Fragments from the Ājīvikas

Piotr Balcerowicz

Abstract The paper examines available references to the Ājīvikas that are often identified by scholars, notably by Basham (1951), as genuine quotations from Ājīvikas’ lost works. In addition, the paper analyses some additional material not previously indentified as possible quotations relevant to Ājīvikism. Unfortunately, none of such references seem to be genuinely derived from an Ājīvika source: All of such passages or verses previously considered genuinely taken from Ājīvika literature turn out to have been composed by non-Ājīvika authors and usually derive either from Jaina works or from fables and narrative literature. There is no clear proof that the Ājīvikas developed their own Sanskrit literature (in addition to Prakrit works), much less philosophical literature in Sanskrit. Further, the faithfulness and reliability of reports of the Ājīvikas and paraphrases of their views cannot be assessed with any certainty.

Keywords Ajivikism · Ājīvikas · Materialists · Destiny · Fate · Fatalism · Niyati · Svabhāva · Niyati-dvātriṁśikā · Sāmañña-phala-sutta

I. Very little is known about the ancient Indian religion and philosophical system of the Ājīvikas. The doctrine, which predates the emergence of Jainism and Buddhism, albeit by only a slight margin, flourished between the fourth and second centuries.
BCE. In the period between the fourth and second centuries BCE, it was perhaps one of the most influential non-Brahmanical religions in India, second to Buddhism.\(^1\) Despite attempts having been made by a number of scholars\(^2\) we still have an impression that we know very little of Ājīvīkism. The sources at our disposal for reconstructing their doctrine are both very limited and unreliable.

Any attempt to reconstruct the views propounded by the Ājīvikas and the founders of the system, one of them being Makkhali Gosāla, will face two major difficulties. First, there are no extant complete texts (except one alleged candidate, see below), or even fragments, which can be claimed reliably to have been written by the Ājīvikas or which have been identified beyond doubt as directly stemming from sources known as both closely linked and faithful to the Ājīvikas. This is because there are no such sources; indeed, all references to the Ājīvikas in the whole history of Indian philosophy originate from rather hostile environment. Secondly, the process of a possibly reconstructing the views of the Ājīvikas must be based on our decision about which of the preserved fragments (quotes, paraphrases etc.), again from these hostile environments, that we encounter is original or faithfully reproduces Ājīvika views. Our decision as to which of the preserved fragments we consider is original or faithfully reproduces Ājīvika views is necessarily based on our knowledge of what the real doctrine of the Ājīvikas actually was (in order to be able to ascribe a fragment to the Ājīvika school or not), which in turn is based on the process of the reconstruction of authentic views of the Ājīvikas. And this is clearly a vicious circle. There is, unfortunately, no logical and methodologically satisfactory way out except through a process of gradual approximation, something that treads on the vicious circle itself. All we can do is to examine (or re-examine) the material which was produced by authors and traditions inimically

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1 Its followers are mentioned three times in two Aśokan edicts. Two of these are inscriptions from Barābār Hill in Bihar (Bloch 1950, p. 159): 1. lājīnā piyādasīnā dūvā-dāsa-vassābhisitātēn iyaṁ niggohā-kūbbā dinnā ājīvikehi.—‘This Banyan Cave was donated to the Ājīvikas by [the king Aśoka] Favourably Disposed, who was consecrated twelve years ago.’; 2. lājīnā piyādasīnā dūvā-dāsa-vassābhisitātēn iyaṁ kūbbā khalatika-pavatassūtī dinnā ājīvikehi.—‘This cave of the Khalatika mountain was donated to the Ājīvikas by [the king Aśoka] Favourably Disposed, who was consecrated twelve years ago.’). They are also mentioned in the seventh pillar edict from Topra-ī in Haryana (Bloch 1950, p. 170): sanīg̲haṭṭhaśi pi me kate, ime viyāpāṭha hohanitī ti. hemeva bābhancesu ājīvikehu pi me kate, ime viyāpāṭha hohanitī ti.—‘Also with respect to the matters of the [Buddhist] community, I decided that these [high officers (mahā-mātra)] are occupied [with them]. Likewise, with respect to Brahmins and Ājīvikas, I decided that these [high officers] are occupied [with them].’).

2 Such as Hermann Jacobi (1880), Bunyiū Namijo (1884), Ernst Leumann (1884), D.R. Bhandarkar (1912), K.B. Pathak (1912), Jarl Charpentier (1913), B.M. Barua (1920), A.F. Rudolf Hoernle (1926), A. Banerji Sastri (1926), B.M. Barua (1926–1927), N. Aiyasvami Sastri (1941), Arthur Llewellyn Basham (1951), Arthur Llewellyn Basham (1971), Haripada Chakrabarti (1973), S.N. Ghosal (1979) and (1980), Pranabandana Jasi (1982a) and (1982b), Gustav Roth (1993), Johannes Bronkhorst (2000), (2003) and (2007). The latest in the series is: Piotr Balcerowicz (2016).
disposed to the Ājīvikas in the hope that a careful comparison and assessment of such sources may reveal some dependable threads from which we will little by little weave a fabric of more definite and tangible texture. In this way we may give a fresh look to a source which we originally considered not quite related to Ājīvikas to throw more light on the history of the system. A way to approach the extant material is to first determine certain terminology or concepts which were traditionally associated by other systems with the Ājīvikas and then, with the help of these technical terms and notions, we may proceed to detect possible new sources for further examination.

That the Ājīvikas had their early canon known as the eightfold *Mahā-nimitta* is attested in Jaina canonical literature. But we also have evidence that the Ājīvikas developed their canon containing 22 *sūtras*, with divisions rather similar to Jaina canon. A reference to it is found in the Jaina *Naṇḍi-sutta*:

Twenty-two *sūtras* are accepted to be the *sūtras* in the arrangement of the Ājīvika *sūtras*, the sections of which are dependent [for meaning] on each other.

We may also suspect that they probably developed some literature in Sanskrit. The question, however, is whether anything of this remains, preserved either in exact citations, loose quotes paraphrases or references.

In this paper I will first re-examine the material which has already been analysed by some scholars heretofore and determined to not only to be related Ājīvikism but to represent genuine quotations from Ājīvika sources. Incidentally, I will also evaluate the methodology so far applied by scholars in their ascribing the authorship of certain passages to the Ājīvikas. Then, I will search for additional passages so far overlooked by scholars and attempt to assess to what extent these can be considered genuine quotations or faithful paraphrases. My intention is to establish a pool of Ājīvika fragments, preferably citations, that is as broad as possible. In my analysis I will concern myself primarily with Sanskrit passages that are possible candidates for original quotations from Ājīvikas’ lost sources. The aim of this paper is not to reconstruct the doctrine of the Ājīvikas. However, such reconstructory attempts will be occasionally undertaken if they are necessary to judge whether a particular fragment may be considered authentic or not.

2. The earliest reference (or, at least, one of the earliest such references) is the well-known account found in the Buddhist description of the six ‘heretical’ teachers of the *Sāmaṇṇa-phala-sutta*, which preserves what is known as ‘the doctrine of

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3 This was already noticed by Leumann (1884, p. 249), Barua (1920, pp. 20, 41), Basham (1951, pp. 213–216) and others. See e.g. Viy 15.7–9 = Viy 15.4–5 = Viy 15.58 = Viy 15.77: tae naṁ te chad-

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4. NanS₁ 105, p. 74.1–4: … iccevāṁ bāvīsaṁ suttaṁ acchinna-cheyaṇaityaṁ ājīvīya-sutta-parivāḍie suttaṁ; see also NanCū 106, p. 74.6–18, ad loc. in the same spirit, esp.: ete cēva bāvīsaṁ achiṇṇa-

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Makkhali Gosāla’ (Makkhali-gosāla-vādo). While it is clearly not a citation, it does seem to reveal certain terminological peculiarities characteristic of the Ājīvikas:

There is no deed [performed by the agent] himself, there is no deed [performed by] someone else [than the agent], there is no deed [performed by] humans [which could influence future births or determine the course of their lives], there is no strength, there is no vigour, there is no human aptitude, there is no human prowess [which could influence future birth or determine fate]. All animate beings, all breathing things, all living beings, all souls are without power, without strength, without vigour; [instead] they are developed by destiny, predetermined concurrence of factors and [own] nature, [and] they experience pleasure and suffering in the six classes [of existence]. … The following is not the case: on account of this virtue, or on account of this vow, or on account of this austerity, or on account of this pure conduct, I will ripen unripened karman or will bring ripened karman to destruction by gradually working on [it through such practices]. This is not the case. Happiness and unhappiness are meted out with a measure, their final end is done in (i.e. through) the cycle of rebirths; there is neither [their] diminishing nor expanding, there is neither [their] increase nor decrease. Just like a ball of thread, when thrown, exhausts itself, [simply] unwinding, exactly in the same manner both the fool and the wise—having transmigrated, having gone through the cycle of rebirths—will put an end to unhappiness.⁵

On the basis of this passage—followed in the Sāmañña-phala-sutta with a detailed list of divisions of the world, living beings etc.—and a comparison of its vocabulary with a number of other passages generally associated by Indian tradition and scholars with the Ājīvikas we can tentatively identify four such ‘Ājīvika keywords’:

1. niyati (destiny),
2. saṅgati i saṃgati (predetermined concurrence of factors),⁶
3. svabhāva (intrinsic nature),
4. daiva (fate)⁷.

The fourth one (fate, or daiva), being traditionally related to the Ājīvika and often identified with destiny (niyati), is absent from the above passage. These—especially in combinations such as niyati-vāda (‘the doctrine of destiny’, or determinism), Saṅgati-vāda (‘the doctrine of predetermined concurrence of factors’), svabhāva-

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⁵ Samañña-phala-sutta, DN 2.20, p. 53–54: n’atthi atta-kāre, n’atthi para-kāre, n’atthi purisa-kāre, n’atthi balan, n’atthi viñña, n’atthi purisa-thāmo, n’atthi purisa-parakkamo. sabbe sattā sabbe pānā sabbe bhītā sabbe jīva avasa abala aviriyā niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-pariṇātā chassi evabhijātā sukkha-dakkhaṁ paṭisajvedenti. … attha n’atthi: imināhanī silena vataena vā tapena vā brahma-cariyena vā aparpakkhaṁ vā kammaṁ paripācessāmi, paripakkhaṁ vā kammaṁ phussa phussa vyanti karissāmiti. h’evain n’atthi [ ] doña-mite sukhā-dakkhe paryanta-kate saṁsāre, n’atthi hāyana-vaddhane, n’atthi ukkānāvakanise. seyyathā pi nāma suṭta-gule khitte nibbēthiyamānam eva paleti, evam eva bāle ca paṇḍite ca sandhāvīvā samāsāvīvā dukkhaṁ antaṁ karissāmiti.

⁶ Equated with niyati, see e.g. SūyVṬ 1.1.2.30, p. 38.38: sā saṃgati niyatis.

⁷ See §§ 11, 14.
vāda (‘the doctrine of intrinsic nature’), or daiva-vāda (‘the doctrine of fate’, or fatalism), which suggest that the usage of these terms is not casual but refers to some kind of world view—will also be the terms which I will use in order to unearth possible ‘concealed citations’ from the Ājīvakas or at least to identify passages that may closely be linked to them, and then I will critically evaluate such passages with an attempt to discard those which do not betray any closer link to Ājīvika doctrine despite the use of one of the above technical terms. In addition, I will follow an obvious procedure: I will examine the passages which are identified by Indian authors with the Ājīvakas, either as describing (paraphrasing) their views or as citing them verbatim.

In my critical enquiry I will make liberal use of a selection of passages listed by BASHAM (1951) in his History and Doctrines of the Ājīvakas, especially a chapter section ‘Quotations by the Commentators’, which he considers genuine quotes from Ājīvika sources. He concludes his selection of quotations from allegedly original Ājīvika Sanskrit sources as follows:

These verses indicate that, beside their early literature in Prakrit, and the Tamil scripture Oṇputu-katir, the Ājīvakas possessed a later literature in Sanskrit, containing much philosophical poetry. It might be suggested that these verses were composed by the commentators themselves, to illustrate the views they were discussing. Yet here are eight verses, quoted by different commentators in different centuries, and all attributed to Ājīvakas or niyativādins. It is more probable that some at least are genuine, than that all are spurious.  

3. With respect to these eight verses mentioned by BASHAM, I will start my critical enquiry with a passage found in Gunaratna-sūri’s commentary Tarka-rahasya-dipikā (TRD) to Haribhadra-sūri’s Saḍ-darśana-samuccaya (ŚDSA) which describes a fourth view out of various theories of ‘what makes the world go round’ and which contains two such verses:

For these [propounders of the fourth view] argue as follows: {A} There is another category [which is responsible for change in the world], namely destiny, [and] by its force all entities without exception manifest themselves in a strictly determined manner, not otherwise. For if [object] \( x \) arises from [factor] \( y \) [at time] \( t \), then [object] \( x \) is understood to exist in a strictly determined manner due to [factor] \( y \) [at time] \( t \); otherwise there would be no basis for [any talk about] effect and cause and about any individually definite form [which an object assumes], because there would be no determining factor [for things to occur this way and not otherwise]. Therefore, in this way, who on earth, being expert in the method of cognitive criteria, could possibly disprove destiny [as determining factor] which is [clearly] apprehended on account of strict determinism of effect?! [There is] no way he

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8 BASHAM (1951, pp. 220–223).
9 BASHAM (1951, pp. 222–223).
can achieve it; otherwise there would be an undesired consequence of self-abortiveness of the method of cognitive criteria. So, accordingly, it is said:

V 1: “{B} Since all entities occur in a strictly determined form, therefore [all of] them are produced by destiny in conformity with their own intrinsic nature. «The what» (i.e. the object), “«the when» (i.e. the time of its occurrence), «the because of» (i.e. its causal factor), «the as long as» (i.e. its duration) occur as determined in a strictly specified manner. Who could possible oppose this [destiny]?”¹⁰

Two layers are distinguishable at first glance in Gunāratna-sūri’s commentary: Section {A} is Gunāratna-sūri’s own paraphrase or account of the views of Ājīvikas the way he knew or understood them, whereas Section {B} seems to be a quotation of two verses. These appear to be genuine, especially due to how they are introduced: tathā cōktam. However, upon closer inspection of Gunāratna-sūri’s introduction to the verses—Section {A}—it becomes obvious that he does not go beyond the contents the two verses: Section {A} is basically their paraphrase and does not bring in any new material or information. BASHAM (1951, p. 222) introduces the two above-mentioned verses as follows: ‘Gunāratna … quotes further verses which he attributes to the niyativādins’.

As a matter of fact, the actual source of these two verses is the Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya¹¹ of Haribhadra-sūri (c. 740–800), the encyclopaedist and author of the Śad-darśana-samuccaya. The two verses occur in a niyati-vāda section consisting of altogether four verses.¹²

That brief passage forms a part of a larger section which collects a number of unorthodox views explaining the causality of the world and events and includes kāla-vāda (‘the doctrine of time’), svabhāva-vāda (‘the doctrine of intrinsic nature’), niyati-vāda (‘the doctrine of destiny’), karma-vāda (‘the doctrine of deeds’), kālādi-sāmagrī-vāda (‘the doctrine of causal complex consisting of time and other

¹⁰ TRD 1 § 23, p.18.6–19.14: te hy evam āhuḥ— {A} niyati nāma tatvāntaram asti yad-vaśād ete bhāvāḥ sarve ’pi niyatenāiva rūpeṇa prādur-bhāvaṃ aśnuvate, nānyathā. tathā hi—yad yadā yato bhavati tat tadā tata eva niyatenāiva rūpeṇa bhavad upalabhyaṁ, anyathā kārya-kāraṇa-vaṇvasthā pratiniyata-rūpa-vaṇvasthā ca na bhavet, niyāmakābhāvāt. tata evaṁ kārya-naiyatyatathā pratyamānāṁ enāṁ niyatiṁ ko nāma pramāṇa-patha-kuśalo bādhituṁ kṣamate. mā prāpād anyatraṁ pramāṇa-patha-vyāghāta-prasaṁgaṁ. tathā cōktam:

{B} niyatenāiva rūpeṇa sarve bhāvā bhavanti yat /
tato niyati-jāḥ ye ete tat-svarūpānuvedhatāḥ //
yad yadāiva yato yāvat tat tadāiva tatas tathā //
niyataṁ jāyate nyāyāt ka enāṁ bādhituṁ kṣamah //

BASHAM (1951, p. 222, n. 4) notices that these verses are found in ‘Gumaratna to Śad-darśnana-samuccaya, p. 12.’

