Experimental Quantum Secret Sharing and Third-Man Quantum Cryptography

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Quantum secret sharing (QSS) and third-man quantum cryptography (TQC) are essential for advanced quantum communication, however, the low intensity and fragility of multi-photon entanglement have made their realization an extreme experimental challenge. Here, we develop and exploit a ultra-stable high intensity source of four-photon entanglement to report an experimental realization of QSS and TQC. The technology developed in our experiment will be important for future multi-party quantum communication.

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With the development of technology, quantum cryptography could well be the first commercial application of quantum communication. To extend quantum communication to more realms, advanced protocols are needed. Among them, Quantum secret sharing (QSS) and third-man quantum cryptography (TQC) are two essential protocols. QSS is a protocol to split a message into several parts so that no subset of parts is sufficient to read the message, but the entire set is. In the scheme, three parties Alice, Bob and Charlie first share a three-photon entangled state. Charlie can then force Alice and Bob to cooperate to be able to establish the secret key with him by performing proper polarization measurements on his photon and announcing which polarization basis he has chosen. In a similar manner, in TQC the third-man, Charlie, can control whether Alice and Bob can communicate in a secure way while he has no access whatsoever on the content of the communication between Alice and Bob.

Although QSS and TQC are essential for advanced quantum communication, the low intensity and fragility of multi-photon entanglement have made their realization an extreme experimental challenge. While a variant of QSS, i.e. quantum state sharing, has been reported in both photonic and continue variable systems, till now solely the principle feasibility of an experimental realization of QSS using pseudo-GHZ states was shown. Here, developing and exploiting an ultra-stable high intensity source of four-photon entanglement we report the first experimental realization of the QSS and TQC schemes.

To see the necessity of QSS, suppose Alice and Bob are sent to Beijing as two separate outstations by Charlie who is in the parent company in Hefei. When Charlie wants to send a business instruction to Beijing, the information should be encrypted because it is a business secret. However, there is a risk that if one of the two people received part of the information, they can dishonestly sell it to other company for money. Remarkably, QSS can provide a novel way to solve this problem.

The working principle of QSS is shown in Fig. 1A. Suppose that Alice, Bob, and Charlie each holds one photon from a GHZ triplet that is in the state:

$$|\Psi\rangle_{abc} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|H\rangle_a |H\rangle_b |H\rangle_c + |V\rangle_a |V\rangle_b |V\rangle_c)$$  (1)

where $H$ (V) denotes horizontal (vertical) linear polarization. Each of them randomly performs a projection measurement on their own photons either along the linear polarization basis $x+/x-$ or along the circular polarization basis $y+/y-$ (right-hand/left-hand). These polarization bases can be expressed in terms of the original ones as

$$|x\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|H\rangle \pm |V\rangle)$$

$$|y\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|H\rangle \pm i|V\rangle)$$  (2)

For convenience we will refer to a measurement of linear polarization $x+/x-$ as an $x$ measurement and one of circular polarization $y+/y-$ as a $y$ measurement.
Representing the GHZ state $|1\rangle$ in the new states by using $2$, we can obtain the perfect correlations among Alice, Bob and Charlie in some certain combinations of measurement basis. For example, in an $xxx$ measurement the state $|1\rangle$ may be expressed as:

$$
|\Psi\rangle_{abc} = \frac{1}{2} (|x_\uparrow a \rangle |x_\uparrow b \rangle + |x_- a \rangle |x_- b \rangle) |x_\uparrow c \rangle + (|x_\uparrow a \rangle |x_- b \rangle + |x_- a \rangle |x_\uparrow b \rangle) |x_- c \rangle.
$$

(3)

This expression implies, first, that any specific result obtained in any two-photon joint measurement is maximally random. For example, Alice’s and Charlie’s photons will exhibit polarizations $x_\uparrow x_\downarrow$, $x_\downarrow x_\uparrow$, $x_\uparrow x_\uparrow$, or $x_\downarrow x_\downarrow$ with the same probability of 25% as well as Bob’s and Charlie’s photons. Second, given any two results of measurements on any two photons, they can predict with certainty the result of the corresponding measurement performed on the other one. For example suppose Alice’s photon and Bob’s photon exhibit different polarizations. Then by the second term in (3), Charlie’s photon will definitely be $x_\downarrow$ polarized. Therefore, Alice and Bob can exploit this perfect correlation to jointly create the secret key with Charlie.

Let us now analyze the quantum correlations of the state $|1\rangle$ for all the other combinations of measurement basis, i.e. for $xyy$, $yyx$, $xxy$, $xyx$, $yx$ and $yy$ measurements. In the same way, one can easily verify the following fact: While in the last four combinations the results that Alice, Bob and Charlie can get are completely independent (random) to each other, similar perfect correlations also exist in the rest three combinations (i.e. $xyy$, $yyx$ and $xxy$). Again, in these three cases, if Alice and Bob know which measurement basis Charlie has chosen (i.e. $x$ or $y$), they can cooperatively determine what Charlie’s result is.

