Timing attacks and local timing attacks against Barrett’s modular multiplication algorithm

Johannes Mittmann and Werner Schindler

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Germany
firstname.lastname@bsi.bund.de

Abstract. Montgomery’s and Barrett’s modular multiplication algorithms are widely used in modular exponentiation algorithms, e.g. to compute RSA or ECC operations. While Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm has been studied extensively in the literature and many side-channel attacks have been detected, to our best knowledge no thorough analysis exists for Barrett’s multiplication algorithm. This article closes this gap. For both Montgomery’s and Barrett’s multiplication algorithm, differences of the execution times are caused by conditional integer subtractions, so-called extra reductions. Barrett’s multiplication algorithm allows even two extra reductions, and this feature increases the mathematical difficulties significantly.

We formulate and analyse a two-dimensional Markov process, from which we deduce relevant stochastic properties of Barrett’s multiplication algorithm within modular exponentiation algorithms. This allows to transfer the timing attacks and local timing attacks (where a second side-channel attack exhibits the execution times of the particular modular squarings and multiplications) on Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm to attacks on Barrett’s algorithm. However, there are also differences. Barrett’s multiplication algorithm requires additional attack substeps, and the attack efficiency is much more sensitive to variations of the parameters. We treat timing attacks on RSA with CRT, on RSA without CRT, and on Diffie-Hellman, as well as local timing attacks against these algorithms in the presence of basis blinding. Experiments confirm our theoretical results.

Keywords: Timing attacks · Local timing attacks · Barrett modular multiplication · RSA · RSA-CRT · Diffie-Hellman · Stochastic modeling · Statistical decision theory

1 Introduction

In his famous pioneer paper [Koc96] Kocher introduced timing analysis. Two years later [DKL+98] presented a timing attack on an early version of the Cascade chip. Both papers attacked unprotected RSA implementations which did not apply the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). While in [Koc96] the execution times of the particular modular multiplications and squarings are at least approximately normally distributed, this is not the case for the implementation in [DKL+98] since the Cascade chip applied the wide-spread Montgomery multiplication algorithm [Mon85]. Due to conditional integer subtractions (so-called extra reductions) the execution times can only attain two values, and the probability whether an extra reduction occurs depends on the preceding Montgomery operations within the modular exponentiation. This fact caused substantial additional mathematical difficulties.

In [Sch02b] the random behaviour of the occurrence of extra reductions within a modular exponentiation was studied. The random extra reductions were modelled by a non-stationary time-discrete stochastic process. The analysis of this stochastic process (combined with an efficient error detection and correction strategy) allowed to drastically
reduce the sample size, i.e. the number of timing measurements, namely from 200,000 to 300,000 [DKL+98] down to 5,000 [SKQ01a].

The analysis of the above-mentioned stochastic process turned out to be very fruitful also beyond this attack scenario. First, the insights into the probabilistic nature of the occurrence of extra reductions within modular exponentiations enabled the development of a completely new timing attack against RSA with CRT and Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm [Sch00]. This attack was extended to an attack on the sliding-window-based RSA implementation in OpenSSL v.0.9.7b [BB05], which caused a patch. The efficiency of this attack (in terms of the sample size) was increased by a factor of \( \approx 10 \) in [ASK05]. Years later it was shown that even exponent blinding (cf. [Koc96], Sect. 10) does not suffice to prevent this type of timing attack [Sch15, Sch16].

Moreover, in [Sch02a, AS08, DGD+16] local timing attacks were considered. There, a side-channel attack (e.g. a power attack or an instruction cache attack) is carried out first, which yields the execution times of the particular Montgomery operations. This plus of information (compared to ‘pure’ timing attacks) allows to overcome basis blinding (a.k.a. message blinding, cf. [Koc96], Sect. 10), and the attack works against both RSA with CRT and RSA without CRT. We mention that [AS08] led to a patch of OpenSSL v.0.9.7e.

Barrett’s (modular) multiplication algorithm (a.k.a. Barrett reduction) [Bar86] is a well-known alternative to Montgomery’s algorithm. It is described in several standard manuals covering RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH) or elliptic curve cryptosystems (e.g. [MvOV96, CFA+05]). The efficiency of Barrett’s algorithm compared to Montgomery’s algorithm has been analysed for both software implementations [BGV93] and hardware implementations [KVV10]. However, to our knowledge there do not exist thorough security evaluations of Barrett’s multiplication algorithm. In this paper we close this gap. For the sake of comparison with previous work on Montgomery’s algorithm, we focus again on RSA with and without CRT. In addition, we cover static DH, which can be handled almost identically to RSA without CRT.

Similarly to Montgomery’s algorithm, timing differences in Barrett’s multiplication algorithm are caused by conditional subtractions (so-called extra reductions), which suggests to apply similar mathematical methods. However, for Barrett’s algorithm the mathematical challenges are significantly greater. One reason is that more than one extra reduction may occur. In particular, in place of a stochastic process over \( \{0, 1\} \), a two-dimensional Markov process over \( \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1, 2\} \) has to be analysed and understood. Again, probabilities can be expressed by multidimensional integrals over \( \{0, 1\}^\ell \), but the integrands are less suitable for explicit computations than in the Montgomery case. This causes additional problems in particular for the local attacks, where \( \ell \) is usually very large. Our results show many parallels to the Montgomery case, and after suitable modifications all the known attacks on Montgomery’s algorithm can be transferred to Barrett’s multiplication algorithm. However, there are also significant differences. First of all, for Barrett’s multiplication algorithm the attack efficiency is very sensitive to deviations of the modulus (i.e. of the RSA primes \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \) if the CRT is applied), and attacks on RSA with CRT require additional attack steps.

The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we study the stochastic behaviour of the execution times of Barrett’s multiplication algorithm in the context of the square & multiply exponentiation algorithm. We develop, prove and collect results, which will be needed later to perform the attacks. In Section 3 properties of Montgomery’s and Barrett’s multiplication algorithms are compared, and furthermore, a variant of Barrett’s algorithm is investigated. In Section 4 the particular attacks are described and analysed, while Section 5 provides experimental results which confirm the theoretical considerations. Interesting in its own right is also an efficient look-ahead strategy. Finally, Section 6 discusses countermeasures.
2 Stochastic modeling of modular exponentiation

In this section we analyse the stochastic timing behaviour of modular exponentiation algorithms when Barrett’s multiplication is applied. We consider a basic version of Barrett’s multiplication algorithm (cf. Algorithm 1). The slightly optimized version of this algorithm due to Barrett [Bar86] will be discussed in Subsubsection 3.2.2 (cf. Algorithm 5), where we show that the same analysis applies, albeit with additional algorithmic noise. Since we assume that Steps 1 to 3 of Algorithm 1 run in constant time for fixed modulus length and base (see Justification of Assumption 2 in Subsubsection 3.2.1), we focus on the stochastic behaviour of the number of extra reductions in Algorithm 1. This knowledge will be needed in Section 4 when we consider concrete attacks. In Subsection 2.1 we investigate the Barrett’s multiplication algorithm in isolation, and in Subsection 2.2 we use our results to study the square & multiply exponentiation algorithm if Barrett’s multiplication is applied. This approach can be transferred to table-based exponentiation algorithms. Finally, we aim at equivalent results, which are already known for Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm. We reach this goal, but the technical difficulties are significantly larger than they are for Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm (cf. Subsection 3.1). In Subsection 2.3 we summarize the facts that are relevant for the attacks in Section 4. This allows to skip the technical Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 during the first reading of this paper.

2.1 Barrett’s modular multiplication algorithm

In this subsection we study the basic version of Barrett’s modular multiplication algorithm (cf. Algorithm 1).

**Definition 1.** Let \( \mathbb{N} := \{0, 1, \ldots \} \). For \( M \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 2} \), let \( \mathbb{Z}_M := \{0, 1, \ldots, M - 1\} \). Given \( x \in \mathbb{Z}, \) we denote by \( x \mod M \) the unique integer in \( \mathbb{Z}_M \) congruent to \( x \) modulo \( M \), i.e. \( x \mod M = x - \lfloor x/M \rfloor M \). We define the fractional part of a real number \( x \in \mathbb{R} \) by \( \{x\} := x - \lfloor x \rfloor \in [0, 1) \).

Let \( M \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 2} \) be a modulus of length \( k = \lfloor \log_b M \rfloor + 1 \) in base \( b \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 2} \), i.e. we have \( b^{k-1} \leq M \leq b^{k} - 1 \). The multiplication modulo \( M \) of two integers \( x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_M \) can be computed by an integer multiplication followed by a modular reduction. The resulting remainder is \( r := (x \cdot y) \mod M = z - qM, \) where \( z := xy \) and \( q := \lfloor z/M \rfloor \). The computation of \( q \) is the most expensive part, because it involves an integer division. The idea of Barrett’s multiplication algorithm is to approximate \( q \) by

\[
\tilde{q} := \left\lfloor \frac{z/b^{k-1} \cdot b^k/M}{b^k+1} \right\rfloor \approx \left\lfloor \frac{z}{b^{k-1}} \cdot \frac{(b^k/M)}{b^k+1} \right\rfloor = q.
\]

If the integer reciprocal \( \mu := \lfloor b^k/M \rfloor \) of \( M \) has been precomputed and if \( b \) is a power of 2, then \( \tilde{q} \) can be computed using only multiplications and bit shifts, which on common computer architectures are cheaper operations than divisions. From \( \tilde{q} \) an approximation \( \tilde{r} := z - \tilde{q}M \) of \( r \) can be obtained. Since \( \tilde{q} \) can be smaller than \( q \), it may be necessary to correct \( \tilde{r} \) by some conditional subtractions of \( M \), which we call extra reductions. This leads to Algorithm 1.

Barrett showed that at most two extra reductions are required in Algorithm 1. The following lemma provides an exact characterization of the number of extra reductions and is at the heart of our subsequent analysis. In particular, the lemma identifies two important constants \( \alpha \in (0, 1) \) and \( \beta \in [0, 1] \) associated with \( M \) and \( b \).

**Lemma 1.** On input \( x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_M \), the number of extra reductions carried out in Algorithm 1 is

\[
\left\lfloor \alpha \frac{x}{M} \cdot \frac{y}{M} \right\rfloor + \left\lfloor \beta \left\{ \frac{xy}{b^{k-1}} \right\} - \left\{ \frac{xy}{M} \right\} \right\rfloor \in \mathbb{Z}_4,
\]

(1)
Algorithm 1 Barrett modular multiplication.

**Input:** A modulus $M \in \mathbb{N}_{>2}$ of length $k = \lfloor \log_b M \rfloor + 1$ in base $b \in \mathbb{N}_{>2}$, the integer reciprocal $\mu = \lfloor b^k/M \rfloor$ of $M$, and integers $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_M$.

**Output:** $(x \cdot y) \mod M$.

1. $z \leftarrow x \cdot y$.
2. $\tilde{q} \leftarrow \lfloor \lfloor z/b^{k-1} \rfloor \mu / b^{k+1} \rfloor$.
3. $r \leftarrow z - \tilde{q} \cdot M$.
4. **while** $r \geq M$ **do**
   5. $r \leftarrow r - M$ **// Extra reduction**
6. **end while**
7. **return** $r$

**Algorithm 2** Left-to-right binary (a.k.a. square & multiply) exponentiation.

**Input:** A modulus $M \in \mathbb{N}_{>2}$, a basis $y \in \mathbb{Z}_M$, and an exponent $d = (d_{\ell-1}, \ldots, d_0) \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 1}$ with $d_{\ell-1} = 1$.

**Output:** $y^d \mod M$.

1. $x \leftarrow y$
2. **for** $i \leftarrow \ell - 2, \ldots, 0$ **do**
3.   $x \leftarrow x^2 \mod M$
4. **if** $d_i = 1$ **then**
5.   $x \leftarrow (x \cdot y) \mod M$
6. **end if**
7. **end for**
8. **return** $x$

where

\[
\alpha := (M^2/b^{2k}) \lfloor b^k/M \rfloor \in [0, 1) \quad \text{and} \quad \beta := \lfloor b^k/M \rfloor / b^{k+1} \in (0, 1].
\]  

(2)

**Proof.** Set $z := xy$, $q := \lfloor z/M \rfloor$, and $\tilde{q} := \lfloor \lfloor z/b^{k-1} \rfloor \mu / b^{k+1} \rfloor$. Since $z \mod M = z - qM$, the number of extra reductions is

\[
q - \tilde{q} = \left\lfloor \frac{z}{M} \right\rfloor - \left\lfloor \left\lfloor \frac{z}{b^{k-1}} \right\rfloor \frac{\mu}{b^{k+1}} \right\rfloor = \left\lfloor \left\lfloor \frac{z}{M} \right\rfloor - \left\lfloor \frac{z}{b^{k-1}} \right\rfloor \frac{\mu}{b^{k+1}} \right\rfloor
\]

\[
= \left\lfloor \frac{z}{M} \right\rfloor - \left\lfloor \frac{z}{b^{k-1}} \right\rfloor \left\lfloor \frac{\mu}{b^{k+1}} \right\rfloor + \left\lfloor \frac{z}{b^{k-1}} \right\rfloor \left\lfloor \frac{\mu}{b^{k+1}} \right\rfloor
\]

\[
= \left\lfloor \frac{z}{M} \right\rfloor + \left\lfloor \frac{z}{b^{k-1}} \right\rfloor \left\lfloor \frac{\mu}{b^{k+1}} \right\rfloor - \left\lfloor \frac{z}{M} \right\rfloor
\]

Since $\alpha, \beta \in [0, 1]$, this number of extra reductions is in \{0, 1, 2\}. \hfill \Box

**Remark 1.** Note that $\alpha = 0$ if and only if $M$ divides $b^{2k}$. In order to exclude this corner case (which is not relevant to our applications anyway) we assume $\alpha > 0$ for the remainder of this paper. Typically, $b = 2^w$ for some word size $w \geq 1$ and $\alpha = 0$ can only happen if $M$ is a power of two, and then modular multiplication is easy anyway. More special cases of $\alpha$ and $\beta$ will be discussed in Subsubsection 3.2.3.

We first study the distribution of the number of extra reductions which are needed in Algorithm 1 for random inputs. To this end, we introduce the following stochastic model. Random variables are denoted by capital letters, and realizations of these random variables (i.e. values taken on by these random variables) are denoted with the corresponding small letters.

**Stochastic Model 1.** Let $s, t \in [0, 1)$. We define the random variable

\[
R(s, t) := \left\lfloor \alpha st + \beta U - V \right\rfloor,
\]  

(3)

where $U, V$ are independent, uniformly distributed random variables on $[0, 1)$. 
A realization $r$ of $R(s,t)$ expresses the random quantity of extra reductions which is required in Algorithm 1 for normalized inputs $x/M, y/M \in M^{-1}\mathbb{Z}_M$ within a small neighbourhood of $s$ and $t$ in $[0,1)$.

**Justification of Stochastic Model 1.** Assume that $N(s)$ and $N(t)$ are small neighbourhoods of $s$ and $t$ in $[0,1)$, respectively. Let $s_{\min}, s' \in N(s) \cap M^{-1}\mathbb{Z}_M$ such that $s_{\min}$ is minimal. Analogously, let $t_{\min}, t' \in N(t) \cap M^{-1}\mathbb{Z}_M$ such that $t_{\min}$ is minimal. Then there are $m,n \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $s' = s_{\min} + m/M$ and $t' = t_{\min} + n/M$. Thus $x' := M s', x_{\min} := M s_{\min}, y' := M t', y_{\min} := M t_{\min}$ are integers in $\mathbb{Z}_M$ such that $x'y' - x_{\min} y_{\min} \equiv my_{\min} + nx_{\min} + mn \mod M$. The integers $m$ and $n$ assume values in $\{0, \ldots, |N(s)\cap M^{-1}\mathbb{Z}_M| - 1\}$ and $\{0, \ldots, |N(t)\cap M^{-1}\mathbb{Z}_M| - 1\}$, respectively. For cryptographically relevant modulus sizes, these numbers are very large so that one may assume that the admissible terms \{(my_{\min} + nx_{\min} + mn) \mod M\} are essentially uniformly distributed on $\mathbb{Z}_M$, justifying the model assumption that the random variable $V$ is uniformly distributed on $[0,1)$. The assumptions on the uniformity of $U$ and the independence of $U$ and $V$ have analogous justifications.

**Remark 2.** (i) In Stochastic Model 1 and Stochastic Model 2 we follow a strategy which has been very successful in the analysis of Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm. Of course, the number of extra reductions needed for a particular computation $(xy) \mod M$ is deterministic. On the other hand, by Lemma 1 the number of extra reductions only depends on the fact whether in (1) the sum within the brackets $[\gamma]$ is contained in $(-1,0)$, $(0,1]$ or $(1,2)$. We exploit the fact that concerning the number of extra reductions $x, x' \in \mathbb{Z}_M$ have similar stochastic properties if $|x/M - x'/M|$ is small in $\mathbb{R}$. Furthermore, for moduli $M$ that are used in cryptography even very small intervals in $[0,1)$ contain a gigantic number of elements of $\mathbb{Z}_M/M$.

(ii) For extremely small input $x$ or $y$ of Algorithm 1, Stochastic Model 1 may not apply. In particular, if one of the inputs $x, y$ is 0 or 1, the integer product $x \cdot y$ is already reduced modulo $M$, hence $\hat{q} = 0$ and no extra reductions occur (cf. Remark 3).

**Definition 2.** For $x \in \mathbb{R}$, we use the notation $(x)_+ := \max\{0,x\}$. Moreover, we set $(x)_+^0 := 1_{\{x\geq 0\}}$ and $(x)_+^n := ((x)_+)^n$ for $n \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$.

**Lemma 2.** Let $s, t \in [0,1)$.

(i) The term $(an)^{-1} (ax + b)_+^n$ is an antiderivative of $(ax + b)_+^{n-1}$ for all $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ with $a \neq 0$ and all $n \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$.

(ii) Let $B([0,1))$ be the Borel $\sigma$-algebra on $[0,1)$. For $r \in \mathbb{Z}_3$ and $B \in B([0,1))$, we have $\Pr(R(s,t) \leq r, V \in B) = \beta^{-1} \int_B (r - \alpha s + \beta t + v)_+ (r - \alpha s - \beta t + v)_+ dv$.

