THE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR DEAL
FOR BIDEN’S DIPLOMACY IN MIDDLE EAST

Multilateral agreements between countries around the world on challenging issues often pave the way for the parties to play a role in the developments following such agreements. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was such a tool for Iran to become an effective player in international bargaining at a time when Iran was trying to isolate itself by trying to build nuclear weapons. The deal that in 2018 US decided to withdraw from it. The American interests in the Middle East, on the one hand represent a single package that is affected by each other, and on the other hand it is the nature of the region’s crises and problems that is seen as an interconnected chain. The “Iran Nuclear Case” is important for future diplomacy of Biden in the Middle East.

This paper describes the importance of deals for Middle East diplomacy of the US and which challenges in the way of the new President. The research is essentially important for the newly elected US President Biden’s foreign policy towards further relations with Iran that is widely estimated by experts for its positively changes in regional balance context. The scientific and practical essence of the paper is seemed to be as an expertise analyze towards enhancing the realistic approach for further isolating Iran in a time when the competition for strategic influence is being increased day by day. The methods used in paper is widely described in framework of as an analytical tool for the Middle East expert in terms of comparative, historical as well as descriptive analysis. The results of analysis might be useful for policy decision-makers as well as for academia that is to say the research conclusion is the Biden’s foreign policy in the Middle East would change its direction in comparison with Trump’s policy in the region. The article intends to have a small contribution in the social science in the context of today’s vague and biased approach in conceptualization of Middle Eastern impact to world affairs. As a final practical essence of the research is dedicated for US sanction policy for Iran’s place in the region by and large.

Key words: Iran, USA, Biden, Diplomacy, Nuclear Deal.
Соглашения между странами по сложным вопросам часто дают возможность сторонам сыграть свою роль в развитии международных процессов. Уже долгое время Иран пытается создать свое ядерное оружие вопреки воле мирового сообщества, и данное стремление стало поводом для введения санкций против официального Тегерана и привело к международной изоляции страны. Администрация Барака Обамы добилась определенного успеха в процессе сдерживания ядерных амбиций Ирана. Однако после того как в 2018 году президент—республиканец Дональд Трамп объявил о выходе из многостороннего договора, ситуация усложнилась. Изменились и приоритеты во внешней политике официального Вашингтона в регионе. Но, однозначно, «ядерное дело Ирана» будет оставаться важным элементом в Ближневосточной дипломатии Джо Байдена.

Статья посвящена рассмотрению важности сделок в рамках «ядерной папки Ирана» безопасности интересам США в регионе. Научная и практическая значимость статьи заключается в экспертном анализе изучения политики США, направленной на дальнейшую изоляцию Ирана. В статье немаловажное значение уделяется анализу изменений во внешней политике США с приходом новой администрации.

Ключевые слова: Иран, США, Байден, дипломатия, ядерная сделка.

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**Introduction**

Joe Biden is a Democratic president who ends all his sentences with the word “BUT”. Likewise, when his government says on his behalf, we will reconsider our partnership relations with Saudi Arabia, but we will continue to support Riyadh; or when he says I will hold China accountable in the Indo-Pacific strategic region, but China needs to be cooperative with us. The situation is the same with the Israeli regime as well. He claims that the legal issue of ownership of the Golan Heights should be addressed in proper way, but at the moment, for security reasons, the situation is not suitable for this by and large! Is he looking to hide in the uncertainty bubble he has adopted in his unclear approach, on the other side surprising with the winning card that will face at the last minute?

At the very least, Biden seems to be talking about Iran, as State Department spokesman Ned Price claims by having adopted such a policy. Regarding Iran, Price announced, “the new Washington administration has no intention of making the options on the table public”, “another thing I can tell you now is that we want to avoid the temptation to negotiate publicly”. Price announced in another key sentence that will help us complete our hypothesis of the Biden administration’s approach to Iran. With that in mind, there has to be something going on behind the scenes, the whispers of which, of course, make their way to the public stage. For example, while sources familiar with Biden’s theory speak of a “step-by-step” return to JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action); EU foreign policy chief Joseph Borrell discusses it during visit to Moscow, concluding that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has stated a common position with Iran that the priority is for the United States to return to JCPOA and lift sanctions. “But it is probably impossible to do it all at once, but it is also wrong to postpone it” (D. Herszenhorn, Feb 2021).

