Political Participation Convergence in Indonesia: A Study of Partisan Volunteers in the 2019 Election

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ABSTRACT
This paper offers an analysis of convergent political participation in Indonesia, which is represented by the strengthening role of partisan volunteers in elections. Using the library research method, this paper explains why partisan volunteers present strategic positions in elections, especially in 2019. The results of this research reveal that the strengthening of the positions of partisan volunteers in elections is driven by the level of public trust in weak political parties in a strict and complex multiparty system, the emergence of flexible and civic-style political participation, and the co-optation of the voluntary understanding and function by political parties to reach undecided voters. The existence of volunteers was initially based on the antithetical spirit of an elitist political process, but later became a complementary element for political parties in the effort to win elections. Consequently, the involvement of partisan volunteers can lead to transactional politics and signifies a shift in the meaning of volunteers to that of a pragmatic arena.

Keywords: voluntarism, political participation, election, political party
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades academic concern has increased regarding the forms of political participation in the dynamics of democracy. Some scholars are interested in analyzing the shift in political participation indicated by lower election participation due to the lack of trust in democratic institutions and the weak credibility of political parties (Ekman & Amnå 2012, 289). The democratic process in Indonesia has as the focus of this study experienced a similar tendency of this decrease of participation in elections, but at the same time the involvement of the public in political contests has increased, as can be observed by the emergence of groups of partisan volunteers. The dynamics of political participation in elections is interesting for further analysis, particularly in explaining the development of political participation in contemporary democracy in Indonesia.

The development of political participation in Indonesia today is very dynamic; specifically, citizens are participating in more creative activities than merely being the subjects of the political process. Conventional participation, such as voting in elections and becoming a member of a party, has experienced a downward trend, or “normalization,” since the overturn of the reform era (Mujani 2007, 40). In the Indonesian 1999 election, the voter turnout in the legislative elections was 93.3%, which then continued to decline to 75.11% in 2014 (Electionguide.com 2019). The high level of participation in the 1999 election was influenced by public euphoria in welcoming the democratic reform era and was driven by people’s hopes of economic improvement after being hit by severe global economic recession in 1997. However, voter turnout continued to decrease in the following elections, which caused, among other things, the increasingly complicated electoral system, fatigues in many elections, and sentiments of not being obliged to vote (Tan 2006, 105).

On the other hand, the number of groups of citizens actively influencing the political processes is growing rapidly, in the form of both non-governmental organizations and volunteer groups. These both actively seek to improve the quality of democracy through advocacy ac-
tivities, empowerment of voter communities, and election observation. Among these democratic volunteers, there is a group of volunteers who focus on electoral matters. Of this group, there are at least two types of volunteer activities in elections, namely non-partisan volunteers and partisan volunteers. In the first type, volunteer activities focus on the quality of elections, starting from supervising the organizing body to increasing the number of participants and increasing the quality of voters. These volunteer groups carry out an alternative supervisory function toward election organizers so that they can play a role in providing early warning when violations may potentially occur in the election (Pas- karina 2018, 130). The latter type devotes their energy and expertise in an effort to win a party or candidate in the election. This paper refers to them as partisan volunteers. In countries with developed democracies, such as the US, partisan volunteers have been institutionalized as part of the campaign team for political parties. But in the political tradition in Indonesia, partisan volunteers tend to work to win candidates in the presidential election and regional head elections rather than for specific political parties.

In the 2014 presidential election, for example, both political parties Prabowo-Hatta and Jokowi-Kalla were supported by various voluntary groups which mainly targeted millennials. In the context of regional elections, the central role of volunteer groups was seen in the 2012 Jakarta governor election when the volunteer group Jokowi Ahok Social Media Volunteer (Jasmev) was quite prominent in delivering Joko Widodo-Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) as the chosen candidate pair. Likewise, in the election of the mayor of Bandung in 2013, the victory of Ridwan Kamil-Oded Danial was also accompanied by groups of volunteers who helped their campaign (Senova 2016, 150). The role of volunteer groups was also in the public spotlight prior to the 2017 Jakarta governor election when a group of young activists calling themselves Ahok’s Friends declared voluntary support for Ahok. They struggled to obtain citizen support by collecting one million ID cards in order to nominate Ahok as an independent candidate to match the dominance of political parties in the process of candidacy (Purbolaksono 2016).
The increasing role of partisan volunteer groups in elections is inseparable from the level of tight and complex multiparty electoral competition. Although Indonesia is among the most democratic countries in Southeast Asia due to the implementation of regular and fair elections (Ufen 2012, 462), the institutionalization of political parties, characterized by the existing patrimonial relations between party elites and their support bases, is still weak. At the same time, the democratization process has also contributed to the dissemination of information and broader political knowledge to the public. The public is increasingly exposed to political information and knowledge, so they experience increased awareness of both the political situation and of various practices that deviate from democratization. That awareness, which mainly takes place among the middle class, has encouraged some citizens to try to influence political direction so that it is not too dominated by the elites (Jati 2017, 152).

The emergence of volunteer groups that try to counterbalance the domination of elites is illustrated by their struggles, as is shown by Jasmev and other Jokowi volunteers in the 2012 Jakarta governor election and in the 2014 presidential election. These volunteers campaigned for Jokowi because they assumed that a number of government issues were unable to be resolved by previous elitist leaders. Meanwhile, Jokowi was considered as a representation of ordinary people who prioritize the interests of the people (Utomo 2013, 79). In the case of Ridwan Kamil’s victory in the 2013 Bandung mayoral election, the volunteer team was able to build the image of Ridwan Kamil as a figure from outside the elitist circle, as well as an urban activist who had brought various advancements in Bandung (Herdiansah, Gunawan & Muhamad 2014). With the support of the volunteers, Ridwan Kamil and Oded were able to outperform other candidates who were dominated by political party elites. The same phenomenon was also present in the struggle of Ahok’s Friends prior to the 2017 Jakarta governor election. The volunteer groups of Ahok’s Friends were fighting against the domination of political party elites by trying to nominate Ahok in efforts toward an independent path. During his term as governor of DKI Jakarta, Ahok
was regarded as a person who dared to oppose the interests of political party elites in the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) (Waluyo 2015).

