Adversarial Attacks and Defense on Texts: A Survey

Aminul Huq & Mst. Tasnim Pervin
ID: 2019280161 & 2019280162
Dept. of Computer Science & Technology
Tsinghua University
{huqa10,pervinmt10}@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn

Abstract

Deep learning models have been used widely for various purposes in recent years in object recognition, self-driving cars, face recognition, speech recognition, sentiment analysis, and many others. However, in recent years it has been shown that these models possess weakness to noises which force the model to misclassify. This issue has been studied profoundly in the image and audio domain. Very little has been studied on this issue concerning textual data. Even less survey on this topic has been performed to understand different types of attacks and defense techniques. In this manuscript, we accumulated and analyzed different attacking techniques and various defense models to provide a more comprehensive idea. Later we point out some of the interesting findings of all papers and challenges that need to be overcome to move forward in this field.

1 Introduction

From the beginning of the past decade, the study and application of Deep Neural Network (DNN) models have sky-rocketed in every research field. It is currently being used for computer vision (Buch et al., 2011; Borji et al., 2014), speech recognition (Deng et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2015), medical image analysis (Litjens et al., 2017; Shen et al., 2017), natural language processing (Zhang et al., 2018; Otter et al., 2020), and many more. DNNs are capable of solving large scale complex problems with relative ease which tends to be difficult for regular statistical machine learning models. That is why in many real-world applications, DNNs are used profoundly and explicitly. In a study by C. Szegedy (2013), showed that DNN models are not that robust in the image domain. They are in fact, quite easy to fool and can be tampered in such a way to obey the will of an adversary. This study caused an uproar in the researcher community and researchers started to explore this issue in other research areas as well. Different researchers worked tirelessly and showed that DNN models were vulnerable in object recognition systems (Goodfellow et al., 2014), audio recognition (Carlini and Wagner, 2018), malware detection (Grosse et al., 2017), and sentiment analysis systems (Ebrahimi et al., 2017) as well. An example of the adversarial attacks is shown in figure 1.

The number of studies of adversarial attacks and defenses in the image domain outnumbers the number of studies performed in textual data (Wang et al., 2019a). In Natural Language Processing (NLP), for various applications like sentiment analysis, machine translations, question-answering, and in many others, different attacks and defense have been employed. In the field of NLP, Papernot (2016) paved the way by showing that adversarial attacks can be implemented for textual data as well. After that, various research has been performed to explore adversarial attacks and defense in the textual domain.

Adversarial attacks are a security concern for all real-world applications that are currently running on DNNs. It is the same scenario for NLP as well. There are many real-world programs launched, which is based on DNNs like sentiment analysis (Pang and Lee, 2008), text question-answering (Gupta and Gupta, 2012), machine translation (Wu et al., 2016), and many others. Users in the physical world use these applications in their lives to get suggestions about a product, movies, or restaurant or to translate texts. An Adversary could easily use attack techniques for ill-will and provide wrong recommendations and falsify texts. Since these attacks are not observed by the models due to the lack of robustness these programs would lose values. Thus, the study of adversarial attacks and defense with respect to text is of utmost importance.

In this review, our major contributions can be
summarized as follows.

- We provide a systematic analysis and study of different adversarial attacks and defense techniques which are shown in different research projects related to classification, machine translations, question-answering, and many others.

- We present here adversarial attack and defense techniques by considering different attack levels.

- After going through all the research works we have tried to answer which attack and defense technique has the advantage over other techniques.

- Finally, we present some exciting findings after going through all the research works and point out challenges that need to be overcome in the future.

Our manuscript is organized as follows. Related research works are mentioned in section 2. In section 3 we start by providing preliminary information about adversarial machine learning concerning both image and textual data. Here we also provide a classification of different attack and defense approaches as well. Following this, in section 4 we discuss various attack techniques based on the taxonomy presented in section 3. To defend models from these attack techniques we discuss different defense techniques in section 5. We provide an in-depth discussion of our findings in these topics and some challenges in section 6. We conclude our manuscript by providing a conclusion in section 7.

2 Related Works

For textual data this topic has not been explored that much but for the image domain, it has been explored much more. Since this topic has not been explored that much small number of publications about it have been found and a smaller number of review works have been done. We were able to go through three review papers related to this topic (Belinkov and Glass, 2019; Xu et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2020). In the manuscript of Belinkov (2019), they mainly studied different analysis in NLP, visualization and what type of information neural networks capture. They introduced adversarial examples to explain that traditional DNN models are weak. Xu (2019) explained adversarial examples in all domains i.e. image, audio, texts etc. It was not specialized for text but mostly related to image domain. Zhang (2020) in their manuscript described different publications related to adversarial examples. Unfortunately it was focused largely on attack strategies and shed little light on defense technique. They mainly discussed data augmentation, adversarial training and one distillation technique proposed by (Papernot et al., 2016). Table 1 provides a comparative analysis between these survey papers and ours.

