Three Approaches to Study Land Tenure in Pastoral Societies
in Post-Socialist States: A Proposal for a Synthesis

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Abstract:
Intellectual wrestling is going on among anthropologists, and the wider social science and humanities, concerning the use of appropriate concept in the study of land tenure in pastoral societies in post-socialist states. Anthropological research has been dominated by three competing concepts: property, territoriality and access. The aim of this article is to appraise merits of each of theoretical approaches. Based on three rounds of ethnographic fieldwork among the pastoral Afar pastoral people near the Ethiopian, Eritrea, and Djibouti border triangle, it is the hypothesis of this article that it is time to jump on to the synthesis wagon to for study on land tenure in pastoral societies living in post-socialist states.

Keywords: Access, afar, property, pastoralists, post-socialist state, territoriality

1. Introduction: The Motive

This article reviews theoretical approaches in anthropology used in the study of land tenure among pastoral societies in post-socialist states. The inspiration and motive to write this article originates from my personal encounters. As part of my doctoral research¹, I have conducted an extended ethnographic fieldwork among the pastoral Afar people in northeastern Ethiopia. I came face-to-face with the question what conceptual approach to use to study changing forms of ownership of land. My initial conceptual backpack was property, but after a careful review of the local realities, or what Gudeman calls ‘local models’ (Gudeman, 2016), I soon realized loopholes. This led to appraisal of three theoretical concepts regarding their relevance in the study of pastoral societies in post-socialist states. The three competing concepts are property (Hann, 2007); territoriality (Sack R., 1983; Saltman, 2002); and access (Ribot J. a., 2003; Thomas Sikor, 2009). I will review the merit of each concept by taking notable publications listed above. I will then argue approaching land tenure as institution-cultural process, as a synthesis, best fitted to bridge the hitherto polarisations on the subject. I will then present lessons from fieldwork near the Ethiopia, Eritrean and Djibouti border triangle to illustrate my argument.

2. Three Approaches to the Study of Land Tenure

2.1. Property as Mainstream Approach

Property theory², with its roots in economic anthropology, is probably the oldest theory in anthropology concerning the study of peoples struggle over land. Scholars saw the study of struggles over land in Africa as land tenure. According to Boone, land tenure defines the manner and terms under which rights in land are granted, held, enforced, contested, and transferred (Boone, 2014). In other words, land tenure regimes define which groups of people have what rights over what resources and at what times (Lund, 2011). Land rights may include those of access, usufruct, inheritance and disposal, but need not necessarily imply ownership. Boone categorizes both the formal and informal institutions as “institutions”, and by doing so intends to bypass the dichotomy between formal-legal and customary arrangements (Boone, 2014:4).

Scholars who studied Eastern and Horn of Africa adopted land tenure as the main conceptual eyeglass. For instance, in his study of the pastoral population of the Eastern Africa, John Galaty drew on the concept of land tenure (Galaty, 2011). In his researches in Ethiopia, Dessalgn Rahmato drew on similar conceptualisation (Rahmato, 2011). For instance, in his study of the process of large-scale land transfers in Afar, Somali, Beni-Shangul Gumuz and Gambela, Rahmato vehemently argues that these processes are not only about transfer land to commercial investors but importantly also about transfers of

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²A textbook anthropological understanding is that property is not a thing, but a network of social relations that governs the conduct of people with respect to the use and dispossession of things. For an excellent state-of-the-art article on the anthropology of property, see (Hann, 2007).
rights. Similar approach has been adopted by scholars who studied the pastoral Afar. Major works include Getachew Kassa’s study in Gewane District in Zone 3 (Getachew, 2001); Bekele Hundie’s research in Awash Fantalle and Dulecha Districts in Zone 3 (Hundie, 2006); and Kelemework Reda who conducted fieldwork in nine districts (Awash, Assayta, Dubti, Chiffa, Kuneba, Ab’ala, Amibara, Gewane and Ewa) across several zones in Afar region (Reda, 2014). In Afar Region land tenure exist as a complex bundle of rights, where the traditional communal ownership prevails alongside and in interlacement with the state ownership systems (Hundie, 2006; Reda, 2014).

There are several criticisms levelled against the above conceptualization. The first criticism lies in the applicability of property, which originated from the West and capitalist economies, to the study of pastoral communities. This lies at the heart of the formalist versus substantivist debate.

