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Cosmopolitanisms in Kant’s philosophy

Georg Cavallar*
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Austria

Abstract
Interpretations of Kant usually focus on his legal or political cosmopolitanism, a cluster of ideas revolving around perpetual peace, an international organisation, the reform of international law, and what Kant has termed cosmopolitan law or the law of world citizens (Weltbürgerrecht). In this essay, I argue that there are different cosmopolitanisms in Kant, and focus on the relationship among political, legal or juridical, moral and ethico-theological cosmopolitanisms. I claim that these form part of a comprehensive system and are fully compatible with each other, given Kant’s framework. I conclude that it is not self-evident that one can pick out some elements of this greater system as if they were independent of it.

Keywords: cosmopolitanism; morality; the highest good; philosophy of history; theology

Recent years have witnessed a rising interest in the concept and theories of cosmopolitanism.1 References to Kant are frequent, since he is usually seen as a typical representative of 18th century cosmopolitanism. Martha Nussbaum, for instance, considers Kant an antidote to critics of Enlightenment universalism and cosmopolitan humanism. In his voluminous study on the development of cosmopolitan thinking in modern European history since Leibniz, Francis Cheneval views Kant as its climax: his whole philosophy is said to be cosmopolitan in nature.2 Philosophers as well as political scientists do not study Kant for historical reasons. For Garrett Brown, Kant is the starting point of a ‘viable form of Kantian cosmopolitanism’ in our contemporary globalised world.3

Interpretations of Kant usually focus on his legal or political cosmopolitanism, a cluster of ideas revolving around perpetual peace, an international organisation, the reform of international law, and what Kant has termed cosmopolitan law or the law of world citizens (Weltbürgerrecht). Toward perpetual peace (1795) is the essential and famous text in this regard. Other types of cosmopolitanism—moral, cognitive, cultural—are usually neglected. This is surprising, since Kant develops the idea of a moral commonwealth in the Religion within the boundaries of mere reason (1793),

To the memory of Sharon Anderson-Gold, fellow Kantian and cosmopolitan.
*Correspondence to: Georg Cavallar, Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Austria. Email: georg.cavallar@univie.ac.at.
which has a strong theological—or at least Christian—dimension, and seems to bring Kant close to a more traditional form of cosmopolitanism, namely theological cosmopolitanism.

In this essay, I argue that there are different cosmopolitanisms in Kant. I focus on the relationship among political, legal or juridical, moral and ethico-theological cosmopolitanisms. I claim that these form part of a comprehensive system and are fully compatible with each other, given Kant’s framework. The centre of contention is the concept of the highest good, and the debate on its proper interpretation is closely related to discussions concerning the role of the philosophies of history and religion within Kant’s system. I conclude that it is not self-evident that one can pick out some elements of this greater system as if they were independent of it.

In what may appear an extreme move, I think we can press Kant interpreters into three camps. The first group—the theologians—consider Kant’s moral theology as inherently flawed: Kant, though perhaps a brilliant author, did not grasp the full religious truth contained in the Christian faith. Along these lines, Kant’s final synthesis would be a—more or less critically modified—theological cosmopolitanism, expressing the idea of a commonwealth of ends or a ‘kingdom of God’ on earth or a transcendent Kingdom of Heaven, which ultimately guarantees the harmony of morality and deserved happiness.

Representatives of the second group, the system thinkers, believe in the co-existence of the philosophies of history and religion within Kant’s system. Allen Wood, for instance, tries to show that Kant’s moral theology is ‘an integral part of the critical philosophy’, but not at the expense of the philosophy of history. These interpreters keep the basic tenets of Kant, implying that all forms of cosmopolitanisms, especially juridical, moral and theological cosmopolitanisms, harmoniously fit into Kant’s overall system. I believe Georg Geismann is a typical representative of this group.

Authors of the third group, who are the secularists, are diametrically opposed to the first one. They assert that the philosophy of history replaces, or should replace the philosophy of religion, if one follows the spirit or the inner logic of Kant’s critical philosophy. For the secularised camp, the concept of the highest good has to be coherently reconstructed as immanent. The moral and/or legal community of humankind is realised in the future without divine assistance.

In this paper, I side with the second group, offering an exegetical argument of how Kant might have understood the compatibility and systematic coherence of moral, legal and theological cosmopolitanisms. I start with a clarification of the concept of cosmopolitanism in Kant, and distinguish among its various forms, namely epistemological, economic or commercial, moral, theological, political and cultural versions, which are related to each other (section 2). Kant’s later theory in the 1790s focused on legal, moral and ethico-theological cosmopolitanism. There is a three-part division in his philosophy concerning the concept of the highest good and the future of humankind: The foundation of a cosmopolitan condition of perpetual peace, a global legal society of peaceful states, a ‘cosmopolitan whole’, perhaps a world republic is the highest political good. Secondly, the establishment of a global
ethical community is the highest moral good in this world. Finally, the highest good proper coincides with the transcendent Kingdom of God, the intelligible world, the Kingdom of Heaven or a moral realm. A secularised concept of the highest good would have to drop the crucial element of a necessary connection of morality and appropriate happiness, thus would no longer be what Kant himself understood as the highest good (section 3). Next I turn to Kant’s philosophy of history, in particular his understanding of Nature as a ‘moral facilitator’ of the education of humankind. There is a tension between the human species propelled or instigated by Nature towards moral ends on the one hand and an understanding of human history as a collective learning process, whereby humans are seen as autonomous agents not manipulated by Nature (section 4). Section 5 focuses on the ethical commonwealth and its cosmopolitan dimension. God and humans together try to realise it, with humans promoting (befördern) and ‘preparing’ this ethical community while God is offering fulfilment (attainment, realisation or Verwirklichung). I offer some reasons why Kant’s ethical commonwealth has a theological dimension. The purpose of the paper is to show that the different cosmopolitanisms form part of a greater system and are compatible with each other, and that contemporary attempts to pick some elements out of this system as if they were independent is quite problematic.

COSMOPOLITANISMS ACCORDING TO KANT

Before I turn to this issue, I will briefly comment on the racist statements against non-Europeans which are scattered all over Kant’s published writings. For instance, Kant asserts in 1764 that there is an ‘essential’ difference between whites and blacks and that ‘it seems to be just as great with regard to the capacities of mind as it is with respect to colour’. Kant seems to be just another white western male whose universalism masks naked Eurocentrism. Most interpreters conclude that Kant’s racist statements are incompatible with his normative universalism and moral cosmopolitanism.

Interpreters have offered various explanations for these tensions between Eurocentric and cosmopolitan statements. A straightforward historical argument would be that Kant did not manage to overcome the prejudices of his time, and was unable to see the glaring contradiction between his professed cosmopolitan stance and his racist statements. This, however, would be surprising, given Kant’s intellectual stature. Robert Louden offers another explanation. He asserts that Kant was logically committed to a cosmopolitan approach, but ‘personally’ prejudiced, and that ultimately Kant’s theory with its element of universality is stronger. Pauline Kleingeld has offered a more lenient and ultimately convincing interpretation. She claims that Kant dropped his earlier race theory in the 1790s, restricted the role of race, and arrived at a coherent version of moral cosmopolitanism by the time he wrote Zum ewigen Frieden in 1795. Then Kant granted full juridical status to non-Europeans like the Hottentots, rejected slavery and criticised European colonialism. He also revised his views concerning migration, asserting that it was Nature’s will that all humans, regardless of race, would eventually live everywhere in the world.
Finally, the issue of race disappeared almost completely from his writings, for instance in his *Anthropology* (1798).

This interpretation would let Kant off the hook. He would be the sage who, after decades of autonomous thinking in accordance with, but also against the ‘spirit of the times’, finally got rid of (almost all) prejudices. This favourable interpretation is supported by recent interpreters, who challenge the familiar and widespread distinction between the pre-critical and critical Kant, and favour a more nuanced approach than this blunt binary juxtaposition. They emphasise the evolutionary aspect of Kant’s thought, and convincingly show that Kant continuously refined his theories. So basically, the Kant of the early 1780s is very different from the Kant of the late 1790s. For instance, Francis Cheneval illustrates how Kant rethought, rewrote and refined his concept of the highest good in subsequent writings. Eckart Förster outlines how Kant’s rational theology changed, also in the years after 1781. Cheneval, Kleingeld, Byrd and Hruschka demonstrate how Kant repeatedly changed his opinion on key issues of international law such as the enforcement problem or the status of hospitality rights.

