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IMAM HATIP SCHOOL (IMAM HATIP LİSESİ): Islamic School in Contemporary Secular Turkey
Mahfud Junaedi
Analisa is a peer-reviewed journal published by Office of Religious Research and Development Ministry of Religious Affairs Semarang Indonesia. It specializes in these three aspects; religious life, religious education, religious text and heritage. Analisa aims to provide information on social and religious issues through publication of research based articles and critical analysis articles. Analisa has been published twice a year in Indonesian since 1996 and started from 2016 Analisa is fully published in English as a preparation to be an international journal. Since 2015, Analisa has become Crossref member, therefore all articles published by Analisa will have unique DOI number.

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INTRODUCTION FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARDS

The advancement of information and technology in this era has encouraged the editorial boards of Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion to change some aspects of the journal for the better. The first changing is the name of the journal since 2015, from “Analisa Jurnal Pengkajian Masalah Sosial Keagamaan” to be “Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion”. As a consequence, there is alteration on the ISSN 1410-4350 to be 2502-5465. Furthermore, at this time, it is a must that a journal is published electronically, as it is stated in the rule issued by PDII LIPI (the Indonesian Institute of Science). Therefore, in 2015, Analisa started the electronic journal with E-ISSN 24443-3853, while the printed edition has been published since 1996 and continued until now. Along with the changing of the name, Analisa began the publication in English started vol.1.no.1 2016 as part of the preparation for being an international journal.

There are various articles submitted to Analisa in the beginning of 2016. These include Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, culture, Islam and Islamic education in Turkey. An article written by Tauseef Ahmad Parray talking about Islamism is placed as the opening of this volume. He argues that the incidence of 9/11 2011 in World Trade Center USA became a turning point for Western country to stereotype Islam as terrorist. Furthermore, after that tragedy Islam is perceived as fundamentalist religion, extremist, conservative Islam, radicalisms, and other negative stereotypes. In this article, he suggests that it is necessary to evaluate the Western perspectives on Islam in which they labeled Islam as extremists.

The next article is entitled “The Chronicle of Terrorism and Islamic Militancy in Indonesia” written by Zakiyah. This paper provides data and deep analysis on the series of bombing and terror happened in Indonesia from 2001 to 2012. After the fall of President Soeharto in 1998, there were a series of bombing and terror in some part of the country which caused hundreds casualties and great number of property damages. This year was also a time for some extremists coming back to Indonesia after a long period of exile abroad. These extremist figures then began their activities in Indonesia and they also disseminated the radical ideology, establishing network, recruiting new members and preparing for terror and violent action. Some of the terrorists and suspected of the bombing actions were indicated having connection with the Islamic radical group which means that there is an Islamic militancy in Indonesia.

The radical ideology was also spread at prominent university in Yogyakarta Indonesia. This theme is discussed by Arifudin Ismail. He mentions that this ideology is not only spread by jihadists but also by some activists in certain campuses. For instance, there are some discussions and discussion groups existed in Gadjah Mada University, Sunan Kalijaga Islamic State University, Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah University, and Indonesia Islam University. In such activity, there is an indication that there is discussion on “the radical ideology”. He focused his study on the exclusive students movement in Gadjah Mada University especially related to how the religious doctrine (Islam) disseminated and perceived by students.

Besides the discussion of the Islamism, terrorism and radical movement as the phenomena happened in Indonesia and in the world, this volume also offers other insights of Indonesia. Betty Mauli Rosa Bustamn explores the Minangkabau tradition. She describes in her article how the local people (Minangkabau) adopted Islamic values into their tradition from generation to the next generation. In this paper, it can be seen that Islam and local culture are living in harmony. In addition, Asep N Musadad talks about the assimilation and acculturation process between local traditions of Sundanese community with Islam. He describes that the harmony between them can be seen on the literature; there is a cultural change as a picture of how Islam and local tradition met and assimilated. Besides, in the folklore as he mentions that some incantations used by shaman (panayangan) contain some symbols of Islam.

Besides being practiced in the local tradition as mentioned earlier, Islam in Indonesia is
transformed and disseminated through electronic media such as television; this can be read at the next article. Siti Solihati wrote a paper about how Islamic symbols are used by a soap opera broadcasted in a national television. In this article, she found that there are some ideologies embedded in such program namely; (1) ideology of materialistic-capitalist, (2) ideology of patriarchy, and (3) violent domination.

Napsiah and her colleagues wrote an article about how the people living in surrounding the Merapi Mountain cope with the disaster especially when the eruption occurred and its aftermath. Community living in Pangukrejo village near the mountain helps each other dealing with their disaster related problems. They are hand in hand in re-building their villages without looking at their religious background. All people participate in those activities since they feel that Merapi is their home and their source of convenience and safety, therefore this honorable symbol should be preserved at all cost. They argue that the eruption is the destiny from God, thus it is undeniable fact. At that time, they were at the bottom level condition, so that to wake up from that situation they need to help each other (gotong royong).

The last article in this volume is about the transformation of Islamic education at Imam Hatip School in Turkey. This paper is written by Mahfud Junaidi. He describes that the curriculum in this school aims to transfer the traditional norms based on the Islamic values. It is expected that by implementing Islam, this will contribute to the development of society and nation-state in Turkey.

Please enjoy reading articles in this volume.

Semarang, May 2016

Editorial boards
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion would like to thank you to all international editorial boards for their support and their willingness to review articles for this volume. Analisa would also like to thank you to all authors who have submitted their articles to Analisa, so that this volume is successfully published.

Analisa do hope that we would continue our cooperation for the next editions.

Semarang, May 2016
Editor in Chief
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THE CHRONICLE OF TERRORISM AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN INDONESIA

ZAKIYAH

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Abstract

This paper examines the chronicle of terrorism in Indonesia and the relationship between terrorism and Islamic militancy in this nation. This research focused on bombing cases from 2001 to 2012. Data was gathered through documentary research including primary and secondary resources. This research shows that after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, there were bomb attacks on various targets and militant extremists were able to return to Indonesia after long periods of exile abroad. They started again their activities including disseminating their radical ideology, building networks and recruiting new members in Indonesia, as well as preparing for militant actions. The perpetrators of these terror attacks were mostly associated with the Islamic radical groups like Jemaah Islamiah and Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia. These two militant groups had a close relationship with Darul Islam, an organization founded during the colonial era that aimed to establish an Islamic state and to apply Syariah as a state law. In addition, both groups became a political window for al-Qaeda in Indonesia.

Key words: terrorism, Islam, Jihad, militancy, radicalism

INTRODUCTION

After the fall of president Soeharto in 1998, there was a sea change in Indonesian politics. The state altered from a centralized authoritarian regime to a decentralized democracy and the government has become more accountable to the people (Ricklefs, 2012: 261). From 1998-2008 Indonesia experienced a democratic transition marked with uncertainty and the rise of violent conflicts (Effendy, 2003: 200; Hasan, 2006: 13). During the Asian financial crisis Indonesia experienced economic collapse and chaos in some parts of the country. In Jakarta, in May, 1998 Chinese-Indonesians became the target of violence and shopping malls were set on fire in the Glodok area of the city (Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 86). In the following years, there were social uprisings and communal conflicts in several provinces such as central Kalimantan, Moluccas, West Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi and Eastern Nusa Tenggara (Hasan, 2006: 13; Varsney & Tadjoeddin & Panggabean, 2008: 377-379).

