Complexity of Terminating Preference Elicitation

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ABSTRACT

Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the complexity of determining when we can terminate eliciting preferences, and prove that the complexity depends on the elicitation strategy. We show, for instance, that it may be better from a computational perspective to elicit all preferences from one agent at a time than to elicit individual preferences from multiple agents. We also study the connection between the strategic manipulation of an election and preference elicitation. We show that what we can manipulate affects the computational complexity of manipulation. In particular, we prove that there are voting rules which are easy to manipulate if we can change all of an agent’s vote, but computationally intractable if we can change only some of their preferences. This suggests that, as with preference elicitation, a fine-grained view of manipulation may be informative. Finally, we study the connection between predicting the winner of an election and preference elicitation. Based on this connection, we identify a voting rule where it is computationally difficult to decide the probability of a candidate winning given a probability distribution over the votes.

Categories and Subject Descriptors

I.2.11 [Computing methodologies]: Artificial Intelligence—Distributed Artificial Intelligence; F.2 [Theory of Computation]: Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity

General Terms

Algorithms, Theory

Keywords

Preferences, elicitation, complexity

1. INTRODUCTION

In multi-agent systems, a simple mechanism for aggregating agents’ preferences is to apply a voting rule. Each agent expresses a preference ordering over a set of candidates, and an election is held to compute the winner. The candidates can be political representatives, or items of more direct concern to multi-agent systems like schedules, resource allocations or joint plans. A number of interesting questions can be asked about such elections. For example, what is a “fair” way to run such an election? Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem answers this question negatively. Under some general assumptions, every voting rule is “unfair” when we have more than two candidates. As a second example, how do we encourage agents to vote truthfully? One mechanism to encourage truthful voting is to make it computationally “difficult” to manipulate the result [2, 1]. In this paper, we consider a number of computational questions surrounding the elicitation of agents’ preferences as well as the strategic manipulation of elections used to aggregate such preferences.

We first consider preference elicitation. In particular, we consider how to decide when to stop eliciting preferences as the winner is guaranteed. Since preference elicitation is time consuming and costly, and agents may have privacy concerns about revealing their preferences, we may want to stop eliciting preferences as soon as the result is fixed. We show that how we elicit preferences impacts on the computational complexity of deciding when to stop elicitation. For instance, we prove that it can be computationally easy to decide when to terminate eliciting preferences if we elicit whole votes from agents, but computationally intractable when we elicit individual preferences. Complexity considerations can thus motivate the choice of an elicitation strategy.

We then consider how to manipulate the result of such an election. Computational complexity may then be desirable as it can provide a barrier to strategic manipulation [1, 2]. We argue that there is a tension between making manipulation computationally intractable and making it computationally easy to decide when to terminate eliciting preferences. In addition, we prove that there are voting rules which are easy to manipulate if we can change all of an agent’s vote, but computationally intractable if we can change only some of their preferences. Most existing results about the complexity of manipulation have assumed all of one or more agents votes can be manipulated. This result suggests that a more fine-grained view of manipulation may be useful. Finally, we consider the connection between preference elicitation and predicting the probability of a candidate winning. This permits us to identify voting rules where computing the probability of a candidate winning is computationally intractable.
2. BACKGROUND

We assume there are \( n \) agents voting over \( m \) possible candidates. A profile is a set of \( n \) total orders over the \( m \) candidates. Each total order is one agent’s vote. A voting rule is a function mapping a profile onto one candidate, the winner. We assume that any rule takes polynomial time to apply. We let \( N(i, j) \) be the number of agents preferring \( i \) to \( j \). In the case that the result of the voting rule is a tie between two or more of the candidates, we assume that the chair chooses the winner from the tied candidates in a way that is unfavourable. For instance, when we are considering if a coalition of agents can strategically manipulate the election to ensure a particular candidate wins, we assume that the chair picks this candidate if there is a tie. However, most of our results go through with other tie-breaking rules. In addition, to reduce the impact of ties, we assume an odd number of agents. We consider the following voting rules.

**Scoring rules**: \((w_1, \ldots, w_m)\) is a vector of weights, the \( i \)th candidate in a total order scores \( w_i \), and the winner is the candidate with highest total score. The *plurality* rule has the weight vector \((1, 0, \ldots, 0)\), the *veto* rule has the vector \((1, 1, \ldots, 1, 0)\), whilst the *Borda* rule has the vector \((m - 1, m - 2, \ldots, 0)\).

**Cup (aka knockout)**: The winner is the result of a series of pairwise majority elections between candidates. The cup is defined by an agenda which is a binary tree with one candidate labelling each leaf. Each non-leaf is assigned to the winner of the majority election between the candidates labelling the children. The candidate labelling the root is the overall winner. The cup is *balanced* if the difference in the depth of any two leaves is 0 or 1. For instance, a cup in which the agenda is a complete binary tree is balanced.

