Quantum correlations (entanglement) between light beams is a subject of considerable activity leading to novel applications such as quantum cryptography, quantum computation and quantum teleportation. As an alternative to classical cryptography, quantum cryptography methods based on correlation of a single photon pair have been widely studied over the past years. They have lead to protocols permitting to transmit confidential messages safely. On the other hand, few results have been presented for systems with a large number of photons such as correlated quadratures. The use of intense photons beams could present numerous technological advantages in comparison to the use of single photons pulses. Photon counting detectors are much more efficient to detect squeezed light and its transmission through an optical fiber can be done over a much longer distance.

In particular, Pereira et al. have proposed a scheme in which a coherent light beam containing the message is transmitted through an adequate superimposition with two entangled beams of squeezed light. Since each of the two entangled beams is a noisy channel, they need to be recombined in order to decrypt the message. In this approach, the noise is used to hide the message which becomes thus unreadable during the transmission.

Based on similar considerations, we aim at developing a “quantum public key” based cryptographic scheme. The public key method is widely used nowadays in classical cryptography. It consists in two keys. The first key is public and known to everybody i.e. to the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) of the message and a possible undesirable third party. On the contrary, the second key is private and known only by the receiver of the message. The procedure is the following: Bob sends the public key to Alice who uses it to encrypt the message; then Alice sends back the encrypted information to Bob who is the only one able to decrypt it thanks to the private key. In this scheme, the essential idea is that the encryption is public in the sense that anyone, including a third party, can encrypt a message but any decryption process must require necessarily the knowledge of the second key. In this manner, messages are transmitted through public channel with strict confidentiality.

In this letter, we investigate theoretically a quantum public key scheme similar to the classical one. We devise a scheme in which the “q-private” and “q-public” keys consist in each of the two entangled photon beams respectively. We analyse a process to encrypt an analog message using the “q-public” light beam. The confidentiality of the message is guaranteed since the second “q-private” light beam is needed for the decryption process. The prefix “q-” has been added to remind the quantum character of the signal produced which, to the contrary of a classical signal, cannot be necessarily reproduced. The non-cloning theorem indeed prevents making an exact copy of an unknown quantum signal. Thus, the q-public beam is accessible only to any first user including a third party.

The non-cloning theorem is also the basic idea from which one can prove that the transmission is secure against an eavesdropper (Eve). The impossibility of reproduction prevents Eve from having access to any quantum state without modifying it. Such a modification makes her vulnerable to any subsequent detection by the sender and/or the receiver. As far as security is concerned, we formally prove for the first time, to our knowledge, the vulnerability of an eavesdropper to any external intervention during a communication process using continuous variables. However, we point out that this result does not imply the absolute security of the transmission since the vulnerability of Eve does not mean that she will be necessarily detected. An appropriated protocol of communication is required to detect that eavesdropping has occured. This essential issue is not completely discussed in this letter and remains still open in the case of continuous variables.

Let us start with the description of the quantum public key based scheme. Suppose that Alice wishes to send a message to Bob. To this purpose, Bob produces an EPR state consisting of two entangled beams characterized by the photon annihilation operators $\hat{a}_1$ and $\hat{a}_2$. Written in occupation photon number representation, this state...
has the form:

$$|\Psi\rangle = \exp\left(r\hat{a}_1^+\hat{a}_2^+ - r\hat{a}_1\hat{a}_2\right)|0\rangle_1|0\rangle_2 = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} c_n|n\rangle_1|n\rangle_2 \quad (1)$$

where $c_n = (\tanh r)^n / \cosh r$ and $r$ is the squeezing real parameter. Bob then sends beam 1 to Alice and keeps beam 2 in his laboratory. Since Bob has access to the beam 2, he is the only one able to carry out any measurement on the total wave function $|\Psi\rangle$. Alice or Eve, however, is restricted to carry out a measurement of any observable concerning the subsystem of the beam 1. All the information available to them is extracted only from the diagonal density matrix resulting from the partial trace of the total wave function over the unknown beam 2:

$$\hat{\rho}_1 = Tr_2(|\Psi\rangle\langle\Psi|) = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} |c_n|^2|n\rangle_1\langle n| \quad (2)$$

With the “q-public” beam received from Bob, Alice encrypts the secret message by making a unitary transformation $\hat{M}$ which modifies the total wave function but not the density matrix. Consequently, $\hat{M}$ should verify the following criteria:

$$\hat{M}|\Psi\rangle \neq |\Psi\rangle \quad (3)$$

$$\hat{M}\hat{\rho}_1\hat{M}^\dagger = \hat{\rho}_1 \quad (4)$$

Then Alice sends the beam 1 back to Bob which, thanks to the second “q-private” beam is the only one to decrypt the message. Another alternative is that Alice carries out some measurement herself on the beam 1 and sends the results to Bob through a public classical channel. The use of such a classical public channel avoids the blockability of the system by Eve and thus is secure against a split-universe attack \[10\]. Since the density matrix has not been altered in the encryption process, one does not observe the presence of the message in the signal received by Bob.

