The Arrest and Trial of Paul Rusesabagina and its Impact on Rwandan Foreign Affairs

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The Arrest and Trial of Paul Rusesabagina and its Impact on Rwandan Foreign Affairs

Abstract
The 2020 arrest and subsequent trial of Paul Rusesabagina fostered controversy about Rwanda’s human rights record and the political dominance of President Paul Kagame against oppositional voices. Despite human rights organizations and even the European Union condemning the arrest and questioning the ability for him to receive a fair trial, Rwandans remain resolute in their desire to seek justice against Rusesabagina. He is best known as the African version of Oscar Schindler because of the 2004 movie, Hotel Rwanda. However, the historical narrative of Rusesabagina’s heroism is questioned within Rwanda. Additionally, he is accused of forming ties to numerous terrorist groups which committed deadly attacks in Rwanda. This article examines Rusesabagina’s role during and after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi and the impact of his arrest and trial on Rwanda’s foreign relations.

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Introduction

On August 27, 2020, Rwandan officials arrested Paul Rusesabagina, the hero from the movie *Hotel Rwanda*. His arrest came after boarding a flight in Dubai believing it would arrive in Burundi for him to meet with religious leaders. Rusesabagina arrest came moments after the private flight arrived in Kigali, Rwanda, for his alleged support for the National Liberation Front (FLN), Rwanda Movement for Democratic Change (MRCD) and Party of Democracy in Rwanda – Ihumure (PDR-Ihumure). Later, he faced thirteen accounts of financing and coordinating with the PDR-Ihumure and the MRCD in several terrorist attacks over the past few years.\(^1\) Within Rwanda, the response to the arrest was relatively joyous as many perceive Rusesabagina as an opportunist during the genocide and a dangerous antagonist since, who has used his fame to support ethnic divisionism and terrorism.\(^2\) The reaction was much different outside of Rwanda. International human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and global government institutions such as the European Union condemned the arrest.\(^3\) Critical journalists and academics used the arrest to repeat existing narratives criticizing Rwanda’s post-genocide development. The international responses angered many Rwandans, especially the victims of Rusesabagina’s suspected ties to terrorist attacks. His involvement, whether planning, financing, or using his public platform for support led many Rwandans to approve of his capture. Rwandans on social media attacked anyone criticizing the arrest and subsequent trial.

The international community has had a rather limited response to the arrest, trial, and conviction of Rusesabagina. The European Union passed a resolution condemning the arrest titled: European Parliament resolution of February 11, 2021 on Rwanda, the case of Paul Rusesabagina (2021/2543(RSP)). Nevertheless, it appears to be a rather limited response by the international community.\(^4\) The U.S. Department of State issued\(^5\) a vague statement of the situation, “engaged the government of Rwanda at the highest levels.”\(^6\) Belgium, which Paul Rusesabagina holds dual citizenship with, has also not publicly condemned the arrest and instead responded similarly to the U.S. Department of State releasing a statement mentioning how it is ‘observing’ the proceedings and providing any requested support.”\(^7\) The United Kingdom, one of Rwanda’s most important foreign allies, has remained relatively quiet on the issue beyond the Member of Parliament Andrew Mitchell publicly supporting Rwanda’s right to
arrest Rusesabagina under the nation’s anti-terrorism laws. On September 20, 2021, Rusesabagina was convicted on terrorism charges with the possibility of spending twenty-five years in prison. This research examines why the most prevalent condemnation of Rusesabagina’s arrest and trial stem from foreign human rights critics rather than state governments. The article provides a review of not only Rusesabagina’s role during the genocide and fame from the film, Hotel Rwanda but how Rwandans perceive him. Additionally, it attempts to understand how the arrest of Rusesabagina does not seriously impact Rwanda’s foreign relations with the international community or its standing within the international community. It applies a Constructivists and Neorealist theoretical framework of the current Rusesabagina situation within Rwanda’s foreign relations.

The research begins by examining Rusesabagina’s constructed identity as the ‘hero of Hotel Rwanda,’ the Hôtel des Mille Collines. Relying on testimonies from survivors of the Hotel and a former neighbor, the section depicts Rusesabagina more of an opportunist. The research shifts to examine Rusesabagina’s actions since departing Rwanda shortly after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, and how he has received praise for his actions during the genocide and used it as a platform to criticize Rwanda’s post-genocide development. The following section examines his arrest and trial within the framework of his arrest, accusations, and Rwandan perceptions. After constructing the history and current situation of Rusesabagina, the article turns to examine how it impacts Rwanda’s foreign relations. It argues that the arrest and trial of Rusesabagina influenced decision making within Rwandan foreign policy based on Rwanda’s own perception of the intersubjective beliefs of abandonment, agaciro, a Kinyarwanda term that best can be described as the promotion of self-reliance, and Rwandan human security. Additionally, it examines how the international community might restrain its response to Rwanda’s capture and trial of Rusesabagina.

