Multipartite Bound Information exists and can be activated

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We prove the conjectured existence of Bound Information, a classical analog of bound entanglement, in the multipartite scenario. We give examples of tripartite probability distributions from which it is impossible to extract any kind of secret key, even in the asymptotic regime, although they cannot be created by local operations and public communication. Moreover, we show that bound information can be activated: three honest parties can distill a common secret key from different distributions having bound information. Our results demonstrate that quantum information theory can provide useful insight for solving open problems in classical information theory.

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In 1993, Maurer introduced the following scenario for information-theoretically secure secret-key agreement: several parties, including a possible adversary, share partially correlated (classical) information. The honest parties aim to establish a secret key, processing this information with local operations and public communication (LOPC). The secret key has to be completely uncorrelated to the adversary’s information. Because information-theoretically secure secret bits cannot be created by LOPC, all the secrecy has to come from the correlations that they initially have. Maurer’s formulation shares many similarities with the standard scenario of entanglement manipulations in quantum information theory. There, several separated parties share many copies of a multipartite quantum state, which specifies the kind of quantum correlations existing among them and the environment. Their goal is to obtain pure-state entanglement applying only local operations and classical communication (LOCC). A pure state is uncorrelated to the environment. Then, the environment plays the same role as the adversary in cryptography. The analogy between both scenarios was first explored in Ref. [2] and later developed in Refs. [3, 4].

Given a state $\rho$ in a composite system of several parties, two fundamental questions in quantum information theory are: (i) can it be prepared by LOCC? and (ii) can pure-state entanglement be extracted from many copies of $\rho$ by LOCC? These questions, that still remain unsolved, define the separability and distillability problems (see for instance [5]). Despite the natural expectation that all entangled states were distillable, in 1998 the Horodecki family showed the existence of the so-called bound entangled states [6]. These are states from which it is impossible to extract pure-state entanglement although they cannot be created by LOCC. Following the analogy between the entanglement and key-agreement scenarios, Gisin and Wolf conjectured and gave evidence for the existence of a classical analog of bound entanglement, the so-called bound information [2]. This consists on information shared among several honest parties and an eavesdropper such that (i) it is impossible for the honest parties to extract a secret key, and (ii), this information cannot be distributed by LOPC.

In this work we present the first provable examples of multipartite bound information. Remarkably, our examples can be activated in the same sense as in the quantum case. That is, after LOPC processing different kinds of bound information, a secret key can be obtained. The intuition used to get these results entirely comes from already known examples of bound entangled states in three-qubit systems. Our work then, constitutes one of the first situations where the quantum information insight gives the answer to an open problem in classical information theory [7]. Indeed, up to now the flow of results has mainly been in the opposite direction, e.g. the quantum protocols for entanglement distillation of Ref. [8] were derived from existing classical protocols for key distillation. But before proving our results, let us review some known facts about secret-key distillation.

In his original formulation of the key-agreement problem, Maurer just considered the bipartite scenario: two honest parties (Alice and Bob) connected by an authentic but otherwise insecure classical communication channel, such that, a possible eavesdropper (Eve) learns the whole communication between them. Additionally, each party—including Eve—has access to correlated information given by repeated realizations of the random variables $A$, $B$ and $E$ (possessed by Alice, Bob and Eve respectively), jointly distributed according to $P(A, B, E)$. The goal for Alice and Bob is to obtain a common string of random bits for which Eve has virtually no information, i.e. a secret key. The maximal amount of secret key bits that can be asymptotically extracted per realization of $(A, B)$ used, is called the secret key rate, denoted by $S(A : B \mid E)$. This quantity can be seen as the analog of the distillable entanglement, $E_D$ [4]. More recently, the so-called information of formation $I_{\text{form}}(A; B|E)$, has been introduced in [10] as the analog of the entanglement cost, $E_C$ [9]. Given $P(A, B, E)$, it can be understood as the minimal number of secret key bits asymptotically needed to generate each independent realization of $(A, B)$
—distributed according to $P(A, B)$, such that the information about $(A, B)$ contained in the messages exchanged through the public channel is at most equal to the information in $E$. A probability distribution can be established by LOPC if and only if $I_{\text{form}} = 0$. Using these quantities, we can now define bound information. A probability distribution $P(A, B, E)$ contains bound information when the following two conditions hold \cite{13}:

$$\begin{align*}
S(A : B \parallel E) &= 0 \\
I_{\text{form}}(A : B | E) &> 0 .
\end{align*}$$