Although this lenient interpretation is supported by textual evidence, it is also plausible to argue that Kant endorsed a form of ‘western-Eurocentric gradualism’. Non-Europeans were backward children, but then according to the later Kant were capable of Bildung or education and possible future members in good standing in the international community. Finally, Ian Hunter offers a totally different approach. He denies the possibility of timeless truths and interprets Kant’s cosmopolitan theory as the offspring of a metaphysical tradition regional within Europe and hostile towards different philosophical cultures. I can’t debate these claims here, which would require another essay (though I tend to side with Pauline Kleingeld). My aim is to show that Kant’s personal convictions have been under scrutiny, and usually found incompatible with the moral universalism formulated in (most of) his later ethical and political writings. In the following pages, my focus is on Kant’s express cosmopolitan theory, and I attempt a coherent reconstruction. The question whether Kant lived up to his own cosmopolitan ideals is of biographical interest only, and has limited philosophical significance (if any). Perhaps Allen Wood is right when he advises us to appreciate the complex ‘relation of important philosophical principles to the historical conditions of their genesis’ and not see ‘a case of simple hypocrisy’.

It is useful to distinguish among different types of cosmopolitanisms in Kant: epistemological, economic or commercial, moral, ethico-theological, political and cultural.

Kant defends moral cosmopolitanism in the 1790s with the claim that all rational beings, irrespective of their race, should be regarded as ends in themselves and as lawgiving members of ‘the universal kingdom of ends’. Moral cosmopolitanism is expressed in the idea of a ‘kingdom (or commonwealth) of ends’ or ethical community where humans unite freely into a commonwealth based on equality and self-legislation, rational beings are respected as ends in themselves, and a moral whole of all ends is achieved. This moral cosmopolitanism has a basis in the moral predispositions of humans, at least according to Kant. One of these, the love of
human beings, is *amor complacentiae*, a delight in moral striving for perfection, of oneself and of others. The ethical commonwealth or community encompasses the entire human race, is distinct from a political community, which governs the external actions of humans, is based on the moral law, coincides with the invisible church and is the moral destiny of the human race (see below). Kant couches this commonwealth in theological terms: it is founded by God, the author of its constitution, who also guarantees the harmony of morality and deserved happiness. The ethical commonwealth has some similarities with the religious commonwealth of the theologians and Christian philosophers before Kant such as Leibniz, and moral cosmopolitanism ultimately seems to coincide with a Kantianised form of theological cosmopolitanism, namely ethico-theological cosmopolitanism. The decidedly Kantian and novel element is the frequent reminder on Kant’s side that this ethical commonwealth is a matter of *practical* metaphysics and moral faith, not of metaphysical knowledge.

Kant is well-known for his *political, contractual, juridical* or *legal* version of cosmopolitanism, and this form is also elaborated in his writings. He distinguished between legal and moral spheres, the former focusing on mutual restrictions of domains of external freedom, the other on the free adoption of ends, and this distinction enabled him to draw a line between legal and moral cosmopolitanism. In *Toward Perpetual Peace*, for instance, Kant claimed that individuals and states ‘are to be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind’. This universal commonwealth is a legal, not a moral community. The quote hides a small revolution: unlike 18th and 19th-century international law, individuals are full juridical persons in Kant’s international legal theory—a status that foreshadows contemporary international law and international human rights doctrines. Then again, states do not simply disappear in Kant’s theory, swallowed up by a future world republic, but form with individuals a legal community which has to reform itself so that a complete juridical state or *Rechtszustand* is approximated.

This distinction between forms of cosmopolitanism is useful because it clarifies Kant’s various uses of the term in his philosophy. For instance, in his famous essay ‘Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim’ (1784), Kant refers to legal cosmopolitanism, not to moral or cultural versions (see below). Kant understands himself in this essay as a philosopher who writes from a cosmopolitan perspective, so Kant implies that he practices a form of epistemological cosmopolitanism. Along these lines, Kant argues for a cosmopolitan historiography, which is based on the maxim that the only relevant perspective or viewpoint is ‘what nations and governments have accomplished or harmed regarding a cosmopolitan aim’. The two major cosmopolitan tasks are establishing a just civil society and ‘lawful external relations between states’. This new, cosmopolitan historiography is distinct from an older one focusing on courts, the dignity of princes, military campaigns, and battles. It is also distinct from a 19th and 20th-century focus on the modern nation-state, one might add. The new historiography and philosophy of history look at historical and political phenomena from a ‘cosmopolitan perspective’, which means ‘a view to the well-being of the human race as a whole and insofar as it is conceived as

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*Cosmopolitanisms in Kant’s philosophy*
progressing toward its well-being in the series of generations of all future times.\(^{26}\)

The distinction between forms of cosmopolitanism thus helps to understand Kant’s complex divisions in his systematic philosophy and avoids confusion.

Kant divided philosophy into theoretical and practical philosophy.\(^{27}\) Epistemological cosmopolitanism relates to our cognitive faculties and thus to theoretical reason aiming at knowledge. Moral and juridical cosmopolitanism are situated within the two branches of practical philosophy, the doctrine of virtue (concerned with our inner moral disposition) and the doctrine of right (governing external relations of humans).\(^{28}\) Cultural cosmopolitanism has to be systematically located near political or legal cosmopolitanism, as it reflects on and evaluates how the universal principle of right manifests itself and is interpreted and applied in cultures and historical epochs. Commercial cosmopolitanism is another branch of legal philosophy. Kant distinguished among three forms of justice in a juridical state.\(^{29}\) Whereas the *iustitia tutatrix* amounts to positive legislation to make rights possible and the *iustitia distributiva* represents the judiciary (making rights a necessity), the *iustitia commutativa* ‘represents the public market where people can exercise their rights to external objects of choice by buying and selling them’ and makes rights a reality. Cosmopolitan law refers to commutative justice, the public order for the market beyond state borders.\(^{30}\)

I want to finish this section with a brief comparison of Kant’s cosmopolitanism with traditional approaches, to put Kant into historical perspective (if only superficially). Natural law cosmopolitanism posited a global and usually morally very thin, *societas humani generis*, a society of the entire human race where members share common features like rationality or compassion for others. This society was conceived as static, and often lacked a legal dimension. Kant is different, together with authors like Christian Wolff.\(^{31}\) The juridical and ethical communities are practical tasks and duties, not something given. They should be promoted by cosmopolitan-minded agents working for a better future. The moral theologian might add that by doing this, these agents also and at the same time help to realise the Kingdom of God on earth, the *telos* of history and the ultimate vocation (*Bestimmung*) of the human race.

The *Bestimmung* (destiny, vocation) of each individual as well as of the whole human race is, together with the doctrine of the highest good, the core of Kant’s critical practical philosophy.\(^{32}\) It is the answer to the question ‘why it is necessary that human beings exist’. Kant’s answer is that the *Bestimmung* of humans is *Selbstbestimmung* or autonomy, moral freedom. Our ‘moral vocation’ is ‘the ultimate end (letzter Zweck) of our existence’.\(^{33}\) Picking up elements of Stoic metaphysics, Enlightenment theologians and philosophers such as Johann Joachim Spalding revived the debate about human destiny after 1750s. Kant’s novel idea is the widening of its scope: he moves from the focus on individuals to the species as a whole and its history and future.\(^{34}\)

The goal is the complete and suitable (*zweckmässig*) development of all natural or original predispositions in the future, including, of course, the moral disposition. It is prepared by the culture of skill in civil society. This can only be achieved by the human
species as a whole, and humans who have enlightened themselves about their proper
vocation that go beyond their roles or functions in civil society, are in a position to
become citizens of the world. According to Kant, human dignity is not some absolute
inner value all humans possess (this is rather the doctrine of more traditional forms of
moral cosmopolitanism), but refers to sublimity (Erhabenheit), the prerogative of
humans over the rest of nature because they are beings capable of self-legislation or
‘internal lawgiving’ and moral freedom, who should respect this potential or capacity
in all other rational agents and should develop it in themselves.

