Exploring the Reasons for France-India Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region under Macron's Government

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Abstract. France and India concluded a bilateral strategic partnership in 1998, and the two countries have long maintained maritime military cooperation. Since Macron came to power, France's "Indo-Pacific Strategy" has been used as a basis to enhance the breadth and depth of maritime security cooperation with India in the Indo-Pacific region, which has the strategic consideration of safeguarding sovereign interests and coping with the complex international situation in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as the purpose of promoting economic exchanges and boosting economic benefits through maritime security cooperation. However, the unpredictable domestic and international situations have brought certain obstacles to the deep development of maritime security cooperation between the two countries, and the prospect of cooperation remains to be seen.

Keywords: Macron; France; India; maritime security cooperation; Indo-Pacific.

1. Introduction

The geopolitical status of the Indo-Pacific region has jumped up since the 21st century. To protect its sovereign security in the Indo-Pacific region and further expand France's influence in global affairs, French President Emmanuel Macron first articulated France's Indo-Pacific strategy in his 2018 Sydney speech and formally launched the "La stratégie de la France dans l'Indopacifique" (France's Indo-Pacific Strategy) in 2021. The "Indo-Pacific Strategy" (La stratégie de la France dans l'Indopacifique) is a clearer and more complete statement of the Macron government's strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. France attaches importance to maritime security cooperation with India, and the two sides have achieved certain results in joint naval exercises, maritime non-traditional security, maritime information exchange, and military trade. To date, changes in the international environment and the domestic situation of France have also affected France's cooperation with India to a certain extent. Therefore, this paper attempts to explore the reasons for promoting and constraining maritime security cooperation between the two countries since Macron's administration, to examine the potential logic of cooperation between the two countries in this field and further exploring possible prospects.

2. Overview of maritime security cooperation between the two countries under the Macron government

2.1 Organize joint military exercises

Launched in 1993, the bilateral naval exercises between France and India, officially named Varuna since 2001, are an important part of the strategic partnership between the two countries and have matured as a result of the importance both sides attach to them. Since Macron took office, the two countries have held joint military exercises almost every year, except for 2020, the year most affected by the new crown epidemic, to expand the scope of the exercises. The latest "Varuna" joint military exercise was held in March-April 2022 and was the 20th joint maritime exercise between the two countries. The French Navy is sending its Lafayette-class frigate (FS Courbet), nuclear-powered submarine (FS Amethyst), and submarine support ship (FS Loire) to participate in the exercise, while the Indian Navy is sending its Indian-made stealth destroyer (INS Chennai) with an integrated...
helicopter (Sea King Mk 42B), maritime patrol aircraft (P8I and Dornier) and MiG 29 fighters. The two navies focused the exercise on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises and conducted personnel cross-visits later in the exercise. Over the years, the Varuna joint exercises have grown in scope and complexity, and the French side sees them as "a major driver of interaction between the two navies at the operational level" that "enhances the ability of both sides to conduct joint operations in the maritime theater when required. The French side sees this as "a major impetus for interaction between the two navies at the operational level" that "which will bolster their ability to undertake joint operations in maritime theatre, when required."

**Table 1. Summary of France-India joint maritime military exercises, 2017-2022**

| Time       | Name   | Equipment                                                                 | Location             | Goal                                      | Emphasis                                         |
|------------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| 2017.4-24-5.12 | Varuna | French Navy: Héroule multi-mission frigate, Aquitaine and Agilis; two anti-aircraft Sigma Cloud; and the Stealth Sigma Aquila. Indian Navy: JAGUAR operational missile destroyer INS Shakti, one guided missile Sigma 89, one modified Sigma 89, one anti-aircraft missile ferry ship INS Athitya. | Mid-Atlantic & Arabian Sea | Enhancing interoperability between the navies of the two countries by sharing equipment and personnel so as to facilitate in conducting joint operations jointly, and to synergise the same. | Anti-Submarine Operations Training. |
| 2018.3-20-3.24 | Varuna (I) | Indian Navy: a destroyer INS Shakti, two guided missile Sigma 89, one modified Sigma 89, one anti-aircraft missile ferry ship INS Athitya. | The coast of Goa | Enhancing interoperability and exchange of personnel. | Joint Anti-Submarine Operations Training. |
| 2018.3-1-3.5 | Varuna (II) | Indian Navy: a destroyer INS Mumbai, a frigate INS Trincomalee, two submarines. | Chumphon's coast | Amphibious Operations. | |
| 2019.5-1-3.5-10 | Varuna (I) | French Navy: an aircraft carrier FS Charles de Gaulle, two destroyers INS Faujir and INS Pratap, a frigate INS Lorient-Deville, a frigate INS Paris, a frigate INS Namur, a nuclear submarine | Reunion Island | Air defense, firing measures, asymmetric warfare and combination. | |
| 2019.5-1-3.5-25 | Varuna (II) | Indian Navy: a nuclear attack submarine INS Shakti. | Oyster | Cross-talks, professional interactions and discussions, and open events. | |

