Historical-Sociological Background of the Relationship between China and Xinjiang Region: A Research from Multidimensional Perspective

Lian Deng* and Sonia Valle de Frutos

1Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Philology, Communication and Documentation, University of Alcala Madrid, Spain
2Vice Dean of Faculty of Communication Sciences of University King Juan Carlos Madrid, Spain

*Corresponding author’s email: l.deng1991 [AT] gmail.com

ABSTRACT ----- China’s minority issue always is a hot topic among scholars from west and east, and Chinese rule in Xinjiang Region is one of the hottest. As Uyghur secessionist’s numerous violent clashes are defined as desperate resistance in the west and terrorist attack in China, the discrepancy is too obvious to ignore. This discrepancy not just influences the public opinion but also the international diplomatic policy and academic investigation. This paper, as a preparation for the further investigation on the China’s Xinjiang policy, examined the background of the China-Xinjiang relationship from multidimensional perspective. By reviewing historical records and comparing them with Chinese official claims and Uyghur secessionist’s claim, this article located Xinjiang region’s position inside both Chinese nationalism and Uyghur independence movement. Also Chinese official minority policies are examined as they are considered as key factor for Uyghur independence movement.

Keywords---- Uyghur, Xinjiang, Minority Policy and Nationalism.

1 INTRODUCTION

The relationship between China and the Xinjiang region, or between the Chinese government and the minority Uyghur have drawn attention for both eastern and western researchers, especially after the Chinese government implements some policies like the Re-educational Camp or the massive mobilization of the security forces. The discussion of these policies makes Xinjiang issues even more attractive than before.

Rather than an investigation of the detail of those policies, we prefer looking for the cause of it. But as a problem which takes place in an ethnic autonomous region of a socialist country with more than 5000 years of history, it's not easy to find out the real cause of what is happening in Xinjiang. So many historical events and ideological movements have involved, it’s hard to judge their relative interaction and effects. Here we try to divide it into two parts, the more historical part, and the more current part. The historical part is the background of the issue, which should come first because a clear review of the past is not just essential for the building of the conceptual framework, it also helps us track the historical origin of many events what is happening more recently.

About the background investigation, many western researchers have dedicated to Xinjiang affairs, including its history and the origin of local minorities long before the implementation of new policies. But regrettably, the majority of them were unidimensional, didn’t focus in a systematic investigation that combined the historical interaction and current policy which take place in Xinjiang, which makes us hard to obtain a full understanding of the current Xinjiang problem. On the other hand, many Chinese scholars are been too limited by the government-sponsored viewpoint (also limited by the language fence), so even their investigation does offer abundant information details, but also failed to construct a complete review over the Chinese government and Xinjiang Region. This article, in order to partly fulfill this void, has its objective as Analyze the Historical-Sociological Background of Interaction between the China Proper-Xinjiang Region.
1.1 Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis

The Reeducation Centers in Xinjiang, according to the criticism made by the vice president Mike Pence of U.S: “Communist Party has imprisoned as many as one million Muslim Uyghurs in government camps where they endure around-the-clock brainwashing. Survivors of the camps have described their experiences as a deliberate attempt by Beijing to strangle Uyghur culture and stamp out the Muslim faith” (Pence, 2018), but from the Chinese official opinion, these RCs, according to Liu Xiaoming, the Chinese ambassador to the UK, are “firm actions against religious extremism and terrorism, from which Xinjiang has suffered deeply” (Liu Xiaoming, 2018).

Some experts already did some investigation into the RCs, for example Dr. Adrian Zenz’s paper China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang shows us an estimated scale and impact of Xinjiang’s RCs, but his work is much more informative than analytical with little historical investigation, and the purpose of RCs is summarized as “China's securitization approach in its restive western minority regions” (Zenz, 2019: 31) This definition is enough for a preliminary understanding of the situation in Xinjiang, but can’t explicate the root cause of what’s happening.

Due to the excessive discrepancy between the critics and defenders, also because the lack of information widely accepted about the RCs, in order to proceed with our investigation, rather than the religious problem, we should analyze this problem from a more macro perspective – a conflict of two nationalisms: Both China and western civilization accept that there is a “group of Uyghur secessionist” want the independence of Xinjiang by any means, meanwhile the Chinese government will defend the integrity of its national sovereignty with any measure. Until here we can build up our theoretical framework with two aspects:

1. The definition of the nation.
2. The drive of the ethnic conflict.

First, it’s important to clarify the definition of the nation, because as the explication of Anthony Smith, one of the most important differences between the Nation and the Ethnic Group is that the nation occupies a certain territory as its homeland, while the ethnic group just maintains some relation with this homeland. According to Smith, the nation is “a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”. (Smith Anthony, 2013: 27)