¹¹ ŚVS₁ 2.173–174, p. 45–46.
¹² ŚVS₁ 2.173–176.
factors’). This whole section (ŚVS₁ 2.164–193, pp. 45–53), which deserves to be reproduced here in extenso primarily for the sake of stylistic analysis, reads as follows:

[kāla-vāda:]
kālādināṁ ca kartṛtvāṁ manyante 'nye pravādhinaḥ / kevalānāṁ tad-anve tu mithaḥ sāmagry-apekṣayā // 2.164 // na kāla-vyatikreṇa garbha-bāla-śubhādikam / yat kiṃcīj jāyate loke tad asau kāraṇam kila // 2.165 //
kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ samhāratī prajaḥ / kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti kālo hi duratiṇamah // 2.166 //
kiṃcī kālaḥ ṛte nāvā mudga-paktir apiṣyate / sthāly-ādi-sāṁnidhāne 'pi tataḥ kālaḥ asau matā // 2.167 //
kālaḥvē ca garbhādi sarvāṁ syād avyavasthayā / parēṣṭa-hetu-sadbhāva-mātrād eva tad-udbhāvāt // 2.168 //

[svabhāva-vāda]
a na svabhāvātiyreṇa garbha-bāla-śubhādikam / yat kiṃcīj jāyate loke tad asau kāraṇam kila // 2.169 //
sarvāḥ svabhāvena sva-svabhāve tathā tathā //
varṛtante 'ha nirvarṛtante kāma-cāra-parān-mukhāḥ // 2.170 //
na vinēha svabhāvāna mudga-paktir apiṣyate (see footnote 13) /
tathā-kālādī- bhāve 'pi nāśva-māsasya sā yatah // 2.171 //
atas svabhāvāt tad-bhāve 'tipasaṅgo 'nivārītaḥ /
tule tatra mṛdāḥ kumbho na paṭāditya-yukti-mat // 2.172 //

[niyati-vāda]
niyatenāva rūpeṇa sarve bhāvā bhavanti yat /
tato niyati-jā hy ete tat-svarūpāṇvedhataḥ // 2.173 //
yad yadēva yato yāvat tat tadāiva tatas tathā //
niyatam jāyate nyāyāt ka enāṁ bādhitum kṣamaḥ // 2.174 //
na ca ret niyatiṁ loke mudga-paktir apiṣyate /
tat-svabhāvādī-bhāve 'pi nāśvāvānuṣṭhāna sarvābhāvaḥ prasajate /
anyōnyātmakatapattēḥ kriyā-vaiphalyam eva ca // 2.176 //

[karma-vāda]
na bhokti-vyatiyreṇa bhogaṁ jagati vidyate /
na cāktasya bhogah svāṁ muktāṁ bhoga-bhāvataḥ // 2.177 //
bhogyaṁ ca viśvam sattvāṁ viśhinaḥ tena tena yat /
dṛṣyate 'dhyakṣam evēmām tasmāt tat karma-jaṁ hi tat // 2.178 //
na ca tat karma-vaipūḍhurye mudga-paktir apiṣyate /
sthāly-ādi-bhaṅga-bhāvena yat kvacina nōpapadīyate // 2.179 //

[kālādī-sāmagrī-vaḍa]
citraṁ bhogyaṁ tathā citrāt karmano 'hetutānyathā //

13 Probably: apiṣyate, cf. ŚVS₁ 2.175, 179.
This is due to a number of reasons. Highly unlikely, it seems, that these verses are a compilation from original sources. It is merely collected verses from original sources in one section, or whether he 

Second, in the exposition of the four respective theories the same patterns occur as a kind of refrain. I have indicated the recurrent similar patterns in bold. For instance, the refrain phrase mudga-pektir apiṣyate, with a variant apiṣyate (167b, 

Interestingly, the niyati section contains no single other doctrinal element which could, at least theoretically, be linked to the Ājivikas.

The natural question is whether Haribhadra himself composed these two verses (ŚVS 2.173–174) quoted by Guṇaratna himself, along with a number of others, or merely collected verses from original sources in one section, or whether he composed some verses and interwove them with some genuinely original ones. It is highly unlikely, it seems, that these verses are a compilation from original sources. This is due to a number of reasons.

First, the exposition of the theories kāla-vāda, svabhāva-vāda, niyati-vāda, kālādi-sāmagrī-vāda has its own specific argumentative structure, e.g. ŚVS₁ 2.171 (exposition of the svabhāva-vāda) rejects the kāla-vāda, whereas ŚVS₁ 2.173 (exposition of the niyati-vāda) in turn discards the svabhāva-vāda, which is then rejected in ŚVS₁ 2.180.

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14 ŚVS₁ misprints: tat-karṭve.
171b, 175b, 179b), or merely apîkṣyate (192b), occurs in the exposition of each of the theories, and always in the same metrical pattern in pāda b; a range of verses of all the subsections end with nōpapadyate (179, 186, 189) in pāda b; the expositions of two theories contain the same phrase garbha-bāla-śubhādikam (165b, 169b), which is, in addition, in two cases (out of three) compounded with ṣvyanikeṇa or ṣättirekena (165, 169, 177) always in the same position in pāda a; the pāda c of the exposition of two theories contains sthālī-ādi (167c, 179c); the pādas cd of the exposition of two theories have the same pattern ṣbhāve ‘pi nā° .......... əā yataḥ (171cd, 175cd); and a whole hemistich yat kiṃci jāyate loke tad asau kāraṇam kila (165cd, 169cd) ) appears twice. It is for all practical reasons impossible for these verses to be quotes from original sources, for it hard to imagine that the proponents of different theories would use the same phrases or even identical hemistiches or phrasal patters.

Third, in some arguments (e.g. ŚVS₁ 2.176) we have a clear use of the argument of anyathânupapatti (‘inexplicability otherwise’), a specifically Jaina invention of later times. had Haribhadra quoted from earlier sources, it would imply that the opponents had known the Jaina argumentative structure before the Jainas!

Fourth, the structure of Haribhadra’s work is to present ‘a summary of the accounts of (or colloquies among) [various] systems of teaching’ (Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya), somehow along the lines of the doxographical text of his Śād-darśana-samuccaya. Indeed the exposition of the theories of kāla-vāda, svabhāva-vāda, niyati-vāda, karma-vāda, kālādi-sāmagrī-vāda follows such a discursive pattern: each subsequent theory serves to refute the former. It seems most probable that it was Haribhadra’s own design to juxtapose all the theories in a dialectical structure and explain them in his own words.

The question remains whether he had access to any original sources of the Ājīvikas (svabhāva-vāda?, see below p. 30 ff.; niyati-vāda) and the exponents of the other theories (kāla-vāda, karma-vāda, kālādi-sāmagrī-vāda), or whether he succumbed to, or delved on some hypothetical descriptions of certain theories which one might entertain by way of a mere theoretical exercise. If this were the case, Haribhadra’s account would be of no descriptive character (i.e. it would present no description of actual views) and would have no actual value for our study of the system of the Ājīvikas. Last but not least, we know that his versified works, the most acclaimed being the Śād-darśana-samuccaya, Haribhadra as a rule restricts himself to his own paraphrases of the views he discusses without quoting original sources. His Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya does not appear to be an exception in containing no quotations from external sources. For the above reasons it is quite unlikely that the two verses are actual quotations from Ājīvika sources.

4. As the first of the list in BASHAM’s (1951, pp. 220–223) survey of the few Sanskrit quotations from alleged Ājīvika sources, mention is made of the following verse:

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15 See BALCEROWICZ (2003a).
V 2: Whatever thing is to be gained, it—whether happy or unhappy—happens to people in a necessary manner on account of the force of destiny. For even if living beings make great effort, that which is not to be does not happen, and there is no destruction of that which is to be.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{BASHAM (1951, p. 221, n. 1)} traces the verse back to three sources: ‘Śīlāṅka to Sū. kṛ, i,1,2,2 and ii,1,29; Jñānavimala to Praśna-vyākaraṇa, 7; Abhayadeva to Uv. Das. vi,165.’ Let us examine these and other sources where these verses occur.

4.1. The first source mentioned by BASHAM is Śīlāṅka’s \textit{Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-vṛtti} (ŚūyVṛ 1.1.2.30, pp. 38.41–42), a Śvetāmbara text belonging to 9th century. The verse is introduced there as follows:

The propounder of destiny [as the sole determining force] reveals his own intention: Predetermined concurrence of factors, i.e. destiny, is that whose course leads to a particular (yat) experience of happiness or unhappiness for a particular person (yasya), at a particular time (yadā), place (yatra) due to a particular transformation of righteousness (samyaktva)\textsuperscript{17}; its condition is the state of being determined. Further, in this way that due to which happiness and unhappiness etc. are not caused by personal agency etc. is these living beings’ state of being determined, i.e. caused by destiny. So, accordingly, it is said…\textsuperscript{18}

The above passage is, in fact, a part of the comment on two verses of the \textit{Śuya-gadaṁga},\textsuperscript{19} which in themselves might at first glance be considered as genuine quotes from Ājīvikas:

\textsuperscript{16} BASHAM’s (1951, p. 221):
\begin{verbatim}
prāptavyo niyati-balāśrayeṇa yo ‘rthah
so ‘vaśyaṁ bhavati nṛṣāṁ śubho ‘śubho vā l
bhūtānāṁ mahatī kṛte ‘pi hi prayaṭne
nabhartvayām bhavati na bhāvino ‘stī nāśaḥ //
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{17} This is a typically Jaina understanding of the saṁśāra and its mechanism. However, we cannot exclude that the Ājīvikas maintained the same opinion, which is however rather unlikely.

\textsuperscript{18} ŚūyVṛ 1.1.2.30, p. 38.36 ff.: \textit{niyati-vādī svābhīrprāyaṁ aviṣ-karoṭi—“saṁgaiyaini” samyak-khaś-paṇiṇāmena gati yasya yadā yatra yat sukha-duḥkhānubhāvanaṁ sā saṁgati niyatis tasyāṁ bhavam sāṅgatikam, yatāṁ caivaṁ na puruṣa-kārādi-kyatiṁ sukha-duḥkhādi atas tat teṣāṁ prāṇināṁ niyati-kyatiṁ sāṅgatikam ity ucyate. tathā cōktam.}

\textsuperscript{19} For an alternative translation of these two verses as well as for a discussion of this passage, alongside Śīlāṅka’s comments, see: \textit{BOLLÉE (1977, pp. 80–84)}. 
V 3: But misery (and pleasure) is not caused by (the souls) themselves; how could it be caused by other (agents, as time, &c.)? Pleasure and misery, final beatitude and temporal (pleasure and pain) are not caused by (the souls) themselves, nor by others; but the individual souls experience them; it is the lot assigned them by destiny. This is what they (i.e. the fatalists) say. (2, 3).  

However, despite the initial impression of being genuine quotes, these two Prakrit verses (V 3) are rather a paraphrase at most, not a direct quote. This is because of the reference to ‘those some [thinkers] who proclaim such [a theory]’ (iham egesi āhiaṁ). The directly following verse of the Sūya-gadāṁga, critical of the fatalists, also confirms such a conclusion:

V 4: Those who proclaim these opinions, are fools who fancy themselves learned; they have no knowledge, and do not understand that things depend partly on fate, and partly on human exertion.  

This particular verse, critical of the straightforward fatalists—which is still not the view accepted by the Jainas, as the subsequent verse (Sūy2 1.1.2.32, JACOBI (1895, p. 240; § 1.1.2.6)) suggests—is further commented by Śīlāṅka:

These, i.e. the above mentioned opinions based on the doctrine of destiny … [They are] those who have no knowledge, i.e. are ignorant … because [they do not understand that] things depend partly on fate, and partly on human exertion, i.e. some things such as happiness etc. are determined by destiny, i.e. their occurrence is caused as something necessary, similarly some things are not determined, i.e. their occurrence is caused by the agency of the soul, person etc.; i.e. they onesidedly conceive existence as caused by destiny. For this reason not knowing the [real] cause of happiness and unhappiness they become those who have no knowledge (abuddhiyā), i.e. they become devoid of knowledge. For it is as follows: certain happiness and unhappiness etc. of the followers is strictly determined. It is said [by them] that karman is caused by destiny on certain occasions inasmuch as its coming into being occurs necessarily. Similarly [there are] some things which are not caused by destiny: they are caused by personal agency, time, god, intrinsic nature, karman etc. In such cases, certain instrumentality of

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20 Sūy2 1.1.2.29–30:

na taṁ sayai-kadāṁ dukkhaṁ kao an-na-kadāṁ ca ṇaṁ / suhaṁ vā jai vā dukkhaṁ sehiyaṁ vā asehiyaṁ / 29 //
na sayai-kadāṁ na annēhiṁ vedayaṁi puḍhō jīyāṁ / saṁgatiyāṁ taṁ tahā tesīṁ iham egesi āhiaṁ / 30 //

Cf. the translation of JACOBI (1895, pp. 239–240; § 1.1.2.2–3).

21 Sūy2 1.1.2.31:

evam eyaṁ jaṁpaniṁ bālā paṁdyā-māṁino / niyayāniyayaṁ sanitaṁ ayānaṁ abuddhiyā //

Cf. the translation of JACOBI (1895, p. 240; § 1.1.2.4).
personal agency with respect to happiness and unhappiness etc. is the basis. That one is struck dead is the fruit on account of an action, but the action proceeds as dependent on the agency of the person. So, accordingly, it is said:

V 5: “Thinking that [things are caused by] fate, one does not renounce his own exertion. How could one get sesame oil from sesame seeds without exertion?”

On the one hand, this view of ‘compromised determinism’—viz. some things are determined by destiny, whereas some are not—seems to be principally in agreement with what we think we may actually know of Ājīvikas. On the other hand, the verse quoted by Śilāṅka serves as an illustration of a view which modifies the theory of strict determinism generally ascribed to the Ājīvikas; it is the view attributed to those who claim that things are determined by destiny with the participation of other factors, such as the soul, personal agency, god etc. (ātma-puruṣa-kārēśvarādi-prāpitāṁ sat niyati-kṛtam ekāntenāśriyanti). It seems, therefore, that Śilāṅka himself did not take the verse to stem from an Ājīvika source: neither the authors of the Sūya-gaḍaṁga nor Śilāṅka himself establish any connection between the views expressed in V 4 and V 5 to the Ājīvikas and do not use the ‘key word’ niyati-vāda, generally associated with the Ājīvikas in Indian tradition, in the context of the ‘compromised determinism’.

It seems that the description of the ‘compromised determinism’, which in some ways may indeed better correspond to what the Ājīvikas really claimed, cannot be attributed to Śilāṅka (and of the authors of the Sūya-gaḍaṁga) having real

22 SūyVṛ 1.1.2.31, p. 39.3 ff.: etāni pūrvoktāni niyati-vādāśritāni vacanāni ... būlā ajñāḥ ... yato niyayāniyayam saṁtāṁ iti sukhādikam kińcin niyati-kṛtam—avaśayāṁ-bhāvy-udaya-prāpitāṁ tathā aniyaṭam—ātma-puruṣa-kārēśvarādi-prāpitāṁ sat niyati-kṛtam eva-kāntenāśriyanti, avo ‘jānānaḥ sukha-dukhādhi-kāraṇaṁ abuddhākā buddhi-rahitā bhavanti, tathā hi ārhatānāṁ kińcit sukhā-dukhādhi niyātita eva bhavati. tat-karaṇasya karmāṇaḥ kasminścid avasare ‘vaśayāṁ-bhāvy-udaya-sadbhāvān niyati-kṛtam ity ucye, tathā kińcit aniyaṭi-kṛtam ca—puruṣa-kāra-kāleśvara-svabhāva-karmādi-kṛtam, tatra kathaṁcit sukhā-dukhādheḥ puruṣa-kāra-sādhayatvam āśriyate, hataḥ kriyātaḥ phalaṁ bhavati, kriyā ca puruṣa-kārīyattā pravartate, tathā cóktam:

na daivam iti saṁcintya tvajye udayam ātmanah / anudyayena kas tavāṁ tilebhayaḥ prāptum arhati? /

23 See BRONKHORST (2003, p. 163): ‘The Jaina ascetic, by practising immobility, aspired to bring about a twofold effect: the annihilation of former actions, and the non-performing of new actions. The inactivity of the Jaina ascetic was not only meant to avoid producing karmic effects in the future, but also to destroy actions carried out in the past. The Ājīvika denied that present inactivity can destroy actions carried out in the past. For him these former actions will carry fruit whatever one does. However, there is no reason to believe that he rejected the possibility of non-performance of new actions. We may therefore formulate the hypothesis that both Jainsm and Ājīvikism interpreted the doctrine of karman in the same way, believing that bodily and mental movements were responsible for rebirth. But whereas the Jainas believed that motionlessness might destroy past karman, the Ājīvikas did not think so.’

24 I deliberately stray from taking the term puruṣa in the standard Sāṃkhya way ‘the conscious principle’ because although often Sāṃkhya view is implied in the discussions on the prime cause of the world, this is not necessarily always the case.
knowledge of or first-hand acquaintance with the tradition of the Ājīvikas but is merely a result dictated by a dialectical structure of the argument along the lines of typically Jaina strategy of the Anekānta-vāda: we first analyse the pure niyati position, then the ‘compromised’ version of niyati-aniyati, then the aniyati position etc.

The only thinkable link of verse V 5 to the Ājīvika tradition could perhaps be the mention of the production of sesamum oil (taila) from sesamum seeds (tila). It is the precisely the story of the sesamum shrub (tila-thambha) that provides the legendary setting for Gosāla to formulate an obscure theory of ‘discontinuance / stoppage [of a subsequent birth in a new body] through / due to continuation [in the same re-animated body]’ in defiance of Vardhamāna Mahāvīra’ prediction of the future fate of the sesamum shrub, which had been uprooted by Gosāla to prevent the future birth of its flowers and seeds. However, just as not every mention of fire and smoke in India has to be treated as a direct hint to the classical model of inference, so should the innocuous mention of sesamum not necessarily be understood as a reference to Ājīvikism. Furthermore, in the story of the sesamum shrub there is not mention of the sesamum oil or of its production from the seeds. The story exemplifies a belief that one-sensed living beings will necessarily be reborn.

