Naive Bayes Spam Filtering Using Word-Position-Based Attributes

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Abstract

This paper explores the use of the naive Bayes classifier as the basis for personalised spam filters. Several machine learning algorithms, including variants of naive Bayes, have previously been used for this purpose, but the author’s implementation using word-position-based attribute vectors gave very good results when tested on several publicly available corpora. The effects of various forms of attribute selection—removal of frequent and infrequent words, respectively, and by using mutual information—are investigated. It is also shown how n-grams, with $n > 1$, may be used to boost classification performance. Finally, an efficient weighting scheme for cost-sensitive classification is introduced.

1 Introduction

The problem of unsolicited bulk e-mail, or spam, gets worse with every year. The vast amount of spam being sent wastes resources on the Internet, wastes time for users, and may expose children to unsuitable contents (e.g. pornography). This development has stressed the need for automatic spam filters.

Early spam filters were instances of knowledge engineering using hand-crafted rules (e.g. the presence of the string “buy now” indicates spam). The process of creating the rule base requires both knowledge and time, and the rules were thus often supplied by the developers of the filter. Having common and, more or less, publicly available rules made it easy for spammers to construct their e-mails to get through the filters.

Recently, a shift has occurred as more focus has been put on machine learning for the automatic creation of personalised spam filters. A supervised learning algorithm is presented with e-mails from the user’s mailbox and outputs a filter. The e-mails have previously been classified manually as spam or non-spam. The resulting spam filter has the advantage of being optimised for the e-mail distribution of the individual user. Thus it is able to use also the characteristics of non-spam, or legitimate, e-mails (e.g. presence of the string “machine learning”) during classification.

Perhaps the first attempt of using machine learning algorithms for the generation of spam filters was reported by Sahami et al. (1998). They trained a naive Bayes classifier and reported promising results. Other algorithms have been tested but there seems to be no clear winner (Androutsopoulos et al., 2004). The naive Bayes approach has been picked up by end-user applications such as the Mozilla e-mail client\(^1\) and the free software project SpamAssassin\(^2\), where the latter is using a combination of both rules and machine learning.

Spam filtering differs from other text categorisation tasks in at least two ways. First, one might expect a greater class heterogeneity—it is not the contents per se that defines spam, but rather the fact that it is unsolicited. Similarly, the class of legitimate messages may also span a number of diverse subjects. Secondly, since misclassifying a legitimate message is generally much worse than misclassifying a spam, there is a qualitative difference between the classes that needs to be taken into account.

In this paper the results of using a variant of the naive Bayes classifier for spam filtering are presented. The effects of various forms of attribute selection are explored, as are the effects of considering not only single tokens, but rather sequences of tokens, as attributes. An efficient scheme for cost-sensitive classification is also introduced. All experiments have been conducted on several publicly available corpora, thereby making a comparison with previously published results possible.

\(^{1}\)http://www.mozilla.org/
\(^{2}\)http://www.spamassassin.org/
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the naive Bayes classifier; Section 3 discusses the benchmark corpora used; in Section 4 the experimental results are presented; Section 5 gives a comparison with previously reported results, and in the last section some conclusions are drawn.

2 The Naive Bayes Classifier

In the general context, the instances to be classified are described by attribute vectors \( \tilde{a} = \langle a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n \rangle \). The naive Bayes classifier assigns to an instance the most probable, or maximum a posteriori, classification from a finite set \( C \) of classes:

\[
C_{\text{MAP}} \equiv \arg \max_{c \in C} P(c|\tilde{a}),
\]

which after applying Bayes’ theorem can be written

\[
C_{\text{MAP}} = \arg \max_{c \in C} P(c) P(\tilde{a}|c). \tag{1}
\]

The posterior probabilities \( P(\tilde{a}|c) = P(a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n|c) \) could be estimated directly from the training data, but are generally infeasible to estimate unless the available data is vast. Thus the naive Bayes assumption—that the individual attributes are conditionally independent of each other, given the classification—is introduced:

\[
P(a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n|c) = \prod_i P(a_i|c).
\]

With this strong assumption, Equation (1) becomes the naive Bayes classifier:

\[
C_{\text{NB}} = \arg \max_{c \in C} P(c) \prod_i P(a_i|c) \tag{2}
\]

(Mitchell, 1997).