At the same time, while the US State Department removes the title of Responding to the Concerns of the Israeli Regime from the text of its statement in order to pretend that it is not too bound by the nuclear agreement with Iran, Biden’s cabinet secretary of state, Anthony Blinken will hold a virtual meeting with his counterparts from the European troika on behalf of the UN Security Council, or Robert Mali, the US special envoy for Iran will hold talks with officials from China, Qatar and the UAE. Then suddenly, Qatar officials speak of mediation to revive
JCPOA, while earlier, just a few days after the reconciliation with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, it had announced its readiness to mediate between the Arab countries and Iran (Charlene Rodrigues, Feb 2021).

Here the research question is why Iranian Nuclear Deal so important in Biden’s diplomacy and is the importance just for US or also Middle East countries? In this article, we will try to describe the connection between the Nuclear Deal and the Diplomacy of Biden for the Middle East region; which challenges are in the way of the new president of the United States and what we can predict from his diplomacy in the Middle East Region by and large. Historically, the US is always concerned with the Iranian nuclear programme as a foreign policy tool and impact strategy in the Middle East that make experts to be involved in it from the analytical perspectives. This research is primarily essential for the further analysis the topic in eyes of the newly elected US administration.

The object of research is the Iranian nuclear programme as the subject is the US Policy in the Middle East particularly emphasizing on the Iranian nuclear deal in the regional context.

The methodology of the paper is a number of methods of comparative, political analysis and forecasting approaches in detail. The article uses the historical method as well. It is aimed at revealing the introduction and development of the concept of “nuclear deal” from historical perspective. The comparative analysis gives the readers further discussion on Biden’s foreign policy for its realization in world’s political agenda as the key element to mention about superiority in international affairs by and large.

The authors were involved in writing this paper in order to give a correct understanding of the concept of “nuclear deal” and its application by the United States, they used information only from reliable primary sources.

**The Iran’s Nuclear Deal (JCPOA)**

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCOPA) is an international agreement on the Iranian nuclear program between the P5 + 1 countries (US, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany) and Iran, set up on July 14, 2015 in Vienna, Austria. The talks were one of the longest-running international talks on a specific issue, which began in 2013 and ended in 2015. Although the initial so-called JCPOA agreement was reached in July, negotiations between the two sides continued until they finally reached the “Lausanne Accord” in April 2015 as a framework for the Vienna Agreement.

The most important points agreed upon by JCPOA can be summarized. One of the points was about the amount of uranium that Iran had enriched and abandoned before JCPOA. Iran was supposed to keep only 300 kilograms out of the 10,000 kilograms of enriched uranium and hand over the rest (UN 2018). Another point is about the extent of uranium enrichment. Uranium must be enriched to 90% to make an atomic bomb, and 20% uranium is used for medical purposes. Iran had stated that it had achieved 20% enrichment. JCPOA allows Iran to continue enriching, but only to the extent of 67.3, which is the minimum sufficient for peaceful purposes (USDS Official).

The next issue is the number of centrifuges used for enrichment. Iran agrees in JCPOA to reduce the existing 19,000 centrifuges to about 6,000 by 10 years, of which it will continue to enrich with only 5,000 centrifuges, and another 1,000 will be active for research purposes only. The Arak heavy water reactor must be redesigned to produce the least amount of plutonium. To the extent that it can not be used to make nuclear weapons. The Fordow Enrichment Center will be closed for 15 years and will become the center of nuclear technology and physics. And most importantly, the nuclear agency’s oversight will be many times greater and much stronger than before. The number of inspectors triples. Some centers (such as Natanz and Fordow) are monitored around the clock (MFA of RF 2018).

According to JCPOA, in exchange for fulfilling all these commitments, all sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program (emphasize only nuclear sanctions, not other sanctions) imposed by the European Union, the United States and the UN Security Council, are removed; Iran has other sanctions that have nothing to do with its nuclear program or the IAEA; For example, sanctions for human rights violations or Iran’s support for terrorism. These sanctions have nothing to do with Iran’s nuclear program and will not be lifted by the IAEA Board.

