Watching the Watchers: Nonce-based Inverse Surveillance to Remotely Detect Monitoring

Laura M. Roberts*,†, David Plonka*
*Akamai Technologies
†Princeton University

Abstract—Internet users and service providers do not often know when traffic is being watched but desire a way to determine when, where, and by whom. We present NOISE, the Nonce Observatory for Inverse Surveillance of Eavesdroppers, a method and system that detects monitoring by disseminating nonces—unique, pseudorandom values—in traffic and seeing if they are acted upon unexpectedly, indicating that the nonce-laden traffic is being monitored. Specifically, we embed 64-bit nonces innocuously into IPv6 addresses and disseminate these nonces Internet-wide using a modified traceroute-like tool that makes each outbound probe’s source address unique. We continually monitor for subsequent nonce propagation, i.e., activity or interest involving these nonces, e.g., via packet capture on our system’s infrastructure. Across three experiments and four months, NOISE detects monitoring more than 200k times, ostensibly in 268 networks, for probes destined for 437 networks. Our results reveal: (a) data collection for security incident handling, (b) traffic information being shared with third parties, and (c) eavesdropping in or near a large commercial peering exchange.

Index Terms—security, networks, monitoring, IPv6, DNS

I. INTRODUCTION

Internet users and service providers exchange content worldwide every day. This traffic traverses routers and exchange points far and wide, but neither those users nor service providers typically know who, if anyone, is watching that traffic. In today’s Internet, the community has deemed pervasive monitoring a threat [1]. Knowledge of such monitoring is of significant interest because surveillance: (a) can threaten quality of service, e.g., when surveillance aids reconnaissance prior to intrusions, thefts of data, or denial-of-service (DoS) attacks; and (b) can threaten the privacy of end-users, risking the reputations of users and service providers when private information is exposed. Thus, the goal of our work is to detect traffic monitoring, Internet-wide, detecting monitoring organizations and monitoring systems, e.g., network firewalls, email filters, and even wiretaps. We also want to know where they are, be it on network links or edges, and to classify such systems when they are of a common type. Furthermore, we want to detect subsequent data sharing, e.g., when information about traffic is shared with third parties, because this exacerbates challenges to privacy.

Discovery and disclosure of Internet monitoring by nation states [2] and other institutions [3], [4] have alerted the community to the presence of such surveillance, and one might expect Internet surveillance not be hard to find by those willing to look. In this work we aim to answer the question, “Can we build a system that remotely detects monitoring?” To that end, we introduce the Nonce Observatory for Inverse Surveillance of Eavesdroppers (NOISE), a method and system to detect monitoring by disseminating nonces, which are single-use, pseudorandom values, and stealthily listening for their subsequent propagation.

First, we actively disseminate nonces, i.e., we initially transmit them as identifiers in Internet traffic (e.g., as a packet’s IPv6 source address in an active measurement survey), and then we passively listen for a surveillant to propagate or convey a nonce to somewhere unusual, e.g., to retransmit it in a response packet or use it to form a reverse DNS query. Because the nonces are unique, we are able to correlate their dissemination with any subsequent propagations. And because we disseminate nonces in hop-limited packets via an enhanced traceroute, we glean topological information on paths that nonces traverse, helping to locate surveillants when detected. Although the technique is not IPv6-specific, our current system detects monitoring of only IPv6 traffic with the expectation that anyone who monitors IPv6 almost certainly monitors IPv4 as well. NOISE reports monitoring without regard to legitimacy or intent, e.g., monitoring that represents security best practices at or near hosts and also eavesdropping, i.e., monitoring in the middle of the communication path.

Our contributions comprise both methods and results: (i) a practical inverse surveillance method to detect Internet traffic monitors; (ii) a modified traceroute that can show when probes propagate rather than shown by traditional traceroutes; (iii) detection of traffic monitoring in 268 networks; (iv) detection of eavesdropping in a commercial Internet exchange; (v) detection of networks sharing traffic information with third parties, e.g., public DNS services; (vi) detection of automated security practices including: forensic DNS queries, logging and retention of traffic records, and aggressive counter-probes; and (vii) results validation using ground truth from interview with experts on three networks where monitoring was detected.

II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

Our system implements a form of inverse surveillance [5] but focuses on the detection and monitoring of surveillants in the Internet rather than in the “real world.” In contrast, Mann coined the term “sousveillance” [6] which focuses on using technology such as wearable devices to enable data collection, e.g., citizens recording video of surveillants.

In our inverse surveillance of Internet traffic, we watch for both interception that is lawful (LI) and potentially unlawful,
i.e., regardless of purpose, whether it is (a) likely innocuous, such as current best practice monitoring of one’s own network for performance or security, or (b) potentially nefarious, such as a malicious party or nation state surreptitiously monitoring traffic at a host or within an IXP. While much prior engineering and research work has to do with surveillance in networks, we know of few that focus on surveilling the surveillants [7].

Prior works [8]–[12] inform our nonce-based detection, e.g., nonces used in DNS labels or “honeytokens” in data objects. There are prior works that relate to ours in a number of areas.

First, our work is not the first to remotely detect traffic monitoring. Some prior works [13], [14] detect types of censorship that entailed monitoring. Instead, we develop a technique having detection of surveillance as its primary goal.

Second, because our method requires dissemination of nonce-laden identifiers, we leverage existing means to do so. Given that locating surveillance points is also our goal, we choose to augment yarrp [15], [16], a high-performance traceroute-like tool, thus simultaneously discovering the topology in which surveillance is taking place, if and when detected. In this, we are also inspired by TCP Sidecar [17] to piggyback new measurements atop existing traffic.