In addition to holding bilateral naval exercises with India, France has also been actively using multilateral naval exercises to strengthen maritime security cooperation with India in recent years. 2019 will see France take the lead in organizing the "La Pérouse" joint naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal for the first time, with the U.S., Japan, and Australia as partners. India will join the exercise for the first time in 2021. This will provide an opportunity for these five like-minded, high-end naval forces to develop closer ties, improve their skills and promote maritime cooperation in a free and open Indo-Pacific region," the French Embassy said in a statement, highlighting the significance of La Pérouse. One of the implications of the joint exercise is to strengthen “interoperability with key partners in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly with India, France's most important strategic partner in Asia.”

### 2.2 Jointly cope with non-traditional security threats

For a long time, the unique geographical location and rich shipping trade of the Indian Ocean have made piracy attacks, illegal trafficking, and other non-traditional security threats emerge, severely affecting the security and economic interests of many sovereign countries, and the Indian Ocean waters have become more and more the focus of attention of all countries. As the only EU country with territory in the Indo-Pacific region, France has deployed considerable military forces in Abu Dhabi and Djibouti to combat piracy to safeguard France's sovereign security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Similarly, India attaches great importance to combating piracy and drug smuggling and has spared no effort to carry out anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden region in particular. The two countries share common interests and broad prospects for cooperation in jointly combating non-traditional security threats at sea.
In 2018, following Macron's state visit to India, the two sides issued a joint strategic vision for cooperation between the two countries in the Indian Ocean region, stating that “France and India have shared concerns about the emerging challenges in the Indian Ocean Region that include: maritime traffic security in the face of the threats of terrorism and piracy...fight against organized crime, trafficking, including in weapons of mass destruction, smuggling and illegal fishing (IUUs)”, and declares that they will further strengthen their cooperation on maritime security. In 2022, when France hosted the first EU Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum to discuss security and defense cooperation between EU member states and selected Indo-Pacific countries with some 30 countries, including India, discussions also focused on joint efforts to combat non-traditional security threats in the Indian Ocean and to establish joint response mechanisms.

2.3 Focus on maritime information exchange

Since Macron's successful election as president in 2017, France and India have engaged in a series of high-level bilateral dialogues on maritime security cooperation. In January, France sent a high-level delegation to India, during which the signing of the White Boat Agreement clarified the two countries' determination to deepen maritime information exchange and cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, and in October, when French Defense Minister Florence Parly paid an official visit to India, the two foreign ministers recognized the need to expand awareness in the Indian Ocean and decided to further expand the scope of maritime information sharing. In 2018, the Joint Strategic Vision issued after Macron's state visit to India highlighted the importance of continuing to strengthen the exchange of maritime information between the two countries in the Indian Ocean based on the White Ship Agreement, ensuring the interests of both countries in the Indian Ocean region by establishing a framework for the realization of maritime domain awareness missions.

Another outcome of the visit is reflected in an agreement signed in 2019 between CNES and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) on the joint development of maritime surveillance programs between the two countries. The agreement specifies that both parties will establish an operating system for the detection, identification, and tracking of ships in the Indian Ocean, focusing on the development of an Indian Ocean maritime surveillance satellite system and a mechanism for the fusion of data related to the Indian Ocean. 2021, Alice Guitton, Director General for International Relations and Strategy of France, and Ajay Kumar, Indian Minister of Defense, co-chaired the 17th High Defense Council. The 17th High Defense Council (HDC), in which both sides identified information-sharing, maritime cooperation, and industrial cooperation in the defense sector as priority areas of cooperation for the development of bilateral relations, and expressed their commitment to work together to "promote an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region".

In addition to close bilateral high-level dialogue, France is also active in broadening information sharing channels with India through multilateral state cooperation. In May 2021, France, India, and Australia held their first trilateral ministerial dialogue and issued a joint statement during their participation in the G7 meeting in London. The three foreign ministers expressed their intention to further deepen maritime safety and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, with particular emphasis on the trilateral maritime domain awareness information exchange workshop held at the Indian Ocean Regional Information Fusion Center (IFC-IOR). The talks identified three priority areas for joint action by the three parties, with deeper information sharing topping the list as a way to deepen "cooperation in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster response and to improve naval interoperability."

