CHAPTER 8

**Virtus and Causae Primordiales in Berthold’s Expositio**

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1 **Prime unum and the Henads**

In the beginning of his *Expositio*, Berthold presents his interpretation of Proclus’s metaphysical universe. The supreme Principle of reality is Unity, which according to Proclus is the same as Goodness. Unity is not a mere concept obtained by way of abstraction, but exists *in natura rerum*.1 This Unity, says Berthold, is an *unum quod non est in multis sive multitudine*. It is pure act, and creates a second unity, which is an *unum quod est in multitudine*. It also creates a third *unum* which participates in the first through the second *unum*. This third *unum* is, then, *ab alio sive per aliud*.

The first unity (*unum secundum causam*), in a strict sense, is not unity but excess of unity. It is not an *unum* among others, it is *unum ante omne unum et multitudinem*; it is an *unum non plurificabile*, and *omnia producuntivum*.2

The second unity (*unum secundum essentiam*) is, for Berthold, a “one-many” because he discerns in it a series of causes which he identifies with Proclus’ henads or gods. Following Moerbeke’s translations, Berthold calls them *unitates* or *bonitates*. This *unum* is, then, *simplex*, but not *simpliciter simplex*.3

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1 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1A, p. 74, l. 108.
2 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1D, p. 77, l. 228–234; and 2E, p. 88, l. 241–244.
3 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 59B, p. 165, l. 65–74: *Simplex primi (…) modi est simpliciter et absolute simplex, cuius simplicitas est omnimoda, in qua nulla est plica diversitatis secundum esse aliquo modo. Et hoc non conventit nisi prime bono, quod nulla plica habitudinis ad aliquid intra vel extra dependet secundum esse diversum a se ipso. Et hoc est simplex omnino et omnimode in fine simplicitatis, cuius simplicitas nulli causato convenire potest. Est et alia simplicitas, quae non habet plicam habitudinis secundum esse ad compositiones intra, cum non constet ex diversis intentionibus, licet habeat dependentiam ad causam extra, a qua accipit id, quod est. Et hoc non est omnino simplex, sed contractum ad determinatum modum et ex hoc conclusum intra ordinem partialem, scilicet unialem, et intra totalem ordinem universi*. The underlined sections come from Albert the Great’s *Summa theologiae* i, 111, 21.
Whereas the first is an *unum simpliciter*, the *unum secundum essentiam* is a *quoddam unum*. It is contracted or limited unity. But it differs from the third kind of unity (*unum secundum participationem*) in that, even if contracted, its essence is unity, whereas *unum secundum participationem* results from a composition.

The absolute One pre-contains every possible kind of unity. Every unity presupposes it, but the One does not have its unity from another, but from itself. It is *prime unum*. And because not only every kind of unity but everything presupposes the *prime unum*, it creates everything. The One, and only the One, creates.

In terms of similarity of nature, the first product of the *unum secundum causam* is the *unum secundum essentiam*. This *unum* is, as we said, the realm of the *unitates* or *bonitates*. Each one of them is, thus, an *unum* or *bonum per essentiam*. Whereas the One is *unum* strictly *secundum causam*, each henad has, properly speaking, an essence, and every essence is contracted. Because they possess the essence of unity in this contracted way, Berthold contends that they are not *prime unum*, but *primo unum*. That is to say, the One is the source of oneness and the henads are, *formaliter*, the first unity.

Nevertheless, if, in regard to its essence, the gods or *unitates* are pure unity, in respect to multiplicity, they are principles of determination. They constitute a plurality of causes, *immediata ad ipsum prime unum*. Berthold distinguishes six henads, i.e. six principles of determination: *prime virtus* (or *infinitas*), *prime entitas*, *prime vita*, *prime intellectualitas*, *prime animealitas* and *prime naturalitas*. The use of the adverb *prime* indicates that the *unitates*, in regard to

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4 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2E, p. 88, l. 245–247: *Unum autem secundum essentiam est quoddam unum eo, quod deficit a superplenitudine simpliciter unius: tum quia est contractum, illud vero illimitatum, tum quia licet sit simplex, tamen non est simpliciter simplex (...).

5 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 65D, p. 203, l. 82–84: (... et sic praehabet omnia, in quibus ipsa eadem intentio contracta est vel contrahabilis, nobiliari, quia absolutioni modo, quam sint in se ipsis, et sic etiam dicitur prime (...).

6 See below, notes 4 and 9.

7 On determination, cf. King 2021, p. 248–267.

8 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5B, p. 116, l. 134–135.