Third, our method detects the propagation of nonce-laden identifiers or nonces themselves and identifies candidate networks that observe and propagate them. In this way, it bears some similarities to efforts in validating and verifying network paths [18] or routes [19]. Given that practical path validation does exist today, we instead explore whether it is possible to detect unexpected divergence of traffic from its expected path, such as an eavesdropper passing information to a third party that is neither the source nor intended destination of the associated traffic. As in the evaluation of Alibi Routing [20], we attempt to geolocate [21] where our traffic, or information about that traffic, may have unexpectedly traveled.

Last, because our detection of surveillance depends on opportunity to witness suspicious actions of surveillants that imply their having observed our traffic, our method is somewhat inspired by the notion of opportunistic measurements [22].

III. Method

Aiming to remotely detect monitoring, we realize a system having two primary operations: (a) active conveyance or dissemination of nonces to distant destinations by placing them in transport header fields of traffic we transmit in periodic measurement campaigns and (b) passive observation, listening for reactions to that nonce-laden traffic that propagate back to our system’s inverse monitoring components.

1) Active components: NOISE disseminates nonces via traceroute-like surveys, essentially masquerading as fairly common active topology measurements. First, NOISE generates nonces en masse and embeds them as interface identifiers (IID), e.g., some lower 64 bits of an IPv6 address, resulting in a batch of “nonced” (nonce-laden) IPv6 addresses. For example: 2001:dead:beef:f00d:cafe, where the portion shown in bold is the nonce and the top 64-bit network identifier is dictated by the prefix of NOISE’s address block, an IPv6 /36 prefix (having 2^32 total addresses) never before used and dedicated solely to our experiments. Specifically, NOISE nonces are a 64-bit value, e.g., a monotonically increasing 64-bit counter, encrypted by the ChaCha20 stream cipher algorithm [23], so the value is obscured and the nonce unpredictable. If they were predictable or the encryption key compromised, an adversary could craft and transmit valid nonces they did not actually observe as the result of our transmissions, misdirecting our analysis.

With our nonced IPv6 source addresses in hand, NOISE disseminates them by running special traceroute-like campaigns. In regular traceroute, probe packets having monotonically increasing Time-to-Live values (TTL, also known as “Hop Limit” in IPv6) are sent from the IP address of the source host to the targets of interest. NOISE emits traceroute-like, TTL-limited probes with crafted or forged source addresses — one-time-use, nonce-laden source addresses — rather than the host’s usual address. Given an incredibly large range of possible nonce values, i.e., 64 bits, we can afford to place a unique nonce in every probe packet that we emit. That is, every single probe sent, each having a TTL value between 1 and a maximum of 32, for example, has its own unique, nonced source address. As with traditional traceroute, each probe’s TTL limits the distance it travels (measured in router hops), therefore limiting where, topologically, this unique nonced-source address might be observed by a monitor.

In order to conduct our special traceroute campaigns, we make a modified version of yarrp [15], a tool that performs traceroutes in a pseudorandom, stateless way, allowing for fast, Internet-scale measurements of topology. While the original yarrp, like traditional traceroute, uses a single source IP address on the localhost when emitting probe packets, our modified yarrp uses a list of source addresses from a file prepared in advance: one for each and every probe packet. In NOISE yarrp campaigns, this list is comprised of millions of nonce-laden source addresses that we generate. Running yarrp on a host dedicated to NOISE, we trace from these nonced IPv6 source addresses to the approx. 15.2M target addresses used in prior work [16], to the best of our knowledge, representing the largest IPv6 topology surveys to date.

 Naturally, the question arises as to how NOISE can collect responses to our traceroute probes given that the source addresses are forged and not those of the NOISE source host itself. We do this by actively restricting forged source addresses to the 2^32 addresses in NOISE’s address block, a /36 prefix, which is under our complete control, and by forwarding all packets destined to addresses within that block to the NOISE source host. This is accomplished in router configuration, i.e., using a “static route” on the source host’s gateway router under our control, which then propagates NOISE’s prefix into routing tables globally, making NOISE an active Internet sink [24].

2) Passive components: While disseminating nonces via yarrp campaigns and on a continuously ongoing basis afterwards, NOISE listens to see who or what reacts with interest to our nonced source addresses. NOISE captures all packets
destined for its address block of all possible nonced source addresses. So the arrival of an unexpected packet destined for a nonced address, e.g., arrival of a packet that is not an ICMP Error message (from a router) but having a source address that was not a yarrp target, may represent interest by a monitor given that it must have observed the nonced address to have used it subsequently as a destination.

NOISE also listens for DNS backscatter. Experience and prior work [25] show that a common reaction to unsolicited traffic or probes, e.g., by firewalls, is to perform a “reverse” DNS query (ip6.arpa. PTR query in IPv6) on the source address. NOISE assumes a reverse query for one of its unpredictable nonced source addresses is an expression of “curiosity,” e.g., on the part of some monitor that must have observed that nonced address. Any reverse queries not carrying previously NOISE-disseminated nonces are easily detected and disregarded. NOISE captures all DNS traffic seen at its nameserver, exclusively dedicated as authoritative for the project’s forward and reverse zones, e.g., reverse DNS nameserver for NOISE’s IPv6 address block.

3) Overview: NOISE comprises the following seven elements and four types of detection (shown in bold), further detailed in Section V: (1) a dedicated IPv6 address block for our nonced source addresses; (2) a source host running yarrp and tcpdump (enabling pcap detection); (3) a gateway router under our control, routing outbound and inbound traffic; (4) two project domain names exclusively for use solely by the system; (5) a DNS nameserver running NSD on a VM, authoritative for both (a) reverse queries in the dedicated address block and (b) forward queries in two NOISE project domains and running tcpdump (enabling rdns and fdns detection, respectively); (6) a web server running Apache2 hosting a publicly-accessible NOISE web site having the domain name that is the PTR name for all nonced source addresses and describing our yarrp use and how to opt-out; and (7) access to DNSDB, a passive DNS database, to determine when queries for NOISE-specific nonced addresses or domain names evidencing interest or monitoring were shared with this third party commercial database (enabling pdns detection).

