Original Paper

Contextualising Participant Factions in the Second Zulu Civil War of 1856 and It’s Consequences up to 1861

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Abstract

The Second Zulu Civil War of 1856, commonly known as the Battle of Ndondakusuka, has been the subject of a number of historical interpretations. Different scholars give different accounts of the battle. Most historians differ on the root causes of the battle. Some attribute it to white imperialists who manipulated scenes and used the weakness of King Mpande to cause the war. According to this opinion, the Natal government entered the succession issue in an attempt to provide itself with a new “reserve” of land between the Thukela and Mhlathuze Rivers. Other sources point King Mpande as the one responsible for the clash between Princes Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi. The land issue and power also played a role in the outbreak of hostilities between princes. It is therefore apparent that different factions played a role in the outbreak of this war. So, this paper aims at contextualising various role-players towards that conflict and consequences thereafter.

Keywords
civil war, Mpande, Cetshwayo, Mbuyazi, Ndondakusuka

1. Introduction

The Zulu kingdom founded by King Shaka had, by the late eighteen to the early nineteenth century, flourished in the inland and on the east coast of South Africa. By the mid-1800s, however, this kingdom had steadily been hemmed in by an expanding Natal colony in the south, and the Boer incursion in the north. By that time King Dingane who ruled from 1828-1840, quarrelled with his younger brother Mpande who was forced to flee from Zululand and became a refugee in Natal which was under white control. Whites who wanted land in Zululand assisted King Mpande to fight and defeat his brother King Dingane. The subsequent events witnessed Mpande being crowned by the whites to become king of the Zulus. King Mpande established sound relations with the whites to such an extent that he
introduced his heir, prince Cetshwayo, to the Boer Volksraad (parliament) in Pietermaritzburg. As time went on Mpande changed and encouraged prince Mbuyazi (Cetshwayo’s brother) with the responsibility of being made heir. Tension broke out between Mpande’s sons and in 1856 the Second Zulu Civil War, popular referred to as the Battle of Ndondakusuka, broke out in Zululand.

In the Zulu society, there existed an elaborate set of rules governing succession and inheritance. Expressed in their simplest form, they stipulate that the heir to a chief or king was the first-born son of the great wife, who was specifically wedded for this purpose. Whereas a commoner’s heir was the eldest son by the first wife, a chief or a king would choose his great wife only when he was advanced in years, so as to minimize the risk of usurpation. In practice, it was seldom possible to order matters so neatly and the rules of succession, far from being an immutable prescription, could be manipulated, especially by means of genealogical gerrymandering. This meant that they did not preclude competition, although they did succeed in defining the field of competitors, providing a legitimating basis for their respective claims (Duminy & Guest, 1989, p. 103). In King Mpande’s case, as well as those of his immediate predecessors, these rules had apparently been set aside, for he had forcible dethroned King Dingane; Dingane had assassinated King Shaka, and Shaka had supplanted Sigujana (who was appointed by Senzangakhona as his heir). Indeed, Mpande was to proclaim, as he surveyed the growing animosity between his two sons: “I won my kingship by force of arms, so must others do like-wise. Our house did not get the kingship by being appointed to sit on a mat. Our house gained the kingship by stabbing with assegai (Webb & Wright, 1976, p. 165). In this instance, however, events were to show that floating the settled principle of succession was by no means the preferred option among the Zulu, nor a guarantee of success.

King Mpande himself had not always displayed such contempt for the conventions. Contrary to the assertion that he had never clearly designated an heir, he had in fact nominated Cetshwayo, at the time of his sojourn in Natal. He had, however, changed his mind by the early 1850’s and when he began to foster Mbuyazi’s cause, he claimed the right to repudiate his earlier action because he himself had not been king at the time. He further argued that, as he had fathered Mbuyazi for Shaka, Mbuyazi was therefore, in terms Zulu levirate custom, the true heir to the great founding father (Duminy & Guest, 1989, p. 104). It would seem that it was only when this manipulation of the ideology of succession had clearly failed to undermine support for Cetshwayo’s candidature that Mpande began to advocate a more violent solution, in the hope thereby of securing Mbuyazi’s right of succession. Perhaps he was trying to intimidate his opponents to acquiesce. In the event, he merely strengthened their resolve.

