Profile of Managers of Public Funds and Accounting
Misappropriations in Cameroon

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In order to curb accounting embezzlements, the key idea supported in this paper recommends a revolution from the top and from the bottom. The paper is interested in the managerial policy whose accounting practices serve as launch pad for embezzlement. To succeed in this, the theory of structuro-managerial embezzlement of public funds is mobilized. The subject is the analysis with a view to present the face of managers-embezzlers of public funds and their accounting mechanisms of embezzlement. The loopholes that these actors-embezzlers exploit are judiciously presented. It is therefore important to explain the determining profiles of public funds embezzlers and the accounting mechanisms used. The positivist approach of accounting thus constitutes a second theoretical backing in support of the first one to answer these questions. In order to oppose the idea of embezzlement without accounting evidence, this article adopts an interpretative and explanatory approach of cases of embezzlement of public funds of which accountancy is the secular lever.

Keywords: managers, embezzlement, accounting misappropriations, public funds, Cameroon

Introduction

Trying to understand the fight against embezzlement by managers of public funds, as a side of corruption, can lead to the creation of an institutional dynamics. As in many African countries, their difficulties to take up the economic challenge are linked to disastrous conditions of the quality of the political leadership that resulted from it (Pigeaud, 2015). Realities experienced show that despite the existence of audit institutions, managers of public funds continue to plunder public property only in personal interest and to become rich, even unlawfully.

Thus, the key idea supported in this research puts the managerial policy and governance practiced at the center of preoccupations in management sciences, in order to present the loopholes that actors-embezzlers of public funds exploit. The interactions among the profile of managers, mechanisms of embezzlements, the mobilization of public revenues, financial and accounting misappropriations for illicit enrichment are therefore analyzed. To succeed in this, the theory of “structuro-managerial embezzlement” of public funds is mobilized in addition to the positivist approach of accountancy linked to the orthodox approach, which considers that embezzlements as a phenomenon itself related to administrative structures and the profile of managers. Studies

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on the theory of public choice published by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) help to understand and explain the role of the state and the behavior of politicians and civil servants in the understanding of challenges of accounting misappropriations. Along with the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), conflicts would come into being within organizations because managers cannot manage public services, in the interest of people. They will rather seek to maximize their personal interests. For this purpose, the profiles of managers of public funds, the determinants of accounting misappropriations identified would explain the economic and managerial challenges of the phenomenon experienced in the context of this study.

The problem we have here being the one of embezzlement of public funds, the subject of this paper is to analyze with a view to present the face of managers-embezzlers of public funds by explaining their accounting mechanisms that help in embezzlement. In other words, this article aims at explaining the profile of managers-embezzlers per accounting misappropriations. In order to explain the determining profiles of accounting misappropriations in the embezzlement of public funds, this article tries to show firstly that management errors assimilated to embezzlement of public funds depend on the knowledge of the principles and accounting techniques by managers. Then, the production of accounting documents by the managers depends on the mechanism of their appointment. Finally, transparency in the management of public funds depends on the political engagement of managers.

The methodology adopted to accomplish this is built according to a conceptual, interpretative, and explanatory framework of embezzlement of public funds and most particularly, accounting is the secular lever, when it becomes a structural asset and is presented as a managerial model. The interviews took place over a period of 15 days: from Thursday 20 July 2017 to Saturday 5 August 2017. With regard to the administration of the questionnaires, it goes from Monday 4 September 2017 to Friday 4 May 2018, a period of nine months. Thus, we mobilize statistical tools of quantitative and qualitative analysis of pertinent data from field survey in order to understand the complexity of the phenomenon of embezzlement of public funds by integrating sociopolitical, economic, and managerial aspects.

In its first section, this paper relates the profiles of managers to their mechanisms of embezzlement. In the second section, it justifies the methodology adopted and in the third one, results and managerial implications are presented.

Profiles of Managers and Mechanisms of Embezzlements

Discussing embezzlement of public funds through accounting misappropriations as a structural and managerial fact implies the adoption of a rigorous approach. The choice of means for fighting this scourge largely depends on the managerial approach of embezzlement carried out in order to understand the motivations of the managers in charge of public expenditures. The managerial approach is interested in the methods and techniques of embezzlement used. The structural approach is analyzed from the perspective of the different structural loopholes offered by state’s structures.

Many studies have highlighted the specificity of dominant values among public managers (Emery & Martin, 2010; Fortier, 2010; Hondeghem & Vandenaeele, 2005; Moore, 1995; Rondeaux, 2006; Rouban, 2001; Perry, Hondeghem, & Wise, 2010). They particularly show the importance of public ethos in the motivations of civil servants and in the construction of public legitimacy. Different notions are highlighted. The profile of

1 Some civil servants are richer than businessmen. This led to the arrest of many top civil servants of the State of Cameroon.
manager (leader) analyzed by Filion (1999) shows that profile is a very important explanatory variable of the nature of its vision of the organization. Profile is also often discussed under different angles (Bayart & Nebenhaus, 1996): Psychological profile (Brockhaus, 1980) highlights a variety of personality characteristics. Psychological profile brings together aspects such as attitude towards risk, its creativity, culture, education (Holmes, Kelly, & Cunningham, 1991; Box, White, & Barr, 1993; Julien & Marchesnay, 1996; Chapellier, 1997). Behavioral profile (Julien & Marchenay, 1988; d’Amboise & Vernea, 1993) is at the basis of strategies and logics of various individual actions. Experience (Reix, 1981; Nadeau, Martel, & M’zalli, 1988) and goals (Marchesnay, 1990; 1993; Blais & Toulouse, 1990; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996) are also part of behavioral profile. As far as it is concerned, socio-demographic profile plays the role of data sheet. It is made up of: age (Nadeau et al., 1988) and the level of education (Capiez, 1990). Thus, structural contingency factors are factors or parameters influencing the organization. Qualified as objectivist, the theory of structural contingency relates the structure of organizations to the features that characterize situations in which it operates. Brennemann and Separi (2002) identify six factors to that effect: structure, height, technology, environment, culture, power relation.

More specifically, the consideration of accounting and financial information in public governance depends on the one hand on its information content and on the other hand on its contractual utility. Concerning the first dimension, many studies agree on information content in financial statements published when its publication modifies the anticipated outputs and the risks involved (Beaver, 1968; Rippinton & Taffler, 1995). In the second dimension, accounting and financial information enable to monitor the respect of contractual commitments (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). According to this second dimension, the analysis of the strategies of managers in the field of publication of financial documents is based on the functional asymmetry hypothesis. This enables managers in an opportunistic attitude, to attempt to escape an efficient control of information supplied. Empirical studies (Dempsey, Hunt, & Schroeder, 1993; Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995) confirm this opportunistic behavior when, for example, the internal control carried out by the board of directors is weak. Thus, managers can instrumentalize accounting and financial information to satisfy the constraints resulting from explicit and implicit contracts concluded with authorizing officers (Palmrose & Scholz, 2004; Healy, 1985). Through accounting policy, the manager can implement strategies of instrumentalization of accounting information, thereby giving a “false” reality.

