Afrophobia, “black on black” violence and the new racism in South Africa: the nexus between adult education and mutual co-existence

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Abstract: Black South Africans have been widely described in the popular media as having anti-foreigner sentiments, particularly towards African migrants in the country. Anchored on labels such as “makwerekwere” (a derogatory word used to describe African migrants in the country) and “foreigner”, such sentiments have unfortunately resulted in waves of violent attacks on African migrants leading to loss of lives and properties. These actions have been described as being “Afrophobic”, “Black on Black” Violence and a new form of racism in South Africa. We contend that these vices cannot be divorced from the history of Apartheid which fostered a system of fear of and mistrust for other foreign African nationals through isolating black South Africans from the international community. In this paper, we employ Kenneth Waltz’s levels of analysis as an analytical framework to examine the conceptualisations of Afrophobia, “black on black” violence and the so-called new racism in South Africa. Using Bronwyn Harris’ thematic classifications of the various hypotheses of the causes of xenophobia, we analyse the rationale behind the increasing anti-migrant tendencies of black South Africans. Going beyond this analysis, the paper examines how adult education could help promote tolerance and co-existence between South Africans and foreign nationals.

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Keywords: afrophobia; “black on black” violence; racism; South Africa; apartheid; adult education

1. Introduction

In early September 2019, violent riots erupted in many parts of Johannesburg, South Africa. The riots and the attacks that ensued were targeted at foreign nationals mainly from other African countries. There was worldwide condemnation of these attacks which had left in its wake loss of lives and destruction to properties running into several million rands. There were also corresponding attacks on South African establishments by unidentified individuals in other African countries as a form of retaliation. Responding to these developments, the President of South Africa made several sweeping measures to curtail future attacks. Amongst them was the appointment of a special envoy to selected countries to communicate the steps being taken by the country to ensure safety of fellow Africans living within its borders. It is, however, worth noting that such attacks and attitudes are not a new phenomenon in South Africa (Tella, 2016). In 1998 for instance, a Mozambican immigrant was thrown from a moving train and two Senegalese were electrocuted in an attempt to escape the violence unleashed on them by a group of South Africans returning from an “Unemployed Masses of South Africa” rally in Pretoria (Vale, 2002 as cited in
Tella, 2016). In 2008, South Africa was in the global, regional and national news as the locals operationalised and intensified xenophobic attacks against the black immigrants (Steenkamp, 2009 in Kang’ethe & Duma, 2013). These attacks recorded the highest rate of deaths (67 people) among African migrants.

Similarly, in April 2015, there were attacks on African migrants in Durban and several parts of Johannesburg leading to many deaths. Aside these vicious attacks, there are other manifestations of xenophobia in South Africa through offensive comments such as “makwerekwere”, “parasites” and “foreigner” and other forms of hostilities towards African migrants. These sentiments, however, do not occur arbitrarily; in fact, they are the result of myths that lead to the formation of stereotypes about these migrants. According to Steenkamp (2009), foreigners in the country are typically accused of committing crimes; bringing disease (particularly HIV/Aids), stealing jobs and women and swamping social services. Making matters worse:

Government departments, parliamentarians, the police, the Lindela detention centre [for undocumented immigrants], and the law itself have all been reinforcing a one-way message since the 1990s: we are being invaded by illegal immigrants who are a threat to national stability, the [Reconstruction and Development Programme], development, our social services, and the very fabric of our society. (Neocosmos, 2008, p. 588)

Such pervasive sentiments have resulted in the scapegoating of African immigrants for the social vices and even the economic downturn confronting many South Africans. This is in stark contrast to Nelson Mandela’s famous declaration during his 1994 inauguration that “Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another”. The “Rainbow Nation” [the newly democratic Republic of South Africa] where the vision of the Freedom Charter seemingly began to be realised through the securing of political stability, the neutralisation of conflicts and the overall diffusion of tensions in the country (Nyar, 2011, p. 150 in Beetor, 2019) was built on the ideals of reconciliation, tolerance, Ubuntu (humanity), Batho Pele (people first), respect for human rights, inclusiveness and equity enshrined in the 1996 constitution. However, these ideals are not largely being upheld when it comes to the treatment of African immigrants in the country despite several efforts by successive South African governments in the post-apartheid era. Within this state of affairs, Amuson and Mchunu’s (2017) questions are very timely. They ask: is it valid to term the recent spates of violence which took place in Johannesburg and Durban as Afrophobia? or are they xenophobic in the sense that they encompass the fear and dislike of foreigners in general? (p. 2). These questions are pertinent since foreigners from other continents aside Africa are often labeled as tourists rather than “makwerekwere” or “parasites” which is generally used to denote the “African Other” with nothing significant to offer to the country.

