Insurgency is a violent political struggle borne out of grievances in a local community. The phenomenon of insurgency is old, and the ways of tackling insurgencies have always been studied with interest. Pakistan has faced sporadic insurgencies in its Balochistan province. This study applies conceptual framework propounded by Scott Moore to Balochistan insurgency and analyzes the complex combination of Actions triggered by varied Beliefs and Structures of the Baloch society. In order to employ effective countermeasures to insurgency, an integrated approach needs to be worked out that seeks to create positive changes in the intertwined dimensions of Actions, Beliefs and Structures. The study finds that such an approach to handle insurgency in Balochistan has generally been successful. And the Baloch society has largely been mainstreamed in the national society and the state of Pakistan.

Key Words: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Balochistan, Pakistan, Actions, Beliefs and Structures, Scott Moore

Introduction

Insurgency is a politico-military struggle, carried through guerrilla warfare. As a form of political violence, the phenomenon of insurgency is as old as humanity itself. Guerrillas and partisans have existed throughout the recorded history, but their irregular conflict format has been transformed by the profound changes occurring in 20th century, when 'social, economic, psychological, and, especially, political elements were combined with guerrilla tactics in order to radically alter the structure of the state by force'. In words of Scott, insurgency is a lingering violent conflict involving multi players or groups in which one or more players seek to either fundamentally bring a change in the political or social order or overthrow the existing system and its managers in a state or a region using tool of violence, subversion, social disruption, and political action. Alternatively, Counterinsurgency (CI) efforts to mitigate the violence caused by insurgency carries equal importance. Scott explains CI as an cohesive set of all elements of state power (political, economic, social, and security) employed to prevent and ultimately end instances of armed violence, create and maintain stability (politically, economically, and socially) and it also seeks resolution of the underlying causes of an insurgency so as to ensure a sustained stability.

Amidst presence of diverse ethno-religious fault lines, since 1947 Pakistan has gone through a number of insurgencies in Balochistan, in former East Pakistan and former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Beside other reasons, collective failure(s) of various actors and players contributed heavily in this regard. State level inefficiency, provincial level inaptness, social level incongruousness and individual level self-centered approach all are to be blamed. Post 9/11,
Pakistan had been involved in a successful CI campaign in former FATA, the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and in Balochistan. There are instances where collective efforts paid rich dividends like Swat and FATA, however, the situation in Balochistan was fragile, brittle and lacked attention. In wake of 9/11, a horrendous wave of terrorism shook the very foundation of Pakistan, however, the threat has been handled very well, though after precious loss of human lives and to the economy as well. Geo-political position and the natural wealth has perpetually kept Balochistan in a constant state of conflict and instability for decades. Insurgency in Balochistan erupted multiple times with different forms yet with similar root causes and manifestation. Nationalist insurgents, religious / sectarian extremists, smugglers and criminal syndicates, geo-strategic and political dynamics to transnational inclinations – the entire spectrum was juxtaposed in Balochistan. Economic deprivation, high illiteracy rate, complicated legal system, poor health facilities, combined together provided ample opportunity to internal and external players to exploit the aggrieved masses on different motives.

This paper studies Balochistan insurgency from the theoretical framework outlined by Scott Moore. The analytical framework is given in the book “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency-2012” has also been applied to identify various parameters of Balochistan insurgency. This framework is similar in academic value with various case studies referred to in US Joint Staff Publication 3-24 of April 2018 on COIN, and in Bunker’s (2016) scholarship “Old and New Insurgency Forms.”

**Insurgency in Pakistan**

Pakistan is a land of people with diverse ethnic identities and cultural practices. Presence of such a mix of ethnic identities and religious sects (Sunni & Shia) presented fault lines prone to ethnic / sectarian exploitation. Political nuances and clinging to the power on creation of Pakistan by the princely states also provided a readymade jump off point to the spate of textbook insurgencies. In March 1948, Prince Karim led the first insurgency to retain State of Kalat as an independent state. 1950s the second insurgency erupted after the establishment of ‘One Unit’. Balochistan was gripped into the third insurgency revolving around removal and arrest of tribal chieftains in 60s era while the creation of Bangladesh was a result of fourth insurgency in East Pakistan in 1971. Fifth insurgency of 1973 lasted for four years, however, in the period between 1978 to 2005 no major insurgencies erupted, however, US invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and Pakistan’s participation in war on terrorism resulted in an upsurge of violence in Pakistan and FATA. CI operations were undertaken in areas of FATA and Swat. Similar cycle of violence also entered Balochistan exploiting ethnic and sectarian fault lines.

