Primal Scene in the Mirror—the Fate of Narcissus

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In Ovid’s story Cephisus, the river-god, forces the beautiful nymph, Liriope into love-making under the waves. She gets pregnant and gives birth to Narcissus. The mother asks seer Tiresias if her son will live to a full age; his answer is “If he doesn’t discover himself”. Narcissus reaching a fountain to drink, the mirror of the water enchants him. From this dramatic moment he cannot leave the spring. Narcissus is notable to grasp why he cannot reach the desperately desired image. In the mirror of the water he does not only see his own figure but in the waves he is confronted with the primal scene repeatedly. We argue that the image in the water reflects the coitus of his parents. It terrifies him while simultaneously he becomes envious. His discovery leads him to death. The paper is based on dreams and clinical material of a psychoanalytical case. Our concept is in accord with some of the insights about narcissism of Lacan, Kohut, and Kernberg.

Keywords: myth of Narcissus, primal scene, mirror, narcissism, psychoanalysis

The Story

In Ovid’s story Cephisus, the river-god, forces the beautiful nymph, Liriope into love-making under the waves. She gets pregnant and gives birth to Narcissus. Later the mother asks seer Tiresias if her son will live to a full age. Tiresias’s answer is yes “If he doesn’t discover himself”. The significance of the seer’s answer was Ovid’s ironical reversal of the classic Greek ideal, “know yourself” inscribed on the temple in Delphi.

The beautiful youth has many suitors, men, women, water, and mountain nymphs. He rebuffs the mall. One of the dejected suitors prayed to Nemesis, the goddess of vengeance, imploring her to afflict Narcissus with the pain he had caused those who loved him. Nemesis granted the wish. Among those enflamed by love for Narcissus was the unhappy nymph Echo. While Jupiter was dallying with nymphs, Juno driven by jealousy went looking for him. Echo detained her with stories long enough for Jupiter to escape. As a punishment Juno condemned her to be unable to converse, never to be able to utter the first word, but also never able to remain silent when someone else was talking. The nymph has some residual power to decide where she would begin to echo. She uses this power to communicate her feelings. She repeats only what she wishes to communicate.

Narcissus reaching a fountain to drink, the mirror of the water enchants him. From this dramatic moment he cannot leave the spring. He looks into the smooth and silvery water, and while he quenches his thirst, a new thirst seize him, for now he is smitten by love for the image that stares at him from the water. At first, he does not recognize the image as his own. Then comes the moment of truth: “I am him”. Narcissus is notable to grasp why he cannot reach the desperately desired image. In the mirror of the water he does not only see his own figure but in the waves he is confronted with the primal scene repeatedly. We argue that the image in the water

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reflects the coitus of his parents. It terrifies him while at the same time carried away by envy. His discovery leads him to his death. He cannot tear himself away and succumbs to the fire that consumes. Even at the banks of the Styx (the river that in Greek mythology segregates the dead and is their abode), he gazes into the water at his own image. Before he dies, Echo once more appears to him, but is unable to tear him away from his image. When those who loved him wish to give Narcissus a proper burial, they discover that a flower with a saffron colored rim and white petals had appeared on the spot where he died.

**The Conceptual Basis of Narcissism in Freud’s Psychopathology**

According to Freud’s (1914) theory about primary narcissism

at the same time as the ego can invest some of its libido to objects, another portion of this original libidinal cathexis fundamentally persist in the ego and is related to the object cathexes much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out. (p. 75)

Because of the persistence of this original narcissistic investment, the pseudopodia can be drawn back again from objects and reinvested in the ego (as a form of secondary narcissism) whenever excessive danger or disappointment is experienced with objects in the external world. Freud struggles to conceptualise the ego as subject and the ego as object. The necessity arise urges our mental apparatus to pass on beyond the limits of narcissism and to attach the libido to objects. “The cathexis of the ego with libido exceeds a certain limit. A strong egoism is a protection against disease, but in the last resort we must begin to love in order that we may not fall ill” (p. 66).

