The Transformation of Radical Movement in Yogyakarta Post 2019 Presidential Election

Putri Hergianasari,1* Kurniawan Netanyahu2

1Faculty of Social and Communication Science, Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana, Salatiga – Indonesia, 2The Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta – Indonesia

Abstract

Radical movements colored the 2019 Elections, especially the dichotomy of the Jokowi and Prabowo camps. This phenomenon also occurs among the people of Yogyakarta after the 2019 Presidential Election. The research aims to map the transformation of fundamentalist groups in Yogyakarta after the 2019 Presidential Election. The significant analysis was carried out to provide sources of information to the public and government regarding the transformation of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) after the 2019 Presidential Election. The researchers used qualitative descriptive methods with the analysis of the theory of social resource mobilization. The research results showed that the transformation of the radical movement that formerly took the anarchist forms and down to the streets, now are more focused and organized by entering the community through religious education and recitation groups, both in universities and at household meetings. This research concludes that in order not to be parallel to HTI, which the government dissolved, the transformation of tranquility is one way to maintain the existence of radical organizations but in a more friendly framework or guise. All of these resource mobilization movements take the form of informal social networks.

Keywords: transformation; social movement; post 2019 Presidential Election; fundamentalist groups

*Corresponding Author: Putri Hergianasari (hergianasari.putri@gmail.com), Jl. Diponegoro No. 52-60, Salatiga 50711, Indonesia.
Introduction

The fall of Soeharto from the Indonesian presidency has brought many changes in the social context of Indonesia, one of which is the increasing activities and the increasing numbers of religious-based organizations. The new democracy opens a space for equal participation for community groups to express their interest. In a democracy, every citizen has the right to express opinions and form associations following the prevailing laws and regulations. Every citizen also enjoys the same status before the law. That means, as long as current laws and regulations are justified, democratic regimes must fight for differences for everyone. Democracy must give every citizen the right to exist, regardless of their social, cultural, and religious background.

Democracy opens opportunities for the emergence of various political, economic, and religious organizations as manifestations of freedom of expression (Hasan 2018). Inevitably, this transition period also opened space for the growth of religious organizations with various characters. The emergence of various organizations such as Islamic militant: Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Majlis Mujahiddin Indonesia (MMI), and Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI) (Fatkhuri 2012).

Most radical groups support Islamic ideology, which declares war on all members of society to replace the democratic system that is considered to be from the West. For them, a democratic system does not represent Islam because that religion has never recognized the word democracy. Democracy is considered a creation of human wisdom, and people are more concerned with it. The radicals call it "rebellion against God’s sovereignty." (Lawrence 1989). Take advantage of Indonesian democracy, but the movement’s agenda is to overthrow democracy itself through violence or peaceful means. This is done in a completely revolutionary way.

The influence of this mass organization is obvious, especially in the political dynamics that occur in Indonesia. The presence of space for them to express and voice their opinions becomes a threat to Indonesia, and this can be seen from several terrorist incidents that are often associated with the interventions of Islamic organizations in Indonesia (Mubarak 2015). The rise of radical understanding that grows during the lives of the Indonesian people has triggered the growth of local transmissions in several regions in Indonesia that are suspected of being the arena for playing these radical groups and as a location for education for potential radical members (IPAC 2020).

Radicalism as a concept has changed its meaning a lot. Many political parties in the 19th century called themselves radical, becoming radical, especially on issues such as supporting republicanism over royalty. Some radical groups demand the introduction of a democratic system in which the right to vote is not linked to property ownership or gender. Most of them are reformers and not revolutionaries. Some of the radical demands of the 19th century have become mainstream rights today. In other words, the radical concept’s content has changed dramatically in less than a century. In contrast, in the 19th century, radicalism mainly refers to the political position that led to the extreme religious era movement (Schmid 2013).
However, the rise of radicalism was being suppressed by the government. It can be seen from the legislations for suppressing various actions from these mass organizations, one of which was the dissolution of HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) (Erdianto 2017). The government in the first period left various social phenomena in the environment of civil society, including in the implementation of counter-radicalism programs that were included in the list of major government programs. Precisely in 2017, where President Joko Widodo issued a policy that drew the attention of Muslim clerics groups, namely revoking the legal permission to establish HTI. The revocation of the HTI permit as a community organization in Indonesia was allegedly caused by the existence of radical motive motives within the organization (Aisy et al. 2019).

