New Extensions of Pairing-based Signatures into Universal (Multi) Designated Verifier Signatures*

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Abstract

The concept of universal designated verifier signatures was introduced by Steinfeld, Bull, Wang and Pieprzyk at Asiacrypt 2003. These signatures can be used as standard publicly verifiable digital signatures but have an additional functionality which allows any holder of a signature to designate the signature to any desired verifier. This designated verifier can check that the message was indeed signed, but is unable to convince anyone else of this fact.

We propose new efficient constructions for pairing-based short signatures. Our first scheme is based on Boneh-Boyen signatures and its security can be analyzed in the standard security model. We prove its resistance to forgery assuming the hardness of the so-called strong Diffie-Hellman problem, under the knowledge-of-exponent assumption. The second scheme is compatible with the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signatures and is proven unforgeable, in the random oracle model, under the assumption that the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem is untractable. Both schemes are designed for devices with constrained computation capabilities since the signing and the designation procedure are pairing-free. Finally, we present extensions of these schemes in the multi-user setting proposed by Desmedt in 2003.

Keywords: pairing-based cryptography, designated verifier signature, security analysis

1 Introduction

Recently many universal designated verifier signature protocols have been proposed (e.g. [14, 20, 23]). The present paper focuses on the proposal of two new efficient constructions for pairing-based short signatures [4, 5] and on the security treatment of them. The resistance to forgery of the first scheme relies on the hardness of the strong Diffie-Hellman problem, under the knowledge-of-exponent assumption, in the standard security model, and the one of the second scheme relies, in the random oracle model, on the hardness of a new computational problem (not easier than the widely used computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem).

1.1 Related work.

Many cryptographic primitives have been proposed to limit the self-authenticating property of digital signatures. The primary one: undeniable signatures – introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen in 1989 [6] – appeared to have some weaknesses. The concept of designated verifier

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signatures was introduced by Jakobsson, Sako and Impagliazzo \cite{11} in order to repair their so-called lie detector problem. Designated verifier signatures are intended to a specific and unique designated verifier, who is the only one able to check their validity. Motivated by privacy issues associated with dissemination of signed digital certificates, Steinfeld, Bull, Wang and Pieprzyk \cite{20} defined, in 2003, a new kind of signatures called universal designated-verifier signatures (UDVS). This primitive can function as a standard publicly-verifiable digital signature scheme but has an additional functionality which allows any holder of a signature to designate the signature to any verifier. Again, the designated-verifier can check that the message was signed by the signer, but is unable to convince anyone else of this fact. Designated verifier signatures (universal or not) have found numerous applications in financial cryptography (e.g. call for tenders, electronic voting, electronic auction or distributed contract signing).

Steinfeld et al. proposed an efficient UDVS scheme constructed using any bilinear group-pair. In collaboration with Laguillaumie, we suggested in \cite{14} a variant which significantly improves this protocol. Both schemes are compatible with the key-generation, signing and verifying algorithms of the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham \cite{5} signature scheme (BLS). In \cite{4}, Boneh and Boyen proposed efficient pairing-based short signatures (BB) whose security can be analyzed in the standard security model. A UDVS scheme compatible with a variant of Boneh and Boyen’s scheme has been proposed by Zhang, Furukawa and Imai \cite{23}.

1.2 Contributions of the paper.

The main contribution of the paper is to provide a new efficient UDVS protocol compatible with the original Boneh-Boyen scheme. The idea underlying our design relies on the flexibility of BB signatures and specifically on their good behaviour under scalar multiplication. The new scheme, that we call UDVS-BB, is unforgeable in the standard security model assuming the hardness of the strong Diffie-Hellman problem \cite{4}, under the knowledge-of-exponent assumption (KEA) \cite{2, 8}. The protocol proposed by Zhang et al. is proven unforgeable assuming the hardness of the same algorithmic problem, but under an additional assumption (which is stronger than KEA). The security of UDVS-BB can also be proved under a well-defined (though \textit{ad hoc}) computational problem without using any non-black-box assumption (such as KEA). The computational workload of UDVS-BB amounts to three exponentiations over bilinear groups for designating a signature and four pairing evaluations to verify it, and moreover, the length of the signatures is much smaller than the one of Zhang et al.’s signatures. Following the general paradigm from \cite{13}, this scheme is readily extended to produce universal multi designated verifier signatures (UMDVS) \cite{16} that are verifiable in a non-interactive way. The multi-user scheme inherits the efficiency properties of UDVS-BB with the same signature size (which, in particular, does not grow with the number of verifiers).

Using the same design principle, we propose a new UDVS protocol compatible with the BLS signatures which is well-suited for devices with constrained computation capabilities and low bandwidth. Indeed the designation procedure of the signatures is pairing-free and the resulting size is comparable to the length of DSA signatures. The proof of security for this scheme, that we called UDVS-BLS, takes place in the random oracle model \cite{3}: we show that this scheme is unforgeable with respect to a new computational assumption weaker than the widely used computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. In some cases \cite{11, 14} it may be desirable that UDVSs provide a stronger notion of privacy. The scheme UDVS-BLS provides this security requirement assuming the hardness of the \textit{xyz}-decisional co-Diffie Hellman problem. It is possible to extend this scheme into a UMDVS one.
2 Definitions

2.1 Notations

The set of $n$-bit strings is denoted by $\{0,1\}^n$ and the set of all finite binary strings is denoted by $\{0,1\}^*$. Let $A$ be a probabilistic Turing machine running in polynomial time (a PPTM, for short), and let $x$ be an input for $A$. The probability space that assigns to a string $\sigma$ the probability that $A$, on input $x$, outputs $\sigma$ is denoted by $A^x(x)$. The support of $A^x(x)$ is denoted by $A^x[x]$. Given a probability space $S$, a PPTM that samples a random element according to $S$ is denoted by $x \xleftarrow{\$} S$. For a finite set $X$, $x \xleftarrow{\$} X$ denotes a PPTM that samples a random element uniformly at random from $X$.

2.2 Universal designated verifier signatures

In this subsection, we recall the definitions of UDVS schemes and of their security requirements [13, 20].

2.2.1 Syntactic definition

Definition 1 A universal designated verifier signature scheme $\Sigma$ is an 8-tuple

$$\Sigma = (\text{Setup}, \text{SKeyGen}, \text{VKeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify}, \text{Designate}, \text{Fake}, \text{DVerify})$$

such that

- $\Sigma.\text{Setup}$ is a PPTM which takes an integer $k$ as input. The output are the public parameters $P$. $k$ is called the security parameter.
- $\Sigma.\text{SKeyGen}$ is a PPTM which takes the public parameters as input. The output is a pair $(sk_s, pk_s)$ where $sk_s$ is called a signing secret key and $pk_s$ a signing public key.
- $\Sigma.\text{Sign}$ is a PPTM which takes the public parameters, a message, and a signing secret key as inputs and outputs a bit string.
- $\Sigma.\text{Verify}$ is a PPTM which takes the public parameters, a message $m$, a bit string $\sigma$ and a signing public key $pk_s$. It outputs a bit. If the bit output is 1 then the bit string $\sigma$ is said to be a signature on $m$ for $pk_s$.
- $\Sigma.\text{VKeyGen}$ is a PPTM which takes the public parameters as input. The output is a pair $(sk_v, pk_v)$ where $sk_v$ is called a verifying secret key and $pk_v$ a verifying public key.
- $\Sigma.\text{Designate}$ is a PPTM which takes the public parameters, a message $m$, a signing public key $pk_s$, a signature $\sigma$ on $m$ for $pk_s$ and a verifying public key as inputs and outputs a bit string.
- $\Sigma.\text{Fake}$ is a PPTM which takes the public parameters, a message, a signing public key and a verifying secret key as inputs and outputs a bit string.
- $\Sigma.\text{DVerify}$ is a deterministic PPTM which takes the public parameters, a message $m$, a bit string $\tau$, a signing public key $pk_s$, a verifying public key $pk_v$ and the matching verifying secret key $sk_v$ as inputs. It outputs a bit. If the bit output is 1 then $\tau$ is said to be a designated verifier signature on $m$ from $pk_s$ to $pk_v$. 


\( \Sigma \) must satisfies the following properties, for all \( k \in \mathbb{N}, \) all \( \mathcal{P} \in \Sigma . \text{Setup}[k], \) all \( (pk_s, sk_s) \in \Sigma . \text{SKeyGen}[\mathcal{P}], \) all \( (pk_v, sk_v) \in \Sigma . \text{VKeyGen}[\mathcal{P}] \) and all messages \( m \):

- **Correctness of Signature:**
  \[
  \forall \sigma \in \Sigma . \text{Sign}[\mathcal{P}, m, sk_s], \quad \Sigma . \text{Verify}[\mathcal{P}, m, \sigma, pk_s] = \{1\}.
  \]

- **Correctness of Designation:**
  \[
  \forall \sigma \in \Sigma . \text{Sign}[\mathcal{P}, m, sk_s], \forall \tau \in \Sigma . \text{Designate}[\mathcal{P}, m, pk_s, \sigma, pk_v], \quad \Sigma . \text{DVerify}[\mathcal{P}, m, \tau, pk_s, pk_v, sk_v] = \{1\}.
  \]

- **Source Hiding:**
  \[
  \Sigma . \text{Designate}(\mathcal{P}, m, pk_s, \Sigma . \text{Sign}(\mathcal{P}, m, sk_s), pk_v) = \Sigma . \text{Fake}(\mathcal{P}, m, pk_s, sk_v).
  \]

The correctness properties insure that a properly formed (designated verifier) signature is always accepted by the (designated) verifying algorithm. The source hiding property states that given a message \( m \), a signing public key \( pk_s \), a verifying public key \( pk_v \) and a designated verifier signature \( \tau \) on \( m \) from \( pk_s \) to \( pk_v \) it is (unconditionally) infeasible to determine if \( \tau \) was produced by \( \Sigma . \text{Designate} \) or \( \Sigma . \text{Fake} \).

