China’s Peaceful Rise and the Security Dilemma: A Theoretical Assessment of the Possibility and Inevitability of War

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The People’s Republic of China’s rapid accession to great power status has shifted the centre of gravity in international relations. China’s rise has produced a heated debate between scholars and policy makers concerning whether or not China can rise peacefully. History is riddled with numerous examples that illustrate the potential conflict that a rising power can produce. The security dilemma concept provides a useful theoretical framework for assessing the probability of war and is essential for understanding the role of misperception in exacerbating and mitigating international conflict. Rapidly growing military expenditures, the U.S. pivot to Asia and the triangular relationship between Beijing, Washington and Tokyo seem to suggest a chaotic future. However, cooperation between these states and the pursuit of foreign policies that address deep insecurities are a source of optimism and hope. China’s peaceful rise is entirely possible and dependent on a genuine desire to mitigate the destructive consequences produced by the security dilemma.

Introduction

Since Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms and open-door policy beginning in 1978, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has experienced incredible growth in its economic productivity, prosperity and presence on the international stage. Without a doubt, China’s rise has altered the primary focus of many states’ foreign policies and transformed the centre of gravity in international relations. The United Nations' 2010 Human Development Report concluded that, “China has seen the fastest growth in income . . . in the past 40 years,” and a, “21-fold increase in GDP per capita.” Despite a slow-down in GDP growth in 2011, China remains an economic powerhouse as the world’s largest manufacturing

1. Ming, Wan. 2014. The China Model and Global Political Economy: Comparison, Impact, and Interaction. London: Routledge, 2014. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost (accessed February 15, 2015), 3.
nation, trading power, and holder of foreign reserve, “which reached $3.3 trillion by [the] end of 2012.”\(^2\) This exceptional growth has coincided with a significant increase in military spending. China’s defense budget is second in the world, and over the past decade its budget, “increased at a rate far exceeding that of any other major power . . . ”\(^3\) This developmental trajectory raises a few important questions. What does China’s economic growth and military investments mean for stability in a post-war on terror world? Is China a revisionist power seeking to undermine world order, or is it a status quo power concerned with economic well-being and stability? How have the United States and other Asia-Pacific actors responded? In this article, I argue that China’s ability to rise peacefully is contingent upon addressing the security dilemma and the will of the United States, China and regional actors such as Japan to prevent it from spiralling into a direct military confrontation. China’s peaceful rise is entirely possible. It is the responsibility of the PRC, the United States, and regional actors in the Asia-Pacific to pursue foreign policies that are conducive to peace. My argument shall proceed as follows. Firstly, I briefly summarize arguments that oppose the idea that China can rise peacefully. Secondly, I describe the theoretical concept known as the security dilemma, explaining how it is applicable to the maintenance of peace. Thirdly, I analyze the three factors contributing to a security dilemma in the region: uncertainty concerning China’s military expenditures, the U.S. pivot to Asia, and the relationship of Beijing and Washington to Japan. Finally, I present modest policy suggestions that all three states should focus on implementing if they want to ensure peace. China’s ability to rise peacefully is entirely possible and can be encouraged through foreign policies that mitigate the security dilemma and its destructive consequences.

**China’s Rapid Rise**

There is little doubt that China is rising.\(^4\) Rather, China’s rise has fuelled debates among prominent scholars about her ability to rise peacefully. John Mearsheimer, an offensive realist and American Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago contends that China cannot rise peacefully. His realist perspective is premised on three theoretical assumptions about the international system: states operate in an anarchical system with no higher authority, the offensive capabilities of great powers give them the means to attack each other, and the intentions of states cannot be known.\(^5\) Accordingly, China’s economic growth, its desire to become a regional hegemon and America’s desire to prevent this makes it likely that they will, “engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.”\(^6\) Mearsheimer’s argument against a peaceful rise has been supplemented by additional work based on power transition theory. Power transition theory, in the Chinese context, asserts that China’s rise is, “most likely dangerous because it . . . pose[s] a threat to others in the region who have long enjoyed the benefits of an international order underpinned by American power.”\(^7\) In his analysis of

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\(^2\) Ibid., 3-4.

\(^3\) Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson. "Demystifying China’s Defense Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate." The China Quarterly no. 216 (2013): General OneFile, EBSCOhost (accessed March 1, 2015), 6.

\(^4\) Jianyong JY. Yue, "Peaceful Rise of China: Myth or Reality?." International Politics 45, no. 4 (July 2008): 439-456. Political Science Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed March 9, 2015), 440.

\(^5\) John J. Mearsheimer, “Why China’s Rise Will Not Be Peaceful.” (2004), 1.