JCPOA goes ahead and openings are provided from the other side. For example, as soon as JCPOA is signed, Iran’s GDP, which has grown negatively, begins to rise. In 2015, GDP growth was negative one and a half percent, which in 2016 it reached a positive twelve and a half percent. Then the growth rate slowed down and in 2017 it was positive four and two tenths percent (IMF 2015).

However, we need to mention something important here. With the arrival of Ahmadinejad, Iran’s position changed. In his first speech to the UN summit, Ahmadinejad said, “Get rid of the idea that Iran
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should abandon enrichment!” “Iran continues to work.” He calls on foreign companies to invest in Iran’s nuclear projects. This is the period of stubbornness between Iran and the West. The West imposes sanctions and Iran expands its nuclear program. Meanwhile, tensions between Iran and Israel escalated and the two sides boasted about each other. It is even said that Israel was planning to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities (UN 2005).

With Rouhani taking office in 2013, Iran’s nuclear program entered a new phase; The stage of “Heroic Flexibility.” When you come down from your position, but not out of weakness, but like a hero who has achieved something and now changes his position. Rouhani became president with the slogan of agreement with the West, and the Islamic Republic fell short of its position. A few months after taking office, Rouhani reached the first interim agreement with the P5 + 1 in November 2013 by changing the negotiating team, this time led by Mohammad Javad Zarif.

The reason why we mentioned two different Presidents in case of negotiations and agreements with the West is because you can see the huge difference between reactions and diplomacy in different periods of time in Iran.

The next stage is the post-Trump stage, in which, with the beginning of his presidency in 2017, Iran’s nuclear program entered a new phase. Trump has always described JCPOA as a “bad” and deceptive deal by Iran. In fact, Trump opposes this deal for three main reasons:

1. There is no agreement that has blocked Iran’s missile program.
2. JCPOA has not been able to stop Iran’s influence in the Middle East. Trump claims that Iran is constantly helping Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria and the Houthis in Yemen (Strategic Council on FR 2019).
3. It has an expiration date, and after ten to fifteen years, Iran can resume the normal course of its nuclear program.

Finally, although Iran’s commitment to the IAEA Board had been reaffirmed several times by the International Atomic Energy Agency and other parties to the agreement called on the United States to adhere to the IAEA Board, Donald Trump announced on May 8, 2018 that the US had withdrawn from the IAEA Board. After these sanctions against Iran returned in the strongest form. Trump announced that other countries that cooperate with Iran will also be sanctioned, and set a three to six-month deadline for companies to clarify their contracts and financial accounts with Iran. Most countries express their dissatisfaction with the US move. Showed, except for Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and several other countries. Iran responded by saying that Iran was trying to adhere to the UN Security Council; But if there is nothing left of JCPOA’s benefits, there is no reason to adhere to this agreement. The effect of Nuclear Deal and benefits that it brings to Iran, not made happy by countries in the Middle East; because of the increase of Iran’s influence and Economy in the region that can not be satisfied by other countries in the region. Nevertheless, now with Biden’s administration, the importance of JCPOA is not just for Iran and 5+1 countries, but also the Middle East Region, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia interested in the diplomacy of the US in this case.

The Importance of Nuclear Deal for Middle East Region

While the nuclear deal should improve Iran’s relations with countries and regional actors in the calculations of some Iranian foreign policy officials, some international experts and analysts believe that JCPOA has not caused any change in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The tone of Iran’s foreign policy has changed since JCPOA, but the more Iran’s foreign policy changes after JCPOA, the more it looks like before. Nearly a decade before JCPOA, a significant part of Iran’s diplomatic power was involved in the nuclear issue, which, with the achievement of JCPOA, freed Iran from this situation and could play a more decisive role in political and international equations, especially in regional crises (Chathamhouse, 2016).

JCPOA removed the Iranian nuclear goal from Iran’s foreign policy. In fact, what has happened in Iran’s foreign policy since JCPOA is that the West’s twelve-year focus on nuclear activities that have accumulated in Iran’s foreign policy and taken the time and energy of the country’s intellectual and instrumental elites has disintegrated.

