THE SULTANATE OF OMAN’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE YEMENI CRISIS: PILLARS AND LIMITATIONS

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Introduction

Since the outbreak of the Yemeni war in 2015, the Sultanate of Oman has been keen to adhere to a policy of neutrality and has refrained from the option of engaging in any military action, convinced of the futility of this option and its inability to resolve and change the reality on the ground. Instead, the Omani conviction was directed towards the option of dialogue and activating channels of negotiation and diplomatic communication, which is what the Sultanate has devoted its policy in Yemen towards, and it has tended to play the role of mediator between the conflicting parties.

With the escalation of the war in Yemen, the Sultanate of Oman adhered to its neutral position with its quest for positive neutrality by activating and exercising the role of mediation, a role that came in line with the premises and principles of its foreign policy, and for which it had several qualifications. However, other factors, such as the nature of the crisis and conflict in Yemen, and the continued hardening of positions, remained an obstacle to the development of mediation and reaching the stage of a comprehensive settlement.

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Research Questions

1. What is the role of the Sultanate of Oman in the Yemeni crisis?
2. What are the most important factors that help the Sultanate play the role it plays in the Yemeni crisis?
3. What are the main obstacles and limitations that prevent the Sultanate from completing the role it plays in the Yemeni crisis?

Research Problem

The problem of the research lies in the difference between the foreign policy of the Sultanate of Oman towards the crisis in Yemen and the policies of other regional countries, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and in the fact that the Sultanate had a policy and an important role in the Yemeni crisis, despite not being involved in the crisis by supporting one of its local parties.

Research Objectives

This research aims to:

1. Defining the role played by the Sultanate of Oman in the Yemeni crisis;
2. Identify the most important factors that help the Sultanate to play the role it plays in the Yemeni crisis;
3. Reaching the most prominent obstacles and limitations that prevent the Sultanate from completing the role it plays in the Yemeni crisis.

Hypothesis

The study started from the hypothesis that there is an effective and important role played by the Sultanate of Oman in the Yemeni crisis, which is exercised through the positions and foreign policy decisions that it has committed towards the crisis in its neighbor Yemen, specifically since the
outbreak of the war in 2015.

Research Importance

The importance of the study stems from the fact that it deals with a unique model of foreign policy behavior in the Arab region and the Middle East, which is to refrain from getting involved in conflicts and to play the role of mediation instead, in a region raging with conflicts. It is an important model for studying the background and process of external political decision-making and the response to contemporary crises, especially in the Middle East, so this research can provide an analytical model that enhances the possibility of developing and disseminating such a response in the region, to serve the goals of achieving stability in the region.

Time and Place

- Time: From the outbreak of war in Yemen in March of 2015, until the date of preparing this study in June of 2021.
- Place: Republic of Yemen, and the Sultanate of Oman.

Methodology

This research relied on two approaches:

- Decision-Making Approach
  The approach is based on considering that there is a category of the ruling class in the state, which is granted the customary and legal authorization to exercise the role of making foreign policy decisions, as this category takes decisions according to what it deems to achieve the interests and goals of the state, on behalf of the rest of the people (Al-Fadl 2013, 17).

- Descriptive-Analytical Approach
  The approach is based on the description of the studied phenomena and observations from the start, so this description is objective and far from impressions. And then the transition to the stage
The Sultanate’s Priorities in Yemen

The Sultanate of Oman is directly affected by the developments of the situation in Yemen due to the geographical contact with Yemen, as the two countries share borders extending for a length of 288 km, which means for the Sultanate that the crisis in Yemen is related to its security. The possibility of the spread of extremist organizations poses a danger and a direct threat to the Sultanate, which consequently reinforces the Sultanate’s efforts and stresses the need to reach a solution and a final settlement that restores stability to Yemen (Al-Barhawi 2018, 137).

The Sultanate’s security concerns have increased with the increase in the activity of “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” in southern Yemen since its founding in 2009. Especially after the organization managed in January 2016 to control the city of Mukalla, the capital of Hadhramaut Governorate, when the Sultanate quickly closed Its border crossings with Yemen (Mazoz 2018, 4).

The Sultanate is interested in reaching a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Yemen due to economic motives as well, as the volume of trade exchange between it and Yemen reached in 2010 (38) billion and (124) million Yemeni riyals, and the balance was likely for the Sultanate, as the value of imports amounted to Yemen, including: (34) billion and (796) million Yemeni riyals (Saudi News Agency 2020).

