Jñānagarbha’s Criticism of Dharmakīrti’s Causation Based on Apoha Theory

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Immediately after he declares causation is illogical, Jñānagarbha in his Satyadvayavibhāṅga-vṛtti (SDV 7a5–8b1) ad kārikā (SDK) 14 rejects four-fold causations, that is, many [causes] produce one [effect], many [causes] produce many [effects], one [cause] produces many [effects], one [cause] produces one [effect].

This is handed down to such later Mādhyamikas as Śantaraksīta in his Satyadrayapaṇḍikā (SDP 28b5–32b7), Kamalaśīla in his Madhyamakāloka (MĀ P 232b2–238a6, D 210b2–215a7) and the Āryasaptāsatikaprajñāpāramitāṭikā (SPT P 110b7–111b7, D 94a6–95a4), and Haribhadra in his Abhisamayālamkārāloka praṇīṭāpāramitāvyākhyā (AAA 969,26–976,18). Therefore it may safely be said that it is in the tradition of the later Mādhyamika. This paper consists of two parts. The first concerns what the target of the argument is. The second part deals with the elaboration and analysis of the argument.

1. In the four-fold of causation mentioned above, it is stated with that many causes produce one effect. Specifically, the eye (cakṣus), color-form (rūpa), light (āloka) and attention (manaskāra) and so on bring about eye-consciousness. This is developed into the three other types of causation. An opponent’s explanation of the second type of causation, that is, many causes produce many effects, is identical with following parts of Dharmakīrti in his Hetubindu (HB 10,19–11,7).

Therefore, even though the self-nature of the effect (kāryavabhāva) is actually one, cooperative causes (sahakārin) do not contribute to the one aspect (naikopayogaviśaya). Consequently in that case (viz. the production of the pot) various causes do not produce a single effect because they contribute to various particularities (bhinnaviśesopayoga). In the same manner the perception caused by the eye etc. should be inferred. This is as follows. Visual consciousness (caksurviṣṇāna) obtains its cognitive nature (upalambhātmatā) on the basis of an immediate cause (samanantarapraptaya). Its cognitive nature is limited to perceiving color-form (rūpa) in particular...
on the basis of the visual organ (caksurindriya). [Visual consciousness] obtains the same kind of nature as its object (tattulyarūpatā) on the basis of the object (visaya). In fact, there is no distinction in the effect; however, particular aspects (viśesa) of the effect are distinguished from each other on the basis of the distinction of the self-natures of the causes. Therefore, there is no non-distinction of particular aspects of an effect on the basis of the distinction of causes. The distinction of causal powers (kāraṇaśaktibhedha) respectively produces the distinguished effects (pratiśiṣṭakārvajanaṃ). In this respect their respective causes are not interrupted because of their nature of momentariness (kṣaṇikatva).

This is Dharmakīrti’s answer against an opponent’s objection: if one effect (visual consciousness) is produced from cooperative causes which have different self-natures, distinction of causes including visual organ, etc. does not produce distinction of effects (HB 9.13–14). The same objection is found in Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti (PVSV 40.21) ad pramāṇavārttika (PV 1.73) (kathāṃ punar bhinnānām abhinnaṃ kāryam). Śākyabuddhi in his Pramāṇavārttikāṭikā (PVṬŚ) 1 (D 145a7–b4) quotes word for word the description of the HB shown above.3) According to Dharmakīrti’s answer mentioned above the idea that many causes produce one effect is shifted to the idea that many causes produce many effects. Many causes are considered in accordance with many causes. This is identical with the idea of Jñānagarbha’s opponent which is described below.

