Improved Latin Square based Secret Sharing Scheme

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Abstract. This paper first reviews some basic properties of cryptographic hash function, secret sharing scheme, and Latin square. Then we discuss why Latin square or its critical set is a good choice for secret representation and its relationship with secret sharing scheme. Further we enumerate the limitations of Latin square in a secret sharing scheme. Finally we propose how to apply cryptographic hash functions, herding attack technique to a Latin square based secret sharing scheme to overcome these limitations.

Key words: Secret sharing scheme, Latin square, partial Latin square, critical set, hash functions, herding and Nostradamus attack.

1 Introduction

How to set up an effective procedure to keep a secret is important. However, how to represent the secret is equally important. If we can discover the secret by exhaustive search, then we can bypass the secret sharing scheme, no matter how good it is. Also, it would be efficient to keep the secret short, and difficult to discover at the same time. Latin square is a good candidate in a secret sharing scheme. We can use a Latin square to represent the secret, because of the huge number of different Latin squares for a reasonably large order. For example, there are about $10^{37}$ different Latin squares of order 10. This makes outsiders difficult to discover the secret without any knowledge due to the tremendous possibilities. We can even improve the efficiency by distributing the shares of the critical set, instead of the full Latin square, to the participants. Whenever any group of the participants join together to form any critical set, the original Latin square and hence the secret can be recovered.

There are Latin square based secret sharing schemes in the literature. Cooper, Donovan, Seberry\textsuperscript{3} used critical sets of Latin square in the design of secret sharing schemes. Their schemes are not perfect because each share of a participant is a component of a critical set. Therefore each share contains partial information of the secret. Chaudhry and Seberry\textsuperscript{3} had another secret sharing scheme based on critical sets of Room squares. This scheme is not perfect, either. Distributing shares of a critical set is fast and efficient. However it’s not easy to reconstruct the full Latin square, which is the shared secret, from the critical set. Chaudhry, Ghodosi, Seberry\textsuperscript{2} proposed a perfect secret sharing scheme from Room squares, but the scheme is not flexible, nor ideal. Each participant needs to have different share for different authorized set he/she belongs to. It’s not flexible to set up a verifiable, or proactive secret sharing scheme by just using Latin square or its critical sets, because it’s hard to verify a critical set for a large order Latin square.
In order to conquer the aforementioned limitations of Latin square in a secret sharing scheme, we propose to apply cryptographic hash functions, herding attack technique to Latin square based secret sharing schemes. We can use hash function to store a partial Latin square in a hash, such partial Latin square is easily extended to the full Latin square. Then we set up a Latin square based ideal perfect \((t+1, n)\) threshold scheme, which utilizes the herding hash function and Nostradamus attack technique to iterative hash functions. Finally we use two hash functions to set up a verifiable secret sharing scheme, the method applies to any general secret sharing schemes, including Latin square based schemes. The security of our newly proposed schemes are dramatically improved.

In this section we review some basic properties of cryptographic hash functions, herding attacks, and secret sharing schemes. In Section 2 we discuss Latin square, partial Latin square, critical set, and other concepts of Latin square. Section 3 presents applications of critical set in secret sharing schemes. Section 4 discusses the limitations of Latin square in a secret sharing scheme. In Section 5 we propose the applications of hash functions to Latin square based secret sharing schemes with three examples. Section 5 concludes the paper and summarizes the advantages of the schemes we have designed.

1.1 Cryptographic hash functions

A cryptographic hash function \([19,20]\) takes an input string of arbitrary length and generates an output string of fixed length, which is called message digest, or hash value, or just “hash”. Hash functions have many applications in information security area, such as digital signatures, message authentication codes, and authentication protocols. The following are common properties that a well designed cryptographic hash function should have.

1) Given an input string of arbitrary length, the output string will be of fixed length. The output is usually called a hash value or message digest.
2) For all practical purposes, given any message \(x\), the message digest \(h(x)\) can be calculated very quickly.
3) Given a message digest \(y\), it is computationally infeasible to find \(x\) such that \(h(x) = y\). This, together with b), implies that \(h\) is a one way function, or preimage resistant.
4) Given an input and output pair \((x, y)\) for a hash function, it should remain infeasible to find a second preimage \(x'\) such that \(x \neq x'\) but \(h(x) = h(x') = y\). This property is called second preimage resistance.
5) It is infeasible to find two different inputs, \(x\) and \(x'\), that produce the same output, i.e. \(x \neq x'\) but \(h(x) = h(x')\). This property is called collision resistance.