The year 1998/1999 was also a time for the birth of militias groups and radical groups prepared to recourse to violence in Indonesia. In August 1998 the Front Pembela Islam (FPI/ Islamic Defender Front) was created (Sukma, 2003: 344-345; Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 90). In 2000, Laskar Jihad (Holy war force) achieved growing momentum and got popular acknowledgement after they held a big gathering attended by approximately ten thousand participants in Senayan the main stadium in Jakarta. At this gathering, the leader of Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar Thalib, mentioned the need for armed jihad (Hasan, 2006: 17).
The regime change also made it possible for religious extremists to return to their homeland after a long period of exile abroad. Among those more politically prominent were Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar (Mietzner, 2009: 281). Both of them fled to Malaysia in the 1980s and claimed to be the ideological successor of the founders of Darul Islam (DI, abode of Islam), an organization promoting the notion of Indonesia as an Islamic state (Abuza, 2003, 126; Mietzner, 2009: 281). They returned to Solo, Central Java to run the pesantren Al Mukmin Ngruki and began teaching Islam as well as organizing a new group (Vaughn et all, 2008: 10). In 2000, Ba’asyir formed Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesia Mujahidin council); this organization aimed to implement Islamic law and to promote the Islamic state as well as forming the political front for Jemaah Islamiah (JI). The organization is recognized as the hardliner group with its paramilitary wing named Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia (Hasan, 2006: 18). When the sectarian conflict arose in Ambon, Maluku, in 1999 and in Poso Sulawesi in 2000, the organization seized a chance to recruit and train members and send them to those conflict zones (Vaughn et all, 2008: 10).

The political transition from the new order to the reformation era was also marked with the rise of national and transnational terrorism. There were numerous bombings occurring throughout the country including night club, hotel, churches, mosques, shopping center, and other public areas. From 1997 to 2002 there were ninety bombings that injured more than three hundred people and 214 people were killed (Pusponegoro, 2004: 100). On October 12, 2002, the bomb explosion happened at Paddy’s bar and Sari night club in Bali killing 202 people, 82 of them were Australian (Ramakrishna and Seng Tan, 2003: 1). Subsequently, on August 5, 2003, there was a car bombing at a hotel owned by the American, JW.Marrriot hotel chain in Jakarta. This incident killed 11 people and 150 people injured (Ramakrishna and Seng Tan, 2003: 1; Pusponegoro, 2004: 100). The terror attack continued throughout the decade with several bombs detonated at various places. For instance, the bombing of the Australian embassy in 2004, the second bombing in Bali occurred at a bar and a restaurant in 2005. In 2009, another bomb exploded at the JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton hotels in Jakarta. In 2011, a bomb blast occurred at a mosque in Cirebon West Java and at a church in Solo Central Java (Kompas, 2010: 1; Vivanews, 2011), and the recent bomb exploded in Thamrin Street Jakarta in 2016.

These bombing attacks were linked to militant Islamic group such as Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia and Jemaah Islamiyah (Barton, 2004: 78-79; Singh, 2010: 47; Jones, 2005: 3; Sukma, 2003: 341; Fealy, 2005: 25). It was reported that JI was responsible for several bombing including a bomb at the Philippine ambassador’s residence in 2004, the first and the second bombing in Bali in 2002 and 2005, the bombing at the Australian embassy in 2004, and a series of bombing attacks at hundred churches across Indonesia during Christmas Eve in 2000 (Crouch, 2005: 44; Singh, 2003: 37; Kingsbury and Fernandes, 2005: 18). In addition, JI was also associated with earlier terror attacks, for example bombing at Istiqlal mosque in 1999, at two churches and at the Atrium mall in Jakarta in 2001 (Singh, 2003: 37). Furthermore, JI and its militias groups, Laskar Jundullah and Laskar Mujahidin, were involved in fighting against Christians in the Maluku and Poso conflict (Chrouch, 2005: 40).

The incident of those terror attacks and the involvement of people affiliated with the Islamic radical groups in such actions are evidences that Indonesia faced a serious internal challenge from terrorists and Islamic militancy. Although, several terrorists including the emir of JI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, were arrested by Indonesian police and some received the death penalty, the underground terrorists’ movement seems to be exist in some part of Indonesia (Kompas, 2010: 1; Vivanews, 2011; the economist, 2010). For instance, Nasir Abas, a former leader of JI who is now helping Indonesian police, mentions that the death of the leader of JI, Nordin M.Top in 2009 has not stopped terrorism in Indonesia. This is because one person killed does not mean the ending of the
extremist ideology. This ideology still remains in the heart and mind of the followers which is much more dangerous (Straits times, 2009).

In more recent time, Indonesian radical have been recruited to fight for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria (ISIL/ISIS). In August 2014, the Indonesian police arrested two people in Depok West Java as suspected supporters of ISIS (Liputan6, 2014). Even, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, from his jail, had encouraged his followers to support ISIS, his messages had been delivered to Mohammad Achwan, the leader of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (the organization of which Ba’asyir was as the former leader) (BBC Indonesia, 2014). Therefore, this paper has objectives to answer these two questions namely; how did terrorism evolve in Indonesia and what is the relationship between terrorism and radical Islamic militancy in Indonesia?

**Literature Review**

There has been much research on terrorism and Islamic militancy in Indonesia over the last decade. After the Bali bombing 1 in October 2002, many analysts and scholars studied this issue. Besides, these events became an important turning point for Indonesia to take part against extremism like issuing some regulations and counter terror law (Sebastian, 2003: 363-365). Thus Sebastian argues (2003) that although there were terrorism and many bombings before 2002, the Indonesian government seemed to be reluctant to take serious action against JI as the “suspected” group supporting terrorism (Sebastian, 2003: 358). In addition, before the Bali bombing the Indonesian government also failed to take action against radical groups like Laskar Jihad and Front Pembela Islam/FPI (Front of Islamic Defender) which engaged in violence and breached the law (Smith, 2005: 110). From a similar perspective, Sahni (2003) argues that the Indonesian leadership tends to hide the fact that there was terrorism in their homeland, and they hesitated to deal seriously with this threat (Sahni, 2002: 4).

After the Bali attack, there were growing concerns on the issue of terrorism and Islamic militancy in Indonesia. This incident demonstrated that the threat from “the radical Islamic group” was real. In addition, there was also the possibility of international terrorist elements involvement in this case that were connected in a network with al-Qaeda, as Sukma argues (Sukma, 2003: 350-353). Batley similarly argues that some of the detainees in the bombing cases were members of JI. In February 2003, three among the 19 arrested people for the Bali bombing were alleged to be JI’s members (Batley, 2003: 21). Furthermore, this attack and the following bombing blast in August 2003 at JW.Mariot hotel in Jakarta are seen by some commentators viewing Southeast Asia particularly Indonesia as a “terrorists heaven”, as Desker argues (Desker, 2003: vii). In April, June and July 2003, there were 41 JI suspects arrested in relation with the bomb at JW.Mariot hotel in Jakarta (Batley, 2003: 20). In this context, some commentators argue that due to these arrests of those bombing suspects and the existence of the organization of JI, it demonstrated how radical Islamism had an International dimension in Indonesia (Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 125). Besides, there was evidence that some important members of JI had developed relationships with other radical Islamic movements in other countries. Even, many members of JI were trained in Pakistan (Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 128).

Break Batley (2003) particularly addresses the relationship between JI and other transnational radical groups (Batley, 2003). He wrote a book entitled “The Complexities of Dealing with Radical Islam in Southeast Asia, a Case Study of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI)”. In this book, he argues that JI had evolved a “branch” or cell structure across Southeast Asia including cell in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippine, Singapore and Thailand. In each country, the cells have a special board which is responsible for their operations in each area. JI had also developed a regional network and trained their member at their pesantren (Islamic boarding school) and mosques. They use Islamic sentiment and ideology to convert and to radicalize new members and to build their regional network (Batley, 2003: 11-17). In addition, they
to utilize halaqah or small study group to teach and spread their jihadist ideology (Batley, 2003: 11-17). Imam Samudra, the organizer of the Bali bombing, promoted several halaqah in pesantren and state Islamic senior high schools which are headed by the supporter of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). They met and played videos showing the violence by Christians against Muslim in Moluccas and Poso. From these meetings, some of the participants were invited to the next stage of intensive training called daurah in which they are trained to be involved in the terrorist operation (Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 120). Moreover, Batley shows that JI developed close relationship with other hardliner groups in Southeast Asia such as Philippine Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Malaysian Mujahidin group (KMM), Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia, Laskar Jihad and Laskar Jundullah in Indonesia (Batley, 2003: 19-20). JI, Singh argued, has linkages with the Arakan Rohingya National organization in Myanmar, and Gerakan Mujahidin Pattani Islam in Thailand (Singh, 2003: 24).

