APPENDIX TO
“HOW DEMOCRACIES PREVAIL”

A  List of Democratic Regression Episodes by Outcome

Table 4. Averted democratic breakdown, 1900–2019

| Country                  | Begin | End  |
|--------------------------|-------|------|
| Australia                | 1907  | 1917 |
| Benin                    | 2007  | 2012 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina   | 2010  | 2015 |
| Dominican Republic       | 2015  | 2018 |
| Ecuador                  | 2008  | 2017 |
| Finland                  | 1937  | 1940 |
| France                   | 1964  | 1965 |
| Georgia                  | 2006  | 2010 |
| India                    | 1971  | 1976 |
| Kosovo                   | 2016  | 2017 |
| Lesotho                  | 2015  | 2017 |
| Mali                     | 1997  | 1998 |
| Moldova                  | 2012  | 2018 |
| Nicaragua                | 1992  | 1999 |
| North Macedonia          | 2000  | 2000 |
| South Korea              | 2008  | 2016 |
| Trinidad and Tobago      | 1969  | 1972 |
| Vanuatu                  | 1988  | 1992 |
| Venezuela                | 1992  | 1992 |

Table 5. Democratic breakdown, 1900–2019

| Country   | Begin | End  |
|-----------|-------|------|
| Argentina | 1930  | 1930 |
| Argentina | 1966  | 1966 |
| Armenia   | 1992  | 1996 |
| Austria   | 1931  | 1933 |
| Bangladesh| 2002  | 2002 |
| Belarus   | 1995  | 1997 |
| Belgium   | 1937  | 1940 |
| Benin     | 2017  | 2019 |

Continued on next page
| Country                | Begin | End  |
|-----------------------|-------|------|
| Bolivia               | 1998  | 2019 |
| Burkina Faso          | 2014  | 2015 |
| Chile                 | 1973  | 1973 |
| Comoros               | 2015  | 2015 |
| Czech Republic        | 1934  | 1939 |
| Denmark               | 1933  | 1943 |
| Dominican Republic    | 1985  | 1990 |
| Estonia               | 1929  | 1934 |
| Estonia               | 1991  | 1992 |
| Fiji                  | 1987  | 1987 |
| Fiji                  | 2000  | 2000 |
| Fiji                  | 2006  | 2007 |
| France                | 1934  | 1940 |
| Germany               | 1921  | 1933 |
| Honduras              | 1998  | 2008 |
| Hungary               | 2006  | 2018 |
| Latvia                | 1929  | 1934 |
| Lithuania             | 1924  | 1927 |
| Luxembourg            | 1940  | 1940 |
| Madagascar            | 1996  | 2001 |
| Madagascar            | 2009  | 2009 |
| Maldives              | 2011  | 2014 |
| Mali                  | 2011  | 2012 |
| Malta                 | 1954  | 1958 |
| Moldova               | 2000  | 2005 |
| Nepal                 | 2012  | 2012 |
| Netherlands           | 1933  | 1940 |
| Nicaragua             | 2003  | 2007 |
| Niger                 | 1995  | 1996 |
| Niger                 | 2007  | 2009 |
| North Macedonia       | 2007  | 2013 |
| Norway                | 1937  | 1941 |
| Palestine/West Bank   | 2007  | 2007 |
| Papua New Guinea      | 2002  | 2011 |
| Peru                  | 1985  | 1992 |
| Philippines           | 2001  | 2004 |
| Philippines           | 2016  | 2019 |

Continued on next page
Table 5 – continued from previous page

| Country        | Begin | End  |
|----------------|-------|------|
| Poland         | 1926  | 1926 |
| Serbia         | 2004  | 2015 |
| Sierra Leone   | 2007  | 2012 |
| Solomon Islands| 2000  | 2000 |
| Spain          | 1936  | 1937 |
| Sri Lanka      | 1970  | 1982 |
| Sri Lanka      | 1998  | 2006 |
| Suriname       | 1980  | 1980 |
| Tanzania       | 2000  | 2001 |
| Thailand       | 2005  | 2006 |
| Togo           | 2017  | 2017 |
| Turkey         | 1980  | 1980 |
| Turkey         | 2007  | 2014 |
| Ukraine        | 1997  | 1998 |
| Ukraine        | 2008  | 2012 |
| Uruguay        | 1921  | 1921 |
| Uruguay        | 1931  | 1933 |
| Uruguay        | 1959  | 1973 |
| Venezuela      | 1999  | 2003 |
| Zambia         | 2013  | 2014 |

