Secure dynamic multiparty quantum private comparison

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We propose a feasible and efficient dynamic multiparty quantum private comparison protocol that is fully secure against participant attacks. In the proposed scheme, two almost-dishonest third parties generate two random keys and send them to all participants. Every participant independently encrypts their private information with the encryption keys and sends it to the third parties. The third parties can analyze the equality of all or some participants’ secrets without gaining access to the secret information. New participants can dynamically join the protocol without the need for any additional conditions in the protocol. We provide detailed correctness and security analysis of the proposed protocol. Our security analysis of the proposed protocol against both inside and outside attacks proves that attackers cannot extract any secret information.

The pioneering work of Bennett and Brassard\textsuperscript{1} laid the groundwork for the rapidly growing field of quantum cryptography and quantum communication. Subsequently, various quantum protocols have been proposed including Shor’s algorithm for factoring\textsuperscript{2–4}, quantum teleportation\textsuperscript{5–9}, superdense coding\textsuperscript{10–14}, quantum secure direct communication\textsuperscript{15–16}, quantum secret sharing\textsuperscript{17–21}, quantum dialogue\textsuperscript{22,23} and quantum key agreement\textsuperscript{24,25}. In 1982, the millionaires’ problem was proposed as a possible application of secure multiparty computing\textsuperscript{26}, the goal is for two parties to compare their wealth and learn who is wealthier without revealing any extra data about the other’s wealth. In 2001, an efficient and fair solution to the socialist millionaires’ problem was proposed\textsuperscript{27}. Furthermore, a solution for the socialist millionaires’ problem based on homomorphic encryption in a semi-honest environment was discussed\textsuperscript{28}. Lo\textsuperscript{29} proved that the task of secure two-party computation is unachievable even with quantum cryptography\textsuperscript{29}. Therefore, a quantum private comparison (QPC) protocol for comparing the equality of information with the help of a third party (TP) was proposed\textsuperscript{30}. Furthermore, Hung \textit{et al.}\textsuperscript{31} proposed a secure QPC protocol with two almost-dishonest TPs. In general, there are four common levels of TP’s trustworthiness\textsuperscript{32,33}: (1) TP is fully honest. In this circumstance, the participants only send their encrypted secrets to the TP. The TP then compares the private information of the participants and announces the final result. This situation is surely ideal, but finding a fully honest TP in the real world could be challenging. (2) TP is dishonest such that all participants cannot trust the TP. This assumption is equivalent to the standard two-party QPC protocols without a TP, whose insecurity was proved by Lo\textsuperscript{29}. (3) TP is semi-honest. Under this circumstance, the participants can partially trust the TP. The TP honestly executes the required processes and may eavesdrop on participants’ private information using passive attacks\textsuperscript{34}. (4) TP is almost-dishonest. This situation, which is more reasonable, assumes that the participants can partially trust the TP, and the TP may perform any active attack while executing the protocol, except conspiring with dishonest participants\textsuperscript{35}. In general, QPC protocols can be used for novel and existing applications, including quantum voting\textsuperscript{36,37}, quantum bidding\textsuperscript{38}, quantum auctions\textsuperscript{39}.

Chang \textit{et al.}\textsuperscript{40} proposed the first multiparty quantum private comparison (MQPC) protocol for comparing the equality of secrets of any two parties among $M$ participants\textsuperscript{40}. The protocol used GHZ states as a quantum resource. Subsequently, a novel QPC protocol that included the support of a semi-honest TP and used d-dimensional entangled photons was proposed\textsuperscript{41}. An MQPC protocol based on entanglement swapping of Bell states was subsequently presented\textsuperscript{42}. This scheme used the one-way hash function to address information leakage issue and to encrypt secret information between the communicating parties. A pioneering $M$-participant QPC protocol that addressed the possibility of a dishonest TP collaborating with participants was discussed\textsuperscript{43}. Furthermore, a novel MQPC protocol with a semi-honest TP that used entanglement swapping of d-level states was
and a unitary operation to encrypt the participants’ secrets was proposed⁴⁴. Then, Hung et al.⁴¹ presented a QPC protocol consisting of two third-parties in which one is malicious and the other is almost dishonest was presented. A multi-user QPC protocol that employs both scattered preparation operation and one-way convergent transmission operation of quantum states was also proposed⁴², where two participants can compare their secrets with the support of the remaining participants using the polarization and spatial-mode degrees of freedom of photons to transmit information. Liu et al.⁴⁶ proposed a QPC protocol in which any participant can join dynamically to participate in the comparison of M participants.

These quantum private comparison protocols still suffer from low efficiency and an inadequate level of security. Therefore, this work proposes a feasible, efficient, and secure dynamic multiparty quantum private comparison protocol (DMQPC) that uses single-photons to encode and send encrypted information. Our proposed scheme has several important features. First, dishonest participants cannot individually or jointly attack the scheme to gain any private or secret information since every participant independently encrypts and transmits secret information to two TPs without the involvement or assistance of other participants. Second, our protocol is dynamic and flexible such that multiple participants can join or leave the protocol and the two TPs can successfully compare the encrypted information of any subset of M participants. Third, the participants only generate and transmit single photons, and the two TPs generate single photons and perform single-photon measurements. Hence, the cost of the deployed quantum devices and the employed quantum operations is reduced, and the efficiency of the proposed protocol is increased. Finally, the communication cost is significantly reduced since the proposed protocol can be executed in a variable number of rounds. We describe our scheme and provide proofs and illustrative examples in the following sections. Section 2 introduces the proposed DMQPC protocol. Section 3 verifies the correctness of the proposed scheme. The security analysis is presented in Section 4. Section 5 discussed the efficiency of the scheme and comparisons to some previous protocols. We show that our scheme is more feasible, efficient, secure and flexible compared to other protocols. Section 6 introduces comparisons to some existing QPC protocols. A summary and conclusion is presented in Section 7.

The Proposed DMQPC Protocol

Here, we will discuss the DMQPC protocol for three different scenarios, namely two-party QPC with two rounds, DMQPC with two rounds and DMQPC with B-block. Before the comparison of data, there are two main processes: (1) validation check process; (2) the initial preparation and encryption process. The two processes are similar in the three scenarios. So, they will be described in detail only for two-party QPC with two rounds.

Two-party QPC with two rounds. Suppose that Alice and Bob intend to compare the equality of their secrets X and Y, respectively, with the help of two almost-dishonest TPs. The binary representation of X in F₂ⁿ is (x₀, x₁, ..., xₙ₋₁), and the binary representation of Y in F₂ⁿ is (y₀, y₁, ..., yₙ₋₁) where xᵢ, yᵢ ∈ {0, 1}ⁿ and n ≥ 2 is the number of secret bits. In general, a protocol with two TPs has many advantages such as: (1) improving load balance performance since we can distribute the workload to two TPs (servers) instead of only one; (2) increasing availability that ensures continuity of communication; (3) ensuring security since one TP can monitor the performance of the other one⁴³. The idea of adopting two TPs to execute the comparison task in QPC was first suggested by Hung et al.⁴⁴. In our work, the advantage of using two TPs is that one can generate two independent random keys by two different TPs. More specifically, the first third-party (TP₁) computes the comparison result of the first round. The second third-party (TP₂) computes the comparison result of the second-round. Both TP₁ and TP₂ prepare a random secret key and send it to both Alice and Bob.

