Reconciling Competing Globalizations through Regionalisms?
Environmental Security in the Framework of Expanding Security Norms and Narrowing Security Policies

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ABSTRACT  This article examines environmental security regimes in 16 regional organizations and asks whether regions can effectively implement environmental security norms. It first defines these norms and discusses their emergence at the international level. At the same time, through the literature review, the article posits that the globalization of security threats has simultaneously led to a retrenchment of coercive non-state security strategies. Consequently, the article contends that the globalization of security norms has made them ineffectual because they have not properly addressed tangible security threats. At the same time, nation-state-based hard power security measures (especially border controls) have not adequately addressed the underlying causes of transnational threats related to human and environmental security. For this reason, the article examines how well regional approaches to security contribute to both protection against imminent violence and the promotion of human and environmental security through medium-term development strategies. The article contends that the emergence of regional environmental security regimes should be fostered by reinforcing regional security architectures through public participation mechanisms.

Keywords: human security, environmental security, comparative regional integration, regional policies

1. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, security debates have become quite nebulous. Internationally, 'new' global security norms such as human security, environmental security, water security, climate security, responsibility to protect (R2P) have emerged. Conversely, nation-state-based security policies have become narrow with specific concentrations on terrorism, organized
crime, trafficking, migration, border control, etc. This article addresses this seeming disconnect between international discourse and domestic strategies through a comparative analysis of regional security regimes. The article addresses three specific research questions: (1) Can regional organizations reconcile the inconsistencies between international security norms and domestic policies with regard to environmental security? (2) Why is environmental security not prominent in regional security agendas?, and (3) What is the impact of inter-regionalism on environmental security policies? It contends that regions are better positioned than nation-states to address environmental security issues because they can coordinate/implement transnational security strategies. However, the potential for regions to do so has been muted due to weak security architectures.

Following this introduction, the article includes four sections and a conclusion. In Section 2, the article presents a literature review and posits that the globalization of security norms has made them ineffectual at the international level because they have not properly addressed tangible security threats through soft power mechanisms. At the same time, nation-state-based hard power security measures (especially border controls) have not adequately addressed the underlying causes of security threats related to poverty, global inequalities, socio-economic and environmental vulnerability, etc. For this reason, the article argues that regional approaches to security can combine, when member states are committed, hard power responses to immediate threats and soft power strategies to the underlying transnational causes of insecurity. Consequently, regions can contribute to protection against imminent violence and they can address human and environmental security issues through medium-term development strategies.

In Sections 3 and 4, the article responds to the first two research questions above by comparing the security agendas of 16 world regions and the places that environmental issues have in them. According to the literature on regional security, there has been an increase in the variance between world regions in how they define security and how they address environmental issues (see Fawcett, 2013). This section documents the differences between the security discourses of regional organizations and specifically, it examines how environmental security figures on these agendas. Section 4 specifically attempts to explain these differences by examining the security architectures of these regional organizations.

Following the comparative parts of this study, section five addresses the impact of inter-regionalism on regional commitments to environmental security. The section focuses on the European Union (EU) because, unlike other global powers, such as the United States (US) or China, it is a region rather than a nation-state and the EU has made a commitment to being a global normative power by including commitments to good governance, human rights, the environment, etc. in foreign policy discourse. This case study of EU–Andean Community of Nations (CAN) relations demonstrates that the impacts of inter-regionalism are complex and the existence of different normative views in the field of environmental security can create tensions between regions.

1.1. Methods and Key Concepts

This article is based on a review of official policy documents and the websites of 16 regional organizations, in addition to secondary sources. Specifically, research was based on regional policy documents in the field of security and an examination of the mention of environmental security within these documents.

This study raises key concepts in the field of international relations, but to varying degrees and for different purposes. The core concept in this article is ‘security’ defined as protection from
harm. The article differentiates ‘hard security’ defined as protection from coercion-based threats and ‘soft security’ defined as protection against non-coercion-based threats. Specifically, the article’s primary focus on ‘environmental security’ defined as protection from environmental dangers, the lack/depletion of strategic resources and conflict over these resources, is generally classified under ‘soft security’. ‘Human security’ broadly defined as the protection of human dignity is a combination of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security measures. ‘Regional policies’, another term of primary importance in this article, are defined as those policies that are conceptualized and implemented by regional organizations and they do not include the individual policies of member states. ‘Globalization’ defined here as the internationalization of political norms is of secondary concern because it merely provides the framework for the article. Similarly, the term ‘norms’ defined as ‘shared political convictions that influence policy discourse/content’ is introduced in order to explain expanding security debates and contextualize this study of regional environmental security. Finally, ‘development’ is referred to as a process that affects our understanding and levels of security within and between polities.

2. Literature Review: How the Globalization of Security Norms Contrasts Trends in Security Policies

As stated in the introduction above, security paradigms have shifted considerably since the 1980s. Scholars such as Thomas (2001), Newman (2001), and Owen (2004) have documented the historical development of this paradigm since the Brandt Commission’s Report opened a debate on the relationship between development and security in 1980 and the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report brought the concept of human security to the forefront of international affairs. Specifically, these milestone reports questioned our very understanding of ‘security’ all the way to its foundations. They focus on three fundamental questions: (1) What is security? (2) For whom is security? and (3) What threatens security?

