Mailbox Types for Unordered Interactions

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Abstract

We propose a type system for reasoning on protocol conformance and deadlock freedom in networks of processes that communicate through unordered mailboxes. We model these networks in the mailbox calculus, a mild extension of the asynchronous π-calculus with first-class mailboxes and selective input. The calculus subsumes the actor model and allows us to analyze networks with dynamic topologies and varying number of processes possibly mixing different concurrency abstractions. Well-typed processes are deadlock free and never fail because of unexpected messages. For a non-trivial class of them, junk freedom is also guaranteed. We illustrate the expressiveness of the calculus and of the type system by encoding instances of non-uniform, concurrent objects, binary sessions extended with joins and forks, and some known actor benchmarks.

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1 Introduction

Message passing is a key mechanism used to coordinate concurrent processes. The order in which a process consumes messages may coincide with the order in which they arrive at destination (ordered processing) or may depend on some intrinsic property of the messages themselves, such as their priority, their tag, or the shape of their content (out-of-order or selective processing). Ordered message processing is common in networks of processes connected by point-to-point channels. Out-of-order message processing is common in networks of processes using mailboxes, into which processes concurrently store messages and from which one process selectively receives messages. This communication model is typically found in the various implementations of actors [22, 1] such as Erlang [3], Scala and Akka actors [21], CAF [5] and Kilim [45]. Non-uniform, concurrent objects [43, 41, 14] are also examples of out-of-order message processors. For example, a busy lock postpones the processing of any acquire message until it is released by its current owner. Out-of-order message processing adds further complexity to the challenging task of concurrent and parallel application development: storing a message into the wrong mailbox or at the wrong time, forgetting a message in a mailbox, or relying on the presence of a particular message that is not guaranteed to be found in a mailbox are programming mistakes that are easy to do and hard to detect without adequate support from the language and its development tools.

The Scala actor in Listing 1, taken from the Savina benchmark suite [27], allows us to illustrate some of the subtle pitfalls that programmers must carefully avoid when dealing with out-of-order message processing. The process method matches messages found in the actor’s mailbox according to their type. If a message of type DebitMessage is found, then balance is incremented by the deposited amount and the actor requesting the operation
is notified with a `ReplyMessage` (lines 5–8). If a message of type `CreditMessage` is found, `balance` is decremented by the amount that is transferred to `recipient` (lines 9–13). Since the operation is meant to be atomic, the actor temporarily changes its behavior and waits for a `ReplyMessage` from `recipient` signalling that the transfer is complete, before notifying `sender` in turn (lines 14–17). A message of type `StopMessage` terminates the actor (line 18).

Note how the correct execution of this code depends on some key assumptions:

- `ReplyMessage` should be stored in the actor’s mailbox only when the actor is involved in a transaction, or else the message would trigger the “catch all” clause that throws a “unsupported message” exception (lines 19–21).
- No debit or credit message should be in the actor’s mailbox by the time it receives `StopMessage`, or else some critical operations affecting the balance would not be performed.
- Two distinct accounts should not try to simultaneously initiate a transaction with each other. If this were allowed, each account could consume the credit message found in its own mailbox and then deadlock waiting for a reply from the other account (lines 14–17).

Static analysis techniques that certify the validity of assumptions like these can be valuable for developers. For example, session types [23] have proved to be an effective formalism for the enforcement of communication protocols and have been applied to a variety of programming paradigms and languages [2], including those based on mailbox communications [35, 7, 16, 37]. However, session types are specifically designed to address point-to-point, ordered interactions over channels [23]. Retrofitting them to a substantially different communication model calls for some inevitable compromises on the network topologies that can be addressed and forces programmers to give up some of the flexibility offered by unordered message processing.

Another aspect that complicates the analysis of actor systems is that the pure actor model...
as it has been originally conceived \cite{22} does not accurately reflect the actual practice of actor programming. In the pure actor model, each actor owns a single mailbox and the only synchronization mechanism is message reception from such mailbox. However, it is a known fact that the implementation of complex coordination protocols in the pure actor model is challenging \cite{47,46,28,9}. These difficulties have led programmers to mix the actor model with different concurrency abstractions \cite{26,46}, to extend actors with controlled forms of synchronization \cite{47} and to consider actors with multiple/first-class mailboxes \cite{20,28,9}. In fact, popular implementations of the actor model feature disguised instances of multiple/first-class mailbox usage, even if they are not explicitly presented as such: in Akka, the messages that an actor is unable to process immediately can be temporarily stashed into a different mailbox \cite{20}; in Erlang, hot code swapping implies transferring at runtime the input capability on a mailbox from a piece of code to a different one \cite{3}.

In summary, there is still a considerable gap between the scope of available approaches used to analyze mailbox-based communicating systems and the array of features used in programming these systems. To help narrowing this gap, we make the following contributions:

- We introduce mailbox types, a new kind of behavioral types with a simple and intuitive semantics embodying the unordered nature of mailboxes. Mailbox types allow us to describe mailboxes subject to selective message processing as well as mailboxes concurrently accessed by several processes. Incidentally, mailbox types also provide precise information on the size and reachability of mailboxes that may lead to valuable code optimizations.

- We develop a mailbox type system for the mailbox calculus, a mild extension of the asynchronous $\pi$-calculus \cite{44} featuring tagged messages, selective inputs and first-class mailboxes. The mailbox calculus allows us to address a broad range of systems with dynamic topology and varying number of processes possibly using a mixture of concurrency models (including multi-mailbox actors) and abstractions (such as locks and futures).

- We prove three main properties of well-typed processes: the absence of failures due to unexpected messages (mailbox conformance); the absence of pending activities and messages in irreducible processes (deadlock freedom); for a non-trivial class of processes, the guarantee that every message can be eventually consumed (junk freedom).

- We illustrate the expressiveness of mailbox types by presenting well-typed encodings of known concurrent objects (locks and futures) and actor benchmarks (atomic transactions and master-workers parallelism) and of binary sessions extended with forks and joins. In discussing these examples, we emphasize the impact of out-of-order message processing and of first-class mailboxes.

\textbf{Structure of the paper.} We start from the definition of the mailbox calculus and of the properties we expect from well-typed processes (Section 2). We introduce mailbox types (Section 3.1) and dependency graphs (Section 3.2) for tracking mailbox dependencies in processes that use more than one. Then, we present the typing rules (Section 3.3) and the soundness results of the type system (Section 3.4). In the latter part of the paper, we discuss a few more complex examples (Section 4), related work (Section 5) and ideas for further developments (Section 6). Additional definitions and proofs can be found in Appendices A–D.

\section{The Mailbox Calculus}

We assume given an infinite set of variables $x, y$, an infinite set of mailbox names $a, b$, a set of tags $m$ and a finite set of process variables $X$. We let $u, v$ range over variables and mailbox names without distinction. Throughout the paper we write $\bar{r}$ for possibly empty sequences
The term $e$ extends dynamically. The reduction relation the order of mailbox restrictions is irrelevant and the scope of a mailbox may shrink or and process compositions, with bound names of a process that all actions in the same guard refer to the same mailbox arguments. A compound guard an $m$ is empty and then continues as from mailbox represents the process that fails with an error for having received an unexpected message the form $\{u_1, \ldots, u_n\}$ of various entities. For example, $\pi$ stands for a sequence $u_1, \ldots, u_n$ of names and $\{\pi\}$ for the corresponding set.

The syntax of the mailbox calculus is shown in Table 1. The term $\text{done}$ represents the terminated process that performs no action. The term $u!m[\pi]$ represents a message stored in mailbox $u$. The message has tag $m$ and arguments $\pi$. The term $P \parallel Q$ represents the parallel composition of $P$ and $Q$ and $(\nu a)P$ represents a restricted mailbox $a$ with scope $P$. The term $X[\pi]$ represents the invocation of the process named $X$ with parameters $\pi$. For each process variable $X$ we assume that there is a corresponding global process definition of the form $X(\pi) \triangleq P$. A guarded process $G$ is a composition of actions. The action $\text{fail } u$ represents the process that fails with an error for having received an unexpected message from mailbox $u$. The action $\text{free } u \cdot P$ represents the process that deletes the mailbox $u$ if it is empty and then continues as $P$. The action $u?m(\pi).P$ represents the process that receives an $m$-tagged message from mailbox $u$ then continues as $P$ with $\pi$ replaced by the message’s arguments. A compound guard $G + H$ offers all the actions offered by $G$ and $H$. We assume that all actions in the same guard refer to the same mailbox $u$. The notions of free and bound names of a process $P$ are standard and respectively denoted by $\text{fn}(P)$ and $\text{bn}(P)$.

The operational semantics of the mailbox calculus is mostly conventional. We use the structural congruence relation $\equiv$ defined below to rearrange equivalent processes:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{fail } a + G & \equiv G \\
\text{done } \parallel P & \equiv P \\
G + H & \equiv H + G \\
G + (H + H') & \equiv (G + H) + H' \\
P \parallel Q & \equiv Q \parallel P \\
(P \parallel Q) \parallel R & \equiv (P \parallel Q) \parallel R \\
(\nu a)(\nu b)P & \equiv (\nu b)(\nu a)P \\
(\nu a)P \parallel Q & \equiv (\nu a)(P \parallel Q) & \text{if } a \not\in \text{fn}(Q)
\end{align*}
\]

Structural congruence captures the usual commutativity and associativity laws of action and process compositions, with $\text{fail }$ and $\text{done}$ acting as the respective units. Additionally, the order of mailbox restrictions is irrelevant and the scope of a mailbox may shrink or extend dynamically. The reduction relation $\rightarrow$ is inductively defined by the rules

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[r-read]} & \quad a!m[\pi] \parallel a?m(\pi).P + G \rightarrow P[\pi/\pi] \\
\text{[r-free]} & \quad (\nu a)(\text{free } a \cdot P + G) \rightarrow P \\
\text{[r-def]} & \quad X[\pi] \rightarrow P[\pi/\pi] & \text{if } X(\pi) \triangleq P \\
\text{[r-par]} & \quad P \parallel R \rightarrow Q \parallel R & \text{if } P \rightarrow Q \\
\text{[r-new]} & \quad (\nu a)P \rightarrow (\nu a)Q & \text{if } P \rightarrow Q \\
\text{[r-struct]} & \quad P \rightarrow Q & \text{if } P \equiv P' \rightarrow Q' \equiv Q
\end{align*}
\]
where $P[r/x]$ denotes the usual capture-avoiding replacement of the variables $x$ with the
mailbox names $r$. Rule [b-read] models the selective reception of an $m$-tagged message from
mailbox $a$, which erases all the other actions of the guard. Rule [b-free] is triggered when the
process is ready to delete the empty mailbox $a$ and no more messages can be stored in $a$
because there are no other processes in the scope of $a$. Rule [b-def] models a process invocation
by replacing the process variable $X$ with the corresponding definition. Finally, rules [r-par]
and [r-struct] close reductions under parallel compositions, name restrictions and
structural congruence. We write $\rightarrow^*$ for the reflexive and transitive closure of $\rightarrow$, we write
$P \rightarrow^* Q$ if not $P \rightarrow^* Q$ and $P \Rightarrow$ if $P \rightarrow Q$ for all $Q$.

Hereafter, we will occasionally use numbers and conditionals in processes. These and
other features can be either encoded or added to the calculus without difficulties.

**Example 1 (lock).** In this example we model a lock as a process that waits for messages
from a self mailbox in which acquisition and release requests are stored. The lock is either
free or busy. When in state free, the lock nondeterministically consumes an acquire message
from self. This message indicates the willingness to acquire the lock by another process and
carries a reference to a mailbox into which the lock stores a reply notification. When in
state busy, the lock waits for a release message indicating that it is being released:

$$\begin{align*}
\text{FreeLock}(\text{self}) & \triangleq \text{free self}.\text{done} \\
& + \text{self?acquire(}\text{owner})\cdot\text{BusyLock(}\text{self, owner}) \\
& + \text{self?release.fail self} \\
\text{BusyLock}(\text{self, owner}) & \triangleq \text{owner!reply[}\text{self}\text{] | self?release.}\text{FreeLock[}\text{self}] \\
\end{align*}$$

Note the presence of the free self guard in the definition of FreeLock and the lack thereof in
BusyLock. In the former case, the lock manifests the possibility that no process is willing
to acquire the lock, in which case it deletes the mailbox and terminates. In the latter case,
the lock manifests its expectation to be eventually released by its current owner. Also note that
FreeLock fails if it receives a release message. In this way, the lock manifests the fact
that it can be released only if it is currently owned by a process. A system where two users
alice and carol compete for acquiring lock can be modeled as the process

$$(vlock)(valice)(\nu\text{carol})(\text{FreeLock[lock]} | \text{User[alice, lock] | User[carol, lock]})$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where

$$\text{User(}\text{self, lock}) \triangleq \text{lock!acquire[}\text{self}\text{] | self?reply(l).}(l!\text{release | free self}.\text{done})$$

Note that User uses the reference $l$ – as opposed to lock – to release the acquired lock.
As we will see in Section 3.3 this is due to the fact that it is this particular reference to the
lock’s mailbox – and not lock itself – that carries the capability to release the lock.

**Example 2 (future variable).** A future variable is a one-place buffer that stores the result
of an asynchronous computation. The content of the future variable is set once and for all by
the producer once the computation completes. This phase is sometimes called resolution of
the future variable. After the future variable has been resolved, its content can be retrieved
any number of times by the consumers. If a consumer attempts to retrieve the content of the
future variable beforehand, the consumer suspends until the variable is resolved. We can
model a future variable thus:

$$\begin{align*}
\text{Future(}\text{self}) & \triangleq \text{self?resolve(x).Present[}\text{self, x}] \\
\text{Present(}\text{self, x}) & \triangleq \text{free self}.\text{done} \\
& + \text{self?get(}\text{sender}.)(\text{sender!reply[x] | Present[}\text{self, x}] + \text{self?resolve.fail self}
\end{align*}$$
The process `Future` represents an unresolved future variable, which waits for a `resolve` message from the producer. Once the variable has been resolved, it behaves as specified by `Present`, namely it satisfies an arbitrary number of `get` messages from consumers but it no longer accepts `resolve` messages.

- **Example 3 (bank account).** Below we see the process definition corresponding to the actor shown in Listing 1. The structure of the term follows closely that of the Scala code:

```
Account (self, balance) ≜
  self?debit (amount, sender).
  sender!reply | Account [self, balance + amount]
  + self?credit (amount, recipient, sender).
  recipient!debit [amount, self] |
  self?reply, (sender!reply | Account [self, balance + amount])
  + self?stop.free self .done
  + self?reply .fail self
```

The last term of the guarded process, which results in a failure, corresponds to the catch-all clause in Listing 1 and models the fact that a `reply` message is not expected to be found in the account’s mailbox unless the account is involved in a transaction. The `reply` message is received and handled appropriately in the `credit`-guarded term.

We can model a deadlock in the case two distinct bank accounts attempt to initiate a transaction with one another. Indeed, we have

```
Account [alice, 10] | alice!credit [2, carol, bank] | → ... | carol!debit [2, alice] | alice?reply ... |
Account [carol, 15] | carol!credit [5, alice, bank] → ... | alice!debit [5, carol] | carol?reply ...
```

where both `alice` and `carol` ignore the incoming `debit` messages, whence the deadlock.

We now provide operational characterizations of the properties enforced by our typing discipline. We begin with mailbox conformance, namely the property that a process never fails because of unexpected messages. To this aim, we define a process context `C` as a process where there is a single occurrence of an unguarded hole `[ ];`

```
C ::= [ ] | C | P | P | C | (νa)C
```

The hole is “unguarded” in the sense that it does not occur prefixed by an action. As usual, we write `C[P]` for the process obtained by replacing the hole in `C` with `P`. Names may be captured by this replacement. A mailbox conformant process never reduces to a state in which the only action of a guard is `fail`.

