NPOs and their Stakeholders’ Psychological Contracts: The Value of Implicit Expectations in Bolivia

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NPOs and their Stakeholders’ Psychological Contracts: The Value of Implicit Expectations in Bolivia

María Renee Barreal, Roland Pepermans & Michael Dooms

Abstract. Managing non-profit organizations (NPOs) in developing countries constitutes a challenge due to the intrinsic hardship of their missions, and the pressure of balancing their stakeholder’s interests and needs. Beyond the explicit challenges NPOs face (e.g., attracting volunteers, retaining employees, accounting to donors), we tackle the implicit obligations and returns that volunteers, employees, and donors hold towards an NPO. By introducing the concept of Stakeholder Psychological Contracts (SPC) and its three currencies (relational, transactional and ideological), we identify how each creates value for these stakeholders in a different way, using data from 409 respondents, representing 7 Bolivian NPOs. Despite the high levels of satisfaction and engagement among respondents, currencies such as Transactional Obligations in volunteers or Relational Returns in donors did not create substantial value. As predicted, Ideological returns showed relevance for all groups. However, in the case of employees, this currency shows a negative impact on satisfaction with the NPO, and engagement with the cause has no influence on their turnover intentions, as only satisfaction with the organization mediates in their intention to quit. We conclude that SPCs are a valuable concept for NPO managers when it comes to triggering engagement and satisfaction for each stakeholder group.

Key words: Stakeholder management, psychological contract, non-profit organizations, Bolivia.

Contratos Psicológicos de Actores: El valor de las expectativas implícitas en OSFLs bolivianas

Resumen. La gerencia de organizaciones sin fines de lucro (OSFL) en países en vías de desarrollo es un reto debido a la dureza intrínseca de su misión y debido a la presión en el equilibrio de los intereses de sus actores. Más allá de los retos extrínsecos (e.g. reclutamiento de voluntarios, retención de empleados y rendición de cuentas), nos referimos a las obligaciones y retornos intrínsecos que voluntarios, empleados y donadores tienen hacia la OSFL. Al introducir el concepto de Contrato Psicológico de Actores (CPA) y sus tres monedas (relacional, transaccional e ideológica), identificamos cómo cada una de ellas genera valor para estos actores clave de manera particular, utilizando datos de 409 participantes que representan 7 OSFLs bolivianas. A pesar de los altos niveles de satisfacción y compromiso en los participantes, monedas como las Obligaciones Transaccionales en voluntarios o los Retornos Relacionales en donantes demostraron no crear valor significativo. De acuerdo con lo anticipado, Retornos Ideológicos demostraron relevancia para todos los grupos. En el caso de los empleados, esta moneda indica un impacto negativo en satisfacción.
hacia la OSFL, y el compromiso con la causa no tiene influencia alguna en sus intenciones de renuncia, es únicamente la satisfacción con la organización que actúa como mediador en este caso. Concluimos en que el CPA es un concepto valioso para las gerencias de OSFL al momento de generar compromiso y satisfacción para cada grupo de actores.

**Palabras clave:** Gerencia de actores claves, contrato psicológico, organizaciones sin fines de lucro, Bolivia.

**Content.** 1. Introduction. 2. Stakeholder Management in NPOs. 3. Stakeholder Psychological Contracts. 4. Hypotheses. 5. Methodology. Sampling procedure. 6. Variables and Measures. 7. Results. 8. Discussion. 8.1 Volunteers. 8.2 Employees. 8.3 Donors. 9. Conclusions and further research. 10. References. 11. Annexes. 11.1a SPC Survey in Spanish as applied to the sample. 11.1b SPC Survey in English. 11.2 Correlation coefficients between all variables per group of stakeholders. 11.3. ANOVA Paired T-test between all currencies, results per group. 11.4 Coefficients for all variables in Model A and Final Model

**1. Introduction**

Since 2010, Bolivia is no longer considered a low-income country (World Bank, 2017). This evolution has led to decreasing international funding for Nonprofit Organizations (NPOs), and therefore, to increasing challenges. While the sector has long benefited from international aid, funds were often misused or used unsustainably (Barber & Bowie, 2008). New government directives further state that all cooperation funds entering the country be controlled for political intentions (García Linera, 2015), leading to a crowding-out of cooperation and funding agencies. Despite its economic growth, 36% of the Bolivian population remains below the poverty line (World Bank, 2017). Hence, NPOs are still prevailing in the country in order to counteract the effects of income inequality and low access to education in vulnerable populations. In order to sustain their efforts, NPOs compete not only for international funding but also for citizens’ donations, for qualified staff and engaged volunteers, under increasing scrutiny of government and society.

These challenges and potential solutions have been documented, from NPOs showing their impact in society (Mook, Maiorano, Ryan, Armstrong, & Quarter, 2015), to increasing their accountability practices (Cavill & Sohail, 2007) and recruiting the right people in competitive environments (Barber & Bowie, 2008). Most of these challenges are addressed from a stakeholder management perspective, as NPOs need to satisfy each stakeholder’s expectations (Balser & McClusky, 2005) and stakeholders need a differentiated treatment from NPOs towards realizing engagement. Recent literature has focused on the value that emerges from collaboration with other stakeholders such as volunteers (Kaltenbrunner & RenzI, 2019) or with other types of organizations (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012). However, there is little focus on what value creation exactly means for stakeholders, especially in southern or developing countries.

In this article, we study the expectations of three important stakeholders (volunteers, employees and donors) in the Bolivian nonprofit environment, by using the recently introduced concept of the stakeholder-psychological contract or SPC (Brown, Buchholtz, & Dunn, 2016). SPCs allows comparing implicit obligations and returns, which may prompt stakeholder satisfaction with the NPO as well as engagement with a cause. By introducing the SPC concept, we are able to unravel the concept of value into three main currencies, where value is obtained and exchanged in stakeholder relationships.
Brown, Buchholtz, and Dunn (2016) are the first to take the relational and transactional currencies as defined by Rousseau (1989) to a firm-stakeholder level. We adapt this to the nonprofit environment and add the ideological component developed by Bingham (2005) and studied mainly in volunteer or employment contexts (e.g., Vantilborgh et al., 2014). Together, these three aspects can be applied to stakeholder relationships, where the contribution to a cause is key for the relationship. The implications of our research are significant for NPO managers, as they will better understand which currencies are more likely to create value for certain groups of stakeholders.

In sum, the main objective of this paper is to adapt the concept of psychological contracts to a stakeholder perspective, enabling a formal comparison of stakeholders’ implicit obligations and returns to an NPO, and determining the salience that emerges from different currencies or expectations. By addressing volunteers, employees and donors, we contribute to stakeholder theory by providing a managerial instrument for acknowledging stakeholders’ expectations, we also contribute to psychological contract theory by expanding its application beyond the employee-employer relationship.

2. Stakeholder Management in NPOs

Stakeholder theory stresses the need for managerial attention to all stakeholders in a balanced way to achieve sustainable organizational success. Freeman (1984) posits that stakeholder management is the only way to sustainability, through integrating partners’ interests in strategic decision-making.

In stakeholder theory, successful relationships exist when all parties provide value for all stakeholders, rather than taking advantage of one group to favor another (Freeman & McVea, 2001). Value creation for stakeholders occurs when all parties in a relationship are better off (Freeman, Harrison, & Wicks, 2007), with each stakeholder judging what makes them better off. In this context, the value within stakeholder relationships can be diverse and particular, but it may also be implicit, and value will be as subjective and idiosyncratic as the relationship itself (Sacconi, 2006).

