RESEARCH ARTICLE

Purity and danger: policing the Italian neo-fascist football *Ultra*S

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The rise of the Far Right in Europe over the past decade has attracted the attention of both academics and police. Popular sports tend to reflect societal trends so it is not bizarre that a popular European cultural practice such as football has seen a rise in supporters with neo-fascist sympathies. Football (soccer in the USA), specifically in Italy, has been linked since the beginning to politics and its stadiums have always been one of the most efficient public *Agorà* for the socialization of the Italian youth. In recent years, together with an ideologization of the football terraces, there has been a noticeable increase in conflict between hardcore football supporters and the Italian police at and around the stadium. These conflicts often involve the *Ultra*S as the main participants. The final capital *S* identifies neo-fascist-oriented fans, distinguishing them from mainstream hardcore football supporters, known as *ultrà*. This paper is the result of ethnographic research lasting six years (2003–2009). The research aimed to investigate the world of the *Ultra*S by using two notorious national and international *Ultra*S as case study. The groups, the *Boys* and the *Irriducibili*, support AS Roma and SS Lazio, respectively. Both are located in the Italian capital city of Rome. The present paper aims to investigate the relationship between the neo-fascist *Ultra*S and the institutions that they identify as their enemies, namely, the Italian State and the police.

**Keywords:** *Ultra*S; Italian police; neo-fascism; anti-*Ultra*S legislation; football stadium

Introduction

Le squadre ferme nel centrocampo sulle gradinate scoppia l’inferno, le squadre ferme nel centrocampo sulle gradinate scoppia l’inferno.... [The teams stop at the centre of the pitch, in the terraces there is hell].

FRA NA LA CURVA FRA NA SULLA POLIZIA ITALIA NA, FRA NA LA CURVA FRA NA SU QUEI FIGLI DI PUTTA NA [The terrace collapses on the Italian Police, the terrace collapses on those son of bitch]

Se deve esserci violenza che violenza sia ma che sia contro la POLI ZIA!!! [If there must be violence, ok but against the Police].

Digos ...... BOIA [DIGOS ...... SHIT]

Digos ...... BOIA

Digos-Digos-Digos1 ...... BOIA-BOIA-BOIA.

The chant above, sung by *Gli Hobbit* – one of the best-known Italian neo-fascist rock groups – is a popular song among the *Ultra*S. The song’s words depict the level of

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anger against the Italian police. Giorgio (40 years old and one of the leaders of the Irriducibili) attempts to articulate this rage:

Football is based on business and people like us have become trouble. They have tried to sterilise the environment; they try to make the experience of watching a football match like going to the cinema. We live with passion, feelings, with ideals – this is our way of watching football. We are not against the police who punish those who throw bottles on the pitch or who create violence but this has to be proven; justice cannot be discretionary. People get banning orders without being proven guilty. …

The Italian police forces have, for decades, found themselves as the bulwark against football-related disorders. They have endured a high price in terms of both resources and the deployment of manpower. In this spiral of violence, involving reactions and counter-reactions, the police have increasingly become the focus of the anger of the UltraS (Testa, 2009, 2010; Testa & Armstrong, 2008, 2010). In return, the police have sought to enact increasingly repressive legislation created to combat their attackers. Over a five-year period (2003–2008), 1114 incidents involving fans and police were documented, equating to 222 per year (one per day when one takes public holidays and feast days out of the equation). Resulting from these incidents, 5388 injuries were recorded; 6000 people were arrested and 2000 were charged; and 20 people have died in circumstances related to football disorder since 1963. Furthermore, in the same years (2003–2008) other alarming data were published by the National Center for Information on Sports Events (CNIMS), a body of the Department of Public Security of the Ministry of the Interior. They indicate that 574 police officers were injured during this period.

In June 2006, the Ministry of the Interior (Ministero dell’ Interno) presented an intelligence document compiled by the Squadre Tifoserie (police fan units). According to this report, of the 487 football clubs comprising some 80,300 supporters, nearly half – 245 – expressed a political orientation (71 to the extreme right, 61 to the moderate right, 34 to the extreme left, and 87 to the moderate left). Some extreme ideological factions were recognized in the document as having been involved in ideological propaganda and proselytism, specifically the distribution of fanzines with a political content. The report also recognized the presence of the UltraS in political events, as well as their participation in criminal activities with no apparent link to sporting manifestations. This should not come as a surprise to the reader. Some form of protest was enshrined in the very existence of the Italian State, and some of it was criminal. Football was not an exception. What was exceptional was the realization that the UltraS had provoked the Italian State to hire people for the specific purpose of stopping them. For example, the Sezione Tifoserie (Fan Units) – which collected data on the UltraS – was established by the Italian Ministry of the Interior. The personnel in the Fan Units sought to develop a systematic intelligence-gathering activity focusing on links between extreme ideologies and football fandom. In pursuit of this strategy, the Fan Units were in weekly contact with representatives of official fan clubs and constantly monitored their supporters. The police were often covert in their methods as they collected and collated information and intelligence on the more secretive UltraS.

Notes on methodology
This paper draws on material collected as part of an ethnographic study between 2003 and 2009, which sought to investigate two groups of Italian UltraS who live with the
nomenclature of the *Irriducibili* and the *Boys*. The choice of the *Boys* and the *Irriducibili* was influenced by the requirements of purposive sampling to satisfy the condition of transferability (Bryman, 2008; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The *Boys* and the *Irriducibili* are well known for the intransigence of their ideology and respected among similar UltraS groups who have adopted their names to their nomenclature. The nature of Italian fascism (and its modern form) tends to encourage the uniformity of individuals by shared values, myths, and beliefs (Kallis, 2000). This suggests a degree of transferability of the findings to other similar groups. These groups manifest neo-fascist ideology most visibly in and around elite level football matches. They articulate nationalist sentiment and enact violent scenarios some football-related, some involving political opponents. Based on such possible transferability, this micro-scale study has macro-scale implications in terms of a better understanding of the whole Italian UltraS phenomenon.

The research adopted a Triangulation strategy (Denzin, 1989, 2000, 2003; Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 230) which utilized participant observation amongst the groups and repeated semi-structured interviews focusing on influential members (seven individuals) alongside regular casual conversations with 21 individuals (cf., Gold, 1958; Haenfler, 2004; Hobbs & Wright, 2006; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Documents including the groups’ fanzines and Internet material were also utilized alongside newspaper reports pertinent to the groups. The collected data were coded topically and later analysed to identify categories of narratives and patterns of behaviours (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992; Haenfler, 2004).

