Distributed Attack-Robust Submodular Maximization for Multi-Robot Planning

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Abstract—In this paper, we design algorithms to protect swarm-robotics applications against sensor denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on robots. We focus on applications requiring the robots to jointly select actions, e.g., which trajectory to follow, among a set of available actions. Such applications are central in large-scale robotic applications, such as multi-robot motion planning for target tracking. But the current attack-robust algorithms are centralized. In this paper, we propose a general-purpose distributed algorithm towards robust optimization at scale, with local communications only. We name it Distributed Robust Maximization (DRM). DRM proposes a divide-and-conquer approach that distributively partitions the problem among cliques of robots. Then, the cliques optimize in parallel, independently of each other. We prove DRM achieves a close-to-optimal performance. We demonstrate DRM’s performance in Gazebo and MATLAB simulations, in scenarios of active target tracking with swarms of robots. In the simulations, DRM achieves computational speed-ups, being 1-2 orders faster than the centralized algorithms. Yet, it nearly matches the tracking performance of the centralized counterparts. Since, DRM overestimates the number of attacks in each clique, in this paper we also introduce an Improved Distributed Robust Maximization (IDRM) algorithm. IDRM infers the number of attacks in each clique less conservatively than DRM by leveraging 3-hop neighboring communications. We verify IDRM improves DRM’s performance in simulations.

Index Terms—Distributed optimization, robust optimization, submodular optimization, approximation algorithm, adversarial attacks, multi-robot planning, target tracking.

I. INTRODUCTION

Safe-critical tasks of surveillance and exploration often require mobile agility, and fast capability to detect, localize, and monitor. For example, consider the tasks:

• Adversarial target tracking: Track adversarial targets that move across an urban environment, aiming to escape [1];
• Search and rescue: Explore a burning building to localize any people trapped inside [2].

Such scenarios can greatly benefit from teams of mobile robots that are agile, act as sensors, and plan their actions rapidly. For this reason, researchers are (i) pushing the frontier on robotic miniaturization and perception [1]–[7], to enable mobile agility and autonomous sensing, and (ii) developing distributed coordination algorithms [8]–[12], to enable multi-robot planning, i.e., the joint optimization of robots’ actions.

Particularly, distributed planning algorithms are important when one wishes to deploy large-scale teams of robots; e.g., at the swarm level of tens or hundreds of robots. One reason is that distributed algorithms scale better for larger numbers of robots than their centralized counterparts [8]. Additionally, in large-scale teams, it is infeasible for all robots to communicate with each other; typically, each robot can communicate only within a certain communication range.

However, the safety of the above critical scenarios can be at peril. Robots operating in adversarial scenarios may get cyber-attacked or simply face failures, resulting in a temporary withdrawal of robots from the task (e.g., because of temporary deactivation of their sensors, blockage of their field of view, among others; cf. Fig. 1). We refer to such attacks as Denial-of-Service (DoS). Hence, in such adversarial scenarios, distributed attack-robust planning algorithms become necessary.

In this paper, we formalize a general framework for distributed attack-robust multi-robot planning for tasks that require the maximization of submodular functions, such as active target tracking [13] and informative path planning [14] with multiple-robots. We focus on worst-case attacks that can result in up to a robot withdrawals from the task at each step.

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1We henceforth consider the terms attack and failure equivalent, both resulting in robot withdrawals from the task at hand.

2Submodularity is a diminishing returns property [15], capturing the intuition that the more robots participate in a task, the less the gain (return) one gets by adding an extra robot towards the task.
Attack-robust multi-robot planning is computationally hard and requires accounting for all possible α withdrawals, a problem of combinatorial complexity. Importantly, even in the presence of no withdrawals, the problem of multi-robot planning is NP-hard [16], [17]. All in all, the necessity for distributed attack-robust algorithms, and the inherent computational hardness motivates our goal in this paper: to provide a distributed, provably close-to-optimal approximation algorithm. To this end, we capitalize on recent algorithmic results on centralized attack-robust multi-robot planning [18]–[21] and present a distributed attack-robust algorithm.

Related work. Researchers have developed several distributed, but attack-free, planning algorithms, such as [8]–[12]. For example, [8] developed a decentralized algorithm, building on the local greedy algorithm proposed in [22] Section 4], which guarantees a 1/2 suboptimality bound for submodular objective functions. In [8] the robots form a string communication network, and sequentially choose an action, given the actions of the robots that have chosen so far. In [11], the authors proposed a speed-up of [8]'s approach, by enabling the greedy sequential optimization to be executed over directedacyclic graphs, instead of string ones. In scenarios where the robots cannot observe all the chosen actions so far, distributed, but still attack-free, algorithms for submodular maximization are developed in [23], [24]. Other distributed, attack-free algorithms are developed in the machine learning literature on submodular maximization, towards sparse selection (e.g., for data selection, or sensor placement) [25], instead of planning.

Researchers have also developed robust planning algorithms [18]–[21], [26]–[28]. Among these, [26]–[28] focus on deceptive attacks, instead of DoS attacks. In more detail, [26], [27] provide distributed resilient formation control algorithms to deal with malicious robots in the team, that share deceptive information. Similarly, [28] provides a distributed resilient state estimation algorithm against robots executing Byzantine attacks by sending differing state estimates or not transmitting any estimates. In contrast to [26]–[28], the papers [20], [21] consider DoS attacks in multi-robot motion planning but in centralized settings: [20] provides centralized attack-robust algorithms for active information gathering, and [21] for target tracking. The paper [29] extended [20] to a Model Predictive Control (MPC) framework. The algorithms are based on the centralized algorithms proposed in [18], [19]. Additional attack-robust algorithms are proposed in [30], [31], which, however, are valid for only a limited number of attacks. For a thorough literature review on attack-robust combinatorial algorithms, we refer to the reader to [32].

Contributions. Towards enabling attack-robust planning in multi-robot scenarios requiring local communication among robots, we make the following contributions:

A. We present the algorithm Distributed Robust Maximization (DRM): DRM distributively partitions the problem among cliques of robots, where all robots are within communication range. Then, naturally, the cliques optimize in parallel, using [21], Algorithm 1. We prove (Section IV):

- System-wide attack-robustness: DRM is valid for any number α of worst-case attacks;
- Computational speed-up: DRM is faster up to a factor $1/K^2$ than its centralized counterparts in [21], where $K$ is the number of cliques chosen by DRM. $K$ depends on the inter-robot communication range, denoted henceforth by $r_c$, which is given as input to DRM (and, as a result, by changing $r_c$ one controls $K$).
- Near-to-centralized approximation performance: Even though DRM is a distributed algorithm, and faster than algorithm its centralized counterpart [21], Algorithm 1, DRM achieves a near-to-centralized performance, having a suboptimality bound equal to [21] Algorithm 1’s.

B. We design an Improved Distributed Robust Maximization (IDRM) algorithm to relax the conservativeness of DRM in inferring the number of attacks against each cliques (Section V). Specifically, DRM assumes that the number of attacks against each clique is equal to α, the total number of attacks against all robots. Instead, in IDRM, robots communicate with their 3-hop neighbors in the communication network of all robots to infer the number of attacks. IDRM has the same approximation performance as DRM. In our numerical evaluations, it maintains a comparable running time to DRM (Section VI-

Notably, the proposed algorithms in this paper allow for the communication graph to be disconnected.

Numerical evaluations. First, we present Gazebo and MATLAB evaluations of DRM, in scenarios of active target tracking with swarms of robots (Section VI-A). All simulation results demonstrate DRM’s computational benefits: DRM runs 1 to 2 orders faster than its centralized counterpart in [21], achieving running times 0.5msec to 15msec for up to 100 robots. And, yet, DRM exhibits negligible deterioration in performance (in terms of number of targets covered). Second, we compare the performance of DRM and IDRM through Matlab simulations (Section VI-B). We show that IDRM performs better than DRM in practice (higher target coverage), while maintaining a comparable running time.

Comparison with the preliminary results. Preliminary results were presented in [33], [34]. In this paper, we present for the first time the algorithm Improved Distributed Robust Maximization (Section V). Moreover, the corresponding Matlab simulations are new (Section VI-B). Also, we present a formal analysis of DRM’s computation and approximation performance (Appendix-A & B). Further, we analyze the approximation of a myopic algorithm and compare its practical performance with DRM and IDRM through Matlab simulations (Remark 2 and Appendix C).

II. Problem Formulation

We formalize the problem of distributed attack-robust submodular maximization for multi-robot planning. At each time-step, the problem asks for assigning actions to the robots, to maximize an objective function despite attacks. For example, in the target tracking with swarms of robots (see Fig. 1), the robots’ possible actions are their motion primitives; the objective function is the number of covered targets; and the attacks are field-of-view blocking attacks.