Another great scholar of nationalism, Eric Hobsbawm defined the nation as “a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state… nations do not make states and nationalism but the other way round”. (Hobsbawm, 2012: 9-10) Benedict Anderson proposed that “nation is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign… it is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age… of being free… the gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.” (Anderson, 2006: 5-7)

For the Chinese academy, their nationalist theory mainly keeps the Soviet style. Only after 2005, the Chinese government renewed its official definition of the nation: “It is a stable human community which formed during a certain stage of historical evolution, its members share common characters in historic origin, productive form, language, culture, habit, and psychological identity, the religion played a nuclear role during the formation of some nations.” (Tang, 2012: 33) More than this definition, we should notice that, under the Chinese context, there are 56 human communities1 meet this standard and can be considered as a nation, but only anthropologically. Sovereignly and politically they’re all subordinate to a higher-wilder conception, the Chinese Nation（中华民族，zhonghuaminzu），a conception emerged since the beginning of the 20th century and now widely-accepted both by the official and common people in China.

Second, about the ethnic conflict, we should understand that the coexistence and the difference between nations don’t always lead to ethnic conflict. Professor Barth argued that “where there is less security and people live under a greater threat of arbitrariness and violence outside their primary community, the insecurity itself acts as a constraint on inter-ethnic contacts… In such situations, fortuitous historical differences in culture between different communities will tend to perpetuate themselves without any positive organizational basis”. (Barth, 1998: 36-37) According to Daniel Byman, there’re four main reasons for the ethnic conflict: Security preoccupation, nation’s defensive attitude towards any possible ethnic risk; Position preoccupation, nation’s demand for its respect, its right and its legitimacy, including its cultural inheritability; Wish of domination, nation’s expansionary desire for its own language, religion and social structure; Conflict of elite, leaders of the nation may provoke

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1 Chinese official viewpoint admit that beside the 56 nations, there are some “undefined ethnicities” in China, which normally are labeled as a subgroup of the official nation.
ethnic conflict for his own interest. (Byman, 2002) On the other side, although not expressed it clearly, in his book Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Donald Horowitz indicated that the main reason for the ethnic conflict is the economic inequality, especially in a developing country. Because the modernization process may widen the economic gap between the rich nation and the poor nation rather than narrow it, which leads to the expansion of negative ethnic stereotype, the rich nation tends to view the poor nation as ignorance and backwardness, while the poor nation tends to view the rich one as greedy and aggressive. (Horowitz, 2001) Another work by David Lake and Donald Rothchild summarized that the very direct drive of ethnic conflict is the emotion of “collective fear… when states lose their ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credible guarantees of protection for groups”, both physically and culturally. (Lake&Rothchild, 1996: 43)

In the case of Xinjiang, without a neutral investigation into the conception of the nation, we will be easily distracted and flooded by the pouring information flow. Also without the investigation of the treatment and living environment of the minorities, we can’t find out the reason for the ethnic conflict. Thence our three hypotheses are:

1. **Since the formation of its main ethnicity - Han, the Chinese government maintains a tight connection with the Xinjiang Region throughout the history.**
2. **Uyghur-East Turkestan Republic can be categorized as a potential nation-state.**
3. **Chinese government’s minority policy is endangering the existence of the Uyghur people.**

### 1.2 State of the Question

On our first hypothesis, as it is the official claim by the Chinese government. The western scholars avoid it while the Uyghur scholars question it. For example in Professor James Millward’s book, Eurasian Crossroad – A history of Xinjiang, chronologically explicate the change of regimen and people which ruled and lived in Xinjiang. However, even professor Millward adopted lots of Chinese history records as his arguments of ancient Xinjiang History, but while discussing the history after 20th century, he turns to use more foreign investigation results, that is to say, he tries to reduce the Chinese official present during the key period of the formation of Uyghur nation. On the other hand, Uyghur scholars’ investigation focus more in the political factor of this official claim, as Nabijan Tursun said: “The speech of Jiang Zemin’s embodied the political orientation of the research on Xinjiang and Uyghur history to which Chinese and Uyghur historians were forced to adhere. Scholars who deviated from this contemporary Sino-centric viewpoint and opposed this politicized historical standard fixed by the Chinese government were dealt with using political or legal standards rather than academic ones”. (Tursun, 2008: 96)

