A Physical Layer, Zero-round-trip-time, Multi-factor Authentication Protocol

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ABSTRACT Lightweight physical layer security schemes that have recently attracted a lot of attention include physical unclonable functions (PUFs), RF fingerprinting / proximity based authentication and secret key generation (SKG) from wireless fading coefficients. In this paper, we propose a fast, privacy-preserving, zero-round-trip-time (0-RTT), multi-factor authentication protocol, that for the first time brings all these elements together, i.e., PUFs, proximity estimation and SKG. We use Kalman filters to extract proximity estimates from real measurements of received signal strength (RSS) in an indoor environment to provide soft fingerprints for node authentication. By leveraging node mobility, a multitude of such fingerprints are extracted to provide resistance to impersonation type of attacks e.g., a false base station. Upon removal of the proximity fingerprints, the residual measurements are then used as an entropy source for the distillation of symmetric keys and subsequently used as resumption secrets in a 0-RTT fast authentication protocol. Both schemes are incorporated in a challenge-response PUF-based mutual authentication protocol, shown to be secure through formal proofs using Burrows, Abadi, and Needham (BAN) and Mao and Boyd (MB) logic, as well as the Tamarin-prover. Our protocol showcases that in future networks purely physical layer security solutions are tangible and can provide an alternative to public key infrastructure in specific scenarios.

INDEX TERMS Physical layer security, multi-factor authentication, PUF, Kalman filter, SKG, 0-RTT.

I. INTRODUCTION Authentication is central in building secure networks; confirming the identity of devices and their role in a network’s hierarchy eliminates the possibility of numerous attacks [1]–[3]. However, stringent latency and computational power constraints are present in many emerging verticals, typically involving Internet of things (IoT) infrastructure [4], [5], rendering the design of respective authentication mechanisms a challenging task. As an example, a recent 3GPP report on the security of ultra reliable low latency communication (URLLC) systems notes that authentication for URLLC is still an open problem [6]. Current solutions rely on modulo arithmetic in large fields and typically incur considerable latency, as an example, it has been reported that verifying digital signatures in a vehicular networking scenario, utilizing a typical 400 MHz processor, takes around 20 ms [7]. Moreover, a full authentication procedure with EAP-TLS (used for the narrow-band IoT standard [8], [9]) on a 1.73 GHz processor tablet takes on average 165.5 ms in static conditions and 336.7 ms for high mobility conditions [10]; the value decreases to approximately 55 ms for the re-authentication process in static environments [10], [11]. Additionally, with the advance of quantum computing, traditional asymmetric key cryptographic schemes will become semantically insecure while, at the same time, current proposals for post-quantum alternatives use keys of substantial lengths [12] and might not be compatible with constrained devices. Therefore, the proposal of new lightweight security primitives and protocols for device authentication is timely. Notably, many critical IoT networks require fast authentication, e.g., in V2X applications, telemedicine and haptics. In this framework, physical layer security (PLS) emerges as...
a lightweight alternative to computational complexity based schemes [13], [14]. The increasing interest in PLS has been stimulated by many practical needs, as it comes with negligible overheads. Moreover, it relies upon information-theoretic security concepts and could provide quantum resistant solutions that are scalable to large IoT networks.

PLS schemes exploit physical layer entropy sources in both the hardware and in the communication medium [15]–[17]. With respect to the former, physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are hardware entities harnessing entropy from physically unclonable variations that occur during the production process of a silicon device [18], [19]. Due to their unclonability, PUFs can be used in challenge–response authentication protocols, where a challenge can refer to measurement of the wireless transmission power and as a result will fail to launch such techniques could be useful to address impersonation attacks. Alternatively, proximity estimation can prevent impersonation attacks in the presence of a malicious server. The proposed system utilize the randomness in the wireless fading coefficients to generate maximum entropy session keys. SKG. The novelty of this contribution is that the Kalman filter low pass filtering properties are used to isolate the Kalman filter to provide forward secrecy and protection against replay attacks.

Table 1: Paper Contributions

| Technology         | Novelty                                                                                       | Overall contributions                                                                 |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Proximity estimation | As an initial factor of authentication we propose a novel proximity detection mechanism leveraging user mobility to authenticate a static server. Standard PUF mechanisms are used as a main factor of authentication in our two-party protocol. Combining PUFs and mobility-based proximity estimation can prevent impersonation attacks in the presence of a malicious server. The proposed system utilize the randomness in the wireless fading coefficients to generate maximum entropy session keys. In a subsequent communication between the nodes the generated keys are incorporated in a novel PHY-based 0-RTT protocol to provide forward secrecy and protection against replay attacks. | The combination of all the technologies in a single solution gives a novel and secure authentication protocol. To support the employment of PHY layer SKG in short blocklength communication protocols, we provide the complete chain of the SKG process. We validate the performance of the proposed mobility-based proximity detection and the SKG process through real-life experiments. The security properties of the protocol are formally proven using MB logic and the Tamarin-prover. We introduce a novel, physical layer, forward secure 0-RTT resumption authentication mechanism. |
| PUFs               |                                                                                               |                                         |
| SKG                |                                                                                               |                                         |
| SKG                |                                                                                               |                                         |

1) A novel, mobility-enhanced proximity estimation using Kalman filters is proposed for soft authentication. A novel aspect of our proposal is that it provides robustness against impersonation attacks by leveraging node mobility. In more detail, by allowing a mobile node to choose freely the distances at which proximity estimation to a base station (access point) is performed, false base stations would not be able to adapt their transmission power and as a result will fail to launch impersonation attacks;

2) SKG from small scale fading. We propose to isolate entropy rich, small scale, fading in the observed RSS by treating the output of the Kalman filter as a predictable component [29], [30] that has to be removed before SKG. The novelty of this contribution is that the Kalman filter low pass filtering properties are used to isolate persistent, location dependent trends in the RSS. We note that in [29] and [30] the isolation of small scale
fading was performed by using power domain separation techniques (e.g., principal component analysis and autoencoders), while in our work an alternative method is presented for the separation of large scale fading from small scale fading in the time domain (i.e., through low pass filtering).

3) Proof of concept through experimental results. In detail, we will showcase proximity estimation and reconciliation performed on the quantized residual measurements with real RSS measurements in an indoor setting using WiFi technology.

4) A 0-RTT protocol using PUFs, in which, resumption keys are generated using SKG. The combination of PUFs, SKG and mobility based-proximity detection ensures security properties such as untraceability, anonymity, protection against cyber impersonation attacks and many more.