3A robot’s 3-hop neighbors are its neighbors, its neighbors’ neighbors, and its neighbors’ neighbors’ neighbors.
Fig. 2. Robots choose trajectories from a set of motion primitives: at each time step, each robot has a set of motion primitives to choose as its trajectory (each covering different targets, depicted as dots). For example, robot 1 has 3 motion primitives, \( \{x_1^1, x_2^1, x_3^1\} \), and robot 2 has 4 motion primitives, \( \{x_2^1, x_2^2, x_3^2, x_2^3\} \), where \( x_1^1 \) covers 2 targets, \( \{t_2, t_3\} \), and \( x_2^2 \) covers 4 targets, \( \{t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4\} \). In combination, however, the two motion primitives totally cover 4 targets, \( \{t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4\} \).

We next introduce our framework in more detail:\footnote{Notations. Calligraphic fonts denote sets (e.g., \( \mathcal{A} \)). \( 2^\mathcal{A} \) denotes \( \mathcal{A} \)'s power set, and \( |\mathcal{A}| \) its cardinality. \( \mathcal{A} \setminus \mathcal{B} \) are the elements in \( \mathcal{A} \) not in \( \mathcal{B} \).}

a) Robots: We consider a multi-robot team \( \mathcal{R} \). At a given time-step, \( p_i \) is robot \( i \)'s position in the environment (\( i \in \mathcal{R} \)). We define \( \mathcal{P} \triangleq \{p_1, \ldots, p_{|\mathcal{R}|}\} \) with \( |\mathcal{R}| = N \).

b) Communication graph: Each robot communicates only with those robots within a prescribed communication range. Without loss of generality, we assume all robots to have the same communication range \( r_c \). That way, an (undirected) communication graph \( G = (\mathcal{R}, \mathcal{E}) \) is induced, with nodes the robots \( \mathcal{R} \), and edges \( \mathcal{E} \) such that \( (i, j) \in \mathcal{E} \) if and only if \( ||p_i - p_j||_2 \leq r_c \). The neighbors of robot \( i \) are all robots within the range \( r_c \), and are denoted by \( \mathcal{N}_i \).

c) Action set: Each robot \( i \) has an available set of actions to choose from; we denote it by \( \mathcal{X}_i \). The robot can choose at most 1 action at each time, due to operational constraints; e.g., in motion planning, \( \mathcal{X}_i \) denotes robot \( i \)'s motion primitives, and the robot can choose only 1 motion primitive at a time to be its trajectory. For example, in Fig. 2 we have 2 robots, where \( \mathcal{X}_1 = \{x_1^1, x_2^1, x_3^1\} \) (and robot 1 chooses \( x_1^1 \) as its trajectory) and \( \mathcal{X}_2 = \{x_2^1, x_2^2, x_3^2, x_2^3\} \) (and robot 2 chooses \( x_2^2 \) as its trajectory). We let \( \mathcal{X} \triangleq \mathcal{U}_{i \in \mathcal{R}} \mathcal{X}_i \). Also, \( \mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{X} \) denotes a valid assignment of actions to all robots. For instance, in Fig. 2 \( \mathcal{S} = \{x_1^1, x_2^2\} \).

d) Objective function: The quality of each \( \mathcal{S} \) is quantified by a non-decreasing and submodular function \( f : 2^{\mathcal{X}} \to \mathbb{R} \). For example, this is the case in active target tracking with mobile robots, when \( f \) is the number of covered targets.\footnote{Problem 1 (Distributed attack-robust submodular maximization for multi-robot planning). At each time step, the robots, by exchanging information only over the communication graph \( G \), assign an action to each robot \( i \in \mathcal{R} \) to maximize \( f \) against \( \alpha \) worst-case attacks/failures:
\[
\max_{\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{X}} \min_{\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathcal{S}} f(\mathcal{S} \setminus \mathcal{A})
\text{s.t. } |\mathcal{S} \cap \mathcal{X}_i | = 1, \text{ for all } i \in \mathcal{R}, |\mathcal{A}| \leq \alpha,
\]}

\( f(S) = 4 \).

e) Attacks: At each time step, we assume the robots encounter worst-case sensor DoS attacks. Each attack results in a robot’s sensing removal (at least temporarily, i.e., for the current time step). In this paper, we study the case where the maximum number of attacks at each time step is known, per Problem 1 below. We denote the maximum number of attacks by \( \alpha \). We also assume that if a robot encounters a sensor DoS attack, it can still act as an information relay node to communicate with other robots.

Problem 1 is equivalent to a two-stage perfect information sequential game\footnote{Problem 1 is equivalent to a two-stage perfect information sequential game [25] Chapter 4] between the robots and an attacker. Particularly, the robots first select \( \mathcal{S} \), and then, the attacker, after observing \( \mathcal{S} \), selects the worst-case \( \mathcal{A} \) (which is unknown to the robots). The “\( \min \)” operator means that the attacker aims to minimize the robots’ objective function \( f \) by removing up to \( \alpha \) robots’ actions \( \mathcal{A} \), no matter what actions \( \mathcal{S} \) the robots take. This is the worst-case attack on the robots’ actions \( \mathcal{S} \). The “\( \min \)” operation is from the attackers’ point of view, and the robots do not know which robots (or their actions \( \mathcal{A} \)) will be attacked. Under this assumption, the robots aim to maximize the objective function \( f \) by assuming the attacker executes up to \( \alpha \) worst-case attacks.

Notably, a robot does not have to understand if it encounters a DoS attack or not, and it does not need to communicate such information to its neighbors either. That is because the robots’ planning happens before the attacks take place. So the robots do not even have a way of knowing who gets a DoS attack, and that is why they need to consider the worst-case scenario. The DoS attacks are not permanent, and a rational attacker will choose the worst-case subset of sensors to attack at each time step. In other words, Problem 1 asks for planning algorithms to prepare the robot team to be robust to withstand the worst-case attacks without knowing the attack details (e.g., which robots’ sensors get attacked).

III. A DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM: DRM

We present Distributed Robust Maximization (DRM), a distributed algorithm for Problem 1 for the case where \( \alpha \) is known (Algorithm 1). DRM executes sequentially two main steps: distributed clique partition (DRM’s line 1), and per clique attack-robust optimization (DRM’s lines 2-8). During the first step, the robots communicate with their neighbors to partition \( G \) into cliques of maximal size (using Algorithm 2 named DCP in DRM’s line 1). During the second step, each clique computes an attack-robust action assignment (in parallel with the rest), using the centralized algorithm in [21] —henceforth, we refer to the algorithm in [21] as central-robust. central-robust takes similar inputs to DRM: a set of actions, a function, and a number of attacks.

We describe DRM’s two steps in more detail below, and quantify its running time and performance in Section V.

5The constraint in eq. (1) ensures that each robot chooses 1 action per time step (e.g., 1 trajectory among a set of primitive trajectories.)

6A clique is a set of robots that can all communicate with each other.
A. Distributed clique partition (Step-1 of DRM)

We present the first step of DRM, distributed clique partition, which is inspired by [36, Algorithm 2] (DRM’s line 1, that calls DCP, whose pseudo-code is presented in Algorithm 2). The problem of distributed clique partition is inapproximable in polynomial time, since finding even a single clique of a desired size is inapproximable [37], even by centralized algorithms.

DCP requires three rounds of communications among neighboring robots to form separate cliques. In the first round, each robot $i$ communicates to find its neighbors (Algorithm 2 line 3). In the second round, it shares its augmented neighbor set $N_i^+$ (containing its neighbors and itself) with its neighbors, and receives its neighbors’ sets $\{N_j^+\}$ (Algorithm 2 line 4). Then robot $i$ intersects its augmented neighbor set $N_i^+$ with each of its neighbors’ augmented neighbor sets $N_j^+$, and sets the largest intersection as its clique (Algorithm 2 line 5).

The aforementioned clique computation of DCP differs from [36, Algorithm 2] in that in [36, Algorithm 2] each robot $i$ computes its clique as the intersection of $N_i^+$ and $N_j^+$ where $j$ is the neighbor with the largest degree in $N_i$, whereas in DCP’s line 5, each robot $i$ computes its clique as the intersection of $N_i^+$ and $N_j^+$, where $j$ instead is the neighbor with the largest neighborhood overlap with $i$. That way, DCP is more likely to obtain larger cliques for each robot. Also, the cliques returned by [36, Algorithm 2] can overlap with each other. In order to form separate cliques, DCP executes the third round of communication to share the computed cliques among neighbors (Algorithm 2 line 6). Specifically, each robot $i$ tells its neighbors which clique it will join. If the clique of some neighboring robot $j$ contains robot $i$ but robot $i$ chooses to join a different clique (by Algorithm 2 line 3), its neighboring robot $j$ will update its clique by removing robot $i$ from it. In this way, each robot $i$ will eventually belong to a single clique, and thus non-overlapping cliques can be generated. An illustrative example of DCP is shown in Fig. [3].

