Network Coding-based Protection Strategies Against a Single Link Failure in Optical Networks

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Abstract—In this paper we develop network protection strategies against a single link failure in optical networks. The motivation behind this work is the fact that 70% of all available links in an optical network suffer from a single link failure. In the proposed protection strategies, denoted NPS-I and NPS-II, we deploy network coding and reduced capacity on the working paths to provide a backup protection path that will carry encoded data from all sources. In addition, we provide implementation aspects and how to deploy the proposed strategies in case of an optical network with n disjoint working paths.

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the main services of operation networks that must be deployed efficiently is reliability. In order to deploy a reliable networking strategy, the transmitted signals must be protected over unreliable links. Link failures are common problems that might occur frequently in single and multiple operating communication circuits. In network survivability and network resilience, one needs to design efficient strategies to overcome this dilemma. Optical network survivability techniques are classified as pre-designed protection and dynamic restoration [13], [19], [22], [24]. The approach of using pre-designed protections aims to reserve enough bandwidth such that when a failure occurs, backup paths are used to reroute the transmission and to recover the data. Examples of this approach are 1-1 and 1-N protections [11], [14]. In dynamic restoration reactive strategies, capacity is not reserved. However, when the failure occurs, dynamic recovery is used to recover the data transmitted in the links that are suffered from failures. This technique does not require preserved resources or provisioning extra paths that work in case of failure. In this work we will provide several strategies of dynamic restoration based on network coding and reduced distributed fairness capacities.

Network coding is a powerful tool that has been recently used to increase the throughput, capacity, security, and performance of communication networks. Information theoretic aspects of network coding have been investigated in [1], [21], [23]. Network coding allows the intermediate nodes not only to forward packets using network scheduling algorithms, but also encode/decode them using algebraic primitive operations, see [1], [6], [21], [23], and references therein. Network coding is used to maximize the throughput [1], [9], [15], network capacity [5], [16], [20]. Also, it is robust against packet losses and network failures [7], [18], and enhances network security and protection [8], [17]. It is believed that network coding will be deployed in all relay nodes and network operations.

Network protection against a single link failure (SLF) by adding one extra path has been introduced in [10]–[12]. The source nodes are able to combine their data into a single extra path (backup protection path) that is used to protect all signals on the working paths carrying data from all sources. Also, protection against multiple link failures has been presented in [8], [13], [14], where m extra paths are used. In both cases, p-cycles have been used for protection against single and multiple link failures. In this model the source nodes are assumed to send their data with a full capacity relaying on the extra paths to protect their data. However, there are situations where the extra paths approach might not be applicable, and one needs to design a protection strategy depending solely on the available resources [2]–[4], [13].

In this work we will assume that all paths are working and adding extra paths to the available ones is a difficult task. We apply two network protection strategies called NPS-I and NPS-II, each of which has (n - 1)/n normalized network capacity.

In these two strategies, we show how the sources achieve the encoding operation and distribute their link’s capacities among them for fairness. We assume that one of the working paths will overlap to carry encoded data, therefore, acting as a protection path.

In this paper we introduce a model for network protection against a single link failure in optical networks. In this model, the network capacity will be reduced by partial factor in order to achieve the required protection. Several advantages of NPS-I and NPS-II strategies can be stated as follows.

• The data originated from the sources is protected without adding extra secondary paths. We assume that one of the working paths will act as a protection path carrying encoded data.

• The encoding and decoding operations are achieved online with less computational cost at both the sources and receivers.
The normalized network capacity is \((n-1)/n\), which is near-optimal in the case of using large number of n connection paths.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sections [II] and [III] we present the network model and problem setup, respectively. The definitions of the normalized capacity, working and protection paths are given. In Section [IV] we present a network protection strategy NPS-I against a single link/path failure using an extra dedicated path. In addition in Section [V] we provide the network protection strategy NPS-II which deployed network coding and reduced capacity. The implementation aspects of NPS-I and NPS-II are discussed in Section [VI] and finally the paper is concluded in Section [VII].