Freud (1917) observes in melancholia that

the object choice has been effected on a narcissistic basis, so that the object-cathexis, when obstacles come in its way, can regress to narcissism. The narcissistic identification with the object then becomes a substitute for the erotic cathexis, the result of which is that in spite of the conflict with the loved person the love-relation need not be given up. The substitution of identification for object-love is an important mechanism in the narcissistic affections. It represents a regression from one type of object choice to original narcissism. (p. 258)

Freud abandons the concept of primary narcissism in his essay “Ego and the Id” (1923) arguing that the id must be seen as the initial reservoir of libido from which cathexes can be sent out to objects. The ego is formed by loss of intensely loved objects and by identifying with and taking in the lost objects as part of oneself. “The character of the ego is a precipitate of the abandoned object-cathexes, it contains the history of these object-choices” (p. 29). This way “the narcissism of the ego is a secondary one, which has been withdrawn from objects” (p. 55). Freud (1923) suggests that

transformation of object libido...into narcissistic libido which thus takes place (the ego assuming the features of the object in order to substitute it after the id’s loss) obviously implies an abandonment of sexual aims, a desexualisation—a kind of sublimation, therefore. (p. 30)

And “the ego is working in opposition to the purposes of Eros and placing itself at the service of the opposing instinctual impulses” (p. 46).

Since the time of Freud’s last theory of drives, we have had to consider the possibility of a dual narcissism: a positive narcissism, whose aim is to reach unity, a narcissism aiming at oneness—the cathexis of the self being fed, at least partly, at the expense of object cathexis; and a negative narcissism, which strives toward the zero level, aiming at nothingness and moving toward psychic death (Green, 2002).
Narcissism and the Oedipal Situation

Kohut (1977) claims narcissism is the result of early damaging effects, insufficient relationships embedding in our self. Narcissism is fostered by empathy deprived, detached self-objects unresponsive to the unfolding subjectivity. He asserts that behind some sexual traumas in early life, e.g., castration anxiety, being part of the oedipal situation, hides a fear of the cold, unempathic, aloof, sometimes concealed psychotic, and in any case, psychologically distorted self-object. We might suppose thus that Kohut’s ideas are in accord with the concept of the connection between the early sexual traumas, experiences or fantasies of the primal scene understood as “the oedipal drama at the point of highest intensity” as Blum (1979) formulated and narcissism.

In Kohut’s (1977) view, the major cause of pathology is the disruption of the mother-infant tie. When the self-object tie is destroyed precipitately, prior to the development of a cohesive self, the infant experiences the loss of the mother as a break. He describes the self-pathologies which arise from this primary defect in the child’s archaic experiences in terms of “a nameless preverbal depression” and a “sense of deadness”. In his psychology, the overriding etiological factor in the disorders of the self—the psychotic, borderline and narcissistic conditions—is failure in empathy, as this is manifested in the mirroring responses of the mother. In analysis, this genetic factor may be offset by the “introspective-empathic” stance of the analyst.

Kernberg (1974) claims that narcissism classified as a borderline level character pathology sprung from aggression, as Narcissus also comes from violence, a violent sexual act and ends his life in a self-destructive move. According to Kernberg, splitting is a prevalent defense mechanism in narcissism, resulting in disintegration of the early internalized object-relations. These primitive internalised object relations and related instincts can be easily reactivated due to the disintegration of the narcissistic inner world. The bad-object representations of early pregenital conflicts might seem overwhelmingly powerful and significant to the individual due to the lack of integration with the idealised or positive contents.

Even Kernberg (1974) describes how such patients present a great need to be loved and to be admired by others, and present an apparent contradiction between a very inflated concept of themselves and an inordinate need for tribute from others. Such persons feel best when the inflated self concept is matched by the external world. However, when the need to be loved and admired is not met, the person is enraged and may turn away in cold indifference. Kernberg’s observation suggests that narcissistic indifference represents a defence against relational issues rather than the repetition of a primary state of withdrawal.

Rosenfeld (1964) claims that primary narcissism may be incorporated into object-relations theory through the concepts of infantile omnipotence and part object-relations. For example,

The object, usually a part-object, the breast, may be omnipotently incorporated, which implies that it is treated as the infant’s possession; or the mother or breast are used as containers into which are omnipotently projected the parts of the self which are felt to be undesirable as they cause pain or anxiety. (p. 333)

In Rosenfeld’s view, the process of identification is explained in terms of the mechanisms of projection and introjection. These two mechanisms illustrate a model of primitive object-relations in which relating is conceived in terms of evacuation or incorporation—putting into others or taking into ourselves; they omit the connotations of imitating, portraying, representing as well as the transitional nature of identification in which the subject identifies in turns with different figures who are themselves related to each other. Rosenfeld states that object-relations of a narcissistic type are defensive against separateness. Indeed, the mechanisms of introjection and projection already presuppose some self-object differentiation. The acknowledgment of
separateness immediately evokes feelings of dependence on the other person which further elicit feelings of anxiety and envy. A narcissistic object-relationship obviates both aggression and envy, since feelings of dependence and anxiety are denied through the illusion of omnipotence.