Leading up to the 2019 election, which was when the legislative and presidential elections would take place, partisan volunteer groups again stood out. Most were concentrated on winning the presidential election. Thousands of volunteer groups were recorded as the strategic strength of each campaign team, from both the Jokowi-Ma’ruf and Prabowo-Sandiaga sides. Volunteer groups increasingly occupy strategic positions in elections, especially in the presidential election. The number of volunteer groups in the ranks of the campaign teams in the presidential election implies the significance of partisan volunteer electoral functions. In connection with this phenomenon, this article seeks to answer the question of why partisan volunteer groups are increasingly gaining strategic positions in electoral competition in Indonesia. More specifically, the question leads to the characteristics that are formed in volunteers when they are increasingly drawn to electoral politics. Then one asks what the consequences of the pragmatic relationship between partisan volunteers and candidates or campaign teams are.

By addressing the questions above, this paper presents an explanation of the characteristics of partisan volunteers in the 2019 Indonesian election. Furthermore, this paper reveals the partisan volunteers who bring the idea of contemporary Indonesian democracy into a new challenge, where public participation is high but is compromised by the interests of dominant practical politics. The analysis shows that the strength of the role of the voluntary electorate is linked to three interrelated points. Firstly, there is a weakening of public trust in political parties that creates political opportunities for rampant citizen activism in influencing political results. Secondly, there is an increase in the complexity of the multiparty political system ahead of the 2019 election with the enactment of simultaneous elections and an increase in parliamentary threshold for political parties. In the midst of these complexities, partisan volunteers are an alternative because they have high flexibility and facilitate the work of political parties, which are stifled
by competition in legislative voting. Thirdly, the concept of volunteers who tend to connect with candidates is utilized by the campaign team as a strategy to engage voters outside of their traditional support bases.

LITERATURE STUDY

Political participation is a term associated with election activities. Verba & Nie (1987) in their study describe political participation as an activity intended to elect good government administrators, both directly and indirectly. Regarding further developments, the term political participation has expanded from just the context of the election, namely all public activities which can influence joint decision-making, or the process of achieving goals carried out both by individuals and groups. In the classical literature, Gabriel A. Almond (in Lamprianou 2013) raising the issue pertaining to the distinction between conventional and unconventional political participation and showing why this distinction is largely artificial and to a certain extent elusive. To facilitate our discussion about extreme and violent political participation activities (as they are described in contemporary research classifies political participation into conventional and non-conventional participation. The first, conventional participation, refers to activities related directly to politics and government and is usually facilitated by formal means such as voting in elections, participating in campaign activities, joining interest groups, joining political parties, and communicating with political actors. Meanwhile, non-conventional participation refers to activities or actions that affect the political process carried out outside the electoral arena. Non-conventional participation provides greater freedom and opportunities for the community to continue to participate effectively, despite being outside the formal structure. Forms of non-conventional political participation include signing petitions, participating in demonstrations, and writing political articles in mass media or blogs (Barret & Zani 2015, 4).

In addition to the two forms of participation above, there are other typologies that highlight public activities which are often not recognized but which have a significant impact on political activities. Ekman
& Amnå (2012, 230) refer to activities such as engaging in political conversations as pre-political participation or latent political participation. Meanwhile, Li and Marsh (2008, 251) in their study highlight the development of forms of political participation in modern society, namely the role of expert citizens who use digital devices and their knowledge, especially of social media, to influence political decision-making or processes without joining the government. Dobratz, Waldner, and Buzzel (2016) in their study classify expert citizens in the form of institutional political participation because their actions or activities are carried out in the corridors of available institutions. Political volunteers fall into this category, as they are separated from political parties, but they use expertise, and provide energy and time to influence political processes by means of forming political associations, campaigning, holding public meetings, and overseeing the election course. Basically, volunteers work to mobilize people’s power in facing the hegemony of the elites, which always creates inequality (Eikenberry 2009, 45). The voluntary political strategic value is related to at least three points: 1) productive activities with qualifications and time availability to achieve public interest; 2) the power of social capital to mobilize collective action to trigger public participation on a broad scale; and 3) the moral commitment of volunteers with the community that can foster altruistic characters (Wilson & Musick 1997, 695).

Volunteers are often joined by the election campaign team as an extra energy in having more flexible characteristics than political parties for approaching voters. This includes making contact with voters (canvassing), holding public meetings to support candidates or parties (house parties), contacting voters via telephone (phone banks), performing clerical tasks, and preparing, installing and maintaining lawn signs (Shaw 2018, 45). The significance of volunteers’ role in the elections is strongly illustrated in Barack Obama’s campaign process, where he succeeded in gathering around 2.2 million volunteers in the 2012 US presidential election. Some 30,000 cell-network volunteers were responsible for bringing 10,000 teams into the neighborhood, and 20% of their
members provided 10 hours per week so as to be active in campaign activities (McKenna & Han 2014).

The increasing role of partisan volunteers in the election arena is related to how political parties carry out their functions. Political parties, whose function it is to recruit leaders in order to achieve public goals, play a key role in a democratic political system (Dalton, Farrell, & Mcallister 2011). In fact, parties tend to focus on winning as many votes as possible without regard for class boundaries, political views, and social identity, or what Otto Kirchheimer refer to as electoral party or catch-all party (Kouwel 2006). In the advanced industrialist society, where the public no longer questions ideology and does not even care about practical political issues, Katz and Mair (1995) identify a developing tendency of the cartel party in response to the diminishing number of party membership that obstructs the party to finance its operations. Parties become increasingly dependent on state subsidies and tend to minimize competition in order to maintain power. With a strong electoral orientation, political parties are practically difficult to distinguish from each other in terms of their ideologies because they pursue middle voters and are involved in non-coalition cooperation to overcome their financial difficulties. As a result, parties become increasingly dependent on the elite and are ultimately used to providing the elite with access to economic resources on the basis of the patron-client relationship (Robison & Hadiz 2004; Slater 2004; Ufen 2006). The failure of political parties in carrying out their functions also causes politics to pivot on the figure and is elitist (Ahmad & Herdiansah 2013, 262).

