ETHIOPIA’S QUEST FOR FRONTIER RECOGNITION FROM SOMALIA: A BRIEF HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

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Abstract
The frontier acknowledgment quest of Ethiopia towards the Somalia Republic was and continued to be one of unending diplomatic strain in African politics. The acknowledgment quest of Ethiopia was recurrently engulfed by the counter self-determination quest of Somalia Republic. Apparently, the differing stance on colonial agreements, the active role of the military on the foreign policy direction of Somalia; the discovery of natural gas and oil on the controversial frontier area, Ogaden; along with headstrong political thought frustrated the quest of Ethiopia for frontier recognition. This article intended to chart a new insight for the frustration of the much-anticipated frontier acknowledgment quest of Ethiopia in the face of Somalia Republic, mainly paying particular attention to differing stance on colonial agreement, hegemonic computation and the issue of self-determination vs. frontier acknowledgment. In the process of analysis, untapped archival documents from the Ethiopian National Archive and Library Agency (ENALA) together with secondary works of literature are employed.

Keywords: Frontier, Ethiopia, Somalia, controversy, self-determination

Öz
Etiyopya'nın Somali'den Şıır Tanıma Arayışı: Kısa Bir Tarihsel Analiz
Etiyopya'nın Somali Cumhuriyeti'ne yönelik sınır tanıma arayışı, Afrika politikasında bitmeyen diplomatik baskılarдан biri olmaya devam etti. Etiyopya'nın sınır tanıma arayışı, Somali Cumhuriyeti'nin kendi kaderini tahmin etme sorunu yüzünden tekrar tekrar yutuldu. Etiyopya ve Somali arasındaki sömürge anlaşmaları konusundaki farklı duruş, ordunun Somali'nin dış politika yönündeki aktif rolü; Ogaden adı verilen tartışmalı sınır bölgesinde doğal gaz ve petrolün bulunması, Etiyopya'nın sınır tanıma arayışı hayal kırıklığına uğrattı. Bu makale, Etiyopya'nın Somali Cumhuriyeti karşısında merakla beklenen sınır tanıma görevinin hayal kırıklığıyla ilgili yeni bir içgörü çizmeyi amaçladı. Özellikle bu makale Etiyopya ve Somali arasındaki farklı

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(Makale Gönderim Tarihi: 11.08.2020 - Makale Kabul Tarihi: 23.12.2020)
duruşlar gibi sömürge anlaşması, hegomonik hesaplama ve kendi kaderini tayin hakkı ile sınır tanıma meselesi üzerinde özellikle dikkat eden konuları tartışmaya çalışmıştır. Analiz sürecinde Etiyopya Ulusal Arşiv ve Kütüphane Ajans'ından (EUAKA) kullanılmamış arşiv belgeleri ve ikincil edebiye t eserleri kullanılmıştır. 

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sınır, Etiyopya, Somali, tartışma, kendi kaderini tayin etme

Context

Following its victory at the battle of Adwa in 1896 Ethiopia became one of the bargaining powers in the Horn region and got territorial recognition from neighboring colonial powers. Subsequently, Ethiopia worked to legalize and internationalize its frontier with neighboring European colonial powers such as Great Britain and Italy through signing different sorts of frontier agreements. However, despite Ethiopia got territorial recognition from neighboring colonial powers, it was not easy or even impossible for it to get heartily territorial recognition from the people and government of Somalia Republic during the postcolonial period. The problem was going unsolved and stayed as a figurehead diplomatic issue in Africa in general and in the region of the Horn in focus throughout the 20th century up until today without scoring brief development. So, Ethiopia’s quest to get frontier recognition from Somalia can be asserted as one of those unending diplomatic tracts in the politics of Northeast Africa. Therefore, this study challenges archival and secondary works of literature to give a new insight into matters that hinders Ethiopia to get frontier acknowledgment from Somalia and the effect of an absence of territorial acknowledgment on the relation of the two states. The study also seeks to answer how the issue of territorial integrity and self-determination challenged the frontier relations of the two countries. Apparently, the study helps to understand the dynamics of the Ethiopia-Somalia regional hegemonic computations and its ramification on the relations of the two countries.

The circumstance that enabled Ethiopia to expand its territory towards the Somali inhabited lands of its eastern region is well-known. But it would be beneficial to remember and explain major historical developments that would help us to understand background historical matters between Ethiopia and Somalia to establish the context for the conflicting interests of the two states.

Historical pieces of evidence remark that among the major population movements of northeastern Africa the movement of the Hamitic Somali starched back to the 10th century. It is believed that before their expansion the Hamitic Somali inhabited the coastal area of the Gulf of Aden and gradually expanded southwards to the northern plain of Kenya and the eastern part of Ethiopia. Afterward, most likely between the 16th and 17th centuries, the Ise and Gadabursi Somali tribes extended their area of influence towards Djibouti and to the direction of the present Ethiopian province of Harar. Almost in the same period, the controversial territory of Ogaden became under the control of Darod and Isaq tribes. Subsequently, possibly at the end of the 17th century the Hamitic Somali get it’s present-day ‘population distribution’ in the region of the Horn.¹

¹ Lewis 1965, p.23.
Ethiopia’s Quest for Frontier Recognition from Somalia: A Brief Historical Analysis

Eventually, before the presence of European colonial powers to the Horn region, there were recurrent incursions between the Ethiopian Christian Highland Princes and the Somali tribal heads. Their confrontations were stemmed from the following three factors: i) religious differences between the Christian Highland rulers and the Muslim majority Somalia; ii) economic interest incompatibility was also the other factor in focus for the recurrent clash between the highlanders that largely employed sedentary agriculture and the pastoralist lowlanders that employed themselves on traditional animal husbandry. In their economic interaction, the highlanders usually endure outlet insecurity and their attempt to secure sea outlet trigger confrontation between the two people (the highlanders and the lowlanders). Particularly the geopolitical seating of Zaila port, which was very important for the economic interaction of Ethiopia with the Arab and Far East made the two side to see in a wary eye; and iii) the competition to acquire political supremacy or political overlordship between the highland Ethiopian princess and the Somali tribal heads can also be taken as a means for their disagreement. In the same vein, in the contemporary era the issue of tribalism and extra-regional and extra-continental global actors involvement in the affairs of the two countries (i.e Ethiopia and Somalia) further complicated the relations of the two nations.