**Public Managerial Policy and Accounting Misappropriations**

Many researchers have highlighted the specificity of dominant values among public managers (Emery & Martin, 2010; Fortier, 2010; Hondeghen & Vandenaeele, 2005; Moore, 1995; Rondeaux, 2006; Rouban, 2001; Perry et al., 2010). They show the importance of public ethos in the motivations of civil servants and in the construction of public legitimacy.

Governance, in its functional aspect is defined “as all the mechanisms that contribute to align the reality of the functioning of an organization with the objectives assigned to it” (Pigé, 2008, p. 41). The principles of governance have been adopted since 1999 and recognized since then as a reference at the international level by state governments, therefore investors, companies, and any other stakeholder. They were revised in 2002 then finalized in 2004 to take into consideration evolutions noticed and lessons from experience acquired in the world.

This managerial policy in the field of public governance shows the importance of the profile of managers of public funds in bookkeeping and consequently in the fair view of management of public funds. Well handled,
accountancy is an important factor in the control of managers’ actions. It also permits to preserve state property. Badly handled, it can conceal embezzlements and by extension, confused as an attempted misappropriation. Therefore, it serves as launch pad for concealing some economic exactions. Accounting is like a double edged sword in management. Shady managers will use it for themselves by carrying out embezzlement in all forms.

**Falsification of Documents and Accounting Documents**

Besides alteration, usurpation, and the disguise of accounting documents practices, some accounting documents are commonly exploited and deprecatory of the heritage value of public funds such as: fake mission orders, fictitious receipt booklets, payroll accounting to fake civil servants, the payment of taxes and duties not refunded, the unrealistic accounting control of public expenditure.

**Fake mission orders.** Another way out of public funds is made of fake mission orders (10, 15, 20, 30, 40 days) that are given to the secretary, a kind senior staff or even to the driver, when they don’t travel. Office supplies are fictitious and for want of fresh cash. Traditional suppliers find it difficult to stay on the market. They no longer sell, since everything is fictitious and accounting documents relating to them are supplied.

**Fictitious receipt booklets.** Other forms of embezzlements are parallel receipt booklets. Yet the law states that each authorizing officer should make his receipt booklets. Moreover, revenue managers do not pay decadal revenues. They keep money in their possession for eight months, even a year in the best case.

**Payroll accounting to fake civil servants.** Agents in some ministries are specialists in the creation of fictitious personnel registration numbers and the transfer of important sums of money cashed by complex networks could lead to senior personnel. Sometimes, this happens through fake reclassification and advancements.

Accounting manipulations also concern the irregularity and the unfaithfulness in the forward balances; the discrepancy between the figures of management account and those of the administrative account; the discrepancy among figures on the trial balance, the administrative account, and the statement of implementation of revenue and expenditure; the accumulation of non-cleared deficits on the trial balance; the absence of the statement of bank reconciliation and its annexes.

**The payment of taxes and charges.** The payment of taxes by the agent (who works for the tax service but also for other companies) and not paid to the treasury amounts to another form of accounting misappropriation. This embezzlement is specifically illustrated by the interviews presented in the results section (4).

**Posting and fictitious control of public expenditure.** Control is a polymorphous notion. It can be defined, in the case that concerns us here as the action of verifying the validity, the sincerity and the reliability of financial information. This action can take a legal, regulatory or conventional nature (contractual). The control of its quality is based on the principles of transparency and reality, which ensures that managers who know it give the users information that is well constructed, comprehensive, reliable, and on time. Thus, one of the instruments on which external audit of the action of managers is based is, the unreal or unpublished accounting and financial information.

**Methodology**

In this paper, we have therefore opted for positivism, which leads us to the qualitative and quantitative approach (inductive and hypothetico-deductive) in the quest for knowledge of the profile of public managers-embezzlers by accounting malpractices. This methodology concerns in particular the approaches followed to obtain the main materials of the study which is data and the procedures of their processing. By
taking as anchorage point the determinants of embezzlement of public funds by accounting misappropriations, two methods have guided and aligned our approach of selection: “the method oriented towards the techniques of accounting misappropriations”. The content analysis is therefore understood as a method aiming at discovering the meaning of a behavior or a message.

The information collection instruments that we have adopted are the interview guide and the questionnaire. The interviews took place over a period of 15 days: from Thursday 20 July 2017 to Saturday 5 August 2017. With regard to the administration of the questionnaires, it goes from Monday 4 September 2017 to Friday 4 May 2018, a period of nine months. Their conception is done by mostly taking into consideration two aspects: the definition of information needs and the structuring (its content and its form). We particularly opted for face-to-face structured interview.

**Sampling and Data Collection and Processing Tool**

The sampling method used in this work is the so-called quota method or non-probability method (Kotler & Dubois, 1997). Its choice is well justified by the charging error that is known, given the impossibility to know the degree of precision of the result to be obtained. The choice of individuals in the sampling is the result of the construction of the sampling, particularly, the construction of the list of people to interview. We have interviewed the maximum number of 497 people, according to Table 1, being aware to collect only useful pertinent information and this, with caution. In general, we can say that the size of our sample depended on the degree of precision sought-after, as well as on the degree of uniformity of the population studied.

| Functions                          | Numbers |
|------------------------------------|---------|
| Mayors/Government Delegates        | 39      |
| Directors/Principals/Heads of institutions | 60 |
| Service providers                  | 20      |
| Divisional Officers                | 30      |
| Senior Divisional Officers         | 20      |
| Governors                          | 10      |
| Regional Delegates                 | 40      |
| Divisional Delegates               | 56      |
| Heads of decentralized offices     | 84      |
| Chiefs of central services         | 50      |
| Members of Parliament/Senators     | 28      |
| Public treasury executives          | 10      |
| General Managers of public administrations | 20 |
| Senior Officers of the armed forces | 30      |
| **Total**                          | **497** |

From the preceding, the indicators linked to the functions effectively show that the opinions of people interviewed remain mixed. This implies the complexity of the handling of the subject on embezzlement of public funds. However, it should be noted that almost all the people interviewed wish the eradication of this gangrene but the whole is not to say enough is enough as some administrators put it, but it is a matter of

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2 The questionnaire is generally defined as a document on which the answers or the reactions of a determined individual are written.
becoming aware of the phenomenon and act really. Some people believe that the political will to put an end to these deviances is not the priority of decision-makers.