This research relies on qualitative research conducted during multiple fieldwork periods between 2008 to 2018. The research uses existing networks within the Rwandan government and other civil society organizations used while conducting research on Rwandan foreign policy. Additional observations that influenced this research stems from interviews with survivors of the Hôtel des Mille Collines. A total of one hundred informants were involved. However, twenty interviewed participants comprising of actors working either as policy makers, civil...
society or in the private sector. Questions focused on their individual, societal and government perceptions of Rusesabagina and Rwandan foreign relations. Eighty other Rwandan informants were either interviewed or held conversations with the author. Within this group are sixty survivors of the Hôtel des Mille Collines during the genocide. The remaining twenty were genocide survivors and one former Interahamwe perpetrator stationed by the hotel during the genocide. Conversations and interviews typically lasted an hour and occurred within the Rwandan cities of Kigali and Gisenyi. While not all the discussions were based on a typical interview structure, the data collected came from consenting conversations and discussions on this topic. Using Interpretivism, found within Constructivism, assisted in better understand the social meanings found within the collected data. In addition, triangulation methods verified if informants’ comments followed similar statements from other interviews.

Rusesabagina During the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi

The 2004 Hollywood film, Hotel Rwanda, starring Don Cheadle as the resourceful Rusesabagina who through his cunning, negotiating skills and undisputed humanitarian beliefs helped save 1,268 Rwandans who fled to the hotel. The film’s depiction of Rusesabagina was akin to Oscar Schindler, who saved an estimated 1,200 Jews from the Nazis during the Holocaust. It elevated his acts during the genocide despite seemingly overlooking what had occurred within the hotel. It has also led to great resentment by the hotel survivors and genocide survivors. Those who sought refuge at the Hôtel des Mille Collines have spoken out against Rusesabagina as the reason for their survival. Several researchers such as Melvern, Beloff, Ndahiro and Rutazibwa as well as Kayihura and Zukus have interviewed Hotel survivors and uncovered a rather different description of events from both within the movie and Rusesabagina’s quasi-autobiography, An Ordinary Man. This section is not attempting to provide a detailed illustration of what occurred at the hotel, but instead to provide opposing context to Rusesabagina’s story during and shortly after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi to illustrate why, within Rwanda, he is not perceived as a hero. This perspective provides insights on why the Rwandan government would be willing to arrest, prosecute and convict Rusesabagina despite possible international backlash.

Prior to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, Paul Rusesabagina worked at the Hotel Diplomates, another hotel just a short distance away from
the Hôtel des Mille Collines within Rwanda’s capital city of Kigali. While he had previous experience working at the hotel, he was not employed by them just prior to the genocide. After the assassination of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana on the night of April 6, 1994, the hotel’s identity dramatically shifted from being a luxurious hotel to a refugee camp. After the genocide’s initial days passed, the international community supplied a large military task force to remove all expatriates after which it would abandon the country to its fate of genocide. This included the Belgium hotel manager Bik Cornelis, whose absence allowed Rusesabagina to take power of the hotel despite Cornelis leaving responsibility to another man, Pasa Mwenenganucye. Nevertheless, through his cunning and calls with the Sabena owners of the Hôtel des Mille Collines, Rusesabagina took over the hotel’s leadership. While ignored by Rusesabagina, he instructed the hotel to become a refugee center without cost to those seeking refuge.

Life within the hotel's compound was difficult with the constant threat of removal if one could no longer pay Rusesabagina. One survivor described, “If you could pay, you would stay in a room. If you couldn’t pay for a room, you could pay to stay in a hallway. If you couldn’t pay that, you could pay to stay by the pool. If you couldn’t pay that, he [Rusesabagina] would demand you to leave.” Even hotel staff were not spared with one maintenance worker describing the conditions placed upon him and his family.

He described:

During the second or third day of the genocide, I was able to escape [the hotel] to find my family to bring them back in. Once I returned with my family, Rusesabagina asked me for money [for their stay at the hotel]. I told him that I work at the hotel, and these were my family. He didn’t care. He told me that I would have to pay for his family to stay and pay him even for myself when I wasn’t working.

