Introducing the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) dataset

Charles Butcher\textsuperscript{a,d} \textcopyright, Jessica Maves Braithwaite\textsuperscript{b} \textcopyright, Jonathan Pinckney\textsuperscript{c} \textcopyright, Eirin Haugseth\textsuperscript{a,d} \textcopyright, Ingrid Vik Bakken\textsuperscript{a} \textcopyright, and Marius Swane Wishmana \textcopyright

Abstract
We introduce the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) dataset, which records information on 1,426 organizations that participated in events of maximalist violent and nonviolent contention in Africa from 1990 to 2015. The ARC dataset contains 17 variables covering organization-level features such as type, age, leadership, goals, and interorganizational alliances. These data facilitate new measurements of key concepts in the study of contentious politics, such as the social and ideological diversity of resistance episodes, in addition to measures of network centralization and fragmentation. The ARC dataset helps resolve existing debates in the field and opens new avenues of inquiry.

Keywords
civil war, data, dissent, networks, organizations, protest

Most resistance movements are composed of organizations that mobilize people, make tactical decisions, issue demands, and accept or reject concessions (Braithwaite & Cunningham, 2020; Cunningham et al., 2017; Haggard & Kaufman, 2016; McAdam, 2010; Metternich et al., 2013; Tarrow, 2011). Organizations often head transitional regimes, assume power after post-conflict elections, and remobilize when democratic institutions are threatened (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016; Wood, 2000). However, we lack systematic cross-national data on dissident organizations spanning a variety of tactics, goals, and group identities.

This matters because organizational dynamics are often central to theories of the onset, dynamics, and outcomes of violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns (Bethke & Pinckney, 2019; Belgioioso, 2018; Brancati, 2016; Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Huang, 2016; Schaftenaar, 2017; Sutton, Butcher & Svensson, 2014; Svensson & Lindgren, 2011; Thurber, 2019). Empirical analyses, however, usually depend on broad indicators of contention summarized over a campaign or campaign-year (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), which leaves uncertainty around whether the theorized mechanisms drive observed effects (Schock, 2005). Case studies show that resistance campaigns involve complex networks of organizations and social groups (Metternich et al., 2013; Osa, 2003; Schock, 2005) and demonstrate – with detailed assessments of actors and their characteristics – that the features of these organizations and networks help explain tactical choices, campaign outcomes, and democratization (Collier, 1999; Nepstad, 2011; Pearlman, 2011; Schock, 2005; Thurber, 2019; Wood, 2000). Yet, it is difficult to generalize these findings to a larger sample of cases.

\textsuperscript{a}Norwegian University of Science and Technology  
\textsuperscript{b}University of Arizona  
\textsuperscript{c}United States Institute of Peace  
\textsuperscript{d}Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

Corresponding author:  
charles.butcher@ntnu.no
The Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) dataset provides information on 1,426 distinct organizations across 3,407 organization-country-years associated with events of ‘maximalist’ collective dissent in Africa from 1990 to 2015. ARC includes information on organization types, origins, leadership, mobilization bases, goals, network ties, relationships with the state, and more. These data enable detailed observations of actor- and network-level characteristics across a large sample of cases, allowing scholars to unpack the organizational composition of resistance campaigns and their network structures. The ARC data can help answer lingering questions: how do ideological diversity and unity (through fronts and alliances) impact campaign outcomes and post-conflict institutional change (Bayer, Bethke & Lambach, 2016; Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011)? Are some campaigns more resilient to repression than others because of their network structures or the nature of participating organizations (Siegel, 2009; Sutton, Butcher & Svensson, 2014)? How do coalitions evolve through periods of institutional reform – especially democratic transitions (Pinckney, 2020)? To the extent that data availability shapes theoretical horizons (Gleditsch, Metternich & Ruggeri, 2014), ARC can stimulate additional research questions in myriad areas.

Core concepts in ARC

The ARC dataset focuses on organizations that participated in acts of collective dissent for goals of maximalist change. Organizations are structures designed to cohere people and resources — often through collective action — to pursue common goals (Daft, 1992; North, 1990). The presence of a formal structure (however thin the hierarchy) intended to aggregate individual efforts towards a defined goal distinguishes organizations from broad social categories such as ‘students’, ‘protesters’, or the ‘working class’. We discuss our operationalization of this concept in a subsequent section.

Collective dissent is observable action involving multiple people, beyond normal institutional procedures for realizing political goals (Tilly, 1978). This ranges from demonstrations and strikes to rebellion and terrorist attacks, while excluding actions lacking a clear political goal and everyday or institutional political activities such as lobbying politicians or electoral participation. Organizations engage in collective dissent when they deploy their mobilization infrastructure to encourage individual participation in these events.

We define maximalist demands as calls for changes in the political structure that would significantly alter the executive’s access to state power, the rules with which executives are selected, or the policy or geographic areas for which the executive has the right to make laws. Examples of maximalism include demands that a head of state resign via a non-institutional method, for democratization in autocratic settings, to enfranchise an excluded social group, and for regional or ethnic autonomy or independence.1

Maximalist demands exclude calls that fall short of altering these fundamental aspects of executive power, such as improved human rights protections or changes in public spending. Demands by a disenfranchised group for better protections can be addressed with legislation that typically does not change the process for deciding who holds executive power or who has lawmakers authority. Demands for enfranchisement of that excluded group are maximalist because – if implemented – they would include a new group in the process of deciding who holds executive power.

