MATHEMATICAL KNOWLEDGE:
INTERNAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ASPECTS

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0. Preface

He is onto us and how, on the one hand, we take pride in building an
elegant world utterly divorced from the demands of reality and, on the other, claim
that our ideas underlie virtually all technological developments of significance.

D. Mumford (from the Preface to [Ens]).

Pure mathematics is an immense organism built entirely and exclusively of ideas
that emerge in the minds of mathematicians and live within these minds.

If one wishes to shake off the somewhat uneasy feeling that such a statement can
provoke, there are at least three escape routes.

First, one can simply identify mathematics with the contents of mathematical
manuscripts, books, papers and lectures, with the increasingly growing net of the-
orems, definitions, proofs, constructions, conjectures (should I include software as
well ?...) – with what contemporary mathematicians present at the conferences,
keep in the libraries and electronic archives, take pride in, award each other for, and
occasionally bitterly dispute the origin of. In short, mathematics is simply what
mathematicians are doing, exactly in the same way as music is what musicians are
doing.

Second, one can argue that mathematics is a human activity deeply rooted in
reality, and permanently returning to reality. From counting on one’s fingers to
moon–landing to Google, we are doing mathematics in order to understand, create,
and handle things, and perhaps this understanding is mathematics rather than in-
tangible murmur of accompanying abstractions. Mathematicians are thus more or
less responsible actors of human history, like Archimedes helping to defend Syra-
cuse (and to save a local tyrant), Alan Turing cryptanalyzing Marshal Rommel’s
intercepted military dispatches to Berlin, or John von Neumann suggesting high
altitude detonation as an efficient tactics of bombing. Accepting this viewpoint,
mathematicians can defend their trade by stressing its social utility. In this role,
a mathematician can be as morally confused as the next person, and if I were to
put on display some trade–specific particularities of such a confusion, I could not
find anything better than the bitter irony of [B-BH] (p. 11): “[...] mathematics
can also be an indispensable tool. Thus, when the effect of fragmentation bombs

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on human bodies was to be tested but *humanitarian concerns prohibited testing on pigs* (italics mine. Yu. M.), mathematical simulation was put into play."

Or, third, there is a noble vision of the great Castle of Mathematics, towering somewhere in the Platonic World of Ideas, which we humbly and devotedly discover (rather than invent). The greatest mathematicians manage to grasp outlines of the Grand Design, but even those to whom only a pattern on a small kitchen tile is revealed, can be blissfully happy. Alternatively, if one is inclined to use a semiotic metaphor, Mathematics is a proto–text whose existence is only postulated but which nevertheless underlies all corrupted and fragmentary copies we are bound to deal with. The identity of the writer of this proto–text (or of the builder of the Castle) is anybody’s guess, but Georg Cantor with his vision of infinity of infinities directly inspired by God, and Kurt Gödel with his “ontological proof”, seemingly had no doubts on this matter.

Various shades and mixes of these three attitudes, social positions, and implicated choices of the individual behavior, color the whole discussion that follows. The only goal of this concise Preface is to make the reader conscious of the intrinsic tensions in our presentation, rather than imitate clear vision and offer definite judgements where there are none.

One last warning about historical references in this exposition. There are two different modes of reading old texts: one, to understand the times and ethnos they were written in, another - to throw some light on the values and prejudices of our times. In the history of mathematics, the polar attitudes are represented by “ethnomathematics” vs Bourbaki style history.

For the sake of this presentation, I explicitly and consciously adopt the “modernizing” viewpoint.

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**I. Mathematical knowledge**

**I.1. Bird’s eye view.** Sir Michael Atiyah starts his report [At] with the following broad outline: “The three great branches of mathematics are, in historical order, Geometry, Algebra and Analysis. Geometry we owe essentially to Greek civilization, Algebra is of Indo–Arab origin and Analysis (or the Calculus) was the creation of Newton and Leibniz, ushering in the modern era.” He then explains that in the realm of physics, these branches correspond respectively to the (study of) Space/Time/Continuum: “There is little argument about Geometry being the study of space, but it is perhaps less obvious that Algebra is the study of time. But, any algebraic system involves the performance of sequential operations (addition, multiplication, etc.) and these are conceived as being performed one after another.
In other words Algebra requires time for its meaning (even if we usually only need discrete instants of time).”

One can argue for an alternative viewpoint on Algebra according to which it has most intimate relations not with Physics but with Language. In fact, observing the graduate emergence of place–value notation for numbers, and later algebraic notation for variables and operations, one can recognize two historical stages.

At the first stage, notation serves principally to shorten and unify the symbolic representation of a certain pool of meanings. At this stage, a natural language could (and did) serve the same goal, only less efficiently. Therefore one can reasonably compare this process with the development of a specialized sub–dialect of the natural language. The so–called Roman numerals still in use for ornamental purposes are fossilized remnants of this stage. As another helpful comparison, perhaps more streamlined and better documented, one can invoke the emergence and evolution of chemical notation.

At the second stage, algorithms for addition/multiplication and later division of numbers in a place–value notation are devised. In a parallel development, variables and algebraic operations start to be combined into identities and equations, and then to strings of equations obeying universal rules of identical transformations/deductions. At this stage, expressions in the new (mathematical) dialect become not so much carriers of certain meanings as a grist for the mill of computations. It is this shift of the meaning, from the more or less explicit semantics of notation to the hidden semantics of algorithms transforming strings of symbols, that was the crucial chain of events marking the birth of Algebra.

Nothing similar to this second stage happened to the natural languages. To the contrary, when in the 60s of the twentieth century large computers made possible first experiments with algorithmic processing of texts in English, Russian, French (e.g. for implementing automatic translation), it became clear how unsuitable for computer processing natural languages were. Huge data bases for vocabularies were indispensable. Intricate and illogical nets of rules governed morphology, word order, and compatibility of grammatical constructions; worse, in different languages these rules were capriciously contradictory. And after all efforts, automatic translation without subsequent editing by a human being never produced satisfactory results.

This property of human languages – their resistance to algorithmic processing – is perhaps the ultimate reason why only mathematics can furnish an adequate language for physics. It is not that we lack words for expressing all this \( E = mc^2 \) and \( \int e^{iS(\phi)} D\phi \) stuff – words can be and are easily invented – the point is that we still would not be able to do anything with these great discoveries if we had only words for them.

But we cannot just skip words and deal only with formulas either. Words in mathematical and scientific texts play three basic roles. First, they furnish multiple bridges between the physical reality and the world of mathematical abstractions.
Second, they carry value judgements, sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, governing our choices of particular chains of mathematical reasonings, in the vast tree of “all” feasible but mostly empty formal deductions. And last but not least, they allow us to communicate, teach and learn.

I will conclude with a penetrating comment of Paul Samuelson regarding use of words vs mathematical symbols in economic models (cited from [CaBa]): “When we tackle them [the problems of economic theory] by words, we are solving the same equations as when we write out those equations. [...] Where the really big mistakes are is in the formulation of premises. [...] One of the advantages of the mathematical medium – or, strictly speaking, of the mathematician’s customary canons of exposition of proof, whether in words or in symbols – is that we are forced to lay our cards on the table so that all can see our premises.”

