An Analysis on Changing Security Policies of Turkey after the July 15th Coup Attempt

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Abstract

Turkey’s security policies have been largely a result of its historical and political experiences. The July 15th (2016) coup attempt indicates a turning point in Turkey’s security policies as it has been strategically important in shaping the political, structural, and bureaucratic structure of the country. A number of reasons would be mentioned in this account. The failed attempt reiterated the need for making swift reforms in its institutionalization and capacity-building with regard to security priorities. As a result, Turkey has got to make certain reforms on its security strategies and state structure. Elimination of the members and elements of the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization (FETO) initiating the coup attempt have become the first priority at the list. Secondly, dismissal of the personnel from nearly every state and government agency has been the second measure. Finally, certain reforms have been implemented in re-structuring the state, the army, and security organizations alike. This paper aims to present and eventually interpret the changes on the security policies of Turkey after the July 15th coup attempt; then the policies are analyzed through the reports produced by think tank organizations. Among these, the relevant reports of İstanbul Policy Center (IPC) and SETA are examined in order to analyze possible effects of the changes, and a contingency analysis is done through those reports. The main purpose of the study is to analyze how Turkey changed its security policies and what are the concurrent results of these changes. Having done so, this study purposes to reveal pros and cons of the changes together with pertinent solutions and suggestions. Consequently, the findings of Turkey would have the prospect to draw lessons for other nations and systems to learn.

Keywords: Coup Attempt; Security Policies; Think Tanks

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INTRODUCTION

The July 15 coup (of 2016) attempt highlighted the need for Turkey to introduce swift reforms in its institutionalization and capacity-building levels. As a result, the country has made a number of reforms on its security strategies and state structures. Elimination of the members and elements of the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization (FETO) has become the first priority immediately after the attempt. Dismissals of the personnel from nearly every state and government agency followed that. Besides, certain reforms have been designed in the structure of the state apparatus, including the army, and security organizations. Therefore, an obvious need for a thorough analysis of the July 15 coup attempt in terms of security issues and policies, as a turning point for Turkey, has come to front.

National security policies are usually shaped in line with possible threats and discrepancies in every political system and regime. Turkey is no exception: national security policies have been largely a result of its historical and political experiences. Security is not only a national issue, but has also has international dimensions. As a matter of fact, the recent developments and the political order of the world are the factors to affect fundamentally the understanding of security and provide significant measures in the formation of national security policies. Throughout the history, especially after the milestone events, as such world wars and global economic crisis, security policies have always been restructured by international order. This refers to the international characters of national security policies. The Cold War period can be given as an example as national security policies had been in accordance with the bipolar world order.

This study evaluates Turkish security policies to provide background information as well as drawing lessons for policymakers. Secondly, security gaps before the July 15, 2016 coup attempt and the reform needs after the attempt are questioned comparatively. As the main aim of the study, the reports produced by influential think tanks i.e. SETA, IPC, ORSAM, and TEPAV are analyzed to find out the changes and reforms of security policies of Turkey after the coup attempt. In addition, this study intends to evaluate the needs of Turkey related to security, the way and means of change, and eventual changes. Having answered these questions, this study strives to reveal mistakes/dilemmas/problems in due process related to the policies and possibly find effective solutions and suggestions.

THE CONCEPTS OF SECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Security is a phenomenon that concerns entire society, from individuals to state. Since it is a relative concept, its definition can vary from person to person and from state to state (Cebeci, 2007). It is defined in various ways. First, dictionary refers to a situation where there is no fear from a threat exposed to the values possessed and there is no possibility of unexpected damage (Guvenlik Terimleri Sözlüğü, 2017). Second, according to Küçükşahin (2007), security is the system of identifying the risks and threats that make it difficult to reach the determined targets, managing these risks, developing strategies against threats and taking measures.

National security, hence, is an important term concerning every person in a society. Similarly, it is defined in different manners with varying priorities in mind: the concept is considered as the execution of military activities in the past for the defense of national territory and survival of the country. Today, however, it has gained political, economic, cultural and technological dimensions as well as military (Turkish Armed Forces General Staff, 2003). According to Dedeoğlu ar-
gues (2003), in mentioning the concept, that there must be certain internal or external threats or possibilities of threats in terms of protection of national existence, continuity, and integrity of a nation.

The Article on “National Security Council and the Secretariat General of the National Security Council” (1983), defines national security as the protection of constitutional order, existence and integrity of nation, and protection of political, social, cultural, and economic interests of the state against all kinds of external and internal threats. According to Davutoğlu (2012), the concept of national security can be defined as the ability to protect the national values of a nation against external threats in the classical sense.