The counter-radicalism program carried out by President Joko Widodo is a form of response to the rampant acts of terrorism and violence targeting minority groups and civilians as victims, as happened in 2016 (Lucky and Kushindarti 2017). One of the events that have attracted public attention is the action against radicalism at the Sarinah shopping center, Central Jakarta. President Joko Widodo has swiftly issued various counter-terrorism and radicalism policies in Indonesia where the revocation of the legal license of the HTI organization is one form of implementation of these policies even though in 2016, the Terrorism Law was already in effect. However, none have been ratified immediately or are still under discussion and are being discussed with other Indonesian public authorities.

Revocation of HTI's legal permits has become a scourge in various Muslim communities where there are pros and cons. One demonstration in 2019 was carried out by the 212 alliance, which accused Jokowi of criminalizing many clerics in Indonesia and revoking legal permits. HTI organizations. Demonstration targeting Jokowi subject anger is a form of transition to the political agenda carried out by those who are members of the 212 alliance, which in the beginning was demanding that the Jakarta Governor called "Ahok" be sentenced to prison for the accusation of blasphemy during his 2016 official visit to the Kepulauan Seribu (BBC News 2016).

In Indonesia, they are reluctant to show total rejection of democracy through the party system. The party system means legitimizing the democratic system which is rejected by the reality of radical movements in Indonesia and other countries reminiscent of the trap theory of democracy. The militant group took action at the end of the operation to seize political power. Indeed, many radical groups do not want to participate in the whole political system. However, this does not mean that they do not want to have supreme power in a country. They still want to take control in their way (Hilmy 2015).

The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) reports the action of the 212 alliance purely contained a practical political agenda wrapped up in religious issues as an attraction for the solidarity of Muslims in Indonesia to join in a demonstration which pushed Joko Widodo to fail to be re-elected as President of Indonesia, but the final result of the Constitutional Court's
decision showed that President Joko Widodo was again elected as President of Indonesia for the second period (Putri 2019).

The euphoria of the 2019 Presidential Election is felt in Jakarta and in the areas where the implementation of the Presidential Election is also very dynamic, especially the dichotomy between the Jokowi and Prabowo camps. Yogyakarta is on the phenomenon of the radical movement that occurred after the 2019 Presidential Election. In this study, researchers focused on the current condition of groups classified as radical groups, namely Hizbuth Tahrir Indonesia. In the research that the researcher conducted, the finding that caught the attention of the researchers was that this HTI group was still operating actively in the social community in Yogyakarta. So, the formulation of the problem study is "How does the transformation of radical movement in Yogyakarta Post 2019 Presidential Election?"

This study uses the theory of resource mobilization social movements. In this theory, the researcher focuses on Islamic activities rather than ideology, in the sense that the author sees the mobilization and analysis of collective action and protests that have increased significantly in response to social movements of the people who have taken to the streets and are anarchic that demand specific demands. Political policy is an ancient form of social movement. Dissatisfaction with the old anarchist social movement model pushed the contemporary social movement theory thinker, Anthony Obserchall, to develop a new idea related to social movements, namely "the theory of resource mobilization." Old model social movement theory considers street political action to be an expression of an irrational and deprived mass mentality. Resource mobilization theory tends to see social movements as a form of organized, rational collective action and has specific goals that are consciously formulated. So that success in this theory is determined by the intelligence of social movement actors who organize members' sense of dissent to minimize the risks that may arise and at the same time utilize existing social solidarity networks and even share incentives to reach mutual consensus (Oberschall 1973).

