PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS AMIDST RISING ILLIBERALISM IN INDONESIA’S DEMOCRACY: State’s Response to Sharia-Based Violence Against Shi’a Groups

M. Khusna Amal
Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) Jember
Email: iza_jbr@yahoo.com

Abstract: This article examines the local government and state representation in response to religious violence against Shi’a minority groups. Intensive scholarly debates on this issue have ignited, especially on what made the government showed an exclusive response to religious violence. Scholars have argued that state agencies commonly tend to take a safe position though no contradictory policies that please conservative groups. This research was conducted through six-month fieldwork in Bondowoso regency, East Java province, in 2017 and 2018. The data was collected through ethnography and in-depth interviews with relevant sources. In this study, I argue that not all government agencies respond exclusively to violence against minority communities. Through a case study on Sunni-Shi’a tension in Bondowoso, East Java, this study reveals that the local government showed inclusive attitudes to protect the rights of Shi’a adherents to practice their faiths. Such responses are aimed to maintain well-developed plurality, harmony, and civil rights for minority citizens of Bondowoso. This study confirms that inclusive local state officials become the critical factor to the sustainability of human rights, religious freedom for the minority and democratization.

Key Words: Sunni, Shia, Indonesia, State, Civil Rights, Illiberalism, and Democracy

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Introduction

In the democratic freedom of post-New Order era, social and religious life in Indonesia were marked by a wide range of religious-based violence. The gratuitous violence troubled both external minority groups and internal Muslim like Shi’a. In the 1990s, bloody sectarian conflicts between Muslims and Christians
broke out in Ambon and Poso. Yet, then in the 2000s, more serious religious conflicts occurred within the internal Islamic communities, especially between Sunni groups, the majority of Indonesian Muslims, and Shi’a groups. Those conflicts posed a severe threat to religious pluralism and Indonesian democracy was desperately in need of consolidation after the New Order.¹

The Shi’a minority group, for example, experienced not only social stigmatization as a deviant sect but also suffered from discrimination, persecution, worship building destruction, house destruction, and even expulsion from the residence.² The violence also involved various actors, even from state agents (such as local government, police, law enforcement officials, and many others) and intolerant groups from civil society. Other Shi’a groups at some other locations in Indonesia also suffered from the same violence, such as in Batang (Central Java) in 2000 and 2006, in Bondowoso and Bangil (East Java) in 2006 and 2016, in Sampang, Madura (East Java) 2011, in Jember (East Java) 2012, in Yogyakarta 2013, and many other areas. ³

¹ A’an Suryana, “Discrepancy in State Practices: The Cases of Violence against Ahmadiyah and Shi’a Minority Communities during the Presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,” Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 55, no. 1 (June 26, 2017): 71–104; Al Makin, “Homogenizing Indonesian Islam: Persecution of the Shia Group in Yogyakarta,” Studia Islamiika 24, no. 1 (April 2017): 1–32.
² Setara Institute, Negara Harus Bersikap: Tiga Tahun Laporan Kondisi Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan di Indonesia (Jakarta: Setara Institute, 2010). Wahid Institute reported that 234 cases of human right violations occurred in 2008, down to 35 in 2009, but steadily rose to 64 in 2010 and 94 cases in 2011. See Wahid Institute, Laporan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan dan Toleransi 2010 (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2010), http://www.wahidinstitute.org/files/_docs/FULL%20REPORT-ANNUAL%20REPORT%20WI%202010.pdf.
³ Fauziah, “Potret Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama di Kabupaten Bondowoso, Jawa Timur,” Harmoni: Jurnal Multikultural dan Multireligius 10, no. 3 (2011): 647–661; Chiara Formichi, “From Fluid Identities to Sectarian Labels: A Historical Investigation of Indonesia’s Shi’i Communities,” Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 52, no. 1 (June 2014): 101–126; Masdar Hilmy, “The Political Economy of Sunni-Shi’ah Conflict in Sampang Madura,” Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 53, no. 1 (June 2015): 27–51; Wahyudi Akmaliah, “Kekerasan dan Pengusiran Atas Nama Agama Pasca Rejim Orde Baru: Studi Kasus Konflik Syi’ah Sampang,” Maarif: Arus Pemikiran Islam dan Sosial 10, no. 2 (2015): 221–242; Ken Miichi, “Minority Shi’a Groups as a Part of Civil Society in Indonesia,” Middle East Institute, last modified 2016, accessed June 11, 2020,
The increasing frequency of religious-based violence against minority Shi’a groups has sparked heated and continuous debates among Indonesian social, political, and Islamic scholars. One of the heated debate issues was related to state response to acts of violence against religious minority groups. State—referring to the national government—should definitely be able to guarantee each citizen’s freedom of belief, Shi’a groups were included. Moreover, the state sometimes looks powerless in front of intolerant groups that often discredit and persecute minority groups.

The state’s weakness in protecting religious minorities is due to its inability to maintain autonomy, independence, and neutral position in dealing with intolerant groups, which generally come from the majority community. In the case of the Sunni-Shi’a conflict in Sampang, for instance, intolerant groups succeeded in forcing the state to adopt public policies that were in line with their religious aspirations. In fact, the release of East Java Governor’s Regulation Number 55 of 2012 on Fostering Religious Activities, the supervision of heretical sects, and the relocation of Sampang Shi’a community to Puspa Agro Flats (Rusun), Sidoarjo, and a two-year prison for Tajul Muluk by Sampang District Court was influenced by conservative Islamic groups.