3 Adversarial Machine Learning

Modern machine learning and deep learning has achieved a whole new height because of its high computational power and fail-proof architecture. However, recent advances in adversarial training have broken this illusion. A compelling model can misbehave by a simple attack by adversarial examples. An adversarial example is a specimen of input data that has been slightly transformed in such a way that can fool a machine learning classifier resulting in misclassification. The main idea behind this attack is to inject some noise to the input to be classified that is unnoticeable to the human eye so that the resulting prediction is changed from actual class to another class. Thus we can understand the threat of this kind of attack to classification models.
3.1 Definition

For a given input data and its labels \((x, y)\) and a classifier \(F\) which is capable of mapping inputs \(x\) to its designated labels \(y\) in the general case we can define them as \(F(x) = y\). However, for adversarial attack techniques apart from input data a small perturbation \(\delta\) is also added to the classifier \(F\). Note that, this perturbation is imperceptible to human eyes and it is limited by a threshold \(||\delta|| < \epsilon\). In this case, the classifier is unable to map it to the original labels. Hence, \(F(x + \delta) \neq y\). The concept of imperceptibility is discussed in length in section 5.2.

A robust DNN model should be able to look beyond this added perturbation and be able to classify input data properly. i.e. \(F(x + \delta) = y\).

3.2 Existence of Adversarial Noises

Since adversarial examples have been uncovered, a growing and difficult question have been looming over the research community. Why adversarial examples exist in real-life examples. Several hypotheses have been presented in an attempt to answer this question. However, none of them have achieved a unanimous agreement of the overall researcher community. The very first explanation comes from C. Szegedy’s paper (2013). In it, he says that adversarial examples exist because there are too much non-linearity and the network is not regularized properly. Opposing this hypothesis I. Goodfellow says that it exists because of too much linearity in machine learning and deep learning models (2014). Various activation functions that we use today like ReLU and Sigmoid are straight lines in the middle parts. He argues that since we want to protect our gradients from vanishing or exploding we tend to keep our activation functions straight. Hence, if a small noise is added to the input because of the linearity it perpetuates in the same direction and accumulates at the end of the classifier and produces miss-classification. Another hypothesis that is present today is called tilted boundary (Tanay and Griffin, 2016). Since the classifier is never able to fit the data exactly there is some scope for the adversarial examples to exist near the boundaries of the classifier. A recent paper argues that adversarial examples are not bugs but they are features and that is how deep neural networks visualize everything (Ilyas et al., 2019). They classified the features into two categories called robust and non-robust features and showed that by adding small noises non-robust features can make the classifier to provide a wrong prediction.

3.3 Classification of Adversarial Examples

Here, we provide a basic taxonomy of adversarial attacks and adversarial defense techniques based on different metrics. For adversarial attack techniques, we can classify different attacks based on how much the adversary has knowledge about the model. We can divide it into two types.

- **White-Box Attacks**: In order to execute these types of attacks the adversary needs to have full access to the classifier model. Using the model parameters, architectures, inputs, and outputs the adversary launch the attack. These types of attacks are the most effective and harmful since it has access to the whole model.

- **Black-Box Attacks**: These attacks represent real-life scenarios where the adversary has no knowledge about the model architecture. They only know about the input and output of the model. In order to obtain further information, they use queries.

We can classify attacks based on the goal of the adversary as well. We can classify it into two types.

- **Non-Targeted Attack**: Adversary in this scenario does not care about the labels that the model produces. They are only interested in reducing the accuracy of the model. i.e. \(F(x + \delta) \neq y\).

- **Targeted Attack**: In targeted attacks, the adversary forces the model to produce a specific output label for given images. i.e. \(F(x + \delta) = y^*\).

These are the general classifications of different attacks. However, for NLP tasks, we can classify attacks differently. Since the data in text-domain is different from the data in the image or audio domain attack strategy and attack types are somewhat different. Based on which components are modified in the text we can classify attack techniques into four different types. They are called character-level attacks, word-level attacks, sentence-level attacks, and multi-level attacks. In these adversarial attacks text data are generally
inserted, removed, swapped/replaced, or flipped. Though not all of these options are explored in different levels of attacks.

- **Character-Level Attack**: Individual characters in this attack are either modified with new characters, special characters, and numbers. These are either added to the texted, swapped with a neighbor, removed from the word, or flipped.

- **Word-Level Attack**: In this attacks words from the texts are changed with their synonyms, antonyms, or changed to appear as a typing mistake or removed completely.

- **Sentence-Level Attack**: Generally new sentences are inserted as adversarial examples in these types of attacks. No other approach has been explored yet.

- **Multi-Level Attack**: Attacks which can be used in a combination of character, word, and sentence level are called multi-level attack.

| Reference       | Attack-type               | Application          |
|-----------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| Ebrahimi(2018)  | White-box and Black-box  | Machine Translation  |
| Belinkov(2017)  | Black-box                | Machine Translation  |
| Gao(2018)       | Black-box                | Classification       |
| Li(2018)        | White-box and Black-box  | Classification       |
| Gil(2019)       | Black-box                | Classification       |
| Hosseini(2017)  | Black-box                | Classification       |

Table 2: Character-level attack type with applications.