A hash function must have the flexibility to process messages of arbitrary length. Most currently used hash functions, such as MD family and SHA family, are built from iterations of a compression function \(C\) using Merkle-Damgård construction \([6,14]\), they are also called iterative hash functions. The process is as follows. (a) Pad the arbitrary length message \(M\) into multiple \(v\)-bit blocks: \(m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_b\). (b) Iterate the compression function \(h_i = C(h_{i-1}, m_i)\), where \(i\) is from 1 to \(b\) and \(h_0\) is the initial value (or initial vector) IV. (c) Output \(h_b\) is the hash of the message \(M\), i.e., \(H(M) = h_b = C(h_{b-1}, m_b)\).

1.2 Herding and Nostradamus attack

Iterative hash functions are also vulnerable to herding and Nostradamus attack. This attack also makes use of the fact that it is not difficult to find intermediate hash values that can be substituted for genuine blocks during iterative application of a compression function and generate the same final hash value, \(h\). Kelsey and Kohno \([12]\) have a detailed analysis of this attack. Stevens, Lenstra and Weger \([18]\) applied the technique to predict the winner of the 2008 US Presidential Elections using a Sony PlayStation 3 in November 2007. They claimed that they have correctly predicted the next US president, and committed the hash of the result to the public. And the correct prediction and the matching hash will be revealed after the election.
The first step is to build a large set of intermediate hashes at the first level: \(h_{11}, h_{12}, \ldots, h_{1w}\). The second step is to build a set of intermediate hashes at the second level: \(h_{21}, h_{22}, \ldots, h_{2w/2}\) so that the followings are satisfied:

- there exists a message \(m_{11}\) such that \(C(h_{11}, m_{11}) = h_{21}\)
- there exists a message \(m_{12}\) such that \(C(h_{12}, m_{12}) = h_{21}\)
- there exists a message \(m_{13}\) such that \(C(h_{13}, m_{13}) = h_{22}\)
- there exists a message \(m_{14}\) such that \(C(h_{14}, m_{14}) = h_{22}\)

By repeating this process, message blocks are linked so that each intermediate hash at level 1 can reach the final hash, say \(h\). This is called the diamond structure (see Fig. 1).

We claim we can predict something happens in the future by announcing this hash to the public. When the result is available, we construct a message as follows:

\[
M = (\text{Prefix} || M^* || \text{Suffix}),
\]

where \text{Prefix} contains the results that we claimed we knew before it happens. \(M^*\) is a block of message which can link the \text{Prefix} to one of the intermediate hash at level 1. \text{Suffix} is the rest of message blocks which linked the \(M^*\) to the final hash.

Fig. 1. A simplified diamond structure.

1.3 Secret sharing schemes

A secret sharing scheme \[19,20\] is a method to split and distribute a secret among a group of participants, each of whom receives a share of the secret. The secret can only be recovered when the participants join together to combine their shares.

There are many practical applications of secret sharing schemes. For example, they can be used to protect a private key from access by outsiders. When we examine the problem of maintaining sensitive information, we will consider two issues: availability and secrecy. If only one person keeps the entire secret, then there is a risk that the person might lose it or the person may not be available when it is needed. We can solve the availability and reliability issues by letting more than one person keep the same secret. But the more people who can access the secret, the higher the chance the secret will be leaked. A
secret sharing scheme is designed to solve these issues.

In 1979 Shamir [16] proposed the \((t + 1, n)\) threshold scheme, in which a secret is divided into pieces (shares) and distributed among \(n\) participants whereby any group of \(t + 1\) or more participants \((t \leq n - 1)\) can recover the secret. Any group of fewer than \(t + 1\) cannot recover the secret. By sharing a secret in this way the availability and reliability issues can be solved.

Shamir’s scheme allows no partial information given out even up to \(t\) participants joined together [19]. In other words, any group of up to \(t\) participants cannot gather more information about the secret than any outsider. A secret sharing scheme with this property is called a perfect secret sharing scheme. If the shares and the secret come from the same domain, we call it an ideal secret sharing scheme. In this case, the shares and the secret have the same size.

