Quantum secret sharing between multiparty and multiparty with four states

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Abstract: An protocol of quantum secret sharing between multiparty and multiparty with four states is presented. We show that this protocol can make the Trojan horse attack with a multi-photon signal, the fake-signal attack with EPR pairs, the attack with single photons, and the attack with invisible photons to be nullification. In addition, we also give the upper bounds of the average success probabilities for dishonest agent eavesdropping encryption using the fake-signal attack with any two-particle entangled states.

Keyword: quantum secret sharing, security, EPR pairs.

Recently we proposed a quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocol between multiparty (m members in group 1) and multiparty (n members in group 2) using a sequence of single photons [1]. In our protocol, all members in group 1 directly encode their respective keys on the states of single photons via unitary operations, then the last one (the nth member of group 1) sends 1/n-multiparty (nB photons, the two groups share the secret messages. Unfortunately, Li et al. [2] pointed out that if the nth party of group 1 is dishonest, she can obtain secret by substituting a sequence of single photons or a sequence of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs generated by himself for the original photons without the detection of the other parties. In this paper, we present a protocol of quantum secret sharing between multiparty and multiparty with four states which is an improvement of the one in [1] and show that this improved protocol can prevent dishonest member from this kind cheating. Moreover, the present protocol is also secure against the Trojan horse attack with a multi-photon signal [3], the fake-signal attack with EPR pairs [4] and the attack with invisible photons [5]. We also give the upper bounds of the average success probabilities for dishonest agent eavesdropping encryption using the fake-signal attack with any two-particle entangled states.

I. REVIEW OF THE ORIGINAL QSS PROTOCOL BETWEEN MULTIPARTY AND MULTIPARTY WITHOUT ENTANGLEMENT

Suppose that there are m (m ≥ 2) and n (n ≥ 2) members in group 1 and group 2, respectively, and Alice 1, Alice 2, · · · , Alice m, and Bob 1, Bob 2, · · · , Bob n are their respective all members. Group 1 wants quantum key sharing with group 2 such that neither part of each group nor the combination of a part of group 1 and a part of group 2 knows the key, but only all members of each group can collaborate to determine what the string (key) is. The original QSS protocol between multiparty and multiparty without entanglement [1] is briefly summarized as follows:

(M1) Alice 1 chooses two random nN-bit strings A1 and B1. She encodes each bit a1k of A1 as |ψ1k⟩b1k, where b1k is the corresponding bit of B1,

\[
\begin{align*}
|\psi_{00}\rangle &= |0\rangle, \\
|\psi_{10}\rangle &= |1\rangle, \\
|\psi_{01}\rangle &= |+\rangle = \frac{|0\rangle + |1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}, \\
|\psi_{11}\rangle &= |-\rangle = \frac{|0\rangle - |1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}.
\end{align*}
\]

(1)

Then she sends the resulting nN-qubit state |Ψ1⟩ = ⊗k=1nN|ψ1k⟩b1k to Alice 2.

(M2) Alice 2 creates two random nN-bit strings A2 and B2. She applies σ0 = I = |0⟩⟨0| + |1⟩⟨1| or σ1 = iσy = |0⟩⟨1| − |1⟩⟨0| to each qubit |ψ1k⟩b1k of nN-qubit state |Ψ1⟩ according to the corresponding bit of A2 being 0 or 1, then she applies I or H = \(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle)|0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle − |1\rangle)|1\rangle to each qubit of the resulting nN-qubit state depending on the corresponding bit of B2 being 0 or 1. After that, she sends Alice 3 the resulting nN-qubit state |Ψ2⟩ = ⊗k=1nN|ψ2k⟩b2k.

(M3) Alice i does likewise, i = 3, 4, · · · , m. After Alice m finishes her unitary operations on each single photon, she sends N-qubit state ⊗l=1N|ψl⟩b1l+lN−1l=1m+1l−1 to Bob l, 1 ≤ l ≤ n.

(M4) Bob 1, Bob 2, · · · , Bob n receive N qubits, and announce this fact, respectively.
(M5) Alice 1, Alice 2, · · · , and Alice m publicly announce the strings $B_1, B_2, \cdots, B_m$, respectively.

