When Textbook RSA is Used to Protect the Privacy of Hundreds of Millions of Users

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Abstract
We evaluate Tencent’s QQ Browser, a popular mobile browser in China with hundreds of millions of users—including 16 million overseas, with respect to the threat model of a man-in-the-middle attacker with state actor capabilities. This is motivated by information in the Snowden revelations suggesting that another Chinese mobile browser, UC Browser, was being used to track users by Western nation-state adversaries.

Among the many issues we found in QQ Browser that are presented in this paper, the use of “textbook RSA”—that is, RSA implemented as shown in textbooks, with no padding—is particularly interesting because it affords us the opportunity to contextualize existing research in breaking textbook RSA. We also present a novel attack on QQ Browser’s use of textbook RSA that is distinguished from previous research by its simplicity. We emphasize that although QQ Browser’s cryptography and our attacks on it are very simple, the impact is serious. Thus, research into how to break very poor cryptography (such as textbook RSA) has both pedagogical value and real-world impact.

1 Introduction
Research into “real-world” cryptography often focuses on relatively hard targets, such as SSL/TLS [2] or ASP.NET [10]. Certain market segments, however, hide much softer targets behind the veil of security-through-obscurity. Analyzing the cryptography of these self-rolled, lower quality applications of cryptography has value mainly in terms of impact and pedagogy. The impact can be great because, for a variety of reasons ranging from education to market forces, major software vendors with hundreds of millions of users often implement very poor cryptography, as we show in this paper. We present QQ Browser, a browser developed by Chinese company Tencent, as a case study and identify research opportunities that are specific to the kinds of exploits that are useful for this type of market segment.

The pedagogical value of attacking very poor cryptography comes from simplicity. For example, one of the contributions of this paper is an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2) on a real-world RSA implementation that can be easily understood by, e.g., introductory cybersecurity class students.

Through reverse engineering, we have documented the encryption protocols used by QQ Browser to protect the trove of sensitive information each client uploads to QQ Browser’s servers (this is summarized in Section 2). This sensitive information includes International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI) numbers, web pages visited, locational data, and many other kinds of private data about a QQ Browser user. The possibility that Tencent shares this information with state actors is explored in existing reports [15], and QQ Browser’s data collection mirrors competing browsers such as UC Browser [12] and Baidu Browser [14]. In this paper we consider a different threat model, that of attacks by a state actor on QQ Browser’s cryptography implementation so that the state actor does not require Tencent’s complicity to violate user privacy. This is motivated by reports [1, 21] that UC Browser’s poor cryptography was being exploited by the Five Eyes intelligence agencies [1] to index that browser’s users by IMEI. Note that QQ Browser has over 16 million users that are outside of China.

One set of vulnerabilities that we present (in Section 3) would easily enable indexing of QQ Browser’s users by IMEI and decryption of private data transmitted to QQ Browser’s servers. This set of attacks is based on, e.g., QQ’s poor pseudorandom number generation, use of hard-coded symmetric keys, and use of a 128-bit RSA key in earlier versions. These attacks are particularly devastating, since they would allow any man-in-the-middle attacker, with minimal resources, to easily decrypt all sessions completely passively and offline.

The second set of vulnerabilities (presented in Sec-
tion is centered around QQ Browser’s use of textbook RSA. This affords us the opportunity to contextualize existing research on breaking textbook RSA and present a novel attack on QQ Browser that is exceptionally simple. This CCA2 attack allows an attacker to decrypt any session by making 128 of their own connections to QQ Browser’s servers to crack the session key. This is a very serious flaw, but would not scale to indexing all users by IMEI and is not a passive, offline attack.

The third set of vulnerabilities (presented in Section) is even more severe, because they would, in some cases, allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to take complete control over a user’s device. We analyze QQ Browser’s update mechanisms for both Android and Windows.

Our specific contributions are:

• We demonstrate an extremely simple attack on QQ Browser’s pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) that would enable a state actor, or any other man-in-the-middle attacker, to easily decrypt any sessions that they were able to record from the network. This would be the easiest way to decrypt all sessions offline and index them by IMEI. We also discuss how previous versions of QQ Browser used hard-coded symmetric session keys and 128-bit RSA keys.

• We present an exceptionally simple CCA2 attack on QQ Browser’s implementation of RSA, which is an example of “textbook RSA” being used to protect the private data of hundreds of millions of users. This attack has pedagogical value because of its real-world impact and simplicity, and is novel.

