Task on Tank model for funding peace operation in Africa – A Southern African perspective

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Abstract: The operations of the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF) have been hindered as a result of the agency’s inability to fund peace operation (PO) in the region. Premised on this backdrop, this study proposes a funding model through which the SADCSF can generate funds for quick response in crisis areas in the region. In so doing, the study uses thematic reviews, analytical framework and secondary data in proposing the model for PO in the region. It contends that a functional and effective peace in the Southern African region could assist in reducing adverse cases of human right abuse as seen in Zimbabwe, transnational criminality (throughout the region) and maritime piracy among others in the region. That with a functional SADCSF in place issues of Xenophobia can be averted in South Africa as well as the political tension in Lesotho, the war in DR Congo among others. The study proposes both the “way” and “how” through which the SADCSF can generate funds through the Task on Tank model.

Subjects: International Politics; International Relations; Public Administration and Management; Security Studies - Pol & Intl Relns; Sociology & Social Policy; Political Sociology

Keywords: Africa; APSA; ASF; AU; economic landscape; finance; financial viability; fiscal sustainability; fiscal responsibility; peace operation; REC; regional integration; SADC; SADCSF; Scale of Assessment Task on Tank

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PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

The Southern African Development Community is a Community of member-states within Southern Africa. In other to guarantee peace and tranquility in the Southern Africa, the Community decided in 2008 to establish a security network for the protection of its interests, businesses, properties and essentially its people. Resulting from the rectification/approval of a Covenant by African Head of States and Governments to form multinational force in 2003. The multinational force was to be established in five regions on the continent. Therefore, the SADC established the SADC Standby Force (SADCSF), as its multinational force for peace and security in the region. The problem here is that since the establishment of the SADCSF in 2008, it has not intervened in any peace operation as a result of paucity of funds (Ndaguba, 2016; Ndaguba, Nzewi, & Shai, 2018). Therefore, this paper proposes a funding model for peace operation called Task on Tank.
1. Introduction
Over the years, the African continent have witnessed asymmetrical attrition of wars, terrorism, arms proliferation, conflicts, increasing rate of unemployment and cross-border criminality. Insecurity in the Africa continent is rife, requiring an effective and functional intervention to curb the spread of violence and conflict in the region. The African Standby Force was introduced as the Force that guarantees quick response in conflict areas on the continent, and for every region, a multinational security force was instituted. For the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the SADC Standby Force (SADCSF) was inaugurated in 2007 with mandate to commence duties with immediate effect. However, since 2007, the Force has not been able to engage in peace operation (PO) for several reasons, principal of which is finance. The SADC region suffers from high level poverty, underdevelopment, unemployment, internal conflict, environmental degradation and diseases (a higher prevalent of HIV/AIDS) (Lekota, 2003, p. 20).

This tends put a strain on the finances of the region. The rationale for the emphases on finance is premised on the notion as articulated by Ndaguba and Okonkwo (2017) that finance is everything it determines production, capacity, skill set, payment of contingents, equipment, machinery and covering every facet of an operation.

This paper is the last in a series of papers aimed at assessing the financial feasibility, financial imperatives, and the prospect and challenges of the SADCSF for PO or better still it could be seen as the harmonising paper that galvanised other strata’s of the arguments into the proposition of an alternative model for funding PO in Southern Africa. While previous papers have demonstrated the aforementioned three (feasibility, financial imperatives, and prospect and challenges), this paper tends to propose a funding alternative for financing the SADCSF called the Task on Tank model. In order to understand this paper, the organisation of the paper is thus—in the next section a background to PO in the African continent. Thereafter, assessing the African Union financial mechanism, before the contextualisation of the SADCSF funding mechanism, an analytical framework that builds to propose the partnership model hosting the Task on Tank model. The Task on Tank model section depicts several elements, conventions, assumption and the framework for funding PO in the SADCSF. Available dataset from local and international database were gathered to answer the crux of the matter. However, an antecedent of the emergence of the African Union in the Global South best set the scene.

2. Material and methods
There is no one best way/method in social research for conducting research. Every social science research is hinge on the ability of the researcher to gather reasonable data, which could support the topic under review (Ndaguba, 2016; p. 12; Ndaguba et al., 2018).

The procedure for gathering information in this study was exploratory, in that, the exploratory method complies with meta-analysis and desk research approach, consistent with the qualitative paradigm. The rock bottom assumptions of the desktop research deals with predominantly knowing where to look and what to look for, understanding the quality of the material sourced and ensuring that the right amount of data is analysed for solving the problem. Hence, in gathering data for proposing a model for funding the SADCSF, a secondary model for analysis was used.

Secondary data analysis is the practice of probing or scrutinising data that have already been collected by a third party, often for a distinct purpose. As a research method, it ensures brevity while saving time, money and unnecessary duplication of research actions. An advantage of the secondary means of data collection is that it is used to gain insight about a phenomenon. However, its biggest weakness is the inability to generalise findings from such study thereof. More so, theme analysis, systematic and narrative literature analysis was used to analyse the data in this study.

3. Background of the study
The African Union is a continental union consisting of 54 countries in Africa, exempting Morocco, modeled after the European Union (Bhalla, 2001; Mbeki, 2002; Ojukwu, 2013). The Constitutive Act
is its supreme legal document empowering African Union (AU) member states to mediate and intervene in the following instances: war crimes, crimes against humanity, act of grave circumstance and genocide (Bah, Choge-Nyangoro, Denso, Mofya, & Murithi, 2014, p. 16), which is a severance or a breakaway from the original nomenclature of the Organisation of African Unity of non-interference on national issues.

To fulfill the objectives of the African Union while abiding to the principles and visions of the Union, the AU established the following: The Assembly (see Article 6); The Executive Council (see Article 10); The Commission (see Article 20); The Permanent Representatives’ Committee (see Article 21); Pan-African Parliament (Article 17); ECOSOCC (Economic, Social and Cultural Council) (see Article 22); The Court of Justice (see Article 18); The Specialised Technical Committees; The Financial Institutions (see Article 19); The AU Commission (see Article 20) and Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) (see Article 9 amended 2003) (AU 2015; AU-PSC, 2003), and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was established in 2001. That is seen as the AU key machinery to achieve sustainable peace in the continent.