(M6) Bob $l$ measures each of his qubit $|\psi_i^{m_{nj+l}}\rangle$ in the Z basis $\{0,1\}$ (if $\otimes_{i=1}^{m_{nj+l}} |b_i^{nj+l} \rangle = 0$) or in the X basis $\{+ = |\langle 0 + |1 \rangle \rangle, - = |\langle 0 - |1 \rangle \rangle\}$ (if $\otimes_{i=1}^{m_{nj+l}} |b_i^{nj+l} \rangle = 1$, $j = 0, 1, \cdots, N - 1$, $l = 1, 2, \cdots, n$).

(M7) All Alices select randomly a subset that will serve as a check on Eve’s interference, and tell all Bobs the bits they choose. In the check procedure, all Alices and Bobs are required to broadcast the values of their checked bits, and compare the XOR results of the corresponding bits of checked bits of $A_1, A_2, \cdots, A_m$ and the values of the corresponding bits of Bob 1, Bob 2, · · · , and Bob n. If more than an acceptable number disagree, they abort this round of operation and restart from first step.

(M8) The XOR results $\otimes_{i=1}^{n} (\otimes_{i=1}^{m} a_i^{nj+l})$ of Bob’s corresponding bits $\otimes_{i=1}^{m} a_i^{nj+l}$ of the remaining bits $n_j + l$ of $\{\otimes_{i=1}^{m} a_i^{nj+l} \}_{j=0}^{N-1}, \{\otimes_{i=1}^{m} a_i^{nj+l+2} \}_{j=0}^{N-1}, \cdots, \{\otimes_{i=1}^{m} a_i^{nj+l+2} \}_{j=0}^{N-1}$ (or $\otimes_{j=0}^{N-1} |\psi_{m_{nj+l+2}}^{m_{nj+l+2}} \rangle$, $\otimes_{j=0}^{N-1} |\psi_{m_{nj+l+2}}^{m_{nj+l+2}} \rangle$, · · · , $\otimes_{j=0}^{N-1} |\psi_{m_{nj+l+2}}^{m_{nj+l+2}} \rangle$) can be used as key bits for secret sharing between all Alices and all Bobs.

There exist security flaws in this protocol. The details are as follows.

1. Alice 1 is a dishonest agent. Alice 1 prepares $nN$ EPR pairs in the state $\otimes_{k=1}^{nN} |\Phi_k \rangle$, where $|\Phi_k \rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00 \rangle \pm |11 \rangle)_{EA}$. Alice 1 holds particle $E$ of each EPR pair and sends the sequence $S_A$ of $\otimes_{k=1}^{nN} |\Phi_k \rangle$ to Alice 2. She does not intercept $S_A$ until $S_A$ is sent to Alice $i_1 + 1$ (or Bobs). Note that after all operations of Alice 2, · · · , and Alice $i_1$ (or Alice m), $|\Phi_k \rangle$ is transformed into one of the states

$$|\Phi^+ \rangle, |\Psi^- \rangle, \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\Phi^- \rangle + |\Psi^+ \rangle), \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\Phi^- \rangle - |\Psi^+ \rangle),$$

which are mutually orthogonal. Here

$$|\Phi^+ \rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00 \rangle \pm |11 \rangle), |\Psi^- \rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01 \rangle \pm |10 \rangle).$$

Since orthogonal states can be distinguish with certainty, Alice 1 never makes a mistake and can steal encoding information of Alice 2, · · · , and Alice $i_1$ (or all Alices) freely and fully. In this way, Alice 1 can steal all Alices encryption freely and fully. After that, whether Alice 1 sends Bobs single photons or she sends Bobs EPR pairs, she and all Bobs share successfully the secret messages shared by all Alices and all Bobs.

2. Alice $i_0$ ($1 \leq i_0 \leq m$) is a dishonest agent. Alice $i_0$ generates $nN$ EPR pairs in the state $\otimes_{k=1}^{nN} |\Phi_k \rangle$ as above Alice 1, where $|\Phi_k \rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00 \rangle + |11 \rangle)_{EA}$. When all Alices complete their respective operations in (M1)-(M3), Alice $i_0$ intercepts $|\Psi^m \rangle$, substitute $S_A$ for $|\Psi^m \rangle$, and sends $N$ particles of the sequence $S_A$ of $\otimes_{k=1}^{nN} |\Phi_k \rangle$ to each Bob $l$. Alice $i_0$ can obtain the original secret message by cheating without the detection of other parties, which is the same as Alice m using the attack with EPR pairs in [2].