Measurement of Variables, Methods, and Tools of Data Analysis

We have adopted non-metric variables (qualitative variables). They seem from the methodological point of view more appropriate in the search of a possible relation of dependency between the variables that we highlight. Thus, we propose the analysis of the degree of association between the variables from bonding index that allow to measure and statistically test the intensity and the direction of the link, while highlighting all the same the factors of structural contingency and the mechanism of embezzlements by accounting misappropriations. Thus, here the analysis is carried out thanks to the binary logistic regression test.

Results

The results are better presented at double levels: descriptive and explanatory.

Descriptive Results

The behavior of managers is decisive to the profile of embezzlers by accounting and financial malpractices. The content analysis is the technique of data analysis adopted in the sense of Bardin (1977). We have therefore presented the summary of the key elements from the information collected. Thus, the most important indicators of accounting malpractices reflecting the themes outlined in our interview guide have been retained. Data has been designed so as to develop recurrences or regularities of variables. The answers given to people interviewed are linked to elements of codification that is:

(+): indicates an element of answer mentioned by all the people interviewed;
(-): indicates a variable that is not taken into consideration or to which they say “no”;
(±): presents a response indicator mentioned by some survey respondents (and not all of them).

Throughout the analysis, we have attempted to acquire an understanding of the object under examination and to continuously refine the interpretations. We have broken up the units into themes of meaning. We started from the determinants proposed by the literature to put in groups the themes of the statements of the interviewees. In our conversations, we have interviewed Mayors/Government Delegates to Urban Councils, Principals of General and Vocational secondary schools, Service providers, Senior Divisional Officers, Divisional Officers, Governors, Chiefs of central and deconcentrated services, General Inspectors of services, Members of Parliament and Senators, Senior Officers in the armed forces, Regional Delegates, Divisional and Sub-divisional Delegates as well as Officers in charge of management of the public treasury.

In fact, “the interview appears as a set, a system structured according to its own laws therefore, analyzable in itself” (Bardin, 1991, p. 105). Thus, we were specifically interested in the following themes: The declaration of assets shall be a good start in the fight against embezzlements (interview of Friday 21/07/2017); the opinions collected in relation to operation sparrow hawk (interview of Saturday 22/07/2017); the treatment of embezzlers of public funds and the amounts embezzled (interview of Saturday 29/07/2017); the system of management of public funds (interview of Tuesday 01/08/2017); the question of knowing how to fight against embezzlement of public funds in Cameroon (interview of Saturday 05/08/20170); the question of management of public funds, the change of mentalities, and the revolution of the system (interview of Thursday 03/08/2017); the reasons that encourage managers to embezzle (interview of Thursday 04/08/2017); the causes and consequences of embezzlement of public funds (interview of Thursday 05/08/2017).
Table 2

*Summary of Opinions of the Interview Guide*

| Sub-themes                  | Items of codification |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| Declaration of assets       | ± (sometimes)         |
| Operation hawk              | ± (sometimes)         |
| Treatment of embezzlers of public funds | ± (sometimes)         |
| Treatment of sums embezzled | + (yes)               |
| Management system of public funds | + (yes)               |
| Efficient fight against embezzlements | + (yes)               |
| Technique of the right man at the right place | ± (sometimes) ± (sometimes) ± (sometimes) |
| Reasons that encourage people to embezzle | ± (sometimes) ± (sometimes) ± (sometimes) |
| Causes of embezzlements of public funds | ± (sometimes) ± (sometimes) ± (sometimes) |
| Consequences of embezzlements of public funds | + (yes)               |

This distribution table answers the question of belonging to the interview panel for the opinions to be balanced on the political, technical, practical, operational, and administrative level. The heads of the anti-corruption units of the ministries and bodies fighting against embezzlements have been interviewed. Regional, divisional, and sub-divisional managers have all been represented. Principals of secondary and technical schools, general and normal are also taken into consideration. The contradictions of political leaders and civil societies are analyzed. Finally, the opinions of the representatives of the audit chamber who are in charge of the control and management of public accounting have also been treated and analyzed. The different opinions, converging, and divergent are treated in a comprehensive manner and summarized in Tables 3 and 4 below.

Table 3

*Points of Convergence of Interviewees*

| Sub-themes                     | Indicators                                                                 | Items of codification |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Declaration of assets          | Fight against embezzlements                                               | + (yes)               |
|                                | Administrative formalities                                                | ± (sometimes)         |
| Operation sparrow hawk         | Homing device operation                                                  | + (yes)               |
|                                | Sanitation of public management                                          | + (yes)               |
| Treatment of embezzlers        | Imprisonment                                                             | + (yes)               |
|                                | Political forfeiture and electoral eligibility                            | + (yes)               |
| Treatment of sums embezzled    | Repatriation and repayment to the treasury                               | + (yes)               |
| Management system of public affairs | Seizure of assets and investment                                       | + (yes)               |
| Technique of fight against embezzlements | Avoid waste and negotiations                                          | + (yes)               |
|                                | Advocate excellence                                                      | ± (sometimes)         |
| Causes of embezzlements        | Governance                                                                | + (yes)               |
|                                | Impunity and laxity                                                      | + (yes)               |
|                                | Political system                                                         | + (yes)               |
| Consequences of embezzlement   | Underdevelopment and poverty                                             | + (yes)               |
|                                | Illicit enrichment                                                       | + (yes)               |
In this table, the convergence points of opinions are highlighted in relation to the themes of the interview. It stands out that all the interviewees are all conscious of the threat of this gangrene of public funds embezzlement in our country. Meanwhile, convergence points are mainly based on operation hawk and the causes of embezzlement. It should be noted that convergence points in our codification mean that the answers are the same on some indicators, which means that this issue is close to the heart of many Cameroonians. It’s the same thing with all the indicators appearing in the table below; people interviewed have given answers which indicate a similar practice of misappropriations of insufficient political will in the fight against this phenomenon. Divergences therefore stem from the indicators of the aspects where all the people interviewed do not agree on some indicators. It is contained in the table below.

### Table 4

**Divergence Points of Interviewees**

| Sub-themes                        | Indicators                                | + (yes) | ± (sometimes) | - (yes) |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------|--------------|---------|
| Declarations of assets            | Demagogy                                  | + (yes) | ± (sometimes) | + (yes) |
|                                   | Constitutional myth                       | ± (sometimes) | ± (sometimes) | ± (sometimes) |
| Operation sparrow hawk            | Instruments of manipulation               | + (yes) | + (yes)      | + (yes) |
|                                   | Political cleansing operation             | + (yes) | + (yes)      | + (yes) |
| Treatment of embezzlers           | Capital punishment                        | + (yes) | + (yes)      | + (yes) |
| System of public affairs management| Objective-oriented management             | + (yes) | + (yes)      | + (yes) |
|                                   | Accountable and patriotic management      | + (yes) | + (yes)      | + (yes) |
| Technique of fight against embezzlements | Does not change anything on the mentalities | ± (sometimes) | ± (sometimes) | ± (sometimes) |
|                                   | Nepotism and tribalism                    | + (yes) | + (yes)      | + (yes) |
| Cause of embezzlement             | Conflict of interests and lodges          | + (yes) | + (yes)      | + (yes) |
|                                   | Incompetence and opportunism             | + (yes) | + (yes)      | + (yes) |
| Consequences of embezzlements     | Social inequalities                       | + (yes) | + (yes)      | + (yes) |
|                                   | Frustrations and structural adjustment    | + (yes) | + (yes)      | + (yes) |

The table above presents all the indicators whose opinions are mixed from one interviewee to another. Each difference stems from one fact that each person has an opinion different from the indicators mentioned above. When some people think that embezzlements are due to the political system in place, others think it is caused by the mentalities of managers and some unorthodox managerial practices.