- **Definition 4.** We say that `P` is mailbox conformant if `P→* C[fail a]` for all `C` and `a`.

Looking at the placement of the `fail` `u` actions in earlier examples we can give the following interpretations of mailbox conformance: a lock is never released unless it has been acquired beforehand (Example 1); a future variable is never resolved twice (Example 2); an account will not be notified of a completed transaction (with a `reply` message) unless it is involved in an ongoing transaction (Example 3).

We express deadlock freedom as the property that all irreducible residuals of a process are (structurally equivalent to) the terminated process:

- **Definition 5.** We say that `P` is deadlock free if `P→* Q` implies `Q ≡ done`.

According to Definition 5 if a deadlock-free process halts we have that: (1) there is no sub-process waiting for a message that is never produced; (2) every mailbox is empty. Clearly, this is not the case for the transaction between `alice` and `carol` in Example 3.
Type $\tau, \sigma ::= ?E$ (input) \\
| $!E$ (output)

Pattern $E, F ::= 0$ (unreliable mailbox) \\
| $1$ (empty mailbox) \\
| $m[\tau]$ (atom) \\
| $E + F$ (sum) \\
| $E \cdot F$ (product) \\
| $E^*$ (exponential)

Table 2 Syntax of mailbox types and patterns.

Example 6 (deadlock). Below is another example of deadlocking process using Future from Example 2, obtained by resolving a future variable with the value it does not contain yet:

\[(\nu f)(\nu c)(\text{Future}[f] | f!\text{get}[c] | c?\text{reply}(x).\text{free} c.f!\text{put}[x])\]  

Notice that attempting to retrieve the content of a future variable not knowing whether it has been resolved is legal. Indeed, Future does not fail if a get message is present in the future variable’s mailbox before it is resolved. Thus, the deadlocked process above is mailbox conformant but also an instance of undesirable process that will be ruled out by our static analysis technique (cf. Example 21). We will need dependency graphs in addition to types to flag this process as ill typed.

A property stronger than deadlock freedom is fair termination. A fairly terminating process is a process whose residuals always have the possibility to terminate. Formally:

Definition 7. We say that $P$ is fairly terminating if $P \rightarrow^* Q$ implies $Q \rightarrow^* \text{done}$.

An interesting consequence of fair termination is that it implies junk freedom (also known as lock freedom [29, 38]) namely the property that every message can be eventually consumed. Our type system does not guarantee fair termination nor junk freedom in general, but it does so for a non-trivial sub-class of well-typed processes that we characterize later on.

3 A Mailbox Type System

In this section we detail the type system for the mailbox calculus. We start from the syntax and semantics of mailbox types (Section 3.1) and of dependency graphs (Section 3.2), the mechanism we use to track mailbox dependencies. Then we present the typing rules (Section 3.3) and the properties of well-typed processes (Section 3.4).

3.1 Mailbox Types

The syntax of mailbox types and patterns is shown in Table 2. Patterns are commutative regular expressions [11] describing the configurations of messages stored in a mailbox. An atom $m[\tau]$ describes a mailbox containing a single message with tag $m$ and arguments of type $\tau$. We let $M$ range over atoms and abbreviate $m[\tau]$ with $m$ when $\tau$ is the empty sequence. Compound patterns are built using sum ($E + F$), product ($E \cdot F$) and exponential ($E^*$). The constants $1$ and $0$ respectively describe the empty and the unreliable mailbox. There
is no configuration of messages stored in an unreliable mailbox, not even the empty one. We will use the 0 pattern for describing mailboxes from which an unexpected message has been received. Let us look at a few simple examples. The pattern $A + B$ describes a mailbox that contains either an $A$ message or a $B$ message, but not both, whereas the pattern $A + !$ describes a mailbox that either contains an $A$ message or is empty. The pattern $A \cdot B$ describes a mailbox that contains both an $A$ message and also a $B$ message. Note that $A$ and $B$ may be equal, in which case the mailbox contains two $A$ messages. Finally, the pattern $A^*$ describes a mailbox that contains an arbitrary number (possibly zero) of $A$ messages.

A mailbox type consists of a capability (either ? or !) paired with a pattern. The capability specifies whether the pattern describes messages to be received from (?) or stored in (!) the mailbox. Here are some examples: A process using a mailbox of type $!A$ must store an $A$ message into the mailbox, whereas a process using a mailbox of type $?A$ is guaranteed to receive an $A$ message from the mailbox. A process using a mailbox of type $!(A + 1)$ may store an $A$ message into the mailbox, but is not obliged to do so. A process using a mailbox of type $!(A + B)$ decides whether to store an $A$ message or a $B$ message in the mailbox, whereas a process using a mailbox of type $?(A + B)$ must be ready to receive both kinds of messages. A process using a mailbox of type $?A \cdot B$ is guaranteed to receive both an $A$ message and a $B$ message and may decide in which order to do so. A process using a mailbox of type $!(A \cdot B)$ must store both $A$ and $B$ into the mailbox. A process using a mailbox of type $!A^*$ decides how many $A$ messages to store in the mailbox, whereas a process using a mailbox of type $?A^*$ must be prepared to receive an arbitrary number of $A$ messages.

To cope with possibly infinite types we interpret the productions in Table 2 coinductively and consider as types the regular trees [12] built using those productions. We require every infinite branch of a type tree to go through infinitely many atoms. This strengthened contractiveness condition allows us to define functions inductively on the structure of patterns, provided that these functions do not recur into argument types (cf. Definitions 8 and 14).

The semantics of patterns is given in terms of sets of multisets of atoms. Because patterns include types, the given semantics is parametric in the subtyping relation, which will be defined next:

**Definition 8 (subpattern).** The configurations of $E$ are inductively defined by the following equations, where $A$ and $B$ range over multisets ($R$) of atoms and $\cup$ denotes multiset union:

$[0] \overset{\text{def}}{=} 0 \hspace{1cm} [E + F] \overset{\text{def}}{=} [E] \cup [F] \hspace{1cm} [M] \overset{\text{def}}{=} \{M\} \hspace{1cm} [E \cdot F] \overset{\text{def}}{=} \{A \cup B \mid A \in [E], B \in [F]\} \hspace{1cm} [E^*] \overset{\text{def}}{=} \{[\cdot] \cup [E] \cup [E \cdot E] \cup \cdots\}$

Given a preorder relation $\preceq$ on types, we write $E \preceq F$ if $(m_i[\pi_i])_{i \in I} \in [E]$ implies $(m_i[\pi_i])_{i \in I} \in [F]$ and $\pi_i \preceq \overline{\pi_i}$ for every $i \in I$. We write $\cong_{\preceq}$ for $\preceq \cap \preceq$.

For example, $[A + B] = \{\langle A \rangle, \langle B \rangle\}$ and $[A \cdot B] = \{\langle A, B \rangle\}$. It is easy to see that $\preceq_{\preceq}$ is a pre-congruence with respect to all the connectives and that it includes all the known laws of commutative Kleene algebra [11]: both $+$ and $\cdot$ are commutative and associative, $+$ is idempotent and has unit 0, $\cdot$ distributes over $+$, it has unit 1 and is absorbed by 0. Also observe that $\preceq_{\preceq}$ is related covariantly to $\preceq$, that is $\tau \preceq \overline{\tau}$ implies $m[\overline{\tau}] \preceq_{\preceq} m[\tau]$.

We now define subtyping. As types may be infinite, we resort to coinduction:

**Definition 9 (subtyping).** We say that $\preceq$ is a subtyping relation if $\tau \preceq \sigma$ implies either

1. $\tau = ?E$ and $\sigma = ?F$ and $E \preceq_{\preceq} F$,
   or
2. $\tau = !E$ and $\sigma = !F$ and $F \preceq_{\preceq} E$.

We write $\subseteq$ for the largest subtyping relation and say that $\tau$ is a subtype of $\sigma$ (and $\sigma$ a supertype of $\tau$) if $\tau \subseteq \sigma$. We write $\subseteq_{\preceq}$ for $\subseteq \cap \preceq$, $\subseteq_{\preceq}$ for $\subseteq_{\preceq}$ and $\cong$ for $\cong_{\preceq}$. 

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**Note:** The content contains mathematical notation and concepts that are central to the discussion on mailbox types and their semantics in the context of process calculi and type theory. It explains the use of patterns and types in describing mailbox configurations, the role of capabilities (both read ? and write !), and the inductive definition of type configurations and their subtyping relations. The notation $[\cdot]$ denotes a configuration of messages stored in a mailbox, whether it is reliable or unreliable. The types $A$, $B$, $A + B$, $A \cdot B$, etc., are used to describe the contents of these mailboxes. The semantics is defined in terms of sets of multisets of atoms, and the subtyping relation is coinductively defined to handle infinite types, ensuring that functions do not recur into argument types.
Items [1] and [2] respectively correspond to the usual covariant and contravariant rules for channel types with input and output capabilities [10]. For example, \( \! (A + B) \leq \! A \) because a mailbox of type \( \! (A + B) \) is more permissive than a mailbox of type \( \! A \). Dually, \( ?A \leq ?(A + B) \) because a mailbox of type \(?A\) provides stronger guarantees than a mailbox of type \(?A + B\). Note that \( !(A \cdot B) \leq !(B \cdot A) \) and \( ?(A \cdot B) \leq ?(B \cdot A) \), to witness the fact that the order in which messages are stored in a mailbox is irrelevant.

Mailbox types whose patterns are in particular relations with the constants 0 and 1 will play special roles, so we introduce some corresponding terminology.

**Definition 10 (type and name classification).** We say that (a name whose type is) \( \tau \) is:

- **relevant** if \( \tau \not< !1 \) and **irrelevant** otherwise;
- **reliable** if \( \tau \not< ?0 \) and **unreliable** otherwise;
- **usable** if \( !0 \not< \tau \) and **unusable** otherwise.

A relevant name must be used, whereas an irrelevant name may be discarded because not storing any message in the mailbox it refers to is allowed by its type. All mailbox types with input capability are relevant. A reliable mailbox is one from which no unexpected message has been received. All names with output capability are reliable. A usable name can be used, in the sense that there exists a construct of the mailbox calculus that expects a name with that type. All mailbox types with input capability are usable, but \( ?(A \cdot 0) \) is unreliable. Both \( !A \) and \( !(1 + A) \) are usable. The former type is also relevant because a process using a mailbox with this type must (eventually) store an \( A \) message in it. On the contrary, the latter type is irrelevant, since not using the mailbox is a legal way of using it.

*Henceforth we assume that all types are usable and that all argument types are also reliable. That is, we ban all types like \( !0 \) or \( !(0 \cdot m) \) and all types like \( ?m[?0] \) or \( !m[?0] \). Example [28] in Appendix [A.7] discusses the technical motivation for these assumptions.*

**Example 11 (lock type).** The mailbox used by the lock (Example [1]) will have several different types, depending on the viewpoint we take (either the lock itself or one of its users) and on the state of the lock (whether it is free or busy). As we can see from the definition of FreeLock, a free lock waits for an acquire message which is supposed to carry a reference to another mailbox into which the capability to release the lock is stored. Since the lock is meant to have several concurrent users, it is not possible in general to predict the number of acquire messages in its mailbox. Therefore, the mailbox of a free lock has type

\[ ?\text{acquire}[!\text{reply}][!\text{release}]^* \]

from the viewpoint of the lock itself. When the lock is busy, it expects to find one release message in its mailbox, but in general the mailbox will also contain acquire messages corresponding to pending acquisition requests. So, the mailbox of a busy lock has type

\[ ?(\text{release} \cdot \text{acquire}[!\text{reply}][!\text{release}])^* \]

indicating that the mailbox contains (or will eventually contain) a single release message along with arbitrarily many acquire messages.

Prospective owners of the lock may have references to the lock’s mailbox with type \( !\text{acquire}[!\text{reply}][!\text{release}] \) or \( !\text{acquire}[!\text{reply}][!\text{release}]^* \) depending on whether they acquire the lock exactly once (just like alice and carol in Example [1]) or several times. Other intermediate types are possible in the case of users that acquire the lock a bounded number of times. The current owner of the lock will have a reference to the lock’s mailbox of type \( !\text{release} \). This type is relevant, implying that the owner must eventually release the lock. ■
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Table 3. A label

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\{u,v\} & \xrightarrow{u-v} & \emptyset \quad & \varphi \xrightarrow{u-v} \psi' & \varphi' \quad & \psi \xrightarrow{u-v} \psi' & \varphi' \\
\varphi \sqcup \psi & \xrightarrow{u-v} & \varphi' \sqcup \psi' & \varphi \sqcup \psi & \xrightarrow{u-v} & \varphi \sqcup \psi' & \varphi' \\
(\nu a) \varphi & \xrightarrow{u-v} & (\nu a) \psi & (\nu a) \varphi & \xrightarrow{u-v} & (\nu a) \psi' & \varphi \\
\end{array}
\]

\[\text{Table 3} \quad \text{Labelled transitions of dependency graphs.}\]

3.2 Dependency Graphs

We use dependency graphs for tracking dependencies between mailboxes. Intuitively, there is a dependency between \(u\) and \(v\) if either \(v\) is the argument of a message in mailbox \(u\) or \(v\) occurs in the continuation of a process waiting for a message from \(u\). Dependency graphs have names as vertices and undirected edges. However, the usual representation of graphs does not account for the fact that mailbox names may be restricted and that the multiplicity of dependencies matters. Therefore, we define dependency graphs using the syntax below:

Dependency Graph \(\varphi, \psi \iff \emptyset \mid \{u,v\} \mid \varphi \sqcup \psi \mid (\nu a) \varphi\)

The term \(\emptyset\) represents the empty graph which has no vertices and no edges. The unordered pair \(\{u,v\}\) represents the graph made of a single edge connecting the vertices \(u\) and \(v\). The term \(\varphi \sqcup \psi\) represents the union of \(\varphi\) and \(\psi\) whereas \((\nu a) \varphi\) represents the same graph as \(\varphi\) except that the vertex \(a\) is restricted. The usual notions of free and bound names apply to dependency graphs. We write \(\text{fn}(\varphi)\) for the free names of \(\varphi\).

To define the semantics of a dependency graph we use the labelled transition system of Table 3. A label \(u-v\) represents a path connecting \(u\) with \(v\). So, a relation \(\varphi \xrightarrow{u-v} \varphi'\) means that \(u\) and \(v\) are connected in \(\varphi\) and \(\varphi'\) describes the residual edges of \(\varphi\) that have not been used for building the path between \(u\) and \(v\). The paths of \(\varphi\) are built from the edges of \(\varphi\) (cf. \([\text{G-AXiom}]\) connected by shared vertices (cf. \([\text{G-TRANS}]\)). Restricted names cannot be observed in labels, but they may contribute in building paths in the graph (cf. \([\text{G-NEW}]\)).

Definition 12 (graph acyclicity and entailment). Let \(\text{dep}(\varphi) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \{(u,v) \mid \exists \varphi' : \varphi \xrightarrow{u-v} \varphi'\}\) be the dependency relation generated by \(\varphi\). We say that \(\varphi\) is acyclic if \(\text{dep}(\varphi)\) is irreflexive. We say that \(\varphi\) entails \(\psi\), written \(\varphi \Rightarrow \psi\), if \(\text{dep}(\psi) \subseteq \text{dep}(\varphi)\).

Note that \(\sqcup\) is commutative, associative and has \(\emptyset\) as unit with respect to \(\text{dep}(\cdot)\) (see Appendix \(\text{A.2}\)). These properties of dependency graphs are key to prove that typing is preserved by structural congruence on processes. Note also that \(\sqcup\) is not idempotent. Indeed, \(\{u,v\} \sqcup \{u,v\}\) is cyclic whereas \(\{u,v\}\) is not. The following example motivates the reason why the multiplicity of dependencies is important.