2.1. The Emergence of Human Security as a Conceptual Paradigm

The immediate answers to these questions have created an inseparable link between security, development, and governance. In response to question one: human security has been defined by the UNDP as ‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’ (see UNDP, 1994 Human Development Report). As Thomas (2001) argues in her seminal work on human security, this concept entails two facets, one quantitative, and one qualitative. In quantitative terms, ‘freedom from want’ includes the provision of all material needs for human life, including food, health, education, etc. Conversely, qualitative aspects of human security are related to ‘freedom from fear’ through the protection of human rights, the protection of physical safety and autonomous control over one’s life course. For Thomas,

... human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realized. Such human security is indivisible; it cannot be pursued by or for one group at the expense of another. (p. 162)

Of course, these discourses affect question two: for whom is security? The major shift created by this paradigm is the emphasis on the individual, or people if considered collectively, as the
referent(s) for security (see Khong, 2001). No longer do security debates exclusively address territories or states but people-centered policies are promoted.

This of course affected policy responses to question three focusing on threats to security. First, coercive threats to security have been redefined to include non-state actors (organized crime, cartels, terrorism, etc.) and intra-state conflict (civil wars, revolutions, rebellions, etc.) Second, non-coercive threats to security have been incorporated into policy strategies. These include poverty, corruption, discrimination, and of course, environmental issues such as climate change and access to water which are the focus of the next sub-section.

2.2. Environmental Security: What Place in Security Debates?

Within the ever-broadening international agenda, environmental security has emerged as pillars of rights-based security norms. Environmental security refers to threats posed by environmental events and conditions to the well-being of individuals, communities, or states (see Barnett, 2011). The development of the early literature on environmental security in the 1990s (see Dabelko & Dabelko, 1995; Homer-Dixon, 1994) often focused on conflicts and violence generated by competition for natural resources. In this regard, scholarship and policies identified and theorized the relationship between environment and security in classical terms. According to Floyd (2008), environmental security emerged as a paradigm because it ‘linked to the military’. Floyd specifically identifies the emergence of budget lines for environmental issues in US military spending.

The emergence of environmental security as a global norm is important because it recognizes the role of environmental resources in transnational conflicts. These resources include water (see Conde, 2010), minerals (see Puerta, 2013), and land (see Zoomers, 2010), among others and they have been central elements of recent conflicts in the Middle East (i.e. the Israel–Palestine conflict) and Africa (i.e. the conflicts in Darfur and Congo). In fact, ‘environmental security’ has shifted the focus in environmental agendas from conservationist discourse aimed at protecting the environment for its inherent moral value, to strategic discussions of how environmental conflicts are inherently human-made and thus, the language utilized in this paradigm reflects the realpolitik approach that has traditionally characterized international security debates (see Zeitoun & Warner, 2006; Koff & Maganda, 2014). Floyd (2008) states that environmental issues have reached the ‘equivalent of military problems’.

In terms of these global security debates, for example, threats to environmental security have emerged in terms of global discussions on climate change impacts (see Dabelko, 2009). The recently concluded 21st Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) focused on this issue and global discussions have analyzed the question of responsibilities and potential remedies to climate change impacts within the framework of sustainable development, democratic participation and the promotion of a global green economy. This global discussion recognizes the inter-linkages between development in different parts of the world and interdependencies between regional economies.

In the academic literature, this issue of interdependence has emerged in different ways. Apart from climate change discussions that center on ‘ecological shadows’ (the resources that a country draws from elsewhere) and ‘greenhouse footprints’ (emissions generated by a country to sustain its population), the literature has developed beyond classical frameworks related to direct conflict over natural resources. For example, Prins (1990) has argued that environmental issues cannot be addressed through classical policy-making strategies but that concerted policy collaboration between states is necessary to effectively address environmental challenges which
are transnational by nature. Dalby (2002) has broadened the notion of environmental security by analyzing ‘colonialism’ and the ‘colonial imagination’. He contends that the world cannot be environmentally separated but that through interconnections, consumption patterns in one part of the world affect the management of strategic resources in another. Moreover, identity formation and the diffusion of economic ideologies affect resource management throughout the world. This even affects how parks and other protected areas are managed in relation to ecotourism or tourism in general. As stated above, however, the main problem with non-traditional security strategies that are norm-based regards effective implementation.

2.3. Human and Environmental Security and Implementation Difficulties

The human right to water was passed by the United Nations in 2010. However, this is a right that is very difficult to implement. According to Maganda (2013), water stress remains a vital issue in global affairs that affects about 1.6 billion people, almost one quarter of the world’s population. The problem with the implementation of environmental security in general is related to its normative success. On one hand, these norms have emerged because they are inclusive by definition. In exchange, because they address notions of ‘justice’ they either raise questions related to the need to redistribute access to environmental resources (see Maganda, 2009) or the distribution of costs and benefits (see Shockley, 2011) to address generalized environmental threats.

In this regard, environmental security suffers from the same weaknesses as ‘human security’. The aforementioned ‘freedom from fear and want’ addresses profound issues related to human rights and responsibilities. On one hand, some observers of human security view this approach as a means to support basic human rights (see Ceballos, 2011). Conversely, other scholars suggest that human security offers policy options to states that permit them to address development issues while avoiding recognition of some human rights (see Naranjo Giraldo, 2009). In these cases, basic services such as food and water are viewed through the lens of ‘resource management’ rather than ‘rights protection’, thus reducing the security aspects of these policies.