Cetshwayo was born in the late 1820s or late 1830s. He was the son of Ngqumbazi, the daughter of Mbonde, the chief. At some stage during the 1840s, Mpande set up Ngqumbazi in her own royal homestead, along with a number of other wives associated with her house. This homestead, Gqikazi, was situated in the northern marches of the kingdom, not far from the present Nongoma. Such practices were common for they enabled the king to spread his control and to prevent quarrels between co-wives and rival sons, while taking better advantage of available natural resources (Guy, 1994, pp. 1-3).
case of Gqikazi, the need for extended royal influence was an especially important factor, for it was in this area that Masiphula, his leading councillor, and Maphitha, who were immensely influential in the affairs of the state, had their regional power bases. When Gqikazi was established, Mpande refused to allow his sons to accompany their mothers, for he realized that the dispersal of royal homesteads facilitated the formation of potentially dangerous dynastic and regional alliances, and would provide the princes with the opportunity to cultivate personal followings (Duminy & Guest, 1989, p. 104).

In Cetshwayo’s case, his prohibition proved only temporarily effective. Possible because Mpande was prevented by his infirmities from visiting the region in person, Cetshwayo was soon able to build upon a core support centered on the Gqikazi and associated Bazeni homesteads (Webb & Wright, 1976, p. 302). The structure of the Zulu military institutions lent itself to Cetshwayo’s purpose. It is often assumed that, until such time as the soldiers were demobilized after many years of service, the Zulu age regiments were permanently stationed at the various centrally-located royal headquarters to which they had been allocated. The period of active service was not continuous. Normally, sections of each regiment, sufficient only to cater for immediate requirements of the royal household, took turns in serving at the royal barracks. This arrangement may have been a recent innovation necessitated by the curtailment of raiding opportunities, but it may equally have been devised by King Shaka (founder of the Zulu Kingdom) himself. Mpande thus did not have an absolute monopoly of coercive power, though the forces at his disposal outnumbered those available to any of his subordinate, provided that there were no alternative focuses of loyalty such as the one Cetshwayo was beginning to establish.

Cetshwayo was also able to take advantage of the practice whereby young recruits foregathered for a fairly protracted period at particular royal homesteads, before proceeding to the king for enrolment in a regiment.

By 1856, Cetshwayo could count on the support not only of his immediate adherents, but also on that of leading chiefs. Two significant supporters were Masiphula and Maphitha, who had numerous followers on their own, and could use their own powerful positions in the national political and military structure to ensure that others follow suit. Their support of Cetshwayo may have arisen from their belief that they would be able to manipulate him once they had installed him as king. Another possibility is that Mpande’s frequent expropriation of livestock belonging to his richer subjects caused them to look for a possible successor. It is also possible that their opposition was provoked by Mpande’s policy towards the Swazi, as well as Natal and the Pedi.

The opposition to Mpande which was now emerging around the person of Cetshwayo was able to capitalize on widespread popular grievance in Zulu society. In the early 1850’s when Mpande began to favour Mbuyazi, Cetshwayo had already built up a basis of support which ruled out both assassination as well as successful intrigue on Mbuyazi’s behalf. By the latter part of 1856, when the crisis was rapidly coming to a head, Mpande saw the need of external support (Duminy & Guest, 1989, p. 105). He instructed the iziGqoza to occupy the south-eastern corner of his kingdom, his former sphere of influence, and to solicit the influence of Natal. Mbuyazi visited Joshua Walmsley, the Natal border
agent, but emerged only with the backing of John Dunn, the white frontierman whose extraordinary involvement in Zulu affairs now began, and a handful of African gunmen. The mercenary force was not enough to deter Cetshwayo and within days, the iziGqoza were overwhelmed at Ndondakusuka, near the mouth of Thukela.