About the second hypothesis – the formation of the Uyghur nation and the independence of East Turkestan Republic. Professor Yitzhak Shichor (2003) wrote a chapter about the Uyghur’s community in Europe and its effort for the independence of ETR. David Wang (1998) from East Asian Institute of Singapore reviewed the East Turkestan Movement since the beginning of the 20th century. Both works give us more details about the Uyghur people and the Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR), but regrettably, neither article digs into the formation of the Uyghur nation and the justification of the ETR as a nation-state. In his work professor, Shichor discussed ETR’s independence movement based on a transcendental confirmation of the Uyghur-ETR as a potential nation-state, while David Wang wrote in a tone similar with the Chinese official, focused more on the event but not on the theory of ETR’s independence movement. Another work by Professor David Brophy, Uyghur Nation (2016), focus more in the interaction between China, Russia, Ottoman, and Uyghur activist during the 19th/20th century, especially the Russian/Soviet influence during the 20th century’s Uyghur independence movement. However, in this book, we can barely find some anthropological discussion, that makes Dr. Brophy’s work too focused on the factor of the Uyghur elite and their political mobilization.

The Chinese scholars’ viewpoint, with a strong denying of the East Turkestan conception, on one side focus more in the nomadic origin of modern Uyghur people, someone believe that the main ancestor of Uyghur people can be traced back to the nomadic tribe from northern Mongolia 300 B.C, and it was the fundamental origin of the modern Uyghur. (Wei, 1999 : 85-86) on the other side, some of them believe that the modern Uyghur was formed after the Islamization of Xinjiang, while local Buddhist, Manichaist and Chinese people and culture are also fundamental to its formation. (Yang, 1988) However, both opinions are still a full-style of the Soviet Union, especially limited by the four definitions of the nation from Joseph Stalin: common language, common territory, common economic life, and common psychological make-up. (Stalin, 1954) More than

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2 Nabijan Tursun, Uyghur independence activist, he is an important coworker of Professor James Millward.
this, the Chinese scholars’ investigation, although under the term “nation”, but as we mentioned before, they are actually talking about “ethnic groups”.

Basically, discussions about the third hypothesis divide into two trends. From one side, many western scholars believe that Chinese authorities are massively violating human rights of the Uyghurs and trying to assimilate them, (Clarke, 2010; Smith Finley, 2007&Hyer, 2006) while Chinese scholars strongly oppose it. On the other side, Chinese scholars talk more about the preferential treatment is given to minorities in China, and mainly consider it as a “socialist’s advantage”. (Han, 2012: 201) Other sociologists, including some Uyghur ones, do notice the Chinese version of “Affirmative Action” implemented for those minorities. For example, Barry Sautman wrote an article about the preferential policies for ethnic minorities in China (1998), mostly quoted cases in Xinjiang. According to Sautman, “China’s preferential policies represent a case that does not conform to the hypothesis of Thomas Sowell and other scholars that affirmative action everywhere fails to produce substantial equity, inhibits economic efficiency and creates interethnic tensions.” But 20 years have passed since this essay, and no new investigations were made.

As we mentioned, there are some beneficial discussions about our topic, but due to different reasons they don’t serve our purpose well, in order to clarify the historical-sociological background of the current Xinjiang and Reeducation Centre issue, another well-designed investigation with the latest data is needed.

1.3 Methodologies

Our main investigation methodology is qualitative. Since the investigation deeply linked with the historical events and the current policies, we will need to look through both Chinese history record and the western investigation, and make meaningful comparisons. Also, we will track the current Chinese policies about the minorities, which may be presented not only by government’s documents but also in multiple media platforms. So, the qualitative method will be applied in all three hypotheses. In the first hypothesis by reviewing historical records we can acquire a historical overview of the Chinese official presence in Xinjiang Region; in the second hypothesis, we will compare claims made by Uyghur independent activist and scientific investigations from multiple sources, which help us verify the essence of the Uyghur independence movement; in third hypothesis no only Chinese official documents will be analyzed, but also information from cyber platform, thereby we can track the evolution process of Chinese official policies about minorities, and also its impact on all ethnic groups in China.

Quantitative method also will be applied during our investigation, mainly used in parts about the Chinese preferential policies for minorities of the third hypothesis. We will use raw data from the Chinese official record of the Civil Service Recruitment Examination of the year 2016, which contains 1000 examples, which were candidates’ examine result, their ethnic identification, and information about every candidate’s ethnic bonus point. By comparing the ranking with/without the influence of the ethnic bonus point, we can easily and clearly analyze the impact of these minority policies for both the Chinese-Han people and other minority’s groups.