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This is a fundamental weakness of human security-based strategies which have not established an international consensus around implementation mechanisms. For example, R2P is a fundamental international norm related to human security which should rest on three principles: (1) conflict prevention, (2) military intervention in the case of attacks on civilian populations, and (3) reconstruction of divided countries. Thus far, R2P has only been sporadically implemented. In part, this has occurred because the norm is vaguely defined. What constitutes a security threat that is so strong that it warrants international responses that disregard state sovereignty? In fact, sovereignty is a key issue in these debates as it is seen as a state’s responsibility rather than a right. Having said this, R2P also raises serious implementation issues as noted by scholars such as Spies and Dzimir (2011). Moreover, so much political debate has focused on military interventions that principles one (conflict prevention) and three (reconstruction) have been virtually ignored.

Similarly, recent scholarship on environmental security has significantly questioned the logic of implementation of securitized environmental policies. For example, Trombetta (2008) has contended that the securitization of climate change mitigation strategies has not necessarily optimized policy implementation. Specifically, Trombetta argues that security frameworks are based on a logic of conflict which does not necessarily apply to environmental issues. For this reason, the securitization of environmental issues is promoting a slow transformation of security logics
and provisions due to the introduction of non-confrontational strategies. However, as Floyd (2008) notes, these transformations have been muted by the ‘war on terror’.

In fact, nation-state security politics based on hard power have recently been reinforced in global affairs. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US, the ‘war on terror’ has led to tangible and decisive policies that have included the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, broader domestic anti-terror monitoring in the US and the reinforcement of external border controls (see Brunet-Jailly, 2007). The US has also externalized its border security through development programs in the Americas, such as the Plan Sur (Mexico), the Plan Puebla-Panama (PPP), and the Plan Colombia. The PPP, also known as the Mesoamerican Integration and Development Project, was established in 2001. It has included 3.5 billion US dollars of funding in eight development areas including some related to environmental security, such as energy, sustainable development, and disaster prevention and mitigation:

- Energy Sector Integration
- Transportation Integration
- Telecommunications Integration
- Trade Facilitation
- Sustainable Development
- Human Development
- Tourism
- Disaster Prevention and Mitigation

The EU has adopted a similar approach to security in part due to terrorist attacks in the UK, Spain and, most recently, France. Like the US, the EU has focused its attention on coercive security responses through which domestic security issues have significantly affected foreign policy (see Lavanex, 2004). The EU has established a common border control agency (FRONTEX), it has significantly increased inter-state cooperation in anti-crime strategies, and the Schengen Information System has been established with the principle objective of providing information on security threats posed by third country citizens. Like the US, the EU has also externalized its border control policies by implementing conditionality in its trade agreements with other world regions (i.e. the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA)) and its development aid (see Koff & Nanga, 2013). A comparison of the EU and US security policies gives credence to what Cornelius, Tsuda, Martin, and Hollifield (2004) have dubbed ‘the convergence hypothesis’. These authors argue that state/regional border control policies are increasingly converging because of the emergence of transnational terrorist threats, global demographic trends, similar labor market and welfare state limits, and transnational organized crime. Cornelius et al. (2004) also correctly propose the ‘gap hypothesis’ which indicates a separation between border security objectives and the results obtained. This gap clearly indicates the limits of coercive nation-state approaches to transnational security.

Consequently, human and environmental security should be viewed in terms of competing globalizations. On one hand, the globalization of security norms has broadened and humanized their objectives but this has led to implementation challenges. Conversely, the globalization of security threats has led to policy retrenchment and the reinforcement of nation-state-based strategies which also face implementation difficulties. How can this paradox be resolved? Recent scholarship on global security has focused its attention on regional security governance. For this reason, this article asks as its main research question: Can regional organizations reconcile
the inconsistencies between international security norms and domestic policies with regard to environmental security?

3. Comparing Regional Security Regimes: What Place for Environmental Security?

Regional environmental governance has emerged in recent years as an important paradigm in global environmental politics (see Petit & Maganda, 2012; Weale et al., 2000). This is an important development because environmental issues are generally considered transnational, and not international in nature. While political borders may cause policy implementation problems in Europe, the fact that they reflect past power relationships (North America: notably the Mexico–US divide) and colonial regimes (Africa, Asia, and South America) creates an entirely different level of difficulties with environmental governance in these parts of the world. Specifically, political borders do not respect the geographical boundaries in these continents nor do they reflect demographic or ethnic compositions which has contributed significantly to resource-based conflict in places such as Darfur, Liberia, or Congo.

Global environmental governance, especially at the level of the United Nations, has not been able to suitably address environmental security because this organization is ‘international’ and it is not well placed to address the ‘transnational’, defined as localized conflicts/problems that spill over national divides. Some observers of the 2012 Rio+20 Summit have noted this important distinction. For example, the Council on Foreign Relations has reported Dr. Suan Ee Ong’s (Nanyang Technological University) claim that the Rio conference erred on the side of breadth while lacking in depth (http://www.cfr.org/world/examining-rio20s-outcome/p28669). The argument here fits the recent trend in security studies presented in Section 2. The practice of global summitry in development and environmental politics reaffirms leaders’ commitments to sustainable development norms that are intrinsically linked to human security and environmental security but mechanisms for implementation cannot be identified because consensus-building in these arenas is seemingly impossible. Consequently, the separation between international norms and transnational environmental governance is strikingly evident. This has been shown by Maganda (2009) in her analysis of water security. Maganda compares world maps of socio-economic wealth and access to water and she shows that water access seems dependent on regional distinctions between levels of economic and political consolidation. For this reason, she argues that more attention should be paid to regional water policies. Consequently, this article raises the first research question presented above: Can regional organizations reconcile the inconsistencies between international norms and domestic policies with regard to environmental security?