Example 13. Consider the reduction

\[
P \overset{\text{def}}{=} (\nu a)(\nu b)(a! A[b] \mid a! B[b] \mid a? A(x) \cdot a? B(y) . \text{free } a . x! \mathbb{m}[y]) \rightarrow^\ast (\nu b)b! \mathbb{m}[b] \rightarrow
\]

and observe that \(P\) stores two messages in the mailbox \(a\), each containing a reference to the mailbox \(b\). The two variables \(x\) and \(y\), which were syntactically different in \(P\), have been unified into \(b\) in the reduct, which is deadlocked. Unlike previous examples of deadlocked processes, which resulted from mutual dependencies between different mailboxes, in this case the deadlock is caused by the same dependency \(\{a,b\}\) arising twice.
Typing rules for processes

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma \vdash P :: \varphi & \qquad [\text{T-DONE}] \\
\emptyset \vdash \text{done} :: \emptyset & \quad [\text{T-DONE}] \\
X : (\overline{x} : \overline{\tau} ; \varphi) & \quad [\text{T-DEF}] \\
\overline{\tau} : \overline{\tau} \vdash X[\overline{\tau}] :: \varphi[\overline{\tau}/\overline{x}] & \quad [\text{T-DEF}] \\
\Gamma, u : \exists \overline{a} P :: \varphi & \quad [\text{T-NEW}] \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma_1 \vdash P_1 :: \varphi_i \ (i=1,2) & \quad [\text{T-PAR}] \\
\Delta \vdash P :: \psi \quad \Gamma \subseteq \Delta \vdash \varphi \Rightarrow \psi & \quad [\text{T-REF}] \\
\end{align*}
\]

Typing rules for guards

\[
\begin{align*}
u : ?\emptyset, \Gamma \vdash \text{fail} \ u & \quad [\text{T-FAIL}] \\
u : ?E, \Gamma, \overline{x} : \overline{\tau} :: P :: \varphi & \quad [\text{T-IN}] \\
u : ?(m[\overline{x}] \cdot E), \Gamma \vdash u ?m(\overline{x}) . P & \quad [\text{T-MSG}] \\
u : ?E, \Gamma \vdash \text{free} \ u . P & \quad [\text{T-FREE}] \\
u : ?E_i, \Gamma \vdash G_i \ (i=1,2) & \quad [\text{T-BRANCH}] \\
u : ?(E_1 + E_2), \Gamma \vdash G_1 + G_2 & \quad [\text{T-BRANCH}] \\
\end{align*}
\]

Table 4 Typing rules.

3.3 Typing Rules

We use type environments for tracking the type of free names occurring in processes. A type environment is a partial function from names to types written as \( \overline{x} : \overline{\tau} \) or \( u_1 : \tau_1, \ldots, u_n : \tau_n \).

We let \( \Gamma \) and \( \Delta \) range over type environments, we write \( \text{dom}(\Gamma) \) for the domain of \( \Gamma \) and \( \Gamma, \Delta \) for the union of \( \Gamma \) and \( \Delta \) when \( \text{dom}(\Gamma) \cap \text{dom}(\Delta) = \emptyset \). We say that \( \Gamma \) is reliable if so are all the types in its range.

Judgments for processes have the form \( \Gamma \vdash P :: \varphi \), meaning that \( P \) is well typed in \( \Gamma \) and yields the dependency graph \( \varphi \). Judgments for guards have the form \( \Gamma \vdash G \), meaning that \( G \) is well typed in \( \Gamma \). We say that a judgment \( \Gamma \vdash P :: \varphi \) is well formed if \( \text{fn}(\varphi) \subseteq \text{dom}(\Gamma) \) and \( \varphi \) is acyclic. Each process typing rule has an implicit side condition requiring that its conclusion is well formed. For each global process definition \( X(\overline{x}) \equiv P \) we assume that there is a corresponding global process declaration of the form \( X : (\overline{x} : \overline{\tau} ; \varphi) \). We say that the definition is consistent with the corresponding declaration if \( \overline{x} : \overline{\tau} :: P :: \varphi \). Hereafter, all process definitions are assumed to be consistent. We now discuss the typing rules in detail, introducing auxiliary notions and notation as we go along.

Terminated process. According to the rule [T-DONE] the terminated process \( \text{done} \) is well typed in the empty type environment and yields no dependencies. This is motivated by the fact that \( \text{done} \) does not use any mailbox. Later on we will introduce a subsumption rule [T-SUB] that allows us to type \( \text{done} \) in any type environment with irrelevant names.

Message. Rule [T-MSG] establishes that a message \( u ! m[\overline{x}] \) is well typed provided that the mailbox \( u \) allows the storing of an \( m \)-tagged message with arguments of type \( \overline{\tau} \) and the types of \( \overline{\tau} \) are indeed \( \overline{\tau} \). The subsumption rule [T-SUB] will make it possible to use arguments...
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whose type is a subtype of the expected ones. A message $u!m[\pi]$ establishes dependencies between the target mailbox $u$ and all of the arguments $\pi$. We write $\{u, \{v_1, \ldots, v_n\}\}$ for the dependency graph $\{u, v_1\} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup \{u, v_n\}$ and use $\emptyset$ for the empty graph union.

Process invocation. The typing rule for a process invocation $X[m]$ checks that there exists a global definition for $X$ which expects exactly the given number and type of parameters. Again, rule $\text{[T-FREE]}$ will make it possible to use parameters whose types are subtypes of the expected ones. A process invocation yields the same dependencies as the corresponding process definition, with the appropriate substitutions applied.

Guards. Guards are used to match the content of a mailbox and possibly retrieve messages from it. According to rule $\text{[T-FAIL]}$ the action $\text{fail } u$ matches a mailbox $u$ with type $?0$, indicating that an unexpected message has been found in the mailbox. The type environment may contain arbitrary associations, since the $\text{fail } u$ action causes a runtime error. Rule $\text{[T-FREE]}$ states that the action $\text{free } u.P$ matches a mailbox $u$ with type $?1$, indicating that the mailbox is empty. The continuation is well typed in the residual type environment $\Gamma$. An input action $u?m[\pi].P$ matches a mailbox $u$ with type $?E$ that guarantees the presence of an $m$-tagged message possibly along with other messages as specified by $E$. The continuation $P$ must be well typed in an environment where the mailbox has type $?E$, which describes the content of the mailbox after the $m$-tagged message has been removed. Associations for the received arguments $\pi$ are also added to the type environment. A compound guard $G_1 + G_2$ offers the actions offered by $G_1$ and $G_2$ and therefore matches a mailbox $u$ with type $?E$, where $E_i$ is the pattern that describes the mailbox matched by $G_i$. Note that the residual type environment $\Gamma$ is the same in both branches, indicating that the type of other mailboxes used by the guard cannot depend on that of $u$.

The judgments for guards do not yield any dependency graph. This is compensated by the rule $\text{[T-GUARD]}$ which we describe next.

Guarded processes. Rule $\text{[T-GUARD]}$ is used to type a guarded process $G$, which matches some mailbox $u$ of type $?E$ and possibly retrieves messages from it. As we have seen while discussing guards, $E$ is supposed to be a pattern of the form $E_1 + \cdots + E_n$ where each $E_i$ is either 0, 1 or of the form $M \cdot F$. However, only the patterns $E$ that are in normal form are suitable to be used in this typing rule and the side condition $\forall E$ checks that this is indeed the case. We motivate the need of a normal form by means of a simple example.

Suppose that our aim is to type a process $u?A.P + u?B.Q$ that consumes either an $A$ message or a $B$ message from $u$, whichever of these two messages is matched first in $u$, and then continues as $P$ or $Q$ correspondingly. Suppose also that the type of $u$ is $?E$ with $E \equiv A \cdot C + B \cdot A$, which allows the rules for guards to successfully type check the process. As we have seen while discussing rule $\text{[T-IN]}$ $P$ and $Q$ must be typed in an environment where the type of $u$ has been updated so as to reflect the fact that the consumed message is no longer in the mailbox. In this particular case, we might be tempted to infer that the type of $u$ in $P$ is $?C$ and that the type of $u$ in $Q$ is $?A$. Unfortunately, the type $?C$ does not accurately describe the content of the mailbox after $A$ has been consumed because, according to $E$, the $A$ message may be accompanied by either a $B$ message or by a $C$ message, whereas $?C$ only accounts for the second possibility. Thus, the appropriate pattern to be used for typing this process is $A \cdot (B + C) + B \cdot A$, where the fact that $B$ may be found after consuming $A$ is made explicit. This pattern and $E$ are equivalent as they generate exactly the same set of valid configurations. Yet, $A \cdot (B + C) + B \cdot A$ is in normal form whereas $E$ is not. In general
The pattern residual operator is closely related to Brzozowski’s derivative in a commutative Kleene algebra \[4, 24\]. Unlike Brzozowski’s derivative, the pattern residual is a partial symmetric operator defined as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
0/M &= 1/M \equiv 0 \\
\tau/M \cap \tau'[M] \equiv 1 & \text{ if } \tau \subseteq \tau' \\
(E + F)/M \equiv E/M + F/M & \text{ if } m \leq m' \\
(E \cdot F)/M \equiv E/M \cdot F/M & \text{ if } m \neq m' \\
\end{align*}
\]

If we take the pattern \(E\) discussed earlier we have \(E/A = 1 \cdot C + A \cdot 0 + 0 \cdot 1 + B \cdot 1 \simeq B + C\). The pattern residual operator is closely related to Brzozowski’s derivative in a commutative Kleene algebra \[4, 24\]. Unlike Brzozowski’s derivative, the pattern residual is a partial operator: \(E/m[\tau]\) is defined provided that the \(\tau\) are supertypes of all types \(\tau\) found in \(m\)-tagged atoms within \(E\). This condition has a natural justification: when choosing the message to remove from a mailbox containing a configuration of messages described by \(E\), only the tag \(m\) of the message – and not the type of its arguments – matters. Thus, \(\sigma\) faithfully describes the received arguments provided that they are supertypes of all argument types of all \(m\)-tagged message types in \(E\). For example, assuming \(\text{nat} \leq \text{int}\), we have that \((\text{int} + \text{nat})/\text{int}\) is defined whereas \((\text{int} + \text{nat})/\text{nat}\) is not.

We use the notion of pattern residual to define pattern normal forms:

\[E/\mathcal{M} \equiv E \] if \(E \vdash E\) is derivable by the following axioms and rules:

\[
\begin{align*}
E \vdash 0 & \quad E \vdash 1 \\
E \vdash F & \quad E \vdash F_1 \\
E \vdash F_2 & \quad E \vdash F_1 \cdot F_2 \\
E \vdash F_1 \cdot F_2 & \quad E \vdash F_1 + F_2
\end{align*}
\]

Essentially, the judgment \(E \vdash E\) verifies that \(E\) is expressed as a sum of 0, 1 and \(\mathcal{M} \cdot F\) terms where \(F\) is (equivalent to) the residual of \(E\) with respect to \(\mathcal{M}\).

A guarded process yields all the dependencies between the mailbox \(u\) being used and the names occurring free in the continuations, because the process will not be able to exercise the capabilities on these names until the message from \(u\) has been received.

Parallel composition. Rule \([\text{P-PAR}]\) deals with parallel compositions of the form \(P_1 \parallel P_2\). This rule accounts for the fact that the same mailbox \(u\) may be used in both \(P_1\) and \(P_2\) according to different types. For example, \(P_1\) might store an \(A\) message into \(u\) and \(P_2\) might store a \(B\) message into \(u\). In the type environment for the parallel composition as a whole we must be able to express with a single type the combined usages of \(u\) in \(P_1\) and \(P_2\). This is accomplished by introducing an operator that combines types:

\[E \parallel F \equiv (E \cdot F) \quad E \parallel ?(E \cdot F) \equiv ?F \quad ?(E \cdot F) \parallel E \equiv ?F\]

Continuing the previous example, we have \(\parallel A = (A \cdot B)\) because storing one \(A\) message and one \(B\) message in \(u\) means storing an overall configuration of messages described by the
pattern $A \cdot B$. When $u$ is used for both input and output operations, the combined type of $u$ describes the overall balance of the mailbox. For example, we have $!A \parallel ?(A \cdot B) = ?B$: if we combine a process that stores an $A$ message into $u$ with another process that consumes both an $A$ message and a $B$ message from the same mailbox in some unspecified order, then we end up with a process that consumes a $B$ message from $u$.

Notice that $\parallel$ is a partial operator in that not all type combinations are defined. It might be tempting to relax $\parallel$ in such a way that $!A \parallel ?(A \cdot B) = !B$, so as to represent the fact that the combination of two processes results in an excess of messages that must be consumed by some other process. However, this would mean allowing different processes to consume messages from the same mailbox, which is not safe in general (see Example 17). For the same reason, the combination of $?E$ and $?F$ is always undefined regardless of $E$ and $F$. Operators akin to $\parallel$ for the combination of channel types are commonly found in substructural type systems for the (linear) $\pi$-calculus \[43\] [35]. Unlike these systems, in our case the combination concerns also the content of a mailbox in addition to the capabilities for accessing it.

**Example 17.** Suppose that we extend the type combination operator so that $?E \parallel ?F$. To see why this extension would be dangerous, consider the process

$$(u!A[\text{True}] | u?A(x). (\text{system}!\text{print}_\text{bool}[x] | \text{free } u. \text{done})) |$$
$$(u!A[2] | u?A(y). (\text{system}!\text{print}_\text{int}[y] | \text{free } u. \text{done}))$$

Overall, this process stores into $u$ a combination of messages that matches the pattern $A[\text{bool}] \cdot A[\text{int}]$ and retrieves from $u$ the same combination of messages. Apparently, $u$ is used in a balanced way. However, there is no guarantee that the $u!A[\text{True}]$ message is received by the process at the top and that the $u!A[2]$ message is received by the process at the bottom. In fact, the converse may happen because only the tag of a message – not the type or value of its arguments – is used for matching messages in the mailbox calculus.

We now extend type combination to type environments in the expected way:

**Definition 18 (type environment combination).** We write $\Gamma \parallel \Delta$ for the combination of $\Gamma$ and $\Delta$, where $\parallel$ is the partial operator inductively defined by the equations:

$$\Gamma \parallel \emptyset \overset{\text{def}}{=} \Gamma \quad \emptyset \parallel \Gamma \overset{\text{def}}{=} \Gamma \quad (u : \tau, \Gamma) \parallel (u : \sigma, \Delta) \overset{\text{def}}{=} (u : \tau \parallel \sigma, (\Gamma \parallel \Delta))$$

With this machinery in place, rule $[\text{t-par}]$ is straightforward to understand and the dependency graph of $P_1 | P_2$ is simply the union of the dependency graphs of $P_1$ and $P_2$.

**Mailbox restriction.** Rule $[\text{t-new}]$ establishes that the process creating a new mailbox $a$ with scope $P$ is well typed provided that the type of $a$ is $?A$. This means that every message stored in the mailbox $a$ by (a sub-process of) $P$ is also consumed by (a sub-process of) $P$. The dependency graph of the process is the same as that of $P$, except that $a$ is restricted.

**Subsumption.** As we have anticipated earlier in a few occasions, the subsumption rule $[\text{t-sub}]$ allows us to rewrite types in the type environment and to introduce associations for irrelevant names. The rule makes use of the following notion of subtyping for type environments:

**Definition 19 (subtyping for type environments).** We say that $\Gamma$ is a subtype environment of $\Delta$ if $\Gamma \preceq \Delta$, where $\preceq$ is the least preorder on type environments such that:

$$\begin{align*}
\tau \preceq \sigma & \quad \text{if } u : \tau, \Gamma \preceq u : \sigma, \Gamma \\
\end{align*}$$
Intuitively, $\Gamma \leq \Delta$ means that $\Gamma$ provides more capabilities than $\Delta$. For example, $u : !((A + B), v : !\emptyset \leq u : !A)$ since a process that is well typed in the environment $u : !A$ stores an $A$ message into $u$, which is also a valid behavior in the environment $u : !((A + B), v : !\emptyset$ where $u$ has more capabilities (it is also possible to store a $B$ message into $u$) and there is an irrelevant name $v$ not used by the process.

