War as an Instrument of Political Policy: Clausewitzian Analysis of Operation Zarb-E-Azb

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ABSTRACT

The article examines C.V. Clausewitz’s view of War as an instrument of political policy, and its viability as a model criterion to evaluate modern military operations like Operation Zarb-e- Azb. The significance of Clausewitz’s theory lies in its practicability. Through juxtaposing Clausewitzian views and the facts from the field of war the level of compatibility has been traced. The study has provided substantial evidence to conclude that Operation Zarb-e-Azb has been initiated and concluded in accordance with Clausewitzian view, and that, it can also be followed as an approach to study and evaluate other similar military operations.

Keywords: Clausewitz, Instrument Militants, Operation Zarb-e-Azb

Introduction

Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a war based on the policy of ensuring peace and economic development in Pakistan seems to be in line with Clausewitz’s view that ‘war is an instrument of policy’. Clausewitz treats policy as representative of all interests of the community (1976, p.607). To protect the people’s life and safeguard their interests from the menace of terrorism, a “violent action for political purposes” (Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary), the Government of Pakistan as a policy-making organ of the state realized the inevitability of military action.

This paper examines the relevance and applicability of Clausewitz’s view that ‘war is an instrument of policy’ (1976, p.605) to operation Zarb-e-Azb (launched in 2014). The study is focused on operation Zarb-e- Azb through following the main points of Clausewitz’s theory of war. These points include, the objectives of war,
plan of total defeat of the enemy, the maximum exertion of strength, physical effort in war, war is never an isolated act, continuity in military action, intelligence in war, military objective: the defeat of the enemy, in war the result is never final, and a total victory etc.

Clausewitz is perhaps the first theorist who introduced necessary mechanism for establishing link between political policy, military instruction and operational planning. The significance of Clausewitz’s theory followed in interpreting Operation Zarb-e-Azb lies in its professional popularity, applicability and appreciation by globally known personalities. Lenin is one of Clausewitz’s followers who agrees to his concept of war and suggests that, "Politics is the reason, and war is only the tool, not the other way around. Consequently, it remains only to subordinate the military point of view to the political"(Sheppard 1990). He also appears in Russian literature frequently. His appearance as a character in Leo Tolstoy’s "War and Peace" as a German staff officer in the Russian service (Bloom 1988). It makes him more important for the students and researchers of war literature.

Clausewitz’s theory of war also appears to be more relevant for academic purposes. Its appropriateness in military training has made it almost a compulsory subject and thus “in military academies, schools, and universities worldwide, Clausewitz’s literature is often mandatory reading”(Caforio, 2007, p.221).It suggests for further research and scholarship on the war from new angles and different perspectives. the scholars and researchers to new studies from different and new angles. The literature of war, in this way deserves more attention and Clausewitz’s theory provides necessary framework to be followed in modern research.

Clausewitz’s views presented in his well-known work titled On War are relevant source of information about armed conflict. His opinions are relevant to contemporary modern wars, but the reader needs to focus on the text to understand the nature of modern armed conflicts without comparing modern wars to eighteenth century warfare. Although his thinking may be influenced by the wars of his own time, but he seems to be interested in limited wars to achieve the goals through targeted actions within minimum time period. Thus, his views provide necessary model to analyze a modern military operation. In this way, Clausewitz’s assumption that there is always a political purpose behind a war makes him relevant to analyze Operation Zarb-e-Azb.

**Literature Review**

The current article is the outcome of examining minutely, the opinions of critics, professional writers, and researchers on the works of Carl von Clausewitz, especially his theory of war. They analyzed it from a variety of approaches. Although it is neither possible nor the scope of this article to discuss the views of all or even majority of them, however, the arguments presented by some of those researchers provided necessary material for better understanding of Clausewitz’s theory of war and how to apply it to analyze a modern military operation like
Operation Zarb-e-Azb. A brief description of existing scholarship on the subject is as follows:

George Dimitriu (2018) suggests a theoretical model for establishing war’s relationship with politics in accordance with the views of Clausewitz pinned down in the book *On War*, a masterpiece of literature on war and conflict studies. Dimitriu claims that the concept of ‘politics’ put forward by Clausewitz has been misinterpreted as a policy only, while it has broader scope encompassing domestic political struggles and combining all factors of power struggle. He believes in Clausewitz’s political logic of war to be analyzed through sociological perspective which implies that the power is supposed to shift from state-oriented political leaders to other political bodies and to some extent non-state actors, and thus political decision making about the war depends mostly on domestic powers.

