Snow Queen is Evil and Beautiful:
Experimental Evidence for Probabilistic Contextuality in Human Choices

Víctor H. Cervantes* and Ehtibar N. Dzhafarov†
Purdue University, USA

Abstract

We present unambiguous experimental evidence for (quantum-like) probabilistic contextuality in psychology. All previous attempts to find contextuality in a psychological experiment were unsuccessful because of the gross violations of marginal selectivity in behavioral data, making the traditional mathematical tests developed in quantum mechanics inapplicable. In our crowdsourcing experiment respondents were making two simple choices: of one of two characters in a story (The Snow Queen by Hans Christian Andersen), and of one of two characteristics, such as Kind and Evil, so that the character and the characteristic chosen matched the story line. The formal structure of the experiment imitated that of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradigm in the Bohm-Bell version. Marginal selectivity was violated, indicating that the two choices were directly influencing each other, but the application of a mathematical test developed in the Contextuality-by-Default theory, extending the traditional quantum-mechanical test, indicated a strong presence of contextuality proper, not reducible to direct influences.

KEYWORDS: concept combinations, context-dependence, contextuality, direct influences, marginal selectivity.

It is commonplace to say that human behavior is context-dependent. What is usually meant by this is that one’s response to stimulus $S$ (performance in task $S$) depends on other stimuli (tasks) $S'$. Asked to explain the meaning of LINE, one’s answer will depend on whether the word is preceded by CHORUS or OPENING. Visual size perception, if interpreted as a response to retinal size, is influenced by distance cues. In all such cases one can avoid speaking of context-dependence by simply including the relevant elements of $S'$ into $S$: visual size is a response to both retinal size and distance cues, the meaning of LINE is a response to the word LINE and to the words preceding it. J. J. Gibson’s psychophysics (1950, 1960) was, essentially, a change from understanding a percept as a response to a target stimulus modified by context stimuli (as, e.g., in H. von Helmholtz’s, 1867, theory of unconscious inference) to a “direct” response to all relevant aspects of the optical flow.

This form of context-dependence is depicted in Fig. 1, with the acknowledgement of the obvious fact that all psychological responses are random variables, generally varying from one presentation to another or from one person to another (Thurstonian cases I and II, respectively). Figure 1 therefore presents a probabilistic response $R$ to $S$, such that its distribution is influenced not only by $S$ but also by $S'$. This means, of course, that the identity of the response $R$ as a random variable is different for different $S'$, at a fixed $S$: one and the same random variable cannot have two different distributions.

One might think that all context-dependence is of this nature: we simply have some “secondary” factors influencing the distribution of one’s response to a “primary” one. Quantum mechanics, however, provides striking examples of another form of context-dependence, when the distribution of $R$ at a fixed $S$ does not change with $S'$, but $R$ nevertheless is not

* cervantv@purdue.edu
† to whom correspondence should be addressed (ehtibar@purdue.edu)
The influence of stimuli on contextuality. The system of random variables representing a particular choice of two axes by Alice and two axes by Bob. For the same two entangled particles but a different choice of the four axes, the system of random variables representing them may very well exhibit no contextuality. For both choices of $\alpha_i$ and $\beta_j$ by, respectively, $A_i$ and $B_j$, as it turns out, the axes can be chosen so that it is impossible for the identity of $A_i$ not to depend on the choice of $\beta_j$ and for the identity of $B_j$ not to depend on the choice of $\alpha_i$. This is established by the following reasoning. If we assume that $A_1$ is one and the same random variable under $\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$ (and analogously for $B_j$ under $\alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2$), then we should have four jointly distributed random variables $A_1, A_2, B_1, B_2$, and the observed pairs of measurements by Alice and Bob then should be derivable from this distribution as its marginals $(A_1, B_1), (A_1, B_2), (A_2, B_1), (A_2, B_2)$. If so, these pairwise joint distributions should satisfy the following inequality, abbreviated CHSH (Clauser, Horne, Shimony, & Holt, 1969; Fine, 1982):

$$\max_{k,l \in \{1,2\}} \left| \sum_{i,j \in \{1,2\}} E[A_i B_j] - 2E[A_k B_l] \right| - 2 \leq 0, \quad (1)$$