Table 6. Censored democratic regression, 1900–2019

| Country                    | Begin | End  |
|----------------------------|-------|------|
| Brazil                     | 2012  | 2019 |
| Bulgaria                   | 2002  | 2019 |
| Chile                      | 2011  | 2019 |
| Croatia                    | 2011  | 2019 |
| Czech Republic             | 2009  | 2019 |
| India                      | 2002  | 2019 |
| Israel                     | 2010  | 2019 |
| Niger                      | 2013  | 2019 |
| Poland                     | 2013  | 2019 |
| South Africa               | 2009  | 2019 |
| Tanzania                   | 2015  | 2019 |
| United States of America   | 2015  | 2019 |
Table 7. Episodes not included in the analysis due to missing data

| Country            | Begin | End  |
|--------------------|-------|------|
| Suriname           | 1980  | 1982 |
| Kosovo             | 2016  | 2017 |
| Latvia             | 1929  | 1939 |
| Maldives           | 2011  | 2017 |
| Papua New Guinea   | 2002  | 2018 |
| Palestinian territories | 2007 | 2013 |
| Estonia            | 1929  | 1935 |
| Fiji               | 1987  | 1988 |
| Fiji               | 2000  | 2001 |
| Fiji               | 2006  | 2007 |
| Lithuania          | 1924  | 1927 |
| Luxembourg         | 1940  | 1941 |
| Solomon Islands    | 2000  | 2001 |
| Vanuatu            | 1988  | 1992 |

B EDI trajectories of censored democratic regression episodes

Figure 7. Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) trajectories of countries in ongoing (censored) democratic regression episodes. Red dots mark the start year of an episode. Plots include the pre-episode year.
C Onset resilience by region

Figure 8. Regional shares of regimes that exhibit onset resilience in a given year from 1900 to 2019.
## D Summary statistics for main variables

Table 8. Onset sample including all non-episode years and the first episode year (n = 3,946 country-years)

|                                | Mean  | St. Dev. | Min  | Max  |
|--------------------------------|-------|----------|------|------|
| Autocratization episode        | 0.02  | 0.14     | 0    | 1    |
| Judicial constraints on executive | 0.84  | 0.14     | 0.06 | 0.99 |
| Legislative constraints on executive | 0.80  | 0.15     | 0.05 | 0.98 |
| GDP per capita (log)           | 9.30  | 0.92     | 6.50 | 11.35|
| GDP growth (5 year avg.)       | 2.26  | 3.20     | -27.26 | 75.14|
| Regional democracy levels      | 0.59  | 0.21     | 0.10 | 0.89 |
| Democratic stock               | 0.60  | 0.19     | 0.08 | 0.90 |
| Previous autocratization episodes | 0.43  | 0.62     | 0    | 3    |
| Coup                           | 0.01  | 0.07     | 0    | 1    |
| Population (log)               | 8.93  | 1.69     | 4.52 | 13.84|
| Autocratizing countries (% global) | 9.42  | 6.49     | 0.00 | 25.71|
| Democratizing countries (% global) | 19.40 | 8.46     | 0.00 | 41.76|

Table 9. Full sample including all non-episode years and all episode years (n = 4,216 country-years)

|                                | Mean  | St. Dev. | Min  | Max  |
|--------------------------------|-------|----------|------|------|
| Autocratization episode        | 0.08  | 0.28     | 0    | 1    |
| Judicial constraints on executive | 0.83  | 0.15     | 0.06 | 0.99 |
| Legislative constraints on executive | 0.79  | 0.16     | 0.05 | 0.98 |
| GDP per capita (log)           | 9.26  | 0.92     | 6.50 | 11.35|
| GDP growth (5 year avg.)       | 2.18  | 3.26     | -27.26 | 75.14|
| Regional democracy levels      | 0.58  | 0.21     | 0.10 | 0.89 |
| Democratic stock               | 0.59  | 0.19     | 0.08 | 0.90 |
| Previous autocratization episodes | 0.48  | 0.65     | 0    | 3    |
| Coup                           | 0.01  | 0.09     | 0    | 1    |
| Population (log)               | 8.94  | 1.66     | 4.52 | 13.82|
| Autocratizing countries (% global) | 9.52  | 6.49     | 0.00 | 25.71|
| Democratizing countries (% global) | 19.20 | 8.48     | 0.00 | 41.76|
Table 10. Episode sample including only episode years (n = 352 country-years)