4. African peace and security architecture
The APSA is a protective arm of the African Union. It defines the key mechanisms in promoting peace, stability, security and safety in the continent (Ndaguba & Okonkwo, 2017, p. 143), established by the African Union in collaboration with Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs). To prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the continent, there are several tools outlined for the preventing conflicts in the area, which includes but not limited to the APSA, PSC and ASF.

The highest decision-making authority of the APSA is the PSC. The PSC has the sole authority for mandating and terminating an AU PO (Kasumba & Debrah, 2010). It utilises the early warning arrangement in facilitating timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations (Kasumba & Debrah, 2010). The impetus for the creation of the APSA alongside the PSC in 2001 is to prevent the reoccurrence of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

The APSA sees and uses RECs as its essential building blocks. This is probably because for the impact of the APSA to be felt, there must be synergy between RECs and the AU arms on conflict prevention and management and the early warning systems for intervening and resolving crisis on the African continent. Kasumba and Debrah emphasised the need for this synergy, when they argue that the APSA brings together a number of key interconnected components concerned with political decision-making (the PSC), gathering and analysis of information (the Continental Early Warning System), mediation and advisory capacity (the Panel of the Wise), peace support operations capacity (the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee) and a Special Fund (Kasumba & Debrah, 2010), to ensure quick response in conflict areas and also seeking diplomatic solutions to the crisis in conflict zones. The legalisation of the APSA was done through the Protocol establishing the PSC of the AU in 2004.

5. Peace and security council
The ratification of the PSC was done in 2004 under the Constitutive Act, adopted by the AU Assembly in July 2002. The definition of the PSC was given by the Protocol for establishing the Council. It sees the PSC as an early warning arrangement and collective security to facilitate effective and timely response to crisis and conflict situations in Africa (AU-PSC 2003; Ndaguba et al., 2018). The Protocol establishing the PSC stipulates other responsibilities such as prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, post-conflict peace building and developing common defence policies (PSC, 2003). The PSC has fifteen members elected on a regional basis by the Assembly similar in intent and operation to the United Nations Security Council. However, decisions made at the PSC summit/meeting require approval from the UNSC.

The PSC established six essential organs that it intend will help facilitate the process of prevention, management, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building, the organs includes the, African Standby Force, New Partnership for African Development, Continental Early Warning...
Systems and Military Staff Committee, Panel of the Wise, and Common African Defence and Security Policy. However, for the purpose of achieving the aim of this research, the organ dealing directly with security will be at the epicenter of the discussion, the African Standby Force.

6. African standby force
The antecedent of the ASF has been discussed in the previous paper (see Ndaguba et al., 2018, pp. 6–7). However, it is important to note that the ASF has no known financial mechanism through which it generates its income other than relying on the AU and international partners for funds. It is therefore expedient to understand the nature of the African Unions funding mechanism which all organs and agencies of the Union relies upon for support.

7. African union financial mechanism
In contrast to the United Nations (humanitarian) and NATO (political), the idea of the African Union is mainly for economic unification as inclined by its predecessor the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The financial statements of the AU are prepared and presented by the AU Commission Chairperson and approved by the PSC of the AU.

The AU has basically four sources of funding, Member States Contributions based on assessment similar to UN and NATO; Peace Funds likened to the Special peacekeeping operation account of the UN, Sanctions on arrears, and International Partners (AU Handbook, 2015, p. 166). Of the four sources of income to the functionality of the AU, two of this four are ineffective—the Peace Fund and Sanction on arrears. Although, while the Peace Fund is yet to be established, the Sanctions on arrears is unnecessary taking into cognisance the notion of the ability to pay. For instance, if a member state was unable to contribute to current expenditure of the AU, what guarantee does the AU have that such member state would possibly be able to pay arrears for the functionality of the Union? Taking into cognisance the dwindling oil prices, increasing poverty in the continent, increasing number of failed and failing states, as well as, the increasing rate of inequality, marginalisation, migration, refugee, slavery and unemployment in African states.

More so, countries that are under the sanction (as Burkina Faso for instance) on the continent continue to do business with other countries irrespective of the sanction. This is possibly because the African Union is perceived as a toothless bulldog that can only bark but cannot bite.

The over-reliance on the gross domestic product (GDP) as a measurement tool for calculating what each member state is to contribute may be misleading. In that, in most member states, a significant amount of the GDP is repatriated to the origin of the multinationals and not reinvested within the economy (Sharples, Jones, & Martin, 2014; Sornarajah, 2004, p. 11).

On the budgetary allocation of the Africa Union, it is worth noting that the 2015 budget, for instance, of the AU was approximately $USD 522,121,802. $USD 131,471,086 is distributed to member states, while International Partners contribute USD 225,536,171 amounting to 61%, which was contributed by the International Partners. This tends to question the debates and proclamations of Pan-Africanism as pioneered and promoted by the African Leaders and Global Partners. In the same year (2015), the AU proposed a budget deficit of approximately $USD 149,266,824 (AU Handbook, 2015, p. 166). This is also linked or attributed to the decline in inter-trade and intra-trade activities in the African continent. It must be understood that he who foots the bills detect the turn. While inter-trade and intra-trade continue to decline within Africa, import trade continues to rise, hence making African market fragile and innovation suppressed and to a large extent decaying (Sharples et al., 2014). Many scholars share this idea as neocolonialism, and Nkrumah referred to neocolonialism as the worst form of colonialism. To this end, the study will analyse two “functional methods” used in financing the African Union activities in the continent: scale of assessment (contribution by member states) and international partner (see Table 1 for nature of contribution by member states).
8. Scale of assessment (contributions by member states)