2 INVESTIGATION

Due to the purpose and object of our investigation, we can’t apply a single time trend in this work, which may cause unnecessary confusions. Therefore we will divide our essay into three parts by the relative order of those three hypotheses.

2.1 Hypothesis 1 – Since the Formation of its Main Ethnicity - Han, the Chinese Government Maintains a Tight Connection with the Xinjiang Region Throughout the History

2.1.1 Protectorate of the Western Regions

In fact, Xinjiang（新疆）is a very modern name, which has only less than 300 years of history. For the Chinese, there is a more traditional name --- Western Territory (西域) --- for this region. It is a very typical Chinese naming way, just like the South China Sea. Western Territory was named according to its relative location from the China Proper³. We no longer know

³ China Proper（中国本土）is a geographic-cultural concept invented and widely used by the western historical academia, it means the main inhabited region of Chinese Han people. But for its implication of the severability of modern China, the mainstream of Chinese academia refuses to use it. In this work we only use it as a geographic concept.
who was the first Chinese entered this western territory, but the historical documents reveal us who was the first Chinese official ambassador traveled there, his name is Zhang Qian (张骞).

The year 139 BC, China was in the Han Dynasty⁴ (汉朝), a war against the Confederation of the nomadic tribe – Xiongnu broke out. Xiongnu harshly controlled the western territory by force and collect tribute from local tribes. To achieve an alliance with those disgruntled tribes, the Chinese emperor sent Zhang Qian as ambassador to the western territory⁵, which resulted in a geographical and cultural discovery inside China. After years of conflict and negotiation, in the year 60 BC, Chinese expelled Xiongnu out and established the first administrative organization in the Western Territory - Protectorate of the Western Territory (PWT).

In Figure 1 we can see several tributary cities in the northwestern part - according to the historical record, the Book of Han, there were at least 36 tributary cities governed by the PWT⁶. These tributaries possessed the most of land in Xinjiang, or even exceeded today’s border, for example, the tributary JiBin (罽宾) is located in the Kashmir region. Although the PWT was not the application of the Chinese bureaucratic administrative system in the western territory, the PWT governor was given the right to supervise, mediate, and mobilize military among the tributaries by the Chinese emperor. (Meng Liaokuo, 2015: 74) More than this, Chinese bureaucrats insisted on taking detailed notes of each tributary, including its location, its population, its land area, the number of the soldier, and the form of administrative organization.

![Figure 1: The Han dynasty and its sphere of control](image)

From its founding until its abandonment due to domestic problems, the PWT lasted no more than 200 years, but it permanently influenced the relationship between China Proper and the western territory.

First, the PWT facilitated the exchange of culture and population. In figure 1 we can clearly see the famous silk route, it is one of the most important trade routes in ancient Asia, linked China with Central Asia and other countries further away. The mansion of the governor of the PWT was located at one of the two branches of the silk route, in the city Wulei, (Zhang, 2013) which is marked by red on the map. That’s to say, the PWT was protecting the commercial route, (Meng Liaokuo, 2015: 76) and obviously not only goods were transported along the route, but also the knowledge, culture, and population, especially when China Proper was in disaster and the people sought land to escape.

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⁴ Han（汉）is the name of a Chinese dynasty (210 BC - 220 AD), it is also the name of the main ethnic group of China - the Han ethnic group (汉族), because this dynasty is considered as the primitive formation of Han ethnicity.

⁵ Book of Han, Biographies of Zhang Qian and Li Guangli. 《汉书 - 张骞李广利传》https://ctext.org/han-shu/zhang-qian-li-guang-li-zhuan/zhs: 1-8

⁶ Book of Han, Traditions of the Western Territory. 《汉书 - 西域传》https://ctext.org/han-shu/xi-yu-zhuan/ens.
Secondly, the PWT increased the centripetal force of the Chinese government in the western territory. Under its governance those tributaries learned about the Chinese society, and admitted the leadership of the central government, which facilitates the integration between the China Proper and the western territory, for example, in more than one thousand years, the Kingdom of Khotan humbly kept all the orders and resolutions issued by Chinese dynasty with respect⁷, and maintained a close relationship with the China Proper.

As we have mentioned, the Han dynasty is considered as the beginning of the formation of the Han ethnic group, hence the PWT's foundation and its governance in the western territory also formed a significant part in the common memory of the Han people. Together, combined with the first influence, we can say that since its ethnic childhood, the Han people already established an emotional link of “homeland” (Smith, 2013: 14) with the western territory. And after a couple of centuries, this emotional connection contributed to the reconquest of the western territory.