5) The security properties of the proposed protocol are verified through formal methods. We first verify the proposed protocol using the well-known Burrows, Abadi, Needham (BAN) [32] logic. However, BAN logic typically does not account for active attacks, hence, it can only ensure secrecy based on a set of assumptions. To overcome that, we perform a further security analysis using Tamarin-prover [33]. Tamarin provides unbounded, symbolic analysis for security protocols and has been widely employed to provide security proofs for protocols such as TLS 1.3 [34], 5G AKA [35], and more [36]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time formal methods are used to demonstrate the veracity of PLS protocols.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: related work is discussed in Section II, the mobility-based proximity estimation and reconciliation of the extrapolated small scale fading residuals and proof of concept are discussed in Section III. In Section IV the proposed authentication protocol is presented while its security properties are verified in Section V using formal proofs and the Tamarin-prover. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.

II. STATE OF THE ART AND BEYOND
Numerous PUF based authentication protocols have been proposed, both for unilateral authentication and mutual authentication [37]. Some of the protocols assume the use of PUFs as the only factor of authentication [23], [38]. However, relying on PUFs as a single security factor can expose the system to a variety of threats, especially in an IoT scenario [39]. Therefore, combining two or more independent credentials can be used to build a secure multi-factor authentication protocol [20]–[22]. For example, [20] proposes a privacy-preserving authentication protocol between an IoT device and a server both connected through a third party wireless gateway. The authors propose to use: PUFs for device authentication; and, RSS measurements, taken between the IoT device and the gateway, to achieve data provenance. However, the process of gateway authentication is not clari-
third party signals (e.g., FM or TV broadcasting). The goal of the study was to demonstrate that users in close proximity would experience similar channel characteristics, hence, this could be used as an advantage over eavesdroppers for authentication. While this is an interesting approach, its success relies on the assumption of very close proximity between users. Further, it is not commented on how users build trust to the third party signals. A different approach was presented in [45], where the authors focus on attendance monitoring, i.e., users are authenticated only if they are inside a premise. However, as those systems rely on a single authentication factor, i.e., RSS measurements, it has been shown that they might be susceptible to a number of attacks [46]. Other works focus on a more precise localization [47]–[53]. To improve the performance most of these works rely on complex operations [50]–[53], (e.g., machine learning techniques), making them unsuitable for constrained IoT devices, while others propose solutions that rely on the use of multiple nodes and measurements of the RSS at multiple locations [49].

In this work, we propose a simple, impersonation attack resistant proximity estimator, as a second factor of authentication. To extract the location-dependent trend from the received signals we use a standard Kalman filter [54]. The complexity of the filter is negligible [55] making it suitable for real-time IoT applications [56]–[58]. The novelty of our solution is that instead of deploying multiple nodes (which would need to be mutually authenticated), we propose to leverage the mobility of a single node, allowing it to capture RSS values from multiple locations. More details, including experimental results, are given in Section III-A. It is important to note that, in this work, proximity estimation is used as a second factor of authentication to complement the primary authentication procedure carried out using PUFs. While, second factors of authentication are typically weaker than primary, they provide an additional security layer and increase the cost and complexity of possible attacks.

Finally, the third PLS solution used in our protocol is SKG from wireless fading coefficients. Fading is a complex physical process process, including both large scale fading (path loss and shadowing) and small scale fading components. With respect to their role in security applications, in [29] and [30] it has been noted that large scale fading is primarily useful for node authentication (e.g., through high precision localization), while small scale fading is a valuable source of entropy for SKG [59]. The separation of the two types of processes can in principle be performed in the time or in the power domain. Note that large scale fading is expected to dominate in power [30], providing a basis for separation using principal component analysis or other unsupervised learning methods.

In fact, it has recently been established that without any pre-processing of the source of shared randomness (i.e., the channel coefficients), the generated keys are susceptible to prediction attacks [60]. In this work, we propose a novel RSS-based SKG approach where entropy-rich, small scale fading components are isolated and subsequently used for key generation. The idea is to subtract the filtered RSS time series (used here for proximity estimation) from the original RSS measurements, hence, suppress the dominant component in the power measurements and use the residual at the input of the SKG. We have evaluated the SKG rates of our proposed solution in an experimental setup using CRC-aided Polar codes that operate in the short block length (Section III-B). We note that, finding an error correcting code that operates in the short block lengths and that is suitable for resource constrained IoT devices is still an open issue [61]. Hence, our experimental work can be considered as a contribution, towards future performance analyses.

To summarise, we propose a multi-factor and privacy-preserving authentication protocol entirely based on PLS techniques. With respect to privacy preservation, similarly to earlier works, we use a one-time alias ID scheme. First, primary authentication is performed using PUFs. Next, to enhance the security levels, apart from PUFs, we propose to additionally use two independent PLS credentials: proximity estimation and SKG. While existing studies are typically focused on a single PLS credential, here, we propose a unique combination that is shown to withstand numerous attacks. Some high level key differences between the proposed multi-factor protocol and existing solutions, based on a single PLS credential, are summarized below:

- PUFs are seen as a lightweight alternative to currently used, complex, authentication solutions. Unfortunately, relying on PUF alone might expose the system to malicious attacks, hence, introducing the challenge of finding further, IoT-friendly, solutions that can complement PUFs and contribute to overall system security. In the current work, we identify two possible candidates and propose a unique combination that is well suited for resource constrained devices and could be implemented without introducing additional costs.
- Proximity estimation is a simple technique that could provide valuable information towards the authentication process. Similarly to PUFs, it is not recommended to use it as a single security factor. Therefore, in this work, estimated distances are used only for soft authentication, that provides initial level of trust before applying the PUF. The novelty of the proposed mechanism is that we leverage the natural movement of users to prevent impersonation attacks, which has not been considered before.
- The literature on SKG solutions is vast. While numerous studies show that key extraction is possible at acceptable rates it is not clear how those keys are i) authenticated; ii) used. Here we show that when SKG is used in combination with PUFs and proximity estimation, the authenticity of the generated keys can be successfully confirmed. Next, we identify a specific application

\footnote{In such a scheme, the IoT device does not use its real ID during the authentication process, instead it uses a one-time alias ID which is updated in every session.}
where PHY generated keys can be utilized, e.g., 0-RTT resumption protocols. It is important to mention that by combining currently used resumption techniques with PHY generated keys we overcome the threat of replay attacks.