### 2.2.2 Security requirements

In this section, we state the definitions of **unforgeability** and **privacy of signer’s identity** under a chosen message attack that were introduced in \([14, 20]\).

In the following \( \Sigma = (\text{Setup}, \text{SKeyGen}, \text{VKeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify}, \text{Designate}, \text{Fake}, \text{DVerify}) \) denotes a UDVS scheme.

**Resistance to forgery.** The accepted definition of security for signature schemes is existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attack \([10]\). The notion of UDVS-EF-CMA-security \([14, 20]\) is a natural extension of this to the UDVS setting.

It is defined via a random experiment parameterized by a security parameter \( k \). The experiment involves an adversarial user \( \mathcal{A} \) and is as follows: first two public/secret key pairs for the signer and the verifier are generated by running the key generation algorithms. Then \( \mathcal{A} \) engages in polynomially many runs of the signing oracle, the verifying oracle and – possibly – the random oracle, interleaved at its own choosing. Eventually, \( \mathcal{A} \) outputs a pair \( (m^*, \tau^*) \), such that \( m^* \) was never queried to the signing oracle, and it wins if the verifying oracle returns \( 1 \) when queried on this pair.

**Definition 2** Let \( \mathcal{A} \) be a PPTM. We consider the following random experiments, where \( k \in \mathbb{N} \) is a security parameter:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Experiment } \text{Exp}^{\text{UDVS-EF-CMA}}_{\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}(k) \quad &
\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \emptyset \\
\mathcal{P} \leftarrow & \Sigma . \text{Setup}(k) \\
(sk_s, pk_s) \leftarrow & \Sigma . \text{SKeyGen}(\mathcal{P}) ; (sk_v, pk_v) \leftarrow \Sigma . \text{VKeyGen}(\mathcal{P}) \\
(m^*, \tau^*) \leftarrow & \mathcal{A}^{(\emptyset, \emptyset)}(\mathcal{P}, pk_s, pk_v) \\
& \mathcal{G} : m \rightarrow \Sigma . \text{Sign}(\mathcal{P}, m, sk_s) ; \mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{m\} \\
& \mathcal{V} : (m, \tau) \rightarrow \Sigma . \text{DVerify}(\mathcal{P}, m, \tau, pk_s, pk_v, sk_v) \\
\text{return} & \{1\} \text{ if } \Sigma . \text{DVerify}(\mathcal{P}, m^*, \tau^*, pk_s, pk_v, sk_v) = \{1\} \text{ and } m^* \notin \mathcal{L} \\
& 0 \text{ otherwise.}
\end{align*}
\]
Let \( \tau, q_\Sigma, q_{\mathcal{G}} \in \mathbb{N}^N \), \( \varepsilon \in [0, 1]^N \). We define the success of \( \mathcal{A} \) via

\[
\text{Succ}_{\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UDVS-EF-CMA}}(k) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UDVS-EF-CMA}}(k) = 1].
\]

1. \( \mathcal{A} \) is a \((\tau, q_\Sigma, q_{\mathcal{G}})\)-UDVS-EF-CMA-adversary if for all \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), the experiment \( \text{Exp}_{\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UDVS-EF-CMA}}(k) \) ends in expected time less than \( \tau(k) \) and in this experiment \( \mathcal{A} \) makes at most \( q_\Sigma(k) \) (resp. \( q_{\mathcal{G}}(k) \)) queries to the oracle \( \mathcal{G} \) (resp. \( \mathcal{U} \)).

2. \( \Sigma \) is \((\tau, q_\Sigma, q_{\mathcal{G}}, \varepsilon)\)-UDVS-EF-CMA-secure if for any \((\tau, q_\Sigma, q_{\mathcal{G}})\)-UDVS-EF-CMA-adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) and any \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), \( \text{Succ}_{\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UDVS-EF-CMA}}(k) \leq \varepsilon(k) \).

This definition does not capture that the adversary cannot generate a new signature on a previously signed message (the so-called \textit{strong unforgeability}).

**Privacy of signer’s identity.** As explained in [11], in some cases, it may be desirable that designated verifier signatures provide a stronger notion of privacy. More precisely, given a designated verifier signature and two potential signing public keys, it should be computationally infeasible for an eavesdropper, to determine under which of the two corresponding secret keys the signature was performed. The \textit{privacy of signer’s identity} (\( \Psi \)) property was formalized in [11] to capture this security notion.

We consider a UDVS-\( \Psi \)-CMA-adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), which runs in two stages: in the \texttt{find} stage, it takes two signing public keys \( \text{pk}_{s_0} \) and \( \text{pk}_{s_1} \) and a verifying public key \( \text{pk}_v \), and outputs a message \( m^* \) together with some state information \( \mathcal{I}^* \). In the \texttt{guess} stage, it gets a challenge UDVS \( \tau^* \) formed at random under one of the two keys and the information \( \mathcal{I}^* \), and must say which key was chosen. The adversary has access to the signing oracles \( \mathcal{G} \), to the verifying oracle \( \mathcal{U} \) and – possibly – to a random oracle. It is allowed to invoke them on any message with the restriction of not querying \( m^* \) from \( \mathcal{G} \) or \( \mathcal{U} \) in any stage.

**Definition 3** Let \( \mathcal{A} \) be a PPTM. We consider the following random experiments, where \( b \in \{0, 1\} \) and \( k \in \mathbb{N} \) is a security parameter:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Experiment } & \text{Exp}_{\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UDVS-}\Psi\text{-CMA-}b}(k) \\
\mathcal{L} & \leftarrow \emptyset \\
\mathcal{P} & \xleftarrow{k} \Sigma.\text{Setup}(k) \\
(\text{sk}_{s_0}, \text{pk}_{s_0}) & \xleftarrow{k} \Sigma.\text{SKeyGen}(\mathcal{P}) \\
(\text{sk}_{s_1}, \text{pk}_{s_1}) & \xleftarrow{k} \Sigma.\text{SKeyGen}(\mathcal{P}) \\
(\text{sk}_v, \text{pk}_v) & \xleftarrow{k} \Sigma.\text{VKeyGen}(\mathcal{P}) \\
(m^*, \mathcal{I}^*) & \xleftarrow{k} \mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{U}}(\text{find}, \mathcal{P}, \text{pk}_{s_0}, \text{pk}_{s_1}, \text{pk}_v) \\
& \quad \mid \mathcal{G} : (m, i) \xrightarrow{} \Sigma.\text{Sign}(\mathcal{P}, m, \text{sk}_i); \mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{m\} \\
& \quad \mid \mathcal{U} : (m, \tau, i) \xrightarrow{} \Sigma.\text{DVerify}(\mathcal{P}, m, \tau, \text{pk}_{s_i}, \text{pk}_v, \text{sk}_v); \mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{m\} \\
\sigma^* & \xleftarrow{k} \Sigma.\text{Designate}(\mathcal{P}, m^*, \text{pk}_{s_b}, \sigma^*, \text{pk}_v) \\
b^* & \xleftarrow{k} \mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{U}}(\text{guess}, \tau^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \\
\text{return } & 1 \text{ if } b = b^* \text{ and } m^* \notin \mathcal{L} \\
& 0 \text{ otherwise.}
\end{align*}
\]

Let \( \tau, q_\Sigma, q_{\mathcal{G}} \in \mathbb{N}^N \), \( \varepsilon \in [0, 1]^N \). We define the advantage of \( \mathcal{A} \) via

\[
\text{Adv}_{\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UDVS-}\Psi\text{-CMA}}(k) = \left| \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UDVS-}\Psi\text{-CMA-}0}(k) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UDVS-}\Psi\text{-CMA-}1}(k) = 1] \right|.
\]
1. \( \mathcal{A} \) is a \((\tau, q_{\mathcal{G}}, q_{\mathcal{G}})\)-UDVS-\(\Psi\)-CMA-adversary if for all \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), the experiment \( \text{Exp}_{\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UDVS-}\Psi\text{-CMA}}(k) \) ends in expected time less than \( \tau(k) \) and in this experiment \( \mathcal{A} \) makes at most \( q_{\mathcal{G}}(k) \) (resp. \( q_{\mathcal{G}}(k) \)) queries to the oracle \( \mathcal{G} \) (resp. \( \mathcal{G} \)).

2. \( \Sigma \) is \((\tau, q_{\mathcal{G}}, q_{\mathcal{G}}, \varepsilon)\)-UDVS-\(\Psi\)-CMA-secure if for any \((\tau, q_{\mathcal{G}}, q_{\mathcal{G}})\)-UDVS-\(\Psi\)-CMA-adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) and any \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), \( \text{Adv}_{\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UDVS-}\Psi\text{-CMA}}(k) \leq \varepsilon(k) \).

**Remark.** Recently, Lipmaa, Wang and Bao [15] have identified a new security requirement for designated verifier signatures, that they called the non-delegatability. This property captures the infeasibility for a signer to delegate her authentication capacity without revealing her private key. In spite of its interest, we do not consider this issue in the following. Indeed, in this paper, we focus on UDVSs, and it is quite easy to see that, if the underlying designated verifier signature scheme is non-delegatable then the basic signature scheme is universally forgeable under a chosen-message attack. In [21], we propose a new definition of non-delegatability for UDVS schemes and present some new schemes achieving this security requirement.