Wendell J. Coats (1986) argues that Clausewitz’s theory of war is focused on connection of military aim in war with political object. If war is regarded as a political activity, it would an argument with force between political bodies, and the object of each body would be nothing but reestablishing peace by order or by cooperation. Similarly, in military conflict Coats opines that, there will be an act of armed forces to counter the armed forces to disarm each other. Clausewitz believes in converging political object and military aim. As both contrast each other, there is a problem for Clausewitzian theory to unite them as a part of policy. It is a natural problem based on an act of reconciling opposing and always conflicting elements.

Jasmin Cajic (2016) professes that Clausewitz’s theory of war is relevant in resolving the conflicts even after two hundred years. Three aspects of his theory are more relevant than others. At first, his assumption that war is the continuation of policy by other means; secondly, his trinity theory, including government, people, and armed forces, which coordinate and cooperate with each other in the course of war, and thirdly, his understanding of the nature of strategy. Jasmin Cajic claims that, if the policy is good enough for deriving sound strategy, higher level of competence is maintained in executing the strategy, and with the support of people, the preconditions to win a war can be created. Jasmin Cajic suggests that Clausewitz’s opinions about the issues associated with strategy of war and resolution of conflict are important for understanding the nature of war and modern strategists and political leaders should follow Clausewitzian views on war because of their relevance and applicability in twenty-first century.

Mary Kaldor (2010) claims that Clausewitzian suggestion that war tends to extremes is not applicable to modern warfare and that war can be long lasting and inconclusive. She shows the applicability of Clausewitz’s central ideas if interpreted in the light of needs and challenges of modern times. She opines that contemporary wars are not based on policy but politics. These wars may be rational and instrumental but not appropriate in accordance with universal values of mankind. They may bring together a trinity of reason, chance and passion instead of government, people, and military. As contemporary wars are fought either against
non-state actors or through non-state actors, there is a need to follow Clausewitz’s views about significance of moral forces as seriously as possible.

Emile Simpson (2017) opines about Clausewitz’s concept of universality of the nature of war to assess the extent to which his concept of victory is universal. Although only few aspects of his concept of war are universal, his concept of victory cannot be regarded as universal to all wars, especially the wars fought against terrorist organizations who do not fight in a traditional style. Emile Simpson deliberates on the applicability of Clausewitzian idea of victory in the light of his theory of war. Clausewitzian idea of total victory does not refer to the enemy’s defeat but the state of enemy being unable to show any resistance. In military operations against terrorists of modern time, Emile Simpson’s point of view seems to be conceivable.

Hugh Smith (1990) cautiously observes the link between Clausewitz and the students of International Relations. Theory of politics and theory of war cannot be discussed in isolation. The Students of War Studies and International Relation simultaneously turn to Clausewitz who becomes a common point of interest for both. They are found equally involved in borrowing from Clausewitz, quoting him, interpreting or misinterpreting him. His views have been used to discuss particular wars or conflicts between states, or wars between state and non-state actors. As politics is war without weapons and war is politics with weapons Clausewitz will always stay among students, politicians, policy makers and soldiers.

Alan Beyerchen (1992) criticizes Clausewitz for offering a theory of war without keeping in view the basic conditions of a theory like, prediction, simplification, and generalization. He considers Clausewitzian views more complicated and confusing for readers to understand and practically apply. But the opinions of his critics are also divided. At one hand, his thoughts are regarded as too philosophical to give an impression of being practical, while on the other side, his views are observed as too empirical to appear elegant. In this way, his critics on both sides appear to be agree on his status of being practical philosopher, and the impression of Clausewitz as ‘more quoted than read’ also pales into insignificance.

Christopher Coker (2017) declares Clausewitz as a war theorist who is not only relevant in the twenty-first century but also a great philosopher whose book, On War, has achieved the status of a sacred document unquestionably followed by war strategists, politicians, and instructors in military academies and war colleges. Coker suggests that rebooting Clausewitz may help to understand his thought in a better way. He compares Clausewitz to Newton. As the physicists in modern world understand newton’s laws without reading much about his works, military professionals must understand Clausewitz’s theory of war without exerting energies on reading On War. Coker believes that it is a complete text about war hardly surpassed in the past. Responding to the views of Clausewitz’s critics he categorically compares Clausewitz’s thought to a thick forest difficult to cross
alone. However, Coker’s work provides necessary guidelines for the readers of Clausewitzian theory of warfare.