**Copeland**: The candidate with the highest Copeland score wins. The Copeland score of candidate \( i \) is given by:
\[
\sum_{j \neq i}(N(i, j) > \frac{1}{2}) - (N(i, j) < \frac{1}{2}).
\]

The Copeland winner is the candidate that wins the most pairwise elections. The 2nd order Copeland rule tie-breaks by selecting the candidate whose defeated competitors have the largest sum of Copeland scores.

**Plurality with runoff**: If one candidate has a majority, they win. Otherwise all but the two candidates with the most votes are eliminated and the winner is chosen using the majority rule.

**STV**: This rule requires up to \( m - 1 \) rounds. In each round, the candidate with the least number of agents ranking them first is eliminated until one of the remaining candidates has a majority.

As in \([7]\), we will consider both weighted and unweighted votes. A vote of integer weight \( k \) can be viewed as \( k \) agents who vote identically. Although human elections are often unweighted, the addition of weights makes voting schemes more general. Weighted voting systems are also used in a number of real-world settings like shareholder meetings, and elected assemblies. Weights are also useful in multi-agent systems where we have different types of agents.

Weights are interesting from a computational perspective for several reasons. First, weights can increase computational complexity. For example, manipulating the Borda rule is polynomial with unweighted votes \([15]\) but NP-hard with weighted votes \([16]\). Second, as we argue in detail later, the weighted case informs us about the unweighted case when we have probabilistic information about the votes. For instance, if it is NP-hard to compute if the election can be manipulated with weighted votes, then it is NP-hard to compute the probability of a candidate winning when there is uncertainty about how the unweighted votes have been cast \([7]\). Again, to reduce the impact of ties, we assume that the sum of weights is odd.

3. ELICITATION

We suppose that not all agents’ preferences are known and that we are eliciting preferences so as to be able to declare the winner. We assume we have either an *incomplete profile* in which one or more of the total orders is only partially specified (that is, some pairs of candidates are ordered but others are left unspecified), or a *partial vote* in which some agents have specified completely their preferences (that is, their total order over candidates) but other agents’ preferences are completely unknown. A partial vote is more a coarse form of uncertainty about the agents’ preferences than an incomplete profile.

Eliciting preferences takes time and effort. In addition, agents may be reluctant to reveal all their preferences due to privacy and other concerns. We therefore often want to stop elicitation as soon as one candidate has enough support that they must win regardless of any missing preferences. We therefore consider the computational complexity of deciding when we can stop eliciting preferences. We introduce two decision problems. If we elicit complete votes from each agent (e.g. we ask one agent “How do you rank all the candidates?”), **Coarse Elicitation Over** is true iff the winner is determined irrespective of how the remaining agents vote. On the other hand, if we elicit just individual preferences (e.g. we ask all agents “Do you prefer Bush to Gore?”), **Fine Elicitation Over** is true iff the winner is determined irrespective of how the undeclared preferences are revealed. Note that in both cases, the missing preferences are assumed to be transitive.

**Definition 1 (Coarse Elicitation Over).**

Input: a partially completed profile.
Output: true iff only one candidate can win irrespective of how the remaining agents vote.

**Definition 2 (Fine Elicitation Over).**

Input: an incomplete profile.
Output: true iff only one candidate can win irrespective of how the incomplete profile is completed.

Note that it does not change the results in this paper if we define **Fine Elicitation Over** so that we ask all agents simultaneously about a particular pair of candidates. However, we choose a more general definition of fine elicitation in which we can ask any agent about the ranking of any pair of candidates.

**Coarse Elicitation Over** and **Fine Elicitation Over** are in coNP as a polynomial witness for elicitation not being over are two completions of the profile in which different candidates win. Since **Coarse Elicitation Over** is a special case of **Fine Elicitation Over**, it is easy to see
that if Fine Elicitation Over is polynomial then Coarse Elicitation Over is too. Similarly, if Coarse Elicitation Over is coNP-complete then Fine Elicitation Over is too. However, as we show later, these implications do not necessarily reverse. For example, there are voting rules where Coarse Elicitation Over is polynomial but Fine Elicitation Over is coNP-complete.

Our analysis considers two different dimensions that govern the complexity of terminating elicitation: weighted or unweighted votes, and a bounded or unbounded number of candidates.

### 3.1 Unweighted votes

If the number of candidates is bounded, there are only a polynomial number of effectively different votes. We can thus enumerate and evaluate all different votes in polynomial time. Hence computing Coarse Elicitation Over and Fine Elicitation Over are both polynomial. A similar argument was made to show that manipulation of an election by a coalition of agents is polynomial when the number of candidates is bounded [7, 6].

Suppose now that the number of candidates is not necessarily bounded. Conitzer and Sandholm prove that Coarse Elicitation Over and Fine Elicitation Over are coNP-complete for STV when votes are unweighted and the number of candidates is unbounded [8]. On the other hand, Coarse Elicitation Over and Fine Elicitation Over are polynomial for the plurality, Borda, veto and Copeland rules with any number of candidates [5].

