Wireless Secrecy in Cellular Systems with Infrastructure–Aided Cooperation

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Abstract

In cellular systems, confidentiality of uplink transmission with respect to eavesdropping terminals can be ensured by creating intentional interference via scheduling of concurrent downlink transmissions. In this paper, this basic idea is explored from an information-theoretic standpoint by focusing on a two-cell scenario where the involved base stations are connected via a finite-capacity backbone link. A number of transmission strategies are considered that aim at improving uplink confidentiality under constraints on the downlink rate that acts as an interfering signal. The strategies differ mainly in the way the backbone link is exploited by the cooperating downlink- to the uplink-operated base stations. Achievable rates are derived for both the Gaussian (unfaded) and the fading cases, under different assumptions on the channel state information available at different nodes. Numerical results are also provided to corroborate the analysis. Overall, the analysis reveals that a combination of scheduling and base station cooperation is a promising means to improve transmission confidentiality in cellular systems.

I. INTRODUCTION

The ability to ensure transmission confidentiality is becoming a crucial requirement of many wireless communications systems due to the increasing role of on-line transactions and new applications that exchange critical personal data. In information-theoretic terms, perfect security (or confidentiality) implies the impossibility for a given eavesdropping terminal to harness any information about the transmitted message from its received signal [1]. This condition implies an even stronger guarantee than traditional cryptography, where security relies on the computational limitations of the eavesdropper (also referred to as the wiretap).

Analysis of transmission strategies that are able to meet the requirement of perfect security in wireless networks is currently an active area of research. As a brief and partial review of available literature, we first recall that, following the basic definitions given in [1] of a wiretap channel (consisting of a single source-destination pair and an eavesdropper), perfect security in a Gaussian wiretap channel with no fading was studied in [2]. More recently, attention has turned to the investigation of the corresponding fading scenario [13] [14], and to multi-user/ multi-antenna Gaussian models [3]-[8]. In particular, the Gaussian multiple-access wiretap channel was studied in [3], the multiple access with confidential messages in [4], the broadcast channel in [5] (parallel broadcast channels) and [6] (multi-antenna broadcast channels), and the single-link Gaussian MIMO case in [7] [8].

In this paper, we focus on secure communications for cellular systems, motivated by the fact that most of confidential transactions are expected to be conducted over such networks in the near future. Specifically, a novel...
basic approach to ensuring confidentiality is proposed that exploits uplink/ downlink scheduling of transmissions in adjacent cells and cooperation at the base station (BS) level. In so doing, we follow on the line of research opened by [10], where it was shown that cooperative transmission, beside being able to improve throughput or reliability (see, e.g., [9]), can also be instrumental in enhancing the confidentiality of transmission (for a basic relay network). BS cooperation is currently being widely investigated as a key enabler for high-data rate infrastructure networks (see, e.g., [12] [11]), and is enabled by the presence of high-capacity backbone links connecting the BSs. The main contribution of this work is to show that such technology can also bring significant gains in terms of secure communications.

The proposed techniques aim at securing uplink transmissions from terminals to a given BS. The basic idea is to schedule downlink BS transmissions at the same time as the concurrent uplink transmissions of interest, so as to create intentional interference on the possible eavesdroppers. Cooperation at the BS level is then used to convey information about the downlink transmission to the uplink-operated BS (uplink) over a finite–capacity backbone. This enables the uplink-operated BS to partially mitigate interference from the BS transmission. The approach is similar to [15] [16] [10] [17], where artificial noise jams the reception of the eavesdropper, while using techniques to avoid interference at the intended receiver. In [15] this interference mitigation is obtained by exploiting the structure and reciprocity of multi-antenna fading channels, while [16] [17] leverage a infinite-capacity backbone between receiving and jamming antennas. We propose several new schemes based on the above mentioned basic idea, each of them using a combined wireless/backbone transmission. The schemes and the corresponding achievable rates are investigated and compared via analysis and simulations.

II. System Model and Background

In this section, we fist introduce the scenario of interest and relevant quantities, and then investigate the reference case where no infrastructure is present to enable cooperation between the BSs.
A. Scenario

We focus on two adjacent cells served by single-antennas BSs as in Fig. 1 (the contribution of other cells is considered implicitly as additive noise), where the two BSs are connected by a high capacity, typically wired, backbone link. The BSs are termed $B$ and $C$, respectively. Terminal $A$ within the first cell has a message to deliver to $B$ under constraints of confidentiality with respect to the activity of an eavesdropping terminal $E$. The eavesdropper is assumed to be within the transmission range of terminal $A$, as otherwise it would not pose any threat to the confidentiality of $A$’s message, but also of the adjacent BS $C$. The main idea behind the considered transmission strategy is that the uplink transmission from $A$ to $B$ can be scheduled at the same time as the downlink transmission from $C$ towards a given terminal $D$ in its range. Hence, the transmission from $C$ effectively acts as a jammer on the reception at $E$. Note this approach is not intended to secure the communication $C\rightarrow D$. Also, notice that jamming is thereby accomplished without exploiting any additional system resource since it is obtained from a regular downlink transmission.

1) System Model: Formally, terminal $A$ randomly selects a rate-$R_A$ message $W_A$ from the set $\{1, ..., 2^{nR_A}\}$, and encodes it via a sequence of $n$ complex channel inputs $X_A = [X_{A,1} \cdots X_{A,n}] \in \mathbb{C}^n$ with normalized average power constraint $E[|X_{A,i}|^2] = P_A$. Encoding takes place through a (possibly stochastic) mapping: $X_A: \{1, ..., 2^{nR_A}\} \rightarrow \mathbb{C}^n$ [1] [2]. Notice that vectors of $n$ symbols are represented throughout the paper by bold letters. At the same time, BS $C$ transmits a rate-$R_C$ downlink message $W_C$, randomly selected from the set $\{1, ..., 2^{nR_C}\}$, with an average power of $P_C$. The actual codebook used by $C$ is assumed to be subject to design and thus depends on the specific cooperative strategy employed by BSs $B$ and $C$. This will be specified for different proposed techniques in the following sections. The capacity of the backbone link is denoted by $C_L$ and is measured in bit/symbol. We consider bandwidth that is normalized to $1$ Hz, such that bit/symbol is equivalent to bit/second (bps). We assume full synchronization between the transmissions of $A$ and $C$ at the receiver of $B$. Finally, to account for a worst-case scenario, synchronization is also assumed at the receiver of eavesdropping terminal $E$, and the latter is endowed with information about the codebooks used by $A$ and $C$.