**Insurgency in Balochistan**

**Strategic Importance of Balochistan**

Balochistan is scarcely populated with a land mass of approximately 44 % of total Pakistan. It is bordering Iran, Afghanistan and is having a 700 km coastline (Mekran Coast) along Arabian Sea. Until 1958, Gwadar was a part of State of Oman and in December 1958, an amount of 550 million Rupees was paid by Pakistan to repossess it. Gwadar Port overlooks the mouth of Persian Gulf and dominates the Sea Lines of Communications of the most important world trade route, thus geo-strategically it becomes important to the world powers. Balochistan is rich in oil and gas resources. The province meets over 1/3rd energy production needs of Pakistan, primarily the fossil fuels. Out of the total reserves of Pakistan, Balochistan contains over 33% of natural gas, about 9% of coal, and about 2% of probable oil reserves. Balochistan is also rich in other mineral resources and even at places rare earth metals have also been identified. Reko Diq, (Gold Hill) is the 4th largest world’s deposit of gold and copper. Empirically, it has also been proved that the Reko Deq sits on a gold and copper reserves of about $260 billion. Yet the province faces utter lack of resources and development is always wanting in many facets. Geo-strategic importance of Pakistan actually lies in Balochistan.
The geography of Balochistan attracts main regional and international players such as US, China, India, Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asian Republics (CARs) because it is the shortest and most economical route to the Arabian Sea from energy rich Eurasia. The geopolitical and energy-based interests contribute towards added importance of this region. Gwadar port once it finally gets connected under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) with the Gulf states further enhances its strategic importance. Chinese investment within the overall ambit of Belt Road Initiative (BRI) adequately amplifies the geo-strategic importance of Balochistan. This interest and investment, however, stirred new waves of geo-politics in this region, with regional and world powers playing main roles. Development of neighboring Chabahar port in order to mitigate and counter significance of Gwadar port aptly reflects the concerns of other nations.

Phases and Players

Since 1947, Balochistan witnessed five successive eruptions of the insurgencies and unrest. Adoption of a non-institutionalized approach caused unrest which was further aggravated due to the poor handling by successive governments. In early 2002, the first Training Camp of militant organization Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) was established in Balochistan. Besides BLA and BRA, Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), United Baloch Army (UBA), Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB) and Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF) were also active in Balochistan. The situation in 2012-2015 was very complex, as the unrest in the province was also being sponsored and incited by the international players, intrinsically linked with Afghanistan situation. Demands of separatist elements included removal of military and paramilitary forces from Balochistan, eviction of settlers including Afghan refugees, and an independent Balochistan – the pro-independence group wished for a future free of tribal system with a liberal, social and secular society. Such an agenda did not augur well with the political forces led by Sardars and religious-political parties, therefore, the idea of independence was not supported by most of the political factions. The year 2016 saw expulsion of members of a High Commission in Islamabad, being ‘persona non grata’. Foreign Office of Pakistan asserted their links with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (a banned terrorist organization in Pakistan) and the issue remained on agenda ubiquitously during all subsequent meetings between the top leadership. The arrest of foreign agents indicated involvements to incite insurgencies in erstwhile FATA and Balochistan. Evidences galore about various countries activities inside Afghanistan to covertly assist, train and finance the terrorists against Pakistan by projecting them as freedom fighters. It was also believed that the Baloch insurgents were having their training camps inside Afghanistan while the weapons and money were also being transported through Afghanistan.

Eruptions

Sense of deprivation prevailed in Balochistan region pre-independence and the issues, challenges and misunderstandings leading to conflicts are deep-rooted. They have relentlessly aggravated and occasionally led to unrest and uprisings. The chaos is mainly a result of the outstanding, unaddressed grievances of the people of Balochistan. Seven decades of troubled history has demonstrated many shades of the security mosaic, each generated by a different background.

