The Online appendix:

The Early Warning System and Policymaking in the European Union

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**TABLE A1** No EP involvement (consultation procedure)

|               | (1)       | (2)       |
|---------------|-----------|-----------|
| Σ RO          | 1.05***   | 1.06**    |
|               | (0.38)    | (0.42)    |
| Σ Contribution|           | 0.30      |
|               |           | (0.15)    |
| Constant      | -1.58***  | -2.39***  |
|               | (0.48)    | (0.85)    |
| Observations  | 25        | 25        |

*Notes: This robustness exercise shows that any effect we may find in our main analysis of ROs is not due to the possibility that the EP contests (and signals) the same proposals that triggered reasoned opinions by national parliaments.*

**Note on possible effect of the EP as confounder**

Under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP) the EP codecides with the Council. Although we find that the Commission may withdraw its proposals in response to reasoned opinions that signal opposition in the Council, one may argue that the Commission may withdraw in response to a signal of opposition in the EP. For this to confound our findings of reasoned opinions, the signaled opposition of the EP needs to be correlated with reasoned opinions. Furthermore, by not including such measure, our data includes more noise, which makes it arguably more difficult to find a significant effect of ROs. Table A1 shows that our findings hold when the EP is not involved. Hence, our significant findings in our main model is not due to the fact that ROs actually reflect a measure of EP opposition and that the Commission therefore withdraws.
| Notation | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| \(\delta\) | Proposal salience |
| \(c\) | Policy-adoption costs |
| \(\pi\) | Commission’s prior that the proposal passes in the Council |
| \(1 - \pi\) | Commission’s prior that the proposal fails in the Council |
| \(\pi_{UN}\) | Commission’s prior that proposal passes under unanimity rule |
| \(\pi_{QM}\) | Commission’s prior that proposal passes under QMV rule |
| \(n\) | Total number of governments |
| \(v_i\) | \(v_i = 1\) if government \(i\) votes in favor, \(v_i = 0\) if against |
| \(p_i\) | Ex-ante probability of a vote in favor |
| \(1 - p_i\) | Ex-ante probability of a vote against |
| \(RO_i\) | \(RO_i = 1\) if parliament \(i\) issued a reasoned opinion |
| \(R\) | \(R = \sum_i RO_i\) total number of ROs |
| \(\xi_{UN}\) | Commission’s posterior under unanimity rule |
| \(\xi_{QM}\) | Commission’s posterior under QMV rule |
| \(V\) | \(\sum_i v_i\) total number of votes in favor |
| \(\alpha_i\) | \(\Pr(RO_i = 1 \mid v_i = 1)\) |
| \(1 - \alpha_i\) | \(\Pr(RO_i = 0 \mid v_i = 1)\) |
| \(\beta_i\) | \(\Pr(RO_i = 0 \mid v_i = 0)\) |
| \(1 - \beta_i\) | \(\Pr(RO_i = 1 \mid v_i = 0)\) |

**Derivation of H1**

Using Bayes’ rule, the probability of a no-vote conditional on an RO is bigger than conditional on no RO if and only if:

\[
\Pr(v = 0 \mid RO = 1) > \Pr(v = 0 \mid RO = 0) \\
\iff \frac{\Pr(v = 0 \cap RO = 1)}{\Pr(RO = 1)} > \frac{\Pr(v = 0 \cap RO = 0)}{\Pr(RO = 0)} \\
\iff \frac{(1 - p)(1 - \beta)}{p\alpha + (1 - p)(1 - \beta)} > \frac{(1 - p)\beta}{p(1 - \alpha) + (1 - p)\beta} \\
\iff 1 - \beta > \alpha
\]
Derivation of the conditional probabilities

The conditional probabilities $\Pr(R = r | V = v)$ can be calculated using the parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$:

$$\Pr(R = r | V = v) = \sum_{i = \max\{0, r - (n - v)\}}^{\min\{v, r\}} \binom{v}{i} \alpha^i (1 - \alpha)^{v-i} \binom{n - v}{r - i} \beta^{n-v-r+i} (1 - \beta)^{r-i}.$$

The $r$ ROs have to be issued by either parliaments of governments in favor or in opposition. For the $v$ governments in favor, the probability of an RO is $\alpha$; for the $n - v$ governments opposed, the probability of an RO is $1 - \beta$. With $i$ the number of ROs from parliaments of governments in favor, $r - i$ ROs have to come from governments opposed, since $i + r - i = r$. This explains the factors $\alpha^i$ and $(1 - \beta)^{r-i}$. The factors $\alpha^{v-i}$ and $\beta^{n-v-r+i}$ ensure that there are $v$ governments in favor and $n - v$ opposed: $i + v - i = v$ and $r - i + n - v - r + i = n - v$. The combinations $\binom{v}{i}$ and $\binom{n - v}{r - i}$ are the number of ways of picking $i$ governments out of $v$ in favor and $r - i$ out of $n - v$ opposed.