Now, the question arises as regards Śīlānka’s reliability as the source on the Ājīvikas with respect to verse V 2 (prāptavyo niyati-balāraye…). We may verify his credibility, reliability or accuracy by comparing what he writes about the Ājīvikas, or actually the propounders of determinism, with how he describes systems better known to us. In his commentary (SūyVṛ 1.1.2.28, p. 37) he provides a short account of other śrāmanas, including the Ājīvikas and the Buddhists. This is what he has to say about the former:

In the opinion of the propounders of destiny there exists no bondage of the sort that one would reflect on it and would destroy it.27

For the propounders of the fourfold diminution of the karman through the knowledge of those ignorant of destiny (?) the very same desire for [a new] birth in the transmigration in the cycle of rebirths is established, [as for the Buddhists].28

The compound niyaty-ajñāni-jñāna-catur-vidha-karmāpacaya-vādin clearly is an extension of the typical phrase niyati-vādin (‘the propounder of the doctrine of destiny’), especially in view of the fact that the whole passage is an introduction to

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25 See Viy 15.46–47, 55–56; pp. 698–470, 702–703; for the translation, see: BALCEROWICZ (2016, pp. 23–26); for the discussion of the passage, see: BASHAM (1951, pp. 47–49) and BALCEROWICZ (2016: 27 ff., 80–82).
26 See: BASHAM (1951, pp. 48–49, 57–58, 250–252), SCHUBRING (1954, p. 258) = (1977, p. 470), BALCEROWICZ (2016, pp. 23–28, 45–46).
27 SūyVṛ 1.1.2.28, p. 37.5–6: ‘bandhanaṁ buddhyeta taci ca troṭayed’ iti tad eva ca bandhanaṁ niyati-vādy-abhiprāyena na vidyate…
28 SūyVṛ 1.1.2.28, p. 37.13–14: niyaty-ajñāni-jñāna-catur-vidha-karmāpacaya-vādināṁ tad eva saṁsāra-cakra-vāla-bhramaṇa-garbhanveṣapaṁ pratipādyate.
the **niyati-vāda** (‘the doctrine of destiny’). This extended phrase may contain a clue to some doctrinal elements of the Ājīvikas, but the actual resolution of the compound cannot be conclusive, for it allows for other interpretations as well. However, if we suppose that it is a credible reflection of an authentic belief, the compound would suggest that the Ājīvikas may have accepted four kinds of decrease of **karman** (of which other sources, e.g. the Sāmañña-phala-sutta, are silent) through which one could somehow mitigate the influence of destiny. Now, this is what Śīlāṅka has to say about the Buddhists:

> The propounders of the five aggregates (**skandha**) of elements (**bhūta**), with their inner self obstructed by a false view of reality (**mithyātva**)—being attached to unreal apprehension [and entertaining] a concept of an awakening to ultimate reality, go to high and low states in the cycle of rebirths characterised by a multitude of disease, death and old age—desire or seek a [new] birth innumerable times.29

The terminology in the above passage is certainly not quite Buddhistic, but does not contain anything which goes directly counter the Buddhist doctrine either, except for a strange claim the Buddhists desire new birth (**garbham esyanti**). The passage does contain some typically Buddhist expressions, e.g. ‘disease, death, old age’ (**vyādhi-mṛtu-jarā**), or echoes certain Buddhist expressions (**pañca-bhūta-skandha**, **paramārthāvabodha**), but are not identical with those used in Buddhist texts (**pañca-skandha**; **yathā-bhūtārthāvabodha** (**ABhK**, Naiṣkarmya-siddhi)). However, the passage could hardly be maintained to faithfully represent what the Buddhists said. In addition, it contains some typically Jaina terms, e.g. **mithyātva**. The author does not refer to Buddhists directly but as the exponents of a particular doctrine (**pañca-bhūta-skandhādi-vāda**). Further, both accounts, of the Ājīvikas and of the Buddhists, contain similar expressions (**samsāra-cakra-vāla-bhramaṇa / samsāra-cakra-vāle ... gacchanto**, **garbhānvesaṇaṁ / garbh ... anveṣayanti**), which may imply what Śīlāṅka thinks of both these groups: despite their beliefs and practices, what they actually achieve is in effect a continuous circle of rebirth. In view of the above comparison, it would not be too wise to grant Śīlāṅka much credibility with regard to accuracy as a source of information, and we cannot rely on what he says about the **niyati-vādins**, i.e. most probably the Ājīvikas.

### 4.2. The second source for **BASHAM**’s (1951, p. 221, n. 1) identification of verse V 2 is Jñānavimala and his **Praśna-vyākaraṇa** 7. Since the work dates from the time around 1688 (?), we may safely assume, that the author no longer had any first-hand acquaintance of the Ājīvikas, and he merely reproduced a verse from earlier sources without probably any knowledge of who the Ājīvikas actually were.

For the same reason we can safely dismiss the usefulness of another source of the verse,

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29 SūyVṛ 1.1.2.28, p. 37.11–13: **pañca-bhūta-skandhādi-vādino mithyātvopahatāntarātmano ṣad-grahābhinniṣṭhāḥ paramārthāvabodha-vikalpāḥ santoḥ samsāra-cakra-vāle vyādhi-mṛtu-jarā-kule uccā-vacāṁi sthānāṁi gacchanto garbham esyanty anveṣayanti vānantaśa iti. [Springer]
i.e. Yaśovijaya-gani’s Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya-ṭīkā (ŚVSV ad ŚVS2 2.62, vol. 2, p. 79.7–8 = ŚVS1 2.174), for the author belongs to the same late period of 17th century. Both Jñānavimala and Yaśovijaya-gani postdate Śīlāṅka by eight centuries. For similar reasons we can also disregard the testimony of Abhayadeva-sūri (11th century) who quotes verse V 2 at least twice: in his commentary on the Uvāsagadāsāo (UvDVi 166, p. 57) and in his Tattva-bodha-viḍhāyinī (TBV 3.53 ad niyāti, p. 714.11–27), as well as the testimony of another very late commentator Vijaya Dārsana-sūri, who quotes the verse in his Saṃmati-tarka-mahārṇava-vatārikā (STPMAA, p. 352).

4.3. All other sources for verse V 2 postdate Śīlāṅka, and there seems to be just one which predates him. It is Haribhadra-sūri (8th century), who mentions the verse in his auto-commentary Yoga-bindu-ṭīkā (YBiṬ 313, p. 130.7–10). The verse is introduced, and rounded up, as follows:

And similar is the view of the doctrine of destiny [which stipulates]: “If [something must happen at time] t, then [it happens at time] t; if [something must happen at place] p, then [it happens at place] p; if [something must happen] due to [factor] f, then [it happens] due to [factor] f; if [some thing] y must occur, then [that thing] y occurs; if [some thing] y must not occur, then [that thing] y does not occur.” Accordingly:

“Whatever thing is to be gained…”

Also [the world’s] being determined by destiny is nothing but dubious. In order to show that, it is said…

The context of verse V 2 mentioned in the Yoga-bindu (YBi 313) is the discussion of the causality of god (īśvara), primordial factor (prakṛti), souls (ātman) etc. Except for this passage, the term niyati otherwise does not occur in the text of Haribhadra’s Yoga-bindu-ṭīkā.

The term is paraphrased in YBi 313 as niyata-bhāvatva (anye niyata-bhāvatvād), or ‘being determined by destiny’, which is further explained as follows:

[Thus speak] others, i.e. the propounders [of a theory that] the cause of the world is only destiny because [the world] is determined by destiny; those ford-makers (religious leaders) etc. whose nature, i.e. existence is due to destiny, i.e. is strictly conditioned by the determinants such as substance, place, time and condition are such [as described in verse 312].

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30 YBiṬ 313, p. 130.3–6: tathā ca niyati-vāda-matam. yad yadā tat tadā, yady atra tat tatra, yad yena tat tena, yad asya tat tasya, yad bhavati tat bhavati, yan na bhavati tan na bhavatī. tathā:

prāptavyo niyati-balārayeṇa yo ’rthaḥ...

and p. 130.11: itī. niyata-bhāvatvam api saṁsiddhikam eveti darśayann āhā...

31 YBiṬ 313, p. 129.26–130.2: anye niyati-mātra-jagat-kāraṇa-vādināḥ niyata-bhāvatvāt niyatiito dravya-ksetra-kāla-bhāva-niyamena pratiniyamāvān bhāvah sattā yesāṁ tīrtha-kārādīnāṁ te tathā, tad-bhāvas tattvāṁ, tasmāt.
What is striking in the description of determinism associated with the Ājīvikas is the quadruplet of substance (dravya), place (kṣetra), time (kāla) and condition (bhāva), which are known to be standard parameters used by the Jainas, mostly in the context of sapta-bhāṅgi. Therefore, it is rather unlikely that the paraphrase of determinist doctrine actually rests on genuine Ājīvika terminology. It is equally unlikely that the one who reproduces Ājīvika ideas does it both faithfully and with full knowledge of them.

Further, as a rule, in the Yoga-bindu and the Yoga-bindu-ṭīkā, Haribhadra does not quote from non-Jaina sources. In those rare cases where he apparently does, he seems to quote quite consistently by specifically introducing the verses which he draws from other sources. In addition, the principle seems to be that Haribhadra does not specifically introduce his own verses, i.e. composed by him, in any particular way, except for occasional (but not obligatory) tathā or iti at the end.

A similar case to the one currently discussed (V 2 quoted by Haribhadra) is Yoga-bindu-ṭīkā 290, in which a pratīka of Yoga-bindu (YBi 290a: sanivignah) is directly followed by (Haribhadra’s own?) verse. There is still one more very similar case (YBiT 78, vide infra, p. 50, n.73) of the same structure (a pratīka followed by a verse, with no iti), which however moderates our findings: that verse is an attested quotation from an earlier source.

Nevertheless, considering all the above, it would seem quite likely that verse V 2 found in the Yoga-bindu-ṭīkā is not a genuine quotation from a lost Ājīvika source but rather Haribhadra’s own paraphrase of deterministic ideas entertained by the Ājīvikas the way he understood them.

4.4. There is, however, one difficulty with this conclusion, which in view of it would seem now too hasty, namely that the verse is also quoted by Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa in his Dvādasāra-naya-cakra, a pre-Dharmakīrti text (most probably 2nd half of the 6th century), a definitely pre-Haribhadra text. It is introduced there as follows:

…[Consider the following objection:] “This very claim that it is inconsistent to maintain that the [conscious principle (puruṣa)] is the knower etc. can easily be corroborated. But also in the case if one acknowledged that it is

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32 E.g. in RVār 4.42 (p. 254.14 ff.), SVM 23.113 (p. 143.12), JTBh₁ 1.22 § 63 (p. 19) / JTBh₂ 1.22 (p. 19); see BALCEROWICZ (2015), n. 70.

33 E.g. YBiT 108, p. 48.1–2 (... sāmkhya-samaya-prasiddhaḥ, tathā ca te pāṭhanti...—this introduces SK 53), YBiT 119, p. 42.4 (mato ‘bhīprāhah’), YBiT 197, p. 83.16–17, 26 (yataḥ pathyate), YBiT 205, p. 88.4 (yataḥ pathyate), YBiT 213, p. 91.5 (yathoktaṁ), YBiT 217, p. 93.2 (yataḥ pathyate), YBiT 426, p. 171.5 (tathā ca te pāṭhanti), YBiT 476, p. 190.11 (tathā ca bhavat-siddhāntah—introduces Haribhadra’s own ŚSV₁ 5.404) with reference to Buddhist Yogācāra), YBiT 476, p. 190.15–16 (tathā ca pāṭhanti—introduces PV₁ 3.35, p. 160; PV₂ 3.35, p. 22.21), YBiT 516, p. 203.6–7 (prāg-abhāvādi-laksanāni cētthham avaseyam—introduces MŚV abhāva 2–3). In other (very few) cases, he rounds up a verse with an ‘extended’ iti-phrase (i.e. a phrase which contains iti alongside other elements), e.g. YBiT 87, 40.14 (iti-ādi vacanaiḥ), YBiT 250, p. 105.18 (iti-ādīnā granthena).

34 YBiT 290, p. 119.14–18: ... sanivignah
tathye dharme dhvasta-hīnā prabhaddhe deve rāga-dveṣa-mohādi-mukte /
sādhau sarva-grantha-sāndarbha-hūne sanivego ’sau niścalo yo ’nurūgaḥ //
consistent to maintain that the conscious principle (puruṣa) is the knower, there is still the exactly same constraint which necessitates the need for the existence of another agent [different from the conscious principle (puruṣa)]. [Suppose] there is an agent …, but it [again] is unconscious. The cause necessarily has to put into effect this constraint, because these [causes (?)] are either such or otherwise; therefore there is only one agent, namely destiny, for occasional and random diversity of its aims is not a defeating argument against the singularity of this [destiny as a single cause]. And it is said in support: “Whatever thing is to be gained…”.

The introduction to the verse is phrased in the context of a discussion on causality in the world and contains a reference, cryptic in many ways (perhaps also due to insufficiencies of the available text of the Dvādaśāra-naya-cakra restored on the basis of the commentary, from which its portions were extracted), to destiny as the only cause of world events. It is used as an argument against the causality exercised by the conscious principle (puruṣa).

It is well known that Mallavādin Kṣamāśramana copiously availed himself of various works which he criticised but also quoted. the best known case is his use of large portions of Diṅnāga’s Pramāṇa-samuccaya. It is very unlikely that the verse in question was a product of Mallavādin who, in his prose text, normally refrains himself from composing his own verses, and the verses found in his work are generally taken from other sources.

Interestingly, in all the above references verse V 2 is quoted without any modification or variant. In a number of other cases which are analysed in this paper the alleged Ājīvika references are often found with some variants. It would, therefore, seem plausible that verse V 2 could be a genuine Ājīvika verse due to the lack of any contrary evidence (I have not traced the verse in any other earlier work, e.g. of Jaina authorship).

However, it is most probably not the case. The source of the verse seems to be fable tradition, from which the Pañca-tatra derives or a version of the Pañca-tatra itself. The whole complete verse is found in one of the editions of the Pañca-tatra with a slight modification (in bold), whereby the verse is adopted to the contents of a story:

Whatever thing is to be gained, even a person who is unconscious lying in bed will obtain it on account of the force of destiny. For even if living beings make great effort, that which is not to be does not happen, and there is no destruction of that which is to be.

35 DNC, p. 193.3–4: namu taj-jñatvādy-ayuktatāvivāsā samarthyate, yuktatvābhimatatve 'pi cāyam eva niyamah kartr-antaratvāpādanāya. bhavati kartā ******* acetano 'pi bhavati. tan-niṣkaya-kāriṇā kāraṇena-bhavyaṁ bhavitavyam, tēṣāṁ tathā-bhāvānyathā-bhāvād iti niyatir evāikā kartir. na hi tasyāṁ kadācit kathācit id-amithyārāpyam ekatva-vyāghāti. anvāhā ca:

prāptavyo niyati-balāśrayena yo 'ṛthe so 'vaśyaṁ bhavati nppāṁ śubho 'śubho vā / bhūtānāṁ mahati kṛte 'pi hi pratyate nābhāvyāṁ bhavati na bhāvino 'sti nāśaḥ //

PañcT; 2.7, verse 2.152, p. 163:

prāptavyo niyati-balāśrayena yo 'ṛthe niśceṣṭaḥ śayana-gato 'py upāśnute tam / bhūtānāṁ mahati kṛte 'pi hi pratyate nābhāvyāṁ bhavati na bhāvino 'sti nāśaḥ //
One may justifiably argue that the case is actually the other way round: a genuinely Ājīvika verse found its way into the narrative literature and fables, and a verse of originally philosophical pertinence was used and modified to serve fables. However, that counter-argument is somehow weakened (albeit not overturned) by the fact that portions of verse V 2 are found as parts of other verses of the Pañca-tantra.  

It would rather seem more justified to assume that a repository of fable verses were freely used, recycled and modified as building blocks to serve the needs a of particular story, and such originally narrative verses were later used by philosophical authors, such as Mallavādin Kṣamāśramana, Haribhadra-sūri and others, to illustrate certain points they wanted to make in their own philosophical works.

There are a number of verses found in the Pañca-tantra which are meant to illustrate ‘worldly wisdom’, often with a fatalistic turn, such as this one:

On the other hand, in the world the fruition—earned through one’s life—of the own deeds of humans, who always resort to each other, whose actions are sinful, one is randomly happy or unhappy. Whatever is to be happens, there is no reason to deliberate over it.  

This and similar verses (vide infra) were to illustrate the idea that one cannot really influence the course of one’s life, that things are in a way predetermined; the poor will remain poor, if they manage a change in their lives, this does not happen through their work or effort but only by chance. In a way, such a pessimistic view is ‘common-sense wisdom’ that is encountered not only in India. It cannot in any way be directly linked to a systematic deterministic thought of the Ājīvikas. Any resemblance such fable verses bear to real characters of the Ājīvikas is therefore purely coincidental.

That is why we should eventually dismiss verse V 2 as a genuine passage which stems from the Ājīvika philosophical or religious literature, but is just a verse taken from the Indian fable lore.

5. Let us examine the second of the passages that BASHAM (1951, p. 221) believes is a genuine quote from an Ājīvika author:

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37 PañcT3 2.1, verses 70, p. 324:

nāvārtho vyasana-gatena śocitavyo ārśo vā sukham upalabhya na prajoyjah /
prāk-karma prati jantio hi yo vipākah so 'vaśya bhavati nr ṇā śubho 'śubho vā / // 70 //

PañcT1 2.6, 2.160, p. 163 = PañcT3 2.1, verse 71, p. 324:

kartavyaḥ pratidivesa prasanna-cittaḥ svalpa’ ’ pi vrata-niyamopāsā-dharmaḥ /
prāṇeṣu praharatī nityam eva daiva ' bhūtāṇā mahatī kr te ' pi hi prayatne // 71 //

PañcT1: daiva ; PañcT3: mr tyur.

38 PañcT3 1.16, verse 1.403, p. 149 = PañcT4 1.16, verse 1.372, p. 98:

loke ’ḥavā tuḥ-bhṛtāḥ niṇa-karma-pākain nityaṁ samāśīrīvatāṁ vihita-kriyāṇāṁ /
bhāvārājitaṁ suḥbam athāpdy asubham nikāmaṁ yad bhāvi tad bhavati nātra vicāra-hetuḥ //

PañcT2: vihita-; PañcT4 1.16: suhita-.
Some [people] say that the world is brought to existence through destiny, adding that what has to be is more dominant in all cases, as [these verses will illustrate]:

**V 3:** “A man obtains a thing that is to be obtained [by him]. What is the reason? That is the inescapable fate. Therefore I neither grieve nor wonder that what is my lot is not [the lot] of others.”

**V 4:** “Fateful ordinance instantly produces a desired thing, as if [it is standing] in front [of the person], bringing it even from another continent, even from the midst of ocean, even from the end of any direction [of the world].”

**V 5:** “Exactly such judgement materialises, and exactly such determination as well as one’s allies in the form as they must be.”

[BASHAM](1951, p. 221, n. 2) traces the source: ‘Jñānavimala to Praśnavyākaraṇa sū 7’ (Pañ).

