GOVERNANCE IN THE ARAB REGION: ADDRESSING CHALLENGES AND ENVISAGING THE FUTURE

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Abstract

When the Arab Uprisings began in 2011, citizens called for dignity, democracy and social justice. Instead of witnessing the birth of more pluralistic societies and stronger governance systems, the past years have brought the Arab region only renewed authoritarianism, conflict, and yet weaker state systems. The regional governance deficit is creating a striking underperformance of most Arab governments in political and socioeconomic development terms. To limit the damage of this downward trend, Arab governments must adopt a 2030 Vision of governance reforms to increase political participation and political freedoms, to ratify and implement international human rights conventions and transitional justice measures, adopt population policies that reflect the region’s changing demographic realities, reduce poverty through economic reform and combat corruption. The 2030 Vision will ensure the region enjoys a new era of inclusive, accountable and effective governance and the consequent benefits for sustainable development.

Keywords: Governance, Democracy, Economic Governance, Human Rights, Political Participation, Development, Poverty, Investment, Corruption, Demographics

1. INTRODUCTION

Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that, ‘good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development’ (UN 1998). Indeed, good governance is generally agreed to benefit societies across the board, from correct and efficient use of aid to effective resource management and consequent gains in growth and productivity. Good governance also advances political inclusiveness and builds trust in government institutions, hence securing the stability of the state and its ability to commit to development work (UNESCWA, 2015). In light of the role governance plays in achieving development and as a worthy goal in itself; this paper will present the necessity for good governance in the Arab region, the current challenges to its implementation and the future of governance in the region.

There is no commonly agreed meaning of governance, but this study will proceed with an understanding of governance as the process by which authority is conferred on rulers, by which they make the rules, and by which those rules are enforced (The World Bank). Governance can be measured by analysing voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption (The World Bank, 2013).

The governance deficit in the Arab region is severe. Whilst the region is highly diverse and each country possesses its own unique socio economic reality, the similarities which exist between the countries go some way in providing a context for the governance challenges. These include (UNESCWA, 2014):

- Economic and political power controlled by few elites
- Political economy shaped by external revenues, such as oil, aid or remittances
- Economic opportunities rationed by connection rather than competition
- Centralised states, dominated by the public sector and a weak private sector
- A security state, with an extensive and fierce coercive apparatus
- Demographic change and resulting youth bulges

These points highlight the underlying absence of meaningful social contracts between states and citizens across the Arab region (Cammack & Muasher, 2016). Indeed in a recent survey from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace only 4 of the 93 participants expressed satisfaction with their governments (Cammack & Muasher, 2016), (see also figure 2 and 3). The problem of governance is particularly dire in those Arab countries in situations of conflict or transition, namely Libya, Syria and Yemen. In these states it is difficult to problematise governance challenges when little official form of government exists.

The Arab region performs poorly on several of the World Bank Governance Indicators. 4 out of 6 of the World Bank Governance Indicators indicate negative linear trends for the region. As figure 1 demonstrates, the region displays a striking negative trend particularly in Political Stability, Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability and Control of Corruption.
These governance challenges are problematic in and of themselves, but also indicative of a "striking underperformance of most Arab governments in political, economic and social terms" (Tisdall, 2011, p. 1). The Arab Knowledge Report (Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation & UNDP, 2009, p. 64) emphasises:

"The restrictions imposed on public freedoms, alongside a rise in levels of poverty and poor income distribution ... have led to an increase in marginalisation of the poor and further distanced them from obtaining their basic rights to housing, education and employment, contributing to the further decline of social freedoms."

Indeed, poor economic governance, corruption, cronyism, heavy centralisation and political instability all contribute to reduced economic activity, poor foreign investment, high market entry barriers, increased unemployment and reduced GDP growth (UNESCWA, 2014). Similar effects are felt in the social realm, government ineffectiveness contributes to poor provision of public services and hence reduced access to the consequent human development benefits. This can result in dissatisfaction and unrest (Brix, Lust, & Woolcock, 2015). Meanwhile highly centralised unaccountable governments and non-participatory political systems reduce the chances of democratic transition and increase political instability (Khatib, 2013) and extremism. In the above mentioned survey by the Carnegie Centre the vast majority of participants surveyed, 88%, attributed the lack of political pluralism in the Arab region as contributing to the extremist wave confronting the Middle East (Cammock & Muasher, 2016).

A mixture of these socio-political and governance challenges provided the impetus to the Arab Uprisings of 2011 (Dalacoura, 2012). Despite this movement's root demands for good governance, the state of governance after the uprisings has largely failed to meet the expectations of those who partook. Social inequalities remain unaddressed, democratic ideology peaked during the early uprisings and declined rapidly into wars of discourse. This has left many states struggling in an environment wholly uncongenial to democracy or good governance (Hinnebusch, 2015). In Egypt, promised democratisation was lost in a bloody contest over the new political order and a resurgent authoritarianism (Bentivoglio & Brown, 2014). In Bahrain a non-violent nationalist uprising was crushed by regime forces and in Yemen a negotiated transition was arranged, but political morass since 2011 has led to the flight of the president, political unrest and a humanitarian crisis. Meanwhile the removal of the authoritarian regime in Syria resulted in a civil war and the decimation of the social fabric of the country. In Libya too, the removal of a highly centralised authoritarian leader unleashed forces which now threaten to tear the country apart. The resulting political and security vacuum in Libya has proven fertile ground for the growth of extremist groups (Salloukh, 2015). In all these cases despite a popular call for democratisation and a frustration with the corrupt modes of government, the governance gap has only widened as a result of the events of recent years.

It is clear the Arab region is in urgent need of a vision that tackles its institutional, political, and economic challenges and proposes innovative solutions to the governance deficit in the region. This paper will assess the key challenges to governance in the Arab region, including political participation, human rights, transitional justice, demographics, poverty and inequality, financial planning and corruption.
Figure 5. People’s perceptions concerning various governance-related issues

Source: Own graphs based on Gallup Analytics data
Figure 6. People’s perceptions concerning various governance related issues (continued)

Source: Own graphs based on Gallup Analytics data
Priorities for action will be defined and recommendations made so that by 2030 the region may hope to enjoy a new era of inclusive, accountable and effective governance. To better outline a visionary path to conquer governance challenges, the paper moves away from the traditional geographic or economic country groupings distinguishing between countries and instead analyses countries through the prism of those affected by conflict, vulnerable to conflict and stable countries.

2. VISION 2030: PRIORITIES FOR CHANGE

2.1. The challenge of political participation

As Verba and Nie (1987, p. 2) define it, "political participation refers to those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take". Political participation can be formal, in the sense of voting for a political candidate or informal through use of social networks, underground political movements, and social movements to challenge the political order (Khatib, 2013). Participation can be considered as narrowly as casting a vote or as broadly as the freedom to speak out, assemble and associate (UNWomen, 2005). Ideally participation creates greater government transparency and accountability and hence improved economic and social policies for all strata of the population. The current chapter will analyse the existing challenges to political participation in the Arab region from prevailing political systems, to institutional barriers, motivation to participate in political activities and demographic barriers.

2.1.1. Political systems and modes of governance

Each different political system in the region, (see Annex) affords different channels, degrees and barriers to political participation. This section will move forward with an analysis of the current modes of governance in the Arab region and how these impact on political participation.

Four years ago the prevailing modes of governance in the Arab region, that of highly centralised authoritarian monarchies and presidential republics, was brought into question by the events of the Arab Uprisings and its demands for democracy, social justice and political freedoms (Dunne, 2013). Despite these demands the region has seen a return towards authoritarianism and renewed restrictions on political rights and freedoms. Citizens have little and in some cases even less voice in running their country’s affairs than before the uprisings (Muasher, 2016). Only Tunisia has made a democratic transition (Freedom House, 2016) and even here some concerns persist, the governing coalition is fractious, it has failed to implement economic reforms and the ruling party split a little less than a year into power, in part because of moves by the President to install his son as a political heir (The Economist, 2016b).

Egypt, political rights are fragile largely due to tactics such as marginalisation of the opposition, state surveillance of the public and unjustified imprisonments that have become the norm after the military counter revolution against the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood (Freedom House, 2015). Since taking power the Egyptian state has made moves to strengthen and centralise the authority of state institutions (Bentivoglio & Brown, 2014) whilst minimizing political opposition and pluralism. This has been aided by a string of legal initiatives including the Protest Law which limits citizens' ability to protest, either by restricting freedom of assembly or by permitting broad definitions of terrorism, sabotage, or inciting violence. Other legislation, such as bans on politically affiliated groups on university campuses, have further clamped down on political expression. Political freedoms in Egypt have become weak and contained and any attempt to take political expression to the street is met with force (Bentivoglio & Brown, 2014). A recent survey by Freedom House ranked political participation in Egypt at just 4/16 (Freedom House, 2015).

