OPINION

Modeling myths: On DICE and dynamic realism in integrated assessment models of climate change mitigation

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Abstract

We analyze how stylized Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), and specifically the widely-used Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy model (DICE), represent the cost of emissions abatement. Many assume temporal independence—that abatement costs in one period are not affected by prior abatement. We contrast this with three dimensions of dynamic realism in emitting systems: (i) inertia, (ii) induced innovation, and (iii) path dependence. We review key evidence from the last quarter century on each of these three components. Studies of stock lifetime, dynamics of diffusion and past transitions suggest typical transition timescales of at least 20–40 years for the bulk emitting systems. The evidence that substantial innovation is induced by both prices and market deployment is unambiguous. Finally, both data and a rapidly growing literature demonstrate substantial path dependence in general, and specifically “carbon lock-in and lock-out.”

Some stylized models in the past decade have incorporated technology learning, and others have considered inertia, but the combination of these factors is important and not yet evident. More complex hybrid IAMs with technology-rich energy-system models incorporate these factors, but their complexity has limited the wider understanding and influence of their underlying insights. Few if any global models fully represent path dependence. We conclude with likely implications drawing upon the empirical and modeling evidence accumulated, including results from extending DICE with a highly stylized representation of such dynamic factors. This suggests that dynamic interdependencies could multiply several-fold the optimal level of initial abatement expenditure. This is because early abatement then also directly facilitates subsequent emission savings. The diversity of dynamic linkages across sectors and technologies also implies more nuanced policy than a single global carbon price. Thus, the issues explored in this review can radically change the general policy conclusions drawn from models, which, like DICE, neglect dynamic realism.

This article is categorized under:

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1 INTRODUCTION

Ever since William Nordhaus (1992) published the first attempt at integrated global cost-benefit assessment of climate change with his DICE model, much economic debate has centered on how to represent the damages and the corresponding “social cost of carbon,” and find the “least-cost” emissions pathway.

Twenty-five years ago, Grubb et al. (1995) argued that an important issue for such assessment could be the dynamic characteristics of energy systems. They suggested that energy systems had potential to adapt to emission constraints, but in ways constrained by their very long-lived and path-dependent nature. A quarter of a century on, we review the accumulated evidence and modeling developments concerning these issues and their implications for assessing the global costs, benefits, and optimal trajectories of climate change mitigation—the main objective of DICE and other “aggregate cost-benefit analysis” (Weyant, 2017) models (hereafter, termed “DICE and related stylized models”).

Our point is simple. Across the now huge and diverse literature on DICE and related stylized models, the vast majority share one common structural assumption: that the cost of cutting emissions in a given period is unrelated to the previous pathway, and does not affect the subsequent prospects. This we term an assumption of temporal independence. Our review explores three main characteristics of “dynamic realism” (inertia, induced innovation, and path dependence) which demonstrate this to be a “myth”—a common and convenient assumption which is contradicted by the evidence.

1.1 The significance of DICE

Global cost-benefit assessment of climate change policy has been a natural focus for climate economists. Nordhaus’ DICE model was the first to do this, adding modules on climate science and damages to the standard (Ramsey) model of economic growth—work expanding over the years and culminating in his award of the Nobel Prize. DICE has become the iconic stylized model and typical reference point for such analyses—including those from many of its vocal critics. One economics colleague (pers. comm) remarked that “everything in economics in regard to climate change is based on DICE”—because economics is about balancing costs and benefits, and DICE provides a standard framework for doing that.

In IPCC mitigation assessments and associated socio-economic scenarios (e.g., IPCC, 2014 Ch. 6) DICE has been largely superseded by far more sophisticated models (see Section 7), due to its lack of technology and sector detail. In principle also, the world has accepted the case for a risk management approach based on the UNFCCC commitment to “avoid dangerous interference” in the world’s climate system, interpreted in the Paris Agreement’s goal to keep global temperature change to “well below 2°C above preindustrial levels and pursue efforts... to 1.5°C”.

As indicated below, this contrasts with the sanguine conclusions when DICE is run with Nordhaus’ default assumptions—which generate moderate initial action leading to 3–4°C global warming. The modest damage assumptions in DICE and similar models have been widely criticized (e.g., Moore and Diaz (2015), Glanemann et al. (2020), and Botzen and van den Bergh (2012)). Made widely and freely available (Nordhaus & Sztorc, 2013), DICE remains a common tool for exploration, with 380 citations of the newest version (Nordhaus, 2017) since January 2017. Some show that DICE can generate “optimal” trajectories compatible with the Paris Agreement when including strongly nonlinear climate damages, climate risks, and endogenous drivers of economic growth (Dietz & Stern, 2015; Hänsel et al., 2020); other updates on the climate module, damage function, and discounting include Faulwasser et al. (2018) and Hafeez et al. (2017). Other developments include studies of regions, inequalities and more, using regionalized versions.

Beyond academia, DICE was the main US-based model used by the US government (Inter-Agency Working Group, 2016) to estimate the “social cost of carbon” (SCC)—the value of avoiding 1 tonne of CO2 emissions. Its simplicity also makes DICE (or variants thereof [Tsigeris & Wood, 2016]) appealing for teaching, widely used for introducing climate change to economics courses and beyond. DICE also served as inspiration for new simple IAMs (Pottier et al., 2015; van der Ploeg & Rezai, 2019).

Such stylized models reflect and reinforce a common conclusion in global climate change economics that the best response is a global, uniform, gradually rising carbon price reflecting the magnitude of climate damages (or the shadow
cost of an agreed goal). Probing that conclusion requires attention to the assumed dynamics not just of impacts, but of emissions abatement cost.

### 1.2 Structure of the article

In Section 2, we first clarify the underlying temporal structure of DICE (and related stylized IAMs), and its resulting time profile of “optimal” policy. In Sections 3–5, respectively we outline accumulated evidence on each of technical inertia, induced innovation, and path dependence, concluding that the past 25 years have added a huge weight of empirical data to the contention that these are all important factors. Drawing upon the distinction in Weyant (2017), we then review dynamic characteristics in DICE and other stylized aggregate benefit–cost models (Section 6), and briefly consider more complex, “detailed process” IAMs developed over the past 25 years (Section 7). In Section 8, we illustrate the importance of dynamic realism using a simple extension to DICE. From this exploration of evidence and modeling developments, we conclude that—compared to the imponderable debates about monetizing climate damages and the “social cost of carbon”—representing dynamic realism in stylized IAMs is just as important, is more empirically tractable, and deserves far more attention.

### 2 ON DYNAMIC REALISM AND TEMPORAL INDEPENDENCE IN DICE AND RELATED MODELS

DICE and other stylized models aim to calculate an optimal long-term balance of costs and benefits in climate policy. This involves projecting emissions in the absence of policy and the cost of reducing emissions, so as to balance against the estimated damages from climate change.

