European Union (EU) relations with its self-defined Southern Neighborhood: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia, have become an area of increasing study since the Arab uprisings began in Tunisia in 2010. The uprisings then quickly affected Egypt, Libya, and Syria in particular and have even spread to other parts of the Southern Neighborhood once thought to be immune from protests due to their recent history, such as Algeria. When charting subsequent events, including North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Libya from March to October 2014, Russia’s intervention in Syria starting in September 2015, and rising commitments to counterterrorism operations in the Sahel, scholars and policymakers are reminded that insecurity persists around the Mediterranean. Yet insecurity, like so many other themes explored in this book such as religiopolitical challenges, mercenaries and militia, and economic engagement through infrastructure, have been apparent for millennia. The Romans cultivated client states around the fringes of the Mediterranean (Gambash 2017).
Machiavelli argued that mercenaries were necessary to strengthen political power, and Lower (2017) concludes this was the case especially where religious differences meant they never threatened their employer. Where the Reformation posed challenges to official state engagement, Pirillo (2017) finds that diplomatic back channels were used instead.

Chronic insecurity has become a feature of North African politics, yet insecurity has become a feature in Europe as well. In Cyprus, the ethnic Greek and Turkish communities have been separated since 1974, and in the Balkans, the breakup of Yugoslavia followed a series of upheavals and conflicts in the early 1990s. The Mediterranean refugee crisis from 2015 was a period characterized by the high number of people arriving in the EU from the Mediterranean Sea and overland from Southeast Europe. With drivers extending as far as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria in the East, down to Eritrea and Somalia in Africa, the crisis has exacerbated social tensions. European state responses have varied from initial accommodation and negotiation with important transit countries such as Turkey, to a populist and xenophobic backlash. Political gains have been made by some European far right groups, especially in Switzerland, Austria, and Hungary, who have been able to leverage fears of violent Islamist (inspired) attacks in Europe. The UK referendum to leave the EU (Brexit) in 2016 hails a new era for Anglo-European relations. This at a time when European (including British) hard and soft power influence is under pressure from illiberal states such as Russia as well as the populist, transnational and unilateral politics of the Trump administration. The Trump administration’s decision to temporarily bar flights from Europe during the Covid-19 outbreak in March 2020 without prior consultation with EU counterparts appears to confirm that the transatlantic relationship is indeed under threat. This is especially damaging as close transatlantic relations have been a cornerstone of the post-1945 international order. Polarization in mainstream politics and growing inequality in economies have fed populism and fuelled discontent even before allegations of Russian electoral interference are considered.

Changes in the global economy have also put the Mediterranean at the forefront of EU responses, including a €289 billion bailout to Greece (the biggest bailout in global financial history) to tackle its sovereign debt crisis in 2010, brought on by the global financial crisis in 2007/2008. The rise of China and the implementation of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is attractive not only to Asian and African states in need
of new infrastructure projects and financing, but a whole host of developed countries, including Israel, Greece, and Italy. The fear here is that eastern and southern neighbors, as well as EU member states themselves, will fall prey to an increasingly assertive China that could fundamentally undermine Europe’s identity that is based on liberal democratic values, closer cooperation and integration. The EU response to China came in September 2018 when it launched a “Connectivity Strategy” linking the EU with Asia that put more emphasis on nations rather than states, would be rules based, and provide alternative sources of financing. Mobilizing private and multilateral investors could scale up the budget.

Apart from increasing competition in the Eurasian region between major powers such as the EU, USA, China, and Russia, there are also growing energy considerations to take into consideration in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel discovered a giant gas field, Leviathan block, in 2010. Lebanon has also found deposits. Further discoveries have been made in the Israeli and Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), while Italy’s ENI found a large natural gas field, named Zohr, in Egyptian waters.

