On Sāmānādhikaraṇya in Maṇḍana Miśra’s Bhāvanāviveka

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0. Since Kumārila, the theory of bhāvanā (‘effectuation’ but left untranslated in this paper) has been based on the structure of sāmānādhikaraṇya (hereafter ‘coreferentiality’).\(^1\) Maṇḍana Miśra’s Bhāvanāviveka (BhV) also begins with a survey of coreferentiality and it consists of three major parts: 1) a critique of Kumārila’s description of coreferentiality in his Tantravārttika (TV), 2) coreferentiality in "kiṃ karoti? dhvanati", and 3) coreferentiality in "kā kriyā? pākaḥ". In this paper, focusing myself on 1), I overview how the opponent\(^2\) in the Pūrvapakṣa section criticizes Kumārila’s theory of bhāvanā and how Maṇḍana improves it in the Siddhānta section.

1. In the Vārttika and Mahābhāṣya (MBh) on A 1.3.1 (bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ), the verbal root (dhātu) was defined as “what expresses action” (kriyāvacanaḥ). Here, Patañjali explained that in "kiṃ karoti? pacati", the coreferentiality that exists between karoti and pacati\(^3\) proves that pac also expresses action and is therefore a verbal root. In this view, the verbal ending does not express action, since it is excluded from the scope of verbal root by anvayavyatireka.\(^4\) Also in the MBh on A 3.1.40, Patañjali stated that the verbal root kṛ expresses “action in general” (kriyāsāmānyya), while other verbal roots, such as pac, express “a particular action” (kriyāviśeṣa), for example, the action of cooking. In this regard, Kaiyaṭa (11th c.), a commentator on the MBh, explains that the relation of universal and particular (sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva) is the necessary condition of coreferentiality between them. Although Patañjali did not clarify this point, this relation becomes the subject of discussion in the bhāvanā theory.

2. Śabara (6th c.), who composed a commentary (ŚBh) on Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtra, was the forerunner of the bhāvanā theory. In his commentary on ŚBh 2.1.1–4, Tantravārttika (TV) 17, Kumārila (7th c.), who refined and improved Śabara’s bhāvanā theory in a coherent system, tried to justify the existence of bhāvanā by using the same coreferentiality used by the Grammarians:
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TV 17: When the verbal ending of a finite verb expresses an action belonging to an established agent, the object of kṛ/karoti (karotyartha) is understood by coreferentiality.5

The biggest disagreement that exists with the Grammarians is that in the bhāvanā theory, it is the verbal ending, not the root, that is responsible for expressing action. Here Kumārila claims that the fact that the word pacati expresses action, i.e., bhāvanā, is understood by the coreferentiality between kṛ/karoti and pacati in «kiṃ karoti? pacati». Although in Patañjali’s case we can say the coreferentiality exists between kṛ and pac, in the bhāvanā theory it must exist between karoti (but in the bhāvanā theory, this is the same as kṛ) and pacati, because the verbal ending cannot be omitted by anvayavyatireka. Kumārila casually adds that in «kiṃ karoti? pacati» there is a relation of universal and particular, which obviously comes from Patañjali’s statement.6 But what are the two things here that have a relation of universal and particular? In Patañjali’s view, these are kriyā and pāka. As Kataoka (2004, 158, fn. 169) explains, in Kumārila’s statement, it is not clear, but these are the object of kṛ (karotyartha), i.e., bhāvanā, and the object of the verbal root (dhātvartha) which has the function of specifying the bhāvanā.7 In other words, the verbal root kṛ expresses “operation in general,” while the verbal root pac expresses a particularity (viśeṣa) that colors the colorless operation. If we understand Kumārila’s relation of universal and particular in this way, it is actually not so much different from Patañjali’s original view:

Sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva exists in the objects of:

[Patañjali:] kṛ —— pac

[Kumārila:] kṛ —— pac [or] pac —— ti (because tiṄ has karotyartha)

3. This, however, causes a problem: the relation of universal and particular shown by Kumārila still targets the verbal root rather than the ending, and furthermore, as a natural consequence, the ending of pacati, which expresses bhāvanā, is what stands as the universal. Maṇḍana’s criticism at the beginning of the BhV undoubtedly stems from the ambiguity of Kumārila’s explanation. Maṇḍana states as follows:

... And [in Kumārila’s bhāvanā theory, the finite verbs] such as pacati have coreferentiality with karoti, thus one infers that they (such as pacati) have the same object [as karoti] (tādarthya). This is wrong, for the coreferentiality, which is the cause of [pacati] denoting a particular (or ‘different’) object of [karoti], does not make understood that [pacati] has the same object [as
For, these two [words with the same object] cannot be used together. As is well-known, *vrkṣatā* (‘the property of being a tree’) is not an object [expressed by] the word *śiṃśapā* and so forth, but [it] is understood [indirectly] as what the object [of the word *śiṃśapā*] (i.e., *śiṃśapātvā*) conveys.