4) Limitations: An unavoidable limitation in any attempt to remotely detect Internet surveillance is simply that surveillants cannot be detected until they act. Secondly, while not a limitation of nonce-based inverse surveillance in general, our NOISE implementation has limited vectors by which it disseminates nonces: we place nonces only in IPv6 source addresses and transmit them from just a single source host in a single address block. This limits the paths or trajectories that nonces travel, constraining detection results to a topologically limited set of networks and paths.

5) Ethical Considerations: Our active measurement survey has similar concerns to that of Beverly et al. [16]. We likewise obtain permission from the network hosting our vantage to perform the survey, limit traffic load by running yarrp at 1k packets per second, avoid probing likely active end host addresses, and provide a way for complainants to contact us, e.g., via email as advertised both in an Internet registry for our address block and on a web site (operated at the PTR name for probe source addresses). In some experiments, where we emit probes that masquerade as WWW traffic, there is a potential risk that a surveillant or censor might incorrectly suspect that destination hosts are participating in actual WWW transactions with NOISE, like in prior works [13], [14]. We claim only that we have no interest nor reasonable way to map these addresses to individuals.

6) Experimental Evaluation: Our evaluation consists of a series of experiments each comprising 16 contiguous yarrp campaigns, largely having differing sets of destination addresses, mimicking those in Beverly et al. [16]. Herein, we present and discuss the results of three such experiments we’ve chosen to highlight which show how parameters such as protocol, port number(s), and maximum TTL may influence results. Table I shows, in bold, each experiment’s parameters and the name by which we will refer to it.

In two experiments, NOISE probes masquerade as QUIC traffic—UDP and port 443—with the hope that encrypted WWW traffic is of interest to a monitor or surveillant. The UDP:443c experiment sends UDP probes from nonced source addresses to port 443 of our approx. 15.2M targets as if the probes are from a QUIC client, having a random source port number. The UDP:443s experiment sends UDP probes with nonced source addresses from port 443 to random port numbers of the same targets, as if the probes are from a QUIC server. In the third, the Ping experiment, we send ICMPv6 Echo Request probes to the same targets, masquerading as a typical topological measurement survey.

Because yarrp, by design, randomly orders probes (with respect to TTL and destination), a given trace to a destination, interspersed amongst millions, may take hours or days. It is only complete after each TTL value, 1 through the maximum, has been transmitted. Throughout our series of experiments, we decreased max. TTL from 32 (initially) to 24 (when we saw 32 was unnecessarily high) to 16 (employing yarrp’s “fill mode,” [10] which goes beyond 16 as long as responses continue to be received).

IV. Data

Data resulting from performing the three experiments is summarized in Table I. Note that because we use a unique nonce in each trace packet transmitted (“xmitted”), the “Nonces Xmitted” value is also the number of packets transmitted across all traces to the destinations (addresses). The 15.2M trace destinations (aka target addresses, of which 12.4M are unique) were chosen as in Beverly et al. [16], which is the largest IPv6 trace survey of which we are aware. We refer the interested reader to that paper for myriad target selection details we have not repeated here.

In total, we emitted approx. one billion unique nonce-laden packets destined for IPv6 networks worldwide. Recall that on our trace source host and DNS server, we capture all transmitted probes and all received packets of interest. We represent our voluminous trace and packet data in a graph
In Figure 1 we show the counts of monitoring by detection type and the amount of time to each type of detection. The number of detections by type is in parentheses, along with the number of peer hosts (unique remote addresses) that were the source of the reaction, where applicable. There was a total of approx. 247k reactions across all three experiments, and these occurred in approx. 25k traces to approx. 17.4k targets. The rdns detections were the most prevalent by far. Most detections occurred within 24 hours. However, there are some outliers: an rdns detection 113 days later in our UDP:443c experiment and a pcap detection that happened 42 days later. We go into detail about the pdns detections from experiment UDP:443s that happened 18 days later in Section V-B.

We also examine which TTL values were associated with the probes generating the most reactions or detections. Figure 2 summarizes our results for rdns, pcap, pdns, and fdns reactions. Reactions to probes having very low TTLs are especially interesting (i.e., TTLs toward the left side of the graph) because these likely represent monitoring in the middle, rather than at the edge, in target networks. In Section V-B we present details for the leftmost instance, having TTL of only 2, where eavesdropping was detected.

Of special interest is monitoring by surveillants who are ostensibly not in the target destination network of a trace but rather somewhere in the middle. We report detection counts in Table II where the reacting remote peer address is identified by origin ASN, i.e., the Autonomous System Number that originates a route via the global BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) covering that remote peer address. With rdns detections, we often see the origin ASN for the source of a reverse query (for a nonced address) is not the origin ASN for the trace’s target/destination address. Indeed, Table III shows

---

**TABLE I
EXPERIMENT PARAMETERS AND RESULTING DATA CHARACTERISTICS**

| Exp. Name  | Description | Maximum TTL | Dates, 2019 | Traces Performed | Dest. Addresses | Nonces Xmitted | Packets Captured |
|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| UDP:443c   | UDP probes sent TO port 443 | 32          | Jun 4 – 10  | 15.2M            | 12.4M          | 486.9M         | > 652M          |
| UDP:443s   | UDP probes sent FROM port 443 | 24          | Apr 10 – 14 | 15.2M            | 12.4M          | 365.2M         | > 495M          |
| Ping       | ICMPv6 Echo Request probes    | 16 +        | Apr 15 – 18 | 15.2M            | 12.4M          | 311.5M         | > 396M          |