Figure 1 shows results from the most recent version of DICE (Nordhaus, 2017). Nordhaus’ standard assumptions produce an optimal emissions path, which (after an initial drop) rises till 2050; emissions then decrease, at accelerating pace, to zero in 2130. Abatement expenditure rises gradually until that point, to a peak of 0.8% of GDP. Global warming reaches 3°C in 2100, but climate damages are then just 2% of GDP (or 3% without any emissions abatement)—trivial compared to assumed seven-fold GDP growth 2015–2100 (Panels c,d).

As noted, the main criticisms of DICE have focused on the assumed structure and valuation of climate damages. A recent WIREs review (Pezzey, 2019), echoing Weitzman’s “dismal theorem” (Weitzman, 2009), suggests that the attempt to reach a globally objective single monetized estimate of the overall damages may be futile, given the challenges in estimating, monetizing and aggregating the wide range of expected impacts, and including uncertainty and risk. Figure 1 also shows that assuming larger damages (as argued in most of the literature noted), for example, 5x DICE’s default damage function or the Weitzman (2012) representation (which resembles DICE for warming below 2.5°C but increases more sharply thereafter), leads to higher abatement.

However, these do not change the overall pattern, of abatement and expenditure increasing steadily, until zero emissions are reached.

This overall pattern is largely determined by the assumed structure of abatement costs. DICE and most related stylized models represent abatement as incurring a cost defined by the degree of emission reduction relative to a “no policy” baseline (reference trajectory). In its most general form:

\[
\text{Cost at time } t \text{ of reducing emissions at } t \text{ by } \mu, C(t) = \mu(t) \cdot f(\mu(t))
\]

where \( \mu(t) \) is the fraction of CO\(_2\) emissions (of a no-policy baseline) prevented by policy, and abatement cost depends purely on the abatement fraction \( \mu \), scaled by \( c_A(t) \). All such models assume \( f(\mu(t)) \) to be a monotonously rising cost function (the bigger the cutback at time \( t \), the higher the cost); DICE uses a power law, \( f(\mu(t)) = \mu(t)^\theta \), with the scaling factor declining exogenously over time.\(^2\)

The fact that unit abatement costs decline autonomously over time makes it economically preferable to defer abatement to take advantage of falling costs, which along with rising impacts explains the pattern observed in Figure 1.

This general approach—a predefined “abatement cost curve” \( \mu(t) \) which gets cheaper over time —seems almost taken for granted in many stylized IAMs. However, strikingly, this assumes that the cost of cutting emissions at any time is independent of previous emission levels. Abatement costs at time \( t \) reflect neither history, or inertia. Equation 1

\[
\text{Cost at time } t \text{ of reducing emissions at } t \text{ by } \mu, C(t) = \mu(t) \cdot f(\mu(t))
\]
supposes that radical cutbacks could occur in any period regardless of earlier (in)action. The abatement cost curves in each period are both temporally independent, and rigid: they cannot be influenced by the previous abatement path.

As we show in this review, this is unrealistic. It takes time, effort, and cost to change complex systems and to write-off, retrofit or replace existing capital stock. The cost of cutbacks depends on the inherited infrastructure, technologies and industries that have been built up over previous decades; it depends upon the prior efforts and inherited level of emissions. Indeed, the assumed “baseline” trajectory inevitably reflects the history of accumulated assets, infrastructure, industries, institutions, and indeed social norms. These simple observations reflect the core components of temporal interdependence: namely inertia, and induced learning, which combine with other effects to generate path dependence. These three concepts are interrelated but analytically distinct, and we now outline our improved understanding on each in turn.

3 | CAPITAL INERTIA: INFRASTRUCTURE, TECHNOLOGY LIFETIMES, AND DIFFUSION

Change takes time and can be costly. The simplest form of inertia arises from the lifetime of capital stock, and particularly infrastructure. Power stations may last some decades, while roads, buildings, and urban forms last even longer. Electricity and rail networks have typically taken 25–50 years for their phases of major growth; transport networks, even longer (Grübler et al., 1999).
The IPCC (2007) observed that timescales “appear to be very long for most greenhouse-gas emitting sectors.” Concerns about “carbon lock-in” were raised by Unruh (2000), with specific estimates of the “committed emissions” from capital stock (Davis et al., 2010). Erickson et al. (2015) identified the typical 40-year lifetime of coal plants as a dominant factor; Davis and Socolow (2014) estimated that the then-existing stock of power plants would emit about 300 GtCO₂, with a range 98–578 GtCO₂ for a 20–60 years range of operating lives. Lower utilization or premature scrapping imply loss of planned returns on investment, risking “stranded assets” (Kefferd et al., 2018; Mercure et al., 2018).

Buildings and transport infrastructure have even longer lifetimes, but with more complex implications. Residential building investments coalesce around an average (first moment) lifetime of 50 years, with huge variety among components ranging from light bulbs to the foundations (Mequignon et al., 2013), while transport infrastructure can persist for centuries but emissions depend on the technologies that use it.

**Introducing new technologies also takes time:** The intertwined nature of technologies, infrastructure, finance, and regulation constrain rates of growth. Figure 2 shows typical timescales of market penetration in initial markets. Nuclear power took about 20 years from 10% to 90% penetration in leading countries; coal, about 30, after a slower formative phase. Modern wind turbines took 15 years from the mid-1990s to mature deployment in the initial market of Denmark, but global diffusion is clearly much slower. Consumer goods vary from very fast (e.g., lightbulbs), to the slow adoption of technologies that depended on consumer wealth, fuel infrastructure, and networks (e.g., cars in the US).

Of course, transitions have occurred more rapidly. French nuclear took just 10 years to go from 1% to 25% of the energy mix. UK coal generation collapsed from 35% in 2013 to under 5% just 5 years later. Solar PV capacity has shot from 15 to 500 GW globally within a decade, but as yet is still barely c. 2% of global electricity.

Even with high duress, energy systems can take decades to adapt. At the macro level, Bashmakov et al. (2020 in review) estimate that energy system adjustments in OECD countries took 25–33 years to work through after the 1970s oil shocks, and that involved little fundamental changes to fuels outside electricity. Jarvis (2018) takes long-run energy growth rates around 2.5% as reflecting a more fundamental investment time constant of around 40 years. The timescale for major transitions thus appears to be 20–40 years. Models with no inertia clearly omit an important characteristic of global energy systems.

Inertia combined with uncertainty provide clear justification for precautionary action, a central point of Ha-Duong et al. (1997). Twenty years on, having barely heeded such risks, we face the likely need for rapid transition—which would clearly be easier had the world not added almost 50% to the global stock of CO₂-emitting capital in the meantime. In *The Climate Casino*, Nordhaus (2013) himself underlined that uncertainty increases the case for precautionary abatement, but the extent of the damage done depends very much on the assumed inertia. Taking account of likely

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**FIGURE 2** Shape and rate of diffusion of technologies in their initial markets. (From Bento and Wilson (2016)). The graph shows rising market shares in the initial markets, from the point when each technology passed a threshold of 0.1% of its eventual maximum installed capacity in that initial (geographic) market.11
capital retirement over the next few decades years, the default “optimum” trajectory in DICE (Figure 1(a)) would involve constructing a huge amount of new carbon-intensive capital—a risky strategy (e.g., Vogt-Schilb et al., 2018), see Section 6.