### 3.2 Weighted votes

With weighted votes, deciding if elicitation is over can be intractable even when the number of candidates is small. For example, Conitzer and Sandholm prove that Coarse Elicitation Over and Fine Elicitation Over are coNP-complete for STV when votes are weighted and there are just 4 (or more) candidates [5]. However, Coarse Elicitation Over and Fine Elicitation Over are polynomial for the plurality, Borda, veto and Copeland with weighted votes and any number of candidates [5].

We now give our first main result. There are voting rules where Coarse Elicitation Over is polynomial but Fine Elicitation Over is intractable. In a companion paper, we consider how to compute the possible winners of the cup rule when elicitation is not finished.

**Theorem 1.** For the cup rule on weighted votes, Fine Elicitation Over is coNP-complete when there are 4 or more candidates, whilst Coarse Elicitation Over is polynomial irrespective of the number of candidates.

**Proof.** Theorem 69 in [4] shows that manipulation of the cup rule by a coalition of agents with weighted votes is polynomial. It follows immediately that Coarse Elicitation Over is polynomial. To show that Fine Elicitation Over is NP-hard with 4 candidates, consider the cup in which A plays B, the winner then plays C, and the winner of this match goes forward to a final match against D [4].

Note that this particular cup tournament is not balanced. The proof can be adapted to use a balanced binary tree by introducing an additional candidate E that first plays against D, and placing E at the bottom of each vote. Whilst this will show that deciding if preference elicitation can be terminated is coNP-complete for balanced cups with 5 candidates, we will reduce number partitioning to deciding if elicitation is over for this cup rule given a particular incomplete profile.

Suppose we have a bag of integers, \( k_i \) with sum \( 2k \) and we wish to decide if they can be partitioned into two bags, each with sum \( k \). We construct an incomplete profile in which the following weighted votes are completely fixed: 1 vote for \( C > D > B > A \) of weight 1, 1 vote \( C > D > A > B \) of weight \( 2k - 1 \), and 1 vote \( D > B > C > A \) of weight \( 2k - 1 \). For the first number, \( k_1 \) in the bag of integers, we have a fixed vote for \( D > B > A > C \) of weight \( 2k_1 \). For each other number, \( k_i \), where \( i > 1 \), we have an incomplete vote of weight \( 2k_i \) in which \( A > C \) is fixed but the rest of the vote is unspecified. We are sure A beats C in the final result by 1 vote whatever happens. Similarly, we are also sure that D beats A, and D beats B. Thus, the only winners of the cup rule are D or C. If in all the incomplete votes we have \( D > C \), then \( D \) will win overall. We now show that C can win iff there is a partition of equal weight. Suppose there is such a partition and that the incomplete votes corresponding to one partition have \( B > A > C \) whilst the incomplete votes corresponding to the other partition have \( A > B > C \). Thus, B beats A overall, and C beats B. We suppose also that enough of the incomplete votes have \( C > D \) for C to beat D. Hence C is the winner of the cup rule and D does not win. On the other hand, suppose C wins. This can only happen if B beats A, C then beats B and C finally beats D. If A beats B in the first round, A will beat C in the second round and then go out to D. For C to beat B, at least half the weight of incomplete votes must rank C above D. Similarly, for B to beat A, at least half the weight of incomplete votes must rank B above A. Since all votes rank \( A > C > B \), B cannot be both above A and below C. Thus precisely half the weight of incomplete votes ranks B above A and half ranks C above B. Hence, we have a partition of equal weight. Therefore, both C and D can win iff there is a partition of equal weight. That is, elicitation is not over iff there is a partition of equal weight.

We may therefore prefer to elicit whole votes as opposed to individual preferences from agents since we can then easily decide when to terminate elicitation. Computational complexity can thus motivate the choice of an elicitation strategy. We suggest that such complexity analysis may be useful to study other aspects of elicitation (e.g. how to ask only those preferences that can decide the winner, or how to decide the winner with as few questions as possible). We note that for the cup rule with just 3 or fewer candidates, it is polynomial to decide if elicitation is over.

**Theorem 2.** For the cup rule on weighted votes, Coarse Elicitation Over and Fine Elicitation Over are both polynomial with 3 or fewer candidates.

**Proof.** For 2 candidates, the cup rule degenerates to the majority rule, and Fine Elicitation Over degenerates to Coarse Elicitation Over. In this case, elicitation can be terminated iff a majority in weight of votes prefer one candidate.

For 3 candidates, without loss of generality, we consider the cup in which A plays B, the winner then plays C. Suppose we have an incomplete profile over these three candidates. For A to win, they must beat B and C in pairwise

\( \text{Kolmogorov Complexity} \)
4. CONDORCET WINNER

The Condorcet winner is the candidate who beats all others in pairwise elections. Unfortunately, not all elections have a Condorcet winner. However, many authorities from the Marquis de Condorcet onwards have argued that, if the Condorcet winner exists, they should be elected. Several voting rules including the Copeland rule elect the Condorcet winner if they exist. Such rules are called Condorcet consistent.