In an age of growing insecurity from non-state and transnational threats, counterterrorism cooperation is an important dimension in Euro-Mediterranean relations. But full political cooperation remains an over-the-horizon objective following the first EU–Arab League summit in Sharm El-Sheikh in 2019. This should not be a surprise given the persistent mismatch of the political philosophies, systems of government, and body politik of the states involved. During the Age of Enlightenment in Europe, Thomas Hobbes referred to the “voice of the people” (1660) while John Locke (1689) wrote about people-driven government and a separation of powers which has largely informed modern secular politics in Europe. In premodern entities in the Middle East, while the notion of sovereignty existed, so did alternative traditions of diplomacy, more personalized systems of governance, and a changing external environment, such as colonial encroachment, that helped give agency to officials in the public domain more than is perhaps the case today. These points are overlaid with more contemporary issues arising from complications, threats, and challenges that can obfuscate advances in bilateral relations and have undermined a comprehensive Mediterranean security system.

The wider Middle East is currently experiencing an escalating rivalry and series of proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Rather than mediate, the Trump administration’s rhetoric and policies continue to
make the USA an actor and force for escalation in this dynamic. Israel remains alert to the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran but also to patterns of asymmetric warfare from its southern flank in Gaza and increasingly, from its northern flank in Lebanon, manifest in Hezbollah which is supported by weapons transfers from Iran. We see many examples where broadly conceived national security policies include repressive tendencies against civil society and the retrenchment of the elite into “bunker states.” While this trend has been evident throughout the region, it has been most recently apparent in Turkey after the failed military coup in 2016. The consequences again, are not favorable to transnational security cooperation.

Finally, the EU leadership itself was in flux in 2019. The new EU Commission president has been announced as Germany’s Defense Minister, Ursula von der Leyen. Charles Michel, formerly Prime Minister of Belgium, will take over as the new Head of the European Council, and Josep Borrell, a Spanish politician, will be the new Head of External Relations. Christine Lagarde, former managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington, DC, was announced as the new president of the European Central Bank (ECB) in September 2019.

**Evolutions in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)**

The Middle East is a contested geographical area, bound up with religious significance in the holy sites of Mecca and Jerusalem, along with significant energy resources in the Gulf region. After the Gulf War in 1991, the US-sponsored Middle East Peace Process and accompanying diplomatic activity in the 1990s gave cause for optimism about the prospects for enhanced regional security. Into this came European efforts, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which was a multilateral approach launched in Barcelona in 1995. As Del Sarto (2006) asserts, the EMP relied on a regional-building approach to regional security based on common interests between the EU and southern neighbors. While the European interest is to remain free from direct military threats, resolve conflicts, improve cooperation, and prevent south–south conflicts which could lead to spillover in the Mediterranean, the EMP was not the instrument to achieve this according to Biscop (2003). The Barcelona Process had a broad, but not military, agenda in promoting cooperation and a very different DNA to the specific events and processes that generated
the institutions of the EU and NATO. A lack of Mediterranean security cooperation could thus initially be chalked up to a poor institutional toolkit and the failure of Arab–Israeli peacemaking, notably in the breakdown of the Camp David Summit and the onset of the second intifada in 2000. The EU’s inability to resolve existing or potential conflicts has been a persistent theme. Included in this is the lack of confidence and security-building measures with southern neighbors.

Following the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, the ENP was conceived in order to promote prosperity, stability and security, and avoid creating new dividing lines between the enlarged EU, candidate countries, and immediate neighbors in the east and south. Prior to the Arab uprisings in 2010, the ENP pro-democratization policies were still judged to be incoherent and weak, although small-scale programs existed (Youngs 2006). The EU was mindful of failed democratic elections in Algeria in 1991 and the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006, followed by the battle of Gaza which brought Hamas to power in the Gaza strip in 2007. Democracy had its downside. The EU was also probably aware of the broad range of literature on the nature of democratization from notable authors such as Huntington (1991). Recent analysis shows that democratization stems not from political leverage but from longer-term changes taking place involving socioeconomic conditions and patterns of governance (Levenex and Schimmelpfenig 2011). While the EU attempted to balance norms and values with other, notably security interests, a laissez faire approach effectively gave (and continues to give) repressive authoritarian regimes the upper hand and insulation they require to survive and consolidate.

