A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems

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ABSTRACT

This paper reviews the state of the art in cyber security risk assessment of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. We select and in-detail examine twenty-four risk assessment methods developed for or applied in the context of a SCADA system. We describe the essence of the methods and then analyse them in terms of aim; application domain; the stages of risk management addressed; key risk management concepts covered; impact measurement; sources of probabilistic data; evaluation and tool support. Based on the analysis, we suggest an intuitive scheme for the categorisation of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems. We also outline five research challenges facing the domain and point out the approaches that might be taken.

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1. Introduction

A Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is a type of Industrial Control System (ICS). An ICS controls processes in the industrial sector and in the sectors which form a Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) (NIST, 2011). The list of sectors forming CNI varies from country to country. In the UK, CNI is defined as “Those infrastructure assets (physical or electronic) that are vital to the continued delivery and integrity of the essential services upon which the UK relies, the loss or compromise of which would lead to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life” and is formed by nine sectors: energy, food, water, transportation, communications, emergency services, health care, financial services and government (Cabinet Office, 2010).

SCADA systems stand out among other ICSs as systems that (1) monitor and control assets distributed over large geographical areas, and (2) use specific control equipment such as a Master Terminal Unit (MTU) and Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), which we further discuss in Section 2. Initially, SCADA systems were used in power transmission, gas pipeline and water distribution control systems. Nowadays, SCADA systems are widely
used in steel making, chemistry, telecommunications, experimental and manufacturing facilities (Daneels and Salter, 1999; Igure et al., 2006; Morgan, 2013).

The smooth and reliable operation of SCADA systems is vital for such sectors of CNI as energy, water and transportation where both data acquisition and control are critically important. A widespread, long-lasting outage of SCADA and, consequently, CNI may cause serious disturbance to a state and society (Guan et al., 2011; Morgan, 2013). The consequences of a malfunction of a SCADA system may be detrimental and may range from financial loss due to an equipment and environmental damage to the loss of human life (Patel et al., 2005).

Security in general and cyber security specifically were not the major concerns of early standalone SCADA systems (Patel et al., 2005). Security was primarily achieved by controlling physical access to system components which were unique and used proprietary communication protocols. For years, security in SCADA systems was present only as an implication of safety. Over the last decade, however, the situation has changed, and a number of standards and directives dealing with the cyber security of SCADA systems have emerged.

In 2004, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the document titled System Protection Profile – Industrial Control Systems which covers the risks and objective of SCADA systems (NIST, 2004). In 2005, the National Infrastructure Security Coordination Center (NISCC), a predecessor of the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) in the UK, published a good practice guide for firewall deployment in SCADA networks (NISCC (CPNI), 2005). In 2007, the US President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board and the Department of Energy outlined the steps an organisation must undertake to improve the security of its SCADA networks in the booklet 21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks (US Department of Energy and Infrastructure Security and Energy, 2007). In 2008, the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) produced a Good Practice Guide for Process Control and SCADA Security (CPNI) encapsulating best security practices. In 2008, NIST released a comprehensive guidance on a wide range of security issues, and technical, operational and management security controls. The guide was updated in 2011 (NIST, 2011). In 2013, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) released the recommendations for Europe on SCADA patching (ENISA, 2013). Currently, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) actively works on the development of a wide range of standards covering many aspects of CNI cyber security (NERG, 2014). More extensive overviews of SCADA-related security standards and initiatives are provided in Igure et al. (2006) and Nicholson et al. (2012).

Modern day SCADA systems are highly sophisticated, complex and based on advanced technology systems. The escalating sophistication and modernisation as well as real-time continuous operation and distributed, multi-component architecture underpin the growth of cyber threats to SCADA systems. SCADA systems are exposed to a wide range of cyber threats also because of the standardisation of communication protocols and hardware components, growing interconnectivity and legacy. (All these aspects we discuss in greater detail in Section 2.)

Over the last several decades we already saw a range of cyber attacks on CNI and SCADA. In 1982, the first recorded cyber attack on CNI took place at the Trans-Siberian pipeline and resulted in an explosion visible from space (Miller and Rowe, 2012). Over the last decade there was a number of cyber attacks on SCADA systems and ICS. In 2003, a slammer worm penetrated a network at the Davies-Besse nuclear plant in Ohio (Guan et al., 2011; Patel et al., 2005) and a computer virus named Sobig shut down train signalling systems in Florida (Miller and Rowe, 2012). In 2006, a hacker penetrated the operation system of a water treatment facility in Harrisburg, USA (Guan et al., 2011; Patel et al., 2005) and the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama was manually shut due to the overload of network traffic (Nicholson et al., 2012). In 2007, a dismissed employee installed unauthorised software on the SCADA system of the Tehama Colusa Canal Authority (Miller and Rowe, 2012). In 2010, the Stuxnet computer worm struck the Iranian nuclear facility causing the failure of almost one-fifth of all centrifuges (Miller and Rowe, 2012). Stuxnet was a game-changer, it attracted the world’s attention to cyber threats to CNI by drawing a vivid and horrifying picture of the consequences of a cyber attack on CNI. In 2011, five global energy and oil firms were targeted by a combination of attacks including social engineering, trojans and Windows-based exploits (Miller and Rowe, 2012). In 2012, a malware named Flame was discovered to have been operating in many sites in the Middle East and North Africa for at least two years (Miller and Rowe, 2012). A larger number of cyber attacks on CNI is listed and analysed in Miller and Rowe (2012) and Nicholson et al. (2012).

The analysis in Miller and Rowe (2012) indicates that the number of cyber attacks on CNI increases over time. The number of SCADA-related incidents also steadily grows. In 2010, the Repository of Industrial Security Incidents (RISI) had 161 incidents listed with about 10 new incidents being added each quarter (Tudor and Fabro, 2010). In 2013, the RISI database contained already 240 incidents recorded between 2001 and the end of 2012 (RISI, 2013). Additionally, an extensive study of the current cyber security state of SCADA systems based on a set of interviews with a large number of experts confirmed that cyber threats in SCADA systems are escalating, they are “real and expanding” (Morgan, 2013).

All the above stipulates the strong need for the effective management of cyber security risks in SCADA systems. Risk assessment is an important part of the best practice risk management in ICS and SCADA systems (Chemino et al., 2013; Leith and Piper, 2013). Risk assessment answers the following three questions (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981):

- What can go wrong?
- What is the likelihood that it would go wrong?
- What are the consequences?

Risk management builds upon the risk assessment in order to answer the other three questions (Chittester and Haimes, 2004):

- What can be done and what options are available?
- What are the associated trade-offs in terms of all costs, benefits, and risks?
- What are the impacts of current management decisions on future options?

A range of standards and normative documents attending to risk management and risk assessment has been devised over the years for IT systems. ISO 31000:2009 (ISO, 2009) outlines
Risk assessment in SCADA systems shall help to prioritise (1) the components of a system in terms of their importance to the successful operation of the system or in terms of their level of vulnerability to an attack, and (2) threats in terms of the danger they pose and their likelihood. Risk assessment shall assist the managers and engineers of SCADA systems with the development of adequate security policies, with the design of secure system and with the rational allocation of often scarce resources (Morgan, 2013). It shall also facilitate the communication between security, business and SCADA experts.

In 2004, it was stated that “[t]here is an urgent need for a systemic risk-based methodology that would add protection to SCADA systems, given their central role in controlling and operating critical interdependent infrastructure systems” (Chittester and Haimes, 2004, p. 18). During the past ten years a number of risk assessment methodologies for SCADA systems were proposed. Driven by the importance of managing and assessing cyber security risks in SCADA systems, the ultimate aim of the paper at hand is a comprehensive, structured and detailed review of existing cyber security risk assessment methods specifically tailored for SCADA systems.

Several relevant literature reviews exist. Reviews covering SCADA security and cyber security issues are presented in Cheminod et al. (2013), Igure et al. (2006), Morgan (2013), Nicholson et al. (2012), but these reviews do not concentrate on risk assessment methods. In Giannopoulos et al. (2012), twenty-one risk assessment methodologies for CNI proposed by various commercial and organisations are surveyed; however Giannopoulos et al. (2012) does not concentrate on SCADA systems. In Kertzner et al. (2006), only a brief description of several risk assessment methodologies for the oil and gas sector is outlined. An extensive overview of risk assessment methodologies is contained in Ralston et al. (2007), but only two methods are examined in detail. This review paper updates and significantly extends the overview of risk assessment methods in Ralston et al. (2007), which was published in 2007. Our review devotes equal attention to every method examined. To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the most comprehensive and detailed overview of cyber security risk assessment methods applied in the context of SCADA systems.

Another aim of the paper is to examine the advantages and drawbacks of the existing cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems. This analysis forms a solid foundation upon which new risk assessment methods for SCADA systems might draw and the existing ones might be improved.

Risk assessment methods in general and in the context of SCADA systems specifically are hard to categorise as we conclude based on our analysis and in agreement with Morgan (2013) and Ralston et al. (2007). A categorisation scheme must be multilateral and must focus attention on the different aspects of methods. The development of a comprehensive, yet intuitive categorisation scheme remains an open research question. A categorisation scheme may assist with (1) the search and review of relevant methods, (2) the identification of similar or duplicating methods, and (3) the elaboration of the common characteristics of the methods of the same category. The latter might enable a sound analysis of methods within a category.

Based on the comprehensive review, in this paper we propose an intuitive categorisation of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems. On one lateral, we split the
methods examined into guidelines, activity-specific methods and elaborated methods into model-based and formula based.

The detailed description of examined methods, their thorough analysis and intuitive classification scheme presented in this paper aim to provide guidance for and assist practitioners with the choice of an appropriate risk assessment method. The review examines the application domain of the methods, their aims, key concepts and stages of risk management addressed. We also discuss the sources of probabilistic data used by the methods, how the impact is measured, how the methods are evaluated and whether tool support is provided. The drawbacks of widely-used probabilistic risk assessment methods are also revealed to the reader.

As the outcome of our review, we describe current research challenges in cyber security risk assessment in SCADA systems and point out to possible approaches that can help future work in this area. Research communities and practitioners dealing with risk management in SCADA systems may benefit from this discussion.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, in order to arm the reader before exposing him/her to the review we provide some background discussion on what SCADA systems are and on security challenges facing them. Then, in Section 3 we describe the review methodology. Section 4 provides the reader with the brief descriptions of all methods examined. We found it necessary to present these descriptions prior to the analysis as the knowledge of separate methods leads to the better appreciation of the review results. Section 5 contains the summary analysis of the methods examined and key findings that stem from it. Finally, Section 6 outlines research challenges facing the domain of cyber security risk assessment in SCADA systems in future. We draw some concluding remarks in Section 7.

2. SCADA systems and cyber security challenges

A SCADA system consists of hardware and software components, and of a connecting network(s). Fig. 1 shows a generic hardware architecture of a SCADA system. An architecture is formed by one or more control centres and a number of field devices such as an RTU, Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) and Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) connected by a communication infrastructure. An RTU receives data from field devices, converts it to digital data and sends it to the control centre as well as receives digital commands from the centre and handles alarms. A PLC is a digital computer that monitors sensors and takes decisions based upon a user created program to control valves, solenoids and other actuators. A control centre includes an MTU, which issues commands to and gathers data from RTUs, it also stores and processes data in order to display information to human operators to support decision making. Human operators monitor and control the system from a control centre via Human–Machine Interface (HMI) displays.

Communication on a SCADA network is paramount. Messages are exchanged (1) between master devices, which control operation of other devices (e.g. PLCs) and slave devices (e.g. sensors, actuators, relays), which send messages to master devices and perform actions at their command, and (2) between field devices using a peer-to-peer communication model (Igure et al., 2006). The following communication protocols are used in SCADA systems: Ethernet/IP, DeviceNet, ControlNet, PROFIBUS, MODBUS TCP/IP, DNP3 and Foundation Fieldbus (Byres et al., 2004; Igure et al., 2006). As they cover large geographical areas, SCADA systems typically use Wide Area Networks (WAN). The communication infrastructure may be satellite, radio, power line based and any combination of the above.