However, all the weaknesses above can be avoided by the following improved QSS protocol.

II. THE IMPROVEMENT OF QSS PROTOCOL BETWEEN MULTIPARTY AND MULTIPARTY WITHOUT ENTANGLEMENT

Now we give the improved quantum secret sharing scheme as follows.

M1. Alice 1 begins with two random classical bit strings $A_1 = \{a_1^1, a_2^1, \cdots, a_{nN}^1\}$ and $B_1 = \{b_1^1, b_2^1, \cdots, b_{nN}^1\}$, where $a_k^1$ and $b_k^1$ are uniformly chosen from $\{0,1\}$. She then encodes these strings as a block of $nN$ qubits,

$$|\Psi^1 \rangle = \otimes_{k=1}^{nN} |\psi_i^{a_k^1b_k^1} \rangle = \otimes_{j=0}^{N-1} |\psi_{a_1^{1+j}b_1^{1+j}}^{a_2^{1+j}b_2^{1+j}} \rangle |\psi_{a_3^{1+j}b_3^{1+j}}^{a_4^{1+j}b_4^{1+j}} \rangle \cdots |\psi_{a_{nN}^{1+j}b_{nN}^{1+j}}^{a_{nN}^{1+j}b_{nN}^{1+j}} \rangle,$$

where $a_k^1$ is the $k$th bit of $A_1$ (and similar for $B_1$), each qubit $|\psi_i^{a_k^1b_k^1} \rangle$ is in one of the four states in Eq. (1). The value of $b_k^1$ determines the basis. If $b_k^1$ is 0 then $a_k^1$ is encoded in the Z basis $\{0,1\}$; if $b_k^1$ is 1 then $a_k^1$ is encoded in the X basis $\{+ = |\langle 0 + |1 \rangle \rangle, - = |\langle 0 - |1 \rangle \rangle\}$. Because the four states are not all mutually orthogonal, therefore no measurement can distinguish between all of them with certainty. Alice 1 then sends $|\Psi^1 \rangle$ to Alice 2 over their public quantum communication channel.

M2. When Alice $i$ receives signals sent by Alice $i - 1$, she selects randomly a large subset of photons as the samples for eavesdropping check. First, she uses a special filter to prevent the invisible photons from entering the operation system. Then she splits each sample signal with a photon number splitter (PNS: 50/50), and measures each signal in the measurement basis (MB) $Z$, or $X$ at random [3]. Evidently if two photons in one signal are detected, then
Alice \( i \) will abort the communication. Moreover, she asks Alice 1, Alice 2, \( \cdots \), Alice \( i - 1 \) to tell her their encoding information \( a^i_1, b^i_1 \) of the samples in a random sequential order. After that, she analyzes the error rate \( \varepsilon_s \) of the samples she measured in MB Z or X if \( \oplus_{i=1}^{n} b^i_1 = 0 \) or 1, respectively. In other words, Alice \( i \) analyzes the error rate \( \varepsilon_s \) of the samples she measured in the same basis with \( |\psi_{i-1}^{s=1}⟩ \). If the error rate of the samples is higher than a threshold \( \varepsilon_s \), then Alice \( i \) aborts the quantum communication. Otherwise she goes ahead. Here \( s \) is the label of the sample chosen for eavesdropping check, and \( i = 2, 3, \cdots, m \).

Clearly the test steps can avoid the Trojan horse attack with a multi-photon signal \( [3] \) and the attack with invisible photons [\( \mathbb{B} \)].