Rule $[\tau \text{-sub}]$ also allows us to replace the dependency graph yielded by $P$ with another one that generates a superset of dependencies. In general, the dependency graph should be kept as small as possible to minimize the possibility of yielding mutual dependencies (see $[\tau \text{-par}]$). The replacement allowed by $[\tau \text{-sub}]$ is handy for technical reasons, but not necessary. The point is that the residual of a process typically yields fewer dependencies than the process itself, so we use $[\tau \text{-sub}]$ to enforce the invariance of dependency graphs across reductions.

$\blacktriangleright$ Example 20. We show the full typing derivation for FreeLock and BusyLock defined in Example 1. Our objective is to show the consistency of the global process declarations

FreeLock : $(\text{self} : \tau ; \emptyset)$ \hspace{1cm} BusyLock : $(\text{self} : \tau, \text{owner} : \rho; \{\text{self}, \text{owner}\})$

where $\tau \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{acquire}[\rho]^*$ and $\rho \overset{\text{def}}{=} !\text{reply}[!\text{release}]$. In the derivation trees below we rename $\text{self}$ as $x$ and $\text{owner}$ and $y$ to reasonably fit the derivations within the page limits. We start from the body of BusyLock, which is simpler, and obtain

$$
\begin{align*}
\vdash x : \tau &\vdash \text{FreeLock}[x] :: \emptyset \\
\vdash x : \sigma &\vdash x ? \text{release} . \text{FreeLock}[x] \\
\vdash x : ! \text{release}, y : \rho &\vdash y ! \text{reply}[x] :: \{y, x\} \\
\vdash x : \sigma &\vdash x ? \text{release} . \text{FreeLock}[x] :: \emptyset \\
\vdash x : \tau, y : \rho &\vdash y ! \text{reply}[x] | x ? \text{release} . \text{Lock}[x] :: \{y, x\} \sqcup \emptyset
\end{align*}
$$

where $\sigma \overset{\text{def}}{=} ?(\text{release} \cdot \text{acquire}[\rho]^*)$.

Concerning FreeLock, the key step is rewriting the pattern of $\tau$ in a normal form that matches the branching structure of the process. To this aim, we use the property $E^* \simeq \emptyset + E \cdot E^*$ and the fact that $\emptyset$ is absorbing for the product connective:

$$
\begin{align*}
\vdash x : ? 0 &\vdash \text{fail} x \\
\vdash x : ? 0 &\vdash \text{fail} x :: \emptyset \\
\vdash x : ?(\text{release} \cdot \emptyset) &\vdash x ? \text{release} . \text{fail} x \\
\vdash x : ?(\emptyset + \text{acquire}[\rho] \cdot \text{acquire}[\rho]^* + \text{release} \cdot \emptyset) &\vdash \cdots + x ? \text{release} . \text{fail} x \\
\vdash x : ?(\emptyset + \text{acquire}[\rho] \cdot \text{acquire}[\rho]^* + \text{release} \cdot \emptyset) &\vdash \cdots + x ? \text{release} . \text{fail} x :: \emptyset
\end{align*}
$$

The elided sub-derivation concerns the first two branches of FreeLock and is as follows:

$$
\begin{align*}
\emptyset &\vdash \text{done} :: \emptyset \\
\vdash x : \tau, y : \rho &\vdash \text{BusyLock}[x, y] :: \{x, y\} \\
\vdash x : ? \text{free} x . \text{done} &\vdash \text{FreeLock}[x, y] :: \emptyset \\
\vdash x : ?(\emptyset + \text{acquire}[\rho] \cdot \text{acquire}[\rho]^*) &\vdash \text{free} x . \text{done} + x ? \text{acquire}[y] . \text{BusyLock}[x, y]
\end{align*}
$$

The process $[1]$, combining an instance of the lock and the users alice and carol, is also well typed. As we will see at the end of Section 3.4, this implies that both alice and carol are able to acquire the lock, albeit in some unspecified order.
Example 21. In this example we show that the process \[ (2) \] of Example 2 is ill typed. In order to do so, we assume the global process declaration

\[
\text{Future} : (\text{self} : (?[\text{put} \cdot \text{int}] \cdot \text{get}![\text{reply} \cdot \text{int}]); \emptyset)
\]

which can be shown to be consistent with the given definition for Future. In the derivation below we use the pattern \( F \overset{\text{id}}{=} \text{put} \cdot \text{int} \cdot \text{get}[^\rho] \) and the types \( \tau \overset{\text{id}}{=} \text{put} \cdot \text{int}, \sigma \overset{\text{id}}{=} ?(\text{reply} \cdot \text{int} \cdot 1) \) and \( \rho \overset{\text{id}}{=} !\text{reply} \cdot \text{int} \):

\[
\begin{align*}
f : \tau, x : \text{int} & \vdash f !\text{put} \cdot x :: \emptyset \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
f : \tau, c : ?\emptyset, x : \text{int} & \vdash \text{free} \cdot f !\text{put} \cdot x \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
f : \tau, c : ?\emptyset, x : \text{int} & \vdash \text{free} \cdot f !\text{put} \cdot x :: \{ c, f \} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
f : \tau, c : \sigma & \vdash \text{?reply} \cdot x \cdot \text{free} \cdot f !\text{put} \cdot x \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
f : \tau, c : \sigma & \vdash \text{?reply} \cdot x \cdot \text{free} \cdot f !\text{put} \cdot x :: \{ c, f \} \\
\end{align*}
\]

In attempting this derivation we have implicitly extended the typing rules so that names with type \( \text{int} \) do not contribute in generating any significant dependency. The critical point of the derivation is the application of \( \text{[t-par]} \) where we are composing two parallel processes that yield a circular dependency between \( c \) and \( f \). In the process on the left hand side, the dependency \( \{f, c\} \) arises because \( c \) is sent as a reference in a message targeted to \( f \). In the process on the right hand side, the dependency \( \{c, f\} \) arises because there are guards concerning the mailbox \( c \) that block an output operation on the mailbox \( f \).

Example 22 (non-deterministic choice). Different input actions in the same guard can match messages with the same tag. This feature can be used to encode in the mailbox calculus the non-deterministic choice between \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) as the process

\[
\text{(}a \cdot m \mid a \cdot \text{m.free} \cdot a \cdot P_1 + a \cdot \text{m.free} \cdot a \cdot P_2\text{)}
\]

provided that \( \Gamma \vdash P_i :: \varphi_i \) for \( i = 1, 2 \). That is, \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) must be well typed in the same type environment. Below is the typing derivation for \( (3) \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma & \vdash P_1 :: \varphi_1 \\
\Gamma, a : ?\emptyset & \vdash \text{free} \cdot a \cdot P_1 \\
\Gamma, a : ?\emptyset & \vdash \text{free} \cdot a \cdot P_1 :: \varphi \quad \text{(for } i = 1, 2 \text{)} \\
\Gamma, a : ?(m \cdot \emptyset) & \vdash a \cdot \text{m.free} \cdot a \cdot P_1 \\
\Gamma, a : ?(m \cdot \emptyset) & \vdash a \cdot \text{m.free} \cdot a \cdot P_1 + a \cdot \text{m.free} \cdot a \cdot P_2 \\
\Gamma, a : ?(m \cdot \emptyset) & \vdash a \cdot \text{m.free} \cdot a \cdot P_1 + a \cdot \text{m.free} \cdot a \cdot P_2 :: \varphi \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
a : \text{!m} & \vdash a \cdot \text{!m} :: \emptyset \\
\Gamma, a : ?(m \cdot \emptyset) & \vdash a \cdot \text{m.free} \cdot a \cdot P_1 + a \cdot \text{m.free} \cdot a \cdot P_2 \\
\Gamma & \vdash (a \cdot \text{!m} \mid a \cdot \text{m.free} \cdot a \cdot P_1 + a \cdot \text{m.free} \cdot a \cdot P_2) :: \varphi
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \varphi \overset{\text{id}}{=} \{a, \text{dom}(\Gamma)\} \). The key step is the application of \( \text{[t-branch]} \) which exploits the idempotency of \( + \) (in patterns) to rewrite \( m \cdot \emptyset \) as the equivalent pattern \( m \cdot \emptyset + m \cdot \emptyset \).
3.4 Properties of well-typed processes

In this section we state the main properties enjoyed by well-typed processes. As usual, subject reduction is instrumental for all of the results that follow as it guarantees that typing is preserved by reductions:

**Theorem 23.** If $\Gamma$ is reliable and $\Gamma \vdash P :: \varphi$ and $P \to Q$, then $\Gamma \vdash Q :: \varphi$.

Interestingly, Theorem 23 seems to imply that the types of the mailboxes used by a process do not change. In sharp contrast, other popular behavioral typing disciplines (session types in particular), are characterized by a subject reduction result in which types reduce along with processes. Theorem 23 also seems to contradict the observations made earlier concerning the fact that the mailboxes used by a process may have different types (Example 11). The type preservation guarantee assured by Theorem 23 can be explained by recalling that the type environment $\Gamma$ in a judgment $\Gamma \vdash P :: \varphi$ already takes into account the overall balance between the messages stored into and consumed from the mailbox used by $P$ (see Definition 18). In light of this observation, Theorem 23 simply asserts that well-typed processes are steady state: they never produce more messages than those that are consumed, nor do they ever try to consume more messages than those that are produced.

A practically relevant consequence of Theorem 23 is that, by looking at the type $?E$ of the mailbox $a$ used by a guarded process $P$ (rule $\{\text{T-GUARD}\}$), it is possible to determine bounds to the number of messages that can be found in the mailbox as $P$ waits for a message to receive. In particular, if every configuration of $E$ contains at most $k$ atoms with tag $m$, then at runtime $a$ contains at most $m$-tagged messages. As a special case, a mailbox of type $?1$ is guaranteed to be empty and can be statically deallocated. Note that the bounds may change after $P$ receives a message. For example, a free lock is guaranteed to have no release messages in its mailbox, and will have at most one when it is busy (see Example 20).

The main result concerns the soundness of the type system, guaranteeing that well-typed (closed) processes are both mailbox conformant and deadlock free:

**Theorem 24.** If $\emptyset \vdash P :: \varphi$, then $P$ is mailbox conformant and deadlock free.

Fair termination and junk freedom are not guaranteed by our typing discipline in general. The usual counterexamples include processes that postpone indefinitely the use of a mailbox with a relevant type. For instance, the $m$ message in the well-typed process $(\nu a)(a!m \mid X[a])$ where $X(x) \triangleq X[x]$ is never consumed because $a$ is never used for an input operation.

Nevertheless, fair termination is guaranteed for the class of finitely unfolding processes:

**Theorem 25.** We say that $P$ is finitely unfolding if all maximal reductions of $P$ use $\{\text{R-DEF}\}$ finitely many times. If $\emptyset \vdash P :: \varphi$ and $P$ is finitely unfolding, then $P$ is fairly terminating.

The class of finitely unfolding processes obviously includes all finite processes (those not using process invocations) but also many recursive processes. For example, every process of the form $(\nu a)(a!m \mid \cdots \mid a!m \mid X[a])$ where $X(x) \triangleq x?m.X[x] + \text{free } x..\text{done}$ is closed, well typed and finitely unfolding regardless of the number of $m$ messages stored in $a$, hence is fairly terminating and junk free by Theorem 25.

4 Examples

In this section we discuss a few more examples that illustrate the expressiveness of the mailbox calculus and of its type system. We consider a variant of the bank account shown in Listing 1 (Section 4.1), the case of master-workers parallelism (Section 4.2) and the encoding of binary sessions extended with forks and joins (Sections 4.3 and 4.4).
class Account(var balance: Double) extends AkkaActor[AnyRef] {
  override def process(msg: AnyRef) {
    msg match {
      case dm: DebitMessage =>
        balance += dm.amount
        sender() ! ReplyMessage.ONLY
      case cm: CreditMessage =>
        balance -= cm.amount
        val recipient = cm.recipient.asInstanceOf[ActorRef]
        val future = ask(recipient, new DebitMessage(self, cm.amount))
        Await.result(future, Duration.Inf)
        sender() ! ReplyMessage.ONLY
      case _: StopMessage => exit()
      case message =>
        val ex = new IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported/unsupported message")
        ex.printStackTrace(System.err)
    }
  }
}

Listing 2 An Akka actor using futures from the Savina benchmark suite [27].

4.1 Actors using futures

Many Scala programs combine actors with futures [46]. As an example, Listing 2 shows an alternative version of the Account actor in Akka that differs from Listing 1 in the handling of CreditMessages (lines 10–11). The future variable created here is initialized asynchronously with the result of the debit operation invoked on recipient. To make sure that each transaction is atomic, the actor waits for the variable to be resolved (line 11) before notifying sender that the operation has been completed.

This version of Account is arguably simpler than the one in Listing 1 if only because the actor has a unique top-level behavior. One way of modeling this implementation of Account in the mailbox calculus is to use Future, discussed in Example 2. A simpler modeling stems from the observation that future in Listing 2 is used for a one-shot synchronization. A future variable with this property is akin to a mailbox from which the value of the resolved variable is retrieved exactly once. Following this approach we obtain the process below:

\[
\text{Account}(self, \text{balance}) \triangleq \begin{align*}
& \text{self?debit(amount, sender).} \\
& \quad \text{sender!reply | Account[self, balance + amount]} \\
& + \text{self?credit(amount, recipient, sender).} \\
& \quad \left(\text{recipient!debit[amount, future]} \mid \\
& \quad \text{(vfuture) (future?reply.freem future)} \mid \\
& \quad (\text{sender!reply | Account[self, balance + amount]})\right) \\
& + \text{self?stop.freem self.done} \\
& + \text{self?reply.fail self}
\end{align*}
\]

Compared to the process in Example 3 here the notification from the recipient account is received from the mailbox future, which is created locally during the handling of the credit message. The rest of the process is the same as before. This definition of Account and the one in Example 3 can both be shown to be consistent with the declaration

\[
\text{Account} : (self : ?(\text{debit}[\text{int}, \rho]^* \cdot \text{credit}[\text{int}, !\text{debit}[\text{int}, \rho], \rho]^* + \text{stop}), \text{balance : int;}\emptyset)
\]
where $\rho \equiv \texttt{reply}$. In particular, the dependencies between $\texttt{self}$ and $\texttt{future}$ that originate in this version of $\texttt{Account}$ are not observable from outside $\texttt{Account}$ itself.

The use of multiple mailboxes and the interleaving of blocking operations on them may increase the likelihood of programming mistakes causing mismatched communications and/or deadlocks. However, these errors can be detected by a suitable typing discipline such as the one proposed in this paper. Types can also be used to mitigate the runtime overhead resulting from the use of multiple mailboxes. Here, for example, the typing of $\texttt{future}$ guarantees that this mailbox is used for receiving a single message and that $\texttt{future}$ is empty by the time $\texttt{free future}$ is performed. A clever compiler can take advantage of this information to statically optimize both the allocation and the deallocation of this mailbox.

### 4.2 Master-workers parallelism

In this example we model a $\texttt{master}$ process that receives tasks to perform from a $\texttt{client}$. For each task, the master creates a pool of $\texttt{workers}$ and assigns each worker a share of work. The master waits for all partial results from the workers before sending the final result back to the client and making itself available again. The number of workers may depend on some quantity possibly related to the task to be performed and that is known at runtime only.