The software in SCADA systems is multi-tasking, uses real-time database(s) and typically provides the following functionality: the display of synoptic diagrams and text as well as a possibility to view them on multiple screens, general editing (e.g. re-sizing and scrolling), trend analysis, alarm handling, logging, archiving, report generation and the automatic triggering of control actions (Daneels and Salter, 1999).

Following advances in Information and Communication Technology (ICT), over the last two decades the architecture of a SCADA system has become more open with a large number of commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software relying upon standardised communication protocols being used. The reasons

![Fig. 1 – Generic SCADA hardware architecture. NIST SP 800-82 (NIST, 2011), p. 2–7.](image-url)
for these changes in a SCADA architecture are, among others, financial. The use of off-the-shelf components and open communication protocols leads to a significant cost reduction. The number of proprietary design and implementation activities to be carried out by an end-user decreases. Technical support and maintenance are provided by a vendor eliminating the need for an in-house support team.

The use of standardised communication protocols enables the integration of a SCADA system with a corporate IT system and its connection to the Internet. The increased interconnectivity of SCADA systems simplifies their maintenance and control: “You are a manager at a municipal utility. A few years ago, when the beeper signaled an alarm well past midnight, you had to drape a raincoat over your pajamas, jump into your car and race to the plant. Once there, you ran down to the basement and flipped some switches. Nowadays, you reach for your tablet or smart phone and tap some icons without leaving your warm and cozy bed” (Luijif, 2013).

SCADA systems must adjust to interconnectivity as did corporate IT systems at the early days of the Internet. However, SCADA are different from business information systems in many ways. SCADA systems are time critical and geographically distributed, they support complex interactions between physical and logical infrastructures while operating continuously, the effect of malfunction is more tangible while access to the various components of a system is more complicated, and the life time of system components is usually 3–4 times longer. NIST SP 800-82 (NIST, 2011, Sec. 3.1), Cheminod et al. (2013), Larkin et al. (2014), and Leith and Piper (2013) discuss the differences between IT systems and ICS in greater detail.

The specifics of SCADA systems lead to the fact that not all security countermeasures exploited in IT systems are applicable to SCADA systems. In fact, some countermeasures may damage a SCADA system more than secure it. On the one hand, security countermeasures such as access control, VPN and firewall, which have already demonstrated their efficiency in the IT security domain, are also successfully adopted by SCADA systems (Patel et al., 2005). On the other hand, countermeasures such as authentication and cryptography must be used with an extreme caution because they may have a disruptive effect on the operation of a SCADA system where every action is time critical. In Larkin et al. (2014), it is discussed how traditional IT security countermeasures may be exploited in SCADA systems avoiding negative impact on system safety and efficiency.

For over forty years confidentiality, integrity and availability – also referred to as the CIA-triad – have been defining the set and priorities of security goals for corporate information systems. In ICS and SCADA systems, the priorities among the goals are different. Among the triad, integrity and availability are highly paramount, while confidentiality is secondary for SCADA systems (Cheminod et al., 2013; McQueen et al., 2006).

In reality, security goals, in whatever order they appear, are often preceded in SCADA systems by safety, reliability, robustness and maintainability (which are the supreme goal of critical systems) leaving little or no resources for security goals. In Park and Lee (2014), the authors discuss a need for an update of such well established international security standards as NIST SP 800-53 and ISO 27001 in order to address the specifics of ISC is stated. A new standards, according to Park and Lee (2014), shall bring together the CIA-triad and safety requirement critical in the context of an ICS.

Cyber security issues in SCADA systems are further exacerbated by the legacy problem. Existing SCADA systems, due to their continuous operation, are not updated or re-designed in some cases for decades. The nature of SCADA systems requires them to be operational 24 hours 7 days a week. This makes the regular patching and upgrading of both a SCADA software and a hosting operating system difficult, if not impossible (Cheminod et al., 2013; Nicholson et al., 2012). The patching of a SCADA system is complicated by the facts that the system is time-critical, there is no test environment and patching may introduce new unknown vulnerabilities or ultimately break the system. Legacy SCADA system may end up relying on operating systems and software that are no longer supported by vendors (Gold, 2009).

The human factor plays a momentous role in cyber security of SCADA systems. Human supervision, and complicated software architecture and development process are the characteristics of SCADA systems which exacerbate the role of the human factor (Chittester and Haimes, 2004). An eternal vigilance regarding human factor helps with the prevention of human errors which may result in unintended attacks, and with the prevention of intended internal and external social engineering attacks. Attacks by internal agents, i.e. employees of an organisation, are more often than attacks by external ones (Morgan, 2013). The increased sophistication of SCADA systems calls for highly knowledgeable and well-trained personnel. Despite the need, proper training for people working with SCADA systems often comes short in practice (Nicholson et al., 2012). The study of the role of the human factor in cyber security of SCADA systems started to gain momentum over the last decade (Chittester and Haimes, 2004; Morgan, 2013).

3. Review methodology

The scope of the literature review conducted was as follows. The original set of papers was formed from the searches run on IEEE Xplore, ACM, SCOPUS and Web of Science as recommended in Kitchenham and Brereton (2013). IEEE Xplore and ACM provide a good coverage of relevant journals and conferences. SCOPUS and Web of Science are two general indexing systems. The search string was constructed from the keywords “SCADA” and “risk assessment”. The search covered the period of ten years between 2004 and 2014. The search was performed in November 2014 and returned for ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, SCOPUS and Web of Science (Core Collection) 36, 14, 105 and 14 papers respectively. The resulting set of papers undergone manual reduplication. Next, papers were selected for review manually based on the examination of the title, abstract and full text where it was readily available or where the information provided in the abstract was not sufficient. We also ensured that all papers relevant to the subject of this review mentioned in the review papers covering security and risk in SCADA, namely Cheminod et al. (2013); Igure et al. (2006); Morgan (2013); Nicholson et al. (2012) are included in our analysis.

As a general rule, we included in the review the papers which suggested a new method covering at least one of the stages
of a risk assessment process and where a method was specifically developed for or applied to a SCADA system. The papers which are dedicated to security requirements derivation, but are not written in the context of risk assessment (e.g. Gopal et al., 2014) as well as the papers addressing vulnerability analysis from the technical rather than the risk management perspective (e.g. Jung et al., 2008; Ten et al., 2008), were not included in our review. We focused only on research publications dealing primarily with cyber security or information security, while the papers covering risk assessment from the safety or reliability perspectives only (e.g. Hamoud et al., 2003) were excluded out of the review. This was done in order to keep the scope of our analysis in such a breadth where it is possible to examine each method in detail rather than superficially. Furthermore, such topics as safety and reliability in the context of SCADA systems are very broad and complex, and are typically studied by different research communities.

Arguably, many IT risk assessment methodologies with some adjustments may be applied to SCADA systems with various degrees of success. However, to what degree IT methods are fit for SCADA systems and what adjustments they need remain open research questions. Therefore, in this paper, we examined only those risk assessment methods which were developed for or already applied to SCADA systems. We avoided conjecturing about the applicability of corporate IT risk assessment methods to SCADA systems.

Finally, 24 papers, each presenting a risk assessment method for a SCADA system, were selected for the analysis in this review paper. The methods were examined according to the following criteria:

1. aim;
2. application domain;
3. stages of risk management addressed;
4. key concepts of risk management covered;
5. impact measurement;
6. sources of data for deriving probabilities;
7. evaluation method; and
8. tool support.

In the following section, the essence of each risk assessment method selected for analysis is epitomised. We describe the methods in a chronological order. This is followed by the discussion and summary analysis of the methods in Section 5.

Before we proceed with the description and analysis of the methods, the limitations of the review process must be noted. The analysis was done based only on our interpretation of the papers. We did not contact the authors of the methods to verify the correctness of our understanding. Second, as with any literature review, it was not possible to exclude the factor of subjectivity while selecting and analysing methods. Facing up this issue, we made the selection and analysis process transparent by thoroughly documenting it. Third, we did not specifically trace for each method analysed whether there is a follow up on the method from one of the authors unless a follow up paper appeared among the papers selected for analysis or the existence of a follow up paper was mentioned in the paper examined. Finally, we cannot completely rule out the existence of other relevant unobserved risk assessment methods for SCADA systems. Some proposals may have not found their place in the review due to various reasons: a terminology used by authors which did not bring a paper in to the radar of our analysis, a paper not being listed on the databases examined, the subjectivity factor, and time and resource restrictions on the report production. Nevertheless, the literature search method adopted helped to ensure an acceptable level of the completeness of our literature review. Hence, we believe that the set of papers analysed is representative and the results of the analysis may be generalised for the domain.

4. Description of risk assessment methods for SCADA

4.1. Risk assessment in SCADA for railways, 2004 (Chittester and Haimes, 2004)

A risk assessment framework which utilises the Hierarchical Holographic Modelling (HHM) and is designed for GPS-based railway SCADA systems is described in Chittester and Haimes (2004).

HHM is the methodology for “capturing and representing the essence of the inherent diverse characteristics and attributes of a system” (Haimes, 1981). HMM was used for modelling complex defence and civilian systems. It aids in assessing risks in sub-systems and their effect on the system as a whole, which makes HHM useful in the context of SCADA (Chittester and Haimes, 2004).

Three sub-models are distinguished in the hierarchical holographic model of a SCADA system (Chittester and Haimes, 2004): (1) hardware and software, (2) human supervisory and (3) environment. Each of these sub-models is decomposed into elements and each element is decomposed into subtopics.

The framework suggests to map the Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (CobiT) onto the holographic model in order to facilitate risk identification.

4.2. Attack trees for assessing vulnerabilities in SCADA, 2004 (Byres et al., 2004)

In Byres et al. (2004), attack trees are used to assess vulnerabilities in SCADA systems based on MODBUS and MODBUS/TCP communication protocols. An attack tree provides a structured view of events leading to an attack and, ultimately, helps with the identification of appropriate security countermeasures.

Risk, according to Byres et al. (2004), depends on: (1) system architecture and conditions; (2) countermeasures in place; (3) attack difficulty; (4) detection probability; and (5) attack cost. The purpose of the assessment in Byres et al. (2004) is to calculate the characteristics of the topmost attack event and to identify possible ways to achieve the final goal of the attack. In order to achieve this, first, a team of industry experts identifies possible goals of an attacker and designs an attack tree with goals depicted as the nodes of the tree. Then, each leaf of an attack tree is assigned a level of technical difficulty on the scale “Trivial–Moderate–Difficult–Unlikely”. Based on two functions – AND as the maximum of the children nodes values and OR as the minimum of the children nodes values – the difficulty of each node that has children nodes is calculated. The difficulty rating may vary over time.
Each goal is also characterised by the severity of impact it may cause and by the probability of detecting malicious activity associated with this goal. Both indicators are also defined on relative scales.

The paper presents a sample attack tree for a MODBUS-based SCADA system (Fig. 2). The trees in Byres et al. (2004) were designed by the team of industry experts and the feasibility of the attacks was tested in a laboratory setting.

### 4.3. Vulnerability assessment methodology for SCADA security, 2005 (Permann and Rohde, 2005)

A cyber vulnerability assessment methodology for SCADA systems in Permann and Rohde (2005) is based upon the experience of assessing the security of multiple SCADA systems conducted as a part of the national SCADA Test Bed program sponsored by the Department of Energy – Office of Electricity and Energy Assurance, US and the Idaho National Laboratory SCADA Test Bed program.

The methodology described in Permann and Rohde (2005) consists of five steps:

1. Assessment plan development: a plan outlines budget, schedule, goals, resources and the engagement of experts required, and deliverables expected from an assessment.
2. Testing environment configuration: the testing environment must be safe and non-production configuration.
3. Vulnerability assessment: the vulnerability assessment is performed via a penetration test conducted from an external to the tested system machine. A range of open source and commercial tools for assessing system vulnerability is listed.
4. Reporting: the methodology of assessment and testing along with the results must be thoroughly documented.
5. Metrics and scoring: the security of SCADA system must be measured quantitatively so that it may be benchmarked against other systems.

