Streaming Complexity of Checking Priority Queues

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Abstract

This work is in the line of designing efficient checkers for testing the reliability of some massive data structures. Given a sequential access to the insert/extract operations on such a structure, one would like to decide, a posteriori only, if it corresponds to the evolution of a reliable structure. In a context of massive data, one would like to minimize both the amount of reliable memory of the checker and the number of passes on the sequence of operations.

Chu, Kannan and McGregor [9] initiated the study of checking priority queues in this setting. They showed that the use of timestamps allows to check a priority queue with a single pass and memory space $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{N})$. Later, Chakrabarti, Cormode, Kondapally and McGregor [7] removed the use of timestamps, and proved that more passes do not help.

We show that, even in the presence of timestamps, more passes do not help, solving an open problem of [9, 7]. On the other hand, we show that a second pass, but in reverse direction, shrinks the memory space to $\tilde{O}((\log N)^2)$, extending a phenomenon the first time observed by Magniez, Mathieu and Nayak [15] for checking well-parenthesized expressions.

1 Introduction

The reliability of memory is central and becomes challenging when it is massive. In the context of program checking [4] this problem has been addressed by Blum, Evans, Gemmell, Kannan and Naor [3]. They designed on-line checkers that use a small amount of reliable memory to test the behavior of some data structures. Checkers are allowed to be randomized and to err with small error probability. In that case the error probability is not over the inputs but over the random coins of the algorithm.

Chu, Kannan and McGregor [9] revisited this problem for priority queue data structures, where the checker only has to detect an error after processing an entire sequence of data accesses. This can be rephrased as a one-pass streaming recognition problem. Streaming algorithms sequentially scan the whole input piece by piece in one sequential pass, or in a small number of passes, while using sublinear memory space. In our context, the stream is defined by the sequence of insertions and extractions on the priority queue. Using a streaming algorithm, the objective is then to decide if the stream corresponds to a correct implementation of a priority queue. We also consider collection data structures that implement multisets.

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A related communication problem with $\Theta(\sqrt{N})$ is not sufficient to guarantee a faster algorithm. The proof of Theorem 3 consists in introducing a related communication problem with $\Theta(\sqrt{N})$ players. Then we reduce the number of players to 3, and prove a lower bound on the information carried by players, leading to the desired lower bound. We are following the information cost approach taken in $[8, 17, 2, 12, 11]$, among other works. Recently, the information cost appeared as one of the most central notion in communication
complexity \[6, 5, 13\]. The information cost of a protocol is the amount of information that messages carry about players’ inputs. We adapt this notion to suit both the nature of streaming algorithms and of our problem.

Even if our result suggests that allowing multiple passes does not help, one could also consider the case of bidirectional passes. We believe that it is a natural relaxation of multi-pass streaming algorithms where the stream models some external read-only memory. In that case, we show that a second pass, but in reverse order, makes the problem of checking PQ easy, even with no timestamps (Section 4). A similar phenomenon has been established previously in [15] for checking the well-formedness of parenthesis expressions. Their problem is simpler than ours, and therefore our algorithm is more general.

**Theorem 4.** There is a bidirectional 2-pass randomized streaming algorithm recognizing PQ(U) with memory space \(O((\log N)(\log U + \log N))\), time per processing item \(\text{polylog}(N, U)\), and one-sided bounded error \(N^{-c}\), for inputs of length \(N\) and any constant \(c > 0\).

Our algorithm uses a hierarchical data structure similar to the one introduced in [15] for checking well-parenthesized expressions. At high level, it also behaves similarly. It performs one pass in each direction and makes an on-line compression of past information in at most \(\log N\) hashcodes. While this compression can loose information, the compression technique ensures that a mistake is always detected in one of the two directions. Nonetheless our algorithm differs on two main points. First, unlike parenthesized expressions, PQ is not symmetric. Therefore one has to design an algorithm for each pass. Second, the one-pass algorithm for PQ [7] is technically more advanced than the one of [15]. Thus designing a bidirectional 2-pass algorithm for PQ is more challenging.

Theorems 3 and 4 point out a strange situation but not isolated at all. Languages studied in [9, 15, 7, 14] and in this paper have space complexity \(\Theta(\sqrt{N}\text{polylog}(N))\) for a single pass, \(\Omega(\sqrt{N}/p)\) for \(p\) passes in the same direction, and \(\text{polylog}(N)\) for 2 passes but one in each direction. We hope this paper makes progress in the study of that phenomenon.

## 2 Preliminaries

In streaming algorithms (see [16] for an introduction), a pass on an input \(w \in \Sigma^N\), for some alphabet \(\Sigma\), means that \(w\) is given as an input stream \(w[1], w[2], \ldots, w[N]\), which arrives sequentially, i.e., letter by letter in this order. For simplicity, we assume throughout this article that the input length \(N\) is always given to the algorithm in advance. Nonetheless, all our algorithms can be adapted to the case in which \(N\) is unknown until the end of a pass.

**Definition 5** (Streaming algorithm). A \(p\)-pass randomized streaming algorithm with space \(s(N)\) and time \(t(N)\) is a randomized algorithm that, given \(w \in \Sigma^N\) as an input stream,

- performs \(k\) sequential passes on \(w\);
- maintains a memory space of size at most \(s(N)\) bits while reading \(w\);
- has running time at most \(t(N)\) per processed letter \(w[i]\);
- has preprocessing and postprocessing time at most \(t(N)\).

The algorithm is bidirectional if it is allowed to access to the input in the reverse order, after reaching the end of the input. Then \(p\) is the total number of passes in either direction.
The proof of our lower bound uses the language of communication complexity with multi-players, and is based on information theory arguments. We consider number-in-hand and message-passing communication protocols. Each player is given some input, and can communicate with another player according to the rules of the protocol. Our players are embedded into a directed circle, so that each player can receive (resp. transmit) a message from its unique predecessor (resp. successor). Each player send a message after receiving one, until the end of the protocol is reached. Players have no space and time restriction. Only the number of rounds and the size of messages are constrained.

Consider a randomized multi-player communication protocol $P$. We consider only two types of random source, that we call coins. Each player has access to its own independent source of private coins. In addition, all players share another common source of public coins. The output of $P$ is announced by the last player. This is therefore the last message of the last player. We say that $P$ is with bounded error $\varepsilon$ when $P$ errs with probability at most $\varepsilon$ over the private and public coins.

