Dynamics of Internal Models in Game Players*

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Abstract

A new approach for the study of social games and communications is proposed. Games are simulated between cognitive players who build the opponent’s internal model and decide their next strategy from predictions based on the model. In this paper, internal models are constructed by the recurrent neural network (RNN), and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game is performed. The RNN allows us to express the internal model in a geometrical shape. The complicated transients of actions are observed before the stable mutually defecting equilibrium is reached. During the transients, the model shape also becomes complicated and often experiences chaotic changes. These new chaotic dynamics of internal models reflect the dynamical and high-dimensional rugged landscape of the internal model space.

Keyword: Iterated prisoner’s dilemma game; recurrent neural network; internal model; evolution; learning

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1 Introduction: Life as Game

Here we propose a new approach to study the emergence of social norms and the evolution of communications. The cooperative solutions found in non-zero sum games are generally

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unstable. That is, nice players are replaced by wicked ones before long. The prisoner’s dilemma game well describes this unhappy situation. How to bring and to maintain norms in such a base society has thus been a central issue. From the game-theoretical analysis to social studies, it has been shown that norms are maintained by players using a certain set of strategies. Axelrod has remarked that they should be reciprocal and nice strategies. A strategy called Tit for Tat (TfT) carries such characteristics with the smallest program size[1]. However, once TfT strategy dominates a population, it is demolished by some prepared anti-TfT strategies. In the other words, no strategy can be evolutionarily stable in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma[2]. Since we can never wipe out all base behavior, imperfect cooperation may be the essential feature of the dilemma game. On the other hand, we sometimes experience a global punishment. For instance, if one breaks a rule, all the members of his group will be punished as well. From a study of many person’s dilemma games[3], a meta-punishment rule (i.e., a rule does not only punish one who breaks the law but also punishes those who do not punish) is required to maintain mutual cooperation. Namely, we read that some global punishment is required for maintaining social norms.

The present approach is quite different from the above approaches. We do not think that social norms are attributed to external requirements (e.g., to invisible hands). We rather think they are attributed to players’ internal dynamics. Strategies and punishments are not forced from without. They should be produced internally by players in a community.

We often see our daily life metaphorically as game. But the game we see as a metaphor is not a set of static game dynamics. The game should be dynamical in the sense that game players are taken as coupled autonomous optimizers with complex internal dynamics. The necessity of studying the dynamical game was initially proposed by Rashevsky[3] and recently emphasized by Rössler[4]. The important point in the dynamical game is not only to find the best (e.g. evolutionarily stable) strategy but to study how players can deviate from the optimal strategy and how they perform autonomously. We argue the complexity of the game is not attributed to its payoff matrix; we rather attribute it to the dynamics of players who can predict the others’ behavior and optimize their own performance.

In the present paper, we prepare a game in advance so that players don’t abstract its rules from situations. Instead, players reconstruct their opponents’ strategy by playing the game. We thus view strategies as the emergent behavior of players and study the dynamics of internal images which are constructed within players.

Several researchers have tried to model games based on players with learning and predicting ability. These models use finite automata to analyze the effects of memory strategies [4], the procedural complexity of strategies [5], the relationship between complex strategies and equilibrium concepts [8], and so on. In certain aspects, our approach is very different from those cited above. We don’t represent strategies in finite automata. Instead we use recurrent networks. That is, the finite automaton is a limited class of the network. In our modeling, an infinitely complex finite automaton can appear in the sense that the automaton can have an infinite number of nodes [8]. By using this network, we represent the strategy of an opponent and not of itself; players do optimize their future
moves based on the generated network. Representation of the recurrent network structure, which was first proposed by Pollack [10], provides a major advantage over other models for studying its strategy complexity. Without counting the number of nodes of the finite automaton, we immediately notice the complexity of the strategy by the representation of the network structure. Also we discuss the time evolution of those structures when a game is repeated. Therefore, a simple IPD game now becomes a very complicated dynamical system with varying its dimensionality. We will show how complicated the dynamics becomes until they ultimately settle down to an “evil” society. The eventual lost of norms in our setting implies that an IPD game is too simple to sustain mutual cooperation whenever players are cognitive agents. But again we have to insist that our main concern here is not to study the established Nash equilibrium but to discuss the complex transient game process as a novel dynamical system.