For those who did not have the resources to pay, they would face threats of eviction from the hotel. One survivor, who was a child during the genocide, described how while residing by the pool waiting for his parents, he encountered Rusesabagina who demanded to know if he had paid to stay there. Standing next to Rusesabagina was a Hutu genocide leader who insisted to Rusesabagina to leave the boy alone as he would “be killed at another time.” These stories provide a rather
contradictory historical narrative than often portrayed in the Global North, a term used to describe the developed or First World nations, about Rusesabagina.

Within a roughly one-hundred-day period between April 6 to July 19, Rwanda witnessed the deaths of up to one million Tutsi and moderate Hutus. Within Kigali, the Hôtel des Mille Collines was one of the few refugee areas. While many credit Rusesabagina for creating an oasis during the conflict, it is not the reason for why the hotel survived. The Interahamwe, the primary Hutu death squads responsible for the genocidal killings, mostly stayed outside the walls of the Hôtel des Mille Collines allowing people to flee to the hotel but not allowing any out or the faced death. One former Interahamwe stationed perhaps twenty meters from the hotel’s entrance received instructions to, “we [Interahamwe] were told to just stay put by the hotel [Hôtel des Mille Collines] and to allow the Tutsis and others to have access. We would scare those trying to flee to the hotel, but barely ever killed them.”

When asked why he was instructed to allow people into the Hôtel des Mille Collines he responded, “we were told by a regional commander that the hotel was being used for prisoner exchanges and it would be the final spot for us to cleanse [murdering the Tutsis] once we beat the [Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)].” The hotel quickly became a negotiating mechanism for the Hutu genocide government during its limited engagement with the RPF for prisoners exchanges. Some survivors commented their surprise to reach the hotel but also how the United Nation’s soldiers protected it. Not depicted in Hotel Rwanda are the seven to ten United Nation’s Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) soldiers that were constantly positioned in front of the hotel. The former commander of UNAMIR, Roméo Dallaire writes of how he placed a handful of soldiers in front of the hotel’s only entrance as a symbolic indication how the hotel was under the protection of UNAMIR. Additionally, he has spoken out against Hotel Rwanda as historical revisionism.

After the genocidal killings ended in Kigali on July 4, Rusesabagina returned to the Hotel Diplomates until he departed Rwanda in 1996. Rusesabagina’s describes leaving Rwanda as a result from an employment change within Sabena, which also was operating the Hotel Diplomates at the time, along with allegations that the RPF threatened his own life. However, after the genocide and the creation of the new RPF post-genocide government, many Rwandans perceived Rusesabagina’s acquired wealth accumulated during the genocide as
ethically problematic and dismissed his post-genocide status. One former neighbor of Rusesabagina commented during a discussion:

Rusesabagina was angry and often complained how he expected a government job after the genocide. After all, he led the hotel [Hôtel des Mille Collines] during the genocide and acquired wealth from it. But no, the RPF didn’t care about what he did during the genocide. They only cared about burying the bodies and rebuilding the country through their [political] beliefs. Rusesabagina was a no one and that bothered him.30

By 2004, the film, Hotel Rwanda, depicted Rusesabagina’s life during the genocide. He became one of the most recognized Rwandans while providing speaking tours to university campuses and establishing in 2006 the Hotel Rwanda Rusesabagina Foundation. While the reasons for Rusesabagina’s emigration from Rwanda are debated, there is a belief in Rwanda that Rusesabagina was not the hero depicted by Don Cheadle in the movie. The historical inaccuracies not only irritate survivors of the Hôtel des Mille Collines but reinforce a negative perception of Rusesabagina even prior to his later involvement in the MRCD and the PDR-Ihumure. Since the release of the film, Rusesabagina became more of a concern for the Rwandan government and genocide survivors with his outspoken political criticisms, denial of the genocide and support for terrorist rebel groups.