The transcript $\Pi$ of $P$ is the concatenation of all messages sent by all players, including all public coins. In particular, it contains the output of $P$, since it is given by the last player. Given a subset $S$ of players, we let $\Pi_S$ be the concatenation of all messages sent by players in $S$, including again all public coins.

We now remind the usual notions of entropy $H$ and mutual information $I$. Let $X, Y, Z$ be random variables. Then $H(X) = -\mathbb{E}_{x \sim X} \log \Pr(X = x)$, $H(X|Y = y) = -\mathbb{E}_{y \sim Y} \log \Pr(X = x|Y = y)$, $H(X|Y) = \mathbb{E}_{y \sim Y} H(X|Y = y)$, and $I(X : Y|Z) = H(X|Z) - H(X|Y, Z)$. The entropy and the mutual information are non negative and satisfy $I(X : Y|Z) = I(Y : X|Z)$.

The mutual information between two random variables is connected to the Hellinger distance $h$ between their respective distribution probabilities. Given a random variable $X$ we also denote by $X$ its underlying distribution.

**Proposition 6** (Average encoding). Let $X, Y$ be random variables. Then $\mathbb{E}_{y \sim Y} h^2(X|Y = y, X) \leq \kappa I(X : Y)$, where $\kappa = \frac{\ln 2}{2}$.

The Hellinger distance also generalizes the cut-and-paste property of deterministic protocols to randomized ones.

**Proposition 7** (Cut and paste). Let $P$ be a 2-player randomized protocol. Let $\Pi(x, y)$ denote the random variable representing the transcript in $P$ when Players A, B have resp. inputs $x, y$. Then $h(\Pi(x, y), \Pi(u, v)) = h(\Pi(x, v), \Pi(u, y))$, for all pairs $(x, y)$ and $(u, v)$.

Last we use that the square of the Hellinger distance is convex, and the following connexion to the more convention $\ell_1$-distance: $h(X, Y)^2 \leq \frac{1}{2}\|X - Y\|_1 \leq \sqrt{2}h(X, Y)$. For a reference on these results, see [10].

## 3 Lower bound for PQ-TS

The proof of our lower bound consists in first translating it into a 3$m$-player communication problem, for some large $m$; then reducing the number of players to 3 using the information cost approach; and last studying the base case of 3 players using information theory arguments.
3.1 From streaming algorithms to communication protocols

In this section, we write $a$ instead of $\text{ins}(a)$ and $\bar{a}$ instead of $\text{ext}(a)$. Consider the following set of hard instances of size $N = (2n + 2)m$:

**RAINDROPS($m, n$)** (see LHS of Figure 1)

- For $i = 1, 2, \ldots, m$, repeat the following motif:
  - For $j = 1, 2, \ldots, n$, insert either $v_{i,j} = 3(ni - j)$ or $v_{i,j} = 3(ni - j) + 2$
  - Insert either $a_i = 3(ni - (k_i - 1)) + 1$ or $a_i = 3(ni - k_i) + 1$, for some $k_i \in \{2, \ldots, n\}$
  - Extract $v_{i,1}, v_{i,2}, \ldots, v_{i,k_i-1}, a_i$ in decreasing order
- Extract everything left in decreasing order

Observe that such an instance is in COLLECTION. One can compute the timestamps for each value by maintaining only $O(\log N)$ additional bits. Last, there is only one potential error in each motif that can make it outside of PQ-TS. Indeed, $v_{i,1}, v_{i,2}, \ldots, v_{i,k_i-1}, a_i$ are in decreasing order up to a switch between $a_i$ and $v_{i,k_i-1}$.

Given such an instance as a stream, an algorithm for PQ-TS must decide if an error occurs between $a_i$ and $v_{i,k_i}$, for some $i$. Intuitively, if the memory space is less than $\varepsilon n$, for a small enough constant $\varepsilon > 0$, then the algorithm cannot remember all the values $(v_{i,j})_j$ when $a_i$ is extracted, and therefore cannot check a potential error with $a_i$. The next opportunity is during the last sequence of extractions. But then, the algorithm has to remember all values $(a_i)_i$, which is again impossible if the memory space is less than $\varepsilon m$.

In order to formalize this intuition, Lemma 8 (proof in Appendix A) first translates our problem into a communication one between $3m$ players as shown on the RHS of Figure 1. Then we analyze its complexity using information theory arguments in Section 3.2.
Any insertion and extraction of an instance in $\text{RAINDROPS}(m,n)$ can be described by its index and a single bit. Let $x_i[j] \in \{0,1\}$ such that $v_{i,j} = 3(ni - j) + 2x_i[j]$. Similarly, let $d_i \in \{0,1\}$ such that $a_i = 3(ni - k_i) + 1 + 3d_i$. For simplicity, we write $x$ instead of $(x_i)_{1 \leq i \leq m}$. Similarly, we use the notations $k$ and $d$.

Then by Lemma 12, $3n(\pi')$ transcript $\Pi'$ another ($P$-round randomized protocol for WeakIndex$^\varepsilon$ bounded error exists a $p$-round randomized protocol for WeakIndex$^\varepsilon$.)

Proof of Theorem 3. Let $n, N$ be positive integers such that $N = (2n + 2)n$. Assume that there exists a $p$-pass randomized algorithm that recognizes PQ-TS$(3N/2)$, with memory space $\alpha n$ and bounded error $\varepsilon$, for inputs of size $N$. Then, by Lemma 8 there a $p$-round randomized protocol $P$ for WeakIndex$(n,n)$ such that each message has size at most $\alpha n$. By Lemma 9 one can derive from $P$ another $(p+1)$-round randomized protocol $P'$ for WeakIndex$(n,1)$ with bounded error $\varepsilon$, and transcript $\Pi'$ satisfying $|\Pi'| \leq 3(t+1)\alpha n$ and max $\{I(D : \Pi'_B|X,K), I(K, D : \Pi'_C|X)\} \leq (p+1)\alpha$. Then by Lemma 10 $3(p+1)\alpha \geq (1 - 2\varepsilon)/10$, that is $\alpha = O(1/p)$, concluding the proof.

Lemma 8. Assume there is a $p$-pass randomized streaming algorithm for deciding if an instance of $\text{RAINDROPS}(n,m)$ is in $\text{PQ-TS}(3mn)$ with memory space $s(m,n)$ and bounded error $\varepsilon$. Then there is a $p$-round randomized protocol for WeakIndex$(n,m)$ with bounded error $\varepsilon$ such that each message has size at most $s(m,n)$.