### 4.4. Quantitative cyber risk reduction estimation methodology, 2006 (McQueen et al., 2006)

McQueen et al. (2006) suggest a methodology for the quantitative estimation of cyber risk reduction for a SCADA system in which an enhancement of cyber security has been performed. For risk reduction estimation a directed graph of a cyber attack is developed for both a baseline and improved systems, and the difference in time-to-compromise in each system is measured and analysed.

The methodology consists of ten steps:

1. Establish system configuration;
2. Identify the applicable portions of the quantitative risk model;
3. Identify and prioritise the security requirements of the primary target(s);
4. Identify system vulnerabilities;
5. Categorise vulnerabilities on each device by the type of attack state, is developed for the baseline and enhanced system.
6. Estimate time-to-compromise for each device;
7. Generate compromise graph(s) and attack paths;
8. Estimate dominant attack path(s);
9. Perform steps 3–8 for both baseline and enhanced system; and
10. Compare results of both versions of the system and estimate risk reduction.

McQueen et al. (2006) introduce a formula for calculating the probability of an occurrence of an undesired event. This probability is the product of the following conditional probabilities: the probability of the system being on an attacker’s target list, the probability of being attacked given that the system is targeted, the probability of a perimeter breach given that the system is attacked, the probability of a successful attack given that there is a perimeter breach and the probability of damage given the system is successfully attacked. Since the estimation of all probabilities involved is not feasible, risk reduction is measured as the change of the probabilities of perimeter breach and successful attack rather than an absolute value of risk.

Security requirements for SCADA are identified so that integrity and availability have the highest priority, while confidentiality is secondary. The vulnerabilities of a system are identified using existing vulnerability identification libraries. Each vulnerability is classified as reconnaissance, breach, penetrate, escalation or damage. Time-to-compromise a device is calculated. It depends on the known vulnerabilities of the target system and the skills of an attacker. A circumstantial discussion of the methods for estimating time-to-compromise could be found in McQueen et al. (2005).

A compromise graph, where each node indicates a potential attack state, is developed for the baseline and enhanced SCADA systems, and the dominant paths of attack are chosen as the paths which require minimum time-to-compromise the target system. Finally, time required to compromise the baseline and enhanced system is compared. Time-to-compromise here is used as the main indicator of system security and risk.

For the evaluation purposes, the proposed methodology is applied to a small-size SCADA system for measuring the effectiveness of security countermeasures.
systems, Energy Management Systems and Management Information Systems, are proposed in Yu et al. (2006).

The vulnerability index of the cyber security of a system is calculated as follows:

\[ I_i = \sum_{j \in N} P(E_j) \times P(EL_j \mid E_j) \times L_i(EL_j) \tag{3} \]

where

\[ P(E_j) \] – the probability of the occurrence of event \( E_j \);
\[ P(EL_j \mid E_j) \] – the probability of power system accident \( EL_j \) resulting from cyber security event \( E_j \); and
\[ L_i \] – the loss caused by accident \( EL_j \).

It is not clear from the paper how the probability of a security event is estimated, it is only mentioned that the probability is Poisson distributed.

4.6. Scenario-based approach to risk analysis in support of cyber security, 2006 (Gertman et al., 2006)

A scenario-based approach to cyber risk assessment used by the Control Systems Security Center (CSSC) for the National Cyber Security Division of the Department of Homeland Security is described in Gertman et al. (2006).

The scenario and risk assessment process consists of ten activities: (1) identify key infrastructure; (2) identify representative mid-level processes; (3) determine consequences levels; (4) develop process flow diagrams with key components, structures and systems; (5) review underlying safety analysis and operating history; (6) review threat and vulnerability data; (7) develop likely attack pathways and key human–system responses; (8) compute probabilities and assess quantifiable resultant damage state; and (10) document findings, assess limitations and produce uncertainty characterisation.

The system under examination was modelled by experts familiar with industrial process and security requirements. Vulnerabilities and threats as well as expected human–system response were reviewed by operation experts, while probabilities and possible ways of attacks were defined by cyber experts. The opinions of experts were captured using the Delphi technique. As a part of the scenario-based method attack variations, skills required by an attacker and potential system effects were elaborated for a particular cyber attack scenario on a nuclear plant.

4.7. Two indices method for quantitative assessment of the vulnerability of critical information systems, 2008 (Patel et al., 2008)

Another method for the qualitative assessment of the vulnerability (security level) of a SCADA system is suggested in Patel et al. (2008). The method helps system managers to make more informed decisions about security countermeasures to be implemented.

The method is based on a vulnerability tree augmented with two indices, namely threat-impact index and cyber-vulnerability index. The threat-impact index reflects a financial effect of a cyber threat: a higher index indicates a higher impact. The cyber-vulnerability index reflects the vulnerability of a system with regard to cyber attacks. A more vulnerable system has a higher index. Both indices are measured on the scale from 0 to 100.

The method requires six steps to be undertaken:

1. development of the base-level and expanded vulnerability trees for an original system;
2. population of an effect analysis table and calculation of threat-impact index values;
3. augmentation of the tree with threat-impact index values;
4. calculation of cyber-vulnerability index values;
5. augmentation of the tree with cyber-vulnerability index values; and
6. reproduction of steps 2–5 for a security-enhanced system and the comparison of results.

The vulnerability tree presented in Patel et al. (2008) was developed based on the analysis of attacks launched in the past. Financial losses caused by attacks were estimated by interviewing engineers, managers, operator and accountants. The probabilities of attacks were identified based on historical data. The method was applied to a test SCADA system at the University of Louisville.

4.8. Cyber-terrorism SCADA risk framework, 2009 (Beggs and Warren, 2009)

In Beggs and Warren (2009), a cyber-terrorism SCADA risk framework which is validated by a focus group of five SCADA industry experts is presented. The framework consists of three stages: (1) risk assessment, (2) capability assessment model, and (3) controls.

The recommendation for the risk assessment stage is to adjust the AS/NZS 4360:2004, an Australian risk management standard, for the specifics of SCADA systems. For the development of the cyber-terrorism capability assessment model, the level of cyber-terrorist group capability is characterised using eight indicators: (1) advanced ICT skills, (2) advanced hacking tools and techniques, (3) access to new advanced ICTs, (4) advanced knowledge of SCADA systems, (5) insiders within the organisation of a selected target, (6) reconnaissance, (7) funding, and (8) motivation.

The control stage adopts another Australian standard AS/NZS 27002:2006 for information security management and adjusts it to the SCADA context listing eleven security control clauses:

1. SCADA Security Policy,
2. SCADA Physical and Environmental Security,
3. SCADA Organisation Information Security,
4. SCADA Asset Management,
5. SCADA Human Resources Security,
6. SCADA Communications and Operations Management,
7. SCADA Access Control,
8. SCADA Information Systems Acquisition, Development and Maintenance,
9. SCADA Information Security Incident Management,
10. SCADA Business Continuity Management, and
11. SCADA Compliance.
4.9. Evaluating the risk of cyber attacks on SCADA systems via Petri net analysis, 2011 (Henry et al., 2009)

A methodology for quantifying the risk of cyber attacks on computer network operations on SCADA systems is introduced in Henry et al. (2009). The method is based on the Petri Net state coverability analysis and process simulation. The purpose of the method is to identify all high-consequence attack states. The method avoids the use of such measure as likelihood since it is “difficult to credibly evaluate in many practical applications”, but rather represents risk as “a function of the resources to which an attacker can gain access during an attack” (Henry et al., 2009). The method is demonstrated on a non-automated hazardous liquid loading process which is described in Balasubramanian et al. (2002).

For the purpose of analysis, first, potential process failure modes with corresponding consequences are identified and from them those failure modes are separated which may lead to a process failure. Then, the resources needed by an attacker to commit an attack are identified. As a result, three Petri net models are designed: industrial process model, SCADA operation model and resource-vulnerability topology. The resources available to an attacker form prerequisites for a SCADA failure, which in its turn may result in one or more process failures. Consequences may be measured in a metric meaningful to process owners. As examples such possible metrics as lost production throughput and environmental pollution are mentioned. In the example provided in the paper, the severity of impact is measured in terms of the number of injuries to the personnel serving the process.

Two risk metrics are proposed in Henry et al. (2009): (1) centre of mass risk measure, which is the median of the set of the consequence of all inducible SCADA and process failure modes; and (2) worst-case risk measure, which is a maximum value of the set. Six types of failure modes are adopted from Balasubramanian et al. (2002).

4.10. Hierarchical, model-based risk management of critical infrastructures, 2009 (Baiardi et al., 2009)

In Baiardi et al. (2009), an approach to risk management based on a set of the hierarchical labelled hypergraphs of the security dependencies between the components of an infrastructure is elaborated.

In this approach an infrastructure hypergraph and an evolution graph, which may be regarded as a more detailed variation of an attack graph, are developed. An infrastructure hypergraph is a model of the interdependent components of a system depicting the internal states of components and operations on them. An evolution graph is a directed acyclic graph which consists of the states of an elementary attack committed to achieve a final goal. Each evolution describes an attack strategy. For analysis, an evolution graph is pruned to remove all evolutions with low probabilities. The probability of an attack strategy is defined based on the complexity of actions and resources required by an attack, and are based on historical data regarding the occurrence of attacks.

A metamathematical framework for the selection of the optimal set of countermeasures based on minimal sets and a partial ordering among subsets of countermeasures accompanies the approach proposed.

Software tools supporting (1) the design of evolution graphs, (2) the pruning of a graph (the removal of the nodes and arches selected according to the strategy described in the paper) and (3) the choice of countermeasures are developed to facilitate and automate the approach proposed.

The application of the approach is demonstrated on generic graphs which may illustrate a water distribution, a pipeline system or a sales devices data collection infrastructure.

4.11. Network security risk model (NSRM), 2009 (Henry and Haimes, 2009)

The Network Security Risk Model (NSRM) is introduced in Henry and Haimes (2009). The NSRM is a directed graph representing an attack. In a graph, nodes depict the components of a system and edges denote linkages through which one component may influence another. The purpose of the model is to assist with the selection of risk management controls by providing a measure of risk and by calculating the measure for a baseline and for a security enhanced versions of a system.

The application of the model is demonstrated on a simplified crude oil pipeline pump station controlled by a SCADA system which is a part of a larger process control network. The NSRM comprises eight steps:

1. Identify risk metrics specific to a system. In the example presented in Henry and Haimes (2009), risk is measured in terms of the gallons of crude oil lost flow per day. Two metrics, expected and extreme event loss production, are examined.
2. Decompose a controlled infrastructure in a hierarchical model.
3. Characterise process failure modes and effects using Adaptive Multi-Player Hierarchical Holographic Modelling (AMP-HHMM) framework (Haimes and Horowitz, 2004), where in order to get a broader view a conflict is examined from the perspectives of both opposing sides.
4. Specify model processes and process disruption modes. Process specification is developed from a hierarchical model of a system.
5. Construct an attack scenario using HHM and AMP-HHMM. Each attack scenario is characterised by attacker objectives, attacker type and the points of access.
6. Characterise network security structure Level and Barrier Diagram (ALBD) (Salinas, 2003) which covers success levels, barriers with OR and AND junctions.
7. Decompose the control network via decomposing the resulting ALBD into network components and linkages between them.
8. Define process disruption modes and resource requirements in terms of component access for each attack scenario.

Based on the return, the optimal attacker policy is identified showing which components of a system and in what order an attacker may attempt to compromise. A loss of crude oil for a baseline systems and the probability of the success of an
attack are calculated. Next, the same parameters are estimated for a security-enhanced version of the system. The analysis of the trade-offs between risk metrics for each security-enhanced version of the system and the cost of the corresponding security solutions allows the identification of the optimal security strategy and helps with security budgeting.

