Tracking-Based Distributed Equilibrium Seeking for Aggregative Games

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Abstract—We propose fully distributed algorithms for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. We first consider the case where local constraints are present and we design an algorithm combining, for each agent, the projected pseudogradient descent and a tracking mechanism to locally reconstruct the aggregative variable. To handle coupling constraints arising in generalized settings, we propose another distributed algorithm based on a recently emerged augmented primal-dual scheme and two tracking mechanisms to reconstruct, for each agent, both the aggregative variable and the coupling constraint satisfaction. Leveraging tools from singular perturbations analysis, we prove linear convergence to the Nash equilibrium for both schemes. Finally, we run extensive numerical simulations to confirm the effectiveness of our methods and compare them with state-of-the-art distributed equilibrium-seeking algorithms.

Index Terms—Distributed algorithms, game theory, network analysis and control, optimization algorithms.

I. INTRODUCTION

RECENT years have seen an increasing attention to the computation of (generalized) Nash equilibria in games over networks [1], [2], [3]. Indeed, numerous applications falling within different domains such as smart grids management [4], [5], economic market analysis [6], cooperative control of robots [7], electric vehicles charging [8], [9], [10], network congestion control [11], and synchronization of coupled oscillators in power grids [12] can be modeled as networks of selfish agents—aiming at optimizing their strategy according to an associated individual cost function—that compete with each other over shared resources.

Among these examples, one can often find instances modeled as an aggregative game, where the strategies of all the agents in the network are coupled through the so-called aggregative variable (expressing, e.g., the mean strategy), upon which each agent’s cost function depends; see, e.g., [13], [14], [15] for a comprehensive overview. Our work investigates such a framework proposing novel distributed algorithms for generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking under partial information, i.e., assuming that each agent is only aware of its own local information (e.g., its strategy set and cost function) and can communicate only with few agents in the network. This restriction naturally calls for the design of fully distributed mechanisms for GNE seeking.

Our approach is motivated by recent developments in cooperative optimization, where agents in a network collaborate to minimize the sum of individual objective functions depending both on local decision variables and an aggregative variable [16], [17], [18], [19], [20].

A. Related Work

In the context of NE problems in aggregative form, first attempts to design equilibrium seeking algorithms involve semidecentralized approaches in which a central entity gathers and shares global quantities (such as the aggregative variable and/or a dual multiplier) with all the agents [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28].

To relax the communication requirements, Koschal et al. [29] proposed a gradient-based algorithm for nongeneralized games with diminishing step-size that relies on dynamic averaging consensus (see, e.g., [30], [31]) to reconstruct the aggregative variable in each agent. Such a method has been refined in [32] to deal with privacy issues and, as a consequence, only guarantees approximate equilibrium computations. In [33], the distributed computation of an approximate Nash equilibrium is guaranteed through a best-response-based algorithm requiring multiple communication exchanges per iteration. In [34], instead, an asynchronous distributed algorithm based on proximal dynamics is proposed.

Looking at GNE problems where the agents’ strategies are coupled also by means of constraints, in [35] the distributed computation of an approximate NE is guaranteed through an algorithm requiring, however, several communication exchanges per iteration. Exact convergence is instead guaranteed in [36], where a distributed algorithm with diminishing step-size is proposed, combining dynamic tracking mechanisms, monotone operator
splitting, and the Krasnosel’ski–Mann fixed-point iteration. An exactly convergent distributed equilibrium-seeking algorithm with constant step-size is given in [37], where the authors propose a distributed method based on a forward–backward splitting of two preconditioned operators requiring a double communication exchange per iteration. Finally, distributed equilibrium-seeking algorithms based on proximal best-responses are proposed in [38].

### B. Contributions

The main contribution of the article is the design and the analysis of novel, fully distributed iterative—i.e., discrete-time—algorithms for (generalized) NE seeking in aggregative games over networks. First, to address the case where local constraints are present, we combine a projected pseudogradient method with a local, auxiliary variable that compensates for the lack of knowledge of the aggregative variable in each agent. Successively, we deal with the case of coupling constraints, however, no local constraints are present. To achieve this, we take inspiration from a recent augmented primal-dual scheme for centralized, continuous-time optimization [39] and resort to 1) an averaging step to enforce consensus among the agents’ multipliers and 2) two auxiliary variables to locally reconstruct both the aggregative variable and the coupling constraint status. Both iterative schemes are analyzed from a system-theoretic perspective that allows us to establish linear convergence to the (G)NE. To the best of our knowledge, the algorithm proposed for the case where coupling constraints are present is the first distributed scheme in the literature with guaranteed linear convergence to a GNE (see Section A of Appendix for the formal definition). As such, it constitutes the main contribution of our article. Moreover, as discussed in detail in Section II-B, such a linear convergence rate is enabled by our system-theoretic interpretation, which offers a new proof-line perspective. Further, we also guarantee linear convergence when only local constraints are present. A similar result is also achieved by the recent contribution [38] (see [38], Rem. 12): our algorithm complements the proximal best-response scheme of Bianchi et al. [38] by constituting its gradient-based counterpart. Proximal algorithms require solving some optimization program (which in turn may rely on some iterative method), whereas our projected gradient descent step can allow a simpler update rule if the projection can be performed in an easy manner. As such, gradient-based approaches are often computationally less intensive compared to proximal ones, as verified in the numerical simulations of Section V (see Table III); however, such a conclusion is case-dependent.

### As a side technical contribution, in contrast with existing methods, our algorithms i) do not require compactness of the local feasible sets and ii) allow for a general form of the aggregative variable, thus not necessarily requiring the mean of the agents’
strategies to operate. To better classify our work within the existing literature, Tables I and II compare it with the most relevant works. Specifically, Table I considers the framework without coupling constraints, while Table II the one with coupling constraints (GNE) (note that some of the technical conditions and variables appearing in the table entries will become clear in the sequel). The analysis of our iterative algorithms is carried out by relying on a singular perturbations approach that allows us to see each procedure as the interconnection between a slow subsystem and a fast one. Specifically, the slow dynamics are produced by the update of the strategies and, in the case with coupling constraints, of the mean of the multipliers over the network. The fast dynamics, instead, describes the evolution of the auxiliary variables used to compensate for the lack of knowledge of the global quantities and, in the case with coupling constraints, the consensus error among the agents’ multipliers. Based on this interpretation, we construct two auxiliary, simplified subsystems, known as boundary layer and reduced system, to separately study the fast and slow dynamics, respectively. Leveraging this connection, we first provide the convergence properties of these auxiliary dynamics with Lyapunov-based arguments, and then we merge the obtained results to establish linear convergence to the (G)NE of the whole interconnection. This last step relies on a general theorem (cf., Theorem 2.5) considering a class of singularly perturbed systems that includes the proposed iterative algorithms. In detail, this theorem shows that global exponential stability results for the interconnection can be achieved, while typical results in literature only provide semiglobal properties (see [40, Prop. 8.1], or [41, Ch. 11] for the continuous-time case). To the best of our knowledge, similar results are not yet available in the literature: besides the construction of a novel, fully distributed iterative mechanism with appealing features for their practical implementation, they offer a new proof line for equilibrium-seeking problems. Finally, we provide detailed numerical simulations to confirm the effectiveness of our methods and compare them with state-of-the-art distributed NE-seeking algorithms.

C. Article Organization

In Section II we introduce aggregative games over networks, while in Section III-A we propose and analyze a novel distributed algorithm to find NE when only local constraints are present. In Section IV, we devise a novel distributed GNE-seeking algorithm to address the case of linear coupling constraints. Finally, in Section V we provide detailed numerical simulations to test our methods. The proof of the result on singular perturbations—instrumental in the derivation of our main theorems—is deferred to Section B of Appendix; Sections C and D of Appendix gather the proofs of all other technical results and lemmas.

Notation: A matrix $M \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ is Schur if all its eigenvalues lie in the open unit disc. The identity matrix in $\mathbb{R}^{m \times m}$ is $I_m$. $0_m$ is the all-zero matrix in $\mathbb{R}^{m \times m}$. The vector of $N$ ones is denoted by $1_N$, while $1_{N,d} := 1_N \otimes I_d$ with $\otimes$ being the Kronecker product. Dimensions are omitted whenever clear from the context. Given a function of two variables $f: \mathbb{R}^{n_1} \times \mathbb{R}^{n_2} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, we denote as $\nabla_1 f \in \mathbb{R}^{n_1}$ its gradient with respect to its first argument and as $\nabla_2 f \in \mathbb{R}^{n_2}$ its gradient with respect to the second one. The vertical concatenation of column vectors $v_1, \ldots, v_N \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is $\text{COL}(v_1, \ldots, v_N)$. $\text{diag}(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ denotes the diagonal matrix whose $i$th diagonal element is given by $v_i$. $\text{blkdiag}(M_1, \ldots, M_N)$ is the block diagonal matrix whose $i$th block is $M_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i \times n_i}$. Given a vector $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and a set $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$, $P_X(x)$ denotes the projection of $x$ on $X$. For matrix (resp., vector) $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ ($v \in \mathbb{R}^n$), we denote as $[A]_{i,j}$ ($[v]_j$) its $j$th row (jth component). Given two matrices $A, B \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$, $A \succeq B$ (resp. $A \asymp B$) is equivalent to saying that $A - B$ is positive definite (resp. semidefinite). Given $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and $M \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ such that $M = M^T > 0$, $\|x\|_M = \sqrt{x^TMx}$.

II. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES

A. Problem Definition and Main Assumptions

We consider a population of $N \in \mathbb{N}$ agents—designated by the set $\mathcal{I} := \{1, \ldots, N\}$—whose interaction is described by the following collection of coupled optimization problems:

$$\forall i \in \mathcal{I}: \begin{align*}
\min_{x_i \in X_i} & \quad J_i(x_i, \sigma(x)) \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad A_i x_i + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{I} \setminus \{i\}} A_{ij} x_j \leq b_i,
\end{align*} \tag{1a}$$

In words, every agent $i \in \mathcal{I}$ seeks an individual strategy $x_i \in X_i \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{n_i}$ to minimize a local cost defined by the function $J_i: \mathbb{R}^{n_i} \times \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, which depends on $x_i$ as well as on some aggregate measure of other agents’ strategies $\sigma(x) \in \mathbb{R}^d$, where $x := \text{COL}(x_1, \ldots, x_N) \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and $\sigma := \sum_{i=1}^N \sigma_i$. The agents’ decisions shall satisfy some global constraints, which can be expressed in the affine form $Ax \leq b$, where $A := [A_1 \cdots A_N] \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ and $b := \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} b_i \in \mathbb{R}^m$. The aggregate variable $\sigma(\cdot)$ formally reads as

$$\sigma(x) := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \phi_i(x_i) \tag{2}$$

where each aggregation rule $\phi_i: \mathbb{R}^{n_i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^d$ models the contribution of the corresponding strategy $x_i$ to the aggregate measure.