After the outbreak of the war in Yemen, the trade exchange between the two countries was interrupted, and limited commercial operations remained at the level of Al-Mahra Governorate in eastern Yemen with the Sultanate, and therefore the Sultanate is firmly convinced of the need to return stability to Yemen in order to enhance the levels of trade exchange again, especially that the Sultanate is strengthening from its economic plans to diversify its sources of income.

In addition, the Sultanate of Oman is affected by the location of Yemen, which overlooks important waterways, from the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which are important corridors for the movement of oil and global trade, which means that the continuation of tensions in Yemen leads to more threats to navigation through these
corridors, and thus the potential for direct impacts on the Omani economy. As the Omani economy’s largest dependence is still on oil, according to the data, oil exports constitute 50% of the Omani GDP (Al-Amri 2021, 17).

The Evolution of the Omani Position on the Yemeni Nrisis

Impartiality

On March 25, 2015, military operations led by Saudi Arabia began in Yemen, with the participation of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, with the exception of the Sultanate of Oman. The Sultanate chose not to participate in the operations from the beginning, given what it saw in the war as a costly armed conflict at all levels, and with an appreciation of its futility and its inability to decisively change the course on the ground (Hizam 2017, 65).

The Sultanate of Oman had several motives in the decision to remain neutral and not get involved in the armed conflict, the most important of which is the relations and interests it maintains with its eastern neighbor, Iran, which was considered one of the influential parties and presence in the crisis, through its support for its allies Ansar Allah group (Houthis). The Sultanate maintains relations and balances with Iran, which is due to several factors, the most important of which are related to considerations of neighborhood, supervision and joint management of the two countries for the strategic Strait of Hormuz (Jargon 2016, 150).

In addition, the constants and principles of Omani foreign policy for nearly four decades emphasize adherence to the principles of non-armed intervention and the preference for dialogue and peaceful solutions, through diplomatic channels and methods. In addition, the Sultanate did not find sufficient justifications for entering into the military alliance. From the Omani perspective, none of the Gulf states was directly threatened - at that time - that required the establishment of this alliance. It did not find in the Yemeni war a similar model, for example, to what Kuwait was subjected to from the Iraqi invasion in 1990, while the Sultanate’s assessments of the crisis came as a civil conflict governed by regional conflicts, in which the Sultanate prefers to distance itself from involvement.

Mediator Role

As the war raged in Yemen, the Sultanate of Oman began taking
steps to calm the raging conflict, including activating a humanitarian role in granting Yemenis transit visas through its lands, opening its doors to hundreds of injured and wounded, and helping Yemenis reach other countries through its lands and airspace. Because of this, the Sultanate began to gain credit and acceptance among increasing segments of Yemenis, regardless of their orientations and positions, which enabled it to have more elements to play a mediating role to end the war in Yemen. This was reinforced by considering that Oman does not have ambitions in Yemen or interests and positions that favor one party at the expense of the other, but rather seeks first to maintain stability in Yemen (Day and Brehony 2020, 175).

In May 2015, while the United Nations envoy to Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, was holding talks between the parties to the conflict in Yemen to pave the way for the Geneva talks, negotiations had begun in the Omani capital, Muscat, between the Houthis and the US side, at the beginning of international efforts to implement the Security Council Resolution No. (2216), issued on April 14, 2015, which stipulated the withdrawal of the Houthis from Sana’a and the cities they seized in 2014 (Atef 2019, 2).

After the Houthi delegation returned from the Geneva conference, it headed directly to the Omani capital, Muscat, to resume the talks, and there it met the former Omani Foreign Minister, Yousef bin Alawi, and discussed the reasons for the failure of the Geneva negotiations, and ways to stop the armed conflict. Since then, the role of Omani mediation has begun to emerge, as it seeks to bring the Yemeni parties closer in order to reach a final political solution to the crisis and spare the country the cost of continuing the fighting (Atef 2019, 3).