2.1. The formalist versus substantivist debate

Karl Polanyi drew the contours of the debate between the formalists and substantivists, where he argues that property was limited to a restricted number of western, industrial societies. He argues that formal economic theory, the model that is closely linked to neoclassical economics (formalism) was inappropriate in non-industrial societies. In such societies, economic activity is “embedded” in non-market institutions such as kinship, religion and politics (Polanyi, 1944, p. 23). In non-industrial economies, rather than being a separate and distinct sphere, the economy is embedded in non-economic institutions. Polanyi labeled this approach substantivism. The ‘substantivists’ argue that in pre-capitalist economies, such as pastoral societies struggles over land are embedded in social and political contexts, and could only be analyzed with their own, quite distinct approaches-reciprocity and redistribution (Polanyi, 1944). Polanyi uses the concept of ‘embeddedness’ to draw attention to ways in which pre-industrial economies differed from those of market economies (Polanyi, 1944). In market societies, by contrast, economic action is “disembedded” from society (Polanyi, 1945). On the contrary, the formalists claim we can study struggles over land in all societies, including in pastoralist societies by using the modern economist’s approach (Polanyi, 1944).

Mark Granovetter, a neo-substantivist scholar, argues that formalists view which separated economy from society and culture promoted an “under-socialized account” that atomizes human behavior (Granovetter, 1985, p. 486). Similarly, Granovetter argues the substantivists had an “over-socialized” view of economic actors, refusing to see the ways that rational choice could influence the ways they acted in traditional, “embedded” social roles (Granovetter, 1985, p. 486). Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy (Granovetter, 1985). Their attempts at purposive action is embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations. In his study of ethnic Chinese business networks in Indonesia, Granovetter found out that economic exchanges are not carried out between strangers but rather between individuals involved in long-term continuing relationships, from which he concludes that even in market societies, economic activity is not as disembedded from society as formalists would suggest (Granovetter, 1985, p. 508).

The strongest criticism to the formalist and substantivist approaches in economic anthropology has been to assert the importance of grasping indigenous understandings of land tenure. This is about showing sensitivity to the dangers of imposing Western conceptions of ownership where they did not belong. Perhaps, the strongest push for studying local understandings of land tenure came from Stephen Gudeman (Gudeman, 2016). Gudeman argues that on the one hand the formalist insistence on reducing all exchanges to the rational decision-making of individual is not helpful to understanding pastoral societies, and on the other the substantivist paradigm’s offers little value in grasping ‘local models’ (Gudeman, 2016, p. 17). However, the concept of property, even as argued by the substantivist (and neosubstantivist) has two important limitations. First, it fails to acknowledge the importance of the connection between land and people, which gives rise to claims of belonging (Saltman, 2002). Second, there is a question concerning the very relevance of property in pastoral studies. This will take us to the next concept.

2.2. Territoriality for Pastoral Society

For some scholars the very concept of property has an inherent problem in applying to the study of pastoral societies. Property was thought to be applicable only to what Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson labelled ‘commercial society’ (Hann, 1998, p. 13). Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson were among the first to address property issues in a comparative anthropological way, by analyzing the forms of property associated with different types of society in evolutionary ranking. In their fourfold schema, hunters formed the simplest kind of social organization, thought to be lacking any developed sense of property, though individuals may ‘possess’ their catch; ownership of animals was important to past peoples, and ownership of the land to agriculturalists, and property is a characteristic of the ‘commercial society’(Hann, 1998, p. 23). Territoriality tends to be applied to hunters-gatherers and pastoralists (Schlee, 1951). For additional reference on this issue, please refer to Bohannan, Paul (1959), “The Impact of money on an African subsistence economy”. The Journal of Economic History 19 (4): 491-503; Geertz, Clifford (1963). Agricultural inversion; the process of ecological change in Indonesia. Berkeley: Published for the Association of Asian Studies by University of California Press; and Sahlin, Marshall (1972). Stone Age Economics. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.

4According to Polanyi, the liberal paradigm (neoclassical tradition) in economics from 1870s onwards was a break away from integrated analyses that linked property to social and moral issues of distribution (1944).

5A traditional assumption many formalists borrow from neoclassical economics is that the individual will make rational choices based on full information, or information that is incomplete in a specific way, in order to maximize whatever that individual considers being of value.

6Lewis Henry Morgan (1974), who was concerned with social evolution, argued that the rise of property as the dominant form of social relationship marks the beginning of civilization and of complex socio-political organization.

7Despite the controversy over whether or not pastoralists “own” the land they occupy, the object of such ownership has generally been conceived of as a territory, whilst in the context of agricultural societies territory denotes the wider domain of political sovereignty rather than the particular blocks of cultivable land over which people may claim rights of use and disposal (Veranjes, 2007).
Lentz, 2013), while what may be equivalent behavior among agriculturalists is described in terms of land tenure systems (Saltman, 2002; Sack, 1983) and property for commercial society (Hann, 2007). For critics, however, this differentiation, which implies that concept of land tenure is inapplicable to pastoralist societies, is symptomatic of a residual commitment to the social evolutionist theory (Veranjes, 2007).

Territoriality is defined as the act of delimiting and controlling an area of space a territory in order to control people and things (Sack R. D., 2001, p. 15602). It involves rights to specific locations or areas and the resources and activities within them. The cognitive aspects of territoriality emphasizes the association of the identity of a give social group and a location, which are manifested in different perceptions, in the competition and conflicts in relation to the justified use and control of given spaces (Saltman, 2002). This is a crucial element, which is lacking in the concept of property: a link between people and place. One important way in which people identify with place is ethnicity6 (Schlee, 2011).