We are now ready to give the structure of the proof of Theorem 3 which has techniques based on information theory. Define the following collapsing distribution $\mu_0$ of hard inputs $(x,k,d)$, encoding instances of $\text{RAINDROPS}(1,n)$, where $f$ always takes value 0. Distribution $\mu_0$ is such that $(x,k)$ is uniform on $\{0,1\}^n \times \{2,\ldots,n\}$ and, given $x,k$, the bit $d \in \{0,1\}$ is uniform if $x[k] = 0$, and $d = 1$ if $x[k] = 1$. From now on, $(X,K,D)$ are random variables distributed according to $\mu_0$, and $(x,k,d)$ denote any of their values.

Then the proof of Theorem 3 consists in studying the information cost of any communication protocol for WeakIndex$(n,n)$, which is a lower bound on its communication complexity. Using that $\mu_0$ is collapsing for $f$, Lemma 9 establishes a direct sum on the information cost of WeakIndex$(n,m)$. Then, even if $f$ is constant on $\mu_0$, Lemma 12 lower bounds the information cost of a single instance of WeakIndex$(n,1)$.
3.2 Communication complexity lower bound

We first reduce the general problem WeakIndex\((n, m)\) with \(3m\) players to a single instance of WeakIndex\((n, 1)\) with 3 players. In order to do so we exploit the direct sum property of the information cost. The use of a collapsing distribution where \(f\) is always 0 is crucial.

**Lemma 9.** If there is a \(p\)-round randomized protocol \(P\) for WeakIndex\((n, m)\) with bounded error \(\varepsilon\) and messages of size at most \(s(m, n)\), then there is a \((p + 1)\)-round randomized protocol \(P'\) for WeakIndex\((n, 1)\) with bounded error \(\varepsilon\), and transcript \(P'\) satisfying \(|P'| \leq 3(p + 1)s(m, n)\) and max \(\{I(D : \Pi_B'|X, K), I(K, D : \Pi_C'|X)\} \leq \frac{p + 1}{m}s(m, n)\).

**Sketch of proof.** Given a protocol \(P\), we show how to construct another protocol \(P'\) for any instance \((x, k, d)\) of WeakIndex\((n, 1)\). In order to avoid any confusion, we denote by \(A\), \(B\) and \(C\) the three players of \(P\), and by \((A_i, B_i, C_i)\), the ones of \(P\).

Protocol \(P'\):

- Using public coins, all players generate uniformly at random \(j \in \{1, \ldots, m\}\), and \(x_j \in \{0, 1\}^n\) for \(i \neq j\).
- Players \(A\), \(B\) and \(C\) set respectively their inputs to the ones of \(A_j, B_j, C_j\).
- For all \(i > j\), Player \(B\) generates, using its private coins, uniformly at random \(k_i \in \{2, \ldots, n\}\), and then it generates uniformly at random \(d_i\) such that \(f(x_i, k_i, d_i) = 0\).
- For all \(i < j\), Player \(C\) generates, using its private coins, uniformly at random \(k_i \in \{2, \ldots, n\}\), and then it generates uniformly at random \(d_i\) such that \(f(x_i, k_i, d_i) = 0\).
- Players \(A\), \(B\) and \(C\) run \(P\) as follows. \(A\) simulates \(A_j\) only, \(B\) simulates \(B_j\) and \((A_i, B_i, C_i)_{i \neq j}\), and \(C\) simulates \(C_j\) and \((A_i, B_i, C_i)_{i < j}\).

Observe that \(A\) starts the protocol if \(j = 1\), and \(C\) starts otherwise. Moreover \(C\) stops the simulation after \(p\) rounds if \(j = 1\), and after \(p + 1\) rounds otherwise. For all \(i \neq j\), entries are generated such that \(f(x_i, k_i, a_i) = 0\), therefore \(f_m(X, k, d) = f(x_j, k_j, a_j) = f(x, k, a)\), and \(P'\) has the same bounded error than \(P\).

Then we show in Appendix A that \(P'\) satisfies the required conditions of the lemma. \(\square\)

We now prove a trade-off between the bounded error of a protocol for a single instance of WeakIndex\((n, 1)\) and its information cost. The proof involves some of the tools of \([10]\) but with some additional obstacles to apply them. The inherent difficulty is due to that we have 3 players whereas the cute-and-paste property applies to 2-player protocols. Therefore we have to group 2 players together.

Given some parameters \((x, k, a)\) for an input of WeakIndex\((n, 1)\), we denote by \(\Pi(x, k, a)\) the random variable describing the transcript \(\Pi\) of our protocol. We start by two lemmas exploiting the average encoding theorem (proofs in Appendix A).

**Lemma 10.** Let \(P\) be a randomized protocol for WeakIndex\((n, 1)\) with transcript \(\Pi\) satisfying \(|\Pi| \leq \alpha n\) and \(I(K, D : \Pi_C'|X) \leq \alpha\). Then

\[
E_{x[l, l-1], l} h^2(\Pi(x[1, l-1]0X[l + 1, n], l, 1), \Pi(x[1, l - 1]1X[l + 1, n], l, 1)) \leq 28\alpha,
\]

where \(l \in [\frac{n}{2} + 1, n]\) and \(x[1, l - 1]\) are uniformly distributed.
Lemma 11. Let $P$ be a randomized protocol for $\text{WeakIndex}(n, 1)$ with transcript $\Pi$ satisfying $I(D : \Pi_B | X, K) \leq \alpha$. Then

$$E_{x[l-1],l} h^2(\Pi(x[l-1]0X[l+1,n],l,0), \Pi(x[l-1]0X[l+1,n],l,1)) \leq 12\alpha,$$

where $l \in [\frac{n}{2} + 1, n]$ and $x[l-1]$ are uniformly distributed.

We now end with the main lemma which combines both previous ones and applies the cut-and-paste property, where Players $A, C$ are grouped.

Lemma 12. Let $P$ be a randomized protocol for $\text{WeakIndex}(n, 1)$ with bounded error $\epsilon$, and transcript $\Pi$ satisfying $|\Pi| \leq \alpha n$ and $\max \{ I(D : \Pi_B | X, K), I(K, D : \Pi_C | X) \} \leq \alpha$. Then $\alpha \geq (1 - 2\epsilon)/10$.