In this paper, we contribute to the discourse on black on black violence and supposed racism in South Africa. In doing so, we first deconstruct and denounce the conceptualisation of the phenomenon of violent attacks perpetrated by black South Africans on fellow African immigrants as xenophobia. Instead, and as will be seen in this paper (in the next section), we frame the phenomenon as constituting a new form of racism by black South Africans on migrants from other parts of the African continent. We acknowledge, however, that an attempt to frame Afrophobia/xenophobia in South Africa cannot be dissociated from the country’s dark history of apartheid, oppression and human rights abuses prior to the attainment of freedom and democracy in 1994. The miseducation of black children by the apartheid regime is the major perpetrator of ethnicism which sowed the seeds of xenophobia. The ethnic-based education established by the apartheid era government has left in its trail suspicion and hatred for people from different backgrounds. Soudien & Baxen (1997) attest that during the apartheid era, education was used not only to achieve social separation but also the legitimating arena for white supremacy. Within that order the hidden and explicit curricula were configured to produce, reproduce and validate racial separation and hierarchy. The poor education provided for blacks under apartheid dislodged
the traditional African values of compassion, unity, cooperation and love and replaced with alien values. The miseducation under apartheid has made most of its products forget their identities as Africans. According to Akua (2020) “the alien values served alien interests, including hyper-individualism, lack of respect for black life and culture, distrust of other black people, anti-African and anti-human values”. The author adds that, “when a people do not know who they are, they are reduced and relegated to being imps and imitators of their oppressors. Copying others, the monkey cuts its own throat” (Akua, p. 116). This explains what apartheid education has done to most black South Africans – disrespect for black life and hatred for their fellow Africans. Subsequently, Waltz’s (1959) levels of analysis is engaged, in this paper, as analytical framework to understand xenophobia and its recent conceptualization as Afrophobia and black on black racism. Afterwards, the various explanatory accounts of Afrophobia and black on black racism are discussed using Harris (2002) thematic classifications. Finally, we highlight the role of adult education in promoting tolerance and mutual co-existence between black South Africans and African Others in the country.

2. Constructing afrophobia, black on black violence as the new racism in South Africa
Anti-foreigner sentiments are not new in South Africa. Prior to the attainment of political freedom from the hegemony of white minority rule, there were instances of hostile attitudes towards the “foreign other”. For instance, “general historiography on South African Jew immigrants has documented a strong anti-immigrant sentiment that was directed at them in the beginning of the twentieth century” and also “the Indian immigrants who arrived in South Africa from 1860 onwards were the targets of anti-immigrant prejudice” (Kang’ethe & Duma, 2013, pp. 159–160). Following the country’s first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa underwent a rapid transformation from a white, autocratic and largely repressive state to an inclusive, democratic one where the previously banned African National Congress (ANC) took a reconciliatory, one nation-many cultures approach to the celebrated transition (Breetze, 2012 in Hiropoulos, 2020, p. 105). The new nation became attractive to the many African migrants wanting to escape the socio-economic hardships and security concerns in their home countries. The rise in the number of foreign others brought along with a lot of mistrust and fear on the part of South Africans toward African immigrants within their borders. Moreover, the policies of segregation under the apartheid regime enforced the logic that the rights of groups were directly linked to the people that belonged in a particular territory. This was how apartheid education taught black South Africans who grew up with that knowledge, hence a hostile attitude was developed towards those who were seen to be “invading” from beyond South Africa’s borders (Freemantle, 2012 in Mabera, 2017, p. 29). These foreigners, in the eyes of many citizens, present a competitive risk for the scarce socio-economic resources the country has to offer its citizens. The perception of Africans migrants as intruders and parasites make many South Africans turn a blind eye to the socio-economic contribution many African migrants make to the country’s development.