4 **Adversarial Attacks**

Most of the literature is about attack techniques that are where we start our discussion. In this section, we will be analyzing different attack techniques published in recent years in detail. In order to provide a clear understanding, we are diving our explanations based on the taxonomy for the NLP that we mentioned in section 2.

4.1 **Character-Level Attack**

As mentioned before character level attacks includes attack schemes which try to insert, modify, swap, or remove a character, number, or special character. Ebrahimi (2018) in his paper worked with generating adversarial examples for character-level neural machine translation. They provided white and black box attack techniques and showed that white-box attacks were more damaging than black-box attacks. They proposed a controlled adversary that tried to mute a particular word for translation and targeted adversary which aimed to push a word into it. They used gradient-based optimization and in order to edit the text, they performed four operations insert, swap two characters, replace one character with another and delete a character. For black-box attack, they just randomly picked a character and made necessary changes.

Belinkov (2017) worked with character-based neural machine translation as well. In their paper, they didnt use or assume any gradients. They relied on natural and synthetic noises for generating adversarial noises. For natural noises, they collected different errors and mistakes from various datasets and replaced correct words with wrong ones. In order to generate synthetic noises they
relied on swapping characters, randomized characters of a word except the first and last one, randomized all the characters, and replaced one character with a character from its neighbor in the keyboard.

Another black-box attack was proposed by Gao (2018). They worked with Enron spam emails and IMBD dataset for classification tasks. Since in the black-box settings, an adversary does not have access to gradients they proposed a two-step process to determine which words are the most significant ones. Temporal score and temporal tail scores are to be calculated to determine the most significant word. This approach was coined as DEEPWORDBUG by the authors. To calculate the temporal score, they checked how much effect each word had on the classification result. The Temporal tail score is the complement of temporal scores. For temporal tail score, they compared results for two trailing parts of sentences, one had a particular word and another did not have it.

TEXTBUGGER is both a white-box and black-box attack framework that was proposed by Li (2018). For generating bugs or adversarial examples they focused on five kinds of edits: insertion, deletion, swapping, substitution with a visually similar word, substitution with semantically similar meaning. For white-box attacks, they proposed a two-step approach. The first step is to determine which words are most significant with the help of determining the Jacobian matrix. Then generate all five bugs and choose the one which is the most optimal for reducing accuracy. In order to generate black-box attacks in this framework, they propose a three-step approach. Since there is no access to the gradient thus they propose to determine first which sentence is the most important one. Then determine which word is the most significant and finally generate five bugs for it and choose which one is the most optimal.

Gil (2019) was able to transform a white-box attack technique to a black-box attack technique. They generated adversarial examples from a white-box attack technique and then trained a neural network model to imitate the overall procedure. They transferred the adversarial examples generation by the HotFlip approach to a neural network. They coined these distilled models as DISTFLIP. Their approach had the advantages of not being dependent on the optimization process which made their adversarial example generation faster.

4.2 Word Level Attack

Papernot (2016) was the first one to generate adversarial examples for texts. They used a computational graph unfolding technique to calculate the forward derivative and with its help the Jacobian. It helps to generate adversarial examples using the FGSM technique. The words they choose to replace with are chosen randomly so the sentence doesn’t keep original meaning or grammatical correctness.

To change a particular text classification label with the minimum number of alterations Samanta

| Reference     | Attack-type      | Application  |
|---------------|------------------|--------------|
| Papernot(2016)| White-box        | Classification|
| Samanta(2017) | White-box        | Classification|
| Liang(2017)   | White-box and Black-box | Classification|
| Alzantot(2018)| Black-box        | Classification|
| Kulesov(2008)| White-box        | Classification|
| Zang(2019)    | Black-box        | Classification|

Table 3: Word-level attack type with applications.
(2017) proposed a model. In their model, they either inserted a new word or deleted one or replaced one. They first determined which words are highly contributing to the classifier. They determined a word is highly contributing if removing it changes the class probability to a large extent. To replace the words they created a candidate pool based on synonyms, typos that produce meaningful words and genre-specific words. They changed a particular word based on the following conditions.

\begin{verbatim}
if Word is an adverb and highly contributing then remove it
else
  Choose a word from the candidate pool
  if the word is an adjective and candidate word is adverb then
    Insert
  else
    replace particular word with candidate word
  end if
end if
\end{verbatim}

Liang (2017) proposed a white-box and black-box attack strategy based on insertion, deletion, and modification. To generate adversarial examples they used natural language watermarking technique (Atallah et al., 2001). To perform a white-box attack they provided a concept of Hot Training Phrase (HTP) and Hot Sample Phrase (HSP). These are obtained with the help of backpropagation to get all the cost gradients of each character. HTP helps to determine what needs to be inserted while HSP helps to determine where to insert, delete, and modify. For black-box attacks, they borrowed the idea of fuzzing technique (Sutton et al., 2007) for implementing a test to get HTPs and HSPs.