In text classification applications, one may choose to define one attribute for each word position in a document. This means that we need to estimate the probability of a certain word \( w_k \) occurring at position \( i \), given the target classification \( c_j \): \( P(a_i = w_k|c_j) \). Due to training data sparseness, we introduce the additional assumption that the probability of a specific word \( w_k \) occurring at position \( i \) is identical to the probability of that same word occurring at position \( m \): \( P(a_i = w_k|c_j) = P(a_m = w_k|c_j) \) for all \( i, j, k, m \). Thus we estimate \( P(a_i = w_k|c_j) \) with \( P(w_k|c_j) \). The probabilities \( P(w_k|c_j) \) may be estimated with maximum likelihood estimates, using Laplace smoothing to avoid zero probabilities:

\[
P(w_k|c_j) = \frac{C_j(w_k) + 1}{n_j + |\text{Vocabulary}|},
\]

where \( C_j(w_k) \) is the number of occurrences of the word \( w_k \) in all documents of class \( c_j \), \( n_j \) is the total number of word positions in documents of class \( c_j \), and \( |\text{Vocabulary}| \) is the number of distinct words in all documents. The class priors \( P(c_j) \) are estimated with document ratios. (Mitchell, 1997)

Note that during classification the index \( i \) in Equation (2) ranges over all word positions containing words which are in the vocabulary, thus ignoring so called out-of-vocabulary words.

The resulting classifier is equivalent to a naive Bayes text classifier based on a multinomial event model (or unigram language model). For a more elaborate discussion of the text model used, see Joachims (1997) and McCallum and Nigam (1998).

3 Benchmark Corpora

The experiments were conducted on the PU corpora\(^3\) and the SpamAssassin corpus\(^4\). The four PU corpora, dubbed PU1, PU2, PU3 and PUA, respectively, have been made publicly available by Androutsopoulos et al. (2004) in order to promote standard benchmarks. The four corpora contain private mailboxes of four different users in encrypted form. The messages have been preprocessed and stripped from attachments, HTML-tags and mail headers (except Subject). This may lead to overly pessimistic results since attachments, HTML-tags and mail headers may add useful information to the classification process. For more information on the compositions and characteristics of the PU corpora see Androutsopoulos et al. (2004).

The SpamAssassin corpus (SA) consists of private mail, donated by different users, in unencrypted form with headers and attachments retained\(^5\). The fact that the e-mails are collected from different distributions may lead to overly optimistic results, e.g. if (some of) the spam messages have been sent to a particular address, but none of the legitimate messages have. On the other hand, the fact that the legitimate messages have been donated by different users may lead to underestimates since this should imply greater diversity of the topics of legitimate e-mails.

The sizes and compositions of the five corpora are shown in Table 1.

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\(^3\)The PU corpora may be downloaded from http://www.iit.demokritos.gr/skel/i-config/.
\(^4\)The SpamAssassin corpus is available at http://spamassassin.org/publiccorpus/.
\(^5\)Due to a primitive mbox parser, e-mails containing non-textual or encoded parts (i.e. most e-mails with attachments) were ignored in the experiments.
Table 1: Sizes and spam ratios of the five corpora.

| corpus  | messages | spam ratio |
|---------|----------|------------|
| PU1     | 1099     | 44%        |
| PU2     | 721      | 20%        |
| PU3     | 4139     | 44%        |
| PUA     | 1142     | 50%        |
| SA      | 6047     | 31%        |

4 Experimental Results

As mentioned above, misclassifying a legitimate mail as spam \((L\rightarrow S)\) is in general worse than misclassifying a spam message as legitimate \((S\rightarrow L)\). In order to capture such asymmetries when measuring classification performance, two measures from the field of information retrieval, called precision and recall, are often used. Denote with \(|S\rightarrow L|\) and \(|S\rightarrow S|\) the number of spam messages classified as legitimate and spam, respectively, and similarly for \(|L\rightarrow L|\) and \(|L\rightarrow S|\). Then spam recall \((R)\) and spam precision \((P)\) are defined as

\[
R = \frac{|S\rightarrow S|}{|S\rightarrow S| + |S\rightarrow L|} \quad \text{and} \quad P = \frac{|S\rightarrow S|}{|S\rightarrow S| + |L\rightarrow S|}.
\]

In the rest of this paper, spam recall and spam precision are referred to simply as recall and precision. Intuitively, recall measures effectiveness whereas precision gives a measure of safety. One is often willing to accept lower recall (more spam messages slipping through) in order to gain precision (fewer misclassified legitimate messages).

Sometimes accuracy \((Acc)\)—the ratio of correctly classified messages—is used as a combined measure.

All experiments were conducted using 10-fold cross validation. That is, the messages have been divided into ten partitions and at each iteration nine partitions were used for training and the remaining tenth for testing. The reported figures are the means of the values from the ten iterations.