The First Baloch Insurgency – 1948

With the accession of the Khanate of Kalat to Pakistan in March 1948 unrest erupted in some areas of Balochistan. ‘National Party’ disregarded the accession and started agitating. Prince Agha Abdul Karim led the insurgency focusing in Jhalawan area and took up arms against Pakistan as he was never convinced for an accession to Pakistan. The prince started threatening state of Pakistan. Due to a swift action by Pakistan Army, Abdul Karim and his followers (approx. 6-700) fled into Afghanistan. On 8 July 1948, Prince Abdul Karim and his comrades while returning to Balochistan were arrested, awarded 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and a monetary penalty of Rupees 5,000 by a special jirga.
The Second Baloch Insurgency (1958-1959)

‘One Unit’ system was considered by Baloch people of Kalat as reduction in Baloch identity and demanded exclusion of Kalat state restoring the original status. Khan of Kalat also mobilized large-scale demonstrations against the ‘One-Unit’ formula, mustered armed militants to fight against the government and hoisted the ancestral Kalat flag atop his palace. On 7 October 1958, the Khan on charges of treason was arrested and his arrest triggered widespread violence in length and breadth of Balochistan. From there on, Baloch nationalism became a potent movement. Nauruz Khan of Zehri tribe also led a small armed group numbering around 750 to 1,000 men. Soon the insurgency spread all over the Jhalawan area and many smaller groups of armed fighters joined the insurgency.

The Third Baloch Insurgency (1963-1969) - The Parari Resistance

The third rebellion erupted in Marri area in 1962 with a title of ‘Pararis’ chosen by the rebels for themselves. The epicenter was in the Marri-Bugti areas and the movement was led by Sher Muhammad Marri, a prominent figure and known strategist in the field of unconventional warfare with vast experience of planning low-intensity conflicts. This armed resistance spread swiftly to other areas of Balochistan. The Pararis avoided engaging in large scale combat with the army and harassed the security forces by ambushing convoys, targeting trains and raiding isolated softer military positions adopting the Guerilla tactics, the hallmark of any insurgency of such a nature. On 30 March 1970, the ‘One-Unit’ was dissolved and four provinces, Punjab, Balochistan, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and Sind, emerged through a Legal Framework Order.

The Fourth Baloch Insurgency (1973-1977)

Prime Minister Bhutto in 1973 dismissed the Balochistan government and arrested Khair Bakhsh Marri, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Ata Ullah Mengal which incited another armed conflict between the Baloch and the federal government. A few of the hardcore Baloch nationalist elements also joined the armed struggle initiated by the Marris and the Mengals. As a result, the Baloch people united and triggered mass-scale violence. Rebels started attacking military convoys and government installations. Bhutto immediately ordered a large-scale military operation against the insurgents. At the apex of activity, over 65,000 soldiers were employed against approximately over 50,000 rebels and this operation costed some 8,000 lives on both sides. The spread of the insurgency at that time was larger than the previous uprisings. It ranged from Dadu in Sindh to Nushki in the West; and from Dera Ghazi Khan in Punjab to Sibi.

The Fifth Insurgency - 2005

After a period of relative peace, Balochistan once again saw protracted turmoil at the beginning of the new millennium. August 2006, the simmering state of insurgency suddenly accelerated. A senior Baloch leader, Nawab Akbar Shahbaz Khan Bugti was killed during a security forces operation after his refusal to surrender to state authority. An uneasy arrangement hung between Nawab Bugti and the government at Islamabad over the issues of royalty for natural gas, control of the province’s natural resources, and construction of new military cantonments in Balochistan. In 2004, the Governor of Balochistan, Awais Ghani, tried to convince the Nawab (who was physically and politically weak by then) to give up armed resistance against the state. In 2005, Nawab Bugti offered a fifteen-point agenda for the federal government but it did not work. From 2007 to 2012, Balochistan witnessed the worst security breakdown. Balochistan was facing the after-effects of Bugti’s killing. Attacks on government buildings and security forces vehicles took place in routine. During this period, civilian targeted killings, abduction for ransom, and threats to settlers increased intensely. Along with armed militancy, sub-nationalist political parties were also gaining momentum in their activities. Seminars covering hostile propaganda were routinely organized in some of the European countries in which international observers, especially anti Pakistan scholars and think tanks were invited. On 12 August 2009, the Khan of Kalat, Mir Suleman Dawood, announced a Council of Independent Balochistan and declared himself the ruler of an
independent Balochistan. In his self-acclaimed definition of a new state, he included the territories of Iranian Balochistan but excluded the Baloch portion in Afghanistan. During those years, the activities of the BLF and BLA militants intensified. Intellectuals and scholars were the focus of targeted killings. Those incidents indicated a change in militant strategy, and it was evident that they wanted to flush out the non-Baloch presence from Balochistan.

