Regionalism from without: External involvement of the EU in regionalism in southern Africa

Stephen Robert Buzdugan

Department of Management, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK

ABSTRACT

Theories and analyses of regionalism, from both ‘orthodox’ and ‘critical’ strands of international political economy (IPE), have tended to conceptualise regional integration as a process led by intra-regional actors typically in reaction to external forces such as globalisation and the hegemonic power of international actors. This article sheds new light on theories of regionalism by arguing that international actors can have a direct and significant influence on the dynamics of regionalism, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, by examining the influence of the European Union (EU) on the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Building on the recent literature on Africa and international relations, which shows how lines of sovereignty between domestic and international actors are blurred in the case of African political economies, the article shows how the EU played a significant role in the SADC’s inception and has been directly influential in shaping the SADC’s strategies and priorities in the post-Lomé period. In the latter instance, this article explains how the EU’s institutional embeddedness in the SADC’s aid structures and its asymmetrical bargaining power in the SADC Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) has encouraged the SADC’s pursuit of a neoliberal, trade-oriented form of regionalism.

KEYWORDS

Regionalism; SADC; European Union; the political economy of aid and trade; Africa; Economic Partnership Agreements.

From the earliest formulations of theories of regional integration in the 1940s and 1950s, regionalism has been conceptualised as a process led by states within a defined region in order to benefit from closer economic and political ties. This understanding of regionalism as being initiated and
sustained by a region’s member states is a conceptual thread that started with functionalism and neofunctionalism and has run through, without re-examination, theories of international relations (IR) and international political economy (IPE), from neorealist and new institutionalist theories of IR to ‘orthodox’ and ‘critical’ theories of IPE. Thus, analyses of regionalism have tended to focus on states within regional institutions on questions such as how and why integration has emerged, the benefits or losses (either economic, political or social) from integration and how the region has reacted to extra-regional forces such as hegemonic states and processes of globalisation. This inward focus has especially been the case in analyses of regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa, where ‘weak’ states (Gibb, 2009: 717–8; Harrison, 2004: 237–8), ‘weak’ regional institutions (UNECA, 2006: 7) or the espousal of a neoliberal economic model by regions and their member states (Grant and Söderbaum, 2003: 8; Taylor, 2003: 313) have been identified as explanations for the dynamics (and indeed, the failures) of integration.

It is striking that these studies, despite their considerable relevance to the case of regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa and the light that they have shed onto its shortcomings, have omitted the direct involvement of international political actors, particularly international donors, in shaping the nature of regions and the process of regionalism and development in Africa. As Björn Hettne (2005a: 555) has argued:

Even if the external environment and globalisation are often readily called into account, extra-regional actors themselves are also generally weakly described and conceptualised within the study of regionalism. This is somewhat surprising, given the considerable attention which ‘external’ actors – such as foreign powers, donors, international financial institutions, non-governmental organisations, transnational corporations and so on – receive in the study of national and local transformation processes, especially in the South. In the final analysis, it is not really a question of state-led regionalism versus non-state-led regionalism. On the contrary, ‘state, market, civil society and external actors often come together in a variety of mixed-actor collectivities, networks and modes of regional governance’.

Although several attempts have been made to include the role of international actors in the framework of analysis on regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa, these have been either incomplete or insufficient. For instance, Grugel and Hout (1999: 10) suggest that, theoretically, regionalism amongst poor countries in the ‘periphery’ ‘may sometimes be pushed by external actors and the changing global order more than domestic groups’. However, beyond stating this possibility, they do not elaborate on the means by which international actors influence the dynamics of regionalism amongst poor countries and what effect this has on these regions theoretically or
empirically. In particular, the chapter on regionalism in Africa in their volume, authored by Daniel Bach, does not address the role of international actors on sub-Saharan African regions, with the exception of a brief mention of France’s involvement in the monetary affairs of the African Financial Community (CFA) zone (Bach, 1999: 155). Instead, Bach’s chapter focuses on ‘trans-state’ processes, whereby he argues that ‘informal’ or illicit networks and institutions are an important or, as he states, a de facto feature of regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa (Bach, 1999: 155). In this way, Bach confines the analysis of regionalism to the structures, processes and actors internal to any particular region with Africa.

Similarly, at a broad level, Fawcett and Gandois’s (2010) recent analysis of regionalism in Africa and the Middle East acknowledges the influence of international actors as a key factor explaining the development of regionalism in these areas. Yet, in their brief discussion of this point, which is mainly based on relations of security, they argue that the significance of this factor may apply to the start of some regionalist projects in sub-Saharan Africa in the post-independence period but not as significantly to the post-Cold War period due to the withdrawal of superpower involvement in Africa into the 1990s. As such, Fawcett and Gandois (2010: 624) state that ‘[international] actors may be important in the start-up of regionalism whether in Africa, Europe or elsewhere, but in consolidating regionalism their role changes’. Yet, with respect to western and southern Africa, they maintain that the influence of European involvement in the case of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the 1970s was limited to a ‘stimulus’ effect and that its creation in was ‘predominantly the result of regional dynamics’; and in the case of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), they argue that its formation in 1980 (as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference) was also due to ‘regional dynamics’, in countering the power of South Africa, and make no reference is made any external involvement during its creation (Fawcett and Gandois, 2010: 620–1). Furthermore, Fawcett and Gandois state that at the end of the Cold War withdrawal or ‘constructive disengagement’ of external powers with African regions led to intra-regional factors increasingly influencing the dynamics of regionalism from that point forward:

In Africa, though external influences were certainly present in the post-colonial/early independence and Cold War period as illustrated, after the end of the Cold War not only did Russia withdraw, but the United States and the two former colonial powers that maintained an interest in the region adopted a policy of ‘constructive disengagement’ . . . with each country reaching independently the conclusion that they would refrain from unilateral intervention in African conflicts without Security Council authorisation and should, as an alternative, refocus their efforts on peacekeeping training for
African troops... This disengagement, coupled with the multiplication of crises during the 1990s that fuelled the *internal demand for regionalism*, provided fertile ground for the revival of regional organisations in Africa. (Fawcett and Gandois, 2010: 624, emphasis added)

Thus, through a limited analysis based on international security factors rather than the wider context of historical political-economic relations between sub-Saharan African regions and dominant international actors, they offer the sweeping conclusion that ‘Africa, like Europe, was able to consolidate and sustain regionalism because the demand for regionalism came from the member states and *no external great power was directly involved*’ (Fawcett and Gandois, 2010: 624–5, emphasis added).

This article challenges this conclusion and seeks to address the historical lack of theoretical and empirical attention to the role of international actors in the dynamics of regionalism in IR and IPE by analysing the influence of international donors on the SADC, particularly the European Union (EU) as the SADC’s largest donor and trading partner. Theoretically, this article builds on the works of Clapham (1996) and Taylor and Williams (2004), which have emphasised that the key to understanding contemporary African political economies in the world order is to analyse the ways in which the international system and dominant international actors have interacted with Africa in the post-colonial and post-Cold War periods (Taylor and Williams, 2004: 2–3), and shows how they can inform theories and analyses of regionalism. In this way, this article expands on Clapham’s (1996) argument that the nature of sovereignty in sub-Saharan African political economies blurs the lines between domestic and international actors, showing how this phenomenon applies at the regional level through the direct influence of the EU on regionalism in the SADC case. Thus, taking into account the wider pattern of historical political and economic relations between dominant international actors and sub-Saharan African political economies allows for a key assumption in IR and IPE theories of regionalism – that integration is initiated and directed by intra-regional actors – to be reconsidered.

From this perspective, this article shows that, in the case of the SADC, as with other African political economies, reliance on international donors for aid and trade has resulted in what Clapham (1996: 184) has termed the ‘external penetration of domestic policy-making’. In essence, EU involvement in the SADC represents, within this context, a case of ‘post-conditionality’ politics (Harrison, 2001), whereby:

... intervention is not exercised solely through conditionality, but also to a significant degree through a closer involvement in state institutions and the employment of incentive finance. This constitutes a less visible but perhaps more powerful role for donors. (Harrison, 2001: 660)
As we shall see, the insights gained from analysing the relationship between international actors such as the EU and the SADC contribute to a more complete understanding of the dynamics of regionalism in southern Africa and indeed of regionalism within the broader IR and IPE literature than one limited to the examination of intra-regional factors.