(iii) For $r \in \mathbb{Z}_3$, we have $\Pr(R(s,t) \leq r) = (2\beta)^{-1} \left((-r - \alpha s)^2 + (r - \alpha s - \beta t)^2 + (r - \alpha s + 1)^2 - (r - \alpha s - \beta)^2\right)$.

(iv) We have $E(R(s,t)) = \alpha s + \beta / 2$.

(v) We have $\Var(R(s,t)) = \alpha s + \beta / 2 - (\alpha s + \beta / 2)^2 + \beta^{-1}(\alpha s - \beta - 1)^2$.

**Proof.** For assertion (i), see e.g. [BPC09]. Now let $r \in \mathbb{Z}_3$ and $v \in [0,1)$. By (3), we have $\Pr(R(s,t) \leq r \mid V = v) = \int_0^1 1_{(\alpha s + \beta u - v \leq r)} du = \int_0^1 (r - \alpha s + \beta u + v)_+ du = \beta^{-1}(r - \alpha s + v)_+ - (r - \alpha s - \beta u + v)_+$. Now let $B \in B([0,1))$. Since $V$ is uniformly distributed on $[0,1)$, we obtain $\Pr(R(s,t) \leq r, V \in B) = \int_B \Pr(R(s,t) \leq r \mid V = v) dv = \beta^{-1} \int_B ((r - \alpha s + v)_+ - (r - \alpha s - \beta u + v)_+) dv$. Setting $B = [0,1)$, we get $\Pr(R(s,t) \leq r) = \beta^{-1} \int_0^1 (r - \alpha s + v)_+ - (r - \alpha s - \beta u + v)_+ dv = (2\beta)^{-1} \left((-r - \alpha s)^2 + (r - \alpha s - \beta t)^2 + (r - \alpha s + 1)^2 - (r - \alpha s - \beta)^2\right)$. Distinguishing the cases $\alpha s + \beta \leq 1$
Algorithm 1. Our goal is to define and analyse a stochastic process which allows to study
where modular squarings and multiplications are performed using Barrett’s algorithm (see
we obtain
Let
2.2 Modular exponentiation (square & multiply algorithms)
Let
(ii) We have \(E(R(S,t)) = \alpha t/2 + \beta/2\).
(iii) We have \(\text{Var}(R(S,t)) = \alpha t/2 + \beta/2 - (\alpha t/2 + \beta/2)^2 + (3\alpha\beta t)^{-1}(\alpha t + \beta - 1)^2\).

Proof. Let \(r \in \mathbb{Z}_3\). We have \(\text{Pr}(R(S,t) \leq r) = \int_0^1 \text{Pr}(R(S,t) \leq r) \, ds\). By Lemma 2 (iiii),
we obtain \(\text{Pr}(R(S,t) \leq r) = (2\beta)^{-1} \int_0^1 (-(r - \alpha s)^2 + (r - \alpha s^2 - \beta)^2 + (r - \alpha s^2 + 1)^2 - (r - \alpha s^2 - \beta + 1)^2) \, ds\). For \(c \in \{r, r - \beta, r + 1, r - \beta + 1\}\), we have \(\int_0^1 (c - \alpha s)^2 \, ds = (15\alpha^2)^{-1}(15\alpha^2 \min\{\alpha, (c)_+\})^{1/2} - 10\alpha(1 - \beta) + \alpha^2\) = 15(1 - \beta)^2/15. This implies (i). Distinguishing the cases \(\alpha + \beta \leq 1\) and \(\alpha + \beta > 1\), the expectation and variance of \(R(S,t)\) can be determined by careful but
elementary computations.

Lemma 4. Let \(L \in \mathbb{Z}_3\) be uniformly distributed random variable on \([0,1]\).
(i) For \(r \in \mathbb{Z}_3\), we have \(\text{Pr}(R(S,L) \leq r) = (30\alpha^{1/2}\beta)^{-1}(-15r^2 \min\{\alpha, (r)_+\}^{1/2} + 10r \min\{\alpha, (r)_+\}^{3/2} - 3 \min\{\alpha, (r)_+\}^{5/2} + 15r - \beta)^2 \min\{\alpha, (r - \beta)_+\}^{1/2} - 10r - \beta) \min\{\alpha, (r - \beta)_+\}^{3/2} + 3 \min\{\alpha, (r - \beta)_+\}^{5/2} + 15(r + 1)^2 \min\{\alpha, (r + 1)_+\}^{3/2} - 10(r + 1) \min\{\alpha, (r + 1)_+\}^{3/2} + 3 \min\{\alpha, (r + 1)_+\}^{5/2} - 15(r - \beta + 1)^2 \min\{\alpha, (r - \beta + 1)_+\}^{3/2} + 3 \min\{\alpha, (r - \beta + 1)_+\}^{5/2} - 8(15\alpha^{1/2}\beta)^{-1}(1 - \beta)^{5/2}.
(ii) We have \(E(R(S,L)) = \alpha/3 + \beta/2\).
(iii) If \(\alpha + \beta \leq 1\), then \(\text{Var}(R(S,L)) = \alpha/3 + \beta/2 - (\alpha/3 + \beta/2)^2\). If \(\alpha + \beta > 1\), then
\(\text{Var}(R(S,L)) = \alpha/3 + \beta/2 - (\alpha/3 + \beta/2)^2 + (15\beta)^{-1}(15(1 - \beta)^2 - 10\alpha(1 - \beta) + 3\alpha^2) - 8(15\alpha^{1/2}\beta)^{-1}(1 - \beta)^{5/2}.

Proof. Let \(r \in \mathbb{Z}_3\). We have \(\text{Pr}(R(S,L) \leq r) = \int_0^1 \text{Pr}(R(s,s) \leq r) \, ds\). By Lemma 2 (iii),
we obtain \(\text{Pr}(R(S,L) \leq r) = (2\beta)^{-1} \int_0^1 (-(r - \alpha s)^2 + (r - \alpha s^2 - \beta)^2 + (r - \alpha s^2 + 1)^2 - (r - \alpha s^2 - \beta + 1)^2) \, ds\).

\[\alpha + \beta > 1\] and associate the sequence of

2.2 Modular exponentiation (square & multiply algorithms)

Now we consider the left-to-right binary exponentiation algorithm (see Algorithm 2),
where modular squarings and multiplications are performed using Barrett’s algorithm (see
Algorithm 1). Our goal is to define and analyse a stochastic process which allows to study
the stochastic behaviour of the execution time of Algorithm 2. Subsection 2.2 provides a
sequence of technical lemmata which is needed later.

Definition 3. Let \(d \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}\). The binary representation of \(d\) is denoted by \((d_{\ell-1}, \ldots, d_0)\),
d with \(d_{\ell-1} = 1\) and \(t\) is called bit-length of \(d\). The Hamming weight of \(d\) is defined as
\[\text{ham}(d) := d_0 + \cdots + d_{\ell-1}.
\]

Let \(y \in \mathbb{Z}_M\) be an input basis of Algorithm 2. We denote the intermediate values
computed in the course of Algorithm 2 by \(x_0, x_1, \ldots \in \mathbb{Z}_M\) and associate the sequence of
squaring and multiplication operations with a string \(0_1 0_2 \cdots\) over the alphabet \(\{S, M\}\). For
the sake of defining an infinite stochastic process, we assume that Algorithm 2 may run forever, hence \( x_0, x_1, \ldots \) is an infinite sequence and \( 0_10_2 \cdots \in \{ S, M \}^\omega \). Consequently, we have \( x_0 = y \) and

\[
x_{n+1} = \begin{cases} x_n^2 \mod M, & \text{if } 0_{n+1} = S, \\ (x_n \cdot y) \mod M, & \text{if } 0_{n+1} = M, \\ \end{cases}
\]

for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \). Note that \( 0_10_2 \cdots \) does not contain the substring \( MM \). We will refer to strings \( 0_10_2 \cdots \) without substring \( MM \) as operation sequences.

Note that the square & multiply algorithm applied to an exponent \( d \) corresponds to a particular finite \((d\text{-specific})\) operation sequence \( 0_10_2 \cdots 0_{\text{ham}(d) - 2} \), where \( \ell \) is the bit-length of \( d \).

**Stochastic Model 2.** Let \( t \in [0, 1) \) and let \( 0_10_2 \cdots \in \{ S, M \}^\omega \) be an operation sequence. We define a stochastic process \( (S_n, R_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) on the state space \( S := [0, 1) \times \mathbb{Z}_d \) as follows. Let \( S_0, S_1, \ldots \) be independent random variables on \([0, 1)\). The random variable \( S_0 \) is uniformly distributed in \( N(s_0) \cap M^{-1}Z_M \), where \( N(s_0) \) is a small neighbourhood of \( s_0 = y/M \). Further, the random variables \( S_1, S_2, \ldots \) are uniformly distributed random variables on \([0, 1)\), while \( R_0 \) is arbitrary (e.g. \( R_0 = 0 \)), and for \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) we define

\[
R_{n+1} := \begin{cases} \alpha S_n^2 + \beta U_{n+1} - S_{n+1}, & \text{if } 0_{n+1} = S, \\ \alpha S_n + \beta U_{n+1} - S_{n+1}, & \text{if } 0_{n+1} = M, \\ \end{cases}
\]

where \( U_1, U_2, \ldots \) are independent, uniformly distributed random variables on \([0, 1)\).

The value \( t \) represents a normalized input \( y/M \) of Algorithm 2, realizations \( s_0, s_1, \ldots \) of \( S_0, S_1, \ldots \) represent the normalized intermediate values \( x_0/M, x_1/M, \ldots \) of \( M^{-1}Z_M \), and a realization \( r_{n+1} \) of \( R_{n+1} \) represents the number of extra reductions which are necessary to compute \( x_{n+1} \) from \( x_n \) (and, additionally, from \( y \) if \( 0_{n+1} = M \)).

**Justification of Stochastic Model 2.** This follows from the justification of Stochastic Model 1 by observing that, for inputs \( x, y \in Z_M \) of Algorithm 1, the term \( \{ xy \} \) in (1) equals the normalized value \( (xy) \mod M \)/\( M \) of the product modulo \( M \). As in Stochastic Model 1 we first conclude that \( U_1 \) and \( S_1 \) are uniformly distributed on \([0, 1)\). It follows by induction that \( S_2, S_3, \ldots \) are uniformly distributed on \([0, 1)\), and \( S_0, S_1, S_2, \ldots \) are independent. \( \Box \)

**Remark 3.** Remark 2 (ii) applies to the stochastic Stochastic Model 2 as well. In Subsection 4.3 we will adjust the stochastic process \( (S_n, R_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) to a table-based exponentiation algorithm (fixed window exponentiation), where multiplications by 1 occur frequently. Multiplications by 1 will therefore be handled separately.

**Lemma 5.** Let \( \lambda \) be the Lebesgue measure on the Borel \( \sigma \)-algebra \( B([0, 1)) \), let \( \eta \) be the counting measure on the power set \( P(Z_d) \) (i.e. \( \eta(0) = \eta(1) = \eta(2) = 1 \)), and let \( \lambda \otimes \eta \) be the product measure on the product \( \sigma \)-algebra \( B([0, 1)) \otimes P(Z_d) \).

(i) The stochastic process \( (S_n, R_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) is a non-homogeneous Markov process on \( S \).

(ii) The random vector \( (S_n, R_n) \) has a density \( f_n(s_n, r_n) \) with respect to \( \lambda \otimes \eta \).

(iii) For \( B \in B([0, 1)) \), \( r_{n+1} \in \mathbb{Z}_d \), and fixed \( (s_n, r_n) \in S \), we have

\[
\Pr\{ S_{n+1} \in B, R_{n+1} = r_{n+1} \mid S_n = s_n, R_n = r_n \} = \int_{B \times \{ r_{n+1} \}} h_{n+1}(s_{n+1}, r \mid s_n) d\eta(r) = \int_B h_{n+1}(s_{n+1}, r_{n+1} \mid s_n) ds_{n+1},
\]

where

\[
h_{n+1}(s_{n+1}, r \mid s_n) = \begin{cases} \frac{\lambda(S_{n+1} \in B \mid s_n)}{\lambda(0 \in B \mid s_n)} \eta(B)r^n, & \text{if } s_n = 0, \\ \frac{\lambda(S_{n+1} \in B \mid s_n)}{\lambda(1 \in B \mid s_n)} \eta(B)(1 - r^n), & \text{if } s_n = 1, \\ \frac{\lambda(S_{n+1} \in B \mid s_n)}{\lambda(2 \in B \mid s_n)} \eta(B)(1 - r^n), & \text{if } s_n = 2, \\ \end{cases}
\]
where the conditional density is defined by

\[ h_{n+1}(s_{n+1}, r_{n+1} \mid s_n) \]

\[ = \beta^{-1}((r_{n+1} - \alpha s_n t + s_{n+1})_+ - (r_{n+1} - \alpha s_n t + s_{n+1} - \beta)_+ - (r_{n+1} - \alpha s_n t + s_{n+1} - 1)_+ + (r_{n+1} - \alpha s_n t + s_{n+1} - \beta - 1)_+) \]

if \( \Omega_{n+1} = S \) (i.e. the \((n+1)\)-th operation is squaring) and

\[ h_{n+1}(s_{n+1}, r_{n+1} \mid s_n) \]

\[ = \beta^{-1}((r_{n+1} - \alpha s_n t + s_{n+1})_+ - (r_{n+1} - \alpha s_n t + s_{n+1} - \beta)_+ - (r_{n+1} - \alpha s_n t + s_{n+1} - 1)_+ + (r_{n+1} - \alpha s_n t + s_{n+1} - \beta - 1)_+) \]

if \( \Omega_{n+1} = M \) (i.e. the \((n+1)\)-th operation is multiplication by \(y\)).

In particular, the conditional density \( h_{n+1}(s_{n+1}, r_{n+1} \mid s_n) \) does not depend on \( r_n \).

(Also justifies the omission of \( r_n \) from the list of arguments.)

**Proof.** Assertion (i) is an immediate consequence of the definition of Stochastic Model 2.

To show (ii), let \( B \subseteq \{0, 1\} \times \mathbb{Z}_3 \) be a \((\lambda \otimes \eta)\)-zero set. Then \( B = \bigcup_{j \in \mathbb{Z}_3} (B_0 B_1) \) (disjoint union) for measurable \( \lambda \)-zero sets \( B_0, B_1 \) and \( B_2 \). Hence \( \lambda(B_0) = 0 \) for \( B_0 := B_0 \cup B_1 \cup B_2 \). Finally, we get \( \Pr((S_n, R_n) \in B) \leq \Pr((S_n, R_n) \in B_0 \times \mathbb{Z}_3) = \Pr(S_n \in B_0) = \lambda(B_0) = 0 \).

This shows that the pushforward measure of \((S_n, R_n)\) is absolutely continuous with respect to \( \lambda \otimes \eta \), therefore assertion (ii) follows from the Radon–Nikodym Theorem. Assertion (iii) follows from Lemma 2 (ii) with \((s, t) = (s_n, s_n)\) if \( \Omega_{n+1} = S \) or \((s, t) = (s_n, t)\) if \( \Omega_{n+1} = M \) and \( V = S_{n+1} \).

---

**Lemma 6.**

(i) For \( r_{n+1} \in \mathbb{Z}_3 \), we have

\[ \Pr(R_{n+1} = r_{n+1}) \]

\[ = \int_{\{0, 1\} \times \mathbb{Z}_3} \left( \int_0^1 h_{n+1}(s_{n+1}, r_{n+1} \mid s_n) \, ds_n \right) f_n(s_n, r_n) \, ds_n \, d\eta(r_n) \]

\[ = \int_0^1 \left( \int_0^1 h_{n+1}(s_{n+1}, r_{n+1} \mid s_n) \, ds_n \right) \, ds_n . \]

In particular, the distribution of \( R_{n+1} \) does not depend on \( n \) but only on the operation type \( \Omega_{n+1} \in \{S, M\} \).

(ii) There exist \( \mu_\alpha, \mu_\beta, \sigma_\alpha^2, \sigma_\beta^2 \in \mathbb{R} \) such that \( E(R_{n+1}) = \mu_{n+1} \) and \( \text{Var}(R_{n+1}) = \sigma_{n+1}^2 \) for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \). In particular, we have

\[ \mu_\alpha = \alpha/3 + \beta/2, \quad \mu_\beta = \alpha t/2 + \beta/2 \]  

\[ \sigma_\alpha^2 = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
\alpha/3 + \beta/2 - (\alpha/3 + \beta/2)^2 & \text{if } \alpha + \beta \leq 1 \\
\alpha/3 + \beta/2 - (\alpha/3 + \beta/2)^2 + (15\beta)^{-1}(15(1 - \beta)^2 - 10\alpha(1 - \beta) + 3\alpha^2) - 8(15\alpha^2/3\beta)^{-1}(1 - \beta)^{5/2} & \text{if } \alpha + \beta > 1
\end{array} \right. \]

\[ \sigma_\beta^2 = \alpha t/2 + \beta/2 - (\alpha t/2 + \beta/2)^2 + (3\alpha \beta t)^{-1}(3\alpha \beta t) \]  

The expectation \( \mu_\beta \) is strictly monotonously increasing in \( t = y/M \).

**Proof.** Let \( r_{n+1} \in \mathbb{Z}_3 \). Since

\[ \Pr(R_{n+1} = r_{n+1}) = \Pr((S_n, R_n) \in S, (S_{n+1}, R_{n+1}) \in [0, 1) \times \{r_{n+1}\}) , \]
the first equation of assertion (i) follows from Lemma 5. The second equation of (i) follows from the fact that \( \sum_{r=0}^{2} f_n(s_n, r) = 1 \) for all \( s_n \in [0, 1] \), because \( S_n \) is uniformly distributed on \([0, 1] \). Assertion (ii) is an immediate consequence of (i). The formulae (5), (6), and (7) follow from Lemma 4 (ii), Lemma 3 (ii), Lemma 4 (iii), and Lemma 3 (iii). The final assertion of (ii) is obvious since \( \alpha > 0 \). \( \square \)

**Definition 4.** A sequence \( X_1, X_2, \ldots \) of random variables is called \( m \)-dependent if the random vectors \((X_1, \ldots, X_u)\) and \((X_v, \ldots, X_n)\) are independent for all \( 1 \leq u < v \leq n \) with \( v - u > m \).

