Comment on ”Quantum Dialogue protocol”

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Abstract

In 2004, Ba An Nguyen [Phys. Lett. A 328, 6-10] has presented a Quantum Dialogue scheme for simultaneously communicating their messages. In this comment, we show that the quantum dialogue scheme is not secure against the intercept-and-resend attack and we propose a modified scheme which is secure against that attack.

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In 2004, Ba An Nguyen has presented the Quantum Dialogue scheme [1]. He demonstrated that the protocol is asymptotically secure against the disturbance attack, the intercept-and-resend attack and the entangle-and-measure attack.

Let us start with the brief description of the quantum dialogue protocol. Bob initially prepares the state $|\psi_{0,0}\rangle_{h_n,t_n} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|01\rangle + |10\rangle)$ and encodes his bits $(k_n, l_n)$ by performing $U_{k_n,l_n} (U_{00} = I, U_{01} = \sigma_x, U_{10} = i\sigma_y$ and $U_{11} = \sigma_z)$ on the state $|\psi_{0,0}\rangle_{h_n,t_n}$. Bob keeps qubit $h_n$ with him and sends qubit $t_n$ to Alice. Alice confirms Bob that she received qubit. She determines the mode (the message mode (MM) or the checking mode (CM)) and encodes her messages by performing the unitary operation $U_{i_n,j_n}$. If the mode is the checking mode, she encodes random bits. And she sends Bob the encoded qubit $t_n$. Bob performs a Bell measurement on the pair of qubits with the result in state $|\psi_{x_n,y_n}\rangle_{h_n,t_n}$, and listens to Alice to tell him that was a run in MM or in CM. If it was a MM, Bob publicly reveals the values of $(x_n, y_n)$. Alice and Bob decodes the each other’s secret messages. That is, Alice’s bits as $i_n = |x_n - k_n|$ and $j_n = |y_n - l_n|$ and Bob’s bits as $k_n = |x_n - i_n|$ and $l_n = |y_n - j_n|$. If it was a CM mode, Alice publicly announces the value of $(i_n - j_n)$. And Bob checks the eavesdropping by checking both $i_n = |x_n - k_n|$ and $j_n = |y_n - l_n|$. If the checking computation is correct, we determine that there is no eavesdropping. Otherwise the process is discontinued.

The author claim that this protocol is asymptotically secure against the disturbance attack, the intercept-and-resend attack and the entangle-and-measure attack. But our simple strategy of attack shows that the protocol is not secure against the intercept-and-resend attack. So that, undetectable eavesdropping scheme may exist. The method of attack is as follows.

1. Bob prepares initial states and encodes his messages on the initial states. We suppose that Bob’s encoded states is $|\psi_{k,l}\rangle$. Here $(k, l)$ means a Bob’s secret messages. He stores the first photon(home photon) $h$, and sends the second photon(travel photon) $t$ to Alice.

2. Eve intercepts the travel photon $t$ and restores it. She generates any Bell states $|\psi_{k',l'}\rangle$ and sends the second photon $t'$ of the states to Alice.

3. After receiving the travel photon $t'$ Alice randomly switches between MM and CM. In the MM, Alice encodes her messages by performing the Pauli-operation on that
FIG. 1: The intercept-and-resend attack to the quantum dialogue protocol. Here BSM means a Bell states measurement.

In the CM, Alice randomly encodes on that photon by using the same way. Then Alice sends the photon to Bob.

4. Eve takes snatch the photon $t'$ and performs a Bell measurement on the pair of the received photon $t'$ and the his first photon $h'$. Then he knows the Alice’s encoding operations because she already knows Bob’s $t'$ and initial states of the pairs of photon $h'$. So, Eve successfully eavesdrops the Alice’s secret messages. And Eve performs the same operation with Alice did on the photon $t$. Eve sends the encoded photon $t$ to Bob.

5. Bob receives the travel photon $t$ and performs a Bell measurement on both photon $h$ and $t$ to decode Alice’s information. And Bob wait for Alice to tell him that was a perform in MM or in CM. If it was a MM, Bob decodes the Alice’s messages by using the initial states, his encoding operation and final Bell measurement outcome. And he publicly announce the his measurement outcome to allow Alice also to decode Bob’s message. If it was a CM, Alice publicly announces the her operator for Bob to check the Eve.

In this checking step, Eve’s intervention is not reveled. Because Eve knows Alice’s messages and performs the encoding operations according the messages.

Eve has no access to Bob’s home photon $h$ but can handle the travel photon $t$ while it goes from Bob to Alice and travel photon $t'$ when from Alice to Bob. Our attacking strategy is not detected by permitted users. Eve eavesdrops the Alice’s all secret messages without detection. But he doesn’t know Bob’s messages. Note that the attacker is not revealed to the right users and the messages of the one of users is exposed to the attacker in the attack.
Let us now consider how to modify the Quantum Dialogue protocol to make it secure against the proposed attack. Bob initially prepares the state $|\psi_{0,0}\rangle_{h_n,t_n} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|01\rangle + |10\rangle)$ and chooses the mode of two mode, MM and CM. For the MM, he encodes his secret messages $(k_n, l_n)$ by performing $U_{k_n,l_n}$ on the state $|\psi_{0,0}\rangle_{h_n,t_n}$. For the CM, he encodes just random bits. Then he sends the second photon $t_n$ to Alice. Alice’s choice of the mode is the same with the Bob’s action. Alice sends the photon $t_n$ back to Bob. Bob performs a Bell measurement on the pairs of the photon $h_n$ and $t_n$. Alice and Bob publicly announce the mode which they chose. If Alice’s and Bob’s choice was CM at the same time, they inform their encoding operation and Bob announce his measurement outcome. Then they can determine the Eve’s intervention by checking the correlation of states. If Alice’s and Bob’s mode choice was different, they do not inform their encoding operations. In this case, only one user can know opposite user’s messages. That is, If Alice chose CM and Bob chose MM, Alice can know Bob’s message by using her operation and measurement outcome. If Alice chose MM and Bob chose CM, Bob can know Alice’s message by using Alice’s measurement outcome and his operation. If Alice’s and Bob’s mode was MM at the same time, the decoding method is the same as the original quantum dialogue protocol. The point of security of this protocol is that each of two communicators have a choice of the mode. The checking mode is runs if and only if they chose CM simultaneously. If they selected different mode each other, the protocol runs in one-way communication.

In summary, we show that the quantum dialogue protocol proposed by Nguyen [1] is not secure against the intercept-and-resend attack and propose a modified quantum dialogue protocol which is secure against the attack described above. The modified quantum dialogue protocol is asymptotically secure against the disturbance attack, the entangle-and-measure attack and the intercept-and-resend attack. Its proofs about asymptotic security is the same as that of the original quantum dialogue protocol.

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[1] Ba An Nguyen, Phys. Lett. A, 6, 328 (2004)