Relationship to existing datasets

ARC is distinct from existing resources because it provides information on the features of organizations that participated in nonviolent and violent dissent, while also going beyond self-determination or ethnonationalist movements (Cunningham, Dahl & Frugé, 2020; Wilkenfeld, Asal & Pate, 2011), or armed groups alone (Braithwaite & Cunningham, 2020; Cunningham, 2013; Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009; Harbom, Melander & Wallensteen, 2008; Pettersson & Öberg, 2020; Stewart, 2018; Svensson & Nilsson, 2018). Events datasets often identify participating actors, but lack information on their features (Chenoweth, Pinckney & Lewis, 2018; Chenoweth, Hendrix & Hunter, 2019; Clark & Regan, 2021; Raleigh et al., 2010; Salehyan et al., 2012). The Revolutionary and Militant Organizations Dataset (REVMOD) does provide information about resistance organizations but seems to oversample on violent organizations (75% of REVMOD organization-years are rebel or terrorist groups) and does not account for relationships between organizations (Acosta, 2019). ARC is unique in capturing interorganizational ties that help us understand network structures in resistance episodes.

---

1 A series of borderline demands and their treatment can be found at the ARC project website.
Creating ARC

To construct the ARC dataset, we first identified organizations that participated in events of maximalist collective dissent, and then we recorded information on the features of those organizations. To maximize transparency and replicability, coding decisions at each step were recorded in RMarkdown files.2

Identifying participants

Participating organizations were identified by drawing on five events datasets: the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg & Melander, 2013), the Social Conflict Analysis Dataset (Salehyan et al., 2012), the Mass Mobilization Dataset (Clark & Regan, 2021), the Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset (Raleigh et al., 2010), and the NAVCO 3.0 data covering African countries (Chenoweth, Pinckney & Lewis, 2018). Together, these datasets provide a comprehensive catalogue of nonviolent and violent collective dissent across Africa. We began by creating a list of candidate maximalist events by subsetting on variables related to dissident demands and a customized text-matching string.

We then determined whether event participants made maximalist demands, and whether one or more named organizations participated, by conducting newswire searches in FACTIVA and LexisNexis using a targeted search string. Event IDs from the events datasets are stored with the organization-year observations in ARC, allowing users to integrate variables from events data with ARC.

We added the constituent organizations of ‘fronts’ according to a ‘three-year’ rule. Fronts are distinct, umbrella organizations coordinating the actions of member organizations. Some projects like the UCDP treat fronts as unitary actors, but this obscures variation in the preferences and features of member organizations. However, always treating fronts as decentralized organizational networks can be impractical – and empirically inaccurate. Fronts often become more unified over time (or they split apart), but systematically determining when a front ceases to consist of semi-autonomous groups and becomes a single organization is extremely difficult. We adopted an arbitrary but empirically informed rule to resolve this issue, whereby member organizations of a front were added as participants when those organizations had been members of the front for three or fewer years. Member organizations were identified in newswire databases and primary and secondary sources, and through an iterative process when coders collected information on front organizations. A more detailed description of the rules for coding fronts can be found in the codebook.

This three-year rule means that some organizations may be included that were relatively new members of fronts but did not participate in protests, or played only a peripheral role. However, we argue that this risk is outweighed by the inclusion of organizations that often participate in protests but are overlooked by news media, such as local human rights organizations, women’s organizations, and youth groups. Since front participants are identified through newswires and primary and secondary sources, our inclusion criterion is less subject to media biases and provides a new, more comprehensive picture of opposition networks.

Coding organization features

This process produced a list of organizations linked to events of dissent. Organization-years of maximalist dissent were then generated from events data and a team of coders recorded information on the features of participating organizations. Some variables are constant across organization-years (e.g. ‘birth date’), while others are dynamic. Organization-years are only included in ARC when the organization was identified as participating in collective dissent with maximalist demands in a given year. Organizations often continue to exist when they are not participating in dissent; however, their non-participation means these observations are omitted from ARC. Constructing a full panel for organizations between 1990 and 2015 is not possible for this reason and because we do not record if and when organizations cease to exist (versus entering into abeyance). Table I summarizes several organization-feature variables in ARC.3

ARC includes information on two types of ties between organizations: fronts and alliances. Front ties connect a constituent organization to a higher-level organization (a front) when the constituent organization is formally a member of the front, or its leaders participate in the front’s leadership.4 Organizations identified by the aforementioned ‘three-year’ rule have front ties to the main front.

---

2 Markdown files available on request.

3 The full codesheet can be found in the Online appendix.

4 In some cases, fronts themselves become constituent organizations in higher-level fronts. In this case, we only include ties from constituent organizations to the closest-level front in the hierarchy.
Alliance ties connect two or more organizations that declared they were coordinating resistance activities, or where sources indicated that organizations coordinated efforts, but no standalone organization (front) was formed to manage coordination. Fronts and their constituent organizations can have alliance ties with non-front organizations. For example, in Malawi in 1993, the Public Affairs Committee (PAC, a front of civil society organizations and religious groups) allied with the Alliance for Democracy (a political party), which was not part of PAC. Users can assemble alliance-pairs with these front and alliance variables to explore factors driving interorganizational ties. Figure 1 illustrates the potential structures of these ties. The organization at the bottom-center has alliance ties to two other organizations and is a member of a front. That front is also a member of another front.