The complex channel coefficient between any two nodes $U$ and $V$ is denoted by $h_{UV}$, while the $i$–th symbol transmitted by node $U$ is denoted by $X_{U,i}$ ($U \in \{A, C\}$ and $V \in \{B, D, E\}$). The signal received by $B$ and $E$, respectively, at the $i$–th symbol ($i = 1, ..., n$) reads:

$$Y_{B,i} = h_{AB}X_{A,i} + h_{CB}X_{C,i} + N_{B,i}$$

$$Y_{E,i} = h_{AE}X_{A,i} + h_{CE}X_{C,i} + N_{E,i}$$

Each noise component $N_{V,i}$ is a complex Gaussian white noise with unit power, so that if the node $U$ transmits with power $P_U$, the corresponding received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the node $V$ is:

$$\gamma_{UV} = \frac{P_U|h_{UV}|^2}{\text{variance of } N_{V,i}}$$

In the most of the paper (Sec. III-VI), we focus on Gaussian (unfaded) channels, where the channel gains are fixed and deterministic. In practice, these rates can be achieved, for given channel realizations, when channel state
information is known at the receiver side, and all the channel gains of interest ($h_{AB}$, $h_{CB}$, $h_{AE}$, $h_{CE}$) are known to terminal $A$, while the channel gains $h_{CB}$ and $h_{CD}$ are known to the downlink-operated BS $C$. In Sec. VII, the analysis will be extended to a fading scenario under different assumptions on the channel state information at the transmitters’ side.

Finally, the BS $B$ decodes through a mapping $g(Y_B): \mathbb{C}^n \rightarrow \{1, \ldots, 2^{nR_A}\}$. According to standard definitions [1] [2], a rate $R_A = R_{A,s}$ is said to be achievable with perfect secrecy with respect to eavesdropper $E$ if, as the number of samples per coding block $n \rightarrow \infty$: (a) the decoding error at BS $B$ vanishes:

$$P_e = P[g(Y_B) \neq W_A] \rightarrow 0; \quad (4)$$

(b) the uncertainty (equivocation) $\Delta$ of eavesdropper $E$ regarding $A$’s message, measured as the conditional entropy of $W_A$ given the signal received by $E$ normalized over the unconditional entropy, satisfies:

$$\Delta = \frac{H(W_A|Y_E)}{H(W_A)} \rightarrow 1. \quad (5)$$

**B. Some Useful Functions**

To simplify the presentation of the results in this paper, it is useful to define the following two functions. The first function $C(\gamma_{UV})$ is the standard capacity of a Gaussian single link with source $U$ and receiver $V$, and SNR equal to $\gamma_{UV}$:

$$C(\gamma_{UV}) = \log(1 + \gamma_{UV}). \quad (6)$$

The second function $S_{U_1V}(R_{U_2})$ pertains to the performance of a multiple–access channel (MAC) with two users $U_1$ and $U_2$ and receiver $V$. It measures the supremum of the achievable rates from $U_1$ to $V$ for a given transmission rate $R_{U_2}$ of $U_2$. Notice that rate $R_{U_2}$ is not restricted to be within the MAC capacity region, that is, it is not necessarily decodable by $V$. Given the SNRs $\gamma_{U_1V}$ and $\gamma_{U_2V}$, the function is given by:

$$S_{U_1V}(R_{U_2}) = \begin{cases} 
C(\gamma_{U_1V}) & \text{if } R_{U_2} \leq C(\frac{\gamma_{U_2V}}{1+\gamma_{U_1V}}) \\
C(\gamma_{U_1V} + \gamma_{U_2V}) - R_{U_2} & \text{if } C(\frac{\gamma_{U_2V}}{1+\gamma_{U_1V}}) < R_{U_2} \leq C(\gamma_{U_2V}) \\
C(\frac{\gamma_{U_2V}}{1+\gamma_{U_1V}}) & \text{if } R_{U_2} > C(\gamma_{U_2V})
\end{cases}. \quad (7)$$

**C. Perfect Secrecy Without Backbone Link ($C_L = 0$)**

Here, we briefly discuss the baseline scenario where no backbone link exists between BSs $B$ and $C$ ($C_L = 0$). In such a case, no cooperation via the backbone link is possible, and we assume that the BS $C$ transmits with a standard Gaussian codebook $X_C(W_C) = [X_{C,1}(W_C) \cdots X_{C,n}(W_C)] \in \mathbb{C}^n$, where variables $X_{C,i}$ are generated as complex Gaussian independent with zero mean and power $P_C$. As explained above, this codebook conveys information to a downlink user $D$. Given this set-up, it can be readily seen that the considered approach coincides with the strategy considered in [10] under the name Noise–Forwarding (NF). It was shown therein that the secrecy capacity can be found by considering the compound multiple access channel (MAC), with two receivers $B$ and $E$ and two transmitters $A$ and $C$. In particular, for the Gaussian case of interest here, and using the function $[7]$, the result of [10] (Theorem 3) can be restated as follows.
Proposition 1: If BS $C$ transmits in downlink with rate $R_C$ and there is no backbone link ($C_L = 0$), the rate $R_{A,s}(R_C)$ is achievable with perfect secrecy with respect to eavesdropper $E$

$$R_{A,s}(R_C) = (S_{AB}(R_C) - S_{AE}(R_C))^+,$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

with $S_{AB}(R_C)$ and $S_{AE}(R_C)$ defined in (7).

From (8) it can be seen that an increase in the secrecy rate can be obtained by either increasing the achievable rate $S_{AB}(R_C)$ to the intended destination $B$ or hampering reception of the eavesdropper (decreasing $S_{AE}(R_C)$).

III. Perfect Secrecy with Large-Capacity Backhaul Link ($C_L \geq R_C$)

We now turn to the interesting case where the backhaul link has a capacity larger than the downlink rate, $C_L \geq R_C$. As in the baseline case considered above, we assume that BS $C$ transmits codewords from a given rate-$R_C$ randomly generated Gaussian codebook. Since $C_L \geq R_C$, BS $C$ can communicate the current codeword $X_C(W_C)$ to the adjacent BS $B$ by using the backbone link. Therefore, BS $B$ can effectively cancel the interference signal $X_C(W_C)$ from the received signal (1), leading to the equivalent received signal

$$Y_{B,i} = h_{AB}X_{A,i} + N_{B,i}. \hspace{1cm} (9)$$

This implies that for any $R_C$ we have:

$$S_{AB}(R_C) = S_{AB}(0) = C(\gamma_{AB}), \hspace{1cm} (10)$$

from which the following proposition easily follows.

Proposition 2: If BS $C$ transmits in downlink with rate $R_C$ and $C_L \geq R_C$, the rate $R_{A,s}(R_C)$ is achievable with perfect secrecy:

$$R_{A,s}(R_C) = (C(\gamma_{AB}) - S_{AE}(R_C))^+ \hspace{1cm} (11)$$

with $S_{AE}(R_C)$ defined in (7).

Proof: Follows directly from Theorem 3 of [10] (see discussion in Sec. II-C).

