused by divergent and competing assertions of religious and ethnic identities on the bases of their apprehensions regarding equal constitutional status of citizenship, assumed socio-economic relative deprivation, and share in political power. Different religious and ethnic identities do not feel themselves secure in the existing state structure of Pakistan. Various governments have remained unable to implement in the true sense existing constitutional arrangements for the protection of religious minorities.

A Historical Account of Sectarianism in Pakistan

Pakistan since its inception is comprised of various regional, linguistic, ethnic and religious minorities. Shia sect almost constitutes 10-15 percent of population of Pakistani state whereas the majority of Pakistani population ranging from 80-85 percent adheres to Sunni sect (Kalin & Siddiqui, 2014). This makes Pakistan, second largest home to Shia community after Iran which is her neighboring country in West. During the period of British India, Sunni-Shia conflicts were largely uncommon and this trend did not change in post-independence period in Pakistan (Grare, 2007). The sectarian tendencies remained very minimal in early years of Pakistan however the issue of potential political and constitutional place of Islam prompted a debate on the role of religion in state structures, discourses and policies. The conservative elements such as Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani in first Constituent Assembly pressurized government to include Islamic provisions into the Objective Resolution in 1949 as they wished to see Pakistan a religious exclusive state. However, status of Islam as a guiding principle of future constitution was not only established due to emergent demands of Ulemas but substantial support was also extended to idea of an Islamic society (though not a theocratic one) by modern political leadership. It seemed that besides Ulemas, the political elite specifically who were deprived of their constituencies due to their migration towards Pakistan also wanted some degree of commitment to the idea of an Islamic state. Moreover, religious identity of Muslim community in Sub-Continent was previously much emphasized during the last years of independence movement by modern Muslim political elite which made it a compulsion for them to symbolically endorse Islam as guiding principle in post-partition period in Pakistan. Despite the inclusion of Islamic provisions into Objective Resolution, neither religion became an important dynamic of neither public policy formulation nor sectarianism proved to be key issue in early years (Abbas, 2010).

It was 1953 when very first time, sectarian conflict was visibly surfaced as a result of anti-Ahmediyya riots in Lahore. Earlier, Ahmedi group was generally recognized as a minor sect of Islam. In 1956, certain signs of Sunni-Shia hostility were apparent in Punjab on the issue of increasingly large Shia processions in Muharram. Some of Sunni religious leaders demanded to bar these processions, however respective issue settled peaceably by negotiations between the two sects.
involving the government machinery (Rieck, 2015). Despite the amicable resolution of the matter, this led to far-reaching consequences as Shia community became conscious about organizing the community as a distinct religious group and with effective leadership. Shia community started to assert itself and this assertion widened already existing gulf between Sunni and Shia sects. The leading organizational development of Shia community was largely backed by Shia landlords in Punjab and Sindh, largely industrialist elements from Karachi and trading families from Lahore. In 1957, Shia clerics via joint resolution by two Shia organizations, first time made political power claims by demanding reservation of seats for the community at provincial and national assemblies. However, this demand was not backed by a unified stand as it created disagreement within the Shia community specifically between clerics and landed aristocracy (Abbas, 2010). By this demand of Shia community it was apparent that Shia community feel itself politically a deprived community in political system of Pakistan.

Later under Ayub Khan Regime (1958-1969), various incidents of anit-Shia violence were evident. In 1963, Sunni-Shia tensions appeared primarily as result of an attack on Shia procession in Their, Khairpur Sindh, allegedly by Sunni radicals which caused mass killings of the Shia participants of that religious gathering (International Crisis Group Asia Report, 2005). This incident led to fortify Shia activism which compelled Ayub regime to seriously address Shia reservations by taking Shia Ulemas on board. In 1967, the establishment of Pakistan people’s Party (PPP) by a landlord; Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was a Shia but with secular credentials fostered the political identity of Shia community. Nevertheless, during Bhutto era, Shia youth inclined more towards liberal and radical substitutes, primarily due to their inspiration of left-wing ideologies than their religious establishment (Ahmad, 2003). Moreover, Shia intellectuals under pro-Shia Bhutto regime were more interested to compete Sunni right-wing parties and groups by joining left-wing political alliances and enlarging their influences to manifest political claims rather than sectarian contestations.