Today, rapid changes in political, economic, technological and socio-cultural areas deeply influenced the scale and scope of security. The end of the cold war era and dizzying developments in the field of technology and communication led to the emergence of phenomenon of globalization. The 9/11 have fundamentally shaken and greatly changed the concepts of international relations, alliances, strategic thinking, threats and security.

Security issue is also globalized. Global economy and security have emerged as two important concepts, complementing each other. While large corporations and financial circles around the world are interested in economic dimension of the issue, political actors have focused on security. Security has shifted from national to regional and global security dimensions. In addition, scope of security phenomenon has been enlarged and the fields of economy, energy, environment, health, socio-culture and education have been counted in its realms.

In response to the evolving environment of security, the methods adopted by international community, responding to new challenges are also constantly reviewed. However, the main objective has endured as the preservation of international peace, stability and establishment of relevant security and peace environment for sustainable developments in terms of human factor. To this end, preservation of territorial integrity, contribution to collective defense and crisis management operations such as peace-keeping activities and humanitarian aid, the prevention of the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, and promotion of disarmament have remained important. To contribute to stability in security issues, increase in international cooperation on global scale and develop an understanding of security based on partnership, dialogue, and soft power have also been transferred into prominence.

During the C21st, an internationally-joint effort has been needed to respond to security threats i.e. terrorism, organized crime, reduction or threat of basic resources, armed conflicts, uncontrolled mass movements, and cyber-attacks (MFA, 2019). To ensure security in both national and international senses and achieve a safe environment, there is need for a clear-cut path to fight against violence, including its causes. It is impossible to isolate/differentiate national security from international system. Similarly, international organizations guarantee the security of the state in international arena. For security, international organizations have taken active steps protecting peace and guarantee security. Hence, in cases where states have a freehand in the international system, state is left to defend itself against external threats. In this respect, it is up to the governments to take counter measures in protecting itself against threats (Dedeoğlu, 2003).

Though certain security risks are essentially non-military, security can no longer be achieved solely by military means and capabilities. Therefore, expansion of the definition of security requires diversification of the methods in dealing with risks and threats. In this, it is important to deploy political, military, eco-
nomic and social tools in coordination, and implement them to solve problems (MFA, 2019).

BACKGROUND OF TURKISH NATIONAL SECURITY

Undoubtedly, Turkey has been a security-centered state as it is always a priority in public policy processes (Ministry of Justice, 2017). It has been perceived around internal and external factors that are inter-connected. It has been constantly thought that Turkey has always encountered a number of internal and external threats. The rhetoric deployed by the state has been that enemies outside the country and their allies inside Turkey have threatened its territorial integrity (Ministry of Justice, 2017).

The Turkish security policies, from the beginning of the 20th, have been shaped by two main factors as geographical position and relations with neighboring countries (MFA, 2019). These two decisive factors have transformed Turkey into an important actor within the terms of security around Europe, Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, Mediterranean and Black Sea regions. Initially, Turkish national security policy was defined as “peace at home, peace in the world” by the founder of the Republic, M. Kemal Atatürk. This principle was prevailing until the World War II (Doğan, 2006).

Turkey chose to abstain from the WWII (Aydın, 2003). During the post-war period Turkey was with Western Bloc, a loyal NATO member. This was consistent with the basic philosophy of the newly-established Republic of Turkey. Since its membership in 1952, NATO has played a pivotal role in the processes of Turkish defense and security policies. During the period of Democrat Party (DP) governments (between 1950 and 1960) Turkey undertook the mission of preventing the Soviet spread in the region (Bağcı, 1994). As a result of the distrust by the military to public will, National Security Council (NSC) was established, a constitutional institution, by 1961 Constitution to interfere with politics (Soysal, 1990).

The period between 1960 and 1980 was quite hectic and difficult. The military operation of Turkey in Cyprus in 1974, affected country’s relations with its neighbors and NATO (Oran, 2003). After the Operation, the US, an ally of Turkey, imposed an arms embargo in 1975. This directed Turkey to reduce security costs via developing friendly relations with neighboring countries (Oran, 2003). Second military coup d’etat, taking place in September 12, 1980, facilitated increase of NSC power. The Article 118 of the Constitution states that ‘the NSC informs the Council of Ministers about their demands/views on the national security policy, and the Council shall give priority to the views of the NSC in decision making processes’ (Constitution, 1981). This places the Council at the top of the will of government (Sezen, 2000).