Furthermore, these insights challenge the manner in which relations between the EU and regions such as the SADC in sub-Saharan Africa have been conceptualised in the recent literature on ‘interregionalism’. The literature on interregionalism distinguishes between ‘core regions, peripheral regions and, between them, intermediate regions’ (Hettne, 2005b: 277) – with the ‘triad’ of Europe, North America and East Asia representing the core; regions such as the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) representing intermediate regions; and regions such as the SADC representing peripheral regions (Hettne, 2005b: 277–8). From within the core, the EU is considered to be the ‘hub’ of relations that are increasingly interregional in character:

To get some order in [the] emerging cobweb of relations between regions, one can relate to the three above-mentioned structural levels: core regions, intermediate regions and peripheral regions. That the EU constitutes the hub of these arrangements is in full accordance with its regionalist ideology, encompassing not only trade and foreign investment but also political dialogue and cultural relations between regions. The EU ambition is also to formalise the relations (now called ‘partnerships’) as being between two regional bodies rather than bilateral contacts between countries . . . (Hettne, 2005b: 279–80)

The model of formal interregional relations between the EU and other regions takes bilateralism between countries, however, as its analogue. In the special issue on interregionalism in the *Journal of European Integration* (2005, Volume 27, Issue 3), edited by Söderbaum and van Langenhove, the term ‘pure interregionalism’ is used by Aggarwal and Fogarty (2005) ‘to signify when the EU has relations only with one distinct and formally organised counterpart region, for instance a free trade area or customs union, as exemplified by the EU’s interregional free trade area with Mercosur’. In this way, interactions between the EU and other, formal, regions is considered ‘bilateral’ in nature:

. . . there is an overlap between bilateralism and interregionalism, since a bilateral relationship between two regions (as actors) leads to interregionalism. . . . In this context, it is particularly important to acknowledge that the EU can act as one collective regional actor in a bilateral relationship or, perhaps even more importantly, be seen as ‘one’ by outsiders, for instance, when signing a cooperation agreement or when disbursing aid. Therefore, the EU is the half of the
‘bilateral’ relationship with another actor (which may be a state or a region or multilateral institution). (Söderbaum and van Langenhove, 2005: 259, emphasis added)

Whilst this article supports this view of the EU’s ‘actorness’, it challenges the idea of a ‘bilateral’ relationship between the EU and the SADC from the perspective of the literature on African political economy. The notion of a ‘bilateral’ relationship between the EU and the SADC in the literature on interregionalism implies that the SADC is bounded by an internal dimension of sovereignty, similar to that of a Westphalian state, in its interactions with the EU.¹ This article argues instead that the SADC, in an African political context, has a strong international dimension of sovereignty whereby international actors such as the EU play a direct role in the definition and activities of the region due to its historical relations with dominant international actors and its economic and political weaknesses in the world order. Therefore, this article argues that interregionalism in this case is not one of the EU and the SADC (or one of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’) but rather one of the EU within the SADC.

Thus, this article will show how external actors were instrumental in the formation of the SADC in 1980 (under its previous name of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, or SADCC), how the EU has motivated the SADC’s pursuit of a free trade-oriented development strategy and how the EU has influenced a reconfiguration of membership in the regional organisations of southern and eastern Africa through the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiation process. The SADC has historically relied on high levels of donor funding to sustain both the organisation and its development projects. As the last report of donor funding shows, international funds continue to account for a large proportion (72.36 per cent) of the 2011/2012 SADC budget (SADC, 2011). The focus on the EU is due to it being both the largest contributor of aid to the SADC and the region’s largest trading partner (as will be shown in more detail below). Furthermore, the EU acts as the lead international cooperating partner (ICP) within the SADC–ICP Joint Task Force (JTF), an institutional feature introduced within the SADC in 2003, which has embedded international donors within the organisation and contributed to post-conditionality politics.

This article will first briefly expand on the international nature of sovereignty in sub-Saharan Africa and argue that dominant theories of regionalism, from both ‘orthodox’ and ‘critical’ strands of international political economy (IPE), have not adequately accounted for the influence of international actors within their frameworks. Next, the article will show how this particular form of sovereignty was at work within the origins of the SADC organisation (as the SADCC) in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
whereby international actors had a strong influence on its creation and its early operations. With this groundwork laid out, the article moves into the more contemporary era to demonstrate the influence of the EU on the SADC in the post-Lomé period, showing how the structure of its aid relationship with the SADC (and its associated EU–SADC development strategy) has motivated the pursuit of a free trade agenda in the region. Lastly, the article will focus on the EU–SADC EPA and the manner in which the negotiations and the EU’s preference to end overlapping membership in regional organisation (where one country is a member of multiple regions) has influenced a reconfiguration of regional alliances in southern and eastern Africa.

INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND THE DOMESTIC BIAS OF REGIONALISM THEORY

Within the African politics and IR/IPE literature, Christopher Clapham’s *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (1996) represented a landmark in conceptualising the relationship between African states and international structures and actors. The thrust of Clapham’s argument was that orthodox theories of international relations, which he claimed have tended to focus on the dominant states in the world order, have represented an incomplete understanding of international politics due to a lack of attention to the particular nature of ‘poor, weak and subordinate’ states and societies, such as those which compose much of sub-Saharan Africa (Clapham, 1996: 3). His argument rested on Robert Jackson’s (1990) concept of a ‘quasi-state’ amongst ‘Third World’ countries, in which state sovereignty differs significantly from that upon which the Westphalian model is based. Unlike Western European states, for instance, the ‘quasi-states’ of the ‘Third World’ depend on the international community for both their status of statehood, through international legal structures (such as the UN Charter) that recognised these territories and governments as states in the wake of decolonisation, and for material support to sustain their political economies, which they are unable to provide the adequate conditions for. Sovereignty in Jackson’s formulation exists in two forms: positive (or empirical) and negative (or juridical). Negative sovereignty is defined as a state’s ‘freedom from outside interference’ – a right understood in formal legal terms through the recognition of statehood by other states and by international institutions upon which classical principals of non-intervention and the ‘exclusive legal jurisdiction of states’ rests (Jackson, 1990: 27). Positive sovereignty, conversely, reflects states’ freedoms ‘to be their own masters’ and to act in the interests of their citizens (Jackson, 1990: 29).
Thus, quasi-states do not possess much positive, or empirical sovereignty, and must rely on international assistance. As Jackson (1990: 31) argues:

\[\ldots\] international aid is justified on the affirmative action grounds that independence is necessary, but not sufficient to enable ex-colonial states to become their own masters. Consequently, the positive norms and activities of contemporary international organization can be understood as an attempt \ldots to compensate for the shortage of positive sovereignty of quasi-states.

Clapham (1996) critically applied the main elements of the concept of quasi-states to highlight the strong international dimension of the nature of states in sub-Saharan Africa. Most significantly, he applied the idea of negative sovereignty to the process of state formation on the continent from the post 1945 period (particularly the 1950s and the 1960s when a large number of African states gained their independence) to the contemporary era of globalisation. In general, he argued that the:

\[\ldots\] recognition of formal statehood, protected by such international conventions as the Charter of the United Nations, conferred real power on the leaders of apparently powerless states. On the other hand, the power which these leaders exercised came to depend \ldots as much on the international system as on the support which they were able to derive from the people of the states which they governed.

(Clapham, 1996: 25)

Formal independence, he argues, contributed to an ‘artificiality’ of both the territorial demarcations of the states in sub-Saharan Africa as well as their sense of identity. With their domestic economic and political weaknesses, African states ‘had to look beyond their own frontiers in order to generate the resources that they needed in order to keep themselves going at home’ (Clapham, 1996: 73). This combination of the international dimension of state sovereignty and sub-Saharan African states’ reliance on international actors to sustain their economies has led to what Clapham (1996: 169) has called the ‘externalisation of economic management’ in sub-Saharan Africa.

