Can Quantum Cryptography Imply Quantum Mechanics?

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It has been suggested that the ability of quantum mechanics to allow secure distribution of secret key together with its inability to allow bit commitment or communicate superluminally might be sufficient to imply the rest of quantum mechanics. I argue using a toy theory as a counterexample that this is not the case. I further discuss whether an additional axiom (key storage) brings back the quantum nature of the theory.

One of the great desires of those who study both quantum information theory and quantum foundations has been to find simple information-theoretic axioms sufficient to imply all the rest of quantum mechanics \[^1\]. To this end it has been suggested (private communication from Fuchs and Brassard to Bub, reported in \[^2\] and cf. \[^3,4\]) that the existence of unconditionally secure cryptographic key distribution (of the sort granted by quantum mechanics \[^5,6\]), together with the impossibility of secure bit commitment (also a feature of quantum mechanics \[^5,6\]) might comprise just such a sufficient set. This is appealing as these two cryptographic primitives capture two of the key properties of quantum mechanics: Quantum key distribution is built on the idea that information gathering causes a necessary disturbance to quantum systems, while the bit commitment no-go theorem depends on an entanglement-based attack. More recently, this question has been rephrased slightly, and an axiom added by Clifton, Bub and Halvorson (CBH) \[^8\]. Their axioms are:

- No broadcasting of arbitrary information \[^10\].—In quantum mechanics, noncommuting density matrices cannot be cloned or even distributed in such a way that all marginal density matrices are correct.

- No unconditionally secure bit commitment.

- No superluminal communication transfer, \textit{i.e.} a measurement on one system does not affect other systems.

In this paper I argue that these axioms are not sufficient to imply quantum mechanics. To make the argument, I propose an alternate toy theory of physics which satisfies these axioms but which quite obviously will not imply quantum mechanics. This result is in direct contradiction to Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson’s, whose result seems to depend on the additional assumption that a physical theory must be a $C^*$ algebra. It is unclear at this time just how much that additional assumption brings into the discussion.

\section*{LOCKBOX MODELS}

I will consider a class of toy models whose basic unit of matter is the \textit{lockbox}. A lockbox in general is an object akin to a physical box that can contain bit strings and cannot be opened except when the correct conditions exist to open the box. Depending on the model the box might be opened with a combination, a physical key, or something else. A lockbox may also perform other functions on the data within it depending on various inputs. Such boxes need not be allowed by physics, but instead are the building block of toy theories.

For example, consider a lockbox with a combination lock, that can contain a bit value $b$. The value cannot be read out of the lockbox except if the correct conditions exist. If the lockbox is opened with an incorrect combination, the bit value is destroyed. It can be helpful to think of such a lockbox as a physical box, that one could made of brass or steel, but it must be stressed that this can only be an approximation. The bit value in the lockbox by definition cannot be read out by \textit{any means} other than using the correct combination, whereas a brass or steel box can always be drilled or blown open with explosives if enough effort is expended.

A true lockbox cannot exist in classical mechanics. It is often said that one way in which quantum mechanics differs from classical mechanics is that it cannot be represented by a local hidden variable theory. This statement hides a common oversight about classical mechanics. Classical mechanics also is not correctly represented by a local hidden variable theory, but by a local \textit{unhidden} variable theory—in principle every possible property of a classical system can be measured perfectly \[^11\] whereas the contents of a lockbox are unconditionally protected. Our example lockbox also differs from both classical and quantum theory in that its behavior when the wrong combination is applied is \textit{irreversible}—the bit value is destroyed and cannot be recovered \[^12\]. Thus a lockbox explicitly mimics the quantum property that unknown nonorthogonal states cannot be cloned (copied) \[^13,14\] or even measured without disturbance \[^15\]. A lockbox
also cannot be broadcast, since in order for the copies to have the correct marginal behavior they each must have the right combination, and there is no way of reliably determining the combination.

It is straightforward to implement secure key distribution using lockboxes of this type. As in quantum key distribution, two parties (Alice and Bob) are assumed to share an ordinary classical channel, which is unjammmable and authenticated, and to have the ability to prepare systems, in this case lockboxes, and send them, to each other. Eve, the eavesdropper, is assumed to have full physical access to the lockboxes while they are in transit, meaning she can manipulate them at will, subject only to the constraints imposed by the physical theory. In particular, she is unable to reliably open the boxes if she does not know \( C \).