Much of the broader scholarship on regional environmental governance contends that potential exists for an affirmative response. For example, Ken Conca argues that regional approaches to environmental governance are attractive for four reasons: (1) regions offer hope for political progress where global discussions have stalled, (2) regions offer superior conditions for common property resource management, (3) regions are more conducive to promoting norm diffusion, and (4) regional approaches may be a foundation for a cumulative approach to building global environmental governance (Conca, 2012). Alternatively, Debarbieux (2012) indicated that ‘knowledge regions’ can promote sustainable development through the establishment of spaces of dialogue and even common policy identities.

In fact, regional environmental agendas are quite developed throughout the world. Table 1, which is based on a review of policy documents from the regional organizations included in the table, shows the different policy objectives of environmental regimes in 16 regional...
| Regional organization                          | Regional environmental agendas                                      | Regional security agendas (environmental aspects in italics)                                                                 |
|---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| African Union (AU)                          | Biodiversity, climate change, energy, environmental                  | Small arms, weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorism, conflict early warning system, landmines, cross-border security, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building (including the promotion of sustainable development) |
| Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) | Climate change, food security                                         | Conflict early warning system, war economies approach, human security and good governance (transparency and promotion of democracy) |
| East African Community (EAC)                | Climate change, bio safety, water management, minerals and mining    | Cross-border crime, drug trafficking, small arms, counter-terrorism and anti-piracy, research on resource-based conflict     |
| Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) | Forest conservation, common energy policy, fishing                   | Conflict early warning system, election monitoring                                                                       |
| Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) | Water resources, energy                                              | Small arms, peacekeeping, border security                                                                               |
| Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) | Food security, natural resource management, sustainable development, disaster prevention | Protect against instability and intra- and inter-state conflict and aggression, conflict early warning system, intelligence cooperation, peacekeeping and peace-making, cross-border crime, conflict prevention, protection of human rights, migration governance, disaster prevention |
| Mercado del Sur (MERCOSUR)                  | No regional policy arenas recognized                                  | Democratization and military–civic relationships; inter- and intra-state conflict; terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking |
| CAN                                         | Climate change, food security, water, disaster prevention, biodiversity | Common Andean Policy on External Security; establishment of a Peace Zone in the Andean Community; limiting military spending in order to use those funds for social investment purposes; intensifying cooperation to fight terrorism, illegal arms trafficking and drug trafficking; harmonization of security policies with social development, environmental and biodiversity management, and human rights |
| Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)    | Energy security                                                      | Defense cooperation, trafficking and organized crime, democratic stability, economic security, energy security               |

(Continued)
organizations. This table illustrates the developed state of regional environmental governance as most regional organizations have made significant commitments to sustainability in key environmental areas such as the protection of biodiversity, water resource management, climate change mitigation, and energy policies. This seems to reinforce the notion that regions are well placed to address environmental issues. On one hand, their transnational nature offers opportunities for

| Regional organization | Regional environmental agendas | Regional security agendas (environmental aspects in italics) |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| Sistema de la integración centroamericana (SICA) | Water (including climate change impacts), food security, sustainable energy | Democratic security including rule of law and transparency, strengthening the role of civil society in security policy-making, anti-corruption, anti-terrorism, small arms, drug trafficking, disaster mitigation and prevention |
| North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) | Cross-border water management, climate change, pollutants, protection of ecosystems | Migration, terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime |
| Organization of American States (OAS) | Biodiversity, energy, climate change, water resource management | Drug trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism, cyber security, disarmament, landmines, conflict resolution (including Peace Fund) |
| Caribbean Community (CARICOM) | Water resources management, sustainable land management and integrated watershed and coastal areas management waste management: solid, liquid, hazardous, biomedical and electronic waste sustainable consumption and production, eco-efficiency and renewable energy environmental and social impact assessments climate change | Organized crime, small arms, drug trafficking, financial crime, cyber-crime, corruption, human trafficking and smuggling, disaster prevention, pandemics, climate change, irregular migration |
| Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) | Climate change, haze pollution, water resources management, disaster prevention | Comprehensive security including political development, peace through norm diffusion, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict peace-building through common actions such as humanitarian assistance |
| European Union (EU) | Biodiversity, water governance, soil and land management, waste management, climate change, air pollution, natural resource management, sustainable production and consumption, sustainable energy, policy coherence | Counter-terrorism, organized crime, human trafficking, sexual exploitation, irregular migration, external peace-building, a responsible neighbor, human rights, climate change, development cooperation, disaster relief and humanitarian aid, trade |
| Arctic Council | Climate change, biodiversity, oceans | Climate change, strategic resources including oil, minerals and natural gas, governance of shipping lanes, territorial disputes |

*Source: Table compiled by author.*
collaboration in innovative management schemes. For example, the EU has implemented a Water Framework Directive that has facilitated the governance of cross-border water basins. Similarly, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has made smog and air pollution a priority on its agenda because it is a transnational phenomenon that affects various states in the region.