---

**A. Macroscopic View**

Across three experiments, NOISE detects monitoring more than 200k times, ostensibly in 268 networks, for probes destined for 437 networks. When monitoring was detected, it resulted from approx. 25k of the traces having target destinations in a total of 55 countries. The top five were the United States (9,099), Germany (3,805), Brazil (2,726), Switzerland (1,850), and the United Kingdom (1,502). (Our NOISE source host/vantage point is in the United States.)
From TTLs 1-32. The solid blue squares represent responsive this visualization, the traces are represented from left to right, techniques, Figure 3 shows three traces from experiment space and origin ASNs. To introduce this visualization experiment parameters and varies across the targets’ address in aggregate to see how monitoring detection varies by the distance increases from left to right. Showing evidence of monitoring. The horizontal axis is spatial by TTL, i.e., Fig. 3. A visualization of three UDP:443c experiment traces (to three targets) sending packets to nonced addresses. Anonymity) have as many as 40 unique source addresses with pcap reactions (not shown, to preserve those networks’ termination address are also suspicious. The top ASNs associated having different origin ASN than that of the trace target des- ana, and policies clearly differ by ASN. It also indicates that probe divisions between targets’ origin ASNs on the rightmost label of the vertical axis. The traces are arranged on the vertical axis by destination ASN and in order of target address within each ASN, and we display divisions between targets’ origin ASNs on the rightmost label of the vertical axis.

In the top trace, we see that our probes might not have reached the target’s origin ASN because it has only blue responsive hops, not green. (It’s possible the probes were responded to, and possibly filtered, by some network upstream from the destination, one that is possibly affiliated with it.) In the middle trace, we see monitoring detected by rdns and pcap methods involving the nonced address for a probe sent with a TTL of 2. In the bottom trace we see evidence of a monitor based on rdns and pdns detection. Notice that these are probes that reached the target’s origin ASN. (Section V-B has details validating monitor detection for these particular traces.) With this knowledge, we can move on to looking at our similar, but bigger, visualization in Figure 4. This displays trace data for nearly 250 of the approx. 25k traces where monitoring was detected. Because we trace to the same targets in each experiment, we line-up the traces having the same target (horizontally), exposing how monitor behaviors change either over time or due to differing probe types per experiment. The traces are arranged on the vertical axis by destination ASN and in order of target address within each ASN, and we display divisions between targets’ origin ASNs on the rightmost label of the vertical axis.

First, comparing experiments across Figure 4 note that there are routers that respond to UDP probes to or from port 443 that did not respond to our ICMPv6 ping probes, and the same can be said of monitors or surveillants. The differences between experiments UDP:443s and Ping are particularly interesting given that they were run back-to-back. For example, the topmost ASN ignored our ICMPv6 probes and the same can be said of monitors or surveillants. The differences between experiments UDP:443s and Ping are particularly interesting given that they were run back-to-back. For example, the topmost ASN ignored our ICMPv6 probes but was very responsive to, or arguably interested in, probes having source port 443. This reveals that monitoring practices and policies clearly differ by ASN. It also indicates that probe protocols matter when designing systems to detect monitoring. While space limitations preclude describing all the phenomena evident in Figure 4 we claim it demonstrates NOISE’s power to identify monitoring and active response practices and associate them with specific networks’ address blocks, albeit shown anonymously, here.

The pcap detections involving remote source addresses having different origin ASN than that of the trace target destination address are also suspicious. The top ASNs associated with pcap reactions (not shown, to preserve those networks’ anonymity) have as many as 40 unique source addresses sending packets to nonced addresses.

In more detail next, we visualize trace-level results in aggregate to see how monitoring detection varies by experiment parameters and varies across the targets’ address space and origin ASNs. To introduce this visualization technique, Figure 3 shows three traces from experiment UDP:443c that contain rdns, pcap, and pdns detections. In this visualization, the traces are represented from left to right, from TTLs 1-32. The solid blue squares represent responsive hops. The solid green squares represent responsive hops that were in the target destination ASN of the trace. The small orange circles (rdns) indicate that a reverse lookup was performed on the nonced address of the probe we sent with that TTL. The bigger magenta circles (pdns) indicate that we found the nonced address of the probe we sent having that TTL subsequently present in DNSDB. Finally, the big red circles (pcap) indicate that a packet was unexpectedly received destined for the nonced address of the probe we sent having that TTL. Note that if we detect a reaction to a nonce-laden packet sent with TTL of 9, for example, it does not mean that a monitor or surveillant was at exactly hop 9. It means that monitoring ostensibly occurred within 9 hops along the path to the target because hops 1-8 also had the opportunity to observe the probe packet with a TTL of 9. The lower the TTL value associated with detection, the lower the upper limit on topological distance to the monitor and typically, the more constrained the observer’s possible location.

In the top trace, we see that our probes might not have reached the target’s origin ASN because it has only blue responsive hops, not green. (It’s possible the probes were responded to, and possibly filtered, by some network upstream from the destination, one that is possibly affiliated with it.) In the middle trace, we see monitoring detected by rdns and pcap methods involving the nonced address for a probe sent with a TTL of 2. In the bottom trace we see evidence of a monitor based on rdns and pdns detection. Notice that these are probes that reached the target’s origin ASN. (Section V-B has details validating monitor detection for these particular traces.) With this knowledge, we can move on to looking at our similar, but bigger, visualization in Figure 4. This displays trace data for nearly 250 of the approx. 25k traces where monitoring was detected. Because we trace to the same targets in each experiment, we line-up the traces having the same target (horizontally), exposing how monitor behaviors change either over time or due to differing probe types per experiment. The traces are arranged on the vertical axis by destination ASN and in order of target address within each ASN, and we display divisions between targets’ origin ASNs on the rightmost label of the vertical axis.