M3. Alice \( i \) creates a quaternary string \( A_i = \{a^i_1, a^i_2, \cdots, a^i_{nN+m-1}\} \) and a binary string \( B_i = \{b^i_1, b^i_2, \cdots, b^i_{nN+m-1}\} \), where \( a^i_k \) and \( b^i_k \) are uniformly chosen from \( \{0, 1, 2, 3\} \) and \( \{0, 1\} \), respectively. For each \( |\psi_{i-1}^{s=1}⟩ \) of the \( nN + m^{i-1} \) qubit state \( |\Psi^{i-1}⟩ = \otimes_{i=1}^{nN+m^{i-1}} |\psi_{i-1}^{s=1}⟩ \), she performs the operation \( \sigma_0, \sigma_1, \sigma_2 \) or \( \sigma_3 \) on it depending on the corresponding \( a^i_k \) of \( A_i \) is 0, 1, 2 or 3, respectively. Simultaneously she has to operate the qubit with I or a Hadamard operator \( H \) according to the bit \( b^i_k \) in \( B_i \) is 0 or 1, respectively. Here

\[
\begin{align*}
\sigma_0 &= I = |0⟩⟨0| + |1⟩⟨1|, \\
\sigma_1 &= i \sigma_y = -|1⟩⟨0| + |0⟩⟨1|, \\
\sigma_2 &= \sigma_z = |0⟩⟨0| - |1⟩⟨1|, \\
\sigma_3 &= \sigma_x = |0⟩⟨1| + |1⟩⟨0|, \\
H &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0⟩ + |1⟩)⟨0| + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0⟩ - |1⟩)⟨1|. 
\end{align*}
\]

(5)

Alice \( i \) making these unitary operations is equal to the encryption on the states of single photons. The resulting state of this qubit is denoted by \( |\psi_{a^i_k b^i_k}⟩ \). After that Alice \( i \) inserts randomly \( m^i - m^{i-1} \) decoy single photons into \( nN + m^{i-1} \) photons encoded by her, where each of the decoy single photons is randomly in one of the states in Eq.(1). Here \( i = 2, 3, \cdots, m \).

M4. Alice \( i \) sends the photons \( nN + m^{i} \) qubits in the state \( |\Psi^{i}⟩ = \otimes_{i=1}^{nN+m^{i}} |\psi_{a^i_k b^i_k}⟩ \) to Alice \( i + 1 \) \( (i = 2, 3, \cdots, m-1) \). After Alice \( m \) completes her encoding operations and randomly inserts \( m^{m-1} - m^{m-1} \) decoy single photons, she sends \( nN + m^m \) photons to Bob 1, Bob 2, \( \cdots \), Bob \( n \) in a sequential order.

M5. When all Bob 1, Bob 2, \( \cdots \), and Bob \( n \) have received their respective strings of qubits, each of them first randomly and independently chooses sufficient samples to make measurement in MB Z, or X randomly. Then they ask Alice 1, Alice 2, \( \cdots \), and Alice \( m \) to announce publicly the \( a^i_k, b^i_k \) of the samples in a random sequential order. Here \( i = 1, 2, \cdots, m \). After that all Bobs publish their measurement outcomes and the MBs. If the error rate of the samples is higher than a threshold, then they abort the quantum communication. Otherwise they go to the next step.

M6. All Alice s ask all Bobs to delete the decoy qubits which are not chosen for eavesdropping check. All members in group 1 publicly announce the strings \( B_1, B_2, \cdots, B_m \) in a random sequential order.

M7. Bob \( l \) \( (l = 1, 2, \cdots, n) \) measures each of their qubits with the MB Z or X according to the XOR results of the corresponding bits in the strings \( B_1, B_2, \cdots, B_m \). That is, Bob \( l \) measures \( |\psi_{a^m_{nN+m} b^m_{nN+m}}⟩ \) in the Z basis if \( \oplus_{i=1}^{nN} b^i_{nj+l} = 0 \) or in the X basis if \( \oplus_{i=1}^{nN} b^i_{nj+l} = 1 \). From his measurement on \( |\psi_{a^m_{nN+m} b^m_{nN+m}}⟩ \), he obtains the outcome \( d_{nj+l} \), which is 0 or 1, corresponding to the +1 and −1 eigenstates of \( \sigma_x \) and \( \sigma_z \).