While Table 1 does recognize regional commitments to sustainable development, it also highlights a broader problem related to environmental security. Section 2 has shown that this norm has been accepted internationally and the table also demonstrates that regional organizations have made important commitments to this norm through the recognition of environmental security in key regional development programs. Nonetheless, the third column in the table lists the key issues in regional security regimes. Environmental issues are highlighted in italics in this column. It is clear that ‘regional environmental security’ has not yet been fully integrated into general regional security strategies. For this reason, it seems evident that world regions have recognized environmental issues as political priorities and potential exists for them to address globalized security debates. However, these regions have not yet operationalized ‘environmental security’ within their regional security agendas.

Thus, one must ask: How can we discuss ‘environmental security’ separately from broader security debates? The policy arenas listed in column three of the table seem to reinforce the conclusion presented in Section 2: the globalization of security threats has narrowed security policies which largely focus on inter- and intra-state conflict, organized crime, trafficking, and terrorism. The AU has vaguely included sustainable development as part of its peace-building post-conflict reconstruction program and the Andean Community has impressively linked sustainable development to a broader security agenda that includes human rights, anti-poverty strategies, and the rights of indigenous populations. Largely, however, regional environmental security policies are limited to disaster prevention in developing regions (SADC, SICA, CARICOM) and climate change policies in wealthier and more consolidated regions (EU and Arctic Council). UNASUR focuses on energy following the interests of member states such as Venezuela and Ecuador which are exporters of oil, Bolivia which exports gas, and regional hegemon Brazil which exports oil and alternative fuels such as palm oil.

For this reason, it seems that regions presently hold limited potential for the implementation of environmental security norms. The trends illustrated by Table 1 indicate that regional security agendas, both general and environmental, seem to be driven by the interests of member states rather than international norms. Consequently, regions should be viewed as extensions of their members’ security personalities and their security agendas seem to reflect the accumulated interests of their member states. In short, they seem to be extensions of state-based security policies rather than autonomous polities with their own security agendas based on globalized norms which inform their member states. This leads to the second research question listed above: Why is environmental security not prominent in regional security agendas?

4. Comparing Regional Security Architectures: What Opportunities for Implementation of Environmental Security Strategies?

The previous section has shown that environmental security is marginalized in most regional security agendas. This suggests that nation-states remain dominant actors in transnational security debates. An emerging literature on regional security regimes has documented this situation in great detail. Fawcett (2006) has noted that ‘security regionalisms’ have become prominent in specific security fields (i.e. border controls, migration policies, anti-terrorism, etc.) but that, in general, these organizations have not developed strong regional security institutions. Similarly,
van Langenhove et al. (2009) have recognized the significant contributions that numerous regional organizations have made to the protection of human security in different world regions. They too, however, have contended that the successful implementation of human security policies depends on multilevel governance and coordinated actions at the supranational, national, and sub-national levels.

These studies, among others, provide clues as to why environmental security has not figured prominently in regional security regimes. They have indicated that unlike other policy arenas, such as environmental management, where regions have taken leading roles in policy implementation, security has remained an issue dominated by member states which are hesitant to cede authority to regional organizations over hard security questions. This is evident in the EU (which according to Kirchner and Dominguez has the most developed regional security architecture in the world) where Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been one of the policy arenas in which supranationalism has been slowest to develop (see Hix & Hoyland, 2011).

For this reason, it seems that security architectures influence regional security strategies more than international norms such as environmental security. Even the EU, which has attempted to carve a niche for itself in global affairs through the operationalization of commitments to global norms such as human and environmental security, is characterized by CFSP that is driven by the interests of member states. Smith (2004), among others, has analyzed the establishment of the EU’s CFSP through the lens of multilevel governance. He contends that CFSP results from the combination of domestic politics of member states and institutional mechanisms. Rarely does this scholarship mention the evolution of global norms in the formulation of CFSP.

The most complete comparative study in this field has been conducted by Kirchner and Dominguez (2011). These authors examined the relationship between regional security performance and the domestic economic and political conditions of 14 regional organizations’ member states. In general, the authors of this study noted that member states have readily supported regional organizations in the definition of regional security policies. However, their support has waned through the policy coordination and implementation stages. Consequently, member states supported regional security discourse without necessarily supporting operationalized regional security policies.

Also, Kirchner and Dominguez note that significant variance exists between the definition of security strategies in different policy arenas and the depth of implementation of these strategies. Of the 14 regional organizations included in the study, nine were ranked with low levels of regional security governance. Only the EU scored highest in both the range of policy arenas covered in the regional security regime and the ability to implement these policies (including coordination and implementation mechanisms). Mixed regimes, such as UNASUR, CAN, and CARICOM, had well-defined security regimes but their commitments to implementation stopped at the policy coordination stage (see Kirchner & Dominguez, 2011).

Of course, these findings indicate that regional security agendas remain dominated by organizations’ member states. The present article confirms that regional security architectures vary significantly and this affects both the breadth and depth of these security regimes. It is difficult for environmental security policies to emerge in agendas that are largely dominated by state actors following domestic incentives and conflict-based security logics.

