Celebrating 70: An Interview with Don Berry

Dalene Stangl, Lurdes Y. T. Inoue and Telba Z. Irony

Abstract. Donald (Don) Arthur Berry, born May 26, 1940 in Southbridge, Massachusetts, earned his A.B. degree in mathematics from Dartmouth College and his M.A. and Ph.D. in statistics from Yale University. He served first on the faculty at the University of Minnesota and subsequently held endowed chair positions at Duke University and The University of Texas M.D. Anderson Center. At the time of the interview he served as Head of the Division of Quantitative Sciences, and Chairman and Professor of the Department of Biostatistics at UT M.D. Anderson Center.

Don’s research deals with the theory and applications of statistics, especially Bayesian methods for sequential design of experiments. His work challenges the status quo, always striving to improve design and analysis of clinical trials, genetic modeling and the process of health-related decision making. His research impacts health research broadly, but has achieved the greatest influence in cancer research. As of 2010, he has published over 200 articles and 10 books and has mentored 24 Ph.D. and 16 M.S. students.

Don’s honors include fellowship election to the International Statistical Institute, the American Statistical Association and the Institute of Mathematical Statistics. He gave Presidential invited addresses to the Western North American Region of the International Biometric Society (New Mexico, 2004), the Canadian Statistical Society (Ottawa, 2006) and the Eastern North American Region of the International Biometric Society (Washington, 2008).

Don married Donna Berry in 1960. Together they raised six children, Don, Mike, Tim, Scott, Jennifer and Erin. Celebrating Don’s 70th birthday, the authors co-organized two invited sessions and a dinner reception at the ENAR 2010 in New Orleans. This interview occurred while his family, friends, colleagues and students gathered to celebrate his birthday and his contributions to statistics.

Key words and phrases: Bayesian inference, adaptive design, clinical trials, mammography.

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DS: We would like to begin with some questions that help us put your life in historical context. Where were you born, how did your parents earn a living, and what are your earliest recollections of life in the 1940s?

Berry: Oh my! I was born in Southbridge, Massachusetts, in my maternal grandparents’ home, on the day FDR responded to and tried to comfort Americans about Hitler’s invasion of Western Europe in one...
of his Fireside Chats. My parents lived in Sturbridge. They had a small family farm, 100 acres. My father was from Beverly, Massachusetts, a suburb of Boston. He bought the farm before he married. He paid $3000. It’s pretty nice real estate for $3000, $25/month for 10 years, no interest. At the time he worked in the “mill.” Even though most textile mills had left the Northern U.S. to be closer to the cotton fields of the South, there was still one in Southbridge. When I was young my mother “didn’t work,” but in fact she worked her fingers to the bone, “keeping body and soul together,” in the terms of the day.

We were poor. We didn’t have running water. And no electricity until the late 1940s.

TI: There is an old saying: “Behind every man is a strong woman.” How has Donna contributed to your career?

Berry: She contributes to my career by contributing to me. She gives me a reality check. I say to her things like, “I don’t think I’m as smart as I once was.” And she’ll reply, “You used to exaggerate your intelligence back then, too!” (That’s a joke: Donna’s too nice to say such a thing, even if true.) She’s a mate in the truest and warmest senses of the term. The highlight of my day is dinner, simple, and I stand at the counter, she sits on the other side, and we chat about things. She asks how my day has gone and is interested in the details of who is doing what to whom, but she’s interested in my career only to the extent that it is part of me.

TI: Your sons, Tim and Scott, have master’s and Ph.D. degrees in statistics, respectively. How much were their education and career choices influenced by growing up with a father as committed to the field as you are?

Berry: There are a number of statisticians whose parents are statisticians. Partly it’s because they have been made aware of statistics as a vocation, and one that is intellectually satisfying. In the cases of Tim and Scott, it was sports and the connection between statistics and sports. I wrote a paper with Tim before he got his master’s degree that we published in the *American Statistician* (Berry and Berry, 1985). It was on the probability of making a field goal in American football depending on distance from the goal and the individual’s record. We built a geometric model that enabled ranking individual kickers. The attraction of statistics for Tim and Scott was mostly sports, and I provided some intellectual foundation on the mathematical side.

DS: Now we are going to switch to your education. Tell us about your undergrad days?

Berry: They weren’t pretty, at least not the first half of them. My first exposure to amazing intellects was sobering, especially John Kemeny. I had scored well on math exams, despite coming from a small public high school with run-of-the-mill teachers and no calculus courses. So Dartmouth assigned their math guru to be my advisor. I remember a reception at his home for his half dozen advisees. Kemeny headed the math department. He was from Princeton where he had been Einstein’s mathematician. I was in awe of his abilities and of the abilities of others, students as well as faculty. Kemeny pioneered computer time-sharing in the 1960s and 1970s and transformed Dartmouth into the country’s first computer-intensive campus, becoming its President from 1970 to 1981. He was co-inventor (with Thomas E. Kurtz) of BASIC, which became more widely used in the world than all other languages combined. Kemeny’s predictions about the future of computing are amazingly prescient; it’s as though he had a crystal ball: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HHHi3VFOL-AI](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HHHi3VFOL-AI). Outside of academic circles Kemeny was best known for leading the 1979 President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. He was from Hungary. When he arrived in New York City as a 14-year-old, his English was poor. He told me the following story. There were Regents’ Exams in New York, and they included two days of English. On the first day he figured out the scheme of the answers, and
Fig. 2. In the U.S. Army in the Panama Canal Zone, 1961, making intelligence maps.

so on the second day he got a perfect score. From then on, his teacher would never ask him a question unless no one else knew the answer. If he didn’t know the answer (which he never did!), she forgave the rest of the class. Kemeny was brilliant. I knew I would never be as smart or as accomplished as he was.