With the realization that the military campaign launched by the Arab coalition in Yemen has stalled, and its inability to achieve tangible results on the ground, as well as impeding efforts to progress on the path of a political solution, the Saudi position began to change, with the emergence of Saudi keenness to maintain a channel of communication with the Houthis. The Saudi side found an opportunity in the relations established by the Sultanate of Oman with the Houthis, and this new trend was quickly embodied by Muscat hosting secret negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in March of 2016. Thus, the Omani role in mediation began to gain more importance, and talks began to be repeated. hosted by Muscat (Albasoos and Maashani 2020, 159).

In November 2016, Muscat hosted for the second time meetings between US and Houthi officials. The US delegation was led by former US Secretary of State, John Kerry. In February 2018, Muscat hosted a meeting that brought together representatives of the Houthis and US officials, which is the
third meeting between the two parties in Muscat, thus turning the Omani capital into a major center for meetings between the parties to the Yemeni conflict on the one hand and international envoys on the other (Albasoos and Maashani 2020, 160).

After the signing of the Stockholm Agreement in December 2018, which stipulated a halt to the fighting in the city of Al-Hodeidah, in addition to the entry of humanitarian aid through its port, and a call for the lifting of the Houthi siege on the city of Taiz. Then, with the outcome of the agreement not being implemented, in March 2019 Muscat hosted a meeting between the British Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, with prominent Houthi leaders, to discuss the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement, in a British effort to support the efforts of the British international envoy, Martin Griffiths, to advance peace efforts in Yemen (Day and Brehony 2020, 176).

During the year 2020, the UN envoy, Martin Griffiths, intensified his visits and contacts with Omani officials. On October 25, 2020, Griffiths met with Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi, with the aim of discussing the ongoing negotiations on the joint declaration to support the political process in Yemen. This coincided with the Sultanate playing an active role, in mid-October 2020, represented in the success in obtaining the release of two American citizens who were held by the Houthis, and returning the body of an American citizen to the United States after his death in captivity, in return for the return of about two hundred wounded Houthis who were stranded in Oman (Al Sunaidi 2021, 67).

In 2021, with the arrival of a new US administration led by Democratic US President Joe Biden, and his statements about the necessity of stopping the war in Yemen and preventing arms sales to the Arab coalition countries. In March 2021, Saudi Arabia presented a proposal for a ceasefire, coinciding with the holding of a direct meeting between US envoys and a Houthi delegation in the Omani capital, Muscat, which gave a new impetus to the efforts of the talks sponsored and hosted by the Sultanate, despite the continued stumble of talks in reaching a final settlement formula. Because of the unwillingness of each party to concede to the other, the Houthis continued to insist on the need to lift the naval and air blockade of Yemen, while the Saudi side feared that such a step would lead to strengthening the Houthis’ position and supporting them with more weapons and equipment from the Iranians (France 24, 2021).

On March 30, 2021, the Sultanate announced that it was working, in partnership with Saudi Arabia, to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Yemeni crisis, as Saudi Arabia had begun to show greater flexibility in the settlement path, which came as a result of its unwillingness to bet much on the steadfastness of the legitimate forces on the Marib front, especially after
the escalation of Houthi attacks targeting the city, with the realization that the defeat in Marib is a breaking of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. This is in addition to the impact of the Houthi strikes on the Saudi depth, and Saudi Arabia’s inability to offer Aramco shares for sale due to the Houthi bombing of its facilities.

With these shifts in the level of positions, Muscat has turned into a hub for intense visits by the US and Saudi officials with the Houthis, including a visit by Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan to Oman on May 2, 2021, as well as the visit of the US envoy to Yemen, Timothy Lenderking, and UN envoy Martin Griffiths (Emirates Policy Center 2021, 3).

The talks attempted to separate the humanitarian track from the political one. They focused on ensuring regular and unhindered humanitarian access to all parts of Yemen, including the opening of Sana’a airport and the port of Hodeidah, in addition to supporting a permanent ceasefire, preparing for the parties’ transition to political negotiations, and providing guarantees regarding compensation, and reconstruction (Emirates Policy Center 2021, 4).

While the Houthi side focused on the necessity of a comprehensive ceasefire and the unconditional reopening of Sana’a’s airport and Hodeidah’s port, on the other hand, the Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition reject the Houthi condition, considering that lifting the ban on Sanaa’s airport and Hodeidah’s port will allow the flow of weapons from Iran to the Houthis, with Saudi Arabia intensifying its demand that the Houthis first commit to stopping the attack on Marib. As a result of this hardening on both sides, in June 2021, the talks were again declared a failure.

