SECURITY ASPECTS OF EU COUNTRIES
INTRODUCTION

One of the international order’s main missions has been to achieve successful power transitions following hegemonic shifts. The main concern of the victors during such a transition has been to minimize the disruptive elements that could distort the stability of the order. To achieve this, states must ensure that the defeated hegemonic power is fully integrated into the international order and that its quest for prestige is met. As a result, transition periods constitute a crucial component of the formation of an international order, as they serve to harmonize the foreign policy variables of defeated powers with the hegemonic international order’s principles and values.

Amid the West’s euphoria over its victory in the Cold War, the quagmire of Russia’s position in the international order emerged – and needed a quick response. There was no question that the new international dynamics would lead to a “Russia Question.” It is fairly clear that Russia’s participation in the U.S.-led liberal international order has put pressure on its stability. The on-going confrontational dynamics between the West and Russia have eroded states’ ability to construct a stable and legitimate international order. In fact, there have been serious confrontations between Russia and the West, especially NATO. This continued hostility seems to confirm the existence of a “question” that the existing international order must overcome.

Given the time-sensitive nature of this dilemma, this article aims to determine Russia’s position as the defeated power of the former bipolar order amid the on-going instability of the modern international order. It seeks a greater understanding of the degree to which the modern international order has successfully harmonized Russia’s inclusion with its own values and principles. My focus in this article is on analysing the impact of the current liberal international order on Russia’s foreign policy variables. I aim to explain Russia’s quest to find a prestigious position in the modern international order by detailing the “access problem” of a defeated power. In explaining Russia’s position as the defeated hegemon—the dependent variable – I take the international order as the independent variable. I address the access problem of a defeated power and underline the way in which it stems from a systemic problem. I detail how the geopolitics of the international order have shaped the foreign policy elite as post-Cold War Russia’s dominant foreign policy variable. This study also contributes to the literature by deepening our understanding of how difficult it is to challenge continuity in the foreign policy of a defeated power.
STABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
AND THE “DEFEATED HEGEMON”

Since the international order is not a formal entity, its stability depends on whether a defeated hegemon would benefit from its dynamics. As a result, the future of the international order is dependent on its successful conversion into a new one that successfully incorporates the defeated hegemon. This fact points to the importance of transition periods following the collapse of a global order. In all periods following hegemonic shifts, the main question remains fundamentally the same: How can the defeated hegemon be integrated into the new international order in a way that harmonizes its foreign policy essentially with the values and principles of the victorious hegemon(s)?

Of course, the international order is not a product of a manufacturing process; there is no factory to which the victors of a hegemonic war can bring the following commission: “Prepare us such an international order that…” Rather, shifts in the international order are brought about by compromises made as a result of the evolution of hegemonic dynamics. To ensure stability, state actors must successfully adapt the previous order into one from which both winners and losers of the previous hegemonic conflict could benefit. It is clear why there has never been a robust international order: each one is built upon the ashes of its predecessor. In other words, no international order can ever emerge without the destruction of the previous one. In turn, an international order can never emerge as a standard model than can be re-created or copied, as such a model does not exist. The international order invariably evolves from the foundation of its previous incarnation. Once a hegemonic shift takes place, the emerging international order must inevitably confront the pressures of its predecessor’s remnants. This fact renders the success of a new international order dependent on a healthy transition that minimizes the frictions stemming from the remnants of its predecessor (e.g., rising nationalist, revanchist, secessionist sentiments). The international order saw the worst of these transitional frictions during the “interwar period”; in fact, these frictions reached a breaking point in World War II, and the international order’s values and principles soon needed to be re-defined once again. Under such circumstances, the crucial task of the emerging order is to find a new equilibrium in order to stabilize the international order as much as possible. Of course, this equilibrium depends on the degree of harmony that the emerging order shares with the values, principles and foreign policy variables of the defeated actors.

When there has been a stable international order, this stability has generally stemmed from hegemonic conflicts or radical transformations in the international system. Victors imposing their will allowed for the adoption of values and principles whose legitimacy none could question, at least for a certain period of time. The post-1815 Vienna Congress settlement was the first example of this process. Of course, these dominant status quos are not exempt from ongoing power calculations. They can simultaneously be viewed as “dynamic equations,” as they reflect an equilibrium struck under specific conditions – they remain vulnerable to potential challenges. The existing international order is always subject to modification should a powerful actor see an advantage in questioning it (Gilpin, 1981). In a sense, the international order serves as a compromise among world powers within flexible boundaries, as per the “balance of power system” derived from the Peace of Westphalia. According to Kissinger: “The genius
of the Westphalian system as adapted by the Congress of Vienna had been its fluidity and its pragmatism, ecumenical in its calculations, it was theatrically expandable to any region and could incorporate any combination of states.” (Kissinger, 2014: 78).