M8. All members in group 1 complete the error rate analysis of the transmission between the two groups. To this end, all Alice s require each of the member in group 2 to publish a subset of the measurement results chosen randomly, and analyze the error rates of the samples. If the channel is secure, the XOR results of measurement outcomes of Bob 1, Bob 2, \( \cdots \), and Bob \( n \)’s corresponding bits can be used as key bits for secret sharing, otherwise they discard the results obtained and re-try the quantum communication from the beginning.

III. SECURITY

Obviously, the test in M2 can make the attack with invisible photons \( [\mathbb{B}] \) and the Trojan horse attack \( [\mathbb{B}] \) to be nullification. The checking procedure in M5 can avoid the attack with single photons and the attack with EPR pairs \( [\mathbb{B}] \). The fake-signal attack with EPR pairs \( [\mathbb{A}] \) can be detected by the operations in M3 and the check in M2 and M5. The security of this present QSS protocol against the attacks in \( [\mathbb{B}], [\mathbb{A}] \) are discussed as follows.
A. The security against the attack with single photons and the attack with EPR pairs

Now, we show that the attack stated in Ref. [2] is easily detected in the present quantum secret sharing. Apparently, Bob’s measurements on the checked samples collapse them into the states (in Eq. (1)) of single photons. In other words, all Bob’s measurements on the checked samples remove the entanglements between checked photons and other eavesdropping particles, which corresponds to that the attacker Alice $i_0$ sends Bobs single quantum states in Eq. (1) whether in the attack with EPR pairs or in the attack with single photons [2]. Thus, all Alices and all Bobs can find out the attacker in the attack with single photons via all Alices’ publishing their respective encoding information in a random sequential order. Since Bob $l$ asks Alices to announce $a_s^l$ and $b_s^l$ in a random sequential order, the attacker will not be the last one to answer the Bob $l$’s enquiry with a probability $\frac{m-1}{2m}$. If there is an Alice to be asked after the attacker Alice $i_0$, Alice $i_0$ can only guess $a_s^{i_0}$ and $b_s^{i_0}$ to answer the inquiry as she can not distinguish the quantum state intercepted by her with certainty. It is easy to derive that the error rate of the samples that Bobs asks after the attacker Alice $i_0$ is $\frac{m-1}{2m}$. Then she can not obtain any information, though this kind of eavesdropping can not be found in the eavesdropping check. So it does not make any sense for Alice 1 to do this kind of eavesdropping.

B. The security against the fake-signal attack with EPR pairs

The present QSS protocol is secure against any dishonest agent eavesdropping secret using the fake-signal attack with EPR pairs [4]. We shall actually show that this protocol is secure against more general attack, the fake-signal attack with any two-particle entangled states (general EPR pairs). Next let us see how this works in detail.

Suppose that the malicious party Alice $i_0$ who may be any dishonest one of Alices, generates $nN + m^{i_0}$ general EPR pairs in the state $\otimes_{k=1}^{nN+m^{i_0}} |\phi_k\rangle$, where

$$|\phi_k\rangle = |\phi\rangle = |0\rangle_A|\alpha\rangle_E + |1\rangle_A|\beta\rangle_E,$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

$|\alpha\rangle$ and $|\beta\rangle$ are unnormalized states of the $S$-level ($S \geq 2$) particle $E$. Note that when

$$\langle\alpha|\beta\rangle = \langle\beta|\alpha\rangle = 0, \langle\alpha|\alpha\rangle = \langle\beta|\beta\rangle = \frac{1}{2},$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