The content analysis retranscribing the interviews of managers appealed to within the framework of this research shows that the manager effectively commits accounting and financial misappropriations. These managers abusively use public properties in return of fictitious registrations because they estimate that they are perks offered by the posts they occupy. Managers therefore use public properties without neither remorse nor fear because they are confused with the perks offered by the post they occupy. The content analysis used here attempts to minimize the possible cognitive and cultural bias by ensuring objectivity in the research. The results that we present come from the analysis of our interview guide, and the most precise analysis of the content of recordings transcribed in order to refine our quantitative results, in relation to the characteristics of the people interviewed. One of the managers answers in these terms:
Within the framework of my activities, tax regulations remain vague. In the past, I had two tax reassessments. Now, I informally employ a tax officer. He takes care of my statements, proposes me “tricks” to pay less and always works out to adapt my statement to the new provisions of the law and for my file to be [clean]. I pay this agent every month (with a bonus during the period of statement) and some gifts in kind. That is very profitable for me! […] 

The anchorage of accounting misappropriation practices by public service civil servants concerns in most cases, customs officers here. In fact, the perception of an accounting document gives rise to a negotiation in business sense. That indicates well that the practice of embezzlement by accounting misappropriations in the light of a service rendered (authorization, acceleration of the procedure, issuing of a document, etc.) is done through an organized network. The practice is thus institutionalized and does not fall within isolated cases.

My accounting documents being subject of negotiation ensure me that the commissions earned cover well the additional expenses for sharing within the administration network. If these commissions do not permit to reward all the members involved, the operation will not be profitable. […] Once, I found myself negotiating to obtain a building permit. It was surreal because the person in charge explained that it was insufficient to pay his other colleagues and his chiefs and that at that “price”, the operation was not profitable for him! […] we had to play on accounting documents to give as piece of evidence.

Various specific cases occur, among which misappropriation is obvious because it can concern for instance the “purchase” of false invoices that serve to make credible a turnover excessively low for tax administration.

I declare only the legal threshold in order not to arouse suspicions from one year to another (if the turnover remained too stable), I buy phony invoices to artificially inflate my turnover. I subtract the VAT that I retrieve, and I pay the bill between 10% and 20% of the amount indicated. You will ask me what the invoice seller does so as not to pay tax on it. It is simple, he has “free access” to taxation and he gets his file “torn up”. Everyone has satisfaction (except tax authorities of course!) By contrast, we have to pay attention, because there are many false sellers of false invoices: they know that we will not go to the police to lodge a complaint for false invoice!

The interest of these verbatim is to inform on the behavior of agents of the public administration. The content analysis of the transcriptions of the interviews of the managers we appealed to within the framework of our research shows a consensus as to the embezzlement by structural and managerial accounting misappropriation of public funds, the background of the problem of our work.

Within the context of the study carried out, governance principles are characterized by: individualized institutions, a system of hyper centralized political management, the insecurity of institutions. By bringing together the different elements of the profile of contingency factors which are the most associated to accounting practices, we have selected and adapted Lavigne’s grid (1999), based on two fundamental aspects of the profile of the manager: the factors of structural and behavioral contingency.
In view of this figure, we deduce the different factors of the profile of credit manager who determines through accounting misappropriations the embezzlements of public funds. It appears that the items of the most explanatory factors of the profile of credit managers are those of male gender of higher education level who are moreover, either customs officers or civil administrators.

Let’s recall that in order to formulate our hypothesis, we considered Chapellier (1994; 1997) who analyses associations between accounting practices and behavioral determinants of managers such as education, experience, age, and type of education of the manager. The different behaviors observed (Pigeaud, 2015) during our investigation are: impunity\(^3\), laxity, favoritism, nepotism, clientelism, and opportunism. Managers who adopt these behaviors occupy the different posts shown in the graph below.

\(^3\) The phenomenon has been aggravated by the appointment to very high functions, in domains in relation with finance, of many officials from the same ethnic group. Many of them thought that their proximity with the president gave them the right to use government’s money (Pigeaud, 2015).
The reading of Figure 2 proves the tendencies of different managers and the existence of relations among their post, their profile, and accounting misappropriations that took place. This illustrates our central assumption according to which accounting misappropriations depend on the profile of managers of public funds.

Furthermore, public administration must be the base of the new legitimacy of the state through the promotion of good governance. It is viewed as the system of political and administrative management of public resources which, with the assistance of public authority and a power of control, aims at the social and economic development of a society.

**Explanatory Results**

In our research, the determining profiles are specified by the analysis of four characteristics: occupation, gender, qualification, and professional experience. The objective of the logistic regression used is therefore to measure the individual incidence of each variable of the profile of managers of public funds on accounting misappropriations in Cameroon. It is therefore a matter of measuring the incidence of the increase of the score of a given manager by one point on the measurement items of the first hypothesis, on the probability of moving from a presence of accounting misappropriations to an absence of accounting misappropriations. It should be noted that within the framework of each hypothesis, the variable explained concerns the production of accounting data supporting the management of the budget calculated in the form of score (scale: When the score is higher, the manager provides less accounting data supporting his management).
**Quality of the model.** The model carried out on 497 available observations and the estimated data made it possible to construct the adequacy of the model.