The Barcelona Process was relaunched as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008, including a range of projects from economy and environment to migration and social affairs, but still put political and economic ties (prizing security and stability) ahead of democracy and human rights. Thus, in the lead up to the Arab uprisings, closer ties were being sought with Gaddafi’s Libya and Ben Ali’s Tunisia. The elite-centric focus has fundamentally undermined the UfM and has caused significant difficulties in generating closer political ties between the EU and some member states such as France and Southern Neighborhood states in transition, such as Tunisia (Khalaf and Daneshkhu 2011). In the words of Behr (2014), the ENP has effectively gone “full circle.” The European Commission (2011) adjusted the ENP following the Arab uprisings with A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the
Southern Mediterranean. It encouraged more reform efforts with additional support, including financial. The ENP was revised again in line with the EU’s new Global Strategy (EUGS) which was adopted in June 2016 and focuses on new aspects such as resilience. The revised ENP launched on November 18, 2015 (notably after the Arab uprisings refocused attention on the Southern Neighborhood) removed many of the enlargement related tools and reduced EU focus on democracy promotion, good governance, the rule of law and human rights (Delcour 2017, 1). In other words, it has become de-politicized. Bilateral issues appear to be related to inconsistent use of conditionality, failure to empower civil society and other change agents, and an unwillingness to offer substitutes for political accession (ibid.). Systematic upgrades have helped the policy survive a rapidly changing Europe and Middle East but still the use of conditionality grinds. The ENP review also focused on the differentiation approach which had been a feature of the ENP but was not adequately implemented. It recognizes the regions do not form a coherent bloc in geographical, political or economic terms and that state responses to the ENP also vary widely. Whether the ENP can be considered to be a neighborhood policy at all remains to be seen for these reasons and since shared values and interests remain unclear.

**EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)**

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty established the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This fundamentally altered the context in which ENP would operate (Delcour 2017, 285). The CFSP puts the European Council in the lead for identifying EU strategic interests and broad objectives but voting on decisions must be unanimous with only aspects eligible for qualified voting. The Council of the EU votes on the actions or positions to be taken. Although European roots on common defense go back to the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, including the Western European Union (WEU) from 1954 to the late 1990s, and NATO, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) was only created by the Treaty of Lisbon. EU countries must make civilian and military capabilities available, and the European Defense Agency (EDA) helps member states improve their military capabilities, but there is no predetermined level of EU country commitment. EU defense policy is progressive and
deepening in areas such as conflict prevention, crisis management, military assistance and post-conflict stabilization (EUR-Lex).

For many states, including those in the Southern Neighborhood, Smith (2017) says that it is Europe’s position as a “power multiplier” for member states, its collective resources (including promise of enlargement, large aid budget, and the fact that it is the largest trading bloc in the world) that are more relevant to its foreign policy impact. There has also been €15 billion of neighborhood funding available from 2014 to 2020 and unparalleled political support for partners to draw on (Hahn 2017, xvii). These aspects are relevant in terms of trade, development, sanctions, and energy. However, EU member state vetoes can be an inherent weakness to EU efficacy, as well as slow policymaking, possibly leading to decisions being made at the lowest common denominator which can affect outcomes (Smith 2017). Being 27 member states makes the bloc inherently influential in world affairs, and as a values-driven supranational organization, it means that many of the EU states do align, especially on critical issues. EU enlargement, sanctions on Syria and Russia, and the UK, France, and Germany (E3) convergence on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran are just some examples.

**Conceptual Considerations for Transnational Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean**

There are a number of international relations (IR) theories and frameworks which are worth pointing to in our study of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa region, and their interactions across the Mediterranean. In selecting the most appropriate foreign policy analysis (FPA) and IR concepts from the toolkits available it is necessary to bear in mind the region under study is both diverse and multifaceted. The Mediterranean is certainly a historic area of littoral state interaction through transport, trade, and social exchange, but it is also one which is found to have been fragmented at various intervals (Wickham 2007). Contemporary EU engagement in the Mediterranean draws on state influence as far north as Finland and as far south as Greece. As we will detail in this volume, influence from international powers cannot be discounted both in terms of increasing multipolarity and power differentials in the Mediterranean region. Contentions and alliances also have a role to play through which proxy struggles and wider regional influences are channelled, most notably from the Gulf.
The Southern Neighborhood being a largely artificial construct also highlights other more “rational” modes of engagement, most recently evident in the Eastern Mediterranean where growing energy interests, EU efforts at stabilization in Libya, and a convergence of subregional contention, notably focused on the role of political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, is becoming more evident. Energy has often been at the heart of Euro–Arab relations, as illustrated by the Euro–Arab Dialogue (EAD) established by the European Economic Community in 1974 to improve relations after the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War and the global energy crisis. Miller (2014) asserts that this was actually a failure due to the politicization of the framework, internal divisions over its mandate and goals, and US hostility toward it.

