Dilemma that cannot be resolved by biased quantum coin flipping

Satoshi Ishizaka
Nano Electronics Research Laboratories, NEC Corporation, 34 Miyukigaoka, Tsukuba, 305-8501, Japan
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We show that a biased quantum coin flip (QCF) cannot provide the performance of a black-boxed biased coin flip, if it satisfies some fidelity conditions. Although such a QCF satisfies the security conditions of a biased coin flip, it does not realize the ideal functionality, and therefore, does not fulfill the demands for universally composable security. Moreover, through a comparison within a small restricted bias range, we show that an arbitrary QCF is distinguishable from a black-boxed coin flip unless it is unbiased on both sides of parties against insensitive cheating. We also point out the difficulty in developing cheat-sensitive quantum bit commitment in terms of the uncomposability of a QCF.

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Consider Alice and Bob who have just divorced. They agree to flip a coin to decide who gets their car, but they live in different cities. How do they flip a coin by telephone? This is a well-known introduction to a coin flip [1], which is now an important cryptographic primitive on a communication network. Another important primitive is bit commitment (BC). The purpose of BC is to realize the scenario in which Alice commits to a bit (b) and later she reveals it; this is done such that Bob cannot know b until Alice reveals it and she must reveal b as it is. A fair coin flip is realized by using secure BC in the following way: Alice first commits to b, Bob next sends b’ to Alice, and she reveals b. Then, b ⊕ b’ is a fair random bit, because Bob cannot know b before choosing b’ and Alice cannot change b after knowing b’.

An effort was made to construct unconditionally secure BC (QBC), but unfortunately it was shown that all previously proposed QBC protocols are broken by the so called entanglement attack [2]. After controversial discussions, it was then generally accepted that unconditionally secure QBC is impossible [3]. It was also proved that a perfectly fair quantum coin flip (QCF) is impossible [4, 5, 6, 7].

Fortunately, quantum mechanics enables biased coin flipping [8, 9, 10, 11]. In a biased QCF, if both Alice and Bob are honest, the outcome is either 0 or 1, each with probability 1/2. A dishonest party can cheat to bias the probability to 1/2 + ǫ, but it is ensured that the amount of the bias satisfies |ǫ| < 1/2; so a dishonest party cannot fully control the outcome. Moreover, when a dishonest party tries to largely bias the probability, a honest party sometimes obtains the outcome reject, which conclusively identifies the presence of cheating. In this paper, however, we only consider insensitive cheating such that the outcome reject never occurs. Even through insensitive cheating, a dishonest party can generally bias the probability, whose maximum (or minimum) is called the threshold for cheat sensitivity [2].

On the other hand, let us imagine ideal biased coin flipping such that a black-box outputs a common random bit to both parties. A dishonest party can bias the probability of the outcome but can do nothing else because the party cannot touch the inside of the box at all. A biased QCF, at first glance, realizes the black-boxed coin flip, because it is ensured by the laws of physics that the bias range is limited to |ǫ| < 1/2 against all possible operations for cheating.

In this paper, however, we show that a biased QCF generally does not provide the performance of a black-boxed biased coin flip, when it is used to resolve a quantum dilemma. Although such a QCF satisfies the security conditions of a biased coin flip, it does not realize the ideal functionality. This warns that, if a QCF is combined with another quantum cryptographic protocol, an unexpected security hole will occur.

Now, let us introduce a quantum dilemma where, in some sense, the car in the previous dilemma concerning divorce is replaced with a fully quantum object: an entangled state. Suppose that Alice is required to send half of a maximally entangled state to Bob. However, Bob is doubtful whether she sends the entangled state honestly. On the other hand, dishonest Bob sometimes destroys the shared entanglement and Alice worries about this. At a later time, Bob wishes to confirm that Alice has honestly sent the entangled state, and Alice wishes to confirm that the entanglement has been maintained safely. Therefore, both wish to get the whole state in her/his hand, because the entanglement cannot be evaluated from their half of the state (this situation is analogous to quantum bit escrow [8] as we will discuss later).

Since both wishes cannot be satisfied simultaneously, let us introduce a coin flip to resolve this dilemma, and thus consider the following protocol:

Protocol 1 (sharing and maintaining entanglement)
Stage 1 (sharing): Alice prepares |φ⟩_{AB} = (|00⟩ + |11⟩)/√2 and sends the B qubit to Bob. This maximal entanglement is to be shared and maintained.

