Hidden Riot: Investigating the Impact of Rural–Urban Gap in Afghanistan’s Political Changes

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Abstract
Afghanistan, with major rural population is of the countries that face varieties of problems for transformation from tradition to modernity (underdevelopment). Nowadays various social gaps in this geographical area have crystallized in ethnic clef; has been originated from another background that the most important is the rural-urban gap. This hidden gap has shown itself in different forms in the social history of Afghanistan. Sometimes with a cover of Tribe, sometimes in the form of wealth and poverty and sometimes it rises with a cover over modernity and tradition. Development experts concentrate on other gaps and they didn’t pay enough attention to this important gap. The question is: What has been the role of rural-urban gap in underdevelopment and political changes in Afghanistan? In a country where social relations are generated from rural areas and political changes rise by using violent tools in different forms, necessitate deep socialistic investigations on ruling relations in rural communities that constitute the most population of the country. It seems inattention to rural people needs and problems led to the profound gap which shaped violent changes in the history of Afghanistan. Meaningful rural relations, nomadism and tribal culture, have led to many partitions in the process of development.

Keywords: Social gaps, Political development, Rural development, Tribal culture.

Introduction
Almost all sociologists and development experts consider Afghanistan as a rural country with rural traditions that emanate from rural life and they have brought up a lot of obstacles in the way of Afghanistan’s transformation from a traditional to modernity society. All thinkers and intellectuals believe that Afghanistan needs to join a universal development caravan and all believes and emphasise that there are a lot of challenges and obstacles in the way of development. Meanwhile, different ideas have been expressed about challenges and barriers to development. Some consider tribal relations as a non-development solution. (Mahdi, 1389: 64) Some others consider tribal culture the main cause of non-development in the country (Ansari, 1382: 66-68). Some scholars have also considered nomadic structure, fundamentalism and authoritarianism efficient in Afghanistan’s non-development. (Arefi, 1393: 115-279). The political system (presidential), about which many statements have been made, is considered a barrier to political development. (Rahimi, 1390: 181). Abdul Hafiz Mansour is acknowledging the factors such as poverty, tribal culture, type of political system, the policy of elder Pashtun brother tribe and the domination of wrong interpretations of religion consider the main causes of non-development. (Mansour 1392, 13). Some political scholars in Afghanistan consider similar variables as important factors in non-development. Mohammad Shafaq Khawati categorising the development obstacles in the classification of barriers and cultural challenges (rationality and tribal culture, dogmatic interpretation of religion, traditional structure of society, tyranny over
people, administrative structure and outlawing), political challenges and barriers (violent political culture and pessimism to human nature, degeneration in political morality, weakness of civil society and degradation of political parties), barriers and economic challenges (traditionally closed economy), and external barriers and challenges (imposing democracy and generalisation of particular pattern and impermissible middling of some countries) has been exploring the issue with more details. (Kawai, 1388: 207-222). According to Ahmad Zia Rafat presidential system, centralised political system, non-partisan election, governmental Media, weak public awareness, economic weakness and weak civil institutions are the major obstacles and challenges in the way of development and democracy. (Rafat, 1388: 233-237). Nazer Hussain Afghanyar has the same view. He evaluates lack of national democratic forces, democracy in tribal deals, and lack of national government are barriers in the way of development. (Afghanyar, 1388: 253-256).

Some, due to the lack of modern formation of economic relations, have highlighted Afghanistan’s weak middle-class society as the main obstacle to development. (Erfan and Khani, 1395: 7). The sociology of Afghanistan’s social gaps has not been seriously debated. Only Abdul Qayyum Sajadi has penetrated the issue by analysing Afghanistan’s sociological social gaps by focusing on two ethnic and religious cracks. (Sajadi, 1391: 63-109). So far, no significant research has been done about rural sociology and rural development management. Regardless of the urban-rural gap, almost all sociologist and political development experts in Afghanistan have been considered other issues in non-development. We should not forget that the tribal mindset, considered the main factor of the non-development and political crisis in Afghanistan regardless of the locale of the urban-rural gap, is the key factor of this mindset.