2. Different Accounts of the Battle

Amongst the versions of this battle was that of J Y Gibson, in The Story of the Zulus (1911, p. 103). This historian admitted that Prince Mbuyazi’s delegation crossed the Thukela River to solicit the Natal government’s aid, though such aid was denied. Gibson’s account was followed by R C A Samuelson’s in Long Long Ago (1929, p. 4). He provided a largely superficial account of the battle and blamed it on the confusion surrounding the choice of successor to King Mpande. Samuelson added, quite erroneously, that the military assistance provided by the white settlers enabled Mbuyazi’sizigqoza faction to resist the uSuthu faction of Prince Mbuyazi for quite some time. A further interpretation of the battle was provided by R RR Dhlomo, in Cetshwayo (1951, pp. 7-8). Dhlomo also focused on the indecision surround the choice of a successor to Mpande, but introduced further important factors. He noted that Mbuyazi, one of the contestants for the throne, was in fact King Shaka’s son, as Shaka had presented the mother of Mbuyazi (Monase Nxumalo) to Mpande already pregnant. Thus, whilst it appears that Mbuyazi was Mpande’s son, in actual fact he was the son of King Shaka. According to custom Mpande was married to NgqumbaziZungu and ilobolo (cattle given to girl’s parents before wedding) for this union was provided by King Shaka who thereby legitimised the marriage. The son of this union was Cetshwayo, the other contestant for the throne. Dhlomo pointed out that the Zulus as a whole were unaware that Mbuyazi was a direct descendant of King Shaka, and thus considered Cetshwayo to be the lawful heir to the throne. Dhlomo also pointed out that Mpande, having brought to power as a result of an alliance with Whites, continued to Natal government for military support (Dhlomo, 1951, p. 10).

Brookes and Webb presented their account of the Battle of Ndondakusuka in A History of Natal (1965, pp. 93-94). They advanced the historiography of this battle by writing that King Mpande had no real strength of character and thus lacked the complete support of his people, which would have made his choice of successor, Mbuyazi (who was his favourite), completely acceptable. These historians point out that whereas Mbuyazi’s mother, Monase, was a commoner, Cetshwayo’s mother, Ngqumbazi, was of noble birth and thus the claim of her son was considerably strengthened, in opposition to the choice of a king. The next account was presented by B Roberts in The Zulu Kings. Roberts agreed with Brookes and Webb and others, blaming the indecisiveness of Mpande for the war. This historian pointed to the savagery of the battle which was “a massacre—one of the worst to occur in Zululand’s blood-stained history” (Roberts, 1974, pp. 93-94).

Jeff Guy, in The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom (1979, p. 11) argued that Mpande’s aim in causing hostilities between Mbuyazi and Cetshwayo was to achieve recognition for Prince Mkhungo (one of
Mpande’s sons) as heir to the Zulu throne. He hoped that both Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi would perish in the battle. The most recent account of this battle is that provided by Charles Ballard in his doctoral thesis of 1980 entitled, *The Trans-frontiersman: The Career of John Dunn in Natal and Zululand*. Ballard argued that the participation of the white traders on the side of Mbuyazi’siziGqoza faction was determined by their desire for booty, in the form of thousands of cattle held by this faction in Zululand. He says nothing of the offer of reward made by Mbuyazi. He also denies any involvement on the part of the Natal government. In addition he exonerates John Dunn’s involvement in the battle, claiming that the participation of this frontiersman resulted solely from his desire to mediate between the two warring factions. A further dimension introduced by Ballard was a concern shown by the Natal government following the defeat of Mbuyazi and iziGqoza faction. He points out that the Natal Secretary for Native Affairs (Sir Theophilus Shepstone) proceeded to the scene of the battle on the same day, 2 December 1856. On his arrival he had talks with Captain J Walmsely (the Border Agent), John Dunn, and a few other white traders. But Ballard does not provide us with any knowledge of the result of this discussion.