2.4 Enhance military trade cooperation between the two countries

India is one of France's major arms partners, and its defense autonomy program has shown France great prospects for cooperation in military trade between the two countries. The contract for 36 Rafale fighter jets became the largest order in the history of military trade cooperation between the two countries. Despite the global public health crisis in 2020, France handed over the first 27 Rafale fighters at the end of August 2021, of which 26 have already flown to India, and will commission the
first three conventional submarines built in India. The first three conventional submarines built in
India will also be commissioned.

Following Macron's second presidential election victory, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
visited France on May 4, 2022, and issued a joint statement with Macron the following day. In the
joint statement, the two sides reviewed their strategic cooperation, citing the timely delivery of Rafale
fighter jets and the technology transfer of the Scorpene submarine as key achievements. The two
heads of state agreed that "the long-standing armament cooperation is testimony to the mutual trust
between the two sides", and agreed that France will participate more deeply in India's "self-reliance"
program and strengthen its cooperation with India in defense technology, manufacturing, and exports.

3. Driving factors for France to strengthen maritime security cooperation with
India

3.1 Political factor: maintain the sovereign interests of the Indo-Pacific region

France firmly defends its sovereign security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. France's territories
in the Indo-Pacific region include mainly La Réunion, Mayotte, French Polynésie française and
Nouvelle-Calédonie. The Indo-Pacific region is also home to some 1.5 million French citizens, with
more than 7,000 subsidiaries of established companies and around 8,000 resident French soldiers. As
a result, France often presents itself as an "Indo-Pacific country" and is actively involved in Indo-
Pacific affairs.

The Indian Ocean waters are rich in natural resources such as oil and natural gas and have a pivotal
position in international shipping, energy transportation, and international trade, among which the
Straits of Malacca, the Gulf of Aden, and the Somali Sea are important transportation routes in the
world. The Indian Ocean waters carry the interests of many actors in international relations and the
ensuing conflicts of interest, which have become one of the reasons for the endless rivalries between
the major powers and the complicated border situation in this region since the 21st century. In France's
view, its territory in the Indo-Pacific region would also be affected. In this regard, the then-French
Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said in the Indo-Pacific Strategy: "As the Indo-Pacific region
is becoming a strategic center of gravity for the world, and as the security, economic, technological
and environmental challenges that arise there are also challenges for us France and the EU have
interests to defend, values to promote and partnerships to forge there."

3.2 Economic factor: Promote domestic arms exports

France is a leader in industrial technology in the defense sector, particularly in aviation, naval, and
missile equipment. Demonstrating defense armaments to India is also an important purpose of France
in the joint military exercises held by the two countries in the name of deepening maritime security
cooperation. The reason for this is that France's small domestic market and the economic benefits of
advanced defense industry technology, mainly translated by armaments exports, have also increased
France's dependence on exports. According to Stockholm Peace Research Institute statistics, France
is the third largest arms supplier in the world, with a 59% increase in arms exports in 2017-2021
compared to 2012-2016, while India is the world's largest arms importer in 2017-2021. As the sixth
largest economy in the world, India has a large economy but a relatively weak defense industrial and
technological base to meet its defense needs and has been importing armaments from Russia, France,
and other countries with strong growth in imports. According to The Conversation, France exported
2.5% of the total arms orders to India from 1991 to 2000 but has grown to 12% from 2011 to 2020,
with the largest contribution from the Scorpene submarine and the Rafale fighter jet. The biggest
contributors are the contracts for Scorpene submarines and Rafale fighter jets.

This shows that strengthening maritime security cooperation between the two sides can, to a certain
extent, enhance political trust between France and India, help boost French arms exports to India,
promote the diversification of French arms export markets, and better cope with the complex
environment of the international market. After the announcement of the trilateral partnership between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia ("AUKUS") in 2021, Australia canceled the contract for 12 conventional-powered submarines signed with France in 2016 and instead purchased nuclear submarines from two other AUKUS members.

The move dealt a heavy blow to French arms exports and severely affected France's diplomatic relations with the three countries, and prompted France to reorient its Indo-Pacific strategy to place greater emphasis on cooperation with India, a country with a large economy that seeks strategic autonomy to bridge the economic gap. In December 2021, French Defense Minister Frans Paley revisited India and held his annual defense dialogue with Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, during which Paley “reiterated France’s commitment to strengthening India’s defense industrial base and its willingness to offer the best of its technology with a high ‘Make In India’ component.” The French government intends to cater to India's enthusiasm for independent arms development and expand military trade between the two countries.