As reviewed in Section 7, more complex IAMs do model capital lifetimes and diffusion, and correspondingly emphasize more the urgency of action. Of course, carbon-intensive capital can be retired prematurely, and growth rates of clean technologies can be accelerated. However, either may increase costs. For stylized IAMs, Grubb et al. (1995) were the first to reflect this by adding a second cost term related to the rate of change of abatement,

\[
C_{\text{AB}}(t) = c_A(t) + c_B(t) \frac{d\mu(t)}{dt}
\]

(2)

The notation \(C_{\text{AB}}(t)\) emphasizes that cost now includes a standard (A), and a transitional (B) element, a simple modification to reflect the first and most obvious dimension of dynamic realism.

4 | INDUCED LEARNING AND COST REDUCTION

The second issue concerns innovation: specifically, whether technology costs are assumed to be exogenous—specified externally by modeling assumptions—or induced by the cumulative impact of policy, investment, and market growth within a model. This reflects a long-standing issue in climate economics again going back about 25 years, drawing on earlier economic theory spanning (Hicks, 1932; Nordhaus, 1969; Romer, 1990; Schumpeter, 1934) and many others.

A major review of innovation modeling (Gillingham et al., 2008) concluded a decade ago that “our ability to conceptually model technical change has outstripped our ability to validate models empirically.” Here, we summarize some evidence accumulated over the past 20 years (see also Grubb et al., 2021).

4.1 | Evidence on market-induced innovation

Innovation is not random but involves investment. Some of that may be “‘exogenous,’ for example, public R&D or ‘spilling over’” from other sectors into deployed energy technologies. But the direction and scale of innovation is also substantially “endogenous”—influenced by relative prices, demand and expectations, as originally proposed by (Hicks, 1932). The 1970s oil price shocks stimulated private energy R&D (Lichtenberg, 1986), reflected in numerous studies of patents (Popp, 2002). Across 30 articles, Popp et al. (2010) and Popp (2019) found that a 10% increase in energy prices increased energy-related patenting by 3–6%—a “patenting elasticity” of 0.3–0.6 (also see Verdolini & Galeotti, 2011). For low carbon and energy efficient technologies specifically, elasticity averaged 0.86, and exceeded 1 for solar PV (Kruse & Wetzel, 2016, Vincenzi and Ozabaci (2017)), as also found for vehicles (Aghion et al. (2016)). Carbon prices also enhance low carbon patenting (Calel & Dechezleprêtre, 2016).

The influence of price goes beyond patenting. Rising electricity and gas prices induced efficiency improvement in end-use equipment (Newell et al., 1999) and vehicle fuel use (Knittel, 2011), and preceded lower solar module prices in major countries (Taghizadeh-Hesary et al., 2019). Similarly, carbon pricing is associated with lower wind and solar costs (Kim et al., 2017).

“Learning rates” document cost reductions associated with a doubling of capacity (“Wrights law”). While correlation is not causation (e.g., (Nordhaus, 2014), many studies show that growing markets and deployment drive (renewable) innovation and cost reduction (Bettencourt et al. (2013), Kavlak et al. (2018), Nemet (2019)), and a major systematic review (Grubb & Wieners, 2020) documents both the evidence and causal mechanisms. The key mechanisms of cost reduction include learning-by-doing and learning-by-using, but also simple economies of scale, from unit size to bigger factories and the industry overall, along with the development of global supply chains, and growing confidence which reduces the perceived risks and hence cost of finance. Weiss et al. (2010, p. 411) found an average learning rate of 18% across 15 demand-side technologies. Reviews by Rubin et al. (2015), Samadi (2018), and Farmer and Lafond (2016) find learning rates for renewable technologies to be uniformly positive; in particular, they are remarkably high (close to 20%) and stable for solar. The evidence is unequivocal that deploying clean energy at scale helps to make it cheaper.
4.2 The innovation gap in model projections

The assumptions of optimizing models with cost structures like Equation (1) require projections decades ahead, and we have been running such models for almost 30 years. It is time to compare their past projections with observed outcomes. Figure 3(a) shows that even since 2010, the global average cost of solar PV has fallen by a factor of 5, and onshore wind energy by about 30%. Even offshore wind, long considered an exceptionally challenging and expensive technology, has seen a rapid expansion. Deployment-related policies culminated with contract prices a third of the cost only 5 years previously (Jennings et al., 2020), resulting in “zero subsidy” auctions (BEIS, 2019; GWEC, 2019).

Figure 3(b) compares the PV trend to past model projections. The average global cost of PV is already well below the projections for 2030 made in 2011/12 by a wide range of institutions, including in the IPCC Renewables Assessment (Edenhofer et al., 2011). Models predicated on projections about technology costs over the century have thus become outdated within 5 years.

Three points flow from this. First, results from models with “rigid” abatement cost assumptions—projected independently of the scale of effort—may be rapidly rendered obsolete by innovation. Second, the impact can be radical, not marginal—though it involved large transitional investment, the global average costs of wind and solar are now comparable to the cheapest coal plants (bottom of the blue band in Figure 3(a1,a2)), and still declining. Competitive tenders during 2019 broke multiple consecutive tariff records, with costs well below the cost of fossil fuel generation even from existing coal plants, let alone the cost of building new ones, leading the IEA (World Energy Outlook, 2020) to describe solar PV now as the cheapest electricity in history.

Third, this reflects the finding summarized above that costs are not exogenous but depend on actions, and in particular, deployment. The cost reductions reflect learning and development of the industry and its supply chains at scale. Moreover, PV cost variations between countries reflect not just the solar resource, but the maturity and scale of the local PV businesses. We are in the midst of a dynamic process in which the global average cost will continue to decline as renewables expand globally. Nor is this unique. For light duty transport, electric vehicles are cheaper to run than gasoline, and given battery costs are falling even faster than PV, may be cheaper to buy as well within a few years as the market grows (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2019).

**FIGURE 3** Cost trends in solar (a1) and wind (a2) electricity compared to cost ranges for new coal plants, (from IRENA, 2020) and (b) PV costs compared to projections.
Only a decade ago, decarbonizing the electricity and transport sectors—which comprise over half of global CO₂ emissions—was projected to be difficult and expensive. The variability of wind and solar output may constrain contributions but only at high penetrations (Heptonstall & Gross, 2020)—renewables already supply half of Danish electricity for example,—while falling storage costs, interconnections and other flexibilities expand the scale further (Kroposki et al., 2017). The fact remains that extensive decarbonisation has already been rendered cheaper than historically assumed in most model projections—in many cases, for decades to come—and the costs continue to decline with deployment.

4.3 | Implications for modeling

While stylized optimizing models summarize abatement costs with a function (Equation (1)), technology-rich models build “marginal abatement cost curves” (MACC) from the bottom-up, projecting costs for different specific technologies and sectors. Figure 4(a) shows how the DICE projected cost curve for 2030 has varied over successive model vintages, while Figure 4(b) shows one famous (and hotly debated) projected MACC for 2030, by McKinsey in 2009. The central parts of the cost curve are dominated by low carbon electricity generation options.