A further dimension of the historiography of the battle is provided by Zulu oral tradition (izibongo—praise songs) as recorded in the works of Maphalala, Dhlomo, Samuelson, and others. All Zulu kings had *izimbongi* (official praisers) whose duty was to record important events in oral verse thus preserving them for generations. According to Zulu version of the events the white settlers in general are to blame for precipitating the battle. Two settlers in particular were singled out for the part they played in the events leading to the battle; these were Captain J Walmsley (whose Zulu name was Mantshonga) and E F Rathbone (whose Zulu name was Gqelebana). A praise song of King Cetshwayo reads: *UZululadumobala! Laphokungenamungakungenamtholo*. The *munga* and *mtholo* trees are trees associated with thunder and lighting. It is still believed that if a person stands next to these trees during a storm he will be hurt by their conduction of thunder and lighting. In the praise songs, there were no such trees that might have caused the battle; only the whites were to blame (Maphalala 1985: 3-4).

According to Maphalala, the Natal government was to blame for the outbreak of the Second Zulu Civil War. The Natal government entered the succession issue in an attempt to provide itself with a new “reserve” of land between the Thukela and Umhlathuze Rivers. It proposed to relocate some 50000 Zulus from within its borders onto this new reserve. In 1855 the Natal government was faced with a problem of overcrowding in its “native reserves” (Rees, 1958, p. 41). In order to find an outlet for approximately 50000 Zulus, it looked to the south of its colony. However, this possibility was vetoed by Sir George Grey (Governor and British High Commissioner), who apparently feared the spilling over of blacks towards the turbulent Eastern Cape frontier. The Natal government subsequently focused its attention on the greener pastures of Zululand, i.e., the fertile territory between the Thukela and Umhlathuze Rivers, for the establishment of a native reserve. This track of land had long been the focal point of whites from Natal. It was described by John Shepstone after his visit to Zululand in 1850 as a “wholly unoccupied part of the country” (Maphalala, 1995, p. 4). While E F Rathbone romanticized it
as “uninhabited track of land between Thukela and Umhlathuze Rivers, which then was full of large animals” (Government House 1055, p. 119a).

However, Cetshwayo who was regarded by the majority of the Zulus as the heir to the throne was the greatest stumbling block. In order to achieve its goal, the Natal government exploited the preference of the existing king of the Zulus, Mpande, for Mbuyazi as his successor to the throne instead of Cetshwayo. It apparently believed that the Zulu King’s word was final, and did not realize that Zulus, ever since the formation of their nation, believed: *inkosi yinkosingabantu* (the institution of kingship is the people’s institution). One can see a dimension of this belief in the fact that no Zulu king had a right to alienate land, as it belonged to the nation. Mbuyazi’s faction was only supported by only five royal princes and a few generals living between Thukela and Umhlathuze Rivers. The generals included Nongalaza of Nondela, a veteran of 1840 Battle of Maqonqo hills. Mpande and Rathbone had therefore pinned their support of Masiphula Ntshangase to tip the balance. They realised that his position as *undunankulu* (prime minister) and commander-in-chief of the Zulu forces was vital. Although actually involved in their intrigue, he later supported Cetshwayo and mobilised the Zulu forces against Mbuyazi.

3. The Rathbone Intrigue against Cetshwayo

The conspiracy against Cetshwayo achieved its first tangible form on 15 November 1856 when a meeting took place between Rathbone and a delegation of Mpande who supported Mbuyazi. This meeting was held at Rathbone’s house near the Msunduzi River (GH 1055, 134a). The delegation reported that Masiphula was Mbuyazi’s enemy, and wanted to kill him and that the king had sent him to Rathbone to take care of him. This proved to what extent had Mpande come to depend on Rathborne. Rathbone proposed that Mbuyazi and his delegation, which consisted of five royal princes and few *indunas* (local head-men), proceed to Natal with a view to discussing with Captain Walmsely the possibility of military aid. However, he warned that should such military aid be denied by the Natal government, Mbuyazi was to remain in Natal until peace had been restored in Zululand. The delegation remained in Natal for three days. The talks resulted in John Dunn being ordered to lead a contingent of 135 men in support of Mbuyazi. Dunn’s men were armed with Enfield guns (Ballard, 1980, p. 69). Dunn was an official of the Natal government, being constable and interpreter to Walmsley, he was the only mounted member of the contingent which accompanied Mbuyazi’s delegation to Zululand.