THE CONCEPT OF THE HIGHEST GOOD

The highest good is the coincidence of virtue and happiness, with the latter
‘distributed in exact proportion to morality’, and an idea of pure practical reason
aiming at ‘unconditioned totality’. The concept has been interpreted in divergent
ways; ever because John Silber published his famous article in the late 1950s. Some
defend a theological—or transcendent—and personal interpretation: the highest
good is ultimately only attainable for individuals in the afterlife and guaranteed by
God. Others understand the highest good as a worldly or immanent concept, as the
ultimate end (letzter Zweck) of nature and history and attainable as a collective
achievement of humanity. These interpreters, the secularists, usually drop the
theological dimension or Kant’s moral religion. The highest good becomes a
normative goal, an ideal which cannot be fully realised but approximated by the
human species as a whole. Attempting to realise this ideal of reason, and bringing it
‘ever nearer to a possible greatest perfection’ is a task humans should set
themselves. In Kant’s tentative cosmopolitan philosophy of history, the future
becomes a learning process, a process of education where humans grasp the meaning
of their task, spell out its implications, and eventually try to realise it.

Kant’s theory in the late 1790s focuses on legal and commercial cosmopolitanisms
and not on cultural or moral versions. This becomes obvious if we look at the main
thrust of his arguments in Perpetual Peace, the Doctrine of Rights and the Contest of
Faculties. These texts revolve, among others, around the following problems: the
institutionalisation of an international organisation, world trade and the role of
individuals in international law (the sections on cosmopolitan law), and the
possibility of legal progress in history. The highest good in these writings is the
highest political good, namely a global juridical state (Rechtszustand) which
approximates world peace.

Francis Cheneval has suggested abandoning Kant’s dualism in favour of his
philosophical chiliasm, dropping the cosmic-theological chiliasm, arguing that the
former respects the limits of theoretical reason and is thus more moderate
by focussing on external freedom and law independent of moral change. A
cosmopolitan legal society as the highest good is, according to Cheneval, the final
result of Kant’s constantly revised intellectual development in the late 1790s,
culminating in the clear statement in the Contest of Faculties that progress will only
yield ‘an increase of the products of legality in dutiful actions’. I agree with Cheneval insofar as he does not confound Kant’s philosophy of history with that of religion, as some interpreters do. However, Cheneval’s thesis that Kant abandoned his so-called dualism is not convincing. If Kant focuses on legal cosmopolitanism in the late 1790s, then this does not necessarily prioritise this form, or imply that Kant deliberately dropped the ethico-theological one. In the philosophy of right and history Kant does not refer to the highest good proper, only to the highest political good for methodological reasons.

There are various reasons why Kant’s philosophy of history and that of religion cannot merge. In the famous Spinoza passage in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant offers a glimpse at his crucial arguments. The righteous atheist Spinoza will strive unselfishly for a morally better world here on Earth and this is just what his own practical reason demands him to do. However, he will be faced with his limited powers to change the world for the better, will have to acknowledge that nature is indifferent to morality, will meet other humans who are evil and undermine his well-intentioned efforts, will lead a life that might be just nasty, miserable and short. The end would be absurd, namely being thrown back ‘into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter’. According to Kant, this attitude or belief-system of the righteous atheist is not in the ‘interest of reason’ and the ‘interest of humanity’. Kant concludes that we have to postulate a supreme being which guarantees the harmony of nature and freedom, and ‘the exact correspondence of happiness with morality’ in another, transcendent and moral world, the Kingdom of Heaven.

I make no attempt to discuss Kant’s postulates here, but want to explain why Kant’s philosophy of history and that of religion cannot merge. First, there is the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal world. The world of phenomena is subject to natural laws, and not related to the laws of morality and the idea of the highest good. ‘In nature, everything is: the question of ought does not arise there’. This leads to a gulf between morality, freedom and virtue on the one hand and (the laws of) nature on the other: ‘no necessary connection of happiness with virtue in the world, adequate to the highest good, can be expected from the most meticulous observance of moral laws’. Unlike legal progress, moral or religious progress is not a topic of historical development, because it belongs to the noumenal world. From the outside, that is, as far as actions as phenomena are concerned, we humans can never tell the difference between legality where someone ‘complies with the law according to the letter’ and is ‘a human being of good morals’ and morality, where she ‘observes it according to the spirit’ and is ‘a morally good human being’. The philosophy of history is exclusively concerned with the former, progress in the realm of legality (compliance with the letter of the moral law), the philosophy of religion with the latter, namely moral progress, which is beyond human cognition and an issue of moral hope only. Some secularist interpreters tend to confound these two worlds, perspectives or spheres, which amounts to abandoning the core of Kant’s critical enterprise.

This distinction is closely connected with the difference between the irreducible spheres of external actions of the human species and individual, inner morality.
The philosophy of history only focuses on actions as phenomena, no matter whether these were caused by practical reason or natural impulses, by the spirit or the letter of the moral law. Therefore Kant constructs the history of humankind in ‘Idea for a universal history’ as a development based on natural causes such as unsocial sociability or the cunning of nature. The final end (Endzweck) of creation is thus not an issue of the philosophy of history (see below).

Humans do not know the moral status of other humans or their own, to be precise. Therefore, they are in no position to assess if others deserve happiness—only an omniscient, omnipotent and just being could do that. In addition, legal progress in history does not answer the problem of individual happiness. A purely immanent interpretation of the highest good does not solve the moral paradox, the discrepancy between morality and happiness. In other words: Kant would have seen that the concept of the highest good devoid of any transcendent dimension keeps the dialectic of practical reason unsolved. Kant himself points out that it is odd that ancient philosophers like Epicurus or the Stoics believed that the highest good could be found in our sensible world. Experience contradicts this belief. Virtue does not necessarily produce happiness on earth. Thus ‘we find ourselves compelled’ to postulate ‘an intelligible world’ where the highest good as an unconditioned totality is possible or thinkable. Of course this idea of an omnipotent, transcendent and omniscient moral being compensating moral behaviour with happiness is beyond possible human experience.

There is an additional problem mentioned in the third proposition of Kant’s ‘Idea for a universal history’: it is ‘strange’ that according to the philosophical reconstruction of history, only the later generations will enjoy the ‘good fortune’ the previous ones might also have deserved. It is significant that Kant does not use the word ‘happiness’ here, which would relate to the highest good. In the philosophy of history, the issue is not the highest good; for Kant, the realm of experience or phenomena, and thus also of history, can never relate to the intelligible world of the highest good.

One standard theme of Kant’s critical philosophy is the fact of limited human faculties in cognitive and moral terms. The spheres of human agency and those of nature are separated by a wide gulf. ‘[T]he acting rational being in the world is [...] not also the cause of the world and of nature itself’; in fact, there is no connection between rational agency and nature. Finite human beings are in no position to reward virtue with the appropriate amount of happiness, as they do not have the necessary amount of knowledge or power. As Kant puts it, ‘the moral law in fact transfers us, in idea (der Idee nach), into a nature in which pure reason, if it were accompanied with suitable physical power, would produce the highest good’. However, this ‘suitable power’ of human reason is in fact missing. Humans do manage, though, to improve their external, legal arrangements and institutions, as European history demonstrates. This legal progress can be confirmed by empirical evidence.

A final reason why the philosophies of history and religion cannot merge is human incompetence and radical evil. Eckart Förster has claimed that over the years, Kant has reworked his moral theology, to arrive in the opus postumum at a completely subjective and immanent version of religion which drops the postulates of the second
According to Förster, Kant held already around 1786 that ‘the highest good [...] must be located not in an afterlife but in this life, in this world’. For various reasons, this interpretation is not convincing. However, Förster is right in stressing the ongoing changes in Kant’s religious doctrine. In addition, as Förster shows, Kant ponders the possibility that humans themselves could be the authors of their own happiness and that of others, provided that they fulfil their moral duty. Kant calls this a ‘system of self-rewarding morality’, which would not require the idea of God. Whereas Kant does not develop this possible ‘system’ any further in the first Critique, it does live on in the philosophy of history, and especially in the Religion, where Kant asserts that promoting the highest moral good in this world is the task of the ethical commonwealth. However, even here Kant clearly distinguishes between promoting and realizing the highest good, and between the highest political good, the highest moral good and the transcendent highest good.

The historical development of the human species in the juridical sphere towards more external freedom and legality on the one hand and the moral hope of the individual concerning the afterlife can be seen as two legitimate aspects which complement each other. This co-existence is suggested in various passages. In the Critique of Practical Reason, happiness in this and in a future life is two sides of one and the same coin and both are legitimate interests of reason. Right at the beginning of ‘The end of all things’ (1794), Kant distinguishes between humans as ‘temporal beings’ on the one hand and as ‘supersensible’ beings on the other and discusses the possibility (from a theoretical perspective) as well as the religious hope (from a moral perspective, from ‘a practical point of view’ or ‘in a moral regard’) that as supersensible beings, humans live on after death. Therefore, ‘it is wise to act as if another life—and the moral state in which we end this one, along with its consequences in entering on that other life—is unalterable’. Kant’s main concern in these paragraphs is not whether ‘the future eternity’ should be doubted or not, but he investigates what kind of moral belief concerning it should be held, and discusses the systems of the unitists and the dualists, ultimately siding with the latter. Apparently the main thrust of Kant’s reasoning is to show that both legal progress in history, promoting the highest moral good and belief in the afterlife are not impossible objects of volition, because impossibility would imply no obligability, and this in turn would undermine the command of the moral law.