The consequence of the degradation of party functions is the decline of public trust in political parties and correlates with the low identification of the public toward political parties. According to Mason (2018, 6), the low level of connectedness between the public and political parties also weakens political participation. At the same time, new social movements, in which activists in the social sphere mobilize public support to intervene in the electoral process to direct results toward public expectations, also emerge. Therefore, partisan volunteers increase in number as the numbers of party membership decrease. Parties are
increasingly open to non-formal members or supporters who carry out volunteer functions in the election arena (Fisher, Fieldhouse, & Cutts 2013, 4). The growing presence of partisan volunteers is also facilitated by rapid digital communication and information technology that makes it easier for activists to mobilize the power of public participation. In their study, Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, and Valenzuela (2012) scholars tested how digital media use for informational purposes similarly contributes to foster democratic processes and the creation of social capital. Nevertheless, in the context of today’s socially-networked-society and the rise of social media applications (i.e., Facebook revealed that the use of social media and the Internet have a positive and significant impact on increasing individual activities to engage in social and political actions. This tendency later contributed to partisan volunteers in contemporary political marketing strategies by utilizing community communication nodes. They combine efforts to direct and exploit public disappointment with the leadership of the political elite through movements facilitated by social media.

Regarding further developments in election contests, a strategy emerged when the understanding of volunteers was harnessed to gain sympathy from a broad community. Volunteer groups were made part of the campaign team both openly and covertly when the campaign team tried to reach voters outside their traditional support base. Volunteer groups struggled to support the campaign, while other members, such as political parties, were directed to control the political process (Kholid et al. 2015). Although such an approach was legitimate as a vote-making tactic, especially to recruit undecided voters (Arianto 2014), the involvement of partisan volunteer groups also indicated an elite intervention that could shift volunteer functions in the political system. As suggested by Agustino (2014), volunteer groups function as a second tier campaign team to assist the core team that consists of elites who have the power of capital. This model of partisan volunteer placed its position on what Gramsci calls civil society and the political society (Coutinho 2012, 83). For some volunteer activists, working with elites is considered beneficial because elites are people who have strategic organizational positions
that can influence national politics (Field, Higley, & Burton 1990, 152). However, following Gramsci’s thoughts on hegemony, political elites will try to use all dimensions of public lives, not only economic instruments but also social production, especially ethos and ideas, to gain community support (Sen 2010, 10). In return, elites provide incentives to activists who have helped them to gain legitimacy from the community. For example, in Indonesia, the party elites are often involved in implementing “projects” together with activists from non-governmental organizations, bureaucrats, journalists, and academics (Aspinall 2013; Mietzner 2007).

RESEARCH METHODS

The analysis of this article is constructed using the desk study method by reviewing literature sources and information including scientific articles, books, research reports, and news related to the theme of political volunteers and elections. In terms of the data type used, this research falls into the category of library research or desk research. Library research was chosen for its function in analyzing secondary narrative data in a broad range (McNabb 2010, 236). In this article, the analyzed data intersect with the phenomena of volunteers in elections, the function of political parties, and the dynamics of democracy particularly after the 2014 election in Indonesia. To complete the analysis, this article also explores the facts and events relating to volunteer groups in elections in Indonesia that are recorded in various news outlets. The elaboration of the literature method with a study of factual events is then used to build an analysis of the role of political volunteer groups in elections, especially in the 2019 elections.

PARTISAN VOLUNTEERS IN MULTIPARTY ELECTORAL COMPETITION

The significance of the role of partisan political volunteer groups is inseparable from the weakening of public trust in political parties in Indonesia. The reform era, which began with the spirit of anti-
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (KKN), has not dampened the practice of KKN itself. The level of corruption remains high and not only occurs at the national level but also spreads to the regions. Ironically, those involved in KKN actions are mostly elites and cadres of political parties. Robison and Hadiz (2004) explained in detail that the endurance of corrupt practices in the post-Suharto era was due to the decentralization of power, which gave rise to local elites collaborating with the central elite. Mietzner (2015) mentioned that the failure to create a clean government is the result of systemic errors of political parties due to the overdominance of the interests of the elite. Instead, of being an institution that aggregates and fights for the interests of the public, political parties become the most undemocratic, exclusive organizations and focus on the interests of their leaders (Schulte Nordholt 2008). Political parties tend to be vehicles for the elites and their cronies to access economic resources with rent-seeking patterns so that public interests are ignored. Although emphasizing the interests of the elite and neglecting cadre competence, institutionalization of political parties in Indonesia is still relatively weak (Ufen 2012).

The weak institutionalization of political parties has caused them to become one of the least trusted institutions by the community. In 2014, Polcomm Institute revealed the results of its survey that 58.2% of people in Indonesia did not believe in political parties (Maharani 2014). Based on the survey results of public trust in political parties in 2018 by Charta Politika, as many as 45.8% of respondents rated political parties as institutions that could not be trusted. The public was concerned about the performance of political parties that have not yet brought about positive impacts in people’s lives, mass corruption in political party cadres in the parliament, and lack of emotional closeness to the public (Merdeka.com 2018). The survey from the Political Research Center (P2P) of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) also stated that public trust in political parties was relatively bad (Agung 2018). The low level of trust in political parties led to an increase in undecided voters. The P2P LIPI survey revealed that as many as 26 per cent of the people had determined which political parties to vote for
in the 2019 election (Tribunnews.com 2018). In addition, a survey by the Saiful Mujani Research Center revealed that the closeness of the party to voters was only 11%. This means that most voters do not feel connected by certain political parties and make their choices when they are at the ballot box. The low party identification (party-id) also affected the swelling of campaign budgets that political parties allocated to mass media campaigns (Basrianto 2018).

