Fuzzing: Challenges and Reflections

Marcel Böhme, Monash University
Cristian Cadar, Imperial College London
Abhik Roychoudhury, National University of Singapore

// We summarize the open challenges and opportunities for fuzzing and symbolic execution as they emerged in discussions among researchers and practitioners in a Shonan Meeting and that were validated in a subsequent survey. //

THE INTERNET AND the world’s Digital Economy run on a shared, critical open source software infrastructure. A security flaw in a single library can have severe consequences. For instance, OpenSSL implements protocols for secure communication and is widely used by Internet servers, including the majority of HTTPS websites. The Heartbleed vulnerability in an earlier version of OpenSSL would leak secret data and caused huge financial losses. It is important for us to develop practical and effective techniques to discover vulnerabilities automatically and at scale. Today, fuzzing is one of the most promising techniques in this regard. Fuzzing is an automatic bug and vulnerability discovery technique that continuously generates inputs and reports those that crash the program. There are three main categories of fuzzing tools and techniques: black-, gray-, and white-box fuzzing.

Black-box fuzzing generates inputs without any knowledge of the program. There are two main variants of black-box fuzzing: mutational and generational. In mutational black-box fuzzing, the fuzz campaign starts with one or more seed inputs. These seeds are modified to generate new inputs. Random mutations are applied to random locations in the input. For instance, a file fuzzer may flip random bits in a seed file. The process continues until a time budget is exhausted. In generational black-box fuzzing, inputs are generated from scratch. If a structural specification of the input format is provided, new inputs are generated that meet the grammar. Peach (http://community.peachfuzzer.com) is one popular black-box fuzzer.

Gray-box fuzzing leverages program instrumentation to get lightweight feedback, which is used to steer the fuzzer. Typically, a few control locations in the program are instrumented at the compile time and an initial seed corpus is provided. Seed inputs are mutated to generate new inputs. Generated inputs that cover new control locations and, thus, increase code coverage are added to the seed corpus. The coverage feedback allows a gray-box fuzzer to gradually reach deeper into the code. To identify bugs and vulnerabilities, sanitizers inject assertions into the program. Existing gray-box fuzzing tools include American fuzzy lop (AFL) (https://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/), LibFuzzer (https://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html), and Honggfuzz (https://github.com/google/honggfuzz).

White-box fuzzing is based on a technique called symbolic execution, which uses program analysis and constraint solvers to systematically enumerate interesting program paths. The constraint solvers used as the back end in white-box fuzzing are Satisfiability Modulo
Theory (SMT) solvers, which allow for reasoning about (quantifier-free) first-order logic formulas with equality and function/predicate symbols drawn from different background theories. White-box fuzzers calculate the path condition of an input \(i\)—the set of inputs that traverse the same path as \(i\). The path condition is represented as an SMT formula, e.g., \(i[0] = 42 \land i[0] - i[1] > 7\).

Given seed input \(s\), the path condition is calculated and mutated (as opposed to mutating the program input). The mutated path condition is then sent to a constraint solver to generate new inputs. The main benefit of this technique is that by carefully keeping track of path conditions of all inputs seen so far, it always generates an input traversing a new path (new control flow). Existing white-box fuzzing tools include KLEE\(^2\) and SAGE.\(^3\)

In this article, we provide reflections on recent advances in the field as well as concrete directions for future research. We discuss recent impacts and enumerate open research challenges from the perspective of both practitioners and researchers. For a detailed, technical review, we refer the reader to Godefroid.\(^4\)

**Recent Impact**

Fuzzing for automatic bug and vulnerability discovery has taken both the software industry and the research community by storm. The research problem of finding bugs in a program by automatic input generation has a long-standing history, which began well before Miller’s invention of the term “fuzzing” in 1990,\(^5\) yet only now do we see mainstream deployment of fuzzing technology in industry.