The rate (11) is plotted in Fig. 2 along with the capacity of the direct link $C(\gamma_{AB})$ and the maximum achievable rate at the eavesdropper $S_{AE}(R_C)$ for $\gamma_{AB} = 7, \gamma_{AE} = 15, \gamma_{CE} = 10$. A relevant quantity that can be observed from the figure is the rate $R_x = C(\gamma_{AB}) - R_{A,s}$. This can be interpreted as the rate loss that terminal $A$ must sacrifice to the aim of “confounding” the eavesdropper $E$ and thus achieving rate $R_{A,s}$ with perfect secrecy. For this particular example, when $R_C = 0$, the single–user link $A - E$ is less noisy than the link $A - B$ and therefore the secrecy capacity is zero. As the downlink rate $R_C$ increases, while the achievable rate $C(\gamma_{AB})$ on the link $A - B$ is clearly unaffected (see (9)), the rate decodable by the eavesdropper $S_{AE}(R_C)$ decreases (for $R_C$ large enough), and thus a positive secrecy rate is obtained as soon as $S_{AE}(R_C) < C(\gamma_{AB})$. In particular, the secrecy rate $R_{A,s}$ increases linearly with $R_C$ until it reaches the maximum value $\left(C(\gamma_{AB}) - C \left(\frac{\gamma_{AE}}{1+\gamma_{CE}}\right)\right)^+$ for $R_C \geq C(\gamma_{CE})$.

\footnote{We define $(x)^+ = x$ if $x > 0$ and $(x)^+ = 0$ otherwise.}
Fig. 2. The achievable secrecy rate $R_{A,s}$ in Proposition 2. Here $R_s = C(\gamma_{AB}) - R_{A,s}$ is the amount of information spent by $A$ to “confound” the eavesdropper $E$ in order to achieve a rate $R_{A,s}$ with perfect secrecy.

It can be easily seen that this value of $R_{A,s}$ corresponds to the case where the signal from $C$ acts as a Gaussian noise with power $\gamma_{CE}$, which is known to be worst-case jammer on $E$ (see, e.g., [20]).

Finally, two remarks on the case at hand of large-capacity backbone link ($C_L \geq R_C$) are in order, that will be compared in the next sections with the complementary case where $C_L < R_C$. (a) With a large-capacity backbone, the secrecy rate $R_{A,s}$ is a non-decreasing function of the downlink rate $R_C$. (b) With a large-capacity backbone, the value of the inter-BS channel gain $\gamma_{CB}$ is irrelevant to the system performance. This clearly contrasts with the case of $C_L = 0$ studied in Sec. II-C, for instance, for the chosen SNRs in the example on Fig. 2 if in addition we assume $\gamma_{CB} \leq \gamma_{CE}$, it can be seen from (8) that with $C_L = 0$ the secrecy rate $R_{A,s}$ is identically zero.

IV. QUANTIZATION–BASED TRANSMISSION STRATEGIES

In this section, we start the analysis of the secrecy capacity for the case where the backbone link capacity is smaller than the downlink rate, $C_L < R_C$. In such as case, different strategies can be devised by the BS $C$ in order to provide the adjacent BS $B$ with some information about the downlink transmitted waveform $X_C$ in order to enable interference mitigation at $B$ and thus improve the secrecy rate $R_{A,s}$ (recall the discussion about (8)). In this section, we describe two strategies based on source coding arguments (quantization) for transferring information from $C$ to $B$, while the next section proposes strategies based on channel coding principles. For the strategies considered in this section, we assume, as above, that the BS $C$ employs a standard randomly generated Gaussian codebook.

A. Elementary Quantization

The first considered approach is based on quantizing the downlink codeword $X_C(W_C)$ via a rate-$C_L$ Gaussian codebook. Quantization/compression is done by using standard joint typicality-based vector quantization [19] and
does not exploit here any side information available at the receiver (elementary quantization). Given its optimality in a rate-distortion sense, here we consider a Gaussian test channel, which we represent for convenience in the forward form [18]:

$$\hat{X}_{C,i} = X_{C,i} + Q_i,$$

where $Q_i$ is i.i.d. complex Gaussian quantization noise with power $\sigma_Q^2$. From basic rate-distortion theory, it follows that the following condition should be satisfied:

$$I(X_C; \hat{X}_C) = C_L$$

which, as mentioned above, reflects the fact that the quantization process at $C$ is oblivious to the fact that there is a parallel wireless link between $C$ and $B$ that conveys side information. The quantization error power $\sigma_Q^2$ can then be found from (13) as

$$\sigma_Q^2 = \frac{P_C}{2^{C_L} - 1}$$

so that the SNR on the equivalent channel (12) reads

$$\gamma_Q = \frac{P_C}{\sigma_Q^2} = 2^{C_L} - 1.$$  

It is remarked that the quantization codebook is assumed to be known to the BS $B$, which uses the received index from the backbone link to decompress the signal into $\hat{X}_C$. The following proposition provides the rate achievable with this strategy (see proof in Appendix-A).

**Proposition 3:** If BS $C$ transmits in downlink with rate $R_C$, the elementary quantization-based strategy achieves with perfect secrecy the rate $R_{A,s}(R_C)$ given by:

$$R_{A,s}(R_C) = \left(S^{EQ}_{AB}(R_C) - S_{AE}(R_C)\right)^+$$

with $S_{AE}(R_C)$ defined in [7].

$$S^{EQ}_{AB}(R_C) = \begin{cases} 
C(\gamma_{AB}) & \text{if } R_C \leq C \left(\frac{\gamma_{CB}}{1 + \gamma_{AB}} + \gamma_Q\right) \\
C_{sum} - R_C & \text{if } C \left(\frac{\gamma_{CB}}{1 + \gamma_{AB}} + \gamma_Q\right) < R_C \leq C(\gamma_{CB} + \gamma_Q) \\
C_{sum} - C(\gamma_{CB} + \gamma_Q) & \text{if } R_C > C(\gamma_{CB} + \gamma_Q)
\end{cases}$$

and $C_{sum} = \log_2 \left(2^{C_L}(1 + \gamma_{AB}) + \gamma_{CB}\right)$.

It can be seen that, unlike the large-backbone case of Proposition 2 here the achievable rate (15) is not a monotonically increasing function of $R_C$ since the latter affects (decreases) also $S^{EQ}_{AB}(R_C)$. Moreover, it can be shown that only for $C_L \to \infty$, the rate (15) tends to the large-backbone secrecy rate (11) due to the residual quantization noise for any finite $C_L$. In practice (and in our evaluations in Sections VI and VII) whenever the instantaneous rate $R_C \geq C_L$, then we do not use quantization, but transfer the message completely over the backhaul.