The protocol is as in Bennett and Brassard’s 1984 quantum key distribution paper [5] (BB84), but simplified: Alice picks \( N \) random bits and prepares \( N \) lockboxes with random combinations. She sends the lockboxes to Bob. Once Bob has received them, he tells Alice they have arrived and then she sends the combinations to him over the classical channel. He can now open the lockboxes and extract the bits. They then test some number \( m \) of the bits to see if they are what Alice put into the lockboxes in the first place. Since Eve would likely have destroyed the contents of any lockbox she tried to open, the correctness of the tested bits assures Alice and Bob that Eve could not have opened very many of the lockboxes. They can then do privacy amplification [16] and reduce Eve’s information to much less than one bit.

On the other hand, lockboxes as proposed fail to exclude the possibility of bit commitment. In fact, they essentially are the embodiment of the simplest possible form of bit commitment. Alice puts a bit in the lockbox and gives it to Bob, who cannot open it. She opens the commitment by telling him \( C \). Alice cannot cheat using an EPR attack as in [7, 8] because the physics does not allow for entanglement at all. Clearly we need a more sophisticated lockbox.

One simple modification to the lockboxes that appears to eliminate bit commitment fails, but the reason is interesting: Suppose every lockbox is given a second combination—call this \( C \) (note this is not necessarily the bitwise NOT of \( C \)). Now in the above bit-commitment scheme Bob has no way of knowing if Alice told him the real combination \( C \) or the complementary combination \( C \). Since Alice can open the commitment to either \( b \) or \( \bar{b} \) this is no commitment at all. It would seem evident that in any bit-commitment protocol such a lockbox is useless, since it essentially a bit controlled utterly by its creator. The creator can cause it to become either a zero or a one and can prevent anyone else from learning even this noninformation until such time as either \( C \) or \( \bar{C} \) is announced. But, as pointed out by Aram Harrow [19], by using more than one lockbox, bit commitment can be achieved. Alice prepares many lockboxes, all with different combinations. To commit to a zero, she makes the numerically lower combination open the bit as a zero for all of them. To commit to a one, she makes it so the numerically higher combination opens the bit as a zero. She gives all the boxes to Bob. To open the commitment, Alice tells Bob all the combinations. Bob can check her truthfulness about the commitments and combinations by opening each box randomly using either its lower or higher combination.

It is the ordering property of classical numbers that allows this version of bit commitment to work, and I conjecture this will be the case with any scheme based on classical combinations securing lockboxes. However, this problem suggests its own solution: Instead of a classical combination, what is needed are boxes secured by physical keys. If a key has a button on it which causes the secured bit to flip without having any physically detectable effect on either the key or the lockbox, it is immune to the ordering to which classical combinations are subjected.

### A Lockbox Theory Satisfying the Axioms

Such a lockbox-key pair still is not able to avoid bit commitment without further modification. The asymmetry between boxes and keys could lead to a protocol where Bob gets to hold onto the keys and Alice holds the boxes, preventing Alice from changing the concealed bits. So we will add buttons to the lockboxes as well, which also flip the bit inside. Notice that now the keys and boxes are interchangeable—someone in possession of either one can flip the bit, and both are needed to reveal the bit. So we may as well consider them as symmetric lockbox pairs.

To formalize a lockbox pair (LBP) we write its state as a vector

\[
B = (b, s, x_1, x_2, p_1, p_2)
\]

where \( b \) is the value stored in the pair, \( s \) is a classical label unique to each pair, \( x_1 \) and \( x_2 \) are the position coordinates of each box of the pair and \( p_1, p_2 \) are their momenta. The \( x \)'s and \( p \)'s transform as usual classical coordinates. This actually encompasses quite a bit, for in a cryptographic setting one cannot simply talk about an operator which changes the momentum of a particle, one needs to make clear that only the party in possession of a particle can perform such an operator. In the following we make this explicit with respect to the position variables but omit the momenta. It is to be understood that the boxes can be moved from place to place with some finite velocity as classical objects.
There are two types of measurements allowed on an LBP. First is the \# operator, which reads out the serial number of the pair:

\[
\#_x(B) = s(\delta_{x,x_1} + \delta_{x,x_2} - \delta_{x_1,x_2}) \tag{2}
\]

An important feature is that no two pairs have the same serial number, nor can anyone create another pair with a given serial number. This, perhaps unappealing, feature can be resolved most simply by having all the pairs created with their unique serial numbers at the time of the creation of the universe, after which they are conserved \[17\]. This is not so unusual in that traditional physical theories have finite conserved resources like angular momentum and energy.