Observations include:

- The cost curves in DICE for 2030 have varied substantially between successive model vintages. The projected cost of cutting emissions by 10 GtCO₂ fell by two-thirds, before rising again in the 2016 version (in curious contrast to the evidence reviewed above);
- The DICE curves seem more expensive than the ones by McKinsey. In Equation (1), this would mean that c_A(t) is too high (or the curve insufficiently nonlinear), partly because DICE omits some options and assumes that any “negative cost” possibilities appear automatically in the baseline.
- Many of the sector options in corresponding parts of the McKinsey curve are ones in which the costs have fallen dramatically over the past few years.

With hindsight, both bottom-up and top-down approaches clearly underestimated the potential for innovation, and both have been eclipsed by the trends shown above (Figure 3). Many models—both stylized and complex—have thus been outdated by reality, unless they modeled processes of induced innovation. The future cost of abatement depends on cumulative action. The implication is not so much that c_A in Equation (1) has been too big in most models, but that the structural form is too simplistic: It lacks dynamics.

Indeed, the initial policy-driven strategic deployment of the technologies noted above was expensive: renewables deployment in the German Energiewende, which substantially drove the renewables revolution, cost over a hundred billion dollars. But it was a transitional, not an enduring cost: Rather than “prematurely” deploying a high-cost element of the abatement cost curve, it fundamentally changed the curve itself. From the stylized perspective of Equation (2), it seems that DICE and similar models misallocated abatement costs, assigning them to the rigid (c_A) cost term, while for a large part they were (initially high) transitional investments.

5 | PATH DEPENDENCE

At any given point in time, the state of an economy reflects its previous evolution. An economy inherits, and bequests, a given set of infrastructure, technologies, industries, institutions, and social norms. For climate change, this concept points to “carbon lock-in” (Unruh, 2000; Unruh, 2002): Once established, a system of carbon-based, interlocked technologies and institutions is hard to replace. Lehmann et al. (2012) identified the corresponding risk of “lock-out” of renewable systems without strong policies to shift the trajectory of electricity technologies and systems.

5.1 | Path dependence—the economic concepts

Path dependence obviously entails induced innovation and inertia. Inertia expresses a transitional cost of moving away from a given path. Innovation, through economies of scale and learning-by-doing, makes an established path more attractive. Fouquet and Aghion (2019) identify at least three more relevant economic processes:
Knowledge spillovers—in innovations to build upon prior, related innovations in cumulative ways
Network effects—attractiveness of a technology depends upon interrelated networks of other users or suppliers
Complementarities—when technologies have complementary roles, such as renewables and storage

A review of carbon lock-in (Seto et al., 2016) identified a dozen contributions to lock-in, including institutional and behavioral ones (Table 1).

Path dependence implies that past choices create a new default trajectory, and that there may be many such possible paths. It features not only in theories of evolutionary economics since Arthur (1989), but also more mainstream economics on “sunspot equilibria” (e.g., Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986), Farmer (1993), and Benhabib and Farmer (1999)), in which different equilibrium paths are shaped partly by expectations and the intervention of random events.

5.2 Path dependence—evidence in energy systems

For energy, the theories of path dependence are complemented by the observed trends of the past quarter century. A simplistic interpretation of the idea of a “least-cost, optimum pathway” would imply that countries at a similar stage of economic development would have similar levels of per-capita energy consumption. In fact, among developed countries with similar per-capita income differ by almost a factor of 3 in their primary per-capita energy consumption (Figure 5(a)). Effects of geography and trade can only account for a modest part of these differences. Per-capita CO2 emissions vary even more (Figure 5(b)), though this is also influenced by the endowment of hydro and other noncarbon energy sources.

Even more striking, there has been no sign of convergence. If carbon really were a generally valuable input to economic development, one might expect countries to use more, and converge at least somewhat in their carbon intensity, over time. In fact, per-capita CO2 emissions have been stable or declining in most OECD countries, but show no convergence: Europe and Japan have remained at less than half the levels in North America for decades. This is consistent with theories of path dependence, in which the institutions, infrastructures, and vested interests in fossil-fuel-intensive countries tend to self-perpetuate, while lower carbon economies may be more able to further decarbonize.

Econometrics literature supports this observation. An extensive series of studies culminated in the finding by Parker and Liddle (2017) that “For the 33 countries analyzed... regression test provided no evidence of convergence within our sample,” but rather “a clustering algorithm identified four convergence clubs for economy-wide energy productivity and six for manufacturing. The clubs did not show any clear reason for groupings, such as geography....”

This offers a different perspective from the structures of DICE and many other IAMs, most of which start from an assumption that there is a unique, least-cost pathway for the global energy system, that can serve as a reference.
This issue has remained problematic—not least in communication (Schenk & Lensink, 2007)—ever since the IPCC’s Special Report on Emission Scenarios (Rogelj et al., 2000) concluded that we could not plausibly reduce the future to just one projected, least-cost path amended by costly abatement. Analysis needs to consider multiple different kinds of futures as reference paths. This includes the scope for emerging economies to orient along different paths, based on the newfound cost-effectiveness of renewables and smart systems in electricity, transport, and buildings energy use.

From this view, assumptions of temporal independence (Equation 1) are again invalidated. Not only does history matter and abatement potentially endure, it may also create positive international spill overs. Far from being neglected, these dynamic realities should be at the core of more realistic modeling.

6 | DYNAMIC REALISM IN IAMs: (A) STYLISED MODELS AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENTS

Against this background, we now consider the main development of efforts to include dynamic realism in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs). In the Appendix (Table A1), we list 28 global IAMs, with brief notes on their coverage of the three components discussed in this article. This section considers “stylized IAMs” (such as DICE), which correspond closely to the class of “aggregate cost-benefit analysis (CBA) IAMs” distinguished in (Weyant, 2017). Section 7 addresses “complex” or detailed-process IAMs, which have high sectoral detail and are often calibrated to extensive datasets, including hybrid models derived from linking the stylized with detailed-process IAMs. Complex IAMs typically focus on providing a feasible (usually optimized, “cost-effective”) trajectory toward a predefined goal (such as global warming level).

6.1 | The role of stylized IAMs

Three pioneer models developed in the 1990s were DICE (Nordhaus, 1992), PAGE (Hope et al., 1993), and FUND (Tol, 1997), which sought to quantify optimal responses to climate change. In 2010, 2013, and 2016, the US government Inter-Agency Working Group adopted these three cost-benefit IAMs to analyses the SCC.

The DICE-based studies outlined in Sections 1 and 2 illustrate the use of such models as a platform for exploring multiple issues and uncertainties. As noted, the dominant focus has been upon factors influencing the SCC, through assumptions particularly around damages and discounting (including regional/equity weighting). As such, the models are tools for important economic debates (though results are generally interpreted in terms of a global carbon tax, which is practically problematic and ethically complex). In recent years, these stylized models have been used to review broader issues, for example the assumptions which could underpin Paris goals, and emission pathways toward them.
(Glanemann et al., 2020; Hänsel et al., 2020). Others take advantage of the model’s simplicity and analyze the impact of probabilistic assumptions around climate damages (Daniel et al., 2019) or the conceptual reaction toward climate inflection points (Lemoine & Rudik, 2017).

