Zero-Error Attacks and Detection Statistics in the Coherent One-Way Protocol for Quantum Cryptography

Cyril Branciard\textsuperscript{1}, Nicolas Gisin\textsuperscript{1}, Norbert Lütkenhaus\textsuperscript{2}, Valerio Scarani\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1} Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva; 20, rue de l'Ecole-de-Médecine, CH-1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland
\textsuperscript{2} Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo; 200 University Ave. W., Waterloo, ON Canada N2L 3G1

(August 6, 2018)

This is a study of the security of the Coherent One-Way (COW) protocol for quantum cryptography, proposed recently as a simple and fast experimental scheme. In the zero-error regime, the eavesdropper Eve can only take advantage of the losses in the transmission. We consider new attacks, based on unambiguous state discrimination, which perform better than the basic beamsplitting attack, but which can be detected by a careful analysis of the detection statistics. These results stress the importance of testing several statistical parameters in order to achieve higher rates of secret bits.

I. INTRODUCTION

First proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84 protocol, [1]), quantum cryptography has attracted a lot of attention, as means of realizing a useful task (key distribution for secret communication) based on the superposition principle of quantum physics. One of the features, that makes quantum cryptography appealing, is the possibility of implementing it with present-day technology. After several years devoted to more and more elaborated realizations of the BB84 protocol [2], people gained in confidence, and started devising new protocols that are tailored for practical implementations. A new class of such protocols are distributed phase reference schemes [3–5], where the signals have overall phase-relationships to each other which is expected to protect against some loss-related attacks, such as the photon-number splitting attack, in a similar way as the strong phase reference in the original Bennett 1992 (B92) protocol [6] does. These new protocols are providing new challenges for theorists, as we can no longer identify individual signals, and so the usual security proof techniques do not apply. It is important to understand how we prove the security, and the context of the present work is to show limitations of secure rates by showing specific attacks that can be performed by an eavesdropper.

In a protocol like BB84, each bit is coded in a qubit: Alice prepares a photon in a given state which codes (say) for 0 and sends it to Bob; then, she prepares another photon in another state which codes (say) for 1, and sends it, and so on. In short, each quantum signal codes for one bit. For this kind of protocols, powerful security proofs have been derived for the case where the quantum signal is a single photon [7–9] or a weak coherent pulse [10,11]. But one can also code a bit in the relative phase (Appendix B); we also present the detailed calculations that are tailored for practical implementations. A

...
II. THE COW PROTOCOL

A. The protocol

The idea of the COW protocol is to have a very simple data line in which the raw key is created, protected by the observation of quantum interferences in a monitoring line. We review here its features, referring to Refs [4,5] for a more comprehensive discussion of motivations and practical issues. The protocol is schematized in Fig. 1.

![Diagram of the COW protocol](image-url)

**FIG. 1.** Schematic description of the COW protocol. A continuous, phase-stabilized coherent laser beam is sent through an intensity modulator (IM) that shapes discrete pulses, while preserving the coherence. See text for all other details.

Alice produces a beam of equally spaced coherent pulses. The logical bit 0 is encoded in the sequence $|0\rangle_{2k} |\alpha\rangle_{2k-1}$ of a non-empty pulse at time $t_{2k-1}$ followed by an empty one at time $t_{2k}$; the logical bit 1 in the opposite sequence $|\alpha\rangle_{2k} |0\rangle_{2k-1}$. We write $\mu = |\alpha|^2$ the mean photon number in a non-empty pulse. Alice produces each bit value with probability $p = \frac{1}{2}$; with probability $f$, she sends out the decoy sequence $|d\rangle = |\alpha\rangle_{2k} |\alpha\rangle_{2k-1}$, which does not encode any bit value. The coherence time of Alice’s laser is very large, so that the quantum signal cannot be divided bitwise, because there is phase coherence between any two non-empty pulses. In other words, there is a single quantum signal, defined by Alice’s list, e.g.

\[ |\ldots0d01\ldots\rangle = |\ldots : 0\alpha : 0\alpha : 0\alpha : \alpha0 : 0\alpha : 0\rangle \]

(from now on, the colon represents the bit separation). The coherence across different bits is crucial to this scheme — a protocol that uses the same coding of bits, but in which there is no distributed coherence, is presented in Appendix A.

Alice and Bob are connected by a quantum channel of length $t$, whose transmission coefficient is $t = 10^{-\alpha_{att}L/10}$; the parameters $\alpha_{att}$, whose units are dB/km, is called attenuation coefficient.

Bob’s detection is completely passive. At the entrance of Bob’s device, an asymmetric coupler sends a fraction $t_B$ of the photons into the data line, and the remaining fraction $1 - t_B$ into the monitoring line. The data line consists of a single photon counter $D_B$: the logical bits 0 and 1 are discriminated by measuring the time of arrival (this gives indeed the best unambiguous state discrimination between the states $|0\rangle|\alpha\rangle$ and $|\alpha\rangle|0\rangle$). The errors on the data line give the quantum bit error rate (QBER, $Q$). The monitoring line contains a stabilized unbalanced interferometer and two photon counters $D_{M1}$, $D_{M2}$. In the interferometer, the delayed half of each pulse is recombined by the non-delayed half of the next pulse: if the two pulses were non-empty, the interference is arranged in such a way that $D_{M2}$ should never click. The cases where two successive pulses are non empty are (i) the decoy sequences, in which case the coherence is within the bit separation, and (ii) a logical bit 1 followed by a logical bit 0, in which case the coherence is across the bit separation. In each of these cases separately ($s = 0$ or $s = 1 - 0$), Alice and Bob can estimate the errors through the visibility $V_s = \frac{p(D_{M1}|s) - p(D_{M2}|s)}{p(D_{M1}|s) + p(D_{M2}|s)}$ where $p(D|s)$ is the probability that detector $D$ has fired at a time corresponding to a $s$ sequence.

For the estimation of the visibilities and of the counting statistics, Bob announces (i) in which two-pulse sequence he had a detection in the data line, and (ii) at which times he had a detection in $D_{M1}$ and $D_{M2}$. Alice tells Bob which items of the data line must be discarded because they correspond to decoy sequences; on her side, she estimates $V_d$ and $V_{10}$ and the counting statistics. Finally, $Q$ is estimated as usual by Bob revealing some of the bits of the data line.

The amount of information gathered by Eve is estimated through $Q$, $V_d$, $V_{10}$, but not only: the monitoring of other statistical quantities may provide much better estimates. Specifically, it is important to monitor detection rates, as we show in this paper. Finer checks could involve the monitoring of the frequency of each bit value and of many-bit strings, the rate at which any two or all three detectors fire, etc.

B. Detection statistics in the zero-error case

In this work, we consider only attacks that introduce no errors in the state parameters of the coding ($Q = 0$, $V = 1$), and that can therefore be detected only by looking at the statistics of the photon counters. Among the statistical parameters, we focus on detection rates. We suppose that all three Bob’s detectors have the same quantum efficiency $\eta$ and no dark counts. We also work in the trusted-device scenario, i.e. the inefficiency of the detector is not given to Eve. Under these assumptions, the expected detection rates are the following:

- In detector $D_B$, one can estimate the detections due to ”bits” and those due to ”decoy sequences”
(Detection rate per two time-slots):

\[ D_{B,\text{bit}}^t = (1 - f)(1 - e^{-\mu_t t_B n}) , \]
\[ D_{B,\text{decoy}}^t = 2 f (1 - e^{-\mu_t t_B n}) ; \]

of course, the total detection rate in this detector is

\[ D_B^t = D_{B,\text{bit}}^t + D_{B,\text{decoy}}^t . \]

- In detectors \( D_{M1} \) and \( D_{M2} \), one can estimate two different detection rates. (i) The detection rates at time \( t_2k \) correspond to interference between two pulses within a bit sequence. The logical bits produce random outcomes, while the decoy sequences interfere constructively in \( D_{M1} \) (recall \( V = 1 \)):

\[ D_{M1,2k}^t = (1 - f)D_{\text{rand}} + f D_{\text{int}} , \]
\[ D_{M2,2k}^t = (1 - f)D_{\text{rand}} \]

where \( D_{\text{rand}} = 1 - e^{-\mu t(1-t_B n)} \) and \( D_{\text{int}} = 1 - e^{-\mu t(1-t_B n)} \). (ii) The detection rates at time \( t_{2k+1} \) correspond to interference between two pulses across the bit separation. Constructive interference appears in \( D_{M1} \) in the cases \( 1 - 0, 1 - d, d - 0 \) and \( d - d \), i.e. with probability \((1 + f)^2/4\); in the case of \( 0 - 1 \) there is no photon, so no detection, in the other cases the outcome is random:

\[ D_{M1,2k+1}^t = \frac{1 - f^2}{2} D_{\text{rand}} + \frac{(1 + f)^2}{4} D_{\text{int}} , \]
\[ D_{M2,2k+1}^t = \frac{1 - f^2}{2} D_{\text{rand}} . \]

Now, since \( t_B \) has been calibrated by Bob, these six detection rates depend only on two parameters, namely \( f \) and \( x = e^{-\mu t} \). Bob can verify that the observed detection rates are consistent in themselves, and with the expected values of \( f \) and \( x \).