It is evident that apart from sectarian disagreements at elite level, Pakistani society was not predominantly characterized by opposing violent sectarian tendencies till the period of late 1970s. Though religion remained an important identity maker since the inception of idea of a separate state for Muslims in Sub-Continent, however the political exploitation of Islam in post-independence period in Pakistan remained primarily confined to secure legitimization of government and regimes. The relationship between Sunni and Shia sect in first three decades remained very cordial and as inter-sect marriages were largely acceptable. Moreover the members of Sunni sect used to participate in Shia rituals like religious processions and gatherings to annually mourn the death of grandson(Imam Hussain) of last prophet Hazarat Mohammad (PBUH) who martyred with his family members and associates in 680AD at battle of Karbala (Abbas, 2010).

It has been noted that political activity of Shia community primarily lacked distinct symbols of religious inspiration in pre-Zia regime period (Ahmad, 2003).
The underlying reasons of emergent polarization between Sunni and Shia can be traced by extensive overhauling of Constitution of 1973 under Zia regime which ingrained the orthodox version of Sunni Islam into the state discourses of Pakistan. One of the significant aspects of these Islamization reforms was announcement of an ordinance which authorized Pakistani state to automatically deduct Zakat (Religious Tax by an Islamic state) from the personal Bank accounts of Pakistani Muslim citizens. The imposition of Zakat in 1980 was strongly resisted by Shia community and their respective clerics as they argued to have their own jurisprudence primarily known as Fiqq-e-Jaafariya (Haqqani, 2006). The enforcement of respective ordinance was viewed contrary to the Shia jurisprudence by Shia community which brought far-reaching consequences for Pakistani state and society (Kalin & Siddiqui, 2014). This clearly developed the sectarian lines in Pakistan and in the backdrop of Iranian revolution of 1979, Shia community refused to subscribe to the Sunni brand of Islam while demanding separate religious identity of their sect. From 1970s and onwards, the interaction of religion and ethnicity led to form an “Ethnicized form of Islam” in Pakistan which was mainly the offshoot of various political movements primarily for the mobilization of masses for political reasons. This also illustrates that a tussle was visibly developed between the idea of a “state sponsored Islam” largely aimed to ensure legitimacy of the regimes and a counter form of Islam by various ethnic categories in response to the authoritarian modes of governance of military or military led- establishment. The politicization of religion in Pakistan seemed evident under Zia regime as antagonism towards Shia sect and non-Muslim minorities was generally increased as a result of state patronage to some Sunni groups (Falki & Bano, 2019). Islamization process by General Zia gave air to the existence differences between Sunni and Shia Sects. The government of Zia had provided official patronage to Sunni sect and they became more active to organize their activities against the Shia sect.

The sectarian developments and counter narratives by respective sects in Pakistan made Punjab a battle ground in 1980s for the execution of sectarian violence. It was evident as in 1985 largely in reaction to the Shia organization; Thereek-e-Fiqq-e-Jaafariya, a Deobandi cleric Haq Nawaz Jhangvi established an anti-Shia outfit known as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) which also secured some electoral success in Punjab. This Sunni organization was formed to compete the Shia activism as Jhangvi demanded that Zia regime should pronounce Shia as non-Muslim while declaring Pakistan a Sunni state (Ahmed, 2001). As a retort strategy, a radical Shia organization Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP) was formed which responded by retaliatory killings of members of opposite sect (Kalin& Siddiqui, 2014). It is also imperative to comprehend that in the district of Jhang, Sunni-Shia conflict was initially of economic rationale as this dispute surfaced between influential Shia landlords who controlled the economy of respective district and their Sunni peasants. Later, with the establishment of SSP cultural differences were much highlighted and turned into a sectarian skirmish (Ahmar, 2008: 6).
Under Zia regime on one hand, Shia sect was suspected to have connections with Iranian state to destabilize the pro-Sunni state of Pakistan. On the other side, Saudi Arab and United States of America extensively financed and backed the proxy war by Pakistan against Soviet Union. The flow of finances from these two states not only strengthened Sunni radical groups on Pakistan-Afghanistan boarder but also helped them to penetrate deeply into Pakistani society by their welfare and educational activities. This led to develop the network of Madaris (religious seminaries) following the tradition of Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith while providing radical groups the desired indigenous acceptance and societal support. Iran also countered increased Saudi and American influence on Pakistan by providing finances to the Shia religious scholars who studied in Iranian cities of Qom and Najaf which helped Shia clerics to establish their religious schools in most populated province of Punjab (International Crisis Group Report, December 12, 2011).