In order to define correlative nature in respect of self-nature (svabhāva) and of the kind (jāti) between cause and effect, Dharmakīrti declares that the distinction and non-distinction of the causes produce the distinction and non-distinction of the effects because there is a correspondence between the cause and the effect; otherwise the distinction and non-distinction of all things has no cause.4) Dharmakīrti’s answer to an opponent’s objection mentioned above is based on apoha theory which is applied to explaining the consistency of causation in Buddhist thought. In the background of this: Dharmakīrti in his PVSV ad PV 1.73 mentions that the eye, object, light and attention etc. produce a single eye consciousness, even though there is no universal (sāmānya). He also describes in his VN 8.17–96 that it is known that [even though there is no composite (avayavin) distinguished from components (avayava)] one [cause] produces many effects, just as a [single] flame of lamp produces its cognition, a change of the wick of a lamp and a different flame and many [cause], the eye etc., produce a single [eye] consciousness. On the ground of this in the background of Dharmakīrti’s arguments there are the theories of the universal of Kumārila in his Ślokavārttika 5–12–15~18 and of the composite (avayavin) of the follow-
ers of Kaṇabhakṣa and Akṣapāda. Dharmakīrti’s theories of causation based on apoha theory in his PVSV are positively introduced into Śāntarakṣita in his Tattvasamgraha (TS) and Kamalaśīla in his Tattvasamgrahapañjikā (TSP)’s apoha chapter. On the other hand, the Dharmakīrti’s theories are criticized in such texts which are intended to prove the Mādhyamika theories.

The descriptions in the PV 3.534 as well as in the HB mentioned above play an important role in the later Mādhyamika texts. Dharmakīrti declares in his PV 3.534:

One effect is never produced by one cause. All effects are produced by aggregates of causes. One cause produces many effects, because it belongs to two aggregates.

This is quoted by Śāntarakṣita in his Vādanyāyavittivipañcitārtha (VNV). Kamalaśīla’s opponent refers to the PV 3.534ab in the pūrva-pakṣa (P 148b7–149a7, D 138a4–b2) in his MĀ and then argues back to the Mādhyamika: there is no contradiction as to the causations that one cause produces many effects and many causes produce one effect. The opponent must have known the arguments of Jñānagarbha in his SDV ad SDK 14. It is considered to be Śākyabuddhi. According to PV 3.534, Dharmakīrti’s fundamental types of causation are understood as meaning that many causes produce one effect, and one cause produces many effects. If these two types of causation take apoha theory into consideration, the former shows that many causes produce many effects, the latter shows that one cause produces one effect.

The opponent idea in the Jñānagarbha’s SDK 14b is: Even though the effect is one, it is considered as many, because the effect has many particularities (viśeṣa) in accordance with many causes. Therefore, one effect produced by many causes is considered as many effects produced by many causes. This is devised from the viewpoint of the cause (hetu), that is, the effect is considered in accordance with the cause. Dharmakīrti also represents the same idea in his PVSV 42, 7–8 ad PV 1.75. It is described from the viewpoint of apoha theory thus: Many [effects] produced by one [cause] [are considered as one] because they are excluded from other effects which are not produced by the same [cause]. In the same manner Jñānagarbha’s opponent shifts from the idea that one [cause] produces many [effects] in the SDK 14c to the idea that one [cause] produces one [effect] in SDK 14d. This way of thinking from the view point of the cause (hetu) is identical with what is maintained by Dharmakīrti in HB mentioned above. Thus, it can be concluded that Jñānagarbha’s...
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Jñānagarbha’s opponent is Dharmakīrti. It may safely be said that the four-fold causations are formed on Dharmakīrti’s theory of causation composed of his apoha theory. In accordance with the cause its effect are formed. If so, just as many causes produce one effect, it can be supposed that many causes produce many effects. This explanation is made by Jñānagarbha’s opponent, namely, Dharmakīrti. It is as follows. According to many causes, when the dhāmas in the effect which is excluded from many are considered to be diverse, the aspects (yul, viṣaya) affected by them (the causes) are considered as being differentiated (SDV 7b5–6, AAA 973,14–15 HB 10,19 sahakāriṇah pratayā naikopayogaviśayāḥ). This is equal to the statement of Dharmakīrti in his HB (10,19–22) mentioned above. Here Jñānagarbha’s opponent idea is identical with apoha theory which is constructed from the viewpoint of the cause. Taking this into consideration we are able to understand the idea of the opponent depicted above by Jñānagarbha. Thus, the opponent of Jñānagarbha in this discussion with regard to causation is thought to be Dharmakīrti. From the same apoha theory Śaṅtaraśita’s TS 1040 and Kamalaśīla’s TSP are described. From the viewpoint of the cause, Dharmakīrti turns the idea that many causes produce one effect into the idea that many causes produce many effects. This shift by means of the apoha theory enables the fulfillment of the condition that the distinction and non-distinction of the causes should produce the distinction and non-distinction of the effects. Therefore the apoha theory is able to bring identical nature or correspondence to the cause and effect.