About other statistical quantities that can be checked by Alice and Bob: in the attacks that we consider below, the coincidence rates are not really a concern, the bit values are equally probable; but the many-bit statistics are somehow biased and may reveal the attacks.

C. Zero-error attacks

In the ideal situation that we consider (zero-error, i.e. \( Q = 0, V = 1 \)), the eavesdropper can take advantage only of the losses in the channel, whose transmission is \( t \). Here we characterize the full set of attacks that Eve can have performed, if Alice and Bob observe zero errors.

The simplest attack is beam-splitting (BS) attack: Eve simulates the lossy channel by extracting the \((1 - t)\) fraction of the signal with a beam-splitter, and sends the expected fraction \( t \) to Bob on a lossless line. Since a beam-splitter is strictly equivalent to losses, this attack is always possible and is impossible to detect by monitoring the data of Alice and Bob. Thus, this attack sets an obvious upper bound on the achievable secret key rate. We analyze it in detail in Appendix B, improving over the study of Ref. [5]. Though it is unavoidable, the BS attack is not very powerful: it would be a very good point for a protocol, if it could be shown that this attack is the only possible one in the absence of errors.

The BS attack is an example of attacks that preserve the mode, while possibly changing the statistics of the photon numbers; these attacks always belong to the class of zero-error attacks. In distributed phase reference schemes, each photon belongs to an extended mode that encodes the coherence. Specifically, in the case of differential phase shift, the mode is \( A^+ = \sum_{j=1}^N e^{i\phi_j} a_j^+ \) where \( a_j^+ \) creates a photon in the \( j \)-th pulse [12]. In the case of COW, the extended mode is

\[ A^+ \propto \sum_{k=1}^N a_{k,s_k}^+ \]

where \( s_k \in \{0, 1, d\} \) defines the nature of the \( k \)-th two-pulse sequence, and the creation operators are \( a_{k,0}^+ = a_{2k-1}^+, a_{k,1}^+ = a_{2k}^+, a_{k,d} = a_{2k-1}^+ + a_{2k}^+ \).

The attacks that preserve the extended mode would be the only zero-error attacks if Alice and Bob would check all the coherence relations. In the case of COW however, Alice and Bob check the coherence only on two successive pulses: in particular, no coherence is checked between all that comes before and all that comes after an empty pulse. Therefore, if Eve can be sure that a given pulse was empty, she can make an attack that breaks the coherence at the location of that pulse. More generally, Eve can try and distinguish a sequence of \( n \) pulses that begins and ends with an empty pulse: if she succeeds, she can then resend photons belonging to this \( n \)-slots mode ("partial mode"). All these attacks must use unambiguous state discrimination (USD). In this paper we study examples of such attacks.

The list of zero-error attacks is now complete. To see it, we note that any photon received from Bob is either one of the photons originally sent by Alice (which then belongs to the original extended mode), or a new photon created by Eve (in which case she must have known exactly in which partial mode to send it). In particular, the photon-number splitting (PNS) attack [13] is never a zero-error attack for the schemes under study [5,14]: since any two non-empty pulses are coherent, any attempt of measuring the number of photons on a finite number of pulses breaks some coherence and contributes to errors.
III. UNAMBIGUOUS STATE DISCRIMINATION ON THREE AND FOUR PULSES

A. Generalities

The attacks that we study are based on unambiguous state discrimination (USD). Suppose the set of possible states is known (cryptography is a natural example [15]): the unambiguous discrimination of any state $|\psi\rangle$ in the set is possible if and only if this state is linearly independent from all the other states in the set [16]. For the present study, we just need to identify one state $|\psi\rangle$ in the set; therefore, we consider measurements with only two outcomes: the unambiguous identification and the inconclusive outcome [17]. In this case, the optimal USD strategy is as follows: in the subspace formed by the states of the set, one selects $|\phi\rangle$ as the state orthogonal to all but $|\psi\rangle$, and performs the von Neumann measurement $\{P_{\perp} = |\phi\rangle\langle\phi|, P_\perp = I - P_{\perp}\}$. If the state was not $|\psi\rangle$, the result is certainly $\perp$; so if the result is $c$, the state was certainly $|\psi\rangle$. Given that the state is $|\psi\rangle$, the conclusive result $c$ happens with probability $p_c = |\langle\psi|\phi\rangle|^2$.

Specifically, Eve wants to discriminate a given finite sequence of pulses from all the other possible ones; the chosen sequence must be such that the first pulse and the last one are empty. When the result is conclusive, she can prepare and forward the same sequence to Bob; when the result is inconclusive, we suppose that she blocks everything (finer strategies are possible, but we neglect them [18]). By definition, such an attack leaves $Q = 0$ and $V = 1$, because Bob receives something only when Eve is sure to forward the same sequence as Alice sent, and because no observable coherence has been broken thanks to the empty pulses [19]. However, Eve introduces losses, because the conclusive result is only probabilistic; and, according to the state she actually discriminates and forwards, Bob’s statistics are also modified.

Our goal in what follows is to quantify the amount of information that Eve obtains and to analyze how Bob’s statistics are affected, for some examples of USD attacks on the COW protocol. Specifically, we are going to present three USD attacks. These three attacks can be alternated with one another without introducing errors. Eve can also avoid errors by stopping the USD attacks after a successful discrimination. However, she cannot avoid the risk of errors if she resumes the attack again. What she can do, is to attack large blocks, then to stop also for a large block, then resume and so on: this way, the events in which Eve risks introducing an error have almost zero statistical weight (in particular, they can be overwhelmed by dark counts and other imperfections, which are neglected here).

B. USD3: Attack on Three Pulses

The USD3 attack is defined as follows: Eve takes three pulses that come from Alice and wants to discriminate unambiguously the sequence $|00\alpha\rangle$ from the other possible three-pulses sequences. When the discrimination is successful, she forwards some photons (not necessarily a coherent state) in the central time-slot; when the result is not conclusive, she doesn’t forward anything. One can see immediately that this attack doesn’t introduce any errors in the data line, preserves the randomness of the bit value, and doesn’t make detector $D_{M2}$ of Bob’s monitoring click when it shouldn’t. The limitation of this attack is that Eve never forwards anything when Alice had sent two successive non empty pulses; so, if this attacks is performed systematically, Alice and Bob notice that no decoy sequences have been detected, nor do they have any data to estimate $V$.

1. Discriminating $|0\alpha0\rangle$

Eve wants to discriminate the state $|0\alpha0\rangle$ from the other possible states, which are the following:

$$|00\alpha\rangle, |0\alpha\alpha\rangle, |\alpha00\rangle, |\alpha\alpha\alpha\rangle. \quad (10)$$

Note that the sequence $|000\rangle$ is never sent by Alice. Moreover, the sequences $|0\alpha\alpha\rangle$ and $|\alpha00\rangle$ can be sent only if the bit separation is between the two empty pulses; given that Eve knows the position of the separation, she therefore has only to discriminate between $|0\alpha0\rangle$ and five other states.

For each case, the six possible states are linearly independent. As a consequence, there is a state in this 6-dimensional subspace which is orthogonal to the five other possible states: this state is (in both cases)

$$|\psi_{0\alpha0}\rangle = \frac{1}{1 - \chi^2}(|0\alpha0\rangle - \chi |0\alpha\alpha\rangle - \chi |\alpha00\rangle + \chi^2 |\alpha\alpha\alpha\rangle) \quad (11)$$

where $\chi = (0|\alpha)$ = $e^{-|\alpha|^2/2} = e^{-\mu/2}$. Eve performs a projective measurement which separates $|\psi_{0\alpha0}\rangle$ from the subspace orthogonal to it. Conditioned on the fact that the state $|0\alpha0\rangle$ was sent by Alice, the probability of a conclusive result is $|\langle 0\alpha0|\psi_{0\alpha0}\rangle|^2 = (1 - \chi^2)^2 = (1 - e^{-\mu})^2$.

2. Detection rates in COW for USD3

Let us compute the detection rates in Bob’s detectors when Eve performs the USD3 attack. Eve forwards something to Bob with probability

$$p_{\text{concl}}^{0\alpha0} = \left(\frac{1 - f}{2}\right)^2 (1 - e^{-\mu})^2. \quad (12)$$

We denote by $\Pi(p) = 1 - \langle (1 - p)^\infty \rangle$ the average detection probability of the state $|\xi\rangle$ that Eve forwards, as
a function of the single-photon probability detection \( p \).