With the government perceived to be doing nothing about the influx of “African” foreigners into the country, the locals (black South Africans) have resorted to the use of violent attacks to uproot the so-called “undesirables” from their land. Sinclair (1999) commenting on the attacks on African immigrants in South Africa argues that “these stand as a sad reflection of the inability of South African people to acknowledge the contribution and inevitability of foreigners in the new South Africa, as much as an indictment of the government to lead the way by example” (p. 466). In the wake of the repeated attacks on the African other, scholars (Gqola 2008; Mngxitama 2008) have described them as Afrophobia—“the fear and/or dislike of Africans and their culture” (Tafira, 2011, p. 115)—instead of the widely conceived xenophobia—fear and dislike for foreigners. Extending this conceptualization of xenophobia and hence Afrophobia in South Africa further, Tafira (2011) argues that these attacks on African immigrants represent a “new racism” “practiced by black people on other blacks, who belong to the community but are seen as socially and culturally inferior” (p. 114). This negative attitude confirms the perception that when the oppressed is liberated they can become oppressors too. Making reference to the incidents in Alexandra (a township in the Gauteng Province of South Africa) during the infamous 2008 attacks, Tafira
contends that “while immigrants are defined by their phenotypical appearances (they are seen as those of a darker hue), they are also a racialised group with distinct cultural identities which primarily motivate certain prejudices and discriminations” (p. 116). Employing Wivelk’s\(^1\) (1997) concept of differential racism which is cultural racism, the Other is seen as a new danger to society, a threat, an invader intent on usurping the hard won materialities which the locals earned with sweat and blood (in Tafira, 2011). Similarly, Gqola argues that “the specific racialisation of the attacks matters … No one is attacking wealthy German, British or French foreigners in Camps Bay … This is unthinkable. This racialisation makes it safe to victimise Black people from the African continent in our everyday exchanges” (2008, p. 213 in Kerr, Kerr et al., 2019, p. 998). Racism in the view of Fuller (1984) is a global system of control and oppressive power relations affecting all areas of people’s activities including economics, education, health, law, politics, religion, sex and war. It must be said that there is a clear difficulty and confusion in conceptualizing racism due in part to the often blurred lines between racism and purported patriotism or nationalism. To therefore succeed in framing xenophobia as racism, the pervasive question of what constitutes racism needs to be properly dealt with. Subsequently, we turn to the definition found in the Early Years Trainers’ Anti-Racist Network Manual:

an unjust situation, in which a group because of its unequal place in society, suffers from a persistent pattern of prejudice, exclusion, injustice, discrimination and disadvantage which are slow to change and rooted deep in the institutions and structure of society and in people’s psyches. (Darbyshire, 1994, p. 9 in Pillay, 2017, p. 4)

The significance of this definition is that it departs from the overreliance on physical features of individuals as the underlying indicator for racism. It speaks to all forms of prejudice systematically targeted at a group by virtue of certain prevailing characteristics. In South Africa, the various attacks on the African Other represent nothing but a racial discrimination perpetrated on cultural lines, indeed what Stolcke (1995) calls “racism in disguise” (p. 4). Tafira (2011) has also likened xenophobia in South Africa to what he refers to as the “new racism”:

My renunciation of the term xenophobia and subsequent adoption of the term New Racism is inspired mainly by the following propositions: xenophobia has been the term the media has used, juggled around and fed to their audiences; it is possible that the media themselves do not understand the racial nature of anti-immigrant attacks; commentators who have used the term may have done so unconsciously and inadvertently or for lack of a better term to describe anti-immigrant practices in post-apartheid South Africa. I assume that it may be incomprehensible to many people that racism can be a practice between people of the same skin colour. Furthermore, I suspect commentators, the media included, may fail to see the New Racism, as it has unfolded, as an unfortunate misconception. They may fall into the common trap of understanding the conundrum of racism as mostly biology-based. They have not come to see how people of the same skin colour, in this case black African immigrants and black South Africans, are and have over the years been transformed into racialised subjects and how they have come to perceive each other in the light of their racial subjectivities. (p. 115)

Balibar (1991) maintains that while biological racism is based on unequal treatment and exclusion of others due to phenotypical and other physical differences, cultural racism builds on these to vilify and marginalise certain groups; this is expressed in racial terms (in Tafira, 2011, p. 115). In reality, there appears to be “… a complete lack of reference to crime and illegality on the part of Western Europeans and North Americans in South Africa, despite the fact that nationals from these regions also commit crimes and many are in the country illegally” (Solomon & Kososa, 2013, p. 12) which, without doubt, evinces the lingering curse on the black identity and the white privilege that colonialists had occasioned (Montle, 2021).