Stage 2 (coin flip): Alice and Bob execute a coin flipping subprotocol. If the output of the subprotocol is 0 (1), Alice (Bob) loses the coin flip.

Stage 3 (verification): The winner of the coin flip obtains both A and B qubits and checks whether or not the state of the AB qubits is |φ⟩ by a projective measurement. If the state is not |φ⟩, the party detects the...
cheating of the other party with nonzero probability.

Suppose that Alice is dishonest and sends a partially entangled state \( |\Phi(a)\rangle_{AB} = \sqrt{a} |00\rangle + \sqrt{1-a} |11\rangle \) \((1/2 < a \leq 1)\) instead of \( |\phi\rangle\) in the stage 1. Let \( P_d \) be the probability that Bob detects this cheating. The performance of the protocol is characterized by the minimal value of \( P_d \) for a given \( a \). Let us consider the case where a black-boxed coin flip is used in the stage 2. The allowable maximal (minimal) bias of the probability of the outcome 0 is \( \epsilon_{\text{max}} \) \((\epsilon_{\text{min}})\) and \( \epsilon_{\text{min}} < 0 < \epsilon_{\text{max}} \). Exploiting this controllable bias range, Alice tries to decrease \( P_d \). However, as proved later, the best strategy is to constantly bias the probability to 1/2+\( \epsilon_{\text{min}} \), and to send the A qubit as it is in the stage 3, when she loses the coin flip. Namely,

\[
P_d \geq P_d^{\text{box}} = \left( \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon_{\text{min}} \right) \text{tr} \left[ |\Phi(a)\rangle \langle \Phi(a)| (I - |\phi\rangle \langle \phi|) \right] = \left( \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon_{\text{min}} \right) \left( \frac{1}{2} - \sqrt{a(1-a)} \right).
\]  

(1)

Our concern is whether or not a QCF can provide the same performance. To investigate this, let us recall a unitary model of a QCF [3, 7], where all classical communication is replaced by quantum communication and all measurements are postponed until the end of the protocol. We can thus assume that Alice or Bob’s operation in each round is a unitary transformation. Following the model in [3], let \( |\psi_{\text{ini}}\rangle \) be an initial state of the protocol. Alice first applies \( U_1 \) to her own qubits and sends some qubits to Bob, and then Bob applies \( U_2 \) and sends some qubits to Alice. They repeat this and the final state after all the rounds is \( |\psi_{\text{fin}}\rangle = (\cdots U_3 U_2 U_1) |\psi_{\text{ini}}\rangle \). Alice and Bob then measure \( |\psi_{\text{fin}}\rangle \) to obtain the outcome. When both are honest, they can obtain 0 or 1 with probability 1/2, and so \( |\psi_{\text{fin}}\rangle \) is decomposed such that \( |\psi_{\text{fin}}\rangle = |\psi_0\rangle + |\psi_1\rangle \), where \( |\psi_i\rangle \) is a part of leading to the outcome \( c \), \(|\psi_0\rangle|\psi_1\rangle = 0 \), and \( ||\psi_i||^2 = 1/2 \). Moreover, since both must know the outcome certainty, \( F(\hat{q}_{X,0}, \hat{q}_{X,1}) = 0 \), where \( F(\sigma, \varphi) = \text{tr} \left( \sqrt{\sigma^2 / 2} \varphi^{1/2} \right)^2 \) is the fidelity and \( \hat{q}_{X,c} \) is the normalized reduced state of \( |\psi_i\rangle \) for the party \( X = A, B \) [3].

Let \( \epsilon_{\text{max}} \) be the possible maximal bias for the outcome 0 of this QCF, which is achieved if Alice applies \( U_i' \) instead of \( U_1 \). The final state is then \( |\psi_{\text{fin}}'\rangle = (\cdots U_3 U_2 U_1) |\psi_{\text{ini}}\rangle = |\psi_0\rangle + |\psi_1\rangle \), where \( |\psi_0\rangle|\psi_1\rangle = 0 \) and \( ||\psi_i'||^2 = 1/2 + \epsilon_{\text{max}} \). Moreover, \( \hat{q}_{B,c} \) which is the reduced state of \( |\psi_c'||\rangle \), must not be conclusively distinguished from \( \hat{q}_{B,c} \) by Bob so that the cheating is insensitive [hence supp(\( \hat{q}_{B,c} \)) \( \subseteq \) supp(\( \hat{q}_{B,c} \)) where supp(\( \hat{q} \)) denotes the support space of \( \hat{q} \)] Since Alice must know the outcome certainty, \( F(\hat{q}_{A,0}', \hat{q}_{A,1}') = 0 \); otherwise the cheating is sensitive due to the disagreement of their outcomes. Likewise, let \( \epsilon_{\text{min}} \) be the minimal bias that is achieved by \( U_i'' \). The corresponding final state, the reduced state, and so on, are also indicated by the double prime. These satisfy the same conditions as in the \( \epsilon_{\text{max}} \) case, except \( ||\psi_i''||^2 = 1/2 + \epsilon_{\text{min}} \).