We define the constraint functions $c_i: \mathbb{R}^{n_i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$, $c_{-i}: \mathbb{R}^{n_{-i}} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$, and $c: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ as follows:

$$c_i(x_i) = A_i x_i - b_i \tag{3a}$$

$$c_{-i}(x_{-i}) := \sum_{j \in \mathcal{I} \setminus \{i\}} (A_{ij} x_j - b_j) \tag{3b}$$

$$c(x) := c_i(x_i) + c_{-i}(x_{-i}) = Ax - b \tag{3c}$$

where $x_{-i} := \text{COL}(x_1, \ldots, x_{i-1}, x_{i+1}, \ldots, x_N) \in \mathbb{R}^{n_{-i}}$. Then, the collective vector of strategies $x$ belongs to the feasible set $\mathcal{C} := \{x \in X | c(x) \leq 0\} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$.

We refer to any equilibrium solution to the collection of interdependent optimization problems (1) as aggregative GNE [3] (or simply GNE), and to the problem of finding such an equilibrium as GNE problem (GNEP) in aggregative form—as opposed to a NE problem (NEP), which is characterized by local constraints only. We will design distributed algorithms to find aggregative GNEs, which formally correspond to the following definition.

Definition 2.1 (GNE [3]): A collective vector of strategies $x^* \in C$ is a GNE of (1) if we have:

$$J_i(x^*_i, \sigma(x^*)) \leq \min_{x_i \in \mathcal{C}(x^*_{-i})} J_i(x_i, \frac{1}{N} \phi_i(x_i) + \sigma_{-i}(x^*_{-i}))$$

for all $i \in \mathcal{I}$, with $\mathcal{C}(x_{-i}) := \{x_i \in X_i | A_i x_i \leq b_i - c_{-i}(x_{-i})\}$ and $\sigma_{-i}(x_{-i}) := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{I} \setminus \{i\}} \phi_j(x^*_j) \quad \blacksquare$.

We remark that the definition of NE follows directly from the above by noting that, in the case without coupling constraints, it holds $\mathcal{C}(x_{-i}) \equiv X_i$. An equivalent definition of GNE requires
one to find a fixed point of the best response mapping \( x_{i,br}(x) := \arg \min_{x_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i}} J_i(x_i, \sigma(x)) \), of each agent, which is formally defined as
\[
x_{i,br}(x_{-i}) = \arg \min_{x_i, x_{-i} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i} \times \mathbb{R}^{n_{-i}}} J_i(x, \sigma(x)) = \arg \min_{x_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i}} J_i(x_i, \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} \phi_j(x_j) + \sigma_i(x_{-i})).
\]

In fact, a collective vector of strategies \( x^* \) is a GNE if, for all \( i \in \mathcal{I}, x^*_i = x_{i,br}(x^*_{-i}) \). Next, we enforce customary assumptions about the regularity of some quantities in (1).

Standing Assumption 2.2 (Cost functions): For all \( i \in \mathcal{I} \), the function \( J_i(\cdot, \phi_i(\cdot))/N + \sigma-(x_{-i}) \) is of class \( C^1 \), i.e., its derivative exists and is continuous, for all \( x_{-i} \in \mathbb{R}^{m_i-1} \).

A key ingredient in this game-theoretic framework is the so-called pseudogradient mapping \( F : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^n \):
\[
F(x) := \text{COL}(\nabla_{x_1} J_1(x_1, \sigma(x)), \ldots, \nabla_{x_N} J_N(x_N, \sigma(x))).
\]

With this regard, we also make the following assumption.

Standing Assumption 2.3 (Strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity): \( F \) is \( \mu \)-strongly monotone, i.e., there exists \( \mu > 0 \) such that
\[
(F(x) - F(y))^\top (x - y) \geq \mu \|x - y\|^2
\]
for all \( x, y \in \mathbb{R}^n \). Moreover, given any \( x_i, x'_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i} \), and \( y, y' \in \mathbb{R}^{n_{-i}} \), for all \( i \in \mathcal{I} \), we assume that
\[
\|\nabla_{x_i} J_i(x_i, \phi_i(x_i))/N + y - \nabla_{x'_i} J_i(x'_i, \phi_i(x'_i))/N + y'\| \leq \beta_1 \|\text{COL}(x_i(y) - \text{COL}(x'_i, y')\|
\]
\[
\|\nabla_1 J_i(x_i, y) - \nabla_1 J_i(x'_i, y')\| \leq \beta_1 \|\text{COL}(x_i(y) - \text{COL}(x'_i, y')\|
\]
\[
\|\nabla_2 J_i(x_i, y) - \nabla_2 J_i(x'_i, y')\| \leq \beta_2 \|\text{COL}(x_i(y) - \text{COL}(x'_i, y')\|
\]
\[
\|\phi_i(x_i) - \phi_i(x'_i)\| \leq \beta_3 \|x_i - x'_i\|.
\]

While assumptions on strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the game mapping are quite standard in the literature [15, 25, 26], the second part of Standing Assumption 2.3 specializes the Lipschitz properties of the gradients of the cost functions in both the local and aggregate variables, as well as of each single aggregation rule \( \phi_i(\cdot) \). Note that we assume partial information, i.e., each agent i is only aware of its own local information \( x_i, J_i, \phi_i, A_i \), and \( b_i \). Moreover, each agent can exchange information with a subset of \( \mathcal{I} \) only. Specifically, we consider a network of agents whose communication is performed according to a directed graph \( \mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{E}) \), with \( \mathcal{E} \subseteq \mathcal{T}^2 \) such that i can receive information from agent j if only if the edge \((j, i) \in \mathcal{E}\). The set of in-neighbors of i is represented by \( \mathcal{N}_i := \{j \in \mathcal{I} \mid (j, i) \in \mathcal{E}\} \) (while also \( i \in \mathcal{N}_i \)), while \( \mathcal{N}_0 := \{j \in \mathcal{I} \mid (i, j) \in \mathcal{E}\} \) denotes the set of out-neighbors of the agent i. Graph \( \mathcal{G} \) is associated with a weighted adjacency matrix \( W = W^T (W \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times N}) \) whose entries satisfy \( w_{ij} \geq 0 \) whenever \((j, i) \in \mathcal{E}\) and otherwise. The next assumption characterizes the considered graphs.

Standing Assumption 2.4 (Network): The graph \( \mathcal{G} \) is strongly connected, i.e., for every pair of nodes \( (i, j) \in \mathcal{T}^2 \) there exists a path of directed edges that goes from \( i \) to \( j \), and the matrix \( W \) is doubly stochastic, namely it holds that
\[
W1_N = 1_N, \quad 1_N^TW = 1_N^T.
\]

### B. Key Result on Singularly Perturbed Systems

The convergence analysis of the iterative schemes introduced in Sections III and IV exploits a system-theoretic perspective based on singular perturbation, which strongly relies on the following crucial result proved in Section Section B of Appendix.

**Theorem 2.5 (Global exponential stability for singularly perturbed systems):** Consider the system
\[
x^{t+1} = x^t + \delta f(x^t, w^t)
\]
\[
w^{t+1} = g(w^t, x^t, \delta)
\]
with \( x^t \in D \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n, w^t \in \mathbb{R}^m \), \( f : D \times \mathbb{R}^m \to \mathbb{R}^n, g : \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^m, \delta > 0 \). Let f and g be Lipschitz continuous with respect to both \( x^t \) and \( w^t \), with Lipschitz constants \( L_f \) and \( L_g \), respectively. Assume that there exists an \( L_h \)-Lipschitz continuous function \( h : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^m \) such that, for all \( x \in \mathbb{R}^n \),
\[
h(x) = g(h(x), x, \delta)
\]
and further assume that there exists \( x^* \in \mathbb{R}^n \) such that
\[
0 = \delta f(x^*, h(x^*)).
\]
Then, let
\[
x^{t+1} = x^t + \delta f(x^t, h(x^t))
\]
be the reduced system
\[
\psi^{t+1} = g(\psi^t + h(x, x, \delta) - h(x)
\]
be the boundary layer system with \( \psi^t \in \mathbb{R}^m \).

Assume that there exists a continuous function \( U : \mathbb{R}^m \to \mathbb{R}^n \) and \( \delta_1 > 0 \) such that, for any \( \delta \in (0, \delta_1) \) (cf. (5)), there exist \( b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4 > 0 \) such that for all \( \psi_1, \psi_2 \in \mathbb{R}^m, x \in \mathbb{R}^n \),
\[
b_1 \|\psi\| \leq U(\psi) \leq b_2 \|\psi\|^2
\]
\[
U(\psi) = U(\psi_1) - U(\psi_2) \leq b_4 \|\psi_1 - \psi_2\| \|\psi_1\|
\]
\[
+ b_4 \|\psi_1 - \psi_2\| \|\psi_2\|. \quad \text{(8c)}
\]

Further, assume there exists a continuous function \( W : D \to \mathbb{R}^n \) and \( \delta_2 > 0 \) such that, for any \( \delta \in (0, \delta_2) \), there exist \( c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4 > 0 \) such that for all \( x, x_1, x_2, x_3 \in D \)
\[
c_1 \|x - x^*\|^2 \leq W(x) \leq c_2 \|x - x^*\|^2 \quad \text{(9a)}
\]
\[
W(x + \delta f(x, h(x))) - W(x) \leq -\delta c_3 \|x - x^*\|^2 \quad \text{(9b)}
\]
\[
|W(x_1) - W(x_2)| \leq c_4 \|x_1 - x_2\| \|x_1 - x^*\|
\]
\[
+ c_4 \|x_1 - x_2\| \|x_2 - x^*\|. \quad \text{(9c)}
\]