First, comparing experiments across Figure 4 note that there are routers that respond to UDP probes to or from port 443 that did not respond to our ICMPv6 ping probes, and the same can be said of monitors or surveillants. The differences between experiments UDP:443s and Ping are particularly interesting given that they were run back-to-back. For example, the topmost ASN ignored our ICMPv6 probes but was very responsive to, or arguably interested in, probes having source port 443. This reveals that monitoring practices and policies clearly differ by ASN. It also indicates that probe protocols matter when designing systems to detect monitoring. While space limitations preclude describing all the phenomena evident in Figure 4 we claim it demonstrates NOISE’s power to identify monitoring and active response practices and associate them with specific networks’ address blocks, albeit shown anonymously, here.

### TABLE II

**Detection Counts Where Remote Peer Host’s Origin ASN Differs From That of Trace Target Destination**

| Exp. Name | Detection Type | # Reactions from Diff. DsASN | Total # Reactions |
|-----------|----------------|-------------------------------|------------------|
| UDP:443c  | rdns           | 34,308                        | 79,352           | 43.12 |
|           | pcap           | 2,003                         | 7,625            | 26.27 |
|           | pdns           | n/a                           | 21               | n/a |
| UDP:443s  | rdns           | 28,615                        | 76,154           | 37.58 |
|           | pcap           | 1,191                         | 6,237            | 19.10 |
|           | pdns           | n/a                           | 154              | n/a |
| Ping      | rdns           | 29,812                        | 54,663           | 54.54 |
|           | pcap           | 248                           | 1,869            | 13.27 |
|           | pdns           | n/a                           | 0                | n/a |

### TABLE III

**Top 10 Origin ASNs for Remote Addresses Performing PTR Queries on Nonced Addresses (rdns), in One Experiment**

| Exp. Name | # NS addr | ASN | AS Name                        |
|-----------|-----------|-----|--------------------------------|
| UDP:443c  | 1,277     | 15169 | Google LLC                     |
|           | 175       | 13335 | Cloudflare, Inc.               |
|           | 139       | 6692  | OpenDNS, LLC                   |
|           | 85        | 3356  | Level 3 Parent, LLC            |
|           | 83        | 8075  | Microsoft Corp.                |
|           | 63        | 9355  | NICT                           |
|           | 62        | 2040  | HETZNER-AS                     |
|           | 53        | 3462  | HINET Data Comm. Business Group|
|           | 38        | 4782  | GSNET Data Comm. Business Group|
|           | 34        | 42    | WoodyNet                       |

Fig. 3. A visualization of three UDP:443c experiment traces (to three targets) showing evidence of monitoring. The horizontal axis is spatial by TTL, i.e., the distance increases from left to right.
B. Microscopic View & Validation

Given the myriad instances of monitoring we’ve detected in the modest set of experiments presented, we next attempt to validate or verify a subset of the results by gathering ground-truth for instances of NOISE-detected monitoring: curious DNS queries, sharing DNS data, and eavesdropping or “monitoring in the middle.” Each of these anecdotes entails monitoring by, or sharing resulting information with, third parties who are neither the source nor target networks of monitoring.

1) Curious Queries: Table IV shows an abbreviated timeline of events for a trace in which NOISE received reverse DNS (rdns) queries, indicating monitoring, i.e., a reverse lookup was performed on the nonced source address of a probe packet. The lines in bold represent evidence of monitoring within 10 hops of the NOISE source host. At 9m 7s and seconds thereafter, NOISE captures reverse DNS queries for the nonced address sent with hop limit of 10. The source address of these query packets belongs to the network containing the trace’s target address.

This trace is also the top trace in Figure 3, where we see the NOISE observations (orange circles) occur at hops 9, 10, and 11, although we did not receive an ICMPv6 hop limit exceeded error message from routers at these hops. Note that no responsive hops are in a network associated with the target (that is, only blue squares). Here a traditional traceroute, without nonces, does not show whether or not probes reach the destination network. However, NOISE’s rdns detection provides evidence that trace probes’ nonces did reach the destination network of the target because the recursive DNS queries had source addresses within the target’s destination network. This demonstrates how NOISE’s modified yarrp sometimes improves reachability measurements over those performed with either yarrp or other traceroute tools.

Furthermore (but not shown), using NOISE’s detailed packet capture logs at its authoritative DNS service (NSD), we find that this network’s DNS server(s) subsequently queried our NOISE DNS server by the name .noise.example.com. This exposes a network vulnerability that could be abused. Once such behavior is known, an adversary could remotely cause the institution to query an arbitrary domain name of the adversary’s choosing merely by replying with that name in response to a PTR query (that it can elicit using NOISE’s nonced address probing technique). For example, this can be abused for (a) misdirection (of network forensics investigation), (b) adversely affecting caching and performance of the institution’s DNS service, and (c) the institution’s unwitting participation in DNS amplification attacks.

2) Sharing Passive DNS Data: Table IV shows an abbreviated timeline of events for a trace in which NOISE found that queries involving its nonced addresses were somehow conveyed to DNSDB. This trace, performed in April 2019, was from the NOISE source host located within a commercial datacenter in the U.S. to a target at a U.S. university. The two lines in bold represent strong evidence of monitoring within 14 hops of the NOISE source host. At 1h 47s in the trace, NOISE transmits a UDP probe having a nonced address and port 443 as its source and a hop limit of 14. At 4h 44m, the trace is complete. At 18d 5h—18 days later—NOISE captures a reverse DNS query for the nonced address sent with hop limit of 14. The source address of this query packet belongs to the
university’s network containing the trace’s target address. At 18d 6h—an hour later—this nonced address appears in the third-party passive DNS database.