The names of all UltraS used in this paper are fictional (Testa, 2009, 2010).

**Dura Lex Sed Lex: the Italian anti-UltraS legislation**

The first law dedicated to confront football violence was introduced in December 1989 and became known as No. 401. The legislation was, in part, a response to an event that occurred earlier the same year, when the football supporter Antonio De Falchi died from cardiac arrest caused in no small part by an attack from Milan hardcore football supporters during the Milan–Rome fixture (cf., Mariottini, 2004). The first part of the law, however, focused on tackling illegal betting on football matches. The second part aimed to prevent and suppress violence around sporting competitions. Over the years the law has been frequently modified in an attempt to make it more applicable and rigorous. Unfortunately, such changes have complicated matters; modifications have invariably been the products of urgent Decree-Laws issued by the government and changed at a later date, usually with modifications by parliament.5

Such ad hoc intervention has created a large body of laws and modifications of pre-existing laws that have proved difficult to implement, though this often occurs in Italy. As the hardcore football supporter phenomenon changed, so did the law. The UltraS movement emerged at the beginning of the 1990s. During this period, racist and anti-Semitic discourse became evident in the Italian football terraces. The Italian government and parliament, with good reason, responded by passing measures attempting to repress such objectionable manifestations. Law No. 401, aimed specifically at repressing the neo-fascist UltraS, was modified via decreto legge (Decree-Law) in June 1993 to contain specific criteria for punishing expressions of racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination.6

A central piece of legislation in the anti-UltraS armoury appeared in 1995, when Law No. 45 introduced the DASPO (the prohibition of access to places where sports
When violent events take place was a power given to the Questore – local Police Chief); such a DASPO could be imposed on anyone convicted of crimes and, more controversially, on those not arrested or convicted in a court of law but considered instrumental in episodes of violence. In reality, the DASPO could be imposed by the Questore irrespective of convictions or complaints against the person. The Questore could, therefore, demand that a person provide – in writing – the address of the place where they may be found during sports events. The Questore could then require the person to appear once or more during a specified period in a police station during the day of the sporting event. The DASPO could also be applied to minors aged between 14 and 18 years who were considered threats to public order and safety. It might be enacted around places where sports events were held or places of transportation of football supporters. Violation of the DASPO and non-attendance at designated ‘sign on’ police stations might result in a custodial sentence lasting between one and three years, or a fine ranging from 10,000 to 40,000 euros (Law No. 410, art. 6, paragraph 6, 1989). Arrest is also permitted in the case of breach of the terms of the DASPO (Law No. 410, art. 8, paragraph 1 bis, 1989). Pending trial, the courts could ban access to the places where sports events were held. The DASPO was strongly opposed by both the entire hardcore football supporters’ movement and the UltraS.

In 2001, Law No. 401 was modified again following the death of a Messina fan who was killed when struck by a petard thrown by rival fans during a match with Catania. Amongst the most important elements of this change was an increase in DASPO timescales and duties. Those subjected to a DASPO were now to appear at the police stations on one or more occasions at pre-established times. The potential length of the DASPO was also increased from one to three years. The application of the DASPO and the obligation it brought to appear at a police station could be issued by the court for between two and eight years’ duration. Guilt was assumed and redress was very difficult. The Constitutional Court (Judgment No. 512, 2002) affirmed the constitutionality of the DASPO obligation to appear at a police station. Simultaneously, the court remarked that the Questore was required to check the need and urgency of the DASPO order, as well as the satisfactoriness of its contents in terms of duration. The court also allowed a judge to assess whether the DASPO was (and remained) necessary. The judge could simultaneously order the perpetrator to undertake socially useful activities for the benefit of the community. When I asked Dr Mazzilli (President of the National Observatory on Sport Events of the Italian Ministry of the Interior, ONMS) about the legal nature of the DASPO and its efficacy, he replied:

The DASPO is an ‘atypical’ prevention measure applicable to a specific type of fans judged dangerous for the public security. The DASPO can also be issued for sports events taking place abroad and it can also be imposed by authorities of other Member States of the European Union for sports events taking place in Italy. The constant application of DASPO, in recent years, has allowed banning from the stadium dangerous individuals who had committed violations of the Italian laws that safeguard public security at sports events. At the time of this interview, 4185 DASPOs have been issued and the measure has successfully tackled violence at football matches. (2009)