Harrison (2001) and Thomas (2004) have both demonstrated that since the late 1990s and early 2000s, a new form of the externalisation of economic management in sub-Saharan Africa has taken shape, in which international donors have become more institutionally embedded in the state’s apparatuses of economic decision-making. Harrison (2001) has termed this new form of involvement, ‘post-conditionality politics’ as a means to distinguish it from the politics of conditionality that often accompanied World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s and early
1990s. The two key insights from Harrison’s work which are relevant here are that donor–state relations in sub-Saharan Africa have reached a point in which donor involvement in the state’s economy is far less coercive than in the former era of conditionality, and that donors have promoted their interests by becoming embedded within state institutions. With regard to the former point, Harrison (2001: 660) argues that donor–state interaction in the post-conditionality era has become more consensual in nature, as state elites have accepted, to a greater degree than in previous eras, a neoliberal perspective on economic strategy. As may be seen in the SADC case, a semblance of partnership between the SADC and international donors – such as in the use of the term ‘international cooperating partners’ (ICPs) to describe donors and the joint EU–SADC Regional Strategy Paper, discussed below – has masked the dominance of international actors. With regard to the second point in the notion of post-conditionality politics, Harrison (2001: 660) argues that since the late 1990s donors have become more institutionally embedded within government institutions responsible for setting and implementing economic strategy. This has been the case with regard to the SADC, which in 2003 created the SADC–ICP Joint Task Force – an institutional mechanism to bring in external donors within the organisation in order to improve funding coordination, monitoring and planning, which have affected the region’s economic strategy.

The concepts of the external nature of sovereignty, the externalisation of economic management and of post-conditionality politics above were formulated with respect to states in sub-Saharan Africa. This article shows that these phenomena apply directly to regions such as the SADC in sub-Saharan Africa as well. However, current theories of regionalism do not account for the involvement of external actors in the dynamics of regional integration. Both ‘orthodox’ and ‘critical’ strands of supra-national theories of regionalism share a common conceptualisation that states within a particular region act to form the region and direct its processes and strategy. Thus, both sets of theory have maintained David Mitrany’s (1943) and Ernst B. Haas’s (1958, 1964) early notion that states coalesce into formal regions through the cross-border activities of state and non-state actors pursuing their common interests. With respect to ‘orthodox’ theories, the new institutionalist perspectives have a theoretical basis in neofunctionalism (Mansfield and Milner, 1997: 6) and as such have carried over the concept of a set of states within a defined region creating a formal, supra-national institution through a long-term return of benefits (as opposed to costs) to these states. With respect to neorealism, the other dominant orthodox body of theory:

. . .  the politics of regionalism and the emergence of regionalist alignments have much in common with the politics of alliance formation.
Regionalism is understood by looking at the region from the outside in and by analyzing the place of the region in the broader international system. Regional groupings form in response to external challenges and there is no essential difference between economic and political regionalism. (Hurrell, 1995: 340)

Therefore, for neorealism, states may form regions in order to maintain a balance of power in the international system or within the region itself through the participation of a regional hegemon (Hurrell, 1995: 340–4). In either case, regionalism strictly excludes the direct participation of extra-regional actors in the neorealist formulation, as regions are seen to encapsulate states within the international system (even if they maintain open trade relations with the rest of the world).

With respect to theories of regionalism which emerge from a ‘critical’ perspective in IPE (Phillips, 2005: 9–14), of which the ‘world order approach’ (WOA) and the ‘new regionalism approach’ (NRA) stand out (Söderbaum, 2005: 232), regionalism is also considered principally an intra-regional process, despite the greater concern with the relationships between global structures, regions and state and non-state actors. The NRA, as Björn Hettne (the NRA’s chief exponent) argues, the new regionalism represents a ‘second movement’ arising from the ‘wish to halt or reverse the process of globalization’ and which seeks to ‘bring the globalization processes and the transnational transactions under some political–territorial control’ (Hettne, 1999: 6). In this way, ‘regions must . . . be understood as endogenous processes, emerging from within the geographical area in question’ (Hettne, 2005a: 548). Such a formulation excludes the theoretical possibility that extra-regional actors, particularly international donors, may be intrinsic to the process of regionalism, undermining efforts to assert ‘political–territorial control’ of the region. Similarly, the WOA, closely associated with the work of Anthony Payne and Andrew Gamble, ‘conceives of regionalism as a state-led or states-led project designed to reorganise a particular regional space along defined economic and political lines’ (Payne and Gamble, 1996: 2). States in this context ‘seek to accelerate, to modify, or occasionally to reverse the direction of social change’ of processes such as globalisation through regional integration (Gamble and Payne, 1996: 250). Thus, the approach is open to the possibility that regionalism may act to catalyse, rather than resist, processes of globalisation. Implicitly, however, the process of regionalism is assumed to be under the direction of intra-regional state actors, which experience and act through the ‘constraints and opportunities’ that globalisation present (Gamble and Payne, 1996: 250), and thus intra and extra-regional actors are kept conceptually separate. Intra-regional state actors may be exposed to the ‘constraints and opportunities’ of structures such as globalisation but they are accorded an implied degree of autonomy from external actors,
which African states have generally not had, over the nature and strategic direction of the region.

Thus, the dominant theories of regionalism above imply that the sovereignty to assert some form of political–economic control within its borders in the face of the power of external actors (such as hegemonic states) or forces of globalisation is inherited from its member states. However, in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, there is a strong external dimension to sovereignty that not only applies to a region’s member states as argued above, but also to the region itself. Put differently, the historical nature of relations between African states and external actors has established the political–economic context of relations between African regions (such as the SADC) and external actors, whereby the external nature of sovereignty and the externalisation of economic management apply directly to the region itself, independently of the region’s member states. As will be shown below in the SADC case, this external dimension of sovereignty was present in the origins of the organisation in the late 1970s and has continued in a post-conditionality form in the post-Lomé period with the EU in the 2000s.

**INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SADCC**

The direct influence of international donors on the process of regional integration in the SADC originates with the foundation of the organisation. As previously stated, the SADC was formed in 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference in the midst of increased tensions between South Africa and the states of southern Africa, as well as international calls for a ‘New International Economic Order’ (NIEO). The official account of the SADC’s origins states that the SADCC emerged out of the actions of the Frontline States (FLS), a mainly southern African political body initially ‘formed in an effort to isolate apartheid South Africa and bring an end to white minority rule in the country’ (Bauer and Taylor, 2005: 5), to promote a ‘coordinated’ and ‘collective’ effort towards development between Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (SADC, 2005: 11–12). However, by examining the early literature on the SADCC, a number of accounts reveal the strong influence of international actors in the creation and operation of the organisation in its initial years. For instance, Leys and Tostensen (1982: 52) acknowledged that the roots of the SADCC lay in meetings between the leaders of the Frontline States in 1979; yet they also argued that the SADCC was part of an initiative with ‘western states for a massive programme of reconstruction in southern Africa after years of war’. Anglin (1983: 685–6) went further and stated that the European Economic Community (EEC), or several of its officials, served as a ‘midwife’ in ‘discretely promoting the
birth of the SADCC’. He reported that David Anderson, the EEC delegate in Maseru, Lesotho, first proposed the idea of the SADCC in 1977 to influential intellectuals and academics in Zambia and Tanzania, as well as to a number of EEC officials, amongst others (Anglin, 1983: 685). Furthermore, he explained:

In the course of extensive consultations, the concept of ‘economic liberation’ came to the attention of Sir Seretse Khama [first president of Botswana] and immediately captured his imagination. Quickly seizing the initiative, he enlisted the support of his fellow FLS presidents, thereby pre-empting any possibility of undue EEC influence through the London Steering Committee [the interim secretariat of the FLS in London]. Thereafter, a series of high-level meetings took place in rapid succession. As a result, on 1 April 1980 the five Front-line States, joined by Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland, as well as nearly-independent Zimbabwe, solemnly signed the Lusaka Declaration on Economic Liberation that formally brought the SADCC into existence. (Anglin, 1983: 685–6)

Similarly, Christopher Hill (1983: 235) referred to Anderson as ‘if not an architect, at least a devoted master builder of SADCC’. More recently, Lee (2003: 48–9), relying on data from personal interviews with officials close to the SADC, writes that the direct involvement of international actors in the affairs of the organisation continued well into the 1980s, long after its establishment. As she states:

From the time the SADC Secretariat was established in Gaborone, until 1984, with the exception of the executive secretary [Arthur Blummeris from Zimbabwe] and his personal secretary, the office was staffed by British nationals, who also established SADC’s institutional structure. Nonetheless, the FLS bought into the idea of SADC and began to own it. The member states have remained committed to the organisation since its inception in 1980 and therefore SADC developed into a genuine African organisation. However, it was only after Blummeris’ death in 1984 that the SADC Secretariat experienced a transformation from being predominantly staffed by British nationals to being staffed by Africans from throughout the region. (Lee, 2003: 49)