Returning to the large scale map of mathematical provinces, Geometry/Algebra/Analysis, one should find a place on it for (mathematical) Logic, with its modern impersonation into the Theory of Algorithms and Computer Science. There are compelling arguments to consider it as a part of broadly conceived Algebra (pace Frege.) And if one agrees on that, Atiyah’s insight about association of Algebra with Time, becomes corroborated. In fact, the great shift in the development of Logic in the 30s of the twentieth century occurred when Alan Turing used a physics metaphor, “Turing machine”, for the description of an algorithmic computation. Before his work, Logic was considered almost exclusively in para–linguistic terms, as we did above. Turing’s vision of a finite automaton moving in discrete steps along one–dimensional tape and writing/erasing bits on it, and theorem about existence of a universal machine of this type, stress exactly this temporal aspect of all computations. Even more important, the idea of computation as a physical process not only helped create modern computers, but also opened way to thinking in physical terms, both in classical and quantum mode, about general laws of storing and processing information.

I.2. Objects of mathematical knowledge. When we study biology, we study living organisms. When we study astronomy, we study celestial bodies. When we study chemistry, we study varieties of matter and of ways it can transform itself.

We make observations and measurements of raw reality, we devise narrowly targeted experiments in a controlled environment (not in astronomy however), and finally we produce an explanatory paradigm, which becomes a current milestone of science.

But what are we studying when we are doing mathematics?

A possible answer is this: we are studying ideas which can be handled as if they were real things. (P. Davis and R. Hersh call them “mental objects with reproducible properties”).

Each such idea must be rigid enough in order to keep its shape in any context it might be used. At the same time, each such idea must have a rich potential
of making connections with other mathematical ideas. When an initial complex of ideas is formed (historically, or pedagogically), connections between them may acquire the status of mathematical objects as well, thus forming the first level of a great hierarchy of abstractions.

At the very base of this hierarchy are mental images of things themselves and ways of manipulating them. Miraculously, it turns out that even very high level abstractions can somehow reflect reality: knowledge of the world discovered by physicists can be expressed only in the language of mathematics.

Here are several basic examples.

**I.2.1. Natural numbers.** This is arguably the oldest *proto–mathematical* idea. “Rigidity” of 1, 2, 3, ... is such that first natural numbers acquire symbolic and religious meanings in many cultures. Christian Trinity, or Buddhist Nirvana come to mind: the latter evolved from Sanskrit *nir–dva–n–dva* where *dva* means “two”, and the whole expression implies that the state of absolute blessedness is attained through the extinction of individual existence and becoming “one” with Universe. (These negative connotations of the idea of “two” survive even in modern European languages where it carries association with the idea of “doubt”: cf. Latin *dubius*, German *Zweifeln*, and Goethe’s description of Mephistopheles).

Natural number is also a *proto–physical* idea: counting material objects (and later immaterial objects as well, such as days and nights) is the first instance of *measurement*, cf. below.

Natural number becomes a *mathematical* idea when:

a) Ways of handling natural numbers as if they were things are devised: adding, multiplying.

b) The first abstract features of the internal structure of the totality of all natural numbers is discovered: prime numbers, their infinity, existence and uniqueness of prime decomposition.

These two discoveries were widely separated historically and geographically; arguably, culturally and philosophically as well. Place–value system marks the origin of what we nowadays call *applied mathematics*, primes mark the origin of what used to be called *pure mathematics*. Here are a few details.

At first, both numbers and ways of handling them are encoded by specific material objects: fingers and other body parts, counting sticks, notches. Notch is already a sign, not a proper thing, and it may start signifying not 1, but 10 or 60, depending on where in the row of other symbols it is situated. A way to the early great mathematical discovery, that of place–value numeration system is open. However, a consistent place–value system also requires a sign for “zero”, which came late and marked a new level of mathematical abstraction.

An expressive summary in [B-BH] sketches the following picture:
“In c. 2074 BCE, king Shulgi organized a military reform in the Sumerian Empire, and the next year an administrative reform (seemingly introduced under the pretext of a state of emergency but soon made permanent) enrolled the larger part of the working population in quasi–servile labour crews and made overseer scribes accountable for the performance of their crews, calculated in abstract units worth 1/60 of a working day (12 minutes) and according to fixed norms. In the ensuing bookkeeping, all work and output therefore had to be calculated precisely and converted into these abstract units, which asked for multiplications and divisions en masse. Therefore, a place value system with base 60 was introduced for intermediate calculations. Its functioning presupposed the use of tables of multiplication, reciprocals and technical constants and the training for their use in schools; the implementation of a system whose basic idea was “in the air” for some centuries therefore asked for decisions made at the level of the state and implemented with great force. Then as in many later situations, only war provided the opportunity for such social willpower.”

Primes, on the other hand, seem to spring off from pure contemplation, as well as the idea of a very concrete infinity, that of natural numbers themselves, and that of prime numbers.

The proof of infinity of primes codified in Euclid’s Elements is a jewel of an early mathematical reasoning. Let us recall it briefly in modern notation: having a finite list of primes \( p_1, \ldots, p_n \), we can add one more prime to it by taking any prime divisor of \( p_1 \ldots p_n + 1 \).

This is a perfect example of handling mathematical ideas as if they were rigid material objects. And at this stage, they are already pure ideas bafflingly unrelated to any vestiges of Sumerian or whatever material notation. Looking at the modern decimal notation of a number, one can easily tell whether it is even or divisible by 5, but not whether it is prime. Generations of mathematicians after Euclid marveled at an apparent randomness with which primes pop up in the natural series.

Observation, controlled experimentation, and recently even engineering of primes (producing and recognizing large primes by computationally feasible algorithms, for security applications) became a trademark of much of modern number theory.

1.2.2. Real numbers and “geometric algebra”. Integers resulted from counting, but other real numbers came from geometry, as lengths and surfaces, volumes. The discovery by Pythagoras of the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with its side was at the same time the demonstration that there were more “magnitudes” that “numbers”. Magnitudes were later to become real numbers.

Arithmetical operations on integers evolved from putting together sticks and notches to systematic handling normalized notations in an ordered way. Algebraic operations on reals evolved from drawing and contemplating sketches which could intermittently be plans of building sites or results of surveying, and renderings of Euclidean circles, squares and angles.
Historians of mathematics in the twentieth century argued *pro* and *contra* interpretation of a considerable part of Greek mathematics as “geometric algebra”. One example of it is a sketch of a large square subdivided into four parts by two lines parallel to the orthogonal sides so that two of the parts are again squares. This sketch can be read as an expression and a proof of the algebraic identity 

\[(a + b)^2 = a^2 + b^2 + 2ab.\]

Our modernizing perspective suggests a more general consideration of several modes of mental processes, in particular those related to mathematics. The following two are the basic ones:

a) Conscious handling of a finite and discrete symbolic system, with explicitly prescribed laws of formation of meaningful strings of symbols, constructing new strings, and less explicit rules of deciding which strings are “interesting” (left brain, linguistic, algebraic activity).

b) Largely subconscious handling of visual images, with implicit reliance upon statistics of past experience, estimating probabilities of future outcomes, but also judging balance, harmony, symmetry (right brain, visual arts and music, geometry).