Several studies drew on the concept of territoriality in the study of pastoral societies. For instance, (Schlee, 2011) in his study of the pastoral communities of Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia, discussed 'tribal' territories and how this has shaped local politics. Fekadu Adugna used the same concept in his study of the pastoral Gabra community of Southern Ethiopia (Adugna, 2014). In Afar, Simone Retberg used the concept of territoriality in her study of disputes between pastoral Afar and Somali communities in the Middle Awash Basin exploring how clan territoriality figured in territorial disputes between the two ethnic groups (2012). For instance (Lentz, 2013), by focusing on an area of the savannah in northern Ghana and southwestern Burkina Faso in West Africa explores how those who claim native status hold sway over others who are perceived to have come later.

In the context of the fall of the Socialist Bloc in the early 1990s, scholars questioned the benefits of both property and territorialitytostudy the dynamism in access to and ownership of land in post-socialist states (Ribot J. a., 2003). In many post-socialist states' rights and local belonging failed to guarantee ownership of land.

2.3. Access for Post-Socialist States

In many post-socialist sates, property land right is only way by which people are able to benefit from resources. People gain and maintain access to resources in many ways that do not amount to property (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). That is, varieties of access mechanisms condition people's access to land. In addition to property, these include technology, capital, markets, labor, knowledge, identities and social relations (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 159–60). Hence, the utility of property as an analytical lens has been challenged as too narrow by recent emphasis on the multiple mechanisms that open up, influence, hinder and close down access to resources. Access is thus different from property, as access refers to 'the ability to benefit from things' (Ribot J. a., 2003, p. 153), making it more encompassing than property, which refers to "the right to benefit" (Macpherson, 1978). Access is broader and includes property. The difference between access and property implies that social actors may derive benefits from resources without holding rights to them.

Ribot provides an illustrative example of the different ways by which social actors enjoy access to resources (1998). He investigates the distribution of benefits along a charcoal commodity chain in Senegal from extraction in the Tambacounda region. Different groups benefit from the charcoal commodity chain, yet they derive their respective benefits in different arenas and by way of different mechanisms. Villagers, for example, enjoy customary property rights to forests, even though Senegal's forests are legally owned by the state and managed by the Forest Service. In contrast, merchants, in turn, work through 'social ties with other state agents, and through misinformation, and licenses' (Ribot, 1998: 328).

Correspondingly, formal property rights do not necessarily imply that the social actors holding them are able to derive material benefits from the natural resources to which those rights apply. One example is the forest devolution in Ghana (Lentz, 2013), where the forest department decided to grant villagers use rights to local forests. Despite the devolution of forest management to the locals, access to the forest actually depended on a variety of access mechanisms in addition to property rights. For families who did not benefit from such mechanisms, 'property rights' remained indeed vacuous claims. This study demonstrates that people may hold property rights to some resources without having the capacity to derive any material benefit from them. Carola Lentz argues that people may lack 'real' rights even if law guarantees such rights but are denied in practice (Lentz, 2013). This is exactly what the distinction between property and access is about: property is about claims, which are considered legitimate (or even legal), and access is about the de facto ability to benefit. It demonstrates that property rights may or may not translate into ability to benefit; and access may or may not come about because of property rights. Lack of legitimized property rights does not exclude actors without those rights to benefit from the resource. Even if not all forms of access to land are guaranteed by politico-legal institutions, they may still constitute an important element in people's livelihoods (Ribot R. w., 2003).

There are two major limitation in this concept: first, it fails to acknowledge the emotional and historical attachment between land and people-identity. Secondly, it falls in the same trap as property-it embraces a view of dual society. I will propose an approach that will enable to overcome the limitations inherent in all three concepts.

2.4. The Synthesis: Struggles Over Land as Ongoing Institutional-Cultural Process

With globalization, the debate between "commercial society and pastoral society, socialist state and capitalist state" became theoretically weak; and anthropologists have mostly questioned focus on their 'primitivist niche' (Hann,

6Ethnicity in its narrowest anthropological sense refers to groups set apart by different origins, while broad definition encompasses groups set apart by cultural characteristics (Saltman, 2002, p. 5).

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In order to bypass these dichotomies, I chose to view the struggles over land as an ongoing process that involves institutional and cultural bargains among actors involved. The institutional view draws from institutional analysis that can be used to study struggles over land in all contexts. I interpret “institutions” as the constellations of social networks and organizations as well as the associated rules of the game that govern interactions between and within structures, as they are actually enforced. This much is not new; what is new is to approach it as a process. Approaching the study of struggles over land as an institutional process helps in introducing an epistemological shift away from a dualistic view of society (socialist/capitalist; commercial/pastoral) to a focus on ongoing and interconnected humankind (Hann, 2007).