In the first and also in the second part of my undergraduate life, the Dean of the College Thaddeus Seymour was very influential and encouraging. I left Dartmouth in my second year because I flunked out. I went into the Army, at Dean Seymour’s suggestion. Before I left he said, “You’ve got to come back; it would be a crime against humanity if you don’t come back.” I’ve thought of that phrase many times since, and each time it gives me a boost. I was stationed in Panama with the Army. To gain readmission to Dartmouth I had to fly back to interview with some high-level faculty committee headed by Dean Seymour. I was able to convince them I had grown up, and I had. The Army will do that!

Tom Kurtz had probably the biggest influence on my becoming a statistician. I knew him as a duplicate bridge player in my first undergraduate stint and as a teacher in my second. After I had gained a bit of knowledge about statistics he hired me to write statistics programs (cumulative distributions, test statistics, regression analyses, ANOVA, factorials, Latin squares, etc.) that became software distributed with BASIC. This was 1964–1965. I hadn’t thought about this before, but it may well have been the first statistics package. Of course, it was crude by today’s standards. It had a “manual” of sorts: a series of “REM” statements in the programs. But at least they contained examples of input and output, which are usually helpful.

LI: During your graduate school years at Yale you were co-advised by Leonard Jimmie Savage (your primary advisor) and Joseph (Jay) Kadane. What did you learn uniquely from each of them?

Berry: Recently I have been rereading Savage. He continues to be the most important influence in my intellectual being. The atmosphere around him tingled with intelligence. He knew as much about everything as anybody could possibly imagine. He could put his finger on the nub of a problem, and solve it. He was regarded by some people in the profession as abrupt and sometimes arrogant and insulting, but to me he was amazing and wonderful. (Shortly after Savage died in 1971 I was chatting with a world-famous statistician. He dissed Savage. I protested, saying that after all he was human. The reply was, “He had some human characteristics.” I added, “...and the rest were superhuman.”) We would go into his office after departmental seminars and we would discuss what we had learned. Imagine if you can, having Jimmie Savage as a guide while reading individual sentences from Kolmogorov’s Foundations of the Theory of Probability (Kolmogorov, 1956). Imagine translating Gnedenko from the original for him to prove that I could read Russian as my second foreign language requirement, but mainly because he wanted to know whether the published translation accurately conveyed Gnedenko’s attitude toward subjective probability (as near as I could tell, it did). Imagine having him commenting on and reacting to every word of your dissertation. It was better than winning any lottery. Whether in my dissertation or more generally, when I would say something that didn’t make sense, he wouldn’t tell me it was wrong. Rather, he would say, “Let’s look at it this way,” and he would carefully guide me over a cliff, and while falling I would discover where and why I had erred.

Seminars at Yale back then were different from today’s standard fare. They would last at least an hour and a half and sometimes two hours. We would flesh out the issues, oftentimes leaving the presenter in the dust. Savage couldn’t see well. If a presenter had written something on the board that Savage wanted to ask about he would go up and point to the spot, peering intently through his Coke bottle glasses. His questions and comments were inevitably insightful. They made attending seminars a pleasant and even pleasurable experience.

Jay Kadane was young at the time, I’m older than he is, so he had less influence, but indeed he was a help for me in writing a dissertation, things in life, and we both have incredible respect for Savage.

DS: What was your first encounter with Bayesian statistics?

Berry: Tom Kurtz had introduced me to statistics, late in my undergraduate career. He asked me what
I was going to do with my life. I said I didn’t know, but said I liked probability. He suggested I go to graduate school in statistics. I asked what it was! I took a statistics course. I found out later that two famous statisticians, Tom Louis and Kinley Larntz, were in the same class. Both later became my colleagues and are good friends. But we didn’t do anything Bayesian. Kurtz knew Frank Anscombe when both were at Princeton and so he suggested that I apply to Yale.

My first Bayesian encounter was shortly after I got to Yale. There was a get-acquainted picnic in one of the early fall weekends. Donna was pregnant with Scott. When chatting with Anscombe I told him we had three children, all boys, and that Donna’s obstetrician said we were due for a girl. I said I know that’s not right, but the maximum likelihood estimate—which was the limit of my knowledge—of the probability of a boy is also clearly wrong. I asked him how to calculate this probability. He took me through Laplace’s rule. If you start with a uniform probability density, he said, the posterior probability of a boy is $\frac{4}{5}$. He indicated this was on the high side because the prior distribution is not uniform, not as extreme as the MLE, but in the right direction. His conclusion made sense to me but I had no idea what he was saying about the mathematics. Later I asked Savage about it. Did I say Savage knew everything? He took a book from his shelf by Corrado Gini of Gini coefficient fame. The book included amazing compilations of data on the distribution of gender by sizes of families up to something like 16 children. He said we could use these data to figure out a reasonable prior distribution. I deconvolved what I assumed were beta-binomials to find the betas. The striking thing was that beta priors didn’t provide a good fit. Indeed, the samples were consistent with mixtures of binomials, having bigger tails than binomials. But, for example, among families of size 10 there were more families with 10 girls than with 9 girls. There seemed to be a small but important point-mass at 0. I found out later that some women can’t carry a male fetus. Anyway, I calculated the posterior probability that our unborn child would be a boy at about 56%.

DS: Now we are going to switch from people who influenced you, to those that you’ve influenced through your work.

LI: From your earliest work, “Bandit Problems” (with Bert Fristedt, dated 1985), your professional commitment has been to Bayesian methods and decision analysis. Could you tell us how that book was born and how that work has evolved through your subsequent work on health-related diagnostics and clinical trial designs?

Berry: Do you have a month? My thesis was on bandit problems. One result, probably the most noteworthy result, was the optimality of the stay-with-a-winner rule: If an optimal arm is successful, then it continues to be optimal. It had been shown in one very special case of dependent arms. I showed it in the generality of independent arms. (It’s not true in general for dependent arms.) As I indicated, I worked closely with Savage on my dissertation. I submitted a draft of 10 pages. He said it was great. Ten pages is short, he said, but that’s okay. I thought I was done. However, he said, we should try to do a bit more. He took me through five iterations, each time adding some things to be addressed and in the end we had 60 pages. After that I removed two of the nine chapters that dealt with special cases and submitted the rest to *The Annals of Mathematical Statistics* (Berry, 1972), precursor of *The Annals of Probability* and *The Annals of Statistics*. Tom Ferguson was the Associate Editor. He accepted it without modification, no doubt due to Savage’s fine-tooth comb. It was a long journal article, at 27 pages. I was lucky and the next paper I submitted was accepted as well. By the time I got a paper rejected, 10 papers or so hence, I had built up the confidence to think that the rejection was a fluke. Whether true or not, I had come to believe that important people were interested in what I had to say. I’ve since seen the opposite happen to young researchers. Getting one’s first paper rejected can be so negative that one’s career can take a different path. It’s likely that had my early papers been rejected I wouldn’t have stayed in academia.