Support for Rebel Groups and Eventual Arrest

On August 31, 2020, the Rwanda Investigation Bureau (RIB) announced the arrest of Paul Rusesabagina for his involvement with the MRCD and the PDR-Ihumure, which committed terrorist attacks at Nyabimata in June and at Nyungwein December 2018. The arrest came after Rwandan officials previously issued an international arrest warrant.31 Prior to his arrest, Rusesabagina lived a relatively comfortable life as a speaker since the movie. In 2006, he alongside Tom Zoellner wrote and published, An Ordinary Man: An Autobiography which provided a more personal understanding of Rusesabagina as well as contradicting elements within Hotel Rwanda.32 He received multiple awards such as the Immortal Chaplains Prize for Humanity, Tom Lantos Human Rights Prize from the Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice, Freedom Award from the National Civil Rights Museum and in 2005, received the Presidential Medal of Freedom from former U.S. President George W. Bush.33 While
his reputation increased in the Global North, his focus began to shift away from discussing the genocidal events at the Hôtel des Mille Collines to political issues within Rwanda. Increasingly, he became critical of President Paul Kagame and the current Rwandan government. Additionally, he began to even disagree with historical narratives of the genocide. Akin to Rever, he argued the RPF was responsible for the death of former President Habyarimana and infiltrated the Interahamwe death squads. Melvern describes this claim of the RPF as perpetrators during the Genocide against the Tutsi as promoting a false historical narrative to deny the seriousness of the genocide.

Rusesabagina held a lecture on February 16, 2007, at Kean University. Entering the hall with two large security guards, Rusesabagina spoke little about the events at the Hôtel des Mille Collines and instead of his hatred for President Paul Kagame. His speech focused on denying that the genocide ever took place against the nation’s Tutsi population to an audience largely ignorant of Rwanda's genocide. Rather, his focus was on the RPF revenge killings during the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994). His attacks were not only against President Kagame but of Rwanda’s post-genocide development stating the suppression of ethnic divisions was part of a conspiracy by the region’s Tutsis population. The attacks against Rwanda’s post-genocide development during the lecture was not unique as it had become a staple of his university speeches.

Rusesabagina’s political beliefs did not just remain in the confines of speeches, as he formulated the political parties, the MRCD, FLN alongside the PDR-Ihumure. These political and rebel organizations called for the removal by any means of the RPF and supported a return to ethnic divisions of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. The Rwandan government replaced these identities with instead a uniform ‘Rwandan’ ethnic identity. Videos surfaces of Rusesabagina, described as the President of MRCD-FLN, speaking of the necessity of armed conflict against the Rwandan government. This announcement was enough for the Rwandan government to accuse Rusesabagina of supporting for terrorism. As mentioned earlier, in 2018, fighters associated with the PDR-Ihumure committed terrorist’s attacks killing at least nine. Rusesabagina has denied directing the attacks. However after his arrest, Rusesabagina did take responsibility for founding the PDR-Ihumure and admitted it had invaded with a small military rebel force parts of Nyungwe forest in southwestern Rwanda.
militant groups were not only with the PDR-Ihumure as German intelligence officials previously uncovered messages between Rusesabagina and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a rebel group composing the remnants of genocide fights and ideology, former leader Ignace Murwanashyaka. He has denied providing financial support to the FDLR. These accusations alongside Rusesabagina’s public speaking impacted Rwandan perceptions of Rusesabagina by confirming what many had previously believed of him being an opportunist. The major difference between 1994 and now was Rusesabagina desire for political power.

**Rusesabagina’s Arrest**

On August 27, 2020, Rusesabagina flew on a GainJet charter flight to what he had believed would arrive in Burundi based on an invitation by Pastor Constantin Niyomwungere to speak at a church; however, his flight would be directed to Rwanda. It would later be uncovered by Minister of Justice Johnston Busingye that the Rwandan government had paid for Rusesabagina’s flight. Human Rights Watch accused the Rwandan government of intentionally misleading Rusesabagina and torturing him during the flight to Kigali. On August 31, Rusesabagina’s arrest became public with the accusation of supporting anti-Rwandan groups such as the FLN, MRCD and the PDR-Ihumure. In addition, are charges of terrorism, arson, kidnapping, and murder in the 2018 PDR-Ihumure attacks. Since his arrest, he faced trial within a Kigali Rwandan court on thirteen charges, found guilty with the resulting punishment of twenty-five years in jail.

Amnesty International did not believe that Rusesabagina will face a fair trial in what they categorize as an inherently biased judicial system. Rusesabagina claims that his arrest violated the rights of his Belgium citizenship. However, Rwandan Prosecutors dismissed his citizenship argument stating that he still held Rwandan citizenship and how Belgium officials were made aware of Rwanda’s intent to arrest Rusesabagina. Former Vice-President of the MRCD-FLN, Callixte Nsabimana, has challenged Rusesabagina innocence of the charges by claiming his direct involvement with the political organization and PDR-Ihumure military attacks. With the issue of citizenship, Nsabimana argued, “how can he claim not to be Rwandan yet when we launched the rebel group his aim was to be Rwandan president? Would he be president of a country to which he was not a citizen?” Human Rights Watch argues that Rusesabagina’s arrest was a violation of
international law. Doris Umqicyeza Picard, a Rwandan legal researcher, argued that while there could be arguments made, Rusesabagina’s human rights were not violated during his arrest. Picard’s opinion piece in the New Times Rwanda, a pro-government English news media site, has gained traction with Rwandans who often will cite to it to defend the arrest of Rusesabagina.