Making stakeholder relationships the main unit of analysis provides great opportunities as it allows us to analyze the terms of a relationship and the role of each stakeholder in it. Given that NPO stakeholders hold diverse interests in the organization, they generate managerial challenges for the NPO (Wellens & Jegers, 2014). For instance, governments tend to have great power, as they set the regulatory context and can easily influence the fulfillment of NPOs’ missions. Financers can impose certain expenses or overheads (Candler, 2010); and while beneficiaries should receive most of the attention, we often find unattended groups of stakeholders such as volunteers and employees, not having sufficient leverage with the organization to improve their working conditions. Recent literature has emphasized volunteer management as a highly relevant challenge for NPOs (Vantilborgh & Puyvelde, 2018), but studies regarding the balancing of needs of both employees and volunteers are scarce, as are comparisons between multiple stakeholders (e.g., Liao-Troth, 2005).

According to Balser and McClusky (2005), NPOs need to be responsive to their stakeholders and act according to the stakeholders’ expectations to be effective. This responsiveness becomes problematic when expectations are conflicting, unaligned or unclear, in particular when it concerns beneficiaries’ objectives versus less powerful, but equally legitimate, stakeholder objectives (Ebrahim, 2005). This confirms the need for an instrument that translates stakeholder’s expectations and helps NPO managers understand stakeholders, in terms of specific sources of value creation.
3. Stakeholder Psychological Contracts

Psychological contracts (PCs) have been widely studied to describe employees’ expectations towards their employer in a wide array of employment relationships (Cavanaugh & Noe, 1999; Dainty, Raiden, & Neale, 2004; Dries, Forrier, De Vos, & Pepermans, 2014; Rousseau, 1995). Most recently in nonprofit environments, PCs have been used to gain a better understanding of volunteers’ motivations and their perceptions towards an organization (Nichols, 2013; Vantilborgh, 2015).

Rousseau (1989) defined PCs as the expectations and beliefs employees hold regarding the terms of their relationship with their employer and the obligations the employer owes in return. Fulfilled PCs have shown positive correlations with affect (Aranda, Hurtado, & Topa, 2018; Vantilborgh, Bidee, Pepermans, Grie, & Hofmans, 2016), job satisfaction (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994), increased performance (Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000; Millward & Hopkins, 1998), work engagement (Soares & Mosquera, 2019), trust (Atkinson, 2007) and reduced turnover intention (Collins, 2010), while breached or unfulfilled PCs are associated with reduced commitment and engagement (Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000), aggressive and decreased considerate voice (Vantilborgh, 2015), among other negative behaviors.

However useful the PC has proven to be, most of the literature focuses on the employee-employer relationship, where the employee’s expectations are either described (Festing & Schäfer, 2014; Ho, Rousseau, & Levesque, 2006; Rousseau, 2000), fulfilled (Morrison & Robinson, 1997) or breached (Antonaki & Trivellas, 2014). Some authors have emphasized the need to explore further types of employment relationships (Herriot & Pemberton, 1997) even considering “there are as many contracts as there are relationships within the workplace” (Marks, 2001, p. 456). And although not all NPOs use volunteers as a resource, some are highly reliant on volunteer work at grassroots levels of the organization (Wellens & Jegers, 2014).

The application of PC theory outside the employee-employer relationship is not entirely novel, as it has been extended to describe customer-supplier relationships (Koh, Ang, & Straub, 2004; Pavlou & Gefen, 2005). The term “firm-stakeholder psychological contracts” is used to create a moral salient framework for trust repair between a firm and a stakeholder when some misconduct has taken place (Brown et al., 2016). This last approach applies the relational and transactional currencies in order to describe when stakeholder relationships can be easier to mend.

Using PC theory to analyze stakeholder relationships increases the opportunity for meaningful stakeholder management. As managers think about retributing their stakeholders, they may reflect on all possible currencies that will be valuable for stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). We, therefore, define Stakeholder Psychological Contracts (SPCs) as the perceived expectations stakeholders hold towards an organization, considering the obligations and returns that arise from the reciprocity of the relationship. Consistent with PC theory, SPC currencies exchanged among stakeholders can be divided into Relational, Transactional and Ideological.

The relational currency is associated with behavior or actions beyond written requirements, where arrangements are based upon mutual trust and loyalty and rewards are not necessarily conditioned to performance. Loyalty, stability and an open-ended time frame are the main characteristics (Rousseau, 1995, 2000). From this perspective, resources are provided freely and reciprocated over time; resources and capabilities are developed and shared between parties with high involvement and continuity in order to achieve the full potential of the relationship (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012).

The transactional currency focuses on economic exchange and limited involvement, whether in a specific time frame or limiting duties and tasks. The possibility of written
agreements with specific contributions is part of this currency. Contributions will be limited to what stakeholders will receive in return for their input in the short term. Hence, stakeholders such as funders may earn tax exemptions, volunteers receive contribution certificates and employees receive compensations (Wellens & Jegers, 2014).

We find the ideological currency particularly relevant for NPOs since it concerns the sponsoring of a cause or being committed to a mission above all else. This also includes involving other stakeholders in the cause in order to multiply its effects (Bingham, 2005). Ideological contracting can elicit further contributions from stakeholders that strengthen the relationship and create stronger bonds.

4. Hypotheses

Stakeholders hold varied motivations to engage with NPOs, therefore they may find value in one or more currencies of the SPC. Our first hypothesis addresses the general composition of SPCs for each group under consideration. According to social exchange theory, behaviors that are reciprocated by another party are sustained over time; according to Thacker (2015), in a working environment, when employees provide time and effort, they can be reciprocated with a paycheck, job security, and recognition. Contrary to this, Knutsen and Chan (2015) indicate that the nature of volunteer work is providing ‘something’ and expecting ‘nothing’ in return, thereby finding satisfaction in their obligations. However, they may expect other currencies above the monetary such as friendship, experience, etc. (Vantilborgh et al., 2011a). Meanwhile, donors delegate decision making to the NPO, where the latter becomes responsible for the outcome of the transaction, and therefore highly accountable for the results (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, & Jegers, 2012; Wellens & Jegers, 2014) making the donor highly expectant.

We state that, independently of the nature of the relationship, volunteers, employees, and donors engage in economic exchange, even though they may not exchange the same currencies. According to SPC, relationships are based on reciprocity and balance, therefore we expect to find it in stakeholders’ perceived Obligations and Returns.

- H1. The composition of SPCs: The SPC of each stakeholder group (volunteers, employees, donors) will not show significant differences when comparing their individual Returns and Obligations.

We insist that in order to sustain a stakeholder relationship both the stakeholder and the organization are receiving valuable outcomes. If one of the parties expects more returns than obligations, they may be destroying value for themselves. While if they have too high obligations, they may be being taken advantage of.

Through the SPC framework, we expect to find a combination of three currencies (transactional, relational and ideological) at two different levels: expected Returns and expected Obligations. From H1 we anticipate that stakeholders will find a balance between overall returns and obligations, however, for H2 we expect each stakeholder to behave differently by prioritizing specific currencies within returns and obligations.