In addition, the state unsuccessfully protected Shi’a minority groups from growing violence due to its accommodative, cooperative, and even compromising attitude with intolerant groups. This particularly unfair attitude was even apparent during President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono (SBY) leadership, which resulted in the flourishing conservative and intolerant groups. For

https://www.mei.edu/publications/minority-shia-groups-part-civil-society-indonesia; Cahyo Pamungkas, “Social Resilience of Minority Group: Study on Syiah Refugees in Sidoarjo and Ahmadiyah Refugees in Mataram,” Ulumuna 19, no. 2 (December 2015): 251–278.

4 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (New York: Berminster Press, 1968), 54.

5 Al Makin, “Homogenizing Indonesian Islam,” 1–31.

6 Khoirul Mustamir, “Agama Menegara: Potret Pembajakan Kekuasaan Negara dan Masa Depan Syi‘ah di Jawa Timur,” Ma‘arif 10, no. 2 (2015): 268–296; Johan Wahyudi, “Negara Suni: Kala Negara Diambil Alih Agama,” Ma‘arif 10, no. 2 (December 2015): 243–268.
instance, following the MUI’s issuance of a fatwa against considered-to-be-heretical groups in 2005 (the first years of SBY’s government), attacks towards minority groups increased. Yet, ironically, SBY condemned a wide range of violent incidents and confirmed that the growing violence as horizontal clashes between two antagonistic groups in society, not as unlawful attacks sparked by Islamists against minorities.⁷

Nevertheless, unlike the views of some scholars, this study identifies different facts of the state’s stance in response to various religious-labeled sectarian conflicts. This article confirms that the local government did not present a homogeneous and monolithic stance in the post-New Order era as that of previous periods. As most districts adopt autonomy and decentralization as implemented in the New Order era, they practiced dynamic socio-political pluralism. Many local governments have succeeded in establishing an inclusive government, clean and good government—a governmental system run based on principles of openness, accountability, and non-discrimination.⁸

This paper theoretically conceptualizes an inclusive state as a system and practice of government institutions characterized by accountability, responsiveness, and integrity among public sector service providers by ensuring social inclusion in policies, programs, and services.⁹ Thus, such a governmental practice eventually results in proper ideas of good governance. In various references, good governance refers to the government which respects human rights,¹⁰ obeys the law, and makes effective public

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⁷ Suryana, “Discrepancy in State Practices,” 71–103; Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation,” *Asian Studies Review* 42, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 479–497.

⁸ United Nations Human Rights, *Good Governance Practices for the Protection of Human Rights* (New York and Geneva: The United Nations Human Rights, 2007), https://www.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/Documents/Publications/GoodGovernance.pdf&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1.

⁹ Ahmad Zainul Hamdi and Marzuki Wahid, “Demokratisasi, Inclusive Government, dan Perlindungan Minoritas,” in *Ruang Untuk Yang Kecil dan Berbeda, Pemerintahan Inklusif dan Perlindungan Minoritas*, ed. Ahmad Zainul Hamdi and Marzuki Wahid (Yogyakarta: Gading, 2017), 4–5.

¹⁰ Ibid.
participation, ensures political pluralism, transparency, and accountability in every institutional process, strengthens equity, behavior, and values which encourages responsibility establishment solidarity, and tolerance in society.\textsuperscript{11}

Meanwhile, in Bondowoso, where this study has focused, the local government affirms their inclusive attitudes in response to Sunni-Shi’\textsuperscript{a} conflicts despite the release of East Java Governor Regulation (\textit{Peraturan Gubernur/Pergub}) Number 55, 2012 on the development of religious activities and supervision of heretical religious sects and the fatwa of East Java MUI No. Kep-01 / SKF-MUI / JTM / I / 2012) on the heresy of Shi’\textsuperscript{a} teachings. In other words, the Bondowoso local government has even provided services and protection for Sunni and Shi’\textsuperscript{a} groups to express their respective religious agendas in the public area.

Furthermore, this paper aims to elaborate on the inclusive attitude of the Bondowoso local government towards the sharia-based movement, especially in rejecting the 2016 \textit{Milad Fatimah}, an occasion held by the Shi’\textsuperscript{a} group. This paper, unlike the previous studies\textsuperscript{12} is aimed at exploring the role of inclusive state agents in response to religious violence against minority groups. Hence, it will initially discuss the social context of Sunni-Shi’\textsuperscript{a} conflicts, the Shari‘ah-based mass mobilization for the 2016 \textit{Milad Fatimah}, the local government’s response towards socio-religious movements, and the impacts of local government policies on democracy, especially in relation to civil rights for minority groups.