Because only $v$ ROs can come from governments in favor, and only $n - v$ from governments against, the sum has to be taken from $i = \max\{0, r - (n - v)\}$ to $i = \min\{v, r\}$. For example, with 3 governments in favor and 4 ROs, $v = 3, n - v = 25, r = 4$. In this case, the number of ROs from parliaments of governments in favor $i$ can only run from $\max\{0, 4 - (28 - 3)\} = 0$ to $\min\{3, 4\} = 3$. Correspondingly, the number of ROs from parliaments of governments opposed $r - i$ will run from $4 - 0 = 4$ to $r - 3 = 1$.

**TABLE A3** Parameter values $\alpha$, $\beta$ and $p$.

|       | UN  | QM  |
|-------|-----|-----|
| $\alpha$ | 0.003 | 0.011 |
| $\beta$    | 0.833 | 0.942 |
| $p$         | 0.982 | 0.952 |
### TABLE A4 Descriptive statistics

| Variable                                      | Obs  | Mean  | Std. Dev. | Std. Dev. | Min  | Max  |
|-----------------------------------------------|------|-------|-----------|-----------|------|------|
| **Part I: reasoned opinions and voting**      |      |       |           |           |      |      |
| RO (incl. upper chambers)                     | 10,044 | 0.018 | 0.131     | 0         | 1    |      |
| RO (not upper chambers)                       | 10,044 | 0.013 | 0.113     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Contribution                                  | 10,044 | 0.099 | 0.299     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Vote: yes                                     | 10,044 | 0.014 | 0.118     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Vote: statement                               | 10,044 | 0.021 | 0.142     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Vote: abstention                              | 10,044 | 0.011 | 0.106     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Government opposition                         | 10,044 | 0.046 | 0.210     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Government opposition formal                  | 10,044 | 0.026 | 0.159     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Council opposition                             | 10,044 | 1.241 | 2.226     | 0         | 16   |      |
| Decision                                      | 10,044 | 0.113 | 0.316     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Directive                                     | 10,044 | 0.312 | 0.463     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Regulation                                    | 10,044 | 0.575 | 0.494     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Presidency                                    | 10,044 | 0.036 | 0.185     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Trio presidency                               | 10,044 | 0.111 | 0.314     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Parliamentary strength                        | 10,044 | 1.704 | 0.596     | 0.33      | 2.67 |      |
| Minority government                           | 10,044 | 0.159 | 0.366     | 0         | 1    |      |
| QMV                                           | 10,044 | 0.933 | 0.250     | 0         | 1    |      |
| **Part II: reasoned opinions and withdrawal** |      |       |           |           |      |      |
| 2010                                          | 424  | 0.212 | 0.409     | 0         | 1    |      |
| 2011                                          | 424  | 0.354 | 0.479     | 0         | 1    |      |
| 2012                                          | 424  | 0.175 | 0.380     | 0         | 1    |      |
| 2013                                          | 424  | 0.259 | 0.439     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Decision                                      | 424  | 0.101 | 0.302     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Directive                                     | 424  | 0.300 | 0.459     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Regulation                                    | 424  | 0.599 | 0.491     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Codecision                                    | 418  | 0.926 | 0.262     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Consultation or consent                       | 418  | 0.074 | 0.262     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Unanimity                                     | 424  | 0.090 | 0.286     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Topic                                         | 418  | 5.268 | 2.596     | 1         | 11   |      |
| Withdrawal                                    | 424  | 0.097 | 0.296     | 0         | 1    |      |
| RO_aggregated                                 | 424  | 0.571 | 1.411     | 0         | 11   |      |
| RO (no upper chambers)                        | 424  | 0.429 | 1.205     | 0         | 11   |      |
| Contribution aggregated                       | 424  | 2.771 | 1.831     | 0         | 11   |      |
| Salience (directive)                          | 424  | 0.302 | 0.460     | 0         | 1    |      |
| Salience (log recitals)                       | 424  | 3.012 | 0.763     | 1.099     | 5.088|      |
| Posterior $\xi$                               | 424  | 0.818 | 0.117     | 0         | 0.86 |      |
| Gridlock interval                             | 424  | 2.369 | 1.364     | 1.324     | 7.090|      |
| Ros from minority                             | 424  | 0.165 | 0.497     | 0         | 4    |      |
TABLE A5 Full regression models Table 1