We consider here the complexity of deciding if we have elicited enough preferences to identify the Condorcet winner. There are three possible situations: the Condorcet winner is guaranteed whatever the remaining preferences, there cannot now be a Condorcet winner, or it still depends on the un-elicited preferences whether there is a Condorcet winner or not. We therefore define the following function problem.

Definition 3 (CONDORCET WINNER FIXED).

Input: an incomplete profile.
Output: "true" if one candidate is the Condorcet winner win irrespective of how the profile is completed, "false" if there cannot now be Condorcet winner and "not determined" otherwise.

A nice property is that Condorcet Winner Fixed can be decided in polynomial time.

Theorem 3. Condorcet Winner Fixed is polynomial to compute for weighted votes and any number of candidates.

Proof. For each candidate, we check if agents with at least half the weight in votes have specified a preference for this candidate over any other candidate. If there exists such a candidate, then they must be the Condorcet winner. Otherwise, for each candidate, we check if agents with at least half the weight in votes have specified a preference for some other candidate. If this is the case for every candidate, then there cannot be a Condorcet winner. If neither of the above tests holds, then it is not yet determined if there is or is not a Condorcet winner.

Hence, if we are only interested in the Condorcet winner, we can easily determine if we can terminate eliciting preferences. It does not matter (as it did with the cup rule) if we elicit whole votes or individual preferences.

5. SINGLE PEAKED PREFERENCES

Agent’s preferences may have a limited form. One common restriction is to single peaked votes. In this situation, candidates can be placed in a left to right order and each agent’s preference decreases with distance from their peak. For example, an agent’s preference over the price of an object tends to depend on the distance from their optimal price. Knowing that unspecified preferences are single peaked may make elicitation easier. We consider here the computational complexity of deciding when to terminate preference elicitation when preferences are guaranteed to be single peaked. We introduce the following decision problem.

Definition 4 (FINE ELICITATION OVER).

Input: an incomplete profile which can be completed to give a single peaked profile with respect to a given total ordering on candidates.
Output: true iff only one candidate can win irrespective of how the profile is completed, provided that the completion is single peaked with respect to the given ordering.

An interesting open question is to consider what happens when profiles are guaranteed to be single peaked, but we are not told the ordering along which preferences are single peaked. Adding the assumption that preferences are single peaked may change the complexity of deciding when preference elicitation can be terminated. For instance, it is now polynomial to decide if we can terminate elicitation with the cup rule.

Theorem 4. For the cup rule with weighted votes, Fine Elicitation Over is polynomial.

Proof. If preferences are single peaked, there is always a Condorcet winner (the median candidate who beats all others in pairwise comparisons). The cup rule will elect this candidate. By Theorem 3, it is polynomial to decide if the Condorcet winner is fixed.

On the other hand, there are voting rules where it remains computationally difficult to decide if preference elicitation can be terminated when votes are assumed to be single peaked.

Theorem 5. For the STV rule with 3 or more candidates and weighted votes, Fine SP Elicitation Over is coNP-complete.

Proof. We use a reduction from number partitioning similar to that used to prove that STV is hard to manipulate strategically with weighted votes. The partial vote used in this reduction was not single peaked. However, it can be modified to be single peaked with a small change. Suppose we have a bag of $n$ numbers, $\{k_i\}$ where $\sum_{i=1}^{n} k_i = 2k$. The 3 candidates are $A$, $B$ and $C$. We suppose agents’ preferences are single peaked when candidates are ordered alphabetically. We construct an incomplete profile as follows. One agent with weight $6k - 1$ votes $B > C > A$, a second agent with weight $4k$ votes $A > B > C$, and a third agent also with weight $4k$ votes $C > B > A$. There are $n$ other agents, each with a weight $2k$, and unspecified preferences. Suppose there is a perfect partition. Then, we can have $2k$ weight of votes putting $A$ at the peak, and the other $2k$ weight of votes putting $C$ at the peak. In this case, the STV rule
eliminates $B$ in the first round (as $B$ has just $6k - 1$ weight of votes, and the other two candidates have $6k$), and then elects $C$. Hence, there is a completion in which $C$ is a winner if there is a perfect partition. Suppose there is not a perfect partition. Then either $A$, $B$ or $C$ will receive less than $2k$ weight of votes from the final $n$ agents. In the first case, $A$ is eliminated by the first round of STV and $B$ goes on to win. In the second case, either $A$ or $C$ is eliminated by the first round. If $A$ is eliminated, $B$ then wins. If $C$ is eliminated, $B$ also wins. Finally, in the third case, $C$ is eliminated and $B$ wins. Hence $B$ or $C$ can be the winner iff there is a perfect partition. Thus, voting is not yet over iff there is a perfect partition.