In the context of presidential and regional elections, the low voter loyalty to parties that nominated candidates tended to be overcome by partisan volunteers. From a normative perspective, the existence of partisan volunteer groups is a criticism of the performance of political parties and at the same time signifies increasing awareness and the ability of civil society to influence the electoral political process (Kholid et al. 2015). Some researchers have described the phenomenon of volunteers from this perspective, such as Hamid (2014, 86), who reviewed the emergence of Jokowi as the presidential candidate with the strongest electability with political branding through volunteer groups. The groups, part of the New Jakarta Volunteers, succeeded in gathering participants as 12,000 people who tried to encourage Jokowi to advance to the national stage by making him a potential candidate in the 2012 Jakarta governor election. Another example is the phenomenon of Ahok’s Friends, which fought to nominate Ahok in the DKI Jakarta governor election in the 2017 election through an independent path. Even though Ahok finally failed to be nominated by independent political forces, at least he managed to strengthen his electability so that he could get a candidate election ticket from political parties (Angeline 2016, 107).

Becoming a partisan volunteer is a channel for those who do not want political parties as their aspirational vehicles. As stated in Goe nawan Mohamad’s statement during the 2017 DKI Jakarta governor election, “The DKI Jakarta governor election is not only to win Ahok-Djarot, but also to assert our rights as non-political party people who believe in democracy” (Husein 2016). This statement was relevant to the survey results of Indo Barometer in 2017, which revealed that 51.3%
of respondents found that politics was bad. From the survey, 62.9% of respondents felt that they were not close to political parties. Generally, distrust of political parties is influenced by the negative actions of party cadres, such as always being involved in corruption (Faiz 2017) and in internal conflicts (Solihah 2016). In some regions, distrust of political parties led to citizen action to nominate regional head candidates without the political party path (independent), for example, Yogyakarta in 2016 (Sucahyo 2016). In line with this, the existence of partisan volunteers has yet to overcome the problem of low voter loyalty to political parties, as political tradition in Indonesia does not recognize the culture of volunteers as playing an active role in mobilizing support for political parties.

ROLE OF PARTISAN VOLUNTEERS IN THE 2019 ELECTION

The increasing role of partisan volunteer groups, apart from being a result of public responses to disappointing political party performance, has also been driven by an increasingly complicated electoral system. Facing the 2019 election in Indonesia, changes were made to the electoral system by the enactment of Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections that imposes a simultaneous election mechanism for 2019, raising the parliamentary threshold by 4%, and setting the presidential threshold at 20% of the seats in the DPR or 25% of the votes. These provisions automatically increase the challenges and complexity that have never been faced by political parties previously, not to mention the problem of increasingly tight legislative competition, in which as many as 7,978 candidates fight for only 575 seats in the DPR. At the same time, political parties must fight for their victory in the 2019 presidential election. This situation has made political parties have to work extra hard to win seats and pass their parties in the DPR while winning the presidential election. Thus the parties to divide their attention between fighting for presidential election victory and gaining votes in the legislative elections (*pileg*). Parties capable of placing their cadres as presidential and vice-presidential candidates have the advantage of electoral incentives.
Based on various surveys, the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P) and the Gerindra Party have electoral advantages from the presidential election. Other parties must fight to increase electability in order to obtain seats in the DPR (Tempo.co 2018).

The level of complexity increases when the requirements for nominating the president and vice president by political parties or a combination of political parties have a minimum of 20% of the votes. This new provision makes parties search for figures who have certainly had promising electability. Regarding the determination of the candidates, from a number of figures, Jokowi and Prabowo have the highest chance of winning the presidential election, resulting in a polarization between the nominators of Jokowi-Ma’ruf and Prabowo-Sandi. In the regions, the configuration of the community of the presidential supporters is not always parallel with the direction of the party coalition in the presidential election. Therefore, some elements demand flexibility in providing support for presidential elections. In Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), for example, several legislative candidates in a number of regions are more supportive of Jokowi-Ma’ruf because they prioritize winning the legislative seats. According to their calculations, supporting Prabowo-Sandi will be of more benefit to the Gerindra Party than to their own parties (Mardani 2018). Therefore, the presence of volunteers is considered helpful for the work of the political party coalition in the matter of winning the presidential election, and thus political parties can concentrate more on fighting for the votes that will pass them to DPR.

The configuration of partisan volunteer groups in the 2019 election is dominated by the desire to win the presidential election. This can be seen in the characteristics of volunteer formation and the distribution patterns of volunteer teams. In November 2018, Jokowi-Ma’ruf registered more than 420 groups of supporting volunteers to the General Elections Commission (KPU) (Wildansyah 2018), including Jokowi Mania, Maluku Jokowi, P2NUSA, Jokowi Center, Sangkar Bejo, and Projo. Meanwhile, Prabowo-Sandi claimed to have 560 volunteer groups working at both national and regional levels. They served primarily as a team that promoted candidate pairs to the public (Rosana 2018). In Decem-
ber 2018, the number of partisan volunteers recorded increased by as many as 1,827 groups in favor of Jokowi-Ma’ruf and 1,368 groups rooting for Prabowo-Sandi. The distribution of volunteer groups also followed the winning strategy of each candidate pair (paslon), in which 215 pro Prabowo-Sandi groups were placed in Central Java, while only 70 pro-Jokowi-Ma’ruf groups operated in the same area (Pancawati 2019). The proportion of the volunteer group distribution was aimed at expanding the coverage of the votes. Prabowo-Sandi assigned many volunteers in Central Java because their electability in the area was outnumbered by Jokowi-Ma’ruf.