The paper is structured in the following manner: In the next section we explain the simulation models. The recurrent neural network, the training method, and the algorithms to determine next actions will be described. In section 3, the results of games with fixed strategies are shown. The ability of the recurrent network to learn deterministic and stochastic automata are confirmed. Then, we describe the results of games between learning strategies. An origin of complex behavior and its social implication will be discussed in section 4.

2 Model

In this study we use the IPD game, which involves only two players. We created two models of game players. The first one is “pure reductionist Bob”, who makes the opponent's model by a recurrent neural network. He thinks that the opponent may behave with simple algorithms like finite automata, which can be expressed by the recurrent networks. The second one is “clever Alice”, who assumes that the opponent behaves like “pure reductionist Bob”. She knows that the opponent makes her model by recurrent networks and he decides the next action based on that model of herself. In other words, she builds the model of herself and treats this model as her image in the opponent. In the following we describe the behavior of the game players in detail.

2.1 Recurrent Neural Networks

First we explain the recurrent neural network which was used to make the internal models. Building the model of a player’s behavior may involve many methods such as finite automata, Markov chain, and so on. In this study we use dynamical recognizers, simple and powerful tools for studying dynamical behavior from the viewpoints of cognitive studies. Dynamical recognizers were first discussed by Pollack [10,12] and have been used independently by Elman [11] studying the dynamical aspects of language. Pollack showed that some automata could be learned very well by dynamical recog-
nizers. When it could not learn automata, fractal-like patterns are generated in context spaces. In our simulations these situation can be considered as incomprehensive or random behavior.

Figure 1 shows the schematic diagram of the dynamical recognizer. The dynamical recognizer is now generally called the recurrent neural network (RNN). In particular it is called “cascaded” RNN, which consists of a function and a context network[10]. It is quite similar to a two-layer neural network, though the recurrent outputs are feedbacked not to the input nodes but to the weights of the function network. The recurrent outputs memorize the opponent’s current status, and the context network converts the recurrent outputs to the weights of the function network which predicts the next action. Hereafter we call the space constructed by the outputs from the function network (including both recurrent and network outputs) as the “context space”. The output is taken from a node of the function network. In this study, only one input and one output node are necessary since the IPD game has only two actions, cooperation and defection. We define cooperation as 0 and defection as 1 in the network. The output is rounded off to 0 (cooperation) and 1 (defection). The network is expressed by the following equations.

\[
\begin{align*}
    z_i(n) &= g(w_i y(n) + w_i^0), \\
    w_i &= \sum_{j=1}^{N} u_{ij} z_j(n - 1) + u_{i}^b,
\end{align*}
\]  

(1)
\[ w_i^0 = \sum_{j=1}^{N} u_{ij} z_j(n - 1) + u_{ib}^i, \]

where symbols have the following meanings.

- \( g(x) \): sigmoid function \((e^{-x} + 1)^{-1}\)
- \( y(n) \): input
- \( z_0(n) \): output
- \( z_i(n) \): recurrent outputs \((i = 1 \cdots N)\)
- \( w_i \): weight of function network
- \( w_i^0 \): bias of function network
- \( u_{ij}, u_{ij}^0 \): weight of context network
- \( u_{bi}, u_{bi}^0 \): bias of context network