Our method for identifying organizations might introduce bias. Participation is coded when newswires identify named organizations engaged in maximalist dissent. Journalists may view some organizations – especially political parties and trade unions – as more deserving of a proper noun when describing events. Parties are skilled at attracting media attention and might be over-represented in reporting. Urban organizations may also be over-represented because events in cities receive more media coverage than events in rural locations (Day, Pinckney & Chenoweth, 2015; Eck, 2012; Kalyvas, 2004). Media biases could affect inferences drawn from ARC, so robustness tests such as those from Weidmann (2016) are recommended.

Maximalist demand-making is strategic and may occur after initial campaign-building, following high levels of past participation in non-maximalist protest, or when repression offers ‘no other way out’ (Goodwin, 2001) – factors that independently generate regime concessions or democratization (Brancati, 2016; Klein & Regan, 2018). Researchers should control for omitted variables capturing these selection processes wherever possible, and inferences from ARC should be informed by the limitations of selecting on maximalist demands.

ARC is limited to African countries in the period 1990–2015 for practical reasons driven by overlap in

---

Table I. Organization-level variables

| Variable       | Description                                                                 | Format                                      |
|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Type           | Categorization of organization type                                         | Categorical                                |
| Birthdate      | Date organization was founded                                               | Date: dd-mm-yyyy                           |
| Origins        | How organization formed                                                     | Categorical: (splitter, merger, other)      |
| Goals          | Primary organization goals                                                  | Open text                                  |
| Size           | Membership size in year                                                     | Numeric                                    |
| Size estimate  | Approximate size                                                            | Ordinal                                    |
| Leadership     | Leader gender                                                               | Open text                                  |
| Leadership tenure | Date leader assumed position                                              | Date: dd-mm-yyyy                           |
| Leadership ties | Did leader serve at a high level in previous governments?                 | Categorical: (yes/no)                      |
| Social base    | Main social group(s) in organization                                        | Open text                                  |
| Social media   | Extent of social media use                                                  | Categorical: (none, some, significant)      |
| State rel.     | Relationship with state at t−1                                              | Categorical                               |
| Formal ties    | Ties with other active organizations                                        | String: Organization IDs                   |
| Structure I    | Clear leadership/decisionmaking structure?                                 | Categorical: (yes/no)                      |
| Structure II   | Characterized as ‘decentralized’?                                          | Categorical: (yes/no)                      |

Figure 1. ARC ties example

---

5 Urban organizations may also be more frequent participants because organizations and collective action are more common in cities (Miller & Nicholls, 2013; Nicholls, 2008; Weidmann & Red, 2018).
available events datasets. However, by building on existing datasets, we augment those resources while also maximizing compatibility. African countries’ histories of contention, civil society, and statehood are unique and context-specific, so we direct readers to studies that provide useful background (Boone, 2003; Branch & Mampilly, 2015; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Herbst, 2014; Mueller, 2018). While inferences drawn from ARC only apply with confidence to the African continent after the Cold War, our method of building upon existing event-based resources is transportable to other regions, time periods, and non-maximalist dissent – extensions we plan to offer in the future.

Table II shows continuous measurements of ideological diversity and opposition unity generated from ARC and compares them to similar (but categorical) measures in the NAVCO 2.1 dataset (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019) from Egypt between 2003 and 2015. ARC encompasses years of democratic transition, identifies more organizations, and enables new measurements of features such as organization age. Figure 2 shows a network map for Egypt in 2011, generated using front and alliance variables in ARC.

### Table II. Comparison of ARC and NAVCO 2.1: Egypt 2003–15

| Year | Religious diversity | Unity | New orgs | No. orgs | Unity | Diversity | Mean age |
|------|---------------------|-------|----------|----------|-------|-----------|----------|
| 2003 | Yes                 | Seemingly united | 3        | 10       | 0.750 | 0.72      | 17       |
| 2004 | Yes                 | Moderate disunity | 11       | 7        | 0.710 | 0.73      | 17       |
| 2005 | Yes                 | Moderate disunity | 6        | 9        | 0.765 | 0.77      | 23       |
| 2006 | NA                  | NA    | NA       | 9        | 0.793 | 0.77      | 24       |
| 2007 | No                  | Seemingly united | 1        | 9        | 0.793 | 0.77      | 25       |
| 2008 | No                  | Moderate disunity | 1        | 2        | 0     | 0.5       | 40       |
| 2009 | No                  | Moderate disunity | 1        | 3        | 1     | 0.67      | 29       |
| 2010 | No                  | Moderate disunity | 3        | 13       | 0.701 | 0.71      | 21       |
| 2011 | Yes                 | Seemingly united | 3        | 41       | 0.850 | 0.79      | 9        |
| 2012 | NA                  | NA    | NA       | 64       | 0.843 | 0.82      | 11       |
| 2013 | No                 | Seemingly united | 6        | 74       | 0.874 | 0.82      | 9        |
| 2014 | NA                  | NA    | NA       | 30       | 0.901 | 0.74      | 9        |
| 2015 | NA                  | NA    | NA       | 15       | 0.846 | 0.61      | 12       |

- **a** Measured with the `camp_conf_intensity` variable.
- **b** Measured as the network centralization score, which captures the extent to which a network coheres around (or is united by) one focal point (often a single front in our case).
- **c** In years for valid observations.
- **d** NAVCO 2.1 features three campaigns in 2013.
- **e** All three campaigns were ‘seemingly united’.
- **f** No religious diversity was recorded across all three campaigns.
- **g** Legend is visualized in the network map (Figure 2). Organizations that do not fit into these categories are grey. Embedded numbers are fractionalization index scores.