Later with the advent of globalization, religious militant organizations of respective sects developed their transnational links while extensively proliferating towards other provinces of Pakistan. It has been noted that in post-Iranian revolution period, Shia in Pakistan became more centralized while being more united with Shia community internationally. On the other hand, as an offshoot of international dynamics involved with Pakistan’s foreign policy choices during the Cold War and later mass migration of Pakistani labor force to Middle Eastern countries, Sunni groups were Arabnized. The Sunni inclination to adopt urbanization was also backed by funding provided by Saudi Arab to various sectarian organizations and madrasas which not only empowered these non-state actors in Pakistan but also provoked a competition among these Sunni groups to win state and international patronage primarily leading to formation of their factions and breakaways (Ahmad, 2003).

According to the data available from 1989-2018 on South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the peak of sectarian violence based incidents in Pakistan was in 1990 when almost 274 terrorist instances took place with the only exception of 2007 with total 341 terror attacks. However comparatively less number of terrorist attacks since 2002 did not provide that sectarian violence was on decline as causalities and killings in each terror incident were somewhat higher than 1990s (South Asian Terrorism Portal). It has been pointed out that increase in intensity of sectarian conflicts while making these more deadly in post-1990s and expansion of its social base is due to enhanced possibilities of usage of print media, availability of efficient channels of electronic communication, improved transport services largely facilitating the mobility of groups to join sectarian networking (Ahmar, 2008).

According to the constitution of Pakistan, this is the significant responsibility of state and concerned government to make necessary arrangements to ensure protection and security to various individuals of society and to provide them a conducive environment to groom their potential to participate in the development of country. Pakistan is a country which wants to promote peace and harmony among various ethnic and religious identities within its boundary. One can see that Pakistan
Pakistan has signed a number of international conventions related to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of citizens. Different segments of society of Pakistan enjoy the legitimate right to participate in political activities and play an effective role in the decision making process through their elected representatives and hold their representatives accountable for performing different responsibilities. All the citizens under the constitution of Pakistan has right to move freely within the boundary of state without any fear and celebrate their all rituals according to their specific belief system. All the basic rights which have been explained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are available in written form in the constitution of Pakistan. It has been explained in the article 36 of the constitution of Pakistan that protection would be given to minorities thus it becomes the responsibility of various ruling authorities to implement rules and regulations in the true sense and ensure the protection of various minorities of Pakistan. It will create a soft image of Pakistan at regional and global level and it will open a door for developing cordial relationship with different countries of the world and foreign direct investment will also increase which will give a boost up to the economy of the country. Government with stable economy will be able to formulate policies for the well being of social capital. Groomed, trained and economically well off individuals will tolerate each other and live together peacefully. The UN Declaration of 1992 related to rights of individuals of various linguistic, religious and ethnic minorities describes the responsibility of state to initiate different legislative and policy measures for the sake of protection of minorities and create a conducive environment to flourish their identities in their specific areas (NCHR, 2018). The state of Pakistan is having the responsibility to initiate different security measures related to various ethnic, religious and cultural minorities. Various governments have been initiating different legislative and policy measures to build an environment of harmony among different identities within the territorial boundaries of Pakistan. But these measures remained unable to bring the desired results because people do not cooperate. Shia Hazara community of Pakistan has been facing persecution especially in Balochistan by the non-state actors and government of Pakistan is accountable to ensure security of Shia Hazara Community of Quetta. According to Home Department of Balochistan from 2013 to 2018 during different incidents of target killing, suicide attack and bomb blast 509 Hazaras have been killed. (NCHR, 2018) Under these circumstances threat perception for Hazaras living in Balochistan have become more visible and strong. Pakistan is a plural society with different cultural, religious linguistics and ethnic minorities. Official religion of Pakistan is Islam with 96% of Muslim population and dominant sects are Sunni and Shia. Hazara people are easily identifiable because of their unique facial features. They have strong affiliation with Shia sects and become easy target of attack by opponent group during sectarian conflicts. The Shia community of Pakistan visits Iran on the regular basis because there are many holy places. It has been observed for many past years that Shia have been facing many serious threats for their life while they were travelling towards Iran through Nushki, Dalbandin Mastung and Taftan border. Hazara people are more vulnerable to attacks because of their facial features. Different incidents have been reported when during travel from Balochistan to Iran militants killed passengers with Hazara identity. When one
goes through the history of attacks on Hazara, a number of bloodiest incidents can be found.