Below we define three processes corresponding to the three states in which the master process can be, and we leave $\texttt{Worker}$ unspecified:

\begin{align*}
\texttt{Available}(\texttt{self}) & \triangleq \texttt{self} ? \texttt{task}(\texttt{client}) \cdot (\nu \texttt{pool}) \texttt{CreatePool}[\texttt{self}, \texttt{pool}, \texttt{client}] \\
& \quad + \texttt{free self}.\texttt{done} \\
\texttt{CreatePool}(\texttt{self}, \texttt{pool}, \texttt{client}) & \triangleq \begin{cases} 
\texttt{if more workers needed then} \\
(\nu \texttt{worker})(\texttt{worker}! \texttt{work}[\texttt{pool}] \mid \texttt{Worker}[\texttt{worker}]) \mid \\
\texttt{CreatePool}[\texttt{self}, \texttt{pool}, \texttt{client}] \\
\texttt{else} \\
\texttt{CollectResults}[\texttt{self}, \texttt{pool}, \texttt{client}]
\end{cases} \\
\texttt{CollectResults}(\texttt{self}, \texttt{pool}, \texttt{client}) & \triangleq \begin{cases} 
\texttt{pool} ? \texttt{result}.\texttt{CollectResults}[\texttt{self}, \texttt{pool}, \texttt{client}] \\
+ \texttt{free pool}.(\texttt{client}! \texttt{result} \mid \texttt{Available}[\texttt{self}])
\end{cases}
\end{align*}

The “$\texttt{if condition then P else Q}$” form used here can be encoded in the mailbox calculus and is typed similarly to the non-deterministic choice of Example 22. These definitions can be shown to be consistent with the following declarations:

\begin{align*}
\texttt{Available} : (\texttt{self} : ?\texttt{task}![\ast \texttt{result}]; \emptyset) \\
\texttt{CreatePool}, \texttt{CollectResults} : (\texttt{self} : ?\texttt{task}![\ast \texttt{result}], \texttt{pool} : ?\texttt{result}, \texttt{client} : !\texttt{result}; \\
\{\texttt{pool, self}\} \sqcup \{\texttt{pool, client}\})
\end{align*}

The usual implementation of this coordination pattern requires the programmer to keep track of the number of active workers using a counter that is decremented each time a partial result is collected [27]. When the counter reaches zero, the master knows that all the workers have finished their job and notifies the client. In the mailbox calculus, we achieve the same goal by means of a dedicated mailbox $\texttt{pool}$ from which the partial results are collected: when $\texttt{pool}$ becomes disposable, it means that no more active workers remain.

### 4.3 Encoding of binary sessions

Session types [23, 25] have become a popular formalism for the specification and enforcement of structured protocols through static analysis. A session is a private communication channel shared by processes that interact through one of its $\texttt{endpoint}$. Each endpoint is associated
Mailbox Types for Unordered Interactions

with a session type that specifies the type, direction and order of messages that are supposed to be exchanged through that endpoint. A typical syntax for session types in the case of

\[ T, S ::= \text{end} \mid ?[\tau].T \mid ![\tau].T \mid T \& S \mid T \oplus S \]

A session type \(?[\tau].T\) describes an endpoint used for receiving a message of type \(\tau\) and then according to \(T\). Dually, a session type \(![\tau].T\) describes an endpoint used for sending a message of type \(\tau\) and then according to \(T\). An external choice \(T \& S\) describes an endpoint used for receiving a selection (either \text{left} or \text{right}) and then according to the corresponding continuation (either \(T\) or \(S\)). Dually, an internal choice \(T \oplus S\) describes an endpoint used for making a selection and then according to the corresponding continuation. Communication safety and progress of a binary session are guaranteed by the fact that its two endpoints are linear resources typed by dual session types, where the dual of \(T\) is obtained by swapping inputs with outputs and internal with external choices.

In this example we encode sessions and session types using mailboxes and mailbox types. We encode a session as a non-uniform, concurrent object. The object is “concurrent” because with a session, according to the session types the sum of two numbers exchanged through a session

As an example, suppose we want to model a system where Alice asks Carol to compute the sum of two numbers exchanged through a session \(s\). Alice and Carol use the session according to the session types \(T \triangleq ![\text{int}] . ![\text{int}] . ?[\text{int}] . \text{end}\) and \(T \triangleq ?[\text{int}] . ?[\text{int}] . ![\text{int}] . \text{end}\).
respectively. The system is modeled as the process
\[ \nu \text{alice}((\nu \text{carol})(\nu s)(\text{Alice}[\text{alice}, s] | \text{Carol}[\text{carol}, s] | \text{Session}_T[s])) \tag{4} \]
where Alice and Carol are defined as follows:

Alice(self, s) \triangleq s!send[4, self] | self?reply(s).
(s!send[2, self] | self?reply(s).
(s!receive[1, self] | self?reply(x, s).
(system!print_int[x] | free self.done))

Carol(self, s) \triangleq s!receive[1, self] | self?reply(x, s).
(s!receive[1, self] | self?reply(y, s).
(s!send[x + y, self] | self?reply(s).free self.done))

The process \text{Alice} and the definitions of \text{Alice} and \text{Carol} are well typed. In general, \text{Session}_T is consistent with the declaration \text{Session}_T : (self : ?(E(T) \cdot E(T)); \emptyset) where E(T) is the pattern defined by the following equations:

E(end) \triangleq 1
E(?[T].T) \triangleq receive![reply[r, !E(T)]]
E(![T].T) \triangleq send[r, !reply[!E(T)]]
E(T \& S) \triangleq receive![left[!E(T)] + right[!E(S)]]
E(T \oplus S) \triangleq left[!reply[!E(T)]] + right[!reply[!E(S)]]

This encoding of binary sessions extends easily to internal and external choices with arbitrary labels and also to recursive session types by interpreting both the syntax of \text{T} and the definition of \text{Session}_T coinductively. The usual regularity condition ensures that \text{Session}_T is finitely representable. Finally, note that the notion of subtyping for encoded session types induced by Definition \text{1} coincides with the conventional one \text{1}. Thus, the mailbox type system subsumes a rich session type system where Theorem \text{2} corresponds to the well-known communication safety and progress properties of sessions.

### 4.4 Encoding of sessions with forks and joins

We have seen that it is possible to share the output capability on a mailbox among several processes. We can take advantage of this feature to extend session types with forks and joins:

\[ T, S ::= \text{end} | ?[T].T | ![T].T | T \& S | T \oplus S | \forall i \leq n.m_i[\tau_i]; T | \forall i \leq n.m_i[\tau_i]; T \]

The idea is that the session type \( \forall i \leq n.m_i[\tau_i]; T \) describes and endpoint that can be used for sending all of the \( m_i \) messages, and then according to \( T \). The difference between \( \forall i \leq n.m_i[\tau_i]; T \) and a session type of the form \( ![\tau_i] \ldots ![\tau_n]; T \) is that the \( m_i \) messages can be sent by independent processes (for example, by parallel workers) in whatever order instead of by a single sender. Dually, the session type \( \forall i \leq n.m_i[\tau_i]; T \) describes an endpoint that can be used for collecting all of the \( m_i \) messages, and then according to \( T \). Forks and joins are dual to each other, just like simple outputs are dual to simple inputs. The tags \( m_i \) need not be distinct, but equal tags must correspond to equal argument types.

The extension of Session\text{1} to forks and joins is shown below:

Session_\forall i \leq n.m_i[\tau_i]; T(self) \triangleq self?send(s).self?receive(r).Join_\forall i \leq n.m_i[\tau_i]; T[self, s, r]

Session_\forall i \leq n.m_i[\tau_i]; T(self) \triangleq Session_\forall i \leq n.m_i[\tau_i]; T[self]

Join_\forall i \leq n.m_i[\tau_i]; T(self, s, r) \triangleq \begin{cases} s!reply[self] \mid r!reply[self] \mid Session_T[self] & \text{if } I = \emptyset \\
self?m_i(x_i).\forall i \leq n.m_i[\tau_i]; T[self, s, r] & \text{if } i \in I \\
self?m_i(x_i).\forall i \leq n.m_i[\tau_i]; T[self, s, r] & \text{if } i \in I \\
Session_T[self] & \text{if } I = \emptyset \end{cases}
As in the case of simple interactions, sender and receiver manifest their willingness to interact by storing \texttt{send} and \texttt{receive} messages into the session’s mailbox \texttt{self}. At that point, \texttt{Join}_T[s, r] forwards all the \texttt{m}_i messages coming from the sender side to the receiver side, in some arbitrary order (case \( i \in I \)). When there are no more messages to forward (case \( I = \emptyset \)) both sender and receiver are notified with a \texttt{reply} message that carries a reference to the session’s endpoint, with its type updated according to the rest of the continuation.

The encoding of session types extended to forks and joins follows easily:

\[
\delta(\otimes_{i \in I} \texttt{m}_i[\tau_i]; T) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \texttt{send}[\texttt{!reply}[\texttt{!}T]] \cdot \prod_{i \in I} \texttt{m}_i[\tau_i]
\]

\[
\delta(\exists_{i \in I} \texttt{m}_i[\tau_i]; T) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \texttt{receive}[\texttt{!}(() \prod_{i \in I} \texttt{m}_i[\tau_i]) \cdot \texttt{reply}[\texttt{!}T]]
\]

An alternative definition of \texttt{Join}_T that forwards messages as soon as they become available can be obtained by providing suitable input actions for each \( i \in I \) instead of picking an arbitrary \( i \in I \).

\section{Related Work}

\textbf{Concurrent Objects.} There are analogies between actors and concurrent objects. Both entities are equipped with a unique identifier through which they receive messages, they may interact with several concurrent clients and their behavior may vary over time, as the entity interacts with its clients. Therefore, static analysis techniques developed for concurrent objects may be applicable to actors (and vice versa). Relevant works exploring behavioral type systems for concurrent objects include those of Najim \textit{et al.} \cite{36}, Ravara and Vasconcelos \cite{43}, and Puntigam \textit{et al.} \cite{41, 42}. As in the pure actor model, each object has a unique mailbox and the input capability on that mailbox cannot be transferred. The mailbox calculus does not have these constraints. A notable variation is the model studied by Ravara and Vasconcelos \cite{43}, which accounts for \textit{distributed objects}: there can be several copies of an object that react to messages targeted to the same mailbox. Another common trait of these works is that the type discipline focuses on sequences of method invocations and types contain (abstract) information on the internal state of objects and on state transitions. Indeed, types are either finite-state automata \cite{36}, or terms of a process algebra \cite{43} or tokens annotated with state transitions \cite{42}. In contrast, mailbox types focus on the content of a mailbox and sequencing is expressed in the type of explicit continuations. The properties enforced by the type systems in these works differ significantly. Some do not consider deadlock freedom \cite{43, 11}, others do not account for out-of-order message processing \cite{11}. Details on the enforced properties also vary. For example, the notion of protocol conformance used by Ravara and Vasconcelos \cite{43} is such that any message sent to an object that is unable to handle that message, but can do so in some future state is accepted. In our setting, this would mean allowing to send a \texttt{release} message to a free lock if the lock is acquired later on, or allowing to send a \texttt{reply} message to an account if the account will later be involved in a transaction.

The most closely related work among those addressing concurrent objects is the one by Crafa and Padovani \cite{14}, who propose the use of the Objective Join Calculus as a model for non-uniform, concurrent objects and develop a type discipline that can be used for enforcing concurrent object protocols. Mailbox types have been directly inspired by their types of concurrent objects. There are two main differences between the work of Crafa and Padovani \cite{14} and our own. First, in the Objective Join Calculus every object is associated with a single mailbox, just like in the pure actor model \cite{22, 1}, meaning that mailboxes are not first class. As a consequence, the types considered by Crafa and Padovani \cite{14} all have
an (implicit) output capability. Second, in the Objective Join Calculus input operations are defined atomically on molecules of messages, whereas in the mailbox calculus messages are received one at a time. As a consequence, the type of a mailbox in the work of Crafa and Padovani [14] is invariant, whereas the same mailbox may have different types at different times in the mailbox calculus (Example 11). Remarkably, this substantial difference has no impact on the structure of the type language that we consider.

**Static analysis of actors.** Srinivasan and Mycroft [45] define a type discipline for controlling the ownership of messages and ensuring actor isolation, but consider only uniformly typed mailboxes and do not address mailbox conformance or deadlock freedom.

Christakis and Sagonas [10] describe a static analysis technique whose aim is to ensure matching between send and receive operations in actors. The technique, which is described only informally and does not account for deadlocks, has been implemented in a tool called dialyzer and used for the analysis of Erlang programs.

Crafa [13] defines a behavioural type system for actors aimed at ensuring that the order of messages produced and consumed by an actor follows a prescribed protocol. Protocols are expressed as types and describe the behavior of actors rather than the content of the mailboxes they use. Deadlock freedom is not addressed.

Charousset et al. [8] describe the design and implementation of CAF, the C++ Actor Framework. Among the features of CAF is the use of type-safe message passing interfaces that makes it possible to statically detect a number of protocol violations by piggybacking on the C++ type system. There are close analogies between CAF’s message passing interfaces and mailbox types with output capability: both are equipped with a subset semantics and report only those messages that can be stored into the mailbox through a mailbox reference with that type. Charousset et al. [8] point out that this feature fosters the decoupling of actors and enables incremental program recompilation.

Giachino et al. [19, 34] define a type system for the deadlock analysis of actors making use of implicit futures. Mailbox conformance and deadlocks due to communications are not taken into account.

Fowler et al. [17] formalize channel-based and mailbox-based communicating systems, highlighting the differences between the two models and studying type-preserving encodings between them. Mailboxes in their work are uniformly typed, but the availability of union types make it possible to host heterogeneous values within the same mailbox. This however may lead to a loss of precision in typing. This phenomenon, dubbed type pollution by Fowler et al. [17], is observable to some extent also in our typing discipline and can be mitigated by the use of multiple mailboxes (cf. Section 4.2). Finally, Fowler et al. [17] leave the extension of their investigation to behaviorally-typed language of actors as future work. Our typing discipline is a potential candidate for this investigation and addresses a more general setting thanks to the support for first-class mailboxes.

**Sessions and actors.** The encoding of binary sessions into actors discussed in Section 4.3 is new and has been inspired by the encoding of binary sessions into the linear $\pi$-calculus [30, 15], whereby each message is paired with a continuation. In our case, the continuation, instead of being a fresh (linear) channel, is either the mailbox of the peer or that of the session. This style of communication with explicit continuation passing is idiomatic in the actor model, which is based on asynchronous communications. The encoding discussed in Section 4.3 can be generalized to multiparty sessions by defining Session$_T$ as a medium process through which messages are exchanged between the parties of the session. This idea has been put
forward by Caires and Pérez [5] to encode multiparty sessions using binary sessions.

Mostrous and Vasconcelos [35] study a session type system for enforcing ordered dyadic interactions in core Erlang. They use references for distinguishing messages pertaining to different sessions, making use of the advanced pattern matching capabilities of Erlang. Their type system guarantees a weaker form of mailbox conformance, whereby junk messages may be present at the end of a computation, and does not consider deadlock freedom. Compared to our encoding of binary sessions, their approach does not require a medium process representing the session itself.

Neykova and Yoshida [37] propose a framework based on multiparty session types for the specification and implementation of actor systems with guarantees on the order of interactions. This approach is applicable when designing an entire system and both the network topology and the communication protocol can be established in advance. Fowler [16] builds upon the work of Neykova and Yoshida to obtain a runtime protocol monitoring mechanism for Erlang. Charalambides et al. [7] extend the multiparty session approach with a protocol specification language that is parametric in the number of actors participating in the system. In contrast to these approaches based on multiparty/global session types, our approach ensures mailbox conformance and deadlock freedom of a system compositionally, as the system is assembled out of smaller components, and permits the modeling of systems with a dynamic network topology or with a varying number of interacting processes.

