Patriotism: from Twardowski to Bocheński

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Abstract
In my paper, I show three concepts of patriotism present in the Lvov-Warsaw School, and try to indicate how these concepts differed and what norms they were involved in, as well as to evaluate the justifications indicated for these norms.

Keywords  Chauvinism · Homeland · Nationalism · Patriotism · Bocheński · Ossowski · Twardowski

Historical background

On March 29, 1919, Kazimierz Twardowski delivered a lecture, “On patriotism,” inaugurating the Soldiers’ University for officers and privates of the Polish Army in Lvov. Three years earlier, Stanisław Ossowski, a student of Tadeusz Kotarbiński, who was himself a student of Twardowski, had given a lecture with the same title in the Students’ Philosophical Club of the University of Warsaw; this theme returned to his work shortly after the Second World War. On July 5, 1942, Józef M. Bocheński published his text, “On patriotism,” in Nauka Chrystusowa, printed in Rome; he later returned to the question of patriotism at least twice more—at the turn of the eighties and nineties of the last century. All three proved that they not only knew what “patriotism” meant, but that “patriotism” was not an empty word for them. In the summer of 1914, Twardowski was the commander of the Civic Guard in Poronin, and in the winter of 1919–1920, he was a member of the volunteer Civic Guard in Lvov. Ossowski took part in the Polish–Bolshevik war of 1920, having joined the cavalry of the Polish Army 2 years earlier; in the September Campaign of 1939—as a second lieutenant—he commanded a platoon of riflemen. Bocheński also participated in the Polish–Bolshevik war, joining the regiment of lancers of the Polish Army and taking part in the pursuit of Budyonny’s Horse Army across the “Sienkiewiczian” Ukrainian
steppes; in 1939, he fought under General Kleeberg in the battle of Kock; finally, in 1944, he participated in the Battle of Monte Cassino.

Below, I reconstruct the notions of “patriotism” analyzed by these three representatives of the Lvov–Warsaw School.

**Preliminary conceptual findings**

Let me introduce an analysis of the notion of patriotism. I will note first that I value analytical work, but I do not overestimate it. Such a standpoint was described aptly and suggestively by Ossowski a century ago (the highlights in the second part of the description are mine):

> It should be remembered that not everything can be known though analysis. In fact, analysis often moves us away from the essence. For instance, can the most perfect and the most exhaustive analysis of Beethoven’s 9th Symphony give us even the faintest idea of this masterpiece? Will it let us learn its essence? Will it let us understand the unmatched beauty of the symphony created by a half-mad artist? In order to understand it, one must hear and feel it. (Ossowski 1970, p. 16)

I did not mean to say by this that […] all rational dissection is useless. On the contrary, I only mean that one should not disregard non-intellectual factors, which are usually described as a “feeling,” and that we cannot reject any objects just because when analyzing them we found certain things at the bottom which cannot be explained by reason. (Ossowski 1970, p. 17)

Taking Ossowski’s observation as a memento, let me begin with some preliminary findings. I assume that patriotism is love for one’s homeland:

\[
\text{\( x \)'s patriotism} = \text{\( x \)'s love for \( x \)'s homeland}. \]

Respectively:

\[
\text{\( \forall x (x \text{ is a patriot} \iff x \text{ loves } x \text{'s homeland}). \)}
\]

If someone uses the word “patriotism” in a different sense, I can’t help it, as other meanings of the word “patriotism” do not interest me here. Someone who uses the word “patriotism” in a different sense may react to what I am going to say in two ways: either ignore it or understand my considerations as simply regarding love for one’s homeland.

**The concept of homeland**

Let us further agree to the following specification of the word “homeland,” the antonym of which is the term “foreign land”:
(3) $x$’s homeland = $x$’s native country and $x$’s nation.

(4) $x$’s native country = the country (specified as the place/territory, landscape, and climate) where $x$ was born and lives.

In turn:

(5) $x$’s nation = a group of people living together in $x$’s native country and sharing $x$’s traditions.

Let us now specify the meaning of the word “tradition”:

(6) The tradition of $x$’s homeland = the history and culture of $x$’s homeland.

Whereas:

(7) The culture of $x$’s homeland = language, science, art (including architecture, literature, and music), ideology (including religion), customs (including rites), morality, laws, and the country specific to $x$’s homeland.

Since homeland includes the country and the nation, when reference is made to the language, etc., of the homeland, it may be a language, etc., specific to a given country or nation.

**The concept of love (for the homeland): passive and active patriotism**

I will now distinguish between two types of patriotism, ergo love for the homeland and nation—depending on the way you understand “love.”

The first is called “passive patriotism”:

(8) $\forall x (x$ loves $x$’s homeland passively $\leftrightarrow x$ is familiar with and values $x$’s homeland traditions and is attached to them$^1$).

Note that the word “love” in context (8)—again also below in context (9)—has a completely different meaning from that in contexts like “John loves Mary.”

In turn, I will describe active patriotism as follows:

(9) $\forall x (x$ loves $x$’s homeland actively $\leftrightarrow x$ enriches $x$’s homeland traditions and defends them from enemies$^2$).

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$^1$ In this formula, I use the pronoun of the natural language, preferring its simplicity over formal elegance.

$^2$ Idem
It is significant that the distinction between these two types of patriotism is found in Bełza’s collection, *The Catechism of a Polish Child*, from 1901. The poem “Ziemia Rodzinna” is devoted to passive patriotism:

With all my heart, an innocent soul,
I love this holy family country,
On which my cradle stood
And whose glory has long sustained me.
I love these colorful flowers in the meadow,
I love these humming fields,
That feed me, that dress me,
And which adorn my homeland.
I love these mountains, forests, and groves,
Mighty rivers, quiet rushes;
Because in these streams, in the water at the spring,
You look at yourself, my homeland,
Enriched by blood, bathed in tears,
So dear to us and so loved!