The Demography of Shia Hazara Community

One of the most vulnerable segment of Pakistani population is a Persian-speaking ethnic minority known as Hazara community which largely resides in Quetta; the provincial capital of Balochistan. The province of Balochistan is less developed constituent unit of Pakistani federation which suffered due to various incidences of insurgencies and largely remained victim of uneven development of Pakistani state. Hazara is the third largest ethnic minority group based in Central Afghanistan which constitutes almost 20 percent of the population, largely out of 30 million inhabitants of Afghan state. The majority of Hazaras in Afghanistan are Shia although some of them belong to Sunnis and Ismaili sect. Iran has second largest number of Hazara group which is approximately 1,534,000 (Gier, 2014).

Some sources revealed that people of Hazara community migrated from Afghanistan to Balochistan almost 150 years ago. In Afghanistan, due to their Persian dialect, Mongolian features and Shia identity, Hazaras seem discernably distinct from majority of ethnic Pashtun who follow Sunni school of thought. The apparent identity of Hazaras primarily based on their facial features along with their religious affiliation with Shia sect led to view them as outsiders by many in Afghanistan (Aljazeera, June 27, 2016). The discrimination against Hazaras remained patent by their persecution in Afghanistan throughout the history. In nineteen century, King Amir Abdul Rahman Khan of Afghanistan; who was an ethnic Pashtun, ordered mass killing of Hazaras which caused death of almost ten thousand members of Hazara community. Moreover during nineteen century, Hazaras were also sold as slaves in Afghanistan. This brutal practice in Afghanistan in 1880s forced large number of Hazaras to flee towards eastern and western side of city of Quetta, which is now part of south west of Pakistani Province of Balochistan. During the rule of the hardliner Taliban in Afghanistan (1996–2001), Hazaras were again exposed to an unprecedented degree of ferocity and oppression due to their religious identity as Shia Muslims (Saikal, 2012). This caused another phase of migration of Hazaras towards Quetta from Afghanistan (The Diplomat, April 25, 2019).

It has been provided that the number of Hazara community in Pakistan can be from 650,000 to 900,000. It has been also assessed that majority of them live in Quetta which is nearly 500,000 (World Directory of Minorities & Indigenous People). Other than Quetta, Hazara community is spread over major urban centers of different provinces like Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Karachi and Lahore. It is reported that approximately 25000 families of Hazara Shia live in Karachi, largely concentrated in the areas of Mughal Hazara Goth and Hussain Hazara Goth. Some segment of Hazara population also reside in Parachinar, Sanghar, Hyderabad and Nawabshah and some areas of Gilgit-Baltistan (Country Policy & Information Note, 2019).
Geographic Dynamics of Sectarian Violence against Shia Hazara in Quetta