Social movement theory offers a middle ground between structuralist schools that focus on the system, namely the state and international relations, and schools of rational choice that favor individual roles. Unlike the two schools, the theory of social mobilization of resources takes groups as a unit of analysis. Still, it recognizes the individuals involved in it as a form of collective action with free choice. This social movement theory of resource mobilization explains that options do not occur in a vacuum, out of context, changing networks and relationships. In contrast, social resource mobilization theory assumes that structural changes in creating conditions lead to collective action.

This theory emphasizes the issue of commonality rooted in the process, how a movement can arise, under what conditions it allows a disappointment to a mobilization. Resource mobilization usually arises in long-established social networks. Through this network, the masses and sympathizers are recruited and mobilized. In mobilizing the masses, social movement actors frame planned actions with slogans and language that are easy to understand and represent and move members' sentiments.
The resource mobilization social movement explains how the dynamics, the process, the organization of activism. The movement emerged rationally, arising from certain political dynamics that went through a mobilization process and involved a recruitment network polished with a touch of ideology through proper framing (Hasan 2006).

Islamic activism tends to utilize informal social networks that have been formed through personal relationships. The Muslim Brotherhood, which is a formal organization, also consists of dynamic informal networks that rely on family, friendship, and collegial connections. As examples of its activities are Mahwah in mosques, recitation in homes, interpretation forums in Musholla, Islamic print media that are packaged excitingly. Networks like this are overgrowing and are ready to be mobilized with the art of mobilization (Hasan 2006).

Radical ideology encourages Islam to create a radical Islamic movement. Radical Islam is thought to be a forerunner to the growth of terrorism. Hergianasari’s study finds that the radical movement tends to change the nation's ideology from Pancasila to Radical Islam. However, to eliminate such ideology, the role of the state to fight terrorism is very large, as Jokowi has done to disperse HTI, which is allegedly a radical Islamic mass organization. The radical organizations have been transformed into informal organizations whose teachings enter the midst society in’s midst structured and massive manner (Hergianasari 2018).

Hergianasari (2019) explains that the factors of violent extremism based on Islamic religion, which flourished recently by using three combinations of theories as Primordialism, Constructivism, and Instrumentalism, are stated three theories could not stand alone but its interrelation as a dimension of the case. It proves that the feeling one is psychologically and supported and united by dogma as a framework can make a community into one entity and turn into radicalism. There is evidence that the political figures have tricked people of the group as a tool for them to accomplish their goals. When they can fulfill their goals, a discrepancy of power inevitably is happening. Thus, the implementation of their power will be erupted and lead to the nations’ misery.

In a study examining the Cairo case, Diane Singerman explained that informal social networks have cultural validity because they are integrated with the community. The network can function as a movement resource for the recruitment of collective actions. Through this network, solidarity and collective identity can be built, enabling mobilization effectively and free riding (Singerman and Amar 2006).

Janine A. Clark, in her research in Yemen explained how social movement activists used Qur’anic study groups to reproduce messages and support activity agendas where the movement could facilitate community involvement in various class segments (Clark 2004).

Lorne L. Dawson argues that the Western model or recruitment of religious denominations uses existing social networks and interpersonal relationships. Not only that, but the model used also includes recruiting friends from friends and family members. Members and neighbors are recruiting neighbors (Gallagher 2007).
This research is different from previous research that transformed the radical movement after the 2019 Presidential Election, which political interests have ridden. At the same time, the movement has a radical ideology and wants to replace the government with a government. *Khilafah*, like a symbiotic mutualism mutual. However, in Yogyakarta, researchers found different things regarding the transformation of the radical movement after the 2019 Presidential Election, where the movement was a massive and structured transformation, first but the movement mobilized resources. As a result, they are now acting cautiously, no longer on the road, and acting anarchically, but carrying out informal movements through informal organizations packaged according to each member's segment, both millennials and even philanthropists.