Then, there exist \( \delta \in (0, \min(\delta_1, \delta_2)) \), \( a_1 > 0 \), and \( a_2 > 0 \) such that, for all \( \delta \in (0, \delta_1) \), it holds
\[
\|x^t - x^*\| \leq a_1 \left\| \begin{array}{c} x^0 - x^* \\ w^0 - h(x^0) \end{array} \right\| e^{-a_2 t}
\]
for all \( (x^0, w^0) \in D \times \mathbb{R}^m \). Theorem 2.5 establishes a stability result for the system in (5), which can be thought of as an interconnection of a fast and a slow subsystem (for sufficiently small \( \delta > 0 \)). This is schematically illustrated in Fig. 1. To analyze this interconnection, we study separately the simplified auxiliary systems (6) and (7). For all \( x \in \mathbb{R}^n \), \( h(x) \) is a parametric equilibrium of the fast subsystem; we can then fix the slow state \( x^s = x \) into the fast dynamics (5b), to obtain the so-called boundary layer system, as pictorially shown in Fig. 2. This is the auxiliary system described by (7), whose state \( \psi^t \) encodes the distance of the
state $w^t$ of the fast subsystem from the equilibrium $h(x)$, once $x$ is fixed. Existence of a Lyapunov-like function with properties as in (8) ensures then that for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^n_i$, the boundary layer system is exponentially stable. Setting now $w^t = h(x^t)$ for all $t \geq 0$ in (5a), i.e., considering the fast state at its parametric equilibrium, we obtain the so-called reduced system, i.e., the auxiliary system (6). This is schematically shown in Fig. 3. Existence of a Lyapunov-like function with properties as in (8) ensures then that $x^*$ is globally exponentially stable for the reduced system. By properly combining these two Lyapunov functions, Theorem 2.5 ensures that, for sufficiently small values of $\delta$, the point $(x^*, h(x^*))$ is globally exponentially stable for the original interconnected system (5). The detailed proof is provided in Section Section B of Appendix. We will show next how our algorithms, namely Primal TRADES and Primal-Dual TRADES, can be recast in the form of the interconnected system (5) while satisfying all assumptions of Theorem 2.5, and hence prove their convergence in Theorems 3.3 and 4.3, respectively, provided in the next sections. Compared with traditional approaches, taking a singular perturbation view offers a novel proof line for (generalized) equilibrium-seeking problems.

III. AGGREGATIVE GAMES OVER NETWORKS WITHOUT COUPLING CONSTRAINTS

A. Primal TRADES

In this section, we introduce and analyze Primal TRacking-based Aggregative Distributed Equilibrium Seeking (TRADES), a fully distributed iterative NE seeking algorithm for a special case of the aggregative game described by (1), i.e., where the local decision spaces are decoupled. Formally,

$$\forall i \in \mathcal{I} : \min_{x_i \in X_i} J_i(x_i, \sigma(x))$$

where $X_i \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n_i$, the local feasible set known to agent $i$ only, satisfies the following conditions.

Assumption 3.1: For all $i \in \mathcal{I}$, the feasible set $X_i$ is nonempty, closed, and convex.

Remark 3.2: The general structure of the aggregative variable $\sigma(x)$ in (2) can accommodate “soft” possibly nonlinear, coupling constraints; these can be incorporated in the game (10) by penalizing their residual in the players’ cost functions.

Let $x^t_i \in \mathbb{R}^n_i$ be the strategy chosen by each agent $i$ at iteration $t \geq 0$. Taking its convex combination with a projected pseudogradient step may be an effective way to steer each agent’s strategy to the best response $x_{i,br}((\sigma_{-i}(x_{-i})))$. When applied to problem (10), it reads as

$$x_{i}^{t+1} = x_i^t + \delta(\sigma_i - \gamma \nabla_i J_i(x_i^t, \sigma(x^t))) - x_i^t$$

(11)

where $\delta \in (0, 1)$ is a constant performing the combination and $\gamma > 0$ plays the role of the gradient step-size.

We point out that the chain rule and the definition of $\sigma(x)$ in [c.f., (2)] lead to $\nabla_i J_i(x_i^t, \sigma(x^t)) = \nabla_i \gamma J_i(x_i^t, \sigma(x^t)) + \frac{\nabla_i \phi_i(x_i^t)}{N} \nabla_2 J_i(x_i^t, \sigma(x^t))$. In our distributed setting, however, agent $i$ cannot access the global aggregate variable $\sigma(x)$. To compensate for this lack of information, we rely on the locally available $\phi_i(x_i^t)$ and the auxiliary variable $z_i^t \in \mathbb{R}^d$. Thus, for all $i \in \mathcal{I}$, let the operator $\tilde{F}_i : \mathbb{R}^n_i \times \mathbb{R}^d \to \mathbb{R}^n_i$ be defined as

$$\tilde{F}_i(x_i, s) := \nabla_1 J_i(x_i, s) + \frac{\nabla_i \phi_i(x_i)}{N} \nabla_2 J_i(x_i, s)$$

and, in accordance, we modify the update (11) as

$$x_i^{t+1} = x_i^t + \delta \left(\sigma_i - \frac{\nabla_1 J_i(x_i^t, s_i)}{\nabla_2 J_i(x_i^t, s_i)}\right)$$

(12)

which can be directly implemented without violating the distributed nature of the algorithm. By comparing (11) and (12), we note that the global term $\sigma(x)$ has been replaced by the locally available proxy $\phi_i(x_i^t) + z_i^t$. Therefore, if

$$z_i^t \to -\phi_i(x_i^t) + \sigma(x^t)$$

(13)

then the implementable law (12) coincides with the desired one given in (11). Note that $z_i^t$ encodes the estimate of $\sigma(x^t) - \phi_i(x_i^t)$, i.e., the aggregate of all other agents’ strategies except for the $i$th one. For this reason, we update each auxiliary variable $z_i^t$ according to the following causal version of the perturbed average consensus scheme (see, e.g., [42], where a similar scheme has been used to locally compensate the missing knowledge of the global gradient of a distributed consensus optimization problem):

$$z_i^{t+1} = \sum_{j \in N_i} w_{ij} z_j^t + \sum_{j \in N_i} w_{ij} \phi_j(x_i^t) - \phi_i(x_i^t).$$

(14)

This is implementable in a fully distributed fashion since it only requires communication with neighboring agents $j \in N_i$. We report the whole algorithmic structure in Algorithm 1 and, from now on, we will refer to it as Primal TRADES.

We note that Algorithm 1 requires the initialization $z_i^0 = 0$ for all $i \in \mathcal{I}$; we will discuss in the sequel the interpretation of this particular initialization. The local update (15) leads to the stacked vector form of Primal TRADES, namely

$$x_i^{t+1} = x_i^t + \delta \left(\sigma_i - \gamma \tilde{F}_i(x_i^t, \phi(x^t) + z_i^t)\right)$$

(16a)
Algorithm 1: Primal TRADES (Agent $i$).

Initialization: $x_i^0 \in X_i, z_i^0 = 0$.
for $t = 1, 2, \ldots$ do
\begin{align*}
x_i^{t+1} &= x_i^t + \delta \left( P_{X_i} \left[ x_i^t - \gamma \tilde{F}_i (x_i^t, \phi_i(x_i^t) + z_i^t) \right] - x_i^t \right) \quad \text{(15a)} \\
z_i^{t+1} &= \sum_{j \in N_i} w_{ij} z_j^t + \sum_{j \in N_i} w_{ij} \phi_j(x_j^t) - \phi_i(x_i^t). \quad \text{(15b)}
\end{align*}
end for

\begin{equation}
z_{i+1}^t = W_i z^t + (W_d - I) \phi(x^t) \quad \text{(16b)}
\end{equation}
with $X := \prod_{i \in I} X_i \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$, $W_d := \mathbb{W} \otimes I_d \in \mathbb{R}^{N_d \times N_d}$, $z := \langle z_{1,t}, \ldots, z_{N,t} \rangle$, $\phi(x^t) := \langle \phi_1(x_1^t), \ldots, \phi_N(x_N^t) \rangle$, and $\tilde{F}(x^t, \phi(x^t) + z^t) := \langle \tilde{F}_1(x_1^t, \phi_1(x_1^t) + z_1^t), \ldots, \tilde{F}_N(x_N^t, \phi_N(x_N^t) + z_N^t) \rangle$.
We remark that, since $F$ is $\mu$-strongly monotone (cf., Assumption 2.3) and $X$ nonempty, closed, and convex (cf., Assumption 3.1), there exists a unique Nash equilibrium $x^* \in \mathbb{R}^n$ for (10). Moreover, for such an equilibrium it holds
\begin{align}
x^* &= P_X \left[ x^* - \gamma \tilde{F}(x^*) \right] \\
\text{for any } \gamma > 0, \text{ see [43, Ch. 12]. This result, in turn, guarantees that } x^* &= x^* + \delta \left( P_X \left[ x^* - \gamma \tilde{F}(x^*) \right] - x^* \right) \text{ for any } \delta > 0. \text{ We establish next the properties of Primal TRADES in computing the NE } x^* \text{ of problem (10).}
\end{align}

Theorem 3.3: Consider the dynamics in (16) and Assumption 3.1. There exist constants $\delta, \gamma, a_1, a_2 > 0$ such that, for any $\delta \in (0, \delta)$, $\gamma \in (0, \gamma)$, and $(x^t, z^t) \in \mathbb{R}^{n+N_d}$ such that $1_{N_d} z^t = 0$, it holds
\begin{equation}
x^t - x^* \leq a_1 e^{-\alpha t}.
\end{equation}

The proof of Theorem 3.3 relies on a singular perturbation analysis of system (16), and will be given in the next section.

