NEPOTISTIC CORRUPTION BREEDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POLITICAL DYNASTY

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Keywords
Nepotistic Corruption, Political Dynasty, Pilkada

Abstract
Simultaneous Pilkada 2020 is still dwelling on the same pattern of problems from the previous Pilkada which actually experienced a significant increase in the journey of regional heads who came from the Political Dynasty. A total of 124 candidates are affiliated with political dynasties. One of them is caused by the double-edged sword of decentralization and regional autonomy. In addition to giving power to the regions in forming their own households, decentralization of regional autonomy triggers the decentralization of corruption that spreads to various regions which then drags the political elite. This is what causes regional autonomy to encourage oligarchic decentralization and the practice of political dynasties. The "little kings" in the regions that were born from regional autonomy finally made the Pilkada a power defense industry that was also correlated with the defense of wealth. This research article uses a qualitative approach with a phenomenological type, prioritizing secondary data, with the 4M writing technique, namely Describing, Analyzing, Concluding and Describing the phenomenon of nepotistic corruption which is the seed of political dynasties to answer the problem of how nepotistic corruption forms a political dynasty. The conclusions drawn from this research, this type of corruption refers to preferential treatment given to children, wives, nieces or close relatives of officials at every level, and every route in the formation of political dynasties in other words nepotistic corruption is the seed in the formation
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Introduction

The development of democracy through direct elections, on the one hand, deserves appreciation, but on the other hand, it should not be too late in the trappings of democratic formalities. The formalities of democracy not only threaten the survival of democracy in Indonesia, but can also create a political regime that only works to serve power, not serve the people who are the source of true sovereignty. This is what is often referred to as Pilkada which results in a pseudo-democracy, full of formalities and fails to produce a power that serves the interests of the people. The results of the Nagara Institute Research show that the democratic formalities practiced in the 2020 Simultaneous Regional Head Elections gave birth to political dynasties (Syauket, 2021). There are 124 candidates affiliated with political dynasties, which are almost evenly distributed in 270 constituencies at both the Province-Kabupaten and City levels. Meanwhile, when viewed from the supporting parties, it appears that the Golkar Party is the largest party carrying political dynasties, followed by PDI-P and Nasdem.

From a theoretical point of view, elections are the most important means and instrument of democratization. However, the realization of democracy will be felt in real terms when the general election process is held in order to determine the candidate for the leader who is worthy of holding the reins of power (Fitriciada, 2004). Without this step, the truth of democracy as a means of realizing people's sovereignty still invites a number of separate problems that open up space for the emergence of claims for the legitimacy of the ruling government. The belief in elections as the most important instrument for democratization gains strong legitimacy from Samuel.P Huntington (Azhari, 2004).

Since the Direct Pilkada was held in 2015, democracy at the local level has experienced significant dynamics. Direct Pilkada and Simultaneous Pilkada are one of the significant political breakthroughs in realizing democratization at the local level. Because before 2005, Regional Heads and Deputy Regional Heads were elected by the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). Only
since the enactment of Law Number 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government, Regional Heads are directly elected by the people through the Election of Regional Heads and Deputy Regional Heads/Pilkada. The first Pilkada was held in June 2005 in Kutai Kertanegara Regency, East Kalimantan. The implementation of the Pilkada in the first phase was not carried out simultaneously, but separately from one region to another. Meanwhile, nationally, according to (Erb & Sulistiyanto, 2009) that in 2005 Indonesia had the first experience of directly electing a national leader and this was the initial momentum of democracy in Indonesia.

Unfortunately, until the 2020 Simultaneous Pilkada, the political dynamics showed a blurry portrait, namely the emergence of a Political Dynasty which according to various sources was called the "2020 Simultaneous Election of Many Political Dynasties", even Koran Tempo featured a cover story "Family Party in Power" on the 20 July 2020 Edition.

**Research Method**

This study uses a qualitative approach with a phenomenological type, in order to see the symptoms of the government of the formation of a Political Dynasty in Indonesia. The issue of political dynasties in Indonesia has emerged since the transition period after the end of the Suharto regime to substantive democracy. This approach as explained by Alase18 phenomenology is a qualitative methodology that allows researchers to apply and apply their subjectivity and interpersonal skills in the exploratory research process. This study prioritizes secondary data sources in the form of literature studies aimed at finding a problem to be researched, seeking information relevant to the problem to be studied, reviewing some basic theories relevant to the problem to be studied.

**Result and Discussion**

**A. Nepotistic Corruption**

There are many definitions of corruption. From these various definitions Nye, J.S stated that corruption is defined as behavior that deviates from formal ethical rules concerning the actions of a person in a position of public authority caused by personal considerations, such as wealth, power and status11.
In relation to the Simultaneous Pilkada, the practice of clientelism according to (Katz & Crotty, 2015), (Crotty, 2014) or (Rais, 1993) and (ISMANSYAH, Wahyuni, & MUCHTAR, 2020) calls it Nepotistic Corruption is something that often occurs. This practice is even mushrooming in electoral practice in Indonesia. Arlan Siddha in (Syauket, 2021) describes a clientelism or nepotistic model in the Simultaneous Pilkada, including:

1. Party as Patron and Candidate as Client, which is indicated by a magic letter in the form of party recommendation,
2. The clientelism relationship between the candidate and the success team, where the candidate is the patron and the successful team is the client, which is shown through the provision of gifts in the form of rations for government projects,
3. Clientelism between candidates and constituents, where candidates are patrons and constituents are clients, which is indicated by the provision of money and positions in government.