There is a three-part division in Kant’s philosophy concerning the highest good and the future of humankind:

1. The foundation of a cosmopolitan condition of perpetual peace, a global legal society of peaceful states, a ‘cosmopolitan whole’, ‘a universal cosmopolitan condition’, perhaps a world republic is the highest political good (see section below Kant’s philosophy of history: the manipulation, education or self-education of humankind?)

2. The establishment of a global ethical community is the ‘highest moral (sittliche) good’ (see section below The ethical commonwealth: the duty of the human race towards itself).
3. The highest good proper coincides with the transcendent Kingdom of God, the ‘supersensible (intelligible) world’ or the ‘kingdom of Heaven’. As Kant puts it in *The Conflict of Faculties*, ‘the human being must be destined for two entirely different worlds: for the realm of sense and understanding and so for this terrestrial world, but also for another world, which we do not know—a moral realm’.

A secularised concept of the highest good would have to drop the crucial element of a *necessary* connection of morality and appropriate happiness ‘as ground and consequent’, thus would no longer be what Kant himself understood as the highest good proper. It would not solve the antinomy of practical reason, would entail a duty to promote the highest good, but full realisation would be conceived as impossible. Van der Linden, for example, reinterprets the highest good as ‘a moral society in which human agents seek to make one another happy, but do not necessarily succeed’. Here, the concept of the highest good is so thinned down that it no longer deserves the name. In stead, Kant’s reinterpreted philosophy would offer two other notions for the secularists: first, the idea of a cosmopolitan whole (the legal version of a world community); secondly, the moral (but not the ethico-theological) commonwealth.

Kant’s own philosophy is different from this secularist interpretation. Both legal and moral commonwealths are just preliminary steps in the true goal of world history, which lies beyond history and is ‘a visible Kingdom of God on earth’. Kant hopes that gradually the true religious faith, natural religion or the pure faith of moral reason will spread across the globe; he sees his own century as an epoch in the process of Enlightenment when at least in Christianity ‘the seed’ of this faith is growing unhindered, so that the ‘invisible Kingdom of God on earth’ is continuously approximated, finally encompassing and uniting ‘all human beings’. Jesus Christ is credited for introducing this ‘pure religious faith’, which has the potential to become ‘a universal world-religion’. The ‘world religion’ which Kant favours and which is universal since it is valid for every human being is closely linked with the Christian religion. Kant’s clearly favours and privileges a modernised form of Christianity, something which is usually eyed with suspicion by contemporary commentators, since it sounds so un-cosmopolitan and rather Eurocentric. I make no attempt to discuss this complex issue here. Suffice it to say that Kant tries to mediate a priori idea of an ethical community with the human condition and historical developments, and consequently interprets the visible churches as symbols or archetypes of the idea of an invisible church. The winners, at any rate, are the Christian churches, though Kant harshly criticises the history of Christianity and some of its deformed practices.

**KANT’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: THE MANIPULATION, EDUCATION OR SELF-EDUCATION OF HUMANKIND?**

The question I raise in this section is the following: How does the highest political good in this world (a cosmopolitan legal society of peaceful states and individuals)
come about? There is a tension in Kant’s writings between the human species propelled or instigated by Nature towards moral ends on the one hand and an understanding of human history as a collective learning process, whereby humans are seen as autonomous agents not manipulated by Nature. Thus the philosophy of history offers two interpretations. In the first case, Nature or providence educates the human race towards a cosmopolitan condition, and history is the education of humankind on a grand scale. In the second case, the human race educates itself. Perhaps Kant even had a more elaborate combination of the two possibilities in mind, where Nature helps humans to help themselves actualise their potentials.  

I will start with the first, more widespread interpretation, where Nature educates the human race. In his Lectures on pedagogy, Kant distinguishes among three kinds of formation or Bildung. The education of skilfulness and of prudence cultivates acting on hypothetical imperatives, which have the form ‘If you want x, then you should do y’. The action is good ‘merely as a means to something else’. The child cultivates imperatives of skilfulness (Geschicklichkeit) to attain certain ends and prudence (Klugheit), learning how to use other people for her own ends and thus also learning how to fit into civil society. The result is legality, not morality of disposition. The third form of practical education is moral education based on the categorical imperative, ‘by which the human being is to be formed so that he can live as a freely acting being’. It coincides with cosmopolitan education, because ‘through moral formation’ the human being ‘receives value in view of the entire human race’. Eckart Förster has pointed out that Bildung, together with history and Entwicklung, was one of the new concepts of Enlightenment philosophy which ‘reflect a deep revolution in the way reality was experienced’. According to the new, secularised concept of formation, humans manage to reach a stage in their development when ‘they form themselves a picture of what they want to achieve’, thus becoming both objects and subjects of formation.

Kant transposes this tripartite structure to the philosophy of history, where humankind faces the task of cultivating the imperatives of skilfulness, prudence and morality. Kant deplores the fact that in human history, the third and most important kind of formation or Bildung has remained underdeveloped: ‘very much is still lacking before we can be held to be already moralised’. Nature educates humankind to reach this final goal, according to Kant’s philosophy of history, which is a critical, reflective and teleological interpretation of history, embedded in §§ 82–84 of the Critique of Judgement. I will just enumerate the main theses of this interpretation. The purposiveness (Zweckmässigkeit) of nature is a reasonable assumption, based on the reflective power of judgement. An ultimate end (letzter Zweck) of nature presupposes a final end (Endzweck) of creation. Because only humankind is related to an unconditional, moral end, humankind is the ultimate end of nature. The final end for humankind is moral, and morality is the result of the freedom of the will. Therefore, nature cannot produce a final end, but nature can reflectively be interpreted as a ‘moral facilitator’. Nature promotes its ultimate end with the help of culture, which comes in two forms, namely as the culture of skill (Geschicklichkeit) and as the culture of discipline (Zucht), which liberates us from sensuous desires.
The culture of skill is the more important one for the philosophy of history, since the ‘cunning of nature’ uses this form to promote its ultimate end. Thus nature prepares the ground for genuine morality, which can only be the work of humans themselves. One method is the manipulation of human ‘unsocial sociability’ by nature to trigger the establishment of republican constitutions, which in turn facilitate the growth of moral dispositions, since ‘the good moral education of a people is to be expected from a good state constitution’ only.

However, culture itself is still part of nature; the moral vocation of humans lies beyond nature and thus also beyond history. Possible morality (based on the freedom of the will) is not an object of the philosophy of history. The philosophy of history belongs to the ‘teleological doctrine of nature’, thus focuses on culture as the ultimate end of nature, on virtue ‘as a facility in actions conforming to duty (according to their legality)’, not on inner morality, the final end of creation or on the highest good. Attempts of the secularists to relocate the concept of the highest good and morality in the realm of history are therefore not convincing. The legal and ethical communities prepare the ground for something beyond history, ‘a visible Kingdom of God on earth’ in the future ‘which is not itself history’.

I will now turn to the second way of interpreting Kant’s philosophy of history, where the human race educates itself and legal progress is the result of a learning process of the human species. The interpretation of history as a collective learning process is suggested by the second part of The Contest of Faculties (1798), and brackets the hypothesis of a natural teleology. Given ‘immeasurable time’, the principle of plenitude states that any possibility will sooner or later be realised. A symptom of the ‘moral tendency of the human race’ is the constitutional phase of the French Revolution, since the civil constitution corresponded with the idea of right. Secondly, the universal sympathy of the onlookers is interpreted by Kant as the outcome of a ‘purely moral’ disposition in humanity. Even if the revolution should fail, Kant muses, a cumulative learning process for all of humankind will be the overall result. ‘For that occurrence is too important, too much interwoven with the interest of humanity, and its influence too widely propagated in all areas of the world to not be recalled on any favourable occasion by the nations which would then be roused to a repetition of new efforts of this kind’. According to this interpretation, history is an intercultural learning process, and the education of humankind is partly self-education. This is a perspective reserved for the cognitive, moral and legal cosmopolitan, ‘who does not consider what happens in just some one nation but also has regard to the whole scope of all the peoples on earth’.

