Security Through Amnesia: A Software-Based Solution to the Cold Boot Attack on Disk Encryption

Patrick Simmons
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Abstract

Disk encryption has become an important security measure for a multitude of clients, including governments, corporations, activists, security-conscious professionals, and privacy-conscious individuals. Unfortunately, recent research has discovered an effective side channel attack against any disk mounted by a running machine [23]. This attack, known as the cold boot attack, is effective against any mounted volume using state-of-the-art disk encryption, is relatively simple to perform for an attacker with even rudimentary technical knowledge and training, and is applicable to exactly the scenario against which disk encryption is primarily supposed to defend: an adversary with physical access. To our knowledge, no effective software-based countermeasure to this attack supporting multiple encryption keys has yet been articulated in the literature. Moreover, since no proposed solution has been implemented in publicly available software, all general-purpose machines using disk encryption remain vulnerable. We present Loop-Amnesia, a kernel-based disk encryption mechanism implementing a novel technique to eliminate vulnerability to the cold boot attack. We offer theoretical justification of Loop-Amnesia’s invulnerability to the attack, verify that our implementation is not vulnerable in practice, and present measurements showing our impact on I/O accesses to the encrypted disk is limited to a slowdown of approximately 2x. Loop-Amnesia is written for x86-64, but our technique is applicable to other register-based architectures. We base our work on loop-AES, a state-of-the-art open source disk encryption package for Linux.

1 Introduction

The theft of sensitive data from computers owned by governments, corporations, and legal and medical professionals has escalated to a problem of paramount importance as computers are now used to store, modify, and safeguard all kinds of sensitive and private information. Hard drive thefts in the past have put information such as medical data [5], Social Security and passport numbers [19], and the access codes for a financial service corporation’s private Intranet [3] at risk.

Because of the significant potential for harm such breaches represent, disk encryption, in which an entire filesystem is stored on nonvolatile storage in encrypted form, has become a standard and often mandatory security technique in many environments [9]. Most major commercial operating systems now offer some form of kernel-based disk encryption [12] [29] [12], and third-party tools supporting disk encryption, such as TrueCrypt [2], are freely available for many architectures and operating systems. This software has proven effective against determined adversaries wishing to defeat its protection [14].

However, recent work [23] by Halderman et al. has uncovered a flaw common to all commercially available disk encryption packages. These researchers observed that, as long as an encrypted volume is mounted, a disk encryption package will store the encryption key in RAM. They further discovered that, contrary to popular belief, DRAM does not lose its contents for several minutes after a loss of power. Thus, Halderman et al. put forth the following attack on all disk encryption: cut power to the target machine, pull out the RAM, put the RAM in a new machine and boot this machine with an attack program of their creation which overwrites a minimal amount of RAM with its own code and dumps the original contents of RAM to nonvolatile storage. At this point, an attacker can search the contents of RAM for the encryption key or simply try every key-length string of bits present in the RAM of the original machine as a potential key. This attack, called the “cold-boot attack” by Halderman et al., is simple to perform, routinely effec-
tive, and broadly applicable against the existing universe of disk encryption software packages.

It is difficult to overstate the significance of the cold-boot attack. The protection afforded by disk encryption against any adversary with access to the running target machine is now effectively skewered. Many users for whom disk encryption previously offered protection are now at risk of having their data stolen when their machines are stolen or lost. One may argue that these users should physically secure their machines, but, as disk encryption is specifically intended to protect against an attacker who has physical access to the disk, that argument rings hollow.

In this paper, we describe the novel implementation approach we used in Loop-Amnesia, the first disk encryption software package not vulnerable to the cold-boot attack. We contribute a method of permanently storing an encryption key inside CPU registers rather than in RAM, an approach of capitalizing on this ability to allow the masking of arbitrarily many encryption keys from disclosure under a cold-boot attack, an implementation strategy for the AES encryption algorithm which ensures that no data related to encryption keys is ever leaked to RAM, a prototype implementation of our approach, and performance measurements validating our technique’s usability in practice.

Section 2 describes the attack model used by our paper. Section 3 provides an overview of AES and the loop-AES software package we enhanced to thwart the cold-boot attack. Section 4 describes the design of Loop-Amnesia. Section 5 describes our implementation. Section 6 describes our justification that Loop-Amnesia is in fact immune to the cold-boot attack and describes our correctness testing. Section 7 details our performance benchmarking of Loop-Amnesia. Section 8 details the limitations of our approach to this problem. Section 9 describes related work. Section 10 describes future work. Section 11 concludes the paper.

