On Parameterized Complexity of Binary Networked Public Goods Game

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Abstract

In the Binary Networked Public Goods (BNPG for short) game, every player needs to decide if she participates in a public project whose utility is shared equally by the community. We study the problem of deciding if there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in such games. The problem is already known to be $NP$-complete. This casts doubt on predictive power of PSNE in BNPG games. We provide fine-grained analysis of this problem under the lens of parameterized complexity theory. We consider various natural graph parameters and show $W[1]$-hardness, XP, and FPT results. Hence, our work significantly improves our understanding of BNPG games where PSNE serves as a reliable solution concept. We finally prove that some graph classes, for example path, cycle, bi-clique, and complete graph, always have a PSNE if the utility function of the players are same.

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1 Introduction

In a public goods game, players need to decide if they contribute in a public project and, if yes, then how much. The outcome of such public projects is typically shared equally by all the players. Public goods games are effective in modeling tension between individual cost vs community well being [16, 23]. One of the well-explored variants of the above game is the networked public goods game where we assume a network structure on the players and the utilities of individual players depend on the action of them and their neighbors only [2].

An important class of networked public goods game is the binary networked public goods (BNPG for short) game where players only need to decide if they participate (play 1) in the public project or not (play 0) [10]. Although this seems restricted, such games are still powerful enough to model various important real world application scenarios. For some motivating examples, let us think of an air-borne virus pandemic like Covid-19 where individuals need to decide whether to wear a mask or not. While individuals may feel uncomfortable while wearing a mask, the benefits of herd immunity, if achieved by a large fraction of population wearing a mask, will be shared by the entire community. Indeed, there are reports that a considerable fraction of population refuse to wear a mask during Covid-19 pandemic [3, 26]. Another important application is whether to report a crime or not. While individuals who report crimes may be at risk, the benefit of having lower crime rates will be enjoyed by the entire community. The general observation at many places is that crimes are often under-reported [20].
Computing a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in any game is a fundamental question. The concept of Nash equilibrium guides social planner to predict how players will act in a strategic setting and act accordingly. We know that the Exists-PSNE problem, where we are asked to decide if a BNPG game has a PSNE, is NP-complete \cite{28}. In this work, we provide a comprehensive study of the parameterized complexity of the Exists-PSNE problem.

1.1 Related Work

The immediate predecessor of our work is \cite{28} where the authors initiate the algorithmic question of Exists-PSNE. Our work broadly belongs to the field of graphical games where there is a graph structure on the players and a player’s utility depends only on the actions of her neighbors \cite{14}. A central question in graphical games is to find complexity of the problem of computing an equilibrium \cite{9} \cite{8} \cite{11}. Network public goods games are a special case of graphical games where the utility of players depends only on the sum of the “efforts” put in by neighbors and the cost of her action. Many models of the network public goods game have been explored which are fine-tuned to different applications. Important examples of such applications include economics, research collaboration, social influence, etc. \cite{4} \cite{24} \cite{5} \cite{25}. The BNPG model is closely related to that proposed in Bramoullé et al. \cite{2}. There are however two qualitative distinctions (a) Bramoullé et al. focus on the continuous investment model whereas BNPG model focuses on binary investment decisions and (b) Bramoullé et al. assume homogeneous concave utilities whereas BNPG model considers a more general setting. Supermodular network games \cite{19} and best-shot games (which is actually a special case of BNPG game) \cite{7}, etc. \cite{10} \cite{14} \cite{18} are other important variations of graphical games. In the model of Supermodular network games, each agent’s payoff is a function of the aggregate action of its neighbors and it exhibits strategic complementarity. An important example of supermodular games on graphs are technology adoption games which have been studied in the social network literature \cite{15} \cite{12} \cite{21}.

1.2 Parameters

As Exists-PSNE is NP-complete \cite{28}, we provide a comprehensive study of the parameterized complexity of the Exists-PSNE problem w.r.t. the following parameters:

- **Maximum Degree:** Many applications of BNPG games involve human beings as nodes in the network. Due to human cognitive limitation, such graphs often exhibit small maximum degree. With this motivation, we consider the maximum degree of the graph as our parameter.

- **Diameter:** Graphs which involve human beings as nodes tend to have a small diameter. Therefore, we consider the diameter of the graph as our parameter.

- **Distance from tree and complete graph:** Trees and complete graphs are important classes of graphs in the context of BNPG games. It is already known from previous work that Exists-PSNE is polynomial-time solvable for trees and complete graphs. Therefore the next natural question would be to check the tractability of those instances where the graphs are quite close to being a tree or a complete graph. For this purpose, we consider the parameters distance from tree, which is also known as circuit rank, and distance from complete graphs [Definition 19].

- **Treedepth and Treewidth:** We also consider treedepth and treewidth as parameters as they have often turned out to be useful parameters to obtain a fixed-parameter-tractable
(FPT) algorithm for many classical problems for which it is known that the problem is polynomial-time solvable for trees.

- **Number of participating and non-participating players:** One may wish to know what are the equilibria during a pandemic like Covid-19 example where most and least people wear masks. For such scenarios, the number of participating (who play 1) and non-participating players (who play 0) are the natural parameters.

## 2 Preliminaries

For a set $X$, we denote its power set by $2^X$. We denote the set $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ by $[n]$. For 2 sets $X$ and $Y$, we denote the set of functions from $X$ to $Y$ by $Y^X$.

Let $G = (V, E)$ be an undirected graph with $n$ vertices. An edge between $u, v \in V$ is represented by $(u, v)$. In a graph $G$, we denote the degree of any vertex $v$ by $d(v)$. For a subset $U \subseteq V$ of vertices (respectively a subset $F \subseteq E$ of edges), we denote the subgraph induced by $U$ (respectively $F$) by $G[U]$ (respectively $G[F]$). A Binary Networked Public Goods (BNPG for short) game can be defined on $G$ as follows. The set of players is $V$. The strategy set of every player is $\{0, 1\}$ and constant $c_w$ for all $w \in V$. A function $g : V \cup \{0\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ is a subadditive function if

$$g(x_1 + x_2) \leq g(x_1) + g(x_2)$$

for all $x_1, x_2 \geq 0$. We call a function $g$ subadditive if $g(x + y) \leq g(x) + g(y)$ for every $x, y \in \mathbb{R}^+$.

A strategy profile $(x_v)_{v \in V}$ is called a pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) of player $w$ if and only if, for every strategy profile $(x_v)_{v \in V}$, we have $U_w((x_v)_{v \in V}) = U_w(x_w, n_w) = g_w(x_w + n_w) - c_w \cdot x_w$

where $g_w : \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ is a non-decreasing function in $x$ and $c_w \in \mathbb{R}^+$ is a constant. We denote a BNPG game by $(G = (V, E), (g_v)_{v \in V}, (c_v)_{v \in V})$. For any number $n \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\}$ and function $g : \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$, we define $\Delta g(n) = g(n + 1) - g(n)$. In general, every player $w \in V$ has a different mapping function $g_w(.)$ and hence we call this version of the game a heterogeneous BNPG game. If not mentioned otherwise, by BNPG game, we refer to a heterogeneous BNPG game. In this paper, we also study the following three special cases — (i) **homogeneous:** $g_w = g$ for all $w \in V$, (ii) **fully homogeneous:** homogeneous and $c_w = c$ for all $w \in V$ and (iii) **strict:** for every player $w \in V$, we have $U_w(x_w = 0, x_{-w}) \neq U_w(x_w = 1, x_{-w})$ for every strategy profile $x_{-w}$ of other players. So a BNPG game is strict if and only if $\Delta g_w(k) \neq c_w, \forall w \in V, \forall k \in \{0, 1, \ldots, d(w)\}$

A strategy profile $(x_v)_{v \in V}$ is called a **pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE)** of a BNPG game if we have $U_v(x_v, x_{-v}) \geq U_v(x'_v, x_{-v}) \forall x'_v \in \{0, 1\}, \forall v \in V$. We call the problem of deciding if there exists a PSNE in BNPG games as **EXISTS-PSNE**.

For a player $w$ in a BNPG game $(G = (V, E), (g_v)_{v \in V}, (c_v)_{v \in V})$, we define her best response function $\beta_w : \{0, 1, \ldots, n - 1\} \rightarrow 2^{\{0, 1\}} \setminus \{\emptyset\}$ as follows. For every $k \in \{0, 1, \ldots, n - 1\}$ and $a \in \{0, 1\}$, we have $a \in \beta_w(k)$ if and only if, for every strategy profile $x_{-w}$ of players other than $w$ where exactly $k$ players in the neighborhood of $w$ play 1, we have $U_w(x_w = a, x_{-w}) \geq U_w(x_w = a', x_{-w})$ for all $a' \in \{0, 1\}$. The following lemma proves that, for every function $\beta_w$, there is a function $g_w : \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ and constant $c_w$ such that $\beta_w$ is the best response function.

**Lemma 1** (*) Let $\beta : \{0, 1, \ldots, n - 1\} \rightarrow 2^{\{0, 1\}} \setminus \{\emptyset\}$ be an arbitrary function. Then we can compute in polynomial (in $n$) time a function $g : \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ and constant $c$ such that $\beta$ is the corresponding best response function.

We call a function $f : \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ sub-additive if $f(x + y) \leq f(x) + f(y)$ for every $x, y \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\}$ and additive if $f(x + y) = f(x) + f(y)$. We call a BNPG game $(G = \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ sub-additive if $f(x + y) \leq f(x) + f(y)$ for every $x, y \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\}$ and additive if $f(x + y) = f(x) + f(y)$. We call a BNPG game $(G = \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$}
(V, E), (g_v)_v\in V, (c_v)_v\in V) sub-additive (respectively additive) if g_v is sub-additive (respectively additive) for every v ∈ V.

**Parameterized Complexity.** A parameterized problem is represented by the tuple (x, k), where k is the parameter. Fixed parameter tractability (FPT) refers to the solvability of a given instance (x, k) in time f(k) · p(|x|), where p is a polynomial in the input size |x| and f is an arbitrary computable function of k. We use the notation O*(f(k)) to denote O(f(k)poly(|x|)). There is a hierarchy of complexity classes above FPT, such as W [1], W [2], para- NP, and showing that a parameterized problem is hard for one of these complexity classes would imply that the problem may not be fixed-parameter tractable. XP is the class of parameterized problems, where k is the parameter, n is the input size and f is some computable function.

**Definition 2.** [6] A tree decomposition of a graph G is a pair T = (T, {X_v}_{v∈V(T)}), where T is a tree whose every node t is assigned a vertex subset X_t ⊆ V(G), called a bag, such that the following three conditions hold:
1. ∪_{t∈V(T)} X_t = V(G). In other words, every vertex of G is in at least one bag.
2. For every {u, v} ∈ E(G), there exists a node t of T such that bag X_t contains both u and v.
3. For every u ∈ V(G), the set T_u = {t ∈ V(T) : u ∈ X_t}, i.e., the set of nodes whose corresponding bags contain u, induces a connected subtree of T.

**Definition 3.** [6] The width of tree decomposition T = (T, {X_v}_{v∈V(T)}) equals \max_{v∈V(T)} |X_v| − 1, that is, the maximum size of its bag minus 1. The treewidth of a graph G, denoted by tw(G), is the minimum possible width of a tree decomposition of G.

**Definition 4.** [13] An elimination forest T of a graph G = (V, E) is a rooted forest on the same vertex set V such that, for every edge {u, v} ∈ E, one of u and v is an ancestor of the other. The depth of T is the maximum number of vertices on a path from a root to a leaf in T. The tree-depth td(G) of a graph G is the minimum depth among all possible elimination forests.

### 3 Technical Contributions

Our main technical contributions in this paper are the hardness results. First we show that EXISTS-PSNE is para-NP-hard with respect to the maximum degree of the graph as parameter [Theorem 5]. We prove this by exhibiting a non-trivial reduction from (3, B2)-SAT. Next we show that EXISTS-PSNE is W[1]-hard parameterized by treedepth [Theorem 7]. We prove this by exhibiting a non-trivial reduction from GENERAL FACTOR. We also show an important reduction from heterogeneous game to fully homogeneous game which allows us to prove that the hardness results for maximum degree, treedepth, diameter hold even for fully homogeneous games [Theorems 12 and 13].

We complement the hardness result for treedepth by designing a non-trivial dynamic programming based XP algorithm parameterized by treewidth [Theorem 16]. Our XP algorithm also yields a fixed-parameter tractability for the combined parameter “treewidth+maximum degree”.

