The Wiretap Channel with Feedback:
Encryption over the Channel

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Abstract

In this work, the critical role of noisy feedback in enhancing the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel is established. Unlike previous works, where a noiseless public discussion channel is used for feedback, the feed-forward and feedback signals share the same noisy channel in the present model. Quite interestingly, this noisy feedback model is shown to be more advantageous in the current setting. More specifically, the discrete memoryless modulo-additive channel with a full-duplex destination node is considered first, and it is shown that the judicious use of feedback increases the perfect secrecy capacity to the capacity of the source-destination channel in the absence of the wiretapper. In the achievability scheme, the feedback signal corresponds to a private key, known only to the destination. In the half-duplex scheme, a novel feedback technique that always achieves a positive perfect secrecy rate (even when the source-wiretapper channel is less noisy than the source-destination channel) is proposed. These results hinge on the modulo-additive property of the channel, which is exploited by the destination to perform encryption over the channel without revealing its key to the source. Finally, this scheme is extended to the continuous real valued modulo-Λ channel where it is shown that the perfect secrecy capacity with feedback is also equal to the capacity in the absence of the wiretapper.

I. INTRODUCTION

The study of secure communication from an information theoretic perspective was pioneered by Shannon [1]. In Shannon’s model, both the sender and the destination possess a common secret key $K$, which is unknown to the wiretapper, and use this key to encrypt and decrypt the message.
M. Shannon considered a scenario where both the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper have direct access to the transmitted signal and introduced the perfect secrecy condition $I(M; Z) = 0$, implying that the signal $Z$ received by the wiretapper does not provide any additional information about the source message $M$. Under this model, he proved the pessimistic result that the achievability of perfect secrecy requires the entropy of the shared private key $K$ to be at least equal to the entropy of the message itself (i.e., $H(K) \geq H(M)$ for perfect secrecy). Clearly, the distribution of the secret key under this model is challenging.

In a pioneering work [2], Wyner introduced the wiretap channel and established the possibility of creating an almost perfectly secure source-destination link without relying on private (secret) keys. In the wiretap channel, both the wiretapper and destination observe the source encoded message through noisy channels. Similar to Shannon’s model, the wiretapper is assumed to have unlimited computational resources. Wyner showed that when the source-wiretapper channel is a degraded version of the source-destination channel, the source can send perfectly secure messages to the destination at a non-zero rate. The main idea is to hide the information stream in the additional noise impairing the wiretapper by using a stochastic encoder which maps each message to many codewords according to an appropriate probability distribution. This way, one induces maximal equivocation at the wiretapper. By ensuring that the equivocation rate is arbitrarily close to the message rate, one achieves perfect secrecy in the sense that the wiretapper is now limited to learn almost nothing about the source-destination messages from its observations. Follow-up work by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman has characterized the secrecy capacity of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) wiretap channel [4]. In a landmark paper, Csiszár and Körner generalized Wyner’s approach by considering the transmission of confidential messages over broadcast channels [5]. This work characterized the perfect secrecy capacity of Discrete Memoryless Channels (DMC)s, and showed that the perfect secrecy capacity is positive unless the source-wiretapper channel is less noisy than the source-destination channel (referred to as the main channel in the sequel). Positive secrecy capacity is not always possible to achieve in practice. In an attempt to transmit

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1Wyner’s notion of per symbol equivocation is weaker than Shannon’s notion of perfect secrecy [3].

2The source-wiretapper channel is said to be less noisy than the main channel, if for every $V \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y Z$, $I(V; Z) \geq I(V; Y)$, where $X$ is the signal transmitted by the source, and where $Y$ and $Z$ are the received signal at the receiver and the wiretapper respectively.
messages securely in these unfavorable scenarios, [6] and [7] considered the wiretap channel with noiseless feedback. They showed that one may leverage the feedback to achieve a positive perfect secrecy rate, even when the feed-forward perfect secrecy capacity is zero. In this model, there exists a separate noiseless public channel, through which the transmitter and receiver can exchange information. The wiretapper is assumed to obtain a perfect copy of the messages transmitted over this public channel. Upper and lower bounds were derived for the perfect secrecy capacity with noiseless feedback in [6], [7]. In several cases, as discussed in detail in the sequel, these bounds coincide. But, in general, the perfect secrecy capacity with noiseless feedback remains unknown. Along the same line, [8] established the critical role of a trusted/untrusted helper in enhancing the secret key capacity of public discussion algorithms. The multi-terminal generalization of the basic set-up of [6], [7] was studied in [9]. Finally, in [10]–[12], the public discussion paradigm was extended to handle the existence of active adversaries.

Our work represents a marked departure from the public discussion paradigm. In our model, we do not assume the existence of a separate noiseless feedback channel. Instead, the feedback signal from the destination, which is allowed to depend on the signal received so far, is transmitted over the same noisy channel used by the source. Based on the noisy feedback signal, the source can then causally adapt its transmission scheme, hoping to increase the perfect secrecy rate. The wiretapper receives a mixture of the signal from the source and the feedback signal from the destination. Quite interestingly, we show that in the modulo-additive DMC with a full-duplex destination, the perfect secrecy capacity with noisy feedback equals the capacity of the main channel in the absence of the wiretapper. Furthermore, the capacity is achieved with a simple scheme where the source ignores the feedback signal and the destination feeds back randomly generated symbols from a certain alphabet set. This feedback signal plays the role of a private key, known only by the destination, and encryption is performed by the modulo-additive channel.