Validation check process. Firstly, X and Y must have the same length. Secondly, to correctly execute the proposed QPC protocol, secret data must be checked as follows; If the length of X(Y) is odd, then Alice (Bob) must replace the last bit with two bits;

\[
\begin{align*}
0 & \rightarrow 00 \\
1 & \rightarrow 10
\end{align*}
\]

(1)

Initial Preparation and Encryption Process. TP₁ and TP₂ prepare two random secret keys K₁rand and K₂rand, respectively, and send them through quantum channels to both Alice and Bob⁴⁵,⁴⁷. Alice and Bob compute K₁rand = K₂rand ⊕ K₁TP₁ and K₂rand = K₂TP₂, where K₁rand = |K₁TP₁⟩ = |K₂TP₁⟩ = |X⟩ = |Y⟩. Then Alice and Bob split K₁rand into two equal parts K₁rand and K₁rand, where K₁rand ∈ {0, 1}ⁿ and K₂rand, K₂rand ∈ {0, 1}²ⁿ. To reduce the communication cost, Alice also divides X into two equal parts X₁part,1 and X₂part,2. Alice then computes

\[
X₁ = K₁rand \oplus X₁part,1
\]

(2)

\[
X₂ = K₂rand \oplus X₂part,2
\]

(3)

The encrypted parts X₁ and X₂ can be represented as follows.

\[
X₁ = \left\{ x₁,0, x₁,1, \ldots, x₁,\left(\frac{n}{2}\right) \right\}
\]

(4)
\[ X_2 = \left\{ x_2, x_2 \left( \frac{q}{2} + 1 \right), \ldots, x_{2,n(n-1)} \right\}, \]

where \( X_1 \) and \( X_2 \) are the first and second parts of \( X \) encrypted with \( K_{\text{rand}}^1 \) and \( K_{\text{rand}}^2 \), respectively. Similarly, Bob computes \( Y_1 \) and \( Y_2 \) just as Alice does.

\[ Y_1 = \left\{ y_1, y_1, \ldots, y_1 \left( \frac{q}{2} + 1 \right) \right\}, \]

\[ Y_2 = \left\{ y_2, y_2, \ldots, y_{2,n(n-1)} \right\}, \]

where \( Y_1 \) and \( Y_2 \) are the first and second parts of \( Y \) encrypted with \( K_{\text{rand}}^1 \) and \( K_{\text{rand}}^2 \), respectively. Also, we have \( X_{12} = X_1 \oplus X_2 \) and \( Y_{12} = Y_1 \oplus Y_2 \). Here, \( \oplus \) is the exclusive-OR operation.

As shown in Table 1, Alice generates new encoded parts \( X'_{12} \) and \( X_{12} \) from \( X_1, X_2, \) and \( X_{12} \) according to the following rule: If the bit value of \( X_1 = X_2 = 0 \) or \( X_1 = X_2 = 1 \), then \( X'_{12} = X_{12} = 1 \). Otherwise, \( X'_{12} = X_{12} \) and \( X_{12} = X_{12} \), where \( X'_{12} \) and \( X_{12} \) are updated parts of \( X_1 \) and \( X_2 \). The purpose of this process is to relate the secret message parts to each other so that we can reduce the communication cost. That is to say, it is possible to only compare one part of the secret messages in some situations to get the final result.

From Table 1, we can get the sequences \( X'_{12}, X_{12}, \) and \( X_{12} \), with length \( \frac{n}{2} \):

\[ X'_{12} = \left\{ x'_{1,0}, x'_{1,1}, \ldots, x'_{1,n-1}(\frac{n}{2} + 1) \right\}, \]

\[ X_{12} = \left\{ x_{1,0}, x_{1,1}, \ldots, x_{1,(n-1)} \right\}, \]

\[ X'_{12} = \left\{ x'_{2,0}, x'_{2,1}, \ldots, x'_{2,(n-1)} \right\}. \]

Alice uses the XOR function to encrypt \( X_1 \) with \( X'_1 \) getting \( C_{\text{a}1} \):

\[ C_{\text{a}1} = X_1 \oplus X'_1 = \left\{ (x_{1,0} \oplus x'_{1,0}), (x_{1,1} \oplus x'_{1,1}), \ldots, \left( x_{1,\left(\frac{n}{2} + 1\right)} \right) \oplus \left( x'_{1,\left(\frac{n}{2} + 1\right)} \right) \}. \]

Similarly, Bob performs the same processes as Alice does,

\[ C_{\text{b}1} = Y_1 \oplus Y'_1, \]

Alice computes \( X_{12} = X_1 \oplus X_2 \):

\[ X_{12} = \left\{ (x_{1,0} \oplus x_{2,0}), (x_{1,1} \oplus x_{2,1}), \ldots, \left( x_{1,\left(\frac{n}{2} + 1\right)} \right) \oplus \left( x_{2,\left(\frac{n}{2} + 1\right)} \right) \}. \]

Bob also computes \( Y_{12} = Y_1 \oplus Y_2 \):

\[ Y_{12} = \left\{ (y_{1,0} \oplus y_{2,0}), (y_{1,1} \oplus y_{2,1}), \ldots, \left( y_{1,\left(\frac{n}{2} + 1\right)} \right) \oplus \left( y_{2,\left(\frac{n}{2} + 1\right)} \right) \}. \]

In our protocol, we have three options to compute and announce the comparison result. The first option would be for \( TP_1 \) to compute and announce (in the first and second rounds) the comparison result. The second option would be for \( TP_2 \) to compute and announce the comparison result. These two options can be used when

| \( X_1 \) | \( X_2 \) | \( X_{12} = X_1 \oplus X_2 \) | \( X'_{12} \) | \( X_{12} \) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| \( x_{1,0} \) | \( 0 \) | \( x_{2,0} \) | \( 0 \) | \( x'_{2,0} \) |
| \( x_{1,1} \) | \( 0 \) | \( x_{2,1} \left( \frac{n}{2} + 1 \right) \) | \( 1 \) | \( x'_{2,1} \left( \frac{n}{2} + 1 \right) \) |
| \( x_{1,2} \) | \( 1 \) | \( x_{2,2} \left( \frac{n}{2} + 1 \right) \) | \( 1 \) | \( x'_{2,2} \left( \frac{n}{2} + 1 \right) \) |
| \( \ldots \) | \( \ldots \) | \( \ldots \) | \( \ldots \) | \( \ldots \) |
| \( x_{1,(n-1)} \) | \( 0 \) | \( x_{2,(n-1)} \) | \( 1 \) | \( x'_{2,(n-1)} \) |

Table 1. Illustration of the proposed technique for preparing \( X'_{12} \) and \( X_{12} \).
The private information

| X = (01100110010) | Y = (01100110010) |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| Random keys | $K_{\text{rand}}^{X} = (010110010110), K_{\text{rand}}^{Y} = (11111010010)$ |
| $K_{\text{rand}} = K_{\text{rand}}^{X} \oplus K_{\text{rand}}^{Y} = (101010000010), K_{\text{rand}} = (101001), K_{\text{rand}}^{2} = (000100)$ |
| Validity check | Length check for equality $X_{\text{length}} = Y_{\text{length}} = 12$ |
| Length check for 2 blocks $\frac{X}{y} = 6$ |
| Initial preparation | $X_{1,1} = (011001), X_{1,2} = (110100), K_{1,1}^{X} = (101001)$ |
| Encryption | $Y_{1,1} = (011101), Y_{1,2} = (110100), K_{1,1}^{Y} = (101001)$ |

Encoding

If $X_{1} = X_{12} = 0 (X_{1} = X_{12} = 1)$ then $X_{2} = X_{12} = 1 (X_{1} = X_{12} = 0)$. Else, $X_{1} = X_{12}$ & $X_{2} = X_{12}$ The same process for $Y$

| $X_{1}$ | $X_{2}$ | $X_{12}$ | $X'_{1}$ | $X'_{2}$ |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1      | 1      | 0      | 1      | 0      |
| 0      | 0      | 1      | 0      | 1      |
| 1      | 1      | 0      | 1      | 0      |
| 0      | 1      | 1      | 0      | 0      |
| $X = 100101, X' = 101100, X_{12} = 0100111.$ |

| $Y_{1}$ | $Y_{2}$ | $Y_{12}$ | $Y'_{1}$ | $Y'_{2}$ |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1      | 1      | 0      | 1      | 0      |
| 0      | 0      | 1      | 0      | 1      |
| 1      | 1      | 0      | 1      | 0      |
| 0      | 1      | 1      | 0      | 1      |
| $Y = 110101, Y' = 111100, Y_{12} = 000011.$ |

Compute $C_{a1} = X_{1} \oplus X'_{1}, X_{12} = X_{1} \oplus X_{2}, C_{b1} = Y_{1} \oplus Y'_{1}, C_{b2} = Y_{12} \oplus Y'_{12}$

$C_{a1} = (001001), X_{1} = (010011).$, $C_{b1} = (000110), Y_{1} = (000011).$

Table 2. Illustration of preparation of encrypted secrets for two participants.