where $E$ is expected value. Now, the expected values in the CHSH inequality can be computed for any axes $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \beta_1, \beta_2$ by using the principles of quantum mechanics, and it turns out that for certain choices of these axes these expected values violate the inequality. By reductio ad absurdum, therefore, we have to reject the initial assumption that $A_1$ is the same for both choices of $\beta_j$ and $B_j$ is the same for both choices of $\alpha_i$. In other words, $A_i$ and $B_j$ measured together are in fact $A_i^j$ and $B_j^i$, so that, e.g., $A_1^1$ (Alice’s measurement along axis $\alpha_1$ when Bob has chosen axis $\beta_1$) is different from $A_1^2$ (Alice’s measurement along the same axis when Bob has chosen $\beta_2$). However, we do not have the same situation as in Fig.1. Bob’s choice of an axis cannot directly influence Alice’s measurement because this choice and the measurement are simultaneous (in some inertial frame of reference). They cannot be causally related. In the past, this situation was often presented as paradoxical, with Einstein famously

Figure 2: The situation when $R$, interpreted as a response to $S$, changes its identity but not its distribution as “context stimuli” $S'$ change. This can be revealed by looking at how $R$ is co-distributed with other random variables as $S'$ changes. The influence of $S$ on $R$ is direct, while influence of $S'$ on $R$ is “purely contextual.”

Figure 3: Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradigm adapted to spins by Bohm (Bohm & Aharonov, 1957) and famously investigated by Bell (1964). Two spin-1/2 particles (e.g., electrons) are created in what is called a “singlet state” and move away from each other. Alice measures the spin of the left particle along one of the two axes denoted $\alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2$, Bob simultaneously does the same for the right particle along one of the two axes denoted $\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$. Spins are binary random variables, with values +1 or −1. Adapted from Dzhafarov & Kujala (2016a).
referring to it as “a spooky action at a distance.” In fact, contextual influences involve no “actions” (i.e., no transfer of energy or information). They simply reflect a fundamental fact of probability theory, that part of the identity of a random variable is what other random variables it is jointly distributed with (see Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014a, 2016a, 2017b, for probabilistic foundations of contextuality). A simple analogy would be the property of being or not being “the brightest star in the sky” considered part of each star’s identity: the identity of a given star then can change depending on the brightness of stars that do not influence it directly. It is a basic but fascinating aspect of reality, fundamentally different from direct influences in being non-causal (see Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2016a, for a detailed discussion).

With contextuality (or lack thereof) understood as a property of a system of random variables describing an aspect of a physical system (see Footnote 1), there are no known principles, in physics or elsewhere, that would confine all contextual systems to quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanical computations may establish certain properties of a set of particles, and then by means of classical probability theory one may establish that a certain system of random variables describing these properties forms a contextual system. No quantum mechanical computation, however, is based on contextuality as a physical property. It is not surprising therefore that numerous attempts were made to reveal probabilistic contextuality analogous to the EPR/BB one outside quantum physics, in particular, in human cognition and decision making (Aerts, 2014; Aerts et al., 2017; Aerts, Gabora, & Sozzo, 2013; Asano, Hashimoto, Khrennikov, Ohya, & Tanaka, 2014; Bruza, Kitto, Nelson, & McEvoy, 2009; Bruza, Kitto, Ramm, & Sitbon, 2015; Bruza, Wang, & Busemeyer, 2015). The idea of constructing a behavioral analogue of a quantum-mechanical experiment is simple: each experimental setting (e.g., an axis chosen by Alice) is replaced with a task of responding to a stimulus or question, and the measurement outcome (e.g., the spin along this axis) is replaced with a response given to this stimulus or question. With these correspondences, the design of a behavioral experiment can be made formally identical to that of the quantum one. For instance, in the experiment described in Aerts, Gabora, and Sozzo (2013), the axis $\alpha_i$ corresponded to the task of choosing between two animals (one pair for $i = 1$, another for $i = 2$), and $\beta_j$ corresponded to the task of choosing between two animal sounds (again, different pairs for $j = 1$ and $j = 2$). The respondent was asked to choose an animal in response to $\alpha_i$ and to choose the best matching animal sound in response to $\beta_j$. The expectation in this experiment was that the responses to $\alpha_i$ and $\beta_j$ could be treated as random variables $A_i$ and $B_j$, respectively, and the CHSH inequality [1] could then be used to reveal the presence or absence of contextuality.