2 Attack Model

We assume our attacker has full physical access to the target machine. The attacker is assumed to possess any commonly available equipment necessary or useful for performing the cold-boot attack, such as his own computer or other device capable of reading RAM after he has removed it from the target machine.

In the event our attacker has access to an account on the target machine, such as with stolen login credentials or due to the fact that the machine was stolen with a user logged in, we seek to prevent the attacker from gaining unauthorized access to the disk volume key or to parts of the encrypted disk to which the account he is using does not have access. We assume an attacker will not be able to gain access to the encryption keys through vulnerabilities in the operating system; other work (SVA [13], SECVisor [35], and HyperSafe [38]) can protect the kernel from exploitation.

3 Background

3.1 Aspects of AES Relevant to Loop-Amnesia

AES, or the Advanced Encryption Standard, is an efficient block cipher algorithm. Originally published as Rijndael [15], the algorithm became the AES standard in 2001. It has proven quite resistant to cryptanalysis [8] [20] since its standardization.

3.1.1 Rounds

AES encryption proceeds in multiple rounds. In a round-based encryption process, plaintext is first encoded to ciphertext by applying the main body of the encryption algorithm. The resulting ciphertext is then encrypted again using the same algorithm in a second round of encryption. This process is repeated a number of times: in the case of 128-bit AES, our algorithm of concern, the number of rounds is 10.

3.1.2 Key Schedule

In order to increase the algorithm’s resistance to cryptanalysis, AES and other block ciphers employ a concept called a key schedule, in which a different key is used for each round of encryption. In AES, the original key is used for the first round, and subsequent rounds use keys obtained by permuting the contents of the previous round key. This permutation is reversible. In most AES implementations, all 10 keys of the key schedule are precomputed and stored to RAM for performance purposes. Since there are different but related key schedules for encryption and decryption, a total of 20 128-bit quantities from which the original key can be derived are stored to RAM when using unmodified loop-AES or a similar disk encryption package.

3.2 Organization of loop-AES

Loop-AES [30] is a kernel plugin for Linux providing an encrypted loopback device to the user. An encrypted loopback device binds to a normal block device, such as a disk partition or file, and provides a view of its data after having been decrypted with a key. If data is written to

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3 For reasons discussed in later sections, this performance optimization is foreclosed to Loop-Amnesia.
the loopback device, it is encrypted before being stored on the device to which the loopback device is bound.

The internal structure of loop-AES is both clean and modular. All encryption, decryption, and key-setting work is performed by the three methods `aes_encrypt`, `aes_decrypt`, and `aes_set_key`. Key data is stored inside the `aes_context` structure, which is treated as opaque by all of loop-AES outside of the three routines mentioned above. IV computation, CBC chaining, and other functions necessary to a full disk encryption system are handled independently of the implementation of these functions and, indeed, independently of the cryptographic algorithm used. Loop-Amnesia’s changes to loop-AES are confined to these three subroutines.

Of particular concern to us is how loop-AES stores cryptographic keys. Keys are stored only inside the aforementioned opaque `aes_context` structures; loop-AES conscientiously deletes them from other locations in memory after initializing the `aes_context` structures with `aes_set_key`. Because the keys are stored in memory by `aes_set_key`, however, loop-AES, like other prior disk encryption software, is fully vulnerable to the cold-boot attack.

4 The Design of Loop-Amnesia

The basic insight of Loop-Amnesia’s design is that, because of the ubiquity of model-specific registers, or MSRs, in CPU architectures today, it is possible to store data inside the CPU, rather than in RAM, thus making that data unreadable to a perpetrator of the cold-boot attack. The challenging aspect of this approach is finding model-specific registers that can practicably be used for this task: if an MSR is repurposed as storage space for an encryption key, it is unavailable for its intended use. Model-specific registers are used for a diverse variety of system tasks; some, like the control for the CPU fan, must not be tampered with lightly lest the safe operation of the hardware be threatened.