Proof. Let $L$ be a uniform integer random variable in $[\frac{n}{2} + 1, n]$. Remind that we enforce the output of $P$ to be part of $\Pi$. Therefore, any player, and in particular $B$, can compute $f$ with bounded error $\epsilon$ given $\Pi$. Since $f(x[l-1]0X[l+1,n],l,0) = 0$ and $f(x[l-1]1X[l+1,n],l,1) = 1$, the error parameter $\epsilon$ must satisfies

$$E_{x[l-1],l} \| \Pi(x[l-1]0X[l+1,n],l,0) - \Pi(x[l-1]1X[l+1,n],l,0) \|_1 \geq 2(1 - 2\epsilon).$$

The rest of the proof consists in upper bounding the LHS by $19\alpha$.

Applying the triangle inequality and that $(u+v)^2 \leq 2(u^2 + v^2)$ on the inequalities of Lemmas 10 and 11 gives

$$E_{x[l-1],l} h^2(\Pi(x[l-1]0X[l+1,n],l,0), \Pi(x[l-1]1X[l+1,n],l,1)) \leq 30\alpha.$$

We then apply the cut-and-paste property by considering $(A, C)$ as a single player with transcript $\Pi_{AC}$. Therefore

$$E_{x[l-1],l} h^2(\Pi(x[l-1]0X[l+1,n],l,0), \Pi(x[l-1]1X[l+1,n],l,0)) \leq 30\alpha.$$

Combining again with the inequality from Lemma 11 gives

$$E_{x[l-1],l} h^2(\Pi(x[l-1]0X[l+1,n],l,0), \Pi(x[l-1]1X[l+1,n],l,0)) \leq 42\alpha.$$

Last, we get the requested upper bound by using the connexion between the Hellinger distance and the $\ell_1$-distance, and the convexity of the square function.

4 Bidirectional streaming algorithm for PQ

Remember that in this section our stream is given without any timestamps. Therefore we consider in this section only streams $w$ of $\text{ins}(a), \text{ext}(a)$, where $a \in [0, U]$. For the sake of clarity, we assume for now that the stream has no duplicate. Our algorithms can be extended to the general case, but the technical difficulties shadow the main ideas.

Up to padding we can assume that $N$ is a power of 2: we append a sequence of $\text{ins}(a)\text{ext}(a)\text{ins}(a+1)\text{ext}(a+1)\ldots$ of suitable length, where $a$ is large enough so that there
is no duplicate (assuming that \( w \) is of even size, otherwise \( w \not\in \text{PQ}(U) \)). We use \( O(\log N) \) bits of memory to store, after the first pass, the number of letters padded.

We use a hash function based on the one used by the Karp-Rabin algorithm for pattern matching. For all this section, let \( p \) be a prime number in \( \{ \max(2U+1,N^{c+1}),\ldots,2\max(2U+1,N^{c+1}) \} \), for some fixed constant \( c \geq 1 \). Since our hash function is linear we only define it for single insertion/extraction as

\[
\text{hash(\text{ins}(a))} = \alpha^a \mod p, \quad \text{and} \quad \text{hash(\text{ext}(a))} = -\alpha^a \mod p,
\]

where \( \alpha \) is a randomly chosen integer in \([0,p-1]\). This is the unique source of randomness of our algorithm. A hashcode \( h \) encodes a sequence \( w \) if \( h = \text{hash}(w) \) as a formal polynomial in \( \alpha \). In that case we say that \( h \) includes \( w[i] \), for all \( i \). Moreover \( w \) is balanced if the same integers have been inserted and extracted. In that case it must be that \( h = 0 \). We also say that \( h \) is balanced it encodes a balanced sequence \( w \). The converse is also true with high probability by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma.

**Fact 13.** Let \( w \) be some unbalanced sequence. Then \( \Pr(\text{hash}(w) = 0) \leq \frac{N}{p} \leq \frac{1}{N^c} \).

The forward-pass algorithm was introduced in [7], but the reverse-pass one is even simpler. As a warming up, we start by introducing the later algorithm. In order to keep it simple to understand, we do not optimize it fully. Last define the instruction \texttt{Update}(h,v)\) that returns \((h + \text{hash}(v) \mod p)\) and updates \( h \) to that value.

### 4.1 One-reverse-pass algorithm for PQ

Our algorithm decomposes the stream \( w \) into blocks. We call a valley an extraction \( w[t] = \text{ext}(a) \) with \( w[t+1] = \text{ins}(b) \). A new block starts at every valley. To the \( i \)-th block we associate a hashcode \( h_i \) and an integer \( m_i \). Hashcode \( h_i \) encodes all the extractions within the block and the matching insertions. Integer \( m_i \) is the minimum of extractions in the block. With the values \((m_i)\), one can encode insertions in the correct \( h_i \) if \( w \in \text{PQ} \). Observe that we use index notations for block indices and bracket notations for stream positions.

Algorithm [1] uses memory space \( O(r) \), where \( r \) is the number of valleys in \( w \). We could make it run with memory space \( O(\sqrt{N \log N}) \) by reducing the number of valleys as in [7]. We do not need to as we use another compression in the two-pass algorithm.

We first state a crucial property of Algorithm [1] and then show that it satisfies Theorem 15 when there is no duplicate. We remind that we process the stream from right to left.

**Lemma 14.** Consider Algorithm [7] right after processing \( \text{ins}(a) \). Assume that \( \text{ext}(a) \) has been already processed. Let \( h_k, h_{k'} \) be the respective hashcodes including \( \text{ext}(a), \text{ins}(a) \). Then \( k = k' \) if and only if all \( \text{ext}(b) \) occurring between \( \text{ext}(a) \) and \( \text{ins}(a) \) satisfy \( b > a \).

**Theorem 15.** There is a 1-reverse-pass randomized streaming algorithm for \( \text{PQ}(U) \) with memory space \( O(r (\log N + \log U)) \) and one-sided bounded error \( N^{-c} \), for inputs of length \( N \) with \( r \) valleys, and any constant \( c > 0 \).