However, before the colonial penetration of Europeans to the Horn region the concept of legally recognized frontier and territorial sovereignty was not well developed and well known to both rulers. As a result, the landholding of a ruler expands during the time of his political and military upper hand and drawback to a limited territorial administration during the time of his power frustration. So, individual ruler’s power strength was measured by his popular allegiances and what matters more for a ruler was not defined as territorial jurisdiction rather it was the allegiance or faithfulness of the people to a ruler. Therefore, before colonial penetration, the allegiance of people to the rulers or to a certain system was measured by paying tributes. So, if there was any defined border before the arrival of European colonial rulers to the region, it was fluid and unstable. In line with this, before the era of colonial penetration, no Ethiopian king effectively occupied the Somali inhabited lands of the Horn region except Niguse Negesit Libinedingle, who penetrated to the land of the Somali inhabiting region, in the 15th century, for a brief period. Therefore, landmarked border recognition was not a matter to assert territorial jurisdiction before the colonial era rather the jurisdiction and popular acceptance of rulers were stemmed from tribute payment.

Later, in the last quarter of the 19th century, two vital elements both largely connected with European colonial presence in the region contributed to balance out or changed the existing balance of power in the region of the Horn.
Among factors that changed the existing power relation statuesque between the highland Ethiopian prince and Somali tribal rulers, the first was the coming to power of Niguse Negesit Menelik II. After his coming to power Niguse Negesit Menelik II able to reach all Ethiopian provinces and began to collect tributes effectively. Besides, he began to deal effectively with outside powers. This was true partly because of his diplomatic capability and due to the number of weapons that he collected during his interaction with France and Italy. The second reason for the change of the existing frontier dynamics stemmed from the institutionalization of the idea of territorial sovereignty towards the political environment of the Horn region. As per the colonial expansion of colonizers increased in scale and intensity Niguse Negesit Menelik II also increased the intensity of his territorial expansion and he tried to introduce his defined territorial limit to the colonial powers. It is largely believed that the advisors of Niguse Negesit Menelik II explained to him that the European colonial powers would only give recognition to a well-marked and well-distinct frontier under his jurisdiction. Then Niguse Negesit Menelik II tried to strengthen his stronghold position over the territories under his jurisdiction including the Somali inhabiting land in eastern Ethiopia to avert territorial claim from neighboring colonial powers.\(^5\)

In the meantime, per its interest to expand its colonial frontier in the Horn region, Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1896. However, as a result of the coordinated effort of the Ethiopian patriots together with the leadership quality of Niguse Negesit Menelik II, Italy was defeated at the Battle of Adwa. Subsequently, Niguse Negesit Menelik II wrote a circular letter to the neighboring colonial powers about territorial sovereignty. Afterward neighboring colonial powers signed agreements with Niguse Negesit Menelik II that give recognition to the territorial sovereignty of Ethiopia including the Somali inhabiting land of eastern Ethiopia. Despite the opposition of the Somali tribal leaders the accord helped to legitimatize Menelik’s presence on the Somali inhabited lands of eastern Ethiopia and secure territorial sovereignty at least on the eye of neighboring colonial powers. Nonetheless, it was not possible and continued to be impossible for the Ethiopian authority at different eras to get frontier recognition from the Somali people and government.\(^6\)

So, brief anatomy of Ethiopia’s agreement with colonial powers (Great Britain and Italy) to legitimize its eastern frontier as well as its move to use these agreements as a means to attain its quest to get territorial recognition from Somalia will be presented in this paper. Concomitantly the way Somalia invalidate those colonial agreements which were presented by Ethiopia as a means to request territorial recognition will also be demonstrated in this paper. The other tract of the paper tries to see Ethiopia’s quest for territorial recognition on the bases of the principle of territorial integrity and the reaction of Somalia to Ethiopia’s essence of territorial integrity. In its

\(^5\) ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A “A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden Districts and Somalia”, (1977).

\(^6\) ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A “A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden District and Somalia”, (1977); Barnes, 2010: 122-132; Issa-Salwe, 2000: p.90; Marcus 1994, p.103; Lewis 1965, p.40-41; see also Lewis 1981, p.25-27.
third tract, the paper tries to assess the challenges of regional hegemonic competition on Ethiopia’s quest to ensure frontier recognition from Somalia.

**Differing Stance on Interpretation of the Colonial Era Frontier Agreements**

The colonial-era complicated boundary affinity enabled Ethiopia to develop a good experience on ways of approaching the frontier problems. During the era of colonial scramble, one of the frontier challenges against Ethiopia’s territorial sovereignty was observed on the eastern front. This front’s frontier challenge was particularly from the northern Somali colonial ruler (Great Britain) and southern Somali colonial ruler (Italy). On one side Ethiopia able to secure its frontier sovereignty through military action (a case in point was the 1896 Italo-Ethiopian war at Adwa). On the other side, to avert territorial question and to ensure territorial sovereignty, Ethiopia employed a diplomatic approach and signed different frontier agreements with Great Britain (the colonial master of British Somaliland). After the battle of Adwa, Italy also relinquished its forceful action and signed different frontier accord with Ethiopia.7

Particularly the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian agreement to delaminate the boundary between British Somaliland and Ethiopia as well as the subsequent boundary demarcation work between British Somaliland and Ethiopia, 1932-1934, can be taken as the noticeable diplomatic success for Ethiopia’s quest to get territorial recognition. Concomitantly, the 1896 Italian unequivocal renunciation of its colonial assertion over Ethiopia together with the 1897 Italo-Ethiopian accord to delaminate the Italian Somaliland-Ethiopian boundary was also the other success of Ethiopia in its quest to boundary recognition during the colonial era. The subsequent 1908 Italo-Ethiopian boundary accord and the ratification of the agreement in the Italian parliament to delaminate the boundary between the Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia was the other important step forwarded for Ethiopia’s quest to boundary recognition during the colonial era. However, the boundary demarcation issue between the Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia was not easy and continued to be an interrogation.8

In 1911, while the Ethio-Italian boundary team was under the preliminary process to start the demarcation work, the Italo-Turkish war breakout. Subsequently, the Italian team on the boundary demarcation work urgently called home. As a result, the demarcation work was interrupted. Later after the restoration of Italian administration as a mandate protectorate to the Italian Somaliland in 1950 by the UN, the idea of demarcating Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia resumed. The discussion was begun in 1955 and there was a good discussion on both sides to demarcate the boundary based on the 1908 Italo-Ethiopian boundary accord. However, despite recurrent discussion on the issue consensus was not reached to start the work of demarcation. As a result, the long awaiting goals of Ethiopia to demarcate its boundary with southern Somalia (the Italian Somaliland) aborted