On our target platform, x86-64, we disabled performance counting and therefore were able to use the performance counter registers to hold a single 128-bit AES key. To evaluate the generality of our approach, we examined the CPU system programming manual for a PowerPC chip. We were also able to find performance counter MSRs on PowerPC that would appear to be repurposable for key storage on that architecture.

Of course, on any platform, disabling and repurposing the hardware performance counter infrastructure in this manner has the side effect of foreclosing the use of any hardware-assisted performance profilers. Since we expect protection against cold-boot attacks to be most important for production machines, which do not typically use hardware-assisted performance profilers, we do not consider this a serious deficiency of our approach.

Since storing the disk volume key in the MSRs directly would prevent the mounting of more than one encrypted volume simultaneously, we instead store a randomly generated number in the MSRs, then use this master key to encrypt the disk volume key for each mounted volume. Because we assume an attacker may later have access to all RAM, we require a random number generator (RNG) which guarantees that previously output random numbers cannot be calculated from its subsequent internal state.

5 Implementation

5.1 Constraints

To validate our design, we built a cold-boot immune 128-bit AES implementation as a drop-in replacement for the 128-bit AES implementation already present in the loop-AES disk encryption package. In order to satisfy our primary design criterion of cold-boot immunity, we must take care in our implementations of `aes_encrypt` and `aes_decrypt` that no key data is ever stored to RAM. This places a number of constraints on our implementation.

First, in order to ensure no register containing key data could ever be spilled to RAM, we needed a degree of control over the register allocation process not available to the programmer in any high-level language, including C. For this reason, our implementation of Loop-Amnesia uses x86-64 assembly language exclusively.

Second, though most AES implementations, in order to improve performance, precompute the AES key schedule and cache it to RAM, our repurposed MSR space is far too limited to store even one full AES key schedule. We instead compute the key schedule on-the-fly during encryption and decryption as discussed in 5.2.

execute arbitrary user-level code on PowerPC unless we found other repurposable MSRs. On x86-64, the ability of unprivileged code to read performance counters is configurable by the operating system, and we disable this ability.

Another motivation for supporting multiple simultaneous encryption keys is to support a mode of loop-AES which uses 64 different encryption keys to protect against watermark attacks.

In our implementation, we use the Linux kernel random number generator, which is specifically designed to provide this guarantee. There has been some cryptanalysis of the Linux RNG with respect to its ability to provide this guarantee, but the implementation is still considered safe in practice.
aes_encrypt(context, plaintext_buffer, ciphertext_buffer):
- Disable interrupts.
- Read master key from MSRs to registers.
- Read encrypted volume key from memory to registers.
- Decrypt volume key without storing any temporary data in RAM.
- Read plaintext_buffer from RAM to registers.
- Encrypt plaintext using volume key without storing any temporary data in RAM.
- Write ciphertext to ciphertext_buffer.
- Zero all registers containing key data.
- Enable Interrupts.
- Return

aes_decrypt(context, ciphertext_buffer, plaintext_buffer):
- Disable interrupts.
- Read master key from MSRs to registers.
- Read encrypted volume key from memory to registers.
- Decrypt volume key without storing any temporary data in RAM.
- Read ciphertext_buffer from RAM to registers.
- Decrypt ciphertext using volume key without storing any temporary data in RAM.
- Write plaintext to plaintext_buffer.
- Zero all registers containing key data.
- Enable Interrupts.
- Return

aes_set_key(context, key_bytes):
- if this is the first call to aes_set_key:
  master_key = gen_random_bytes(); msr_store(master_key)
  master_key = msr_load()
  first_round_key = internal_decrypt(master_key, key_bytes)
- context->first_round_key = first_round_key
  last_round_key = lastround(key_bytes)
  last_round_key = internal_decrypt(master_key, last_round_key)
- context->last_round_key = last_round_key

Figure 1: Pseudocode Description of Loop-Amnesia

Finally, as MSRs are per-CPU (or per-core), the need to copy our master key to all CPUs that may run the Loop-Amnesia subroutines presents a logistical problem. Our prototype implementation currently handles this problem by compiling the Linux kernel in single-CPU mode, forcing all software to execute on only one CPU or CPU core. While the prototype implementation of loop-AES therefore currently limits a machine to a single core, there is nothing in the design of Loop-Amnesia requiring this limitation. In a production implementation of Loop-Amnesia, we would suggest storing the master key to RAM after its generation, forcing all CPUs to read it and store it to their MSRs, and subsequently scrubbing the key from RAM.