In delving into conceptual models, we should start with the EU and theories related to actorness, power, and alliances. As for the ENP, it is rooted in the EU’s enlargement policy (and yet without the prospects of EU membership) and shared values and so theories related to regional integration would be relevant here. Rationalist theories of international relations versus constructivism would account for the possible logic(s) of action best summarized as “values versus interests” (Gstöhl 2017, 5). By focusing on conditionality, the EU has been focusing on an “external incentives model” over empowering domestic change agents (ibid.). The ENP is also a composite policy, drawing together foreign policy, sectoral EU policies, and different groups of policymakers together. The ENP attempts to draw on the EU’s experience of economic and political transitions, economic development, and modernization (Schumacher 2017, 4). Yet, little in the ENP literature draws on the socioeconomic experiences, political philosophy, and decision-making apparatus from the Southern Neighborhood, thus there is often a lacuna in many ENP studies.

The Arab states in the Southern Neighborhood are generally considered to form part of the developing world. Since President Nasser of Egypt was a leading proponent and advocate for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which held its first conference in 1961, much emphasis has been placed on south–south relations, cooperation, and unity. Many of the EU member states on the other hand have been closely involved in the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since its inception in 1949. Only EU members Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden are not part of NATO. The EU is firmly of the mind that a partnership—the EMP—is the vehicle through which to deliver and enhance cooperation in the Southern Neighborhood. It
goes beyond détente which is designed to ease hostility or strained relations and yet in so doing fails to recognize that significant tensions exist, especially on human rights. However, it stops short of a formal alliance, defined as: “formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states” (Snyder 1990, 104). However, NATO has been active since 1994 in initiating a Mediterranean Dialogue with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. In 2004 NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to expand cooperation in the Middle East with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE, on matters such as countering WMD, counterterrorism, NATO exercises, interoperability, advice on civil–military relations and border security (NATO 2019). There is potential for the number of MENA states involved in this to increase.

The second conceptual framework is the history of engagement, from the third millennium BCE when sailors were trading across the Mediterranean to the arrival of the Greeks in Egypt in 332 BC through to the years of Islamic conquests across North Africa, in Egypt in 641, and into Al-Andalus (Muslim Spain) in 711. This served to shift North African orientation back to the Arabian Peninsula, the Fertile Crescent and Mesopotamia. The successive waves of Christian crusades from 1095 to 1492 into the Holy Land, encompassing Jerusalem and the battles therein, have been etched into the history taught on all sides of the Mediterranean, in Turkey, Syria and Egypt, to France and Spain, which only drove out Arabs from their territories in 1492 after a series of wars known as the Reconquista.

Chinese engagement in the Mediterranean is regarded as a new development and yet it rests on a history of Chinese engagement in the wider Middle East (Hormuz, Aden and East Africa). For example, Admiral Zheng He, who led China to become a superpower in the Indian Ocean, embarked on his first voyage in 1405 (Roell 2018, 2). From 1299 until its slow dissolution from 1792 to 1923, the Ottoman Empire served to influence the Southeast Europe, Western Asia, and North Africa, interrupting Middle East–European contact and connections despite it being based in Europe.

The French capture of Algiers in 1830, followed by the Ottoman reoccupation of Tripoli in 1835, interrupted North Africa’s attempts to follow Muhammad Ali, Pasha of Egypt, in gaining greater independence and control over their internal affairs. Muhammad Ali is widely credited with
being the “Founder of Modern Egypt”, but the economic system based on expanding trade relations with Europe was already growing based on Egypt’s strategic location between the Ottoman Empire, Syria, and the Red Sea. The disparity in volume between commodities from Egypt such as rice, flax and wool, and finished goods from Europe such as medium quality cloth, coupled with the Mamluk’s purchase of European arms to bolster their efforts to control Egypt, made Europe a major trading partner (al-Sayyid-Marsot 1984). Not only did this make Egypt subject to European trade pressures and economic directives but also led to the reintroduction of exceptional taxes which were once used as a means to fund the civil wars between the Ojakat and Mamluks for control of the country.