According to Paul (2015), the scale of assessment is a reflection of a country’s contribution to the regular budget of the AU, UN or NATO (not the SADCSF) revised every three years. The contribution is

| Member states | Scale of assessment | 2015 Assessment (US$) | 2014 Assessment (US$) | Difference 2014/2015 (US$) |
|---------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
| Algeria       | 12.904              | 16,965,029.03         | 16,265,607.88         | 699,421.16                  |
| Angola        | 5.275               | 6,935,099.83          | 6,649,184.87          | 285,914.96                  |
| Benin         | 0.374               | 491,701.86            | 471,430.36            | 20,271.51                   |
| Botswana      | 1.004               | 1,319,969.71          | 1,265,551.02          | 54,418.69                   |
| Burkina Faso  | 0.475               | 624,487.66            | 598,741.77            | 25,745.90                   |
| Burundi       | 0.100               | 131,471.09            | 126,050.90            | 5,420.19                    |
| Cabo Verde    | 0.113               | 148,562.33            | 142,437.51            | 6,124.81                    |
| Cameroon      | 1.442               | 1,895,813.07          | 1,817,653.95          | 78,159.12                   |
| Central African Republic | 0.103 | 135,415.22          | 129,832.42            | 5,582.79                    |
| Chad          | 0.437               | 574,528.65            | 550,842.42            | 23,686.22                   |
| Comoros       | 0.031               | 40,756.04             | 39,075.78             | 1,680.26                    |
| Congo         | 0.612               | 804,603.05            | 771,431.50            | 33,171.56                   |
| Côte d’Ivoire | 1.306               | 1,717,012.39          | 1,646,224.73          | 70,787.66                   |
| DR Congo      | 0.599               | 787,511.81            | 755,044.88            | 32,466.93                   |
| Djibouti      | 0.076               | 99,918.03             | 95,798.68             | 4,119.34                    |
| Egypt         | 12.904              | 16,965,029.03         | 16,265,607.88         | 699,421.16                  |
| Equatorial Guinea | 0.752 | 988,662.57          | 947,902.75            | 40,759.82                   |
| Eritrea       | 0.113               | 148,562.33            | 142,437.51            | 6,124.81                    |
| Ethiopia      | 1.419               | 1,865,574.72          | 1,788,662.24          | 76,912.48                   |
| Gabon         | 1.165               | 1,531,638.16          | 1,468,492.96          | 63,145.20                   |
| Gambia        | 0.050               | 65,735.54             | 63,025.45             | 2,710.09                    |
| Ghana         | 1.993               | 2,620,218.76          | 2,512,194.40          | 108,024.36                  |
| Guinea        | 0.270               | 354,971.93            | 340,337.42            | 14,634.51                   |
| Guinea Bissau | 0.065               | 59,161.99             | 56,722.90             | 2,439.08                    |
| Kenya         | 1.784               | 2,345,444.19          | 2,248,748.02          | 96,696.17                   |
| Lesotho       | 0.113               | 211,668.45            | 202,941.95            | 8,726.50                    |
| Liberia       | 0.042               | 55,217.86             | 52,941.38             | 2,276.48                    |
| Libya         | 12.904              | 16,965,029.03         | 16,265,607.88         | 699,421.16                  |
| Madagascar    | 0.457               | 600,822.87            | 576,052.60            | 24,770.26                   |
| Malawi        | 0.269               | 353,657.22            | 339,076.92            | 14,580.31                   |
| Mali          | 0.494               | 649,467.17            | 622,691.44            | 26,775.73                   |
| Mauritania    | 0.199               | 261,627.46            | 250,841.29            | 10,786.18                   |
| Mauritius     | 0.688               | 904,521.08            | 867,230.18            | 37,290.90                   |
| Mozambique    | 0.519               | 682,334.94            | 654,204.16            | 28,130.78                   |
| Namibia       | 0.757               | 995,236.13            | 954,205.30            | 41,030.83                   |
| Niger         | 0.290               | 381,266.15            | 365,547.60            | 15,718.55                   |
| Nigeria       | 12.904              | 16,965,029.03         | 16,265,607.88         | 699,421.16                  |
| Rwanda        | 0.300               | 394,413.26            | 378,152.69            | 16,260.57                   |
| Sahrawi Republic | 0.037 | 48,644.30          | 46,638.83             | 2,005.47                    |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | 0.014 | 18,405.95         | 17,647.13             | 758.83                      |
based on the capacity of the member state to pay, calculated using the gross national income of the member state, the population size, per capita income and the debt burden of member state (United Nations, 2016, 2017). The contribution by member states as alluded earlier is based on the ability of the member state to pay. This assumption is principally dependent on the GDP of member states, which does not take cognisance of other factors such as the means of production, volume of trade, inter-trade and many others. For instance, while the GDP of Nigeria has improved over time, the poverty levels and rate have also increased in geometric proportion: 38% in 1985, 43% in 1992, 47% in 1996, 54.7% in 2004 and 60.9% in 2010 (Aigbokhan, 2000; BBC, 2015; Nwabughiogu, 2015; Una, 2015).

Hence, while GDP may be on the rise in a country, if other weaknesses are bound, as weak: capacity, regional cooperation and integration, institutions and systems, governance, political economy, and nature of regionalism then the use of the GDP is inadequate (Ndaguba, 2016; Ndaguba et al., 2018). There might be no significant change in the well-being of the citizens. According to Miller, this is particularly worrisome for Southern African countries as some of these countries rely and make national budget on donor funding and international partners (Alemu and Lee, 2015).