The TPM Alternative

Many of these design constraints could be lifted if hardware support were available. However, the Trusted Protection Modules [37] present on so many computers today do not provide useful hardware support for our goal. While it might at first appear that we could secure the key inside of such a cryptographic coprocessor and use it to perform all encryption and decryption of the disk, the current TPM standard only supports the public-key RSA algorithm, which is inappropriate for disk encryption.

However, even though TPMs are not useful for performing the actual disk encryption, they could be used as an alternative method of encrypting the disk volume keys: instead of using an AES key hidden in an MSR on the main processor for the master key, we could use a public RSA key generated by the TPM. When we wanted to perform disk encryption or decryption, we could ask the TPM to use the corresponding private RSA key to decrypt the values we stored in RAM, reading the decrypted disk volume key directly from the TPM to registers over the serial bus.

Unfortunately, this is an inferior alternative to our approach from both security and performance standpoints.
From a security standpoint, the disk volume keys would frequently be transferred unencrypted over a bus from the TPM to the system CPU. An adversary able to tap this bus would be able to obtain the disk volume keys. From a performance standpoint, the master key would be decrypted by a relatively slower algorithm on a relatively slower processor, and we would in addition incur the latency of two transmissions over the TPM-CPU bus for every volume key decryption. For these reasons, we chose not to utilize a TPM for our implementation.

5.2 Implementation Outline

The `aes_encrypt` and `aes_decrypt` functions take an AES context structure, a buffer containing the plaintext or ciphertext, and a buffer to which the encrypted ciphertext or decrypted plaintext must be stored. Each of these functions must use the master key to decrypt the volume key stored in the AES context structure, use this decrypted key to encrypt the plaintext buffer or decrypt the ciphertext buffer, and must finally write the fully encrypted ciphertext or fully decrypted plaintext to the output buffer. Programming these cryptographic routines in assembly language, on an architecture with 16 registers, and under the constraint that RAM not be used for working storage proved, predictably, to be a significant engineering challenge.

`aes_encrypt` and `aes_decrypt` work similarly as the encryption and decryption operations are nearly symmetric. There are 16 registers available for use on x86-64. Of these, `RSP` is the stack pointer and must always point to the stack, so it is not available for our use. We use `RBX` to point to the encryption or decryption function, depending on which operation we wish to perform. The 16 bytes of partially encrypted plaintext or partially decrypted ciphertext are moved from `EAX`, `ECX`, `R10D`, and `R11D` to `EBX`, `EDX`, `R14D`, and `R15D` during the performance of a single round of encryption or decryption. The routine performing a single round of encryption or decryption uses `R8`, `R13`, `RDI`, and `RSI` as temporary registers. The round key is stored in `R9` and `R12` while each round is performed. See Figure 2 for an illustration of Loop-Amnesia’s register usage.

Thus, every general-purpose integer register available in the x86-64 instruction set is in use during the encryption and decryption subroutines. Since the 32-bit x86 architecture has only 8 integer registers available, adapting this technique to 32-bit x86 would likely require the use of the MMX or SSE registers. Adopting the technique to a RISC architecture with an abundance of general-purpose registers, however, would be straightforward.

Non-maskable interrupts, or NMIs, cannot be disabled by software, and it is therefore theoretically possible for key data to leak to RAM if NMIs must be considered. We further discuss the problem of non-maskable interrupts in §3.

6 Verification of Cold-Boot Immunity

6.1 Justification

A system will be immune to a cold-boot attack if, when the system is running normally (i.e., not including directly after the input of a key to the system), no key data is ever stored to RAM. From the perspective of the x86-64 assembler programmer, key data could only be stored to RAM due to one of the following occurrences:

1. An explicit store, including a stack push instruction.
2. A taken interrupt causing registers with key data to be stored to the interrupt stack.

A review of the code in `aes_encrypt` and `aes_decrypt` easily shows that no register containing part of any master key, volume key, or round key is ever stored to RAM. Moreover, interrupts are disabled before the master key is read out of the MSRs and only enabled after registers containing key data have all been zeroed, so it is theoretically impossible for Loop-Amnesia to be vulnerable to the cold-boot attack given its structure.