Shamir’s original sharing scheme assumes the dealer and all the participants are honest. However, in reality, we need to consider the situation that the dealer or some of the participants are malicious. In this case, we need to set up a verifiable secret sharing scheme so that the validity of a share of the participants can be verified. In order to make this possible, additional information is required for the participants to verify their shares as consistent. Feldman’s scheme [9] is a simple verifiable secret sharing scheme that is based on Shamir’s scheme. It is based on the homomorphic properties of the exponentiation function: \(x^{a+b} = x^a \cdot x^b\).

Many existing secret sharing schemes are subject to certain limitations. One particular scheme is only applicable to one specific access structure. If we want to apply one scheme to another access structure, either it doesn’t work or it’s inefficient. Although Ito, Saito, and Nishizaki [11] proved that any general access structure can be realized by a secret sharing scheme, but there is no guarantee that the scheme is efficient. Also, any secret sharing scheme may not have all the desired properties such as perfect, ideal, verifiable, and proactive.

2 Latin square

A Latin square of order \(n\) is an array consists of \(n\) rows and \(n\) columns such that for any row and any column only one out of the \(n\) symbols occurs exactly once. For simplicity, we usually use \(0, \ldots, n - 1\) to represent the symbols so that each entry in a Latin square can be represented as a triple \((i, j, k)\), where \(0 \leq i, j, k \leq n - 1\), and \(i, j, k\) are the row, the column and the symbol, respectively. For any order \(n\), there exists a Latin square of this order. The addition table of the additive group \(\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}\) of integers mod \(n\) is an example [15].

2.1 Use a Latin square as a secret

Suppose we use a Latin square to represent the secret and its order, \(n\), is made public. For an empty \(n \times n\) array, there are \(n!\) ways to fill out the first row. Now consider the second row. There are \(n - 1\) choices for filling the ‘0’. There are \(n - 1\) or \(n - 2\) choices for filling the ‘1’ depending on whether the ‘0’ was filled under the ‘1’ in the first row or not. So there are at least \(n - 2\) choices for filling the ‘1’. We continue with ‘2’, there are at least \(n - 3\) choices. So, there are at least \((n - 1)!\) ways to fill out the second row. By similar argument, we can see there are at least \(n!(n - 1)!(n - 2)\ldots 2!\) Latin squares of order \(n\). This is just a lower bound. For a reasonably large \(n\), say \(n > 10\), there are many different Latin squares of this order. This definitely makes an outsider very difficult to figure out the secret itself without having any related knowledge.

The larger the order \(n\) is, the larger the number of Latin squares will be. For instance the number of Latin squares of order 10 and 11 are as follows [13,15].
\[ L_{10} = 10! \times 9! \times 7,580,721,483,160,132,811,489,280; \]
\[ L_{11} = 11! \times 10! \times 5,363,937,773,277,371,298,119,673,540,771,840. \]
The number of Latin square of a given order is an open problem. By now, the number of Latin squares of order 12 has not been determined.

2.2 Partial Latin square and extension of a partial Latin square

A partial Latin square of order \( n \) is an array that consists of \( n \) rows and \( n \) columns such that for any row and any column no symbol occurs more than once and one or more cells(s) can be empty. I.e, there exists one or more pair \((i, j)\) such that there is no symbol in row \( i \) and column \( j \).

Some partial Latin squares can be extended to Latin squares of the same order, while others cannot be. In the following example (see Tab. 1), the partial Latin square on the left can be extended into a Latin square in the middle. But the Latin square on the right cannot be extended to a Latin square.

| Table 1. Partial Latin square extendibility. |
|---|
| 0 3  |
| 2   |
| 1   |
| 3   |
| 0 1 3 2 |
| 3 2 0 1 |
| 2 3 1 0 |
| 1 0 2 3 |
| 0 3 1 |
| 2   |

In 1960, Trevor Evans conjectured that any partial Latin square of order \( n \) can be always extended to a full Latin square if the size of the partial Latin square is up to \( n-1 \) \[8\]. Twenty years later, this was proved to be true by Smetaniuk \[17\]. \( n-1 \) is the optimal number as we can see from the last table in Tab. 1.