The first of these verses, i.e. V 3, can be easily found in the *Pañca-tantra*, with a minor variant (in bold):

**V 3***: “A man obtains a thing that is to be obtained [by him]. Even god is not capable of preventing this. Therefore I neither grieve nor wonder that what is my lot is not [the lot] of others.”

The way the verse is used confirms the conclusion of § 4.4. that we are dealing here with one of a pool of verses which were recycled and applied to various contexts in fables and narratives. As with verse V 2, it is hardly unlikely that the verse was taken from an Ājīvika source.

The second verse, i.e. V 4, quoted by Jñānavimala is found in Harṣadeva’s *Ratnāvalī-nātiṅka.*

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39 **kecin niyati-bhāvitaṁ jagad iti jalpanti, bhavitavatāśa sarvatra baliyāsitī, yathā:**

```
V 3: prāptavyam arthaṁ labhate manusyaḥ kiṁ kāraṇam daivam alaṁghanīyaṁ / tasmān na ṭocāni na vismayāmi yad asmādiyāṁ na hi tat paresāṁ // 1 //
V 4: dvīpād anyasmād api madhyād api jala-nidher diśo 'py antāt / ānīya jhaṭ iti ghaṭayati vidhīr abhimatam abhimukhī-bhūtām // 2 //
V 5: sā sā sampadyate buddhir vyavasāyaś ca tādṛśāḥ / sāhāyāśa tādṛśā jñeyā yādṛśī bhavitavyatā // 3 //
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a Recte: sahāyāś.

For an alternative translation see [BASHAM](1951, p. 221).

40 PaṁcT₁ 2.4, verse 4.3, p. 147 = PaṁcT₂ 2.3, verse 2.111 / 113, p. 206 / 207 (repeated) = PaṁcT₄ 2.3, verse 104 / 109, p. 22 / 26 (repeated):

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prāptavyam arthaṁ labhate manusyaṁ devo 'pi taṁ laṁghayituṁ na śaktaṁ / tasmān na ṭocāni na vismayo me yad asmādiyāṁ na hi tat paresāṁ //
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41 RAN 1.6:

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dvīpād anyasmād api madhyād api jala-nidher diśo 'py antāt / ānīya jhaṭ iti ghaṭayati vidhīr abhimatam abhimukhī-bhūtām // 1.6 //
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The third of these verses, i.e. V 5, is partly \( (pādas cd) \) found in at least two different sources, with various modifications adopted to different contexts. One of them is the alchemic Rasārṇava:

What happened, what is to happen now and what will happen in the whole triple world, this [apprehension] would tell. [These are] his allies in the form as they must be.\(^42\)

The other source is the Advaitic Bhāmatī (Bhām) of Vācaspatimiśra, who quotes a part of the verse \( (pādas cd) \) in a very different context:

But since this created world is fictional, there is its another ally made of illusion, as they say: ‘[Its] allies are precisely of such a form as they must be.’\(^43\)

We can observe here a case very similar to the one noticed in the instance of the Pañca-tantra and fables: the use and recycling of the same versified material in different contexts. Jñānavimala’s commentary to the canonical Praśna-vyākaraṇa is a patchwork in which various patterns are interlaced and adapted to serve his needs in order to illustrate the rather vague thesis that ‘some [people] say that the world is brought to existence through destiny’. But this is not necessarily the same theoretical concept which was expressed by the Ājīvikas; it might equally be the ‘common-sense wisdom’ so frequently expressed in narrative tales and fables. In addition, these three verses in no way form a uniform whole, either in terms of contents or style, and the points of reference in each of them is quite different. As with verse V 2, there is therefore no reason to ascribe any of the verses quoted by Jñānavimala to the Ājīvikas. Jñānavimala apparently draws from fables and tales.

6. Let us now turn our attention to another verse alleged by Basham (1951, p. 222) to genuinely belong to Ājīvika literature.

V 6: ‘For that which is not to be does not happen, and that which is to be happens even without any effort. Even something contained in the palm of [our] hand disappears if it does not possess the necessity to exist.’\(^44\)

The source from which Basham (1951, p. 222, n. 2 takes the quote is: ‘Abhayadeva to Uvāsaga-dasāo 166 (= Uv—P.B.).’ Indeed it is the well-known commentator

\(^{42}\) RasA 2.35: 
\[
\text{bhūtaṁ bhavyaṁ bhavisyaṁ ca trailokyā kathayet tu sā l}
\text{sahāyaśaśādṛśāśaśādṛśā bhavitavyatatā l}
\]

\(^{43}\) Bhaṁ 2.2.1.2, p. 419.30–31: 
\[
kālpanikyāṁ tu srṣṭāṁ asti kālpanikaṁ dvitiyaṁ sahāyaṁ māyā-mayam. yathāhuko: 
\text{sahāyaśaśādṛśā eva yādṛśā bhavitavyatatā l}
\]

\(^{44}\) na hi bhavati yan na bhāvyam bhavati ca bhāvyam vināpi yatnena l 
kara-tala-gatam api naśyati yasya tu bhavitavyatā nāsti l
Abhayadeva, flourishing in 11th century, who avails himself of the verse in his commentary to the canonical work *Uvāsaga-dasaño* (UvDVi 166, p. 57).

However, precisely this verse in precisely the same reading is also found in the *Pañca-tantra*. Again, as in similar cases discussed so far, there is no reason to believe that the original source was an Ājīvika text.

7. Another verse BASHAM (1951, p. 222) draws our attention to is the following, which is preceded with an introduction explicitly ascribing the view expressed in the verse to the Ājīvikas:

‘For instance, the followers of the Ājīvika theory say:

V 7: “The cognoscenti who are the makers of the passage (ford) to the moral law, having reached the highest destination, return again to existence on account of the abuse (maltreatment) of the pathway (ford).”

BA SHAM (1951, p. 222, n. 5) describes his source as: ‘Syād-vāda-mañjarī, ed. Dhruva, p. 3.”

Indeed, this verse is quite peculiar in many ways, including the fact that it to any other text and is thus seemingly unique. Malliśena-sūri’s Syād-vāda-mañjarī, dating to 1229, is one of two works which refer to an idea of a return of Ājīvika (apparently) liberated saints to mundane existence. The verse is, however, ambiguous and somewhat eccentric, which might make it a bit doubtful whether Malliśena-sūri flourishing in the 13th century Gujarat (where there had been no community of Ājīvikas for centuries any longer) had any sound knowledge of the system of the Ājīvikas.

However, the obscure idea has its predecessor in a passage found in Haribhadra-sūri’s *Lalita-vistarā* (LV), a commentary on the *Caitya-vandana-sūtra*, belonging to the eighth century. There we find the sentence, introduced as a reference to a source: tīrtha-nikāra-darśanād āgacchanti, and quoted with reference to the Ājīvikas, which conveys a very similar idea: ‘[Ājīvika cognoscenti] return [to existence] when [they] see the abuse (maltreatment) of the pathway (ford)’. This is

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45 PañcT₁ 2.6, verse 134, p. 156.6–17 = PañcT₂ 2.5, verse 5.130, p. 215.
46 SVM 1.57, p. 3: tathā cāhur ājīvika-nayānārīṇaḥ:
   jñānino dharma-tīrthasya kartāraḥ paramāni padam /
   gatavacchanti bhūyo ’pi bhavanī tīrtha-nikārataḥ //
47 BASHAM (1951, p. 222) translates the verse as follows: ‘And thus say those who follow the Ājīvika school: “The knowers, the founders of the faith, having gone to the highest state, return again to existence, when the faith suffers injury.”’ Compare also the translation of F.W. THOMAS (1960, p. 11): ‘Knowers, makers of the ford of dharma, are the highest station: having gone, they come again into existence for the overthrow of heresies.’
48 See e.g. DUNDAS (2003, p. 152): ‘the dating of Haribhadra, the likelihood is that the LV (i.e. Lalita-vistarā—P.B.) was written some time in the eighth century CE.’
49 Cf. the translation in DUNDAS (2003, pp. 160–161): ‘they (i.e. the teachers) come because they see the wickedness of heresy’.
mentioned by Haribhadra as a reason why the Ājīvikas allegedly maintain that their teachers would never become truly liberated:

Also these [Ājīvika omniscients] are obviously admitted by the disciples of Gosāla, followers of the doctrine of the Ājīvika [limited/partial] viewpoint, to be in reality persons who have not destroyed karmic obstruction, [and this is so] due to the statement: “[Ājīvika cognoscenti] return [to existence] when [they] see the abuse (maltreatment) of the pathway (ford)”.\(^{50}\)

In Haribhadra’s interpretation the idea of the return must imply that the Ājīvika liberated teachers are never liberated, inasmuch as they have never got rid of the binding karman. This is the idea taken further up by Malliśeṇa.\(^{51}\) As with Malliśeṇa’s verse, it is difficult to assess with certainly to what extent Haribhadra’s sentence is a genuine quote from Ājīvika sources.

The appellation ‘the makers of the passage (ford) to the moral law’ (jñānino dharma-tīrthasya kartārah), found in Malliśeṇa’s verse (SVM), may seem at first atypical. From Buddhist and Jaina sources, if we can trust them, we know that the Ājīvikas apparently used the term tīrtha-kāra to refer to their founders and saints, in the very same way as the Jainas did. The Jainas themselves also used the appellation dharma-tīrtha-kāra since canonical times\(^{52}\); it is also found in their Sanskrit philosophical literature.\(^{53}\) It would therefore not be particularly surprising to find the same term or idea—dharma-tīrthasya kartārah, dharma-tīrtha-kartṛ, dharma-tīrtha-kāra, etc.—being used by the Ājīvikas from early times, and being used in the sense of ‘a fully liberated religious founder’.

If dharma-tīrthasya kartārah refers to ‘fully liberated religious founders or teachers of the Ājīvikas’, at least two elements are ambiguous in the verse are. The first is the sentence: āgacchanti bhūyo ’pi bhavaṁ (‘they return again to existence’), which echoes Haribhadra’s earlier tīrtha-nikāra-darśanād āgacchantī (‘they return when [they] see the abuse of the pathway’), which—out of context—may denote at least two different things: (1) ‘they return to the mundane world temporarily and at their own will, without any new karmic bondage’, just like the avatāras of Viśṇu, or somehow resemble the Buddhist ideal of the Bodhisattva, and by implication their highest destination (paramaṁ padam) remains the liberated state; (2) ‘they return to the cycle of rebirths (saṁsāra) and start the process of karmic retribution anew’, so by implication their highest destination (paramaṁ padam) was merely a temporary

\(^{50}\) LV\(_1\) p. 220 = LV\(_2\) p. 189: ete py ājīvika-naya-matānusāribhir gośāla-śisyais tattvataḥ khalv avyāyṛtta-cchadmāna evěẏyante tīrtha-nikāra-darśanād āgacchantīt vacanāt.

\(^{51}\) DUNDAS (2003, pp. 160–162) discusses both passages, SVM and LV, and the idea of the return.

\(^{52}\) See, e.g., Uttar 23.1d, 5b: dhamma-tīrthayare jīpe.

\(^{53}\) E.g., LT 1.1:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{dharma-tīrtha-karebhyo ďtu syād-vādibhyo namo-namaḥ} & / \text{ṛṣabhādi-mahāvīrāntarebhhyah svātmōpaladḥaye} / 1 \parallel \\
\text{ananta-darśana-jīnāna-vīryānanda-mayātmane} & / \text{namo ‘ṛhate kṛpā-kṛpta-dharma-tīrthāya tāyine} / 1 \parallel
\end{align*}\]
liberation, i.e. a kind of heaven. The latter interpretation is taken for granted by Haribhadra.

The second ambiguity is the expression tīrtha-nikārataḥ (following the earlier tīrtha-nikāra-darśanād), which could be understood in a variety of ways: (1) because there are obstacles to the pathway, or as BASHAM (1951, p. 222) translates: ‘when the faith suffers injury’; (2) ‘because the pathway (i.e. religious tradition) is diminished’, i.e. people themselves gradually neglect the pathway and it becomes obsolete and in need of revitalisation; (3) ‘because there is opposition to the pathway’, i.e. non-believers abuse, or maltreat pious followers and oppose the creed, etc.; (4) ‘because of the bringing down of the pathway [by the cognoscenti]’, i.e. they themselves depart from or bring down the pathway. In any case, the verse does not allow for the translation of F.W. THOMAS (1960, p. 11): ‘they come again into existence for the overthrow of heresies’, albeit this is what BASHAM’s understanding implies.

One of the interpretations of the compound tīrtha-nikārataḥ would suggest that the liberated beings would return as some sort of Bodhisattvas, who—untainted by karman and mundane world—reappear in the material world in order to rectify it and to show suffering humans the correct path anew. That such an interpretation of Ājīvika’s original idea behind these two reports (LV and SVM) could in fact be correct may be implied by the way Haribhadra later discusses the Mahāyāna idea of Bodhistattvas, and characterises them as ‘standing (suspended) by giving up both mundane existence and liberation’\textsuperscript{54,55} It is rather unlikely that this was an ancient idea of the Ājīvikas; it is more probably a later development prompted by parallel developments in Buddhism and, perhaps, Viṣṇuism. Another interpretation could be that the Ājīvika tīrtha-kāras depart from the mundane world and attain liberation (paramāṁ padam), whereas new teachers reappear in the world to continue the mission; that would point in a direction of a series of tīrtha-kāras, one succeeded by another, well-known from Jainism or Buddhism. Still another possibility would be—even though at first much less likely, but still possible in view of our extremely limited knowledge of the Ājīvika doctrine—that even the liberated beings themselves could overstep certain limits and abuse the pathway, and in the end they would have to go through the whole cycle of samsāra anew, resulting in their having to go through the whole cycle of samsāra again. This interpretation would point to a ceaseless cycle of rebirths, at least in some cases. In fact, such an interpretation, or similar, may turn out to be most plausible in view of the context in which it occurs, namely the discussion of the qualities of a real tīrtha-kāra, who is of infinite knowledge (ananta-vijñāna) and whose faults have been eliminated (atīta-doṣa); Malliśena refers to a counter-argument, which incorporates Ājīvikas as an example and embeds the above-quoted verse V 7:

With regard to these [qualities of a tīrtha-kāra mentioned in the main text], an opponent says: “It is enough to says that [a real tīrtha-kāra] must be just someone of infinite knowledge, but not someone whose faults are eliminated”,

\textsuperscript{54} LV\textsubscript{1} p. 394 = LV\textsubscript{1} p. 343: \textit{ete ca samsāra-nirvānōbhaya-parityāgena shitavantaḥ kaścid īṣyante.}

\textsuperscript{55} This possibility is discussed by DUNDAS (2003, p. 162).
inasmuch as the meaning [of the latter] is included [in the former], because without a destruction of faults infinite knowledge is not possible.” We reply to this as follows: this [mentioning that a tīrtha-kāra must be, in addition, someone whose faults are eliminated] serves the purpose of excluding an authority conceived by followers of mistaken theories. For instance, the followers of the Ājīvika theory say:

V 7: “The cognoscenti who are the makers of the passage (ford) to the moral law, having reached the highest destination, return again to existence on account of the abuse (maltreatment) of the pathway (ford).

Therefore these [makers of the passage] are not those whose faults are eliminated. How could otherwise their descent (return) back to existence be possible, even if one sees the abuse of the pathway?”

The framework for the verse, perhaps authentic, is what Malliṣeṇa says; he indeed explains tīrtha-nikārataḥ as tīrtha-nikāra-darśane ‘pi, which does not really fit grammatically into what we have in the verse. In any case, the idea which transpires, also supported by Haribhadra’s reading, is that the liberated teachers of the Ājīvikas fall back because their faults and karmic blemishes are never completely eliminated. That would ultimately render the whole idea of liberation meaningless, and would also contradict the image of a determined way to liberation, explicated in the Sāmaṇṇa-phala-sutta above:

Just like a ball of thread, when thrown, exhausts itself, [simply] unwinding, exactly in the same manner both the fool and the wise—having transmigrated, having gone through the cycle of rebirths—will put an end to unhappiness.

Had this ‘return’ theory really been maintained by the Ājīvikas, at least at some point of time, their opponents would not have hesitated to immediately point out the actual impossibility of liberation in their theory: the Ājīvikas would be an easy prey for sharp criticism from all sides. However, we do not find such evidence from their critics, except for Haribhadra and Malliṣeṇa. Of course, we deal here with two equally unreliable sources—an early Buddhist and a late Jaina—and without access to more reliable data it is impossible to decide what the Ājīvikas really believed in. Here is precisely the methodological vicious circle mentioned at the outset: as long as we do not have a reliable picture of reconstructed doctrine of the Ājīvikas, we cannot assess whether the above verse V 7 is compatible with what the Ājīvikas claimed, ergo can be admitted as genuinely Ājīvika, or whether it contradicts their doctrine, ergo has to be dismissed as inauthentic.