To preserve syntactical and semantic meaning Kuleshov (2008) used thought vectors. They took the inspiration from (Bengio et al., 2003; Mikolov et al., 2013) which mapped sentences to vectors. Those who had similar meanings were placed together. To ensure semantic meaning they introduce syntactic constraint. Their approach was iterative and in each iteration, they replaced only one word with their nearest neighbor which changed the objective function the most.

Genetic algorithm based black-box attack techniques are proposed by Alzantot (2018). They tried to generate adversarial examples that were semantically and syntactically similar. For a particular sentence, they randomly select a word and replace it with a suitable replacement word that fits the context of the sentence. For this, they calculate the first few nearest neighbor words according to the GloVe embedding space. Next using Googles 1 billion words language model they try to remove any words which do not match the context. After that, they select a particular word which maximizes the predication. This word is then inserted into the sentence.

An improvement of the genetic algorithm based attack was proposed by Wang (2019b). They modified it by allowing a single word of a particular sentence to be changed multiple times. To ensure that the word is indeed a synonym of the original word it needs to be fixed.

A sememe based word substitution method using particle swarm optimization technique was proposed by (Zang et al., 2019). A sememe is the minimum semantic unit in human language. They argued that word embedding and language model based substitution methods can find many replacements but they are not always semantically correct or related to the context. They compared their work with (Alzantot et al., 2018) attack technique and showed their approach was better.
| Reference     | Attack-type       | Application                  |
|---------------|-------------------|------------------------------|
| Jia(2017)     | White-box and Black-box | Question Answering |
| Wang(2018)    | White-box         | Classification               |
| Zhao(2017)    | Black-box         | Natural Language Inference   |
| Cheng(2019)   | White-box         | Machine Translation          |
| Micheal(2019) | White-box         | Machine Translation          |

Table 4: Sentence-level attack types with applications.

4.3 Sentence Level Attack

In the domain of question answering Robin Jia (2017) introduced two attack techniques called ADDSENT and ADDANY. They also introduced two variants of this ADDONESENT and ADDCOMMON randomly. Here, ADDONESENT is a model-independent attack i.e. black-box attack. Using these attacks they generated an adversarial example that does not contradict the original answer and inserts it at the end of the paragraph. To show the effectiveness of ADDSENT and ADDANY they used it on 16 different classifiers and showed that all of them got reduced F1 score. Figure 5. provides a visual representation of how ADDSENT and ADDANY attack is used for generating texts.

There is another group of researchers named Yicheng Wang (2018) who have worked on the modification of the ADDSENT model. They proposed two modifications of the ADDSENT model and named their model as ADDSENTDIVERSE. ADDSENT model creates fake answers that are semantically irrelevant but follows similar syntax as a question. In ADDSENTDIVERSE, they targeted to generate adversarial examples with a higher variance where distractors will have randomized placements so that the set of fake answers will be expanded. Moreover, to address the antonymstyle semantic perturbations that are used in ADDSENT, they added semantic relationship features enabling the model to identify the semantic relationship among contexts of questions with the help of WordNet. The paper shows that the ADDSENTDIVERSE model beats ADDSENT trained model by an average improvement of 24.22% in F1 score across three different classifiers indicating an increase in robustness.

Zhao (2017) Proposed a new framework utilizing Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) on Stanford Natural Language Interface (SNLI) dataset to generate grammatically legible and natural adversarial examples that are valid and semantically close to the input and can detect local behavior of input by searching in semantic space of continuous data representation. They have implemented these adversaries in different applications such as image classification, machine translation, and textual entailment to evaluate the performance of their proposed approach on black-box classifiers such as ARAE (Adversarially Regularized Autoencoder), LSTM and TreeLSTM. By their work, they have proved that their model is successful to generate adversaries that can pass common-sense reasoning by logical inference and detect the vulnerability of the Google Translate model during machine translation.

Cheng (2019) worked with neural machine translation and proposed a gradient-based white-box attack technique called AdvGen. Guided by the training loss they used a greedy choice based approach to find the best solution. They also used the language model into it as well because it is computationally easy for solving an intractable solution and it also retains somewhat semantic meaning. Their research paper is based on using adversarial examples for both attack generation and using these adversarial examples to improve the robustness of the model.

Michael (2019) worked with neural machine translation as well and in their manuscript, they proposed a natural criterion for untargeted attacks. It is adversarial examples should be meaning preserving on the source side but meaning destroying on the target side. From it, we can see that they are focusing on the point about preserving the meaning of the sentences while pushing adversarial examples into it. They propose a white-box attack using the gradients of the model which replaces one word from the sentences to maximize the loss. To preserve the meaning of the sentences they used KNN to determine the top 10 words which are similar to a given word. This approach has the advantage of preserving the semantic meaning of the sentence. They allowed swapping characters to create substitute words but if the word is out of the vocabulary then they repeated the last character to generate the substitute word.
4.4 Multi-level Attack

| Reference      | Attack-type      | Application                          |
|----------------|------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Ebrahimi(2017) | White-box        | Classification                       |
| Blohm(2018)    | White-box and    | Question-Answering                   |
|                | Black-box        |                                      |
| Wallace(2019)  | White-box        | Classification, Question-Answering   |

Table 5: Multi-level attack types with applications.