We define a partial Latin square as a Latin rectangle if the first \( m \) rows are all filled \((m < n)\) and the remaining \( n-m \) rows are all empty. A Latin rectangle can always be extended to a full Latin square by adding row by row. This can be proved by Hall’s condition in perfect matching \[10\]. However, whether an arbitrary partial Latin square can be extended to a full Latin square is an NP-complete problem \[4\]. Also, given a partial Latin square, there may be different ways to extend it to different Latin squares of the same order.

2.3 Critical set and strong critical set

A critical set of a Latin square is a partial Latin square which can be extended to a full Latin square uniquely. In other words, there is only one Latin square which contains the critical set. After deletion of any entry of a critical set, the unique completion property does not hold any more. For a given Latin square, there may exist critical sets of different sizes.

By definition, we know we can recover the original Latin square from one of its critical set and the completion is unique. However, whether we can complete to a Latin square from a partial Latin square is an NP-complete problem \[4\]. That means the recovery of the Latin square from one of its critical set may be time-consuming. We really need some criteria to speed up the process.

Donovan, Cooper, Nott and Seberry \[7\] defined a strong critical set. Let \( L \) be a Latin square of order \( n \) and \( C \) one of its critical set. Let \(|C|\) be the size of \( C \), the number of non empty cells in \( C \). If there is a sequence of partial Latin squares \( \{P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_m\} \) such that
1) $C = P_0 \subset P_1 \subset \ldots \subset P_m = L$, where $m = n^2 - |C|$

2) For any $i, 0 \leq i \leq m - 1, P_i \cup \{(r_i, c_i, k_i)\} = P_{i+1}$ and $P_i \cup \{(r_i, c_i, k)\}$ is not a partial Latin square if $k \neq k_i$.

That means we start from the critical set $C$ and enter an entry one at a time until we finish the extension to a full Latin square $L$. When we get a new partial Latin square $P_{i+1}$, $0 \leq i \leq m - 1$ each time, there always exists a cell $(r_i, c_i)$ that can be filled with only one symbol $k_i$. We call such critical set as a strong critical set if it has the above properties. In other words, the ‘force out’ process makes a strong critical set to be extended to a full Latin square easily.

3 Application of critical set in secret sharing

Cooper, Donovan, Seberry [5] proposed to form a collection of critical sets of a Latin square, say $S$. Elements of $S$ are distributed to participants. Any group of participants is an authorized group if their shares pooled together is one of the critical sets forming $S$.

(1) For example: A $(2, 3)$ threshold scheme is shown in Tab. 2.

Table 2. A $(2, 3)$ threshold secret sharing scheme.

|   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 2 |   |
| 2 |   | 1 |
|   |   |   |

$C_1$  $C_2$  $C_3$  $L$

We can easily verify that all the partial Latin squares $C_1, C_2, C_3$ are critical sets. They can be extended uniquely to the full Latin square in $L$. This unique completion property does not hold any more if any entry of any partial Latin square $C_1, C_2, C_3$ is deleted.

Let $S$ be the union of the three critical sets $C_1, C_2, C_3$. Then $S = \{(1, 1, 1), (2, 2, 3), (3, 3, 2)\}$. We distribute a triple to a participant as a share. Any two participants can recover the full Latin square. So we have a $(2, 3)$ threshold scheme.

(2) The above simple example can be extended to the following general case. Let $C_1, C_2, C_3, \ldots, C_n$ be the critical sets of a given Latin square of size $s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n$. Each $C_i$ consists of a set of triples as follows:

$C_1 = \{(x_{11}, y_{11}, k_{11}), \ldots, (x_{1s_1}, y_{1s_1}, k_{1s_1})\}$

$C_2 = \{(x_{21}, y_{21}, k_{21}), \ldots, (x_{2s_2}, y_{2s_2}, k_{2s_2})\}$

$\vdots$

$C_n = \{(x_{n1}, y_{n1}, k_{n1}), \ldots, (x_{ns_n}, y_{ns_n}, k_{ns_n})\}$

A triple $(x_{ij}, y_{ij}, k_{ij})$ is interpreted as follow: $x_{ij}$ is the row of the $j$th element in $C_i$, $y_{ij}$ is the column of the $j$th element in $C_i$, and $k_{ij}$ is the symbol of the $j$th element in $C_i$.