Table 1. (Continued)

| Member states | Scale of assessment | 2015 Assessment (US$) | 2014 Assessment (US$) | Difference 2014/2015 (US$) |
|---------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| Senegal       | 0.761               | 1,000,494.97          | 959,247.33             | 41,247.64                  |
| Seychelles    | 0.058               | 76,253.23             | 73,109.52              | 3,143.71                   |
| Sierra Leone  | 0.142               | 186,688.94            | 178,992.28             | 7,696.67                   |
| Somalia       | 0.059               | 77,567.94             | 74,370.03              | 3,197.91                   |
| South Africa  | 12.904              | 16,965,029.03         | 16,265,607.88          | 699,421.16                 |
| South Sudan   | 0.625               | 821,694.29            | 787,818.11             | 33,876.18                  |
| Sudan         | 3.457               | 4,544,955.47          | 4,357,579.54           | 187,375.92                 |
| Swaziland     | 0.254               | 333,936.56            | 320,169.28             | 13,767.28                  |
| Togo          | 0.173               | 227,444.98            | 218,068.05             | 9,376.93                   |
| Tunisia       | 2.849               | 3,745,611.26          | 3,591,190.08           | 154,421.18                 |
| Uganda        | 0.924               | 1,214,792.84          | 1,164,710.30           | 50,082.54                  |
| UR of Tanzania| 1.215               | 1,597,373.70          | 1,531,518.41           | 65,855.29                  |
| Zambia        | 0.837               | 1,100,413.00          | 1,055,046.02           | 45,366.98                  |
| Zimbabwe      | 0.361               | 474,610.62            | 455,043.74             | 19,566.88                  |
| Total         | 100.000             | 131,471,086.74        | 126,050,898.00         | 5,420,188.74               |

Source: AU Handbook (2014).

Table 2. Elements of the Task on Tank partnership model

| Empowerment | Preparing to partner sustaining drive |
|-------------|--------------------------------------|
| Member-states collaborations | Assessing needs and strength |
| Coming together | |
| Financial realities | Viability |
| Landscape | Sustainability |
| Strengths focused | Creating common or shared vision and plan |
| Collective action | |
| Social justice | Evaluating and celebrating progress |
| Maintaining momentum | |

Source: Author’s configuration.
9. International partners
The Union relies extensively on external source to finance to fund its operation. The 2015 budget is a case in point, where international partners contributed about 40% of the total amount required of the operability of the AU and the same partners loan the AU about 30-40% of the monies for the operability of the Union, questions the notion of the Africa by Africans philosophy in all ramifications as pioneered by New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (AU 2015; Bostan, 2011). This is possibly one of the reasons why the regional economic development strategies are failing in protecting its citizenry.

10. Contextual background of SADC
The SADC is one of five regional economic communities in the African continent. It comprises of 15 member states before the reshuffling of region member states to 10 (SADC, 2015a). Its common agenda is to promote and encourage regional integration cum peace and security (Meessen, Bungenberg, & Puttler, 2009). The main goal of SADC member states is articulated in the Windhoek Treaty of 1992 (which transformed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference to SADC) was to establish full economic union with integrated monetary and fiscal systems as well as a regional parliament in 2034 (Reddy & Kauzya, 2015, p. 201). The objectives of SADC include the following: “To achieve peace and security; economic development and growth; enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa; alleviate poverty; and to support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration. These objectives are to be achieved through increased regional integration, built on democratic principles, through equitable and sustainable development” and peace and security (Reddy & Kauzya, 2015; SADC, 2015b, p. 201).

11. The idea of SADCSF
The SADCSF is one of the five African Standby Force mechanisms to “prevent dispute; observe and monitor mission”, the modalities and scope for interventions in conflict is enshrined in Article 4(h) and (i) of the Constitutive Act. The Act states that

Preventive deployment in order to prevent: a dispute or conflict from escalating in the region, an on-going violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring states or regions, and recovery of violence after parties to conflict have reached an agreement; peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; couple with humanitarian assistance in the region. As well as to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support other functions as may be authorized by the SADC Summit (Article 4 of the SADC MoU on SADCBRIG). (SADC, 2007)

In 2007, SADC formed an alliance of military cohesion that culminated in the SADCSF (formerly SADC Brigade) through the instrumentalities of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ. The aim of the Force is to promote quick response in conflict areas in accordance with Article 13 of the PSC Protocol of the African Union (Engel & Porto, 2010, pp. 133–137).

12. Composition of the SADCSF
The SADCSF is comprised of five independent components that work together to reduce threats and incidents of such threats in the SADC region (Baker & Maeresera, 2009, p. 106). The five components of the SADCSF include the following:

- Military, Police and Multidisciplinary Civilian Component,
- Planning Element (PLANEML),
- Southern Africa Defence and Security Management (SADSEM),
- Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) and
- Main Logistic Depot (MLD).
It is hoped that when fully operational, the Force may be guarantee sustainable peace and security in the region (Forward, 2010). However, without a security or peace fund of some sort established or any means through which the Force can generate its finances makes it difficult for this noble idea to be one of the many wish list of member states in the SASC region. While the funding streams were not established, the Force invoked timelines for intervention in conflict areas.

13. Southern African Development Community Standby Force funding mechanism
The SADCSF has no known funding mechanism other than its dependence on the African Standby Force (which is not also functional and poorly financed), the SADC region (which has multiple tasks without funds) and International Partners. The inability to establish a partnership model for funding PO in the region has limited the operability of the SADCSF.

13.1. The problem
Since the inauguration of the SADCSF in 2007, the Force has failed to intervene or prevent conflict in the region as a unit. Ojo asserts that the military is configured in a pyramid structure of authority and a major characteristic is the ability of a force to fight as a unit (Ojo, 2015, p. 67). In addition, the Force has five major components (Military, Police and Multidisciplinary Civilian Component, Planning Element, Southern Africa Defence and Security Management, Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, and the Main Logistic Depot) through which quick response is assured to combat threats and insecurities in the region. However, none of the five components is fully equipped or operational for PO, due to paucity of funds to equip and pay personnel. More worrisome is that of these mechanisms for the full operation of the SADCSF, there is no protocol or stipulation on how to fund the activities of any of these component or how income may be generated or disbursed when it begins to function. Hence, this study therefore tends to propose a viable partnership model that could generate funds based on a partnership model called Task on Tank for the SADCSF.