Remark 1. We partition the communication graph $G$ into cliques instead of connected subgroups because we want robots to have a shorter communication time interval before making decisions. Robots within a clique have point-to-point communication, while robots in a connected subgroup need multi-hop communication to propagate information. Typically, multi-hop communication takes time when the diameter of the communication graph is large. More formally, point-to-point communication has $O(1)$ communication round, while multi-hop communication has $O(N)$ communication rounds in the worst case (e.g., a line graph). Therefore, we choose the clique partition model that enables robots to have a shorter communication time before making decisions.

Reducing the time of information sharing becomes essential when robots need to make decisions quickly. For example, in a multi-target tracking scenario, robots need to firstly share information (e.g., subsets of targets covered) and then decide their actions (e.g., movements). Since targets are mobile and may move fast, the robots need to choose actions as quickly as they can. Otherwise, the information shared can be outdated and thus misleading for decision-making. Therefore, we use cliques with one-hop communication only to shorten the time of information sharing among robots.

Moreover, multi-hop communication may reduce communication bandwidth and increase energy consumption. For example, when robots communicate over a single channel, only one robot can be active to broadcast information during a certain time interval. Therefore, communicating messages over multiple hops result in a smaller communication bandwidth and a higher communication cost [38]. But investigating the number of communication hops to trade off energy consumption/bandwidth with performance could be an interesting future direction.

B. Per clique attack-robust optimization (Step-2 of DRM)

We now present DRM’s second step: per clique attack-robust optimization (DRM’s lines 2-8). Since the step calls central-robust as subroutine, we recall here its steps from [21]: central-robust takes as input the available actions of a set of robots $\mathcal{R}' \subseteq \mathcal{R}$ (i.e., the $\bigcup_{i \in \mathcal{R}'} X_i$), a monotone submodular $f$, and a number of attacks $\alpha' \leq \alpha$, and constructs an action assignment $\mathcal{S}'$ by following a two-step process. First, it tries to approximate the conjectured worst-case attack to $\mathcal{S}'$, and, to this end, builds a “bait” set as part of $\mathcal{S}'$. Particularly, the bait set is aimed to attract all attacks at $\mathcal{S}'$, and for this reason, it has cardinality $\alpha'$ (the same as the number of conjectured attacks). In more detail, central-robust includes an action $x \in \bigcup_{i \in \mathcal{R}'} X_i$
that each clique we consider there is a prior on the attack mechanism such

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each clique in parallel with the others computes an attack-

the clique partition step returns \( K \) cliques, as shown in subfige (b). In the second step, all 5 cliques perform central-robust in parallel. Particularly, the cliques \{1, (2, 8)\}, since \( \alpha \) is larger than or equal to their size, consider that all of their robots will be attacked, and as a result they select all of their robots as baits (depicted with red in subfige (c)), per central-robust. In contrast, the remaining 3 cliques, since \( \alpha \) is smaller than their size, they select \( \alpha \) of their robots as baits. The remaining robots (depicted with blue in subfige (c)) of each clique choose their actions greedily, independently of the other cliques, and assuming that the red robots in their clique do not exist.

in the bait set (at most 1 action per robot, per Problem [1]) only if \( f(\{x\}) \geq f(\{x'\}) \) for any other \( x' \in \bigcup_{i \in \mathcal{R}_\alpha} \mathcal{X}_i \).

That is, the bait set is composed of the “best” \( \alpha \) single actions. In the second step, central-robust a) assumes the robots in the bait set are removed from \( \mathcal{R}_\alpha \), and then b) greedily assigns actions to the rest of the robots using the centralized greedy algorithm in [22, Section 2] which ensures a near-optimal assignment (at least 1/2 close to the optimal).

Specifically, for the remaining \( |\mathcal{R}_\alpha| - \alpha \) robots, denoted by \( \mathcal{R}_\alpha \), the centralized greedy algorithm assigns actions \( S'_g \) for them as follows.

1: \( S'_g \leftarrow \emptyset \);
2: while \( \mathcal{R}_\alpha \neq \emptyset \) do
3: \((x'_g, i'_g) \leftarrow \arg\max_{x \in \bigcup_{i \in \mathcal{R}_\alpha} \mathcal{X}_i} f(S'_g \cup \{x\}) - f(S'_g)\);
4: \( S'_g \leftarrow S'_g \cup \{x'_g\}; \mathcal{R}_\alpha \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_\alpha \setminus \{i'_g\} \).

Notably, it chooses an action \( x'_g \) and the corresponding robot \( i'_g \) with the maximal marginal contribution to the function value at each round (line 3).

The bait set is one way of approximating \( \alpha \) worst-case attacks to the action assignment \( S' \). By executing the worst-case attacks, the attacker may or may not attack the bait set. Selecting the bait action set for the robots can add robustness against the worst-case attacks. That is, no matter the attacker attacks the bait set or not, central-robust, composed of bait action assignment and greedy action assignment, gives suboptimality guarantees against the worst-case attacks [18], [19].

In this context, DRM’s second step is as follows: assuming the clique partition step returns \( K \) cliques (DRM’s line 1), now each clique in parallel with the others computes an attack-robust assignment for its robots using central-robust (DRM’s lines 3-8). To this end, the cliques need to assess how many of the \( \alpha \) attacks each will incur. If there is no prior on the attack generation mechanism, then we consider a worst-case scenario where each clique incurs all the \( \alpha \) attacks. Otherwise, we consider there is a prior on the attack mechanism such that each clique \( k \) infers it will incur \( \alpha_k \leq \alpha \) attacks. Without loss of generality, in DRM’s pseudo-code in Algorithm [1] we present the former scenario, where \( \alpha_k = \alpha \) across all cliques; notwithstanding, our theoretical results on DRM’s performance (Section [IV]) hold for any \( \alpha_k \) such that \( \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \geq \alpha \). Overall, DRM’s lines 3-8 are as follows (cf. example in Fig. 3):

- a) DRM’s lines [2] (\( \alpha < |C_k| \)): If \( \alpha \) is less than the clique’s size (DRM’s line [4]), then the clique’s robots choose actions by executing central-robust on the clique assuming \( \alpha \) attacks (DRM’s line [5]).
- b) DRM’s lines [6] (\( \alpha \geq |C_k| \)): But if \( \alpha \) is larger than the clique’s size (DRM’s line [6]), then the clique’s robots choose actions by executing central-robust on the clique assuming \( |C_k| \) attacks (DRM’s line [5]); i.e., assuming that all clique’s robots will be attacked.
- c) DRM’s line [5] All in all, now all robots have assigned actions, and \( S \) is the union of all assigned actions across all cliques (notably, the robots of each clique \( k \) know only \( S_k \), where \( S_k \) is the notation in DRM).

Finally, DRM is valid for any number of attacks.

IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF DRM

We now quantify DRM’s performance, by bounding its computational and approximation performance. To this end, we use the following notion of curvature for set functions.

| Algorithm 2: Distributed clique partition (DCP) |
|---------------------------------------------|
| **Input:** Robots’ positions \( P \); communication range \( r_c \). |
| **Output:** Clique partition of graph \( G \). |
| 1. Given \( P \) and \( r_c \), find communication graph \( G \); |
| 2. for each robot \( i \) do |
| 3. \( S = \arg\max_{x \in \mathcal{X}_i} f(\{x\}) \); |
| 4. \( \mathcal{R}_\alpha \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_\alpha \setminus \{i\} \); |
| 5. \( \mathcal{R}_\alpha \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_\alpha \setminus \{i\} \); |
| 6. \( \mathcal{R}_\alpha \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_\alpha \setminus \{i\} \); |
| 7. \( \mathcal{R}_\alpha \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_\alpha \setminus \{i\} \); |
| 8. return Generated cliques. |
A. Curvature

Definition 1 (Curvature [39]). Consider non-decreasing submodular \( f: 2^\mathcal{X} \to \mathbb{R} \) such that \( f(x) \neq 0 \), for any \( x \in \mathcal{X} \setminus \{ \emptyset \} \) (without loss of generality). Also, denote by \( \mathcal{I} \) the collection of admissible sets where \( f \) can be evaluated at. Then, \( f \)'s curvature is defined as

\[
\nu_f \triangleq 1 - \min_{S \in \mathcal{I}} \min_{x \in S} \frac{f(S) - f(S \setminus \{x\})}{f(x)}. \tag{2}
\]

The curvature, \( \nu_f \), measures how far \( f \) is from being additive. Particularly, Definition 1 implies \( 0 \leq \nu_f \leq 1 \), and if \( \nu_f = 0 \), then \( f(S) = \sum_{x \in S} f(\{x\}) \) for all \( S \in \mathcal{I} \) (\( f \) is additive). On the other hand, if \( \nu_f = 1 \), then there exist \( S \in \mathcal{I} \) and \( x \in \mathcal{X} \) such that \( f(S) = f(S \setminus \{x\}) \) (\( x \) has no contribution in the presence of \( S \setminus \{x\} \)).