B. Proof of Theorem 3.3

We build the framework to prove Theorem 3.3 by analyzing (16) under a singular perturbations lens. We therefore establish the related proof in five steps: 1) Bringing (16) in the form of (5): we leverage the initialization $z^0 = 0$ to introduce coordinates $\tilde{z} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ and $z_L \in \mathbb{R}^{(N-1)d}$ defined as
\begin{equation}
\begin{bmatrix} \tilde{z} \\ z_L \end{bmatrix} := \begin{bmatrix} 1_{N_d} \\ R_d \end{bmatrix} z \Rightarrow z = 1_{N,d} \tilde{z} + R_d z_L \quad \text{(17)}
\end{equation}
where $R_d \in \mathbb{R}^{N_d \times (N-1)d}$ with $\| R_d \| = 1$ is such that
\begin{equation}
R_d R_d^\top = I - 1_{N_d} 1_{N,d} \text{ and } R_d^\top 1_{N,d} = 0. \quad \text{(18)}
\end{equation}
Then, by using the definition of $\tilde{z}$ given in (17), the associated dynamics reads as
\begin{equation}
\begin{align}
\tilde{z}^{t+1} &= 1_{N_d} z^{t+1} + \frac{1_{N_d}}{N} W_d \tilde{z}^t + \frac{1_{N_d}}{N} (W_d - I) \phi(x^t) \\
\text{where in (a) we exploit the update (16), in (b) we use the facts that, in view of Standing Assumption 2.4, 1) } 1_{N_d} W_d = 1_{N,d} \\
\text{and 2) } 1_{N_d}(W_d - I) = 0, \text{ in (c) we rewrite } z^t \text{ according to (17), and in (d) we use the fact that } 1_{N,d} R_d = 0. \text{ Thus, (19) leads to } z^{t+1} = z^t \text{ for all } t \geq 0, \text{ where the last equality follows by the initialization } 1_{N,d} z^0 = 0 \text{ and the definition of } z \text{ [cf., (17)].}
\end{align}
\end{equation}
We are thus entitled to ignore the null dynamics of $z^t$ and, according to (17), we equivalently rewrite (16) as
\begin{equation}
x^{t+1} = x^t + \delta \left( P_X [x^t - \gamma \tilde{F}(x^t, \phi(x^t) + R_d z_L)] - x^t \right) \quad \text{(20a)}
\end{equation}
\begin{equation}
z_L^{t+1} = R_d^\top W_d R_d z_L + R_d^\top (W_d - I) \phi(x^t). \quad \text{(20b)}
\end{equation}
For all $t \geq 0$, the interconnected system (20) can thus be obtained from (5) by setting
\begin{equation}
w^t := z_L \\
f(x^t, w^t) := P_X \left[ x^t - \gamma \tilde{F}(x^t, \phi(x^t) + R_d w^t) \right] - x^t \\
g(w^t, x^t) := R_d^\top W_d R_d w^t + R_d^\top (W_d - I) \phi(x^t). \quad \text{(21)}
\end{equation}
In particular, we refer to the subsystem (20a) as the slow system, while we refer to (20b) as the fast one.

2) Equilibrium function $h$: Under the expression for $R_d R_d^\top$ in (18) and since $W_d$ is doubly stochastic (cf., Standing Assumption 2.4) notice that for all $x^t \in \mathbb{R}^n$,
\begin{equation}
z_L = h(x) := - R_d \tilde{F}(x) \quad \text{(22)}
\end{equation}
constitutes an equilibrium of (20b). Since $R_d^\top W_d R_d$ is Schur in view of Standing Assumption 2.4, we interpret (20b) as a strictly stable linear system with nonlinear input $R_d^\top (W_d - I) \phi(x^t)$ parametrizing the equilibrium of the subsystem. The role of $\gamma$ is to slow down the variation of $x^t$ so that $z_L$ always remains close to the parametrized equilibrium $h(x^t)$.

3) Boundary layer system and satisfaction of (8): the so-called boundary layer system associated with (20) can be constructed by fixing $x^t = x$ for all $t \geq 0$, for some arbitrary $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ in (20b), and rewriting it according to the error coordinates $\tilde{z}^t := z_L - h(x)$. Using (18), we obtain that
\begin{equation}
\tilde{z}^{t+1} = R_d^\top W_d R_d \tilde{z}^t. \quad \text{(23)}
\end{equation}
Notice that the latter is in the form of (7) with $\psi = \tilde{z}^t$, and $g(\psi + h(x), x) - h(x) = R_d^\top W_d R_d \tilde{z}^t$. The next lemma provides a Lyapunov function for (23).

Lemma 3.4: Consider system (23). Then, there exists a continuous function $U : \mathbb{R}^{(N-1)d} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ satisfying (8) with $\tilde{z}$ in place of $\psi$.

4) Reduced system and satisfaction of (9): the so-called reduced system can be obtained by plugging into (20a) the fast state at its steady-state equilibrium, i.e., we consider $z^t = h(x^t)$ for all $t \geq 0$. We thus have
\begin{equation}
x^{t+1} = x^t + \delta \left( P_X \left[ x^t - \gamma \tilde{F}(x^t, \phi(x^t) + R_d h(x^t)) \right] - x^t \right) \quad \text{(24)}
\end{equation}
Due to (18) we have that $\tilde{F}(x^t, \phi(x^t) + R_d h(x^t)) = \tilde{F}(x^t, 1_{N,d} \sigma(x^t)) = F(x^t)$, so (24) is equivalent to
\begin{equation}
x^{t+1} = x^t + \delta \left( P_X \left[ x^t - \gamma F(x^t) \right] - x^t \right) \quad \text{(25)}
\end{equation}
The next lemma provides a Lyapunov function for (24).

Lemma 3.5: Consider system (24). Let $x^t \in \mathbb{R}^n$ be such that $f(x^t, h(x^t)) = 0$ with $f$ defined as in (21). Then, there exist a continuous function $W : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and $\tilde{\delta}_2 > 0$ such that, for any $\gamma \in (0, \gamma)$ and $\delta \in (0, \delta_2)$, $W$ satisfies (9).

5) Lipschitz continuity of $f$, $g$ and $h$: as we will be invoking Theorem 2.5, we need to ensure that the Lipschitz continuity
assumptions required by the theorem are satisfied. In particular, we require \( f \) and \( g \) in (21) to be Lipschitz continuous with respect to both arguments and \( h \) in (22) to be Lipschitz continuous with respect to \( x \).

Lipschitz continuity of \( f \) follows by the fact that \( \nabla J_i \) is Lipschitz continuous due to Standing Assumption 2.3. To show Lipschitz continuity of \( g \) in (21) notice that for all \( w, w' \in \mathbb{R}^{(N-1)d} \) and all \( x, x' \in \mathbb{R}^n \),

\[
\| R_d^t W_d R_d (w - w') + R_d^t (W_d I)\phi(x) - \phi(x') \| \\
\leq \| R_d^t W_d R_d \| \| w - w' \| + \beta_3 \| R_d^t (W_d I) \| \| x - x' \|, \\
\]

where the inequality follows from (22) and Lipschitz continuity of \( \phi \), while the equality from the fact that \( \| R_d \| = 1 \).

By combining Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5 with the Lipschitz conditions expressed above, Theorem 2.5 can therefore be applied. Thus, there exists \( \delta \in (0, \bar{\delta}) \) so that \((x^*, h(x^*))\) is an exponentially stable equilibrium for (20).

IV. GNE PROBLEMS IN AGGREGATIVE FORM

A. Primal-Dual TRADES

In this section, we introduce the Primal-Dual TRADES algorithm, i.e., a distributed iterative methodology to find a GNE in aggregative games with affine coupling constraints as formalized in (1).

In addition to the assumptions made in Section II, we need some further conditions for our mathematical developments.

**Assumption 4.1 (Feasibility):** The set \( C \) is nonempty. \( \square \)

Note that the condition \( C \neq \emptyset \) is weaker than Slater’s constraint qualification required by many results in the literature. However, to establish linear convergence of our distributed algorithm, we will enforce an additional assumption on the matrix \( A \) (see Assumption 4.2). Consider the following variational inequality, defined by the mapping \( F \) in (4) over the domain \( C \):

\[ F(x^*)^\top (x - x^*) \geq 0, \quad \text{for all } x \in C. \] (26)

It is known that every point \( x^* \in C \) for which (26) holds is a GNE of the game (1) and, specifically, a variational GNE (v-GNE) (cf. [3, Th. 3.9]). The converse, however, does not hold in general. However, since \( F \) is strongly monotone (cf., Standing Assumption 2.3) and \( C \) is nonempty (cf., Assumption 4.1), closed and convex (since the constraint are in the form \( Ax \leq b \)), [43, Prop. 1.4.2 and Th. 2.3.3] guarantee that a unique v-GNE exists, and this satisfies (26).

In the following, we devise an iterative algorithm that asymptotically returns the (unique) v-GNE of (1). Inspired by Qiu and Li [39], where an augmented primal-dual scheme was used for continuous-time, centralized optimization, we require the following additional condition on the matrix \( A \), which characterizes the coupling constraints [cf., (1)].

**Assumption 4.2 (Full-row rank):** There exist \( \kappa_1, \kappa_2 \geq 0 \) such that \( \kappa_1 I_m \leq AA^\top \leq \kappa_2 I_m \). \( \square \)

We note that Assumption 4.2 imposes, as a necessary condition, the fact that \( m \leq n \), i.e., the number of constraints is at most equal to the total number of components of the global strategy vector.

Following [39], for all \( i \in \mathcal{I} \) we consider the augmented Lagrangian function \( L_i : \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^m \to \mathbb{R} \) defined as

\[
L_i(x, \lambda) := J_i(x_i, \sigma(x)) + \sum_{\ell=1}^{m} H_\ell(\|Ax - b\|, [\lambda]_\ell) =: H( Ax - b, \lambda), \tag{27}
\]

where

\[
H_\ell([Ax - b]_\ell, [\lambda]_\ell) := \begin{cases}
[Ax - b]_\ell [\lambda]_\ell + \frac{\rho}{2} (Ax - b)_\ell^2 & \text{if } \rho |Ax - b|_\ell + |[\lambda]_\ell| \geq 0 \\
- \frac{1}{2\rho} |[\lambda]_\ell|^2 & \text{if } \rho |Ax - b|_\ell + |[\lambda]_\ell| < 0
\end{cases}
\] (28a)

\[ \lambda^{t+1} = \lambda^t + \delta \nabla_x H(Ax - b, \lambda^t) \] (28b)

where \( x^t \) and \( \delta \) have the same meaning as in (11), \( \lambda^t \in \mathbb{R}^m \) is the multiplier at \( t \geq 0 \), and the explicit form of the gradients \( \nabla_x H(Ax - b, \lambda^t) \) and \( \nabla_\lambda H(Ax - b, \lambda^t) \) reads as

\[
\nabla_\lambda H(Ax - b, \lambda^t) = \sum_{\ell=1}^{m} \nabla_\lambda \left( \rho |Ax - b|_\ell + |[\lambda]_\ell| \right) \\
= \sum_{\ell=1}^{m} \max \left\{ \rho |Ax - b|_\ell + |[\lambda]_\ell|, 0 \right\} |A_\ell|_\ell^\top \\
\nabla_x H(Ax - b, \lambda^t) = \sum_{\ell=1}^{m} \nabla_x \left( \rho |Ax - b|_\ell + |[\lambda]_\ell| \right) \\
= \sum_{\ell=1}^{m} \frac{1}{\rho} \max \left\{ \rho |Ax - b|_\ell + |[\lambda]_\ell|, 0 \right\} |A_\ell|_\ell^\top \\
\] (29a)