Although Morocco was defeated by France at the Battle of Isly in 1844 and by Spain at Tetuan in 1860, the support of Great Britain gave it some independence. Immigration from France, Italy and Spain to Algeria meant that around one sixth of the total population by 1900 were expatriates until the Algerian Revolution, led by the National Liberation Front (FLN), in 1954. A French protectorate was imposed on Tunisia in 1881–1883 after the British withdrew their objections on French expansion in North Africa at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The Morocco protectorate was established in 1912 which the French divided with Spain. Spain took control of the Rif Mountains in the North and the borderlands with the Sahara in the south. Libya was invaded by Italy in 1911 but resistance was put up by the Sennusiya Muslim Sufi sect who delayed Italian control of the whole country until 1931.

Only after the Second World War were national liberation movements able to get a foothold, supported by the Arab League, but sometimes at a heavy cost from a protracted civil war as in the case of Algeria. Colonialism has thus sowed another layer of mistrust and antipathy across the Mediterranean, often within living memory. From this to effective and efficient EU relations with the Southern Neighborhood seems quite a leap, especially considering that the EU’s institutional history dates back only to 1950.

The EU’s security response (e.g., from conditionality to taking the path of least resistance in cooperation agreements) and in follow-through (e.g., state-building after NATO intervention in Libya) has been insufficient to meet security challenges. Constructivism, that is the significance of historical and social aspects in international relations, would generally appear to hold here. Realism is also significant given the regional
disorder currently being experienced and the high threat perception. Foucauld’s understanding of power might also prove appropriate in dissecting the ENP and contributing to our understanding of how knowledge and leading by example can shape power and norms in the Southern Neighborhood. Identity (including religious ties), experience and national independence will continue to trump new EU incentives. History has also left behind non-state actors still in search of a state, whether the Tuareg in the Sahara region or the Kurds living in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. They seek to enhance their nation-building activities which, their political legitimacy aside, have become an added complication in contemporary measures aimed at stabilization.

The third conceptual issue to consider is socioeconomics, domestic politics, and regime security. Given the popular demand for “bread, freedom and social justice” during the Arab uprisings it is clear that popular political and economic concerns persist. As Morgenthalau (1974) found, all political action has moral consequences—there is no way to keep social and political life separate and therefore the onus is on moral judgment to chart the least evil course of action. In authoritarian regimes this might be hard to do as many economies remain state-led and open to accusations of crony capitalism and the marginalization of youth. Poverty, corruption, a bloated public sector, legislative and bureaucratic insufficiencies, dependence on foreign remittances from oil and gas exporters, and a limited number of industries such as tourism, keeps many Middle East and North African (MENA) economies rentier or semi-rentier, unstable and vulnerable to external shocks. A multilevel approach advanced by David and Nonneman (2005) helps to deal with the plethora of broad policy inputs at the domestic, regional, and international levels, and how their boundaries are often blurred.

Linked to socioeconomic concerns are notions of governance, national security, and conflict. The lack of security sector reform (SSR), political contestation over the plethora of socioeconomic issues raised above, and authoritarian upgrading measures to ensure regime security and survival, all continue to pose threats to human security. This is clearly demonstrated by Dagher (2019) who explains the political calculations that President Assad made at the onset of the Arab Uprising which engulfed Syria. Again, elite politics gives credence to constructivist interpretations of political decision-making and policy outcomes.

The fourth set of conceptual considerations includes the concepts of regionalism, inter-regionalism and borderlands. As Buzan (2007) notes,
the scope of security should be broadened to include regional security, societal and environmental factors, and indeed any areas where the state feels threatened or vulnerable or has a major security interest. While structural realists such as Walt would assert that states look out for their own security interests first in an anarchic environment (and certainly the Middle East lacks the regional security institutions and capacities available in some other parts of the world), this creates a “security dilemma” due to the actions they take leading other states to take countermeasures (Lawson 2009). Arms races and antagonisms don’t often lead to war, but disagreements over the regional and international balance of power can. Balancing and alliance formation is key, but there remain many questions of how balancing will occur in an international environment undergoing rapid changes toward multipolarity. Meanwhile, Democratic Peace Theory, which dates back to at least the eighteenth century and enlightenment thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, suggests that the spread of democracies, including the strength of their domestic political institutions, political norms, and constructed identities, substantially mitigates against the risk of conflict (Reiter 2012).