Winnicott (1958) has made the point that, in the earliest days and weeks of life, the infant is also in a state of near-absolute dependence, since he has little notion of separateness. These contrary attributions may be reconciled in the commonly held hypothesis that infantile omnipotence is sometimes a defence against the impotent state of absolute dependence.

The Primal Scene Phenomenon

Freud (1908) believed that the observation of parental intercourse could be traumatic and that the child inevitably conceives of the sexual act as sadistic.

In many marriages the wife does in fact recoil from her husband’s embraces, which bring her no pleasure, but the risk of a fresh pregnancy. And so the child who is believed to be asleep (or who is pretending to be asleep) may receive an impression from his mother which he can only interpret as meaning that she is defending herself against an act of violence. At other times the whole marriage offers an observant child the spectacle of an unceasing quarrel, expressed in loud words and unfriendly gestures; so that he need not be surprised if the quarrel is carried on at night as well, and finally settled by the same method which he himself is accustomed to use in his relations with his brothers and sisters or playmates. Moreover, if the child discovers spots of blood in his mother’s bed or on her underclothes, he regards it as a confirmation of his view. (pp. 220-221)

The child’s character is shaped on the basis of identifications formed with one or both participants in the primal scene. Freud (1918) argued that even if the child did not actually witness the primal scene, he or she would develop and elaborate primal phantasies of the scene derived from hereditary phylogenetic influences. One of the difficulties with the concept of the primal scene is that its meaning and referents are unclear. It sometimes refers to the actual observation of parental sexual intercourse, sometimes to the phantasy of parental sexual intercourse, and sometimes to the wide area of the child’s knowledge and phantasy regarding sexuality. As Blum (1979) has noted, just as the primal scene inevitably elicits reactions of rejection, exclusion, and intrusion on a personal level, so too, on a theoretical level, there is confusion about the scope and boundaries of the concept. McDougall (1980) uses the term primal scene “to connote the child’s total store of unconscious knowledge and personal mythology concerning the human sexual relation, particularly that of his parents” (p. 56).

The meaning and function of the primal scene certainly concerns sexuality, but it also concerns much more. The primal scene is one of the primary psychic organizers linking narcissism and object relations (Ikonen & Rechardt, 1984). The child wishes to share in and participate in the world of the adults. The child’s wish to be included represents both a wish for relationship with the parents (an object-relational need) and an attempt to maintain self-esteem (a narcissistic need). It is both a narcissistic injury to be excluded from the couple’s activities and a relational deprivation in being cast out of the parents’ interaction.

In the classical psychoanalytic tradition, the primal scene is thought of as “the quintessential oedipal drama” (Blum, 1979), although the child may regressively experience the primal scene along preoedipal lines. Therefore, the primal scene is thought of as involving three people: the mother, the father, and the child in an interaction of three whole objects, and it is thought to involve genital sexuality. In contrast, for Klein (1928) the oedipal situation begins in relation to part-objects and its content is pregenital. In this way Kleinian theory
relates oedipal issues and whole-object relations to pregenital issues and to part-object relations. Although he does not directly refer to Klein’s notion of the combined parent figure, Ogden (1989) has elaborated a point of view regarding the primal scene that is based on Kleinian theory. Ogden proposes that primal scene phantasies do not simply express the highly charged sexual and aggressive aspects of parental intercourse. Rather, primal scene phantasies are pivotal organizers of internal and external object relations. Ogden proposes a developmental line of primal scene phantasy in which there are early preoedipal phantasies of part-objects engaged in mysterious sexuality intermingled with battle and violence. For Ogden, these primitive primal scene phantasies operate in the paranoid-schizoid mode, and therefore the observing child has no reflective awareness. The child is caught up in the scene but has little sense of being removed from it. The child in this mode is unable to see himself or herself as the author or interpreter of his or her own experience, and therefore thoughts and feelings seem just to happen to the child, with symbols being experienced concretely.