**Issues of 5th Insurgency**

The disturbances spread in large swaths of Balochistan mostly in area inhabited by Baloch and Brahvis. Its focus was in areas offering fecund milieu for masses ready for mental subversion from lower and middle class yet educated thus adding to the complexities. There were number of issues identified in the last wave of insurgency in Balochistan. There were troubles in Southern Region of Mekran – Awaran comprising districts of Gwadar, Punjgur, Turbat and Awaran with a 700 km of coast line with a strategic value. People picked up arms under the leadership of Allah Nazar a non-sardar rebel, realizing their deprivations. Approximately 15 km of area around major cities was governed by police and all other spaces were ‘B’ areas (local tribal ineffective policing system of Levies was in place). Writ of the government was almost non-existent in this area. Moreover, the administration departments were mostly locals, thus they were either afraid or had their sympathies with the insurgents. Porous borders also afforded narco-routes coupled with petrol smuggling. The looting of banks served as provision of cash which made the militants to thrive. Security forces present in the area for checking cross border smuggling activities in the area were insufficient. Kalat and Khuzdar being a traditional hotbed of insurgency seriously affected the security situation along Regional Cooperation for Development Highway, Khuzdar and Wadh. Militant organizations were thriving in this area before the CI effort. Intra nawab and tribal animosity were embedded in the societal norms. In Dera Bugti an uncomfortable peace existed where being in self-exile one of the grandsons of Nawab Bugti was directly leading the sabotage and militant activities, other grandsons of Bugti clan were embroiled and entangled to re-establish their writ amidst a family dispute. Frequent attacks on gas pipelines, improvised explosive devices, land mines and target killings were frequent. In Kohlu, Khair Bakhsh Marri’s sons were leading BLA and UBA. Number of insurgents Camps were present and their militant activities transcended to area of Harnai, Barkhan, Mastung, Mach and Quetta. Insurgents showed resistance to oil and exploration projects and construction of roads in the area. Quetta City virtually was the playground for the insurgents. Presence of extremist elements was yet another aspect which fueled the ongoing insurgency. Sectarian intolerance and violence as a challenge was thriving in Balochistan. Lashkar-e-Jhangavi continued to victimize Hazara Community and focused on used Quetta for display of their actions. Abduction for ransom was also an issue during this phase where some important personalities were abducted which involved operation to recover them. Presence of loose border made smuggling a way of life along a 1268 km border with Afghanistan, 909 kms border with Iran and a coastline of 700 kms. Long stretches of borders resulted in loose border control, owing to insufficient resources with the law enforcement agencies (LEAs). The forces present to fight insurgencies in length and breadth of Balochistan were inadequate. In nutshell, internal security mosaic of Balochistan was laden with extremism, external interference, unemployment, ethnic disharmony, poor governance, criminal violence, grievances amongst masses, gun running, tribal disputes, terrorism, Afghan refugees, negative perceptions, corruption, missing persons’ hype, target killing, sectarianism, youth subversion, poor economy, poor law and order, poor border control, abduction for ransom and smuggling. All these factors specifically affected governance, economy and security – fulfilling the aims of a text book insurgency.

**Robert Moore Theoretical Framework – Insurgency Model**

In the framework of Robert Moore, Insurgencies reflect a complex, three-dimensional web of **Actions, Structures and Beliefs**. It is very important to understand that actions in Balochistan insurgency are aptly covered in the definition given by Moore where he says that **Actions** consist of those events, behaviors, and acts that characterize and are vividly visible. They encompass the
individual and group behaviors, large and small, of all those caught in an insurgency, be they insurgents, military and security forces, aid workers, local or national leaders, or the populace. In the study of Balochistan insurgency we see that as per Moore, *Structures are the conditions that frame an insurgency*. Such terms as stability, instability, infrastructure, economic development, humanitarian aid, and security describe structural elements of insurgencies. Insurgents attempt to tear down existing structures, exploit those that are repressive, discriminatory, or corrupt, and build new ones. Such structures were deftly damaged by the insurgents in Balochistan. As regards beliefs system, what Moore say about is abundantly true. *Beliefs* are the attitudes, perceptions, prejudices, ideologies, worldviews, cultures, and social and individual identities that fuel insurgencies. These are the psychological and sociological imperatives that drive and are driven by actions and structures. Beliefs encompass more than just the conscious decision or willingness to side with one faction or the other, to support an insurgency or the government. The same was aptly found in Balochistan where social, ethnic and religious belief systems were challenged and tarnished.

**Application of Robert Moore Model on Balochistan Insurgency**

The study of Balochistan Insurgency under the trinity of Actions, Structures and Beliefs brings out the essence of the insurgents’ strategy which served as a framework for this paper. It was the ability of the insurgents to make an interplay of these three aspects deftly which helped them to undertake an insurgency of such a magnitude.