HotFlip is a very popular, fast, and simple attack technique that was proposed by Ebrahimi (2017). This is a white-box gradient-based attack. In the core of the attack lies a simple flip operation which is based on the directional derivatives of the model with respect to one-hot encoding input. Only one forward and backward pass is required to predict the best flip operation. This attack can also include insertion and deletion as well if they are represented as character sequences. After estimating which changes ensure the highest classification errors a beam search algorithm finds a set of manipulations that works together to ensure the classifier is confused. Their original manuscript was on character level adversarial attack but they also showed that their approach can be extended to word-level attack as well. Since flipping a word to another has the possibility of losing its original value they flipped a word only if it satisfied certain conditions. They flipped a word if the cosine similarity of the word embeddings were higher than a given threshold and if they were members of the same parts of speech. They didn’t allow stop words to be removed.

On the topic of question answering system Blohm (2018) implemented word and sentence level white-box and black-box attacks. They started by achieving the state of the art score on the MovieQA dataset and then investigate different attacks effect.

- Word-level Black-box Attack: For this type of attack the authors substituted the words manually by choosing lexical substitutions that preserved their meanings. To ensure the words were inside of the vocabulary they only switched words which were included in the pretrained GloVe embeddings.
- Word-level White-box Attack: With the help of the attention model they used for classification they determined which sentence and which word was the most important one. This had a huge impact on the prediction results.
- Sentence-level Black-box Attack: Adopting the strategy of ADDANY attack proposed by (Jia and Liang, 2017) they initialized a sentence with ten common English words. Then each word is changed to another word which reduces the prediction confidence the most.
Sentence-level White-box Attack: Similar to the word-level white-box attack they target the sentence which has the highest attention i.e. the plot sentence. They removed the plot sentence to see if the classifier was indeed focusing on it and its prediction capability.

Wallace (2019) proposed a technique in which they added tokens at the beginning or end of a sentence. They attempt to find universal adversarial triggers that are optimized based on the white-box approach but which can also be transferred to other models. At the very beginning, they start by choosing trigger lengths as this is an important criterion. Longer triggers are more effective but more noticeable than shorter ones. To replace the current tokens they took inspiration from the HotFlip approach proposed by (Ebrahimi et al., 2017). They showed that for text classification tasks the triggers caused targeted errors for sentiment analysis and reading comprehension task triggers can cause paragraphs to generate arbitrary target prediction.

5 Adversarial Defense

As mentioned earlier most of the researchers focused on attacking DNN models in the field of NLP few focused on defending it. Here we divide our studied manuscripts into two sections one being the most common approach called adversarial training found in (Goodfellow et al., 2014). In the second section, we include all the research papers that try to tackle attacks by working on a specific defense technique.

5.1 Adversarial Training

Adversarial training is the process of training a model on both the original dataset and also adversarial example with correct labels. The general idea behind this approach is that, since the classifier model is now introduced to both original and adversarial data the model will now look beyond the perturbations and recognize the data properly.

Belinkov (2017) in their experiments showed that training the model with different types of mixed noises improves the model’s robustness to different kinds of noises. In the experiments of Li (2018) they also showed for TEXTBUGGER attack adversarial training can improve model performance and robustness against adversarial examples. In the experiments of Zang (2019) they showed that their sememe based substitution and PSO based optimization improved classifiers’ robustness to attacks. By using CharSwap during adversarial training on their attack Micheal showed that adversarial training can also improve the robustness of the model. Ebrahimi (2017) in their manuscript of HotFlip also performed adversarial training. During their testing phase, they implemented beam search which was not used for training hence the adversary in the training was not strong as the testing ones. This reflects in their adversarial training experimental results as well. Though after training with adversarial examples the model attains certain robustness its accuracy isn’t as high as the original testing.

5.2 Topic Specific Defense Techniques

One of the major problems with adversarial training is that during training different types of attacks need to be known. Since adversaries don’t publicize their attack strategies adversarial training is limited by the users knowledge. If a user tries to perform adversarial training against all attacks known to him then the model would not be able to perform classification properly as it would have very low information on the original data.

In the research work of Alzanot (2018) they found that their attack approach which was based on genetic algorithm was indifferent to adversarial training. A good reason for this would be that since their attack diversified the input so much adversarial training did not affect them.

To protect models from synonym based attack techniques Wang (2019b) proposed the synonym encoding method (SEM) which puts an encoder network before the classifier model and checks for perturbations. In this approach, they cluster and encode all the synonyms to a unique code so that they force all the neighboring words to have similar codes in the embedding space. They compared their approach with adversarial training on four different attack techniques and showed that the SEM-based technique was better in the synonym substitution attack method.