Political parties and rebel groups⁶ are the most common types of organizations in ARC. Figure 3 shows the number of organizations in maximalist dissent by year and country. Stretches of little dissent are sometimes followed by bursts (Burkina Faso), while the number of functions years of democratic transition, identifies more organizations, and enables new measurements of features such as organization age. Figure 2 shows a network map for Egypt in 2011, generated using front and alliance variables in ARC.

### Descriptive statistics

Political parties and rebel groups⁶ are the most common types of organizations in ARC. Figure 3 shows the number of organizations in maximalist dissent by year and country. Stretches of little dissent are sometimes followed by bursts (Burkina Faso), while the number of functions years of democratic transition, identifies more organizations, and enables new measurements of features such as organization age. Figure 2 shows a network map for Egypt in 2011, generated using front and alliance variables in ARC.

---

⁶ We use the term ‘rebel group’ to characterize armed groups explicitly organized to challenge the state using violence; this does not require involvement in conflicts with 25+ battle-deaths as with UCDP coding rules, but rather follows the logic of Lewis (2020).
organizations in dissent escalates over time in other cases (Sudan). Some countries exhibit consistently high numbers of organizations in dissent (Ethiopia) while others are stable and low (Namibia). Table III shows how ARC variables vary across organization types.

Rebel groups and political parties commonly split from other organizations. Rebel groups dissent for longer (3.6 years on average) and more continuously (they have the lowest variance around the mean participation year) than other organizations. Participation by other types of organizations in ARC is ‘bursty’, perhaps concentrated around elections or other focal points. Trade unions tend to be large, old, and more connected to the state and other opposition organizations than most other organizations. As one would expect, fronts are the most highly connected, with ties to 5.67 other organizations on average. Only civil society organizations (CSOs) have moderate levels of female leadership. Decentralization is most common in fronts, religious groups, and trade unions.

Correlates of organizational participation

Different types of organizations should have distinct correlates of participation in resistance given their varied constituencies and goals.⁷ We use negative binomial models for overdispersed count data to explore associations between socio-economic factors and the number of organizations of different types engaged in maximalist dissent. Specifically, we examine inequality, economic modernization, industrialization, economic growth, natural resource wealth, democratic institutions, the number of other participating dissident organizations of various types and a lagged dependent variable. Past research highlights these possible explanations for participation in maximalist dissent (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005; Aksoy, Carter & Wright, 2012; Ansell & Samuels, 2014; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2010; Haggard &

---

⁷ Models were run in R 4.0.2.
Kaufman, 2016; Maves & Braithwaite, 2013; Ross, 2001).

Income inequality (and its square) is captured using Gini coefficients.8 Economic development is measured with GDP per capita in constant 2,000 USD, along with the GDP growth rate to proxy economic downturns. Value-added manufacturing as a percentage of GDP represents the strength of the industrial sector (Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Haggard & Kaufman, 2016) and oil revenues as a percentage of GDP proxy for natural resource dependency. We measure prior political institutions with the V-DEM Polyarchy score (Coppedge et al., 2019), as well as its square (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). Repression is measured with the Physical Violence Index, also from VDEM. These variables are

Figure 3. ARC organizations over time and space

Table III. Features of organization-years in resistance by type

| Type                | N     | N Unique orgs | Splinter | Size estimate | Age | Included in regime | Legal | No. ties | Female leader | Decentralized | Alliances |
|---------------------|-------|---------------|---------|---------------|-----|--------------------|-------|----------|---------------|---------------|-----------|
| Pol. party          | 1,143 | 532           | 0.27    | 3             | 6.51| 0.08               | 0.7   | 1.2      | 0.02          | 0.05          | NA        |
| Trade union         | 214   | 96            | 0.16    | 4             | 24.06| 0.06               | 0.83  | 1.87     | 0.05          | 0.63          | NA        |
| Religious           | 101   | 42            | 0       | 3             | 32.85| 0.02               | 0.95  | 1.38     | 0             | 0.63          | NA        |
| Student/Youth       | 69    | 27            | 0.09    | 3             | 17.62| 0.03               | 0.55  | 1.52     | 0             | 0.25          | NA        |
| Front               | 262   | 157           | 0.01    | 3             | 2.01 | 0.03               | 0.33  | 6.67     | 0.06          | 0.87          | NA        |
| Other CSO           | 558   | 297           | 0.08    | 2             | 10.13| 0.01               | 0.72  | 1.51     | 0.19          | 0.21          | NA        |
| Rebel               | 1,004 | 273           | 0.4     | 3             | 7.63 | 0.02               | 0.03  | 1.32     | 0             | 0.26          | NA        |
| Other               | 44    | 26            | 0.2     | 3             | 9.65 | 0.02               | 0.5   | 1        | 0.13          | 0.25          | NA        |
| Missingness (%)     | 0.12  | 0.17          | 0.08    | 0.03          | 0.03| NA                 | 0.12  | 0.01     | 0.01          |               |           |

All summary statistics are means except for the Size estimate which is a median. Included measures whether the organization was formally or informally included in the governing coalition at \( t – 1 \).