This study uses descriptive qualitative methods by collecting data using field observation techniques, interviews, and related documents. The study was conducted with unstructured observations, namely observations made without using observation guidelines. In this observation, the researcher personally develops the power of observation in observing research objects. Researchers observe the transformation of the radical movement after the 2019 Presidential Election in Yogyakarta. Researchers conducted interviews by interviewing the D.I. Yogyakarta National Unity and Politics Agency lecturers from the UGM Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) as well as several students involved in research on the fundamental movement. Document data was obtained through online data searches, data from the Institutions of National Unity and Politics, and books, journals, and articles related to the radical movement.

The researcher descends directly into the field to interview related informants or informants who follow informal organizations. The researcher also made observations to see and observe directly. The obstacle was that the researcher did not ask questions directly related to the informal organization's missions but rather indirectly searched so as not to arouse suspicion.

**Transforming HTI Activities After 2019 Presidential Election**

Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf briefly explains HTI community behavior in Indonesia. HTI has been in Indonesia since the early 1980s. They prefer to move massively using underground methods and targeting their teachings to university students in Indonesia. HTI gained a wider scope when the Soeharto government ended. HTI is known as a Salafi-based organization, and holds the Tarbiyah ideology owned by Taqiuddin an-Nabhani as the founder of Hizbuth Tahrir in struggling for the *Khilafah* values (Ahnaf 2017).

HTI is very active in publishing its teachings on campuses and through many printed media such as the Al-Islam Bulletin, which is published once a week, and Al-Wa'ie magazine. HTI obtained permission as a community organization in Indonesia from the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2006 through a license letter number 44 / D.III.2 / VI / 2006. Based on this letter HTI may carry out teaching activities like religious preaching as well as responding to the ongoing government in Indonesia. The freedom of HTI during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's
administration has helped HTI expand its wings to take part in the Islamic world in Indonesia to spread teachings that are under their ideology.

HTI organizes activities such as Tabillig Akbar and demonstrations as their movement for showing organization’s political ethics. They consider this method is strategic for conveying their Islamic political thought. On the next step, there are some controversies regarding to some activities which are considered as radical. Even HTI activities are considered to threaten the Republic of Indonesia’s integrity because they are considered to be contrary to Pancasila. With the emergence of stigma and concerns, the government decided to dissolve HTI (Muazaroh 2019).

The existence of HTI has been limited by the regulation enacted by President Joko Widodo in 2016 through Law Number 2 of 2017, which acts as a substitute for Law Number 17 of 2013 concerning social organizations. However, HTI continues to carry out various teaching activities and uses the same method at the former times. There are several campuses in Yogyakarta used as a medium for disseminating khilafah ideology, such as at UGM (Gadjah Mada University) and UNY (Yogyakarta State University) (Koes 2019).

One researcher from CRCS UGM stated that the enactment of the new regulation related to social organization did not HTI convert the activities to become more hidden. Still, contrary, the HTI members carried out their activities openly and there was an increase in their enthusiasm to fight for the values of Khilafah in Indonesia. The location used by the HTI group for activities is in the UGM campus mosque, but at this time UGM has acted to suppress HTI group activities within UGM.

In expanding its teachings HTI often uses social media as a promotional platform and propaganda media. The role of social media has long been used before the enactment of government regulation related to social organization. The various activities that HTI allegedly initiated were routine ḥalaqah, intellectual discussion forums, mudzakarah figure and ulama, Muslim United, educational activities, business economics, and arts and cultural events.

To maintain self-existence amidst pressure and pressure from the state. HTI has used various methods and information to keep its activities going. Some of the movement transformations carried out by HTI will be explained by the researchers in the following items:

**Informal Social Network**

*First*, the ḥalaqah is an activity carried out by HTI members, usually filled with weekly and monthly studies. In studies conducted every month, HTI members often invite speakers from outside.

