Both Worst Case and Outage Constrained Robust Design for MIMO Wiretap Wireless Sensor Networks

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Abstract—In this paper, we consider a MIMO wiretap system in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), where the confidential signal sent to the legitimate receive (Bob) may be eavesdropped by the eavesdropper (Eve). Assuming that only partial channel state information (CSI) can be obtained by the transmitter, we consider both worst case (WC) and outage-constrained (OC) robust secrecy optimizations. To solve the WC design, we propose to linearize these logarithmic determinant terms. After linearization, we tackle the CSI uncertainty using the Nemirovski lemma. Then, an alternating optimization (AO) algorithm is proposed to solve the reformulated problem. On the other hand, to solve the OC design, we transform the probabilistic constraint into safe and tractable reformulation by the Bernstein-type inequality (BTI) and large deviation inequality (LDI), and an AO algorithm is proposed. Numerical results are provided to demonstrate the performance of the proposed scheme.

1. INTRODUCTION

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are considered as a promising technique with numerous applications such as data acquisition, location monitoring, and node control [1, 2]. However, secure transmission has been seen as an important problem for WSN due to the openness of wireless channel [3, 4]. The physical layer security (PLS) technique, which exploits the characteristics of wireless channels, has been proved as an effective method to improve the security in wireless networks [5].

The design of transmit precoding or beamforming in multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel is a typical non-convex problem [6, 7]. To solve this problem, various methods have been proposed in [8–13]. In [8], the authors proposed a transmit precoding design based on alternating optimization (AO). In [9], the authors proposed a method based on matrix generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD). In [10], the authors proposed an iterative custom-made method. In [11], the authors proposed an inexact block coordinate descent (IBCD) method to design information signal and energy signal in a secrecy MIMO system with energy harvesting (EH). Recently, the minorization-maximization (MM) based method has aroused new attention to design the precoding in MIMO wiretap channels [12, 13].

However, due to the existence of channel estimation and feedback errors, it is difficult to obtain perfect channel state information (CSI). Robust design has been widely investigated to handle this obstacle. Commonly, there are two kinds of robust design in wiretap channel, e.g., the worst case (WC) secrecy design and outage constraint (OC) secrecy design.

Specifically, the worst case robust optimizing problem was investigated in [14–18]. The technique to tackle the bounded CSI uncertainty in these works mostly involved the S-Procedure. However, for a MIMO wiretap channel, the S-Procedure is not directly workable since the secrecy rate expression

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consists of several logarithmic determinant (log-det) terms, not the matrix trace formulation as in the multiple-input single-output (MISO) channel. To overcome this obstacle, log-det is commonly approximated as a trace by first order Taylor series expansion [14–16]. However, at high SNR region, the difference between the actual value and this approximation is huge [17]. In [18], the authors proposed an epigraph reformulation to handle the CSI uncertainty without considering artificial noise (AN).

On the other hand, the outage constraint design has been investigated in [19–23]. In [19], the authors proposed an AO method to achieve a safe approximation for the secrecy outage design. In [20], the authors proposed a successive convex approximation (SCA) based method to maximize the outage secrecy rate. In [21], the authors proposed an SCA method to maximize the harvested energy at the energy receiver subject to the outage secrecy rate constraint. Recently in [22] and [23], the authors proposed AO based methods to maximize the outage secrecy rate in MIMO channel without and with considering AN, respectively.

Motivated by these observations, in this paper, we investigate the bounded and probabilistic CSI uncertainties constraint robust designs, respectively. Specifically, considering both imperfect Bob’s and Eve’s CSIs, we aim to optimize the transmit precoding matrix and AN covariance. We propose to linearize these log-det terms and utilize epigraph reformulation to deal with CSI uncertainties. Then, an AO algorithm is proposed to solve the reformulated problem. For the outage-constraint design, we transform the probabilistic constraint into tractable reformulation by Bernstein-type inequality (BTI) and large deviation inequality (LDI), to achieve better performance and lower complexity, respectively. Finally, numerical results demonstrate the performance of the proposed scheme.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system model and problem statement are given in Section 2. Section 3 investigates the worst case secrecy design. Section 4 investigates the worst case secrecy design. Simulation results are provided in Section 5. Section 6 concludes this paper.