Willmott and Barrett. (2010) also express their concern about Clausewitz’s relevance in understanding modern military conflicts. They argue that according to Clausewitz, war is an instrument of policy and, keeping in view the context of his theory, it can be interpreted that war is an instrument of state policy. They raise pertinent questions about validity of Clausewitz’s assertion. They present an example from the year 2004. In this year, there were more or less sixty wars being fought around the world, and few of these were wars between states, and undeniably, in many of these conflicts one of the parties was not what may be called polities (states). In such a case, one is left to question the relevance of Clausewitz’s theory of war.

Gray (1999) argues that, Clausewitz as a source of inspiration and guide for modern philosophers working on theories of war generally, and modern theories of strategy particularly, provides a protecting shield to all theorists and strategists from going seriously wrong. He professes that no theory is harmful till the time human spirit is enslaved by the system through which it is applied. It will leave the men of wisdom to draw a line or boundary between a valid theory and its invalid application. A theorist who follows Clausewitz as a master can easily manage to avoid such a worthless controversy. Clausewitz’s thought has roots in history and seems to hold power of acceptability in near future. Thus, a link of predictability a can be established with strategy through following the spirit of Clausewitzian thought.

Windsor, Philip. (2002) puts forward a comprehensive proposition on political context of strategy in line with Clausewitz thought. In chapter four, “The Political Context of Strategy: Clausewitz” (p.23) he clearly states that war is the outcome or result of the failure of diplomacy. He claims that emerging state system is administered by a natural agreement that in case of failure to resolve an issue through political accommodation, war is the only option left with a state. In war political forces join military commanders. Philip Windsor gives examples of monarchs and kings who actually participated the war as a soldier like Frederick the Great and George II. For better understanding of modern strategic thinking, Windsor interprets the political context of war in line with Clausewitz. His analysis, however, appears to be insightful and provides excellent argument for better understanding of modern warfare.

Daniel S. Papp (1996) gives description of the power of political motives behind a war. He analyses the spirit of Clausewitzian thought without mentioning his name. The success of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm has been much debated by war strategists, war instructors, and civilian critics with reference to political reasons behind the success. These operations were conducted by Coalition forces not even an alliance. It was a mixture of friends and foes to achieve common political ends. Their common objective was to fight for the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. How a coalition of more than thirty-five
states could be possible who won the Persian Gulf War through contributing to this war according to their position and power.

American president who performed the leading role suggested that there is a need to defend Saudi Arabia, to isolate Iraq in the global community, and liberate Kuwait. Papp believes that coalition partners agreed to join Coalition forces for their own economic and political interests. American president could not afford unrest in American society by decreasing the oil supply from gulf region and higher prices of oil. It provided an opportunity to USA and allies to increase their political influence in Middle East and establish their control over their resources. All coalition partners expected political benefits in the form political influence, economic benefits, American friendship, and improving position and status in international community.

Papp’s description of the success of Operations Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm clearly gives an impression that political motives for launching a war are more forceful than other reasons like, religion, culture, and economy. Clausewitz’s theory of war appears to be a theoretical model fully supportive and applicable in analyzing the wars of modern times. Clausewitz offers basic criterion to judge the motives and success of a war. The reader is supposed to apply his views in accordance with available conditions and specific type of war to achieve specific political objectives.

An overview of twelve different writers on Clausewitz’s theory of war from different angles provides necessary material for understanding the motives, nature and types of war. The scholars have argued with great force that Clausewitz’s theory of war relevant to analyze contemporary wars. The principles of Clausewitzian model are viable to apply on military operations launched against non-state actors, religious extremists, and different networks of terrorism. There is a need to follow Clausewitz’s view of War as an instrument of political policy as a model criterion to evaluate a military operation i.e., Operation Zarb-e- Azb. This study will open new avenues for researchers to apply this model on other military operations conducted by armed forces of Pakistan including Operation Radd-ul-Fassad.