Using gray-box fuzzing, Google has discovered more than 16,000 bugs in the Chrome browser over the past eight years and more than 11,000 bugs in more than 160 open source software projects over the past three years (https://google.github.io/clusterfuzz/#trophies). Microsoft credits its white-box fuzzing tool SAGE with saving millions of dollars during the development of Windows 7.\(^3\) Trail of Bits has been developing various fuzzing tools, including DeepState, a unit testing framework that allows developers to fuzz the various units of their system (https://github.com/trailofbits/deepstate). The 2016 DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge had machines attack and defend against other machines by exploiting and hardening against software vulnerabilities. The Mayhem system,\(^6\) which was awarded US$2 million for winning the competition, made extensive use of white-box fuzzing.\(^7\)

What has enabled this recent surge of interest in fuzzing? First, there is a tremendous need. Life and business are increasingly permeated by software systems, and a security vulnerability in even the smallest system can have dire consequences. Second, we now have the incentives and the required mindset. Some software companies have established lucrative bug bounty programs that pay top dollar for critical bugs. Anyone, including the reader, can offer vulnerability rewards on bug bounty platforms, such as HackerOne (https://www.hackerone.com/), which provides ethical coordination and responsible disclosure. Independent security researchers can report the discovered vulnerabilities and collect the bounties. Some stakeholders take matters into their own hands, with several companies continuously fuzzing their own software.

Third, we now have the tools. Many fuzzers are open source, freely available, easy to use, and very successful in finding bugs. For instance, the KLEE symbolic execution engine (https://klee.github.io/) has been freely available, maintained, and widely used for more than 10 years. As a result, several companies, such as Baidu, Fujitsu, and Samsung, have used and extended it to test their software products. Similarly, the AFL gray-box fuzzer (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/) is highly effective and easy to use. Its trophy case includes bugs and security vulnerabilities found in a large number of open source systems.

Finally, this open science approach and meaningful engagement between industry and academia have facilitated rapid advances in fuzzing. For instance, fuzzers are getting faster, find more types of bugs, and work for more application domains.

**Challenges**

In September 2019, we organized a Shonan Meeting on Fuzzing and Symbolic Execution in Shonan Village Center, Japan (https://shonan.nii.ac.jp/seminars/160/). The meeting brought together thought leaders, distinguished researchers, tool builders, founders, and promising young scientists from the gray- and white-box fuzzing (symbolic execution) communities. Next, we discuss the main challenges identified during the meeting. We phrase the challenges as research questions and hope that they provide guidance and direction going forward.

**Automation**

Automated vulnerability discovery is a game between adversaries. Given the same resources, the adversary with the fuzzer that finds more vulnerabilities has the advantage.
More Software

How can we efficiently fuzz more types of software systems? We already know how to fuzz command-line tools (AFL and KLEE) and application programming interfaces (APIs) (LibFuzzer). The fuzzer generates inputs and observes the program’s output. The community is actively working on how to fuzz programs that take highly structured inputs, such as file parsers or object-oriented programs. However, fuzzing cyberphysical systems, which interact with the environment as part of their execution, or machine learning systems, whose behavior is determined by their training data, is an underexplored area.

How do we fuzz stateful software, such as protocol implementations, which can produce different outputs for the same input? Most gray-and white-box fuzzers are written with a single programming language in mind. How do we fuzz polyglot software, which is written in several languages? How do we fuzz GUI-based programs that take as inputs a sequence of events executed on a user interface? For white-box fuzzing, we already know how symbolic execution can formulate constraints on numeric or string-based input domains. However, given a program whose input domain is defined by a grammar and/or protocol, how can a symbolic execution tool effectively formulate constraints on such “structured” input domains?

More Bug Types

How can the fuzzer identify more types of vulnerabilities? A significant portion of current work on fuzzing focuses on simple oracles, such as finding crashes. We need studies of security-critical classes of bugs that do not manifest as crashes and develop oracles that can efficiently detect them. Vulnerabilities are often encoded as assertions on the program state. Using such assertions, we already know how we can discover memory- or concurrency-related errors. The discovery of side-channel vulnerabilities, such as information leaks or timing, cache, or energy-related side channels, is currently an active research topic. Going forward, we should invent techniques to automatically detect and invoke privilege escalation, remote code execution, and other types of critical security flaws not only in C/C++ but also in other programming languages.