Notations: Throughout this paper, boldface lowercase and uppercase letters denote vectors and matrices, respectively. The conjugate, transpose, conjugate transpose, trace, and rank of matrix $A$ are denoted as $A^\dagger$, $A^T$, $A^H$, $\text{Tr}(A)$, and $\text{rank}(A)$, respectively. $\mathbf{a} = \text{vec}(A)$ indicates to stack the columns of matrix $A$ into a vector $\mathbf{a}$. $\mathbb{H}^+_N$ denotes the set of all $N \times N$ Hermitian positive semi-definite matrices. $A \succeq 0$ indicates that $A$ is a positive semi-definite matrix. $|\cdot|$ and $\|\mathbf{a}\|$ denote the absolute value and Euclidean norm of vector $\mathbf{a}$, respectively. $\otimes$ denotes the Kronecker product. $D(\mathbf{a})$ represents a diagonal matrix with $\mathbf{a}$ on the main diagonal. $\mathbf{I}$ is an identity matrix with proper dimension. $\lambda_{\text{max}}(A,B)$ denotes the largest generalized eigenvalue of matrices $A$ and $B$. $\text{Re}\{a\}$ denotes the real part of a complex variable $a$. $\mathcal{CN}(0, I)$ denotes a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vector with mean $\mathbf{0}$ and covariance $\mathbf{I}$. $[x]^+$ indicates $\max(0,x)$, and $\mathbb{E}[\cdot]$ stands for the statistical expectation.

2. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

2.1. Problem Statement

Let us consider a MIMO wiretap system, which consists of one transmitter (T), one legitimate receiver (Bob), and an eavesdropper (Eve), as shown in Fig. 1. It is assumed that the T, Bob, and Eve are equipped with $N_t$, $N_b$, and $N_e$ antennas, respectively. The channel matrices between T and Bob, and between T and Eve are denoted as $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{C}^{N_b \times N_t}$ and $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{C}^{N_e \times N_t}$, respectively.

In this paper, we assume that only imperfect Bob’s and Eve’s CSIs can be obtained. The bounded CSI uncertainties are modeled as

$$\mathcal{H} = \{ \mathbf{H} | \mathbf{H} = \bar{\mathbf{H}} + \Delta \mathbf{H}, \| \Delta \mathbf{H} \| \leq \chi_H \} , \quad (1a)$$

$$\mathcal{G} = \{ \mathbf{G} | \mathbf{G} = \bar{\mathbf{G}} + \Delta \mathbf{G}, \| \Delta \mathbf{G} \| \leq \chi_G \} , \quad (1b)$$

where $\bar{\mathbf{H}}$ and $\bar{\mathbf{G}}$ denote the estimates of $\mathbf{H}$ and $\mathbf{G}$, respectively; $\Delta \mathbf{H}$ and $\Delta \mathbf{G}$ are their respective channel uncertainties; $\chi_H$ and $\chi_G$ denote the respective sizes of the bounded channel uncertainties region.

Accordingly, the worst case secrecy rate can be expressed as

$$R_{\text{worst}} = \min_{\forall \mathbf{H} \in \mathcal{H}, \forall \mathbf{G} \in \mathcal{G}} C_b (\mathbf{W}, \Sigma) - C_e (\mathbf{W}, \Sigma) , \quad (2)$$
where $C_b$ and $C_e$ denote the mutual information at Bob and Eve, respectively, and are given by

\[
C_b (W, \Sigma) \triangleq \ln \left| I + HWW^H \mathbf{H}^H (\sigma_b^2 I + H\Sigma H^H)^{-1} \right|,
\]

\[
C_e (W, \Sigma) \triangleq \ln \left| I + GWW^H G^H (\sigma_e^2 I + G\Sigma G^H)^{-1} \right|.
\]

On the other hand, for the outage constraint design, the CSI uncertainties are modeled as follows

\[
\mathcal{H} = \{ H \mid H = \bar{H} + \Delta H, \ \text{vec} (\Delta H) \sim \mathcal{CN} (0, C_H) \},
\]

\[
\mathcal{G} = \{ G \mid G = \bar{G} + \Delta G, \ \text{vec} (\Delta G) \sim \mathcal{CN} (0, C_G) \},
\]

where $\Delta H$ and $\Delta G$ denote the channel uncertainties, respectively; $C_H$ and $C_G$ denote the covariances, respectively.

Accordingly, the secrecy outage probability can be expressed as

\[
\Pr \left\{ \min_{H \in \mathcal{H}, G \in \mathcal{G}} C_b (W, \Sigma) - C_e (W, \Sigma) \geq R_{out} \right\} \geq 1 - \rho,
\]

where $\rho$ is the secrecy outage probability, e.g., the chance of the achievable secrecy rate $R$ falling below the target rate $R_s$ due to CSI uncertainty.