In the following section, we describe the proposed proximity estimation and SKG methods in greater detail and demonstrate their potential through a set of real-life experiments. The relationship between all three PLS credentials used to build our authentication protocol is also discussed.

III. PROXIMITY ESTIMATION AND SKG USING RSS

In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed RSS-based proximity estimation and SKG techniques. First, we separate the location fingerprints (in the RSS measurements) from the small scale fading components by using a fast Kalman filter. After separation, the location dependent trend is used towards proximity estimation while the fast varying and unpredictable components are used as an input for SKG. Finally, as a proof of concept, we present experimental results for the proposed methods using WiFi chipsets in an indoor office environment.

A. MOBILITY-ENHANCED PROXIMITY ESTIMATION

Introducing a “smart movement” environment brings a number of advantages to IoT systems, including energy savings, control over the node mobility and increased overall quality-of-experience (QoE) [62]. In this direction, we propose in this section a proximity estimation approach, leveraging mobility. The novelty in our strategy relies upon the fact that if Alice (a mobile IoT node) moves in a manner unpredictable for adversaries, she can take successive measurements of the RSS transmitted by a static entity, Bob, (e.g., a static access point) and use them for proximity estimation, as shown in Fig. 1. In fact, this lightweight proximity estimation approach allows Alice to detect impersonation attacks when used in combination with the authentication protocol presented in the next section. We will present a straightforward algorithm for proximity estimation using Kalman filters.

Due to the ease of implementation and signal availability, RSS-based localization is usually a favoured technique. Focusing on large scale fading, according to the inverse-square law, the RSS at Alice can be used to estimate the distance between her and Bob. Based on the fact that the large scale fading coefficients typically follow a log-normal distribution, we assume a standard path loss model to map RSS values to distances between two nodes [63], i.e., we assume the following model:

$$d = d_0 \frac{P_0 - P}{\text{SNR}} e^{-\frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{X - \ln(10)}{\sigma_X} \right)^2}, \quad (1)$$

where $\hat{d}$ is the estimated distance to the transmitter, $P$ is the strength of the received signal in dB, $P_0$ represents the average RSS at some reference distance $d_0$ in dB, $n$ is an attenuation factor that describes the relation between distance and received power in a given environment, and $X \sim N(0, \sigma_X^2)$ is a zero mean Gaussian random variable modeling shadowing [64].

To extrapolate the components that follow (1) from the measured RSS, we propose the use of a Kalman filter. Kalman filters have been widely used in literature to improve the reliability of RSS-based localization [65]. The filter’s parameters are usually in the form of matrices resulting in a computational complexity higher than $O(N^2)$ [66]. However, as the target in the scenario assumed here is static, all of the parameters reduce to scalar values. This allows us to apply a lightweight version of the filter, the fast Kalman filter, without penalty in performance [67], [68]. The computational complexity of the fast Kalman filter is only $O(N)$ [55], [68], making the algorithm suitable for real-time applications on resource constrained devices, e.g., a low-end IoT nodes [56]–[58]. The smoothing process at Alice works under the assumption that the current state $Y_{A,i}$ is related to the previous state $Y_{A,i-1}$ as follows:

$$Y_{A,i} = Y_{A,i-1} + K_{A,i}(X_{A,i} - Y_{A,i-1}), \quad (2)$$

where $X_{A,i}$ and $Y_{A,i}$, with $i = 1, \ldots, N$, are elements within the vectors $X_A$ and $Y_A$ that contain raw and filtered RSS measurements, respectively, and $K_{A,i}$ is a parameter that determines the convergence of the filter, called Kalman gain (the filtering process at Bob is defined identically). Note that, the initial values $K_1$ and $Y_0$ must be pre-defined (for the purpose of this work we assume the initial values to be equal for Alice and Bob). For more details on the filtering algorithm the readers are referred to [67], [68].

To validate the proposed proximity estimation technique we have performed a set of experiments in an indoor environment. The experiments were performed using two nodes, each equipped with an ESP32 low-power system on a micro-controller chip with integrated WiFi. The measurement setup...
The standard deviation of the raw measurements and the filter output, which is used by Alice to determine her distance to Bob, is illustrated in Fig. 2 and setup parameters are summarized in Table 2.

First, in Fig. 3, a set of raw RSS measurements $X_A$ and $X_B$, taken at a distance of 9 m, are depicted along with outputs of the Kalman filters for Alice, $Y_A$, and Bob, $Y_B$. The initialization parameters for the filter were chosen as $K_1 = 0.5$ and $Y_0 = -32$. It is observed that both the RSS measurements and the filter outputs at the two nodes are highly reciprocal. Note that, the filter output quickly stabilizes smoothing out the fast variations in the raw data (e.g., due to small scale fading). In fact, it converges in less than 20 samples and afterwards its output varies only by a few dBms. Based on this observation, we allow for a small margin in terms of convergence time, and assume that the 30-th output of the Kalman filter, $Y_{A,30}$ in (2), is the “decision” output which is used by Alice to determine her distance to Bob.

Next, the path loss model for the considered scenario was determined. A set of 50 independent measurement sessions were performed at each of the distances $d \in \{1, 3, 6, 9\}$. From each set the “decision” output of the Kalman filter, $Y_{A,30}$, as well as the corresponding RSS measurement, $X_{A,30}$, were extracted. The values were used to estimate the unknown variables in (1). This is illustrated in Fig. 4 where the standard deviation of the raw measurements and the filter outputs are plotted against a fitted curve based on (1). The estimated parameters used for curve fitting are $F_0 = -47.56$ dBm, $d_0 = 6$ m, $n = 1.1$ and $\sigma_{X_A} = 3.24$. It is clear that the impact of small scale fading, due to movement as well as noise effects, is efficiently removed, leaving a stable source for our proximity estimation.

Based on the performed experiments, distances are classified in four categories: immediate ($d \leq 1$ m), near ($d$ between 1 and 3m), medium ($d$ between 3 and 6m) and far ($d \geq 9$ m). To validate the approach a new, independent set of measurements was taken at each distance. Table 3 presents the classification probabilities, when the estimated distance is evaluated as follows:

$$\hat{d} = \arg \min_{d_i \in \{1,3,6,9\}} |Y_{A,30} - Y_M(d_i)|,$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)$$

where $Y_M$ are the values corresponding to the fitted curve in Fig. 4. It is observed that correct classification is achieved with a probability higher than 0.82 in all cases, while mis-
classifications occur primarily between neighboring ranges of distances.