Institutions determine access to land: rights and opportunities are a direct function of the institutional arrangements in which actors are situated. Institutions determine distribution (allocation of land) and differential access for the different actor groups. The process view, which is the contribution of this paper, highlights the importance of looking not just in to distributional effects of institution but also the relation between actors and institutions, which are themselves the result of struggles fought between the social actors. This means that institutions themselves are avenues of ongoing bargaining process among actor groups hooked in the struggles over land. Institutional arrangements are the result of a complex set of different, historically situated, ongoing bargaining processes among social actors, occurring at different places and societal levels (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 1998). This view seems to offer a promising alternative between an under-socialised analysis of institutional arrangements (for which the formalists have been heavily criticised) where the “institutional arrangements” is treated in a ceteris paribus way, and an over-socialised account of an all determining institutional environment (for which the substantivists have been heavily criticised) that dictates the outcomes of struggles over land. I, therefore, view institutional arrangements not as independent, exogenous determinants of struggles over land, but rather as evolving social construction. Institutions in many countries can be described as polysepalous or pluriform (Bierschenk, Chauveau, and Oliver de Sardan, 2000, p. 10), or heterarchical (Klute G., 2011), involving different public arenas, being a product of different historical periods and based on varying meaning systems, rules and actors. This is to argue that both the formal-legal institutions (aka ‘statist’) and the informal-custodial institutions (aka neocustomary) are simply institutions (Boone, 2014, p. 19). In the former, land, is governed indirectly through local, neocustodial authorities, and in the latter, governments administer the allocation of rural property directly via state representatives (Boone, 2014). In pastoral society in post socialist states, it is futile to search for a central institutional realm, where the ballgame is being played. This process view of institutions also means that rights and opportunities to access and own land are continuously negotiated in everyday life. This view helps bridge the conceptual gap between property and access.

In addition to adopting an institutional focus, I must also take into account the existence of an underlying cultural layer that provides a collection of cognitive models from which people assemble their identities and (re)create their perceptions about belonging. This broadens the conceptualisation of ‘struggles over land to include the vast field of cultural as well as social relations, to the symbolic as well as material contexts within which meanings are created and collective identities are shaped (Rose, 1994). The process view, which is rooted in the social constructionist view entails that identities (and therefore belonging) is an ongoing process of definition and redefinition. The formalist school (neoliberal approach), which propose disembodied view of property, ignores the significance of emotional ties to land for group identity. The emotional and historical connections that link people to land, which give land one of its most important kinds of value, have mostly been ignored by the formalist approach to property (Gudeman, 2016), though it is clearly acknowledged in the concept of territoriality. Several studies have indicated that belonging (identity) is the other way, other than institution, by which actors make claims over access to and ownership of land (Lund, 2011; Lentz, 2013; Boone, 2014). These scholars have empirically demonstrated how local belonging (in the form of kinship and autochthony) is central to claims over inclusion and exclusion concerning access to and ownership of land in Africa. The issue of local belonging also brings to mind discourses of autochthony and allochthony that actors invoke in their claims to land. It is the hypothesis of this article that land tenure should be seen as institution-cultural process. Lessons from fieldwork near the Ethiopian, Djibouti Eritrean border triangle area will illustrate this hypothesis.

3. Forms of Land Tenure in Dobi between 1991 and 2004

3.1. Dobi: Pastoral Clan Territory That Extends From Ethiopia to Djibouti

First let me cosset you to a virtual tour of Dobi. Geo-politically, Dobi is a territory that cuts across Djibouti and Ethiopia, although the latter is the focus of this research. Dobi is a low-lying plain surrounded by hill ranges. Agro-ecologically, Dobi is an arid and very hot place, which in good season, has average temperature of about 36 degree centigrade, and in hot seasons is in the forties. Dobi is located at a cross road: highway that connects Addis Ababa to Assab port in Eritrea, and Addis Ababa to Djibouti port in Djibouti. It is located in Eli Dar District, in the Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti border triangle area. Dobi is located at eight hundred kilometers from Addis Ababa. All this is an etic description of Dobi: researcher’s points of view. Fig 1. Bird’s eye view image of Dobi

*North, D.C. 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press*
3.2. Ownership of Dobi between 1991 and 2004

There are several bases for claims of ownership of Dobi. These include state laws, Afar traditional law (Mada’a) and local belonging. Each will be discussed in detail in the following sub-sections.

When the federal constitution was adopted in 1995, public ownership of land was adopted, which is a continuation of the Derg era (1974-1991) land tenure system (Rahmato, 2007). Article 40 (sub Article 3) of the 1995 FDRE Constitution provides that the right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively vested in the state and in the people of Ethiopia (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995). Art 52 of the Constitution states that Regional Governments have the duty to administer land and other natural resources according to federal laws (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995). In similar vein, Article 2 (6) of the FDRE “Rural Land Administration Proclamation, No. 89/1997”, vests Regional Governments with the power of land administration (defined as “the assignment of holding rights and the execution of distribution of holdings” (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1997).