8 Data come from the World Bank unless indicated otherwise.
Table IV. Correlates of organizational participation

|                          | Political parties | Trade unions | Rel. orgs | Student/Youth | Fronts | Rebel groups | Other CSOs | Others |
|--------------------------|-------------------|--------------|-----------|---------------|--------|--------------|------------|--------|
| Oil (% GDP)              | −0.01             | −0.09**      | −0.27**   | −0.08*        | −0.01  | 0.03***      | −0.02      | −0.61** |
|                          | (0.01)            | (0.03)       | (0.09)    | (0.03)        | (0.01) | (0.01)       | (0.01)     | (0.23) |
| Manufacturing (% GDP)    | 0.02              | 0.00         | 0.09      | 0.13***       | −0.01  | −0.02*       | 0.01       | 0.07   |
|                          | (0.01)            | (0.02)       | (0.05)    | (0.03)        | (0.02) | (0.01)       | (0.02)     | (0.07) |
| Polyarchy                | 7.19**            | −2.23        | 17.24     | 1.76          | 2.79   | −1.65        | 6.12       | 12.46  |
|                          | (2.52)            | (5.19)       | (9.88)    | (6.40)        | (2.86) | (1.68)       | (3.84)     | (11.00) |
| Polyarchy                | −10.26***         | 0.42         | −29.11*   | 0.31          | −3.96  | 1.16         | −5.76      | −16.34 |
|                          | (2.95)            | (5.79)       | (12.07)   | (7.68)        | (3.30) | (2.05)       | (4.20)     | (12.70) |
| Income inequality        | 0.00              | −0.00        | −0.00     | −0.00         | −0.00  | −0.00        | 0.00       | 0.00   |
|                          | (0.00)            | (0.00)       | (0.00)    | (0.00)        | (0.00) | (0.00)       | (0.00)     | (0.00) |
| Income inequality        | −0.03             | 0.10         | 0.11      | 0.20          | 0.09   | −0.04        | 0.24       | −0.43  |
|                          | (0.09)            | (0.18)       | (0.28)    | (0.22)        | (0.10) | (0.06)       | (0.13)     | (0.27) |
| Log GDP per capita       | 0.03              | 0.79**       | −0.33     | 0.85**        | 0.12   | −0.51***     | 0.58**     | 0.94*  |
|                          | (0.13)            | (0.26)       | (0.41)    | (0.33)        | (0.13) | (0.09)       | (0.18)     | (0.47) |
| GDP growth               | 0.81              | −4.24*       | −1.07     | −0.42         | −0.29  | 0.09         | −1.28      | 4.66   |
|                          | (0.87)            | (1.87)       | (3.21)    | (1.97)        | (0.94) | (0.53)       | (1.39)     | (4.06) |
| Physical integrity rights| 0.02              | 0.33         | 0.30      | −4.96**       | −0.96  | −0.40        | −1.40*     | −3.90* |
|                          | (0.46)            | (0.92)       | (1.70)    | (1.55)        | (0.53) | (0.33)       | (0.71)     | (1.76) |
| Year                     | 0.01              | 0.04         | 0.14**    | 0.03          | −0.01  | 0.00         | 0.08***    | 0.07   |
|                          | (0.01)            | (0.02)       | (0.04)    | (0.03)        | (0.01) | (0.01)       | (0.02)     | (0.04) |
| Population (log)         | 0.08              | −0.28*       | 0.47      | 0.13          | 0.04   | 0.26***      | 0.39***    | 0.78*  |
|                          | (0.07)            | (0.14)       | (0.30)    | (0.20)        | (0.08) | (0.05)       | (0.10)     | (0.34) |
| No. political parties    | 0.11*             | 0.31***      | −0.01     | 0.19***       | −0.01  | 0.10**       | 0.02       | 0.02   |
|                          | (0.05)            | (0.08)       | (0.04)    | (0.02)        | (0.02) | (0.02)       | (0.04)     | (0.06) |
| No. trade unions         | 0.06              | −0.01        | 0.28**    | 0.29***       | 0.00   | 0.39**       | 0.25       | 0.00   |
|                          | (0.09)            | (0.23)       | (0.10)    | (0.05)        | (0.08) | (0.10)       | (0.20)     | (0.14) |
| No. rel. orgs            | 0.15              | 0.23*        | 0.24*     | 0.15*         | −0.18  | 0.41***      | 0.21       | 0.21   |
|                          | (0.09)            | (0.12)       | (0.10)    | (0.07)        | (0.14) | (0.09)       | (0.14)     | (0.14) |
| No. student/youth orgs   | −0.07             | 0.44         | 0.02      | −0.24         | −0.28  | 0.61**       | −0.20      | 0.41   |
|                          | (0.23)            | (0.28)       | (0.55)    | (0.17)        | (0.17) | (0.23)       | (0.37)     | (0.40) |
| No. fronts               | 1.71***           | 0.88***      | 0.38      | 0.16          | 0.11   | 0.93***      | 0.18       | 0.18   |
|                          | (0.12)            | (0.18)       | (0.36)    | (0.18)        | (0.09) | (0.17)       | (0.17)     | (0.23) |
| No. rebel groups         | −0.17***          | −0.19        | −0.18     | 0.25***       | 0.25*** | −0.27***     | −0.01      | 0.07   |
|                          | (0.04)            | (0.11)       | (0.23)    | (0.05)        | (0.03) | (0.07)       | (0.24)     | (0.24) |
| No. CSOs                 | 0.01              | 0.16***      | 0.51***   | 0.10**        | 0.09*** | 0.00         | 0.15**     | 0.00   |
|                          | (0.03)            | (0.04)       | (0.08)    | (0.03)        | (0.02) | (0.03)       | (0.06)     | (0.06) |
| No. others               | −0.40*            | −0.52*       | −2.53***  | 0.01          | −0.55*** | 0.12         | −0.53*     | 0.07*  |
|                          | (0.20)            | (0.25)       | (0.52)    | (0.20)        | (0.13) | (0.15)       | (0.21)     | (0.03) |

(continued)
lagged one year. The number of organizations of other types engaged in maximalist dissent in year $t$ is included to explore patterns of co-participation across organization types.