Law No. 401 was changed yet again in February 2003 by the Decree-Law No. 28 (converted to Law No. 88, with modifications, 24 April 2003), via the introduction of the controversial arresto differito (deferred arrest). The deferred arrest enabled the detention of those suspected of involvement in football-related violence up to 36 hours
after the perpetration of the crime (based on video–photographic evidence or other, never defined ‘objective elements’). The Decree-Law also prohibited fans from bringing smoke bombs and petards into the stadiums. Transgression was punishable with arrest, and if found guilty, custodial sentences ranging from 3 to 18 months and fines of up to 500 euros. Some of the amendments permitted the police to act as both judge and jury. For example, Article 6 gave the police the power to prevent individuals from entering the stadium if the local Questore considered them dangerous based on the elusive concept of ‘intelligence.’ Five days after the February 2007 death of the police inspector Filippo Raciti (following the violence instigated by UltraS against police forces at the end of a Catania–Palermo match); the Italian government issued Decree-Law No. 8. This law had a severity without precedence in Italy (‘Stadi securi, pene più dure adesso c’è anche la legge’, 2007). Decree-Law No. 8 increased and strengthened previous anti-UltraS measures. Law No. 41, 2007, demanded that football matches scheduled for stadiums that had not been structurally updated (following the terms of the Decree-Law in 2003) would henceforth take place ‘in the absence of spectators.’ The decision was to be made by the Prefetto (provincial representative of the Italian government) following the recommendations of the National Observatory on Sport Events. The law also became more punitive for fans caught in the stadium or in nearby parking or transport areas with petards, batons, and blunt objects. Those arrested and convicted faced imprisonment ranging from one to four years, the punishment increased if the crime delayed the scheduled start or caused the cancellation of the match. The punishment would be increased by up to an additional half if any such act caused personal injury. Furthermore, the law limited the number of tickets any single fan could purchase to four and maintained the prohibition on football clubs selling blocks of tickets to visiting fans. On the back of every match-day ticket was now a message stressing the obligation for the buyer ‘to respect the rules of the stadium’ as an essential pre-condition for entry. Fans were also required to show a valid identity card (checked by stewards at the stadium entrance) as part of the admission criteria. Fines ranging from 5000 to 20,000 euros could be imposed upon stewards who fail to implement the law. The clubs were charged with the responsibility of issuing and selling tickets individually numbered and matched to a seat. The sale of tickets on the day of the match was prohibited. Breach of this law was punishable with fines ranging from 2500 to 10,000 euros. The law also forbade clubs to give discounted tickets or any other benefits to fans convicted of football-related offences; the penalty was a fine issued by the Prefetto ranging from 50,000 to 200,000 euros. In 2007, the Italian government explained that the problem of controlling fans in the stadium was linked to the difficulty of managing sports facilities, almost all of which were owned by local authorities and entrusted to clubs for football matches. For these reasons, the government intended to work towards a system of structures characterized by clearly identifiable liability. With the support of the parliament, the Italian government identified the regulatory measures affecting the safety of the stadiums that remained unrealized or circumvented since 2003. The negligence of these measures was implicated in the shadow of police Inspector Raciti’s tragic death. With a few exceptions (such as the Olympic Stadium in Rome), Italian football stadiums are the property of their respective municipalities. They are lands and structures given in concession to the custody of the clubs. This situation has made for a problematic scenario involving the application of safety procedures, notably due to uncertainty about who has to bear the expenses of implementing structural changes and the wages of safety personnel. Arising out of the debate over Raciti’s death, the control of behaviour in the stadiums was effectively
privatized with governmental stipulations. The management of order and public security inside the stadiums became the obligation of the football clubs, under the supervision of the Gruppo Operativo di Sicurezza (GOS – Group Operations Security) and police commanders. The GOS are essentially responsible for football stadium safety management, which includes all responsibilities demanded by the Questore. As of February 2008, all stadiums with more than 7500 seats were required to have at least one steward for every 250 spectators, as well as a coordinator for every 20 stewards. Failure to comply with these regulations brought the threat of closure. Stewards were required to search fans as they entered the stadium. Other procedures were promoted to change the relationships of fans with clubs and players. The tessera del tifoso (fan membership card), launched by the ONMS (together with CONI, FIGC, and the Italian Football League), began in March 2008. Promoted as providing a number of benefits for subscribers, the card gave priority for purchasing tickets, provided for dedicated entry gates, and created a category of official and loyal supporters. Individuals subjected to DASPO were excluded from any official relationship with the clubs.

The anti-Ultra legislation is characterized by an overproduction of laws and ad hoc passing of special legislation that, not only have proved difficult to implement, but tend to increase the sense of victimization of the ‘ordinary’ fans and, most importantly, the neo-fascist groups. This has increased their hostility towards the Italian State. The disproportionate number of laws in Italy is a widely known problem; it was a topic during the last 2008 electoral campaign, which saw the former Mayor of Rome, Walter Veltroni, representing the centre-left Partito Democratico (PD – Democratic party) and Silvio Berlusconi, candidate Prime Minister for the centre-right Popolo delle Libertà. In the electoral programme, Veltroni underlined his commitment about controlling the production of new laws and decrees to avoid what he negatively termed the ‘Italian legislative jungle.’ Veltroni stated that there were currently 21,000 laws in Italy – five times more than in Germany and double that of France. To reduce the progressive bureaucratization of the legislative system and make the application of the laws more efficient, fast, and certain, the PD proposed to abrogate 5000 laws by the end of 2008, to reduce all the laws and State’s rules to just 100 testi unici, and to limit special laws to 1000 (Veltroni, 2008). The overproduction of laws added to the inefficiency of the Italian justice system; court processes are also notoriously slow. The recent Eurispes Report of 2007 titled Giustizia al Collasso (Collapsed Justice) focuses on this very problem. The average duration of the judicial process is some 35 months (i.e., three years) for processing in the first instance and 65 months (i.e., five and a half years) if the case went to appeal. During the period from 2001–2004, civil cases increased by 64%, and those in the Court of Appeal increased by 122%. The Corte di Cassazione saw a rise in hearings of 33%. Criminal cases increased by 16% in the Fase Istruttoria – 60% in the first instance and 24% on appeal. A rise of 4% was recorded for the Cassazione Court. In 2007, there were no fewer than 10 million legal cases pending (4 million civil and 6 million criminal); a further 700,000 final sentences were still not completed. Eurispes data further reported that the justice system was heavily in debt, and its financial resources were inadequate to meet the needs of state prosecutors. The total debt of the Ministry of Justice amounted to 250 million euros. According to Eurispes, the populace did not trust the justice system, and a sense of insecurity came with that absence of trust. The consequence was voters’ cynicism, which, regardless of their political sympathies, ranged from 80% of those sympathetic to the centre-right to 60% preferring the political left.
The inadequacy of the Italian justice system also hit the *UltraS* of this study, contributing to the current amplification of the rage of the *UltraS* movement. The leadership of the *Irriducibili* – all interviewed in this study – was arrested in 2006 and detained in prison for more than eight months. In the eyes of the Italian *UltraS*, four Italian citizens had been subjected to the abuse of the *Custodia Cautelare* (Preventive Custody) legislation. This case was highlighted in the Italian parliament in December 2006 by Paolo Cento (an MP for *Verdi* – Green Party), the Deputy Minister for the Economy; Antonio Buonfiglio (at the time MP of the *Alleanza Nazionale Party*); and Sergio D’Elia, Secretary of the MP’s Chamber (MP for the *Radical Party* with an extreme left past), in a petition to the Minister of Sport, Giovanna Melandri. In February 2007, the latter three articulated their opinions in the pressroom of the Italian parliament. Buonfiglio argued that the four *UltraS* had been imprisoned for more than 100 days, and that the silence from the Italian media was quite strange. Cento focused on the anomaly of this *provvedimenti* (internments without trial), claiming that pre-trial preventive custody was used to such an extent that would have been not tolerated in any other civilized country. Cento declared his confidence in the magistrates but argued that, in the Italian justice system, the pre-trial detention should be the exception; instead, it is a common practice. He argued:

> The four leaders of the *Irriducibili* are an emblematic case. Our [Cento and colleagues] appeal is to put the case under the magnifying glass; they, like any citizen, have the right to a fair trial without prejudices. It is important to assess whether there are conditions for ending such preventive custody.13

D’Elia added to this consideration, stating:

> This morning [1 February 2007] I spoke with the *Irriducibili* leaders, for the fourth time in 45 days. I found them nervous and anxious due to their experience. Their prison is a sort of ‘advance’ for a crime eventually committed: they have been not even called in for process … This case of the 4 Lazio fans is an ‘ordinary’ example of the Italian administration of justice, or perhaps non-administration. A citizen has the right of certainty of the length of justice. A judgment in 4 years would be unfair because the length of justice or has to be contemporary with the facts [to be judged] or is an injustice. This state has 40% of prisoners awaiting trial … the guys are not saints, they have made mistakes and sometimes used violence, but they are not potential extortionist … What I want to emphasize is that they have been found guilty already in the press and via public opinion they are already guilty – and for this there will not be any compensation for the damages suffered; the only proper place to determine whether or not they are guilty should be the court. The only compensation possible is that if convicted the length of justice should be made as short as possible.14

The accused are currently facing a very long process, while at the same time, paradoxically, the *Irriducibili*’s accuser and victim has also been charged by the Italian justice system. In 2009, the president of Lazio, Claudio Lotito, was condemned to a two-year custodial prison sentence and fined 65,000 euros for the same ‘supposed’15 crime of market agiotage of a financial operation related to the SS Lazio in 2005 (‘Aggiotaggio, Lotito condannato’, 2009).

**Models of policing**

> … What is the objective of policing? What is the meaning of prevention? How should we evaluate police discretion? What is the meaning of community, etc.? Stated differently,
the choice of a police model should give a detailed answer to the question: What kind of policing do we want? In this sense, a police model always implies statements concerning values, objectives and norm. (Ponsaers, 2001, p. 470)

The prevention and repression of violence in and around sporting events are tasks given to the somewhat intricate Italian public security arrangement. These tasks are designed to protect the freedoms and rights of citizens, the maintenance of public order, and the protection and preservation of property. Further duties seek to enforce compliance with laws and regulations (be they State, regional, provincial, or municipal) and the provision of emergency assistance in case of disasters and accidents. The apex of this system, at a political level, is the office of the Minister of the Interior, who is responsible for national public security and the preservation of order and public safety. The Minister coordinates – with the assistance of the provincial public security – the activities of the Italian police forces. The Minister is assisted in the exertion of these powers by an advisory body of the National Committee of Order and Public Safety. Crucial to this task in each province is the titled office of Prefetto and Questore. To this end, they control the provincial police and coordinate their activities. In exercising power, the Prefetto calls upon an advisory body – the previously mentioned Provincial Committee – for advice on order and public security. The Questore has the task of the technical management, accountability, and coordination of public order and public safety. The Prefetto and Questore will inevitably use police for this purpose.

To ensure security at football stadiums, the Italian State commits on average 10,500 law enforcement personnel to the task. Of these 10,500, 6300 are drawn from territorial forces (local police in whose remit the stadium is situated). An additional 700 are drawn from special police forces (transport police, dog units), and 3500 are from specialist reinforcement units, of which some 66% belonged to the anti-riot units of the State Police and 34% belonged to the Arma dei Carabinieri. The deployment of police personnel over the past five years can be summarized by Tables 1 and 2.

There are also entities created to work specifically for the prevention and repression of violence at sporting events. As underlined earlier, the most important is the l’Osservatorio Nazionale Sulle Manifestazioni (National Observatory on Sport Events – ONMS), located at the Ministry of the Interior. The ONMS was established in 1999 and institutionalized by law in 2005. It is composed of 13 representatives of sport institutions and police forces with the right to vote and notify public security authorities of their assessments of public disorder in order for decisions to be made.

The ONMS has recently seen its powers increased. Via 2007 legislation (Law No. 41, 4 April 2007; G.U., 2007, n. 80) the following functions were tasked to the

Table 1. The use of the Italian territorial police forces during the Football League championships.

| Serie | Championships       | 2003/2004 | 2004/2005 | 2005/2006 | 2006/2007 | 2007/2008 (up to 5 November 2007) |
|-------|---------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------------------------------|
| A     |                     | 23,780    | 27,276    | 23,603    | 23,551    | 28,263                           |
| B     |                     | 25,918    | 19,253    | 20,137    | 23,626    | 15,367                           |
| C     |                     | 29,340    | 27,030    | 26,275    | 24,336    | 22,484                           |
| Total |                     | 79,038    | 73,559    | 70,015    | 71,513    | 66,114                           |
existing body: (a) to monitor the phenomenon of violence and intolerance occurring at sporting events; (b) to monitor the safety of Italian sports stadiums; (c) to examine problems linked to scheduled sporting events and assess the levels of risk to the public presented by such competitions; (d) to promote initiatives for the prevention of violence and intolerance in collaboration with sport associations, fan clubs, and local and national government; (e) to define measures that could be adopted by the sporting societies to guarantee the safety of sporting competitions; and (f) to publish an annual report on the phenomenon of violence and intolerance at sporting competitions. The ONMS also has the power, via legislation passed in September 2007,\textsuperscript{19} to implement the use of the stewards in sports stadiums, as well as the procedures for their training and qualification. The ONMS introduced a threat level classification for each game based on specific indicators: the characteristics and structural requirements of the stadiums, profiles of the fans (based on historical precedence, previous conflicts, and recent behaviours), the type of game, the consequences of the result, and the possible link to other events. The ONMS then make suggestions to the provincial public security authorities, who usually implement them. In such tasks, the ONMS is supported by the Centro Nazionale di Informazione sulle Manifestazioni Sportive (The National Center for Information on Sports Events – CNIMS).