II. NETWORK MODEL

The network model can be described as follows. 

i) Let \(\mathcal{N}\) be a network represented by an abstract graph \(G = (V, E)\), where \(V\) is the set of nodes and \(E\) be set of undirected edges. Let \(S\) and \(R\) is a set of independent sources and destinations, respectively. The set \(V = V \cup S \cup R\) contains the relay nodes, sources, and destinations. Assume for simplicity that \(|S| = |R| = n\), hence the set of sources is equal to the set of receivers.

ii) A path (connection) is a set of edges connected together with a starting node (sender) and an ending node (receiver).

\[ L_i = \{(s_i, e_{i1}), (e_{i1}, e_{i2}), \ldots, (e_{im}), r_i)\}, \]

where \(1 \leq i \leq n\) and \((e_{j-1}, e_j) \in E\) for some integer \(m\).

iii) The node can be a router, switch, or an end terminal depending on the network model \(\mathcal{N}\) and the transmission layer.

iv) \(L\) is a set of links \(L = \{L_1, L_2, \ldots, L_n\}\) carrying the data from the sources to the receivers as shown in Fig. 1. All connections have the same bandwidth, otherwise a connection with high bandwidth can be divided into multiple connections, each of which has a unit capacity. There are exactly \(n\) connections.

v) Each sender \(s_i \in S\) will transmit its own data \(x_i\) to a receiver \(r_i\) through a connection \(L_i\). Also, \(s_i\) will transmit encoded data \(\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i\) to \(r_i\) at different time slot if it is assigned to send the encoded data.

vi) The data from all sources are sent in sessions. Each session has a number of time slots \(n\). Hence \(t_\delta\) is a value at round time slot \(\delta\) in session \(\delta\).

vii) In this model \(\mathcal{N}\), we consider only a single link failure, it is sufficient to apply the encoding and decoding operations over a finite field with two elements, we denote it \(\mathbb{F}_2 = \{0, 1\}\).

viii) There are at least two receivers and two senders with at least two disjoint paths, otherwise the protection model cannot be deployed for a single path, in which it can not protect itself.

Fig. 1. Network protection against a single link failure using reduced capacity and network coding. One link out of \(n\) primary links carries encoded data.

We will define the working and protection paths between two network nodes (switches and routers) in optical networks as shown in Fig. 2.

**Definition 1**: The working paths on a network with \(n\) connection paths carry traffic under normal operations. The protection paths provide an alternate backup path to carry the traffic in case of failures. A protection scheme ensures that data sent from the sources will reach the receivers in case of failure incidences on the working paths.

III. PROBLEM SETUP AND TERMINOLOGY

We assume that there is a set of \(n\) disjoint connections that requires protections with \(\%100\) guaranteed against a single link failure (SLF). All connections have the same bandwidth, and each link (one hop) with a bandwidth can be a circuit.

Every sender \(s_i\) prepares a packet \(\text{packet}_{s_i \rightarrow r_i}\) to send to the receiver \(r_i\). The packet contains the sender’s ID, data \(x_i^\ell\), and a round time for every session \(t_\delta^\ell\) for some integers \(\delta\) and \(\ell\). We have two types of packets:

i) Packets sent without coding, in which the sender does not need to perform any coding operations. For example, in case of packets sent without coding, the sender \(s_i\) sends the following packet to the receiver \(r_i\):

\[ \text{packet}_{s_i \rightarrow r_i} := (ID_{s_i}, x_i^\ell, t_\delta^\ell) \] (1)

ii) Packets sent with encoded data, in which the sender needs to send other senders’ data. In this case, the sender \(s_i\) sends the following packet to the receiver \(r_i\):

\[ \text{packet}_{s_i \rightarrow r_i} := (ID_{s_i}, \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^{n} x_j^\ell, t_\delta^\ell) \] (2)

The value \(y_j^\ell = \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^{n} x_j^\ell\) is computed by every sender \(s_i\), in which it is able to collect the data from all other senders and encode them using the bit-wise operation. In either case the sender has a full capacity in the connection link \(L_i\). We will provide more elaboration in this scenario in Section [VI] where implementation aspects will be discussed.
We can define the network capacity from min-cut max-flow information theoretic view [1]. It can be described as follows.

Definition 2: The unit capacity of a connecting path \( L_i \) between \( s_i \) and \( r_i \) is defined as:

\[
c_i = \begin{cases} 
1, & L_i \text{ is active;} \\
0, & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

The total capacity of \( N \) is given by the summation of all path capacities. What we mean by an active path is that the receiver is able to receive and process signals/messages throughout this path.

Clearly, if all paths are active then the total capacity is \( n \) and normalized capacity is 1. If we assume there are \( n \) disjoint paths, then, in general, the capacity of the network for the active and failed paths is computed by:

\[
C_N = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} c_i.
\]

There have been several techniques developed to provide network survivability. Such techniques will add additional resources for the sake of recovery from failures. They will also depend on the time it takes to recover from failures, and how much delay the receiver can tolerate. Hence, network survivability is a multi-objective problem in terms of resource efficiency, operation cost, and agility. Optimizing these objectives has taken much attention recently, and has led to the design of more efficient reliable networks.