I’ve always been attracted by notions of strategy, games and decision making, including questions of optimality. My dissertation and early work were examples. I chose my dissertation subject and brought it to Savage. I didn’t know much about the literature in
the area and lucked out because little had been done. On the other hand, the reason little had been done is that the problem is a bear. Savage too was interested in strategic questions, as even a casual reading of How to Gamble If You Must will reveal. Fristedt, a mathematician who had not worked in this area, too was interested in strategy. Ed Thorpe had written a book called Beat the Dealer (Thorpe, 1966) on strategies for playing blackjack. David Heath (who is a mathematician and another collaborator of mine) and Fristedt worked on improved blackjack strategies. They used them in Las Vegas and won . . . applied mathematics! Thorpe called the Heath/Fristedt strategy the best one available.

I told Fristedt about some of the problems on which I worked. We attacked a variety of optimization issues related to those problems. We did some things in the book which in retrospect would have been better off in a journal first. Readers don’t look for innovations in books. One result in the book is based on something called the Gittins index. John Gittins had considered \( k \) independent arms with geometric discounting. That means the current observation is worth 1, the next is worth alpha, the next is worth alpha squared, etc. He showed that this \( k \)-armed bandit problem can be reduced to \( k \) two-armed bandit problems where within each you compare an arm with a known arm and ask which known arm would make you indifferent between the arm in question and the known arm. The “equivalent” known arm is the Gittins index and Gittins showed that the optimal strategy is to always choose the arm with the biggest Gittins index. Fristedt and I showed that a Gittins index exists only with geometric discounting. So if you want to maximize the expected number of successes in five observations, say, within each you compare an arm with a known arm and ask which known arm would make you indifferent between the arm in question and the known arm.

I leave to you to decide the meaning of “fraction” and whether Thompson should receive some credit for the randomized clinical trial, and in a blocked design no less. (Perhaps randomization was “in the air” in 1933, especially in the air around R. A. Fisher.) And Thompson’s adaptive design is arguably better than Hill’s balanced design that has so dominated clinical research over the last 60 years.

The reason I tell you about Thompson is that when I went to M. D. Anderson in 1999 my principal goal was to use adaptive designs in phase II cancer trials. But I wanted to add some randomization to otherwise deterministic bandit strategies. Solving bandit problems requires dynamic programming and the resulting strategies are less than transparent. Moreover, the traditional bandit approach leads to deterministic strategies. So I opted for the Thompson procedure, modifying it and applying it with more complicated endpoints. It is easy to use and—as opposed to 1933—we can now easily calculate operating characteristics such as Type I error rate and statistical power, which have become standard measures for comparing designs. Indeed, we are using a generalization of the concept in I-SPY2, which is a high-profile adaptive phase II drug screening trial that aims to pair drugs with biomarker signatures in breast cancer (http://www.ispy2.org/).

In a very short time adaptive randomization has become a big hit in cancer clinical trials. It’s also a big hit in non-cancer drug trials for assessing the drug’s dose-response relationship. But with a twist. In the latter the goal of the treatment assignment—that is, the dose—is to get information about the important aspects of the dose-response curve, such as the minimally effective dose and the maximal utility dose. In the late 1990s Peter Mueller and I built a design for Pfizer that was used in a stroke trial called ASTIN (Berry et al., 2002a). There were 16 doses including placebo. The design worked perfectly, exploring the dose-response curve in an efficient fashion, adaptively with some randomization. And the algorithm we built stopped as soon as it was allowed to do so—proclaiming the drug a dud. More recently, Scott Berry and I built a design for Eli Lilly that is being used in a diabetes trial called GBCF. Also Bayesian, but several improvements over ASTIN. One is that it was designed to seamlessly morph into a
phase III trial upon sufficiently identifying two doses to carry forward along with controls. Another is that it is being driven by a utility function defined on the various important efficacy and safety characteristics of the drug. Another is that it incorporates longitudinal modeling with highly informative prior distributions for the various endpoints.

I continue to work on the theory as well as the application of bandit problems. For example, Yi Cheng is helping Bert Fristedt and me with an updated version of our book.

LI: What do you envision for the second edition?

Berry: We’ll do more applications. There have not been many theoretical advances in the 25 years since the book came out. There have been essentially none in discrete-time problems; we have to update more for continuous time.

LI: Since Bandit Problems (Berry and Fristedt, 1985) you have researched and written prolifically on topics ranging from introductory to advanced and from applied to theoretical. Which ones do you regard as most influential and why? Which were most controversial and why?

Berry: Influence and controversy go hand in hand. If you’re saying the same thing everybody else is saying, no one listens. Also, theoretical contributions don’t create much controversy. If you show that there is a consequence from a set of assumptions, then the extent of applause depends on whether the argument is correct, whether it is “elegant,” and how difficult it was to prove. But if you want to actually use the result, then people will attack your assumptions. Bandit problems are good examples. An explicit assumption is the goal to treat patients effectively, in the trial as well as out. That is controversial for reasons associated with statistical philosophy and the inability of the frequentist approach to have this goal be made explicit. In particular, it is counter to the 1979 Belmont Report which clearly states that clinical trials are designed to test hypotheses and not to treat trial participants effectively.