Linear logic. Shortly after its introduction, linear logic has been proposed as a specification language suitable for concurrency. Following this idea, Kobayashi and Yonezawa [31, 32] have studied formal models of concurrent objects and actors based on linear logic. More recently, a direct correspondence between propositions of linear logic and session types has been discovered [6, 48, 33]. There are several analogies between the mailbox type system and the proof system of linear logic. Mailbox types with output capability are akin to positive propositions, with \(!0\) and \(!1\) respectively playing the roles of \(0\) and \(1\) in linear logic and \(!E + F\) and \(!E \cdot F\) corresponding to \(\oplus\) and \(\otimes\). Mailbox types with input capability are akin to negative propositions, with \(?0\) and \(?1\) corresponding to \(\top\) and \(\bot\) and \(?E + F\) and \(?E \cdot F\) corresponding to \(&\) and \(\exists\). Rules \([t-fail]\), \([t-free]\) and \([t-branch]\) have been directly inspired from the rules for \(\top\), \(\bot\) and \(&\) in the classical sequent calculus for linear logic. Subtyping corresponds to inverse linear implication and its properties are consistent with those of the logic connectives according to the above interpretation. A noteworthy difference between our type system and those for session types based on linear logic [6, 48, 33] is the need for dependency graphs to ensure deadlock freedom (Section 3.2). There are two reasons that call for such auxiliary mechanism in our setting. First, the rule \([t-par]\) is akin to a symmetric cut rule. Dependency graphs are necessary to detect mutual dependencies that may consequently arise (Example 21). Second, unlike session endpoints that are linear resources, mailbox references can be used non-linearly. Thus, the multiplicity of dependencies, and not just the presence or absence thereof, is relevant (Example 13).

6 Concluding Remarks

We have presented a mailbox type system for reasoning about processes that communicate through first-class, unordered mailboxes. The type system enforces mailbox conformance, deadlock freedom and, for a significant class of processes, junk freedom as well. In sharp contrast with session types, mailbox types embody the unordered nature of mailboxes and enable the description of mailboxes concurrently accessed by several processes, abstracting
away from the state and behavior of the objects/actors/processes using these mailboxes. The fact that a mailbox may have different types during its lifetime is entirely encapsulated by the typing rules and not apparent from mailbox types themselves. The mailbox calculus subsumes the actor model and allows us to analyze systems with a dynamic network topology and a varying number of processes mixing different concurrency abstractions.

There are two natural extensions of the mailbox calculus that we have not incorporated in the formal development for the sake of simplicity. First, it is possible to relax the syntax of guarded processes to accommodate actions referring to different mailboxes as well as actions representing timeouts. This extension makes the typing rules for guards more complex to formulate but enhances expressiveness and precision of typing (see Appendix D). Second, it is possible to allow multiple processes to receive messages from the same mailbox by introducing a distinguished capability that identifies shared mailboxes. The notion of type combination (Definition 16) must be suitably revised for deadling with shared mailboxes and avoid the soundness problems discussed in Example 17. With this extension in place, it might also be possible to replace recursion with replication in the calculus.

Concerning further developments, the intriguing analogies between the mailbox type system and linear logic pointed out in Section 5 surely deserve a formal investigation. On the practical side, a primary goal to fulfill is the development of a type checking/inference algorithm for the proposed typing discipline. Subtyping is decidable and a type checking algorithm for a slightly simpler type language has already been developed [39]. We are confident that a type checking algorithm for the mailbox calculus can be obtained by reusing much of these known results. Concerning the applicability of the approach to real-world programming languages, one promising approach is the development of a tool for the analysis of Java bytecode, possibly with the help of Java annotations, along the lines of what has already been done for Kilim [45]. Other ideas for further developments include the extension of pattern atoms so as to accommodate Erlang-style matching of messages and the implementation of optimal matching algorithms driven by type information.

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A Supplementary Properties

A.1 Properties of subtyping

► Proposition 26. If \( \tau \leq \sigma \), then \( \tau \) reliable implies \( \sigma \) reliable and \( \sigma \) usable implies \( \tau \) usable.

Proof. We only prove the part of the statement concerning reliability, since usability is analogous, and we prove the reverse implication. The interesting case is when \( \tau = \?E \). From the hypothesis \( \tau \leq \sigma \) we deduce \( \sigma = \?F \) and \( E \sqsubseteq F \). Now if \( F \sqsubseteq 0 \) we have \( E \sqsubseteq F \sqsubseteq 0 \) by transitivity of \( \sqsubseteq \). Hence, \( \sigma \) unreliable implies \( \tau \) unreliable.

► Proposition 27. If \( m[\tau] \cdot F \sqsubseteq E \) and \( F \sqsubseteq 0 \) and \( E \backslash m[\tau] \) is defined, then \( \tau \leq \sigma \) and \( F \sqsubseteq E \backslash [m[\tau]] \).

Proof. Let \( A \in m[\tau] \cdot F \sqsubseteq E \). From the hypothesis \( F \sqsubseteq 0 \) we deduce that \( A = \langle m[\tau] \rangle \cup \langle m, [\tau_i] \rangle \) for some \( m, [\tau_i] \in F \). From the hypothesis \( m[\tau] \cdot F \sqsubseteq E \) and the definition of \( \sqsubseteq \) we deduce that there exist \( \rho \) and \( \tau_i \) such that \( \langle m[\rho] \rangle \cup \langle m, [\tau_i] \rangle \in [E] \) and \( \tau_i \leq \rho \) and \( \tau_i \leq \tau_i \) for every \( i \in I \). From the hypothesis \( E \backslash [m[\tau]] \) is defined we deduce that \( \tau \leq \sigma \), hence \( \tau \leq \sigma \). Also, from the definition of derivative, we have \( \langle m, [\tau_i] \rangle \in [E \backslash [m[\tau]]] \). We conclude \( F \sqsubseteq E \backslash [m[\tau]] \).

We extend the terminology used for type classification (Definition 10) to type environments as well. We say that \( \Gamma \) is reliable/irrelevant if all the types in its range are reliable/irrelevant.

► Example 28. The global assumptions we made on types are aimed at ensuring that in a judgment \( u : \tau, \Gamma \vdash P \) where \( \tau \) is relevant and \( \Gamma \) is reliable the name \( u \) does indeed occur free in \( P \). If we allowed unreliable arguments, then it would be possible to derive

\[
u : \tau, v : ?m[\emptyset] \vdash v ?m(x) . \text{fail} \ x :: \emptyset
\]

meaning that \( u \) is not guaranteed to occur even if \( \tau \) is relevant. Analogously, if we allowed unusable arguments, then it would be possible to derive

\[
u : \tau, v : !m[\emptyset] \vdash (\nu a)(v !m[a] | \text{fail} \ a) :: (\nu a)[v, a]
\]

again meaning that \( u \) is not guaranteed to occur even if \( \tau \) is relevant.

A.2 Properties of dependency graphs

► Proposition 29 (structure preserving transitions). The following properties hold:

1. If \( \varphi_1 \sqcup \varphi_2 \xrightarrow{u-v} \varphi \), then \( \varphi = \varphi' \sqcup \varphi'' \) for some \( \varphi' \) and \( \varphi'' \).
2. If \( (\nu a)\varphi \xrightarrow{u-v} \psi \), then \( \psi = (\nu a)\varphi' \) for some \( \varphi' \).

Proof. A straightforward induction on the derivation of the transition.
Because of the previous result, in the proofs that follow we only consider transitions where the structure of the dependency graph is preserved.

**Proposition 30.** If \( \varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2 \xrightarrow{u-v} \varphi_1' \cup \varphi_2' \), then \( (\psi \cup \varphi_1) \cup \varphi_2 \xrightarrow{u-v} (\psi \cup \varphi_1') \cup \varphi_2' \).

**Proof.** By induction on the derivation of \( \varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2 \xrightarrow{u-v} \varphi_1' \cup \varphi_2' \) and by cases on the last rule applied. We omit the discussion of \( \text{g-right} \) which is symmetric to \( \text{g-left} \).

Case \( \text{g-left} \): Then \( \varphi_1 \xrightarrow{u-v} \varphi_1' \) and \( \varphi_2 = \varphi_2' \). We conclude by applying \( \text{g-right} \), then \( \text{g-left} \).

Case \( \text{g-trans} \): Then \( \varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2 \xrightarrow{u-v} \varphi_1'' \cup \varphi_2'' \xrightarrow{w-v} \varphi_1' \cup \varphi_2' \). Using the induction hypothesis we derive \( (\psi \cup \varphi_1) \cup \varphi_2 \xrightarrow{u-v} (\psi \cup \varphi_1'') \cup \varphi_2'' \xrightarrow{w-v} (\psi \cup \varphi_1') \cup \varphi_2' \) and we conclude with one application of \( \text{g-trans} \).

**Proposition 31.** If \( \varphi_1 \cup (\varphi_2 \cup \varphi_3) \xrightarrow{u-v} \varphi_1' \cup (\varphi_2' \cup \varphi_3') \), then \( (\varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2) \cup \varphi_3 \xrightarrow{u-v} (\varphi_1' \cup \varphi_2') \cup \varphi_3' \).

**Proof.** By induction on the derivation of \( \varphi_1 \cup (\varphi_2 \cup \varphi_3) \xrightarrow{u-v} \varphi_1' \cup (\varphi_2' \cup \varphi_3) \) and by cases on the last rule applied.

Case \( \text{g-left} \): Then \( \varphi_1 \xrightarrow{u-v} \varphi_1' \) and \( \varphi_2 = \varphi_2' \) and \( \varphi_3 = \varphi_3' \). We conclude with two applications of \( \text{g-left} \).

Case \( \text{g-right} \): Then \( \varphi_1 = \varphi_1' \) and \( \varphi_2 \cup \varphi_3 \xrightarrow{u-v} \varphi_2' \cup \varphi_3' \). We conclude by Proposition 30.

Case \( \text{g-trans} \): Then \( \varphi_1 \cup (\varphi_2 \cup \varphi_3) \xrightarrow{u-v} \varphi_1'' \cup (\varphi_2'' \cup \varphi_3'') \xrightarrow{w-v} \varphi_1' \cup (\varphi_2' \cup \varphi_3') \). Using the induction hypothesis we deduce \( (\varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2) \cup \varphi_3 \xrightarrow{u-v} (\varphi_1'' \cup \varphi_2'') \cup (\varphi_2' \cup \varphi_3') \xrightarrow{w-v} (\varphi_1' \cup \varphi_2') \cup \varphi_3' \). We conclude with one application of \( \text{g-trans} \).

**Proposition 32.** If \( (\nu a)\varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2 \xrightarrow{u-v} (\nu a)\varphi_1' \cup \varphi_2' \) and \( a \notin \text{fn}(\varphi_2) \), then \( (\nu a)(\varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2) \xrightarrow{u-v} (\nu a)(\varphi_1' \cup \varphi_2') \).

**Proof.** By induction on the derivation of \( (\nu a)\varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2 \xrightarrow{u-v} (\nu a)\varphi_1' \cup \varphi_2' \) and by cases on the last rule applied. We do not discuss rule \( \text{g-right} \) which is straightforward.

Case \( \text{g-left} \): Then \( (\nu a)\varphi_1 \xrightarrow{u-v} (\nu a)\varphi_1' \) and \( \varphi_2 = \varphi_2' \). From \( \text{g-new} \) we deduce \( \varphi_1 \xrightarrow{u-v} \varphi_1' \) and \( a \neq u, v \). We conclude with one application of \( \text{g-left} \) and an application of \( \text{g-new} \).

Case \( \text{g-trans} \): Then \( (\nu a)\varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2 \xrightarrow{u-v} (\nu a)\varphi_1'' \cup \varphi_2'' \xrightarrow{w-v} (\nu a)\varphi_1' \cup \varphi_2' \). From the induction hypothesis we deduce \( (\nu a)(\varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2) \xrightarrow{u-v} (\nu a)(\varphi_1'' \cup \varphi_2'') \xrightarrow{w-v} (\nu a)(\varphi_1' \cup \varphi_2') \). We conclude with one application of \( \text{g-trans} \).

**Proposition 33.** The following properties hold:

1. \( \text{dep}(\emptyset \cup \varphi) = \text{dep}(\varphi) \)
2. \( \text{dep}(\varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2) = \text{dep}(\varphi_2 \cup \varphi_1) \)
3. \( \text{dep}(\varphi_1 \cup (\varphi_2 \cup \varphi_3)) = \text{dep}(\varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2) \cup \varphi_3 \)
4. If \( a \notin \text{fn}(\varphi_2) \), then \( \text{dep}(\nu a)\varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2) = \text{dep}(\nu a)(\varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2)) \).

**Proof.** Items 1 and 2 are trivial. Items 3 and 4 respectively follow from Proposition 31 and Proposition 32.
A.3 Properties of type environments

Proposition 34. If $\Gamma \subseteq \Delta$, then $\Gamma$ reliable implies $\Delta$ reliable and $\Delta$ usable implies $\Gamma$ usable.

Proof. Immediate from Proposition 26.

Proposition 35. If both $\Gamma_1 \parallel \Gamma_2$ and $\Delta_1, \Delta_2$ are defined and $\Gamma_1 \subseteq \Delta_i$, then $\Gamma_1 \parallel \Gamma_2 \subseteq \Delta_1, \Delta_2$.

Proof. We discuss a few notable cases when $u \in (\text{dom}(\Gamma_1) \cap \text{dom}(\Gamma_2) \cap \text{dom}(\Delta_1)) \setminus \text{dom}(\Delta_1)$.

Case $\Gamma_1(u) = !E$ and $\Gamma_2(u) = !F$ and $\Delta_1(u) = !G$. Then $!E \leq !G$ and $!F \leq !1$, which means $G \subseteq E$ and $1 \subseteq F$. From the properties of $\subseteq$ we deduce $G \subseteq E \subseteq 1$ and $F \subseteq 1$. We conclude $\Gamma_1 \parallel \Gamma_2(u) = !(E \cdot F) \leq !G = (\Delta_1, \Delta_2)(u)$. We deduce that there exist $\Gamma(\Delta_1, \Delta_2)$.

Case $\Gamma_1(u) = ?(E \cdot F)$ and $\Gamma_2(u) = ?E$ and $\Delta_1(u) = ?G$. Then $?(E \cdot F) \leq ?G$ and $?E \leq ?1$, which means $E \cdot F \subseteq G$ and $1 \subseteq E$. From the properties of $\subseteq$ we deduce $F \subseteq 1 \cdot F \subseteq F \subseteq G$. We conclude $\Gamma_1 \parallel \Gamma_2(u) = ?F \leq ?G = (\Delta_1, \Delta_2)(u)$.

Case $\Gamma_1(u) = ?(E \cdot F)$ and $\Gamma_2(u) = ?E$ and $\Delta_1(u) = ?G$. Then $?(E \cdot F) \leq ?G$ and $?E \leq ?1$, which means $E \cdot F \cdot G \subseteq 1$ and $1 \subseteq E$. From the properties of $\subseteq$ we deduce $F \cdot G \subseteq 1$. We conclude $\Gamma_1 \parallel \Gamma_2(u) = ?F \leq ?G = (\Delta_1, \Delta_2)(u)$.

Proposition 36. If $\Gamma$ is usable and $\Delta \parallel \Delta$ is reliable, then $\Delta$ is reliable.

Proof. We discuss only the interesting case when $\Gamma(u) = !E$ and $\Delta(u) = ?(E \cdot F)$, the others being symmetric or simpler. Then $(\Delta \parallel \Delta)(u) = ?F$. From the hypothesis that $\Gamma$ is usable we deduce $!E \not\subseteq !E$, that is $E \not\subseteq 0$. From the hypothesis that $\Delta \parallel \Delta$ is reliable we deduce $?F \not\subseteq ?0$, that is $F \not\subseteq 0$. We conclude $E \cdot F \not\subseteq 0$.

B Proof of Theorem 23

Lemma 37. If $\Gamma, x : \tau \vdash P :: \varphi$ and $a \notin \text{dom}(\Gamma)$, then $\Gamma, a : \tau \vdash P[a/x] :: \varphi[a/x]$.

Proof. A straightforward induction on the derivation of $\Gamma, x : \tau \vdash P :: \varphi$.

Lemma 38. If $\Gamma \vdash P :: \varphi$ and $P \equiv Q$, then $\Gamma \vdash Q :: \varphi$.