Adversarial spelling mistakes were the prime concern of Pruthi (2019) in their research work. Through their approach, they were able to handle adversarial examples which included insertion, deletion, swapping of characters, and keyboard mistakes. They used a semi character-based RNN model with three different back-off strategies for a word recognition model. They
proposed three back-off strategies pass-through, back-off to a neutral word, back-off to the background model. They tested their approach against adversarial training and data augmentation based defense and found out that ScRNN with pass-through back-off strategy provided the highest robustness.

A defense framework was proposed by Zhou (2019) to determine whether a particular token is a perturbation or not. The discriminator provides some candidate perturbations and based on the candidate perturbations they used an embedding estimator to restore the original word and based on the context using the help of KNN search. The authors named this framework as DISP. This discriminator is trained on the original corpus during training time for figuring out which one is the perturbation. Token of the embedding corpus is fed to the embedding estimator to train it and recover the original word. During the testing phase, the discriminator provides candidate tokens which are perturbations, and for each of the candidate perturbation, the estimator provides an approximate embedding vector and attempts to restore the word. After this, the overall restored text can be passed to the model for prediction. To evaluate their frameworks’ ability to identify perturbation tokens they compared their results against spell checking technique on three character level attacks and two-word level attacks. Results show that their approach was more successful in achieving better results. To test the robustness of their approach they compared against adversarial training, spell checking, and data augmentation. Their approach was able to perform in this experiment as well.

6 Discussion

We will be providing a discussion on some of the interesting findings that we found while studying different manuscripts. We are also going to shed some light on the challenges in this area.

6.1 Interesting Findings

Based on the papers that we had studied we summarize and list out here some interesting findings.

- Character-level Perturbations: It can be astounding to see that changing a single character can affect the model’s prediction. Hosseini showed that adding dots(.) or space in words can be enough to confuse perspective api(Hosseini et al., 2017). Not only this in HotFlip we have seen that the authors swapped a character based on the gradients to fool the model. So, while designing defense strategies a mere character level manipulation needs to be considered as well.

- Research Direction: From the papers that we studied we found out that most of the papers were based on different attack strategies. Very few papers were focused on defending the model. The same can be said for multi-stage attacks as well. Only a few researchers produced manuscripts for multi-stage attacks.

- Adversarial Example Generation: Through the studies of different manuscripts we found that to generate adversarial examples most of the researchers followed a two-step approach. The first being finding out which word was the most significant in providing prediction and the second step was to replace it with suitable candidates that benefit the adversary.

6.2 Challenges

In our study, we found several challenges in this field. They are mentioned below.

- This phenomenon was first found in existence in the image domain and it has gained a lot of attention. Many research works have been published on it. It can be an easy assumption that we can use it in the text domain as well. However, there is a significant difference between them. In the image domain, the data is continuous but text data is discrete. Hence, the attacks proposed in the image domain cannot be utilized in text-domain.

- Another limitation of textual data is the concept of imperceptibility. In the image domain, the perturbation can often be made virtually imperceptible to human perception, causing humans and state-of-the-art models to disagree. However, in the text domain, small perturbations are usually clearly perceptible, and the replacement of a single word may drastically alter the semantics of the sentence and be noticeable to human beings. So, the structure of imperceptibility is an open issue.
Till now no defense strategy can handle all different types of attacks that were mentioned here. Each defense strategy worked on a single type of attack approach. For example, for spelling mistakes, we can use the defense technique proposed by (Pruthi et al., 2019). For synonym based attacks we can use the SEM model. A unified model that can tackle all these issues has not been proposed yet.

The concept of universal perturbation has still not been introduced for textual data. In the image domain, researchers established a method that was able to generate a single perturbation that can fool the model.

Whenever a new attack technique is proposed researchers use different classifiers and datasets as there is no benchmark. From table 6 we can see for a particular application different datasets are used no ideal dataset is being used for attack generation. Since there is no benchmark it is not easy to compare different attack and defense strategies with each other. Lacking such a benchmark is a big gap in this field of research.

There is no standard toolbox that can be used to easily reproduce different researchers’ work. There are many toolbox which can be used in the image domain like cleverhans (Papernot et al., 2018), art (Nicolae et al., 2018), foolbox (Rauber et al., 2017) etc but there is no standard toolbox for text-domain.

7 Conclusion

In this review, we discussed the adversarial attack and defense techniques for textual data. Since the inception of adversarial examples, it has been a very important research topic for many aspects of deep learning applications. DNNs perform very well on a standard dataset but perform poorly in the presence of adversarial examples. We tried to present an accumulated view of why they exist, different attack and defense strategies based on their taxonomy. Also, we pointed out several challenges that can be tended to for getting future direction about research works in the future.

References

Naveed Akhtar and Ajmal Mian. 2018. Threat of adversarial attacks on deep learning in computer vision: A survey. *IEEE Access*, 6:14410–14430.