In Henry and Haimes (2009), a methodology for calculating all parameters of the system is provided. It is noted also that due to the lack of statistical data and due to the specifics of individual systems, experts must be involved in the estimation of parameters involved in the calculation.

4.12. Attack countermeasure tree, 2010 (Roy et al., 2010)

In Roy et al. (2010), the risk assessment method based on Attack Countermeasure Tree (ACT), which enriches a widely used in risk assessment concept of an attack tree with information about security countermeasures, is introduced. There are three types of events in an ACT: attack event, detection event and mitigation event. An ACT may be augmented with the cost of an attack and the amount of security investment. The cost of an attack is the cost of the consequences of events leading to an attack with the minimal cost and is restricted by the budget of an attacker.

Attack scenarios may be produced from an ACT, as well as information extracted enabling qualitative and probabilistic security and risk assessment. Qualitative analysis allows the identification of the minimal combination of attack events as in any attack tree. The probability of an attack may be calculated based on the probabilities of single attack events. Formulas or calculating return of investment and return of attack are also suggested.

An ACT may be used to find the minimum set of defence mechanisms which includes at least one defence mechanism from each attack path. If more than one of such sets are found then other parameters (e.g. the cost of a set or the probability of an attack) may be used to choose the optimal set.

The use of an ACT is demonstrated on a case study of a SCADA attack. The analysis in Roy et al. (2010) was performed using a software tool SHARPE (Symbolic Hierarchical Automated Reliability and Performance Evaluator), “a general hierarchical modeling tool that analyzes stochastic models of reliability, availability, performance, and performability” (Trivedi and Sahner, 2009). The optimisation was performed in MATLAB.

4.13. Adversary-driven state-based system security evaluation, 2010 (LeMay et al., 2010)

In LeMay et al. (2010), the ADversary VIew Security Evaluation (ADVISE) method is proposed. It enriches an attack graph with the characteristics of an adversary. The purpose of the method is to simulate an attack on a system, identify the most likely attack path and to calculate the probability of the success of an attack using an executable state-based security model of a system.

The ADVISE method recommends to follow three steps in order to receive an answer to a security question: (1) characterise adversaries and system, and specify security metrics; (2) developed an executable attack graph describing possible attacks; and (3) execute the graph to produce an answer.

A security model of a system, an attack execution graph, includes security-relevant system characteristics presented as a set of attack steps and the characteristics of an adversary. An attack step, an example of which is depicted in Fig. 3, is characterised by attack precondition, execution time, cost, a set of outcomes, outcome distribution, detection distribution, payoff and state variable updates. An adversary is characterised by two system-independent characteristics (attack preference weight and attack skill level) and by three system-dependent characteristics (attack goal, system access and system knowledge).

In 2011, in the follow up paper (LeMay et al., 2011) a software tool that automates the ADVISE method was presented. The tool, which is built upon the existing modelling tool Möbius (Deavours et al., 2002), automates input of system and adversary data, and the generation of executable models. In LeMay et al. (2011), another case study is presented based on the comparison of two generic SCADA architectures described in NIST SP 800-82 (NIST, 2011) attacked by four types of adversaries.

**Fig. 3 – An attack step (LeMay et al., 2010, 2011).**
4.14. Risk-assessment model for cyber attacks, 2010 (Patel and Zaveri, 2010)

Another risk-assessment model for cyber attacks on Information Systems is introduced in Patel and Zaveri (2010) and its application is demonstrated on a test SCADA system of a chemical plant. The model may be used for risk assessment, cost–benefit analysis supporting the acquisition of IT components, and for the calculation of insurance premium by insurance companies.

Based on the literature review and their research, the authors of the paper enumerate seven possible attack types (replay capture, spoofing, denial of service, control message modification, write to master terminal unit, write to remote terminal unit and remote terminal unit response alteration) and specify six types of loss an attack may cause (control-loss, product-loss, staff-time loss, equipment damage, and prevention) along with the probability of type of loss for each type of attack.

A loss caused by an attack in Patel and Zaveri (2010) depends on the type of an attack and other losses as estimated by chemical plant experts. The paper presents a formula for calculating a loss of each type. The prevention cost, for example, is calculated as a product of the cost of the upgrade of IT components resistant to a specific type of attack and the probability of prevention loss for this attack type. Ultimately, a total estimated revenue loss from all types of cyber attacks may be calculated using the model proposed.

It is mentioned that a tool was developed to automate the loss estimation process suggested, but no details regarding the tool are provided.

4.15. Cybersecurity for critical infrastructures: attack and defence modelling, 2010 (Ten et al., 2010)

A SCADA security framework RAIM, which consists of four parts (Real-time monitoring, Anomaly detection, Impact analysis and Mitigation strategies) is introduced in Ten et al. (2010).

The real-time monitoring and anomaly detection modules of the framework are based on the continuous monitoring of system logs and are needed to collect data for the subsequent impact analysis. Impact analysis aims to examine intrusion behaviours and a possible impact of a cyber attack on a SCADA system and consists of four steps: (1) capturing system configuration in a cybertnet; (2) power flow simulation; (3) vulnerability index calculation; and (4) security improvement.

Impact analysis is based on an attack tree where a cyber security vulnerability index shows the likelihood of a leaf of an attack tree being compromised, the likelihood of a specific intrusion scenario or of the overall attack. The indices are calculated based on historical data regarding intrusions, and information about security countermeasures and password policies. The leaf vulnerability index depends on port auditing and password strength.

The application of the framework is demonstrated on a test subnet of electric power control network.

4.16. Digraph model for risk identification and management in SCADA systems, 2011 (Guan et al., 2011)

A digraph model of a SCADA system for a chemical distillation column of a laboratory scale is presented in Guan et al. (2011). The model provides a formal representation of the structure and behaviour of a SCADA system and may be exploited for risk impact assessment and fault diagnosis.

The vertexes of the graph are the components of a SCADA system and a directed edge exist between two vertexes if a security risk at an initial vertex may affect security of a terminal vertex. The reachability matrix of a graph and its partitioning may be used to separate the components that are more likely to be impacted from those that are less likely to be impacted if the component represented by the initial vertex of a digraph is found at risk. For fault diagnosis a digraph is used in a deductive manner in a way similar to fault trees. It is used to identify the sources of a fault when a fault is observed in one of the components. The ancestors of all faulty components form the set of potential fault sources. The set is then reduced to one source which is common to all faulty components. The use of digraph for fault diagnoses is exemplified on the scenario where a hacker penetrates a corporate network and then injects a SCADA DNP3 traffic with a malicious code.

4.17. Risk assessment, detection, and response, 2011 (Cardenas et al., 2011)

A risk assessment method for sensor networks accompanied by attack detection and automatic response modules is presented in Cardenas et al. (2011).

In Cardenas et al. (2011), the standard formula for calculating risk as an average loss is accepted and interpreted in the context of a sensor network:

\[ R_s = \sum_i L_i p_i \]  

(4)

where \( p_i \) is the probability of an attacker compromising sensor \( i \) and is accepted to be the same for all sensors and \( L_i \) is a loss resulting from the compromise.

The following attack model is proposed which may reflect integrity and DoS attacks:

\[ \hat{y}_i(k) = \begin{cases} y_i(k), & \text{for } k \in \mathcal{K}_o \\ a_i(k), & \text{for } k \in \mathcal{K}_o, a_i(k) \in \mathcal{Y}_i \end{cases} \]

(5)

where \( \hat{y}_i(k) \) is a measurement received by the controller at time \( k; y_i(k) \) is an actual measurement; \( a_i(k) \) is a measurement under attack; and \( \mathcal{K}_o \) is the duration of an attack.

For detecting anomaly, a linear model as an approximation of the behaviour of a physical system is developed. Then, anomaly is detected using a non-parametric cumulative sum statistic. When anomaly is detected, an automated response to an attack is fired while awaiting human actions.

The experiments were run to simulate cyber attacks on a chemical reactor implemented as a Tennessee-Eastman process control system model presented in Ricker (1993). The experiments demonstrated that the risk assessment model proposed
helps to establish which type of attack and which sensor in a network must be given a priority in a security budget.

4.18. Cyber security risk assessment in nuclear power plants, 2012 (Song et al., 2012)

A cyber security risk assessment methodology that may be exploited in the process of the design of instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants is suggested in Song et al. (2012).

The methodology outlines six steps that must be undertaken in order to conduct cyber security risk assessment during the system and component design, and equipment supply stages:

1. system identification and cyber security modelling,
2. asset and impact analysis,
3. threat analysis,
4. vulnerability analysis,
5. security control design, and
6. penetration test.

The paper describes the activities that must be undertaken during each step by summarising the relevant NIST standards. Possible attack scenarios are listed to be used in threat analysis. As for vulnerability analysis, it is recommended to use an existing lists of vulnerabilities and adapt them to the specifics of a system under analysis. Security controls may be adopted from relevant NIST standards (e.g. NIST SP 800-82 (NIST, 2011)). Finally, security control design must be validated by means of vulnerability scans and penetration tests.

4.19. Boolean logic driven markov processes, 2012 (Kriaa et al., 2012)

The Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes (BDMP) modelling approach is described in Kriaa et al. (2012).

The BDMP formalism, which combines fault trees with Markov processes, facilitates the modelling of an attack on a system. Qualitative and quantitative outcome useful for risk assessment may be produced from a BDMP model.

The BDMP formalism uses the following modelling objects: (1) leaves for attack modelling, namely Attacker Action, Timed Security Event and Instantaneous Security Event; (2) gates such as AND and OR, and several specific gates; and (3) links including classical logic links and two specific links, Trigger Link and Before Link. An example of the STUXNET attack model rendered using the BDMP modelling approach is presented in Kriaa et al. (2012). A leaf of a BDPM model is characterised by success rate and probability. All attack paths may be identified and ordered by their probabilities or by effect on attack success.

The quantitative analysis of the STUXNET BDPM model in Kriaa et al. (2012) was performed using modelling tool KB3 (Piétre-Cambacédès et al., 2011). The probabilities and success rates of the leaves of the model were quantified by the authors of the paper "based on [their] own estimation and writings by security consultants" (Kriaa et al., 2012).

4.20. A CORAS-based risk assessment for SCADA, 2012 (Francia et al., 2012)

CORAS (Aagedal et al., 2002; Stolen et al., 2002) is a model-based risk assessment method designed for security critical systems. It is based on ISO/IEC 31000. CORAS is designed for “security-critical systems in general, but puts particular emphasis on IT security” (Aagedal et al., 2002). CORAS covers the entire risk management process and heavily uses models at many stages of risk management.

There is a large number of publications related to CORAS. In this paper, we analyse only the publication related to the application of CORAS in the context of a SCADA system, namely Francia et al. (2012).

In Francia et al. (2012), CORAS is used for the risk analysis of a SCADA system. First, assets and their levels of importance are identified. Then, threats and vulnerabilities are listed. Finally, using the CORAS modelling language a set of threat diagrams is developed. The threat diagrams presented in the paper were created as a result of a brainstorming session in which security and risk experts participated along with system stakeholders.

The paper reports only preliminary results of a research project and outlines an extensive future work. In the main Francia et al. (2012) demonstrates that the CORAS modelling language is useful for threat modelling in the context of a SCADA system.

4.21. A PMU-based risk assessment framework for power control systems, 2013 (Yan et al., 2013)

In Yan et al. (2013), a Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU)-based risk assessment framework for SCADA systems of power grids is introduced. The application of the framework is demonstrated using a simulation on the IEEE 10 Generator 39 Bus System.

The steps of the framework are as described below. First, the configuration of a system is identified. Next, vulnerabilities within the system are identified and quantified using the Duality Element Relative Fuzzy Evaluation Method (DERFEM). Then, an attack graph is designed and used in order to find intrusion scenarios, the probabilities of which are also calculated.

In addition, the paper presents System Stability Monitoring and Response System (SSMARS). SSMARS is an on-line scheme based on PMU data. It monitors the impact of adversary events on a power system in real time and induces control actions to control voltage when needed.