### 2.3 Bilinear maps and computational assumptions

The security of asymmetric cryptographic tools relies on assumptions about the hardness of certain algorithmic problems. Bilinear maps such as Weil or Tate pairing on elliptic curves and hyperelliptic curves have found various applications in cryptography (e.g. [4, 5]). In the following, we review the definition of cryptographic bilinear maps and in order to highlight that our schemes apply to any instantiation of BLS and BB signatures, we do not pin down any particular generator, but instead parameterize definitions and security results by a choice of generator.

**Definition 4** A prime-order-BDH-parameter-generator is a PPTM that takes as input \( k \in \mathbb{N} \) and outputs a tuple \((q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi)\) satisfying the following conditions:

1. \( q \) is a prime with \( 2^{k-1} < q < 2^k \);
2. \((G_1, +), (G_2, +)\) and \((G_3, \cdot)\) are groups of order \( q \);
3. \( \psi : G_2 \rightarrow G_1 \) is an isomorphism s.t. there exists a PPTM to compute \( \psi \);
4. \( \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle : G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_3 \) satisfies the following properties:
   - (a) \( \langle [a]Q, [b]R \rangle = \langle Q, R \rangle^a \) for all \( (Q, R) \in G_1 \times G_2 \) and all \( (a, b) \in \mathbb{Z}^2 \);
   - (b) \( \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle \) is non degenerate (i.e. \( \langle \psi(P), P \rangle \neq 1_{G_3} \) for some \( P \in G_2 \));
   - (c) there exists a PPTM to compute \( \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle \).

Let \((q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi)\) be as above, \( P_2 \in G_2 \) and let \( P_1 = \psi(P_2) \). In margin to the classical Diffie-Hellman problems in the groups \( G_1, G_2 \) and \( G_3 \), the introduction of bilinear maps in cryptography gives rise to new algorithmic problems [5, 14]. For instance, to analyze the security of their signatures, Boneh and Boyen [4] introduced a new computational problem, on which relies also the unforgeability of our scheme UDVS-BB:

**\( \ell \)-Strong Diffie-Hellman (\( \ell \)-SDH):** let \( x \in [1, q - 1] \). Given \( \ell \in \mathbb{N} \) and \(( [x]P_2, \ldots, [x^\ell]P_2 \) \in \( G_2^\ell \), compute a pair \( \langle (x + m)^{-1}P_1, m \rangle \) in \( G_1 \times [1, q - 1] \).

We will prove the unforgeability of UDVS-BB assuming the intractability of this problem under KEA and the one of a new ad-hoc problem (but not easier than the previous one under KEA):
Let \( x, y \) be two integers smaller than \( q \). Given \( \ell \in \mathbb{N}, (m_1, \ldots, m_\ell) \in [1, q]^{\ell} \) and
\[
((x + m_1)^{-1}P_2, \ldots, (x + m_\ell)^{-1}P_2) \in \mathbb{G}_2^{\ell},
\]
compute a 4-tuple \((m, R, S, T)\) in \( ([1, q - 1] \setminus \{m_1, \ldots, m_{q_\ell(k)}\}) \times \mathbb{G}_1^2\) such that
\[
\langle S, X + [m]P_2 \rangle = \langle R, P_2 \rangle \text{ and } \langle T, P_2 \rangle = \langle R, Y \rangle.
\tag{1}
\]

The unforgeability of UDVS-BLS relies also on a new algorithmic problem (but not easier than the widely used computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem):

\( \mathcal{PR}_2 \): let \( x, y, z \) be three integers smaller than \( q \). Given \([x]P_1, [y]P_2\) and \([z]P_2\), compute a pair \((R, Q) \in \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2\) such that \( \langle R, Q \rangle = \langle P_1, P_2 \rangle^{xyz}\).

Its UDVS-\( \Psi \)-CMA-security relies on the decisional variant of it that we denote \( \mathcal{PR}_3 \).

**Definition 5** Let \( \ell \in \mathbb{N} \) and \( A \) be a PPTM. We consider the following random experiments, where \( k \in \mathbb{N} \) is a security parameter:

**Experiment** \( \text{Exp}_{\text{Gen}, A}^{\mathcal{PR}_1(\ell)}(k) \)

\[
P = (q, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(k)
\]

\( P_2 \leftarrow R \mathbb{G}_2 \setminus \{0, \mathbb{G}_2\} ; (x, y) \leftarrow R [1, q - 1]^2 \)

\( X \leftarrow [x]P_2, Y \leftarrow [y]P_2 \)

for \( i \) from 1 to \( \ell(k) \) do

\( m_i \leftarrow R [1, q] ; R_i \leftarrow [(x + m_i)^{-1}\psi(P_2)] \)

\( (m, R, S, T) \leftarrow R A(P, P_2, X, Y, m_1, \ldots, m_{\ell(k)}, R_1, \ldots, R_{\ell(k)}) \)

return 1 if \((R, S, T) \in \mathbb{G}_1^3\) and satisfies (1)

0 otherwise

**Experiment** \( \text{Exp}_{\text{Gen}, A}^{\mathcal{PR}_2}(k) \)

\[
P = (q, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(k)
\]

\( P_2 \leftarrow R \mathbb{G}_2 \setminus \{0, \mathbb{G}_2\} ; (x, y, z) \leftarrow R [1, q - 1]^3 \)

\( X \leftarrow [x]\psi(P_2), Y \leftarrow [y]P_2, Z \leftarrow [z]P_2 \)

\( (R, Q) \leftarrow R A(P, P_2, X, Y, Z) \)

return 1 if \((R, Q) \in \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2\)

and \( \langle R, Q \rangle = \langle \psi(P_2), P_2 \rangle^{xyz} \)

0 otherwise

Let \( \tau \in \mathbb{N}, \varepsilon \in [0, 1]^\mathbb{N} \) and let \( i \in \{1, 2\} \). We define the successes of \( A \) via

\[
\text{Succ}_{\text{Gen}, A}^{\mathcal{PR}_i}(k) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{Gen}, A}^{\mathcal{PR}_i}(k) = 1].
\]

1. \( A \) is a \( \tau \)-\( \mathcal{PR}_i \)-adversary if for all \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), the experiment \( \text{Exp}_{\text{Gen}, A}^{\mathcal{PR}_i}(k) \) ends in expected time less than \( \tau(k) \).

2. \( \text{Gen} \) is a \( (\tau, \varepsilon) \)-\( \mathcal{PR}_i \)-secure-generator if for any \( \tau \)-\( \mathcal{PR}_i \)-adversary \( A \) and any \( k \in \mathbb{N} \),

\[
\text{Succ}_{\text{Gen}, A}^{\mathcal{PR}_i}(k) \leq \varepsilon(k).
\]

**Definition 6** Let \( A \) be a PPTM. We consider the following random experiments, where \( k \in \mathbb{N} \) is a security parameter:
3.1 Design principle

We give in details the ideas underlying their design, since we are convinced for the construction of new privacy-preserving schemes. The technique presented in this paper can be used to improve the efficiency of their schemes.

3 Description of the new schemes

In this section, we describe our new UDVS schemes. The general principle underlying the construction of UDVS-BB and UDVS-BLS is based on an elegant technique proposed by Damgård [8] and aimed at making public-key encryption scheme secure against (non-adaptive) chosen ciphertext attacks. We give in details the ideas underlying their design, since we are convinced that they may be of independent interest (e.g. for the construction of new privacy-preserving signature schemes).

3.1 Design principle

Let \((G, +)\) be a group of prime order \(q\) and let \(P\) be a generator of \(G\). In 1991, Damgård [8] presented a simple variant of the Elgamal encryption scheme in \(G\). In his proposal, Alice publishes two public keys \(A_1 = [a_1]P\) and \(A_2 = [a_2]P\) and keeps secret their discrete logarithms \(a_1\) and \(a_2\). When Bob wants to privately send a message \(M \in G\) to Alice, he picks uniformly at random an integer \(r \in [1, q - 1]\) and transmits the triple \((Q_1, Q_2, C)\) where \(Q_1 = [r]P\), \(Q_2 = [r]A_1\) and \(C = M + [r]A_2\). When she receives the ciphertext \((Q_1, Q_2, C)\), Alice checks whether the equality \(Q_2 = [a_1]Q_1\) holds: if it is the case, she retrieves the message \(M\), as \(M = C - [a_2]Q_1\), otherwise she rejects the ciphertext.

Damgård proved that if the DDH problem is hard in \(G\), then this scheme is semantically secure against (non-adaptive) chosen ciphertext attacks, if we assume the so-called knowledge-of-exponent assumption [2]. Intuitively this assumption states that, without the knowledge of \(a_1\), the only way to generate couples \((Q_1, Q_2) \in G^2\), verifying \(Q_2 = [a_1]Q_1\), is to choose an integer \(r \in [1, q - 1]\) and to compute \(Q_1 = [r]P\) and \(Q_2 = [r]A_1\).

There are many ways in which the formulation of KEA can be varied to capture this intuition that the only way to generate a Diffie-Hellman triple is to know the corresponding exponent \([2, 8]\). Usually, this is done by saying that for any PPTM outputting such a triple, there is

\[\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{Gen, }A}(k)] = \left| \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{Gen, }A, 1}(k) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{Gen, }A, 0}(k) = 1] \right|.

1. \(A\) is a \(\tau\)-\(\mathcal{PR}_3\)-adversary if for all \(k \in \mathbb{N}\), the experiment \(\text{Exp}_{\text{Gen, }A}(k)\) ends in expected time less than \(\tau(k)\).

2. \(\text{Gen}\) is a \((\tau, \epsilon)\)-\(\mathcal{PR}_3\)-secure-generator if for any \(\tau\)-\(\mathcal{PR}_3\)-adversary \(A\) and any \(k \in \mathbb{N}\),

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{Gen, }A}(k) \leq \epsilon(k).
\]
We define the advantage of an "extractor" than can return this exponent. For our purposes, it is necessary to allow the adversary to be randomized as in \([1]\) (in that case, it is important that the extractor gets the coins \(\varpi\) of the adversary as an additional input, since otherwise the assumption is clearly false). We propose a similar definition suitable for bilinear structures.