The detailed character of the network of JI in Southeast Asia was also explored in the work done by Zachary Abuza (2003). He describes that every cell of JI in each country has functions to support the work of JI either with funding, recruiting new members, or providing logistic (Abuza, 2003: 128-140). For instance, the Malaysian cell is responsible for establishing commercial companies which is connected with al-Qaeda and has the capacity to buy weapons and to gathers the material to make bombs. The Philippine cell by contrast is responsible for the main logistics like purchasing explosive bombs, arsenals, and other facilities. The Singapore cell is in charge of the planning of actions and the attacks. Meanwhile, the Indonesian cell is the coordinating center of JI operation (Abuza, 2003: 128-140).

The existence of JI and other radical Islamic groups in Indonesia is not moreover a new phenomenon. As Vaughn and Sydney Jones show, historically, JI is closely related to the Darul Islam movement that emerged in 1948 in West Java and sought to establish shariah law in Indonesia (Vaughn et.all, 2008: 10; Jones, 2005: 5). Two of the important figures of JI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar are the ideological successors of Darul Islam’s founder (Vaughn et.all, 2008: 10). In 1992 Abdullah Sungkar stepped out from Darul Islam and then he formally established JI on January, 1, 1993 (Vaughn et.all, 2008: 10). Fealy (2005) argues that between 1993 to 2000, JI focused on establishing the organization and its network by recruiting new members, training, generating fund, preaching to and teaching the wider society (Fealy, 2005: 25). The first bomb explosion associated with JI was in May 2000 at a church in Medan North Sumatra. Then on Christmas Eve in the same year, there were more than 30 bombings at several churches across Indonesia (Fealy, 2005: 25). It was followed by other bombing actions in the next years culminating at nightclub bomb in Bali (Fealy, 2005: 25).

After the death of Abdullah Sungkar in 1999, Jamhari and Jahroni argue that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir became the emir of JI and established an organization named Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in 2000 (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004: 48). This organization aimed to build an Islamic state in Indonesia and it is claimed that most of the members coming from many regions are originally member of Darul Islam who want to revive the Islamic state ideal (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004: 49). Feillard and Madinier claimed that Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia provided a political window for JI to be heard (Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 134). Subsequently in 2008, Ba’asyir founded a new organization named Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) after he left MMI. In 2010, JAT was suspected of providing funds for a JI training camp in Aceh (Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 130-134). The position of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir toward terrorist operation was questioned for many years whether he was directly involved in operation or merely called for radical reform of the state. He was prosecuted in relation to terrorist attacks after 2002 but he often evaded sentencing or revived short sentences. Only in 2011 was he sentenced to 15 years imprisonment due to proof of his involvement in several terrorists attacks (BBC, 27 February 2012).
The literature on JI from 2000 demonstrated the involvement of people associated with the radical Islamic groups in the terrorist attacks and showed an evolving relationship between terrorism and Islamic militancy as previously discussed. However, most of those studies focused on JI and its transnational network. Besides, they focused on the cases of Bali Bombing and other bombing occurring from 2000 to 2005. Therefore, this research exercise differs from the earlier researches, while drawing upon it because it addresses terrorism and Islamic militancy in Indonesia from 2001 to 2012. This study fills the gap, provides some insight through the chronicle of the cases during that period, and shows why the terrorist engaged in those actions.

**Theoretical Framework**

This research chronicles the evolution of new terrorism and its relationship with Islamic militancy in Indonesia. To examine those aspects, various frameworks are applied. The first thing that arises in addressing the phenomenon relates to the definition and scope of terrorism. Although there is no fixed definition of this word, terrorism in this research is defined as terror, intimidation, attack, and violent actions against other peoples conducted by non-state actors (Aly, 2011, 4-5). In this study, it focuses only on a series of attacks especially bombing cases undertaken by non-state actors in several parts of Indonesia between 2001 and 2012. These years were a period when many bombing attacks happened in this country as previously discussed and caused serious casualties (Pusponegoro, 2004: 100; Ramakrishna and Seng Tan, 2003: 1; Kompas, 2010: 1; Vivanews, 2011).

To know how those people are associated with the Islamic radical groups, it is necessary to look at the background of the terrorists. As previously discussed, some of the detainees related to the terrorism are member or former member of certain Islamic groups like *Jemaah Islamiyah*. From this point, it can be assumed that there is a link between those people with the Islamic radical group. Therefore, this study briefly analyzes the structure and thinking of certain Islamic groups which are considered as the “radical” group such as *Jemaah Islamiyah, Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia* and *Darul Islam* to establish the relationship between their religious understanding and their recourse to violent action (Crouch, 2005: 43-45). Then, this research seeks to place these groups in the broader context of Indonesian Islam, as the Islamic radical groups are minorities living in a society generally recognized as moderate in its Islamic approach to politics (Hughes, 2010: 76).

To examine these phenomena, the ideology of Islamism is examined. Barton (2004) mentions that to understand the Islamic movement and political parties, it is necessary to look at the ideology and belief system of the organization (Barton, 2004: 28). In relation to this, “Islamism” is one of the ideological frames through which to understand this movement. Islamism, unlike the moderate views of Nahdlatul Ulama, considers Islam profoundly linked to religious and political purification. It means that Islam is not only the belief system but also political ideology; in other words, they will endorse Islamic law and promote an Islamic state (Barton, 2004: 29-30). Furthermore, the main ambition of the Islamists is remaking the world. Regarding this matter, Tibi (2012) argues that “Islamism is not about violence but as the order of the world” (Tibi, 2012: 15). In this sense, Islamism serves as the central ideology of the political challenges. The reformed political order is based on the concept of *Dawla Islamiyya* (Islamic state), and *Hukumiyyat Allah* (God’s rule) (Tibi, 2012: 15).

In this context, a further aspect that needs to be looked at is the motivation of the terrorists. This is an important step to understand the world-view of the radical Islamist groups. In order to know the terrorists motives, there are several elements that should be looked at namely; firstly, how the terrorists create their enemy. Generally, their ideology and belief system will influence them when constructing their enemy (Drummond, 2002: 56). For instance, a study done by Pavlova (2003) mentions that the radical Islamists consider that the modern society does not follow the Islamic order and secularism and capitalism have
returned the world to the period of ignorance or *Jahiliyya* (the time before Islam and Muhammad’s reception of the message). Hence, modern states with their ruling elites are categorized as breaking the God’s law and deviating from the path of Islam. Therefore, the radical Islamists will see those not following the path as their enemy (Pavlova, 2003: 32). To reinforce this Manichean division of the world, terrorists give their enemy certain labels like *kuffar* (infidel) and they seek *fatwas* (religious instructions) to justify their actions (Pavlova, 2003: 32; Drummond, 2002: 56). Religion, in this case, is used as the basis of their deed and as the reason to gather people’s support, then it is used to achieve their aim in establishing the Islamic state and a new world order (Aly, 2011: 39-40). Secondly, as a result the terrorists argue that violence is justified and they perceive killing the enemy not as murder but part of their moral obligation (Drummond, 2002: 60-61). In some cases, Islamic radical groups see this as part of the *jihad* to implement *syariah* law and to reach their goals (Khan, 2006: 172-187). In the case of the Bali blast, Smith (2005) argues that the main purpose of their action is to create an Islamic state in the region and to demonstrate a form of solidarity toward al-Qaida (Smith, 2005).