In Jordan the pattern is similar with a continued tendency towards autocratic governance and a lack of commitment to genuine democratic reform (Freedom House, 2015). Whilst in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings promises were made of parliamentary and electoral reforms, no timetable was defined for the former and whilst the latter was amended, only the margins were changed, with the core of the system unchanged (Gause, 2013). Opposition to the monarchy has been curtailed, opposition is restricted, in June 2013 in response to protests, the Jordanian government shut down nearly 200 news websites and used state security courts, where there is no right to appeal, to try civilians for participating in protests (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

Similarly in Morocco recent years have seen a lack of commitment to reforms towards more participatory politics. Parliamentary reforms and constitutional changes were made though did little to limit the power of the King. Instead the reforms outlined an ambiguous role for the monarch and maintained his position as head of state and commander of the armed forces. The reforms amounted to more of a “tactical victory for regime stability than the beginning of real political reform” (Gause, 2013, p. 16).

The Gulf’s dynastic monarchs have an infamously poor relationship with political participation. Some responses to the Arab Uprisings were made for instance municipal elections were held in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The more prevalent reaction of the dynamic monarchs however was to involve security forces and to crack down on political dissent (Gause, 2013). Thus the unsurprisingly dire statistics on the Gulf’s political participation (see table 1).

Table 9. Political Participation in the Gulf

| Country     | Saudi Arabia | UAE | Qatar | Bahrain |
|-------------|--------------|-----|-------|---------|
| Political Participation | 0/16 | 2/16 | 2/16 | 2/16 |
| Pluralism    |              |     |       |         |

Source: Freedom House, 2015

Even in the region’s more stable environments political participation remains minimal. Lebanon has experienced a downward trend in political freedoms in recent years which has materialised in the Lebanese parliament’s failure to elect a new president and its postponement of overdue legislative elections for two and a half years. This has left the country with a National Assembly whose mandate expired in 2013 and elections delayed until 2017 at the earliest (Freedom House, 2015).
In Syria, Libya and Yemen space for political participation is largely marred by the ongoing violence, human rights abuses and consequent humanitarian crises. If and when elections do occur, for example the Syrian parliamentary elections in April 2016, they are too fractional for an event to be considered legitimate (The Economist, 2016a). Prevailing political systems and their methods of governing go some way in explaining the barriers to political participation in the Arab region.

2.1.2. Institutional and Political Barriers

Khatib (2013) raises several challenges to political participation in the Arab region including; the endurance of formal political institutions that benefit from sustaining the old political status quo. For example in Egypt, the military has played a decisive role in Egyptian politics in both the post-Mubarak and post-Morsi era, where they continue to encroach on civil society, exert political control and make it difficult for new political entities to enter the formal political sphere (Khatib, 2013). Another challenge is the overlap between the political environment and the social and economic spheres, the Arab economic elite and the political elite which infringes on the neutrality of political decision making. Similarly on the social level, political institutions are often infused with sectarian or tribal politics which reduces the institutions’ ability to serve the public good. Further threatening political participation is that, for countries in transition, as much of the Arab region is, the public often yearns for stability and security which attracts citizens towards voting for established political entities rather than emerging parties. This can lead to the entrenchment of traditional parties and limit the participation of new political entities (Khatib, 2013).

Other hurdles include the fear and reluctance to permit certain ideologies a foothold in the politics of the Arab region. This is particularly notable with regard to Islamist parties (The Economist, 2016b). In Algeria an insurgency that continues until this day was unleashed as a result of the cancellation of an election that expected an Islamist victory. In Palestine, the population fell into a form of Arab authoritarianism due to a refusal to accept the victory of Hamas in a 2006 parliamentary election. Similarly the military coup in Egypt against the elected Muslim Brotherhood has led to an even more authoritarian and oppressive government today.

2.1.3. Motivation for political participation

There is a strong link in the Arab world between political participation, specifically voting, and personal economic circumstance. Blaydes (2008) argues that parliamentary elections are an important device for the distribution of rents, promotions and state resources to important groups, Lust-Okar (2009, p. 122) calls this “competitive clientelism”. Such realities are harmful to the actualisation of democratic practice as those who have used clientelist networks in the past are more likely to vote than are individuals who have never been involved in clientelist networks (Tessler, Jamal, & Miguel, 2008). In additional people with low incomes are more likely to be targeted for patronage because their “votes are more easily bought and their reliance on state patronage is higher” (Blaydes, 2006) and (Tezcur, 2008) in (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009, p. 409). This trend undermines the existence of political participation in the Arab region as it posits that political candidates are elected on the basis of expected returns rather than actual identification of voters with policy issues. (Blaydes, 2008; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Tessler et al., 2008).

2.1.4. Demographic challenges

Beyond these institutional barriers to participation there are also population specific barriers including illiteracy, expense, lack of access to information and institutionalised gender biases (UNESCO, 2006). The diversity of the population of the Arab region is also problematic as each group fears that rivals will capture the state, its resources and its monopoly of the use of violence (The Economist, 2016b). This means that whilst political opportunity is limited for many in the Arab region it is particularly difficult to access for certain groups including women, youth, ethnic and religious minorities.

All of this means poor statistics for formal political participation in the Arab region. Across the region just 61% they have voted in the last 12 months or in the more distant past (Pew Research Centre, 2014). In the countries in conflict political participation is a distant concern, while for relatively stable countries voting is not a given. In Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, national elections have not been held in five or more years (Pew Research Centre, 2014). These trends are disconcerting and have a negative impact on governance quality. Poor political participation infers a low level of government accountability and hence government effectiveness, control of corruption, and political management (Nekola, 2006). As such the 2030 Vision for Governance in the Arab Region must provide counter measures against poor political participation in the region.

2.2. Governance challenges related to human rights

In their recent annual report, Human Rights Watch (2015, p. 1) globally reviews human rights issues at the country-level and emphasises the main governance challenge: “The once-heralded Arab Spring has given way almost everywhere to conflict and repression. Islamist extremists commit mass atrocities and threaten civilians throughout the Middle East and parts of Asia and Africa. [...] Many governments have responded to the turmoil by downplaying or abandoning human rights...”

That subordination of human rights is not only wrong, but also shortsighted and counterproductive. Human rights violations played a major role in spawning or aggravating most of today’s crises. Protecting human rights and enabling people to have a say in how their governments address the crises will be key to their resolution. Particularly in periods of challenges and difficult choices, human rights are an essential compass for political action.”

The report singles out the emergence of ISIS, the wars in Syria and Iraq, the growing repression in Egypt and the unrelenting Israeli-Palestine conflict as major human rights challenges in the region. These challenges not only impact the countries directly involved but also spill-over across the whole Arab region. Seemingly aware of the fundamental role of human rights, policy-makers appear unable to translate the core human rights values into action. Despite significant revisions of a 1994 version, the
“Arab Charter on Human Rights in its current form [as adopted in 2004] is inconsistent with international human rights standards and lacks effective guarantees to ensure the aspirations of Arab people for an effective human rights system” (International Federation for Human Rights, 2013). As a result, the League of Arab States is not “consistent in its decisions on human rights issues throughout the Arab region and needs to address other pressing human rights situations in the Arab Region with the same degree of determination and persistence it has shown over the situation in Libya and Syria” (International Federation for Human Rights, 2013). Ideally commitments towards human rights are anchored in national constitutions thereby setting an inviolable legal framework, however high-level of de facto protection of human rights can work without strong de jure provisions (see table 2). Governance vis-à-vis women’s rights are strongly linked to overall human rights challenges. Gender equality and women’s participation in political, economic and social life remains mired in traditional world views. While some progress is made in some countries lag distinctly behind or even deteriorate.