Here, however, the study in question, as well as all other studies mentioned above, faced a serious difficulty (Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014b; Dzhafarov, Kujala, Cervantes, Zhang, & Jones, 2016; Dzhafarov, Zhang, & Kujala, 2015). The CHSH inequality [1] and other traditional contextuality tests in quantum mechanics are derived under the assumption of “no-signaling” (Abramsky & Brandenburger, 2011; Adenier & Khrennikov, 2017) or “marginal selectivity” (Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014b), which is the condition ensuring that the context does not influence random variables directly. Thus, in the classical version of EPR/BB, the distribution of $A_1$ does not depend on whether it is measured together with $B_1$ or $B_2$. Without this condition the expression in [1] would be hopelessly confused, as the symbols it contains for random variables then would change their meaning within the expression. In human behavior, however, this condition is almost never satisfied: a response to a stimulus $S$ is typically directly influenced by any stimulus $S'$ in the temporal-spatial vicinity of $S$. For instance, in Aerts, Gabora, and Sozzo (2013), when choosing between Tiger and Cat (task $\alpha_2$), Tiger was chosen with probability 0.86 when combined with the choice between Growls and Winnies (task $\beta_1$), but Tiger was only chosen with probability 0.23 when combined with the choice between Snorts and Meows (\(\beta_2\)). There is no way therefore one can denote the response to $\alpha_2$ by $A_2$ and use Inequality [1] The change in the distribution of the response to $\alpha_2$ indicates that it is directly influenced by the choice of the sound, while the CHSH inequality expressly excludes this possibility (Dzhafarov & Kujala 2014b).

However, the presence of direct influences from $S'$ to $R$ does not automatically exclude the presence of pure contex-
tuality: it is possible, as schematically shown in Fig. 4, that contextual influences coexist with direct ones. The situation depicted in Fig. 4 is merely a special case, when the change in the distribution of $R$ with $S'$ is nil, so whatever change in the identity of $R$ is observed in response to changes in $S'$, it is purely contextual. More generally, however, one can consider the possibility that the distribution of $R$ does change with $S'$, but the extent of this change is not sufficient to account for the extent of the changes in $R$'s identity, as revealed by its joint distribution with other random variables. This combined form of context-dependence has been studied in the mathematical theory called Contextuality-by-Default (CbD, Dzhafarov, Cervantes, & Kujala, 2017; Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014a, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a; Dzhafarov, Kujala, & Cervantes, 2016; Dzhafarov, Kujala, & Larsson, 2015; Kujala, Dzhafarov, & Larsson, 2015).

When applied to the EPR/BB system, the logic of CbD is as follows. One determines the maximal probability with which $A_1$ could equal $A_2$ if the two were jointly distributed. This probability is a measure of difference between the two distributions (the smaller the probability the larger the difference). Analogously one determines the maximal probabilities of $A_2 = A_3$, $B_1 = B_2$, and $B_2 = B_3$. If this measure of difference between the distributions is sufficient to account for the entire difference between the random variables $A_1$ and $A_2$, $B_1$ and $B_2$, etc., then these maximal probabilities should be compatible with the observed joint distributions of $(A_1,A_2)$, $(A_2,B_2)$, $(A_3,B_3)$, and $(A_2,B_3)$. If they are, the system in noncontextual. If they are not, then $A_1$ and $A_2$, or $B_1$ and $B_2$, etc., have to be more dissimilar as random variables than they are due to the difference between their distributions. Such a system exhibits contextuality proper (“on top of” direct influences). 3

It is proved (Dzhafarov, Kujala, & Larsson, 2015; Kujala & Dzhafarov, 2016) that the EPR/BB system is noncontextual if and only if

$$
\max_{k,l \in \{1,2\}} \left| \sum_{i,j \in \{1,2\}} E\left[A_i'B_j'\right] - 2E\left[A_i'B_k\right] \right| - \sum_{i \in \{1,2\}} \left| E[A_i'] - E[A_i] \right| - \sum_{j \in \{1,2\}} \left| E[B_j'] - E[B_j] \right| - 2 \leq 0.
$$

The formula generalizes the CHSH inequality (1), which obtains if the second and third sums in the expression are zero (no-signaling or marginal selectivity condition). When this formula was applied to behavioral experiments imitating the EPR/BB design, all available data (Aerts, 2014; Aerts et al., 2017; Aerts, Gabara, & Sozzo, 2013; Bruza, Kitto, Ramm, & Sitbon, 2015; Cervantes & Dzhafarov, 2017a; Zhang & Dzhafarov, 2017) were in compliance with lack of contextuality. The same conclusion (lack of contextuality) was reached regarding behavioral experiments with other designs (Asano, Hashimoto, Khrennikov, Ohya, & Tanaka, 2014; Cervantes & Dzhafarov, 2017b; Wang & Busemeyer, 2013; Wang, Solloway, Shiffrin, & Busemeyer, 2014). This series of negative results led Dzhafarov, Zhang, and Kujala (2015) and Dzhafarov, Kujala, Cervantes, Zhang, and Jones (2016) to hypothesize that all context-dependence in behavioral and social data may be due to direct influences, with no contextuality proper.