More Difficult Bugs

How can we find “deep bugs” for which efficient oracles exist but which nevertheless evade detection? There are bugs that evade discovery despite long fuzzing campaigns, e.g., because they are guarded by complex conditions or because existing techniques require impractical amounts of resources to find them. Are there certain kinds of deep bugs that can be found efficiently with specialized approaches? Structure-aware and grammar-based fuzzing as well as the integration of static analysis and symbolic execution with gray-box fuzzing are promising directions. Second, software also changes all of the time—techniques that can target software patches will prove essential for finding bugs as they are introduced. Third, we should investigate strategies to boost fault finding, such as AFLFast, which enables faster crash detection in gray-box fuzzers, and study the utility of GPUs and other means of efficient parallelization to maximize the number of executions per unit time. Finally, ranking bugs in terms of their importance can also improve the effectiveness of fuzzing in practice.

More Empirical Studies

What is the nature of vulnerabilities that have evaded discovery despite long fuzzing campaigns? Why have they evaded discovery? We need empirical studies to understand the nature and distribution of security vulnerabilities in source code.

The Human Component

Human-in-the-Loop Approach

How can fuzzers leverage the ingenuity of the auditor? Many researchers think of fuzzing as a fully automated process that involves the human only at the beginning, when the software system is prepared for the fuzzer, and at the end, when the fuzzer-discovered vulnerabilities need to be reported. In reality, security auditors use fuzzers in an iterative manner. During our meeting, Ned Williamson, a prolific security researcher at Google, demonstrated his semi-automated approach to vulnerability discovery. Williamson would first audit the code to identify units that may contain a security flaw. He would prepare the unit for fuzzing, run the fuzzer for a while, and identify roadblocks for the fuzzer. He would manually patch out the roadblock to help the fuzzer make better progress. If the fuzzer spent more time fuzzing less relevant portions of the code, he would adjust the test driver and refocus the fuzzer. Once a potential vulnerability was found, he would backtrack, add each roadblock back, and adjust the vulnerability-exposing input accordingly.
This semiautomated process raises several research questions. How can we facilitate a more effective communication between fuzzer and security auditor? How can the security auditor extend the fuzzer such that it generates a detailed bug report or even a bug fix for each identified vulnerability? Automated repair techniques that have emerged recently can help in guarantee about the absence of detectable vulnerabilities. If we assume that a symbolic execution engine can enumerate all paths in a piece of code and the oracle is encoded as assertions, then white-box fuzzing can formally verify the absence of bugs. If it can enumerate only some paths in a reasonable time, we can still provide partial guarantees. To make symbolic execution applicable in practice, correctness or completeness are traded for scalability. How does this tradeoff affect the guarantees?

In contrast, a black-box fuzzer can never guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities for all inputs. What is the residual risk that, at the end of a fuzzing campaign, a bug still exists in the program that has not been found? If we model black-box fuzzing as a random sampling from the program’s input space, we can leverage methods from applied statistics to estimate the residual risk.

A gray-box fuzzer uses program feedback to boost the efficiency of finding errors. However, this program feedback introduces an adaptive bias. How do we account for this adaptive bias when assessing residual risk? To answer such questions, we should develop statistical and probabilistic frameworks and methodologies for sound estimation with quantifiable accuracy.

**Theoretical Limitations**

What are the theoretical limitations of black-, gray-, white-box fuzzing? Black- and gray box-fuzzers are highly efficient—but at the cost of effectiveness. Unlike white-box fuzzers, they struggle to generate inputs that exercise paths frequented by few inputs. This tension raises several research questions. Given a program and a

**Usability**

How can we improve the usability of fuzzing tools? Ethical hacking requires a very special set of skills. Fuzzing already simplifies the process by automating at least the test input generation. How can we make fuzzing more accessible to developers and software engineers? How can we make it easier to develop test drivers for fuzzers? How can we integrate fuzzing into the day-to-day development process, e.g., as a component of the continuous integration pipeline or as a fuzz-driven unit testing tool in the IDE? In particular, our industry participants and respondents identified usability as the most important.

How can we prepare the output of a fuzzer for human consumption? A fuzzer produces an input that crashes the program, and the developer must find out why it crashes. How can we this regard.15 Recent work on Linux kernel fuzzing16 discusses techniques to address usability challenges while deploying the kernel fuzzer syzkaller on enterprise Linux distributions. Generalizing such enhancements to a fuzzer for general-purpose software remains a challenge.