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7 Hall 2003, p.62-65; Touval 1963, p.48; International boundary study, “Ethiopia-Somalia Boundary”, No.153, (1978): Issa-Salwe 1996, p.18; Morone 2015, p.95.
8 ENALA, Ogaden District A4.7.11: Demise Tefera (governor of Kebridahar district) to Maharen Minda (governor of Jigjiga district) “A General Report about Boundary issue and the Security Situation of Ogaden”, (January 5, 1953); Feyisa and Hoehnes 2015, p.122-130.
again. In the meantime the coordinated Somali anti-colonial movement came up with the removal of colonial powers (Great Britain and Italy) from northern and southern parts of Somalia in 1960. Afterward, British Somaliland (June 26, 1960) and the Italian Somaliland (June 30, 1960) became independent and subsequently unified as the Somalia Republic on July 1, 1960. As a result, Ethiopia’s quest for territorial recognition was transferred to the newly independent Somalia Republic. In its request to demarcate the southern Somalia-Ethiopia boundary the officialdom of Ethiopia marked that the issue of demarcation on the side of British Somaliland (northern Somalia) was already done and they noticed no need to open discussion on the issue again.9

In the meantime, to the surprise of Ethiopia, the authority of the new Somalia government unilaterally abrogated the boundary delimitation and demarcation agreements between Ethiopia and the former colonial masters of Somalia (Britain and Italy). In return rather than giving frontier recognition for Ethiopia’s quest the authority of Somalia declared the idea of ‘Greater Somalia’. For instance, in its new constitution which was promulgated in 1960 on Article 4 Somalia asserted that ‘the Somalia Republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means the union of all Somali territories’.10

Meanwhile when Somalia argued its stance to invalidate the colonial agreement and stood against the territorial recognition quest of Ethiopia based on the colonial agreement the following were the major reasoning:

First, Somalia argued, the eastward expansion of Niguse Negesit Menelik II towards the Somali inhabiting lands of eastern Ethiopia in the turn of the 19th century was territorial. Based on the protectorate pact, which was signed between the Somali tribal heads and colonial rulers, the frontier agreement between Niguse Negesit Menelik II and the colonial masters of Somalia (Great Britain and Italy) was also depicted as illegal by the authority of Somalia. Concomitantly, the authority of Somalia showed their position that the treaty of protectorate signed between the Somali tribal heads and colonial powers (Great Britain and Italy) in the last quarter of the 19th century testify persuasively that the treaty of protection was signed supremely aiming to ensure the territorial integrity of the Somali inhabiting lands from external threat.11

The above argument of Somalia can be strengthened by the preamble of the 1884-85 treaty of protection which was signed between Great Britain and the Somali tribal chiefs reads: ‘We the undersigned elders … are desirous of entering into an agreement with the British government for the maintenance of our independence, the preservation of order and other good and sufficient reasons’.12

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9 ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A “A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden District and Somalia, (1977); see also Morone, 1994: p.95; Issa-Salwe 1996, p.18.
10 Onyango 1995, p.97-98.
11 ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.2.268.03A Redan Abdala (Ethiopian Embassy Somalia, Mogadishu) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) “General Reports of Somalia news outlets concerning Ethiopia”, (May 1973).
12 ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A “A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden District and Somalia, (1977).
On the other opinion to invalidate Ethiopia’s quest to use colonial agreements, the new Somali authority argued that in the 1886 supplementary protectorate treaty between the Somali tribal chiefs and Great Britain the latter agreed not to cede the Somali inhabited land to the third party. Besides, Somalia argued, in the 1886 protectorate treaty the British solemnly agreed to protect the territory and people of Somali. This argument of Somalia can be supported by the 1886 supplementary protectorate agreement that on its Article 1, states ‘the British government in compliance of the wish of the undersigning elders…here by undertakes to extend to them and the territories under their authority and jurisdiction the gracious favor and protection of her majesty the Queen-Empress’.

So, the first ground that was presented by the authority of Somalia to oppose the territorial recognition and demarcation quest of Ethiopia was by invalidating the agreement between Ethiopia and northern Somalia’s colonial master (Great Britain). The Somalia ruler associated the invalidity by arguing the Anglo-Ethiopian colonial agreement to delaminate and demarcate the boundary was against the essence of the 1884-86 protectorate agreement between the Somali tribal chiefs and Great Britain.

On the other hand, the authority of Somalia refused to accept Ethiopia’s quest for territorial recognition as well as to resume boundary demarcation for the un-demarcated southern Somali-Ethiopia boundary based on the 1908 Italo-Ethiopian boundary accord. The root for the refusal of Somalia for Ethiopia’s quest was stemmed from the claim of contradiction between the 1908 Italo-Ethiopian boundary accord with the spirit of the 1889 protectorate accord among the Somali tribal chiefs and Italy.

Likewise, the 1889 protectorate accord of Italy and the Somali tribal chiefs stressed the issue of the safety and protection of the Somali against external danger but not on the issue of deciding and ceding lands inhabited by the Somali. For instance, the third paragraph of the treaty states: ‘We have placed our country and all over passion from Ras Awad to Ras El-Kyle (Wadi-Nugal being the farthest limit) under the protection and government of His Majesty’s…’ Accordingly, the authority of Somalia asserted that in 1908 the Italian officialdom signed the frontier accord with Ethiopia without owning a ‘valid title’ on the matter. This was mainly because the protectorate accord did not allow or grant neither to Italy nor to Great Britain to sign frontier agreement to cede the Somali inhabiting lands to the third party. Rather the peerless right given to the colonial authorities was protecting the Somali people. Here it is important to notice that Great Britain and Italy signed the protectorate accords with different Somali tribal chiefs at different time. But the general notions of the accords were almost the same, which is protection.