2.1.2 Grand Protectorate to Pacify the West Territory

After the Han Dynasty, China entered four hundred years of civil war, although several regimes from northern China reestablished its administration in the western territory, none of it operated stably. Till the year 640, a new unified regime of China - the Tang dynasty, looked again toward the West and tried to retake it. After the war defeated the northern horde, the new PWT - Grand Protectorate to Pacify the Western Territory (GPPWT) was established, the GPPWT not only reconquered all the PWT old territory but also expanded itself into Persia⁸. But in comparison with the PWT, the most influential progress of the GPPWT was not its administrative sphere, but rather the form of its organization.

Generally, the nature of the PWT exactly corresponded to its name - a protectorate, the central government didn’t intervene much in the daily governance of those tributaries. However, in the Tang dynasty, the influence of the central government reached a higher level.

According to historical documents, two parallel systems were implemented in GPPWT (Trombert, 2000. Liu & Chen, 2006). In Han’s villages, the administrative system was totally transplanted from China Proper, peasants paid the same tax and were mobilized in the same military system as all other Chinese, local officials were directly appointed by the central government. (Zhao, 2011: 48) For the minority’s tribes, based on the population they were classified into different levels, and chiefs of each tribe were offered a permanent and hereditary position/title within the Chinese bureaucratic system, which corresponded to the level of their tribe. For example, the king of Khotan (于阗), his full title was “Cavalry General, Director of the Pisha Directory, King of Khotan”⁹. (Meng Xianshi, 2012: 122) From the order of his titles, we can confirm that the central title was nobler than the local one, and the Chinese title was nobler than the traditional one. That is to say, although those tribal chiefs were quite independent on internal affairs within their tribe, theoretically, they already are absorbed by the Chinese bureaucratic system. In the case of the General Supreme of the GPPWT, who managed the military affairs and also the civil affairs of the western territory as the head of both two parallel administrative lines, he was directly appointed by the central government and had a clear mandate limit.

The application of two parallel systems reveals two facts for us: First, four hundred years after the PWT, the population of ethnic Han had grown so much that allowed the transplant of Chinese administrative system in the western territory, which also verifies the influence of the PWT mentioned before. Second, the Tang dynasty respected the traditions of the tributaries. Rather than took aggressive measures with its military superiority to convince the local people, Tang regimen expected a voluntary and natural conversion. This attitude of respect is inherited by the later regimes of China. To some extent, the attitude of no intense intervention is also a factor of what is happening now in Xinjiang, we will discuss it in subsequent chapters.

Obviously, in the Tang Dynasty, the influence of China proper in western territory reached a new height. On the one hand, Han’s garrison station became Tang’s city with heavy defense (Meng Xianshi, 2012), indicates the normalization of the existence of the central government, and independent tributaries of the Han period became a county or prefecture in the dynasty

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⁷ Universal Book, Frontier VIII, Khotan. 《通典 - 边防八 - 于阗》
https://ctext.org/text.pl?node=564966&if=gb&remap=gb: 5

⁸ Old Book of Tang, Volume XL, Chronicle XX, Geography III. 《旧唐书-卷二十-地理三》
https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=741847&remap=gb: 464-489

⁹ In Simplified Chinese: 骠骑大将军, 毗沙都护府都督, 于阗国王
Tang, which is a significant indicator of the integration/sinicization progress of the western territory. On the other hand, the lost and reconstruction of the PWT consolidate the “homeland” emotional bond between the Han ethnic group and the western territory. Because the reconquest not only justifies the domination of an ethnic group in a territory but also could be a national supremacy signal. (Sanjuán, 2012: 71-72) For those local tributaries, the Chinese reconquest demonstrated the power and determination of the central government, fortified its sense of belonging to China and fostered its acceptance of Chinese culture.

But Tang also encountered a domestic problem and abandoned the GPPWT in less than 200 years, just like Han dynasty. In the following centuries after Tang, China Proper was in the circle between unification and division. Although some Chinese dynasties during this period still received tribute from the western territory, none of their influence had ever surpassed the achievement of Tang dynasty. Especially after the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), the western territory was ruled by the Mongol hordes and threatened the northwest border of China.

2.1.3 Foundation of Xinjiang Province

In the year 1759, the new central regimen of China, Qing dynasty reconquered all the land of the western territory after 70 years of war with the Mongolian Zunghar Khanate and reestablished the PWT / GPPWT with a new name - General of Yili (GY).