The more challenging scenario with a half-duplex destination, which cannot transmit and receive simultaneously, is considered next. Here, the active transmission periods by the destination will introduce erasures in the feed-forward source-destination channel. In this setting, we propose a novel feedback scheme that achieves a positive perfect secrecy rate for any non-trivial channel distribution. The feedback signal in our approach acts as a private destination only key which.

3The authors also considered a more general secret sharing problem.
strikes the optimal tradeoff between introducing erasures at the destination and errors at the wiretapper. Finally, the proposed scheme is extended to the continuous modulo-$\Lambda$ lattice channel where it is shown to achieve the capacity of the main channel. Overall, our work proposes a novel approach for encryption where 1) the feedback signal is used as a private key known only to the destination and 2) the encryption is performed by exploiting the modulo-additive property of the channel. This encryption approach is shown to be significantly superior to the classical public discussion paradigm.

Recently, there has been a resurgent interest in studying secure communications from information theoretic perspective under various scenarios. The point-to-point fading eavesdropper channel was considered in [13]–[18] under different assumptions on the delay constraints and the available transmitter Channel State Information (CSI). In [19]–[22], the information theoretic limits of secure communications over multiple access channels were explored. The relay channel with confidential messages, where the relay acts both as a wiretapper and a helper, was studied in [23], [24]. In [25], the interference channel with confidential messages was studied. In [26], the four terminal relay-eavesdropper channel was introduced and analyzed. The wiretap channel with side information was studied in [27].

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the system model and our notation. Section III describes and analyzes the proposed feedback scheme which achieves the capacity of the full duplex modulo-additive DMC. Taking the Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) as an example, we then compare the performance of the proposed scheme with the public discussion approach. The half-duplex scenario is studied in Section IV. In Section V, we extend our results to the modulo-$\Lambda$ lattice channel. Finally, Section VI offers some concluding remarks and outlines possible venues for future research.

II. THE MODULO-ADDITIVE DISCRETE MEMORYLESS CHANNEL

Throughout the sequel, the upper-case letter $X$ will denote a random variable, a lower-case letter $x$ will denote a realization of the random variable, a calligraphic letter $\mathcal{X}$ will denote a finite alphabet set and a boldface letter $\mathbf{x}$ will denote a vector. Furthermore, we let $[x]^+ = \max\{0, x\}$. Without feedback, our modulo-additive discrete memoryless wiretap channel is described by the
following relations at time $i$

$$y(i) = x(i) + n_1(i),$$
$$z(i) = x(i) + n_2(i),$$

where $y(i)$ is the received symbol at the destination, $z(i)$ is the received symbol at the wiretapper, $x(i)$ is the channel input, $n_1(i)$ and $n_2(i)$ are the noise samples at the destination and wiretapper, respectively. Here $N_1$ and $N_2$ are allowed to be correlated, while each process is assumed to be individually drawn from an identically and independently distributed source. Also we have $X \in \mathcal{X} = \{0, 1, \ldots, |\mathcal{X}| - 1\}$, $Y, N_1 \in \mathcal{Y} = \{0, 1, \ldots, |\mathcal{Y}| - 1\}$ and $Z, N_2 \in \mathcal{Z} = \{0, 1, \ldots, |\mathcal{Z}| - 1\}$ with finite alphabet sizes $|\mathcal{X}|, |\mathcal{Y}|, |\mathcal{Z}|$ respectively. Here ‘+’ is understood to be modulo addition with respect to the corresponding alphabet size, i.e., $y(i) = [x(i) + n_1(i)] \mod |\mathcal{Y}|$ and $z(i) = [x(i) + n_2(i)] \mod |\mathcal{Z}|$ with addition in the real field.

In this paper, we focus on the wiretap channel with noisy feedback. More specifically, at time $i$ the destination sends the causal feedback signal $X_1(i)$ over the same noisy channel used for feed-forward transmission, i.e., we do not assume the existence of a separate noiseless feedback channel. The causal feedback signal is allowed to depend on the received signal so far $Y_{i-1}$, i.e., $X_1(i) = \Psi(Y_{i-1})$, where $\Psi$ can be any (possibly stochastic) function. In general, we allow the destination to choose the alphabet of the feedback signal $\mathcal{X}_1$ and the corresponding size $|\mathcal{X}_1|$. With this noisy feedback from the destination, the received signal at the source, wiretapper and destination are

$$y_0(i) = x(i) + x_1(i) + n_0(i),$$
$$y(i) = x(i) + x_1(i) + n_1(i),$$

and

$$z(i) = x(i) + x_1(i) + n_2(i),$$

respectively. Here $Y_0 \in \mathcal{Y}_0 = \{0, 1, \ldots, |\mathcal{Y}_0| - 1\}$ is the received noisy feedback signal at the source and $N_0$ is the feedback noise, which may be correlated with $N_1$ and $N_2$. We denote the alphabet size of $N_0$ and $Y_0$ by $|\mathcal{Y}_0|$. Again, all ‘+’ operation should be understood to be modulo addition with corresponding alphabet size.