On the other hand, active patriotism—and in its extreme version (see the note about zealous patriots below)—is described in the title poem of this collection:

Who are you? A little Pole.
What is your sign? A white eagle.
Where do you live? Among my people.
In which country? In the Polish land.
What is this country? My homeland.
How was it obtained? With blood and wounds.
Do you love her? I love her truly.
What do you believe in? I believe in Poland!
What are you for her? A grateful child.
Do you owe her anything? I owe her my life.

The distinction between passive and active patriotism appears clearly in Ossowski, but he characterizes these varieties of patriotism slightly differently:

In the feeling of love towards the homeland, two basic elements can be distinguished: passive – attachment to everything that we connect in the concept of homeland, and active – the desire for the good of the homeland. This factor combines the desire for the happiness or prosperity of the nation as a society and the desire that everything that is native be the best, the strongest, the noblest, the highest (this is a symptom of what we call national pride). (Ossowski 1970, p. 11)

It seems that Bocheński prefers active patriotism over passive patriotism. He writes:
Not he […] who has the hottest patriotic feelings is a good patriot, but he who can best fulfill his patriotic duty. (Bocheński 1989, p. 11)

In any case, it is a fact that there are people who are both passive and active patriots. Does active patriotism entail passive patriotism? According to Bocheński—yes.

To be able to develop your native culture, you first need to know it. Hence the strict obligation to try one’s best to learn about, and to know as well as possible, all the valuable components of the native culture and the homeland as a whole. (Bocheński 1989, p. 18)

In this case, Twardowski limited himself to emphasizing the importance of knowing one’s homeland:

It is hard to love what one does not even know exists. Therefore, people who lack the knowledge of their homeland and their Country’s history, people who are not familiar with contemporary and past Poland, cannot fully be patriots. (Twardowski 2013, p. 443)

Three views of patriotism

We have already referred above to Twardowski, Ossowski and—above all—Bocheński. We will now directly point out what distinguishes their views of the phenomenon of patriotism.

Twardowski

Twardowski seems to attach the greatest importance to the concept of his home country, living there during his childhood—so that his home country transforms into the country of birth and childhood. Here, he consciously follows Mickiewicz, who is therefore quoted with good reason:

Your childhood country… It will always remain Holy and pure, like your first love.

Having narrowed down the scope of the notion of homeland, Twardowski also narrows the scope of the notion of nation, adding to the definiens of “nation” the notion of blood ties. Thus, formulas (4) and (5) take the form of:

(10) \(x’s\) homeland = the country where \(x\) was born and \(x\) lived during \(x’s\) childhood.
(11) \(x’s\) nation = a group of people connected to one another by blood ties and living together in \(x’s\) home country—sharing a common tradition with \(x\).

Ultimately, his definition of “patriotism” is as follows:

Whoever […] heartily embraces all […] countries [of his homeland] and all his countrymen, who feels like a son of these countries and a brother of his
countrymen, and who wants to live not for himself but for others, and when the need arises, is ready to die for it – is called a […] “patriot”; and this love [of] the homeland is called “patriotism.” (Twardowski 2013, p. 443)

Among the components of the culture of the homeland listed in formula (7), Twardowski lists language (“mother tongue”) at the beginning, and also places it first in terms of importance. Twardowski justifies this distinguished position of language as follows:

Only human speech enables a person to really coexist with other people; it is what connects us in a relationship that covers wide circles […]. And with our mother tongue in common, we also acquire a multitude of common views and beliefs; common likes and dislikes are born, common aspirations and desires; we influence one another, we get closer to each other. (Twardowski 2013, p. 440)

Twardowski considered national solidarity (Twardowski 2013, p. 448) and “military service” (Twardowski 2013, p. 454) to be the most important elements in the defense of the homeland (or more narrowly: the nation). National solidarity has two forms: activist and sentimental. He wrote about this as follows:

Where the sense of national solidarity manifests itself only in feeling, and does not lead to action, there is no true patriotism yet – there is only patrioticism [Polish: patriotnictwo]. The patrioticist [Polish: patriotnik] willingly gives vent to his national feelings – he discusses Poland beautifully and solemnly, sings national songs with passion, takes part in national celebrations – but this is where it all ends; what in others is only a contingent expression of a sense of national solidarity, becomes the sole basis of this feeling for him, because he cannot afford anything else but sentiment, sometimes even very tender, but unable to spark action from his inert will. (Twardowski 2013, p. 448)

As we can see, Twardowski very suggestively called patriotism limited in this way to sentimental solidarity: “patrioticism.” Twardowski speaks rather unfavorably about it. My opinion is more favorable to patrioticism—I believe that patrioticism in certain circumstances promotes true patriotism.

Ossowski

Ossowski distinguishes between two meanings of “patriotism”: (a) a feeling called “love [for] the homeland” and (b) “a certain view about the attitude of people towards society” (Ossowski 1970, p. 10). In other words:

The desire to do good for the homeland […] remains […] in the domain of feelings […] [or] is put into action. (Ossowski 1970, p. 14)

Let us call patriotism of type (a) “emotional patriotism,” and that of type (b) “theoretical patriotism.” On the basis of our preliminaries, emotional patriotism partially corresponds to formula (1); it is a partial correspondence because, according to formulas (8) and (9), “love for one’s homeland” is understood not as a feeling, but
as a certain complex attitude toward the homeland. Thetical patriotism, in turn, corresponds to what will be described below as the norm of patriotism: that one should love one’s homeland.