Dharmakīrti composes his theories of causation depending on the apoha theory. Jñānagarbha in his SDV ad SDK 14 argues against Dharmakīrti. On the other hand Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory from the viewpoint of the effect is mentioned in his PVSV 42,5–7 ad PV 1.75, 82, 83: Even though certain objects are differentiated in their own-natures (svabhāvabhedā), they produce single recognition (ekapratyabhijñāna). As they are differentiated from [the other causes] which do not produce it [viz. the same effect], they are not distinguished.

Many [causes] which produce one effect are represented as one by means of words and knowledge which depend on being different from things which do not have the effect. // 82 // In the same manner when one [cause] which produces many [effects] is represented as being in accordance with [the effects] is known as being diverse by means of distinguishing from things (other causes) which do not have the effects. // 83 //
From the same standpoint Śaṅtarakṣita’s TS 1033 and 1038 and Kamalaśīla’s TSP of it are described. With regard to the *apoha* theory Śaṅtarakṣita in his TS and Kamalaśīla in his TSP rebut Kumārila’s theory of universal (*sāmāṇya*) by means of following Dharmakīrti. On the other hand Kamalaśīla in his MĀ and Haribhadra in his AAA, following Jñānagarbha in his SDK 14 and SDV and Śaṅtarakṣita in his SDP, critically examine Dharmakīrti’s theory of causation based on *apoha* in order to establish the Maḍhyamika theory. Consequently by means of viewpoint of exclusion from other effects which do not have the cause or by means of viewpoint of exclusion from other causes which do not have the effect, that many causes produce one effect can be expressed in two ways: many causes produce many effects or one cause produces one effect. The same is true in case of that one cause produces many effects: it can be expressed as one cause produces one effect or many causes produce many effects. Taking this into consideration it is safely said that Jñānagarbha in his SDV *ad* SDK 14 takes the method of the viewpoint of exclusion from other effects which do not have the same cause.

### 2.1. Many does not produce one.

(SDV 7a7–b1) Jñānagarbha argues that, if it is so, causes are diverse, effect is single, therefore distinction of causes (*kāraṇabhedā*) does not produce distinction of effects (*kāryabheda*).—Therefore distinction and non-distinction of effects have no grounds. Nothing has a cause because it is not separate from the relation of distinction and non-distinction. If this is so, everything is an eternal existence or a non-existence (SDV 7a6–b1).

Here he indicates that the positive concomitance (*anvaya*) and the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) cannot be established, and that when things have no grounds, everything is an eternal existence or a non-existence.

This is stated by Dharmakīrti himself in such his own texts as HB (21,4–10) and PVSV (22,15–21 *ad* PV1.35. Hence it follows that Jñānagarbha’s criticism against Dharmakīrti takes advantage of Dharmakīrti’s statement.

### 2.2. Many does not produce many.

(SDV 7b4, AAA 972, 27–973,2) Dharmakīrti in his HB declares that even though the self-nature of the effect is actually one, the cooperative causes do not contribute to the one aspect, but various specific features. Jñānagarbha in his SDV (7b4–5) argues as follows.