During the 80s, certain changes in Turkey’s internal and external security policies were introduced. In internal security, the attacks by PKK, terrorist organization, in 1984 signified a threat against the unitary of Turkey (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997). Since the early 80s, the continuing struggle against PKK has become the most important security priority for Turkey. Along with the settlement of PKK in Northern Syria and Northern Iraq, security issues have been regionalized. In terms of external politics, a special importance has been attributed to developing economic relations with its neighbors. The intention was to solve political problems as well as eliminate the concerns about security by establishing economic ties with the neighbors. Since the end of the Cold War period, certain dramatic developments in the region was directing Turkey to strike a delicate balance in security. The security lines between countries have become fluid due to conflicts, uncertainties, and newly-established unstable states.
The 9/11 attacks was a turning point for transformation of international system. After this terror act, being perceived as a total offence against the Western values, governments were directed to fight against Al Qaeda. So, threat of “Islamic terrorism” replaced the Soviet threat. Turkey has been an important part of the anti-terror initiatives in the globe. Turkey co-chaired the Global Anti-Terrorism Forum for five years with the US, and played also a dynamic role in UN Resolution No. 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters, one crucial issue (Sönmez, 2016a).

The understanding of “security based on cooperation” has become the basic understanding of NATO. In short, Turkey, as one of the founding members of the UN, a key member of NATO and leading members of European initiatives, and as a candidate in the negotiation process for EU membership, has pursued a proactive policy for building peace and cooperation in both its region and remote regions (MFA, 2019).

One of the key developments in the 2000s is to accelerate transformation of security in Turkey, being a new foreign policy vision of the Justice and Development Party governments. Ahmet Davutoğlu, serving as Prime Minister Erdoğan’s chief adviser on foreign policy between 2003 and 2009 and as Foreign Affairs Minister between 2009 and 2014, was the mastermind of this policy. Davutoğlu wanted to build up a foreign policy with a new geographical imagination that emphasizes the need to put an end to the alienation of neighbors (Aras, 2009). Thus, it was aimed to establish relations based on understanding of “zero problem with neighbors” as the first stage of the new foreign policy, and then to move to maximum cooperation stage (Aras, 2009). Finally, Arab Spring and Syrian refugee crisis in the external sense and the July 15 coup attempt in the internal sense have affected security arrangements of Turkey. This paper intends to deal with the effects of the coup attempt on the national security policy and therefore provide a thorough analysis on security priorities.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES AND FLAWS OF TURKEY

Turkish national security policy can be examined under four headings; national defense, external relations, economic prosperity, and democratic values (Ministry of Justice, 2017). Based upon these, Turkey has always needed to develop strategies in accordance with the interests of the country through a dynamic foreign policy, deterrence, and crisis management (Küçükşahin et al., 2008). “Protecting the constitutional order, national presence, and indivisible integrity by the means of political, military, social, cultural, and economic interests against all kinds of internal and external threats” become the main resources for Turkish national security policy. In parallel with this, the strategy has aimed at achieving a strong position in political, economic, military, social, scientific, and technological fields in international arena (Baran, 2018).

Turkey has to fight against several terrorist organizations such as PKK, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and currently Fetullahist Terrorist Organization (FETO). By July 15th 2016, Turkey had followed certain strategic plans and patterns to assure national security. Due to its tradition of anti-democratic implementations in the military, Turkey encountered weaknesses against coup attempts. Therefore, in July 15, Turkey had to face once again another coup attempt. The term, coup, refers to the use of non-legitimate power and force against the sovereign institutions (Ergün, 2018). It, therefore, involves a situation where monopoly of legitimate use of power in centralization process of modern state cannot be controlled (Barbak, 2017).

A strategic security flaw at national
security level causes not only political but also military, economic, financial, legal and humanitarian problems (Ergun, 2018). This vulnerable strategic area can be compensated by recovery and successes in other areas without abandoning immediately after the attempt, but this depends on the characteristic of the flaw (Gray, 2008). Although Turkey has some weaknesses in many areas, its discrepancies in the security field have been exploited, turning into security flaws. Those problems also increased the sensitivity and vulnerability in the weakness in other fields. The replacement of the “Center” by the “Periphery” continued for many years to shape the norms, especially social and political life (Mardin, 1973), and introduced certain arrangements (Ergun, 2018). Therefore, Turkey has begun to follow a strategy in recent years that has been expressed as “domestic and national”. However, the coup attempt on July 15 of 2016, the betrayals and conflicts within the Center opened up the question of Turkish security policy whether domestic or international.

One important problem areas of security strategy is the convergence or communalization of decision-making elites or groups, guiding them in decision-making processes. According to social psychologists, adherence to group decisions is an attractive situation, because it provides a cover for legitimacy to leaders (Houghton, 2018). However, if a group is closed to ideas from the outside and open to the illusion of invincibility, it has a radically deep adherence to the group decisions and oppression to the opposing ideas of its members, and applies the mind guarding which they created by their own; this group will become a threat to the existence and security of the state as seen in the example of the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization. The only solution for the formation of similarly-organized groups is ensuring the involvement of every citizen who has the necessary qualifications and respects the laws in the security service based on merit, regardless of their personal beliefs and opinions (Ergun, 2018).