The CNIMS has been operating since 2002, and is similarly located at the Department of Public Security of the Ministry of the Interior. The CNIMS collects, analyses, and processes data on football spectator violence. It is also the national contact point for the exchange of both domestic and international information around the policing of football. The establishment of CNIMS was in response to the Council of Europe’s concerns over security around international football. One strong recommendation was that national governments establish national football intelligence centres. The consequence of such powers and policing personnel was the end of spectating as it had been known for decades. The ONMS established criteria and procedures to regulate banners and other material held by fans whilst in the stadiums. These include materials for creating choreography, for instance, drums, percussion instruments, and other means of disseminating sound. The ONMS regulations permitted only flags bearing the colours of the club teams or those of countries represented on the pitch in international games. Banners that displayed a content which manifested racial discrimination, violent messages, or anything considered to be of an ‘offensive nature’ were banned. Also banned were megaphones, flags that might impair other fans sight of the pitch, and all material not authorized in advance by the police. The presence of five national police forces\textsuperscript{20} on top of local/municipal police forces makes for great difficulty in applying theoretical models to real life situations.

| Serie | 2003/2004 | 2004/2005 | 2005/2006 | 2006/2007 | 2007/2008 (up to 5 November 2007) |
|-------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------------------------------|
| A     | 14,287    | 15,085    | 13,043    | 13,978    | 13,599                           |
| B     | 13,345    | 8856      | 10,648    | 13,245    | 6475                             |
| C     | 6706      | 9266      | 9057      | 8701      | 7507                             |
| Total | 34,338    | 33,207    | 32,748    | 35,924    | 27,581                           |
Nevertheless, it is safe to conclude that the model that best fits the Italian policing situation is Ponsaers’ ‘military–bureaucratic’ model (2001). All policing entities in Italy are organized using a military style hierarchical structure where little is left to discretion and more is left to the ethos, ‘you will do this because I tell you to.’ In this type of organization, much is left to internal inquiries and very little to external accountability. The most important form of external accountability is provided by the Italian magistrates, who intervene when disciplinary procedures are required. Internal inquiries are more valued than external, but in some cases this presents a risk because, as Ponsaers argues, the logic of such engagement manifests the practice of: ‘When faced with a decision, find a rule; when a rule cannot be found, make a rule’ (2001, p. 473).

Witnessing the police forces in action against the UltraS underlines elements of the earlier mentioned ‘military–bureaucratic’ model. The first is legitimacy, which, as Kiser (in Ponsaers, 2001) details, is the authority of a police action justified by the pursuit of an ‘absence of disorder.’ Consequently, physical force (at times excessive) is justified because it guarantees peace in the wider community. The moral panics against the UltraS also justify the use of physical force; being evil means a police ‘beating’ is legitimate or at least unquestioned. At least in the case of the UltraS, the prevention strategy is linked with the logic of the bureaucratic model, which aims at efficiency and control as well as prevention (which, while valued, is used less than repression). Such procedures provoke reactions from those on the receiving end, Marco articulated the feelings of the Boys towards the Italian police:

… when we see them attack our friends, or when they arrest them (and you know that once in custody the police will beat you up) you remember it. If one day some police become isolated from colleagues [during our scuffles] we will hit him and he will pay for everyone. I am angry; do you know that 90% of police officers use their baton reversed to cause more damage? They shoot tear gas at eye level and if you fall when they charge, they kick you. After the derby, there was a group of Laziali and Romanisti – 500 against 200 police – and there were several charges and at every charge, some remained on the ground [unconscious]. In the course of these disturbances, a Guardia di Finanza officer went down; he received seven stab wounds and they broke a flashlight on his body. His police colleagues could not move; they could only watch. One of the big men of the UltraS threw the officer back to his colleagues saying: ‘take him back because he is not good even to set on fire.’ It was a gesture of unheard of brutality but did not tell the full story. If the police ‘take you,’ they ask you why did you hit our colleagues and they kick your face. We reminded them of this on a banner that read ‘pestaggi nelle carceri, pestaggi nelle caserme questa e la prova che tu sei solo un verme’ [Beating in the prisons. Beating in the police cells. This is the proof that you are a scum]. It is not just us…. The same brutality can be seen in the ‘No Global’ case and the Diaz school when there were many beatings. The difference is the ‘No Global’ are more powerful (and supported by the left) and so can publicize their cause better.

Research conducted in May 2007 indicated that the State Police, together with the Carabinieri, occupy the first place in terms of confidence given by Italian citizens. There are good reasons for such admiration. The Italian police forces, together with the judiciary, were crucial in the defeat of domestic terrorism of the 1980s. The Italian police were able to draw on the benefits of greater resources and advanced technologies to face complex crime phenomena that require more than uninformed police intervention. The subsequent investigations led to the capture of the murderers and the suppression of the groups they acted in the name of. The police were also crucial to the successful containment of the Mafia and other criminal organizations, via the
capture of important fugitives such as the Mafia boss Totó Riina in 1993 and Bernardo Provenzano in 2000.

Though they are trusted, the police have recently been involved in a few football-related controversies. In 2007 at the match of Roma vs. Manchester United, the clashes between rival fans also saw police intervention (‘Man United condemn Italian police’, 2009). In commenting on the Italian police action, the British newspaper The Independent argued: ‘football is still a military operation [in Italy] where its policing is about containment of trouble inside the ground through the use, or threat, of violence’ (‘John Foot’, 2007).

To date very few police officers have been successfully prosecuted in an Italian law court for misdemeanours against football fans. Nonetheless, the nucleo mobile or Celere, which has been repeatedly on duty at the stadium, has been often accused of disproportionate use of force. The journalist of La Repubblica Carlo Bonini (2009) describes the lives of three real members of the Celere in his book. He explains the Celere’s world with one effective catchphrase ‘odiati e hanno imparato a odiare’ (hated and they have learned to hate).