In this way, if all of them randomly select the $x$, $y$ polarization basis to measure their own photons, then by announcing publicly which basis they have chosen, and only keeping those events with the right combinations of measurement basis, i.e. the $xxx$, $xyy$, $yyx$ and $xxy$ combinations, Alice and Bob can thus jointly establish the secret key with Charlie. In details, we can use these measurement results to generate raw keys by the following encoding rule: In the $xxx$ measurement, Charlie encodes $x_\downarrow (y_\uparrow)$ as 1 and $x_\uparrow (y_\downarrow)$ as 0, while Alice and Bob encode $x_\uparrow (y_\uparrow)$ as 1 and $x_\downarrow (y_\downarrow)$ as 0. For the other combinations, Alice, Bob and Charlie all encode the result $x_\uparrow (y_\uparrow)$ as 1 and $x_\downarrow (y_\downarrow)$ as 0.

In the QSS scheme, its security can be guaranteed by randomly choosing the measurement basis and testing the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the raw keys. Moreover, from the above analysis it is clear that after Charlie uses the generated secret key to encrypt a message, none of Alice and Bob can decrypt the message with her/his individual key and it is only possible for them to read out the encrypted message after performing a cooperative Exclusive OR (XOR) operation.

Another important application of the above perfect correlations is in the TQC $\mathbb{3}$. As in usual telecommunication, it is expected that the necessary resource of single photons or quantum entanglement in future realistic quantum communication will be provided by some organizations such as a company or the government. It is reasonable that the providers of quantum resources would like to have some controls on the users. For example, the providers would like to hold the right to control whether the users can communicate in a secure way while, as a regulation, they have no access whatsoever on the content of the communication between the users. The TQC offers a satisfied way to accomplish this purpose.

As it shown in Fig. 1B, in the TQC scheme Alice, Bob and Charlie also need to share a three-photon GHZ state $|1\rangle$. However, Alice and Bob are now two users at two different locations, say, Beijing and Shanghai, while Charlie in Hefei plays the role of a provider. Similarly, each of them performs a projection measurement on their own photons by randomly choosing either the linear polarization basis $x_\uparrow / x_\downarrow$, or the circular polarization basis $y_\uparrow / y_\downarrow$. From $\mathbb{3}$ we can see if Charlie publicly announces his measurement results including the basis chosen, Alice and Bob’s photons can immediately build up their own perfect correlation. Thus, Alice and Bob can exploit this perfect correlation to create the secret keys. This exactly corresponds to the entanglement-assisted BB84 protocol $|1\rangle$. Clearly, in this process Charlie has no idea of the keys which Alice and Bob have created.

On the other hand, if Charlie does not want Alice and Bob to generate the secret keys he could simply choose not to announce his measurement results or not to make any measurement on his photon. Then, if Alice and Bob continue to finish the $x$ or $y$ projection measurement, the results that they will get will be completely random. Therefore, without the help of Charlie they will fail to generate the secret key. Note that, if Alice and Bob do not trust Charlie in the beginning, instead of performing a $y$ measurement on their own photons, they could perform a measurement along the $H/V$ basis. In this way, they can manage to generate some keys with perfect correlation, but they are insecure – indeed any eavesdropper can acquire the same key without being detected. The above analysis shows that Charlie can successfully control the generation of the secret keys between Alice and Bob while has no access whatsoever on the content of the communication between Alice and Bob.

The realization of QSS and TQC necessitates a ultrastable high intensity source of three-photon entanglement. The experimental setup to generate three-photon entanglement is shown in Fig. 2(a). An infrared pulse is focused properly on the LBO crystal (LiB$_3$O$_5$) to achieve the best up-conversion efficiency creating the pulse of ultraviolet (UV) light. Then the created UV
pulse passes through a beta-barium borate (BBO) crystal twice to produce two polarization-entangled photon pairs, where both pairs are in the state \( |ψ⟩ = 1/\sqrt{2} (|H⟩|H⟩ + |V⟩|V⟩) \). One photon out of each pair is then steered to a polarization beam splitter (PBS) where the path lengths of each photon have been adjusted (by scanning the Delay position) so that they arrive simultaneously. After the two photons pass through the PBS, and exit it by a different output port each, and there is no way whatsoever to distinguish from which emission which of the photons originated, then correlations due to four-photon GHZ entanglement \( |ψ^4⟩ = 1/\sqrt{2} (|H⟩|H⟩|H⟩|H⟩ + |V⟩|V⟩|V⟩|V⟩) \) can be observed. In the experiment, by performing a \( x_+ \) polarization projective measurement onto one of the four outputs, the remaining three photons are prepared in the desired GHZ-state \( |H⟩|V⟩|H⟩ \) with a visibility of 83%.

To achieve the necessary ultra stability and high intensity, various efforts have been made. Different from previous four-photon experiments, to avoid the damage to the up-conversion LBO crystal caused by the focusing laser beam, we assemble the LBO crystal in a closed but transparent tube of oxygen. Moreover, by using thicker and more rigid fiber holder in a compact set-up and by focusing the UV pump onto the BBO crystal, we achieve both better collection efficiency and production rate of entangled photon pairs with a ultra-high stability. In our experiment, after achieving the perfect time overlap between the two photons coming into the PBS the four-photon entanglement source with a 2 four-fold coincidence per second can be stabilized for a couple of weeks. Thus, we managed to finish all the required measurements without the need of scanning the Delay position.