While perhaps not strictly necessary for immunity to the cold-boot attack, it is also not desirable that partially encrypted ciphertext (such as after one round of encryption) be stored to RAM as an attacker may be able to use cryptanalysis against such a degenerate version of AES to recover the volume key. Loop-Amnesia only stores fully encrypted ciphertext or fully decrypted plaintext to RAM, thwarting such an attack.

6.2 Correctness Testing

We performed correctness testing on an AMD Athlon64 X2 Dual Core Processor 3800+. For convenience, we used the Linux /dev/mem device to inspect the physical RAM of this machine, rather than actually replicating the cold-boot attack ourselves. Using this methodology, we were able to extract the secret key from loop-AES. When using Loop-Amnesia, we found neither the master key nor volume key present in RAM. We did, however, find data equivalent to the volume key encrypted with the master key present in RAM, as we expected.

\[^{8}\text{Performance problems due to bus latency and TPM processor speed would plague even a hypothetical TPM implementation supporting AES or another symmetric encryption algorithm.}\]

\[^{9}\text{Non-maskable interrupts, or NMIs, cannot be disabled by software, and it is therefore theoretically possible for key data to leak to RAM if NMIs must be considered. We further discuss the problem of non-maskable interrupts in §3.}\]

\[^{10}\text{Using only one core, for the reasons mentioned in §5.}\]
7 Performance

7.1 Benchmarking

We compare Loop-Amnesia against three other disk encryption methods. Our results are shown in Figure 3. “Xornesia” refers to a modified version of Loop-Amnesia which encrypts the disk volume keys in RAM by XORing them with the master key instead of performing full AES. Xornesia continues to use full AES when using the disk volume keys to do encryption and decryption of user data. We use Xornesia to isolate the overhead caused by repeated calculation of the key schedule, which is still present in Xornesia, from the overhead caused by the need to repeatedly decrypt the disk volume keys, which is not. “AES” refers to the loop-AES 128-bit AES implementation, with which we are fully compatible. We use this to measure the overhead of our Loop-Amnesia implementation relative to state-of-the-art disk encryption software using an optimized implementation of the same algorithm. “Naked” refers to a simple loopback mount with no encryption whatsoever. We use this as our baseline in order to eliminate from consideration the overhead of a loopback device.

The benchmarks are small, disk-intensive shell operations. dd writes a 900MB file consisting entirely of zeroes to disk. xz untars the Linux kernel from an xz-format archive. The “find” benchmark searches the Linux kernel source tree for instances of a particular word. “noatime” is the same as “find” but done on a filesystem mounted with an option to disable the recording of the time of last access. “Cold” benchmarks are done with the disk cache cleared; “warm” benchmarks are done after the disk cache has been primed by performing the same benchmark immediately before the test. We do not report numbers for warm xz as the CPU component of decompression made this test a poor measure of disk performance. We formatted the encrypted loopback device with the ext2 filesystem for all tests and

Figure 2: Register Usage of Loop-Amnesia (2 rounds of 10 shown)
used a single-core laptop with an Intel Celeron 540 at 1.8GHz with 1GB of RAM for benchmarking. The disk, a Hitachi HTS54258 (5400 RPM), experimentally performs reads at 725MB/s from the disk cache (on CPU) and at 44MB/s from the disk buffer (on disk microcontroller). Our results show that, on average, Loop-Amnesia introduces a slowdown of approximately 2.04x relative to Loop-AES and 2.23x relative to an unencrypted disk.

We also ran a simple unit test pitting Loop-Amnesia, Xornesia, and Loop-AES against each other, graphed in Figure 3. Since this is a CPU test, not a test of performance in practice, this provides a measure of the theoretical worst potential overhead Loop-Amnesia could cause, which would occur if disk accesses were free and performance of an encrypted filesystem was therefore bound entirely by CPU speed. The times given are for 10 million encryption and decryption operations. The theoretical worst-case slowdown of Loop-Amnesia relative to Loop-AES was found to be 3.77x.

7.2 Analysis

While we would have preferred Loop-Amnesia to have less of a performance impact, we believe that this overhead is acceptable given the unique benefit we provide. It is also worth noting that, while we designed these benchmarks to stress the disk subsystem, disk access speed does not play a major role in overall performance for many computing applications. The author has been using Loop-Amnesia for several months on both the laptop used for conducting the benchmarks and on another machine and has not noticed an appreciable decline in performance on either machine for interactive desktop use.