**Proof.** We show that Algorithm [1] suits the conditions, assuming there is no duplicate. Let \( w \in \text{PQ}(U) \). Then \( w \) always passes the test at line 10. Moreover, by Lemma 14 each insertion \( \text{ins}(a) \) is necessarily in the same hashcode than its matching extraction \( \text{ext}(a) \). Therefore, all hashcodes
Algorithm 1: One-reverse-pass algorithm for PQ

\begin{verbatim}
  m_0 ← −∞; h_0 ← 0; t ← N; i ← 0 // i is called the block index
  While t > 0
    If w[t] = ins(a)
      k ← max{j ≤ i : m_j ≤ a}; // Compute the hashcode index of a
      Update(h_k, w[t])
    Else w[t] = ext(a)
      If w[t + 1] = ins(b) // This is a valley. We start a new block
        i ← i + 1; m_i ← a; h_i ← 0 // Create a new hashcode
      Else w[t + 1] = ext(b)
        Check(a ≥ b) // Check that extractions are well-ordered
      Update(h_i, w[t])
    t ← t − 1
  For j = 0 to i: Check(h_j = 0) // Check that hashcodes are balanced w.h.p.
  Accept // w succeeded to all checks
\end{verbatim}

equal 0 at line 13 since they are balanced. In conclusion, the algorithm accepts w with probability 1.

Assume now that w ∉ PQ. First we show that unbalanced w are rejected with high probability, that is at least 1 − N^−c, at line 13 if they are not rejected before. Indeed, since each w[t] is encoded in some h_ı, at least one h_ı must be unbalanced. Then by Fact 13 the algorithm rejects w.h.p. We end the proof assuming w balanced. We remind that we process the stream from right to left. The two remaining possible errors are: (1) ins(a) is processed before ext(a), for some a; and (2) ext(a), ext(b), ins(a) are processed in this order with b < a and possibly intermediate insertions/extractions. In both cases, we show that some hashcodes are unbalanced at line 13 and therefore fail the test w.h.p by Fact 13 except if the algorithm rejects before.

Consider case (1). Since ins(a) is processed before ext(a), there is at least one valley between ins(a) and ext(a). Therefore ins(a) and ext(a) are encoded into two different hashcodes, that are unbalanced at line 13.

Consider now case (2). Lemma 14 gives that ext(a) and ins(a) are encoded in two different hashcodes, that are again unbalanced at line 13.

4.2 Bidirectional two-pass algorithm

Algorithm 2 performs one pass in each direction using Algorithm 3. We use the hierarchical data structure of [15] in order to reduce the number of blocks. A block of size 2^ı is of the form [(q − 1)2^ı + 1, q2^ı], for 1 ≤ q ≤ N/2^ı. Observe that, given two such blocks, either they are disjoint or one is included in the other. We decompose dynamically the letters of w, that have been already processed, into nested blocks of 2^ı letters as follows. Each new processed letter of w defines a new block. When two blocks have same size, they merge. All processed blocks are pushed on a stack. Therefore, only the two topmost blocks of the stack may potentially merge. Because the size of each block is a power of 2 and at most two blocks have the same size (before merging), there are at most log N + 1 blocks at any time.

Moreover, since our stream size is a power of 2, all blocks eventually appear in the hierarchical decomposition, whether we read the stream from left to right or from right to left. In fact, if two same-sized blocks appear simultaneously in one decomposition before merging, the same is true in
Algorithm 2: Bidirectional 2-pass algorithm for PQ

OnePassAlgorithm(w) reading stream from left to right
OnePassAlgorithm(w) reading stream from right to left
Accept // w succeeded to all checks

Algorithm 3: OnePassAlgorithm

S ← [];
If left-to-right-pass Then Push(S,(0,−∞,0)) // Initialization of S
While stream is not empty
Read(next letter v on stream) // See below
While the 2 topmost elements of S have same block size ℓ
(h₁,m₁,ℓ) ← Pop(S); (h₂,m₂,ℓ) ← Pop(S)
Push(S,(h₁+h₂ mod p,min(m₁,m₂),2ℓ)) // Merge of 2 blocks
If left-to-right-pass Then Check(S = [(0,−∞,0),(0,0,N)])
Else Check(S = [(0,0,N)])
Return

Function Read(v):
Case v = ins(a) // When reading an insertion
Let (h,m,ℓ) be the first item of S from top such that a ≥ m
Replace (h,m,ℓ) by (Update(h,v),m,ℓ)
Push(S,(0,+,∞,1))
Case v = ext(a) and left-to-right-pass // When reading an extraction
For all items (h,m,ℓ) on S such that m > a: Check(h = 0)
Let (h,m,ℓ) be the first item of S from top such that a > m
Replace (h,m,ℓ) by (Update(h,v),m,ℓ)
Push(S,(0,a,1))
Case v = ext(a) and right-to-left-pass // When reading an extraction
For all items (h,m,ℓ) on S such that m > a: Check(h = 0)
Push(S,(hash(v),a,1))

the other decomposition. This point is crucial for our analysis.

Algorithm 3 uses the following description of a block B: its hashcode \( h_B \), the minimum \( m_B \) of its extractions, and its size \( ℓ_B \). For the analysis, we also note \( t_B \) the index such that \( w[t_B] = m_B \). Among those parameters, only \( h_B \) can change without \( B \) being merged with another block. On the pass from right to left, all extractions from the block and the matching insertions are included in \( h_B \). On the pass from left to right, insertions are included in the hashcode of the earliest possible block where they could have been, and the extractions are included with their matching insertions. The minimums \( (m_B)_B \) are used to decide where to include values (except extractions on the pass from right to left). Observe that it is important to check that \( h_B = 0 \) whenever possible and not at the end of the execution of the algorithm, since only one block is left at the end.

When there is some ambiguity, we denote by \( h_B^→ \) and \( h_B^← \) the hashcodes for the left-to-right and right-to-left passes. Observe that \( m_B,t_B,ℓ_B \) are identical in both directions.

Proof of Theorem 4. We show that Algorithm 3 suits the conditions, assuming there is no duplicate. The space constraints are satisfied because each element of \( S \) takes space \( O(\log N + \log U) \) and \( S \) has size at most \( \log N + 1 \). The processing time is from inspection.
As with Theorem 15, inputs in \( \text{PQ}(U) \) are accepted with probability 1, and unbalanced inputs are rejected with high probability (at least \( 1 - N^{-c} \)). Let \( w \notin \text{PQ} \) be balanced. For ease of notations, let \( w[-1] = \text{ins}(\neg \infty) \) and \( w[0] = \text{ext}(\neg \infty) \). Then, there are \( \tau < \rho \) such that \( w[\tau] = \text{ext}(b) \), \( w[\rho] = \text{ext}(a) \), \( a > b \), and \( w[\tau] \neq \text{ins}(a) \) for all \( \tau < t < \rho \).