9 The adverb *prime* signifies that those determinations are not their essence, but rather that these determinations can be attributed to the henads only in that they are their causes. Also, when we simply mean *prime unum*, we say that it causes unity. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 163K, p. 8, l. 168–181: *De primo sciendum, quod (...) prime adverbium, quod secundum grammaticos est vi verbi adiectivum, modificat terminum, cui addicitur ad standum pro simplicissimo, absolutissimo et sic illimitatisimo intentionis seu proprietatis per terminum denotatae, verbi gratia prime intellectus stat pro simplicissimo, absolutissimo et illimitatisimo intellectu,
multiplicity, are what the *prime unum* is in regard to the *unitates* and everything else. They mediate between absolute unity and the multiplicity of the determined things.

I will analyze the way Berthold defines the number and the character of the *unitates*, and the specific order he assigns them.

2 Proclus, Eriugena, and the List and Order of Henads

One fundamental source used by Berthold to redefine in Christians terms the metaphysical status of the gods or henads is the thought of John Scotus Eriugena which he receives mainly through the *Clavis physicae* written by Honorius Augustodunensis during the first half of the twelfth century. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, Berthold considers the Eriugenian notion of *causa primordialis* to be a philosophical Christian equivalent of Proclus’ henad. Thus, throughout the *Expositio*, Proclus’ gods are identified with the Eriugenian *causae primordiales* which, according to the *Clavis physicae* (and the *Periphyseon*), are made by the Father in the Son (*quas Pater in Filio fecit*).

The Eriugenian sources, as well as the thought of pseudo-Dionysius, play a crucial role in the *Expositio* when it comes to state how many and which are the *causae primordiales* or *unitates*. The list of *unitates* could not come from Proclus because the *Elements of Theology*, like the *Tria opuscula*, does not specify the names of the henads—although it does state that their number is finite. However, pseudo-Dionysius and Berthold’s Eriugenian sources can clarify the origin of Berthold’s own doctrine only partially. Regarding Eriugena’s thought there

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10 Cf. Ludueña 2013, p. 111–118; Führer, Gersh 2014, p. 327; King 2019, p. 395–414.
11 Cf. Ludueña 2013, p. 119–143.
12 Cf., e.g., Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 128A, p. 166, l. 22–26.
13 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 149, p. 72, l. 1–2: *Omnis multitudo divinarum unitatum finita est et secundum numerum.*
is a significant difference, for, according to the Irish philosopher, the number of causae primordiales is infinite, and, because of this, one cannot definitively state the order of those causae. Berthold, as we said, speaks of six henads or causae and he mentions them in a precise order:

prime infinitas (or virtus)
prime entitas
prime vita
prime intellectualitas
prime animealitas
prime naturalitas

The number six proceeds, as Berthold himself notes it, from Macrobius. Six is the first perfect number. However, the total number of unitates or bonitates seems to be related to a precise image of a universe determined by six metaphysical “intentions” conceived in a specific order.

As it is well known, the Eriugenan doctrine of the causae primordiales is, mainly, a re-elaboration of the Dionysian doctrine of the divine names. The list of divine names and the order in which Dionysius presents them constitute a sort of table of contents of his De divinis nominibus.

bonum, lumen, pulchrum, amor, extasis, zelus
existens
vita
sapientia, mens, ratio, veritas, fides
virtus, justitia, salvatio, liberatio
magnus, parvus, idem, alter, similis, dissimilis, statio, motus, aequalitas
omnipotens, vetus dierum

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14 The passage where Eriugena declares that the primordial causes are infinite in number (Periphyseon 623D–624A) does not appear in the Clavis nor in any the other Eriugenian sources known by Berthold. But the Eriugenian remark about the impossibility of finding an exact order of the causes did find a place in the Clavis. Cf. Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis physicae, 118, p. 88, l. 25–29: Ordo itaque primordialium causarum iuxta contemplantis animi arbitrium constituitur, in quantum earum cognitio de divinis causis disputantibus datur: licet enim pie philosophantibus ab unaquaque earum, prout vult, inchoare, et in qualibet earum terminum suae theoriae constituisse.