[Conclusion] The consciousness becomes many. [Logical reason] Because the consciousness does not differentiate (*abheda*) from the [many] specific features. [Conclusion]
The specific features do not differentiate (*abheda*) from each other. [Logical reason] Because the specific features do not differentiate (*ananyatva*) from the single consciousness.⁷

According to Śāntarakṣīta in his SDP (30b4–5) and Haribhadra in his AAA (973,12–17) an opponent argues that the logical reason is not established (*asiddha*).⁸ The opponent is considered as Śākyabuddhi. Because Śākyabuddhi in his PVTŚ I (D 54b1–2) takes up the supposed Jñānagarbha’s argument mentioned above as follows. If the contributions of respective causes that produce the specific features (*višeṣa*) [of one effect] are admitted, as [the specific features produced from] the differentiated contributions do not differ (*abheda*) from the effect, [the effect] becomes many because the differentiated contributions do not differ from the effect. Or the differentiated contributions become one because they do not differ (*abheda*) from one effect. Śākyabuddhi in his PVTŚ I (D 54b2–4) rebuts the supposed Jñānagarbha’s criticism (SDV 7b4–5): Therefore [Dharmakīrti in his PVSV ad PV1.36 stated]⁹ that just the aggregation [of the causes] is the foundation of the self-nature of the effect. In the circumstances many effects are not identical with many functions from cooperative causes. In fact when the effect is produced from the aggregate [of the causes], the single effect which is excluded from the same (*sajātiya*) and the different kinds (*vijātiya*) of [effects] is produced (Cf. PV I 40–42, 78). When the eye-consciousness is produced from the eye (*cakṣus*), color-form (*rūpa*) and attention (*manasikāra*), the cause of the moment of the eye is only the eye (Cf. SDV 2–4). The immediate cause (*upādāna*) of the moment of the color-form is only the color-form (Cf. PVP D 267a2, 2.4.). In the same manner the cause of the consciousness with conception is only attention; therefore the distinctions [of the effects] are produced.

2.3. **One does not produce many.** Dharmakīrti in his PV 3. 534cd declares that one cause produces many effects, because it belongs to two aggregates. Jñānagarbha in his SDV ad SDK 14c argues against Dharmakīrti: If the one and same own attribute (*ātmātiśaya*) [Cf. PVSV 84,14–22 ad PV1.167abc] of the cooperative causes as an one produce many effects, how can be the effects differentiated ? The distinction and non-distinction [of the effects] will not have cause, because though the cause has no distinction, the effects have distinction. Śākyabuddhi in his PVTŚ (P 262a2–263a3, D 212a6–213a6) refers to the same kind of statement which is an objection of the opponent. Śākyabuddhi replies to this: it is not the case that the self-nature of the cause transmits (`pho ba) the result [as in the Sāṃkhya school]. One effect is produced only in the vicinity of the self-nature of the cause
which inevitably produces one effect. Many effects are produced only in the vicinity of the
self-nature of the causes which inevitably produce many effects. The difference and non-
difference of the self-nature of the cause produces the difference and non-difference of the
effect.

The statement of Śākyabuddhi is taken up by Kamalaśīla in his MĀ pūrvapakṣa
(P 148b8–149a7, D 138a4–b2) and Haribhadra in his AAA (974,19–24, 975,13–20). Harib-
hadra argues that Śākyabuddhi’s objection is false. If the self-nature of the cause is one,
many effects become one and the same. If the cause has two self-natures and they are dif-
ferent from each other, the two self-natures actually produce the effects and the cause has
no any function. If two self-natures and the cause are not different from each other, the
cause which is supposed to one is divided.