- H2. The currencies of SPCs: Volunteers, employees, and donors will display different levels of Relational, Transactional and Ideological currencies within their expected Returns and Obligations.

Research on volunteers shows that although mission and value-oriented factors are highly relevant (Scheel & Mohr, 2012), close contact and appreciation from their
organization are also valued highly (Kappelides, Cuskelly, & Hoye, 2019). This indicates that for volunteers, Ideological Obligations and Relational Returns are highly relevant (Vantilborgh et al., 2014).

- **H2.A** Volunteers SPCs show Ideological Obligations as being the most important, while Relational Returns come second. Transactional Returns, however, will be the least relevant.

The main discrepancy between volunteers and employees regarding the PC lies in the benefits perceived in exchange for their work, i.e., the Transactional Expectations (Liao-Troth, 2001). Atkinson (2007) mentions that employees find the Transactional currency particularly relevant as if the fulfillment of this currency would enable the creation of a Relational one and both of these will have an impact on trust in the employer. Although employees, in general, might be more transactional-driven, literature also highlights the relevance of the NPOs’ mission in recruiting and retaining human resources, which would give high relevance to the Ideological currency (Bingham, 2005; Brown & Yoshioka, 2003), however, in a labor market as narrow as the Bolivian, Ideological returns may be irrelevant.

- **H2.B** Employees’ SPCs are balanced, however, Transactional and Relational Returns are most important.

NPOs are highly dependent on donors to perform their operations, and donors trust organizations to boost their reputation (Ebrahim, 2005). As Stevens and Hauser (2004) indicate, donating and cooperating is often driven by future benefits. Since this relationship is mainly focused on the spending of money for specific purposes (Lloyd, 2005), we expect that donors have high Transactional Obligations while expecting Ideological and Relational currencies in exchange.

- **H2.C** Donors’ SPC will show Transactional Obligations, Ideological Returns and Relational Returns as being most important; Ideological Obligations are the least relevant.

We also intend to assess some outcomes triggered by the SPC currencies in order to determine their value creation potential. Satisfaction with the organization was very early linked to PCs, as well as satisfaction with a particular aspect (e.g., job satisfaction, supervisor satisfaction, etc.) (Tett & Meyer, 1993). Turnover intention in employees has also been studied together with PC, (Kotter, 1973), however, Engagement to a cause has not yet been addressed through a PC perspective and could help to assess how value is delivered to the cause through the NPO (Manetti & Toccafondi, 2014).

We address global Satisfaction to the NPO as well as the Engagement to the cause, both as understood by the stakeholder. We assert that SPC currencies can have different priorities for each stakeholder group, but that all currencies have the potential for triggering value either for the NPO in the form of Satisfaction or for the cause as Engagement. Evidently, we expect Turnover intention to behave opposite from satisfaction and engagement.

- **H3.A** The salience of SPCs: All SPC currencies relate positively to Satisfaction towards the organization and Engagement towards the cause.
H3.B) **Satisfaction towards the organization and Engagement towards the cause** will relate negatively to **Turnover intention** in employees.

The model to be tested for this hypothesis is shown in Figure 1, considering **Turnover intention** is only measured in employees.

![Figure 1. Model for testing Hypothesis 3](image)

### 5. Methodology. Sampling procedure

The Bolivian Ministry of Planning and Development provided a list of current NPOs in the country, however, not all of them had running operations at the time of the study. We contacted only local NPOs, with managerial presence in the country and with a history of at least 5 years. After reaching out to more than 50 Bolivian NPOs fifteen organizations responded favorably to participating in the study and from those, 7 distributed the surveys to their stakeholders, being volunteers, employees and donors. The missions of these organizations are diverse, i.e., animal rights, protection of the elder, housing, children protection, young people with special needs, education and women’s rights, the biggest NPO had 60 employees on their payroll. Individual participants were contacted through email by their organization’s manager or by the researcher on behalf of the organization. The email contained an organizational and a personal link to the online survey and emphasized the voluntary and anonymous nature of people’s participation. An open link was also published through social media at the NPOs’ websites and sent to groups of people who participated in volunteer groups and/or had a network of personal donors that participated in fund-raising events, thereby increasing our pool of participants.

Overall, 650 individuals were contacted. We obtained 409 complete and valid responses (overall response rate: 63%), out of which 86.5% came from the contacted NPOs. 251 women and 158 men participated in the study: 271 volunteers, 171 employees and 21 donors. The donor sample is quite small compared to the other groups in view of further statistical analyses, therefore, caution as well as a particular analysis approach is needed. All the communications, as well as the survey, were done in Spanish.

### 6. Variables and Measures

The independent variables measuring SPCs’ expected Returns and Obligations are presented in Table 1, dependent variables are included in Table 2.
Table 1. Independent Variables

| Variable | Definition | Subcategory | Definition |
|----------|------------|-------------|------------|
| Stakeholder Psychological Contract | The perceived expectations stakeholders hold towards an organization, considering the obligations and returns that arise from the reciprocity of the relationship | Ideological | The espousal of a cause or commitment to a mission, that represents a distinct inducement to elicit employee contributions and commitment. |
| | | Relational | Arrangements based upon mutual trust and loyalty. Rewards derive from membership and participation. Behaviour extends beyond the written requirements but for the benefit of the common good. |
| | | Transactional | Contributions will be limited to what stakeholders will receive in return of their input in the short term. Primarily focused upon economic exchange; specific, narrow and non-flexible duties. |

Table 2. Dependent Variables

| Variable | Definition | Subcategories |
|----------|------------|---------------|
| Satisfaction with the organization | Overall satisfaction with the organization | Affective reactions a person has towards the organization which arise from establishing a comparison between what a person wants and what the person receives. |
| Engagement with the cause | Overall commitment to the cause sponsored cause of the organization | As perceived by each respondent |
| Turnover intention (for employees only) | The cognitive process that eventually leads to an employee quitting a job. | Consideration to leave, Intention to leave, Intention to search |

The instrument consists of a questionnaire with four subscales (see Annex 1). SPC items were adapted from the scales by Bingham (2005) and Rousseau (2000) and were to be answered on a 5-point Likert scale. Expected Returns were measured asking participants to rate the statement “As a <stakeholder>, I expect <name of the NPO> to...”. For example, if the respondent was a donor for the fire department, it read “As a donor, I expect the Fire Department to...”. We provided a list of 8 Relational, 10 Transactional and 9 Ideological items.

In a similar way, we asked to rate Expected Obligations as “The Fire Department can expect from me as a donor that I...” and provided a list of 9 Relational, 8 Transactional and 10 Ideological observed variables.

For the dependent variables, we developed specific items for this study based on work by (Mcdonald & Makin, 2000; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). We asked respondents their level of agreement with each statement and provided them with a slider scale from 0 to 100 as recommended by (Fisher & To, 2012) for single item measurement. Satisfaction to the organization (α= 0.945) consisted of: level of satisfaction with the organization, perception of the organization's performance and the degree to which their expectations are in line with the organization's expectations. Engagement with the cause was measured through a single item by asking respondents to rate their level of personal commitment with the cause sponsored by the organization. Turnover intention (for employees only) was measured through three items as developed by Carmeli and Weisberg (2007), the items stem from the thoughts of quitting to the intention to search for another job. Finally, identification variables were included:
gender, the duration of the relationship with the organization and the frequency of contact with the NPO.