### 2.2 Learning

The recurrent neural network is trained by the back-propagation method. In the game, the player knows only his or her own past actions and those of the opponent. In the case of “pure reductionist Bob”, the model of the opponent is built by the recurrent neural network. This means that the RNN takes the player’s last action as an input and outputs the opponent’s next action. Thus, the target for training is a series of the opponent’s action when the inputs are the player’s actions. However, since the number of training targets becomes too large as a game proceeds, the weights for learning are varied for each action so that far actions in the distant past are forgotten. Thus, the error \( E(n) \) after the \( n \)-th game is given by

\[
E(n) = \sum_{k=1}^{n} \lambda^{n-k} (z_0(k) - d(k))^2, \tag{2}
\]

where \( d(k) \) is a target (i.e., the actual opponent’s action in the \( k \)-th game), \( z_0(k) \) is the predicted action by the RNN, and \( \lambda \) is a parameter which controls the memory retention of the past actions. Usually we used \( \lambda = 0.9 \) for most simulations. Using the above error we trained the network by using the Williams-Zipser back-propagation algorithm\[13, 14\]. All the weights \((u_{ij}, u_{ij}^0, u_{bi}, u_{bi}^0)\) and the initial recurrent outputs \((z_i(0), i = 1 \cdots N)\) are adopted based on the gradients of the error. The back-propagation processes have been performed by a fixed count of 200–400, depending on the network size, to ensure convergence. We trained the network after each game. The initial weights are random, and after each game the previous weights are used as the initial weight for learning.

### 2.3 Action

To determine the player’s next action, we use the prediction of the opponent’s future action based on the RNN. First, the algorithm for pure reductionist Bob is explained.
Bob chooses his forward actions up to $M$ games. Then, he can predict the opponent’s actions from his forward actions, and the expected score can be evaluated. The process is repeated for all possible strings of actions of length $M$ and Bob chooses the action with the highest score as the best action. In this study we used $M = 10$ for all simulations.

Clever Alice considers the opponent is a pure reductionist Bob. She chooses her forward $M$ actions. She predicts the opponent’s actions assuming that he behaves like pure reductionist Bob. Again the process is repeated for all strings of the length $M$ and she chooses the action string with the highest score as the best one. In other words, she predicts her image in the other person and tries to educate him to have a favorable image through her actions. In this study we used $M = 4$ for all simulations because of the computational resource.

3 Results and Discussions

In this section we describe the games’ results and discuss the observed behavior. At first we briefly describe the results between the learning strategy and fixed strategies like Tit-for-Tat. The learning strategy could behave cleverly in the case. Next the results of the games between the learning strategies (Bob-Bob and Alice-Alice) are displayed. Through random and complex behavior the systems reach the trivial fixed point, complete mutual defection. An origin of the complex transients and the meanings of the final closing with complete defection are discussed.

3.1 Games with fixed strategies

In the games with fixed strategies, we expressed the strategies of the opponents by deterministic and stochastic finite automata. The Tit-for-Tat (TfT), Tit-for-Two-Tat (Tf2T), and their mixed strategy are used as examples. The first example is the famous Tit-for-Tat strategy, wherein the player repeats the opponent’s last action. The structure and dynamics in the context space after learning is visualized in Fig. 2(a). In the simulation, the network with two recurrent outputs was used, so the function network has three output nodes including the target output. In the figure, two of these three outputs are plotted on the plane. The points represent the output of the function network $z_i(n)$ for all possible inputs of 8 games. Thus, the figure corresponds to a transition diagram for a finite automaton. To learn the TfT strategy, the random initial action of the player for 10 games $CDDCCCCCDDC$ are given, where $C$ and $D$ indicate cooperation and defection, respectively. The figure is plotted for the network after 100 games (including the initial games). The result shows that the network learned the target automaton (TfT) perfectly. After the 10 games of the learning period, the player kept complete cooperation for at least more than 100 games with the forgetfulness parameter $\lambda = 0.95$. The results do not depend on the initial actions except for very rare ones such as all cooperation or all defection.