The logic of the international order is dynamic, as it does not embody a particular ideal in the Wilsonian sense; it will always inherit the remnants of the previous order. For example, outside of the Wilsonian reference to the order following the Cold War as “a liberal international order,” it would be more correct to call it as “the post-Cold War liberal international order” – it is a liberal order led by the U.S., the victor of the Cold War. In this new order, NATO continued to serve as the primary Western military alliance and be identified with liberal values. The main standards of foreign policy conduct were determined by the West, which was largely led by the United States. Friendly relations with the U.S. were encouraged; pursuing neutral foreign policies were discouraged. States in the non-Western world were rated in terms of their regimes and foreign policy choices. Close relations with the IMF, the World Bank, and NATO came to constitute an important state goal, as they helped states reach a more prestigious position. Thus, the post-Cold War international order was a liberal – but selective – order; we can view it as an amalgam of liberalism and realism amid U.S. supremacy. The emergence of the post-Cold War liberal order was distinct from that of the previous order, as it was rooted in a political and economic downfall rather than a military defeat. As the transition to the post-Cold War era was peaceful, the stability of the emerging order was highly dependent on Russia’s willingness to adopt the values and principles of the new international order.

Questions in the international order such as the North Korean one, arise due to disharmony between the value expectations of the international order and the foreign policy variables of a defeated hegemon. To prompt the defeated side to participate, the emerging order may encourage revanchism rather than status-quo tendencies. Either the defeated actor completely dismisses the international order and regards it as illegitimate – as in the case of Nazi Germany – or it is simply dissatisfied with its position in the international order, as in the case of Germany following World War II. The Versailles Settlement, which followed World War I, crumbled when the emerging international order failed to resist rising revanchist sentiments indicating the social variable of in foreign policy analysis. Following World War II, the division of Germany resulted in an unstable equilibrium that gave the international system its bipolar character.

Of course, fully integrating a defeated power into the international order gives it access to the foreign policy interests of the major actors, which can distort the international order’s stability. In this context, the “access problem” has always constituted a prime question for transitioning international orders. How can a defeated power keep its prestige when asked to harmonize with a new international order? Access problems may emerge from the dictates of the hegemon. Criteria set by the U.S.-led, hegemonic international order could lead actors to struggle in earning prestige. The post-Cold War liberal order has undoubtedly rendered the formation of a prestigious foreign policy far costlier. While militarily supporting anti-Israel coalitions was a legitimate strategy during the Cold War – as seen in Moscow’s arms transfers to the Arab states in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 – flirting with totalitarian regimes like Syria or

---

1 Ikenberry calls this as liberalism 2.0 which is undergoing a crisis (Ikenberry, 2009).
Venezuela under the modern international order exacts a far higher price. When the international order works disproportionately for the benefit of a single hegemonic power, it can render legitimate foreign policy quests disharmonious with or even aggressive towards the norms of the order. “Legitimate” foreign policy interests are those that remain within the tolerable limits of the international order and do not interfere with the hegemon’s direct interests. The international order may heighten the cost of legitimate but impermissible foreign policy efforts and, in turn, nourish “aggressiveness.” When multipolarity no longer promised stability as World War I was approaching, Wilhelmine Germany’s foreign policy was perceived to be far more aggressive than it was in reality. Germany simply intended to acquire a more prestigious position within the multipolar system. This foreign policy quest was as legitimate as the U.K.’s efforts to preserve the status quo. The German state felt that the development of the Tirpitz battle fleet would serve as an important adjunct to German commerce and foreign policy (Choucri, North, 1975: 104) – but the U.K. perceived the German naval program, which formed from the Navy Law of 1818, as a direct challenge to its diplomatic and military hegemony. Therefore, the program’s mere existence was viewed as an aggressive act against British interests. Kennedy (1989: 248) argues that it would not have been possible for Germany to convert its economic power into political might without confronting other great powers. Since multipolarity was too weak in this era to satisfy Wilhelmine Germany’s demand for recognition as a legitimate hegemonic power, the international order’s collapse was inevitable. In 1908, the German press began to discuss the country’s “encirclement” as a result of the Anglo-French-Russian military alliance (Kennedy, 1980: 445). Clearly, that which constitutes “legitimate” foreign policy is relative based on the existing international order. Unipolar structures often expand what is considered to be aggressive. However, with a functioning bipolar system, previously “aggressive” actions become legitimate. During the Cold War, for example, Moscow supported “people’s liberation fronts” while Washington supported “freedom fighters.” Evidently, international systems influence foreign policy behaviour and determine the “costliness” of certain actions, especially as they pertain to overcoming access problems. A “costly” foreign policy is one that requires more expensive or difficult instruments of power to achieve an identical end.