The nucleo mobile was successfully prosecuted in 2008 for excess use of force albeit not in relation to their policing duty at a football stadium. During the 2001 G8 meeting in Genoa, disturbances occurred between the Italian police forces and the international No-Global movement. Disorder arose in different areas of the city, supported by a heterogeneous range of international groups ranging from anarchists to extreme left and right groups. The centre of Genoa suffered damage estimated at millions of euros, arising out of disturbances between protestors and police. The event will be remembered for the tragic death of protestor Carlo Giuliani and the actions of the police at the Diaz School. The episode of Carlo Giuliani occurred in Piazza Alimonda when 15 protesters armed with batons surrounded a Land Rover with three Carabinieri aboard. Giuliani died when shot at close range by one of the officers. The Diaz School episode occurred on 21 July at the school given by the local authority as headquarters for the protestors’ cause. The police stormed the school after a group of police officers was attacked at a nearby school. The police suspected that inside were sympathizers of the Black Bloc. At the time of the police raid, 93 people were reportedly sleeping. All were arrested, the majority of them taken away with injuries – some serious. Weapons such as batons and chains were reportedly found on the premises. Many of those arrested accused the police of brutality. The Italian magistrate began an inquiry under the collective action taken by protestors. In 2007, all the Italian newspapers published the following quote: ‘It was like a Mexican butcher shop’ (‘G8, Fournier’, 2007). The comment was made by Dr Michelangelo Fournier, the commander of the settimo nucleo mobile di Roma-Celere (the seventh mobile unit of Rome; one of the Roman riot police units), which participated in the irruption at the Diaz School. He continued answering the questions of public prosecutor Francesco Cardona Albini: ‘During the investigation I did not have the courage to reveal such a serious behaviour (referring to the police) because of my loyalty for the unit’ (‘G8, Fournier’, 2007). In 2008, after seven years the epilogue of the judicial process saw 12 members of the settimo nucleo mobile di Roma-Celere condemned for the Diaz operation (‘Sentenza Diaz, assolti i vertici della polizia Tredici condanne’, 2008).

This study does not aim to support the UltraS rhetoric that ‘frames’ all police as violent. There are situations in which police, especially anti-riot units, need to intervene with firmness for public safety. It is also quite naïve to neglect the fact that episodes of gratuitous police violence occur all over the world. Furthermore, when
such episodes have occurred in Italy, the State has been able to punish the perpetrators according to the law. That said, it is interesting to underline that the same police unit found guilty by the Italian justice system was also the most evident expression of the policing strategy used at the football stadiums in Italy to contain the UltraS violence (Bonini, 2009). During the research, the UltraS never failed to compare their repression with the episode involving the G8, as Marco (Boys) details:

We have almost every Sunday a small ‘Diaz’ episode. In Orvieto 200 UltraS were put in a caserma [police barrack] and beaten up. Against Napoli, the year the SS Roma won the scudetto, the police stopped our train at Torricola and all of us in the train were beaten up. The train was later stopped at Formia and when two police officers entered to inquire about 300 of us – perhaps they believed they were Rambo – they started to shoot their pistols at people. I was at a fountain getting water and the people started to count the bullets. Someone more cunning than them knew how many bullets the guns had and then when they ran out of bullets … [laughs] … [he did not say but implied the police officers were cornered and beaten].

The view of the ‘persecuted’

The UltraS target the police forces, who are tasked with the duty of applying the law against them. The latter have chosen the strategy of tackling the UltraS problem by the use of tough repression. Such a strategy has its own risks as the episode of the death of the Lazio supporter Gabriele Sandri demonstrates. In 2007, Sandri was killed by the gun of a police officer who was intervening to stop a fight between Juventus and Lazio fans at a petrol station along the city of Arezzo motorway (“Tifoso ucciso da un agente dopo una rissa all’autogrill”, 2007). The tragic episode provoked an extraordinary violent reaction manifested by UltraS groups throughout Italy. In Rome, the reaction of the Roma and Lazio UltraS in the streets was extremely violent and 20 police officers were injured in the disturbances. The episodes of UltraS direct attacks on representatives of the Italian State, such as those occurred following Sandri’s death, underscore the power and danger of an ideology like fascism rooted in a location such as the football stadium, which is attended by thousands of youths and is able to contain a mix of myths, values, and beliefs that can be collectively transformed into actions.

In 2008 we received an email from Todde the gatekeeper of the Boys titled The Real Infamy of the Italian State. The email illustrates the rage of the UltraS after finding out that the officer who killed Sandri was, at the time of the email, still part of the transport police of Santa Maria Novella in Tuscany (though he is currently suspended). The email complained about the difference in treatment of the police officer; it argued: ‘He has killed a boy and sees not even one day of prison … And there is someone who stays in prison for months or years without any proof’ (the email refers to the prison experience of the Irriducibili’s leaders). The email reflects the rage of the UltraS after finding out that the officer who killed Sandri was, at the time of the email, still part of the transport police of Santa Maria Novella in Tuscany (he was later suspended and in July 2009 given a six-year custodial sentence for the shooting). Furthermore, the last page of the email articulates possible reactions against to the police officer: ‘Santa Maria Novella (the location where the officer was working) coffin of Spaccarotella (the surname of the police officer); Gabriele with us!’

The email is just another demonstration of the UltraS oppositional logic which may have subversive traits. The only difference with the Italian ‘revolutionary’ youth
groups of the 1970s (from the extreme left and right) is a clear lack of planning. What the UltraS express is at the moment just rage: anger against a State – and football system – that they do not respect and aim to erase them. If the UltraS logic is not understood (and why should it be by non-believers?) unpredictable consequences may result.

**The danger of radicalization of the football terraces**

Among the most controversial norms which aimed to target the UltraS and were enforced by the police are the possibility to forbid the fans’ banners and the, previously mentioned, DASPO. We asked Dr Mazzilli to articulate the first norm, he answered from a strictly procedural point of view without allowing any comments:

The national observatory adopted this directive the 8th of March 2007. This intervention was necessary to protect the security of the spectators, athletes and referees and all the people involved in the management of the sport event. The rule forbids the introduction in all the sports structures of banners or any other related object used for the fans choreography if not authorized before hand by the Questore.

The response of the UltraS was quite clear; they believed that via such a procedure, the spectacle that is il calcio was finished. Actually the whole hardcore football supporter movement, ‘ordinary’ fans and the UltraS alike, have criticized the prohibitions, deeming them alarmist responses that do not respect the rights of the individual and manifest discriminatory policing. Particular criticism was also reserved for the DASPO mainly because they are imposed by the Questore (police) rather than a court of law and, whilst ostensibly subject to judicial review, have to date not been scrutinized by the Constitutional Court. Supporters mainly criticize the extension of Decree-Law Amato 2007 until 2010 as hopelessly open to abuse as it allows arrest up to 48 hours later if the suspect is identified through photographs or video footage. Similarly, the minimum penalty for football-related crimes is considered excessive compared with sentencing tariffs for more serious crimes committed outside the sporting context. In the eyes of the fans, this makes it impossible for the courts to impose fair and just punishment.