**Lemma 7.**

(i) For \( r_{n+1}, \ldots, r_{n+u} \in \mathbb{Z}_3 \), we have

\[
\Pr(R_{n+1} = r_{n+1}, \ldots, R_{n+u} = r_{n+u}) = \int_{(0,1) \times \mathbb{Z}_3} \left( \int_{0}^{1} \left( \int_{0}^{1} h_{n+u}(s_{n+u}, r_{n+u} \mid s_{n+u-1}) \, ds_{n+u} \cdots \right) \right) \, h_{n+1}(s_{n+1}, r_{n+1} \mid s_n) \, ds_{n+1} \, df(r_n)
\]

In particular, the joint distribution of \( R_{n+1}, \ldots, R_{n+u} \) does not depend on \( n \) but only on the operation types \( 0_{n+1}, \ldots, 0_{n+u} \in \{S, M\} \).

(ii) There exist \( \text{cov}_{S}, \text{cov}_{M}, \text{cov}_{SS} \in \mathbb{R} \) such that \( \text{Cov}(R_n, R_{n+1}) = \text{cov}_{S_0, S_{n+1}} \) for all \( n \in \mathbb{N}_{>0} \).

(iii) The sequence \( R_1, R_2, \ldots \) is 1-dependent. In particular, we have \( \text{Cov}(R_n, R_{n+s}) = 0 \) for all \( s \geq 2 \).

**Proof.** Let \( r_{n+1}, \ldots, r_{n+u} \in \mathbb{Z}_3 \). Then

\[
\Pr(R_{n+1} = r_{n+1}, \ldots, R_{n+u} = r_{n+u}) = \Pr((S_n, R_n) \in S, (S_{n+1}, R_{n+i}) \in [0, 1) \times \{r_{n+i}\} \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, u)
\]

and assertion (i) follows from Lemma 5, Lemma 6 (i), and the Ionescu-Tulcea Theorem. Assertion (ii) is an immediate consequence of (i). To prove (iii), let \( 1 \leq u < v \leq n \) such that \( v - u > 1 \), let \( r_1, \ldots, r_u, r_v, \ldots, r_n \in \mathbb{Z}_3 \), and define the events

\[
E_1 := \{(S_0, R_0) \in S\}, \quad E_2 := \{(S_i, R_i) \in [0, 1) \times \{r_i\} \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, u\},
\]

\[
E_3 := \{(S_{v-1}, R_{v-1}) \in S\}, \quad E_4 := \{(S_i, R_i) \in [0, 1) \times \{r_i\} \text{ for } i = v, \ldots, n\}.
\]

Using the Markov property of \((S_n, R_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}\) and (i), we obtain

\[
\Pr(R_1 = r_1, \ldots, R_u = r_u, R_v = r_v, \ldots, R_n = r_n)
\]

\[
= \Pr(E_1, E_2, E_3, E_4)
\]

\[
= \Pr(E_1, E_2) \cdot \Pr(E_3 \mid E_1, E_2) \cdot \Pr(E_4 \mid E_1, E_2, E_3)
\]

\[
= \Pr(E_1, E_2) \cdot 1 \cdot \Pr(E_4 \mid E_3)
\]

\[
= \Pr(E_1, E_2) \cdot \Pr(E_3, E_4) \cdot \Pr(E_3)^{-1}
\]

\[
= \Pr(E_1, E_2) \cdot \Pr(E_3, E_4)
\]

\[
= \Pr(R_1 = r_1, \ldots, R_u = r_u) \cdot \Pr(R_v = r_v, \ldots, R_n = r_n),
\]
hence \((R_1, \ldots, R_u)\) and \((R_v, \ldots, R_n)\) are independent. We conclude that \(R_1, R_2, \ldots\) is a 1-dependent sequence.

**Definition 5.** The normal distribution with mean \(\mu\) and variance \(\sigma^2\) is denoted by \(N(\mu, \sigma^2)\), and \(\Phi(x) := (2\pi)^{-1/2} \int_{-\infty}^{x} e^{-t^2/2} dt\) is the cumulative distribution function of \(N(0, 1)\). For strings \(x, y \in \{S, M\}^*\), we denote by \(\#_x(y) \in \mathbb{N}\) the number of occurrences of \(x\) in \(y\).

Below we will use the following version of the central limit theorem for \(d\)-dependent random variables due to Hoeffding & Robbins.

**Lemma 8 ([HR48, Theorem 1]).** Let \(X_1, X_2, \ldots\) be an \(m\)-dependent sequence of random variables such that \(E(X_i) = 0\) and \(E(|X_i|^3)\) is uniformly bounded for all \(i \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}\). For \(i \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}\) define \(A_i := \text{Var}(X_i + m) + 2 \sum_{j=1}^{m} \text{Cov}(X_{i+m-j}, X_{i+m})\). If the limit \(A := \lim_{u \to \infty} u^{-1} \sum_{h=1}^{u} A_{i+h}\) exists uniformly for all \(i \in \mathbb{N}\), then \((X_1 + \cdots + X_i)/\sqrt{s}\) has the limiting distribution \(N(0, A)\) as \(s \to \infty\).

**Lemma 9.** Let \(0_10_2 \cdots \in \{S, M\}^\omega\) be an operation sequence such that the limit
\[
\rho := \lim_{u \to \infty} \frac{\#_S(0_1 \cdots 0_{i+u})}{u}
\]
exists uniformly for all \(i \in \mathbb{N}\) and define
\[
A := \rho \cdot \sigma^2 + (1 - \rho) \cdot \sigma^2 + 2\rho \cdot \text{cov}_{\text{RS}} + 2\rho \cdot \text{cov}_{\text{SM}} + (2 - 4\rho) \cdot \text{cov}_{\text{SS}}.
\]
Then \(\lim_{s \to \infty} \text{Var}(R_{n+1} + \cdots + R_{n+s})/s = A\) and
\[
\frac{R_{n+1} + \cdots + R_{n+s} - \text{E}(R_{n+1} + \cdots + R_{n+s})}{\sqrt{s}}
\]
has the limiting distribution \(N(0, A)\).

**Proof.** Let \(R'_i := R_i - E(R_i)\) for all \(i \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}\). Then \(R'_1, R'_2, \ldots\) is a 1-dependent sequence of random variables with \(E(R'_i) = 0\) and \(E(|R'_i|^3) \leq 2^3 = 8\) for all \(i\). Define \(A_i := \text{Var}(R'_{i+1}) + 2 \text{Cov}(R'_i, R'_i+1)\). For \(x \in \{S, M\}^*\) and \(0 \leq i \leq j\), we set \#_y^i := \#_y(0_i \cdots 0_j)\). With this notation, we have
\[
\sum_{h=1}^{u} A_{i+h} = \#_M^{i+2,i+u+1} \sigma^2_M + \#_S^{i+2,i+u+1} \sigma^2_S
\]
\[
+ 2\#_S^{i+1,i+u+1} \text{cov}_{\text{RS}} + 2\#_M^{i+1,i+u+1} \text{cov}_{\text{SM}} + 2\#_M^{i+1,i+u+1} \text{cov}_{\text{SS}}.
\]
Using the identities
\[
\#_M^{i+1,i+u+1} = \#_M^{i+1,i+u}, \quad \#_M^{i+2,i+u+1} = \#_M^{i+2,i+u+1},
\]
\[
\#_S^{i+1,i+u+1} = \#_M^{i+2,i+u+1}, \quad \#_S^{i+2,i+u+1} = \#_M^{i+1,i+u} - \#_M^{i+1,i+u+1},
\]
we obtain
\[
\sum_{h=1}^{u} A_{i+h} = \#_M^{i+2,i+u+1} \sigma^2_M + (u - \#_M^{i+2,i+u+1}) \sigma^2_S
\]
\[
+ 2\#_M^{i+1,i+u+1} \text{cov}_{\text{RS}} + 2(u - \#_M^{i+2,i+u+1} - \#_M^{i+1,i+u}) \text{cov}_{\text{SS}}.
\]
As \( u \to \infty \), the ratio \( \frac{\mu^1_{n+1,i+u}}{u^n} \) converges to \( \rho \) uniformly for all \( i \) by assumption, therefore \( u^{-1} \sum_{h=1}^{u} A_{i+h} \) converges to \( A \) uniformly for all \( i \). Since

\[
\text{Var}(R'_{n+1} + \cdots + R'_{n+s}) = \text{Var}(R'_{n+1}) + \sum_{h=1}^{s} A_{n+h} - A_{n+s},
\]

\( \text{Var}(R'_{n+1} + \cdots + R'_{n+s})/s \) converges to \( A \) as \( s \to \infty \). Finally, \( (R'_{n+1} + \cdots + R'_{n+s})/\sqrt{s} \) has the limiting distribution \( N(0, A) \) by Lemma 8.

We note that for random operation sequences \( 0_1 0_2 \cdots \) (corresponding to random exponents with independent and unbiased bits), the convergence of (8) is not uniform with probability 1. However, for any given finite operation sequence \( 0_{n+1} \cdots 0_{n+s} \) we may construct an infinite sequence \( 0_1 0_2 \cdots \) with subsequence \( 0_{n+1} \cdots 0_{n+s} \) for which convergence of (8) is uniform and \( \rho \approx \#n(0_{n+1} \cdots 0_{n+s})/s \). Therefore, if \( s \) is sufficiently large, it is reasonable to assume that the normal approximation

\[
\Pr\left( \frac{R_{n+1} + \cdots + R_{n+s} - \mathbb{E}(R_{n+1} + \cdots + R_{n+s})}{\sqrt{\text{Var}(R_{n+1} + \cdots + R_{n+s})}} \leq x \right) \approx \Phi(x), \tag{9}
\]

is appropriate. We mention that in our experiments in Subsection 5.1 approximation (9) is applied and leads to successful attacks.

### 2.3 Summary of the relevant facts

In this section we studied the random behaviour of the number of extra reductions when Barrett’s modular multiplication algorithm is used within the square & multiply exponentiation algorithm. In Subsection 4.3 we generalize this approach to table-based exponentiation algorithms.

We defined a stochastic process \((S_n, R_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}\). The random variable \( S_n \) represents the (random) normalized intermediate value (= intermediate value divided by the modulus \( M \)) in Algorithm 2 after the \( n \)-th Barrett operation, and the random variable \( R_n \) represents the (random) number of extra reductions needed for the \( n \)-th Barrett operation.

Algorithm 1 needs 0, 1 or 2 extra reductions. The stochastic process \((S_n, R_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}\) is a non-homogeneous Markov chain on the state space \( S = [0, 1] \times Z_3 \). The projection onto the first component gives independent random variables \( S_1, S_2, \ldots \), which are uniformly distributed on the unit interval \([0, 1]\). However, we are interested in the stochastic process \( R_1, R_2, \ldots \) on \( Z_3 \), which is more difficult to analyse. In particular, \( \mathbb{E}(R_n) \) and \( \text{Var}(R_n) \) depend on the operation type \( 0_n \) of the \( n \)-th Barrett operation (multiplication \( \mathbb{M} \) or squaring \( S \)), while the covariances \( \text{Cov}(R_n, R_{n+1}) \) depend on the operation types of the \( n \)-th and the \((n + 1)\)-th Barrett operation \((\mathbb{M}, \mathbb{S} \text{ or } \mathbb{S})\). The formulae (5), (6) and (7) provide explicit formulae for the expectations and the variances while Lemma 7 (i), (ii) explains how to compute the covariances. Further, the stochastic process \((R_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}\) is 1-dependent. In particular, a version of the Central Limit Theorem for dependent random variables can be applied to approximate the distribution of standardized finite sums (cf. (9)).

### 3 Montgomery multiplication vs. Barrett multiplication

In Subsection 3.1 we briefly treat Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm (MM) [Mon85] and summarize relevant stochastic properties. This is because in Section 4 we consider the question whether the (known) pure and local timing attacks against Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm can be transferred to implementations that apply Barrett’s algorithm.
3.1 Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm in a nutshell

Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm is widely used to compute modular exponentiations because it transfers modulo operations and divisions to moduli and divisors, which are powers of 2.

For an odd modulus $M$ (e.g., an RSA modulus or a prime) the integer $R := 2^t > M$ is called Montgomery’s constant, and $R^{-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_M$ denotes its multiplicative inverse modulo $M$. Moreover, $M^* \in \mathbb{Z}_R$ denotes the integer equation $RR^{-1} - MM^* = 1$.

Montgomery’s algorithm computes $(a, b) \mapsto \text{MM}(a, b; M) := abR^{-1} \mod M$ with a version of Algorithm 3. Here $ws$ denotes the word size of the arithmetic operations (typically, depending on the platform $ws \in \{8, 16, 32, 64\}$), which divides the exponent $t$. Further, $r = 2^w$, so that $R = r^v$ with $v = t/ws$. In Algorithm 3 the operands $x, y$ and $s$ are expressed in the $r$-adic representation. That is, $x = (x_{v-1}, \ldots, x_0)_r, y = (y_{v-1}, \ldots, y_0)_r$, and $s = (s_{v-1}, \ldots, s_0)_r$ with $r = 2^w$. Finally, $m^* = M^*$ mod $r$. After Step 3 the intermediate value $s = abR^{-1} \mod M$ and $s \in [0, 2M]$. The instruction $s := s - M$ in Step 4, called ‘extra reduction’ (ER), is carried out if $s \in [M, 2M)$. This conditional integer subtraction is responsible for timing differences, and thus is the source of side channel attacks.

**Algorithm 3** Montgomery modular multiplication.

**Input:** An odd modulus $M \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 2}$, Montgomery constant $R = r^v > M$ with $r = 2^w$, $m^* = M^* \mod r$, and integers $x = (x_{v-1}, \ldots, x_0)_r, y = (y_{v-1}, \ldots, y_0)_r \in \mathbb{Z}_M$.

**Output:** $xyR^{-1} \mod M$.

1: $s \leftarrow 0$
2: for $i \leftarrow 0, \ldots, v - 1$ do
3:   $u \leftarrow (s + x_i y_0)m^* \mod r$
4:   $s \leftarrow (s + x_i y + uM)/r$
5: end for
6: if $s \geq M$ then
7:   $s \leftarrow s - M$ \quad (Extra reduction)
8: end if
9: return $s$ \quad (Extra reduction $s = \text{MM}(x, y; M)$)

**Algorithm 4** Montgomery left-to-right binary exponentiation.

**Input:** An odd modulus $M \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 2}$, Montgomery constant $R > M$, integers $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_M$, and an exponent $d = (d_{\ell-1}, \ldots, d_0) \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 1}$ with $d_{\ell-1} = 1$.

**Output:** $y^d \mod M$.

1: $\tilde{y} \leftarrow \text{MM}(y, R; M)$ \quad $\triangleright \; \tilde{y} \leftarrow yR \mod M$
2: $\tilde{x} \leftarrow \tilde{y}$
3: for $i \leftarrow \ell - 2, \ldots, 0$ do
4:   $\tilde{x} \leftarrow \text{MM}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}; M)$
5: if $d_i = 1$ then
6:   $\tilde{x} \leftarrow \text{MM}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}; M)$
7: end if
8: end for
9: $x \leftarrow \text{MM}(\tilde{x}, 1; M) \triangleright \; x \leftarrow \tilde{x}R^{-1} \mod M$
10: return $x$

**Assumption 1** (Montgomery modular multiplication). For fixed modulus $M$ and fixed Montgomery constant $R$,

$$\text{Time} \left( \text{MM}(a, b; M) \right) \in \{c, c + c_{ER} \} \quad \text{for all } a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_M,$$

(10)

which means that an MM operation costs time $c$ if no ER is needed, and $c_{ER}$ equals the time for an ER. (The constants $c$ and $c_{ER}$ depend on the concrete implementation.)

**Justification of Assumption 1.** (see [Sch15], Remark 1, for a comprehensive analysis) For known-input attacks (with more or less randomly chosen inputs) Assumption 1 should usually be valid. An exception are pure timing attacks on RSA with CRT implementations in old versions of OpenSSL [BB03, ASK05], cf. Subsection 4.2. The reason is that OpenSSL applies different subroutines to compute the for-loop in Algorithm 3, depending on whether $x$ and $y$ have identical word size or not. The before-mentioned timing attacks on RSA with CRT are adaptive chosen input attacks, and during the attack certain MM-operands become smaller and smaller. This feature makes the attack to some degree more complicated but does not prevent it because new sources for timing differences occur. Smart cards...
and microcontroller should not have this feature because in normal use for RSA operands with different word size rarely occur so that an optimization of this case seems to be needless.

In the following we summarize some well-known fundamental stochastic properties of Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm, or more precisely, on the distribution of random extra reductions within a modular exponentiation algorithm. Their knowledge is needed to develop (effective and efficient) pure or local timing attacks [Sch00, SKQ01a, Sch02b, Sch02a, BB03, ASK05, Sch05, Sch15, Sch16].

We interpret the normalized intermediate values of Algorithm 4 as realizations of random variables $S_0, S_1, \ldots$. With the same arguments as in Subsection 2.2 (for Barrett’s multiplication) one concludes that for Algorithm 4 the random variables $S_1, S_2, \ldots$ are iid uniformly distributed on $[0, 1)$. We set $w_i = 1$ if the $i$-th Montgomery operation requires an ER and $w_i = 0$ otherwise. We interpret the values $w_1, w_2, \ldots$ as realizations of $\{0, 1\}$-valued random variables $W_1, W_2, \ldots$.

Interestingly, it does not depend on the word size $w\$ whether an ER is necessary but only on the quadruple $(a, b, M, R)$. This allows to consider the case $w\ = t$ (i.e. $v = 1$) when analyzing the stochastic behaviour of the random variables $W_i$ in modular exponentiation algorithms. In particular,

$$\text{Time}(\text{BM}(a, b; M) \text{ requires an ER}) \iff \left( \frac{\text{MM}(a, b, M)}{M} < \frac{a \ b \ M}{M \ M \ R} \right).$$

This observation allows to express the random variable $W_i$ in terms of $S_{i-1}$ and $S_i$. For Algorithm 4 this implies

$$W_i = \begin{cases} 1 \{ s_i < s_{i-1} \frac{a \ b}{M} \} & \text{if the } i \text{-th MM operation is a multiplication by } \tilde{y}, \\ 1 \{ s_i < s_{i-1} \frac{a \ b}{M} \} & \text{if the } i \text{-th MM operation is a squaring.} \end{cases} \quad (12)$$

The random variables $W_1, W_2, \ldots$ have interesting properties which are similar to those of $R_1, R_2, \ldots$. In particular, they are neither stationary distributed nor independent but 1-dependent and under weak assumption they fulfil a version of the Central Limit Theorem for dependent random variables. Relation (12) allows to represent joint probabilities $\Pr(W_i = w_i, W_{i+1} = w_{i+1})$ as integrals over the $(k + 1)$-dimensional unit cube. We just note that

$$\Pr(W_i = 1) = \begin{cases} \frac{\tilde{y}}{M} & \text{if the } i \text{-th MM operation is a multiplication by } \tilde{y}, \\ \frac{M}{M} & \text{if the } i \text{-th MM operation is a squaring.} \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

### 3.2 A closer look at Barrett’s multiplication algorithm

In this subsection we develop and justify equivalents to Assumption 1 for the two (different) Barrett multiplication algorithms (Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 5). Therefrom we deduce stochastic representations, which describe the random timing behaviour of modular exponentiations $y \mapsto y^d \mod M$.