For example, in active target tracking, \( f \) is the expected number of covered targets (as a function of the robot trajectories). Then, \( f \) has curvature \( 0 \) if each robot covers different targets from the rest of the robots. In contrast, it has curvature \( 1 \) if, e.g., two robots cover the exact same targets.

B. Running time and approximation performance

We present DRM's running time and suboptimality bounds. To this end, we use the notation:

- \( t_{\text{DCP}}^c \) and \( t_{\text{CRO}}^c \) denote the communication and computation time of the robot that spends the highest time on three-round communications (Algorithm 2, lines 5–6) and neighbor set intersection (Algorithm 2, line 3) in DCP;
- \( \mathcal{M} \) is a clique of \( G \), which spends the highest time executing central-robust;
- \( t_{\text{CRO}} \) denotes the communication time of the robot that spends the highest time exchanging information collected (e.g., the subsets of targets covered) in \( \mathcal{M} \);
- \( t^f \) denotes the time of one evaluation of the objective function \( f \) (e.g., computing the number of targets covered by robots' actions);
- \( \mathcal{X}_\mathcal{M} \) is the set of possible actions of all robots in \( \mathcal{M} \); that is, \( \mathcal{X}_\mathcal{M} \triangleq \bigcup_{i \in \mathcal{M}} \mathcal{X}_i \);
- \( f^* \) is the optimal value of Problem 1;
- \( \mathcal{A}^*(S) \) is a worst-case removal from \( S \) (a removal from \( S \) corresponds to a set of sensor attacks); that is, \( \mathcal{A}^*(S) \in \arg \min_{A \subseteq S, |A| \leq s} f(S \setminus A) \).

Theorem 1 (Computational performance). DRM runs in \( O(1)t_{\text{DCP}} + O(t_{\text{CRO}}^c) + O(|\mathcal{X}_\mathcal{M}|^2)t^f \) time. In addition, by DRM, each robot \( i \in \mathcal{R} \) has four-round communications, including three rounds in DCP and one round in per clique central-robust, and exchanges \( 3|\mathcal{N}_i| + |C_k| - 1 \) messages with \( i \in C_k \). Moreover, DRM performs \( O(|\mathcal{N}_i|) \) operations for set intersections of each robot \( i \in \mathcal{DCP} \) and \( O(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}\setminus \emptyset|^2) \) evaluations of objective function \( f \) in central-robust for each clique \( C_k \), \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \).

\( O(1)t_{\text{DCP}} + t_{\text{CRO}}^c \) corresponds to DRM’s clique partition step (DRM’s line 1), and \( O(1)t_{\text{CRO}} + O(|\mathcal{X}_\mathcal{M}|^2)t^f \) corresponds to DRM’s attack-robust step (DRM’s lines 2–8). Particularly, DRM’s communication time includes the time of three-round communications in the clique partition step and the time of one-round communication of information collected in the attack-robust step; that is \( O(1)t_{\text{DCP}} + O(1)t_{\text{CRO}}^c \). DRM’s computation time contains the time of neighbor set intersection in the clique partition step and the time of objective function evaluations in the attack-robust step; that is \( t_{\text{DCP}} + O(|\mathcal{X}_\mathcal{M}|^2)t^f \). Notably, as the number of robots and/or the number of actions increase, DRM’s running time will be dominated by the time for function evaluations, i.e., \( O(|\mathcal{X}_\mathcal{M}|^2)t^f \).

In contrast, to evaluate the objective functions, central-robust [21] Algorithm 1 runs in \( O(|\mathcal{X}|^2)t^f \) time. Thus, when \( \mathcal{X}_\mathcal{M} \subset \mathcal{X} \) (which happens when \( G \) is partitioned into at least 2 cliques), DRM offers a computational speed-up. The reasons are two: parallelization of action assignment, and smaller clique size. Particularly, DRM splits the action assignment among multiple cliques, instead of performing the assignment in a centralized way, where all robots form one large clique (the \( \mathcal{R} \)). That way, DRM enables each clique to work in parallel, reducing the overall running time to that of clique \( \mathcal{M} \) (Theorem 1). Besides parallelization, the smaller clique size also contributes to the computational reduction. To illustrate this, assume \( G \) is partitioned to \( K \) cliques of equal size, and all robots have the same number of actions \( |\mathcal{X}_i| = |\mathcal{X}_j| \) for all \( i, j \in \mathcal{R} \). Then, \( O(|\mathcal{X}_\mathcal{M}|^2) = O(|\mathcal{X}|^2)/K^2 \), that is, DRM’s function evaluation time is reduced by the factor \( K^2 \).

Theorem 2 (Approximation performance of DRM). DRM returns a feasible action-set \( S \) such that

\[
\frac{f(S \setminus \mathcal{A}^*(S))}{f^*} \geq 1 - \frac{\nu_f}{2}. \tag{3}
\]

The proof of the theorem follows from [19, Theorem 1]. From eq. (3), we conclude that even though DRM is a distributed, faster algorithm than its centralized counterpart, it still achieves a near-to-centralized performance. Generally, Theorem 2 implies DRM guarantees a close-to-optimal value for any submodular \( f \) with curvature \( \nu_f < 1 \).

Remark 2. A myopic algorithm that selects actions for each robot independently of all other robots (in contrast to DRM, whose subroutine central-robust accounts for the other robots’ actions during the greedy action assignment), guarantees the approximation bound \( 1 - \nu_f \) (Algorithm 4 in Appendix C). However, being exclusively myopic, Algorithm 4 has worse practical performance than DRM.

In Appendix C, we also show Algorithm 4 is equivalent to central-robust (cf. Section III-B) when applied to \( \mathcal{R} \), under the assumption that all robots in \( \mathcal{R} \) are attacked. This further reveals the practical inefficiency of Algorithm 4.

Remark 3. Notably, DCP always finds a set of cliques. That is, it always terminates. However, in some degenerate cases, it may end up with a set of singletons, i.e., cliques that have one robot only. This issue can be mitigated by allowing for longer computation times. For example, in DCP’s line 23, there may exist multiple largest intersection sets \( C_i \) for each robot \( i \). To break ties, we randomly select one, which may result in more singletons in the end. One natural way to find the largest intersection set that leads to the smallest number of singletons is to evaluate all the largest intersection sets \( C_i \). Clearly,
the evaluation takes more time. Specifically, the number of largest intersection sets for each robot \(i\) is the number of its neighbors \(|N_i|\) in the worst case. Then evaluating all the largest intersection sets takes \(O(N)\) time, while random selection takes \(O(1)\) time. However, with longer computation time, DCP is more likely to generate fewer and larger cliques.

The number of cliques plays a trade-off between the running time and practical performance of DRM. Specifically, for a given number of robots, DRM runs faster with more and smaller cliques since all cliques operate in parallel. While, at the same time, DRM’s practical performance becomes poorer. This is because, with more and smaller cliques, more attacks will be inferred by DRM since each clique \(C_k\) infers it will incur \(\alpha_k = \min\left\{\alpha, |C_k|\right\}\) attacks. Therefore, DRM is more conservative and closer to the myopic algorithm introduced in Remark \(\sharp\). On the contrary, with fewer and larger cliques, DRM gives a better practical performance but runs slower.

V. Improved Distributed Robust Maximization

In DRM, each clique \(C_k\) assumes that the number of attacks \(\alpha_k\) against the clique is either equal to the total number of attacks \(\alpha\), or equal to its size \(|C_k|\) (when \(\alpha \geq |C_k|\)). Even though this strategy guarantees a close-to-optimal approximation performance (cf. Section IV), it is conservative, since the total number of attacks that all cliques infer \(\sum_k \alpha_k\) can be much larger than the real number of attacks \(\alpha\) for the team. In this section, we design a strategy to amend this conservativeness. Particularly, we present an Improved Distributed Robust Maximization (IDRM), and analyze its performance in terms of approximation performance and running time.