As for the word “homeland,” Ossowski associated it with at least two concepts: one he called “metonymic” and the other “etymological.”3 His vague and—unfortunately—not very ordered pronouncements about these concepts can be interpreted as follows.

“Homeland” in the metonymic (synecdochic) sense concerns the conceptual cluster referred to in our formula (3), linking the native country (i.e., the homeland in a narrower sense) and the nation with its traditions. As Ossowski wrote:

The word “homeland” […] in the broadest sense […] includes not only the land, but also the nation, language, culture and, in general, the entire spiritual and material heritage of past generations, in a word, all that we have inherited from our “forefathers.” (Ossowski 1970, p. 10)

[At the same time] a nation can be defined as all the people who have a common homeland. (Ibidem.)

It is interesting that Ossowski did not notice in this system of definitions a kind of vicious circle: the word “nation” appears in the definiens of “homeland,” and in the definition of “nation,” the word “homeland.” I can overlook the fact that the definition of “homeland” in its definiendum does not take into account the relativity of this concept (the fact that \( y \) is not just a homeland, but always—the homeland of some \( x \)).

In turn, “homeland” in the etymological sense is a synonym for “patrimony.”

[Homeland – in this sense – includes] all inheritance from “forefathers,” and forefathers here can be both past generations of the national or tribal community, as well as private ancestors in the family. (Ossowski 1946, p. 159)

Ossowski also distinguishes between a private homeland (in German *Heimat*) and an ideological homeland (in German *Vaterland*)—and, respectively, private patriotism and ideological patriotism. These patriotisms are characterized by the following pairs of opposites: the homeland which is different for different members of the nation versus the homeland which is the same for all (as assigned to the whole nation); the emotional basis of patriotism, and the habitual bond—the belief-derived basis of patriotism, and the bond resulting from beliefs. After all:

The ideological homeland is determined by […] participation in the national community. (Ossowski 1946, p. 174)

Ossowski suggested that a belief bond may gradually replace an emotional bond:

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3 According to Ossowski, the number of notions of homeland is much greater. As he wrote, “the typology of homelands, depending on the cultural tradition, the attitude of a territorial group to other communities, the role of cultural and on political factors in the image of the homeland, is a topic that a separate study to which a separate study should be devoted” (Ossowski 1946, p. 174).
Establishing personal communication, if not with the whole country, then at least with a whole series of points scattered around its territory, became a postulate of national education, and was manifested in the school activities program, by teachers organizing youth trips under the slogan: “Get to know your country.” (Ossowski 1946, p. 173)

Communing with the country through literature, art, and historical tradition can create a personal relationship that sometimes competes with the relationship created by long-term direct contact. (Ossowski 1946, p. 173)

**Bocheński**

Formula (1) can be treated as a paraphrase of Bocheński’s phrase: “Patriotism [is] love for the homeland and countrymen” (Bocheński 1988, p. 81), assuming—rightly in my opinion—that x’s nation is all of x’s countrymen.

Bocheński sometimes adds puzzling biological conditions (features) to point (5). Perhaps he is referring to racial characteristics.

Bocheński distinguishes between two concepts of the nation: basic and complete.

The basic concept is that the traditions of a given homeland include a common language and common customs (and thus only some elements of the culture of this nation⁴). Hence, we can briefly say that patriotism is love for one’s own country, language, and customs.

In the full concept, the traditions of a given homeland also include its history and culture understood more narrowly (i.e., perhaps, *inter alia*, science and art), as well as ideology (including religious worldviews) and morality Cf. [Bocheński 1999, p. 60]; sometimes Bocheński adds the state to this list.

In considering Bocheński’s concept of patriotism, there is no mention of active patriotism; instead, he gives examples of such patriotism after presenting the results of his analysis of the concept itself.

In general, Bocheński’s conceptual analysis of patriotism—similarly to Ossowski’s analysis—is not precise. He lists different constituents of this concept in various places; the relationship of the mentioned components to each other is not clear; sometimes he adds an enigmatic “etc.” to the end of a list of components (Bocheński 1989, pp. 8–10).

**Substantive comments to the preliminaries**

Before we move on to further stages of our analysis of patriotism, I will provide its preliminaries with certain material reservations.

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⁴ Bocheński considers culture to be the most important element of this conglomerate because, as he writes, man is “above all a spiritual being” (Bocheński 1989, p. 9).
(A) Definitions (3), (6) and (7) have the structure: $A = (B \text{ and } C)$. However, this structure should in no way be understood as meaning that $A$ is a logical product or a logical sum of $B$ and $C$; this would obviously lead to the absurdity that $z$ is $A$, when $z$ is both $B$ and $C$—or when $z$ is $A$ or $B$. The functor “and” in definition (3) has a similar function as in the definition of “hammer,” which we would define as a “combination” of a handle and a head.

Note that in the case of a hammer, both its parts are connected in such a way that the head can be said to be fixed on a handle. The same is true in the case of the homeland, as stated in definitions (4) and (5).