**RESEARCH METHOD**

This study follows a process tracing case study approach. It is a case study of terrorism and Islamic militancy in Indonesia from 2001 to 2012 or it could be described as evaluating Islamism from the reformation era onward. As such, a qualitative approach is used in this research. According to George and Bennet (2005) a case study focuses on the depth of data and identifying setting of the case which can be applied to make inferences (George and Bennet 2005, 31-32). In relation to this idea, this research refers to the argument proposed by Bailey (1994) who said that a case study can be interpretive. It means that it not only describes the data but also interprets it (Bailey, 1994 in Menabb, 2004: 359). To do this, there are several steps as follows; (a) identifying and selecting the case as the focus of the study; here I selected “terrorism and Islamic militancy in Indonesia” as the case for the study, (b) classifying the data based on the issues namely; the chronicle of terrorism in Indonesia, the actor and their motives, the terrorist groups and their networks, (c) analyzing and interpreting the data.

Data was collected using documentary research. This method is used to gather data on the chronicle of emerging terrorism and Islamic militancy in Indonesia. This comprises primary and secondary data. The primary data includes testimony of the terrorists published in the mass media, books written by some actors involved in terror actions, and records of interviews with the people involved in terror attacks that are published in Western and South East Asian as well as Indonesian media. Meanwhile, the secondary data consists of government documents, law, news from the media, and scholarly papers on this topic either books or journal articles.

**The Origin of Terrorism and Islamic Militancy in Indonesia**

The chronicle of terrorism in Indonesia dates back to the colonial history of this country. Before the independence of Indonesia, Muslim societies were involved in fighting against the Dutch and Japanese colonization. At that time, when the country did not exist and consisted of a thousand islands composed of various languages, traditions and cultures, Islam played an important role as the unity among them (Effendy, 2003: 15). Islam is also used to mobilize people to participate in the battles against colonialism. For instance, Islam became catalyst of the war of Padri against Dutch colonial in Minangkabau West Sumatra from the 1920s to 1938, although the main purpose of this revolt is actually to gain an economic control over coffee trading (Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 9). Another example is the Java war from 1925 to 1930, the leader of this revolt, Prince Diponegoro, used Islam to mobilize people with an Islamic teaching background to fight against the infidels (the Dutch) (Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 9).

The Dutch policy, at that time, tried to restrict
Islam as the main focus of the independent movement. They tried to marginalize the role of religious leaders by working with the traditional *abangan* aristocracy or *priyayi* in Java. *Priyayi* were the elites who had power to control and to manage people. These aristocrats were selected by the Dutch as the senior administrator who were always superior to the religious leaders (Abuza, 2003: 61). Meanwhile, during this period many Islamic groups emerged as prominent in the nationalist movement (Abuza, 2003: 61; Effendy, 2003: 16). For example, *Sarikat Islam* (Islamic association) was the first political organization led by H.O.S Tjokroaminoto, Agus Salim and Abdoel Moeis. This organization was formed from the *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (Islamic trading association) founded by H Samanhoedi in 1911 in Solo (Effendy, 2003: 16-17; Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 13).

The main purpose of *Sarikat Islam* was to achieve an independent Indonesia. However, the Islamic nationalist organization suffered from the introduction and growing influence of Marxism. In 1917, the ideology of Marxism started to influence *Sarekat Islam* and undermined and caused the decline of this group. The two prominent supporters of Marxist ideology are Semaun and Darsono, the leaders of *Sarekat Islam* branch in Semarang. This situation resulted in two factions in the organization; the Islamic and the Marxist who fought over defining the movement and agenda. In 1921 during the Surabaya congress, the Marxist faction was expelled from the organization, but this could not stop internal disputes and fragmentation (Effendy, 2003: 16-17; Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 13). Lastly, from 1930 onward, *Sarekat Islam* along with other activists and intellectuals such as Syahrir and Mohammad Hatta who had education background from the Netherlands, created a nationalist movement against the colonialists (Effendy, 2003: 16-17).

Afterwards, in 1912 Muhammadiyah was created by Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta. This organization represented the moderate Muslim and reformists which has developed good networks with mosques, educational institutions and charity organizations (Ricklefs, 2012: 19; Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 11-12). Then, in 1926, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was formed. This organization showed a traditional response to the modernist Islamic organization and a challenge to the authority of the traditional Islamic scholars (*kyai*). These two organizations focused mainly on non-political matters such as education, social, economy and health issues (Abuza, 2003: 61; Ricklefs, 2012: 19). NU became a political party after separating from Masyumi. NU participated in the 1955 election (Ricklefs, 2012: 83-84). In 1973 the New Order government issued a regulation on political parties that required nine existing parties to merge into two parties; (a) Partai Perjuangan Indonesia (PDI, Indonesian Democracy party) for those national and Christian based parties, and (b) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, Development Unity party) for parties with Islam as the religion followed by majority of the constituents including NU (Effendy, 2003: 49).

It should be noted in the evolution of Indonesian political Islam that from 1941 to 1945, Japan came and occupied the East Indies (pre-Indonesian country). Japanese policy was different from the Dutch; they started to use Islam to gain sympathy and to fight against Westerner influence. They built an office for religious affairs in charge of dealing with the Islamic problems at the local level (Abuza, 2003: 63; Effendy, 2003: 27). The Japanese attempted to merge all Muslim organizations into one entity. In this case, the Masyumi became a single organization representing all those organizations and the sole Islamic political party. Moreover, the Masyumi became a leading actor in fighting against Dutch and in pursuing independence after 1945 (Abuza, 2003: 62).

In the period from 1940s to 1950s, the idea of Islam and the state was spreading throughout the country (Abuza, 2003: 62; Mietzner, 2009: 74). There were heated debates between nationalists and Islamists about whether Islam should be included in the Jakarta charter or not, and whether the newborn country should use *Syariah* as the basis of state law or not (Barton, 2004: 68).
For instance, Mohammad Natsir, the leader of Masyumi, promoted *daulah Islamiyah* (Islamic state) for Indonesia. On the other hand, Soekarno, the nationalist leader, preferred a secular state (Azra, 2003: 49).

One day after the declaration of the Indonesian independence, on August 18, 1945, Wahid Hasyim (the leader of Nahdlatul Ulama) and other Islamic scholars such as Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Kasman Singodimedjo, and Teuku Mohammad Hassan made a compromise and dropped the sentence “in accordance with the Islamic doctrine and *tauhid*” in the first of the *Pancasila* (five principles of Indonesia). They changed it to “belief in God is one” (Barton, 2004: 68). They also approved to remove some Islamic elements from the state law including; Islam as the official religion of the nation, Islam as a requirement for Indonesian president, and all Muslims have to practice Islamic law (Effendy, 2003: 32). Post colonial Indonesia was not, therefore, an Islamic state although Indonesia is a nation with the largest Muslim population in the world (Azra, 2008: 52). However, the debate regarding the relationship between Islam and the state had not ended. Some people were upset with the decision of the nationalist leadership. One of them was Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo, a former member of Masyumi (Azra, 2008: 49; Kingsbury and Fernandes, 2005: 11). He was disappointed in the state political ideology and the strategy toward the Dutch in preventing them from coming back to re-colonize the nation (Effendy, 2003: 35; Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004: 17).

On November 15, 1946, the Indonesian government signed a Linggarjati agreement with the Dutch. This agreement mentioned that the Indonesian government approved to work under the United State of Indonesia, and both Indonesia and the Dutch agreed to withdraw their armies and made clear boundary for both of them. Consequently, the Siliwangi (troops) division had to leave West Java and move to Central Java. Kartosuwirjo, as the deputy defense minister, rejected this idea because it disadvantaged Indonesia (Singh, 2003: 7). Then, in 1948 Kartosuwiryo declared the creation of *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (TII, Islamic army of Indonesia). In early 1949, there was a clash between *Darul Islam* (DI, the abode of Islam) and the new state’s troops. It was happened when the Siliwangi troops rallied to West Java after Yogyakarta was attacked by the Dutch on December 1948 (Mietzner, 2009: 87). In July 1949, Kartosuwirjo declared a Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, Islamic state of Indonesia) with its headquarters in West Java (Conboy, 2004: 138; Singh, 2003: 6-8). The exact date of the birth of DI was debatable, but it was generally said that it was on August 7, 1949, along with the declaration of NII (Fealy, 2005: 16-17).