At first, GY was only a position to coordinate Qing’s military action contra Zunghar, but as the reconquest campaign proceeded, it also acquired civil responsibilities, and at the end of the reconquest GY became the de facto regional governor. Same as the GPPWT, GY also applied two parallel systems, in the northern region of Xinjiang, where the majority of the population was Han and Mongolian people, the classic Chinese bureaucratic system was implemented; and in the southern region, where more Muslims lived, the Beg system was kept: Except for the obligation of the Separation of Church and State, local Muslim chiefs (Beg) maintained their traditional dominant state in exchange for their allegiance to the central government. (Ding, 2009: 122)

But soon the Qing Dynasty encountered the most serious crisis throughout all Chinese history – the arrival of Europeans colonist, so the East Coast was in danger now. On the other hand, supported by Russia and encouraged by the Muslim Rebellion of 1862 inside of the China Proper, a general from Central Asia, Yaqub Beg, invaded the western territory and established his own regime caesarpopism, Yetteshahar in the years 1871. (Fairbank & Twichett, 1978: 211) If the central Chinese government followed the historical routine, like the Han dynasty of Tang dynasty, the western territory would be abandoned once again. But in the year 1876, Qing Dynasty decided a new reconquest campaign of the western territory and defeated all the Muslim rebellions within 2 years.

After his triumph, the leader of the new reconquest, General Tso Tsung-t’ang began the provincialization of the western territory and accomplished in the year 1884, (Ding, 2009: 123) that is to say, the Chinese bureaucratic system was totally transplanted and the Muslim administrative system was abolished in all the western territory since 1884. In his letter to the emperor of October 18, 1882, Tso said that the western territory “is the most forward frontier against the foreign invasions, and it is also a lost land that newly recovered”, that is why he proposed Xin (new - 新) jiang (territory - 疆) as the provincial name. (Ji, 2003: 48) Since then, our main discussion scenario received its modern name - Xinjiang Province, but this name is not yet its official name of today.

During the Qing dynasty, the reconquest of Xinjiang occurred twice, and the influence of the central government increased more and more, especially after the second time. We must have in mind that the Qing dynasty was not founded by the Han ethnic group, but by the minority Manchu, but the central government manifested its firm determination in defending the indivisibility of China, even with more passion than the Han ethnic group. Except for the demonstration of certain characteristics of civic nationalism in its regime, the most important result is, the firm nationalist determination of a minority making high nationalist pressure on the Han ethnic group, which diminishes the space and desire in any negotiation about the separation of Xinjiang. More than this, the reconquest of Xinjiang was one of the rare bright spots during the “Century of

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10 Prefectural-County System is the administrative system of ancient China (implemented since 221 A.C.), it is a bureaucratic system, and the Province - Municipality – County system of today’s China is its latest evolution.

11 Wei Yuan, Sacred Military - Qianlong Overcome the Zunghar. 1842. 魏源, 《圣武记 - 乾隆荡平准部记》
https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=877379&remap=gb

12 In Chinese: 他族逼处, 故土新归
Humiliation, that the Chinese army successfully overcame a foreign intervention. That is why for the Chinese people, Xinjiang is directly linked with their patriotic and nationalistic emotion, and therefore the possibility of abandon Xinjiang again is almost 0%.

Except for the emotional influence for the Chinese, we should notice another fact during the reconquest of Xinjiang. Although the reconquest occurred twice, the central government always maintained a tolerant attitude toward the cultural traditions in Xinjiang, more specifically, Muslim traditions. We know that after the Spanish reconquest, specifically after the year 1526, “the Muslim religion no longer existed officially in Spain, all Mudejars were now Moriscos”, and of course the conversion was not a voluntary act. (Kamen, 2014: 161) But even though the Muslim Rebellion of 1862 caused at least 20 million deaths (75% are of the Han ethnic group), (Lu, 2014: 356) the central government did not force Muslims to abandon their religion, only abolished the Beg system. In this case, the Qing dynasty was consistent with the routine of all past Chinese regimes.

2.1.4 Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang

The peace lasted until the year 1933 when the Japanese invaded China again, the Uyghurs launched a new rebellion with English and Soviet support, founded the First East Turkestan Republic (ETR). But separatism was no longer a universally accepted option, the rebellion even was resisted by other Muslim groups. Only half a year after the burst of rebellion, an army of the Hui (also a Muslim group) suppressed the secessionists. (Forbes, 1986: 63-81)

Some Uighurs continued to fight for the dream of the ETR, the year 1944, when half of China was occupied and tortured by the Japanese, supported and directed directly by the Soviet Union, the Three Regions Rebellion broke out. Three regions signified the Yili region, the Tacheng region, and the Ashan region, which are three regions on the northern Xinjiang-Soviet border. On November 12, 1944, the rebellions founded the provisional government of the Second ETR in the capital of Yili and immediately began genocide against the Han ethnicity in their control zone. (Forbes, 1986: 177-179) Although the corruption and incompetence governance of the Republic of China (Ruled by Kuomintang Party), was an important factor of the rebellion, those acts of ethnic hatred reduced its justification.