\textbf{Sunni-Shi’\textsuperscript{a} Tension}

Sunni-Shi’\textsuperscript{a} tensions have existed for decades in the social and religious life of Indonesian Muslims. According to some scholars, the tensions between the two Indonesian Islamic groups came to the spotlight at the end of the New Order continued to the reform

\textsuperscript{11} United Nations Human Rights, “Governance Reforms Help Protect Human Rights,” News and Events, \textit{The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights)}, last modified March 2008, accessed August 1, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/GoodGovernance.aspx.

\textsuperscript{12} Suryana, “Discrepancy in State Practices”; Al Makin, “Homogenizing Indonesian Islam”; Hilmy, “The Political Economy”; Mustamir, “Agama Menegara”; Wahyudi, “Negara Suni.”
era. During the New Order era, the tensions between the two groups had just begun along with political changes in the global context. For instance, when the Iranian revolution broke out in 1979, it marked the downfall of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi regime and Shi’a as the group which overthrew him then established the Islamic State of Iran. This phenomenon eventually had a serious impact on political identity in various parts of the Muslim world, Indonesia included. After what happened in Iran, Shi’a followers confidently uncovered their identity, publicly showed their faith. From then on, the Sunni-Shi’a identity and polarization were formed and began to mark dynamic religious life in Indonesia.

Nevertheless, the Sunni-Shi’a polarization was fortunately unable to continue into tensions and even sectarian conflicts, which eventually triggered violence and destruction. That was not because each group, especially the mainstream Sunni group, had a tolerant and inclusive attitude and even managed to accept differences and were willing to live together, but it was due to the restrictive approach of the New Order regime. The New Order was known as an authoritarian regime and showed no tolerance towards any potential social upheaval which could endanger the national integration, particularly the regime’s power stability. Through its militaristic approach, the New Order regime managed to control and penetrate into pluralistic and multicultural social life. Moreover, through its iron-fisted policy, the New Order regime succeeded in suppressing potential differences and contradictions, which would turn into horizontal as well as vertical conflicts.

With its various causes, such as social, religious, economic, and political, Sunni-Shi’a polarization and conflict have significantly increased, and at the same time, freedom and

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13 Asef Bayat, *Pos-Islamisme* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2011), 37–45.
14 Formichi, “From Fluid Identities to Sectarian Labels.”
15 Marcus Mietzner, “Authoritarian Elections, State Capacity, and Performance Legitimacy: Phases of Regime Consolidation and Decline in Suharto’s Indonesia,” *International Political Science Review* 39, no. 1 (June 2017): 83–96.
16 Al Makin, “Homogenizing Indonesian Islam”; Hilmy, “The Political Economy”; Formichi, “From Fluid Identities to Sectarian Labels.”
openness emerged in the post-New Order era. Various incidents in Sampang (Madura), Bangil (Pasuruan), Yogyakarta, Puger (Jember), and in many other places are only a small part of the bloody conflicts which involved the two groups.\textsuperscript{17} Along with other religious conflicts such as terrible tragedies in Poso and Ambon, the first and second Bali Bombings, terrorism attacks in various regions, the Sunni-Shi’a conflicts also significantly contributed to religious sectarian violence, which had a direct impact on moderate Muslims in Indonesia, mostly post the New Order era.\textsuperscript{18}

Bondowoso, East Java, is one area where polarization, contestation, and negotiation between Sunni and Shi’a groups live together. Shi’a group identity in this district was initially initiated by Habib Hamzah bin Ali Al-Habsy; a charismatic \textit{ḥabīb} (Arabian-blood Muslim leader), pious, and also a role model for most Muslims in Bondowoso. According to a number of informants, Habib Hamzah started to publicly inform Shi’a identity in the early 1990s, which was initially sparked by his admiration for the Iranian revolution leader Ayatullah Imam Khomeini (1979) and his intensive thoughts towards Shi’a intellectuals such as Ali Shari’ati, Mutahari, Thabathaba’i, and many factors which enabled Habib Hamzah to embrace Shi’a.\textsuperscript{19} Yet, according to the internal Shi’a community, Habib Hamzah (also other \textit{ḥabīb} throughout the district) had long embraced Shi’a. The Iranian revolution was just another momentum for them to assert their Shi’a identity.\textsuperscript{20}

Habib Hamzah initially asserted himself as a Shi’a, then followed by his followers. It did not only influence the Shi’a formation and polarization in Bondowoso, but it also increased

\textsuperscript{17} Fikri Disyacitta, “Melawan Diam-Diam di Tengah Dominasi: Kajian Strategi Penerimaan Sosial Politik Kelompok Minoritas Syiah di Kabupaten Jember,” \textit{Jurnal PolGov} 1, no. 2 (October 2019): 231–262.

\textsuperscript{18} Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein, eds., \textit{Islam, Politics and Change, the Indonesian Experience after the Fall of Suharto} (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016); Martin van Bruinessen, “Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam and the ‘Conservative Turn’ of the Early Twenty-First Century, Introduction,” in \textit{Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn,”} ed. Martin van Bruinessen (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian, 2013), 1–20.

\textsuperscript{19} Interview with Habib Umar, September 8, 2017.