Now, the source wishes to send the message $W \in \mathcal{W} = \{1, \ldots, M\}$ to the destination using a $(M, n)$ code consisting of: 1) a casual stochastic encoder $f$ at the source that maps the message
and the received noisy feedback signal $y_{i-1}$ to a codeword $x \in \mathcal{X}^n$ with

$$x(i) = f(i, w, y_{i-1}),$$

(2)

2) a stochastic feedback encoder $\Psi$ at the destination that maps the received signal into $X_1(i)$ with $x_1(i) = \Psi(y_{i-1})$ and 3) a decoding function at the destination $d: \mathcal{Y}^n \rightarrow \mathcal{W}$. The average error probability of the $(M, n)$ code is

$$P_e^n = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{w \in \mathcal{W}} \Pr\{d(y) \neq w \mid w \text{ was sent}\}.$$  

(3)

The equivocation rate at the wiretapper is defined as

$$R_e = \frac{1}{n} H(W | Z).$$

(4)

We are interested in perfectly secure transmission rates defined as follows.

**Definition 1:** A secrecy rate $R^f$ is said to be achievable over the wiretap channel with noisy feedback if for any $\epsilon > 0$, there exists a sequence of codes $(M, n)$ such that for any $n \geq n(\epsilon)$, we have

$$R^f = \frac{1}{n} \log_2 M,$$

(5)

$$P_e^n \leq \epsilon,$$

(6)

$$\frac{1}{n} H(W | Z) \geq R^f - \epsilon.$$  

(7)

**Definition 2:** The secrecy capacity with noisy feedback $C^f_s$ is the maximum rate at which messages can be sent to the destination with perfect secrecy; i.e.

$$C^f_s = \sup_{f, \Psi} \{R^f: R^f \text{ is achievable}\}.$$  

(8)

Note that in our model, the wiretapper is assumed to have unlimited computation resources and to know the coding scheme of the source and the feedback function $\Psi$ used by the destination. We believe that our feedback model captures realistic scenarios where the terminals exchange information over noisy channels.

### III. THE WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH FULL-DUPLEX FEEDBACK

#### A. Known Results

The secrecy capacity of the wiretap DMC without feedback $C_s$ was characterized in [5]. Specializing to our modulo-additive channel, one obtains

$$C_s = \max_{V \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y, Z} [I(V; Y) - I(V; Z)]^+.$$  

(9)
The wiretap DMC with public discussion was introduced and analyzed in [6], [7]. More specifically, these papers considered a more general model in which all the nodes observe correlated variables, and there exists an extra noiseless public channel with infinite capacity, through which both the source and the destination can send information. Combining the correlated variables and the publicly discussed messages, the source and the destination generate a key about which the wiretap only has negligible information. Please refer to [7] for rigorous definitions of these notions. Since the public discussion channel is noiseless, the wiretapper is assumed to observe a noiseless version of the information transmitted over it. It is worth noting that some of the schemes proposed in [6], [7] manage only to generate an identical secret key at both the source and destination. The source may then need to encrypt its message using the one-time pad scheme which reduces the effective source-destination information rate. Thus, the effective secrecy rate that could be used to transmit information from the source to the destination may be less than the results reported in [6], [7]. Nevertheless, we use these results for comparison purposes (which is generous to the public discussion paradigm). The following theorem gives upper and lower bounds on the secret key capacity of the public discussion paradigm $C_p^s$.

**Theorem 3 ([6], [7]):** The secret key capacity of the public discussion approach satisfies the following conditions:

$$\max\{\max_{P_X} [I(X;Y) - I(X;Z)], \max_{P_X} [I(X;Y) - I(Y;Z)]\} \leq C_p^s \leq \min\{\max_{P_X} I(X;Y), \max_{P_X} I(X;Y|Z)\}.$$  \hfill (10)

**Proof:** Please refer to [6], [7].

These bounds are known to be tight in the following cases [6], [7].

1) $P_{YZ|X} = P_{Y|X}P_{Z|X}$, i.e., the main channel and the source-wiretapper channel are independent; in this case

$$C_p^s = \max_{P_X} \{I(X;Y) - I(Y;Z)\}. \hfill (10)$$

2) $P_{XZ|Y} = P_{X|Y}P_{Z|Y}$, i.e., $X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z$ forms a Markov chain, and hence the source-wiretapper channel is a degraded version of the main channel. In this case

$$C_p^s = \max_{P_X} \{I(X;Y) - I(X;Z)\}. \hfill (11)$$

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4 The wiretap channel model is a particular mechanism for the nodes to observe the correlated variables, and corresponds to the “channel type model” studied in [7].
This is also the secrecy capacity of the degraded wiretap channel without feedback. Hence public discussion does not increase the secrecy capacity for the degraded wiretap channel.