A similar trace, performed in January 2019, destined for a different U.S. university, is the bottom trace in Figure 3. There you can see at hop 14 that NOISE has both rdns (reverse DNS, orange circle) and pdns (passive DNS, magenta circle) observations. Across all three experiments, we found that some of our nonced addresses ultimately appeared in DNSDB when the NOISE probe packets reached either of two unrelated U.S. universities. That is, their PTR queries and responses were captured in this database somehow by that third-party’s network of monitored DNS servers. This means that NOISE can identify some recursive nameservers that have a third party’s monitor installed and are monitoring DNS queries and answers and transmitting them to the company.

To get to the truth, we had personal conversations with expert operations personnel at each of the two universities, agreeing to maintain their anonymity. The first university, associated with pdns detections on traces in January 2019, reported that network operations collected data from border routers via flow export [26] to support network troubleshooting and forensics. This data was then post-processed using custom scripts that sometimes perform DNS reverse lookups [27]. Furthermore, they reported that the university had been running passive DNS query monitoring software in the university’s primary DNS server infrastructure in January 2019 and years prior. A security officer also reported that their operations systems rely on this DNS infrastructure for recursive queries, and thus, DNS queries in incident handling may very well be subject to passive DNS monitoring [28]. Coincidentally, they also reported that university technical personnel decided not to reinstall this passive DNS software when the DNS server infrastructure was upgraded prior to April 2019. Our results coincide with this: NOISE no longer had pdns detections associated with this university as of April 2019.

Similarly, regarding the second university, we validated our results by personal, anonymous interview. For traces like the one in Table V, we learned that this university’s network team records all traffic meta-data via flow export, not just unsolicited traffic such as our probes [28]. Furthermore, the reported purpose of the data collection was to support incident handling and network troubleshooting [29]. With respect to the 18 days passing between the time the NOISE probe was received and the time the reverse DNS lookup was performed, they hypothesized that the subsequent lookup was due to an actual incident investigation, likely attended to by an analyst, i.e., some manual effort. Their hypothesis is that the probe matched an automatic detection rule targeting threats which would cause it to garner additional attention. They did not share their log retention policy, but it is clear from our results that logs were retained for at least 18 days at the time. They also reported that the university indeed operates passive DNS monitoring as is a prescribed best practice amongst some higher-education institutions [4].

Figure 4 includes for both these universities pdns observations in context (magenta circles). These two universities’ ASNs are arranged above and below the tick mark IX, topmost in the vertical axis labels on the right. First, considering the traces above that tick mark (trace numbers 187-250), we see that in the first column (UDP:443c, January 2019) of traces destined for UDP port 443, there are many rdns detections (orange circles) but no pdns detections (magenta circles). In the second column (UDP:443s, April 2019) of traces, however, from UDP port 443 and destined for pseudorandom ports, there are many pdns observations (magenta circles). Lastly for this ASN, in the third column (Ping, April 2019) of traces, ICMPv6 echo requests show no detections. The Ping experiment’s traffic is treated differently, either in monitoring or in reactions, e.g., automated or manual analysis. In Figure 4 consider the traces in the other university’s ASN, below tick mark IX, above tick mark VIII (trace numbers 106-186). Here we see occasional pdns detections in the first column (UDP:443c, January 2019), evidencing that institution’s participating in passive DNS monitoring at the time of that survey experiment. However, these observations do not appear in the latter columns (UDP:443s and Ping, April 2019), coinciding with the university personnel reporting they were no longer performing the passive DNS monitoring.

Overall, this remote detection of passive DNS could be used and abused in some ways. Because the NOISE technique can remotely detect data collection and monitors, potential adversaries could use NOISE to classify institutions’ networks and attack surfaces. For instance, one might attack collection infrastructure by employing the NOISE technique to cause certain institutions to perform many queries. This can pollute the passive DNS database with either misleading or superfluous information, causing confusion or operational problems that could be detrimental to security investigations. The ability to remotely cause a network to perform DNS lookups and cause the resulting names and addresses to be stored, indefinitely, in passive DNS databases also presents subsequent security or privacy issues, e.g., as addresses or names in those long-lived records become encumbered by reputation or become targets [16], [30] as they pass from one third party to the next.

**Table V**

| Delta time | Event | ProbETTL |
|------------|-------|----------|
| 0s         | tr probe sent to target | 15 |
| 2m 32s     | tr probe sent to target | 17 |
| 16m 14s    | tr probe sent to target | 7  |
| 16m 14s    | tr hop response | 7  |
|            | ... | ... |
| 1h 47s     | tr probe sent to target | 14 |
|            | ... | ... |
| 4h 44m     | last tr probe sent to target | 4 |
|            | ... | ... |
| 18d 5h     | RDNS query on noncedAddr by university | 14 |
| 18d 6h     | noncedAddr appears in passive DNS database | 14 |

**Figure 4** includes for both these universities pdns observations in context (magenta circles). These two universities’ ASNs are arranged above and below the tick mark IX, topmost in the vertical axis labels on the right. First, considering the traces above that tick mark (trace numbers 187-250), we see that in the first column (UDP:443c, January 2019) of traces destined for UDP port 443, there are many rdns detections (orange circles) but no pdns detections (magenta circles). In the second column (UDP:443s, April 2019) of traces, however, from UDP port 443 and destined for pseudorandom ports, there are many pdns observations (magenta circles). Lastly for this ASN, in the third column (Ping, April 2019) of traces, ICMPv6 echo requests show no detections. The Ping experiment’s traffic is treated differently, either in monitoring or in reactions, e.g., automated or manual analysis. In Figure 4 consider the traces in the other university’s ASN, below tick mark IX, above tick mark VIII (trace numbers 106-186). Here we see occasional pdns detections in the first column (UDP:443c, January 2019), evidencing that institution’s participating in passive DNS monitoring at the time of that survey experiment. However, these observations do not appear in the latter columns (UDP:443s and Ping, April 2019), coinciding with the university personnel reporting they were no longer performing the passive DNS monitoring.