Note that plurality with runoff for 3 candidates is equivalent to STV. It follows therefore that Fine SP Elicitation Over is NP-hard for plurality with runoff. With other rules like plurality, Borda and veto, Fine SP Elicitation Over is polynomial for weighted votes with any number of candidates.

6. STRATEGIC MANIPULATION

A closely related problem to deciding if elicitation can be terminated is the problem that agents may try to vote strategically. That is, agents may try to manipulate the result by ranking the candidates in some order different to their true preferences. This is undesirable for several reasons including, for instance, that a socially less preferred candidate may win. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem demonstrates that any “non-dictatorial” voting rule is vulnerable to such manipulation when there are three or more candidates \cite{Gibbard1973}. A voting rule is dictatorial if one of the agents dictates the result no matter how the others vote. Unfortunately, the manipulability of voting rules is especially problematic for multi-agent systems. Such systems may have significant computational power with which to look for manipulations. In addition, agents may follow fixed voting strategies, making them more prone to manipulation.

We define Coalition Manipulation as the problem of deciding if a coalition of agents can ensure a particular candidate wins.

**Definition 5 (Coalition Manipulation).**

**Input:** a candidate, a profile and a subset of agents

**Output:** true iff the subset of agents can change their votes to ensure the candidate wins.

The complexity of manipulation by a coalition of agents is closely related to the complexity of deciding if preference elicitation can be terminated. In particular, if a voting rule is polynomial to manipulate by a coalition then it is also polynomial to decide when to terminate eliciting whole votes. Dually, if it is NP-hard to decide when to terminate eliciting whole votes then it is also NP-hard for a coalition to manipulate the result. Unfortunately, this may create a tension since we want it to be computationally hard to manipulate an election but computationally easy to decide when to terminate elicitation. The next example illustrates this tension.

Consider manipulating an election when the voting rule elects the Condorcet winner. We define Coalition Manipulation of the Condorcet winner as the problem of deciding if a coalition of agents can ensure that a particular candidate is the Condorcet winner.

**Theorem 6. Coalition Manipulation of the Condorcet winner is polynomial with weighted votes and any number of candidates.**

**Proof.** The coalition of agents simply places the chosen candidate first in their total orders. \[\square\]

Hence, whilst it may be easy to decide when to terminate eliciting preferences when electing the Condorcet winner, this result suggests that Condorcet consistent voting rules may be vulnerable to manipulation. The only feature of Condorcet consistent rules that might make manipulation computationally difficult is how they decide the winner when there is no Condorcet winner. For example, the 2nd order Copeland rule which is Condorcet consistent is NP-hard to manipulate by a coalition of agents \cite{Boutilier2002}. This illustrates the tension between choosing a voting rule with which it is computationally easy to decide when to terminate preference elicitation, but with which it is computationally hard to manipulate the election.

7. ELECTION PRE-ROUND

An interesting approach to make manipulation computationally difficult is to add a pre-round to an election \cite{Brandt2014}. For instance, we might perform one round of the cup rule, before executing the plurality rule on the surviving candidates. Such a pre-round turns plurality which is computationally easy to manipulate by a coalition into a hybrid rule that is NP-hard to manipulate assuming an unbounded number of candidates \cite{Boutilier2002}. Whilst this hybridization of the plurality rule makes manipulation computationally difficult, it does not appear to make it difficult to elicit preferences.

**Theorem 7. Coarse Elicitation Over for the hybrid rule which applies one round of the cup and then plurality to the survivors is polynomial, even with weighted votes and an unbounded number of candidates.**

**Proof.** A candidate can win their pre-round if their opponent has less than half the weight of possible votes. For each candidate $A$ that can win their pre-round, we test if any other candidate $B$ that can win their pre-round is able to defeat them. $B$ will be able to defeat $A$ overall if the total weight of votes cast for $A$ is less than the total weight of votes cast for $B$ plus the total weight of uncast votes. If there is only one candidate that can win their pre-round who cannot be defeated then the result is determined and we can terminate eliciting votes. Otherwise, elicitation of votes needs to continue. \[\square\]

This illustrates that the tension between manipulation and the termination of eliciting preferences is not inevitable. We started with the plurality rule. It is polynomial to decide when to terminate preference elicitation when using the plurality rule (which is good), but it is also polynomial for a coalition of agents to manipulate the result (which is bad). Adding a pre-round to the plurality rule makes manipulation computationally intractable (which is good). However, deciding if elicitation can be terminated remains polynomial (which is good).
8. PREFERENCE MANIPULATION

Up till now, manipulation has been by a coalition of agents. We can consider a more limited form of manipulation. Suppose we cannot manipulate all the votes of a coalition of agents, but we can manipulate only certain preferences of certain agents. For example, we might run a TV campaign to persuade agents to rank one candidate first in their vote, but we might be able to bribe them to swap the order of two more lowly ranked candidates. We therefore define Preference Manipulation as the problem of deciding if we can change some given preferences to ensure a particular candidate wins.