3) \( P_{XY|Z} = P_{X|Z} P_{Y|Z} \), i.e., \( X \rightarrow Z \rightarrow Y \), so that the main channel is a degraded version of the wiretap channel. In this case

\[
C^p_s = 0. \tag{12}
\]

Again, public discussion does not help in this scenario.

B. The Main Result

Before presenting the main theorem, we present the crypto lemma which will be intensively used later.

**Lemma 4 (Crypto Lemma [28]):** Let \( G \) be a compact abelian group with group operation ‘+’,

and let \( Y = X + X_1 \), where \( X \) and \( X_1 \) are random variables over \( G \) and \( X_1 \) is independent of \( X \) and uniform over \( G \). Then \( Y \) is independent of \( X \) and uniform over \( G \).

**Proof:** Please refer to [28]. ■

The following theorem characterizes the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with noisy feedback. Moreover, achievability is established through a novel encryption scheme that exploits the modulo-additive structure of the channel and uses a private key known only to the destination.

**Theorem 5:** The secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless modulo-additive wiretap channel with noisy feedback is

\[
C^f_s = C, \tag{13}
\]

where \( C \) is the capacity of the main channel in the absence of the wiretapper.

**Proof:**
1. Converse.

Let

\[
\mathcal{R}^f = \{ R^f : \text{there exists a coding scheme that satisfies (5)-(7) for } R^f \}. \tag{14}
\]

Also, let

\[
\mathcal{R} = \{ R : \text{there exists a coding scheme that satisfies (5)-(6) for } R \}. \tag{15}
\]
Obviously $\mathcal{R}^f \subseteq \mathcal{R}$, since we are dropping off the equivocation condition (7), i.e., we are ignoring the wiretapper. Hence we have $C_s^f = \sup \mathcal{R}^f \leq \sup \mathcal{R}$. It is clear that $\mathcal{R}$ is the set of reliable transmission rate of an ordinary DMC channel with feedback. It is well known that feedback does not increase the capacity of discrete memoryless channels, hence we have

$$C_s^f = \sup \mathcal{R}^f \leq \sup \mathcal{R} = C. \quad (16)$$

2. Achievability.

For any given input probability mass function $p(x)$, we use the following scheme.

1) Coding at the source.

The source ignores the feedback signal and uses a channel coding scheme for the ordinary channel without wiretapper. More specifically, the source generates $M = 2^{R^f}$ length-$n$ codewords $x$ with probability

$$p(x) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p(x(i)).$$

When the source needs to send message $w \in \mathcal{W}$, it sends the corresponding codeword $x(w)$.

2) Feedback at the destination.

The destination sets $\mathcal{X}_1 = \mathcal{Z}$, and at any time $i$ sets $x_1(i) = a, a \in \{0, \ldots, |\mathcal{Z}| - 1\}$ with probability $1/|\mathcal{Z}|$. Hence $x_1$ is uniformly distributed over $\mathcal{Z}^n$.

3) Decoding at the destination.

After receiving $y$, the destination sets $\hat{y} = y - x_1$, here ‘−’ is understood to be a component-wise modulo $|\mathcal{Y}|$ operation. It is easy to see that $\hat{y} = x + n_1$. The destination then claims that $\hat{w}$ was sent, if $(\hat{y}, x(\hat{w}))$ are jointly typical. For any given $\epsilon > 0$, the probability that $\hat{w} \neq w$ goes to zero, if $R^f = I(X; \hat{Y}) - \epsilon = I(X; Y|X_1) - \epsilon$ and $n$ is large enough. The channel $X \rightarrow \hat{Y}$ is equivalent to the main channel without feedback. Hence as long as $R^f < C$, there exists a code with sufficient code-length such that $P_{e}^n \leq \epsilon$ for any $\epsilon > 0$.

4) Equivocation at the wiretapper.

The wiretapper will receive

$$z = x + x_1 + n_2, \quad (17)$$
and $x_1$ is uniformly distributed over $\mathcal{Z}^n$ and is independent with $x$. Based on the crypto lemma, for any given $x$, $x + X_1$ is uniformly distributed over $\mathcal{Z}^n$, and hence $z$ is uniformly distributed over $\mathcal{Z}^n$ for any transmitted codeword $x$ and noise realization $n_2$. Moreover $Z$ is independent with $X$, thus

$$I(X; Z) = 0. \quad (18)$$

Hence we have $I(W; Z) \leq I(X; Z) = 0$, thus

$$\frac{1}{n} H(W|Z) = \frac{H(W) - I(W; Z)}{n} = R^f, \quad (19)$$

and we achieve perfect secrecy.

This completes the proof.

The following observations are now in order.

1) Our scheme achieves $I(W; Z) = 0$. This implies perfect secrecy in the strong sense of Shannon [1] as opposed to Wyner’s notion of perfect secrecy [2], which has been pointed out to be insufficient for certain encryption applications [3].

2) The enabling observation behind our achievability scheme is that, by judiciously exploiting the modulo-additive structure of the channel, one can render the channel output at the wiretapper independent from the codeword transmitted by the source. Here, the feedback signal $x_1$ serves as a private key and the encryption operation is carried out by the channel. Instead of requiring both the source and destination to know a common encryption key, we show that only the destination needs to know the encryption key, hence eliminating the burden of secret key distribution.