*Halaqah* is the main means of the tarbiyah (education) process aimed at strengthening relationships with Allah by using the *talaqqi* (direct learning) method in a group dynamic so that an intensive process of interaction occurs between each other so that there is a process of reflecting on influencing, and training togetherness within the scope of cooperation neatly arranged, with a maximum number of members of 12 people. The limitation of the number of *halaqah* participants to 12 people is based on the consideration of the effectiveness of the learning process in the supervision and control of
learning activities outside the ḥalaqah. This figure is not an absolute number, because the most important thing is how educators ensure the fulfillment of the learning needs of ḥalaqah participants, both inside and outside ḥalaqah. An educator must try to give the ḥalaqah participants the rights both inside and outside the ḥalaqah. A murabbi must try to communicate (stay in touch) with all his mutarabbi (ḥalaqah participants) within a week (Amirudin 2016).

Ḥalaqah activity itself is carried out in a nomadic way and is dominated by students discussing economic, political, and educational system issues. HTI members who are in the campus environment, such as at UGM call themselves mahali. Mahali UGM often rents cafes, shops, and hotels to carry out these activities, while mahali UIN and UNY choose to conduct ḥalaqah activities in the open space according to their funds.

In ḥalaqah, it consists of various agendas that are carried out massively and packaged as attractive as possible to attract members and guests who are usually targeted at Muslim students and ordinary Muslim citizens. One of the agendas in ḥalaqah which is very well known and managed to attract the attention of many Muslims is "YukNgaji" (let’s take the Koran), Felix Siauw initiator of this agenda. This ḥalaqah has been held in various cities in Indonesia.

The attraction of the "YukNgaji" program which is on the agenda in this ḥalaqah is packed with young people’s tastes. In the beginning, this activity used HTI figures from young people like Hawariyun, Shifrun, and Fuad Naim. In the "YukNgaji" program there are various activities including 1) Ngefast, this activity was originally known as KEY (YukNgaji Executive Class) and contains teaching using HTI doctrines and each participant must provide an infaq of Rp. 250,000. 2) "NgeFast for Kids" is not much different from Ngefast in general but this enterprising is filled with various practices. 3) Xkwavers, this activity is carried out to encourage young people to leave the K-Pop trend, which is still often mushrooming among young people. 4) dehallyusinasi, this activity is focused on helping and increasing the awareness of Muslim youths to migrate.

Second, the Intellectual Forum, this activity is one of the elite events which is closed and only limited people who take part in this activity, and in fact, the participants come from HTI members themselves, and the location of the activity is often done in hotels.

Third, Multaqa Ulama Aswaja/Mudzakarah Figures and Ulama/Jalsa Ammah Ulama, this activity is carried out at the regional/city level, followed by the ulama who enter the HTI network and are not routinely carried out and are not contained in the structural HTI. According to researchers’ findings, several regions have held this event, namely Bogor, Garut, Probolinggo, Madura, Samarinda, and Sumedang.

Fourth, Muslim United (MU) is a united alliance formed after a variety of demonstrations in 2016, which Nanang Syaifurozi founded. According to the researcher’s results, Nanang Syaifurozi himself has a close relationship with the HTI group. The key figures of Muslim United are Salim Fillah (Jogokaryan), Syukri Fadloli (Yogyakarta Ukhluwah Islamiyah Forum), Steven Indra Wibowo (Indonesian Mualaf Center), and
several figures. Also, MU uses several public figures in attracting the attention of other Muslims such as Ustad Abdul Somad (UAS), Ustad Adi Hidayat (UAH), Felix Siauw, Oemar Mita, Hannan Attaki, Muhammad Bin Anies Shahab, and Lukmanul Hakim and referred to as The Avengers as a symbol of unity of the people.

The group's movement, which is seen as thick with radical values, especially those in Yogyakarta, is an alliance of the unity of Muslims, namely the Muslim United (MU) network. Researchers have encountered various difficulties in searching for the background of the formation of this alliance, but using various research meetings that discuss this MU group has made it easy for researchers to obtain various information about MU.