|                                | Mean | St. Dev. | Min  | Max  |
|--------------------------------|------|----------|------|------|
| Judicial constraints on executive | 0.20 | 0.19     | 0.98 |      |
| Legislative constraints on executive | 0.62 | 0.23     | 0.12 | 0.93 |
| GDP per capita (log)             | 8.60 | 0.79     | 6.55 | 10.47|
| GDP growth (5 year avg.)         | 1.27 | 3.77     | -21.73 | 9.54 |
| Regional democracy levels        | 0.48 | 0.14     | 0.15 | 0.71 |
| Democratic Stock 0.50            | 0.14 | 0.17     | 0.76 |      |
| Previous autocratization episodes | 1.28 | 0.54     | 1    | 3    |
| Coup                            | 0.05 | 0.21     | 0    | 1    |
| Population (log)                 | 9.24 | 1.24     | 5.75 | 13.32|
| Autocratizing countries (%, global) | 10.88 | 6.28     | 0.00 | 25.14|
| Democratizing countries (%, global) | 16.67 | 8.27     | 2.00 | 41.76|
| Episode duration                 | 4.58 | 3.73     | 0    | 22   |
E Robustness Checks

In this section, we report a series of robustness tests and additional analyses. First, we run two variants of our main models (Table 11). Model 3 is an onset model with country dummies, often referred to as country fixed-effects, instead of region dummies. The results are similar to Model 2 in the main text (Table 3), including the positive and significant effect for GDP per capita and democratic stock. However, we note one deviation from the main model: the coefficient for judicial constraints has switched signs. As stated earlier, autocratization episodes in democracies are rare events. Variation lies mainly between countries. In addition, judicial constraints is a variable that changes slowly. Therefore, we prefer the inclusion of region dummies over country dummies in our main analysis. Model 4 is a probit regression using only second stage observations, thus ignoring the selection process. The results are highly comparable to the second stage results from the selection models in the main table.

Second, we rerun our main models including all components of the executive constraints indices as separate predictors to test if certain sub-components are particularly influential (Table 12). Model 5 (selection) and 7 (onset) include all sub-indicators from the judicial constraints index and Model 6 and 8 all sub-indicators from the legislative constraints index. The indicators for the variables “executive respects constitution” stick out as significant predictors for onset and the high court seems to be of particular relevance for breakdown resilience. and “legislature opposition parties” stick out as significant predictors of breakdown resilience. The results for all other variables are highly comparable to our main models.

Third, our operationalization of episodes depends on several deliberate choices regarding how to identify start and end dates of episodes. While we have chosen theoretically motivated default parameters, we run additional models where we modify these (Table 13). For Model 9, we reduce the threshold to avert democratic breakdown in one year from 0.03 to 0.02 in line with Lührmann and Lindberg. In Model 11, we use an increment of 0.15 to create the episodes, Model 12 is based on the lower bounds of the EDI (codelow) and for Model 13, we use the upper bounds of the EDI credible intervals (codehigh) to generate the episodes. Overall, our main variables of interest (judicial constraints, democratic stock, and regional levels of democracy) and all other variables show similar results in these additional tests. The coefficient for judicial constraints is positive and significant except for Model 12. Democratic stock is positive and significant in every model. Regional levels of democracy, is less robust. The coefficient fails to reach statistical significance in Models 9 and 12. Overall, these robustness tests corroborate our initial results.
Table 11. Robustness checks: Onset model with country dummies and pooled probit model ignoring selection effects