4.1 Attribute Selection

It is common to apply some form of attribute selection process, retaining only a subset of the words—or rather tokens, since punctuation signs and other symbols are often included—found in the training messages. This way the learning and classification process may be sped up and memory requirements are lowered. Attribute selection may also lead to increased classification performance since, for example, the risk of overfitting the training data is reduced.

Removing infrequent and frequent words, respectively, are two possible approaches (Mitchell, 1997). The rationale behind removing infrequent words is that this is likely to have a significant effect on the size of the attribute set and that predictions should not be based on such rare observations anyway. Removing the most frequent words is motivated by the fact that common words, such as the English words “the” and “to”, are as likely to occur in spam as in legitimate messages.

A very common method is to rank the attributes using mutual information \((MI)\) and to keep only the highest scoring ones. \(MI(X; C)\) gives a measure of how well an attribute \(X\) discriminates between the various classes in \(C\) and is defined as

\[
\sum_{x \in \{0,1\}} \sum_{c \in C} P(x, c) \log \frac{P(x, c)}{P(x)P(c)}
\]

(Cover & Thomas, 1991). The probability distributions were estimated as in Section 2. This corresponds to the multinomial variant of mutual information used by McCallum and Nigam (1998), but with the difference that the class priors were estimated using document ratios rather than word-position ratios. (Using word-position ratios gave almost exactly the same classification results.)

In the first experiment, tokens occurring less than \(n = 1, \ldots, 15\) times were removed. The results indicated unaffected or slightly increased precision at the expense of slightly reduced recall as \(n\) grew. The exception was the PU2 corpus where precision dropped significantly. The reason for this may be that PU2 is the smallest corpus and contains many infrequent tokens. On the other hand, removing infrequent tokens had a dramatic impact on the vocabulary size (see Figure 1). Removing tokens occurring less than three times seems to be a good trade-off between memory usage and classification performance, reducing the vocabulary size with 56–69%. This selection scheme was used throughout the remaining experiments.

Removing the most frequent words turned out to have a major effect on both precision and recall (see Figure 2). This effect was most significant on the largest and non-preprocessed SA corpus where recall increased from 77% to over 95% by just removing the hundred most common tokens, but classification gained from removing the 100–200 most frequent tokens on all corpora. Removing too many tokens reduced classification performance—again most notably on the smaller PU2 corpus. We believe that this selection scheme increases performance because it makes sure that very frequent tokens do not dominate Equation (2) com-

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\(\text{The PU corpora come prepartitioned and the SA corpus has been partitioned according to the last digit of the messages’ decimal ids.}\)
The greater impact of removing frequent tokens on the SA corpus can thus be explained by the fact that it contains many more very frequent tokens (originating from mail headers and HTML) (see related discussion in Section 4.2).

In the last attribute-selection experiment, $MI$-ranking was used instead of removing the most frequent tokens. Although the gain in terms of reduced memory usage was high—the vocabulary size dropped from 7000–35000 to the number of attributes chosen to be kept (e.g. 500–3000)—classification performance was significantly reduced. When $MI$-ranking was performed after first removing the 200 most frequent tokens, the performance penalty was not as severe, and using $MI$-ranking to select 3000–4000 attributes then seems reasonable (see Figure 3). We are currently investigating further the relation between mutual information and frequent tokens.

Since learning and classification time is mostly unaffected—$MI$ still has to be calculated for all attributes—we see no reason for using $MI$-ranking unless memory usage is crucial\(^7\), and we decided not to use it further (with unigram attributes).

4.2 n-grams

Up to now each attribute has corresponded to a single word position, or unigram. Is it possible to obtain better results by considering also token sequences of length two and three (i.e. n-grams for $n = 2, 3$)? The question was raised and answered partially in Androutsopoulos et al. (2004). Although many bi- and trigrams were shown to have very high information contents, as measured by mutual information, no improvement was found.

\(^7\)Androutsopoulos et al. (2004) reaches a different conclusion.

| n-grams | $R$ | $P$ | Acc |
|---------|-----|-----|-----|
| PU1     |     |     |     |
| $n = 1$ | 98.12 | 95.35 | 97.06 |
| $n = 1, 2, 3$ | 99.17 | 96.19 | 97.89 |
| PU2     |     |     |     |
| $n = 1$ | 97.14 | 87.00 | 96.20 |
| $n = 1, 2, 3$ | 95.00 | 93.12 | 96.90 |
| PU3     |     |     |     |
| $n = 1$ | 96.92 | 96.02 | 96.83 |
| $n = 1, 2, 3$ | 96.59 | 97.83 | 97.53 |
| PUA     |     |     |     |
| $n = 1$ | 93.68 | 97.91 | 95.79 |
| $n = 1, 2, 3$ | 94.74 | 97.75 | 96.23 |
| SA      |     |     |     |
| $n = 1$ | 97.12 | 99.25 | 98.95 |
| $n = 1, 2, 3$ | 92.26 | 98.70 | 97.42 |
| $n = 1, 2, 3$ | 98.46 | 99.66 | 99.46 |