$|\phi_k\rangle = |\phi\rangle$ is an EPR pair, that is, EPR pair is the special case of $|\phi\rangle$. Alice $i_0$ replaces each of the original single photons $|\Psi^{i_0}\rangle$ with a fake signal, the general EPR pair $|\phi_k\rangle$ and sends the sequence $S_A$ of $nN + m^{i_0}$ particles $A$ in $\otimes_{k=1}^{nN+m^{i_0}} |\phi_k\rangle$ to Alice $i_0 + 1$ while each particle $E$ in $\otimes_{k=1}^{nN+m^{i_0}} |\phi_k\rangle$ is held by herself. If $|\phi\rangle$ is not a two-particle maximally entangled state, then the cheating of Alice $i_0$ can be found by Alice $i_0 + 1$ in M2, because Alice $i_0$ can not distinguish between $|\alpha\rangle$ and $|\beta\rangle$ and between $|\alpha\rangle + |\beta\rangle$ and $|\alpha\rangle - |\beta\rangle$ perfectly, it is a certain that Alice $i_0$ makes mistakes. Next we only assume that $|\phi\rangle$ is an EPR pair. Alice $i_0 + 1$ in the step M2 cannot detect this cheating as Alice $i_0$ is able to produce no errors in the results if Alice $i_0$ is asked to announce her encryption $a_s^{i_0}$ and $b_s^{i_0}$ of the samples after Alice 1, $$\cdots,$$ Alice $i_0 - 1$. But if Alice $i_0$ is not the last to announce her encoding information, then her cheating introduces errors and can be found out by Alice $i_0 + 1$ in M2 without fail. However, when the dishonest Alice $i_0$ is Alice 1, this cheating of her cannot be found out by Alice 2 as it does not introduce errors in the results.

Alice 1 intercepts $S_A$ while it was sent to Alice $i_1$ ($2 < i_1 \leq m$) or Bobs (evidently, if Alice 1 never intercepts $S_A$, then she can not obtain any information, though this kind of eavesdropping can not be found in the eavesdropping check. So it does not make any sense for Alice 1 to do this kind of eavesdropping ). Note that the result of the encryptions by Alice 2, $$\cdots,$$ Alice $i_1 - 1$ or Alice $m$ in step M3 is equivalent to one Alice’s operations in M3 (that is, one Alice performs one of operations $\sigma_0$, $\sigma_1$, $\sigma_2$, $H\sigma_0$, $H\sigma_1$, $H\sigma_2$, $H\sigma_3$ on each particle $A$). This is because of $H\sigma_1 H = -\sigma_1$, $H\sigma_2 H = \sigma_3$, $H\sigma_3 H = -\sigma_2$, $H^2 = \sigma_u^2 = 1$, $\sigma_u \sigma_v = -\sigma_v \sigma_u$ for $u, v = 1, 2, 3$.

The object of Eve is to get all Alices’ encoding information $A_i$ and $B_i$. Therefore, Alice 1 must manage to distinguish
the eight operations $\sigma_0$, $\sigma_1$, $\sigma_2$, $\sigma_3$, $H\sigma_0$, $H\sigma_1$, $H\sigma_2$, and $H\sigma_3$ with which $|\phi\rangle$ is transformed into one of eight states

\[
|\varphi_1\rangle = \sigma_0|\phi\rangle = |0\rangle|\alpha\rangle + |1\rangle|\beta\rangle,
\]

\[
|\varphi_2\rangle = \sigma_1|\phi\rangle = -|1\rangle|\alpha\rangle + |0\rangle|\beta\rangle,
\]

\[
|\varphi_3\rangle = \sigma_2|\phi\rangle = |0\rangle|\alpha\rangle - |1\rangle|\beta\rangle,
\]

\[
|\varphi_4\rangle = \sigma_3|\phi\rangle = |1\rangle|\alpha\rangle + |0\rangle|\beta\rangle,
\]

\[
|\varphi_5\rangle = H\sigma_0|\phi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle)|\alpha\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)|\beta\rangle,
\]

\[
|\varphi_6\rangle = H\sigma_1|\phi\rangle = -\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)|\alpha\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle)|\beta\rangle,
\]

\[
|\varphi_7\rangle = H\sigma_2|\phi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle)|\alpha\rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)|\beta\rangle,
\]

\[
|\varphi_8\rangle = H\sigma_3|\phi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)|\alpha\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle)|\beta\rangle,
\]

(8)

where $|\phi\rangle$ is an EPR pair (i.e. $|\alpha\rangle$ and $|\beta\rangle$ satisfy Eq. (7)). In other words, she is to distinguish the eight states. The eight states in Eq. (8) belongs to the subspace $W$ of the entire Hilbert space $H$ spanned by $|0\rangle|\alpha\rangle$, $|0\rangle|\beta\rangle$, $|1\rangle|\alpha\rangle$ and $|1\rangle|\beta\rangle$. Obviously, the dimension $\dim W$ of subspace $W$ is less than or equal to 4. It implies that it is impossible for all eight states in Eq. (8) being mutually orthogonal, so these eight states can not be reliably distinguished [6]. Thus Alice 1’s eavesdropping can be detected in M2 by Alice $i_1$ or M5 by all Bobs. Therefore the fake-signal attack with EPR pairs can not work for the present quantum secret sharing protocol.