\textsuperscript{20} Interview with Habib Baqir, Head of IJABI Bondowoso, September 8, 2017.
tensions among Muslim groups in the district. As a matter of fact, many Muslims in Bondowoso district became lovers of the ḥabīb (plural of ḥabīb), especially Habib Hamzah. However, they then left Habib Hamzah and even boycotted him by no longer invited and not expected his attendance and participation in some religious occasions. Furthermore, they also took distance from the emerging Shi’a group under Habib Hamzah. Yet, in fact, there were no excessive reactions such as intimidation and persecution, or even violence towards Shi’a groups.\(^{21}\)

After the governmental reform in Indonesia (1998), the Shi’a group accelerated development. The momentum of freedom and is fully utilized by this group to affirm its identity, role, and development in public areas. Thus, Shi’a development can be identified in two main aspects: firstly, community and, secondly, institutional. In terms of the number of communities, Shi’a followers are proliferating in Arabian neighborhoods, especially among the ḥabīb. In this Indo-Arabian area, the number of Shi’a ḥabīb can no longer be considered to be a minority compared to those of Sunni in which, in fact, the estimated percentage is roughly fifty-fifty. Whereas, based on the information from the Sunni group, the number of Shi’a ḥabīb is approximately 40 percent. In addition, Shi’a also grew rapidly in several areas, one of which is Jambesari village, Jambesari Darus Solah sub-district. Since its initial development in 2005 up to the present time, the number of Shi’a followers in Jambesari has reached around 500 people.\(^{22}\)

In terms of institutional aspect, the development of Shi’a can be explored from IJABI (Ahlul Bait Congregation) Bondowoso branch in 2006, which was directly related to the headquarter of IJABI led by Jalaluddin Rahmat and established on July 1, 2000.\(^{23}\)

\(^{21}\) M. Khusna Amal, “Anti-Shia Mass Mobilization in Indonesia’s Democracy: Godly Alliance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Exclusion,” Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies 10, no. 1 (May 2020): 25–48.

\(^{22}\) Interview with Kiai Musowir & Kiai Matrawi, Leaders of Shi’a in Jambesari Village, Bondowoso, Oktober 12, 2017.

\(^{23}\) Formichi, “From Fluid Identities to Sectarian Labels”; Hilman Latief, “The Identity of Shi’a Sympathizer in Contemporary Indonesia,” Journal of Indonesian Islam 2, no. 2 (December 2008): 300–335; Moh Hasyim, “Syi’ah: Sejarah Timbul
In addition, Shi’a in Bondowoso also has the As-Shadiq Foundation founded by Habib Hamzah in the 2000s, and it is affiliated with ABI (Ahlul Bait Indonesia). After Habib Hamzah passed away, his son—Abu Thalib bin Hamzah—continued the As-Shadiq Foundation’s leadership. At the same time, Habib Baqir led the management of IJABI. The two religious institutions are not only symbols of the Shi’a community, but they are also institutional instruments for the development of Shi’a in Bondowoso.\(^{24}\)

During the development of Shi’a, polarization, tension, and conflict between Sunni and Shi’a groups have increased. Based on some references, many tensions and conflicts that involved these two groups occurred post-New Order period. A group of people refused forcibly disband the inauguration of IJABI Bondowoso Regional Board on June 4, 2006. Then, the next day, a number of ulamas came to the Ministry of Religion Office in Bondowoso district to submit the letter objection for IJABI existence. Second, mass tensions following the bullying and hits of a *santri* of Al-Wafa Islamic Boarding School belong to *kiai* (religious person, mostly from pesantren) Musowir in Jambesari on 12 August 2006. *Kiai* Musowir was the leader of the Shi’a group in the village. Third, raged mass attacked Shi’a recitation congregation followed by burnt of the *kiai* Musowir’s house on September 12, 2006. Fourth, force dispersal was conducted by an unknown mass at the IJABI *halal* and recitation ceremony in Jambesari on 23-24 December 2006.\(^{25}\)

**The Anti-Shi’a Turn**

*Milad Fatimah* is an annual religious ritual held by the Shi’a community in Bondowoso to commemorate the historical moment of the birth of *Sayyidah* Fatimah al-Zahra, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad and the mother of the Prophet’s

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24 Interview with Habib Muhsin bin Alwy Al-Habsy, Habib Ali Zaenal Abidin, Abu Thalib bin Hamzah, December 1, 2018.

25 Imam Syaukani, “Konflik Sunni-Syi’ah Di Bondowoso,” *Harmoni: Jurnal Multikultural & Multireligius* 8, no. 1 (2009).
grandchildren, Hasan and Husein, and also Ali Abi Talib's wife. So far, Fatimah's birth ceremony did not cause serious tensions, especially with the Sunni community. However, the group of anti-Shi'a Sunni sparked tension and resistance towards the celebration of Milad Fatima (April 4-6). The Sunni group objected to such an occasion, which was carried out on an ample open public space, in which many Shi'a followers from outside the region gathered with several national speakers such as Jalaluddin Rahmat with banners all over the streets.26