|                        | Model (1)     | Model (2)     | Model (3)     | Model (4)     |
|------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Reasoned opinion (RO)  | 0.91 (0.18)***| 0.80 (0.16)***| 0.88 (0.17)***| 0.98 (0.18)***|
| Parliament characteristics |               |               |               |               |
| Political dialogue contribution | 0.15 (0.07)**  | 0.28 (0.09)***| 0.31 (0.10)***|               |
| Parliamentary strength | 0.11 (0.04)**  |               |               |               |
| Government characteristics |               |               |               |               |
| Trio presidency        | -0.51 (0.11)***| -0.36 (0.13)***| 0.09 (0.24)    |               |
| Minority government    | -0.20 (0.07)***| -0.22 (0.21)  | 0.38 (0.42)    |               |
| Proposal characteristics |               |               |               |               |
| Qualified majority     | 0.40 (0.14)***| 0.44 (0.12)***| 0.50 (0.11)***|               |
| Proposal directive     | 0.33 (0.08)***| 0.39 (0.10)***| 0.40 (0.12)***|               |
| Proposal regulation    | 0.26 (0.08)***| 0.31 (0.09)***| 0.37 (0.11)***|               |
| Level of contestation by others | 0.21 (0.01)***| 0.23 (0.01)***| 0.26 (0.01)***|               |
| Constant               | -1.71 (0.04)***| -2.97 (0.19)***| -2.59 (0.24)***| -2.28 (0.86)***|
| # of observations      | 10,044        | 10,044        | 10,044        | 8,051         |
| # of matched proposals | 372           | 372           | 372           | 372           |
| # of member states     | 27            | 27            | 27            | 27            |
| FE (country)           | No            | No            | Yes           | Yes           |
| FE (year)              | No            | No            | Yes           | Yes           |
| FE (country x year)    | No            | No            | Yes           | Yes           |

Notes: Results for 372 matched proposals for the period 2010-2013. Dependent variable: government opposition (“no”-vote, abstention, or negative statement). Probit regression. Standard errors in parentheses: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the proposal level.
### Robustness checks PART I

#### TABLE A6  Robustness: analysis 2010-2012

|                      | Key results                                                                 |
|----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                      | Model (1)                      | Model (2)                      | Model (3)                      | Model (4)                      |
| Reasoned opinion (RO)| 0.95 (0.22)***                | 0.92 (0.23)***                | 1.02 (0.25)***                | 1.12 (0.25)***                |
| **Parliament characteristics** |                                   |                                |                                |                                |
| Political dialogue contribution | 0.12 (0.08) | 0.14 (0.11) | 0.19 (0.12) | 0.19 (0.12) |
| Parliamentary strength | 0.08 (0.05) | 0.08 (0.05) | 0.08 (0.05) | 0.08 (0.05) |
| **Government characteristics** |                                   |                                |                                |                                |
| Trio presidency      | -0.45 (0.12)***                | -0.24 (0.15)                  | 0.35 (0.23)                   |                                |
| Minority government  | -0.15 (0.09)*                  | -0.02 (0.23)                  | 1.02 (0.51)**                 |                                |
| **Proposal characteristics** |                                   |                                |                                |                                |
| Qualified majority   | 0.43 (0.11)***                 | 0.45 (0.11)***                | 0.53 (0.11)***                |                                |
| Proposal directive   | 0.27 (0.11)**                  | 0.24 (0.13)*                  | 0.26 (0.15)*                 |                                |
| Proposal regulation  | 0.29 (0.10)***                 | 0.28 (0.12)**                 | 0.30 (0.14)**                 |                                |
| Level of contestation by others | 0.22 (0.02)*** | 0.24 (0.02)***** | 0.26 (0.02)***** | 0.26 (0.02)***** |
| Constant             | -1.71 (0.05)***                | -2.97 (0.20)***               | -2.57 (0.24)*****            | -2.88 (0.79)*****             |
| # of observations    | 7,236                          | 7,236                         | 7,236                         | 5,609                          |
| # of matched proposals| 268                            | 268                           | 268                           | 268                            |
| # of member states   | 27                             | 27                            | 27                            | 27                             |
| FE (country)         | No                             | No                            | Yes                           | Yes                            |
| FE (year)            | No                             | No                            | Yes                           | Yes                            |
| FE (country x year)  | No                             | No                            | No                            | Yes                            |
TABLE A7 Robustness: analysis 2010-2014

| Key results                                      | Model (1)       | Model (2)       | Model (3)       | Model (4)       |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Reasoned opinion (RO)                           | 0.91 (0.18)***  | 0.77 (0.16)***  | 0.84 (0.17)***  | 0.96 (0.18)***  |
| **Parliament characteristics**                  |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Political dialogue contribution                 | 0.14 (0.07)**   | 0.27 (0.09)***  | 0.33 (0.10)***  |                 |
| Parliamentary strength                          | 0.10 (0.04)**   |                 |                 |                 |
| **Government characteristics**                  |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Trio presidency                                 | -0.48 (0.10)*** | -0.31 (0.12)*** | 0.09 (0.24)     |                 |
| Minority government                             | -0.20 (0.07)*** | -0.15 (0.17)    | 0.41 (0.34)     |                 |
| **Proposal characteristics**                    |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Qualified majority                              | 0.41 (0.14)***  | 0.45 (0.13)***  | 0.50 (0.11)***  |                 |
| Proposal directive                              | 0.29 (0.08)***  | 0.34 (0.09)***  | 0.36 (0.10)***  |                 |
| Proposal regulation                             | 0.22 (0.08)***  | 0.28 (0.08)***  | 0.33 (0.10)***  |                 |
| Level of contestation by others                 | 0.21 (0.01)***  | 0.22 (0.01)***  | 0.25 (0.01)***  |                 |
| Constant                                        | -1.71 (0.04)*** | -2.94 (0.18)*** | -2.59 (0.23)*** | -2.20 (0.82)*** |
| # of observations                               | 10,827          | 10,827          | 10,827          | 8,781           |
| # of matched proposals                          | 401             | 401             | 401             | 401             |
| # of member states                              | 27              | 27              | 27              | 27              |
| FE (country)                                    | No              | No              | Yes             | Yes             |
| FE (year)                                       | No              | No              | Yes             | Yes             |
| FE (country x year)                             | No              | No              | No              | Yes             |
### TABLE A8 Robustness: old independent variable RO_UPPER_HOUSE