Moustafa Alzantot, Yash Sharma, Ahmed Elgohary, Bo-Jhang Ho, Mani Srivastava, and Kai-Wei Chang. 2018. Generating natural language adversarial examples. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.07998*.

Mikhail J Atallah, Victor Raskin, Michael Crogan, Christian Hempelmann, Florian Kerschbaum, Dina Mohamed, and Sanket Naik. 2001. Natural language watermarking: Design, analysis, and a proof-of-concept implementation. In *International Workshop on Information Hiding*, pages 185–200. Springer.

Yonatan Belinkov and Yonatan Bisk. 2017. Synthetic and natural noise both break neural machine translation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.02173*.

Yonatan Belinkov and James Glass. 2019. Analysis methods in neural language processing: A survey. *Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics*, 7:49–72.

Yoshua Bengio, Régine Ducharme, Pascal Vincent, and Christian Jauvin. 2003. A neural probabilistic language model. *Journal of machine learning research*, 3(Feb):1137–1155.
Matthias Blohm, Glorianna Jagfeld, Eka Sood, Xi-ang Yu, and Ngoc Thang Vu. 2018. Comparing attention-based convolutional and recurrent neural networks: Success and limitations in machine reading comprehension. arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.08744.

Ali Borji, Ming-Ming Cheng, Qibin Hou, Huaiyu Jiang, and Jia Li. 2014. Salient object detection: A survey. Computational Visual Media, pages 1–34.

Norbert Buch, Sergio A Velastin, and James Orwell. 2011. A review of computer vision techniques for the analysis of urban traffic. IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 12(3):920–939.

Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. 2018. Audio adversarial examples: Targeted attacks on speech-to-text. In 2018 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), pages 1–7. IEEE.

Yong Cheng, Lu Jiang, and Wolfgang Macherey. 2019. Robust neural machine translation with doubly adversarial inputs. arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.02443.

Li Deng, Jinyu Li, Jui-Ting Huang, Kaisheng Yao, Dong Yu, Frank Seide, Michael Seltzer, Geoff Zweig, Xiaodong He, Jason Williams, et al. 2013. Recent advances in deep learning for speech research at microsoft. In 2013 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, pages 8604–8608. IEEE.

Javid Ebrahimi, Daniel Lowd, and Dejing Dou. 2018. On adversarial examples for character-level neural machine translation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.09030.

Javid Ebrahimi, Anyi Rao, Daniel Lowd, and Dejing Dou. 2017. Hotflip: White-box adversarial examples for text classification. arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.06751.

Ji Gao, Jack Lanchantin, Mary Lou Soffa, and Yanjun Qi. 2018. Black-box generation of adversarial text sequences to evade deep learning classifiers. In 2018 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), pages 50–56. IEEE.

Yotam Gil, Yoav Chai, Or Gorodisky, and Jonathan Berant. 2019. White-to-black: Efficient distillation of black-box adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.02405.

Yuan Gong and Christian Poellabauer. 2018. Protecting voice controlled systems using sound source identification based on acoustic cues. In 2018 27th International Conference on Computer Communication and Networks (ICCCN), pages 1–9. IEEE.

Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. 2014. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572.

Kathrin Grosse, Nicolas Papernot, Praveen Manoharan, Michael Backes, and Patrick McDaniel. 2017. Adversarial examples for malware detection. In European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, pages 62–79. Springer.

Poonam Gupta and Vishal Gupta. 2012. A survey of text question answering techniques. International Journal of Computer Applications, 53(4).

Hossein Hosseini, Sreram Kannan, Baosen Zhang, and Radha Poovendran. 2017. Deceiving google’s perspective api built for detecting toxic comments. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.08138.

Jui-Ting Huang, Jinyu Li, and Yifan Gong. 2015. An analysis of convolutional neural networks for speech recognition. In 2015 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), pages 4989–4993. IEEE.

Andrew Ilyas, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Logan Engstrom, Brandon Tran, and Aleksander Madry. 2019. Adversarial examples are not bugs, they are features. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 125–136.

Robin Jia and Percy Liang. 2017. Adversarial examples for evaluating reading comprehension systems. arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.07328.

V Kuleshov, S Thakoor, T Lau, and S Ermon. 2008. Adversarial examples for natural language classification problems. In URL https://openreview.net/forum.

Jinfeng Li, Shouling Ji, Tianyu Du, Bo Li, and Ting Wang. 2018. Textbugger: Generating adversarial text against real-world applications. arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.05271.

Bin Liang, Hongcheng Li, Miaoqiang Su, Pan Bian, Xirong Li, and Wenchang Shi. 2017. Deep text classification can be fooled. arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.08006.

Geert Litjens, Thijs Kooi, Babak Ehteshami Bejnordi, Arnaud Arindra Adiyoso Setio, Francesco Ciompi, Mohsen Ghafoorian, Jeroen Awm Van Der Laak, Bram Van Ginneken, and Clara I Sánchez. 2017. A survey on deep learning in medical image analysis. Medical image analysis, 42:60–88.