3. Analytical framing
In this section, we adapt Kenneth Waltz’s (1959) levels of analysis in conceptualizing the countless attacks of black South Africans on African immigrants in the country. Waltz published his classic
book titled “Man, the state and war” in 1959. In the book, he posits three “images” (individual, state and international system) as independent variables to explain state behaviour as the dependent variable—in this case, the decision of a state to go to war (Temby, 2013). The various levels can be understood as people’s accounts of decision-making—encompassing all aspects of international relations. His approach to international relations helps in understanding the relationships between individuals and the wider political system. The individual level represents the first image and examines the material conditions of human beings and its effects on his propensity to go to war. Waltz attributes political ill's to a fixed nature of human beings. He states that

According to the first image of international relations, the locus of the important causes of war is found in the nature and behaviour of man. Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected impulses, from stupidity. (Waltz, 1959, p. 16)

The main theme in this image is that people will pursue actions that foster their wellbeing. Within this theme, human beings are seen as rational actors in pursuit of their selfish interests. In the context of South Africa, there is a perceived competition between black South Africans males and African immigrants for the scarce social amenities and jobs, and even women, in the country. It is a widely held view that “a job for a foreigner is a job lost for a South African”, therefore to address this unfavourable situation, black South Africans have resorted to “war” against African others as a means to take back what “rightly” belongs to them. Even where African immigrants create their own jobs and employ some locals, they are still seen as people who have come to “steal” their jobs hence whenever there is any upheaval such businesses are targets for violent destruction. This idea is made worse by the inflammatory pronouncements made by leaders at all levels (national, provincial, municipal, and traditional) about African foreigners in the country.

The state—the second image—“considers the argument that the properties of the state matters in affecting its behaviour. These include its type of government or modes of production and distribution but, once again, a state’s social identities could easily be added to this framework” (Temby, 2013, p. 723). Within this image, countries with similar systems of government behave in a similar fashion in relation to their policies and political constraints. Since South Africa ushered in democracy in 1994, the freedom charter was passed into law and is seen as one of the most progressive human rights constitutions in world. In terms of the constitution, South Africa plays a crucial role on the international stage. Beyond the nature of the political system, this level also analyses collective within the state which range from interest groups to political associations and government agencies (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008 in Tella, 2016, p. 148). Thus, it examines how state policies and structures promote anti-foreigner sentiments and narratives. In South Africa, the Lindela Repatriation Centre, regular police raids on [undocumented] immigrants, and the difficulty for African foreigners in securing residence permits all help to strengthen the argument that xenophobia has become systemic in the country. Dodson (2010) and Harris (2002) argue that the post-apartheid South African state perceives immigrants, especially undocumented African immigrants, as a threat to the social fabric and economic survival of the South African body politic (In Tella, 2016, p. 152). Since many black South Africans cannot differentiate between documented and undocumented African immigrants, they generalize their Afrophobic and racist sentiments towards all African others in the country and may attack any African immigrant whether citizen or permanent resident. In fact, the general perception is that South Africans are only those born in the country to one of the local tribes. In line with this perception, naturalized bona fide citizens of South Africa are still wrongly referred to as “foreign nationals”, even in some official circles.

Waltz’s third image, the international system is based on the idea of mutual global awareness: “everyone’s policy depends upon everyone else’s” (p. 226). Hawley (2020) uses the example of hunters felling a stag to illustrate the dynamics of the international system.

Five hunters may agree to cooperate in the complex operation of felling a stag in order to satiate the hunger of all, but one hunter may defect upon capturing a hare, which suffices to
satiate his hunger alone. No hunter may assume with confidence that one or more of the others might not at any time seize such an opportunity to defect. (p. 872)

The essence of international relations is to foster mutual interest; however, the state can justifiably choose national interest over the international good. For the state to survive, it needs to maximize its power defined as the ability to influence people. This includes the physical ability to influence your opponent’s thinking, such as possessing nuclear weapons; or it could be psychological power—the ability to change others’ thinking without any physical or financial outlay on your part (Morgenthau, 1985 in Tamaki, 2019, p. 7). South Africa wields considerable power on the African continent due to its advancements in infrastructure and technology in relative comparison to other countries on the continent. Other African countries are associated with problems such as corruption, wars, diseases and poverty, and by extension, African immigrants are perceived as “free-loaders” who leave their poverty-stricken countries to milk South African resources (Neocosmos, 2008 in Tella, p. 154). South Africa’s international relations with other African countries is premised on the belief that the country is better than the rest of the continent. Therefore, there is an antagonistic attitude towards African foreigners on the basis that they have nothing significant to offer to the growth of the country.