Considering the above-mentioned issues, there is an urgent need for a scientific analysis of the rural-urban gap. The results of such gap should be carefully examined in crisis making and non-development. To repair such gap drastic steps should be taken by Afghan statesmen.
(kingdom substitution) is not his business unless his daily life is endangered. But the display of power outside the city is local lords (Khan) struggle to remain on the scene to increase their allies and be recognised as a legitimate ruler and verdict. To achieve these goals, they should increase wealth and allies. This is the ideal of a local lord. Sometimes the battle for power in nomadic areas presents itself in a violent manner. However, this display does not have many spectators, and whatever is the consequence, no change takes place in a traditional structure. (Oliver Roy, 1369: 25-26). When still rural and urban infrastructures were not completely ruined, a permissible analysis rural-urban gap is possible. He later, in another study with Andre Brigo, analysed the urban-rural gap about the political sociology of Afghanistan by analysing the political system and decisions making of Afghan political parties. (Brigo & Roy, 1366: 29). Finally, in an article, they named the war in Afghanistan “the war of poor peasants”. Among Afghan experts, Qasim Akhgar is the only expert who has paid deep attention to the urban-rural gap. He believes the rural-urban gap is one of the obstacles in the way of institutionalization of democracy in Afghanistan. Gap and distance between town and village, imbalanced economic, social and regional growth are the undeniable characteristics of Afghanistan. It is based on this fact which rural people look with suspicion, alienation and even sometimes with hostility and humiliation to urban areas and civilisation, so this is the result of the deep gap between rural-urban areas. The villagers in the farthest corner of the country abhor the urban residents and towns. They feel urban residents bleed them dry and enjoying the blessing of their suffering. They believe every kind of facilities including health, well-being, and well-fair, are available in towns. On the other hand, the collection of catastrophes such as misery, illness and poverty are in the villages. In such a situation, every kind of phenomenon which arises in cities is seen with suspicion especially those which are the target of tendentious propaganda of backward and fanatic movements. When democracy is considered as a government, urban and mechanical project, are considered as a means of imposing will which created by urban people for the continuity of their cruel relations with villagers. At the time, left-wing ruling (Khalq) this characteristic intensified because all disasters and mass killing out broke from cities. Villages became the shelters of the people who were fighting with a centre of crime and cruelty. Those who wore villager’s clothes and left behind their urban appearance to reduce the suspicions. The truth is that democracy and it emanates values are still urban meanwhile rural people are the majority and they are unaware about it. They only see some signs of democracy in the performance of government administrations which the imposition of urban and they are involved in corruption, bribery, immorality and aristocracy. Meanwhile, neither government nor political parties nor civil society institutions have any especial plan for rural awareness. On the other hand, enemies and opponents of democracy are fully equipped. The government knows rural areas through its appointments, properties and barons. (Akhgar, 1388: 12-13).

Conceptual Framework of Research

The conceptual framework of research is taken from the sociological theory of social gaps. Some sociologists have talked about social contradiction and aggression instead of social gaps. It seems that social contradictions and aggressions have a more comprehensive concept. The social gap can practically lead to disintegration, the partition of population and creating new groups and bonds which may appear in political and organisational forms. The general principle of political sociology is that the political life in every country is influenced by various unique methods of social gaps and the methods that gaps are formulated. However, the diversity of political sociology of different countries is due to the type and number of these gaps and the methods of their formulation.