Table 2, which is based on an examination of institutional frameworks of 16 regional organizations, presents the security architectures for these organisms. The analysis is based on the research conducted by Kirchner and Dominguez. It classifies the case regional organizations into three groups: (1) ‘open security structures’ that are defined by regional authorities and characterized by direct public participation. This legitimizes their activities and confirms that regional actors
are defining policies and not simply implementing those strategies forwarded by member states, (2) ‘weak security structures’ in which regional institutions exist but they are dominated by member state actors, and (3) organizations in which security structures are lacking and regional policy is made through ad hoc bilateral negotiations or formal/informal consensus-building.

This table confirms many of the conclusions presented by Kirchner and Dominguez. Seven of the organizations examined here are characterized by ad hoc bilateral negotiations between member states or consensus decision-making through formal or informal channels (ECCAS, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, OAS, CARICOM, ASEAN, Arctic Council). Six more are characterized by relatively weak institutional structures (EAC, ECOWAS, SADC, CAN, UNASUR, SICA) that loosely coordinate security strategies in regional organizations and only three regions have institutionalized and open security structures that promote public participation and legitimate decision-making (AU, COMESA, EU).

Because regional organizations, especially those in the developing world have weaker security architectures, it is not surprising that their strategies are more closely tied to the interests of member states than international security norms. A more systematic comparison of these regimes’ characteristics illustrates this point. In order to understand the place of environmental security in regional security agendas, this article utilizes scales to compare this (dependent) variable to regional environmental policies and regional security architectures.

### Table 2. Comparison of 16 regional security architectures

| Regional organization | Regional security architecture |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| **Open security structures—public participation** |
| AU                    | Peace and Security Council: members represent Africa’s Sub-regions; African Peace and Security Architecture: parliamentary and civil society inclusion |
| COMESA                | Committee on Peace and Security; Ministries of Foreign Affairs; Programme on Peace and Security: Civil Society Participation, Inter-Parliamentary Forum, Committee of Elders |
| EU                    | External Action Service and Justice and Home Affairs |
| **Weak regional security structures—lack of public participation** |
| EAC                   | Sectoral Council on Interstate Security: member states |
| ECOWAS                | Mediation and Security Council; ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework |
| SADC                  | Organ for Politics, Defense and Security which includes member states’ ministers of defense |
| CAN                   | High-Level Group on Security and Confidence-Building |
| UNASUR                | Energy Council of South America |
| SICA                  | Central American Security Commission (autonomous) |
| **Ad hoc bilateral negotiations or formal/informal consensus-building** |
| NAFTA                 | Ad hoc bilateral relations |
| OAS                   | Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, Security consensus through formal and informal structures |
| CARICOM               | CARICOM’s Implementation Agency for Crime and Security; consensus through formal and informal institutions |
| MERCOSUR              | Security consensus through formal and informal structures |
| ASEAN                 | Security consensus through formal and informal structures |
| ECCAS                 | Security consensus through formal and informal structures |
| Arctic Council        | Peace and Security Council; ad hoc bilateral relations |

**Source:** Table compiled by author based on policy documents.

are defining policies and not simply implementing those strategies forwarded by member states, (2) ‘weak security structures’ in which regional institutions exist but they are dominated by member state actors, and (3) organizations in which security structures are lacking and regional policy is made through ad hoc bilateral negotiations or formal/informal consensus-building. This table confirms many of the conclusions presented by Kirchner and Dominguez. Seven of the organizations examined here are characterized by ad hoc bilateral negotiations between member states or consensus decision-making through formal or informal channels (ECCAS, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, OAS, CARICOM, ASEAN, Arctic Council). Six more are characterized by relatively weak institutional structures (EAC, ECOWAS, SADC, CAN, UNASUR, SICA) that loosely coordinate security strategies in regional organizations and only three regions have institutionalized and open security structures that promote public participation and legitimate decision-making (AU, COMESA, EU).

Because regional organizations, especially those in the developing world have weaker security architectures, it is not surprising that their strategies are more closely tied to the interests of member states than international security norms. A more systematic comparison of these regimes’ characteristics illustrates this point. In order to understand the place of environmental security in regional security agendas, this article utilizes scales to compare this (dependent) variable to regional environmental policies and regional security architectures.
environmental policies’ have been measured in terms of their breadth by counting the issue arenas that regional organizations have included in their environmental policies. This approach highlights the general value of ‘environmental security’ present within a given regional organization. Conversely, ‘environmental aspects of security strategies’ and ‘regional security architectures’ have been operationalized by utilizing the model proposed by Kirchner and Dominguez which examines policy definition, policy harmonization, and policy coordination. The article proposes an ordinal scale in which:

0 = no regional definition of security  
1 = regional definition but no policy harmonization or coordination  
2 = regional definition and harmonization but no policy coordination  
3 = regional definition, harmonization and coordination

Figure 1 compares these variables across the 16 regional organizations presented in Tables 1 and 2. The lines in the figure illustrate a weak but present relationship between the breadth of regional environmental agendas and the place of environmental issues in regional security strategies. However, the trends illustrated by this figure illustrate a much closer relationship between the character of regional security architectures and the importance of environmental issues in regional security agendas. Given that 13 of the 16 regional security architectures examined in this article are considered ‘weak’ at best, this would seemingly reinforce the argument that the ‘globalization of security norms’ is weak and it would seem to explain the difficulty with promoting environmental security more prominently in regional security debates. This point is further illustrated below through a qualitative analysis of the EU and its inter-regional policies.
5. Inter-regionalism and Environmental Security: A Discussion of EU–CAN Relations