Another regional consequence of JCPOA is the increase in Iran’s geopolitical importance in the West; In a way, the implementation of JCPOA provides the ground for stabilizing the region in order to prevent the growth of extremism and terrorism and to resolve regional crises. Europe faces a number of security challenges, including a wave of ISIS attacks and a flood of migrants from the West Asian region. EU convergence is at stake, as exemplified by Britain’s exit from the bloc. Iran can be considered an opportunity for Europe; In the sense that it
can take the energy market of these countries out of the monopoly of the Russians (Banco, Erin 2016).

The direct impact of JCPOA on increasing the Islamic Republic of Iran’s influence in the region is so obvious that regional opponents of Iran, including Saudi Arabia and regional rivals such as Turkey, have increased their interventions and mutual military adventures in the surrounding area; They prefer that political isolation and economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran remain in place in order to manage developments in the region in their own interests. In fact, the increase in Iran’s acting power has forced Turkey to revive the Brotherhood crescent against Iran more than ever. Therefore, this country supports the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad and the return of the Brotherhood to power in Egypt (Freilich, Chuck, 2015).

JCPOA has had profound implications for the equations of the West Asian region, especially for the GCC member states. Through JCPOA, Iran has been able to upset the regional balance in its favor. Iran’s oil production and exports increased to about three million and six hundred thousand barrels per day in 2017. The World Bank estimates that the lifting of sanctions will increase Iran’s GDP to about 5.1 percent in 2016 and 2017 and 5.5 percent in 2017 to 2018 (The World Bank, 2020). Injecting blocked capital into the Iranian economy; It enables the country to shift the regional balance in its favor. In this situation, Iran is above weak competitors.

The implementation of JCPOA, with all its positive economic and geopolitical effects for Iran, is undoubtedly considered a loss by the Saudis in the area of regional equations, and therefore Saudi Arabia has increased its military power. The Peace Institute recently reported that Saudi Arabia was the world’s third-largest arms buyer after China, with about $80 billion (Phillips, James, 2015). Although, JCPOA has removed Iran’s nuclear threat from Iran’s foreign policy, the headlines in regional and international news have shifted to fears of hegemonic ambitions and US betrayal of Arab countries instead of fears about Iran’s nuclear activities. Some experts are of the opinion that despite the short-term psychological effects that JCPOA has had on the regional dimension, this agreement will not be a decisive and key component in shaping the developments in the region due to its nature. This group of analysts even emphasizes that JCPOA can have negative consequences on the political trends and developments in the Middle East and increase regional rivalries and tensions to some extent.

Trump’s decision to pull out of the deal with Iran was the result of two factors that have shaped much of his foreign policy. First, his overwhelming confidence in his talents as a “trader” and second, his desire to stimulate his social standing. Trump has so far refused to engage in a cycle of escalating tensions since the departure of JCPOA. He and those who admire him have no idea how to turn the policy of maximum pressure into a new deal, and seemingly have little inclination to do so. As he has made it clear, Trump has no plans to use military force to increase pressure. Apparently, Trump’s plan is to have no plan and let events take place wherever they want.

When we look at it this way, it becomes clear that Trump, like the British politicians who supported Brexit in the referendum, broke an international agreement without having a realistic idea of what could replace it. However, Mr. Trump’s ability to do so in relation to Iran reveals a deeper truth about the Middle East’s position in American foreign policy: “the Middle East is no longer as important as it once was”. Modern American foreign policy in the Middle East has been based on the idea that the free flow of oil from this region is a vital US national security interest. This fundamental fact has played a major role in US foreign policy toward the Middle East since Jimmy Carter said in 1980 that the United States would militarily resist any attempt by a power to dominate the Middle East. But over the past decade, the importance of this oil to Washington has diminished. In 2018, the United States produced more oil than any other country in the world; The United States accounted for 18 percent of world production, compared to 12 percent for Saudi Arabia, 11 percent for Russia and five percent for Canada. As a result, US imports from Saudi Arabia in 2018 had an unprecedented decline (Pollack, Kenneth, 2015).