Lastly, using some standard techniques, we bridge the gap between tractibility and intractibility by showing (i) W[2]-hardness for the parameters- the number of participating (who play 1) and non-participating players (who play 0) [Theorems 10 and 11], (ii) fixed-parameter tractability for parameters like vertex-cover number [for strict games], circuit rank and distance from complete graphs [Theorems 17, 21] and 23 and (iii) existence of PSNE in
Fully homogeneous games for important classes of graphs like path, complete graph, cycle, and bi-clique [Theorem 24].

4 Results

We begin with presenting our results for Exists-PSNE. We omit some proofs; they are marked *. They are available in the appendix.

4.1 Hardness Results

The Exists-PSNE problem is already known to be NP-complete [28]. We strengthen this result significantly in Theorem 5 by proving para-NP-hardness by the maximum degree and the number of different utility functions. We use the NP-complete problem (3, B2)-SAT to prove some of our hardness results [1]. The (3, B2)-SAT problem is the 3-SAT problem restricted to formulas in which each clause contains exactly three literals, and each variable occurs exactly twice positively and twice negatively.

Theorem 5. Exists-PSNE is NP-complete for sub-additive strict BNPG games even if the underlying graph is 3-regular and the number of different utility functions is 2. In particular, Exists-PSNE parameterized by (maximum degree $\Delta$, the number of different utility functions) is para-NP-hard even for sub-additive strict BNPG games.

Proof. The Exists-PSNE problem clearly belongs to NP. To show its NP-hardness, we reduce from the (3, B2)-SAT problem. The high-level idea of our proof is as follows. For every clause in (3, B2)-SAT instance, we create a vertex in the Exists-PSNE instance. Also, for every literal we create a vertex in the Exists-PSNE instance. We then add the set of edges and define the best-response functions in such a way that all the clause vertices play 1 in any PSNE and a set of literal vertices play 1 in a PSNE if and only if there is a satisfying assignment where the same set of literal vertices is assigned True. We now present our construction formally.

Let $(X = \{x_i : i \in [n]\}, C = \{C_j : j \in [m]\})$ be an arbitrary instance of (3, B2)-SAT. We define a function $f : \{x_i, \bar{x}_i : i \in [n]\} \rightarrow \{a_i, \bar{a}_i : i \in [n]\}$ as $f(x_i) = a_i$ and $f(\bar{x}_i) = \bar{a}_i$ for $i \in [n]$ and consider the following instance $(G = (V, E), (g_v)_{v \in V}, (c_v)_{v \in V})$ of Exists-PSNE.

$V = \{a_i, \bar{a}_i : i \in [n]\} \cup \{y_j : j \in [m]\}$

$E = \{(y_j, f(l^1_j)), (y_j, f(l^2_j)), (y_j, f(l^3_j)) : C_j = (l^1_j \lor l^2_j \lor l^3_j), j \in [m]\} \cup \{(a_i, \bar{a}_i) : i \in [n]\}$

We observe that the degree of every vertex in $G$ is 3. We now define $(g_v)_{v \in V}$ and $(c_v)_{v \in V}$. $\forall j \in [m]$, $c_{y_j} = 4, g_{y_j}(0) = 1000, g_{y_j}(1) = 1003, g_{y_j}(2) = 1008, g_{y_j}(3) = 1013, g_{y_j}(4) = 1018$. $\forall i \in [n]$, $c_{a_i} = c_{\bar{a}_i} = 4, g_{a_i}(0) = g_{\bar{a}_i}(0) = 1000, g_{a_i}(1) = g_{\bar{a}_i}(1) = 1005, g_{a_i}(2) = g_{\bar{a}_i}(2) = 1010, g_{a_i}(3) = g_{\bar{a}_i}(3) = 1015, g_{a_i}(4) = g_{\bar{a}_i}(4) = 1018$.

It follows from the definition that both the above functions are sub-additive. Also, one can easily verify that the above functions give the following best-response functions for the players.

$\forall i \in [n], \beta_{a_i}(k) = \beta_{\bar{a}_i}(k) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } k \leq 2 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

$\forall j \in [m], \beta_{y_j}(k) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } k = 0 \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
From the best-response functions, it follows that the game is strict. We now claim that the above BNPG game has a PSNE if and only if the $(3, B2)$-SAT instance is a yes instance.

For the “if” part, suppose the $(3, B2)$-SAT instance is a yes instance. Let $h : \{x_i : i \in [n]\} \rightarrow \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$ be a satisfying assignment of the $(3, B2)$-SAT instance. We consider the following strategy profile for the BNPG game.

- $\forall j \in [m], s(y_j) = 1$
- $\forall i \in [n], s(a_i) = 1$ if and only if $h(x_i) = \text{true}$
- $\forall i \in [n], s(\bar{a}_i) = 0$ if and only if $h(x_i) = \text{true}$

We observe that, since $h$ is a satisfying assignment, the player $y_j$ for every $j \in [m]$ has at least one neighbor who plays 1 and thus $y_j$ does not have any incentive to deviate (from playing 1). For $i \in [n]$ such that $h(x_i) = \text{true}$, the player $a_i$ has at least one neighbor, namely $\bar{a}_i$, who plays 0 and thus $a_i$ does not have any incentive to deviate (from playing 1); on the other hand the player $\bar{a}_i$ has all her neighbor playing 1, and thus she is happy to play 0. Similarly, for $i \in [n]$ such that $h(x_i) = \text{false}$, both the players $a_i$ and $\bar{a}_i$ have no incentive to deviate. This proves that the above strategy profile is a PSNE.

For the “only if” part, let $(s(a_i)_{i \in [n]}, s(\bar{a}_i)_{i \in [n]}, s(y_j)_{j \in [m]})$ be a satisfying assignment of the BNPG game. We claim that $s(y_j) = 1$ for every $j \in [m]$. Suppose not, then there exists a $t \in [m]$ such that $s(y_t) = 0$. Let the literals in clause $C_t$ be $l_{t_1}^1, l_{t_2}^1, l_{t_3}^1$. Then $s(f(l_{t_1}^1)) = 0, \forall i \in [3]$ otherwise the player $y_t$ will deviate from 0 and play 1. But then the player $f(l_{t_1}^1)$ will deviate to 1 as $y_t$ plays 0 which is a contradiction. We now claim that we have $s(a_i) \neq s(\bar{a}_i)$ for every $i \in [n]$. Suppose not, then there exists an $\lambda \in [n]$ such that $s(a_{\lambda}) = s(\bar{a}_{\lambda})$. If $s(a_{\lambda}) = s(\bar{a}_{\lambda}) = 1$, then both the players $a_{\lambda}$ and $\bar{a}_{\lambda}$ have incentive to deviate to 0. On the other hand, if $s(a_{\lambda}) = s(\bar{a}_{\lambda}) = 0$, then both the players $a_{\lambda}$ and $\bar{a}_{\lambda}$ have incentive to deviate to 1. This proves the claim. We now consider the assignment $h : \{x_i : i \in [n]\} \rightarrow \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$ defined as $h(x_i) = \text{true}$ if and only if $s(a_i) = 1$ for every $i \in [n]$. We claim that $h$ is a satisfying assignment for the $(3, B2)$-SAT formula. Suppose not, then $h$ does not satisfy a clause, say $C_{\gamma}, \gamma \in [m]$. Then the player $y_{\gamma}$ has incentive to deviate to 0 as none of its neighbors play 1 which is a contradiction. □

For the remainder of this subsection, we describe a game using the best response functions for the sake of simplicity of presentation. This suffices as due to Lemma 1 we can always compute the utility functions using the best response functions in polynomial time.

We next consider treedepth as parameter. Problems on graphs which are easy for trees are often fixed-parameter-tractable with respect to treedepth as parameter. We show that this is not the case for our problem. Towards that, we use the General Factor problem which is W[1]-hard parameterized by treedepth. □

**Definition 6** (General Factor). Given a graph $G = (V, E)$ and a set $K(v) \subseteq \{0, \ldots, d(v)\}$ for each $v \in V$, compute if there exists a subset $F \subseteq E$ such that, for each vertex $v \in V$, the number of edges in $F$ incident on $v$ is an element of $K(v)$. We denote an arbitrary instance of this problem by $(G = (V, E), (K(v))_{v \in V})$.

**Theorem 7.** EXISTS-PSNE for BNPG games is W[1]-hard parameterized by treedepth.

**Proof.** To prove W[1]-hardness, we reduce from General Factor parameterized by treedepth to BNPG game.

Let $(G = (\{v_i : i \in [n]\}, E'), (K(v_i))_{i \in [n]})$ be an arbitrary instance of General Factor. The high level idea of our construction is as follows. For each vertex and edge in the graph $G$ associated with General Factor instance, we add a node in the graph $H$ (where the
BNPG game is defined) associated with \textsc{Exists-PSNE} problem instance. On top of that we add some extra nodes and edges in $\mathcal{H}$ and appropriately define the best response functions of every player in $\mathcal{H}$ so that a set of nodes in $\mathcal{H}$ corresponding to a set $\mathcal{F}$ of edges belonging to $\mathcal{G}$ play 1 in a PSNE if and only if $\mathcal{F}$ makes \textsc{General Factor} a yes instance. We now formally present our construction.

We consider a BNPG game on the following graph $\mathcal{H} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$. See Figure 1 for a pictorial representation of $\mathcal{H}$.

$V = \{u_i : i \in [n]\} \cup \{a_{(i,j)} : \{v_i, v_j\} \in \mathcal{E}'\}
\cup \{u'_i : i \in [n+1]\} \cup \{d_1, d_2\}
\cup \{\{d_1, u'_i\}, \{d_2, u_i\} : i \in [n]\} \cup \{\{d_1, d_2\}, \{d_1, u'_{n+1}\}, \{d_2, u'_{n+1}\}\}$

Let the treedepth of $\mathcal{G}$ be $\tau$. Create a graph $\mathcal{G}'$ by adding the vertices $d_1, d_2$ and the set of edges $\{\{d_1, v_i\}, \{d_2, v_i\} : i \in [n]\} \cup \{d_1, d_2\}$ to the graph $\mathcal{G}$. The treedepth of $\mathcal{G}'$ is at most $\tau + 2$.

We claim that the treedepth of $\mathcal{H}$ is at most $\tau + 3$. To see this, we begin with an elimination tree of $\mathcal{G}'$ and replace $v_i$ with $u_i$ for every $i \in [n]$. Let $S = \{u'_i : i \in [n+1]\} \cup \{a_{(i,j)} : \{v_i, v_j\} \in \mathcal{E}'\}$. \forall u' \in S, add an edge between $u'$ and $u$ in the elimination tree where $u, v$ are neighbors of $u'$ in $\mathcal{H}$ and $u$ is descendant of $v$ in the elimination tree. This results in a valid elimination tree for $\mathcal{H}$ and hence, the treedepth of $\mathcal{H}$ is at most $\tau + 3$.

We now describe the best-response functions of the vertices in $\mathcal{H}$ to complete the description of the BNPG game.

$\beta_{u_i}(k) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } k - 1 \in K(v_i) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

$\beta_{u'_i}(k) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } k = 2 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

$\beta_{a_{(i,j)}}(k) = \begin{cases} 0,1 & \forall k \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\} \end{cases}$

$\beta_{d_1}(k) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } k = 0 \text{ or } k = n \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

$\beta_{d_2}(k) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } k = 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

We claim that the above BNPG game has a PSNE if and only if the \textsc{General Factor} instance is a yes instance.
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For the “if” part, suppose the General Factor instance is a yes instance. Then there exists a subset $F \subseteq E'$ such that for all $i \in [n]$, the degree of $v_i$ in $G[F]$ is an element of the set $K(v_i)$. We consider the strategy profile $\bar{x} = (x_v)_{v \in V}$.

\[ \forall i \in [n], x_{u_i} = x_{u_i'} = 1, x_{u_{n+1}} = 0 \]

\[ \forall \{v_i, v_j\} \in E', x_{a(i,j)} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \{v_i, v_j\} \in F, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, x_{d_1} = 1, x_{d_2} = 0 \]

Now we argue that $\bar{x}$ is a PSNE for the BNPG game. Clearly no player $a_{\{i,j\}}, \{v_i, v_j\} \in E'$ deviates as both 0 and 1 are her best-responses irrespective of the action of their neighbors. The player $d_1$ does not deviate as she has exactly $n$ neighbors playing 1. The player $u_i', i \in [n]$ does not deviate as she has exactly 2 neighbors playing 1. The player $u_{n+1}'$ does not deviate as she has exactly 1 neighbor playing 1. The player $d_2$ does not deviate as she has at least 1 neighbors playing 1. Note that $\forall i \in [n]$, the number of neighbors of $u_i$ playing 1 excluding $u_i'$ and $d_2$ (which in this case is $n_{u_i} - 1$ as $x_{d_2} = 0, x_{u_i'} = 1$) is the same as the number of edges in $F$ which are incident on $v_i$ in $G$. Hence, $\forall i \in [n]$, the player $u_i$ does not deviate as $(n_{u_i} - 1) \in K(v_i)$. Hence, $\bar{x}$ is a PSNE.