|                                      | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|--------------------------------------|---------|---------|
| Judicial constraints on executive    | −2.70*** | 1.92*  |
| (0.44)                               | (0.75)  |
| Legislative constraints on executive | 0.62    | −0.03   |
| (0.33)                               | (0.67)  |
| GDP per capita (log)                 | 0.37*   | 0.06    |
| (0.16)                               | (0.31)  |
| GDP growth (5 year avg)              | 0.00    | 0.02    |
| (0.0)                                | (0.03)  |
| Regional democracy levels            | 1.01    | 4.81†   |
| (0.70)                               | (1.34)  |
| Democratic stock                     | 3.17**  | 3.29*   |
| (0.60)                               | (1.60)  |
| Coup                                 | −1.05***| −2.48***|
| (0.20)                               | (0.52)  |
| Population (log)                     | 0.64*   | 0.10    |
| (0.27)                               | (0.12)  |
| Previous aut. episodes               | −2.28***|
| (0.08)                               |         |
| Autocratizing countries (% global)   | 0.02**  |         |
| (0.01)                               |         |
| Democratizing countries (% global)   | 0.01    |         |
| (0.00)                               |         |
| Episode duration                     |         | −0.20** |
| (0.06)                               |         |
| Episode duration²                    |         | 0.01*   |
| (0.00)                               |         |
| t                                     | −0.12***|
| (0.01)                               |         |
| t²                                    | 0.09*** |
| (0.02)                               |         |
| t³                                    | 0.00*** |
| (0.00)                               |         |
| Intercept                             | −9.51***| −4.20   |
| (3.51)                               | (3.92)  |

Nonlinear time trend                    yes       yes
Region dummies                         no        yes
Country dummies                        yes       no
AIC                                    583.29    258.51
BIC                                    1355.79   339.64
Log Likelihood                         −168.65   −108.25
Num. obs.                              3,946     352

Model 3 estimates episode onset including country dummies and time since last episode onset (t). DV: democratic regression onset. Model 4 is a probit model for ongoing episodes of democratic regression without taking into account selection effects. DV: democratic breakdown. Standard errors clustered at the country-level. Significance levels ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10.
Table 12. Robustness checks: Subcomponents of executive constraints indices for selection models (Model 5 and 6) and onset models (Model 7 and 8)

|                                | Model 5 Selection | Model 5 Outcome | Model 6 Selection | Model 6 Outcome | Model 7 Onset | Model 8 Onset |
|--------------------------------|------------------|----------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| Executive respects constitution| -0.33* (0.17)   | 0.25           |                   | 0.45*** (0.11) |              |              |
| Compliance with judiciary      | -0.26 (0.21)     | -0.27          | 0.17              | (0.14)         |              |              |
| Compliance with high court     | -0.13 (0.18)     | 0.57*          |                   | (0.16)         |              |              |
| High court independence        | -0.01 (0.19)     | 0.48†          |                   | (0.13)         |              |              |
| Lower court independence       | -0.12            | -0.46*         | 0.04              | (0.13)         |              |              |
| Legislature questions officials| -0.28* (0.14)    | -0.54*         |                   | (0.10)         |              | 0.16         |
| Executive oversight            | 0.04             | 0.25           |                   | (0.12)         |              | -0.19        |
| Legislature investigates in practice| -0.17     | -0.12          | 0.15              | (0.11)         |              |              |
| Legislature opposition parties | 0.15             | 0.43†          | -0.21             | (0.12)         |              |              |
| Judicial constraints on executive| -2.60*** (0.78)| 2.13*          | 1.80**            | (0.58)         |              |              |
| Legislative constraints on executive| -1.20* (0.53)| -0.44          |                   | -0.50          |              |              |
| GDP per capita (log)           | -1.01*** (0.25)  | 0.11           | -0.96*** (0.32)   | 0.13           | 0.39         | 0.33         |
| GDP growth (5 year avg)        | -0.04** (0.02)   | 0.01           | -0.05*** (0.01)   | 0.00           | 0.01         | 0.01         |
| Regional democracy levels      | -0.42            | 3.25           | 0.38              | 4.20           | 0.03         | -0.08        |
| Democratic stock               | 2.10† (1.29)     | 4.00**         | 1.68†             | 3.37*          | 5.73***      | 5.56***      |
| Coup                           | 1.45*** (0.29)   | -2.37***       | -1.50*** (0.09)   | -2.68***       | -1.46***     | -1.41***     |
| Population (log)               | 0.02             | 0.20           | 0.07              | 0.20*          | -0.03        | -0.09        |
| Previous aut. episodes         | 1.33*** (0.09)   | 1.34***        |                   | -1.35***       | -3.13***     |              |
| Autocratizing countries (%)    | -0.01            | -0.01          |                   | 0.02           | 0.02         |              |
| Democratizing countries (%)    | -0.03** (0.01)   | -0.04***       | 0.02*             | (0.01)         | 0.02         |              |
| Episode duration               | -0.24** (0.08)   | -0.17***       |                   | (0.05)         |              |              |
| Episode duration^2             | 0.01*            |                 | 0.00              | (0.02)         |              |              |
| Intercept                      | 9.39*** (1.97)   | -3.71          | 9.38***           | -5.79          | -4.34*       | -4.49**      |