|                           | Key results                     |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
|                           | Model (1)   | Model (2)   | Model (3)   | Model (4)   |
| Reasoned opinion (RO)     | 0.89 (0.16)**| 0.75 (0.14)**| 0.77 (0.15)**| 0.83 (0.16)**|
| **Parliament characteristics** |          |            |            |            |
| Political dialogue contribution | 0.15 (0.07)** | 0.28 (0.09)** | 0.30 (0.10)** |
| Parliamentary strength    | 0.11 (0.04)** |            |            |            |
| **Government characteristics** |          |            |            |            |
| Trio presidency           | -0.50 (0.11)** | -0.36 (0.13)** | 0.08 (0.24)  |
| Minority government       | -0.19 (0.07)** | -0.21 (0.21)  | 0.40 (0.42)  |
| **Proposal characteristics** |          |            |            |            |
| Qualified majority        | 0.39 (0.14)** | 0.43 (0.13)** | 0.49 (0.11)** |
| Proposal directive        | 0.32 (0.08)** | 0.39 (0.09)** | 0.40 (0.12)** |
| Proposal regulation       | 0.26 (0.08)** | 0.31 (0.09)** | 0.36 (0.11)** |
| Level of contestation by others | 0.21 (0.01)** | 0.23 (0.01)** | 0.26 (0.01)** |
| Constant                  | -1.71 (0.04)** | -2.96 (0.19)** | -2.60 (0.24)** | -2.30 (0.84)** |
| # of observations         | 10,044     | 10,044     | 10,044     | 8,051      |
| # of matched proposals    | 372        | 372        | 372        | 372        |
| # of member states        | 27         | 27         | 27         | 27         |
| FE (country)              | No         | No         | Yes        | Yes        |
| FE (year)                 | No         | No         | Yes        | Yes        |
| FE (country x year)       | No         | No         | No         | Yes        |
TABLE A9  Robustness: Dependent variable without formal statements.

|                               | Model (1)       | Model (2)       | Model (3)       | Model (4)       |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Reasoned opinion (RO)         | 1.08 (0.20)***  | 0.99 (0.18)***  | 1.04 (0.20)***  | 1.12 (0.21)***  |
| **Parliament characteristics**|                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Political dialogue contribution| 0.00 (0.08)     | 0.14 (0.11)     | 0.11 (0.12)     |                 |
| Parliamentary strength        | 0.12 (0.05)**   |                 |                 |                 |
| **Government characteristics**|                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Trio presidency               | -0.41 (0.12)*** | -0.20 (0.14)    | 0.06 (0.31)     |                 |
| Minority government           | -0.23 (0.09)*** | -0.37 (0.20)*   | -0.38 (0.41)    |                 |
| **Proposal characteristics**  |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Qualified majority            | 0.85 (0.34)***  | 0.89 (0.38)**   | 1.01 (0.40)**   |                 |
| Proposal directive            | 0.52 (0.13)***  | 0.55 (0.16)***  | 0.57 (0.18)***  |                 |
| Proposal regulation           | 0.37 (0.13)***  | 0.40 (0.15)***  | 0.44 (0.18)**   |                 |
| Level of contestation by others| 0.13 (0.02)***  | 0.15 (0.02)***  | 0.17 (0.02)***  |                 |
| Constant                      | -1.98 (0.04)*** | -3.61 (0.38)*** | -3.18 (0.47)*** | -2.92 (1.17)**  |
| # of observations             | 10,044          | 10,044          | 10,044          | 5,985           |
| # of matched proposals        | 372             | 372             | 372             | 372             |
| # of member states            | 27              | 27              | 27              | 27              |
| FE (country)                  | No              | No              | Yes             | Yes             |
| FE (year)                     | No              | No              | Yes             | Yes             |
| FE (country × year)           | No              | No              | No              | Yes             |
**TABLE A10** Robustness: dependent variable only ‘no’-votes.