For the “only if” part, let $\bar{x} = (x_v)_{v \in V}$ be a PSNE of the BNPG game. We claim that we have $x_{d_1} = 1, x_{u_i} = x_{u_i'} = 1, \forall i \in [n], x_{u_{n+1}'} = 0, x_{d_2} = 0$. To prove this, we consider all cases for $(x_v)_{v \in [n]}$.

1. Case $\forall i \in [n], x_{u_i} = 0$: We have $x_{d_2} = 0$ as $d_2 > 0$ otherwise $d_2$ would deviate. This implies that $x_{u_{n+1}'} = 0$ since $n_{u_{n+1}'} \leq 1$ (as $x_{d_2} = 0$). Now we consider the following sub-cases (according to the values of $x_{d_1}$ and $x_{u_i}'$, $i \in [n]$):
   - $(x_{d_1} = 1, \exists k \in [n] \text{ such that } x_{u_k'} = 0)$. Here $x_{u_k'}$ will then deviate to 1 as $n_{u_k'} = 2$.
     Hence, it is not a PSNE.
   - $(x_{d_1} = 1, \forall i \in [n] \text{ and } x_{u_i'} = 1)$. This is exactly what we claim thus we have nothing to prove in this case.
   - $(x_{d_1} = 0, \exists k \in [n] \text{ such that } x_{u_k'} = 1)$. Here $x_{u_k'}$ will then deviate to 0 as $n_{u_k'} = 1$.
     Hence, it is not a PSNE.
   - $(x_{d_1} = 0, \forall i \in [n] \text{ and } x_{u_i'} = 0)$. The player $d_1$ will deviate to 1 as $n_{d_1} = 0$. Hence, it is not a PSNE.

2. Case $\exists k_1, k_2 \in [n] \text{ such that } x_{u_{k_1}} = 1 \text{ and } x_{u_{k_2}} = 0$: We have $x_{d_2} = 0$ as $d_2 > 0$ otherwise $d_2$ would deviate. This implies that $x_{u_{n+1}'} = 0$ since $n_{u_{n+1}'} \leq 1$ (as $x_{d_2} = 0$). Now we consider the following sub-cases (according to the values of $x_{d_1}$ and $x_{u_i}'$, $i \in [n]$):
   - $(x_{d_1} = 1, \forall i \in [n] \text{ and } x_{u_i'} = 0)$. Here $u_{k_1}'$, will deviate to 1 as $n_{u_{k_1}'} = 2$. So, it isn’t a PSNE.
   - $(x_{d_1} = 1, \forall i \in [n] \text{ and } x_{u_i'} = 1)$. Here $u_{k_2}'$, will deviate to 0 as $n_{u_{k_2}'} = 1$. So, it isn’t a PSNE.
   - $(x_{d_1} = 1, \exists i, j \in [n] \text{ such that } x_{u_i'} = 1 \text{ and } x_{u_j'} = 0)$. Here $d_1$ will deviate to 0 as $0 < n_{d_1} < n$ (there are at least 2 neighbours of $d_1$ which play 0 and at least 1 neighbour of $d_1$ which plays 1). Hence, it is not a PSNE.
   - $(x_{d_1} = 0, \forall i \in [n] \text{ and } x_{u_i'} = 0)$. Here $d_1$ will deviate to 1 as $n_{d_1} = 0$. So, it isn’t a PSNE.
   - $(x_{d_1} = 0, \exists i \in [n] \text{ such that } x_{u_i'} = 1)$. Here $u_i'$ will deviate to 0 as $n_{u_i'} \leq 1$ and hence, it is not a PSNE.

3. Case $\forall i \in [n] \text{ and } x_{u_i} = 0$: For every $i \in [n]$, we must have $x_{u_i'} = 0$ so that $u_i'$ doesn’t deviate. We have the following sub-cases (according to the values of $x_{d_1}, x_{d_2}$ and $x_{u_{n+1}'}$):
   - $(x_{d_1} = 0, x_{u_{n+1}'} = 0)$. Here $d_1$ deviates to 1 as $n_{d_1} = 0$ and hence, it is not a PSNE.
   - $(x_{d_1} = 0, x_{u_{n+1}'} = 1)$. Here $u_{n+1}'$ deviates to 0 as $n_{u_{n+1}'} \leq 1$. So, it isn’t a PSNE.
   - $(x_{d_1} = 1, x_{u_{n+1}'} = 0, x_{d_2} = 0)$. Here $d_2$ deviates to 1 as $n_{d_2} = 0$. So, it isn’t a PSNE.
= (x_{d_1} = 1, x'_{u_{i+1}} = 0, x_{d_2} = 1). Here u'_{n+1} deviates to 1 as n_{u'} = 2 and hence, it is not a PSNE.

= (x_{d_1} = 1, x'_{u_{i+1}} = 1, x_{d_2} = 0). Here u'_{n+1} deviates to 0 as n_{u'} = 1 and hence, it is not a PSNE.

= (x_{d_1} = 1, x'_{u_{i+1}} = 1, x_{d_2} = 1). Here d_2 deviates to 0 as n_{d_2} > 0. So, it isn’t a PSNE.

So if \( \bar{x} = (x_i)_{v \in V} \) is a PSNE of the BNPG game, then we have \( x_{d_1} = 1, \forall i \in [n], x_{u'_i} = 1, x'_{u_{i+1}} = 0, \forall i \in [n] x_{u_i} = 1, x_{d_2} = 0 \). Now consider the set \( F = \{(v_i, v_j) : x_{a(i,j)} = 1, \{v_i, v_j\} \in E'\} \). Note that \( \forall i \in [n] \), the number of neighbors of \( u_i \) playing 1 excluding \( u'_i \) and \( d_2 \) (which in this case is \( n_{u_i} - 1 \) as \( x_{d_2} = 0, x_{u'_i} = 1 \)) is the same as the number of edges in \( F \) which are incident on \( v_i \) in \( G \). Since \( \forall i, n_{u_i} - 1 \in K(v_i) \), the number of edges in \( F \) incident on \( v_i \) in General Factor instance is an element of \( K(v_i) \). Hence, the General Factor instance is a yes instance. ▶

**Corollary 8.** Exists-PSNE for BNPG games is \( W[1] \)-hard parameterized by treewidth and pathwidth.

We next consider the diameter (\( d \)) of the graph as our parameter and prove para-NP-hardness in Observation 9. It follows immediately from the fact that the reduced instance in the NP-completeness proof of Exists-PSNE for BNPG games in \([28]\) has diameter 2.

**Observation 9.** Exists-PSNE for BNPG games is NP-complete even for graphs of diameter at most 2. In particular, the Exists-PSNE problem for BNPG games is para-NP-hard parameterized by diameter.

We next consider a variant of Exists-PSNE where at most \( k_0 \) (respectively \( k_1 \)) players are playing 0 (respectively 1) in the PSNE. We denote this variant as \( k_0\)-Exists-PSNE (resp. \( k_1\)-Exists-PSNE). Obviously there is a brute force \( \mathcal{NP} \) algorithm which runs in time \( O^{*}(n^{k_0}) \) (respectively \( O^{*}(n^{k_1}) \)). We show that \( k_0\)-Exists-PSNE (resp. \( k_1\)-Exists-PSNE) is \( W[2] \)-hard parameterized by \( k_0 \) (respectively \( k_1 \)). For this, we reduce from the DOMINATING SET problem parameterized by the size of dominating set which is known to be \( W[2] \)-hard \([3]\).

**Theorem 10 (⋆).** \( k_0\)-Exists-PSNE for BNPG games is \( W[2] \)-hard parameterized by \( k_0 \).

**Theorem 11 (⋆).** \( k_1\)-Exists-PSNE for BNPG games is \( W[2] \)-hard parameterized by \( k_1 \) even for fully homogeneous BNPG games.

Till now we have mostly focused on heterogeneous BNPG games. We next consider fully homogeneous BNPG games and show the following by reducing from the Exists-PSNE problem on heterogeneous BNPG games.

**Theorem 12.** The following results hold even for fully homogeneous games.

1. Exists-PSNE is NP-complete even if the diameter of the graph is at most 4.
2. Exists-PSNE is \( W[1] \)-hard with respect to the parameter treedepth of the graph.
3. \( k_0\)-Exists-PSNE is \( W[2] \)-hard parameterized by \( k_0 \).

**Proof.** We first present a reduction from the Exists-PSNE problem on heterogeneous BNPG games to the Exists-PSNE problem on fully homogeneous BNPG games. Let \( (G = (V = \{v_i : i \in [n]\}, E), (g_v)_{v \in V}, (c_v)_{v \in V}) \) be any heterogeneous BNPG game. We now
construct the graph $H = (\mathcal{V}', \mathcal{E}')$ for the instance of the fully homogeneous BNPG game.

$$\mathcal{V}' = \{u_i : i \in [n]\} \cup \bigcup_{i \in [n]} \mathcal{V}_i,$$

where $\mathcal{V}_i = \{a^i_j : j \in [2 + (i - 1)n]\}, \forall i \in [n]$

$\mathcal{E}' = \{(u_i, u_j) : \{v_i, v_j\} \in \mathcal{E} \} \cup \bigcup_{i \in [n]} \mathcal{E}_i,$

where $\mathcal{E}_i = \{\{a^i_j, u_i\} : j \in [2 + (i - 1)n]\}, \forall i \in [n]$

Let us define $f(x) = \lceil \frac{x-2}{n} \rceil + 1$, $h(x) = x - 2 - (f(x) - 1)n$. We now define best-response strategies $\beta$ for the fully homogeneous BNPG game on $H$.

$$\beta(k) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } k = 0 \text{ or } k = 1 \\ \{0, 1\} & \text{if } \Delta g_{v_{f(k)}}(h(k)) = c_{v_{f(k)}}, k > 1 \\ 1 & \text{if } \Delta g_{v_{f(k)}}(h(k)) > c_{v_{f(k)}}, k > 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } \Delta g_{v_{f(k)}}(h(k)) < c_{v_{f(k)}}, k > 1 \end{cases}$$

This finishes description of our fully homogeneous BNPG game on $H$. We now claim that there exists a PSNE in the heterogeneous BNPG game on $G$ if and only if there exists a PSNE in the fully homogeneous BNPG game on $H$.

For the “only if” part, let $x^* = (x^*_v)_{v \in \mathcal{V}}$ be a PSNE in the heterogeneous BNPG game on $G$. We now consider the following strategy profile $y = (y_v)_{v \in \mathcal{V}}$ for players in $H$.

$$\forall i \in [n]y_{u_i} = x^*_v; y_w = 1 \text{ for other vertices } w$$

Clearly the players in $\bigcup_{i \in [n]} \mathcal{V}_i$ do not deviate as their degree is 1 and $\beta(0) = \beta(1) = 1$. In $y$, we have $n_{u_i} = n_{v_i} + 2 + (i - 1)n \geq 2$ and $n_{v_i} \leq n - 1$ for every $i \in [n]$. If $x^*_v = 1$, then we have $\Delta g_{v_{(n_{v_i})}}(h(n_{v_i})) \leq c_{v_{(n_{v_i})}}$. This implies that $\Delta g_{v_{(n_{v_i})}}(h(n_{v_i})) \leq c_{v_{(n_{v_i})}}$. So $u_i$ does not deviate as 0 is the best-response. If $x^*_v = 0$, then we have $\Delta g_{v_{(n_{v_i})}}(h(n_{v_i})) \geq c_{v_{(n_{v_i})}}$. We now define best-response $\bar{v}$ for players in $H$.

Similarly, if $x^*_v = 0$, then $\Delta g_{v_{(n_{v_i})}}(h(n_{v_i})) \leq c_{v_{(n_{v_i})}}$. We now claim that there exists a PSNE where at most $k$ players play 0 in the heterogeneous BNPG game on $G$ if and only if there exists a PSNE where at most $k$ players play 0 in the fully homogeneous BNPG game on $H$. Hence, the result follows from Theorem 10.
We next show that Exists-PSNE for fully homogeneous BNPG games is para-NP-hard parameterized by the maximum degree of the graph again by reducing from heterogeneous BNPG games.