Inspection of Inequality 2, however, suggests another possibility: perhaps the correlations between $A$ and $B$ variables in the previous attempts imitating the formal structure of the EPR/BB experiment were not strong enough. The maximum of the first sum in (2) is large if the four expectations $E\left[A_i'B_j'\right]$ are large in absolute value, and one of them has the sign opposite to the sign of the remaining three. What if this maximum were large enough to offset the terms reflecting violations of marginal selectivity and to make the left-hand side of the expression positive? Here, we report an experiment in which contextuality proper is definitely established by achieving the desired pattern of sufficiently large correlations between $A$ and $B$ variables.

The design of the experiment is similar to other behavioral imitations of the EPR/BB paradigm: the choice of an axis is replaced by a choice between two options, the options corresponding to each $\alpha$-axis being two characters from a story, and the options corresponding to each $\beta$-axis being two characteristics which characters from the story may possess. The story was The Snow Queen by Hans Christian Andersen, and, e.g., the pair $(\alpha_1, \beta_1)$ was the offer to choose between Gerda and the Troll (the result being $A_1'$) and also to choose between Beautiful and Unattractive ($B_1'$), so that the two choices match the story line (in which Gerda is Beautiful and the Troll is Unattractive). The choices are offered to many people in a crowdsourcing experiment, and the probabilities are estimated by the proportions of people making this or that pair of choices. The expectation is that a respondent who understands the story line would choose a “correct” combination of a character and a characteristic (e.g., either Gerda and Beautiful, or the Troll and Unattractive). If so, the max of the first sum in Inequality 2 should equal 4 (its maximal possible value), and the presence or absence of contextuality would

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3To avoid technicalities, the formulation given is far from being general and is less than rigorous. A rigorous formulation for the EPR/BB system involves considering maximal couplings of $(A_1, B_1)$, $(A_2, B_2)$, $(A_3, B_3)$, and $(A_2, B_3)$. More complex systems require dichotomizations of the random variables and multimaximal couplings (Dzhafarov, Cervantes, & Kujala, 2017; Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2017a, 2017b).
| Character choice | Characteristic choice | N total (correct) |
|------------------|-----------------------|------------------|
| Context 1 ⋆ Gerda ⋆ Troll | ⋆ Beautiful ☞ Unattractive | 447 (425) |
| Context 2 ⋆ Gerda ⋆ Troll | ⋆ Kind ☞ Evil | 453 (429) |
| Context 3 ⋆ Snow Queen ⋆ Old Finn Woman | ⋆ Beautiful ☞ Unattractive | 446 (410) |
| Context 4 ⋆ Snow Queen ⋆ Old Finn Woman | ⋆ Kind ☞ Evil | 453 (388) |

Table 1: Each context consisted of two choices, between two characters and between two characteristics. N total is the number of respondents assigned to each context (the number in parentheses shows the subset of respondents whose answers were correct, in accordance with the story line).

depend only on the relative proportions of people preferring one correct choice to another. We will see, however, that a fraction of respondents, more than 8%, chose “incorrect” options.

Method

Participants

1989 participants signed up for the study on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Barr, J., 2005) and indicated their agreement with a standard informed consent page in exchange for financial compensation ($0.10). No demographics were required nor recorded. 1799 of the participants completed the experiment by answering the two questions posed to them. They will be referred to below as respondents, and their responses were used for the analysis. The number of respondents was planned to exceed 1600, estimated to be more than sufficient for construction of 99.99% bootstrap confidence intervals (as explained in Results). The data were collected in January 12-14, 2017.