### Table 10. Human rights related procedural rules and their administration

| De jure provisions on human rights | De facto provisions on human rights |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| • The effectiveness of international human rights treaties as well as national de jure provisions on human rights contained in the constitution of the state, include in context of corruption, authoritarian systems with at least a modest level judicial independence that do not already a high-level of de facto rights protection. Corruption is generally associated with negative effects to human rights protection in all spheres and the “consequences of corruption governance are multiple and touch on all human rights — civil, political, economic, social and cultural, as well as the right to development. Corruption leads to violation of the government’s human rights obligation “to take steps… to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of this Covenant [on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights].” The corrupt management of public resources compromises the government’s ability to deliver an array of services, including health, educational and welfare services, which are essential for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights. Also, the prevalence of corruption in public services inaccessibility to those deprived the authorities to act in their personal interest, including by offering bribes. The economically and politically disadvantaged suffer disproportionately from the consequences of corruption, because they are particularly dependent on public goods.” (OHCHR, 2014) |
| • Continuing the discussion on security sector reform above, Roach (2013, p. 5) points out for Tunisia: “The August 2012 draft Constitution contained a broad array of rights including an absolute prohibition on torture (Art. 2.2) and broad protections for freedom of association (Art. 2.11), assembly (Art. 2.13), and expression (Art. 2.26). These rights and protections have been carried through into the December 2012 and April 2013 draft Constitutions. It is, however, sobering to reflect that the 1959 Constitution contained many of the same guarantors. Rights cannot exist only on paper. The legislature, the courts and executive watchdogs such as the proposed National Authority on Human Rights must vigilantly protect human rights.” |
| • De facto protection of human rights depends on the strength of a portfolio of institutions, with emphasis on executive and judiciary ones. |
| • De jure provisions on women’s rights: The Council of Europe defines “gender equality as equal visibility, empowerment and participation of both sexes in all spheres of public and private life” (Committee on Rules of Procedure and Institutions Affairs, 2014). The gender and corruption nexus can be explained both via non-economic and economic determinants for corruption (see table 1). The effectiveness of the gender mainstreaming “…is the process whereby a gender perspective is included from the earliest planning stages to final decisions on policy or implementation in a specific field.” (Committee on Rules of Procedure (Immunities and Institutional Affairs), 2014) |
| • De facto provisions on women’s issues: The translation of de jure provisions on women’s rights is translated into de facto by “Gender mainstreaming” […] the process whereby a gender perspective is included from the earliest planning stages to final decisions on policy or implementation in a specific field.” (Committee on Rules of Procedure (Immunities and Institutional Affairs), 2014) |
| • Only aggregate measures of corruption exist, which fail to measure direct impact on citizens as well as do not disaggregate by gender. (Hossain, Musenbi, & Hughes, 2010) |
| • Correlating women’s participation with corruption, researchers argue the higher the involvement of women in public offices the lower corruption as they less conduct or are involved in corrupt practices, because: “First, women may be brought up to be more honest or more risk averse than men, or even feel there is a greater probability of being caught.” Second, women, who are typically more involved in raising children, may find they have to practice honesty in order to teach their children the “appropriate values.” Third, women may feel more than men “are more of those left to protect them and therefore be more willing to follow rules.” Lastly, girls may be brought up to have higher levels of self-control than boys which affects their propensity to indulge in criminal behaviour.” (Swamy, Knack, Lee, & Axford, 2000) |
| • The relationship between better women’s participation and lower levels of corruption appears not universally applicable, a new theory (Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2014) using data from 70 democracies tries to explain why women’s representation is sometimes related to lower levels of corruption: “greater risk aversion has been observed in women, and there is evidence that voters hold women to a higher standard at the polls” (OECD, 2014) |

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17 See for more information (OHCHR, 2014)
18 To ascertain the implementation of de jure human rights the CIRI Human Rights Data Project dataset contains standards-based quantitative information on government respect for 15 internationally recognized human rights for 202 countries, annually from 1981-2011 (http://www.humanrightsdatal.org/)
19 See for more information. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaf/publication/en/publications/womens-empowerment/corruption-accountability-and-gender-understanding-the-connection/Corruption-accountability-and-gender.pdf and https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2014/methodology/

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In her comment on the Arab Charter on Human Rights, Rishmawi (2009) emphasises political will and civil society participation as key ingredients for a successful pan-Arab human rights policy:

“…success of the Charter will depend on how seriously states and Arab Human rights organizations decide to take it. Aside from the obvious question of whether Arab states will follow through in making actual changes in law and practices to conform to the Charter, there is the question of whether Arab civil society organizations will engage in the process in the same way they do with other regional and international systems. For the Charter to succeed in furthering human rights, Arab governments would have to be willing to re-open the debate on some provisions that clearly contradict international standards. Another measure of the significance of the Charter will be whether, once states submit their reports on measures they have taken to conform to the Charter, serious debates on human rights start to take place within the walls of the Arab League.”

2.3. Transitional justice challenges

Transitional justice measures in the Arab region are necessary for the evolution towards democratic governance systems. Transitional justice refers to “the full set of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuse, in order to secure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (United Nations, 2004, p. 4). With several countries in the region currently suffering from different forms of conflict, transitioning from autocracy to democracy and being perpetually on the brink of relapsing into conflict, reconciliation and transitional justice measure are key political development strategies. Tools to achieve transitional justice include: (a) achieving accountability through the prosecutions of perpetrators; (b) revealing the truths behind victims suffering through truth commissions; (c) designing reparation programmes, both material and symbolic, in an attempt to compensate for victims’ suffering; (d) institutional reforms and awareness-raising, to avoid future violations” (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2013, p. 1).

In the past a number of countries in the region have used transitional justice as a component transitional justice requires a consolidated approach to rebuild the state’s security sector that is thoroughly grounded in the (new) constitution of the respective country. For example, in the case of Tunisia (Roach, 2013) it is suggested that security forces report to a cabinet member and not directly the President to prevent accumulation of presidential power. The security sector especially in transition countries may also require capacity-building for a better understanding of the difference between their roles and responsibilities under democratic vs. authoritarian rule of law.

3.4. Addressing the governance challenge of rapid population growth

High population growth and weak economic performance are considered contributing factors of political instability (Urdal, 2004, 2011). Therefore, the ‘Vision 2030’ for the Arab region needs to include coping strategies to deal with quantitative (i.e. youth bulge) as well as qualitative demographic challenges:

“Changing age structures, combined with other demographic trends have exacerbated the challenges to governments, particularly regarding unemployment, underemployment and job creation. […] The number of youth more than doubled since 1980 and its share in the population is at an all-time high […] the absolute number of youth is estimated to increase by 12 million by 2025. […] The reduction of high fertility and increases in the working-age population can create opportunities for economic growth if the right mix of educational, health, and labor-market policies are in place. For Arab countries to reap the benefit from this “demographic dividend”, employment generation must keep pace with the large number of job seekers, which has not been the case in the recent past.” (Mirkin, 2013, pp. 7-8).
Table 11. Illustrative sample of current transitional justice challenges in the Arab Regions

| Challenge                                                                 | Country Examples                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Prosecution:                                                             | Egypt: “trials of former President Mubarak, his sons, and those officials immediately around him are centered on corruption...Addressing gross human rights violations that happened over the last thirty years remains a challenge. Despite demands by the Tahrir protesters for this file to be opened, only small steps have been taken in this direction.” |
| Main dilemma: 1) the scope of jurisdiction over crimes; 2) relations with the International Criminal Court (ICC); and the 3) issue of amnesty | Libya: “the ICC has jurisdiction. Yet there is now much confusion about how to deal with one indictee for crimes against humanity, Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi, son of the late leader Muammar Qaddafi. Libya wishes to try him at home.” |
|                                                                           | Yemen: Amnesties are not permissible if they prevent the prosecution of individuals who may be criminally responsible for international crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and gross violations of human rights. In violation of this principle, the Amnesty Law adopted by the Yemeni Parliament on January 21, 2012, purports to grant: (1) full immunity to Ali Abdullah Saleh, and (2) partial immunity to “officials who worked with the President in the civil, military and security institutions of the state” in criminal prosecution “in relation to politically motivated acts performed” by them, with the exception of “acts of terrorism.” |
| Truth:                                                                   | Egypt: “some domestic efforts, including the Commission on Investigation into the Abuses Committed After 17 December 2010 (Bourdabala Commission), and a commission established by the National Council for Human Rights in Egypt to examine events that took place following the revolution of January 25, 2011. None of these efforts, however, amounts to a full-fledged truth commission.” |
| The right to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes and about circumstances and reasons that led to them. Can be undertaken by truth commissions, commissions of inquiry, or other fact-finding mechanisms | Libya and Syria: Reports of the fact-finding missions and international commissions of inquiry on Libya and Syria, established pursuant to resolutions of the Human Rights Council, have been instrumental in shedding light on human rights violations, and have made recommendations for accountability and broader transitional justice measures |
| Reparations:                                                             | There have been demands for reparations throughout the region. In some countries, a monetary compensation is now being considered. In Tunisia a limited monetary compensation was handed out to the victims of the events following the protests of December 17, 2010, or their families. However, these efforts remain limited and ad hoc. |
| include restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction       | In Tunisia a limited monetary compensation was handed out to the victims of the events following the protests of December 17, 2010, or their families. However, these efforts remain limited and ad hoc. |
| Institutional Reform, Including the Vetting:                            | Egypt and Tunisia: to date, free and fair elections (early on in the democratic transition, an ambitious gender parity law was introduced in Tunisia). The reform of the security service and the ministry of interior were among the main demands of the protesters in Tunisia and Egypt. |
| with great sensitivity, and due process standards and principles of non- | In Yemen, the reform of the military was a main demand in Yemen. |
| discrimination observed throughout these processes.                     | “While there are commendable and vibrant discussions in the region about transitional justice, these discussions are yet to be structured as national consultations” |
| National Consultations:                                                  | Libya: lack of public consultation during the drafting of the Transitional Justice Law contributed to misconceptions about its scope and content. Following the adoption of the law, seven out of ten persons (all judges and all men) appeared to have been appointed to the commission established under this law, without any transparent selection process. |
| Time-consuming, meaningful public participation and broad-based         | Yemen: draft Law on Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation was elaborated without consultations |
| consultations, with the inclusion of victims, youth, women, and         | Country Examples                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| traditionally marginalized groups, to allow sharing their priorities for achieving accountability and sustainable peace. |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |

Source: Mona Rishmawi, 2012

While the region slowly transitions to lower population growth and fertility rates, the consequences of historically unaddressed demographic challenges continue to translate into low labour participation, including limited empowerment of women, while straining the environment and stretching infrastructure beyond its limits. This variation in the annual rate of population change differs strongly between the countries in the Arab region and among the country groupings of this report. Tunisia and Egypt have seen relatively stable population growth rates that will not change drastically until 2030, but the other countries considered vulnerable to conflict outbreak, Jordan and Lebanon, will see a recognisable drop in population growth (see figure 4). Gulf countries, in particular Oman and the UAE, are expected to see a drastic decline in population growth rates by 2030 (see figure 6). Most interestingly, the population change rate in conflict countries is expected to remain stable at a relatively high level over the two decades to come (see figure 5). Policy responses require an upgrade to the education systems (especially secondary education) as well as innovative approaches to employment generation. Furthermore, urbanisation and housing concerns need to feature in national infrastructure planning to prevent the emergence of urban segregation and “slum-isation” which would be detrimental to citizen welfare (UN-HABITAT, 2015).

2.5. Reducing poverty and income/wealth inequalities through accountability

In 2013, the Arab Millennium Development Goals Report revealed the mystery of low poverty rates in just 4 percent in the region measured by using the extreme poverty line of 1.25 USD (PPP) per day. Applying more realistic poverty lines, i.e. 2 USD (PPP) per day and 2.75 USD (PPP) per day, the poverty levels rise to 19 percent and 40 percent in the region respectively (Sarangi & Abu-Ismail, 2015).
Over the next decades policy makers in the Arab region need to address poverty rates and ponder the following questions: “(i) Which institutional reforms are likely to lead to a competitive (or at least a contestable) political system, where political competition among elites leads to centralised political power and thus more effective provision of maximum social benefit to the poorer classes? (ii) Which institutional reforms can improve the political cohesion of the poor, or as a corollary, can reduce the fragmentation of the votes of the poor (in a democratic framework), due to the impact of patron-client relationships? (iii) Which institutional reforms are required to improve bureaucratic capacity (and thereby policy implementation effectiveness) and autonomy?” (Lakshman, 2003).

Table 4. Disclosure provisions in selected Arab countries

| Legal Framework | Public Officials Subject to Disclosure Requirements |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Laws regulating requirement to disclose | Constitutional requirement to disclose | Head of State | Ministers/ Cabinet members | Members of Parliament (MPs) | Civil Servants |
| Jordan | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Mauritania | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Morocco | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Source: (The World Bank, 2012)

Table 5. Conflict of interest provisions in selected Arab countries

| Legal Framework | Public Officials Coverage |
|-----------------|---------------------------|
| Laws regulating restrictions on conflict of interest | Constitutional requirement to avoid specified conflict(s) of interest | Code of Conduct /Ethics | Heads of State are obligated to avoid specified conflict(s) of interest | Ministers/ Cabinet members are obligated to avoid specified conflict(s) of interest | Members of Parliament (MPs) are obligated to avoid specified conflict(s) of interest | Civil Servants are obligated to avoid specified conflict(s) of interest | Spouses and children are obligated to avoid specified conflict(s) of interest |
| Jordan | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Mauritania | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| Morocco | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No |

Source: (The World Bank, 2012)
Arab states may choose gradual reforms that strengthen the rights of the poor population. Examples include: increased public accountability and fostering decentralisation to empower concerned population groups. Public accountability is a crucial mechanism for poverty reduction programmes. The World Bank (The World Bank, 2015b), for example, analysed Jordan, Mauritania and Morocco as principal case studies in terms of their public accountability. Their findings highlighted a lack of public accountability in terms of financial disclosure, conflict of interest restrictions, freedom of information and formal immunity provisions, see Tables 4, 5 and 7.

Other examples include pro-poor subsidy reform. Food availability and food prices provide a relevant example. Regional dependency on food imports is seen as playing an influential role in triggering the events of the Arab Spring, some Arab countries resorted to quick-fix subsidies to appease their populations (Ciezadlo, 2011; Zurayk, 2011). However, consistent with many Arab governments historically not delivering on their social contract, policy-makers were not well-targeted, nor transparent or accountable, with respect to the allocation of subsidies:

“The cost of such policies is high. Food subsidies eat up some 4% of Egypt’s budget; Morocco boosted spending on fuel and food subsidies to $5 billion this year... These subsidies are having perverse effects. According to the Gallup World Poll, between a half and three-quarters of Arab populations say they are dissatisfied with their government’s poverty-reduction efforts. And cheap calories are bad for people’s health. Arab countries are seeing some of the biggest increases in obesity in the world... Most of all, subsidies are unaffordable, at least for oil importers... Because subsidies are not targeted, they are inefficient... Since the poorest 40% get less than 40% of the spending on cheap bread, the middle classes are capturing more than their fair share of benefits.” (The Economist, 2012)

Reform of subsidies, especially on food and fuel, as called for by the IMF’s conditionality criteria for financial aid have been called into question by regional NGOs due to their detrimental impact on the populations they are supposed to support (Sherry, 2015; Zaid, Sherry, El-Badrawi, & Haber, 2014). The lessons learned and to be implemented through reform packages for the next two decades are clear: 1) Subsidy reform needs to be anchored in broader inclusive economic policy reform and if subsidies are necessary, then they must be designed to pursue an inclusive, targeted, human-rights based approach with a clear schedule of phasing-out; 2) develop a competitive political environment following public accountability standards in order to leverage available resources for poverty reduction; 3) involve the concerned populations in the political process and decision-making to foster participation and ownership beyond a patronising elite hand-out approach; 4) link anti-corruption initiatives to poverty reduction strategies and ensure institutional reform of public accountability mechanisms.

2.5. Enabling efficient public investment

The difficulty of political transitions in the Arab region hinders an inclusive reform of the economic model across the region generally and in vulnerable and conflict-prone countries in particular. Persistent macro-economic inefficiencies and a lack of structural reforms result in sub-optimal economic performance in terms of growth and labour market expansion. Some countries have started to implement reforms, but over the next two decades far-reaching initiatives are needed. In their recent analysis, the European Commission (Arroyo, 2014, p. 6) concludes seven categories of structural factors responsible for “disappointing economic and equity performance”:

1. Fiscal policy deficiencies, including in particular, the existence of costly and inefficient price subsidy systems, the lack of modern and well-targeted social safety nets, large subsidies that add meagre revenues and are socially regressive, and states that are oversized and discourage private sector development but that, at the same time, are highly inefficient, leaving few resources for targeted social expenditure and public investment.

2. Deficiencies in the labour market and in the education systems [...].

3. Deficiencies in the trade and investment framework [...].

4. Financial sector deficiencies. Capital markets are insufficiently developed. Financial systems tend to be dominated by banks (often public banks), which devote a significant part of their assets to refinancing the government, contributing to the crowding out of the private sector. Also, there tends to be a low degree of access of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) to finance [...].