### 2.2. Problem Statement

In this paper, we investigate the joint precoding and AN design to maximize the worst case secrecy rate and outage secrecy rate, respectively. Mathematically, the two problems can be formulated as

**P1:**

\[
P1: \max_{W, \Sigma \succeq 0} \left[ \min_{\| \Delta H \|_{F} \leq \chi_H} \ln \left| I + HWW^H \mathbf{H}^H (\sigma_b^2 I + H\Sigma H^H)^{-1} \right| - \max_{\| \Delta G \|_{F} \leq \chi_G} \ln \left| I + GWW^H G^H (\sigma_e^2 I + G\Sigma G^H)^{-1} \right| \right],
\]

s.t. $\text{Tr} (WW^H + \Sigma) \leq P_s$.

**P2:**

\[
P2: \max_{W, \Sigma \succeq 0} R_{out}
\]

s.t. $\Pr \left\{ \min_{H \in \mathcal{H}, G \in \mathcal{G}} C_b (W, \Sigma) - C_e (W, \Sigma) \geq R_{out} \right\} \geq 1 - \rho$.

where $P_s$ is the maximum achievable power for the transmitter.
3. WORST CASE SECRECY DESIGN

P1 is highly non-convex due to maximize the difference of several log-det functions in the CSI uncertainty region. In this section, we will propose an effective method to linearize these log-det terms and handle the CSI uncertainty.

Firstly, we introduce the following Lemma.

Lemma 1 [11]: Define an \( m \) by \( m \) matrix function,

\[
\Xi(U, V) \triangleq U^HNU + (I - U^H MV)(I - U^H MV)^H,
\]

where \( N \) is any positive definite matrix. Then, the following three equations hold true.

Equation (1): For any positive definite matrix \( S \in \mathbb{C}^{m \times m} \), we have

\[
S^{-1} = \arg \max_{T > 0} \ln |T| - \text{Tr}(TS),
\]

and

\[
-\ln |S| = \arg \max_{T > 0} \ln |T| - \text{Tr}(TS) + m.
\]

Equation (2): For any positive definite matrix \( T \), we have

\[
\tilde{U} \triangleq \arg \min_U \text{Tr}(T\Xi(U, V)) = (N + MVV^HM^H)^{-1}MV,
\]

and

\[
\Xi(\tilde{U}, V) = I - \tilde{U}^HMV = (I + V^HM^HN^{-1}MV)^{-1}.
\]

Equation (3): We have

\[
\ln |I + MVV^HM^HN^{-1}| = \arg \max_{T > 0, U} \ln |T| - \text{Tr}(T\Xi) + m.
\]

Equations (1) and (2) can be proven by the first-order optimality condition, while Equation (3) directly follows from Equations (1) and (2) and the identity \( \ln |I + AB| = \ln |I + BA| \).

Eq. (6) is hard to handle due to the coupled variables and non-convex objective and constraints. In the following, we will decouple Eq. (6) based on these above equations.

To utilize the above equations, we denote \( \Sigma = QQ^H \) and rewrite \( R_s \) as

\[
R_s = \ln \left| I + \sigma_b^{-2}HWW^H\left( I + \sigma_b^{-2}HQQ^HH^H \right)^{-1} \right| + \ln \left| I + \sigma_e^{-2}GQQ^HG^H \right|
\]

\[
+ \ln |\sigma_3^2I| - \ln |\sigma_2^2I + GWW^HG^H + GQQ^HG^H|,
\]

where

\[
f_1 = \max_{\Psi_{1} > 0, U} \ln |\Psi_1| - \text{Tr}(\Psi_1\Xi_1(U, W, Q)) + N_d, \tag{9a}
\]

\[
f_2 = \max_{\Psi_{2} > 0, V} \ln |\Psi_2| - \text{Tr}(\Psi_2\Xi_2(V, Q)) + N_T, \tag{9b}
\]

\[
f_3 = \max_{\Psi_{3} > 0} \ln |\Psi_3| + N_E - \text{Tr}(\Psi_3(\sigma_2^2I + GWW^HG^H + GQQ^HG^H)) . \tag{9c}
\]