(B) The definiendum of the definition of “nation” (5) includes the expression “group of people,” the meaning of which is imprecise, as it is not known how large a group is meant here. Twardowski says in general terms that it is “some great whole,” but also decides that it is not only about people living now, but also in the past and in the future (Twardowski 2013: 442), following the words of Mickiewicz:

I love the whole nation! I embrace
All its past and future generations…

Bocheński draws attention to this imprecision of the concept of the nation; he does so by mentioning nationalism, but we can—I think—apply his words also to our context. In connection with nationalism, Bocheński writes:

*nationalism* is idolatry and, as such, superstition […]. Apart from the idolatrous side of nationalism, its superstitious nature results from the fact that the nation is only one of the numerous groups [communities] to which a person belongs. (Bocheński 1988, pp. 72–73)

Bocheński lists here, for example, family, region, professional group, class, cultural and religious communities. Which of these groups should the patriot choose as the object of love? According to Bocheński—when making this choice, one must take into account the voice of conscience, guided by the “cultural meaning” of a given group:

The entity exceeding any other in its cultural significance […] is Poland as a whole. (Bocheński 1989, p. 14)

This is why, according to their conscience, for example, patriotic Poles chooses Poland as the object of love:

Europe is a larger community than Poland, and yet our conscience never demands that we forget about Polish interests for the sake of Europe. (Bocheński 1989, p. 13)

Let us be blunt: invoking conscience is not the operational criterion we are concerned with. If I were to set a boundary here on my own, I would do it using the term “largest group of people.” Formula (5) would then take the form:
(12) $x$’s nation = the largest group of people co-inhabiting $x$’s native country, sharing common traditions with $x$.

Unfortunately, this does not remove a similar difficulty with the notion of native country.

(C) As Bocheński aptly points out, language itself cannot be a determinant of the homeland, and in particular of the nation, because there are nations using several different languages (e.g., the Swiss) and there are languages spoken by different nations (e.g., English).

There is one more difficulty with language. Suppose a country is inhabited by two very different populations who speak one language. Belonging to a specific linguistic community does not, therefore, determine belonging to a particular nation. Ossowski proposed taking this fact into account by modifying the definiens of “nation” by adding a volitional component to the definition, i.e., national consciousness:

(13) $x$’s nation = a group of people co-inhabiting $x$’s native country, sharing common traditions with $x$, such that $x$ wants to belong to this group.

Quoting Ossowski:

I belong to the nation not only because my ancestors belonged to it, because I was born on a certain territory, acquired a certain culture and customs, but above all because I want to belong. (Ossowski 1970, p. 18)

Patriotism is a strong and constant will to belong to one’s nation, i.e., the will to abide by the national spiritual individuality, with which the individuality of the individual is linked [...], and the desire for the highest prosperity of this society and the highest development of this spiritual individuality. [...] Patriotism is related to the love of everything [which is included in the name of “homeland”]: I love my native land because the national spirit was formed within it, I love the language and culture of my homeland, because it is a reflection of this spirit, I love my countrymen, because they are relatives in spirit, and at the same time they are a society to which I owe everything; finally, the history of my nation is dear to me, because it is the history of this national spirit and of this society. (Ossowski 1970, p. 19)

(D) Someone might object to considering the cohabitation of $x$’s home country as a feature connoted by the phrase “$x$’s nation.” After all, someone may belong to a certain nation, e.g., the nation of $x$, and be outside the home country of $x$ (as, e.g., an emigrant).

Note that this is an extension of the concept of nation; even the natural language registers it, distinguishing, for example, the Polish nation from the Polish diaspora.
“Ideology” can be interpreted in a broader or narrower sense. Understood in a broader sense, it encompasses all ideals adopted by a group. Ossowski had in mind, among other things, common desires and shared emotional attitudes among group members. According to Bocheński, in turn, ideology would be “a set of views and ideas defining the role of a given group of people in the history of mankind” (Bocheński 1999, p. 60).

The knowledge and appreciation of the traditions of a certain country or nation, attachment to them, and even enrichment of those traditions as well as defending them against enemies do not mean that we are dealing with patriotism. In any case, someone who is not a patriot for the sake of that nation can know and even value the traditions of a nation. Similarly, someone may de facto enrich this tradition, e.g., by creating great works of art, but not create them with such enrichment in mind.

Ossowski drew attention to one more important moment: love for one’s homeland—if it is to be an indicator of patriotism—is a selfless love. Formula (2) and each of its derivatives should, therefore, preferably take on the form:

\[(14) \land x (x \text{ is a patriot} \iff x \text{ loves } x’s \text{ homeland unconditionally}).\]

Ossowski justified the necessity of this moment as follows:

The history of so many peoples, and above all the history of our nation, prove that the essence of patriotism is not to strive for one’s own well-being, as the consequence of this would be to move from one nation to another, according to circumstances. (Ossowski 1970, p. 15)

Breaking this attachment takes the form of denationalization or betrayal.

A person who passes from a nation of the oppressed to a nation of victors and enemies of his homeland is met with contempt not only by his abandoned compatriots, but even by nobler individuals among his new fellow citizens. (Ossowski 1970, p. 15)

Defense against the enemy can apply to an internal or external enemy.
Facts concerning patriotism

In the Lvov–Warsaw School, the attitude toward patriotism was shared in common: by both the founder of the School—Twardowski—and his students. Here is an example of Łukasiewicz’s declaration of this attitude, contained in his inaugural lecture at the University of Warsaw:

At this moment when the Polish language resounds within the University of Warsaw, the grateful thought of some turns to the bright moments of the Polish past of this university, the fearful thoughts of others look to a future hidden from us. Thought about the present is more important than those thoughts about the past and the future. We are experiencing moments that are truly great. We must focus all our spiritual energy on today, which is ours. Let everyone, without looking too much to the past or the future, use all his strength to work for the good of the nation. (Łukasiewicz 1998, pp. 33–34)

Łukasiewicz and before him Twardowski, followed by Leśniewski, Kotarbiński, Tatarkiewicz, Ajdukiewicz, Dąmbska, Bocheński, all joined the army when their homeland was in need, not only when such was the order of their sovereign, but also by their own choice.