Part of the reason statisticians take the older me more seriously is that I’ve changed over time—as have they. I’ve become more ecumenical and arguably more politic. And I’ve come to appreciate even more than I had before what frequentist statistics and frequentist statisticians have achieved over the years. I used to think it inevitable that the Bayesian view would lead to the right answer. That was naïve. I no longer think Bayesians have an inside track. Multiple comparisons is an example. No statistical philosophy has the right answer—and I don’t think a “right answer” is possible if the requirement is “one size fits all.” In particular, having inferences depend on the number of tests can’t be right . . . and in some forms it is counter to the likelihood principle. But if you were to give 100 Bayesians and 100 frequentists a quiz, with say 20 settings involving a range of multiplicity issues, my answers would probably line up closer to those of frequentists.

DS: How have you addressed statistical controversies outside of statistics?

Berry: One of my papers that turned out to be more controversial than I anticipated was entitled “Bayesian Clinical Trials.” It appeared in 2006 Nature Reviews Drug Discovery (Berry, 2006). It has been influential because it was aimed at and was accessible by non-statisticians. MDs read it and said to their collaborating statisticians, “Can we do that?” Also, in the cancer world we published a paper in Clinical Trials (Biswa et al., 2009) chronicling the clinical trials in my first five years at M.D. Anderson, focusing on the 200 of them that were Bayesian. Mithat Gonen wrote the editorial. He said this is great, but why are such trials confined to one Zip code? Bayesian clinical trials are not controversial at my institution. And in cancer research we are regarded with a bit of awe because of our ability to run these trials. But our work is still nascent, and the world hasn’t embraced our approach with open arms. But its ears are open. In a way we are an experiment to actually do what we said we could do got people to listen, to take Bayesians more seriously.

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Across the theory/application divide, I’ve written about the likelihood principle and obviously that’s controversial. In the early days of the 70s and 80s I tried to persuade people of its appropriateness but to no avail.

TI: Michael Krams says you are like Nelson Mandela: you were imprisoned, no one listened.

Berry: The analogy is a major stretch, but the conclusion is correct. About 20 years ago someone from the FDA approached me on the Metro in DC. He said he’d heard me talk on many occasions, and whenever he did, he became a Bayesian . . . for ten minutes! He said I needed to work on a sustained release version. The elegance of modern computational methods helped to provide the necessary sustenance. The ability to actually do what we said we could do got people to listen, to take Bayesians more seriously.

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pointed. For example, Bayesians identified which frequentist methods were “incoherent,” or more accurately, lamented that none seemed to be coherent. On the other hand, Bayesians were accused of being “biased.” The rhetoric was not all that different from that of the Fisher/Pearson duels. But we Bayesians have stopped saying derogatory things, partly because we have changed and partly because frequentists have been listening. When you’re walking beside someone you tend to be cordial; when you’re trying to catch up to tell them something and they are ignoring what you say, you sometimes yell. One circumstance of great importance that contributed to this change in attitude was the work of Telba and Greg Campbell in the Center for Devices at the FDA, including their recently published Bayesian Guidance for Industry (www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm071121.pdf). Even if it did nothing but exist it would lend credibility to the Bayesian approach. It announces, “Listen to this, and evaluate it on its merits.”

The most controversial of my work, engendering death threats, if you can imagine, is not much reflected in my publications. In 1997 I co-chaired an NIH Consensus Development Conference Panel on mammographic screening for women in their 40s. I had never published my ideas regarding screening, but I had a very different attitude from the widely accepted medical view that finding cancer as early as possible is uniformly wonderful. I’m not against screening mammography, as many of my critics have claimed, but I want to see the evidence for benefits and harms evaluated and presented to women. It’s such an important issue and it affects so many people that we must get it right. And if 30 million women a year are getting mammograms in the U.S., we need to know what to tell them about the benefits and harms. After the Conference I reported the panel’s conclusions to the National Cancer Advisory Board. Our report created quite a political storm, including a 98-0 U.S. Senate vote saying that we were wrong. Interestingly, our recommendations were almost word for word what the 2009 U.S. Preventive Services Task Force said about screening mammography for women in their 40s.

As a side note on the Bayesian issue, in 1998 I published in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute (Berry, 1998) a Bayesian meta-analysis of the eight screening trials. Estimates of individual trial effects were shrunk in the usual way. I recently compared the updated data from these trials with my earlier estimates. It’s revealing how similar they are, and my estimates are much closer than the earlier MLEs. It’s empirical validation of the appropriateness of Bayesian shrinking.

In 2000 a paper published by the Cochrane Collaboration regenerated interest in the question of mammographic screening (Gøtzsche and Olsen, 2000). There was a U.S. Senate hearing, and they invited me to present my views, which I did.

LI: How did you get involved in the Senate hearing1?

Berry: When one has views at odds with those of the establishment, there are two possible consequences. One is that you get ignored as a lunatic. The other is that you get widely quoted. The latter happened to me (although most of the establishment said I was a lunatic, and worse). I haven’t counted and I know I’ve

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1Transcribed U.S. Senate Hearings on Feb 28, 2002 http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/107s/78085.txt.
not seen them all, but I have been quoted in over 100 newspaper articles concerning screening, including in *The New York Times, The Chicago Tribune, The Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal*. The reason is not just that my views were anti-establishment. They rang true to clear-thinking reporters such as Gina Kolata (2009a, 2009b) Judy Peres, John Crewdson and many others. I was a voice for views they thought should be presented to women and evaluated for their possible merit. And of course I am not alone in my views, as the recent United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) recommendations make clear.

My name came to be associated with throwing cold water on the unquestioning lockstep acceptance of screening. For example, breast cancer incidence dropped substantially starting in 2002. This coincided with the publication by the Women’s Health Initiative which showed that postmenopausal hormone therapy is detrimental to the cardiovascular system as well as increasing the incidence of breast cancer. Women stopped taking it and breast cancer incidence dropped.

We published a paper in the *New England Journal of Medicine* (Ravdin et al., 2007) implicating hormone therapy. The only serious competitor was the decreased use of mammography over the same period. One of the co-authors of our paper, Kathy Cronin, who is a terrific statistician at the NCI, called the decreased use of mammography the “Berry effect.”