Mental processes of mathematicians doing research must combine these two modes in many sophisticated ways. This is not an easy task, in particular because information processing rates are so astonishingly different, of the order 10 bit/sec for conscious symbolic processing, and \(10^7\) bit/sec for subconscious visual processing (cf. [\(N0\)]).

Probably because of inner tension created by this (and other) discrepancies, they tend to be viewed emotionally, as an embodiment of values – cold intellect against warm feeling, bare logic vs. penetrating intuition. See beautiful articles by David Mumford [\(Mu1\)] and [\(Mu2\)] who eloquently defends statistics against logic, but invokes mathematical statistics, which is built, as any mathematical discipline, in an extremely logical way.

Returning to real numbers and the “geometric algebra” of the Greeks, we recognize in it a sample of right brain treatment of a subject which later historically evolved into something dominated by the left brain. Or, as Mumford puts it, modern algebra is a grammar of actions with objects which are inherently geometric, and Greek algebra is an early compendium of such actions.

Perhaps the continuity of Greek geometric thinking as a cognitive phenomenon can be traced not only in modern geometry but also in theoretical physics. The last decades have seen such a vigorous input of insights, conjectures, and sophisticated constructions, from physics to mathematics, that an expression “physical mathematics” was coined. The theoretical thinking underlying the creative use of Feynman’s path integral, strikes us by the richness of results constructed on a foundation which is mathematically shaky by any standards. This can be considered as an additional justification of the notion that “geometric algebra” was a reality, and not only our reconstruction of it.
I.2.3. \( e^{\pi i} = -1 \): a tale of three numbers. Arguably, Euler’s formula \( e^{\pi i} = -1 \) is the most beautiful single formula in all mathematics.

It combines in a highly unexpected way three (or four, if one counts \(-1\) separately) constants that were discovered in various epochs, and emanate an aura of very different motivations.

Very briefly, \( \pi = 3, 1415926... \) is a legacy of the Greeks (again). Even its existence as a real number, that is (the length of) a line segment, or surface of a square, is not something that can be grasped without an additional mental effort. The problem of “squaring the circle” is not just the next geometric problem, but a legitimacy test, with an uncertain outcome.

By contrast, \( e = 2, 7128128... \) emerged in the already mature, if not fully developed Western mathematics (mid–seventeenth century). It is a combined theoretical by–product of the invention of logarithm tables as a tool of optimization of numerical algorithms (addition replacing multiplication) and the problem of “squaring the hyperbole”. None of the classical geometric constructions led to \( e \) and none suggested any relation between \( e \) and \( \pi \).

Finally, the introduction of \( i = \sqrt{-1} \), an “imaginary” number, a monstrosity for many contemporaries, was literally imposed on Cardano by the formulas for roots of a cubic equation expressed in radicals. When all three roots are real, formulas required complex numbers in intermediate calculations.

Euler’s formula is a remarkable example of “infinite” identities of which he (and later Srinivasa Ramanujan) was a great practitioner. In fact, \( e^{\pi i} = -1 \) is a particular case of the series \( e^{ix} = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} (ix)^n / n! \) which gives a more general expression \( e^{ix} = \cos x + i \sin x \).

Further progress in our understanding of real numbers and theory of limits relegated the Euler and Ramanujan great skills of dealing with “infinite identities” to backstage. G. Hardy, describing Ramanujan’s mathematical psyche, was at a loss trying to interiorize it. This story does tell something about the logic vs statistics dichotomy, but I cannot pinpoint even a tentative statement.

As a totally unrelated development, \( e^{ix} = \cos x + i \sin x \) turned out to be at the base of an adequate description of one of the most important and unexpected discoveries of the physics of twentieth century: quantum probability amplitudes, their wave–like behaviour, and quantum interference.

I.2.4. Cantorian set: the ultimate mathematical object. In the original description by Cantor,

Unter einer ‘Menge’ verstehen wir jede Zusammenfassung \( M \) von bestimmten wohlunterschiedenen Objekten \( m \) unserer Anschauung oder unseres Denkens (welche die ‘Elemente’ von \( M \) genannt werden) zu einem Ganzen.

“By a ‘set’ we mean any collection \( M \) into a whole of definite, distinct objects \( m \) (called the ‘elements’ of \( M \)) of our perception or our thought.”
German syntax allows Cantor to mirror the meaning of the sentence in its structure: *Objekten m unserer Anschauung etc* are packed between the opening bracket *Zusammenfassung* and the closing bracket *zu einem Ganzen*.

Contemplating this definition for the first time, it is difficult to imagine what kind of mathematics or, for that matter, what kind of mental activity at all, can be performed with such meager means. In fact, it is precisely this parsimony which allowed Cantor to invent his “diagonal process”, to compare infinities as if they were physical objects, and to discover that the infinity of real numbers is strictly larger than that of integers.

Simultaneously, Cantor’s intuition underlies most of foundational work in the mathematics of the twentieth century: it is either vigorously refuted by logicians of various vintages, or works as a great unification project, in both guises of Set Theory and its successor, Category Theory.

### 1.2.5. “All men are mortal, Kai is a man ...”: from syllogisms to software

Aristotle codified elementary forms of statements and basic rules of logical deductions. The analogies between them and elementary arithmetics were perceived early, but made precise late; we recognize Boole’s role in this development. Philosophers of science disagreed about hierarchical relationships between the two. Frege, for example, insisted that arithmetic was a part of logic.

The 20th century has seen a sophisticated fusion of both realms when in the thirties Gödel, Tarski and Church produced mathematical models of mathematical reasoning going far beyond the combinatorics of finite texts. One of the important tools was the idea, going back to Leibniz, that one can use a computable enumeration of all texts by integers allowing to replace logical deductions by arithmetical operations.

Tarski modeled truth as “truth in all interpretations”, and found out that the set of (numbers of) arithmetical truths cannot be expressed by an arithmetical formula. Infinitarity of Tarski’s notion of truth is connected with the fact that logical formulas are allowed to contain quantifiers “for all” and “there exists”, so interpretation of a finite formula involves potentially infinite sequence of verifications.

Gödel, using a similar trick, demonstrated that the set of arithmetical truths deducible from any finite system of axioms and deduction rules cannot coincide with the set of all true formulas. Self–referentiality was an essential common feature of both proofs.

Among other things, Gödel and Tarski showed that the basic hierarchical relation is that between a language and a metalanguage. Moreover, only their interrelation and not absolute status is objective. One can use logic to describe arithmetics, and one can use arithmetics to discuss logic. A skillful mixture of both levels unambiguously shows inherent restrictions of pure logic as a cognitive tool, even when it is applied “only” to pure logic itself.
Turing and Church during the same decade analyzed the idea of “computability”, which had a more arithmetic flavor from the start. Alan Turing made a decisive step by substituting a physical image (Turing machine) in place of the traditional linguistic embodiments for logic and computation dominating both Tarski’s and Gödel’s discourses. This was a great mental step preparing the subsequent technological evolution: the emergence of programmable electronic calculators.