Ogden (1989) contrasts this early and primitive version of the primal scene (which is equivalent to Klein’s concept of the combined parent figure) with the developmentally later and more differentiated version of the primal scene. The latter occurs in the context of the depressive position. In this mode, the child is aware of herself or himself as a separate subject in interaction with whole and external objects. The achievement of whole-object relations, and the concomitant establishment of the individual’s subjectivity, allows for the experience of the primal scene on the oedipal level. Now the child is an interpreting subject in a world of whole-objects (separate persons with their own subjectivities); the child can form identifications with each parent and also take each parent as a love object. In the depressive mode, the child can maintain awareness of his or her own subjectivity and of these parateness of the other; he or she maintains a symbolic relation with the primal scene and is therefore not threatened with merger and the loss of identity.

**Case Vignette: Alexander’s Dreams**

The earliest infantile reaction to the primal scene may be due to its strangeness and unfamiliarity, as the infant is used to seeing the parents in a totally different and usually responsive position. This may be complicated by a feeling of loneliness if there is no parental response to the infant’s crying. At least in the latter half of the first year, the infant may show a primitive pregenital type of envy or jealousy if he becomes aware that the parents are in close bodily contact of which he is deprived. Or he may react with fear. The former reaction is not unlike what some pets show when a new baby is being fondled while they are neglected. This infantile jealousy may lead to exhaustion from crying or the infant may turn his attention to substitute, autoerotic comforts, such as sucking his hand or whatever happens to be nearby. In such a situation, the denial of the external stimulation may relieve the inner pain of jealousy. This unrelieved arousal of primitive jealousy, combined with loneliness and helplessness, may be the dominant cause of denial of the primal scene or related sexual situations, sometimes giving rise to negative hallucinations (Greenacre, 1973).

Alexander is a music teacher in his thirties; he originally sought help because of his panic disorder and chaotic attachments. In the initial stage of his analysis his strong panic attacks abated, but his relationship issues persisted, and he could either give up his drinking habit. Separation anxiety and wish for independence are equally characteristic of him. He wants to achieve a greater emotional intimacy with his girlfriend but feels threatened by closeness and afraid of being engulfed. He often regulates his psychic tension with alcohol. He was the first and long waited child of his parents; he has a two years younger sister. He lost his father at the age...
of 16, whom died of alcohol induced liver failure. Alexander was always closely connected to his mother. The therapist appeared in the transference as a soothing father figure. Related to Alexander first the author would like to present a transference momentums. The dream contains the scene duplicatedly, related to a landscape, the fields of the mother and related to an abduction of the dreamer’s lover.

My analyst is taking me in his car between my childhood hometown and a neighboring village. Black cars are following us, mafios are sitting in them, and they have taken my girlfriend in captivity. The lines of black cars behind us are menacing. We arrive in the village, stopping in front of the church and I get out from the car.

The landscape (field, plough-field, meadow) in the dream symbolises the body of the mother; the line of the black cars alludes to the intrusive presence of the father. The abduction refers to the violent dramatics of the parental intercourse. The figure of the therapist is there to help to overcome the numbness of the dreamer. The church symbolises Alexander’s religious convictions.

Turning to another dream of Alexander’s, we feature an image which might be close to a possible memory of a real childhood experience of the primal scene. Alexander previously mentioned that he and his sister slept in the same room with his parents until he turned 10 year old.

We are at home with my sister in our childhood house. We look out the window, staring at the sky. We hear tantalizing sounds and see a rocket, a bomb approaching and falling down. It crashes to earth not far from us. I did not hear the explosion though and woke up at this point.

The flawless musical performance is a significant source of narcissistic charge for him; he handles criticism of flawlessness with desperation, as criticism evokes an elemental sense of vulnerability. Music as Kernberg hints might have been an ideal and mysterious companion, with whom narcissistic patients might strengthen a kind of faint belief in trust and goodness.

A recurrent motive of the therapy is Schubert’s song inspired the poem Erlkönig of Goethe (1782/2015). Goethe’s poem tells of a little boy pursued by a monster, the Erlkönig or elfking. The exact Danish etymology of the word suggests old woman or menacing woman as the root. The little boy begs his father for help—to be saved from the Erlkönig. The father cannot perceive the threat (perhaps because he is drunk or dead) and therefore cannot comply. In the end, the boy lies dead in his father’s arms, a victim of Erlkönig—or, in terms of this paper’s theme, a victim of the intensive nearness of the mother and the unresolved primal scene fantasies.