**Model adequacy test.** This test permits to see if the model equation globally adjusts the relation between the instructions of the decision-making organ for all the expenditures and the production of accounting data supporting the management of the budget. Here, the overall significance test (Hosmer-Lemeshow test, ddl = 2) shows that at the threshold of 5%, there is a balance between the data and the postulated model (p.value = 1 > 0.05 → the null hypothesis of balance between the variables and the data is not rejected). Therefore, we can appreciate the individual contribution of the instructions of the decision-making organ for all the expenditures and the production of accounting data supporting management in the model through the coefficients of that test. The table below permits to verify the strength of association of models of hypotheses from the examination of R2 of Nagelkerke which represents the variance explained by the model.

|  | 2log-Likelihood | R-two Cox & Snell | R-two of Nagelkerke | Khi-Chi-two | ddl | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| H1 | 207.694 | 0.580 | 0.802 | 430.839 | 2 | 0.000 |
| H2 | 85.068 | 0.672 | 0.929 | 553.465 | 2 | 0.000 |
| H3 | 0.000 | 0.742 | 1.000 | 672.964 | 2 | 0.000 |
| H4 | 47.134 | 0.716 | 0.965 | 625.830 | 4 | 0.000 |
| H5 | 183.829 | 0.599 | 0.829 | 672.964 | 14 | 0.000 |

**Results of hypothesis H1 model.** For this first hypothesis, the model explains 80.2% of the variance of the independent variable which is the production of accounting data supporting the management of the budget. In other words, there exists a strong association between the instructions of the decision-making organ for all the expenditures and the production of accounting data supporting the management of the budget. Moreover, this table gives information on the quality of the adjustment of the model from the value of R2 of Cox and Snell. For a value of R2 and Snell of 0.58 we will say that it is acceptable in exploratory research.

**Results of hypothesis H2 model.** For the second hypothesis, the estimated model explains 92.9% of the variance of the dependent variable which is the production of accounting data supporting the management of the budget. In other words, there exists a very strong link between the occupation of a post by the manager of public funds and his production of accounting data supporting the management of the budget. Moreover, a value of R² of Cox and Snell of 0.672 is acceptable.

**Results of hypothesis H3 model.** For the third hypothesis, the estimated model explains 100% of the variance of the explained variable which is accounting abuses. In other words, this means that there exists a strong association between the professional experience of the manager of public funds and accounting abuses.

**Results of hypothesis H4 model.** The estimated model of the fourth hypothesis explains the variability of the variable explained by the model for a value of 0.965. This means that the model explains 96.5% of the variance of the dependent variable which is accounting exactions. In other words, there exists a very strong link between the political engagement of managers and the abuses committed in the management of public budget. In addition, a value of R² of Cox and Snell equal to 0.716 is observed. Therefore we will say that the model is acceptable in an exploratory research.
Results of hypothesis H5 model. The estimated model of the fifth hypothesis presents an $R^2$ of Cos & Snell of 0.599, describing a very good quality of adjustment of the model. We all the same notice that with an R2 of Nagelkerke equal to 1, the model perfectly adjusts the total data. This shows that the predictions are perfect (equal to observations). That is what explains why the software has no longer provided the variables confusion matrix and the table of variables in the final equation. Thus, the general original hypothesis (GOH) is validated. Moreover, crossings permit us to analyze and appreciate the links and the profile of the managers and accounting misappropriations. According to the general model of research, the profile of the manager embezzler is identifiable and non-identifiable to accounting practices.

Analysis of the Profile of Manager Embezzler Identifiable to Accounting Practices

This model highlights decision-making on the basis of technical services, the inclusion of accounting information in decision-making, the place of training for management of public properties, the anticipation of management decision-making, the reimbursement of balance due, the equivalence or correspondence of the current position, the years of experience prior to the current position. Table 6 shows the shared distribution between decision-making on the basis of technical services and accounting misappropriations. It becomes apparent that 41.9% of managers of public funds admit having taken decisions on the basis of technical services and did not commit any accounting misappropriations. Besides, 10.3% of managers have committed accounting misappropriations and did not have to take decisions on the basis of technical services. Moreover 41% of interviewees have committed accounting misappropriations during their function. Table 7 presents the cross-classification between the inclusion of accounting information in decision-making and accounting misappropriations. It appears that 55.5% of managers of public funds declare that they have often taken into consideration accounting information in decision-making and accounting misappropriations. Furthermore, no manager who has often taken accounting information into consideration in decision-making has committed accounting misappropriations. The distribution of Table 8 shows the crossing between the place of training for public affairs management and accounting misappropriation. It appears that 10.3% of managers of public funds who graduated from ISMP have committed accounting misappropriations. And that 30.8% of managers of public funds trained at ENAM have committed accounting misappropriations. On the contrary, no managers of public funds trained in other training institutions have committed accounting misappropriations.

| Decision-making based on technical services | Embezzlement accounting | Yes | No | Total |
|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----|----|-------|
| Never                                     | Effective               | 51  | 0  | 51    |
| % of total                                |                          | 10.3% | 0.0% | 10.3% |
| Often                                     | Effective               | 153 | 85 | 238   |
| % of total                                |                          | 30.8% | 17.1% | 47.9% |
| Always                                    | Effective               | 0   | 208| 208   |
| % of total                                |                          | 0.0% | 41.9% | 41.9% |
| Total                                     | Effective               | 204 | 293| 497   |
| % of total                                |                          | 41.0% | 59.0% | 100%  |
Table 7  
**Accounting Information in Decision-Making and Embezzlement Accounting**

| Accounting information taken into account in decision-making | Embezzlement accounting |   |   | Total |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|---|---|-------|
|                                                           | Yes | No  |       |
| Never Effective                                            | 204 | 17  | 221   |
| % of total                                                 | 41.0% | 3.4% | 44.5% |
| Often Effective                                            | 0   | 276 | 276   |
| % of total                                                 | 0.0% | 55.5% | 55.5% |
| Total Effective                                            | 204 | 293 | 497   |
| % of total                                                 | 41.0% | 59.0% | 100%  |

Table 8  
**Place of Public Affairs Management Training and Embezzlement Accounting**

| Place of public affairs management training | Embezzlement accounting |   |   | Total |
|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------|---|---|-------|
|                                            | Yes | No  |       |
| ISMP Effective                             | 51  | 0   | 51   |
| % of total                                 | 10.3% | 0.0% | 10.3% |
| ENAM Effective                             | 153 | 34  | 187  |
| % of total                                 | 30.8% | 6.8% | 37.6% |
| Other                                      | 0   | 259 | 259  |
| % of total                                 | 0.0% | 52.1% | 52.1% |
| Total                                      | 204 | 293 | 497  |
| % of total                                 | 41.0% | 59.0% | 100%  |