In particular, \( \Pi(p) = p \) if Eve forwards a single photon, \( \Pi(p) \approx 1 \) if she forwards a bright pulse. The detection rates on the detector \( D_B \) are

\[
D_{B, \text{bit}}^{(3)} = \frac{2}{3} p_{\text{decoy}} \Pi \left( t_B \frac{\eta}{4} \right), \\
D_{B, \text{decoy}}^{(3)} = 0.
\]  

(13)

(14)

The factor \( \frac{2}{3} \) comes from the fact that we compute the detection rate per bit, i.e. for two time slots, while the attack was performed on three pulses. The detection rates on the monitoring line are just random clicks, since two successive pulses are never sent, and so we find

\[
D_{M_{1,2k}}^{(3)} = D_{M_{2,2k}}^{(3)} = D_{M_{1,2k+1}}^{(3)} = D_{M_{2,2k+1}}^{(3)} = \frac{2}{3} p_{\text{decoy}} \Pi \left( (1-t_B) \frac{\eta}{4} \right),
\]

where the factor \( \frac{1}{3} \) in the transmission probability comes from the fact that each photon has the "choice" between two paths in the interferometer, and the "choice" between two detectors.

C. USD4a: A First Attack on Four Pulses

The USD4a attack is defined as follows: Eve takes four pulses coming from Alice that correspond to two bits, and she wants to discriminate the sequence \( |0a : a0 \rangle \) from the other possible sequences. As before, when Eve successfully could discriminate this sequence, she forwards photons in the two middle time slots, making sure they will interfere correctly in Bob’s monitoring line, while when she couldn’t discriminate this sequence she doesn’t forward anything.

Again, this attack doesn’t introduce any bit error, and doesn’t make the detector \( D_{M2} \) click when it shouldn’t. Contrary to USD3, \( V \) can be estimated, but only from \( 1 \rightarrow 0 \) bit sequences: no decoy sequences are ever forwarded.

1. Discriminating \( |0a : a0 \rangle \)

Eve wants to discriminate the sequence \( |0a : a0 \rangle \) from the other possible following states that Alice could send:

\[
|0a : 0a \rangle, |0a : a0 \rangle, |a0 : 0a \rangle, |a0 : a0 \rangle, \\
|0a : aa \rangle, |aa : 0a \rangle, |aa : a0 \rangle, |aa : aa \rangle.
\]  

(16)

In the subspace defined by the nine possible states, the state which is orthogonal to the eight states listed in (16) is

\[
|\psi_{0a:a0} \rangle = \frac{1}{1-\chi^2} \left( |0a : a0 \rangle - \chi |0a : aa \rangle + \chi^2 |aa : a0 \rangle \right).
\]

(17)

Eve performs a projective measurement which separates \( |\psi_{0a:a0} \rangle \) from the subspace orthogonal to it. Conditioned on the fact that the state \( |0a : a0 \rangle \) was sent by Alice, the probability of a conclusive result is \( |\langle 0a : a0 |\psi_{0a:a0} \rangle|^2 = (1-\chi^2)^2 \). This is the same probability as obtained before, in the discrimination of three-pulse state \( |0a0 \rangle \).

2. Detection rates in COW for USD4a

Let us compute the detection rates in Bob’s detectors when Eve performs the USD4a attack. Eve forwards something to Bob with probability \( p_{\text{decoy}} \) which, as we just stressed, is given by (12). The detection rates on the detector \( D_B \) are

\[
D_{B, \text{bit}}^{(4a)} = \frac{1}{2} p_{\text{decoy}} \Pi \left( t_B \frac{\eta}{4} \right), \\
D_{B, \text{decoy}}^{(4a)} = 0.
\]  

(18)

(19)

The factor \( \frac{1}{2} \) comes from the fact that we compute the detection rate per bit, i.e. for two time slots, while the attack was performed on 4 pulses. We have also assumed that Bob’s detectors have no dead time [20].

The detection rates on the monitoring lines behave differently, according to the time. The detections at times \( t_{2k} \) are just random, since there are no decoy sequences and consequently no interference between pulses within a bit sequence:

\[
D_{M_{1,2k}}^{(4a)} = D_{M_{2,2k}}^{(4a)} = \frac{1}{2} p_{\text{decoy}} \Pi \left( (1-t_B) \frac{\eta}{4} \right).
\]

(20)

On the contrary, when Eve forwards something, there is always a coherence across the bit separation: therefore the detections at times \( t_{2k+1} \) exhibit full interference effects:

\[
D_{M_{1,2k+1}}^{(4a)} = \frac{1}{2} p_{\text{decoy}} \Pi \left( (1-t_B) \frac{\eta}{4} \right), \\
D_{M_{2,2k+1}}^{(4a)} = 0.
\]  

(21)

(22)

D. USD4b: A Second Attack on Four Pulses

The two attacks USD3 and USD4a share the same feature, namely, that no decoy sequences ever reach Bob. In order to pass as much unnoticed as possible, Eve could be obliged to alternate those attacks with another one, in which decoy sequences are sent. We consider the simplest one, in which Eve wants to discriminate \( |0 : a0 : 0 \rangle \) from the other possible sequences. Again, the colon represents the bit separation: contrary to USD4a, now the four pulses are across three bit sequences.

One realizes immediately that this is a curious attack: if performed systematically, Eve would forward only decoy sequences, so no raw key would be created! As we said, it is interesting to consider it only as a part of a more complex attack, in which Eve would alternate it with the attacks we have already presented.
1. Discriminating $|0: \alpha \alpha : 0\rangle$

One might expect that the probability of conclusive result is the same as before. But this is not the case: there are now more possible sequences, across the 3 bits, that Alice could send. Specifically, Eve wants to discriminate the sequence $|0: \alpha \alpha : 0\rangle$ from the following eleven states:

$$
\begin{align*}
|0 : 0\alpha : 0\rangle, |0 : \alpha 0 : 0\rangle, \\
|0 : \alpha \alpha : 0\rangle, |0 : \alpha 0 : \alpha\rangle, |0 : \alpha \alpha : \alpha\rangle, \\
|\alpha : 0\alpha : 0\rangle, |\alpha : 0 \alpha : \alpha\rangle, |\alpha : \alpha \alpha : 0\rangle, \\
|\alpha : 0 \alpha : \alpha\rangle, |\alpha : \alpha 0 : \alpha\rangle, |\alpha : \alpha \alpha : \alpha\rangle.
\end{align*}
$$

(23)

The state orthogonal to these eleven states is

$$
|\psi_{0: \alpha \alpha : 0}\rangle = \frac{(1 + \chi^2)\phi(\alpha \alpha) - \chi [\phi(0 \alpha) + \phi(\alpha 0)]}{\sqrt{1 - \chi^2}}
$$

(24)

where we have written

$$
\phi(X) = |0X0\rangle - \chi|0X\alpha\rangle - \chi|\alpha X0\rangle + \chi^2|\alpha X\alpha\rangle.
$$

(25)

Conditioned on the fact that the state $|0 : \alpha \alpha : 0\rangle$ was sent by Alice, the probability of a conclusive result is

$$
\frac{|\langle 0 : \alpha \alpha : 0 | \psi_{0: \alpha \alpha : 0} \rangle|^2}{|\langle 0 : \alpha \alpha : 0 | \psi_{0: \alpha \alpha : 0} \rangle|^2 + |\langle 0 : \alpha \alpha : 0 | \psi_{\alpha \alpha : \alpha} \rangle|^2} = \frac{(1 - \chi^2)^2}{1 + \chi^2}.
$$

Note that this is much smaller than the value $(1 - \chi^2)^2$ obtained in the previous examples: specifically, for $\mu \ll 1$, it goes as $\frac{1}{2}\mu^3$ (three photons) instead of $\mu^2$ (two photons).

2. Detection rates in COW for USD4b

Eve forwards something to Bob with probability

$$
P_{\text{concl}}^{0: \alpha \alpha : 0} = f \left(1 - \frac{f}{2}\right)^2 \frac{(1 - e^{-\mu})^3}{1 + e^{-\mu}}.
$$

(26)

The detection rates on the detector $D_B$ are

$$
D_B^{(4b)} = 0,
$$

(27)

$$
D_B^{(4b), \text{bit}} = \frac{1}{2} P_{\text{concl}}^{0: \alpha \alpha : 0} \Pi(t_B n)
$$

(28)

with the same factor $\frac{1}{2}$ as discussed for the USD4a attack. Detections in the monitoring line behave just the opposite way as they did for the USD4a attack:

$$
D^{(4b)}_{M1,2k} = \frac{1}{2} P_{\text{concl}}^{0: \alpha \alpha : 0} \Pi \left(1 - t_B \frac{n}{2}\right),
$$

(29)

$$
D^{(4b)}_{M2,2k} = 0;
$$

(30)

$$
D^{(4b)}_{M1,2k+1} = D^{(4b)}_{M2,2k+1} = \frac{1}{2} P_{\text{concl}}^{0: \alpha \alpha : 0} \Pi \left(1 - t_B \frac{n}{4}\right).
$$

(31)

In summary, there is an obvious symmetry between the USD4a and USD4b attacks. However, the fact that $P_{\text{concl}}^{0: \alpha \alpha : 0} < P_{\text{concl}}^{0: \alpha \alpha : 0}$ introduces an important difference. In fact, the need for sending some decoy sequences is very costly for Eve: she has to perform sometimes a very inefficient attack, which moreover gives her no information on the key (she knows that the decoy sequence was preceded by a bit 1 and followed by a bit 0, but she does not send anything to Bob apart from the decoy sequence itself, so these two bits cannot be detected).