The second example shows the Tit-for-Two-Tat (Tf2T) strategy, which only defects
Figure 2: Context space plot of the recurrent neural network after learning (a) Tit-for-Tat strategy, (b) Tit-for-Two-Tat strategy, and (c) their mixed strategy. Each strategy is shown in the diagram upon each graph. Each point represents the output from the function network with the inputs for all strings of the length 8. White squares and black dots correspond to the output after an input of cooperation and defection, respectively. The networks are shown after 100 games (including the initial 10 games) in (a), 90 games (including the initial 20 games) in (b) and (c). The learning algorithm could learn all these strategies and could produce the best actions.
after the opponent’s successive defections. Thus, the Tf2T strategy is more generous than TfT and requires only one new node in the finite automata representation. Figure 2(b) shows the similar context space plot with a transition diagram. In this case, also, the network could learn the automaton perfectly. After the initial action for 20 games CDDCCCDCCDDDCDCCDD, the player cooperated for first three games. Then, the player started to express the optimal action DCDCDCDCDC ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ . The network after 90 games is shown in the figure. We confirmed that the network could predict perfectly the correct actions of the Tf2T strategy, though the output $z_0$ is not shown in the diagram.

The third example is the mixed strategy of TfT and Tf2T. When the player defects, the opponent chooses the TfT and Tf2T strategy with the probability of 1/3 and 2/3, respectively. Figure 2(c) shows the three-dimensional plot of outputs from the network. The initial actions of 20 games are given as

Player : CDDCCCDCCDCCDDCDCDCCDD
Opponent: CCCDCCCDCCDCCDDCDCDCC

then the games proceeded as

Player : CCCCCCCCCCCCCDCDCDCDCDCCCDCDCDC
Opponent: DCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCDCCDDCDCDCDCDC

and both players’ actions became completely cooperative. Since the original automaton is stochastic, the network can not learn it perfectly. However, it could model such random behavior. The points surrounded by dashed ovals are reached when the transition occurs from the original cooperative state (shown by a double circle) by the player’s defection. These points are distributed from 0 (Cooperation) to 1 (Defection) in the output $z_0$. This means that he cooperates sometime and defects sometime. Thus, the stochastic behavior can be learned as spread states in the context space. When the strategy is completely random, the points spread over an entire region of the outputs.

3.2 Games with learning strategies

In this section we show the results when both players have learning strategies. At first, we describe the games between two pure reductionist Bobs. To set the initial weights, both players learn the Tit-for-Tat strategy by playing initially given 20 games. Actually, both players’ initial actions were set to CCDCCCDCCDCCDDCDCDCCCD and the opponent was assumed to use the Tit-for-Tat strategy. The forgetfulness parameter $\lambda$ was 0.9 so that the players could forget the initial memories of the Tit-for-Tat. If the learning is smooth enough, the new model after leaning will be very close to the initial model in so far as each player’s actions will be consistent with the model. However, a finite step width in the discrete leaning process causes the model to deviate from the previous local minima. Thus, the models could deviate from the initial Tit-for-Tat strategy and the cooperation could easily be violated. An example of the players’ action is as below.

Player : CDDCCCDCCDCCDDCDCDCCDD
Opponent: CCCDCCCDCCDCCDDCDCDCC

then the games proceeded as

Player : CCCCCCCCCCCCCDCDCDCDCDCCCDCDCDC
Opponent: DCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCDCCDDCDCDCDC

and both players’ actions became completely cooperative. Since the original automaton is stochastic, the network can not learn it perfectly. However, it could model such random behavior. The points surrounded by dashed ovals are reached when the transition occurs from the original cooperative state (shown by a double circle) by the player’s defection. These points are distributed from 0 (Cooperation) to 1 (Defection) in the output $z_0$. This means that he cooperates sometime and defects sometime. Thus, the stochastic behavior can be learned as spread states in the context space. When the strategy is completely random, the points spread over an entire region of the outputs.
Each row corresponds to each player. Here the network with \( N = 4 \), i.e., four recurrent outputs, has been used. In the earlier games players tried to maintain cooperation but gradually increased their frequency of defections. During this transient the series of actions were very complicated. After 210 games both players reached the trivial fixed point (Nash equilibrium), all defection.