**B. Wyner–Ziv Quantization**

The approach presented above can be improved by designing the quantization scheme according to Wyner-Ziv compression with side information at the decoder [21] (Wyner-Ziv quantization). In fact, the wireless signal $Y_B$
received by BS $B$ is correlated with the signal $X_C$ transmitted by BS $C$ and can thus be used as side information at the decoder. From [21], the following relationship should now hold:

$$I(X_C; \hat{X}_C|Y_B) = C_L.$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

By using the Gaussian forward test channel (12), the power of the quantization noise $\sigma^2_Q$ and the respective equivalent quantization SNR $\gamma_Q$ can be easily derived (see Appendix-B) leading to the equivalent SNR

$$\gamma_Q = \frac{P_C}{\sigma^2_q} = (2^{C_L} - 1) \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma_{CB}}{1 + \gamma_{AB}} \right).$$ \hspace{1cm} (18)

Achievable rates with Wyner-Ziv compression then follow directly from Proposition 3 by simply replacing $\gamma_Q$ in (14) with (18). It is noted that if $\gamma_{CB} = 0$, this scheme has clearly no advantage over the elementary quantization considered above due to the absence of useful side information at the receiver.

V. **SUPERPOSITION CODING-BASED TRANSMISSION STRATEGIES**

Here we investigate a channel coding-based strategy to exploit the backbone link with capacity satisfying the condition $C_L < R_C$. The strategy is based on rate–splitting encoding at BS $C$ so that, differently from the previous sections, here $C$ changes the format of its wireless transmission to facilitate the transfer of information over the backbone. It is also noted that this assumption requires downlink terminal $D$ to modify its decoding strategy accordingly (see details below). The message $W_C$ is transmitted by sending two independent messages $W_{C1}, W_{C2}$ with rates $R_{C1}, R_{C2}$, respectively such that:

$$R_C = R_{C1} + R_{C2},$$ \hspace{1cm} (19)

where $R_C$ is determined by the capacity of the downlink transmission by $C$:

$$R_C = \mathcal{C}(\gamma_{CD}).$$ \hspace{1cm} (20)

The two messages are combined by using superposition coding, such that the $i$th symbol sent by $C$ is:

$$X_{C,i} = \sqrt{\alpha}X_{C1,i} + \sqrt{1-\alpha}X_{C2,i},$$ \hspace{1cm} (21)

where $\alpha$ is the power–division coefficient and $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$. Notice that, unlike the previously described quantization-based scheme, here the downlink channel gain $\gamma_{CD}$ plays an important role, since any modification in the design of the transmission scheme at BS $C$ (i.e., rates $(R_{C1}, R_{C2})$ and coefficient $\alpha$) has to guarantee successful decoding at terminal $D$. To elaborate, we assume that decoding at $D$ is carried out via successive interference cancellation, such that $W_{C1}$ is first decoded and subtracted and then $W_{C2}$ is decoded. Such a decoding imposes the following conditions on rates $(R_{C1}, R_{C2})$ and coefficient $\alpha$:

$$R_{C1} = \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha \gamma_{CD}}{1 + (1-\alpha)\gamma_{CD}} \right)$$ \hspace{1cm} (22)

$$R_{C2} = \log_2 (1 + (1-\alpha)\gamma_{CD}).$$ \hspace{1cm} (23)
It can be easily seen that for any $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$, condition (20) is satisfied $(R_{C1} + R_{C2} = C(\gamma_{CD}))$ and we have freedom to choose $\alpha$.

The basic idea of this strategy is to send one of the messages, either $W_{C1}$ or $W_{C2}$ (i.e., either the one decoded first or last by downlink user $D$), over the backbone. This implies either $R_{C1} = C_L$ or $R_{C2} = C_L$, respectively. It is noted that once either of the latter condition is specified, this choice, by way of (22)-(23), uniquely determines the value of $\alpha$ and, from (19), the remaining rate. As we will see in the next sections, the choice of which message to send over the backbone drastically impact the achievable secrecy rate, and neither strategy dominates the other.

A. Sending the Message Decoded Last by $D$ ($W_{C2}$)

In this first case, we set $R_{C2} = C_L$, which, from (23), determines the following value of $\alpha$:

$$\alpha = \alpha_2 = 1 - \frac{2^{C_L} - 1}{\gamma_{CD}},$$  

(24)

and the rate $R_{C1} = R_C - C_L$. BS $B$ can then uses $W_{C2}$ to cancel $X_{C2}(W_{C2})$ from its wireless received signal $Y_B$, such that the resulting received wireless signal at $B$ at the instance $i$ is given by:

$$Y_{B,i} = h_{AB}X_{A,i} + h_{CB}\sqrt{\alpha_2}X_{C1,i} + N_{B,i}.$$

(25)

The following lemma follows (see proof in Appendix-C).

**Lemma 1:** If BS $C$ transmits in downlink with rate $R_C$ using the superposition coding scheme with (24), the maximum rate achievable on the link $A-B$ is given by:

$$S_{AB}^{(\alpha_2)}(R_C) = \begin{cases} 
\min\{C(\gamma_{AB}), C(\gamma_{AB} + \alpha_2 \gamma_{CB}) - (R_C - C_L)\} & \text{if } R_C - C_L < C(\alpha_2 \gamma_{CB}) \\
C \left(\frac{\gamma_{AB}}{1 + \alpha_2 \gamma_{CB}}\right) & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}$$  

(26)

B. Sending the Message Decoded First by $D$ ($W_{C1}$)

When $W_{C1}$ is sent over the backbone, we set $R_{C1} = C_L$, resulting in

$$\alpha = \alpha_1 = \frac{1 - 2^{-C_L}}{1 - 1/(1 + \gamma_{CD})},$$

(27)

and $R_{C2} = R_C - C_L$. After cancelling out $X_{C1}(W_{C1})$, the multiple access channel at $B$ is given as:

$$Y_{B,i} = h_{AB}X_{A,i} + h_{CB}(1 - \sqrt{\alpha_1})X_{C2,i} + N_{B,i}.$$

(28)

The following result follows from the same arguments as in Appendix-C.

**Lemma 2:** If BS $C$ transmits in downlink with rate $R_C$ using the superposition coding scheme with (27), the maximum rate achievable on the link $A-B$ is given by:

$$S_{AB}^{(\alpha_1)}(R_C) = \begin{cases} 
\min\{C(\gamma_{AB}), C(\gamma_{AB} + (1 - \alpha_1) \gamma_{CB}) - (R_C - C_L)\} & \text{if } R_C - C_L < C((1 - \alpha_1) \gamma_{CB}) \\
C \left(\frac{\gamma_{AB}}{1 + (1 - \alpha_1) \gamma_{CB}}\right) & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}$$  

(29)
C. Achievable Secrecy Rate with Superposition Coding

Accounting for both options of sending either $W_{C1}$ or $W_{C2}$ over the backbone, we can now state the following result.