Social conflict theories are among those that try to explain social gaps, identifying social conflicts because these conflicts and contradictions lead to various political implications, including fleeting political events, new political policies and life-long political institutions. In this regard, it is important to distinguish between two main tendencies in the theory of conflict based on the emphasis on the type of social gaps and the historical role of social conflict in the course of history. The first tendency
is the category of theories that are more and less directly related to Marxist tradition. In this point of view, the basic material interests of various groups that are intertwined with political forces are at the hub of analysis. In the final analysis, these collateral interests have deep roots in the mode of production, which create two main classes of the capitalist system (labour and master). It is believed that the struggle between these two major classes and their representative organisations are the main keys to explaining the political implications. Based on this traditional thought, eventually, the working class fight to overthrow the current mode of production and struggled to reach a more advanced method, which in its apex emerged in Socialism. Finally, in this new mode of production, fundamental conflicts derived from material interests will be ended. In this sense, the battle of the downtrodden is “progressive” and their purpose is to eliminate social struggles. (Pippa Norris & Others, 1388, 16). The most important difference between Marxist and other social conflict theories is that the non-Marxist tendencies do not put social conflicts in the discursive perspective such as historical progress. This category of theories take the advantage of Weberian sociology tradition. They regard social and political conflicts as inescapable, stable and permanent in social life and do not prioritise class struggles. They consider established political power itself is the main source of gap and social conflict or emphasise that in addition to economic interest, other various social resources such as race, sex, ethnicity, religion, language, and age are available for social conflicts which every single above mentioned factors can generate new groups that compete with each other and pursue different political ends and in this course they may be able to defeat their opponents or make them downtrodden. (Pippa Norris & Others, 1388: 16-17). Seymour Martin Lipest is of the thinkers who talk about the social gap because the focusing on economic relations derived from industrialisation, and acknowledge to this fact such relations conducive to a gap between haves and have-nots. However, his insistence on reaching to democratic compromise is appealing to both classes. In another essay, he also has analysed the role of social gaps in structuring the voting behaviour in individuals. Seymour Martin Lipest and Stan Rackan brought up social gaps by writing the party system and voters alignment in political sociology. (Pippa Norris & Others, 1388: 17-18). In the following steps, scholars such as Gary Cox and Liphart have written about the same issue. Cox, like Lipest and Rackan, believes that the more social gaps in a country, the more political parties there will be. (Pippa Norris & Others, 1388: 19). Liphart stated: “When the dimensions of political struggle are multiples in a society, we can expect to express all that dimensions; there must be a large number of parties unless these dimensions are overlapping”. (Pippa Norris & Others, 1388: 19). It is obvious due to the different economic, social and cultural situations of north and south countries, the types of social gaps in these countries are different. In developing countries, the process of different social groups’ participation and nation-state building has been the most fundamental social and political difficulties in this structure. But in this process, great challenges are revealed from the social gaps necessarily conducive to a ruling of monarchy and autocratic governments or involving the society in long-term civil war. (As we have seen in Afghanistan). (Pippa Norris & Others, 1388: 20). Lipest and Rackan, after all-pervasive studies, have divided social gaps into three broad categories. Situational gaps, behavioural gaps and ideological gaps are the three gaps that are mentioned by these two thinkers. (Pippa Norris & Others, 1388: 21-22). Joel S. Migdal, in strong societies, weak states, government and community ties and government capabilities in the third world (1988), has tried to develop such a model for explaining the social gap in the developing world. The foundations of Migdal’s theory are strong state, weak state, fibroid or networked society, survival strategies, social control and survival politics. (Pippa Norris & Others, 1388: 23). Generally, gaps in developing countries have been divided into tradition and modernity gaps, generation gap, rich and poor gap, linguistic gap, religious gap, ethnic gap, gender gap and rural-urban gap. In the social gaps survey geographical variations and historical variations should be considered. According to such variations, social gaps can be divided into active or inactive, structural and historical gaps. In terms of influencing political life,
social gaps should be divided into active and inactive gaps. For example, from a political point of view, class gaps in a country might be neutral or inactive. It means political consciousness, organisation, and political action are not based on it. When political consciousness, action and grouping build based on conception, social gaps are activated. (Bashiriya, 1391: 99). The transition from inactive status to active status implying processes in which social mobilisation be discussed. In this respect, two situations can be imagined:

- The gap is currently inactive and may activate in future, such as class gaps in semi-industrial societies.
- The gap was activated in the past, but it has lost its effectiveness, such as religious gaps in industrial societies. (Bashiriya, 1391: 100).