• We re-evaluate Boneh et al.’s meet-in-the-middle style attack on textbook RSA for 128-bit key sizes and modern understandings of state actor capabilities. We find that this attack, which would be attractive because it is passive and offline, does not scale to 128-bit symmetric session keys.

• We present man-in-the-middle attacks on the update mechanisms of both the Android and Windows versions of QQ Browser. Taken in the context of similar attacks from previous work, we find that patterns emerge where man-in-the-middle attackers can develop powerful attack primitives.

Finally, we put these vulnerabilities and related exploits in the context of related work in Section and find that more research is needed in certain areas of inquiry to address the problem of poor security and privacy practices in specific (but very large and important) market segments. This is followed by a brief summary in the conclusion.

2 QQ Browser Cryptography

When users run QQ Browser on Android, it makes a series of what QQ Browser internally terms as “WUP requests” to QQ Browser’s server. These WUP requests contain information such as a user’s International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI), International Mobile Subscriber Identification (IMSI), QQ username, WiFi MAC address, SSID of connected WiFi access point and of all in-range access points, Android ID, URLs of all webpages visited, and other private information. More details about WUP requests are available in the report by Knockel et al. which analyzes version 6.3.0.1920 of QQ Browser. Here we focus on the encryption protocol of the version of QQ Browser that Tencent released as a response to the vulnerabilities identified in that report.

The main vulnerability that they fixed that is relevant to the attacks that we present is that they increased the size of the RSA key from 128 bits to 1024 bits. Before this fix using factorization to crack the private key took less than a second on Wolfram Alpha.

Specifically, we analyzed version 6.5.0.2170 of QQ Browser for Android. This version, and the updated QQ Browser server, implement the following steps to encrypt WUP requests from the client to the server:

1. First, the client generates a 128-bit AES session key for the session, using a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) seeded with the current time in milliseconds since the Unix epoch.
2. Then, the client encrypts this session key using a 1024-bit RSA public key. The public key has exponent 65537, and the RSA implementation is “textbook RSA,” meaning that no form of padding—such as OAEP—is applied at all.
3. The client uses the AES session key to encrypt the WUP request, in ECB mode.
4. The client sends the RSA-encrypted AES session key and the encrypted WUP request to the server.
5. The server decrypts the RSA-encrypted AES key it received from the client using its private key, then chooses the least significant 128 bits of the plaintext to be the AES session key.
6. The server decrypts the WUP request using the AES session key that it obtained via RSA decryption.
7. If the AES ciphertext received from the client decrypts to a valid WUP request correctly, the server sends an AES-encrypted response using the AES session key (also using ECB mode).

We reiterate the following important points about this protocol because they will be relevant to the attacks:
• The only entropy source used by the client to choose the AES session key is the current time in milliseconds.

• The client encrypts with the session key first, and the server only responds if the client’s request is properly encrypted with the correct AES key that the client sent to the server with RSA encryption.

• The server “chops off” all but the 128 least significant bits of the decrypted RSA plaintext, with these 128 least significant bits becoming the 128-bit AES session key and all the other bits being ignored.

3 Passive, Offline attacks

In this section, for completeness, we present vulnerabilities in QQ Browser that are devastating in the sense that they allow all sessions to be decrypted completely offline.

3.1 PRNG attack in QQ Browser 6.3.0.1920 for Android

As described in a previous report [15] analyzing QQ Browser version 6.3.0.1920, that version’s PRNG algorithm, shown in in Figure 1, decreases the entropy of the AES session key used by the client for WUP requests from the normal $2^{128}$ to $8999999^2 < 2^{53}$. This vulnerability was rendered moot by the fact that this session key is protected by a 128-bit RSA key.

3.2 128-bit RSA key in QQ Browser 6.3.0.1920

Although QQ Browser distinguishes itself from competing browsers by attempting to implement asymmetric cryptography, the RSA key in version 6.3.0.1920 was 128 bits long and is easily factored using Wolfram Alpha or a factorization library:

$$24540641757374088471004774586965023463 = 14119218591450688427 \cdot 17381019776996486069.$$  

To resolve this vulnerability, QQ Browser can use the java.security.SecureRandom random number generator with no explicitly passed seed (i.e., with the no-args constructor).

3.3 Hard-coded symmetric keys in QQ Browser 6.3.0.1920

As described in a previous report [15], QQ Browser version 6.3.0.1920 does use hard-coded symmetric keys in some places, such as

QQ Browser has at least an attempted implementation of asymmetric cryptography, distinguishing it from less security-conscious browsers such as UC Browser [12] and Baidu Browser [14].