There are many possible ways of extending the attribute set with general n-grams, for instance, by using all available n-grams, by just using some of them, or by using some kind of back-off approach. The attribute probabilities $P(w_i, w_{i+1}, \ldots, w_{i+n} | c_j)$ are still estimated using maximum likelihood estimates with Laplace smoothing

$$C_j(w_i, w_{i+1}, \ldots, w_{i+n}) + 1$$

$$n_j + |V o c a b u l a r y|$$

Note that extending the attribute set in this way can result in a total probability mass greater than one. Fortunately, this need not be a problem since we are not estimating the classification probabilities explicitly (see Equation (2)).

It turned out that adding bi- and trigrams to the attribute set increased classification performance on all of the PU corpora, but not (initially) on the SA corpus. The various methods for extending the attribute set all gave similar results and we settled on the simple version which just considers each n-gram occurrence as an independent attribute\(^8\). The results are shown in Table 2.

\(^8\)This is clearly not true. The three n-grams in the phrase “buy now”—“buy”, “now” and “buy now”—are obviously not independent.
corpora the precision gain was relatively small or even non-existing. At first the significantly decreased classification performance on the SA corpus came as a bit of a surprise. The reason turned out to be that when considering also bi- and trigrams in the non-preprocessed SA corpus, a lot of very frequent attributes, originating from mail headers and HTML, were added to the attribute set. This had the effect of giving these attributes a too dominant role in Equation (2). By removing more of the most frequent n-grams, classification performance was increased also for the SA corpus. The conclusion to be drawn is that mail headers and HTML, although containing useful information, should not be included by brute force. Perhaps some kind of weighting scheme or selective inclusion process would be appropriate.

Finally, we note that the gained classification performance came with a cost in terms of increased memory requirements. The vocabulary sizes became 17–23 times larger prior to attribute selection (i.e. during training) and 8–12 times larger afterwards (i.e. during operation) compared to when only using unigrams. The latter figure may, however, be reduced to 0.7–4 (while retaining approximately the same performance gain) by using mutual information to select a vocabulary of 25000 n-grams.

4.3 Cost-Sensitive Classification

Generally it is much worse to misclassify legitimate mails than letting spam slip through the filter. Hence, it is desirable to be able to bias the filter towards classifying messages as legitimate, yielding higher precision at the expense of recall.

A common way of biasing the filter is to classify a message $d$ as spam if and only if the estimated probability $P(\text{spam}|d)$ exceeds some threshold $t > 0.5$, or

Figure 2: Impact on spam precision and recall when removing the most frequent words.
equivalently, to classify as spam if and only if

$$\frac{P(\text{spam}|d)}{P(\text{legit}|d)} > \lambda,$$

for some real number $\lambda > 1$ (Sahami et al., 1998; Androutsopoulos et al., 2000; Androutsopoulos et al., 2004). This has the same effect as multiplying the prior probability of legitimate messages by $\lambda$ and then classifying according to Equation (2).

As noted in Androutsopoulos et al. (2004), the naive Bayes classifier is quite insensitive to (small) changes to $\lambda$ since the probability estimates tend to approach 0 and 1, respectively. As is shown below, this insensitivity increases with the length of the attribute vectors, and by exploiting this fact, a more efficient cost-sensitive classification scheme for word-position-based (and hence, variable-length) attribute vectors is made possible.

Instead of using the traditional scheme, we propose the following classification criterion:

$$\frac{P(\text{spam}|d)}{P(\text{legit}|d)} > w|d|,$$

where $w > 1$, which is equivalent to multiplying each posterior probability $P(w_i|\text{legit})$ in Equation (2) with the weight $w$. Intuitively, we require the spam posterior probability for each word occurrence to be on average $w$ times as high as the corresponding legitimate probability (given uniform priors).