Theoretically, both Church and Turing discovered that there existed a “final” notion of computability embodied in the universal recursive function, or universal Turing machine. This was not a mathematical theorem, but rather a “physical discovery in a metaphysical realm”, justified not by a proof but by the fact that all subsequent attempts to conceive an alternative version led to an equivalent notion. A “hidden” (at least in popular accounts) part of this discovery was the realization that the correct definition of computability includes elements of un-computability that cannot be avoided at any cost: a recursive function is generally not everywhere defined, and we cannot decide at which points it is defined and at which not.

Computers which are functioning now, embody a technologically alienated form of these great insights.

I.3. Definitions/Theorems/Proofs. I will briefly describe now tangible traces of “pure” mathematics as a collective activity of the contemporary professional community. I will stress not so much organizational forms of this activity as external reflection of the inner structure of the world of mathematical ideas.

Look at any contemporary paper in one of the leading research journals like Annals of Mathematics or Inventiones mathematicae. Typically, it is subdivided into reasonably short patches called Definitions, Theorems (with Lemmas and Propositions as subspecies), and Proofs, that can be considerably longer. These are the basic structure blocks of a modern mathematical exposition; frills like motivation, examples and counterexamples, discussion of special cases, etc., make it livelier.

This tradition of organizing mathematical knowledge is inherited from the Greeks, especially Euclid’s Elements. The goal of a definition is to introduce a mathematical object. The goal of a theorem is to state some of its properties, or interrelations between various objects. The goal of a proof is to make such a statement convincing by presenting a reasoning subdivided into small steps each of which is justified as an “elementary” convincing argument.

To put it simply, we first explain, what we are talking about, and then explain why what we are saying is true (pace Bertrand Russell).

Definitions. The first point is epistemologically subtle and controversial, because what we are talking about are extremely specific mental images not present normally in an untrained mind (what is a a real number? a random variable? a group?). Presenting some basic objects above, I used narrative devices to make them look more graphic or vivid, but gave no real definitions in the technical sense of the word.
Euclid's definitions usually consist of a mixture of explanations involving visual images, and "axioms" involving some idealized properties that we want to impose on them.

In contemporary mathematics, one can more or less explicitly restrict oneself to the basic mental image of a Cantorian "set", and a limited inventory of properties of sets and constructions of new sets from given ones. Each of our Definitions then can be conceived as a standardized description of a certain structure, consisting of sets, their subsets etc. This is a viewpoint that was developed by the Bourbaki group and which proved to be an extremely influential, convenient and widely accepted way of organizing mathematical knowledge. Inevitably, a backlash ensued, aimed mostly at the value system supporting this neo–Euclidean tradition, but its pragmatic merits are indisputable. At the very least, it enabled a much more efficient communication between mathematicians coming from different fields.

If one adopts a form of Set Theory as a basis for further constructions, only set–theoretic axioms remain "axioms" in Euclid's sense, something like intuitively obvious properties accepted without further discussion (but see below), whereas the axioms of real numbers or of plane geometry become provable properties of explicitly constructed set–theoretic objects.

Bourbaki in their multivolume treatment of contemporary mathematics developed this picture and added to it a beautiful notion of "structures–mères" (the issue [Sci] is dedicated to the history of the Bourbaki group).

In a broader framework, one can argue that mathematicians have developed a specific discursive behavior which might be called "culture of definitions". In this culture, many efforts are invested into clarification of the content (semantics) of basic abstract notions and syntax of their interrelationships, whereas the choice of words (or even to a larger degree, notations) for these notions is a secondary matter and largely arbitrary convention, dictated by convenience, aesthetic considerations, by desire to invoke appropriate connotations. This can be compared with some habits of humanistic discourse where such terms as Dasein or différence are rigidly used as markers of a certain tradition, without much fuss about their meaning.

I.4. Problems/Conjectures/Research Programs. From time to time, a paper appears which solves, or at least presents in a new light, some great problem, or conjecture, which was with us for the last decades, or even centuries, and resisted many efforts. Fermat’s Last Theorem (proved by Andrew Wiles), the Poincaré Conjecture, the Riemann Hypothesis, the P/NP–problem these days even make newspapers headlines.

David Hilbert composed his talk at the second (millennium) International Congress of Mathematicians in Paris on August 8, 1900, as a discussion of ten outstanding mathematical problems which formed a part of his list of 23 problems compiled in the published version. One can argue about their comparative merit in pure scientific terms, but certainly they played a considerable role in focusing
efforts of mathematicians on well defined directions, and providing clear tasks and motivation for young researchers.

Whereas a problem (a yes/no question) is basically a guess about validity or otherwise of a certain statement (like Goldbach’s problem: every even number \( \geq 4 \) is a sum of two primes), a Research Program is an outline of a broad vision, a map of a landscape some regions of which are thoroughly investigated, whereas other parts are guessed on the base of analogies, experimentation with simple special cases, etc.

The distinction between the two is not absolute. Problem Number one, the Continuum Hypothesis, which in the epoch of Cantor and Hilbert looked like a yes/no question, generated a vast research program which established, in particular, that neither of the two answers is deducible within the generally accepted axiomatic Set Theory.

On the other hand, the explicit formulation of a research program can be a risky venture. Problem Number 6 envisioned the axiomatization of physics. In the next three decades or so physics completely changed its face.

Some of the most influential Research Programs of the last decades were expressions of insights into the complex structure of Platonian reality. A. Weil guessed the existence of cohomology theories for algebraic manifolds in finite characteristics. Grothendieck constructed them, thus forever changing our understanding of the relationships between continuous and discrete.

When Poincaré said that there are no solved problems, there are only problems which are more or less solved, he was implying that any question formulated in a yes/no fashion is an expression of narrow-mindedness.

The dawning of the twenty first century was marked by the publication by the Clay Institute of the list of Millenium Problems. There are exactly seven of them, and they are all yes/no questions. For the first time a computer science–generated problem appears: the famous P/NP conjecture. Besides, Clay Problems come with a price tag: USD \( 10^6 \) for a solution of any one of them. Obviously, free market forces played no role in this pricing policy.

II. Mathematics as a Cognitive Tool

II.1. Some history. Old texts that are considered as sources for history of mathematics show that it started as a specific activity answering the needs of commerce and of state, servicing large communal works and warfare: cf the excerpt above about Sumero–Babylonian administrative reform.

As another example, turn to the Chinese book “The nine chapters on mathematical procedures” compiled during the Han dynasty around the beginning of our era. We rely here upon the report of K. Chemla at the Berlin ICM 1998, [Che]. The book generally is a sequence of problems and of their solutions which can be read
as special cases of rather general algorithms so that a structurally similar problem with other values of parameters could be solved as well. According to Chemla, problems “regularly invoke concrete questions with which the bureaucracy of the Han dynasty was faced, and, more precisely, questions that were the responsibility of the “Grand Minister of Agriculture” (dasinong), such as renumerating civil servants, managing granaries or enacting standard grain measures. Moreover, the sixth of The nine chapters takes its name from an economic measure actually advocated by a Grand Minister of Agriculture, Sang Hongyang (152–82 B.C.E), to levy taxes in a fair way, a program for which the Classic provides mathematical procedures.”