IV. COMBINING THE THREE USD ATTACKS

In the previous Section, we have described an attack where Eve forwards "bits" (USD3), an attack where she forwards "coherence across the bit separation" (USD4a), and an attack which forwards "decoy sequences" (USD4b). These are zero-error attacks as far as the state parameters are concerned ($Q = 0$, $V = 1$), but each one taken separately introduces deviations from the expected detection rates. Here we show that, provided $f \lesssim 0.236$, Eve can alternate among the three attacks in order to simulate all the expected detection rates.

A. Definition of the attack

The attack that we consider (with no claim of optimality) is constructed as follows. Eve performs USD3 with probability $q_1$, USD4a with probability $q_2$, and USD4b with probability $q_3$. With probability $q_0$, she just forwards the pulses through a lossless channel ($t = 1$). Recall that Eve can alternate as she likes among the USD attacks, but she must not stop and resume them too often (see end of paragraph III A).

We suppose that this is all she does, so that

$$
q_0 + q_1 + q_2 + q_3 = 1.
$$

(32)

We want all detection rates to be the expected ones: the six rates $D = D_{B, \text{bit}}, D_{B, \text{decoy}}, D_{M1,2k}, D_{M2,2k}, D_{M1,2k+1} \text{ or } D_{M2,2k+1}$ must be such that

$$
q_0 D^{(1)} + q_1 D^{(3)} + q_2 D^{(4a)} + q_3 D^{(4b)} = D^t.
$$

(33)

We make two further assumptions, namely (i) that Eve forwards always a single photon when she has got a conclusive result [21], in particular then $\Pi(p) = p$; and (ii) that we can work in the limit $\mu n \ll 1$, so that we can linearize all the detection rates $D^t$. In this case, an analytical solution can be found (Appendix C), that reads

$$
q_0 = \frac{\mu F - 1}{\mu F - 1},
$$

(34)

$$
q_j = \frac{\mu (1 - t_j) F_j}{\mu F - 1} \quad (j = 1, 2, 3)
$$

(35)

where
This implies

\[ F_1 = \frac{3(1 - 4f - f^2)}{4p_{\text{cond}}^{\text{out}}} = \frac{3(1 - 4f - f^2)}{(1 - f)^2} \frac{1}{(1 - e^{-\mu})^2}, \quad (36) \]

\[ F_2 = \frac{(1 + f)^2}{p_{\text{cond}}^{\text{col}}} = 4 \left( \frac{1 + f}{1 - f} \right)^2 \frac{1}{(1 - e^{-\mu})^2}, \quad (37) \]

\[ F_3 = \frac{4f}{p_{\text{cond}}^{\text{concl}}} = \frac{16}{(1 - f)^2} \frac{1}{(1 - e^{-\mu})^3}, \quad (38) \]

\[ F = F_1 + F_2 + F_3 = \frac{32 - F(1 - e^{-\mu})}{(1 - f)^2} \quad (39) \]

with \( F = 9 + 4f - f^2 \). Note that, while \( F_2 \) and \( F_3 \) are always strictly positive, for \( F_1 \) to be non-negative one must have \( f \leq \sqrt{5} - 2 \approx 0.236 \): this means that Eve cannot reproduce the detection rates with this attack if a large fraction of decoy sequences is used.

### B. Upper Bound on the Secret Key Rate

We can now compute the secret key rate that can be extracted by Alice and Bob in the presence of the attack just described. We consider the case of one-way classical post-processing, and use the Csiszár-Körner formula [22]

\[ R = D_{B,\text{bit}}^t [I(A : B) - \min (I(A : E), I(B : E))] \quad (40) \]

where \( H \) is Shannon entropy, \( I(X : Y) \) is mutual information, and by definition of our attacks we have

\[ D_{B,\text{bit}}^t = q_0 D_{B,\text{bit}}^{t=1} + q_1 D_{B,\text{bit}}^{(3)} + q_2 D_{B,\text{bit}}^{(4a)} \quad (41) \]

The use of the Csiszár-Körner formula can be justified by an argument analog to the one used in Ref. [23]: the USD attack immediately gives a decomposition of the data into those on which Eve has full information (i.e. those on which the USD attack has been applied and has given conclusive result) and those on which Eve has no information at all (i.e. those that have been sent over the ideal channel). In this case, the Csiszár-Körner formula gives a tight bound if Alice and Bob were sure that Eve is performing exactly that attack; since this is not proved (there might be better attacks compatible with the observed statistics), the value of \( R \) that we compute is an upper bound on the secret key rate that can be extracted with one-way post-processing.

Now, on the one hand, since there are no errors in the state, whenever Bob detects something in \( D_B \) (other than a decoy sequence) he learns correctly Alice’s bit:

\[ I(A : B) = 1. \quad (42) \]

This implies \( I(A : E) = I(B : E) \). On the other hand, Eve has full information on the bits that she attacked and forwarded and were detected in \( D_B \), and she has no information in all the other cases:

\[ I(A : E) = \frac{q_1 D_{B,\text{bit}}^{(3)} + q_2 D_{B,\text{bit}}^{(4a)}}{D_{B,\text{bit}}} \quad (43) \]

This gives the expected results, namely that Alice and Bob have secrecy if and only if the bit was not attacked by Eve:

\[ R(\mu) = q_0 D_{B,\text{bit}}^{t=1} = \frac{\mu t F(\mu) - 1}{\mu F(\mu) - 1} \mu t \eta (1 - f) . \quad (44) \]

As usual, Alice and Bob choose the value of \( \mu \) that maximizes \( R \). Another meaningful parameter is \( \mu_{\text{max}} \), the critical value such that \( R = 0 \) (that is, \( q_0 = 0 \): Eve can perform her attack on all the bits). The calculation of \( \mu_{\text{opt}} \), \( R(\mu_{\text{opt}}) \) and \( \mu_{\text{max}} \) has been done numerically; the results are shown in Fig. 2. These parameters can also be estimated analytically in the limit \( \mu \ll 1 \), using \( F(\mu) \approx \frac{1}{(1 - f)^2} \frac{32}{\mu^2} \) and therefore \( q_0 \approx (1 - f)^2 \frac{1}{\mu^2} \); it yields

\[ \mu_{\text{opt}} \approx \frac{4 \sqrt{6}}{3(1 - f)} \sqrt{\ell}, \quad (45) \]

\[ R(\mu_{\text{opt}}) \approx \frac{8 \sqrt{6}}{9} t B \eta t^{3/2}, \quad (46) \]

\[ \mu_{\text{max}} \approx \sqrt{3} \mu_{\text{opt}}. \quad (47) \]

For long distances, these analytical estimation are in close agreement with the numerical optimization.

In Fig. 2, our attack is compared to the Holevo bound on the beam-splitting (BS) attack computed in Appendix B. As we can see in the lower graph, the BS attack is more powerful than ours for \( \ell \lesssim 100 \text{km} \); by referring to the upper graph, we note a discontinuity in \( \mu_{\text{opt}} \). This is due to the fact that we have not considered a mixture between our attack and the BS attack; if we had considered it, the transition between the two would have been smooth.
C. Comments on the result

We have described a specific attack, which introduces no errors in the state parameters, and which reproduces all the expected detection rates as well. Let’s comment on the results.

To the attack, as we have studied it, many limitations can be found. First, this attack is not a real concern as of today: in fact, it outperforms the BS attack only for $\ell > 100$km (Fig. 2), which is anyway the typical limiting distance when dark counts are taken into account [5]. Second, the attack is not entirely undetectable with the actual setup: even though all the detection rates are reproduced, one could check other statistical parameters, which would behave in an unexpected way. For instance, since decoy sequences are always forwarded in the form $|0 : \alpha \alpha : 0\rangle$, Alice and Bob can realize that the two pulses before a decoy sequence that they detect always encodes a logical bit 1, and the two pulses after the decoy sequence always encodes a logical bit 0. Finally, as seen in Sec. IV A, Alice and Bob could simply choose $f > 0.236$, and the attack that we studied becomes impossible.

A further interesting point is that the power of the attack can be further reduced by a hardware modification, which keeps the simplicity of the experimental realization: it simply amounts at adding empty decoy sequences. The idea is that, by adding a new kind of signal, the conclusive probability of USD become smaller, because Eve has to distinguish the desired state among a larger set. The analysis is done in Appendix E; the intuition is confirmed: by adding empty decoy sequences, we obtain a decrease $R(\mu_{opt}) \propto t^{4/3}$ [Eq. (46)] at long distances, which is slower than $R(\mu_{opt}) \propto t^{3/2}$ given in Eq. (46). Note that other hardware modifications would help as well, in particular adding interferometers that monitor coherence across more than one pulse; but these would make the experiment more complicated [24].