The rebellions controlled the three northern areas, and the central government continued to control the remaining seven regions of Xinjiang, and neither of them had the strength to achieve a decisive victory in the battlefield, so two sides began negotiation and signed a Pact of Peace in 1945. Under that pact, a Coalition Government of Xinjiang was founded and the provisional government of ETR was canceled. The Russian adviser was sent back to the Soviet Union, accompanied by those most stubborn secessionists, including the president of the provisional government of ETR - Ali Khan Türe, an Uzbek and famous religious leader in the Yili region. (Forbes, 1986: 200,236)

After the founding of the Coalition Government, leaders of Three Regions began to approach the Communist Party of China (CPC), they purged the so-called influence of “anti-Soviet Turkish-Islamic”, and accepted Xinjiang as an indivisible part of China. But their rapprochement with Chinese communists threatened the central government of Kuomintang, so it began a new confrontation contra the Three Regions, and the Coalition Government collapsed. In 1948, as the result of the growing CPC’s influence, a new government, Union in Defense of Peace and Democracy in Xinjiang, was founded in Three Regions. At the ceremony of foundation, Ahmadjiin Qasim, one of the most important Uyghur leaders of Three Regions, emphasized once again the importance of the indivisibility of China: “Although according to the spirit of freedom of speech, the geographical name of our province can be called arbitrarily, but we must use Xinjiang politically and procedurally. This term has been stipulated specifically since the first founding negotiation.” (Qi Ruoxiong, 2001: 46) In the fall of 1949, CPC won the war for the most part of China and started marching towards Xinjiang. Except some guerrilla groups pro-Kuomintang still fought against CPC, most powers in Xinjiang opted for cooperation without resistance, this is the Peaceful Liberation of Xinjiang. On October 1, 1955, six years after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, the central government converted the Xinjiang Province into the Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang.

In the first fifty years of the 20th century, we see the more foreign influence in Xinjiang than ever before, it was because the central government of China Proper was in its worst period, and it didn’t project enough power into Xinjiang. A direct result was the rise of the separatists with the ideology Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turquism, but none insurrection fulfilled its original purpose, these failures were mainly because the majority of the people of Xinjiang (including the Uyghur people) didn’t want to provoke a new reconquest caused by a Muslim rebellion, especially after the painful history of the Muslim Rebellion of 1862. That is to say, the idea of Xinjiang as a province of China won more popularity among the peoples of Xinjiang, especially

13 Century of Humiliation, from 1840 (First Opium War) to 1949 (Founding of the People's Republic of China)
among the Uyghurs. Secondly, the communist ideology contributed a lot to the peaceful resolution in Xinjiang. Internationally, due to its geographical advantage, Russia/Soviet Union held very significant influence in Xinjiang, and things came easier while the Sino-Russia relation was enhanced by the same ideology. On the domestic part, the Class-Struggle theory also alleviated ethnic conflicts, although more cover-up than resolve.

2.1.5 Result of 1st Hypothesis

We’ve talked a lot about the history of Xinjiang, with special focus on the evolution of Chinese official presence form. With all the data and historical records mentioned, we now can conclude some features of the interaction between Xinjiang and the Chinese central government:

1. The official contact between Xinjiang and China proper last more than 2000 years, which began in the first years of the formation of the Han ethnic group.
2. Although it encountered many obstacles and tortuosity, the influence from China expanded firmly in Xinjiang.
3. Although the Chinese central government established its military superiority over the peoples of Xinjiang since the first contact, it mainly keeps a very tolerant attitude towards local cultures and traditions.
4. In history, ethnic conflicts in Xinjiang are generally the result of the confrontation between China and another extraterritorial power. That means Xinjiang played as the arena of regional powers.
5. Although the abandonment of Xinjiang when the central government encountered domestic problem did repeat several times, the reconquest of Xinjiang was also a routine action. And by the loss and the reconquest of Xinjiang, the emotional bond between the Chinese people and Xinjiang was fortified.

With all these five features, not just the presence of Chinese official power can be verified in Xinjiang, the more important fact is, certainly nowadays Xinjiang is the homeland of many ethnicity groups, but historically it never was a territory of exclusive occupation. In the case of the Chinese Han people, its connection --- official or civil --- with Xinjiang began since the formation of its proto-nationalism14. Although this connection was cut off several times during the history, it’s finally stabilized since centuries ago, and the repeated loss/reconquest of Xinjiang create a strong emotional bond between Chinese people and Xinjiang, which especially is expressed in a nationalist way.