The Hazara community in Pakistan also included some Sunni population however most of the people of this ethnic group are adherents of Shia sect. The susceptibility of Hazara population in Pakistan is primarily caused by their ethnic origin and religious beliefs which are significantly different from majority Sunni population of Pakistani state. The sectarian dispute is one of the underlying reasons for instigating violence against Hazara Shia in Balochistan by Sunni radical elements. The persistence of distress of persecution and potential threats from non-state actors for Hazara community in Quetta are comparatively high than any other Shia community in Pakistan due to their distinctive appearance including lighter skin color and oriental facial features which make them easily identifiable even in large gatherings. It has been noted that due to their unique Mongolian facial features, militants usually distinguished from other passengers and killed them.

The second most important reason of being an easy target for radical groups is concentration of population of Shia Hazara in certain areas of Quetta. The most part of population of Hazara community in Quetta reside in the lower and middle income areas of Alamdar road towards Mariabad (also called Mari Abad) and Hazara Town (Brewery road) which are enclaves as surrounded by high walls. These two districts are connected by Spini road which is approximately 11.2 kilometers and in past, most of attacks on Hazara community were made when they traveled along this road. (The Diplomat, April 16, 2019). The securitization of Hazara community is evident by the fact that these areas included several security checkpoints guarded by federal paramilitary troops of Pakistani state. However these security measures failed to protect Hazara community in Quetta as attacks continued and proliferated towards the Hazaras especially targeted them while they were going to work, universities, taking public transport, shopping in the local markets or following their daily routine. The extensive security safeguards remained counterproductive as Hazara community became hostage into the enclaves of Mariabad and Hazara Town districts and their socio-economic activities were jeopardized. These two districts became camps and jail for community of Hazara due to inevitable segregation largely resultant of extensive security scrutiny of respective areas.

Historically, Balochistan remained a plural and tolerant society however several episodes of insurgencies and constant overlooking of Baloch apprehensions regarding their socio-economic deprivation and overlooking of their political rights from Central government factionalized the province. It is important to note that generally discrimination against Hazara Shia is not found at societal level although their freedom of movement remained limited due to security reasons (Country Policy & Information Note, Pakistan: Hazara, 2019). Additionally, due to confinement caused by prospective harm to their lives, education, health and employment opportunities remained limited to the community and they had been suffered due to resultant isolation. Most of the facilities of education and health are provided by the community itself in the enclave areas. It is imperative to note that
historically Hazara Shia never remained a party to any conflict neither in Balochistan nor in city of Quetta but their persecution primarily resulted of the fact that they are helpless minority and an easy target for homicidal indignation of radical non-state actors in Pakistan. It has been reported by National Commission of Human Rights (NCHR) that since 1999, Hazara community has been repeatedly attacked by militants and terrorists through target killings and bombings as approximately 2000 Hazara Shia are killed (NCHR Report, 2018).

The Hazara Shia also live in other areas of Balochistan other than Quetta such as Much, Loralai, Dukki, Harnai, Sanjawiand Zhob (NHCR Report 2018). Others areas of frequent attacks on Shia in Quetta are Mastung, Nushki, Dalbandin and 650 kilometer route to Taftan boarder; a passage Shia used to visit the holy places located in Iran and Iraq. The Hazara community used to host these Shia pilgrimage tours, however these Shia groups are recurrently targeted. Despite the joint patrolling of police, Frontier Crops (FC) and deployment of a special ‘Eagle force’ on the respective route, the miseries of Hazara Shia community were not reduced as most often these armed forces become target of terror attack as well (Dawn, November 12, 2018). Moreover FC largely remained less successful to disarm Lashkar e Jhangvi (LeJ) in Quetta and there is also persistence of an uneasy relationship between Hazara community and this para military force where people of this group have apprehensions of lack of determination among the security force to address the problem. Whereas, security and law enforcement agencies also viewed this community as untrustworthy for their alleged connections with Iran (Dawn, June 26, 2014).