3) Remarkably, the secrecy capacity with noisy feedback is shown to be larger than the secret key capacity of public discussion schemes. This point will be further illustrated by the binary symmetric channel example discussed next. This presents a marked departure from the conventional wisdom, inspired by the data processing inequality, which suggests the superiority of noiseless feedback. This result is due to the fact that the noiseless feedback signal is also available to the wiretapper, while in the proposed noisy feedback scheme neither the source nor the wiretapper knows the feedback signal perfectly. In fact, the source in our scheme ignores the feedback signal, which is used primarily to confuse the wiretapper.
4) Our result shows that complicated feedback functions $\Psi$ are not needed to achieve optimal performance in this setting (i.e., a random number generator suffices). Also, the alphabet size of the feedback signal can be set equal to the alphabet size of the wiretapper channel and the coding scheme used by the source is the same as the one used in the absence of the wiretapper.

C. The Binary Symmetric Channel Example

![Figure 1: The Binary Symmetric Wiretap Channel.](image)

To illustrate the idea of encryption over the channel, we consider in some details the wiretap BSC shown in Figure 1, where $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{Y} = \mathcal{Z} = \{0, 1\}$, $\Pr\{n_1 = 1\} = \epsilon$ and $\Pr\{n_2 = 1\} = \delta$. The secrecy capacity of this channel without feedback is known to be [6]

$$C_s = [H(\delta) - H(\epsilon)]^+,$$

with $H(x) = -x \log x - (1-x) \log (1-x)$. We differentiate between the following special cases.

1) $\epsilon = \delta = 0$.

In this case, both the main channel and wiretap channel are noiseless, hence

$$C_s = 0.$$  

Also we have

$$C_s^p = 0,$$

since the wiretapper sees exactly the same as what the destination sees. Specializing our scheme to this BSC channel, at time $i$, the destination randomly chooses $x_1(i) = 1$ with probability 1/2 and sends $x_1(i)$ over the channel. This creates a virtual BSC at the
wiretapper with $\delta' = 1/2$. On the other hand, since the destination knows the value of $x_1(i)$, it can cancel it by adding $x_1(i)$ to the received signal. This converts the original channel to an equivalent BSC with $\epsilon' = 0$. Hence, through our noisy feedback approach, we obtain an equivalent wiretap BSC with parameters $\epsilon' = 0, \delta' = 1/2$ resulting in

$$C_s^f = H(\delta') - H(\epsilon') = 1.$$  

2) $0 < \delta < \epsilon < 1/2$, $N_1$ and $N_2$ are independent.

Since $\delta < \epsilon$, we have

$$C_s = 0.$$  

Also, $N_1$ and $N_2$ are independent, so $P_{YZ|X} = P_{Y|X} P_{Z|X}$. Then from (10), one can easily obtain that [6]

$$C_s^p = H(\epsilon + \delta - 2\epsilon\delta) - H(\epsilon).$$

Our feedback scheme, on the other hand, achieves

$$C_s^f = 1 - H(\epsilon).$$

Since $H(\epsilon + \delta - 2\epsilon\delta) \leq 1$, we have $C_s^f \geq C_s^p$ with equality if and only if $\epsilon + \delta - 2\epsilon\delta = 1/2$.

3) $0 < \delta < \epsilon < 1/2$ and $N_1(i) = N_2(i) + N'(i)$, where $\Pr\{n'(i) = 1\} = (\epsilon - \delta)/(1 - 2\delta)$.

The main channel is a degraded version of the source-wiretapper channel, $X \rightarrow Z \rightarrow Y$, as shown in Figure 2.

![Fig. 2. The BSC Wiretap Channel with a Degraded Main Channel.](image)

Hence, from (12), we have

$$C_s = C_s^p = 0,$$

while $C_s^f = 1 - H(\epsilon)$.

4) $0 < \epsilon < \delta < 1/2$, and $N_2(i) = N_1(i) + N'(i)$, where $\Pr\{n'(i) = 1\} = (\delta - \epsilon)/(1 - 2\epsilon)$. 

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In this case, the source-wiretapper channel is a degraded version of the main channel as shown in Figure 3; $X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z$, so from (11)

$$C_s = C_p^s = H(\delta) - H(\epsilon).$$

But

$$C_f^s = 1 - H(\epsilon) \geq C_p^s$$

with equality if and only if $\delta = 1/2$.

5) $N_1$ and $N_2$ are correlated and the channel is not degraded.

In this case

$$C_s = [H(\delta) - H(\epsilon)]^+. $$

The value of $C_p^s$ is unknown in this case but can be bounded by

$$C_s = [H(\delta) - H(\epsilon)]^+ \leq C_p^s \leq 1 - H(\epsilon) = C_f^s.$$ 

In summary, the secrecy capacity with noisy feedback is always larger than or equal to that of the public discussion paradigm when the underlying wiretap channel is a BSC. More strongly, the gain offered by the noisy feedback approach, over the public discussion paradigm, is rather significant in many relevant special cases.