MU is generally understood as an alliance formed after 212 actions that took place during 2016-2019. The bearers/initiators expect MU to be a means to maintain the strength of the unity of both Muslims who are participants in the 212 action or other Muslims in Indonesia. The initiator from MU who is famous mainly based on information that researchers got from the HTI research movement in Yogyakarta is a businessman who is the owner of "Rumah Warna", Nanang Syaifurozi. Rumah Warna is very well known by Indonesian people, both across ages and gender. Various products from "Rumah Warna" such as bags and wallets for women have spread all over Indonesia. Nanang Syaifurozi himself started his business since 2002 and was called to behave in a range of 2016. The background is why Nanang Syaifurozi made a move and formed MU as a place to unite Muslims because he was unable to restrain his emotions and disappointment in seeing the many Muslims blame each other.

The beginning of the MU movement began in October 2018 where Nanang Syaifurozi along with several figures such as Fani (Jogokaryan), Syukri Fadloli (Yogyakarta Ukhuhwah Islamiyah Forum), Andi Antoni (Indonesia Mualaf Center), Akhid (Teras Da'wah), and several key figures in the movement. Muslim United held their first event in the context of Tablig Akbar on 16-18 October 2018 at the Kauman Gedhe Mosque in Yogyakarta. The second Muslim United event was held on 11-13 October 2019 at the Jogokaryan mosque. They invited several well-known public figures among Muslims such as Ustdaz Abdul Shomad (UAS), Ustad Adi Hidayat (UAH), Felix Siauw, Oemar Mita, Hannan Attaki, Muhammad Bin Anies Shahab and Lukmanul Hakim. These names became teachers who were often brought in by the MU preaching event and they were named as MU "The Avengers".

In 2019 MU made a big break where they expanded the teaching space by forming a philanthropic foundation in 2019 named Muslim Ukhuhwah. Through the formation of this foundation MU ventured to implement a professional management model. The vision of the Ukhuhwah Muslim Foundation is "to be a credible, creative, and innovative Islamic philanthropic institution that plays an active role in community charity for the people in Islamic civilization". Without a mission, surely that vision cannot be achieved so that MU forms the mission of the foundation, namely: 1) Campaigning the importance of Ukhwah Islamiyah to Muslims by holding various da'wah and social events. 2) Helping the community's welfare to get a decent life in terms of material and education. 3) Take part in helping our brothers and sisters in Sham. 4) Participate in the movement to develop the country through environmental campaign activi-
ties such as "Less Waste, Go Green." 5) Managing and empowering funds from profitable business proceeds and donations, alms, endowments, and donations for foundation activities in the social and propaganda fields.

The development of MU through the foundations that they form shows us a pattern of management that is formed in stages by focusing on three things, namely: 1) charity, 2) social charity/da'wah and 3) charity education.

As one of the initiators who played a lot in establishing MU, Nanang Syaifurozi realized that managing MU would require a large number of funds to support various activities both routinely every month or in a certain period. Based on the findings at the first MU meeting, the budget spent was around Rp. 800,000,000 and increased at the second MU meeting of Rp. 2,900,000,000. This fund is needed to support the grand meeting and several UM needs. Therefore, UM made various efforts to collect various sources of funding. One of them is from the merchandise provided by UM. The percentage of funds from donations is obtained through infaq and fundraising. Then they divide the donation into several basic needs, namely social activities, education and preaching; ¼ for rice ATMs, ¼ for education at the At-Tasnim boarding school, ¼ for donations in the Islamic world such as Palestine, Uyghur, Rohingya, etc., and ¼ the rest to finance the studies conducted.

Not only from donations, but they also sell merchandise such as t-shirts, caps, and drinking bottles (Tumblr). MU did not forget those who work in the field so that from donations, fundraising, and merchandise, sales proceeds are also distributed as salaries for employees.