**Table 1.**

| Actions        | Balochistan Insurgency | Beliefs                              | Structures             | Balochistan Insurgency |
|----------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Guerrilla Attacks | Conducted              | Revolutionary Ideology               | Local Cadres           | Yes                    |
|                 |                        | Fear and Uncertainty                 | Shadow Government      | Partially Exist        |
| Terrorism       | Manifested             | Cultivated                           | Terrorist Cells        | Existed                |
| Sabotage        | Conducted              | Exploited                            | Military Units         | Available              |
| Civil Disorder  | Partial                | Moulded                              | External Support       | Overt & Covert        |
| Propaganda      | Successful             | Successfully orchestrated            |                        |                        |

An application of sub factors of action, beliefs and structure on Balochistan Insurgency clearly reflects how deeply the web of these factors has been able to influence the overall shaping up of insurgency in Balochistan. The insurgent actions in Balochistan include conduct of guerilla attacks on security convoys and government installation, manifestation of terrorism activities in the province by launching suicidal attacks, conduct of sabotage activities with pinpoint accuracy by destroying gas pipelines and electricity towers, implementing partial civil disorder by challenging writ of the provincial administration and taking matter into their own hands and in the process gaining legitimacy of their actions from local residents with an effective propaganda campaign, falsely projecting atrocities of the LEAs. The table also highlights that insurgents based their beliefs upon a revolutionary ideology focusing on creation of a separate homeland i.e., Independent Balochistan. Fear and uncertainty amongst the masses were cultivated through ruthless practices and punishing those siding with the state authorities. Fault lines presented by tribal culture and identities were fully exploited by the insurgents, successful molding of perceptions in the cognitive domain was also achieved and thereby successfully orchestrating self-proclaimed opinions amongst the local populace. The insurgents conducted their attacks on the local population, yet they remained part of the local cadres, they were partially able to run their shadow government with an effective command hierarchy, terrorist cells were made by them.
(though eliminated through CI effort. Security forces as part of structures remained involved throughout the period of insurgency for countering the outcome of insurgent activities who were enjoying overt and covert support of the internal and external players.

**Counter Insurgency Strategy in Balochistan**

To mount a successful Counter Insurgency strategy, it was of paramount importance to identify the challenges and building blocks in Balochistan. These included supporting and ensuring success of provincial government, ensuring mutual harmony amongst institutions, creating an environment for reconciliation. Physical dilution in space was resulting in response dilemma so compatibility with security apparatus was needed. Defeating insurgency with focus and resolve by checking ingress of extremism & terrorism and thereby removing strategic confusion. Achieving religious reconciliation, unearthing and busting of abduction gangs, curtailing smuggling - weapons, explosives and drugs besides launching an effective media campaign for addressing issues of perception management were a few lines of actions adopted.