In this sense, regional geopolitics may be encouraging or discouraging based on the integration of the defeated power. Since the international order is effectively the result of a dynamic equation, it requires a precise geopolitical maintenance to ensure sustainability. As a result, evolving geopolitics must not encourage zero-sum rivalries. Both the victorious side and the defeated side must benefit from the new state of geopolitics. Following the Napoleonic Wars, the U.K. and Russia passed up on opportunities for individual gains; they made clear that they did not intend to exploit France’s defeat for territorial aggrandizement, demonstrating strategic restraint and power-checking (Kupchan, 2010: 191). The two powers also refrained from constructing a bipolar order, instead elevating Prussia, Austria and France to secure the future stability of Europe. We can view the Concert of Europe as a project of power de-concentration aimed at delaying the return of geopolitical competition (Kupchan, 2010: 192). In this sense, NATO and its expansionist policies in Eastern Europe bore the greatest sensitivity in terms of encouraging confrontation or cooperation. NATO played a key role in the post-Cold War liberal
international order, even constructing its own geopolitics. With the eastern enlargements of 1999 and 2004, Eastern European geography needed to be re-defined. Framed in the continuity logic of Russian foreign policy, this shift in Eastern European geography has had an alarming effect on the security concerns of Russia. During the Yalta Conference in 1945, Stalin demanded a “friendly” Poland, arguing that Poland has functioned as a corridor for the invasion of Russia throughout the ages. About 50 years later, Russian President Yeltsin mentioned similar concerns. Following Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996, President Clinton and President Yeltsin met in 1997 for a summit meeting in Helsinki. To appease Yeltsin’s concerns over NATO’s eastward expansion, Clinton gave him assurances. Clinton discusses this exchange in his memoirs:

“He reminded me that unlike the United States, Russia had been invaded twice – by Napoleon and by Hitler – and the trauma of those events still colored the country’s collective psychology and shaped its politics. I told Yeltsin that if he would agree to NATO expansion and the NATO–Russia Partnership, I would make a commitment not to station troops or missiles in the new member countries prematurely, and to support Russian membership in the new G-8, the World Trade Organization, and other international organizations. We had a deal.” (Clinton, 2005: 750).

NATO’s geopolitical map has effectively influenced Russian foreign policy. The West has viewed NATO not only as a military alliance but also as an instrument through which to disseminate Western values. Each member is expected to have at least a certain level of pluralistic political system, a globalized liberal economy, a human-rights regime based on Western values and a foreign policy that is harmonious with that of the U.S. This fact has turned Russian geography into a reactionary element. The political geography on which Russian foreign policy is set is one shaped by the remnants of the Cold War. Under these circumstances, unforeseen escalations in the European order are inevitable; even minor, legitimate foreign policy steps that Russia makes are perceived as aggressive. During the Kosovo Crisis, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov accused the U.S. of trying to force Russia out of territories that historically were in the Russian sphere of influence, particularly in the Balkans (Gvosdev, Marsh, 2014: 82). Thus, it was not surprising that the conflict in Kosovo sped up the eastward expansion of NATO (Gvosdev, Marsh, 226). In other words, every move Russia makes contributes to the self-rationalization of its geopolitics. Therefore, a liberal international order that cannot imagine itself as distinct from NATO has set the rules for judging the legitimacy of foreign policy behaviours.

Modern European geopolitics lean more toward competition than toward cooperation, as U.S. foreign policy largely defines Europe’s basic security goals. It is regarding “sovietization” a national security issue for itself. More specifically, NATO has reached a point of momentum where it resorts to expansion as a political instrument and diplomatic solution. Modern European geopolitics effectively constitute a “sensory detection system” that is rapidly awakening past memories – and NATO plays a significant role in instrumentalising this fact. European geography is one rooted in the “Munich Settlement,” alternatively known as the “Devil’s Pact” or “Prague Coup.” Because of such a past, the West easily plunges into the indifference of establishing a link between the Soviet Union and the replacing Russian Federation. Depending on the strengthening of NATO, this geography could develop a rationality of its own.
A potential negative outcome, however, could be a geography that is devoid of genuine distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate foreign policy behaviours, especially on the part of Russia. NATO functions as a police force over post-Cold War Europe; it does not allow flexibility to maintain “the permanent dialogue.”

THE RISE OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY ELITE

If an international order has evolved by adopting new normative principles, it is likely to arouse serious questions over how it will incorporate hegemonic and regional actors. This problem is a significant one if an actor the size of Russia never ceases to seek prestige in the emerging international order. Under such conditions, the values and principles of the emerging international order are bound to confront the foreign policy variables of Russia.