SECURITY MEASURES TAKEN AFTER JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT

The July 15th Coup attempt failed in military terms, but at social level it has still triggered very serious destructive effects on society. It can be claimed that the effects become clear with the declaration of state of emergency (OHAL) announced a week after the coup attempt. The state of emergency refers to an extraordinary threat or danger that the state cannot overcome by the rules of everyday law & enforcement measures. After declaration, arrests of involved military and civilian officers who participated in the coup, supporters of the armed upheaval have been identified. For this end, a series of steps were taken by the government.

Particularly, the Decree (No. 667) defines the profile of the institutional prevalence of FETÖ structure. According to official data, 15 universities in 10 provinces, 997 schools, 109 student dormitories, 35 health institutions, 19 unions, federations, and confederations, 229 foundations and associations, 3 news agencies, 16 TV channels, 23 radio stations, 45 newspapers, 15 magazines, and finally 29 publishing houses were closed down on the grounds that they were linked to FETÖ (Decree Law no. 667, 2016). The terror group had established networks in certain sectors such as education, media, publishing houses, and labor and management organizations. This shows that FETÖ had a high level of institutionalization. Apart from that, the decree identifies the trustees in these business circles and companies as affiliations of FETÖ.

The decree facilitating the measures declared by the legal frame identified was possible with Articles 119 and 120 and 121. In means that the steps are taken by constitutional legitimacy and legacy.
After the attempt, the government carried out a process of rapid and comprehensive revision on state bureaucracy and institutions by the state of emergency and decrees (Onder & Zengin, 2018). The decrees have been to prevent coup attempts by establishing mechanisms of monitoring and balancing among civilian actors as well as concentrating power in an elected person, the President.

After the coup attempt, a number of steps have been taken to reform military. First, the Decree, 669 (2016), commands Turkish Land Forces, Naval Forces and Air Forces to be attached to the Ministry of National Defense. Second, the Decree 690 (2017) attached Gendarmerie General Command and Coast Guard Command to the Ministry of the Interior. Final, military courts were abolished in the constitutional amendment of the 16 April 2017 referendum. The reforms show that there have been a general operation of demilitarization in Turkey after the attempt (Sönmez, 2016b). This study intends to evaluate the effects and results of these reforms in the light shed by the findings, inferences and suggestions put forward in the reports of think tanks Istanbul Policy Center (IPC), Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA), and the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV).

AN ANALYSIS ON SECURITY REFORMS

As mentioned, after July the 15th (2016), there has been a movement of demilitarization in Turkey for the aim of preventing possible coups attempts. The think tanks operating in Turkey have published a number of reports, analysis papers, policy notes, and articles on this issue. This paper examines major studies conducted on security issue to find out how think tanks evaluated the changes, as there are obvious indicators to argue that they are influential in designing security policies. As specialists in the field, their analysis would reflect the pearls and pitfalls of the policies followed after the coup attempt. With this, the aforementioned think tanks were examined and six reports (three from SETA and three from IPC) were especially chosen as empirical evidences. The studies are taken one-by-one with their policy suggestions and findings, and then a general evaluation provided eventually.

RESEARCH METHODS

The subject of the study is defined as “developments experienced in Turkey in the understanding of security and national security policies after the July 15 coup attempt”. Accordingly, the aim of paper is to analyze “how the understanding of security has been changed together with the weaknesses of the reform achieved by Turkey” through examining certain think tank reports published on the topic. The main focus of the study is the attitude of Turkish governments on the measures taken in terms of security. For this, a short literature review was conducted on the studies published after July 15 by think tanks operating in Turkey. This study deploys qualitative content analysis method, including the frequency analysis and evaluative analysis. Content analysis defined as a research method, allowing the qualitative data collected in research to be analyzed systematically and reliably so that generalizations can be made in relation to the categories of interest of the researcher (Haggarty, 1996).

In conducting a content analysis, report archives of 8 different think tanks (Table 1) which operate in Turkey and listed in “Global Go To Think Tank Index” reports published by “The Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP)” at Pennsylvania University (McGann, 2018) have been scanned. The reports published by these think tanks constitute the population of this study. Among the reports obtained, having the sample of this study, 9 reports (Table 2) are chosen for examination. Then, five of the reports from the
Table 1. List of Think Tanks Scanned  
Source: Processed by the Authors (2020)

| NO | NAME                                                      | ABBREVIATION |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 1  | Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation         | TESEV        |
| 2  | Association for Liberal Thinking                       | LDT          |
| 3  | Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies        | EDAM         |
| 4  | Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey          | TEPAV        |
| 5  | Istanbul Policy Center                                  | IPC          |
| 6  | International Strategic Analysis and Research Center   | USTAD        |
| 7  | Center for Turkey's Economic and Strategic Studies     | TESAM        |
| 8  | Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research | SETA         |