Clausewitzian Analysis

Terrorism as a ‘violent action for political purposes’ provides necessary justification for a policy based on political objectives to counter its impact on society. To restore the writ of the state, and protect fundamental rights of the people, the government of a country is supposed to launch military action against terrorists and miscreants. Clausewitz claims that governments design policies to achieve political objectives through using the force as a tool, “the main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace” (1976, p.605).
Although political thoughts have nothing to do in the practical activities of war in the field yet the planning for war, to determine its objectives and provision of necessary resources are major responsibilities of policymakers. Clausewitz professes that, “Policy converts the overwhelmingly destructive element of war into a mere instrument. If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character. As policy becomes more ambitious and vigorous, so will war” (1976, p.606). Operation Zarb-e-Azb can be analyzed in the light of Clausewitz’s views on war as follows:

**Political Policy**

It is political policy which may determine the basic objectives of war and how the war as a tool will serve the purpose of political policy makers. Although the execution of war plan is completely a military action and thus entirely different from political activities yet the level of force to be used and the use of non-military tools including media (print, electronic, social) to demoralize the enemy socially, ethically, and religiously, are devised by political leaders and policy-makers.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb appears to be based on the political policy of neutralizing the power of militants who try to destabilize the country to impede its economic progress. To extend this policy the basic objectives of Operation Zarb-e-Azb have been designed through focusing on counter-narrative to that of militants, to secure the Pak-Afghan border, and to mainstream FATA. Keeping in view the objectives of war, the Plan of war and modalities of executing the war plan have been premeditated. Operation Zarb-e-Azb appears to be in line with Clausewitz’s view of war and thus his theoretical model seems to be viable for analyzing the objectives, plan, and execution of war plan as follows:

**The Objectives of War**

The basic objective of war as suggested by Clausewitz (1976, p. 75) is to throw one’s “opponent to make him incapable of further resistance. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare”. The main purposes of operation Zarb-e-Azb seem to be in line with this assertion. It has four objectives (Javaid 2015, p.50): 1. to destroy the terrorists’
network, their integrity, their organizational command, infrastructure, social network physically and intellectually, the umbrella of TTP, their master mind, logistic, intelligence, and financial support system. 2. to destroy their assets, factories, caves, explosives, training sites, hideouts. 3. to recapture or regain the territory under their control. 4. to destroy the hardest targets through US drone strikes.

Planning for the War

Keeping in view the objectives of war based on the State’s political policy, planning for the war seems to be a core activity on which the whole exercise of war mostly depends. Clausewitz’s planning (1976, p.619) for the war is focused on total defeat of the enemy. He divides his war plan into two parts. 1. to identify the enemy’s centers of gravity, and if possible, trace them back to a single one. 2. to ensure that the forces to be used against that point are concentrated for a main offensive. Clausewitz further suggests that “a divided advance against a single center, this implies a concentric attack. Both in strategy and in tactics a convergent attack always holds out promise of increased results, for if it succeeds the enemy is not just beaten; he is virtually cut off” (1976, p.619).

The speech delivered by the Prime Minister of Pakistan clearly elucidates the existing policy of the Government. He said, “the now ongoing operation would conclude only with the total defeat of the insurgents. We will change the fate of this country and under no circumstances will the country be allowed to serve as a safe haven for terrorists. Whatever the cost, this nation will never be handed over to terrorists” (Javaid, 45) In the light of political policy, the planning for war seems to be typically Clausewitzian:

Pakistan’s armed forces’ impending major assault on the TTP should, therefore, be built on the policy of deliberate, accurate, ferocious and no holds-barred attacks on the policy of rebel leadership. In the tribal belts this is best accomplished by a combination of air power and raids by the special services group and, in the urban areas, through the use of police and paramilitary forces. (Javaid, 45).

The enemy’s center of gravity and concentric attack are two main points of Clausewitzian war plan. In operation Zarb-e-Azb, a total defeat of the enemy has been planned. In the execution of plan, the practicability of plan plays an important role. It is a principle universally acknowledged that, as much as the plan is based on the ground realities the people to implement it can be supposed to be in a better position to produce desirable results. In the planning for operation Zarb-e-Azb the ground realities have been fully realized.

Execution of War Plan

A war plan is supposed to be executed in the field of war; its different facets may be virtually connected to one another. The commander who controls the whole
course of practical activities in the field of war is supposed to be competent enough to act most appropriately to avoid maximum loss of life, resources, and morale of his soldiers. He is supposed to determine the extent of using force, ensure flawless intelligence, appropriate physical effort, and continuity in military action. He is expected to convert the defeat of the enemy into a total victory.

The Exertion of Strength

Clausewitz believes that, to measure the enemy’s power of resistance (the means at his disposal and the strength of his will) is a rational approach to determine the level of power to be used in war. The means at the disposal of enemy are usually measurable but the strength of enemy’s will is perhaps more difficult to determine. Clausewitz suggests that, “Assuming you arrive in this way at a reasonably accurate estimate of the enemy’s power of resistance, you can adjust your own efforts accordingly; that is, you can either increase them until they surpass the enemy’s or, if this is beyond your means, you can make your efforts as great as possible” (1976, p. 77).