With preparation of the two sides having commenced at the beginning of November, the iziGqoza faction swelled to approximately 7000 (The Natal Mercury, 31.03 1880). On 20 November 1856 they camped between the Msunduzi and Matigulu Rivers. Mpande had promised Mbuyazi more reinforcement but these were not provided. Mbuyazi’s delegation joined iziGqoza faction here. They then advanced southwards towards the Thukela River and close to Nongalaza homestead. The army eventually camped on a ridge near Nyoni River which was about three miles from Rathbone’s house. Dunn’s contingents joined iziGqoza here. It was enforced by other whites consisting of Afrikaners under
the leadership of Gorewse, two sons of Paul du Preez, the two du Preez brothers, John Strydom, Thomas Morris, T Campkin, and others. There was also a contingent of about 40 coloureds and black hunters, all armed with rifles (Maphalala, 1985, p. 7).

Dunn told Rathbone that he had been sent on the orders of Walmsely with a view to support Mbuyazi’s faction militarily. He was confident of a victory and also expected the Natal government to send another force from Pietermaritzburg. He held military council with izi Gqoza indunas and suggested that women and children be moved further inland to avoid their being stampeded into the river. However Cetshwayo’su Suthu faction had already sent spies to infiltrate the iziGqoza line. Whilst Rathbone was busy packing his property preparing to remove his family, one of the spies approached him asking for protection against uSuthu faction. But when Rathbone tested him with iziGqoza code, he did not know how to reply and subsequently fled through the garden, disappearing into the bushy banks of the Msunduzi River (Maphalala, 1985, p. 7).

Rathbone and others formed what may be termed as “rear guards”. This force was responsible for the protection of white women and children, cattle and wagons near the Thukela River. After transporting their families across the flooded Thukela River, they remained on the Zulu side of the border. They endeavoured to transport approximately 2 000 cattle across the river. However, this attempt failed because the heavy south wind blowing over the surface of the water swept them a couple of miles lower down the stream and landed them on the Zulu side again. Furthermore, some of the cattle were devoured by crocodiles in the process. They then decided to remain in their wagons awaiting news of commencement of the battle. However messengers who crossed daily from John Dunn to Captain Walsely told them that hostilities would not begin until the full moon (the moon then in the first quarter).

4. Final Preparations and Combat

The uSuthu forces numbering approximately 50000 with regiments as far as Nongoma were being ritually prepared for war (GH 1055, p. 134). This task was Gamalakhe’s responsibility. He was Cetshwayo’s greatest herbalist. Then the mainuSuthu army left the eMangweni homestead, present day eMpangeni Town. They marched along the Ntambanana River northwards towards the Ndlayangubo homestead, near the present day eNkwalini. This was at the beginning of November 1856. From Ndlayangubo, the uSuthu forces advanced towards the Ngxangaza homestead, belonging to an induna of Langanaza’s, who had joined iziGqoza faction. Consequentially all women and children in that vicinity fled in the panic and slept in vacant cattle kraals for fear of their lives. The deserted huts were occupied by the advancing army.

The combined uSuthu forces met at Nohadu’s homestead near Cethwayo’s Gingindlovu homestead. Nohadu had been Mpande’s experienced inceku (personal servant) since Shaka’s days and had now joined the uSuthu faction. From Gingindlovu the uSuthu forces moved to the war zone. But Cetshwayo in accordance with Gagamela’s orders did not personally take part in the battle. Instead he remained...
kneeling on Mbuyazi’s stolen shield (which was ritually prepare by Gagamela) until the battle was over (Stuart, 1926, p. 184). In the meantime Mbuyazi’sizi Gqoza faction and its white allies moved closer to the Thukela River. They eventually camped on a ridge of hills leading from the northern spur of the Ndondakusuka Mountain. The main uSuthu army had by then camped in the valley of the Msunduzi River and on the thorn-bushed hills at the head of the valley.