Exactly why the Senate invited me to present my views at the hearing I do not know. Everybody knew the Senators were going to come out strongly in favor of screening because it was the only politically viable conclusion. Perhaps they wanted token opposition or perhaps they wanted to be able to say they’d heard from all sides. Fran Visco, who heads the National Breast Cancer Coalition, was the only other presenter on my side of the debate. I loved her comment to Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee, the then Senate Majority Leader. In his 5 minutes of questions for me he harped on the fact that I was not an MD and he was. Fran deviated from her prepared remarks at the start of her testimony to say to Senator Frist, “Biostatisticians are the experts in this debate.”

LI: The most recent mammography recommendation was released at the end of 2009. In an interview you said: “Consistent with the attitude in U.S. medicine that if some is good then more is better, we’ve opted hell-bent for more—with no evidence [. . .] The standard in Europe is biennial screening. In the United States we tend to go overboard when it comes to medicine, and screening is an example. We’ve been overselling screening. Sanity has set in and we’re realizing that we were flying without wings. Sometimes less is more.” Is this a sign of progress from earlier debates? Is this going to survive the strong reactions against the recommendations?

Berry: As usual, the best guide to the future is the past. So I’m not optimistic. The attitudes of people are very complicated. And sophistication in evidentiary matters is not necessarily predictive of rational
judgment. Religion is probably the clearest example. I know famous statisticians who have had prostate cancers detected by PSA screening. They’ve had surgery and suffered the side effects of incontinence and impotence. They say PSA testing saved their lives. Any open-minded examination of the evidence points to the contrary. And it suggests that PSA testing has robbed them of quality of life. Will I tell them that? Not any more than I will argue with a religious fanatic that his is no more likely to be the true religion than someone else’s.

But let me tell you what really concerns me about this issue, and what I’m willing to stand up for and fight against. I once gave a talk at a Gordon Conference dealing with cancer prevention. The principal presentations before mine were biologists trying to find cancer ever earlier. For example, they were working on blood tests to find breast cancer or increased susceptibility to breast cancer. When I got to speak I asked what they planned to do when they found breast cancer without knowing where in the breast it was, or which breast contained it. Double mastectomies for millions of women? And for girls as well? Moreover, they would have no idea whether the cancer was something
that the body could take care of by itself. Or the cancer might grow so slowly that it wouldn’t become evident until the women were 100 years old. I told them they didn’t know what they were doing. To demonstrate the utility of their findings would require randomization, and following women for many years. This would be an almost impossible hurdle. So that was my initial part of the presentation. It was like I was telling religious fanatics that there is no God. Had there been tomatoes in the room they would have thrown them. A friend of mine, Bernard Levin, who at the time was Vice President of Cancer Prevention at M. D. Anderson, relayed one person’s reaction. She consoled him saying, “I feel sorry for you, Bernard, that you have to be in the same institution as Don Berry.”

The value of early detection is so ingrained in people that it’s difficult to get them to think rationally on the subject. Here’s a helpful calculation. It takes about 27 doublings to have a breast cancer big enough to be found on a mammogram. After another couple of doublings it will become symptomatic. (Actually, many cancers become symptomatic even before they can be detected by a mammogram, but let’s set that aside.) If it has become metastatic in the first 27 cycles, it doesn’t matter if you find it because metastatic disease is fatal. If it becomes metastatic after 29 or more cycles, then again it doesn’t matter how you find it. So screening is only effective if metastasis occurs in a short period of a cancer’s existence. (And if we get to the point that we can cure metastatic disease, then it doesn’t matter when it’s found.) Back to the point of very early detection. If we find cancer when it’s only 1,000 or so cells, then we have no idea if we should have found it. Maybe it’s already metastatic, and finding it is no help. Or maybe it will never become metastatic, and finding it does only harm.

The 2009 United States Preventive Services Task Force has lots of very brave people given what they concluded. They were widely criticized for it, including by a noted radiologist in The Washington Post (Stein, 2009) for being “idiots.” They walked into a storm that they hadn’t anticipated would be as rough as it turned out.

**LI:** In a related vein, and quoting from [http://cisnet.cancer.gov/](http://cisnet.cancer.gov/), “The Cancer Intervention and Surveillance Modeling Network (CISNET) is a consortium of NCI-sponsored investigators that use statistical modeling to improve our understanding of cancer control interventions in prevention, screening and treatment and their effects on population trends in incidence and mortality. These models can be used to guide public health research and priorities.” As regards modeling breast cancer, you were the lead author of a paper published in the *New England Journal of Medicine* (Berry et al., 2005): “Effect of Screening and Adjuvant Therapy on Mortality from Breast Cancer.” Could you tell us a little about your work with the CISNET consortium? What were the unique contributions CISNET brought to the debate on screening mammography?

**Berry:** There has been substantial progress in reducing mortality to breast cancer in the U.S. (about 24% between 1990 and 2000) and more generally. What interventions were responsible? Was it screening mammography? Was it adjuvant therapy, tamox-
ifien and polychemotherapy? The paper that you mention reports on the efforts of seven modeling groups in addressing these questions. I think this paper was unique in reporting and comparing the efforts of multiple modeling groups in addressing the same questions and using the same data. The M. D. Anderson model (Berry et al., 2006) was one of the seven. It was the only model that took a Bayesian perspective. We got quantitatively different answers, but, well, in the words of a *New York Times* editorial: “What seems most important is that each team found at least some benefit from mammograms. The likelihood that they are beneficial seems a lot more solid today than it did four years ago, although the size of the benefit remains in dispute” (NYT Editorial, 2005). One of my favorite headlines was CNN’s: “Statistical Blitz Helps Pin Down Mammography Benefits” (Peck, 2005).