All these arguments can be made as an objection to the importance of our attack. However, that precise attack is only an example: there is no claim of optimality. There is some room for improvement even on USD strategies with three and four pulses [18], and we have not studied USD attacks on more than four pulses. Another concern is that we don’t have any estimate of the robustness of our result when the precision of the statistical estimates of Alice and Bob decreases. Here, we have worked without dark counts and in the limit of an infinite sequence: the presence of dark counts and the finite-size effects, obviously present in any real experiment, may blur the statistics. Eve’s attack may become much more serious if she is asked to guarantee only an approximation of the expected detection rates, or to reconstruct only a smaller set of statistical quantities. A simple example of what can happen if Alice and Bob do not make a careful enough statistical estimate is given in Appendix D.

FIG. 2. USD attack that reproduces the detection rates: optimal mean photon number $\mu_{opt}$ (upper graph) and corresponding secret key rate $R$ (lower graph) as a function of the Alice-Bob distance $\ell$. The attack is compared to the Holevo bound on the beam-splitting attack. Parameters: $\eta = 0.1$, $\alpha_{att} = 0.25$ dB/km, $f = 0.1$, $t_B \simeq 1$.

V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we have studied the security of the COW protocol in the regime of zero error in the state parameters ($Q = 0$, $V = 1$). In this regime, Eve can take advantage only of the losses; while the beam-splitting attack is always possible, because it preserves the collective mode in which all photons have been encoded, we addressed the existence of more powerful attacks.

We have indeed found examples of other zero-error attacks, which however introduce some modifications in the statistics observed by Bob. We have presented an attack that preserves all the detection rates and can be detected only by looking at correlations between two or more bits. This attack becomes relevant only for large distances ($\ell \gtrsim 100$ km for typical values).

These results show that, both in the experiment and in the theoretical search of lower bounds for security, higher secret key rates can be achieved if the COW protocol includes several tests of Bob’s statistics. We conjecture
that the beam-splitting attack is the only possible one in
the zero-error limit provided Alice and Bob analyze all
statistics of their data.

Acknowledgements

C.B. acknowledges hospitality in IQC Waterloo, where
part of this work was realized. We acknowledge financial
support from the European Project SECOQC and from
the Swiss NCCR “Quantum Photonics”.

Appendix A: Three-State Protocol

Here we describe a three-state protocol, that was in-
spired by the study of the COW protocol. If the cohe-
rence across the bit separations in COW would be bro-
ken, the protocol could be seen as a implementation with
weak coherent pulses of a standard three-state protocol
for qubits. The qubits states thus obtained are

\[
\begin{align*}
|+z\rangle &= |0\rangle \\
|-z\rangle &= |1\rangle \\
|+x\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle).
\end{align*}
\]

(A1)

Each state of the Z basis is sent with probability \((1 - f)/2\); it codes a bit value, and the errors in these mea-
surements give the quantum bit error rate (QBER) \(Q\).
The third state, belonging to the X basis, is sent with
probability \(f\); it allows to estimate a visibility \(V\).

In this appendix we give a quick overview of security
studies for this protocol, relying mainly on Ref. [9], to
which we refer for the justification of the methods. An
independent study of this three-state protocol has been re-
alized recently by Fung and Lo with different techniques
[25].

1. Single Photon Case

a. Quick Review of the Approach

In Ref. [9], a lower bound on the secret-key rate for a
general class of quantum key distribution protocols using
one-way classical post-processing has been derived. Re-
markably, the bound can be computed considering only
two-qubit density operators \(\sigma_{AB}\) [26]:

\[
\begin{align*}
\rho_{AB} &= \mathcal{E}(|\Psi_{AB}\rangle\langle\Psi_{AB}|) \\
&= \sum_j \mathbb{1}_A \otimes E_j |\Psi_{AB}\rangle\langle\Psi_{AB}| \mathbb{1}_A \otimes E_j^\dagger.
\end{align*}
\]

(A4)

After the public communication, Alice and Bob know
which systems led to bits of the key (when Alice ob-
tained either \(|0\rangle_A\) or \(|1\rangle_A\) and Bob measured in the Z
basis), and which systems came from decoy sequences
(with Alice obtained \(|D\rangle_A\) and Bob measured in the X
basis). They have 2 sets of systems in the states:

\[
\rho_{AB}^{\text{bit}} = (|0\rangle\langle 0| + |1\rangle\langle 1|)_{AB} \rho_{AB} (|0\rangle\langle 0| + |1\rangle\langle 1|)_{AB} \\
&= (1 - f) \sum_j \mathbb{1}_A \otimes E_j |\Phi_{AB}^+\rangle\langle\Phi_{AB}^+| \mathbb{1}_A \otimes E_j^\dagger
\]

(A5a)

\[
\rho_{AB}^{\text{decoy}} = |D\rangle\langle D|_A \rho_{AB} |D\rangle\langle D|_A \\
&= f \sum_j \mathbb{1}_A \otimes E_j |D, +x\rangle_A |D, +x\rangle_B \mathbb{1}_A \otimes E_j^\dagger.
\]

(A6)

We shall write \(\rho = \rho_{AB}^{\text{bit}} = \frac{1}{f - \rho_{AB}^{\text{decoy}}} \rho_{AB}^{\text{decoy}}\) the corresponding normalized states. Note that

\[
\sqrt{2} |D\rangle\langle +x|_A \otimes \mathbb{1}_B |\Phi_{AB}^+\rangle_B = |D\rangle_A |+ x\rangle_B
\]

and therefore

\[
\rho_{AB}^{\text{decoy}} = 2 |D\rangle\langle +x|_A \otimes \mathbb{1} \rho_{AB}^{\text{bit}} |+ x\rangle \otimes \mathbb{1}.
\]
c. Characterizing the set \( \Gamma_{Q,V} \)

The set \( \Gamma_{Q,V} \) contains any state of the form

\[
\sigma_{AB} = \lambda_1 P_{\Phi^+} + \lambda_2 P_{\Phi^-} + \lambda_3 P_{\Psi^+} + \lambda_4 P_{\Psi^-}
\]  

(A7)

where we use the notation \( P_\Phi = |\Phi\rangle \langle \Phi| \) for any state \( |\Phi\rangle \), where the \( |\Phi\rangle, |\Psi\rangle \) are the Bell states, and where

\[
\lambda_1 = \langle \Phi^+ | \rho | \Phi^+ \rangle, \quad \lambda_2 = \langle \Phi^- | \rho | \Phi^- \rangle, \\
\lambda_3 = \langle \Psi^+ | \rho | \Psi^+ \rangle, \quad \lambda_4 = \langle \Psi^- | \rho | \Psi^- \rangle.
\]  

(A8)

The first constraint is the definition of the QBER, the same for all protocols, namely

\[
Q = \lambda_3 + \lambda_4.
\]  

(A9)

The constraint that defines \( V \) is typical of this protocol. To derive it, we use the fact that the probability for decoy sequences to be detected correctly by Bob is \( \frac{1+V}{2} \):

\[
\frac{1 \pm V}{2} = (D| \otimes \langle \pm x | \rho^{\text{decy}}_{AB} | D \rangle \otimes | \pm x ) = 2 (\langle +x , \pm x | \rho | +x, \pm x ).
\]  

(A10)

Since \( | +x , +x \rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (| \Phi^+ \rangle + | \Psi^+ \rangle ) \), then

\[
\frac{1 + V}{2} = (\langle \Phi^+ | + \langle \Psi^+ | ) \rho (| \Phi^+ \rangle + | \Psi^+ \rangle ) = \lambda_1 + \lambda_3 + (\langle \Phi^+ | \rho | \Psi^+ \rangle + \text{c.c.}) .
\]  

(A11)

The Cauchy-Schwartz inequality implies \( | \langle \Phi^+ | \rho | \Psi^+ \rangle | \leq \sqrt{\lambda_1 \lambda_3} \), and therefore \( | \langle \Phi^+ | \rho | \Psi^+ \rangle + \langle \Psi^+ | \rho | \Phi^+ \rangle | \leq 2 \sqrt{\lambda_1 \lambda_3} \). We finally obtain the following constraint:

\[
(\sqrt{\lambda_3} - \sqrt{\lambda_3})^2 \leq \frac{1 + V}{2} \leq (\sqrt{\lambda_1} + \sqrt{\lambda_3})^2.
\]  

(A12)

Similarly, starting from \( \frac{1 - V}{2} \), one obtains

\[
(\sqrt{\lambda_2} - \sqrt{\lambda_3})^2 \leq \frac{1 - V}{2} \leq (\sqrt{\lambda_2} + \sqrt{\lambda_4})^2.
\]  

(A13)

For a state \( \sigma_{AB} \) to be in the set \( \Gamma_{Q,V} \), its coefficients \( \lambda \) therefore have to satisfy the constraints (A9), (A12) and (A13), along with the normalization condition

\[
\lambda_1 + \lambda_2 + \lambda_3 + \lambda_4 = 1.
\]  

d. Lower bound on the secret key rate

Now we have to compute the bound (A2). One can show that, given our constraints, the infimum of \( 1 - S(\sigma_{AB}) \) is obtained when

\[
\sqrt{\lambda_1} + \sqrt{\lambda_3} = \sqrt{\frac{1 + V}{2}} \\
\sqrt{\lambda_2} - \sqrt{\lambda_4} = \sqrt{\frac{1 - V}{2}}
\]  