Anti-Milad Fatimah groups, also known as members of FOKUS (Sunni Ulema Communication Forum or Forum Komunikasi Ulama Sunni), showed their rejection through mass mobilization and struck aiming to pressure the government to thwart the Milad Fatimah event. Even before Milad Fatimah occasion (April 3, 2016), a large crowd carried out a long march and yelled out the rejection through hate-speech and threats of violence. Moreover, anti-Milad Fatimah also mobilized mass to perform similar rituals in recitation gathering and prayers located in At-Taqwa Central Mosque. Besides, this particular religious event also aimed to prevent other Muslims (such as people from grassroots) from participating in the annual Milad Fatimah occasion.27

Furthermore, in their resistance, anti-Milad Fatimah groups used a wide range of issues, including the heresy and dangers of Shi’a ideology for Sunni Islamic teachings taken by most Indonesian Muslims such as mut’ah marriage and scolding against the Prophet's companions. In addition, the dangers of Shi’a are also linked to the nationality issue. On various banners and posters during the demonstration, some expressions were written: "Shi’a in Indonesia has divided the nation, a real threat to the national disintegration". Therefore, the mass urged the government not to permit the Milad Fatimah celebration as it is

26 Pebriansyah Ariefana, “Amin Said Husni: Mengelola Potensi Konflik SARA di Bondowoso,” News, Suara.com, last modified August 7, 2017, accessed January 1, 2020, https://www.suara.com/wawancara/2017/08/07/070000/amin-said-husni-mengelola-potensi-konflik-sara-di-bondowoso.

27 Interview with one of the leaders of FOKUS, kiai Hasan bin Abdul Muis, September 30, 2017.
considered to legitimize the existence of the Shi’a community with their heretical teachings.\(^{28}\)

Though considered to be cliche, religious issues such as sectarianism have proven useful to negatively encourage Muslim groups to get involved in mass mobilization. Such a frame was just like the previous Defending Islam Action (Aksi Bela Islam) in Jakarta dealing with blasphemy by Ahok (former Jakarta governor). The use of religious sentiment was considered sufficient to mobilize mass and achieve their political goals. However, 3,000 people was a large number for a small city like Bondowoso. Even the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization was considered the biggest Islamic demonstration in the history of Shi’a rejection in Bondowoso. During the strike, an alliance among various conservative Islamic groups was also formed. And the anti-Shi’ah sentiment has been a reason to unite them in one religious coalition.\(^{29}\)

The collective actions of contra-Milad Fatimah did involve not only a large mass of various socio-religious backgrounds but also alliances among groups, which was called Godly Muslims by Jeremy Menchik.\(^{30}\) They comprised elements of conservative NU, FPI, Wahabi / Salafi groups of Al-Irsyad organization, Tarbiyah activists, and HTI (The Liberation Party of Indonesia or Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia). Unlike the Defending Islam Action conducted by FPI, the refusal of Milad Fatimah in Bondowoso was initiated by conservative nahdliiyin elites such as kiai Mohammad Hasan Abdul Muiz (the son of kiai Abdul Muiz Tirmidzi), the owner and leader of the Sayyid Muhammad Alawi al-Maliki Islamic boarding school (pesantren), Koncer, Bondowoso.\(^{31}\)

Meanwhile, conservative NU youths have also initiated another forum called GERPAS (Anti-Shi’ah Youth Movement or Gerakan Pemuda Anti-Shi’a) led by a prominent young ulama.

\(^{28}\) Interview with the leader of GERPAS, kiai Mudassir, November 24, 2017.

\(^{29}\) Moch Nur Ichwan, “The Local Politics of Orthodoxy: The Majelis Ulama Indonesia in the Post-New Order Banten,” *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 6, no. 1 (June 2012): 166–194.

\(^{30}\) Jeremy Menchik, “Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, no. 3 (July 2014): 591–621.

\(^{31}\) Interview with one of NU members, November 18, 2017.
Sidogiri Islamic boarding school, kiai Mudassir. He convinced that the organization was inspired by *ijtihad* of national Muslim leaders to form the National Anti-Shia (*ANNAS or Aliansi Nasional Anti-Shi’ah*), an alliance that emerged in response to the Sunni-Shi’a conflict in Sampag in 2011. Through GERPAS, kiai Mudassir is actively involved in socializing, gathering, and mobilizing the millennial Muslim generation to join and to involve in the Aswaja defense action against the *Milad Fatimah* ceremony.

Also, anti-Shi’a groups connected FOKUS and GERPAS conducted propaganda by claiming that Shi’a as the enemy of Islam eligible to be at war with even through violent ways. They suggested that to get rid of Islam enemy will keep Islam teachings authentic. They believe that Islam becomes disintegrated is due to Muslim public figures’ indecisiveness, especially in response to the existence of Islam’s enemy. Thus, they severely criticized various Muslim groups’ attitudes in favor of Islam enemies (Shi’a). Through their criticism, the accommodative groups comprised liberal groups which prefer struggling for human rights and democracy to Islamic agendas.

**The Local Government Response**

In his research on the Sunni-Shi’a conflict in Sampang, Johan Wahyudi suggested that the state could not protect minority groups as the political institution has been taken over by mainstream religious groups. At least, the state’s inability to keep the autonomy was indicated by many of their public policies in response to the Sunni-Shi’a conflict in Sampang. Among the policies which were considered to be discriminatory was the decision Sampang local government to relocate Shi’a minority

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32 *ANNAS* was established by FUUI (Forum of Indonesian Ulama and Islamic Society or *Forum Ulama Umat Indonesia*) and declared in Bandung on April 20, 2014. The main points of the declaration can be read on *ANNAS Indonesia,* “Teks Deklarasi Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah,” April 20, 2014, accessed January 1, 2020, https://www.annasindonesia.com/profil/deklarasi-aliansi-nasional-anti-syiah.