Table 2. List of Think Tank Reports Examined  
Source: Processed by the Authors (2020)

| No | NAME                                                                 | ORGANIZATION | DATE       | NUMBER OF PAGES |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|
| 1  | Democratic control of the Military: A Reminder Note                   | TEPAV        | August 2016| 14              |
| 2  | Observations on the Decrees of the State of Emergency Applications of Purging in the World and Purge of FETO from the State in Turkey | TEPAV        | January 2018| 5               |
| 3  | Turkey’s National Security Architecture post April 16 Referendum: Consolidating the Pillars | SETA         | December 2016| 26              |
| 4  | The Road to July 15 in the Turkish Armed Forces and Combat Readiness in Its Aftermath | SETA         | April 2017 | 5               |
| 5  | Two Years of The State of Emergency and Aftermath                    | SETA         | July 2017  | 20              |
| 6  | The State, Institutions and Reform in Turkey after July 15           | IPC          | March 2017 | 10              |
| 7  | Never Again! But How? State and the Military in Turkey after July 15 | IPC          | April 2017 | 15              |
| 8  | Fifteen Months After July 15: Reformsing The Military, Transforming The State | IPC          | November 2017| 32             |
|    | **TOTAL**                                                              |              |            | **157**        |
sample are chosen for examination in evaluative analysis as a result of the frequency analysis.

As Table 2 highlights, only three of the eight think tanks have published reports related to the security issues in Turkey after the July 15. A total of 157 pages of texts are evaluated within a frequency analysis. For the frequency analysis, concepts and categories of “security, national security, July 15, coup attempt, FETÖ, military, Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), decree (KHK), state of emergency, purge, Presidency (President), and reform” are scanned (Table 3).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Frequency Analysis

Nine reports constituting the sample of this study have been scanned individually for the frequency analysis. The categories and concepts already mentioned were measured the relevance of the chosen reports. The data obtained from the frequency analysis are given in Table 3.

The categories and concepts analyzed in the frequency analysis were specified according to the main topics of the reports in relevance with this study. The main topics of the reports are civil-military relations, reforms processes, and the applications within the process of state of emergency after July 15 coup attempt. The aforementioned categories and concepts were scanned from the reports already mentioned in accordance with the main topics. This frequency analysis approves the relevance of the reports in line with the study.

The 12 terms were repeated 2650

| Concepts/Report No. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | TOTAL |
|---------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------|
| Security            | 71 | - | 4 | 69 | 10 | 14 | 4 | 38 | 40 | 250    |
| National Security   | 5  | - | 2 | 9  | 4  | 2  | 1 | 2  | 2  | 27     |
| July 15             | 5  | 3 | 25| 1  | 62 | 29 | 20| 79 | 147| 371    |
| Coup Attempt        | 4  | 3 | 19| 1  | 40 | 48 | 9 | 6  | 18 | 148    |
| FETÖ                | -  | - | 17| -  | 94 | 61 | 3 | 20 | 22 | 217    |
| Military            | 79 | - | 13| -  | 11 | 2  | 7 | 100| 145| 357    |
| Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) | 15 | - | 9 | -  | 122| 30 | - | 108| 232| 516    |
| Decree (KHK)        | 2  | 38| 13| 2  | 11 | 82 | - | 5  | 12 | 165    |
| State of Emergency  | 1  | 26| 6 | -  | 2  | 128| - | 9  | 10 | 182    |
| Purge               | -  | 1 | 9 | -  | 11 | 32 | 1 | 2  | 8  | 64     |
| Presidency (President) | 4 | 3 | 2 | 8  | 2  | 25 | 4 | 15 | 36 | 99     |
| Reform              | 15 | - | 15| 1  | 13 | 6  | 62| 40 | 102| 254    |
| TOTAL               | 201| 74| 134| 91| 382| 449| 111| 424| 784| 2650   |
times in nine reports. The most mentioned term among these is “Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)” total 516 times. This indicates that the most important issue taken as crucial in the reports has been the armed forces. The term “military” was mentioned 357 times in the reports. The reform needs and processes in the military have been discussed more than the relations between the military and the state. The least mentioned term in the reports is, surprisingly though, “national security”. The term national security was totally mentioned only 27 times, while “security” was mentioned 250 times. This symbolizes the discussions on security in the country after the coup attempt have not reflected a concern about a general national security in think tank reports. It should be reiterated that the think tanks urge for the need for security reform in general, but not in national security policies. To comprehend a general evaluation over the reports, a comprehensive analysis is a necessity. Hence, it is also essential in making a comparative analysis over the frequency analysis to determine the reports to be evaluated in the analysis. Thus, the relations between the concepts handled in the frequency analysis should be examined first. As a result, inferences which can be made from the frequency analysis in Table 3 may be listed below as:

- In first report, the most mentioned terms were “military”, 79 times and “security” with 71 times, and specifically the terms “FETÖ” and “purge” were not included in the report. In addition, other concepts in the analysis were only mentioned few times. In 14 pages, the first report does not reflect the results of the analysis and does not show enough relevance with the study.
- In second report, the most mentioned terms were “decrees” with 38 times and “state of emergency” with 26 times. However, it can be seen from the frequency analysis that the report is generally about the applications of the state of emergency and it doesn’t have any relevance with the security issues.
- In third report, all of the chosen terms were mentioned in rates that close to each other. In total 26 pages, the most mentioned terms in the report were “July 15” with 25 times and “coup attempt” with 19 times, also significantly the term “reform” was mentioned 15 times in accordance with the processes after the coup attempt. Therefore, this study was found appropriate for evaluative analysis.
- In fourth report, the term “security” was excessively highlighted than others, 69 times over a total of 91. In 5 pages, 5 of the 12 terms were absent and all of the terms without “security” were mentioned under 10 times. Therefore, it can be said that the report focused on security issues of the post April 16 Referendum process without mentioning the threat of FETÖ and purges.
- In fifth report, the selected terms were mentioned within 20 pages and the most mentioned term was “Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)”, 122 times like total results. Also, the second most mentioned term was “FETÖ” with 94 times. That is, it can be deduced that the report generally focused on the processes of demystifying of elements of FETÖ from TSK and reform processes within TSK after the coup attempt. As a result, the fifth report was found appropriate for evaluative analysis.
- In sixth report, although the chosen terms were mentioned, the term “state of emergency” was mentioned 128 times over 182 times within all of the reports. Therefore, this report stood out as a study focused mainly on the applications of state of emergency after the coup attempt. It can be deduced that it did not focus on reforms in that process because the term
“reform” was only mentioned 6 times within 30 pages. Moreover, the terms “security” and “national security” were not mentioned in the context of the applications of state of emergency enough to be evaluated in evaluative analysis of this study.

- In seventh report, three of the chosen terms were not mentioned and two of them were just mentioned 1 time within 10 pages of text. However, the most mentioned term in the report was “reform” with 62 times. When considered that all of the 12 terms were mentioned totally 111 times in the report, it can be said that the report mainly focus on reform processes. It mentioned the relations between the state and the military after July 15 and stated reforms and reform necessities in accordance with the existing situation. Therefore, the seventh report was found appropriate for evaluative analysis in this study because it reflected reform process in general.

- In eighth report, all of the chosen terms were mentioned and the most mentioned terms were “Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)” with 108 times and “military” with 100 times. It can be deduced that the report focused on the changes in the military after July 15 forasmuch as the terms “July 15” and “reform” were also mentioned respectively 79 and 40 times. This report also reflects the total results in a manner because the most used term was “Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)” and the less used term was “national security” as seen in total results. Moreover, mentions on the other terms reflect the total results. Therefore, this report was found appropriate for the evaluative analysis of this study.

- In ninth report, again, the chosen terms were mentioned; the most mentioned term was “Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)” with 232 times and the less mentioned term was “national security” with only 2 times. Then, as in the total again, mostly used terms in the report were “July 15”, “military”, and “reform” 147, 145 and 102 times respectively. Therefore, this report also reflects the total in general and shows a compatible characteristic with this study. When considered that its title also replicates the main focus of this study, this report was found appropriate for the evaluative analysis.

Evaluative Analysis

As the first report, “Applications of Purging in the World and Purge of FETÖ from the State in Turkey” (Gülener & Erciyas, 2016) which was published by SETA in December 2016 has been selected for analysis. This report cites applications from around the world on the issue of removal of corruptive elements from the state cadres, and then mentions on removal of the elements of FETÖ from the Turkish state mechanisms. This report is chosen because expulsion of the elements of FETÖ has still been an important security issue for the state. According to Gülener and Erciyas (2016), dismissal of the elements of FETÖ from the state refers also to a comprehensive investigation and trial process as well as the elimination of the members of the organization, which has been a reflection of the state’s self-protection reflex after the July 15 coup attempt. In this respect, this process has a legal perspective as well as political. The report also states that the models previously applied in the world do not constitute an example for the process of removal of the elements of FETÖ. Therefore, there has been a need for a model of purging that is in line with the principles of universal rule of law and human rights. When developing strategies to apply a model, Turkey faced with two major problems, first, the investigation process has been operated in a collective manner not in an individual scale. As a result, the
people who are not affiliated with the organization have been punished while people who were involved in coup attempt have not been punished. This might result in a crisis of confidence between society and the state. Second, is a problem that the laundering efforts of criminals by being concealed within the society. The report provides some policy suggestions as below:

- To establish a reliable check and balance system on the actors involved in the process of purging.
- To examine and make quick decisions on the issues of the allegations of injustice through various administrative mechanisms to be established.
- To examine public officials identified with suspicion of FETO connection one by one and determination of their link with the organization.
- To share the findings of the investigations and trials with the public as much as possible.
- To take maximum on fulfilling the procedural requirements in the operation of both the purges and legal processes.