4.22. Improved risk assessment method for SCADA information security, 2014 (Markovic-Petrovic and Stojanovic, 2014)

In Markovic-Petrovic and Stojanovic (2014), a modification of a traditional method for calculating the effectiveness of intrusion, detection and prevention systems in terms of averting a specific class of attacks on a system is presented. The purpose

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1 http://coras.sourceforge.net/online_documentation.html.
of the method is to “allow the determination of the optimum level of security investment and definition of different levels of acceptable risk”. The method, according to its authors, enables a more precise calculation of loss expectancy than any other method. This is achieved by taking into account the strength of an attack and its effect on the system performance, which is measured using weighting factors.

The following formula is introduced in Markovic-Petrovic and Stojaanovic (2014) for calculating Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE):

$$ ALE = W_a \prod_{i=1}^{N} W_i \left( \sum_{j=1}^{M} DL_j \right) \times ARO $$

(6)

where $W_a$ is weighting factor, which scales maximum direct losses depending on the strength of attack; $N$ is the number of conditions contributing to indirect losses; $W$ is indirect costs resulting from a condition; $M$ is the number of loss types; and $ARO$ is the annual rate of the occurrence of an attack, which is defined based on the analysis of historical data.

Return on Security Investment (ROSI) is then calculated as follows:

$$ ROSI = (ALE \times \%RiskMitigated - C_s)/C_s $$

(7)

where $C_s$ is the cost of implemented security controls.

The application of the method is demonstrated on a case study of a run-off-river hydro-power plant.

### 4.23. Cyber-security analysis of smart grid SCADA systems with game models, 2014 (Hewett et al., 2014)

The application of game theory to a cyber security analysis of a smart grid SCADA system is discussed in Hewett et al. (2014). The interaction between an attacker and a defender (a SCADA system administrator) is modelled as a two-player, non-cooperative, sequential, perfect information and non-zero sum game. The approach is demonstrated on a case study of the sensor network of a smart grid SCADA system.

Within the approach, a game tree is developed and populated with players' payoffs. In order to develop a game tree, first, the following possible actions of an attacker are defined: $a_s$ is Sybil attack, an attacker deploys a malicious (Sybil) sensor device, which acts as a legitimate sensor; $a_{comp}$ is node compromise, $a_{ed}$ is eavesdropping; $a_{di}$ is data injection; and $a_{noa}$ is no attack action. Then, the possible defender response modes are defined as $r_{ce}$ – cut-off energy to a sensor, $r_{alert}$ – alert MTU, and $r_{correct}$ – maintain correct data and valid nodes.

The following formula for calculating an impact of an action $a$ is presented in Hewett et al. (2014):

$$ \text{Impact}(a) = w_C C(a) + w_I I(a) + w_A A(a) $$

(8)

where $w_C$, $w_I$, and $w_A$ are the weights of confidentiality, integrity and availability respectively and $C(a)$, $I(a)$ and $A(a)$ are the impacts of action $a$ on confidentiality, integrity and availability respectively. The parameters in this formula are quantified based on expert opinion and historical data. The payoff of a player at a current decision node is calculated as a sum of his previous payoff at the parent node and the current payoff, which is a function of the impact of the current action on the player. Game theory analysis in Hewett et al. (2014) helps to identify a payoff of an attacker and defender at each step and to establish the strategies with the best payoff for both players.

### 4.24. Quantitative methodology to assess cyber security risk of SCADA systems, 2014 (Woo and Kim, 2014)

A methodology for quantitative assessment of cyber security risk in SCADA systems based on the optimal power flow and power flow tracing is introduced in Woo and Kim (2014).

The fifteen types of threats and the four components of a SCADA system (EMS server, a SCADA server, RTU and communication network) are distinguished in Woo and Kim (2014). For the quantification of vulnerabilities, first, the relevance of each threat to each component is defined. Then, a vulnerability index is assigned to each component of a system. The vulnerability index of a component is based on historical data, where available, and on the security characteristics of the component. For the quantification of threats, a normalised weighted index is assigned to each type of threat for each component of a SCADA system. It is based on the applicability of the treat to the component, the vulnerability index of the component and the damage capacity of the component. The asset value is calculated based on the outage cost.

The optimal power flow is estimated as a minimal power generation cost for all generators under the restrictions on generators and line capacities. The power flow tracing method, which is based on the graph theory, is then used to examined the interdependencies between generators and load terminals in order to calculate outage cost for each component of a SCADA system.

Finally, risk is calculated in monetary terms as a product of the probabilities of a threat and vulnerability, and of the cost of an asset.

### 5. Summary analysis and key findings

#### 5.1. Descriptive statistics

The list of the risk assessment methods described in the previous section is summarised in Table 1. In Table 1, country is the country of the first author of the paper and citations is the number of citations of the paper according to Google Scholar Citation Index as on 12 January 2015.

The number of papers covering risk assessment in SCADA produced between 2004 and 2014 vary between 0 and 4 per year (Fig. 4). No noticeable increase in the number of papers over time is encountered. Among the papers analysed, the research from the following countries France, Canada, China, Australia, Serbia, Ireland and Italy is represented by one paper each. Two papers originate from Korea, while the majority (15 papers) are produced by researchers from the USA.

The largest number of citations (104) is acquired by Cardenas et al. (2011) published in 2011. It is worth noting here that Cardenas et al. (2011) covers the scope broader than risk assessment and describes also modules for attack detection and automated response to an attack. The second most cited paper...
among analysed, with 87 citations, is Ten et al. (2010) which is published in 2010 and which introduces the four component (real-time monitoring, anomaly detection, impact analysis and mitigation strategies) security framework for SCADA systems. The third most cited paper, with 85 citations, is Byres et al. (2004) which is published in 2004 and describes the use of attack trees for assessing vulnerabilities in SCADA systems.

## 5.2. Categorisation of the methods

Most often, risk assessment methods in general are classified into qualitative and quantitative (Campbell and Stamp, 2004; Karabacak and Sogukpinar, 2005; Patel et al., 2008), with semi-quantitative methods being distinguished in some publications (Campbell and Stamp, 2004; Markovic-Petrovic and Stojanovic, 2014). While qualitative methods use a subjective classification of risk (e.g. low–medium–high), quantitative methods strive to measure risk numerically. The majority of quantitative methods are probabilistic. The difficulties of the quantitative measurement of security which hold in the risk quantification context also are discussed in Verendel (2009).

Alternatively, risk assessment methods are classified into traditional assessments and baseline controls (von Solms, 1997). In Campbell and Stamp (2004), a new classification scheme for risk assessment methods is suggested. It separates methods

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**Table 1 – List of the risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (ordered by the number of citations).**

| No. | Ref.          | Year | Method title                                                                 | Country    | Citations |
|-----|---------------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-----------|
| 1   | Cardenas et al. (2011) | 2011 | Risk Assessment, Detection, and Response                                     | USA        | 104       |
| 2   | Ten et al. (2010)          | 2010 | Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructures: Attack and Defense Modeling      | Ireland    | 87        |
| 3   | Byres et al. (2004)          | 2004 | Attack Trees for Assessing Vulnerabilities in SCADA                         | Canada     | 85        |
| 4   | McQueen et al. (2006)          | 2006 | Quantitative Cyber Risk Reduction Estimation Methodology                     | USA        | 44        |
| 5   | Patel et al. (2008)          | 2008 | Two Indices Method for Quantitative Assessment of the Vulnerability of Critical Information Systems | USA        | 31        |
| 6   | Chittester and Haines (2004) | 2004 | Risk Assessment in GPS-based SCADA for Railways                             | USA        | 26        |
| 7   | Baiardi et al. (2009)         | 2009 | Hierarchical, Model-Based Risk Management of Critical Infrastructures       | Italy      | 26        |
| 8   | LeMay et al. (2010)          | 2010 | Adversary-Driven State-Based System Security Evaluation                     | USA        | 21        |
| 9   | Roy et al. (2010)            | 2010 | Attack Countermeasure Tree                                                   | USA        | 19        |
| 10  | Yu et al. (2006)             | 2006 | Vulnerability Assessment of Cyber Security in Power Industry                | China      | 12        |
| 11  | Kriaa et al. (2012)          | 2012 | Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes (BDMP)                               | France     | 10        |
| 12  | Perrmann and Rohde (2005)     | 2005 | Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for SCADA                               | USA        | 9         |
| 13  | Henry and Haines (2009)       | 2009 | Network Security Risk Model (NSRM)                                         | USA        | 8         |
| 14  | Henry et al. (2009)           | 2009 | Evaluating the Risk of Cyber Attacks on SCADA                              | USA        | 7         |
| 15  | Patel and Zaveri (2010)       | 2010 | Risk Assessment Model for Cyber Attacks                                     | USA        | 7         |
| 16  | Song et al. (2012)           | 2012 | Cyber Security Risk Assessment in Nuclear Power Plants                      | Korea      | 6         |
| 17  | Beggs and Warren (2009)       | 2009 | Cyber-Terrorism SCADA Risk Framework                                       | Australia  | 2         |
| 18  | Francia et al. (2012)         | 2012 | CORAS-based Risk Assessment for SCADA                                       | USA        | 2         |
| 19  | Guan et al. (2011)            | 2011 | Digraph Model for Risk Identification and Management in SCADA Systems        | USA        | 1         |
| 20  | Yan et al. (2013)             | 2013 | "PMU-based Risk Assessment Framework for Power Control Systems"             | USA        | 1         |
| 21  | Gertman et al. (2006)         | 2006 | Scenario-based Approach to Risk Analysis in Support of Cyber Security       | USA        | 0         |
| 22  | Markovic-Petrovic and Stojanovic (2014) | 2014 | Improved Risk Assessment Method for SCADA Information Security | Serbia     | 0         |
| 23  | Hewett et al. (2014)          | 2014 | "Cyber-Security Analysis of Smart Grid SCADA Systems with Game Models       | USA        | 0         |
| 24  | Woo and Kim (2014)            | 2014 | Quantitative Methodology to Assess Cyber Security Risk of SCADA Systems      | Korea      | 0         |
into nine categories according to the approach used, and the level of the involvement of a risk expert and system owner.

Risk assessment methods based on graphs are widespread. Tree-based risk assessment methods (e.g. fault tree, attack tree, event tree, vulnerability tree and various combinations of the above) as well as other risk assessment methods based on directed graphs fall under the category of probabilistic methods. Tree-based methods are similar in their logic and aim to define the probability of the top event or its reliability (Patel et al., 2008). What constitutes the major difference between various tree-based methods is the top event. In Cheminod et al. (2013), Patel et al. (2008), Ralston et al. (2007), Taylor et al. (2002), among probabilistic tree-based methods for SCADA systems inductive and deductive methods are distinguished. Inductive methods (e.g. event tree) trace from possible causes to undesired events as opposed to deductive methods (e.g. fault and attack trees), which trace from undesired events to possible causes (Ralston et al., 2007). Inductive methods are also referred to as forward search techniques, while deductive methods are referred to as backward search techniques (Taylor et al., 2002).

As pointed out in Morgan (2013) and Ralston et al. (2007), risk assessment methods as applied to SCADA systems are difficult to categorise. Based on the analysis presented in this paper, we suggest an intuitive categorisation for the methods examined. This classification scheme is generic and we foresee that it may be applied to other domains.

First, the methods examined may be categorised by the level of detail and coverage as follows:

- **Guidelines** outline a set of steps for a user to follow either assuming that the user knows how to perform each step or, in better cases, providing references to specific methods that may be exploited. An exhaustive description of activities within each step is absent. Guidelines strive to cover the majority of the stages of the risk management process. The coverage of the stages by guidelines is broad, while the level of detail provided is low.

- **Activity-specific methods** focus on and in depth examine a specific activity performed at a certain stage of the risk management process. The level of detail here is high, while the coverage in terms of the stages of the risk management process is narrow.

- **Elaborated guidelines** are the combinations of the two categories listed above. Elaborated guidelines provide a coarse outline of many or even all stages of the risk management process and concentrate particularly on one or more specific activities within the process. The coverage of the risk management process stages here is broad and the level of detail provided is high.

