Abstract—We consider the problem of synthesizing safe-by-design control strategies for semi-autonomous systems. Our aim is to address situations when safety cannot be guaranteed solely by the autonomous, controllable part of the system and a certain level of collaboration is needed from the uncontrollable part, such as the human operator. In this paper, we propose a systematic solution to generating least-limiting guidelines, i.e., the guidelines that restrict the human operator as little as possible in the worst-case long-term system executions. The algorithm leverages ideas from 2-player turn-based games.

I. INTRODUCTION

Recent technological developments have enhanced the application areas of autonomous and semi-autonomous cyber-physical systems to a variety of everyday scenarios from industrial automation to transportation and to housekeeping services. These examples have a common factor; they involve operation in an uncertain environment in the presence of highly unpredictable and uncontrollable agents, such as humans. In robot-aided manufacturing, there is a natural combination of autonomy and human contribution. Even in fully autonomous driving, passengers and pedestrians interact with the vehicle and actively influence the overall system safety and performance. The need for obtaining guarantees on behaviors of these systems is then even more crucial as the stakes are high. Formal verification and formal methods-based synthesis techniques were designed to provide such guarantees and recently, they have gained a considerable amount of popularity in applications to correct-by-design robot control. For instance, in [12], [19] temporal logic control of robots in uncertain, reactive environments was addressed. In [11] control synthesis for nondeterministic systems from temporal logic specifications was developed. Loosely speaking, these works achieve provable guarantees by accounting for the worst-case scenarios in the control synthesis procedure, which however, often prevents the synthesis procedure to find a correct-by-design autonomous controller.

We take a fresh perspective on correct-by-design control synthesis. In contrast to the above mentioned approach, we view the uncertain, uncontrollable elements in the system as collaborative in the sense that they have as much interest in keeping the overall system behavior safe, effective, and efficient as the autonomous controller does. At the same time, we still view them as to a large extent uncontrollable in the sense that they still have their own intentions and we cannot force them to follow step-by-step instructions. In contrast, we aim to advise them on what not to do if completely necessary, while keeping their options as rich as possible.

For example, consider a collaborative human-robot manufacturing task with the goal of assembling products $ABC$ through connecting pieces of types $A$ and $C$ to a piece of type $B$. The human operator can connect $A$ with $B$ or with $BC$, whereas the autonomous robot can connect $B$ or $AB$ with $C$. Our goal is to guarantee system safety, meaning that the human and the robot do not work with the same piece of type $B$ at the same time. While we can design a controller for the robot that does not reach for a piece being held by a human, we cannot guarantee that the human will not reach for a piece being held by the robot. To that end, we aim to synthesize guidelines for the human, i.e., advise that reaching for a piece that the robot holds will lead to safety violation. Assuming that the human follows this advise, the safety is guaranteed. Yet, this advise is still much less restrictive for the human operator than if the human-robot system was considered controllable as a whole. Namely, in such a case, a correct-by-design controller could dictate the human to always touch only solo $B$ pieces while the robot would be supposed to work only with $AB$ pieces pre-produced by the human. Clearly, the former mentioned guidelines allow for more freedom of the human’s decisions as the human may choose to work with an instance of $B$ piece or $BC$ piece.

This paper introduces a systematic way to synthesize least-limiting guidelines for the uncontrollable elements in (semi-)autonomous systems, such as humans in human-robot systems, that allow the autonomous part of the system to maintain safety. Similarly as in some related work on correct-by-design control synthesis (e.g., [11]), we model the overall system state space as a two-player game on a graph with a safety winning condition. We formalize the notion of adviser as a function that “forbids” the application of certain inputs in certain system states, and we classify the advisers based on the level of limitation they impose on the uncontrollable element. We provide an algorithm to find a least-limiting adviser that allows to keep the system safe. Finally, we discuss the use of the advisers for on-the-fly guidance of the system execution. In this work, we do not focus on how the interface between the adviser and the uncontrollable element should look like. Instead, the contribution of this paper can be summarized as the development of a theoretical framework for automated synthesis of reactive, least-limiting guidelines and control strategies that guarantee the system safety.
Related work includes literature on synthesis of environment assumptions that enable a winning game [6] and on using counter-strategies for synthesizing assumptions in generalized reactivity (1) (GR(1)) fragment of LTL [13], [1]. These works however synthesize the assumptions in the form of logic formulas, whereas we focus on guiding the adversary through explicitly enumerating the inputs that should not be applied. Synthesis of maximally permissive strategies is considered in [4] and also in discrete-event systems literature in [18], where however, only controllable inputs are being restricted. Our approach is different to the above works, since we aim for systematic construction of reactive guidelines in the sense that if the least-limiting adviser is not followed, a suitable substitute adviser is supplied if such exists. We also use a different criterion to measure the level of limitation that is the worst-case long-term average of restrictions as opposed to the cumulative number of restrictions considered in [6] or the size of the set of behaviors considered in [4].

Other related literature studies problems of minimal model repair [3], [7], synthesis of least-violating strategies [9], [17], or design of reward structures for decision-making processes in context of human-machine interaction [14]. This work can be also viewed in the context of literature aimed at collaborative human-robot control, e.g., [15], [10].