Furthermore, the matrix functions \( \Xi_1 \) and \( \Xi_2 \) are as follows

\[
\Xi_1(U, W, Q) \triangleq U^H\left( I + \sigma_b^{-2}HQQ^HH^H \right)U + \left( I - \sigma_b^{-1}U^HW \right)\left( I - \sigma_b^{-1}U^HHW \right)^H, \tag{10a}
\]

\[
\Xi_2(V, Q) \triangleq \sigma_e^{-2}V^HV + \left( I - \sigma_e^{-1}V^HGQ \right)\left( I - \sigma_e^{-1}V^HGQ \right)^H. \tag{10b}
\]
Based on the above relationships, Eq. (6) can be rewritten as

\[
\max_{\Psi_1 > 0, \Psi_2 > 0, \Psi_3 > 0, U, V, W, Q} \ln |\Psi_1| - \text{Tr} (\Psi_1 U^H U) - a - b + \ln |\Psi_2| - \sigma_e^2 \text{Tr} (\Psi_2 V^H V) - c
\]

\[
+ \ln |\Psi_3| - \sigma_e^2 \text{Tr} (\Psi_3) - d - e,
\]

s.t. \( \text{Tr} \left( \Psi_1 (I - \sigma_b^{-1} U^HHW) (I - \sigma_b^{-1} U^HHW)^H \right) \leq a \), \( \text{Tr} (\Psi_1 U^H HQQ^H H^U) \leq \sigma_b^2 b \), \( \text{Tr} (\Psi_2 (I - \sigma_e^{-1} V^HGQ) (I - \sigma_e^{-1} V^HGQ)^H) \leq c \), \( \text{Tr} (\Psi_3 G^H W^H W^H G^H) \leq d \), \( \text{Tr} (\Psi_3 G^H G^H) \leq e \), \( (6b) \).

(11a)

Furthermore, Eq. (12) is still hard to handle due to the CSI uncertainty. Next, we will introduce the following Nemirovski Lemma to handle the CSI uncertainty. Firstly, we rewrite Eq. (12b) as

\[
\| I_{1}^H (I - \sigma_b^{-1} U^HHW) \|^2_F \leq a,
\]

\[
\| I_{1}^H U^H HQQ^H H_{U} \|^2_F \leq \sigma_b^2 b,
\]

\[
\| I_{2}^H (I - \sigma_e^{-1} V^HGQ) \|^2_F \leq c,
\]

\[
\| I_{3}^H G^H W^H W^H G^H \|^2_F \leq d,
\]

\[
\| I_{3}^H G^H G^H \|^2_F \leq e,
\]

(6b).

(12a)

Eq. (12) is still hard to handle due to the CSI uncertainty. Next, we will introduce the following Nemirovski Lemma to handle the CSI uncertainty. Firstly, we rewrite Eq. (12b) as

\[
\left| I_{1}^H (I - \sigma_b^{-1} T_{1}^H U^H (\tilde{H} + \Delta H) W) \right|^2_F \leq a,
\]

\[
\| I_{1}^H (I - \sigma_b^{-1} T_{1}^H U^H (\tilde{H} + \Delta H) W) \|^2_F \leq \chi_H.
\]

By denoting \( \Delta h = \text{vec} (\Delta H) \) and invoking the equation \( \text{vec} \left( A_1 A_2 A_3 \right) = (A_3^T \otimes A_1) \text{vec} (A_2) \), we obtain the relationship \( \| t_1 - \sigma_b^{-1} P_1 \Delta h \|_2 \leq a, \| \Delta h \|_2 \leq \chi_H \), where \( t_1 = \text{vec} (X_1 \tilde{H}W - T_1^H) \), \( P_1 = W^T \otimes X_1 \) and \( X_1 = T_1^H U^H \).

Based on the Schur complement, the above relationship can be reformulated as

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  a & (t_1 - P \Delta h)^H \\
  t_1 - P \Delta h & I
\end{bmatrix} \succeq 0, \| \Delta h \|_2 \leq \chi_H.
\]

(13)

Furthermore, Eq. (13) can be rewritten as follows

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  a & t_1^H \\
  t_1 & I
\end{bmatrix} \succeq \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \Delta h \end{bmatrix} \left[ \begin{array}{cc} -1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{array} \right] \Delta h^H \begin{bmatrix} 0 & P \\ 0 & P \end{bmatrix}^H.
\]

(14)

Next, we will introduce the following Nemirovski Lemma to handle the CSI uncertainty.