In contrast, attention to the dynamic characteristics of emitting systems in DICE and related models has been limited, although some stylized approaches have been developed.

Reasons for this situation could include the appeal of relatively simple frameworks. It may also reflect a common misunderstanding. DICE and related models are characterized as Computable General Equilibrium models, a name that reflects origins in the basic theories of that name taught as fundamental in economics classes. In much of the IAM community this has commonly been interpreted as implying also optimal path solutions over time and space. However, as noted in Grubb and Wiener (2020), this is not at all implied by the fundamental axioms of General Equilibrium theory, which the “Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu” critique demonstrated decades ago to be incredibly unrestrictive (as reviewed in Rizvi, 2006). Core GE theory is about balancing aggregate supply and demand in economies through markets and pricing, and in no way implies such equilibria to be either overall least-cost, forward-looking, or dynamically stable.

6.2 | Induced innovation in stylized models

The topic of induced innovation has attracted long-standing attention. In modeling terminology, the high-level distinction is between exogenous and endogenous treatments of technology change. Reviews by Gillingham et al. (2008) and by Wei et al. (2015) note several approaches to modeling endogenous change, typified as R&D/learning-by-searching; price-induced; and learning-by-doing.

Of the three cost-benefit IAMs used in the US Inter-Agency Review, DICE and the PAGE-02 model (Hope, 2006, used also in the Stern review) neglected all three components of dynamic realism, though the subsequent version, PAGE-09 (Hope, 2012) has some learning. FUND 3.9 (Anthoff & Tol, 2013) models Learning-by-doing as a knowledge stock that increases (sub-linearly) with cumulative abatement expenditure, reducing abatement cost.
Even some new stylized IAMs (e.g., Dietz and Venmans (2019) and van der Ploeg and Rezai (2019)), while shedding useful light on established debates around the shape of abatement cost curves and rates of (exogenous) cost reduction, do not incorporate the dynamic realities considered in this article.7

Goulder and Mathai (2000) showed that in a cost–benefit setting, while R&D-type “learning-by-searching” would reduce initial abatement (to wait for cheaper technologies), the impact of learning-by-doing (and hence price-induced innovation) on abatement is analytically ambiguous: the overall benefits of accelerated abatement or higher carbon prices may or may not outweigh the gain (in discounted costs) of waiting for such improvements—though their empirical illustration suggests it does.

To address induced innovation in DICE, R&DICE (Nordhaus, 2002a) replaces the “abatement” of the standard DICE by R&D-induced reduction of the carbon intensity coefficient, and finds slower emission reductions than DICE. In ENTICE (Popp, 2004), fossil fuels can be substituted by a knowledge stock which is built up through R&D expenditure. In neither model does learning directly depend on emission reduction, and both assume diminishing returns to energy-related research and (as opposed to Buonanno et al., 2003) “crowding out” of more growth-inducing R&D. Consequently energy-related R&D incurs substantial opportunity costs with modest gains in terms of future emission reduction.

In these models, abatement increases energy costs relative to an emissions-intensive baseline, which is implicitly assumed to be least-cost and optimal without climate change. By construction this does not allow for the possibility that low carbon technologies might become cheaper than fossil-based ones once the (costly) transition is completed. As opposed to DICE and PAGE, FUND3.9 can, at least in principle, reach such a state, but it is unclear whether this state is reached in any of its actual applications (within relevant modeled time horizons).

The ground-breaking model by Acemoglu et al. (2012) explicitly distinguished low and high carbon technologies (as opposed to general abatement costs) in a long-run growth model. By switching R&D and direct investment from high to low carbon technologies, with knowledge accumulation, this generated scenarios in which low-carbon energy could, through such investment, rapidly displace the fossil fuel system once it became cheap enough.

From a different angle, this was challenged by Pottier et al. (2014) as an “incorporeal” vision—an economy still based on sequential equilibria with little inertia, so that successful learning in low carbon technologies meant an implausibly rapid, painless displacement of fossil fuels. The combination of Acemoglu with this critique suggests the central importance of combining learning with inertia.

### 6.3 Inertia and path dependence in stylized models

Inertia may be captured by including an abatement cost term which depends on the rate of change of abatement. The approach was first implemented by Grubb et al. (1995) in their DIAM (Dynamics of Inertia and Adaptability) model, and used to study also timing in the face of uncertain stabilization targets (Ha-Duong et al., 1997). Pottier et al. (2015) added a similar inertial term to their RESPONSE model. FUND3.9 lets part of the abatement effort cause a lasting (as opposed to temporary) emission reduction. However, the share of lasting emission reduction decreases with abatement efforts, a choice which is not empirically based but helps to align results with the behavior of other models.

All these models take a single global carbon price as the efficient mechanism because they equalize marginal abatement costs at any point in time. By contrast, Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte (2014) explored the implications when different options have different inertia. Their model showed that adopting the cheapest abatement first could exacerbate a carbon intensive-lock-in and make long-term targets more expensive to reach. Their subsequent model of sectors with different capital and lifetime structures showed that carbon budgets are delivered most efficiently if initial abatement efforts (marginal prices) are larger in sectors with higher inertia (Vogt-Schilb et al., 2018). Otherwise, there seems to have been little attention to the issue in stylized IAMs. Moreover, as far as we could ascertain, none of the stylized models allow for explicit path dependence in the abatement trajectory, though some (notably Acemoglu et al. (2012)) do so for innovation as a cumulative process.8

To summarize Sections 6.1–6.3, treatment of dynamic realism in standard stylized IAMs is patchy at best, but dedicated (stylized) models illustrated the potential importance of learning (Goulder & Mathai, 2000), the possibility of a cheap low-carbon future (Acemoglu et al., 2012), and the need to swiftly address sectors with high inertia (Vogt-Schilb et al., 2018). All these are beyond the standard results of DICE-like models.
HYBRID AND OTHER COMPLEX IAMs

Here we give a brief overview of temporal interdependence in complex IAMs, drawing on model intercomparison studies such as Köhler et al. (2006), Edenhofer et al. (2006), and the EMF 27 project (Krey et al., 2014; Weyant & Kriegler, 2014). See Table A1 for model-specific information.

7.1 Endogenous innovation in complex/hybrid models

In the 1990s, few models (IMAGE (Rotmans, 1990), ICAM (Dowlatabadi, 1998)) incorporated endogenous technical change, initially in terms of price-induced energy efficiency improvements (Hassler and Krusell (2012)). Path-breaking studies using ERIS, MARKAL, and MESSAGE introduced learning-by-doing at scale in global modeling, suggesting it could radically change views of future possibilities (Seebregts et al., 1999). Latter works also found that high and low carbon futures might have similar costs (Grübler et al., 1999). A meta-analysis (Barker et al. (2006)) confirmed that induced technological change generally amplifies the benefits of abatement. “Learning” through international knowledge spill-overs can also affect policy: Paroussos et al. (2019) built on GEM-E3 to show that this could allow economically positive formation of “climate clubs” arising from the innovation benefits of participation.