The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II we introduce necessary preliminaries. In Sec. III, we state our problem. Sec. IV introduces the synthesis algorithm and discusses the use of the synthesized solution for on-the-fly guidance. Sec. V concludes the paper and outlines future research. Due to space constraints, proofs of lemmas are omitted and can be all found in [16] together with additional illustrative examples.

II. PRELIMINARIES

\( \mathbb{Z} \) denotes the set of integers. Given a set \( S \), we use \( 2^S, |S| \), \( S^* \), \( S^\infty \) to denote the powerset of \( S \), the cardinality of \( S \), and the set of all finite and infinite sequences of elements from \( S \), respectively. \( w(i) \) denotes the \( i \)-th element of a sequence \( w \), and \( w_{<a} \) denotes the prefix of \( w \) that ends in \( w(a) \). Given a finite sequence \( w \) and a finite or an infinite sequence \( w' \), we use \( w \cdot w' \) to denote their concatenation. Assuming that \( S \) is a set of finite sequences and \( S' \) is a set of finite and/or infinite sequences, \( S \cdot S' = \{ w \cdot w' | w \in S \land w' \in S' \} \).

Definition 1 (Arena) A 2-player turn-based game arena is a transition system \( T = (S, (S_p, S_a), s_{init}, U_p, U_a, T) \), where \( S \) is a nonempty, finite set of states; \( (S_p, S_a) \) is a partition of \( S \) into the set of protagonist (player \( p \)) states \( S_p \) and the set of adversary (player \( a \)) states \( S_a \), such that \( S_p \cap S_a = \emptyset \), \( S_p \cup S_a = S \); \( s_{init} \in S_p \) is the initial protagonist state; \( U_p \) is the set of inputs of the protagonist; \( U_a \) is the set of inputs of the adversary; \( T = T_p \cup T_a \), is a partial injective transition function, where \( T_p : S_p \times U_p \rightarrow S_a \) and \( T_a : S_a \times U_a \rightarrow S_p \).

We assume that from a protagonist state, the system can only transition to an adversary state and vice versa. This assumption is not restrictive, since it can be shown that any game arena with \( T_p : S_p \times U_p \rightarrow S \) and \( T_a : S_a \times U_a \rightarrow S \) can be transformed to satisfy it. Let \( U_p^i = \{ u_i \in U_p | T_i(s_i, u_i) \) is defined\} denote the set of inputs of player \( i \in \{ p, a \} \) that are enabled in \( s_i \in S \). Arena \( T \) is non-blocking if \( |U_p^i| \geq 1 \), for all \( i \in \{ p, a \} \) and all \( s_i \in S \), and blocking otherwise. A play in \( T \) is an infinite alternating sequence of protagonist and adversary states \( \pi = s_1 p_1 s_2 p_2 s_3 a_3 \ldots \), such that \( p_1 = s_{init} \) and for all \( j \geq 1 \) there exist \( u_j \in U_p, a_j \in U_a \), such that \( T_p(s_{j-1}, p_j) = s_{a_j} \), and \( T_a(s_{a_{j-1}}, a_j) = s_{p_{j+1}} \). A play prefix \( \pi_{<j} = \pi(1) \ldots \pi(j) \) is a finite prefix of a play \( \pi = \pi(1)\pi(2) \ldots \).

Plays\( ^T \) denote the set of all plays in \( T \). If a set of plays \( \text{Plays}^T \) of a blocking arena \( T \) is nonempty, then \( T \) can be transformed into an equivalent non-blocking arena \( T \) via a systematic removal of blocking states and their adjacent transitions that are defined inductively as follows: (i) each \( s_i \in S_i \), \( i \in \{ p, a \} \), such that \( U_p^i = \emptyset \) is a blocking state and (ii) if \( T_i(s_i, u_i) \) is a blocking state for each \( u_i \in U_p^i \), then \( s_i \in \{ i, p \} \) is a blocking state, too. Then \( \text{Plays}^T = \text{Plays}^T \).

A deterministic control strategy (or strategy, for short) of player \( i \in \{ p, a \} \) is a partial function \( \sigma_i^T : S^* \rightarrow S_i \) that assigns player \( i \)'s enabled input \( u_i \in U_i^1 \) to each play prefix in \( T \) that ends in a player \( i \)'s state. Strategies \( \sigma_i^T, \sigma_a^T \) induce a play \( \pi^T = \sigma_1^T p_1 \sigma_2^T p_2 \sigma_3^T a_3 \ldots \in (S_p \cup S_a)^\infty \), such that \( p_1 = s_{init} \), and for all \( j \geq 1 \), \( T_p(s_{j-1}, \sigma(p_{j-1}, s_{p_{j-1}})) = s_{a_j} \), and \( T_a(s_{a_{j-1}}, \sigma(a_{j-1}, s_{a_{j-1}})) = s_{p_{j+1}} \). A strategy \( \sigma^T_i \) is called memoryless if \( \sigma_i^T(s_1 \ldots s_n) = \sigma_i^T(s'_1 \ldots s'_m) \) whenever \( s_n = s'_m \). Hence, with a slight abuse of notation, memoryless control strategies are viewed as functions \( \zeta_i^T : S_i \rightarrow U_i \). The set of all strategies of player \( i \) in \( T \) is denoted by \( \Sigma_i^T \). The set of all plays induced by all strategies in \( \Sigma_i^T \cdot \Sigma_i^T \) i.e. the set of all plays in \( T \) is \( \text{Plays}^T \Sigma_i^T \Sigma_i^T = \{ \pi_p^T \sigma_a^T | \pi_p^T \in \Sigma_p^T, \sigma_a^T \in \Sigma_a^T \} \). Analogously, we use \( \text{Plays}^T \sigma_p^T \Sigma_a^T = \{ \pi_p^T \sigma_a^T | \pi_p^T \in \Sigma_p^T \} \) to denote the set of plays induced by strategy \( \sigma_p^T \) and by all strategies \( \sigma_a^T \in \Sigma_a^T \).