IV. NETWORK PROTECTIONS AGAINST A SLF USING EXTRA AND DEDICATED PATHS

Assume we have \( n \) connections carrying data from a set of \( n \) sources to a set of \( n \) receivers. All connections represent disjoint paths, and the sources are independent of each other. The author in [10], [11] introduced a model for protecting an optical network against a single link failure using an extra path provision. The idea is to establish a new connection from the sources to the receivers using virtual (secondary) source and virtual (secondary) receiver. The goal of the secondary source is to collect data from all other sources and encode it using the Xored operation.

The extra path that carries the encoded data from all sources is one cycle. In the encoding operations every source \( s_i \) adds its value, and the cycle starts at source \( s_1 \) and ends at source \( s_n \). Hence, the encoded data after performing the cycle or extra path is \( X = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \). The decoding operations are done at every receiver \( r_i \) by adding the data \( s_i \) received over the link \( L_i \). The node \( r_j \) with failed connection \( L_j \) will be able to recover the data \( x_j \). Assuming all operations are achieved over the binary finite field \( F_2 \). Hence we have:

\[
x_j = X - \sum_{i=1; i \neq j}^{n} x_i^j.
\]

Protecting With Extra Paths (NPS-I): We will describe the network protection strategy NPS-I against a single link failure in optical networks. Assume a source \( s_i \) generates a message \( x_i^t \) at round time \( t_i \). Put differently:

\[
\text{packet}_{s_i} = (ID_{s_i}, x_i^t, t_i^t).
\]

The packet \( s_i \) is transmitted from the source \( s_i \) to a destination \( r_i \) for all \( 1 \leq i \leq n \). It is sent in the primary working path \( L_i \), i.e. a path that conveys an unencoded data. The secondary protection path provisioned from a source \( s \) to destination \( r \) can convey the message:

\[
\text{packet}_s = (ID_s, \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i^t, t_i^t).
\]

This process is explained in Scheme (8).

| round time | session 1 | \ldots | \ldots |
|------------|-----------|-------|-------|
| 1          | 2         | 3     | \ldots|
| \( s_1 \rightarrow r_1 \) | \( x_1^1 \) | \( x_1^2 \) | \( x_1^3 \) | \ldots | \( x_1^n \) |
| \( s_2 \rightarrow r_2 \) | \( x_2^1 \) | \( x_2^2 \) | \( x_2^3 \) | \ldots | \( x_2^n \) |
| \( s_3 \rightarrow r_3 \) | \( x_3^1 \) | \( x_3^2 \) | \( x_3^3 \) | \ldots | \( x_3^n \) |
| \ldots     | \ldots     | \ldots | \ldots | \ldots     |
| \( s_i \rightarrow r_i \) | \( x_i^1 \) | \( x_i^2 \) | \ldots | \( x_i^t-1 \) | \ldots | \( x_i^n \) |
| \ldots     | \ldots     | \ldots | \ldots | \ldots |
| \( s_n \rightarrow r_n \) | \( x_n^1 \) | \( x_n^2 \) | \( x_n^3 \) | \ldots | \( x_n^n \) |
| \( s \rightarrow r \) | \( y_1 \) | \( y_2 \) | \( y_3 \) | \ldots | \( y_n \) |

All \( y_j \)'s are defined over \( F_2 \) as:

\[
y_j = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i^j.
\]

We notice that the encoded data \( y_j \) is fixed per one session transmission and it is fixed for other sessions. This means that the path \( L_j \) is dedicated to sending all encoded data \( y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n \).
Lemma 3: The normalized capacity of NPS-I of the network model $N$ described in Scheme (1) is given by

$$ C = (n)/(n + 1) $$

Proof: In every session, we have $n$ rounds. Furthermore, in every round there are $(n + 1)$ senders with $n + 1$ disjoint paths, and only one sender sends encoded data. Therefore $C = n^2/(n + 1)n$, which gives the result.

Protecting Without Extra Paths: If we do not allow an extra path, then one of the available working paths can be used to carry the encoded data as shown in Scheme (11). It shows that a path $L_j$ exists which carries the encoded data sent from the source $s_j$ to the receiver $r_j$.