#### 3.2.1 Modular exponentiation with Algorithm 1

At first we formulate an equivalent to Assumption 1.

**Assumption 2** (Barrett modular multiplication). For fixed modulus $M$,

$$\text{Time}(\text{BM}(a, b; M)) \in \{ c, c + c_{\text{ER}}, c + 2c_{\text{ER}} \} \quad \text{for all } a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_M, \quad (14)$$
which means that a Barrett multiplication (BM) costs time $c$ if no ER is needed, and $c_{ER}$ equals the time for one ER. (The constants $c$ and $c_{ER}$ depend on the concrete implementation.)

Justification of Assumption 2. The justification of Assumption 2 is rather similar to the justification of Assumption 1 in Subsection 3.1. In Line 1 of Algorithm 1, $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_M$ are multiplied in $\mathbb{Z}$, and in Line 2 the rounding off brackets \(\lfloor\cdot\rfloor\) are simple shift operations if $b$ equals 2 or a suitable power of two (e.g. $b = 2^{\text{ws}}$, where ws denotes the word size of the underlying arithmetic). For known-input attacks (with more or less randomly chosen inputs), and for smart cards and microcontrollers in general it is reasonable to assume that the Lines 1 to 3 cost identical time for all $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_M$ and, consequently, that Assumption 1 is valid. Exceptions may exist for adaptive chosen input timing attacks on RSA implementations (cf. Subsection 4.2) on PCs, which use large general libraries. Even then it seems to be very likely that (as for Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm) such optimisations allow timing attacks anyway.

This leads to the following stochastic representation of the (random) timing of a modular exponentiation $y^d \mod M$ if it is calculated with Algorithm 2.

\[(\text{Alg. 2} + \text{Alg. 1}): \quad \text{Time}(y^d \mod M) = t_{\text{set}} + (\ell + \text{ham}(d) - 2)c + (R_1 + \cdots + R_{\ell + \text{ham}(d) - 2})c_{\text{ER}} + N\]

Here the ‘setup-time’ $t_{\text{set}}$ summarizes the time needed for all operations that are not part of Algorithm 1, e.g. the time needed for input and output and maybe for the computation of the constant $\mu$ (if not stored). The random variable $N$ quantifies the ‘timing noise’. This includes measurement errors and possible deviations from Assumption 2. We assume that $N \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$. We allow $\sigma^2 = 0$, which means ‘no noise’ (i.e. $N \equiv 0$) while a non-zero expectation $E(N)$ is ‘moved’ to $t_{\text{set}}$. The data-dependent timing differences are quantified by the stochastic process $R_1, R_2, \ldots, R_{\ell + \text{ham}(d) - 2}$, which has been thoroughly analysed in Section 2. Recall that the distribution of this stochastic process depends on the secret exponent $d$ and on the ratio $t = y/M$.

Remark 4. (i) Without blinding mechanisms Time($y^d \mod M$) is identical for repeated executions with the same basis $y$ if we neglect possible measurement errors. At first sight the stochastic representation (15) may be surprising but the stochastic process $R_1, R_2, \ldots$, describes the random timing behaviour for bases $y' \in \mathbb{Z}_M$ whose ratio $y'/M$ is close to $t = y/M$ (cf. Stochastic Model 1).

(ii) A similar stochastic representation exists for table-based exponentiation algorithms, see Subsection 4.3.

3.2.2 Modular exponentiation with Algorithm 5

Algorithm 5 is a modification of Algorithm 1 containing an optimization which was already proposed by Barrett [Bar86]. Its Lines 3-6 substitute Line 3 of Algorithm 1. We may assume $b = 2^{\text{ws}} > 2$, where $\text{ws}$ is the word size of the integer arithmetic (typically, $\text{ws} \in \{8, 16, 32, 64\}$). Line 3 of Algorithm 1 computes a multiplication $\tilde{q} \cdot M$ of two integers, which are in the order of $b^k$, and a subtraction of two integers, which are in the order of $b^{2k}$. In contrast, Line 3 of Algorithm 5 only requires a modular multiplication $(\tilde{q} \cdot M) \mod 2^{\text{ws}(k+1)}$, the subtraction of two integers in the order of $b^{k+1}$ and Line 5 possibly one addition by $b^{k+1}$.

After Line 6 of Algorithm 5, $r \equiv z - (\tilde{q} \cdot M) \mod b^{k+1}$, and further $0 \leq r < b^{k+1}$. Since $|\log_b M| \leq \log_b M < k = \lceil \log_b M \rceil + 1$, we have $b^{k+1} \leq M < b^k$, hence $3M < 3b^k \leq b^{k+1}$. By Lemma 1 the values $r$ after Line 3 of Algorithm 1 and $r$ after Line 6 of Algorithm 5 thus coincide, which means that the number of extra reductions is the same for both algorithms.
**Algorithm 5** Barrett modular multiplication (optimized).

**Input:** A modulus $M \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 2}$ of length $k = \lceil \log_b M \rceil + 1$ in base $b \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 3}$, the integer reciprocal $\mu = \lfloor b^{(k+1)} / M \rfloor$ of $M$, and integers $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_M$.

**Output:** $(x \cdot y) \mod M$.

1. $z \leftarrow x \cdot y$
2. $\tilde{q} \leftarrow \lfloor \lfloor z / b^{k-1} \rfloor \mu / b^{k+1} \rfloor$
3. $r \leftarrow (z \mod b^{k+1}) - \left( (\tilde{q} \cdot M) \mod b^{k+1} \right)$
4. if $r < 0$ then
5.   $r \leftarrow r + b^{k+1}$ \hspace{1em} ▶ Extra addition
6. end if
7. while $r \geq M$ do
8.   $r \leftarrow r - M$ \hspace{1em} ▶ Extra reduction
9. end while
10. return $r$

If $c_{\text{add}}$ denotes the time needed for an addition of $b^{k+1}$ in Line 5 of Algorithm 5 this leads to an equivalent of Assumption 2.

**Assumption 3** (Barrett modular multiplication, optimized). For fixed modulus $M$,

$$\text{Time}(\text{BM}(a, b; M)) \in \{c, c + c_{\text{ER}}, c + 2c_{\text{ER}}, c + c_{\text{add}}, c + c_{\text{ER}} + c_{\text{add}}, c + 2c_{\text{ER}} + c_{\text{add}}\}$$  \hspace{1em} (16)

for all $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_M$, which means that a Barrett multiplication (BM) with Algorithm 5 (without extra reductions or an addition by $b^{k+1}$) costs time $c$, while $c_{\text{ER}}$ and $c_{\text{add}}$ equal the time for one ER or for an addition by $b^{k+1}$, respectively. (The constants $c$, $c_{\text{ER}}$ and $c_{\text{add}}$ depend on the concrete implementation.) When implemented on the same platform the constant $c$ in (16) should be smaller than in (14).

**Justification of Assumption 3.** The justification is rather similar to that of Assumption 2. The relevant arguments have already been discussed at the beginning of this subsection. This also concerns the general expositions to the impact of possible optimizations of the integer multiplication algorithm.

The if-condition in Line 4 of Algorithm 5 introduces an additional source of timing variability, which has to be analysed. We have already explained that this if-condition does not affect the number of extra reductions. Next, we determine the probability of an extra addition by $b^{k+1}$.

Let $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_M$ and let $z = x \cdot y$. We denote by $r_a$ the number of extra additions by $b^{k+1}$ in the computation of $z \mod M$. Obviously, $r_a = 1$ iff $z \mod b^{k+1} < \tilde{q}M \mod b^{k+1}$ (and $r_a = 0$ otherwise), or equivalently, when dividing both terms by $b^{k+1}$,

$$r_a = 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad \left\{ \frac{z}{b^{k+1}} \right\} < \left\{ \frac{\tilde{q}M}{b^{k+1}} \right\}. \hspace{1em} (17)$$

Next, we derive a more convenient characterisation of (17). Let $\gamma := M / b^{k+1} \in (0, b^{-1})$. 

| Algorithm 5 | Barrett modular multiplication (optimized). |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------|
| **Input:**  | A modulus $M \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 2}$ of length $k = \lceil \log_b M \rceil + 1$ in base $b \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 3}$, the integer reciprocal $\mu = \lfloor b^{(k+1)} / M \rfloor$ of $M$, and integers $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_M$. |
| **Output:** | $(x \cdot y) \mod M$. |

| Algorithm 6 | RSA with CRT, left-to right exponentiation, Barrett multiplication. |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Input:**  | Prime factors $p_1$ and $p_2$ with $n = p_1p_2$, exponents $d_{(1)} = d \mod (p_1 - 1)$, and an integer $y \in \mathbb{Z}_n$. |
| **Output:** | $y^d \mod n$. |

1. $y_{(1)} := y \mod p_1$
2. Compute $x_{(1)} = y_{(1)}^{d_{(1)}} \mod p_1$ with Alg. 2
3. $y_{(2)} := y \mod p_2$
4. Compute $x_{(2)} = y_{(2)}^{d_{(2)}} \mod p_2$ with Alg. 2
5. Compute $x = y^d \mod n$ from $x_{(1)}$ and $x_{(2)}$ (recombination step)
6. return $x$
We now assume that Algorithm 5 is applied in the modular exponentiation algorithm. We have

\[
\tilde{q}_M = \left\lfloor \frac{z}{b^{k+1}} \right\rfloor \frac{b^{2k}/M}{b^{k+1}} M 
= \left\lfloor \frac{z}{b^{k+1}} \right\rfloor \frac{b^{2k}/M}{b^{k+1}} M - \left\lfloor \frac{z}{b^{k+1}} \right\rfloor \frac{b^{2k}/M}{b^{k+1}} M
\]

Since \(0 \leq \alpha \gamma (z/M^2) + \beta \gamma \{z/b^{k-1}\} + \gamma \{\beta \lfloor z/b^{k-1}\rfloor\} \leq 3\gamma < 3/b \leq 1\), we can rewrite characterization (17) as

\[
r_a = 1 \text{ iff } \left\{ \frac{z}{b^{k+1}} \right\} < \alpha \gamma \frac{z}{M^2} + \beta \gamma \left\{ \frac{z}{b^{k+1}} \right\} + \gamma \left\{ \frac{z}{b^{k+1}} \right\}.
\] (18)

Our aim is to develop a stochastic model for the extra addition. We start with a closer inspection of the right-hand side of (18). Let \(z = (z_{2k-1}, \ldots, z_0)_b\) be the \(b\)-ary representation of \(z\), where leading zero digits are permitted. Then

\[
u' := \{z/b^{k+1}\} = (0.z_k, \ldots, z_0)_b,
\]

\[
v_1 := z/M^2 = (z_{2k-1}, \ldots, z_0)_b/M^2,
\]

\[
v_2 := \{z/b^{k-1}\} = (0.z_{k-2}, \ldots, z_0)_b, \quad \text{and}
\]

\[
v_3 := \{\beta \lfloor z/b^{k-1}\rfloor\} = \{b^{2k}/M \left\lfloor (0.z_{2k-1}, \ldots, z_{k-1})_b \right\rfloor\}.
\] (19)

We now assume that Algorithm 5 is applied in the modular exponentiation algorithm Algorithm 2. In analogy to the extra reductions we interpret the number of extra additions by \(b^{k+1}\) in the \((n+1)\)-th Barrett operation, denoted by \(r_{n+1}\), as a realization of a \(\{0,1\}\)-valued random variable \(R_{n+1}\). In particular, \((x \cdot y) \mod M\) either represents a squaring (\(x = y\)) or a multiplication of the intermediate value \(x\) by the basis \(y\), respectively.

As in Stochastic Model 2 we model \(v_1 = (xy)/M^2\) as a realization of \(S_{n-1}^{(2)}\) (squaring) or \(S_{n,t}\) (multiplication by the basis \(y\)) with \(t = y/M\), respectively, and \(v_2\) as a realization of the random variable \(U_{n+1}\) which is uniformly distributed on \([0,1]\). With the same argumentation as for \(v_2\) we model \(\nu'_{n+1} := u' = (xy/b^{k+1})\) as a realization of a random variable \(U'_{n+1}\) that is uniformly distributed on \([0,1]\).

It remains to analyse \(v_3\). Let for the moment \((a_k, \ldots, a_0)_b\) be the \(b\)-ary representation of \(\lfloor b^{2k}/M \rfloor\) (we have \(b^k \leq b^{2k}/M < b^{k+1}\) since we excluded the corner case \(M = b^{k-1}\)) and \(a_{k-1} = a_{k-2} = 0\). Then

\[
v_3 = \sum_{j=0}^{k} a_j b^j \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} z_{2k-i} b^{-i} \approx \sum_{h=-3}^{k-1} b^h \sum_{j=i}^{k-1} a_j z_{2k-i} \approx \sum_{j=-3}^{k-1} b^j \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} a_i b^{j+3} z_{2k-i} \mod b^3.
\] (20)

We model \(\nu'_{n+1} := v_3\) as a realization of a random variable \(V_{n+1}\) that is uniformly distributed on \([0,1]\).
By (19) and (20) the values \( s', v_1, v_2 \) and \( v_3 \) essentially depend on \( z_k \) (resp., on \((z_k, z_{k-1})\) if \( w_s \) is small), on the most significant digits of \( z \) in the \( b \)-ary representation, on \( z_{k-2} \) (resp., on \((z_{k-2}, z_{k-3})\) if \( w_s \) is small) and on the weighted sum of the \( b \)-ary digits \( z_2k-1, \ldots, z_{k-1} \), respectively. This justifies the assumption that the random variables \( U_{n+1}', S_n, U_{n+1}', V_{n+1} \) essentially behave as if they were independent.

We could extend the non-homogeneous Markov chain \((S_n, R_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}\) on the state space \([0,1) \times \mathbb{Z}_3\) from Section 2 to a non-homogeneous Markov chain \((S_n, R_n, R_{a:n})_{n \in \mathbb{N}}\) on the state space \([0,1) \times \mathbb{Z}_3 \times \mathbb{Z}_2\). Its analysis is analogous to that in Section 2 but more complicated in detail. Since for typical word sizes \( w \) the impact of the extra additions on the execution time is by an order of magnitude smaller than the impact of the extra reductions we do not elaborate on this issue. We only mention that

\[
\Pr(R_{a:n+1} = 1) = \Pr(U_{n+1}' < \alpha S_n^2 + \beta U_{n+1} + \gamma V_{n+1})
\]

\[
= \int_{[0,1]^3} \Pr(U_{n+1}' < \alpha S_n^2 + \beta u_{n+1} + \gamma v_{n+1}) \, dv_{n+1} \, du_{n+1} \, ds_n
\]

\[
= \int_{[0,1]^3} (\alpha S_n^2 + \beta u_{n+1} + \gamma v_{n+1}) \, dv_{n+1} \, du_{n+1} \, ds_n
\]

\[
= \alpha \gamma / 3 + \beta \gamma / 2 + \gamma / 2 =: \mu_{a,S}, \quad \text{if } 0_{n+1} = S,
\]

and analogously

\[
\Pr(R_{a:n+1} = 1) = \Pr(U_{n+1}' < \alpha S_n t + \beta U_{n+1} + \gamma V_{n+1})
\]

\[
= \alpha \gamma t / 2 + \beta \gamma / 2 + \gamma / 2 =: \mu_{a,M}, \quad \text{if } 0_{n+1} = M.
\]

For the reason mentioned above we treat the extra additions as noise. Equation (23) is the equivalent to (15) for the modified version of Barrett’s multiplication algorithm. We use the same notation as in (15).

\[(\text{Alg. 2 + Alg. 5}: \quad \text{Time}(y^d \mod M) = t_{\text{set}}^* + (\ell + \text{ham}(d) - 2)c + R_1 + \cdots + R_{\ell + \text{ham}(d) - 2} c_{\text{ER}} + N^*, \quad (23)\]

with \( t_{\text{set}}^* = t_{\text{set}} + (\mu_{a,S}(\ell - 1) + \mu_{a,M}(\text{ham}(d) - 1))c_{\text{add}} \) and \( N^* \sim N'(0, (\mu_{a,S}(1 - \mu_{a,S})(\ell - 1) + \mu_{a,M}(1 - \mu_{a,M})(\text{ham}(d) - 1))c_{\text{add}}^2 + \sigma^2) \). The expected time for all extra additions has been moved to the setup time, and the variance became part of \( N^* \). While the formula for the expectation is exact, we used a coarse approximation for the variance which neglects any dependencies. We just mention that \( R_{n+1} \) and \( R_{a:n+1} \) are positively correlated. This follows from the fact that apart from the factor \( \gamma \) the terms \( '\alpha S_n^2', '\alpha S_n t', \) and \( '\beta U_{n+1}' \) in (21) and (22) coincide with terms in (4) and since \( R_{a:n+1} \) and \( R_{n+1} \) are both ‘large’ if the corresponding terms in (21), (22) and (4) are ‘large’.

**Remark 5.**

(i) The stochastic representations (15) and (23) are essentially identical although (23) has slightly larger noise.

(ii) The ratio \( c_{\text{add}} / c_{\text{ER}} \) depends on the implementation.

### 3.2.3 Special values for \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \)

The stochastic behaviour of the Barrett multiplication algorithm depends on \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \). In particular, \( \alpha \) has significant impact on most of the attacks discussed in Section 4. In this subsection we briefly analyse the extreme cases \( \alpha \approx 0 \) and \( \beta \approx 0 \).