Now, let us consider Alice’s cheating strategy for the protocol 1. In the QCF subprotocol executed in the stage 2, she applies the controlled unitary transformations

\[
O_i = |0\rangle\langle 0|_A \otimes U_i'' + |1\rangle\langle 1|_A \otimes U_i''
\]  

(2)

to \(|\Phi(a)\rangle_{AB} \otimes |\psi_{\text{ini}}\rangle \). The whole state after all the rounds of the QCF subprotocol is

\[
\begin{align*}
\sqrt{a} |00\rangle_{AB} \otimes (|\psi_0''\rangle + |\psi_1''\rangle) + \sqrt{1-a} |11\rangle_{AB} \otimes (|\psi_0''\rangle + |\psi_1''\rangle) = \\
\sqrt{a} |0\rangle_{AB} \otimes (|\psi_0''\rangle + |\psi_1''\rangle) + \sqrt{1-a} |1\rangle_{AB} \otimes (|\psi_0''\rangle + |\psi_1''\rangle).
\end{align*}
\]  

(3)

The first two and the last two terms in Eq. (3) lead to the outcomes 0 and 1, respectively. Since Bob’s reduced state of the system employed for the QCF is \( a\hat{q}_{B,c}' + (1-a)\hat{q}_{B,c}'' \) for the outcome \( c \), and supp(\( \hat{q}_{B,c}' \)) \( \subseteq \) supp(\( \hat{q}_{B,c}'' \)), he knows the outcome certainty by a regular measurement. Alice’s reduced state is \( a|0\rangle\langle 0|_A \otimes \hat{q}_{A,c}' + (1-a)|1\rangle\langle 1|_A \otimes \hat{q}_{A,c}'' \), and she can obtain the outcome certainty using the projector \( |0\rangle\langle 0|_A \otimes \Pi_{c}' + |1\rangle\langle 1|_A \otimes \Pi_{c}' \), where \( \Pi_{c}' \) \( (\Pi_{c}'') \) distinguishes \( \hat{q}_{A,c}' \) and \( \hat{q}_{A,c}' \) \( (\hat{q}_{A,c}'' \) and \( \hat{q}_{A,c}'' \)). These projectors exist because \( F(\hat{q}_{B,0}', \hat{q}_{B,0}'') = F(\hat{q}_{B,0}', \hat{q}_{B,0}'') = 0 \). Suppose that the outcome of the QCF is 0; the state of the AB qubits will be checked by Bob in the stage 3. Before Alice sends the A qubit to Bob, she applies \( |0\rangle\langle 0|_A \otimes I + |1\rangle\langle 1|_A \otimes V \), where \( V \) maximizes the overlap between \( |\psi_0''\rangle \) and \( |\psi_0''\rangle \) such that \( ||\psi_0''\rangle || \sqrt{V} ||\psi_0''\rangle ||^2 = ||\psi_0''\rangle ||^2 \). Through this procedure, the whole state becomes \( |\psi_{\text{final}}\rangle = \sqrt{a} |00\rangle_{AB} \otimes |\psi_0''\rangle + \sqrt{1-a} |11\rangle_{AB} \otimes V |\psi_0''\rangle \), and \( P_d \) in this strategy is

\[
P_d^Q = \text{tr} \left( |\Psi_0\rangle \langle \Psi_0| (I - |\phi\rangle \langle \phi|)_{AB} \right) = \\
\frac{1}{2} \left[ a \left( \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon_{\text{min}} \right) + (1-a) \left( \frac{3}{2} + \epsilon_{\text{max}} \right) \right] - \left[ a \left( \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon_{\text{min}} \right) \left( \frac{3}{2} + \epsilon_{\text{max}} \right) \right]^{1/2}
\]  