DI spread to other parts of the country and continued to fight against the Dutch and to challenge the Indonesian nationalist government. The fight was to last for many years (from 1949 to 1965) across the country including South Kalimantam, West Java, Central Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi (Fealy, 2005: 17). In 1962, Kartosuwirjo received the death penalty and the activities of DI were repressed by the military. However, the ideology and the spirit of establishing an Islamic state have never ended (Conboy, 2004: 138-139; Fealy, 2005: 20-21; Mietzer, 2009: 86-87; Kingsbury and Fernandes, 2005: 11). The first reappearance of DI was *Komando Jihad* (holy war command). It was a militia group founded by Dodo Mohammad Darda, the son of Kartosuwirjo (Conboy, 2004: 140). Consequently today, DI was recognized as the embryo of the current Islamic militancy and radicalization in Indonesia (Conboy, 2004: 138-139; Fealy, 2005: 20-21; Mietzer, 2009: 86-87; Kingsbury and Fernandes, 2005: 11). DI actively recruited new members through many ways, not only using traditional based support like *pesantren* but also enlisting members at the universities and at senior high schools. From these places, they built networks and cells for activities. Besides, they held series of discussions at mosques (Fealy, 2007: 70).

The characteristic of DI ideology can be seen from its leader perspectives on several aspects related to their own struggle (Fealy, 2005: 20). Kartosuwirjo used Islamic terms in delivering his thought such as (a) *jihad* or *perang suci* (holy war)
to explain their action, (b) mujahid to describe people involved in the holy war. These people’s action were called as jihad fi sabillilah (holy war for the sake of God), (c) the enemy was described as kafir (infidel) or communists who should be killed due to the religious reasons (Fealy, 2005: 21). DI leaders also distinguished between the Islamic state (darul Islam) and non-Islamic state (dar al-harbi) as their enemy. In this case, the Indonesian republic was considered as the enemy for it was not based on the Islamic law. Moreover, the true Muslim had to follow the Darul Islam (NII), whereas other Muslim who did not follow this could be considered as an apostle. This notion was also used as the reason to attack other Muslim outside the DI (Fealy, 2005: 21; Fealy, 2004: 111-112).

**Terrorism and Islamic militancy in the reformation era**

After the first Bali bombing on 12 October 2002, there has been much attention to the terrorism and Islamic militancy in Indonesia. Many scholars mentioned that Indonesia has become a target of terrorists and a source of jihadis from the Islamic militant groups (Ramakrishna and Seng Tan, 2003: 1-2; Thayer, 2005a: 53; Ankersen, 2007: 1). Furthermore, this radical revival of Islamic militancy is also called as the “new terrorism” since the targets are civilians, Indonesians and foreigners (mostly Australian and several Americans, Canadians and Europeans). It is different from the old terrorism focusing their targets on the property related to politics or state assets (Thayer, 2005a: 53).

The attacks on two prominent nightclubs frequently visited by western tourists to the peaceful Bali island demonstrated that a serious terrorists’ threat in Indonesia. Moreover, there is also a threat of Islamic militancy; this can be seen from the confession of the perpetrators of the bombing who are associated with JI (Ramakrishna and Seng Tan, 2003: 1). Among the 30 people arrested by the Indonesian police, there are several prominent actors related to Bali bombing namely Amrozi, Ali Imron, Imam Samudra (the leader), and Abdul Rauf; They are members of JI (Harsawaskita and Laksmana, 2007: 72-73). Besides, these people received their education from the pesantren al-Mukmin, al-Islam, or Lukmanul Hakim, the Islamic education institution affiliated with Ba’asyir (Batley, 2003: 11). Furthermore, Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, another suspected person who was arrested and jailed in Singapore, confessed during his interrogation that Imam Samudra had participated in the previous bombing attack in Jakarta. (Harsawaskita and Laksmana, 2007: 72-73). He also mentioned that JI was responsible for the Christmas Eve attacks in 2000 at various cities in Indonesia and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was involved in the discussion about terror preparation held in Solo Central Java (Harsawaskita and Laksmana, 2007: 72). The arrests of those people depicted that JI in Indonesia had links with other radical Muslim groups. Indeed, it was predicted that terrorism in Indonesia was interrelated with those militant groups (Singh Daljit, 2003: 205).

The Bali incident was occurred just one year after the 9/11 2001 tragedy, the attack on the World Trade Center, in New York the United States of America, so that this received international attention. The focus was on a new type of the terrorism and how the Islamic extremists have relations with international groups (Kingsbury, 2005: 1; Thayer, 2005a: 54). Regarding this issue, there is a significant debate over whether Islamic militant groups in Indonesia have relationships with transnational terrorists like al-Qaeda and other groups or not. One of the reports released by the Brussels-based International Crisis group (ICG) in August 2002 mentioned that there was no evidence about the relationship between al-Qaeda and Islamic radical group in Indonesia (Barton, 2005: 76-77). This report focused on the Pesantren Al Mukmin, Ngruki located in Solo Central Java which was led by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir; he was also the founder of Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) (Barton, 2005: 77).

Another source described that there is a connection between al-Qaeda and the militant groups in Indonesia. Time magazine, as quoted by Barton (2004), states that Omar al-Faruq, a
Kuwaiti, was involved in a camp established by Indonesian Islamist militants in Borneo. Al Faruq had received training for three years at a camp associated with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Besides, he had close relationship with camp leaders, al-Mughira al Gazairi and Abu Zubaidah who both were close to Osama bin Laden. Al-Faruq married an Indonesian through Agus Dwikarna (Barton, 2004: 16-17). Besides, it was mentioned that Al-Faruq was the senior operative of al-Qaeda in Indonesia (Williams M.G, 2003: 88).

The Indonesian intelligence agency also disclosed that four members of MMI including al-Faruk and Dwikarna were involved in the camp. In March 2002, Dwikarna was arrested at Manila port by the Philippine police. A month later, in April 2002 Zubaidah was caught in Pakistan (Barton, 2004: 17; Sukma, 2003: 351). Later on, during the judiciary session 26 March 2002, Mohammad Ikhsan also known as Idris, a witness and a suspected of Bali Bomb 1, said that Osama bin Laden gave US $ 30,000 to Mukhlas (Suhendi, 2012). Mukhlas also known as Ali Ghufron, another detainee of Bali bomb 1, was reported as the coordinator of the Bali bombing (Bately, 2003: 7). Before Idris’ confession, Ali Imron mentioned about that money too during the tribunal at the state court in Jakarta (Suhendi, 2012; Susanto, 2012). This is an evidence that the Islamic extremists in Indonesia have links to al-Qaeda (Suhendi, 2012; Susanto, 2012; Thayer, 2005).

The network between local extremists and the international group is a symbiotic relationship. Vaughn et.al (2008) mentions that they share a training camp in some countries including the Philippines (in Mindanao), Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, al-Qaeda offered financial aid and technical expertise for operational matters to JI (Voughn.et.all, 2008: 11; Thayer, 2005: 55). Furthermore, JI is believed to represent al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. Moreover, after the Singaporean government took action on the JI cell in Singapore, the JI leadership was moved to Indonesia (Gunaratna, 2003: 141).

The link between al-Qaeda with the local extremists in Indonesia was shown at the guise of Laskar Jihad as well (Chalk, 2002: 115). Laskar Jihad was a militia group; the wing of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Waljamaah (Sunni communication forum). It was founded on 30 January 2000 as a response to the communal conflict in Moluccas in which they saw this conflict as the intentional assassination toward Muslim community (Chalk, 2002: 115; Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004: 88-89). Therefore, they send their fighters to Moluccas to help their fellow Muslims fight the Christian “Kafir” (Chalk, 2002: 115; Hefner, 2008: 36).

The leader of Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar Thalib, called involvement in that battlefield as jihad. To justify this action, he sought a fatwa from Muslim authorities in the Middle East, al-Abbad of Medina said that going to the conflict zone in Moluccas was lawful since it was to defend their fellow Muslims from attacks. Similarly, An-Najm of Mecca mentioned that jihad in Moluccas was mandatory for Muslims to help their brothers. He described three types of helping based on their abilities; either with their body, their wealth or their mind (Hasan, 2006: 116-117; Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004: 100-102).