A game \( G = (T, W) \) consists of a game arena \( T \) and a winning condition \( W \subseteq \text{Plays}^T \cdot \Sigma_a^T \) that is in general a subset of plays in \( T \). A safety winning condition is \( W_{safe} = \{ \pi \in \text{Plays}^T \cdot \Sigma_a^T | \text{for all } j \geq 1, \pi(j) \in \text{safe} \} \), where \( S = \{ \text{safe}, \text{unsafe} \} \) is a partition of the set of states into the safe and unsafe state subsets. A protagonist's strategy \( \sigma_p^T \) is winning if \( \text{Plays}^T \sigma_p^T \subseteq W \). Let \( \Omega^T_p \subseteq \Sigma_p^T \) denote the set of all protagonist’s winning strategies.

Let \( T = (S, (S_p, S_a), s_{init}, U_p, U_a, T) \) be an arena and \( w : S \times S \rightarrow \mathbb{Z} \) be a weight function that assigns a weight to each \((s, s')\), such that there exists \( u \in U_p \cup U_a \), where \((s, u, s') \in T \). Then \((T, w)\) can be viewed as an arena of a mean-payoff game. The value secured by protagonist's strategy \( \sigma_p^T \) is \( \nu(\sigma_p^T) = \inf_{\sigma_a^T \in \Sigma_a^T} \liminf_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} w(\pi^T, \sigma_a^T(j), \pi^T \sigma_a^T(j+1)) \).

An optimal protagonist's strategy \( \sigma_p^{T^*} \) secures the optimal value \( \nu(\sigma_p^{T^*}) = \sup_{\sigma_a^T \in \Sigma_a^T} \nu(\sigma_p^{T^*}) \). Several algorithms exist to find the optimal protagonist’s strategy, see, e.g., [5]. For more details on games on graphs in general, we refer the interested reader e.g., to [2].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION

The system that we consider consists of two entities: the autonomous part of the system that we aim to control (e.g., a robotic arm), and the agent that is uncontrollable, and to a large extent unpredictable (e.g., a human operator in a human-robot manufacturing scenario). The overall state of such system is determined by the system states of these entities (e.g., the positions of the robotic and the human arms and objects in their common workspace and the status of the manufacturing). In this paper, we consider systems with a finite number of states $Q$ (obtained, e.g., by partitioning the workspace into cells). The system state can change if one of the entities takes a decision and applies an input. For simplicity, we assume that the entities take turns in applying their inputs. This assumption is however not too restrictive as we may allow the entities to apply a special pass input $\varepsilon$ that does not induce any change to the current system state.

To model the system formally, we call the controllable entity the protagonist, and the uncontrollable entity the adversary, and we capture the effects of their inputs on the system states through a game arena (see Def. 1)

$$T = (S, \langle S_p, S_a \rangle, s_{init}, U_p, U_a, T).$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

The set of the arena states is $S = Q \times \{p, a\}$ and each arena state $s = (q, i) \in S$ is defined by the system state $q \in Q$ and the entity $i \in \{p, a\}$ whose turn it is to apply its input, i.e. $(q, p) \in S_p$, and $(q, a) \in S_a$, for all $q \in Q$. Behaviors of the system are thus captured through plays in the arena. The goal of the controllable entity is to keep the system safe, i.e. to avoid the subset of unsafe system states, while the uncontrollable entity has its own goals, such as to reach a certain system state, etc. Formally, the protagonist is given a partition of states $S = \langle \text{Safe}, \text{Unsafe} \rangle$ and the corresponding safety winning condition $W_{\text{Safe}}$. The arena $T$ together with the safety winning condition $W_{\text{Safe}}$ establish a game $(T, W_{\text{Safe}})$.

**Example 1** Consider the simplified manufacturing scenario outlined in the introduction. A system state is determined by the current pieces in the workspace and their status; each of them is either on the desk, held by the human, or by the robot: $Q \subset 2(\{A, B, C\} \times \{\text{desk, human, robot}\})$. The robot acts as the protagonist and the human as the adversary. $s_{init} = \{(A, \text{desk}), (B, \text{desk}), (C, \text{desk})\}$ is an example of a system initial state. The inputs of the robot are $U_p = \{(\text{grab}_a, \text{drop}_a) \times \{A, B, C, AB, BC, ABC\} \cup \{\text{connect}_p\} \times \{B, C\}, (AB, C)\}$ and similarly, $U_a = \{(\text{grab}_a, \text{drop}_a) \times \{A, B, C, AB, BC, ABC\} \cup \{\text{connect}_a\} \times \{(A, B), (A, BC)\}\}$. The transition function reflects the effect of inputs on the system state. For instance,

$$T((A, \text{desk}), (B, \text{desk}), (C, \text{desk}), a, (\text{grab}_a, A)) = ((A, \text{human}), (B, \text{desk}), (C, \text{desk}), p),$$