An international order can only secure its position if it successfully incorporates the foreign policy goals of the defeated power. If the international order fails to incorporate or at least consider these foreign policy goals, it will struggle to remain stable. Here, the interaction among foreign policy variables plays a crucial role in terms of understanding the path of the international order. If there is a strong alignment among them, this demonstrates strong resistance to the demands of the international order. One of the variables may also play a more influential role than – or even dominate – the others. The Treaty of Versailles was an extreme example of this logic. Under the conditions of the 1929 global economic crisis, the social variable of post-War German nationalism was strong enough to dominate all others, nullifying the distinction between domestic politics and foreign policy. The foreign policy of the Weimar Republic was far from an autonomous effort aimed at maintaining the raison d'état; rather, it was driven by the dictates of the German social-economic breakdown. The Treaty of Versailles succumbed to this social-economic breakdown. In contrast, the post-World War II liberal international order was sustainable because it incorporated the foreign policy variables of Germany and Japan. Both states were converted into actors that would benefit from the long-term functioning of the international order. Their foreign policy variables were altered to consolidate the pillars of the liberal order. German society adopted – and has since maintained – liberal values in the operation of foreign policy. Through nourishment from both NATO and the EU, Germany has not sought other foreign policy options. There is no doubt that the impact of the Cold War on the international order was a strong catalyst that consolidated this process. Consequently, full socialization must be achieved to stabilize the international order, as the defeated side gains a new identity alongside new foreign policy variables. Continuity and rationality have been kept aligned in the post-World War II German foreign policy path.

The most striking facet of the post-Cold War international order has been the ambiguous position of Russia: Would the fall of communism lead to Russia’s full integration into the liberal international order? Could a regime change nullify the variables that clinch to continuity rather than change?

These questions cannot be answered without considering Russia’s foreign policy determinants. We can view these as constituting a state “foreign policy ID card” that
contains constants regarding their position in the international order. The confrontation between Russia’s foreign policy variables and the demands of the modern international order constitutes a serious case study of the stability of the international order. While the modern international order was being constructed, the victors – the West – needed to keep in mind that the defeated power – Russia – was one of the two hegemons under the previous order.

Russia, as the heir of the Soviet Union, needed to find a new identity to maintain its prestige and status as a hegemon in the emerging international order. In this sense, Russia demonstrates perfect harmony among its foreign policy determinants in terms of serving a coherent foreign policy path. The main peculiarity of Russian foreign policy is that its variables are extremely sensitive to the degradation of Russia’s position in the international order. It is quite remarkable that the discussion of Russia’s foreign policy variables often triggers a civilizational debate. Size is one of Russia’s defining foreign policy variables. Russia is abnormal in the sense that it maintains its legitimate but impermissible foreign policy interests; this is possible only because of its immense size. In fact, this size entails an international system that satisfies its expectations of status and prestige without its pillars being disrupted. Therefore, Yeltsin’s remarks demanding a worthy place in the international community for Russia two years after the collapse of the Soviet Union are unsurprising (Lo, 2002: 50). So far, the international order has functioned as both multipolar and bipolar systems with Russia (and, formerly, the Soviet Union) occupying one of its hegemonic positions. The size variable is a crucial component that stresses the reality of continuity in Russian foreign policy.

It is clear that the Soviet legacy has a strong effect on Russian foreign policy that is unlikely to be replaced by foreign policy alternatives. Crucially, however, the Russian foreign policy elite have played a greater role than any other variable. As Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) stress, hegemonic control emerges when foreign elites buy into the hegemon’s vision of international order and accept it as their own by internalizing its norms and values; this normative reorientation secures the stability of the emerging order. In the case of Russia, however, it is clear that the foreign policy elite have not internalized the ideology of the modern international order. Under the leadership of Yevgeni Primakov, the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, a new foreign policy elite coalition began to take shape among former industrialists, bureaucrats and military officials. This coalition quickly turned its back on West-oriented foreign policy. The prospects of NATO expansion and military conflicts in the Russian periphery fostered a sense of insecurity in the eyes of the foreign policy elite (Tsygaknov, 2016: 68). The emerging elite coalition – known as the “Statists” – rejected the Westerners when they began to perceive that the West was treating Russia as a dependent client rather than a full participant in the group of Western nations (Tsygaknov, 2016: 89). This shift in perception led to the defeat of the Western-oriented foreign policy path led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev. Driven by its Soviet inheritance, the Russian foreign policy elite did not ultimately adopt Western values. Vladimir Frolov – known as “the Kremlin’s journalist” – has summarized this situation as a civilizational matter for Russia’s foreign policy identity:

---

2 A foreign policy output is formed as a result of the interaction of various variables such as size, international system/order, geography, socio-cultural variables such as nationalism or the impact of the foreign policy past on the society.
“A consensus has formed in Russia, a national consensus and a consensus among the authorities, to the effect that Russia cannot be integrated into Western structures. And there is no opening for us to be integrated into the East. This means that Russia is destined to remain and independent centre of power, whether it wants it or not. It will have to rely on its own code of civilization, doing its best to establish equally distant or equally close relations with other centres of power” (Shevtsova, 2007: 172).