In operation Zarb-e-Azb, the use of force is matching the strength of militants. The militants hiding in the caves, possessing sophisticated weapons, and highly motivated to fight against Pakistan’s armed forces, have been a great challenge. The use of force has been as appropriate as possible. Operation Zarb-e-Azb in this way, can be stated as a plan to curb the militants’ growing power and influence. Thus, “the involvement of about 30,000 Pakistani soldiers in the indiscriminate and comprehensive operation was initiated in the wake of brazen attack on Jinnah International Airport Karachi to eliminate all terrorists; local and foreign, hiding in safe haven in NWA by the Pakistan Army” (Javaid, 44).

Accurate Intelligence

Clausewitz’s execution of war plan seems to be restricted by the availability of actionable intelligence. In war, the sources of information are usually more than one and their reports are naturally different from one another. Their contradiction may create ambiguity and difficulty in making any decision. Clausewitz suggests that:

What one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense. He should be guided by the laws of probability. These are difficult enough to apply when plans are drafted in an office, far from the sphere of action; the task becomes infinitely harder in the thick of fighting itself, with reports streaming in (1976, p.117).

In the light of Clausewitz’s views, launching a war on the ground needs actionable information but also through reliable sources. Intelligence agencies are supposed to have a check on counterintelligence. If the enemy has links in local population either on the basis of religious sympathy or any other interest, the links
need to be restricted and those who are found involved in the practice of giving information to enemy or helping them in any other way should be prosecuted under the laws of land. Umbreen Javaid, supporting intelligence-based actions, suggests that, “If this strategy is implemented successfully, the TTP movement is likely to either collapse or their leaders will beg for peace on terms acceptable to the state” (Javaid, 45).

**Level of Physical Effort**

Clausewitz’s assertion about the level of physical effort in the field of war appears to be based on practical wisdom. He believes that although physical effort is the essence of war but to measure its level is difficult. He claims that, “physical effort is a coefficient of all forces, and its exact limit cannot be determined. But it is significant that, just as it takes a powerful archer to bend the bow beyond the average, so it takes a powerful mind to drive his army to the limit. (1976, p.115). An overview of physical exertion by the armed forces of Pakistan gives a clear picture of physical effort in line with Clausewitz’s view of physical struggle in war.

The strategy, Pakistan Army followed in Operation Zarb-e-Azb required a higher degree of motivation to exert the energy required for achieving the goals. The strategy to be followed for this operation comprised of four segments i.e., Seek, Destroy, Clear, Hold. Pakistan Army planned to seek the target and destroy it as soon as it is found. After destroying the target, the dead or injured bodies and weapons of enemy were cleared, and the area was held by Pakistan Army to ensure security during the phase of reconstruction and rehabilitation.

**The Defeat of Enemy**

The aim of war is supposed to be nothing other than defeating the enemy. The success of military operations is usually examined through keeping an eye on the operational activities and new developments. Clausewitz professes that military operations are judged from the actions like, 1. Capture the enemy fortresses in your path. 2. Accumulate the stores you need. 3. Fortify important points like depots, bridges, positions, and so forth. 4. Rest your troops in winter quarters and rest-camps. 5. Wait for next year’s reinforcements. (1976, p.599)

Similarly, the Armed forces of Pakistan ensured the enemy’s defeat entirely in line with Clausewitz’s view of war. Through using air strikes and artillery simultaneously, they ensured to take back Pakistani territory occupied by terrorists. According to DG, ISPR, “Militant strongholds, communications infra structure and sanctuaries were cleared on a large scale in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), including North Waziristan and Khyber agencies. Thousands of suspected terrorists with their supporters had been detained”. (Dawn, June 13, 2015)

**A Total Victory**


Clausewitz makes fundamental difference between winning a war and total defeat of enemy. He believes that total defeat of enemy is the real objective of a war which cannot be achieved through winning a war only. He suggests unceasing efforts to consolidate the hold over achieved targets, “Once a major victory is achieved there must be no talk of rest, of a breathing space, of reviewing the position or consolidating and so forth, but only of the pursuit, going for the enemy again if necessary, seizing his capital, attacking his reserves and anything else that might give him aid and comfort” (1976, p.625).