(29b)

\[
x^{t+1} = x^t - \delta \left( F(x) + \nabla_x H(Ax - b, \lambda^t) \right) \\
\lambda^{t+1} = \lambda^t + \delta \nabla_\lambda H(Ax - b, \lambda^t) \] (30a)

where \( \nabla_x H(Ax - b, \lambda^t) := \text{COL}(\nabla_x H(Ax - b, \lambda^t), \ldots, \nabla_x H(Ax - b, \lambda^t)) \). By computing the KKT conditions of the VI (26) and using [39, Prop. 1], we obtain that the v-GNE \( x^* \) and the corresponding (unique) optimal multiplier \( \lambda^* \in \mathbb{R}^m \) are such that

\[
0 = F(x^*) + \nabla_x H(Ax^* - b, \lambda^*) \\
0 = \nabla_\lambda H(Ax^* - b, \lambda^*). \] (31a)

(31b)

The above result ensures that \( \text{COL}(\sigma(x^*), \lambda^*) \) represents an equilibrium point of (30) for any \( \delta > 0 \).

However, since agent \( i \) does not have access neither to \( \sigma(x^t) \) nor to \( Ax^t - b \), the scheme in (28) cannot be directly implemented. Moreover, dynamics (28) requires a central unit that can compute the global quantity \( Ax^t - b \) and communicate the multiplier \( \lambda^t \) to all the agents. For this reason, in Algorithm 2 we introduce for all \( i \in \mathcal{I} \) two additional variables \( z_i \in \mathbb{R}^d \) and \( y_i \in \mathbb{R}^m \) to compensate the local unavailability of \( \sigma(x^t) \) and \( Ax^t - b \), respectively, 2) a local copy \( \lambda_i \in \mathbb{R}^m \) of the multiplier.
\[ I = - (33a) \]
\[ \lambda^t = \lambda^t + G \lambda^t + y^t \lambda^t \]  
\[ z^t = \lambda^t + (W_d - I)z^t \]  
\[ y^t = y^t + (W_m - I)(Ax^t - b) \]  

where \( f_x : \mathbb{R}^{m} \times \mathbb{R}^{m} \times \mathbb{R}^{m} \times \mathbb{R}^{m} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{m} \) is defined as
\[ f_x(x, \lambda, y, z) = -\chi(x + z) - Gz(Ax - b) + y, \lambda) \]  

and, similarly to (16), \( \lambda : \text{col}(\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_N) \), \( W_d := W \otimes I_d \), \( W_m := W \otimes I_m \), and \( G_x := \text{col}(G_{x,1}(Ax^t - b), y^t, \lambda^t) \) := \( G_x(N(A_N N_m b^0) - b_N) + y_N^t \lambda_N^t) \), and \( G_x := \text{col}(G_{x,1}(Ax^t - b), y^t, \lambda^t) \) := \( \text{col}(G(1, A_N N_m b^0) - b_N) + y_N^t \lambda_N^t) \). Next, we extend the convergence properties of Primal-Dual TRADES in computing the v-GNE of (1).

**Theorem 4.3:** Consider 35 and Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2. Let \((x^0, \lambda^0, z^0, y^0) \in \mathbb{R}^{m} \times \mathbb{R}^{m} \times \mathbb{R}^{m} \times \mathbb{R}^{m} \) satisfy \( 1_{N,m} b^0 = 0 \) and \( 1_{N,m} y^0 = 0 \). Then, there exist \( \delta, A_1, A_2 > 0 \) such that, for any \( \delta \in (0, \delta) \), with \( w_i \geq \frac{\delta}{\rho} \) for all \( i \in \{1, \ldots, N\} \), it holds
\[ \|x^t - x^*\| \leq A_1 e^{-\rho t}. \]

Note that the additional condition \( w_i \geq \delta/\rho \) needs to be satisfied by \( \delta \), given \( \rho \), to ensure the dual variables remain nonnegative, as discussed below (34). As in the case of NE seeking without coupling constraints, the proof of Theorem 4.3 relies on a singular perturbations analysis of system (35). We provide this in the next section.

**B. Proof of Theorem 4.3**

As with the proof of Theorem 3.3, we show that the setting of Theorem 4.3 fits the framework of Theorem 2.5, and organize its proof in five steps.

1) **Bringing (35) in the form of (5):** We introduce the change of coordinates
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
x^t
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1_{N,d} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} N \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x^t \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} g^t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1_{N,m} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} N \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} y^t \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} \lambda^t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1_{N,m} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} N \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \lambda^t \end{bmatrix}
\]

where \( R_d \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times (N-1)d} \), \( R_d^\top R_d = I \), \( R_m \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times (N-1)m} \), and \( R_d^\top R_d = I \| R_d \| = 1 \), \| R_m \| = 1 \), and
\[
R_dR_d^\top = I - \frac{1_{N,d} 1_{N,d}^\top}{N}, R_mR_m^\top = I - \frac{1_{N,m} 1_{N,m}^\top}{N}.
\]

As in the proof of Theorem 4.3, we use the initialization \( 1_{N,d} b^0 = 0 \) and \( 1_{N,m} y^0 = 0 \) to ensure that \( z^0 = 0 \) and \( y^0 = 0 \) for all \( t \geq 0 \). In view of (36), we can therefore rewrite (35) by ignoring the dynamics of \( \bar{z}^t \) and \( \bar{y}^t \), thus obtaining the system
\[
\begin{align}
\chi^t &= \chi^t + \delta f(x^t, \lambda^t) \\
\bar{w}^t &= S\bar{w}^t + K(\delta)u(\chi^t)
\end{align}
\]
in which
\[ \chi^t := \begin{bmatrix} x^t \\ \lambda^t \end{bmatrix}, \quad w^t := \begin{bmatrix} \lambda^t \\ y^t \end{bmatrix} \] (39a)

\[ f(\chi^t, w^t) := \begin{bmatrix} f_x(x^t, 1_N, m A\dot{x}^t, R_m \lambda^t, R_d \dot{z}_d^t, R_m y^t) \\ \frac{1}{N} G_x(N(A x^t - \bar{b}) + R_m y^t, 1_N, m \lambda^t + R_m \lambda^t) \end{bmatrix} \] (39b)

\[ S := \begin{bmatrix} R_m N^T W_m R_m & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & R_m W_d R_m & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & R_m W_m R_m \end{bmatrix} \] (39c)

\[ K(\delta) := \begin{bmatrix} \delta R_m^T & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & R_d (W_d - I) & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & R_m (W_m - I) \end{bmatrix} \] (39d)

\[ u(\chi^t) := \begin{bmatrix} G_x(N(A x^t - \bar{b}) + R_m y^t, 1_N, m \lambda^t + R_m \lambda^t) \\ \phi(x^t) \\ \tilde{N}(A x^t - \bar{b}) \end{bmatrix} \] (39e)

We view (38) as a singularly perturbed system, namely the interconnection between the slow dynamics (38a) and the fast one (38b). Indeed, system (38) can be obtained from (5) by considering \( \chi^t \) as the state of (5a) and setting

\[ g(\chi^t, w^t, \delta) := Sw^t + K(\delta)u(\chi^t). \] (40)

2) Equilibrium function \( h \): Under the double stochastic condition of \( W \), due to Standing Assumption 2.4, and using (37), for all \( \chi^t = \chi \),

\[ h(\chi) := \begin{bmatrix} -R_m \phi([I_n \ 0] \chi) \\ -R_m^T \tilde{N}([A \ 0] \chi - \bar{b}) \end{bmatrix} \] (41)

constitutes an equilibrium of (38b) (parametrized by \( \chi \)).

3) Boundary layer system and satisfaction of (8): the so-called boundary layer system associated with (38) can be constructed by fixing \( \chi^t = \chi = \text{col}(x, \lambda) \) for some arbitrary \((x, \lambda) \in \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^m\), and rewriting it according to the error coordinates \( \hat{w} := \text{col}(\hat{\lambda}, \hat{z}_d, \hat{y}_d) := w - h(\chi) \). Using (37), we then obtain that

\[ \hat{w}^{t+1} = S \hat{w} + \delta \hat{u}(\chi, \hat{w}) \] (42)

where

\[ \hat{u}(\chi, \hat{w}) := \begin{bmatrix} R_m^T G_x(1_N, m (A x - b), 1_N, m \lambda^t + R_m \lambda^t) \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}. \]

The next lemma provides a Lyapunov function for (42).

**Lemma 4.4:** Consider system (42). Then, there exists a continuous function \( U : \mathbb{R}^{(N-1)2+dm} \to \mathbb{R} \) and \( \delta_1 > 0 \) such that, for any \( \delta < (0, \delta_1) \), \( U \) satisfies (8) with \( \hat{w} \) in place of \( \psi \).

4) Reduced system and satisfaction of (9): the so-called reduced system can be obtained by considering the fast dynamics in (38a) at steady state, i.e., \( w^t = h(\chi^t) \) for all \( t \geq 0 \). We thus have

\[ \chi^{t+1} = \chi^t + \delta f(\chi^t, h(\chi^t)). \] (43)

Let us expand (43). Using (37), we obtain

\[ x^{t+1} = x^t - \delta \tilde{F}(x^t, 1_{N, d} \sigma(x^t)) \]

Notice that

\[ \tilde{F}(x, 1_{N, d} \sigma(x)) = F(x) \]

\[ G_x(1_N, m (A x^t - b), 1_N, m \lambda^t) = \nabla_x H(A x^t - b, \lambda^t) \] and also

\[ \frac{1}{N} G_x(1_N, m (A x^t - b), 1_N, m \lambda^t) = \nabla_x H(A x^t - b, \lambda^t). \]

Therefore, (43) is identical to the original update (30). Given the unique v-GNE \( x^* \) of (30) (see Assumptions 4.1, 4.2) and the associated multiplier \( \lambda^* \in \mathbb{R}^m \), the next lemma provides a Lyapunov function for (43), hence for (30).