**Proposition 4:** If BS $C$ transmits in downlink with rate $R_C$, the superposition-based strategy achieves the following rate $R_{A,s}(R_C)$ with perfect secrecy:

$$R_{A,s}(R_C) = \left( S_{SUP}^{AB}(R_C) - S_{AE}(R_C) \right)^+$$

with

$$S_{SUP}^{AB}(R_C) = \max_{i=1,2} \left\{ S_{AB}^{(\alpha_i)}(R_C) \right\},$$

where $S_{AB}^{(\alpha_i)}(R_C)$ are defined in (26) and (29), and $S_{AE}(R_C)$ is given by (7).

The proposition follows from Lemmas 2 and 1 and similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1 [10]. In particular, following such arguments, one should calculate the maximum rate decodable by the eavesdropper $E$ for given $R_C$ and for the rate splitting strategy. It can be shown that this maximum rate is indeed $S_{AE}(R_C)$ as in (30), that is, it is the same rate that we would have if BS $C$ had used a single-rate Gaussian codebook. This is because from (19), (22), and (23), it can be proved that any of the superposed messages is decodable if and only if the other is.

A final remark concerns a comparison between the superposition strategy and elementary quantization. It can be shown by comparing (30) and (16) (with (14)) that for downlink rate $R_C \to \infty$ the performance of both scheme coincide since $S_{SUP}^{AB}(R_C) \to S_{EQ}^{AB}(R_C) = C_{sum} - C(\gamma_{CB} + \gamma_Q)$.

D. Some Comments on the Superposition Strategy

The achievable secrecy rate (30) contains a maximization over the choice of which message should be sent over the backhaul link. This choice is made so as to optimize the maximum achievable rate on the link $A-B$ (31). In this regard, some general conclusion can be drawn by noticing that from the assumption $R_C = C(\gamma_{CD}) \geq C_L$ it can be verified that

$$\alpha_2 \geq 1 - \alpha_1.$$ (32)

Then the following observations can be made:

- **For large** downlink rates $R_C$, such that:

$$R_C \geq C_L + C(\alpha_2 \gamma_{CB}) = C(2C_L \gamma_{CB}) \geq C_L + C((1 - \alpha_1) \gamma_{CB})$$ (33)

where (a) follows from (32) it follows from Lemmas [1] and [2] that

$$S_{AB}^{(\alpha_2)}(R_C) \leq C \left( \frac{\gamma_{AB}}{1 + \alpha_2 \gamma_{CB}} \right) \leq C \left( \frac{\gamma_{AB}}{1 + (1 - \alpha_1) \gamma_{CB}} \right) = S_{AB}^{(\alpha_1)}(R_C)$$ (34)

which means that sending $X_{C1}$ over the backbone offers higher achievable rates $R_A$.

- **For low** downlink rates $R_C$, such that:

$$R_C \leq C_L + C((1 - \alpha_1) \gamma_{CB}) = C_L + C(\alpha_2 \gamma_{CB})$$ (35)
it follows from Lemmas [1] and [2] that

$$S_{AB}^{(\alpha_2)}(R_C) = \min\{C(\gamma_{AB}), C(\gamma_{AB} + \alpha_2 \gamma_{CB}) - (R_C - C_L)\}$$

$$S_{AB}^{(\alpha_1)}(R_C) = \min\{C(\gamma_{AB}), C(\gamma_{AB} + (1 - \alpha_1) \gamma_{CB}) - (R_C - C_L)\}$$

thus

$$S_{AB}^{(\alpha_2)}(R_C) \geq S_{AB}^{(\alpha_1)}(R_C)$$  \hspace{1cm} (36)

which means that sending $X_{C2}$ over the backbone offers higher achievable rates $R_A$.

We give an intuitive explanation of the previous result. Note that if a signal contains two superimposed messages and one of those messages is known a priori, then this is equivalent to cancelling power from the composite message. For example, if in [21] the message $W_{C1}$ is known, then we cancel the signal $\sqrt{\alpha}X_{C1}$, which corresponds to the power of $\alpha P_C$. Now we can ask the following question: If we fix the condition $R_{C1} + R_{C2} = R_C$ and we set one of the rates ($R_{C1}$ or $R_{C2}$) to be equal to $C_L$, then in which case we can cancel the maximal amount of power from the composite message? From the previous discussions, if $R_{Cj} = C_L$ then we determine $\alpha = \alpha_j$. If $W_{C2}$ is sent over the backhaul then $j = 2$ and the amount of power cancelled is $(1 - \alpha_2)P_C$. If $j = 1$, the amount of power cancelled is $\alpha_1P_C$. Hence, using the condition (32), we conclude that sending $W_{C2}$ over the backhaul implies minimal possible cancellation of power from the composite message (and thus at the receiver $B$) and the remaining power of the wireless signal from $C$ at $B$ is largest possible. At relatively low $R_C$, this effect increases the interval of values for $R_C$ that are completely decodable at $B$ and that is why sending $W_{C2}$ over the backhaul gives higher achievable rate $S_{AB}(R_C)$. However, when the rate $R_C$ is large and thus not completely decodable at $B$, then $X_{C1}$ acts as a noise and such a high remaining power harms the rate achievable for large $R_C$. On the other hand, when $W_{C1}$ is sent over the backbone, the uncancelled part of the composite message has minimum possible power, which is desirable when that portion of the signal sent by $C$ is undecodable and has to be treated as noise.

VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES

In this section we provide some numerical examples for the performance of the proposed confidential transmission schemes when all the wireless channels are deterministic (unfaded), as assumed in the previous sections. We will use the following acronyms: EQ for Elementary Quantization, WZ for Wyner–Ziv quantization, and SUP for transmission based on superposition coding. In the cases $R_C \leq C_L$, the message from $C$ is completely transferred via the backhaul, such that all the schemes behave identically.

We start by considering the maximum achievable rates with no confidentiality constrains from terminal $A$ to BS $B$, namely $S_{AB}^{EQ}(R_C)$ [16] [14]; $S_{WZ}(R_C)$ [16] [18]; $S_{AB}^{(\alpha_1)}(R_C)$ [29] and $S_{AB}^{(\alpha_2)}(R_C)$ [26]. Fig. 3 depicts such rates versus the downlink rate $R_C$. For the chosen parameters ($\gamma_{AB} = \gamma_{CB} = 10$ [dB] and $C_L = 2$ [bps]), WZ is to be preferred for any value of the downlink rate $R_C$. Moreover, by appropriately selecting which message is sent over the backbone ($W_{C1}$ or $W_{C2}$), that is choosing between $S_{AB}^{(\alpha_1)}(R_C)$ and $S_{AB}^{(\alpha_2)}(R_C)$, the SUP strategy outperforms the EQ for any $R_C$. On this note, confirming the discussion of Sec. III we have that for lower $R_C$ it is more convenient to send $W_{C2}$ over the backbone ($S_{AB}^{(\alpha_2)}(R_C) > S_{AB}^{(\alpha_1)}(R_C)$) and vice versa for larger $R_C$. Finally,
Fig. 3. Maximum achievable rates from $A$ to $B$ (without confidentiality constraints) $S_{AB}^{(\alpha_1)}(R_C)$, $S_{AB}^{(\alpha_2)}(R_C)$, $S_{AB}^{EQ}(R_C)$ and $S_{AB}^{WZ}(R_C)$ with $\gamma_{AB} = \gamma_{CB} = 10$ [dB] and $C_L = 2$ [bps]. As a reference, the function $S_{AB}(R_C)$ with $C_L = 0$ is also shown.