(1)

A useful upper bound for $S(A : B \parallel E)$ is given by the so-called intrinsic information, introduced in \cite{14}. This quantity, denoted by $I(A : B \parallel E)$, will play a significant role in the proof of our results. The intrinsic information between $A$ and $B$ given $E$ is defined as:

$$I(A : B | E) = \min_{E \rightarrow \hat{E}} I(A : B | \hat{E}) ,$$

(2)

where the minimization runs over all possible stochastic maps $P(\hat{E} | E)$ defining a new aleatory variable $\hat{E}$. The quantity $I(A : B | E)$ is the mutual information between $A$ and $B$ conditioned on $E$. It can be written as

$$I(A : B | E) = H(A, E) + H(B, E) - H(A, B, E) - H(E) ,$$

(3)

where $H(X)$ is the Shannon entropy of the aleatory variable $X$. The intrinsic information also gives a lower bound for the information of formation \cite{10}, thus

$$S(A : B \parallel E) \leq I(A : B \parallel E) \leq I_{\text{form}}(A : B | E) .$$

(4)

The generalization of Maurer’s formulation to the multipartite scenario is straightforward. In our case, three honest parties —Alice, Bob and Clare— are connected by a broadcast public communication channel which is totally accessible to the eavesdropper —Eve— but that she cannot tamper. As it happens in entanglement theory, the generalization of the secret key rate ($E_4$) and the information of formation ($E_5$) to the multipartite case may not be univoque \cite{4}. Anyhow, the idea of multipartite bound information is unambiguous: a probability distribution $P(A, B, C, E)$ contains bound information if

1. No pair of honest parties —even with the help of the third one— can generate a secret key from many copies of $P(A, B, C, E)$. This also prevents the possibility of distilling a tripartite secret key \cite{14}, because from it, a bipartite key between any pair of parties could be generated, giving a contradiction (see the note \cite{15}).

2. Its distribution by LOPC is not possible. More precisely, a large number of realizations of the aleatory variables $A$, $B$ and $C$ following the reduced probability distribution $P(A, B, C)$, cannot be distributed among Alice, Bob and Clare if the broadcasted messages are constrained to contain at most the information of the variable $E$ \cite{11}.

Having collected all these facts, let us prove the main result of this work, namely the existence of bound information.

Our example of bound information is given by the following probability distribution, denoted by $P_1$:

| $A$ | $B$ | $C$ | $E$ | $P_1(A, B, C, E)$ |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------------|
| 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 1/6              |
| 0   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1/6              |
| 1   | 0   | 1   | 2   | 1/6              |
| 1   | 0   | 1   | 3   | 1/6              |
| 1   | 1   | 0   | 4   | 1/6              |
| 1   | 1   | 1   | 0   | 1/6              |

This is the probability distribution that one obtains after measuring the three-qubit bound entangled state $\rho_1$, given in the Eq. (17) of Ref. \cite{10}, in the computational basis. Note that $P_1(0, 1, 1) = P(1, 0, 0) = 0$ and this distribution is invariant, up to a relabeling of $E$, under interchange of $B$ and $C$. In what follows, it is seen that from these correlations, it is impossible to extract a secret key between any pair of parties, even with the help of the third one.

First, consider the bipartite splitting $AB - C$, where Alice and Bob are allowed to perform joint (secret) operations, i.e. they are connected by a private channel. It is easy to see that $I(AB : C | E) = p(E = 0) I(AB : C | E = 0) = 1/3$. Now, applying the stochastic map $E \rightarrow \hat{E}$ corresponding to: $1 \rightarrow 0, 4 \rightarrow 0$ and identity for the rest of the values, we obtain $I(AB : C | \hat{E}) = 0$. That is, the intrinsic information \cite{2} vanishes, and because of \cite{4} we have that

$$S(AB : C \parallel E) = 0 .$$

(5)

This implies that Clare cannot establish a secret key with Alice nor with Bob (even in the favorable situation where Alice and Bob are together). Because $P_1$ is symmetric with respect to $B$ and $C$, we also have that Bob cannot extract a key with Alice nor with Clare. Therefore, no secret key between any pair of parties can be generated from many copies of $P_1$ by LOPC.