Are there patriots who are both passive and active, as described in formulas (8) and (9)?

Bocheński so believed. He considered Żółkiewski to be such a patriot:

Hetman Żółkiewski […] is […] one of the most beautiful models of patriotism that we know in history. (Bocheński 1989, p. 31)

Usually, however, we deal with lukewarm patriots, so to speak, i.e., those characterized by only some of the defining features of patriotism, and in the case of those features that are gradual, not to the highest degree, e.g., they only partially know the traditions of their homeland, they value them, and are attached to them only to a certain extent—and likewise enrich them somewhat, and if possible defend them.

However, there are—though probably not so many—zealous patriots (let’s call them that). As Ossowski wrote:

The desire to do good for the homeland […] is sometimes linked to the highest self-sacrifice. (Ossowski 1970, p. 12)
In order to grasp all this wealth, the definition of “patriotism” should be given in the form of, so to speak, a fluidal definition, i.e., such that a concept constructed by means of such a definition can easily—like a fluid in a vessel in which it is placed—adjust the content to a specific exemplification of patriotism. All the above-mentioned cases would be taken into account by the fluidal definition below, interpreted alternatively or conjunctively (see Fig. 1):

\[ \forall x \forall s \ (x \text{ is a patriot } \leftrightarrow \]

\[ x \text{ LOVES unconditionally to the degree } s \]

knows \ values \ is-attached-to \ enriches \ defends-from-enemies

\text{HOMELAND}

\begin{align*}
\text{x’s home country} \\
\text{x’s place of birth} & \quad \text{x’s place of residence} \\
\text{in a certain period of x’s life, e.g.:} & \\
\text{in x’s childhood} & \quad \text{in x’s adulthood} \\
\text{x’s nation} & \quad \text{i.e., a group of people} \\
\text{connected to x with blood ties} & \quad \text{co-inhabiting x’s native land} & \quad \text{with common with x:} \\
\text{history} & \quad \text{language} & \quad \text{science} & \quad \text{art} & \quad \text{ideology} & \quad \text{customs} & \quad \text{morality} & \quad \text{law} & \quad \text{country} \\
\text{tradition} & \end{align*}

\text{Fig. 1 The ‘fluidal’ definition of PATRIOTISM}
Patriotism as a value

Usually, and certainly in the Lvov–Warsaw School, from Twardowski to Bocheński, patriotism was given a positive value. It is therefore considered that:

(15) Patriotism—love for one’s homeland—is a positive value (strictly speaking, a virtue).

On the other hand, lack of patriotism is generally regarded as evil, i.e., in particular, harm caused to other members of one’s nation.

Norms concerning patriotism

Let us consider two main norms of patriotism: one is for duty, the other is for permission:

(16) $\forall x (x \text{ should love } x\text{’s homeland}).$
(17) $\forall x (x \text{ is allowed to love } x\text{’s homeland}).$

Let us then juxtapose formulas (16) and (17) with their sui generis opposites:

(18) $\forall x (x \text{ should hate } x\text{’s homeland}).$
(19) $\forall x (x \text{ is allowed to hate } x\text{’s homeland}).$

Formulas (18) and (19) are detailed versions of more general schemes in the form of:

(20) $\forall x \forall y \neq x (x \text{ should hate } y\text{’s homeland}).$
(21) $\forall x \forall y \neq x (x \text{ is allowed to hate } y\text{’s homeland}).$

We will return to formulas (18)–(21) below, in the context of remarks on the relationship between patriotism and chauvinism.

As you know, the semantic intuitions about duty and permission vary from person to person. Hence, different researchers assume the existence of different relationships between the two concepts. The matter is further complicated by the following fact.

Let us use the symbol “$M$” to denote both norm-creating modal words: “$x$ should” and “$x$ is allowed to.” Now consider the general scheme of formulas (16) and (17):

(22) $\forall x (x M \text{ love } x\text{’s homeland}).$

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5 What the formula of type (16) states is called duty or obligation. It is significant that there is no neat definition for what is stated by the formula of type (17). Of the two terms that may be used with reservations in the latter case—the term “admissibility” and the term “permission”—I choose the latter.
In formula (22) it is possible to negate its four different terms, which will result in four different formulas (not counting cases with “no” in different parts at the same time):

(23) not-\(\forall x (x M \text{ love } x’s \text{ homeland})\).
(24) \(\forall x \text{ not-(} x M \text{ love } x’s \text{ homeland})\).
(25) \(\forall x (x \text{ not-} M \text{ love } x’s \text{ homeland})\).
(26) \(\forall x (x M \text{ not-love } x’s \text{ homeland})\).

In this way, you can see at once how many combinations would have to be considered if we wanted to list the relevant semantic relationships between “should” and “is allowed to.” The same must be repeated about formulas (18)–(21). Most of these combinatorially allowed dependencies are questionable—with the possible exception of dependencies of the type:

(27) \(\forall x \forall \alpha (x \text{ should do } \alpha \rightarrow x \text{ is allowed to do } \alpha)\).
(28) \(\forall x \forall \alpha (x \text{ should not do } \alpha \rightarrow x \text{ is not allowed to do } \alpha)\).
(29) \(\forall x \forall \alpha (x \text{ hates } \beta \rightarrow x \text{ does not love } \beta)\).

Among the above-mentioned types of norms, I will only comment on norms (18)–(21) below when I comment on the relationship between patriotism and chauvinism. As for the relationship between duty and permission, their exhaustive presentation would require a separate study, for which there is no room here.