Among the many existing possibilities, the phase transformation:

$$\hat{M} = \exp\left(i f(\hat{a}_1^+\hat{a}_1)\right) \quad (5)$$

satisfies both criteria \[3\] and \[4\]. $f(x)$ could be any real function. For convenience, we choose a simple linear function $f(x) = \theta x$ which transforms the coefficients $c_n \rightarrow \exp(i\theta n)c_n$. The constant $\theta$ is the analog quantity containing the message that Alice encrypts. In comparison with \[3\], in our encryption process, the message is really “invisible” in the signal and thus cannot be distinguished from the noise.

After the phase transformation, the field operator associated to the first beam becomes $\hat{a}_1' = \hat{M}^\dagger\hat{a}_1\hat{M} = \exp(-i\theta)\hat{a}_1$. An efficient way to decrypt the information is to measure observables for which the EPR state is an eigenstate. Because of the difficulty to get access to some of them in experiment, one uses rather the quadrature components operators:

$$\hat{Z}_1' = \hat{a}_1 e^{-i\phi_A} + \hat{a}_1^+ e^{i\phi_A} = e^{-i\theta}\hat{a}_1 + e^{i\theta}\hat{a}_1^\dagger \quad (6)$$

$$\hat{Z}_2 = e^{-i\theta}\hat{a}_2 + e^{i\theta}\hat{a}_2^\dagger \quad (7)$$

where $\theta_A = \phi_A + \theta$. $\phi_A$ and $\theta_B$ are the phases of the local oscillators used by Alice and Bob, respectively, in their homodyne measurements and determine which quadrature they select for their measurements. $\theta_B$ must remain private to Bob whereas $\phi_A$ must be communicated in public to Bob at some stage of the protocol.

Although the EPR state is not an eigenstate of these operators, the uncertainty in the quadrature difference $Z_+ = \hat{Z}_1' - \hat{Z}_2$ is close to zero as the squeezing parameter $r$ becomes large and $\theta_A + \theta_B = 0$. We notice indeed from the expression \[4\] that:

$$\langle|\Psi|\delta^2 Z_+|\Psi\rangle = 2 \left| \cosh 2r - \cos(\theta_A + \theta_B) \right| \sinh 2r \quad (8)$$

$$r \gg 1 \quad 4 \sinh 2r \sin^2 \left(\frac{\theta_A + \theta_B}{2}\right) \quad (9)$$

On the other hand, the introduction of non opposite phases $\theta_A + \theta_B \neq 0$ generates for large $r$ a quantum uncertainty which appears under the form of fluctuations during the measurement of the quadrature difference. In this manner, the message is obtained by determining the intensity of the noise resulting from these fluctuations \[13\].

Fig.1 depicts a possible setup. The two EPR “q-private” and “q-public” beams are generated through a nondegenerate parametric down conversion process. They result from the fluorescence of a pump beam passing through a type II crystal acting also as an optical parametric amplifier (OPA) \[8\] [11, 12, 13\]. The quadratures components are measured in a homodyne detection with the help of local oscillators fields (LO). The pump field, which generates the two EPR beams via parametric down conversion, is obtained by an intermediate second harmonic (SHG) step as usually. While Bob carries out the homodyne detection of one quadrature of beam 2 for phase $\theta_B$, Alice encrypts the message $\theta$ by modulating the beam 1 phase (e.g. by means of an electro-optical modulator), before carrying out the measurement of the quadrature $\phi_A$. Finally, Alice sends back to Bob the results of her measurement through a public classical channel.