The second interpretation, the self-education of humankind, is the more secularised one, as the concept of God or providence (which looms behind the more modest notion of nature) is not essential there, though one might argue that Nature or divine supervision is still required to make sure that the collective learning process of humankind advances properly and eventually reaches the desired goal. Theological connotations are stronger in the context of the ethical commonwealth, to which I will turn now.
THE ETHICAL COMMONWEALTH: THE DUTY OF THE HUMAN RACE TOWARDS ITSELF

No matter which interpretation of Kant’s philosophy of history we prefer, both highlight a key problem, namely the transition from culture or civilisation (revolving around skillfulness and prudence) to moralisation. In the Starke manuscript of 1790–91, Kant explains: ‘The most difficult condition of the human race is the crossing-over [Übergang] from civilisation to moralisation ... One must try to enlighten human beings and to better establish international law ... We are now, those of us who are working on the unity of religion, on the step of this crossing-over from civilisation to moralisation. Inner religion stands in now for the position of legal constraint. To reach the great end, one can either go from the parts to the whole, that is to say, through education, or from the whole to the parts’. According to this passage, Kant envisions several methods to promote moralisation (since morality is the result of freedom, it can only be fostered, nurtured or helped indirectly): education (with Enlightenment as one element), politics based on the idea of right, and religion. ‘Inner religion’ coincides with Kant’s version of moral religion with its emphasis on morality and duties towards others rather than statutes and dogmas. Education, going ‘from the parts to the whole’ or following a bottom-up procedure, is one way to reach the ‘great end’, realising one element of the highest good, namely morality, to which humans themselves can contribute (proportionate happiness would be God’s task). The second way ‘from the whole to the parts’ could either refer to providence or nature or to political change on a grand scale, such as reforms of constitutions or governments (like under Frederick II. of Prussia), events like the French Revolution, or reforms of international law or international organisations.

I have mentioned in the second section that Kantian ethics postulates that all rational beings, irrespective of their race, are ends in themselves and lawgiving members of ‘the universal kingdom of ends’, where humans unite freely into a commonwealth based on equality and self-legislation, are respected as ends in themselves, and a moral whole of all ends is achieved. Since only an omnipotent and omniscient being ‘who knows the heart’ (Herzenskündiger) can guarantee the highest good, the harmony of morality and deserved happiness, this commonwealth has God as its founder and author of its constitution. The ethical commonwealth or community encompasses ‘the entire human race’ and is distinct from a political community, which governs the external actions of humans, is a ‘universal republic based on the laws of virtue’, coincides with the invisible church, and is the moral destiny of the human race. God and humans together try to realise it, with humans promoting (befördern) and ‘preparing’ this ethical community and God offering fulfilment (attainment, realisation or Verwirklichung). According to the immanent or secularised version of this ethical commonwealth, the highest good is partly realised by humans as much as they can, namely by trying to make each other happy and by increasing one’s own moral perfection, without divine assistance or ultimate fulfilment.
Kant calls the duty to promote the highest good as a member of this cosmopolitan moral community or ‘union […] of well-disposed human beings’ a duty ‘sui generis […] of the human race toward itself’, since the highest good is a good ‘common to all’. This is an enhancement of the legal goals in the philosophy of history, but eschatology remains immanent and part of history; Kant refers here to the highest moral good in this world. The ethical commonwealth has to be global in reach since each ethical community—the Anglican church, for instance—is just a ‘particular society’ which remains in a state of nature in relation to others, thus would not overcome its imperfections or the constant threat of conflict and strife.

The highest moral good entails a social dimension, which is related to the Religion of 1793 and its thesis of radical evil: Kant adds a third level of human ‘propensity to evil’ which is absent in the philosophy of history: apart from frailty and impurity of the heart, there is depravity or corruption. Radical evil is not in our biological nature (Kant does not offer a restatement of the doctrine of original sin), but our Willkür has a tendency towards the reversal of our moral maxims, subordinating ‘the incentives of the moral law to others (not moral ones)’. Radical evil has a social dimension. As Kant puts it, as soon as humans have contact with each other, ‘they will mutually corrupt each other’s moral disposition and make one another evil’. The task of the ethical community is to overcome this very situation of mutual moral corruption, and since it affects all humans, ‘the entire human race’ has a duty to establish this society ‘in its full scope’. Promoting the highest moral good is a collective or communitarian, not an individual task. Radical evil can be held at bay, if not completely overcome, as freedom also includes the freedom to choose good.

There is a difference between the ‘people of God’ on earth or the ethical community on the one hand and the transcendent Kingdom of God where ‘nature and morals come into a harmony’ on the other, a harmony which is impossible on this earth. In contrast to the secularist interpreters, Kant never abandons this distinction. The two cannot merge; they are only loosely related to each other, because the ethical community is designed to promote or preserve morality ‘by counteracting evil with united forces’ in the first place, and not to make possible proportionate happiness. Happiness might be an unintended by-product and will in all likelihood not be proportionate to morality.

Why not an ethical commonwealth without God? Reiner Wimmer has argued that Kant offers three distinct arguments for the duty to found the ethical commonwealth, which make use of the doctrine of radical evil, the ethical state of nature, and the highest good. Again Kant resorts to a familiar claim, namely human wickedness. ‘But how could one expect to construct something completely straight from such crooked wood? To found a moral people of God is, therefore, a work whose execution cannot be hoped for from human beings but only from God himself’. Earlier in the text, Kant made a weaker claim, suggesting that ‘single individuals … on their own’ are in no position to realise this ‘universal republic’ of virtue. Their organisational incompetence and their finite volition and power are decisive. At any rate, humans are in need of divine assistance.
It is often assumed that God’s grace or providence is incompatible with human freedom of choice, since the former would determine the latter. However, divine grace could also be understood as liberating and complementary, enabling humans to overcome their initial predisposition to evil. As Leslie Mulholland argues, ‘there can be an external condition of moral improvement even though it is not determining of the action produced’. Divine grace would precede free choice in so far as it would provide the favourable circumstances to restore this freedom, might complement the disposition or receptivity to good one has acquired, and might help in the realisation of the highest good with God as ‘a moral ruler of the world’.

There are passages where Kant hints at this possibility, though he quickly adds the familiar critical caveat that this issue ‘cannot be resolved theoretically, for this question totally surpasses the speculative capacity of our reason’.

**CONCLUSION**

The contemporary philosophical climate and Kant’s cosmopolitan philosophy do not easily match. Firstly, academic philosophy is often highly sceptical of even a Kantian form of critical metaphysics ‘with a moral purpose’. Secondly, it usually says farewell to the philosophy of history and Kant’s moral teleology. Thirdly, Kant’s ethics focussing on the vocation of humankind looks like an odd relic from the past. Contemporary cosmopolitans usually argue *pragmatically* for cosmopolitanism (equivalent to imperatives of prudence) along the following lines: increasing economic, cultural and political interdependence requires a cosmopolitan ethics, perspective or vision in a globalised world. This amounts to deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. Fourthly, many—the secularists—do not seem to be happy with Kant’s moral theology and his doctrine of radical evil.

Kant offered a systematic whole, and apparently took the co-existence and compatibility of various forms of cosmopolitanisms for granted. Nowadays many interpreters pick out some of its elements as if they were independent from this system, and this is problematic. For instance, the second interpretation of the philosophy of history, the self-education of the human species, looks rather secularised, as the concepts of nature, God, providence or teleology seem to be rather unimportant (if only for methodological reasons). This makes Kant attractive for contemporary philosophies, although a Kantian from the camp of the system thinkers might argue that the result is a truncated Kant and an interpretation which follows neither the letter nor the spirit of his philosophy. It could be argued that the notions that ‘nature educates the human race’ and that ‘the human race educates itself’ are integral parts of the Kantian cosmopolitan system, with the first perspective emphasising the role of nature and the second stressing what humans can and should do, but ‘with the assistance—and not the determining influence—of nature’. The overarching idea is the vocation of the human species, the teleological unfolding of its various dispositions in an attempt to promote the highest moral good.
I expect there are several reasons why Kant remains attractive for contemporary cosmopolitan philosophies, including those of the secularists. For a start, the highest moral good that has to be promoted does not require belief in God. Morality and moral religion are distinct from each other, morality is independent of religious belief in Kant’s philosophy, and the assumed impossibility to realise the highest moral or political good does not devalue the honest attempt to promote it. Secondly, Kant’s practical philosophy leads only to the threshold of moral faith. This faith is subjective insofar as it requires ‘moral cognition of oneself’, self-awareness, honesty, choice and commitment, which can only be done by the individual agent.