|                                  | Model (1)       | Model (2)       | Model (3)       | Model (4)       |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Robustness: dependent variable only ‘no’-votes.** |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Reasoned opinion (RO)            | 0.82 (0.21)***  | 0.69 (0.23)***  | 0.63 (0.26)**   | 0.71 (0.31)**   |
| **Parliament characteristics**   |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Political dialogue contribution  | 0.13 (0.10)     | 0.34 (0.13)**   | 0.32 (0.16)**   |                 |
| Parliamentary strength           | 0.07 (0.07)     |                 |                 |                 |
| **Government characteristics**   |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Trio presidency                  | -0.23 (0.15)    | -0.04 (0.17)    | 0.41 (0.33)     |                 |
| Minority government              | -0.14 (0.10)    | -0.63 (0.24)**  | -5.04 (0.73)*** |                 |
| **Proposal characteristics**     |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Qualified majority               |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Proposal directive               | 1.04 (0.28)***  | 1.08 (0.29)***  | 1.16 (0.31)***  |                 |
| Proposal regulation              | 0.93 (0.28)***  | 0.97 (0.29)***  | 1.08 (0.30)**   |                 |
| Level of contestation by others  | 0.10 (0.02)***  | 0.12 (0.02)***  | 0.15 (0.02)***  |                 |
| Constant                         | -2.30 (0.05)*** | -3.52 (0.30)*** | -2.96 (0.46)*** | -2.95 (0.70)*** |
| # of observations                | 10,044          | 9,369           | 8,475           | 3,742           |
| # of matched proposals           | 372             | 347             | 339             | 339             |
| # of member states               | 27              | 27              | 27              | 27              |
| FE (country)                     | No              | No              | Yes             | Yes             |
| FE (year)                        | No              | No              | Yes             | Yes             |
| FE (country × year)              | No              | No              | No              | Yes             |
TABLE A11  Robustness: ordered probit.

|                     | Model (1)     | Model (2)     | Model (3)     | Model (4)     |
|---------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Reasoned opinion (RO) | 0.92 (0.17)*** | 0.81 (0.16)*** | 0.86 (0.18)*** | 0.94 (0.20)*** |
| **Parliament characteristics** |               |               |               |               |
| Political dialogue contribution | 0.14 (0.07)** | 0.27 (0.09)*** | 0.29 (0.10)*** |               |
| Parliamentary strength | 0.10 (0.04)** |               |               |               |
| **Government characteristics** |               |               |               |               |
| Trio presidency | -0.46 (0.11)*** | -0.30 (0.12)** | 0.19 (0.22) |               |
| Minority government | -0.20 (0.07)*** | -0.24 (0.18) | 0.13 (0.40) |               |
| **Proposal characteristics** |               |               |               |               |
| Qualified majority | 0.46 (0.14)*** | 0.51 (0.13)*** | 0.55 (0.12)*** |               |
| Proposal directive | 0.38 (0.08)*** | 0.45 (0.10)*** | 0.46 (0.12)*** |               |
| Proposal regulation | 0.29 (0.09)*** | 0.37 (0.09)*** | 0.39 (0.10)*** |               |
| Level of contestation by others | 0.17 (0.02)*** | 0.20 (0.01)*** | 0.21 (0.02)*** |               |
| / cut 1 | 1.71 (0.04) | 2.97 (0.20) | 2.69 (0.25) | 7.17 (/) |
| / cut 2 | 1.98 (0.04) | 3.30 (0.18) | 3.05 (0.25) | 7.55 (/) |
| / cut 3 | 2.31 (0.05) | 3.66 (0.19) | 3.44 (0.25) | 7.97 (/) |
| # of observations | 10,044 | 10,044 | 10,044 | 10,044 |
| # of matched proposals | 372 | 372 | 372 | 372 |
| # of member states | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 |
| FE (country) | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| FE (year) | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| FE (country x year) | No | No | No | Yes |
**TABLE A12** Robustness: Excluding EPPO proposal (enhanced cooperation).