On 2 December 1856 at about 5h00 John Dunn sent the usual message to Captain Walmsely and the “rear guard”, namely that the uSuthu army would attack only when the moon was full. At 10h00 the “rear guard” was startled by the sudden appearance of John Dunn on horseback with Dick Pearce, his brother-in-law, clinging to the horse’s tail. He informed them of the course of the battle. In the early stages the white force in front of iziGqoza faction had engaged the uSuthu forces with heavy rifle fire which had had little effect and they had therefore fled. This flight of the white force confused the iziGqoza faction which fought in disarray. John Dunn accused the Afrikaners part of the white force of cowardice. The iziGqoza army in accordance with the Zulu military strategy had regrouped and divided itself into three units but was defeated on all fronts.

The newly formed uSuthuKubaza regiment defeated the iziGqoza faction in the upper reaches of the Nyoni River. On the plain known Kwa-Ludumayo the iziGqoza were also defeated. They were led by the brave and able Prince Shonkweni. This bloody battle was fought against four uSuthu regiments, the uDlambedlu, uThulwana, Sangqu and Sihlambisinye regiments. The first encounter was indecisive until the entry of the extremely brave Mandlakaziregiment apparently led by ZibhebhukaMaphitha. This put the iziGqoza army to flight. They were then hotly pursued by the victorious uSuthu army while fleeing in the direction of the “rear guard” at the Thukela. The “rear guard” in the meantime desperately tried to in-span their oxen in order to remove their wagons from Zululand. However, their desperate move failed as the fugitives from the iziGqoza faction were pouring in at an alarming rate. The “rear guard” took all their weapons and handed them to iziGqoza fugitives, directing them to a safer place higher up the Thukela. By so doing they hoped to appear neutral and to be left alone.

Those members of the “rear guard” who were still on the Zulu side of the border had only two choices: to be stabbed to death by the uSuthu forces or to be washed away by the flooded Thukela, whilst facing the possibility of being devoured by the crocodiles. They chose the latter. Rathbone, who was apparently a good swimmer, plunged into the Thukela River. Lonsdale, using his swimming belt, did the same while Paxton supported himself with the shields, sticks and calabashes collected on the sandbank. Moore and Barber made desperate dash for the ferry but could not make it. IziGqoza faction also tried to swim across the river but the uSuthu victors also took to the river, swimming with one hand while stabbing their opponents with the other hand. The uSuthu troops then turned on the abandoned wagons of the “rear guard”. Their forces were led by Peter, a black Christian; Jacob, a coloured; and Puspus, a Malabar man. They had been part of John Dunn’s force and had defected to the uSuthu forces. The wagons were completely plundered and looted (The Natal Mercury, 31.3.1880). On the sandbank, two young uSuthu troops nearly stabbed Rathbone to death, shouting their war cry:
'uSuthu! uSuthu! uSuthu! However the old uSuthu troops saved Rathbone’s life by intervening. The Natal government received news of the iziGqoza’s defeat with great disillusionment. It sent Sir Theophilus Shepstone to the scene on the same afternoon. Shepstone was concerned about Zulu reprisals against Natal on account of the involvement of whites in the battle. Bodies of the victims were found as far as Durban because those who were killed had fallen near Dlokweni in the vicinity of the Indian Ocean. Prince Mbuyazi, leader of the iziGqoza, also fell in the battle and was afterwards honoured for his bravery in Cetshwayo’s praise songs. Cetshwayo’s praiser regarded him as a very strong man and called him *iNyathi(yaseNhlakanhlakeni* (the Buffalo of Nhlakanhlakeni), and because of the birthmark on his back, he was praised *iNdlovu(nesihlonti* (the elephant with a tuft of hair). His tragic death was linked to a sunset, i.e., *uPhaqanjengelanga*. Mpande’s five sons who had joined Mbuyazi’s cause also died in the battle. They were Princes Shonkweni, Mantantashiya, Somxawana, Mdumba, and Dubulesinye.