South Africa and many other African countries subscribe to the notion of African Renaissance —“restoring Africa as a contributor and beneficiary of the achievements of human civilization” (Mbeki, 2000, p. 76). In fact, the government of South Africa sees itself as leading this renaissance on the continent. Fundamental to the realization of this African renaissance is unity and mutual co-existence among the peoples. However, the reality for African foreigners in the country is in stark contrast to the African renaissance rhetoric. Actually, many South Africans do not consider themselves as Africans. The comment “you people from Africa” is often used to describe African others in the country. This seeming lack of African identity and the negative perceptions about African people appear to be linked with the hardening of anti-African immigrant sentiments among many black South Africans.

4. Explanatory accounts: centring Harris’ (2002) thematic classifications

In trying to decode the underlying causes of Afrophobia and black on black racism in South Africa, we engage with Harris’ (2002) thematic classifications of the various hypotheses underpinning the tendency for black South Africans to attack other Africans living within their boundaries. In Harris’ classification, three main hypotheses are advanced; isolation, scapegoating and biocultural. According to Harris, these are not mutually exclusive [in reality, in the South African context some or all of these hypotheses may interact]; they offer varied perspectives to understand xenophobia [and black on black violence] in South Africa. The first, isolation hypothesis situates xenophobia within the apartheid system and argues that the discriminatory policies of the apartheid regime resulted in the international community ostracizing or isolating the country (Crush, 2000; Dodson, 2010; Matsinhe, 2011; Morris, 1998; Steenkamp, 2009). Tella (2016) observes that

While there was a considerable inflow of white immigrants during this period, Black African immigration to South Africa was extremely limited. Thus, there was minimal contact between South Africans and black foreigners. The end of apartheid and South Africa’s re-entry to the international arena sparked a massive inflow of African migrants into the country. This resulted in hostility and hatred towards foreigners, especially African immigrants. (p. 143)

Likewise, the racial and ethnic spatial policies of the apartheid regime also encouraged the “boxing” of different groupings of black South Africans to specific areas. Therefore, within the country itself, inter-ethnic contact was as well limited. The onset of democracy in 1994 opened up the country internally for free movement and also to migrants from different parts of the world, especially the African continent. Due to this systemic isolation, black South Africans developed an “inward looking” attitude towards the African Other and even among the different ethnic groups
within the country. Within this thesis therefore, “immigrants are threatening to the extent that they are culturally distinct from natives and to the extent that natives hold strong national identities” (Claassen, 2017, p. 5). Also, during the colonial and apartheid rule, South Africa was detached from the rest of the world (Matsinhe, 2011, p. 301) and during this period, it developed its infrastructure and became a technologically advanced nation comparable to many European countries (Tella, 2016). This promoted a white privilege—that everything white was good while black was associated with all forms of “evil”. According to Tella (p. 144) this metamorphosed into South African exceptionalism—the belief that South Africa can be likened to European countries and does not share similar characteristics with other African countries—in the post-apartheid era. The resulting effect of this situation as Tella observes is that South Africans do not see themselves as Africans but rather see themselves in the image of their colonizers which has facilitated the development of Afrophobic sentiments among black South Africans towards immigrants from other African countries.

A recurring theme in the literature is the assertion that Afrophobic attacks on African migrants in South Africa are the result of accumulated frustrations with government (Claassen, 2017). The attainment of democracy in the country brought with it a burgeoning of hope among the mass of black South Africans that the new nation would propel a change in their [mis]fortunes—it is fair to say that the apartheid regime consciously limited opportunities for black South Africans. This notwithstanding, the opportunities and fortunes that the many black South Africans envisaged would accompany the freedom era have been largely elusive to say the least. The Human Sciences Research Council (2008), Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (2008), and Morris (1998) in their studies emphasize the insufficient provision of government services, or “service delivery,” while others underline the perceived disinterest of government and the resulting lack of voice experienced by many communities (in Claassen, p. 4). Tevera (2013) provides a specific case in point:

Alexandra whose 350 000 residents experience high levels of unemployment, poor accommodation, inadequate infrastructural services, systemic exclusion and deprivation. Here, unemployment and infrastructural challenges are decisive determinants in the reproduction of poverty and deprivation that in turn have generated conditions that are conducive to the emergence of conflict or violence. In Alexandra, as in many former African townships, residents often struggle violently for access to basic infrastructural services, such as decent toilets, clean water and electricity (p, 17).