|                                | Key results                                      |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
|                                | Model (1)                  | Model (2)                  | Model (3)                  | Model (4)                  |
| Reasoned opinion (RO)          | 0.79 (0.17)*****            | 0.78 (0.17)*****            | 0.86 (0.19)*****            | 0.97 (0.19)*****            |
| **Parliament characteristics** |                                  |                                |                                |                                |
| Political dialogue contribution|                                  |                                |                                |                                |
|                               | 0.16 (0.07)*****            | 0.28 (0.09)*****            | 0.31 (0.10)*****            |                                |
| Parliamentary strength        |                                  |                                |                                |                                |
|                               | 0.10 (0.04)****            |                                |                                |                                |
| **Government characteristics** |                                  |                                |                                |                                |
| Trio presidency                |                                  |                                |                                |                                |
|                               | -0.50 (0.11)*****          | -0.33 (0.13)*****          | 0.22 (0.24)                |                                |
| Minority government           |                                  |                                |                                |                                |
|                               | -0.21 (0.08)*****          | -0.23 (0.22)                | 0.37 (0.43)                |                                |
| **Proposal characteristics**  |                                  |                                |                                |                                |
| Qualified majority            |                                  |                                |                                |                                |
|                               | 0.40 (0.13)*****          | 0.44 (0.12)*****          | 0.50 (0.11)*****          |                                |
| Proposal directive            |                                  |                                |                                |                                |
|                               | 0.33 (0.08)*****          | 0.38 (0.10)*****          | 0.40 (0.12)*****          |                                |
| Proposal regulation           |                                  |                                |                                |                                |
|                               | 0.27 (0.08)*****          | 0.32 (0.09)*****          | 0.37 (0.11)*****          |                                |
| Level of contestation by others|                                  |                                |                                |                                |
|                               | 0.21 (0.01)*****          | 0.23 (0.01)*****          | 0.26 (0.01)*****          |                                |
| Constant                      | -1.71 (0.04)*****         | -2.98 (0.19)*****         | -2.59 (0.24)*****         | -1.98 (0.85)*****         |
| # of observations             | 10,017                     | 10,017                     | 10,017                     | 8,017                     |
| # of matched proposals        | 371                         | 371                         | 371                         | 371                         |
| # of member states            | 27                          | 27                          | 27                          | 27                          |
| FE (country)                  | No                          | No                          | Yes                         | Yes                         |
| FE (year)                     | No                          | No                          | Yes                         | Yes                         |
| FE (country x year)           | No                          | No                          | No                          | Yes                         |
**TABLE A13** Robustness: penalized likelihood estimates (firthlogit).

|                      | Key results               |
|----------------------|---------------------------|
|                      | Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) |
| **Reasoned opinion (RO)** | 1.79 (0.22)*** | 1.60 (0.25)*** | 1.72 (0.27)*** |
| **Parliament characteristics** |           |           |           |
| Political dialogue contribution | 0.35 (0.15)** | 0.50 (0.19)*** |    |
| Parliamentary strength | 0.24 (0.10)**|           |           |
| **Government characteristics** |           |           |           |
| Trio presidency | -1.14 (0.25)*** | -0.78 (0.27)*** |    |
| Minority government | -0.47 (0.16)*** | -0.52 (0.39) |    |
| **Proposal characteristics** |           |           |           |
| Qualified majority | 0.75 (0.31)** | 0.88 (0.33)*** |    |
| Proposal directive | 0.74 (0.23)*** | 0.88 (0.25)*** |    |
| Proposal regulation | 0.60 (0.22)*** | 0.75 (0.24)*** |    |
| Level of contestation by others | 0.38 (0.01)*** | 0.43 (0.02)*** |    |
| Constant | -2.30 (0.05)*** | -5.64 (0.41)*** | -8.41 (0.02)*** |
| # of observations | 10,044 | 10,044 | 10,044 |
| # of matched proposals | 372 | 372 | 372 |
| # of member states | 27 | 27 | 27 |
| FE (country) | No | No | Yes |
| FE (year) | No | No | Yes |
| FE (country × year) | No | No | No |

Notes: we also ran Model (1) with a ReLogit. The results are nearly identical. The most demanding model (Model 4) did not converge within three hours.
**TABLE A14** Robustness excluding EPPO proposal

| Direct measure: posterior = $\xi$ | Indirect measure: posterior = $\sum ROs$ |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Model (1)                         | Model (2)                         | Model (3) | Model (4) | Model (5) |
| Posterior ($\xi$)                | -3.47 (1.11)***                  | -4.22 (1.16)*** | 0.26 (0.08)*** | 0.28 (0.08)*** | 0.21 (0.10)*** |
| Salience ($\delta$)              | -0.44 (0.22)**                   | -0.48 (0.26)*  | -0.49 (0.22)** | -0.53 (0.26)** | -0.52 (0.26)** |
| Policy adoption cost ($c$)       | -0.18 (0.43)                     | -0.11 (0.47)   | 0.85 (0.26)*** | 1.08 (0.32)*** | 0.83 (0.35)**  |
| Political dialogue contr.        | 0.02 (0.05)                      | 0.05 (0.06)    | 0.02 (0.05)    | 0.04 (0.06)    | 0.04 (0.06)    |
| Posterior x policy costs         | –                                | –              | –              | –              | 0.72 (0.36)**  |
| constant                         | 1.54 (0.99)                      | 1.76 (1.17)    | -1.50 (0.17)***| -1.98 (0.54)***| -1.86 (0.53)***|
| FE topic                         | –                                | ✓              | –              | ✓              | ✓              |
| FE year                          | –                                | ✓              | –              | ✓              | ✓              |
| Observations                     | 423                              | 380            | 423            | 380            | 380            |

**Notes:** Dependent variable: withdrawal of the proposal by the Commission. Results for 424 proposals introduced in the period 2010 - 2013. Probit regression. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.