3.4 PRNG attack in QQ Browser 6.5.0.2170 for Android

The most recent vulnerability, the attack for which we will refer to as the PRNG attack, is that the AES key randomly generated for each WUP request is generated using a random number generator (java.util.Random) seeded with the current time in milliseconds (java.lang.System.currentTimeMillis()) before generating every key (this is shown in Figure 2). Thus, to guess the key, one must know only the time that the key was generated, which can be approximated by the time that the WUP request was observed being transmitted. By observing a WUP request and using the time of its observation and simultaneously searching forward and backward from that time, we were able to guess the correct AES key in fewer than 70,000 guesses, i.e., the key had been generated within 35,000 milliseconds.

To resolve this vulnerability, QQ Browser can use the java.security.SecureRandom random number generator with no explicitly passed seed (i.e., with the no-args constructor).

4 Active Attacks on QQ Browser’s Use of Textbook RSA

In this section, we explore attacks on QQ Browser’s use of textbook RSA.

4.1 CCA2 attack

The first attack, which we refer to as the CCA2 attack, results from the fact that no key padding such as OAEP is used when encrypting the AES key with RSA. Because of this, we are able to leverage the malleability of RSA to perform a chosen ciphertext attack to guess the AES key one bit at a time. The threat model for this attack is an attacker with the ability to record a user’s encrypted session from the network. We call the client that
int i = 10000000 + new Random().nextInt(89999999);
int j = 10000000 + new Random().nextInt(89999999);
return (String.valueOf(i) + String.valueOf(j)).getBytes();

Figure 1: Decompiled Java method generating an AES session key in version 6.3.0.1920.

Random random = new Random(System.currentTimeMillis());
byte[] bArr = new byte[8];
byte[] bArr2 = new byte[8];
random.nextBytes(bArr);
random.nextBytes(bArr2);
return new SecretKeySpec(ByteUtils.mergeByteData(bArr, bArr2), "AES");

Figure 2: Decompiled Java method generating an AES session key in version 6.5.0.2170.

the user is using the victim client. After recording the user’s session, the attacker wants to determine the AES key used for the WUP session so that they can decrypt it. The attacker accomplishes this by making a series of connections, using its own client, to the QQ Browser server and attempting encrypted communications with the server with a series of transformed RSA ciphertexts to gain information about the original key used by the victim client.

Let \( C \) be the RSA encryption of 128-bit AES key \( k \) with RSA public key \((n, e)\). Thus, we have

\[
C \equiv k^e \pmod{n}
\]

Now let \( C_b \) be the RSA encryption of the AES key \( k_b = 2^b k \)

\[ i.e., \text{ } k \text{ bitshifted to the left by } b \text{ bits. Thus, we have} \]

\[
C_b \equiv k_b^e \pmod{n}
\]

We can compute \( C_b \) from only \( C \) and the public key, as

\[
C_b \equiv C(2^{be} \pmod{n}) \pmod{n} \\
\equiv (k^e \pmod{n})(2^{be} \pmod{n}) \pmod{n} \\
\equiv k^{e2^b} \pmod{n} \\
\equiv (2^bk)^e \pmod{n} \\
\equiv k_b^e \pmod{n}
\]

The third line follows from the fundamental property of multiplication in modular arithmetic.

We begin the attack by considering \( C_{127} \). It is the RSA encryption of \( k_{127} \), the AES key where every bit but the highest bit are necessarily zero and where \( k_{127} \)'s highest bit is \( k \)'s lowest bit (recall that the QQ Browser server ignores all but the lowest 128 bits of the decrypted key). We first guess that \( k_{127} \)'s high bit is zero and send a WUP request with \( C_{127} \) and encrypt the request with the key where that bit is zero. If the server responds, that means that the bit was zero, since it was able to decrypt our request. If not, the bit must have been a one. After we know this bit, we consider \( C_{126} \) and guess the next bit (note that we know one of \( C_{126} \)'s bits from \( C_{127} \)). We repeat this process for each bit of the AES key. In total, this requires 128 guesses, since the AES key is 128 bits and each request reveals one bit of the key. By using this approach, we can iteratively learn every bit of the AES key.