(4)

where \( F = F(\hat{q}_{A,0}', \hat{q}_{A,0}'') \). Comparing Eqs. (1) and (4), it is found that \( P_d^Q < P_d^{\text{box}} \) if \( 1 > a > \frac{r-1}{2 \sqrt{(r-1)^2 + (r-1)^2}} \)

\[
F > 1/r \equiv (1 + 2\epsilon_{\text{min}})/(1 + 2\epsilon_{\text{max}})
\]  

(5)

This result shows that, if a QCF has the property of Eq. (5), there exists a finite range of \( a \) in which \( P_d^Q < P_d^{\text{box}} \). Therefore, it is concluded that such a QCF cannot provide the performance of a black-boxed coin flip.

The point of the above cheating strategy is that it is possible to superpose two biasing operations \( U_i' \) and \( U_i'' \). This enables to correlate the state of the AB qubits with the outcome of the QCF such that the state is more entangled than \( |\Phi(a)\rangle_{AB} \) whenever Alice loses the QCF (and thus \( P_d \) decreases). For this purpose, Alice utilizes the difference of \( ||\psi_0''||^2 \) and \( ||\psi_1''||^2 \) (i.e., difference of \( \epsilon_{\text{max}} \) and \( \epsilon_{\text{min}} \)). However, this procedure has created undesired entanglement between the AB qubits and the system employed for the QCF, and so Alice needs to disentangle them; otherwise the entanglement of the AB qubits will be washed out by the undesired entanglement. This is done by increasing the overlap between \( |\psi_0''\rangle \) and \( |\psi_1''\rangle \).

Note that the disentangling process is incomplete (unless
to decrease
positive operator valued measurement (POVM) of the
dishonest action in the stage 1 is to perform the following
metric with respect to parties, if we assume that Bob’s
fidelity for some of the proposed QCF protocols is also
the black-boxed coin flip with the same bias range. The
side the gray region, the QCF is distinguishable from
F

local ancilla qubit and she prepares the initial state
following biasing operation: Suppose that Alice has a
subscript
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plies ˜

the maximal and minimal bias for each QCF protocol.
So, let us now prove Eq. (1). The general action of dishonest Alice when deciding on the bias of a
black-boxed coin flip is described by a POVM {L}_i of the A qubit (|dL_i L_e = 1_A). The probability of the outcome 0
is then biased to \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon, and \langle \Phi(a) | A | B \rangle will be checked by Bob with this probability. Before sending the A qubit, she can apply a trace-preserving operation regarding \epsilon,
but this is included in \text{L}_e. Moreover, the singlet fraction
\langle \sigma | \Phi(a) | B \rangle is bounded as \langle \sigma | N_B(\sigma) | 2, where N_B(\sigma) is negativity \text{[13]} [the subscript denotes the partial transposition with respect to the \text{B} qubit]. Since \text{N}_B is an entanglement monotone \text{[13]}, the average cannot be increased by the local operation of the POVM. Hence,

P_d = \int_{\epsilon_{\text{min}}}^{\epsilon_{\text{max}}} d\epsilon \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon \text{tr} [L_e | \Phi(a) \rangle \langle \Phi(a) | L_e (I - |\phi \rangle \langle \phi |)]
\geq \frac{1}{2} \epsilon_{\text{min}} [1 - \int d\epsilon N_B(\sigma) | \Phi(a) \rangle \langle \Phi(a) | L_e ]
\geq \frac{1}{2} \epsilon_{\text{min}} \left[ 1 - N_B | \Phi(a) \rangle \right],

and we have Eq. (11), because N_B | \Phi(a) \rangle = 2 |\sqrt{a(1-a)} - 1 |

So far, we have focused on the comparison through \text{P}_d. Now, we concentrate on a case where \text{P}_d = 0; the probability of detecting cheating is strictly zero, and so the state of the \text{AB} qubits must be precisely |\phi \rangle when it is checked in the stage 3. The performance of the protocol 1 is then characterized by the maximal allowed value of a for a dishonest party. Suppose again that Alice is dishonest. For a black-boxed coin flip, it is found from Eq. (11) that a = \frac{1}{2} must hold regardless of the bias range; so she cannot cheat at all under \text{P}_d = 0, as expected. For a QCF, however, it is found from Eq. (11) that \text{P}_d = 0 even for a > 1/2 if F = 1. This occurs for an arbitrary pair of biasing operations as far as the pair of operations