**Theorem 13 (⋆).** Exists-PSNE for fully homogeneous BNPG games is NP-complete even if the maximum degree $\Delta$ of the graph is at most 9.

### 4.2 XP Algorithm for the parameter treewidth

Our next result is an XP algorithm for the Exists-PSNE problem when parameterized by treewidth. Towards that, we introduce the notion of “feasible function” in Definition 14 and prove a related algorithmic result in Lemma 15.

**Definition 14.** Let $G = (V, E)$ be a graph with maximum degree $\Delta$. Let $f : V \rightarrow [\Delta] \cup \{0\}$ be a function where $V \subseteq V$. We call a function $f$ feasible if there exists a strategy profile $S$ of all the players in $G$ such that for each $u \in V$, number of neighbours of $u$ in the strategy profile $S$ is $f(u)$.

**Lemma 15 (⋆).** Let $G = (V, E)$ be a graph with maximum degree $\Delta$. Let $V \subseteq V$. Then the set of all feasible functions $f : V \rightarrow [\Delta] \cup \{0\}$ can be computed in time $O^*(\Delta^{V})$.

We now present a $O^*(\Delta^{O(k)})$ time XP algorithm for Exists-PSNE where $k$ is the treewidth of the input graph. Note that the running time of $O^*(\Delta^{O(k)})$ implies that Exists-PSNE is fixed-parameter tractable for the combined parameter “treewidth+maximum degree”.

**Theorem 16.** Let $G$ be an $n$-vertex graph given together with its tree decomposition of treewidth at most $k$. Then there is an algorithm running in time $O^*(\Delta^{O(k)})$ for Exists-PSNE in BNPG game on $G$ where $\Delta$ is the maximum degree of graph $G$.

**Proof Sketch.** Let $(G = (V, E), (g_v)_{v \in V}, (e_v)_{v \in V})$ be any instance of Exists-PSNE for BNPG games. Let $(\beta_v)_{v \in V}$ be the set of the best response functions. Let $T = (T, \{X_t\}_{t \in T} \subseteq V(T))$ be a nice tree decomposition of the input $n$-vertex graph $G$ that has width at most $k$. Let $T$ be rooted at some node $r$. For a node $t$ of $T$, let $V_t$ be the union of all the bags present in the subtree of $T$ rooted at $t$, including $X_t$. We solve the Exists-PSNE problem using dynamic programing. Let $N_1(X_t)$ denote set of vertices in $V \setminus V_t$ which is adjacent to at least one vertex in $X_t$. Let $N_2(X_t)$ denote set of vertices in $V_t \setminus X_t$ which is adjacent to at least one vertex in $X_t$. Let $c[t, (x_v)_{v \in V}, (d_v)_{v \in V}, (d_v^2)_{v \in V}] = 1$ (resp. 0) denote that there exists (resp. doesn’t exist) a strategy profile $S$ of all the players in $G$ such that for each $u \in X_t$, $u$ plays $x_u$, number of neighbours of $u$ in $N_1(X_t)$ (resp. $N_2(X_t)$) playing 1 is $d_u^1$ (resp. $d_u^2$) and none of the vertices in $V_t$ deviate in the strategy profile $S$. Before we proceed, we would like to introduce some notations. Let $V$ be a set of vertices and $S_1 = (x_v)_{v \in V}$, $S_2 = (x_v)_{v \in V \setminus \{w\}}$ be two tuples. Then $S_1 \setminus \{x_w\} := S_2$ and $S_2 \cup \{x_w\} := S_1$. Also, we denote an empty tuple by $\phi$. Clearly $c[t, \phi, \phi, \phi]$ indicates whether there is a PSNE in $G$ or not. We now present the recursive equation to compute $c[t, (x_v)_{v \in X_t}, (d_v^1)_{v \in V_t}, (d_v^2)_{v \in V_t}]$ for various types of node in $T$.

**Leaf Node:** For a leaf node $t$ we have that $X_t = \phi$. Hence, $c[t, \phi, \phi, \phi] = 1$.

**Join Node:** For a join node $t$, let $t_1, t_2$ be its two children. Note that $X_t = X_{t_1} = X_{t_2}$.

Now we proceed to compute $c[t, (x_v)_{v \in X_t}, (d_v^1)_{v \in X_t}, (d_v^2)_{v \in X_t}]$. Let $F$ be a set of tuples $(d_v^1)_{v \in X_t}$ such that there is a strategy profile $S$ such that for each $v \in X_t$, its response is $x_v$, the number of neighbours in $N_1(x), V_{t_1} \setminus X_{t_1}$ and $V_{t_2} \setminus X_{t_2}$ playing 1 is
$d^1_n, d'_n, d''_n - d'_n$ respectively. Using Lemma 15 we can find the set $F$ in time $O^*(\Delta^6)$. Then $c[t, (x_v)_{v \in X_i}, (d^1_v)_{v \in X_i}, (d'_v)_{v \in X_i}]$ is equal to the following formula:

$$0 \lor \bigvee_{(d'_v)_{v \in X_i} \in F} (c[t_1, (x_v)_{v \in X_i}, (d^1_v + d'_v)_{v \in X_i}, (d'_v)_{v \in X_i}]$$

$\land c[t_2, (x_v)_{v \in X_i}, (d^1_v + d''_v)_{v \in X_i}, (d'_v)_{v \in X_i}])$

**Introduce Node:** Let $t$ be an introduce node with a child $t'$ such that $X_t = X_{t'} \cup \{u\}$ for some $u \notin X_{t'}$. Let $S' = (x_v)_{v \in X_i}$ be a strategy profile of vertices in $X_i$. Let $n'_v$ denote the number of neighbours of $v$ playing 1 in $S'$. Let $g : V \times V \to \{0, 1\}$ be a function such that $g(\{u, v\}) = 1$ if and only if $\{u, v\} \in E$. We now proceed to compute $c[t, S', (d^1_v)_{v \in X_i}, (d'_v)_{v \in X_i}]$. If there is no strategy profile $S$ where $\forall v \in X_i, \text{the number of neighbours of } v \text{ in } N_1(X_i)$ (resp. $N_2(X_i)$) playing 1 is $d^1_v$ (resp. $d'_v$), then clearly $c[t, S', (d^1_v)_{v \in X_i}, (d'_v)_{v \in X_i}] = 0$. Due to Lemma 15 we can check the previous statement in $O^*(\Delta^6)$ by considering a bipartite subgraph of $G$ between $X_t$ and $N_1(X_t)$ (or $N_2(X_t)$). Otherwise, we have the following:

$$c[t, S', (d^1_v)_{v \in X_i}, (d'_v)_{v \in X_i}] = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ if } \exists v \in X_t, x_v \notin \beta_v(n'_v + d^1_v + d'_v) \\
\left( c[t', S'' \setminus \{x_u\}, (d^1_v + g(\{v, u\}))_{v \in X_{t'}}, (d'_v)_{v \in X_{t'}}] \text{ if } x_u = 1 \\
\left( c[t', S'' \setminus \{x_u\}, (d^1_v)_{v \in X_{t'}}, (d'_v)_{v \in X_{t'}}] \text{ otherwise} \right) \right) \right) \end{cases}$$

**Forget Node:** Let $t$ be a forget node with a child $t'$ such that $X_t = X'_t \setminus \{w\}$ for some $w \in X_{t'}$. Let $S_0 = (x_v)_{v \in X_i} \cup \{v, w = 0\}$, $S_1 = (x_v)_{v \in X_i} \cup \{v, w = 1\}$ be two strategy profiles of vertices in $X'_t$. Let $g : V \times V \to \{0, 1\}$ be a function such that $g(\{u, v\}) = 1$ if and only if $\{u, v\} \in E$. We now have the following:

$$c[t, (x_v)_{v \in X_i}, (d^1_v)_{v \in X_i}, (d'_v)_{v \in X_i}] = \bigvee_{d^1_v, d'_v \in \mathbb{N}, d_v \leq \Delta} (c[t', S_0, (d^1_v)_{v \in X_{t'}}, (d'_v)_{v \in X_{t'}}]$$

$$\lor c[t', S_1, (d^1_v)_{v \in X_{t'}}, (d'_v - g(\{v, w\}))_{v \in X_{t'}}])$$

We refer the reader to the appendix for the proof of correctness of the above recursive equations. Now we consider the time complexity of our algorithm. Total number of cells in the dynamic programming table which we created is $O^*(\Delta^{O(k)})$. For each cell, we spend at most $O^*(\Delta^{O(k)})$ time if we are computing the table in a bottom up fashion. Hence, the running time is $O^*(\Delta^{O(k)})$.

### 4.3 Tractable Results

To conclude our fine-grained analysis of the EXISTS-PSNE problem, we bridge the gap between the tractability and intractability by showing some tractable results. Our first result is an FPT algorithm for EXISTS-PSNE for strict games when parameterized by the vertex cover number.

**Theorem 17 (\*)**. There is a $O^*(2^{vc(G)})$ time algorithm for EXISTS-PSNE for strict BNPG games where $vc(G)$ is the vertex cover number.

Our next result shows that we can always find a PSNE for additive BNPG games in $O(n)$ time. This complements the intractable result for subadditive BNPG games.

**Observation 18 (\*)**. There exists an $O(n)$ time algorithm to find a PSNE in an additive BNPG game.
We next consider circuit rank and distance from complete graph as parameter. These parameters can be thought of distance from tractable instances (namely tree and complete graph). They are defined as follows.

**Definition 19.** Let the number of edges and number of vertices in a graph \( G \) be \( m \) and \( n \) respectively. Then \( d_1 \) (circuit rank) is defined to be \( m - n + c \) (where \( c \) is the number of connected components in the graph) and \( d_2 \) (distance from complete graph) is defined to be \( \frac{n(n-1)}{2} - m \). Note that circuit rank is not the same as feedback arc set.

Yu et al. presented an algorithm for \textsc{Exists-PSNE} on trees in \cite{28}. It turns out that their algorithm can be appropriately modified to get the following observation.

**Observation 20.** \cite{28} Given a BNPG game on a tree \( T = (V, E) \), a subset of vertices \( U \subseteq V \) and a strategy profile \( (x_u)_{u \in U} \in \{0,1\}^U \), there is a polynomial time algorithm for deciding if there exists a PSNE \( (y_v)_{v \in V} \in \{0,1\}^V \) for the BNPG game such that \( x_u = y_u \) for every \( u \in U \).

Now by using the observation \cite{20} as a subroutine, we exhibit an FPT algorithm for the parameter circuit rank.

**Theorem 21.** There is an algorithm running in time \( \mathcal{O}^*(4^{d_1}) \) for \textsc{Exists-PSNE} in BNPG games where \( d_1 \) is the circuit rank of the input graph.

**Proof.** Let \( (G = (V, E), (y_v)_{v \in V}, (c_v)_{v \in V}) \) be any instance of \textsc{Exists-PSNE} for BNPG games. Let the graph \( G \) have \( c \) connected components namely, \( G_1 = (V_1, E_1), \ldots, G_c = (V_c, E_c) \). For every \( i \in [c] \), we decide if there exists a PSNE in \( G_i \); clearly there is a PSNE in \( G \) if and only if there is a PSNE in \( G_i \) for every \( i \in [n] \). Hence, in the rest of the proof, we focus on the algorithm to decide the existence of a PSNE in \( G_i \). We compute a minimum spanning tree \( T_i \) in the connected component \( G_i \). Let \( E'_i \subseteq E_i \) be the set of edges which are not part of \( T_i \); let \( |E'_i| = d'_i \) and \( V'_i = \{v'_1, v'_2, \ldots, v'_l\} \subseteq V_i \) be the set of vertices which are endpoints of at least one edge in \( E'_i \). Of course, we have \( |V'_i| = l \leq 2d'_i \). For every tuple \( t = (x'_{v})_{v \in V'_i} \in \{0,1\}^l \), we do the following.