This section of the article asks: what is the impact of inter-regionalism on regional environmental security? Specifically, it inquires whether inter-regionalism promotes the globalized norms addressed in the literature review or whether regions behave like macro-states, reinforcing hard security approaches. In order to complement the comparative analysis presented above, this section presents a case study of the EU. The EU represents a critical case in the context of this study. On one hand, the EU has positioned itself as a ‘normative power’ in the world (see Pace, 2007) through open diffusion of ‘core values’ such as human rights and democratic governance. In the field of environmental governance, the EU has criticized other world powers such as the US and China for their relative inaction in the field of climate change mitigation. Moreover, as Kirchner and Domiguez have shown, the EU has the most complete regional security architecture in the world in terms of regional definition and regional implementation. For these reasons, the EU should present an example of ‘best practice’ in terms of implementing environmental security within its regional security agenda.

The article discusses EU cooperation with the CAN. This relationship has been chosen for two reasons. First, it is an example of symmetrical inter-regionalism (see Roloff, 2008) because it involves cooperation between two regional organizations. Second, as Table 1 illustrates, the Andean Community has internally demonstrated a commitment to environmental security on two levels. First, it has a well-developed environmental agenda with policies on topics such as climate change, food security, water, disaster prevention, and biodiversity. Second, the CAN has integrated environmental dimensions in its security agenda and it actively attempts to harmonize security policies with social development, environmental and biodiversity management, and human rights. These characteristics are recognized in the scholarship on CAN regional integration by scholars such as Marquez and Romero (2003) and König (2013). For these structural reasons, one would expect environmental security to emerge in EU–CAN cooperation, also within the framework of security discussions.

A review of EU inter-regional agreements (based on official policy documents and announcements posted on the EU website and those of its regional partners) indicates a more complex situation. It is true that the EU has promoted sustainable development and environmental conservation through its development strategies, notably, the Lomé III and Lomé IV Conventions and the Cotonou Agreements. The EU has included food security and water security in its development programs and it has demonstrated a strong commitment to the Millennium Development Goals in both its development and trade relations with ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) countries.

Nonetheless, even though the EU has promoted environmental security in development and trade, environmental concerns have not emerged in EU security agendas nor in EU partnership negotiations with other world regions. For example, the Barcelona process (1995–2005) which aimed to establish a free trade zone in the Mediterranean Basin operationalized the externalization of borders and migration controls because all non-EU Mediterranean states participating in the initiative committed to support the EU’s actions to prevent clandestine migration. Since 2005, when the Euro-Mediterranean Union was formed, the language of this approach has been softened as the union discusses ‘the promotion of regular migration’. Nonetheless, the implementation of these initiatives has not changed as the EU and member states, such as France and Spain, have invested heavily in anti-immigration and anti-trafficking measures in third countries. Conversely, Marín Durán and Morgera (2012) have noted that even though environmental norms are part of the discourse of the Euro-Mediterranean Union, ‘Euro-
Mediterranean Associations do not establish special procedures for the implementation of environmental commitments, nor for resolving environment-related disputes’ (p. 81). In this regard, the EU has adopted normative discourse but it has not operationalized it through implementation mechanisms. Instead, it has reinforced member state security interests.

The EU’s relationship with the Andean Community of Nations is more complex, in part due to the CAN’s commitment to environmental security. A cooperation agreement signed in 1993 included numerous policy arenas related to environmental security. In general, the agreement identifies the promotion of sustainable development as a main objective of EU–CAN cooperation. Moreover, specific goals were enumerated in relation to individual policy fields. For example, ‘protection and improvement of the environment’ and ‘rational use of natural resources’ were included in the agreement under the auspices of ‘cooperation in science and technology’. The agreement also included specific focus on mining, energy, forestry, and fisheries.

In the EU’s Andean regional action plan from 2003 to 2006, environmental security also figured prominently. Specific budgets (amounting to nine million euros) were allocated to disaster prevention and disaster relief. Other identified priorities included: climate change, water, biodiversity, and forests. Moreover, the agreement stipulated that environmental impact assessments would be carried out when appropriate at the project level.

Despite this seemingly solid collaboration in environmental arenas, tensions have arisen in the EU–CAN relationship due to different positions on important aspects of environmental security. One of the most significant issues which has actually blocked deeper EU–CAN cooperation is water privatization. The EU has pushed for water privatization in its cooperation agreement negotiations with the CAN. In 2007, Bolivian President Eva Morales prominently withdrew from EU–CAN trade negotiations because they included water privatization.

This dispute manifested itself on a much larger scale in 2010. As Carmen Maganda’s contribution to this special issue has shown, the EU has not adequately included water security in its foreign policies. Maganda’s article documents, how EU member states unanimously abstained from the UN vote on the human right to water in 2010 which was heavily supported by the Andean Community following its introduction to the United Nations by Bolivia.