Among those pairs \((\tau, \rho)\), consider the ones with the smallest \( \rho \). From those, select the one with the smallest \( b \), with \( w[\tau] = \text{ext}(b) \). Let \( B, C \) be the largest possible disjoint blocks such that \( \tau \) is in \( B \) and \( \rho \) is in \( C \). Then \( B \) and \( C \) have same size, are contiguous, and appear simultaneously in each direction before they merge. Let \( \rho' \) and \( \rho'' \) be such that \( w[\rho'] = \text{ins}(a) \) and \( w[\rho''] = \text{ins}(b) \). The minimality of \( \rho \) and the minimality of \( b \) guarantee that \( w[t] \) is an insertion for all \( \tau < t < \rho \). Indeed if \( w[t] = \text{ext}(c) \) either \( b > c \), which contradicts the minimality of \( b \), or \( c > b \) and \((\tau, t)\) contradicts the minimality of \( \rho \). In particular, \( t_C \geq \rho \) and \( t_B \leq \tau \). Similarly \( \tau < \rho' \), otherwise \( \tau \) would be a better candidate than \( \rho \).

We distinguish three cases based on the position \( \rho' \) of \( \text{ins}(a) \) (see Figure 2): \( \rho' \notin [t_B, t_C] \), \( t_B < \rho' < \tau \), and \( \rho < \rho' < t_C \). These cases determine in which hashcode \( \text{ins}(a) \) is included. We analyze Algorithm 3 when some letter is processed before blocks potentially merge.

**Case 1**: \( \rho' \notin [t_B, t_C] \). One can prove that \( h_B^{-} \) is unbalanced when \( w[t_C] \) is processed and that \( h_C^{+} \) is unbalanced when \( w[t_B] \) is processed; therefore Algorithm 3 detects w.h.p. \( h_B^{-} \neq 0 \) or \( h_C^{+} \neq 0 \) depending on whether \( m_B > m_C \) (see Lemma 19 in Appendix B).

**Case 2**: \( t_B < \rho' < \tau \). We show that when Algorithm 3 processes \( w[t_B] = \text{ext}(m_B) \), it checks \( h_D^{-} = 0 \) at line 23 for some \( h_D^{-} \) including \( \text{ins}(a) \) but not \( \text{ext}(a) \). Thus it rejects w.h.p.

When \( w[\rho'] = \text{ins}(a) \) is processed on the right-to-left pass, \( \tau \in B_1 \) with \( B_1 \) a block in the stack. \( \tau \in B \), therefore \( B_1 \) intersects \( B \). Because \( B_1 \not\subseteq B \), we have \( B_1 \subseteq B \). Because \( w[\tau] = \text{ext}(b) \), we have \( a > b \geq m_B \), and block \( B_1 \) is eligible at line 14 of Algorithm 3 meaning that \( w[\rho'] = \text{ins}(a) \) is included in either \( h_B^{-} \) or a more recent hashcode \( h_B^{-'} \). Since \( \rho' \in B \), again \( B_2 \subseteq B \). Last, when Algorithm 3 processes \( w[t_B] = \text{ext}(m_B) \), since we are still within \( B \), some hashcode \( h_B^{-} \), with \( B_3 \subseteq B \), includes \( w[\rho'] \). Moreover, \( h_B^{-} \) does not include \( w[\rho'] = \text{ext}(a) \) since \( \rho \in C \) and \( C \) comes before \( B \). Last, \( m_B > m_B \), by definition of \( m_B \). Hence, Algorithm 3 checks \( h_B^{-} = 0 \) at line 23 when processing \( w[t_B] \). \( B_3 \) satisfies the conditions for \( D \) when \( w[t_B] \) is processed, and Algorithm 3 rejects w.h.p.

**Case 3**: \( \rho < \rho' < t_C \). The proof is the same as case 2, replacing \( \tau \), \( B, B_1, B_2, B_3, h_B^{-}, h_B^{-'}, h_B^{+}, h_B^{+'}, t_B, C \) with \( \rho, C, C_1, C_2, C_3, h_C^{-}, h_C^{+}, h_C^{+'}, t_C, B \) and line 23 with line 18. Note that we only have \( a > m_C \) this time, so it is important that the inequality at line 14 is large and not strict. 

### 4.3 Generalization when duplicates occur

We maintain two additional parameters \( \delta_B \) and \( C_B \) for each block \( B \). The difference between the number of insertions and extractions included in \( h_B \) is stored in \( \delta_B \). Whenever \( \delta_B = 0 \), we
check $h_B = 0$. The number of unmatched occurrences of \texttt{ins}(m_B) for the left-to-right pass (resp. \texttt{ext}(m_B) for the right-to-left pass) is stored in $C_B$. We can then appropriately determine whether each \texttt{ext}(m_B) (resp. \texttt{ins}(m_B)) should be included in $h_B$.

The change on the criterion of line 14 of Algorithm 3 makes the proof of case 3 of the theorem longer and breaks the symmetry.

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A Missing proofs for the lower bound

We start by proving the lemma relating the streaming complexity of deciding if an instance of $\text{Raindrops}(m, n)$ belongs to $\text{PQ-TS}(3mn)$ to the communication complexity of $\text{WeakIndex}(n, m)$.

**Proof of Lemma** Assume that there exists a $p$-pass randomized streaming algorithm with memory space $s(m, n)$, that decides if an instance of $\text{Raindrops}(m, n)$ belongs or not to $\text{PQ-TS}(3mn)$. Each instance of $\text{Raindrops}(m, n)$ can be encoded by an input of $\text{WeakIndex}(n, m)$, where each of the $3m$ players has one part of it. Then, the rest of the proof consists in showing how the players can use the algorithm in order to construct a protocol that satisfies the required properties of the lemma.

Each player simulates alternatively the algorithm. A player performs the simulation until the algorithm reaches the part of the input of the next player. Then the player sends the current state of the algorithm, so that the next player can continue the simulation. Since the algorithm uses at most memory space $s(m, n)$, the current state can be encoded using $s(m, n)$ bits. Each pass corresponds to one round of communication, implying the result.

Before giving the next missing proofs of Section 3 we state some useful properties of entropy and mutual information that we need. See [10] for more information.

**Fact 16.** Let $X, Y, Z, R$ be random variables such $X$ and $Z$ are independent when conditioning on $R$, namely when conditioning on $R = r$, for each possible values of $r$. Then $I(X : Y | Z, R) \geq I(X : Y | R)$. 