The categorisation of the methods analysed into guidelines, activity-specific methods and elaborated guidelines is summarised in Table 2, which shows that the majority of the methods examined fall under the category of activity-specific methods.

Second, the risk assessment methods examined may be split into:

- **Formula-based methods** – these methods are based on mathematical models of risk. A formula-based method consists of a set of formulas to calculate risk or impact. These methods do not use any models to support risk assessment, but represent supporting information in a tabular or textual form.

- **Model-based methods** – in these methods risk analysis is based on a graphical model. These methods, in the majority of cases, are supported by mathematical models as well to enable qualitative and typically probabilistic analysis. Among model-based methods one may separate graph-based methods and methods based on other types of models (e.g. HHM).

Table 3 shows the categorisation of the papers examined into formula- and model-based methods. The majority of the methods are based on graphs or their multiple variations as Table 3 hints at. Attack trees are used in the large number of proposals. Many attack-tree-based methods either enrich an attack tree with additional data or combine it with the models of other types (Table 3).

Three of the papers examined, namely Beggs and Warren (2009); Permann and Rohde (2005); Song et al. (2012), we were not able to assign to either formula- or model-based category since the papers are guidelines, and the specific methods of analysis within these guidelines must be chosen by users.

As Table 3 also shows that among the model-based methods, the vast majority are attack- or failure-oriented, while only three methods (Baiardi et al., 2009; Chittester and Haimes, 2004; Guan et al., 2011; Hewett et al., 2014) are goal-oriented. More precisely Baiardi et al. (2009) exploits dual approach, while infrastructure hypergraph may be attributed to the goal-oriented approach, evolution graph belongs to the attack-oriented approach. The goal-oriented approach focuses on positive outcomes and bring together the elements that an organisation’s success (The Open Group, 2012) as opposed to failure-oriented approach that concentrates around the identification of all possible types of attack and failure modes.
Traditionally, we also split the risk assessment methods examined into qualitative and quantitative as summarised in Table 4. More than a half of the methods examined are probabilistic. Three methods are quantitative, but do not use the notion of probability in their quantification of risk. Five out of the methods examined are qualitative.

### 5.3. Probabilistic methods

Table 4 indicates that Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods are widely used in risk assessment of SCADA systems. However, PRA methods suffer from a range of disadvantages (Guan et al., 2011; Morgan, 2013; Ramana, 2011):

- The estimation of risk is never complete in the mathematical sense. The reader may want to return to Formula (1), where a complete set of undesired events is never known.
- No way is provided to deal with hitherto unknown vulnerabilities, attacks or failure modes.
- Continuous revision is required. In Formula (1), a revision is needed in order to keep a set of undesired events as complete as possible reflecting the rapidly evolving cyber security domain, or, turning to Formula (2), to keep the set of known vulnerabilities and threats up-to-date. In 1979, it was stated: “It is conceptually impossible to be complete in a mathematical sense in the construction of event-trees and fault-trees; what matters is the approach to completeness and the ability to demonstrate with reasonable assurance that only small contributions are omitted. This inherent limitation means that any calculation using this methodology is always subject to revision and to doubt as to its completeness” (Lewis et al., 1979). Attack and vulnerability trees, which belong to PRA methods, usually concentrate on a specific type of attack and at best attempt to cover “all known threats and vulnerabilities in an infrastructure” (Patel et al., 2008, p. 484), ignoring unknown threats. In Kriaa et al. (2012), it is declared that “in very large and complex situations the exhaustive computation of all possible attacks is often impossible or simply not practical.”
- Context establishment, upon which risk identification draws, is not given direct attention (Section 5.7).
- Methods rely either on historical system data, which are difficult to access, or on subjective data (Section 5.4). The availability of objective data for analysis limits the applicability of many PRA methods. In Lewis et al. (1979), it is recommended to “avoid use of the probabilistic risk analysis methodology for the determination of absolute risk probabilities for subsystems unless an adequate data base exists and it is possible to quantify the uncertainties.”
- Indirect, non-linear and feedback relationships that characterise many incidents in SCADA systems are not accounted for.
- Numerous simplifying assumptions, which do not always hold in real life, are made. For example, a few of the assumptions encountered by this analysis are “adversaries are like managers of multinational corporations who make rational choices investments and expected returns” (McQueen et al., 2006), “the vulnerabilities of each component C are known” (Ten et al., 2010), perfect information of an attacker and a system administrator when “both players know what has happened to the system so far before making their decision on the next move” (Hewett et al., 2014) and “the defender will not take any action to defend the system unless an attack action occurs” (Hewett et al., 2014). The examples of other assumptions are the independence of security events, the stationarity of a system

### Table 3 – Categorisation of the methods into formula-based and model-based.

| Category            | References                                                                 |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Formula-based       | Cardenas et al. (2011); Gertman et al. (2006); Markovic-Petrovic and Stojanovic (2014); Patel and Zaveri (2010); Woo and Kim (2014); Yu et al. (2006) |
| Model-based         | Byres et al. (2004) – attack tree with characteristics of attack goals/nodes (A) Guan et al. (2011) – directed graph of a system (G) McQueen et al. (2006) – compromise graph (A) Chittester and Haimes (2004) – HHM (G) Patel et al. (2008) – vulnerability tree with threat-impact and cyber-vulnerability indices (A) Henry et al. (2009) – Petri Net (A) Baiardi et al. (2009) – hypergraph and evolution graph (D) Henry and Haimes (2009) – directed attack graph (A) LeMay et al. (2010) – attack tree with adversary profile (A) Roy et al. (2010) – attack tree with countermeasures (A) Ten et al. (2010) – attack graph with system-, scenario-, and leaf-level vulnerability indices (A) Yan et al. (2013) – attack graph with probabilities of events (A) Hewett et al. (2014) – game tree (game theory) (A) Kriaa et al. (2012) – fault tree with Markov processes with probabilities and success rates (A) Francia et al. (2012) – CORAS modelling language (A) |

(A) – attack- or failure-oriented approach; (G) – goal-oriented approach; (D) – dual approach.

### Table 4 – Categorisation of the methods into qualitative and quantitative.

| Category            | References                                                                 |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Qualitative         | Beggs and Warren (2009); Byres et al. (2004); Chittester and Haimes (2004); Francia et al. (2012); Song et al. (2012) |
| Quantitative        | Biaardi et al. (2009); Gertman et al. (2006); Henry and Haimes (2009); Hewett et al. (2014); Kriaa et al. (2012); LeMay et al. (2010); Markovic-Petrovic and Stojanovic (2014); McQueen et al. (2006); Patel and Zaveri (2010); Patel et al. (2008); Roy et al. (2010); Ten et al. (2010) |
| Probabilistic       | Yan et al. (2013); Yu et al. (2006) Guan et al. (2011); Henry et al. (2009); Woo and Kim (2014) |
| Non-probabilistic   |                                                                                           |
| Not specified       | Permann and Rohde (2005)                                                             |
over time or similarities with other systems, the use of the aggregation of security numbers related to the different components of a system overlooking mutual interdependencies (Verendel, 2009). A method based on wrong assumptions may highly likely produce incorrect results.

- Methods do not effectively cope with risks with low probabilities, but extreme, catastrophic consequences (Morgan, 2013). For predicting catastrophic events such as for example 9/11, Fukushima and Chernobyl frequency-based statistical methods on which PRA methods rely have little value (Haimes and Chittester, 2005; Ramana, 2011).

Despite their drawbacks PRA methods are popular among the researchers and practitioners predominantly because they provide a convenient numeric estimation of risk which assists security decision-makers with the understanding of the security posture of an organisation and with the allocation of security funds.

5.4. Sources of probabilistic data

Table 5 shows that in the methods examined probabilities used for the calculation of risk or impact are derived based on historical data (e.g. incident logs as in Gertman et al., 2006), expert judgement or both. In five methods, we were not able to find any indication of where probabilistic data come from.

PRA methods typically use probabilistic data to measure at least one or several metrics, e.g. vulnerability existence, vulnerability severity, attack frequency, loss occurrence, detection and mitigation rates, attack step success and overall attack success to name just a few. Hence, the success of a PRA method strongly depends on the quality of estimated probabilities, which ideally should originate from objective empirical rather than hypothetical data. Objective data in this instance are data received from statistical sampling, historical records or experimentation (Taylor et al., 2002).

The authors of the methods examined point out that data required for the effective estimation of risk are rarely available (Dondossola et al., 2009; McQueen et al., 2006) and, therefore, research often has to rely on artificial data (Luijijf et al., 2009).

Objective data may often be unavailable due to various reasons: hardware and software specifics, legacy and confidentiality. Undoubtedly, this issue hinders the validation of the methods, and diminishes the trustworthiness of risk assessment results.

In Henry et al. (2009), the authors consciously avoid the use of probabilistic data, but characterise security by median loss and maximum loss. However, this approach is based on the assumption that it is possible to identify a complete set of all failure and attack modes. This assumption is open to argument.

In those examined methods, which use expert opinion, little or no detail is provided as to how the opinion was captured and analysed. Ultimately, this is a crucial point of any expert opinion-based method since the correctness of risk estimation is founded in the precision of the probabilities involved in the calculation.

5.5. Domain and aim

More meticulous overview of the methods examined is summarised in Table 6, where the domain, aim and evaluation route are outlined for each method.

The risk assessment methods are developed for and applied to a range of domains including power grids, chemical plants, pump systems and rail road sector. Table 6 shows that eleven out of twenty-four proposals deal with SCADA systems in power sector considering smart grids, hydro power and nuclear power plants. Four proposals (Baiardi et al., 2009; Beggs and Warren, 2009; Francia et al., 2012; Roy et al., 2010) do not mention any specific sector, but discuss SCADA systems in general.

The methods examined vary significantly in terms of their aims because they cover different stages of the risk management process or different activities within the same stage. While one method (Song et al., 2012) aims to list and discuss risk assessment activities to be undertaken at the system design stage, four methods (Guan et al., 2011; Permann and Rohde, 2005; Ten et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2006) target to identify vulnerabilities and/or to quantify the level of vulnerability of a system. The method presented in Chittester and Haimes (2004) strives to identify sources of risk. The declared aim of three methods (Baiardi et al., 2009; Patel et al., 2008; Roy et al., 2010) is the assistance with the selection of an optimal set of countermeasures.

5.6. Evaluation

As Table 6 indicates the vast majority of methods are evaluated by means of a single case study or example. A case study or an example is typically based on a generic and simplified model of a system or on a testbed. In some instances, a method is not demonstrated in full, only some activities within the method are dealt with in a case study (e.g. Roy et al., 2010). In three proposals (Chittester and Haimes, 2004; Permann and Rohde, 2005; Yu et al., 2006) no discussion of a method evaluation was found. The application of a method to a real world system is declared as future work in several proposals (e.g. LeMay et al., 2010). Only in two papers, namely McQueen et al. (2006) and Patel and Zaveri (2010), it is explicitly mentioned that the method was applied to a real system. In Byres et al. (2004),
the validity of an attack tree is evaluated by energy sector operators and the feasibility of attacks is tested in a laboratory setting. In Beggs and Warren (2009), the guideline aiming at protection of SCADA systems from the threat of cyber-terrorism within Australia is evaluated by a focus group of five SCADA engineering consultants.

Unsurprisingly, the analysis of the risk assessment methods for SCADA systems in terms of their evaluation leads to a conclusion that it is easier to propose a method than to evaluate it in a sustainable rigorous manner. The methods are rarely, apart from a few exceptions, discussed with industry experts (Table 6). Since the methods are not applied to real systems, the validity or practicality of the results rendered by a method are also not evaluated by industry experts.

In few cases, where a method is applied to a real system, a system is accessed only once and is not revisited again for retesting or regarding the feedback on the usefulness and effectiveness of the method.
For the qualitative methods it is not discussed whether the outcome produced by the method gives a sufficiently accurate description of risk. The same is true for quantitative methods. In Kriaa et al. (2012), the method is said to “enable a coarse quantification of the attack success probability”, but it is not validated whether the quantification suggested is accurate enough to back up security decisions.