Since his arrest, critics of Rwanda’s government have come out to defend Rusesabagina. Carine Kanimba, the adopted daughter of Rusesabagina, has become one of the most visible champions against the arrest. Through social media campaigns and on news media, Kanimba attests to her stepfather’s innocence and condemns the Rwandan government and President Kagame for his arrest. She has gained support from critics such as Timothy Longman and Anjan Sundaram who argue that Rusesabagina’s arrest falls within typical characteristics of human rights violating behaviors by the Rwandan government. Phil Clark and Michael Rubin differ by arguing how a Rwandan court should handle the accusations against Rusesabagina. While opinion articles illustrate Global North condemnation of the arrest, opinions within Rwanda differs.

Shortly after his arrest, Rwandans flooded social media applauding RIB for capturing Rusesabagina. For years, many Rwandans expressed their desire for accountability on Rusesabagina’s association with antagonistic and terrorist organizations. One commented in 2018, “He lied during the genocide and lies to Westerns at universities when he says Rwandans like him. We don’t.” The New Times Rwanda, published opinion pieces from the family of victims and survivors of 2018 PDR-Ihumure attacks praising the arrest of Rusesabagina. The response by Rusesabagina’s supporters within the Global North have helped support narratives of Westerns lecturing to African societies on how to conduct domestic policy. Fundamentally, the case of Rusesabagina is more complex than described in many European and U.S. news media reports. Terry George, the director of Hotel Rwanda, accurately describes how many Rwandans, including President Kagame were supportive of the film in its debut. However, he misunderstands the complex nuance reaction to the film in Rwanda. As one high ranking Rwandan official, who was at the Rwandan premier of the film in 2005 said, Hotel Rwanda is a blessing and a curse. Before it came out, so few people knew of Rwanda or the genocide that happened here.
There were a few news articles and books about it, but that was it. People [outside Africa] did not know or even care about the genocide. But the film brought attention to us. People saw a dramatic movie of what happened and that brought their attention. Rusesabagina’s role was exaggerated and even ignored what really happened at the hotel [Hôtel des Mille Collines]. But it brought attention to Rwanda.\(^6^4\)

The quote provides insight into the perceptions Rwandans hold towards Rusesabagina both in terms of what he did during the genocide and after. Many, such as Kayihura whose book criticizes Rusesabagina and the film, acknowledge his role in bringing global attention to Rwanda through the film, but that acknowledgment does not dismiss his criticisms of the government and support of rebel organizations that call for a military uprising against the current government. \(^6^5\)

The goodwill towards Rusesabagina had long faded before the attacks in 2018. The current court case, which has pinned responsibility on Rusesabagina through testimony by Nsabimana and close colleague Professor Michelle Martin from California State University, only deteriorates Rusesabagina’s standing in Rwanda despite him bringing attention to the nation.\(^6^6\) On the September 20, 2021, the court found Rusesabagina guilty and sentenced him for up to twenty-five years in jail.\(^6^7\) The international reactions to Rusesabagina’s arrest could impact how the Rwandan government conducts its foreign policy.

**Rwandan Foreign Affairs and the Impact of Rusesabagina’s Arrest and Trial**

Despite condemnation from human rights activists and organizations, a question arises of how the arrest and trial of Rusesabagina will impact Rwandan foreign relations. As mentioned, many international actors have either condemned or expressed concern about the arrest. Clark commented within the context of the situation how, “Rwanda keeps a lot of western diplomats up at night just because of how complex the country is.”\(^6^8\) During past controversies between Rwanda and the Global North, such as accusations of Rwanda’s interference in neighbor Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its domestic human rights situation, resulted in foreign aid removal and lessening of diplomatic ties.\(^6^9\) Rwandan foreign policy has remained relatively resolute in promoting state interest and security in what best can be understood within a Neorealist theoretical framework.\(^7^0\) A deeper examination of Rwanda’s perceptions and beliefs can provide context to understand
how the Rusesabagina situation will impact Rwandan foreign policy. Fundamentally, Rwandan officials responsible for crafting and engaging foreign policy will argue how the themes of abandonment, *agaciro* and promoting Rwandan human security takes precedence over international condemnation over its handling of Rusesabagina.