This straightforward proximity estimation technique is used by Alice as an independent factor in the multi-factor authentication protocol presented in Section IV. As noted earlier, upon removal of the proximity fingerprints, the residual measurements are used as an entropy source for SKG, i.e., the input for the SKG is evaluated as: \( X_A - Y_A \) for Alice and \( X_B - Y_B \) for Bob. The performance of this SKG approach is evaluated in the next section.

### B. SKG based on RSS

The steps in the SKG scheme can be summarized as follows:

1. Alice and Bob pass their SKG inputs through a quantizer, obtaining binary sequences \( Y_{K,A} \) and \( Y_{K,B} \), respectively; as is standard in literature, in this work we use an equal probability quantizer. To reconcile mismatches at the generated binary sequences, one of the legitimate parties, e.g., Alice, sends syndrome information \( S_A \) to Bob. Finally, to create maximal entropy secret keys, both users employ privacy amplification over the reconciled information [69].

To evaluate the SKG scheme, we gathered 38,000 RSS measurements at a user distance of 3 m. We experimented with equal probability quantizers using 1, 2, and 3 bits, respectively, and employed gray coding to minimize the bit mismatch probability. For information reconciliation we implemented CRC-aided polar codes with list size 128 and implemented CRC-aided polar codes with list size 128 and blocklength of 1024 bits [31]. The CRC bits aid the decoders in selecting the correct decoding route from a list of options. The decoder can drop a frame if none of the options in the list verifies the CRC conditions. The reconciliation rate is measured as the ratio of output (reconciled) bits over the number of input (quantized) bits. The experimental results are depicted in Table 4. As expected, it is observed that the mismatch probability increases with the number of quantization bits. This is due to the fact that each increase in the number of the quantization bits leads to a decrease in the range represented by a single quantization region.

Next, we have chosen the reconciliation rates shown in Table 4 as the highest rates for which the users can correct all mismatches. For information reconciliation we implemented CRC-aided polar codes with list size 128 and blocklength of 1024 bits [31]. The CRC bits aid the decoders in selecting the correct decoding route from a list of options. The decoder can drop a frame if none of the options in the list verifies the CRC conditions. The reconciliation rate is measured as the ratio of output (reconciled) bits over the number of input (quantized) bits. The experimental results are depicted in Table 4. As expected, it is observed that the mismatch probability increases with the number of quantization bits. This is due to the fact that each increase in the number of the quantization bits leads to a decrease in the range represented by a single quantization region.

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### IV. PROPOSED MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL

This section presents a lightweight multi-factor authentication scheme, leveraging PUFs, proximity estimation and SKG. It provides a mutual authentication between Alice (a mobile node) and Bob (static access point) and consists of: an enrollment phase, an authentication phase and uses SKG as a quick resumption mechanism. We note that during the channel estimation (through pilot exchange in both directions) the parties can take measurements of the RSS and/ or of the full channel state information (CSI) if needed. Using the RSS measurements, Alice performs the mobility-based proximity introduced in Section III-A. She positions herself in diverse (unpredictable) locations and takes multiple measurements in order to estimate Bob’s location. Next, both Alice and Bob perform SKG as discussed previously, in Section III-B. Before providing the overall security analysis, we first present all individual primitives. The notation used throughout this section is defined as follows:

- A SKG scheme generates as outputs binary vectors \( K \) and \( S_A \) of sizes \( K = |K| \) and \( |S_A| \), respectively, with \( K \in K \) denoting the key obtained after privacy amplification and \( S_A \in S \) denoting Alice’s syndrome. An important advantage of the SKG scheme, as compared to currently used solutions (e.g., EAP-TLS), is that its performance improves with the mobility of the user [70], [71].

- Alice’s PUF denoted by \( P_A \) that generates a response \( R \in R \) to a challenge \( Ch \in Ch \), i.e., \( R = P_A(Ch) \). Although different PUF constructions exist, both in literature and in practice [37], [72], in this study we do not
limit ourselves by choosing a specific construction. In fact, depending on the application different PUFs are expected to have different performances. It was shown that some constructions could be susceptible to voltage variations while others to temperature variations, causing a bias in their response (i.e., probability of 1 or 0 higher than 0.5) or introducing a high number of errors upon response reproduction [72]–[74]. Therefore, to achieve optimal performance the choice of the PUF construction must be application specific. In terms of delay requirements, several PUF constructions have been tested over IoT systems showing response generation time in the range of 1 – 6 ms [75]–[78].

A pair of fuzzy extractor algorithms, denoted by $Gen: \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{K}_R \times \mathcal{H}_R$, accepting as input the PUF response and generating as outputs the identification (fuzzy) key and helper data, with corresponding reproduce algorithm $Rep: \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{H}_R \rightarrow \mathcal{K}_R$, such that:

$$Gen(R) = (H_R, K_R),$$
$$Rep(R', H_R) = K_R,$$

where $R, R' \in \mathcal{R}, K_R \in \mathcal{K}_R$ and $H_R \in \mathcal{H}_R$. Similarly, to the SKG process, a fuzzy extractor requires the implementation of an error correcting code and a hash function. The helper data $H_R$ is obtained using error correction code, e.g., if a linear $(n, k, t)$ BCH code is used, $H_R$ represents a syndrome with size $n - k$. In our protocol, $H_R$ is considered to be public, hence, an entropy of $n - k$ about $R$ is leaked [73], [74], [79]. Therefore, to obtain the key $K_R$, a one-way compression mechanism is applied, e.g., a cryptographic or universal hash function. This reduces the size of the sequence to $k < n$ bits, but increases the entropy per bit. Next, within the $Rep$ algorithm, a decoder is used to reproduce the original response, $R$, which is then hashed to the key $K_R$. A hash function has a typical complexity of $O(nk)$ [80], [81] which, when performed on an IoT device, requires less than 0.3 ms [75], [82], [83]. Regarding the error correction, the computation required for a standard BCH encoding mechanisms is trivial compared to the hashing and requires less computational overhead [24], [84]. However, the decoding has greater computational overhead than the encoding [73], hence, in the proposed scheme we perform the more complex operation, i.e., $Rep$ on the resourceful device rather than on a constrained IoT node.

A symmetric encryption algorithm, e.g., AES-256 in Galois field counter mode (GCM)$^4$, denoted by $Es: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}_T$ where $\mathcal{C}_T$ denotes the ciphertext space with corresponding decryption $Ds: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{C}_T \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$, i.e.,

$$Es(K, M) = C,$$
$$Ds(K', C) = M,$$

for $M \in \mathcal{M}, C \in \mathcal{C}_T$. The average run-time of AES for constrained IoT systems is approximately 1 ms [82]. For further detail the readers are referred to [85] where benchmarking results are presented for 12 lightweight block ciphers.