Figure 3 shows the context space plot of the internal models in the players. Only three of the outputs are shown and two of them are ignored. In the initial game they learned Tit-for-Tat perfectly, as shown in the upper left corner of the figure. Cooperation was broken quite soon, and this internal model became indistinct after 10 games. Sometimes the models became deterministic, as seen in the player 1 model after 18 games. However, it broke again quite soon. In the earlier games each player’s model was rather cooperative, and it gradually became defective as the game proceeded. Finally, both players believed their opponents would always defect. Thus the system reached the trivial fixed point of all defection.

Next we briefly show the result of games between clever Alices who assume the opponents as pure reductionist Bob. The initial condition is again Tit-for-Tat; however, in this case this initial condition means that they believed that the opponents regards themselves as Tit-for-Tat. The observed actions are shown below.

Again the cooperation has been broken quite soon since the player Alice expects that the opponent (whom she assumes as Bob) will keeps cooperation as far as he will regard herself as Tit-for-Tat. Thus she considers that an occasional defection would not break the opponent’s cooperation. However, both players share the identical assumption, so mutual
Figure 3: Context space plot of the recurrent neural network after games between pure-
reductionist Bob players. White squares and black dots correspond to the output after
an input of cooperation and defection, respectively. The upper rows correspond to the
internal models of player 2 in player 1, and the lower rows to those of player 1 in player
2. The game generation is shown upon each graph.
cooperation is easily violated. Sometimes they cooperated to educate their opponents to cooperate. Figure 4 shows the context space plot of the internal models in the players after 41 games. Again, very complicated images were produced. The internal model gradually became defective as the game proceeded. Thus each player lost her faith in her opponent’s inclination for cooperation. When she gave up her own attempts to cooperate, the system reached the trivial fixed point of all defection.

Why do we see such complex behaviors? In the games with the fixed strategies, the system could easily reach equilibria. However, in the games between learning strategies, complicated transients were observed. The length of the transients, i.e., the length of time it took to reach the fixed point of complete defection, depends on the size of the networks. When the number of the recurrent output nodes was 2, equilibrium was reached after 90 games. When the network size is small, the player tends to over-simplify the opponent and easily recognizes his strategy as all-defection. As the network size becomes larger, the ability to express complex models increases. Thus the transients become longer.

Figure 5 shows an example of the error landscape in model space. Since there are \(4N^2 + 2N\) parameters in the model, it is difficult to show them all. In the figure only models on a line in the 72-dimensional space are presented. The line was determined to pass two local minima, which were obtained by creating internal models from two different initial weights. These minima correspond to 0 and 1 in the horizontal axis, and all parameters are linearly interpolated and extrapolated on the line between these minima. The error \(E(n)\) are calculated and plotted for each model.

In the initial stage when each player successfully believes that the opponent is Tit-for-Tat, the landscape is smooth and has only one local minima. However, after a few ten steps it becomes quite complex and reveals a lot of local minima. At the games’ end when each player assumes that the opponent always defects, again it gradually returns to a simple flat landscape. These complex landscapes (Fig. 5) reflect this complex behavior. The error increases after each new game, then the model changes to a new local minimum when the error exceeds the barrier. Thus such an itinerancy between local minima has been observed, and constitutes an origin of complex behavior. Note that these landscapes do not indicate that the evolution of the behavior is considered the optimization process in the landscape. Each player assumes that the landscape reflects the reality of the opponent, but actually it is almost always an illusion. Since no unique model has an ability to express behavior, the landscapes have many local minima with similar errors.