Note that $T$ does not have to be manually enumerated. Instead, it can be generated from conditions, such as $T((x, y) \cup Z, a, (\text{grab}_a, x)) = ((x, \text{human}) \cup Z, p)$, applied to all $x \in \{A, B, C, AB, AC, ABC\}$, $y \in \{\text{desk, robot}\}$, $Z \subseteq \{(A, B, C, AB, AC, ABC) \setminus \{x\}\} \times \{\text{desk, human, robot}\}$.

The problem of finding a protagonist’s winning control strategy $\sigma^p_T$ guaranteeing system safety has been studied before and even more complex winning conditions have been considered [2]. In this work, we focus on a situation when the protagonist does not have a winning control strategy. For such cases, we aim to generate a least-limiting subset of adversary’s control strategies that would permit the protagonist to win. Loosely speaking, this subset can be viewed as the minimal guidelines for the adversary’s collaboration.

Note that this problem differs from the supervisory control of discrete event systems as we do not limit only the application of controllable, but also the uncontrollable inputs. However, it also differs from the synthesis of controllers for fully controllable systems as we aim to limit the adversary’s application of uncontrollable inputs as little as possible. We formalize the guidelines for the adversary’s collaboration through the notion of adviser and adviser restricted arena.

**Definition 2 (Adviser)** An adviser is a mapping $\alpha : S_a \rightarrow 2^U_a$, where $\alpha(s_a) \subseteq U_{\alpha a}$ represents the subset of inputs that are forbidden in state $s_a$.

Given an arena $T = (S, \langle S_p, S_a \rangle, s_{init}, U_p, U_a, T_p \cup T_a)$, and an adviser $\alpha$, the adviser restricted arena is $T^\alpha = (S, \langle S_p, S_a \rangle, s_{init}, U_p, U_a, T_p \cup T_a)$, where $T_p^\alpha = T_p$, and $T_a^\alpha = T_a \setminus \{(s_a, u_a, s_p) | u_a \in \alpha(s_a)\}$. The set of all plays in $T^\alpha$ is denoted by $\text{Plays}^\alpha$.

If $\alpha(s_a) = U_{\alpha a}^a$ for some $s_a \in S_a$, the adviser restricted arena is blocking. However, if $\text{Plays}^\alpha$ is nonempty, we can transform $T^\alpha$ into a non-blocking adviser restricted arena $T^\alpha = (S^\alpha, \langle S_p^\alpha, S_a^\alpha \rangle, s_{init}, U_p, U_a, T_p^\alpha \cup T_a^\alpha)$ (2) that has the exact same set of plays $\text{Plays}^\alpha = \text{Plays}^\alpha$ as $T^\alpha$ as outlined in Sec. II. Let us denote the sets of all protagonist’s and adversary’s strategies in $T^\alpha$ by $\Sigma^p_{T^\alpha}$ and $\Sigma^a_{T^\alpha}$, respectively. $\text{Plays}^\alpha_{\Sigma^p_{T^\alpha}, \Sigma^a_{T^\alpha}}$ refers to the set of plays induced by $\sigma^p_{T^\alpha} \in \Sigma^p_{T^\alpha}$ and $\sigma^a_{T^\alpha} \in \Sigma^a_{T^\alpha}$ in $T^\alpha$. If however $\text{Plays}^\alpha$ is empty, a non-blocking adviser restricted arena $T^\alpha$ does not exist.

Given the winning condition $W_{\text{Safe}}$, we define a good adviser $\alpha$ as one that permits the protagonist to achieve safety in the non-blocking adviser restricted arena $T^\alpha$. Since there might be more good advisers, we distinguish which of them limit the adversary less and which of them more through the level of limitation $\lambda(\alpha)$, which is the worst-case long-term average of the number of forbidden inputs along the plays induced by the best-case protagonist’s strategy $\sigma^p_{T^\alpha}$. The choice of the worst-case long-term average is motivated by the fact that although the adversary can be advised, it cannot be controlled. On the other hand, the consideration of the best-case $\sigma^p_{T^\alpha}$ is due to the protagonist being fully controllable.

**Definition 3 (Good adviser)** An adviser $\alpha$ is good for $(T, W_{\text{Safe}})$ if there exists a non-blocking adviser restricted arena $T^\alpha$ and a protagonist’s strategy $\sigma^p_{T^\alpha} \in \Sigma^p_{T^\alpha}$, such that $\text{Plays}^\alpha_{\Sigma^p_{T^\alpha}, \Sigma^a_{T^\alpha}} \subseteq W_{\text{Safe}}$. Given a good adviser $\alpha$, the set of protagonist’s winning strategies is denoted by $\Omega^\alpha \subseteq \Sigma^p_{T^\alpha}$.
Definition 4 (Level of limitation) Given an arena $\mathcal{T}$ and a good adviser $\alpha$, the adviser level of limitation is

$$\lambda(\alpha) = \inf_{\sigma_p \in \Omega_p} \gamma(\sigma_p^\alpha),$$

where $\gamma(\sigma_p^\alpha) = \sup_{\sigma_p^\alpha \in \Sigma_p} \limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} |\alpha(\pi_p^\sigma, \sigma_p^\alpha(2j))|}$.