Table IV presents our findings. Visualizations can be found in the Online appendix. The results for economic development are striking. A greater number of rebel groups mobilize in poorer countries, while more trade unions, student organizations, and other CSOs dissent in more developed countries. Broad, labor-based civil society coalitions may be an important link in the chain from modernization to democracy (Bayer, Bethke & Lambach, 2016; Boix, 2003; Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Dahllum, Knutsen & Wig, 2019). Movements underpinned by thinner, technology-driven networks may be more brittle (Weidmann & Rød, 2018). Oil dependency is associated with fewer trade unions, student groups, ‘other’ organizations, and religious organizations engaging in maximalist dissent, but a greater number of active rebel groups. These models are a first, descriptive look at patterns of participation but offer little about the deeper mechanisms involved in mobilization. For example, structural factors may alter the underlying organizational ecology, drive participation in maximalist dissent directly, or activate other processes, such as splintering.

Structural variables appear to be poor predictors of the number of fronts in dissent. Coalition formation may occur after shorter term shocks related to food prices (Abbs, 2020) or severe repression events (Chang, 2008). This is worth investigating in future work. Models addressing censorship and international media coverage (in the Online appendix) do not indicate strong media biases across most organization types.

Table IV also reveals patterns of organizational co-participation. Parties mobilize with fronts, but alongside fewer rebel groups. Trade unions and CSOs dissent alongside one another and with more parties, religious organizations, and fronts. Religious organizations have narrower co-participation profiles, mobilizing alongside other CSOs. Student groups dissent alongside rebel groups, in addition to trade unions, religious organizations, and other CSOs. Rebel groups tend to act without large numbers of other types of organizations. Finally, fronts assemble many group types including parties, rebels, trade unions, religious organizations, and other CSOs. These findings highlight the usefulness of ARC for (re)examining mechanisms emphasized in theories of social change, as well as the ability to uncover previously un(der)theorized relationships.

### Conclusion

The ARC dataset advances our understanding of anti-government mobilization and has many potential applications. ARC provides details about organizations that engaged in violent and nonviolent dissent at various periods of their existence and could be used to identify correlates of tactical shifts. ARC should be useful to scholars of repression and dissent; connections to events datasets facilitate exploration of how organizational networks interact with repression to produce backlash and demobilization. ARC can also be collapsed into a country-year format and merged with data on campaign outcomes (e.g. Chenoweth & Shay, 2019; Kreutz, 2010), regime change, and democratization (Coppelidge et al., 2019; Djuve, Knutsen & Wig, 2020; Goemans, Gleditsch & Chiozza, 2009). Information on interorganizational ties can be used to generate network maps that span conventional violent–nonviolent dichotomies and even link campaigns cross-nationally. We look forward to seeing how others engage ARC to expand our

Table IV. (continued)

|                              | Political parties | Trade unions | Rel. org | Student/Youth | Fronts | Rebel groups | Other CSOs | Others |
|------------------------------|-------------------|--------------|---------|--------------|--------|--------------|------------|--------|
| No. others ($t$–1)           |                   |              |         |              |        |              |            |        |
| AIC                          | 1,918.39          | 606.68       | 334.35  | 270.20       | 798.84 | 1,743.83     | 1,018.85   | 177.61 |
| BIC                          | 2,020.66          | 708.95       | 436.62  | 372.47       | 901.11 | 1,846.10     | 1,121.12   | 279.88 |
| Log likelihood               | −938.19           | −282.34      | −146.17 | −114.10      | −378.42 | −850.91      | −488.42    | −67.81 |
| Deviance                     | 592.27            | 202.48       | 85.70   | 128.22       | 359.43 | 699.10       | 332.07     | 84.89  |
| No. obs.                     | 963               | 963          | 963     | 963          | 963    | 963          | 963        | 963    |

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$.**
knowledge of the causes, dynamics, and consequences of maximalist dissent.

**Replication data**

The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article, along with the Online appendix, are available at https://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets/. All analyses were conducted using Stata.

**Acknowledgements**

We thank Alice Dalsjø, Nina Bjørge, Xiran Chen, Stephanie Clinch, Tyler DeMers, Kelly Gordell, and Luna Ruiz for valuable research assistance. For valuable comments and feedback we thank three anonymous reviewers, Margaret Ariotti, Alex Bruens, Scott Gates, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Katelyn Knapp, Janet Lewis, Nils Metternich, Jakana Thomas, participants at the 2017 Peace Research Society Workshop on Conflict Networks, the NTNU VIP seminars, participants in the SECVIC workshops, the 2019 workshop on ‘Introducing ARC’ at the Conflict Research Society annual meeting at the University of Sussex.

**Funding**

We gratefully acknowledge funding from the Norwegian Research Council and the United States Institute of Peace, and support grants from the Department and Faculty at NTNU. Braithwaite received funding from USIP prior to Pinckney accepting a position at USIP.