The Italian police have inevitably invested resources in gathering intelligence intended to prevent violent episodes at football matches. The primary strategy of the police is still perceived by the UltraS to be in favour of hard physical repression. This tactic is integral to any pro-reactive debate around policing and the technical orientation of law enforcement. Such a tactic may create a massive divide between citizens and the police and may diminish public confidence.

The police would argue that they do not seek either dialogue or the confidence of the UltraS. Such a distance is strongly perceived by the UltraS; the police are considered as a danger to their values and way of life. Such a reality has destroyed any possible dialogue. The perception that they are treated as ‘special threats’ only fosters further tension increasing the UltraS sense of perceived discrimination and possibly promoting their strong reactions. Giorgio (Irriducibili) explains this feeling:

*UltraS does not mean gratuitous violence; we need to be careful when labeling UltraS ‘violent.’ Sometimes we are involved in violence; but then you see that in normal life a person can be stabbed for a quarrel in any city. Violence exists in society and the stadium reflects this. The stadium has been for many years a comfortable box to ghettoize a part*
of Italian youth. At the stadium there is much more repression and demonization of the UltraS. Simple banners such as those in support of Giorgio Chinaglia are no longer allowed.

The perceived criminalization at the hands of the police is not a sentiment shared only by the UltraS. Other groups of the hardcore football supporters’ movement, even those who are not ideologically oriented and those who follow the interpretations of Marxism or anarchism, are similarly angered by policing strategies. The repressive policies of the Italian State have unwittingly united the UltraS and other hardcore supporters (regardless of their ideological connotations) around a cause. In the UltraS discourses, the police are the armed wing of a repressive State. Sara (Boys) explains this thought:

I think [the police] create tension; personally I get nervous when I see police dog units [at the stadium] and officers in riot gear etc. This does not help; the Italian stadiums are becoming fortresses; there are already emotions and rivalries among fans then if this climate of war is added, you can understand why these things [violence] happen. A girl of 20 years old as me when goes to the stadium does not want to feel criminalized; I believe many violent acts will not happen if there were less police. Too many police make me [and the football terraces] nervous; [I would like to have] less repression and militarization in the stadiums. I am a female and I get angry for this militarization [imagine what the guys feel] it happened that they [the police] ordered me to open my purse on the train to check it; I felt as a terrorist.

When we go to see the match of the AS Roma away because of the police searches we always leave late; once we had to go to Messina and the train was scheduled to leave at 1 pm, it left at three because of the police search. They treat you as a terrorist and this logically produces rancor in people; it promotes rancor in me that I am a girl imagine the effects on the Boys and other UltraS …

Opp and Roehl (1990) argue that repression in many social movements tends to promote micro mobilization that creates the incentive and reduces the price of membership. Academia has also taken into consideration the effects of police repression on ideologically motivated protestors, and the UltraS quite clearly fit into this category. Because of what is considered ‘brutal’ police repression, protesters often gain support from people who did not suffer directly from the excesses (De Nardo, 1985, p. 191). Not only are the UltraS interactions with outside society mediated by ideology, but their fighting/resisting for survival in a collective way (at a micro level via their communitas and at a macro level via their movement) is intrinsically political. Todde (Boys) argues that the DASPO are absurd because they deny individuals the freedom of choosing to watch their team. He thinks that the most hated thing about the DASPO is that even if a person is eventually declared innocent, he/she has still been greatly affected by the banning order. Who or what will compensate this loss of personal freedom?

This strategy, although at times necessary, needs to be used cautiously to avoid a further radicalization of the UltraS protest. Forced sanctions (such as the DASPO) are ‘deprivations, the threat of sanctions is equivalent to the concept of anticipated deprivation, the innate emotional response to both is anger’ (Gurr, in Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 522). The football stadium has always been an exceptional location in Italian society. It is now akin to a state of emergency wherein those who enter are filtered. The citizens who enter now have to reveal all personal data as demanded. Entry has prerequisites. Those not wanted cannot come near the event due to the requirement of signing-on at police stations at the same time. Unprecedented measures and
unprecedented circumstances have acquired the status of legitimate repression and come with ever-expanding exceptionalist logic. The risk of failure cannot be considered. The police and ultimately the Italian State would risk accusations of incompetency if they failed to control this footballing and ultimately political carnival.

Conclusion
Offering a road map to live by and narratives to act within, the UltraS ideology and culture define the boundaries of the possible. While the Italian neo-fascists try to promote their ideology within society, the UltraS consider themselves bearers and promoters of this ideological ‘way of life’ within the Italian football stadiums. The football stadium, therefore, remains dangerously the most important Italian mediatic piazza, as a result, one of the most efficient Agorà of the twenty-first-century Italian youth socialization. When asked how efficient the police are, considering the strategy of tackling the UltraS, Dr Mazzilli, limiting his answer to a mere articulation of data as to reinforce the idea of a winning Italian State, replied:

In the current championship (2008–2009) there is a reduction of 72% matches with injured, 81% of injured among the police forces, 83% of injured among civilians, 39% of arrested and 40% of reported by the police. So it is possible to say that the data are comforting and clearly show the decrease of all indices relating to violence linked to football spectatorship if we consider the last five years.

The data of the Ministry of the Interior are undoubtedly a credit to the work done by the Italian police, but do they imply a reduction in the radicalization of the football terraces and suggest that the policing strategy is working? The appearance of the UltraS Italia and episodes such as those mentioned earlier suggest a move in the opposite direction. La Repubblica newspaper does not agree with the figures of Dr Mazzilli; according to this newspaper there are now 63 UltraS groups, accounting for 75% of all Italian hardcore football supporter groups (‘Quei filo-nazi partiti dal Nordest nero da cinque anni assediano la Nazionale’, 2008). Regardless of whose figures are correct, a reader should find from both sources that the UltraS are not a small collective and, from the various episodes chronicled in this study, are capable of resisting if their existence is challenged. Caution should be taken in choosing the ‘right’ strategy to tackle this problem; the terrorism of Italy in the 1970s provides lessons about the power of youth protest and its inclination to become dangerously subversive.