Description of Rwanda’s foreign engagement with the international community often falls within the genocide guilt card. The concept holds the narrative that the Rwandan government ‘guilts’ other nations, especially within the Global North, for their inactions during the genocide, violating the United Nations Convention on Genocide, in order to promote state interests. Examples of its usage start soon after the genocide, such as with the 1995 Gersony report which was a United Nations report examining RPF revenge killings during the genocide. The Rwandan government used the emotions of guilt and shame for previous inactions to stop the genocide as a way to justify suppressing the report by arguing that the international community did not have the moral authority to criticize how the RPF ended the genocide. It was used to deflect international criticism of Rwanda’s involvement in the First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo Wars as well as later Rwandan military interference in eastern DRC. Straus and Waldorf argue that the policy was still in use over a decade later by former Rwandan Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo to deflect international criticism of Rwanda’s domestic human rights record.

However, this reductionist description of Rwandan foreign policy ignores intersubjective beliefs, which with a Constructivist theoretical lens provides clarity of how these beliefs guide the Rwandan governments engagements with the international community. Constructivism examines international relations through the spectrum of perceiving the international system as composed of a historically and socially constructed realities based on human nature. Adler provided perhaps one of the best definitions of Constructivism for this research. Adler writes that constructivism is, “the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.” Intersubjectivity, which contains the different meanings and operations, such as social practices, discourses, and routines, within the international structure, describes how states accept and operate to promote their interest and security. Intersubjectivity beliefs exist regarding the shared ideas of a group of individuals, typically decision-makers or government officials. Found within these intersubjective beliefs are three
predominate ones composing abandonment, *agaciro* and promoting Rwandan human security within the case study of Rwanda.

The intersubjective belief of abandonment comprises from historical periods of Rwandan abandonment, often during periods of violence, by the international community. Events include the 1959 Hutu Revolution that resulted in forced emigration, destruction of property and the deaths of thousands; various pogroms leading to greater internal violence throughout the 1960s until the 1990s; the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi; post-genocide violence from refugee camps in neighboring former Zaire; and so on. These events greatly influence the belief within the current Rwandan government of the necessity to not rely on international rhetoric which might seem to be supportive of humanitarian causes or Rwanda’s development but hold little substance when violence erupts. Within the context of Rusesabagina, Rwandan officials have often felt, especially with the awarding of the U.S. Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2005, that the international community has abandoned Rwandan criticism of Rusesabagina’s role during the genocide and his later support for antagonistic forces. *Ibuka*, a government umbrella genocide survivors organization, condemned the promotion of Rusesabagina within the Global North as an educational ambassador of Rwanda’s genocide despite the near universal condemnation of his actions by hotel survivors. President Kagame has also criticized the Global North for its reliance on Rusesabagina, which created a platform for his antagonistic political rhetoric, while ignoring Rwandan opinions of the genocide and especially within the *Hôtel des Mille Collines*. While critics might describe the situation as the Rwandan government attempting to politically dominate the historical narrative of the genocide, it should be perceived through the context of the intersubjective belief of Rwandans perceiving how they are experiencing another form of abandonment with their voices often ignored in terms of Rusesabagina.

*Agaciro* is the second major intersubjective theme. The concept typically resides in economic formats such as the Agaciro Development Fund as described by Behuria. Rutazibwa examines *agaciro* through domestic, rather than foreign, knowledge production. Akin to Japanese strategic priority shifts since World War Two as described by Katzenstein, historical experiences such as the international abandonment during the genocide fostered a belief of the necessity to promote self-reliance in terms of state interests, development, and
A common usage of *agaciro* within Rwandan foreign policy is the reduction of foreign aid reliance from donor states. The arrest and subsequent trial of Rusesabagina falls within *agaciro’s* desire for Rwanda to be self-reliant in matters of security. The Rwandan government perceives Rusesabagina’s antagonistic rhetoric against post-genocide development and denial of the genocide as threatening Rwandan human security, the following intersubjective belief, which requires the Rwandan government to act. His involvement with the 2018 terrorist attacks, let alone engagement with the FDLR, resulted in what Rwandans perceive as the necessity for a response. Reliance on the international community to prosecute Rusesabagina is contrary to the nation’s *agaciro* as Rwandans, in this case the state, must rely on its abilities rather than a foreign entity to arrest and bring Rusesabagina to justice.