The major difference between the Derg land tenure (1974-1991) and post 1991 is that in the case of the latter land tenure officially became the basis for ‘ethnicisation of territories’ and ‘territorialisation of ethnicities’. In so doing, it officiated local belonging as basis for claiming ownership of land in the country. In this regard, Art 38 (3) of the Revised Constitution of Afar National Regional State declares all rural and urban land is a communal property of the Afar people and the State (Afar National Regional State, Revised Constitution of Afar National Regional State, 2002). It can be said that with regards to the state law, Afar land belongs to the Afar people. This position has been reinforced by the Afar Region’s ‘Rural Land Use and Administration Policy’ which declares land belongs to the Afar people and Afar Regional State and shall be administered under the laws and regulations of the Afar Region government (Afar National Regional State, 2009). It was in this policy that the pastoral Afar right to use and the right to transfer their holdings are clearly stated. To the local Afar, the state and its laws are not reference points in claims over and dispute concerning land in Dobi. During my three rounds of fieldwork, I did not come across a local Afar who claims ownership of Dobi based on state legal provisions. They rely on the traditional (non-state)law.

The Afar people have their own age-old traditional law known as Mada’a. Mada’a means law in Afar language. The Mada’a, according to some scholars, is an embodiment of Afar worldview, culture, and livelihood specific values, norms and rules that govern all aspects of Afar society, including land governance (Getachew, 2001). The development of the Mada’among transhumant pastoralist Afar clans long before the advent of Islamic teachers-Shakists-as influential actors has made it prototype reflection of its emergence from the particular needs of pastoralist Afar and not mainly of metaphysical abstraction of any kind (Getachew, 2001). To the local Afar, the state and its laws are not at all reference points in claims over land in Dobi. A proxy indictor for this is the number of land related dispute cases referred to the state court. Based on information collected from Eli Dar District First Instance Court, no land related dispute has been presented to the state court between 1991 and 2004 (Judge, 2017). The story is almost similar at the region level as
10The Afar heavily rely on the role of neocustomary rules and institutions in resolving multifaceted external and internal claims and conflicts. The sharia courts function in resolving family and marriage affairs limited to matters of divorce and inheritance. Formal courts are rarely attended for resolving conflict among the Afar and even in case of an Afar versus non-Afar because the Mada’a also have specific version of law (the Adanle) to govern Afar-non-Afar relations. Albeit such custom dominated reliability, formal courts see in to cases involving migrant workers, people of different ethnic origin and their relations with native Afar which according to regional justice service statistical amounts to not more than 4% of all cases that has come to cognition of formal courts (AJB, 2007).

11Both the Mada’a and local belonging grant communal ownership of land and in the context of my study area, all members of the two clans communally and equally share the rights to enjoy the resources in the territories. In fact, it is not like that; benefits are differentiated, notably along gender differences. In other words, although all members of a clan have equal rights to ownership of land by virtue of their belongingness, male and female members are not equal. An unmarried woman has no equal right with men to inherit lands, especially for fear that when she marries she would transfer the property rights of such land from her parents to that of her husband. A married woman has no right to inherit land if she has not given birth to a child at the time of divorce, or if her husband dies before she gives birth. In this thesis, I have consciously chosen to stay away from the gendered issue of access and ownership of land in Afar Region.

12I will have to state my observation that, unlike the descendants of the Harel Mahesi, who proudly talk about their history, the Lubakubo are uncomfortable. When I raised this issue with Lubakubo elders, they were very uncomfortable and hesitant to talk about it. During my fieldwork period, I tried several times to raise again this issue but found answers to which my respondents feel uncomfortable to answer. They either respond by saying “I don’t know much about it.” And or answering in third person “people say this: This stands in stark contradiction with the confident responses and oral histories from the Assaimara group key informants about their ancestors.
clan, acknowledges the oral tradition which places the Aydahis Baras as 'late arrivals' in Dobi, he however rejects the implications and relevance of these discourses to contemporary territorial governance (Intibara, 2015). Ibrahim Intibara says "since the formation of Lubakubo kee Modaito clan, Dobi belongs to all members of the clan" (Intibara, 2015). Ibrahim Intibara states:

According to our Mada’a, Afar land is divided among clans. In fact, we believe that Afar land is divided equally among clans. The Lubakubo kee Modaito territory is found in today’s Eli Dar District. We are in three kebeles out of the 18 kebeles in the District. According to our Mada’a, Dobi is part of the territory of Lubakubo kee Modaito clan. These are contradictory discourses. Whereas members of the Lubakubo clan underline their claim by reciting tradition about their belonging to Dobi, the Aydahis Bara place their claim based on the Afar Mada’a. The Afkihe MahadMada’a recognizes communal ownership of Dobi. These different and conflicting narratives have been used in the claims and counter-claims over Dobi over the past twenty five years. This controversy, which subsided during the Derg regime (1974-1991), resurfaced after the re-installment of Ausa Sultanate in 1991.