More recently, we Breast CISNETers were asked by the aforementioned 2009 USPSTF to model several matters related to screening mammography. Of course we accepted. And we were pleased that they used our results in their recommendations. Our paper (lead author, Jeanne Mandelblatt) was published as a companion article to their recommendations in the *Annals of Internal Medicine* (Mandelblatt et al., 2009). One set of issues the TF asked us to address was the relative benefits and risks of biennial versus annual screening for women aged 50 to 74. This important question was never addressed in the randomized screening trials. And comparing across trials doesn’t suggest increased benefit for more intensive screening. Our modeling concluded that there is little benefit and substantially greater risks associated with doubling the frequency of screening. The TF recommended biennial screening, modifying their earlier recommendation of annual screening.

The most controversial TF recommendation was “against routine screening mammography in women aged 40 to 49 years.” Our CISNET models had addressed this question. Our conclusions were consistent with the benefits seen in the randomized screening trials. We concluded that “Initiating biennial screening at age 40 years (vs. 50 years) reduced mortality by an additional 3% (range, 1% to 6%), consumed more resources, and yielded more false-positive results.”

A unique contribution of CISNET to the effectiveness of screening mammography was the role of adjuvant therapy. Most of the randomized trials were conducted in the era before the use of such therapy. Their relevance for today is questionable. Perhaps therapy makes up for any benefit seen with screening in the pre-adjuvant therapy era and so screening is now irrelevant. Or maybe being able to treat patients with anti-cancer drugs enhances the effectiveness of screening. In our models we found that the mortality benefits of screening and adjuvant therapy were essentially independent, and therefore additive.

**LI:** So what should statisticians be doing to help understand what evidence or lack of evidence there is regarding mammography?

**Berry:** Randomizing women to get screened versus not screened is now impossible. So modeling is the only recourse. And in the modeling process it is critical to assess uncertainty in the conclusions. I might add that the Bayesian approach is ideal for such assessment because it treats the model parameters as random variables.

**LI:** Mutations to BRCA1 and BRCA2 have been linked to breast and ovarian cancers. You have been quoted to say that “there is no BRCA3” meaning that no gene of the importance of the BRCA1 and 2 was going to be found in breast cancer. It seems that you have been right on! Lesser players have come up, but they have been shown to be minor. Can you tell us how you come up with such a prediction in those early days that proved to be so accurate? How did your clinical colleagues react then and now to that prediction?

**Berry:** In the 1990s, Duke had a SPORE in breast cancer. (SPOREs are Specialized Programs of Research Excellence. These are megagrants from the National Cancer Institute to teams of researchers working to translate basic science into clinical practice.) I was the PI of the Biostatistics Core of the SPORE. Giovanni Parmigiani and I had one of the projects in the SPORE. We planned to build a model to assess the role of family history in addressing whether an individual carried a mutation of BRCA1 or BRCA2 (Berry et al., 1997; Parmigiani, Berry and Aguilar, 1998). My attitude was that this was just the beginning, something that would lead us to doing really good things to help the other projects. And I thought it might provide a tool for the breast cancer research community. But I regarded it as just a start. It was to be the easy part. It was not quite so easy. We did it, mainly due to Giovanni’s ingenuity and diligence. We married Mendel and Bayes. The end result was BRCAPRO,2 which is now widely used

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2BRCAPRO is a statistical model, with associated software, for assessing the probability that an individual carries a germline deleterious mutation of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, based on family history of breast and ovarian cancer. Source: [http://astor.som.jhmi.edu/BayesMendel/brcapro.html](http://astor.som.jhmi.edu/BayesMendel/brcapro.html).
by genetics counselors. I don’t know where it stands in rankings of the contributions by the SPORE programs of the NCI, but it’s not at the bottom.

So to your question. Giovanni and I and others did a validation study of BRCAPRO (Berry et al., 2002b). We had family histories of about 300 individuals for whom we also had BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutation status, although we didn’t know all the possible mutations of these two genes. We assessed each individual’s BRCAPRO and compared it to that individual’s mutation status. We found an excellent fit. The proportion of carriers within narrow categories of BRCAPRO was about that value of BRCAPRO, with a slight amount of overestimation. So there was very little room for another gene. Such genes might well exist, but they had to be either very rare or have very low penetrance (few carriers getting cancer) or both. In any case, trying to find such a gene is like trying to find a needle in a haystack.

I told some BRCA3 seekers that they were wasting their time. This was over 10 years ago. I was pooh-poohed. They kept looking. But as you say, they’ve never found it.

**TI:** What do you see as the primary impact of your research and writings on Bayesian methods and decision analysis for health-related diagnostics (especially breast cancer) and for clinical trials of drugs and devices?

How has your work been contributing to the treatment of cancer patients and what do you think were your major breakthroughs? What do you hope can be achieved in the future in terms of treatment of such patients?

**Berry:** The impact I’ve had in the cancer world is only partly on the Bayesian side. When I moved from Minnesota to Duke in 1990, Steve George asked me to be the statistician on Breast Cancer Committee of the Cancer and Leukemia Group B (CALGB). This is a national oncology group that runs clinical trials and is funded by the National Cancer Institute. Getting my ideas accepted was hard. Craig Henderson chaired the committee. In our early meetings he would set me up and knock me down. He indicated that my ideas were radical and inconsistent with science. In a profile of me in *Science* magazine, Jennifer Couzin (Couzin, 2004) picks up this thread: “Berry would be the lead statistician for CALGB’s breast cancer studies. He was not greeted warmly. ‘I objected rather strenuously,’ recalls I. Craig Henderson, a breast oncologist at the University of California, San Francisco, who had heard that Bayesians were ‘loosey-goosey’ in adhering to the rules. Henderson subsequently had a change of heart: Last year, he was the first in a string of authors on one of the largest breast cancer studies Berry has designed, with more than 3,000 women. Its factorial design revealed that adding the drug paclitaxel (Taxol) to standard chemotherapy is beneficial, and that high doses of doxorubicin (Adriamycin), one of the most toxic chemotherapy agents, don’t fight cancer any more effectively than lower doses. This came as a great surprise, and some criticized the study for its unusual methodology.” Craig Henderson became one of my best friends. We learned from each other and we drifted toward a common view of medical research.