Thus the manner in which the SADCC/SADC came into existence and initially operated defies the explanation given by the theoretical models of regionalism discussed above. Instead of a set of intra-regional state and non-state actors cooperating and creating a formal regional institution of their own accord through mutual self-interest, or as a reaction to an imbalance of power, the SADC was strongly shaped by the direct intervention of international actors. In this way, international actors acted as a catalyst
to the process of regional integration, whilst a set of enabling conditions such as the apartheid government of South Africa’s hostilities in the region and ideas amongst the SADC states of reducing economic dependence on both South Africa and the industrialised countries allowed the process of regionalism to emerge within southern Africa. This process, through the region’s own external dimension of sovereignty, allowed international actors – mainly donors such as the EEC/EU – a foothold in the organisation and influence over its policies and strategic direction, through relations of aid and trade, in the decades following its establishment.2

At the first official Summit of the SADCC, in Lusaka, Zambia on 1 April 1980, Seretse Khama’s address to the delegates of the newly formed organisation highlighted the paradoxical nature of the SADCC’s aims to reduce economic dependency and the requirement of donor support by the SADCC. In Khama’s address, he referred to an initial meeting held by representatives from Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, the main Frontline States, in 1979, in which the preliminary strategy of the SADCC had been sketched out:

... the Governments of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia took the initiative to convene a conference in Arusha, Tanzania in July last year to develop a strategy for economic liberation. The conference was also attended, at our invitation, by several bilateral and multilateral donor agencies and other organisations with whom we wanted to shape views on, and seek support for, this new policy dimension. It gratifies me to report that the response of the international community was most favourable indeed. (SADCC, 1980: 20)

Indeed, so crucial was the support of international donors that a second SADCC Summit (known as SADCC 2) immediately followed the first, and was convened in November 1980 in Maputo, Mozambique with the aim of securing donor funding for a long list of suggested development projects, prepared by Danish consultants (Leys and Tostensen, 1982: 53; Amin et al., 1987: 9). In total (considering funds which had already been earmarked prior to the Summit and funds that had newly been pledged), US$650 million over five years had been allocated by major donors such as the EEC ($100 million), the US ($50 million), the Netherlands ($32 million), Sweden ($22 million) and Italy ($15 million) (Amin et al., 1987: 9–10). The ‘trend’ of donor pledges to the SADCC continued into the 1980s to the extent that, by the end of that decade, the SADCC declared that ‘individual programmes and projects have had a higher foreign input that [sic] was either anticipated or can be sustained in the long term’ (Hanlon, 1989: 11). As such, in 1990, the SADCC portfolio of development projects which had either had either been earmarked for funding or were in the full stages
of implementation received over 70 per cent of its financing from mainly European donors (SADCC, 1990: 20).

This high level of foreign assistance was often conditional upon the adoption of World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), ‘as many donors made clear in their statements at the 1988 annual consultative conference in Arusha’ (Hanlon, 1989:16). The EEC, in particular, strongly supported SAPs in southern Africa and towards the end of the 1980s increasingly linked its assistance to the SADCC to the adoption of SAPs by its member states. In 1988, as part of its mid-term review of Lomé III, the EEC further increased its contributions to the SADCC by 97 million European Currency Units (ECUs – the predecessor of the Euro), 78 per cent of which were explicitly tied to the adoption of SAPs by SADCC countries (AWEPAA et al., 1989: 9). SAPs, which were in place in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania (and under negotiation in Angola and Zambia) by 1989, promoted trade liberalisation policies which precluded the SADCC from creating a ‘protected SADCC market, even for a short period of time’, as part of its publicly declared strategy of implementing a degree of import substitution at a regional level to promote industrial development amongst its member states (Hanlon, 1989: 17–8).

By linking regional development assistance to SAPs, the EEC used aid as an instrument to influence the region’s development strategy, thereby influencing the nature of regionalism in the SADCC. From 2000 onwards, with the signing of the ‘Cotonou Agreement’ (formally, the ACP–EC Partnership Agreement) between the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), the EU has further directly promoted market integration as a development strategy through its funding to the SADC, despite the SADC calling for a ‘development integration’ approach which entailed balancing trade liberalisation with regional and state promotion of industrial development and equitable social development in the region (SADCC, 1992: 26–29). This emphasis on trade, effected through the insistence of the EU, has caused critics to identify it as a ‘development community without a development policy’ (Pallotti, 2004).

THE INFLUENCE OF THE EU–SADC IN THE POST-LOMÉ ERA

During an interview with a high-level SADC official close to policy-making and strategic planning for the organisation, as part of field research in the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana in 2006, we discussed the SADC development strategy outlined in the SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) (a 15-year strategic framework set forth in 2003). He stated the benefits of economic liberalisation and the linkages between trade and growth. However, when asked to compare the SADC’s trade-oriented strategy to other models of development, he argued that the
strategy followed by the so-called ‘newly industrialised countries’ such as South Korea (in which the state has strongly intervened in developing its industries), could be applied to southern Africa, and may be a ‘better alternative’. When asked why the SADC was not pursuing such a strategy, he referred to the region’s ICPs and expressed the view that their formula for development was ‘not necessarily those perceived in the region’. As he put it:

. . . the region says that infrastructure should be developed by the states; they say ‘no, this should be developed by the private sector’. But when you are using other people’s resources, this [contradicting the ICPs’ policies or conditions] is not so easy. The SADC and member states in the region are under pressure from them, and they are under pressure from their private sectors. (Anonymous, Interview 1)

By the European Commission’s (EC) own acknowledgement:

. . . in regional integration and trade, the evolution of the strategy and the areas of [the EC’s] support reflect developments in the SADC region. The EC’s assistance has contributed significantly to promoting the concept of regionalisation in SADC countries and in the SADC organization. (EC, 2008: 32)

Such was the conclusion reached by the EC as a result of an internal evaluation, in 2007, of its support to the SADC (EC, 2008: 32; DRN, 2007: xii). Furthermore, the EC’s evaluation found that ‘while EC has been the main facilitator for regionalisation, other ICPs are increasingly taking the regional agenda on board’ (DRN, 2007: 75). In both these instances, the EC has had a specific idea of ‘regionalisation’ based on its own experiences. During interviews conducted at the EC Directorate General for Development (‘DG Development’) in 2005, the then SADC desk officer stated that the EU sees itself as the ‘model’ for regional integration in the SADC case (and, indeed, across the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific group of states), and thus deliberately promotes a form of regional integration based on its own experiences (Vincent Dowd, interview, 2005). Officials from the SADC and its member states, he added, have visited the EU on missions designed to ‘learn’ about its institutional model, precisely in order to apply it to southern Africa. Furthermore, the promotion of regional integration is the ‘ambition’ behind the Regional Indicative Programme, which details the policies associated with the EC’s assistance to the SADC, and is based, he said, on the conviction that ‘trade leads to growth’, and that growth leads to development (Dowd, interview, 2005).

In order to further examine the nature of the EC’s influence on the dynamics of regionalism in the SADC case, it will be necessary to examine the nature of the policies associated with the EC’s assistance to the SADC and the means by which these policies are promoted. Three key aspects of
this will be examined here: the manner in which aid relations with the EC and other donors have been institutionalised in the SADC; the nature of the EC’s strategy of regionalism and development for the SADC, promoted through the 10th European Development Fund (EDF), the main channel of aid from the EC; and the effect of the EPAs – the main instrument of trade relations between the EU and the ACP – on defining membership in the SADC, and thus the political–geographical borders of the region.

The institutional embeddedness of the EC and other SADC donors

First, with regard to the institutions of donor influence within the SADC, the SADC institutionalised its relations with its donors by creating a ‘Joint SADC–ICP Task Force’ (JTF) in 2003 (SADC, 2009a) as part of a wide-scale restructuring process, started in 2001, to streamline the organisation and centralise much of the decision-making that had previously been delegated to the member states (Tjønneland et al., 2005). In so doing, the JTF had the effect of enveloping the SADC’s donors within the regional organisation. Therefore, in contrast to the mainly ad hoc process of donor funding that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s (save for the annual SADCC Consultative Conferences), donors now interact with the SADC in a more structured manner, discussing, monitoring and, to some degree, coordinating funding. Thus international actors have been woven fully into the fabric of regionalism in the SADC case and have become not only integral to the process but also intrinsic to the institution.

The JTF is organised into thematic groups, which are chaired by donors and intended to assist with coordination between ICPs and their counterparts within the SADC directorates on issues of project funding, policy and project monitoring (SADC, 2010). The SADC has four such directorates: Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources; Infrastructure and Services; Social and Human Development and Special Programmes; and Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment. Table 1, below, outlines the JTF thematic groups and displays the donor country to which responsibility is assigned. In addition to the EC’s responsibilities for trade and institutional development on the JTF, the EC is also the ‘lead ICP’ and part of the ‘core group’ of ICPs which meet between three to four times per year with the SADC (EC, 2008: 36).