Example 2 An example of a game arena with a safety winning condition $W_{\text{Safe}}$ is given in Fig. 1. (A). Fig. 1.(B)-(D) show three advisers $\alpha_B$, $\alpha_C$ and $\alpha_D$, respectively, via marking the forbidden transitions in red. For instance, in Fig. 1.(B), $\alpha_B(s_2) = \{u_{a_1}, u_{a_3}\}$, $\alpha_B(s_4) = \{u_{a_4}, u_{a_5}\}$, and $\alpha_B(s_6) = \{u_{a_6}, u_{a_7}\}$. For $\alpha_B$, the non-blocking adviser restricted arena contains states $S_{\alpha_B} = \{s_1, s_2, s_3\}$. The set of protagonist's strategies in $\mathcal{T}_{\alpha_B}$ is $\sum_{\alpha_B} = \{\sigma_p^\alpha\}$, where $\sigma_p^\alpha(\pi(1), \ldots, \pi(2))s_1 = u_{p_1}$, $\sigma_p^\alpha(\pi(1), \ldots, \pi(2))s_3 = u_{p_3}$, for all play prefixes $\pi(1), \ldots, \pi(2)$, $j \geq 0$ of all plays $\pi \in \text{Plays}_{\alpha_B, \sum_{\alpha_B}}$. Since $\sigma_p^\alpha$ is winning, $\alpha_B$ is good. The set of protagonist’s winning strategies and the set of all adversary’s strategies in $\mathcal{T}_{\alpha_B}$ induce a set of plays $\text{Plays}_{\alpha_B, \sum_{\alpha_B}} = \{s_1s_2\pi(3)s_3\pi(5)s_5\pi(7)s_7 \ldots | \pi(2j + 1) \in \{s_1, s_3\}, \text{for all } j \geq 1\}$. The strategy $\sigma_p^\alpha \in \Omega_p$ is thus associated with $\gamma(\sigma_p^\alpha) = \sup_{\sigma_p^\alpha \in \Sigma_p} \limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} |\alpha_B(\pi_p^\sigma, \sigma_p^\alpha(2j))|} = \sup_{\sigma_p^\alpha \in \Sigma_p} \limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} |\alpha_B(\sigma_p^\alpha)|} = 1$, and the level of limitation of $\alpha_B$ is $\lambda(\alpha_B) = 1$. Although it might seem that adviser $\alpha_B$ is more limiting than $\alpha_C$, it is not the case. Finally, $\alpha_D$ is more limiting than $\alpha_B$ and $\alpha_C$.

Fig. 1: (A) An example of a game arena with a safety winning condition. The protagonist’s and adversary’s states are illustrated as squares and circles, respectively. The safe set $\text{Safe}$ is in green, the unsafe set $\text{Unsafe}$ in blue. Transitions are depicted as arrows between them and they are labeled with the respective inputs that trigger them. (B) – (D) show three different advisers $\alpha_B$, $\alpha_C$ and $\alpha_D$, respectively, via marking the forbidden transitions in red.

Problem 1 Consider $\mathcal{T} = (S, \langle S_p, S_a \rangle, s_{\text{init}}, U_p, U_a, T)$, and a safety winning condition $W_{\text{Safe}}$ given via a partition $S = \langle \text{Safe}, \text{Unsafe} \rangle$. Synthesize an adviser $\alpha^*$, and a protagonist’s winning strategy $\sigma_p^{\alpha^*}$, such that:

(i) $\alpha^*$ is good and $\sigma_p^{\alpha^*} \in \Omega_p^\alpha$.
(ii) $\lambda(\alpha^*) = \inf_{\alpha \in A} \lambda(\alpha)$, where $A$ is the set of all good advisers for $(\mathcal{T}, W_{\text{Safe}})$, i.e. $\lambda(\alpha^*)$ is least-limiting.
(iii) $\gamma(\sigma_p^{\alpha^*}) = \inf_{\sigma_p^{\alpha^*} \in \Omega_p^\alpha} \gamma(\sigma_p^{\alpha^*})$, i.e. $\sigma_p^{\alpha^*}$ is optimal.

IV. Solution

Our solution builds on the following steps: first, we generate a so-called nominal adviser, which assigns to each adversary state the set of forbidden inputs. We prove that the nominal adviser is by construction good, but does not have to be least-limiting. Second, building on the nominal adviser, we efficiently generate a finite set of candidate advisers. Third, the structural properties of the candidate advisers inherited from the properties of the nominal adviser allow us to prove that the problem of finding $\alpha^*$ and $\sigma_p^{\alpha^*}$ can be transformed to a mean-payoff game. By that, we prove that at least one $\sigma_p^{\alpha^*}$ is memoryless and hence we establish decidability of Problem 1. Finally, we discuss how the set of the candidate advisers and their associated optimal protagonist’s winning strategies can be used to guide an adversary who disobeys a subset of advises provided by a least-limiting adviser.