**Justification of norms concerning patriotism**

Why are there people—and there are many—who follow standards of type (16) in their behavior? Why do they think that—to put it simply, but bearing in mind the developments necessary here—one should love one’s homeland?

It is obvious that there are people who follow standards like (16)—as well as any other standard—because they have been forced to do so by someone. Let us say, therefore, emphatically that such forced love for the homeland is not patriotism—and here I am not interested in it. I am interested in a situation in which the norm of love for the homeland is not imposed by force, but adopted because of its conscious legitimacy.6 How can a standard of the type (16) be justified then?

Ossowski wrote:

At every step we encounter issues of great importance which cannot be resolved by reason. Even the most general ethical principles cannot be suffi-

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6 A sophist would say that also undertaking a specific deed by \(x\) because some \(y\) forced \(x\) to do so may be considered justified, and more broadly: rational—if, for example, the calculation of goods leads to the conclusion that the forced deed entails more evil than resisting coercion. In order to avoid this sophisticated twist, I will limit myself to saying that I am simply not interested in a situation where the justification for someone else’s deed is external coercion.
x has a feeling, \( NP \).

\( NP \) is an analytical sentence.

\( NP \) entails non-analytically from \( p \).

\( NP \) is accepted by an authority.

Loving one’s homeland is good.

\( x \) owes something to one’s homeland.

\((NP)\) \( x \) should love one’s homeland.

Fig. 2  Four ways to justify norms concerning PATRIOTISM

![Diagram of four ways to justify norms concerning PATRIOTISM]

Ossowski, who distinguishes, as we remember, emotional patriotism from thetic patriotism, aptly noticed that “you cannot prove the rightness of your feelings, and yet patriotism is very often proven” (Ossowski 1970, p. 10).

The members of the Lvov–Warsaw School were looking for such a justification for thetic patriotism, and therefore for a certain norm rather than feelings. This is exactly what Bocheński had in mind when he wrote:

Patriotism is a reasonable attitude (Bocheński 1988, p. 73)

**Justifications of duty**

There are four ways to justify theorems: intuitive, analytical, deductive, and by *ad auctoritatem*. Let us at them one by one (Fig. 2).

**Intuitive justifications**

We justify intuitively when we have the right to state:

\[(30) A \text{ feels that (16).}\]

In this case, we speak of a direct justification.\(^7\) The phrase “\( x \) feels that \( p \)” is taken here in the sense that \( x \) has some external or internal experience that (16). Sometimes this experience consists in the fact that \( x \) simply—willingly—wants to obey

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\(^7\) Cf. Ossowski’s opinion: “Each belief is ultimately based on some completely non-intellectual feeling, even the belief that our reason is working properly” (Ossowski 1970, p. 16). Ossowski wrote about such a feeling in the case of the duty of patriotism: “From the standpoint of ethics, the relationship of the individual with the nation has another basis: an individual owes a large part of his values to his society. By renouncing it, he commits an act of utmost ingratitude and acts like a merchant who, having contracted numerous debts, runs away with gold in his pocket […]. Therefore, it is difficult to find a man who would not have a deep, though sometimes unconscious sense of duty towards the homeland” (Ossowski 1970, p. 19).
the norm (16). If someone considers calling such a justification “intuitive” in this way unacceptable, the latter could be called a volitional justification.

**Analytical justifications**

We justify analytically when we have the right to state:

(31) Sentence (16) is a definition or a consequence of a definition.

It is possible that this method of justification is used by those who believe that the duty of love for the homeland results from the fact that it is our homeland:

(32) $\forall x \forall y (y \text{ is } x \text{'s homeland} \rightarrow x \text{ should love } y)$.

Perhaps this is how the following sentence could be generalized in Bocheński: The mere fact that someone is, for example, a Pole, justifies the moral requirement that he develops Polishness. (Bocheński 1942, 18)

**Deductive justification**

We justify deductively when we have the right to state:

(33) Sentence (16) follows (logically) from certain sentences (excluding analytical sentences).

The question arises, from what non-analytical sentences which we consider to be true does sentence (16) follow, i.e., which sentences may be the reasons for sentence (16)? (For the sake of simplicity, let us assume—although this is a far-reaching idealization—that we are using the universally approved rules of logical consequence).

The first case, the simplest, is that the reason for sentence (16) is given in the following scheme:

(34) $\forall \alpha (\text{one should do } \alpha)$.

The symbol “$\alpha$” is here a variable whose range of variability covers the class of activities whose element is loving-one’s-homeland. It is therefore a case of justifying from generalization.

This kind of justifying sentence could take the form of, for example:

(35) $\forall \alpha [\alpha \text{ is a value (and in particular a virtue)} \rightarrow \forall x (x \text{ should implement } \alpha)]$.

Bocheński formulated this relationship as follows:

If any character trait is ethical perfection, each person has a strict duty to develop it in himself – according to the gospel commandment “Be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect.” (Bocheński 1989, p. 17)
Naturally, it is then assumed that love for one’s homeland is a virtue, so thesis (15) is assumed.

There is also the justification which assumes that the duty of love for the homeland results from the duty of love for God, whose “reflection” is native culture (Bocheński 1989, pp. 10–11). The “duty to love God” is understood here as the duty to spread His glory:

According to the commandment to love God, we must love Him in all that is beautiful and good, wherever we find it – and patriotism combined with hatred of a foreign culture is obviously nonsense from the Catholic point of view, because it contradicts the principle on which it is based. (Bocheński 1942, p. 13)

The second case is that the reason for sentence (16) is a sentence with the scheme:

(36) If $p$, then (16).