56 SVM 1.43–50, p. 3: atrāka paraḥ. ananta-vijñānam ity etavad evāstvā nātā-dosām iti. gatārthatvāt. doṣātayayāṁ vināyanta-vijñānatvāsvāyamapaṭṭāḥ. atrōcyate. kunaya-matānusāri-parikalpitāpta-vyavac-chedārtham idam. tathā cāhur ājīvika-nayāmūsārināḥ:

jñānino dharma-tīrthasya kartāraḥ paramaṁ padam /
gatvāgacchanti bhūyo ’pi bhavaṁ tīrtha-nikārataḥ //

iti. tan nāmaṁ na te ’yā-daśūḥ. katham anyathā teṣāṁ tīrtha-nikāra-darśane ’pi bhavāvataraḥ.
In addition, we must also take into account that the doctrine of the Ājīvikas certainly evolved. It is possible that they did admit an everlasting liberation in the beginning, but in the course of time they (or some of their adherents) adopted another idea, namely that the liberation is never permanent.

Of course, an idea of transitory liberation is a contradiction in terms, because such a picture relegates ‘the highest goal’ to being merely to one of heavenly abodes from which one falls back to earth. Thus it is never liberation. Further, such an idea is incompatible with the determinism according to which the cycle of rebirths ends at a fixed moment after the lapse of a particular, though myriad, number of births and deaths. If we accept that one falls back from such ‘limited liberation’, there is no need to speak of a path to it determined by destiny, because ‘limited liberation’ becomes merely one of innumerable existences. Its only difference might be that it would be incorporeal, which would not be logical. But of course logic is hardly ever at work when it comes to religion and belief.

However, such a position of the Ājīvikas would be so peculiar—even more peculiar than the idea of strict determinism—that it would certainly lead a number of critical comments and ridicules from other schools. That was however not the case: we do not hear such reports that the Ājīvikas admitted of a fallible and temporarily ‘limited liberation’.

For precisely these reasons I would be tempted to reject the above verse V 7 as not genuinely Ājīvika, but merely a hearsay reference to their doctrine, which does not faithfully reproduce it.

8. In the search for data on the Ājīvikas, BASHAM (1951, p. 226) refers to the following passage, reported by Jñānavimala:

Some [people] maintain that the world is brought to existence through [its] intrinsic nature and that everything originates only through [its] intrinsic nature.57

In the first place, since the passage is introduced as kecit ... manyante, it can only be a paraphrase of an idea. In fact, it is quite likely that it is not even a genuine report but—due to the standard, almost mechanical phrase which Jñānavimala uses (n. 50)—a rephrasing of one of possible views about the origins of the world:


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We therefore cannot attach any value to such and similar references because their informational value is actually tautological, and they certainly say nothing about the Ājīvikas.

9. In fact, in many sources where the idea of determinism and destiny (niyati)—closely related to the Ājīvikas—occurs, a range of similar causal factors are discussed (either

57 BASHAM (1951, p. 226, n. 1): kecit svabhāva-bhāvitam jagad manyante, svabhāvenāiva sarvah sampadyate. To Praśna-vyākaraṇa 7, fol. 29. V[jde] also Śīlāṅka to Śū. kr. i.1.2.2, fol. 30.’ BASHAM (1951, p. 226) translates the verse: ‘Some believe that the universe was produced by Svabhāva, and that everything comes about by Svabhāva only.’
all or most of them): (1) time (kāla), (2) intrinsic nature (svabhāva), (3) primordial factor (prakṛti), (4) destiny (niyati), (5) personal agency (puruṣa), (6) former deeds (pūrva-kṛta), i.e. karmic retribution (karma) and (7) god (iśvara), etc.58

Since this list covers some of the factors sometimes associated with the Ājīvikas, one may, it seems, justifiably entertain a suspicion that the list systematically reflects a set of causes which includes also causes which, at a certain point in the evolution of their doctrine to explain the causality of the world and auxiliary factors assisting the main force of destiny (niyati). Especially two would seem, at least in theory, good candidates to complement niyati, i.e. kāla (time) and svabhāva (intrinsic nature). At the same time we can safely exclude puruṣa (personal agency) and iśvara (god, creator) as causal complements of niyati: clearly the doctrine of destiny the way it was conceived in India did not allow for either god or creator as an external factor over and above destiny. The same was also the case with former deeds (pūrva-kṛta), because that would contradict the force of destiny, or with puruṣa, understood either as human agency, or as the active soul (ātman) or conscious inactive principle of the Sāṅkhya, since in both these meanings puruṣa was either incompatible with or, respectively, contrary to niyati.

One of such standard enumerations is found in the Saṁmati-tarka-prakaraṇa, a late fifth-century Jaina work of Siddhasena Divākara:

The causes [of everything], such as time (kāla), inherent nature (svabhāva), destiny (niyati), former deeds (pūrva-kṛta) and personal agency (puruṣa), all taken in the absolute sense, [constitute] false belief. However, all these taken jointly are the correct belief.59

This verse immediately reminds us of a Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad verse, and even the sequence of a number of causal factors is the same:

Suppose [the cause of everything] is time (kāla), inherent nature (svabhāva), destiny (niyati), chance (yadṛcchā), material elements (mahā-bhūta), the womb (yoni) or conscious principle (puruṣa), or a combination of these? However, [none] is the case, because there is the self. [Still,] even the self is powerless, because it has as its causal factors pleasure and pain.60

58 Some of such doctrines (svabhāva-vāda, niyati-vāda, kāla-vāda) are discussed, alongside yadṛcchā-vāda, in: KAVIRAJ (1966: 45–71, ‘Theism In Ancient India’), and two of them (svabhāva-vāda and kāla-vāda) by BHATTACHARYA (2012). BHATTACHARYA (2001) and (2012: ‘Appendix’, 610–611) lists a number of such causal factors, and claims to have found as many as 28 (2012, p. 594).

59 STP 3.53:

kālo sahāva niyai purva-kayaṁ purisa kāraṇēgaṁida /
mechatāṁ te cēva samāśao hoṁī sammatāṁ ī//

60 ŚvU 1.2:

kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatir yadṛcchā bhātani yonih puruṣa iti cintyam /
samyogā esāṁ na tv ātma-bhāvaṁ ātmāpy anīśaṁ sukha-duḥkha-hetoḥ ī//

Interestingly, commenting on this verse, Rāmānuja no longer knows who the proponents of niyati were, see his PS Bh ad loc., p. 3.5: māṁsāsakaṁ tu niyati-lakṣaṇaṁ karmādhiha hetum manyaṁte. ‘Inherent nature’ is here clearly identified with materialists, PS Bh ad loc., p. 3.4–5: lokāyatikās tu svabhāvam eva hetum ācāśate.
If niyati-vāda can indeed be taken as a ‘indicator’ reference to the Ājīvikas, and we know of no other system so strongly associated with this notion, the Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad is the earliest Sanskrit reference to the doctrine of niyati, ergo to the Ājīvikas.

Since both time and intrinsic nature are not necessarily incompatible with destiny, and may be conceived of as complementary to or supplementing the power of niyati, in the sense that they merely emphasise two aspects of destiny over which no one has any control and which override all individual actions and decisions, we should also consider whether they could be used as ‘Ājīvika indicators’, i.e. whether we have any evidence that they were indeed conceived as corollaries of destiny and whether there are any verses referring to time and intrinsic nature that can be classified as genuinely Ājīvika.

The Buddhist author Asvaghoṣa, in his Saundarananda, enumerates other causes: time (kāla), inherent nature (svabhāva), chance (yadrechā), primordial factor (prakṛti), god (iśvāra) and vidhi (fateful ordinance), some of which we know are associated or synonymous with niyati (see § 4.1. and verse V 4):

So, in this world the causal factor for this suffering [bound to] activity is the conglomeration of defects, such as desire etc. It is not god, it is not primordial factor, neither time nor intrinsic nature, neither fateful ordinance nor chance.61

The same author follows a similar pattern in his Buddha-carita: BC 9.38 concerns time (kāla), BC 9.58–62 deals with intrinsic nature (svabhāva), BC 9.57 discusses primordial factor (prakṛti), BC 9.63ab pertains to god (iśvāra), BC 9.63cd seems to speak of destiny (niyati) (?), 62 BC 9.64–65 touches on personal agency (puruṣa), here referred to as ‘soul’ (ātman) or ‘man’ (nara).

Another good example of such a list, dated slightly later, is that provided by the Jaina commentator Śīlāṅka. In his discussion of various causes of the world and of happiness and unhappiness (SūyVṛ 1.1.2.28–34, p. 37–40), Śīlāṅka mentions four causes: destiny (niyati), personal agency (puruṣa), time (kāla) and god (iśvāra).

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61 Sau 16.17:

pravṛtti-duḥkhasya ca tasya loke tṛṣṇādayo dosa-gaṇā nimittam /
nāivēśavano prakṛtimāna kālo nāpi svabhāvo na vidhir yadrechā /

62 Despite the fact that BC 9.63cd does not seem to be related to BC 9.63ad, still BC 9.63 allows for some ambiguity, for it says:

sargaṁ* vadantāsvaratas tathānye tatra pravatne puruṣasya ko ’rthaḥ l /
ya eva hetur jagataḥ pravṛttau hetur niyattau niyataḥ sa eva l 9.63 //

‘Similarly others claim that the world* is due to god, and as far as this [world] is concerned, what would be the purpose of any effort on the part the human being? Only that which is the cause of any activity in the world is also determined to stop it.’

* In the particular context of the discussion on how to achieve liberation and what is the driving force in the world, sarga cannot mean ‘creation [of the universe]’ but rather ‘the world’ or ‘what happens in the world’.
Śīlāṅka explicates the doctrine of destiny, normally associated with the Ājīvika, but does not ascribe it to them in the passage:

[The world is caused] only by destiny. This is what is said at the end of the second verse, namely that time is not the agent either, because—since this [time] is uniform—it would not be possible to explain the manifoldness of results (forms) in the world. For [the rule is that] there are a variety of effects if there are a variety of causes, but not if there are no variety of causes.… 63

The list does not, however, include intrinsic nature (svabhāva), which may indicate, that time and intrinsic nature were not, in fact, corollaries of destiny (niyati) as associated with the Ājīvakas, but were independent causal factors postulated by schools other than the Ājīvakas.

The rejoinder to the above verse does not represent Śīlāṅka’s own view but a tentative objection or uttara-pakṣa, which—in a complex argumentative structure—might be considered, perhaps, representing a genuinely Ājīvika response:

It has been criticised: “Since time is uniform, the manifoldness of the world is not be possible.” This is not a [proper] criticism for us, because we do not accept time as the only one agent, but also karman. Therefore [the argument based on] the manifoldness of the world is not a [proper criticism]. Similarly, god is an agent as well… 64

After the discussion, when speaking of ‘the doctrine of destiny (niyati-vāda) and other [doctrines]’ 65, Śīlāṅka explicitly keeps destiny separate from the other causal theories discussed (time, god etc.) making it clear that the propounders of destiny (the Ājīvakas?) did not combine it with other explanatory factors responsible for the change and causality in the world. Therefore it is extremely unlikely that the Ājīvakas integrated in their belief a complex of causal factors, such as destiny, time, human agency and god taken jointly as a variegated whole. What actually remains as an ‘Ājīvika indicator’ of later period (after approx. 1 century CE) and Sanskrit literature is nityati only.

10. Much earlier Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa (6th century) opens a discussion on the prime causal factor of events in the world in his Dvādaśāra-naya-cakra. Here various possibilities are discussed, e.g. personal agency (puruṣa), that is, the agency of a conscious subject (DNC 189.3–191.2). Then (DNC 191.3 ff.), Mallavādin discusses three stereotypic factors jointly: time (kāla), primordial factor (prakṛti), destiny (niyati) and intrinsic nature (svabhāva), beginning likewise conventionally:

63 SūyVṛ 1.1.2.29–30, p. 38.8–9: niyater evêti. etaṁ ca dvitīya-ślokānte bhidhāsya nāpi kālaḥ kārtā, tasāika-rūpatvāj jagati phala-vaicitryānupatteḥ, kāraṇa-bhede hi kārya-bheda bhavati nabhede…
64 SūyVṛ 1.1.2.31, p. 39.19–23: yac coccye “kālasyāika-rūpetvāj jagad-vaicitryaṁ na ghaṭata” iti, tad asmān pratī, yato śmāhīra na kāla evākhaṁ karṭyānāhupagamyate api tu karmaiṇi, tato jagad-vaicitryam ity adosāḥ tatēśvaro ‘pi kārtā…”
65 SūyVṛ 1.1.2.34, p. 40.26: niyati-vādādy-ekāntājñāna-vādino…
'This determining force] is nothing but (1) time because it reckons [everything], (2) nature because it gives form [to everything], (3) destiny because it destines the way [everything] is formed etc., (4) intrinsic nature because [everything] exists through its own form.\(^{66}\)

The verse is also quoted in Abhayadeva-sūri’s *Tattva-bodha-vidhāyinī* (TBV 3.53, p. 712.1–2). It is the commentator Simha-sūri who, in his *Nyāyāgamāṇusārīnī* (NĀA), identifies some of these doctrines. Time (*kāla*) is associated with the Sāṃkhya system\(^{67}\), and a part of a verse is quoted in support: ‘Time brings living beings to maturity’.\(^{68}\) Similarly, primordial factor (*prakṛti*) is associated with Sāṃkhya and described as related to the three qualities (*guna: sattva, rajas, tāmas*).\(^{69}\) That Simha-sūri identifies two separate driving forces of the universe with one and the same system is in itself rather curious. On the other hand, he does not relate the two other causality doctrines (*niyati* and *svabhāva*) to any particular school. Of *niyati*—which here no longer means ‘destiny’ but rather ‘necessity’ or ‘necessary correlation’—he merely says:

Destiny (necessity) because of determination of the following sort: the datum for the eyes is colour because of [it] colouring [the eye], not taste etc.; taste is

\(^{66}\) DNC, p. 191.3–4: *sa eva kalanāt kālaḥ, prakaraṇāt prakṛṭīḥ, rūpeṇāti-niyamanān nyatiḥ, svena rūpeṇa bhavanāt svabhāvaḥ.*

\(^{67}\) Notice the pun on the name of the Saṃkhya system in NĀA 191.13: *kalaḥ śaṁkhyāne kalanāṁ jñānāṁ saṅkhyānām ity arthaḥ.*—‘Time is used in the sense of counting, “reckoning” means cognition, i. e. counting—such is the meaning.’

\(^{68}\) NĀA 191.14–15: *kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni iti ślokāḥ.* The verse must be associated with one current of the Sāṃkhya tradition, but does not belong to the later mainstream classical Sāṃkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Gaudapāda. It is a fragment of a longer verse, quoted and ultimately rejected in Gaudāpāda’s *Bhāṣya* (GBh 61, p. 153.6–8): ‘tathā keśāṁcit kālaḥ karanam iti, uktaṁ ca:

\[
\begin{align*}
&kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṁharate jagat / \\
&kālaḥ supeṣu jāgāti kālo hi duratikramah //
\end{align*}
\]

See also: MaiU\(_1\) 6.15, p. 123.5–6 = MaiU\(_2\), p. 341.20–21:

\[
\begin{align*}
&kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni sarvāṇi mahāāṇāni / \\
yasmiṣesas tu pacyate kālo yas tain veda sa vedavit //
\end{align*}
\]

In fact, the verse occurs in different variants in the *Mahā-bhārata*, e.g. MBh 1.1.188:

\[
\begin{align*}
&kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṁharato prajāḥ / \\
nirdhanantam prajāḥ kālam kālaḥ sāmayate punah //
\end{align*}
\]

It is also quoted in a variant by Gunaratma-sūri and ascribed to some ‘propounders of time’ (*kāla-vādin*), TRD 1 § 19, p.16.13–14:

\[
\begin{align*}
&kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṁharate prahāḥ / \\
&kālaḥ supeṣu jāgāti kālo hi duratikramah //
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{69}\) NĀA 191.15–18, *prakṛti:* *sattva-rajas-tāmas-svattattvān prakāśa-prakṛti-niyamārthān guṇān ātma-svattatta-vikalpān eva bhoktā prakurute iti prakṛtiḥ, yathāhur eke:

\[
\begin{align*}
aajām ekāṁ lohita-sukla-krṣṇān buddhiḥ prajāḥ sṛjāmānāṁ sarūpāḥ //
&ajo hy eko juṣamaṇo 'nuṣete jahāty enāṁ bhukta-bhogām ajo 'nyāḥ // \text{[ŚvU 4.5]}
\end{align*}
\]
the datum for the sense of taste because of [it] giving taste [to the sense of
taste], not colour etc.

He also does not have much to say about intrinsic nature (svabhāva):

**Intrinsic nature because** [everything] **exists through its own form,** i.e. its
existence is all by itself. As some people say:

V 8: “What makes the sharpness of thorns and multiform appearance of beasts
and birds? All that is driven by intrinsic nature. There is no independent
act. Wherefrom [should] any effort [come if not from intrinsic nature]?”

As aptly noticed by BASHAM (1951, p. 226), the verse is cited also by Guṇarata-
sūri (TRD 1 § 24, p.20.1–2). It is also quoted in Haribhadra-sūri’s *Yoga-bindu-
tīkā,* and elsewhere, i.e. Bhaṭṭa Utpala’s *Bṛhat-saṁhitā* 1.7, Dallana’s commentary
on the *Suśruta-saṁhitā* (Śarīra, chapter 1) of 13th century. In these texts, its role is
to illustrate *svabhāva-vāda,* and it is coupled with another verse of a similar ‘thorny’
image:

Of [numerous] thorns of a jujube tree, one thorn is sharp, another is straight,
still another is crooked, but its fruit is round. Say what has fashioned [these
forms of one and the same tree]?
V 9: Who beautified the eyes of does? And who endowed peacocks with so radiant tail plumage? Who makes the buds of petals in blue lotuses? Or who establishes good conduct among well-born men?76

The verse strikes a familiar note with a range of similar verses found for instance in the Tattva-saṅgraha:

What makes the diversity of filaments of a lotus flower? What has fashioned the variegated eyes in a peacock’s tail?77

or in the Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha,

What would colour peacocks? What would make cuckoos coo? In these cases, there is no other cause except intrinsic nature.78

These views and verses are ascribed to the Lokāyatas / Cārvākas.79 Also Śīlāṅka combines the two images—that of sharp thorns and that of colourful tail plumage of peacocks—and explicitly establishes a connection with the materialists:

Thus arises the multiform appearance of the world due to intrinsic nature, as it has been said:

“The sharpness of thorns, colourful appearance of peacock, the colours of pheasants all occur indeed due to intrinsic nature.”

Thus the view of those who say that the soul is the same as the body (sc. materialists) has been described.80

In the very same spirit Simḥa-sūri links the image of ‘thorny things’ and intrinsic nature to the materialists:

As they say: One sees that the origin [of consciousness] depends solely on a complex configuration of material substances such as earth etc., so since [consciousness] is seen to originate in dependence on these [material elements] and because there is no deviance from intrinsic nature (i.e.

76 DNC, p. 222.8–9:

kenāñjitāni nayanāni mṛgāṅganānāṁ ko vā karoti rucirāṅga-ruhān mayūrān / kaś cōtpāleṣu dala-sānnicayāṁ karoti ko vā karoti vinayaṁ kulajeṣu puṁsu //

77 TSa 111:

rājiya-kesarāṁnāṁ vaicitryanāṁ kah karoti hi / mayūra-candrakād̄ir vā vicitraṁ kena nirmityaḥ //

78 SSS 2.5:

śikhinaś citrayet ko cā kokilān kah prakājayet / svabhāva-vyatirekena vidyate nātra kārṇam //

79 For more examples see BHATTACHARYA (2012: 596–7, 604).

80 SuVr 1.1.12. 12. p. 27.13–17: evāṁ svabhāva-vāj jagad-vaicitryanāṁ, tathā cōktam: kañṭakasya ca tīkṣṇatvaṁ mayūrasya vicitrattā / varṇāṁ ca tāmra-cūḍānāṁ svabhāvena bhavanti hi // iti taj-īva-tac-charīra-vādi-mataṁ gataṁ…
because these developments are consistently related to intrinsic nature with no exception), one should maintain that [the only cause in the world] is intrinsic nature. For it is as follows: in certain cases of disfigurement, etc., one can see some [trees] with thorns among [particular species of] trees etc. [naturally] without thorns, and some [trees] without thorns among [particular species of] trees etc. [naturally] with thorns as inferential signs of such a particular arrangement [of material elements], as it as been said:

“Some things [normally] without thorns are seen the other way round, i.e. being with thorns, and other things [normally] with horns are seen the other way round, i.e. being without thorns. [That is why people] speak of [such cases as] defining feature of a particular arrangement [of material elements].”81

As the above examples which consistently link the queries for the cause of the beauty of nature and animals to the materialists,82 also verse V 9 can be easily dismissed as non-Ājīvika. Since the sectarian source of V 9 is connected with that of V 8, we can be justified in also dismissing V 8 as a verse of Ājīvika origin.

And there are more reasons to dismiss this verse as authentically Ājīvika. Again Bhattacharya (2012, p. 602) draws our attention to three other variants of verse V 8. In fact, there is yet another variant quoted by Vijaya Darśana-sūri in his Saṁmat-tarka-mahārāṇavāvatārikā.83 All of these cases are associated with svabhāva-vāda and none of these cases is related to the Ājīvikas in any way whatsoever.

The sources for both verses V 8 and V 9 are quite clear: V 8 (kaḥ kauṭakānāṁ prakaroti...) is from Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddha-carita (BC 9.62), whereas V 9 (badaryāḥ kauṭakās tīkṣṇa...) from Haribhadra-sūri’s Loka-tattva-nirṇaya (LTN 2.22). Both passages are associated with the doctrine of intrinsic nature (svabhāva-vāda). In fact, all of the above-mentioned cases when V 8 is quoted are associated solely with svabhāva-vāda; in none do the authors mention the Ājīvikas. On the contrary, usually—albeit not always—the context makes it clear that the Cārvākas / Lokāyatas are meant. This confirms the observation of Gopinath Kaviraj (1966, pp. 46–54) who considers the svabhāva-vādins in some contexts as a branch of the Lokāyatikas.

Nowhere do find any reference to the Ājīvikas, and it seems that the authors—Mallavādin and his commentator Simha-sūri as well as others who refer to the svabhāva-vāda—do not establish any (either explicit or indirect) link between

81 NAĀ 223.10–14: yad ucyate bhūmy-ādi-dravya-vinirvṛtyt-apekṣāiviopaṭtir drṣṭā ity etat tad-apekṣōopaṭtara-darśanāt svabhāvavyabhicārārca ca svabhāva eveti mantavyaṃ. tad yathā—aptāddhiṣu kaṇṭakānāṁ vykaṣādānāṁ kaṇṭakāḥ kaṇṭakānāṁ cākaṇṭakāḥ nīḍhy-ādi-līṅgatvāna drṣṭāḥ. yathoktāṃ:

ākaṇṭakāḥ kaṇṭakānāḥ kaṇṭakāś cāpy akenṭakāḥ /
viṃpya-vyayena drṣṭyaṃtā vadaṃtī nidhi-lakṣaṇam //

82 See also Bhattacharya (2012).

83 STPMAA, p. 352:

kaḥ kaṇṭakānānāṁ prararoti taikaśyam viaตรa-bhāvam nṛga-pakṣānāṁ ca /
svabhāvataḥ sarvam idaṃ pravṛttain na kāma-cāro 'sti kutaḥ prasaṅgāḥ //

iti-vacanāt kaiś cice ca svabhāvo hetvutenaḥbhupagamyate.
svabhāva and the Ājīvikas. They also make no link between svabhāva and niyati, seemingly being unaware of this possibility.

Still, the lack of any established links between svabhāva-vāda and niyati-vāda does not provide sufficient ground to criticise BASHAM (1951, p. 226) for maintaining that ‘[t]hese ideas have much in common’ or for suggesting that svabhāva-vāda was ‘a small sub-sect of Ājīvikism’, as does BHATTACHARYA (2012, p. 598), who adds:

Basham’s total involvement with the Ājīvikas led him to include every heretical view as a part of Ājīvikism. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the doctrine of svabhāva was adopted by any community, religious or secular. If the evidence of the ŚvUp (i.e. ŚvU—P.B.) and the Sau (i.e. Aśvaghoṣa’s Saundarananda—P.B.) is to be believed, svabhāva, along with but distinct from the doctrines of time, destiny, etc., was proposed by a set of philosophers whom the author/s of the ŚvUp did not approve of. Svabhāva is mentioned there only in connection with the origin of the universe, “the first cause”, so to say.

First, contrary to BHATTACHARYA’s claim, there is some evidence to suggest that the doctrine of svabhāva was adopted by some community/ies, in exactly the same way as niyati-vāda, karma-vāda, iśvara-vāda, purusa-vāda, etc., were. Svabhāva did not have to be part of a relationship that was linked to a particular religious community in one-to-one relationship, as e.g. anekānta-vāda is connected to Jainism and Jainism to anekānta-vāda, or as Buddhism and kṣaṇika-vāda are so connected. One and the same term, through its different shades, could relate to various schools of thought at the same time. This was noted by Indian thinkers themselves, one of them saying that ‘there are five kinds of the propounders of the doctrine of intrinsic nature.’

Second, ‘a community’ does not have to be a strictly religious community with a well-established social structure and interlinking network to be a community. Indeed, when we deal with certain ideas and doctrines in Indian tradition, they are professed by some philosophical schools, philosophical-religious sub-currents, sub-sects, etc. Adopting Bhattacharya’s understanding, we could equally dismiss the ideas of, say, sat-kārya-vāda or iśvara-vāda, because it is neither strictly related to a particular religious group, being primarily upheld by philosophers and theoreticians, nor to religious followers, these being generally quite unconcerned about such debates.

Third, contrary to BHATTACHARYA’s claim, there is no doubt some evidence to suggest that of the communities that possibly had some representatives subscribing to svabhāva-vāda, one could have been the Ājīvikas. The idea of svabhāva is apparently present as early as the Sāmañña-phala-sutta, found as the third element

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84 See e.g. NārhVṛ ad NārhS2 88, p. 78.6: pañcama-vikalpah svabhāva-vādinah.
85 ŚvU 1.2 mentions inherent nature (svabhāva) and the material elements (mahā-bhūta) side by side, which indicates that these cannot be both references to the Lokāyata / Cārvāka, and apparently svabhāva is in this case a reference to Sāṅkhya. On the other hand, svabhāva is clearly identified with materialists in some other cases, e.g., in PSBh ad loc., p. 3.4–5: lokāyatikās tu svabhāvam eva hetum ācakṣate.
(bhāva) in the compound: niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-parinatā (‘they are developed by destiny, predetermined concurrence of factors and [own] nature’). The term svabhāva also features in the Niyati-dvātriniṣkā (NiDv 1, 10, 26, see below), which provides an account of the Ājīvikas.

Having said that, V 8 and V 9 as candidates for a genuine survivors of Ājīvikas’ verses must both be rejected as being clearly related to materialists.

11. There is also some evidence that fate (daiva) as a determining cause was a concept associated with the Ājīvikas and that at least sometimes was identified with niyati. In the section on ‘the refutation of absolute admission of fate and human causality’ (daiva-puruṣa-kārwānta-nirāsaḥ) in his Aṣṭa-sahasrī-tātparya-vivaraṇa, Yaśovijaya-gani cites two verses and provides a commentary establishing the link between daiva and niyati and the Ājīvikas. A Prakrit verse illustrating his longer discourse on fate (AṣṭV 90, p. 913.21 ff.) runs as follows:

V 10: ‘Former deeds (pūrva-kṛta), karmic retribution (karman), diverse fruition [of past deeds] is called fate (daiva), and so is the influence on this [karmic fruition] on the part of time etc. as well as human effort (puruṣa-kāra).’

In the interpretation of the verse I follow the context set by Yaśovijaya-gani, who explains that ‘everything is caused by fate’ (sarvaṁ daiva-kṛtam), ‘because it has been established that even human effort, in the form of a transformation of the fruition of karman under the influence of time etc., is in fact an operation of fate’ (kālādi-kṛta-karma-vipāka-parināma-rūpasya puruṣa-kārasya tattvato daiva-vyā-pāratva-siddheḥ). The verse understood in this way could in theory be taken as originating from a Prakrit work by an Ājīvika author. Such interpretation would, however, be too hasty.

Without knowing the original context, the verse allows for at least two more interpretations, both of which are more plausible, and can be taken either (1) as an enumeration of six causes of the world:

[The primary cause] is called: former deeds (pūrva-kṛta), karmic retribution (karman), diverse fruition [of past deeds], fate (daiva), the influence on this [karmic fruition] on the part of time etc. and human effort;

or (2) as three separate definitions of karman, daiva and puruṣa-kāra:

Former deeds (pūrva-kṛta) are called karmic retribution (karman); diverse fruition [of past deeds] is called fate (daiva); human effort (puruṣa-kāra) is the influence on this [karmic fruition] alongside time etc.

86 AṣṭV 90, p. 613.21–23:
puvva-kayaṁ kammaṁ ciya citta-vivāgam iya bhannai divvāni /
kālāichiṁ tappōyaṁ tu taha purisa-gāru tti //

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We may be well justified in suspecting that the context set by Yaśovijaya-gaṇi is not the
original one, and that one should rather subscribe to either of the two alternative
interpretations, none of which could be regarded as advancing the Ājīvika claim that
fate (daīva), or destiny (niyati), is the ruling factor in all that befalls the man.

What is important, however, is that daīva (fate) is explicitly related to the Ājīvikas
by name and associated with the idea of niyati (destiny) after its initial exposition
(ājīvika-samaya-prasiddhāṃ niyati-janyatvam). In addition, in the conclusion of his
comments Yaśovijaya reproduces a verse to illustrate the Ājīvikas’ position on
destiny/fate, and mentions the source of the verse by name as the Niyati-dvātrīṃṣikā:

As it is said in the Thirty-two Verses on Destiny:

V 11: “If [true] knowledge of the Victorious (liberated Jinas) is non-deviation
(non-deviant or certain / inevitable?), then one should not make any
exertion. Also if in the case [of the Victorious Jinas, their true knowledge]
is multiplex (sc. they are omniscient from one point of view, and not
omniscient from another), then these [Victorious Jinas in fact] are already
vanquished (not victorious, i.e. liberated). But where is then the Lord [of
yours as authority on liberation, if the Jinas’ omniscience cannot be
established]?”

The second hemistic sounds apparently like a (superficial, but common) critique of
Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekānta-vāda): if one accepts that various,
apparently even contradictory qualities could be predicated of one and the
same object, then a Jina, being omniscient from one point of view, must be non-
omniscient from another point of view as well. But since for the Jainas complete
omniscience is not possible, neither is complete liberation. What is, however,
problematic with (the interpretation of) the verse is the first hemistich, beginning
with the actual meaning of the term avyābicāraṇī. The term AsSTV could hardly
mean: ‘non-deviation’, in the sense of non-deviant, i.e. true knowledge, because the

87 The whole passage commenting on the verse, AsSTV 90–91, p. 613.21–615.21, reads: śrī-
harībhṛdācāryoṣṭa-ītī śākād-kṛta-karma-vīpāka-parināma-rūpaśya puruṣa-kārasya tattvato daīva-
vypāravatva-siddhe vyāpārena vyāpārinī ‘nyathā-siddhatvānānyathā-siddhatvayor vyavahāra-niscayād-
hīmatvāt tad-vivakṣā-krīḍāḥ syāt sarvāṇa daīva-kṛtam ity-ādāyaḥ sapta-bhaṅgā draṣṭāvyāḥ. mokṣe jñāna-
janayatva-kriyā-janayatva-sapta-bhaṅgī-karaṇe ‘śyā evēpāyatvāt, ata eva paramārthathe sarvatra niyatāniy-
āte ‘pi vastuny ājīvika-samaya-prasiddhāṃ niyati-janyatvam upamāna puruṣa-kāra-janayatvān
bhagavād-vaco ‘nusrāthībhīr vyavasthāpyate, matāntara-hetor nayasya nayāntarena khaṇḍanasyāpi
śāstrārthatvāt, niyatāniyātā-sapta-bhaṅgī-prayrtvātu tu niyati-janyatā-gṛāhako ‘pi naya āśrītye eva,
dāhako ‘pi vahnir āvāt vākādāv iti tatra vyavasthitam. athāvā daīva-śabdena kālādī-catuṣṭayavān grhyate,
puruṣa-sabdena cātma-prayātanaḥ, tar-īṛatvān ca tad-avyvahāśīta-saṃśāpratitiṣṭhāvān itc-ch-
abdarthe ca sāmaṇgri-pratitviṣṭo vācyā iti, tattva-vinirmāṇat syād daīva-kṛtam sarvan iti-ādi-sapta-
bhaṅgī-prayṛtāvpruvedhā, dīrgha-vivakṣā-mahīmnā syād daṇḍa-janera ghaṭaḥ syāc cakru-janya iti-ādi
sapta-bhaṅgī-prayṛtver api sambhāved eka-svabhāvenābhaya-janayatva-vivakṣāyām avaktavyatvāt-
tha-jantaḥ-janyatva api svākhaśītvāt iti yuktam atapāṣyamāḥ.

88 AṣSTV 91, p. 615.16–18: yac ca niyati-dvātrīṃṣikāyāni:
   jñānam avyābicāraṇī cej jinnānāṁ mā śramāṇaṁ kṛthāh /
   atha tatrāpy anekānto jītāḥ smaḥ kīn nu a ko bhavān //

a NiDv 16d: kiṃ tu.

For an alternative translation see below n. 88.
link between true knowledge of the Jinas and dispensability of any exertion seems very unclear to me in an argument which would run: ‘If the knowledge of the Victorious (liberated Jinas) is true, then one should not make any exertion’. If we take \textit{avyabhicāraṁ} as ‘inevitability’, then the argument makes better sense: ‘If the knowledge of the Victorious (liberated Jinas) is inevitable, then one should not make any exertion’, i.e. one will sooner or later achieve omniscience without any effort. The problem with the latter interpretation is that it would perhaps sound like a criticism of determinism (\textit{niyati}) of the Ājīvikas, which cannot escape the paradox that the Ājīvikas must have faced: if we are bound to attain liberation (and become omniscient), what is the use of any penance practised by the Ājīvikas? If the second interpretation is nevertheless correct (\textit{avyabhicāraṁ} = ‘inevitability’) and it does express criticism, then the verse can hardly be classified as a genuinely Ājīvika verse. While this conclusion would rest on my inability to correctly understand both the meaning of \textit{avyabhicāra} in the verse and the gist of the argument, nonetheless, perhaps, precisely such a conclusion is correct, as we shall see below (p. 50).