We first translated and back-translated the survey to Spanish, then run a pilot test using a small convenience sample (N= 93) to check comprehensibility and verify internal consistency of all subscales through Cronbach alpha coefficients: Expected Returns, Relational (RREL $\alpha =0.75$), Transactional (RTRA $\alpha =0.77$) and Ideological (RIDE $\alpha =0.87$); Expected Obligations, Relational (EREL $\alpha =0.82$), Transactional (ETRA $\alpha =0.75$) and Ideological (EIDE $\alpha =0.88$).

We performed statistical analyses with SPSS Statistics 25 and STATA 14.2. We calculated frequencies, descriptive statistics, internal consistency (reliability), Pearson correlations and performed path analyses. Multicollinearity was controlled for when required.

7. Results

In order to check the reliability of the measures in the final sample, we analyzed the data for the volunteers, employees and donors separately. Accepting Cronbach’s alpha coefficients above 0.70 (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013), we found that two items in the SPC had to be deleted; Table 3 shows all coefficients. Descriptive measures for each SPC currency can be found in table 4.

Table 3. Reliability Statistics. Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient per subscale

| SPCs (Returns and Obligations) | N Items | Satiation Scale | N Items | Turnover Scale | N Items |
|-------------------------------|---------|-----------------|---------|----------------|---------|
| Volunteers                    | 0.951   | 38              | 0.845   | 4              |         |
| Employees                     | 0.929   | 38              | 0.913   | 4              | 0.847   |
| Donors                        | 0.922   | 38              | 0.833   | 4              |         |

Table 4. Descriptive indicators for SPC

|                  | n      | REL   | TRA   | IDE   | REL   | TRA   | IDE   | SATISF NPO | ENGAG W CAUSE | Turnover Intention |
|------------------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Volunteers Mean  | 271    | 3.863 | 3.774 | 4.256 | 4.209 | 4.010 | 4.221 | 81.776     | 85.650           |                   |
| St. Dev.         | 0.773  | 0.737 | 0.657 | 0.700 | 0.710 | 0.695 | 16.469 | 17.741     |                  |                   |
| Employees Mean   | 117    | 4.185 | 4.157 | 4.326 | 4.255 | 4.261 | 4.166 | 75.641     | 87.670           | 22.143            |
| St. Dev.         | 0.612  | 0.510 | 0.528 | 0.575 | 0.576 | 0.612 | 18.115 | 16.974     | 24.921           |                   |
| Donors Mean      | 21     | 3.648 | 3.699 | 4.089 | 4.086 | 4.107 | 4.173 | 78.492     | 78.380           |                   |
| St. Dev.         | 1.077  | 1.065 | 0.799 | 0.625 | 0.673 | 0.488 | 21.550 | 20.402     |                  |                   |

H1: The composition of SPCs

Returns and Obligations for each group of stakeholders were compared using the nonparametric Wilcoxon paired t-test (Table 5) since the data is not normally distributed and we have a small sample size in donors. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find significantly higher Obligations than Returns (p＜.01) for volunteers. As expected, employees do not show significant differences between these variables, demonstrating balanced SPCs. The same happens for donors, where the difference between Obligations and Returns is not significant.
Therefore, we can only accept H1 for employees and donors showing a balance between Obligations and Returns.

Table 5. Discrepancy measures between Returns and Obligations

|       | Mean  | Std. Deviation | Z      | Significance |
|-------|-------|----------------|--------|--------------|
| Volunteers | Returns: 3.964 | 0.605 | 6.939** | 0.000 |
|        | Obligations: 4.147 | 0.632 |         |              |
| Employees | Returns: 4.222 | 0.461 | 0.316 | 0.752 |
|        | Obligations: 4.227 | 0.501 |         |              |
| Donors | Returns: 3.812 | 0.895 | 1.112 | 0.226 |
|        | Obligations: 4.122 | 0.547 |         |              |

**, Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*, Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The balance between Obligations and Returns changes slightly when analyzing the separate currencies within them. We performed paired sample t-tests in order to compare each currency’s Obligations vs. Returns. Table 6 shows this difference of means, where a positive outcome indicates higher Obligations and a negative outcome indicates higher Returns.

Table 6. Discrepancies between Returns and Obligations per currency

|       | t     | Significance |
|-------|-------|--------------|
| Volunteers | Relational: 9.064** | 0.000 |
|        | Transactional: 7.183** | 0.000 |
|        | Ideological: -1.203 | 0.230 |
| Employees | Relational: 1.273 | 0.206 |
|        | Transactional: 2.696** | 0.008 |
|        | Ideological: -3.592** | 0.000 |
| Donors | Relational: 1.762 | 0.093 |
|        | Transactional: 1.667 | 0.111 |
|        | Ideological: 0.433 | 0.670 |

**, Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*, Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

We find volunteers possess significantly higher Transactional (9.064**) and Relational Obligations (7.183**). The impression that employees’ SPCs are balanced is not entirely so, as they expect significantly higher Ideological Returns (-3.592**) and hold high Transactional Obligations (2.696**). Donors do not show significant differences.

H2: The currencies for each stakeholder

In order to determine the priorities, we performed a one-way ANOVA and a Student T-test to establish the significance of the difference in means for each of the six currencies, the complete results for this analysis can be found in Annex 3. Figure 2 shows that volunteers prioritize Ideological Obligations and Returns as much as their Relational Obligations, not showing a significant difference between them. As expected, volunteers’ Transactional Returns are significantly lower than all other currencies (p<0.01). The results provide partial support for H2.A, especially when prioritizing the cause they contribute to, above economical rewards.
Figure 2. The priority of currencies for Volunteers

For employees, we do not find significant consecutive differences between currencies, however, we find two distinct priorities, where they expect more Ideological than Transactional Returns. Contrary to H2.B, we find employees hold even higher Transactional Obligations than Returns.

Figure 3. The priority of currencies for Employees

Finally, among donors, we find a surprisingly balanced SPC. And though there are no significant differences between each consecutive currency, we do find a marginal gap between the highest and lowest currency, this leads us to reject H2.C.
H3: The salience of SPCs

In this section, we used path analysis to identify if all SPC currencies relate significantly to Engagement with the cause, Satisfaction to the Organization and Turnover Intention (the latter only for employees). We will address the initial model as Model A. As Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby, and Paxton (2008) recommend, we use multiple statistical measures to test the fit of the model, chi-square (p> .05), RMSEA (p> .05), Tucker-Lewis index (p> .08) and SRMR (p<.05).

As seen in table 7 we first tested Model A, however, this did not yield adequate indexes for all stakeholder groups. We decided to delete the direction with the least significant p-value and the model was run again until we found a fit for each group. In some cases, this resulted in the deletion of the entire observed variable. The original z-coefficients and p-values for Model A and the Final Model can be found in Annex 4, while the values regarding model fit can be found in Table 6.