A. Improved inference of each clique’s attack number

The number of attacks in each clique \(\alpha_k\) can be inferred by leveraging neighboring communications. First, note that robots can communicate with all their neighbors within communication range even though these neighbors are in different cliques. For example, in Fig. 4, robot 2 can still communicate with robots 1 and 4 even though they are partitioned into different cliques. However, in DRM, this available communication is ignored. Second, besides the 3-hop communications required for the execution of distributed clique partition (DCP; cf. Algorithm 2), the robots can also share their actions’ function values (e.g., the number of targets covered) with their 3-hop neighbors. Evidently, while DRM assumes robots to share actions’ function values with their 1-hop neighbors within the same clique, sharing the actions’ function values among 3-hop neighbors can give a better inference of \(\alpha_k\), and, consequently, better performance.

Recall that DRM sets \(\alpha_k\) equal to \(\alpha\) (or to \(|C_k|\)), when \(\alpha \geq |C_k|\) for each clique \(C_k\). Therefore, DRM selects a bait set of \(\alpha_k\) robots in each clique (cf. Section III-B). Evidently, some of these “bait” robots may not be among the \(\alpha\) “bait” robots that central-robust would have selected if it would have been applied directly to \(\mathcal{R}\) (assuming centralized communication among all robots)\footnote{We refer to any robot in the selected bait set of a clique \(k\) as a top \(\alpha_k\) robot in the clique; similarly, when we consider the set of all robots \(\mathcal{R}\), the top \(\alpha\) robots are the robots in the bait set selected by a central-robust applied to \(\mathcal{R}\) (when the number of attacks against \(\mathcal{R}\) is \(\alpha\)).}

This can be checked by communicating actions’ function values among 3-hop neighbors. Particularly, if some robot is not one of the top \(\alpha\) robots among its 3-hop neighbors, it is impossible that it is in the top \(\alpha\) robots among the entire team. Thus, this robot can be marked as “unselected” and \(\alpha_k\) can be reduced. Based on this rule, we describe our \(\alpha_k\) inferring strategy in detail in Algorithm 3.

We use Fig. 4 to illustrate how Algorithm 3 works with an example. When \(\alpha = 2\), clique \(C_2 = \{2, 8\}\) first infers \(\hat{\alpha}_1 = 2\), and robots 2 and 8 are selected. Then, robot 2 communicates with its 1-hop, 2-hop, and 3-hop neighbors \(\{1, 4, 8\}, \{3, 5, 6, 7, 11\}, \{9, 10, 12, 13\}\). If robot 2 is not one of the top 2 robots among its 3-hop neighbors, robot 2 will be marked as “unselected” and \(\hat{\alpha}_1\) will be reduced by 1 (\(\hat{\alpha}_1 = 1\)). Similarly, if robot 8 is not one of the top 2 robots among its 3-hop neighbors, \(\hat{\alpha}_1\) will be further reduced by 1 (\(\hat{\alpha}_1 = 0\)). This way, instead of picking out 9 “bait” robots from 5 cliques (Fig. 4-c), fewer robots will be selected. All in all, by using Algorithm 3 we can reduce DRM’s conservativeness in inferring the number of attacks in each clique.

B. Performance analysis of IDRM

The robots of each clique \(k\), using the number of attacks \(\alpha_k\) generated by Algorithm 3 choose actions \(\mathcal{S}_k\) by executing central-robust \(\sharp\), that is,

\[
\mathcal{S}_k = \text{central-robust}\left(\bigcup_{i \in C_k} \mathcal{X}_i, f, \hat{\alpha}_k\right).
\]

**Approximation performance of IDRM.** IDRM has the same approximation bound as that of DRM (cf. eq. 3). Notwithstanding, as we demonstrate in our numerical evaluations (cf. Section VI-B), IDRM performs better than DRM in practice, since IDRM utilizes more information (actions’ function values

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**Algorithm 3: Algorithm to approximate the number of attacks \(\alpha_k\) against a clique \(k\), given a known number of attacks \(\alpha\) against all robots in \(\mathcal{R}\).**

**Input:** Robots’ available actions \(\mathcal{X}_i, i \in \mathcal{R}\); monotone submodular function \(f\); attack number \(\alpha\).

**Output:** Number of attacks \(\hat{\alpha}_k\) for clique \(C_k\), \(k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}\).

1. if \(|C_k| > \alpha\) then
2. \(\hat{\alpha}_k = \alpha\);
3. else
4. \(\hat{\alpha}_k = |C_k|\);
5. Each clique selects the top \(\hat{\alpha}_k\) robots as \(C_k^\hat{\alpha}_k\);
6. for each robot \(i \in C_k^\hat{\alpha}_k\) do
7. if robot \(i\) is not one of the top \(\alpha\) robots in its 3-hop neighbors then
8. \(\hat{\alpha}_k = \hat{\alpha}_k - 1\);
9. return \(\hat{\alpha}_k\).
shared among all 3-hop neighbors). When the communication graph \( G \) only has non-overlapping cliques (i.e., the robots of each clique can communicate only with their neighbors within the clique), IDRM and DRM will exhibit the same performance.

**Computational performance of IDRM.** IDRM runs in more time than DRM, since each robot needs to verify if it belongs to the top \( \alpha \) robots among its 3-hop neighbors instead of its 1-hop neighbors within its clique as in DRM. But this verification only takes linear time. Thus, the running time of IDRM is similarly dominated by the central-robust operating in all cliques as in DRM. Also, each robot only needs to share with its 3-hop neighbors the function value of its best action instead of that of each action. Thus, IDRM keeps the computational advantage of DRM.

VI. NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS

We first present DRM’s Gazebo and MATLAB evaluations in scenarios of active target tracking with swarms of robots. Then we illustrate the advantages of IDRM by comparing it to DRM. The implementations’ code is available online.\(^8\) We run the code on a ThinkPad laptop with Intel Core i7 CPU @ 2.6 GHz \( \times \) 8 and 62.8 GB Memory by using Matlab 2018b and ROS Kinetic installed on Ubuntu 16.04. Due to the limited computer resources, we approximate the running time of these distributed algorithms by the total running time divided by the number of cliques, since all the cliques perform in parallel. Notably, the running time of the algorithms contains both the time of communication and the time of computation.

**A. Robust multi-robot target tracking**

**Compared algorithms.** We compare DRM with two algorithms. First, the centralized counterpart of DRM in \([21]\), named central-robust (its near-optimal performance has been extensively demonstrated in \([21]\)). The second algorithm is the centralized greedy algorithm in \([22]\), named central-greedy. The difference between the two algorithms is that the former is attack-robust, whereas the latter is attack-agnostic. For this reason, in \([21]\) we demonstrated, unsurprisingly, that central-greedy has inferior performance to central-robust in the presence of attacks. However, we still include central-greedy in the comparison, to highlight the differences among the algorithms both in running time and performance.

1) Gazebo evaluation over multiple steps with mobile targets: We use Gazebo simulations to evaluate DRM’s performance across multiple rounds (time-steps). That way, we take into account the kinematics and dynamics of the robots, as well as, the fact that the actual trajectories of the targets, along with the sensing noise, may force the robots to track fewer targets than expected. The motion model for the moving targets is known to the robots but it is corrupted with Gaussian noise. Therefore, the robots use a Kalman Filter to estimate the positions of the targets at each step. Due to the running efficacy of Gazebo (which is independent of DRM), we focus on small-scale scenarios of 10 robots. In the MATLAB simulation, we focus instead on larger-scale scenarios of up to 100 robots. We set the number of attacks \( \alpha \) equal to 4, and the robots’ communication range to be \( r_c = 5 \) meters. We also visualize the robots, their field-of-view, their cliques, and the targets using the Rviz environment (Fig. 5(b)). Each robot \( i \) has 5 candidates trajectories, \( X_i = \{\text{forward, backward, left, right, stay}\} \), and flies on a different fixed plane (to avoid collision with other robots). Each robot has a square field-of-view \( l_o \times l_o \). Once a robot picks a non-stay trajectory, it flies a distance \( l_f \) along that trajectory. If the robot selects the stay trajectory, it stays still (i.e., \( l_f = 0 \)). Thus, each trajectory has a rectangular tracking region with length \( l_t = l_f + l_o \) and width \( l_o \). We set the tracking length \( l_t = 6 \), and tracking width \( l_o = 3 \) for all robots. We assume robots obtain noisy position measurements of the targets, and then use a Kalman filter to estimate the target’s position. We consider \( f \) to be the expected number of targets covered, given all robots chosen trajectories.