A strategy based on internal models can not be expressed by the strategy itself. Pure reductionist Bob actually has no fixed strategy, so he can not make a model of himself. He changes his strategy every game based on his opponent’s actions. Without being aware of it, they change their opponent’s strategy. Clever Alice can make a model of Bob, though she can not make a model of herself. To make a model of themselves, an infinite regression will occur. Thus, with learning strategies players can never completely understand others and behave rather randomly with no definite strategy except during the stable equilibrium of the state of all defection.

The misunderstanding of others and semantic complexity in the model space are essential to observe complex behavior like in games between learning strategies. We think
Figure 4: Context space plot of the recurrent neural network after 41 games between clever Alice players. White squares and black dots correspond to the output after an input of cooperation and defection, respectively. The upper rows correspond to the internal models of player 1, and the lower rows to those of player 2.
Figure 5: Rugged landscape of the error $E(n)$ in the model space. A one-dimensional line in the space on two local minima is taken as the horizontal axis. The minima are normalized to 0 and 1. All the network weights are linearly interpolated or extrapolated on the axis. Dashed line: after game 0; dot-dashed line: after game 10; solid line: after game 20; long-dashed line: after game 180.
that this scenario is generic and not specific to the RNN. Morimoto and us performed similar simulations using finite-state automata to build internal models\cite{10}. Again, very long and complex transients were observed.

3.3 Games between learning and double-learning strategies

Next, we discuss the games between the learning and double-learning strategies. In this case, the players can maintain collaboration for some time; ultimately, however, the equilibrium of all-defection arose. The observed actions are shown below.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{DDDDDCDCCCDDDCDDDDDCDCCCDDCDDCDDCD} \\
\text{DDDDDCDCCCDDDCDCCCDDDCDCCCDDCDDCDDCD} \\
\text{CCDCCDCCCDDDCDCCCDDDCDCCCDDCDDCDDCDDCD} \\
\text{CCCCCCCCCCCDDCCCCCCCCCCCDDCCCCCCCCCCDDDD}
\end{align*}
\]

where the first and the second rows are the double-learning (Alice) and the learning (Bob) strategies, respectively. For 50 games they can maintain a state of collaboration. In this case, Alice had an accurate model of Bob; therefore Alice defected as much as Bob maintained the collaboration. However, since the model is not unique, Alice made an inaccurate model of Bob, thus the collaboration was broken. The player using the double-learning strategy makes the RNN model of herself, and the player using the learning strategy makes the RNN model of the opponent. Therefore, the similarity between these models is a good measure for the correctness of the model in Alice. We define the semantical “distance” \( l \) between models by

\[
l = 2^{-n} \sum_x (\text{Output}_{\text{Alice}}(x) - \text{Output}_{\text{Bob}}(x))^2,
\]

where the summation on \( x \) is taken for all possible actions of length \( n \), and \( \text{Output}_{\text{Alice}}, \text{Output}_{\text{Bob}} \) are the outputs from the RNN models of Alice in Alice and Bob, respectively. Figure \[6\] shows the calculated “distance” for the same simulation.

As expected, while Alice and Bob imagined a similar RNN model of Alice, they could maintain the collaboration. Alice could defect so that Bob could keep collaborating. When they started to build the semantically different models, Alice could not make accurate estimations of Bob’s behavior. Then when Bob started to defect, the collaboration broke. The coincidence of the models could not be achieved until both models entered the state of all-defection. Many models are able to express a particular behavior, and the selection of the model is rather random because of the rugged landscape in the model space. Thus, players happen to choose models of a different behavior depending on the initial value of the RNN parameters, though they learn the same behavior. The non-uniqueness of models plays an important role in this situation also.
3.4 Discussion

How can mutual cooperation be imported into our system? If a player assumes by learning that the opponent is an All-C player, he never cooperates. On the other hand, if he assumes that the opponent is an All-D player, he again never cooperates. One resolution is to make player himself believe that the opponent is a Tit-for-Tat player. Once both players come to believe that their opponent is TfT, they never defect again. If the internal model never changes with the addition of the action sequences generated by the model itself, we call it a stable model. This self-consistent equation of the internal model dynamics determines whether a TfT model can be stable or not. As far as we have tested, the attraction basin volume of TfT (i.e., the initial set of action sequences) hardly exists. We have also studied the meta-learning model (i.e., to learn the internal model which the opponent learns) to show that it is still difficult to have TfT fixed points.