There is a moral to this story for young statisticians. Pay your dues. Learn the lay of the land before you set out to change it. Build your own credibility before you try to rebuild anything. Show that you understand and can deal with the status quo. However elegant are your ideas, innovations are viewed with suspicion.

The future of breast cancer treatment? We are getting better and better at understanding the disease, biologically and empirically. Regarding the latter, trials such as I-SPY2 will help us pair patient characteristics with appropriate therapies, including with no therapy. This is sometimes called “personalized medicine.”

**TI:** I-SPY and ISPY-2 are incredibly innovative clinical trials. Could you talk a little about what they are, their advantages and the challenges of implementing them? How are they seen by patient advocates, the pharmaceutical and medical device industry and by regulatory agencies?

**Berry:** When breast cancer is first diagnosed, the tumor is usually removed and the patient is given systemic hormone therapy and/or chemotherapy. The I-SPY trials are built on a platform of neo-adjuvant treatment in which the order is reversed. The tumor is left in the breast and systemic therapy is delivered, for 6 months or so, before the tumor is removed. Actually, the tumor may be gone, having been eliminated by the therapy. That is the endpoint of the I-SPY trials—the presence or not of tumor at surgery.

I-SPY2 is adaptive in the sense that we use accumulating information to guide the treatment of patients in the trial. But we don’t wait for 6 months to get information about how well the patient is doing. We use longitudinal modeling of tumor burden based on breast imaging with MRIs.

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3The I-SPY project is a national study to identify biomarkers predictive of response to breast cancer therapy. [Source: http://tr.nci.nih.gov/Ispy].
I-SPY2 is a phase II drug screening trial. Actually, it’s more a process than a trial. We’re starting with five experimental therapies plus control. For the purposes of the design and for assigning treatment we categorize breast cancer into 8 biomarker subtypes. Of the 255 combinations of the 8 biomarker subtypes we’ve identified 10 “biomarker signatures” that make biological sense and have marketing relevance. We use adaptive randomization, assigning a patient with higher probabilities to better performing therapies for that patient’s subtype. This moves better performing therapies through the process more quickly, as well as providing better therapy to trial participants.

Traditional clinical trials are discrete entities. They live like frogs on their private lily pads. Their precise role in drug development must be better defined. I sometimes ask investigators, “So what will you do next depending on the results of your trial?” You’d be surprised at the muddled answers. A result is that phase III oncology drug trials fail between 60 and 70 percent of the time.

Perhaps it’s just the Bayesian in me, but I think a trial should have a theme, a long-term outlook, a strategy. Its design should be viewed as the next action in a bigger decision problem. Think of a game of chess. The best chess players make moves in the middle game while looking forward to the end game. The entire focus of I-SPY2 is on what comes next: phase III. For each therapy we continually ask what population of patients (defined by biomarker signature)—if any!—would be most appropriate in a small, focused phase III trial. So we consider 10 different phase III trials, one for each prospectively defined signature. The answers evolve over time, until the therapy is ready to move to phase III or be abandoned for futility. Graduation to phase III is based on current (Bayesian) predictive probabilities of success in a small phase III trial, focusing on the ideal biomarker signatures.

Quite obviously, in view of the various multiplicities, false positives abound. Beating them down requires somewhat larger sample size than is traditional: a maximum of 120 patients per treatment arm, although the expected sample size is substantially less. We show by simulations that we control Type I error rates.

Our approach in I-SPY2 will lead others to design better, more informative, early phase trials and greatly reduce the failure rate of phase III trials ... and treat patients better in the process. This is already happening, despite the fact that I-SPY2 has just started to accrue patients.

The principal investigator of both I-SPY trials is Laura Esserman of the University of California at San Francisco. Without her innovative ideas and uninhibited approach to clinical research, these trials would never have existed.

**TI:** Your current department has been largely influenced by your views and, in fact, most clinical trials designed at M.D. Anderson have Bayesian designs. However, Bayesian designs are not widespread in other research/university hospitals. In your view, what should be done so that Bayesian designs would have wider acceptance? What do you see as the current major obstacle to the wide use of Bayesian clinical trials?

**Berry:** Actually, not quite “most,” but close to half the trials we design are Bayesian. The major obstacle outside of M. D. Anderson is the lack of Bayesian statisticians who have built up the credibility that I mentioned earlier, and who understand the pitfalls of taking the Bayesian approach in clinical trials. Graduates of our best “Bayesian schools” may be great at analysis but some don’t have a clue about experimental design. And even if they’ve studied experimental design, they have no understanding of clinical trials. At M. D. Anderson, when we tell an investigator that the Bayesian perspective is ideally suited for his or her trial, there is no pushback. They accept that we know what we’re doing and they trust us. That is not a standard reaction elsewhere. And, regrettably, I’m happy for that! I tell you quite candidly that there are very few Bayesians outside of M. D. Anderson and Berry Consultants that I would trust to design a clinical trial, including some who have designed clinical trials! That must change. It can change only through education and better, apprenticeships. Unfortunately, such change is slow.

**LI:** You have traveled around the world to advocate for Bayesian designs and have even been tagged “The Bayesian Tsunami.” Could you tell us a little bit about that story? How do you see the propagation of the Bayesian ideas around the world?

**Berry:** The tsunami title comes from the front-page article of a pharmaceutical newsletter in Japan, with my photo, and some words that I can’t read. So I asked my Japanese friends to translate. It says something about the coming Bayesian tsunami in clinical trials. But there’s actually not much of a Bayesian tsunami in Japan. I am going there next month for a meeting on breast cancer to talk about innovative designs in cancer. The circumstance is a bit like Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) at the FDA in the late 1990s in that they started to get serious...
about science at the same time that they started getting serious about efficiency in product development. They are open minded. There is a famous biostatistician there named Ohashi who is very interested in Bayesian things, but it’s a stretch to say they are in the Bayesian camp. They are interested, but they have little experience. Next month I’m also going to Brussels and London to give talks about Bayesian adaptive designs. And we have frequent visitors to M. D. Anderson from around the world with the goal of learning what we do.