3.3 Diplomatic factor: strengthen international influence

India, as an important country in the Indo-Pacific region, has a strong interest in participating in the region and is an important partner for France to strengthen its influence in the Indo-Pacific region. The high priority given by both countries to their maritime security has led both sides to be active in many regional organizations in the Indo-Pacific region, and France has taken advantage of such multilateral cooperation to strengthen its partnership with India, such as participation in the Summit of Asian Coast Guard Agencies (HACGAM), the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), etc., to jointly In May 2022, at the Tokyo Summit of the Quadripartite Security Dialogue, India also announced its formal participation in the Indo-Pacific Maritime Situational Awareness Partnership (IPMDA). France has established a network of partnerships with the countries of the Quadripartite Security Dialogue (QUAD), which are active in the Indo-Pacific region, to position itself in the competition of the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy and to seek opportunities to enhance France's voice in the region. T France has established a network of partnerships with the countries of the Quadripartite Security Dialogue (QUAD), which are active in the Indo-Pacific region, and is seeking opportunities to enhance France's voice in the region. In this network, India is an important link.

Moreover, the world strategic landscape and the power structure among countries in the Indo-Pacific region are different from those of the past. France's diplomacy is deeply influenced by de Gaulle's policy of independence and autonomy, and the Macron government has been able to respond to the tense and delicate geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific region in a more flexible manner, especially focusing on developing relations with India, Australia, Japan and ASEAN, and downplaying the issue of "choosing sides" in the strategic competition between China and the United States while It has also strengthened its influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Among France's major partners in the Indo-Pacific region, India is an ideal strategic partner for France because of its traditional non-alignment policy and its firm sense of strategic autonomy, which makes it cautious in cooperating with the United States and other countries, as well as its huge economic volume and important international status.

4. Constraints on France's deepening maritime security cooperation with India

4.1 Constrained by a weak economy

Since Macron took office in 2017, France's finances have once improved. However, in recent years, due to a series of reasons such as the new crown epidemic, domestic economic downturn, and intensified social conflicts, the purchasing power of French nationals has decreased, and the government has invested a lot of resources to cope with the public health crisis, with social security spending and health spending occupying the top two items of public spending. In addition to the
global public health crisis in recent years, some geopolitical events have also had a negative impact on the economic situation in France. The Russia-Ukraine conflict and the sanctions imposed by the West on Russia have hit the French economy through several channels, among which there are three main ones: energy and raw materials, finance and investment, and exports. The volatile international environment has caused short-term inflation worldwide and the international environment has deteriorated due to supply chain disruptions and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

The variables brought about by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict expose France to severe production cost shocks and will also be affected by the slowdown of economic growth in key economic partner countries. While the French government has seen successful deliveries in the aviation and maritime sectors and moderate growth in exports, imports have contracted, particularly in transport equipment and coker-refined products; tourism-related trade has slowed significantly or even declined; energy trade has seen a sharp acceleration in imports and a pullback in exports. According to data released by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (Insee), France's fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP remained around 3% in 2017-2019, as defined by the EU Stability and Growth Pact, but the share in 2020-2021 is already well above that mark.

Figure 1. France's fiscal deficit as a share of GDP, 2017-2021

Since the new crown pneumonia swept the world, the domestic economy has just been eased and hit hard by the international situation. Macron's government must respond to the major geopolitical events brought about by inflation and the energy crisis, but also must respond to domestic discontent over the decline in purchasing power and the impact of Omicron on the health of the nation. The weak national economy is full of uncertainty, and the soaring debt ratio will affect the fiscal spending structure of the French government, which may crowd out the future fiscal budget of the French government in the areas of foreign affairs and defense, bringing certain impact to the implementation of future French foreign policy.

4.2 Distracted by complex internal affairs

A country's diplomacy serves its internal affairs, and the domestic political situation is closely linked to its foreign policy. As a developed capitalist country in Western Europe, France's comprehensive national power cannot be underestimated, but it is an indisputable fact that the French economy has been declining for more than two decades and the purchasing power of its citizens has been declining. The weak domestic economy has given rise to a series of social and political problems, and these profound domestic contradictions will also hold the Macron government's foreign policy in check to a certain extent.

In 2018, Macron's fuel tax hike to fulfill the Paris Climate Agreement became the trigger for the "yellow vest" movement. As the movement continued to fester, crowds of people with different demands and a variety of political forces emerged, making it the biggest riot in Paris since the May Storm. Despite the Macron government's concessions to reduce taxes and raise the minimum wage, the movement has yet to be quelled, and on July 14, 2022, during France's National Day, crowds of demonstrators from the movement gathered in Paris' Place de la Bastille to protest against the
worsening living conditions due to inflation and to pressure the Macron government to lower taxes, among other things. Under such threats, Macron's government not only failed to implement the reform plan in full but also had to spend more time and energy on maintaining law and order and stabilizing the regime. In January, to better solve the domestic security problem, Macron's government plans to increase the security budget by 15 billion euros in five years, if implemented will also affect the allocation of resources in France in the field of defense and security.