Statistics in Table 9 show the intersection between anticipation of decision-making and accounting misappropriations. This table reveals to us that all managers of public funds (that is 153) having anticipated their decision-making have committed accounting misappropriations. And that 59% of those who have had to anticipate their management decision did not commit any accounting misappropriations. Table 10 highlights the relation between the reimbursement of balance due and accounting misappropriations. It appears that all the 119 managers of public funds having reimbursed the balance due have committed accounting misappropriations. And that 59.0% of those who have not reimbursed the balance due have committed accounting misappropriations. Table 11 analyzes the relation between equivalence or correspondence of current position and accounting misappropriations. It is becoming apparent that the chiefs of service (23%) commit accounting misappropriations and directors (12.9%); sub-directors (16.9%) have committed accounting misappropriations. The table informs us that, Inspectors of Services, Secretary of State, Ministers, Others did not commit any accounting misappropriations. Table 12 shows the crossing between decisions taken on the basis of technical services and accounting misappropriations. We observe that 45.9% of managers of public funds did not commit any accounting misappropriations because they took financial decisions on the basis of technical services and 34.2% of these managers having taken economic decisions on the basis of technical services have had to commit accounting misappropriations. Table 13 analyzes the relation between years of experience prior to the current position and accounting misappropriations. It appears that 20.3% of managers of public funds with more than 15 years of experience do not commit accounting misappropriations. But 10.3% of managers with less than five years of experience commit accounting misappropriations. We understand that with a higher number of years of experience, accounting misappropriations reduce.
Table 9  
*Anticipation of Management Decision-Making and Embezzlement Accounting*

| Anticipation of management decision-making | Embezzlement accounting | Yes | No | Total |
|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----|----|-------|
| Yes                                       | Effective                | 153 | 0  | 153   |
| % of total                                | 30.8%                    | 0.0%|    | 30.8% |
| No                                        | Effective                | 51  | 293| 344   |
| % of total                                | 10.3%                    | 59.0%|   | 69.2% |
| Total                                     |                          | 204 | 293| 497   |
| % of total                                | 41.0%                    | 59.0%|   | 100%  |

Table 10  
*Refunds of Amounts Set in Debet and Embezzlement Accounting*

| Refunds of amounts set in debit | Embezzlement accounting | Yes | No | Total |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------|-----|----|-------|
| Yes                             | Effective                | 119 | 0  | 119   |
| % of total                      | 23.9%                    | 0.0%|    | 23.9% |
| No                              | Effective                | 85  | 293| 378   |
| % of total                      | 17.1%                    | 59.0%|   | 76.1% |
| Total                           |                          | 204 | 293| 497   |
| % of total                      | 41.0%                    | 59.0%|   | 100%  |

Table 11  
*Current Occupation and Embezzlement Accounting*

| Equivalence or correspondence of the current position | Embezzlement accounting | Yes | No | Total |
|------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----|----|-------|
| Office Manager                                       | Effective                | 17  | 0  | 17    |
| % of total                                           | 3.4%                     | 0.0%|    | 3.4%  |
| Deputy Head of service                               | Effective                | 68  | 0  | 68    |
| % of total                                           | 13.7%                    | 0.0%|    | 13.7% |
| Head of service                                      | Effective                | 119 | 17 | 136   |
| % of total                                           | 23.9%                    | 3.4%|    | 27.4% |
| Assistant director                                   | Effective                | 0   | 84 | 84    |
| % of total                                           | 0.0%                     | 16.9%|   | 16.9% |
| Director                                             | Effective                | 0   | 64 | 64    |
| % of total                                           | 0.0%                     | 12.9%|   | 12.9% |
| Service inspectors                                   | Effective                | 0   | 48 | 48    |
| % of total                                           | 0.0%                     | 9.7% |   | 9.7%  |
| Secretary of State                                   | Effective                | 0   | 16 | 16    |
| % of total                                           | 0.0%                     | 3.2% |   | 3.2%  |
| Minister                                             | Effective                | 0   | 32 | 32    |
| % of total                                           | 0.0%                     | 6.4% |   | 6.4%  |
| Other                                                | Effective                | 0   | 32 | 32    |
| % of total                                           | 0.0%                     | 6.4% |   | 6.4%  |
| Total                                                |                          | 204 | 293| 497   |
| % of total                                           | 41.0%                    | 59.0%|   | 100%  |
Table 12

Decisions Made on the Basis of Technical Services and Embezzlement Accounting

| Decisions made on the basis of technical services | Yes   | No   | Total |
|--------------------------------------------------|-------|------|-------|
| Policy                                           |       |      |       |
| Effective                                       | 34    | 0    | 34    |
| % of total                                      | 6.8%  | 0.0% | 6.8%  |
| Economic                                        |       |      |       |
| Effective                                       | 170   | 17   | 187   |
| % of total                                      | 34.2% | 3.4% | 37.6% |
| Accounting and financial management             |       |      |       |
| Effective                                       | 0     | 228  | 228   |
| % of total                                      | 0.0%  | 45.9%| 45.9% |
| Other                                           |       |      |       |
| Effective                                       | 0     | 48   | 48    |
| % of total                                      | 0.0%  | 9.7% | 9.7%  |
| Total                                           | 204   | 293  | 497   |
| % of total                                      | 41.0% | 59.0%| 100%  |

Table 13

Years of Experience Prior to the Current Position and Embezzlement Accounting

| Years of experience prior to the current position | Yes   | No   | Total |
|---------------------------------------------------|-------|------|-------|
| Nothing to report                                 |       | 192  | 192   |
| % of total                                        | 0.0%  | 38.6%| 38.6% |
| Less than five years                              | 51    | 0    | 51    |
| % of total                                        | 10.3% | 0.0% | 10.3% |
| 5-15 years                                        | 153   | 0    | 153   |
| % of total                                        | 30.8% | 0.0% | 30.8% |
| More than 15 years                                | 0     | 101  | 101   |
| % of total                                        | 0.0%  | 20.3%| 20.3% |
| Total                                             | 204   | 293  | 497   |
| % of total                                        | 41.0% | 59.0%| 100%  |

Analysis of the Profile of Embezzlers Not Identifiable Upon Accounting Practices

This model highlights: the status of the respondent, the current situation of the respondent, the procedure of expenditure commitments, the absorption of liquidities before the production of supporting documents, the operating expenses validated by people in charge, the convocation of the manager by an audit organ. Firstly, let’s highlight the relation between the post occupied by the manager of public funds and accounting misappropriations. Table 14 shows the relation between the status of the respondent and accounting misappropriations. We notice that 41%, all the people who have embezzled public funds are paid workers. Furthermore, unemployed, retired people, prisoners, and others did not commit accounting embezzlements. They represent 59% of the size of the sample. One could therefore say that the embezzlement of public funds is related to the status of the individual. Table 15 illustrates the relation between the current situation of the respondent and accounting embezzlements. This table permits us to observe that 41% of cases of accounting embezzlements are identified for managers who are still in function. Furthermore, the same table shows that 59% of cases of accounting embezzlements have been noticed only when they were put at the disposal of justice, in prison, as staffing complement or other circumstances. Let’s highlight the relation between political
engagement of managers and accounting misappropriations. Table 16 shows the relation between expenditure commitments and accounting misappropriations. The table shows that 30.8% of cases of misappropriations are due to the trust in the provider and 10.3% to trust in hierarchy. We observe that the production in person of necessary documents or by an expert enables some managers to avoid some accounting misappropriations. This category represents 59% of cases studied. Table 17 is an illustration of the association between the withdrawal of liquidities before the production of supporting documents and accounting misappropriations. This table shows that there are 59% of managers who have not committed accounting misappropriations. We notice that 20.5% of managers-embezzlers who have withdrawn liquidities before the production of supporting documents have committed accounting misappropriations and 20.5% of managers-embezzlers always withdraw cash before the production of supporting documents. Table 18 shows the relation between operating expense validated by the following officers in charge and accounting misappropriations. This table shows that we can notice 41% of cases of misappropriations, 36% are found at the level of Senior Divisional Officers within the framework of validation of operating expenses, and 3.4% at the level of the Governor’s services. We also notice that quite often, the Governor’s services record only 13.1% of cases of misappropriations and 26.4% at the level of Divisional Officers. Ministers and other State’s services only have 9.9% and 9.7% of accounting misappropriations respectively. Table 19 presents the relation between the convocation of a manager by an audit organ and accounting misappropriations. It becomes apparent that over 41% of cases of accounting misappropriations noted, there have been 37.6% of convocations of managers concerned by an audit organ. On the contrary, 59% of managers testify that they have never embezzled and consequently, have never been summoned by an audit organ.