**Lemma 2** (Nemirovski Lemma) [24, 25]: For a given set of matrices \( A = A^H \), \( B \) and \( C \), the following LMI is satisfied

\[
A \succeq B^H X C + C^H X^H B, \| X \| \leq t,
\]

if and only if there exists a non-negative real number \( \mu \) such that

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  A - \mu C^H C & -tB^H \\
  -tB & \mu I
\end{bmatrix} \succeq 0.
\]
Based on the Nemirovski Lemma, Eq. (14) can be rewritten as the following LMI
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
    a - \lambda_1 & t_1^H & 0 \\
    t_1 & I & \chi H P_1 \\
    0 & \chi H P_1^H & \lambda_1 I
\end{bmatrix} \succeq 0, \quad (15)
\]
where \( \lambda_1 \geq 0 \) is the introduced auxiliary variables.

Similarly, we denote \( t_2 = \text{vec}(X_2 \bar{H} Q) \), \( P_2 = Q^T \otimes X_1 \), \( t_3 = \text{vec}(X_3 \bar{G} Q - T_3^H) \), \( P_3 = Q^T \otimes X_2 \), \( X_2 = T_2^H V^H \), \( t_4 = \text{vec}(T_3 \bar{G} W) \), \( P_4 = W^T \otimes T_3 \), \( t_5 = \text{vec}(T_3 \bar{G} Q) \), \( P_5 = Q^T \otimes T_3 \), then, the following LMIs can be obtained
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
    \sigma^2 b - \lambda_2 & t_2^H & 0 \\
    t_2 & I & \chi H P_2 \\
    0 & \chi H P_2^H & \lambda_2 I
\end{bmatrix} \succeq 0, \quad (16)
\]
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
    c - \lambda_3 & t_3^H & 0 \\
    t_3 & I & \chi G P_3 \\
    0 & \chi G P_3^H & \lambda_3 I
\end{bmatrix} \succeq 0, \quad (17)
\]
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
    d - \lambda_4 & t_4^H & 0 \\
    t_4 & I & \chi G P_4 \\
    0 & \chi G P_4^H & \lambda_4 I
\end{bmatrix} \succeq 0, \quad (18)
\]
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
    e - \lambda_5 & t_5^H & 0 \\
    t_5 & I & \chi G P_5 \\
    0 & \chi G P_5^H & \lambda_5 I
\end{bmatrix} \succeq 0, \quad (19)
\]
where \( \{ \lambda_2 \geq 0, \cdots, \lambda_5 \geq 0 \} \) are introduced auxiliary variables.

Bases on these above operations, we obtain the following problem
\[
\max_{T_1 > 0, T_2 > 0, \quad \text{s.t.} \quad (6b), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19)} \quad 2 \ln |T_1| - \text{Tr} (T_1 T_1^H U^H U) - a - b + 2 \ln |T_2| - \sigma_2 \text{Tr} (T_2 T_2^H V^H V) - c + 2 \ln |T_3| - \sigma_3 \text{Tr} (T_3 T_3^H) - d - e,
\]
\[
(20a)
\]
\[
(20b)
\]

To this end, we turn Eq. (6) into an equivalent problem in Eq. (12). Eq. (12) is still non-convex w.r.t all these optimization variables, but is convex w.r.t given variables when other variables are fixed. Specifically, these variables can be divided into three groups: \{W, Q\}, \{U, V\}, and \{T_1, T_2, T_3\}. Then, Eq. (12) can be decoupled into four subproblems w.r.t these variables. Both these subproblems can be effectively solved by the convex optimization tool CVX [28], and the optimal solution to Eq. (6) can be achieved in an alternating method.

### 4. OUTAGE SECRECY DESIGN

In this section, we will handle the outage secrecy design. As discussed in the above, we find that the OCSRM problem is non-convex due to the constraints in Eq. (7b). Hence, in the following, in order to solve the OCSRM problem, we propose an effective way to convert the non-convex constraints.