Meanwhile, Ja’far Umar Thalib, a son of Abdullah bin Amir bin Abi Thalib from Yemen, had experiences of involvement in the war zone. He was engaged in the Afghan war against Soviet Union in 1987. He was firstly trained in Peshawar camp and then became the leader of volunteer troops in Syria. In the Afghan war, he joined the group named the Hisb-i-Islami under the leader of Gulbudin Hekmatyar. Afterwards, he joined the group Jami’at-i-Islami directed by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (Hasan, 2006: 71). After his arrest and subsequent release in 2002, however, Ja’far Umar Thalib disbanded Laskar Jihad (Hefner, 2008: 37; Hasan, 2006: 210).

Before the Bali tragedy, Indonesia experienced several bombing attacks. For instance, in 2000 there were several bomb explosions at churches in different cities during Christmas Eve (Crouch, 2005: 44). Regarding this case, it was reported
that Omar Faruq confessed as the mastermind of this action (Barton, 2004: 14). In addition, Umar Patek, the suspected of the Bali Bomb 1, was also reported responsible for attacks at six churches in Jakarta (Natalia, 2012). In the same year, there were other bomb blasts at the Philippine embassy that caused the death of two people and at Malaysian embassy, as well as a bomb at Jakarta stock exchange building that killed 10 people (Saifullah, 2009). One year later, there were four incidents namely, a bomb at Santa Ana church and HKBP church; caused five people died, a bomb at Plaza Atrium Jakarta, a bomb at KFC restaurant in Makasar, and a bomb at the front of the Australian international school (Saifullah, 2009).

After the Bali attack, the threat of terror continued. In 2003, there were three bomb attacks: at the Soekarno-Hatta International airport; at the police headquarters in Jakarta; a suicide bomb attack at JW Marriot hotel in Jakarta; (Singh, 2003: 28; Saefullah, 2009; Jones, 2010: 120). Then, On September 9, 2004, a bomb was detonated at the Australian embassy in Jakarta. In total the bombings took 18 lives, all Indonesian (Saefullah, 2009). In 2005 another bomb exploded at a bar and a restaurant in Bali at Kuta and Jimbaran Bay which is responsible for 31 deaths. (Bali post, 2005). Besides, there were other bomb attacks in other places during this year; in Tentena, Ambon and at a market in Palu Sulawesi (Saefullah, 2009).

This data demonstrates that after the fall of Soeharto, also known as the reformation era terrorism had emerged in Indonesia. From 2001 to 2005, there were bomb blasts each year that caused hundreds of deaths and injured (Bali post, 2005; Saefullah, 2009; Jones, 2010: 120; Harsawaskita and Laksmana, 2007: 72-73). The perpetrators in each case were arrested and sentenced, but this did not put a stop to the violence. This suggests that the terrorists are not ended just because the main actors of terrorism JI were jailed or killed (Kompas, 2011). In addition, as a consequence of the greater political openness, Islamic militancy and radical groups resurfaced during these years (Ricklefs, 2012: 409-410; Mietzner, 2009: 281). The militant groups were MMI, Lakar Jihad, JI, Komando Jihad, and FPI (Jamhari and Jahroni, 20-28). (Vaughn, 2008: 15; Singh, 2003: 27-28; Barton, 2004: 17-19).

MMI was officially declared as an organization on August 7, 2000 in Yogyakarta. It was a response to Muslim political repression during the old and new order era (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004: 48-49). The main aim of this organization is to build an Islamic state for the reason that the essence of Islam is both a religion and a state (din wa daulah) (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004: 49). Moreover, the creation of MMI is intended to serve as the political wing of JI (Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 124). In addition, it is understood that most of the MMI constituents are former members of Darul Islam (DI). Among those people involved in MMI are Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (Jones, 2005: 5) who created this organization along with Irfan Awwas, Surya hardi and Mursalin Dahlan (Singh, 2003: 38). At that time, Ba’asyir thought that during the reformation era there were opportunities for them to establish an Islamic state since there was much more political tolerance (Singh, 2003: 38).

Following the death of Sungkar, Ba’asyir became the main ideological pillar of their movement. (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004: 56-57). In 1971, they had founded a Pesantren al-Mukmin also known as Pesantren Ngruki in Solo Central Java (Barton, 2004: 49). In the later period, this pesantren formed the basis of what the International Crisis Group called the “ngruki network” (Wildan, 2013: 191; Singh, 2003: 39).

Ba’asyir and Sungkar had long opposed the government policy and promoted an Islamic state. In 1977, Sungkar and Ba’asyir created a group named Jemaah Mujahidin Anshorullah; this was also known as another form of DI (Singh, 2003: 18). A year later, Ba’asyir and Sungkar were arrested by Indonesian government due to subversion indictment. They were alleged that they tried to destroy Pancasila, the ideology of the state and attempted to promote an Islamic state (Jones, 2005: 5). Another source mentions that they were...
accused because of their participation in Komando Jihad, an Islamic militia (Singh, 2003: 18). In
court, Sungkar confessed that he established a community (jemaah) as a way to fight against communism (Kingsbury and Fernandes, 2003: 19). Both of them were sentenced to nine years in jail, but later the sentence was decreased to three years on demand.

In 1985, Ba’asyir and Sungkar fled to Malaysia where they built an Islamic school in Johor as the training based camp and created additional networks (Kingsbury and Fernandes, 2003: 19; Jones, 2005:5; Mietzner, 2009: 90). Malaysia became a safe haven for Ba’asyir and Sungkar. This network helped them when recruiting volunteers for participating in the war against Soviet Union in Afghanistan (Barton, 2003: 31). In addition, Ba’asyir and Sungkar actively recruited people from other countries including Malaysia and Singapore to participate in the military training in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Thayer, 2005: 69).

During their stay in Malaysia, Sungkar formed JI in 1993 (Fealy, 2005: 25). Meanwhile, Ba’asyir was known as the spiritual leader of this JI (Smith, 2005: 113). Sungkar claimed that this group was different from DI (Thayer, 2005: 69). However, to say that this group totally different from DI in reality was quite difficult. This is because historically both DI and JI members were interrelated. These two groups also share some of the basic principles such as promoting Islamic state, the differentiation between darul harbi and darul Islam, the distinction between true Muslim and infidel (Jones, 2005: 25-26). The main goal of JI is to build the Islamic state and Islamic community throughout Southeast Asia (Fealy, 2005: 25; Jones, 2010: 199). In the 1990s, Sungkar met with several leaders of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden at the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. He also pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden during that meeting (Abuza, 2003: 127).

From 1993 to 2000, JI focused their activities on developing the network, recruiting members, educating members, enhancing the members’ skill and capability (Abuza, 2003: 129; Fealy, 2005: 112). To create external links, Ba’asyir and Sungkar delegated Hambali and Jibril as their deputy. During this period, JI was not involved in terror action or attacks (Singh, 2003: 40-41; Abuza, 2003: 128-129). In this stage, Hambali made linkage successfully with Islamic movements in Southeast Asian countries such as KMM, MILF, Abu Sayaf and other groups. He also established a business company selling palm oil to Afghanistan. This business was intended to make money for financing logistics and material for their actions (Singh, 2003: 41).

During the political transition in 1998, there was an opportunity for some “extremists” to return to Indonesia. In 1999, Ba’asyir and Sungkar returned to Solo Central Java. They came back to Pesantren Ngruki and continued teaching (Thayer, 2005: 69; Abuza, 2003: 141). Sungkar died in late 1999. This death caused friction within JI, it was reported that younger militants were not satisfied with Ba’asyir as the new leader. They argued that Ba’asyir was considered too weak and was easily influenced (Thayer, 2005: 70). In 2000, Ba’asyir founded MMI as an umbrella for Muslim community to promote syariah (Islamic law) for Indonesia and to build daulah Islamiyah (Islamic state). To reach this goal, MMI conducted legitimate activities such as teaching, publication, public sermons, campaign, seminar, and rallies (Fealy, 2004: 113-114).