A pair of message authentication code (MAC) algorithms, denoted by $Sign: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$, with a

$^3$In a $(n, k, t)$ BCH code, $n$ denotes the size of the codeword, $k$ the number of information bits and $t$ the error correcting capability of the code.

$^4$We note that using a block cipher such as AES-256 in a GCM operation allows to the use of the same key $K$ to encrypt typically Gigabytes of data.
corresponding verification algorithm $\text{ver} : K \times M \times T \rightarrow \{\text{yes}, \text{no}\}$:

$$
\text{ver}(K, M, T) = \begin{cases} 
\text{yes}, & \text{if integrity verified} \\
\text{no}, & \text{if integrity not verified}
\end{cases}
$$

Similarly to the above mechanisms, the security community has been working on realizing lightweight MAC algorithms suitable for constrained IoT devices; for examples see [83], [86]–[88].

- A cryptographic (irreversible) one-way hash function

$$
\text{Hash} : \{0, 1\}^q \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k,
$$

that is used to compress the size of an input binary vector of length $q$ to a binary vector of length $k = |K|$. As mentioned above, hash functions are well suited for IoT devices. For a complete study and performance evaluation with respect to lightweight implementations please see [89].

In all of the previously defined functions, the insertion of an index $i-1$ denotes the value of a variable or quantity one instance earlier than its corresponding value at instance $i$, e.g., $Ch_1$ denotes the PUF challenge at instance 1 while $Ch_2$ denotes the PUF challenge at instance 2. Furthermore, following from the definition of PUFs, every challenge produces a unique response, corresponding helper data and authentication keys, i.e., $P_A(Ch_1) \neq P_A(Ch_2)$ and $\text{Gen}(P_A(Ch_1)) \neq \text{Gen}(P_A(Ch_2))$. Finally, concatenation of two binary vectors $X$ and $Y$ is denoted by $(X||Y)$.

### A. DEVICE ENROLLMENT

The enrollment is a one-time operation carried out off-line over a secure channel between Alice (referred to in the following as node $A$) and Bob (referred to in the following as node $B$). The steps taken during enrollment are summarized in Fig. 6 and are performed as follows:

1) In order to establish the link between them, both devices need to exchange pilot signals. During this exchange $A$ measures the RSS. Furthermore $A$ downloads (or creates) a map of the premises which contains the location of $B$ to enable proximity based authentication.

2) After establishing the connection, Alice sends her ID, $A$, with a request for registration $\text{Request}$.

3) Upon receiving the request, $B$ first checks if the received ID has already been registered. If $B$ finds the ID within his database the request is rejected. If $A$ has not been registered $B$ generates two initial PUF challenges $Ch_1, Ch_2$ and an initial one-time alias ID $A_{1D,1}$. These challenges will be used during subsequent authentication and will be updated with each run of the protocol. Next, $B$ generates sets of emergency challenges and one-time alias IDs $C_{\text{emerg}}$ and $A_{1D,\text{emerg}}$, respectively, such that $C_{\text{emerg}} = |A_{1D,\text{emerg}}|$. The emergency sets are used only in a case of de-synchronization between the devices and have multiple entries to allow for multiple recoveries. Finally, Bob sends the message $(Ch_1||Ch_2||A_{1D,1}||C_{\text{emerg}}||A_{1D,\text{emerg}})$ to Alice. Note that the two emergency sets are linked such that each element has a corresponding one in the other set.

4) After receiving the message, Alice excites her PUF $P_A$ with $Ch_1, Ch_2$ and all challenges from the set $C_{\text{emerg}}$, producing responses $R_1, R_2$ and $R_{\text{emerg}}$, respectively. Next, she uses $R_1$ and $R_{\text{emerg}}$ as inputs to her fuzzy extractor to generate the pair $(H_{R,1}, K_{R,1})$ and the sets of pairs $(H_{R,\text{emerg}}, K_{R,\text{emerg}})$. Afterwards, Alice stores $A_{1D,1}, K_{R,1}, C_{\text{emerg}}, R_{\text{emerg}}, A_{1D,\text{emerg}}$ and sends the following message to Bob $(R_2||R_{\text{emerg}}||K_{R,1}||K_{R,\text{emerg}})$.

5) To finalize the registration process, $B$ stores the following elements that correspond to ID $A$ in his database: initial authentication parameters $A_{1D,1}, K_{R,1}, Ch_2, R_2$ and emergency authentication parameters in case of de-synchronization $C_{\text{emerg}}, R_{\text{emerg}}, K_{R,\text{emerg}}, A_{1D,\text{emerg}}$. 

![FIGURE 6: Enrollment phase](image-url)
B. AUTHENTICATION

Once the enrollment is finished, both devices can use the established parameters for future authentication over an insecure channel. The steps taken during authentication are summarized in Fig. 7 and are performed as follows:

1) First, the devices exchange pilot signals and measure the RSS. Next, to confirm the location of $B$, $A$ filters the RSS observations and performs the proximity verification, discussed in Section III-A. If the verification fails, she stops the authentication process. If it succeeds, she subtracts the Kalman filter’s output from the raw RSS measurements and completes the steps of the SKG process, described in Sec. III-B, calculating her syndrome $S_A$ and key $K$. The key will be used later as a session key if the authentication is successful. Then, $A$ sends her request for authentication which contains a one-time alias ID $A_{10,1}$ and a fresh random nonce $N_1$.

2) Upon reception, $B$ accesses the database and loads the parameters that corresponds to the ID, i.e., CRP $(Ch_2, R_2)$ and key $K_{R,1}$. Then he generates a fresh random nonce $N_B$ and breaks $K_{R,1}$ into two parts as follows: $K_{R,1} = (K_{R,1,1}, K_{R,1,2})$. He uses the first part to encrypt $C_B = E_S(K_{R,1,1}, (A||B||Ch_2||N_1||N_B))$ and uses the second part to sign $C_B$: $T_B = Sign(K_{R,1,2}, C_B)$. Finally, he sends the ciphertext $C_B$ and the signature $T_B$ to $A$.