5. An insufficient degree of economic diversification. [...].

6. The informal or underground economy tends to be sizeable in many countries, [...].

Source: (The World Bank, 2012)

Table 6. Selected freedom of information provisions in selected Arab countries

| Country   | Existence of legal right to access | Existence of FOI-specific law | Constitu-tional requirement for access to information | Access to draft legal instruments | Access to enacted legal instruments | Access to annual budgets | Access to annual chart of accounts/ expenditure | Access to annual reports |
|-----------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Jordan    | Yes                              | Yes                         | No                                                  | No                              | Yes                               | Yes                    | Yes                                           | Yes                    |
| Mauritania| No                               | No                          | No                                                  | No                              | No                                | Yes                    | Yes                                           | No                     |
| Morocco   | Yes                              | No                          | No                                                  | No                              | Yes                               | Yes                    | Yes                                           | Yes                    |

"Most Arab countries buy half of what they eat from abroad and between 2007 and 2010, cereal imports to the region rose 13% to 66 million tonnes. Because they import so much, Arab countries sink in food inflation when world prices rise. In 2007–08, they spiked, with some staple crops doubling in price. In Egypt local food prices rose 37% in 2008–10. (The Economist, 2012)

Arab countries rank across a wide spectrum, but generally low: with the exceptions of Jordan (57), Morocco (58), Lebanon (53), Egypt (13, Tunisia (11), Iraq (4), Saudi Arabia (1), and Qatar (0). For additional information refer to http://internationalbudget.org/who-who-are/

Access to annual chart of accounts/ expenditure: Yes/ No. The lessons learned and to be implemented through reform packages for the next two decades are clear: 1) Subsidy reform needs to be anchored in broader inclusive economic policy reform and if subsidies are necessary, then they must be designed to pursue an inclusive, targeted, human-rights based approach with a clear schedule of phasing-out; 2) develop a competitive political environment following public accountability standards in order to leverage available resources for poverty reduction; 3) involve the concerned populations in the political process and decision-making to foster participation and ownership beyond a patronising elite hand-out approach; 4) link anti-corruption initiatives to poverty reduction strategies and ensure institutional reform of public accountability mechanisms.

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|-----------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Jordan    | Yes                              | Yes                         | No                                                  | No                              | Yes                               | Yes                    | Yes                                           | Yes                    |
| Mauritania| No                               | No                          | No                                                  | No                              | No                                | Yes                    | Yes                                           | No                     |
| Morocco   | Yes                              | No                          | No                                                  | No                              | Yes                               | Yes                    | Yes                                           | Yes                    |

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7. Weaknesses in public finance management and statistical systems, which also lack in some cases independence from the government [and] contributes to the perception of weak economic governance and transparency.7

Table 7. Public investment index rating for selected Arab countries in 2010 (latest year and countries available only; PIM - Overall index (0=lowest, 4=highest))

| Country          | 2010 Rating |
|------------------|-------------|
| Tunisia          | 2.975       |
| Jordan           | 2.209       |
| Mauritania       | 1.717       |
| Egypt, Arab Rep. | 1.433       |
| Yemen, Rep.      | 0.8         |

Source: (The World Bank, 2015a)

Table 8. Income distribution - Selected pillars of Justice and entry points for corruption

| Education outcomes | • Private schools’ ability to pay higher salaries and thus attract better teachers -> high tuition compared to free public schools, which reduces accessibility for lower income groups (Camnett, 2014; Gupta, Davoodi, & Tiqson, 2000)  
|                   | • An educated citizenry has been empirically associated to lower levels of corruption in some American states (Alt & Lassen, 2008) |
| Health care outcomes | • Private hospitals’ ability to pay higher salaries and thus attract better medical staff - > selective admission of patients based on private insurance or group identity (e.g. sectarian welfare services provision in Lebanon (Camnett, 2014)) as well as overall negative externalities (e.g. reduced immunization and higher child mortality (Azfar & Gurgur, 2004; Gupta et al., 2000)) |
| Natural resources management | • Rent-seeking (“resource curse”) and patronage behavior (e.g. paying political supporters) require strengthening of institutions and the need to restructure incentives (Kolstad & Soreide, 2009) |
| Investment climate and business environment | • Detrimental patron-clientelism: “policymakers distribute privileges to particular groups on the basis of loyalty, ethnic or cultural solidarity, or other political criteria at the expense of the broader public” (Desai & Pradhan, 2005)  
|                   | • Corruption reduces the ratio of investment to GDP, while increasing the “level of integrity” within a country increases the net inflows of capital (Lambsdorff, 2003) |
| Labour Market | • Corrupt practices have direct consequences on labour market concerns ranging from the compromised ability of workers to freely associate and collectively bargain, reduced safety in the workplace and depression of minimum wage and hence reduced incentives to add value to production (Walsh, 2010; Lacks, 2004) |
| Infra-structure | Opportunity for corruption at all stages of large-scale infrastructure projects (Hawkman, 2013; Kenny, 2006):  
|                   | • Project selection: diversion of resources from one sector to another, as well as selection of uneconomical projects due to kick-backs and patronage;  
|                   | • Planning stages: neglect of priority but voter catching, overstatement or misrepresentation of specifications to advantage certain bidders, as well as favouring “white elephant projects” over pro-poor projects, lack of oversight mechanisms in place, malpractice;  
|                   | • Design: over-design, manipulation of timing and project plan to benefit particular suppliers, consultants, contractors, and other private parties. Bribe for favourable environmental impact assessment/planning proposal/approval, etc.;  
|                   | • Bid and contract signing stage: political influence, levy large rents on international businesses in return for government contracts, kick-back expectations;  
|                   | • Construction: Provision of equipment or goods of lower then specified quality, non-transparent contract amendments and diversion of funds, and lack of record-keeping |

2.8. Combating corruption

Finding strategies to combat corruption contributes towards achieving economic and social justice. While research often centers on the actions of individuals with power, corruption is not only a state-centric or elite phenomenon. It can be found at all levels in society and in all spheres. Corruption manifests in negative behavior22 and negative outcomes23 of behavior not in accordance with the individual’s (and/or the institutions) rights, freedoms, duties and responsibilities. Corruption can be defined as the abuse of public office and/or private position (both in terms of actions and intent) for either direct or indirect personal gain, which in turn can violate obligations of fairness and betray social trust.24

These structural factors reflect in the Public Investment Management index performance and indicate urgently required policy reforms (table 7). A state’s ability to govern the efficient allocation of public investment is a crucial component of enabling social justice (see table 8). Consequently, improving governance systems for public investments in infrastructure, education and health together with investments into improving the business climate and enhancing labour market conditions will have positive and durable development outcomes across the Arab region.

22 E.g. preferential treatment or pandering influence, nepotism, fraudulent activities, misuse of financial resources, bribery and so on
23 E.g. government failure, market failures, biased allocation of welfare services, distorted business practices and so on
24 The proposed definition expands on existing definitions (The World Bank, 1999; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004; United States Institute of Peace, 2010), for example the World Bank definition, which straightforwardly defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain” and UNODC detailing the origins of the word corruption as stemming “from the Latin corruptus (spoiled) and corruptum (to ruin; to break into pieces)."
corruption as a self-defense mechanism or last resort. The questionable argument can be found especially in societies that prioritise (economic) efficiency over justice (You, 2007, p. 11). Quantitative analysis on the impact of corruption in the Arab region is limited: For example, Brunetti and Weder (1998) include only Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in their analysis on how institutional uncertainty affects investments. While Gupta et al. (2000) examines the health and education sector only.

The events of the Arab Spring have drawn attention to the requirements for anti-corruption principles in the drafting of new constitutions (Al-Ali & Dafel, 2013; Ginsburg, 2013; Olaya & Hussmann, 2013) for Arab countries in transition. While political transitions in Tunisia and Egypt provide a window of opportunity for establishing anti-corruption principles, Lebanon’s resiliency towards external and internal pressures contribute to the perception of public sector corruption which ranks just slightly better than in conflict countries. The latest results of the Corruptions Perception Index25 by Transparency International show: Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries score on average 38/100 (compared to globally 43/100). The Arab countries with the perception of lowest public sector corruption are United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The Arab countries with the worst score are Iraq and Sudan. Overall 84 per cent of the countries in the MENA region score below 50. In their empirical study across 41 developing countries Shabbir and Anwar (2007) conclude “that economic determinants are more important as [...] non-economic determinants in reducing the perceived level of corruption in developing countries”, while the impact of religion may be negligible26. Consequently, the policy discussion about corrupt practices in the Arab region should be separate from discussing sectarian influences.

Bearing recent empirical results in mind and consistent with the existing body of research on corruption, Brunetti and Weder’s (1998, p. 17) conclusion still stands: “Perhaps the most interesting and promising result from a policy perspective is the relative importance of a more stable and predictable law enforcement. According to our analysis, governments can get most mileage from an improvement of the predictability of law enforcement and, more generally, adherence to the rule of law. Therefore, reducing corruption and improving the general predictability of the institutional framework should be among the reform priorities.”