The other measurement is the value operator \( V \) which reads out the value \( b \) contained in the pair:

\[
V_x(B) = (1 + b) \delta_{x,x_1}\delta_{x,x_2} \tag{3}
\]

Each operator has an \( x \) subscript, representing where the party performing the operation is located. The \# operation can be performed by a party possessing one or both of the boxes in a pair, the \( V \) operator only works if the party is colocated with both boxes. Note that \( V \) is a three-outcome measurement, resulting in a zero if the boxes and measurer are not all together, and in \( 1 + b \) if they are.

There is also the flip operation, which is not a measurement, but rather a transformation on the state \( B \). It flips the bit value of the state when it is applied in the location of either or both halves of the pair:

\[
F_x(B) \rightarrow (b \oplus \delta_{x,x_1} \oplus \delta_{x,x_2} \oplus \delta_{x_1,x_2}, s, x_1, x_2) \tag{4}
\]

There is a trivial no-go theorem for broadcasting for LBPs. No two LBPs have the same serial numbers, so no copy can have the right properties.

LBPs can be used for key distribution: Alice puts a bit into the pair, sends one of the boxes to Bob, who tells her when it has been received. Only then does she send the other box of the pair, allowing Bob to reveal the bit. Eve cannot substitute a box of her own due to the serial numbers unique to each LBP.

Bit commitment is excluded by the following argument. For each LBP in a protocol, during the committed phase either Bob has both boxes or else Alice has at least one of them. If Bob has both, he can read the bit. If Alice has at least one of the boxes, she can change the bit.

Furthermore, the LBPs are a purely local theory. The formal rules mask this somewhat, as it appears that the flip operator allows changing the bit value at a distance, but since the bit can only be read once the boxes are brought together this isn’t a problem. Each box merely has to remember locally whether or not to flip the bit when brought together. The LBP theory is equivalent to the following, where each box is individually represented by a vector:

\[
B_1 = (b_1, s, x_1), \quad B_2 = (b_2, s, x_2) \tag{5}
\]

\[
\#_x(B_i) = s\delta_{x,x_i} \tag{6}
\]

The value operator now acts on pairs of boxes:

\[
V_x(B_i, B_j) = [1 + (b_i \oplus b_j)]\delta_{x,x_i}\delta_{x,x_j} \tag{7}
\]

and the flip operator is

\[
F_x(B_i) \rightarrow (b_i \oplus \delta_{x,x_i}, s, x_i) \tag{8}
\]

This is clearly a local hidden variable theory describing LBPs. So we are faced with a theory that is compatible with all the axioms but which is incompatible with quantum mechanics (and therefore cannot imply quantum mechanics).

**ANOTHER AXIOM AND MORE MODELS**

This leaves us with the question of what additional axioms are needed to imply quantum mechanics. One suggestion, due to Jeffrey Bub \[18\], is the additional ability of quantum mechanics to perform key storage. Key storage is similar to key distribution but the key is distributed across time rather than space. Alice and Bob do some quantum communication, then open their labs up to Eve, who can look around all she likes, and can even measure, modify, or replace any quantum states she finds stored there. After some period of time Alice and Bob communicate classically, and are still able to generate secure key. (Eve cannot be allowed to actually play with their equipment while she is there. If she replaces everything in the labs with her own Trojan lab racks then there isn’t much of anything Alice and Bob can trust. Some work on such Trojans has been done by Mayers \[20\].) The quantum key distribution protocol of Ekert \[21\] which uses EPR pairs rather than the unentangled states of BB84 is also a key storage protocol. The protocol is for Alice and Bob to first share EPR pairs and later, when they wish to create key, measure them in random bases, which they only then agree upon over a non-secret classical channel. By revealing the results of some of the measurements they can ensure that Eve has not tampered with the EPR pairs.

Such a protocol appears to be impossible with LBPs. Whatever Alice and Bob do, once they leave Eve alone with the lockboxes Eve could just read out their contents using the value operator and by Alice and Bob would be none the wiser. However, key storage using EPR pairs, as well as all forms of key distribution, relies on a peculiar assumption. These protocols all depend on the existence of an authenticated public channel between Alice
and Bob to prevent a man-in-the-middle attack. Such an assumption is anathema to a cryptographer, especially when there exist provably secure classical authentication protocols. These all rely on Alice and Bob having a shared secret, which in a sense obviates key distribution, since this secret is a key. The difference is that the shared secret can be very small, indeed a constant amount of key can authenticate any sized classical message. So more correctly quantum key distribution and storage protocols should be thought of as expanding the existing key rather than generating one from nothing.