33 Interview with kiai Mudassir, September 25, 2017.

34 Interview with kiai Hasan bin Abdul Muiz, September 30, 2017.

35 Interview with kiai Mudassir, September 25, 2017.
groups in Sampang Sports Stadium, and then was moved to a house named Puspo Agro Flats (Rusun) Sidoarjo, East Java on 20 June 2013. The policy was a realistic choice to keep the region conducive. Besides, it was in response to Sampang ulama’s commandment, especially those of MUI ulama.36

On the contrary, Bondowoso local government took a moderate-inclusive attitude. On one occasion, the district leader stated:

"I was frequently forced by FOKUS; they even urged me not to permit Milad Fatimah ceremony. That way, they referred to the rejection for Shi’a in Bogor. They assured me that the Shi’a ceremony was eventually dismissed in Bogor; even the district mayor played a pivotal role in the dismiss. They wondered why Bondowoso district leader, who rooted from NU, denied the same event. FOKUS is a forum with various outspoken Muslim leaders (kiais) or NU Garis Tegas (NU with strict stance).” 37

Having been forced by FOKUS elite and dealing with a colossal mass demonstration for Milad Fatimah rejection, Amin Said Husni, the district leader, accommodatively let the Shi’a group hold their religious ceremony, yet on one condition: the event is not held in the evening, and no outside speakers allowed. In fact, Jalaluddin Rahmad, one of the national preachers, eventually managed to attend the national Milad Fatimah in the capacity of the distinguished guest. For the sake of security during the Milad Fatimah ceremony, Regent was in cooperation with joint-security forces such as the Indonesian Armed Force (TNI), Indonesian Police (Polri), Personnel of the public order agency (Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja), and NU security force (Banser NU).38

Fortunately, regent Amin Said Husni provided the contra-Milad Fatimah group with equal access to express their aspiration without any force and violent actions. As a matter of fact, the contra Milad Fatimah groups conducted a huge demonstration to dismiss the Milad Fatimah ceremony. They argued that once the state permitted the Milad Fatimah ceremony, they were apparently claimed to support Shi’a heretical, misleading teaching, which also

36 Wahyudi, “Negara Suni”; Hilmy, “The Political Economy.”
37 Interview, November 20, 2017.
38 Interview with Amin Said Husni, November 20, 2017.
endangers the unity of the Republic of Indonesia. In addition, the Regent also guaranteed security service for the contra-Milad Fatimah group to hold Isra ’Mi’raj ceremony at the Jami’ At-Taqwa Mosque, which was 2 Km away from where Milad Fatimah event was being held.

It was apparent that the standing position taken by Bondowoso local government due to the personal and track record of the Regent, Amin Said Husni himself, who was well-known as a moderate and decisive santri bureaucrat. Prior to his service as Regent for two terms (2008-2018), he served as a member of the Indonesian Parliament from the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/PKB) in 1999-2004 and 2004-2009. In addition, he was also an NU activist and actively involved in the resolution of the Sunni-Shi’a conflict sparked for IJABI establishment in Bondowoso in 2005. In an interview with the media, Amin stated:

“Shi’a only appeared around 2005 when they inaugurated IJABI organization. In 2006, Shi’a management in Bondowoso was then inaugurated in which a strong reaction—social conflict leading to anarchy—from NU community took place. Back then, I was not yet a regent but a member of the parliament. It was the first conflict between NU-Shi’a groups during the inauguration of IJABI.”

The chairperson of the Bondowoso Unity and Political Body (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik/Bakesbangpol) shared a common, inclusive stance with the Regent. As a matter of fact, he convinced his leader not to worry about threats made by groups of disharmony in Bondowoso. The essential duty of the local government is to maintain social harmony and stability by taking religions and beliefs, diversity, and differences into account.

Bondowoso Regional Representative Council (DPRD) leader, Ahmad Dhafir—the Regent's colleague in the National Awakening Party (PKB), also his partner in the regional government—also shared a standard view with him. Though members of district representatives share a different response to

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39 Interview with kiai Hasan bin Abdul Muiz, September 30, 2017.
40 Interview with Matkur, Nov 6, 2017 & Syaiful Bahar September 25, 2017.
41 Ariefana, “Amin Said Husni.”
42 Interview with Abdul Manan, Head of Bakesbangpol, October 5, 2017.
the 2016 anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization, institutionally, the DPRD decisively supported the Regent’s policies to reconcile the Sunni-Shi’a conflict. Thus, the chairman of Commission IV DPRD Bondowoso stated:

“Contra-Milad Fatimah group urged the local government to apply Governor’s Regulation on supervision and guidance of heretical religious sects. However, this way cannot necessarily be a basis for policy-making, especially in dealing with the Sunni-Shi’a conflict in Bondowoso as Pergub is not legally eligible, and it is not under other legal rules. In addition, East Java fatwa MUI does not necessarily represent the state institution.”