Up to 1974, Ali Mohammed cites, “due to the Asaimara-Adoimara and Modaito-nonModaito status differences to which the Lubakubo and Aydahis Bara were pigeonholed, only the voices of the latter (the Aydahis Bara, who belong to the Asaimara- Modaito class) were taken as trustworthy in the face of traditional and government offices” (Mohammed, 2016). This social stratification was banned by the Derg regime (1974-1991), only to be brought back to life after the removal of the Derg. Many people consider the 1975 land reform by the Derg as a radical measure that has abolished tenant landlord relationships in the highland Ethiopia, and the status differences among the pastoral Ethiopia. The reform was designed to alter fundamentally the then agrarian relations and make those working the land the owners and the provisions of the proclamation (No. 31/1975). Habib Mohammed says “in the context of Afar Region we contextualised the proclamation and those keeping cattles of the Modaito lords became the owners. We also abolished any status differentiation between Modaito and Non-Modaito” (Yayo, 2016). The power of administering land was vested in the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration (MLRA) through Peasant Associations at the grassroots level. In the context of Dobi, a committee established from both the Aydahis Bara and Lubakubo became formed peasant association known as Dobi Zenbaba Peasant Association. In other words, despite all the short comings of the Derg, in Dobi its effect cannot be understated. The 1975 proclamation removed the Modaito clan overlords in Dobi and put on equal footing the Lubakubo and Aydahis Bara.

With the regime change in 1991, and reinstalling Sultan of the Ausa Sultanate, Ali Mirah declared ‘there is no more land to the tiller in Afar’ (Yassin, 2018). Sultan Ali Mirah disbanded all peasant associations (PAs) established by the Derg, including Zenebaba Pastoralist Association in Dobi. By this simple declaration, Sultan Ali Mirah “re-created the ‘feudal like system’ that existed before 1974 and led to the re-installment of Modaito-Non-Modaito status” (Yayo, 2016). Therefore, it can be said that in 1991 the ‘feudal-like’ features of the sultanate that existed before 1974, including Aydahis rule over the others has been rebooted. From the point of view of the Lubakubo clan it was the EPRDF that helped resuscitate the pre-1974 social stratifications, which Ali Mohammed calls “going back to Modaito rule” (Mohammed, 2016). However, these different narratives raised by the competing sides did not deter their ability to access and benefit from Dobi until 2004, when it all changed.

3.2.1. Struggles Over Dobi between 2004 and 2016

Dobi under big man control in the post 2004 period

In this sub-section, I will discuss the issue of ownership of Dobi in the post 2004 period. I will follow the theoretical differentiation between rights of ownership and real ownership (Vardery, 2003), but modify it to ‘effective ownership without right’ and ‘rights without effective ownership’, which encapsulate the post 2004 scenario in Dobi.

In the post 2004 period, there is one person that stands tall in the space of struggles over access to and control over Dobi. His name is Ass Mahammed- the over-lord of Dobi. This is how he presents himself:

My name is Ass Mahammed Umed. I was born and raised up in Dobi in Afar region. I began salt mining in a place called Fil Whuha in 2003/4. Although there were so many people from abroad and Ethiopia who have thought that there would be a big investment potential in the Dobi area for years, nobody has achieved it in real sense until I did.
Ass Mohammad views himself as the person who opened up Dobi to commercial salt mining (As-Mohammed, 2017). Figure 6 above is a testament to this claim. The Ethiopian government shares his view. In fact, the ANRS President Office and Ethiopian Federal Government each have awarded gold medals to Ass Mohammad as model businessman in 2010 and in 2012 respectively. Ass Mohammad uses these as acts that legitimize his control over Dobi. The ‘big man’ does not only control Dobi, but also owns a lion’s share of Dobi salt mining operations. He is the person from whom others obtained permit for salt mining. The ‘big man’ belongs to the Lubakubo kee Modaito clan. However, his control extends beyond his clan territory and extends to parts of the Wandaba clan territory. The big man drew on plethora of mechanisms to gain control over Dobi. One factor for the big man’s control of Dobi is his ingenuity in inventing the mechanisms of transforming Dobi, barren land, to a large scale commercial salt mining site. It suffices to state here that although many foreigners (including Italians) and Ethiopians tried to turn Dobi into a successful salt mining site, it was the big man who succeeded in doing so in 2004. Almost all the informants I spoke to, government and civilians alike, acknowledge his inventiveness and brilliance in opening up Dobi. When he started this operation, he did so on his own clan territory, the Lubakubo kee Modaito clan territory. Habib notes “It is true that Ass Mohammad invented a way to commercial salt mining by excavating water from underground and treating it. He should be recognized for that.” (Yayyo, 2016). His inventiveness was not the only factor.