As the second report, “The State, Institutions and Reform in Turkey after July 15” (Aras, 2017) published by IPC in March 2017 has been selected for analysis. The report, after background information, makes a current situation analysis and provide policy suggestions on the need for reforms in the fields of the state institutions. This report is helpful as being endeavoring for reform and aiming at taking security measures against any attack against the state and its institutions. According to Aras (2017), Turkey needs to compensate the gaps in the public sector with an immediate provision of human and material resources, because this need cannot be postponed in the light of the state crisis after July 15 which there has an obvious need for bureaucratic reform and restructuring of institutions. However, the report states that in order to avoid from security problems in public sector, Turkey should cooperate or at least a certain level of agreement among the government, the oppositions, and the bureaucracy; because a polarized environment can only increase the security problems and crisis within the public sector. Therefore, based on this premises, some policy suggestions were listed in the report. The suggestions listed by Aras (2017) as follows:

- To establish an understanding of functional and service-oriented state in public administration.
- To produce concrete reform plans for each public entity according to the specific characteristics of the institution.
- To compensate the purges in the public sector urgently by doing initiating substantial changes in the process of recruiting civil servants on the basis of the criteria of talent, expertise, merit, and equal representation of society’s sub-groups, especially women.
- To establish an understanding of public administration that is efficient, responsible and sensitive to social demands by balancing the autonomy in the relationship between the government and the bureaucracy.
- To benefit from public-private sector cooperation.
- To include civil society, interest groups and important actors in society for the purpose of providing the basis for the democratization and legitimacy of the reform process.

As the third report, “Never Again, But How, State and the Military in Turkey after July 15” (Gürcan, 2017) which published by IPC in April 2017 has been also selected for analysis. This report highlights the situation that the state faced after July 15 coup attempt and makes an analysis on the effects of the coup attempt to the relation between state and the military in Turkey. This report is chosen because the relations between the state and the military became at the top of priority
issue while security reforms are designed. The report states that July 15 coup attempt has been a shock for the entire state apparatus. According to Gürcan (2017, p. 7), the important factor differentiating the July 15 attempt from previous coups is the interventions by the state after the attempt. That is, the state tried to establish new relations with the military by making radical reforms on its structure. The report finally states 6 types of reforms which government has made on the military after the coup attempt, then makes analysis, giving policy suggestions. The six types of reforms on the military are (Gürcan, 2017) are reforms in military-government relations, reforms changing the military promotion and appointment system, reforms in the military education system, the abolishment of the military judicial system, reforms ending the military's privileged domains, and reforms aiming to diminish the gap between the military and society.

Gürcan (2017) asserts in the report that the reforms signify a transition from the Huntingtonian approach, which is based on managing the distinction between the civilians and the military by creating autonomous and privileged areas for the military to stay away from civilian politics, to Janowitzian approach which is based on rejecting the military with autonomous and privileged areas and reducing the gap between civilians and the military. Therefore, based on these, six different policy proposals were listed in the report to strike a balance between civilians and the military with the aim of managing the security within the state. The suggestions are:

- Transfer of power from the military to the civilians should be managed through democratic principles, civilian control, effectiveness and efficiency of the Turkish Armed Forces.
- Civilian-military integration within the presidency, the Ministry of Defense, and the General Staff should strengthen the civilian intellectual capital on security.
- The military should be removed from the primary domain of the debate between conservatives and secularists.
- A consensus should be established between civilian elites and the military officers on the reasons, nature, scope, and timing of military reforms, changed civil-military relations and the organization of the Turkish Armed Forces after July 15.
- Transition from the monolithic military to a polylithic one, driven by the weakening of the agency of the Chief of General Staff, should be delicately managed as this seems to be occupying the prime risk factor within the military by the power-distributional implications of power relations among the micro-identities within the military.
- In the post-July 15 setting, what Turkey needs to do is to ‘democratize security’ by diffusing the power of the state among the executive branch, parliament, and civil society with using effective monitoring mechanisms so as not to face with another hijack attempt like July 15.