Materials and procedure

The experiment was set up as a “survey” on Purdue University’s Qualtrics platform (Purdue University, 2015). Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four conditions, referred to as contexts: see Table 1. The experiment consisted in the participant being presented with the instructions (“story line”) and, on the same computer screen, offered to make two choices forming the context assigned to this participant: of a character from a given pair of characters, and of a suitable characteristic of this character from a given pair of characteristics. For example, in Context 3 (Table 1), the computer screen looked as shown in Fig. 5, asking to choose between Snow Queen and Old Finn Woman and to choose between Beautiful and Unattractive, with the instruction that the two choices had to be true to the story line (which says that Snow Queen is Beautiful and Old Finn Woman is Unattractive).

Results

We present the results first for correct responses only, and then for all responses, with the numbers of respondents shown in Table 1. In Tables 2 and 3 we present the observed proportions for each combination of choices in the first and second group, respectively. We refer to these tables of proportions (or probabilities they estimate) as “systems,” in accordance with the terminology of “context-content systems” introduced in Dzhafarov & Kujala (2016a).

4As pointed out at the end of the Discussion section, the logic of CbD dictates that only one context (one pair of choices) be presented to a given respondent, dividing thereby the pool of respondents into four groups, one responding to Context 1, another to Context 2, etc.
System of correct choices

In this system, the max of the first sum in Inequality 2 equals 4 (its maximal possible value), and the presence or absence of contextuality depends only on the relative proportions of two correct pairs of choices. The system is contextual on the sample level: the left-hand side of Inequality 2 equals 0.452. To evaluate how reliable this figure is, a bootstrap confidence interval (Davison & Hinkley, 1997) was calculated by generating $n = 400,000$ resamples from each of the contexts, computing the left hand side of Inequality 2 for each of them, choosing a confidence level $C$, and finding the $1 - C/2$ and $1 - 1 - C/2$ quantiles of their distribution. The histogram of the distribution is shown in the upper panel of Fig. 6. For this system, the 99.99% bootstrap confidence interval for the left hand side of Inequality 2 is $[0.226, 0.668]$. The confidence needed for the bootstrap interval to cover zero exceeds 99.999% since none of the 400,000 resamples produced a non-positive value.

System of all responses

This system is contextual on the sample level: the left-hand side of Inequality 2 equals 0.279. A bootstrap confidence interval was calculated by generating $n = 400,000$ resamples and analyzing them in the same way as for the system of correct responses. The histogram of the distribution of values of the left hand side of Inequality 2 is shown in the lower panel of Fig. 6. For this system, the 99.99% bootstrap confidence interval for the left hand side of Inequality 2 is $[0.008, 0.506]$.

Discussion

We have demonstrated that a contextual system of random variables formally analogous to the EPR/BB system in quantum mechanics can be observed in human behavior. It has been done without making the mistake of ignoring lack of marginal selectivity in psychological data. Marginal selectivity (or no-signaling condition), in application to the EPR/BB system, means that the second and third sums in Inequality 2 are zero. If this were the case in our experiments (e.g., if the two correct choices of the character-characteristic pairs were made with equal probability), the left hand side of Inequality 2 for the system with correct choices would have the maximal theoretically possible value, 2. This would make the system a so-called PR box (Popescu & Rohrlich, 1994), a system forbidden by laws of both classical and quantum mechanics. There is no a priori reason why a behavioral system could not violate boundaries established by quantum mechanics, but the sample level contextuality value of 0.452 obtained in our experiment for correct responses is quite moderate, well below the quantum boundary (so-called Tsirelson bound) of $2(\sqrt{2} - 1)^5$. Recall that application of Inequality 2 and similar

\[5\] Note, however, that the derivability of the Tsirelson bound without assuming non-signaling is not obvious and requires special investigation.
Table 2: Observed proportions of correct choices for each of the four contexts. ‘Mar.’ indicates marginal observed proportions. To apply Inequality 2, one of the two options (no matter which) in each choice is encoded by +1, the other by -1.