In general, we make $S$ as a union of some critical sets of a given Latin square $L$ which represents a secret. Then, the dealer distributes a share in $S$, in this case a triple of the Latin square, to each participant. Whenever, a group of participants joins together to form a critical set, the original Latin square, and hence the secret can be recovered.
Chaudhry, Ghodosi, and Seberry [2] proposed a perfect secret sharing scheme based on Room squares. This can be applied to Latin square. The idea is to generate shares randomly for all the participants with the exception of the last participant, whose shares will be determined by the shares of other participants and the critical set in such a way that all the shares when summing up will be equal to the value of the critical set. Modular arithmetic are done here.

**Example:**

Let \( C = \{(0,0,0),(1,1,1)\} \) be the critical set of the Latin square \( L \) as Tab. 3.

\[
L = \{(0,0,0),(0,1,2),(0,2,1),(1,0,2),(1,1,1),(1,2,0);(2,0,1),(2,1,0),(2,2,2)\}.
\]

**Table 3.** Calculation of the share for the last participant.

|    | 0 | 1 | 2 |
|----|---|---|---|
| C  | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| L  | 0 | 2 | 1 |

Let \( \{P_1, P_2, P_3\} \) be an authorized set over \( C \). Suppose we generate the following random shares \( S_1, S_2 \) for \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) as: \( S_1 = \{(0,1,2),(2,0,0)\} \) and \( S_2 = \{(1,2,1),(0,2,1)\} \). Then share \( S_3 \) for \( P_3 \) will be calculated as:

\[
S_3 = \{(0-(0+1),0-(1+2),0-(2+1)),(1-(2+0),1-(0+2),1-(0+1))\} = \{(2,0,0),(2,2,0)\}.
\]

All arithmetic are done in \( \text{mod} \ 3 \). It can be easily verified that \( P_1, P_2, P_3 \) can recover the critical set when they pool their shares together. If any participant is missing, it makes the unauthorized set contain nothing more than any outsider.

To summarize, there are reasons why we want to apply critical sets to secret sharing scheme:

1) Since a critical set can always be extended to a full Latin square uniquely, it would be more efficient to distribute shares of a critical set rather than a full Latin square.
2) A \((t+1,n)\) threshold scheme or multilevel scheme can be implemented through critical sets, as discussed in Chaudhry, Ghodosi, and Seberry [2].

4 Limitations of Latin square based secret sharing schemes

Many researches have been done since the original secret sharing ideas of Shamir [16] and Blakley [1] in 1979. Latin square was suggested as a good candidate being used in secret sharing schemes. However, there are certain limitations as discussed below.

1) By just distributing shares of a critical set to participants, partial information will be available to any unauthorized group. That means there is a good chance for any unauthorized group to figure out the remaining shares by trial and error method. So, the scheme proposed by Cooper, Donovan, Seberry [4] is not perfect.

2) The scheme proposed by Chaudhry, Ghodosi, Seberry [2] is not flexible if there is only one authorized set. In this case it is just a secret splitting scheme. If more than one authorized set exists, the secret
sharing scheme is not ideal. Each participant needs to have different share for different authorized set he/she belongs to.

3) As we know, distributing shares of a critical set instead of a Latin square is definitely more desirable. However, there are two issues need to be considered:

(a) Even getting all the shares about a critical set, it may not be easy to get back the original Latin square, the shared secret. In order to speed up the recovering process, we should use a strong critical set.
(b) However, if the participants of an authorized group join together, it will be much easier for them to figure out the shared secret if the chosen critical set is a strong one.

4) The knowledge about the critical sets of Latin squares, especially of large order (say 10), is very limited. There are critical sets of different size. It is very difficult to verify or find a critical set. These hinder the implementation of various secret sharing schemes based on critical sets.

(a) Control: Let $S$ be a collection of critical sets $C_1, C_2, C_3$ of Latin square $L$. We would like to design a secret sharing scheme such that any authorized set of participants can recover $C_1$ or $C_2$ or $C_3$. But there is a possibility that $S$ contains another critical set $C_4$. If individuals of any unauthorized set (in the sense that they cannot recover $C_1, C_2$ or $C_3$) can pool their shares to form $C_4$, then they can recover $L$. Hence some careful controls need to be taken especially given the condition that critical set of large order Latin square is difficult to find or verify.