In the past counter insurgency strategies, only temporary redressal of grievances of parties in conflict was achieved by employing military component only. The political will was found lacking for making realize sustainable peace in the insurgency ridden areas. Rather at places, the use of force alone turned out to be counterproductive and the masses felt further alienated. Learning from the past lessons, a multi prong CI strategy (kinetic and non-kinetic both) was employed by the state institutions to deal with insurgency in Balochistan. The CI strategy aimed at synergizing the application of political (the non-kinetic) and military (kinetic) approaches so as to achieve integration of peace and prosperity in the province. The non-kinetic prong was aimed at addressing grievances, ensuring structures and assuaging believes, while the kinetic prong aimed at achieving stable security environment and reclaiming space from the insurgents. Sub Nationalism sentiment was assuaged by a blend of Nationalism and Integrated approach. CI effort aimed at capacity building and integrating LEAs / intelligence, undertaking people-centric development and connecting with masses and youth in particular, improving law & order and restoring people’s confidence, liberating people from clutches of fear to start progression and development, also developing connectivity within and with the region thus defeating insurgency by synchronized application of non-kinetic / kinetic means. In the manifestation of this strategy civil-military relations saw a marked improvement by frequent interactions between the top leadership. Capacity building of the LEAs was carried out by conducting their professional training in line with demands of the prevalent situation. Integration of security apparatus was ensured and a greater intelligence fusion was achieved amongst all agencies for a coordinated and timely response. Comprehensive efforts were made to harden the soft borders with construction of ditches and fencing along the border. Enhanced interactions with media were carried out aimed at chalking out a national narrative and an effective propagation of the same amongst masses. Adequate security arrangements were made in areas where developments projects were being undertaken. Kachhi Canal project was initiated for irrigation purposes in Balochistan, development of Gawadar Port (future of Pakistan) as part of CPEC was initiated and protected, development projects of Reko Deq, exploration of oil and gas were initiated and are still under progress. A people centric approach was adopted as part of revised CI strategy, whereby less focus was on the use of force and more on development of the area and human capital. In this regard establishment of de-radicalization centres, establishment of Institute of Medical Sciences, training of over 6-7000 students in Balochistan institute of technical education, establishment of Gawadar institute of technology, creation of an education city at Sui by establishing cadet college Sui, Balochistan public school, federal government school Sui and women vocational welfare centre were important initiatives. Armed Forces also contributed in this regard; an institute of mineralogy was established to impart training in mine related jobs, over 60 schools and 8 colleges are being run by Army, Frontier Corps and Navy in entire Balochistan housing over 35000 students. A very large number of officers & soldiers have joined Pakistan Armed Forces between 2012 to 2019. There also has been an enhanced focus on connecting with youth of the province to infuse love,
acceptance & nationalism. Balochistan Youth Festival 2014, 2015, 2016 were huge successes. Acknowledging the supreme sacrifices made by security forces, celebration of “martyr’s day” was introduced. To reinfuse the spirit of nationalism, Independence Day and Defence Day celebrations were held with lot of passion and nation spirit. Kinetically, number of intelligence-based security operations (IBOs) were conducted to defeat the insurgents and large recoveries of weapon, ammunition and explosives were made. High valued insurgents and miscreants were also neutralized by calibrated use of force. Gangs involved in ransom abduction were busted and crime rate drastically plummeted. The comprehensive multi-pronged CI strategy paid very well and a stable peace environment was achieved in Balochistan, though sporadic events of violence are still there. The tangible indicators of improved situation were indicated by the return of normalcy in day to day life. The lives, wealth and self-respect of people in Balochistan were protected and a notion of ‘comprehensive security’ started to take roots again.

Application of Robert Moore Counter Insurgency Model

Scott Moore suggests that successful counterinsurgencies tend to last, on average, nearly ten years. In case of Balochistan, starting from 2005 till 2014/15 once the tide was turned, it took almost 10 years. During that period significant efforts were made to keep the insurgent threat at bay while the underlying causes (Sustained Actions, Transformed Beliefs and Rebuilt Structures) were being addressed. The following table outlines the critical enablers of a successful counterinsurgency strategy and application of the same on Balochistan Insurgency.

Table 2.

| Sustained Actions | Balochistan Insurgency | Transformed Beliefs | Balochistan Insurgency | Rebuilt Structures | Balochistan Insurgency |
|-------------------|------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| Security operations | Successful            | Popular Acceptance  | Not amongst all        | Stable Authority   | Almost Achieved         |
| Law Enforcement Intelligence Operations | 80-90%                | Secure Identities   | Exploited              | Rule of Law        | Established             |
| Economic Development | Successful            | Changed Attitudes   | Observed               | Social Services   | Almost Restored         |
| Partial (50-60%)    | Reconciliation         | Partial (60-70%)    | Professionals          | Security Forces   | Evolving                |
| Political Processes | Successful            | -                   | -                      | Restored Infrastructure | Progressive |
| Capacity Building  | Progressive           | -                   | -                      | Economic Growth    | Progressive             |

An evaluation of sub factors of sustained actions transformed beliefs and rebuilt structure as part of a CI strategy and the adopted strategy in Balochistan, highlights that a comprehensive multi-pronged response is the panacea to defeat the insurgents and their narrative alike. In Balochistan, security operations as part of sustained actions were successfully and synergistically conducted by security forces of Pakistan, thus achieving law enforcement and establishing writ of the state. Economic activity in the province has been seen thriving with improved security situation. Political government with all stakeholders onboard is on the driving seat, thus delegitimizing the insurgent claims of independent Balochistan. As part of transformed beliefs, insurgent’s narrative has lost its credibility and is no more famous amongst the local population. By enabling better security environment to the masses, their identities (being exploited previously) have been secured. The warm participation by the locals in all celebrations and rehabilitation programs introduced by the government in insurgency struck areas clearly reflect a change in attitude of the population. Coupled with others, a major success is return of insurgents back into society as part of wider reconciliation effort launched by the government which is also
fully backed by a detailed deradicalization program. A study of *rebuilt structure* highlights that a stable authority has been achieved in almost all zones of conflict by successful CI strategy and rule of law has been established in all parts. Social services have been fully restored, which at places are even better than previous state. Rebuilding of professional security forces is an evolving process, yet CI experiences gained through employment in other insurgency zones is paying off and an effective coordinated security response was mounted against the insurgents. Infrastructure has been fully restored; rather new development projects are under progress as part of CPEC for overall uplift of the area. The presence of better security environment achieved as part of CI strategy is now contributing towards enhanced economic activity. Media is now more open and responsible as compared to times of insurgency, yet it is going through a continuous process of improvement. CI framework outlined by Robert Moore is very apt in evaluating and identifying the line of actions used / adopted Balochistan related CI strategy. The framework also stresses on the need to incorporate missing aspects (if not included earlier) for a comprehensive and successful CI strategy. It has also proved that CI strategy used by Pakistan is modern, tested, fitted well on the model of Moore and can also act as a reference for other case studies besides Scott Moore’s model’s efficacious interpretation.