In an uncertain institutional environment of the public sector, private actors might take over functions of the state and control access to services. Their distribution may not be based on fairness or equity, but on group-membership or any deliberate criteria to differentiate allocation of resources. In order to significantly improve the ranking of Arab countries in the Corruption Perception Index by 2030, the “Vision 2030” path for combating corruption contains efforts to: 1) address confidence-building measures to strengthen institutions to remedy the “self-defense” argument in addition to increasing stability and predictability of law enforcement; 2) strengthen formal justice frameworks and anchor anti-corruption principles in national legislation and set-up reliable and objective enforcement institutions to monitor their implementation; 3) address economic determinants of corruption, such as unemployment and slow economic growth by formulating and implementing inclusive economic policy measures.

3. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Any development outlook for the Arab States benefits from being embedded in regional and international policy discussions. The timetable for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as the key development framework is coming to a close and another set of internationally agreed upon development goals, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) continues and expands the existing framework to guide development efforts, to measure achievements and to hold policy makers accountable.

With reference to addressing governance challenges the priorities are clear (UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, 2012, pp. 8-9):

- "Focus on strengthening institutions and human resource capacities at all levels, concentrating on parliaments, electoral bodies and related processes, the security and justice sectors, public services, and promoting coherence across institutions;
- Support a state-society compact and culture grounded in constitutionalism, access to justice, equality and human rights;
- Assist public institutions to become effective, responsive, accountable and representative through e-government and other means, foster public sector capacities and public-private partnerships at national and sub-national levels, prevent corruption and promote the transparent and sustainable management of public goods and financial and natural resources;
- Support capacity for cross-sectoral, integrated and inclusive decision-, policy- and law-making, at all levels;
- Ensure the strengthening of citizen participation and civil society organizations’ engagement, including through e-participation, to ensure accountability and transparency and better inform decision-making;
- Support transparency and the right to access information about public affairs, encouraging states to adopt and implement legislation ensuring broad access to information by the public, including through the use of mobile, social media and other appropriate technologies;
- Strengthen the environment for an independent and pluralistic media, and ensure that the media serve the needs of society by reflecting a diversity of political views, cultures, languages and beliefs.”

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25 Measuring the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 175 countries/territories around the world with a score: 0 = worst perception of public sector corruption to 100 = best perception (http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results)

26 However and as discussed earlier, the role of religion or belonging to a sectarian group, however plays a role in distribution of welfare services (Camnett, 2014).
Table 9. Recommendations to foster political participation and inclusion

| Stable countries | Vulnerable countries | Countries in conflict |
|------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| **Medium-term** | **Medium-term**       | **Medium-term**       |
| • Revisit existing political institutions and explore how citizens can contribute towards national development at the political, economic and social level | • Reduce constraints and central control in the political space (e.g. over parties, unions) | • Establish a “cease-fire” and/or a peace agreement to ensure safety and to enable negotiations |
| • Redesign administrative processes and structures to change the way policy-makers and citizens interact and communicate | • Create a safe environment for formal and informal peaceful activism | • Allow transition dialogues to be as inclusive as possible and hold them to high standards of good governance |
| • Revisit democratic and economic reform. Successful reform in some countries can act as a model to others. | • Address fears and lack of trust into political systems through increased transparency in decision-making and through active reconciliation across party lines | • During periods of transition, channel deliberate and non-deliberate political activity to become a precursor for democratic governance instead of a continuation of elite-based systems |
| • Reduce constraints and central control in the political space (e.g. over parties, unions) | • Leverage the dynamic of the broad “protest demographic” to involve a diversity of stakeholders constructively in political decision-making | • Create an inclusive political space and build/re-build capacities for civic skills involving also marginalized groups (e.g. women, minorities) |
| • Allow the formation of civil society organizations, political parties and other forms of associations to enable formal participation in policy-making | • Generally build the capacity for civic skills, in particular to support engagement of marginalized groups (e.g. women, minorities) | • Allow the formation of civil society organizations, political parties and other forms of association to enable formal participation in policy-making |
| • Educate citizens about the roles and responsibilities related to electoral fairness and electoral participation (i.e. representation is independent of “wasta”) | • Improve access to information and foster a climate of constructive exchange of views, including independent and pluralistic media | • Rebuild institutions observing good governance criteria (e.g. transparency, accountability, voice) |
| • Set specific targets measuring the responsibility and accountability of the public administration | • Remove repressive control over freedom of speech and association and desist with the trial of civilians in non-civilian courts | • Leverage the fluidity of transition periods to redesign administrative processes and structures to change the way policy-makers and citizens interact and communicate |
| • Improve access to information and foster a climate of constructive exchange of views, including independent and pluralistic media | • Reform existing political institutions and explore how citizens can contribute towards national development at the political, economic and social level | • Strengthen the capacity to politically engage of marginalized groups (e.g. women, minorities) |
| • Generally build the capacity for civic skills, in particular to support engagement of marginalized groups (e.g. women, minorities) | • Set specific targets measuring the responsibility and accountability of the public administration | • Improve access to information and fostering a climate of constructive exchange of views, including independent and pluralistic media |
| • Encourage all forms of non-violent political participation: electoral, faith-based, civic and so on | | |
| • Train and educate public administrators to understand their role as facilitators, partners and collaborators in the service of the population | | |
| • Foster a climate constructive to political dialogue at all levels within society considering the criteria of freedom of speech | | |
| • Train the ability to form viable political coalitions that benefit the country | | |
| **Long-term** | **Long-term** | **Long-term** |
| • Continuously strengthen human resource capacities and participation | • Continuously strengthen human resource capacities and participation | • Continuously strengthen human resource capacities and participation |
| | • Set specific targets measuring the responsibility and accountability of the public administration | |
Table 10. Recommendations concerning a state-society compact based on observation of universal human rights and effective transitional justice

| Stable countries | Vulnerable countries | Countries in conflict |
|------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| **Medium term**  | Ensure political will and the recognition of the fundamental role of Human Rights (if they don’t exist yet, consider the establishment of national human rights commissions) | Ensure the political will and the recognition of the fundamental role of Human Rights becoming a binding treaty and consider ratification | Ensure the political will and the recognition of the fundamental role of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law including the Geneva Conventions and other treaties and protocols that govern actions of states and non-state actors during conflict |
|                  | Work towards making the 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights a binding treaty and consider ratification (to enter into force, seven ratifications are necessary and only five states have signed it to date — Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Yemen — only Jordan has thus far ratified it) | Participate in, observe regulations and report to the main human rights treaty bodies, which meet regularly to monitor the implementation of treaties²⁹ | Reflect Human Rights provisions in all policy measures at all levels during the transition period and work towards ratifying the 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights |
|                  | Participate and observe their regulations and report to the main human rights treaty bodies, which meet regularly to monitor the implementation of treaties²⁹ | Empower and improve the capacities of civil society groups that advocate for and work on Human Rights issues | Consider the establishment of national human rights commissions as part of transitional arrangements |
|                  | Empower and permit the work of human rights observatories and ombudsmen and implement their recommendations | Empower and improve the capacities of civil society groups that advocate for and work on Human Rights issues | Permit the access of humanitarian agencies and human rights observatories/ombudsmen |
| **Long term**    | Long-term commitments concerning the above recommendations for a state-society compact based on observation of universal human rights and effective transitional justice need to build on progress towards the above short- and medium-term recommendations | Long-term commitments concerning the above recommendations for a state-society compact based on observation of universal human rights and effective transitional justice need to build on progress towards the above short- and medium-term recommendations | Long-term commitments concerning the above recommendations for a state-society compact based on observation of universal human rights and effective transitional justice need to build on progress towards the above short- and medium-term recommendations |

²⁷ Implementation of transitional justice tends to be a short-term policy recommendation in the countries concerned as it paves the way for sustainable and inclusive development in a climate of political, economic and social stability. However, medium- to long-term demands on implementation from the countries emerge and — in addition to the recommendations of this report — to successfully navigate through periods under transitional justice regimes, the UN (2004, pp. 21-22) proposes a comprehensive framework of recommendations.