(b) Implementation: It would not be so flexible and easy to set up a verifiable sharing scheme, a proactive sharing scheme, or a $(t + 1, n)$ threshold scheme just by using a Latin square or some of its critical sets to represent the secret especially when we choose a Latin square of order greater than 10 due to the limited knowledge about its critical set.

5 Apply hash function to Latin square based secret sharing schemes

Zheng, Hardjono, and Seberry [21] discuss how to reuse shares in a secret sharing scheme by using universal hash function. In this Section, we’ll show how to use general hash function properties including herding, and Nostradamus attacks [12] to design and improve Latin square based secret sharing schemes.

5.1 Store Latin square in a hash

If we want to use the hash to store a fixed secret, for example, a Latin square of order 10, we need to store 81 numbers (since the last row and last column are not necessary). Four bits can be used to store a number, so we need 324 bits. In this case, we can choose SHA-384 or SHA-512 to fulfill the requirements easily.

If we need to use SHA-256, we can proceed in the following way. 10 bits can be used to represent 3 numbers. So, we first use 250 bits to represent 75 numbers and then the next 4 bits to represent a single number. Altogether, we can store 76 numbers. We fix the partial Latin square in the following format.

We want to recover the number in (4, 8), (5, 8), (6, 8), (7, 8), (8, 8) in the following way. Pick any row between 4th and 8th. If $a$ and $b$ are the number missed in row $I$ ($4 \leq I \leq 8$) and $a(b)$ is in the 8th column, we can fill in $b(a)$ in the $(I, 8)$ cell. If we can recover (4, 8), (5, 8), (6, 8), (7, 8), and (8, 8) in
Table 4. Use 10-bit to represent 3 numbers in Latin square of order 10.

```
| × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × |
| × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × |
| × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × |
| × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × |
| × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × |
| × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × |
| × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × |
```

this way, we can recover the original Latin square uniquely.

Unused bits can be filled in randomly. The above are just simple examples to demonstrate how to use hash to represent fixed secret.

### 5.2 Set up an ideal perfect \((t + 1, n)\) threshold scheme

Let’s continue with Section 5.1 and suppose the secret is the hash of a (partial) Latin square. Let’s consider how to apply a hash function \(f\) to set up a \((t + 1, n)\) threshold secret sharing scheme. The approach we take is based on herding hash technique.

First we randomly generate a share of more or less the same size as that of the hash to each participant. Then, we set up different authorized subsets so that each subset consists of \((t + 1)\) or more distinct participants.

Let \(N\) be the size of the access structure, i.e., the total number of all authorized subsets.

\[
N = C(n, t + 1) + C(n, t + 2) + \ldots + C(n, n),
\]

where \(C(n, t) = \frac{n!}{t!(n - t)!}\) is the combination function. That means we need to have \(N\) messages for these \(N\) authorized subsets. There is a one-to-one correspondence between messages and authorized subsets.

Each participant holds a share and any combination of the shares of an authorized subset will generate one of these \(N\) messages. The next step is to herd the hashes of these \(N\) messages into the final hash as the Nostradamus attack by setting up the linking messages.

Suppose an authorized set consists of participants \(P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_b\) and their shares are sub-messages \(m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_b\). When they join together, they can form \(M_{\text{priv}} = m_1 || \ldots || m_b\) and find the corresponding linking message \(M_{\text{pub}}\), as shown in Fig. 2 Then they can recover the secret \(h\) by applying the hash function \(f\) to \(M_{\text{priv}} || M_{\text{pub}}\), i.e., \(f(M_{\text{priv}} || M_{\text{pub}}) = h\).

In the Nostradamus attack, we don’t know what will happen, so we need to

a) build a huge diamond structure leading to a final hash \(h\);
b) find a linking block after the result is known.

In our case, the above steps are not necessary since we know the hashes of these $N$ messages. This greatly reduces the effort.

For any message $M_{priv}$ obtained by combining the shares of the participants in an authorized subset, there is a corresponding message $M_{pub}$ in the diamond structure. Linking these two messages can reach the final hash of the diamond structure. So, we have a $(t+1, n)$ threshold scheme based on herding hash functions technique. The linking messages are stored in a public place which can be accessed by any participant. When any group of $t+1$ or more participants join together, they can look for the corresponding linking message and plus their shares to recover the secret.