**Definition 7** Let \(A\) and \(\overline{A}\) be two PPTM’s. We consider the following random experiments, where \(k \in \mathbb{N}\) is a security parameter:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Experiment } & \text{Exp}_{\text{Gen},A,\overline{A}}^{\text{kea}}(k) \\
& (q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi) \xrightarrow{R} \text{Gen}(k) \\
& P_2 \leftarrow R \ G_2 \setminus \{ O_{G_2} \} ; x \xrightarrow{R} [1, q - 1] \\
& (R, S) \xrightarrow{R} \overline{A}_k((q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi), P_2, [x]P_2) \\
& r \leftarrow \overline{A}_k((q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi), P_2, [x]P_2; \varpi) \\
& \text{return } 1 \text{ if } (R, S) \in G_1 \times G_2, \ \psi(S) = [x]R \text{ and } R \neq [r]P_2 \\
& \text{ 0 otherwise}
\end{align*}
\]

We define the advantage of \(A\) relative to \(\overline{A}\) via

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{Gen},A,\overline{A}}^{\text{kea}}(k) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{Gen},A,\overline{A}}^{\text{kea}}(k) = 1].
\]

Let \(\varepsilon \in [0, 1]^\mathbb{N}\)

1. \(\overline{A}\) is a \(\varepsilon\)-kea-extractor for \(A\) if for all \(k \in \mathbb{N}\), \(\text{Adv}_{\text{Gen},A,\overline{A}}^{\text{kea}}(k) \leq \varepsilon(k)\)

2. We say that the knowledge-of-exponent assumption holds for \(\text{Gen}\) if there exists a PPTM \(\overline{A}\) such that for every PPTM \(A\), there exists a negligible function \(\varepsilon\) such that \(\overline{A}\) is a \(\varepsilon\)-KEA-extractor for \(A\).

### 3.2 Description of the protocol UDVS-BB

#### 3.2.1 Boneh-Boyen’s signatures.

In 2004, Boneh and Boyen \([4]\) proposed a new application of bilinear structures to construct efficient short signatures. Their idea is to plug the message to be signed in the exponent and, in order to avoid trivial "homomorphic" forgeries, to do so in a non-linear way. For an entity whose private/public key pair is \((u, [u]P_2)\) in \([1, q - 1] \times G_2\), the publication of the group element \(\sigma = [(u + m)^{-1}]P_1\) seems to be a good mean to authenticate a message \(m \in [1, q - 1]\). Indeed, the computation of \(\sigma\) for a given couple \((m, [u]P_2)\) is equivalent to the resolution of the so called co-CDH problem \([5]\) and it seems to remain difficult even if the adversary is allowed to choose \(m\) and knows \([(u + m_1)^{-1}]P_1, \ldots, [(u + m_s)^{-1}]P_1\) in \(G\), for some \(m_i \in [1, q - 1] \setminus \{ m \} (i \in [1, s])\). Boneh and Boyen have proved that this problem is not easier than the \((s + 1)\)-SDH problem. They also made the important remark that the use of a second pair of keys \((v, [v]P_2)\) in \([1, q - 1] \times G\) enables to prove the unforgeability of the scheme under chosen message attacks, in the standard security model: they suggested to replace the signature \(\sigma\) by a couple \([(u + m + rv)^{-1}]P_1, r\) where \(r\) is picked uniformly at random in \([1, q - 1]\). Finally, in order to be able to sign arbitrarily long messages, an hash function family \(h\) is added to the public parameters, such that for every group order \(q\) output by \(\text{Gen}\), \(h(q)\) generates the description of a (collision resistant) hash function \(h\) which maps arbitrary long bit strings on elements from \([1, q - 1]\).
### 3.2.2 The scheme UDVS-BB.

Let \( \mathcal{P} = ((q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi), P_1, P_2) \) and \( h \) be as above, let \((U_a, V_a) \in G_2 \) be Alice’s public key for BB signatures. The principle underlying the universal designated verifier signature scheme UDVS-BB is based on Damgård’s idea. Let us suppose that Bob has published a public key \( U_b = [u_b]P_2 \) and that the pair \( \sigma = (r, S) \) in \([1, q - 1] \times G_1\) is a BB signature produced by Alice, on a message \( m \). If Cindy wants to designate \( \sigma \) to Bob, she picks uniformly at random an integer \( t \in [1, q - 1] \) and sets \( Q_1 = [t]S \), \( Q_2 = [t]U_b \) and \( Q_3 = [t]P_2 \). The quadruple \( \tau = (r, Q_1, Q_2, Q_3) \) is the resulting designated verifier signature on \( m \). The protocol UDVS-BB is described with all the details in figure 1. The following simple observations are intuitive arguments in favor of the security of the protocol.

1. Under KEA, the equality

\[ \langle Q_3, U_b \rangle = \langle Q_2, P_2 \rangle \]  \hspace{1cm} (2)

![Figure 1: Description of the protocol UDVS-BB(\text{Gen}, h)]](image)

| Algorithm UDVS-BB.Setup | Algorithm UDVS-BB.SKeyGen |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| **Input:** \( k \) | **Input:** \( \mathcal{P} \) |
| **Output:** \( \mathcal{P} \) | **Output:** \( (sk_v, pk_v) \) |

\[ \begin{aligned}
(q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi) & \xrightarrow{R} \text{Gen}(k) \\
P_2 & \xrightarrow{R} G_2; P_1 \xrightarrow{\psi(P_2)} h \xrightarrow{R} h(q-1) \\
\mathcal{P} & \leftarrow [(q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi), P_1, P_2, h]
\end{aligned} \]

\[ \begin{aligned}
(u_a, v_a) & \xrightarrow{R} [1, q - 1]^2 \\
\mathbf{sk}_v & \leftarrow (u_a, v_a) \\
\mathbf{pk}_v & \leftarrow (u_aP_2, v_aP_2)
\end{aligned} \]

| Algorithm UDVS-BB.Sign | Algorithm UDVS-BB.Verify |
|------------------------|-------------------------|
| **Input:** \( \mathcal{P}, m, (u_a, v_a) \) | **Input:** \( \mathcal{P}, m, (U_a, V_a), (r, S) \) |
| **Output:** \( \sigma \) | **Output:** \( b \) |

\[ \begin{aligned}
h & \leftarrow h(m) \\
r & \xrightarrow{R} [1, q - 1] \\
\text{repeat} & \\
\text{until } u_a + h + v_ar & \neq 0 \mod q \\
S & \leftarrow [(u_a + h + v_ar)^{-1}]P_1 \\
\sigma & \leftarrow (r, S)
\end{aligned} \]

\[ \begin{aligned}
\alpha & \leftarrow \langle S, \mathcal{U} + [h(m)]P_2 + [r]V \rangle \\
\text{if } \alpha & = \langle P_1, P_2 \rangle \text{ then } b \leftarrow 1 \text{ else } b \leftarrow 0
\end{aligned} \]

| Algorithm UDVS-BB.VKeyGen | Algorithm UDVS-BB.DVerify |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| **Input:** \( \mathcal{P} \) | **Input:** \( \mathcal{P}, m, (U_a, V_a), (r, Q_1, Q_2, Q_3) \) |
| **Output:** \( (sk_v, pk_v) \) | **Output:** \( b \) |

\[ \begin{aligned}
u_a & \xrightarrow{R} [1, q - 1] \\
\mathbf{sk}_v & \leftarrow u_a \\
\mathbf{pk}_v & \leftarrow [u_a]P_2
\end{aligned} \]

\[ \begin{aligned}
\alpha_1 & \leftarrow \langle Q_1, U_a + [h(m)]P_2 + [r]V_a \rangle \\
\alpha_2 & \leftarrow \langle Q_3, P_2 \rangle \\
\beta_1 & \leftarrow \langle Q_3, [u_b]P_2 \rangle, \beta_2 \leftarrow \langle Q_2, P_3 \rangle \\
\text{if } \alpha_1 & = \alpha_2 \land \beta_1 = \beta_2 \text{ then } b \leftarrow 1 \\
\text{else } & b \leftarrow 0
\end{aligned} \]
insures Bob that Cindy knows the value \( t \) such that \( Q_2 = [t]U_b \) and \( Q_3 = [t]P_2 \).

2. If (2) is satisfied, Bob is convinced that Cindy knows the group element \( S = [t^{-1}]Q_1 \). The BB verification equality \( \langle S, U_a + [h(m)]P_2 + [r]V_a \rangle = \langle P_1, P_2 \rangle \), holds if and only if the equality
\[
\langle Q_1, U_a + [h(m)]P_2 + [r]V_a \rangle = \langle Q_3, P_2 \rangle
\]
does. Therefore, if the equalities (2) and (3) are true, the quadruple \( \tau \) proves to Bob that Alice has actually signed the message \( m \).

3. However, this quadruple cannot convince anyone else, since it could have been produced by Bob himself. Indeed, if Bob samples uniformly at random \((r, \tilde{t})\) in \([1, q - 1]^2\) and computes the group elements:
\[
Q_1 = [\tilde{t}]P_1, \quad Q_2 = [u_b \tilde{t}] (U_a + [h(m)]P_2 + [r]V_a), \quad Q_3 = [\tilde{t}]U_a + [\tilde{t} \cdot h(m)]P_2 + [\tilde{t} \cdot r]V_a,
\]
he produces quadruples which verify (2) and (3) and follow the same distribution as those produced by Cindy (namely with \( t \equiv_q \tilde{t}(u_a + h(m) + v_ar) \)).