In order to realize the random choice of the measurement basis, we let the photon pass through a 50-50 beam splitter (BS) as in Fig. 2(b). The half-wave plates (HWP) in front of PBS\(_1\) is oriented at 22.5° to measure the photon along the linear polarization basis \( x_+ / x_- \), and the quarter-wave plate (QWP) in front of PBS\(_2\) is oriented at 45° to measure the photon along the circular polarization basis \( y_+ / y_- \). In our experimental verification of the QSS and TQC schemes, Alice, Bob and Charlie only individually record the measurement results (including the basis chosen) for those events where one and only one click is registered at each of the four detectors. All together, 13 single-photon detectors have been used during the whole experiment.

In the QSS scheme, after the measurement run Alice, Bob and Charlie announce the basis of their measurement results in public. By only keeping those coincident events corresponding to an \( xxx \), \( xyy \), \( xyx \) or \( yyy \) measurement, which occur in half of the cases, they can generate the raw keys using the encoding rule as discussed in this paper. In the experiment, Alice, Bob and Charlie collected 327 579 bits of key each at a rate of a quarter bit/s. To test the security, 10% of the raw keys are used to calculate the QBER by checking if each triplet is coincident by \( Alice \oplus Bob = Charlie \) in which \( \oplus \) plays as the operator of XOR. The QBER is observed to be 12.9%, which is sufficient to ensure the security of the QSS scheme.

For correcting the remaining errors while maintaining the secrecy of the keys, various classical error correction and privacy amplification schemes can be used. We implemented a simple error reduction scheme requiring only little communication between Alice, Bob and Charlie. Each of them arranges their keys in blocks of bits and evaluates the bit parity of the blocks (a single bit indicating an odd or even number of ones in the block). The parities are compared by Alice, Bob and Charlie in public, and the blocks with agreeing parities are kept after discarding one bit per block. Since parity checks reveal only odd occurrences of bit errors, a fraction of errors remains. The optimal block length \( n \) should be determined by a compromise between key losses and remaining bit errors. In order to obtain a final key with a low QBER, we implemented the parity check for two times and the first we use the block length \( n \) of 2. After
that we got 117 616 bits of key with a QBER of 2.2%. Again by the block length n of 8, we got 87 666 bits of key with a QBER of 0.35%.

Finally, Charlie uses the corrected key to transmit a 76 160-bit large image to Alice and Bob via the computer network. None of Alice and Bob can decrypt the image with her or his own key, but they can cooperate to decrypt the image. The final image cooperatively obtained by Alice and Bob shows only a few errors due to the remaining bit errors in the keys (0.35%).

We now show how the same experimental data can also be used to provide an experimental demonstration of TQC. In the TQC, if Charlie allows Alice and Bob to generate the secret keys with each other, he will faithfully announce all his information, not only the basis he has chosen but also his measurement results. Knowing Charlie’s measurement results, Alice then performs an XOR operation between her and Charlie’s keys. Thus, using the same experimental data Alice and Bob can each obtain 327 579 bits of raw keys with a QBER of 12.9%. After QBER checking and error reduction, they finally obtained 87 666 bits cured keys with a QBER of 0.35%. And, if Charlie does not want Alice and Bob to generate the secret key, he simply chooses not to announce his measurement results, or do not perform any measurement on his photon. Without knowing Charlie’s results, the only thing Alice and Bob can do is to randomly guess Charlie’s results and continue the same encoding and error reduction procedure. In our experiment, after performing twice error reductions, the QBER remains 49.999%. All these together clearly confirm that Charlie can successfully control the secure communication between Alice and Bob.

We thus for the first time experimentally demonstrated the QSS and TQC. Compared to the quantum cryptography based on single photons, the QSS and TQC schemes allow richer and more flexible quantum communications. First, in the multi-party QSS any individual can force the others to cooperate to be able to establish the secret keys with her/him [4]. Moreover, with the future development of quantum repeaters one can achieve the QSS or TQC over large distances, without worrying about the effects of attenuation and noise on, say, single photons sent through a long optical fiber. Finally, the entanglement-assisted QSS and TQC have the advantage of still being possible in situations where, for example three parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie, after sharing their storiable multi-particle entanglement [15, 16], have wandered about independently and no longer know each others’ locations. They cannot reliably send single particles to each other, if they do not know where others are; but they can still realize QSS and TQC, by broadcasting the classical information to all places where they might be. Therefore, while in large scale realization further practical investigations are still necessary for improving the limited multi-fold coincidence rate, we believe that the QSS and TQC could very well be tomorrow’s technology for advanced quantum communication.

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\[\text{FIG. 3: Sharing a secret image. Charlie encrypts the image of the “Great Wall” via bitwise XOR operation with his key and transmits the encrypted image to Alice and Bob via the computer network. None of Alice and Bob can decrypt the image with her or his own key, but they can cooperate to decrypt the image. The final image cooperatively obtained by Alice and Bob shows only a few errors due to the remaining bit errors in the keys (0.35%).}\]
(2004).