In terms of the necessity of conception, some gaps are structural, some others are historical and coincidental. Structural gaps are the gaps that have emerged and continue to exist in the context of unchanging and stable features of human life. For example, the continuity of the division of social labour always compels a kind of class gap. Division of sexual and age of population between men and women, young and old, are the stable characteristics of human society. Other social gaps are the results of the historical fate of a country, for example, religious and sectarian gaps, the gap between church and state, ethnic clefts, linguistic, and racial gaps. Therefore, it does not have a structural necessity. In terms of formulation and combination, social gaps may reinforce each other or pile on each other. This type of formulation is called dense gap formulation. Social gaps may weaken each other; in such cases, they are called crisscross. When social gaps are dense, often society becomes bipolar and the potential for social conflict increases. On the contrary, when social gaps cross each other, regarding the increase in common spots, social groupings decrease the context of social conflict. (Bashir, 1391: 103).

Research Model

Analysis & Evaluation

Political Sociology of Rural-urban Gap in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a rural-tribal country. Based on statistics provided by the central census department in 1394, the total population of Afghanistan is 27001365, out of which the majority of people are rustics and nomads. According to the statistics, 20403332 people live in villages and the population of monads are estimated to be about one and half million. Whereas the urban population is only 6698033 out of the total population of the country. (Stanekzai, 1396: 8). These censuses are presented while no reliable statistics are available about the displacement population due to the war or economic factors. By such an assertion, with certainty, we can conclude that the majority population of Afghanistan has a rural origin.

In rural-based demography, the tribe identifies the clan as a fundamental social unit in Afghanistan. The clan has one group variation constituted by different tribal classes, inhabitants of specific areas such as village or valley, or in some cases in career group. (Jonson, Bita: 17). The ethnic-rural relationship is as deep that many Afghan sociologists, by overemphasising ethnic clefts, have forgotten about the rural-urban gaps. Perhaps, the reason for such emphasis refers to the definition of the rural clan by Johnson: “Rural clan identifies the identity and loyalty of many individuals in the village. Villages in Afghanistan are made up of different clans and each clan represents a group of the race that are the owners of the village.” (Johnson, Bita: 17). A clan is the main social unit in Afghanistan which have resulted in effective social and political relations in the history of Afghanistan. Tribal culture and ethnic politics are two main variables in this relationship. Tribal culture has been conducive
to irrationalism, intolerance, scarcity of social movement, unchanging stratification, the inability of the national consensus, sterile of modernism and infertility of political socialisation (Vaezi, 1381: 86, 100). And tribal policies are characterised by a centralised system, ethnic appointments instead of meritocracy, ethnic legislation and counterfeit election lead to social partition in Afghanistan. Tribal culture has led to the destruction of civil, economic and cultural institutions. (Sediqi, 1387: 26-28). On the other hand, ethnic politics, except for increasing identical and legitimacy crisis and national trust crisis did not have better results. “Goodson” believes clan is the oldest unit of Afghanistan society and war caused the traditional institutions such as lord (Khan) and landowner (Arbab) to be replaced by warlords (Jihadi Commanders) and the source of traditional legitimacy, councils and Jirgas by resorting to force and violence have changed their nature and traditional rural economy relations have been ruined and replaced by illegal economic such as smuggling and extortion. Shahrani and Confield believe that in contrast to reductive perceptions that represent tribe as a though lingual and ancestry, in Afghanistan, tribe implies a wide range of social groups, including dynasties, great families, groups in specific geographical regions such as villages, districts, provinces, different directions and so on. In ancient Afghanistan, all meaningful social relations has been reflected in the tribal shape and ethnic units were managed by councils and Jirgas within the framework of prevailing rules and customs in the neighbourhoods. Therefore, the reconcilement of incompatible governmental laws with local guidelines, especially when religion is involved, it faced severe reaction of the society. (Ebrahimi, Newspaper- 8 Sobh). Ruben, by acknowledging the tribal nature of Afghanistan’s society, he does not consider much difference between tribe and clan. “Sometimes a clan is translated to a tribe and refers to various forms of solidarity. In some cases, the clan has been used to mean ethnic groups. For example, when Afghanistan residents say Tajik clan, their mean is Tajik ethnic group and those individuals who have previous regime’s ID. The word clan means a specific ethnic-linguistic group such as Tajik, Pashtun and Uzbek. (Badakhshan, 1392: 66-67). Ruben emphasises that there is a meaningful relationship between clan and village in Afghanistan. “The tribal structure of Afghanistan become more prevalent when we focus on political representation. Afghanistan’s previous regimes since then till now have recognised special tribal institutions and used them as means of control, especially in rural reigns in an indirect way through officially appointed representatives who were called owner or lord and are in contact with people. (Badakhshani, 1392: 67).