| Context 1 | $B_1^1$ | $B_1^2$ | $A_1^1$ | Gerda | Troll | Mar. Character |
|-----------|---------|---------|---------|-------|-------|----------------|
|           | Beautiful | Unattractive | Mar. Character | 0.887 | 0.000 | 0.887 |
|           | Mar. Character | 0.887 | 0.113 | |
| Context 2 | $B_2^1$ | $B_2^2$ | $A_2^1$ | Gerda | Troll | Mar. Character |
|           | Kind | Evil | Mar. Character | 0.841 | 0.000 | 0.841 |
|           | Mar. Character | 0.841 | 0.159 | |
| Context 3 | $B_3^1$ | $B_3^2$ | $A_3^1$ | Snow Queen | Old Finn woman | Mar. Character |
|           | Beautiful | Unattractive | Mar. Character | 0.837 | 0.000 | 0.837 |
|           | Old Finn woman | 0.000 | 0.163 | 0.163 |
|           | Mar. Character | 0.837 | 0.163 | |
| Context 4 | $B_4^1$ | $B_4^2$ | $A_4^1$ | Snow Queen | Old Finn woman | Mar. Character |
|           | Kind | Evil | Mar. Character | 0.769 | 0.011 | 0.780 |
|           | Old Finn woman | 0.070 | 0.150 | 0.220 |
|           | Mar. Character | 0.839 | 0.161 | |

Table 3: Observed proportions of all choices, correct and incorrect, for each of the four contexts. The rest is as in Table 2.

| Context 1 | $B_1^1$ | $B_1^2$ | $A_1^1$ | Gerda | Troll | Mar. Character |
|-----------|---------|---------|---------|-------|-------|----------------|
|           | Beautiful | Unattractive | Mar. Character | 0.843 | 0.020 | 0.864 |
|           | Mar. Character | 0.872 | 0.128 | |
| Context 2 | $B_2^1$ | $B_2^2$ | $A_2^1$ | Gerda | Troll | Mar. Character |
|           | Kind | Evil | Mar. Character | 0.797 | 0.035 | 0.832 |
|           | Mar. Character | 0.815 | 0.185 | |
| Context 3 | $B_3^1$ | $B_3^2$ | $A_3^1$ | Snow Queen | Old Finn woman | Mar. Character |
|           | Beautiful | Unattractive | Mar. Character | 0.769 | 0.011 | 0.780 |
|           | Old Finn woman | 0.070 | 0.150 | 0.220 |
|           | Mar. Character | 0.839 | 0.161 | |
| Context 4 | $B_4^1$ | $B_4^2$ | $A_4^1$ | Snow Queen | Old Finn woman | Mar. Character |
|           | Kind | Evil | Mar. Character | 0.135 | 0.536 | 0.671 |
|           | Old Finn woman | 0.320 | 0.009 | 0.329 |
|           | Mar. Character | 0.455 | 0.545 | |
Figure 6: Histograms of the bootstrap values of the left hand side of Inequality [2] for correct responses (upper panel) and for all responses (lower panel). The solid vertical line indicates the location of the observed sample value. The vertical dotted lines indicate the locations of the 99.99% bootstrap confidence intervals.

| Context 1 | $B_1^1$ | $B_1^2$ |
|-----------|---------|---------|
|           | Beautiful | Unattractive | Mar. Character |
| $A_1^1$   | Gerda 0.817 | 0.000 | 0.817 |
|           | Troll 0.000 | 0.183 | 0.183 |
| Mar. Characteristic | 0.817 | 0.183 |

| Context 2 | $B_2^1$ | $B_2^2$ |
|-----------|---------|---------|
|           | Kind | Evil | Mar. Character |
| $A_2^1$   | Gerda 0.911 | 0.000 | 0.911 |
|           | Troll 0.000 | 0.089 | 0.089 |
| Mar. Characteristic | 0.911 | 0.089 |

| Context 3 | $B_3^1$ | $B_3^2$ |
|-----------|---------|---------|
|           | Beautiful | Unattractive | Mar. Character |
| $A_3^1$   | Snow Queen 0.907 | 0.000 | 0.907 |
|           | Old Finn woman 0.000 | 0.093 | 0.093 |
| Mar. Characteristic | 0.907 | 0.093 |

| Context 4 | $B_4^1$ | $B_4^2$ |
|-----------|---------|---------|
|           | Kind | Evil | Mar. Character |
| $A_4^1$   | Snow Queen 0.000 | 0.696 | 0.696 |
|           | Old Finn woman 0.304 | 0.000 | 0.304 |
| Mar. Characteristic | 0.304 | 0.696 |

Table 4: Hypothetical proportions of correct choices for each of the four contexts. This system is obtained by adding or subtracting 0.07 to/from each of the nonzero probabilities in Table 2.
formulas to all previously reported experimental data showed no contextuality at all, leading Dzhafarov, Zhang, & Kujala (2015) and Dzhafarov, Kujala, Cervantes, Zhang, and Jones (2016) to consider the possibility that all context-dependence in psychology is due to direct influences only. This hypothesis is now falsified.