\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Avery Goldstein, "Power Transitions, Institutions, and China’s rise in East Asia: Theoretical Expectations and Evidence." Journal Of Strategic Studies 30, no. 4-5 (n.d.): 639-682. Social Sciences Citation Index, EBSCOhost (accessed March 5, 2015), 640.
the continuing conflict across the Taiwan Strait, Avery Goldstein explains that China’s increasing political and economic power in the Taiwan Strait and increasing power vis-à-vis the United States, will, “make it possible to realize changes in the status quo that are too difficult and costly at the present.” In addition, although the U.S. has stated that it, “will not be entrapped in a conflict that results from Taiwanese recklessness,” this fear is mitigated by Washington’s desire to preserve its international reputation. The historical focus of China and Taiwan on relative gains rather than absolute gains through cooperation, makes the Taiwan Strait, “a potential flashpoint for Sino-American conflict.” Evidently, based on these arguments, direct confrontation with China seems likely. However, is this really the case?

**Possibility of Peace and the Security Dilemma**

Although evidence against China’s peaceful rise is strong, I remain steadfast in my view that China’s peaceful rise is entirely possible. Before I explain why, I should note that in numerous ways the perspectives described above can be connected to the security dilemma. The security dilemma is a classical theoretical framework in international relations which asserts that, “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.” Robert Jervis aptly explains that, “one state’s gain in security often inadvertently threatens others,” creating a situation where, “two states which support the status quo but do not understand the security dilemma,” could end up in war or conflict.” Thus, insecurity and suspicion may lead to a result that is antithetical to the real interests of either state. Due to the fact that the international system has no element of higher authority, states are correct in remaining vigilant of military build-ups that threaten their security. The self-help nature of the international system where, “there is no higher authority to counter the use of force,” means that, “states must ultimately rely on themselves to achieve security.” There exists no reliable international force that will keep aggressive states at bay. Subsequently, it is my contention that it is not unreasonable for a state to respond with greater defense spending of their own to guarantee survival.

The existence of a security dilemma between the United States and China would greatly influence the ability of the latter to rise peacefully. Many scholars have used this theoretical concept as a framework for understanding the Sino-U.S. relationship. Some individuals may assert that China’s rise inevitably results in a security dilemma, but is this really the case? How has the rise of China contributed to a Sino-U.S. security dilemma? Jie Dalei (2012) explains that the Sino-U.S. security dilemma first emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union. In essence, “the U.S. started to worry about China’s growing

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8. Ibid., 672.
9. Ibid., 674.
10. Ibid., 675.
11. Robert, Jervis. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics*, 1978., 167, *JSTOR Journals*, EBSCOhost (accessed March 2, 2015), 169.
12. Ibid., 170.
13. Ibid., 182.
14. John, Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens. The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Sixth ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 108.
15. Dalei, Jie. "The Asia-Pacific Pivot and U.S.-China Security Dilemma." *Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association* (January 2012): 1-17. *Political Science Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed March 1, 2015), 3.
military power and China was anxious about the U.S. reimposition of containment.”\textsuperscript{16} Evidently, the post-cold war shift in power also led to a shift in geopolitical focus.

**The Intentions of Beijing and Washington**

Firstly, it should be noted that Beijing and Washington want to avoid military confrontation. In the late 1990s, China responded to concerns about the insecurity its rise would produce through, “a reformulation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence declared in the 1950s” that emphasized respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, cooperation, and co-existence.\textsuperscript{17} This was followed by the articulation of a peaceful rise strategy in the early 2000s that some scholars believe showed Beijing’s recognition of the security dilemma.\textsuperscript{18} Similarly, the United States has shown a desire to maintain and build a peaceful relationship. In a 2009 speech, Barack Obama affirmed his belief, “in a future where China is a strong, prosperous and successful member of the community of nations.”\textsuperscript{19} This sentiment has continued throughout his presidential term, evident in his insistence that, “the United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful and prosperous China.”\textsuperscript{20} However, although both the United States and China seek peaceful coexistence, security dilemma theory asserts that confrontation remains a possibility because any actions to increase security on the part of one state, will lead to insecurity for the other.