**ORCID iD**

Charles Butcher 🗓️ https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2652-1229

Jessica Maves Braithwaite 🗓️ https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5738-3047

Jonathan Pinckney 🗓️ https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8427-7423

Eirin Haugseth 🗓️ https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9559-2664

Ingrid Vik Bakken 🗓️ https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5547-5386

Marius Swane Wishman 🗓️ https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9913-6009

**References**

Abbs, Luke (2020) The hunger games: Food prices, ethnic cleavages and nonviolent unrest in Africa. *Journal of Peace Research* 57(2): 281–296.

Acemoglu, Daron & James A Robinson (2005) *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Acosta, Benjamin (2019) Reconceptualizing resistance organizations and outcomes: Introducing the Revolutionary and Militant Organizations Dataset (REVMOD). *Journal of Peace Research* 56(5): 724–734.

Aksoy, Deniz; David B Carter & Joseph Wright (2012) Terrorism in dictatorships. *Journal of Politics* 74(3): 810–826.

Ansell, Ben W & David J Samuels (2014) *Inequality and Democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bayer, Markus; Felix S Bethke & Daniel Lambach (2016) The democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance. *Journal of Peace Research* 53(6): 758–771.

Belgioioso, Margherita (2018) Going underground: Resort to terrorism in mass mobilization dissident campaigns. *Journal of Peace Research* 55(5): 641–655.

Bethke, Felix S & Jonathan Pinckney (2019) Non-violent resistance and the quality of democracy. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 38(5): 503–523.

Boix, Carles (2003) *Democracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Boone, Catherine (2003) *Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Braithwaite, Jessica Maves & Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham (2020) When organizations rebel: Introducing the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) dataset. *International Studies Quarterly* 64(1): 183–193.

Brancati, Dawn (2016) *Democracy Protests*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Branch, Adam & Zachariah Mampilly (2015) *Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Change*. London: Zed.

Bratton, Michael & Nicolas van de Walle (1997) *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce & Alastair Smith (2010) Leader survival, revolutions, and the nature of government finance. *American Journal of Political Science* 54(4): 936–950.

Butcher, Charles & Isak Svensson (2016) Manufacturing dissent: Modernization and the onset of major nonviolent resistance campaigns. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60(2): 311–339.

Celestino, Mauricio Rivera & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2013) Fresh carnations or all thorn, no rose? Nonviolent campaigns and transitions in autocracies. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(3): 385–400.

Chang, Paul Y (2008) Unintended consequences of repression: Alliance formation in South Korea’s democracy movement (1970–1979). *Social Forces* 87(2): 651–677.

Chenoweth, Erica & Christopher Wiley Shay (2019) NAVCO 2.1 Dataset (https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MHOXDV).
Chenoweth, Erica & Maria J Stephan (2011) *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chenoweth, Erica; Cullen S Hendrix & Kyleanne Hunter (2019) Introducing the Nonviolent Action in Violent Contexts (NVAVC) dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 56(2): 295–305.

Chenoweth, Erica; Jonathan Pinckney & Orion Lewis (2018) Days of rage: Introducing the NAVCO 3.0 dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 55(4): 524–534.

Clark, David & Patrick Regan (2021) Mass mobilization protest data (https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HTTWYL).

Collier, Ruth Berins (1999) *Paths toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Coppedge, Michael; John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skanning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, S Dahlum, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzhirorsky, M Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson & Daniel Ziblatt (2019) V-Dem Country-Year Dataset 2019 (https://www.v-dem.net/).

Cunningham, David E; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Belén González, Dragana Vidović & Peter B White (2017) Words and deeds: From incompatibilities to outcomes in anti-government disputes. *Journal of Peace Research* 54(4): 468–483.

Cunningham, David E; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Idean Salehyan (2009) It takes two: A dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcome. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 570–597.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher (2013) Actor fragmentation and civil war bargaining: How internal divisions generate civil conflict. *American Journal of Political Science* 57(3): 659–672.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher; Marianne Dahl & Anne Frugé (2020) Introducing the strategies of resistance data project. *Journal of Peace Research* 57(3): 482–491.

Daft, Richard L (1992) *Organization Theory and Design*. St. Paul, MN: West.

Dahlum, Sianne; Carl Henrik Knutsen & Tore Wig (2019) Who revolts? Empirically revisiting the social origins of democracy. *Journal of Politics* 81(4): 1494–1499.

Day, Joel; Jonathan Pinckney & Erica Chenoweth (2015) Collecting data on nonviolent action: Lessons learned and ways forward. *Journal of Peace Research* 52(1): 129–133.

Djuve, Vilde Lunnan; Carl Henrik Knutsen & Tore Wig (2020) Patterns of regime breakdown since the French revolution. *Comparative Political Studies* 53(6): 923–958.

Eck, Kristine (2012) In data we trust? A comparison of UCDP GED and ACLED conflict events datasets. *Cooperation and Conflict* 47(1): 124–141.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede; Nils W Metternich & Andrea Ruggeri (2014) Data and progress in peace and conflict research. *Journal of Peace Research* 51(2): 301–314.

Goemans, Henk E; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Giacomo Chiozza (2009) Introducing Archigos: A dataset of political leaders. *Journal of Peace Research* 46(2): 269–283.