14. Basis for analysis

14.1. Analytical framework
This section presents a framework factoring means through sustainable financial management of a multinational force as the SADCSF is guaranteed. The argument ensued in this paper is that a suitable and sustainable funding model is the first step towards full functionality of the Force, towards achieving its aim quick intervention in conflict areas. Institutions saddled with the responsibility of coordination, strategic planning, compliance and priority setting must be optimally functional. In proposing the Task on Tank model, the study analyses five essential components in financial management towards creating a pathway for a pull-up factor. They include regional integration, economic landscape, fiscal viability, fiscal responsibility and fiscal sustainability. The reason for assessing economic frameworks is centered on the notion that funds derived from trade and investment are same funds injected into the economies of member states.

14.2. The pull-up factors
The pull-up factors are guides that promote the chances of the region in achieving economic growth and sustainable peace and security in the region.

14.3. Financial viability
The National Regulatory System for Community Housing Directorate (NRSCHD) (2014) sees financial viability as the ability of an institution or institutions to create adequate income for meeting the operational cost, payments of troops, debt commitments and where necessary to allow internal growth while it maintains its operation. Additionally, Koleda and Oganisjana (2015) noted that financial viability is a compound phenomenon that characterises various levels of usage of fiscal and any other resources for the realisation of the objective of an institution. In agreement to the assertions by NRSCHD and Koleda and Oganisjana, Ndaguba et al (2018, p. 7) concurs that financial viability deals with the capability “of an entity to continue to achieve its operating objectives and fulfill its mission over the long term”. According to Zhevak (2006),
financial/fiscal viability is an economic situation that condition and creates a prerequisites for stable and favorable steady reproduction process, income—expenditure ratio, and the effective and efficient disbursement of resources premised on the surrounding internal and external factor that confronts the agency (Ndaguba et al., 2018; Ndaguba & Okonkwo, 2017).

### 14.4. Fiscal sustainability

According to Krejdl, Balassone and Franco, fiscal sustainability is within the context of financial management in PO, which deals with the capacity of government agencies to maintain—currency viability or fluctuations, spendings, tax and any other factor resulting in the fulfillment of an operation without threat to the solvency of its liabilities (Ndaguba & Okonkwo, 2017; Krejdl, 2006, p. 3; Balassone & Franco, 2000). León (2001) highlights four pillars that guarantee financial sustainability in terms of generating income for an agency:

- **Financial and strategic planning:**
  
  Deals with the amount of funds the SADCSF needs to generate towards becoming operational, in addressing and ensuring that the Force is financially viable.

- **Income diversification:**
  
  This speaks to having alternative means of ensuring that the Force is a going concern. For instance, while the SADCSF have 15 state actors, it must look for other means through which fund can be generated in the region and possibly abroad. Hence, most member states in the region are financially handicapped.

- **Sound administration and finance:**
  
  It deals with sound bookkeeping and financial planning mechanism that insures prudent financial management of finance and other resources of the SADCSF.

- **Own income generation:**
  
  Diversification of the SADCSF funding pattern is of grave importance, in other for the principle of “cost lie where it falls” of NATO to be able to apply easily (NATO, 2018). Also there exists two principal methods through which funds can be generated internally: (i) funds from institutional building or operations and (ii) contributions to a trust/endowment fund (León, 2001). An understanding that the SADCSF and its principal (the ASF) have no known mechanism for generating funds internally other than reliance on international partners and the AU is both problematic and worrisome. It common a knowledge that both fiscal viability and sustainability may be unproductive and dysfunctional if a measure of fiscal responsibility is not sustained.

### 14.5. Fiscal responsibility

Fiscal responsibility is the ability of a member state to ensure that it fulfils what its obligations are in the peace arrangement. This idea is one that enjoys its popularity between politicians and administrators globally. In that, it is a measure that creates an atmosphere towards escaping financial irresponsibility and recklessness. Hence, Conover it is argued that fiscal responsibility is ‘a catch phrase that seemingly no politician can do without (Conover, 2012)’, which emphasises the need for a stability, fairness, efficiency, and transparency, cutting down debt, balanced budget, sustaining debt levels in relation to the size of the economy, and strengthening the economy (European Commission, 2014a, 2014b). Basically, the central idea of fiscal responsibility revolves in the strategies in managing methodologies for smart spending (fiscal discipline) and debt management. This is in tandem with the principles of good governance and monitoring and evaluation.
According to the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act of 2003 in India, fiscal responsibility implies institutionalised financial discipline exercised to reduce fiscal deficit and improve macroeconomic administration and the management of public funds to ensure a balanced budget. The ends of fiscal responsibility are to achieve a balanced budget, which tends to eliminate revenue deficits.

Fiscal responsibility speaks about the disbursement of funds to the three spheres of government. In addition to how the three spheres of government effectively and efficiently utilise the funds to achieve the aims of the government. Momoniat (2005) concurs to this assertion by stating fiscal responsibility in South Africa deals with how government revenues are shared and expended by the three spheres (national, provincial and municipal). Province receives 57.7%, municipal 4.7% and national 37.6% (Yemek, 2005). The basic assumption of the revenue sharing system of SA is that cost lie where they fall. In that, the three distinct spheres are financially responsible for the provision of the services that fall within its jurisdiction as seen in the provision of the constitution. A method of this nature is what the SADCSF through its various mechanism should adopt in order to become and sustain such responsibility; the various mechanisms must be able to generate and retain the finances it generates to enable the security operability of the organisation moving forward.

14.6. Economic landscape

There are 10 economic indicators that determine economic growth and development in a region. These are GDP, unemployment, interest rates, inflation, business spending, energy, housing, retail sales, trade deficit and practical economic columns (Payne, Somerville, Patterson, Sermeño, & Babb, 2015). While SADC member states have shown exceptional commitment in increasing GDP in the region (Bezuidenhout, 2015, p. 1), states such as Angola had a steady GDP over 10% in the past year, Mozambique 7.3%, Zambia 6.7%, Tanzania 6.6%, the Democratic Republic of Congo 6.6% and Botswana 5.3% (Zambia Daily Mail, 2015). According to the GDP in the region, the region has been placed amongst the fastest growing economies of developing nations across the world with a growth rate of between 5% and 7% annual GDP (Zambia Daily Mail, 2015). On the contrary, the GDP has had no effect on inflation, increasing unemployment, higher interest rates, decline in foreign direct investment, decline in retail sales, and increase in energy prices and housing (Payne et al., 2015). Scholars have argued that there are multiple approaches that accelerate economic growth and development. The most effective approach according to the AU, which the Union has prescribed, is regional cooperation or regional integration amongst member states in terms of trade, investment, shared capacity development, capital and production.