In the example “*vrkṣah śiṃśapā*” (“The tree is *śiṃśapā*”), the property of being a tree and the property of being a *śiṃśapā* are in the relation of universal and particular, but they are not the same thing. Kumārila says in TV 17 that *karoti*/*kṛ* and *pacati* have coreferentiality, but if we look at the *bhāvanā*, it is exactly the same between *karoti* and *pacati*. The coreferentiality and the relation of universal and particular do not mesh well. Thus, Maṇḍana, posing as a Grammarian, declares that the Bhāvanāvādin (i.e., Kumārila) does not understand coreferentiality. To get around that difficulty, if we assume that the verbal ending in *pacati* expresses a particular *bhāvanā*, we get the undesirable consequence that the same ending tiṅ denotes action in general in *karoti* and a particular action in *pacati*.

Maṇḍana, like Kumārila, acknowledges the existence of *bhāvanā*. Therefore, his aim in the BhV is to present a more coherent theory of coreferentiality and to solve the remaining problems in Kumārila’s *bhāvanā* theory. To this end, he begins his discussion by pointing out the problems on the part of the Grammarians.

Maṇḍana states that the position of the Grammarians who insist that the verbal root *kṛ* means “to make/produce” in some cases (as in the case of “*ghaṭaṃ karoti*”) and “to do” (= action in general) in others complicates the discussion. If the most common meaning of *kṛ*, “to make/produce,” were sufficient to explain everything, the argument would be less intractable and complex. Maṇḍana argues that a simpler argument can be achieved by the *bhāvanā* theory. There, the finite verb *karoti* denotes a general act of production, i.e., *bhāvanā* in general, whereas *pacati* denotes a specific type of act of production, i.e., the *bhāvanā* specified by cooking (*pākaviśiṣṭabhāvanā*). There is a relationship of universal and particular, between *bhāvanā* in general and a particular *bhāvanā*. At first glance, they look like “action in general” and “a particular action” claimed by the Grammarians, but they are not the same. This is because, in the *bhāvanā* theory, what is expressed by the verbal ending is the basis of action. The Grammarians have removed the verbal endings through *anvayavyatireka* because *karoti* and *pacati* have the same ending, but what governs the finite verb is actually the verbal ending, and the role of the object of the verbal root is to specify the *bhāvanā*. 
Since Maṇḍana adopts Kumārila’s mode of expression in several places, it is not always easy to see the difference between the two, but it is clear that his argument about the relationship of universal and particular is an improvement. The verbal ending alone cannot express the bhāvanā; although the ending is the same in karoti and pacati, in the former the ending is not specified by any particular element, whereas in the latter the ending is specified by the root. What the ending expresses is “bhāvanā in general that has been colored (anurakta) by particularity,” an expression that certainly comes from Kumārila.11 As can be seen from this, Kumārila’s explanation of coreferentiality was logically problematic, but it does not detract from the value of the theory as a whole. Maṇḍana justifies the coreferentiality improved by himself with the example of «ko rājā yāti? pāñcālarājaḥ» (“Which king goes?” “King of Pañcāla.”). Here, the object “of Pañcāla,” expressed by the word pāñcāla, is not specific by itself, but only when accompanied by “king” can a specific king be identified. In other words, just as “white” alone cannot refer to a particular being, as in the relation between “cow” and “white cow,” the relation of universal and particular exists between rājan and pāñcālarāja, but not between rājan and pāñcāla. Maṇḍana explains as follows:

It is totally appropriate to refer to the universal in the response; otherwise, that [universal] existing in the question would be required [because the relation is not clear]. Especially for the bhāvanā [this is true], whose particular aspect is made clear by being manifested by setting another [element, i.e., the object of the verbal root], since [it] does not possess any particular linguistic element which produces a clear cognition (asaṃvijñānapadabheda).12