While all this was happening in Dobi, the big man became selected by the ANRS (the former Afar Region president Ismael Ali Serro) as Lubakubo kee Modaito clan leader. As I have discussed, the legitimate clan leader, Ibrahim Intibara is still alive when Ass Mohammad was selected. Despite the claims of illegitimacy of his position as clan leader, this new position further emboldened the big man to further consolidate his grip on Dobi. According to Habib “Ismael Ali Serro engineered a way to put Ass Mohammad in total control over Dobi. Ismael selected Ass Mohammad not just to become clan leader but also, Deputy Administrator of Eli Dar District and also member of the APDP central committee” (Yayyo, 2016). All this contributed to the rise of the big man, matching his name.

Hussen Yassin remembers

In 2002, Isamel selected Ass Mahammed as leader of the Lubakubo Modaito clan and made him a point of contact between the clan and the Afar National Regional State. In 2004, Ismael appointed Ass Mahammed to become vice administrator of Eli Dar District. In 2006, Ass Mahammed was selected to join the central committee of the Afar People’s Democratic Party (APDP), the ruling party of the Afar National Regional State (Yassin, 2018). In order to suppress any resistance from his kinsmen to his control over Dobi, the big man employed several tactics, one of which is divide and rule. All Mohammad from the Lubakubo claims that
The big man used several tactics to cause rivalries and foment discord among the people. He gives money to his network. For instance, Kadir Hassan, the current Lubakubo clan leader and administrator of Dichoto is one of the beneficiaries. On the other hand, the big man attacks (physically and verbally) anyone who stands against him. In this way he made sure that we are not united against him (Mohammed, 2016).

The big man gives money to clan members who collect information for him. He displaced thousands of clan families from Dobi to pave the way for salt mining by strangers, highlanders, people who do not belong to the local clan. Local belonging based access and ownership of land ended in 2004. The big man expanded salt mining operation from his own clan territory, Lubakubo kee Modaito clan, to the Wandaba clan. In order to expand into the Wandaba clan territory, the big man employed a combination of stick and carrot. Yassin:

Assammad grabbed our land using his authority as Deputy Administrator of Eli Dar District. As Deputy Administrator, in charge of district police force, he gives orders to the police and kebele officials to remove our people from the Dobi salt sites and threaten us with imprisonment if and when we resist. On top of that, he buys of support with money: he distributes money to his supporters. Let me tell you something. Money is evil. It turns brothers on each other's.

-Afar's Big Man, Ass Mahmoud doesn’t have the right (state nor non-state) to control Dobi. Despite lacking legitimate right of ownership, the big man has managed to control the flow of benefits from Dobi. This speaks to the relevance of Ribot and Peluso’s conceptual differentiation between access and rights (Ribot J., a., 2003). To illustrate this point, I will use a twin analytical approach: before and after approach (comparing Dobi before 2004 with Dobi after 2004), and case comparison-that is comparing Dobi (the second biggest salt producer in Ethiopia) with Afdera13 (the biggest salt producer in the country).

Dobi and Afdera, though located in Afar Region, seem like they are from different worlds. Both were opened up to commercial salt production following the Ethio-Eritrea border conflict. They differ in one big dimension: whereas Afdera is managed by the state, Dobi is under the grip of the Big Man. Several explanations can be sought to explain these variations. One factor, possibly the major one, is their history: Afdera opened up by the state while Dobi was opened by the big man. Aliye Suleyman states:

I led the campaign to open up Afdera salt lake to investors in the late 1990s. In 1998 we advertised the investment potentials of Afdera salt lake on the Ethiopian Television. We encouraged investors to come and invest in Afdera salt lake It was during the Ethio-Eritrea War at which time import of salt from Ertrrea was halted. So, the Ethiopian government was desperately trying to open up alternative domestic salt production sites. Three investors came in, and with the assistance of the government started producing salt. Later, investors came in their thousands. Dobi is a totally different story. Dobi's salt production, which started in 2004, was engineered by Ass Assomamad. We had no hands in it (Sulieman, 2016).

Archives from the Afar Region Bureau of Mining and Energy Bureau shows that whereas there are about 570 active licenses operating in Afdera, all of which is licensed by the Ethiopian State. In Dobi it is a different story: it is the big man’s ‘decides who get access to Dobi. All the investors in salt mining on Dobi received access from Ass Mahmoud. These include institutions such as Samara University; individuals such as Mehari (from Amhara Region), Mussedin (an Afar from a different clan), Umar Ida (leader of the Gambel sub clan of the Wandaba) to mention just a few. Dobi salt mining business is run by Zenbaba Dobi Salt Producers Association (ZBSPA) founded and headed by Ass Assomamad. All salt producers at Dobi are members of ZDSPA. This association is responsible for providing machineries such as excavators, purchases all salt products from Dobi, decides wage rates of laborers, collects tax and royalty from producers etc.

Ethiopian constitution declares land to be commonly owned by the people and the state.