14.7. Regional integration/cooperation

Regional or continental unification otherwise integration has been argued as a basis for African growth and development. Nkrumah is thus referred as the father of Pan-Africanism for calling on unification/integration. In his book Africa Unite, Nkrumah admonished the continent to unite or perish (New African Magazine, 2013; Ojukwu, 2013). The concept of African unity is based on the assumption that regional integration and cooperation (trade and technology) is the only means through which Africa can bridge the gap between the South and the North (as proven China and India). This is one of the major reason for the establishment of NEPAD by the AU which is “to promote regional economic integration by bridging Africa’s Infrastructure gap” with the West (SADC, 2015c).

Frontrunners of the organisation as Thabo Mbeki were of the view that there will be no meaningful development in the continent, except the regions are properly harmonised in terms of regional economic trade unification.

In the SADC context, the vision of the AU is stimulated by the concept of a common future. This argues that the development of a member state is tied to the futuristic development in the neighbouring state. Based on the understanding that “35 percent of the population and one-
third of the economies in the continent trapped as landlocked countries whose trade and development depend on what happens in their coastal neighbors … most countries in Africa are small in size and hence their economic feasibility and global bargaining position individually are highly limited” (Geda & Hussein, 2015, p. 3).

From the SADC perspective, there are three major areas where regional integration will result in the realisation of the visions of the AU for the development community. The three major aspects are trade and investment, economics or political economy, and security. For the purposes of this paper, these three (trade and investment, economics or political economy, and security) are considered very imperative for peace and security in SADC, and on the other to generate funds for the Force.

It is true that trade breeds innovation, which in turn creates employment (trade–innovation–employment). This therefore reduces dependency and poverty ultimately in essence a balance of payment establishes a direct system of governance, which may lead to increase labour, prudent use of land, political will, increase transaction and strengthened regional governance and capacity in the SADC region. While security prepares the atmosphere for sustainable growth and development by dispersing conflict and any fear of violence or conflict in the region.

14.8. Contextualising the partnership funding model for SADCSF

The SADCSF does not have a stream through which it generates resources for its functionality officially, other than its reliance on its principal and/or international partners. This paper therefore proposes a partnership model for which the SADCSF can generate funds and guarantee quick intervention in conflict areas called Task on Tank model.

The central argument of the Task on Tank model is that for every task, certain tank, which justifies the ends to the task, is generated and guaranteed before the commencement of the operation. In this paper, the Task means mission, assignment or operation, and the Tank presupposes funds or resources that see to the ends of the Task. The hypothesis of this model is that for every Task, there must be a corresponding Tank adequate to ensure the realisation of the mission or operation in view. In that, for every vehicle that uses fuel, it must have fuel tank.

15. Conceptualising task on tank

15.1. Task

According to Borman and Motowidlo, Task is a function completed that ensures improvement or growth in an association or phenomena (Borman & Motowidlo, 1997), since completion of a task increases the chances to meet organisational goals. The ideological reference of the model is that every Task must have a corresponding Tank that fuels the Task. Furthermore, one Tank must serve a particular Task. Hence,

\[ T_1 = \text{One Task} \]

\[ T_2 = \text{One Tanks} \]

which simply states that for every mission there must be a corresponding budget.

Myra and Shelley put mildly that “if you chase two rabbits, both will escape” (2010). Hence, every Task must not lose track of its tanks vis-à-vis, because where there is no fund there is hardly any peace intervention/operation that occurs, otherwise the operation is compromised or aborted.

15.2. Tank

The Tank has to do with the resources for sponsoring a Task to its completion.
15.3. Covenant of task on tank model

The philosophy that underpins this analytical model is based on the fact that no military operation can be executed without planning, organising, strategy, coordination, combatant, surveillance and finance. Planning, surveillance and artillery, among others, are dependent on the amount of funds the agency has the capacity to spend. Without adequate funding, planning, organising, payment of soldiers and surveillance, among others, are impossible. This is why the study argues that finance is the first step in the series of steps towards the realisation of a Task.

The reason d'être for the proposition of a model to fund the SADCSF is based on the knowledge that the Force has no independent means of funding itself, to ensure that member states do not exert power from it or demand loyalty, to prevent the unintended consequence as witnessed in Rwanda. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda is a remembrance of one of several calamities that have befallen the continent, which the continent and its regions are not prepared to witness in the future. Also, with the mounting tension in South Africa and recent threats by opposition of an arm struggle to unearth the sitting president call for a galvanisation of operable military strength on regional basis to squash any form of threats in the region (Baum, 2011; He, 2014; Malema, 2016; Raborife, 2016; Thamm, 2016). Therefore, to curb futuristic bridge of security in the region, a functional and effective SADCSF is important. This is operability as argued in this paper is possible first if it generates its funds from within itself as a venture of military might. It is unarguable that funding PO is very expensive but so does ignoring threats to peaceful coexistence. Therefore, a proposition at a time when the funding supplies of the European Union and America are on the decline is most adequate in the region and the wider continent. However, this study is based on the Southern African narrative. Hence, it is pertinent that a funding model for quick intervention in conflict areas in the region is developed devoid of independent state influence which is needed urgently.

On this basis, a partnership model is proposed devoid of individual members bearing much of the burden of the arrangement rather on agreement. Intervention as well is voluntary and not compulsory, so is joining the regional security force. This model advocates for a kind of regional security on arrangement, that is, a member state is not automatically considered to be part of the Force except it agrees to the conditions of the force. Over the years, the idea of regional security has incorporated member states that are not interested in any security arrangement to be member of a security force. This paper’s model is of the view that though a member state might be a member of the regional economic community, it must not necessarily be a member of the security force. This is to ensure that interest is upheld over compulsion. It is in this instant that the partnership model proposes five primary assumptions that guides the model.