15 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, prol. 11, p. 17, l. 401 – p. 19, l. 471; p. 19, l. 343–359. See also Expositio 63C, p. 183–184.
Being, Life, Wisdom, and Power are the Dionysian ancestors of four of the six mentioned by Berthold, i.e. *prime entitas, prime vita, prime intellectualitas* and *prime infinitas* (or *virtus*). Not only are there two extra henads whose names cannot be found in the *De divinis nominibus* (*prime animaelitas* and *prime naturalitas*), but the order of Berthold’s henads does not coincide with the order of Dionysius’ names. In particular, the name “power” does not occupy the first place after “good” (“good”, for Berthold, signifies the *unum secundum essentiam* as a whole, that is, the totality of the henads).

In Eriugena’s *Periphyseon*, the most complete list of primordial causes is to be found at the beginning of book III. Fifteen causes are mentioned there. Berthold, however, did not know that list because the *Clavis physicae* only presents a summary of the passage which does not include the examples. However, in book II, there is another list which provides the names of fourteen causes, and this list does appear in the *Clavis*. These are:

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16 The complete passage is found in *Periphyseon* 622B–623C, p. 192, l. 231–200, l. 333.

17 Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae* 118, p. 88, l. 4–14: *Summae ac verae naturae est prima consideratio, qua intelligitur summa ac vera bonitas, quae nullius particeps per se bonitas est, cuius prima donatione et participatione est per se ipsum, cuius item participatione bona sunt, quaecumque bona sunt. Quae ideo per se ipsum bonitas dicitur, quia per se ipsum sumnum bonum participat, caetera autem bona non per se ipsa sumnum et substantiale bonum participat, sed per eam, quae est per se ipsum summi boni participatio. Similiter dicendum de reliquis primordialibus causis, quod sint principales eo, quod per se ipsas sunt participantes unius omnium causae, quae Deus est, alia autem omnia illarum participatione sunt, quod sunt*. Berthold quotes this text at the beginning of his commentary of the second proposition of the *Elementatio*, cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2A, p. 82, 16–25.

18 Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae* 116, p. 86, l. 21–31: *Sunt igitur primordiales causae, quas rerum omnium principia divini sapientes appellant, per se ipsum bonitas, per se ipsum essentia, per se ipsum vita, per se ipsum sapientia, per se ipsum veritas, per se ipsum intellectus, per se ipsum ratio, per se ipsum virtus, per se ipsum iusticia, per se ipsum salus, per se ipsum magnitudo, per se ipsum omnipotentia, per se ipsum aeternitas, per se ipsum pax, et omnes virtutes et rationes quas semel et simul Pater fecit in Filio et secundum quas ordo omnium rerum a summo usque deorsum textit, hoc est ab intellectuali creatura, quae Deo proxima est, usque ad extremum rerum omnium ordinem, quo corpora continentur. Cf. John Scotus Eriugena, *Periphyseon* 616C, p. 536, l. 6475–508, l. 6493: *Sunt igitur primordiales causae, quas rerum omnium principia divini sapientes appellant, per se*
This is the most extensive list Berthold knew. We can compare this list with the contents of De divinis nominibus:

ipsam bonitas, per se ipsam essentia, per se ipsam vita, per se ipsam sapientia, per se ipsam veritas, per se ipsum intellectus, per se ipsam ratio, per se ipsam virtus, per se ipsam iustitia, per se ipsam salus, per se ipsum magnitudo, per se ipsam omnipotentia, per se ipsam aeternitas, per se ipsum pax
| De divinis nominibus | Clavis physicae 116 |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| bonum, lumen, pulchrus, amor, extasis, zelus | per se ipsam bonitas |
| existens | per se ipsam essentia |
| vita | per se ipsam vita |
| sapientia, mens, ratio, veritas, fides | per se ipsam sapientia per se ipsam veritas per se ipsum intellectus per se ipsum ratio |
| virtus, justitia, salvatio, liberatio | per se ipsam virtus per se ipsam iusticia per se ipsam salus |
| magnus, parvus, idem, alter, similis, dissimilis, statio, motus, aequalitas | per se ipsam magnitude |
| omnipotens, vetus dierum | per se ipsam omnipotentia |
| pax | per se ipsam pax |
| sanctus sanctorum, rex regums, dominus dominorum, deus deorum | |
| perfectus, unus | |

There is a manifest relation between Berthold’s list of henads and those lists he read in Dionysius and the *Clavis physicae*. But we cannot find in either the *prime cialis in natura rerum inventur, quae a primordialibus causis ineffabili participatione non procedit*. 
animealitas and the prime natura, nor are the others mentioned in the same order as in the Expositio. A long tradition, in which the De divinis nominibus belongs, justifies the descending order: being, life, thought. But this does not explain the priority Berthold concedes to prime virtus, first among the unitates.