As the fourth report, “The Road to July 15 in the Turkish Armed Forces and Combat Readiness in Its Aftermath” (Yeşiltaş and Aslan, 2017) published by SETA in July 2017 has been chosen for analysis. This report mentions the negative effects of FETÖ to the operational capability of the military, then mentions the regulations of AK Party after the July 15 coup attempt and their effects on military, and finally issues suggestions for re-increasing the effectiveness and combat readiness of the military. The reason for the selection includes the effectiveness and combat readiness of the military as the crucial issues for national security. According to Yeşiltaş and Aslan (2017), FETÖ has negatively affected the military in terms of command and control mecha-
nisms, personal affairs, military intelligence, operational capability, and combat readiness. Accordingly, the report argues that a group of reforms has been structured on the mentioned fields of military by the government after July 15. As a result, the report analyzes the reforms and gives the following policy suggestions:

- Command and control mechanisms in the Turkish Armed Forces should be arranged for further betterment. In this spirit, a centralized headquarters structure and well-integrated force posture need to be considered in the frame of a revolutionary defense reform.
- Loyalty to the Constitution and the state should be vital prerequisite for personnel recruitment.
- As an urgent need for the Ministry of National Defense, military should be re-structured in the area of counter-intelligence.
- Reliable personnel recruitments and technical developments should be provided in terms of developing operational capability and combat readiness of the military.

As the fifth and the final report examined in this study, “Fifteen Months After July 15: Reforming the Military, Transforming the State” (Gürcan & Keyman, 2017) issued by IPC in November 2017 has been examined for scrutiny. The report summarises the situation 15 months after the coup attempt, and mentions the reforms introduced in the military system, and finally lists the risks and policy suggestions for overcoming them. The report also highlights the reforms initiated and to be introduced. According to Keyman and Gürcan (2017, p. 16), the July 15 coup attempt differs from the previous ones as it was experiencing serious security threats at national and international levels. Therefore, the post July 15 process encounters a number of risk areas. They include re-construction of state institutions, civil-military relations, and institutional transformation of the military. Then, results and suggestions are listed in accordance with already mentioned three risk areas:

- In re-construction of state institutions, the suggestions are;
- A balance between the state and religion with a model of “active secularism in the state and passive secularism in civil society”.
- Equal rights of citizenship to its elements regardless of their political views, ethnic, sectarian or religious origins.
- Effective control mechanisms in order to ensure accountability and transparency in the state bureaucracy.
- A merit-based promotion and appointment system within the bureaucracy.

CONCLUSION

The July 15th coup attempt re-emerged the necessity of urgent reforms in the fields of security, institutionalization of the state, state-military relations, and capacity-building in state and military institutions. As a result, Turkey has made a number of reforms on its security
strategies. However, the ways, methods and context in which these reforms were conducted are open for dispute. Think tank organizations published several reports for evaluating the reforms and suggesting appropriate policy proposals to overcome the shortcomings of them. After applying a frequency analysis and an evaluative analysis on the reports through some chosen important key words of the problems of the reforms, it is found that certain vital revisions should be introduced on those reforms. The reports examined show that there were some deficiencies in the process of reforms after the coup attempt. Besides, they claim that further reform proposals are needed. They analyse the changes in security policies vis-à-vis bureaucratic reforms and restructuring of institutions, the relation between state and the military, the effectiveness and combat readiness of the military, re-construction of state institutions, the institutional transformation of the military, and the removal of corruptive elements from the state cadres. They made a group of suggestions for overcoming the encountered and possible problems about these important topics of national security. After the analysis and comparisons on the reports, the findings and suggestions are listed below:

- Government should introduce separate reform plans for every public institution in line with specific characteristics of the institutions by receiving support from academics and civil society in relevant fields.
- Substantial changes in the process of recruiting civil servants should be led on the criteria of talent, expertise, merit, and equal representation of society’s sub-groups in order to compensate the purges in the public sector.
- The relationships between the state and the society, the state and the military, the society and the bureaucracy should be democratized by establishing a public administration model which is efficient, responsible, and sensitive to social demands.
- Representatives of civil society organizations, interest groups, and social groups should be included in decision-making process in order for democratizing and legitimizing the reform process.
- Merit-based promotion and appointment systems should be established as valid for all of the state institutions.
- The principle of “civil and democratic control” should be applied on the military for protecting stability of military.
- In order to make the steps taken for the removal of FETÖ from the state echelons and permanent damages given to the organization, the systematic process must be carried out via a sensitive balance and control mechanism. Otherwise, it will lead to deterioration of the intended targets and the public trust in government institutions.
- Public services such as education, health, security and religion should not be transferred to a specific social or religious groups partially or completely. In addition, the data on the communities and non-governmental organizations such as membership information, incomes and expenses, and annual activities should be transparent and auditable.

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