On the other hand, in the present protocol, Alices insert randomly decoy single photons into the signal photons in M3. The eavesdropping check on the decoy single photons is the same as that on the signal photons. That is, first Alice $i$ measures (or all Bobs measure) each decoy single photon in MB $Z$, or $X$ at random, then she asks (they ask) Alice 1, Alice 2, …, Alice $i - 1$ (all Alices) to tell her (them) their encoding information $a_i^s, b_i^t$ of the samples in a random sequential order. Note that there is at least one honest agent in one communication group. Therefore the dishonest agent can be found by the eavesdropping checks on the decoy photons by the honest agents. The principle of the checking procedures is the same as that in BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [6].

Remark 1. If only Alice 2 is honest in group 1, and all Alices except Alice 2 collude, the cheating of Alice 1 can be found out by all Bobs in the step M5.

Remark 2. Alice 1 can not unambiguously discriminate four sets

\[
\{|\varphi_{11}\rangle, |\varphi_{12}\rangle\}, \{|\varphi_{21}\rangle, |\varphi_{22}\rangle\}, \{|\varphi_{31}\rangle, |\varphi_{32}\rangle\}, \{|\varphi_{41}\rangle, |\varphi_{42}\rangle\},
\]

(9)

where

\[
|\varphi_{11}\rangle = |\varphi_1\rangle, |\varphi_{12}\rangle = |\varphi_5\rangle, |\varphi_{21}\rangle = |\varphi_2\rangle, |\varphi_{22}\rangle = |\varphi_6\rangle,
\]

\[
|\varphi_{31}\rangle = |\varphi_3\rangle, |\varphi_{32}\rangle = |\varphi_7\rangle, |\varphi_{41}\rangle = |\varphi_4\rangle, |\varphi_{42}\rangle = |\varphi_8\rangle.
\]

(10)

This will be given later. Even if Alice 1 can correctly classify the four sets in (9), she will be detected in the step M2 by Alice $i_1$ or in the step M5 by all Bobs as she produces errors when answering Alice $i_1$’ or all Bobs’ enquiry.

Remark 3. It is not necessary for Alice $i$ ($2 \leq i \leq m$) performing four operations $\sigma_0$, $\sigma_1$, $\sigma_2$ and $\sigma_3$ in M3. In fact, Alice $i$ only needs to use three operations either $\sigma_0$, $\sigma_1$, $\sigma_2$ or $\sigma_0$, $\sigma_1$, $\sigma_3$.

Next we will calculate the upper bounds of the average success probabilities of the two cases, one is to distinguish the eight states in Eq. (8), the other is to classify the four sets in (9), where $|\phi\rangle$ is a two-particle entangled state.

Case I. The upper bound of the average success probability distinguishing the eight states in Eq. (8). Let

\[
x = \langle \alpha | \beta \rangle + \langle \beta | \alpha \rangle,
\]

\[
q = \frac{1}{4}(\langle \alpha | \beta \rangle - \langle \beta | \alpha \rangle),
\]

\[
z = \langle \alpha | \alpha \rangle,
\]

\[
t = \langle \beta | \beta \rangle,
\]

\[
z + t = 1,
\]

(11)
we have
\[
\sum_{i,j=1}^{8} |\langle \varphi_i | \varphi_j \rangle| = 8|q| + 8|z - t| + 8|x| + \frac{8}{\sqrt{2}}|z - t + x|
\]
\[
+ \frac{8}{\sqrt{2}}|z - t - x| + \frac{16}{\sqrt{2}}\sqrt{1 + q^2}.
\]
(12)

It follows that minimum of \(\sum_{i,j=1}^{8} |\langle \varphi_i | \varphi_j \rangle|\) can be realized if \(q = 0, z = t = \frac{1}{2}, x = 0\).

It means that the minimum of \(\sum_{i,j=1}^{8} |\langle \varphi_i | \varphi_j \rangle|\) occurs when \(|\phi_k\rangle\) is an EPR pair.