Components of judicial constraints as labelled in the V-Dem codebook: v2exrescon, v2jucomp, v2j beforeEach, v2jucind, v2juncind; components of legislative constraints: v2lgpexp, v2lgotovat, v2lgmvst, v2lrgp. Standard errors clustered at the country-level. Significance levels *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10.
Table 13. Robustness checks: Different operationalization of episodes.

|                         | Model 9   |            | Model 10   |            |
|-------------------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|
|                         | Selection | Outcome    | Selection  | Outcome    |
| Judicial constraints on executive | -2.12**   | 1.90*      | -1.42**    | 2.04*      |
|                         | (0.61)    | (0.91)     | (0.48)     | (0.79)     |
| Legislative constraints on executive | -1.19**   | -0.16      | -1.20***   | -0.09      |
|                         | (0.43)    | (0.66)     | (0.33)     | (0.51)     |
| GDP per capita (log)    | -0.99**   | -0.73†     | -0.44**    | 0.11       |
|                         | (0.18)    | (0.37)     | (0.13)     | (0.22)     |
| GDP growth (5 year avg) | -0.04*    | 0.01       | -0.02†     | 0.01       |
|                         | (0.01)    | (0.03)     | (0.01)     | (0.02)     |
| Regional democracy levels | -1.10     | 1.93       | 0.31       | 5.77**     |
|                         | (1.10)    | (2.96)     | (1.06)     | (2.02)     |
| Democratic stock        | 1.64*     | 4.29**     | 0.93       | 3.51**     |
|                         | (0.78)    | (1.31)     | (0.61)     | (1.18)     |
| Coup                    | 1.42***   | -1.86***   | 1.03***    | -2.33***   |
|                         | (0.27)    | (0.91)     | (0.30)     | (0.52)     |
| Population (log)        | 0.01      | 0.01       | 0.01       | 0.07       |
|                         | (0.06)    | (0.14)     | (0.01)     | (0.10)     |
| Previous aut. episodes  | 1.16***   | 0.53***    |            |            |
|                         | (0.16)    | (0.11)     |            |            |
| Autocratizing countries (%, global) | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.02 | (0.01) |
|                         | (0.02) | (0.01)     |
| Democratizing countries (%, global) | -0.04**** | -0.02** | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|                         | (0.01) | (0.01)     |
| Episode duration        | -0.12     | -0.22***   |            |            |
|                         | (0.13)    | (0.06)     |            |            |
| Episode duration^2      | 0.00      |            | 0.01**     |            |
|                         | (0.00)    | (0.00)     |            |            |
| Intercept               | 9.88***   | 2.86       | 5.02***    | -4.95†     |
|                         | (1.55)    | (4.36)     | (0.94)     | (2.56)     |

| ρ                       | -0.18     | 0.28       |
|                         | (0.38)    | (0.64)     |

Nonlinear time trend
Region dummies (1st stage)
AIC                      1242.37
BIC                      1567.36
Log Likelihood           -569.18
Total obs.               4,257
Censored obs.            3,955
Obs. in outcome stage    302