1) Nominal adviser: The algorithm to find the nominal adviser $\alpha^0$ is summarized in Alg. 1. It systematically finds a set of states $\text{Losing}$, from which reaching of the unsafe set $\text{Unsafe}$ cannot be avoided under any possible protagonist’s and any adversary’s choice of inputs. The set $\text{Losing}$ is obtained via the computation of the finite converging sequence $\text{Unsafe} = \text{Losing}^0 \subseteq \ldots \subseteq \text{Losing}^n = \text{Losing}$, $n \geq 0$, where for all $0 \leq j < n$, $\text{Losing}^{j+1}$ is the set of states each of which either already belongs to $\text{Losing}^j$ or has all outgoing transitions leading to $\text{Losing}^j$ (line 15). The nominal adviser $\alpha^0$ is set to forbid all transitions that lead to $\text{Losing}$ (line 11). By construction, the algorithm terminates in at most $|S|$ iteration of the while loop (lines 8–16).

Algorithm 1: The nominal adviser $\alpha^0$

Data: $\mathcal{T} = (S, \langle S_p, S_a \rangle, s_{\text{init}}, U_p, U_a, T)$, $\text{Unsafe} \subseteq S$
Result: $\alpha^0: S_a \rightarrow 2^{S_a}$
1 forall $s_a \in S_a$ do
2 $\alpha^0(s_a) := 0$
3 end
4 forall $s_a \in \text{Unsafe}$ do
5 $\alpha^0(s_a) := U_a$
6 end
7 $\text{Losing}^0 := \text{Unsafe}; j := 0$
8 while $j = 0$ or $\text{Losing}^j \neq \text{Losing}^{j-1}$ do
9 forall $s_p \in \text{Losing}^j$ do
10 forall $s_a, u_a$, such that $T(s_a, u_a) = s_p$ do
11 $\alpha^0(s_a) := \alpha^0(s_a) \cup \{u_a\}$
12 end
13 end
14 \text{Losing}^{j+1} := \text{Losing}^j \cup \{s_i \in S_i \mid \exists u_i, t_i(s_i, u_i) \subseteq \text{Losing}^j, i \in \{a, p\}\}$
15 $j := j + 1$
16 end
17 $\text{Losing} := \text{Losing}^j$

The following two lemmas summarize the key features of $\alpha^0$ computed according to Alg. 1. The first one states that if there exists a good adviser for $(\mathcal{T}, W_{\text{Safe}})$, then the nominal adviser is good. The second one states that if the nominal adviser forbids the adversary to apply an input $u_a \in \alpha^0(s_a)$ in a state $s_a$, then there does not exist a less limiting good adviser $\alpha'$, such that $u_a \notin \alpha'(s_a)$.
Lemma 1 If \( s_{\text{init}} \in \text{Losing} \) then there does not exist a good adviser for \((\bar{T}, W_{\text{Safe}})\). If \( s_{\text{init}} \notin \text{Losing} \), then \( \alpha^0 \) computed by Alg. 1 is a good adviser.

Intuitively, Lemmas 1 states that the restrictions imposed by the nominal adviser \( \alpha^0 \) were sufficient. As a corollary, it also holds that the non-blocking nominal adviser restricted arena \( \bar{T}^\alpha \) does not contain any state in \( \text{Losing} \) and therefore that all plays in \( \bar{T}^\alpha \) are winning. Note however, that the nominal adviser does not have to be least-limiting.

Lemma 2 Consider an adviser \( \alpha' \) for \((\bar{T}, W_{\text{Safe}})\) and suppose that there exists a state \( s_a \in S_a \) and \( u_a \in U_a \), such that \( u_a \in \alpha^0(s_a) \) and \( u_a \notin \alpha'(s_a) \). Then \( \alpha' \) is either not good or at least as limiting as the nominal adviser \( \alpha^0 \), i.e. \( \lambda(\alpha^0) \leq \lambda(\alpha') \).

Thanks to Lemma 2, we know that there exists a good adviser \( \alpha^* \) that is least-limiting and builds on the nominal one in the following sense: \( \alpha^0(s_a) \subseteq \alpha^*(s_a) \), for all \( s_a \in S_a \). Whereas following the nominal adviser is essential for maintaining the system safety, following the additional restrictions suggested by \( \alpha^* \) can be perceived as a weak form of advice.

2) Least-limiting solution: Let \( \bar{A}_{\text{cand}} \) denote the finite set of candidate advisers obtained from the nominal adviser \( \alpha^0 \), \( \bar{A}_{\text{cand}} = \{ \alpha \mid \alpha^0(s_a) \subseteq \alpha(s_a), \text{ for all } s_a \in S_a \} \). Note that \( \alpha \in \bar{A}_{\text{cand}} \) does not have to be good since it might not allow for an existence of a non-blocking adviser restricted arena \( \bar{T}^\alpha \). As outlined in Sec. II, it can be however decided whether \( \bar{T}^\alpha \) from Def. 2 has an equivalent non-blocking arena \( T^\alpha \). Building on ideas from Lemmas ?? and 1, we can easily see that the existence of non-blocking adviser restricted arena \( T^\alpha \) also implies the existence of a protagonist’s winning strategy \( \sigma_p^\alpha \in \Omega_p^\alpha \). In fact, because states from \( \text{Losing} \) were removed from \( T^{\alpha} \) (lines 4–6, 8–16 of Alg. 1), all plays in \( T^\alpha \) are winning and \( \Sigma_p^\alpha = \Omega_p^\alpha \).

\[
\bar{A}_{\text{cand}} = \{ \alpha \in \bar{A}_{\text{cand}} \mid \alpha \text{ is a good adviser} \}. \tag{3}
\]

From Lemma 2 and the construction of \( A_{\text{cand}} \), at least one least-limiting good adviser belongs to \( A_{\text{cand}} \). In the remainder of the solution, we focus on solving the following sub-problem for each \( \alpha \in A_{\text{cand}} \).