Fig. 4. Maximum achievable rates from $A$ to $B$ (without confidentiality constraints) $S_{AB}^{(\alpha_1)}(R_C)$, $S_{AB}^{(\alpha_2)}(R_C)$, $S_{AB}^{Q}(R_C)$ and $S_{AB}^{WZ}(R_C)$ with $\gamma_{AB} = 15$ [dB], $C_L = 2$ [bps] and $R_C = 3$ [bps]. As a reference, we have plotted the line $S_{AB}(R_C)$ with $C_L = 0$ and $S_{AB}(R_C) = C(\gamma_{AB})$ for $C_L \geq R_C$.

we remark that, as pointed out in Sec. V-C, if the rate $R_C$ is large enough, the EQ strategy obtains a constant secrecy rate $R_C$, which coincides with the asymptotic achievable for of the SUP strategy.

Fig. 4 shows the achievable rate without confidentiality constraints (as Fig. 3) versus the SNR between the BSs $\gamma_{CB}$. Here it can be seen that, for low values of $\gamma_{CB}$ the SUP strategy outperforms the WZ strategy. The U-shape of all the curves versus $\gamma_{CB}$ can be explained similarly to the arguments used to study interference channels with weak and strong interference. Consider for instance the case $C_L = 0$. For low $\gamma_{CB}$, BS $B$ cannot decode $R_C$, but the wireless interference from $C$ at $B$ is weak, which makes the achievable rate $A - B$ high. As $\gamma_{CB}$ increases, but still not sufficiently as to make rate $R_C$ decodable at $B$, the achievable rate on link $A - B$ drops. However, for
strong interference $\gamma_{CB}$, BS $B$ can decode $R_C$ and then subtract it, thus causing low (if any) penalty to the rate from $A$ to $B$.

Finally, Fig. 5 depicts the derived secrecy rates for different values of $C_L$ versus the downlink rate $R_C$ for $\gamma_{AB} = \gamma_{CB} = \gamma_{AE} = \gamma_{CE} = 20$ [dB]. Note that with such a choice of SNRs the Noise–Forwarding strategy [10] ($C_L = 0$) offers a zero secrecy rate, which implies that in this case the presence of the backbone offers markedly improved secrecy. Moreover, for small downlink rates $R_C$, all proposed strategies have the same achievable secrecy rate as in the case of large backbone capacity studied in Sec. III ($C_L > R_C$) up to a certain value of $R_C$, which is the largest for the WZ strategy. Finally, as pointed out above, WZ offers substantial gains with respect to EQ, and, given the large value of $\gamma_{CB}$ in this example, also with respect to SUP (where SUP and EQ have the same performance for large $R_C$).

VII. EXTENSION TO FADING CHANNELS

In this section, we turn the attention to fading channels and reconsider the performance of the proposed transmission strategies under different assumptions regarding the channel state information available at different nodes.

A. Scenario and Performance Measures

The inter-BS link $C - B$ is considered to be a line–of–sight and thus does not experience fading, i.e., $\gamma_{CB}$ is constant, while the other links are faded. We assume that a fading link $h_{UV}$ features Rayleigh fading, such that the SNR of the link $\gamma_{UV}$ is independently and exponentially distributed with average value $\bar{\gamma}_{UV}$. Furthermore, we consider block fading, such that a fading channel stays constant for a sufficient number of symbols $n$, where for coding purposes $n$ can be assumed to be infinity. It is noted that the assumption regarding the inter-BS link $\gamma_{CB}$ is a reasonable if, e.g., the BSs are sufficiently elevated with respect to the rest of the network. As far as channel
state information is concerned, terminal $A$ is assumed to know the channel gains $\gamma_{AB}$ (and the constant $\gamma_{CB}$), beside the downlink rate $R_C$, so that it can calculate (and transmit at) the maximum instantaneous achievable rate $S_{AB}(R_C)$ in [7]. Other assumptions will be differently specified below for two scenarios, one in which we measure the outage probability and the other in which we assess the scheduling performance.

1) No Channel State Information about $E$: Outage Probability: This scenario relies on the realistic assumption that the instantaneous fading channel to the eavesdropper $\gamma_{AE}$ and $\gamma_{CE}$ are not known to terminal $A$ and BS $C$. In such a case, no non-zero rate is achievable with perfect secrecy, and therefore we one has to resort to the concept of outage probability [13], [17]. In particular, given a target secrecy rate $R_{A,s}$, the outage probability is defined as the probability that such $R_{A,s}$ is not achievable for the given transmission technique. It is noted that, for each fading realization, the value of $R_C$ is selected is here selected as [20], which requires BS $C$ to know the instantaneous downlink channel $\gamma_{CD} - D$.

2) Full Channel State Information: Scheduling Performance: In this second scenario, we assume full channel state information about all the fading channels at both terminal $A$ and BS $C$ know. Given the full channel state information, it is relevant here to generalize the model to include $M_u$ uplink users $A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_{M_u}$ that have data to transmit to $B$ and $M_d$ downlink users $D_1, D_2, \ldots, D_{M_d}$ potentially receiving from BS $C$. The goal is to analyze the impact of different scheduling and transmission strategies on the performance of the network at hand over fading channels. As throughout the paper, of particular interest is the impact of design choices on the trade-off between the downlink ($R_C$) and the uplink secrecy rate ($R_{A,s}$).

Regarding uplink scheduling, we assume that the uplink user $A_i^*$ is selected so as to maximize the uplink rate:

$$i^* = \max_i \gamma_{A_iB}$$

(37)

More interesting is the scheduling of the downlink transmissions from $C$, for which we define two different types of schedulers:

- **Max$R_C$** scheduler: In this case the scheduled user $D_j^*$ is selected so as to maximize the downlink rate:

$$j^* = \max_j \gamma_{CD_j}$$

(38)

- **MaxSec** scheduler: In this case the selection of the user $D_j^*$ is done so as to maximize the uplink secrecy rate $R_{A,s}$. Accordingly, the selection of $D_j^*$ depends on which method is used by $C$ to communicate over the backbone. If WZ quantization is used, the scheduler is denoted $MaxSec_{WZ}$ and we have:

$$j^*,WZ = \max_j R_{A,s}^{WZ}(\log_2(1 + \gamma_{CD_j})),$$

(39)

while if superposition is used, the scheduler is denoted $MaxSec_{SUP}$ and:

$$j^*,SUP = \max_j R_{A,s}^{SUP}(\log_2(1 + \gamma_{CD_j})).$$

(40)

Note that, in general $j^*,WZ \neq j^*,SUP$. Moreover, notice that only the WZ strategy has been considered among the quantization schemes to simplify the discussion and given the superior performance with respect to EQ. Performance evaluation is then carried out by calculating the average secrecy rate $\bar{R}_{A,s}(S)$ and the average downlink rate $\bar{R}_C(S)$,
where the average is taken with respect to the fading channels \((\gamma_{AB}, \gamma_{AE}, \gamma_{CE}, \gamma_{CD})\) given the scheduler \(S \in \{\text{Max} R_C, \text{MaxSec}_{\text{sup}}, \text{MaxSec}_{\text{WZ}}\}\).