²⁹ For a full text of the charter, please refer to: http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/arabcharter2004en.pdf

Emerging from conflict find the resources to participate in, observe their regulations and report to the main human rights treaty bodies, which meet regularly to monitor the implementation of the respective treaties: 1. Human Rights Committee (CCPR), 2. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 3. Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 4. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 5. Committee against Torture (CAT), 6. Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 7. Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW), 8. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)
Table 11. Recommendations related to population growth and demographic change

| Stable countries | Vulnerable countries | Countries in conflict |
|------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| **Medium-term**  |                      |                       |
| • Reform labor markets to create employment, especially for youth and women | • Reform labor markets to create employment, especially for youth and women | • Addressing concerns of displaced populations and rebuild education systems, health systems and housing |
| • Reform urban governance constraints: shelter, secure tenure, WASH, social infrastructure and rule of law | • Guarantee education through secondary school especially for girls and young women | • Observe a greater urban governance agenda to prevent or reduce constraints during transition periods: shelter, secure tenure, WASH, social infrastructure and rule of law |
| • Guarantee education through secondary school especially for girls and young women | • Upgrade education systems to better match labor market requirements with skills to accommodate youthful population and make them job ready | |
| • Eradicate gender bias from law, economic opportunity, health, and culture | • Improve access to sexual education and family planning | |
| • Improve access to sexual education and family planning | • Consider impact of economic migration on education systems, health systems and housing (domestic: rural to urban, regional and plan for mitigation policies) |
| • Consider impact of economic migration on education systems, health systems and housing (domestic: rural to urban, regional) | | |
| **Long-term**    |                      |                       |
| • Adopt appropriate UN Population Recommendations in coordination with UNFPA and the UN Population Division or other appropriate bodies | • Adopt appropriate UN Population Recommendations in coordination with UNFPA and the UN Population Division or other appropriate bodies | • Create a functioning formal labor market |
| • Adopt appropriate UN Population Recommendations in coordination with UNFPA and the UN Population Division or other appropriate bodies | | • Improve access to sexual education and family planning |
| | | • Work towards adopting appropriate UN Population Recommendations in coordination with UNFPA and the UN Population Division or other appropriate bodies |

Table 12. Recommendations related to accountability, institutional reform, economic governance and combating corruption – specific to country groupings

| Stable countries | Vulnerable countries | Countries in conflict |
|------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| **Medium-term**  |                      |                       |
| • Implement public accountability reforms as part of overall poverty reduction strategies | • Implement public accountability reforms as part of overall poverty reduction strategies | • Do the groundwork for public administration reform during the transition |
| • Reform governance of state-owned enterprises | • Reform governance of state-owned enterprises | • Already during transition periods link anti-corruption initiatives to poverty reduction strategies and ensure institutional reform of public administrations |
| • Subsidy reform needs to be anchored in a broader inclusive economic policy reform and if subsidies are necessary pursue an inclusive human-rights based approach to design targeted subsidies with a clear schedule of phasing-out | • Subsidy reform needs to be anchored in a broader inclusive economic policy reform and if subsidies are necessary pursue an inclusive human-rights based approach to design targeted subsidies with a clear schedule of phasing-out | • Implement public accountability reforms as part of overall poverty reduction strategies |
| • Develop a competitive political environment following public accountability standards in order to leverage available resources for poverty reduction, for example through participation in and learning from other countries in the open budget initiative | • Develop a competitive political environment following public accountability standards in order to leverage available resources for poverty reduction, for example through participation in and learning from other countries in the open budget initiative | • Reform governance of state-owned enterprises |
| • Link anti-corruption initiatives to poverty reduction strategies and ensure institutional reform of public administrations | • Link anti-corruption initiatives to poverty reduction strategies and ensure institutional reform of public administrations | |
| **Long-term**    |                      |                       |
| • … | • … | • Reform governance of state-owned enterprises |
Table 13. Recommendations related to accountability, institutional reform, economic governance and combating corruption - generally relevant across all country groupings, but dependent on national context

| Medium-term | Long-term |
|-------------|-----------|
| **Political Institutions** | **Rule of Law** |
| • Allow dual citizenship and grant voting rights to the diaspora. This can encourage migrants to maintain ties with their countries of origin. Avoiding the constraints foreigners face on certain such transactions as temporary work and land ownership, through allowing them access to public services and social benefits would likely promote investment in their countries of origin. | • Cadastres of all countries need to be enhanced and digitalized. Immovable private properties valued above a pre-determined threshold should be taxed. |
| • Mind the political economy of the transition process that is highly context-specific | • Governments need to commit to a real anti-corruption campaign. |
| • Governments must define inclusive growth strategies through a broad consultative process that signals the first step toward a new social contract rather than relying on the advice of small groups of experts. | • PFM reform strategies need to be adopted in countries where they have not as yet been established and notable gaps exposed by Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments must be addressed. |
| **Private and financial sector** | **Public Administration** |
| • The unfinished agenda of banking restructuring needs to be finalized through stringent and prudential regulatory and corporate governance frameworks being imposed, hard budget constraints and reputable foreign strategic investors being accepted. | • The budget formulation remains fragmented in many countries, starting from the split between competencies of the ministry of planning and the ministry of finance. The authorities should focus on the following key priorities: (a) ensuring a unified budget process, including full integration of recurrent and capital budgets; (b) introducing a medium-term perspective to inform the annual budget; (c) presenting a comprehensive and clear budget; and (d) strengthening the links between policy and budgeting. Introducing a budget strategy paper at the start of the budget calendar could strengthen the linkage between policy priorities and budgetary allocations. |
| • Credit concentration needs to be gradually reduced. Banks exposed to high credit concentration risk should ultimately be subject to additional capital requirements. State-owned banks should be regulated and supervised like private-sector banks. | • Regional support initiatives could strengthen governance mechanisms, particularly in natural resource-based economies. Such initiatives as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Publish What You Pay (PWYP) could help the regional public and policymakers advocate greater revenue and expenditure transparency. |
| • Horizontal industrial policies should be favoured over vertical policies as they tend to adjust more easily to changing economic conditions. The playing field must be leveled across industries, transparency increased, backroom politics discouraged, and steps taken to avoid the creation of privileged cronies that will lobby to maintain acquired privileges. Keeping in mind that horizontal policies suffer from collective action problems and are long term in nature. | • Statistical offices and analytical capacity need to be expanded in order to provide more in-depth economic analysis. A number of core indicators, particularly those concerning work conditions and informality, are not available, and this data gap needs to be addressed. |

| Medium-term | Long-term |
|-------------|-----------|
| • The unfinished agenda of banking restructuring needs to be finalized through stringent and prudential regulatory and corporate governance frameworks being imposed, hard budget constraints and reputable foreign strategic investors being accepted. | • An open consultation process could be set up with the business community, and inter-agency coordination should be improved for more effective planning and policymaking. |
| • Credit concentration needs to be gradually reduced. Banks exposed to high credit concentration risk should ultimately be subject to additional capital requirements. State-owned banks should be regulated and supervised like private-sector banks. | • It is important to strengthen financial supervision and macroprudential assessment capacities of supervising authorities in the banking and non-financial sector. Cooperation and the exchange of information among different sectors or national supervisors need to be built. |
| • Horizontal industrial policies should be favoured over vertical policies as they tend to adjust more easily to changing economic conditions. The playing field must be leveled across industries, transparency increased, backroom politics discouraged, and steps taken to avoid the creation of privileged cronies that will lobby to maintain acquired privileges. Keeping in mind that horizontal policies suffer from collective action problems and are long term in nature. | • There is a need for operational measures in security market regulations that aim to increase competition as establishing caps information among different sectors or national supervisors need to be built. |
| • The unfinished agenda of banking restructuring needs to be finalized through stringent and prudential regulatory and corporate governance frameworks being imposed, hard budget constraints and reputable foreign strategic investors being accepted. | • The unfinished agenda of banking restructuring needs to be finalized through stringent and prudential regulatory and corporate governance frameworks being imposed, hard budget constraints and reputable foreign strategic investors being accepted. |
Considering the set priorities and based on the previous discussions, the present chapter outlines key policy recommendations for the countries in the Arab region taking into account the ongoing process for post-2015 Agenda. The chapter uses three country categories (in conflict, vulnerable to conflict and stable) to highlight the governance challenges and the governance differentials. Depending on the individual political, economic, social and environmental context, the sequencing of policies may be very different, i.e. to stable countries with advanced economies in the region other policy priorities apply compared with conflict-countries. It also means that the funding requirements for implementing governance reform policies and available financial resources are largely different.

4. CONCLUSION

The Arab region suffers a serious governance deficit. Across state systems corruption is rife, transgressions against the rule of law are permitted and violations of various international human rights codes occur. Political systems lack accountability and plurality with minimal space for political participation. Economic governance fails to benefit the many, instead emboldening entrenched and traditional elite while neglecting to adapt to the changing realities of Arab demographics. In order to prevent major socioeconomic disaster in the face of this deficit, the 2030 Vision recommends increasing pluralism, ratifying and honouring human rights conventions, reforming labour markets to adapt to the changing demographic realities while simultaneously adopting population control policies, adopting subsidy reforms, banking reforms, increasing competition, increasing public accountability and implementing an anti-corruption campaign. Such efforts would go a long way to ensuring that the Arab region will profit from the many, instead emboldening entrenched and traditional elite while neglecting to adapt to the changing realities of Arab demographics.