The struggle for such basic amenities is often accompanied by the belief that the scarcity is the result of undeserved access to such amenities by “undesirables” in the country. This scenario constitutes the scapegoating hypothesis—blaming others for one’s misfortunes. As Claassen notes in a refinement of the “poverty begets conflict” argument, scholars have argued that frustration, and thus aggression, are functions of expected welfare as much as actual deprivation (p. 4). Going by this argument, many black South Africans seek out easy targets (African migrants in the country) to blame for their unfortunate circumstances leading to violence against the African Other. Supporting this line of thought, the editorial in the Mail & Guardian of 2 June 2006 claimed that “frustrated by escalating costs of living and competition for houses and jobs, poor South Africans, mostly uneducated about the role that fellow Africans played in the South African liberation struggle, are picking the easiest scapegoats amongst them—foreigners” (In Crush, 2008, p. 12). This buttresses the argument that ordinary South Africans has [no] knowledge of the role played by other African countries in their freedom struggle, what Crush refers to as “historical amnesia” (p. 12).

According to Harris (2002), the isolation and scapegoating hypotheses conceive foreigners as a homogenous category with no specific scope for differentiating between them. However, in the South African context anti-foreigner sentiments are not uniform; the levels of risks to the various groups of foreigners differ. The Human Rights Watch (1998) and Human Rights Commission (1999)
are in unison in their observation that African Others seem to be particularly vulnerable to violence and hostility (In Harris, 2002). The biocultural hypothesis – the third hypothesis – seeks to explain the repeated targeting of African foreigners by black South Africans. This hypothesis frames Afrophobia and black on black violence at the level of visible difference, or otherness, i.e. in terms of physical biological factors and cultural differences exhibited by African foreigners in the country (Harris, n.p). Foreigners from certain African countries such as Nigeria and Democratic Republic of Congo are easily identifiable due to their striking physical features, “their clothing style and their inability to speak one of the indigenous languages, they are in general clearly distinct and local residents are easily able to pick them out and scapegoat them” (Morris, 1998, p. 1125). Harris contends that the biological-cultural features of hairstyles, accents, vaccination marks, dress and physical appearance can be read as indexical markers or signifiers. These signifiers are fundamental for the easy identification of African others for the purposes of racial discrimination and attacks against them. It is important to concede at this point that foreigners from Southern Africa are comparatively treated better than their counterparts from other parts of the continent. And within the Southern African region, immigrants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana receive better treatment than others (e.g., Mozambique and Zimbabwe) in the sub-region (Tella, 2016).

From 2008 and beyond, the nature of the Afrophobic attacks in South Africa seem to resonate at the surface with the interplay of all three hypotheses. In 2019 for instance, among the flurry of reasons given for the violent attacks by black South Africans on African foreigners, “they are stealing of our women” was also mentioned. Tafira (2014) notes that a prominent theme in black-on-black racism is the fight and competition for [South African] women by black African immigrant and black South African men. This pervasive theme is the result of a combination of all three hypotheses. First, due to isolation and the subsequent boxing (as a result of the draconian policies of the apartheid regime) of various groupings to certain areas a sense of familiarity and “entitlement” developed. Love relationships were based on belonging to one’s spatial group leading the men to believe that the women belonged to them. This sentiment was carried into the post-apartheid South Africa. Consequently, love relationships between South African women and black African immigrants were frowned upon.

However, according to Tafira “immigrant men are seen as better lovers and the consequences are bitter contestations between the two sets of manhood, which are manifested in racism and their corollary violent forms” (2014, p, 167). This also supports the stereotype and scapegoating hypothesis advanced by Harris. Bioculturally, the distinct looks of male African foreigners make them easily identifiable for scapegoating. Harris’ thematic classifications of the various causes of xenophobia (in this case Afrophobia and black on black violence and racism) offer well-rounded explanations for the Afrophobic tendencies of many black South Africans towards African others. It is necessary to stress that these tendencies are not universal to black South Africans. Also, the attacks against African foreigners seem to be asymmetrical in the sense that (as alluded to earlier on), not all African foreigners are attacked.