Recall from Section 2 that the server only responds if the client sends a properly encrypted WUP request. If the server sent predictable plaintext encrypted with the session key from the client without first checking the client’s request to make sure it decrypts properly, we could infer more than one bit at a time by chopping off, \( e.g. \), 16 or 32 bits and performing a brute-force attack on the plaintext/ciphertext pairs obtained from the server. However, the client must properly encrypt the WUP request for the server to respond, so inferring the session key one bit at a time is the most efficient method of attack, which requires 128 sessions to be initiated with the server by the attacker.

As discussed in Section 6.2, we have implemented this attack and tested it, and informed Tencent of the issue as per ethical disclosure standards. To resolve this issue, QQ Browser can use the OAEP key padding algorithm to encrypt all AES keys. However, we recommend that they use a well-tested implementation of SSL/TLS to communicate all WUP requests as this would not only fix this and other issues (such as the PRNG attack), but also any other undiscovered issues in their cryptographic implementation.

4.2 Offline attacks on textbook RSA

The CCA2 attack on QQ Browser is powerful in the sense that a man-in-the-middle attacker can record a user’s session and then easily recover the session key by testing bits \( \text{via} \) 128 connections to QQ Browser’s server. For a state actor that wants to decrypt all sessions and index them by IMEI, however, this is not ideal since over
99% of the traffic to QQ Browser’s server would be generated by offline attacks on textbook RSA, finding that they would not be practical for attacking QQ Browser.

Boneh et al. [7] demonstrate a meet-in-the-middle style attack on textbook RSA, that is based on the observation that for an encrypted RSA message \( c \equiv M^e \pmod{N} \), if we can find small enough integers \( M_1 \leq 2^{m_1} \) and \( M_2 \leq 2^{m_2} \) such that \( M = M_1 \cdot M_2 \), then:

\[
\frac{c}{M_2^e} \equiv M_1^e \pmod{N}
\]

By building a table with \( 2^{m_1+1} \cdot \max(m_1, m_2) \) bits of memory and performing \( 2^{m_2} \) modular exponentiations, messages (i.e., session keys) can be recovered if they can be written as \( M = M_1 \cdot M_2 \). The table and search are per modulus and exponent, so for a single RSA scheme (such as QQ Browser’s) the work would only need to be done once and all sessions could be decrypted.

Table 1 shows the probabilities that a random 64- or 128-bit number, \( m \), can be written as \( M = M_1 \cdot M_2 \). The data for 64-bit numbers nearly matches the corresponding probabilities from Table 1 of Boneh et al. [7], and are only presented here for verification and comparison purposes. We generated data for 128-bit numbers because that is the size of QQ Browser’s AES session keys. In terms of the underlying assumption of Boneh et al.’s attack about factoring \( M \), the attack is applicable to QQ Browser’s 128-bit session keys. The resources necessary to carry out the attack are probably out of the reach of even a state actor, however. For example, for \( m_1 = m_2 = 64 \) and \( m = 128 \), the attack would require a table of size 295,148 petabytes and \( 2^{64} \) modular exponentiations.

We discuss Boneh et al.’s attack here because we anticipate that in certain market segments textbook RSA with smaller session key sizes may be common. We note that implementations of ElGamal may be susceptible to attacks for 128-bit session keys, since the attack on ElGamal presented by Boneh et al. can be split into more than two factors. Also, it may be possible to combine attacks that reduce the entropy of the session key with this attack. Lastly, it may be possible in the CCA2 attack to use RSA’s malleability in combination with Boneh et al.’s meet-in-the-middle style attack to hide from QQ Browser’s server which session key is being cracked.

| Bit-length | \( m_1 \) | \( m_2 \) | Probability |
|------------|---------|---------|-------------|
| 64         | 32      | 32      | 17%         |
|            | 33      | 33      | 29%         |
|            | 34      | 34      | 33%         |
|            | 30      | 36      | 40%         |
| 128        | 64      | 64      | 15%         |
|            | 66      | 66      | 28%         |
|            | 68      | 68      | 34%         |
|            | 60      | 72      | 39%         |

Table 1: Experimental probabilities of splitting into two factors.

5.1 Attack on mobile version updates

The mobile version of QQ Browser checks for and installs updates as follows:

1. The browser makes a WUP request to the update server containing the current version of the browser and asking if there are any updates available.
2. The server’s response contains a URL to an APK\(^2\) and an MD5 hash of the APK file. (If no update is available, the server returns a response containing no update information and the update process halts.)
3. The browser downloads the APK.
4. The browser computes its MD5 hash and verifies it against the one provided by the server. (If the hashes mismatch, the browser displays an error message and the update process halts.)
5. The browser executes the ACTION_VIEW Android intent against the downloaded APK.