By the time of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014), hybrid models with detailed energy sectors featured far more than stylized IAMs. Although many of these models (e.g., TIAM-ETL) can incorporate induced innovation, several often skip this facility because it hugely increases the computational complexity and sensitivities to assumptions. Most models in the IPCC Assessments were actually run without induced innovation. One comparison found that different representations of endogenous technological change in IAMs may still result in similar future energy structures (Bosetti et al., 2015), though the robustness of this finding may be challenged for example, by the dramatic fall in renewables costs since observed (section 4).

7.2 Inertia

At the macro level, capital stock accumulation is standard in CGE models, but does not in itself constrain rates of abatement. Inertia enters models more directly in terms of the technology lifetime in technology-rich models (see Table A1). Other models like the GEM-E3 introduce the concept of durable and nondurable goods to reflect some lock-in effects (Capros et al., 2013).

The RECIPE project (Luderer et al., 2012) found a wide diversity of responses in comparing just three models. Notably, compared to REMIND and WITCH, IMACLIM-R—which has high inertia derived from its representation of urban and transport systems in particular—required large abatement expenditure (consumption loss of about 5%) in the first few decades, but consumption subsequently increases (and carbon prices fall) thanks to the improved infrastructure.

The more extensive AMPERE programs (Kriegler, Riahi, et al., 2015) used a dozen different models to explore implications of delayed (Riahi et al., 2015; Bertram et al., 2015) or initially partial (Kriegler, Riahi, Bauer, et al., 2015a) action and introduced diagnostic indicators to explore the model behavior, helping to illuminate (though not explicitly) the different dynamic characteristics, finding considerable difference among models' abatement cost (Kriegler, Petermann, 2015b). Subsequent studies have added further to concerns about the cost of delayed action (Winning et al., 2019), and its implications for potentially risky reliance on CDR technologies (Rogelj et al., 2019).

7.3 Path dependence and other dimensions

Few if any models represent path dependence beyond the capital inertia and induced learning, to take account of institutional, social, and behavioral inertia, a limitation acknowledged in some of the leading studies. The data and improved understanding of “carbon lock-in,” complemented by the mainstream economic insights about path dependence associated with expectations (e.g., “self-fulfilling prophecies,” Section 5), suggest a scale of path dependence that has yet to be adequately addressed in global IAMs. Probably the closest to this are simulation (rather than optimizing)
models, the most detailed linking an econometric model (E3ME) with technology innovation (FTT) and climate (GENIE) modules (Mercure et al., 2018).

Also, abatement cost is substantially influenced determined by the underlying socioeconomic development pathway, policy effectiveness, and assumptions around hard-to-abate sectors, rather than climate target stringency (Mercure et al., 2019; van Vuuren et al., 2020). The emerging field of agent-based climate-economy models (Farmer et al., 2015) may handle nonequilibrium effects, learning (by firms, voters, policy makers,...), and bounded rationality in a more natural way (e.g., Hoekstra et al., 2017; Lamperti et al., 2018; Rengs et al., 2020; Wolf et al., 2013).

7.4 Interpretation, complexity, and influence

Despite ongoing efforts, it remains a challenge to construct models that capture enough complexity to be reflect dynamic realities, while producing transparent insights that can be easily interpreted and communicated. Broadly, the more stylized models are easy to compute and well-behaved, generating a global least-cost optimal pathway and simple narrative from a limited set of assumptions. Yet, we have charted serious limitations in their treatment of abatement dynamics.

Conversely, hybrid IAMs have made great strides, but tend to be complex in their specification, operation, and data requirements, and can be sensitive to assumptions. As a result, the insights can be hard to communicate and fall prey to charges of being “black boxes.” The IPCC has increasingly found itself under pressure to increase their transparency, but this can result in vast datasets and extensive descriptions; our Table A1 only scratches the surface of one small aspect of such models.

Moreover, the results can seem potentially quite indeterminate or unstable. This is less satisfactory to modelers, harder to communicate, and harder to implement computationally (e.g., whether a result is a local or global least cost). In researching this article, we came across references to such features as “problems” which needed to be “solved.” Given our empirical findings, it is not scientific to force such models to be more conventional by excluding dynamic realities. The fact that such models can generate widely diverse behaviors, with results sensitive to assumptions, is telling us something important.

8 THE IMPACT OF DYNAMIC FACTORS ON OPTIMAL PATHWAYS

To compare the optimal policy under temporal independence versus interdependence in one single, established IAM, we integrate the stylized approach from Equation (2) into DICE itself (see Supporting Information for details).

Thus, like Pottier et al. (2015), we add an inertial term depending on the rate of abatement (c_B in Equation (2)), but simultaneously, we reduce the “rigid” cost term (c_A) to account for the fact that at least part of the abatement costs are transitional rather than lasting. As in Grubb et al. (2018), we express Equation (2) in terms of the “pliability” p and a characteristic transition timescale $t$:

$$C_{AB}(t,\mu,\mu) = C_{AB}(t) \left[ (1-p)\mu(t)^\theta + p.\frac{t^\theta}{\theta+1}\mu(t)^\theta \right]$$

(3)

A system with no pliability ($p = 0$) has full temporal independence, and is just the DICE model, with no induced technology learning. A fully pliable system ($p = 1$) is fully path-dependent; the abatement costs reflect the investment required to overcome inertia and to induce innovation sufficient to make low-carbon technologies as cheap as fossil fuels. 50% pliability corresponds to the “half-and-half” case in Grubb et al. (1995). We term this model DICE-PACE—DICE with Pliable Abatement Cost Elements.

Results are shown in Figure 6. While inertia precludes the initial jump of abatement observed in models with temporal independence (e.g., the pure DICE ($p = 0$) formulation), positive pliability implies a smoother path of mitigation toward deeper emission reductions. This reflects the behavior observed in the more complex IAMs with learning-by-doing as observed in Section 7.

The second panel shows that this is achieved by greater up-front investment and a radically different investment profile. The DICE model with $p = 0$ initially invests a mere 0.055% of GDP in mitigation, a figure which rises toward
1% over a century. With \( p = 1 \), the initial effort is increased more than five-fold, to about 0.3% GDP. Even with the very modest damage assumptions, global warming stays below 2.3°C. In a sensitivity run with trebled damage (based on Howard & Sterner, 2017), global warming stays below 2°C for \( p = 1 \) and the initial effort is 1% of GDP (see SOM), similar to typical estimates from more complex energy system models of the investment requirements for delivering the Paris goals, but declining steadily.

The underlying reason for these results is simple. With temporal interdependence, every early abatement effort reduces the costs of ambitious abatement levels later (the inertial costs being already paid). With high pliability, the future stream of emission savings induced by early action is several times larger than the initial cuts themselves. This is hardly rocket science, but is impossible in models which assume temporal independence.