3) By using her stored key $K_{R,1}$, $A$ verifies the authenticity of $B$ and the integrity of $C_B$. If one of the verification checks fails, $A$ rejects the message’s claim to authenticity. If the verification succeeds, she accepts and excites her PUF with the received challenge $Ch_2$. By running it on her PUF she obtains a new measurement $R_2 = P_A(Ch_2)$ and $Gen(R_2) = (H_{R,2}^2, K_{R,2}^2)$. Afterwards, she generates a new fresh random nonce $N_A$ and calculates the next two challenges as follows: $Ch_3 = Hash(Ch_2||N_A)$ and $Ch_4 = Hash(Ch_3||N_B)$. Next, she excites her PUF to produce $R_3$ and $R_4$. In order to generate the key that will be used in a future execution of the authentication protocol, $A$ executes $Gen(R_3) = (H_{R,3}, K_{R,3})$. Next, she calculates the one-time alias ID for future execution of the protocol as $A_{10,2} = Hash(A||N_B||R_3)$ which is due to the randomness of $N_B$ and $R_3$, cannot be linked to $A_{10,1}$. Updating the parameter allows Alice to use a fresh ID during subsequent authentications and, therefore, preserves her privacy from eavesdroppers. The pairs $(Ch_4, R_4)$ and $(Ch_3, A_{10,2})$ will be used in a subsequent connection with $B$. Next, $A$ breaks her key $K_{R,2}$ into two parts $K_{R,2} = (K_{R,2,1}, K_{R,2,2})$. Similarly, to the previous step she uses half of the key to encrypt the message $C_A = E_S(K_{R,2,1}, (A||B||S_A||N_A||R_3||R_4))$. Then, $A$ uses the second half of the key to sign the ciphertext $T_A = Sign(K_{R,2,2}, C_A)$. $A$ sends $C_A$, $T_A$, $H_{R,2}$, and $Q = Hash(H_{R,2}||N_B)$ to $B$. Sending a hash value, $Q$, allows Bob to detect helper data manipulation attacks.
as the one introduced in [74]. Finally, $A$ stores the pair $K_{R,3}, A_{ID,2}$.

4) Upon receiving the preceding message, $B$ verifies the conditions $\text{Hash}(H_{R,2}||N_B) \overset{?}{=} Q$ and $R_2(H_{R,2}) \overset{?}{=} K_{R,2}$ by using the stored $R_2$ (from the enrollment phase) and the received helper data $H_{R,2}$. If a verification fails, $B$ rejects the claim to authenticity. If the claim is accepted, he verifies the integrity of $C_A$ using the signed ciphertext $T_A$. Next, using $R_3$ and the principles of the fuzzy extractor, $B$ performs $\text{Geo}(R_3) = (H_{R,3}, K_{R,3})$. He calculates $A_{ID,2} = \text{Hash}(A||N_B||R_3)$. Following that, he stores the pairs $(K_{R,3}, A_{ID,2}), (Ch_4, R_4)$ which will be used during the next round of the protocol. Finally, using the received syndrome $S_A$, $B$ corrects the discrepancies in his observation $Y_{B,K}$ to obtain $Y_{A,K}$ and calculates the session key $K = \text{Hash}(Y_{A,K})$.

5) After the authentication process finishes, $A$ and $B$ enter the secure communication stage using the session key $K$. During this stage, they generate a resumption secret $Z$. Instead of performing full authentication in subsequent sessions, the secret can be used as a parameter to quickly “resume” sessions in a 0-RTT, as is described next.

C. RESUMPTION PROTOCOL

This section presents a novel physical layer resumption protocol in Fig. 7. $B$ sends to $A$ a look-up identifier. Then, both derive a resumption secret $Z$ that is a function of the look-up identifier and the session parameters. The use of a resumption secret for authentication helps to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks in the scenario assumed here. Given the above, the resumption protocol follows the steps:

1) As before, to establish the link, both devices perform pilot exchange. $A$ and $B$ obtain channel observations and generate sequences $Y_{A,K}$ and $Y_{B,K}$, respectively. Note that, $Z$ and $Y_{A,K}, Y_{B,K}$ have the same length.

2) Next $A$, generates a fresh random nonce $N_1$ and reads the resumption secret $Z$ to generate $Y^* = Z \oplus Y_{A,K}$. Then, using her Slepian Wolf decoder she calculates the new syndrome $S^*$, that corresponds to $Y^*$, and generates the session key as $K^* = \text{Hash}(Y^*)$. She also calculates the one-time alias ID that will be used for a subsequent session as: $A_{ID,i+1} = \text{Hash}(A||Y_{A,K})$. $A$ breaks her key into two parts $K^* = (K^*_1, K^*_2)$ and uses the first part to encrypt the early 0-RTT data $M$ as $\text{Es}(K^*_1, M) = C$. The second part she uses to sign the cipher text $\text{Sign}(K^*_2, C) = T$. Finally, she sends $(S^*||A_{ID,i+1}||N_1||C||T)$. Note that the key $K^*$ can only be obtained if both the physical layer generated key and the resumption key are valid; this method can be shown to be forward secure [90].

3) Upon receiving the output from the last step, $B$ reads the resumption secret $Z$ and obtains $Y^* = Z \oplus Y_{B,K}$. Using that and the received syndrome $S^*$, $B$ first corrects the discrepancies in $Y^*$ to obtain $Y^*$ and then performs $K^* = \text{Hash}(Y^*)$. He uses the condition $K^* \overset{?}{=} K^*$ to verify the authenticity of $A$ and the integrity of the message. If the above succeeds he calculates $Y_{A,K} = Y^* \oplus Z$ and stores $A_{ID,i+1} = \text{Hash}(A||Y_{A,K})$. Using the obtained key, $B$ can now decrypt the message $M$.

4) After the resumption process finishes, the two devices enter the secure communication stage using $K^*$ as a session key. During this stage, they use the channel and session properties to generate new shared resumption secrets that can be used in subsequent resumptions.

V. SECURITY ANALYSIS

In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed multi-factor authentication protocol illustrated in Fig. 7. For the purpose of our security proofs we consider a Dolev-Yao...
[91] type of adversary, who has control over the wireless channel between $A$ and $B$. Furthermore: 1) the adversary can send any type of messages and queries using its knowledge gained through observation; 2) all functions and operations performed by the legitimate users during the execution of the protocol are public except $P_A(\cdot)$ and the entire enrollment phase; and, 3) the adversary can launch denial of service (DoS) attacks and block parts of the protocol in order to desynchronize the connection between $A$ and $B$. In terms of the SKG, for simplicity, in this work we assume a rich Rayleigh multipath environment where the adversary is more than a few wavelengths away from each of the legitimate parties and the SKG rates are given as in Section III-B.