(A14)

(A15)

These equalities, together with Eq. (A9) and the normalization condition, allow an analytical expression of the lower bound:

\[
r(Q,V) \geq 1 - H \left( [\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3, \lambda_4] \right)
\]  

(A16)

with

\[
\lambda_1 = (1 - Q) \left[ \frac{1+V}{2} - QV - \sqrt{(1-V^2)Q(1-Q)} \right],
\]

\[
\lambda_2 = (1 - Q) \left[ \frac{1+V}{2} + QV + \sqrt{(1-V^2)Q(1-Q)} \right],
\]

\[
\lambda_3 = Q \left[ \frac{1-V}{2} + QV + \sqrt{(1-V^2)Q(1-Q)} \right],
\]

\[
\lambda_4 = Q \left[ \frac{1+V}{2} - QV - \sqrt{(1-V^2)Q(1-Q)} \right]
\]

The results are plotted in Fig. 3. For all values of the parameters, the rates we find are equal or better than those found by Fung and Lo [25]; in particular, for \( V = 1 \) we find security up to \( Q \approx 11\% \), while they reach only up to \( Q \lesssim 7.57\% \) (see Fig. 2 of Ref. [25], where \( \alpha \equiv \frac{1-V}{2} \) and \( \epsilon_0 \equiv Q \)).

FIG. 3. Security study of the three-state protocol in a single-photon implementation. Upper graph: lower bound \( r \) as a function of \( Q \) and \( V \); lower graph: projection of the upper graph on the \( (Q, V) \) plane, showing the region of parameters in which the protocol is provably secure.
e. Special cases \( Q = 0, V = 1 \)

Let’s study the particular cases \( Q = 0 \) and \( V = 1 \). With the previous analysis, we find

\[
R(Q = 0, V) \geq 1 - \frac{1 - V}{2}, \quad (A17)
\]

\[
R(Q, V = 1) \geq 1 - 2h(Q) \quad (A18)
\]

where \( h \) is binary entropy. In particular, the second rate is the same as the one obtained for the BB84 protocol [7].

In these limiting cases, we have been able to compute a lower bound in a different way, namely using the Devetak-Winter bound for collective attacks [27] and then invoking a de Finetti theorem to extend the result to all possible attacks [8]. For the case \( Q = 0 \), we find exactly the same result; for the case \( V = 1 \) however, the lower bound calculated in this new way is slightly better. This is not a contradiction, as the method of Ref. [9] is not claimed to provide tight bounds in all circumstances.

2. Weak Coherent Pulses

a. Conservative Coherent Pulses

In our three-state protocol, exactly as it happens for BB84, as soon as a pulse contains two photons, Eve can obtain full information using the PNS attack. Therefore, all the pulses containing more than one photon are "tagged": it is as if they would carry a label which reveals the quantum state. Once one has a lower bound \( r \) in a single-photon implementation, a lower bound for implementations with weak coherent pulses can be computed using the techniques developed in Ref. [11].

Let \( \Delta \) be the fraction of tagged signals: on these, Eve has full information thanks to the tag. Eve’s best strategy consists in introducing no error on the tagged pulses, and a larger error \( Q_1 = \frac{Q}{1-\Delta} \) on the untagged ones, so that the total QBER is still \( Q \). A similar reasoning holds for \( V \): in Eve’s best strategy, the tagged pulses have \( V = 1 \), therefore the single photon pulses have \( V_1 = \frac{V-\Delta}{1-\Delta} \). These estimates have a bearing on privacy amplification, while error correction must be done for the average \( Q \). The achievable secret key rate is finally bounded as

\[
r \geq (1 - \Delta) S(Q_1, V_1) - h(Q) \quad (A19)
\]

where \( S(Q, V) = r(Q, V) - h(Q) \) and \( r(Q, V) \) is the single-photon lower bound of Eq. (A16). Finally, it is easy to compute the optimum value of \( \Delta \). In general, \( \Delta \) is the probability that Alice sends more than one photon, conditioned to the fact that Bob has received something. Clearly, the best case for Eve is that Bob always receives something when Alice has sent two or more photons. Therefore

\[
\Delta = \frac{1 - e^{-\mu} - \mu e^{-\mu}}{1 - e^{-\mu t \eta}} \approx \frac{\mu}{2 t \eta}, \quad (A20)
\]

Knowing this, one can now multiply \( r \) by Bob’s detection rate to obtain the secret key rate in bits per pair of pulses, then optimize \( \mu \) to maximize this quantity. Note that the lower bound (A19) is very conservative because it holds only for the untrusted-device scenario — this is why the denominator in (A20) contains \( \eta \) as well; it is not known how to prove a rigorous lower bound in the trusted-device scenario. (See also [28]).

b. PNS attack in the zero-error case

In the main text, we have presented zero-error attacks against the COW protocol in the trusted-device scenario. For comparison, we compute the PNS attack against the three-state protocol implemented with weak coherent pulses: we recall that in this protocol, contrary to COW, there is no coherence across the bit separation.

If \( Q = 0 \) and \( V = 1 \), we have \( I(A:B) = 1 \). Eve counts the number of photons in each two-pulse sequence corresponding to a bit: if she finds \( n = 1 \), she can either let the photon go or block it, but in any case she can’t learn anything; if she finds \( n > 1 \), she keeps some photons and sends the others to Bob, and she has full information. For the purpose of this simple analysis, we write everything in the case \( \mu \ll 1 \) (the generalization is straightforward but complicates the formulae). We have then \( I(A:E) = \frac{\mu}{2} \), the difference with (A20) coming from the fact that we can compute this upper bound in the trusted-device scenario. The rate per bit becomes

\[
R = \left(1 - \frac{\mu}{2t}\right) \mu t \eta (1 - f). \quad (A21)
\]

This expression is optimal for \( \mu_{\text{opt}} = t \), therefore

\[
R(\mu_{\text{opt}}) \approx \frac{t^2}{2} \mu t \eta (1 - f). \quad (A22)
\]

This scales as \( t^2 \), as it happens for BB84 under the same conditions [29]. This rate is much smaller than the upper bounds obtained in the main text for the COW protocol for the most powerful attacks described in this paper (Fig. 2). A better attack may exist against COW; however, we conjecture that this difference is intrinsic — in physical terms, we conjecture that the existence of coherence across the bit separation is a real advantage and increases the extractable secret key rates by a significant amount.
APPENDIX B: BEAM-SPLITTING ATTACK
AND DEVETAK-WINTER BOUND

The beam-splitting attack is the only known attack which will simulate exactly all statistics for Alice and Bob given a lossy channel, since it is a physical model for such a lossy channel. The fraction $1 - t$ of lost photons are given to Eve, who has forwarded the remaining fraction $t$ to Bob through a lossless channel. The information that Eve can extract from her data depends on the way she processes them. For each bit she wants to estimate, Eve faces the problem of distinguishing the two states $|0\alpha\rangle$ and $|\alpha\rangle$, where $\alpha = \sqrt{1 - f} \alpha$.

In Refs [4,5], it was supposed that Eve performed the same measurement as Bob: she measures the time of arrival for each pulse, which corresponds to the best unambiguous state discrimination between the two states $|0\alpha\rangle$ and $|\alpha\rangle$. With probability $1 - \langle \alpha | |0\alpha\rangle \rangle$, the result is conclusive and she gets full information on the bit. Her average information on each bit is then

$$I_{USD} = 1 - \langle \alpha | |0\alpha\rangle \rangle.$$

(B1)

However, there are other measurements that could give Eve more information. For instance, the minimum-error measurement [30] would give her the information

$$I_{ME} = 1 - h \left( \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{1 - \langle \alpha | |0\alpha\rangle \rangle^2} \right),$$

(B2)

which is larger than $I_{USD}$ ($h$ is the binary entropy function).

The USD and ME measurements are bitwise measurements, and define the so-called individual (or incoherent) attacks. More generally, Eve can be allowed to make a collective attack from beam-splitting: each signal is split with the same fraction, as above, but then Eve is allowed to wait until the end of classical post-processing (error correction, privacy amplification) before performing a (possibly coherent) measurement on the quantum systems she has kept. What Eve does may have to find (actually, to our knowledge, this is not known for any protocol); but a computable bound for the secret key rate that can be extracted in the presence of collective attacks has nevertheless been found by Devetak and Winter [27]. The upper bound on the accessible information that Eve can learn, whatever the measurement she performs, is given by the Holevo bound [31]. For the problem of distinguishing the two states $|0\alpha\rangle$ and $|\alpha\rangle$, the Holevo bound is [32]

$$\chi_{Hol} = h \left( \frac{1 - \langle \alpha | |0\alpha\rangle \rangle}{2} \right).$$

(B3)

The Devetak-Winter bound for the secret key rate reads then

$$R \geq (1 - f) \left( 1 - e^{-\mu t \beta} \right) (1 - \chi_{Hol})$$

(B4)

$$\geq (1 - f) \mu t \beta (1 - h \left( \frac{1 - e^{-\mu t \beta}}{2} \right))$$

(B5)

the second expression being for the case $\mu t \beta \eta \ll 1$.