Contextuality in our experiment was exhibited by both the system of correct responses and the system of all responses, correct and incorrect. It is not clear, however, why some respondents made incorrect choices to begin with. The possibilities range from misunderstanding of the instructions to deliberate non-compliance. This makes no difference for the formal contextuality analysis, but one might consider the legitimacy of excluding incorrect choices as outliers.

Focusing on the system of correct responses, one might wonder if a story line that makes one of the two choices in each context rigidly determined by the other choice (Table 1) may somehow predetermine the contextuality of the system. Could the results reported in this paper be essentially forced by the experiment’s design? It is easy to see that this is not the case. For example, in Table 1 all responses are correct but the system is noncontextual, with the left-hand side of Inequality 2 equal to -0.004. No superficial inspection of this system would reveal a qualitative difference from the one in Table 2. The question should not be therefore whether noncontextuality is compatible with the story line, but whether the latter makes it “rare.”

One way of making the meaning of “rare” precise is as follows. The experimental design we use (considering only correct responses) makes the value

\[
\max_{k,l \in \{1,2\}} \left| \sum_{i,j \in \{1,2\}} E \left[ A_i^k B_j^l \right] - 2E \left[ A_i^k B_i^l \right] \right|
\]

equal to 4, its maximal possible value. The system’s (non)contextuality therefore is determined entirely by the value of

\[
\sum_{i \in \{1,2\}} |E \left[ A_i^1 \right] - E \left[ A_i^2 \right]| + \sum_{j \in \{1,2\}} |E \left[ B_j^1 \right] - E \left[ B_j^2 \right]|.
\]

The system is contextual if and only if this expression’s value is less than 2. In the system of correct responses

\[
a = E \left[ A_1^1 \right] = E \left[ B_1^1 \right], \\
b = E \left[ A_2^1 \right] = E \left[ B_2^1 \right], \\
c = E \left[ A_1^2 \right] = E \left[ B_2^2 \right], \\
d = E \left[ A_2^2 \right] = -E \left[ B_2^2 \right].
\]

Each of the four values \(a, b, c, d\) ranges between -1 and 1. It is reasonable now to ask how probable it is that these four values chosen “randomly and independently” (meaning that the quadruple of the expected values is uniformly distributed within the 4-dimensional cube) would yield (4) equal to or exceeding 2. The answer is easily obtained by Monte Carlo simulation, and the probability in question, i.e., the probability that a randomly created system is noncontextual, turns out to be about 0.6667. This is hardly a “rare” event.

In psychological terms, the interpretation of context-dependence in our experiment is straightforward: the meaning of such characteristics as Kind vs Evil or Beautiful vs Unattractive is different depending on what choice of characters is offered to ascribe these concepts to. This difference, however, cannot be fully explained by assuming that the impact of the character choice upon the characteristic choice is “direct” (analogous to a signal propagating from Bob’s measurement to Alice’s measurement). The direct influence is there without doubt, manifested in the lack of marginal selectivity in our data, but the context-dependence contains a component of pure contextuality. We have no psychological terms to discern the two parts of context-dependence. The value of contextuality analysis here is in that it provides rigorous analytic discernments where “ordinary” psychological analysis is underdeveloped or moot.

Note that the term “direct influences” in CbD refers to mathematical properties of a specific system of random variables rather than to physical or psychological mechanisms. Although the initial intuition of direct influences involves conventional schemes with forces and energy transfer, in the mathematical theory direct influences are defined by the differences between the distributions of random variables measuring (responding to) the same property in different contexts. In the EPR/BB system, the difference between the distributions \(A_1^1\) and \(A_2^1\) is, by definition, the difference between the direct influences exerted by \(\beta_1\) and \(\beta_2\) (or, simply, the direct influence of the \(\beta\) upon the measurement of \(\alpha_1\). If the two distributions are identical, \(\beta\) exerts no direct influence, because we only think of particular random variables and of differences in their distributions. It is perfectly possible that the two identical distributions would differ from the distribution of some