In addition to its lack of support for water security, the EU has been criticized for focusing almost its entire cooperative security agenda with the CAN on the fight against drug trafficking. Smaller initiatives focus on combatting illegal immigration, the trafficking of small arms and terrorism. In all these fields, EU rhetoric claims to support policy strategies that present a balanced, multilateral, inclusive and non-selective approach to this issue. In this vein Ministers stressed the importance of stepping up cooperation and of strengthening efforts to address, in a comprehensive way, all relevant supply and demand issues, including political and social stability, security and sustainable development. (http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/conseil/2005/05/26ueand-cc/index.html)

However, when the CAN attempted to introduce rights-based approaches to these issues into the most recent cooperation agreement negotiations, the EU supposedly refused (http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/exteriores/migraciones.htm). This has created discontent among some members of the Andean Community of Nations, especially among NGOs that focus on the protection of biodiversity and water management. Curiously, ‘the environment’ seems to have been demoted in EU–CAN cooperation as it now has been incorporated under to the more general theme ‘social and economic cohesion’ in the EU’s 2007–2013 regional strategy paper. The development seems to indicate that the tension over water management and privatization issues seems to have affected the EU–CAN relationship in the field of environmental
security. Moreover, Andean interest groups and non-governmental organizations have mobilized over these issues. In response, the EU and the CAN have established a civil society forum in which participants discuss varying aspects of EU–CAN cooperation, including environmental security. Such measures have the potential to help reconcile the promotion of globalized security norms as described above, with coercion-based security strategies presently adopted by most regions. This is discussed in the conclusion below.

6. Conclusion

This article has contended that the world is witnessing competing globalizations in security affairs. On one hand, security norms have globalized beyond nation-states as human security and environmental security have emerged as powerful concepts in the international arena. Conversely, the globalization of security threats has reinforced nation-state security strategies, at times to the detriment of international norms.

In line with the emerging literature on regional security governance, this article supports the premise that regional security strategies are well placed to promote new security norms while simultaneously addressing transnational security threats because these organizations are supranational in nature but they are characterized by transnational governance mechanisms (i.e. multi-level governance). The problem with many of these regimes, however, is related to their weak regional governance architectures. First, regional security regimes are characterized by weak institutions which permits member states to reinforce their own security preferences. This is dangerous because national security policies are not only maintained, but they are strengthened since they have been politically legitimized through approval by regional bodies. This point is clear in the presentation of the EU’s security agenda in which inter-regional agreements with Mediterranean and African regional organizations aim to reinforce security more than norm-based development (see Miranda, Pirozzi, & Schäfer, 2012).

Unfortunately, nation-state-based strategies do not satisfactorily address transnational threats as recent events in West Africa (civil strife in Mali), East Africa (terrorism in Kenya and piracy in Somalia), and Europe (Paris terrorist attacks) have shown. Moreover, the lack of focus on social cohesion within regions, means that short-sighted security policies do not address the underlying political, economic, and environmental vulnerability that causes security threats.

This leads to the second weakness of these regional security architectures: they have not properly addressed the issue of policy coherence. The sections above illustrate that environmental security has not been integrated into more general security regimes. Environmental concerns significantly affect the state of security in any given region. Unfortunately, because these issues are not linked to security policies in terms of definition, coordination, or implementation, sustainable development strategies are often undermined by security practices. The management of cross-border water resources presents an excellent example of this situation. When borders are closed by national and supranational leaders due to the implementation of anti-trafficking or migration control policies, how can local populations be expected to coordinate and implement effective trans-boundary water management policies? How can adequate infrastructure be constructed? Security policies aimed at protecting national citizens are making illegal trafficking more profitable and environmental security more expensive and difficult to achieve.

The comparative analysis presented above, in combination with the case study of EU–CAN inter-regionalism, does, however, offer some clues for potential paths to the establishment of regional environmental security. Section 3 of this article has indicated that the relative exclusion
of environmental security policies from regional security agendas can be explained by the weakness of regional security architectures. The central question that needs to be addressed is: ‘how can these regional security architectures be reinforced in such a way that they construct their own identity and no longer simply reflect the interests of member states?’

The EU–Andean Community inter-regional relationship would suggest that regions can successfully promote environmental security when legitimized policy strategies are enacted. The EU and the CAN both have demonstrated a normative commitment to environmental security in their internal politics. Unfortunately, this commitment within their collaborative relationship seems to have been overshadowed by tensions generated by trade and hard security considerations. Nonetheless, a recent development may provide a way forward. The EU–Andean Community Civil Society Forum was established in 2005 in order to allow for an open and transparent exchange of views on EU–Andean relations. In April 2007, before the opening of negotiations for an Association Agreement, civil society organizations were invited to participate in an assembly in order to discuss negotiations. The engagement has been maintained throughout the negotiation process.

The EU–CAN civil society forum, like similar initiatives, can be considered a starting point for such democratic input that, if successful, could be implemented in other world regions. In order for world regions to strengthen their operationalized commitments to environmental security, measures should be taken to reinforce their overall security architectures. This can be accomplished through public participation in policy-making and citizen oversight in policy implementation and evaluation processes. Thus far, virtually all of the regional organizations examined in this study suffer from a democratic deficit. As long as citizens are not informed of regional security policies and how they can affect them, nation-states will continue to dominate regional regimes, especially in the field of security which has generally been characterized by realist perspectives based on national interests. Regional security architectures cannot be strengthened without the evolution of regional security identities. The bases for these identities can only be the emergence of regional citizenship identities. People-based security norms, such as human security and environmental security, can only be implemented when people are involved in decision-making processes. Unless citizens call for and join more participative regional security processes, there are few incentives for nation-states to cede authority to regional regimes. Regional organizations can reconcile competing globalizations in the field of security. However, they need to first operationalize this potential through more inclusive governance structures.

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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