As for the two lowest henads, the source seems to be proposition 20 of the Elements of Theology, for according to it: “Omnibus corporibus superior est animae substantia, et omnibus animabus superior est intellectualis natura, et omnibus intellectualibus hypostasibus superius ipsum unum”. Berthold’s master, Dietrich of Freiberg, had based on this proposition his doctrine of the four ontological strata of the universe (maneries): the One, the intellects, the souls, and the bodies.20 Between the One and the intellectual hypostasis, Berthold adds the level of the henads, but maintains the rest. The determination of everything that is not tantum unum is done by the henads. Berthold seems to take two levels, not mentioned by Dionysius or Eriugena, from this theorem of Proclus already used by Dietrich: the level of souls (prime animealitas) and the level of bodies (prime naturalitas).21

As to the prominent place accorded to prime virtus by Berthold, we must read his explanation of proposition 90 of the Elements of Theology. According to it, there is a prôton péras (prima finitas) and a prôte apeiría (prima infinitas). The first is pure limit; the second, pure unlimited. Both are the principles that constitute everything save the One. In the Elements of Theology, these principles come immediately after the One and before the realm of henads.22 In fact, proposition 159 contends that henads derive from them: ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐστὶν ἀρχῶν (ex prōtous est principiis). As Dodds—and before him, Nicholas of Methone—indicates, this is problematic. Indeed, proposition 127 states that henads are “absolutely unified” (ἕνικώταται, unitissima) and “absolutely simple” (ἁπλούσταται, simplicissima). How, then, can we accept that they derive

20 Cf. Pagnoni-Sturlese 1983, p. 115–117; Libera 1994, p. 373–384; Calma 2011; Führer, Gersh 2014, p. 312–314. Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, 1, 4, 1–2, p. 138, l. 44–49: Distinguit autem idem Proclus quadruplicem rerum maneriem, in quibus singulis dii gens indagator; prout fuerit de propositione suo, nescesse habet quaerere eorum operationes. Dicit ergo propositione 20 sic: ‘Omnibus corporibus superior est animae substantia et omnibus animabus superior intellectualis natura et omnibus intellectualibus hypostasibus superius ipsum unum’.

21 Nevertheless, it is possible that, for Berthold, the prime animealitas signified essentially the same as the Eriugenian per se ipsam ratio.

22 Cf. Dodds 1971, p. 247; Lankila 2010, and, about Berthold’s interpretation, King 2021, p. 238–248.
from two principles, and are, as it were, compounded by them? Are they then “infected by this radical duality”?\(^\text{23}\)

Commenting on proposition 90, Berthold denies that *prima finitas* and *prima infinitas* are intermediate principles between the One and the henads. He declares explicitly that when Proclus speaks of *prima finitas* he is talking about the One: “notandum, quod finitas in proposito non est aliud quam prime unum”.\(^\text{24}\) To support his interpretation, he quotes a text from the last chapter of *De divinis nominibus*,\(^\text{25}\) and concludes: “apparet ex sententia Dionysii prime unum, quod simpliciter omnia finit et terminat, esse prime finitatem”\(^\text{26}\). By speaking of *prime finitas* (not of *prima finitas*), Berthold openly affirms that *prime unum* is the cause of all limit. According to Proclus, *apeiría* should be associated with power,\(^\text{27}\) and Berthold agreed with him, but the latter affirms that the One is pure act and, because of this, is above all power (*super totam virtutem*).\(^\text{28}\) Thus, *infinitas* derives from *prime finitas* or *prime unum*: “prime infinitas et omnis infinitas est effectus finitatis, scilicet prime unius”.\(^\text{29}\) The *prime unum* confers a limit upon all things, that is to say makes everything an *unum*. In respect to any further determination, *prime infinitas* or *virtus* occupies the first place, is the first henad and the most universal: *prima infinitas* (...) *est* (...) *prima unitas intra ordinem unialem*. Berthold has recourse once more to pseudo-Dionysius’ *De divinis nominibus*, this time to chapter 8, devoted precisely to the divine name of *virtus*. There it is said that *virtus* subsists *super omnia creatae*, that is why *ad omnia vadit*.\(^\text{30}\)