The scale of merchandise sales that were successfully sold in the previous months was around 5000 pcs/month and benefited from Rp's tumblr sales. 10,000/bottle, so if you calculate the amount of profit that you can get MU every month is Rp. 50,000,000. MU's contribution to the program of protecting the environment, known as the hashtag #lesswaste and #bringyourown tumblr, shows that there is a form of contribution in MU's financial income, especially in supporting the charitable efforts of the business obtained from selling merchandise. We need to know that MU funding sources are also obtained from several entrepreneurs where MU is trying to establish close relationships with some of these entrepreneurs, especially from entrepreneurs who emigrated. The contribution of these entrepreneurs can help fund several events where collaboration between them and MU has also been successful in mobilizing charitable endeavors for the field of educational development.

The relationship between MU and HTI has seen from the mutual symbiosis between them that MU provides space for HTI to develop, this can be seen from the contribution of Felix Siauw as part of "The Avengers" and some ustad as the backbone in the implementation of various propaganda MU. There is finding that in the color complex of the house, which is the headquarters of MU, it is often found that there are HTI activities such as study activities carried out, in addition to the MU office the "YukNgaji" office is also used to conduct HTI studies/events and most importantly to see the relationship between MU and HTI can be seen from the opinion of MU chairman, Nanang Syaifurozi who...
supports the *Khilafah* as researchers get from the recorded interviews conducted by several researchers who discuss HTI in a different research context with this research. Nanang Syaifurozi said:

"I asked the Avenger ustadz. According to this ustadz, what about this *Khilafah*? Because what I know, the ones who fight for, talk about the *Khilafah* directly are just Ustadz Felix Xiauw or Abdul Somad, sometimes. Yes, it’s a scourge. What is the cleric’s answer? Now Muslims, if they don’t miss the application of the Shari’a, which means the *Khilafah*, it is questionable whether they believe in Islam or not. In what ways do each struggle, if the preaching does not lead to that (*Khilafah*), it is questionable”.

When confirmed whether the khilafah in question is identical to HTI, he said:

“That is only a person's understanding that is too narrow. Those who speak out loud in front and without cover are only HTI. For others, such as FPI, they only voiced an invitation in the form of a sharia Indonesia and did not dare to speak using the words of the *Khilafah*. Thus, the *Khilafah* is identical to HTI. *Khilafah* is the language of the Qur’an. *Khilafah* means the leader is called Khalifah, while the system is called *Khilafah*. That many people do not understand because of ignorance. I used to understand this was quite narrow. Once learned again from various sources, and apparently from the book learned from elementary school, Islamic Jurisprudence book, the main book is NU and the markets. In the last chapter, there is a discussion of the *Khilafah*. There is a duty of the *Khilafah*.”

Thus, it has been seen that Nanang Syaifurozi as the initiator of MU who actively plays a role in teaching with HTI supports the establishment and enforcement of the *Khilafah* in Indonesia. According to Nanang Syaifurozi, the clerics who are members of Muslim United support the establishment of the *Khilafah*. They agree about the obligation to establish it.

**Fifth**, Education, Economics, and Business. HTI, through their education, economy, and business sectors, is affiliated with several educational institutions and business institutions such as STIE Hamfara, At-Turats A-Islami Foundation, which is currently developing the Syaroful Haramain Ma’had Wakaf project under the guidance of Hafidz Abdurrahman, Cinta Qur’an foundation under Fath Karim who founded Cinta Qur’an (Training Institute for Reading and Translating the Qur’an) and in the HTI business sector expanded its wings to Royal Indonesia Travel (Umrah and Islamic Tour), Alanabi (Herbal Vitamins/Supplement), Fath Indonesia (Clothing Brand), and established the Al Fatih shelter. He is also behind @kajianperkantoran and @kajianmuslimahid which is engaged in the management of religious teachers. Some registered service users from PT. PLN Banten, Prudential, Sampoerna, PT. Astra, Central DKI Bank, Oil Company PT. SPR Langgak, BNI Margonda, XL, PT. Suzuki Indomobil Motor, Ministry of Home Affairs, GMF AeroAsia, Directorate General of Oil and Gas, Telkom, and many others. At the same time, Felix Siauw developed Al Fatih Studio, which is engaged in creating Da’wah content, Hijab Alila, Alila Kids, Alila Goods.