For each of the compared algorithms, at each round, each robot picks one of its 5 trajectories. Then, the robot flies a \( l_f = 3 \) meters along the selected non-stay trajectory and stays still with the stay trajectory.

When an attack happens, we assume the attacked robot’s tracking sensor (e.g., camera) to be turned-off; nevertheless, we assume it can be active again at the next round. The attack is a worst-case attack, per Problem’s framework. Particularly, we compute the attack via a brute-force algorithm, which is viable for small-scale scenarios (as this one).

We repeat for 50 rounds. A video is available online.\(^8\)

**Simulation setup.** We consider 10 aerial robots that are tasked to track 50 ground mobile targets (Fig. 5(a)). We set the communication range to be \( r_c = 5 \) meters. We also visualize the robots, their field-of-view, their cliques, and the targets using the Rviz environment (Fig. 5(b)). Each robot \( i \) has 5 candidates trajectories, \( X_i = \{\text{forward, backward, left, right, stay}\} \), and flies on a different fixed plane (to avoid collision with other robots). Each robot has a square field-of-view \( l_o \times l_o \). Once a robot picks a non-stay trajectory, it flies a distance \( l_f \) along that trajectory. If the robot selects the stay trajectory, it stays still (i.e., \( l_f = 0 \)). Thus, each trajectory has a rectangular tracking region with length \( l_t = l_f + l_o \) and width \( l_o \). We set the tracking length \( l_t = 6 \), and tracking width \( l_o = 3 \) for all robots. We assume robots obtain noisy position measurements of the targets, and then use a Kalman filter to estimate the target’s position. We consider \( f \) to be the expected number of targets covered, given all robots chosen trajectories.

For each of the compared algorithms, at each round, each robot picks one of its 5 trajectories. Then, the robot flies a \( l_f = 3 \) meters along the selected non-stay trajectory and stays still with the stay trajectory.

When an attack happens, we assume the attacked robot’s tracking sensor (e.g., camera) to be turned-off; nevertheless, we assume it can be active again at the next round. The attack is a worst-case attack, per Problem’s framework. Particularly, we compute the attack via a brute-force algorithm, which is viable for small-scale scenarios (as this one).

We repeat for 50 rounds. A video is available online.\(^8\)

**Results.** The results are reported in Fig. 6. We observe:

- **a) Superior running time:** DRM runs considerably faster than both central-robust and central-greedy: 1.8 orders of magnitude faster than the former, and 2.2 orders faster than the latter, with average running time 0.1msec (Fig. 6(a)).

- **b) Near-to-centralized tracking performance:** Despite that DRM runs considerably faster, it maintains near-to-centralized performance: DRM covers on average 18.8 targets per round, while central-robust covers 17.1 (Fig. 6(b)). To statis-
Matlab evaluation over one step with static targets:
We use Matlab simulations to evaluate DRM’s performance in large-scale scenarios. Specifically, we evaluate DRM’s running time and performance for various numbers of robots (from 10 to 100) and communication ranges (resulting from as few as 5 cliques to as many as 30 cliques). We compare all algorithms over a single execution round.

Simulation setup. We consider \( N \) mobile robots, and 100 targets. We vary \( N \) from 10 to 100. For each \( N \), we set the number of attacks equal to \( \lfloor N/4 \rfloor, \lfloor N/2 \rfloor \) and \( \lceil 3N/4 \rceil \).

Similarly to the Gazebo simulations, each robot moves on a fixed plane, and has 5 possible trajectories: forward, backward, left, right, and stay. We set \( l_l = 10 \) and \( l_r = 3 \) for all robots. We randomly generate the positions of the robots and targets in a 2D space of size \([0, 200] \times [0, 200]\). Particularly, we generate 30 Monte Carlo runs (for each \( N \)). We assume that the robots have available estimates of targets’ positions. For each Monte Carlo run, all compared algorithms are executed with the same initialization (same positions of robots and targets). DRM is tested across three communication ranges: \( r_c = 30, 60, 90 \).

For a visualization of \( r_c \)’s effect on the formed cliques, see Fig. 7 where we present two of the generated scenarios. All algorithms are executed for one round in each Monte Carlo run.

Notably, since we consider large-scale scenarios (up to \( N = 100 \) robots, and up to 75 attacks, when \( N = 100 \), and \( \alpha = \lceil 3N/4 \rceil \)), computing the worst-case attack via a brute-force algorithm is now infeasible. Particularly, given a trajectory assignment \( S \) to all robots, the problem of computing a worst-case attack is equivalent to minimizing a non-increasing submodular function, an NP-hard problem [40]. Hence, we consider the attacker to use a greedy heuristic to attack the robots, instead of executing the worst-case attacks. Proposed greedy approaches can be found in [40-10].

Results. The results are reported in Fig. 8 and we make the similar qualitative conclusions as in the Gazebo evaluation:

a) Superior running time: DRM runs several orders faster than both central-robust and central-greedy: 1 to 2 orders on average, achieving running time from 0.5msec to 15msec (Figs. 8(a-d)). Particularly, in Figs. 8(a, b), the algorithms’ running time is evaluated with respect to the communication range \( r_c \) (with the number of attacks fixed as \( \alpha = \lfloor N/2 \rfloor \)). We observe that DRM’s running time increases as \( r_c \) increases. This is because, with a larger \( r_c \), DCP generates larger cliques and robots need to communicate more messages and take more time on computation (Theorem 1), and thus both DRM’s communication time and computation time increase, which is shown in Figs. 8(e, f). Particularly, DRM spends more time on communication with a smaller \( r_c \) (e.g., \( r_c = 30 \)) and spends more time on communication with a larger \( r_c \) (e.g., \( r_c = 90 \)).

In Figs. 8(c, d), the algorithms’ running time is evaluated in terms of the number of attacks \( \alpha \) (with the communication range fixed as \( r_c = 60 \)). We observe central-robust runs faster as \( \alpha \) increases, which is due to how central-robust works, that causes central-robust to become faster as \( \alpha \) tends to \( N \) [21]. This parallels the observation that DRM’s computation time decreases as \( \alpha \) increases (Figs. 8(g-h)), since DRM’s computation time mainly comes from the function evaluations in per clique central-robust.

b) Near-to-centralized tracking performance: Although DRM runs considerably faster, it retains a tracking performance close to the centralized one (Figs. 8(i-l)). Unsurprisingly, the attack-agnostic greedy performs worse than all algorithms. Particularly, as shown in Figs. 8(i, j) when the communication range \( r_c \) increases from 30 to 90, central-robust’s tracking performance improves. This is because, with a larger \( r_c \), fewer and larger cliques are generated by DCP, and DRM behaves closer to central-robust. Figs. 8(k, l) show that all algorithms’ tracking performance drops when the number of attacks \( \alpha \) increases.

To summarize, in all simulations above, DRM offered significant computational speed-ups, and, yet, still achieved a tracking performance that matched the performance of the centralized, near-optimal algorithm in [21].

10 Alternative algorithms, along with approximate guarantees, to approximate the worst-case attacks can be found in [41-43].
Fig. 7. MATLAB evaluation: Examples of clique formulations (Algorithm 2) across various numbers of robots and communication ranges \( r_c \).

(a) 10 robots with \( r_c = 120 \)
(b) 15 robots with \( r_c = 60 \)
(c) 30 robots with \( r_c = 90 \)
(d) 100 robots with \( r_c = 50 \)

Fig. 8. MATLAB evaluations (averaged across 30 Monte Carlo runs): (a)-(d) depict running time results of three algorithms, for various \( \alpha \) and \( r_c \) values; (e)-(h) depict the corresponding communication time and the computation time of DRM (distributed-robust); and (i)-(l) depict corresponding tracking performance results.

B. Improved multi-robot target tracking

Compared algorithms. We compare IDRM with DRM. The performance of the algorithms is evaluated through Matlab
simulations on active target tracking scenarios. We compare the algorithms in terms of the total number of attacks inferred, running time, and number of targets covered after $\alpha$ attacks. $\alpha$ is known to both IDRM with DRM. The algorithms are compared over a single execution for 30 trials.

Simulation setup. We consider $N$ mobile robots, and 100 targets. We set $N$ as 20 and 100 for small-scale and large-scale evaluations, respectively. For evaluating the algorithms in the large-scale case (e.g., $N = 100$), we approximate the worst-case attack by a greedy attack since computing the worst-case attack requires exponential time. The total number of attacks $\alpha$ is set as 6 when $N = 20$, and as 30 when $N = 100$. The communication range $r_c$ is set as $r_c = 120$ for $N = 20$, and $r_c = 70$ for $N = 100$. The remaining settings are the same as in the Matlab simulation setup of Section VI-A.