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13 ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A “A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden District and Somalia”, (1977), see also Mohamed Osman Omar, *The Scramble in The Horn of Africa: History of Somalia 1827-1977*, (Somalia Publication, 2001), :571-575.
14 ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A “A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden Didtrict and Somalia”, (1977).
15 ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A “A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden Didtrict and Somalia”, (1977).
In the same line, while rejecting the quest of Ethiopia, the authority of Somalia argued that during its ratification the territorial accord between Ethiopia and colonial powers (Britain and Italy) did not consult the tribal chiefs and peoples of Somali on the matter. Besides, the rejection of the quest was usually associated with the view that the frontier accords were signed without the knowledge and involvement of the Somali people and the new government of Somalia would not be obliged to accept and to be governed by colonial accords.\(^\text{16}\)

Based on the above argument and assertion, the authority of the newly independent Somalia unilaterally abrogated the frontier agreements which was signed between Ethiopia and Somalia’s colonial masters (Britain and Italy). In the meantime, the Somalia authority started aggressive diplomatic campaign to reunify all the Somali inhabiting lands in the Horn region to form a government entitled ‘Greater Somalia’. In the process of their campaign, they also prepared five stars embalmed flag that every star represents the Somali inhabiting lands in the Horn region such as British Somaliland, the Italian Somaliland, the district of Ogaden in eastern Ethiopia, Northern Frontier District (NFD) in northern Kenya and French Somaliland (Djibouti). Based on this point of departure, the authority of Somalia refused to accept Ethiopia’s quest to frontier recognition that in turn leads the two countries to a long military and diplomatic battle.\(^\text{17}\)

Ethiopia on its part challenged the rejection and the invalidation assertion of Somalia over the 1897, 1932-34, and 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian frontier agreements as well as the 1897 and 1908 Italo-Ethiopian accord. The counter-argument of Ethiopia stemmed from the following points:

Regarding Somalia’s illegality assertion over the frontier agreement during the colonial era, the Ethiopian officialdom argued that the language or the text of the protectorate agreement between the Somali tribal chiefs and their colonial rulers (Britain and Italy) reflects the delivery and surrender of Somalia’s foreign matters for Britain and Italy. Accordingly, the authority of Ethiopia argued that since the tribal heads of the Somali people transferred the mandate of external relation to colonial rulers during the protectorate agreement (1884-89) the new Republic obliged to entertain the colonial-era frontier agreements as a successor state to the British and Italian Somaliland. In its position, for instance, Ethiopia asserted that in the 1884 protectorate accord between Britain and the Issa tribal head the latter agreed, on Article 1, on the following basis: ‘the Easa tribal do hereby declare that they are bound never to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British government, any portion of the territory presently inhabited by them or being under their control’\(^\text{18}\).

\(^{16}\) ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A “A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden District and Somalia”, (1977).

\(^{17}\) ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A “A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden District and Somalia” (1977); ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.2.268.03A, Redan Abdala (Ethiopian Embassy Somalia, Mogadishu) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) “General Reports of Somalia news outlets concerning Ethiopia”, (May 1973).

\(^{18}\) ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A “A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden District and Somalia”, (1977), see also Omar 2001, p.564.
This contract between one of the Somali tribal heads and the British can be taken as a good indicator that the tribal heads of Somali fully transferred and surrendered their capacity to conduct external relations. In such circumstance, it would be very difficult for Ethiopia to consult the tribal chiefs and the Somali people to deal about frontier issues. Therefore, in the absence of local chiefs or any other responsible body to discuss the frontier issue which was very crucial during the period, Ethiopia consulted and signed the frontier agreement with the body that was given legal responsibility to see the case of external affairs on behalf of the Somali people and tribal chiefs.

At other time on the 1886 supplementary treaty of protection between Great Britain and heads of different Somali tribes such as Harbar Toljaal, Harbar Gerhajis, Harbar Awal, and Warsangali, the tribal heads ‘agreed and promise to refrain from entering into any correspondence agreement or treaty with any foreign nation or power except with the knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty’s Government’. The authority of Ethiopia argued that this contractual text between the Somali tribal chiefs and colonial rulers also shows that the tribal heads surrender their right of external relation to the protectors (Britain in this case). So there was no chance for Ethiopia to see the frontier matters with the protected entity but rather with the protecting powers (Britain and Italy). 19

In the same way during the protectorate accord with Italy, the authority of the Somali tribal chiefs transferred the right to foreign relation to Italy. In the agreement, the tribal heads agreed ‘not to make treaties or contracts with any other governments or persons’. So, this consensus between the Somali tribal heads and their colonial masters hinders Ethiopia to access and to consult the people and tribal heads of Somali in a formal and legal way. Based on this, Ethiopia argued, the new government of Somalia Republic should accept those colonial agreements without any reservation. 20

Under other conditions, the protectorate agreement between the Somali tribal heads and colonial powers were not limited to the matter of restricting the external relation of tribal chiefs and the people under their rule, the other way round, there were different indicators that colonial masters (Britain and Italy in this case) had pivotal role in internal issues of the Somali in areas such as trade, politics, duties levied on people, as well as military duties up until the independence of Somalia in 1960. So, in such circumstance, it seems hard and even impossible to think about consultation of the Somali people while signing the frontier accord. 21

On the other hand, Ethiopia asserted, the protectorate agreement was signed with different Somali tribal chiefs and this shows the absence of an organized entity that would play a central role as a government. In line with this, Ethiopia argued that with the absence of a central government that would serve the different tribes as a central agent it does not look correct to undermine the quest of Ethiopia by unilaterally abrogating former frontier agreements with colonial rulers who were legally recognized as agents of external relation for Somali people on the protectorate accord. Accordingly, the Ethiopian authority insisted the Somalia Republic to accept its quest as a successor

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19 Omar 2001, p.571-575.
20 Kebede 1978, p.27.
21 Kebede 1978, p.27.
state for the British dominated northern Somalia (British Somaliland) and the Italian dominated southern Somalia (Italian Somaliland); because as stated above the protectorate accord gave legitimacy for the protector to represent the protected on the issue of external affairs.  

The other way around Ethiopia also urged Somalia to accept its quest claiming the legitimacy of its frontier agreement with the former colonial master of Somalia was accepted by the parliament of Great Britain on July 28, 1897, and approved by Her Majesty the Queen. In the same way, the 1897 and 1908 Italo-Ethiopian boundary accord was ratified by the parliament of Italy on July 16, 1908.

While accepting Article V of the 1908 Ethio-Italy accord, the parliament of Italy states ‘That all of the Ogaden, and all of the tribes towards the Ogaden, shall “remain” dependent on Abyssinia [Ethiopia]’. At other conditions when the League of Nation accepted Ethiopia as its member in 1923 it registered Ethiopia’s eastern front legal frontiers on the basis of the 1897 and 1908 Italo-Ethiopia frontier agreement. In addition, Ethiopia asserted, during the 1934 conflict between Ethiopia and Italy the League of Nation tried to look the case of the two countries on the basis of the 1908 Italo-Ethiopian boundary accord. This shows that the frontier between the two states and the frontier agreement already got international recognition.