Jonas Ottosen, the UNDP representative to the SADC in 2006, described the thematic groups within the JTF as structures which help the SADC gauge what it has support for from its donors (personal interview). Furthermore, during an interview with a high-ranking official in the EC Delegation to Botswana in 2006 (Anonymous, Interview 2), the process of interaction between various SADC directorates and the partnering donors on the JTF was described as one in which demands are presented by the directorates
Table 1 JTF donors and thematic groups

| Directorate                                      | Thematic group                        | Donor country              |
|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Trade, industry, finance and investment (TIFI)   | TIFI                                  | EC delegation              |
| Infrastructure and services (I&S)                | Water                                 | Germany                    |
| Food, agriculture and natural resources          | Transport                             | DFID (UK)                  |
|                                                 | Energy                                | Norway                     |
|                                                 | Agriculture and food security         | Food and Agriculture       |
|                                                 | Natural resources and environment     | Organisation (FAO)         |
| Social and human development and special         | HIV/AIDS                              | Sweden                     |
| programmes                                       | Institutional                        | SADC/ICP ‘core group’       |
| Cross-cutting                                    | strengthening and capacity            | (EC, France, Germany, UK,  |
|                                                 | development                           | UNDP and the US).          |
|                                                 |                                       | EC delegation is the      |
|                                                 |                                       | contact point.             |

Source: Tjønneland (2008: 12) and SADC (2009b).

and kept track of by the EC, as lead ICP, in what was referred to as a ‘shopping list’. According to this source, approval of projects, by either one or a group of donors, is subject to alignment of interests, the degree to which these projects would be truly ‘regional’ as opposed to transnational in nature, the legal and accounting procedures in donor countries and several additional conditions on the part of some donors (such as recipient countries having ‘democratically accountable governments’, which precluded Zimbabwe from receiving USAID funding at that time) (Anonymous, Interview 2). As the EC official explained, it is through the JTF that donors participate in budget programming and joint project-planning missions with the SADC and other donors. Thus, with regular interaction between the SADC and donors within the JTF, international actors have become embedded within the regional organisation and have had direct input on policy and strategy.

The nature and influence of the EU–SADC regional strategy and 10th EDF funding

With respect to the nature of the EC policies supported through the SADC EDF, it must be emphasised that, of the SADC’s 19 donors in 2008, the EC contributed 25 per cent of total assistance to the organisation (EC, 2008: 55–86). The EDF was created through the Treaty of Rome in 1957
as ‘an instrument to collectively share the burden of financial assistance to the colonies’, with its budget having been defined directly through the contributions of the European member states, but administered by the EEC’ (van Reisen, 2007: 33). At present, the EDF budget continues to be derived through national funding across the EU member states but is managed by the EC, which is in charge of policy, strategy and disbursement of funding (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 118; EC, 2010). The EDFs cover five-year periods of funding to the ACP group of states, and the 10th EDF is the latest, spanning the period between 2008 and 2013. The total budget for the 10th EDF has been set at €22,682 million (EC, 2010) of which €116 million has been allocated for assistance to the SADC (EC, 2008: iv).

According to the EU–SADC Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008–2013 (henceforth the EU–SADC RSP/RIP), which outlines the EC’s development strategy for the SADC for the 10th EDF, of the sum allocated to the SADC, 80 per cent is earmarked for assistance towards ‘regional economic integration’, 15 per cent is designated for assistance with ‘regional political cooperation’ and 5 per cent is intended for ‘non-focal areas’ (EC, 2008: iv). Non-focal areas, according to the RSP/RIP, are defined as engagement between the SADC and ‘non state actors’, particularly the private sector in the process of regional economic integration, as well as the establishment of a process periodically to monitor spending and the impact of projects funded by the SADC EDF (EC, 2008: 42). These account for a small percentage of the overall SADC EDF budget and slightly greater emphasis is placed on supporting ‘political cooperation’ in the region. In this regard, the RSP/RIP outlines the intention to use EDF funding to enhance ‘governance’, ‘political stability’ and ‘democratic institutions’ in the region through assistance in four areas: supporting SADC institutions which encourage and monitor democratic elections in the region; enhancing the SADC’s capacity to mediate potential political crises in or among its member states; financing ‘joint exercises’ with law enforcement in the region to promote human rights and anti-corruption; and supporting regional defence initiatives through the procurement of military equipment, ‘capacity building’ initiatives and efforts to recruit personnel into SADC defence institutions (EC, 2008: 42). Intervention in these areas involves the EC in key political processes within the SADC – particularly with regard to governance and security – and thus extends its influence into important dimensions of regional integration. In addition, the EC frames its assistance for ‘regional political cooperation’ in terms of economic integration, arguing that the promotion of political stability will ‘attract foreign and local investment’ (EC, 2008: 41). In doing so, it links this 15 per cent of the SADC EDF budget with the overwhelming majority of 80 per cent for ‘regional economic integration’.

According to the RSP/RIP, the EC’s regional strategy with the SADC is aligned with the Cotonou Agreement, signed between the EC and the ACP
states in 2000 – particularly Articles 28 and 29 which refer specifically to ‘regional cooperation and integration’ amongst the ACP states (ACP–EC, 2000: Section 3; EC, 2008: 1). Article 28 of the Cotonou agreement states, inter alia, that the purpose of the Agreement, with regard to regional integration, is to ‘foster the gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy’ (ACP–EC 2000: Section 3, Article 1). This aim reflects what Hurt (2003: 164) has described as the ‘adoption of neoliberal values’ on the part of the EC within the Cotonou Agreement, which reflects a ‘desire’, on the part of the EC, ‘to influence and shape the political systems and policies of ACP states’. Indeed, as Brown (2000: 376) has shown, in developing the Cotonou Agreement:

... the [European] Commission argued that not only did it affirm the value of the EU–ACP relations in a multipolar world... but that the relationship would help to enable ‘the kind of world development that is more compatible with European political and social values’.

Within this context, the EC seeks to influence the path of regionalism in the SADC case towards a customs and monetary union through policies supported by the 10th EDF funding. As such, 80 per cent of the 10th EDF for the SADC will be allocated to the achievement of the following outcomes: the implementation of the SADC Customs Union; the move towards a SADC Common Market and a Monetary Union ‘with integrated rules and standards, free movement of factors of production (goods, services, labour, capital), competition policy, and macroeconomic convergence’; the continued integration with the world economy through the EPAs and the World Trade Organisation (WTO); support to those SADC countries ‘liberalising their trade regimes to enable them to make the necessary economic adjustments and address possible short-term revenue losses’; and the improvement of regional infrastructure (EC, 2008: 39). As the EC argues in the RSP/RIP with regard to funding in these areas, ‘the added value of using Community resources lies in the fact that the EC has a long experience in designing and implementing programmes which assist the deepening and strengthening of regional integration’ (EC, 2008: 41). Thus the RSP/RIP outlines a set of ‘response strategies’ with regard to promoting a customs union, common market and monetary union in the SADC, which entail not only technical and managerial support but also intervention in regional economic policy. For instance, with regard to the promotion of a customs union, the 10th EDF will ‘support the development and implementation of instruments and legislation related to trade liberalisation and tariff reform’ (EC, 2008: 39, emphasis added). Furthermore, with regard to the promotion of a SADC common market:

... the response strategy will support the undertaking of fiscal, judicial, legal and financial sector reforms to facilitate private sector
investment – particularly cross-border investment – in the region, and facilitation of trade promotion activities. It will support the putting in place of domestic regulations, and addressing market access issues in the services sector, so that SADC countries can benefit further from trade in services. (EC, 2008: 40)

Such assistance from the EC arguably now goes beyond the promotion of neoliberal reforms through aid conditionality, for which previous World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes have been criticised (see, for instance, Harrison, 2007), and involves direct policy intervention in the SADC and its member states to influence the process of regionalism in manner which is consistent with the EU’s interpretation and experience of it. From the EC’s perspective, the regional economic integration process in the SADC has stalled, and the EC’s assistance is intended to accelerate it. As stated in the RSP/RIP:

. . . clearly, the economic integration agenda of the region is behind schedule in relation to some of the key RISDP targets, particularly in the trade field. In terms of infrastructure, many of the plans in the RISDP have been on the table for some time – particularly in the area of transport – and a major effort is needed in order to generate momentum on this agenda. (EC, 2008: 25)