Results. The results are reported in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10.

a) Conservativeness relaxing performance: Fig. 9(a) and Fig. 10(a) show that IDRM relaxes the conservativeness of inferring number of attacks $\alpha$ in both small-scale ($N = 20$, $\alpha = 6$) and large-scale ($N = 100$, $\alpha = 30$) cases. Notably, when the communication range is smaller (e.g., $r_c = 70$ in Fig. 10(a)), the inferred number of attacks by DRM is much larger than the real number of attacks ($\alpha = 30$). That is because, with a smaller communication range, the graph is likely to be partitioned into more and smaller cliques by Algorithm 2, which increases the conservativeness of inferring $\alpha$ in DRM. While IDRM gracefully relaxes this conservativeness through 3-hop neighboring communications (Algorithm 3). Particularly, in some trials of both small-scale and large-scale evaluations, the number of attacks inferred by IDRM is very close to the real number of attacks $\alpha$.

b) Superior tracking performance: Because of the conservativeness relaxing, IDRM tracks more targets than DRM (Fig. 9(b) and Fig. 10(b)) since it reduces the unnecessary coverage overlaps induced by conservative estimate of $\alpha$. To further evaluate the tracking performance IDRM and DRM, we run a t-test with the default 5% significance level on the targets covered by them. The t-test gives the test decision $H = 1$ and $p$-value $p = 0.025$ for the small-scale case (Fig. 9(b)) and the test decision $H = 1$ and $p$-value $p = 0.030$ for the large-scale case (Fig. 10(b)). This indicates that, in both cases, t-test rejects the null hypothesis that the means of the number of targets covered by IDRM and DRM are equal to each other at the 5% significance level. Therefore, the difference between the means of the number of targets covered by them is statistically significant.

c) Comparative running time: Fig. 9(c) and Fig. 10(c) show that both DRM and IDRM run very fast (e.g., averaged running time is less than 0.005 seconds). That is because, in IDRM, after robots share the number of targets covered by their best actions and infer a less conservative $\alpha_k$ (Algorithm 3), all cliques run central-robust in parallel as well.

VII. CONCLUSION

We worked towards securing swarm-robotics applications against worst-case attacks resulting in robot withdrawals. Particularly, we proposed DRM, a distributed robust submodular optimization algorithm. DRM is general-purpose: it applies to any Problem 1’s instance. We proved DRM runs faster than its centralized counterpart, without compromising approximation performance. We demonstrated both its running time and near-optimality in Gazebo and MATLAB simulations of active target tracking. However, in DRM, each clique assumes the number of attacks $\alpha_k$ to be the total number of attacks $\alpha$, which can be too conservative if the robots are partitioned into many small-size cliques. To relax this conservativeness, we leveraged the 3-hop neighboring communications to present an improved version of DRM, called IDRM. We showed that IDRM improves the target-tracking performance of DRM with comparative running time.

Note that, with DCP (Algorithm 2), the clique partition solely depends on the positions of robots and the communication range. If robots have a very long communication range, they are likely to be all part of a single clique and then DRM would be the same as central-robust. One way to address this issue is to intelligently manage the number of cliques to control the trade-off between complexity and optimality. Hence, one future research direction is to design such clique partition approaches that can be complementary to DCP. Another potential improvement on DCP is to relax its 3-hop communication constraints. One way is to employ an anytime communication protocol that is tolerant to the failures of communication channels. Another direction is to enable asynchronous communication and achieve tolerance to communication delays.

A second future direction is to secure the team performance when the number of worst-case attacks is unknown. One heuristic approach to infer the number of attacks $\alpha_k$ distributively for cliques without knowing $\alpha$ is presented in the arXiv version [44] (cf. Algorithm 5 in Appendix D of [44]). However, this algorithm is a heuristic approach that aims to secure the expected worst-case performance and thus may not have guarantees against a specific number of worst-case attacks. Therefore, our future work is focused on designing algorithms that have approximation guarantees against the unknown number of attacks. A third future avenue is to investigate other attack or failure models, e.g., random failures [45], [46], and design corresponding distributed robust algorithms.

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APPENDIX

A. Proof of Theorem 7

Proof: DRM’s running time is equal to DCP’s plus the time for all cliques to execute central-robust in parallel.

Particularly, the running time of DCP contains the time of three-round communications—finding neighbors (Algorithm 2 line 3), exchanging neighbor sets (Algorithm 2 line 4) and exchanging computed cliques (Algorithm 2 line 6) and
the time of neighbor set intersection (Algorithm 2 line 5). Since robots perform in parallel by DCP, DCP’s running time depends on the robot that spends the highest time on three-round communications and neighbor set intersection. Thus, DCP takes \(O(1)(t_{DCP}^c + t_{DCP}^s)\) time. Specifically, in each communication round, each robot \(i\) sends its message to and receives the messages from its neighbors, and thus the number of messages exchanged by each robot \(i\) is \(|N_i|\). Hence, over three-round communications, each robot exchanges \(3|N_i|\) messages. During the neighbor set intersection, each robot \(i\) intersects its neighbor set with those of its neighbors, and thus the number of set intersections (operations) for each robot \(i\) is \(|N_i|\).

Next, all cliques perform central-robust \(21\) in parallel. In each clique \(C_k\), each robot \(i\) first communicates and exchanges information collected (e.g., the subsets of targets covered by its candidate actions) with all the other robots. Hence, the number of messages exchanged by each robot \(i\) in \(C_k\) is \(|C_k| - 1\). Notably, since robots can communicate with each other in \(C_k\), the communication only takes one round.

After information exchange, the robots in \(C_k\) perform central-robust that executes sequentially two steps—the bait assignment and the greedy assignment. The bait assignment sorts out the best \(\min(\alpha, |C_k|)\) single actions from \(|C_k|\) robots. We denote the joint candidate action set in \(C_k\) as \(\mathcal{X}_{C_k} = \bigcup_{i \in C_k} \mathcal{X}_i\). Then, the sorting needs \(O(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}| \log(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}|))\) evaluations of objective function \(f\) and thus takes \(O(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}| \log(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}|))t^f\) time. Then, the greedy assignment uses the standard greedy algorithm \(22\) to choose actions for the remaining robots, which needs \(O(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}|^2)\) evaluations of \(f\) and thus takes \(O(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}|^2)t^f\) time. Hence, the number of function evaluations (operations) is \(O(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}| \log(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}|)) + O(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}|^2) = O(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}|^2)\).

Since all cliques perform central-robust in parallel, the running time depends on the clique that spends the highest time, i.e., clique \(M\). \(M\)’s running time contains the time of exchanging information collected, i.e., \(O(1)t_{CRO}^c\), and of evaluating function \(f\), i.e., \(O(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}| \log(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}|))t^f + O(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}|^2)t^f = O(|\mathcal{X}_{C_k}|^2)t^f\). Thus, in total, all cliques performing central-robust in parallel takes \(O(1)t_{CRO}^c + \ldots\)
\( O(|\mathcal{X}_C|^2) t_f \) time.

All in all, DRM takes \( O(1)(t_{\text{DCP}}^c + t_{\text{DCP}}^s) + O(1)t_{\text{CRD}} + O(|\mathcal{X}_C|^2) t_f \) time. In addition, each robot has four-round communications, including three rounds in DCP and one round in per clique central-robust, and exchanges \( 3|\mathcal{N}_i| + \mathcal{C}_i \) messages with \( i \in \mathcal{C}_c \). Moreover, DRM performs \( O(|\mathcal{X}_C|^2) \) operations for set intersections of each robot in DCP and \( O(|\mathcal{X}_C|^2) \) evaluations of objective function \( f \) in central-robust for each clique \( \mathcal{C}_c \).