This complex dialogue between Berthold’s sources finds an expression in a passage of the *Expositio* when it comes the time to comment on proposition
128 of the *Elements of Theology*: “Omnis deus a propinquioribus quidem participatus immediate participatur, a remotoribus autem per media vel pauciora vel plura aliqua”. The first section of the *suppositum* is devoted to the statement that the henads or primordial causes are participated by everything that comes after them. Thus “dii (...) praecedunt omnia, quaecumque se participant et quorum essentia participatio est”. Then he quotes three texts. The first one is a passage taken from the *Clavis physicae* about the nature of the primordial causes, “quae Pater in Filio fecit et per Spiritum sanctum in effectus suos dividit atque multiplicat”. The second is a passage from *De divinis nominibus*, where Dionysius speaks about the “in Deo (...) rationes substantificas et singulariter praeexistentes (...) secundum quas supersubstantialis essentia omnia praedefinit et produxit”. The third is, again, a text from the *Clavis*—precisely the passage referred to above, where it presents the list of primordial causes from book 11 of the *Periphyseon*. Now, if one compares Berthold’s quotation and the original text as read in the *Clavis*, one can observe that the Dominican master alters the text of the *Clavis* so that it conforms to his own interpretation of the Proclean doctrine of henads:

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**Clavis physicae 116**

*Sunt igitur primordiales causae, quas rerum omnium principia divini sapientes appellant, per se ipsam bonitas,*

*per se ipsam essentia, per se ipsam vita, per se ipsam sapientia, per se ipsam veritas, per se ipsam intellectus, per se ipsam ratio, per se ipsam virtus, per se ipsam justitia, per se ipsam omnipotentia, per se ipsam aeternitas, per se ipsam pax, et omnes virtutes et rationes quas semel et simul Pater fecit in Filio et secundum quas ordo omnium rerum a summo usque deorsum texit, hoc est ab intellectuali creatura, que Deo proxima est, usque ad extremum rerum omnium ordinem, quo corpora continentur.*

**Expositio 128A**

‘*Sunt igitur primordiales causae, quas rerum omnium principia divini sapientes appellant, per se ipsam bonitas,*

*per se ipsam potencia sive virtus, per se ipsam essentia, per se ipsam vita, per se ipsum intellectus, per se ipsum anima, per se ipsum natura,*

*quas simul et semel Pater fecit in Filio et secundum quas ordo omnium rerum a summo usque deorsum texit.*
Clavis physicae 116

Quaecumque enim bona sunt, parcipiatione per se boni bona sunt;

et quaecumque essentialiter et substantialiter subsistunt, participacione ipsius per se ipsam essentie subsistunt; et quaecumque vivunt, participacione per se ipsam vitae vitam possident; similiter quaecumque sapiunt et intelligunt et rationalia sunt, participacione per se ipsam sapientiae et intelligentiae et rationis sapiunt et intelligent et ratiocinantur; eodem modo de caeteris dicendum.

Nulla siquidem virtus sive generalis sive specialis in natura rerum inventitur que a primordialibus causis participacione non procedat: sed haec omnia in summa causa existunt, ut omnes numeri in monade et omnes lineaee in centro subsistunt.31

Expositio 128A

Quaecumque enim bona sunt, participacione per se boni bona sunt,

et quaecumque virtutem habent, participacione per se virtutis ipsam habent.

Nulla siquidem virtus sive generalis sive specialis in natura rerum inventitur, quae a primordialibus causis participacione non procedat, sed haec omnia in summa causa existunt, ut omnes numeri in monade et omnes lineaee in centro subsistunt. Ista, quae praemissa sunt, extracta sunt de libro Theodori, qui dicitur Clavis.32

Berthold recognizes that what he offers is not a formal quotation, for he presents it as an extractio. The truth is that, far from being arbitrary, the modifications he introduces are, in fact, the result of a process of reflection about his sources, pagan and Christian. He copies the text literally until it mentions the first of the primordial causes, per se ipsam bonitas, which for Berthold is the same as what he calls unum (or bonum) secundum essentiam. Then, he changes the text by reducing the number of causes and altering their order so that the list matches his own doctrine. And in order to keep this trend of thought he also changes another portion of the text. Everything good is good because it participates of per se ipsam bonitas, so that everything that subsists, subsists because

31 Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis physicae 116, p. 86, l. 21–41.
32 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 128A, p. 167, l. 47–57.
it participates *per se ipsam essentia*, etc. Berthold merely retains the first part, deletes the rest and, instead, writes: “et quaecumque virtutem habent, participacione per se virtutis ipsam habent”.

His interpretation about the order of the primordial causes, their number and their meaning generates a metaphysical conception of the universe. The henads are the origin of multiplicity. They determine the product created by the *prime unum*, a product which is *unum tantum*; because “ipsa intentio boni non potest se ipsa subsistere”, and therefore “recipit diversas determinationes subordinatas diversarum intentionum magis contractarum”. The principle behind this is, as Berthold puts it, that “unum manens unum semper natum est facere unum”.