**Phases of Sectarian Violence against Shia Hazara Leading to Their Persecution**

In post-Zia period, Pakistani political system faced various shocks and breakdown primarily leading to removal of four elected governments after almost every two year. This made political instability a significant problem while overlooking all other persistent threats to national cohesion in Pakistan. The expressions of sectarian violence against Hazara community materialized in three phases. The first phase was significantly characterized by intense radical propaganda largely backed by the state narratives in the back drop of Soviet invasion in neighboring Afghanistan as well to counter its fallout for Pakistan in the support of its foreign policy choices. The Pakistani state patronage to the Sunni radicalism paved grounds for prejudice and fanaticism against Shia sect. During 1990s, the offshoot of Islamization policies of previous Zia regime was quite perceptible by rise of sectarianism by home grown militant groups in Pakistan. The Sunni jihadi groups like SSP and its offshoot emerged in 1996 largely recognized as Lashkar-e-Jangvi (LeJ) viewed Shia as apostates of Islam. In the later period, they not only considered Shias who has renounced Islam but also targeted certain sub-sect of Sunni Islam such as Barelvis as unfaithful to Islam while largely viewing them deserving of death penalty. In 1981 under Zia regime, the first sectarian expression by calling Shia ‘Kafir’ was made by posting it on the walls of Quetta, however locals largely ignored it.
The second phase of sectarian violence involved the targeting killings of prominent and high profile members of Hazara community. The emergent religious ‘Othering’ and its extreme sectarian tones led to the very first incident of sectarian violence against a public figure of Hazara community when provincial education minister, Sardar Nasir Ali Hazara escaped an assassination attempt. Pakistani state authorities did not take concrete measures to counter the first wave of sectarian violence against Shia which resulted the selection, attacks and killings of People of Hazara community from all walks of life.

The third phase of sectarian violence against Hazara Shia proved to be ruthless and widespread as mass murder of this ethnic group in Quetta began (Dawn, November 12, 2018). This phase led to a sort of ethnic cleansing of Hazara at the hands of extremist non-state actors. The mass targeted killings as third wave largely made the environment of city of Quetta for Hazara Shia somewhat threatening (NHCR Report, 2018). Though LeJ is a banned outfit in Pakistan however such militants groups used to enjoy some sort of support within society due to their alleged religiosity. In a similar way, LeJ has roots in province of Punjab and its militants organized publicly anti-Shia gathering in Quetta. The instances of persistent violence apparently based on sectarian disgust against Hazara Shia in Quetta made the community miserable while looking to two options to survive; one is to relocate to some other place or to convert to Sunni sect. The two decades of persecution and maltreatment of Hazara Shia community seemingly caused by sectarian reasons however it is primarily result of multifaceted factors comprising security, geo-politics, ethnic contentions, socio-economic realities of ethnic groups resided in Quetta, sectarian radicalism and religious militancy spread in other parts of the Pakistan and across the border. (NCHR, 2018).

Conclusion

Threat perception is common among Hazara people. They are not comfortable while managing their daily affairs. They are unable to exercise their basic rights freely such as freedom of mobility, the very basic right the right of life. They are unable to send their children in different educational institutions and especially to get higher education. They are unable to go to earn their daily living. They are unable to enjoy various social opportunities because they have limited social opportunities. They do not feel free to visit shopping malls. They are supposed to go only in few safe areas. Under this environment of insecurity and threat it has become difficult for Hazara people of Quetta to use their potential and contribute positively in the development of country though they have capability to work constructively in different fields of life. Federal government in collaboration with the provincial government of Balochistan did initiate various steps to provide a sense of security to the Shia Hazara community of Quetta. For example to establish FC and police check posts for the security of Hazara community at the entrance points of Hazara town and Marri Abad. Government has to take steps to restore the confidence of Hazara community and bridge up the existing gulf between...
government and Hazara community. Government has to initiate a strict and sound policy against those elements who are responsible to make target this community. Actually these elements can be very destructive for the security of the country and distorting the soft image of Pakistan at the regional and global level.
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