**Sixth**, through Art and Culture, Not only playing in the realm of seriousness and focusing on the spiritual aspects, but HTI also seeks to attract some art practitioners such as the Khat. Arts group who introduces *Khilafah* ideas through painting and calligraphy, Ki Dalang Lutfi Caritogomo who spreads the idea of *Khilafah* through wayang and various entertainment
programs through the HijrahFest agenda and creative propaganda.

The Figure 1 explains that the transformation of the radical movement (anarchists) took to the streets to be more directed and organized by entering the community through religious education and study groups, both at universities and household gatherings. Related to political factors is the organization that is meant by the vision and mission that is not based on Pancasila and wants to change Indonesia’s foundation, namely Pancasila, into the Khilafah and will have the same fate as HTI, which is to be dissolved. This calm transformation becomes one way to keep the radical organization in existence but in a friendlier frame or guise. Economic factors are also one of the obstacles the organization moves directly down in a disorderly manner because it is like that which costs money. The driving factor is the ideology and culture of their beliefs that the Pancasila is not following the Khilafah and is considered a Thaghut.

The radical movement transformation mentioned above is in line with the theory of social mobilization of resources which says that commonality is an important element in mobilizing resources (Wiktorowicz 2004). A movement that can emerge like Muslim United

Figure 1.
Map of Concept Radical Movement Transformation in Yogyakarta
(MU) is a form of disappointment that metamorphoses into a mobilization. This is a transformation from HTI that has been formed for a long time. Through this network, the masses and sympathizers can be recruited and mobilized. In mobilizing the masses, actors such as The Avengers also frame the planned actions with a Da’wah frame and bring in capital artists. Activities for millennials are also framed by slogans and language that is current and easy to understand, namely Ngefast, Xkwavers. The social movement of resource mobilization arises rationally due to a certain political condition that is considered incompatible with their ideology.

The 2019 general election was marked by religious sentiment as a campaign. politicians and radical mass organizations work together in symbiotic mutualism. political elites ride radical mass organizations and radical mass organizations also ride political elites. Regarding the dynamics of the relationship between the parties, this attention should focus on the reciprocity, interaction and multi-faceted nature of competition, as well as the cumulative impact of these characteristics on the trajectory of competition. As a participant, group or organization in a social movement put forward propositions that may affect the state and potential other non-state parties (Alimi, Bosi, and Demetriou 2015). Their activities trigger a series of interactive actions that cancel each other out and sometimes even include violence. Whether it is short-lived, continuous, or violent, whether the dispute is sudden, intermittent or gradual, or at the center or periphery of mainstream politics, it is impossible to make accurate predictions in advance because the event’s progress depends on multiple relationships and interact.

Although specific relational dynamics may have a unique influence on radicalization, they cannot be treated independently of other relational dynamics in other interaction frameworks that may have their own unique influence. As we have done, using mechanisms to conceptualize relationship dynamics means that the interactions between mechanisms derived from different interactions may be important. Consider the following illustration of this interaction. Although hypothetical, the recurring relationship mechanism has been captured in many radical events. Political constraints or threats to new developments in the movement’s space for action or the ability to promote its goals, which we label as a spiral of political opportunities, may intensify competition for power among sports organizations and cause one or more people to take action. More confrontational and even violent strategies are more of these organizations. After one or more Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) implement what is considered a more effective competitive strategy, it may cause social control personnel to take severe repressive measures against them. The entire campaign, in turn, may cause that same SMOs or other SMOs to raise bets and adopt more confrontational strategies.

**Conclusion**

This study’s conclusion is the transformation of radical movements after the 2019 Presidential Election and post-dissolution of HTI mass organizations. The members are increasingly active in disseminating radical understanding through Ḥalaqah, Intellectual Forum, Multaqa Ulama Aswaja/Mudzakarah Figure, and Ulama/ Jalsa Ammah Ulama, Muslim United (MU).
economic and business education, as well as through art which is carried out in a structured and massive way into cells both within student organizations to the studies of philanthropist.

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