The availability of at least one $TP$ is the most important requirement. The third option would be for the two $TP$s to collaborate to compute and announce the final result. The steps for executing the two rounds to compare the equality of parties’ secrets are similar in the three options. The choice of which of the three options to use depends on whether the priority is availability, workload or security. The two rounds are described as follows.

The first-round.  

**Step 1.** $TP$ asks Alice and Bob to prepare $C_{a1} = X_{1} \oplus X'_{1}$ and $C_{b1} = Y_{1} \oplus Y'_{1}$, respectively.

**Step 2.** Alice prepares a sequence of 2 single photons, called $S_{a1}$, corresponding to $C_{a1}$ in the $Z$-basis $\{|0\}, |1\}$ or the X-basis $\{|+\} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle), |-\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)\}$. 

**Step 3.** For the eavesdropping check, Alice randomly prepares a sequence of decoy photons $l_{a1}$ in one of the states $\{|0\}, |1\}, |+\rangle, |\rangle\}$. At random positions, she inserts $l_{a1}$ into $S_{a1}$ producing a new sequence $S_{a1}^{\prime}$. Then, Alice transmits $S_{a1}^{\prime}$ to the $TP$.

**Step 4.** Alice announces the random positions and the measurement bases of $l_{a1}$ to $TP$, for performing single photon measurements. $TP$ then reveals the measurement outcomes. Hence, $TP$ and Alice analyze the error rate. If the rate is higher than a predetermined threshold, then they terminate the protocol and restart the process again. Otherwise, $TP$ discards $l_{a1}$ from $S_{a1}$ and extracts $S_{a1}$. Then $TP$ can restore $C_{a1}$ where $S_{a1}$ represents $C_{a1}$.

**Step 5.** Bob and $TP$ perform the same steps 2–4 as Alice and $TP$ to send $C_{b1}$ to $TP$.

**Step 6.** $TP$ performs a comparison between the first part of Alice’s and Bob’s secrets by computing $R_{1} = C_{a1} \oplus C_{b1}$. If $R_{1}$ is $0$, this indicates that $X$ and $Y$ may be equal. In this case, they move to the next round to check whether Alice’s and Bob’s secrets are equal or not. Otherwise, $X$ and $Y$ are not equal, so there is no need to continue to the second-round to check the equality of the second parts.

The second-round.  

**Step 7.** $TP$ informs $TP$ that the first-round comparison result may be equal. Then $TP$ asks Alice and Bob to prepare $X_{12}$ and $Y_{12}$, respectively.

**Step 8.** Alice and Bob perform the same processes described in Steps 2–4 to send $X_{12}$ and $Y_{12}$ to $TP$.

**Step 9.** $TP$ computes $R_{2} = X_{12} \oplus Y_{12}$. If $R_{2}$ is $0$, then $X$ and $Y$ are equal. Otherwise, $X$ and $Y$ are not equal. A detailed example to check the equality of $X = (001100110010)$ and $Y = (011100110010)$ is shown in Tables 2 and 3.

Adding new participants.  

One of the main features of this protocol is the ease of joining of one or more participants. Without loss of generality, suppose a new participant called Charlie want to joint the old participants (Alice and Bob). The steps for adding a new participant are described as follows.

The first-round.  

**Step 1.** Charlie asks $TP$ and $TP$ to join the protocol.

**Step 2.** $TP$ asks Charlie to prepare $C_{a1} = Z_{1} \oplus Z_{1}$, using the same protocol as Alice and Bob to prepare $C_{a1}$ and $C_{b1}$, respectively.

**Step 3.** Charlie prepares a sequence of 2 single photons, called $S_{a1}$, corresponding to $C_{a1}$ in the $Z$-basis $\{|0\}, |1\}$ or the X-basis $\{|+\} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle), |-\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)\}$.
| Round 1 | Alice | $TP_1$ | Bob |
|---------|-------|--------|-----|
| Step 1: Preparation (Alice) | Prepares $C_{a1} = [001001]$ in $Z$-basis or $X$-basis | | |
| Steps 2&4: Eavesdropping check (Alice, $TP_1$) | error rate < specified Threshold, $TP_1$ obtains $C_{a1}$; Else, the communication process is terminated. | | |
| Step 5: Preparation (Bob) | Prepares $C_{b1} = [001001]$, in $Z$-basis or $X$-basis | | |
| Step 5: Eavesdropping check (Bob, $TP_2$) | error rate < specified Threshold, $TP_2$ obtains $C_{b1}$; Else, the communication process is terminated. | | |
| Step 6: Check the equality | If $R_1 = C_{a1} \oplus C_{b1} = 0; X_1 = Y_1; X = Y$. The protocol will terminate and no need for a second-round. Otherwise, they continue to Round 2. | | |

| Round 2 | Alice | $TP_2$ | Bob |
|---------|-------|--------|-----|
| Step 7: Preparation (Alice) | Prepares $X_{12} = [010011]$ in $Z$-basis or $X$-basis | | |
| Step 8: Eavesdropping check (Alice, $TP_2$) | error rate < specified Threshold, $TP_2$ obtains $X_{12}$; Otherwise, the communication process is terminated. | | |
| Step 7: Preparation (Bob) | Prepares $Y_{12} = [000011]$ in $Z$-basis or $X$-basis | | |
| Step 8: Eavesdropping check (Bob, $TP_2$) | error rate < specified Threshold, $TP_2$ obtains $Y_{12}$; Otherwise, the communication process is terminated. | | |
| Step 9: Check the equality | If $R_2 = X_{12} \oplus Y_{12} = 0; X = Y$. Otherwise, $X = Y$. | | |

Table 3. Illustration of the equality check of $X$ and $Y$.

**Step 4.** For eavesdropping check, Charlie randomly prepares a sequence of decay photons $I_{d1}$ in one of the states $|0\rangle$, $|1\rangle$, $|+\rangle$, $|-\rangle$. At random positions, he inserts $I_{d1}$ into $S_1$, producing a new sequence $S'_1$. Then, Charlie transmits $S'_1$ to $TP_1$.

**Step 5.** Upon receiving $S'_1$, Charlie announces the random positions and the measurement bases of $I_{d1}$ to $TP_1$ for performing single photon measurements. $TP_1$ then reveals the measurement outcomes. Hence, $TP_1$ and Charlie analyze the error rate. If the rate is higher than a predetermined threshold, then they terminate the protocol and restart the process again. Otherwise, $TP_1$ discards $I_{d1}$ from $S_1$ and extracts $S_{12}$. Then $TP_1$ can restore $C_{b1}$.

**Step 6.** $TP_1$ performs a comparison between the first part of Alice’s, Bob’s, and Charlie’s secrets by computing $R_1 = (C_{a1} \oplus C_{b1}) + (C_{c1} \oplus C_{a1})$. If $R_1 = 0$, this indicates that $X$, $Y$, and $Z$ may be equal. In this case, they move to the next round to check whether Alice’s, Bob’s, and Charlie’s secrets are equal or not. Otherwise, $X$, $Y$, and $Z$ are not equal, so there is no need to continue to the second-round to check the equality of the second parts.

**The second-round.** **Step 7.** $TP_1$ informs $TP_2$ that the first-round comparison result may be equal. Then $TP_2$ asks Charlie to prepare $Z_{12}$ using the same protocol as Alice and Bob to prepare $X_{12}$ and $Y_{12}$, respectively.