1. For each \( v \in V'_i \), let \( n'_v \) be the number of neighbours of \( v \) in \( G_i[V'_i] \) (subgraph of \( G_i \) containing the set of nodes \( V_i \) and the set of edges \( E'_i \)) who play 1 in \( t \). We now define \( g'_v \) for every player \( v \in V \) as follows.

\[
g'_v(k) = \begin{cases} 
g_v(k + n'_v) & \text{if } v \in V'_i \\
g_v(k) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]

2. We now decide if there exists a PSNE \( (y_v)_{v \in V_i} \in \{0,1\}^{V_i} \) in the BNPG game \( (T_i, (g'_v)_{v \in V_i}, (c_v)_{v \in V_i}) \) such that \( y_v = x'_v \) for every \( v \in V'_i \); this can be done in polynomial time due to Observation \cite{20} If such a PSNE exists, then we output \textsc{yes}.

If we fail to find a PSNE for every choice of tuple \( t \), then we output \textsc{no}. The running time of the above algorithm (for \( G_i \)) is \( \mathcal{O}^* \left( 2^{V'_i} \right) \). Hence the overall running time of our algorithm is \( \mathcal{O}^* \left( \sum_{i=1}^{c} 2^{V'_i} \right) \leq \mathcal{O}^* \left( 2^{2d'_i} \right) = \mathcal{O}^* \left( 4^{d'_i} \right) \). We now argue correctness of our algorithm. We observe that it is enough to argue correctness for one component.

In one direction, let \( x^* = (x'_{v})_{v \in V_i} \) be a PSNE in the BNPG game \( (G_i, (g'_v)_{v \in V_i}, (c_v)_{v \in V_i}) \). We now claim that \( (x'_{v})_{v \in V_i} \) is also a PSNE in the BNPG game on \( (T_i, (g'_v)_{v \in V_i}, (c_v)_{v \in V_i}) \).
where \( t = (x^*_v)_{v \in V'} \). Let \( n^G_v \) and \( n^T_v \) be the number of neighbors of \( v \in V_i \) in \( G_i \) and \( T_i \) respectively who play 1 in \( x^* \). With \( n^G_v \) defined as above, we have \( n^G_v = n^T_v + n^G_v \) for \( v \in V'_i \) and \( n^G_v = n^G_v \) for \( v \in V_i \setminus V'_i \). Hence, we have \( \Delta g^G_v(n^T_v) = \Delta g_v(n^G_v + n^T_v) = \Delta g_v(n^G_v) \) for \( v \in V'_i \) and \( \Delta g^G_v(n^T_v) = \Delta g_v(n^T_v) \) for \( v \in V_i \setminus V'_i \). If \( x^*_v = 1 \) where \( v \in V_i \), then \( \Delta g_v(n^G_v) \geq c_v \) and thus we have \( \Delta g^G_v(n^T_v) \geq c_v \). Hence, \( v \) does not deviate in \( T_i \). Similarly, if \( x^*_v = 0 \) where \( v \in V_i \), then \( \Delta g_v(n^G_v) \leq c_v \) and thus we have \( \Delta g^G_v(n^T_v) \leq c_v \). Hence, \( v \) does not deviate in \( T_i \). Hence \((x^*_v)_{v \in V} \) is also a PSNE in BNPG game \((T_i, (g^i_v)_{v \in V_i}, (c_v)_{v \in V_i})\) where \( t = (x^*_v)_{v \in V} \) (which means our Algorithm returns YES).

In the other direction, let \((x^*_v)_{v \in V_i} \) be the PSNE in BNPG game \((T_i, (g^i_v)_{v \in V_i}, (c_v)_{v \in V_i})\) where \( t = (x^*_v)_{v \in V} \) (which means our Algorithm returns YES). We claim that \((x^*_v)_{v \in V} \) is also a PSNE in BNPG game \((G_i, (g_v)_{v \in V_i}, (c_v)_{v \in V_i})\). If \( x^*_v = 1 \) for \( v \in V_i \), then \( \Delta g_v(n^G_v) \geq c_v \). This implies that \( \Delta g_v(n^G_v) \geq c_v \) and thus \( v \) does not deviate in \( G_i \). Similarly, if \( x^*_v = 0 \) for \( v \in V_i \), then \( \Delta g_v(n^G_v) \leq c_v \). This implies that \( \Delta g_v(n^G_v) \leq c_v \) and thus \( v \) does not deviate in \( G_i \). Hence \((x^*_v)_{v \in V} \) is also a PSNE in BNPG game \((G_i, (g_v)_{v \in V_i}, (c_v)_{v \in V_i})\).  

Yu et al. presented an algorithm for Exists-PSNE on complete graphs in [28]. It turns out that their algorithm can be appropriately modified to get the following observation.

\textbf{Observation 22.} [28] Given a BNPG game on a complete graph \( G = (V, E) \), and an integer \( k \), there is a polynomial time algorithm for deciding if there exists a PSNE where exactly \( k \) players play 1 and returns such a PSNE if it exists.

Now by using the observation 22 as a subroutine, we exhibit an FPT algorithm for the parameter distance from complete graph.

\textbf{Theorem 23.} There is an algorithm running in time \( O^*(4^d) \) for Exists-PSNE in BNPG games where \( d_2 \) is the distance from complete graph.

\textbf{Proof.} Let \( (G = (V, E), (g_v)_{v \in V}, (c_v)_{v \in V}) \) be any instance of Exists-PSNE for BNPG games. If \( d_2 \geq \frac{n}{2} \), then iterating over all possible strategy profiles takes time \( O^*(2^n) \leq O^*(4^d) \). So allow us to assume for the rest of the proof that \( d_2 < \frac{n}{2} \). Let us define \( V' = \{ u \in V : \exists v \in V \setminus \{ u \} \ \text{such that} \ (u, v) \in E \} \). We have \( |V'| \leq 2d_2 \).

For every strategy profile \( y = (y_{uv})_{u \in V'} \), we do the following. For each \( v \in V \setminus V' \), let \( n^G_v \) be the number of neighbors of \( v \) in \( V' \) who play 1 in \( y \). We now define \( g^G_v(\ell) = g_v(\ell + n^G_v) \) for every \( \ell \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\} \) and every player \( v \in V \setminus V' \). For every \( k \in \{ 0, \ldots, |V'| \} \), we decide (using the algorithm in Observation 22) if there exists a PSNE \( x^k = (x^k_v)_{v \in V} \) in the BNPG game \((G[V \setminus V'], (g^G_v)_{v \in V \setminus V'}, (c_v)_{v \in V}) \) where exactly \( k \) players play 1. If \( x^k \) exists, then we output \textsc{yes} if \((y_{uv})_{u \in V', (x^k_v)_{v \in V}} \) forms a PSNE in the BNPG game \((G = (V, E), (g_v)_{v \in V}, (c_v)_{v \in V}) \).

If the above procedure fails to find a PSNE, then we output \textsc{no}. The running time of the above algorithm is \( O^* \left( 2^{|V'|} \right) \leq O^*(4^d) \). We now argue correctness.

Clearly, if the algorithm outputs \textsc{yes}, then there exists a PSNE for the input game. On the other hand, if there exists a PSNE \((y_{uv})_{u \in V', (x^*_v)_{v \in V \setminus V'}} \in \{0, 1\}^{V' \setminus V'} \) in the input game, then let us consider the iteration of our algorithm with the guess \((y_{uv})_{u \in V'} \). Let the number of players playing 1 in \((x^*_v)_{v \in V \setminus V'} \) be \( k \). If \( x^*_v = 1 \) where \( v \in V \setminus V' \), then \( \Delta g_v(n^G_v + k - 1) \geq c_v \) and thus we have \( \Delta g^G_v(k - 1) \geq c_v \). Similarly, if \( x^*_v = 0 \) where \( v \in V \setminus V' \), then \( \Delta g_v(n^G_v + k) \leq c_v \) and thus we have \( \Delta g^G_v(k) \leq c_v \). Hence, we observe that \((x^*_v)_{v \in V \setminus V'} \) forms a PSNE in the BNPG game \((G[V \setminus V'], (g^G_v)_{v \in V \setminus V'}, (c_v)_{v \in V}) \). Let \((x^*_v)_{v \in V \setminus V'} \) be the PSNE of the BNPG game \((G[V \setminus V'], (g^G_v)_{v \in V \setminus V'}, (c_v)_{v \in V}) \) where exactly \( k \) players play 1 returned by the algorithm in Observation 22. We observe that every player in \( V \setminus V' \) has the same number of neighbors
complete graphs, cycles, and bi-cliques. Moreover, we can find a PSNE in a fully homogeneous BNPG game for paths, complete graphs, cycles and bi-cliques. We also showed that a PSNE always exists in a fully homogeneous BNPG game for paths, complete graphs, cycles and bi-cliques. We finally show that a PSNE always exists for fully homogeneous BNPG games for some important graph classes and such a PSNE can be found in $O(n)$ time.

**Theorem 24** (⋆). There is always a PSNE in a fully homogeneous BNPG game for paths, complete graphs, cycles, and bi-cliques. Moreover, we can find a PSNE in $O(n)$ time.

## 5 Conclusion and Future Work

We have studied parameterized complexity of the Exists-PSNE problem for the BNPG games with respect to various important graph parameters. We exhibited intractability w.r.t. the parameters like maximum degree, diameter, treedepth, number of players playing 1 and 0. We complemented this by showing FPT algorithms parameterized by circuit rank, treewidth+maximum degree, and the distance from complete graph. We also showed that PSNE always exists in a fully homogeneous BNPG game for paths, complete graphs, cycles and bi-cliques.

Our work leaves some important questions open. For example, can we show PPAD-Hardness for finding Nash Equilibrium in BNPG games. Another immediate research direction is to study if our algorithmic results could be extended to other types of more general public goods games. Another research direction could be to look at social welfare functions in the context of BNPG game. We can also consider BNPG games with altruism introduced in [24] and try to resolve its parameterized complexity.

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A Missing Proofs

Proof of Lemma 4 Consider an arbitrary player \( v \). Let the best response function of \( v \) be \( \beta_v \). We now define the utility function of \( v \) as \( U_v(x_v, n_v) = g_v(x_v + n_v) - c_v \cdot x_v \) where \( c_v \) is a constant greater than 1 and \( g_v(0) \) is a constant greater than 0. Now we define \( g_v(\cdot) \) recursively in the following way:
\[
g_v(x) = \begin{cases} 
g_v(x - 1) + c_v - 1 & \text{if } \beta_v(x - 1) = 0 \\
g_v(x - 1) + c_v + 1 & \text{if } \beta_v(x - 1) = 1 \\
g_v(x - 1) + c_v & \text{if } \beta_v(x - 1) = 0,1 \\g_v(x) & \end{cases}
\]
In the above recursive definition, \( x \) belongs to \([n - 1]\). Let \( x' \) be an arbitrary number in \([n - 1]\). From the recursive definition, we can conclude that \( 1 \in \beta_v(x' - 1) \iff g_v(x') - c_v \geq g_v(x' - 1) \).
Similarly, we can conclude that \( 0 \in \beta_v(x' - 1) \iff g_v(x') - c_v \leq g_v(x' - 1) \). Since \( x' \) and \( v \) were chosen arbitrarily, we can conclude that for every player \( w \), for every \( k \in \{0, 1, \ldots, n - 1\} \) and for every \( a \in \{0, 1\} \), we have \( a \in \beta_w(k) \) if and only if, for every strategy profile \( x_{-w} \) of players other than \( w \) where exactly \( k \) players in the neighborhood of \( w \) play 1, we have \( U_w(x_w = a, x_{-w}) \geq U_w(x_w = a', x_{-w}) \) for all \( a' \in \{0, 1\} \).

Proof of Theorem 10 Let \( d(v) \) denote the degree of \( v \) in \( G \). To prove the result for the parameter \( k_0 \), we use the following best-response function.
\[
\beta_v(k') = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } k' = d(v) \\
\{0, 1\} & \text{otherwise} 
\end{cases}
\]
We claim that the above BNPG game has a PSNE having at most \( k \) players playing 0 if and only if the Dominating Set instance is a yes instance.

For the “if” part, suppose the Dominating Set instance is a yes instance and \( \mathcal{W} \subseteq \mathcal{V} \) be a dominating set for \( G \) of size at most \( k \). We claim that the strategy profile \( \bar{x} = ((x_0 = 0)_{v \in \mathcal{W}}, (x_v = 1)_{v \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{W}}) \) is a PSNE for the BNPG game. To see this, we observe that every player \( w \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{W} \) has at least 1 neighbor playing 0, and thus she has no incentive to deviate as \( n_w < d(v) \). On the other hand, since 0 is always a best-response strategy for every player irrespective of what others play, the players in \( \mathcal{W} \) also do not have any incentive to deviate. Hence, \( \bar{x} \) is a PSNE.