**China’s Ambiguous Military Expenditures**

The first and primary factor contributing to a Sino-U.S. security dilemma is the uncertainty concerning China’s military modernization. China’s economic capacities have given it substantial resources to revamp its military. In 2012, in the same year that it succeeded the United States as the world’s largest trading economy, it also spent, “106 billion U.S. dollars on defense.”\textsuperscript{21} Although this figure pales in comparison to America’s average yearly defense expenditure of $700 billion, it has undoubtedly raised concerns in the eyes of U.S. policy makers. It has been argued that China’s increase in military spending is, “driven primarily by a desire to modernize and professionalize the PLA after decades of neglect . . .”\textsuperscript{22} Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on the concentration of resources in economic development has led some military officers to propose increased defense spending, “to compensate for

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Andrew, Scobell. 2012. "Learning to Rise Peacefully? China and the Security Dilemma." Journal Of Contemporary China 21, no. 76: 713-721. Humanities International Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed February 5, 2015), 718.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Tan, Seng and Kalyan Kemburi, "Introduction to the Special Issue--China-US Relations and Regional Order in the Era of Rebalancing: Asia-Pacific Perspectives." Issues & Studies 50, no. 3 (September 2014): 1-17. Political Science Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed March 7, 2015), 2.
\textsuperscript{20} Cheryl Pellerin, "Hagel, China’s Defense Minister Build Military Relations Model." US Department of Defense. April 8, 2014. Accessed March 13, 2015. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122006.
\textsuperscript{21} Seng and Kemburi, Introduction to the Special Issue, 3.
\textsuperscript{22} Liff and Erickson, Demystifying China’s Defense Spending, 807.
China’s decline . . . during the 1980s.”\textsuperscript{23} Thus, China’s military modernization seems to be in part motivated by genuine need. Even if this is true, the United States will have an, “unresolvable uncertainty as to whether those preparations are for,” defensive or offensive purposes.\textsuperscript{24}

The assertion that Chinese intentions are motivated solely by need is once again ambiguous in the case of China’s military investments in space. The PRC views space as, “a critical dimension of future warfare,” and a commander of the Chinese Air Force has even gone as far as to assert that the militarization of space is a, “historical inevitability.”\textsuperscript{25} Nigel Inkster notes that, “space has emerged as a domain characterised by a growing array of military operations, and one in which tensions . . . are increasingly played out.”\textsuperscript{26} The importance of space is evident in the fact that the capabilities of the U.S. armed forces are, “dependant on satellite-based communications.”\textsuperscript{27} If a state desired to undermine U.S. capabilities, investment in space technology would be a rational choice. Yet again, it is impossible to determine the exact intentions of Chinese military investments into space. On the one hand, it can be viewed as, “a response to the perceived U.S. threat to its national security.”\textsuperscript{28} Chinese investments in space are geared towards the goal of maintaining nuclear deterrence.\textsuperscript{29} In contrast, the investments could also be viewed as a measure designed to challenge U.S. space dominance. Because of this lack of clarity, the only logical response from both sides is to engage, “in a spiral of action-reaction space planning and/or activity.”\textsuperscript{30} The fact that it is extremely difficult to determine whether China’s military expenditures are based on a need to modernize the military or to challenge U.S. hegemony, reveals the essential role that misperceptions play in the security dilemma.

Scholars have noted that although militarization for security is an element of the security dilemma, it does not necessarily result in violent conflict. States that have powerful militaries have the capacity to act aggressively and assert themselves. However, a state will be aggressive only when, “the benefits to be gained outweigh the likely costs a state would pay.”\textsuperscript{31} In the case of China, militarization does not equate to confrontation with the U.S. or other Asian states. China may be investing in its military, but, “the damage to decades of economic reforms in terms of lost trade, foreign investment . . . technology . . . and participation in an international order that has facilitated greatly its rise” prevents its substantial use of military resources.\textsuperscript{32} Additionally, China’s use of bilateral agreements and restraint in using military force to conquer lands, indicates that future expansion may be unlikely.\textsuperscript{33} In contrast,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Taylor M. Fravel, "International Relations Theory and China's Rise: Assessing China's Potential for Territorial Expansion." \textit{International Studies Review} 12, no. 4 (December 2010): 505-532. \textit{Political Science Complete}, EBSCOhost (accessed March 6, 2015), 522.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Baylis, Smith, and Owens, \textit{The Globalization}, 109.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Baohui, Zhang. "The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship: The Prospects for Arms Control." \textit{Asian Survey} 51, no. 2 (March 2011): 311. MasterFILE Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed March 16, 2015), 311-312.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Nigel Inkster, "Conflict Foretold: America and China." \textit{Survival (00396338)} 55, no. 5 (October 2013): 7-28. \textit{Political Science Complete}, EBSCOhost (accessed March 15, 2015), 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid., \textit{The Security Dilemma}, 312.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 314.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 313.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Fravel, \textit{International Relations Theory}, 506.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
Russia’s persistent backing of separatists in Crimea shows the use of military capabilities to actively challenge Ukraine’s sovereignty.