### V. NETWORK PROTECTION AGAINST A SLF USING DISTRIBUTED CAPACITY AND CODING

In this section we will provide a network protection strategy against a single link failure using distributed fairness capacity and coding. This strategy is called NPS-II. We will compute the network capacity in each approach and how the optimal capacity can be written with partial delay at rounds of a given session for a sender $s_i$. In [3] we will also illustrate the tradeoff between the two approaches, where there is enough space for details.

NPS-II Protecting a SLF: We will describe the NPS-II which protects a single link failure using network coding and reduced capacity. Assume there is a path $L_j$ that will carry the encoded data from the source $s_j$ to the receiver $r_j$. Consider a failed link $(u, v) \in E$, which the path $L_i$ goes through. We would like to design an encoding scheme such that a backup copy of data on $L_i$ can also be sent over a different path $L_j$. This process is explained in Scheme (15), and it is called Network Protection Strategy (NPS-II) against a single Link/path failure (SLF). The data is sent in rounds for every session. Also, we assume the failure happens only in one path throughout a session, but different paths might suffer failures throughout different sessions. Indeed most of the current optical networks suffer experience a single link failure [22], [24].

The objective of the proposed network protection strategy is to withhold rerouting the signals or the transmitted packets due to link failures. However, we provide strategies that utilize network coding and reduced capacity at the source nodes. We assume that the source nodes are able to perform encoding operations and the receiver nodes are able to perform decoding operations. We will allow the sources to provide backup copies that will be sent through the available paths simultaneously and in the same existing connections.

Let $x^j_i$ be the data sent from the source $s_i$ at round time $j$ in a session $\delta$. Also, assume $y_j = \sum_{i=1,i\neq j}^{n} x^j_i$. Put differently

$$ y_j = x^j_1 + x^j_2 + \ldots + x^j_n. $$

The protection scheme runs in sessions as explained below. For the $(n - 1)/n$ strategy presented in Scheme (15), the design issues are described as follows.

i) A total of $(n - 1)$ link disjoint paths between $(n - 1)$ senders $S$ and receivers $R$ are provisioned to carry the signals from $S$ to $R$. Each path has the unit capacity and data unit from $s_i$ in $S$ to $r_i$ in $R$ are sent in rounds. Data unit $x^j_i$ is sent from source $s_i$ at round $(n)$ in a specific session.

ii) A server $S$ is able to collect the signals from all $n$ sources and is able to provision $y_j = \sum_{i=1,i\neq k}^{n} x^j_i$ at round time $j$. A single source $s_k$ is used to deliver $y_j$ to the receiver $r_k$. This process is achieved at one particular session. The encoded data $y_j$ is distributed equally among all $n$ sources.

iii) In the first round time at a particular session, the data $x^1_i$ is sent from $s_i$ to $r_i$ in all paths for $i = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ and $i \neq j$. Only the source $s_j$ will send $y_j$ to the receiver $r_j$ over the path $L_j$ at round $t^j_\delta$.

$$ y_j = \sum_{i=1,i\neq j}^{n} x^j_i. $$

iv) We always neglect the communication and computational cost between the senders and data collector $S$, as well as the receivers and data collector $R$. 

All $y^j_i$’s are defined over $F_2$ as

$$ y^j_i = \sum_{i=1,i\neq j}^{n} x^j_i. $$

We notice that the encoded data $y_j$ is fixed per one session transmission but it is varied for other sessions. This means that the path $L_j$ is dedicated to send all encoded data $y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n$.

Lemma 4: The normalized capacity of the network model $N$ described in Scheme (11) is given as:

$$ C = (n - 1)/n $$

The implementation aspects of this strategy are discussed in Section VI.
In this case \( y_1 = \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} x_i \) and in general \( y_j \)'s are defined over \( F_2 \) as

\[
y_j = \sum_{i=1}^{n-j} x_i + \sum_{i=n-j+2}^{n} x_i^{-1}.
\]

(16)

The senders send packets to the set of receivers in rounds. Every packet initiated from the sender \( s_i \) contains \( ID \), data \( x_{s_i} \), and a round \( t_{s_i} \). For example, the sender \( s_i \) will send the \textit{packet}_{s_i} as follows.

\[
\text{packet}_{s_i} = (ID_{s_i}, x_{s_i}, t_{s_i}^j).
\]

(17)

Also, the sender \( s_j \) will send the encoded data \( y_{s_j} \) as

\[
\text{packet}_{s_j} = (ID_{s_j}, y_{s_j}, t_{s_j}^j).
\]

(18)

We ensure that the encoded data \( y_{s_j} \) is varied per one round transmission for every session. This means that the path \( L_j \) is dedicated to send only one encoded data \( y_j \) and all data \( x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_{n-1} \).