The minimum of \(\sum_{i,j=1}^{8} |\langle \varphi_i | \varphi_j \rangle|\) is
\[
\text{Min} \sum_{i,j=1}^{8} |\langle \varphi_i | \varphi_j \rangle| = \frac{16}{\sqrt{2}}
\]
(14)

The average success probability \(P_1\) for unambiguous identification of the eight states in Eq. (8) satisfies
\[
P_1 \leq 1 - \frac{1}{M - 1} \sum_{i,j=1}^{8} \sqrt{p_i p_j} |\langle \varphi_i | \varphi_j \rangle| = 1 - \frac{1}{56} \times \frac{16}{\sqrt{2}} = 1 - \frac{\sqrt{2}}{\sqrt{2}} < 1,
\]
(15)

where \(M = 8\) is the number of the states to be distinguished, \(p_i = \frac{1}{8}\) and \(p_j = \frac{1}{8}\) are the prior probabilities of \(|\varphi_i\rangle\) and \(|\varphi_j\rangle\), respectively.

Case II. The upper bound of the average success probability classifying the four sets in Eq. (9). By calculation, we obtain that
\[
\sum_{i,j=1}^{4} \sum_{k,l=1}^{2} \sqrt{\eta_{ik} \eta_{jl}} |\langle \varphi_{ik} | \varphi_{jl} \rangle| = \frac{1}{12} (2|y| + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|z - t - x| + 2|z - t|)
\]
\[
+ \frac{4}{\sqrt{2}}\sqrt{1 + q^2} + 2|x| + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|z - t + x|).
\]
(16)

Here \(N = 8\) is the total number of the states in the four classified sets in (9), \(m_i\) is the number of the states of the \(i\)-th set, and \(\eta_{ik}\) is the prior probability of \(|\varphi_{ik}\rangle\).

A little thought shows that
\[
\sum_{i,j=1}^{4} \sum_{k,l=1}^{2} \sqrt{\eta_{ik} \eta_{jl}} |\langle \varphi_{ik} | \varphi_{jl} \rangle| \geq \frac{\sqrt{2}}{6},
\]
(17)
and the equality holds if
\[ x = 0, z = t = \frac{1}{2}, q = 0, \]
that is, the minimum of \( \sum_{i,j=1}^{4} \sum_{k,l=1}^{2} \sqrt{\eta_{ik} \eta_{jl}} \left| \langle \varphi_{ik} | \varphi_{jl} \rangle \right| \) reaches when \( |\phi\rangle \) is an EPR pair.

The average success probability \( P_2 \) of conclusive quantum states sets classification [8] is
\[
P_2 \leq 1 - \sum_{i,j=1}^{4} \sum_{k,l=1}^{2} \sqrt{\eta_{ik} \eta_{jl}} \left( \frac{N - m_i}{N} \right) \left( \frac{N - m_j}{N} \right) \left| \langle \varphi_{ik} | \varphi_{jl} \rangle \right|
\]
\[
= 1 - \frac{\sqrt{2}}{6} < 1.
\]

From (15) and (19), no matter what kind strategy the malicious Alice \( i_0 \) use, she will disturb the quantum system, make mistakes, and therefore can be detected in M2, M5 and M8. Consequently, the present QSS protocol is secure not only against the fake-signal attacking with EPR pairs but also against the fake-signal attacking with any two-particle entangled states—general EPR pairs.

This present QSS protocol is an improvement of original QSS protocol [1]. In the present QSS protocol, we add the special filters, photon number splitters, single-photon detectors, the eavesdropping check of each member Alice \( i \) \((i = 2, 3, \cdots, m)\) in group 1, decoy single photons, two operations \( \sigma_x \) and \( \sigma_z \), and the random measurements of all Bobs on their respective qubits chosen at random. It is the improvement that makes the attacks pointed in [2, 3, 4, 5] to be of no effect (to be nullification). The principle of the checking procedures is the same as that in BB84 quantum key distribution protocol. So the transmission of qubits between authorized members in the two groups is secure. That is, the present QSS protocol between multiparty and multiparty with four states is secure.

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