Yet another description of the preoccupations of Chinese mathematicians is given in [Qu]:

“In the long history of the Chinese empire, mathematical astronomy was the only subject of the exact sciences that attracted great attention from rulers. In every dynasty, the royal observatory was an indispensable part of the state. Three kinds of expert – mathematicians, astronomers and astrologers – were employed as professional scientists by the emperor. Those who were called mathematicians took charge of establishing the algorithms of the calendar–making systems. Most mathematicians were trained as calendar–makers. [...] Calendar–makers were required to maintain a high degree of precision in prediction. Ceaseless efforts to improve numerical methods were made in order to guarantee the precision required for astronomical observation [7]. It was neither necessary nor possible that a geometric model could replace the numerical method, which occupied the principal position in Chinese calendar–making system. [...] As a subject closely related to numerical method, algebra, rather than geometry, became the most developed field of mathematics in ancient China.”

Western tradition goes back to Greece. According to Turnbull [Tu], we owe the word “mathematics” and the subdivision of mathematics into Arithmetic and Geometry to Pythagoras (569 – 500 BC). More precisely, Arithmetic (and Music) studies the discrete, whereas Geometry and Astronomy study the continued. The secondary dichotomy Geometry/Astronomy reflects the dichotomy The stable/The moving.

With small modifications, this classification was at the origin of the medieval “Quadrivium of knowledge”, and Michael Atiyah’s overall view of mathematics still bears distinctive traces of it.

Plato (429–348 BC) in Republic, Book VII, 525c, explains why the study of arithmetic is essential for an enlightened statesman:

“Then this is a kind of knowledge, Glaucon, which legislation may fitly prescribe; and we must endeavour to persuade those who are prescribed to be the principal men of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only; nor again,
like merchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul herself; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being."

With gradual emergence of “pure mathematics”, return to practical needs began to be classified as applications. The opposition pure/applied mathematics as we know it now certainly has already crystallized by the beginning of the nineteenth century. In France, Gergonne was publishing the *Annales de mathématiques pures et appliquées* which ran from 1810 to 1833. In Germany Crelle founded in 1826 the *Journal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik*.

**II.2. Cognitive tools of mathematics.** In order to understand how mathematics is applied to the understanding of real world, it is convenient to subdivide it into the following three modes of functioning: *model, theory, metaphor*.

A mathematical *model* describes a certain range of phenomena qualitatively or quantitatively but feels uneasy pretending to be something more.

From Ptolemy’s epicycles (describing planetary motions, ca 150) to the Standard Model (describing interactions of elementary particles, ca 1960), quantitative models cling to the observable reality by adjusting numerical values of sometimes dozens of free parameters ($\geq 20$ for the Standard Model). Such models can be remarkably precise.

Qualitative models offer insights into *stability/instability, attractors* which are limiting states tending to occur independently of initial conditions, *critical phenomena* in complex systems which happen when the system crosses a boundary between two phase states, or two basins of different attractors. A recent report [KGSIPW] is dedicated to predicting of surge of homicides in Los Angeles, using as methodology the pattern recognition of infrequent events. Result: “We have found that the upward turn of the homicide rate is preceded within 11 months by a specific pattern of the crime statistics: both burglaries and assaults simultaneously escalate, while robberies and homicides decline. Both changes, the escalation and the decline, are not monotonic, but rather occur sporadically, each lasting some 2–6 months.”

The age of computers has seen a proliferation of models, which are now produced on an industrial scale and solved numerically. A perceptive essay by R. M. Solow ([Sol], written in 1997) argues that modern mainstream economics is mainly concerned with model–building.

Models are often used as “black boxes” with hidden computerized input procedures, and oracular outputs prescribing behavior of human users, e. g. in financial transactions.

What distinguishes a (mathematically formulated physical) *theory* from a model is primarily its higher aspirations. A modern physical theory generally purports that it would describe the world with absolute precision if only it (the world)
consisted of some restricted variety of stuff: massive point particles obeying only the law of gravity; electromagnetic field in a vacuum; and the like. In Newton’s law for the force $Gm/r^2$ acting on a point in the central gravity field, $Gm$ and $r$ might be concessions to measurable reality, but $2$ in $r^2$ is a rock solid theoretical $2$, not some $2,000000003...$, whatever experimentalists might measure to the contrary. A good quantitative theory can be very useful in engineering: a machine is an artificial fragment of the universe where only a few physical laws are allowed to dominate in a well isolated material environment. In this function, the theory supplies a model.

A recurrent driving force generating theories is a concept of a reality beyond and above the material world, reality which may be grasped only by mathematical tools. From Plato’s solids to Galileo’s “language of nature” to quantum superstrings, this psychological attitude can be traced sometimes even if it conflicts with the explicit philosophical positions of the researchers.

A (mathematical) metaphor, when it aspires to be a cognitive tool, postulates that some complex range of phenomena might be compared to a mathematical construction. The most recent mathematical metaphor I have in mind is Artificial Intelligence (AI). On the one hand, AI is a body of knowledge related to computers and a new, technologically created reality, consisting of hardware, software, Internet etc. On the other hand, it is a potential model of functioning of biological brains and minds. In its entirety, it has not reached the status of a model: we have no systematic, coherent and extensive list of correspondences between chips and neurons, computer algorithms and brain algorithms. But we can and do use our extensive knowledge of algorithms and computers (because they were created by us) to generate educated guesses about structure and function of the central neural system: see [Mu1] and [Mu2].

A mathematical theory is an invitation to build applicable models. A mathematical metaphor is an invitation to ponder upon what we know. Susan Sontag’s essay about (mis)uses of the “illness” metaphor in [So] is a useful warning.

Of course, the subdivision I have just sketched is not rigid or absolute. Statistical studies in social sciences often vacillate between models and metaphors. With a paradigm change, scientific theories are relegated to the status of outdated models. But for the sake of our exposition, it is a convenient way to organize synchronic and historical data.

I will now give some more details about these cognitive tools, stressing models and related structures.

II.3. Models. One can analyze the creation and functioning of a mathematical model by contemplating the following stages inherent in any systematic study of quantifiable observations.

i) Choose a list of observables.

ii) Devise a method of measurement: assigning numerical values to observables. Often this is preceded by a more or less explicit ordering of these values along an
axis (“more – less” relation); then measurement is expected to be consistent with ordering.

iii) Guess the law(s) governing the distribution of observables in the resulting, generally multidimensional, configuration space. The laws can be probabilistic or exact. Equilibrium states can be especially interesting; they are often characterized as stationary points of an appropriate functional defined on the whole configuration space. If time is involved, differential equations for evolution enter the game.

Regarding the idea of “axis”, one should mention its interesting and general cultural connotations expounded by Karl Jaspers. Jaspers postulated a transition period to modernity around 500 BC, an “axial time” when a new human mentality emerged based on the opposition between immanence and transcendence. For us relevant here is the image of oppositions as opposite orientations of one and the same axis, and the idea of freedom as a freedom of choice between two incompatible alternatives. This is also the imagery behind the standard physical expression “degrees of freedom”, which is now almost lost, as usually happens to images when they become terms.