Amin Rais in (Sanusi, 2009) and Syed Hussein Al'Atas explains that this type of nepotistic or kinship corruption refers to preferential treatment given to children, in-laws, nephews, wives or close relatives of officials in each echelon. With preferential treatment, the son, daughter-in-law, niece and wife of the official can reap as much profit as possible. Nepotistic corruption in general goes by violating the existing rules of the game, which according to (Diansyah, 2009) cannot be separated from the element of abuse of authority/position 10. However, these violations cannot be stopped because behind the nepotistic corruption stands an official who usually feels above the law.

In line with this, (George Junus Aditjondro, 2006) classifies there are three layers of corruption, in the second layer, in the type of Nepotism Corruption among those who have blood relations with public officials, examples of which include:

1. adopt a child or son-in-law in a public position such as the Head of Service, Head of Section,
2. Placing children in important positions in political parties such as the chairman of the DPP or the secretary general of the party,
3. Placing children, wives, daughters-in-law, grandchildren as candidates for Regional Head or DPRD members,
4. Determining family members as winners of development projects or purchases of goods originating from the State budget.
The element of profit-taking as much as possible in this actually refers to one of the three types of income according to Adam Smith, namely profit, wages and rents. Rent, referred to as the easiest form of income. No need for risk, no need for specific skills just because it's based on blood or kinship. The definition of rent in a broad sense, is transformed as a nature of business actors to gain profits, but not using their own resources such as capital/own property. Rent hunters use other people's property rights, public property rights and even state facilities to accumulate profits, according to (Rachbini & Sikumbank, 2006) this is called rent seeking behavior. Thus the behavior of rent-seeking, which basically emphasizes self-interest in this case the family, political clan or business clan is actually against the public interest or detrimental to the public. The point of contact between the “rent-seeking behavior” approach to corruption lies at the heart of the rent-seeking theory itself, namely the use of public facilities, state power and a number of dirty transactions for the benefit of a few parties10.

B. Routes for the Establishment of Political Dynasties

Twenty years after the 1998 reform, political dynasties thrived like mushrooms in the rainy season. Political dynasties can be found in all supporting political parties, at all levels of government and in various regions in Indonesia. Based on the National Research Institute, in the 2020 Simultaneous Regional Head Elections, which were participated by 270 regions, were held in 9 provinces, 224 regencies and 37 cities. It appears that half of the provinces hold pilkada affiliated with the Political Dynasty. The most exposed to political dynasties in the district elections. The route or plot in building a Political Dynasty can be described as follows:

Source: processed from various literatures, 2021.
The picture above describes the route before the local strongman or Local Strongman according to the terms of (Suaza Estrada & Martínez Márquez, 2016) while (Holifah, 2018) calls it Local Bossism to build a political dynasty and become an oligarchic group. In the first stage, Before establishing a political dynasty, local strongmen were nothing. They generally come from the social strata of ordinary people who then advance to contest the Pilkada, win the Pilkada and in the end they collect capital sourced from local government projects. The goal in this first stage is to seize power. The second stage, after they have obtained sufficient capital, they run again in the Pilkada as incumbents, with the aim of maintaining power by expanding their power over projects and buying and selling positions in government, managing government projects and aspiration funds, arranging regional regulations, arranging tax breaks, arrange loans from BPD, the goal to be achieved in this second stage is to use power to accumulate capital to accumulate wealth. The third stage, when the incumbent succeeds in becoming a regional head for two periods, they begin to build their political dynasty by encouraging their wives, children, daughters-in-law, and in-laws to run in the elections with the wealth that has been obtained in the second stage. With the mode of exploitation of economic resources: carry out illegal economic collections such as gambling, smuggling, illegal logging. Victory in the Pilkada to return assets that have been issued in the Pilkada.

The Political Dynasty Model in the 2020 Simultaneous Pilkada has another variant, namely competition between political dynasties. The first model is a competition for regional head candidates contested by several political dynasties. The competition for candidates for regional heads is fair even though it is plagued by political dynasties, because the competition that is built has a balanced power base, namely the battle between dynasties. The second model is competition between "fellow" political dynasties in the same family, for example the competition between wives-in-laws-nieces and nephews. This oligarchy is by buying political parties, which means an entrepreneur's affair with the Chair of a Political Party in order to finance a series of political processes, determine Party Decisions and Recommendations, facilitate certain candidates to be elected with the aim of controlling political parties and expanding their access and control over regional economic resources. In order to strengthen the Oligarchy, the Political Dynasties Circle will then take care of each other's interests in order to strengthen the Oligarchy entering the fourth stage, with the mode of buying
political party policies, controlling political parties, strengthening political cartels with the type of network corruption (cabal) in the Third Layer according to (George J Aditjondro, Keith, & Francisco, 2000). Political dynasties are still possible because of the opportunity, the absence of strict rules that prohibit especially those related to nepotism, thrives in a permissive society with low levels of education.

**Conclusion**

Nepotistic Corruption refers to preferential treatment given to children, wives, nieces or close relatives of officials at every level, and is present in every route in the formation of a political dynasty to reap as much profit as possible, in other words, nepotistic corruption is a seed in the formation of a dynasty. Politics because the family is the main pillar in the formation of a corrupt political dynasty. The contribution of this research more broadly, as part of the mind and energy to continue to oversee the eradication of corruption in Indonesia.

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First publication right:

Devotion: Journal of Research and Community Service

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