Based on Equation (1) and denoting \( W = WW^H \), we obtain the following relationship
\[
- \ln |I + \sigma_2^2 HW \bar{H} W^H| = \max_{S_b \geq 0} f_1 (S_b, I + \sigma_2^2 HW \bar{H} W^H), \quad (21a)
\]
\[
- \ln |I + \sigma_2^2 G (W + \Sigma) G^H| = \max_{S_e \geq 0} f_2 (S_e, I + \sigma_2^2 G (W + \Sigma) G^H), \quad (21b)
\]
where \( S_b \) and \( S_e \) are introduced auxiliary variables.
In addition, at low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) region, we invoke the following SNR approximation method [23],

\[
\ln |I + \sigma_b^{-2}H(W + \Sigma)H^H| = \sigma_b^{-2} \text{Tr} \left( H(W + \Sigma)H^H \right), \tag{22a}
\]

\[
\ln |I + \sigma_e^{-2}GWG^H| = \sigma_e^{-2} \text{Tr} \left( GWG^H \right). \tag{22b}
\]

By substituting Eqs. (21) and (22) into Eq. (5), we obtain the following probability constraint

\[
\Pr \left\{ \sigma_b^{-2} \text{Tr} \left( H(W + \Sigma)H^H \right) + \sigma_e^{-2} \text{Tr} \left( GWG^H \right) + \max_{S_e \geq 0} f(S_e, I + \sigma_e^{-2}G(W + \Sigma)G^H) + \max_{S_b \geq 0} f(S_b, I + \sigma_b^{-2}HWH^H) \geq R \right\} \geq 1 - \rho,
\]

which can be further safely approximated as

\[
\Pr \left\{ \sigma_b^{-2} \text{Tr} \left( H(W + \Sigma)H^H \right) + \sigma_e^{-2} \text{Tr} \left( GWG^H \right) + f(S_e, I + \sigma_e^{-2}G(W + \Sigma)G^H) + f(S_b, I + \sigma_b^{-2}HWH^H) \geq R \right\} \geq 1 - \rho. \tag{24}
\]

Next, we turn channel matrices \(H\) and \(G\) into the following form \(h = \vec h + C_{h1/2}v_h\) where \(h = \text{vec} (H)\) and \(\vec h = \text{vec} (\bar H)\), \(v_h \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, I)\), \(g = \vec g + C_{g1/2}v_g\). Similarly, \(g = \text{vec} (G)\), \(\vec g = \text{vec} (\bar G)\), \(v_g \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, I)\).

By invoking the equations \(\text{Tr} (ABC^H) = \text{vec}(C)^H(B^T \otimes I)\text{vec}(A)\) and \(\text{Tr} (A^HBCD) = \text{vec}(A)^H(D^T \otimes B)\text{vec}(C)\), Eq. (24) can be rewritten as the following equation

\[
\Pr \left\{ \left[ \begin{array}{c} v_h^H \\ v_g^H \end{array} \right] \left[ \begin{array}{cc} C_{h1/2} \Theta_1 C_{h1/2}^{-1} & 0 \\
0 & C_{g1/2} \Theta_2 C_{g1/2}^{-1} \end{array} \right] \left[ \begin{array}{c} v_h \\ v_g \end{array} \right] + 2\Re \left[ \left[ \begin{array}{c} v_h^H \\ v_g^H \end{array} \right] \left[ \begin{array}{cc} C_{h1/2} \Theta_1 & 0 \\
0 & C_{g1/2} \Theta_2 \end{array} \right] \left[ \begin{array}{c} h \\ g \end{array} \right] \right] + \left[ h^H g^H \right] \left[ \Theta_1 \Theta_2 \right] \left[ \begin{array}{c} h \\ g \end{array} \right] + \varphi \geq 0 \right\} \geq 1 - \rho, \tag{25}
\]

where \(\Theta_1 = \sigma_b^{-2}((W^T + \Sigma^T) \otimes I - W^T \otimes S_b)\), \(\Theta_2 = \sigma_e^{-2}(W^T \otimes I - (W^T + \Sigma^T) \otimes S_e)\) and \(\varphi = -\text{Tr} (S_b) + \ln |S_b| + N_b - \text{Tr} (S_e) + \ln |S_e| + N_e - R\).

Next, we will handle the CSI uncertainty based on the following BTI.

**Lemma 2 [26]** (BTI): For any \((A, u, c) \in \mathbb{H}^N \times \mathbb{C}^N \times \mathbb{R}, v \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, I)\) and \(\beta \in (0, 1]\), the following inequalities hold:

\[
\Pr_v \left\{ \left[ v^H A v + 2\Re \left\{ v^H u \right\} + c \geq 0 \right\} \geq 1 - \beta \right. \\
\left. \exists \left[ \begin{array}{c} \text{vec} (A) \\ \sqrt{2u} \end{array} \right] \right| \leq x, \\
yI + A \succeq 0, y \geq 0, \tag{26}
\]

where \(x\) and \(y\) are slack variables. Moreover, BTI is convex w.r.t all the variables \((A, u, c, x, y)\).