\text{F} = 1, and as a result, the state of the \text{AB} qubits (the reduced state of |\Psi_0) is a mixed state. Equation (9) agrees with the condition that this mixed state is more
entangled than |\Phi(a) \rangle in the measure of negativity \text{[13]}

As shown above, a QCF does not provide the performance of a black-boxed coin flip, if it satisfies Eq. (6).
To further investigate this, let us introduce the following biasing operation: Supppose that Alice has a
local ancilla qubit and she prepares the initial state
|\psi_{\text{init}} \rangle \otimes (\sqrt{1 - a}|0 \rangle_a + \sqrt{a}|1 \rangle_a) for the QCF, where the
subscript a denotes the ancilla qubit. Then, if she applies \text{U}_i = U_0 \otimes |0 \rangle_a \langle 0 |a + U'_0 \otimes |1 \rangle_a \langle 1 | a to the initial state
[do not confuse this with Eq. (2)], the QCF is biased by \epsilon_{\text{min}}. Moreover, when the outcome is 0, Bob’s
reduced state is \tilde{\rho}_{B,0} = \rho_{B,0} + \epsilon (\rho_{B,0}' - \rho_{B,0}), and hence
F(x) = F(\tilde{\rho}_{B,0}, \rho_{B,0}) = 1 - O(x^2) \text{[14]}. Now, let us imagine
a special circumstance where Alice’s ability’s restricted such that she can only use \text{U}_i for biasing the QCF
(the point is that she cannot directly employ \text{U}'_0). As a result, the bias of the QCF is restricted within \{\epsilon_{\text{min}}, 0\}, and therefore, it may be natural to compare it with the
black-boxed coin flip with the same bias range. Then, if Alice adopts the cheating strategy like Eq. (2), where \text{U}_i and \text{U}'_i are superposed as \text{O}_i = \text{O}_0 \otimes \text{U}_i + \text{O}_1 \otimes \text{U}'_i to decrease \text{P}_d, we have Eq. (5) in which \epsilon_{\text{max}} and \epsilon_{\text{min}} is replaced by 0 and \epsilon_{\text{max}}, respectively; so \text{P}_d < \text{P}_d^\text{box}
if F(x) > 1 + 2 \epsilon_{\text{max}}. However, this fidelity condition is
always satisfied for x \rightarrow 0 because F(x) = 1 - O(x^2) as mentioned above. The same discussion holds if the bias is
restricted within [0, x_{\text{max}}]. In this way, an arbitrary QCF is distinguishable from a black-boxed coin flip (as \text{P}_d < \text{P}_d^\text{box}) unless the QCF is unbiased against insensitive
cheating (if we compare them around \epsilon = 0).

To see these results graphically, the following two bounds are plotted in Fig. 1.

(I) F(\epsilon) > 1/(1 + 2\epsilon) for \epsilon_{\text{min}} = 0 and \epsilon = x_{\text{max}} \geq 0,

(II) F(\epsilon) > 1 + 2\epsilon \quad \text{for } \epsilon_{\text{max}} = 0 \text{ and } \epsilon = x_{\text{min}} \leq 0.

If the fidelity F of the QCF, whose bias is forcibly restricted within (I) \{0, \epsilon\} and (II) \{\epsilon, 0\}, is located
outside the gray region, the QCF is distinguishable from the black-boxed coin flip with the same bias range. The fidelity for some of the proposed QCF protocols is also plotted for a comparison.

All of the above discussions hold when Bob is dishonest. This is because the protocol 1 is essentially sym-
metric with respect to parties, if we assume that Bob’s
dishonest action in the stage 1 is to perform the following
positive operator valued measurement (POVM) of the \text{B} qubit:

M_0 = \sqrt{a} |0 \rangle \langle 0 | + \sqrt{1 - a} |1 \rangle \langle 1 |,

M_1 = \sqrt{1 - a} |0 \rangle \langle 0 | + \sqrt{a} |1 \rangle \langle 1 |,

where M_0 \otimes M_0^\dagger M_1 \otimes M_1^\dagger = \text{I}_B. Depending on the outcome of the
POVM, the post-measured state becomes |\Phi(a) \rangle_{AB}
or |\Phi(1 - a) \rangle_{AB}, each with probability 1/2. He then tries
to decrease \text{P}_d. For |\Phi(a) \rangle, the same cheating strategy as
used with dishonest Alice is applicable. This is the case for
|\Phi(1 - a) \rangle, if the role of |0 \rangle_B and |1 \rangle_B is exchanged in the
controlled operations of the cheating strategy. Then, we
have the same bound for F = F(\tilde{\rho}_{A,1}, \tilde{\rho}_{A,1}), but \epsilon_{\text{max}} and \epsilon_{\text{min}} must be read as those for the outcome 1 of
the QCF. This implies that a QCF must be unbiased on
both Alice and Bob’s sides simultaneously, so that it is
indistinguishable from a black-boxed coin flip.