5. The Aftermath

After the battle the Natal government sent a delegation to Cetshwayo consisting of Lt Burns of the 45th Regiment and Henry Fynn Senior. The purpose of this delegation was to deny any involvement by the Natal government in the Ndondakusuka battle. The delegation advanced the argument that John Dunn’s actions had not been sanctioned by the Natal government (Ballard, 1980, p. 66). Burns and Fynn also held talks with Mpande and expressed the condolences of the Natal government on the loss of his sons. The king thanked them and wanted the delegation to accept 200 cattle which had been collected as compensation for those whites who had supported Mbuyazi at Ndondakusuka (GH 1055, p. 134). The acceptance of these cattle would have been contradictory and tantamount to an acknowledgement of the involvement of the Natal government. Consequently the delegation diplomatically rejected Mpande’s offer, pointing out that it had been given no instructions by the Governor (John Scott, 1856-1864) to accept the cattle. However, Fynn was later sent by the Natal government to demand head of cattle in compensation for losses, but this was turned down by Mpande (Ballard, 1980, p. 70).

In 1857 Rathbone returned to Zululand after being allowed by uSuthu forces to flee to Natal. He sought to explain his involvement, along with the involvement of the other white settlers in the Battle of Ndondakusuka, to Cetshwayo. The meeting took place at Cetshwayo’s Gingindlovu homestead. He was well received by Cetshwayo. In the course of discussion, however, Cetshwayo made it very clear that it was guns of white settlers which had caused tremendous loss of life among the uSuthu troops. This in turn had caused enmity between the uSuthu followers and the whites. Cetshwayo, however, bore no malice after such an overwhelming victory, and saw no need for further antagonism towards the whites. He was anxious for prosperity in Zululand. He therefore invited Rathbone to return to his farm. He also lent him a span of oxen to enable him to resume occupation without delay. Rathbone accepted the offer of friendship. Rathbone also met King Mpande to explain reasons for the defeat of iziGqoza. They were only two in the house and their meeting was strictly confidential.
In 1957 Queen Monase and her children disappeared and they were allegedly taken to Pietermaritzburg. Amongst these was Mkhunjo who was hereafter to become a useful pawn in the hands of the Natal government. Natal sought to make him heir to the Zulu throne following Mpande’s death. Shepstone and Scott rode together to Ekukhanyeni (Bishopstowe) to place Mkhunjo under Bishop Colenso’s care. Colenso was to act as Mkhungo’s guardian and trustee. His duty was to “civilize” and Christianize him as the future king of Zululand. The Natal government remained antagonistic to Cetshwayo. Rathbone advised Cetshwayo that the best method of approaching the Natal government would be through Shepstone who would be able to consult Scott. Cetshwayo was advised to send his delegation to Pietermaritzburg. Rathbone perhaps believed that, in this manner, the Natal government would be able to deprive the Zulus of their independence peacefully.

On 16 July 1857 Rathbone wrote a letter which he presented to Shepstone in Pietermaritzburg. In this letter he advanced the suggestion that the cattle collected in Zululand were to be given by the Zulus as compensation for the losses of the white traders. In reply Shepstone wrote the Zulu messengers who had earlier negotiated on behalf of Cetshwayo and had offered these cattle had emphatically maintained that the 200 cattle were collected for a very different purpose which was apparently that of peace offering to the Natal government. Rathbone reiterated that the 200 cattle were to be distributed to meet compensation claims. In the meantime the white settlers who had supported the iziGqoza faction and indirectly the Natal government were determined to get compensation. They constituted themselves into the so-called Zulu Traders Committee under the leadership of J D Kock. On July 1858 the resident magistrate in Durban revealed that according to his records only four traders had had the right to trade in Zululand in December 1856, therefore the claim for the so-called Zulu Traders Committee was not genuine.