**TABLE A15** Robustness: recitals as proxy for salience

| Direct measure: posterior = $\xi$ | Indirect measure: posterior = $\sum ROs$ |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Model (1)                         | Model (2)                         | Model (3) | Model (4) | Model (5) |
| Posterior ($\xi$)                | -3.78 (1.09)***                  | -4.43 (1.15)*** | 0.29 (0.08)*** | 0.31 (0.08)*** | 0.25 (0.10)*** |
| Salience ($\delta$)              | -0.33 (0.13)***                  | -0.37 (0.14)***| -0.38 (0.13)***| -0.43 (0.15)***| -0.40 (0.15)***|
| Policy adoption cost ($c$)       | -0.39 (0.43)                     | -0.35 (0.48)  | 0.71 (0.26)*** | 0.85 (0.31)*** | 0.65 (0.34)*   |
| Political dialogue contr.        | 0.06 (0.05)                      | 0.08 (0.06)   | 0.06 (0.05)    | 0.08 (0.06)    | 0.07 (0.06)    |
| Posterior x policy costs         | –                                | –              | –              | –              | 0.66 (0.38)*   |
| constant                         | 2.56 (1.06)**                    | 2.83 (1.24)**  | -0.62 (0.35)*  | -0.97 (0.64)   | -1.86 (0.53)***|
| FE topic                         | –                                | ✓              | –              | ✓              | ✓              |
| FE year                          | –                                | ✓              | –              | ✓              | ✓              |
| Observations                     | 424                              | 381            | 424            | 381            | 381            |

**Notes:** Dependent variable: withdrawal of the proposal by the Commission. Results for 424 proposals introduced in the period 2010 - 2013. Probit regression. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
### TABLE A16 Robustness: old measure of sum ROs (UPPER HOUSE)

|                     | Indirect measure: posterior $= \sum_\text{ROs}$ |                     |                     |                     |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                     | Model (3)                                      | Model (4)                                      | Model (5)                                      |
| Posterior ($\xi$)   | 0.24 (0.06)**                                 | 0.26 (0.07)**                                 | 0.17 (0.10)**                                 |
| Salience ($\delta$) | -0.50 (0.22)**                                | -0.52 (0.26)**                                | -0.53 (0.28)*                                 |
| Policy adoption cost ($c$) | 0.85 (0.27)**                               | 1.08 (0.32)**                               | 0.45 (0.41)                                    |
| Political dialogue contr. | 0.01 (0.05)                                | 0.03 (0.06)                                 | 0.04 (0.06)                                    |
| Posterior x policy costs | –                                             | –                                               | 1.24 (0.40)**                                 |
| constant            | -1.52 (0.17)**                                | -1.94 (0.54)**                                | -1.73 (0.51)**                                 |
| FE topic            | –                                             | –                                               | –                                               |
| FE year             | –                                             | –                                               | –                                               |
| Observations        | 424                                           | 381                                            | 381                                            |

**Notes:** Dependent variable: withdrawal of the proposal by the Commission. Results for 424 proposals introduced in the period 2010 - 2013. Probit regression. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.

### TABLE A17 Robustness 2010-2014

|                     | Direct measure: posterior $= \xi$ |                     | Indirect measure: posterior $= \sum_\text{ROs}$ |
|---------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
|                     | Model (1)                        | Model (2)                                      | Model (3)                                      | Model (4)                                      | Model (5)                                      |
| Posterior ($\xi$)   | -3.22 (1.04)**                   | -3.97 (1.11)**                                | 0.23 (0.07)**                                 | 0.26 (0.07)**                                 | 0.19 (0.09)**                                 |
| Salience ($\delta$) | -0.31 (0.19)                    | -0.28 (0.23)                                 | -0.34 (0.20)*                                 | -0.32 (0.23)                                 | -0.31 (0.23)                                 |
| Policy adoption cost ($c$) | -0.22 (0.41)                  | -0.18 (0.45)                                 | 0.70 (0.25)**                                 | 0.93 (0.30)**                                 | 0.69 (0.32)**                                 |
| Political dialogue contr. | 0.08 (0.04)*                  | 0.08 (0.05)                                 | 0.08 (0.04)*                                 | 0.08 (0.05)                                 | 0.07 (0.05)                                 |
| Posterior x policy costs | –                                 | –                                               | –                                             | –                                             | 0.69 (0.37)*                                 |
| constant            | 1.22 (0.92)                      | 1.69 (1.07)                                  | -1.60 (0.16)**                                | -1.80 (0.43)**                                | -1.71 (0.43)**                                |
| FE topic            | –                                 | –                                               | –                                             | –                                             | –                                             |
| FE year             | –                                 | –                                               | –                                             | –                                             | –                                             |
| Observations        | 460                              | 448                                            | 460                                           | 448                                           | 448                                           |