Thus, we find that since the outbreak of the war, the Sultanate of Oman has played a key facilitating role to support dialogue efforts and activate channels of communication by committing to playing the mediator role and providing support for confidence-building measures, and bringing different viewpoints together, in order to serve the purpose of reaching a comprehensive agreement that achieves peace and stability in Yemen.

The Sultanate has enabled it to play this role by maintaining relations with the various parties to the crisis, including the Houthis, in addition to its good relations with Iran, which enabled it to maintain a middle position that allowed it to embrace the political process to contribute to settling the crisis.

Because of the blockade imposed on Sanaa’s airport, flights through Oman became the only outlet for the Houthis, and Muscat became the only destination for negotiators from various parties to meet with representatives of the Houthi side. The Sultanate of Oman has succeeded in reaching
agreements that contributed to mitigating the crisis, as well as in releasing many detainees held by the Houthis, in addition to the humanitarian role of treating the wounded, in addition to supporting the United Nations efforts to a ceasefire in Hodeidah (Stockholm Agreement), by hosting parallel dialogue sessions.

Pillars and Limitations of the Omani Role in Yemen

The Trust in the Omani Role

The retreat of the option of military settlement by the Saudi-UAE alliance was a major factor behind the rise of the Omani mediation and the increased reliance on its role in reaching a final settlement of the Yemeni crisis, a role that came at the request of the United States and Saudi Arabia, and the welcome and confidence of the Houthis, who maintained confidence in the Omani mediator. This enabled the Sultanate to gain Yemeni, regional and international consensus to play this role, especially with the continued failure of the international negotiations and the faltering of its efforts to reach a settlement.

Given that Oman has maintained normal relations with the Houthis since the start of the war, and does not mind the Houthis becoming a legitimate political party in Yemen’s post-war future, the Houthis are the main proponents of expanding the Omani role in the Yemeni crisis. The Houthis’ confidence in Oman is reflected in the insistence of senior Houthi officials on the use of Omani aircraft for diplomatic purposes (Al-Maslami 2017, 2).

Oman is also seen as an effective mediator by prominent figures in the government of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, due to its persistent record of negotiations with the Houthis. This confidence is enhanced because the Sultanate has always considered that the Houthi takeover of Sanaa was an illegitimate act, and it must be withdrawn from it in accordance with UN Resolution 2216, in addition to the Sultanate’s rejection of the plans to divide Yemen.

Limitations of the Omani Role

In contrast to the Houthi support and the support of members of the government of Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi for the mediation efforts by the Sultanate of Oman, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional
Council has been looking at the Omani role with less enthusiasm, especially in light of the Omani position supporting Yemen’s unity, contrary to the demands separatist council.

The Sultanate does not show any acceptance of the independence of southern Yemen, because it fears that this will cause the establishment of a state allied with the UAE on its borders. On the nineteenth of February 2019, the former Omani Foreign Minister, Yusuf bin Alawi, admitted that the Sultanate of Oman does not agree with the UAE policy towards Yemen, because Muscat, as he put it, “does not like to fuel wars and conflicts.” However, any tendency by the Sultanate to accept a form of autonomy in southern Yemen as the last solution to the crisis and the guarantor of stability may contribute to changing the position of the Council (Albasoos and Maashani 2020, 163).

Saudi Arabia and the UAE also share the Transitional Council’s reservations about the mediation efforts practiced by the Sultanate of Oman, and part of the reason for their skepticism about the Omani role is due to the Sultanate’s close relationship with Iran, which appeared in the allegations circulated by Saudi and Emirati media about arms transfers to the Houthis through the territories of the Sultanate of Oman.

Tensions between Oman and the Saudi-Emirati alliance limit the effectiveness of the Omani mediation role in Yemen. Given that many of the main parties in Yemen, led by the “Hadi government” and the “Southern Transitional Council”, receive various forms of support from both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while their relationship with the Sultanate remains at a much lower level, and therefore any positions adopted by Saudi Arabia or the UAE from the Sultanate limit the ability of these parties to advance in the peace negotiations mediated by the Sultanate of Oman.

Final Remarks

The Sultanate of Oman saw the raging conflict in Yemen as an internal crisis in the first place, in which external regional parties intervened. Therefore, it preferred to maintain its middle position in the region’s politics and preferred to distance itself from engaging in regional polarization and conflicts, especially with its realization that military intervention would not lead to a settlement of the conflict on the ground. It will exacerbate it and generate bad consequences on the humanitarian level, which was proven by the course of events more than six years after the start of military operations in March 2015.