The condition \( k = \lfloor \log_b M \rfloor + 1 \) (cf. Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 5) implies \( b^{k-1} \leq M < b^k \). Now assume that \( b^k / 2 < M < b^k \), which is typically fulfilled if the modulus \( M \) has ‘maximum length’ (e.g. 1024 or 2048 bits). Then

\[
0 \leq \beta = \frac{b^k / M}{b^{k+1}} \leq \frac{2b^k}{b^{k+1}} = 2 b^{-1}. \quad (24)
\]
If \( b = 2^{\omega s} \) with \( ws \gg 1 \) (e.g. \( ws \geq 16 \)), then \( \beta \approx 0 \). In this case one may neglect the term \( '\beta U' \) in (3), accepting a slight inaccuracy of the stochastic model.

Going the next step, cancelling \( '\beta U_{n+1}' \) in (4) simplifies Stochastic Model 2 as (4) can be rewritten as \( R_{n+1} = 1_{(S_{n+1} < \alpha S_n^2)} \) and \( R_{n+1} = 1_{(S_{n+1} < \alpha S_n t)} \), respectively. This representation is equivalent to the Montgomery case (12), simplifying the computation of the variances, covariances and the probabilities in Lemma 7 (i) considerably (as for the Montgomery multiplication). The Barrett-specific features and difficulties yet remain.

Now assume that \( b^{k-1} \leq M < 2b^{k-1} \). Then

\[
0 \leq \alpha = \frac{M^2}{b^{2k}} \left\{ \frac{b^{2k}}{M} \right\} \leq \frac{M^2}{b^{2k}} < \frac{4}{b^2}. \tag{25}
\]

If again \( b = 2^{\omega s} \) with \( ws \gg 1 \), e.g. \( ws \geq 8 \), then \( \alpha \approx 0 \). As above we may neglect the terms \( '\alpha S_n' \) in (3) and analogously \( '\alpha S_n^2' \), resp. \( '\alpha S_n t' \), in (4), which yields the representation \( R_{n+1} = 1_{(S_{n+1} < \beta U_{n+1})} \). Consequently, \( R_1, R_2, \ldots \) are iid \( \{0,1\} \)-valued random variables with \( \text{Pr}(R_i = 1) = \beta/2 \). While \( \beta \approx 0 \) is quite likely the case \( \alpha \approx 0 \) should occur rarely because the bit length of the modulus would be slightly larger than a power of \( b = 2^{\omega s} \).

More generally, assume that \( b^{k-1} \leq 2^{w'} b^{k-1} \leq M < 2^{w'+1} b^{k-1} \leq b^k \) for some \( w' \in \{0, \ldots, ws - 1\} \). With the same strategy as in (24) and (25) we conclude

\[
0 \leq \alpha < \left( \frac{2^{w'+1} b^{k-1}}{b^{2k}} \right)^2 = \left( \frac{2^{w'} b^{k-1}}{b} \right)^2 \quad \text{and} \quad 0 \leq \beta \leq \frac{b^k}{b^{k+1}} = \frac{1}{2^{w'}}. \tag{26}
\]

The impact of \( \alpha \approx 0 \) and \( \beta \approx 0 \) on the attacks in Section 4 will be discussed in Subsection 4.4.

### 3.3 A short summary

The stochastic process \( R_1, R_2, \ldots \) is the equivalent to \( W_1, W_2, \ldots \) (Montgomery multiplication). Both stochastic processes are 1-dependent. Hence it is reasonable to assume that attacks on Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm can be transferred to implementations which use Barrett’s multiplication algorithm. In Section 4 we will see that this indeed the case.

However, for Barrett’s multiplication algorithm additional problems arise. In particular, there is no equivalent to the characterization (11), which allows to directly analyse the stochastic process \( W_1, W_2, \ldots \). For Barrett’s algorithm a ‘detour’ to the two-dimensional Markov process \( (S_i, R_i)_{i \in \mathbb{N}} \) is necessary. Moreover, for Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm the respective integrals can be computed much easier than for Barrett’s algorithm since simple closed formulae exist. If \( \beta \approx 0 \), the evaluation of the integrals becomes easier (as for Montgomery’s algorithm), and if \( \alpha \approx 0 \), the computations become absolutely simple. For CRT implementations the parameter estimation is more difficult for Barrett’s multiplication algorithm than for Montgomery’s algorithm. We return to these issues in Section 4.

### 4 Timing attacks against Barrett’s modular multiplication

The conditional extra reduction in Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm is the source of many timing attacks and local timing attacks [DKL+98, Sch00, SKQ01a, SKQ01b, Sch02b, Sch02a, BB03, ASK05, AS08, Sch15, DGD+16, Sch16]. Some of them even work in the presence of particular blinding mechanisms. When applied to modular exponentiation, the stochastic representations of the execution times are similar for Montgomery’s and Barrett’s multiplication algorithms. The analysis of Barrett’s algorithm, however, is mathematically more challenging as explained in Sections 2 and 3. In Subsections 4.1 to 4.3 we transfer
attacks on Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm to attacks on Barrett’s multiplication algorithm, where we assume that the ‘basic’ Algorithm 1 is applied. We point out that our attacks can be adjusted to Algorithm 5 (cf. Subsubsection 3.2.2).

4.1 Timing attacks on RSA without CRT and on DH

In this subsection we assume that $M$ is an RSA modulus or the modulus of a DH-group (i.e. a subgroup of $\mathbb{F}_M^*$) and that $y^d \bmod M$ is computed with Algorithm 2, where $d = (d_{\ell-1}, \ldots, d_0)_2$ is a secret exponent. Blinding techniques are not applied. We transfer the attack from Sect. 6 in [Sch02b] to Barrett’s multiplication algorithm and extend it by a look-ahead strategy.

The attacker (or evaluator) measures the execution times $t_j = \text{Time}(y_j^d \bmod M)$ for $j = 1, \ldots, N$ for known bases $y_j$. The $t_j$ may be noisy (cf. (15)). Moreover, we assume that the attacker knows (or has estimated) $c$ and $c_{\text{ER}}$. (Sect. 6 in [SKQ01b] explains a guessing procedure for Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm.) In a pre-step the sum $\ell + \text{ham}(d)$ can be estimated in a straight-forward way. We may assume that the attacker knows $\ell$ and thus also $\text{ham}(d)$. (If necessary the attack could be restarted with different candidates for $\ell$. However, apart from its end the attack is robust against small deviations from the correct value $\ell$.) At the beginning the attacker subtracts the data-independent terms $t_{\text{set}}$ and $(\ell + \text{ham}(d) - 2)c$ from the timings $t_j$ and divides the differences by $c_{\text{ER}}$, yielding the ‘discretised’ execution times $t_{d,1}, \ldots, t_{d,N}$.

The attack strategy is to guess subsequently the exponent bits $d_{\ell-1} = 1, d_{\ell-2}, \ldots$. For the moment we assume that the guesses $\tilde{d}_{\ell-1} = 1, \tilde{d}_{\ell-2}, \ldots, \tilde{d}_{\ell+1}$ have been correct. Now we focus on the guessing procedure of the exponent bit $d_k$. Currently, Algorithm 2 ‘halts’ before the if-statement (for $i = k$) so that $k$ squarings and $m$ (calculated from the guesses $\tilde{d}_{\ell-1}, \ldots, \tilde{d}_{\ell+1}$) multiplications still have to be carried out. On the basis of the previous guesses the attacker computes the intermediate values $x_j$, and the number of extra reductions needed for the squarings and multiplications executed so far are subtracted from the $t_{d,j}$, yielding the discretised remaining execution times $t_{\text{drem},j}$. In terms of random variables this reads

$$T_{\text{drem},j} = R_{\ell + \text{ham}(d) - k - m - 1, j} + \cdots + R_{\ell + \text{ham}(d) - 2, j} + N_{d, j} \quad \text{for } 1 \leq j \leq N$$

where $N_{d, j} \sim N(0, \sigma^2/c_{\text{ER}}^2)$. Recall that the distribution of those $R_i$, which belong to multiplications, depends on the basis $y_j$; see e.g. the stochastic representation (4).

To optimise our guessing strategy we apply statistical decision theory. We point the interested reader to [Sch05], Sect. 2, where statistical decision theory is introduced in a nutshell and the presented results are tailored to side-channel analysis. In the following $\Theta := \{0, 1\}$ denotes the parameter space, where $\theta \in \Theta$ corresponds to the hypothesis $d_k = \theta$.

We may assume that the probability that the exponent bit $d_k$ equals $\theta$ is approximately 0.5. (In the case of RSA, $d_0 = 1$ and for indices $k$ close to $\lceil \log_2(n) \rceil$ the exponent bits may be biased.) More formally, if we view $d_k, d_{k-1}, \ldots$ as realisations of iid uniformly $\{0, 1\}$-distributed random variables $Z_k, Z_{k-1}, \ldots$ we obtain the a priori distribution

$$\eta(\theta) = \Pr(Z_k = \theta \mid \text{ham}(d_k, \ldots, d_0) = m) = \left(\frac{k + 1 - m}{k + 1}\right)^{1-\theta} \left(\frac{m}{k + 1}\right)^{\theta}. \quad (28)$$

To guess the next exponent bit $d_k$ we employ a look-ahead strategy. For look-ahead depth $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 1}$ the decision for exponent bit $d_k$ is based on information obtained from the next $\lambda$ exponent bits. As the attacker knows the intermediate value $x_j$ (of sample $j$) he is able to determine the number of extra reductions needed to process the $\lambda$ exponent bits $d_k, \ldots, d_{k-\lambda+1}$ for each of the $2^\lambda$ admissible values $\tilde{\rho} = (\rho_0, \ldots, \rho_{\lambda-1}) \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$. This
yields the discretized time needed to process the left-over exponent bits \( d_{k-\lambda}, \ldots, d_0 \), which is fictional except for the correct vector \( \vec{\rho} \).

In this subsection \( t_{\vec{\rho},j} \) denotes the number of extra reductions required to process the next \( \lambda \) exponent bits for the basis \( y_j \) if \((d_k, \ldots, d_{k-\lambda+1}) = \vec{\rho}\). For these computations \( \lambda \) modular squarings and \( \text{ham}(\vec{\rho}) \) modular multiplications by \( y_j \) are performed. Furthermore, \( t_{\text{drem},j} - t_{\vec{\rho},j} \) may be viewed as a realisation of \( R_{\ell + \text{ham}(d_{k-\lambda-1, j}) + \cdots + R_{\ell + \text{ham}(d_{-2, j})} + N_{d, j}} \). By (9), Lemma 6 (ii), and Lemma 7 (ii), (iii), this random variable is approximately \( N(\epsilon_{\vec{\rho},j}, v_{\vec{\rho},j}) \)-distributed where

\[
e_{\vec{\rho},j} := (k - \lambda)\mu_S + (m - \text{ham}(\vec{\rho}))\mu_{R,j} \quad \text{and} \quad v_{\vec{\rho},j} := (k - \lambda)\sigma^2_S + (m - \text{ham}(\vec{\rho}))\sigma^2_{R,j} + 2(m - \text{ham}(\vec{\rho}))(\text{cov}_{R,j} + \text{cov}_{\text{MS},j}) + 2(k - \lambda - m + \text{ham}(\vec{\rho}) - 1)\text{cov}_{R,j} + \text{Var}(N_{d,j}).
\]

We define the observation space \( \Omega := (\Omega')^N \) consisting of vectors \( \vec{\omega} = (\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_N) \) of timing observations

\[
\omega_j = (t_{\text{drem},j}, (t_{\vec{\rho},j})_{\vec{\rho} \in \{0,1\}^d}) \in \Omega' := \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}^d, \quad 1 \leq j \leq N. \tag{30}
\]

For the remainder of this subsection let \( f_{\vec{\omega}}(\cdot) \) denote the Lebesgue density of the normal distribution \( N(e_{\vec{\rho},j}, v_{\vec{\rho},j}) \). The joint distribution of all \( N \) traces is given by the \( N \)-fold product density of \( f_{\vec{\omega}}(\cdot) \) with arguments \( t_{\text{drem},1} - t_{\vec{\rho},1}, \ldots, t_{\text{drem},N} - t_{\vec{\rho},N} \). For \( \lambda = 1 \) we have \( \vec{\rho} = \vec{\rho}_0 = \theta \), and for hypothesis \( \theta = \theta \) the distribution of the discretized computation time needed for the left-over exponent bits \( d_{k-\lambda}, d_{k-\lambda-1}, \ldots \) has the product density \( \prod_{j=1}^N f_{\theta}(\cdot) \).

If \( \lambda > 1 \) the situation is more complicated. More precisely, for hypothesis \( \theta \in \Theta \) the distribution of the left-over time is given by a convex combination of normal distributions with density

\[
\mathcal{F}_\theta : \Omega \to \mathbb{R}, \quad \mathcal{F}_\theta(\vec{\omega}) = \sum_{\vec{\rho} \in \{0,1\}^d} \mu_{\vec{\rho}} \prod_{j=1}^N f_{\vec{\rho}}(t_{\text{drem},j} - t_{\vec{\rho},j}), \tag{31}
\]

where the coefficients \( \mu_{\vec{\rho}} \) are given by

\[
\mu_{\vec{\rho}} = \Pr(Z_{k-1} = \rho_1, \ldots, Z_{k-\lambda+1} = \rho_{\lambda-1} \mid \text{ham}(d_k, \ldots, d_0) = m - \rho_0)
\]

\[
= \prod_{i=1}^{\lambda-1} \Pr(Z_{k-i} = \rho_i \mid \text{ham}(d_{k-i}, \ldots, d_0) = m - \text{ham}(\rho_0, \ldots, \rho_{i-1}))
\]

\[
= \prod_{i=1}^{\lambda-1} \left( \frac{k + 1 - i - (m - \text{ham}(\rho_0, \ldots, \rho_{i-1}))}{k + 1 - i} \right)^{\rho_i} \left( \frac{m - \text{ham}(\rho_0, \ldots, \rho_{i-1})}{k + 1 - i} \right)^{\mu_i}. \tag{32}
\]

Finally, we choose \( A = \Theta \) as the set of alternatives and consider the loss function \( s : \Theta \times A \to \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \) defined by \( s(\theta, a) = 1_{\{\theta \neq a\}} \), i.e. we penalize the wrong decisions (‘0’ instead of ‘1’, ‘1’ instead of ‘0’) equally since all forthcoming guesses then are useless. We obtain the following optimal decision strategy for look-ahead depth \( \lambda \).

**Decision Strategy 1** (Guessing \( d_k \)). Let \( \vec{\omega} = (\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_N) \) be a vector of \( N \) timing observations \( \omega_j \in \Omega' \) as in (30). Then the indicator function

\[
\tau(\vec{\omega}) := 1_{\{\mathcal{F}_\omega(\vec{\omega})/\mathcal{F}_1(\vec{\omega}) \leq \eta(1)/\eta(0)\}} \tag{33}
\]

is an optimal strategy (Bayes strategy) against the a priori distribution \( \eta \).
**Proof.** We interpret \( \omega_1, \omega_2, \ldots, \omega_N \) as realisations of independent random vectors \( X_j := (T_{\text{rem},j}(T_{\bar{p},j}), \bar{p} \in \{0,1\}) \) with values in \( \Omega' \) for \( 1 \leq j \leq N \), which has already been assumed when \eqref{eq:31} was developed. We denote by \( \mu \) the product of the Lebesgue measure on \( \mathbb{R} \) and the counting measure on \( \mathbb{N}^2 \). We equip \( \Omega' \) with the product \( \sigma \)-algebra \( \mathcal{B}(\mathbb{R}) \otimes \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N}^2) \). Then \( \mu \) is a \( \sigma \)-finite measure on \( \Omega' \), and the \( N \)-fold product measure \( \mu^N = \mu \otimes \cdots \otimes \mu \) is \( \sigma \)-finite on the observation space \( \Omega = \Omega' \times \cdots \times \Omega' \). Note that \( \Pr((T_{\bar{p},j})_{\bar{p} \in \{0,1\}}) = (t_{\bar{p},j})_{\bar{p} \in \{0,1\}} \) is independent of \((d_k, \ldots, d_k-\lambda+1)\) and thus in particular independent of \( d_k \). Furthermore, this probability is \( > 0 \) because all alternatives \( \bar{p} \) are principally possible. Define \( C_j := \mathbb{R} \times \prod_{\bar{p} \in \{0,1\}} t_{\bar{p},j} \) and \( C := \prod_{j=1}^N C_j \subseteq \Omega \). (Here \( \prod \) denotes the cartesian product of sets.) If \( d_k = \theta \) then the conditional probability distribution of \((X_1, \ldots, X_N)\) given \( C \) is \( \mathcal{F}_\theta \cdot \mu^N \). Thus all conditions of Theorem 1 (iii) in [Sch05] are fulfilled, and this completes the proof. \( \square \)

For look-ahead depth \( \lambda = 1 \), Decision Strategy 1 is essentially equivalent to Theorem 6.5 (i) in [Sch02b].

**Remark 6.** All decisions after a wrong bit guess are useless because then the attacker computes wrong intermediate values \( x'_1, \ldots, x'_N \) and therefore values \( t_{\bar{p},j} \) that are not correlated to the correct number of extra reductions \( t_{\bar{p},j} \). However, the situation is not symmetric in 0 and 1 because for \( d_k = 0 \) one uncorrelated term and for \( d_k = 1 \) two uncorrelated terms are subtracted. In [SKQ01a] (look-ahead depth \( \lambda = 1 \)) for Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm an efficient three-option error detection and correction strategy was developed, which allowed to reduce the number of attack traces by \( \approx 40\% \). We do not develop an equivalent strategy for Barrett’s multiplication algorithm but apply a dynamic look-ahead strategy. This is much more efficient as we will see in Subsection 5.1. To the best of our knowledge this look-ahead strategy is new if we ignore the fact that the idea was very roughly sketched in [Sch02b], Remark 4.1.

### 4.2 Timing attacks on RSA with CRT

The references [Sch00, BB03, ASK05] introduce and analyse or improve timing attacks on RSA implementations which use the CRT and Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm, including the square & multiply exponentiation algorithm and table-based exponentiation algorithms. Even more, these attacks can be extended to implementations which are protected by exponent blinding [Sch15, Sch16].

Unless stated otherwise, we assume in this subsection that RSA with CRT applies Algorithm 6 with Barrett’s multiplication (Algorithm 1). Let \( n = p_1 p_2 \) be an RSA modulus, let \( d \) be a secret exponent, and let \( y \in \mathbb{Z}_n \) be a basis. We set \( y(i) := y \mod p_i \) and \( d(i) := d \mod (p_i - 1) \) for \( i = 1, 2 \). For \( y \in \mathbb{Z}_n \) let \( T(y) := \text{Time}(y^d \mod n) \).