This is deemed particularly to be the case with regard to the SADC Customs Union, which was to be formally created in 2010 but has thus far been postponed. One of the primary impediments to the establishment of a customs union, which the EC identified, was the issue of ‘overlapping membership’, whereby SADC member states belong to more than one regional organisation in southern and east Africa, such as the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), to which the SADC states of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland belong, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), of which Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe are members. As, by definition, any state may belong to only one customs union (as it must present only one tariff for any particular item to countries outside the union), the overlapping membership between the SADC and other neighbouring regional organisations that are moving towards a customs union does undoubtedly presents an issue. In response to this, as the final aspect of this analysis will show below, the EC has attempted to put pressure on the SADC and neighbouring regions through its EPA negotiation strategy.
The SADC–EPA negotiations and their influence on regional political configurations

With regard to trade, the EU is the SADC’s largest trading partner: the value of SADC exports to the EU accounted for 30 per cent of its total exports to the rest of the world and the value of goods imported from the EU accounted for nearly 29 per cent in 2006.\(^4\) Exported goods from the SADC countries to the EU were concentrated in primary commodities, particularly diamonds, petroleum and aluminum, which comprised more than 50 per cent of SADC exports, with sugar, gold, tobacco, textiles and fish also amongst the main items (EC, 2008: 5–6). As such, the trade relationship with the EU is of great importance to the SADC and its member states, which, under the Lomé Conventions, enjoyed preferential, non-reciprocal access to EU markets under a waiver from the WTO (Brown, 2000: 379). However, in order to comply with WTO regulations, and bring trade with the ACP states closer to the liberal multilateral trading system, the EU pursued a new round of trade agreements with the ACP states – the EPAs – which, in the SADC case, was tentatively concluded at the end of 2007 in time for the expiration of the WTO waiver in 2008. At the heart of the EU/EC’s negotiation strategy, which has had the effect of dividing the SADC states, was its decision to centre the agreements on supra-national regions within the ACP. As a number of studies have examined the nature of the SADC interim EPA in depth (Vickers, 2011; Flint, 2009; Stevens, 2008; Stevens et al., 2008), this section will not analyse this agreement in detail but will rather briefly outline the manner in which it has influenced a division within the SADC membership.\(^5\)

Until mid 2007, the EU negotiated the EPAs with six regional sub-groups of the ACP states: the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM), West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), Southern Africa (the so-called ‘SADC-minus’ group) and the Pacific (Stevens, 2008: 215). However, from mid to late 2007, the five members of the East African Community (EAC) – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda – formed their own EPA negotiation group, which brought in members from the ESA and the SADC-minus groups (Stevens, 2008: 215). The extent of the EU’s influence in dividing the SADC region is evident from the name, the ‘SADC-minus’ group, which was adopted to reflect the fact that the 15 SADC member states were divided amongst four different regions – the SADC-minus, the ESA, the EAC and Central Africa. Fragmentation of the SADC group initially began in 2004 at the start of the EPA negotiations, when all but Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (also known as the ‘BLNS’ group, which belong to the SACU), Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania, joined the ESA group (effectively, the members of COMESA) (Stevens, 2008: 220). South Africa, at the time, participated in the SADC-minus EPA negotiations as an observer, having had a separate trade and
aid agreement with the EU (the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement, or TDCA), yet joined in 2006 as a full member under SACU rules, which dictated that ‘that no member could negotiate a new external trade regime without the consent of the others’ (Stevens, 2008: 220). Furthermore, the Democratic Republic of the Congo joined the more geographically proximate Central Africa group and Tanzania left the SADC-minus group to join the EAC group (Vickers, 2011: 189).

Brendan Vickers, Head of Research and Policy in the International and Economic Development division of the Department of Trade and Industry in South Africa, has recently expressed his own views suggesting that:

... through subtle directives or pressures on parties to join particular negotiating configurations, or by virtue of the [European] Commission’s substantial leverage as a leading donor in the region, the EC had a hand in reshaping Southern African geography. (Vickers, 2011: 189)

Similarly, the EC’s own research on the impact it has had in the region found that:

... the requirement to negotiate EPAs as regional groupings – and the choices SADC countries make in respect of which configuration to join... may, at the same time, contribute to splitting SADC into two. (DRN, 2007: 59)

Thus the effects of the EPAs on separating the SADC into four different regional negotiation blocs prompted the high-level official at the EC Delegation to Botswana, referred to earlier, to explain that the EPAs have been controversial and have been seen as ‘undermining regionalism in southern Africa’ (Anonymous, Interview 2). Indeed, in the words of Dr Yash Tandon, a highly-regarded Ugandan political economist:

... the Europeans want to divide and conquer Africa... countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe, which were the founding members of the Southern African Development Community, are not even part of the negotiations with Europe within the SADC framework. (Handley, 2010)

Whilst the SADC organisation remains intact with 15 members, the EPA process has nonetheless raised important questions regarding its future membership in the pursuit of its customs union. The EPA process has acted to align politically and economically various sub-groups within the SADC with alternative regions, and these configurations may result in future in a different regional political geography than currently exists in southern Africa. In this way, there has been a strong external influence exercised on the dynamics of regional integration that is not addressed by current theories of regionalism. From an economic standpoint, if the
BUZDUGAN: REGIONALISM FROM WITHOUT

SADC does experience a division in its membership, there will not be a linear progression from an FTA to a customs union, as theory would conventionally expect (for instance, the SADC, COMESA and the EAC regions have been negotiating in earnest since 2008 on the formation of a ‘Tripartite FTA’, to circumvent the customs union issue regarding multiple, overlapping memberships) (COMESA et al., 2011). Looking at this from the perspective of IPE theories of regionalism, SADC integration into the world economy has been influenced through the EPAs, given the asymmetries in bargaining power between its member states and the EU (Vickers, 2011: 184), and a future division in the SADC membership as it attempts to form a customs union will have less to do with intra-regional political and economic motives than with the most preferred agreement that could be reached with the EU through other regional groupings (however, it remains to be seen how the introduction of a Tripartite FTA may change these regional configurations). Therefore, with trade as with aid, international actors such as the EU have had a profound effect on the dynamics of regionalism in southern Africa.

CONCLUSION

By focusing attention and resources on further economic integration, the EU has influenced the SADC development agenda towards one based on trade liberalisation, in the midst of otherwise lacklustre efforts amongst the SADC membership towards this end. Such interventions on the part of international donors such as the EU call into question the degree to which the phenomenon of ‘new regionalism’ in the SADC case is led by the organisation and its member states and the extent to which regionalism is truly a states-led strategy which ‘seek[s] to accelerate, to modify, or occasionally to reverse the direction of social change’ (Gamble and Payne, 1996: 250) represented by globalisation. Instead of a regional–international dichotomy, whereby the region acts as a boundary between its member states and international structures and actors (as is conceptualised in current IR and IPE theories of regionalism), it may be seen that, in the case of the SADC, international actors are infused within the region itself and, in the case of the EU, are attempting to reconfigure its boundaries and integrate it comprehensively with the liberalised world economy.

Thus the pursuit of further liberalisation in the SADC case has had a significant agential influence, as well as a structural one. Put differently, the move towards greater integration of the region with the world economy has been motivated not only by the structure of the liberalised world trading system and dominant ideas of neoliberalism, but by the direct involvement of actors such as the EU. The EU’s direct, institutionalised participation in the SADC is a reflection of historical patterns of relations between sub-Saharan African political economies and international actors,
as argued above. The foundation of the SADC region in 1980 had many of the same elements as the international dimension of post-colonial state formation in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of the external influence on the early architecture and operations of the organisation, the seeking of international legitimacy and economic assistance by the early SADCC leadership and the heavy reliance on this assistance for the existence of the organisation. Towards the end of the 1980s, the politics of relations between the SADCC and its international donors paralleled the experience of states in sub-Saharan Africa with respect to the conditionality associated with the assistance it was receiving – specifically, the condition by the EEC that SADCC member states adopt SAPs. As we have seen, in the post-Lomé period, the nature of these relations has changed. Donors such as the EU have become more institutionally embedded within the SADC organisation and their strategies have been jointly published with the SADC in ‘partnership’, echoing the phenomenon of post-conditionality politics (Harrison, 2001) that various states across sub-Saharan Africa have participated in since the late 1990s. Thus, in these various ways throughout its history, the SADC region has mimicked the ‘quasi’ nature of states, as formulated by Jackson (1990) and Clapham (1996) above, in sub-Saharan Africa.