The Sultanate’s policy towards the crisis in Yemen was committed
to the principles and directions of Omani foreign policy that adhere to the principles of dialogue, the role of mediation, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The Sultanate was able to play a mediating role thanks to the trust it gained from the parties in the crisis, especially from the Houthi side, which is facing a near-state of estrangement and international isolation. However, the Sultanate has limited influence on the parties of the crisis due to its lack of involvement in the conflict as a party. It doesn’t support one of the parties to the local conflict in Yemen, and does not have expansionist ambitions in Yemen. Therefore, its role has been limited to embracing dialogue and managing and maintaining channels of communication, and has not reached the point of decisive intervention in the settlement process and what leads to its completion and achievement in the shortest possible time.

In light of answering the study questions, the study concluded several conclusions:

1. The Sultanate of Oman has invested its political neutrality and moderation diplomacy in order to activate channels of dialogue and diplomacy in order to end the fighting that has been going on in Yemen for more than six years, and its efforts included working to bridge the gap between the parties to the crisis. In addition, the Sultanate played a humanitarian role for the benefit of the Yemeni people, by receiving the wounded and supporting efforts to open humanitarian corridors;

2. The role of the Sultanate of Oman in the Yemeni case has emerged remarkably since 2016, after it was during 2015 just a transfer station for the Houthi party before it had a role in putting forward initiatives to end the war in Yemen, which emerged specifically with the secret negotiations hosted by Muscat between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in March. March of the year 2016, coincided with the coalition’s beginning to realize the failure to bet on the military option alone in order to settle the crisis;

3. Despite the difficulty of the Yemeni case, the Sultanate of Oman remains more qualified than others to play the role of a neutral mediator, and this is reinforced by the fact that the Sultanate is not a party to the conflict in Yemen, as is the case with other regional and international parties;

4. The Sultanate has maintained a good relationship with the parties of the conflict in Yemen, especially with the Houthis. Hence, this is for the people of the Sultanate to return to it by the Americans, the United Nations, and Saudi Arabia to ask it to play a mediating role with the Houthis;
5. The decline in the bet on the military option was a major factor in the emergence of the Omani mediation, which came with the acceptance and approval of the international and regional powers and parties, led by the United Nations, the United States of America, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the welcome of the Houthis, who maintained their confidence in the Omani mediator;

6. Despite the efforts made to mediate and push the wheel of dialogue, talk about a solution to the crisis in Yemen is still far away, which is mainly due to the lack of consensus of local and regional parties and their unwillingness to make the necessary concessions, especially in light of the transformation of the Yemeni case into a pressure card to be employed in the power struggle between regional powers;

7. Completing the factors for the success of the Omani mediation is mainly related to the parties involved in the crisis showing more flexibility, with each of them fulfilling its obligations in accordance with the understandings and agreements.

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ABSTRACT
The study started with the question: What is the role played by the Sultanate of Oman in the Yemeni crisis? What are the most important auxiliary factors and the most prominent obstacles to performing this role? The problem of the study was the difference between the foreign policy of the Sultanate of Oman towards the crisis in Yemen and the policies of other regional countries, especially the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The study adopted the hypothesis that the Sultanate of Oman plays an effective and important role in the Yemeni crisis, which it plays through the positions and foreign policy decisions it has committed to towards the crisis in its neighbor Yemen. The study adopted both the decision-making approach and the descriptive analytical approach. The study analyzed the priorities of the Sultanate of Oman in Yemen, the developments of the Omani position on the Yemeni crisis, and the components and determinants of the Omani role in Yemen. The study concluded a number of results, the most important of which is that the Sultanate of Oman has invested its political neutrality and moderation diplomacy in order to activate channels of dialogue and diplomacy in order to end the ongoing fighting in Yemen and that despite the difficulty of the Yemeni case, the Sultanate of Oman remains more qualified than others to play the role of a neutral mediator. This is reinforced by the fact that the Sultanate is not a party to the conflict in Yemen, as is the case with other regional and international parties.

KEYWORDS
Yemen; Sultanate of Oman; The Yemeni Crisis; The Omani Foreign Policy.

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