Let us now discuss the matter of the vulnerability of Eve to any subsequent detection by Alice and/or Bob. Let $\hat{Z}_1'$ and $\hat{Z}_2$ be the observables measured by Alice and Bob respectively. Suppose that Eve tries to have access to the “q-public” beam 1 and thus modifies it by means of an unitary transformation:

$$\hat{a}_1E = \hat{U}^\dagger\hat{a}_1\hat{U} \quad (10)$$
The unitary operator \( \hat{U} \) could depend on other external degrees of freedom (observables) introduced by Eve. For example, Eve could use another photon beam or other modes of the same beam but taken at a different time or even a detector in view of a measurement on the beam 1. We denote by \( |\nu\rangle \) a basis of the Hilbert space characterizing these external degrees of freedom and assume that \( |0\rangle \) is the initial state before the modification. Then the state after the unitary transformation is \( \hat{U}|\Psi\rangle|0\rangle \). Let us define the probability distribution to find the system with the values \( z_1 \) and \( z_2 \) of the quadrature component observables \( \hat{Z}_1' \) and \( \hat{Z}_2' \):

\[
P(z_1', z_2) = \langle \Psi | \delta(z_1' - \hat{Z}_1')\delta(z_2 - \hat{Z}_2)|\Psi\rangle
\]

(11)

After Eve’s action the probability distribution becomes:

\[
P_E(z_1', z_2) = \langle 0|\langle \Psi | \hat{U}^\dagger \delta(z_1' - \hat{Z}_1')\delta(z_2 - \hat{Z}_2)|\Psi\rangle|0\rangle
\]

(12)

To avoid that Eve presence is revealed, both probability distributions must be equal for the particular values of \( \theta_A \) and \( \theta_B \) chosen by Alice and Bob. On the other hand, Eve is vulnerable to detection, whenever there exist possible choices of \( \theta_A, \theta_B \) (possible homodyne measurements made by Bob or Alice) for which the probability distribution of the measurement outcomes is changed by Eve’s action.

**THEOREM**: If Alice measures only one quadrature \( \hat{Z}_1' \), Eve attack is not vulnerable to a successive detection by Bob if and only if \( \langle \nu | \hat{U}|0\rangle \) is a function only of the quadrature operator \( \hat{Z}_1' \).

**PROOF**: When \( \langle \nu | \hat{U}|0\rangle \) commutes with \( \hat{Z}_1' \) then the \( \hat{U}'s \) cancel each other in (12) and trivially:

\[
P_E(z_1', z_2) = P(z_1', z_2)
\]

(13)

On the contrary, let us examine the consequence of requiring (13) for all possible choices of the quadrature \( \hat{Z}_2' \) measured by Bob but only for the state \( |\Psi\rangle \) given by (1). Taking the Fourier transform on \( \nu_1 \) and \( \nu_2 \), the equation

FIG. 1: Schematic set-up for the “quantum public key” based cryptography with continuous variables

\[
\begin{align*}
P(z_1', z_2) & = \langle \Psi | \delta(z_1' - \hat{Z}_1')\delta(z_2 - \hat{Z}_2)|\Psi\rangle \\
\end{align*}
\]

(11) becomes:

\[
\langle 0|\langle \Psi | \hat{U}^\dagger e^{i\hat{Z}_1' s_1} e^{i\hat{Z}_2 s_2} \hat{U}|\Psi\rangle|0\rangle = \langle \Psi | e^{i\hat{Z}_1' s_1} e^{i\hat{Z}_2 s_2}|\Psi\rangle
\]

(14)

This equality should be satisfied for any value of the real parameters \( s_1, s_2, \theta_B \). The last two can be replaced by the more global complex parameter \( \xi = \xi_X + i\xi_Y = e^{i\theta_B} s_2 \), in such a way that \( \hat{Z}_2 s_2 = \xi \hat{a}_2 + \xi^* \hat{a}_2 \). Let us introduce:

\[
T_{n,n'}(\xi, \xi^*) = 2 \langle n'| e^{-i(\xi \hat{a}_2^\dagger + \xi^* \hat{a}_2)} |n\rangle_2
\]

(15)

A calculation shows that for all occupation number \( n \) and \( n' \) of the beam 2:

\[
\int \frac{d^2 \xi}{\pi} T_{n,n'}(\xi, \xi^*) e^{i(\xi \hat{a}_2^\dagger + \xi^* \hat{a}_2)} = |n\rangle_2 \langle n'|
\]

(16)

Applying this transformation to (14) and using the property of entanglement of (1), we eliminate the states describing the second beam since \( \hat{U} \) does not affect beam 2. We obtain for all occupation numbers \( n \) and \( n' \) for beam 1:

\[
\langle 0|_1 \langle n'|_1 \hat{U}^\dagger e^{i\hat{Z}_1' s_1} \hat{U}|n\rangle_1|0\rangle_1 = \langle n'|_1 e^{i\hat{Z}_1' s_1}|n\rangle_1
\]

(17)
Operating the inverse transformation of the matrix element in the right hand side, we get:

\[
(0 | 1 \langle n' | \hat{U}^\dagger e^{iZ_{1'}s_1} \hat{U} e^{-iZ_{1's_1}} | n⟩_1) = δ_{n',n}
\]  