As usual, Alice and Bob should choose $\mu$ in order to optimize $R$. Let’s define $g(x) = x [1 - h(\frac{1 - e^{-x}}{2})]$. Numerically, we find $\sup_x g(x) \equiv g(\xi) \approx 0.1428$, obtained for $\xi \approx 0.4583$. Therefore, the optimal value of $\mu$ in the case of a collective beam-splitting attack is

$$\mu_{opt} = \frac{\xi}{1 - t}$$

(B6)

and the corresponding lower bound on the extractable secret key rate is

$$R(\mu_{opt}) = g(\xi) \frac{t}{1 - t} t \beta \eta(1 - f).$$

(B7)

This is what we plotted in Figs 2 and 4 in comparison to our attacks.

APPENDIX C: ON THE ATTACK THAT REPRODUCES THE DETECTION RATES

We give here the calculation of $(q_0, q_1, q_2, q_3)$ that define the attack that reproduces the detection rates studied in Section IV, and comment on some of its features. We recall that we work in the limit $\mu \eta \ll 1$ and that we suppose that Eve sends one photon to Bob when she has got a conclusive result.

1. Calculation of the parameters $(q_0, q_1, q_2, q_3)$ of the attack

For $D_{B, bit}$ and $D_{B, decoy}$, the requirement (33) leads respectively to the following two conditions:

$$\mu(t - q_0) = \frac{2 q_1 p_{\text{cond}}^0 + \frac{1}{2} q_2 p_{\text{cond}}^0}{1 - f},$$

(C1)

$$\mu(t - q_0) = \frac{q_3 p_{\text{cond}}^0}{4 f}.$$ 

(C2)

Given these two conditions, the requirement (33) is automatically satisfied for $D_{M,j,2k}$ for both $j = 1, 2$. This is not astonishing, as these detection rates depend on $f$ in the same way as those of $D_B$ do. Finally, for the $D_{M,j,2k+1}$, the requirement (33) gives two new conditions:

$$\mu(t - q_0) = \frac{4 q_1 p_{\text{cond}}^0 + 2 q_2 p_{\text{cond}}^0 + q_3 p_{\text{cond}}^0}{(1 + f)(3 + f)},$$

$$\mu(t - q_0) = \frac{4 q_1 p_{\text{cond}}^0 + q_3 p_{\text{cond}}^0}{1 - f^2}.$$ 

It can be checked that one of these conditions is redundant, as it follows exactly from assuming the other one together with (C1) and (C2); as a third condition, we
take then a simple linear combination of the last two ones, which reads

\[
\mu(t - q_0) = \frac{q_2 \rho_{\text{concl}}^0}{(1 + f)^2}.
\]  

(C3)

In summary, we have four linear conditions [(C1), (C2), (C3) and the normalization (32)] for the four coefficients \(q_j\); the system can be solved exactly as a function of \(\mu\), \(t\) and \(f\).

The solution — whose result is given in the main text, Eqs (34)–(38) — goes as follows. For \(j = 1,2,3\), we have \(q_j = \mu(t - q_0)F_j\) where \(F_j\) can be read directly in Eq. (C3), \(F_3\) in Eq. (C2), and \(F_1 = 3(1 - 4f - f^2)/4\rho_{\text{concl}}^0\) can be derived from those and from Eq. (C1). The normalization condition (32) gives then \(q_0 = \frac{\mu F - 1}{\mu F - 1}\) with \(F = F_1 + F_2 + F_3\).

We must still verify that \(q_0\) is a probability. Since \(t < 1\), the condition \(q_0 \leq 1\) is satisfied provided \(\mu F > 1\), which is true for all values of \(\mu\) and \(f\) (in fact, it can be verified that the minimal value of \(\mu F\), obtained for \(\mu \approx 2\), is of the order 100, slightly dependent on \(f\) ). Given \(\mu F > 1\), the condition \(q_0 > 0\) is satisfied provided \(\mu F > 1\). To fulfill this condition, one must know how \(\mu\) varies with \(t\). Let’s consider first \(\mu_{\text{opt}}\) as defined in (45): then \(\mu F = 3(1-t)\), therefore the condition is satisfied for \(t \leq \frac{2}{3}\) (or with the parameters used for the graphs) \(t \gtrsim 7\text{km}\) — in practice, recall that (45) is valid for \(\mu \ll 1\) that is for \(t \ll 1\); so the result is consistent. If we take now \(\mu_{\text{opt}} = \sqrt{3}\mu_{\text{opt}}\), we find \(\mu F = 1-t\); the condition can never be satisfied. This is not really a problem: it simply means that Eve must add some losses, i.e. that we must add to her strategy the possibility of blocking pulses.

2. Behavior of \(q_1, q_2, q_3\)

In general, it holds \(F_3 > F_2 > F_1\), that is, \(q_3 > q_2 > q_1\), for all values of \(f\) and \(\mu\). The fact that \(q_3\) does not vanish (and remains even larger than \(q_1\) and \(q_2\) if \(f = 0\)) is an artefact of the solution of the system. In fact, the requirement on \(D_{B,\text{dec}y}t\) reads originally \(4f\mu(t - q_0) = q_3 \rho_{\text{concl}}^0\) if \(f > 0\), it gives (C2) as we stated it; but if \(f = 0\), the requirement is automatically satisfied and no constraint is put on \(q_3\) (the best choice for Eve would then be \(q_3 = 0\)). In any case, COW without decoy sequences would be much more vulnerable against Eve’s attacks [4,5], so the case \(f = 0\) is not of real interest. A more meaningful question is, what happens in the limit \(f \to 0\) for real implementations (blurred statistics, finite key length); but, as already mentioned, we haven’t developed the mathematical tools yet, which would allow to tackle this problem.

APPENDIX D: THE CONSEQUENCE OF POOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: AN EXAMPLE

Let us suppose that Alice and Bob verify \(Q = 0\), \(V = 1\) (without distinguishing decoy sequences from 1–0 bit sequences) and just the average detection rate \(D_B^t\). In particular, they don’t check that the fraction of decoy sequences is the expected one: Eve can set \(q_3 = 0\). As simple examples of the attacks that become possible, Eve can always attack with USD3 \((q_2 = 0)\) or with USD4a \((q_1 = 0)\).

USD3 attack. If \(q_2 = q_3 = 0\) and only the detection rate in \(D_B\) is monitored, the set of requirements (33) reduce to the sole condition \(q_1D_B^{(3)} + (1 - q_1)D_B^{t-1} = D_B^t\), i.e.

\[
q_1 = \frac{D_B^{t-1} - D_B^t}{D_B^{t-1} - D_B^{(3)}}.  \tag{D1}
\]

The secret key rate that can be extracted against such an attack is

\[
R = (1 - q_1)D_B^{t-1} = \frac{D_B^{t} - D_B^{(3)}}{D_B^{t-1} - D_B^{(3)}}D_B^{t-1}.  \tag{D2}
\]

The values of \(\mu_{\text{max}}, \mu_{\text{opt}}\) and \(R(\mu_{\text{opt}})\) can now be computed as a function of \(t\). Numerical solutions are plotted in Fig. 4, as a function of the distance. We have plotted two series of curves for our attack (describing the cases where Eve forwards either one photon or bright pulses) against the curve associated to the BS attack. Analytical solutions can be obtained in the limit \(\mu \ll 1\):

\[
\mu_{\text{max}} = C t, \quad \mu_{\text{opt}} = C t/2 \quad \text{and} \quad R(\mu_{\text{opt}}) = \frac{1}{4}t B_2 C t^2
\]

with \(C = [6(1 + f)t B_2]/[(1 - f)^2 II(t B_2)]\). Note that \(R(\mu_{\text{opt}}) \propto t^2\), whereas for the attack that preserves the detection rates we had the much slower decrease \(R(\mu_{\text{opt}}) \propto t^{3/2}\) [Eq. (46)].

USD4a attack. The analysis of the case \(q_1 = q_3 = 0\) follows exactly the same pattern, just replacing \(D_B^{(3)}\) with \(D_B^{(4)}\) — in fact, the only difference is the factor \(\frac{1}{2}\) which relates these two quantities, see Eqs (13) and (18). This attacks gives slightly better rates than those plotted in Fig. 4; in the case \(\mu \ll 1\), the analytical solutions for \(\mu_{\text{max}}, \mu_{\text{opt}}\) and \(R(\mu_{\text{opt}})\) are the same as before, with now \(C = [8(1 + f)t B_2]/[(1 - f)^2 II(t B_2)]\).
a new type of decoy sequence, which is just two empty pulses. In this modified COW, Alice sends an "empty decoy sequence" |00⟩ with probability $f_0$, and a "full decoy sequence" |αα⟩ with probability $f_1$. We will write $f = f_0 + f_1$. With probability $\frac{1-f}{f}$, Alice sends a logical bit 0 (resp. 1).