3.2.2. Federal Constitutions and Proclamations

The land policy of Ethiopia is founded on Art. 40 of the 1995 FDRE Constitution declares land is the common property of the state and the nations, nationalities and the peoples of Ethiopia and will not be subjected to sell (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995). The possessors have only usufruct rights—the right to use. The FDRE Constitution Art. 40(5) also declares that pastoralists have the right not to be displaced from their grazing lands (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995). The pastoralists have, therefore, constitutional guarantee for the land they hold not to be considered as ‘no man’s land’. The FDRE constitution (Article 52) states Regional Governments have the duty to administer land and other natural resources according to federal laws.

Afar National Reginal State Constitution Art 311 (Afar National Regional State, 1997) and the revised constitution (Afar National Regional State, 2002) declares all rural and urban land is a communal property of the Afar people and the State. In most parts of the Afar Region, including in Dobi, land is divided by clans and administered by clan leaders; the state and public ownership of land is hardly recognizable (Afar National Regional State, 2009). This ncessitated the introduction of the Afar Region land use proclamation and establishment of land use and administration agency (Afar National Regional State, Afar Rural Land Use and Administration Policy, 2009).

Habib Yayyo, Afar elder involved in policy formulation process, remembers “the first conference to discuss Afar Region rural land policy was held in Dubti in 2006. That is two years after Dobi started salt production. The conference was attended by over 3000 people. I was also a key note speaker, as the government knew I am respected and can allure the participants (mostly clan leaders) to agree to the policy” (Yayyo, 2016). The policy, which was endorsed in 2009, reaffirms that “the right to ownership of rural lands is vested in the people and the ANRS” (Afar National Regional State, 2009). For Habib the introduction of the land use and administration policy “removes not just the non-state forms of land

13For details on Afdera please refer to Dereje Feyissa ,‘the Political economy of salt in Afar Region’ (Feyissa, The Political economy of salt in the Afar Region in northeast Ethiopia, 2011)
ownership but also the institution which lie behind it- the ‘Modaito rule’ from Aussa Sultanate territory” (Yayyo, 2016) The policy was received differently by the local clans around Dobi. While the Lubakubo clans supported the policy for it removes the social stratification between themselves and the Aydahis Bara, the latter vouch for clan ownership to maintain status quo. However, from the Ethiopian state perspective, Dobi is a mineral land and as such is subject to mineral laws and proclamations.

Since 1991, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) introduced several proclamations aimed at governing mining operations in the country, including salt mining in Dobi. The proclamations are: Mining operations proclamation 2002; mining operations proclamations No. 678/2010; and the mining operations proclamation No. 816/2013. In essence, all of these proclamations aim at putting mineral lands in the hands of the State. Despite state legal provisions that put ownership of Dobi in the hands of public and state, on the one hand, and the Afar Mada’a that defines land as communal clan territories on the other, none of these mattered in post 2004 period in Dobi. Dobi fell under the grip of a big man by the name Ass Mahammad.

The state laws provided no legal shelter for the local Afar who have been forcefully displaced from their territories by the big man. The forceful displacement of the local clans defeats the provisions of not just the traditional Afar law but also the State laws. The ANRS 2008 Rural RLA policy states “pastoralists have… the right not to be displaced from their own lands.” It is despite this provision that clans have been displaced from Dobi, their homeland without consultation nor compensation. Rights did not translate in to access and benefits.

I have shown that formal property rights do not necessarily imply that the actors holding them are able to derive material benefits from the natural resources to which those rights apply nor be able to decide who get benefits from it. People lack ‘real’ rights if such rights are promised in law but denied in practice. Verdery observes a lack of ‘effective ownership’ by Romanian villagers who find themselves unable to benefit from their land rights (Vardery, 2003). ‘In Dobi is possible to argue that both the clans and the state lack real rights over Dobi. Effective ownership rests with a big man.

4. Conclusion

Three concepts are popular in the study of land tenure. These are property, territoriality and access. This article appraised the merits and relevance of each of these concepts for research in pastoral societies in post-socialist states. Each of the three concepts have their own niches, from which grows their inherent limitations in the study of ongoing struggles people make over land in the 21st Century. It is this realisation which led to a new proposition: struggles over land is an ongoing bargaining process which embodies institutional process and claims of belonging. Lessons from the fieldwork in Afar shows that property rights, even when it works, is not the only way by which people own and benefit from land. The concept of territoriality, which seem to better describe forms of land ownership during the better part of 20th C, fails to capture the emergence of individual control of land in the post 2004 period. Since 1991, Dobi endured changes in forms of land tenure (legal reality). Traditional law, state law, and local belonging were all used as basis for claims over Dobi until 2004. In the post 2004, all these failed to guarantee ownership and stream of benefits from the land. Dobi fell under the control of a big man. It is this lesson which points to the importance of understanding in pastoral societies in the contemporary post socialist states that land tenure is an ongoing process of institutional and cultural bargains. It is a process.

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