Mohammad Akram Arefi mentions three vital patterns: nomadism, ruralism, and urbanism which every single of them have had a special role in Afghanistan politics. These vital patterns by dividing into two traditional social groups (clergy, aristocrat, tribes and peasants) and new social groups (new middle class and labourers) have led to the dispersion of power and legitimacy, scarcity of social mobilisation, political dissocialization and regionalism. Arefi further notes that the result of above mentioned vital patterns is the establishment of special cultural systems that have shaped the components of Afghanistan political culture. The historical study of the sociology of Afghanistan indicates that the economic, cultural and structures of Afghanistan have been built on two great concepts of tribe and village. These structures have affected each other during history in various forms and created a landlord-peasant network, which has connected Afghanistan’s loose society. (Sharan, 1396: 54). The traditional form of this society has built with concepts of Khan, lord, landlord, village head, elder, Mullah and other social units and with the outbreak of war in Afghanistan, traditional form has deeply transmuted and new relations exhibited in the form of social relations with Jihadi leaders, Jihadi commanders, and Mullah. After the Bonn conference, the terms war time remained stable with little change. At this time, the presence of western technocrats on top of the power and their coalition with Jihadi leaders and commanders led to the emergence of a new social structure based on dual social pretence which mean the role of technocrats and Jihadi leaders caused polarity in political expediency. Jihadi leaders in power appeared as defenders of citizen’s relations and when they found themselves out of the circle of power, they came to tribal politics. On the contrary,
western technocrats comers, beside citizens slogans, sometimes resorted to ethnic politics for more votes.

The Genealogy of Political Flows Concerning to Rural-urban Gap in Afghanistan

The genealogy of political flows in Afghanistan indicates that six main political processes in the history of Afghanistan can be identified. Flows such as monarchy, constitutionalism or democracy, nationalism, leftism, Islamism and fundamentalism or neo-fundamentalism have been the main actors in the social, political and cultural arenas of Afghanistan. (Shafaee, 1393). Reviewing of the above flows disclose that almost all political flows in Afghanistan have a rural origin. Remarkably, all above flows (except Shole –e- Jawid leftist Maoism flow) have disintegrated state’s power and their actions have had a key role in illustrating state and society’s sociological relation in Afghanistan.

The Flow of Monarchy

The flow of monarchy is regarded as one of the oldest political flows in Afghanistan. The advocates of such flow have been involved in Afghan politics since Ahmad Shah Abdali, the founder of Afghanistan, till Jihad period. Definite parties such as Mosavwat, Mahaz -e- Mili-Islami, and Jinhe –e- Nejat –e- Mili (Shafaee, 1393) have had monarchial claims. From two aspects, this flow is related to village and tribal culture. First, traditional legitimacy and resort to Loya Jirga are considered as mental basis of this trends and second, the leaders of at least two major monarchist parties (Mahaz-e- Mili-Islami led by Peer Sayyed Ahmad Gilani and Jehbe-e- Nejat Mili led by Hazrat Sebghatullah Mujadedi) are considered as traditional (Peer) clergy. These type clergies have many disciples in rural regions which are the sources of legitimate power of monarchy in countryside. (Gregorian & Evans).