One of the main criticisms of the ENP is that it does not take into full consideration drivers of instability in the Mediterranean because many emanate from outside the Mediterranean (Heijl 2007; Browning and Joenniemi 2008). Significantly, Gulf and Levant politics have become well connected through Saudi–Iranian competition, proxy conflicts, and directed regional economic interventions. Enhanced economic integration between the EU and Gulf, through the renegotiation of a Free Trade Agreement (negotiations collapsed in 2009) and de-escalation measures, starting with dialogue as advanced by Sager and Mousavian (2019), could be a good place to start. Many controversies remain, including Germany blocking arms sales to Saudi Arabia due to the Yemen conflict, concerns over human rights, and European states such as France trying to keep the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on track with Iran (BBC News 2019). Some of the states contributing to the Mediterranean refugee crisis are located in Central Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa. EU-MENA borderlands as researched by Del Sarto (2011–2017) shows that the EU has been trading access to the internal market for security and stability, without offering political participation to MENA states, and has therefore maintained an uneven balance of power. She also found that the EU co-opted MENA states in the EU’s management of migration, counterterrorism, and border controls. Because the ENP has been
applied inconsistently, it challenges assumptions about the EU’s normative approach but also challenges any universal assertions of EU policy successes or failures.

This study argues that there are a number of policy disconnects between the EU and Southern Neighborhood, especially as the shifting domestic, regional, and international landscape does not favor enhanced Mediterranean security cooperation. It points to the changing international environment and prospects for the maintenance of a loose federation of states in the regional system that favors maximum control over the domestic sphere as well as mistrust of other states, notably between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, this volume identifies issues and areas which could impact favorably on EU-Southern Neighborhood (Mediterranean) security cooperation. Should the overarching and ambitious objective of Mediterranean security continue to falter, such measures could at least foster greater human security, contrary to Bull’s assertion that human rights principles risk undermining the international order (Dunne 2011).

During a period of MENA state weakness and collapse, coupled with cases of emerging alliances with illiberal international powers, this volume also calls into question the existing states system (sovereignty and regional order) and any regional security construct based upon it.

**Structure of the Volume**

In Chapter 2, Beck outlines the security threats as viewed by Europe and the key events, dynamics and complexities in the EU’s perceptions and relations with pivotal actors. In Chapter 3, Mason focuses on the mode of governance and perceptions in the MENA region and its impact on threat perception as well as EU–MENA cooperation. In Chapter 4, Pauwels zeros in on EU counterterrorism cooperation in the MENA region and discusses reasons why there have been successes and failures in this form of cooperation. Niemann and Blöser discuss migration in the Mediterranean and the “European refugee crisis” in Chapter 5, charting its development and impact. In Chapter 6, Giuli analyzes European energy security and subregional political dynamics with reference to oil and gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. In Chapter 7, Mason and Suchkov assess Russia’s participation in the Syria conflict and its relations with major regional actors to determine whether it has a Middle East strategy and what it might be, with ramifications for both the EU
and NATO. In Chapter 8, Telci delves into the complexities of Turkey–EU relations over the last decade, noting the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy back to the Middle East following obstacles in the EU accession process and the realization of new geopolitical realities closer to home. In Chapter 9, Zoubir and Lounnas discuss the difficulty of merging the European and North African security complexes but also the necessity in doing so along the lines of counterterrorism, tackling illegal migration, and securing borders from the instability in the Sahel. They include specific reference to EU relations with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. In Chapter 10, Mason broadens out the geographical focus to assess the policies and actions of the USA, China, India, Japan, and the Gulf States in the Mediterranean. He also assesses the roles played in the region by the International Monetary Fund, the African Union and non-state actors. All with the objective of contextualizing shifting and often strengthening interactions in the Southern Neighborhood which may challenge our assumptions about the EU’s current and possibly future role in the region. In Chapter 11, Mason sets about rethinking the current EU approach, followed by some concluding remarks about the state of the Euro-Mediterranean relationship.

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