**Fuzzing Theory**

It is important for any discipline to stand on a firm scientific foundation. We have seen many technical advances in the engineering of fuzzing tools. But why do some fuzzers work so much better than others? What are their limitations? We want to be able to explain interesting phenomena that we have observed empirically, make predictions, and extrapolate from these observations. To do this, we need a sound theoretical model of the fuzzing process.

**Residual Risk**

How can we assess residual security risk if the fuzzing campaign was unsuccessful? Black- and white-box fuzzing sit on two ends of a spectrum. A white-box fuzzer might provide a formal

**How can the fuzzer explain what prevents it from progressing, and how can the auditor instruct the fuzzer to overcome the roadblock?**
time budget, how can we select the fuzzing technique, or combination of techniques, that finds the most vulnerabilities within the time budget? How do program size and complexity affect the scalability and performance of each technique? How much more efficient is an attacker that has an order of magnitude more computational resources? With an understanding of the limitations of existing approaches, we can develop more advanced techniques.

Evaluation and Benchmarks

To validate a claim of superiority for novel fuzzing tools and techniques, we need sound methods for evaluation. Generally speaking, the better fuzzer finds a larger number of important bugs in software that we care about within a reasonable time. But what is a “reasonable time,” “software that we care about,” or “important bugs?” If no important bugs are found, how do we measure effectiveness? How do we prevent overfitting? What is a fair baseline for comparison?

To measure progress, we need to develop reasonable standards for comparison against previous work. We encourage the community to be open about releasing tools, benchmarks, and experimental setups publicly for anyone to reproduce the results and to build upon.

Benchmarks

Specialized Fuzzers

How can we evaluate specialized fuzzers? There are programs that take structured and those that take unstructured inputs. There are stateful and stateless programs. There are programs where the source code is available and programs where only the compiled binary is available. There are programs that take inputs via a file, a GUI, or an API. Extending fuzzing to different types of software systems is a key technical challenge (see the “More Software” section).

Similarly, some fuzzers are specialized for a specific purpose. For instance, there are fuzzers that seek to reach a program location11,12 or that focus on exposing specific types of bugs, such as performance bugs.18

However, existing benchmarks are often not designed for these specialized tasks. If there is no previous work, we need standards for researchers to choose suitable subject programs and baselines for comparison.

Preventing Overfitting

How can we prevent overfitting to a specific benchmark? For any benchmark suite, there is always the danger of overfitting. Despite a demonstration of superiority on the benchmark subjects, a fuzzer might still be inferior in general. What are reasonable strategies to mitigate overfitting? Can we propose a fair and sound policy to collect benchmarks? How can we avoid “single-source” types of benchmarks that are contributed by just one group and might give undue control to a single set of people?

Fuzzing tool competitions could be part of the solution for the challenges in the “Evaluation” and “Preventing Overfitting” sections. One model, inspired by constraint solving and verification competitions, is to have different competition categories, such as coverage-based fuzzing, directed fuzzing, and so on. Within each category, there can be a further division based on the type of bugs and applications the fuzzer is suited for. Tool builders can submit their own benchmarks and fuzzers, which would allow independent scrutiny of the entire process. TestComp (https://test-comp.sosy-lab.org/) is an existing competition that illustrates this model.

A second model is to come up with challenge problems in the form of buggy programs and have tool developers directly apply the fuzzers to find the hidden bugs. This has the advantage of tool developers configuring their tools in the best possible way for each task but makes independent reproduction of the results more challenging. Rode0Day (https://rodeo0day.mit.edu/) is an existing competition that illustrates this model.

Another approach is a continuous evaluation, where fuzzers are repeatedly used to fuzz real programs. For instance, as a concrete outcome of our Shonan meeting, Google has developed FuzzBench (https://github.com/google/fuzzbench) and committed computational resources to evaluate submitted fuzzers on submitted benchmarks. In addition to scientific evaluation of technical advances, this approach allows direct application of these technical advances to a large set of actual open source software to make critical software systems safer and more secure.