**B. Proof of Theorem 2**

**Proof:** We prove Theorem 2, i.e., DRM’s approximation bound, by following the steps of [19] Proof of Theorem 1.

We introduce the notation: \( \mathcal{S}^* \) denotes an optimal solution to Problem 1. Given an action assignment \( \mathcal{S} \) to all robots in \( \mathcal{R} \), and a subset of robots \( \mathcal{R}' \), we denote \( \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{R}') \) the actions of the robots in \( \mathcal{R}' \) (i.e., the restriction of \( \mathcal{S} \) to \( \mathcal{R} \)). And vice versa: given an action assignment \( \mathcal{S}' \) to a subset \( \mathcal{R}' \) of robots, we let \( \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{S}') \) denote this subset (i.e., \( \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{S}') = \mathcal{R}' \)). Additionally, we let \( \mathcal{S}_k \triangleq \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{C}_k) \); that is, \( \mathcal{S}_k \) is the restriction of \( \mathcal{S} \) to the clique \( \mathcal{C}_k \) selected by DRM’s line 1 \( (k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}) \); evidently, \( \mathcal{S} = \bigcup_{k=1}^K \mathcal{S}_k \). Moreover, we let \( \mathcal{S}_k \) correspond to bait actions chosen by central-robust in \( \mathcal{C}_k \), and \( \mathcal{S}_k \) denote the greedy actions for the remaining robots in \( \mathcal{C}_k \); that is, \( \mathcal{S}_k = \mathcal{S}_k^{*}\cup\mathcal{S}_k^g \). If \( \alpha \geq |\mathcal{C}_k| \), then \( \mathcal{S}_k = \emptyset \). Henceforth, we let \( \mathcal{S} \) be the action assignment given by DRM to all robots in \( \mathcal{R} \). Also, we let \( \mathcal{W} \) be remaining robots after the attack \( \mathcal{A}^*(\mathcal{S}); \) i.e., \( \mathcal{W} \triangleq \mathcal{R} \setminus \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A}^*(\mathcal{S})) \). Further, we let \( \mathcal{W}_k \triangleq \mathcal{W} \cap \mathcal{C}_k \) be remaining robots in \( \mathcal{C}_k \), \( \mathcal{W}_k \triangleq \mathcal{W} \cap \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{S}_k) \) be remaining robots with bait actions in \( \mathcal{C}_k \), and \( \mathcal{W}_k \triangleq \mathcal{W} \cap \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{S}_k^g) \) be remaining robots with greedy actions in \( \mathcal{C}_k \). Then we have \( \mathcal{S}_k^{*}\cup\mathcal{S}_k^g \) and \( \mathcal{S}_k^{*}\cup\mathcal{S}_k^g \) to denote the attacked robots with bait actions and with greedy actions in \( \mathcal{C}_k \), respectively. Then, we have the number of attacks in \( \mathcal{C}_k \) as \( |\mathcal{S}_k^{*}\cup\mathcal{S}_k^g| \) and

\[
|\mathcal{S}_k^{*}\cup\mathcal{S}_k^g| + |\mathcal{S}_k^{*}\cup\mathcal{S}_k^g| \leq \alpha, \tag{4}
\]

since the total number of attacks for the robot team is \( \alpha \). Also, we have

\[
|\mathcal{S}_k^{*}\cup\mathcal{S}_k^g| + |\mathcal{S}_k^{*}\cup\mathcal{S}_k^g| = \alpha, \tag{5}
\]

since the number of robots with bait actions in \( \mathcal{C}_k \) is \( \alpha \). With Eqs. 4 and 5, we have

\[
|\mathcal{W}_k| \geq |\mathcal{S}_k^{*}\cup\mathcal{S}_k^g|. \tag{6}
\]

With Eq. 6, we let \( \mathcal{W}_k^f \) denote the remaining robots in \( \mathcal{W}_k \) after removing from it any subset of robots with cardinality \( |\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{S}_k^f) \setminus \mathcal{W}_k^f| \). Then \( |\mathcal{W}_k^f| \setminus \mathcal{W}_k^f| = |\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{S}_k^f) \setminus \mathcal{W}_k^f| \) and robots in \( \mathcal{W}_k^f \setminus \mathcal{W}_k^f \) have both actions and robots in \( \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{S}_k^f) \setminus \mathcal{W}_k^f \) have greedy actions. Then, \( \mathcal{W}_k^f \setminus \mathcal{W}_k^f \) can be used to compensate for the attacked robots \( \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{S}_k^f) \setminus \mathcal{W}_k^f \) in \( \mathcal{C}_k \).

Now the proof follows from the definition of \( \nu_f \) (see 19, Proof of Theorem 1).

Eqs. 8 and 9 follow from the notation we introduced above. Eq. 10 holds since \( \mathcal{W}_k^f = \mathcal{W}_k^f \cup (\mathcal{W}_k^f \setminus \mathcal{W}_k^f) \). Ineq. 11 holds since a) \( |\mathcal{W}_k^f \setminus \mathcal{W}_k^f| = |\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{S}_k^f) \setminus \mathcal{W}_k^f| \); b) robots in \( \mathcal{W}_k^f \setminus \mathcal{W}_k^f \) have both actions and robots in \( \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{S}_k^f) \setminus \mathcal{W}_k^f \) have greedy actions, such that for any \( r \in \mathcal{W}_k^f \setminus \mathcal{W}_k^f \) and \( r' \in \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{S}_k^f) \setminus \mathcal{W}_k^f \), we have \( f(S(r)) \geq f(S(r')) \). Eq. 12 holds from the notation. Ineq. 13 holds by the submodularity of \( f \), which implies \( f(A) + f(B) \geq f(A \cup B) \) for any sets \( A, B \). Ineq. 14 holds since a) with respect to the left term in the sum, the robots in the sum correspond to robots whose actions are baits; and b) with respect to the right term in the sum, the greedy algorithm that has assigned the actions \( \mathcal{S}_k^g \) guarantees at least 1/2 of the optimal [22]. Ineq. 15 holds again due to the submodularity of \( f \), as above. The same for ineq. 12. Ineq. 13 follows from [19], Proof of Theorem 1 because of the worst-case removal.
Algorithm 4: Myopic algorithm for Problem 1

Input: Robots’ available actions $X_i$, $i \in R$; monotone and submodular $f$.

Output: Robots’ actions $S$.

1: $S \leftarrow \emptyset$
2: for $i \in R$ do
3: $s \leftarrow \text{argmax}_{s \in X_i} f(s)$;
4: $S \leftarrow S \cup \{s\}$,
5: return $S$.

C. Myopic optimization yields tighter approximation performance, yet worse practical performance

The myopic Algorithm 4 according to which each robot selects its best action independently, guarantees a tighter approximation bound than that of DRM:

Theorem 3 (Approximation performance of Algorithm 4). Algorithm 4 returns a feasible action-set $S$ such that

$$\frac{f(S \setminus A^*(S))}{f^*} \geq 1 - \nu_f. \quad (18)$$

Proof: We split $S$ generated by Algorithm 4 into $S_1$ and $S_2$, with $S_1$ denoting the action set selected by the top $\alpha$ robots, and $S_2$ denoting the action set selected by the remaining $|R| - \alpha$ robots. Denote $S_2^*$ as the action set selected by $R(S_2)$ to maximize $f(A)$, $A \in \mathcal{A}$, $A \subseteq \mathcal{A}(R(S_2))$.

$$f(S \setminus A^*(S)) \geq (1 - \nu_f) \sum_{s \in S_2} f(s) \quad (19)$$

$$\geq (1 - \nu_f) \sum_{s \in S_2} f(s^*) \quad (20)$$

$$\geq (1 - \nu_f) f(S_2^*) \quad (21)$$

$$\geq (1 - \nu_f) f(S^* \setminus A^*(S^*)). \quad (22)$$

Ineq. (19) follows from the definition of $\nu_f$ (see [19] Proof of Theorem 1). Ineq. (20) holds since Algorithm 4 selects the best action for each robot (Algorithm 4 line 3). Ineq. (21) holds due to the submodularity of $f$. Ineq. (22) follows from [19] Proof of Theorem 1] because of the worst-case removal.

However, Algorithm 4 performs in practice worse than DRM because: (i) it chooses actions for each robot independently of the actions of the rest of the robots (instead, DRM takes into account other robots’ actions to intentionally reduce the performance redundancy among these robots); and (ii) it is equivalent to central-robust but under the assumption the number of attacks is equal to the number of robots, which is, evidently, conservative; DRM instead is less conservative assuming at most $\alpha$ attacks per clique).

An evaluation of the practical performance of Algorithm 4 in comparison to DRM’s is made in Fig. 11. The figures clearly show that in both small-scale and large-scale cases, DRM outperforms Algorithm 4.

Figure 11. MATLAB evaluations: comparison of number of targets covered by Algorithm 4 (called MO), DRM, IDRM in (a) small-scale and (b) large-scale cases. The simulation settings follow the Matlab simulation setup of Section VI.A. In (a) small-scale case with $N = 20$, $\alpha = 4$, and $r_c = 120$, the number of target tracked by these three algorithms are calculated after applying 4 worst-case attacks. In (b) large-scale case with $N = 100$, $\alpha = 10$, and $r_c = 70$, the number of target tracked by these three algorithms are calculated after applying 10 greedy attacks. In (a) and (b), the representations of each box’s components follow the corresponding explanations in the caption of Fig. 6.

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