The authority of Somalia counter-argued the reasoning of Ethiopia by explaining the legal capacity of a protectorate state on the protecting state. Accordingly, Somalia Republic argued, despite its reliance on the protecting state the protectorate did not totally lose their international identity and are subjects of international law. Concomitantly, Somalia asserted the word protectorate is often used to describe not merely a protected state in the proper sense, but territories such as tribal ones under the indigenous chiefs, which have not the characteristics of states at all and lack statehood. So long as an entity remains a protectorate it may be dependent, but it is an international personality and is in same possession of external sovereignty.

On the other hand, to explain that the protectorate agreement did not alienate or deprive their right for involving in external affairs the authority of Somalia brought the arguments of the British colonial secretary in the House of Commons that debated on Somaliland. The colonial secretary remarked that ‘his majesty does not possess full sovereignty there (Somaliland) but had for many years possessed full powers of administration and jurisdiction by virtue of usage and sufferance under the 1884 treaties’.

On the basis of the above counter-argument, Somalia Republic tried to assert that in their protectorate accord with colonial rulers, the tribal heads of Somali people never

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22 Kebede 1978, p.27-29.
23 Kendie 2007, p.13.
24 Kendie 2007, p.14.
25 Kendie 2007, p.13.
26 ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A “A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden District and Somalia”, (1977).
27 ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A “A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden District and Somalia”, (1977); Parliamentary debates Vol.304, 1934-35, July 4th, col.6.
intended to surrender rights of external affairs including ceding and curving of frontiers fully to colonial rules. Rather, the authority of Somalia asserted, the protectorate accord gave the responsibility of maintaining territorial integrity to the protected, mean the Somali people in this case.

On the other side to undermine the quest of Ethiopia the authority of Somalia accused Ethiopia as an African ‘colonialist’ that forcefully controlled the Somali inhabiting territories such as the Ogaden, Haude, and Reserved area. Accordingly, the authorities of Somalia demand the right to self-determination for the Somali people inhabiting in eastern Ethiopia.\(^{28}\)

In its counter-response Ethiopia asserted that before the colonial era there was no country with the name Somalia that hold defined territory. So, Ethiopia argued, with the absence of a state that took the name ‘Somalia’ before 1960 Ethiopia could not take land from the non-existing state.\(^{29}\)

**Territorial Recognition vs. the Rhetoric of Self-Determination**

The other difficult matter on the quest of Ethiopia for frontier recognition with Somalia was the interrogation and interpretation of territorial integrity on one side vis-à-vis the issue of self-determination on the other. The authority of Somalia invoked the principle of self-determination right for the Somali people in eastern Ethiopia against Ethiopia’s quest for recognition of frontier. So, the position of Somalia on the idea of self-determination vis-à-vis the paradigm of territorial integrity (endorsed by Ethiopia) can be taken as the other factor that determine the boundary recognition quest of Ethiopia on its eastern frontier.

As a successor state for the British and Italian Somaliland the authority of Somalia was asked by the authority of Ethiopia to resume the boundary demarcation work in the southern section of Somalia (formerly the Italian Somaliland). Likewise, Ethiopia insisted Somalia for full territorial recognition and unconditional renouncement of its territorial assertion over Ethiopia. Nonetheless, rather than responding to Ethiopia’s quest, the authority of Mogadishu showed their position by demanding land from Ethiopia under the title of self-determination. However, Ethiopia rejected the Self-determination request of Somalia by linking the principle of self-determination with anti-colonial struggle. Instead, Ethiopia insisted Somalia to respect its territorial integrity and to avoid involving in Ethiopia’s internal affairs. Concomitantly, Ethiopia challenged the self-determination advocacy of Somalia as an illegal act that contradicts with the UN and OAU charters- recognizing frontier integrity of member state and nonintervention on the affairs of a sovereign state. But in its counter-position Somalia recurrently asserted Ethiopia’s presence in the Somali

\(^{28}\) ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.2.268.03A, Redan Abdala (Ethiopian Embassy Somalia, Mogadishu) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) “General Reports of Somalia news outlets concerning Ethiopia”, (May 1973).

\(^{29}\) Kendie 2007, p.14.
inhabited land of Ogaden, Haud and reserved land as colonization and depicted Ethiopia as a ‘black colonialist’.

After the formal initiation of the OAU in 1963 the swinging self-determination and frontier matter ended with recognizing colonial frontier as a legal and inviolable frontier for the African states. In line with this position the OAU’s interpretation of self-determination that urged to territorial integrity deferred from the position of Somalia. This move of OAU ‘provided a rhetorical fodder’ to Ethiopia by portraying Somalia as provoker and halter of OAU principles. As a result, the issue of Somalia’s self-determination was recurrently engulfed by Article 3 of the OAU charter that states ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state’, as well as ‘noninterference in the affairs of member states’. This position of OAU was mainly stemmed from the fragility nature of most frontiers in Africa. The fragility nature of African frontiers mainly stemmed from the heterogeneous nature of ethnic groups in Africa that one ethnic group might inhabit under different sovereign territorial jurisdiction. The best example in point for the non-uniform nature of ethnic distribution in the continent can be the Hamitic Somali that inhabits in four different sovereign states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Somalia).

So, if OAU promoted the idea of Somalia it would be hard for the organization to manage the issue of self-determination interrogations in the continent. Because the acceptance of Somalia’s self-determination assertion might re-initiate the same kind of interrogation between other African countries like Morocco and Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria, Tunisia and Algeria, Somalia and Kenya, Ethiopia and Kenya, Nigeria and Cameroon, Niger and Benin, Malawi and Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, and many more. It is just because of understanding the sensitivity of frontier issues in the continent that the OAU and its member countries agreed to use colonial frontiers as a legal frontier for the post-colonial African states. On the same line, OAU and its members urged Somalia to stop its territorial assertion over Ethiopia and other neighboring states like Kenya and Djibouti.

Nonetheless, the political setup of Somalia was not ready to absorb the proposal of OAU and its member states to use colonial frontier as a legal frontier for African states and the authority of Somalia refused to sign the accord that affirms colonial boundary as a legal boundary of post-independent African states. In return, the authority of Somalia began their unilateral diplomatic struggle to internationalize the frontier issue of Somalia against its neighboring states including Ethiopia. For instance, the first president of Somalia, Abdullah Osman, in one of his press releases stated that:

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30 ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.2.268.03A, Redan Abdala (Ethiopian Embassy Somalia, Mogadishu) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) “General Reports of Somalia news outlets concerning Ethiopia”, (May 1973).