According to what said in above, for sure now Middle East countries are hoping for better decisions from Biden as a new President of the USA; His diplomacy in case of the Middle East and Iran’s Nuclear Deal for sure are connected to each other and it’s meaning the importance of this Diplomacy for the region.

**The Biden’s Diplomacy in Middle East**

Although the Biden administration has not yet announced a specific policy on the Middle East, experts continue to predict the White House strategy in this regard, focusing mainly on the strategic importance of the region to Washington. does not have. Since the fourth decade of the 1990s, US governments have sought to prioritize West Asia
because the region has been of strategic importance to the powers and is a global source of energy due to its vast oil reserves.

Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates have the world’s largest oil and gas resources in the region, and the Arab Gulf states are major allies of Washington because of its dependence. Now that Joe Biden has won the US election, some in the Middle East are worried and some are hopeful, the question arises as to what President Joe Biden will do with the Middle East and for the Middle East (Singh, Michael, 2015).

The Trump administration’s mismanagement of other domestic cases, including insurance laws, because of America’s internal problems, including the outbreak of coronary heart disease, which has infected millions of people in the United States and drawn thousands of Americans to hospital intensive care units. Immigrants and the withdrawal from some international treaties, which have widened the gap between Washington and its European allies, are forcing the Biden administration not to make West Asia its top priority. The region’s policy priorities are graded based on the US government’s share of energy supply. In this regard, some international affairs experts believe that the situation in the Middle East has changed compared to the past, and especially with the United States becoming one of the major oil producers, the Middle East is no longer a priority for the United States in terms of energy supply. The Democratic Party’s government is not too worried about energy supply, and most of the first Democrats at the moment are restoring the country’s place in the world leadership, so after considering the country’s internal cases, open human rights cases. The next priority is to put pressure on countries and get concessions from them to improve America’s position in world leadership.

Given these issues, it takes time for the Biden administration to develop and implement plans in West Asia, which is why some countries allied with the Trump administration, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, are saddened by the departure of a Republican representative and the arrival of a Republican representative. Democrats at the helm of the United States are seeking policies to extend this time. Joe Biden is someone who knows the Middle East well, both as the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he served for 17 years, and during Barack Obama’s eight years as Vice President. He has met their elites closely and established friendly relations with them, adding: “But it should be noted that the Middle East today is fundamentally different from the Middle East of previous years” (MANSOUR, THOMPSON, 2020). The US approach and interests at the time were summarized in the three pillars of the Israeli regime: oil and communism, but today the US oversees almost all pillars.

One of the major concerns of the United States these days is the Chinese government and its growing military and economic power. In the year that Corona has besieged the world, China has grown and won economically. On the other hand, with the growth of digital currency launched by China, the situation for the US dollar is becoming more dangerous every day. Biden is looking for a solution to the crisis that Trump has with China, because today the two countries are at a high level of tension (Office of the Secretary of State, 2020). Accordingly, the Middle East and Israel do not seem to be at the top of Biden’s top priorities these days. In fact, China and the problems facing the United States play a major role in Biden’s concerns about the White House’s foreign policy, and resolving America’s problems with the Middle East and even ringing the bell of its main ally in the Middle East is not at the top of the table.

Biden needed at least one great achievement in the Middle East, and he knew that this great achievement must be achieved through Tehran, Ankara and Riyadh; Putting pressure on two old friends without driving them to China and Russia, compromising with an old enemy, without Repeating the mistakes of the Obama era. As the chances of each of these three developments diminish, the role and importance of the other two developments increases. In order for the Islamic Republic to begin its work from the very first day of Biden’s return to JCPOA, 20 days before Biden entered the White House, he started the new year with the threat of the Foreign Ministry, which has only a few weeks left in JCPOA’s life. Ten days later, the issue of dismissal of inspectors was raised, which provoked only a sharp reaction from Europeans. After a long wait, when Biden described his policies in the Middle East, it became clear that all the efforts of the Islamic Republic were in vain, so that Biden did not even mention JCPOA and sanctions in his speech, and a few days later his secretary of state returned to JCPOA. Put a weight; The return of the Islamic Republic to all its nuclear obligations (MAHSA ROUHI, 2021).