There is a great similarity of Clausewitz’s view of victory and Operation Zarb-e-Azb. A statement by Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) clearly shows the direction of Operation Zarb-e-Azb to total victory, “18,087 weapons, including heavy machine guns, light machine guns, sniper rifles, rocket launchers and AK-47s have also been recovered from the hideouts of terrorists. Thousands of militants with their accomplices are detained in metropolitan areas in thousands of intelligence-based operations. Umbreen Javaid (2015, p.44) rightly observes, “this operation does not only mean the success of this operation, the terrorism will be completely removed from Pakistani soil and fight will be continued till the end of last terrorist”.

Discussion

The link of political policy with the war is more like that of theory and practice. Whereas, theory is debatable and flexible enough to be modified at any time without bearing any loss, the war on the other hand, bears serious consequences if the execution of war plan is not compatible with ground realities. Policy provides necessary motivation for setting specific objectives of war and the success or failure in war confirm the viability of political policy behind the war. Clausewitz (1976, p.81) opines that, “the more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must”.

In this way, the war against terrorists with the title, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, seems to be based on strong political policy deeply rooted in religion (to protect Islamic values), society (Pakistani social values), Ethics (Human values), and fundamental human rights (Right to live, express, and prosper). The success in Operation Zarb-e-Azb shows that political policy behind the war is based on justice and the people of Pakistan extended their moral, political, and physical support for this war. They fully participated in the war through standing with Pakistan’s Armed forces and added their own share through bearing the loss of their property, business, and lives of their loved one.

Clausewitz provides two platforms for the students and researchers. One for the students of war and strategic studies and the other for researchers of war literature. Universality of his views about war makes him a part of war studies even after two hundred years. His discussion of moral and political and political aspects of war gives him the status of political philosopher in the field of war. However, his
theory of war at one hand, is itself a war literature, and at the other hand, has emerged as a model for research in war literature.

The study of Operation Zarb-e-Azb in the light of Clausewitz’s model helps to establish a link between objectives of war in old times and postmodern time. Although the weapons of war were completely different, but the motives of war appear mostly similar. Protection of life, property, religion and culture, and promotion of economic interests have always been the common motives for political policies leading to war. The strategy (excluding the use of weapons) in modern times also seems to be more like the strategy followed during Clausewitz’s time i.e., later years of Eighteenth century.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched in the light of political policy adopted by the government of Pakistan. To make use of force against militants (TTP) who challenged the writ of the state through creating a state of fear and an environment not conducive for economic development of Pakistan. In accordance with the spirit of this policy, the operational objectives of this operation were set. To achieve the basic objectives, the plan of war was designed to destroy their physical, moral and financial roots. For this purpose, the use of appropriate level of force in the light of accurate and reliable intelligence was ensured. The whole practice appears to be in line with the principles of war deliberated by Clausewitz.

The study of Operation Zarb-e-Azb in the light of Clausewitz’s concept of war is primarily focused on confirming the applicability of Clausewitz’s system of war in modern military operations like Operation Zarb-e-Azb. It is mainly focused on analyzing the assertion that Operation Zarb-e-Azb is an ultimate tool of political policy. Through presenting facts from the field of war and establishing their links to Clausewitz’s views an effort has been made to prove their compatibility. Clausewitz’s assertion apparently seems to be confirmed and thus the truthfulness of his opinion appears to be established.

Conclusion

The concept of War, as a byproduct of political policy, has been examined through establishing link of Clausewitzian view of war with the wars in twentieth century. The viability of Clausewitzian model to analyze literature of war, or the practice of modern warfare, has been confirmed through applying its principles to evaluate Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a war launched against militants of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in June 2014. The motives of war, the strategy, and results of war, as highlighted in electronic and print media of Pakistan show linkage of practice on the ground with Clausewitzian argument.

It can be safely concluded that, ‘War as an instrument of political policy’ an assertion by C.V.Clausewitz, stands confirmed and thus stated as an argument based on wide-ranging practical wisdom. War, in this way, can be recognized as an extension of political practice. Even in the postmodern period, an era of war of
economies and clash of civilizations, the concept of politically motivated wars seems to be more pertinent. As political motives encompass social, economic, cultural, and religious aspects the interdependence of war and politics appears to be logically established.

The application of Clausewitz’s view of war to examine Operation Zarb-e-Azb shows necessary level of acceptability, appropriateness, and adequacy to be generalized. It provides a model for the study of modern wars. It can be followed in the study of modern military operations in Pakistan or other parts of the world including Operation Rah-e-Nijat, Khyber-I, Khyber-11, Khyber-III, Khyber-IV, and Operation Radd-ul-Fasad. It can be followed for research in the fields of Defense and Strategic Studies, War Studies, Literature of War, Politics, and International Relations.
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