In this essay, I focused on the relationship among political or juridical, moral and ethico-theological cosmopolitanisms, and tried to explain why for Kant the various forms of cosmopolitanisms were fully compatible. I have argued against a secularised and purely immanent interpretation of the highest good that does not solve the problem of the discrepancy between morality and happiness. As a consequence, the philosophy of history, which focuses on external actions, cannot solve the dialectic of practical reason, and Kant never implied that it could do this. The legal and ethical communities prepare the ground for something beyond history, namely ‘a visible Kingdom of God on earth’ in the future ‘which is not itself history’. Contemporary cosmopolitan theories tend to use Kant as a starting point or a kind of quarry, picking out elements that might be useful for one’s own philosophical enterprise. This approach faces the charge of being both anachronistic and reductive, because, as I have tried to show, Kant’s cosmopolitan system includes an ethico-theological idea, that of transcendent ‘unconditioned totality’. As a consequence, current debates on cosmopolitanism would either have to take this metaphysical and theological system into account or should accept the probably insurmountable distance between these contemporary approaches and Kant’s own.

In contrast to the secularist interpreters, Kant never abandoned the distinction between the ethical community on the one hand and the transcendent Kingdom of God on the other. The overall result is a rich account of cosmopolitanism, where the threads of theological and more secularised Enlightenment conceptions are woven into a delicate synthesis.

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NOTES

1. See, among others, Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, eds., *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Andrea Albrecht,
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Kosmopolitismus. Weltbürgerdiskurse in Literatur, Philosophie und Publizistik um 1800 (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 2005), Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse, The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Robert Fine, ‘Cosmopolitanism and human rights: Radicalism in a global age’, Metaphilosophy 40, no. 1 (2009): 8–23, Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held, eds., The Cosmopolitanism Reader (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Andreas Niederberger and Philipp Schink, eds., Kosmopolitanismus. Zur Geschichte und Zukunft eines unumstrittenen Ideals (Frankfurt am Main: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2010) and Georg Cavallar, Imperfect cosmopolis: studies in the history of international legal theory and cosmopolitan ideas (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2011).

2. Martha C. Nussbaum, edited by Joshua Cohen, For Love of Country? (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996) and ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 5, no. 1 (1997): 1–25; Francis Cheneval, Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung. Über die Entstehung und die philosophischen Grundlagen des supranationalen und kosmopolitischen Denkens der Moderne (Basel: Schwabe, 2002), 403–621; see also Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011, forthcoming).

3. Garrett Wallace Brown, Grounding Cosmopolitanism. From Kant to the Idea of a Cosopolitan Constitution (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 17.

4. Examples are: Heinz Walter Cassirer, Grace and Law: St. Paul, Kant, and the Hebrew Prophets (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1988), Stephen R. Palmquist, Kant’s Critical Religion. Volume Two of Kant’s System of Perspectives (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) and Giovanni B. Sala, ‘Das Reich Gottes auf Erden. Kants Lehre von der Kirche als “ethischem gemeinen Wesen”’, in: Norbert Fischer, ed., Kants Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie (Hamburg: Meiner, 2004), 225–64.

5. Allen Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970 [reprint 2009]), 9; see also Gene Fendt, For What May I Hope? Thinking with Kant and Kierkegaard (New York: Lang, 1990).

6. Georg Geismann, ‘Sittlichkeit—Religion—Geschichte’, in: Kant und kein Ende Band 1. Studien zur Moral-, Religions- und Geschichtsp hilosophie (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2009), 11–118 and Kant und kein Ende Band 2. Studien zur Rechtsp hilosophie (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2010); see also Michael Albrecht, Kants Antinomie der praktischen Vernunft (Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms, 1978), Sharon Anderson-Gold, Cosmopolitanism and human rights (Cardiff: Wales University Press, 2001) and Unnecessary Evil. History and Moral Progress in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (Albany: State University of New York Press 2001), Reinhard Brandt, Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant. Second edition (Hamburg: Meiner, 2009), Cheneval, Philosophie, and Reiner Wimmer, Kant kritische Religionsphilosophie (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1990).

7. Sidney Axinn, The Logic of Hope: Extensions of Kant’s View of Religion (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1994), Eckart Förster, ‘Die Wandlungen in Kants Gotteslehre’, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 52, no. 3 (1998): 341–62 and Kant’s Final Synthesis. An Essay on the Opus postumum (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), Harry van der Linden, Kantian Ethics and Socialism (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett publishing, 1988), Gordon E. Michelson, Kant and the Problem of God (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), Yirmiyahu Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980).

8. Immanuel Kant, Critique of the power of judgement, edited by Paul Guyer, translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 300.

9. Kant, Immanuel, Anthropology, History, and Education, edited by Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 59.

10. See for example Sharon Anderson-Gold, Cosmopolitanism and human rights (Cardiff: Wales University Press, 2001), 20–7, Todd Hedrick, ‘Race, Difference, and Anthropology in Kant’s Cosmopolitanism’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (2008): 245–268, at 262 and
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268, Robert B. Louden, *Kant’s Impure Ethics. From Rational Beings to Human Beings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 102f. and Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race’, *The Philosophical Quarterly* 57 (2007): 573–92, at 575 and 582f.

11. Louden, *Kant’s Impure Ethics*, 105, referring to Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 79 and 87.

12. Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race’, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 57 (2007): 573–92, at 586–9.

13. Francis Cheneval, *Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung. Über die Entstehung und die philosophischen Grundlagen des supranationalen und kosmopolitischen Denkens der Moderne* (Basel: Schwabe 2002), 440–7 and passim.

14. Eckart Förster, ‘Die Wandlungen in Kants Gotteslehre’, *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 52 no. 3 (1998): 341–62 and *Kant’s Final Synthesis. An Essay on the Opus postumum* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 118–47.

15. Cheneval, *Philosophie*, 582–621, Kleingeld, Pauline (2009). Kant’s changing cosmopolitanism’, in: Amélie Oksenberg Rorty and James Schmidt, eds., *Kant’s Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim. A Critical Guide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 171–86 and Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka, *Kant’s Doctrine of Right. A Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 205–11.

16. Louden, *Kant’s Impure Ethics*, 178; see also ‘Race, Difference, and Anthropology in Kant’s Cosmopolitanism’, 264–7.

17. Ian Hunter ‘Kant’s regional cosmopolitanism’, at http://sisr.net/events/docs/Hunter.pdf, accessed February 12, 2010, ‘Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics: On the Critical History of the Law of Nature and Nations’, in S. Dorsett and Ian Hunter (eds.), *Law and Politics in British Colonial Thought: Transpositions of Empire* (Houndmills: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2010), at http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv/UQ:179565/Hunter.Transpositions.revised1.pdf, accessed February 12, 2010. see also *Rival Enlightenments. Civil and Metaphysical Politics in British Colonial Thought: Transpositions of Empire* (Houndmills: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2010), at http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv/UQ:179565/Hunter.Transpositions.revised1.pdf, accessed February 12, 2010. see also *Rival Enlightenments. Civil and Metaphysical Politics in British Colonial Thought: Transpositions of Empire* (Houndmills: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2010), at http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv/UQ:179565/Hunter.Transpositions.revised1.pdf, accessed February 12, 2010.