Now that Biden has lost Iran’s option for a ‘great achievement’, he has set an end to the Yemeni war as his main strategy and priority in the Middle East, which, ironically, comes with pressure. Human rights in Saudi Arabia will put additional pressure
on Tehran. Any possibility of an end to the Yemeni war would deprive Tehran of an important card, and any improvement in the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia would highlight the gross human rights violations in Iran, while removing the double standard charge from the United States. Both will continue to be a major achievement for Biden and for the Americans, making the issue of reaching or not reaching an agreement with Tehran a marginal issue.

The main danger for Tehran in this case will be the possibility that with Biden moving away from a compromise with Tehran, this time Israel will take charge of the nuclear case in its own way. The relative coldness of US-Israeli relations in the first 20 days of Biden’s presidency should be seen in Biden’s efforts to slow down Israel’s willingness to act arbitrarily against Iran’s nuclear facilities, but there is no doubt that despite all these pressures and colds, Washington is finally will be with Israel.

The Future Challenges & Predictions for Returning to JCPOA

Biden’s victory and entry into the White House were expected to fundamentally change US strategy toward Iran. Iranian officials hoped to change the geopolitical climate and reduce economic suffering after enduring the “maximum pressure” campaign of the Donald Trump administration and its stifling sanctions (Mohammed Nuruzzaman, 2020). It will be difficult and complicated to return to the pre-Trump situation. Although Biden is committed to re-engaging with Iran, his aides have not yet made it clear when and how they will do so.

Meanwhile, the Iranians want the Americans to take the first important step. Khamenei openly stated that the “definite message” is that the United States should first lift the sanctions and then return to JCPOA after the fact that Iran has been tested. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif wrote in an article in Foreign Affairs: The Biden government should start the process by unconditionally lifting all sanctions. Iran, in turn, will reverse all the measures it has taken following Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal (Tehran Times, 2021).

The Islamic Republic’s plan to persuade the US government to accept the UN Security Council and to halt its aftermath is to implement a nuclear resolution called “Strategic Action to Lift Sanctions and Protect the Nation’s Interests.” Decision-makers on both sides think that the Biden government is forced to return to the UN Security Council amid increasing pressure from the Iranian government and fears of escalating nuclear and security challenges. Also, “carrying out 20% enrichment”, “producing metallic uranium” and “suspending the implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” will lead to their termination and reversibility of the JCPOA commitments as new concessions and convince the Biden government and the European troika that more they cannot have these demands from the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, JCPOA should be the ceiling of their demands, not the starting point and the bottom of the demands according to the plan.

Rising sensitivities and concerns about the return of the Islamic Republic of Iran to sensitive nuclear measures, and in particular the cessation of intrusive inspections, have created a special situation in the world and the region to make appropriate decisions to deter the reduction of the “nuclear escape point.”

The current stalemate between the governments of Biden and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has been exacerbated by internal pressures in both countries. Republicans and supporters of the Trump administration’s approach seem to be waiting to prevent Biden from making any acceptable concessions to Iran. Iran’s regional enemies, especially Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, also believe that Biden should use the leverage exerted by Trump. Some Iranian policy analysts argue that there is no leverage and that Iran has shown considerable resistance despite the pressure of sanctions.

What is clear is the great distance between the two sides from each other’s positions and the attempt to impose their views on the other side to take the first step. Simultaneous implementation of measures is not applicable, at least in the whole issue. Step-by-step measures also require a new executive dialogue and agreement. Therefore, JCPOA is still in a coma and its fate will be determined in a new period of violence between the governments of Iran and the United States. If JCPOA is revived, it will go through a rocky, time-consuming and ups and downs path, and contrary to the Rouhani government’s expectations, it will not be a quick step. Unlike the Europeans, the Biden government does not see the Rouhani government as a privilege to solve the problem, and has come to the realistic conclusion that the main and final decision-maker in Iran is the “Velayat-e Faqih” (DAVAR, 2021), and that Iran’s executive branch and diplomatic apparatus play a subordinate role.
Although Iran is primarily seeking the lifting of US economic sanctions imposed under the Trump administration, there are other possible situations in which the United States may use them as a tool to lubricate the negotiations. One option might be to remove the block on Iran’s request to the International Monetary Fund for a loan related to the outbreak of the coronavirus. What Robert Mali, Biden’s representative in Iran, said last year. The United States may authorize Iran’s oil trade with the Asians, in return for which Iran reverses recent steps, such as increasing the volume and purity of its enriched uranium. To release the US financial system blocked by the tightening of sanctions on the Trump administration. This money can be transferred through Switzerland and the channel maintained to continue the humanitarian financial flow to Iran.