Definition 6 (Preference Manipulation).

Input: a candidate, a profile and certain preference orderings within the profile.

Output: true if these preference orderings can be manipulated to give a profile in which the candidate wins.

Note that some preferences are fixed (“agent 3 prefers B to C and this cannot be manipulated”), that other preferences can be changed (“the ranking between A and B for agent 3 is manipulable”), but that we can only change preferences to give a total order. This last condition is needed as many voting rules are only defined over total orders. However, when the voting rule works with a more general preference relation, we may be able to relax this condition. Surprisingly, this more subtle form of manipulation can be computationally harder than manipulation by a coalition of agents. Coalition Manipulation is a subproblem of Preference Manipulation. It follows immediately that if manipulation by a coalition is NP-hard, then so is manipulation of individual preferences, and that if manipulation of individual preferences is polynomial then manipulation by a coalition is also. However, as the following example illustrates, these implications do not necessarily reverse (unless \( P = NP \)).

With the cup rule, we only need 3 candidates for it to be NP-hard for a coalition of agents to be able to manipulate the result if they can only change individual preferences.

Theorem 8. For the cup rule on weighted votes, Coalition Manipulation is polynomial irrespective of the number of candidates, but Preference Manipulation with 3 or more candidates is NP-complete.

Proof. Theorem 7 in [1] proves that Coalition Manipulation for the cup rule on weighted votes is polynomial. To prove Preference Manipulation is NP-hard for 3 or more candidates, we give a reduction from the number partitioning problem. We consider the cup in which A plays B, and the winner then plays C. We have a bag of integers, \( k_i \), with sum 2\( k \) and we wish to decide if they can be partitioned into two bags, each with sum \( k \). We will show that we can set up an election where we can manipulate a given set of preferences so that C wins if and only if a partition exists.

We suppose the following votes for the three candidates are not manipulable: 1 vote for \( C > B > A \) of weight 1, 1 vote \( C > A > B \) of weight 2\( k - 1 \), and 1 vote \( B > C > A \) of weight 2\( k - 1 \). At this point, the weight of votes such that \( C \) is ahead of \( A \) is 4\( k - 1 \), the weight of votes such that \( C \) is ahead of \( B \) is 1, and the weight of votes such that \( B \) is ahead of \( A \) is 1. For each \( k_i \), we also have a manipulable vote of weight 2\( k_i \), in which \( A > C \) is fixed and cannot be changed, but the rest of the vote can be manipulated. That is, the ordering between \( A \) and \( B \) and between \( B \) and \( C \) is manipulable. As the total weight of these manipulable votes is 4\( k \), we are sure \( A \) beats \( C \) in the final result by 1 vote whatever manipulation takes place. We now show that the manipulable vote can be changed to make the final result that \( B \) beats \( A \) and then \( C \) beats \( B \) if there is a partition of size \( k \).

Suppose there is such a partition. Then let the manipulated votes in one bag of such a partition be \( A > C > B \) and the manipulated votes in the other be \( B > A > C \). Then, \( B \) beats \( A \) and \( C \) beats \( B \) (and thus \( C \) wins). On the other hand, suppose there is a way to manipulate the preferences so that \( C \) wins. This can only happen if \( B \) beats \( A \) and then \( C \) beats \( B \). If \( A \) beats \( B \) in the first round, \( A \) will beat \( C \) in the final round and win. For \( C \) to beat \( B \), at least half the weight of manipulable votes must rank \( C \) above \( B \). Similarly, for \( B \) to beat \( A \), at least half the weight of manipulable votes must rank \( B \) above \( A \). Since all votes rank \( A \) above \( C \), \( B \) cannot be both above \( A \) and below \( C \). Thus precisely half the weight of manipulated votes ranks \( B \) above \( A \) and half ranks \( C \) above \( B \). Hence, we have a partition of equal weight. To conclude, we can manipulate the preferences so that \( C \) can win iff there is a partition of size \( k \). Note that the particular cup used in the reduction was balanced. It therefore follows that Preference Manipulation remains NP-complete even if we are limited to balanced cups.

Thus, the cup rule is easy to manipulate when we can change the whole vote of a coalition of agents. If we can change only some of their preferences, manipulation is NP-hard. The computational complexity of manipulating preferences is closely related to that of deciding if preference elicitation can be terminated. In particular, it is easy to show that Fine Elicitation Over is coNP-complete implies Preference Manipulation is NP-complete. However, this implication does not reverse. For example, by Theorem 8, Preference Manipulation is NP-complete for the cup rule on weighted votes with 3 candidates but by Theorem 2, Fine Elicitation Over is polynomial for the cup rule with the same number of candidates.