Finally, and perhaps more important for this research, is the intersubjective belief of Rwandan human security. The shifting of international norms within the Constructivist framework to understand the international system includes the recent drive towards human security beyond traditional understandings of state security. Several researchers such as King and Murray, Conteh-Morgan and Newman provide definitions of human security, as departing Realist’s notions of state security and survival towards more of a focus on threats and needs experienced by individuals. King and Murray as well as Tsai provide a more economic and social examination of human security based from its initial conception by Mahbub ul-Hag from the 1990 United Nations Human Development Report which concentrated on social rights such as access to healthcare, education and political freedoms. While Conteh-Morgan attempts to provide a more holistic overview of any structural and cultural, both visible or not, that threaten the wellbeing of an individual, Newman, whose description follows closely with Rwandan human security, describes how human security composes, “freedom from want and freedom from fear.”

Rwandan human security incorporates these Constructivist theoretical concept to Rwandan history and lived experiences with the output composing the necessity for the Rwandan government to promote security, whether physical, economic, social or so on, of all those who identify as ‘Rwandan’. The government’s quest to promote Rwandan human security introduces the possibility of how ontological security provides insights into Rwandan security promotion. Mitzen identifies ontological security to explain why states will prioritise promoting
security beyond the physical threats towards individual and the state. As foreign threats from tangible actors against the government decreased, intangible threats began to be seen by the Rwandan government and citizens as greater threats to the nation’s ontological security. This often focuses on treats posed to that of ‘security as being’ and identity within international politics. Steele argues how an autobiographical narrative impacts the formation of the state’s self. The importance of fostering these narratives provides insights into how the Rwandan government’s promotion of a singular ethnic identity, also known as Ndi Umunyarwanda, based on its interpretation of history rather than of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.

Rwandan human security does not incorporate protecting Rwandans who promote ethnic divisions but instead protects those accused by a third actor as being a member of Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. Rusesabagina’s involvement and leadership of several antagonist political groups such as the MRCD, FLN and PDR-Ihumure threaten not only state security by committing terrorism, but the promotion of ethnic divisionism. Human security incorporates more traditional notions of security threats and harm which Rusesabagina is accused of committing through his support of PDR-Ihumure’s attack in 2018. However, Rusesabagina’s calls for the overthrowing of the Rwandan government, re-establishment of ethnic divisions and the more recent denial of genocidal killings of Tutsis by Hutu extremists threatens Rwandan human security. Thus, the Rwandan government’s responsibility in stopping Rusesabagina goes beyond traditional security concerns and instead as a threat to Rwandan human security.

These intersubjective beliefs found within Rwandan foreign policy provide an understanding of the reasons for why Rwandan government officials and its supporters welcomed the arrest and trial of Rusesabagina. Rather than a human rights issue within the constructs of human rights norms found within the Global North, Rusesabagina proposed through his associations and rhetoric a threat to the Rwandan beliefs, especially of Rwandan human security. Rwandans, especially those who survived at the Hôtel des Mille Collines during the genocide, believe Rusesabagina’s global status as a humanitarian based on acquiring human rights awards and speaking engagements at universities, is a continuation of abandonment by the international community. Genocide survivors feel the sense of abandonment, alongside scholars and journalists such as Melvern and Rubin, who have campaigned to expose the historical deficits within
Rusesabagina’s story with little avail. It fosters a sense of how Rwandan’s history of abandonment because of Hotel Rwanda. Finally, the arrest of Rusesabagina, despite human rights groups calling it a violation of international law, is perceived within the nation’s agaciro as the government stopping those who threaten its human security. While there are always issues of placing a situation within a framework, can better understand Rwandan policies and foreign policy perceptions through the case study of Rusesabagina alongside his arrest and trial.

The Global North’s Limited Response

As prior mentioned by Clark, the situation for Global North states is a bit more complicated. While the European Union has issued a statement condemning the arrest and trial, there has been relatively little response by foreign governments. Many Global North nations have issued statements of how they are following the situation, but as of writing, there have been no foreign policy shifts. This differs from in 2008 when the Netherlands and Sweden withdrew foreign aid support after accusations of Rwanda’s domestic democratic mechanisms and involvement in eastern DRC or in 2012 with accusations of Rwandan support for the Congolese rebel group, the March 23 Movement (M23). Speculating for the difference of response is challenging but assumptions based on prior situations provide some possible explanations for why the international community, at the state level, has not shifted its foreign engagement with Rwanda.