2.4. One does not produce one. According to the apoha theory from the viewpoint
of cause, it is shifted from the type in which one cause produces many effects to the type in
which one cause produces one effect. Hence Jñānagarbha in his SDV ad SDK 14d rebuts
the idea that one [cause] produces one [effect], if a person’s eye produces the moment of
the eye and it does not produce the eye-consciousness, he or she becomes a blind person.
With regard to the ear, he or she becomes a deaf person (Cf. MĀ pūrvapakṣa ibid.). It can
be safely assumed that Jñānagarbha’s opponent in this section is Devendrabuddhi. This is
because Devendrabuddhi in his Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (PVP D 267a2, 2.2) states that
color-form as a immediate cause produces the same kind of color-form in a single moment
(Cf. Śākyabuddhi in his PVTŚ I D 54b2–4). With regard to Devendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita
in his SDP (35a5) ad SDK 15 refers to the name of him in the discussion on arising and
non-arising.

Conclusion Jñānagarbha in his SDV ad SDK 14 examines and rebuts Dharmakirti’s
and his follower Devendrabuddhi’s theory of causation founded on the apoha theory. Śāky-
abuddhi disproves Jñānagarbha’s rebuttal against Dharmakirti. Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla
and Haribhadra who are the followers of Jñānagarbha, raise an objection against Śāky-
abuddhi. This is the later Mādhyamika tradition. On the other hand Śāntarakṣita in his TS
and Kamalaśīla in his TSP positively adopt Dharmakirti’s theory of causation founded on
the apoha theory. Jñānagarbha in his second antaraśloka ad SDV 14 devises five kinds of
models which evidence niḥsvabhāva of all dharmas. According to Dharmakirti’s pramāṇa
theory which consists of pratyakṣa and anumāna Jñānagarbha in his SDK 8, 12 and his ad-
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herents divide the conventional truth (saṃvytisātva) into the correct one (tathyasamvytī) and the incorrect one (atathyasamvytī).

Notes

1) See Moriyama 1991.
2) Cf. SDV 7b5 de’i byed pa’i yul tha par brtag pa byed do she na /
3) In addition to this, HB 722–17,11 are quoted in the PVTŚ P168b3–173b3, D143b7–148b5.
4) HB 20,12–21,10 (Cf. PV 1. 36,37), PVSV 22,15–21.
5) VNV 266–8. Cf. NV 1050,11–12 ad NS 4–2–12.
6) Cf. Śāntarakṣīta in his TS 1040 and Kamalaśīla in his TSP1040.
7) Cf. MĀ p. 236b8–237a2, D214a5–6.
8) This is probably because the logical reason (sādhana, non-differentiation) and the thing which is proved (sādyā, non-differentiation) are synonymous. Hence it follows that the logical reason would be part of the thesis (pratijñārthaikadeśa). Cf. PVSV 26,16–17 ad PV 1. 40–42. According to Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory, kṛtaka and anitya are differentiated from each other with regard to exclusion. This is employed in MAP 1896–19119 and AAA 635,24–636,14.
9) PVSV 23,21 saiva ca sāmagrī svabhāvasthityāśrayaḥ kāryasya /

Abbreviations

AAA: AbhisamayālaṁkāraLOka Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā (Haribhadra).
HB: Hetubindu (Dharmakīrti).
MĀ: Madhyamakāloka (Kamalaśīla)
PV: Pramāṇavārttika (Dharmakīrti)
PVP: Pramāṇavārttikapāṇijīka (Devendrabuddhi).
PVSV: Pramāṇavarttikasvavṛtti (Dharmakīrti).
PVTŚ: Pramāṇavārttikaśāntikā (Śākyabuddhi).
SDK: Satyadvayavibhaṅgaśāntikā (Jñānagarbha).
SDP: Satyadvayaśāntikā (Śāntarakṣīta).
SDV: Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti (Jñānagarbha).
SPT: Āryasaṅptaśatikaprajñāpāramitāṭikā (Kamalaśīla).
TS: Tattvasamgraha (Śāntarakṣīta).
TSP: Tattvasamgrahapāṇijīka (Kamalaśīla).
VN: Vādanyāya (Dharmakīrti).
VNV: Vādanyāyavyāptiśāntikā (Śāntarakṣīta).

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