Our overhead comes from two sources. First, we must perform two cryptographic operations for each single cryptographic operation we are called on to perform by

\[ \text{Overhead} = 2 \times \text{Encryption Time} + \text{Decryption Time} \]

11The machines did not previously use any form of disk encryption.
the loop-AES framework. Specifically, we must decrypt the device key with the master key, then use this decrypted key to perform the cryptographic operation originally requested (either encryption or decryption of a 16-byte block of data). Xornesia stores device keys XORed with the secret key rather than performing AES to encrypt the device keys, therefore cutting out the overhead of two cryptographic operations for every single act of encryption or decryption. Our second source of overhead is the necessity of generating round keys on-the-fly; loop-AES pregenerates these and keeps them within the AES context structure.

Though Xornesia has significantly lower overhead, we do not recommend the use of Xornesia instead of our original algorithm as doing so would weaken our security guarantee. An adversary able to choose the device key for an encrypted loopback device on the system would be able to derive the master key by performing the cold-boot attack and examining the encrypted device key\footnote{It may also be possible to find the secret key by performing cryptanalysis on the first and last round keys in RAM, but we could negate this vulnerability by storing only the last round key in RAM and computing the first round key from the last whenever encryption is required. This would still be faster than performing full AES.} From this, the attacker could discover the keys for encrypted loopback devices he did not configure. We felt that our method of defeating the cold boot attack should thwart even an attacker with user-level access to the machine.

8 Limitations

In this section, we discuss some limitations and potential vulnerabilities of both our approach and of the current implementation of Loop-Amnesia.

8.1 Architecture Dependence

Our approach is inherently architecture-dependent and limited to encryption systems with a kernel-mode implementation. An assembly-language implementation must be completed for every combination of CPU architecture and encryption algorithm needing support.

However, we nevertheless feel our approach is applicable to a wide variety of use cases. Encryption algorithms are small, self-contained pieces of code which only need be written once. Our implementation already supports a secure and widely used algorithm for the most common desktop and server CPU architecture. We expect that vendors will have the resources to adapt their existing encryption algorithm implementations – which, as in the case of loop-AES, may have already been implemented in assembly language for performance purposes – to use the Loop-Amnesia method for countering cold-boot attacks if there is even moderate institutional demand.

8.2 Functionality Limitations

As the CPU registers, including the MSRs, are cleared when a computer is suspended to RAM, we cannot support suspension to RAM. It would be possible for an implementation of our technique to copy the master key to RAM before allowing the computer to suspend, but this would be ill-advised: in such an implementation, the contents of the master key would be at risk of discovery by a cold-boot attack if the attacker gained access to the suspended computer.

8.3 Potential Effectiveness Issues

Espionage An attacker able to install a keystroke logger or otherwise tamper with the victim computer may be able to deduce the key through espionage. While we do not protect against a keystroke logger, the use of two-factor authentication, supported by loop-AES and Loop-Amnesia, could reduce its effectiveness, and a trusted path execution framework could be used to prevent an attacker from tampering with unencrypted binaries used to mount the encrypted disk.
Key Information in Userspace  According to the developer of loop-AES, the userspace portions of the cryptographic system of which Loop-Amnesia is a part will overwrite userspace key material with zeroes after transmitting it to the kernel [31]. However, since key material is transmitted through a UNIX pipe, it may still be available in the buffer unless the pipe is zeroed by the kernel after use; this is currently not done.

Cached Data  Large amounts of decrypted data may be cached to RAM by the operating system, and our approach does not protect this data against a cold boot attack. However, it is possible for a user to manually clear the Linux disk cache by writing to a special file [4]. Periodically writing to this file from userspace, therefore, could mitigate the effectiveness of this attack at the expense of performance if the Linux kernel clears pages when they are freed (instead of when they are allocated). We have not checked whether the Linux kernel does in fact clear freed pages, but it would be simple to modify the operating system to do so.

