CCNx 1.0 Bidirectional Streams
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Abstract
In Content Centric Networks, where one retrieves data based on a given name, not a conventional connection to a server or other device, there is a need for a standard mechanism to establish bi-directional streams. We describe a method to open and maintain such conversations using the techniques of a named data network.

Keywords
Content Centric Networks – Named Data Networks

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Introduction
CCNx Bidirectional Streams describes how two parties may open bidirectional data streams using networking techniques of CCNx. In CCNx, parties exchange data based on descriptive names of the data, not on machine addresses. This allows for more diverse forms of networking than traditional TCP/IP. In some cases, however, parties may still wish to directly exchange byte streams between two “live” applications and thus need the techniques described here.

Bidirectional Streams describes a Basic Setup and Authenticated Setup. In Basic Setup, the parties do not authenticate each other upfront, but defer it to later optional verification of the exchanged data. In Authenticated Setup, both parties authenticate each other before exchanging data, and they may optionally use data encryption.

Section 1 describes the Content Centric Networking (CCN) approach to Named Data and previous work on Voice over CCN that solved a specific type of bi-directional data. Section 2 presents this paper’s contribution on Bidirectional Streams and describes both basic setup and authenticated setup. Section 3 describes how Bidirectional Streams works when an initial setup request does not reach the best site to service the stream, and the request is forwarded to a different site.

1. CCNx Overview
In a Content Centric Network (CCN) [1], devices exchange data on a network based on descriptive names for the data, not on machine addresses such as in Internet Protocol. In summary, CCN is based on the exchange of Interest messages asking for content and Content Objects that contain data. A device requests content by issuing an Interest for the data using a name, such as ”ccnx:/newyorktimes/frontpage”. The Interest travels through the network until a device has a corresponding Content Object with a matching name. The matching Content Object travels on the Interest’s reverse path and provides the data to the original device.

The Interest/Content Object exchange is a uni-directional flow of data. The Interest contains a name prefix that enables the message to be routed over a network and usually contains information needed to select a specific content object or initiate a specific service at the Interest consumer. Application data then travels back in response to the Interest using a similar name to the Interest. What is missing is a conventional way to establish bi-directional data exchanges using simple names.

Bidirectional streams over Named Networks extends the methods originally proposed for Voice over CCN (VoCCN) [2]. VoCCN describes a method to initiate a Voice-over-IP conversation by exchanging SIP messages in Interests and Content Objects, then using bi-directional named streams for the Real Time Protocol (RTP) packet exchange. We generalize this method for arbitrary data connections between devices.

1.1 Voice over CCN
In Voice over CCN (VoCCN), a caller sends a specially formed Interest to the callee. The Interest contains the routable name of the callee and also encodes a SIP Invite [3] and a symmetric encryption key. The symmetric encryption key is encrypted with the callee’s public key, so only they can decrypt it. The SIP Invite is encrypted with the symmetric key. The callee inspects the SIP Invite and extracts the caller’s identity, which includes their routable name and the call-id. The callee creates a response Content Object that includes the callee’s SIP
Accept. Based on these exchanges over CCN, the caller and callee can create a bi-directional RTP flow, that is optionally encrypted with the symmetric key.

## 2. Bidirectional Streams

To establish bi-directional streams, at least one party must register to receive Interests on a service name for *service rendezvous*. The initiator sends to the service name an Interest that specifies the initiator’s stream name. The provider responds with a Content Object that contains the provider’s stream name. The parties may now exchange data over the two streams using segmented Content Objects. When one party is done writing to its stream, it indicates the final segment by setting the FinalBlockID of the ContentObject to that final segment number. If no final data is necessary, sets the Content size to zero. When the second party is done writing to its stream, it closes it with the same technique.

We use the notation `Int: <name>` to indicate an Interest with the name `<name>`. Other CCN selectors may appear to facilitate reading a CCN stream, but for brevity we do not detail them here. We use the notation `Obj: <name> :: <contents>` to represent a Content Object with the name `<name>` and its payload contents `<contents>`. We assume the contents are encoded using a standard method, such as XML objects or CCNB encoding. The actual stream payloads, noted as “Data” exchanges in Fig. 1, have arbitrary user bytes as payload and are not interpreted by the bidirectional protocol.

![Figure 1. Basic Stream Setup](image)

**Figure 1. Basic Stream Setup**

### 2.1 Closing a stream

A Content Object contains an optional field called the FinalBlockID. To close a stream, the writer sends a Content Object where the FinalBlockID is set to the object’s segment number. If no data needs to be sent, the object’s Content block has zero length.

When a stream reader receives a final block, it should cancel any pending interests for segments beyond the final block.

### 2.2 Authenticated streams

We saw how basic stream setup is susceptible to denial-of-service attacks because Bob does not know Alice’s identity during the Accept phase. This could cause Bob to send unwanted Read Interests to some third party. In this section, we present an authenticated stream setup.

We use the notation $S_{Adata}$ to mean that data is signed by the private key of $A$ so someone with the public key of $A$ could verify the signature. The notation $E_{Bdata}$ means that the data is encrypted with the public key of $B$ so someone with the private key of $B$ could decrypt it.

**Figure 2.** We use the notation $S_{Adata}$ to mean that data is signed by the private key of $A$ so someone with the public key of $A$ could verify the signature. The notation $E_{Bdata}$ means that the data is encrypted with the public key of $B$ so someone with the private key of $B$ could decrypt it.

![Figure 2.](image)

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In another scenario, the service name `ccnx:/bob/srvname` may be used like an Anycast address, getting Alice to a nearby service provider. That provider, however, may not be the best to service Alice. In this case, the first site, `bob_1`, forwards Alice’s Open interest to site `bob_2`, and data then flows directly between Alice and `bob_2`.

Fig. 4 depicts this scenario. Forwarding applies to both Basic Setup and Authenticated Setup. The Open request is forwarded from `bob_1` to `bob_2`, and the Accept object follows the reverse path of the Interests. The Accept content object carries `bob_2`’s stream name, so in the Data Exchange phase, Alice and `bob_2` communicate directly without `bob_1`.

In Basic Setup, the second provider does not necessarily need to be related to the first provider. For example, Bob could forward to Carol, so long as Alice is willing to accept an Accept Content Object signed by Carol. In Authenticated Setup, it may still be possible to use a 3rd party for the second service provider, but one would need to assure that Alice’s trust model allows for it, and that the second service provider can decrypt the session key, if Alice included one.
VoCCN: Voice-over Content-Centric Networks. In *ReArch*, 2009.

[3] IETF. RFC 3261 – SIP: Session initiation protocol.

[4] IETF. RFC 1889 – RTP: A transport protocol for real-time applications.