Whatever the case may be, the information provided by this 17th-century author appears to be quite enlightening in being apparently the first tangible information about the Ājīvikas. Thus we might hail the first success: what we have here at last is both a direct quotation as well as a title of an unidentifiable Ājīvika work.

12. What is disturbing about the above seemingly successful conclusion is that the source of the verse is a work ascribed to a Jaina Śvetāmbara author, Siddhasena-sūrī: it is verse 16 of his \textit{Niyati-dvātriṃśikā}. And that itself raises a range of questions.

Olle Qvarnström, in a paper ‘Siddhasena Divākara on Ājīvika’ presented during 11th Jaina Studies Workshop at SOAS on 12th March 2009 devoted primarily to the \textit{Niyati-dvātriṃśikā},

believes this hymn is of great historical importance because he thinks it may be an original Ājīvika text that was edited by the compiler of the \textit{Dvātriṃśikā}

and thus is an impartial account of their philosophy.\footnote{\textit{Jaina Studies, Newsletter of the Centre of Jaina Studies} 5 (2010) 12.}

For various reasons—including structural, conceptual, terminological, thematic, vocabulary, lack of any overlap—one can not only endorse Qvarnström’s claim that ‘it is highly probable that the different hymns neither have a common authorship nor are composed by Siddhasena Divākara’\footnote{\textit{Jaina Studies, Newsletter of the Centre of Jaina Studies} 4 (2009) 9; see also \textit{Qvarnström} (2015): ‘In fact, internal and external criteria also negate the assumption that the \textit{Dvātriṃśikā} and its doxographical texts were written by a single author.’}, but it may justify venturing much further and maintaining that a range of works ascribed to Siddhasena Divākara do not stem
from one and the same author. Indeed, the two best known—San̄mati-tarka-prakāraṇa and Nyāyāvātāra—are separated by about 250 years. ⁹¹

In his paper ‘The Niyatifādadvātrimiṣikā ascribed to Siddhasena Divākara’, into which his original London paper developed and in which he provides a collated reproduction of the text based on three editions and two manuscripts (not really present in the actual apparatus found in the manuscript of Qvarnström’s paper), Qvarnström gives a closer look at The Hymn on Destiny in 32 Stanzas (Niyati-dvātrimiṣikā), which he incorrectly titles Niyati-vāda-dvātrimiṣikā, ⁹² and maintains that

The Niyatifādadvātrimiṣikā may turn out to be such an Ājīvika Sanskrit text, i.e. an emic portrayal of Ājīvika doctrine—including certain polemical elements—reflecting a fully elaborated doctrinal system whose logic and epistemology resembled that of the Jains.

It is not clear to me what ‘emic portrayal’, or ‘insider’s perspective’, really means. Would be a genuine text written by Ājīvikas or not? And this is not a genuine text written by Ājīvikas, how would it differ in essence from a typical doxographical work written by an outsider, i.e. a Jaina author?

Before proceeding with further analysis, however, I will first reproduce the text of the tiny work in order to assess how far it may really be considered ‘an Ājīvika Sanskrit text, i.e. an emic portrayal of Ājīvika doctrine’.

\[ \text{nityānāntaram} \text{ ayakti-sukha-dukhbhābjātyāyah} / \\
\text{svabhāvah} \text{ sarva-sattvānāṁ payaḥ kṣīrāṅkarādīvāt} // \text{1} // \\
dharmādharmaṁmatakte tu śarīrāndriya-sanvidām / \\
kathāḥ purusā-kaśrāḥ syād idam eveti nēti vā // \text{2} // \\
śarīrāndriya-nispattau yo nāma svayam aprabhuḥ / \\
tasya kāḥ kartṛ-vādo śtu tad-āyattāsu vyṛtisū // \text{3} // \\
dharmādharmau tadānyonya-nirodhāti-saśaya-kriyau / \\
desādy-apekṣau ca tayeḥ kathāṁ kāḥ kartṛ-sambhavau // \text{4} // \\
yat pravṛttyāpamardena vyṛtāṁ sad-asad-ātmakam / \\
tad vētārā nimmāṁ vēty ubhayaṁ pakṣa-ghātakam // \text{5} // \\
na drśṭāntākṛṭāsakṣeḥ svātāntrayaṁ pratiṣidhyate / \\
aminnīṁ nimmāṁ nimmāṁy avārītam // \text{6} // \\
viśva-prāyāṁ pṛthivy-ādi-parināmo prayaṭnataḥ / \\
viṣayas tat-prabodhas te tulye ²² yasyeti manyate // \text{7} //

⁹¹ See Balcerowicz (2001a), (2001b), (2003b) and (2004), i.e. evidence which Qvarnström (2015) apparently overlooks.

⁹² If this is a genuinely Ājīvikan text, it is highly unlikely that an Ājīvika author would refer to niyati-vāda— in a work describing his own system (one would rather expect niyati-vāda alone). If that is not an Ājīvikan text, but rather a Jaina text providing a report on the Ājīvikas, the title of this particular dvātrimiṣikā as given by Qvarnström would be the odd one out in a whole series, because -vāda features in no other work title in the doxographical range of 32-stanza texts from nos. 12 to 17 -vāda in just one of them would be very peculiar. That is why, unless we have some other very strong evidence, we would have to accept Niyati-dvātrimiṣikā as the real title solely on the basis of the internal evidence of the dvātrimiṣikās ascribed to Siddhasena. However, the final argument against Qvarnström’s title Niyati-vāda-dvātrimiṣikā is the one provided by Yasovijaya who himself provides the correct title (vide supra n. 88, AsSTV 91, p. 615.16: yac ca niyati-dvātrimiṣikāyāṁ).
नोक्तब्याम सहा नारम्भं सहम adhyakṣa-saṁpadi /
vināśānupapateṣ ca bhoya-bhaksya-vikalpataḥ // 8 //
prthvya nāvarudhyeta yathā vā rājata-kriyāḥ //
gunānāṁ puruse tad-vad ahaṁ kartetī adah-krteḥ3° // 9 //
sudūram api te gatvā hetu-vāda nivartṣyati /
na hi svabhāvān adhyakṣo loka-dharmo 'sti kaścana // 10 //
pravartāvayam eveti pravartante yadā gunāḥ //
atha kiṁ saṁpramugdho 'sti jñāṇa-vairāgya-siddhiṣu // 11 //
karmād aṣṭāṅgataḥ buddher na virodha-kṛte ca yaiḥ //
vaktur adya-nimittatvādivat atatha-pratyayād api // 12 //
asato hetuto vētā pratisaṁdhau ca vagraḥ /
asahas tu hetur dhī-mātraṁ karteti ca viśiṣyate // 13 //
blaṅgara-sravaṇādy-artha-saṁvin-mātre nirātmako /
rāgādi-sāntau yatnas te kathaṁ kasya kim ity ayam // 14 //
karma-jah pratyayo nāma karma ca pratyayātmaṃ /
tat-phaḷain nirayādyāś ca na ca sarvatra vismṛtaḥ // 15 //
jñāṇam avyabhicāram cej jīnānāṁ mā śrāmaṁ kṛthaḥ //
atha tatrāpy anēkānto jītaḥ smaḥ kiṁ tu ko bhavān // 16 //
ekendriyānāṁ avyakter ajāty-antara-saṁgatau /
vyaktānaṁ ca tadādau kā rāgādi-pravibhaktayā / 17 //
na saṁsaraty atah kaścit sva-parābhyā-hetukam /
abhijāti-viśeṣāt tu mithyā-vāda-mukho janaḥ // 18 //
cattanyam api naḥ sattvo mohādi-jñāna-lakṣaṇaḥ /
tad-ādi tad-vat saṁkalpo mithyā-rāṣṭrī pravartate // 19 //
tula-yā-prasaṅgō nānāte tulayānīkena bādhyaṭe /
akasmāt-kāraṇāvesau hetu-dharmāviśeṣataḥ // 20 //
saṁsānaṁ mano 'nāṁ bhūta-sāmānīya-jātiṃ /
mano 'haṁ niyataṁ4° dravyāṁ parināmy anumūrtī ca // 21 //
saṁśārika-visayatvādīs tattvāntaḥ krama-jātayāḥ /
artāpād anabhīvyakta-bhedāḥ kṛṣṇābhijātayāh // 22 //
yathā duḥkhādi nirayas tiryaṅkaṁ5° puruṣottamāḥ /
rākṣāyām ajanāyāṁ tu suka-ja na guṇottarāḥ // 23 //
hināsāvidyābhīcārārthāḥ pūrvānte madhyāmaḥ sāmaḥ /
samyag-dārsana-bhāvāntaḥ prati-buddhas tv ayojitaḥ // 24 //
nacopadeśo buddheḥ svād ravi-paṅka-ja-yogavat /
tattvāṁ ca prati-buddhyaṃ tebhāḥ pratyabhijātayāḥ // 25 //
saṁānabhijānasya eva guru-gaurava-mānīnaḥ /
svabhāvam abhigacchanti na hy agniḥ samam adhyati // 26 //
pravṛty-antarikāvāja-vibhāga-svapna-saṁbhavat /
najātā ca saṁsṛter uktaṁ saṅkaro 'ntarikāntajāḥ // 27 //
surādi-krāma ekeśāṁ mānasā hy utkrama-kramāt /
sukha-duḥkhā-vikalpāc ca khaṇḍir yā no bhijātayāh // 28 //
vomāvakāśo nānayeśaṁ kālo dravyaiṁ kriyā vidhīḥ /
sukha-duḥkhā-rajo dhātāu5° jīvājīva-nabhaṁśa ca // 29 //
anumānaṁ mano-vṛttir anvaya-niścayātmikaḥ /
In any preliminary analysis of this short work, we must take into account the present textual context in which the Niyati-dvātrinśikā features. These 32 verses follow a few other dvātrinśikās that stylistically consistently recapitulate the views of some other schools:

—Dvātrinśikā 12 recapitulates the views of the Nyāya school, but no single verse seems to be a quote from genuine Nyāya sources. The text is most likely a paraphrase. Even the expressions used seem to be foreign to Nyāya sources, as for example in verse 1:

\[
daiva-khātam ca vadanaṁ ātmyattam vāṁ-mayam / \]
\[
śrotāraḥ santi cōktasya nirlajjāḥ ho na pañḍitaḥ // 1 //
\]

Even in cases when mostly genuine Nyāya terminology is used, the passages are interwoven either with odd expressions or with a rather eccentric recapitulation of Nyāya ideas that seems to confuse orders of entities, as for example in verse 9 (the order of pañcāvaśava and that of the tattvas are mixed):

\[
pratijñā nirṛayo hetur dṛṣṭāntaṁ buddhi-kāraṇam / 
pramāṇa-hetu-dṛṣṭānta-jāti-tarkās tad-uktayaḥ // 9 //
\]

—Dvātrinśikā 13 recapitulates the views of the Sāmkhya but again, no verse seems to be a quote from a genuine Sāmkhya source. Also this text is most likely a paraphrase. As before, expressions used seem to be even foreign to Sāmkhya sources in terms of vocabulary, but not necessarily in spirit, as for example in verse 32:

\[
cakṣurvaḥ puruṣo bhoktā bandha-mokṣa-vilākṣanah / 
kṛtārthaiḥ sa prayukto pi śūnya eva guṇair iti // 32 //
\]
—Dvātrimśikā 14 recapitulates the views of the Vaiśeṣika. Again, no verse seems to a quote from genuine Vaiśeṣika sources, and often the recapitulation of Vaiśeṣika ideas is rather unusual, right from the very first verse or verse 3:

\[
\begin{align*}
dharmādharmēṣvarā loka-siddhy-apāya-pravṛttiṣu & / 
dravyādi-sādhanāv etau dravyād yā vā parasparam & 1 // 
sanśārenā tad-āpekṣyam eka-dravya-kṣaṇa-sīthiḥ & / 
karma kārya-virodhi syād ubhayābhayathā guṇaḥ & 3 //
\end{align*}
\]

—Dvātrimśikā 15 recapitulates the views of the Buddhists. Again, no verse seems to a quote from genuine Buddhist sources, and the text is most likely a paraphrase. Expressions used seem to be even foreign to Buddhist sources, as for example in verse 1:

\[
\begin{align*}
nāham-krṣasya nirvāṇaṁ na setsyat anahaṁ-krṣaḥ & / 
nā vā vidyā vivekāya na vidyā bhava-gāminī & 1 //
\end{align*}
\]

There are also expressions which are not Buddhistic, but rather smack of Jaina accounts, e.g. naya or avaktavya:

\[
\begin{align*}
avaktavyam asabhāvāt prāsaṅārthasya kha-puspavat & / 
saṁtānaṁ bhāvanārtham vā sarit-prota-pradīpavat & 6 // 
mahā-bhūtāchchrayo rūpaṁ vijñānaṁ viṣayo nayāḥ & / 
deva-nātya-prthag-bhāvo nṛ-jāty-ādi-vikalpavat & 7 // 
āhetu-pratayaya-nayam pārvāpara-saṁābhavam & / 
vijñānaṁ tat-saṁuṭthaṁ kaḥ saṁvyavasyed vicaksanāḥ & 21 //
\end{align*}
\]

—Dvātrimśikā 17 apparently recapitulates the views close to those of a nihilist / materialist (?), see the beginning verses. However the whole terminology is Jainistic:

\[
\begin{align*}
na duḥkhena virudhyete dharmādharmau sukhena vā & / 
pratayāvābhidhārītvā svā-parābhaya-vṛttiṣu & 1 // 
deśa-kāla-nimittāni nimittāni aniyogataḥ & / 
niyogato vā tat-siddhau na vādhyātmā-viśeṣataḥ & 2 // 
na mithyā-darśanāt pāpaṁ na samyag-darśanāc chubham & / 
na ca nēti kāṣṭhānāṁ tad-vṛtty-avyātirekataḥ & 6 //
\end{align*}
\]

There is nothing, it seems, which would speak against a common authorship or source of these five works (Dvātrimśikā 12–15, 17). On the contrary, they are all quite uniform in structure, approach and style; indeed, a close reading reveals a number of close lexical and stylistic similarities between them. And all of them are slightly off-the-mark in their portrayal of the systems under discussion.

In addition, if we only focus on the Niyati-dvātrimśikā (NiDv), in this work there are some expressions that are identical (or almost identical) to those used in the other texts of the group, and these identical expressions are in metrically exactly (or almost exactly) the same positions:

(1) NiDv 6cd: animittāni nimittāni nimittānīy avāritam // 6 //
Dvātrimśikā 17.1ab: deśa-kāla- nimittāni nimittāny aniyogataḥ /
The above speaks, in my opinion, strongly against an independent, allegedly Ājīvika origin of the Niyati-dvātriṃśikā, and instead supports a thesis of this and the other four short versified texts having a common author. This does not preclude, however, a possibility that the author (pseudo-Siddhasena Divākara) was sufficiently well informed about the school and his information is reliable. However, as long as we do not have a clear picture of what the Ājīvikas actually maintained, we are not able to fully assess the faithfulness of the account found in the Niyati-dvātriṃśikā or to judge how far the account is that of a reflection in a distorting mirror. What is important in this context is that none of the verses of the Niyati-dvātriṃśikā is found to be quoted or referred to anywhere else, other than the very late quote by Yaśovijaya. If the work was indeed penned by an Ājīvika author and was preserved as such by the Jainas, being then incorporated with some changes into a doxographical collection of short versified texts, one would expect to find the text quoted also in other sources as an illustration of the Ājīvika doctrine, at least by Jaina authors.

Another problem is the actual dating of this selection of the dvātriṃśikās, alongside the Niyati-dvātriṃśikā, and whether they indeed come from around 6th century. It must also be asked whether they can be ascribed to Siddhasena Divākara. However, there is a strong evidence that Siddhasena Divākara composed his Saṁmati-tarka-prakaraṇa before Diṅnāga, i.e. before ca. 480. A close analysis of the textual material is necessary to determine the probable date of the dvātriṃśikās and their relation to Saṁmati-tarka-prakaraṇa.

Examining the vocabulary found in the Niyati-dvātriṃśikā also does not help us much to determine the work’s authenticity. We can distinguish three lexicographic categories:

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93 See Balcerowicz (2001a), (2001b), (2003b) and (2004).
(1) Some terms (in bold, dotted underline) are known to be shared by the Jainas and the Ājīvikas:

NiDv 5b: sad-asad-ātmakam—this expression is a part of Jaina Anekāntavāda and also it consists the method of the Trairāṣikas, identified with the Ājīvikas.\(^{94}\)

NiDv 29d: ājīva—this is a basic division of all ontology of both the Jainas and the Ājīvikas.

NiDv 17a: ekendriyānām—as Barua (1921, pp. 306–307) has shown, one-sensed beings probably opened Ājīvika’s classification of living beings based on the number of sense organs possessed by them, in some ways similar to that of the Jainas.

NiDv 10b: hetu-vādo—the doctrine of causation (the cause of things) was shared by both the Ājīvikas and the Jainas, but was not restricted to them.

(2) Other expressions (bold, no underline) are known only to be specific to the Jainas, and it is not known whether the Ājīvikas used them as technical terms. We have no information which would preclude a possibility that they may have used them too:

NiDv 24a: samyag-darśana-bhāvāntāh,

NiDv 32b: mithyātvāpara-buddhayaḥ.

(3) Some expressions (in bold, underlined) are known only to be specific to the Ājīvikas, and are not used by the Jainas as technical terms:

(a) abhijāti (‘classes of existence’):
—NiDv 1b: avyakti-sukha-dukhkhābhijātayah,
—NiDv 22d: kṣṛṇābhijātayah,
—NiDv 25d: prayabhijātayah,
—NiDv 28d: yā no bhijātayah,
—NiDv 28c: abhijāti -viśeṣat tu.

(b) svabhāva (‘intrinsic nature’):
—NiDv 1c: svabhāvah sarvātattvāṁ
—NiDv 10c: na hi svabhāvān adhyakṣo

(c) vidhi (‘fateful ordinance’):
—NiDv 29b: vidhiḥ (‘fateful ordinance’)

(d) *pravṛtty-upamarda (‘suppression through action’?):
—NiDv 5a: pravṛttyopamardena, which is perhaps reminiscent of the idea of pautṣa-parihāra.\(^{95}\)

\(^{94}\) See e.g. Nandi-sutra (p. 78 ff., 86 ff.).

\(^{95}\) ‘Discontinuance / stoppage [of a subsequent birth in a new body] through / due to continuation [in the same reanimated body]’; alternatively ‘reanimation without transmigration’ (Basham) or ‘die Beschränkung (der Neuerkörperring) durch Weitergelten’ (Schubring), see Basham (1951, pp. 48–49, 57–58, 250–252) and, esp. for the formation (pravṛtya-parihāra), Schubring (1954, p. 258) = (1977, p. 470). The term is found esp. in Viy 15, and explained in BhCū 15, p. 53.19–21: ...pautṣa-parihāra. pāravṛtya vānaspatyās tatrāiva jāyate. bhagavatā katham itara-sarva-jīvas tathā-drṣṭaḥ, pautṣa1-parihāra-diṭṭhi jāto [1 Recte: pautṣa-].