These insights from the SADC case thus call for a re-evaluation of the conceptualisations and theories of regionalism in the fields of IR and IPE, particularly with regard to regions in sub-Saharan Africa, and perhaps in other regions of poor countries with a post-colonial experience. For instance, Davidson and Munslow (1990) alluded to the direct role that international donors were playing in the 1980s in shaping regional integration in Africa, particularly in ECOWAS:

The multilateral donor institutions are providing a stimulus to regional cooperation. ECOWAS was founded in response to the EEC’s desire to deal with a collective grouping. It first met following the Lomé meeting in 1975. After that the 15, and later the 16, got together. Some international institutions and bilateral donors find it easier to deal with larger groupings of African states. This is frequently driven by administrative expediency, to reduce the cost of the administration of aid dispersal... Hence the logic of aid dispersal can be supportive of regional groupings. (Davidson and Munslow, 1990: 13–4)

Thus, there exists scope to re-examine the emergence of regions such as ECOWAS in sub-Saharan Africa with greater attention to the role of international actors in these processes, and to analyse the extent to which donors such as the EU have directly influenced the contemporary nature of regionalism through, for instance, the EPA negotiations. One potential case for research in this light is the emerging Tripartite FTA between the SADC, COMESA and the EAC, referred to above. At first, the Tripartite
FTA appears to signal an alternative to neoliberal forms of regionalism through greater emphasis on infrastructural development and ‘industrial development to address the productive capacity constraints’, in addition to market integration (COMESA et al., 2011: Article 1, Paragraph iii). However, as observers have noted that at this time, the notion of ‘industrial development’ and the policies that this entails at the regional level remain unclear within the Tripartite negotiations (Hartzenberg, 2011: 21). Furthermore, donors such as DFID are significantly involved in the formation of the Tripartite FTA, funding both the administrative aspects of the FTA and the development of a ‘North–South Corridor’ (NSC), a series of trade routes ‘linking the copper belt of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia with ports in South Africa and Tanzania’ (DFID, 2011: 25). As Taylor (2003), and Söderbaum and Taylor (2003), have argued, so-called Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) such as the Maputo Development Corridor and the NSC, are attempts ‘to reconstitute the region along lines favoured by private enterprise, particularly externally oriented fractions of capital with an eye to the global market’ (Taylor, 2003: 317) and therefore represent an externally influenced form of neoliberal development initiatives.

As the analytical lenses of established theories of regionalism have been focused almost exclusively on intra-regional political, economic and social processes in current theories of regionalism in IR and IPE, a reformulation of these theories (particularly with regard to either orthodox or critical IPE theories of regionalism) would involve broadening these frameworks to include the analysis of extra-regional actors in the dynamics of regional integration. At present, these frameworks, from both ‘orthodox’ and ‘critical’ strands of IR and IPE, have assumed a dichotomy between intra-regional and extra-regional actors and structures and have applied this assumption uniformly across different regions. As such, in areas such as sub-Saharan Africa where historical relations with dominant international actors have influenced the nature of states and regions, these current frameworks have obscured the dynamics of these relations at the regional level, as well as the conditions and processes under which these regions arise and are inserted into the global political economy. Attention to the role of extra-regional political actors in these cases may offer a more complete explanation of the underlying causes for, or influences on, a region’s chosen strategy (such as the neoliberal trade strategy in the SADC case), its relationship with processes of globalisation and insights into the nature of the region’s sovereignty and autonomy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Nicola Phillips, Anthony Payne, Heinz Tüselmann, Hamed El-Said, Agnieszka Chidlow, as well as the editorial board and
three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article. Any errors are my own.

NOTES

1 For a discussion on the ‘Westphalian assumptions of sovereign statehood’ in Africa, see Clapham (1996: 267).

2 As Joseph Hanlon noted, European support for the SADCC had both economic and political motivations. On the economic front, support was due to interest in ‘opening up new markets and sources of raw materials’ (Hanlon, 1989: 41). Politically, European support for the SADCC had the aim of promoting a social–democratic alternative in southern Africa to the Marxist governments of Mozambique and Angola. It was hoped that through such European support, the SADCC could help steer Angola and Mozambique away from Soviet influence (Hanlon, 1989: 40).

3 The remaining ICPs, in order of their percentage contribution are: the African Development Bank (20 per cent), World Bank (20 per cent), USAID (11 per cent), Germany (10 per cent), Norway (7 per cent), Sweden (3 per cent), Denmark (2 per cent), France (<1 per cent), Austria (<1 per cent), Finland (<1 per cent), United Kingdom (<1 per cent), United Nations Development Programme (<1 per cent), Japan (<1 per cent), Switzerland (<1 per cent), Belgium (<1 per cent), Development Bank of Southern Africa (<1 per cent), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (<1 per cent) and the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (<1 per cent); Source: SADC Donor Matrix (EC, 2008: 55–86).

4 Source: SADC Trade Database (http://www.sadctrade.org).

5 Although not related to the SADC, see Heron (2011) for an insightful analysis of the EPA negotiations in the Caribbean region.

6 There is a growing literature on the involvement of China and India in sub-Saharan Africa and the degree to which these countries may be competing with the EU and the US for influence. To date, China has focused more on aid and economic relations with African countries rather than African regions (Mohan and Power, 2008: 35; Davies et al., 2008; Taylor, 2006), despite pledging support for regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa, as stated in the ‘Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010–2012)’ within the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, 2009: Article 2, Paragraph 5). However, as Ayers (2012) has recently argued, the degree of China’s involvement in aid and trade in sub-Saharan Africa may be overstated, with Chinese FDI being eclipsed by investment by the UK, the US and France (Ayers, 2012: 4) and Chinese aid representing a small fraction of support from OECD states (Ayers, 2012: 5). With regard to India, the SADC and India established the India–SADC Forum in April 2006 and thus far, India’s aid commitments appear to be small relative to the EU and other donors discussed above (India, Ministry of External Affairs, 2011). (I would like to thank one anonymous review for drawing my attention to these matters.)

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTOR

Stephen Robert Buzdugan is a Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy at the Manchester Metropolitan University Business School. He holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Manchester and is currently writing a book
together with Anthony Payne on The Changing Political Map of Global Governance (Routledge, forthcoming).

REFERENCES

ACP–EC (2000) Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the Other Part. Signed in Cotonou, Benin, 23 June 2000.

Aggarwal, V. K. and Fogarty, E. A. (2005) ‘The Limits of Interregionalism: The EU and North America’, European Integration, 27(3): 327–46.

Amin, S., Chitala, D. and Mandaza, I. (1987) SADCC: Prospects for Disengagement and Development in Southern Africa, London: Zed Books.

Anglin, D. G. (1983) ‘Economic Liberation and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and PTA’, International Organization, 37(4): 681–711.

Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action Against Apartheid (AWEPPA), Apartheid and Catholic Institute for International Relations (1989) The European Community and Southern Africa: Looking Towards Lomé IV, The Hague: AWEPPA.

Ayers, A. J. (2012) ‘Beyond Myths, Lies and Stereotypes: The Political Economy of a “New Scramble for Africa”’, New Political Economy, DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2012.676821.

Bach, D. (1999) ‘Regionalism Versus Regional Integration: The Emergence of a New Paradigm in Africa’, in J. Grugel and W. Hout (eds), Regionalism Across the North–South Divide, London: Routledge, pp. 152–156.

Bauer, G. and Taylor, S. D. (2005) Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. (2006) The European Union as a Global Actor, London: Routledge.

Brown, W. (2000) ‘Restructuring North–South Relations: ACP–EU Development Co-operation in a Liberal International Order’, Review of African Political Economy, 27(85): 367–83.

Clapham, C. (1996) Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

COMESA, EAC and SADC (2011) ‘Communiqué of the Second COMESA–EAC–SADC Tripartite Summit’, document reference: T/TS/II/6, Johannesburg, South Africa, <http://www.comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite.org/documents> (accessed 31 July 2012).

Davidson, B. and Munslow, B. (1990) ‘The Crisis of the Nation State in Africa’, Review of African Political Economy, 17(49): 9–21.

Davies, M. with Edinger, H., Tay, N. and Naidu, S. (2008) How China Delivers Development Assistance to Africa, Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch.

Development Researchers’ Network (DRN) (2007) Evaluation of the Commission’s Regional Support to SADC: Regional Level Evaluation, Rome and Brussels: DRN.