31 ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.2.268.03A, Redan Abdala (Ethiopian Embassy Somalia, Mogadishu) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) “General Reports of Somalia news outlets concerning Ethiopia”, (May 1973); see also Woodwell 2007, p.103-104.

32 Makinda 1982, p.95.
The right of self-determination of the inhabitants of the Somali territories still under foreign rule will continue to be prime consideration of my government during its term of office. The government’s policy will be to intensify our activities of enlightening would opinion of the righteousness of the Somali case...until the Somali people, a nation bound by strongest links of race, tradition, culture, language, and religion are allowed to achieve their unity with their motherland Somalia in the exercise of their right to self-determination, the border problems in the Horn of Africa would not be solved.33

At another time during the 1963 OAU summit of liberated African countries, the representatives of Somalia insisted on the necessity of approving the right to self-determination for the Somali minorities under foreign rule. In its position, the Somali representative, on the OAU summit, stated the case of the Somali minority under foreign rule as different by asserting the language, religious and cultural similarity as a reason. Accordingly, through consistently insisting self-determination and rejecting colonial frontiers as a legal frontier for independent African states as a backup the authority of Somalia undermined the frontier recognition quest of Ethiopia. Even the authority of Somalia extensively invoked the UN charter as evidence to invalided Ethiopia’s presence in Ogaden, Haud and Reserved areas. Mistakenly understanding the charter of the UN in a way to go with its own advantage the authority of Somalia even claimed that the OAU covenant contradicts with the code of the UN on the affair of self-determination. But in reality, the assertion of Somalia was stemmed from the misinterpretation of the UN charter to secure its own advantage.34

On the other hand, regarding Somalia’s representation of Ethiopia as a ‘black colonizer’ the code of the UN has never been illustrated Ethiopia as a colonial power and continued to recognize Ethiopia an one of an African country next to Liberty that had never been under colonial rule.35

Afterward, an increasing scale of Ethiopia’s quest to frontier recognition and territorial integrity on one side vis-à-vis Somalia’s quest for self-determination on the other corner caused a long and provocative diplomatic campaign between the two states. Besides, minor and major armed incursion happened in the frontier areas between the two countries. For instance, in between September 1963 and January 1964 nearly 65 armed confrontations that caused material devastation and humanitarian crises happened along the frontiers of the two states.36

33 African Research Ltd, (London, 1966), p.529; African Research Bulletin, Vol.4, African Research Ltd, (London, 1967), :837.
34 ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.2.268.03A, Redan Abdala (Ethiopian Embassy Somalia, Mogadishu) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) “General Reports of Somalia news outlets concerning Ethiopia”, (May 1973); Hoskyans, 1969, p.39; Woddwell, 2007, p.105; Onyango 1975, p.96; Somalia Newspaper Mogadishu, “Self-determination a National Responsibility”, (September 25th, 1964), :1.
35 Makinda 1982, p.96.
36 Yihun 2012, p.125.
At other time in 1964 during his first press release substituting Sharmarke as a prime minister of Somalia Abdirazak Haji Hussein stated that ‘the right to self-determination of the inhabitants of the Somali territories still under foreign rule will continue to be the prime consideration of his government during its term of office’. This reflects that despite the change of leadership the authority of Somalia used to use the issue of self-determination as cornerstone of their foreign policy to challenge the assertion of Ethiopia’s quest for frontier recognition and territorial integrity, even during the Hussen–Osman era (1964-1967).  

In other diplomatic efforts, during the era of détente (1967-1969) even if the authority of Egal Shamarke soften its provocative diplomatic battle with Ethiopia the quest of the latter for frontier recognition remained under interrogation. Besides, despite the Egal-Shamarke administration tried to create smooth binomial contact with Ethiopia the rhetoric of self-determination remains unchanged. However, during the Egal-Shamarke era (1967-69) armed clash, paramilitary insurgency, and counterinsurgency reduced on large-scale.  

Ethiopia’s quest for frontier recognition vis-à-vis Somalia’s quest for self-determination reached at its pic during the era of Said Barry (r.1969-1991). Following his coming to power through the 1969 coup d’état (the October Revolution), Barry employed strategies that ranged from aggressive diplomacy to subversive actions and from infiltration of shiita combatant to full-scale military incursion. This was done to influence the self-determination efforts of Somalia on one hand and to undermine the frontier quest of Ethiopia on the other. Like his predecessors Barry’s foreign policy also relayed on warranting self-determination on one side and degrading the acceptance of Ethiopia’s frontier quest on the eye of the international community on the other. Concerning the continuity of the matter of Self-determination as a major foreign policy agenda of Somalia, for instance, in one of his public speech, Barry read ‘the policy of the revolution towards the parts of our country occupied by foreign powers is that our people should be allowed peaceful self-determination, to gain their freedom’.  

On the other side, while insisting frontier recognition and territorial integrity the Ethiopian officialdom recurrently asserted the move of Somalia as territorial expansionism and territorial aggrandizement. For instance, in December 1980 on his state visit to Kenya, Colonel Mengistu said that ‘…the country’s policy of self-determination for Somalis living outside the Republic is a serious danger to Africa and the world peace’.  

Latter Barry proposed the UN Security Council to see their case. Nonetheless, Ethiopia refused the involvement of the UN Security Council on the matter. Ethiopia’s opposition to the UN Security Council was stemmed from the apprehension of Ethiopia that since Somalia was one of the associates of the Arab League it might get the support of

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Hoskyans 1962, p.39; Woodwell 2007, p.105; Onyango 1995, p.96; Somalia Newspaper Mogadishu, “Self-determination a National Responsibility”, (September 25th, 1964), :1.  

Onyango 1995, p 99-100.  

Onyango 1995, p 135-136.  