**Step 8.** Charlie performs the same processes described in Steps 3–4 to send $Z_{12}$ to $TP_2$.

**Step 9.** $TP_2$ computes $R_2 = (X_{12} \oplus Y_{12}) + (Y_{12} \oplus Z_{12})$. If $R = R_1 + R_2 = 0$, $TP_2$ announces to Alice, Bob, and Charlie that $X$, $Y$, and $Z$ are equal. Otherwise, $X$, $Y$, and $Z$ are not equal.

**Deleting old participants.** Without loss of generality, suppose we have three participants Alice, Bob, and Charlie. $TP_1$ and $TP_2$ are allowed to delete one or more participants (e.g., Charlie) for several reasons. For example, they may want to compare just Bob’s and Alice’s private information. The detailed steps for deleting Charlie are as follows.

**The first-round.** **Step 1.** $TP_1$ and $TP_2$ agree to delete Charlie. $TP_1$ then discards $C_{c1}$.

**Step 2.** $TP_1$ updates the comparison process, to be only between Alice and Bob. $TP_1$ then recomputes $R_1$. In that case, $TP_1$ computes and considers the result of $R_1 = C_{a1} \oplus C_{b1}$ instead of $R_1 = (C_{a1} \oplus C_{b1}) + (C_{c1} \oplus C_{a1})$. If the result of $R_1 = 0$, this indicates that $X$ and $Y$ may be equal. In this case, they move to the next round to check whether Alice’s and Bob’s secrets are equal or not. Otherwise, $X$ and $Y$ are not equal and the final result is announced.

**The second-round.** **Step 3.** $TP_1$ informs $TP_2$ that the first-round comparison result of Alice’s and Bob’s secrets may be equal. **Step 4.** $TP_2$ discards the encrypted information of Charlie ($Z_{12}$) and only considers the private information of Alice and Bob, that is, $X_{12}$ and $Y_{12}$, respectively.

**Step 5.** $TP_2$ computes and considers $R_2 = X_{12} \oplus Y_{12}$ instead of $R_2 = (X_{12} \oplus Y_{12}) + (Y_{12} \oplus Z_{12})$. If $R = R_1 + R_2 = 0$ then $X$ and $Y$ are equal. Otherwise, $X$ and $Y$ are not equal.

**Multi-party QPC with two rounds.** The proposed two-party QPC protocol is easy to extend to $M$ participants (see Fig. 1). In this scenario, there are $M$ participants $P_i$ ($i = 1, 2, \ldots, M$), and each of them has secret information $X_i$ with length $n$. Firstly, participants check the validity of their secrets according to the validation check.
process. After that, it is not necessary to execute the second-round to check if \( X_1 = X_2 \). If \( X_1 \neq X_2 \) are equal or not. If \( X_1 \neq X_2 \) are equal, each participant computes \( C_{\lambda, 1} = X_{\lambda, 1} \otimes X_{\lambda, 2} \). Now each participant has completed preparing encrypted secrets, and they are ready for checking the equality of their secrets using the QPC protocol.

**The first-round.**  
**Step 1.** \( TP_1 \) asks each participant to prepare \( C_{\lambda, 1} \).

**Step 2.** \( P_i \) prepares a quantum sequence containing \( \frac{m}{2} \) single photons corresponding to \( C_{\lambda, 1} \) (i.e. \( S_{\alpha, i} \)) in the Z-basis \( |0\rangle, |1\rangle \) or X-basis \( \{+\} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle), \{-\} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle) \).

**Step 3.** For the eavesdropping check, \( P_i \) randomly prepares a sequence of decoy photons \( l_{\alpha, i} \) in one of the states \( \{0\}, \{1\}, \{+\}, \{-\} \). At random positions, \( P_i \) inserts \( l_{\alpha, i} \) into \( S_{\alpha, i} \) producing a new sequence \( S'_{\alpha, i} \). Then, \( P_i \) sends \( S'_{\alpha, i} \) to the \( TP_1 \).

**Step 4.** Upon receiving \( S'_{\alpha, i} \), \( TP_1 \) announces the random positions and the measurement bases of \( l_{\alpha, i} \) to \( TP_1 \) for performing single photon measurements. \( TP_1 \) then announces the measurement outcomes. \( TP_1 \) and \( TP_2 \) analyze the error rate. If the rate is higher than a predetermined threshold, they terminate the communication and restart the process again. Otherwise, \( TP_1 \) discards \( l_{\alpha, i} \) from \( S_{\alpha, i} \) and extracts \( S_{\alpha, i} \). Then the \( TP_1 \) can restore \( C_{\alpha, i} \), where \( S_{\alpha, i} \) represents \( C_{\alpha, i} \).

**Step 5.** \( TP_1 \) performs a comparison of the first part of \( P_i \)’s secret, where for \( M = 3 \)

\[
R_1 = (C_{1,1} \oplus C_{2,1}) + (C_{2,1} \oplus C_{3,1}) ,
\]

For \( M > 3 \)

\[
R_1 = (C_{1,1} \oplus C_{2,1}) + (C_{2,1} \oplus C_{3,1}) + \cdots + (C_{M-1,1} \oplus C_{M,1}) .
\]

If \( R_1 = 0 \), \( X_1 = X_2, \ldots, X_M \) may be equal. Hence, they move to the next round to compute the comparison check of \( X_{i,12} \). Otherwise, \( X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_M \) are not equal. Then it is not necessary to execute the second-round to check the equality of \( X_{i,12} \).

**The second-round.**  
**Step 6.** \( TP_1 \) informs \( TP_2 \) that the first-round comparison result may be equal. Then \( TP_2 \) asks \( P_i \) to prepare \( X_{i,12} \).

**Step 7.** \( P_i \) performs the same processes as in Steps 2–4 to send \( X_{i,12} \) to \( TP_2 \).

**Step 8.** \( TP_2 \) computes the comparison check of \( X_{i,12} \), where for \( M = 3 \)

\[
R_2 = (X_{1,12} \oplus X_{2,12}) + (X_{2,12} \oplus X_{3,12}) ,
\]

For \( M > 3 \)

\[
R_2 = (X_{1,12} \oplus X_{2,12}) + (X_{2,12} \oplus X_{3,12}) + \cdots + (X_{M-1,12} \oplus X_{M,12}) ,
\]

Now, \( TP_2 \) can compute \( R = R_1 + R_2 \) to determine whether \( X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_M \) are equal or not. If \( X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_M \) are equal. Otherwise, \( X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_M \) are not equal. Obviously, it is easy to add or remove any subset of participants to the protocol, where participants independently perform the required processes to prepare their secret for the final step of the protocol. Moreover, \( TP_1 \) and \( TP_2 \) can easily compare the equality of the secrets of any subset of \( M \) participants without any additional conditions.
Multi-Party QPC with B blocks. The secret data can be divided into several blocks (B), which could be useful in comparing the equality of big data. Each block contains \( \frac{n}{B} \) bits and is executed in two rounds, where \( \frac{n}{B} \) is an even number such that,

\[
2 \leq \frac{n}{B} \leq n \quad \begin{cases} \text{B is even} & \text{B is odd, and } \frac{n}{B} \text{ is even} \end{cases}
\]

Suppose there are \( M \) participants \( P_i \) (\( i = 1, 2, \ldots, M \)). Each of them has secret information \( X_i \) with a length of \( n \), and they would like to check the equality of their secrets. Firstly, all participants check the validity of their secrets according to the previously described validation check. After they make sure that their secrets are valid for applying the proposed protocol, \( TP_1 \) and \( TP_2 \) send two random secret keys (\( K_{\text{rand}}^{TP_1} \) and \( K_{\text{rand}}^{TP_2} \)) with length \( n \) to all participants. Based on the length of the secret data \( n \), \( TP_1 \) and \( TP_2 \) agree with participants on the value of \( B \) (see Fig. 2). \( P_i \) computes \( K_{\text{rand}} = K_{\text{rand}}^{TP_1} \oplus K_{\text{rand}}^{TP_2} \) and divides \( K_{\text{rand}} \) into \( B \) blocks. Each block contains two sub-keys \( K_{\text{rand}}^j \) and \( K_{\text{rand}}^j \), where \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, B \).