DFID (2011) The Engine of Development: The Private Sector and Prosperity for Poor People, London: Department for International Development.

European Commission (EC) (2008) Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008–2013, <http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_r7_rsp-2007-2013_en.pdf> (accessed 24 September 2011).
European Commission (EC) (2010) ‘European Development Fund’, <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/edf_en.htm> (accessed 10 October 2011).

Fawcett, L. (2004) ‘Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism’, International Affairs, 80(3): 429–46.

Fawcett, L. and Gandois, H. (2010) ‘Regionalism in Africa and the Middle East: Implications for EU Studies’, European Integration, 32(6): 617–36.

Flint, A. (2009) ‘The End of a “Special Relationship”? The New EU–ACP Economic Partnership Agreements’, Review of African Political Economy, 36(119): 79–92.

FOCAC (2009) Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010–2012), Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, <http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/hywj/t626387.htm> (accessed 31 July 2012).

Gamble, A. and Payne, A. (1996) ‘Conclusion: The New Regionalism’, in A. Gamble and A. Payne (eds) Regionalism and World Order, New York: St Martin’s Press, pp. 247–264.

Gibb, R. (2009) ‘Regional Integration and Africa’s Development Trajectory: Metatheories, Expectations and Reality’, Third World Quarterly, 30(4): 701–21.

Grant, J. A. and Söderbaum, F. (2003) The New Regionalism in Africa, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Grugel, J. and Hout, W. (1999) Regionalism Across the North–South Divide, London: Routledge.

Haas, E. B. (1958) The Uniting of Europe, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Haas, E. B. (1964) Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Handley, P. (2010) ‘Q&A: “Impose an Embargo on the EPA Talks”’, Inter Press Service Africa, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/03/qa-impose-an-embargo-on-the-epa-talks/> (accessed 15 October 2011).

Hanlon, J. (1989) SADCC in the 1990s: Development on the Front Line, London and New York: Economist Intelligence Unit.

Harrison, G. (2001) ‘Post-Conditionality Politics and Administrative Reform: Reflections on the Cases of Uganda and Tanzania’, Development and Change, 32(4): 657–79.

Harrison, G. (2004) ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’, in A. Payne (ed), The new regional politics of development, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 218–247.

Hartzenberg, T. (2011) ‘Regional Integration in Africa’, World Trade Organization, Economic Research and Statistics Division Staff Working Paper: ERSD-2011-14, <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201114_e.pdf> (accessed 31 July 2012).

Heron, T. (2011) ‘Asymmetric Bargaining and Development Trade-offs in the CARIFORUM–European Union Economic Partnership Agreement’, Review of International Political Economy, 18(3): 328–57.

Hettne, B. (1999) ‘Globalization and the New Regionalism: The Second Great Transformation’, in B. Hettne, A. Inotai and O. Sunkel (eds) Globalism and the New Regionalism, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 1–24.

Hettne, B. (2005a) ‘Beyond the “New” Regionalism’, New Political Economy, 10(4): 543–71.

Hettne, B. (2005b) ‘Regionalism and World Order’, in M. Farrell, B. Hettne and L. van Langenhove (eds) Global politics of regionalism: theory and practice, London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press.

Hill, C. R. (1983) ‘Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa’, African Affairs, 82(327): 215–39.
Hurrell, A. (1995) ‘Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics’, *Review of International Studies*, 21(4): 331–58.

Hurt, S. R. (2003) ‘Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP States and the End of the Lomé Convention’, *Third World Quarterly*, 24(1): 161–76.

Jackson, R. H. (1990) *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lee, M. C. (2003) *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Leys, R. and Tostensen, A. (1982) ‘Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa: The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference’, *Review of African Political Economy*, 9(23): 52–71.

Mansfield, E. D. and Milner, H. V. (1997) *The Political Economy of Regionalism*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Ministry of External Affairs (2011) *India–Southern African Development Community (SADC) Cooperation*, Government of India, [http://meaindia.nic.in/staticfile/BriefnoteonIndia.pdf](http://meaindia.nic.in/staticfile/BriefnoteonIndia.pdf) (accessed 31 July 2012).

Mitrany, D. (1943) *A Working Peace System*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Mohan, G. and Power, M. (2008) ‘New African Choices? The Politics of Chinese Engagement’, *Review of African Political Economy*, 35(115): 23–42.

Pallotti, A. (2004) ‘SADC: A Development Community Without a Development Policy?’, *Review of African Political Economy*, 31(101): 513–31.

Payne, A. and Gamble, A. (1996) ‘Introduction: The Political Economy of Regionalism and World Order’, in A. Gamble and A. Payne (eds) *Regionalism and World Order*, New York: St Martin’s Press, pp. 1–20.

Phillips, N. (2005) ‘“Globalizing” the study of international political economy’, in N. Phillips (ed.) *Globalizing International Political Economy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–19.

SADC (2005) *SADC Major Achievements and Challenges: 25 Years of Regional Co-operation and Integration*, Gaborone, Botswana: SADC Secretariat.

SADC (2009a) ‘Joint SADC–ICP Task Force’, [http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/376>](http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/376>) (accessed 20 October 2011).

SADC (2009b) ‘SADC–ICP Joint Task Force Contacts’, [http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/397>](http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/397>) (accessed 20 October 2011).

SADC (2010) ‘Thematic Coordination’, [http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/378>](http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/378>) (accessed 20 October 2011).

SADC (2011) ‘Talking Notes by Hon. Dr Hage Geingob, Chairperson of the SADC Council of Ministers and Minister of Trade and Industry of the Republic of Namibia on the Occasion of Briefing the Media on the Outcome of the Meeting of the SADC Council of Ministers, Windhoek, Namibia, 04 March 2011’, [http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2011/gein0304.html>](http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2011/gein0304.html) (accessed 23 October 2011).

SADCC (1980) *Record of the Summit Held in Lusaka Republic of Zambia on the 1st April 1980*, Gaborone, Botswana: SADCC.

SADCC (1990) *Commemorative Summit Lusaka, Republic of Zambia 1st April, 1990*, Gaborone, Botswana: SADCC.

SADCC (1992) *Maputo: Towards Economic Integration. The Proceedings of the Annual Consultative Conference held in Maputo, Republic of Mozambique*, Gaborone: SADCC.

Söderbaum, F. (2005) ‘The International Political Economy of Regionalism’, in N. Phillips (ed.) *Globalizing International Political Economy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 221–245.
Söderbaum, F. and Taylor, I. (2003) *Regionalism and uneven development in Southern Africa: The case of the Maputo Development Corridor*, Aldershot, Hants and Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Söderbaum, F. and van Langenhove, L. (2005) ‘Introduction: The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism’, *European Integration*, 27(3): 249–62.

Stevens, C. (2008) ‘Economic Partnership Agreements: What Can We Learn?’, *New Political Economy*, 13(2): 211–23.

Stevens, C., Meyn, M. and Kennan, J. (2008) *The New EPAs: Comparative Analysis of their Content and the Challenges for 2008*, London and Maastricht: Overseas Development Institute and European Centre for Development Policy Management.

Taylor, I. (2003) ‘Globalization and Regionalization in Africa: Reactions to Attempts at Neo-liberal Regionalism’, *Review of International Political Economy*, 10(2): 310–330.

Taylor, I. (2006) *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise*, Abingdon, UK and New York: Routledge.

Taylor, I. and Williams, P. (2004) *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent*, London and New York: Routledge.

Thomas, C. (2004) ‘The International Financial Institutions’ Relations with Africa: Insights From the Issue of Representation and Voice’, in I. Taylor and P. Williams (eds) *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent*, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 174–194.

Tjønneland, E. N. (2006) *SADC and Donors—Ideals and Practices: From Gaborone to Paris and Back*, Gaborone, Botswana: Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis.

Tjønneland, E. N. (2008) *From Aid Effectiveness to Poverty Reduction: Is Foreign Donor Support to SADC Improving?*, Gaborone, Botswana: Lightbooks (on behalf of Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis).

Tjønneland, E. N., Isaksen, J. and le Pere, G. (2005) *SADC’s Restructuring and Emerging Policies: Options for Norwegian Support*, Bergen: CMI.

UNECA (2006) *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Economic Commission for Africa.

van Reisen, M. (2007) ‘The enlarged European Union and the Developing world: what future?’, in A. Mold (ed), *EU Development Policy in a Changing World: Challenges for the 21st Century* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 29–65.

Vickers, B. (2011) ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Small States in the EU–SADC EPA Negotiations’, *The Round Table*, 100(413):183–97.