Those *intentiones* are the gods: “determinatio originatur et principiatur necessario a diversis et subordinatis primordialibus causis”. Thus, even if they are simple, the gods constitute a *ratio componibilitatis*. They vary according to the extension of their causal action, and the order in which Berthold presents them reflects that variation: *non omnis deus est eiusdem totalitatis*. In this sense, *primes naturalitas*, which establishes the level of bodies, “infimus est et particularissimus, contractissimus et limitatissimus inter deos”; whereas “prime virtus is summus [deus] intra ordinem (...) absolutissimus et illimitatissimus” (even if not *simpliciter, sed in manerie deorum*). The latter causes the first determination of the product created by *prime unum*. Only after *virtus* come the other determinations: being, life, intellect, soul, body. This is why it is the first and most universal *intentio* after the *intentio unius*. With the determination

33 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 136E, p. 10, l. 208–209.
34 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 136E, p. 10, l. 212.
35 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 136E, p. 10, l. 210–211.
36 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 91A, p. 158, 21–22: *In ordine namque unitatum est totalis simplicitas, utpote quae constant seu subsistant in una intentione, scilicet unitatis seu finitatis (...).*
37 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 136E, p. 10, 219–224: (...) *prima intentio contracta et recondens ab universalitate et totalitate boni est infinitas, quae ex radix et fundamentum entium, quae appropriate sunt entia; tertia entitatem contrahens intentio est vitalitas; quarta intellectualitas; quinta animenta; sexta corporeitas seu natura corporeitatis, et ista est ultima et particularissima omnium intentionum. Ibid. 136B, p. 5, 65–67: *Licet ergo omnis deus sit totus, ut patet per iam dicta, tamen non omnis deus est eiusdem totalitatis.*
38 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 136C, p. 6, 99–102: *Et sic infimus est et particularissimus, contractissimus et limitatissimus inter deos; summus autem intra ordinem est absolutissimus et illimitatissimus, non tamen simpliciter, sed in manerie deorum intra ordinem locorum.*
39 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 14C, p. 5, 75–82.
40 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 3B, p. 94, 80–81.
of *virtus* appears the first composition: *unum* plus *virtus*. But that every other determination implies *virtus* does not mean that *prime virtus* is, in some way, the cause of all the other henads—and *prime entitas* the cause of *prime intellectus*, and this the cause of *prime animealitas*, etc. Otherwise, since they all share the same essence, the henads would be causes of themselves. Berthold rather says that less universal henads keep a *vestigium* of more universal ones. Every henad after *prime virtus* keeps then a *vestigium* of it.41

3 Conclusion

Berthold redefines the Proclean doctrine of henads as he found it in the *Elements of Theology* by identifying *prima finitas* with the absolute One, and *prima infinitas* with the first of the henads. Moreover, he specifies the metaphysical contents of the henadic realm. To do this, he uses four of his main sources: the *Clavis physicae*, the *De divinis nominibus*, Proclus (notably proposition 20 of the *Elements of Theology*) and the teaching of Dietrich of Freiberg.

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41 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 92A, p. 162, 24–26: *Dico autem qualitercumque, sive tantum habeant vestigium infinitatis, sicut unitates subordinatae primae infinitati, puta prime ens, prime vita et sic de aliis unitatibus, sive sint infinita primo et per se, scilicet per essentiam, quae tamen dicuntur participare infinitate, quia non habent eam in superplenitudine, in qua stat in superioribus unitatibus et praeципue in eo, quod est prime respectu sui ipsorum, scilicet infinitum, sive habeant infinitatem secundum participationem et exemplariter sicut omnia citra ordinem infinitatum, scilicet enter entia. And Ibid., 126 prob., p. 165, 191–198: (...) in omni ordine essentiali, qui est quoddam totum, superius sicut stans sub ordine principalis et essentialis causae et per consequens existens concausa est generans quodammodo inferior, sicut cor in animali et intellectus agens in anima; sed in diis est ordo essentialis per 19; ergo inferiores et particulariores generantur ex superioribus et neque partitis illis, scilicet superioribus, cum sint unitates et antipostaton, neque alteratis, cum sint immobiles per 26, neque habitudine, quae est apposito ad esse, plurificatis, cum non misceantur inferioribus, sed superioribus, inquam, generantibus a se ipsis fecundos processus (...).
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