African Research Bulletin: African Research Ltd., Vol.17, (London, 1980), :5864.
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Arab countries that had a good relationship with western countries. So, Ethiopia afraid the Arab ally of Somalia might lobby western countries, which are influential within the UN, to favor the Somalia Republic. In return, Ethiopia proposed OAU to see the case between the two states. Subsequently, OAU recalled its Good Office Commissions at Libreville, Gabon, in 1977. Afterward, the Good Office Commission proposed both states to respect the 1964 Cairo declaration that accepted the colonial frontier as a legal frontier for Africa. While Somalia rejected the proposal of the OAU Good Office Commission’s unequivocally, Ethiopia accepted it and used it for its own propaganda purpose by disseminating the proposal to the UN and other allies of Ethiopia.41

Afterward, the recurrent refusal of Barry to accept the proposal of OAU and Ethiopia’s quest for boundary recognition pushed the authority of Ethiopia to use the domestic problem of Somalia as a means to influence Barry. Accordingly, Ethiopia began helping anti-Barry opposition groups such as the Somali National Movement (SNM); the Somali Salivation Democratic Front (SSDF); the Somalia Workers Party (SWP); and the Somalia Democratic Liberation Front (SDLF). Ethiopia allowed these opposition groups to make their base in Ethiopian soil and supported them financially and materially.42

On the other hand, to weaken and to force the government of Barry the authority of Ethiopia worked for the defection of government officials from their posts at different levels. These include ambassadors and diplomats at various levels as well as government officials working at domestic government structure. The other target of defection work was the military officials of Barry. For instance, army officials such as Lieutenant Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, who was participated on the unsuccessful coup attempt of April 1978; and Lieutenant Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf who was the commander of Somalia’s army during the 1977-78 Ogaden war and he commanded Somalia army during Somalia’s occupation of the town of Jijiga were defected. Side by side, Somalia’s ambassador to Kenya, Hussein Dualeh defected in 1978. Ambassador of Somalia to Djibouti, Abdullahi Loye, defected in 1980, Somalia’s ambassador to the U.S.A, Mohammed Warsam Ali, defected in 1980. Ethiopia tried to use the defected politician and military officials to influence the authority of Barry and to fulfill its frontier quest. Ethiopia’s help enabled the opposition group to launch a successful guerrilla operation and propaganda campaign using the Ethiopian based media outlet.43

To avert the propaganda campaign and guerilla operations, the authority of Barry tried to respond in various ways. Some of the ways that Barry reacted were: i) through organizing the same kind of guerrilla activity against Ethiopia; ii) through organizing a multifaceted diplomatic campaign alongside Ethiopia and; iii) through promulgating a new constitution and announcing a state of emergency and shaking his cabinet.44

41 Yihun 2012, p.161; Jackson 2016, p.28.
42 Ododa 1985, p.285-286.
43 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol. 33, Somalia, (April 1987), p.35042; Ododa 1985, p.285-286.
44 Ododa 1985, p.288.
Nonetheless, despite the presence of a successful plot and counter political plot on both sides both countries actions neither enabled them to attain their goals nor bring lasting peace among people and government of the two states. As a result, Ethiopia’s frontier recognition quest and the self-determination assertion of Somalia continued to be under the state of interrogation until today.

**Hegemonic Competition**

The intrigue of Somalia Republic to emerge as a new hegemonic ruler of the Horn region and the enthusiasm of imperial Ethiopia to sustain itself as a hegemonic authority in the region had also shaped the frontier recognition quest of Ethiopia. In their move to become a regional hegemonic power the two states followed hostile and provocative diplomatic approaches as well as both states tried to create their own fronts with regional, continental and extra-continental powers. At a regional level, for instance, Ethiopia approached Kenya under common agenda to continue the colonial boundary statuesque and defending their land from the irredentist movement of Somalia. The other point in focus that instigated Ethiopia to approach Kenya was to isolate Somalia from the political life of the Horn region and the African political role, in general, using the political acceptance of Kenyan leaders like Jomo Kenyatta. The authority of Somalia, on its part, approached Egypt, Sudan, and Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran warping its hegemonic interest with other profound matters as religious similarity, self-determination right, and membership of the Arab League. Besides, the authority of Somalia tried to build their hegemonic interest through manipulating the existing norms in their own advantage and through ceding one-fifth of Ethiopia. The other move of Somalia to undermine the frontier quest of Ethiopia and to hasten the hegemonic building of Somalia was through instigating Somali diaspora rebellion among the Somali inhabitants of eastern Ethiopia through multiple contexts such as identity constrictions, ethnic affiliation, religious affiliation as well as through means of socio-cultural and politico cultural matters.\(^{45}\)

Moreover, in the proses of finding itself as a hegemonic power as well as to have the support of the Somali people and to frustrate the legitimacy of Ethiopia in the Somali inhabited land the authority of Somalia also used to use the metaphor of ‘savage-victim-saver’. In this metaphor, the government of Somalia depicted itself as a ‘saver’ or usually uses the rhetoric of the sole legal body to protect all Somali speaking communities in the region of the Horn. This assertion of Mogadishu was used as a tool to depict Ethiopia as a ‘savage’ and illegitimate administrator of the Somali inhabited land in eastern Ethiopia. Side by side, the Somali speaking societies in neighboring states including Ethiopia was portrayed as ‘victim’. This all scheme by the authority of Somalia was partly stemmed from: i) interests of glorification of power and recognition at home and on the eye of the Somali diaspora community; and ii) interest of building strong internal unity that enable the Republic to radiate its hegemonic power to the rest.

\(^{45}\) ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02: From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Production and Campaign Directorate (Miritina Zemecha Memiriya) “The Issue of Security in the District of Harar”, (August 26, 1978); Iyob, 1993, p.258; Luckham and Bekele 1984, p.10-15.
part of the Horn region by frustrating the existing regional hegemon, Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{46} For instance, after his coming to power as the Somalia’s prime minister in 1967, Egal made a speech that asserts his authority as a ‘saver’ or ‘liberator’ in one hand and the government of the Somali inhabiting land outside the Republic was presented as an illegal governor or in a term of human right metaphor as a ‘savage’. The Somali that inhabited outside jurisdiction was presented as ‘victim’ of an illegal and forceful external rule. The speech of Egal reads:

...the Republics foreign policy cannot be separated from the Somalis under foreign rule. Its policy towards Ethiopia, Kenya and France cannot ignore the Somaliland they occupy...Somali unification, as set forth in the constitution, meant the uniting of Somalis of their own free will, after they had achieved independence, my government is ready achieve that end.\textsuperscript{47}

Under other conditions, Barry also presented his government as the sole liberator or ‘saver’ of the Somali under neighboring countries’ jurisdiction. His speech reads: ‘Although only two parts of the Somali territories have achieved their independence so far, the liberation of the remaining part is quite a possibility in the same way as we were able to chase the Britain and the Italians out of our country’.\textsuperscript{48}