Despite these obvious limitations, Harris’ hypotheses are clear in pointing out the various reasons for the programmed violent attacks on immigrants from certain African countries. These “violent attitudes towards African immigrants can neither be explained nor analysed within a singular focal lens. Instead, there are multiple causes at play which converge to give rise to tensions” (Tafira, 2014, p. 157) giving credence to Harris’ classification. A close analysis of the various hypotheses shows that the causes of Afrophobia and black on black racism are the result of myths, attitudes, and behaviours which have developed over the years. These infuse into the cognitive and affective domains of learning.

5. Light at the end of the tunnel
Black South African’s perceptions, attitudes and behaviours towards foreigners from the African continent are very disturbing in the sense that they have resulted in the senseless deaths of many
people. There has also been widespread condemnation in the media and amongst ecumenical groups of the violent attacks on African foreigners who are deemed unwelcomed in South Africa. Unfortunately, these sentiments still persist and if steps are not taken to address the repeated attacks and various forms of racial discrimination against African others by black South Africans, it could degenerate into a more deadly conflict between the two. We argue that xenophobic, Afrophobic and black on black racist values could be diminished through education. Indeed, education has often been seen as an antidote against Afrophobic and black on black racist values as well as a preventative measure against their resurgence (Hjerm, 2001). As Nelson Mandela famously declared:

No one is born hating another person because of colour of his skin, or his background, or his religion. People must learn to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to love, for love comes more naturally to the human heart than its opposite (Long Walk to Freedom, 1994).

Emphasizing the power of education, Mandela (1918–2013) again had this to say, “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world”. This statement from an Africanist statesman highlight the significance of education (both formal and informal - through the media and other important platforms) in the quest to promote tolerance and mutual co-existence among different groups of people in South Africa. Given this premise, an understanding of the cognitive and affective processes of acquiring and internalizing Afrophobic and racist values are instrumental in design strategies to mitigate against future events. We need Afrocentric education to neutralize hatred and bring about peaceful co-existence and harmony in the various South African communities. Akua (2020, p. 109) defines Afrocentric education as “a process of centering ourselves in the best of African culture to examine information, meet needs and solve problems in African communities”. Centering ourselves means placing African ideas, values and ideals at the centre of any analysis of phenomena that affects African people. An African centred education can only be built on the foundation of traditional African concepts of education and traditions which must be modified to reflect contemporary concerns and issues (Akua, p. 109).

In the context of South Africa, the perpetrators of these attacks are largely the youth and their actions are informed by unjustified perceptions which lead to stereotypical tendencies towards the African other. We contend that adult education could help to change their perceptions of, and attitudes and behaviours towards African immigrants in the country. According to Darkenwald and Merriam (1982):

Adult education is concerned not with preparing people for life, but rather with helping people to live more successfully. Thus if there is to be an overarching function of the adult education enterprise, it is to assist adults to increase competence, or negotiate transitions, in their social roles (worker, parent, retiree etc.), to help them gain greater fulfillment in their personal lives, and to assist them in solving personal and community problems. (p. 9)

Adult education should be geared towards inculcating in the youth African values such as sacredness of life, compassion, brotherhood, cooperation, solidarity, empathy, sympathy, acceptance, tolerance and respect. It must engage in an effort to recognize African identity. The restoration of African identity constitutes heritage and knowledge. King and Swartz (2016, p. 4) attest that heritage and knowledge refer to group memory, a repository of heritable legacy that makes a feeling of belonging to one’s people.

In discussing the instrumentality of [adult] education in combating black on black racism, we employ two separate viewpoints. First, adult education can reduce if not eliminate black on black racism in South Africa. Education is supposed to foster a situation where adult learners from different cultures interact without any form of limitation. This enhances their understanding of different cultures which reinforces tolerance towards others. Also, there is “the possibility that
higher levels of education may restrain people from responding in ways that are not considered to be socially acceptable" (Hjern, p. 56). Adult education curriculum should be seen as an important aspect in the fight against black on black racism in the country. Using a culturally responsive curriculum, adult educators can promote understanding of the contested issue of immigration in South Africa. Intercultural learning programmes could be assimilated into the mainstream curriculum to help students internalize the need for mutual co-existence.