Model 9 uses a sudden turn threshold of 0.02. Model 10 uses a threshold of 0.05 change in EDI to identify manifest episodes. Dependent variable in selection equation: autocratization. Dependent variable in outcome equation: breakdown resilience. Standard errors clustered at the country-level. Significance levels ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10.
| Variables                      | Model 11 |                | Model 12 |                |
|-------------------------------|----------|----------------|----------|----------------|
|                               | Selection | Outcome | Selection | Outcome |
| Judicial constraints on executive | -3.12*** | 1.54*        | -2.85*** | -0.36        |
|                               | (0.68)   | (0.69)       | (0.69)   | (0.92)       |
| Legislative constraints on executive | -1.62**  | -0.09        | -0.63    | 0.35         |
|                               | (0.52)   | (0.51)       | (0.53)   | (0.77)       |
| GDP per capita (log)          | 0.98**   | 0.12         | -0.59*** | -0.30        |
|                               | (0.25)   | (0.24)       | (0.15)   | (0.20)       |
| GDP growth (5 year avg)       | -0.05**  | 0.01         | -0.02    | 0.01         |
|                               | (0.01)   | (0.02)       | (0.01)   | (0.02)       |
| Regional democracy levels     | 0.24     | 3.02***      | -0.71    | 3.37         |
|                               | (1.62)   | (0.73)       | (1.02)   | (1.12)       |
| Democratic stock              | 2.12†    | 2.84*        | 0.91     | 2.73†        |
|                               | (1.16)   | (1.14)       | (0.81)   | (0.94)       |
| Coup                          | 1.67***  | 2.35***      | 0.85**   | -1.15*       |
|                               | (0.27)   | (0.39)       | (0.31)   | (0.57)       |
| Population (log)              | 0.06     | 0.15         | 0.12*    | 0.05         |
|                               | (0.01)   | (0.08)       | (0.07)   | (0.098)      |
| Previous aut. episodes        | 1.37***  | 0.87***      |          |              |
|                               | (0.12)   | (0.12)       |          |              |
| Autocratizing countries (%, global) | 0.03   | -0.00       |          |              |
|                               | (0.03)   | (0.01)       |          |              |
| Democratizing countries (%, global) | -0.04** | -0.02**     |          |              |
|                               | (0.01)   | (0.01)       |          |              |
| Episode duration              |          | -0.22**      |          | -0.02       |
|                               |          | (0.06)       |          | (0.067)     |
| Episode duration^2            |          | 0.01**       |          | 0.00        |
|                               |          | (0.00)       |          | (0.00)      |
| Intercept                     | 10.01*** | -6.92***     | 6.86***  | 1.72         |
|                               | (1.95)   | (1.69)       | (1.28)   | (1.92)       |

Model 11 uses increments of .15 to identify manifest episodes. Model 12 uses the lower bound of the EDI to create the episodes data. Dependent variable in selection equation: autocratization. Dependent variable in outcome equation: breakdown resilience. Standard errors clustered at the country-level. Significance levels ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10.
Table 15. Robustness checks: Different operationalization of episodes.

| Selection                      | Model 13 Outcome |
|-------------------------------|------------------|
| **Judicial constraints on executive** | −1.18*           |
|                               | (0.82)           |
| **Legislative constraints on executive** | −1.43***         |
|                               | (0.41)           |
| **GDP per capita (log)**      | −0.52**          |
|                               | (0.19)           |
| **GDP growth (5 year avg)**   | −0.01            |
|                               | (0.01)           |
| **Regional democracy levels** | 0.48             |
|                               | (1.19)           |
| **Democratic stock**          | 1.03             |
|                               | (0.83)           |
| **Coup**                      | 1.33***          |
|                               | (0.24)           |
| **Population (log)**          | 0.06             |
|                               | (0.05)           |
| **Previous aut. episodes**    | 0.86***          |
|                               | (0.12)           |
| **Autocratizing countries (% global)** | 0.01          |
|                               | (0.01)           |
| **Democratizing countries (% global)** | −0.02**        |
|                               | (0.01)           |
| **Episode duration**          | −0.16            |
|                               | (0.13)           |
| **Episode duration^2**        | 0.00             |
|                               | (0.01)           |
| **Intercept**                 | 4.91**           |
|                               | (1.71)           |
| ρ                             | −0.18            |
|                               | (0.38)           |
| Nonlinear time trend          | yes              |
| Region dummies (1st stage)    | yes              |
| AIC                           | 1242.37          |
| BIC                           | 1567.36          |
| Log Likelihood                | −569.18          |
| Total obs.                    | 3,827            |
| Censored obs.                 | 3,544            |
| Obs. in outcome stage         | 283              |

Model 13 uses the upper bound of the EDI to create the episodes data. Dependent variable in selection equation: autocratization. Dependent variable in outcome equation: democratic breakdown. Standard errors clustered at the country-level. Significance levels ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10.