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Proof. From the definition of mutual information and the independence of $X, Z$ when conditioning on $R$, we get that
\[
I(X : Y | Z, R) = H(X | Z, R) - H(X | Y, Z, R) = H(X | R) - H(X | Y, Z, R).
\]
Using that entropy can only decrease under conditioning, and using again the definition of mutual information, we conclude by bounding the last term as
\[
H(X | R) - H(X | Y, Z, R) \geq H(X | R) - H(X | Y, R) = I(X : Y | R).
\]
\[\square\]

Proposition 17 (Chain rule). Let $X, Y, Z, R$ be random variables. Then $I(X, Y : Z | R) = I(X : Z | R) + I(Y : Z | X, R)$.

Proposition 18 (Data processing inequality). Let $X, Y, Z, R$ be random variables such that $R$ is independent from $X, Y, Z$. Then $I(X : Y | Z) \geq I(f(X, R) : Y | Z)$, for every function $f$.

Note that the previous property is usually stated with no variable $T$. Nonetheless, since $T$ is independent from the other variables, we have $I(X : Y | Z) = I(X, R : Y | Z)$, and then we can apply the usual data processing inequality.

We can now prove our three lemmas.

End of proof of Lemma 4. Let $\Pi, \Pi'$ be the respective transcripts of $P, P'$. For convenience, note $\Pi_{C_{m+1}} = \Pi_B$, $\Pi_{B_0} = \Pi_C$, and $\Pi_{C_{m+1}} = \Pi_A$. Remind that the public coins of a protocol are included in its transcript.

First, each player of $P'$ sends 3 messages by round, and there are $(p + 1)$ rounds. Since each message has size at most $s(m, n)$, we derive that the length of $\Pi'$ is at most $3(p + 1)s(m, n)$.

Then, in order to prove that there is only a small amount of information in the transcripts of Bob and Charlie, we show a direct sum of some appropriated notion of information cost. Consider first the transcript of Player $C_1$. Because of the restriction on the size of his messages, we know that $|\Pi_{C_1}| \leq (p + 1)s(m, n)$. From this we derive a first inequality on the amount of information this transcript can carry, using that the entropy of a variable is at most its bit-size:
\[
I(K, D : \Pi_{C_1} | X) \leq |\Pi_{C_1}| \leq (p + 1)s(m, n).
\]
We now use the chain rule in order to get a bound about the information carried by $P'$ on a single instance.
\[
I(K, D : \Pi_{C_1} | X) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} I((K_i, D_i)_{j \geq i} : \Pi_{C_1} | X, (K_i, D_i)_{i < j}) \quad \text{(by chain rule)}
\]
\[
\geq \sum_{j=1}^{m} I(K_j, D_j : \Pi_{B_{j-1}} | X, (K_i, D_i)_{i < j}) \quad \text{(by data processing inequality)}
\]
\[
\geq \sum_{j=1}^{m} I(K_j, D_j : \Pi_{B_{j-1}} | X) \quad \text{(by Fact 16)}
\]
\[
= m \times I(K_j, D_j : \Pi_{B_{j-1}} | X, J) \quad \text{(by conditioning on $J$)}
\]
\[
= m \times I(K_j, D_j : \Pi_{B_{j-1}}, J, (X_i)_{i \neq j} | X_j) \quad \text{(independence of $J, (X_i)_{i \neq j}$)}
\]
\[
= m \times I(K, D : \Pi'_{C} | X) \quad \text{(since $J, (X_i)_{i \neq j}$ are public coins of $P'$)}.
\]
We then do similarly for Player $B_m$ and therefore conclude the proof. First the size bound on messages of $B_m$ gives $I(\Pi_{B_m} : D | X, K) \leq (p + 1)s(m, n)$. Then as before we get:

$$I(D : \Pi_{B_m} | X, K) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} I(D_j : \Pi_{B_m} | X, K, (D_i)_{i>j}) \geq \sum_{j=1}^{m} I(D_j : \Pi_{C_{j+1}} | X, K, (D_i)_{i>j}) \geq m \times I(D : \Pi_{B}' | X, K).$$

Proof of Lemma \[\Box\] From the second hypothesis and the data processing inequality we get that $I(K, D : \Pi_{A,C} | X) \leq \alpha$, which after applying the average encoding leads to $E_{x,k,d} h^2(\Pi_{A,C}(\pi, x, k, d), \Pi_{A,C}(x, K, D)) \leq \kappa \alpha$. We now restrict $\mu_0$ by conditioning on $D = 1$. Then $(X, K)$ is uniformly distributed. Moreover, since $D = 1$ with probability $3/4$ on $\mu_0$, we get $E_{x,k} h^2(\Pi_{A,C}(x, k, 1), \Pi_{A,C}(x, K, D)) \leq \frac{4}{3} \kappa \alpha$ and $E_{x,l} h^2(\Pi_{A,C}(x, l, 1), \Pi_{A,C}(x, K, 1)) \leq \frac{2}{3} \kappa \alpha$. Applying the triangle inequality and that $(u + v) \leq 2(u^2 + v^2)$, we get

$$\mathbb{E}_{x,j,l} h^2(\Pi_{A,C}(x, j, 1), \Pi_{A,C}(x, l, 1)) \leq \frac{32}{3} \kappa \alpha.$$

Using the convexity of $h^2$, we finally obtain for $b = 0, 1$:

$$\mathbb{E}_{x[1, l-1], j, l} h^2(\Pi_{A,C}(x[1, l-1]bX[l+1, n], j, 1), \Pi_{A,C}(x[1, l-1]bX[l+1, n], l, 1)) \leq \frac{64}{3} \kappa \alpha.$$

Now the chain rule allow us to measure the information about a single bit in $\Pi_{A,C}$ as

$$I(X[l] : \Pi_{A,C}(X, J, 1) | X[1, L-1]) = \mathbb{E}_{l \leftarrow L} I(X[l] : \Pi_{A,C}(X, J, 1) | X[1, l-1]) = \frac{2}{n} \times I(X[\frac{n}{2}+1, n] : \Pi_{A,C}(X, J, 1) | X[1, \frac{n}{2}]).$$

Since the entropy of a variable is at most its bit-size, we get that the last term is upper bounded by $|\Pi_{A,C}||$, which is at most $\alpha n$ by the first hypothesis. Then as before, the average encoding and the triangle inequality lead to

$$\mathbb{E}_{x[1, l-1], j, l} h^2(\Pi_{A,C}(x[1, l-1]0X[l+1, n], j, 1), \Pi_{A,C}(x[1, l-1]1X[l+1, n], j, 1)) \leq 16 \kappa \alpha.$$