**Analysis of Balochistan Insurgency as per “Guide to Insurgency 2012”**

With the above discussion, the insurgency in Balochistan can easily be termed as a textbook insurgency fulfilling all the criteria a successful insurgency thrives upon. Having applied the theoretical frameworks of Insurgency and CI by Robert Moore on Balochistan Insurgency, another analysis of this insurgency under a different analytical framework as given in book “Guide to Insurgency 2012” is also carried out. The framework is primarily configured to assist in understanding the anatomy of an insurgency and is very useful for analysts with knowledge of the *political, military, cultural, and socioeconomic* characteristics of a specific insurgency. This analytical framework covers several aspects (pre-existing conditions, insurgent characteristics, government characteristics, insurgent actions, government actions) and net assessment of who’s winning the insurgency. Mostly in this part, reliance is on the tabulated format as it is easy to comprehend after a deliberate dilation in paras above. The details will be covered one by one in the succeeding tables.

| Table 3. Pre-Existing Conditions |
|----------------------------------|
| **Issue**                        | **Applicability**                      |
| History of conflict              | Yes                                   |
| Conflict in Neighboring States   | Yes, Iran and Afghanistan              |
| Societal Factors                 | Poor societal bondage                  |
| Terrain                          | Rough, Rugged, Inhospitable            |
| Polarized Politics               | Yes                                   |
| Government Negligence            | Yes – Grievances                       |
| Economic Crisis                  | Yes                                   |
| Window of Vulnerability          | Yes                                   |

| Table 4. Insurgent Characteristics |
|------------------------------------|
| **Issue**                          | **Applicability**                     |
| Goals / Type                       | Separatist Tendencies                 |
| Organizing Strategy                | Historical Lineages                   |
| Grievances, Group Identity and base of Support | Induced independence, State of Khan of Kalat, Historical aspects, State’s Neglect and external support by other countries |
| Leadership / Structure             | Sardars and Non Sardars (Allah Nazar) |
Unity within & amongst Gps
Size and Force Comparison
Recruiting and Training
Arms, Comm and Supplies
Funding
External Sp
Sanctuary

Table 5. Insurgent Actions

| Issue                                      | Applicability                                           |
|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| What are the Insurgents Doing?             |                                                        |
| Tactics                                    | Guerilla Warfare, Terrorism                            |
| Method of Population Control, use of       | Use of force, abduction, killings, terror attacks,     |
| intimidation/coercion                      | religious and political control                        |
| Propaganda                                 | Effective – use of social network                      |
| Displacement of Govt structures and functions | Yes – Distt Awaran Zero Writ of State                  |
| Conditions or constraints imposed by external supporters | Not Much                                               |

Table 6. Government Actions

| Issue                                      | Applicability                                           |
|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| What is the Government Doing?             |                                                        |
| Treatment Tolerance of legal opposition    | Fair                                                   |
| Attempt to address grievances through      | Badly wanting and ineffective                          |
| reforms                                    |                                                        |
| Creation and composition of civilian self- | Police and Levies capacity building, FC and            |
| defense forces                             | Army employed                                          |
| Security Forces expansion or reorganization, | Enhanced in capacity and role                          |
| effects on discipline and effectiveness    |                                                        |
| Conditions or constraints imposed by foreign | Political pressures and back door aspects by          |
| allies                                     | neighbors, global and regional powers                  |