Measures of Fuzzer Performance

During the evaluation of two fuzzing techniques, which quantities should we compare? What do we measure? Today, fuzzers are typically evaluated in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency. When we are interested in security vulnerabilities, a fuzzer’s effectiveness for a software system is determined by the total number of vulnerabilities a fuzzer has the capability of finding. In contrast, a fuzzer’s efficiency for a software system is
determined by the rate at which vulnerabilities are discovered.

Synthetic Bugs

Are synthetic bugs representative? For evaluation, buggy software systems can be generated efficiently simply by injecting artificial faults into an existing system. We need to study empirically whether such synthetic bugs are indeed representative of real and important security vulnerabilities. If they are not representative, how are they different from actual vulnerabilities? What can we do to make synthetic bugs more like real bugs? Which types of vulnerabilities are not represented in synthetic bug benchmarks?

Real Bugs

Are real bugs, which have previously been discovered with other fuzzers, representative? Another approach is to collect actual vulnerabilities that have been found through other means into a benchmark. However, this process is tedious, such that the sample size may be relatively small, which would affect the generality of the results. Second, the evaluation only establishes that the newly proposed fuzzer finds at least the same vulnerabilities that have been found before. It does not evaluate how well the newly proposed fuzzer finds new vulnerabilities. How representative are the discovered vulnerabilities of all (un)discovered vulnerabilities? We could build a large, shared database of vulnerabilities in many software systems that have been found by several fuzzers or auditors over a period of time.

Coverage

Is coverage a good measure of fuzzer effectiveness? When no suitable bug benchmark is available, we need other means of evaluating the effectiveness of a fuzzer. Code coverage is the classic substitute measure. The intuition is that vulnerabilities cannot be exposed if the code containing the vulnerability is never executed. How effective is coverage really at measuring the capability of a fuzzer to expose vulnerabilities? We need empirical studies that assess how strongly the increase in different coverage metrics correlates with an increase in the probability of finding a vulnerability. In addition to code coverage, there are many other measures of coverage, such as GUI, constraint, model, grammar, or state coverage. We should conduct empirical studies to determine correlation and agreement of various proxy measures of effectiveness.

Time Budget

What is a fair choice of time budget? It is not possible to measure fuzzer effectiveness directly. If our measure is the number of bugs found, then effectiveness is the total number of bugs the fuzzer finds in the limit, i.e., when given infinite time. Instead, researchers can derive a trivial lower bound on the effectiveness, i.e., the total number of bugs a fuzzer finds, by fixing a time budget. Currently, this time budget is typically anywhere between one hour and one day. However, an extremely effective fuzzer may take some time to generate test cases, during which time another fuzzer can generate several orders of magnitudes more test cases. If the chosen time budget is too small, the faster, yet less effective, fuzzer might appear more effective. Thus, we should develop standards that facilitate a fair choice of time budget when evaluating the effectiveness of a fuzzer.

Techniques Versus Implementations

Technique Evaluation

How do we evaluate techniques instead of implementations? To demonstrate claims of the superiority of a proposed technique, researchers compare an implementation of the proposed technique to that of an existing technique. In the implementation, the researcher can make engineering decisions that can substantially affect the effectiveness of the fuzzer. For instance, a comparison between the AFL gray-box fuzzer against the KLEE white-box fuzzer to determine whether a white-box fuzzing technique outperforms a gray-box fuzzing technique should always be taken with a grain of salt. If possible, the proposed technique (e.g., an improvement to gray box fuzzing) is implemented directly into the baseline (e.g., AFL).

Survey

To request feedback from the larger community on the identified challenges, we surveyed further experts from industry and academia. Our objective was to identify points of contention, to add challenges or reflections that we might have overlooked, and to solicit concrete pathways or initiatives for some of the identified challenges. We sent an email invitation to software security experts who have previously published in fuzzing or have professional work on automatic vulnerability discovery. Out of 24 respondents, 14 work in academia and 10 work in industry; three attended the Shonan meeting.

The survey participants marked improving automation (71%), building a theory of fuzzing (63%), and finding valid measures of fuzzer performance (63%) as their top three most important challenges. While
practitioners and researchers were mostly in agreement, practitioners demonstrated a particularly greater interest in the development of human-in-the-loop approaches (+0.8 Likert points). On average, a respondent marked all identified challenges as important or very important on a 5-point Likert scale. No major additional challenges were identified. Other survey results were directly added to the corresponding sections.