So, let us now prove Eq. (11). The general action of dishonest Alice when deciding on the bias of a
black-boxed coin flip is described by a POVM \{L}_i of the A qubit (\text{\int dL}_i ^L_i = \text{I}_A). The probability of the outcome 0
is then biased to \text{\frac{1}{2}} + \epsilon, and \langle \Phi(a) | b | A, B \rangle will be checked by Bob with this probability. Before sending the A qubit, she can apply a trace-preserving operation regarding \epsilon,
but this is included in \text{L}_e. Moreover, the singlet fraction
\langle \sigma | \Phi(a) | B \rangle is bounded as \langle \sigma | N_B(\sigma) \rangle \text{[13]} [the subscript denotes the partial transposition with respect to the \text{B} qubit]. Since \text{N}_B is an entanglement monotone \text{[13]}, the average cannot be increased by the local operation of the POVM. Hence,

P_d = \int_{\epsilon_{\text{min}}}^{\epsilon_{\text{max}}} d\epsilon \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon \text{tr} [L_e | \Phi(a) \rangle \langle \Phi(a) | L_e (I - |\phi \rangle \langle \phi |)]
\geq \frac{1}{2} \epsilon_{\text{min}} [1 - \int d\epsilon N_B(\sigma) | \Phi(a) \rangle \langle \Phi(a) | L_e ]
\geq \frac{1}{2} \epsilon_{\text{min}} \left[ 1 - N_B | \Phi(a) \rangle \right],

where \text{N}_B | \Phi(a) \rangle = 2 |\sqrt{a(1-a)} - 1 |.

FIG. 1: Bound for fidelity (F) as function of bias (\epsilon). If a
QCF is located outside the gray region, it is distinguishable
from a black-boxed coin flip. The fidelity for the QCF pro-
tocols proposed in \text{[3, 4, and 11] is also plotted, where we
assumed dishonest Bob. Two ends of each line correspond to
the maximal and minimal bias for each QCF protocol.
satisfies $F = 1$. So, by replacing $\epsilon_{\text{max}}$ and $\epsilon_{\text{min}}$ in Eq. 4 with $\epsilon'$ and $\epsilon''$, respectively, we have $P_d^Q = 0$ if $a = 1/2 + \epsilon' - \epsilon''/[2(1+\epsilon' + \epsilon'')]$ and $F(q_B^B, q_B'B, 0') = 1$. Basically, if the QCF has a property of
\begin{equation}
\Delta a \equiv \max_{\epsilon', \epsilon''} \frac{\epsilon' - \epsilon''}{2(1 + \epsilon' + \epsilon'')} > 0,
\end{equation}

Alice can successfully cheat because $a = 1/2 + \Delta a > 1/2$ while $P_d^Q = 0$. The maximization in Eq. 5 is taken over all the pairs of the two biasing operations ($\epsilon'$ and $\epsilon''$) subject to $F(q_B^B, q_B0, 0'') = 1$. Such a QCF also cannot provide the performance of a black-boxed coin flip, and even allows the cheating that is completely prohibited by a black-boxed coin flip. Note that the same discussion holds again for dishonest Bob $|\epsilon'$ and $\epsilon''$ are those for the outcome 1 and $F(q_B^B, q_B0, 0'') = 1$.

As a simple example, let us analyze the following protocol 14 (this is not a true QCF because the probability of the outcome is not 1/2 even if both are honest, but the above cheating strategy is applicable):

**Protocol 2 (QCF like):** Alice prepares $|\phi\rangle_{CD}$ and sends the D qubit to Bob. He optionally checks $|\phi\rangle_{CD}$ (getting the $C$ qubit). If he uses the option, this protocol automatically outputs 1. Otherwise, he measures the D qubit in the $\{\{0\}, \{1\}\}$ basis, sends the result to Alice, and she confirms the validity by measuring the $C$ qubit. This protocol then outputs the measurement result.