On the other hand, the more militant members of JI started to play a more “extreme” role, Hambali, Imam Samudra, and Muchlas also known as Ali Ghurfron actively created a plan for violent actions (Thayer, 2005: 70). For instance, Hambali activated the Malaysian cell to attack Western properties; however al-Qaeda did not follow his instruction (Thayer, 2005: 70). Hambali also planned the “Singaporean attack” in 1999 and initiated other attacks including Christmas Eve bombing in 2000, attack at the Philippine embassy in Jakarta in 2000, Bali bombing 1 in 2002, and bombing at the JW. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2003 (Singh, 2003: 41).

After the second Bali attack in 2005, there
was no further major incident related to terrorism until 2009. During this period, the Indonesian police had arrested many important terrorists and attempted to dismantle JI link (SuaraMerdeka, 2005; Jones, 2010: 172). For instance, in 2005 detachment 88 (special group of Indonesian police) searched for terrorist’s house successfully in Malang East Java and killed Azhari Husein, the Bali bomb maker (SuaraMerdeka, 2005; Jones, 2010: 172). In 2007, other important figures of JI were arrested namely, Abu Dujana (the leader of JI militia) and Zarkasih (the new leader of JI). In addition, several suspected people of the Bali attack had been arrested in 2005 including Hambali, Faiz Bafana, Abu Jibril and Abu Rusdan (Jones, 2010: 172).

On 17 July 2009, bombing was renewed with two attacks in Mega Kuningan Jakarta. One suicide bomb attack was at JW Marriot hotel, and another suicide attack was at Ritz Carlton hotel. These explosions killed seven people (BBC, 2013; Siradz, 2009). One year later, on 15 April 2010 Muhammad Syarif exploded himself during the Jum’at praying at a mosque in the police complex in Cirebon West Java. On September 2011 another suicide bombing occurred at Bethel Injili Church in Solo Central Java (Bbc, 2013).

There are different opinions regarding whether the new attacks were affiliated with JI. One report issued by police office mentioned that the suicide bombers at Mega Kuningan were invited by Ibrohim who was part of the West cell of JI (Jakarta and Bogor) under Saifudin Zuhri as the leader (Republika, 2009). Ibrohim worked as a florist for both hotels; he masterminded the terror action with Saifudin Zuhri and Noordin M Top, the masterminds of bombings in 2003, 2004 and 2005 (Republika, 2009; Liputan6, 2009). However, Al Chaidar, a terrorism expert, said that the actors of the Mega Kuningan terror were not JI, since the name of JI was not used anymore. Nevertheless, he mentioned that they were associated with Pesantren Ngruki due to the fact that Nur Said, one of the suspected actors, was an alumnus of the Pesantren (Okezone, 2009).

The bombing in Cirebon in 2010 was reported as the work of the underground group Tauhid Wal Jihad. This group was established by Aman Abdurahman in 2003 (Beritasatu, 2011). Detachment 88 mentions that from the collected evidence, Syarif (the suicide bomber) might learn to make bomb from Sigit Qardhawi, the leader of Hisbah team and the leader of Laskar in Solo. Sigit was involved in the bomb attack at the police office and a church in Solo in 2010. The ideology of Tauhid wa Jihad had some similarities with JI as they use violence to achieve the Islamic state. In addition, people in this group studied “Bergabung dengan khalifah suhada” translated by the Arafah group which was part of JI (Beritasatu, 2009). In addition, Indonesian intelligent argues that people in this group received training from Sogiri and Rois (suspects of the Australian embassy attack). These two were students of Azhari (the chief JI bomb maker) (Beritasatu, 2009). Although, the recent bombs are undertaken by a new generation of radicals, Ansyad Mbai, the chief of BNPT (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, the National board for counter terrorism) considered that they have links to JI. This can be seen from their modus operandi that was similar with the past cases (Bbc, 2012).

**Indonesian Islam and the Terrorists’ Motives**

Indonesia as a country with the largest Muslim population in the world has many variants of Islam. Clifford Geertz classically divided Muslims in Java into tree types namely (a) Abangan, the nominal Muslim peasantry living in a rural areas, this group is also characterized as syncretism between Islam and Hinduism as well as Animism or the old Javanese traditions. (b) Priyayi, the aristocratic class and also syncretism in tendency and, (c) Santri, the strict Muslim practicing Islam or the conservative and traditional Islam (Du Bois, 1961: 603; Benda, 1962: 404-405; Azra, 2003: 39). Meanwhile, in the recent era the distinction of these Muslim are not referred to the occupation or place of living, but more the religious orientation and their political affiliation (Du Bois, 1961: 603).
Moreover, Geertz also describes that majority Muslims in Indonesia are generally nominal Muslims or *abangan* (Azra, 2003: 39-40). In this sense, Indonesian Islam was recognized as different from the Middle Eastern Islam or less Arabized (Azra, 2003: 40).

Islamic based organizations that have various ideologies existed in Indonesia. Muhammadiyah and NU are the two biggest Muslim organizations and are considered a moderate groups (Ricklefs, 2012: 408). Besides, there are many other organizations such as Persis and Al-Irsyad which concern on social aspect and providing education (Abdullah, 2013: 75-76). Meanwhile, other scholars mention that the *santri* group had influenced the life of community. This can be seen from the transformation of the society who tends to be more orthodox. For instance, more Indonesians now travel to Mecca for pilgrimage, and distribute alms giving and donation to the needy. Institutions for collecting and distributing alms were created like Dompet Dhuafa Republika, along with the establishment of Islamic banks and Islamic insurance (Azra, 2003: 40-43). Smith further argues that the orthodoxy in the practice of Islam in Indonesia reflected “Arabisation” and the opposition to the idea of democracy as well as “Neo-Salafi” (Smith, 2005b: 100).

The dynamic of Islam in Indonesia is also influenced by global factors. For instance, the Middle East continued to influence Indonesian perspectives like the idea of pan-Islamism and Wahabism (Azra, 2003: 43-44). In the past, Wahabism influenced the Padri’s movement in West Sumatra in which they tried to impose the literal understanding of Islam, but they were not successful. This group used some terms like *jihad* and *dar-alharbi* in order to fight against colonialism (Azra, 2003: 44). The Wahabist ideology influenced on the contemporary radical groups too (Batley, 2003: 4). In quoting the Qur’an and Hadith, JI preferred to use the raw understanding of Islam and choose the most suitable parts for their actions such as the verses on *jihad* and Islamic law (Batley, 2003: 4).

The contemporary radical Islamic groups like JI and MMI have objectives to build an Islamic state that is generally different from the mainstream Islam in Indonesia (Azra, 2003: 51). Also, there are many other factors which influenced those militant groups such as political marginalization and the hatred toward the West (Feillard and Madinier, 2011: 271). The JI interpretation of certain Islamic texts had given them legitimacy to fight against their “enemy”. One of them is “*jihad*”, this term can be traced back in the JI’s commands and objectives. It is stated at the JI’s charter that *Jihad mussalah* (military struggle) is the final stage of JI’s planning. This *Jihad* is a way to prepare an Islamic state, and to build the Islamic caliphate accordingly (global Islamic governance) (Pavlova, 2007: 82).

The declaration of *Jihad* against their enemy including the West legitimated radical groups to use violence (Dolnik, 2007: 108). This can be perceived from their attacks from 2000 to 2012 (Pusponegoro, 2004: 100; Crouch, 2005: 44; Singh, 2003: 37; Kingsbury and Fernandes, 2005: 18; Kompas, 2010: 1; VivaneWS, 2011). The attitude of militant groups toward *jihad* differentiated them from the majority Islam. Mainstream Islam usually emphasizes their interpretation of *jihad* as a non-violent action and only favored *jihad* when under attack (Fealy, 2007: 66).