Paul Michel, Xian Li, Graham Neubig, and Juan Miguel Pino. 2019. On evaluation of adversarial perturbations for sequence-to-sequence models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.06620.

Tomas Mikolov, Kai Chen, Greg Corrado, and Jeffrey Dean. 2013. Efficient estimation of word representations in vector space. arXiv preprint arXiv:1301.3781.

Maria-Irina Nicolae, Mathieu Sinn, Minh Ngoc Tran, Beat Buesser, Ambrish Rawat, Martin Wistuba, Valentina Zantedeschi, Nathalie Baracaldo, Bryant
Chen, Heiko Ludwig, Ian Molloy, and Ben Edwards. 2018. Adversarial robustness toolbox v1.2.0. CoRR, 1807.01069.

Daniel W Otter, Julian R Medina, and Jugal K Kalita. 2020. A survey of the usages of deep learning for natural language processing. *IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems*.

Bo Pang and Lillian Lee. 2008. Opinion mining and sentiment analysis. *Foundations and trends in information retrieval*, 2(1-2):1–135.

Nicolas Papernot, Fartash Faghri, Nicholas Carlini, Ian Goodfellow, Reuben Feinman, Alexey Kurakin, Cihang Xie, Yash Sharma, Tom Brown, Aurko Roy, Alexander Matyasko, Yahid Behzadan, Karen Hambardzumyan, Zhishuai Zhang, Yi-Lin Juang, Zhi Li, Ryan Sheatsley, Abhishek Garg, Jonas Rauber, and Rujun Long. 2018. Technical report on the cleverhans v2.1.0 adversarial examples library. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.00768*.

Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Ananthram Swami, and Richard Harang. 2016. Crafting adversarial input sequences for recurrent neural networks. In *MILCOM 2016-2016 IEEE Military Communications Conference*, pages 49–54. IEEE.

Danish Pruthi, Bhuwan Dhingra, and Zachary C Lippton. 2019. Combating adversarial misspellings with robust word recognition. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.11268*.

Jonas Rauber, Wieland Brendel, and Matthias Bethge. 2017. Foolbox: A python toolbox to benchmark the robustness of machine learning models. In *Reliable Machine Learning in the Wild Workshop, 34th International Conference on Machine Learning*.

Suranjana Samanta and Sameep Mehta. 2017. Towards crafting text adversarial samples. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.02812*.

Dinggang Shen, Guorong Wu, and Heung-Ii Suk. 2017. Deep learning in medical image analysis. *Annual review of biomedical engineering*, 19:221–248.

Michael Sutton, Adam Greene, and Pedram Amini. 2007. Fuzzing: brute force vulnerability discovery. Pearson Education.

Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. 2013. Intriguing properties of neural networks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199*.

Thomas Tanay and Lewis Griffin. 2016. A boundary tilting perspective on the phenomenon of adversarial examples. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.07690*.

Eric Wallace, Shi Feng, Nikhil Kandpal, Matt Gardner, and Sameer Singh. 2019. Universal adversarial triggers for nlp. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.07125*.

Wenqi Wang, Benxiao Tang, Run Wang, Lina Wang, and Aoshuang Ye. 2019a. A survey on adversarial attacks and defenses in text. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.07285*.

Xiaosen Wang, Hao Jin, and Kun He. 2019b. Natural language adversarial attacks and defenses in word level. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.06723*.

Yicheng Wang and Mohit Bansal. 2018. Robust machine comprehension models via adversarial training. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.06473*.

Yonghui Wu, Mike Schuster, Zhifeng Chen, Quoc V Le, Mohammad Norouzi, Wolfgang Macherey, Maxim Krikun, Yuan Cao, Qin Gao, Klaus Macherey, et al. 2016. Google’s neural machine translation system: Bridging the gap between human and machine translation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.08144*.

Han Xu, Yao Ma, Haochen Liu, Debayan Deb, Hui Liu, Jiliang Tang, and Anil Jain. 2019. Adversarial attacks and defenses in images, graphs and text: A review. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.08072*.

Y-Zang, C Yang, F Qi, Z Liu, M Zhang, Q Liu, and M Sun. 2019. Textual adversarial attack as combinatorial optimization. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.12196*.

Lei Zhang, Shuai Wang, and Bing Liu. 2018. Deep learning for sentiment analysis: A survey. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery*, 8(4):e1253.

Wei Emma Zhang, Quan Z Sheng, Ahoud Alhazmi, and Chenliang Li. 2020. Adversarial attacks on deep-learning models in natural language processing: A survey. *ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST)*, 11(3):1–41.

Zhengli Zhao, Dheeru Dua, and Sameer Singh. 2017. Generating natural adversarial examples. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.11342*.

Yichao Zhou, Jyun-Yu Jiang, Kai-Wei Chang, and Wei Wang. 2019. Learning to discriminate perturbations for blocking adversarial attacks in text classification. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.03084*.