The tragic situation of the poem is similar to the transference drama of the analysis, as it represents the fear of Alexander, the fear of narcissus’s fate: that nobody, neither his therapist is able to rescue him from death, a form of final castration. We previously referred to Freud’s considerations about the primal scene and the fear of castration revived by it, supporting our thoughts. The situation of the ballad could be a primal scene stage also. The seductive death is similar to the overstimulating mother and we have on the other side a passive, powerless father. The child is not capable to live in this triangle.

The Mirror Phenomenon

The image in the mirror, with which the infant identifies, affords an imaginary sense of unity and anticipated bodily mastery—witness the jubilation expressed by the child when it discovers its own reflection in a mirror, an experience limited to the higher primates but one which the chimpanzee and orangutan soon tire of. Only the human child continues to delight in observing its repeated motoric expressions in front of a mirror. This reflected human form, which it identifies as itself, is then idealized and forms the basis for all subsequent
identifications (Muller, 1982).

More specifically, in his introduction of the mirror stage, Lacan (1977) draws on Freud’s theory of biological prematurity, so as to trace the ego’s origins to the manic attempt to deny infantile helplessness. He locates that helplessness in the fragmented and unintegrated state of the child’s bodily experience—what he calls “the body in bits and pieces”—results from its “anatomical incompleteness” and manifests itself in motor uncoordination of the neo-natal month. During the mirror stage, the child anticipates a future situation in which its helplessness would have been overcome. In contradiction to its actually fragmented and uncoordinated state, in the mirror—or, more precisely, in the mirroring experience—the child becomes aware of its own body as a Gestalt. The mirror image is held together; it can come and go with a slight change of the infant’s position and the mastery of its image fills it with triumph and joy. The ego is constituted, in turn, through the identification with this unified image. Lacan (1977) discards in his account of the formation of the ego in the mirror stage. Once the production of the ego in the mirror begins, there is no way back to the id and the historical world and consciousness, or self-consciousness, is radically severed from its somatic origins and empirical history. The only way the id (as the representative of the soma) and the historical world can establish their presence is by violently and traumatically attacking the totalitarian narcissistic structure of the ego. But if we do not want to lose our hope for future happiness, a sharp break between these realms should not be established; they must be neither rendered identical nor absolutely severed.

The fact that the mother of Narcissus was the water nymph Leirope has suggested to Joyce McDougall (1980) that the pond into which he is gazing in vain represents the non-responsive mother. Her unresponsiveness has resulted in a deficiency in narcissism and he has to learn to love himself before he can love another. The fable represents a self-cure that has failed.

Primal Scene as Oedipal Drama

The primal-scene configuration is not only used to represent the copulating parents but is given regressive meanings as well. Such expanding applications of the term have resulted in conceptual confusion and raised new questions about the meaning of the term and the relation of the primal scene to trauma and psychopathology. Because of the resultant dilution of the concept, it is advisable to restrict the scope of the term primal-scene fantasy to the derivatives of the oedipal conflict. These derivatives are far ranging and included in the primal-scene imagery may be fantasies of castration or sadomasochistic concepts of intercourse (Blum & Isay, 1978). We should consider that the primal scene trauma itself may be elaborated into a fantasy that acquires phase-specific meanings or it may be incorporated into a screen memory or itself may become a screen for other trauma. It is important to recognize that primal-scene fantasy is associated with the oedipal stage, while primal-scene exposure may occur at any time.

Freud (1910) delineated the influence of the primal scene on sexual preference and object choice and the need of the child to disavow knowledge of parental intercourse in order to safe guard the idealization of the parents. We are reminded of the Biblical meaning of “knowing” and of the child’s not “knowing”, contrasting with the child’s feeling of parental deception and infidelity in his or her exclusion from the primal scene. Defensive falsification by the child and the parents fosters fabrication and idealization and is related to fantasies of the virgin mother and the immaculate conception.

Klein (1926) suggests that the fundamental thing, however, and the criterion of all later capacity for adaptation to reality is the degree in which they are able to tolerate the deprivations that result from the oedipal
situation. The parental relationship starts to take place at a time when the individual has not established a securely based maternal object; the Oedipus situation appears in analysis only in primitive form and is not immediately recognizable as the classical Oedipus complex. An illusional oedipal configuration is formed as a defensive organization in order to deny the psychic reality of the parental relationship. The primal family triangle provides the child with two links connecting him separately with each parent and confronts him with the link between them which excludes him. The oedipal situation begins with the child’s recognition of the parents’ relationship. In severe narcistic disorders development founders at this point, and the Oedipus complex does not appear in recognizable classical form in the psychotherapy or in analysis. The failure to internalize a recognizable oedipal triangle results in a failure to integrate observation and experience (Britton, 1989).