In the methods examined, the formulas provided for the quantification of risk, impact or attack probabilities are typically not proved in a mathematical sense. The proof is often limited to the statements like in McQueen et al. (2006) saying that the formulas suggested have “intuitive meaning for the analysts, testers, and control system users” and are “clear, reasonably intuitive, and sufficiently well-defined to guide the analysis of the proposed method”. Unfortunately, what is intuitive and clear vary from person to person and is very subjective.

5.7 Stages of risk management

The process of risk management, as it is adopted in ISO 31000:2009(E) (ISO, 2009) and ISO/IEC 27005:2011 (ISO, 2011), is depicted in Fig. 5.

ISO 31000:2009(E) (ISO, 2009) provides the following definitions for risk management and risk assessment:

**Risk management** – “coordinated activities to direct and control an organisation with regard to risk” (ISO, 2009, Def. 2.2);

**Risk assessment** – “overall process of risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation” (ISO, 2009, Def. 2.2), where **risk identification** is the “process of finding, recognizing and describing risks” (ISO, 2009, Def. 2.15), **risk analysis** is the “process to comprehend the nature of risk and to determine the level of risk” (ISO, 2009, Def. 2.21) and **risk evaluation** is the “process of comparing the results of risk analysis with risk criteria to determine whether the risk and/or its magnitude is acceptable or tolerable” (ISO, 2009, Def. 2.24).

Table 7 shows which stages of the risk management process are addressed by each method. The stages and their definitions are adopted as outlined in ISO 31000:2009(E) (ISO, 2009) and ISO/IEC 27005:2011 (ISO, 2011).

In Table 7 the cell is left empty if the stage is not addressed by a method; ● means that the stage is addressed in detail; and ◆ denotes that the stage is partially addressed (i.e. it is briefly outlined, but no detailed recommendations on the execution of the activities associated with the stage are provided). The last column of Table 7 describes the metrics analysed or measured by the methods.

According to Table 7, the vast majority of methods concentrates on the risk identification and risk analysis stages of the risk management process, while other stages receive noticeably less attention.

Little or no attention is devoted to the risk evaluation stage. Quantitative risk metrics are often hard to be judged on an absolute scale and require a basis for relative comparison to support security decision-making. We did not encounter an explicit process of comparing the results of risk analysis with risk criteria in the proposals. In the majority of the papers also no discussion was found regarding whether resulting risk metrics, such as vulnerability index or impact, are acceptable or tolerable. There are though several proposals (Henry and Haimes, 2009; LeMay et al., 2011; McQueen et al., 2006; Patel et al., 2008), which we mark with ◆ regarding risk evaluation in Table 7, where the comparison of risk metrics is performed between different security configurations of a system.

It is hard to overestimate the importance of the context establishment stage. Risk management decisions must be well-informed and based on an in-depth knowledge of a system and its environment. A complete set of risks to a system may not be identified without an understanding of system configuration, interactions with other systems, stakeholders’ goals, rights and responsibilities, and human-machine interactions. During the context establishment stage an organisation examines its structure, current security posture, specifies security goals and security strategy, investigates possible external influences (ISO, 2009). This stage facilitates the scoping and focusing of the process, e.g. the identification of critical assets calling for larger security investment.

Our analysis indicates that the quantitative probabilistic methods in general do not concentrate on the context establishment stage. In the majority of the papers where context establishment is addressed it is limited to the understanding of a system or network configuration. Consequently, only risks associated with the ICT components of a SCADA system are taken into account by a risk assessment method while overlooking a large number of risks arising from non-technical aspects.

Among all methods examined only Chittester and Haimes (2004) is exclusively dedicated to the understanding of a SCADA system. The holographic model of a SCADA system presented in Chittester and Haimes (2004) addresses an extensive range of technical and non-technical subtopics relevant to various aspects of the system. These subtopics are ultimately the sources of risk to a SCADA system.

5.8 Key concepts and impact measurement

The following key concepts of risk management are widely acknowledged in the literature: system (asset), vulnerability, threat,
| Ref.                          | Context establishment | Risk identification | Risk analysis | Risk evaluation | Risk treatment | Metrics analysed/measured                                                                 |
|------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chittester and Haimes (2004) | ●                     | ●                   | ●             | ●              |               | SCADA system submodels, element and subtopics, control objectives                        |
| Byres et al. (2004)          |                       |                     |               |                |               | Attacker goals, resources required for an attack, severity of impact and detection probability |
| Permann and Rohde (2005)     | ●                     |                     | ●             | ●              |               | Hardware, software and network vulnerabilities                                            |
| McQueen et al. (2006)        |                       |                     | ●             | ●              |               | Attack scenarios, vulnerabilities and time-to-compromise                                    |
| Yu et al. (2006)             |                       |                     | ●             | ●              |               | Vulnerability index                                                                       |
| Gertman et al. (2006)        |                       |                     | ●             |                |               | Attack variations, attacker skills, impact                                                 |
| Patel et al. (2008)          |                       |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Vulnerability, threat-impact index and cyber-vulnerability index                          |
| Beggs and Warren (2009)      |                       |                     | ●             |                | ●            | Terrorist cyber-capability level, terrorist motivation                                     |
| Henry et al. (2009)          |                       |                     | ●             |                | ●            | Process failure modes, failure consequences, attacker resources,                          |
| Baiardi et al. (2009)        |                       |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Security dependency among the components of a system, attack strategies, the optimal set of countermeasures |
| Henry and Haimes (2009)      |                       |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Infrastructure, failure modes and effects, processes, attack scenarios, network structure and access requirements |
| Roy et al. (2010)            |                       |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Attack scenarios, cost and impact of an attack, optimal countermeasure set                 |
| LeMay et al. (2010)          |                       |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Attack graph, characteristics of adversary                                                  |
| Patel and Zaveri (2010)      |                       |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Attack type, revenue loss                                                                  |
| Ten et al. (2010)            |                       |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Cybersecurity conditions, intrusion scenarios, vulnerability indices, port risk factor, password strength, security improvements |
| Guan et al. (2011)           |                       |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Structure and behaviour of a system, fault propagation paths                               |
| Cardenas et al. (2011)       |                       |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Attack model, linear model of the behaviour of a system, anomaly detection algorithm       |
| Song et al. (2012)           |                       |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Security modelling, asset, impact, threat, vulnerability, security control design and penetration test |
| Kriaa et al. (2012)          |                       |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Attack step sequences                                                                      |
| Francia et al. (2012)        | ●                     |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Asset, vulnerability, and human and non-human threat modelling                             |
| Yan et al. (2013)            | ●                     |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Attack graph                                                                               |
| Markovic-Petrovic and Stojanovic (2014) |               |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Loss expectancy and return on investment                                                   |
| Hewett et al. (2014)         |                       |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Payoff, impact                                                                             |
| Woo and Kim (2014)           |                       |                     | ●             | ●              | ●            | Asset value, threat, vulnerability, impact                                                 |
Table 8 – Key risk management concepts addressed by the methods.

| Ref.                        | System/Asset | Vulnerability | Threat/Attack | Countermeasure | Impact             | Impact measurement               |
|-----------------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|
| Chittester and Haines (2004)| ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Level of severity on a relative scale |
| Byres et al. (2004)         | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | ●                  | Monetary                          |
| Permann and Rohde (2005)    | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Monetary                          |
| McQueen et al. (2006)       | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Monetary                          |
| Yu et al. (2006)            | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | Monetary            | Monetary                          |
| Gertman et al. (2006)       | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | ●                  | Monetary                          |
| Patel et al. (2008)         | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | ●                  | Number of injuries                |
| Beggs and Warren (2009)     | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Not specified                     |
| Henry et al. (2009)         | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Gallons of crude oil lost         |
| Baiardi et al. (2009)       | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Flow per day                      |
| Henry and Haines (2009)     | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Monetary                          |
| Roy et al. (2010)           | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Monetary                          |
| LeMay et al. (2010)         | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Monetary                          |
| Patel and Zaveri (2010)     | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Numeric index                     |
| Ten et al. (2010)           | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | List of system components affected|
| Guan et al. (2011)          | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Level of severity on a relative scale |
| Cardenas et al. (2011)      | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Number of injuries                |
| Song et al. (2012)          | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Voltage instability               |
| Kriaa et al. (2012)         | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Voltage instability               |
| Francia et al. (2012)       | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Numeric index                     |
| Yan et al. (2013)           | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Monetary                          |
| Markovic-Petrovic and       | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Monetary                          |
| Stojanovic (2014)           | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Monetary                          |
| Hewett et al. (2014)        | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Monetary                          |
| Woo and Kim (2014)          | ●            | ●             | ●             | ●              | N/A                | Monetary                          |

impact (consequence) and security control (countermeasure) (Cheminod et al., 2013; Ericsson, 2009; Francia et al., 2012; Markovic-Petrovic and Stojanovic, 2014; Verendel, 2009). Table 8 shows which key concepts of the risk management domain are addressed by the methods examined. The term system or asset is used here in a wider sense and refers to people, knowledge, the structure of the system and its organisation rather than purely to the technical equipment of a SCADA system.

Table 8 confirms the conclusions drawn in the previous section about insufficient attention to context establishment by indicating that only 9 methods address the system/asset concept. Attacks are dealt with by 18 methods, while risk impact is measured in 15 proposals. A fewer proposals address vulnerabilities and countermeasures, 14 and 12 respectively. A minute description of the concepts analysed or measured by the methods could be found in the last column of Table 7.

One of the major requirements to a risk assessment method is to produce simple key security indicators which would enable senior management and security experts to take well-informed security decisions without getting lost in technical detail (Leversage and Byres, 2008). Therefore, the choice of key indicators and their metrics is important.

The analysis confirms that impact or consequences are typically measured in monetary terms. In Gertman et al. (2006), the impact is measured in monetary terms plus a number of human lives. In Hewett et al. (2014) and Ten et al. (2010), numeric indices are proposed. Several methods point out that risk or impact indicators (and, consequently, their measurement) must be chosen in collaboration with system managers and must be meaningful in the context of a specific organisation or domain.

5.9. Tool support

In the vast majority of the proposals examined (17 out of 24) no software prototype or tool supporting the method is discussed. In several papers the development of a software prototype is outlined as a subject of future work (e.g. LeMay et al., 2010; McQueen et al., 2006).

Out of twenty-four papers examined a software prototype or tool supporting the method is discussed only in seven papers, namely Baiardi et al. (2009); Cardenas et al. (2011); Kriaa et al. (2012); LeMay et al. (2011); Patel and Zaveri (2010); Roy et al. (2010); Ten et al. (2010). In four out of these proposals, supporting software is based on the existing tools. In Roy et al. (2010), the authors use the existing tools SHARPE and MATLAB. In LeMay et al. (2011), the prototype is based on the existing modelling tool Möbius. In Cardenas et al. (2011), the tool builds upon MATLAB and uses FORTRAN. In Kriaa et al. (2012), another existing tool, KB3, automates risk assessment method proposed.

Even in the small number of the papers where tool support is discussed, the information regarding a tool is extremely scarce and most often is simply limited to the statement that a tool was developed (e.g. in Patel and Zaveri, 2010; Ten et al., 2010). Neither the architecture of a tool nor user interface is demonstrated.
6. Research challenges

6.1. Dealing with fragmentation

We encountered a certain level of fragmentation in terms of addressing the stages of the risk management process. In particular, little attention is paid to the context establishment stage of the risk management process. Any risk assessment method would benefit from an in-depth understanding of a SCADA system, its components and the interdependencies between them, and external factors affecting it. The methods often either try to cover many stages of the process at the expense of the level of detail or focus on one stage providing no instructions regarding the other stages. There is clearly a need for a comprehensive method which would cover all sages of the risk management process and deal with all key risk management concepts.