The scope of the variable “$p$” does not include the generalizations of the sentence (16). Formula (36) is therefore a scheme of a law (not a law of logic). And so, for example, according to Bocheński, the duty of love for the homeland results from the debt of gratitude towards it. He believes that this falls under the (normative?) regularity he calls the “principle of fairness” or more broadly the “principle of justice.” We have, namely:

(37) $\forall x\forall y (x$ owes something to $y \rightarrow x$ should love $y)$.

Even more so, we have:

(38) $\forall x\forall y (x$ owes everything to $y \rightarrow x$ should love $y)$.

According to Bocheński, this is the case in the situation where $y$ is the homeland of $x$:

Our duty [of love] to the homeland to which we owe, directly or indirectly, almost everything we are: the ideals we believe in, the virtues we have, our aesthetic culture, our specific customs, upbringing, down to biological features. (Bocheński 1989, p. 10)

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8 *The catechism of the Polish child* “commands the Polish child to love the native country,” because “in these streams and water in the spring is reflected the ideological homeland (Ossowski 1946, p. 170). Examples from Ossowski: (i) “The emotional attitude towards […] a private homeland is supported by a moral imperative; it is not only a matter of my personal attachments, but also my duty; I should love the areas which are my personal homeland, because they represent my homeland in the ideological sense of which they are part; the holy word “homeland” refers to them” (Ossowski 1946, p. 169). (ii) “The individual is […] inseparable from society. He owes a large part of his wealth to this society and he feels indebted in numerous obligations towards it” (Ossowski 1970, p. 9).
Patriotism: from Twardowski to Bocheński

[This should be the] attitude of every honest man to his homeland. (Bocheński 1988, p. 81)

Justifications ad auctoritatem

We justify *ad auctoritatem*, when we have the right to state:

(39) Sentence (16) is accepted by an authority.

Let us connect sentence (39) with the formula:

(40) If sentence “*p*” is accepted by an authority, then sentence “*p*” should be accepted.

The conjunction of sentences (39) and (40) entails that sentence (16) should be accepted, and therefore, it justifies the fact that one should love one’s homeland.

Justifications for allowing

In the last few decades, we have observed an increasing activity of social groups, which prompts us to consider a much weaker version of the formula (16), stating, let us recall, that one should love the homeland, namely, the formula:

(17) $\forall x (x \text{ is allowed to love } x\text{'s homeland}).$

I believe that for this formula, justifications analogous to the justifications for formula (14) can be considered, namely, giving as a reason a sentence with one of the following schemes:

(41) $A$ feels that (19).
(42) Sentence (17) is a definition or a consequence of a definition.
(43) $\forall \alpha [\alpha \text{ is a value (specifically, a virtue)} \rightarrow \forall x (x \text{ is allowed to realize } \alpha)].$
(44) If $p$, then (17).
(45) Sentence (17) is accepted by an authority.

Assessment of the reasons for patriotism

Let us now look at the ultimate reasons for formula (18). (Similar arguments—with appropriate modifications—apply to formula (17).)

In the case of intuitive justification, such a reason is a sentence of the type (30). I doubt whether someone has a feeling (experience), mentioned in (30), for (16); I certainly do not.
In the case of analytical justification, such a reason is a sentence of the type (31), which—let us recall, states that sentence (16) is a definition or a consequence of a definition. I think neither the former nor the latter occurs.

In the case of deductive justification, sentences like (35) or (37) constitute such a reason. Note that reasons (35) and (37) themselves require justification, and that justification must assume one of the four forms considered here—and yes, perhaps ad infinitum.

In the case of justification *ad auctoritatem*, a sentence of type (38) is such a reason. This reason has justifying power as long as we recognize the authority referred to in it.

To sum up: a reason of type (30) refers to a questionable feeling; a reason of type (31) does not hold by itself; reasons of type (35) and (37) may cause ad infinitum regression; a reason of type (36) requires a justification that someone/something is really an authority.

The situation is therefore hopeless for someone who questions the existence of an appropriate feeling, denies the analytical character of the sentences under consideration, denies the value of reasoning exposed to ad infinitum regression, and either rejects the authority given for the reasoned opinion, or rejects all authority. There are people who, in such a situation, are ready to refer to the “intuition of obviousness” which they experience when dealing with sentences of the type in question. Unfortunately, when dealing with any sentence, I do not experience this kind of intuition.

In such a hopeless situation, our adoption of a sentence like (16)—and (17)—is irrational, and the only way to make others recognize these sentences (or more precisely, norms) is to force them to do so: not excluding one force or another.

This conclusion is undoubtedly pessimistic, although it is realistic pessimism: the situation of using force to—in fact—impose certain views on people, including standards, is by no means unique.

**Patriotism in axiological conflict situations**

As we know, the duty of patriotism may in certain situations raise serious practical dilemmas. Suppose that the fulfillment of a patriotic duty involves doing evil to individuals or groups of people outside of our own nation. Then, as Maria Ossowska put it:

Patriotism at some point may cease to be a virtue. (Ossowska 1970, p. 24)

Let us agree with Bocheński’s view that:

Justice requires *more* of us towards our homeland than towards others, although it does not nullify obligations towards others. (Bocheński 1989, pp. 12–13)

Therefore, in a conflict situation, is it axiological to compromise the norm of love for one’s nation, or to violate the more general norm of not doing evil to anyone—regardless of that person’s relationship to our nation? There is no general prescription here how to resolve this dilemma—apart from the general postulate of weighing the moral value of the conflicting actions, which is extremely difficult to carry out.
Nationalism

Let us denote the expression “x’s homeland” with the symbol “O.” Then I would define “nationalism”—following Bocheński—like this:

$$(46) \forall x \ [x \text{ is a nationalist } \iff \forall Q \neq O \ (x \text{ loves } O \text{ more than } Q)].$$ 

If we limit “Q” to the class of homelands of any y other than x, then a nationalist would be one who loves his own homeland more than other people’s homelands.