Let \( \nu := \lceil \log_2 n \rceil + 1 \) be the bit-length of \( n \). We may assume that \( p_1, p_2 \) have bit-length \( \approx \nu/2 \) and that \( d(1), d(2) \) have Hamming weight \( \approx \nu/4 \). From \eqref{eq:5} we obtain

\[
E(T(y)) \approx t_{\text{set}} + 2c \left( \frac{\nu}{2} + \frac{\nu}{4} \right) + c_{\text{ER}} \left( \frac{\nu}{2} \sum_{i=1,2} \left( \frac{\alpha_i}{3} + \frac{\beta_i}{2} \right) + \frac{\nu}{4} \sum_{i=1,2} \left( \frac{\alpha_i t_i}{2} + \frac{\beta_i}{2} \right) \right), \tag{34}
\]

where \( t_i := y(i)/p_i \). Now assume that \( 0 < u_1 < u_2 < n \) with \( u_2 - u_1 \ll p_1, p_2 \). Three cases are possible:

Case A: \( \{u_1 + 1, \ldots, u_2\} \) does not contain a multiple of \( p_1 \) or \( p_2 \).

Case B: \( \{u_1 + 1, \ldots, u_2\} \) contains a multiple of \( p_1 \), but not of \( p_3-1 \).

Case C: \( \{u_1 + 1, \ldots, u_2\} \) contains a multiple of both \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \).
By (34) we conclude

$$E(T(u_2) - T(u_1)) = E(T(u_2)) - E(T(u_1)) \approx \begin{cases} 0 & \text{in Case A,} \\ -\frac{1}{2} & \text{in Case B}, \\ -\frac{1}{2} & \text{in Case C} \end{cases}$$

because if \( p_i \) is in \( \{u_1 + 1, \ldots, u_2\} \) then \( t_{i,2} := (u_2 \mod p_i)/p_i \approx 0 \) and \( t_{i,1} := (u_1 \mod p_i)/p_i \approx 1 \). For RSA without CRT the parameters \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) can easily be calculated while for RSA with CRT the parameters \( \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \beta_1, \beta_2 \) are unknown and thus need to be estimated.

We note that

$$\beta_1, \beta_2 = \left[ \frac{b^2}{p_1} \right], \left[ \frac{b^2}{p_2} \right], b^{-(2k+2)} \approx \frac{b^{2k-2}}{n}.$$  

(36)

The parameter \( \beta_i \) is not sensitive against small deviations of \( p_i \) and could be approximated by \( \frac{b^2}{p_i}/b^{k+1} \approx b^{-k-1}/p_i \approx b^{-k-1}/\sqrt{n} \in (0,1) \). However, this estimate can be improved at the end of attack phase 1 below because then more precise information on \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \) is available. We mention that in the context of this timing attack the knowledge of \( \beta_1 \) and \( \beta_2 \) is only relevant to estimate \( \text{Var}(T(y)) \), which allows to determine an appropriate sample size for the attack steps. Unlike \( \beta_1 \), the second term \( \frac{b^2}{p_i} \) of \( \alpha_i = (\nu_i^2/b^{2k}) \left( \frac{b^2}{p_i} \right) \) and thus \( \alpha_1 \) is very sensitive against deviations of \( p_i \) since \( p_i \ll b^{2k} \).

In the remainder of this subsection we assume \( p_1 < p_2 < 2p_1 \), i.e. that \( p_1, p_2 \) have bit-length \( \ell \approx \nu/2 \). It follows that the interval \( I_1 := (\sqrt{n}/2, \sqrt{n}) \) contains \( p_1 \) but no multiple of \( p_2 \) and the interval \( I_2 := (\sqrt{n}/2, \sqrt{2n}) \) contains \( p_2 \) but no multiple of \( p_1 \). (In the general case, we would have to guess \( r \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 2} \) such that \( (r-1)p_1 < p_2 < rp_1 \). Then \( I_1 := (\sqrt{n}/r, \sqrt{n}/(r-1)) \) contains \( p_1 \) but no multiple of \( p_2 \) and \( I_2 := (\sqrt{n}/(r-1), \sqrt{2n}) \) contains \( p_2 \) but no multiple of \( p_1 \).) Let \( u_0' := \lfloor \sqrt{n}/2 \rfloor < u_1' < \cdots < u_k' := \lfloor \sqrt{n} \rfloor \) be approximately equidistant integers in \( I_1 \) and let \( u_0'' := \lfloor \sqrt{n} \rfloor < u_1'' < \cdots < u_m'' := \lfloor \sqrt{2n} \rfloor \) be approximately equidistant integers in \( I_2 \), where \( h \in \mathbb{N} \) is a small constant (say \( h = 4 \)). Further, define

$$\text{MeanTime}(u, N) := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} T(u + j).$$

(37)

The goal of attack phase 1 is to identify \( j', j'' \) such that \( p_1 \in [u_{j'-1}, u_{j'}] \) and \( p_2 \in [u_{j''-1}, u_{j''}] \). The selection of \( j' \) and \( j'' \) follows from the quantitative interpretation of (35). If \( \alpha_1 \) is small but \( \alpha_{3-i} \) is significantly larger, the decision (for \( j' \), resp., for \( j'' \)) in attack phase 1 might be incorrect, but this is of minor importance since attack phase 2 searches \( p_{3-i} \) anyway. If both \( \alpha_1 \) and \( \alpha_2 \) are small the efficiency of the attack is low anyway. To be on the safe side one then may repeat phase 1 with larger sample size \( N_1 \). Moreover, (36) allows to check the selection of \( j' \) and \( j'' \).

**Attack Phase 1**

1. Select an appropriate integer \( N_1 \).

2. For \( j = 1, \ldots, h \), compute \( \delta_j' \leftarrow \text{MeanTime}(u_{j-1}', N_1) - \text{MeanTime}(u_j', N_1) \) and \( \delta_j'' \leftarrow \text{MeanTime}(u_{j-1}'', N_1) - \text{MeanTime}(u_j'', N_1) \).

3. Set \( j' \leftarrow \arg \max_{1 \leq j \leq h} \delta_j' \) and \( j'' \leftarrow \arg \max_{1 \leq j \leq h} \delta_j'' \). (The attacker believes that \( p_1 \in [u_{j'-1}, u_{j'}] \) and \( p_2 \in [u_{j''-1}, u_{j''}] \).)

4. Set \( \alpha_1 \leftarrow 8\delta_j'/\nu_{\text{ER}} \) and \( \alpha_2 \leftarrow 8\delta_j''/\nu_{\text{ER}} \) (estimates for \( \alpha_1 \) and \( \alpha_2 \)).

5. Set \( \beta_1 \leftarrow 2b^{k-1}/(u_{j'-1} + u_{j'}) \) and \( \beta_2 \leftarrow 2b^{k-1}/(u_{j''-1} + u_{j''}) \) (estimates for \( \beta_1 \) and \( \beta_2 \)).
Attack Phase 2

(1) If $\tilde{\alpha}_1 > \tilde{\alpha}_2$ then set $i \leftarrow 1$, $u_1 \leftarrow u_{j,1}'$, and $u_2 \leftarrow u_{j,2}'$; else set $i \leftarrow 2$, $u_1 \leftarrow u_{j,2}'$, and $u_2 \leftarrow u_{j,1}'$. (Attack phase 2 searches for $p_i$ iff $\tilde{\alpha}_i > \tilde{\alpha}_{3-i}$. This prime is assumed to be contained in $[u_1, u_2]$.)

(2) Select $N_2$ (depending on $\tilde{\alpha}_i$ and $\text{Var}_{u_1, \tilde{\alpha}_2, \tilde{\alpha}_1, \tilde{\alpha}_2}(T(u))$).

(3) While $\log_2(u_2 - u_1) > \ell/2 - 6$, do the following:

(a) Set $u_3 \leftarrow [(u_1 + u_2)/2]$.

(b) If $\text{MeanTime}(u_2, N_2) - \text{MeanTime}(u_3, N_2) > -\frac{1}{16}\nu\tilde{\alpha}_{\text{CER}}$ then set $u_2 \leftarrow u_3$ (the attacker believes that Case A is correct); else set $u_1 \leftarrow u_3$ (the attacker believes that Case B is correct).

The decision rule follows from (35) (Case A vs. Case B). After phase 2 more than half of the upper bits of $u_1$ and $u_2$ coincide, which yields more than half of the upper bits of $p_i$ (more precisely, $\approx \ell/2 + 6$). This enables attack phase 3.

Attack Phase 3

(1) Compute $p_i$ with Coppersmith’s algorithm [Cop97].

Of course, all decisions in attack phase 2 (including the initial choice of $u_1$ and $u_2$) need to be correct. However, it is very easy to verify from time to time whether all decisions in attack phase 2 have been correct so far, or equivalently, whether the current interval $(u_1, u_2)$ indeed contains $p_i$. If $\text{MeanTime}(u_2 + N_2, N_2) - \text{MeanTime}(u_3 + N_2, N_2) < -\frac{1}{16}\nu\tilde{\alpha}_{\text{CER}}$ this confirms the assumption that $(u_1, u_2)$ contains $p_i$, and $(u_1, u_2)$ is called a ‘confirmed interval’ but if not, one computes $\text{MeanTime}(u_2 + 2N_2, N_2) - \text{MeanTime}(u_3 + 2N_2, N_2)$. If this difference is $< -\frac{1}{16}\nu\tilde{\alpha}_{\text{CER}}$ then $(u_1, u_2)$ becomes a confirmed interval. Otherwise the attack goes back to the preceding confirmed interval $(u_{1,c}, u_{2,c})$ and restarts with values in the neighbourhood of $u_{1,c}$ and $u_{2,c}$, which have not been used before when the attack already was at this stage.

Remark 7. (i) Similarities to Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm. By (5) the expected number of extra reductions needed for a multiplication by $y_i := y \mod p_i$ is an affine function in $t_i = y_i/p_i$. (For Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm it is a linear function in $(yR \mod p_i)/p_i$, cf. (13).) As for Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm, (34) allows to decide whether an interval contains a prime $p_1$ or $p_2$ and finally to factorise the RSA modulus $n$.

(ii) Differences to Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm. If $y_1 < p_1 < y_2$, the expectation $E(T(y_1) - T(y_2))$ is linear in $\alpha_i$, which is very sensitive to variations in $p_i$. Consequently, the attack efficiency may be very different whether the attacker targets $p_1$ or $p_2$. This is unlike to Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm where the corresponding expectation is linear in $p_i/R \approx \sqrt{n}/R$. As a consequence attack phase 1 is very different in both cases, depending on whether the targeted implementation applies Barrett’s or Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm.

It should be noted that this timing attack against Barrett’s multiplication algorithm can be adapted to fixed window exponentiation and sliding window exponentiation and also works against exponent blinding. For table-based methods the timing difference in (35) gets smaller while exponent blinding causes large algorithmic noise. In both cases the parameters $N_1$ and $N_2$ must be selected considerably larger, which of course lowers the efficiency of the timing attack. This is rather similar to timing attacks on Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm [Sch15, Sch16].
4.3 Local timing attacks

Unlike for the ‘pure’ timing attacks discussed in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 we assume that a potential attacker is not only able to measure the overall execution time but also the timing for each squaring and multiplication, which means that he knows the number of extra reductions. This may be achieved by power measurements. In [AS08] an instruction cache attack was applied against Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm. The task of a spy process was to realize when a particular routine from the BIGNUM library is applied, which is only used to calculate the extra reduction. This approach may not be applicable against Barrett’s multiplication algorithm because here more than one extra reduction is possible.

In this subsection we assume that fixed window exponentiation is applied where basis blinding (introduced in [Koc96], Sect. 10, a.k.a. message blinding) is applied as a security measure. Algorithm 7 updates the blinding values to prevent an attacker from calibrating an attack to fixed blinding values. Our attack works against RSA without CRT and against RSA with CRT as well. The papers [Sch02a, AS07, AS08, DGD+16] consider several modular exponentiation algorithms with Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm.

**Algorithm 7** Fixed Window Exponentiation, basis blinding, Barrett modular multiplication.

**Input:** A modulus \( M \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 2} \) of length \( k = \lfloor \log_b M \rfloor + 1 \) in base \( b \), width of the window \( w \geq 2 \), a secret exponent \( d = (d_{\ell-1}, \ldots, d_0)_{2^w} \) in \( 2^w \)-ary representation, blinding values \( A, B = A^{-d} \mod M \in \mathbb{Z}_M \), the integer reciprocal \( \mu = \lfloor b^{2k}/M \rfloor \) of \( M \), and a basis \( y \in \mathbb{Z}_M \).

**Output:** \( y^d \mod M \) and updated blinding values \( A^2 \mod M, B^2 \mod M \).

1: \( u_0 \leftarrow 1 \)
2: \( u_1 \leftarrow A \cdot y \mod M \)
3: for \( j \leftarrow 2, \ldots, 2^w - 1 \) do
4: \( u_j \leftarrow u_{j-1} \cdot u_1 \mod M \)
5: end for
6: \( x \leftarrow u_0 \)
7: for \( j \leftarrow \ell - 1, \ldots, 0 \) do
8: for \( i \leftarrow 1, \ldots, w \) do
9: \( x \leftarrow x \cdot x \mod M \)
10: end for
11: \( x \leftarrow x \cdot u_{d_j} \mod M \)
12: end for
13: \( x \leftarrow B \cdot x \mod M \)
14: \( A \leftarrow A^2 \mod M, B \leftarrow B^2 \mod M \)
15: return \( x \) and \( A, B \)

**Algorithm 8** RSA with CRT, modular exponentiation with Alg. 7.

**Input:** Prime factors \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \) with \( n = p_1 p_2 \), exponents \( d_{(i)} = d \mod (p_i - 1) \), and a basis \( y \in \mathbb{Z}_n \).

**Output:** \( y^d \mod n \).

1: \( y_{(1)} := y \mod p_1 \)
2: Compute \( x_{(1)} = y_{(1)}^{d_{(1)}} \mod p_1 \) with Alg. 7
3: \( y_{(2)} := y \mod p_2 \)
4: Compute \( x_{(2)} = y_{(2)}^{d_{(2)}} \mod p_2 \) with Alg. 7
5: Compute \( x = y^d \mod n \) from \( x_{(1)} \) and \( x_{(2)} \) (recombination step)
6: return \( x \)

4.3.1 RSA without CRT and DH

In this subsection we assume that \( y^d \mod M \) is computed with Algorithm 7. The exponentiation phase starts in Step 6. Analogously to Algorithm 2 (left-to-right exponentiation) the exponentiation phase of Algorithm 7 can be described by a sequence of operations
0_1, 0_2, \ldots \text{ with } 0_j \in [S, M_0, \ldots, M_{2^w-1}], \text{ where } M_0 \text{ stands for a multiplication by the table entry } u_0. \text{ Since one multiplication by some table entry } u_j \text{ follows each } w \text{ squarings, it remains to guess the operations } 0_j(w+1) \in [M_0, \ldots, M_{2^w-1}] \text{ for } j = 1, 2, \ldots. 

As for Algorithm 2 the exponentiation phase can be described by a stochastic process \((S_n, R_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}\) on the state space \([0, 1) \times \mathbb{Z}_3\), where \(S_0\) models Step 6 in Algorithm 7, i.e. \(S_0 = 0\). Again, this is a Markov process. However, there are some peculiarities: First of all, \(S_0 = \ldots = S_w\) are identical and correspond to the normalised table entry \(w\). In particular, Remark 2 (ii) allows to identify the \(\theta\) which costs at most \(2^w\) trials. Now we focus on the operations \(0_w+1, 0_{j(w+1)}, \ldots\)

**Lemma 10.** Let \(j \geq 2\). For \(\theta \in \{1, \ldots, 2^w - 1\}\) we have

\[
\Pr_\theta(R_j(w+1) = r_j(w+1)) = \int_0^1 \left( \int_0^1 h[\theta](s_j(w+1), r_j(w+1) \mid s_j(w+1)-1) ds_j(w+1) \right) ds_j(w+1)-1.
\]

The conditional density \(h[\theta](s_{j+1}, r_{j+1} \mid s_n)\) is defined like \(h_{n+1}\) with \(0_{n+1} = M\) in Lemma 5 (iii) with \((s_j(w+1), s_j(w+1)-1, t[\theta] = s_0')\) in place of \((s_{n+1}, s_n, t)\). Here \(\Pr_\theta\) denotes the probability under the hypothesis \(\theta\), i.e. under the assumption \(0_j(w+1) = M_0\). Further, we have

\[
\Pr_\theta(R_j(w+1) = 0) = 1.
\]

**Proof.** Equation (38) follows from Lemma 6 (i) with \(M = M_0\) and equation (39) holds by definition.

However, the attacker does not know the ratios \(t_1, \ldots, t_{2^w-1}\) and in Subsubsection 4.3.2, additionally, not even the moduli \(p_1\) and \(p_2\). Anyway, the table initialisation phase is the source of our attack since the attacker knows the type of operations. In analogy to the exponentiation phase we formulate a stochastic process \((S'_j, R'_j)_{1 \leq j \leq 2^w-1}\) on the state space \([0, 1) \times \mathbb{Z}_3\), where \(S'_j\) corresponds to the normalised table entry \(t_j := u_j/M\). This again defines a two-dimensional Markov process, and \(S'_1, \ldots, S'_{2^w-1}\) are iid uniformly distributed on \([0, 1)\). This leads to Lemma 11.