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### Appendix

**Table A.1. Political systems in the Arab region**

| Country       | Form of Government                                      | Parliament                                                                 | Natural resources                         |
|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Bahrain       | Constitutional Monarchy (independence from UK since 1971)| Bi-cameral parliament: Consultative Council (40 members appointed by the king) and the Council of Representatives (40 members popularly elected through universal suffrage) | Yes (oil: 70% of government revenue)      |
| Egypt         | Presidential republic (tbc) (independence from UK in 1922 and the Egyptian Republic was declared in June of 1953) | People's Assembly: 454 deputies of which ten are appointed by the president and the remainder being elected | yes                                       |
| Iraq          | Parliamentary democracy (Federal parliamentary representative democratic republic) | Presidential council: President and Vice President Council of Representatives (elected through representation) Prime Minister seat is appointed by the Presidential Council | yes                                       |
| Jordan        | Constitutional Monarchy (Hashemite Kingdom, independence from UK since 1946) | Multi-party system and the King's veto can be overruled by two-thirds vote of both houses of parliament Parliament: National Assembly with two parts; a Senate (55 monarch-appointed members) and the Chamber of Deputies (110 elected members) A specified number of seats are reserved for minorities | yes                                       |
| Kuwait        | Constitutional Emirate – hereditary position of Emir (independence from UK since 1961) | National Assembly                                                                 | Yes (oil: xxx % of government revenue)    |
| Lebanon       | Parliament: Single body National Assembly consisting of 128 members elected by popular vote Political parties in the traditional sense do not exist as political blocs are typically formed along personal, ethnic, family or regional lines |                                                                           | no                                        |
| Morocco       | Constitutional Monarchy (independence from France in 1956) | Bi-cameral with the prime minister position appointed by the king: Chamber of Counselors (Upper House, 270 members which are elected indirectly) and Chamber of Representatives (Lower House, with 325 elected seats) | yes                                       |
| Oman          | Hereditary monarchy (Sultanate)                          | No legal political parties, thus no functioning legislative institutions Two part parliament (Council of Oman) consisting: Consultative Assembly and a Council of State | yes                                       |
| Qatar         | Emirate/Absolute Monarchy (formal independence from UK in 1971) | Consultative Assembly (35 appointed members) Slow transition to a constitutional monarchy o include more popularly elected members on the Advisory Council Presently, political parties are forbidden | yes                                       |
| Saudi Arabia  | Monarchy                                                  | No parliament and no political parties                                                                 | yes                                       |
| Sudan         | Republic (independence from the United Kingdom in 1956: power sharing arrangement exists between the Government of National Unity, the National Congress Party (party of Bashir), and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. | Parliament: Two houses - Council of States (50 members elected through state legislatures) and a National Assembly (450 appointed seats) | yes                                       |
| Syria         | Single party republic under a military regime             | Uni-cameral People's Council (250 members) President Bashar al-Asad was elected in an un-opposed referendum | yes                                       |
| Tunisia       | Presidential republic (tbc) (independence from France in 1956) | Bi-cameral legislature: Chamber of Deputies (189) and Chamber of Advisors (126) | Yes (minor oil production)                 |
| United Arab Emirates | Federation of seven states (Emirates) similar to monarchy | Power is distributed between the central government and the individual emirates The positions of president and vice president are elected by the rulers of each emirate. There is no suffrage and political parties are forbidden Parliament: 1) The Federal Supreme Councils serves as the parliament establishing general policies and consists of the rulers of the seven emirates The rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai have veto power, 2) Federal National Council with 20 appointed members and 20 elected members acting as an advisory council | yes                                       |
| Yemen         | Republic (independence of North Yemen from Ottoman Empire in 1918 and South Yemen from UK in 1967) | Presidential elections by popular vote with General People's Congress as dominant power Bi-cameral Parliament: Shura Council (111 seats) appointed by the president and a popularly-elected House of Representatives (301 seats) | yes                                       |

*Source: (Milinski, 2009)*
Table A.2. Parliamentary Structures and Representation

| Structure of Parliament | Country | Chamber | Term of parliament (in years) | Electoral systems | Last elections | Statutory number of seats | Current number of seats | Number of women parliamentarians | Percentage of women | Population size | Average representation |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|-------------------------------|------------------|---------------|--------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|
| Unicameral              |         |         |                               |                  |               |                          |                        |                               |                  |                |                        |
| Algeria                 |         |         |                               |                  |               |                          |                        |                               |                  |                |                        |
|                         |         | Council of the Nation | 6                   | Majority       | Dec-12 | 144 | 142 | 10 | 7.04 | 38,481,705 | 270,998 |
|                         |         | National People's Assembly | 5                   | Proportional   | May-12 | 462 | 462 | 146 | 31.6 |                     |                |
| Bahrain                 |         | Council of Representatives | 4                   | Majority       | Oct-10 | 40  | 40  | 4   | 10   | 1,317,827 | 32,946 |
|                         |         | Shura Council | 4                     | other          | Nov-10 | 40  | 40  | 11  | 27.5 |                     |                |
| Bicameral               |         |         |                               |                  |               |                          |                        |                               |                  |                |                        |
| Egypt                   |         | Majlis Ash-Shura / Shoura Assembly | 6                   | other         | Jan-12 | 270 | 270 | 12  | 4.44 | 80,721,874 | 298,97 |
|                         |         | Majlis Al-Chaab / People's Assembly | 5                   | other         | Feb-12 | 508 | 508 | 10  | 1.97 |                     |                |
| Jordan                  |         | Senate | 4                     | other          | Oct-11 | 75  | 19 | 6,318,000 | 28,332 |
|                         |         | House of Representatives | 4                   | Mixed         | Jan-13 | 150 | 148 | 18  | 12.16 |                     |                |
|                         |         | House of Representatives | 5                   | Proportional   | Nov-11 | 395 | 395 | 67  | 16.96 | 32,521,143 | 82,332 |
|                         |         | House of Councillors | 9                     | other         | Oct-09 | 270 | 270 | 6   | 2.22  |                     |                |
| Morocco                 |         | State Council | 4                   | other         | Oct-11 | 83  | 81  | 15  | 18.07 | 3,314,001 | 39,928 |
|                         |         | Consultative Council | 4                   | Proportional   | Oct-11 | 84  | 84  | 1   | 1.19  |                     |                |
| Oman                    |         | National Assembly | 5                   | Mixed         | Apr-10 | 354 | 354 | 87  | 24.58 | 37,195,349 | 105,072 |
| Sudan                   |         | Council of States | 5                   | other         | May-10 | 32  | 28  | 5   | 17.86 |                     |                |
| Yemen                   |         | House of Representatives | 6                   | Majority      | Apr-03 | 301 | 301 | 1   | 0.33  | 23,852,409 | 79,244 |
|                         |         | Consultative Council | other               | other         | Apr-01 | 111 | 111 | 2   | 0.18  |                     |                |
| Germany                 |         | Bundestag | 4                   | Proportional   | Sep-13 | 598 | 631 | 230 | 36.45 | 81,889,839 | 122,773 |
|                         |         | Bundesrat | other               | Proportional   |                                        | 69  | 69  | 19  | 27.54 |                     |                |
| Iraq                    |         | Council of Representatives of Iraq | 4                   | Proportional   | Oct-10 | 325 | 325 | 82  | 25.23 | 32,578,200** | 100,241 |
| Kuwait                  |         | National Assembly | 4                   | Majority      | Jul-13 | 65  | 65  | 4   | 6.15  | 3,250,496 | 50,008 |
| Lebanon                 |         | National Assembly | 4                   | Majority      | Jun-09 | 128 | 128 | 4   | 3.13  | 4,424,888** | 34,569 |
| Libya                   |         | General National Congress | other               | Mixed         | Jul-12 | 200 | 200 | 33  | 16.5  | 6,154,623 | 30,773 |
| Qatar                   |         | Advisory Council | 3                   | other         | Jul-13 | 35  | 35  | 0   | 0    | 2,050,514 | 58,586 |
| Saudi Arabia            |         | Consultative Council | 4                   | other         |                                        | 151 | 151 | 30  | 19.87 | 28,287,855 | 187,337 |
| Syria                   |         | People's Assembly | 4                   | Majority      | Jan-13 | 250 | 250 | 30  | 12    | 22,399,234** | 89,597 |
| Tunisia                 |         | National Constituent Assembly | 1                   | Proportional   | Oct-11 | 217 | 217 | 58  | 26.73 | 10,777,500 | 49,666 |
| United Arab Emirates    |         | Federal National Council | 4                   | Majority      | Sep-11 | 40  | 40  | 7   | 17.5  | 9,205,651 | 230,141 |

Note: *Parliamentary data on Jordan: the numbers differ in the databases thus both figures are provided; **Population figures are adjusted for Syrian refugees
Source: (International Parliamentary Union, 2013)