We can give other examples where preference manipulation is computationally intractable but manipulation by a coalition of agents is polynomial. For example, the Copeland rule is NP-hard to manipulate by a coalition of weighted agents if we have 4 or more candidates, and polynomial to manipulate if we have 3 or fewer candidates. However, as we show here, it is NP-hard to manipulate individual preferences with the Copeland rule if there are 3 or more candidates. Hence, for 3 candidates and the Copeland rule, Preference Manipulation is NP-hard but Coalition Manipulation is polynomial. The Copeland rule elects the candidate that wins the most pairwise majority elections. In the case of a tie, as in [2], the election is presumed to go in favour of the manipulator.

Theorem 9. For the Copeland rule on weighted votes, Coalition Manipulation is NP-complete if there are 4 or more candidates and polynomial otherwise, whilst Preference Manipulation is NP-complete if there are 3 or more candidates and polynomial otherwise.

Proof. Theorem 2 in [1] proves that Coalition Manipulation is NP-complete for the Copeland rule with weighted
votes and 4 or more candidates. Theorem 70 in \cite{4} proves that it is polynomial for 3 or fewer candidates. To prove \textsc{Preference Manipulation} is NP-hard for 3 or more candidates and weighted votes, we give a reduction from the number partitioning problem. We have a bag of integers, $k_i$ with sum $2k$ and we wish to decide if they can be partitioned into two bags, each with sum $k$. We will show that we can set up an election where we can manipulate a given set of preferences so that $C$ wins if and only if a partition exists. We suppose the following votes for the three candidates are manipulable: 1 vote for $C > A > B$ of weight $k$, and 1 vote $C > B > A$ of weight $k$. For each $k_i$, we also have a manipulable vote of weight $k_i$ in which $A > C$ and $B > C$ are fixed and cannot be changed, but the preference between $A$ and $B$ is manipulable. As the total weight of these manipulable votes is $2k$, we are sure $A$ ties with $C$ and $B$ ties with $C$ whatever manipulation takes place. We now show that the manipulable vote can be changed to make the final result that $A$ ties with $B$ and thus, by the adversarial tie-breaking assumption, that $C$ wins iff there is a partition of size $k$. Suppose there is such a partition. Then let the manipulated votes in one bag of such a partition be $A > B > C$ and the manipulated votes in the other be $B > A > C$. Then, $A$ ties with $B$ and thus $C$ wins. On the other hand, suppose there is a way to manipulate the preferences so that $C$ wins. This can only happen if $A$ ties with $B$. If $A$ beats $B$, then $A$ wins overall. Similarly, if $B$ beats $A$, then $B$ wins overall. Thus precisely half the weight of manipulated votes ranks $A$ above $B$ and half ranks $B$ above $A$. Hence we have a partition of equal weight. Thus, we can manipulate the preferences so that $C$ can win iff there is a partition of size $k$.

To conclude, voting rules like the cup and Copeland rule are easy to manipulate if we can change whole votes. If we can only manipulate individual preferences, they are NP-hard to manipulate. This suggests that a more fine-grained view provides insight into manipulability.

9. \textbf{UNCERTAINTY ABOUT VOTES}

Many of our results so far have considered weighted votes. One reason to consider weighted votes is that they inform us about unweighted votes when we have uncertainty about the votes cast. \textsc{Evaluation} is the problem of deciding if the probability of the candidate winning is strictly greater than some given $r$ \cite{7}.

\textbf{Definition 7 (Evaluation).}

\textbf{Input:} a candidate, a probability distribution over votes, and a number $r \in [0, 1]$.

\textbf{Output:} true iff the probability of the candidate winning is strictly greater than $r$.

\textsc{Evaluation} is closely related to manipulation as the following result illustrates.

\textbf{Theorem 10. Preference Manipulation is NP-hard for a voting rule on weighted votes implies Evaluation with the same rule on unweighted votes is also NP-hard.}

\textbf{Proof.} We reduce \textsc{Preference Manipulation} to \textsc{Evaluation}. Each agent of weight $k$ is replaced by $k$ agents of weight 1 whose votes are perfectly correlated. We construct a joint probability distribution over the votes so that each completion is drawn with the correct frequency. If $r = 0$, \textsc{Evaluation} decides \textsc{Preference Manipulation}.

Note that the reduction can take on board many restrictions on the voting rule or election. For example, if \textsc{Preference Manipulation} is NP-hard for weighted votes with 3 or more candidates then \textsc{Evaluation} is NP-hard for unweighted votes with 3 or more candidates. In a similar fashion, we can show that if \textsc{Coalition Manipulation} on weighted votes is NP-hard then \textsc{Evaluation} is also. However, this is a weaker result as it has a more specific hypothesis that holds in fewer situations. There are voting rules like the cup rule for which \textsc{Coalition Manipulation} is polynomial but \textsc{Preference Manipulation} is NP-hard. As simple corollary of Theorem 10 is that we can conclude for the first time that \textsc{Evaluation} for the cup rule is NP-hard.