18. Allen Wood, *Kantian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 9, cf. ibid. 7–12.

19. The distinction partly follows Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany’, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60, 1 (1999): 505–24; see also Brown, *Grounding Cosmopolitanism*, 10–15. Epistemological or cognitive cosmopolitanism refers to the world citizen who tries to transcend the ‘egoism of reason’, the unwillingness to test one’s judgements with the help of the reason of others. The normative ideal is one of the three maxims of common understanding: the ‘extended way of thinking’ (erweiterte Denkungsart). ‘The opposite of egoism can only be pluralism, that is, the way of thinking in which one is not concerned with oneself as the whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen of the world’ (Kant, *Anthropology, History, and Education*, 241f. and Kant, *Critique of the power of judgement*, 174f.; see Carola Hantsch, ‘The World Citizen from the Perspective of Alien Reason: Notes on Kant’s Category of the Weltbürger according to Josef Simon,’ in Rebecka Lettevall and My Klockar Linder (eds.), *The Idea of Kosmopolis. History, philosophy and politics of world citizenship* (Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, 2008), 51–63, Peter Kemp, ‘Kant the Cosmopolitan’, in: Hans Lenk and Reiner Wiehl (eds.), *Kant today—Kant aujourd’hui—Kant heute* (Berlin: Lit, 2006), 142–62, and Wood, *Kantian Ethics*, 17–20. Kant’s commercial or economic cosmopolitanism, which holds that ‘the economic market should become a single global sphere of free trade’ (Kleingeld, ‘Six Varieties’, 518), is couched in legal terms as the right of hospitality, both in *Perpetual Peace* (1795) and in the *Doctrine of Right* several years later. Kant’s cosmopolitan law has acquired a kind of cult status in contemporary debates on cosmopolitanism, but its systematic position within Kant’s practical philosophy has remained contested. Kant’s cultural cosmopolitanism is more hinted at than a fully developed theory; cf. Sankar Muthu,
Enlightenment against Empire (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), 122–70 and ‘Justice and Foreigners: Kant’s Cosmopolitan Right’, Constellations 7 (2000): 23–45, reprinted in Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka (eds.), Kant and Law (Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate, 2006), 449–71. In this paper, I leave these three additional forms of cosmopolitanisms—epistemological, commercial and cultural—aside.

20. Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, transl. and edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 87 and 79; cf. Cheneval, Philosophie, 434–65.

21. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 530f. and Dieter Schönnecker, Alexander Cotter, Magdalena Eckes, and Sebastian Maly, ‘Kant über Menschenliebe als moralische Gemütsanlage’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 92 (2010): 133–75.

22. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 83–9 and 243, Critique of Pure Reason, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 151f.

23. Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, transl. and edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 322.

24. Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, edited by Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 120 and 114.

25. Cf. Immanuel Kant, Werke. Akademie-Textausgabe (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1900ff.), vol. 15, 610, 629; Peter Kauder and Wolfgang Fischer, Immanuel Kant über Pädagogik. 7 Studien (Hohengehren: Schneider, 1999), 170–5.

26. Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, transl. and edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 281, cf. 304.

27. See for instance Kant, Critique of the power of judgement, 3 and Practical Philosophy, 372.

28. Cf. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 365; see Geismann, Kant und kein Ende Band 2, 11–146, among others.

29. Cf. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 450.

30. Byrd and Hruschka, Metaphysics of Morals, 69; cf. 72–6 and 205–11 for a full analysis.

31. Cf. Cheneval, Philosophie, 132–213, Cavallar, Imperfect Cosmopolis, 17–36 and 64–84, Cavallar, Rights of Strangers, 208–21.

32. Cf. Brandt, Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant, Geismann, Kant und kein Ende Band 1, 11, Thomas Kater, Politik, Recht, Geschichte. Zur Einheit der politischen Philosophie Immanuel Kant’s (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1999), 166–70, Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics, 37, 53f. and 101.

33. Kant, Critique of the power of judgement, 250 and 181. Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A 464, Practical Philosophy, 52, Kant, Critique of the power of judgement, 308f. and 311, Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, 420; Brandt, Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant, 15–7, 19.

34. Cf. Brandt, Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant, 25–7, Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics, 102–6.

35. Cf. Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, 109 and 118f., Kant, Critique of the power of judgement, 299–300, Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, 109 and Arnd Pollmann, ‘Der Kummer der Vernunft. Zu Kants Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichtsphilosophie in therapeutischer Absicht’, Kant-Studien 102 (2011): 69–88, at 77f.,

36. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 558; cf. Oliver Sensen ‘Kant’s Conception of Human Dignity’, Kant-Studien 100 (2009): 309–31.

37. Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, 485 and Practical Philosophy, 227 and 229.

38. John R. Silber, ‘Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent’, The Philosophical Review 68 (1959): 469–92; see the discussion in Cheneval, Philosophie, 441–56, Geismann, Kant und kein Ende Band 1, 23–46 and Wood, Kant’ Moral Religion, 69–99.

39. See Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics, 161f. (with more secondary literature 227f.), Cheneval, Philosophie, 404, 413 and 448 (with a discussion ibid., 434–94), Geismann, Kant und kein Ende Band 1, 87–118 and Anderson-Gold, Unnecessary Evil, 8–52.

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40. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* A 317.

41. Cf. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 491 and Cheneval, *Philosophie*, 488f. On Kant’s legal and political philosophy see, among others, Kater, *Politik, Recht, Geschichte* and Arthur Ripstein, *Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2009).

42. Cheneval, *Philosophie*, 404–79.

43. Immanuel Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, transl. and edited by Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 307; Cheneval, *Philosophie*, 440f, 450f and 478f.

44. Cf. Kant, *Critique of the power of judgement*, 318.

45. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* A 462–76, A 798; cf. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 204 and Kant, *Critique of the power of judgement*, 320.

46. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 240; cf. ibid. 255–7; Albrecht, *Kants Antinomie der praktischen Vernunft*, 98–101.

47. See Bernd Dörflinger, ‘Führt Moral unausbleiblich zur Religion? Überlegungen zu einer These Kants’, in: Norbert Fischer, ed., *Kants Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2004), 207–23, Klaus Düsing, ‘Kritik der Theologie und Gottespostulat bei Kant’, in: Norbert Fischer and Maximilian Forschner, eds, *Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants* (Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder, 2010), 57–71, Geismann, *Kant und kein Ende Band 1*, 47–87, Manfred Kuehn Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of God’s Existence as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason’, *Kant-Studien*, 76 (1985): 152–69, Wimmer, *Kants kritische Religionsphilosophie*, 19–88, Wood, *Kant’s Moral Religion*, 100–52 for more.

48. Immanuel Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, transl. and edited by Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 289; cf. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 232 and 243.

49. Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, transl. and edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 231.

50. Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, transl. and edited by Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 153.

51. Ibid., 78; see also Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, transl. and edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 383.

52. Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, transl. and edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 99f., 104.

53. See for instance ibid., 384 and 387.

54. Cf. ibid., 61.

55. Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the power of judgement*, transl. and edited by Paul Guyer and Eric Mattheews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 310.

56. Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, transl. and edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 226–9.

57. Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, transl. and edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 232.

58. Ibid. and Kant, *Critique of the power of judgement*, 310; cf. Rorty and Schmidt, *Kant’s Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim*, 86, Albrecht, Kants Antinomie der praktischen Vernunft, 58–101, Dörflinger, ‘Führt Moral unausbleiblich zur Religion?’, 211, Klaus Düsing, ‘Kritik der Theologie und Gottespostulat bei Kant’, in: Fischer and Forschner, *Gottesfrage*, 57–71, at 65f., Wood, *Kant’s Moral Religion*, 125–9.

59. Kant, *Anthropology, History, and Education*, 110f., Brandt, *Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant*, 218.

60. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 240.

61. Ibid., 175; Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, 60; cf. Silber, ‘Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good’, 471f., Dörflinger, ‘Führt Moral unausbleiblich zur Religion?’, 212f., Düsing, ‘Kritik der Theologie und Gottespostulat bei Kant’, 68.
62. See Kant, *Anthropology, History, and Education*, 118f., Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Kant on historiography and the use of regulative ideas’, *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 39 (2008): 523–8, at 526 and section 4 below.

63. Förster, *Kant’s Final Synthesis*, 127; see also ibid., 147 and Förster, ‘Die Wandlungen in Kants Gotteslehre’, 343, 346 and 362 and Michelson, *Kant and the Problem of God*, 112–22.

64. Cf. Manfred Gawlina, ‘Kant, ein Atheist? Ein Strawson-Schüler liest das *Opus postumum*, *Kant-Studien*, 95 (2004): 235–7, Wimmer, Kants kritische Religionsphilosophie, 219–70.

65. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 809; Immanuel Kant, *Werke. Akademie-Textausgabe* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1900ff.), vol. 19: 202; Förster, ‘Die Wandlungen in Kants Gotteslehre’, 342f.

66. Cf. Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, 129f. and 132–4.

67. Cf. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 189.

68. See for instance Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, 224 and 222.

69. Ibid., 224; emphasis deleted, my own emphasis added; see also Kant, *Werke. Akademie-Textausgabe*, vol. 28, 298–301, vol. 25, 696f., Brandt, *Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant*, 17f. and 179.

70. Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, 222–4.

71. Silber, ‘Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good’, 477, Forschner, *Gottesfrage*, 117f., Geismann, *Kant und kein Ende Band 1*, 44f.

72. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 492, *Critique of the power of judgement*, 300, *Anthropology, History, and Education*, 118.

73. Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, 133.