Table 14

| Respondent’s status | Embezzlement accounting | Yes | No | Total |
|---------------------|-------------------------|-----|----|-------|
| Employee            |                         |     |    |       |
| Effective           |                         | 204 | 0  | 204   |
| % of total          |                         | 41.0% | 0.0% | 41.0% |
| Self-employed       |                         |     |    |       |
| Effective           |                         | 0   | 117| 117   |
| % of total          |                         | 0.0% | 23.5% | 23.5% |
| Retired             |                         |     |    |       |
| Effective           |                         | 0   | 96 | 96    |
| % of total          |                         | 0.0% | 19.3% | 19.3% |
| Prisoner            |                         |     |    |       |
| Effective           |                         | 0   | 32 | 32    |
| % of total          |                         | 0.0% | 6.4% | 6.4%  |
| Other               |                         |     |    |       |
| Effective           |                         | 0   | 48 | 48    |
| % of total          |                         | 0.0% | 9.7% | 9.7%  |
| Total               |                         | 204 | 293| 497   |
| % of total          |                         | 41.0% | 59.0% | 100.0% |
Table 15
Current Situation of the Respondent and Embezzlement Accounting

| Embezzlement accounting | Yes | No | Total |
|-------------------------|-----|----|-------|
| Current situation of the respondent | | | |
| Based on | Effective | 204 | 0 | 204 |
| % of total | 41.0% | 0.0% | 41.0% |
| Made available to justice | Effective | 0 | 34 | 34 |
| % of total | 0.0% | 6.8% | 6.8% |
| In prison | Effective | 0 | 34 | 34 |
| % of total | 0.0% | 6.8% | 6.8% |
| In addition to staff | Effective | 0 | 49 | 49 |
| % of total | 0.0% | 9.9% | 9.9% |
| In custody | Effective | 0 | 80 | 80 |
| % of total | 0.0% | 16.1% | 16.1% |
| Other | Effective | 0 | 96 | 96 |
| % of total | 0.0% | 19.3% | 19.3% |
| Total | Effective | 204 | 293 | 497 |
| % of total | 41.0% | 59.0% | 100.0% |

Table 16
Procedure for Committing Expenditure and Embezzlement Accounting

| Embezzlement accounting | Yes | No | Total |
|-------------------------|-----|----|-------|
| Procedure for committing expenditure | | | |
| Confide in the supplier | Effective | 153 | 0 | 153 |
| % of total | 30.8% | 0.0% | 30.8% |
| Confide in the hierarchy | Effective | 51 | 34 | 85 |
| % of total | 10.3% | 6.8% | 17.1% |
| Produce one-self the necessary documents | Effective | 0 | 179 | 179 |
| % of total | 0.0% | 36.0% | 36.0% |
| Confide in an expert | Effective | 0 | 32 | 32 |
| % of total | 0.0% | 6.4% | 6.4% |
| Other | Effective | 0 | 48 | 48 |
| % of total | 0.0% | 9.7% | 9.7% |
| Total | Effective | 204 | 293 | 497 |
| % of total | 41.0% | 59.0% | 100.0% |

Table 17
Withdrawal of Cash Prior to the Production of the Supporting Documents and Embezzlement Accounting

| Embezzlement accounting | Yes | No | Total |
|-------------------------|-----|----|-------|
| Withdrawal prior to the of cash production of the supporting documents | | | |
| Never | Effective | 102 | 0 | 102 |
| % of total | 20.5% | 0.0% | 20.5% |
| Often | Effective | 102 | 245 | 347 |
| % of total | 20.5% | 49.3% | 69.8% |
| Always | Effective | 0 | 48 | 48 |
| % of total | 0.0% | 9.7% | 9.7% |
| Total | Effective | 204 | 293 | 497 |
| % of total | 41.0% | 59.0% | 100.0% |
Table 18
Operating Expenses Validated by the Managers and Embezzlement Accounting

| Operating expenses validated by the managers | Embezzlement accounting |
|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
|                                             | Yes | No | Total |
| Sub-prefects                                | 187 | 0  | 187   |
| % of total                                  | 37.6% | 0.0% | 37.6% |
| Prefects                                    | 0   | 131| 131   |
| % of total                                  | 0.0% | 26.4% | 26.4% |
| Governors                                   | 17  | 65 | 82    |
| % of total                                  | 3.4% | 13.1% | 16.5% |
| Ministers                                   | 0   | 49 | 49    |
| % of total                                  | 0.0% | 9.9%  | 9.9%  |
| Other                                       | 204 | 293| 497   |
| % of total                                  | 41.0% | 59.0% | 100.0% |

Table 19
Convening of the Manager by a Supervisory Body and Embezzlement Accounting

| Convening of the manager by a supervisory body | Embezzlement accounting |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
|                                              | Yes | No  | Total |
| Yes                                           | 187 | 0   | 187   |
| % of total                                   | 37.6% | 0.0% | 37.6% |
| No                                            | 17  | 293 | 310   |
| % of total                                   | 3.4% | 59.0% | 62.4% |
| Total                                         | 204 | 293| 497   |
| % of total                                   | 41.0% | 59.0% | 100.0% |

Discussion of Results

Grosso modo, we have carried out three types of analyses to verify our hypotheses. This implies that our general hypothesis according to which accounting misappropriations depend on the profile of the manager of public funds is confirmed on the basis of Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. It is a matter of analyzing these hypotheses on the basis of the test of multiple regressions. The analysis of regression of equations proves the importance of the profile of managers of public funds in the handling of accounting and consequently in the fair view of the management of public funds. Well handled, accounting is an important factor in the control of a manager’s actions. Badly handled, it can conceal many misappropriations and by extension, be confused as attempted misappropriation. For experienced people in the management of public properties, their profile enables to better understand the importance of accounting in the preservation of the state’s heritage. If that accounting is well handled, it permits to reflect a fair view of management. Otherwise, accounting can serve as launch pad for concealing some economic exactions. Accounting is therefore like a double edged sword in management. Shady managers will use it for themselves by committing misappropriations in all its forms. Our general hypothesis has raised five specific research hypotheses which underlie our study. This has enabled us to present the empirical basis of the study. In fact, it was for the profile of the manager-embezzler whose accounting misappropriation indexes are identifiable to
accounting practices, technical instructions of decision-making organ (H1), the type of training of the manager of public funds (H2), and the professional experience of the manager of public funds (H4). Whereas for the profile of the manager-embezzler whose accounting misappropriation indexes are not identifiable upon accounting practices, it was about duty post occupied by the manager of public funds (H3) and the political engagement of the manager of public funds (H5). These empirical bases lead us to the final research model.