There are several ways to remedy this malice situation. If we use finite state automata instead of recurrent neural nets, we succeed in stabilizing several cooperating states [16]. The difference arises from the truncation of learning processes in the latter case. Namely, a player can stop learning the opponent when he has obtained the near perfect model. As a result, the players’ internal model dynamics have far more fixed points than does the present case. More interestingly, several cooperative states are fixed by mutual misunderstanding. This truncation method can also be applied to the present recurrent net case.

Another different approach is to relax the optimization process. In the present case, players make the opponent’s model from the finite history of their moves. This causes a
common generalization problem. Pollack has shown that his dynamical recognizer failed to generalize some complex finite automaton algorithms [10]. The generalizability of such a dynamical recognizer should be studied further [23]. Additionally, we encounter a more serious problem when we study the coupled RNN. In the case of two Bob (or Alice) players, it is essentially impossible to learn the other player’s behavior because players cannot predict the meta-strategic aspect of each other (e.g. what the other player is trying to optimize). Therefore a learning process itself loses its meaning here. But we see that this serious problem also arises in the general learning process among cognitive agents [9]. And this we think is an example of the inevitable demon in the cognitive process. We call it demon naming after Maxwell’s demon, since it can produce structures out of randomness in cognitive processes.

By taking such an inevitable demon seriously, we have succeeded in achieving mutual cooperation among players of the IPD game [22]. Namely, we let players select the internal model of the opponent only within a certain accuracy. We then find that orbits of game actions, which go to mutually cooperative attractors, are embedded in complex manners around the “true orbit” which goes to the mutually defecting attractor. As we have expected, mutually cooperative outcomes can be established when each player comes to assume that the other is also a Tit-for-Tat player.

There have been several attempts to make the IPD game [15] more faithful to realistic situations. For example, a noisy IPD game has been extensively studied. Contrary to his or her own decisions, a player makes erroneous actions due to the influence of noise. The purpose of such noise is to destabilize mutually-cooperating states by creating distrust between players. For example, two TFTs will alternatively defect against the other. TFT will thus be replaced by strategies which are more tolerant of defections [17, 18, 19], leading further to more complex strategies [20, 23]. Namely, noise brings diversity in a society. However, the source of noise itself has not been discussed.

A recent study on noiseless 3-person IPD games [24] reports that the third person will have the effect of a noise source on the other players. Therefore, a many-person IPD game is an another extension of our current study. When we extend the present analysis to many-person games, each player should generate the image of not only one opponent but of the relationship among players. Essential social phenomena such as coalition, threats, altruism, etc. can thus be discussed as emergent behavior. We hope that languages and the abstraction of games can be observed as side effects of the evolution of social structures. Through the present simulation, we understand that the IPD game is a poor interactive way to achieve social norms. We should step back and reconsider out conception of a relevant game which incorporates social rules and structures.

4 Summary

The society of cognitive agents were analyzed. These agents play the IPD games by constructing internal images based on the other’s behavior. In the case of games with fixed strategies like Tit-for-Tat or Tit-for-Two-Tat, sound internal images were created
and optimal actions were selected. In games between cognitive agents, complex transients were observed, and the system ultimately reached the trivial fixed point of all defection. Complex transients emerge because of impossibility of complete learning and the rugged landscapes in the model space. The players change the other’s strategy through their own actions until the stable equilibrium of all defection. These results indicate that it is difficult to maintain mutual cooperation in the IPD game without extra norms or communication in addition to the actions themselves. It will be interesting to study whether the norms emerge in non-zero-sum games involving the more complex actions of many players.

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