Goodwin, Jeff (2001) *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Haggard, Stephan & Robert R Kaufman (2016) *Dictators and Democracies: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Harbom, Lotta; Erik Melander & Peter Wallensteen (2008) Dyadic dimensions of armed conflict, 1946–2007. *Journal of Peace Research* 45(5): 697–710.

Hegre, Håvard & Nicholas Sambanis (2006) Sensitivity analysis of empirical results on civil war onset. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(4): 508–535.

Herbst, Jeffrey (2014) *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, volume 149. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Huang, Reyko (2016) *The Wartime Origins of Democratization: Civil War, Rebel Governance, and Political Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kalyvas, Stathis N (2004) The urban bias in research on civil wars. *Security Studies* 13(3): 160–190.

Klein, Graig R & Patrick M Regan (2018) Dynamics of political protests. *International Organization* 72(2): 485–521.

Kreutz, Joakim (2010) How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP conflict termination dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 243–250.

Lewis, Janet I (2020) *How Insurgency Begins: Rebel Group Formation in Uganda and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Maves, Jessica & Alex Braithwaite (2013) Autocratic institutions and civil conflict contagion. *Journal of Politics* 75(2): 478–490.

McAdam, Doug (2010) *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Metternich, Nils W; Cassy Dorff, Max Gallop, Simon Weschle & Michael D Ward (2013) Antigovernment networks in civil conflicts: How network structures affect conflictual behavior. *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4): 892–911.

Miller, Byron & Walter Nicholls (2013) Social movements in urban society: The city as a space of politicization. *Urban Geography* 34(4): 452–473.

Mueller, Lisa (2018) *Political Protest in Contemporary Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nepstad, Sharon Erickson (2011) *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nicholls, Walter J (2008) The urban question revisited: The importance of cities for social movements. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 32(4): 841–859.

North, Douglass C (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Osa, Maryjane (2003) *Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Pearlman, Wendy (2011) *Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pettersson, Therése & Magnus Öberg (2020) Organized violence, 1989–2019. *Journal of Peace Research* 57(4): 597–613.

Pinckney, Jonathan C (2020) *From Dissent to Democracy: The Promise and Perils of Civil Resistance Transitions*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Raleigh, Clionadh; Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre & Joakim Karlsen (2010) Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 47(5): 651–660.

Ross, Michael L (2001) Does oil hinder democracy? *World Politics* 53(3): 325–361.

Salehyan, Idean; Cullen S Hendrix, Jesse Hamner, Christina Case, Christopher Linebarger, Emily Stull & Jennifer Williams (2012) Social conflict in Africa: A new database. *International Interactions* 38(4): 503–511.

Schaftenaar, Susanne (2017) How (wo)men rebel: Exploring the effect of gender equality on nonviolent and armed conflict onset. *Journal of Peace Research* 54(6): 762–776.

Schock, Kurt (2005) *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Siegel, David A (2009) Social networks and collective action. *American Journal of Political Science* 53(1): 122–138.

Stewart, Megan A (2018) Civil war as state-making: Strategic governance in civil war. *International Organization* 72(1): 205–226.

Sundberg, Ralph & Melander Erik (2013) Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(4): 523–532.

Sutton, Jonathan; Charles R Butcher & Isak Svensson (2014) Explaining political jiu-jitsu: Institution-building and the outcomes of regime violence against unarmed protests. *Journal of Peace Research* 51(5): 559–573.

Svensson, Isak & Mathilda Lindgren (2011) Community and consent: Unarmed insurrections in non-democracies. *European Journal of International Relations* 17(1): 97–120.

Svensson, Isak & Desiree Nilsson (2018) Disputes over the divine: Introducing the Religion and Armed Conflict (RELAC) data, 1975 to 2015. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62(5): 1127–1148.

Tarrow, Sidney G (2011) *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thurber, Ches (2019) Social ties and the strategy of civil resistance. *International Studies Quarterly* 63(4): 974–986.

Tilly, Charles (1978) *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Weidmann, Nils B (2016) A closer look at reporting bias in conflict event data. *American Journal of Political Science* 60(1): 206–218.

Weidmann, Nils B & Espen Geelmuyden Rød (2018) *The Internet and Political Protest in Authoritarian and Censorship Regimes*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan; Victor Asal & Amy Pate (2011) Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) Middle East, 1980–2004 (https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/STGELW).

Wood, Elisabeth Jean (2000) *Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

CHARLES BUTCHER, b. 1982, PhD in Government and International Relations (University of Sydney, 2012); Associate Professor, NTNU (2016– ); Senior Researcher, PRIO (2018– ).

JESSICA MAVES BRAITHWAITE, b. 1986, PhD in Political Science (Pennsylvania State University, 2013); Associate Professor, University of Arizona (2013– ); research interests: civil war, nonviolent resistance, state repression, peacebuilding.

JONATHAN PINCKNEY, b. 1986, PhD in International Relations (University of Denver, 2018); Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, NTNU (2018–19); Senior Researcher, United States Institute of Peace (2019– ); most recent book: *From Dissent to Democracy: The Promise and Peril of Civil Resistance Transitions* (Oxford University Press, 2020).

EIRIN HAUGSETH, b. 1993, MSc in Political Science (NTNU, 2020); Doctoral Researcher, PRIO (2021– ).

INGRID VIK BAKKEN, b. 1991, MSc in Political Science (University of Tromsø, 2017); PhD candidate (NTNU, 2018– ).

MARIUS SWANE WISHMAN, b. 1990, MA in Political Science (University of Tromsø, 2017); PhD candidate in Political Science, NTNU (2017–).