The idea of measurement, which is the base of modern science, is so crucial that it is sometimes uncritically accepted in model–building. It is important to keep in mind its restrictions.

In the quantum mode of description of the microworld, a “measurement” is a very specific interaction which produces a random change of the system state, rather than furnishing information about this state.

In economics, money serves as the universal axis upon which “prices” of whatever are situated. “Measurement” is purportedly a function of market forces.

The core intrinsic contradiction of the market metaphor (including the outrageous “free market of ideas”) is this: we are projecting the multidimensional world of incomparable and incompatible degrees of freedom to the one–dimensional world of money prices. As a matter of principle, one cannot make it compatible with even basic order relations on these axes, much less compatible with non–existent or incomparable values of different kinds.

In this respect, the most oxymoronic use of the market metaphor is furnished by the expression “free market of ideas”.

Only one idea is on sale at this market: that of “free market”.

II.3.1. A brief glossary of measurement. A general remark about measurement: for each “axis” we will be considering, the history of measurements starts with the stage of “human scale” and involves direct manipulation with material objects. Gradually it evolves to much larger and much smaller scales, and in order to deal with the new challenges posed by this evolution, more and more mathematics is created and used.
COUNTING. We suggest to the reader to reread the subsection on Natural Numbers above as a glimpse into the history of counting (and accounting). It shows clearly how the transition from counting small quantities of objects (“human scale”) to the scale of state economy stimulated the creation and codification of a place-value notation.

Skipping other interesting developments, we must briefly mention what Georg Cantor justifiably considered as his finest achievement: counting “infinities” and the discovery that there is an infinite scale of infinities of growing orders of magnitude.

His central argument is structurally very similar to the Euclid’s proof that there are infinitely many primes: if we have a finite or infinite set \( X \), then the set of all its subsets \( P(X) \) has a strictly larger cardinality. This is established by Cantor’s famous “diagonal” reasoning.

Cantor’s theory of infinite sets produces an incredible extension of both aspects of natural numbers: each number measures “a quantity”, and they are ordered by the relation “\( x \) is larger than \( y \)”. Infinities, respectively, are “cardinals” (measure of infinity) and “ordinals” which are points on the ordered axis of growing infinities.

The mysteries of Cantor’s scale led to a series of unsolved (and to a considerable degree unsolvable) problems, and became the central point of many epistemological and foundational discussions in the twentieth century. The controversies and bitter arguments about the legitimacy of his mental constructions made the crowning achievement of his life also the source of a sequence of nervous breakdowns and depressions which finally killed him as the world war I was slowly grinding the last remnants of Enlightenment’s belief in reason.

SPACE AND TIME. Human scale measurements of length must have been inextricably related to those of plots, and motivated by agriculture and building. A stick with two notches, or a piece of string, could be used in order to transport a measure of length from one place to another.

Euclid’s basic abstraction: an infinitely rigid and infinitely divisible plane, with its hidden symmetry group of translations and rotations, with its points having no size, lines stretching uninterrupted in two directions, perfect circles and triangles, must have been a refined mental image of the ancient geodesy. Euclid’s space geometry arguably was even closer to the observable world, and it is remarkable, that he systematically produced and studied abstractions of two-, one-, and zero-dimensional objects as well.

Pythagoras’s theorem was beautifully related to arithmetic in the practice of Egyptian builders: the formula \( 3^2 + 4^2 = 5^2 \) could be transported into a prescription for producing a right angle with the help of a string with uniformly distanced knots on it.

When Eratosphene of Alexandria (ca 200 BC) devised his method for producing the first really large scale scientific length measurement, that of the size of the Earth, he used the whole potential of Euclid’s geometry with great skill. He observed that
at noon on the day of summer solstice at Syene the sun was exactly at the zenith since it shined down a deep well. And at the same time at Alexandria the distance of the sun to the zenith was one fiftieth of the circumference. Two additional pieces of observational data were used. First, that the distance between Syene and Alexandria, which was taken to be 5000 Greek stades (this is also a large scale measurement, probably, based upon the time needed to cover this distance). Second, the assumption that Syene and Alexandria lie on the same meridian.

The remaining part of Eratosthenes’s measurement method is based upon a theoretical model. Earth is supposed to be round, and Sun to be at an essentially infinite distance from its center, so that the lines of sight from Syene and Alexandria to the Sun are parallel.

Then an easy Euclidean argument applied to the cross–section of the Earth and outer space passing through Syene, Alexandria, and the Sun, shows that the distance between Syene and Alexandria must be one fiftieth of the Earth circumference, which gives for the latter the value 250000 stades. (According to modern evaluation of Greek stade, this is a pretty good approximation.)

Implicit in this argument is an extended symmetry group of the Euclidean plane including, with translations and rotations, also rescalings: changing all lengths simultaneously in the same proportion. The practical embodiment of this idea, that of a map, was crucial for an immense amount of human activities, including geographical discoveries all over the globe.

The attentive reader has remarked already that time measurements crept into this description (based upon a book of Cleomedes “De motu circulari corporum caelestium”, middle of the first century BC). In fact, how do we know that we are looking at the position of sun at the same moment in Alexandria and Syene, distanced by 5000 stades?

The earliest human scale time measurement were connected with periodical cycles of day/night and approximate position of sun on the sky. Sky dials, referred to by Cleomedes and Eratosthenes, translate time measurements into space measurements.

The next large scale measurements of time are related to the seasons of the year and periodicity of religious events required in the community. Here to achieve the necessary precision, mathematical observational astronomy is needed. It is used first to register irregularities in the periodicity of year, so basically in the movement of Earth in the solar system. The mathematics which is used here involves numerical calculation based on interpolation methods.

Next level of large scale: chronology of “historical time”. This proved to be a rather un–mathematical endeavor.

Geological and evolutionary time returns us to science: the evolution of Earth structures and of life is traced on the background of a well developed understanding of physical time which is highly mathematicized; however, the changes are so
gradual and the evidence so scattered that precision of measurements ceases to be accessible or essential. Besides the plethora of observational data, brilliant guesses, and very elementary accompanying reasoning, one small piece of mathematics becomes essential for dating: the idea that radioactive decay leaves remnants of the decaying substance whose quantity diminishes exponentially with time. One very original version of this idea was used in “glottochronology”: the dating of proto-states of living languages which were reconstructed using methods of comparative linguistics.

The sheer span of geological and evolutionary time when it was first recognized and scientifically elaborated presented a great challenge to the dogmata of (Christian) faith: discrepancy with the postulated age of the World since the time of Creation became gaping.

Time measurements at a small scale become possible with invention of clocks. Sundials use relative regularity of visible solar motion and subdivide daytime into smaller parts. Water and sand clocks measure fixed stretches of time. This uses the idea of reproducibility of some well controlled physical processes. Mechanical clocks add to this artificial creation of periodic processes. Modern atomic clocks use subtle enhancing methods for exploiting natural periodic processes on a microscale.