Some terrorist attacks in Indonesia used suicide bombings as the strategy for their *jihad*. It was started at the Bali bomb 1 on 12 October 2002; a man detonated himself at Paddy’ Bars cafe and another bomber exploded a van loaded with 1000 kg of bombs outside the bar (Dolnik, 2007: 110).

Suicide bombing continued in the following years: in 2003, Amir Latin Sani exploded himself at J.W Marriot hotel in Jakarta; on 1 October 2005, the explosion in Jimbaran food court in Bali was undertaken by suicide bombers named Muhammad Salik Firdaus, Misno, and Ayib Hidayat; on July 2009, Dani Dwi Permana was the suicide bomber at J.W Marriot hotel in Mega Kuningan Jakarta; Nana Ikhwan Permana exploded himself at Ritz Carlton hotel in Megakuningan Jakarta; on 15
April 2010, Muhammad Syarif exploded himself at a mosque near police office in Cirebon West Java; on 29 September 2010, Abu Ali exploded himself near a police officer in Bekasi; on 25 September 2011, Ahmad Yosepa Hayat was the suicide bomber of Bethel church in Solo Central Java; on 3 June 2013, an unidentified bomber exploded himself in front of the police station in Poso South Sulawesi (Bbc, 2013; Chim and Si Yew and Song, 2007: 2; Widjaya, 2007).

The act of suicide bombing in Indonesia is called “pengantin” (bride). This term reflected their doctrine that those martyrs will receive a reward “meeting fairy” in heaven. Abu Wildan, a friend of Noordin M Top, described that a suicide bomber dies as syahid (a martyr) (Kristanti, 2009). These “will-be brides” (calon pengantin) were recruited by Nordin M Top and his followers. Nordin’s network had recruited young people and trained them for being a martyr/syahid. For instance, Saifudin Jaelani also known as Saifudin Zuhri recruited Dani Permana and Nana Ikhwan Permana. Saifudin Zuhri claimed himself to be an ustad (an Islamic teacher), he brainwashed those “will-be brides” with the doctrine of jihad (Widjaya, 2011; Kusaeni, 2009).

The doctrine of suicide bombing was related to the idea of “martyrdom” or self-sacrifice. Martyrdom was accepted as a way to promote the sect. Martyrdom was different from “suicide” as this martyrdom was self-sacrificing for the name of God, and the logic behind the action was for jihad (Cook, 2005: 142-143). However, besides the religious belief, the strategy of suicide bombing by radical groups was cheap. For example, the bomb explosion in Bali II only cost $700 (Dolnik, 2007: 110). This type of attack results in many casualties (Dolnik, 2007: 110-118).

The targets of bombing blasts in Indonesia are various from night clubs, to embassies and religious places. It can be said that every target has its meaning and purposes. The attack at the night club in Bali is a symbol of fighting against the West (Hafidz, 2003: 396). During the Bali trial, the key offenders mentioned that they committed their terror attack for jihad against the US and its allies as well as fighting against the negative moral effects brought in by Westerners (Hafidz, 2003: 396). One of the offenders described that the Bali bomb target was initially the US, but most of the victims were Australian. This reflected al-Qaeda warning to Australia for its involvement in East Timor (Smith, 2005: 112). Similarly the attacks at JW.Marriot and Ritz Carlton, two hotels with many foreign visitors, were also a symbol of elites and Western investment (Saefullah, 2009; Widjaya, 2011; Smith, 2005: 112).

JI and its network declared the US and non-Muslims as their enemy or their targets (Kompas, 2011:1). The hatred against the US was spread by media outlets. (Batley, 2003: 8). The Bali bomb was a revenge attack for the killing of Muslims in many parts of the world such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Palestine, Bosnia, Kashmir and Iraq (Fealy, 2005: 29). Imam Samudra, the perpetrator of the Bali attack, said that “there was genocide toward Muslim communities in the Philippine and Poso, Ambon as well as other places, therefore as a Muslim I have to repay them; blood paid by blood, life paid by life” (Fealy, 2005: 29). Furthermore, the bomb attack at the Philippine embassy was intended to show solidarity with separatist groups in Southern Philippines. Meanwhile, bombings at several churches were aimed to symbolize the dispute between Muslim and Christian and also as revenge for violence in Ambon and Poso (Smith, 2005: 112).

The post 2010 targets were different from the earlier cases for mosques and police stations became targets such as bombing in Cirebon in 2010 and Poso in 2013 (Bbc, 2013; Chim and Si Yew and Song, 2007: 2; Wijaya, 2007). From the testimony by Bayu Setiono, the bomber in Solo Central Java, it can be understood that the police station represented non Islamic government that also must to be fought. Here is his testimony:

“Dan rencana kami buat pecah Solo atau amaliyah Solo. Target-target kami adalah a parat toghut, aparat polisi itu direncanakan sudah bertahun-tahun.
Sekitar tahun 2007-2008 hingga sekarang. Dan salah satu itu pula alumni Filipina atau Moro, yang namanya Farhan dari Jakarta. Dia di Filipina dua tahun. Di sana dia sekolah militer dan pulang ke Indonesia tahun 2012. Disitu dia sudah membawa senjata api, 200 amunisi dan granat. Di situ di membantu pemecahan Solo. Dan membuat aparat aparat toghut ketakutan. Insya Allah tegaknya Syariah Islam dan khilafah Islamiyah. Dan kami juga terdiri dari. Sekitar enam orang. Salah satunya donatur kami, dan lima yang lain adalah alumni Al Mukmin Ngruki Sukoharjo lulusan 2010. Kecuali saya.” (Sindonews, 2012).

“and our plan was to break Solo and amaliyah Solo. Our targets were toghut governance (government that does not follow the God’s instruction), we have planned this police office as the target for many years, around 2007 to 2008 until now. One of the alumni from the Philippine or Moro named Farhan originated from Jakarta. He was in the Philippine for two years. He studied military and came back to Indonesia in 2012. In that place, he collected weapons, 200 ammunitions, and grenades. In that area, we broke Solo, and make toghut officers afraid. God willing for the sake of syariah Islam and khilafah Islamiyah (Islamic state). We were six people. One of them was the donor; five of them were alumni of Ngruki Sukoharjo 2010 except me”.

The terrorist network is also changing as well as the shifts of targets. Dolnik (2007) mentions that there were many new factions in JI that emerged related to suicide bombing. The attack on the JW Marriot hotel 2009 might come from a new faction named Laskar kar (special force) led by former leader of JI mantiqi III. The bomber for Bali case came from the Thoifah Muqatilah (combat unit) (Dolnik, 2007: 111-112; Jones and Solahudin, 2014: 140). In the later period, the extremists were engaged in low-tech assaults (Jones and Solahudin, 2014: 140). For instance the suicide bombing near police station in Poso in 2013 was intended to create more casualties. Yet, it only killed the suicide bomber (Jones and Solahudin, 2014: 140-141; Bbc, 2013).

CONCLUSION

The chronicle of terrorism in Indonesia dated from the colonial past of this country. It started with the revivalist movement during the colonial era; Masyumi, NII and TII all contributed elements to the forming of DI in the post-colonial era. The struggles of Kartosuwirjo, the leader of NII and TII against the Dutch and against the idea of an Indonesian secular state were the main spirit of the DI. Besides, the main aim of this organization was to establish an Islamic state and to implement Syariah law, the ostensible aim of contemporary jihadis. This organization was, in other words, the embryo of the contemporary of Islamic radical groups such as MMI and JI due to the similarity of their ideology and their members, family and kinship interconnections.

From many reports, the terrorists in the majority of bomb attacks across Indonesia are associated with JI. Primary and secondary evidence show that the perpetrators confessed that they were members of JI. The targets of terrorist were various including bars, churches, mosques, hotels, embassies and police offices. Each of these targets had its meaning such as a symbol of the West, symbol of the “toghut” state, and symbol of the capitalist. The doctrine of jihad becomes the ideological support to engage in the terror action. This can be seen from the involvement of martyrs in suicide bombings as they were ready to die for the sake of religion.

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