For the “only if” part, let \( \bar{x} = ((x_0 = 0)_{v \in \mathcal{W}}, (x_v = 1)_{v \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{W}}) \) be a PSNE for the BNPG game where \( |\mathcal{W}| \leq k \) (that is, at most \( k \) players are playing 0). We claim that \( \mathcal{W} \) forms a dominating set for \( G \). Indeed this claim has to be correct, otherwise there exists a vertex \( w \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{W} \) which does not have any neighbor in \( \mathcal{W} \) and consequently, the player \( w \) has incentive to deviate to 0 from 1 as \( n_w < d(v) \) which is a contradiction.

Proof of Theorem 11 Let \( (G = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}), k) \) an arbitrary instance of Dominating Set. We consider a fully homogeneous BNPG game on the same graph \( G \) whose best-response functions \( \beta_v(\cdot) \) for \( v \in \mathcal{V} \) is given below:
\[
\beta_v(k') = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } k' = 0 \\
\{0, 1\} & \text{otherwise} 
\end{cases}
\]
We claim that the above BNPG game has a PSNE having at most \( k \) players playing 1 if and only if the Dominating Set instance is a yes instance.

For the “if” part, suppose the Dominating Set instance is a yes instance and \( \mathcal{W} \subseteq \mathcal{V} \) be a dominating set for \( G \) of size at most \( k \). We claim that the strategy profile \( \bar{x} = ((x_0 = 1)_{v \in \mathcal{W}}, (x_v = 0)_{v \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{W}}) \) is a PSNE for the BNPG game. To see this, we observe that every
player in $V \setminus W$ has at least 1 neighbor playing 1, and thus she has no incentive to deviate. On the other hand, since 1 is always a best-response strategy for every player irrespective of what others play, the players in $W$ also do not have any incentive to deviate. Hence, $\bar{x}$ is a PSNE.

For the “only if” part, let $\bar{x} = ((x_v = 1)_{v \in W}, (x_v = 0)_{v \in V \setminus W})$ be a PSNE for the BNPG game where $|W| \leq k$ (that is, at most $k$ players are playing 1). We claim that $W$ forms a dominating set for $G$. Indeed, this claim has to be correct, otherwise there exists a vertex $w \in V \setminus W$ which does not have any neighbor in $W$ and consequently, the player $w$ has incentive to deviate to 0 from 1 as $n_w = 0$ which is a contradiction.

**Proof of Theorem 13**. The high-level idea in this proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 12. The only difference is that we add the special nodes in a way such that the maximum degree in the instance of fully homogeneous BNPG game is upper bounded by 9.

Formally, we consider an instance of a heterogeneous BNPG game on a graph $G = (V = \{v_i : i \in [n]\}, E)$ such that there are only 2 types of utility functions $U_1(x_v, n_v) = g_1(x_v + n_v) - c_1 x_v, U_2(x_v, n_v) = g_2(x_v + n_v) - c_2 x_v$, and the degree of any vertex is at most 3; we know from Theorem 9 that it is an NP-complete instance. Let us partition $V$ into $V_1$ and $V_2$ such that the utility function of the players in $V_1$ is $U_1(\cdot)$ and the utility function of the players in $V_2$ is $U_2(\cdot)$. We now construct the graph $H = (V', E')$ for the instance of the fully homogeneous BNPG game.

$$V' = \{w_i : i \in [n]\} \cup W_1 \cup W_2, \text{ where}$$

$$W_i = \{a_i^k : j \in [2 + 4(i-1)], v_k \in V\} \forall i \in [2]$$

$$E' = \{\{v_i, w_j\} : \{v_i, v_j\} \in E\} \cup E_1 \cup E_2, \text{ where}$$

$$E_i = \{\{a_i^k, w_k\} : j \in [2 + 4(i-1)], v_k \in V_i\} \forall i \in [2]$$

We define two functions — $f(x) = \lfloor \frac{x+2}{2} \rfloor + 1$ and $h(x) = x - 2 - 4(f(x) - 1)$. We now define best-response functions for the players in $H$.

$$\beta(k) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } k = 0 \text{ or } k = 1 \\
0, 1 & \Delta g_f(k)(h(k)) = c_f(k), k > 1 \\
1 & \Delta g_f(k)(h(k)) > c_f(k), k > 1 \\
0 & \Delta g_f(k)(h(k)) < c_f(k), k > 1 
\end{cases}$$

This finishes description of our fully homogeneous BNPG game on $H$. We now claim that there exists a PSNE in the heterogeneous BNPG game on $G$ if and only if there exists a PSNE in the fully homogeneous BNPG game on $H$. We note that degree of any node in $H$ is at most 9.

For the “only if” part, let $x^* = (x_v^*)_{v \in V}$ be a PSNE in the heterogeneous BNPG game on $G$. We now consider the following strategy profile $\bar{y} = (y_v)_{v \in V}$ for players in $H$.

$$\forall i \in [n] y_{w_i} = x_{v_i}^*; y_b = 1 \text{ for other vertices } b$$

We now claim that the players in $V'$ also does not deviate. Clearly the players in $\cup_{i \in [2]} W_i$ do not deviate as their degree is 1 and $\beta(0) = \beta(1) = 1$. If $v_k \in V_i$, then in $\bar{y}$ we have $n_{w_k} = n_{v_k} + 2 + 4(i-1) \geq 2$ for every $i \in [2]$ and $n_{v_k} \leq 3$ as the maximum degree in $G$ is 3. If $x^*_{v_k} = 1$, then we have $\Delta g_f(n_{v_k}) \geq c_i$. We have $f(n_{w_k}) = i$ and $h(n_{w_k}) = n_{v_k}$. This implies that $\Delta g_f(n_{w_k})(h(n_{w_k})) \geq c_f(n_{w_k})$. So $w_k$ does not deviate as 1 is the best-response. If $x^*_{v_k} = 0$, then we have $\Delta g_f(n_{v_k}) \leq c_i$. This implies that $\Delta g_f(n_{w_k})(h(n_{w_k})) \leq c_f(n_{w_k})$. So $w_k$ does not deviate as 0 is the best-response. Hence, $\bar{y}$ is a PSNE.
For the “if” part, suppose there exists a PSNE \((x^*_v)_{v \in V}\) in the fully homogeneous BNPG game on \(\mathcal{H}\). Clearly \(x^*_v = 1\) for all \(w \in \cup_{i \in [2]} V_i\) as \(n_v \leq 1\). Now we claim that the strategy profile \(\bar{x} = (x_v = x^*_v)_{v \in [n]}\) forms a PSNE for the heterogeneous BNPG game on \(\mathcal{G}\). We observe that if \(x^*_v = 1\) and \(v_k \in \mathcal{V}_i\), then \(\Delta g_f(n_{v_k}) \geq c_f(n_{v_k})\) for \(k \in [n]\). This implies that \(\Delta g_r(n_{v_k}) \geq c_i\). So \(x_v = 1\) is the best-response for \(v_k \in \mathcal{V}_i\) and hence, she does not deviate. Similarly, if \(x^*_v = 0\) and \(v_k \in \mathcal{V}_i\), then \(\Delta g_f(n_{v_k}) \leq c_f(n_{v_k})\). This implies that \(\Delta g_r(n_{v_k}) \leq c_i\). So \(x_v = 0\) is the best-response for \(v_k \in \mathcal{V}_i\) and hence, it won’t deviate. Hence, \(\bar{x}\) is a PSNE in the heterogeneous BNPG game on \(\mathcal{G}\).

**Proof of Lemma 15** We use dynamic programming to solve this problem. Let \(N(V)\) denote set of vertices in \(\mathcal{V}\) which is adjacent to at least one vertex in \(V\). Let \(N(V) := V \cup N(V)\). Let \(N[V] = \{u_1, \ldots, u_l\}\) where \(l\) is atmost \(O(|V| \cdot \Delta)\). Let \(c((d_u)_{u \in V}, i)\) denote whether there exists a strategy profile \(S\) such that for each \(u \in V\), number of neighbours of \(u\) in the set \(\{u_1, \ldots, u_l\}\) (\(\phi\) if \(i = 0\)) playing 1 in the strategy profile \(S\) is \(d_u\). Let \(f\) be a function such that \(f(u) = d_u\) for all \(u \in V\). Clearly, \(c((d_u)_{u \in V}, i)\) indicates whether the function \(f\) is feasible or not. Let \(g : \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\) be a function such that \(g(u, v) = 1\) if and only if \(\{u, v\} \in \mathcal{E}\). We now present the recursive equation to compute \(c((d_u)_{u \in V}, i)\):

\[
c((d_u)_{u \in V}, i) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \forall u, d_u < 0 \\
c((d_u - g(\{u, u_i\}))_{u \in V}, i - 1) \vee c((d_u)_{u \in V}, i - 1) & \text{if } i \geq 1 \\
1 & \text{if } i = 0 \text{ and } \forall u \in V, d_u = 0 \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

Now we argue for the correctness of the above recursive equation. Base cases are trivial as it follows from the definitions. We now look at the case where \(i \geq 1\) and \(\forall u \in V, d_u \geq 0\). If \(c((d_u - g(\{u, u_i\}))_{u \in V}, i - 1) = 1\), then consider the strategy profile \(S\) which makes it 1. Now consider a strategy profile where the response of \(u_i\) is 1 and rest of the players play as per \(S\). So for any \(u \in V\), the number of neighbours in \(\{u_1, \ldots, u_l\}\) playing 1 increases by \(g(\{u, u_i\})\) when compared to the number of neighbours in \(\{u_1, \ldots, u_{i-1}\}\) playing 1. This would imply that \(c((d_u)_{u \in V}, i) = 1\). Similarly, if \(c((d_u)_{u \in V}, i - 1) = 1\), then considering the response of \(u_i\) as 0 will not change the number of neighbours playing 1 and therefore \(c((d_u)_{u \in V}, i) = 1\). In the other direction, if \(c((d_u)_{u \in V}, i) = 1\), then consider the strategy profile \(S\) which makes it 1. If the response of \(u_i\) is 1 (resp. 0) in \(S\), then the number of neighbours of \(u\) in \(\{u_1, \ldots, u_{i-1}\}\) playing 1 decreases by \(g(\{u, u_i\})\) (resp. 0) when compared with the number of neighbours in \(\{u_1, \ldots, u_i\}\) playing 1. Hence, \(c((d_u - g(\{u, u_i\}))_{u \in V}, i - 1) \vee c((d_u)_{u \in V}, i - 1) = c((d_u)_{u \in V}, i)\) is equal to 1.

Now we look at the time complexity. Total number of cells in the dynamic programming table which we created is \(O^*(\Delta^{|V|})\) as the value of each entry in \((d_u)_{u \in V}\) is at most \(\Delta\). Time spent in each cell is \(n^{(1)}\). Hence, the set of all feasible functions \(f : \mathcal{V} \rightarrow [\Delta] \cup \{0\}\) can be computed in time \(O^*(\Delta^{|V|})\).

**Proof of Theorem 16** Let \((\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}), (g_u)_{u \in \mathcal{V}}, (c_u)_{u \in \mathcal{V}})\) be any instance of \textsc{Exist-PSNE} for BNPG games. Let \((\beta_u(.))_{u \in \mathcal{V}}\) be the set of the best response functions. Let \(\mathcal{T} = (T, \{X_t\}_{t \in \mathcal{V}(T)})\) be a nice tree decomposition of the input \(n\)-vertex graph \(\mathcal{G}\) that has width at most \(k\). Let \(\mathcal{T}\) be rooted at some node \(r\). For a node \(t\) of \(\mathcal{T}\), let \(V_t\) be the union of all the bags present in the subtree of \(\mathcal{T}\) rooted at \(t\), including \(X_t\). We solve the \textsc{Exist-PSNE} problem using dynamic programming. Let \(N_1(X_t)\) denote set of vertices in \(\mathcal{V} \setminus V_t\) which is adjacent to at least one vertex in \(X_t\). Let \(N_2(X_t)\) denote set of vertices in \(V_t \setminus X_t\) which is adjacent to at least one vertex in \(X_t\). Let \(c(t, (x_v)_{v \in X_t}, (d_u)_{u \in X_t}, (d_u')_{u \in X_t}) = 1\) (resp. 0) denote that there exists (resp. doesn’t exist) a strategy profile \(S\) of all the players in \(\mathcal{G}\) such that for each
u ∈ X_t, u plays x_u, number of neighbours of u in N_1(X_t) (resp. N_2(X_t)) playing 1 is d_u (resp. d_u^2) and none of the vertices in V_t deviate in the strategy profile S. Before we proceed, we would like to introduce some notations. Let V be a set of vertices and S_1 = \{x_v\}_v∈V, S_2 = \{x_v\}_v∈V∪{w} be two tuples. Then S_1 \{x_w\} := S_2 and S_2 \{x_w\} := S_1. Also, we denote an empty tuple by φ. Clearly c[r, φ, φ, φ] indicates whether there is a PSNE in G or not. We now present the recursive equation to compute c[t, (x_v)_v∈X_t, (d_1)_v∈X_t, (d_2)_v∈X_t] for various types of node in T.