But change is hard. Your native country is an example. Scott and I designed an international trial for a major pharmaceutical company. Bayesian approach. Adaptive throughout, including morphing into a confirmatory stage. Happily, most sites around the world signed on. But not the site in Brazil. They said they couldn’t accept a design that they didn’t understand.

**TI:** You have held tenured positions at University of Minnesota, Duke and M. D. Anderson. You have worked with numerous government groups and pharmaceutical companies. Your career has taken you across institutions spanning academics, government, and industry. How important has the ability to navigate across these boundaries been to the success of your career?

**Berry:** It’s better to be lucky than good. Going back to the Task Force, I ask people a thought question. It’s obvious that politicians don’t understand science. The U.S. Senate passed a resolution after the Consensus conference on mammographic screening in 1997, a strange resolution, seeming to say that mammography will be effective, as though their law-making ability extends to amending the laws of nature! (Milton Berle said it: “You can lead a man to Congress but you cannot make him think!”) This is the resolution that I mentioned earlier, the one that passed 98 to 0. The Senate insisted that the NCI recommend screening to women in their 40s. Senator Arlen Specter told the director of the NCI that if they wanted funding for the next year they would recommend mammography screening for women in their 40s. Since NCI wanted to be funded they made the recommendation. The Task Force, on the other hand, consisted of people who were adept at science, but who were politically naïve, and who stepped into a political morass. So here’s the thought question: Are politicians more ignorant about science than scientists are about politics?

I’m at least as politically naïve as the Task Force. Regarding the boundaries you mention, I’ve not navigated them at all well. I’ve said things—especially when I was young and green—that made my subsequent challenges even more difficult. Somehow, being right was enough when I was young, even if no one paid any heed. But I was lucky, including by outliving some of my colleagues. And with time I became more pragmatic, more politic. I want to change the world, but to the extent I’ve been successful, it’s more luck than planning.

**DS:** How do we improve as a profession doing what you do so naturally, that is, bringing science to the service of society? You tell us you’ve been able to do this by luck, but is there anything we can do in training statisticians to make that luck happen more often?

**Berry:** I tell my young faculty to worry about big questions, those important to society. It can be in physics, biology, medicine, paleontology (one of my favorites is “what killed the dinosaurs?”). Study it. Assess the uncertainties. Critique the available evidence. Tie yourself to some smart people in the subject matter. Go public. And work hard to state your conclusions concisely and with as few words as possible.

When I became appalled at the sorry science behind the anti-doping crusade in sports I wrote a commentary about it that was published in *Nature* (Berry, 2008). It created a stir. Clearly I was lucky that *Nature* published the piece. I attribute some of this to my fussiness. I revise and revise. I beat on every word to see if I can make it give up the ghost. And I try to use language that resonates. I’m not necessarily good at it, but only hard work has a chance of paying off. Unless you’re Mozart (remember Salieri’s marvel in “Amadeus” at the lack of erasures in Mozart’s musical scores, just as if he had taken down “dictation from God?”) your unadulterated first version will be eminently forgettable.

**DS:** Where do you see Bayesian statistics heading?

**Berry:** The future is bright. The spirit of ecumenism is pervasive in modern statistics circles. In tomorrow’s ENAR presentation Janet Wittes is going to talk about the marriage between Bayesians and frequentists. As I get older I realize that having impact means taking small steps. You can’t sell the whole thing at once. Dalene and I have written about a fully Bayesian approach complete with decision analysis (Berry and Stangl, 1996; Stangl and Berry, 2000). The statistics world will one day be ready for it, but it’s not now, at least not on a broad basis. Instead, at least in biostatistics, we Bayesians do things that fit into and partially emulate the frequentist paradigm. We achieve some benefits from the Bayesian perspective, but many others are still on the horizon. Meanwhile, we have our foot in the door. As the ideas become acceptable and more widely
understood, it will become clearer to others whether we are adding something to the world, including to the frequentist world. For example, I consider Type I error rates to be essential in a regulatory setting. I see even more compromise in the immediate future, and like Janet I see marriage. If James Carville and Mary Matalin can marry, given their very different political perspectives, it’s a cakewalk for Bayesians and frequentists.

Another reason the future looks bright. In one of my examples in tomorrow’s talk, choosing sample size of a clinical trial, I argue against the notion that one size fits all. I rail against the consulting statistician who says, okay, in your two-armed trial you aim to reduce hazard by 25%, your Type I error rate is 5%, two-sided, 80% power, control median time to event is 6 months, you want to accrue for 3 years and follow patients for an additional year, so you need about 12 patients per month or 432 in total. Where are the questions about the disease? About its prevalence? What about the implications of what will be learned from the trial? The disease may be a rare pediatric cancer and there may not be 432 patients in the world. Good frequentist statisticians ask these questions and they learn as much as possible about the disease. They’ll come up with a doable design. But they do it in spite of their philosophy and with little help from it. The fully Bayesian approach provides a formalism for addressing all such questions. Pediatric cancer may be the ideal prototype for developing this formalism in clinical research.

**DS:** Thinking about your professional life, what have been the most rewarding moments/experiences?

**Berry:** Teaching. Lurdes. Seeing former students and colleagues do good things and achieve recognition. But not just rewards from teaching or mentoring graduate students. In classes, seeing light bulbs flash on. Listening to my former students and colleagues make statements, use arguments, etc., that I recognize having said myself. It’s such a compliment. I smile . . . and my shirt buttons pop! I’ve had some success affecting the way people outside of academia think about things, but it’s really teaching and mentoring that are the most rewarding.

**DS:** For what would you most like to be remembered?

**Berry:** That’s a hard question. On the Bayesian side, I hope 50 years from now, people will look back and say this guy had something to do with how we think today. He put some teeth into the elegant jaws of the Bayesian paradigm. On the biostatistical/medical side, I’d like to be thought of as having improved the lives of thousands of patients with what were once regarded to be lunatic ideas about clinical research.

**DS:** Are there any other topics you would like to touch upon?

**Berry:** I need to get on my bicycle and think. But since I’m not on my bicycle I can’t think of any.

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