So, if the system is substantially pliable, such expenditure has only to be sustained at the initial level for few decades, to drive the low-carbon innovation, overcome inertia and break the path-dependency upon fossil fuels. After that, the effort required declines as the world adapts to a low-carbon economy. The outcome with pliable mitigation costs is both lower mitigation costs, and far lower climate damages. As outlined in the SOM, the effect of pliability on optimal policy is of similar magnitude to the effect of damage uncertainty.

Despite its simplicity, DICE-PACE echoes the findings of some of the far more complex models, for example the IMACLIM studies in which the inertia of systems combined with learning leads to high initial investment followed by declining costs (Section 7.2).

The DICE-PACE exercise illustrates that correctly representing temporal interdependence profoundly influences the policy recommendations of IAMs, and that it can be (qualitatively) included even in stylized IAMs such as DICE. One open question remains: How pliable is the real world? The evidence reviewed across Sections 3–5 seems to suggest pliability in the upper range of 0.5–1, but we advance this as a contention for further research.

9 | CONCLUSIONS

We have reviewed some lessons from quarter of a century of evidence and, briefly, model developments, concerning the dynamic characteristics of mitigation costs. We conclude that these lessons deserve just as much future attention in stylized cost-benefit models as that previously devoted to climate damages, for the implications for policy are just as large (and more tractable).

The traditional stylized structure assumes a fixed and predefined (exogenous) abatement cost curve at all points in time: thus, within the model they are temporally independent. In sharp contrast, overwhelming empirical evidence shows that the global energy system has considerable inertia, involves technologies which respond both to market incentives and scale, and has significant path dependence. Correspondingly, we have observed two important conceptual advances in “stylized” economic models. One is recognition (following Acemoglu et al. (2012)) that abatement is not an independent cost factor, but rather represents the difference between two cost streams of high and low carbon investment respectively; superior learning in the latter can lead the whole system to switch. The other advance is recognition that inertia can fundamentally change the dynamics of optimal abatement (Vogt-
The interaction of these two factors is likely to be important, but has yet to be adequately combined in stylized models.

More complex IAMs incorporating sectoral representations capture more of these features and can display quite different behaviors from DICE. However, their complexity has impeded more widespread understanding of the fundamental insights, and indeed, has in some leading models led these features to be turned off in applied scenario studies. Also, no mainstream IAM explicitly captures other features that contribute to the path dependencies observed in energy and other complex systems. A stylized but flexible representation of dynamic realities inserted into the DICE model illustrates the sensitivity of results to these assumptions. Greater emphasis upon dynamics—temporal interdependence—results in much greater up-front investment in abatement, with a flatter subsequent trajectory, and steadily declining emissions rather than deferred abatement.

The implications concern not just the optimal effort, pathways, and outcomes. Obviously, the extent of dynamic linkages—and the corresponding potential for present actions to reduce future emissions—will vary for different technologies, sectors, and types of intervention. Lecocq and Shalizi (2014) demonstrate the need for targeted mitigation in long-lived infrastructure. Innovation itself may be induced more effectively by more targeted instruments than through a global carbon price (e.g., Rozenberg et al., 2020), and dynamic realities imply a more varied policy landscape as also emphasized by Vogt-Schilb et al. (2018). However, enhanced and sustained abatement is also implied by wider inertia and some degree of path dependence that is likely pervasive across many emitting systems.

The past 25 years have demonstrated dynamic realities of energy systems which differ substantially from the standard stylized approaches, including the archetypal DICE model. Temporal independence is a myth, and we have shown it to be one that matters. The observational evidence reviewed in Sections 3–5 implies that early decisive climate action is beneficial to gain time to overcome inertia, to generate and harvest accumulated knowledge, and avoid carbon lock-in. More sophisticated models corroborate this. This needs to be reflected also in DICE and related stylized IAMs, and the implications need to be more widely acknowledged in the economics and modeling of climate change abatement.

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The authors have declared no conflicts of interest for this article.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Michael Grubb: Conceptualization; data curation; formal analysis; investigation; methodology; validation; visualization; writing-original draft; writing-review and editing. Claudia Wieners: Formal analysis; investigation; methodology; software; visualization; writing-original draft; writing-review and editing. Pu Yang: Data curation; methodology; software; visualization; writing-review and editing.

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ENDNOTES
1 According to google search on July 25th, 2020.
2 The DICE model uses the terms $\theta_1(t)$ and $\theta_2$ respectively for $c_A(t)$ and the exponent $\theta$; $\theta_1(t)$ comprises two components, $C_0(t)\sigma(t)$, where $C_0$ is an exogenous cost factor declining by 0.5% per year (representing technological improvement), and $\sigma(t)$ is the “no policy” projected CO2 per unit of GDP, initially declining with 1.5% per year.
3 PV auction prices struck in the US (Los Angeles @ 2 c/kWh), Brazil (1.75 c/kWh), and Portugal (1.6 c/kWh) (PV Magazine (2019a, 2019c). Critiques and data on the systematic failures in PV cost and deployment forecasting include Hoekstra et al. (2017) and the site https://rameznaam.com/2020/05/14/solars-future-is-insanely-cheap-2020/.

4 “Battery prices keep falling. As a result, we expect price parity between EVs and internal combustion vehicles (ICE) by the mid-2020s in most segments, though there is wide variation between geographies and vehicle segments.”

5 The evidence of Figures 3 and 4 is that $c_A(t), \mu(t)^{\theta_A}$ may be close to zero for at least the first portions of the cost curve, or even negative for low $\mu$, which is the implication if zero carbon sources become cheaper than fossil fuels.

6 Modeling in Newbery (2018) concludes that if PV learning curves are taken at face value, the German programme, which many economists criticized for cutting emissions at far greater expense than needed, was in fact globally cost-effective precisely because of the innovation it induced. Many countries have yet to make the investments required to bring down the local costs of PV or electric vehicles (including charging infrastructure) at scale.

7 At least in their default settings: The stylised model by van der Ploeg and Rezai (2019) does consider some of the relevant effects but only in the Appendix, not in the standard version.

8 It is now well established that patents are path-dependent—companies build upon previous research and innovate most in areas of established comparative advantage. Also of course, all styled models have some form of cumulative economic growth (usually based on the standard Ramsay model of economic growth). However, this is very different from path-dependence in the abatement trajectory.

9 A clear example comes from the lead author’s own Institute, which runs the global technology-rich TIAM model. One article (Anandarajah, McDowall, & Ekins, 2013) explored the impact of including learning-by-doing in this model (TIAM-Energy Technology Learning). However, it was so computationally complex to run, unstable and uncertain to parametise, that the TIAM-ETL has not been used since.

10 As part of the AMPERE studies on the cost of delay, Bertram et al. (2015) note being “well aware that the models are only able to capture the restricted aspect of carbon lock-in associated with physical capital and emissions, while institutional and other aspects of this phenomenon (Unruh, 2000) are not modeled and hence, not the subject of this study.”