Little attention is received by the context establishment stage. It is typically assumed that a user of a risk assessment system knows the system and its interdependencies well. However, due to the inherent complexity of SCADA systems such assumption is hardly always true. Also when establishing the context at the initial stage of the risk management process often only the technical aspect of a SCADA system is addressed. In future, risk assessment methods may draw upon more definite account of the human factor, individual knowledge, personnel cyber security awareness, organisational cyber security culture and business processes.

6.2. Overcoming attack- or failure-orientation

As a result of the concentration on threats and vulnerabilities during the risk management process, rather than on system itself the vast majority of the risk assessment methods examined are failure-oriented (Table 3). Thus, “[u]nderstanding consequences and estimating likelihood from cause-related logic trees seem to be pre-requisites of any approach to analyzing risks in a system ...” (The Open Group, 2012, p. 5).

However, as noted earlier in the paper, it is not always feasible to envision all possible failure modes or attacks. We see the application of a goal-oriented approach to risk management (The Open Group, 2012), which would support risk management even in situations where a comprehensive list of failure modes or attack types may not be established, as one of the research challenges of the field. Approaching risk management from the positivist top-down perspective by identifying the elements and dependencies within a SCADA system that are required in order for a system to be operational, safe and secure offers a more solid understanding of a system and risk factors facing it as opposed to the failure-oriented perspective, which is by definition incomplete.

We believe that the use a goal-oriented dependency modelling approach (The Open Group, 2012) in the context of SCADA systems offers multiple benefits including the overcoming failure-orientation. A dependency model focuses on positive outcomes and elements required by an organisation for smooth, safe and secure operation. A dependency model is developed by asking What does the successful operation of a system depend upon? rather than by examining system failure modes. It is not restricted to the boundaries of an organisation and it does not rely on historical data or on the completeness of the list of potential threats (The Open Group, 2012). Linking to the previously outlined research challenge, a dependency model, which provides an insight into more fundamental aspects of a SCADA system, might support the context establishment stage as well as risk identification and assessment stages of the risk management process.

The development of a model of a SCADA system is an arduous task. Both qualitative and quantitative parameters of a dependency model of SCADA system are hard to establish and require reliable statistical data, and the involvement of SCADA and security experts. In future research, a method must be developed for updating the qualitative parameters of a dependency model of a SCADA system dynamically based on the information extracted from SCADA system models of other types, e.g. security-annotated business process models or UML class diagrams with security profiles. A method must automate the process of the creation and refreshing of a dependency model of a SCADA system by pulling together in a consistent way security related information from other models developed while designing a secure SCADA system.

6.3. Search for reliable sources of data

Despite their drawbacks, PRA methods prevail over qualitative and quantitative non-probabilistic methods. One of the major obstacles for PRA methods is the lack of objective accurate data for the calculation of probabilities involved in risk assessment. In 2007, one of the studies on SCADA systems cyber security reported that “accurate historical data on cyber impacts was badly lacking in the SCADA or process industries thus making accurate risk assessment extremely difficult” (Byres et al., 2007).

In order to deal with the absence of historical system data, several methods are discussed in the literature:

- The use SCADA test platforms to collect experimental data on threats and vulnerabilities.

SCADA testbeds may fill up the lack of historical data by building up vulnerability and attack databases (Dondossola et al., 2009). Controlled simulations on test platforms may help to collect statistics regarding vulnerability existence and severity, and attack success rates (Dondossola et al., 2011). There is a range of SCADA testbeds developed by universities across the world (Dondossola et al., 2009; Morris et al., 2011).

- The development of databases of security incidents in SCADA systems.

A number of CNI, ICS and SCADA systems security databases exist, e.g. the RISI database (Tudor and Fabro, 2010), which is mentioned earlier in this section, and the Industrial Security Incident Database (ISID) (Byres et al., 2007). Vulnerability databases accounting for SCADA systems are listed in Song et al. (2012).

- The improvement of information sharing across research and industry.
Although information sharing initiatives exist (e.g. in order to facilitate information exchange, the European SCADA and Control Systems Information Exchange (EUROSCSIE) was established under the initiative of the CPNI) they do not typically involve researchers to the desirable degree. Many authors highlight that it is complicated or even virtually impossible for researchers to access realistic data regarding structure, threats and vulnerabilities of SCADA systems.

- Reliance on expert judgement and its formalisation.

In order to deal with the absence of historical data, some PRA methods rely on subjective data such as expert opinion (see Table 5). In some cases, expert opinion is more easily available and may even be more valuable than historical data.

However, risk assessment methods, which rely on expert opinion, must devote more attention to techniques for capturing, formalising and ultimately turning into numeric values expert knowledge.

In 2007, in Ralston et al. (2007) it was mentioned that a “natural extension to PRA involves the use of fuzzy concepts, though this approach has not been published for use in SCADA system security risk assessment.” In our analysis, we found only one method which uses fuzzy logic. In Yan et al. (2013), the Duality Element Relative Fuzzy Evaluation Method (DERFEM) is exploited for quantifying the severity of vulnerabilities. Thus, while fuzzy methods seem promising in SCADA risk assessment their current application is limited.

6.4. Improving validation of risk assessment methods

According to Verendel (2009), methods for quantifying security are in general weakly justified. Section 5.6 also confirms that there is room for improvement regarding the rigorous multi-aspect evaluation of risk assessment methods for SCADA systems.

Researchers rarely have a chance to evaluate their methods on real case studies and have to be satisfied with the demonstration of their methods on generic simplified examples. The testing of methods in practice with security, risk and SCADA experts, and with managers responsible for security decision-making is invaluable. It may help to evaluate whether a method accounts for the perspectives of multiple stakeholders and conveys cyber security risks in a clear form accessible to non-technical managerial staff and SCADA experts lacking security background.

The general guidance on choosing an evaluation method (or a combination of them) could be found in Venable et al. (2012), where methods are categorised into naturalistic (evaluation in real settings) and artificial (evaluation in laboratory settings, analytical evaluation, simulations etc.) as well as ex ante (evaluation of an uninstantiated artefact) and ex post (evaluation of an instantiated artefact). The authors of risk assessment methods may evaluate the process of risk assessment they propose or the outcome of it or both. As inspired by Venable et al. (2012), a risk assessment methods may be evaluated for the following purposes: (1) to establish its utility and efficacy for achieving its declared purpose; (2) to evaluate the method or theory supporting a risk assessment method; (3) to compare a risk assessment method with other methods in ability to achieve the same purpose; and (4) to identify weaknesses and ways for improvement of a risk assessment method.

The authors of risk assessment methods must be clear about which criterion they evaluate their method against. A “good” risk analysis method shall be (1) comprehensive, (2) adherent to evidence, (3) logically sound, (4) practical and politically acceptable, (5) open to evaluation, (6) based on explicit assumptions and premises, (7) compatible with the institutions, (8) conducive to learning, (9) attuned to risk communication, and (10) innovative (Haines and Chittester, 2005). Compliance with each of these ten criteria may be tested. A risk assessment method may also be evaluated regarding its fitness for purpose, ease to learn and use, the ability of the method to generate correct result, the effectiveness in achieving its goal, efficacy, ethicality, elegance and in terms of acceptance by practitioners (Moody, 2003; Venable et al., 2012).

The Method Evaluation Model (MEM) (Moody, 2003) is one of the possible frameworks to back up the evaluation of a risk assessment method. The MEM builds upon and adapts the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989) for the evaluation of system design methods and modelling languages. The TAM is well accepted in the IS literature as a theoretical model for the evaluation of technology acceptance (Moody, 2003). The MEM facilitates the empirical evaluation of the ease of use, usefulness and intention to use a method. Intention to use a method may serve as an indicator of whether the method might gain traction in industry.

A comparative evaluation of risk assessment methods for SCADA systems might demonstrate advantages and disadvantages of methods, and assist practitioners with the choice of the the suitable method. Over the last several years the MEM was actively used as a framework for the comparative evaluation of security and risk identification and analysis methods (Espaná et al., 2010; Fabian et al., 2010; Labunets et al., 2013, 2014).

6.5. Supporting risk management methods with elaborate tools

The benefits of software tools supporting risk assessment and management activities are undisputed. Tools may facilitate data input for risk assessment in an intuitive user-friendly manner, automatically generate and analyse risk models, recommend security countermeasures or even trigger them as a response to undesired events.

The research on risk assessment in SCADA systems has not yet reached a level of maturity where a software tool automating a method would be thoroughly elaborated and presented at length alongside the method. Software tools may ease the evaluation of methods by academics and industry experts. The feedback from testing may assist with the refinement of methods and tools in many aspects including unambiguous intuitive user interface, which is of no small importance in risk assessment tools. The evaluation of a method on real more complex cases and on a larger number of cases is less tedious when the risk assessment process is at least partially automated. Open access and open source risk assessment tools for
SCADA systems could expedite the progress of the domain remarkably.

7. Conclusions

Over the years, we have seen a number of cyber attacks on CNI, ICS and SCADA systems (Section 2). The severity and consequences of attacks vary. Luckily, until now major disasters have mainly been averted. Unfortunately, without taking precautions we may not hope for this to happen in future as attackers get more sophisticated, experienced and malicious (Haimes and Chitterer, 2005).

It may seem that the probability of catastrophic cyber attacks on SCADA systems is relatively low (Section 1). This may lead to a false sense of security if we overlook two points.

First, considering the number of attacks, it is worth remembering that only a small number of security incidents is reported - “Discussions with operators of traditional business crime reporting databases indicate that a typical incident database collects no better than one in ten of the actual events occurring” (Byres et al., 2007). Further, it is not possible to envision all possible attacks and the ways in which a SCADA system may fail. Resultantly, due to the inherent incompleteness of PRA methods, the actual value of the probability of cyber events occurrence is higher than estimated. For example, for incidents in power industry it was noted that “While these may not be frequent in an absolute sense, there are good reasons to believe that they will be far more frequent than quantitative tools such as probabilistic risk assessments predict” (Ramana, 2011). In line with the above, it is stated in The Open Group (2012) that “[c]omplex systems always retain the capacity to produce novel or surprising events.”

Second, a potential loss from a cyber attack may be so severe that the risk, which is calculated as a product of the loss from the attack and the probability of the attack, is estimated as substantial even with a very low attack occurrence probability. Substantial risk calls for proportionate security investments.

The imperative importance of ensuring the cyber security of CNI and SCADA systems specifically is recognised in the UK. In September 2014, 2.5 million investment was made by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and the UK’s National Cyber Security Programme into a new research project focusing on the cyber-security of the UK’s CNI. The project is supported by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). In 2014, the Airbus Group Endeavr Wales invested in a new research project titled “SCADA Cyber Security Lifecycle (SCADA-CSL)”. The review paper at hand is one of the deliverables of this research project.

This paper contains a structured comprehensive overview of cyber security risk assessment methods applied to SCADA systems. In this review, we followed a well-established literature search methodology and strived to make the literature review process transparent.

Overall, the contribution of this review paper is three-fold:

• a review of the state of art in risk assessment of SCADA systems,
• a new categorisation scheme for risk assessment methods, and
• an outline of the research challenges in the domain.

The review indicates that despite the fact that a large number of risk assessment methods for SCADA systems exists there is still room for further research and multiple improvements. Cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems may be improved in terms of (1) addressing the context establishment stage of the risk management process, (2) overcoming attack- or failure orientation, (3) accounting for the human factor, (4) the capturing and formalisation of expert opinion, (5) the improvement of the reliability of probabilistic data; (6) evaluation and validation, and (7) tool support. We also see a need for a comprehensive method which would cover all sages of the risk management process and deal with all key risk management concepts coherently.

In the paper, we outlined some approaches that might be taken to these challenges. The consistent addressing of the specified research challenges will enhance future research about cyber security risk assessment methods in the SCADA context. We invite well-positioned researchers and practitioners to extend the list of the challenges, and to continue the discussion. Shared understanding of the challenges facing the domain will facilitate its rapid maturing.

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