### B. Numerical Results

We now present some numerical results for the two considered scenarios.

1) **Outage Probability:** Fig. 6 depicts the outage probability as a function of the backbone capacity \(C_L\) for \(\tilde{\gamma}_{AB} = \tilde{\gamma}_{AE} = \tilde{\gamma}_{CE} = \tilde{\gamma}_{CD} = 15\) [dB], \(\gamma_{CB} = 15\) [dB], \(R_{A,s} = 1\) [bps]. We recall that the value \(R_C\) is selected according to the instantaneous SNR \(\gamma_{CD}\) as \((20)\). The line \(C_L \geq R_C\) is obtained by assuming that \(C_L\) is large enough to accommodate any rate \(R_C\) (strictly speaking, \(C_L \to \infty\)). It can be seen that, as \(C_L\) increases, the outage probability of all the strategies approaches this asymptotic performance, as it becomes highly probable that the given \(C_L\) can accommodate the rate \(C(\gamma_{CD})\). The lower bound on the outage probability is obtained by assuming that \(C\) sends pure Gaussian noise (which is the worst jamming signal, see, e.g., [20]), that is perfectly transferred through the backbone \((C_L = \infty, R_C = \infty\). Another reference performance is set by the case \(P_C = 0\), where no downlink transmission takes place. For low values of \(C_L\), the proposed schemes can actually be outperformed by such solution. This is because, for low \(C_L\), the downlink transmission impairs not only reception at the eavesdropper \(E\), but also at the BS \(B\).

Fig. 7 depicts the outage probability as a function of the inter-BS SNR \(\gamma_{CB}\) for \(\tilde{\gamma}_{AB} = \tilde{\gamma}_{AE} = \tilde{\gamma}_{CE} = \tilde{\gamma}_{CD} = 15\) [dB], \(R_{A,s} = 1\) [bps] and \(C_L = 2\) [bps]. The U-shape of the curves for the proposed strategies can be explained by resorting to similar arguments as for Fig. 4 (see Sec. VI). Following this remark, we note from Fig. 7 that the gain in terms of outage probability of all strategies with respect to the case \(C_L = 0\) is most relevant in the regime of weak/strong interference from BS \(C\) (i.e. low/high \(\gamma_{CB}\)). In fact, it is in this regime that the interference from
Fig. 7. Secrecy outage probability vs. the SNR $\gamma_{CB}$. The average values of the fading links are $\bar{\gamma}_{AB} = \bar{\gamma}_{AE} = \bar{\gamma}_{CE} = \bar{\gamma}_{CD} = 15$ [dB]. The constant value $\gamma_{CB}$ is 15 [dB]. The line $P_C = 0$ refers to the case when no cooperative interference from $C$ takes place. The target secrecy rate is $R_{A,s} = 2$ [bps]. The backhaul has $C_L = 2$ [bps], except for the reference line with $C_L = \infty$.

BS $C$ to $B$ (due to the realizations where $R_C > C_L$) has the least impact on the performance of the link $A - B$.

2) Scheduling performance: Turning to the average rates that can be achieved in the scenario of full channel state information, Fig. 8 considered the downlink rates in terms of the ratios $\frac{R_C(\text{MaxSec}_{\text{sup}})}{R_C(\text{MaxR}_{C})}$ and $\frac{R_C(\text{MaxSec}_{\text{WZ}})}{R_C(\text{MaxR}_{C})}$ for $\bar{\gamma}_{AB} = \bar{\gamma}_{AE} = \bar{\gamma}_{CD} = \bar{\gamma}_{CE} = 15$, $\gamma_{CB} = 5$ [dB]. These ratio demonstrate which fraction of the maximal average downlink throughput is achieved if the scheduler at $C$ aims to maximize the secrecy of the transmission $A - B$. Equivalently, the complement to one of such ratios measure the fractional rate loss due to the requirement of maximizing the secrecy of the transmission $A - B$. The results show that at high $C_L$, maximum secrecy is coherent with maximal rate $R_C$. However, from Fig. 8 it is seen that for lower $C_L$, maximal security is not always achieved by maximizing $R_C$, which is in accordance with the observations from Fig. 5. Regarding the SUP strategy, there is one degenerative effect, which can be explained by observing the SUP curve on Fig. 5. It can be seen (on the figure not discernible for $C_L = 2$) that for large $R_C$, the secrecy rate of the SUP scheme slowly decreases towards the asymptotic value (achieved for $R_C \rightarrow \infty$), while for the quantization schemes there are finite values of $R_C$ after which the secrecy rate becomes constant. Hence, the scheduler that maximizes the secrecy tends to select lower rates $R_C$ when SUP is applied. Nevertheless, when $C_L = 0$, both SUP and WZ operate in identical way.

The average secrecy rates from $A$ to $B$ are then shown in Fig. 9-10 in terms of the ratios $\frac{R_{A,s}(\text{MaxSec}_{\text{sup}})}{R_{A,s}(\text{MaxR}_{C})}$ and $\frac{R_{A,s}(\text{MaxSec}_{\text{WZ}})}{R_{A,s}(\text{MaxR}_{C})}$. Thus, the figures shows, for each transmission method (WZ or SUP), how much the secrecy rate is improved if the scheduler at $C$ determines the downlink user (and the corresponding rate $R_C$) in order to maximize the instantaneous rate $R_{A,s}$ rather than the downlink rate $R_C$. It can be seen that for a weak link $C - B$ (low $\gamma_{CB}$), as on Fig. 9 (where $\gamma_{CB} = 5$ [dB]), the gain in the secrecy rate for the MaxSec schedulers is insignificant, which means that application of opportunistic scheduler Max$R_C$ at $C$ will be also good for the security of the link $A - B$. Conversely, for a strong link $C - B$, the results on Fig. 9-10 show that the secrecy of the
Fig. 8. Ratios $\frac{R_C(\text{MaxSec}_{\text{SUP}})}{R_C(\text{MaxRC})}$ and $\frac{R_C(\text{MaxSec}_{\text{WZ}})}{R_C(\text{MaxRC})}$. The parameters are $\gamma_{AB} = \gamma_{AE} = \gamma_{CD} = \gamma_{CE} = 15$ [dB]. The constant SNR is $\gamma_{CB} = 5$ [dB].