JTAG  Many processors implement a standardized debugging infrastructure called the Joint Test Action Group, or JTAG. By sending signals to a CPU over JTAG, a hardware developer is able to test the CPU’s functioning. JTAG is commonly used in verifying that a particular CPU is not defective before releasing it for purchase. Because it is possible to use JTAG to dump the internal registers of a CPU, an attacker able to access the JTAG debug port may be able to read the Loop-Amnesia master key from the CPU’s MSRs. Fortunately, it is rare for the JTAG debug port to be wired out for x86 processors [7]. In the rare case that a JTAG port is available on an x86 machine, we would recommend that a user concerned about this remove or destroy the JTAG port and/or blow the JTAG security fuse. Either of these actions would disable an attacker’s ability to access JTAG [24].

Non-Maskable Interrupts  We take care to disable interrupts before reading the master key into general-purpose registers and to reenable them only after the key has once again been erased from all general-purpose registers. However, some interrupts, called non-maskable interrupts (NMIs), cannot be disabled. These interrupts are usually caused only by hardware faults. Since the general-purpose registers are stored to RAM when an interrupt is taken, an attacker able to introduce a hardware fault during the brief time periods when key material is in the general-purpose registers would be able to read the master key. We consider such an attack unlikely to prove practical, primarily due to its complexity and dependence on extreme luck in timing. However, if this attack does prove to be a concern, modifying the operating system’s interrupt handler to scrub the general-purpose registers from RAM after receiving a non-maskable interrupt would be sufficient to protect against it. This would have no deleterious side effects as the hardware will have faulted, so the CPU will never resume normal execution.[13]

9 Related Work

9.1 Lest We Remember: Cold-Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys

Halderman et al. discussed some forms of mitigation in [23], including deleting keys from memory when an encrypted drive is unmounted, obfuscation techniques, and hardware modifications such as intrusion-detection sensors and epoxy-encased RAM. Halderman et al. admit that they do not present a full solution applicable to general-purpose hardware.

While special-purpose hardware modifications may be effective, such hardware adds cost and may not be available to many users of disk encryption; a solution for commodity hardware is required. As the cold-boot attacker is given a copy of all RAM, including the program text used to perform encryption and decryption, we doubt that obfuscation would prove effective.

9.2 AESSE

A paper at Eurosec 2010 [26] discussed a potential solution to the cold boot attack, in which a single encryption key was stored in the MMX registers of the CPU and MMX register access was disabled for user-level code. Encryption can then be performed by using MMX or SSE instructions in kernel mode to perform AES encryption or decryption. The method proposed causes an algorithmic performance slowdown of approximately 6x. In addition to having worse performance characteristics than Loop-Amnesia, AESSE also does not support multiple disk encryption keys, since only one encryption key schedule may be stored inside the MMX registers. Disabling access to the MMX registers also causes compatibility problems with userland software that requires MMX and performance slowdowns for userland software that would make use of MMX if available but cannot because of AESSE.

13Our prototype implementation does not modify the OS interrupt handlers.
14this is already done in loop-AES according to [31].
9.3 Braving the Cold Black Hat Talk

A talk [25] at Black Hat in 2008 discussed various methods of mitigating the effects of the cold boot attack. Most of these mitigation strategies are discussed elsewhere; however, one contribution of this talk is a suggestion that motherboard temperature sensors be used to detect attempts to cool RAM and take protective measures, such as scrubbing the keys.

This talk also proposed a potential solution to the cold boot attack. The researchers suggested that the key could be stored in RAM only as the product of the hash of a large block of bits. The hope is that at least one of these bits will flip during the performance of the cold boot attack, preventing its success. This strategy, if implemented, would likely suffer from severe performance problems as a large hash would need to be calculated every time an encryption key needed to be accessed. The talk also discussed “caching” the encryption key inside the MMX registers, but it was unclear from the talk how such a caching system would operate.

9.4 Frozen Cache

Jürgen Pabel has posted a website [28], dormant since early 2009, detailing his plans to provide a software-based solution to the cold-boot attack. His approach is to memory-map the L1 cache of the CPU and use this space to store the AES key schedule. Because this approach would prevent the CPU cache from serving its normal role, every memory access on the machine would result in a cache miss. Disabling the CPU cache in this manner results in a slowdown of perhaps 200x [1] felt by all software, not just software accessing files on the encrypted disk. Because our solution avoids the negative system performance side effects of Pabel’s design, we believe it to be more practical.