**Lemma 11.** Let \(j \geq 2\).

(i) For \(\theta \in \{1, \ldots, 2^w - 1\}\) we have

\[
\Pr_\theta(R'_j = r'_2, \ldots, R'_w = r'_2 = r'_w = 1, R_j(w+1) = r_j(w+1)) = \int_0^1 \int_0^1 h^*(s'_j, r'_j \mid s'_1) \cdots \int_0^1 h^*(s'_w-1, r'_w-1 \mid s'_w-2) \\
\int_0^1 \int_0^1 h[\theta](s_j(w+1), r_j(w+1) \mid s_j(w+1)-1) ds_j(w+1) \int_0^1 ds_j(w+1)-1 ds'_w-1 ds'_w-2 \cdots ds'_1 ds'_1.
\]

For \(j = 1, \ldots, 2^w - 2\) the function \(h^*(s_j, r_j \mid s_j)\) is defined like \(h_{n+1}\) for \(0_{n+1} = M\) in Lemma 5 (iii) with \((s'_j+1, s'_j, t_1 = s'_1)\) in place of \((s_{n+1}, s_n, t)\).
(ii) For \( \theta \in \{0, \ldots, 2^w - 1 \} \) we have
\[
\Pr_\theta(R'_2 = r'_2, \ldots, R'_{2^w - 1} = r'_{2^w - 1}, R_{j(w+1)} = r_{j(w+1)}) = \int_0^1 \int_0^1 h^*(s'_2, r'_2 | s'_1) \cdots \int_0^1 h^*(s'_{2^w - 1}, r'_{2^w - 1} | s'_{2^w - 2}) \, ds'_2 \cdots ds'_1 ds'_1.
\] (41)

Proof. The random variables \( S'_1, \ldots, S'_{2^w - 1}, S_{j(w+1)-1}, S_{j(w+1)} \) are iid uniformly distributed on \([0, 1]\). For \( j = 1, \ldots, 2^w - 2 \) and for given \( r'_{j+1} \) the conditional densities \( h^*(s'_{j+1}, r'_{j+1} | s'_j) \) quantify the dependency on the ‘history’ (recall that \( S'_1, \ldots, S'_{2^w - 1} \) is a Markov process).

Similarly, \( h_\theta(s_{j(w+1)}, r_{j(w+1)} | s_{j(w+1)-1}) \) quantifies the dependency on the ‘history’. As in the proof of Lemma 7 (i), equation (40) follows from the Ionescu-Tulcea Theorem. Evaluating the integrals with respect to \( s_{j(w+1)-1} \) and \( s_{j(w+1)} \) proves (41) for \( \theta > 0 \). For \( \theta = 0 \) it is obvious because \( R_{j(w+1)} \) does not depend on \( S'_1, \ldots, S'_{j(w+1)-1} \).

Decision Strategy 2. Let \( j \geq 2 \) and assume that the attacker has observed \( N \) samples of extra reduction vectors \( (r'_{2,k}, \ldots, r'_{2^w - 1,k}, r_{j(w+1),k}) \) for \( 1 \leq k \leq N \). Then the optimal decision strategy is to decide for \( \mathcal{O}_{j(w+1)} = \mathcal{M}_{\theta*} \), where
\[
\theta^* := \arg \max_{\theta \in \{0, \ldots, 2^w - 1\}} \prod_{k=1}^N \Pr_\theta(R'_{2,k} = r'_{2,k}, \ldots, R'_{2^w - 1,k} = r'_{2^w - 1,k}, R_{j(w+1),k} = r_{j(w+1),k}).
\] (42)

Proof. All \( \theta \in \{0, \ldots, 2^w - 1\} \) are equally likely, and each false decision is equally harmful. Hence the optimal decision strategy is given by the maximum likelihood estimator, which follows e.g. from Theorem 1 (i) in [Sch05]. The extra reduction vectors \( (R'_{2,1}, \ldots, R'_{2^w - 1,1}, R_{j(w+1),1}), \ldots, (R'_{2,N}, \ldots, R'_{2^w - 1,N}, R_{j(w+1),N}) \) may be considered to be independent, which yields (42). Formula (42) combines both cases \( \theta = 0 \) and \( \theta \neq 0 \).

Remark 8. (i) Similarities to Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm. For both Barrett’s and Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm the joint probabilities can be expressed by integrals over high-dimensional unit cubes. In both cases the type of the first multiplication (operation \( w + 1 \)) has to be guessed exhaustively.

(ii) Differences to Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm. For Barrett’s multiplication algorithm these integrals are \((2^w + 1)\)-dimensional while for Montgomery’s algorithm they are \((2^w + 2)\)-dimensional. This is due to the pre-operation (cf. Algorithm 4, Step 1).

4.3.2 RSA with CRT

In this subsection we assume that \( y^d \mod n \) is computed with Algorithm 8. Algorithm 8 calls Algorithm 7 twice, which applies basis blinding. (Alternatively, the basis blinding could also be moved to a pre-step 0 and to Step 6 in Algorithm 8 but this would not affect the attack.) Here the situation for the attacker is even less favourable than in Subsubsection 4.3.1 because not only the blinded basis and thus the table entries are unknown but also the moduli \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \). However, apart from additional technical difficulties our attack still applies.

We first note that it suffices to recover \( d_{(1)} \) or \( d_{(2)} \). In fact, if \( x = y^d \mod n \) then \( \gcd(x - y^{d(i)} \mod n, n) = p_i \) for \( i = 1, 2 \) (cf. [AS08], eq. (1)). If necessary the attacker may construct such a pair, e.g. by setting \( y = x^{x'} \mod n \) and \( x = x' \) for some \( x' \in \mathbb{Z}_n \).

The plan is to apply the attack method from the preceding subsection to the modular exponentiation \( \mod p_1 \) or \( \mod p_2 \). First, similarly as in Subsection 4.2 we estimate
α₁, β₁, α₂, β₂. To estimate α₁ and β₁, we consider all \( k'_n \) squarings in the modular exponentiation \( \mod p_1 \), beginning with operation \( w + 2 \). We neglect all multiplications by 1, which can be identified by the fact that no extra reductions can occur, so that \( k'_n \) relevant multiplications remain. Counting the extra reductions in the relevant squarings and multiplications over all \( N \) exponentiations gives numbers \( n_g \) and \( n_m \), respectively. We may assume that for \( \theta > 0 \) the normalised table entries behave like realisations of iid random variables, which are uniformly distributed on \([0, 1]\). Thus we may assume that the average of all normalised table entries over all \( N \) samples is \( \approx 0.5 \). From (5) we thus conclude

\[
n_g \approx N k'_n \left( \frac{\alpha_1}{3} + \frac{\beta_1}{2} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad n_m \approx N k'_n \left( \frac{\alpha_2}{4} + \frac{\beta_1}{2} \right). \tag{43}
\]

Replacing \( \approx \) by \( = \) and solving the linear equations provides estimates \( \bar{\alpha}_i \) and \( \bar{\beta}_i \) for \( \alpha_i \) and \( \beta_i \). The attacker focuses on the exponentiation \( \mod p_1 \) iff \( \bar{\alpha}_1 > \bar{\alpha}_2 \).

Remark 9. (i) Similarities to Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm. As for Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm the attack remains feasible if the CRT is applied.

(ii) Differences to Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm. Unlike for Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm the choice, whether the modular exponentiation \( \mod p_1 \) or \( \mod p_2 \) is attacked, may have significant impact on the attack’s efficiency. This is similar to the situation in Subsection 4.2.

4.4 \( \alpha \approx 0, \beta \approx 0 \), Algorithm 5: Impact on the attack efficiency

In Subsubsection 3.2.3 we mentioned that \( \alpha \approx 0 \) and \( \beta \approx 0 \) may occur if \( b = 2^{ws} \gg 2 \), e.g. for \( ws = 8, 16, 32, 64 \). While \( \beta \approx 0 \) is quite likely, \( \alpha \approx 0 \) is certainly possible but very unusual. For both special cases the necessary computations become considerably easier.

For \( \beta \approx 0 \) all before-mentioned attacks remain feasible. The attacks in Subsection 4.2 and Subsection 4.3 exploit differences between multiplications with different factors, which are caused by different \( \alpha \)-values. As \( \beta \approx 0 \) this reduces the part of variances which does not depend on the particular factor. Hence \( \beta \approx 0 \) there leads to even more efficient attacks while this has little relevance for the attack in Subsection 4.1. If \( \alpha \approx 0 \) the \( \{0, 1\} \)-valued random variables \( R_1, R_2, \ldots \) are iid distributed with \( \Pr(R_j = 1) = \beta/2 \), and thus only the timing attack in Subsection 4.1 remains feasible.

In Subsubsection 3.2.2 we have shown that in Algorithm 5 extra additions are rather rare and thus can be treated like noise. For the timing attacks in Subsection 4.1 and Subsection 4.2 this effect slightly increases the variance and thus also the sample size. If \( c_{add} \neq c_{ER} \) in the local timing attacks in Subsection 4.3, the extra additions can be detected yielding to the same situation as for Algorithm 1. If \( c_{add} \approx c_{ER} \), we occasionally get a wrong number of extra reductions, which may slightly increase the sample size. (As already pointed out for \( \beta \approx 0 \) the situation is rather similar to Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm.)

5 Experiments

In this section we report experimental results for the attacks presented in Section 4. In each experiment we used simulations of the exponentiation algorithms returning the exact number of extra reductions needed by the multiplications and squarings, either cumulative (pure timing attacks) or per operation (local timing attacks). This represents the ideal (noise-free) case (accurate timing measurement, no time noise by other operations). Of course, non-ideal scenarios would require larger sample sizes.

We performed timing attacks on RSA without CRT and on Diffie-Hellman exemplarily on 512-bit RSA moduli and on a 3072-bit DH group, and for RSA with CRT we considered...
1024-bit moduli and 3072-bit moduli. Finally, we carried out local timing attacks on 512-bit RSA moduli and on a 3072-bit DH group. Our experiments confirmed the theoretical results. Of course, 512-bit RSA moduli have not been secure for many years, and also 1024-bit RSA is no longer state-of-the-art. These choices yet allow direct comparisons to results from previous papers on Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm which considered these modulus sizes.

We primarily report on experiments using Barrett’s multiplication algorithm with base \( b = 2 \), but in the respective subsections we also explain how the results change when a more common base \( b = 2^\omega \) for \( \omega \geq 8 \) is used. The case \( b = 2 \) is usually less favourable for the attacker in terms of efficiency and represents a worst-case analysis in this sense. Mathematically it is also the most challenging case as it requires the most general stochastic model.

The experiments were implemented using the Julia programming language [BEKS17] with the Nemo algebra package [FHHJ17].

5.1 Timing attacks on RSA without CRT and on DH

We implemented the timing attack with the look-ahead strategy as presented in Subsection 4.1.

Since our simulations are noise-free, we set \( \text{Var}(N_{d,j}) := 0 \) in (29). For simplicity, in (29) we approximated the covariances \( \text{cov}_{\text{BG,j}}, \text{cov}_{\text{SG,j}} \) and \( \text{cov}_{\text{SS}} \) by the empirical covariances of suitable samples generated from Stochastic Model 2. For instance, \( \text{cov}_{\text{SS},j} \) can be approximated using samples from

\[
R_n = \left[ \alpha S_{n-1} t_j + \beta U_n - S_n \right],
\]

\[
R_{n+1} = \left[ \alpha S_n^2 + \beta U_{n+1} - S_{n+1} \right],
\]

where \( t_j := y_j / M \) is the normalized basis of the \( j \)-th timing sample. (Recall that the random variables \( S_{n-1}, S_n, U_n \) and \( U_{n+1} \) are iid uniformly distributed on \([0,1)\).) Furthermore, the \( n \)-th and the \((n+1)\)-th Barrett operations correspond to a multiplication by the basis and a squaring, respectively. We point out that Lemma 7 (i) would theoretically allow an exact computation of these covariances since \( \text{Cov}(R_n, R_{n+1}) = E(R_n R_{n+1}) - E(R_n) E(R_{n+1}) \) and \( E(R_n R_{n+1}) = \sum_{1 \leq i, j \leq 2} ij \Pr(R_n = i, R_{n+1} = j) \).

In order to make the attack more efficient, we chose the look-ahead depth \( \lambda \) dynamically during the attack. Our strategy is based on the observation that when Decision Strategy 1 fails for the first time the decisions usually are close, i.e., using the notation of Subsection 4.1, \( |\eta(0) \tilde{f}_0(\omega) - \eta(1) \tilde{f}_1(\omega)| \) is small. Close decisions happen mostly at the beginning of the attack when the number of remaining exponent bits \( k \) is large (if \( \text{Var}(N_{d,j}) \approx 0 \) then the variance \( v_{\tilde{\phi},j} \) in (29) decreases (essentially) linearly in \( k \) or if the number \( N \) of timing samples is insufficient. For each decision, we gradually incremented the look-ahead depth \( \lambda \) starting from 1 until either the heuristic condition

\[
|\eta(0) \tilde{f}_0(\omega) - \eta(1) \tilde{f}_1(\omega)| \geq 3 \cdot \log_2 (1 + N/k)
\]

was fulfilled or we reached some maximum look-ahead depth \( \lambda_{\text{max}} \).

For simplicity, we assumed in our experiments that we know the bit-length and Hamming weight of the secret exponent (cf. Subsection 4.1).

For the first experiment we used the Diffie–Hellman group \( \text{dhe3072} \) defined in Appendix A.2 of RFC 7919 [Gil16]. RFC 7919 recommends to use this group with secret exponents of bit-length at least 275. The 3072-bit modulus of this group has Barrett parameters \( \alpha \approx 0.63 \) and \( \beta \approx 0.5 \) for the base \( b = 2 \) we used. The results of the experiment are reported in Table 1. For each sample size \( N \) and maximum look-ahead depth \( \lambda_{\text{max}} \) given in the table, we conducted 100 trials of the timing attack. For each trial, a 275-bit secret exponent and \( N \) input bases were chosen independently at random.
Table 1: Timing attack on Diffie–Hellman group dhe3072 with 275-bit secret exponents (base $b = 2$).

| Sample size | $\lambda_{\text{max}}$ | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|-------------|----------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 400         | 0              | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| 600         | 0              | 0 | 1 | 2 | 12 | 13 | 21 | 41 | 39 | 50 |
| 800         | 0              | 0 | 5 | 23 | 37 | 54 | 74 | 73 | 75 | 83 |
| 1000        | 0              | 0 | 31 | 42 | 65 | 82 | 83 | 88 | 93 | 91 |
| 1200        | 0              | 11 | 37 | 72 | 88 | 89 | 94 | 97 | 98 | 100 |
| 1400        | 3              | 32 | 69 | 89 | 95 | 94 | 100 | 99 | 99 | 99 |

Table 1 shows that in terms of the sample size the applied (dynamic) look-ahead strategy is much more efficient than the constant look-ahead strategy $\lambda = 1$.

For the second experiment we considered RSA with 512-bit moduli and again used Barrett’s multiplication with base $b = 2$. Of course, factoring 512-bit RSA moduli has been an easy task for many years but this choice allows a direct comparison with the results on Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm in [SKQ01a]. The results of these experiments are reported in Table 2. For each sample size $N$ and maximum look-ahead depth $\lambda_{\text{max}}$ given in the table, we conducted 100 trials of the timing attack. For each trial, a 512-bit RSA-modulus and $N$ input bases were chosen independently at random. Since we chose $e := 65537$ as public exponents, the secret exponents were ensured to be of bit-length near 512 as well.

Table 2: Timing attack on 512-bit RSA without CRT (base $b = 2$).

| Sample size | $\lambda_{\text{max}}$ | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|-------------|----------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1000        | 0              | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 12 |
| 1500        | 0              | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 18 | 32 | 50 | 63 | 71 | 77 |
| 2000        | 0              | 0 | 15 | 37 | 62 | 80 | 84 | 93 | 97 | 92 |
| 2500        | 0              | 7 | 40 | 74 | 91 | 89 | 97 | 98 | 100 | 97 |
| 3000        | 0              | 25 | 66 | 87 | 96 | 98 | 100 | 100 | 98 | 99 |
| 3500        | 0              | 49 | 89 | 98 | 100 | 99 | 99 | 98 | 100 | 99 |
| 5000        | 17             | 89 | 100 |
| 7000        | 66             | 99 |
| 9000        | 89             | 100 |

Reference [SKQ01a] treats 512-bit RSA moduli, the square & multiply algorithm and Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm. In our terminology, [SKQ01a] applies the optimal decision strategy for the constant look-ahead strategy $\lambda = 1$. For the sample size $N = 5000$ (for $N = 7000$, for $N = 9000$) simulations yielded success probabilities of 12% (55%, 95%). The results in Table 2 underline that the efficiency of the attacks on Barrett’s and on Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm is rather similar for $\lambda = 1$. Moreover, in [SKQ01a] also so-called real-life attacks were conducted where the timings were gained from emulations of the Cascade chip (see [SKQ01a], Remark 4). For the above-mentioned sample sizes the real-life attack was successful in 15%, 40% or 72% of the trials. In [SKQ01a] further experiments were conducted where the optimal decision strategy was combined with an error detection and correction strategy. There already $N = 5000$ led to
We implemented the timing attack presented in Subsection 4.2 (RSA with CRT, square &
30 Timing attacks and local timing attacks against Barrett’s modular multiplication

success rates of 85% (simulation) and 74% (real-world attack). This improved the efficiency
of the original attack on the Cascade chip in [DKL+98] by a factor \( \approx 50 \). We refer the
interested reader to [SKQ01a], Table 1 and Table 2, for further experimental results.

This error detection and correction strategy can be adjusted to Barrett’s multiplication
algorithm, and for \( \lambda = 1 \) this should also increase the efficiency (in terms of \( N \)) considerably.
Of course, one might combine this error detection and correction strategy with our look-
ahead strategy. We do not expect a significant improvement because the look-ahead
strategy treats suspicious (‘close’) decisions with particular prudence (by enlarging \( \lambda \)).
However, the other way round the look-ahead strategy can be applied to Montgomery’s
multiplication algorithm as well and should yield similar improvements.

**Decision Strategy 1** considers the remaining execution time and the following \( \lambda \) exponent
bits. Since the variance of the remaining execution time \( v_{\beta,j} \) (29) is approximately linear in
the number of exponent bits, wrong decisions should essentially occur in the beginning of
the attack. This observation suggests a coarse rule of thumb to extrapolate the necessary
sample size to different exponent lengths: When the exponent length increases from \( \ell_1 \)
to \( \ell_2 \) the sample size \( N \) should increase by factor \( \approx \ell_2/\ell_1 \). The experimental results in
Table 1 and Table 2 are in line with this formula, cf. the results for \( N = 1000 \) (Table 1)
and \( N = 2000 \) (Table 2), for instance.

Our experiments showed the interesting feature that unlike for the attacks in Subsec-
tions 5.2 and 5.3 the parameters \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) only play a small role for the efficiency, at least
under optimal conditions when no additional noise occurs. Qualitatively, this feature can
be explained as follows: **Decision Strategy 1** essentially exploits the fact that the variances
of the \( 2^\lambda \) (hypothetical) remaining execution times should be the smaller the more of the
left-hand bits of the \( \lambda \)-bit window are correct. Large (resp., small) \( \alpha, \beta \) imply large (resp.,
small) variances and differences of variances. In the presence of additional noise large \( \alpha, \beta \)
should favour the attack efficiency because then the relative impact of the additional noise
on the variance is smaller.