The boosters of the volunteer groups came from various backgrounds ranging from politicians, political observers, and activists to community organizations. The following is a list of some partisan volunteer groups and their brief characteristics in the 2019 election.

| No. | Group Name                        | Founder/Chairman       | Background/Affiliation                                      | Role                                                                 |
|-----|----------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1   | Pro-Jokowi (PROJO)               | Gunawan Wirosaroyo     | Jokowi’s volunteer group in the 2014 presidential election | After Jokowi’s victory in the 2014 Presidential Election, Projo transformed into a mass organization to guard the Jokowi-JK government |
| 2   | Sekretariat Nasional (Seknas Jokowi) | Helmy Fauzy            | A politician/PDIP                                           | Seknas Jokowi was formed in Jakarta, December 11, 2013, with the agenda of supporting Jokowi in the 2014 presidential election. In the implementation of the 2019 Presidential Election, Seknas Jokowi declared the movement “Tetap Jokowi” as a response to the hashtag #2019gantipresiden |
| 3   | Barisan Relawan Jokowi Presiden (BaraJP) | Boni Hargens           | A political observer, lecturer. An activist supporting Jokowi in the 2014 presidential election An activist/Indonesian Voter Institution (LPI) Commissioner of LKBN | Bara JP (Barisan Relawan Jalan Perubahan) |
| No. | Group Name                          | Name                  | Description                                                                                                                                         |
|-----|------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 4   | Relawan Buruh Sahabat Jokowi       | Andi Gani Nena Wea,   | An activist Labour Organization/Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions. Consists of labor and the claim to have a vote power base in industrial estates throughout Indonesia and some overseas countries. |
|     |                                    | President of          |                                                                                                                                                     |
|     |                                    | Confederation of All  |                                                                                                                                                     |
|     |                                    | Indonesian            |                                                                                                                                                     |
|     |                                    | Trade Unions          |                                                                                                                                                     |
| 5   | Aliansi Masyarakat Indonesia Hebat | Hendrik Sirait        | Democracy activist. LBH Almisbat also reported two of the initiators of movement #2019gantipresiden, Mardani Ali Sera and Ismail Yusanto, due to alleged treason. |
|     | (Almisbat)                         |                       |                                                                                                                                                     |
| 6   | Solidaritas Merah Putih (Solmet)   | Sifester Matutina     | A Jokowi’s volunteer activist in the 2014 Presidential Election. Previously known as Barisan Merah Putih since 2005.                                  |
|     |                                    |                       |                                                                                                                                                     |
| 7   | Masyarakat Peduli Pangan (MAPAN)   | Wignyo Prasetyo       | A Jokowi’s volunteer activist in the 2014 presidential election, Chairman of New Indonesian National Network (JNIB).                                 |
|     |                                    |                       | Jokowi’s volunteer base, especially in East Java. MAPAN carries on #jokowisekalilagi and brings up the issues of agriculture, food security, and sovereignty. |
| 8   | Galang Kemajuan (GK) Jokowi        | Kelik Wirawan         | An activist, Chairman of Indonesian Archery Association (Perpani) 2018–2022. Kathi’s volunteer group in the 2012 DKI Jakarta governor election. The members of GK Center include professionals such as architects, economists, doctors, engineers, humanists and artists. |
|     |                                    |                       |                                                                                                                                                     |
| 9   | Sekber Jokowi Nusantara            | Bayutammi Sammy Amalia| A Jokowi’s volunteer activist in the 2014 presidential election. Declaration of support to Jokowi was carried out on July 29, 2018, in Bogor.           |
| 10  | Duta Jokowi                        | Joanes Joko           | A youth Activist, Indonesian Bishops Conference (KWI). Initiate National Movement “Indonesia Bijak” focusing on educational sector and the intelligence of political contents of millennial generation. |
| 11  | Jokowi Mania (Joman)               | Immanuel Ebenezer     | An activist from Ahok’s volunteer group for the in 2017 DKI Jakarta Governor Election. Declare the hashtag movement #2019TetapPresiden as a match for the opponent’s hashtag. |
| 12  | Pos Raya                           | Ferdinandus Semaun    | An activist of Jokowi’s volunteer group in the 2014 presidential election. Declared support to Jokowi on September 30, 2018, in Menteng, Jakarta. Oversee Jokowi’s consistency in running Nawacita Program and community empowerment through the strengthening of micro-economy. |
| No. | Group/Network Name                  | Name              | Role/Activities                                                                                                                                   |
|-----|------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 13  | Rumah Kreasi Indonesia Hebat       | Kris Budihardjo   | A volunteer activist supporting Jokowi in the 2012 Jakarta Governor Election and 2014 Presidential Election                                        |
|     | (RKIH)                             |                   | RKIH was initially named the New Indonesia Coalition, which was declared on September 23, 2013. Then it changed into RKIH mass organization on August 11, 2014 |
| 14  | Golkar-Jokowi (Gojo)              | Rizal Mallarangeng| A politician/Golkar Party Support Jokowi’s winning as presidential candidate and increase the votes of Golkar Party in the 2019 legislative election |
| 15  | Relawan Jokowi (Rejo)             | HM Darmizal       | A politician/Founders of Demokrat Party Rejo is occupied by several major figures from Demokrat Party. According to them, the development in the Jokowi era was considered to have continued the 10-year struggle of development carried out by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono |
| 16  | Jaringan Kemandirian Nasional (Jaman) | Iwan Dwi Laksono | An activist of Pro-NKRI issue Formed since Jokowi’s nomination as DKI Jakarta Governor candidate. In the 2019 presidential election, Jaman socializes the programs that Jokowi has implemented through social media |
| 17  | Jokowi Smart (JoSmart)            | Heri Sosiawan     | An activist supporting Jokowi, Chairman of UNS Alumni Movement for Jokowi-Ma’ruf Focus on mobilizing support for the movement of Jokowi 2 Periode |
| 18  | Sedulur Jokowi                    | Paiman Raharjo    | A Campus intellectual /lecture of private universities Commissioner of PT, PGN Established in 2004 when Jokowi still served as the mayor of Solo. Reactivated to support Jokowi 2 periode. Currently, it has been in 34 provinces and 300 districts/cities in Indonesia |
| 19  | Relawan Merah Putih (RMP)         | Titi Rizky        | An activist supporting Jokowi RMP has been a pro-Jokowi group since the 2014 Presidential Election. The Jakarta RMP coordinator at the time, Charles Honoris, was a PDIP politicians, although he claimed not to have any organizational relationship with PDIP |
| 20  | Komunitas Alumni Perguruan Tinggi (KAPT) | Ammar Syah       | An activist supporting Jokowi Consisting of intellectuals and professionals engaged in campuses in capturing sectoral and human resources investments |
| 21  | Komunitas Indonesia Cinta Jokowi (KITA Jokowi) | Ichya Halimudin | An organizational Activist/HMI Focus on recruiting millennials by holding discussions about Indonesia’s hopes and future |
Meanwhile, some of the volunteer groups that stand out in Prabowo-Sandi’s side are as follows:

| No. | Group Name                                                                 | Founder/Chairman      | Background/Affiliation           | Role                                                                 |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1   | Praga (Komunitas Prajurit Muda)                                             | Eka Gumilar           | A politician/Gerindra Party      | Praga is a *netizen* (people of the Internet) community that supports the winning of Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno |
| 2   | Ruang Sandi                                                                 | Dimas Akbar           | An activist                      | Ruang Sandi is hosting an event called #TitikTemuSandi throughout Indonesia to help with the campaign |
| 3   | Partai Emak-emak Pendukung Prabowo-Sandi (PEPES)                            | Eka Gumilar and Wulan | A politician/Gerindra Party      | PEPES is the aspiration and outcry of mothers with Indonesia’s economic conditions |
| 4   | Gerakan Konsolidasi Pemilih Indonesia untuk Demokrasi (KOPI Demokrasi)      | Young activists of Gerindra Party and PK | Politicians/Gerindra Party and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) | This action will consolidate millennial generations, youth and women who become the main supporting base of Prabowo-Sandi |
| 5   | Kaum Millenial bersama Prabowo-Sandi (#Kamiberani)                          | Maulidan Isbar        | A young entrepreneur             | The action #kamiberani to show support for millenial volunteers who take risks courageously. Focus on employment, tourism-based economic development, and the creation of employment opportunities through technology developments |
### Political Participation Convergence in Indonesia

|   | Organization/Group | Leader(s) | Role | Support Details |
|---|---------------------|------------|------|-----------------|
| 6 | Relawan alumni Universitas Gadjah Mada Pendukung Prabowo-Sandi (Relagama PAS 2019) | Andri Dian Ujianto | An activist | UGM Alumni declared their support for Prabowo-Sandi |
| 7 | Satuan Relawan Indonesia Raya (Satria) | Nizar Zahro | A politician/Gerindra Party | Have amassed supporters in 34 provinces and 514 regencies with claims of membership reaching 75,000 |
| 8 | Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa (GNPF) | Yusuf Muhammad Martak | A religious organization activist/GNPF Ulama | Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa (GNPF) officially supported Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno |
| 9 | Gerakan Rabu Biru (GRB) | Siti Hediadi Hariyati and Vivi Susanti | A politician/Berkarya Party | Persuasive actions wearing symbols of light blue shirt and cream trousers every Wednesday as support for Prabowo-Sandi |
| 10 | Relawan Selendang Putih Nusantara (RSPN) | Reza Pahlevi | Former supporters of Gatot Nurmantyo | RSPN has decided to support Prabowo-Sandi pair in the 2019 presidential election. The decision was taken after Gatot Nurmantyo failed to get the support of political parties to step forward in the presidential election |
| 11 | Relawan Rumah Indonesia | Djoko Santoso, Ferry Juliantono, Ferry Mursyidan Baldan, and Said Iqbal | A combination of actors/politicians supporting Prabowo | Members of Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia and other elements in Relawan Rumah Indonesia declared their support to Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno |
| 12 | Relawan Nasional Prabowo-Sandi (RN PAS) | Eggi Sudjana | An activist/attorney | Volunteer for the effort to win Prabowo-Sandi |
| 13 | Melati Putih Indonesia (MPI) | Vivi Sumantri | A volunteer activist Supporting Prabowo | Initially, it was a militant community on WhatsApp group PAS (Prabowo-Sandi) |
| 14 | Jaringan Pribumi (Japri) | Muhardi Zainuddin | A politician/Priboemi Party | Have their fighting vision and mission in line with the natives’ |
| 15 | Laskar Garuda Bersatu (Ladatu) | Reni Harti | An activist supporting Prabowo | Empower members who have entrepreneurial spirit |
| 16 | Komunitas Alumni UI Pendukung Prabowo-Sandi | Kamal Heryandri | An activist supporting Prabowo | Declared support for Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno at the 2019 Presidential Election at the Secretariat (Seknas) Jl. Hos Cokroaminoto, Menteng, Central Jakarta |
| 17 | GL-Pro 08 | Jimmy Ck | An activist supporting Prabowo | Follows the strategy of Joko Santoso to win Prabowo-Sandi |
| 18 | Jaringan Relawan Prabowo-Sandi (Jarpas) | Yahdil Abdi Harahap | An activist supporting Prabowo | Consist of various elements of society declared in South Jakarta, September 2018 |

Source: Processed by the author from various sources
From the characteristics of some partisan volunteer groups shown in the two tables above, we can determine some patterns of volunteer involvement based on their background. The first pattern is volunteer groups, whose activists are connected with mass nodes or at least represent certain mass bases such as labor volunteers and religious leaders (ulama) from the two sides. The second one is volunteer groups that represent certain social categories, especially among the younger generation and gender (women). Next, we have volunteers who showed loyalty to the candidates. Jokowi’s supporters included Joman, Duta Jokowi, Sekber Nusantara, Bara JP, and Projo, while on Prabowo-Sandi teams there was Ruang Sandi. Interestingly, several activists also tried to identify themselves as representatives of university alumni, particularly at the incumbent side. It is implied from these patterns that partisan volunteers tend to patch up the performance of political parties by facilitating the work of winning teams in approaching voter communities, especially from non-constituent groups of nominating parties. The campaign teams benefited from volunteers who worked at the grassroots level, such as building a positive image and directing public opinion in building candidate branding when political parties found it difficult to reach undecided voters. Volunteers could penetrate the boundaries of voters that were blocked by ideology, class, group, and political parties.