**Lemma 5.5:** Consider system (43) and Assumptions 4.1, 4.2. Then, there exist a continuous function \( W : \mathbb{R}^{n+dm} \to \mathbb{R} \), \( \delta > 0 \) such that, for any \( \delta < (0, \delta) \), \( W \) satisfies (9) with \( \chi \) in place of \( x \).

5) Lipschitz continuity of \( f, g, \) and \( h \): As we will be invoking Theorem 2.5, we need to ensure that the required Lipschitz properties are satisfied. In particular, we need to show that \( f, g \) in (39b) and (40), respectively, and \( h \) in (41) are Lipschitz with respect to their arguments. This is guaranteed by the Lipschitz continuity of the aggregation rules and the gradients of the cost functions (cf., Standing Assumption 2.3), and the Lipschitz continuity of \( G_x \) and \( G_z \), that appear in \( f \) and \( g \), which is ensured as shown in (64) within the proof of Lemma 4.4.

By combining Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 with the Lipschitz continuity properties expressed above, we can apply Theorem 2.5. Then, there exists \( \delta < (0, \min(\delta_1, \delta_2)) \) so that, for any \( \delta < (0, \delta) \), \( \text{col}(x^*, \lambda^*, h(x^*, \lambda^*)) \) is an exponentially stable equilibrium point for (38).

V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES

We demonstrate the efficacy of Primal TRADES and Primal-Dual TRADES and compare them with the most closely related distributed equilibrium-seeking algorithms from the literature. First, we consider the case with local constraints only, and then we focus also on problems with coupling constraints. In both cases, we performed Monte Carlo simulations consisting of 25 trials. In each trial, we randomly generate the problem parameters, the graph of the network, and the initial conditions of the algorithms’ variables.

A. Example Without Coupling Constraints

In this section, we consider an instance of problem (10) and perform numerical simulations in which we compare Primal TRADES with Algorithm 2 proposed in [33] and Algorithm 4 proposed in [38]. We consider the multiagent demand response problem considered in [33]. Consider \( N \) loads whose electricity consumption \( x_i := \text{col}(x_{i,1}, \ldots, x_{i,T}) \in \mathbb{R}^T \) with \( T \in \mathbb{N} \) has to be chosen to solve

\[ \forall i \in I : \min_{x_i \in X_i} \rho_i \|x_i - \tilde{u}_i\|^2 + \lambda \sigma(x) + p_0 \]

where \( \tilde{u}_i \in \mathbb{R}^T \) denotes some nominal energy profile, \( \rho_i > 0 \) is a constant weighting parameter, and the term \( \lambda \sigma(x) + p_0 \) with \( \lambda \in \mathbb{R}, p_0 \in \mathbb{R}^T \) models the unit price which is taken to be an affine increasing function of the aggregate (average) energy demand.
\( \sigma(x) = (1/N) \sum_{i \in I} x_i \). As for the local feasible set \( X_i \subseteq \mathbb{R}^T \), for all \( i \in I \), we pick
\[
X_i := \left\{ x_i \in \mathbb{R}^T \mid s_{i,1} \in \mathcal{S}_i \text{ and } x_i, \tau \in \mathcal{U}_i \forall \tau \in \{1, \ldots, T\} \right\}
\]
where \( \mathcal{U}_i \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+, \mathcal{S}_i \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+ \), and \( s_{i,\tau}(x_i) \) is the state of the \( i \)th load at time \( \tau \); this, given the parameters \( a_i, b_i \in \mathbb{R} \), is computed according to the linear dynamics
\[
s_{i,\tau} = a_{i,\tau-1} s_{i,1} + \sum_{k=1}^{\tau-1} a_{i,k-1} b_i x_{i,k-1,\tau-k}
\]
where \( s_{i,1} \in \mathcal{S}_i \) is the initial condition of the state of the \( i \)th load. To instantiate the problem, we set \( T = 24 \) and randomly generate values for \( \hat{a}_i, \hat{p}_i, \lambda, \rho_0, a_i, b_i, s_{i,1} \) and initial strategies \( x_{i,1} \) from uniform distributions. As for the sets \( \mathcal{U}_i \) and \( \mathcal{S}_i \), we pick the intervals \([0,1]\) and \([0,10]\), respectively. We consider a network with \( N = 10 \) players communicating according to an undirected, connected Erdős–Rényi graph with parameter 0.3.

This setting satisfies our standing assumptions. We compare our scheme, namely, Primal TRADES with [33, Algorithm 2] and [38, Algorithm 4]. We empirically tune the former with \( v_1 = v_2 = 20 \) communication rounds per iterate and update the auxiliary variable \( z^t \) according to \( z^{t+1} = (1 - \lambda) z^t + \lambda A_{i_{\text{max}},v_{\text{max}}} \) with \( \lambda = 0.01 \) (the quantity \( A_{i_{\text{max}},v_{\text{max}}} \) is a proxy for the unavailable aggregate variable \( \sigma(x) \), see [33] for more details). We empirically tuned the method by Bianchi et al. [38] choosing \( \alpha = 0.1, \beta = 1, \) and \( \tau_i = 0.1 \) for all \( i \in I \). As for the parameters of our scheme, we set \( \delta = 0.5 \) and \( \gamma = 0.001 \). Fig. 4 shows the evolution of the normalized distance \( \|x^t - x^*\| / \|x^*\| \) from the NE \( x^* \) as the communication rounds (corresponding to iterations) progress. Our algorithm exhibits faster convergence and achieves higher accuracy in the calculation of the equilibrium \( x^* \) with respect to the method in [33], while it turns out to be slower than the algorithm in [38]. This was anticipated as 1) the method in [33] is not guaranteed to converge to the exact NE (see Table I) and 2) the method in [38] is based on proximal-based updates which are known to exhibit faster behavior compared to gradient-based updates, but are computationally more intensive due to the proximal operator involved. In Table III, we provide a numerical comparison of the considered methods in terms of the mean and standard deviation based on Monte Carlo simulations of the time needed to perform a single iterate. As expected, Primal TRADES turns out to be much lighter than the other algorithms from a computational point of view. The simulations have been executed on MATLAB, using FMINCON() to solve the optimization steps involved in the methods by [33] and [38].

### B. Example With Coupling Constraints

Here, we compare our Primal-Dual TRADES algorithm with the distributed methods proposed in [36], [37], and [38]. For a fair comparison, we test the scheme by [36] with a constant step-size even if convergence was theoretically proven only with a diminishing one (see Table II); note that slower convergence is expected by using a diminishing step-size. We focus on a case study inspired by Li et al. [16]—where it was addressed within a cooperative scenario—and adapt it as an instance of (1). In particular, we consider the cost function
\[
J_i(x_i, \sigma(x)) = \frac{1}{2} ||x_i - p_i||^2 + \frac{w}{2} ||x_i - \sigma(x)||
\]
where \( w > 0 \) and \( p_i \in \mathbb{R}^n \) for all \( i \in I \), while \( \sigma(x) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i \in I} x_i \). We consider a communication graph with ring topology. As for the coupling constraints, in each trial of the Monte Carlo simulations, we randomly generate each \( A_i \) and \( b_i \) by imposing the full row rank property for the former (cf. Assumption 4.2) and extracting the latter from the interval \([0,100]\) with a uniform probability; we set \( N = 20, n = 2.  
Moreover, in each trial, we uniformly randomly extract each \( p_i \) and \( w \) from \([0,100]\)^2 and \([0,1]\), respectively. We empirically tune the algorithm in [36] with \( \alpha_i = 0.5 \) for all \( i \in I \), and \( \gamma = 0.1 \) for all \( t \geq 0 \). As for the parameters of the method in [37], we empirically choose \( c = 1, \tau = 0.2, \alpha = 0.2, \) and \( w = 0.1 \). The algorithm in [38] has been empirically tuned setting \( \alpha = 0.3, \beta = 1, \tau = 0.3 \) and \( \delta = 0.3 \) for all \( i \in I \). Finally, as for the parameters of our algorithm, we empirically tune them as \( \delta = 0.05 \) and \( \rho = 0.1 \). In Fig. 5, we compare the performance of the algorithms in [36], [37], and [38] with Algorithm 2 in terms of the normalized distance \( \|x^t - x^*\| / \|x^*\| \) from the GNE \( x^* \). In this case, the proposed scheme outperforms the others in terms of accuracy and convergence speed.

### VI. Conclusion and Outlook

We propose two novel fully distributed algorithms for (generalized) equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. The first algorithm is designed to address the case where only local constraints are present. The second method does not involve local constraints, however, it allows handling coupling constraints, thus encompassing GNE problems. Both schemes
are studied by means of singular perturbations analysis in which slow and fast dynamics are identified and separately investigated to demonstrate the linear convergence of the whole interconnection to the (generalized) Nash equilibrium. Current work concentrates on extending our analysis line to allow for local constraint sets, either in a hard manner or by means of dualizing these and satisfying them asymptotically. An additional aspect worth of investigation is the possibility of time-varying communication patterns among the agents. Finally, we perform detailed numerical simulations showing the effectiveness of the proposed methods and that they outperform state-of-the-art distributed methods.

APPENDIX A

A. Q-Linear Rate

Here, we report the definition of Q-linear convergence [44, App. A.2]. For the sake of readability, in the rest of the document, we omit the prefix Q.