Observed and imagined events take place in a world conceived of as continuous in space and time, and given structure by the oedipal configuration. The capacity to envisage a benign parental relationship influences the development of a space outside the self capable of being observed and thought about, which provides the basis for a belief in a secure and stable world.

Fear of Castration, Exclusion of the Father, and Primal Scene

Exposure to the primal scene at 18 months of age could be understood as causing a disturbance of the rapprochement phase, with aggravation of rapprochement conflict and crisis tendencies. As we now know, children have begun to differentiate between the sexes by this time and to show the pre-curors of castration reactions (Blum, 1979). However, castration anxiety would be fused with the crucial separation anxiety of this infantile period. The dominant danger situations described by Freud, the loss of the object and of the object’s love, with parallel fears of loss of self and ego integration, represent the major threats. The primal scene would then be a relatively nonspecific trauma impeding separation-individuation, but it could also predispose the infant to anal fixation and to heightened castration anxiety and narcissistic injury.

Knafo and Feiner (1996) argue that primal scene fantasies contribute significantly to the child’s blue print for internalized object relations. According to this we may suppose that narcissistic patients’ possible primal scene experiences or fantasies can result in compelling negative, aggression-laden representations that easily revive. We argue that in the myth of Narcissus at the location of his conception this revival might take place in the form of a vision of his violent origin, the reviving scene resulting in further destruction.

In his paper on “Negation” (1925a) Freud discussed how thinking is an embodied mental process that takes place within a body. Thoughts are initially as simulated to physical things, and then to a physical activity. Bringing things inside the body is at the origin of assent; expelling them from the body is the origin of denial. We examined the way in which the patient externalised in the transference such an archaic system of representations in which drinking had the function of allowing him to believe that he had created a space in which he survived in the face of a primal scene that was experienced as space obliterating, claustrophobic, and thus terrifying.

These ideas link with Glasser’s (1986) notion of a “core complex” that “includes an intense longing for indissoluble union with the object”, which leaves the individual, at the same time, with a fear of being merged and annihilated. In the pervert, Glasser adds, the father is emotionally, if not geographically, absent. We have suggested that for Narcissus the core phantasy is that the primal scene is an act of violence and that the relationship to the pre-oedipal mother is also engulfing and violent.

Drinking had the function of allowing Alexander to believe that he had created a space in which he could
survive. This is derived from a phantasy of a devouring and engulfing mother-infant relationship, locked in a primal scene that gives origin to himself and from which the father is excluded. Drinking is an attempt to create a space away from this terrifying object. This silent violence against himself is a communication about his belief systems about himself, about his relationships with others and about his origins. The violent actor phantasy tells a story, which is his personal myth of creation and contains both pre-oedipal and distorted oedipal theories.

**Conclusion**

Besides the pathological consequences of the primal scene, Freud (1925b) also commented upon its arousing, stimulating influence on the child’s entire sexual development. The child’s curiosity, affective development, and intellectual activity could be stimulated. The developmental role of childhood and adolescent masturbation with primal scene fantasy should be considered in relation to sex role rehearsal, consolidation of identification systems and sexual identity, preparation for adult object choice and relationship, and motivation for parenthood. Fantasy may serve as trial action and as a means of experimental adaptation, as well as serving the usual function of defense and symbolic gratification. The universal fantasy of the primal scene could represent to oedipal conflicts and solutions; the fantasy itself, in the context of age appropriate development and structure, is not necessarily a pathogenic influence. The child projects his or her own impulses onto the copulating parents or onto other dimensions of the parental relationship. The normal, expectable primal scene fantasies are created by the child and influenced by the actual relationships and unconscious communications of the parents. The fantasy will represent infantile gratifications on various levels and defend against dangers of castration, separation, etc., while castrating and separating the parents.

We suggest that with the working through of the Oedipus complex the patient internalizes a model of intercourse (an internal primal scene) that is experienced as a creative activity. When the healthy, creative, and loving aspects of the primal scene outweigh its aggressive, hateful, and frightening dimensions, and when this is internalized as a structure, this serves as a model of identification for allowing thoughts and ideas, as well as thoughts and feelings, to interact in a kind of healthy, fruitful, and creative intercourse.

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