Still, time remains a mystery, because we cannot freely move in it as we do in space, we are dragged to who knows where, and St Augustine reminds us about this perennial, un-scientific torment: “I know that I am measuring time. But I am not measuring the future, for it is not yet; and I am not measuring the present because it is extended by no length; and I am not measuring the past because it no longer is. What is it, therefore, that I am measuring? ” (Confessions, Book XI, XXVI.33).

CHANCE, PROBABILITY, FINANCE. Connotations of the words “chance” and “probability” in the ordinary speech do not have much in common with mathematical probability: see [Cha] for an interesting analysis of semantics of related words in several ancient and modern European languages. Basically, they invoke the idea of human confidence (or otherwise) in an uncertain situation.

Measurements of probability, and mathematical handling of the results, refer not to the confidence itself which is a psychological factor, but to objective numerical characteristics of reality, initially closely related to count.

If a pack contains 52 cards and they are well shuffled, the probability to pick the queen of spades is 1/52. Elementary but interesting mathematics enters when one starts calculating probabilities of various combinations (“good hands”). Implicitly, such calculations involve the idea of symmetry group: we not only count the number of cards in the pack, or number of good hands among all possible, but assume that each one is equally probable if the game is fair.

The mathematics of gambling was one source of probability theory, while another was the statistics of banking, commerce, taxation etc. Frequencies of various
occurrences and their stability led to the notion of empirical probability and to the more or less explicit idea of “hidden gambling”, the unobservable realm of causes which produced observable frequences with sufficient regularity in order to fit into a mathematical theory. The modern definition of a probability space is an axiomatization of such an image.

Money started as a measure of value and made a crucial transition to the world of probability with the crystallization of credit as a main function of a bank system.

The etymology of the word “credit” again refers to the idea of human confidence. The emergent “culture of finance”, according to the astute analysis of Mary Poovey in [Po2], drastically differs from an economy of production “which generates profit by turning labor power into products that are priced and and exchanged in the market”. Finance generates profit, in particular, “through placing complex wagers that future prices will raise or fall” ([Po2], p. 27), that is, through pure gambling. The scale of this gambling is staggering, and the incredible mixture of real and virtual worlds in the culture of finance is explosive.

INFORMATION AND COMPLEXITY. This is an example of a quite sophisticated and contemporary measurement paradigm.

As with “chance” and “probability”, the term quantity of information, which became one of the important theoretical notions in the second half of the twentieth century after the works of Claude Shannon and Andrei Kolmogorov, has somewhat misleading connotations. Roughly speaking, the quantity of information is measured simply by the length of a text needed to convey it.

In the everyday usage, this measure seems to be rather irrelevant, first, and disorienting, second. We need to know whether information is important and reliable: these are qualitative rather than quantitative characteristics. Moreover, importance is a function of cultural, scientific, or political context. And in any case, it seems preposterous to measure the information content of “War and Peace” by its sheer volume.

However, quantity of information becomes central if we are handling information without bothering about its content or reliability (but paying attention to security), which is the business of the media and communication industry. The total size of texts transmitted daily by Internet, mass media and phone services is astounding and far beyond the limits of what we called “human scale”.

Shannon’s basic ideas about measuring quantity of information can be briefly explained as follows. Imagine first that the information you want to transmit is simply the answer “yes” or “no” to a question of your correspondent. For this, it is not even necessary to use words of any natural language: simply transmit 1 for “yes” and 0 for “no”. This is one bit of information. Suppose now that you want to transmit a more complex data and need a text containing \( N \) bits. Then the quantity of information you transmit is at least bounded from above by \( N \), but how do you know that you cannot use a shorter text to do the same job? In fact, there
exist systematic methods of compressing the raw data, and they were made explicit by Shannon. The most universal of them starts with the assumption that in the pool of texts you might be wanting to transmit not all are equally probable. In this case you might change encoding in such a way that the more probable texts will get shorter codes than less probable ones, and thus save on the volume of transmission, at least in average.

Here is how one can do it in order to encode texts in a natural language. Since there are about 30 letters of alphabet, and $2^5 = 32$, one needs 5 bits to encode each one, and thus to get a text whose bit–length is about 5 times its letter–length. But some letters statistically are used much more often than others, so one can try to encode them by shorter bit sequences. This leads to an optimization problem that can be explicitly solved, and the resulting length of an average compressed text can be calculated. This is essentially the definition of Shannon’s and Kolmogorov’s entropy.

Using the statistical paradigm of measurement, the creators of Google found an imaginative solution for the problem of assigning numerical measure to the relevance of information as well. Roughly speaking, a search request makes Google produce a list of pages containing a given word or expression. Typically, the number of such pages is very large, and they must be presented in the order of decreasing importance/relevance. How does Google calculate this order?

Each page has hypertext links to other pages. One can model the whole set of pages on the Web by the vertices of an oriented graph whose edges are links. One can assume in the first approximation that importance of a page can be measured by the number of links pointing to it. But this proposal can be improved upon, by noting that all links are not equal: a link from an important page has proportionately more weight, and a link from a page that links to many other pages has proportionately less weight. This leads to an ostensibly circular definition (we omit a couple of minor details): each page imparts its importance to the pages it links to, divided equally between them; each page’s importance is what it receives from all pages that link to it. However a classical theorem due to A. Markov shows that this prescription is well defined. It remains to calculate the values of importance and to range pages in their decreasing order.

Let us now return to the Shannon’s optimal encoding/decoding procedures. The reader has noticed that economy on transmission has its cost: encoding at the source and decoding at the target of information.

What happens if we allow more complex encoding/decoding procedures in order to achieve further degree of compression?

The following metaphor here might be helpful: an encoded text at the source is essentially a program $P$ for obtaining the decoded text $Q$ at the target. Let us now allow to transmit arbitrary programs that will generate $Q$; perhaps we will be able to choose the shortest one and to save resources.
A remarkable result due to Kolmogorov is that this is a well defined notion: such shortest programs \( P \) exist and their length (the Kolmogorov complexity of \( Q \)) does not depend essentially on the programming method. In other words, there exists a totally objective measure of the quantity of information contained in a given text \( Q \).

Bad news, however, crops up here: a) one cannot systematically reconstruct \( P \) knowing \( Q \) (unlike the case of Shannon entropy); b) it may take a very long time decoding \( Q \) from \( P \) even if \( P \) is known and short. A very simple example: if \( Q \) is a sequence of exactly \( 10^{10} \) 1’s, one can transmit this sentence, and let the addressee bother with the boring task of printing 10\(^{10}\) 1’s out.

This means that Kolmogorov’s complexity, a piece of beautiful and highly sophisticated (although “elementary”) mathematics, is not a practical measure of quantity of information. However, it can be used as a powerful metaphor elucidating various strengths and weaknesses of the modern information society.

It allows us to recognize one essential way in which scientific (but also everyday life) information used to be encoded. The basic physical “laws of nature” (Newton’s \( F = ma \), Einstein’s \( E = mc^2 \), the Schrödinger equation etc.) are very compressed programs for obtaining relevant information in concrete situations. Their Kolmogorov complexity is clearly of human size, they bear names of humans associated with their discovery, and their full information content is totally accessible to a single mind of a researcher or a student.