Definition A.1: Let \( \{x^t\} \) be a sequence in \( \mathbb{R}^n \) that converges to \( x^* \in \mathbb{R}^n \). We say that the convergence is Q-linear if there is a constant \( r \in (0, 1) \) such that
\[
\frac{\|x^{t+1} - x^*\|}{\|x^{t} - x^*\|} \leq r
\]
for all \( t \) sufficiently large. \( \square \)

B. Proof of Theorem 2.5

Let \( \tilde{w}^t := w^t - h(x^t) \) and accordingly rewrite (5) as
\[
x^{t+1} = x^t + \delta f(x^t, \tilde{w}^t + h(x^t)) \tag{45a}
\]
\[
\tilde{w}^{t+1} = g(\tilde{w}^t + h(x^t), x^t, \delta) - h(x^t) + \Delta h(x^{t+1}, x^t) \tag{45b}
\]
where \( \Delta h(x^{t+1}, x^t) := -h(x^{t+1}) + h(x^t) \). Pick \( W \) as in (9). By evaluating \( \Delta W(x^t) := W(x^{t+1}) - W(x^t) \) along the trajectories of (45a), we obtain
\[
\Delta W(x^t) = W(x^t + \delta f(x^t, \tilde{w}^t + h(x^t))) - W(x^t)
\]
Using inequalities (a) we add and subtract the term \( W(x^t + \delta f(x^t, h(x^t))) \), in (b) we exploit (9b) to bound the difference of the first two terms, in (c) we use (8c) to bound the difference of the last two terms, and (d) uses the triangle inequality. By recalling that \( f(x^*, h(x^*)) = 0 \) we can thus write
\[
\|f(x^t, \tilde{w}^t + h(x^t))\| = \|f(x^t, \tilde{w}^t + h(x^t)) - f(x^*, h(x^*))\|
\]
(50)
where in (a) we add and subtract the term \( W(x^t + \delta f(x^t, h(x^t))) \), in (b) we exploit (9b) to bound the difference of the first two terms, in (c) we use (8c) to bound the difference of the last two terms, and (d) uses the triangle inequality. By using the definition of \( \Delta h(x^{t+1}, x^t) \) and the Lipschitz continuity of \( h \), we write
\[
\|\Delta h(x^{t+1}, x^t)\| \leq L_h \|x^{t+1} - x^t\|
\]
(51)
where in (a) we use the Lipschitz continuity of \( f \) and \( h \), and in (b) we use the Lipschitz continuity of \( h \) together with the triangle inequality. With similar arguments, we have
\[
\|f(x^t, h(x^t))\| \leq L_f (1 + L_h) \|x^t - x^*\|.
\]
(48)
\[
\delta_L \preceq \delta_{L_h} L_f (1 + L_h) \left\| x^t - x^* \right\| + \delta L_h L_f \left\| \bar{w}_t \right\|
\]
(51)

where in (a) we use the update (45a), in (b) we add the term \( f(x^*, h(x^*)) \) since this is zero, and in (c) we use the triangle inequality and the Lipschitz continuity of \( f \) and \( h \). Moreover, since \( g(h(x^t), x^t, \delta) = h(x^t) \), we obtain

\[
\left\| g \left( \bar{w}_t + h(x^t), x^t, \delta \right) - g(h(x^t), x^t, \delta) \right\| \leq L_g \left\| \bar{w}_t \right\|
\]
(52)

where the inequality is due to the Lipschitz continuity of \( g \). Using inequalities (51) and (52), we then bound (50) as

\[
\Delta U(\bar{w}) \\
\leq -b_2 \left\| \bar{w}_t \right\|^2 + 2b_4 L_h L_g L_f (1 + L_h) \left\| x^t - x^* \right\| \left\| \bar{w}_t \right\|
\]
(53)

where we introduce the constants

\[
k_4 := 2b_4 L_h L_g L_f (1 + L_h), \quad k_5 := 2b_4 L_h^2 L_f^2 (1 + L_h)
\]

\[
k_6 := 2b_4 L_h L_g L_f, \quad k_7 := b_4 L^2 L_f^2
\]

\[
k_8 := b_4 L^2 L_f^2 (1 + L_h)^2.
\]

We pick the following Lyapunov candidate \( V : \mathbb{D} \times \mathbb{R}^m \to \mathbb{R} : \)

\[
V(x^t, \bar{w}_t) = W(x^t) + U(\bar{w}_t).
\]

By evaluating \( \nabla V(x^t, \bar{w}_t) := V(x^{t+1}, \bar{w}^{t+1}) - V(x^t, \bar{w}_t) = \Delta W(x^t) + \Delta U(\bar{w}_t) \) along the trajectories of (45), we can use the results (49) and (53) to write

\[
\Delta V(x^t, \bar{w}_t) \leq -q \left[ \left\| x^t - x^* \right\| \left\| \bar{w}_t \right\| \right]^T Q(\delta) \left[ \left\| x^t - x^* \right\| \left\| \bar{w}_t \right\| \right]
\]
(54)

where we define the matrix \( Q(\delta) := Q(\delta)^T \in \mathbb{R}^2 \) as

\[
Q(\delta) := \begin{bmatrix}
\delta_c - \delta^2 k_8 & q_{21}(\delta) \\
q_{21}(\delta) & \delta_c - \delta^2 k_8
\end{bmatrix},
\]

\[
q_{21}(\delta) := -\frac{1}{2} \left( \delta(k_3 + k_4) + \delta^2 (k_2 + k_5) \right).
\]

By relying on the Sylvester criterion [41], we know that \( Q > 0 \) if and only if

\[
c_3 b_3 > p(\delta)
\]
(55)

where the polynomial \( p(\delta) \) is defined as

\[
p(\delta) := q_{21}(\delta)^2 + \delta^2 b_3 k_8 + \delta^2 (\delta_c k_3 + k_7) + b_3 k_8
\]

\[
- \delta^3 k_3 k_8 - \delta^4 k_8 (k_3 + k_7).
\]

(56)

We note that \( p \) is a continuous function of \( \delta \) and \( \lim_{\delta \to 0} \frac{p(\delta)}{\delta} = 0. \) Hence, there exists some \( \delta \in (0, \min\{\bar{\delta}_1, \bar{\delta}_2\}) \) such that \( \delta_1 \) and \( \delta_2 \) exist as \( U \) and \( W \) are taken to satisfy (8) and (9)—so that (55) is satisfied for any \( \delta \in (0, \bar{\delta}) \). Under such a choice of \( \delta \), and denoting by \( \eta > 0 \) the smallest eigenvalue of \( Q(\delta) \), we can bound (54) as

\[
\Delta V(x^t, \bar{w}_t) \leq -q \left[ \left\| x^t - x^* \right\| \left\| \bar{w}_t \right\| \right]^2
\]

which allows us to conclude, in view of [45, Th. 13.2], that \((x^*, 0)\) is an exponentially stable equilibrium point for system (45). The theorem’s conclusion follows then by considering the definition of exponentially stable equilibrium point and by reverting to the original coordinates \((x^t, \bar{w}_t)\).

C. Proofs of Technical Lemmas of Section III-B

Proof of Lemma 3.4: System (23) is a linear autonomous system whose state matrix \( R_d^T W_d R_d \in \mathbb{R}^{(N-1)d \times (N-1)d} \) is Schur. Hence, there exists \( P \in \mathbb{R}^{(N-1)d \times (N-1)d}, P = P^T \succ 0 \) for the candidate Lyapunov function \( U(\bar{z}) = (\bar{z}^T) P \bar{z} \), solving the Lyapunov equation

\[
(R_d^T W_d R_d)^T P R_d^T W_d R_d - P = -Q
\]
(57)

for any \( Q \in \mathbb{R}^{(N-1)d \times (N-1)d}, Q = Q^T \succ 0 \). Condition (8a) follows then from the fact that \( U \) is quadratic with \( P \succ 0 \) so \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \) can be chosen to be its minimum and maximum eigenvalue, respectively. The left-hand side of (8b) becomes \((\bar{z}^T)^T (R_d^T W_d R_d)^T P R_d^T W_d R_d - P) \bar{z} = -((\bar{z}^T) Q \bar{z})\), where the equality is due to (57). Hence, (8b) is satisfied by taking \( \beta_1 \) to be the smallest eigenvalue of \( Q \). To see (8c), notice that

\[
\left\| U(\bar{z})^T - U(\bar{z}_2)^T \right\| = \left\| (\bar{z}_2^T)^T P \bar{z}_2 - (\bar{z}^T)^T P \bar{z}_2 \right\|
\]
(58)

\[
\leq \left\| (\bar{z}_2^T)^T P \bar{z}_2 - (\bar{z}_2^T)^T P \bar{z}_2 \right\| + \left\| (\bar{z}_2^T)^T P \bar{z}_2 - (\bar{z}_2^T)^T P \bar{z}_2 \right\| + \left\| (\bar{z}_2^T)^T P \bar{z}_2 - (\bar{z}_2^T)^T P \bar{z}_2 \right\|
\]

where (a) follows from adding and subtracting \((\bar{z}_2^T)^T P \bar{z}_2\) and using the triangle inequality, while (b) from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality. The bound (8c) follows from (58) by setting \( b_4 \) as the largest eigenvalue of \( P \).

We provide here the following technical lemma which is used in the proof of Lemma 3.5.

Lemma A.2 (Contraction of strongly monotone operator): Let \( F : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^n \) be \( \mu \)-strongly monotone and \( L \)-Lipschitz continuous. If \( \gamma \in (0, 2\mu/L^2) \), then for all \( x, x' \in \mathbb{R}^n \) it holds

\[
\| x - \gamma F(x) - x' + \gamma F(x') \| \leq (1 - \bar{\mu}) \| x - x' \|
\]
(59)

where \( \bar{\mu} := 1 - \sqrt{1 - \gamma(2\mu - \gamma L^2)} \in (0, 1) \).