Based on BTI and denoting \(v = \left[ v_h^H \ v_g^H \right]^H\),

\[
A \triangleq \left[ \begin{array}{cc} C_{h1/2} \Theta_1 C_{h1/2}^{-1} & 0 \\
0 & C_{g1/2} \Theta_2 C_{g1/2}^{-1} \end{array} \right], \tag{26}
\]

\[
u \triangleq \left[ \begin{array}{c} C_{h1/2} \Theta_1 \\
C_{g1/2} \Theta_2 \end{array} \right] \left[ \begin{array}{c} h \\ g \end{array} \right], \tag{27}
\]
\[ c \triangleq [h^H \ g^H] \begin{bmatrix} \Theta_1 & 0 \\ 0 & \Theta_2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} h \\ g \end{bmatrix} + \varphi, \] (28)

we obtain the following relationship

\[
\begin{aligned}
\text{Tr} (A) - \sqrt{-2 \ln (\rho) x + \ln (\rho) y + c} & \geq 0, \\
\left\| \text{vec} (A) \right\|_2 & \leq x, \\
yI + A & \succeq 0.
\end{aligned}
\] (29)

To this end, we turn Eq. (25) into a solvable reformulation.

In addition, to reduce the computation complexity of the BTI method, we propose to use the following LDI method.

**Lemma 3** [27] (LDI): Let \( x \sim \mathcal{CN} (0, I) \), and \( A \in \mathbb{H}^{n \times n} \), \( r \in \mathbb{C}^{n \times 1} \) are given. Then, for any \( v > \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \) and \( \zeta > 0 \), we have

\[
\Pr \{ x^H A x + 2Re \{ x^H r \} \leq \text{Tr} (A) - \zeta \} \\
\leq \begin{cases} \\
\exp \left( -\frac{\zeta^2}{4T^2} \right), & 0 < \zeta \leq 2\bar{v}T, \\
\exp \left( \frac{\bar{v}v\zeta}{T} + (\bar{v}v)^2 \right), & \zeta > 2\bar{v}T,
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \bar{v} = 1 - \frac{1}{2v^2} \) and \( T = v\|A\|_F + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \|r\| \). Similarly with BTI, LDI is also convex w.r.t all the variables \((A, u, c, x, y)\).

Based on LDI, we transform Eq. (25) into the following relationship

\[
\begin{aligned}
\text{Tr} (A) + c & \geq 2\sqrt{-\ln (\rho)} (x + y), \\
\left\| u \right\|_2 & \leq \sqrt{2x}, \\
v\|A\|_F & \leq y,
\end{aligned}
\] (30)

where \( v \) is the solution of the following equation \( \bar{v}v = (1 - 1/2v^2)v = \sqrt{-\ln (\rho)} \).

For both BTI and LDI based methods, Eqs. (29) and (30) are still non-convex w.r.t all these optimization variables, but are convex w.r.t certain variables when other variables are fixed. Specifically, these variables can be divided into two groups: \( \{W, \Sigma\} \) and \( \{S_n, S_e\} \). Then, Eq. (24) can be decoupled into four subproblems w.r.t these variables. Both these subproblems can be effectively solved by the

**Table 1.** Complexity analysis of BTI and LDI methods.

| problems | Complexity Order (\( \ln (1/\varepsilon) \sqrt{\beta (K)} \bar{C}, \varepsilon \) denotes the accuracy requirement.) |
|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| subproblem 1 with BTI | \( \beta (K) = (2 + N_r + N_e) N_t + 4, \ C = n^3 + n \left[ (N_r + N_e)^3 N_t^3 + 2N_t^3 + 2 \right] + nN_t^2 (N_r + N_e)^2 (N_t N_r + N_t N_e + 1)^2, \) and \( n = \mathcal{O} (2N_t^2) \). |
| subproblem 2 with BTI | \( \beta (K) = (2 + N_r + N_e) N_t + 2, \ C = n^3 + n \left[ (N_r + N_e)^3 N_t^3 + 2N_t^3 \right] + nN_t^2 (N_r + N_e)^2 (N_t N_r + N_t N_e + 1)^2, \) and \( n = \mathcal{O} (N_t^2 + N_e^2) \). |
| subproblem 1 with LDI | \( \beta (K) = 2N_t + 5, \ C = n^3 + n(2N_t^2 + 1)^3 + n^2(2N_t^2 + 1)^2 + nN_t^4 (N_r + N_e)^4 + nN_t^2 (N_r + N_e)^2, \) and \( n = \mathcal{O} (2N_t^2) \). |
| subproblem 2 with LDI | \( \beta (K) = 2N_t + 4, \ C = n^3 + 2nN_t^6 + 2n^2N_t^4 + nN_t^4 (N_r + N_e)^4 + nN_t^2 (N_r + N_e)^2, \) and \( n = \mathcal{O} (N_t^2 + N_e^2) \). |
convex optimization tool CVX [28], and the optimal solution to Eq. (6) can be achieved in an alternating method.