Remark. Given a UDVS produced by UDVS-BB, it is easy, by random scalar multiplication, to produce a new signature on the same message for the same public keys. It is admitted that weak forgery is no real threat whatsoever.

Remark. The computational workload of UDVS-BB.DVerify for the designated verifier can be reduced to only two pairing evaluations and one bilinear exponentiation thanks to the knowledge of \( u_b \) by checking that \( Q_2 = [u_b]Q_3 \) instead of \( \beta_1 = \beta_2 \).

Remark. In the algorithm UDVS-BB.Fake, the verifier’s secret key \( u_b \) is used only to compute \( Q_2 = [u_b]R \). Therefore, the signer as well as the verifier can delegate his authenticating capacity (without revealing the secret key) by publishing the elements \( K_1 = [u_a \cdot u_b]P_1 \) and \( K_2 = [v_a \cdot u_b]P_1 \) in \( G_2 \). Indeed, the knowledge of \((K_1, K_2)\) suffices to produce an UDVS \( \tau = (r, Q_1, Q_2, Q_3) \) on a message \( m \) by picking uniformly at random \((r, \tilde{t}) \in [1, q - 1]^2\), and computing \( Q_1 \leftarrow [\tilde{t}]P_1 \), \( Q_2 \leftarrow [\tilde{t}]K_1 + [\tilde{t} \cdot h(m)]\psi(U_b) + [\tilde{t} \cdot r]K_2 \) and \( Q_3 = [\tilde{t}]\psi(U_a) + [\tilde{t} \cdot h(m)]P_1 + [\tilde{t} \cdot r]\psi(V_a) \). Therefore, the scheme UDVS-BB is delegatable.

3.3 Description of the protocol UDVS-BLS

3.3.1 Boneh-Lynn-Shacham’s signatures.

In [5], Boneh et al. presented the signature scheme BLS that works in any bilinear cryptographic context. The scheme resembles the undeniable signature scheme proposed by Chaum and van Antwerpen [6] and can be seen as a variant of the FDH signature scheme [3]. The protocol BLS is efficient, produces short signatures (for carefully chosen parameters), and is unforgeable in the random oracle model assuming the intractability of the co-CDH problem.

3.3.2 The scheme UDVS-BLS.

Let \( \text{Gen} \) be a prime-order-BDH-parameter-generator, let \( f_r \in \mathbb{N} \), and let \( \mathcal{H} \) be an hash function family such that for bilinear structure \((q, G_1, G_2, G_3, (\cdot, \cdot), \psi)\) output by \( \text{Gen} \), \( \mathcal{H}(G_1) \) generates the description of an hash function \( \mathcal{H} \) (modeled in the security analysis as a random oracle) which maps arbitrary long bit strings on elements from \( G_1 \). Let BLS be the associated signature scheme; using the same approach, it is possible to construct a new UDVS scheme compatible with the BLS signatures. The protocol UDVS-BLS is described with all the details in figure [2]
Let $k \in \mathbb{N}$, let $\mathcal{P} = ((q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi), P_2, \mathcal{H})$ be some output of BLS.Setup($k$) and let $U_a = [u_a]P_2$ (resp. $U_b = [u_b]P_2$) be Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) public key output by BLS.KeyGen($\mathcal{P}$). BLS signatures are elements $S = [u_a]H \in G_1$, where the group element $H$ is the hash value of the signed message $m$ and (potentially) some random salt (of size $n_r = f_r(k)$). The discrete logarithm of $H$ is unknown to all users, therefore, whence the signature $S$ is randomized as above: $Q_1 = [t]S$ for some $t \in [1, q - 1]$, it suffices to reveal the element $Q_2 = [t^{-1}]U_b$ to prove, in a non-transferable way, to Bob that Alice actually signed the message $m$. The tuple $(P_2, U_a, U_b, H, \langle Q_1, Q_2 \rangle)$ is indeed a bilinear Diffie-Hellman tuple which could have been produced by using secret information from Alice or Bob, but not otherwise under the assumption that the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable.

**Remark.** The protocol UDVS-BLS is delegatable [15]. Indeed, in the algorithm UDVS-BLS.Fake, the secret key $u_b$ from the designated verifier is only used to compute the element $Q_2 = [t \cdot u_b]U_a \in G_2$ and the signer as well as the verifier can delegate their authenticating capability (without disclosing their secret key) by publishing the element $[u_a \cdot u_b]P_2$. 

---

**Figure 2:** Description of the protocol UDVS-BLS($Gen, f_r, \mathcal{H}$)
4 Security results

In this section, we state the security properties of our schemes.

4.1 Unforgeability of the scheme UDVS-BB

The theorem below states that the protocol UDVS-BB(\text{Gen}, h) is UDVS-EF-CMA-secure assuming the KEA assumption, the collision-resistance of h and the intractability of the problem $\ell$-SDH in Gen, for all polynomial $\ell \in \mathbb{N}^\mathbb{N}$. Since KEA is a somewhat strange and impractical assumption, it would be better if we could do without it, as it has been recently done by Gjosteen [9] for Damgård’s encryption scheme. In the following theorem, we prove the unforgeability of UDVS-BB to $\mathcal{PR}_1(\ell)$ without KEA. Finally, since the protocol UDVS-BB is publicly verifiable, we consider only UDVS-EF-CMA-attackers that do not make queries to the verifying oracle $\mathcal{V}$.

**Theorem 1** Let \text{Gen} be a prime-order-BDH-generator and h be an hash-function family of codomain indexed by the orders of groups generated by \text{Gen}.

1. If the scheme BB(\text{Gen}, h) is EF-CMA-secure against polynomial adversaries, then under the KEA assumption in \text{Gen}, the scheme UDVS-BB(\text{Gen}, h) is UDVS-EF-CMA-secure against polynomial adversaries.

2. If for all polynomial $\ell$, \text{Gen} is $\ell$-SDH-secure against polynomial adversaries and if h is an hash-function collision-resistant against polynomial adversaries then, under the KEA assumption in \text{Gen}, the protocol UDVS-BB(\text{Gen}, h) is UDVS-EF-CMA-secure against polynomial adversaries.

3. Let $(\tau, q_\mathcal{E}) \in \mathcal{F}[\mathbb{N}, \mathbb{N}]^2$ and let $\mathcal{A}$ be a $(\tau, q_\mathcal{E}, 0)$-UDVS-EF-CMA-adversary against the scheme UDVS-BB(\text{Gen}, h). There exist $\tau', \tau'' \in \mathcal{F}[\mathbb{N}, \mathbb{N}]$ verifying,

\[
\tau' = \tau + q_\mathcal{E} \cdot (T_{\text{exp}}(G_1) + O(1)) \text{ and } \tau'' = \tau + O(1),
\]

a $\tau'$-$\mathcal{PR}_1(q_\mathcal{E})$-adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against \text{Gen} and a $\tau''$-Collision-adversary $\mathcal{C}$ against h such that,

\[
2 \cdot \text{Succ}_{\mathcal{Gen}, \mathcal{B}}^{\mathcal{PR}_1(q_\mathcal{E})} + \text{Succ}_{h, \mathcal{C}}^{\text{Collision}} \geq \text{Succ}_{\text{UDVS-BB}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UDVS-EF-CMA}}.
\]

**Proof.**

1. The algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ which try to forge a signature BB, takes as input some public parameters $\mathcal{P}$ and a signing public key $pk_s$. It computes a verifying public key $U_b = [u_b]P_2$ by running the algorithm UDVS-BB.VKeyGen($\mathcal{P}$) and then executes the algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ on the entries $\mathcal{P}$, $pk_s$ and $U_b$. It forwards $\mathcal{A}$’s signature queries to its own signing oracle and the simulation of the verifying oracles is straightforward since the protocol UDVS-BB is publicly verifiable.

Let us denote $\mathcal{A}'$ the algorithm whose execution is identical to the one of $\mathcal{A}$, but which returns the pair $(Q_3, Q_2)$, when $\mathcal{A}$ returns $\tau^* = (r, Q_1, Q_2, Q_3)$. If $\mathcal{A}$’s output is a valid forgery, then the 4-tuple $(\psi(P_2), [u_b]\psi(P_2), Q_3, Q_2)$ is a valid Diffie-Hellman 4-tuple. Assuming KEA, there exists $\mathcal{\overline{A}}$ which taken as inputs $\mathcal{A}$’s random tape and entries, outputs $t \in [1, q - 1]$ such that $Q_3 = [t]P_2$ et $Q_2 = [t]U_b$ with a probability negligibly close to the success of $\mathcal{A}$.

$\mathcal{B}$ run the algorithm $\mathcal{\overline{A}}$ to get this value $t$ and outputs the pair $\sigma^* = (r, [t^{-1}]Q_1)$ which is a valid forgery for the scheme BB if $\tau$ is a valid forgery and $Q_3 = [t]P_2$. The probability of success of $\mathcal{B}$ is therefore negligibly close to the one of $\mathcal{A}$ and its running time is polynomial.
2. It is a simple consequence of the first part of the theorem and the security theorem from [4].

3. Let $Gen$ be a prime-order-BDH-generator, $q_{\mathcal{E}}, \tau \in \mathcal{F}([N, N]$ and let $\mathcal{A}$ be a $(\tau, q_{\mathcal{E}}, 0)$-UDVS-EF-CMA-adversary against UDVS-BB($Gen$). It is readily seen that $\mathcal{A}$ can be converted into an attacker for the simplified scheme defined without the hash function $h$ or into an attacker $C$ against the collision resistance of $\mathcal{E}$. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the scheme works directly on messages $m \in [1, q]$.