Proof: We have that

\[
\| x - \gamma F(x) - x' + \gamma F(x') \|^2
\]

\[
= \| x - x' \|^2 + \gamma^2 \| F(x) - F(x') \|^2
\]

\[
- 2\gamma \langle x - x', F(x) - F(x') \rangle
\]

\[\leq \| x - x' \|^2 - 2\gamma (2\mu - \gamma L^2) \| x - x' \|^2
\]

where in (a) we use the strong monotonicity and the Lipschitz continuity of \( F \). By construction, \( \bar{\mu} \in (0, 1) \) is equivalent to \( \gamma(2\mu - \gamma L^2) > 0 \) and \( \gamma(2\mu - \gamma L^2) \leq 1 \). The former holds since \( \gamma \in (0, 2\mu/L^2) \). To see the latter, notice that, by definition of \( \mu \)-strong monotonicity and L-Lipschitz continuity, we have

\[
\mu \| x - x' \|^2 \leq \langle F(x) - F(x') \rangle \} \| x - x' \|^2
\]

for all \( x, x' \), hence \( \mu \leq L \). Thus, for any \( \gamma \), it holds that

\[
1 - 2\mu \gamma + \gamma^2 L^2 \geq 1 - 2\gamma L + \gamma^2 L^2 = (1 - \gamma L)^2 \geq 0.
\]
Proof of Lemma 3.5: pick \( W : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R} \) defined as
\[
W(x^t) = \frac{1}{2} \|x^t - x^*\|^2.
\]
Since \( W \) is a quadratic function, conditions (9a) and (9c) are satisfied. To show (9b) we evaluate \( \Delta W(x^t) := W(x^{t+1}) - W(x^t) \) along (25). We then have
\[
\Delta W(x^t) = \frac{1}{2} \| (1 - \delta) x^t + \delta (P_X [x^t - \gamma F(x^t)]) - x^* \|^2 - \frac{1}{2} \| x^t - x^* \|^2
\]
where in (a) we introduce \( \delta (x^t - P_X [x^* - \gamma F(x^t)]) \) within the first norm, as this is zero due to the definition of \( x^* \), expand the square, and use the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality. Inequality (b) follows by the fact that for all \( a, b \), we have that
\[
\| P_X [a] - P_X [b] \| \leq \| a - b \|, \text{ since the projector operation is nonexpansive.}
\]
Since \( F \) is \( \mu \)-strongly monotone and \( \beta_1 \) Lipschitz continuous (cf., Standing Assumption 2.3), set \( \tilde{\gamma} = 2\mu/(\beta_1)^2 \) and choose \( \gamma \in (0, \tilde{\gamma}) \). Applying Lemma A.2 yields
\[
\| x^t - x^* \|^2 \leq (1 - \tilde{\mu}) \| x^t - x^* \|^2
\]
with \( \tilde{\mu} = 1 - \sqrt{1 - 2\mu/(\beta_1)^2} \in (0, 1) \). Thus, by using the inequality in (61), we can bound (60) as follows:
\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta W(x^t) &\leq \frac{(1 - \delta)^2}{2} \| x^t - x^* \|^2 - \frac{1}{2} \| x^t - x^* \|^2 \\
&\quad + (\delta - \tilde{\mu}) (1 - \tilde{\mu}) \| x^t - x^* \|^2 \\
&\quad + \tilde{\mu} \| x^t - x^* \|^2 \\
&\quad - \delta \tilde{\mu} (1 - \delta \tilde{\mu}) \| x^t - x^* \|^2
\end{align*}
\]
where (a) is obtained by rearranging the above terms. Thus, for any \( \delta \in (0, \tilde{\delta}_2) \) with \( \tilde{\delta}_2 := 2\tilde{\mu}, (1 - \delta \tilde{\mu}/2) > 0 \) in (62), thus establishing condition (9b) and concluding the proof.

D. Proofs of Technical Lemmas of Section IV-B

Proof of Lemma 4.4: Since \( R_{m}^{\perp} 1_{N,m} = 0 \), we can write
\[
R_{m}^{\perp} G_{k} (1_{N,m}(Ax - b) + R_{m} \tilde{y}_1, 1_{N,m}\tilde{\lambda} + R_{m} \tilde{\lambda}_1^\perp)
\]
and use them to define
\[
\begin{align*}
r_{1,i} := \rho (Ax - b + q_{i}) \quad \lambda + p_{i}^t \\
r_{2,i} := \rho (Ax - b + \tilde{\lambda}) \quad \tilde{\lambda}
\end{align*}
\]
where in the last equality we used \( 1_{N,m} \nabla H (Ax - b, \tilde{\lambda}) = G_{k} (1_{N,m}(Ax - b), 1_{N,m}\tilde{\lambda}) \). Applying [39, Lemma 3], notice that, for all \( r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{R} \), there exists \( \epsilon(r_1, r_2) \in [0, 1] \) so that
\[
\max \{ r_1, 0 \} - \max \{ r_2, 0 \} = \epsilon(r_1, r_2)(r_1 - r_2).
\]
Let us introduce
\[
q_{i}^t := \sum_{\ell=1}^{m}[R_{m} \tilde{y}_1]_{\ell+i-1} e_{\ell}, \quad p_{i}^t := \sum_{\ell=1}^{m}[R_{m} \tilde{\lambda}_1^\perp]_{\ell+i-1} e_{\ell}
\]
and use the definitions of \( \tilde{u}(x, \tilde{w}) \) we have that its norm \( \| \tilde{u}(x, \tilde{w}) \| \) is equal to the norm of the quantity in (63). Let \( n_w := (N - 1)(2m + d) \). As such, for all \( x \in \mathbb{R}^{n+m} \) and \( \tilde{w} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_w} \), we use the definition of \( G_{k} \) in (32), \( r_{1,i}^t \) and \( r_{2,i} \), in (66), and apply (64) for each component of \( \tilde{u}(x, \tilde{w}) \) obtaining
\[
\| \tilde{u}(x, \tilde{w}) \| \leq \left[ R_{m}^{\perp} \rho \right]_{
abla} \left( \sum_{\ell=1}^{m} \epsilon([r_{1,i}^t]_{\ell}, [r_{2,i}]_{\ell}) \left( [r_{1,i}^t - \tilde{\lambda}^t - p_{i}^t]_{\ell} - [r_{2,i} - \tilde{\lambda}]_{\ell} \right) e_{\ell} \right)_{i=1}^{N}
\]
where in (a) we use the fact that \( \epsilon([r_{1,i}^t]_{\ell}, [r_{2,i}]_{\ell}) \in [0, 1] \) for all \( \ell \in \{1, \ldots, m\} \) and \( i \in T \), (b) uses the definitions in (66) to simplify the terms, (c) follows from (65), and (d) uses \( R_{m}^{\perp} R_{m} = I \) and \( \| \tilde{w} \|^2 \leq \| \tilde{w}^t \| \) that holds since \( \tilde{y}_1 \) is a component of \( \tilde{w} \). Now, let \( U : \mathbb{R}^{n_w} \to \mathbb{R} \) be
\[
U(\tilde{u}) = (\tilde{w})^T U \tilde{w}
\]
where \( U \in \mathbb{R}^{n_w \times n_w} \) with \( U = U^T \succ 0 \), such that
\[
S^{T} U S - U = -I.
\]
We remark that such a matrix $H$ always exists because, in light of Standing Assumption 2.4, both $R_m^TLR_d$ and $R_d^TW_dR_d$ are Schur matrices and, thus, $S$ is Schur as well. Under this choice of $U$, conditions (8a) and (8c) are satisfied. To show (8b), we evaluate $\Delta U(\tilde{w}^t) := U(\tilde{w}^{t+1}) - U(\tilde{w}^t)$ along the trajectories of (42), obtaining

$$\Delta U(\tilde{w}^t) = (S\tilde{w}^t + \delta\tilde{u}(\chi, \tilde{w}^t))\top U(S\tilde{w}^t + \delta\tilde{u}(\chi, \tilde{w}^t))$$

$$- (\tilde{w}^t)\top U\tilde{w}^t$$

$$= -\|\tilde{w}^t\|^2 + 2\delta(\tilde{w}^t)\top S\tilde{U}\tilde{u}(\chi, \tilde{w}^t)$$

$$+ \delta^2\tilde{u}(\chi, \tilde{w}^t)\top U\tilde{u}(\chi, \tilde{w}^t)$$

$$\leq -(1 - \delta \mu_1 - \delta^2 \mu_2)\|\tilde{w}^t\|^2$$

(69)

where the second equality is due to (68), and the inequality follows from (67) and the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, with the constants $\mu_1 := 2\|S\|\|U\|$ and $\mu_2 := \|\tilde{U}\|$. Thus, there always exists $\delta > 0$ small enough so that $(1 - \delta \mu_1 - \delta^2 \mu_2) > 0$ for any $\delta \in (0, \delta_1)$, concluding the proof.

**Proof of Lemma 4.5:** the proof is inspired by [39, Theorem 2, Lemma 3, Lemma 4], adapted to our framework. Let $F : \mathbb{R}^{n+m} \to \mathbb{R}^{n+m}$ and $H : \mathbb{R}^{n+m} \to \mathbb{R}^{n+m}$ be defined as

$$F(\chi^t) := \begin{bmatrix} F[I \ 0] \chi^t \end{bmatrix}$$

$$H(\chi^t) := \begin{bmatrix} \nabla_x H(A[I \ 0] \chi^t - b[I \ 0]) \chi^t \end{bmatrix}$$

(70a)

Applying (64) to each of the components of $F(\chi^t) - F(\chi^*)$, for all $\chi^t \in \mathbb{R}^{n+m}$ we obtain

$$\mathcal{H}(\chi^t) - \mathcal{H}(\chi^*)$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} \rho A^T E(\chi^t, \chi^*)^2 A - E(\chi^t, \chi^*)A - \frac{1}{\rho}(E(\chi^t, \chi^*) - I) \end{bmatrix} (\chi^t - \chi^*)$$

(71)

where $E(\chi^t, \chi^*) = \text{diag}(e_1(\chi^t, \chi^*), \ldots, e_m(\chi^t, \chi^*))$ and $e_t(\chi^t, \chi^*) \in [0, 1]$ so that

$$\max\{\rho[Ax^t - b] + [\lambda]^t e, 0\} - \max\{\rho[Ax^t - b] + [\lambda]^t e, 0\} = e_t(\chi^t, \chi^*)(\rho[Ax^t - b] + [\lambda]^t e, 0)$$

for all $t \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$ and $\chi^t := \text{COL}(\chi^t, \lambda^t) \in \mathbb{R}^{n+m}$. Moreover, for all $\chi^t \in \mathbb{R}^n$, we have

$$F(x^t) - F(x^*) = \int_0^1 \nabla F((1 - \nu)x^t + \nu x^*)(x^t - x^*) d\nu$$

$$\leq \int_0^1 \nabla F((1 - \nu)x^t + \nu x^*)(x^t - x^*) d\nu$$

(81)

where in (a) we have extracted the term $(x^t - x^*)$ from the integral and in (b) we have introduced $B(x^t, x^*) := \int_0^1 \nabla F((1 - \nu)x^t + \nu x^*) d\nu$. Since $F$ is $\mu$-strongly monotone and $\beta_1$-Lipschitz continuous (cf. Standing Assumption 2.3), we can uniformly bound the integral term of (72) as

$$\mu_1 \leq \nabla F((1 - \nu)x^t + \nu x^*) \leq \beta_1 I$$

which leads to

$$\mu_1 \leq \int_0^1 \mu_1 d\nu \leq B(x^t, x^*) \leq \int_0^1 \beta_1 I d\nu \leq \beta_1 I.$$
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