We also see the possibility that preventing the flexibility and resilience of the “no war, no negotiation” and “armed peace” policies and the full implementation of the 11th Majlis (Parliament) nuclear law will lead to the implementation of a strict view that the Biden government will abandon Burjum and Use the legacy of the Trump administration and converge with Europe to impose a new agreement on the Islamic Republic. The Biden government’s initial intention is not to do so, and it wants to revive JCPOA as much as possible and lay the groundwork for complementary agreements. But if the current stalemate continues, then it is unlikely that it will inevitably move in that direction.

Conclusion

Biden’s decisions to return to the UN Security Council and lift sanctions on Iran come at a time when unprecedented US pressure on Iran has so far failed to halt Iran’s regional activities and bring Iran to the negotiating table. The Trump administration’s attempt to activate the trigger mechanism has failed. Iran and its regional allies have become more courageous against the United States and its allies, endangering the interests and security of the United States and its allies in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria; Iran’s direct military confrontation with the United States over the shelling of Iraq’s Ain al-Assad base and the launch of the ultra-modern Global Hawk drone in the Persian Gulf has damaged US international credibility.

International trust in the United States has been severely damaged as a result of its unilateral actions in withdrawing from international agreements such as the Paris Climate Agreement and international organizations such as the World Health Organization. The US economic war with China has jeopardized US interests and strengthened Iran’s ties with those countries. The protests and failure of the US government in controlling Covid-19 and the resulting economic problems have posed many internal problems for the Biden administration.

On the other hand, Iran’s regional activities in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan have been expanded and Iran’s ballistic missile program has been upgraded. Maximum US pressure has now escalated to the point where, according to experts, effective sanctions are no longer in place, and Iran has reached the point of saturation of sanctions, and the Iranian economy has gradually been able to adapt to sanctions and find ways to escape sanctions and seeks to solve the internal problems of the economy by relying on internal capabilities.

With Trump’s departure from the IAEA Board, Iran’s nuclear commitments to the IAEA Board were virtually canceled, and Iran withdrew from its commitments on enrichment, research and development, the volume of nuclear material accumulation, the number of centrifuges, and the changing nature of some nuclear facilities. It has created the mind of America and its allies.

Biden published his official policy toward Iran in a note on CNN on September 13, 2020, (Joe Biden, 2020) entitled “A Smarter Way Against Iran.” The implication of this memorandum is that the United States will make the decision to return to the UN Security Council and lift sanctions subject to negotiations with the new Iranian government after the results of the 2021 presidential election are known. According to the memo, Biden will emphasize the precondition for confirming Iran’s “full and accurate” return to all of its obligations under the International Atomic Energy Agency to return the United States to the IAEA and suspend sanctions.

The Biden administration will also emphasize the precondition of expanding restrictions and strengthening the UN Security Council’s provisions on issues such as Iran’s regional presence and Iran’s ballistic missile capability. Another possible precondition for Biden to return to the UN Security Council will be the amendment of the sanctions clause (extension of the time required to lift the sanctions). Biden is also likely to emphasize the presence of other international partners in addition to the P5 + 1, including Saudi Arabia, Israel and other Middle Eastern actors such as the UAE. Of course, all of these
preconditions would at least mean prolonging the preparations for the US return to the UN Security Council and easing sanctions. However, what is clear with all information and analysis that the Iranian society has paid a high price for sanctions. Ordinary people in Iran have so far paid for US sanctions. As Trump imagined, deteriorating economic conditions did not lead to the collapse or surrender of the regime, but it has harmed the people.

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