Leftist Flow

The left flow in Afghanistan has been manifested in three major parties: Khalq (People), Parcham (Flag), and Shuleye Jawid (Eternal Flame). Although the left parties emerged and developed in urban atmospheres, their link never cut with rural. In fact, at the time of formation of leftist parties 80 per cents of Afghan people were poor and rural. (Abdulwakil, 1395: 43). Many leftist leaders had left wing origins. Tarakai was a nomad and after reaching to power, governmental TV portrayed his life in a simple tent. Abdul Qader the real hero of the coup, in an interview with Dr. Abdul Ghafoor Arezu acknowledges that he is the son of a shepherd from a remote village called “Barnabad” in Ghoriyan district of Herat province who stepped up the ladder of power to lead the coup and remove the president Dawoud Khan. (Arezu, 1392: 15). Soraya Baha in her book named “Raha dar Bad” (Released in the Wind) reminds the rural-ruler relations in the family of Dr. Najibullah, the last president Democratic People’s Party. (Baha, 1392).

Village is one of the bone of contention in Shuleye- Jawid party, another left wing party, following the theories of Mao Xu Dong the leader of Chinese Communist Party, with Khalq and Parcham mostly affected by Marxist-Leninism ideology. Resorting to Mao’s theories, Shulees were advocates of revolution in the village then it spread to urban, but Khalqi and Parchamis with inspiration of Marxist-Leninism theories believed in urban revolution. (Mash’uf, 1397).

The left flow of Afghanistan in several other ways have links with rural. During the ruling of Noor Mohammad Tarakai, the first Khalqi president of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, by orders he issued; in first place, it was influential on rural relations. (Farhang, 1385: 933). On the other hand, oppositions to communist government reforms initiated from rural areas as well. The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan was forced to include rural people for controlling the crisis and for the first time in the history of Afghanistan, Militias with rural origins were used. (Guistozzi, 1386: 221). “Cristian Perini” a western writer in an investigation indicates to rural-urban gaps during the People’s Democratic Party Afghanistan. “Mr. Saleh Mohammad Waziri” a senior communist official who was living in an ordinary building in London, whom was traced by Mr. Steal, described the resistance of people in following words: “At the beginning, villagers were pleased, but when they found out that we are communist, they changed their attitudes toward us. The whole world was against us. People were saying that you do not believe in Islam, off
course they were not wrong. They clearly were seeing that we do not do prayers. We have freed women from the burden of dowry and the same people were saying that you are the supporters of promiscuity. Another member of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, who also is resident of the capital of the Great Britain, remembers that party leaders who have come to power “wanted to eradicate illiteracy within five years; a ridiculous dream and imagination. People were not agree on land reform. The rulers issued revolutionary circulars that they wanted to imply by force. Society was not ready. They had not consulted with people. (Prenti, Le Monde Diplomatic).

The Printi’s conclusion is based on this hypothesis that “the reforms of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan which in urgent were launched did not remain safe from the ancient rural-urban gap in Afghan society. Urban idealist educated youth did not understand about the rural roles and wanted to give another shape to it whereas, the villagers with adobe and clay walls did not show any sympathy with urban bureaucracy. Thus, it was not surprising that the social and cultural dimensions of reforms were not liked by some people because, those reforms threatened the privileges of Mullahs and Landlords. But more suffering was that pious peasants didn’t tolerate all aspects of economic program. (Prenti, Le Monde Diplomatic).

The crisis, during the ruling of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, from two sides make deep link with rural areas. On one hand, the government failed to properly understand the difference between rural-tribal society of Afghanistan with European and Russian society that was obliged to adhere them. (Farhang, 1385: 994). On the other hand, the government in order to curb the villagers’ revolution, resorted to rural militias. That the heavy presence of these militias were effective in forming dangerous future of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan and finally collapse of regime in 1370.

The Islamism Flow/ Fundamentalism

Amanullah Shafaee in his book, “the Rheology of contemporary history of Afghanistan” entitles the Brotherhood (Ikhwani) Parties such as Jameyat-e-Islami and Hezb Islami and the flow of Sufism among Sunni people and some parties such as Harakat-e-Inqlab-e-Islami and Hezb-e-Wahdat among Shias, as Islamism flows. And parties such as Islamic Revolution Movements by Maulavi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi and Etehad-e-Islami by Sayyaf are identified as fundamentalist and the Taliban is neo-fundamentalist. (Shafaee, 1393).

Based on political changes in Afghanistan, in this article Islamism and fundamentalism flows will be investigated based on Jihadi and the Taliban government regarding to rural-urban gap.