With that in mind, we can find protocols for key storage using a slightly modified form of LBP. Consider an LBP which is “set and read-once”—one can initially store a bit value in the pair after which the value operator can be applied only once. After that it always returns null. These can be used to store secrets as follows: Alice makes many LBPs, the values of which are the secret. She keeps these entirely in her own lab. Bob does likewise. What they must remember even when Eve is granted access to their labs are the serial numbers of some subset of the pairs. If Eve were to read the values of those pairs the value operator would cease to function on them, a condition which Alice and Bob would notice upon their return. They can therefore estimate how many pairs Eve might have measured, and then perform traditional privacy amplification to increase the security of the bits encoded by the remaining LBPs. Oddly, the extra information Alice and Bob need to keep secret from Eve during her intrusion need not be a shared secret between them, but only private secrets about the LBPs in their own labs.

Another protocol would be for Alice and Bob to remember the serial numbers of all the pairs. If Eve applies the value operator to any of the pairs Alice and Bob will notice. This is really a slightly different case than we have discussed before—the amount of information Alice and Bob need to remember is much larger than before, but does not need to be kept secret, only secure from alteration.

Each of these cases still differs from the quantum case using EPR pairs in an interesting way: With the EPR pairs the needed small authentication key could be stored at the time of the key generation (through a low-capacity secure channel, or in person for example)—Alice and Bob need only be sure they are talking to each other. In the LBP schemes they need to have remembered something about the actual boxes. This is a subtle but inescapable difference: If neither Alice nor Bob remembers anything about the LBPs themselves nothing can prevent Eve from replacing them all with her own, whose contents she knows but which otherwise would appear to Alice and Bob to obey all the rules of their protocol. The EPR pairs provide, due to their odd nonlocal nature, a way around this problem. In a quantum-mechanical world only true EPR pairs can pass all the tomographic tests that Alice and Bob could perform knowing only that they are supposed to be EPR pairs. Once assured that they really share EPR pairs, Alice and Bob can generate secure key.

This suggests a third kind of toy model, which I call the random correlated pair (RCP). Like the LBP these come in pairs, each member having an identical serial number, distinct from that of all other RCPs, and each having an enclosed bit value. RCPs can, however, be opened revealing their bit value even when the two members of a pair are separated, and each member has the same bit value as its twin. RCPs are read-once, and the bit value of an RCP is unknown to anyone before either box of a pair is read. These behave like EPR pairs with respect to key storage, in that Alice and Bob can easily check if what they have is really an RCP pair—merely having a pair with matching serial numbers is sufficient to ensure Eve has not tampered with them, as she cannot control the bit value in a pair, nor read the bit value without using up at least one member of the pair.

**DISCUSSION**

I have been careful to consider both the no broadcasting and the key distribution properties of all these toy models. This is because there is a trivial theory that satisfies the other axioms. Namely, a theory with only one type of element, a box with a unique serial number and no bit value inside at all. Such a box cannot be cloned or broadcast, due to the serial number, cannot communicate superluminally, and cannot be used for bit commitment. On the other hand, it is also useless for distributing key, thus I maintain that key distribution is a necessary axiom to make this question meaningful.

One objection which has been raised is that lockboxes don’t capture the true flavor of an information-disturbance tradeoff—a quantum measurement on non-orthogonal states can reveal partial information, while the lockboxes are all or nothing. In fact, Brassard and Fuchs specifically mentioned lockboxes as something which they did not want used to refute their conjecture. Leaving aside the issue of whether it is fair to directly exclude the embodiment of one’s axioms, I believe this is not a real failing of the lockboxes. It should be possible to modify them to reveal varying amounts of information under certain conditions without affecting their ability to satisfy the CBH axioms. I expect that proofs using such systems will likely be more difficult, for relatively little gain in insight.

All of the toy models herein that satisfy the CBH axioms employ unique serial numbers, primarily as a way of ensuring no broadcast (though this is also useful in excluding some bit commitment strategies which may be insecure, but for which this is difficult to prove). The original combination lockboxes have the no broadcast property for a different reason, but fail to avoid bit commitment. It would appear that something deep comes from
the *distinguishability* implicit in serial numbers. However, recently Spekkens [24] has invented another toy model which appears to satisfy all the CBH axioms (as well as key distribution) and does not have a distinguishability property. Like the lockbox models, it is based on certain information being assuredly inaccessible to any observer, and is a local hidden variable theory. Unlike them, the Spekkens theory has a composability lockbox models lack. His model defines what happens in measurement on multiple systems in a nontrivial way, whereas all the models presented in this note are explicitly noninteracting. This makes the Spekkens model much more like quantum mechanics than any lockbox model without being quantum mechanics. It will be the subject of future work to flesh out the connections between these different kinds of models. Understanding the differences may lead us to a better understanding of just what, in addition to kinds of models. Understanding the differences may lead us to a better understanding of just what, in addition to

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