At this point, the Android operating system takes over. Under normal conditions, the system will present a UI

\(^2\)An APK is an Android Application Package, a file format used by the Android operating system for distributing mobile apps.
asking the user whether to upgrade QQ Browser to a newer version. However, other prompts are possible depending on the APK the browser downloads that a man-in-the-middle attacker may exploit. Android requires that an APK upgrading an app be signed with the same key as that of the currently installed APK, so an attacker cannot simply upgrade QQ Browser to arbitrary code. Moreover, Android also does not allow installing any APK that would downgrade an app, and so a downgrade attack is not possible. However, if the downloaded APK is for a different app than that of QQ Browser or any other app currently installed, then the user will be prompted to install the APK instead of upgrading QQ Browser. Although this requires user interaction, most users would be unlikely to notice or appreciate the significance of being prompted to install a new package instead of upgrading an existing one, especially if the new package were designed by an attacker to have the same title and icon of QQ Browser.

In order for a man-in-the-middle attacker to cause the browser to prompt to install a malicious APK, the attacker must cause the browser to download the malicious APK and send the browser the corresponding hash. As the URLs to APKs we observed being sent by the QQ Browser server were all unencrypted HTTP, a man-in-the-middle attacker could attack the APK download itself, but then the APK would not have the same MD5 hash as that sent by the server. The feasibility of an attacker forging the MD5 hash depends on the version of QQ Browser requesting updates and the encryption it uses for WUP requests.

Version 6.3.0.1920 of the browser always receives responses from the server encrypted with a symmetric, hard-coded key (see Section 3.3). In this version the attacker can respond to any WUP request to the update server with a forged response containing a malicious APK URL and its corresponding MD5 hash.

In later versions that use the AES session key to decrypt server responses, the attack requires a full man-in-the-middle position or a man-on-the-side attacker who can crack the session key fast enough using the attack in Section 2 before the browser receives the real server’s response. Alternatively, a man-on-the-side attacker can have already redirected all traffic via (e.g.) DNS redirection and then perform a man-in-the-middle attack.

5.2 Attack on Windows version updates

The Windows version of QQ Browser checks for and installs updates as follows:

1. The browser sends an unencrypted JSON request to the update server containing the current version of the browser and asking if there are any updates available.

2. The server’s unencrypted JSON response contains a URL to an EXE\[3\] an MD5 hash of an EXE file, and the name of the file to save the file as. (If no update is available, the server returns a response containing no update information and the update process halts.)

3. The browser downloads the EXE and saves it in a temporary directory using the file name provided by the server.

4. The browser computes its MD5 hash and verifies it against the one provided by the server. (If the hashes mismatch, the browser displays an error message and the update process halts.)

5. The browser verifies the EXE’s Authenticode digital signature to ensure that it was signed by Tencent. (If it is not, the browser displays an error message and the update process halts.)

6. The browser executes the downloaded EXE.

5.2.1 Attack via directory traversal

Since the update metadata is not protected by any asymmetric cryptography, a man-in-the-middle attacker can modify any of it. One attack is possible by modifying the field specifying the name of the file. We found that this field is not sanitized by the browser to prevent directory traversal. An attacker can overwrite any file on the user’s machine that the user has permission to overwrite. (Since the file is downloaded before it is verified, it need not have the correct digital signature nor even be an EXE file.) For instance, we found that by using the file name \texttt{.../.../.../.../.../.../programfiles/\{\texttt{tencent/qqbrowser/qqbrowser.exe}}\texttt{, we were able to overwrite the QQ Browser executable with an arbitrary program.}

5.2.2 Attack via other signed binaries

We found another vulnerability in the update process that results from the fact that digital signature verification of an EXE file does not, in general, verify that the downloaded EXE will perform its intended task such as upgrading the browser. It only guarantees that the EXE was signed by Tencent, and so any EXE signed by Tencent can be substituted to satisfy the check. We found an older web installer for QQ Browser signed by Tencent that downloads an EXE unencrypted without any digital signature verification. By first attacking QQ Browser to download the web installer, and then attacking the web

\[3\]Specifically, an EXE is a Windows Portable Executable (PE) format binary program that can be executed on machines running the Windows operating system.

\[4\]Although backslashes are typically used as a path separator on Windows, the Windows kernel generally accepts forward slashes as a path separator as well.
installer to download a malicious EXE, a man-in-the-middle attacker can still attack the browser’s update process to run an arbitrary program even though the browser verifies the downloaded program’s digital signature. This attack requires user interaction to run the web installer, but it is unlikely that a user would be surprised to have to run an installer after checking for updates. Moreover, there may exist an undiscovered Tencent-signed executable that would download and execute code without any required user interaction that would remove the requirement for user interaction from this attack.