What conclusions can be drawn for this comparison? The presence of specifically Jaina terms (category 2), provided they were indeed not shared by the Ājīvikas (and that we cannot know with certainty, given the extant material) would rather speak against genuinely Ājīvika origin of the text, whereas the presence of typically Ājīvika technical terms (category 3) would support a thesis that the Niyati-dvātrinīśikā is actually based on Ājīvika texts and recapitulates their doctrine second-handedly using the Ājīvika lexicographic material. If it is indeed the case—that the text is a recapituation, albeit not necessarily an objective and non-partisan one—then the above supposition (§ 11, p. 33) that verse NiDv 16, quoted by Yaśovijaya (AṣSTV 91, p. 615.17–18) as V 11, must be interpreted as authentic criticism against the Ājīvikas.96 Nonetheless, the whole text of the Niyati-dvātrinīśikā can be treated as a highly useful source, albeit biased, of information on the Ājīvikas, their doctrine, certain concepts and terminology, especially when compounded with other similarly weak evidences.

13. There are some more stray references to niyati (destiny) and its propounders.

13.1 One is found in Dallana’s commentary on the Suśruta-saṁhitā of 13th century:97

The propounders of destiny [claim] that “Destiny is [operative] with respect to righteousness and unrighteousness, which are earned through previous births, and only this [destiny] is the cause of everything”.

It is most unlikely that it is an independent statement deriving from an authentic Ājīvika work, because it almost identical in wording with the view expressed in Bhaṭṭotpala’s commentary on Varāhamihira’s Brhat-saṁhitā 1.7:

The same karman which is earned through previous births and which is people’s fortune and misfortune is also the cause of origination and destruction of all living beings.98

There the view is ascribed to the Mīmāṁsakas. Further, to take the third person (iti niyati-vādinaḥ) as an auto-reference of the Ājīvikas is impossible.

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96 The translation of the verse could be more precise: ‘If [true] knowledge of the [Ājīvikan] Victorious (liberated Jinas) is tantamount to inevitability, then one should not make any exertion, [which the Ājīvikas however do undertake]. Also if in the case [of the Ājīvikan Jinas, their true knowledge] is multiplex (sc. they are omniscient from one point of view, and not omniscient from another), then these [Jinas in fact] are already vanquished (they are never victorious / liberated). If that is so, where is the Lord [of the Ājīvikas as authority on liberation, if the Jinas’ omniscience cannot be established]?’

97 Suśruta-saṁhitā, Śārīra, chapter 1; I quote after KAVIRAJ (1966: 54–55), as the edition is not available to me: pūrva-jannāṁjitau dharmāḥdharmau niyatiḥ, sāiva sarvasya kāraṇam iti niyati-vādinaḥ.

98 Quoted after KAVIRAJ (1966: 54–55), as the edition is not available to me:

pūrva-jannāṁjitaṁ yac ca karma puṁsāṁ śubhāḥśubham /
tad eva sarva-janūnāṁ śṛṣṭi-saṁhāra-kāraṇam //
13.2. There are a number of references to *niyati* found in the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* (YVā).\(^{99}\) Metrically and stylistically speaking, the verses belong to the texture of *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, of which they are an integral part. Further, the expressions, terms and names used and the ideas (e.g. the beginning of the world or its creation, which presupposes a creator) found in the verses make it highly unlikely that the verses are either quotations from Aśūvikā sources or even faithful paraphrases, and they can safely be dismissed as candidates for quotes from Aśūvikā sources or even as reports or references to genuine Ājīvika ideas.

14. Last but not least, another Jaina author, Samantabhadra (c. 580–640) refers to *fate* (*daiva*) in his *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*:

[88] If the attainment of desired goals is due to fate, then how is it possible that [karmic] fate is due to human perseverance? If it is due to [still another] fate, then no liberation is [possible, and] human perseverance would be futile.

[89] If the attainment [of desired goals] is due to human perseverance, then how is it possible that human perseverance is due to fate? If it is due to [still

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\(^{99}\) YVā 2.10.1:

\[ \text{yathā-sthitam brahma-tattva tattā niyatir ucyate /} \]
\[ \text{sā vinetur vineyatva sā vineya-vineyatā // 2.10.1 //} \]

YVā 3.54.22:

\[ \text{sargādau yā yathā rūdhā samvīt-kacana-santatiḥ /} \]
\[ \text{sādyāpy acalitā nyena sthitā niyatir ucyate //} \]

YVā 3.54.22:

\[ \text{sargādau yā yathā-rūdhā saṁviktā-canā-saṁtatiḥ /} \]
\[ \text{sādyāpy acalitānyena sthitā niyatir ucyate // 3.54.22 //} \]

YVā 3.62.9–11:

\[ \text{ādi-sarge hi niyatir bhāva-vacitryam aksayam /} \]
\[ \text{anenētāṃ sadā bhāvam iti saṁpadaye param // 3.62.9 //} \]
\[ \text{mahā-sattēti kāthitā mahā-citrā ita smr tā /} \]
\[ \text{mahā-śaktī iti khyātā mahā-drīt śīr iti śhītā // 3.62.10 //} \]
\[ \text{mahā-kriyāti gaditā mahādbhaya iti smr tā /} \]
\[ \text{mahā-spanda iti prau hā mahāmāikatōyōditā // 3.62.11 //} \]

YVā 3.62.26:

\[ \text{avaśyāṃ-bhavatvāśā tv idam itthāṁ iti thītah /} \]
\[ \text{na śākyate langhayitum api rudrādi-buddhibhiḥ // 3.62.26 //} \]

YVā 5.89.26:

\[ \text{saṁvītā niyatiṁ martum na śakaḥ kaścid eva hi // 5.89.26 //} \]

YVā 6.36.21:

\[ \text{ā-mahā-rudra-paryantam idam itthāṁ iti sthītah /} \]
\[ \text{a-trṇa-padmāḥa-spandaṁ niyatāmāni niyatiṁ smṛtā // 6.36.21 //} \]

YVā 6.37.23:

\[ \text{niyatiṁ niyāna udvega-varjītā parimārijitā /} \]
\[ \text{eṣā niyatyai vai niyatyam jagaj-jālaka-nātakam // 6.37.23 //} \]
another] human perseverance, then the perseverance of all living beings should consistently be [successful].

These verses somehow echo a criticism against the idea of niyati, but they do not really refer to any concrete system, it seems. In Samantabhadra’s work they are merely a rhetorical and argumentative device: fate is mentioned only as a vague idea in order to establish the overwhelming influence of karman, which must be eliminated through the path proffered by the Jinas. In addition, these verses seem to be genuine creations of Samantabhadra, who does not quote from other works in his Āpta-mīmāṁsā. They are also found nowhere else.

15. To conclude, of the verses and passages that have been previously identified by BASHAM and other scholars as most probably genuinely Ājīvika, none turns out to be derived from an Ājīvika source. New material brought to our attention in the paper has produced some passages that at first seemed possible to qualify as genuinely Ājīvika, however after some analysis they must also be dismissed. All the verses previously considered genuinely Ājīvika have been composed by non-Ājīvika authors and usually derive either from Jaina works or from fables or narrative literature. In other words, there is no single genuinely Ājīvika verse or passage to be found.

Even those few that at first seemed uncontested after a preliminary analysis have also been shown to be spurious for a couple of reasons, primarily because until now they have been found to be quoted only in a single work, whereas generally alleged Ājīvika verses are found in several works. That is why they have to be considered the product of later non-Ājīvika authors.

Further, there is no proof that the Ājīvikas developed their own Sanskrit literature, much less philosophical literature in Sanskrit. On the other hand, there is no evidence disproving their having such a body of texts.

Conspicuously, references to the Ājīvikas and possible quotes from Ājīvika sources in Sanskrit seem to be found almost exclusively in Jaina sources, with only a few suspicious exceptions (e.g. Yoga-vāsiṣṭha). Apparently it was mostly Jaina authors who engaged in discussions of the doctrinal elements of the Ājīvikas. This may in itself be quite puzzling.

A probable explanation for that is that both religious groups shared the same historical origins. Perhaps when the Jaina authors composing in Sanskrit were still commenting on selected philosophical ideas of the Ājīvikas, the religious movement had already lost its philosophical impact and become extremely marginal, to the extent that it was generally ignored by all, except for the Jainas who had had direct sectarian affiliation with them. That would further suggest that while the Jaina authors were referring to the ideas of the Ājīvikas, there were no more any Sanskrit

[^100]: ĀMi 88–89:

daivād evārtha-siddhāś ced daivaṁ pauruśataḥ katham //
daivaṁ ced anirmokāḥ pauruṣaṁ nisphalaṁ bhavet // 88 //
pauruṣād eva siddhiḥ cet pauruṣaṁ daivataḥ katham //
pauruṣāc ced amoghaṁ syāt sarva-prāṇisu pauruṣam // 89 //
sources. The Jainas thus had to compose all such verses, pretending that they were authentic.

Last but not least, the faithfulness and reliability of reports of the Ājīvikas and paraphrases of their views cannot be assessed with any certainty due to the vicious circle mentioned at the outset. Still, the stray fragments that we do have at our disposal, regardless of their actual reliability and accuracy, is all we have to reconstruct the doctrine of the Ājīvikas.

It is also very difficult, if at all possible, to develop any consistent methodology to assess which of the material at our disposal relies on genuine knowledge of the Ājīvikas’ doctrine on the part of the reporter, which is solely based on hearsay and second- or third-hand knowledge, and which is merely imagining what would it be like if one assumed a deterministic theory of the world. My fear is that in many cases it is the third case, which is the least interesting option for a historian of ideas.

BASHAM’s (1951) reconstruction of the doctrine of the Ājīvikas, notwithstanding its merits, seems overoptimistic: in fact, it seems we know much less of that tradition than BASHAM thought we did.

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RVār = Akalaṅka: Tattvārtha-vārttika (Rāja-vārttika). Mahendra Kumar Jain (Ed.): Tattvārtha-vārttika [Rāja-vārttika] of Śrī Akalākhaedeva. Edited with Hindi Translation, Introduction, appendices, variant readings, comparative notes etc. Parts I–II. Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevi Jaina Grantha-mālā: Sanskrit Grantha 10, 20, Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha Prakāśana, Delhi 1953–1957 [2. edition: Delhi 1982]. Sau = Asvaghōsa: Saundarāṇānda. E.H. Johnston (Ed.): The Saundarāṇānda of Asvaghōsa. Oxford University Press 1928.

Schubring 1954 = Schubring, Walther: ‘A.L. Basham: History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas. A vanished Indian Religion. With a foreword by L.D. Barnett. London: Luzac 1951. XXXII, 304 S., 8. T., 2 K. 16 s.’, ZDMG 104,1 (1954) 256–263. [Reprinted in: Walther Schubring: Kleine Schriften. Ed. by Klaus Bruhan, Glasenap-Stiftung 13, Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1777: 468–475].

SDSa = Haribhadra-sūri: Śad-dāraṇa-samuccaya. Mahendra Kumār Jain (ed.): Śrī-Haribhadrasūri-viracita-Śad-dāraṇa-samuccaya Śrī-Gurumatāsūri-kṛta-Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā Somatilaka-sūri-kṛta-Laghu-vṛtti tathā ajñāta-kārtya-Avacūrīni. With the Introduction of Pt. Dalsukh Malvania. Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevi Jaina Grantha-mālā 36 [Sanskrit Grantha], Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha Prakāśana, Vārānāsī 1981 [first edition: 1969].

SK = Īśvara-kīrtīka. Nārāyana-carana Śāstri and Śvetavaikunthā Śāstri (Eds.): Sāṃkhya-kīrītīka of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. With the Commentaries of Svāmin Nārāyaṇa, Gaudapādācārya and Tattva-kaumudi of Vācaspati Miśra with Kiranavallabha-cārya Svamināraṇya. Banaras 1937 [Second Edition, Vyāsaprakāsan, Vārānasī 1989.]

SSS = [Śaṅkarācārya (Schubring 1954 = Schubring, Walther: ‘A.L. Basham: History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas. A vanished Indian Religion. With a foreword by L.D. Barnett. London: Luzac 1951. XXXII, 304 S., 8. T., 2 K. 16 s.’, ZDMG 104,1 (1954) 256–263. [Reprinted in: Walther Schubring: Kleine Schriften. Ed. by Klaus Bruhan, Glasenap-Stiftung 13, Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1777: 468–475], ascribed:] Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha. M. Ranagacārya; Rao Bahadur (Eds.): Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha of Śaṅkarācārya. Government Press, Madras 1909.

STP = Śuddhāsena Divākara: Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa. Sukhāl Śaṅghāvī; Biecardās Dāsi (Ed.): Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇam by Śuddhāsena Divākara with Abhayadeva-sūri’s Tattva-bodha-vidhiyāni. Gujarāt-purā-tattva-mandir-granthavālī 10, 16, 18, 19, 21, Gujarāt-purā-tattva-mandir, Amdavad 1924–1931 [reprinted: 2 Vols., 1777: Kyoto 1984].

STPMAA = Vijaya Īraśā-pīrā: Saṃmati-tarka-mahārṇavāvatārīkā. Rikhavesād Bhabatama (Ed.): Śrīmad-Vijaya-Īraśā-pīrā-pranītā Saṃmati-tarka-mahārṇavāvatārīkā. Madrāsā-nagara-sthā Jaina-mārga-prabhāvacaka Sabhā, Madras 1954 [Vikrama Saṅvat 2013].

Sūy = Śūy-a-dāṅga [Śūtra-kṛtāṅga]. (1) Śūtra-kṛtāṅga with Śīlākā’s Tīkā. Āgamodaya-samiti, Bombay 1917. (2) See: Śūyvr (3) See: Śūyvyā.

Śūyvr = Śīlākā: Śūtra-kṛtāṅga-vṛtti. Muni Dīparatnasāgar (ed.): Āgama-sūtānai (śaṅkaṇī). Bhaṭagā 2: Śūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtram (mūlam + śrī-Bhadrabāhu-svāmī-kṛta-nīyukti + śrī-Śilākācārya-racita-vṛttiyuktani). Āgama Śrītra Prakāśan, Ahamadābad 1998 [Ravivā 2056].

Śūyvyā = Śādhūraṅga-gāni: Śūtra-kṛtāṅga-vāykhāya. Mohān Lāl (Ed.): Śrīmat-Sādhūraṅga-gāni-sankalītāya dipikāya samalāṅkārita śrī-Śūya-gāṅgā-sūtraṁ. 2 Vols., Surat-vāstvāya Śreṣṭhi Devacandra Lalabābbā Jaina-pustakōdhhāra-kośasya Kāryā-vāhako Motiĉandā Mananabhaī Cōsāi, Surat, 1959 1962 [Vikrama Saṅvat 2015, 2019].

SVM = Mahīśeṇa-sūri: Śyād-vāda-maṇjarī. A.B. Dhruva (Ed.): Śyād-vāda-maṇjarī of Mahīśeṇa with the Anyā-yoga-svavacchdha-dvērtāṁśikā of Hemacandra. Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 83, Bombay 1933.

ŚVS = Haribhadra-sūri: Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya. (1) K.K. Dīxit (ed., Hindi transl.): The Śāstravārttā-samuccaya of Ācārya Haribhadrasūri with Hindi Translation, Notes and Introduction. L.D. Series 22, Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Bharatiya Sanskriti Vidyaṃdāra, Ahmedabad 1969. (2) See: ŚSVV.

ŚSVV = Yaśovijaya-gāni: Śyād-vāda-kalpalatā [= Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya-vāykhāya]. Bārdīnāṭ Śyāla (ed., transl.): Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya aur uski Vāykhāya Śyād-vāda-kalpalatā aur Hindi-vivecana. Stambakas 1–11. 7 Vols., Divyā-dārāṇ Trast, Caukhambha Oiyantīlīyā, Vārānāsī 1977–1989.

Śvu = Śvetāvatsara-upānisad. (1) Virarāghavācārya (Ed.): Śvetāvatsarādy-upānisat-pruruṣa-sūktabhāṣyam. Part I, Tirumala-tirupati-devasthāna-mudranālāya, Tirumala-tirupati 1955. (2) Olivelle, Patrick: The Early Upanisads. Annotated Text and Translation, Oxford University Press 1998: 413–433.

TBV = Abhayadeva-sūri: Tattva-bodha-vidhiyinī. See: STP.
THOMAS 1960 = Thomas, F.W. (transl.): Śrī Malliṣeṇaśīrisūri: Syād-vāda-maṇjarī—The Flower-spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine. Translated and annotated. Akademie-Verlag 1960 [reprinted: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1968].

TRD = Gunārata-sūri: Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā. See: SDSa.

TSa = Śantarākṣita: Tattva-saṅgraha. Embar Krishnamacharya (ed.): Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the commentary of Kamalāśīla. 2 Vols., Gaekwad’s Oriental Series 30–31, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1926 [reprinted: 1984, 1988].

Uttar = Uttarājñāṇa-sūtra [Uttarādhyayana-sūtra]. Muni Punyavijayaji and Pt. Amritlāl Mohanlāl Bhojak (Ed.): Dasaveyādīyasuttaṁ, Uttarādhyayanaśīla and Āvassayasuttaṁ. Jaina-Āgama-Series 15, Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay 1977.

UvD = Uvāsa-dasāṇa [Upasaka-dasāṇ / Upāsakādhyayana-dasāṇ]. A.F. Rudolf Hoernle (Ed.): The Uvāsa-gadasaṇa or the Religious Profession of an Avāṣaṇa Expounded in Ten Lectures, being the Seventh Anga of the Jains edited in the Original Prakrit with the Sāṃskrit Commentary of Abhayadeva. 2 Vols., Bibliotheca Indica 105, Calcutta 1890.

UvDVi = Abhayadeva-sūri: Saptamāñga Upāsaka-dasāṇa-vivarana. See: UvD.

VIy = Viyāha-paṇṇatti / Viyāha-paṇṇatti / Bhagavatī-viēha-paṇṇatti / Bhagavatī-vyēkhyā-prajñapti / Bhagavatī-sūtra. Bechardas J. Doshi; Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak (ed.): Viyāha-paṇṇatti-suttaṁ. 3 parts, Jaina-Āgama-Series 4, Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay 1974–1982.

YBi = Haribhadra-sūri: Yoga-bindu. Luigi Suali (Ed.) Haribhadra Suri’s Yogabindu with commentary. Jain Dharma Prasarak Sabha Bhavnagar, Mumbai 1911.

YBiT = Haribhadra-sūri: Yoga-bindu-ṭīkā (Yoga-bindu-prakaraṇa-ṛtti). See: YBi.

YVā = Yoga-vāśīṣṭha, Wāsudev Laxman Śastri Panshikar (Ed.): The Yssogavāśīṣṭha of Vālmiki With the Commentary Vāśīṣṭhamahārāmāyaṇa-tātpāryapraṇāsa. Parts I and II, Third edition, Pāṇḍurang Jāwaṭ, Nirṇaya-sāgar Press, Bombay 1937.

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