**A. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION**

The proposed protocol uses a set of factors to achieve mutual authentication. It uses a mobility-based proximity estimation as a first factor of authentication. This verifies whether the server is at the expected distance. Next, $A$ authenticates $B$ by verifying whether the correct key is used for creating $C_B$ and $T_B$. On the other hand, $B$ authenticates $A$ by first confirming the validity of the received one-time alias ID $A_{1D,i}$ and second by verifying whether she produced a valid response to $C_{R,i}$. The second condition is confirmed only if $A$ uses the correct key to generate the pair $C_A, T_A$.

**B. UNTRACEABILITY AND ANONYMITY**

During the execution of the authentication protocol, $A$ must posses a valid one-time alias ID $A_{1D}$ for each session. The one-time alias identity cannot be used twice and there is no direct relationship between subsequent IDs. Thus, no one except $B$ would know the origin of the message. Furthermore, in case of de-synchronization the device can use the set of emergency IDs $A_{1D, emerg}$. After using an emergency ID it has to be deleted from $A$’s and $B$’s memory. This approach provides privacy against eavesdroppers and ensures the user’s anonymity and identity untraceability properties.

**C. PERFECT FORWARD SECRECY**

Assuming an attacker compromises $A$ and obtains all stored secrets, i.e., $(K_R, A_{1D})$, they cannot obtain previous keys or one-time alias IDs. First, each $K_R$ is generated using a CRP and CRPs are randomly generated and independent. Hence, by obtaining $K_{R,i}$ an adversary cannot learn $K_{R,i-1}$. Next, one-time alias IDs are generated using a one-way hash function of unique parameters for each session; if an adversary obtains $A_{1D,i}$, they can not inverse the hash function. Furthermore, using the randomness of the wireless channel ensures that session keys are unique and independent for each session. Therefore, the proposed authentication protocol ensures the perfect forward secrecy property.

**D. PROTECTION AGAINST REPLAY ATTACK**

If an adversary intercepts previous communication between $A$ and $B$, they can replay the same messages and try to pass the authentication process. In the protocol presented in Fig. 7 none of the parameters in the initial request are allowed to be sent twice, hence, if an attacker resends the same message to $B$ the attack will be detected and the request will be rejected. Next, if the adversary tries to re-send $C_B$ to $A$, they will be detected, since the key used to encrypt $C_B$ is changed during every session. Similarly, if the adversary tries to re-send $C_A$, they will be detected and the request will be rejected because the key used to encrypt $C_A$ is changed every session. The above shows that the proposed protocol provides resistance against replay attacks.

**E. PROTECTION AGAINST IMPERSONATION ATTACK**

A successful impersonation attack will allow the adversary to be authenticated as a legitimate user. Following from above, an adversary cannot perform a replay attack, which limits their options to perform an impersonation attack. Following from that, in order to impersonate $A$ they must generate 1) a valid one-time alias ID, and, 2) a valid ciphertext $C_A$. However, due to the unclonability properties of the PUF and the fact that the connection between a device and its PUF is secure, (i.e., system on chip) the adversary cannot generate a valid ciphertext $C_A$, hence cannot impersonate $A$. Next, in order to impersonate $B$, the adversary must posses a valid key $K_{R,1}$ and generate a valid ciphertext $C_B$. However, even if an adversary obtains $K_{R,1}$, (an example of such a scheme vulnerable to this attack can be found in [22]) the attack could still be detected using the proposed proximity detection approach if the adversary is not in close proximity to the legitimate device. Overall, a false base station attack would succeed if and only if the attacker possesses a valid authentication key and is located in proximity to $B$ (more precisely, in the same proximity interval as $B$).

**F. PROTECTION AGAINST HELPER DATA MANIPULATION ATTACKS**

Recently, several helper data manipulation attacks have been introduced [74], [92]. The authors of [74] proposed an attack in which a malicious user sends a series of modified helper data queries to the device that implements the reproduce algorithm, Rep. The malicious device observes whether the attack results in a decoding failure, hence, learns sensitive information regarding the PUF response. As a simple countermeasure to this attack, we add a hash value $Q$ that allows $B$ to check the integrity of the helper data before performing the decoding step. A different type of helper data manipulation attack was proposed in [92]. The goal of this attack is to send a valid pair $H''_R$ and $Q''$ to $B$ that trigger the generation of the authentication key, $K''_R \neq K_R$. The success of the attack depends on both: the error correcting capabilities at $B$, and the number of errors when $B$ uses $H''_R$ as helper data. Interestingly, it was demonstrated that not all error correcting codes are susceptible to this attack; in fact, [92], showed that linear BCH codes with syndrome decoding (also discussed in Section IV) are immune to this attack. While we do not bound our protocol to a specific error correcting implementation,
we note that it is of great importance to examine the chosen constructions prior to deployment.

G. RESISTANCE TO DOS ATTACK

To ensure security against DoS and de-synchronization attacks, the authentication protocol uses unlinkable one-time alias IDs and pairs of sets with emergency parameters \((C_{\text{emergency}}, R_{\text{emergency}})\) and \((K_{R,\text{emergency}}, A_{\text{ID,emergency}})\). If an adversary manages to block a message from a legitimate party, such that it does not reach its intended receiver, the authentication process will stop and the used \(A_{\text{ID,i}}\) will not be updated. To overcome that, \(A\) can use one of her emergency IDs from the set \(A_{\text{ID,emergency}}\). \(B\) will then read the corresponding \(K_{R,\text{emergency}}\) from the set \(K_{R,\text{emergency}}\) and use it to encrypt a message containing an emergency challenge \(C_{\text{emergency}}\) from the set \(C_{\text{emergency}}\). Next, both parties can continue the authentication process as usual and setup a new one-time alias ID. In order to prevent replay attacks all used emergency parameters must be deleted from the corresponding set. It is important to mention that an attack could aim to introduce an error state at \(A\), and exhaust all emergency IDs. To detect and redirect this type of malicious traffic different machine learning techniques can be used [93]. The investigation on which anomaly detection scheme would best fit our protocol is left as a future work.

H. PROTECTION AGAINST CLONING ATTACKS

A successful cloning attack allows the adversary to use a captured device in order to obtain secrets stored on another device. In the proposed protocol each device posses a unique pair \((K_R, A_{\text{ID}})\). Furthermore, all devices have unique PUFs and will produce a unique response to a challenge. Hence, the adversary cannot use secrets derived from one device in order to clone another.