Fuzzing is used today in corporations in a significant manner, often on a daily basis, for detecting bugs and security flaws. Despite advances in static analysis and formal verification, fuzzing remains the primary automatic mechanism for vulnerability discovery in most software products. However, the security of our software systems is in the hands of each and every software engineer, including future volunteers who contribute to critical open source software. We believe awareness and education, in the small and in the large, are of paramount importance.

One mechanism is the organization of security-oriented hackathons and Capture-the-Flag competitions. For instance, the Build it Break it Fix it contest from Maryland (https://builditbreakit.org/) represents an early successful attempt in this direction. The community could also move toward competitions between fuzzing tools (such as FuzzBench, Test-Comp, and Rode0Day) or organize regular fuzzing camps.

Another mechanism is to teach about fuzzing in software engineering and cybersecurity courses. The second and third authors were actively involved in designing and delivering such courses at the university level. A key challenge in developing such educational content is that the students need to be exposed to several tools, which takes a significant amount of the students’ time. The recent development of online books can alleviate some of these issues by presenting an integrated resource and repository for getting familiarized with various variants of fuzzing.

Acknowledgments
We thank the participants at the Shonan Meeting on Fuzzing and Symbolic Execution and the survey respondents. This work was partially funded by the Australian Research Council through a Discovery Early Career Researcher Award (DE190100046). This project has received funding from European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement 819141) and from the United Kingdom Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council through grant EP/R011605/1. This work was partially supported by the National Satellite of Excellence in Trustworthy Software Systems and funded by National Research Foundation Singapore under the National Cybersecurity R&D program.

References
1. C. Cadar and K. Sen, “Symbolic execution for software testing: Three decades later,” Commun. ACM, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 82–90, Feb. 2013. doi: 10.1145/2408776.2408795.
2. C. Cadar, D. Dunbar, and D. Engler, “KLEE: Unassisted and automatic generation of high-coverage tests for complex systems programs,” in Proc. USENIX Conf. Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI’08), 2008, pp. 209–224. doi: 10.5555/1855741.1855756.
3. P. Godefroid, M. Y. Levin, and D. Molnar, “Automated whitebox fuzz testing,” in Proc. Network and Distributed System Security Symp. (NDSS 2008), 2008, pp. 1–16.
4. P. Godefroid, “Fuzzing: Hack, art, and science,” Commun. ACM, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 70–76, Jan. 2020. doi: 10.1145/3363824.
5. B. P. Miller, “Foreword for fuzzing book,” Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, Mar. 22, 2009. [Online]. Available: http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~bart/fuzz/Foreword1.html
6. S. K. Cha, T. Avgerinos, A. Rebert, and D. Brumley, “Unleashing Mayhem on binary code,” in Proc. IEEE Symp. Security and Privacy (S&P’12), 2012, pp. 380–394. doi: 10.1109/SP.2012.31.
7. “Mayhem” Declared Preliminary Winner of Historic Cyber Grand Challenge,” DARPA, Arlington, VA, Aug. 4, 2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2016-08-04
8. S. Nilizadeh, Y. Noller, and C. S. Pasareanu, “DiFuzz: Differential fuzzing for side-channel analysis,” in Proc. Int. Conf. Software Engineering (ICSE 2019), 2019, pp. 176–187. doi: 10.1109/ICSE.2019.00034.
9. C. Holler, K. Herzig, and A. Zeller, “Fuzzing with code fragments,” in Proc. USENIX Security Symp. (USENIX Security 2012), 2012, pp. 1–38. doi: 10.5555/2362793.2362831.
10. N. Stephens et al., “Driller: Augmenting fuzzing through selective symbolic execution,” in Proc. Network and Distributed System Security Symp. (NDSS 2016), 2016, pp. 1–16. doi: 10.14722/ndss.2016.23368.
11. M. Böhme, V.-T. Pham, M.-D. Nguyen, and A. Roychoudhury, “Directed greybox fuzzing,” in Proc. ACM Conf. Computer and Communications Security (CCS’17), 2017, pp. 2329–2344. doi: 10.1145/3133956.3134020.
12. P. D. Marinescu and C. Cadar, “KATCH: High-coverag
MARCEL BÖHME is an Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Researcher Award Fellow and a senior lecturer at Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, 3168, Australia. He leads his research group with a reproducibility policy (https://mboehme.github.io/manifesto), which means that experiment data and tools are usually published with the peer-reviewed article to facilitate open science. He received his Ph.D. from the National University of Singapore and is a member of the Association for Computing Machinery. Further information about him can be found at https://mboehme.github.io/. Contact him at marcel.boehme@acm.org.