As they are operating outside the domain of political parties, the prominent characteristic of partisan volunteer groups has to substantiate the issues that benefit their candidates and their opinions that harm their opposing candidates. Political volunteers can confirm arguments that are useful for political parties or candidates. The stigma surrounding political parties is due to their perceived bad credibility. Arguments from volunteers can be better heard by the public. Volunteers who usually consist of activists and intellectuals are considered to have legitimacy of knowledge so that their arguments can influence public attitudes or opinions. At the same time, the party can also concentrate on strengthening its mass base and on relatively avoiding criticism from critical voters. For example, the Jokowi volunteer organization, Projo, always builds positive opinions about Jokowi’s government by revealing
the successes of the government (Tribunnews.com 2018). They also struggle to avenge attacks from elements of the Jokowi government’s opposition, for example, by stating that Jokowi’s opponents failed to carry out a bring-into-conflict strategy with Islamic groups after Zainul Majdi declared his support to Jokowi (Kuwado 2018). The supporting parties of Jokowi-Ma’ruf certainly benefit from the “help” of the volunteer groups in facing discourse battles in various media.

Not only do volunteer groups act as voter seekers, but they also commit political attacks to the opposing party, which is difficult for political parties to do. When the “battle” is in the domain of discourse, such as dropping each other’s image through policy views, activists from volunteer groups are more flexible to attack, for example by reporting the opponents to the police. Meanwhile, the same actions, if carried out by political parties, will be troublesome and have the potential to bring down the image of the party in the public eye or will narrow the voter segment. For example, LBH Amisbat reported the initiators of #2019GantiPresiden to the police for alleged treason; Mardani Ali Sera and Ismail Yusanto, (Kurniawan 2018). At the same time, volunteer groups also made counter-attacks to counterbalance the power of discourse or the leading of opinions the other party was trying to build; like Joman, who declared #2019TetapPresiden, and Mapan, who supported #JokowiSekaliLagi.

Most volunteer groups comprise volunteer activists who are connected with candidates rather than political parties, although there are several activists from political parties. Several prominent volunteer groups have fought to support Jokowi since the 2014 presidential election, such as Pos Raya, Almisbat, Sekber Jokowi Nusantara, Masyarakat Peduli Pangan, and Solmet. Even RKIH has been a volunteer team since Jokowi participated in the 2012 Jakarta governor election. The survival of partisan volunteer groups in the previous election tried to maintain Jokowi’s victory factors in the 2012 Jakarta governor election and the 2014 presidential election, which were based on representation of ordinary people’s hopes of being effective in the 2019 presidential election. Several other volunteer groups were connected on a mass ba-
sis, such as the Relawan Buruh Sahabat Jokowi, who was close to the Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia. They mobilized the voting base in industrial estates throughout Indonesia and established support with migrant workers overseas (Metrotvnews.com 2019). Such voluntary groups also have the role of expanding the voter base to the mass base with the characteristics of collective identity, thus giving access for converting sympathy to vote support to campaign teams.

Observed in Table 2 is that most partisan volunteer groups from Prabowo-Sandi’s side include activists whose political track record is less prominent, such as RSPN, Relagama PAS 2019, Kamiberani, Relawan Buni Yani, Melati Putih Indonesia, Jaringan Pribumi, GL-Pro 08, Jarpras, and Ladatu. Volunteer groups that were in support in the 2014 presidential election, like those of Jokowi’s, are not seen in the Prabowo-Sandi’s side. This means that Prabowo’s side is less able to maintain the elements of his supporting volunteers. This seems to be related to the position of Prabowo’s stronghold, which does not have privileges as the incumbent’s stronghold, namely “the luxury of incumbent” in the form of incentives in government positions or state-owned enterprises that provide activists with access to resources so that political support is possibly sustainable.

The survival of partisan volunteer groups in providing support for Jokowi was also from the incumbent’s position inseparable from political-economic incentives. This is in line with Millmore’s (1994) study that revealed that incumbents always have advantages such as public visibility and obtaining funding sources for election purposes. One of these advantages can be observed in campus intellectual activists who formed volunteer groups and openly declared their support for Jokowi-Ma’ruf, such as Boni Hargens and Paiman Raharjo. Some volunteer activists who helped to fight for Jokowi’s victory before the 2019 presidential election were offered the position of commissioner in the government or state-owned enterprises (BUMN). This phenomenon indicates that there is a tendency for volunteers not to be completely free from personal or group interests. When the candidates whom they
supported won the election, volunteer activists were then recruited to occupy “wet” positions within BUMN.

After the 2014 presidential election, many of Jokowi’s volunteers were placed as commissioners in BUMN. In the three years of Jokowi’s government, 21 volunteer activists were appointed as commissioners in various BUMNs (Detik.com 2017). This fact implies that a shift in the meaning of volunteers began to occur from those who originally fought purely for the public interest to be those with personal interests. Such practices will reduce the credibility of political volunteers in the public eye. The strategic placement of volunteers also indicates the existence of political contracts with candidates but not with political parties. This is similar to the research results of Aspinall (2014) in the 2014 presidential election, where political volunteers were not always loyal to the figures they nominated. As a result, the presence of volunteers can lead to positive participatory democracy and can also have the opposite effect. The government that represents the power of the political parties faces increasingly complex problems due to the increase in rent-seeking parties that are difficult to control due to the absence of formal relations between political parties and volunteers.

Among the volunteer groups, some are driven by political party activists. They prepare their volunteers to be able to lead undecided voters to be closer to political parties, in addition to the candidate figures they support. This has been at least in the highlight when political parties lack electoral incentives when their cadres do not get tickets to presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the 2019 presidential election. Prabowo-Sandi Coalition, for example, asks volunteers to also promote the nominating parties (Anggoro 2018) or Golkar Party activists who founded Relawan GoJo (Golkar Jokowi), with the intention of targeting the coat-tail effect of Jokowi. It is quite challenging to meet the expectation of these efforts because the principle of volunteers basically means to escape the shadow of political parties.