We will construct an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ which takes as inputs $(q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi)$ generated by $Gen(k)$, a vector $(m_1, \ldots, m_{qE}(k)) \in [1, q]^{q_{\mathcal{E}}(k)}$, $(P_2, X, Y) \in \mathbb{G}_2^3$ and $(R_1, \ldots, R_{qE}(k)) \in \mathbb{G}_1^{q_{\mathcal{E}}(k)}$ satisfying $R_i = [(x + m_i)^{-1}]P_1$ for all $i \in [1, q_{\mathcal{E}}(k)]$ with $P_1 = \psi(P_2)$ and $X = \{x\}P_2$, outputs a 4-tuple

$$(m, R, S, T) \in ([1, q - 1] \setminus \{m_1, \ldots, m_{q_{\mathcal{E}}(k)}\}) \times \mathbb{G}_1^3$$

which satisfies (1).

Our method of proof is inspired by Shoup [19]: we define a sequence of games $Exp_1, \ldots, Exp_4$ starting from the actual UDVS-EF-CMA-adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and modify it step by step, until we reach a final game whose success probability has an upper bound related to solving the $PR_1(q_{\mathcal{E}})$ problem. All the games operate on the same underlying probability space: the public and private keys of the signature scheme and the coin tosses of $\mathcal{A}$.

$\text{Exp}_1 \; \mathcal{B}_1$ plays the role of the challenger in the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{UDVS-EF-CMA}}^{\text{UDVS-BB}, \mathcal{A}}$ of the definition [2].

**Initialization** $k$

$\mathcal{P} \leftarrow UDVS-BB.\text{Setup}(k)$,

$(sk, pk) \leftarrow UDVS-BB.\text{SKGen}(\mathcal{P})$,

$(sk_c, pk_c) \leftarrow UDVS-BB.\text{VKGen}(\mathcal{P})$

$run \; \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{P}, sk, pk_c) \sim (m^*, \tau^*)$.

**Simulation of the oracles**

- $\mathcal{S}(m) \leftrightarrow UDVS-BB.\text{Sign}(\mathcal{P}, m, sk_s)$.

In the random experiments $\text{Exp}_i$, for $i \in [1, 5]$, we denote by $F_i$, the event “$m^* \notin Q_\mathcal{E}$ and UDVS-BB.DVerify$(\mathcal{P}, m^*, pk_s, \tau^*, pk_c, sk_c) = 1$”.

By definition, we have $Pr[F_1] = Succ_{\text{UDVS-EF-CMA}}^{\text{UDVS-BB}, \mathcal{A}}(k)$.

$\text{Exp}_2 \; \mathcal{B}_2$ modify the previous simulation by inserting the bilinear structure underlying the instance of the problem $PR_1(q_{\mathcal{E}})$ to solve in the public parameters $\mathcal{P}$.

**Initialization** $k$

$\mathcal{P} \leftarrow [(q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi), P_1, P_2]$,

$(u_a, v_a, u_b) \leftarrow [1, q - 1]^3$, $(U_a, V_a, U_b) \leftarrow ([u_a]P_2, [v_a]P_2, [u_b]P_2)$

$run \; \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{P}, (U_a, V_a), U_b) \sim (m^*, \tau^*)$.

**Simulation of the oracles**

- $\mathcal{S}(m) \leftrightarrow UDVS-BB.\text{Sign}(\mathcal{P}, m, (u_a, v_a))$.

The distribution of $\mathcal{A}$’s entries is unchanged and we have $Pr[F_2] = Pr[F_1]$.

$\text{Exp}_3 \; \mathcal{B}_3$ precomputes the signatures given to the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and then uses his knowledge of the secret key $u_a$ or $v_a$ in the chameleon hash function to answer $\mathcal{A}$’s signature queries. The algorithm $\mathcal{B}_3$ distinguishes two types of forgers:
Type 0: the forgers which
   (a) either make a signature query on \( m \) such that \( m = -u_a \);
   (b) or return a forgery \( (m^*, \tau^*) \) with \( \tau^* = (r^*, Q_1^*, Q_2^*, Q_3^*) \), such that \( m^* + v_ar^* \notin \{m_1, \ldots, m_{q_3}(k)\} \).

Type 1: the other forgers, namely those which
   (a) do not make a signature query on \( m \) such that \( m = -u_a \);
   (b) and return a forgery \( (m^*, \tau^*) \) with \( \tau^* = (r^*, Q_1^*, Q_2^*, Q_3^*) \), such that \( m^* + v_ar^* = m_i \) for some \( i \in [1, q_3(k)] \).

The adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) is necessarily of one of these two types and the algorithm \( \mathcal{B}_4 \) picks uniformly at random a bit \( \beta \in \{0, 1\} \). This algorithm will be able (at the end of the simulation) to solve the \( \mathcal{PR}_1(q_3) \) problem if the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) is of type \( \beta \).

Initialization \( k \)
\[
\mathcal{P} \leftarrow [(q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle, \cdot, \psi \rangle, P_1, P_2)], \quad c \leftarrow 1, \quad \ell \leftarrow 0, \quad \beta \leftarrow 0, \quad \{0, 1\}
\]
\[
(u_a, v_a, u_b) \leftarrow [1, q - 1] \quad \text{and} \quad (U_a, V_a, U_b) \leftarrow [(u_a]P_2, [v_a]P_2, [u_b]P_2)
\]
\[
(h_1, \ldots, h_{q_3(k)}) \leftarrow [1, q]^{q_3(k)}
\]
for \( i \) from 1 to \( q_3(k) \) do
   if \( \beta = 0 \) then \( T_i \leftarrow [(u_a + h_i)^{-1}]P_1 \) else \( T_i \leftarrow [(v_a + h_i)^{-1}]P_1 \)
run \( \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{P}, (U_a, V_a), (U_b) \leftarrow (m^*, \tau^*) \).

Simulation of the oracles
* \( \mathcal{S}(m) \):
  if \( \beta = 0 \) and \( [m]P_2 = -U_a \) then \( \ell \leftarrow -m \mod q \)
  else \( r \leftarrow (h_c - m) \cdot v_a^{-1} \mod q, \quad S \leftarrow T_c \)
  if \( r = 0 \) then return \( -1 \) else \( c \leftarrow c + 1 \), return \( (r, S) \).
In both cases, the signatures produced by \( \mathcal{B}_3 \) are perfectly distributed. We have indeed \( \langle S, U_a + [m]P_2 + [r]V_a \rangle = \langle T_c, U_a + [h_c]P_2 \rangle = \langle P_1, P_2 \rangle \), for \( \beta = 0 \) and \( \langle S, U_a + [m]P_2 + [r]V_a \rangle = \langle [r^{-1}]T_c, [r \cdot h_c]P_2 + [r]V_a \rangle = \langle P_1, P_2 \rangle \) for \( \beta = 1 \).

In the random experiment \( \text{Exp}_i \), let us denote for \( i \in \{3, 4\} \), \( T_i \) the event "\( \mathcal{A} \) is of type \( \beta \)". The algorithm \( \mathcal{B}_3 \) aborts the simulation only if \( \mathcal{A} \) is of type \( 1 - \beta \).

Therefore, we have \( \text{Pr}[F_3|T_3] = \text{Pr}[F_2] \).

\( \text{Exp}_4 \) \( \mathcal{B}_4 \) replace in the following the public keys given as inputs to \( \mathcal{A} \) and the precomputed signatures \( (h_i, S_i) \) by elements coming from the instance of the problem to solve.

Initialization \( k \)
\[
\mathcal{P} \leftarrow [(q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle, \cdot, \psi \rangle, P_1, P_2)], \quad c \leftarrow 1, \quad \ell \leftarrow 0, \quad \beta \leftarrow 0, \quad \{0, 1\}
\]
\[
\text{if } \beta = 0 \text{ then } (U_a, U_b) \leftarrow (X, Y), \quad v_a \leftarrow [1, q - 1], \quad V_a \leftarrow [u_b]P_2
\]
\[
\text{else } (V_a, U_b) \leftarrow (X, Y), \quad u_a \leftarrow [1, q - 1], \quad U_a \leftarrow [u_b]P_2
\]
\[
(h_1, \ldots, h_{q_3(k)}) \leftarrow (m_1, \ldots, m_{q_3(k)})
\]
\[
(S_1, \ldots, S_{q_3(k)}) \leftarrow (R_1, \ldots, R_{q_3(k)})
\]
run \( \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{P}, (U_a, V_a), (U_b) \leftarrow (m^*, \tau^*) \).

In the random experiment \( \text{Exp}_3 \), if \( \beta = 0 \) (resp. if \( \beta = 1 \)) the knowledge of \( (u_a, v_a, u_b) \) (resp. of \( (v_a, u_b, v_b) \)) is not necessary to answer \( \mathcal{A} \)'s signature queries. Hence, \( \mathcal{B}_4 \) can still answer \( \mathcal{A} \)'s queries and since the distribution of the public keys and the precomputed signatures is unchanged, we get
\[
\text{Pr}[F_4|T_4] = \text{Pr}[F_3|T_3].
\]

Eventually, when \( \mathcal{A} \) returns the pair \( (m^*, \tau^*) \), with \( \tau^* = (r^*, Q_1^*, Q_2^*, Q_3^*) \), the algorithm \( \mathcal{B} \) can solve the instance of the problem \( \mathcal{PR}_1(q_3) \):
We prove (in the random oracle model) that UDVS is at least as hard as the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem underlying the schemes

Let \( \text{Gen} \), \( \text{Succ}^\text{UDVS-EF-CMA}_{\text{Gen},B} \), \( \text{Succ}^\text{UDVS-\Psi-CMA}_{\text{Gen},B} \), \( \text{Succ}^\text{PR}_{\text{Gen},B} \) be a prime-order-BDH-generator.