The "yellow vest" movement has not only confirmed the rise of populism and anti-globalization forces in France but also reflected the gradual division and changes in French society, which to a certain extent weakened the credibility of Macron's government. The 2022 French election also shows that the situation of centrist, far-left, and far-right in the French political arena is divided into three parts. In the subsequent National Assembly elections, the left-wing coalition of Mélenchon, the leader of the political party France Unbowed, won 131 seats, while Le Pen led her party to 89 seats. The coalition of Macron's parties, on the other hand, lost its parliamentary majority and had to form a coalition government. After the second term, Macron will not be able to continue to run in the election, and the renewal of the French political arena may affect France's policy toward India, which in turn will affect the stability of maritime security cooperation between the two countries.

4.3 Limited by the international environment

The complex political environment of the Indo-Pacific region will complicate the region's problems. The Indo-Pacific region has attracted much attention in the international community, and the strong rise of its regional powers and the competition of extra-territorial powers, intertwined with the clash of civilizations, resource disputes, and terrorism, have made the Indian Ocean region undergo unprecedented changes and constitute an important part of the restructuring of the global power pattern and the world political and economic order in the 21st century, with many countries competing for political, economic and security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. With the dynamic changes in the power pattern of the international community, the maritime security order will also be transformed and adjusted.

Meanwhile, France will also be influenced by countries that also maintain cooperative relations with India, especially in recent years, the United States’ increasingly obvious trend of unilateralism, as well as the "America First" strategic guidance to the Indian Ocean region, brings more and more uncertainty, the direction of U.S.-India relations may also affect France's policy toward India. From the "Return to Asia-Pacific Strategy" to the "Asia-Pacific Rebalance Strategy" and now to the "Indo-Pacific Strategy", it is sufficient to prove the ambition of the US to dominate the order of the region. Since the announcement of France's Indo-Pacific Strategy, the EU has also adopted the Report on the EU and Indo-Pacific Security Challenges, which not only stresses the need for the EU to strengthen its presence in the Indo-Pacific region but also grossly interferes in the internal affairs of other countries. Countries such as the UK, Australia, and Japan are also frequently present in the US-led strategic organizations to pursue their own interests. It can be said that the Indo-Pacific region is gradually becoming a chessboard for the game of great powers. France has to seek development interests in its cooperation with India but also needs to balance the power of various countries to avoid too much friction between interests, which may limit the development of maritime security cooperation between the two countries to a deeper level.

5. Prospects for maritime security cooperation between the two countries

With the geopolitical significance of the Indo-Pacific region and the importance of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a strategic space for securing supplies of goods and energy, maintaining the security of sea lanes is a guarantee of freedom of maritime navigation and an important part of reshaping the maritime security order. With the increasing complexity of maritime risks, maritime security includes not only elements that are dominated by state and non-state actors but is also expanding with the introduction of issues such as the protection of the marine environment and the development of the
"blue economy", with a growing trend towards specialization and more frequent interaction between different security issues. Under the Macron government, France and India have also diversified their cooperation on maritime security, with extensive cooperation on energy transition, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable ocean management.

France and India have important interests in the Indian Ocean region, and their maritime security cooperation has not only continued the tradition of joint military exercises but also made breakthroughs in addressing non-traditional security threats and military trade, as well as reaching an unprecedented level of cooperation in the exchange of maritime information through the widening of cooperation channels and the multilateral cooperation system. In addition, the diversity of areas of cooperation between the two countries in the Indo-Pacific region can, to a certain extent, offset the negative impact of changes in the power pattern of the international community on both sides, so the possibility of continuing and expanding maritime security cooperation between the two countries is not ruled out. However, there are still constraints in front of the two countries, including the weak economic situation in France, the volatile political situation, and the rising uncertainty in the international environment, all of which make the future of cooperation between the two countries full of uncertainties.

At a time of unprecedented change, the situation at home and abroad is changing. More and more countries are focusing their attention on the Indo-Pacific region, which has not only brought about frequent maritime security cooperation between countries but also created many sensitive issues. Some countries have repeatedly stirred up trouble in the Indo-Pacific region in the name of cooperation, taking the opportunity to test China's bottom line and create tensions. For China, the region is of great strategic importance. The maritime security cooperation between France and India in the Indo-Pacific region, which is not without its military defenses against China, should also be of close concern to China.

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