IV. EVEN HALF-DUPLEX FEEDBACK IS SUFFICIENT

It is reasonable to argue against the practicality of the full duplex assumption adopted in the previous section. For example, in the wireless setting, nodes may not be able to transmit and receive with the same degree of freedom due to the large difference between the power levels of the transmit and receive chains. This motivates extending our results to the half duplex wiretap channel where the terminals can either transmit or receive but never both at the same time. Under
this situation, if the destination wishes to feed back at time $i$, it loses the opportunity to receive the $i^{th}$ symbol transmitted by the source, which effectively results in an erasure (assuming that the source is unaware of the destination decision). The proper feedback strategy must, therefore, strike a balance between confusing the wiretapper and degrading the source-destination link. In order to simplify the following presentation, we first focus on the wiretap BSC. The extension to arbitrary modulo-additive channels is briefly outlined afterwards.

In the full-duplex case, at any time $i$, the optimal scheme is to let the destination send $x_1(i)$, which equals 0 or 1 with probability 1/2 respectively. But in the half-duplex case, if the destination always keeps sending, it does not have a chance to receive information from the source, and hence, the achievable secrecy rate is zero. This problem, however, can be solved by observing that if at time $i$, $x_1(i) = 0$, the signal the wiretapper receives, i.e.,

$$z(i) = x_1(i) + n_2(i),$$

is the same as in the case in which the destination does not transmit. The only crucial difference in this case is that the wiretapper does not know whether the feedback has taken place or not, since $x_1(i)$ can be randomly generated at the destination and kept private.

The previous discussion inspires the following feedback scheme for the half-duplex channel. The destination first fixes a faction $0 \leq t \leq 1$ which is revealed to both the source and wiretapper. At time $i$, the destination randomly generates $x_1(i) = 1$ with probability $t$ and $x_1(i) = 0$ with probability $1 - t$. If $x_1(i) = 1$, the destination sends $x_1(i)$ over the channel, which causes an erasure at the destination and a potential error at the wiretapper. On the other hand, when $x_1(i) = 0$, the destination does not send a feedback signal and spends the time on receiving from the channel. The key to this scheme is that although the source and wiretapper know $t$, neither is aware of the exact timing of the event $x_1 = 1$. The source ignores the feedback and keeps sending information. The following result characterizes the achievable secrecy rate with the proposed feedback scheme.

**Theorem 6:** For a BSC with half-duplex nodes and parameters $\epsilon$ and $\delta$, the scheme proposed above achieves

$$R_s^f = \max_{\mu, t} \left[ (1 - t) \left[ H(\epsilon + \mu - 2\mu \epsilon) - H(\epsilon) \right] - \left[ H(\hat{\delta} + \mu - 2\mu \hat{\delta}) - H(\hat{\delta}) \right] \right]^+, \quad (20)$$

with $\hat{\delta} = \delta + t - 2\delta t$. 

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Proof: For the main channel, if the destination spends a $t$ fraction of its time on sending, the equivalent main channel is shown in Figure 4 with output $\hat{y} \in \{0, \phi, 1\}$, where $\phi$ represents an erasure. The erasure probability is $t$. In the remaining $1-t$ fraction of the time, the channel is a BSC with parameter $\epsilon$. Hence, the transition matrix of this equivalent channel is

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
(1-t)(1-\epsilon) & t & (1-t)\epsilon \\
(1-t)\epsilon & t & (1-t)(1-\epsilon)
\end{pmatrix}.
$$

Meanwhile for the wiretapper, the equivalent channel is still a BSC, but with the increased error probability

$$\hat{\delta} = (1-t)\delta + t(1-\delta) = \delta + t - 2\delta t. \quad (21)$$

Hence the original BSC wiretap channel with noisy feedback is equivalent to a new wiretap channel $X \rightarrow (\hat{Y}, Z)$ without feedback, and the channel parameters are given as above.

As shown in [5], for this equivalent wiretap channel the following secrecy rate is achievable for any input distribution $P_X$:

$$R^f = [I(X; \hat{Y}) - I(X; Z)]^+. \quad (22)$$

Hence, by using the input distribution $\Pr\{X = 1\} = \mu$, one can see that

$$R^f = \max_{\mu,t} [ (1-t)[H(\epsilon + \mu - 2\mu\epsilon) - H(\epsilon)] - [H(\hat{\delta} + \mu - 2\mu\hat{\delta}) - H(\hat{\delta})] ]^+ \quad (23)$$

is achievable.

In general, one can obtain the optimal values of $\mu$ and $t$ by setting the partial derivative of $R^f$, with respect to $\mu$ and $t$ to 0, and solving the corresponding equations. Unfortunately, except for some special cases, we do not have a closed form solution for these equations at the moment. Interestingly, using the not necessarily optimal choice of $\mu = t = 1/2$, we obtain
\( R_f = \frac{1 - H(\epsilon)}{2} \) implying that we can achieve a nonzero secrecy rate as long as \( \epsilon \neq 1/2 \) irrespective of the wiretapper channel conditions. Hence, even for half-duplex nodes, noisy feedback from the destination allows for transmitting information securely for almost any wiretap BSC. Finally, we compare the performance of different schemes in some special cases of the wiretap BSC.