Properties of the proposed scheme include:

a) Perfect: One of the basic properties of a cryptographic hash function is its randomness. Based on the message, we cannot figure out any information about the hash. This avoids revealing partial information to any participant. When all participants join together, they can recover the secret by applying the hash function $f$ to the message $M = M_{priv} || M_{pub}$. In order to maintain the security level, the length of each share should be at least as long as the hash. On the other hand, increasing the length of the share does not increase the security level. So, we would like to have each share to be generated randomly and of length more or less the same as the hash. This will be the case if the message was generated randomly. This provides a perfect sharing scheme because even one participant is missing, the share cannot be recovered and no information about the secret is leaking out.

b) Ideal: The scheme is ideal since each participant holds one share which has the same size of the hash.

c) Fast recovery of secret: The calculation of hash function is fast, this can assure that the partial Latin square and hence the full Latin square can be recovered quickly.

d) Avoid of critical sets: Under the new scheme, looking for critical sets of large size can be avoided. This makes it more efficient and better controlled as discussed above.

e) Application of minimal authorized subset: We provide a complete description here. But, as we shall see in the example, we can speed up the whole process by considering the minimal authorized subset only.

f) General access structure: As we shall see in the following example, this approach can be extended to general access structure.

Example:

A $(2, 3)$ threshold scheme. Let $m_1, m_2,$ and $m_3$ be shares of participants $P_1, P_2,$ and $P_3$, respectively. Then, the access structure consists of four authorized subsets, also shown in Fig. 3. $M_{pub1}, M_{pub2}, M_{pub3}, M_{pub4}$ will be the linking messages stored in the public area.
a) \{P_1, P_2\} \quad m_1|m_2|M_{pub1}

b) \{P_1, P_3\} \quad m_1|m_3|M_{pub2}

c) \{P_2, P_3\} \quad m_2|m_3|M_{pub3}

d) \{P_1, P_2, P_3\} \quad m_1|m_2|m_3|M_{pub4}

Fig. 3. A (2, 3) threshold scheme example.

While it would be straightforward to set up the access structure with all the authorized groups, it would be more efficient if we only consider the minimal authorized subset of the access structure. In this case, we can skip $m_1|m_2|m_3|M_{pub4}$.

Suppose we know $P_2, P_3$ are family members or good friends, we don’t want them to recover the secret. Then, a general (2, 3) threshold scheme doesn’t work. For our case, we can just simply skip the setup of $m_2|m_3|M_{pub3}$.

It is easy to show that this method is good for any general access structure.

5.3 Set up a verifiable scheme

A cryptographic hash function has an application as message authentication code to certify that original message was not altered. We can apply this idea to secret sharing scheme so that any dishonest participant who does not return the original share will be found by the dealer. On the other hand, the participants can verify whether the dealer really sends out consistent shares for them to keep. So, let us modify 5.2 approach for an implementation of a verifiable secret sharing scheme.

Let $f, g$ be cryptographic hash functions. Let $M$ be a message such that $f(M) = s$ where $s$ is the shared secret. The dealer breaks $M$ into different sub-messages $m_1, m_2, \ldots$, and distributes each share to each participant and then publishes the hashes (by hash function $g$) of each share as commitments: $g_1, g_2, \ldots$, as in Feldman’s case.

Participant $i$ verifies his/her share by checking if $g(m_i) = g_i$ holds. If all participants confirm that taking his/her share as input to the hash function $g$, he/she gets the hash value equals to one of the commitments published by the dealer, we conclude the dealer sends out consistent shares. Likewise, when the participants return their shares, the dealer can verify in the same way.

As we can see from the above, we use two hash functions $g$ and $f$. Hash function $g$ is used to make the scheme as an verifiable secret sharing scheme. Hash function $f$ is used to recover the shared secret:
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$f(M)$. Participant $i$ can fool the party if he/she can find $m'_i$ such that $g(m_i) = g(m'_i) = g_j$. If $g$ is second preimage resistant, this is difficult to achieve and the scheme is safe.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we use cryptographic hash functions to improve the security and performance of secret sharing schemes based on a Latin square or its critical sets. We can store a partial Latin square in a hash for a fast retrieval of the shared secret; we can set up an ideal perfect $(t + 1, n)$ threshold secret sharing scheme with easily extendable to have verifiable, proactive, hierarchical properties. This can also apply to any general access structure.

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