TNI/Polri worked as a pro-active security institution, especially in relation to the Sunni-Shi’a conflict for the Milad Fatimah event. The two institutions provided local administration leaders with inputs as an immediate response to the heated conflict. That way, a similar incident as took place in Sampang (Madura) would not occur in Bondowoso. Moreover, during the mass demonstration by contra-Shi’a group, Milad Fatimah ceremony, and Isra Mi’raj occasion, which took place almost at the same time, TNI/Polri had deployed a large number of joint personnel (around 2000 people) from Bondowoso, Situbondo, Jember and even from the East Java Regional Police. As TNI/Polri was not polarized in response to the Sunni-Shi’a conflict as it was the case in Sampang, they eventually managed to play a pivotal role with an effective and non-discriminatory attitude.

The chairperson of the Islamic Ulema Council (MUI), the Forum for Religious Harmony (FKUB), NU, and Muhammadiyah are stakeholders from Islamic civil society who shared standard views and standing position with the Regent in addressing the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization. One of the administrators of Nahdlatul Ulama (Pengurus Cabang NU) Bondowoso branch stated that the Regent asked NU for consideration to deal with the incident. PCNU then advised Regent to adopt moderate, tolerant, and non-discriminatory policies. MUI also proposed that Regent

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43 Interview with Ahmad Fauzan, October 10, 2017.
44 Interview with Afrisal, local police chairman, September 25, 2017.
45 Suryana, “Discrepancy in State Practices.”
46 Interview with kiai Abdul Qodir Syams, NU & MUI Bondowoso chairman, September 18, 2017.
not be fixated with discriminatory East Java MUI fatwa and the East Java Governor Regulation. One of NU administrators stated:

"Regent is a great leader. Local police chairman (Kapolres) and military district commander (Dandim) were invited for discussion. Though he was blasphemed by a right-wing group, he managed to solve it with a cultural approach. He then stated that Shi'ah was not in line with our beliefs or understandings (Aswaja), but it cannot be denied. Once they got a pressure, the more they have a big chance, as I know exactly when the Regent invited the police chief, they should not do same particular that, so the rule basis are eventually used."47

The Policy Effects

The local government’s inclusive response to the mass mobilization of anti-Milad Fatimah cannot satisfy all. The group which was against the Milad Fatimah event was the most disappointed one. They claimed the permission for the Milad Fatimah event in a public place given by the Regent would impact people's consideration that the state had legitimized Shi'a as a group with heretical religious views stated through MUI East Java decree No. Kep-01 / SKF-MUI / JTM / I / 2012) considering this particular group into religious sects which needs close supervision and foster-based on East Java governor regulation number 55, 2012. The inclusive response is shown by the local government toward Shi’s group eventually betrays the trust of intolerant groups.48

Whereas the Shi’a minority group took it, especially about Fatimah's Milad celebration's permission, and no public figure from outside Bondowoso allowed to join in the event—as a sensible policy. Such an attitude shows the government’s recognition of minority groups the existence, especially in public areas, Shi’a, for instance. That way, the Shi’a Bondowoso community will unlikely be repressed and alienated in their own hometown like the one in Sampang (Madura). Hence, it will

47 Interview with Syaiful Bahar, November 25, 2017.
48 Interview with kiai Hasan bin Abdul Muiz, Sept 30, 2017. Read Bangsa Online, “Polres-Dandim Janji Buat Regulasi, Kiai Hasan Tolak Komentar Pejabat Bondowoso Pro-Syiah,” Harian Bangsa Online, last modified April 8, 2016, accessed January 1, 2020, https://bangsaonline.com/berita/21471/polres-dandim-janji-buat-regulasi-kiai-hasan-tolak-komentar-pejabat-bondowoso-pro-syiah.
definitely increase their satisfaction and trust in the government in running public services.49

Moreover, stakeholders who were directly involved by the government in finding the solution for anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization such as Bakesbangpol (Bondowoso Unity and Political Body), local people’s representatives (DPRD), NU, Muhammadiyah, FKUB, MUI, and pesantren, apparently agreed with the positive response stimulated by regent Amin Said Husni. In fact, the government’s decision eventually leads to a win-win solution. Such a policy has proven to have a positive impact not only to de-escalate religious conflicts but also to preserve the harmony, tolerance, and religious pluralism in Bondowoso. In regard to this, an informant once stated:

...It is true indeed, once the state or district administration mismanages a conflict, it will no longer be a latent conflict, but the manifestation one. The police and other security forces such as sub-district military command (Koramil) and district military command (Kodim), MUI, and PCNU play a pivotal role. The district leader was encouraged to wisely respond to any conflict. Above all, apart from adopting normative regulation, the policies enacted must not be discriminatory.50

In fact, the inclusive policies adopted by Bondowoso district leader have had an empirical impact on the peaceful solution of the Sunni-Shi’a conflict. Fortunately, the resistance carried out by intolerant groups had no chance to escalate into intensified and uncontrolled conflict. As David G. Bromley quoted as saying (also quoted by Arifin and Junaidi), a resistance movement takes place in three stages: latent tension, nascent conflict, and intensified conflict.51 In this context, the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization in Bondowoso did not progress to the third stage; it intensified conflict as the district leader showed a firm and uncompromising