Fig. 9. Ratios $\frac{R_{A,s}(\text{MaxSec}_{\text{SUP}})}{R_{A,s}(\text{MaxRC})}$ and $\frac{R_{A,s}(\text{MaxSec}_{\text{WZ}})}{R_{A,s}(\text{MaxRC})}$. The parameters are $\gamma_{AB} = \gamma_{AE} = \gamma_{CD} = \gamma_{CE} = 15$ [dB]. The constant SNR is $\gamma_{CB} = 5$ [dB].

link $A - B$ can be boosted by selecting appropriate non-maximal $R_C$ and in this case the opportunistic downlink scheduler at $C$ is not compatible with the secrecy requirements.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

Optimized scheduling and multi-cell BS cooperation are becoming increasingly standard features of current and future wireless infrastructure (cellular) networks. This work has advanced the notion that such technologies can play an important role in ensuring confidentiality (security) of wireless transmissions. From the analysis of several transmission strategies under different assumptions regarding propagation channels and corresponding channel state information, a number of conclusions have been drawn. In particular, a technique based on Wyner-Ziv compression...
Fig. 10. Ratios $\bar{R}_C(\text{MaxSec}_{\text{SUP}})$ and $\bar{R}_C(\text{MaxSec}_{WZ})$. The parameters are $\gamma_{AB} = \gamma_{AE} = \gamma_{CD} = \gamma_{CE} = 15$ [dB]. The constant SNR is $\gamma_{CB} = 20$ [dB].

over the backbone link connecting the BSs has proved to be the most promising, with the added benefit of requiring no modifications on the uplink/ downlink transmissions of a conventional cellular systems. When complexity of Wyner-Ziv encoding is an issue, one could resort to simpler quantization schemes with a performance loss that depends on the network topology. Or else, if willing to modify the downlink transmission/ reception strategy for the sake of ensuring uplink confidentiality, one could opt for channel coding (rather than source coding) based techniques which perform close (or even better than) Wyner-Ziv under some circumstances.

There are several interesting extensions of this work. In this paper we have shown some achievable rates, but it is important to know what is the true secrecy capacity of the introduced method or at least to derive some tight upper bounds. Furthermore, the considered scenario can be extended to multiple cooperating base stations, which raises the question how to organize the transmission/receive schedule for the access points in order to maximize the secrecy effect, while not degrading the throughput. Finally, the study can be extended to consider colluding eavesdroppers, which attempt to jointly decode the desired signal and the interference from the downlink transmissions.

APPENDIX I

APPENDIX-A: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3

The equivalent signal seen at BS $B$ over both the wireless and wired channels in a given time instant $i$ can be written as a vector MAC channel:

$$\tilde{Y}_{B,i} = \begin{bmatrix} Y_{B,i} \\ X_{C,i} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} h_{AB} & h_{CB} \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} X_{A,i} \\ X_{C,i} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} N_i \\ Q_i \end{bmatrix}. \quad (41)$$

Let $S_{AB}^{EQ}(R_C)$ denote the maximum achievable rates from $A$ to $B$ for a given transmission rate $R_C$ when the quantization strategy is used (recall (7)). In order to determine $S_{AB}^{EQ}(R_C)$, we have to examine the achievable
region for the vector MAC channel with output (41):

\[ R_{AB} < I(X_A; \hat{Y}_B|X_C) \] (42a)
\[ R_{CB} < I(X_C; \hat{Y}_B|X_A) \] (42b)
\[ R_{AB} + R_{CB} < I(X_A, X_C; \hat{Y}_B) \] (42c)

where we have dropped the index i for simplicity) and \( X_A \) represents normally–distributed complex signal transmitted by A. The mutual informations in (V-A) can be determined as follows:

\[ I(X_A; \hat{Y}_B|X_C) = I(X_A, Y_B|X_C) = C(\gamma_{AB}) \] (43)

since \( \hat{X}_C \) is conditionally independent of \( X_A \) when \( X_C \) is given. The second bound leads to:

\[ I(X_C; \hat{Y}_B|X_A) = C(\gamma_{CB} + \gamma_Q) \] (44)

while the third condition is:

\[ I(X_A, X_C; \hat{Y}_B) = \]
\[ = I(X_C; \hat{Y}_B) + I(X_A; \hat{Y}_B|X_C) = \]
\[ = C \left( \frac{\gamma_{CB}}{1 + \gamma_{AB}} + \gamma_Q \right) + I(X_A; Y_B|X_C) \] (46)
\[ \overset{\text{(a)}}{=} C \left( \frac{\gamma_{CB}}{1 + \gamma_{AB}} + \gamma_Q \right) + \gamma_{AB} \] (47)
\[ = C \left( \frac{\gamma_{CB}}{1 + \gamma_{AB}} + \gamma_Q \right) + C(\gamma_{AB}) \] (48)
\[ = \log_2 \left( 2^{C \left( \frac{\gamma_{CB}}{1 + \gamma_{AB}} + \gamma_Q \right)} \right) \] (49)

where (a) follows again from \( X_A \) being conditionally independent of \( \hat{X}_C \) for given \( X_C \). The rate \( S^{EQ}_{AB}(R_C) \) in (3) then easily follows.

**APPENDIX II**

**APPENDIX-B: PROOF OF (50)**

Using the same model for the vector MAC channel as in (41), we can write:

\[ C_L = I(X_C; \hat{X}_C|Y_B) = I(X_C; \hat{X}_C, Y_B) - I(X_C; Y_B) = \]
\[ = C \left( \frac{\gamma_{CB}}{1 + \gamma_{AB}} + \gamma_Q \right) - C \left( \frac{\gamma_{CB}}{1 + \gamma_{AB}} \right) = \]
\[ = \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma_Q}{1 + \gamma_{AB}} \right) \] (50)

and thus (50) easily follows.
Similarly to Appendix-A, we need to determine the maximal achievable rate $S^{(\alpha_2)}_{AB}(R_C)$. We start from the MAC capacity region obtained after the cancellation of $W_{C2}$:

$$R_A < C(\gamma_{AB})$$

$$R_{C1} = R_C - C_L < C(\alpha_2\gamma_{CB})$$

$$R_A + R_C - C_L < C(\gamma_{AB} + \alpha_2\gamma_{CB})$$

Depending on the value of $R_C$, we have two cases to consider, namely, when $R_{C1}$ is decodable at $B$ ($R_C - C_L < C(\alpha_2\gamma_{CB})$) and when $R_{C1}$ is not ($R_C - C_L \geq C(\alpha_2\gamma_{CB})$). Analysis of these two cases easily leads to (26).

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