Furthermore, it should be highlighted that this way of proceeding pushes many managers to finance political rallies. Therefore, they conceal these expenditures in their accounting. It makes that accounting cannot reflect in any way the real picture of management. Thus, accounting which is the showcase of management could no longer play its role.

From the above, results relative to the profile of the manager in general (Lavigne, 1999) and the one of the manager of public funds in particular (Proulx, 2008; Ramirez, 2009) are real and existing facts in other
organizations. In a descriptive manner, they are contingent factors such as gender, level of education, occupation as well as professional experience. Inadequacies noticed in public governance and hence in the structure of the state that favor embezzlements through accounting misappropriations have explanatory wakes. This is due to the fact that on the one hand, the profile of the manager-embezzler of public funds whose indexes of accounting misappropriations are identifiable upon accounting practices through: technical instructions of decision-making organ, the type of training of the manager of public funds, the professional experience of the manager of public funds. On the other hand, the profile of the manager-embezzler of public funds whose indexes of accounting misappropriations are not identifiable upon accounting practices is explained through: the duty post occupied by the manager of public funds and the political engagement of the manager of public funds. Hence, proposals of opportunities for the improvement of efficient management of public properties. These include the acceleration of decentralization, the implementation of Article 66 of the Constitution, the improvement and the continuation of operation hawk, the revolution towards the top and from the bottom to name just a few.

Managerial Implications

Since its origins, the new public management (NPM) had at the heart of its doctrine, the importance of raising a public manager with a power of decision and accountable for his actions, through performance indicators (Hood, 1991). Administrative reforms that started in many countries around the processes of modernization of public management institutionalize the notion of expected results (Pettigrew, 1997). A device registered in the transposition of Management by Objectives (Drucker, 1954), would make public management more efficient, by favoring empowerment, motivation, and the autonomy of managers, as well as the valorization of services provided to citizens in the context of this research. It must permit to articulate three dimensions of public performance: citizenship in public accounting services, optimization of resources and available means and transparency through the accountability of public managers towards citizens and their representatives (Mazouet, Leclerc, & Tardif Marcel, 2008).

Some consequences are probably linked to economic and political realities. Moreover, the World Bank’s report (1984; 1989) explained the causes of discontents of public enterprises in the South. “Because of a bad public management, we notice the existence of various deficit public enterprises, of ill-advised investments, of expensive and less reliable infrastructures and of divergent price evolution” (Easterly, 2009, p. 175). Taken from the angle of a public enterprise whole sole proprietor is the state, by virtue of what is recognized in him “bad manager”, we are inevitably moving towards no less adventitious acceptations such as: “commercial performance cannot be imposed on public utility companies”. In the same way, Gouadain and Lecointre made people observe in 1985 the difficulties of management of companies in those countries and particularly in Senegal. In the same vein, Causse (1988) identifies two series of difficulties specific to countries in the phase of emergence. She points out that

in Africa, auditing appeared few years after independence under the pressure on the one hand of international organizations which, having financed important projects, wanted to have an opinion on the use of funds allocated and on their capacity of reimbursement, on the other hand the branches of multinational companies which had created branches in developing countries. The latter found themselves with the problem of reliability of information and aggregation of information given by the different units subject to different legal and accounting rules. (Causse, 1992, p. 35)
In short, the regression analysis carried out in this work and the different illustrations prove the importance of the profile of managers of public funds in the handling of accounting and consequently in the fair view of management of public funds. Well handled, accounting is an important factor in the control of managers’ actions. Badly handled, it can conceal many misappropriations and by extension, be confused with attempted misappropriations. For people experienced in the management of public properties, their profile enables to better understand the importance of accounting in the preservation of state heritage. If that accounting is well handled, it permits to reflect the fair view of management. On the contrary, accounting rather serves as launch pad to conceal some economic exactions. Accounting is therefore a double edged sword in management. Shady managers use it for themselves by all means.

It emerges from this work that managers use public properties in an abusive manner with neither remorse nor fear, because they think that they are perks in their duty posts. Transparency in the management of public funds depends on the political engagement of credit managers. The relation between our concepts that is the profile of managers and accounting misappropriations implies the dependence of the profile of managers of public funds. In the management of public properties, the identification of the profile of the manager permits us to better understand the importance of accounting in the preservation of the State’s assets.

**Conclusion**

The study of embezzlement of public funds through accounting misappropriations as a structural and managerial fact implies the adoption of a rigorous explanatory approach. We have carried out four types of analyses to verify our hypotheses. They are: content analysis, chi-square test, factorial analysis of correspondence, and regression analysis. It emerges that the manager commits various misappropriations such as financial, technical, and structural accounting misappropriations. These managers use public properties in an abusive manner with neither remorse nor fear because they think that they are perks offered in their duty post. The verification of our hypotheses has shown the existence of the relation between the profile of managers of public funds and accounting misappropriations. The regression analysis of the binary logistic regression has shown six most significant factors of the profile of credit manager who intervene most in embezzlements. They are people with a higher level of education exercising the profession of customs officers or civil administrators, and who have a very rich professional experience in which they play the role of public funds authorizing officer. It is therefore important to note that a managerial approach to embezzlements makes people understand the motivations of managers in charge of public expenditures. The managerial approach is interested in the methods and techniques of embezzlements used. As far as the structural approach is concerned, it is analyzed under the angle of the different structural loopholes offered by the structures of the state. Thus, the key idea supported advocates a revolution from the top and from the bottom. It is interested in the managerial policy and the governance practiced in the country studied (Cameroon) and the loopholes that the actors-embezzlers exploit are presented. For that, the theory of “structure-managerial embezzlement” has been mobilized. Therefore, in parallel, by binding the face of managers-embezzlers to their accounting mechanisms, subject of this research, the positivist theory of accounting has served as experimentation to insert it as bedrock constituent of our thought.
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