Notice that $P_1$ contains some kind of secret correlations, although they are not distillable in the previous scenarios. This fact becomes manifest when we allow Bob and Clare to perform joint operations. In this case, we have again that $I(BC : A | E) = 1/3$. But now, it is possible to construct a key distillation protocol achieving this rate: Bob and Clare announce publicly the cases where they have $B = C$, without saying the specific value. Each of these filtered realizations of $P_1$, that happen with probability $1/3$, contains one secret bit shared between $A$ and $BC$. Therefore,

$$S(AB : BC \parallel E) = I(AB : BC \parallel E) = \frac{1}{3} .$$

(6)
This condition cannot be satisfied by those probability distributions created by LOPC, since in this case $S = 0$ for all the bipartite splitting of the honest parties. Hence, by definition, $P_{1}$ is an example of bound information, since it contains non-distillable secret correlations.

As we have seen, the secret correlations present in $P_{1}$ can be activated when a private channel is established between Bob and Clare. Indeed, the secret key given to these two parties allows to activate the already existing secret correlations with Alice. A similar phenomenon also happens in the quantum case, e.g. for the state $\rho_{1}$ that inspired the construction of $P_{1}$. An even more intriguing example of activation of bound entanglement consists of the fact that the tensor product, and even the mixture of bound entangled states can contain distillable entanglement \cite{16,17}. This process is sometimes called superactivation of bound entanglement. In the next lines, we show the analog of superactivation for secret correlations. Again, our example is inspired by the results of Ref. \cite{16}.

Consider the case in which the honest parties have access to a source of correlated information that supplies them with three probability distributions $P_{1}$, $P_{2}$ and $P_{3}$, where $P_{2}$ and $P_{3}$ are cyclic permutation of $P_{1}$,

\begin{align}
P_{2}(A, B, C, E) &= P_{1}(B, C, A, E) \\
P_{3}(A, B, C, E) &= P_{1}(C, A, B, E).
\end{align}

(7)

Of course, all these distributions contain bound information. Using only LOPC, Alice, Bob and Clare can construct an equally weighted mixture of $P_{1}$, $P_{2}$ and $P_{3}$:

\begin{equation}
P_{\text{mix}} = \frac{1}{3}(P_{1} + P_{2} + P_{3})
\end{equation}

(8)

An equivalent scenario would consist of a source preparing randomly the three distributions, in such a way that the knowledge about the actual distribution is only accessible to Eve. The resulting distribution, $P_{\text{mix}}$, is detailed in the following table:

| $A$ | $B$ | $C$ | $E$ | $P_{\text{mix}}(A, B, C, E)$ |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------------------------------|
| 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | $1/6$                         |
| 0   | 0   | 1   | 1   | $1/9$                         |
| 0   | 1   | 0   | 2   | $1/9$                         |
| 0   | 1   | 1   | 3   | $1/9$                         |
| 1   | 0   | 0   | 4   | $1/9$                         |
| 1   | 0   | 1   | 5   | $1/9$                         |
| 1   | 1   | 0   | 6   | $1/9$                         |
| 1   | 1   | 1   | 0   | $1/6$                         |

Actually, if one takes into account the total information accessible to the parties, Eve’s symbol should be equal to $(E, i)$, where $i = \{1, 2, 3\}$ specifies the distribution $P_{i}$, and $E$ is associated to the triple of random variables $(A, B, C)$. However, it is easy to see that this distribution is equivalent to $P_{\text{mix}}$ from the point of view of Eve’s information on Alice, Bob and Clare’s symbols.

Interestingly, $P_{\text{mix}}$ can be distilled into a tripartite key. To achieve this goal, the honest parties can use the repeated code protocol of Ref. \cite{14}, generalized to the multipartite scenario. It consists of the following steps:

1. Each party takes $N$ realizations of its own random variable:

\begin{align}
A_{1}, A_{2}, \ldots , A_{N} \\
B_{1}, B_{2}, \ldots , B_{N} \\
C_{1}, C_{2}, \ldots , C_{N},
\end{align}

where $A_{i}, B_{i}, C_{i}$ are correlated according to $P_{\text{mix}}(A_{i}, B_{i}, C_{i}, E_{i})$, for every value of $i$.