Table 7. Result of the Model coefficients in Model A vs. Final Model

| Model       | Role    | Chi² | RMSEA | TLI   | SRMR |
|-------------|---------|------|-------|-------|------|
|             | Volunteers | 0.000 | 0.535 | -7.578 | 0.076 |
| Model “A”   | Employees | 0.000 | 0.329 | -0.980 | 0.117 |
|             | Donors E  | 0.858 | 0.000 | 2.017  | 0.007 |
|             | Donors O  | 0.253 | 0.124 | 1.763  | 0.060 |
| FINAL MODEL | Volunteers | 0.186 | 0.050 | 0.988  | 0.020 |
|             | Employees | 0.769 | 0.000 | 1.046  | 0.035 |
|             | Donors    | 0.896 | 0.000 | 1.723  | 0.034 |

We first elaborate on the results for volunteers and employees. For volunteers, we found that Ideological Obligations has a significantly positive relation with both Satisfaction to the NPO (β=.33, z=4.64, p<.01) and Engagement with the cause (β=.28, z=3.31, p<.01), while Transactional Obligations has a significantly negative relation with Satisfaction to the NPO (β=−.18, z=−2.68, p<.05) and no impact on Engagement with the cause (Figure 6). It is not a surprise to find a positive covariance between Satisfaction to the NPO and Engagement with the cause of (cov=.516, z=11.51, p<.01).

![Figure 5. Final Model for Volunteers](image)

For employees, we also find Ideological Obligations positively related both to Satisfaction to the NPO (β=−.39, z=3.91, p<.05) and Engagement with the cause (β=.24, z=2.72, p<.01) (Figure 7). While Ideological Returns shows a negative effect on Satisfaction to the NPO (β=−.33, z=3.67, p<.01). After testing Satisfaction as a mediating variable according to the model proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986), we confirmed that it indeed has a mediating effect between Engagement with the cause and Turnover intention which
indicates that more satisfied employees are, the less likely to leave the organization ($\beta=-.52$, $z=-7.31$, $p<.01$).

Due to the small sample size, it is not possible to estimate the entire model at once for donors, therefore we estimated Returns and Obligations separately. Despite having a good model fit, we did not find significant relationships between currencies and the dependent variables. After modeling Returns, we eliminated the Transactional Returns component, due to no significant relationship with the outcome variables.

When modeling Obligations in donors, we found that none of the components had significant p-values. Therefore, we took the Returns model and added the Obligations variables one by one in order to observe any possible impact this may have on the variability of the model. The final outcome, to be treated with caution, shows a significantly negative relationship of Relational Returns with Satisfaction to the NPO ($\beta=-.54$, $z=2.99$, $p<.01$) as well as with Engagement with the cause ($\beta=-.52$, $z=-2.26$, $p<.01$) (Figure 8). Ideological Obligations shows a significant effect on Engagement with the cause ($\beta=.47$, $z=2.85$, $p<.01$) as Relational Obligations over Satisfaction to the NPO ($\beta=.45$ $z=2.34$, $p<.05$).

8. Discussion

In developing economies as the Bolivian, managers tend to neglect stakeholders by prioritizing financiers or donors above others such as employees working at ground level (Ebrahim, 2005). Previous research in the Bolivian non-profit context has focused either in the socio-political environment (Bebbington, 2004), the psychological factors that influence beneficiaries (Losantos, Berckmans, Villanueva, & Loots, 2014) or most recently, on touristic volunteering (Thompson, Curran, & Gorman, 2017). However, the challenges of NPOs in the face of changing legislation and decreasing funding are hardly addressed, especially for local NPOs who lack institutional leverage in front of the imposition of international development institutions (Arellano-Lopez & Petras, 1994). As international funding gets relocated to low-income countries, Bolivian NPOs need to compete for citizens’ credibility to retain their staff and keep their volunteers engaged.
In order to give value to stakeholders, managers need to fulfill their expectations, and this may mean focusing on different currencies for each stakeholder. In this paper we aim to identify the currencies that Bolivian stakeholders value from the relationship with an NPO. Through SPCs, we were able to classify expected returns and obligations from volunteers, employees, and donors towards several Bolivian NPOs and the emerging outcomes of each of these currencies.

8.1 Volunteers

We were able to confirm that Volunteers show more expected Obligations than Returns. This positive imbalance comes from highly regarded Relational and Transactional Obligations; volunteers perceive their relationship and their feelings of belonging to the NPO is their own responsibility and they are willing to uphold the NPOs’ image and reputation even beyond their agreement.

However, we found that volunteers’ Ideological component is the highest ranked for this group of stakeholders, but their expected Returns and Obligations do not have the same effects. In line with previous research (Scheel & Mohr, 2012) their Obligations will generate engagement with the cause and satisfaction with the organization. Vantilborgh and cols. (2016) encounter for this group, when organizations ask too much from volunteers, in our case in the shape of Transactional Obligation (e.g. fees to participate in volunteering activities), Satisfaction with the NPO decreases, while providing support and supervision encourages them to participate more.

When volunteers feel the need to contribute to a cause and engage in it, they rank their own Transactional Returns as their lowest priority, which indicates they are the least demanding stakeholders. On the other hand, when volunteers do not have the resources or the conditions to perform their tasks, and they feel they need to take the lead in establishing the specific aspects of their relationship, value to the organization is being drained.

The lack of a relational currency driving Satisfaction with the NPO does not negate the conclusions drawn by Vantilborgh et al. (2011), stating that friendship is key, however, it signals the likelihood that the Bolivian NPOs are merely an enabler of volunteers finding this currency in peers or beneficiaries.

8.2 Employees

For employees, we find a balance between Returns and Obligations as expected. Surprisingly, we find higher Transactional Obligations than Returns, although the initiative for setting the transactional agreement generally comes from the employer. Employees themselves, in this case, are keen on setting the intentions and acting according to their responsibilities in their employment agreements, perhaps due to the need to retain their income in a limited job market as the Bolivian.

We also find that employees for Bolivian NPOs expect from the organization to contribute to the cause and engage with it more than they do themselves. We find a balance in the Relational currency, where employees show concern about the NPO’s reputation and image and also expect to receive appreciation for their efforts and their wellbeing, even beyond the professional exchange, in line with general PC research (Aykan, 2014; Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2002; Morrison & Robinson, 1997).

Although Ideological Obligations is not employees’ first priority, Satisfaction to the organization is mainly related to this component, as is their Engagement with the cause. While Ideological returns seem to have an opposite effect on Satisfaction with the organization. Based on (Ebrahim, 2005), we contemplate the possibility that employees
perceive they may need to compromise their own well-being when the organization engages more towards the main cause. Further, Bingham (2005) and Brown and Yoshioka (2003) already noticed the importance of the ideological currency at the moment of recruiting and retaining employees. Our results highlight the importance of sponsoring a cause and allowing employees to contribute actively and getting a sense of reward from their duties. This is probably the relationship where most value is exchanged between NPO and Stakeholder, as they reciprocally exchange relational aspects and the ideological salience delivers value to the cause.

Despite observing a high correlation between Engagement with the cause and Turnover intention, the final model for employees suggests that Satisfaction to the organization is a key mediator for employees’ intention to leave the organization, which means that no matter how engaged an employee is to the cause, when they are unsatisfied with the organization, they will look for another job, even if this means stopping their contribution to the cause in line with Tnay, Othman, Siong, and Lim (2013).

8.3 Donors

In the case of donors, our sample size does not allow us to draw definitive conclusions. However, results showed a balanced SPC between Returns and Obligations, as well as among currencies, where we only found a marginal significance where Ideological Obligations were found to be slightly more relevant than Relational Returns. This may be because donors get involved very narrowly with the NPO, as Townsend and Townsend (2004) state, not all donors receive the accountability reports NPOs make, and sometimes they limit their involvement to eventual donations.