Nowadays, such endeavors as the Human Genome projects provide us with huge quantities of scientific data whose volume in any compressed form highly exceeds the capability of any single mind. Arguably, similar databases that will be created for understanding the central nervous system (brain) will present the same challenge, having Kolmogorov complexity of comparable size with their volume.

Thus, we are already studying those domains of material world whose descriptions have much higher information content (Kolmogorov complexity) than the ones that constituted the object of classical science. Without computers, neither the collective memory of observational data nor their processing would be feasible.

What will happen when the total essential new scientific “knowledge” and its handling will have to be relegated to large computer databases and nets?

III. Mathematical Sciences and Human Values

III.1. Introduction. Commenting on the fragments of the Rhind papyrus, a handbook of Egyptian mathematics written about 1700 BC, the editor of the whole anthology [WM] James R. Newman writes (vol. I, p. 178, published in 1956):

“It seems to me that a sound appraisal of Egyptian mathematics depends upon a much broader and deeper understanding of human culture than either Egyptologists or historians of science are wont to recognize. As to the question how Egyptian
mathematics compares with Babylonian or Mesopotamian or Greek mathematics, the answer is comparatively easy and comparatively unimportant. What is more to the point is to understand why the Egyptians produced their particular kind of mathematics, to what extent it offers a culture clue, how it can be related to their social and political institutions, to their religious beliefs, their economic practices, their habits of daily living. It is only in these terms that their mathematics can be judged fairly."

By 1990, this became a widely accepted paradigm, and D’Ambrosio coined the term “Ethnomathematics” for it (cf [MAC]). Our collage, and the whole project of which it is a part, is a brief self–presentation of ethnomathematics of Western culture, observed from the vantage point of the second half of the twentieth century.

Probably the most interesting intracultural interactions involving mathematics are those that are not direct but rather proceed via the mediation of value systems. A value system influences activities in each domain and practically determines their cultural interpretation. Conversely, an emerging value system in one part of cultural activity (e.g. scientific) starts a process of reconsideration of other ones, their reformation, sometimes leading to their extinction or total remodeling.

This is why in the last section I briefly touch upon human values in the context of mathematical creativity.

III.2. Rationality. Let us listen again to J. R. Newman (Introduction to vol. I of [WM]):

“... I began gathering the material for an anthology which I hoped would convey something of the diversity, the utility and the beauty of mathematics”.

The book [WM] “... presents mathematics as a tool, a language and a map; as a work of art and an end to itself; as a fulfillment of the passion for perfection. It is seen as an object of satire, a subject for humor and a source of controversy; as a spur to wit and a leaven to the storyteller imagination; as an activity which has driven men to frenzy and provided them with delight. It appears in broad view as a body of knowledge made by men, yet standing apart and independent of them.”

In this private and emotional list of values associated with mathematics one is conspicuously absent: rationality. One possible explanation is that in the Anglo–Saxon tradition, this basic value of the Enlightenment came to be associated with economic behavior, and often gets a narrow interpretation: a rational actor is the one that consistently promotes self–interest.

Another explanation is that being rational is not really delightful: “Cogito ergo sum” is an existence proof but it lacks the urgency which a living soul feels without thinking.

Still, rationality in the Renaissance sense, “Il natural desiderio di sapere” (cf. [Ce]), and the drive to be consistently rational is a force without which the existence of mathematics through the centuries, and its successes in bringing its share to the technological progress of society would be impossible.
III.3. Truth. Extended and complex, subtle and mutually contradictory views were expounded on the problem “truth in mathematics”: see [Tr] for a fairly recent review. Here I simply state that axiologically, this is one of the central values associated with mathematics, whatever its historical and philosophical correlates might be.

Authority, practical efficiency, success in competition, faith, all these clashing values must recede in the mind of a mathematician when he or she sets down to do their job.

III.4. Action and contemplation. By the nature of their trade, mathematicians are inclined more to contemplation than to action.

The Romans, who were actors *par excellence* and revered Greek culture, skipped Greek mathematics. The imperial list of virtues – valor, honor, glory, service – did not leave much place for geometry.

This tradition continued through centuries, but as with any tradition, there were exciting exceptions, and I will conclude this essay with a sketch of a great mathematician of the last century, John von Neumann.

Neumann János was born on October 28, 1903 in Budapest, and died in Washington, D.C., on February 8, 1957. During this relatively short life span, he participated in, and made crucial contributions to: the foundations of set theory, quantum statistics and ergodic theory, game theory as a paradigm of economic behavior, theory of operator algebras, the architecture of modern computers, the implosion principle for the creation of the hydrogen bomb, and much more.

Here are two samples of his thinking and modes of expression, marking the beginning and the end of his career.

**Contemplation: The von Neumann Universe.** Cantor’s description of a set as an arbitrary collection of distinct elements of our thought is too generous in many contexts, and the von Neumann Universe consists only of sets whose elements are also sets. The potentially dangerous self–referentiality is avoided by postulating that any family of sets $X_i$ such that $X_i$ is an element of $X_{i+1}$ has a least element; and the ultimate set, the least of all, is empty. Thus von Neumann Universe is born from a “philosophical vacuum”: its first elements are $\emptyset$ (the empty set), $\{\emptyset\}$ (one–element set whose only element is the empty set), $\{\{\emptyset\}\}$, $\{\emptyset, \{\emptyset\}\}$ etc. Stingy curly brackets replace Cantor’s *Zusammenfassung ... zu einem Ganzen*, and this operation, which can be iteratively repeated, is the only one that produces new sets from the already constructed ones. Iteration can be, of course, transfinite, which was another great insight of Cantor’s.

It is difficult to imagine a purer object of contemplation than this quiet and powerful hierarchy.

**Action: Hiroshima.** Excerpts from von Neumann’s letter to R. E. Duncan, IBM War History section, dated December 18, 1947 ([Neu], pp. 111–112):
Dear Mr. Duncan

In reply to your letter of December 16, [...] I can tell you the following things: I did initiate and carry out work during the war on oblique shock reflection. This did lead to the conclusion that large bombs are better detonated at a considerable altitude than on the ground, since this leads to the higher oblique-incidence pressure referred to. [...] I did receive the Medal for Merit (October, 1946) and the Distinguished Service Award (July, 1946). The citations are as follows:

"Citation to Accompany the Award of
The Medal for Merit
to
Dr. John von Neumann

DR. JOHN VON NEUMANN, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the United States from July 9, 1942 to August 31, 1945. Dr. von Neumann, by his outstanding devotion to duty, technical leadership, untiring cooperativeness, and sustained enthusiasm, was primarily responsible for fundamental research by the United States Navy on the effective use of high explosives, which has resulted in the discovery of a new ordnance principle for offensive action, and which has already been proved to increase the efficiency of air power in the atomic bomb attacks over Japan. His was a contribution of inestimable value to the war effort of the United States.

HARRY TRUMAN"

[...]

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