Table 7. Net Assessment

| Issue                                      | Applicability                                           |
|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| Who is Winning?                            |                                                        |
| Changes in control of territory            | Area reclaimed from Insurgents                          |
| Existence of No-Go areas for government forces | Nil                                                   |
| Population movements-displacement or returns | Returns                                               |
| Nature of Civilian interactions with security forces | Good                                                  |
| Shifts in populations loyalties            | Yes                                                    |
| Shifts in international community support or recognition | Un discernable                                      |
| With drawl of formal support for either belligerent | Unclear, yet frozen for time being                     |
| Emergence of cleavages / weakening of unity | Insurgents on weak position                           |
| Ability of civilians to conduct normal daily life | 75-80 % normalized                                    |
| Government Functioning Normally            | Almost                                                 |

A study of net assessment (table 7) clearly identifies that the area has been appropriately reclaimed from the insurgents in Balochistan with a systematic, synergetic and sustained effort. The ‘No Go’ areas which used to exist at start of insurgency are no more there after successful CI
by the government of Pakistan ensuring writ of state in all areas. The population which had
displaced has now returned to their houses reflecting their trust on government and owing to
better security environment and providing opportunities for development and economic activities.
There are frequent friendly interactions between civilians and the security forces for the
betterment of the region. The popular support is now enjoyed by the security forces and the state
of Pakistan. The insurgents have gone on a weaker position. The people in Balochistan are happily
leading their normal daily life. Previously dysfunctional political government is fully functional
while taking all stakeholders on board in critical decisions. Multipronged strategy involving all
elements of society and state have been able to defeat the insurgency. The dictum ‘together we
can do it’ has again proven itself but this time it has added a clause that ‘ONLY together we can
do it’.

Lessons Learnt

Lessons that came to fore are compelling and convincing and offer a good lead to what should
be done to thwart such a predicament. Firstly, the insurgencies thrive on popular sentiment and
popular support. In case of Balochistan, both the ingredients were available where people were
deprieved, and insurgents were having domestic support along-with foreign support to continue
with the insurgency. Secondly, grievances are a major source of concern in any society and
governance system. Governments have to ensure a deep-rooted social system that is able to
identify the issue and address it before it becomes an exploitable situation. Thirdly, no strategy
can thrive and succeed if it is not well thought out and planned accordingly. All older versions of
CIs in Balochistan failed to address the root cause, hence, the eruption of the same insurgency
happened four times, where Actions, Structures and Believes were same with no change. Fourthly,
multipronged approach is a tested recipe for success in CI. Whole of the nation approach with
kinetic and non-kinetic (psycho-social, developmental, structural, beliefs) will defeat the narrative
based on which the insurgency thrives. Fifthly, centre and province have to be in hand and glove
to ensure social security and safety following the strategic direction of national security policy.
Cultural nuances and national security issues must be dealt with a well-articulated strategy.
Sixthly, absence of education and social sector uplift induces deprivations which are exploitable
by anti-state elements (domestic and external). Education is the panacea for sustained peace and
stability and germinates positivity and inclusivity in the national social structure.

Conclusions

Balochistan is a vast province that has enormous potentials to become the gateway for a
prosperous Pakistan and ultimately for the region. Pakistan stands at the cusp of three civilizations,
gate way to three continents and harbinger of change and development. It is in the right moment
of the history to become the gateway of a global change. Strategic developments suggest adopting
an accommodative strategy hence not being entrapped into a spiral of security dilemma. A few
steps of the strategy applicable to multi levels of policy makers and practitioners, may help to
avoid recurrence of such insurgencies. One, restructuring of the social system(s) across the entire
country / state would accrue unity, legitimacy and reduce space for anti-state elements. Two,
education in all its forms and manifestations is the only solution for a learned, evolving and
developing state. Any weakness in this aspect would aggravate the complicated, complex,
conjoined scenarios. State level education program focused on nationalism and state unity must
be adopted. Three, capacity building and upgradation of the security apparatus of the state and
the provinces emerges as one of the cardinals of the response mechanism. Homeland security
models can be emulated in emerging and developing states. Four, equitable distribution of
economic dividends of the areas and localities amongst locals and state would keep the negative
syndrome away. Sense of deprivation needs to be guarded well. Democratic and bureaucratic
good practices / values enshrined in the developed nations and religious injunctions would serve
as a guideline and must be studied for adoption in line with national priorities. Five, effective,
synergized and well thought out ‘Information Operation Campaign’ to deny cognitive space to
potential insurgents and hostile agencies and enemies of state must be vigorously pursued perpetually. Media in all its forms needs to be harnessed appropriately under a strategically orchestrated plan. Six, calibrated use of force should only be resorted to for a very limited time and scope for creating necessary conditions for the political prong to take lead. Human Rights for the insurgents in accordance with the Geneva protocol must be adhered to as applicable.
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