Frolov’s remarks assert that it was irrational for the West to expect a dramatic foreign policy shift within just ten years of the Cold War’s conclusion. Rather than breaking it, the international order added a new link to the chain of Russian continuity – Imperial Russia, Soviet Union, Russian Federation. In this sense, foreign policy author Andranik Migranyan’s talk of a “Russian Monroe” doctrine in 1992 over former Soviet territories begins to make sense (Lo, 2002).

The international order that emerged following the end of the Cold War has flourished with newly liberal regimes. The more this liberal snowballing continued, the more legitimacy the international order garnered. If emerging democracies could add both material and non-material value to this order, they would have the chance to earn prestige in the liberal world. States that took a reactionary stance against this order would not find themselves in a “respected” or beneficial position; in fact, they could be exposed to punitive actions from the U.S. In other words, the emerging international order has encouraged clear-cut value choices in the non-Western world. Still, as mentioned above, the modern international order was built on the ashes of the bipolar international order. Normative elements like pluralism and the legitimate rights of the opposition are viewed as indispensable components of the international order, despite the lack of a full normative transformation. The confrontation over Ukraine was a prime example of this dynamic. As John Mearsheimer argues:

“In essence, the two sides have been operating with different playbooks: Putin and his compatriots have been thinking and acting according to realist dictates, whereas their Western counterparts have been adhering to liberal ideas about international politics. The result is that the United States and its allies unknowingly provoked a crisis over Ukraine” (Mearsheimer, 2014: 77–89).

Mearsheimer’s use of “unknowingly” here is significant, as the U.S. and its allies believed that they were acting to maintain a stable and peaceful order – but their actions brought about a collision between two different approaches to the international order. The Eastern Partnership program unveiled by the EU in May 2008, which aimed to integrate Ukraine into the Western economy, was alarming for Russia, as it believed that this economic integration served the same goals as NATO – two sides of the same coin. Interestingly, NATO has been extremely vigilant against any sign indicating the reawakening of the ex-Soviet territories under the leadership of Russia. It largely measures the status of an actor by its contribution to the liberal international order. The security agendas of the post-Cold War international order, such as the conflict in Kosovo and the war on terror, functioned as tests of actors’ position in the emerging international order. The leaders of the “post-Cold War liberal international order” appealed to states outside of NATO to expand their sphere of influence. In this way, the international system has encouraged Russia to base its foreign policy on continuity rather than change. On the Syrian question, turning its back on Soviet foreign policy past
would not be a rational choice for Russia, as it is less costly to construct a new Russian foreign policy that leans on the Soviet heritage than to construct a new one that denies it. In fact, it could cost Russia some of its traditional Cold War allies. According to RIA Novosti, Russia lost nearly 4 billion USD in arms sales contracts following the fall of the Qaddafi regime (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/russias-many-interests-in-syria). A July 1993 Russian editorial argued that, at least in terms of arms exports, Russia and the U.S. are not partners but competitors – both economically and politically (Gvodsev, Marsh, 2014: 82). Again, this indicates why continuity is more rational for Russia than change. When the determinative impact of continuity on Russian foreign policy is so strong, this can reduce “the individual variable” to a minor factor. In his interview with Oliver Stone, Russian President Putin indicated that he was certain that the U.S. was doing everything in its power to prevent Russia from getting closer with Ukraine (Stone, 2017: 201).