I. PROTECTION AGAINST PHYSICAL ATTACKS

Successful physical attacks could be performed by physical tampering of the IoT device in order to change its behavior. However, by changing its behavior, the PUF will not produce the desired response, hence, \(B\) will detect the attack. Therefore, the proposed protocol is resistant against physical attacks.

J. SECRECY PROOFS USING BAN AND MB LOGIC

The secrecy evaluation of security protocols ensures that an adversary cannot obtain or alter secret parameters. In this regards, the BAN logic [32] is a widely used secrecy verification tool. However, some weaknesses were identified by the authors of [94]. They extended and improved the BAN logic to a more reliable version, namely MB logic, which is used in this paper. Formal proofs are deduced using a set of initial beliefs and rules which are based upon the message exchange within the protocol. The initial steps of MB logic are idealization of the protocol and identification of the initial beliefs. The protocol message idealization is used to interpret the implicit context-dependent information into an explicit protocol specification. Based on the set of rules defined in [94], the protocol in Fig. 7 is idealized as:

1. \(A \rightarrow B : A_{\text{ID,1}}, N_1\)
2. \(B \rightarrow A : \{N_B \oplus N_1\} K_{R,1}\)
3. \(A \rightarrow B : \{R_3 \oplus R_4 \oplus N_A \oplus N_B\} K_{R,2}\)

where \(\oplus\) gives the relation of the parameters, as defined in [94]. Next, denoting principals as \(A, B\), messages and keys as \(M, K\), respectively and formulas as \(X\), the main properties of MB logic are: \(A \equiv X\) denotes \(A\) believes \(X\) is true; \(A \rightarrow M\) denotes \(A\) sees \(M\) using key \(K\); \(A \sim M\) encrypts \(M\) using key \(K\); \(\#(M)\) denotes \(M\) is of type fresh; \(A \sim B\) denotes \(K\) is a good shared key between \(A\) and \(B\); \(A \leftrightarrow M\) denotes \(M\) is not available to \(A\); \(sup(B)\) denotes \(B\) is a super-principal. Following that, the inference rules defined in [94], as used in this paper, are given in Table 5 (Note. \(\{}\) denotes complement). Given the fact that the enrollment phase is performed on a secure channel the initial beliefs can be defined as follows:

\[\begin{align*}
A_1 & : A \equiv A_{\text{ID,1}} B \quad \text{and} \quad B \equiv A_{\text{ID,1}} B \\
A_2 & : A \equiv A_{\text{ID,1}} B \quad \text{and} \quad B \equiv A_{\text{ID,1}} B \\
A_3 & : A \equiv A \leftrightarrow ||R_3 | R_4 | R_4 N_A R_N | N_B | B \\
A_4 & : B \equiv sup(B) \\
A_5 & : B \equiv || R_3 | R_4 | R_4 N_A R_N | N_B | K_{R,2} \\
A_6 & : \equiv K_{R,2} | R_4 | R_4 N_A R_N | N_B \\
A_7 & : A \equiv R_3 | R_4 | R_4 N_A R_N | N_B \\
A_8 & : \equiv (N_1), A \equiv \#(N_A), A \equiv \#(R_3), A \equiv \#(R_4) \\
A_9 & : \equiv N_B R_N | N_1 \\
A_10 & : B \equiv B \equiv \#(N_B) \\
A_11 & : B \equiv sup(B) \\
A_12 & : B \equiv \#(N_B) \\
A_13 & : B \equiv \#(N_B) R_N | N_1 \\
\end{align*}\]

Given the initial beliefs, the authentication property of the current run of the protocol can be directly verified using the authentication rule (R1) as shown in Table 5. In fact, the authentication of \(B\) to \(A\) (\(A\) to \(B\)) can be proven by simply using assumptions \(A_1\) and \(A_9\) (\(A_{2, A \{5\}}\)) in the numerator of the rule.

| Notation | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| \(\Delta = A_{\text{ID,1}} B \) \(\Delta \sim M\) | Authentication rule (R1) |
| \(\Delta = B \leftrightarrow M\) | Confidentiality rule (R2) |
| \(\Delta = B \leftrightarrow M\) | Fresh rule (R3) |
| \(\Delta = (A, B, C) \equiv ||M | \equiv \#(K)\) | Good-key rule (R4) |
| \(\Delta = B \leftrightarrow X \leftrightarrow sup(B)\) | Nonce verification rule (R5) |
| \(\Delta = B \leftrightarrow X \leftrightarrow sup(B)\) | Super-principal rule (R6) |

TABLE 5: Inference rules adopted from MB logic
studies have reported that the former two options have several weaknesses as compared to Tamarin-prover [33], [100], [101]. For example, Scyther does not support user-specified equational theories and relies only on a set of fixed cryptographic primitives [33], [100], [102], [103]. ProVerif does not have this problem, however, it experiences difficulties when dealing with precise states within the protocol description [100], [102], [103]. This makes the tool susceptible to false attacks [101]. Based on these findings, we use Tamarin-prover [33] as a formal verification tool for the authentication protocol proposed in Section IV. Tamarin is a computer simulation tool that allows for user-specified security properties and cryptographic primitives, it supports equational theories, and can successfully maintain state information. Tamarin has an automated proof search which returns either a security proof (assuming an unbounded number of sessions) or a counterexample (attack). In this work Tamarin was used to prove: secrecy, aliveness, weak agreement, non-injective agreement, injective agreement, untraceability and anonymity. The code used for our Tamarin simulation and all security proofs are publicly accessible and can be found at [95]. More detail regarding Tamarin-prover and a step by step guide on how to reproduce our results, can be found in Section III and Appendix A of [104].

VI. CONCLUSIONS

In this work we introduced a fast, privacy preserving, multi-factor mutual authentication protocol for IoT systems, leveraging SKG from fading coefficients, proximity estimation leveraging mobility and PUFs. Next, we conducted a set of experiments to demonstrate the applicability of our proposed proximity detection and SKG process, with an ESP32 low-power system. Finally, we validated the properties of the proposed authentication protocol through a detailed security analysis, using BAN and MB logic as well as the Tamarin-prover. Our analysis demonstrates the potential of the proposed protocol as a lightweight, multi-factor alternative to the currently used computationally intensive authentication schemes, with a particular interest in IoT networks of constrained devices and wireless sensor networks. As a future work the authors intend to further enhance the proposed authentication protocol and provide more security guarantees, e.g., through in-depth camera estimation and anomaly.
detection techniques.

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