Assumption 1: The distance a car may cover is proportional to energy (fuel) expended. Therefore, the extent to which the SADCSF have a budget (a separate budget, that is, separate from the overall regional budget) to fund the five components of the Force is to that extent it functions.

The extent of any peace mission is dependent on the financial resources available and disposable by the force, with no clearly stated means of the SADCSF generating funds. It is quite hazy to stipulate where the SADCSF derive is funds. This leaves much to be desired considering that as a unit, the Force since its inauguration in 2007 had not carried out a single intervention as a combat squad. Allison and Jackson clearly demonstrate how finance impede operability of a force and at the same time determines the strength of a force. “Funding is key, funding is everything, and it determines capability, movement, equipment and maintenance, payments to injured soldiers. If we can sort that out, the rest can follow” (Allison, 2012). This implies that without funding, little or practically nothing can be achieved.

Assumption 2: Most cars that use fuel have one fuel tank to avoid unnecessary complication. So, it is proposed that there must be only one Force on regional scale in the region. And all resources for securing that region must be voted to the regional force in the region, in this case the SADCSF.
In that, multiplicity of security institutions dwindles financial capacity of any region, especially struggling regions.

**Assumption 3:** Intervention must be based on two dimensions: either the member state under attack is an active member state (fiscally responsible) of the regional security arrangement or for strategic gains (i.e. strategic importance which must be clear to all parties) accruing to member states.

**Assumption 4:** Proper monitoring of the inflow and outflow must be renewable, by using a graphical user interface as the dashboard.

**Assumption 5:** Recent events have shown that international organisations require cooperation and collaboration to strive. Therefore, every Task must be carried out through a collaboration framework and the Tank known since no nation in the region or continent is capable of providing military security alone.

Even the AU and the RECs have consistently argued that collaboration and collective action are the catalysts towards accelerated growth, peace and security, and development in the region and the wider continent. The niche here is that collective action is much profitable to individual action.

In utilising the ideas from the technology of a functional petro-car, the study argues that each element of a car is tied to another. As the battery to the engine, the radiator to the oil filter, etc., so it is with funding the Force, under the notion of a *common shared future* and the *Nkrumah mantra that development of a member state is tied to the development of its neighbour*. Emphases must be placed on the need for collection action and collective security of communities and nations in the Southern part of Africa. This implies that the future of each member state is inversely proportional to the functionality of the neighbouring states.

As conceptualised above and detailed through its assumptions, the Task on Tank has certain elements that play a significant part in the operability of the security arrangement.

**15.4. Elements of task on tank model**

The Tank on Tank model has five basic elements that condition the functionality of the SADCSF, derived from the idea of collective security and strategy theory and the analytical framework of this paper.

The five elements set in motion actions to be considered in adopting this model, as well as, the responsibilities of member states. See Figure 1 for the proposed Task on Tank Model for funding the SADCSF.

The consideration for the proposition of the Task on Tank Model in this paper is based on the understanding as stated elsewhere that the SADC Standby Force since inception in 2007 have not intervened in PO due to the lack of finance. In addition, the force do not have any known financial mechanism for generating funds. The model therefore proposes a means through which funds could be generated. Table 3 lists the conditions under which the model will function adequately, while Table 2 demonstrates the elements required for the partnership for funding the SADCSF.

**15.5. Limitation of the paper**

No matter how meticulous a research pretends or intends to be, the researcher will never be able to cover all the sectors of a topic (whether topical or trivial). However, the most the researcher is expected to do is to ensure that the research is of scientific merit, by ensuring that such a research is repetitive. Thus, this paper in no way pretends or intends to cover all the sectors relating to funding SADCSF or where attention given to the financial recklessness (such as issues of corruption, mismanagement, governance, xenophobia, and political cultures and alliance) of the elite within this community. The study argues that finance is the nucleus for intervention in any peace...
mission, in that without the financial aspect for peace intervention other challenges may not arise, because there may be no intervention, hence, probably the reason why the SADCSF have not intervened in any peace mission since inception in 2008.

16. Conclusion

Literature has shown that conflict, wars, terrorism and disharmony in a region dismay investors (see Afghanistan, Somalia, South Africa, DRC, Nigeria, etc.). In the same light, proliferations of study exist that established the connection between security and development (see Chandler, 2007; Stern & Öjendal, 2010; Uvin, 2012). In that, all terror and conflict challenges legitimate investors from participating in countries where insecurity was abound.

Peace and security is a key instrument in promoting and fostering regional integration, growth and development in a region or continent. Thus, Bösl's submission that regional integration as understood by RECs is the most important and successful instruments of economic growth, political cooperation, socio-economic development and general stability in a regions (Bösl, Breytenbach, Hartzenberg, McCarthy, & Schade, 2011). Since, regional integration strengthens economic growth and well-being of member states. Nonetheless, the nature of commodity, wealth, capital and resources needs to be reassessed and discussed to favour owners and occupants of land (Ndaguba & Okonkwo, 2017).

In sum, the study proposed a framework through which the SADCSF can generate fund for effective PO in the region and elsewhere, with an understanding of the condition for participation. This study argues that finance is the first step in multiple steps towards the realisation of a functional SADCSF. It also contends that without financial sustainability, financial viability, financial responsibility and regional integration, the functionality of the SADCSF will only be for a while or at worse a wishful thinking. In that, financial viability can only be realised where there is continuous balance of inflows and outflows of income with the support of fiscal sustainability and regional integration. It is only through fiscal responsibility of members of the region that fiscal sustainability of PO in the region and elsewhere in the continent can be guaranteed.