It is clear that the modern international order cannot meet the demands of the Russian foreign policy elite. Russia’s current foreign policy variables cannot be harmonized with the norms and values of the modern international order. Put simply, the international order is not strong enough to lead Russia’s foreign policy away from continuity. Contessi (2016: 288) confirms this view by arguing that Russia’s history as a great power contributes to its elites’ preferences and identities. For the elite, it is more rational to seek one-sided gains than to be integrated into the international order. The normative standards set by the U.S. has raised the cost of forming foreign policy output in terms of a gigantic actor of the international system whose civil and military elite stands as the legacy of the Cold War. Russia’s quest to back its Cold War ally Syria is a legitimate foreign policy interest – it is not dissimilar to U.S. actions in the region – as it is simply working to maintain its ties. In other words, continuity in foreign policy fosters its own rationality. It has no intention of targeting its rival state, but supporting its traditional client inevitably leads to escalation. Through the West’s use of NATO to pursue beneficial continuity through expansion, it is increasing the cost of foreign policymaking for Russia. The modern international order effectively encourages Russia to confront the post-Cold War liberal international order. Of course, the foreign policy determinants of Russian elites also include a civilizational dimension, as their aims extend beyond maximizing foreign policy interests. Sakwa asserts that it is unsurprising that post-Soviet foreign policy identity easily led to civilizational debates in an attempt to redefine Russia’s position vis-à-vis Western civilization (Sakwa, 1993: 362). According to Dimitri Trenin, until Putin’s Munich speech on February 10, 2007, Russia saw itself as a Pluto in the Western solar system, far from the centre but still fundamentally part of it; after the speech, however, it left the Sun’s orbit entirely (Stent, 2014: 149). The Cold War legacy has definitely aroused Russia-centric notions of the international order in the eyes of the Kremlin’s elite. The spread of liberal values in former Soviet territories is alarming for Moscow. The “Orange Revolution” and the “Rose Revolution” are two examples that demonstrate Moscow’s view of “the liberal menace” on its borders. The dissemination of democratic values are perceived as harmful to the stability of Russia and ex-Soviet territories, which are viewed as inseparable from its national security. According to Krastev and Leonard, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine constituted Putin’s equivalent of 9/11. In fact, Moscow has maintained its
assertation that the U.S. instigated the uprising (Shevtsova, 2007: 241). The developments in Ukraine have also alarmed Russia. In the words of Krastev and Leonard (2014), NATO’s way of thinking was more threatening than its tanks. Nuland’s visit to Kiev and subsequent high-level CIA visit highlighted the Kremlin’s suspicions about Washington’s aim to encircle Russia and promote regime change (Stent, 2014: 303). Of course, this foreign policy sensitivity towards the West cannot be understood without a civilizational dimension. As Shevtsova argues, the Russian elite are still allergic to Poland, which raises the Kremlin’s ire by trying to act as the missionary of democracy in former Soviet territories (Shevtsova, 2007: 172). The interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy is extremely strong in Russia, meaning foreign policy is not viewed as an autonomous realm in the sense of the raison d’état. So long as the rhetoric pertaining to “the goal of the West…” continues, Russian foreign policy will contain a civilizational dimension. The view that all people are unique – but Russians are more unique than others – has both defensive and offensive aspects (Lo, 2015: 17). As Lo (2015: 43) states, the Russian notion of multipolarity under Putin has acquired a civilizational meaning that contradicts Western universalism; the Russian foreign elite intend to emphasize moral and cultural relativism against Western liberal values.

ACCESS DENIED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The modern international order demonstrates extreme indifference in terms of drawing its boundaries and legitimizing the foreign policy goals of both Russia and the West. It does not recognize any chance to clarify legitimate foreign policy goals and interests. The serious threat to the current international order is the overlapping of contradictory foreign policy interests held by the West (primarily NATO) and Russia that they both regard as legitimate and in the pursuit of stability. The underlying cause of this impasse is the fact that the modern international order leaves no room for flexibility with the legitimate foreign policy demands of hegemonic powers. This inevitably leads to zero-sum games, as actors can easily question the foreign policy constants of the U.S. Today’s international order is particularly confrontational; the foreign policies of the U.S. and Russia cannot find an area of breathing room where their interests do not collide.

These circumstances evoke the idea of ‘tissue incompatibility’ in the organ transplantation field, as they make it difficult to maintain a functioning and sustainable system. Russia’s foreign policy variables have become too strong, in part through a dependence on the legacy of the Cold War, not to allow any easy integration into the European international order. Since the modern international order has raised the cost of socializing, a better-functioning international system is necessary to socialize a large-scale actor like Russia. Of course, no such system currently exists. In classical European practices, conference diplomacy played a vital role in reaching peace settlements following hegemonic wars. The Cold War completely eliminated this logic. It played as a zero-sum game in which defeat would signify the collapse of one’s values. The replacing order has demanded a higher price for participation with high standards of freedom, human rights, US-friendly policies and cooperation with NATO. The international order has
never before witnessed an era whose dominant values were so reliant on a single military organization. In nineteenth-century diplomacy, statecraft had a crucial significance as a building block of the international order. Although it ended the division of Europe, the end of the Cold War also eliminated this crucial building block. NATO’s organizational priorities do not allow for the diplomatic alternatives that statecraft could bring. In fact, the institutionalization of security has limited statecraft’s potential contribution. Even LGBT rights in Russia have turned into a matter of the international order.

As much as the modern international order was founded on liberal, anti-Soviet values, its demands for new members are too high for Russia to adapt to. Thus, it is clear why Russia under Putin could conclude that, for Russia to maintain hegemonic prestige in the international order, it cannot turn its back on the legacy of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy.

In post-Napoleonic and post-World War II Europe, while its overarching system transformed, its principles simultaneously harmonized with the geopolitics of the emerging international order. There was no gap between principles and geopolitics. Today, however, while the West won the Cold War, the Soviet Union was never militarily defeated. Both the Red Army and NATO remained standing. The Soviet state elite were not replaced by Western elite. These circumstances resulted in an extremely fragile international order riddled with revanchist sentiments. The Treaty of Versailles may not have worked, but at least it was able to undergo a rapid transformation into a new order. The modern international order cannot undergo any kind of evolution or self-legitimization, making it more susceptible to failure.