We repeated some of the experiments in Tables 1 and 2 for base \( b = 2^8 \) and obtained
comparable success rates.

### 5.2 Timing attacks on RSA with CRT

We implemented the timing attack presented in Subsection 4.2 (RSA with CRT, square &
multiply algorithm).

The efficiency of the attack depends on the Barrett parameters \( \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \beta_1, \beta_2 \) of the
RSA-primes \( p_1, p_2 \). The value \( \alpha_i := \max\{\alpha_1, \alpha_2\} \) (which is estimated in attack phase 1)
determines the ‘size’ of useful information (‘signal’), whereas \( \alpha_{3-i}, \beta_1, \beta_2 \) determine the
size of unwanted ‘algorithmic noise’ for the attack. We use \( \alpha_{\max} := \max\{\alpha_1, \alpha_2\} \) and
\( \overline{\beta} := (\beta_1 + \beta_2)/2 \) as simple measures for the amount of signal and algorithmic noise,
respectively.

The results of our experiments are reported in Table 3 and Table 4 for RSA moduli of
bit-size \( \nu := 1024 \) (allowing a comparison with [Sch00]) and \( \nu := 3072 \), respectively. We
used Barrett’s multiplication algorithm with base \( b = 2 \) and RSA primes of bit-size \( \nu/2 \).
Each row of the table represents an experiment consisting of 100 trials. For each trial, we
used rejection sampling to generate an RSA modulus such that \( \alpha_{\max} \) and \( \overline{\beta} \) are contained
in the given intervals.

In attack phase 1 we divided the initial intervals containing \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \) into \( h := 4 \)
subintervals each and chose a sample size of \( N_1 := 32 \). For attack phase 2 we estimated
the sample size \( N_2 \) as follows. For an interval \([u_3, u_2]\), we consider \( \Delta := T(u_2) - T(u_3) \)
as random variable. Then we have \( \Var(\Delta) \approx (v_{i,3} + v_{i,2} + v_{3-i,3} + v_{3-i,2})\nu_{ER} \), where the

decision can approximately be achieved by setting

\[ \nu \cdot \frac{\tilde{\alpha}_i \cdot \Phi^{-1}(\gamma)}{\sqrt{N_2}} \]

Therefore, a desired maximum error probability \( \gamma \) for a single decision can approximately be achieved by setting

\[ N_2 := \left[ \frac{16 \cdot \tilde{\sigma}_{\Delta i} \cdot \Phi^{-1}(\gamma)}{\nu \cdot \tilde{\alpha}_i \cdot \tilde{\epsilon}_{\text{ER}}} \right]^2. \]
We implemented the local timing attacks presented in Subsection 4.3. We point out that (44) does not depend on $c_{ER}$ because $\tilde{\sigma}_{\Delta,i}$ is a multiple of $c_{ER}$. In the simulation we thus may assume $c_{ER} = 1$. Of course, in a noisy setting the relation between the noise and $c_{ER}$ is relevant. For the experiments in Tables 3 and 4, we chose $\gamma := 2^{-8}$ and $\gamma := 2^{-9}$, respectively. The median and mean of the values chosen for $N_2$ in successful attacks are denoted by $\bar{N}_2$ and $\bar{N}_2^*$; the median and mean of the total number of timing samples required for an successful attack are denoted by $\bar{N}_{total}$ and $\bar{N}_{total}^*$.

The experiments were implemented using the error detection and correction strategy as outlined in Subsection 4.2. We ‘confirmed’ every 64-th interval using additional $N_2$ timing samples and aborted attacks as soon as 10 errors had been detected. The average number of errors that were corrected in successful attacks is denoted by $\bar{E}_{total}$ in Tables 3 and 4.

Our experiments confirm the theory developed in Subsection 4.2. In particular, the efficiency of the attack increases with $\alpha_{max}$, which is the reason why in Step 2 of the attack we focus on the prime $p_i$ with larger $\alpha_i$.

It may be surprising that the average sample sizes for 1024-bit moduli and for 3072-bit moduli are comparable although the latter takes almost three times as many individual decisions. The reason is that the average gap $E(T(u_2) - T(u_1))$ (35) increases linearly in the exponent size while the standard deviation of MeanTime$(u,N)$ (37) (in the absence of additional noise, for fixed $N$) only grows as its square root.

For $b = 2^m$ with $w \geq 8$, we have $\beta_1, \beta_2 \approx 0$ and the algorithmic noise is considerably reduced whereas the gap remains constant. In this case, the required sample sizes are smaller on average compared to those reported in Tables 3 and 4 (except for ranges where $N_2$ is already 1).

### 5.3 Local timing attacks

We implemented the local timing attacks presented in Subsection 4.3.

For window width $w$, the computation of the decision rule (42) requires the evaluation of $(2^w + 1)$-dimensional integrals in (41). In contrast to the corresponding attack against Montgomery’s algorithm, those integrals cannot easily be determined explicitly, which is why we have to resort to numerical methods. However, due to the so-called ‘curse of dimensionality’, generic numerical integration algorithms break down completely for $w \geq 3$ in terms of either efficiency or accuracy. We therefore take a step back and consider the stochastic model for the table initialisation phase,

$$
\begin{align*}
R'_2 &= \left[ \alpha S'_1 S'_2 S'_2 + \beta U'_2 - S'_2 \right], \\
R'_3 &= \left[ \alpha S'_2 S'_2 + \beta U'_3 - S'_3 \right], \\
&\vdots \\
R'_{2w-1} &= \left[ \alpha S'_{2w-2} S'_1 + \beta U'_{2w-2} - S'_{2w-1} \right],
\end{align*}
$$

and for operation $\theta_{j(w+1)} = \theta_{j}(j \geq 2, \theta \in \{1, \ldots, 2^w - 1\})$ of the exponentiation phase,

$$
R_{j(w+1)} = \left[ \alpha S_{j(w+1)} - 1 S'_0 + \beta U'_{j(w+1)} - S'_{j(w+1)} \right].
$$

Let $(r'_{2,1}, \ldots, r'_{2w-1}, r_{j(w+1))})$ be a corresponding realisation of extra reductions. Let us assume for the moment that we can draw samples $(s'_1, \ldots, s'_{2w-1}, i)$ and $(u'_2, \ldots, u'_{2w-1}, i)$ from (45) for $1 \leq i \leq N'$ which give rise to the extra reductions $(r'_{2,1}, \ldots, r'_{2w-1})$. For $N'$ sufficiently large (we used $N' := 10,000$ in our experiments), we obtain the approximation

$$
\Pr\left(R_{j(w+1)} = r_{j(w+1)} \mid R'_2 = r'_2, \ldots, R'_{2w-1} = r'_{2w-1}\right) \\
\approx \frac{1}{N'} \sum_{i=1}^{N'} \Pr\left(\theta_{j(w+1)} = r_{j(w+1)} \mid s'_{0,i} = r_{j(w+1)}\right) \quad \text{for all } \theta \in \{1, \ldots, 2^w - 1\},
$$

(46)
The mean number of errors is denoted by $R$ where Johannes Mittmann and Werner Schindler 33

large algorithm with on the multiplication by results in [Sch02a] and [Sch05], Section 6. There Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm

2 most (unknown) input bases independently at random. Again, we counted attacks with at rejection sampling to generate an RSA modulus with

ranges of attack is sensitive to the value of the experiment for 256 bit-size reductions never occur.

by the unknown input basis) have to be distinguished, which is easy because for reason is that in this case only the operations

easily be corrected by exhaustive search, beginning with the most plausible alternatives. Therefore, we re-sample the elements $s_1', s_2', u_1',...,u_w'$ from (45) giving rise to an extra

reduction vector $(r_2',...,r_w')$ can in principle be generated using rejection sampling. For $w \geq 3$, however, this is way too inefficient for aforementioned reasons. We therefore use an approach akin to Gibbs sampling. First, instead of generating the components of $(s_1',...,s_w')$ and $(u_1',...,u_w')$ independently and uniformly from $[0,1)$, we sample them adaptively in the order $s_1', s_2', u_1',...,s_w'-1, u_w'-1$, with each choice conditioned on the previous choices (when we reach a dead end, we start over). At this moment, the samples $(s_1',...,s_w')$ and $(u_1',...,u_w')$ give rise to $(r_2',...,r_w')$, but are biased and require some correction. Therefore, we re-sample the elements $s_1', s_2', u_1',...,s_w'-1, u_w'-1$ cyclically in this order, with each choice conditioned on the current values of the other variables. In our experiments, we used just 10 such rounds. The final values of $(s_1',...,s_w')$ are taken as the desired sample. For the next sample, we restart the whole process from the beginning. (Our experiments have shown that continuing the process from the previous sample may lead to a biased distribution.) Although this method is somewhat experimental, our experiments below demonstrate that it is sufficient for our attacks to work. Note that the time complexity of this approach is linear in $2^w$, while the complexity of rejection sampling is in general exponential in $2^w$.

For the first experiment we used the Diffie–Hellman group $	ext{dhe3072}$ defined in Appendix A.2 of RFC 7919 [Gil16] with 275-bit exponents (cf. Subsection 5.1). The 3072-bit modulus of this group has Barrett parameters $\alpha \approx 0.63$ and $\beta \approx 0.5$ for the base $b = 2$ we used. The results of the experiment are reported in Table 5. For each window size $w$ and sample size $N$ given in the table, we conducted 100 trials of the timing attack. For each trial, a 275-bit secret exponent and $N$ (unknown) input bases were chosen independently at random. We counted attacks with at most 2 errors as successful since one or two errors can easily be corrected by exhaustive search, beginning with the most plausible alternatives. The mean number of errors is denoted by $E$.

It can be observed that the attack is exceptionally efficient for window size $w = 1$. The reason is that in this case only the operations $\mathbb{H}_0$ (multiplication by 1) and $\mathbb{H}_1$ (multiplication by the unknown input basis) have to be distinguished, which is easy because for $\mathbb{H}_0$ extra reductions never occur.

For the second experiment we considered RSA without CRT with 512-bit moduli. We used Barrett’s multiplication algorithm with base $b = 2$ and $b = 2^8$, and RSA primes of bit-size 256. In this experiment we limited ourselves to window size $w = 4$. The results of the experiment for $b = 2$ are reported in Table 6 and for $b = 2^8$ in Table 7. Since the attack is sensitive to the value $\alpha$ of the modulus (‘signal’), we conducted trials for several ranges of $\alpha$. For each row of the table, we conducted 100 trials. For each trial, we used rejection sampling to generate an RSA modulus with $\alpha$ in the given interval and we chose $N$ (unknown) input bases independently at random. Again, we counted attacks with at most 2 errors as successful.

As in Subsection 5.1 the choice of 512-bit RSA moduli allows a comparison with the results in [Sch02a] and [Sch05], Section 6. There Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm was applied together with a slightly modified exponentiation algorithm, which resigned on the multiplication by 1 (resp. by Montgomery constant $R$) when a zero block of the exponent bits was processed. Even for large $\alpha$ the attack on Barrett’s multiplication algorithm with $b = 2$ is to some extent less efficient than the attack against Montgomery’s algorithm although there only one guessing error was allowed. In contrast, for $w = 8$ (and large $\alpha$) the success rates are similar to those for Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm.
Table 5: Local timing attack on Diffie–Hellman group dhe3072 with 275-bit secret exponents (base \( b = 2 \)).

| Window width \( w \) | Sample size \( N \) | Errors \( E \) (in %) | Success rate (in %) |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| 1                    | 6                | 6.03            | 9                 |
|                      | 8                | 2.33            | 64                |
|                      | 10               | 0.62            | 97                |
|                      | 12               | 0.23            | 100               |
| 2                    | 400              | 5.76            | 7                 |
|                      | 500              | 3.25            | 45                |
|                      | 600              | 2.19            | 59                |
|                      | 700              | 1.43            | 79                |
|                      | 800              | 0.92            | 94                |
|                      | 900              | 0.57            | 96                |
|                      | 1000             | 0.31            | 100               |
| 3                    | 500              | 6.14            | 6                 |
|                      | 600              | 3.78            | 26                |
|                      | 700              | 2.24            | 62                |
|                      | 800              | 1.74            | 74                |
|                      | 900              | 1.09            | 91                |
|                      | 1000             | 0.92            | 92                |
|                      | 1100             | 0.47            | 100               |
| 4                    | 600              | 5.26            | 7                 |
|                      | 800              | 2.35            | 55                |
|                      | 1000             | 0.93            | 89                |
|                      | 1200             | 0.50            | 98                |
|                      | 1400             | 0.24            | 100               |
| 5                    | 600              | 6.89            | 5                 |
|                      | 800              | 2.93            | 44                |
|                      | 1000             | 1.33            | 88                |
|                      | 1200             | 0.71            | 96                |
|                      | 1400             | 0.23            | 100               |

The results for \( ws > 8 \) should be alike because \( \beta \approx 0 \) in all cases.

For the local timing attack against RSA with CRT, the Barrett parameters \( \alpha_1, \beta_1, \alpha_2, \beta_2 \) of the unknown primes \( p_1, p_2 \) have to be estimated in a pre-step as outlined in Subsubsection 4.3.2. We successfully verified this procedure in experiments. Since the remaining part of the attack is equivalent to the local timing attack against RSA without CRT, we dispense with reporting additional results on the full attack against RSA with CRT.

A single decision by Decision Strategy 2 depends on the whole table initialisation phase but only on one Barrett operation within the exponentiation phase. For given parameters \( \alpha, \beta, w, b \) and \( N \) its error probability thus does not depend on the length of the exponent. Since the number of individual decisions increases linearly in the length of the exponent, for longer exponents the sample size \( N \) has to be raised to some extent to keep the expected number of guessing errors roughly constant. Table 5 to Table 7 underline that local timing attacks scale well when the exponent length increases. Consider \( w = 3 \) in Table 5, for instance: Increasing \( N \) from 1000 to 1400 reduces the error probability of single decisions to \( \approx 25\% \), which in turn implies that \( N = 1400 \) should lead to a similar success probability...
Table 6: Local timing attack on 512-bit RSA with window width $w = 4$ (base $b = 2$).

| Signal $\alpha$ | Sample size $N$ | Errors $E$ | Success rate (in %) |
|-----------------|-----------------|------------|---------------------|
| [0.4, 0.6]      | 1600            | 6.10       | 33                  |
|                 | 2000            | 3.75       | 46                  |
|                 | 2400            | 2.78       | 54                  |
|                 | 2800            | 1.93       | 67                  |
|                 | 3200            | 1.23       | 82                  |
|                 | 3600            | 1.14       | 84                  |
|                 | 4000            | 0.74       | 90                  |
|                 | 4400            | 0.49       | 95                  |
|                 | 4800            | 0.39       | 96                  |
| [0.6, 0.8]      | 800             | 4.11       | 36                  |
|                 | 1000            | 1.67       | 76                  |
|                 | 1200            | 0.84       | 90                  |
|                 | 1400            | 0.27       | 100                 |
| [0.8, 1.0]      | 500             | 3.80       | 29                  |
|                 | 600             | 1.84       | 77                  |
|                 | 700             | 0.79       | 95                  |
|                 | 800             | 0.35       | 99                  |

Table 7: Local timing attack on 512-bit RSA with window width $w = 4$ (base $b = 2^8$).

| Signal $\alpha$ | Sample size $N$ | Errors $E$ | Success rate (in %) |
|-----------------|-----------------|------------|---------------------|
| [0.4, 0.6]      | 800             | 3.25       | 44                  |
|                 | 1200            | 0.62       | 93                  |
| [0.6, 0.8]      | 600             | 1.47       | 84                  |
|                 | 800             | 0.23       | 100                 |
| [0.8, 1.0]      | 400             | 2.42       | 56                  |
|                 | 500             | 0.88       | 95                  |

for exponent length 1024 as $N = 1000$ for exponent length 275.

6 Countermeasures

In Section 4 we discussed several attack scenarios against Barrett’s multiplication algorithm. It has been pointed out that these attacks are rather similar to those when Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm is applied. Consequently, the same countermeasures apply.

The most rigorous countermeasure definitely is when all modular squarings and multiplications within a modular exponentiation need identical execution times. Obviously, then timing attacks and local timing attacks cannot work. Identical execution times could be achieved by inserting up to two dummy operations per Barrett multiplication if necessary. However, this should be done with care. A potential disadvantage of a dummy operation approach is that dummy operations might be identified by a power attack, and for software implementations on PCs the compiler might unnoticeably cancel the dummy operations if they are not properly implemented. It should be noted that for Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm a smarter approach exists: One may completely resign on extra reductions if not only $R > M$ but even $R > 4M$ for modulus $M$ [Wal02].
For Barrett’s multiplication algorithm a similar approach exists, see the variant of this algorithm presented in [Dhe98].

If constant execution times cannot be guaranteed (combinations of) blinding techniques may be applied. We note that state of the art (pure) timing attacks on RSA without CRT (or on DH) neither work against basis blinding nor against exponent blinding. While basis blinding suffices to protect RSA with CRT implementations against timing attacks, exponent blinding does not suffice. The attack from [Sch15, Sch16] can easily be transferred to Barrett’s multiplication algorithm. On the other hand sole basis blinding does not prevent local timing attacks as shown in Subsections 4.3 and 5.3.

If constant execution times cannot be achieved we propose to apply a combination of basis blinding and exponent blinding (and possibly of modulus blinding). State-of-the-art knowledge might be used to determine minimal countermeasures although we would recommend to stay on the safe side by avoiding timing differences completely and reliably or to apply several countermeasures at the same time.

7 Conclusion

We have thoroughly analysed the stochastic behaviour of Barrett’s multiplication algorithm when applied in modular exponentiation algorithms. Unlike Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm, Barrett’s algorithm does not only allow one but even two extra reductions, a feature, which increases the mathematical difficulties considerably. All known timing attacks and local timing attacks against Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm were adapted to Barrett’s multiplication algorithm, but specific features require additional attack substeps when RSA with CRT is attacked. Moreover, for timing attacks against RSA without CRT and against DH we developed an efficient look-ahead strategy. Extensive experiments confirmed our theoretical results. Fortunately, effective countermeasures exist.

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