Finally, the Task on Tank model as argued in this paper acknowledges that among several steps towards the operability of the SADCSF. Finance is indeed the first of these many steps (see Jackson and Allison). Until the SADCSF maintain a proper balance of inflow and outflow, its operations will
### Table 3. Reflective process board of the Task on Tank model

| Preparing to partner | Shared common value and plan |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| Where to begin?      | How do I get everyone on board and on the same page? |
| (1) A familiarity must be drawn from those in the SADC region on who intends to be part of Standby Force. The first stage in this partnership process is to identify member states willingness to be a part of the Standby Force. |
| (2) Align the common goals and vision of member-states to ensure uniformity of thoughts and interests |
| (3) Align the visions and goals of the SADC Standby Force to the regional architecture of the region (OPSC) |
| (4) Use research-based evidence of how partnerships foster peace operation missions achievement in the region (contextual) |
| (1) What are the political, social and economic and culture of member states? |
| (2) What are the beliefs, attitudes, fears and values of member-states? |
| (3) What are the commonly shared security challenges of the member states? |
| (4) What are the commonly shared visions of the member states? |
| (5) Why should the UMPIRE (AU) give SADC Standby Force the opportunity to form this partnerships? |
| (6) What are its consequence of this partnership? |
| (7) Can a partner back down? |
| Use identified needs to create a partnership plan. |
| a. Build on existing partnerships. |
| b. Do not consider starting a new alliance if one exists earlier to avoid proliferation. |
| 2. The strategy must be shared with every partner. Feedback and ideas are helpful medium of strengthening the partnership |
| 3. The strategy should be based collective action and democracy. |
| 4. A logical model must be established that guarantees transparency and representation |
| 5. The financial plan should be threefold: |
| a. A 1-year financial plan |
| b. A 1–3-year financial plan |
| c. A 3–5-year financial plan |
| 5. A timeline of the operations and activities of the partners must be clearly known yearly |
| 1. What procedure and implementation techniques will be used in achieving the plan? |
| 2. What is the time line for implementing a plan? |
| 3. How will barriers and challenges such as non-payment and withdrawal from an operation affect the plan? |
| 4. What are the pros and cons of involving external forces? |
| What role can the media play or are there benefits for involving the media? |

(Continued)
Table 3. (Continued)

Assessing strategic needs and strength
How to identify the goals of the partnership?
(1) Organise a conference to ascertain the needs and strengths of the member states (assuming anything at any time is dangerous in partnership).
(2) Conduct needs assessment surveys with member states on what the partnership aims to achieve and on what circumstance or ground should the force intervene in PKO (not premised on the overall framework of the UN, AU or EU rather based on indigenous knowledge).
(3) Conduct one-on-one needs and strengths assessment of member-states to actualise where their strengths and weaknesses lies (some member states might be poor in finance but might have dedicated soldier some sharp shooter others good pilots). Talk to all member states.
(4) Community policing must be encouraged, thereby involving the communities in the securitisation of the region.
(5) Individuals of influence (social, political and cultural heads and personalities) must be involved in generating funds for the Force.
(6) Ascertain the effectiveness of the RECs and its institutional alliance.
(7) Formulate a framework/roadmap that invokes or engages the community.

Collectivity
How to bring about togetherness, oneness and unity?
1. Identify the strengths of each member state and assign such member state with a task its best effective for in the plan.
2. Assess the diagnosed strengths and needs of member states.
3. Feedback of identified needs and strengths and ideas member states must be taken to account.
4. Liaise with cultural, social and political blocs and individual and groups of influence in member states.
5. Help member states in understanding the vision, missions and strategy.

(1) What is the status of the civilian component in member states?
(2) What are the ends of any/every intervention?
(3) What are the strengths and needs of the military component in member states?
(4) What are the strengths and needs of the police personnel in member state?
(5) What partnerships lesson can be learned from other existing Standby Force? For instance what is the ECCAS doing that works that SADC Standby Force could learn from?

(1) Who are the potential partners?
(2) Who determine what constitute a security risk or threat to regional peace?
(3) Determine the diagnosed cultural, political and social blocs and individuals of influence in each member states?
(4) What are the roles of member states in times of conflict?

(Continued)
| Table 3. (Continued) |
|----------------------|
| **Collective action** |
| How and what are the desired outcome? |
| 1. Delegate responsibilities to member states and partners. |
| 2. Formulated partnership agreement based on common shared threat must be implemented. |
| 3. Plan strategically to overcome challenges anticipated, but this must not hinder implementation anyway. |
| 4. Embrace media. |
| (1) Determine the methods and techniques to be used in the implementation stage? |
| (2) Every programme implementation must have a time line for such implementation plan |
| (3) How will partners and member states overcome challenges and barriers anticipated? |
| 4. Is there any benefit in involving the media? |
| **Impact assessment** |
| Determine how and who determines success or failure of the partnership venture? |
| 1. Impact is critical to accountability and evaluation. |
| 2. Monitor and evaluate the results the finances have achieved in an operation. |
| 3. Measure the implementation processes to ensure procedures are not subverted. |
| 4. Successful accomplishment should be shared, celebrated and rewarded. |
| (1) How and who measures and evaluate results of the partnership? |
| (2) Who should identify and report the differences made through the partnership? Taking into cognisance, what worked? What did not work? why it failed or was successful? And what can be learnt. |
| 3. How would partners be celebrated? |
| **Maintaining momentum** |
| How will the partnership be sustained? |
| 1. Constantly revisit the plan. |
| 2. Evaluation results must be improved upon. |
| 3. Partners and member states feedback must be improved upon in revisiting the plan. |
| 4. New plans must be shared and communicated to all stakeholders. |
| 5. In any case of disturbance or insecurity within a region, member states and partners must be put on high alert. |
| 6. Source for possible new partners and member states that would add value to the partnership. |
| (1) What strategies could be used in sustaining the partnership? |
| (2) How can the partnership be improved upon? |
| (3) What are the requirements for admittance into the partnership? |
| (4) Who are the new partners and member states? |
| (5) What do they have to offer? |

Source: Author’s configuration
be always be compromised. This paper recommends that citizens, multinationals, NGOs and the wider community organisations in the region must support the funding of PO through a trust (see Figure 2 for alternative funding model).

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Note
1. Sections 9 and 10(4) of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act (Act 97 of 1997). Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, sections 26, 27, and 29.

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