6 Discussion and Related Work

Here, we discuss opportunities for research and ethical issues.

6.1 Opportunities for research

Although market segments such as Chinese mobile web browsers have very sophomoric cryptography implementations that lead to very simple attacks, there are several interesting potential avenues of research. As pointed out by Bratus et al. [8], an exploit serves as a constructive proof that “unforeseen computations are indeed possible.” Exploits also lend credibility to security concerns and therefore have pedagogical value in relaying the importance of current best practices (cryptographic or otherwise) to software developers, policy makers, the public, and others. Thus, research into exploiting vulnerabilities in less-developed (in terms of security and privacy) market segments can have great value. Here, we point out potential avenues of research in this respect that are, in our opinion, under-served.

First, we found that there are relatively few attacks in the literature for textbook RSA. Boneh’s survey paper [6] about attacks on RSA mostly covers different padding schemes and issues with, e.g., the choice of public exponent. Existing CCA2 attacks on RSA implementations [2,10,20,11,17] are all Bleichenbacher-style attacks [5]. Two exceptions are Boneh et al. [7] (discussed in Section 4.2) and Kühn [16]. The latter presents attacks that are similar to our CCA2 attack, but for schemes that are de-facto padding schemes. To the best of our knowledge, our CCA2 attack is the simplest and possibly the only published attack for a real implementation of RSA that has no padding.

Second, research into combining PRNG vulnerabilities with other attacks, such as Boneh et al. [7], could be very valuable for demonstrating the exploitability of more subtle PRNG issues such as those reported by Michaelis et al. [19]. We anticipate that the evolution from the current state of cryptography in markets such as Chinese mobile browsers to current best practices will be a gradual evolution, and attacks that exploit conversion issues such as DecryptoCat [23] or what we showed in Section 3.1 will be very valuable during this transition in order to keep “raising the bar.”

Lastly, attacks on update mechanisms could use a more formal treatment to survey the different attack primitives that are possible. Buffer overflows and other memory corruption vulnerabilities have been seen elsewhere. Research into categorizing different primitives to enable research into attack techniques and primitives that are possible. Buffer overflows and other memory corruption vulnerabilities have been seen elsewhere. Research into categorizing different primitives to enable advanced exploit techniques (see, e.g., Bratus et al. [8] or Shacham [22]). Attacks on update mechanisms by man-in-the-middle attackers are not new, but they are becoming increasingly important as state actors build up their capabilities to detect vulnerable update services [12] and exploit them (see, e.g., [18]). Patterns emerge when QQ Browser’s vulnerabilities are taken in the context of existing work [13,14], such as the re-use of code signed by a company for other purposes as an exploit primitive. We believe that more research in this important area is needed.

6.2 Ethical considerations

With the exception of the respective vulnerabilities exploited in our PRNG attack and CCA2 attack, all vulnerabilities presented in this paper have been previously published [5], and before that they were subjected to a 45-day vulnerability disclosure process in line with international standards on vulnerability disclosure [9]. We reported the two vulnerabilities that are newly presented in this paper to Tencent (the developers of QQ Browser) on 20 April 2016, so this paper is no longer embargoed as of 4 June 2016.

We tested the CCA2 attack in Section 4.1 against QQ Browser’s servers to verify that it worked. We cracked session keys for three of our own test sessions. By sending QQ Browser’s servers ciphertexts that decrypted into plaintexts that went beyond the 128-bit boundary of a typical session key, we were putting QQ Browser’s server at no more than usual risk of denial-of-service than any other public-facing web server.

7 Conclusion

In summary, we have presented three classes of attacks against QQ Browser, a piece of software that has hundreds of millions of users and collects and transmits a wide array of private data about them. The first class of attacks allowed offline, passive decryption of all sessions recorded. The second class of attacks was based on QQ Browser’s use of plaintext RSA and included a CCA2 attack that allowed decryption of targeted sessions via 128 active connections to QQ Browser’s servers. The third class of attacks enabled arbitrary code execution by a man-in-the-middle attacker. All three classes of attacks are very serious and illustrate the importance of further research into attack techniques and primitives that are common to the emerging threats posed by state actors,
especially in market segments where security and privacy best practices are underdeveloped.

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