Jihadi (Mojahedin)

Most domestic and foreign writers have considered villages as the origin of Jihadi (Mujahedin). (Brigo & Rawa, 1366, Himan, 1377, Saiqal, 1394 & Farhang, 1385). Although many scholars consider Afghanistan Jihad as conflict of religion against imported communism idea, foreign intervention and the People’s Democratic Party’s mistakes, but the confrontation between urban against rural areas has not been considered. Mujahedin are the rural guerrillas who first revolt against communist government actions and then fight against the aggression of the Red Army. Leaders and commanders of Mujahedin had risen from rural areas of Afghanistan, and by combining of Sharia (Religious Law) with tribal culture, restructured the Afghan traditional society and for the first time Commander/ commander of Jihadis together with council and Sharia have taken the control of local administration. However it does not mean that Mujahedin have had united policy in canonical law and conventional cases. Mujahedin based on Afghan mosaic society (side by side but not united) grew up in different parties with different thoughts. Religious and ethnic classification is quite evident in political parties and according to such classifications the policies of mujahedin in different region of Afghanistan were formed. Mujahedin have never been able to form a favorable united entity. Various disagreements of Mujahedin, which were the symbol of multi-cultural and multi-tribal society in Afghanistan, eventually caused ruinous civil war. As the Mujahedin revolt originated from rural regions against communist government reforms, the continuity of war at the time Mujahedin’s victory formed in rural regions. If Mujahedin’s uprising is
considered as a hidden riot of rural regions against urban, the subsequent wars of Mujahedin regarded as disposal of village against the village to keep the victory over urban areas. Some groups of Mujahedin with domination over cities, attacked over urban’s cityscapes and feudalism governments displayed a variety of tribal and cultural practices in every nook and corner of Afghanistan.

The Taliban
Most of the Afghanistan study experts acknowledge to a small urban population among Mujahedin, but there is consensus on the rural origin of the Taliban among domestic and foreign experts that the Taliban are from rural regions and have been created under the pretext of security, formed a government and played role in Afghanistan civil war and now are fighting against presence of foreign forces and the government which emerged from the Bonn Conference. (Mahdavi, 1393; Muzhdeh 1382; Ahmad Rashid, 1387).

The Taliban’s educational environment is Pakistani religious schools. These schools have been able to recruit from rural regions of Afghanistan due to poverty and distrust of rural people to modern schools. The Taliban’s educational environment whether in village or in religious schools has been heavily anti-urban cityscapes. Vahid Mozhdeh one of the Taliban’s advisers, is of the opinion that the Taliban are a generation who came from Pakistani refugee camps and Pakistani religious schools. While Afghan young men in groups from refugees camps were heading to Jihad in Afghanistan, in these camps new generation were growing up. A generation that tents, clay houses, and camps were their birthplace and growth place whether they didn’t see their homeland or at the time leaving the country, they were young kids. Some families sent their children to camps’ schools, where modern science (secular science) and religious teaching were taught together, but among some rural families the idea that modern education deviates the youth and keep them away from religious teaching. In Afghanistan, modern schools were called Maktab and from such families’ point of view, if schooling was not synonym with infidelity, at least representing a type of deviation and distance from religion because they saw communism the child of such schools. Instead of sending their children to modern schools, these families sent their children to religious schools. The children of poor families whose fathers have been martyrdom during the Jihad and were unable to provide enough food for their children, preferred to send their children to these schools. During the Jihad, attention to religious teaching sharply increased, and religious scholars became very powerful. People started Jihad by religious scholars’ declaration (Fatwa) and thus, this group which in the past was at the low level of social hierarchy, came to the top the society… Children grew up in a masculine environment and had little contacts with their families. They were deprived of emotional and kindness teachings which only available in home’s atmosphere by mothers and families they were learning to obey masters and respect to masters. The atmosphere in those schools was surrounded with deprivation and suffer in which basic food was not available, but for the majority who entered to these new environment from their poor family environment, such problems to compare with their family problems were nothing, as a result this environment was more tolerable. Women were not allowed to enter in those environments. An educated and urban woman considered dangerous. (Mozhdeh, 1382: 31-33).