There is some hesitation in Bocheński’s understanding of “nationalism.” Sometimes he perceives the claim that “the good of the nation is the highest good” (Bocheński 1999, p. 76) or that “the nation is the highest good” (Bocheński 1987, p. 72) as a slogan of nationalism. At other times, he demonstrates the view that the good of one’s own homeland is higher than the good of other homelands and, for example, the good of Europe or some supranational communities is nationalism:

Every nationalism contains two statements: first, that a given nation is a kind of absolute entity, a deity standing above everything, and therefore also above the individual who should sacrifice everything for it; second, that a given nation is something better, more worthy, more valuable than other nations.

(Bocheński 1988, p. 72)

Let us call nationalism of the former kind “absolute nationalism” for our purposes, and nationalism of the latter kind “relative nationalism.” I have the impression that while Bocheński considers absolute nationalism as unreasonable (as a “superstition”), he considers the second kind of nationalism to be a reasonable and permissible. This is due to the fact that our countrymen are people close to us, and it adheres to the principle that:

Every person has a sacred right to care first of all for their relatives. (Bocheński 1988, p. 81)

It is worth emphasizing that nationalism does not create difficulties in a situation of a conflict of the good of one’s own nation with the good of other nations or of individuals belonging to them; in such situations, nationalism always chooses the good of its own nation.

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9 Similar fluctuations occur early in Twardowski, but within the concept of patriotism. He states: “A patriot puts the good of his homeland above all earthly goals […] according to an ancient Roman principle: *Salus rei publicae suprema lex esto*” (Twardowski 2013, p. 448). Another time he writes: “Every Pole was and will be closer to our [viz., a Pole’s] heart than a person of a different nationality” (Twardowski 2013, p. 442).
Chauvinism

Patriotism must be distinguished not only from nationalism but also—and even more so—from chauvinism. Let us assume that \( x \) and \( y \) have different homelands. With this assumption, I would define “chauvinism” as follows:

\[
(47) \land x [x \text{ is a chauvinist} \leftrightarrow \land y (x \text{ hates } y\text{’s homeland})].
\]

For now, let’s just say that the attitude of patriotism does not exclude, by definition, the attitude of chauvinism.

Patriotism versus nationalism and chauvinism

Many misunderstandings in discussions about patriotism stem from the fact that either patriotism is identified with nationalism or even chauvinism, or nationalism or chauvinism are believed to result from patriotism.

The above reconstructions of the concepts of patriotism, nationalism, and chauvinism show—clearly, I hope—that there is no analytical implication (ergo synonymity) between them. As Bocheński writes:

Whoever loves his own country does not necessarily adore it or disregard other countries, much less hate them (Bocheński 1988, p. 81)

On the other hand, numerous facts prove that there are no non-analytical (e.g., psychological) regularities which, if \( x \text{’s homeland was marked with “} O\text{”} \) would have the following form:

\[
(48) \land x [x \text{ loves } O \rightarrow \land Q \neq O (x \text{ loves } O \text{ more than } Q)].
\]

\[
(49) \land x [x \text{ loves } O \rightarrow \land Q \neq O (x \text{ hates } Q)].
\]

Moreover, chauvinism can be condemned in the name of more general moral standards, with a general form:

\[
(50) \land x \land y (x \text{ should not hate } y).
\]

Patriotism and internationalism versus cosmopolitanism and particularism

Internationalists and cosmopolitans juxtapose the country of patriots with greater territories, as internationalists do, or maximum territory, that is, the whole human world, as cosmopolitans do. Bocheński and Ossowski wrote:

[In turn, according to cosmopolitanism] the earth should be homeland for all; the whole humanity, the broadest society should be the nation; only its prosperity can ensure the prosperity of individuals. (Ossowski 1970, p. 13)
Ossowski also stressed that:

Patriotism by no means repels all-human ideals, but cosmopolitanism does not allow patriotism, wishing to reign supremely. (Ossowski 1970, pp. 9–10)

On the opposite side of internationalism/cosmopolitanism is the attitude that Twardowski called “particularism.” He wrote about particularists:

They are regional patriots. […] Such regional patriots feel only the plight of their district; they are indifferent to the fate of the rest of their homeland. (Twardowski 2013, pp. 444–445)

The area of cosmopolitanism is well defined: it is “all earth” and “all humanity”; on the other hand, the juxtaposition of particularism-patriotism-internationalism, due to the vagueness of the word “homeland” mentioned above, is relative and vague. Another thing is that in the case of internationalism and cosmopolitanism as well, axiological conflict situations, as mentioned in connection with patriotism, do not disappear, but they transform into “internal” conflicts related to, for example, class and party status (Twardowski 2013, p. 446).

Final remark

In the contemporary axiological chaos, amplified more or less consciously by increasingly influential publishers without any moral restraints, opinions are expressed on patriotism, nationalism, and chauvinism which are as extreme and fanatical as they are irrational, and therefore, as Bocheński would say, superstitious.

One of the practical intentions of the above remarks is to make all those who have common sense aware that it does not make sense to discuss these topics until they have agreed in detail with possible adversaries what they really are talking about. And to all those who do everything to make people feel that they must not be patriots, my text aims at making you aware that such anti-patriotism can only be justified when it adopts the norm: you must not do good.

It is impossible to make someone change their mind about such a norm, if someone professes it, with the help of rational argumentation.

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