As for the outcomes of donors’ SPCs, we find Relational Returns to associate negatively with Engagement with the cause and with Satisfaction to the NPO. This indicates that the more an NPO tries to engage the donor, the less satisfied the donor becomes. Contrary to this, Relational Obligations indicates higher levels of Satisfaction to the NPO, suggesting donors perceive more value when they control the relationship and they can contribute to the NPO with their own ideas. Finally, we find that Bolivian donors Engage further in a cause when they see NPOs contributing to it, advocating in its favor and encouraging others to get involved. In this case, value emerges from a relational exchange and multiplies towards the cause when the NPO is fully committed. Value arrives at the NPO when the donor can control its involvement and is given the opportunity to contribute to the cause.

9. Conclusions and further research

The concept of PC can be adapted to a stakeholder perspective in order to give an operationalization of how each stakeholder might create value for the cause. Being the first study to compare different NPO stakeholders through one research framework, we show that a single model does not hold for all stakeholders since the salience of the currencies changes among different stakeholders. We were able to see that the creation of value is both an expectation from the stakeholder, as well as an opportunity to contribute to a cause.

However, our study is not without limitations, and sampling is probably the most important one. As our sample was not randomly selected, and only limited to three stakeholders, we may have incurred a self-selection bias by having NPOs that are already quite attentive to their stakeholders being the most interested in participating. Also, because of sample size, we cannot generalize these results to all volunteers, employees, and donors from all Bolivian NPOs, nor the causality of the relationships found because of our cross-

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sectional model. Nevertheless, the importance of ideological obligations for all Bolivian NPO stakeholders cannot be ignored.

Important to emphasize that we did not measure SPC fulfillment, therefore we cannot conclude that certain expectations are fulfilled or breached, this might be tackled in future research. But we do offer a comparable overview of different stakeholders’ value appropriation from their relationship with their NPO.

Our application of SPC shows that a myriad of opportunities exists to shed light on the implicit expectations that contribute to other outcomes that we did not consider here. Our results also lead us to question the limit of volunteers’ engagement and the outcomes associated with volunteers’ expected obligations.

In line with Brown and Yoshioka (2003), we find satisfaction to the NPO and engagement with the cause positively associated both in volunteers and. However, since satisfaction mediates turnover intention in employees, it could also have an effect on the permanence of other stakeholders.

In a context where funding challenges and limitations can be used to restrict payroll and avoid providing employees with proper working conditions, the results showing higher employees’ Transactional Obligations than Returns lead us to question whether they feel compelled to make transactional sacrifices. The fact that they would have to take initiatives to fulfill their agreements, can also signal employee neglect on behalf of management, which can be focusing their attention to funders above employees.

In the case of donors, it seems relevant to further study the Relational currencies, as it appears that when donors take the lead in the relationship, they can be more satisfied with the NPO they contribute to. However, we only considered personal donors, and only two of the NPOs in our sample rely on these stakeholders. Most Bolivian NPOs depend greatly in corporate donors and international cooperation, who may have a different impact on NPO management, especially in influencing their focus on certain development plans.

Finally, we provide an important step towards mapping several stakeholder’s expectations. We anticipate SPC can be applied with other NPO stakeholders such as governments, society, and beneficiaries. The reciprocity cycle would not be finished without getting the perspective of the NPO and its agents, namely, managers and employees who act on behalf of the NPO towards other stakeholders and who actually face contradictory expectations. By mapping out all parties’ expected returns and obligations we may actually be able to appreciate how the cycle of reciprocity and value appropriation works in a ‘full’ stakeholder network.

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### Annexes

#### 11.1a SPC Survey in Spanish as applied to the sample

| Part 1. | Como (voluntario/empleado/donador), YO ESPERO DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN QUE ESTA.... | Part 2. | La Organización puede esperar DE MI, COMO (voluntario/empleado/donador), que yo.... |
|---------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| EREL    | Demuestre preocupación por mi reputación e imagen                       | OREL    | Demuestre preocupación por nuestra asociación                                      |
| EREL    | Ofrezca una asociación/acuerdo seguro                                   | OREL    | Responda a sus preocupaciones                                                     |
| EREL    | Se preocupe de mi, incluso más allá de nuestro acuerdo                    | OREL    | Tome decisiones con sus intereses en mente                                          |
| EREL    | Demuestre aprecio por lo que hago y lo que soy                          | OREL    | Demuestre preocupación por su reputación e imagen                                   |
| EREL    | Considere no solamente el resultado final, pero también mis esfuerzos    | OREL    | Aporte con mis propias ideas a nuestra relación                                     |
| ETRA    | Me rinda cuentas únicamente por las responsabilidades relacionadas a nuestro acuerdo o contrato | OTRA    | Actúe de acuerdo a las responsabilidades específicas establecidas en un principio  |
| ETRA    | Limite su involucramiento conmigo a responsabilidades y tareas específicas | OTRA    | Establezca un acuerdo de nuestra asociación por escrito                            |
| ETRA    | Se comprometa a mantener nuestra relación en el futuro                   | OTRA    | Indique explícitamente mis intenciones y planes para nuestra relación              |
| ETRA    | Establezca responsabilidades específicas y bien definidas para nuestra relación | OTRA    | Indique claramente si surgen problemas dentro de nuestra relación                  |
| ETRA    | Establezca acuerdos sobre nuestra asociación por escrito                 | OIDE    | Contribuya a la causa                                                               |
| ETRA    | Brinde una rendición de cuentas específicamente por los procedimientos y resultados que nos conciernen | OIDE    | Respalde la causa, incluso si esto requiere un sacrificio financiero de mi parte     |
| ETRA    | Describa sin ambigüedad mis obligaciones hacia ellos                     | OIDE    | Demuestre compromiso con la causa y fomenten que otros también se involucren en ella|
| ETRA    | Describa sin ambigüedad mis derechos al relacionarme con ellos           | OIDE    | Actúe como defensor público de esta causa                                           |
| EIDE    | Contribuya a la causa establecida                                        | OIDE    | Contribuya al logro de esta causa                                                  |
| EIDE    | Comprometa recursos (financieros, humanos, en género u otros) hacia la causa | OIDE    | Actúe de acuerdo a los principios de la organización                               |
| EIDE    | Respalde la causa de la organización, incluso si esto requiere un sacrificio financiero | OIDE    | Desarrolle prácticas orientadas a contribuir a la causa                            |
| EIDE    | Fomente la participación de otros actores en la causa                    | OIDE    | Contribuya a la causa, incluso si esto significa no ser compensado por ello         |
| EIDE    | Actúe como defensores públicos de la causa patrocinada                   |         |                                                                                 |
| EIDE    | Sea devota de la causa de la organización                               |         |                                                                                 |
| EIDE    | Mantenga una cultura organizacional que promueva los principios de la organización |         |                                                                                 |
| EIDE    | Desarrolle prácticas en favor de la causa                                |         |                                                                                 |