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Notes
1. The Divisione Investigazioni Generali e Operazioni Speciali (Digos, Investigations and Special Operations Division) was established in 1978 via decree of the Minister of the Interior in the context of the reform of the Italian Secret Services. The aim of this police unit is to investigate and repress:
   – national and international terrorist organizations
   – subversive associations which promote social divisions inciting violence for racial, ethnic, or religious motives
   – associations which pursue the objective of the destruction of the independence and of the unity of the Italian State or the change of the constitutional order by illegal means
   – military or paramilitary associations
   – links among national and international terrorist organizations with the flows of clandestine immigration and international weapons traffic
   – secret and sectarian associations
   – informatics terrorism
   – phenomena of ‘group violence’ promoted by ideologies
   – episodes of violence at sports events accomplished by organized factions.
2. Cf., Il Sole24.com, Diritto e società. http://professionisti24.ilsole24ore.com/art/AreaProfessionisti/Diritto/DIR_VIOLENZA%20STADI.shtml?uuid=822462e6-b75d-11db-ae4e-00000e251029&type=Libero; readers are also directed to Mariottini (2004).
3. Source: The National Center for Information on Sports Events (CNIMS) of the Department of Public Security of the Italian Minister of the Interior. http://osservatoriosport.interno.com/dati.html
4. Report on crime in Italy in 2006, presented by the Ministry of the Interior on 30 June 2006, pp. 399–400. http://interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/14/0900_rapporto_criminalita.pdf
5. The original law was composed of 9 articles and 21 sub-articles. Via continuous modifications the law is now composed of 16 articles and 41 sub-articles. This makes it very difficult to make sense of the modifications. These modifications are:
   (a) Law No. 24, 537, art. 35, 1993 (G.U. 303, 28 December 1993)
   (b) Decree-Law No. 557, art. 11, comma 4, 1993; the decree was converted into Law No. 133, 1994 (G.U. 305, 28 February 1994, n. 48)
   (c) Decree-Law No. 717, 1994; it was converted into Law No. 45, 1995 (G.U., 25 February 1995, n. 47)
   (d) Law No. 388, art. 37, comma 5, 2000 (G.U., 29 December 2000, n. 302)
   (e) Decree-Law No. 336, 2001; it was converted into Law No. 377, 2001 (G.U., 20 October 2001, n. 245)
   (f) Decree-Law No. 28, 2003; it was converted into Law No. 88, 2003 (G.U., 24 April 2003, n. 95)
   (g) Decree-Law No. 162, 2005; it was converted into Law No. 210, 2005 (G.U., 17 October 2005, n. 242)
   (h) Decree-Law No. 8, 2007; it was converted into Law No. 41, 2007 (G.U., 5 April 2007, n. 80).
6. Decree-Law No. 122, art. 2, comma 2, 1993; it was converted with modifications into Law No. 205, 1993.
7. According to the interpretation of the law, sporting events were defined as any competition taking place promoted by sports federations and the institutions and organizations recognized by the Italian National Olympic Committee (CONI). The measure may also be applied for misbehaviour around sporting events taking place abroad in other EU member states.
8. Decree-Law No. 336, 2001; it was converted – with modifications – into law in 2001. Cf., Gazzetta Ufficiale No. 245, 20 October 2001.
9. In 2009, we questioned Dr Domenico Mazzilli, a high-ranking officer of the Italian police and at the time President of the National Observatory on Sport Events of the Italian Ministry of the Interior.

10. Decree-Law No. 28, 2003; it was converted into Law No. 24, April 2003.

11. Cf., Polizia Moderna, *Allo stadio con gli steward* (September 2007). Roma: Ministry of the Interior Press.

12. Eurispes (called ‘Ispes’ between 1982 and 1993) is a non-profit institute which aims to study and research political, economic, and social issues. The institute publishes an annual report which gives a snapshot of the condition of Italian politics, economy, and society.

13. http://claudiocaprara.it/?id_blogdoc=1388209

14. http://claudiocaprara.it/?id_blogdoc=1388209

15. The term ‘supposed’ is used because the four *Irriducibili* have not been yet considered guilty and condemned by an Italian court.

16. Cf., Art. 1 (Powers of Public Security Authority); T.U. of laws of Public Security and Art. 24 (Institutional Functions of the State Police), Law No. 121, 1 April 1981.

17. Details derived from an interview with Dr Francesco Tagliente former President of the National Observatory for Sports Events, the Ministry of the Interior – cf., F. Tagliente (2004), *Rapporto 2004 del Osservatorio sulle Manifestazioni Sportive*. Roma: Laurus Robuffo.

18. Decree-Law No. 162, 2005, ‘Further Measures to Counter the Phenomenon of Violence at Sporting Competitions’; it was converted into Law No. 210, 2005.

19. Decree-Law No. 8, 2007 ‘Urgent Measures for the Prevention and Suppression of Phenomena of Violence related to Football Competitions’; it was converted into Law No. 41, 2007 (G.U., 2007, n. 80).

20. The central command for policing functions lies with the office of *Presidente del Consiglio* (i.e., the Prime Minister) who delegates to the Minister of the Interior in which the *Dipartimento della Pubblica Sicurezza* (Department of Public Security) is located. The *Caso della Polizia* (Chief of Police) is the head of the State Police (a role created during the fascist era). The Chief of Police is also the *Direttore Generale della Pubblica Sicurezza* (Director General of Public Security) and coordinates the five police forces: the *Polizia di Stato* (State Police, answerable to the Minister of the Interior); the *Arma dei Carabinieri* (the Carabinieri – an army corp with police functions – answerable to the Minister of Defence); the *Guardia di Finanza* a force specialized in public order prevention and and financial and tax crimes (answerable to the Minister of the Economy); the *Polizia Penitenziaria* (the Prison Police who function in the Italian prison system and answerable to the Minister of Justice). Finally comes the *Corpo Forestale dello Stato* (the parks police answerable to the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, who specialize in the management and preservation of national environments and heritage parks).

21. The research was carried out by the *Istituto Piepoli* SpA and titled ‘Confidence in the State Police.’ http://poliziadistato.it/pds/primapagina/sondaggio_piepoli/la_fiducia_nella_polizia_di_stato.pdf

22. The latest supposed example occurred in the UK, in 2009, at the G20 protests in London (‘Metropolitan police officer suspended over attack at G20 death vigil’, 2009).

23. Cf., Reuters: http://it.reuters.com/article/topNews/idITMIE56D0TD20090714

24. Cf., http://progettoultra.it/cms/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=502&Itemid=172

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