49 Interview with habib Bakir, September 8, 2017.
50 Interview with kiai Masud, Head of FKUB Bondowoso, November 22, 2017.
51 Syamsul Arifin and Muhammad Junaedi, “Konstruksi Sosial Masyarakat Syi’ah dan Sunni di Sampang, Madura,” in Hak Asasi Manusia untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan di Indonesia: Keniscayaan, Kenyataan dan Penguatan, ed. Syamsul Arifin (Malang: Pusat Studi Agama dan Multikulturalisme (PUSAM) & Program Pascasarjana UMM, 2014).
stance. Yet, if it happened otherwise, it will lead to persecution and discrimination in which the minority groups will eventually suffer the consequences. We can notice from some empirical evidence, such as the case of Ahok when Islamic defense mobilization eventually succeeded in throwing the former Jakarta governor into jail.52 Besides, intolerant groups carried out massive resistance against the Ahmadiyah minority group in Bogor and Shi‘ah in Sampang.53

The district head’s policy also ensures that the civil rights of Bondowoso people, especially that of minority groups such as Shi‘a, are still taken into account. To some extent, the government guarantees that the Shi‘a minority group in Bondowoso still have access and space to maintain their existence and express their religious beliefs. Moreover, anti-Shi‘a groups can no longer enforce and even protest against the district head’s policies. What happened in Bondowoso will become an anti-thesis for scholar critiques that have attributed the state to a failure to manage religious conflict and violence in a democratic approach.54

Moreover, Bondowoso regional government-guaranteed civil rights, including that of minority groups. Thus, the Shi‘a community will apparently be able to express their theological beliefs. Nevertheless, this empirical evidence in Bondowoso has posed a paradox in which western Indonesian studies highlight the deconsolidation of democracy and even the tendency to protect it, which is known as illiberal democracy. In several studies, Marcus Mietzner, Greg Fealy, Vedi R. Hadiz, for instance, assessed the development of Indonesian democracy after the 2014 period. They claimed that Indonesian democracy leads to regression with the indicator: the increase of violations of civil rights, especially suffered by minority groups. They assured that civil rights violations do not only the result of intolerant groups’

52 Greg Fealy, “Bigger than Ahok: Explaining the 2 December Mass Rally,” Indonesia at Melbourne, last modified December 7, 2016, accessed October 1, 2018, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/bigger-than-ahok-explaining-jakartas-2-december-mass-rally/.
53 Hilmy, “The Political Economy.”
54 Mustamir, “Agama Menegara”; Wahyudi, “Negara Suni.”
actions but also the result of intolerant, conservative and even repressive attitudes of the state.55

Conclusion

The local government in Bondowoso district has showed its inclusive political will in response to sectarian religious movement and those who rejected Milad Fatimah occasion in 2016. The inclusive attitudes were shown through the issuance of a permit to both Shi’a’s Milad Fatimah event and the Sunni’s with Isrā’ Mi’rāj celebration. The local government also guaranteed the security service for both events with the deploying police (Polri) and military (TNI) personnel to safeguard the events.

The inclusive attitude taken by the local government was supported by stakeholders. Thus, there was comprehensive communication, synergy, and coordination with, at least three elements such as the district administration, TNI/Polri for security concern, DPRD (local parliament), and the mainstream Islamic organization such as NU and MUI. However, this phenomenon seems to be a paradox through an exclusive attitude of Sampang local government (Madura) and also Jember. They even showed a discriminatory response to the Sunni-Shi’a conflict due to the influence of intolerant groups of both governmental and Islamic non-governmental institutions such as MUI, NU, boarding school leaders (kiais).

55 Marcus Mietzner, Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi’s Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in Indonesia (Honolulu, Hawai’i: East-West Center, 2015); Marcus Mietzner, “Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia,” Pacific Affairs 91, no. 2 (June 2018): 261–282; Thomas P. Power, “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 54, no. 3 (September 2018): 307–338; Vedi R. Hadiz, “Behind Indonesia’s Illiberal Turn,” New Mandala, October 19, 2017, accessed January 1, 2020, https://www.newmandala.org/indonesia-illiberal/; Vedi R. Hadiz, “Indonesia’s Year of Democratic Setbacks: Towards a New Phase of Deepening Illiberalism?,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 53, no. 3 (September 2, 2017): 261–278; Greg Fealy, “Reformasi and the Decline of Liberal Islam,” in Activists in Transition: Progressive Politics in Democratic Indonesia, ed. Thushara Dibley and Michele Ford (Cornell University Press, 2019), 117–134.
Though not satisfied for all groups, the policy of the local government of Bondowoso was proven effective in de-escalating religious conflicts. Religious conflicts among Sunni and Shi’ah groups can escalate into violent conflicts. However, with local government inclusive attitudes, the prospective violent conflict will likely be avoided. Above all, local government inclusive attitudes have played a pivotal role and have a constructive impact on tolerance quality improvement, harmony, and religious freedom for the minority group like Shi’a.

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