1) \( \epsilon = \delta = 0 \).

As mentioned above, here we have \( C_s = C_{ps} = 0 \). It is easy to verify that the optimal choice of \( \mu \) and \( t \) are 1/2, and we thus have \( R_f^s = 1/2 \).

2) \( 0 < \delta < \epsilon < 1/2 \) and \( N_1(i) = N_2(i) + N'(i) \), where \( \Pr\{n'(i) = 1\} = (\epsilon - \delta)/(1 - 2\delta) \).

The main channel is a degraded version of the wiretap channel, so

\[ C_s = C_{ps} = 0. \tag{24} \]

But by setting \( \mu = t = 1/2 \) in our half-duplex noisy feedback scheme, we obtain \( R_f^s = (1 - H(\epsilon))/2 \).

The extension to the general discrete modulo-additive channel is natural. The destination can set \( X_1 = Z \), and generates \( x_1(i) \) with certain distribution \( P_{X_1} \). At time \( i \), if the randomly generated \( x_1(i) \neq 0 \), the destination sends a feedback signal, incurring an erasure to itself. On the other hand, if \( x_1(i) = 0 \), it does not send the feedback signal and spends the time listening to the source. The achievable performance could be calculated based on the equivalent channels as done in the BSC. This scheme guarantees a positive secrecy capacity as seen in the case where \( P_{X_1} \) is chosen to be uniformly distributed over \( Z \). This is because a uniform distribution over \( Z \) renders the output at the wiretapper independent from the source input, i.e., \( I(W; Z) = 0 \), while the destination can still spend \( 1/|Z| \) part of the time listening to the source. Finding the optimal distribution \( P_{X_1} \), however, is tedious.

V. THE MODULO-\( \Lambda \) CHANNEL

In this section, we take a step towards extending our approach to continuous valued channels. In particular, we consider the Modulo-\( \Lambda \) channel [29]–[32]. This choice is motivated by two considerations 1) this channel still enjoys the modulo structure which proved instrumental in deriving our results in the discrete case, and 2) the modulo-\( \Lambda \) channel has been shown to play an important role in achieving the capacity of the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel.
using lattice coding/decoding techniques \[31\] (in other words, an AWGN source-destination channel can be well approximated by a Modulo-\(\Lambda\) channel). In the following, we show that, similar to the discrete case, noisy feedback can increase the secrecy capacity of the wiretap modulo-\(\Lambda\) channel to that of the main channel capacity in the absence of the wiretapper.

Before proceeding further, we need to introduce few more definitions. An \(m\)-dimensional lattice \(\Lambda \subset \mathbb{R}^m\) is a set of points
\[
\Lambda \triangleq \{ \lambda = Gu : u \in \mathbb{Z}^m \},
\] (25)
where \(G \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times m}\) denotes the lattice generator matrix. A fundamental region \(\Omega \in \mathbb{R}^m\) of \(\Lambda\) is a set such that each \(x \in \mathbb{R}^m\) can be written uniquely in the form \(x = \lambda + e\) with \(\lambda \in \Lambda, e \in \Omega\), and \(\mathbb{R}^m = \Lambda + \Omega\). There are many different choices of the fundamental region, each with the same volume which will be denoted as \(V(\Lambda)\). Given a lattice \(\Lambda\), a fundamental region \(\Omega\) of \(\Lambda\), and a zero-mean white Gaussian noise process with variance \(\sigma_1^2\) per dimension, the mod-\(\Lambda\) channel is defined as follows \[29\].

Definition 7 (\[29\]): The input of the mod-\(\Lambda\) channel consists of points \(X \in \Omega\); the output of the mod-\(\Lambda\) channel is \(Y = (X + N_1) \mod \Lambda\), where \(N_1\) is an \(m\)-dimensional white Gaussian noise variable with variance \(\sigma_1^2\) per dimension. Hence \(Y\) is the unique element of \(\Omega\) that is congruent to \(X + N_1\).

In our wiretap mod-\(\Lambda\) channel, the output at the wiretapper (in the absence of feedback) is also given by \(Z = (X + N_2) \mod \Lambda\). Here \(N_2\) is an \(m\)-dimensional white Gaussian noise variable with variance \(\sigma_2^2\) per dimension. Similar to Section \[3\] we consider noisy feedback, where the destination sends a feedback signal \(X_1 \in \Omega\) based on its received signal, and the received signal at the source is \(Y_0 = (X + X_1 + N_0) \mod \Lambda\), where \(N_0\) is an \(m\)-dimensional white Gaussian noise with variance \(\sigma_0^2\) per dimension. Now, the received signal at the destination and wiretapper are \(Y = (X + X_1 + N_1) \mod \Lambda\) and \(Z = (X + X_1 + N_2) \mod \Lambda\), respectively.