Volunteer groups on Jokowi’s side consist of politicians who are affiliated with nominating parties. Some volunteer groups mobilized by nominating parties include Super Jokowi by Ida Fauziyah (PKB), Rela-
wan Gojo by Rizal Malarangeng (Golkar Party), and Seknas Jokowi by Helmy Fauzy (PDIP). Volunteer groups connected to political parties seem to emphasize efforts to gain support from the basis of the constituents of each party while aiming at Jokowi’s electability coat-tail effect. For example, not only did Ida Fauziah attract PKB voters but she also sought to mobilize NU’s mass base, especially in Central Java (Liputan6.com 2018). Interestingly, the founder of the Demokrat Party, HM Darmizal, established volunteer groups. In fact, the party was in the ranks of Prabowo’s supporters. This indicates that volunteer groups can move flexibly without having to be pegged to political parties or bound to coalition contracts with certain candidates.

Meanwhile, on Prabowo-Sandi’s side, partisan volunteer groups formed by politicians of the Gerindra Party were quite prominent, such as Praga, PEPES, and Satria. Supporting parties that formed volunteer groups included the Gerakan Rabu Biru led by Siti Herdiadi (Berkarya Party). In PKS, the Demokrat Party, and PAN, politicians showed less enthusiasm for mobilization of voluntary groups in the presidential election. PKS politicians and the Gerindra Party together with counter-incumbent activists were able to declare #2019GantiPresiden in July 2018. However, various attempts to block and intimidate allegedly carried out by the pro-incumbent elements made the action less likely to continue.

The weak support of volunteers from political parties other than the Gerindra Party was caused by the coat-tail effect of Prabowo-Sandi, which was less favorable to other parties in their coalition. The combined nominating parties of Prabowo-Sandi were known in the first three months of the campaign period. The consideration of the coat-tail effect due to the conical candidates in the two candidate pairs made it difficult for non-government parties to come to an agreement on Prabowo’s companion. Every party, other than the Gerindra Party, wanted the vice-presidential position to be filled by its cadres. The decision of Sandiaga Uno as vice president initially received less appreciation from the Demokrat Party who also wanted the position. Meanwhile, PAN and PKS also appeared to be more focused on legislative elections. Moreover, the results of various party electability surveys showed that they
would probably not pass the parliamentary threshold. Party resources are certainly allocated to gain legislative votes rather than campaign for candidates in the presidential election. Therefore, the formation of volunteer groups from political parties is more dominantly carried out by the Gerindra Party, which has benefited from the coat-tail effect of Prabowo, whose cadres have the power to mobilize the presidential election volunteers.

Volunteers, as part of the strategy for winning elections, may certainly affect the democratization process. The involvement of partisan volunteers tends to have electoral interests. They are deliberately designed to work with political parties to gain support from voter segments that are less affordable to political parties. The investigation of Tapsell (2015) revealed how the struggle of volunteer groups in bringing Jokowi forward as the strongest candidate with massive movements in online and offline media mingled at the time with the power of conventional media oligarchy connected with elements of political parties. The merging of these two forces, the activities of volunteers and political oligarchs, made Jokowi’s figure even stronger and almost without rival. Interesting and viral content on social media about Jokowi always received positive responses. The struggle of the volunteer groups has succeeded in leading Jokowi to become a political figure by being widely accepted by the community, but in the end the effort remains to be in tandem with the interests of the rich who dominate the political economy.

In any case, political volunteer groups are not institutionalized political organizations that perform political functions, such as recruiting and selecting prospective leaders. Activists who are members of a volunteer team may not be experienced in managing political affairs. Therefore, there is no guarantee that volunteers will carry out their political functions professionally and competently. In addition, the existence of volunteer groups themselves has created problems. In KPU Regulation No. 23 of 2018, volunteer groups that can be prosecuted if they commit a campaign violation are those who are registered as part of the campaign team (Pancawati 2019). This means that unregistered partisan volunteer groups have the potential to trigger various violations
which ultimately defame the quality of the election. This situation can adversely affect political parties. For example, volunteers incompetent in managing sensitive issues can drag people to non-substantive debates that cause chaos and are prone to politicization of identity (Herdiansah 2017). In this condition, political parties can be trapped to take advantage of polarized voters. Political parties that should educate voters to be smarter in channeling political aspirations will find it increasingly difficult to deal with less rational voters, for example, because they are carried away by narratives of hatred as a result of exploitative volunteer teams attacking the opposing team. Meanwhile, political parties have become accustomed to using measurable efforts in conducting political debates in the public domain. Political parties are also bound by the rules and norms of electoral laws not to use SARA sentiments (ethnicity, religion, race, and class) while campaigning. At the same time, incompetent volunteers have the potential to perform ethics violations in competing in elections. Their actions can be detrimental to the candidates they support and furthermore have the potential of threatening social disintegration when conflict or hatred at the grassroots level is prevalent (Herdiansah, Junaidi, & Ismiati 2017).

CONCLUSION

The significance of the partisan volunteer position in the 2019 election in Indonesia shows a form of convergent political participation in which the concept of volunteer groups with characteristics of a grassroots movement having a spirit of citizenship mingles with the full interests of electoral politics. The low level of public trust in political parties has created a political opportunity for the growth of partisan volunteer groups. Volunteers provide access to mass base nodes that can be converted into vote support. Volunteers fight outside the institutional arena and are not bound by political norms, so they are more flexible for substantiating public issues while at the same time attacking the opposing candidates. The convergence of political participation in partisan volunteers is also reflected in the configuration of volunteer groups who follow the strategy of campaign teams in obtaining potential
votes. This factor works in a multiparty political system with a tighter and more complex level of competition with simultaneous elections and an increase in the parliament’s passing threshold.

Volunteers are also more attached or connected with candidates and their relationship with candidates tends to be based on political incentives. The incumbent seems to have privileges with the power of its resources in maintaining the loyalty of volunteer groups. The enactment of political incentives as an instrument for maintaining volunteer loyalty signifies the presence of transactional principles in volunteer support. Volunteer involvement in the political process does show a democratic political life, but the intensive use of partisan volunteers by practical political power makes volunteers institutionalized as supporters of candidates. Partisan volunteers also demonstrate the validity of the compromise that those in the domain of political society have with the representational power of civil society. With the rise of partisan volunteers fighting for the interests of campaign teams, political volunteers who bring pure characters from community activism will eventually thin out.

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