Subsequently, \( P_i \) performs the initial preparations as previously indicated in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) for generating \( X_{ij} \), where \( i = 1, 2, \ldots, M \). At this point, using Table 1, participants can easily prepare their encrypted secret information producing \( C_i \) and \( X_{ij} \), and are ready to check the equality of their secrets using the following steps.

The first-round. **Step 1.** \( TP_1 \) asks each participant to prepare \( C_{ij} \).

**Step 2.** \( P_i \) prepares a sequence of \( \frac{n}{B} \) single photons for each block, called \( S_{ij} \), corresponding to \( C_{ij} \), in the Z-basis \( \{|0\}, |1\} \) or X-basis \( \{|+\} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\) + |1\), |−\} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\) − |1\)\).

**Step 3.** To prevent eavesdropping, \( P_i \) randomly prepares a sequence of decoy photons \( I_{ij} \) in one of the states \( \{|0\}, |1\}, |+\}, |−\} \). At random positions, \( P_i \) inserts \( I_{ij} \) into \( S_{ij} \) producing a new sequence \( S'_{ij} \). \( P_i \) then sends \( S'_{ij} \) to \( TP_1 \).

**Step 4.** Upon receiving \( S'_{ij} \), \( P_i \) announces the random positions and the measurement bases of \( I_{ij} \) to \( TP_1 \) for performing single photon measurements. \( TP_1 \) then announces the measurement outcomes. \( TP_1 \) and \( P_i \) analyze the error rate. For any error rate above a predetermined threshold, they cancel the communication and restart all over again. Otherwise, \( TP_1 \) discards \( I_{ij} \) from \( S_{ij} \) and extracts \( S'_{ij} \). \( TP_1 \) then can construct \( C_{ij} \) where \( S_{ij} \) represents \( C_{ij} \).

**Step 5.** \( TP_1 \) computes the comparison check of \( C_{ij} \), where for \( M = 3 \)

\[
R_1^1 = (C_{1,1} \oplus C_{2,1}) + (C_{2,1} \oplus C_{3,1}) \quad (R_2^2 = (C_{1,2} \oplus C_{2,2}) + (C_{2,2} \oplus C_{3,2}), \ldots, R_k^B),
\]

For \( M > 3 \)
Table 4. All possible encrypted data from two bits according to the initial preparation and encryption method, where $X_i = K_{i\text{rand}} \oplus X_{\text{part}_{i-1}}, X_{i+1} = K_{i\text{rand}} \oplus X_{\text{part}_{i-2}}$.

| $X_1$ | $X_2$ | $X_{12}$ | $X_1$ | $X_{12}$ | $X_1$ | $X_{12}$ |
|-------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|
| 0     | 0     | 0       | 1     | 1       | 1     | 0       |
| 0     | 1     | 1       | 0     | 1       | 0     | 1       |
| 1     | 0     | 1       | 0     | 0       | 1     | 1       |
| 1     | 1     | 0       | 1     | 0       | 1     | 0       |

$R_1 = (C_{1,1} \oplus C_{2,1}) + (C_{2,1} \oplus C_{3,1}) + \ldots + (C_{M-1,1} \oplus C_{M,1}) + (R_2 = (C_{1,2} \oplus C_{2,2})$ $+ (C_{2,2} \oplus C_{3,2}) + \ldots + (C_{M-1,2} \oplus C_{M,2}), \ldots, R_1 = (C_{1,2} \oplus C_{2,2})$ $+ (C_{2,2} \oplus C_{3,2}) + \ldots + (C_{M-1,2} \oplus C_{M,2})$. \hfill (21)

If $R_1 = 0$ ($R_2 = 0, \ldots, R_1 = 0$), $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_M$ may be equal, where $R_1$ is the comparison result of the first round of block number $B$ for all participants. Hence, they move to the next round to compute the comparison check of $X_{12}^{i}, X_{12}^{i+1}, X_{12}^{i+2}, \ldots, X_{12}^{i+M-1}$, $X_{12}^{i+M-2}$, otherwise, their secrets are not equal.

The second-round. Step 6. $TP_3$ informs $TP_2$ that the first-round comparison result of the 1st–block (2nd–block, $\ldots$, $B_{th}$–block) may be equal. Then $TP_2$ asks $P_i$ to prepare $X_{12}^{i+1}$ ($X_{12}^{i+2}, \ldots, X_{12}^{i+M-1}$).

Step 7. $P_i$ performs the same processes as in Steps 2–4 to send $X_{12}^{i+1}, X_{12}^{i+2}, \ldots, X_{12}^{i+M-1}$ to $TP_2$.

Step 8. $TP_2$ computes the comparison check of $X_{12}^{i+1}, X_{12}^{i+2}, \ldots, X_{12}^{i+M-1}$, where for $M > 3$

$R_2 = (X_{12}^{i+1} \oplus X_{12}^{i+2}) + (X_{12}^{i+2} \oplus X_{12}^{i+3}) + (X_{12}^{i+3} \oplus X_{12}^{i+4}) + \ldots + (X_{12}^{i+M-3} \oplus X_{12}^{i+M-2})$ $= (X_{12}^{i+1} \oplus X_{12}^{i+2}) + (X_{12}^{i+2} \oplus X_{12}^{i+3}) + \ldots + (X_{12}^{i+M-4} \oplus X_{12}^{i+M-3})$, \hfill (22)

for $M > 3$

$R_2 = (X_{12}^{i+1} \oplus X_{12}^{i+2}) + (X_{12}^{i+2} \oplus X_{12}^{i+3}) + (X_{12}^{i+3} \oplus X_{12}^{i+4}) + \ldots + (X_{12}^{i+M-3} \oplus X_{12}^{i+M-2})$ $= (X_{12}^{i+1} \oplus X_{12}^{i+2}) + (X_{12}^{i+2} \oplus X_{12}^{i+3}) + \ldots + (X_{12}^{i+M-4} \oplus X_{12}^{i+M-3})$. \hfill (23)

If $R = R_1 + R_2 = R_1 + R_2 = \ldots = R = R_2 = 0$, this means that $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_M$ are equal. Otherwise, $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_M$ are not equal. Note, participants check the result of the first block ($R_1$) if and only if they continue to check the next block and so on until they reach the last block; otherwise, $TP_2$ announces that the secrets are not equal.

Correctness

From Table 4, according to our initial preparation and encryption method, for every two bits we get two different encrypted bits, that is to say, we get $C_{i\text{rand}} = 1$ and $X_{12} = 0$ only when $X_1 = 0$ and $X_2 = 0$. So, the bit values of $C_{i\text{rand}}$ and $X_{12}$ together are decisive in determining the bit values of $X_1$ and $X_2$. Assume we have two participants Alice and Bob, and each participant has two bits $X = 00$ and $Y = 10$, respectively, and $K_{i\text{rand}} = 00$. Alice computes $C_{i\text{rand}} = X_1 \oplus X_2 = K_{i\text{rand}} \oplus X_{\text{part}_{i-1}} \oplus X_1$ getting 1, and sends it to $TP_1$. Bob also computes $C_{i\text{rand}} = Y_1 \oplus Y_2 = K_{i\text{rand}} \oplus Y_{\text{part}_{i-1}} \oplus Y_1$ getting 1, and sends it to $TP_1$. When $TP_1$ computes $R_1 = C_{i\text{rand}} \oplus C_{i\text{rand}}$, he gets $R_1 = 0$, which means that the secrets of Alice and Bob may be equal or unequal (note if $R_1 = 1$, $TP_1$ announces that the secrets of Alice and Bob are not equal). So, they should move to the second-round to compare $X_{12}$ and $Y_{12}$.