Second, through the media, adult education practitioners could contribute to public dialogue aimed at creating awareness and, ultimately, changing attitudes in respect of xenophobic beliefs (Igglesden, 2002). The media are a powerful force in shaping our perception of reality and reality itself (Winkler, 1999, p. 11). Also, they are essentially the “chief vehicle” for ensuring an informed citizenry and a commitment to democratic values (Dahlgren, 2000 in Igglesden, 2002, p. 21). Through equipping audiences to interpret xenophobic constructions, the media can assist in the creation of an atmosphere in which xenophobia can be successfully challenged (Hilversummary, 1996, p. 3). Making reference to the constructivist learning theory where people are guided to construct meaning from a wide range of events, the media could create the conducive environment for black South Africa to understand the need for mutual co-existence between themselves and African others. As such, Igglesden (2002) advises that adult (post-formal) education to combat xenophobia through the media needs to be broadly framed in an ethos of welcome and appreciation of diversity and calls for a multifaceted approach that is fully cognisant of the range of instrumental and psychosocial factors that affect different sectors of the target audience (p. 22). Through dispassionate public debates, the media could lead the way in the fight against black on black racism in South Africa. Adult education on the need for peaceful co-existence cannot be a once-off parochial activity. Various constituencies—politicians, political organisations, traditional leaders, church leaders, educational institutions etc.—must take advantage of every opportunity to educate the public about the sanctity of life and African values espoused by Ubuntu.

6. Conclusion
This paper sought to contribute to the debate on Afrophobia and black on black racism in South Africa. This issue is a daunting reality in the lives of African foreigners living in the country. Lives have been lost and properties running into several million rands have been destroyed by angry mobs seeking to send a message to African immigrants that they are not welcomed in the country. This paper has argued that these sentiments do not develop overnight; in fact, they are the result of apartheid's miseducation which created myths, perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and values that developed prior to democracy and still persist in the post-apartheid era. This miseducation sought to characterize multiculturalism as problematic which unfortunately is the terrain on which xenophobic/afrophobic tendencies have been nurtured (Osler & Starkey, 2002). Osler and Starkey have argued that:

far right and populist politicians spuriously link multiculturalism to crime, unemployment, insecurity and loss of national identity. Such discourses are profoundly anti-democratic as they deny the basic tenets of liberal democracy, namely equality of rights and respect for human dignity. (p. 145)

We have constructed xenophobia in South Africa as Afrophobia and black on black racism due to the nature of the attacks by black South Africans on African others in the country. African foreigners in South Africa face varied forms of discrimination, prejudice, and violence at the hands of the indigenes mostly black South Africans. Kenneth Waltz’s (1959) levels of analysis is used as analytical framework to extend our understanding of Afrophobia and black on black violence in the South African context. It points out that certain images of the human being, state, and international system inform decisions to engage in war. In the context of South Africa, war is construed as violent attacks on African foreigners in the country. These events paint a negative image about the safety of foreigners in the country in general and those from the African continent in particular. The point has been made that education can
promote tolerance and mutual co-existence between South Africans and African immigrants in the country. Indeed, any educational programme that promotes democratic citizenship could help engender mutual co-existence and respect between people from different cultures and nationalities. The Committee of Ministers of Education of the Council of Europe has observed that such a programme “can contribute to social cohesion through learning to participate in the life of society, to assume responsibility and to live together” (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 3). Therefore, there must be a conscious effort to mainstream the fight against Afrophobia and black on black violence in all adult education programmes in the country. To achieve this, however, there is a need for a strong commitment from government and other civil society organizations to initiate and intensify the provision of adult education programmes that raise awareness, all over the country, with the intention of promoting a culture of tolerance, respect for human rights and dignity, inclusivity, diversity, anti-discrimination, and equality. Such programmes should be anchored on Afrocentric ideals and values which locate black South African adults within the context of their own cultural references so that they can relate socially and psychologically to other cultures (Asante, 1991). This would help nurture an African consciousness that perpetuates an African identity predicated on respect for human rights and dignity, and the idea of mutual co-existence. That said, it is important for these educational programmes to reassert Ubuntu and the oneness of the African people in all sectors the South African society.

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Notes
1. Michel Wievorka (1997) differentiates between two kinds of racism: classical/egalitarian and differential. In classical racism, the Other is considered as inferior and marginalized in society and hence “legitimizes domination and discrimination as a result of overt racial doctrines, which support biological racism” (Tafira, 2011).

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