Let \((q_\Theta, q_\Psi, q_\Sigma, \tau) \in \mathcal{F}(N,N)^4\).

1. For all \((\tau,q_\Theta,q_\Psi)\)-UDVS-EF-CMA-adversary \(A\) against UDVS-BLS(\(\text{Gen}, f_r, \Theta)\) where \(\Theta\) is a \(q_\Theta\)-random oracle, there exists \(\tau' \in \mathcal{F}(N,N)\) verifying

\[
\tau' \leq \tau + (q_\Theta + q_\Psi + 2q_\Psi + 2)(T_{\exp}(G_1) + O(1))
\]

and a \(\tau'\)-\(\text{PR}_2\)-adversary \(B\) against \(\text{Gen}\) such that

\[
\text{Succ}_{\text{Gen},B}^{\text{PR}_2} \geq \frac{\text{Succ}_{\text{Gen},B}^{\text{UDVS-EF-CMA}}} {(1 + 6 \cdot q_\Theta \cdot 2^r)(q_\Psi + 1)}.
\]

2. For all \((\tau,q_\Theta,q_\Psi)\)-UDVS-\(\Psi\)-CMA-distinguisher \(A\) against UDVS-BLS(\(\text{Gen}, f_r, \Theta)\) where \(\Theta\) is a \(q_\Theta\)-random oracle, there exists \(\tau' \in \mathcal{F}(N,N)\) verifying,

\[
\tau' \leq \tau + (q_\Theta + q_\Psi + 2q_\Psi + 1)(T_{\exp}(G_1) + O(1)),
\]
and a \( \tau' \)-\( \mathcal{PR}_3 \)-distinguisher \( \mathcal{B} \) against \( \mathsf{Gen} \) such that

\[
\mathsf{Avan}^{\mathcal{PR}_3}_{\mathsf{Gen}, \mathcal{B}} \geq \frac{\mathsf{Avan}^{\mathsf{UDVS-\psi-CMA}}_{\mathsf{UDVS-BLS}, \mathcal{A}}}{2} - q_{\mathsf{S}} + q_{\mathsf{M}} 2^{f_{\mathcal{B}}}.
\]

Proof.

1. The algorithm \( \mathcal{B} \), which takes as input \((q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi)\) output by \( \mathsf{Gen}(k) \), \( X \in G_1 \) and \((P_1, Y, Z) \in G_2^3\) and tries to output \((R_1, R_2) \in G_1 \times G_2\) such that \((R_1, R_2) = [xyz](P_1, P_2)\), where \( P_1 = \psi(P_2), X = [x]P_1, Y = [y]P_2 \) and \( Z = [z]P_2 \). Our exact security reduction relies on two clever techniques from [7, 17]:

- Following a well-known technique due to Coron [7], a random coin with expected value \( \lambda \in [0, 1] \) decides whether \( \mathcal{B} \) introduces the challenge in the answer to the random oracle or an element with a known preimage. For the optimal value of \( \lambda \), this introduce the (small) loss factor \((1 + 6 \cdot q_{\mathsf{S}} \cdot 2^{f_{\mathcal{B}}})\) in the success probability.

- Using an approach due to Ogata, Kurosawa and Heng [17], introduced to analyze the security of Chaum’s undeniable signatures, we do not need a decisional oracle to simulate the verification queries. The idea is that, unless \( \mathsf{UDVS-BLS} \) is not unforgeable, all verification queries necessarily involve designated verifier signatures that were obtained from signing oracles (and can be readily checked) or that are invalid. \( \mathcal{B} \)'s strategy is to guess which verification query involves a forged signature and reject signatures involved in all other queries. This is done at the expense of losing the factor \((q_{\mathsf{M}} + 1)\) in \( \mathcal{B} \)'s probability of success.

For the ease of presentation, let us (at first) assume that \( \mathcal{B} \) has an access to a decisional oracle for the problem \( \mathcal{PR}_3 \) (following Okamoto-Pointcheval’s so called gap-problems [18]).

\( \mathsf{Exp}_1 \) : \( \mathcal{B}_1 \) plays the role of the challenger in the experiment \( \mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{UDVS-EF-CMA}}_{\mathsf{UDVS-BLS}, \mathcal{A}} \) of the definition [2] in the random oracle model. It plugs the bilinear structure underlying its problem instance in the public parameters \( \mathcal{P} \). \( \mathcal{B}_1 \) simulate the random oracle \( \mathcal{O}_S \) by storing the queries made by \( \mathcal{A} \) into a list denoted \( \mathsf{HList} \) (which contains at most \((q_{\mathsf{S}}(k) + q_{\mathsf{S}}(k) + q_{\mathsf{M}}(k) + 1)\) 4-tuples). \( \mathcal{B}_1 \) manage a counter \( c \) (with initial value 0) and for each signing, verifying or hashing query, \( \mathcal{B}_1 \) executes the routing \( \mathsf{Message} \).

Initialization \( k \)

\[
c \leftarrow 0 \quad \mathcal{P} \leftarrow [(q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi), P_1, P_2, n_r],
\]

\[
(u_a, u_b) \leftarrow [1, q - 1]^2 \\
(U_a, U_b) \leftarrow ([u_a]P_2, [u_b]P_2) \\
\text{run } \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{P}, U_a, U_b) \leadsto (m^*, \tau^*).
\]

Message \( m \)

\[
\text{if } \exists i \in [1, c], m = m_i \text{ then return } i \\
\text{else } c \leftarrow c + 1 \\
m_c \leftarrow m; \mathcal{L}_c \leftarrow \varepsilon; \nu \leftarrow [0, 1] \\
\text{while } \nu < \lambda \text{ and } \#\mathcal{L}_c \leq q_{\mathsf{S}}(k) \text{ do } \rho \leftarrow [0, 1]^{n_r}, \mathcal{L}_c \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_c \cup \{\rho\}, \nu \leftarrow [0, 1] \\
\text{return } c.
\]

The oracle queries are then simulated by \( \mathcal{B}_1 \) in a classical way:
Simulation of the oracles

- $O_B(m, r)$: if $\exists R, (m, r, R, ?) \in H\text{-List}$
  then return $R$
  else $\alpha \leftarrow [1, q - 1], i \leftarrow \text{Message}(m)$
  if $r \in L_i$ then $R \leftarrow [\alpha]P_1$ else $R \leftarrow [\alpha]X$
  $\text{H-List} \leftarrow \text{H-List} \cup \{(m_i, r, R, \alpha)\}$
  return $R$

- $\mathcal{S}(m)$: $i \leftarrow \text{Message}(m)$
  if $L_i = \emptyset$ then return $\perp$
  else $r \leftarrow L_i ; L_i \leftarrow L_i \setminus \{r\}$
  $O_B(m, r) : \text{find} (m_i, r, R, \alpha) \in \text{H-List}$
  $S \leftarrow [\alpha]U_a$
  return $(r, S)$

- $\mathcal{W}(m, \tau)$: $i \leftarrow \text{Message}(m)$,
  $(r, Q_1, Q_2) \leftarrow \tau$
  $O_B(m, r) : \text{find} (m_i, r, R, \alpha) \in \text{H-List}$
  return $\mathcal{PR}_X(R, U_a, U_b, Q_1, Q_2)$.

In the random experiment $\text{Exp}_i$, for $i \in \{1, 2\}$, let us denote $F_i$, the event

“$m^* \notin \mathcal{Q}_S$ and UDVS-BLS.DVerify($P, m^*, pk_s, \tau^*, pk_c, sk_c$) = 1.”

Compared to the definition [2] the distribution of $A$’s entries is unchanged and the
simulation of the oracles $O_B$ and $\mathcal{W}$ is perfect. Moreover, $B_1$ answers without aborting
to all signature queries with probability $\lambda^{q_e(k)}$, and therefore we have

$$\text{Pr}[F_1] \geq \lambda^{q_e(k)}\text{SuC}_{\text{UDVS-BLS.A}}^{\text{UDVS-EF-CMA}}(k).$$

$\text{Exp}_2\ B_2$ replace in the following the public keys $U_a$ and $U_b$ furnished to $A$ by the values
$Y$ and $Z$ of unknown discrete logarithms (in base $P_2$).

Initialization

$k$

$\mathcal{P} \leftarrow [(q, G_1, G_2, G_3, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \psi), P_2, n_r]$

$(U_a, U_b) \leftarrow (Y, Z)$

run $A(\mathcal{P}, U_a, U_b) \leadsto (m^*, \tau^*)$.

When $A$ returns the pair $(m^*, \tau^*)$, with $\tau^* = (r^*, Q_1^*, Q_2^*)$, the algorithm $B_2$ executes
a hash query $O_B(m^*, r^*)$ and gets $i \in [0, c]$ such that $m^* = m_i$ and $(m^*, r^*, R, \alpha)$ in
$\text{H-List}$. The algorithm $B_2$ aborts its execution (by returning $\perp$) if $r^* \in L_i$. Otherwise,
$B_2$ returns the pair $([\alpha^{-1}]Q_1^*, Q_2^*)$.

End of $B = B_5$’s execution $(m^*, \tau^*)$

$(r^*, Q_1^*, Q_2^*) \leftarrow \tau^*$

$i \leftarrow \text{Message}(m)$

$O_B(m, r)$

find $(m_i, r, R, \alpha)$ in $\text{H-List}$

if $r^* \in L_i$ then return $\perp$

else return $([\alpha^{-1}]Q_1^*, Q_2^*)$.