\textbf{Remark 5:} In NPS-I, the data transmitted from the sources does not experience any round time delay. This means that the receivers will be able to decode the received packets online and immediately recover the failed data.

\textbf{Lemma 6:} The normalized capacity NPS-I of the network model \( N \) described in Scheme 15 is given by

\[
C = (n - 1)/(n).
\]

(19)

\textbf{Proof:} We have \( n \) rounds and the total number of transmitted packets in every round is \( n \). Also, in every round there are \( (n-1) \) un-encoded data \( x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_j, \ldots, x_n \) and only one encoded data \( y_j \) for all \( i = 1, \ldots, n \). Hence, the capacity \( c_t \) in every round is \( n - 1 \). Therefore, the normalized capacity is given by

\[
C = \frac{\sum_{\ell=1}^{n} c_t}{n * n} = \frac{(n - 1) * n}{n^2}.
\]

(20)

The following lemma shows that the network protection strategy NPS-II is in fact optimal if we consider \( F_2 \). In other words, there exist no other strategies that give better normalized capacity than NPS-II.

\textbf{Lemma 7:} The network protection scheme NPS-II against a single link failure is optimal.

The transmission is done in rounds, hence linear combinations of data have to be from the same round time. This can be achieved using the round time that is included in each packet sent by a sender.

\textbf{Encoding Process:} There are several scenarios where the encoding operations can be achieved. The encoding and decoding operations will depend mainly on the network topology; how the senders and receivers are distributed in the network.

- The encoding operation is done at only one source \( s_i \).
  In this case all other sources must send their data to \( s_i \), which will send encoded data over \( L_i \). We assume that all sources have shared paths with each other.
- If we assume there is a data distributor \( S \), then the source nodes send a copy of their data to the data distributor \( S \), in which it will decide which source will send the encoding data and all other sources will send their own data. This process will happen in every round during transmission time.
- The encoding is done by the bit-wise operation which is the fastest arithmetic operation that can be performed among all source’s data.
- The distributor \( S \) will change the sender that should send the encoded data in every round of a given session.

\textbf{VI. Implementation Aspects}

In this section we shall provide implementation aspects of the proposed protection strategy in case of a single link failure. The network protection strategy against a link failure is deployed in two processes: Encoding and decoding operations. The encoding operations are performed at the set of sources, in which one or two sources will send the encoded data depending on the strategy used. The decoding operations are performed at the receivers’ side, in which a receiver with a failed link had to XOR all other receivers’ data in order to recover its own data. Depending on NPS-I or NPS-II the receivers will experience some delay before they can actually decode the packets. If the failure happen in the protection path of NPS-I, then the receivers do not perform any decoding operations because all working paths will convey data from the senders to receivers. However, if the failure happens in the working path, the receivers must perform decoding operations to recovery the failure using the protection path. We also note that the delay will happen only when the failure occurs in the protection paths.

The synchronization between senders and receivers are done using the time rounds, hence linear combinations of data have to be from the same round time. Each packet sent by a sender has its own time and ID. In this part we will assume that there is a data distributor \( S \) at the sources side and data distributor \( R \) at the receivers side.

\textbf{Encoding Process:} The encoded process of the proposed protection strategies can be done as follows.
that will transmit the encoded data over its path. The objective
is to withhold rerouting the signals or the transmitted packets
due to link failures. However, we provide strategies that utilize
network coding and reduced capacity at the source nodes.

Decoding Process: The decoding process is done in a similar
way as the encoding process. We assume there is a data
distributor server $S$ that assigns the senders that will send only
their own data as shown in Fig. 3. In addition $S$ will encode
the data from all senders and distribute it only to the sender
that will collect the encoded data in every round of a given session.

The server $S$ will change the sender that should send the encoded
data in every round. This process will be repeated in every session
during transmission till all sources send their data.

The source nodes send a copy of their data to the data
distributor $S$, then $S$ will decide which source will send
the encoding data and all other sources will send their
own data. This process will happen in every round during
transmission time.

The encoding is done by the bit-wise operation which is the fastest arithmetic operation that can be performed
among all source’s data.

This process will be repeated in every session during
transmission time.

VII. Conclusion

In this paper we presented a strategy for network protection
against a single failure in optical networks. We showed
that protecting a single link failure in optical networks can
be achieved using network coding and reduced capacity. In
addition, we provided implementation aspects of the proposed
network protection strategies.

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