### Part 3. ¿Cómo calificaría usted los siguientes...?

- **Satisf.** Su nivel de satisfacción con la organización
- **Satisf.** El rendimiento de esta organización
- **Satisf.** El grado en que sus expectativas están en línea con las de la organización
- **Engajm.** Su grado de compromiso personal con la causa de la organización
  - **Solo para FUNCIONARIOS o Empleados....**
    - **Turnover** Durante los últimos 6 meses he considerado seriamente buscar trabajo en otra empresa
    - **Turnover** Considerando todo, haré todo por dejar mi trabajo actual lo más pronto posible
    - **Turnover** Me encuentro buscando activamente otro trabajo
## 11.1b SPC Survey in English

### Part 1.
**As a stakeholder, I EXPECT from the organization that it...**

| Code | Description |
|------|-------------|
| EREL | Show concern for my reputation and image |
| EREL | Offers a secure partnership/agreement |
| EREL | Shows concern for my wellbeing, even beyond our agreement |
| EREL | Shows appreciation for what I do and who I am |
| EREL | Considers not only the end result, but also my efforts |
| ETRA | Accounts to me only for the responsibilities limited to our agreement or contract |
| ETRA | Limits their involvement with me to a specific set of duties and responsibilities |
| ETRA | Makes commitments to maintain our relationship in the future |
| ETRA | Establishes specific and well-defined responsibilities for our relationship |
| ETRA | Establishes written agreements regarding our partnership |
| ETRA | Provides specific accountability regarding the procedures and results concerning our agreement |
| ETRA | Clearly describes my obligations towards the NPO |
| ETRA | Clearly describes my rights within this NPO |
| EIDE | Contributes to the stated cause. |
| EIDE | Commits resources (human, financial, etc.) towards the stated cause. |
| EIDE | Supports the stated cause, even if it requires making a financial sacrifice. |
| EIDE | Encourages other stakeholders to participate in the cause |
| EIDE | Acts as a public advocate in favor of cause. |
| EIDE | Devotes itself to the contribution to the cause |
| EIDE | Maintains an organizational culture that promotes the organization’s principles. |
| EIDE | Develops internal practices and policies that advance on the organization’s ideals. |

### Part 2.
**The organization can expect FROM ME that I....**

| Code | Description |
|------|-------------|
| OREL | Show concern for our partnership |
| OREL | Respond to their concerns |
| OREL | Make decisions with their interests in mind |
| OREL | Show concern for their reputation and image |
| OREL | Contribute with my ideas to our partnership |
| OTRA | Act according to the specific responsibilities established in our agreement |
| OTRA | Establish a written agreement on our partnership |
| OTRA | Explicitly indicate my intentions and plans for this partnership |
| OTRA | Clearly indicate if problems on our relationship arise |
| OIDE | Contribute to their cause |
| OIDE | Stand by the cause, even if this means making a financial sacrifice |
| OIDE | Demonstrate engagement to the cause and encourage others to engage |
| OIDE | Act as a public advocate of the cause. |
| OIDE | Contribute to the fulfillment of their mission |
| OIDE | Act according to their organization’s principles. |
| OIDE | Develop practices oriented to the contribution to the cause. |
| OIDE | Contribute to the cause, even if it means not being compensated for it. |

### Part 3.
**How would you evaluate the following statements?**

- **Satisf.** Your level of satisfaction with the organization
- **Satisf.** The organization’s performance
- **Engage.** Your level of personal commitment with the cause sponsored by the organization
  - **For EMPLOYEES only...**
  - **Turnover** Considering everything, I will do anything to quit my job as soon as possible
  - **Turnover** I am currently looking for another job
11.2. Correlation coefficients between all variables per group of stakeholders

|                  | EREL | ETRA  | EIDE  | OREL   | OTRA   | OIDE   | Satisfaction with the Organization | Engagement towards the Cause | Turnover Intention |
|------------------|------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| **Volunteers n=271** |      |       |       |        |        |        |                                   |                             |                    |
| EREL             | 1    | .626** | .473** | .640** | .567** | .449** | .158**                            | .194**                      |                    |
| ETRA             | 1    | .539** | .593** | .720** | .487** | 0.005  | 0.053                             |                             |                    |
| EIDE             | 1    | .567** | .636** | .756** | 0.074  |        | 0.047                             |                             |                    |
| OREL             | 1    | .753** | .724** | .133*  | .183** |        |                                   |                             |                    |
| OTRA             | 1    | .667** | .032   | 0.083  |        |        |                                   |                             |                    |
| OIDE             | 1    | .209** | .175** |        |        |        |                                   |                             |                    |
| Satisfaction     |      |       |       |        |        |        | 1                                 |                             | .579**             |
| Engagement       |      |       |       |        |        |        | 1                                 |                             |                    |
| **Employees n=171** |      |       |       |        |        |        |                                   |                             |                    |
| EREL             | 1    | .558** | .520** | .498** | .492** | .343** | .204*                             | .184*                       | -0.003             |
| ETRA             | 1    | .582** | .565** | .711** | .490** | 0.072  | 0.11                              | 0.163                       |                    |
| EIDE             | 1    | .575** | .521** | .646** | 0.035  |        | .224*                             | 0.063                       |                    |
| OREL             | 1    | .581** | .658** | .258** | 0.171  |        | -0.045                            |                            |                    |
| OTRA             | 1    | .529** | .082   | 0.134  | 0.104  |        |                                   |                             |                    |
| OIDE             | 1    | .238** | .253** | -0.114 |        |        |                                   |                             |                    |
| Satisfaction     | 1    |       |       |        |        |        | 1                                 | .698**                      | -.497**            |
| Engagement       | 1    |       |       |        |        |        | 1                                 | -.368**                     |                    |
| **Turnover n=171** |      |       |       |        |        |        |                                   |                             |                    |
| EREL             | 1    | .923** | .620** | 0.187  | 0.172  | -0.021 | 0.322                             | 0.354                       |                    |
| ETRA             | 1    | .639** | .249   | 0.227  | 0.073  | 0.382  | 0.381                             |                             |                    |
| EIDE             | 1    | .084   | -0.056 | 0.127  | .750** |        | .800**                            |                             |                    |
| OREL             | 1    | .815** | .834** | -.181  | -.255  |        |                                   |                             |                    |
| OTRA             | 1    | .640** | -.209  | -.255  |        |        |                                   |                             |                    |
| OIDE             | 1    | -.198  | -.247  |        |        |        |                                   |                             |                    |
| Satisfaction     | 1    |       |       |        |        |        | 1                                 | .811**                      |                    |
| Engagement       |      |       |       |        |        |        | 1                                 |                             |                    |