For example, if \(m = 1\), \(\Lambda = \mathbb{Z}\) is a lattice in \(\mathbb{R}\), with \([-1/2, 1/2)\) being one of its fundamental regions. With this lattice and fundamental region, the output at the destination is then
\[
Y = (X + X_1 + N_1) \mod \Lambda = X + X_1 + N_1 - \lfloor X + X_1 + N_1 + 1/2 \rfloor,
\]
where \(N_1\) is a one-dimensional Gaussian random variable with variance \(\sigma_1^2\). Here \(\lfloor x \rfloor\) denotes the largest integer that is smaller than \(x\). One can easily check that \(Y \in [1/2, 1/2)\). The output at the wiretapper and source can be written in a similar manner. This \(m = 1\) example can be viewed as the continuous counterpart.
of the discrete channels considered in Section III.

Let \( N' = N_1 \mod \Lambda \), and let \( f_{\Lambda,\sigma_1^2}(n') \) be the probability density function of \( N' \), one can easily verify that \[ f_{\Lambda,\sigma_1^2}(n') = \sum_{b \in \Lambda} (2\pi\sigma_1^2)^{-\frac{n'}{2}} \exp^{-\frac{||n'+b||^2}{2\sigma_1^2}}, n' \in \Omega. \] (26)

Denote the differential entropy of the noise term \( N' \) by \( h(\Lambda, \sigma_1^2) \). Then

\[ h(\Lambda, \sigma_1^2) = -\int_{\Omega(\Lambda)} f_{\Lambda,\sigma_1^2}(n') \log f_{\Lambda,\sigma_1^2}(n') \, dn'. \] (27)

We are now ready to prove the following.

**Theorem 8:** The secrecy capacity of mod-\( \Lambda \) channel with noisy feedback is

\[ C_s^{f} = \log(V(\Lambda)) - h(\Lambda, \sigma_1^2). \] (28)

**Proof:** The proof follows along the same lines as that of Theorem 5. For the converse, (28) was shown to be the capacity of the mod-\( \Lambda \) channel with the absence of the wiretap in [29], which naturally serves as an upper-bound for the secrecy capacity, as argued in the proof of Theorem 5.

To achieve this secrecy capacity, the source generates length-\( n \) codewords \( x \), with the \( i \)th element \( x(i) \) being chosen uniformly from \( \Omega \). Hence each codeword \( x \in \Omega^n \subset \mathbb{R}^{n \times m} \). Now, at time \( i \), the destination generates feedback signals \( x_1(i) \) with uniform distribution over the set \( \Omega \), and thus the feedback signal \( X_1 \) is uniformly distributed over \( \Omega^n \). Based on the crypto lemma, for any codeword \( x \) and any particular noise realization \( n_1 \), the length-\( n \) random variable received at the wiretapper

\[ Z = x + X_1 + n_1 \mod \Lambda, \]

is uniformly distributed over \( \Omega^n \) and is independent with \( X \). Hence, we have

\[ I(X; Z) = 0. \] (29)

On the other hand, with \( X \) uniformly distributed over \( \Omega^n \), the mutual information between \( X \) and \( Y \) given \( X_1 \) (the destination knows \( X_1 \)) is

\[ \frac{1}{n} I(X; Y|X_1) = \log(V(\Lambda)) - h(\Lambda, \sigma_1^2). \] (30)

So, for any \( \epsilon > 0 \), there exists a code with rate \( R^f = C^f - \epsilon \) and \( I(M; Z) = 0 \). This completes the achievability part.

\[ \square \]
Our result for the modulo-\(\Lambda\) channel sheds some light on the more challenging scenario of the wiretap AWGN channel with feedback. The difference between the two cases results from the modulo restrictions imposed on the destination and wiretapper outputs. The first constraint does not entail any loss of generality due to the optimality of the modulo-\(\Lambda\) approach in the AWGN setting [31]. Relaxing the second constraint, however, poses a challenge because it destroys the modulo structure necessary to hide the information from the wiretapper (i.e., the crypto lemma needs the group structure). In other words, if the wiretapper is not limited by the modulo-operation then it can gain some additional information about the source message from its observations. Therefore, finding the secrecy capacity of the wiretap AWGN channel remains elusive (at the moment, we can only compute achievable rates using Gaussian noise as the feedback signal).

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have obtained the secrecy capacity (or achievable rate) for several instantiations of the wiretap channel with noisy feedback. More specifically, with a full duplex destination, it has been shown that the secrecy capacity of modulo-additive channels is equal to the capacity of the source-destination channel in the absence of the wiretapper. Furthermore, the secrecy capacity is achieved with a simple scheme in which the destination randomly chooses its feedback signal from a certain alphabet set. Interestingly, with a slightly modified feedback scheme, we are able to achieve a positive secrecy rate for the half duplex channel. Overall, our work has revealed a new encryption paradigm that exploits the structure of the wiretap channel and uses a private key known only to the destination. We have shown that this paradigm significantly outperforms the public discussion approach for sharing private keys between the source and destination.

Our results motivate several interesting directions for future research. For example, characterizing the secrecy capacity of arbitrary DMCs (and the AWGN channel) with feedback remains an open problem. From an algorithmic perspective, it is also important to understand how to exploit different channel structures (in addition to the modulo-additive one) for encryption purposes. Finally, extending our work to multi-user channel (e.g., the relay-eavesdropper channel [26]) is of definite interest.
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