Combining gives

$$\mathbb{E}_{x[1, l-1], l} h^2(\Pi_{A,C}(x[1, l-1]0X[l+1, n], l, 1), \Pi_{A,C}(x[1, l-1]1X[l+1, n], l, 1)) \leq 28 \alpha.$$

Let $R_B$ be the random coins of $B$. Since they are independent from all variables, including the messages, the previous inequality is still true when we concatenate $R_B$ to $\Pi_{A,C}$. Then $\Pi_B$ is uniquely determined from $R_B$ once $K, D, X[1, K-1]$ are fixed, which is the case in that inequality. Therefore replacing $R_B$ by $\Pi_B$ can only decrease the distance, concluding the proof. \[\Box\]
Proof of Lemma 19. Using the data processing inequality and the hypothesis we get that $I(D : \Pi(X, K)) \leq \alpha$. Therefore by average encoding, $\mathbb{E}_{x,k,d} h^2(\Pi(x, k, d), \Pi(x, k, D)) \leq \kappa \alpha$.

Let $L$ be a uniform integer random variable in $[\frac{\alpha}{2} + 1, n]$. Then $\mathbb{E}_{x,l,d} h^2(\Pi(x, l, d), \Pi(x, l, D)) \leq 2\kappa \alpha$. Using the convexity of $h^2$ and the fact that $X[l]$ is a uniform random bit, we derive

$$\mathbb{E}_{x[l-1,l,d]} h^2(\Pi(x[l-1|0X[l+1,n], l, d), \Pi(x[l-1|0X[l+1,n], l, D))) \leq 4\kappa \alpha.$$ 

Since $D = 0$ with probability $1/2$ when $X[l] = 0$ and $K = l$, we finally get the two inequalities

$$\mathbb{E}_{x[l-1,l]} h^2(\Pi(x[l-1|0X[l+1,n], l, 0), \Pi(x[l-1|0X[l+1,n], l, D))) \leq 8\kappa \alpha,$$

leading to the conclusion using the triangle inequality and that $(u + v)^2 \leq 2(u^2 + v^2)$. 

B Missing proofs for the algorithm

We start by proving the property of Algorithm 1 we use in the proof of Theorem 15.

Proof of Lemma 14. Remind again, that we process the stream from right to left in this proof, and that $h_k, h_{k'}$ are the respective hashcodes including $\text{ext}(a), \text{ins}(a)$. First assume that all $\text{ext}(b)$ between $\text{ext}(a)$ and $\text{ins}(a)$ satisfy $b > a$. Let $i$ be the current block index while processing $\text{ins}(a)$. Observe that $k$ is the current block index right after processing $\text{ext}(a)$. Since $\text{ext}(a)$ is processed before $\text{ins}(a)$ and since there is a valley between $\text{ext}(a)$ and $\text{ins}(a)$, we have $k < i$.

We prove that $k' = \text{max}\{j \leq i| m_j \leq a\} = k$. The first equality is from line 4 of Algorithm 1. We now prove the second equality. For each $j \in \{k+1, \ldots, i\}$, value $m_j$ is extracted between $\text{ext}(a)$ and $\text{ins}(a)$. Then, our assumption leads to $m_j > a$. Moreover, because the algorithm checks at line 10 that extraction sequences included in the same hashcode are decreasing, we have $m_k \leq a$, leading to the second equality.

We now prove the converse by contrapositive. Assume that some $\text{ext}(b)$ between $\text{ext}(a)$ and $\text{ins}(a)$ satisfies $b \leq a$. Since we forbid duplicates, in fact $b < a$. Let $j$ be the current block index right after processing $\text{ext}(b)$. Then line 10 ensures that $m_j \leq b$. Again, $k$ is the current block index right after processing $\text{ext}(a)$, and therefore $k \leq j$. If $k = j$, then the extraction sequence is not decreasing and line 10 rejects, contradicting the hypotheses that the algorithm has not rejected yet after processing $\text{ins}(a)$. Therefore $k < j$. But, line 4 and the fact that $m_j \leq b$ imply that $k' \geq j$, and therefore $k < k'$.

We now give the missing part of the proof of Theorem 4.

Lemma 19. If $\rho' \not\in [t_B, t_C]$, then Algorithm 2 rejects $w$ with probability at least $1 - N^{-c}$.

Proof. We prove that $h_B$ is unbalanced when $w[t_C]$ is processed and that $h_C$ is unbalanced when $w[t_B]$ is processed. From that, we deduce that the algorithm rejects with high probability unless $m_B \leq m_C$ and $m_C \leq m_B$, i.e. $m_B = m_C$, which is impossible because $w$ has no duplicates and $B$ and $C$ are disjoint.
Indeed if $m_C < m_B$ then Algorithm 3 checks that $h_B^C = 0$ at line 18 when processing $w[t_C]$, and rejects with high probability because $h_B^C$ is unbalanced. Similarly, if $m_C < m_B$, it rejects with high probability at line 23 when processing $w[t_B]$ on the right-to-left pass.

Now we only have to prove that $h_B^C$ (resp. $h_C^B$) is unbalanced when $w[t_C]$ (resp. $w[t_B]$) is processed. Let us assume there exists $B_1 \subseteq B$ such that $\text{ins}(a)$ is included in $h_B^{B_1}$ when $w[t_B]$ is processed. Then, by definition of $m_B$, $m_{B_1} > m_B$. Moreover, $\rho \in C$, so $w[\rho] = \text{ext}(a)$ is not processed yet and not included in $B_1$. Therefore, Algorithm 3 checks $h_{B_1}^C = 0$ at line 18 and rejects w.h.p. We can now assume that there is no such $B_1 \subseteq B$, and therefore that $h_B^C$ does not include $\text{ins}(a)$ when $w[t_C]$ is processed. Since $h_B^C$ includes $\text{ext}(a)$, $h_B^C$ is unbalanced when $t_C$ is processed.

The proof for $h_C^B$ is the same as above, replacing $h_B^C$, $h_{B_1}^C$, $B$, $t_B$ and $t_C$ with $h_C^B$, $h_{C_1}^B$, $C$, $C_1$, $t_C$ and $t_B$, and line 18 with line 23. \qed