Proof. An easy induction on the derivation of $P \equiv Q$, reasoning by cases on the last rule applied. The most critical points concern dependency graphs, whose structure changes as processes and restrictions are rearranged. Proposition 33 provides all the arguments to conclude that these changes do not affect the semantics of dependency graphs and therefore that no cycles are introduced.

Theorem 23. If $\Gamma$ is reliable and $\Gamma \vdash P :: \varphi$ and $P \rightarrow Q$, then $\Gamma \vdash Q :: \varphi$.

Proof. By induction on the derivation of $P \rightarrow Q$ and by cases on the last rule applied. Case $[\text{IL-READ}]$ Then $P = a \cdot \mathbb{m}[\mathbb{x}] \mid a?\mathbb{m}(\mathbb{x}), P + G \rightarrow P[\mathbb{y}/\mathbb{x}] = Q$. From $[\text{IL-COND}]$ and $[\text{IL-PAR}]$ we deduce that there exist $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \varphi_1$ and $\varphi_2$ such that:

$\Gamma \leq \Gamma_1 \parallel \Gamma_2$

$\varphi \Rightarrow \varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2$
Lemma 37 we deduce the hypothesis that all process definitions are well typed we know that

\[ \{ \text{connected graph with domain} \} \]

\[ \{ a \in \text{Proposition 27 and} \} \]

\[ \{ \tau \} \]

From the definition of \( \Gamma \) and the precongruence and transitivity properties of \( \sqsubseteq \) we derive \( m[\varnothing] \cdot F \subseteq E \). From the hypothesis that \( \Gamma \) is reliable we deduce \( F \sqsubseteq 0 \). From Proposition 37 and the fact that \( F \subseteq E/m[\varnothing] \). From Lemma 37 we deduce \( a : ?F_1, \Delta, \varnothing \vdash P : \psi \). To conclude we apply \( F_1 \approx E/m[\varnothing] \)

From the fact that \( \varphi \) is acyclic and the properties of \( \varphi_1 \) and \( \varphi_2 \) we deduce that \( \{ \varnothing \} \cap \text{dom}(\Delta) = \emptyset \). Indeed, suppose by contradiction that \( u \in \{ \varnothing \} \cap \text{dom}(\Delta) \) and observe that \( u \) cannot be \( a \). Then \( \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \{ a, u \} \) and \( \varphi_2 \Rightarrow \{ a, u \} \), so \( \varphi \Rightarrow \{ a, a \} \) which is absurd.

From the definition of subtype environment and of \( \Gamma_1 \parallel \Gamma_2 \) we deduce that:

\[ \Gamma_1 = a : E', \Gamma_1' \text{ where } \Gamma_1' \subseteq \text{E/m[}\varnothing] \text{ and } \Gamma_1' \subseteq \varnothing : F \]

\[ \Gamma_1 = a : ?(F' \cdot F'), \Gamma_2' \text{ where } \Gamma_1' \parallel \Gamma_2' \leq \Gamma \]

\[ \text{From the definition of } \sqsubseteq, \text{ the precongruence and transitivity properties of } \sqsubseteq \text{ we derive } m[\varnothing] \cdot F' \subseteq F' \subseteq E \]

Case \[ \text{free} \quad a.Q \] Then \( P = (\nu a)(\text{free} a.Q + G) \rightarrow Q \). From \( \text{SUB} \) and \( \text{NEW} \) we deduce that there exist \( \Delta \) and \( \psi \) such that:

\[ \Gamma \leq \Delta \]

\[ \varphi \Rightarrow (\nu a)\psi \]

\[ \Delta, a : ?1 \vdash \text{free} a.Q + G : \psi. \]

From \( \text{SUB} \) and \( \text{GUARD} \) we deduce that there exist \( \Delta', E \) and \( \psi' \) such that:

\[ \Delta, a : ?1 \leq \Delta', a : ?E \]

\[ \Delta', a : ?E \vdash \text{free} a.Q + G \]

\[ \psi \Rightarrow \{ a, \text{dom}(\Delta') \} \]

From \( \text{BRANCH} \) and \( \text{DEF} \) we deduce that there exists \( \psi' \) such that \( \Delta' \vdash Q : \psi' \). From the well formedness condition on judgments and the definition of \( \leq \) for type environments, we know that \( \text{dom}(\psi') \subseteq \text{dom}(\Delta') \subseteq \text{dom}(\Delta) \subseteq \text{dom}(\Gamma) \). From the fact that \( \psi \) implies a connected graph with domain \( \{ a \} \cup \text{dom}(\Delta') \) we deduce \( \varphi \Rightarrow \psi \Rightarrow \psi' \). We conclude with one application of \( \text{DEF} \)

Case \[ \text{DEF} \quad \text{Then } P = X[\varnothing] \rightarrow R[\varnothing] \]

From \( \text{SUB} \) and \( \text{DEF} \) we deduce that there exist \( \varnothing \) and \( \psi \) such that \( \Gamma \leq \varnothing : \tau \) and \( X : (\tau : \psi, \psi) \) and \( \varphi \Rightarrow \psi[\varnothing/\varnothing] \).

From the hypothesis that all process definitions are well typed we know that \( \varnothing : \tau \vdash R : \psi \). From Lemma 37 we deduce \( \varnothing : \tau \vdash R[\varnothing] : \psi[\varnothing/\varnothing] \). To conclude we apply \( \text{SUB} \)
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Case [6-PAR]. Then $P = P_1 | P_2 \rightarrow P_1' | P_2 = Q$ where $P_1 \rightarrow P_1'$. From [T-SUB] and [T-PAR] we deduce that there exist $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \varphi_1$ and $\varphi_2$ such that $\Gamma_i \vdash P_i :: \varphi_i$ for $i = 1, 2$ where $\Gamma \leq \Gamma_1 \parallel \Gamma_2$ and $\varphi \Rightarrow \varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2$. From the hypothesis that $\Gamma$ is reliable and Proposition 34 we deduce that $\Gamma_1 \parallel \Gamma_2$ is reliable. From the assumption that types are usable and Proposition 36 we deduce that $\Gamma_1$ is reliable. From the induction hypothesis we deduce $\Gamma_1 \vdash P_1' :: \varphi_1$. To conclude we apply [T-PAR] and then [T-SUB].

Case [6-NEW]. Then $P = (\nu a)P' \rightarrow (\nu a)P'' = Q$ where $P' \rightarrow P''$. From [T-SUB] and [T-NEW] we deduce that there exist $\Delta$ and $\psi$ such that $\Delta, a : ?\emptyset \vdash P' :: \psi$ where $\Gamma \leq \Delta$ and $\varphi \Rightarrow (\nu a)\psi$. From the hypothesis that $\Gamma$ is reliable and Proposition 35 we deduce that $\Delta$ is reliable and so is $\Delta, a : ?\emptyset$. From the induction hypothesis we deduce $\Delta, a : ?\emptyset \vdash P'' :: \psi$. To conclude we apply [T-NEW] and then [T-SUB].

C Proofs of Theorems 24 and 25

► Theorem 24. If $\emptyset \vdash P :: \varphi$, then $P$ is mailbox conformant and deadlock free.

Proof. Immediate consequence of Lemma 40 and Lemma 45.

► Theorem 25. If $\emptyset \vdash P :: \varphi$ and $P$ is finitely unfolding, then $P$ is fairly terminating.

Proof. Consider a reduction $P \rightarrow^* Q$. From the hypothesis that $P$ is finitely unfolding we know that there exists $R$ such that $P \rightarrow^* Q \rightarrow^* R$ and no reduction of $R$ uses [6-DEF]. We conclude applying Theorem 23 and Lemma 46.

C.1 Proof of mailbox conformance

► Lemma 39. If $\Gamma \vdash \mathcal{C}[\text{fail } u] :: \varphi$, then $\Gamma$ is unreliable.

Proof. We reason by induction on the derivation of $\Gamma \vdash \mathcal{C}[\text{fail } u] :: \varphi$ and by cases on the last rule applied, omitting symmetric cases and those ruled out by the syntax of $\mathcal{C}$.

Case [T-GUARD]. From [T-FAIL] we deduce that $\Gamma = u : ?\emptyset, \Delta$ and we conclude that $\Gamma$ is unreliable.

Case [T-PAR]. Suppose, without loss of generality, that $\mathcal{C} = P \mid \mathcal{C}'$. Then there exist $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \varphi_1$ and $\varphi_2$ such that $\Gamma = \Gamma_1 \parallel \Gamma_2$ and $\varphi \Rightarrow \varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2$ and $\Gamma_1 \vdash P :: \varphi_1$ and $\Gamma_2 \vdash \mathcal{C}'[\text{fail } u] :: \varphi_2$. From the induction hypothesis we deduce that $\Gamma_2$ is unreliable. We know that $\Gamma_1$ is usable since all types are assumed to be usable, hence we conclude that $\Gamma_1 \parallel \Gamma_2$ is unreliable by Proposition 36.

Case [T-NEW]. Then $\mathcal{C} = (\nu a)\mathcal{C}'$ and $\Gamma, a : ?\emptyset \vdash \mathcal{C}'[\text{fail } u] :: \psi$. By induction hypothesis we deduce that $\Gamma, a : ?\emptyset$ is unreliable. Since $?\emptyset$ is reliable, we conclude that $\Gamma$ is unreliable.

Case [T-SUB]. Then $\Delta \vdash \mathcal{C}[\text{fail } u] :: \psi$ where $\Gamma \leq \Delta$. By induction hypothesis we deduce that $\Delta$ is unreliable and we conclude by Proposition 34.

► Lemma 40. If $\emptyset \vdash P :: \varphi$, then $P \rightarrow^* \mathcal{C}[\text{fail } a]$ for all $\mathcal{C}$ and $a$.

Proof. Immediate consequence of Theorem 23 and Lemma 39.
C.2 Proof of deadlock freedom

► Notation. We abbreviate $\Gamma \vdash P :: \varphi$ with $\Gamma \vdash P$ when the dependency graph $\varphi$ is irrelevant.

► Notation. Let $\Gamma \vdash P$ and $u \in \text{fn}(P)$. We write $u^* \in P$ if $u \in \text{fn}(P)$ and there is a judgment of the form $\Delta, u : \tau \vdash Q$ in the derivation tree of $\Gamma \vdash P$. Similarly for guards.

► Definition 41. We say that $Q$ occurs unguarded in $P$ if $P = \mathcal{C}[Q]$ for some $\mathcal{C}$.

► Lemma 42 (output occurrence). If $a : !E, \Gamma \vdash P$ and $\Gamma$ is reliable, then there exist $n \geq 0$ and $F_1, \ldots, F_n$ such that $F_1 \cdot \ldots \cdot F_n \subseteq E$ and $a^{F_i} \in P$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$. Furthermore, the $a^{F_i}$ occurrences account for all of the unguarded messages stored into $a$ by $P$.

Proof. By induction on the typing derivation and by cases on the last typing rule applied. The fact that all of the unguarded messages stored into $a$ by $P$ are considered follows from the structure of the proof, which visits every sub-process of $P$ in which $a$ may occur free.

Case $[\text{t-done}]$. This case is impossible because $\text{done}$ is well typed in the empty context only.

Case $[\text{t-msg}]$. Then $P = u \cdot \mathfrak{m}[\pi] \cdot a : !E, \Gamma = u : !\mathfrak{m}[\pi], \pi : \tau$ where $a$ is either $u$ or one of the $v_i$. We conclude by taking $n \overset{\text{def}}{=} 1$ and $F_1 \overset{\text{def}}{=} E$.

Case $[\text{t-def}]$. Similar to the previous case.

Case $[\text{t-par}]$. Then $P = P_1 \mid P_2$ and $a : !E, \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \mid \Gamma_2$ and $\Gamma_1 \vdash P_i$ for every $i = 1, 2$. From the hypothesis that $\Gamma$ is reliable, the assumption that all types are usable and Proposition 56 we deduce that $\Gamma_1$ and $\Gamma_2$ are reliable. We discuss two interesting sub-cases:

- Suppose $\Gamma_1 = a : !E, \Gamma'_1$ and $a \not\in \text{dom}(\Gamma_2)$. Then $a \not\in \text{fn}(P_2)$ and we conclude from the induction hypothesis on $P_1$.

- Suppose $\Gamma_1 = a : !E_1, \Gamma'_1$ and $\Gamma_2 = a : !E_2, \Gamma'_2$ and $E = E_1 \cdot E_2$. From the induction hypothesis we deduce that there exist $n_1 \geq 0$ and $n_2 \geq 0$ and $F'_1, \ldots, F'_n_1$ and $F''_1, \ldots, F''_n_2$ such that $F'_1 \cdot \ldots \cdot F'_n_1 \subseteq E_1$ and $F''_1 \cdot \ldots \cdot F''_n_2 \subseteq E_2$ and $a^{F'_i} \in P_1$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n_1$ and $a^{F''_i} \in P_2$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n_2$. We conclude by taking $n \overset{\text{def}}{=} n_1 + n_2$ and $F_1, \ldots, F_n \overset{\text{def}}{=} F'_1, \ldots, F'_n_1, F''_1, \ldots, F''_n_2$.

Case $[\text{t-new}]$. Then $P = (\nu c)Q$ and $a : !E, \Gamma, c : ?! \vdash Q$. Since $?!$ is reliable we conclude by the induction hypothesis.

Case $[\text{t-guard}]$. Then $P = G$ and $\Gamma \vdash G$. We conclude by the induction hypothesis.

Case $[\text{t-sub}]$. Then $\Delta \vdash P$ where $a : !E, \Gamma \subseteq \Delta$. We have two possibilities:

- Suppose $a \in \text{dom}(\Delta)$. Then $\Delta = a : !E', \Delta'$ where $E' \subseteq E$ and $\Gamma \subseteq \Delta'$. From Proposition 54 we deduce that $\Delta'$ is reliable. We conclude by the induction hypothesis using transitivity of $\subseteq$.

- Suppose $a \not\in \text{dom}(\Delta)$. Then $a \not\in \text{fn}(P)$ and $!E$ is irrelevant, meaning that $\not\in \subseteq E$. We conclude by taking $n \overset{\text{def}}{=} 0$.

Case $[\text{t-fail}]$. This case is impossible because $\Gamma$ is reliable by hypothesis.

Case $[\text{t-free}]$. Then $P = \text{free } u, Q$ and $a : !E, \Gamma = u : ?\not\in, \Delta$ and $\Delta \vdash Q$. Clearly $a \not= u$. Also, from the hypothesis that $\Gamma$ is reliable we deduce that $\Delta$ is reliable. We conclude by the induction hypothesis.

Case $[\text{t-in}]$. Then $P = u \cdot \mathfrak{m}[\pi], Q$ and $a : !E, \Gamma = u : ?(\mathfrak{m}[\pi] \cdot F), \Delta$ and $u : ?F, \Delta, \pi : \tau \vdash Q$. Clearly $a \not= u$ therefore $\Delta = a : !E, \Delta'$. From the hypothesis that $\Gamma$ is reliable we deduce that

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\[ F \not\subseteq \emptyset. \] From the assumption that argument types are reliable we deduce that \( u : \forall F, \Delta, \tau : \tau \) is reliable. We conclude by the induction hypothesis.

Case [Y-BRANCH] Then \( P = G_1 + G_2 \) and \( a : \exists E, \Gamma = u : \exists (E_1 + E_2), \Delta \) and \( u : \forall E_i, \Delta \vdash G_i \) for every \( i = 1, 2 \). Clearly \( a \neq u \), therefore \( \Delta = a : \exists E, \Delta' \). From the hypothesis that \( \Gamma \) is reliable we deduce that \( E_1 + E_2 \not\subseteq \emptyset \). Suppose, without loss of generality, that \( E_1 \not\subseteq \emptyset \). We conclude by the induction hypothesis on \( G_1 \).