(18)

Without loss of generality we can write the explicit dependence of \( \hat{U} \) on the observables associated to the first beam as \( \hat{U} = \hat{U}(Z_{1'}, Q_{1'}) \), where \( Q_{1'} = (a_1 e^{-iθ_1} - a_1^\dagger e^{iθ_1}) / i \) is the observable canonically conjugated to \( Z_{1'} \). Noticing that the exponential operator is the generator of translations i.e. \( e^{iZ_{1's_1}} \hat{Q}_{1'} e^{-iZ_{1's_1}} = \hat{Q}_{1'} - 2s_1 \), Eq. (18) becomes:

\[
(0 | 1 \langle n' | \hat{U}^\dagger (Z_{1'}, Q_{1'}) \hat{U} (Z_{1'}, Q_{1'} - 2s_1) | n⟩_1) = δ_{n',n}
\]  

(19)

Because two normalized states with unity scalar product are necessarily equal, we infer that for all \( n \):

\[
\hat{U}(Z_{1'}, Q_{1'}) | n⟩_1 = \hat{U}(Z_{1'}, Q_{1'} - 2s_1) | n⟩_1
\]  

(20)

We conclude that, for any state \( |ν⟩ \), \( \langle ν | (Z_{1'}, Q_{1'}) | 0⟩ \) does not depend on \( Q_{1'} \) or equivalently it depends only on the quadrature operator \( Z_{1'} \) measured by Alice.

**COROLLARY:** If Alice chooses to measure between at least two distinct and non opposite quadratures, Eve attack is not vulnerable if and only if \( \hat{U} \) does not interact with the beam 1 and acts only onto the state \( |0⟩ \), i.e.:

\[
\langle ν | 1 \langle n' | \hat{U} | n⟩_1 = δ_{n',n}υ
\]  

where \( υ \) does not depend on \( n \).

**PROOF:** From the theorem, we deduce that for each non opposite quadrature we must have the dependence \( \hat{U}(Z_{1'}) \). Since the quadratures are independent, the only possibility is that \( \hat{U} \) is independent of any observable relative to the beam 1 or is of the form \( 21 \).

One direct consequence of the theorem and its corollary is that if there is any element of randomness in the choice of the quadrature \( Z_{1'} \) made by Alice, then Eve cannot safely extract any information about beam 1 and therefore about the message. This element of randomness can be introduced as a random choice between two distinct and non opposite values \( φ_{A} \). Alternatively the message itself can be a random sequence of phase shifts \( θ \), chosen at least between two distinct and non opposite values. Thus, Eve is also vulnerable in the case of a digital transmission in which for example, Alice restricts her measurement to two orthogonal quadratures.

The facts that the probability distributions must be equal for any value of \( θ_{B} \), that the second beam has been kept private and that \( |Ψ⟩ \) has the entangled form \( 21 \) permits to achieve the proofs. If the value of \( θ_{B} \) remains fixed, the linear transformation cannot be carried out since the integration in \( 24 \) must be done over all \( θ \). If Eve has access to the second beam, then the unitary operator depends also on \( a_2 \) and \( a_2^\dagger \) and the passage from \( 24 \) to \( 17 \) is not necessarily valid. Finally, if \( |Ψ⟩ \) is different and for example is a disentangled state, then the beam 1 might be cloned by Eve and therefore she can obtain information without being detected.

The vulnerability of Eve does not mean that she will be necessarily detected by Bob. When Bob receives a message, how can he know a priori that eavesdropping has occurred? For example, Eve can block Bob’s public beam and can replace it with a public beam of her own. Alice proceeds as planned and sends the results of her measurement to both Bob and to Eve. Eve decrypts the correct message but Bob gets the wrong message. To avoid this situation, Bob must be able to check that some expected correlations are recovered. One possibility is the introduction of some redundancies in the message which can help him to detect the presence of the third party. For example, Alice sends twice portions of the message. Any external intervention is detected if two identical portions are not recovered. Therefore, a strategy of communication or protocol is needed in order to guarantee the absolute security of the transmission. The study of such protocols requires further investigation and is beyond the scope of this letter.

In summary, we developed a “quantum public key” scheme for encrypting a message by means of quantum correlated beams. This scheme is based on the principle that any decryption of the message requires both measurements of a “q-private” key signal and an encrypted “q-public” key signal. Directions for a future research work include, in addition to the study of secure protocols, the imperfection in the photon counting of the detector and the possibility of loss in the transmission which degrades the correlations.

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