In the past, the multipolar system offered a variety of instruments to great powers to check one another’s power ambitions. Russia was able to occupy itself through various ventures, such as digging the grave of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and fighting for the victory of communism against the capitalist West during the Cold War. However, the modern international system is unable to grant such occupations to a massive state like Russia.

***

If we are to define a stable international order as one that can socialize all major actors and, in turn, forestall the formation of polarized perceptions and actions, the modern international order is quite fruitless, as it could not even manage to make a healthy transition from the end of the previous order. While the bipolar international order was converted into a liberal international order, the new order was unable to foster geopolitics that would complement its structure. This is the most crucial loophole of the current international order. The values of an international order must complement the geopolitics on which it is founded. Without the potential of Russian harmonization, however, such “access” is impossible. The Western-oriented international order has been unable to rescue itself from the ashes of the Cold War. The landscape of European geopolitics has played an indispensable role in reproducing Russian geopolitics, as it does not allow for coexistence with the “illiberal hegemonic powers.” The current international order has far higher barriers in a normative sense, as it sets rigid criteria for the participation of hegemonic powers. While the world cannot return to multipolarity, it has remained far
from a community-based international order. It has sought to homogenize actors before granting legitimacy. Instead of facilitating dynamic equilibrium, the post-Cold War liberal international order has established an assimilation-or-rejection entrance. The modern international order has raised the bar so that every actor feels obligated to consent to a higher price of legitimacy. Clearly, the highest deficiency of the modern international order is that it does not allow for a high level of socialization. While it has prevented the use of hegemonic wars as a “solution,” it has been unable to forestall the development of “cumulative sediments” in global dynamics, as it is far from eradicating the remnants of the previous international order. This is clear through various phenomena, such as the Russia-Ukraine bond, the view of the Soviet Union’s collapse as “the geopolitical catastrophe,” Russian minorities in the Baltics, the lingering concept of “the Red Menace” and the American obsession with Sovietization. In contrast, the international order following the Vienna Congress of 1815 did not prevent the limited use of force – but it was capable of producing various alternatives. The modern international order has limited the options that were available to major powers in a multipolar system, such as coalition building, the limited use of force to overcome an impasse and statesmanship. The modern international order resorts to confrontation rather than communitarian sentiments. As a result, the liberal international order has prompted Russian foreign policy to adopt a more nationalist, civilizational tone. In other words, it has failed to achieve norms transmission, which is indispensable for socialization.

In both the international and European orders, we face a “Russia question.” The modern international order is far from serving its intended socializing function, meaning it cannot successfully incorporate Russia. All of Russia’s foreign policy variables currently indicate continuity – but what frames Russia as aggressive is the failure of the international order’s transformation process.

By arguing this idea, I do not intend to argue on behalf of a multipolar system. Instead, I am simply arguing the fact that, in an international order that has increased the cost of socializing, major actors must actively work to lower the costs of socialization and, in turn, lower the costs of foreign policymaking for Russia. It is clear that Russia’s political nature could not simply be converted into liberalism in the foreseeable future. Therefore, I believe that the modern international order can only overcome the “Russia question” through the pursuit of greater legitimacy. Additionally, the EU must soften its attitude towards the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union and not regard the defence of Ukraine as a matter of maintaining a “red line.” Given the circumstances of “tissue incompatibility,” adding more realist values such as legitimacy to the international order is logical, as it would signify the elimination of Russia’s main arguments against the West.