In the second-round, Alice and Bob send $X_{12} = X_1 \oplus X_2 = K_{i\text{rand}} \oplus X_{\text{part}_{i-1}} \oplus X_{12}$ and $Y_{12} = Y_1 \oplus Y_2 = K_{i\text{rand}} \oplus Y_{\text{part}_{i-1}} \oplus Y_{12}$ to $TP_2$, respectively. $TP_2$ computes $R_2 = X_{12} \oplus Y_{12} = 0\oplus 1$ getting $R_2 = 1$. Then, if $R = R_1 + R_2 = 1$, which means that $X$ and $Y$ are not equal. Thus, $X$ and $Y$ are equal if and only if $R = R_1 = 0$. For example, suppose we have $X = 0000$ and $K_{i\text{rand}} = 0000$. Then $X_1 = 00$ and $X_2 = 00$. As shown in Table 5, we must get $C_{i\text{rand}} = X_1 \oplus X_2 = Y_1 \oplus Y_2 = 00$, and $Y_2 = 00$. Hence, we get $C_{i\text{rand}} = Y_1 \oplus Y_2 = 11$ and $Y_2 = 00$. Now the two $TP_2$s can announce that the two inputs are equal by computing $R = C_{i\text{rand}} \oplus C_{i\text{rand}} + (X_{12} \oplus Y_{12}) = 0$, which proves the correctness of this protocol. Note that if we proposed that $C_{i\text{rand}} = X_1 \oplus X_2$ and $C_{i\text{rand}} = Y_1 \oplus Y_2$ instead of $C_{i\text{rand}} = X_1 \oplus X_2$ and $C_{i\text{rand}} = Y_1 \oplus Y_2$, respectively, we also get the same correct comparison result.

Here, we provide the necessary equations to verify the equality check by $TP_2$ and $TP_3$ for the various suggested protocols.

Two-party QPC with two rounds. From Eqs. (11) and (12), $TP_1$ computes...
From Eqs. (13) and (14), TP$_2$ computes

\[ R_2 = X_12 \oplus Y_2, \]
\[ = X_1 \oplus X_2 \oplus Y_1 \oplus Y_2, \]
\[ = X_{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{\text{part} \_1} \oplus X_{\text{part} \_2} \oplus K_{\text{rand}} \oplus Y_{\text{part} \_1} \oplus K_{\text{part} \_2} \]
\[ = X_{\text{part} \_1} \oplus X_{\text{part} \_2} \oplus Y_{\text{part} \_1} \oplus Y_{\text{part} \_2}. \]

In the proposed protocol, computing only $R_2$ is not sufficient for getting the comparison result. For example, if we have $X_1 = X_2 = 0$, $Y_1 = Y_2 = 1$, and $K_{\text{rand}} = K_{\text{rand}} = 0$. Then $R_2 = 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 1 = 0$. This means that $X$ and $Y$ are equal in contrast to the correct comparison result ($R = R_1 + R_2 = 1 + 0 = 1$). In such a case, $R_1$ guarantees the correctness of the final result.

**MDQPC with two rounds.** From Eq. (15), for $M = 3$, TP$_1$ computes
\[ R_1 = (C_{1,1} \oplus C_{2,1}) + (C_{2,1} \oplus C_{3,1}). \]
\[ R_2 = (X_{1,1} \oplus X'_{1,1} \oplus X_{2,1} \oplus X'_{2,1}) + (X_{2,1} \oplus X'_{2,1} \oplus X_{3,1} \oplus X'_{3,1}). \]
\[ R_1 = (K_{1}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{1,\text{part}_1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus K_{2}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{2,\text{part}_2} \oplus X_{1,2}^{'}) + (K_{1}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{2,\text{part}_1} \oplus X_{1,2} \oplus K_{2}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{3,\text{part}_2} \oplus X_{1,3}^{'}). \]

From Eq. (16), for \( M > 3 \), \( TP_1 \) computes
\[ R_1 = (C_{1,1} \oplus C_{2,1}) + (C_{2,1} \oplus C_{3,1}) + \cdots + (C_{M-1,1} \oplus C_{M,1}), \]
\[ R_2 = (X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,2} \oplus X_{2,2} \oplus X_{2,3}) + (X_{2,1} \oplus X_{2,2} \oplus X_{3,1} \oplus X_{3,2}), \]
\[ R_1 = (K_{1}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{1,\text{part}_1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus K_{2}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{2,\text{part}_2} \oplus K_{1}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{3,\text{part}_2} \oplus K_{2}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{3,\text{part}_2} \oplus X_{1,3}^{'}). \]

In addition, from Eq. (17), for \( M = 3 \), \( TP_2 \) computes
\[ R_2 = (X_{1,12} \oplus X_{2,12}) + (X_{2,12} \oplus X_{3,12}), \]
\[ R_2 = (X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,2} \oplus X_{2,1} \oplus X_{2,2}) + (X_{2,1} \oplus X_{2,2} \oplus X_{3,1} \oplus X_{3,2}), \]
\[ R_2 = (K_{1}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{1,\text{part}_1} \oplus K_{2}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{2,\text{part}_1} \oplus K_{1}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{2,\text{part}_2} \oplus K_{2}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{3,\text{part}_2} \oplus K_{2}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{3,\text{part}_2} \oplus X_{1,3}^{'}). \]

where \( K_{1}^{\text{rand}} \) and \( K_{2}^{\text{rand}} \) represent the random encryption keys for the first and second parts of the private information, \( X_{\text{part}_1} \) and \( X_{\text{part}_2} \) represent the first part and second part of the private information of \( P_1 \).

From Eq. (18), for \( M > 3 \), \( TP_2 \) computes
\[ R_2 = (X_{1,12} \oplus X_{2,12}) + (X_{1,12} \oplus X_{3,12}) + \cdots + (X_{M-1,12} \oplus X_{M,12}), \]
\[ R_2 = (X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,2} \oplus X_{2,1} \oplus X_{2,2}) + (X_{2,1} \oplus X_{2,2} \oplus X_{3,1} \oplus X_{3,2}) + \cdots + (X_{M-1,1} \oplus X_{M,1} \oplus X_{M,2}). \]
\[ R_2 = (K_{1}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{1,\text{part}_1} \oplus K_{2}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{1,\text{part}_1} \oplus K_{1}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{2,\text{part}_1} \oplus K_{2}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{2,\text{part}_2} \oplus K_{1}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{3,\text{part}_2} \oplus K_{2}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{3,\text{part}_2} \oplus X_{1,3}^{'}). \]

Thus, if \( R_1 = 0 \) and \( R_2 = 0 \), \( R = R_1 + R_2 = 0 \), hence \( X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_M \) are equal. Otherwise, \( X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_M \) are not equal.