Problem 2 Consider a good adviser \( \alpha \in A_{\text{cand}} \). Find \( \lambda(\alpha) \) and an optimal and protagonist’s winning strategy \( \sigma_p^\alpha \) with \( \gamma(\sigma_p^\alpha) = \inf_{\sigma_p \in \Omega_p^\alpha} \gamma(\sigma_p) = \inf_{\sigma_p \in \Sigma_p^\alpha} \gamma(\sigma_p) \).

We propose to translate Problem 2 to finding an optimal strategy to a mean-payoff game on a modified arena \( \bar{T}^\alpha \).

Definition 5 (Mean-payoff game arena \( \bar{T}^\alpha \)) Given a non-blocking adviser restricted arena \( \bar{T}^\alpha = (S^\alpha, (S_p^\alpha, S_a^\alpha), s_{\text{init}}, U_p, U_a, T_p^\alpha \cup T_a^\alpha) \), we define the mean-payoff game arena \( \bar{T}^\alpha = (T^\alpha, w) \), where for all \( \bar{T}_p(s_p, u_p) = s_a \), \( w(s_p, s_a) = -|\alpha(s_a)| \) and for all \( T_a(s_a, u_a) = s_p \), \( w(s_a, s_p) = 0 \).

Lemma 3 Problem 2 reduces to the problem of optimal strategy synthesis for the mean-payoff game \( T^\alpha \).

It has been shown in [8] that in mean-payoff games, memoryless strategies suffice to achieve the optimal value. In fact, using the algorithm from [5], the strategy \( \bar{\sigma}_p^\alpha \) takes the form of a memoryless strategy \( \bar{\sigma}_p^\alpha : S_p^\alpha \rightarrow U_p^\alpha \).

3) Overall solution: We now summarize how the presented algorithms serve in finding a solution to Problem 1. 1) The nominal adviser \( \alpha^0 \) is built according to Alg. 1. If there does not exist a non-blocking adviser restricted arena \( \bar{T}^\alpha \), then there does not exist a solution to Problem 1. 2) The set of candidate advisers \( A_{\text{cand}} \) is built according to Eq. (3). 3) For each \( \alpha \in A_{\text{cand}} \), \( \lambda(\alpha) \) and the memoryless optimal protagonist’s winning strategy \( \sigma_p^\alpha \in \Omega_p^\alpha \) are computed through the translation to a mean-payoff game optimal strategy synthesis according to Def. 5. 4) An adviser \( \alpha^* \in A_{\text{cand}} \) with \( \lambda(\alpha^*) = \inf_{\alpha \in A_{\text{cand}}} \lambda(\alpha) \) together with its associated optimal strategy \( \sigma_p^\alpha \) are the solution to Problem 1.

4) Guided system execution: Finally, we discuss how the set of good advisers \( A_{\text{cand}} \) can be used to guide the adversary on-the-fly during the system execution. Given an adviser \( \alpha \in A_{\text{cand}} \), let us call the fact that \( u_a \in \alpha(s_a) \) an advise. We distinguish two types of advises, hard and soft. Hard advises are the ones imposed by the nominal adviser, \( u_a \in \alpha^0(s_a) \), while soft are the remaining ones that can be violated without jeopardizing the system safety. The goal of the guided execution is to permit the adversary to disobey a soft advise and react to this event via a switch to another, possibly more limiting adviser that does not contain this soft advise. Let \( \preceq \) be a partial ordering on the set \( A_{\text{cand}} \), where \( \alpha \preceq \alpha' \) if \( \alpha(s_a) \subseteq \alpha'(s_a) \), for all \( s_a \in S_a \). Hence, for the nominal adviser \( \alpha^0 \), it holds that \( \alpha^0 \preceq \alpha \), for all \( \alpha \in A_{\text{cand}} \).