It may be at first sight astonishing, that additional vacuum signals may provide an advantage; still, this happens also in decoy state protocols [33]. In our case, the possibility of new signals (albeit empty ones) makes the unambiguous state discrimination that we have studied in Section III less efficient, because the set of possible states becomes larger.

1. Attack on 3 pulses

Eve wants to discriminate the state |00α0⟩ from the seven other possible states, which are now:

$$|00\rangle, |00\alpha\rangle, |0\alpha\rangle, |\alpha0\rangle, |\alpha\alpha\rangle, |\alpha\alpha\alpha\rangle.$$  

(E1)

Note that the previous state |ψ₀₀₀⟩ [Eq. (11)] is not orthogonal to |00⟩. Instead, the state orthogonal to the seven states listed in (E1) is

$$|ψ₀₀₀⟩ = \frac{\phi(α) - χφ(0)}{√1-χ^2}$$  

(E2)

where $\phi$ is given by Eq. (25). As before, Eve performs a projective measurement which separates |ψ₀₀₀⟩ from the subspace orthogonal to it. Conditioned on the fact that the state |00α⟩ was sent by Alice, the probability of a conclusive result is $|⟨00α|ψ₀₀₀⟩|^2 = (1-χ^2)^3 = (1-e^{-μ})^3$. This is smaller than the value $(1-e^{-μ})^2$ found in the absence of empty decoy sequences.

2. Attack on 4 pulses

Eve wants to discriminate the state |0αα0⟩ from the fifteen other possible states, which are now:

$$|0000⟩, |000\alpha⟩, |00\alpha0⟩, |00\alpha\alpha⟩, |0\alpha00⟩, |0\alpha0\alpha⟩, |0\alpha\alpha0⟩, |0\alpha\alpha\alpha⟩, |\alpha0\alpha0⟩, |\alpha0\alpha\alpha⟩, |\alpha0\alpha\alpha0⟩, |\alpha\alpha00⟩, |\alpha\alpha0\alpha⟩, |\alpha\alpha\alpha0⟩, |\alpha\alpha\alpha\alpha⟩.$$  

(E3)

Note that the analysis is the same for attacks USD4a and USD4b here, since all the sequences are possible.

The state orthogonal to these fifteen states is

$$|ψ₀α₀₀⟩ = \frac{\phi(αα) - χφ(0α) - χφ(α0) + χ^2φ(αα)}{1-χ^2}.$$  

(E4)

Conditioned on the fact that the state |0αα0⟩ was sent by Alice, the probability of a conclusive result is $|⟨0αα0|ψ₀α₀₀⟩|^2 = (1-χ^2)^4$. Again, the probability of

APPENDIX E: USD ATTACKS IN THE CASE OF "EMPTY DECOY SEQUENCES"

In this Appendix, we study a modification of the COW protocol, which makes it more robust against the attacks known to date (in particular, against the attacks studied in this paper), while keeping the simplicity at the experimental level. The modification consists in introducing
success is smaller than the probability of success $\left(1 - \frac{x^2}{2}\right)^3$ for the USD4b attack, and much smaller than the one $(1 - \chi^2)^2$ for the USD4a attack in the absence of empty decoy sequences.

3. Attack that preserves the detection rates

The study follows exactly the same lines as for the attack studied in Section IV and Appendix C. As we did there, we suppose that Eve performs one of the three USD attacks with probabilities $q_j$, or forwards the pulses through a lossless channel with probability $q_0$. The probabilities for each USD attack to be conclusive are the following:

$$p_{\text{concl}}^0 = \frac{1 - f}{2} \left( \frac{1 - f}{2} + f_0 \right) (1 - e^{-\mu})^3,$$  
(E5)

$$p_{\text{concl}}^{0:0} = \left( \frac{1 - f}{2} \right)^2 (1 - e^{-\mu})^4,$$  
(E6)

$$p_{\text{concl}}^{0:0} = f_1 \left( \frac{1 - f}{2} + f_0 \right)^2 (1 - e^{-\mu})^4.$$  
(E7)

Under the assumption that Eve forwards one photon when her attack is conclusive, and in the regime where $\mu \eta \ll 1$, one finds $q_j = \mu(t - q_0)F_j$ for $j = 1, 2, 3$, and $q_0 = \frac{\mu F - 1}{\mu F - 4}$, with now:

$$F_1 = \frac{3(1 - 4f_1 - (f_1 - f_0)^2)}{4\mu_{\text{concl}}^0},$$  
(E8)

$$F_2 = \frac{(1 - f_0 + f_1)^3}{\mu_{\text{concl}}^{0:0}}.$$  
(E9)

$$F_3 = \frac{4f_1}{\mu_{\text{concl}}},$$  
(E10)

$$F = F_1 + F_2 + F_3.$$  
(E11)

Apart from the obvious restriction $f_0 + f_1 \leq 1$, since $F_1$ has to be positive there is a restriction on the values of $f_0$ and $f_1$ for this attack to be possible: $f_1 \leq \min\left(\frac{1}{4}, -2 + f_0 + \sqrt{5 - 4f_0}\right)$.

The upper bound on the extractable secret key rate is

$$R(\mu) = q_0 D_{\text{bi},\text{bi}}^{0:0:0} = q_0 \mu t_B \eta (1 - f).$$  
(E12)

In the limit $\mu \ll 1$, the optimization of $R$ can be done analytically, using $F(\mu) \approx \frac{4F}{\mu \pi}$ with $F = \frac{(1 + f_0 - f)^2}{(1 - f_1 - f_0)^2} + \frac{(1 - f_1 + f_0)^2}{(1 - f_1 + f_0)^2}$ and $q_0 \approx t \frac{F}{F}$. In order to optimize $R$, Alice and Bob will choose

$$\mu_{\text{opt}} \approx F^{1/3} t^{1/3}$$  
(E13)

and obtain the rate

$$R(\mu_{\text{opt}}) \approx \frac{3F^{1/3}}{4} t_B \eta (1 - f) t^{1/3}.$$  
(E14)

Note that now, $\mu_{\text{opt}} \propto t^{1/3}$ and $R(\mu_{\text{opt}}) \propto t^{4/3}$: the new protocol with empty decoy sequences is more robust against our USD attacks. Besides, one gets $\mu_{\text{max}} = 4^{1/3} \mu_{\text{opt}}$.

In general, the optimization of $R$ over $\mu$ must be done numerically. We show the results in Fig. 5 for the same parameters as we used for Fig. 2, but here $f = 0.1$ is split into $f_0 = f_1 = 0.05$. We see that, in the presence of empty decoy sequences, the USD attack reproduces all rates overcomes the beam-splitting attack only for $\ell \gtrsim 120$km.

FIG. 5. USD attack that reproduces the detection rates, on the COW protocol, with and without empty decoy sequences, compared to the Holevo bound on the BS attack. Same parameters as in Fig. 2, and $f_0 = f_1 = 0.05$.

[1] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, in Proceedings IEEE Int. Conf. on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984), pp. 175-179.
If Bob’s detectors have a dead time, the analysis of USD4a is more subtle, because the first non-empty pulse can be detected with the probability we have written in the main text; but the following pulse can be detected only if the first one has not been detected. This may introduce an asymmetry: the logical bit 1 may be detected more often than the logical bit 0. In the extreme case of bright pulses, the first non-empty pulse always triggers the detector, therefore only the logical bit 1 is detected. In the other extreme case, where Eve sends out a single photon, there is no asymmetry, because only one detection can take place.

Of course, the fact that Eve forwards always a single photon can be verified by the absence of the expected coincidence counts in two or three of Bob’s detectors. But this is not a serious concern: the probability of coincidence is small, and we can easily suppose that Eve sends sometimes a brighter pulse when she has a conclusive result in USD3. If she does so, she can reproduce the coincidence rates. Alice and Bob could still detect this attack by checking if the cases of coincidences are equally distributed among all possible bit and decoy sequences; but it is pointless to make such a detailed analysis here. Finally note that it may be advantageous for Eve to send other states that a single-photon state, for instance vacuum-subtracted coherent states.

This is after Alice and Bob applied a random permutation on their qubit pairs and random bit-flip operations, and assuming they apply optimal error correction and privacy amplification. See [9] for details. Note that we don’t consider here the possible classical “preprocessing” $A' \leftarrow A$.

The Holevo bound is computed here for the task of bit-wise distinguishing the states. One can check that the discrimination was inconclusive. Such are in particular the USD attacks as defined in [15].

The inconclusive result is a projection onto a subspace. If in this subspace there are still pulse sequences that are linearly independent from all the others (as is the case in particular for the USD attacks under study in this paper), each of these sequences could then in turn be unambiguously discriminated with some probability.

Note that this attack is not possible on the differential phase shift protocol [3] because there no empty pulses are used. But other USD attacks are possible, as studied in: M. Curty et al., quant-ph/0609094

If Bob’s detectors have a dead time, the analysis of USD4a is more subtle, because the first non-empty pulse can be detected with the probability we have written in the main text; but the following pulse can be detected only if the first one has not been detected. This may introduce an asymmetry: the logical bit 1 may be detected more often than the logical bit 0. In the extreme case of...