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6It is worth mentioning that violations of marginal selectivity or no-signaling condition (the general CbD term being “consistent connectedness”) are also common in quantum physical experiments (Adenier & Khrennikov, 2007; Khrennikov, 2017, pp. 25-28). Compared to behavioral data, however, inconsistent connectedness in quantum mechanics is relatively small, even when statistically significant, and with the use of CbD theory pure contextuality can usually be established at extremely high level of confidence (see, e.g., the analysis of experimental data in Kujala, Dzhafarov, & Larsson, 2015).
A\textsuperscript{1}, had there been a third context in which \(\alpha_1\) were measured alone or together with some \(\beta_3\). Moreover, it is possible that a physical theory could establish that the influences exerted by \(\beta_1\) and \(\beta_2\) are physically different despite affecting the distributions of \(A_1^1\) and \(A_1^2\) identically (see, e.g., Filk, 2015). Our analysis, however, does not depend on this or that physical or psychological theory. Even in the case of the classical EPR/BB system with two particles, the Bohmian version of quantum mechanics allows for the possibility of direct influences being responsible for the entire picture, albeit defying special relativity. However, the EPR/BB system with a specific choice of axes would remain contextual even if the Bohmian mechanics became universally accepted. As everything else in CbD, “direct influence” is not a physical term (although it may be assigned a physical interpretation in many cases), it is a mathematical term that is relative to the system of random variables in play.

Our experiment establishes a clear template for designing analogous experiments aimed at pure contextuality, whether in the EPR/BB or similar format. In the terminology of CbD, the EPR/BB system is a cyclic system of rank 4 (Dzhafarov, Kujala, & Larsson, 2015; Kujala, Dzhafarov, & Larsson, 2015). This system involves eight binary random variables, \(A_i^j, B_i^j\) \((i, j \in \{1, 2\})\), and the design maximizing the chances of this system exhibiting contextuality (“on top of” direct influences) is as follows. Label the values of all the random variables +1 and -1 and create a “story line” in which +1 of \(A_i^j\) and +1 of \(B_i^j\) are associated with a very high probability in three out of four pairs \((A_i^j, B_i^j)\), and with a very low probability in the fourth pair (or vice versa). For other cyclic systems (say, of ranks 3 or 5) the criteria of contextuality are similar to (2), and the design can be constructed similarly.

An important feature of the design is that each respondent should be assigned to a single context only, instead of asking each of them to make (in the case of the EPR/BB system) all four pairs of choices \((\alpha_1, \beta_1), \ldots, (\alpha_2, \beta_2)\), whether presented simultaneously, in a fixed order, or a variable order. The reason for this is that making all four pairs of choices would have created an empirical joint distribution of the eight random variables in play,

\[
A_1^1, B_1^1, A_1^2, B_1^2, A_2^1, B_2^1, A_2^2, B_2^2,
\]

contravening the logic of CbD in which different contexts are mutually exclusive, and different pairs \((A_i^j, B_i^j)\) are not jointly distributed (are stochastically unrelated to each other). Contextuality analysis consists in finding out whether a joint distribution can be imposed on these eight random variables, subject to certain constraints (maximality of the probabilities of \(A_1^1 = A_1^2, B_1^1 = B_1^2\), etc.). For this analysis an empirical joint distribution involving, say, \(A_1^1\) and \(A_2^2\) would be a nuisance relation. It would have to be ignored, and an additional theory would be required to know how the ignored relations affect the results of the analysis. Consider, e.g., the fact that every given choice (e.g., between Gerda and Troll) in the EPR/BB system enters in two different contexts. The respondent would normally remember her previous choice when facing it the second time, albeit in combination with another pair of characteristics (which in turn, will appear once again, in combination with another pair of characters). It is clear that the respondent’s choice would depend on the previously made one in some complex way (e.g., the strategy may be adopted to always repeat it, or to always choose a new option). This would affect the marginal distributions of the choices in some unknown way. Note that our design is not different from how the measurements are made in the quantum-mechanical EPR/BB system, where only one pair of measurements can be performed on a given pair of entangled particles.

Jerome Busemeyer (personal communication, November 2017) mentioned to us that the “respondents” in our design need not be people, they can be any entities to which measurements can be performed on a given pair of entangled particles.

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*Of course, if the systems with physically certified direct influences that are not reflected in the differences between the distributions were ubiquitous, the CbD analysis would be less interesting to physicists. This is too complex an issue to discuss in a paper focusing on a single experiment. We believe in the “no-conspiracy” principle reflected in Einstein’s famous “Subtle is the Lord, but malicious He is not.” All known to us examples of hidden direct influences are artificially constructed on paper, with even slight modifications revealing them.*
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