11 “The spatial scale of analysis always corresponds to the initial markets of first commercial application for each technology in which the formative phases marked the emergence of a new innovation system. As examples, wind power is analyzed in Denmark, cars in the US, e-bikes in China” (Bento & Wilson, 2016, p. 7).

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**SUPPORTING INFORMATION**

Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of this article.

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**APPENDIX: DYNAMIC CHARACTERISTICS IN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT MODELS**

The table in this Appendix tabulates, to the extent possible, how various global Integrated Assessment Models incorporate the three aspects of dynamic realities covered in this article. The first part of the table covers the main stylized “simple” IAMs, namely DICE, PAGE, FUND, and variants thereof. The second part covers complex IAMs, based mainly on the EMF 27 model comparison exercise (Krey et al., 2014; Table A1).
| Model                          | References             | Intertemporal solution method | Inertia     | Induced innovation                                                                 | Additional sources of path dependence |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| **Stylized global cost-benefit IAMs** |                        |                             |             |                                                                                     |                                       |
| DICE                          | Nordhaus (1992, 2017)  | Intertemporal optimization  | None        | None                                                                               | None                                  |
| R&DICE (DICE variant)         | Nordhaus (2002b)       | Intertemporal optimization  | None        | R&D builds up knowledge stock (diminishing returns to scale; crowding-out of growth-enhancing R&D) | None                                  |
| ENTICE (DICE variant)         | Popp (2004)            | Intertemporal optimization  | None        | R&D builds up knowledge stock (diminishing returns to scale; crowding-out of growth-enhancing R&D) | None                                  |
| RESPONSE (partly inspired by DICE) | Pottier et al. (2015)  | Intertemporal optimization  | A cost term depending on rate of change of abatement is added to the abatement cost | None | None |
| DICE-PACE (DICE variant)      | This paper             | Intertemporal optimization  | A cost term depending on rate of change of abatement (partly) replaces enduring abatement cost | Only indirect insofar as costs is shared between two terms, one of which reflects abatement rate as a proxy for investments which reduce the long term costs | The pliability term reflects an aggregated proxy for path-dependent costs, but system only fully path-dependent for \( p = 1 \). |
| FUND                          | Anthoff and Tol (2013) | Policy testing             | Carbon tax causes (costly) abatement; part of the effect is lasting, part is temporary | Learning-by-doing expands knowledge stock decreasing abatement cost | None |
| PAGE                          | Hope (2012)            | Policy testing (under uncertainty) | None | Learning-by-doing expands knowledge stock decreasing abatement cost | None |
| **Complex IAMs**              |                        |                             |             |                                                                                     |                                       |
| AIM-CGE                       | Fujimori et al. (2017) | Recursive dynamic          | None        | None                                                                               | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by calibrating CES production function to base-year value shares |
| DNE21+                        | Fujii and Komiyama (2015) | Intertemporal optimization | Fixed lifetimes, early retirement allowed | None | None |
| IMACLIM-R                     | Crassous et al. (2006) | Recursive dynamic          | Immobility of the installed capital across sectors | Learning by doing for energy; Price induced change and international spillovers of knowledge in the productive sector | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by logit share weights; rigidities in real wages, which may lead to partial utilization of production factors (labor and capital) |
| Complex IAMs     | Model       | Type                      | Assumptions                                                                 | Learning Method                                                                 | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by... |
|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| IMAGE           | Stehfest et al. (2015) | Recursive dynamic | None                                                                        | Learning by doing                                                              | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by... |
| MERGE           | Kypreos (2007) | Intertemporal optimization | Fixed lifetimes for existing vintages (early retirement allowed), smooth depreciation for new vintages | Not included in EMF27, but can provide induced technology analysis by offline interactions (MERGE-ETL). | Initial technology share affecting expansion constraints and determine value share in each region's production function |
| MESSAGE         | Gritsevskiy and Nakićenovi (2000) | Intertemporal optimization | Fixed lifetimes, early retirement allowed | Not included in EMF27, but can include ITC by offline iteration with learning curves to project their technology costs. | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by technology vintages |
| REMIND          | Kriegler et al. (2017) | Intertemporal optimization | Fixed lifetimes, early retirement allowed | Learning curves for solar and wind energy as well as electric vehicles | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by... |
| WITCH           | Bosetti et al. (2006) | Intertemporal optimization | None                                                                        | Induced technology change for advanced, noncommercial technologies. Experience depends on cumulative deployment; innovation depends on R&D investments. Features international spillovers of knowledge | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by... |
| GEM-E3          | Capros et al. (2013) | Recursive dynamic | Consumption split between durable and nondurable goods | Learning by doing; Price induced change in energy consumption | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by... |
| POLES           | Keramidas et al. (2017) | Recursive dynamic | Early retirement allowed in the power sector | Investment costs depend on cumulative installed capacity and cumulative R&D effort | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by... |
| GCAM            | Markovic et al. (2018) | Partial equilibrium | Fixed lifetimes, early retirement allowed. Initial technology share reflected by logit share weights | None | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by... |
| AIM-Enduse      | Selvakumaran and Limmeechokchai (2015) | Recursive dynamic | Early retirement allowed | None | None |
| C³IAM            | Wei et al. (2018), Yang et al. (2018) | Intertemporal optimization | None                                                                        | None                                                                                     | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by... |

(Continues)
| Complex IAMs | Description | Model Type | Tech. Availability | Endogenous Constraints | Initial Technology Share | Technological Path Affect |
|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| BET         | Yamamoto et al. (2014) | Intertemporal optimization | Fixed lifetimes in the power sector; Technology expansion and contractions constraints | None | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by calibrating CES production function to base-year value shares |
| EC-IAM      | National Energy Board (2016) | Intertemporal optimization | Capital vintage in the macroeconomy and certain electricity generation technology | None | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by expansion constraints and contractions constraints |
| E3ME-FTT-GENIE | Mercure et al. (2018) | Recursive dynamic | Fixed lifetimes. Technology availability is endogenously depending on market share | Technology level learning curves. Sectoral technology progress increase competitiveness with cumulative investment | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by expansion constraints |
| ENV-linkages | Chateau et al. (2014) | Recursive dynamic | New versus old vintages in all sectors with full malleability of new and limited possibilities to sell old capital | None | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by calibrating CES production function to match the productivities of the factors of production |
| FARM        | Sands et al. (2014) | Recursive dynamic | None | None | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by calibrating CES production function to base-year value shares |
| GRAPE       | Kurosawa (2006) | Intertemporal optimization | Fixed lifetimes in the energy sector | None | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by calibrating CES production function to match the productivities of the factors of production |
| Phoenix     | Fisher-Vanden et al. (2012) | Recursive dynamic | None | None | Initial technology share affecting future technological path by calibrating CES production function to base-year value shares |
| TIAM-WORLD  | Labriet et al. (2012) | Intertemporal optimization | Fixed lifetime, early retirement allowed | For investment costs only. No endogenous technological learning | Flexible link between base year and future years capacities with growth constraints for several key technologies |