When comparing the two weighting schemes by plotting their recall/precision curves for the five benchmark corpora, we found that the length-sensitive scheme was more efficient than the traditional one—rendering higher recall at each given precision level (see Figure 4). This can be explained by the fact that the certainty quotient $q(d) = \frac{P(\text{spam}|d)}{P(\text{legit}|d)}$ actually grew (decreased) exponentially with $|d|$ for
spam (legitimate) messages, and thereby made it safe to use much larger thresholds for longer messages. With length-sensitive thresholds we were thus able to compensate for longer misclassified legitimate mails in the process (as would a large $\lambda$ with the traditional scheme) (see Figure 5).

5 Evaluation

Many different machine learning algorithms besides naive Bayes, such as C4.5, $k$-Nearest Neighbour and Support Vector Machines, have previously been used in spam-filtering experiments. There seems to have been no clear winner, but there is a difficulty in comparing the results of different experiments since the used corpora have rarely been made publicly available (Androutsopoulos et al., 2004). This section gives a brief comparison with the implementation and results of the authors of the PU corpora.

In Androutsopoulos et al. (2004), a variant of naive Bayes was compared with three other learning algorithms: Flexible Bayes, LogitBoost, and Support Vector Machines (SVM). All of the algorithms used real-valued word-frequency attributes. The attributes were selected by removing words occurring less than four times and then keeping the 600 words with highest mutual information.\footnote{The authors only report results of their naive Bayes implementation on attribute sets with up to 600 words, but they seem to conclude that using larger attribute sets only have a marginal effect on accuracy.} As can be seen in Table 3, the word-position-based naive Bayes implementation of this paper achieved significantly higher precision and better or comparable recall than the word-frequency-based variant on all four PU corpora. The results were also better or comparable to those of the best-performing algorithm on each corpus.

In Androutsopoulos et al. (2000), the authors used a naive Bayes implementation based on Boolean attributes, representing the presence or absence of a fixed number of words selected using mutual information. In their experiments three different cost scenarios were explored, and the number of attributes used was optimised for each scenario. Table 4 compares the best results achieved on the PU1 corpus\footnote{The results are for the bare PU1 corpus, i.e. the stoplist and lemmatiser have not been applied.} for each scenario with the results achieved by the naive Bayes implementation of this paper. Due to the difficulty of relating the two different weights, $\lambda$ and $w$, the weight $w$ has been selected in steps of 0.05 in order to get equal or higher precision. The authors deemed the $\lambda = 999$ scenario too difficult to be used in practice because of the low recall figures.

6 Conclusions

In this paper it has been shown that it is possible to achieve very good classification performance using a word-position-based variant of naive Bayes. The simplicity and low time complexity of the algorithm thus makes naive Bayes a good choice for end-user applications.
Figure 5: Certainty quotient $q(d) = P(\text{spam}|d)/P(\text{legit}|d)$ versus document length (after removing out-of-vocabulary words) for the PU1 corpus. The left figure shows a plot of the unbiased certainty quotients. The right figure shows a linear regression of the left plot and of the certainty quotients after biasing them by multiplying the legitimate posteriors and prior with the weights $w = 2.0$ and $\lambda = 10^{55}$, respectively.

Table 4: Comparison of the results achieved by naive Bayes on the PU1 corpus in Androutsopoulos et al. (2000) and by the author’s implementation. Results for the latter are shown for both unigram and n-gram ($n = 1, 2, 3$) attributes. In both cases, attributes were selected by removing the 200 most frequent n-grams as well as n-grams occurring less than three times. For each cost scenario, the weight $w$ has been selected in steps of 0.05 in order to get equal or higher precision.

| learner                              | $R$  | $P$  |
|--------------------------------------|------|------|
| Androutsopoulos ($\lambda = 1$)     | 83.98| 95.11|
| Hovold (unigram, $w = 1$)           | 98.12| 95.35|
| Hovold (n-gram, $w = 1$)            | 99.17| 96.19|
| Androutsopoulos ($\lambda = 9$)     | 78.77| 96.65|
| Hovold (unigram, $w = 1.20$)        | 97.50| 97.34|
| Hovold (n-gram, $w = 1.05$)         | 99.17| 97.15|
| Androutsopoulos ($\lambda = 999$)  | 46.96| 98.80|
| Hovold (unigram, $w = 1.65$)        | 91.67| 98.88|
| Hovold (n-gram, $w = 1.30$)         | 96.04| 98.92|

The importance of attribute selection has been stressed—memory requirements may be lowered and classification performance increased. In particular, removing the most frequent words was found to have a major impact on classification performance when using word-position-based attributes.

By extending the attribute set with bi- and trigrams, better classification performance may be achieved, although at the cost of significantly increased memory requirements.

With the use of a simple weighting scheme, precision may be boosted further while still retaining a high enough recall level—a feature very important in real-life applications.

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