CRISTIAN CADAR is a professor in the Department of Computing at Imperial College London, London, SW7 2AZ, U.K., where he leads the Software Reliability Group. His research interests span the areas of software engineering, computer systems, and software security, with a focus on building practical techniques for improving the reliability and security of software systems. Cadar received his Ph.D. in computer science from Stanford University. He is a Member of IEEE and the Association for Computing Machinery. Further information about him can be found at https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~cristic/. Contact him at c.cadar@imperial.ac.uk.

ABHIK ROYCHOWDHURY is Provost’s Chair professor of computer science at the National University of Singapore, 117417, Singapore. His research interests are in program analysis, software security, and trustworthy systems. He is the director of the National Satellite of Excellence in Trustworthy Software Systems, 117417, Singapore. Roychowdhury received his Ph.D. in computer science from Stony Brook University. Further information about him can be found at https://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~abhik/. He is a Senior Member of IEEE and a distinguished member of the Association for Computing Machinery. Contact him at abhik@comp.nus.edu.sg.

13. M. Böhme, V.-T. Pham, and A. Roychowdhury, “Coverage-based greybox fuzzing as Markov chain,” in Proc. ACM Symp. Foundations Software Engineering (ESEC-FSE 2013), 2013, pp. 235–245. doi: 10.1145/2491411.2491438.
14. A. Rajan, S. Sharma, P. Schrammel, and D. Kroening, “Accelerated test execution using GPUs,” in Proc. Int. Automated Software Engineering Conf. (ASE 2014), 2014, pp. 97–102. doi: 10.1145/2642937.2642957.
15. C. L. Goues, M. Pradel, and A. Roychowdhury, “Automated program repair,” Commun. ACM, vol. 62, no. 12, pp. 56–65, Dec. 2019. doi: 10.1145/3318162.
16. H. Shi et al., “Industry practice of coverage-guided enterprise Linux kernel fuzzing,” in Proc. ACM Symp. Foundations Software Engineering (ESEC-FSE 2019), 2019, pp. 986–995. doi: 10.1145/3338906.3340460.
17. A. Filieri, C. S. Pasareanu, and W. Visser, “Reliability analysis in Symbolic PathFinder,” in Proc. Int. Conf. Software Engineering (ICSE 2013), 2013, pp. 622–631. doi: 10.1145/2486788.2486870.
18. J. Burnim, S. Juvekar, and K. Sen, “WISE: Automated test generation for worst-case complexity,” in Proc. 2009 Int. Conf. Software Engineering (ICSE 2009), pp. 463–473. doi: 10.1109/ICSE.2009.5070545.
19. B. Dolan-Gavitt et al., “LAVA: Large-scale automated vulnerability addition,” in Proc. IEEE Symp. Security and Privacy (IEEE S&P 2016), 2016, pp. 110–121. doi: 10.1109/SP.2016.15.
20. G. Klees, A. Ruhe, B. Cooper, S. Wei, and M. Hicks, “Evaluating fuzz testing,” in Proc. ACM Conf. Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2018), 2018, pp. 2123–2138. doi: 10.1145/3243734.3243804.
21. E. F. Rizzi, S. Elbaum, and M. B. Dwyer, “On the techniques we create, the tools we build, and their misalignments: A study of KLEE,” in Proc. Int. Conf. Software Engineering (ICSE 2016), 2016, pp. 132–143. doi: 10.1145/2884788.2884835.
22. A. Zeller, R. Gopinath, M. Böhme, G. Fraser, and C. Holler, The Fuzzing Book. 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.fuzzingbook.org/