**MDQPC with B-block.** From Eq. (20), for \( M = 3 \), \( TP_2 \) computes
\[ R_1 = (C_{1,1} \oplus C_{2,1}) + (C_{2,1} \oplus C_{3,1}) + (C_{1,2} \oplus C_{2,2}) \]
\[ + (C_{2,2} \oplus C_{3,2}), \quad R_2 = (C_{1,3} \oplus C_{2,3}), \ldots, \]
\[ R_2 = (C_{1,B} \oplus C_{2,B}) + (C_{2,B} \oplus C_{3,B}). \]

So,
\[ R_1 = (X_{1,1} \oplus X'_{1,1} \oplus X_{2,1} \oplus X'_{2,1}) + (X_{2,1} \oplus X'_{2,1} \oplus X_{3,1} \oplus X'_{3,1}) \]
\[ \times (R_1 = (X_{1,2} \oplus X'_{1,2} \oplus X_{2,2} \oplus X'_{2,2}) + (X_{2,2} \oplus X'_{2,2} \oplus X_{3,2} \oplus X'_{3,2}), \ldots, \]
\[ R_2 = (X_{1,3} \oplus X'_{1,3} \oplus X_{2,3} \oplus X'_{2,3} \oplus X_{3,3} \oplus X'_{3,3}), \ldots \]
\[ R_2 = (K_{1}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{1,\text{part}_1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus K_{1}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{2,\text{part}_1} \oplus X_{1,2}^{'}) + (K_{1}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{2,\text{part}_1} \oplus X_{1,2} \oplus K_{1}^{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{3,\text{part}_2} \oplus X_{1,3}^{'}). \]

For \( M > 3 \),
\[ R_1^i = (C_{1,1} \oplus C_{2,1}) + (C_{2,1} \oplus C_{3,1}) + \ldots + (C_{M-1,1} \oplus C_{M,1}) (R_1^i = (C_{1,2} \oplus C_{2,2}) + (C_{2,2} \oplus C_{3,2}) + \ldots + (C_{M-1,2} \oplus C_{M,2}), \ldots \]
\[ R_M^b = (C_{1,1} \oplus C_{2,1}) + (C_{2,1} \oplus C_{3,1}) + \ldots + (C_{M-1,1} \oplus C_{M,1})), \]

So,

\[ R_1^1 = (X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,2} \oplus X_{2,1} + X_{2,2}) + (X_{2,1} \oplus X_{2,2} \oplus X_{3,1} + X_{3,2}) + \ldots + (X_{M-1,1} \oplus X_{M,1} \oplus X_{M,1}), \]
\[ \times (R_1^2 = (X_{1,2} \oplus X_{1,2} \oplus X_{2,2} \oplus X_{2,2}) + (X_{2,2} \oplus X_{3,2} \oplus X_{3,2}) + \ldots + (X_{M-1,2} \oplus X_{M,2} \oplus X_{M,2}), \ldots \]
\[ R_M^b = (X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{2,1} \oplus X_{2,1}) \times (X_{2,1} \oplus X_{2,2} \oplus X_{3,1} \oplus X_{3,1}) + \ldots + (X_{M-1,1} \oplus X_{M,1} \oplus X_{M,1}), \]}

In addition, from Eq. (22), for \( M = 3 \), TPE computes

\[ R_2^1 = (X_{1,2} \oplus X_{1,2} \oplus X_{2,2} \oplus X_{2,2}) + (X_{2,2} \oplus X_{3,2} \oplus X_{3,2}), \ldots \]
\[ R_2^2 = (X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1}) + (X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1}) \times (R_2^2 = (X_{1,2} \oplus X_{1,2} \oplus X_{2,2} \oplus X_{2,2}) + (X_{2,2} \oplus X_{2,2} \oplus X_{3,2} \oplus X_{3,2}), \ldots \]
\[ R_2^b = (X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{2,1} \oplus X_{2,1}) \times (X_{2,1} \oplus X_{2,2} \oplus X_{3,1} \oplus X_{3,1}) + \ldots + (X_{M-1,1} \oplus X_{M,1} \oplus X_{M,1}), \]}

where \( K_{\text{rand}}^{1,j} \) and \( K_{\text{rand}}^{2,j} \) are random subkeys for encrypting the first and second part of the \( j \)th block, \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, B \). From Eq. (23) for \( M > 3 \), TPE computes

\[ R_2^1 = (X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{2,1} \oplus X_{2,1}) + \ldots + (X_{M-1,1} \oplus X_{M,1}), \ldots \]
\[ R_2^b = (X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{2,1} \oplus X_{2,1} \oplus X_{3,1} \oplus X_{3,1} \oplus X_{3,1} \oplus X_{3,1}), \ldots \]

So, we can get

\[ R_2^1 = (X_{1,2} \oplus X_{1,2} \oplus X_{2,2} \oplus X_{2,2}) + (X_{2,2} \oplus X_{3,2} \oplus X_{3,2} \oplus X_{3,2}) + \ldots + (X_{M-1,2} \oplus X_{M,2} \oplus X_{M,2}), \ldots \]
\[ R_2^2 = (X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1}), \ldots \]
\[ R_2^b = (X_{1,1} \oplus X_{1,1} \oplus X_{2,1} \oplus X_{2,1} \oplus X_{3,1} \oplus X_{3,1}), \ldots \]
Thus, if \( R_1 = R_2 = \cdots = R_B = 0 \), \( X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_M \) are equal. Otherwise, \( X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_M \) are not equal.

**Security analysis.** Here, we will show the robustness of the proposed QPC protocol against insider and outsider attacks. If the length of the secrets is odd, it should be modified. This process not only contributes to correctly executing the proposed protocol but also assists in enhancing the security of the protocol by altering the original secret bits without affecting the final comparison result. Moreover, two random keys are generated and distributed between TP's and participants to encrypt the private information of parties. As discussed in Refs. \(^{39,48}\), for improving the efficiency of the proposed DMQPC protocol, the private information of parties can be divided into several blocks of data. If the comparison result of a particular block is not equal, TP announces that the outcome of the comparison is not similar; hence there is no need to execute the remaining rounds. The three protocols in subsections 2.1, 2.4, and 2.5 are similar. Also, in the two-party QPC with two rounds, the quantum channel in the first-round is similar to the quantum channel in the second-round, so here we only analyze the quantum communication in the first-round between the participants and TP.

**Outside attack.** In the two-party situation, Alice (Bob) sends \( S'_l \) (\( S_l' \)) to TP, protected by single decoy photons \( l_1 \) (\( l_b \)). Alice (Bob) then announces the measurement bases and the positions of all inserted decoy particles. Subsequently, the TP announces the measurement results of all embedded decoy particles. Alice (Bob) then checks the security of the communication by checking whether the measurement results of the decoy particles are correct. Since the outside attacker does not learn the measurement bases of the decoy particles and their positions ahead of time, the well-known attacks such as entangle-resend attacks\(^ {32}\), correlation-elicitation attacks\(^ {49}\), and intercept-resend attacks\(^ {30}\) can be detected with nonzero probability\(^ {31}\). For instance, if the eavesdropper, Eve, attempts to measure the decoy photons \( |0 \rangle \) or \( |1 \rangle \) in \( S'_l \) (\( S_l' \)) with the correct basis (e.g., Z-basis), she successfully passes the public eavesdropping check. But, if Eve attempts to measure the decoy photons \( |0 \rangle \) or \( |1 \rangle \) in \( S'_l \) (\( S_l' \)) with an incorrect basis (e.g., X-basis), she will be detected with a probability of 50%. The probability of choosing the wrong measuring basis is 50%. Thus, the rate of detecting Eve for single decoy photon is 25% (i.e., 50% × 50%). Hence, the rate of detecting Eve for \( l \) single decoy photon is \( 1 - (3/4)^l \), where \( l = |l_b| = |l_1| \). This rate approaches 1 when \( l \) is large enough. Furthermore, a Trojan-horse attack\(^ {32}\) is prevented since photons are transmitted only once from participants to the TP. So, our two-party QPC protocol is fully secure against outsider attacks. Since the proposed DMQPC protocol uses the same strategy as the two-party process, it is also secure against outsider attacks.

**Participant's attack.** A significant advantage of our three different scenarios is that participant attacks such as collusion attack and cheating attack are not possible for the proposed protocols. Each participant receives two random keys from TP and TP, for encrypting her/his secret without the participation or assistance of other parties. Therefore, there is no exchange of information or even communication among participants, and each participant sends the private information directly to the TP and TP through quantum channels. Thus, to steal confidential information, dishonest participants must adopt Eve's attack strategies because they act as outside attackers. As discussed above, the protocol is secure against outside attacks.