So, to win acceptance among the Somali community at home and outside the jurisdiction of the Republic and to institutionalize the legitimacy the rhetoric of ‘victim’ was reflected by the officialdom of the Republic. Besides, the ‘victimhood’ rhetoric was circulated among the Somali speaking community of the Horn region to radiate the power and order of the Somalia authority beyond the frontier of the Somalia Republic. Likewise, the officialdom of the Republic used to instigate the Somali diaspora for a mutiny to create destabilization in Ethiopia aiming internationalization of the matter. The concept of internationalizing the matter was stemmed from the interest of Somalia to exercise the diplomatic field to cede one-fifth of the territory of Ethiopia. Here the Somalia authority well aware that if Ethiopia lost one-fifth of its territory under any condition including self-determination it would be difficult for heterogonous Ethiopia to continue as a hegemonic power in the region. However, in reverse what the authority of Somalia failed to understand was that Ethiopia survived in the region of the Horn for many years resisting military and diplomatic challenges from different directions principally as a result of its ‘diplomatic capability essential to hegemonic dominance’.\textsuperscript{49}

The other factor in focus that escalated the hegemonic competition between Ethiopia and Somalia that in turn affected the territorial recognition quest of Ethiopia was the shift of global power after World War II. When World War II came to an end the interrogation of an independent movement intensified throughout Africa. This situation paved conditions for the newly emerging global powers (Soviet Russia and U.S.A) to replace those actual global and colonial powers in the Horn region.

\textsuperscript{46} Iyob 1993, p.263-265; see also Mutua 2002, p.10-38.
\textsuperscript{47} African Research Bulletin: African Research Ltd., (London: 1967). :837; see also Mutua 2002, p.10-38.
\textsuperscript{48} African Research Bulletin: African Research Ltd., (London, 1974), :3263.
\textsuperscript{49} Farer 1979, p.118-119; Iyob 1993, p.260.
Afterward, the new powers (Soviet Russia and U.S.A) began to play cold war politics in the Horn region to have leverage on the geopolitical vital district of the African Horn through conspiring with faithful regional powers. The Horn powers also approached the global powers to build up their capacity aiming to appear as the sole regional power. Therefore, the tense computation of global powers to have a base on the strategically important districts of the Horn in one side and the inflexible political reality and hegemonic calculation between Ethiopia and Somalia on the other briefly hindered the long awaiting territorial recognition quest of Ethiopia.

The other point in focus that hindered the territorial recognition quest of Ethiopia was the presence of the heavy hands of the military of the Somalia Republic on the foreign policy direction of the country both during the rule of the civilian parliamentary period (1960-1969) and the era of military rule (1969-1991). Particularly, during the era of military rule, the role of the army officials on the foreign relations of Somalia reached its peak. There was also a belief among army officials and the army of Somalia that the interrogation of frontier recognition from Ethiopia could be frustrated through building a strong army. The army officials of Somalia also believe that the interrogation of self-determination for the Somali diaspora would get an answer through armed struggle. For instance, some documents tried to link the escalation of the role of the army in the policy-making of the Republic’s politics exclusively with Barry, but in reality ‘the rise of military decision making should be viewed as more than simply a reflection of the policies of Barry. Rather it is clear that Barry was, himself, subject to the influence of other military leaders from below’. This combative move of Somalia complicated the frontier recognition quest of Ethiopia through diplomacy.

So, the influential political clandestine of army officials in shaping the foreign policy direction of Somalia had its direct relevance in hindering and casting the frontier recognition quest of Ethiopia.

Under other conditions, the frustration of the frontier acknowledgment quest of Ethiopia on the eye of Somalia Republic was stemmed from natural resource struggle. Unlike its arid natural condition, the controversial district of Ogaden is rich in large-scale natural gas and oil. So, the existence of this natural wealth along with the headstrong political approach employed by both states also hindered the much-anticipated frontier acknowledgment quest of Ethiopia in the face of the Somalia Republic. Particularly, the report of the discovery of natural gas and oil at Ogaden in 1972 by the American company named Tenneco further complicated the frontier quest of Ethiopia added extra full on the tension between the two countries.
Conclusion

This article has sought to explain the dynamics of the frontier relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. In the analysis it has argued that the Ethiopia-Somalia frontier relations cannot be separated from issues such as, among other, colonial agreement, hegemonic computation, the issue of territorial integrity and self-determination, the clandestine role of the army on the politics of Somalia, and the discovery of important minerals on the disputed territory. Apparently, throughout the discussion of the article we are witnessing that change of leadership in Somalia does not curtail the status of Somalia’s self-determination agenda. In the same manner, Ethiopia time and again securitizes Somalia’s agenda of self-determination for its territorial integrity.

More specifically, the article has shown that as a successor state for the British and Italian Somaliland the authority of Somalia Republic inherited the colonial frontier, colonial frontier accords, and the unfinished territorial recognition quest of Ethiopia on the Southern section of Somalia. After the declaration of the official unification of British Somaliland (northern Somalia) and the Italian Somaliland (Southern Somalia) on June 1, 1960, the authority of Ethiopia insisted on the new authority of Somalia to resume the boundary demarcation work on the southern section of Somalia. Nonetheless, the frontier recognition quest of Ethiopia was engulfed by the rhetoric fodder of Somalia’s self-determination interrogation for the Somali inhabitants in eastern Ethiopia.

Additionally, in conceptual expression, the study of the Ethiopia-Somalia frontier relations is an important research path and provides interesting notes at least on the following three points. First, the much-anticipated territorial recognition quest of Ethiopia was declined because of the hidden hegemonic computation between the two Horn countries. Second, the presence of natural gas and oil on the controversial frontier area together with the clandestine active role of the military of the Somalia Republic on the foreign policy direction of Somalia plus the headstrong political approach by the officialdoms of Ethiopia and Somalia also narrowed the peaceful diplomatic road to solve the interrogation.

Third, the unsuccessful political move to normalize the frontier issue also impeded the two neighboring states to improve their relations on tourism and economic areas. Besides, the failure of the two states to control their hostile approach through codified political formula directed them to look at their own security pairs at regional, continental and extra-continental scale. This was done, mainly aiming for political isolation of each other and to emerge as a sole winner. Side by side Somalia’s move to engulf Ethiopia’s quest of frontier acknowledgment through the subject of self-determination leads the two states to the activity of preparing platforms for insurgency and counter-insurgency. However, the hostility brings neither the much-anticipated frontier acknowledgment plus lasting peace for Ethiopia nor self-determination for the Somali minorities in Ethiopia. Rather the hostility approach results in a broken order in Somalia that is not fixed yet. But, the frontier interrogation between the two states remains under the status of interrogation until today.
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