**The U.S. Pivot to Asia**

The second factor that has the potential to fuel the security dilemma focuses on the U.S. strategic pivot to Asia that began under Barack Obama’s first administration. Following its decision to withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. proceeded to emphasize, “a renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific region” with militaristic components, commitments to Asian multilateral diplomacy, and solidifying the Trans-Pacific Partnership regional trade zone.\(^{34}\) There has been significant debate over whether or not the pivot has helped reduce the security dilemma or exacerbated it. In their analysis of scholarly and public debate in mainland China, Dong Wang and Chengzhi Yin found that although Chinese policy makers desire non-adversarial relations with the United States, Obama’s pivot strategy has, “increased the sentiment of insecurity.”\(^{35}\) This is evident in the fact that upon announcement of the U.S. strategic pivot, many first reactions viewed the shift as a U.S. containment effort designed to maintain its hegemony in East Asia.\(^{36}\) Although the U.S. has made every effort to show that the pivot is not solely about China, this objective is constantly disputed.\(^{37}\) In contrast to those who view U.S. efforts from a strictly realist perspective, Tan Seng and Kalyan Kemburi are more optimistic in their assertion that the U.S. pivot, “has the potential to help China transition into a responsible great power” and prevent the exclusion of other powers from the region.\(^{38}\) Essentially, a U.S. presence would counter any actions on the part of China that would upset the regional balance of power.

Scholars note that the Obama administration seems to have recognized the insecurity that the Asia pivot has created. In 2013, U.S. National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon stated that central to the U.S. rebalancing strategy was a desire to build, “a stable, productive, and constructive relationship with China.”\(^{39}\) Essentially, U.S. engagement would guide China to the, “stable, peaceful, and prosperous China” that Obama desired. The way in which the U.S. approaches increased engagement with the Asian region is a key factor in determining whether or not China perceives it as a threat. The pivot can either make-or-break peaceful relations with China.

**The Japanese Dilemma**

It would be unwise to draw conclusions without assessing the role of regional actors in influencing China’s peaceful rise. Although an assessment of many other actors (e.g. India) is critical, given the scope of this article, I will only consider one. The third factor influencing the Sino-U.S. security dilemma is their relationship with Japan. In order to understand the Sino-U.S. security dilemma, we must take into account the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. In fact, in many ways, these two dilemmas are not mutually

\(^{34}\) Seng and Kemburi, *Introduction to the Special Issue*, 4.

\(^{35}\) Wang Dong and Yin Chenzhi, "Mainland China Debates U.S. Pivot/Rebalancing to Asia." *Issues & Studies* 50, no. 3 (September 2014): 57-101. *Political Science Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed March 7, 2015), 59.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 61.

\(^{37}\) Jie, *The Asia-Pacific Pivot*, 8.

\(^{38}\) Seng and Kemburi, *Introduction to the Special Issue*, 15.

\(^{39}\) Wang and Yin, Mainland China Debates, 89.
exclusive. Since the end of World War 2, Japan and the United States have had a security treaty whereby Japan’s security is guaranteed by the U.S. After the Nye Initiative of 1995, Japan took on, “greater and clearer security-related responsibilities,” and in 1998 agreed to joint development of theatre missile defense systems. Japan’s increased responsibility has been perceived by Beijing with fear. In fact, many in China view any change in Japan’s role within the alliance as an action that “could break important norms of self-restraint.” Essentially, they see this shift in terms of the possibility that Japan could remilitarize such as it did during the Second World War.

Japan’s present and historical conflicts with China exacerbate tensions with the United States. Historical atrocities committed by Japan in World War 2 (e.g. the Rape of Nanking) and the occupation of the Chinese mainland, created a high degree of mistrust and resentment. In fact, Chinese sentiments towards the Japanese differs greatly from sentiments towards Americans. It is noted that, “most Chinese elites as well as the general public see the United States as a competitor rather than an outright enemy.” This varies greatly from deep feelings of, loathing that is, “rarely found in their attitudes about the United States.” One of the reasons for this mistrust is that the Japanese have refused to apologize for its imperial past. The effect of refusing to acknowledge past atrocities is evident if one imagines the difficulty in engaging in effective bilateral partnerships with Germany, had she not sincerely apologized for the actions of Nazi Germany. This history of mistrust could exacerbate conflicts and result in a further spiral of tensions. Any attempt of China to increase its security against Japan, cannot not be differentiated from attempts to increase security against the United States.