As Uṃveka explains, «ko rājā yāti?» is not exactly the same as «kiṃ karoti?». Because in the former case, if the question and answer is «ko rājā yāti? yudhiṣṭhiraḥ» (“Which king goes?” “Yudhiṣṭhira.”), then Yudhiṣṭhira can be understood as a particular king without the word “king,” but in the latter case, whatever response is assumed, it cannot be established without the verbal ending. The point is that in pacati and pāñcālarājaḥ, there is a linguistic element for the universal, but not for a particular exactly. The term asaṃvijñānapadabheda, which most probably traces back to Bhartṛhari,13 illustrates this and, according to Uṃveka, distinguishes this view from the anvitābhidhāna theory, which holds that a linguistic element expresses its object in such a way that it is already connected to the objects of all the other words in the sentence. In discussions involving coreferentiality, “what expresses what,” which is quite explicit in
the view of the Grammarians, is ambiguous in the bhāvanā theory. When Maṇḍana says “the verbal ending expresses a particular bhāvanā,” what is intended is that the verbal ending specified by the object of the verbal root expresses a particular bhāvanā. Even though the ending is principal, pacati as a totality is seen as denoting a particular bhāvanā. Alternatively we can say that there are two levels of denotative function, that is, if we look at the parts, the ending expresses the bhāvanā in general, and the verbal root expresses a particular quality, but if we look at the word pacati as a whole, that whole expresses a particular bhāvanā and at this point we can no longer separate “particular” and “bhāvanā.”

5. To conclude,

1) Kumārila did not properly theorize the relation of universal and particular, so his coreferentiality does not prove the bhāvanā as the object of the verbal ending.

2) To solve this problem, Maṇḍana argues that a particular bhāvanā specified by the object of the verbal root stands as the particular of the bhāvanā in general.

Kumārila’s TV 17 was explained in detail by the later commentators, and his theory was considerably strengthened, but if we look at Maṇḍana, who came right after him, we can see that he was not satisfied with Kumārila’s theory and improved it significantly by reformulating his arguments. The issue of coreferentiality dealt with in this paper is based on Kumārila’s theory and its improvement, but in the subsequent discussions, Maṇḍana investigates his own theory of bhāvanā through a series of more original arguments.

Notes

1) In this discussion, in light of the context of the BhV sāmānādhikaranya is understood as “coreferentiality,” that is, two different words referring to the same object. Cf. Ogawa 2005, 111.

2) Frauwallner (1938, 232) assumes that the BhV’s Pūrvapakṣa shows that the bhāvanā theory was further developed after Kumārila and before Maṇḍana’s time, but my tentative view is that the objection to Kumārila was constructed by Maṇḍana himself.

3) For the sake of consistency, I have interpreted sāmānādhikaranya in Patañjali’s discussion as śabda-sāmānādhikaranya, but Ogawa (2005, 111, fn. 20) argues that this is not Patañjali’s intention.

4) MBh p. 255, ll. 15–17. See Ogawa 2005, 113–114.

5) See Kataoka 2004, 155.

6) TV 71:8–9: tathā ca “kiṃ karoti?” “paṭhati,” “gacchati” iti sāmānyaviśeṣarūpeṇa sāmānādhikaranyaprayogo drśyate/ Note that the example is slightly different in the TV.

7) See also TV 33 and its auto-commentary. Here we can see Kumārila’s statement that bhāvanā is the universal of the various objects of the verbal roots.

8) Maṇḍana’s reference to “having the same object [as karoti]” (tādarthya = aikārthya) was
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probably prompted by Kumārila’s reference to “karotyarthanty ākhyātānī” (‘the finite verbs that have the object of kṛ’) in the TV 17 explanation. See TV 71:10.

9) Auto-commentary on BhV 2 (6,2-7,4).

10) Maṇḍana, unlike Kumārila, does not accept the distinction between “making” and “becoming” of karoti. See Frauwallner 1938, 234.

11) According to Kataoka (2004, 149, fn. 142), Kumārila prefers to use the term anurañj to explain the connection between the word objects.

12) Auto-commentary on BhV 28 (87,4-88,2).

13) It appears frequently in the VP (I & II) in the form “saṃvijñānapada,” which always means the word that brings about the cognition of the object denoted without excess or deficiency.

14) For example, see Kataoka 2004, 155, fn. 160.

Abbreviations

A Aṣṭādhyāyī. Pāṇini’s Grammatik. Vol. 2. Ed. and tr. Otto Böhtlingk. Kyoto: Rinsen Book Company, 1977.

BhV Bhāvanāviveka. Ed. Sri V. A. Ramaswami Sastri and Sri K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastri. Annamalainagar: Annamalai University, 1950.

MBh The Vyākaraṇa = Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. 3 vols. 3rd. ed. Ed. F. Kielhorn. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1962–1972. 1st. ed., 1880–1885.

ŚBh See Kataoka 2004.

TV See Kataoka 2004.

VP Vākyapadiya of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti and Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva. 3 vols. Ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer. Deccan College Monograph Series 32. Poona: Decan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1966.

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