The probability that $r^* \notin L_i$ is independent from $i$ and equal to

$$F(\lambda) = [\lambda(1 - 2^{-nr})]^{q_e(k)} + (1 - \lambda) \sum_{j=1}^{q_e(k)-1} [\lambda(1 - 2^{-nr})]^j.$$

By the simulation, if $r^* \notin L_i$ and if the event $F_2$ holds, we have $R = [\alpha]X$ and if $\tau^*$ is a
valid forgery $\langle Q_1^*, Q_2^* \rangle = \langle P_1, P_2 \rangle^{x_{\alpha}^{\tau^*}}$. Therefore, the pair $([\alpha^{-1}]Q_1^*, Q_2^*)$ is the solution
of the problem $\mathcal{PR}_2$ instance.
The security analysis shows that $B = B_2$ satisfies

$$\text{Succ}_{\text{Gen,B}}^{\text{PR}_2}(k) \geq \lambda q_0^\ast(k) F(\lambda) \text{Succ}_{\text{UDVS-BLS},A}^{\text{UDVS-EF-CMA}}(k)$$

and runs in time at most $t' \leq t + (q_0 + q_0 + q_0 + 1)(T_{\text{exp}}(G_1) + O(1)) + T_{\text{exp}}(G_3)$ while making at most $q_0^\ast(k)$ queries to the decisional oracle $\mathcal{PR}_3$. An easy computation gives proves the existence of a value $\lambda_0$ such that $\lambda_0^0 q_0^\ast(k) F(\lambda_0) \geq (1 + 6 \cdot q_0 \cdot 2^t)$ (see [7]).

In this reduction, if the decisional oracle for the problem $\mathcal{PR}_3$ returns 1 for a 5-tuple $(R, Y, Z, Q_1, Q_2)$ associated to a verifying query on a pair $(m_i, (r, Q_1, Q_2))$ and if $r \notin \mathcal{L}_i$, then the pair $(\alpha^{-1}Q_1, Q_2)$ is a solution of the problem $\mathcal{PR}_2$ and there is no need to continue the execution of $\mathcal{A}$. By using this remark, it is possible to prove the resistance to forgery of the scheme to the problem $\mathcal{PR}_2$ without using the decisional oracle.

A verifying query (made by $\mathcal{A}$ or $\mathcal{B}$ at the end of its execution) on a pair $(m_i, (r, Q_1, Q_2))$ is said special if $r$ does not belong to the list $\mathcal{L}_i$. Let us denote $\mathcal{A}$ the event: “One special verifying query is made in the random experiment $\text{Exp}_5$”, $\mathcal{A}_i$ the event “The first special verifying query in the experiment $\text{Exp}_5$ is the $i$-th”, for $i \in [1, q_0(k)]$ and $\mathcal{A}_{q_0(k)+1}$ the event “The first special verifying query in the experiment $\text{Exp}_5$ is the one on the pair $(m^*, \tau^*)$”. We have

$$A = \bigcup_{i=1}^{q_0(k)+1} \mathcal{A}_i \text{ and } \widetilde{F}_2 \subseteq A,$$

where $\widetilde{F}_2$ is the event “UDVS-BLS.DVerify$(P, m^*, pk_s, \tau^*, pk_c, sk_c) = 1$, $m^* = m_i \notin Q_3$ and $r^* \notin \mathcal{L}_i$.”

In this variant, the algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ picks uniformly at random an integer $v \in [1, q_0(k) + 1]$ at the beginning of its execution. For each verifying queries on $(m_i, \tau)$ where $\tau = (r, Q_1, Q_2)$, $\mathcal{B}$ gets the 4-tuple $(m_i, r, R, \alpha)$ corresponding to the hash value of $(m_i, r)$ and

- if $r \in \mathcal{L}_i$ then $\mathcal{B}$ returns 1 if and only if $\langle Q_1, Q_2 \rangle = \langle \psi(U_a), U_b \rangle^\alpha$;
- if $r \notin \mathcal{L}_i$ and if the verifying query is not the $v$-th, then $\mathcal{B}$ returns 0;
- if $r \notin \mathcal{L}_i$ and if the verifying query is the $v$-th, $\mathcal{B}$ stop $\mathcal{A}$’s execution and returns the pair $([\alpha]Q_1, Q_2)$.

If the event $A_v$ occurs then the simulation of the oracles done by $\mathcal{B}$ until the $v$-th verifying query is indistinguishable from the previous one and $([\alpha]Q_1, Q_2)$ is actually the solution to the instance $(P_2, X, Y, Z)$ of the problem $\mathcal{PR}_2$. Consequently, we have

$$\text{Succ}_{\text{Gen,B}}^{\text{PR}_2}(k) \geq \sum_{i=1}^{q_0(k)+1} \Pr[A_i] \cdot \Pr[i = v] = \frac{1}{q_0(k) + 1} \sum_{i=1}^{q_0(k)+1} \Pr[A_i] = \frac{\Pr[A]}{q_0(k) + 1} \geq \frac{\Pr[\widetilde{F}_2]}{q_0(k) + 1}.$$

This variant of $\mathcal{B}$ does not make any call to the oracle DBDH and its execution time is increased by at most one exponentiation in the group $G_3$ by each query to the oracle $\mathcal{G}$. This gives the claimed result.
2. The proof is more or less routine (see [14] [17] for instance) and therefore left to the reader.

Remark. If the public verification is desirable in an application (e.g. to design a UMDVS scheme) or if the anonymity property is not necessary, the unforgeability of the protocol UDVS-BLS can be reinforced. It is indeed possible to add a fourth element to the signature (namely \( Q_3 = [t^{-1}]P_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2 \) allowing the public verification) in such a way that the scheme obtained is really close to the protocol UDVS-BB. Since a designated verifier signature for the protocol UDVS-BLS can be readily derived from one for this scheme and since the underlying signature scheme is the same, we get immediately that forging a signature for the latter scheme is at least as hard as for UDVS-BLS. Under the knowledge-of-exponent-assumption in \( \mathbb{G}_2 \), we can also prove, in the standard security model, the resistance to forgery of the scheme assuming only the EF-CMA-security of the underlying signature scheme BLS.

5 Extension of the schemes to the Multi-verifier setting

At Crypto’03 rump session, Desmedt opened the question to allow several designated verifiers in designated verifier signatures. The first step towards this problem was made in [13] with the introduction of the multi designated verifiers signature primitive and some concrete realizations of it. The notion of universal multi designated verifier signatures was naturally proposed shortly afterwards in [16].

5.1 UDVS-BB

Let \( n \in \mathbb{N} \). The scheme UDVS-BB can be seen as a “discrete-log two-party ring signatures” and therefore, following the generic construction from [13], it can readily be extended into a universal \( n \)-designated verifier signature schemes: the algorithm VKeyGen remains unchanged and in the signing algorithm, the verifying public key \( pk_v \) is simply replaced by the sum of the \( n \) verifying public keys

\[
pk_{v_1} + \cdots + pk_{v_n} = [sk_{v_1} + \cdots + sk_{v_n}]P_2.
\]

Using a multi-party computation (for instance) and the algorithm UDVS-BB.Fake, the designated verifiers can cooperate to produce an \( n \)-designated verifier signature from \( pk_s \) to the keys \((pk_{v_1}, \ldots, pk_{v_n})\). This fact, with the source hiding property of UDVS-BB ensure the same property for the multi-user protocol. Finally, since the algorithm UDVS-BB.DVerify is public (i.e. does not require the verifying secret key) the algorithm DVerify is identical in the multi-user setting with the verifying public key \( pk_v \) replaced again by the sum of the \( n \) verifying public keys \( pk_{v_1} + \cdots + pk_{v_n} \). In particular, it is very efficient and does not require interaction between the designated verifiers. It is worth noting, that in order to avoid well-known rogue key attacks, the users should prove the knowledge of their secret key (in the registered public key model, for instance).

5.2 UDVS-BLS

The scheme UDVS-BLS is not publicly verifiable and therefore it does not enter in the generic construction proposed in [13]. However, it is possible to adapt this scheme in order to design a universal \( n \)-designated verifier signature scheme for all integer \( n \geq 1 \). With the previous notations, suppose that Alice (resp. the \( n \) verifiers) has published a public key \( U_a = [u_a]P_2 \) (resp. \( U_i = [u_{b_i}]P_2 \) for \( i \in [1, n] \)) and that the pair \( \sigma = (r, S) \in [1, q - 1] \times \mathbb{G}_1 \) is a signature BLS produced by Alice on a message \( m \). If Cindy wants to designate \( \sigma \) to the set of the \( n \)
verifiers, she picks uniformly at random an integer \( t \in [1, q - 1] \) and sets \( Q_0 = [t]S \) and for all \( i \in [1, n] \), \( Q_i = [t^{-1}]U_i \). The \((n + 1)\)-tuple \( \tau = (r, Q_0, Q_1, \ldots, Q_n) \) is the multi-designated verifier signature on \( m \).

The pairing insures the correctness of the scheme since the \( i \)-th verifier can check the consistency of the multi-DVS by checking for all \( j \in [1, n] \setminus \{i\} \) if the equality \( \langle \psi(U_j), Q_i \rangle = \langle \psi(U_i), Q_j \rangle \), holds and then ascertain its validity thanks to its knowledge of its secret key by verifying the equality: \( \langle Q_0, Q_i \rangle = \langle [u_b]H(m, r), U_a \rangle \).

The security properties of the scheme UDVS-BLS\((n)\) are similar to those of the scheme UDVS-BLS. In the security reduction of unforgeability, a factor \( 1/n \) is lost. This factor corresponds to the bet made by the algorithm \( B \) on the public key that will not corrupt the adversary \( A \). Once this choice has been made, the proof is identical to the one of the theorem and we can easily prove the unforgeability and the anonymity of this scheme assuming the intractability in \( \text{Gen} \) of the problems \( \mathcal{PR}_2 \) and \( \mathcal{PR}_3 \) (respectively).

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