The first is of the international community’s reliance on Rwanda for contributing effective soldiers and police in African peacekeeping missions. Rwanda provides substantial contributions to the Central African Republic (CAR) [United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)], South Sudan [United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)], Darfur (Sudan) [United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)], Haiti [United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH)] and Mali [United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)]. Fisher suggests that the Rwandan government, similar to Uganda, used its soldier’s effectiveness and professionalism to reduce contention with donor nations and promote state interests. Beswick adds that Rwanda’s military capacity building effectiveness since the genocide has made it possible for it to be an effective contributor to African peacekeeping, which is used to deflect international criticism. There is validity to
this understanding as seen in 2010, when former Minister of Foreign Affairs Louise Mushikiwabo threaten to pull Rwandan soldiers out of UNAMID after a leaked early report from the United Nation’s Group of Experts accused Rwanda of committing mass human rights violation in neighboring DRC. The fear of losing Rwandan military and police support for these peacekeeping missions can be a primary reason for why the international community has largely kept silent during the arrest and trial of Rusesabagina.

Another reason perhaps why there is a relatively moot response from foreign states, especially in the Global North, is the necessity of Rwanda as a case study for proper foreign aid utilization towards development. As Beswick describes, donor nations rely on Rwanda as a case example for other aid receiving nations for proper utilization of foreign aid. Rwanda’s anti-corruption policies and efficient usage of foreign aid for social and economic development affords Rwanda the leverage with donor nations even more than aid ownership policies. Zorbas also illustrates how Rwanda’s effective use of foreign aid has trumped concerns of its human rights record. Thus, donors within the Global North balance condemning Rwandan policy, in this case about the arrest and trial of Rusesabagina, with macro-strategic goals in using Rwanda as a case study to promote good usage of foreign aid for other aid receiving nations.

Finally, the case of Rwanda’s arrest and trial of Rusesabagina falls within expected state behaviors. Taking a more Neorealist framework, Jervis provides some context of why Global North states might not be particularly concerned about the recent events of Rusesabagina. Jervis’s examination of perceptions and its consequences on international structures and foreign policies illustrates how states desire predictable behaviors from other nations. Accusations of human rights abuses against the Rwandan government is not new with many Global North government having long established concerns. During a 2014 interview with a United Kingdom official within the High Commission in Rwanda, he commented how the Global North negatively perceives on how Rwanda’s government conducts its domestic policy in terms of human and political rights, however it has been effective for the nation’s post-genocide development. With the exception of 2008 with Sweden and the Netherlands and 2012 after the accusations of Rwanda’s support to the M23, there have only been minor shifts in the Global North’s engagements with Rwanda. This is despite human rights groups and activists calling for harsher methods.
Fundamentally, Rwanda’s importance to these nations, whether because of reliance on Rwandan peacekeepers; as a case study for foreign aid utilization; or just accustomed to Rwanda’s human rights record, has not significantly influenced how these nations engage with Rwanda since the arrest and trial of Rusesabagina.

Conclusion

The disappearance and subsequential arrest of Paul Rusesabagina in August 2020 reintroduced questions of historical narratives and human rights concerns in Rwanda. Human rights activists from the Global North have descended on social and news media to condemn Rwanda’s capture and trial of Rusesabagina. For most within this category, the man is best known from the film, *Hotel Rwanda*. The 2004 film elevated Rusesabagina into an African version of the famous Holocaust hero Oskar Schindler. Within Rwanda, the complexities of Rusesabagina’s story have him seen more as an opportunist rather than a savior. His public condemnation of Rwanda’s post-genocide development resulted in the founding or collaborating with antagonistic forces such as the MRCD, FLN and PDR-Ihumure. The latter would commit two terrorists in 2018, killing nine. These reasons led to the thirteen accounts with the possibility if convicted to serve over twenty-years in prison.

Despite the outrage of his arrest and trial by human rights activists, the international community at the state level has relatively remained silent. The European Union did issue a statement condemning the arrest of Rusesabagina but has not enacted public policy changes that could harm its relations with Rwanda. Rwandan foreign policy will justify its response to international criticism by explaining the necessity of his arrest and trial under the intersubjective beliefs of abandonment, *agaciro* and promoting Rwandan human security. Nonetheless, many nation’s governments have issued statements of how they are concerned and are watching the case as it unfolds. Yet, there have been no significant foreign policy responses. The likely reasons stem from reliance on Rwanda for its military contribution to peacekeeping missions, as a case study for proper aid use for other aid receiving nations, and an understanding of Rwandan human rights situation that while it might not fit within the constructs of Global North understandings of human rights, it nevertheless still exists within Rwandan society. If the international community is concerned about the arrest, trial, and prison time of Rusesabagina, they will need to
understand and work within the constructs of how Rwandan perceives and engages with the international community.

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