**TP's attack.** TP's attack is another type of participant's attack which could threaten the security of the protocol. Here we prove that our scheme is secure against dishonest or malicious TPs. Firstly, with the assumption that the two TPs are not allowed to collude together or with participants, our protocol is secure since the encrypted data is distributed to two independent TPs for computing the final comparison result. To clarify, assume we have a secret \( a \) and an encryption key \( b \) and \( c = a \oplus b \). The probability of an attacker to know \( a \) is \( \frac{1}{2^l} \), where \( n \) is the length of the secret \( a \). In the proposed protocol, from TP's point of view, as shown in Table 4, \( X_1 = X_1 \oplus X_2 \). From Eqs. (2) and (3), \( X_1 = K_{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{\text{part}, 1} \) and \( X_2 = K_{\text{rand}} \oplus X_{\text{part}, 2} \). Hence, TP can know \( X_1 \) or \( X_2 \) when \( X_1 \) or \( X_2 \) is the first part of the secret message \( X \) and \( X_{\text{part}, 2} \) is the second part of \( X \). The probability of TP to know \( X_1 \) or \( X_2 \) is \( \frac{1}{2^l} \), where \( n \) is the length of the secret \( X \) and \( l \) is the length of \( X_{\text{part}, 1} \) and \( X_{\text{part}, 2} \). When \( n \) is large enough, the probability of getting the secret data is negligible. In addition, according to Table 4, TP can obtain \( X_1 = 1 \oplus X_1 \). Hence, if \( X_{12} = 0 \) then TP can learn that \( X_1 = 1 \), otherwise \( X_1 = 0 \). However, the private information of Alice is still secure against TP's attack for two reasons: (1) TP cannot learn any private information of Alice using \( X_1 \); (2) the private information of Alice \((X_{\text{part}, 1} \text{ and } X_{\text{part}, 2})\) is protected by two random keys \((K_{\text{rand}} \text{ and } K_{\text{rand}}')\).

From TP's point of view, Alice sends her encrypted secret (i.e., \( C_{a, j} = X_1 \oplus X'_1 (C_{a, j} = X_1 \oplus X'_1) \)) to TP. TP cannot reveal any useful information without knowing \( X_1 \) or \( X'_1 \) (\( X_2 \) or \( X'_2 \)). The probability of knowing the original secret is \( \frac{1}{2^l} \), where \( n \) is the length of the secret \( X \) and \( l \) is the length of \( C_{a, j} \). When \( n \) is large enough, the probability of TP to know the original secret is negligible. Also, when participants' secret data is divided into B...
Then the qubit efficiency ranges from 25% to 100%. It should be noted that $C_{54–56}$, where $n$ is the number of bits in each round and $B$; hence the efficiency is equal to 40%.

(i.e., $B$); hence the efficiency is equal to 40%.

For example, consider four participants ($M = 4$) who would like to compare their secrets of length 12 bits ($n = 12$). In this case, they can divide the secret into 2, 3, or 6 blocks, each part containing 6 bits, 4 bits, or 2 bits, respectively. Assume that they choose to divide the secrets into 2 blocks (i.e., $B = 2$) and each block contains 6 bits (i.e., $n = 6$); hence the $r_n = \frac{n}{B} = \frac{6}{2} = 3$. Then the qubit efficiency ranges from 25% to 100%. It should be noted that the qubit efficiency increases or decreases depending on the number of participants and selected blocks. For comparison, in Liu and Wang’s protocol46, the qubit efficiency is $\frac{n}{M(B + 2)}$, and for $n = 12$ and $M = 4$, the qubit efficiency is equal to 40%.

**Comparison**

Here we compare the performance of our DMQPC proposed scheme with previous MQPC schemes. We first compare our DMQPC protocol with Liu and Wang’s protocol46 (see Table 6). We then compare our DMQPC protocol with previous MQPC protocols.

| Features | Ref. 46 | Ref. 58 | Ref. 40 | Ref. 41 | Ref. 42 | Ref. 43 | Ref. 44 | Ref. 31 | Ref. 45 | Ref. 46 | Our |
|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----|
| Multiparty | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Dynamic | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Secure against participant attack | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Secure against the malicious TP | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Work in strangers’ environment31 | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Table 6. Comparison to Liu-Wang protocol46.

| Parameters | Liu-Wang protocol46 | Our protocol |
|------------|---------------------|--------------|
| Quantum resource | Single photon states | Single photon states |
| Number of TPs | One | Two |
| Secure against participant attack | No | Yes |
| Quantum measurement (TP) | Single photon measurements | Single photon measurements |
| Quantum measurement (parties) | Single photon measurements | Single photon measurements |
| Preparing single photons (TP) | Yes | Yes |
| Preparing single photons (parties) | Yes | Yes |
| Dynamic | Yes | Yes |
| The flexibility of comparing the private information of parties | TP can compare the secret information of any two parties of $M$ ($M \geq 4$) parties with the assistance of other $M–2$ parties | TPs can compare the secret information of any subset of $M$ parties without any assistance of other parties |
| Joining and leaving the comparison protocol | Any subset of $M$ parties can join in the protocol before the quantum states are measured | Any subset of $M$ parties can join in or leave the protocol at any time without any extra conditions |
| The cost of transmission | All private information of parties should be transmitted among parties for deducing the final result of the comparison | In case of executing the protocol in one round, only the first part of the secret bits is transmitted to $TP_1$ for deducing the final result of the comparison |

Table 7. Comparison to some existing QPC protocols.
Abulkasim et al. showed that the Liu-Wang protocol suffers from participant attack. In our proposed protocol, participant attack is not possible. Thus, our protocol is safe not only against well-known participant attacks but also against potential participant attacks. Both the Liu-Wang protocol and our protocol use single photon states as a quantum resource and perform single photon measurements. The Liu-Wang protocol uses one TP who performs single photon measurements. In our protocol, two TPs are adopted and they also perform single photon preparation and measurements.

Like the Liu-Wang protocol, in our scheme, both the TP and the participants prepare single photons for deducing the comparison result. Like the Liu-Wang protocol, our protocol is dynamic so that any new subset of M parties can join or leave the protocol at any time. However, in the Liu-Wang protocol, new participants have to participate in the protocol before the quantum states are measured. Unlike the Liu-Wang protocol, in our scheme, the TPs can compare the private information of any subset of M parties without any assistance from other parties. In contrary to the Liu-Wang protocol, our scheme reduces the cost of communication by half, in some situations, where the protocol can be executed in one round to get the final comparison result.

From Table 7, like the protocols in refs. 31,40-42,45,58, our protocol is secure against participant attack. In contrast with the proposed protocols in refs. 31,40-46, which suppose that there is a semi-honest TP who executes the QPC protocol loyally, our proposed protocol allows for almost-dishonest TPs. Unlike the protocols in refs. 31,40-46,58, our protocol is secure against a malicious TP (TP2). Like the protocols in refs. 31,46, our protocol works in an environment where participants and TPs could be strangers, where there is no need for authenticated channels to prevent secret information from leaking. Compared to previous work, our main contribution is that participant attack is not possible in this work, since there is no exchange of information or even communication among participants. In addition, our scheme reduces the cost of communication.

Conclusion

This work proposes a novel dynamic multiparty quantum private comparison protocol that does not allow participant attack. The proposed protocol divides the private information into equal parts, and every participant independently encrypts her/his secrets using two random keys before sending them to two third parties using quantum channels. The protocol is executed in one or more rounds depending on the result of the previous round. The private information can also be divided into a number of blocks, with each block containing two equal parts of the secret. The dynamic nature of the proposed protocol enables the two TPs to compare the private information of any subset of M parties without any assistance from other parties. Any subset of M parties can join in or leave the protocol at any time without any extra conditions. Our analysis proves that the proposed protocol is correct and fully secure against outside attack. Furthermore, the scheme is not open to participant attacks. Compared to existing schemes, our protocol is more efficient, more secure and more feasible. Thus, our scheme is an ideal choice for comparing private information of M parties.

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Abulkasim, H. designed the scheme. Abulkasim, H., Farouk, A., Hamad, S., Mashatan, A. and Ghose, S. did security analysis and comparisons. Abulkasim, H. and Farouk, A. prepared all tables and figures. All authors contributed to the writing and discussion of the paper.

Competing interests
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