9.5 Linux-Crypto Mailing List Brainstorming

Shortly after Halderman et al. published their attack, a mailing list discussion on Linux-Crypto discussed possible mitigation strategies. The general approach of keeping key information in CPU registers was brought up [39], but the ideas given were too vague to suggest how this might specifically be accomplished and do not appear to have been pursued further.

9.6 Leakage-Resistant Algorithms

There has been considerable work [6] [17] [27] [36] in designing cryptosystems resilient to partial key leakage due to side channel attacks. Most of this work has focused on the design of new ciphers with properties mitigating the impact of partial key leakage.

Unfortunately, we do not believe that protecting against partial key leakage is a sufficient defense against the cold boot attack. According to Halderman et al., it is possible to perform the cold-boot attack in such a way that over 99.9% of memory remains uncorrupted an entire minute after power is cut. Any countermeasure to the cold-boot attack must account for its potential to fully leak any encryption keys stored to RAM.

9.7 TCG Platform Reset Attack Mitigation Specification

The Trusted Computing Group has published a standard [21] which purports to mitigate the vulnerability of compliant systems to the cold-boot attack. This specification states that a compliant BIOS must zero out all RAM before giving control to the operating system. While this prevents the attack from being performed using only the victim’s computer [15] the attacker can still easily perform the attack by moving the RAM from the victim’s machine to a machine under his own control, then booting using a BIOS not following the TCG specification. Thus, the TCG specification cannot be considered a sufficient countermeasure.

9.8 Forenscope: A Framework for Live Forensics

The RAM of a computer may contain sensitive material other than the encryption keys to the hard disk. The Forenscope rootkit [10] takes advantage of the cold-boot attack to gain access to active network sessions as well; the session keys’ presence in memory could allow an attacker to masquerade as the victim to any website, SSH server, or other remote system to which the user was connected at the time of the attack.

Loop-Amnesia will protect against a Forenscope-using attacker’s gaining access to the encrypted disk: the attack tool uses the exact same strategy as Halderman et al. to attempt recovery of the key. Unfortunately, SSH and SSL session keys will likely remain in RAM, so an attacker with Forenscope could still conceivably keep the victim’s network connections alive, sniff the session keys, and masquerade as the victim to connected machines. See [10] for a discussion on how Loop-Amnesia may be extended to assist in preventing Forenscope attacks.

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15 A BIOS password would also necessitate the use of a separate machine.
10 Future Work

A ripe area for future research is the applicability of our approach to algorithms outside of the AES cipher family. Some algorithms, such as Blowfish [33], use key-dependent S-boxes; proving whether these S-boxes can be safely stored to RAM would require careful analysis. We believe that our approach should work well for all algorithms without key-dependent S-boxes and with key schedules that are computationally inexpensive to compute, but its effectiveness outside this class of ciphers remains to be analyzed.

The ability of Loop-Amnesia to assist in neutralizing Forenscope’s other attack capabilities also merits examination. For instance, an operating system attempting to harden itself against Forenscope could use Loop-Amnesia to encrypt various pieces of data inside the kernel TCP stack. As the master key will have been erased by the reboot preceding Forenscope’s installation, Forenscope will have no way of recovering the network connections. By the time the attacker has had time to download and analyze the SSH/SSL session keys from RAM, any active TCP sessions will likely have expired.

Finally, our work exposes a limitation in current system programming languages: the inability to insist to a compiler that particular values never be spilled to RAM. While we recognize that our needs are uncommon and do not by themselves merit the redesign of system programming languages, we speculate that programming language designers may one day wish to allow users more control over the register allocation process for performance reasons. We would encourage the designers of such languages or language extensions to include functionality allowing the user to express the needs we faced when implementing Loop-Amnesia. User control over the register allocation process may provide useful benefits for both security and performance.

11 Conclusion

In this paper, we present the first practical solution to the cold-boot attack applicable to general-purpose hardware. For a performance cost likely to be very moderate under most workloads, our solution provides protection for general-purpose hardware against a significant practical attack affecting all previous state-of-the-art disk encryption systems. We present a design strategy applicable to all operating system-based disk encryption systems and a usable open-source implementation which validates our design. After the publication of this paper, we intend to work with the Linux kernel community to integrate our approach, and possibly code, into the standard Linux kernel distribution.
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