In this protocol, it is confirmed that $F(q_B^B, q_B0, 0'') = 1$ for Bob's two biasing operations of (i) he always uses the option ($\epsilon' = 1/2$, and (ii) he measures the D qubit, and if the result is 1, he uses the option ($\epsilon'' = 0$). Hence, we have $\Delta a \geq 1/6$ and $A = 2/3$ from Eq. 5. On the other hand, it can be shown that $a \leq 2/3$ for Bob's general action [17]. Therefore, it is found that the cheating strategy considered in this paper has optimally maximized $a$ under $P_d = 0$. This is the case for the 3-round protocol in 8 ($a = \cos \frac{\pi}{3}$) and for the optimal 3-round protocol in [6] ($a = 3/4$), for which we assumed dishonest Bob. Apart from the optimality of the strategy, the QCF protocols of 8 10 11 also have the property of $\Delta a > 0$, at least, on either side of parties.

As mentioned before, the situation considered in this paper is analogous to quantum bit escrow 8 (it is in fact regarded as its entanglement version).

**Protocol 3 (quantum bit escrow)**

**Stage 1 (commitment):** To commit to $b = 0$ (1), Alice prepares either $|0\rangle_B$ or $|\rangle_B$ $(|1\rangle_B$ or $|\rangle_B$), each with probability 1/2, which is written as $|\xi_{bx}\rangle$ where $x$ denotes the encoding basis. She then sends the $B$ qubit to Bob.

**Stage 2 (opening):** Alice reveals $b$.

**Stage 3 (verification):** Either Alice or Bob obtains the $B$ qubit and checks whether or not it is $|\xi_{bx}\rangle$ to detect cheating (Alice reveals $x$ if Bob checks the state).

This is a weak variant of QBC such that either Alice or Bob can detect cheating with nonzero probability. The question of whether or not it is possible to use a biased QCF for the purpose of deciding which party will check the $B$ qubit in the stage 3 was raised in 8. If this is so, the resultant protocol is cheat-sensitive QBC (CSQBC) 8 10, which enables both to detect cheating, albeit with smaller nonzero probability.

However, since the resultant CSQBC has the same structure as in the protocol 1, it struggles with the difference between a QCF and a black-boxed coin flip. For example, if $\Delta a > 0$, dishonest Bob can steal partial information about $b$ before the opening stage by a POVM like in Eq. 6 (whose $\{\{0\}, \{1\}\}$ basis is replaced by an appropriate one to steal the information 17). Alice cannot detect his cheating because he can precisely recover $|\xi_{bx}\rangle$ from a state collapsed by the POVM whenever he loses the QCF, as he recovers $|\phi\rangle$ from $|\Phi(a)\rangle$ or $|\Phi(1-a)\rangle$. Likewise, if $\Delta a > 0$, dishonest Alice can change the probability of revealing $b = 0$ in the opening stage 18. Therefore, a QCF that is combined with bit escrow should not satisfy Eq. 8 on both sides of parties. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the example of CSQBC suggested in 8, and even in 10. We described the cheating method for those in 17. Note that, as far as we know, an explicit protocol for secure CSQBC has not been found yet 17, contrary to the widespread belief that CSQBC is possible.

To summarize, we considered the problem of sharing and maintaining entanglement between distrustful parties, and showed that a QCF cannot provide the performance of a black-boxed coin flip, if it satisfies the fidelity conditions of Eqs. 5 or 8. Such a QCF obviously does not fulfill the conditions for universally composable (UC) security 19; the demands for ensuring the security of a cryptographic primitive regardless of how it is used in applications 20. This result is quite contrast to quantum key distribution (QKD), where a QKD protocol is automatically UC secure if it satisfies the general security conditions 21. Moreover, through a comparison within a small restricted bias range, we showed that an arbitrary QCF is distinguishable from a black-boxed coin flip unless it is unbiased on both sides of parties against insensitive cheating, i.e., unless it is a cheat-sensitive unbiased QCF. Finally, we discussed the relation to CSQBC constructed from bit escrow and a QCF, and pointed out the difficulty in developing secure CSQBC in terms of the incomposability condition of Eq. 5. We wish these results could shed some light on the important open problem of whether or not quantum mechanics enables cheat-sensitive bit commitment and cheat-sensitive unbiased coin flipping.

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