**Notes:** Dependent variable: withdrawal of the proposal by the Commission. Results for 460 proposals introduced in the period 2010 - 2014. Probit regression. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
TABLE A18 Robustness 2010-2012

|                      | Direct measure: posterior = \( \xi \) | \( \sum \) ROs |
|----------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------|
|                      | Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | Model (4) | Model (5) |
| Posterior (\( \xi \)) | -4.16 (1.27)** | -5.48 (1.43)*** | 0.37 (0.10)*** | 0.40 (0.11)*** | 0.32 (0.12)*** |
| Salience (\( \delta \)) | -0.41 (0.26) | -0.63 (0.33)* | -0.49 (0.26)* | -0.74 (0.34)** | -0.74 (0.34)** |
| Policy adoption cost (\( c \)) | -0.37 (0.50) | -0.36 (0.57) | 0.88 (0.06)*** | 1.25 (0.37)*** | 0.94 (0.42)** |
| Political dialogue contr. | 0.02 (0.06) | 0.08 (0.07) | 0.01 (0.06) | 0.06 (0.07) | 0.06 (0.07) |
| Posterior x policy costs | – | – | – | – | 0.82 (0.41)** |
| constant | 2.08 (1.14)* | 3.05 (1.40)** | -1.54 (0.22)*** | -1.75 (0.58)*** | -1.65 (0.56)*** |
| FE topic | – | ✓ | – | ✓ | ✓ |
| FE year | – | ✓ | – | ✓ | ✓ |
| Observations | 314 | 284 | 314 | 284 | 284 |

Notes: Dependent variable: withdrawal of the proposal by the Commission. Results for 314 proposals introduced in the period 2010 - 2012. Probit regression. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.

TABLE A19 Robustness: gridlock interval instead of unanimity rule as proxy for policy costs.

|                      | Direct measure: posterior = \( \xi \) | \( \sum \) ROs |
|----------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------|
|                      | Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | Model (4) | Model (5) |
| Posterior (\( \xi \)) | -3.60 (1.97)*** | -4.77 (1.10)*** | 0.27 (0.08)*** | 0.29 (0.08)*** | 0.04 (0.20) |
| Salience (\( \delta \)) | -0.45 (0.22)** | -0.47 (0.26)* | -0.47 (0.22)** | -0.48 (0.26)* | -0.41 (0.29) |
| Policy adoption cost (\( c \)) | -0.05 (0.08) | -0.10 (0.10) | 0.16 (0.06)*** | 0.18 (0.07)*** | 0.14 (0.07)* |
| Political dialogue contr. | 0.02 (0.05) | 0.04 (0.06) | 0.02 (0.05) | 0.03 (0.06) | 0.03 (0.06) |
| Posterior x policy costs | – | – | – | – | 0.11 (0.07) |
| constant | 1.76 (1.00)* | 2.45 (1.22)*** | -1.82 (0.23)*** | -2.29 (0.56)*** | -2.13 (0.56)*** |
| FE topic | – | ✓ | – | ✓ | ✓ |
| FE year | – | ✓ | – | ✓ | ✓ |
| Observations | 424 | 381 | 424 | 381 | 381 |

Notes: Dependent variable: withdrawal of the proposal by the Commission. Results for 424 proposals introduced in the period 2010 - 2013. Probit regression. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
**TABLE A20** Robustness: test for stronger effect if Ros come from parliaments of minority govs.

|                      | Direct measure: posterior = $\xi$ | Indirect measure: posterior = $\sum ROs$ |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
|                      | Model (1)                         | Model (2)                              | Model (3)        | Model (4)        |
| Posterior ($\xi$)    | -4.77 (2.09)**                    | -4.56 (2.38)*                         | 0.45 (0.12)**    | 0.42 (0.14)**    |
| Minority govs        | -0.20 (0.59)                      | 0.20 (0.94)                           | -0.37 (0.33)     | -0.26 (0.34)     |
| Salience ($\delta$)  | -0.38 (0.22)*                     | -0.42 (0.26)                          | -0.44 (0.22)**   | -0.50 (0.26)*    |
| Policy adoption cost ($c$) | -0.54 (0.58) | -0.28 (0.66) | 0.96 (0.27)** | 1.12 (0.32)**    |
| Political dialogue contr. | 0.03 (0.05) | 0.06 (0.06) | 0.03 (0.05) | 0.04 (0.06)     |
| Posterior x Minority govs | -0.32 (0.72) | -0.94 (0.94) | -0.04 (0.06) | -0.03 (0.06)     |
| constant              | 2.65 (1.80)                       | 2.07 (2.11)**                         | -1.56 (0.18)**   | -2.04 (0.55)**   |
| FE topic             | –                                 | ✓                                      | –                | ✓                |
| FE year              | –                                 | ✓                                      | –                | ✓                |
| Observations         | 424                               | 381                                    | 424              | 381              |

*Notes:* Dependent variable: withdrawal of the proposal by the Commission. Results for 424 proposals introduced in the period 2010 - 2013. Probit regression. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.

**References**

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