Lemma 43 (input occurrence). If \( a : \forall E, \Gamma \vdash P \) and \( \Gamma \) is reliable and \( : F \subseteq E \) and \( F \not\subseteq \emptyset \), then there exist \( \mathcal{W} \) and \( F' \) such that \( \mathcal{W} \subseteq \mathcal{W}' \) and \( F' \not\subseteq \emptyset \) and \( a^\mathcal{W} F' \in P \).

Proof. By induction on the derivation of \( a : \forall E, \Gamma \vdash P \) and by cases on the last rule applied, recalling that a guard is also a process.

Case [Y-DONE] This case is impossible because done is well typed in the empty context only.

Case [Y-MSG] Then \( P = u \triangleright m[\tau] \) and \( a : \exists E, \Gamma = u : \triangleright m[\tau], \tau : \tau \). Clearly \( a \neq u \), so we conclude by taking \( \mathcal{W} \triangleq \emptyset \) and \( F' \triangleq \emptyset \).

Case [Y-DEF] Similar to the previous case.

Case [Y-NEW] Then \( P = \{ \text{new} \} Q \) and \( a : \exists E, \Gamma, c : \exists 1 \vdash Q \). Observe that \( \exists 1 \) is reliable, so we can conclude by the induction hypothesis.

Case [Y-SUB] Then \( \Delta : P : \exists \) for some \( \Delta \) such that \( a : \exists E, \Gamma \subseteq \Delta \), which implies \( \Delta = \exists E', \Delta' \) where \( E \subseteq E' \) and \( \Gamma \subseteq \Delta' \). We have \( : F \subseteq E \subseteq E' \) by transitivity of \( \subseteq \). From the hypothesis that \( \Gamma \) is reliable and Proposition 36 we deduce that \( \Delta' \) is reliable. We conclude by the induction hypothesis.

Case [Y-GUARD] Straightforward application of the induction hypothesis.

Case [Y-GUARD] This case is impossible because \( E \not\subseteq \emptyset \) and \( \Gamma \) is reliable.

Case [Y-FREE] Then \( P = \text{free } u, Q \) and \( a : \exists E, \Gamma = u : \exists 1, \Delta \) and \( \Delta : Q \). From the hypotheses \( \mathcal{W} \cdot F \subseteq E \) and \( F \not\subseteq \emptyset \) we deduce \( a \neq u \), hence \( \Delta = a : \exists E, \Delta' \) for some \( \Delta' \) such that \( \Delta' \) is usable. We conclude by the induction hypothesis.

Case [Y-IN] Then \( P = u?m(\tau), Q \) and \( a : \exists E, \Gamma = u : \exists (m[\tau] \cdot E'), \Delta \) and \( u : \exists E', \Delta, \tau : \tau \vdash Q \). We distinguish the following sub-cases:

1. Suppose \( a = u \) and \( \mathcal{W} \subseteq m[\tau] \). Then \( E = m[\tau] \cdot E' \). From the hypotheses \( \mathcal{W} \cdot F \subseteq E \) and \( F \not\subseteq \emptyset \) we deduce \( E' \not\subseteq \emptyset \). We conclude by taking \( \mathcal{W} \triangleq m[\tau] \) and \( F' \triangleq E' \).

2. Suppose \( a = u \) and \( \mathcal{W} \not\subseteq m[\tau] \). From the hypotheses \( \mathcal{W} \cdot F \subseteq E \) and \( F \not\subseteq \emptyset \) we deduce that \( \mathcal{W} \cdot E'' \subseteq E' \) for some \( E'' \not\subseteq \emptyset \). Observe that \( \Delta = \Gamma \). From the assumption that argument types are reliable we know that all the types in \( \tau \) are reliable. Therefore we can conclude by the induction hypothesis.

3. Suppose \( a \neq u \). From the hypothesis that \( \Gamma \) is reliable we deduce \( E' \not\subseteq \emptyset \). From the assumption that argument types are reliable we know that all the types in \( \tau \) are reliable. Therefore we can conclude by the induction hypothesis.
We distinguish two sub-cases:

- If \( a = u \), then \( E = E_1 + E_2 \) and \( \Gamma = \Delta \). From the hypothesis \( \Gamma \vdash F \subseteq E \) we deduce \( \Gamma \vdash F \subseteq E_i \) for some \( i = 1, 2 \). We conclude by the induction hypothesis.

- If \( a \neq u \), then \( \Delta = \Delta' \). From the hypothesis that \( \Gamma \) is reliable we deduce \( E_1 + E_2 \nsubseteq 0 \). Suppose, without loss of generality, that \( E_1 \nsubseteq 0 \). We conclude by applying the induction hypothesis on \( G_1 \).

\[ \square \]

\[ \textbf{Lemma 44.} \text{ If } \emptyset \vdash P :: \psi \text{ and } P \rightarrow \text{, then } P \equiv \text{ done}. \]

\[ \textbf{Proof.} \text{ Using the hypothesis } P \rightarrow \text{ and the laws of structural congruence we deduce that } \\
\quad P \equiv (\nu \pi)Q \quad \text{where } Q = \prod_{i \in I} a_i ! m_i[\tau_i] \mid \prod_{j \in J} G_j \]

where \( \vdash Q :: \varphi \) and \( \varphi \) is acyclic and each guarded process \( G_j \) concerns some mailbox \( a_j \). We prove the result by contradiction, assuming that \( I \cup J \neq \emptyset \). The proof proceeds in two steps. In the first step we show that, for every \( m \in I \cup J \), there exist \( n \in I \cup J \) such that \( \varphi \vdash \{a_n, a_m\} \) and \( \varphi \) contains an edge where \( a_n \) and \( a_m \) occur precisely in this order. In the second step, we show that this ultimately leads to a cyclic graph.

Suppose \( Q \equiv R \mid G \) where \( G \equiv \sum_{b \in B} a ? m_b[\tau_b], P_b \{ + \text{ free } a \cdot P' \} \). From \( \text{T-SUB} \) and \( \text{T-PAR} \) we deduce that there exist \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, E, F, \varphi_1 \) and \( \varphi_2 \) such that:

\[ \begin{align*}
\Gamma_1, a & : !E \vdash R :: \varphi_1 \\
\Gamma_2, a & : ?(E \cdot F) \vdash G :: \varphi_2 \\
\Gamma & \vdash F
\end{align*} \]

where \( \Gamma_1 \) and \( \Gamma_2 \) are both reliable. From \( \text{T-SUB} \) and \( \text{T-GUARD} \) we deduce that \( E \cdot F \subseteq \sum_{b \in B} m_b[\tau_b] \cdot E_b \{ + 1 \} \). From Lemma 42 we deduce that there exist \( n \geq 0 \) and \( F_1, \ldots, F_n \) such that \( F_1 \ldots F_n \subseteq E \) and \( a^{F_k} \in R \) for all \( 1 \leq k \leq n \). Suppose \( n = 0 \). Then \( \Gamma \vdash E \) and therefore \( \Gamma \vdash E \cdot F \), meaning that the \text{ free } a \cdot P' sub-term must be present in \( G \). This is absurd for we know that \( P \rightarrow \), hence there must be at least one occurrence of \( a \) in \( R \). In particular, one of the \( F_k \) for \( 1 \leq k \leq n \) generates a non-empty subset of the \( m_h[\tau_h] \) for \( h \in H \).

We reason by cases on the places where the \( a^{F_k} \) may occur:

- From the hypothesis \( P \rightarrow \) we deduce that for every \( i \in I \) either \( a_i \neq a \) or \( m_i \neq m_h \) for every \( h \in H \). Therefore, the \( a^{F_k} \) cannot be any of the \( a_i \).

- If \( a^{F_k} \) occurs in \( \{\tau_i\} \) for some \( i \in I \), then \( a_i \neq a \) and \( \varphi \vdash \{a_i, a\} \).

- All of the \( a_j \) have an input capability, therefore the \( a^{F_k} \) cannot be any of them.

- If \( a^{F_k} \) occurs in \( G_j \) for some \( j \in J \), then \( a_j \neq a \) because \( a \) is already used for input in \( G \), so we have \( \varphi \Rightarrow \{a_j, a\} \).

Suppose \( Q \equiv a ! m[\tau] \mid R \). From \( \text{T-SUB} \), \( \text{T-PAR} \) and \( \text{T-MSG} \) we deduce that there exist \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, E, F, \varphi_1 \) and \( \varphi_2 \) such that:

\[ \begin{align*}
\Gamma_1, a & : !m[\tau] \vdash a ! m[\tau] :: \varphi_1 \\
\Gamma_2, a & : ?(E \cdot F) \vdash R :: \varphi_2 \\
m[\tau] & \subseteq E \text{ and } \Gamma \vdash F
\end{align*} \]

where \( \Gamma_1 \) and \( \Gamma_2 \) are both reliable. From Lemma 43 we deduce that there exist \( M \) and \( F' \) such that \( m[\tau] \subseteq M \) and \( F' \nsubseteq 0 \) and \( a^MF' \in R \). We reason by cases on the places where \( a^MF' \) may occur:

- All the \( a_i \) have an output capability, therefore \( a^MF' \) cannot be any of them.

- If \( a^MF' \) occurs in \( \{\tau_i\} \) for some \( i \in I \), then \( a_i \neq a \) and \( \varphi \vdash \{a_i, a\} \).

- If \( a^MF' \in G_j \) where \( a_j \neq a \), then \( \varphi \Rightarrow \{a_j, a\} \).
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If \( a^{mk} F' \in G_j \equiv \sum_{h \in H} a?m_h([\pi_h]).P_h\{ + \text{free } a . P' \}, \) then we can reason as in the case for inputs and find some \( a_k \neq a \) such that \( \varphi \Rightarrow \{ a_k, a \}. \)

In summary, we have seen that starting from the assumption that \( I \cup J \neq \emptyset \) it is possible to obtain a set \( A \) of mailbox names that contains at least two distinct elements and such that for every \( a \in A \) there exists \( b \in A \) such that \( \varphi \Rightarrow \{ b, a \} \) and \( \varphi \) contains an edge where \( b \) and \( a \) precisely occur in this order. The set \( A \) is necessarily finite because \( Q \) is finite, therefore \( \text{dep}(\varphi) \) must be reflexive, which contradicts the hypothesis that \( \varphi \) is acyclic. This is absurd, hence we conclude \( I = J = \emptyset. \)

Lemma 45. If \( \emptyset \vdash P :: \varphi \) and \( P \rightarrow^* Q \rightarrow, \) then \( Q \equiv \text{done}. \)

Proof. Straightforward consequence of Theorem 23 and Lemma 44.

C.3 Fair termination for finitely unfolding processes

Lemma 46. If \( \emptyset \vdash P :: \varphi \) and no reduction of \( P \) uses \([\text{r-def}]\) then \( P \rightarrow^* \text{done}. \)

Proof. Let \( \text{size}(P) \) be the function inductively defined by the following equations

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{size}(\text{done}) &= \text{size}(\text{fail } u) = \text{size}(u!m([\pi])) = \text{size}(X([\pi])) \overset{\text{def}}{=} 0 \\
\text{size}(\text{free } u . Q) &= \text{size}(u?m([\pi]) . Q) \overset{\text{def}}{=} 1 + \text{size}(Q) \\
\text{size}(G_1 + G_2) &= \overset{\text{def}}{=\max} \{\text{size}(G_1), \text{size}(G_2)\} \\
\text{size}(P_1 \parallel P_2) &= \overset{\text{def}}{=\text{size}(P_1) + \text{size}(P_2)} \\
\text{size}(\nu a Q) &= \overset{\text{def}}{=\text{size}(Q)}
\end{align*}
\]

and observe that \( P \rightarrow Q \) implies \( \text{size}(Q) < \text{size}(P) \) from the hypothesis that no reduction of \( P \) uses \([\text{r-def}]\). Then \( P \) is strongly normalizing and we conclude by Lemma 45.

D Readers-Writer Lock

A readers-writer lock grants read-only access to an arbitrary number of readers and exclusive write access to a single writer. Below is a particular modeling of a readers-writer lock making use of mixed guards, where different actions may refer to different mailboxes:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Free}(\text{self}) & \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{free } \text{self} \cdot \text{done} \\
& + \text{self}?\text{acquire}(w). (w!\text{reply}[\text{self}] \mid \text{Write}[\text{self}]) \\
& + \text{self}?\text{acquireR}(r). (r!\text{reply}[\text{pool}] \mid \text{Read}[\text{self}, \text{pool}]) \\
& + \text{self}?\text{read}. \text{fail } \text{self} \\
& + \text{self}?\text{write}(w). \text{fail } \text{self} \\
\text{Write}(\text{self}) & \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{self}?\text{release}. \text{Free}[\text{self}] \\
& + \text{self}?\text{write}(w). (w!\text{reply}[\text{self}] \mid \text{Write}[\text{self}]) \\
& + \text{self}?\text{read}. \text{fail } \text{self} \\
\text{Read}(\text{self}, \text{pool}) & \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{self}?\text{acquireR}(r). (r!\text{reply}[\text{pool}] \mid \text{Read}[\text{self}, \text{pool}]) \\
& + \text{self}?\text{write}(w). \text{fail } \text{self} \\
& + \text{pool}?\text{read}. \text{Read}[\text{self}, \text{pool}] \\
& + \text{free } \text{pool} \cdot \text{Free}[\text{self}]
\end{align*}
\]

The readers-writer lock may be free, in which case it can be acquired either by a reader or by a writer but it does not accept read or write requests. When the lock has been acquired by a writer process, the writer is granted exclusive access and read requests are not accepted.
When a reader acquires a free lock, the lock creates pool of readers and moves into a state where more readers may be granted access. Each reader manifests its intention to read the resource by storing a read message into pool whereas prospective readers manifest their intention of accessing the resource by storing acquireR into self. The mixed guard in the Read process is key to serve both kinds of requests. In particular, when all readers have terminated, pool can be deleted and the lock moves back into the free state.

In order to deal with mixed guards, the typing rules for guards and guarded processes must be generalized as shown in Table 5. The basic idea is the same as for restricted guards, namely the type of mailboxes different from the one referred to by an action cannot be affected by the content (or lack thereof) of that mailbox. To do so, the judgments for guards have the form \( \Gamma; \Delta \vdash G \) where \( \Gamma \) is the type environment of the guarded process as a whole whereas \( \Delta \) keeps track of the types of the mailboxes referred to by the actions, which are split exactly as in the restricted typing rules (Table 4). The + operation on type environments is defined thus:

\[
\Gamma_1 + \Gamma_2 = \begin{cases} 
\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 & \text{if } \text{dom}(\Gamma_1) \cap \text{dom}(\Gamma_2) = \emptyset \\
\Gamma_1 + \Gamma_2 & \text{if } \Gamma_1 = u : ?(E_1 + E_2), \Gamma_1' + \Gamma_2' & \text{if } \Gamma_1 = u : ?E_1, \Gamma_1' \text{ and } \Gamma_2 = u : ?E_2, \Gamma_2'
\end{cases}
\]

With the relaxed rules, it is possible to show that the above process definitions are consistent with the following declarations:

- **Free**: \( \text{Free : (self : ?(\text{acquireW[\tau]* \cdot acquireR[\rho]*}); \emptyset)} \)
- **Write**: \( \text{Write : (self : ?(\text{acquireW[\tau]* \cdot acquireR[\rho]* \cdot (release + write[\tau]}]); \emptyset)} \)
- **Read**: \( \text{Read : (self : ?(\text{acquireW[\tau]* \cdot acquireR[\rho]*}), pool : ?read*; \{self, pool\})} \)

where \( \tau \triangleq !\text{reply}![\text{release + write[\tau]}] \) and \( \rho = !\text{reply}![\text{read*}] \). The remarkable aspect of this typing is that it guarantees statically the key properties of the readers-writer lock: that there are no readers nor writers when the lock is free; that there are no readers if there is a single writer; that there is no writer if there are one or more readers. Once again, the modeling makes key use of multiple mailboxes so as to keep the typing as precise as possible.