Thereafter a commission known as Umhlali Commission was appointed by the Natal government and its aim was to address the question of compensation. On 11 October 1858 the uMhlali Commission gave notice to all interested parties to proceed to Durban Court House where it was to receive proof of their claims. Cetshwayo watched these developments with keen interest. He pardoned all white settlers who had supported the iziGqoza faction. John Dunn, the leader of the white force at Ndondakusuka, was amongst those pardoned. He returned to Zululand and built his homestead in the Ngome Forest. In view of this rapprochement, the traders and missionaries went on peace with their duties (Secretary for Native Affairs 1/1/8: 6.7.1858). However this situation did not last. Rathbone reported that John Dunn, the author of false accusation to Cetshwayo, soon revealed his “duplicity of action by getting all the whites expelled with exception of Nun, who placed himself under the protection of Oham” (SNA 1/1/8: 6.7.1858).

Dunn had in fact told Cetshwayo that Rathbone was a spy in the employment of the Natal government and that his main duty was to report Cetshwayo’s actions to the Natal government. Rathbone also told the Natal government about Cetshwayo’s hunting plans, Dunn said. Lastly, it was alleged that Rathbone intended opening up the land between the Thukela and Mhlathuze Rivers to white settlement and this
would seriously threatened Zulu political independence. These accusations were made known to Rathbone by Cetshwayo’s induna Mkhaseya and others at Ondini. They were vehemently opposed by Rathbone who told the indunas that Dunn was trying to get land by making him a scapegoat. These accusations were believed by Cetshwayo who ordered Rathbone to leave Zululand immediately (GH1055, p. 138). Thus, Dunn succeeded through intrigues and malicious accusations in bringing about the expulsion of every respectable trader that had settled in Zululand. He thereby obtained a monopoly of hunting rights in Zululand to the exclusion of the oldest hunters whom he discredited.

The Natal government was now in a dilemma regarding its position towards Cetshwayo. The expulsion of Rathbone, who was later described by Colonel R Buller at the Exeter Banquest as “the earliest Pioneer of Civilisation in the Zulu Country” shocked the Natal government (GH 1055, p. 138). The Natal government was still determined to have a showdown with Cetshwayo in order to establish a native reserve in Zululand, and as result the expulsion of white traders now had strong grounds for implementing such a policy. In 1860 Sir George Grey approved of an invasion plan after a visit to Natal. However, when the plan leaked to Cetshwayo, he solicited aid from the Afrikaners of Utrecht with a view of forming an alliance (Maphalala, 1985, p. 25). Such aid was readily offered by these Afrikaners.

In the face of the formidable Zulu—Afrikaner alliance being implemented against the Natal government, it temporarily backed down from its invasion stance.

Thereafter in July 1861 Sir Theophilus Shepstone was dispatched to Zululand. His orders from John Scott were to accept the status quo in Zululand. By this time reports of British invasion of Zululand were already abroad. Shepstone’s mission to Zululand was also aimed at severing all ties with the iziGqoza faction now known as the Peace or King’s Party. On his arrival at Nodwengu he was well received by Mpande who was now little more than a figurehead. During the second day he delivered the Natal government message to Mpande. The message did not please Mpande, for it was a virtual capitulation to Cetshwayo’su Suthu faction. Another message delivered by Shepstone was a request for cattle to be used to maintain Queen Monase and Mkhungo in Pietermaritzburg. Mpande could not accede to the request, and he pointed out that doing so would be within Cetshwayo’s jurisdiction.

6. Conclusion

This paper concludes by affirming that the Battle of Ndondakusuka was caused by the desire of the Natal government to establish a native reserve between the Thukela and Mhlathuze Rivers for approximately 50000 Zulus. In order to achieve its goal it exploited Mpande’s preference for Mbuyazi as an heir for the Zulu throne. In the subsequent events, John Dunn—the leader of white force, formed an alliance with the Mbuyaziizi Gqoza faction. He was ordered by Captain J Walmsely to support Mbuyazi militarily. Following the defeat of iziGqoza—white alliance, on 2 December 1856, the Natal government supported the claims of white traders who had suffered at the Battle of Ndondakusuka. The Second Zulu Civil war of 1856 and its consequences provide important insights into the causes of the British invasion of Zululand in 1879 as subsequent events culminated in the outbreak of the
Anglo-Zulu War in 1879.

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