Five-year ruling of the Taliban and their primitive activities showed the apex of rural power over the urban. The Taliban leaders without exception, raised from the villages of Afghanistan. The villages that did not touch the smallest phenomenon of modernization during the history. Anti-women, antagonism with modern clothes, schools, and universities and all narrated a dark rural mentality that saw urban as a symbol of evil, cause of poverty and backwardness. The Taliban assumed new situation after Bonn Conference as a great danger, and with unprecedented anger and abhor attacked all urban cityscapes. Under the ideological justifications, they burned the schools, blow up bridges and roads, and annoyed many people in urban clothes on highways for being student or government employee, and in some cases also murdered them. Hostility with cityscapes did not end in that activities. They committed suicide bombings in the capital city of Afghanistan, large cities, highly populated places,
and killed tens of thousands innocent people. Still the Taliban recruiting soldiers from rural regions of Afghanistan and attack on urban cityscapes.

Conclusion

In Afghanistan village is symbol of poverty, backwardness and historical complexes. In fact, almost every extremist forces in Afghanistan have risen from village. Rural life along with tribal mentality has started a secret war against the urban in which ideological justifications have been manifested. Urban cityscapes have always been distinctive symbol of primitive traditions. From this point of view, hatred from cityscapes has been available in the unconscious of rural Afghan man. This hatred is responded unintentionally via bullet against all cityscapes and urbanisation and defending religion.

In this article attempts have been made that first investigates rural-urban sociology in Afghanistan and then discuss the genealogy of political flows, the activity of derived governments and cause of extremism and insurgency in Afghanistan.

About the above, one can say that various changes in Afghanistan since Amanullah Khan until now, have been affected from the rural-urban gap. The first development plan launched by Amanullah Khan, regardless of public sensitivities, provoked those villagers with kind of superficial programs. The binding of Amani government was shattered by poor villagers who defined new relationships against their values. The second political development plan implemented during the decade of democracy of Mohammad Zaher, although it had reasonable programs, could not moderate the extremist’s view. It was then that the first sparks of religious extremism were formed which signalised the formation of extreme movements by spraying acid on female students. Most acid sprayers were poor rural students who could not tolerate the new situation. The third development period which is known as the development of the Republic time, failed to provide codify programs for moderate religious education at the top of their priority. The developmental plans of the Communist government, with its anti-religious nature, paved the way for the better growth of religious extremism. According to historical evidence, most members of the People’s Democratic Party were villagers. The poor youth sought their wishes in internationalism communist programs. Nowadays, Afghanistan’s developmental do not have to codify plan for standing against this phenomenon, so that we see the militant extremists growing day by day. Although the new government emphasises on eradication of poverty, but the gap between rich and poor has dramatically grown in rural-urban regions and militant extremists recruiting soldiers from this weak point.

With the beginning of resistance of the people of Afghanistan against the aggression of the former Soviet Union, Brzezinski, one of most important theoreticians of American foreign policy, presented his famous theory by travelling to Pakistan and visiting the Mujahedin’s camps. According to his theory, communism fundamentalism can be stopped with Islamic fundamentalism only. Islamic fundamentalism in Mujahedin’s camps indicated the Mujahidin’s sociological base. Most of the Mujahedin were poor villagers who have sheltered in neighbouring countries with the intention of fighting infidelity. Concerning such a theory, the great western powers by supporting that radical project, allowed from all over the world Arab youth to participate in Afghanistan Jihad. After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, these forces scattered all over the world and remained part of Afghanistan established Al-Qaeda. The geopolitical position of Afghanistan and the absence of dominant power that could command over Afghanistan has made this geographical region a paradise of militant extremism, in which nowadays more than twenty terrorist groups are settled in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, world and regional powers have benefited from the presence of extremist groups to defeat each other and even regional countries have used the potential of terrorist groups to pressure Afghanistan government. The Taliban and other terrorist groups have a rural social base. A large number of poor villagers are fighting for livelihood as the Taliban troops against Afghanistan government.

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