Overall, this remote detection of passive DNS could be used and abused in some ways. Because the NOISE technique can remotely detect data collection and monitors, potential adversaries could use NOISE to classify institutions’ networks and attack surfaces. For instance, one might attack collection infrastructure by employing the NOISE technique to cause certain institutions to perform many queries. This can pollute the passive DNS database with either misleading or superfluous information, causing confusion or operational problems that could be detrimental to security investigations. The ability to remotely cause a network to perform DNS lookups and cause the resulting names and addresses to be stored, indefinitely, in passive DNS databases also presents subsequent security or privacy issues, e.g., as addresses or names in those long-lived records become encumbered by reputation or become targets [16], [30] as they pass from one third party to the next.
3) Eavesdropping: Table VII shows an abbreviated timeline of events for a trace in which NOISE detected monitoring amid the trace path from source to destination ASN, i.e., a monitor in the middle. This trace is the middle trace in Figure 3 where we see the NOISE detections (circles) occur at hop 2 (a blue square), well before the trace reaches the destination ASN by hop 12 (green squares). This trace, performed in January 2019, was from the NOISE source host, located within a commercial datacenter in the U.S., to a U.S. target thousands of miles away. The three lines in bold represent strong evidence of eavesdropping within two hops of the NOISE source host. First, to start the trace, NOISE transmits a UDP probe having a nonced address as its source and a hop limit of 2, destined for port 443 of the target. At 9m 58s, NOISE unexpectedly captures a TCP SYN packet destined for port 80 and the nonced address used as source of the hop-limit=2 probe. At 10m 25s, NOISE captures a similar TCP SYN packet destined for port 443 and this same nonced address. Both these TCP SYN packets have an unfamiliar source address belonging to a popular cloud host provider, different than the datacenter. At 10m 43s, NOISE captures a reverse DNS query for this same nonced address. The source address of this query belongs to a public recursive DNS provider’s network.

Notice that the second line of Table VII at 0.0005s, shows that NOISE captured a router hop response for hop limit 2 after only a fraction of a millisecond, i.e., an ICMPv6 hop limit exceeded error message was received, destined for the nonced source address. This means that the nonce was first propagated by a router before the eavesdropping detection events (bold lines), and thus, it is possible that an eavesdropper gleaned the nonced address from the ICMPv6 error message packet rather than from the NOISE probe packet. However, we further find that that ICMP error message packet itself had a hop limit of 31 when it arrived at the NOISE source host. This suggests its initial hop limit was 32 because common host implementations are known to use 32, 64, or 255. If so, the ICMPv6 error response traversed just one router, suggesting it originated at a router at hop 2 and that its return path has a maximum length of two hops. Given (a) a rule-of-thumb that 1ms round-trip-time (RTT) represents a maximum distance of approx. 100km and (b) the RTT for a router at hop 2 is only 0.5 milliseconds, we can reasonably assume that this router is within 50km of the NOISE source host. Consequently, hop 2 is definitely “in the middle” given that the trace target is thousands of miles away, bolstering a conclusion that this evidences eavesdropping.

With the help of the host network’s architect, we have eliminated the possibility that the eavesdropping is being performed in the NOISE host network itself, i.e., within the first hop [27]. All indications are that the eavesdropping is on a link between the host’s gateway router (belonging to the host network) and the next-hop router, operated by an ISP with which the host network peers.

Using NOISE’s detailed logs, we further find that a little more than 10 minutes passed between dissemination of the nonce in the probe packet (and presumed eavesdropping) and propagation of that nonce back to our authoritative name server by third-party reverse query. Thus, NOISE can detect some monitoring (e.g., packet or flow capture or logging), can then isolate its candidate location in the router-level Internet topology (path), and can ultimately show that information about traffic is being shared with third parties. Across all three experiments, we find a total of 459 traces having one of these suspicious TCP SYN connection attempts from the given cloud host provider’s ASN to 459 distinct NOISE nonced addresses. The distribution of hop limits associated with those nonced source addresses (not shown) suggests uniform packet sampling, irrespective of hop limit.

Once NOISE identified the cloud host provider’s source IP address used in these curious TCP SYN connection attempts, we searched for independent records of this suspicious behavior in the security community. This search yielded two pieces of evidence involving the source address’s /64 prefix. First, a large Content Delivery Network’s transaction logs were searched for the /64 prefix in question as a WWW client. We find that it is regularly the source of myriad successful connections to WWW infrastructure [31]. Second, we find an independent report online (late 2018, not included here to maintain privacy) that it has been the source of connection attempts to IPv6 temporary privacy addresses in another country, consistent with the monitors being in a privileged location, such as an Internet exchange.

**Conclusion**

Motivated by concerns of our own and of the community about pervasive, systematic surveillance of Internet traffic, we develop NOISE: an inverse surveillance method and system. We’ve evaluated and reported its effectiveness, but this is only a start. In general, the method is not limited to only nonce-laden (IPv6) transport identifiers, nor limited to traffic synthesized for active measurements. We envision broad application in concert with, and literally within, everyday Internet traffic and applications. With NOISE implemented pervasively, e.g., in the WWW, monitors would have no choice but to observe nonce-laden traffic, improving detection of surveillants whenever they act on their observations.