2. Alice—or any of the honest parties—generates locally a random bit $s_{A}$, computes the numbers $X_{i} := A_{i} + s_{A}$, where the sum is modulo 2, for each value of $i$, and broadcasts through the public channel the $N$-bit string:

\begin{equation}
X_{1}, X_{2}, \ldots , X_{N}.
\end{equation}

(10)

3. Bob adds bitwise this string to his symbols $B_{1}, B_{2}, \ldots , B_{N}$. If he obtains the same value for all of them, $B_{i} + X_{i} = s_{B}, \forall i$, he accepts $s_{B}$ and communicates the acceptance to the other parties. If not, the $N$ realizations of $P_{\text{mix}}$ are rejected. Clare does the same, accepting $s_{C}$ only when $C_{i} + X_{i} = s_{C}, \forall i$.

For any accepted $N$-bit string only four cases are possible: $A_{i} = B_{i} = C_{i}, \forall i$, $A_{i} = B_{i} \neq C_{i}, \forall i$, $B_{i} = C_{i} \neq A_{i}, \forall i$ or $C_{i} = A_{i} \neq B_{i}, \forall i$. The probability of being in the first case, once the string has been accepted by Bob and Clare, reads

\begin{equation}
P(s_{A} = s_{B} = s_{C}|\text{accepted}) = \frac{\left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^{N}}{\left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^{N} + 3 \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^{N},}
\end{equation}

(11)

which tends to one for large $N$. Thus, this protocol allows the honest parties to correct all their errors since it only selects the 000 and 111 events. Note that for these filtered events, Eve has $E = 0$ whatever the value of $(A, B, C)$ is. Therefore, she has no information about $s_{A}$, so the parties end sharing a perfect secret bit \cite{15}. This proves that $P_{\text{mix}}$ is distillable, although it has been generated by LOPC from three probability distributions that are non-distillable. We have then that bound information can be activated with bound information. Let us also mention that this activation provides per se an alternative proof of the fact that the initial probability distribution, $P_{1}$, contains secret correlations.

To summarize, in this work we have proven the existence of bound information, a classical analog of bound
entanglement conjectured in \[2\], in the tripartite scenario. The intuition for our proof comes from known examples of bound entangled states in three-qubit systems. We have also shown that bound information, like bound entanglement, can be activated: the probabilistic mixture of three distributions having bound information gives a distillable distribution. These results are straightforward generalizable to an arbitrary number of parties. Indeed, we have found several examples of probability distributions having bound secret correlations, which exhibit a wide variety of activation properties. These results will be given elsewhere.

Of course, it still remains as an open question whether bound information exists in the bipartite scenario, i.e. to find probability distributions \(P(A, B, E)\) such that \(0 = S < I_{\text{form}}\). The previous evidence given in Ref. \[2\] is now significantly strengthened by our results. And if it exists, the next open problem would be to see whether bound information can be activated, as it seems to happen for bound entanglement in the bipartite scenario \[21\].

We would like to conclude mentioning the intriguing analogies that exist between privacy and entanglement. Very recently, it has been shown that any entangling channel can be seen as a source of privacy \[21\] and that a secret key can be extracted even from some non-distillable quantum states \[22\]. Our results indeed exploit this connection, and constitute one example of an almost unexplored application of quantum information theory: the use of its formalism to solve open problems in classical information theory.

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[11] More precisely: given \(P(A, B, E)\), if \(C\) denotes the communication sent over the public channel for the preparation of \(N\) events of \((A, B)\), there exists a channel for Eve mapping \(N\) realizations of \(E\) into \(C\), where \(N \to \infty\).
[12] The initial definition of bound information given in Ref. \[2\] consisted on a probability distribution \(P(A, B, E)\) such that \(0 = S(A; B|E) < I(A : B \downarrow E)\), where \(I(A : B | E)\) is defined in Eq. \[2\]. However the two definitions are equivalent (R. Renner and S. Wolf, private communication).
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[14] By a tripartite key we mean a common random bit possessed by each of the three honest parties, about which Eve has virtually no information.
[15] This is analogous to the scenario of entanglement transformations. There: (i) three collaborating parties can transform a shared GHZ state, \((|000\rangle + |111\rangle)\sqrt{2}\), into a singlet, \((|00\rangle + |11\rangle)\sqrt{2}\), between any pair of parties, and (ii), if Alice shares singlets with Bob and Clare, she can locally prepare a GHZ state and teleport two of the three qubits to both of them. These two procedures have the following cryptographic analogs: (i) the sharing of a tripartite secret key allows the honest parties to obtain a bipartite key between any two of them. The third party should simply forget her information. And (ii), if a party—say Alice—shares one secret key with Bob and other with Clare, she can distribute any kind of secret correlations using one-time pad, e.g. a tripartite key.
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