**Leaf Node:** For a leaf node t we have that X_t = φ. Hence, c[t, φ, φ, φ] = 1.

**Join Node:** For a join node t, let t_1, t_2 be its two children. Note that X_t = X_t_1 ∩ X_t_2. Now we proceed to compute c[t, (x_v)_v∈X_t, (d_1)_v∈X_t, (d_2)_v∈X_t]. Let F be a set of tuples (d'_v)_v∈X_t such that there is a strategy profile S such that for each v ∈ X_t, its response is x_v, the number of neighbours in N_1(x_v), V_t \ X_t, and V_t \ X_t playing 1 is d'_1, d'_2, d'_2 respectively. Using Lemma 15, we can find the set F in time O^*(|d|^k). Then c[t, (x_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_1)_v∈X_t, (d'_2)_v∈X_t] is equal to the following formula:

\[
0 ∨ \bigvee_{(d'_v)_v∈X_t∈F} \left( c[t_1, (x_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_1)_v+d'_2-d'_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_v)_v∈X_t] \right) ∧ c[t_2, (x_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_1)_v+d'_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_v)_v∈X_t] \]

Now we argue for the correctness of the above recursive equation. If F is empty then the above equation trivially holds true. Hence, we assume that F is non-empty. In one direction let us assume that there exists a tuple (d'_v)_v∈X_t ∈ F such that (c[t_1, (x_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_1)_v+d'_2-d'_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_v)_v∈X_t] ∧ c[t_2, (x_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_1)_v+d'_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_v)_v∈X_t]) = 1. Let S_1 and S_2 be the strategy profiles which leads to c[t_1, (x_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_1)_v+d'_2-d'_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_v)_v∈X_t] and c[t_2, (x_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_1)_v+d'_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_v)_v∈X_t] respectively being 1. Let S_1 be a strategy profile that leads to (d'_v)_v∈X_t being included in F. Now consider a strategy profile S such that responses of players in V_t \ X_t are their responses in S_1, responses of the players in V_t \ X_t is their responses in S_2 and responses of rest of the players is their responses in S_2. Now observe that there are no edges between the set of vertices V_t \ X_t and V_t \ X_t and there are no edges between the set of vertices V \ V_t and V \ X_t. Therefore, the number of neighbours of vertices in V_t \ X_t and V_t \ X_t playing 1 doesn’t change when compared to S_1 and S_2 respectively. Also, the number of neighbours of vertices in X_t playing 1 doesn’t change when compared to S_1, S_2 and S_3. Hence, c[t_1, (x_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_1)_v∈X_t, (d'_v)_v∈X_t] = 1. In other direction, let c[t, (x_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_1)_v∈X_t, (d'_v)_v∈X_t] = 1. Let S’ t be the strategy profile which leads to c[t, (x_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_1)_v∈X_t, (d'_v)_v∈X_t] being 1. For each v ∈ X_t, let the number of neighbours in V_t \ X_t playing 1 in S’ be d'_v. Then clearly S’ leads to both c[t_1, (x_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_1)_v+d'_2-d'_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_v)_v∈X_t] and c[t_2, (x_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_1)_v+d'_v)_v∈X_t, (d'_v)_v∈X_t] being 1.

**Introduce Node:** Let t be an introduce node with a child t’ such that X_t = X_t’ ∪ \{u\} for some u ∈ X_t. Let \( S’ = (x_v)_v∈X_t \) be a strategy profile of vertices in X_t. Let n_v’ denote the number of neighbours of v playing 1 in S’. Let g : V × V → {0, 1} be a function such that g(\{u, v\}) = 1 if and only if \{u, v\} ∈ E. We now proceed to compute c[t, S’, (d'_1)_v∈X_t, (d'_v)_v∈X_t]. If there is no strategy profile S where ∀ v ∈ X_t, the number of neighbours of v in N_1(X_t) (resp. N_2(X_t)) playing 1 is d'_v (resp. d'_v), then clearly c[t, S’, (d'_1)_v∈X_t, (d'_v)_v∈X_t] = 0. Due to Lemma 15 we can check the previous statement in O^*(|d|^k) by considering a bipartite subgraph of G between X_t and N_1(X_t) (or N_2(X_t)). Otherwise, we have the following:
Now we argue for the correctness of the above recursive equation. The base case is trivial. Now if \( x_u = 1 \) and \( c[t', S' \setminus \{ x_u \}, (d_v')_{v \in X_t'} \in \mathbb{E}, (d_v^d)_{v \in X_t'}) = 1 \), then let \( S_v \) be the strategy profile that makes the cell value to be 1. Let \( S_2 \) be a strategy such that \( \forall v \in X_t \), the number of neighbours of \( v \) in \( N_1(X_t) \) (resp. \( N_2(X_t) \)) playing 1 is \( d_v^1 \) (resp. \( d_v^2 \)). Let \( S_3 \) be a strategy profile where the responses of players in \( X_t \) is \( (x_v)_{v \in X_t} \), the responses of players in \( V_t \setminus X_t \) is their responses in \( S_1 \) and the responses of the rest of the players is their responses in \( S_2 \). Now observe that there is no edge between the set of vertices \( V_t \setminus X_t \) and \( V_t \setminus X_t \) (due to this the only valid value of \( d_v^2 \) is 0 which is ensured by us). Therefore, none of the vertices deviate in \( V_t \setminus X_t \) deviate. Also, the number of neighbours of the vertices in \( X_t \) playing 1 in \( S_3 \) is the same as that of \( S_1 \). Hence, the vertices in \( X_t \) don’t deviate. Vertex \( u \) doesn’t deviate as we are not in the base case and therefore \( x_u = \beta_u(n_u' + d_u^1 + d_u^2) \). Hence, \( c[t, S', (d_v')_{v \in X_t}, (d_v^d)_{v \in X_t}] = 1 \). By similar arguments we can show that if \( x_u = 0 \) and \( c[t', S' \setminus \{ x_u \}, (d_v')_{v \in X_t}, (d_v^d)_{v \in X_t}] = 1 \), then \( S_4 \) is the strategy profile which makes the value of this cell 1. If \( x_u = 1 \) in \( S_4 \), then for each \( v \in X_t \), the number of neighbours of \( X_t \) in \( N_1(X_t) \) (resp. \( N_2(X_t) \)) playing 1 in \( S_4 \) is \( d_v^1 + g((v, u)) \) (resp. \( d_v^2 \)). Since none of the vertices in \( V_t \) deviate, so clearly \( S_4 \) leads \( c[t', S' \setminus \{ x_u \}, (d_v^1 + g((v, u)))_{v \in X_t}, (d_v^d)_{v \in X_t}] \) to being 1. Similar argument holds when \( x_u = 0 \) in \( S_4 \), and it would lead \( c[t', S' \setminus \{ x_u \}, (d_v^1)_{v \in X_t}, (d_v^d)_{v \in X_t}] \) to being 1.

**Forget Node:** Let \( t \) be a forget node with a child \( t' \) such that \( X_t = X_t' \setminus \{ w \} \) for some \( w \in X_t \). Let \( S_0 = (x_v)_{v \in X_t} \cup \{ x_w = 0 \} \), \( S_1 = (x_v)_{v \in X_t} \cup \{ x_w = 1 \} \) be two strategy profiles of vertices in \( X_t' \). Let \( g : V \times V \rightarrow \{ 0, 1 \} \) be a function such that \( g((u, v)) = 1 \) if and only if \( \{ u, v \} \in E \). We now have the following:

\[
c[t, (x_v)_{v \in X_t}, (d_v^1)_{v \in X_t}, (d_v^d)_{v \in X_t}] =
\begin{cases}
0 & \text{if } \exists v \in X_t, x_v \notin \beta_v(n_v' + d_v^1 + d_v^2) \\
\left( c[t', S_0', (d_v')_{v \in X_t'}, (d_v^d)_{v \in X_t'}) \in [\Delta] \right) \\
\vee (c[t', S_1', (d_v')_{v \in X_t'}, (d_v^d)_{v \in X_t'}) = 1 \\
\text{where } d_v^2 \in [\Delta] \cup \{ 0 \} \\
\text{and } \beta_v = \min\{ \beta_v(n_v' + d_v^1 + d_v^2), 0 \} \\
\text{and } d_v^d = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
\frac{1}{\beta_v} & \text{if } \beta_v > 0 \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{array} \right.
\end{cases}
\]

Now we argue for the correctness of the above recursive equation. In one direction, let us assume that \( \exists d_v^1, d_v^2 \in [\Delta] \cup \{ 0 \} \) such that \( c[t', S_0, (d_v')_{v \in X_t'}, (d_v^d)_{v \in X_t'}] \vee c[t', S_1, (d_v')_{v \in X_t'}, (d_v^d)_{v \in X_t'}] = 1 \). Let \( S \) be the strategy profile that made the formula in the previous statement to be true. Now observe that for each \( v \in X_t \), the number of neighbours in \( N_1(X_t) \) and \( N_2(X_t) \) is \( d_v^1 \) and \( d_v^2 \) respectively. Since none of the vertices in the set \( V_t \setminus V_t' \) deviate, therefore \( c[t, (x_v)_{v \in N[X_t]}, (d_v^1)_{v \in X_t}, (d_v^d)_{v \in X_t}] = 1 \). In other direction, let us assume that \( c[t, (x_v)_{v \in N[X_t]}, (d_v^1)_{v \in X_t}, (d_v^d)_{v \in X_t}] = 1 \). Let \( S' \) be the strategy profile that made the formula in the previous statement to be true. Let \( d_v^1 \) and \( d_v^2 \) be the number of neighbours of \( v \) in \( N_1(X_t') \) and \( N_2(X_t') \) respectively playing 1 in the profile \( S' \). For each \( v \in X_t \), if \( x_w = 1 \) (resp. \( x_w = 0 \)) then the number of neighbours in \( N_2(X_t') \) playing 1 in \( S' \) is \( d_v^1 - g((v, w)) \) (resp. \( d_v^2 \)). Similarly, for each \( v \in X_t \), the number of neighbours in \( N_1(X_t') \) playing 1 in \( S' \) is \( d_v^1 \). Since none of the vertices in \( V_t \setminus V_t' \) deviate in \( S' \), therefore \( c[t', S_0, (d_v')_{v \in X_t'}, (d_v^d)_{v \in X_t'}] \vee c[t', S_1, (d_v')_{v \in X_t'}, (d_v^d)_{v \in X_t'}] = 1 \).

Now we look at the time complexity. Total number of cells in the dynamic programming table which we created is \( O^* (\Delta^{O(k)}) \). For each cell, we spend at most \( O^* (\Delta^{O(k)}) \) time if we are computing the table in a bottom up fashion. Hence, the running time is \( O^* (\Delta^{O(k)}) \).
Proof of Theorem \[17\] Let \((G = (V, E), (g_e)_{e \in V}, (c_v)_{v \in V})\) be any instance of EXISTS-PSNE for BNPG games. We compute a minimum vertex cover \(S \subset V\) in time \(O^*(2^{\Delta(G)})\). The idea is to brute force on the strategy profile of players in \(S\) and assign actions of other players based on their best-response functions. For every strategy profile \(x_S = (x_v)_{v \in S}\), we do the following.

1. For \(w \in V \setminus S\), let \(n_w\) be the number of neighbors of \(w\) (they can only be in \(S\)) who play
   1. We define \(x_w = 1\) if \(\Delta g_w(n_w) > c_w\) and 0 if \(\Delta g_w(n_w) < c_w\). This is well-defined since \(\Delta g_w(n_w) \neq c_w\) as the game is strict.