Via a similar way to that in [27], we obtain the complexity comparison between BTI and LDI methods, which are shown in Table 1. From the comparison, we observe that the LDI method achieves lower complexity than the BTI method.

5. SIMULATION RESULTS

In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed design through Monte Carlo simulations. The simulation settings are assumed as follows: \( P_s = 10 \text{dBW} \), \( \sigma_b^2 = \sigma_e^2 = 10^{-4} \). Each element of \( \bar{H} \) and \( \bar{G} \) is randomly generated by \( \mathcal{CN}(0, 10^{-4}) \), and the channel uncertainties are \( \chi_H^2 = \chi_G^2 = 2 \times 10^{-6} \) for bounded uncertainty and \( C_H = C_G = 2 \times 10^{-6} \) for the outage case, respectively. The outage probability is \( \rho = 0.05 \). For the worst case design, we compare our algorithm with the following methods: 1) The case of perfect CSI, which can be seen as the upper bound of our proposed design; 2) The no AN method, e.g., setting \( \Sigma = 0 \) while only optimizing \( W \); 3) The SCA based method in [16]; 4) The MM based method in [13]. The five methods are denoted as “the proposed method”, “the perfect CSI case”, “the no AN method”, “the SCA based method”, and “the MM based method”, respectively. On the other hand, for the outage case design, we compare our BTI and LDI methods with the following methods: 1) The case of perfect CSI; 2) The no AN method; 3) The MM based method. The five methods are denoted as “the BTI method”, “the LDI method”, “the perfect CSI case”, “the no AN method”, and “the MM based method”, respectively.

5.1. Worst Case Performance

Firstly, in Fig. 2, we show the convergency of our proposed AO method with random channel realization. From this figure, we can see that for different channel conditions, the proposed method can always converge in limited AO numbers.

Secondly, in Fig. 3, we show the worst case secrecy rate \( R_{\text{worst}} \) versus the source transmit power \( P_s \). From this figure, we can see that our proposed method achieves better performance than the other methods. In addition, the performance gaps among the four methods with the perfect CSI case become larger with the increase of \( P_s \), while the SCA method tends to decrease in respectively high \( P_s \) region.

Furthermore, in Fig. 4, we show the worst case secrecy rate \( R_{\text{worst}} \) versus the channel uncertainty level. The proposed method achieves better performance than other methods. For all these methods,
The worst case secrecy rate $R_{\text{worst}}$ tends to decrease with the increase of the channel uncertainty level, which shows the impact of the channel uncertainty on the secrecy performance.

### 5.2 Outage Secrecy Performance

Firstly, in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, we show the convergency of the proposed BTI and LDI methods with random channel realization. Similarly with the previous AO method, both the BTI and LDI methods can be convergent in limited AO numbers.

Secondly, in Fig. 7, we show the outage secrecy rate $R_{\text{out}}$ versus the source transmit power $P_s$. From this figure, we can see that our proposed method achieves better performance than the other methods. In addition, the no AN design suffers from the worst performance, which suggests the importance of AN in resistance of the channel uncertainty.
Lastly, in Fig. 8, we show the outage secrecy rate $R_{out}$ versus channel uncertainty level. From this figure, we can see that the gap between BTI and LDI methods is tiny. However, the performance loss for the no AN method is quite large, which suggests the necessity of AN again.

6. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have investigated both WC and OC robust secrecy designs in MIMO wiretap WSNs. To solve the WC design, we propose to linearize log-det terms in the secrecy rate expression. After linearization, we tackle the CSI uncertainty based on epigraph reformulation and the Nemirovski lemma. Then, an AO algorithm is designed to solve the reformulated problem. Furthermore, to solve the OC design, we transform the probabilistic constraint into tractable approximation by the BTI and LDI. Numerical results are provided to demonstrate the performance of the proposed scheme.

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