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
11.3 ANOVA Paired T-test between all currencies, results per group

|               | Mean  | Std. Deviation | Std. Error Mean | 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference | t     | Sig. (2-tailed) |
|---------------|-------|----------------|-----------------|------------------------------------------|-------|----------------|
|               |       |                |                 | Lower | Upper |                 |       |                |
| **Volunteers**|       |                |                 |       |       |                 |       |                |
| EREL - ETRA   | 0.08905 | 0.65361 | 0.0397 | 0.01088 | 0.16722 | 2.243* | 0.026 |
| EREL - EIDE   | -0.3928 | 0.74045 | 0.04498 | -0.48136 | -0.30425 | -8.733** | 0     |
| EREL - OREL   | -0.34613 | 0.62862 | 0.03819 | -0.42131 | -0.27095 | -9.064** | 0     |
| EREL - OTRA   | -0.14742 | 0.69232 | 0.04206 | -0.23022 | -0.06462 | -3.505** | 0.001 |
| EREL - OIDE   | -0.35821 | 0.77286 | 0.04695 | -0.45064 | -0.26578 | -7.630** | 0     |
| ETRA - EIDE   | -0.48186 | 0.67334 | 0.0409 | -0.56239 | -0.40313 | -11.781** | 0     |
| ETRA - OREL   | -0.43518 | 0.64982 | 0.03947 | -0.51289 | -0.35746 | -11.024** | 0     |
| ETRA - OTRA   | -0.23647 | 0.54194 | 0.03292 | -0.30128 | -0.17166 | -7.183** | 0     |
| ETRA - OIDE   | -0.44726 | 0.72647 | 0.04413 | -0.53415 | -0.36308 | -10.135** | 0     |
| EIDE - OREL   | 0.04668 | 0.55576 | 0.03376 | -0.01979 | 0.11315 | 1.383 | 0.168 |
| EIDE - OTRA   | 0.24539 | 0.585 | 0.03554 | 0.17547 | 0.31535 | 6.905** | 0     |
| EIDE - OIDE   | 0.02459 | 0.4735 | 0.02876 | -0.02203 | 0.09122 | 1.203 | 0.23  |
| OREL - OTRA   | 0.19871 | 0.49607 | 0.03013 | 0.13938 | 0.25804 | 6.594** | 0     |
| OREL - OIDE   | 0.01208 | 0.51801 | 0.03147 | -0.07404 | 0.04987 | -0.384 | 0.701 |
| OTRA - OIDE   | -0.21079 | 0.57294 | 0.0348 | -0.27931 | -0.14227 | -6.057** | 0     |
| **Employees** |       |                |                 |       |       |                 |       |                |
| EREL - ETRA   | 0.02792 | 0.53511 | 0.04947 | -0.07006 | 0.1259 | 0.564 | 0.574 |
| EREL - EIDE   | -0.14124 | 0.56317 | 0.05206 | -0.24436 | -0.03812 | -2.713** | 0.008 |
| EREL - OREL   | -0.07009 | 0.59557 | 0.05506 | -0.17914 | 0.03897 | -1.273 | 0.206 |
| EREL - OTRA   | -0.07607 | 0.59912 | 0.05539 | -0.18577 | 0.03364 | -1.373 | 0.172 |
| EREL - OIDE   | 0.02009 | 0.70159 | 0.06846 | -0.10838 | 0.14855 | 0.31 | 0.757 |
| ETRA - EIDE   | -0.16916 | 0.47467 | 0.04388 | -0.25608 | -0.08224 | -3.855** | 0     |
| ETRA - OREL   | -0.09801 | 0.50874 | 0.04703 | -0.19116 | -0.00485 | -2.084 | 0.039 |
| ETRA - OTRA   | -0.10399 | 0.41723 | 0.03857 | -0.18039 | -0.02759 | -2.695** | 0.008 |
| ETRA - OIDE   | -0.00783 | 0.57316 | 0.05299 | -0.11279 | 0.05712 | -0.148 | 0.883 |
| EIDE - OREL   | 0.07115 | 0.50958 | 0.04711 | -0.02215 | 0.16446 | 1.51 | 0.134 |
| EIDE - OTRA   | 0.06517 | 0.54129 | 0.05004 | -0.03394 | 0.16429 | 1.302 | 0.195 |
| EIDE - OIDE   | 0.16132 | 0.48581 | 0.04491 | 0.07237 | 0.25028 | 3.592** | 0     |
| OREL - OTRA   | -0.00598 | 0.52646 | 0.04867 | -0.10238 | 0.09042 | -0.123 | 0.902 |
| OREL - OIDE   | 0.09017 | 0.49205 | 0.04549 | 0.00007 | 0.18027 | 1.982* | 0.06  |
| OTRA - OIDE   | 0.05615 | 0.57713 | 0.05356 | -0.00952 | 0.20183 | 1.802 | 0.074 |

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
# 11.4 Coefficients for all variables in Model A and Final Model

| MODEL A | Volunteers | Employees | Donors |
|---------|------------|-----------|--------|
| **Total Satisfaction** | | | |
| Relational | 0.178623 | 2.19* | 0.029 | 0.217893 | 1.91 | 0.056 | -0.65281 | -1.48 | 0.14 |
| Expectations | -0.10461 | -1.15 | 0.25 | -0.06899 | -0.49 | 0.627 | 0.071932 | 0.16 | 0.877 |
| Ideological | -0.18592 | -2* | 0.046 | -0.25888 | -1.95 | 0.052 | 0.324926 | 0.81 | 0.42 |
| Relational | 0.469287 | 0.44 | 0.662 | 0.170798 | 1.28 | 0.2 | 0.435598 | 0.96 | 0.336 |
| Obligations | -0.18321 | -1.74 | 0.083 | -0.13963 | -1.01 | 0.31 | 0.019208 | 0.06 | 0.956 |
| Ideological | 0.409457 | 4.22** | 0 | 0.311398 | 2.38* | 0.017 | -0.24464 | -0.48 | 0.631 |
| Turnover Intention | | | -0.52012 | -5.55 | 0 | |
| **Engagement** | | | |
| Relational | 0.164415 | 2 | 0.046 | 0.130898 | 1.11 | 0.268 | -0.50605 | -1.2 | 0.231 |
| Expectations | -0.074 | -0.81 | 0.42 | -0.09901 | -0.68 | 0.493 | -0.1628 | -0.38 | 0.707 |
| Ideological | -0.25453 | -2.74 | 0.006 | 0.115653 | 0.84 | 0.403 | 0.719956 | 2.03* | 0.042 |
| Relational | 0.180394 | 1.68 | 0.093 | -0.0574 | -0.42 | 0.676 | 0.0786 | 0.18 | 0.856 |
| Obligations | -0.10766 | -1.01 | 0.313 | -0.01124 | -0.08 | 0.937 | 0.260689 | 0.81 | 0.415 |
| Ideological | 0.269289 | 8.65 | 0.007 | 0.218563 | 1.61 | 0.108 | -0.40337 | -0.85 | 0.393 |
| Turnover Intention | | | 0.008698 | 0.07 | 0.941 | |

| FINAL MODEL | Volunteers | Employees | Donors |
|-------------|------------|-----------|--------|
| **Total Satisfaction** | | | |
| Relational | 0.13662 | 1.82 | 0.069 | -0.54399 | -2.99** | 0.003 |
| Expectations | | | | -0.32861 | -3.67** | 0 |
| Transactional | | | | 0.453902 | 2.34* | 0.019 |
| Ideological | 0.331144 | 4.64** | 0 | 0.386607 | 3.91** | 0 |
| Relational | | | | -0.51823 | -7.31** | 0 |
| Obligations | -0.1814 | -2.68** | 0.007 | | | |
| Ideological | | | | | | |
| Turnover Intention | | | | | | |

| Engagement | Volunteers | Employees | Donors |
|------------|------------|-----------|--------|
| **Total Satisfaction** | | | |
| Relational | | | | | | |
| Expectations | | | | | | |
| Transactional | | | | | | |
| Ideological | | | | | | |
| Relational | | | | | | |
| Obligations | | | | | | |
| Ideological | | | | | | |
| Turnover Intention | | | | | | |

**Engagement- Satisfaction Covariance** | 0.516189 | 11.51** | 0 | 0.717175 | 15.22** | 0 |

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