REFERENCES

Bull H., Watson A. (1989), The Expansion of International Society, Oxford.
Choucri N., North R. C. (1975), National Growth and International Violence, San Francisco.
Clinton B. (2005), My Life, London.
Contessi N. (2016), Prospects for the accommodation of resurgent Russia, in: Accommodating Rising Powers, edited by T. V. Paul, Cambridge.
d’Encausse H. C. (2010), La Russie entre Deux Mondes, Paris.
Gilpin R. (1981) War and Change in World Politics, New York.
Götz E., Merlen C. (2019), Russia and the Question of World Order, “European Politics and Society”, 20(2), 133–153.
Gvosdev N. K, Marsh C. (2014), Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors, Los Angeles.
Ikenberry J. I., Kupchan C. (1990), Hegemonic Powers and Socialization, “International Organization”, 44(3), 283–315.
Kaplan M. (1957), System and Process in International Politics, New York.
Kennedy P. (1989), The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York.
Kennedy P. (1980), The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism(1860–1914), Atlantic Highlands.
Kissinger H. (2000), A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and The Problems of Peace 1812–1822, London.
Kissinger H. (2014), World Order, London.
Krastev I., Leonard M. (2014), The new European disorder. London: European Council on Foreign Relations, Retrieved from http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR117_TheNewEuropeanDisorder_ESSAY.pdf.
Kupchan C. (2010), How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, Princeton.
Lo B. (2002), Russian Foreign Policy in the post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking, Basingstoke.
Lo B. (2015), Russia and the New World Disorder, Washington D.C.
Marks S. (1976), The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe 1918–1933.
Matlock J., The Mistakes We Made with Russia and How to Stop Making Them, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VmP513n78YE.
McFaul M. (2018), From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia, New York.
Mearsheimer J. J. (2014), Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusion That Provoked Putin, “Foreign Affairs”, 93(5), 77–89.
Russia’s many Interest in Syria, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/russias-many-interests-in-syria.
Sakwa R. (1993), Russian Politics and Society, London.
Orttung R., Walker C. (2015, February 13), Putin’s frozen conflicts. Foreign Policy (online), Retrieved from http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/13/putins-frozen-conflicts/.
Shevtsova L. (2007), Russia: Lost in Transition, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.
Primakov Y . (2004), Russian Crossroads, New Haven.
Stent A. (2014), The Limits of Partnership: US-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton.
Stone O. (2017), Interv’ju s Vladimirom Putinym, Moskva.
Trenin D. (2006), Russia Leaves the West, “Foreign Affairs” 85, No. 4 July–August): 87–96.
Tsygankov A. P. (2016), Russian Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, Rowman &Littlefield-London.
Watson A. (1992), The Evolution of International Society, London.
Atlantic Council Speech, https://www.c-span.org/video/?407763-1/nato-secretary-jens-stoltenberg-remarks.
ABSTRACT

It has been evident that Russia as the heir of Soviet foreign policy, could neither achieve to integrate herself into the international order, nor could the international order achieve to find a solution to Russian foreign policy identity quest. As long as Russia cannot find a stable and permanent status for herself in the world politics, her foreign policy will signify a permanent instability on the behalf of the international order. The current hegemonic international order is far from residing technical capabilities in terms of satisfying Russia’s foreign policy expectations, because it is unprecedentedly rigid in terms of allowing or refusing the incorporation of hegemonic power like Russia. While it cannot return to multipolarity, it could not set a community based international order either. Since the current international order was founded upon liberal anti-Soviet values, it entered into a lightness of exposing Russia to make clear-cut choices in her foreign policy. As much as the current international order was founded upon liberal anti-Soviet values, its demands from the new members would much higher that especially Russia would not easily adapt herself to.

Keywords: international order, Europe, Russia, foreign policy, the Cold War

PORZĄDEK MIĘDZYNARODOWY I PROBLEM DOSTĘPU POKONANEGO HEGEMONA: PRZYPADEK ROSJI W ERZE POZIMNOWOJENNEJ

STRESZCZENIE

Za oczywisty fakt należy uznać, iż Rosja jako spadkobierczyni Związku Radzieckiego i jego polityki zagranicznej nie mogła skutecznie zintegrować się z obowiązującym porządkiem międzynarodowym. Równie bezspornym pozostawał fakt, iż system międzynarodowy nie mógł znaleźć dla Rosji i jej wizji polityki zagranicznej odpowiedniego miejsca, które by z jednej strony odpowiadało oczekiwaniom strony rosyjskiej, a z drugiej było zgodne z obowiązującymi zasadami ładu światowego. Zdaniem autora, dopóki Rosja nie znajdzie dla siebie stabilnego i trwałego miejsca w systemie międzynarodowym, jej polityka zagraniczna będzie stanowiła ciągłe wyzwanie dla stabilności międzynarodowej architektury bezpieczeństwa. Co więcej, współczesny hegemoniczny porządek międzynarodowy daleki jest od technicznych możliwości zaspokojenia aspiracji Rosji w zakresie jej polityki zagranicznej. Przyczyną tego stanu rzeczy jest bezprecedensowo sztywna natura wspomnianego porządku międzynarodowego, uniemówotwiązająca Rosji realizację jej własnych hegemonicznych celów geopolitycznych. Zdaniem autora, współczesny ład międzynarodowy został zbudowany w oparciu o liberalne i antysowieckie zasady i wartości. Z tego też powodu Rosja, jako polityczna dziedziczka ZSRR, stając się w 1991 r. uczestniczką tego systemu, postawiona została przed wyzwaniami znacznie utrudniającymi jej integrację w ramach obowiązującej architektury ładu międzynarodowego.

Słowa kluczowe: ład międzynarodowy, Europa, Rosja, polityka zagraniczna, zimna wojna

Article submitted: 19.02.2021; article accepted: 10.05.2021.