2. If \((x_v)_{v \in V}\) forms a PSNE, then output YES. Otherwise, we discard the current \(x_S\).

If the above the procedure does not output YES for any \(x_S\), then we output NO. The correctness of the algorithm is immediate. Since the computation for every guess of \(x_S\) can be done in polynomial time and the number of such guesses is \(2^\Delta = 2^{\Delta(G)}\), it follows that the running time of our algorithm is \(O^*(2^{\Delta(G)})\).

\[\Box\]

Proof of Observation \[18\] \(\forall x \geq 0, \forall i \in [n], g_{v_i}(x + 1) - g_{v_i}(x) = g_{v_i}(1).\) This implies for a player \(v_i\), the best response doesn’t depend on the responses of its neighbours and solely depends on \(g_{v_i}(1)\). Hence, if \(g_{v_i}(1) \geq c_{v_i}\) then we assign the response of player \(v_i\) as 1 and 0 otherwise. This will make sure that no player \(v_i\) deviates. So calculating the PSNE takes \(O(n)\).

\[\Box\]

Proof of Theorem \[24\] Proof for Path: Let the set of vertices in the input path \(P\) be \(V = \{v_1, \ldots, v_n\}\) and the set of edges \(E = \{(v_i, v_{i+1}) : i \in [n-1]\}\). Note that the possible values of \(n_v\) for any vertex \(v\) in \(P\) is 0, 1 and 2. We show that there is a PSNE in \(P\) for all possible best response strategies. Let \(S_i := \beta(i)\) (since the game is fully homogeneous, the best-response function is the same for all players) be the set of the best responses of a player \(v\) if \(n_v = i\). Let \(x_v\) be the response of a player \(v \in V\).

- If \(0 \in S_0\), then \((x_v = 0)_{v \in V}\) forms a PSNE as clearly no player would deviate as \(n_v = 0\) for every player. So, allow us to assume for the rest of the proof that \(S_0 = \{1\}\).

- If \(1 \in S_i, \forall i \in \{1, 2\}\), then \((x_v = 1)_{v \in V}\) forms a PSNE as the best response is 1 irrespective of the value of \(n_v\) and hence no player would deviate. So, allow us to assume that we have either \(1 \notin S_1\) or \(1 \notin S_2\).

- If \(0 \in S_1, 0 \in S_2\), then \((x_v = 0)_{v \equiv 1 (\text{mod 2})}, (x_v = 1)_{v \equiv 0 (\text{mod 2})}\) forms a PSNE. If \(i\) is an odd integer then \(n_{v_i} > 0\) and in this case one of the best responses is 1 and hence \(v_i\) does not deviate. If \(i\) is an even integer then \(n_{v_i} = 0\) and in this case one of the best responses is 1 (recall \(S_0 = \{1\}\)) and hence \(v_i\) does not deviate.

- If \(1 \in S_1, 0 \in S_2\), then \((x_v = 1)_{v \equiv 1 (\text{mod 2})}, (x_v = 0)_{v \equiv 0 (\text{mod 2})}\) forms a PSNE. If \(i\) is an odd integer and not equal to \(n\), then \(n_{v_i} \leq 1\) in this case one of the best responses is 1 and hence \(v_i\) does not deviate. If \(i\) is an even integer and not equal to \(n\) then \(n_{v_i} = 2\) and in this case one of the best responses is 0 and hence \(v_i\) does not deviate. Note that \(n_{v_n} \leq 1\) and hence in this case one of the best responses is 1 and hence \(v_n\) does not deviate.

- If \(0 \in S_1, 1 \in S_2\). In this we have two sub-cases:

  - \(n\) is a multiple of 3: In this sub-case, \((x_v = 0)_{v \equiv 2 (\text{mod 3})}, (x_v = 1)_{v \equiv 2 (\text{mod 3})}\) forms a PSNE. If we have \(i \equiv 2 (\text{mod 3})\), then \(n_{v_i} = 1\) and in this case, 0 is a best response and hence \(v_i\) does not deviate. If \(i \equiv 2 (\text{mod 3})\), then \(n_{v_i} = 0\) and in this case one of the best responses is 1 and hence \(v_i\) does not deviate.
- **n is not a multiple of 3**: In this sub-case, \( \{x_{v_i} = 0_{i \not\equiv 1 \pmod{3}}, (x_{v_i} = 1)_{i \equiv 1 \pmod{3}} \} \) forms a PSNE. If \( i \neq 1 \pmod{3} \), then \( n_{v_i} = 1 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 0 and hence \( v_i \) does not deviate. If \( i \equiv 1 \pmod{3} \), then \( n_{v_i} = 0 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 1 and hence \( v_i \) does not deviate.

Since we have a PSNE for every possible best-response function, we conclude that there is always a PSNE in a fully homogeneous BNPG game on paths. Also, we can find a PSNE in paths in \( \mathcal{O}(n) \) time.

**Proof for Complete graph**: We assume that the input graph \( \mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}) \) is a complete graph. Let the utility function for all the players \( v \in \mathcal{V} \) be \( U(x_v, n_v) = g(x_v + n_v) - c \cdot x_v \). If \( \Delta g(n - 1) \geq c \), then \( (x_v = 1)_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \) is a PSNE. If \( \Delta g(0) \leq c \), then \( (x_v = 0)_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \) is a PSNE. If \( \Delta g(n - 1) < c \) and \( \Delta g(0) > c \), then there should exist a \( 0 < k \leq n - 1 \) such that \( \Delta g(k) \leq c \) and \( \Delta g(k - 1) \geq c \) otherwise both \( \Delta g(n - 1) < c \) and \( \Delta g(0) > c \) can’t simultaneously hold true. Now we claim that if there exists a \( 0 < k \leq n - 1 \) such that \( \Delta g(k) \leq c \) and \( \Delta g(k - 1) \geq c \), then choosing any \( k \) players and making their response 1 and rest of players response as 0 would be PSNE. Any player \( w \) whose response is 1 has \( n_w = k - 1 \) and since \( \Delta g(k - 1) \geq c \), \( w \) does not have any incentive to deviate. Similarly, any player \( w' \) whose response is 0 has \( n_{w'} = k \) and since \( \Delta g(k) \leq c \), \( w' \) does not have any incentive to deviate. This concludes the proof of the theorem as we showed that there is a PSNE in all possible cases. Also, clearly we can find a PSNE in \( \mathcal{G} \) in \( \mathcal{O}(n) \) time.

**Proof for Cycles**: We assume that the input graph is a Cycle. Let the set of vertices in the input cycle \( \mathcal{C} = \{v_1, \ldots, v_n\} \) and the set of edges \( \mathcal{E} = \{(v_i, v_{i+1}) : i \in [n - 1] \cup \{v_n, v_1\}\} \). Note that the possible values of \( n \) (number of neighbors of \( v \) choosing 1) for any vertex \( v \in \mathcal{C} \) is 0, 1, and 2. We show that there is a PSNE in \( \mathcal{C} \) for all possible best response strategies. Let \( S_i := \beta(i) \) (since the game is fully homogeneous, the best-response function is the same for all players) denote the set of the best responses of a player \( v \) if \( n_v = i \). Let \( x_v \) denote the response of a player \( v \in \mathcal{V} \).

- If \( 0 \in S_0 \) then \( x_v = 0 \) for every player \( v \in \mathcal{V} \) forms a PSNE as clearly no player would deviate as \( n_v = 0 \) for every player. So, allow us to assume that \( S_0 = \{1\} \) in the rest of the proof.
- If \( 1 \in S_2 \), then \( x_v = 1 \) for every player \( v \in \mathcal{V} \) forms a PSNE as clearly no player would deviate as \( n_v = 2 \) for every player. So, allow us to assume that \( S_2 = \{0\} \) in the rest of the proof.
- If \( 0 \in S_1 \), then \( \{(x_{v_i} = 0)_{i \equiv 1 \pmod{2}}, (x_{v_i} = 1)_{i \equiv 0 \pmod{2}}\} \) forms a PSNE. If \( i \) is odd then \( n_v > 0 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 0 and hence \( v_i \) does not deviate. If \( i \) is even number then \( n_v = 0 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 1 (recall, we have \( S_0 = \{1\} \)) and hence \( v_i \) does not deviate.
- If \( 1 \in S_1 \), then \( \{(x_{v_i} = 1)_{i \equiv 1 \pmod{2}}, (x_{v_i} = 0)_{i \equiv 0 \pmod{2}}\} \) forms a PSNE. If \( i \) is an odd number then \( n_v \leq 1 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 1 and hence \( v_i \) does not deviate. If \( i \) is an even number and then \( n_v = 2 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 0 and hence \( v_i \) does not deviate.

Since we have a PSNE for every possible best-response functions, we conclude that there is always a PSNE in a fully homogeneous BNPG game on cycles. Also, we can find a PSNE in cycles in \( \mathcal{O}(n) \) time.

**Proof for Bicliques**: Let the input graph \( \mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}) \) be a biclique; \( \mathcal{V} \) is partitioned into 2 sets namely \( \mathcal{V}_1 = \{u_1, \ldots, u_{n_1}\} \) and \( \mathcal{V}_2 = \{v_1, \ldots, v_{n_2}\} \) where \( n_1 + n_2 = n \) and \( \mathcal{E} = \{(u_i, v_j) : i \in [n_1], j \in [n_2]\} \). We show that there is a PSNE in \( \mathcal{C} \) for all possible best response strategies. Let \( S_i := \beta(i) \) (since the game is fully homogeneous, the best-response function is the same for all players) denote the set of the best responses of a player \( v \) if
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Let \( n_v = i \). Let \( x_v \) denote the response of a player \( v \in V \).

1. If \( n_1 = n_2 \): For this case we have the following sub-cases:

   - If \( 0 \in S_0 \), then \((x_v = 0)_{v \in V}\) forms a PSNE as clearly no player would deviate as \( n_v = 0 \) for every player. So, allow us to assume that \( S_0 = \{1\} \).
   - If \( 1 \in S_{n_1} \), then \((x_v = 1)_{v \in V}\) forms a PSNE as clearly no player would deviate as \( n_v = n_1 \) for every player. So, allow us to assume that \( S_{n_1} = \{0\} \). However, then \( ((x_v = 0)_{v \in V_1}, (x_v = 1)_{v \in V_2}) \) forms a PSNE. If \( v \in V_2 \) then \( n_v = 0 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 1 and hence \( v \) won’t deviate. If \( v \in V_1 \) then \( n_v = n_1 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 0 and hence \( v \) won’t deviate.

2. If \( n_1 \neq n_2 \): For this case we have the following sub-cases:

   - If \( 0 \in S_0 \) then \( x_v = 0 \) for every player \( v \) in \( V \) forms a PSNE as clearly no player would deviate as \( n_v = 0 \) for every player. So, allow us to assume that \( S_0 = \{1\} \) for the rest of the proof.
   - If \( 1 \in S_{n_1}, 1 \in S_{n_2} \), then \((x_v = 1)_{v \in V}\) forms a PSNE. If \( v \in V_1 \), then \( n_v = n_2 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 1 and hence \( v \) does not deviate. If \( v \in V_2 \), then \( n_v = n_1 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 1 and hence \( v \) does not deviate.
   - If \( 0 \in S_{n_1}, 1 \in S_{n_2} \), then \((x_v = 1)_{v \in V_1}, (x_v = 0)_{v \in V_2}\) forms a PSNE. If \( v \in V_1 \) then \( n_v = 0 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 1 (recall \( S_0 = \{1\} \)) and hence \( v \) does not deviate. If \( v \in V_2 \) then \( n_v = n_1 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 0 and hence \( v \) does not deviate.
   - If \( 0 \in S_{n_1}, 0 \in S_{n_2} \), then \((x_v = 1)_{v \in V_1}, (x_v = 0)_{v \in V_2}\) forms a PSNE. If \( v \in V_1 \) then \( n_v = 0 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 1 (recall \( S_0 = \{1\} \)) and hence \( v \) does not deviate. If \( v \in V_2 \) then \( n_v = n_1 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 0 and hence \( v \) does not deviate.
   - If \( 1 \in S_{n_1}, 0 \in S_{n_2} \), then \((x_v = 0)_{v \in V_1}, (x_v = 1)_{v \in V_2}\) forms a PSNE. If \( v \in V_1 \) then \( n_v = n_2 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 0 and hence \( v \) does not deviate. If \( v \in V_2 \) then \( n_v = 0 \) and in this case one of the best responses is 1 (recall \( S_0 = \{1\} \)) and hence \( v \) does not deviate.

Since we have a PSNE for every possible best-response functions, we conclude that there is always a PSNE in a fully homogeneous BNPG game on biclique. Also, we can find a PSNE in biclique in \( O(n) \) time.