Maintaining Peace and Mitigating the Security Dilemma

To secure its peaceful rise, China must maintain a delicate balance between asserting itself and remaining cognizant that its actions may create fear in other states. Andrew Scobell asserts that China’s recognition of the security dilemma is ambiguous because of its historical underdog mentality that has prevented it from seeing itself as a threat to others. Scobell explains that there exists a recognition of the security dilemma at play in China, but, “this seems one step removed from decision makers.” Similarly, he notes that the situation is mirrored in the U.S.. In order to ameliorate this, he advocates for placing the security dilemma as a central issue in Sino-U.S. relations. To build upon this, I would add that the security dilemma needs to be central to Sino-U.S.-Japanese relations. All three sides need to recognize each of their roles in managing tensions. Discussions concerning the Sino-U.S. security dilemma should not be separated from discussions concerning the Sino-Japanese dilemma.

40. Thomas J. Christensen, "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia." International Security, 2006., 81, JSTOR Journals, EBSCOhost (accessed March 3, 2015), 117.
41. Thomas J. Christensen, 1999. "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia." International Security, 1999. 49. JSTOR Journals, EBSCOhost (accessed February 6, 2015), 51.
42. Ibid.
43. Christensen, Fostering Stability, 94.
44. Seng and Kemburi, Introduction to the Special Issue, 10.
45. Christensen, China, The U.S-Japan Alliance, 53.
46. Ibid., 52.
47. Christensen, Fostering Stability, 94.
48. Scobell, Learning to Rise Peacefully, 715.
49. Ibid., 718.
50. Ibid., 720.
With respect to United States foreign policy, I propose one measure that would improve China’s ability to maintain a peaceful rise. First and foremost, the United States must remain invested in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in their commitments to the security alliance with Japan. Tan Seng and Kalyan Kemburi are skeptical of the U.S. pivot, arguing that severe budget cuts to U.S. defense reduce the feasibility of effectively engaging the region.\(^{51}\) Additionally, the U.S. remains heavily involved in conflicts that should have long been resolved including the Syrian civil war, tensions between Hamas and Israel, and most recently, the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.\(^{52}\) If a military confrontation were to break out in the Asia-Pacific, the capacities of the United States would be pulled between Asia and the Middle East. It is wishful thinking to believe that the U.S. public would be content in supporting military mobilization in both regions. This problem is further exacerbated when one considers, “the perceived U.S. pivot to Europe . . .” in response to the Ukraine and Crimea crisis.\(^{53}\) Although some scholars assert that increased U.S. presence would reduce, “the likelihood that China will adopt a reassuring and constructive posture . . .”\(^{54}\), I believe that such a policy would do the opposite. The United States must ensure it does not neglect to invest resources into managing the security dilemma in the Asia-Pacific.

Finally, Japan must focus on easing historical tensions with China. Japan must offer a sincere and heartfelt apology on behalf of the Japanese people for atrocities committed during Japan’s invasion and occupation of China. Condemnation of Japanese imperialism and satisfactory recognition of the comfort women issue is critical. Many commentators have noted the impact of Japan’s refusal to apologize. Japan’s refusal to apologize serves to exacerbate tensions and has the potential to exaggerate minor security conflicts with China into major ones. For China’s part, its leaders must be willing to listen and accept Japanese apologies. Additionally, with respect to the general problem of the potential for a Sino-Japanese military confrontation, this can be addressed through increasingly greater economic integration. Christensen explains that despite, “frosty” political relations, “economic relations are deep and growing quickly.”\(^{55}\) The recent Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal could serve as a source of stability. Although China is exempt from the deal, the U.S. has not opposed the PRC’s eventual entry. Currently, the trade deal consists of 40% of the world’s economy. If China were to enter, mutual economic gains would provide a greater incentive to avoid military confrontation. Further development of these relations would increase the apprehensions of all three countries and increase the costs of war.

**Conclusion**

It is my contention that the continuation of China’s peaceful rise is entirely possible. The security dilemma provides a theoretical framework for understanding the factors that are critical to stability in the Asia-Pacific. Uncertainties concerning China’s military expenditures, the U.S. pivot to Asia, and Sino-Japanese historical relations, have fuelled tensions in the region. All three countries play an essential role in mitigating the probability of military confrontation. The anarchical international

\(^{51}\) Seng and Kemburi, *Introduction to the Special Issue*, 5.
\(^{52}\) Ibid.
\(^{53}\) Wang and Yin, *Mainland China Debates*, 89.
\(^{54}\) Christensen, *Fostering Stability*, 125.
\(^{55}\) Ibid., 97.
system does not preclude the peaceful rise of China. The peaceful rise of China is precluded by the failure of states to adequately address misperceptions and insecurities before they spiral into a disaster that no sides seeks.
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