\textbf{Corollary 1. Evaluation for the cup rule with 3 or more candidates is NP-hard.}

The cup rule is used in a wide range of situations including major sporting competitions like the World Cup. The computational difficulty of manipulating the cup rule (or of predicting the winner) therefore appears to be of some importance. However, we need to be careful in drawing too strong a conclusion. In particular, we have assumed that each agent’s preference relation is transitive. This creates a tension: we want the runner-up to be strong enough to win their side of the tournament, but not so strong that they beat the winner. If we drop the assumption that agents’ preference relations are transitive, then manipulating the cup rule (or predicting the winner) may be easy.

10. \textbf{RELATED WORK}

Conitzer and Sandholm studied the computational complexity of eliciting preferences \cite{8}. They proved that for unweighted votes and an unbounded number of candidates, it is NP-hard to decide when to stop eliciting votes for the STV rule, but polynomial for many other rules including plurality, Borda and Copeland. They also considered how hard it is to design an elicitation policy so that few queries are needed. They showed that even with complete information about how the agents will vote, it is NP-hard for many voting rules to determine which agents to ask their preferences. Finally, they showed that elicitation introduces additional opportunities for strategic manipulation.

Bartholdi, Tovey, Trick and Orlin were the first to suggest that computational complexity might be used as a barrier to manipulation \cite{2} \cite{1}. Their results considered manipulation by a single agent. Conitzer, Sandholm and Lang subsequently considered manipulation by a coalition of agents \cite{6} \cite{19} \cite{4}. For instance, they proved that manipulation of Borda, veto, STV, plurality with runoff, Copeland and Simpson by a coalition of agents are all NP-hard for weighted votes with a small (bounded) number of candidates. Similarly, they proved that it is NP-hard for a coalition of agents to manipulate the election so that a given candidate does not win for STV and plurality with runoff with weighted votes and a small (bounded) number of candidates. Finally, they proved that deciding when eliciting preferences can be terminated is NP-hard for STV but polynomial for many other rules, whilst deciding which votes to elicit is NP-hard for approval, Borda, Copeland and Simpson \cite{8}.

Procaccia and Rosenschein studied the average-case complexity of manipulating \cite{17}. Worst-case results like those here may not apply to elections in practice. They consider
elections obeying junta distributions, which concentrate on hard instances. They prove that scoring rules, which are NP-hard to manipulate in the worst case, are computationally easy on average. In a related direction, Conitzer and Sandholm have shown that it is impossible to create a voting rule that is usually hard to manipulate if a large fraction of instances are weakly monotone and manipulation can make either of exactly two candidates win [10].

Faliszewski et al. studied a form of preference manipulation, called “micro-bribery” in which individual preferences of agents can be manipulated [13]. Note that the resulting orders may not be transitive. Interestingly, they proved that for the Llull and Copeland rules, it is polynomial for the chair to perform such manipulation of individual preferences, but computationally intractable when the chair can only manipulate whole votes. This contrasts with the results here where we prove that there are rules like the cup and Copeland rule which are easy to manipulate by a coalition if we can change whole votes, but computationally intractable when we can change only individual preferences.

To deal with uncertainty in the votes, Konczak and Lang introduced the notions of possible and necessary winners [15]. Given an incomplete profile, possible winners are those that win in some completion whilst necessary winners are those that win in all completions. When the set of possible winners contains just one candidate, this is the necessary winner and elicitation can be terminated. They proved that for any scoring rule, possible and necessary winners are polynomial to compute, as are possible and necessary Condorcet winners. They also argue that when computing possible winners is polynomial, so is manipulation by a coalition of agents. Pini et al. proved that possible and necessary winners are NP-hard to compute for STV for an unbounded number of candidates, and NP-hard even to approximate those sets to within some constant factor in size [16]. Finally, in a companion paper, we study how to compute the possible and necessary winners of the cup rule when there is uncertainty about the votes and/or the agenda.

11. CONCLUSIONS

We have studied some computational questions surrounding preference elicitation and strategic manipulation. We proved that the complexity of determining when we can terminate elicitation depends on the elicitation strategy. In particular, we showed that it can be polynomial to decide when to stop eliciting whole votes from agents but NP-hard to decide when to stop eliciting individual preferences. Computational complexity thus motivates the choice of an elicitation strategy. We also studied the connection between manipulation and preference elicitation. We argued that there is a tension between making manipulation computationally intractable and making it computationally easy to decide when to terminate eliciting preferences. We also showed that what we can manipulate affects the computational complexity of manipulation. In particular, we proved that there are voting rules which are easy to manipulate if we can change all of an agent’s vote, but intractable if we can change only some of their preferences. A more fine-grained view of manipulation can thus be informative. Finally, we studied the connection between preference elicitation and predicting the winner. Based on this, we identified a voting rule where it is NP-hard to decide the probability of a candidate winning given a probability distribution over the votes.

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