74. Ibid., 31 and 162; cf. 222.

75. Ibid., 289; cf. 162, Kant, *Werke. Akademie-Textausgabe*, vol. 28, 301, Wimmer, Kants kritische Religionsphilosophie, 19–88.

76. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 229.

77. Linden, *Kantian Ethics and Socialism*, 4.

78. Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, 161; cf. Kant, *Werke. Akademie-Textausgabe*, vol. 15, 608–9.

79. Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, 159; see also Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 11–22.

80. Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, 180.

81. Claus Dierksmeier, *Das Noumenon Religion. Eine Untersuchung zur Stellung der Religion im System der praktischen Philosophie Kants* (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 175f., Louden, *Kant’s Impure Ethics*, 130–2, Vincent McCarthy, *Quest for a Philosophical Jesus. Christianity and Philosophy in Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Schelling* (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1986), 89–91 and 101, Sala, ‘Das Reich Gottes auf Erden’, 230.

82. Cf. Louden, *Kant’s Impure Ethics*, 125–30 and Heiner Bielefeldt, *Kants Symbolik. Ein Schlüssel zur kritischen Freiheitsphilosophie* (Freiburg and München: Karl Alber, 2001), 186–9.

83. Cf. Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, 135, 95 and 208.

84. On Kant’s philosophy of history see Brandt, *Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant*, 179–222, Pauline Kleingeld, *Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants* (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1995) and Kant on historiography and the use of regulative ideas’, *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 39 (2008), 523–8, Michael Pauen, ‘Teleologie und Geschichte in der “Kritik der Urteilskraft”, in: Heiner Klemme, Bernd Ludwig, Michael Pauen, Werner Stark, eds., *Aufklärung und Interpretation. Studien zu Kants Philosophie und ihrem Umkreis* (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1999), 197–216, Pollmann, ‘Der Kummer der Vernunft’, Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History*.

85. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 67.

86. Kant, *Anthropology, History, and Education*, 448f., Lutz Koch, *Kants ethische Didaktik* (Würzburg: Ergon, 2003), 17, Kate A. Moran, ‘Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?’, *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 43, no. 4 (2009): 471–84, at 475–9.

87. Kant, *Anthropology, History, and Education*, 448.
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88. Eckart Förster, ‘The hidden plan of nature’, in Rorty and Schmidt, Kant’s Idea (2009), 187–99, at 189 with the following quotation.

89. Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, 116.

90. For more extensive analyses, see Karl Ameriks, Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), Bielefeldt, Kants Symbolik, 132–68, Cheneval, Philosophie, 494–562, Axel Honneth, ‘Die Unhintergebarkeit des Fortschritts. Kants Bestimmung des Verhältnisses von Moral und Geschichte’, in: Nagl and Langthaler, Recht (2004), 85–98, and the contributions in Rorty and Schmidt, Kant’s Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim and in Otfried Höffe, ed., Kritik der Urteilskraft (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2008), in particular the editor’s essay.

91. Kant, Critique of the power of judgement, 293–303, Cheneval, Philosophie, 545 and Geismann, Kant und kein Ende Band 1, 88f.

92. Henry E. Allison, ‘Teleology and history in Kant: the critical foundations of Kant’s philosophy of history’, in Rorty and Schmidt, Kant’s Idea, 24–45 (2009), 40, cf. Cheneval, Philosophie, 534.

93. Kant, Critique of the power of judgement, 299f., Allison, ‘Teleology and history in Kant’, 41, Geismann, Kant und kein Ende Band 1, 90f.

94. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 336.

95. Cf. Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, 108.

96. Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, 109, Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 65, cf. 91; see the analysis in Geismann, Kant und kein Ende Band 1, 90–7.

97. For a full discussion see Geismann, Kant und kein Ende Band 1, 99–113.

98. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 162f.

99. Again, this would be a reflective, critical judgement; this interpretation is offered by Honneth, ‘Die Unhintergebarkeit des Fortschritts’; see also Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘Verrechtlichung als Reformprozess. Kants Konstruktion der Rechtsentwicklung’, in: Nagl and Langthaler, Recht, 73–84 and Menschenrechte als interkulturelle Lerngeschichte’, in: Hans Jörg Sandköhler, ed., Philosophie, wozu? (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008), 289–301, Kleingeld, ‘Kant on historiography and the use of regulative ideas’, 524 and 526, Pollmann, ‘Der Kummer der Vernunft’, 78–82 and Cheneval, Philosophie, 501–60.

100. Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, 304f., Cheneval, Philosophie, 526f.

101. Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, 301.

102. Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, 304.

103. Ibid.

104. Cf. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 331f.

105. Translated in Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics, 42.

106. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 188; see among others Fischer and Forschner, Gottesfrage, Otfried Höffe, ed., Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2011).

107. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 87 and 79.

108. Bielefeldt, Kants Symbolik, 101–2 and 184–8, Cheneval, Philosophie, 467–72, Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics, 125–32, Sala, ‘Das Reich Gottes auf Erden’, Wood, Kantian Ethics, 259–69 and ‘Ethical Community, Church and Scripture’, in Höffe, Religion, 131–50.

109. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 134.

110. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 83–9 and 243, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 151f.

111. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 131, 133, 135; cf. Kant, Werke. Akademie-Textausgabe, vol. 15, 608–9.

112. Ibid.; cf. Geismann, Kant und kein Ende Band 1, 49, Silber, ‘Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good’, 478f., Wimmer, Kants kritische Religionsphilosophie, 11 and 74–7.

113. Cf. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 566–76.

114. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 133, 132f.

115. Ibid., 131f.
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116. Ibid., 77f.
117. Ibid. 78.
118. Ibid. 129.
119. Ibid. 130.
120. Paul Guyer, The crooked timber of mankind’, in Rorty and Schmidt, Kant’s Idea, 129–149, at 148f.; for a full argument see Anderson-Gold, Unnecessary Evil 25–52 and Wood, ‘Ethical Community, Church and Scripture’ 131–5.
121. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 135 and Kant, Practical Philosophy, 243.
122. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 130.
123. Cf. Wimmer, Kants kritische Religionsphilosophie, 187–97; see also Heiner Klemme, ‘Die Freiheit der Willkür und die Herrschaft des Bösen. Kants Lehre vom radikalen Bösen zwischen Moral, Religion und Recht’, in: Heiner Klemme, Bernd Ludwig, Michael Pauen, Werner Stark, Hrsg., Aufklärung und Interpretation. Studien zu Kants Philosophie und ihrem Umkreis (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1999), 125–51, at 127f., Sala, ‘Das Reich Gottes auf Erden’, 236–43.
124. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 135.
125. Ibid., 133.
126. There is an additional argument based on God as supreme and public lawgiver of the ethical community developed by Wimmer, Kants kritische Religionsphilosophie 194–6.
127. Leslie A. Mulholland, ‘Freedom and Providence in Kant’s Account of Religion: The Problem of Expiation’, in: Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen, eds., Kant’s Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 77–102, at 98; see also Burkhard Nonnenmacher, ‘Der Begriff sogenannter Gnadenmittel unter der Idee eines reinen Vernunftglaubens’, in Hoffe, Religion, 211–29, Wimmer, Kants kritische Religionsphilosophie, 158 and Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion, 238–48.
128. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 92 and 165.
129. Ibid., 148; cf. 165.
130. This scepticism may have an unwelcome consequence: it leaves the field of metaphysics to reckless and esoteric speculation, cf. Bielefeldt, Kants Symbolik, 20.
131. Cf. Pollmann, ‘Der Kummer der Vernunft’, 87, Rüdiger Bittner, ‘Philosophy helps history’, in: Rorty and Schmidt, Kant’s Idea, 231–49, at 249; Brown, Grounding Cosmopolitanism 6, 31, 33, 38 and 43.
132. Heiner Klemme, ‘Die Freiheit der Willkür und die Herrschaft des Bösen. Kants Lehre vom radikalen Bösen zwischen Moral, Religion und Recht’, in: Heiner Klemme, Bernd Ludwig, Michael Pauen, Werner Stark, Hrsg., Aufklärung und Interpretation. Studien zu Kants Philosophie und ihrem Umkreis (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1999), 125–51, at 125.
133. Here I follow the interpretation of Wimmer, Kants kritische Religionsphilosophie, 76f.
134. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 562, Kant, Critique of the power of judgement, 316 and the discussion in Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion 153–87 and 252f., Kuehn, ‘Kant’s Transcendental Deduction’, 157–60 and Wimmer, Kants kritische Religionsphilosophie, 77–88.
135. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 162f.
136. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 227.