The system execution that corresponds to a play in \( \bar{T} \) proceeds as follows: 1) The system starts at the initial state \( s_{\text{curr}} = s_{\text{init}} \) with the current adviser being least-limiting adviser \( \alpha_{\text{curr}} = \alpha^* \) and the current protagonist’s strategy being the memoryless winning strategy \( \bar{\sigma}_p^\alpha = \sigma_p^\alpha \). 2) The input \( s_{\text{prev}}(s_{\text{curr}}) \) is applied by the protagonist and the system changes its current state \( s_{\text{curr}} \) according to \( T_p \). The current state belongs to the adversary. 3) \( \alpha_{\text{curr}}(s_{\text{curr}}) \) is provided. The adversary chooses an input \( u_a \in U^*_{\text{curr}} \). a) If \( u_a \notin \alpha_{\text{curr}}(s_{\text{curr}}) \), then the system updates its state \( s_{\text{curr}} \) according to \( T_a \) and proceeds with step 2. b) If \( u_a \in \alpha^0(s_{\text{curr}}) \) then hard advise is disobeyed and system safety will be unavoidably violated and the system needs to stop immediately. c) If \( u_a \notin \alpha^0(s_{\text{curr}}) \), only then a soft advise is disobeyed. The current adviser \( \alpha_{\text{curr}} \) is updated to \( \alpha' \), with the property that \( \lambda(\alpha') = \inf_{\alpha \in A_{\text{cand}}} \lambda(\alpha) \), where \( A_{\preceq} = \{ \alpha \in A_{\text{cand}} \mid \alpha \preceq \alpha_{\text{curr}} \} \) and the current protagonist’s strategy \( \bar{\sigma}_p^\alpha \) is updated to \( \bar{\sigma}_p^{\alpha'} \). The current state \( s_{\text{curr}} \) is updated according to \( T_0 \) and the system proceeds with step 2).

Example 3 Consider the safety game in Fig. 2(A). The result of the nominal adviser computation according to Alg. 1 is illustrated in Fig. 2(B). Fig. 2(C) shows the non-blocking adviser restricted arena \( \bar{T}^\alpha \) with the removed
states and transitions in light grey. The corresponding optimal protagonist’s memoryless winning strategy $\alpha^*$ in $T^{s_0}$ is highlighted in green in Fig. 2.(B). The level of limitation of $s_0$ is $\lambda(s_0) = \limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} \left( |\lambda^0(s_2)| + \sum_{j=2}^{n} |\lambda^j(s_8)| \right) = \limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} (2n - 1)$. Fig. 2.(D) shows least-limiting adviser $\alpha^*$. As opposed to $\alpha^*$, $\alpha^*(s_2) = \{u_{a_2}, u_{a_3}\}$, where the advise $u_{a_2} \preceq \alpha^*(s_2)$ (in cyan) is soft. Fig. 2.(E) shows $T^{s_0}$. The optimal protagonist’s winning strategy is the only protagonist’s strategy in $T^{s_0}$. The level of limitation of $\alpha^*$ is $\lambda(\alpha^*) = \limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} (|\alpha^0(s_2)| + \sum_{j=2}^{n} |\alpha^j(s_8)|) = \limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} < \lambda(s_0)$. For each of the candidate advisers $\alpha' \in A_{\text{rand}}$, either $\lambda(\alpha') = \lambda(s_0)$ or $\lambda(\alpha') = \lambda(\alpha^*)$.

![Fig. 2](image_url) (A) An example of a game arena with a safety winning condition. (B) The nominal adviser $\alpha^0$ and Losing via marking the forbidden transitions and states in Losing in red. $s^\text{Losing}$ is in green. (C) The non-blocking adviser restricted arena $T^{s_0}$. (D) $\alpha^*$ and (E) The non-blocking adviser restricted arena $T^{s_0}$.

The guided system execution proceeds as follows: The system starts in state $s_{\text{curr}} = s_{p1}$ with $\alpha_{\text{curr}} = \alpha^*$ and $s_{p,\text{curr}} = s^0_{p}$. Input $u_{p1}$ is applied, $s_{\text{curr}} = s_{2}$. Then, $\alpha_{\text{curr}}(s_{\text{curr}}) = \alpha^*(s_2)$ is the adversary. The adversary chooses either $u_{a_1}$, $u_{a_2}$, or $u_{a_3}$, but, through the adviser it is recommended not to select $u_{a_3}$ (soft advise) and $u_{a_2}$ (hard advise). If the choice is $u_{a_3}$, a soft advice is disobeyed, the current state becomes $s_3$ and the current adviser and strategy are updated to $\alpha_{\text{curr}} = \alpha^0$ and $s_{p,\text{curr}} = s^p_{p}$. Then, $\lambda(\alpha^0) = \liminf_{t \to \infty} \inf_{A_{\text{rand}}} \lambda(\alpha)$. Input $u_{p3}$ is then applied and $s_{\text{curr}} = s_{8}$. In the remainder of the execution, the adversary is guided to follow the hard advises $u_{a_4}, u_{a_5} \in \alpha_{\text{curr}}(s_8)$, leading the system to switching between $s_8$ and $s_9$. If the choice in $s_2$ is $u_{a_2}$ despite the hard advice, the system reaches an unsafe state.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

We studied synthesis of least-limiting guidelines for decision making in semi-autonomous systems involving entities that are uncontrollable, but partially willing to collaborate on achieving safety of the system. We proposed a rigorous formulation of such problem, an algorithm to synthesize least-limiting advisers for an adversary in a 2-player safety game, and a systematic way to guide the system execution with their use. As far as we are concerned, this paper is one of the first steps towards studying synthesis of guidelines for uncontrollable entities. However, the potential use of the approach goes beyond such scenarios, e.g., to decentralized collaborative robot manipulation. Future work includes extensions to complex winning conditions, different measures of limitation, and continuous state spaces, and implementation of the approach and demonstration of its potential in a case study.

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