### TABLE VI

| Delta time | Event Description | ProbeTTL |
|------------|-------------------|----------|
| 0s         | tr probe sent to target | 2        |
| 0.0005s    | tr hop response     | 2        |
| 9m 58s     | TCP SYN :20 → noncedAddr:30 \(\rightarrow\) by cloud Provider | 2        |
| 10m 25s    | TCP SYN :20 → noncedAddr:443 \(\rightarrow\) by cloud Provider | 2        |
| 10m 43s    | DNS query on noncedAddr \(\rightarrow\) by cloud DNS Provider | 2        |
| 22m 26s    | tr probe sent to target | 24       |
|            |                   |          |
| 11h 51m    | last tr probe sent to target | 15       |
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We appreciate the significant help on this work from these colleagues and coworkers: Niels Bakker, Arthur Berger, Robert Beverly, Aaron Block, David Coffinnes, David Duff, Jared Mauch, Suzanne Pan, Philipp Richter, Kyle Rose, Steven Schecter, Chris Schill, Jon Thompson, and Rick Weber. This work utilizes tshark, GNU parallel, and Neo4j.

REFERENCES

[1] S. Farrell, “Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack,” RFC 7258, Internet Engineering Task Force, May 2014. [Online]. Available: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7258

[2] C. C. Demchak and Y. Shavitt, “Chinas Maxim–Leave No Access Point Unexploited: The Hidden Story of China Telecoms BGP Hijacking,” Military Cyber Affairs, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 7, 2018.

[3] Farsight Security, “Passive DNS project,” 2018. https://www.farsightsecurity.com/technical/passive-dns/

[4] REN-ISAC, “PASSIVE DNS,” 2019, https://www.ren-isac.net/member-resources/pDNS.html

[5] C. Stoll and J. Connolly, “The Cuckoo’s Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer Espionage,” Physics Today, vol. 43, p. 75, 1990.

[6] B. Cox, “The ISPs sharing your DNS query data,” June 2018, https://blog.benjojo.co.uk/post/ISPs-sharing-DNS-query-data.

[7] S. Mann, “Sousveillance: Inverse Surveillance in Multimedia Imaging,” Proceedings of the 12th annual ACM international conference on Multimedia. ACM, 2004, pp. 620–627.

[8] S. Mann, J. Nolan, and B. Wellman, “Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments,” Surveillance & society, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 331–355, 2003.

[9] S. Mann, “Sousveillance: Inverse Surveillance in Multimedia Imaging,” in Proceedings of the 12th annual ACM international conference on Multimedia. ACM, 2004, pp. 620–627.

[10] S. Farrell, “Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack,” RFC 7258, Internet Engineering Task Force, May 2014. [Online]. Available: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7258

[11] B. VanderSloot, A. McDonald, W. Scott, J. A. Halderman, and R. Ensafi, “Quack: Scalable Remote Measurement of Application-Layer Censorship,” in 27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18), 2018, pp. 187–202.

[12] A. McDonald, M. Bernhard, L. Valenta, B. VanderSloot, W. Scott, N. Sullivan, J. A. Halderman, and R. Ensafi, “403 Forbidden: A Global View of CDN Geoblocking,” in Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018. ACM, 2018, pp. 218–230.

[13] R. Beverly, “Yarrping the Internet: Randomized High-Speed Active Topology Discovery,” in Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC), Nov. 2016.

[14] R. Beverly, R. Durairajan, D. Plonka, and J. P. Rohrer, “In the IP of the Beholder: Strategies for Active IPv6 Topology Discovery,” in Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018, ser. IMC ’18. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2018, pp. 308–321. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3278532.3278559

[15] V. Yegneswaran, P. Barford, and D. Plonka, “On the Design and use of Internet Sinks for Network Abuse Monitoring,” in International Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection. Springer, 2004, pp. 146–165.

[16] B. VanderSloot, A. McDonald, W. Scott, J. A. Halderman, and R. Ensafi, “403 Forbidden: A Global View of CDN Geoblocking,” in Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018. ACM, 2018, pp. 364–378.

[17] B. VanderSloot, A. McDonald, W. Scott, J. A. Halderman, and R. Ensafi, “403 Forbidden: A Global View of CDN Geoblocking,” in Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018. ACM, 2018, pp. 364–378.

[18] R. Beverly, “Yarrping the Internet: Randomized High-Speed Active Topology Discovery,” in Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC), Nov. 2016.

[19] R. Beverly, R. Durairajan, D. Plonka, and J. P. Rohrer, “In the IP of the Beholder: Strategies for Active IPv6 Topology Discovery,” in Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018, ser. IMC ’18. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2018, pp. 308–321. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3278532.3278559

[20] R. Beverly, R. Durairajan, D. Plonka, and J. P. Rohrer, “In the IP of the Beholder: Strategies for Active IPv6 Topology Discovery,” in Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018, ser. IMC ’18. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2018, pp. 308–321. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3278532.3278559

[21] M. Casado, T. Garfinkel, W. Cui, Y. Paxson, and S. Savage, “Opportunistic measurement: Extracting insight from spurious traffic,” in Proc. 4th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks (Hotnets-IV), 2005.

[22] D. J. Bernstein, “ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20,” 2008.

[23] V. Yegneswaran, P. Barford, and D. Plonka, “On the Design and use of Internet Sinks for Network Abuse Monitoring,” in International Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection. Springer, 2004, pp. 146–165.

[24] B. VanderSloot, A. McDonald, W. Scott, J. A. Halderman, and R. Ensafi, “403 Forbidden: A Global View of CDN Geoblocking,” in Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018. ACM, 2018, pp. 364–378.