2.2 Hypothesis 2 – Uyghur-East Turkestan Republic can be categorized as a potential nation-state

For the Uyghur independent fighter, the existence of East Turkestan is self-evident, according to the description of International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation, their main opinions are15:

1. East Turkestan is located beyond a logical boundary of China, the Great Wall. Historically, East Turkestan is a part of Central Asia, not of China.
2. Records show that the Uyghurs have a history of more than 4000 years in East Turkestan.
3. The Uyghurs are the indigenous group of East Turkestan… Uyghurs were one of the few settled, as opposed to nomadic
4. Uyghurs embraced Islam in A.D. 934 during the Karahanid Kingdom.
5. The Chinese government’s restriction and censorship of Uyghur language materials, including vast collections of Uyghur literature, have perfectly served their interests in assimilating the Uyghurs into Han.

Some of these opinions are already been discussed before, and the other will be discussed right now on. When introduced PWT and GPPWT, we mentioned nothing about neither Islam nor the Uyghur people, but those two elements just came out and played nuclear roles in the declaration of those Uyghur secessionists, even the Chinese official name of Xinjiang contains the word “Uyghur”, but obviously when the first Chinese ambassador entered Xinjiang neither Uyghur, East Turkestan nor Islam didn’t even exist, so our next question is to find out the origin of the Muslim Uyghur in Xinjiang.

2.2.1 Uyghur: Origin, Name, Islamization and Expansion in Xinjiang.

Since the foundation of the PWT, between China and Inner Asia a commercial route was established, it’s called the Silk Route, which we can clearly distinguish in Figure 1. As we have mentioned, not only goods were transported on the route, but also the

14 Proto-nationalism is a conception proposed by Erick Hobsbawm, which describe “feelings of collective belonging which already existed” before the modern nation-state. (Hobsbawm, 2012: 46)
15 http://www.iuhrdf.org/uyghurs
ideas. Buddhism originated in India, expanded rapidly through the expansion and development of the Silk Route. Although Chinese were mainly believers in Confucian or Taoism, with the respect of freedom of religion and diversity of culture, they didn’t prohibit the expansion of Buddhism. In the Tang Dynasty (618-907), the Chinese government built and maintained Buddhist monasteries among Central Asia, so to maintain their friendship with tributary in the western territory, as generally, they’ve already accepted the Buddhism. (Elverskog, 2011: 30-32) The Kingdom of Khotan kept a special relationship with the Tang dynasty, for it owned a Buddhist monastery which also was sacramental for the Taoist. More than this, GPPWT also protected the western territory from the Islamic invasion in the year 717. (Beckwith, 1993: 88)

But Tang dynasty abandoned the western territory for a rebellion in northern China, and during this rebellion, a nomadic Turkish Khanate from the Mongolian steppe also participated in the war with a speculative role, it’s called Uyghur Khanate. Years after the rebellion, the Uyghur Khanate was destroyed by the Tang dynasty, but many of its people fled to the western territory, located there and mixed with other tribes, which is a part of the origin of the modern Uyghur people. Although it has the same name as the Uyghur people of today, according to Professor Millward’s description:

The Uyghurs of the Uyghur khaghanate were... not Muslims, but rather Manichaean. Later, the Uyghur state in eastern Xinjiang tolerated Buddhism and Christianity among its urban population—it opposed Islam... while certainly among the ancestors of today’s Uyghur people, (the Uyghurs of the Uyghur khaghanate) are not their only ancestors... the Uyghurs from the Uyghur khaghanate were also some cultural distance away from the sedentary agriculturalist Muslim Turki of the Tarim oases in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who came by the twentieth century to call themselves ‘Uyghur’. (Millward, 2007: 43-44)

As the investigation by Chinese scholars revealed, during this period, the ancient nomadic Uyghur, forced by the natural environment of Xinjiang and influenced by local agricultural residents, remaining Chinese and other tributaries, turned to a settled group. (Yang shengmin, 1988)

On the other hand, without the protection from China, many Buddhist tributaries couldn’t resist the Islamic invasions any more. An iconic event was, in 1044, the Islamic Karakhanids dynasty from Transoxiana, conquered the capital of the Kingdom of Khotan and forced the conversion of religion. Mahmud al-Kashgari, author of the famous book “Compendium of the Languages of the Turks”, wrote a poem which described the conquest of Khotan and expressed his hatred towards Buddhism:

We came down on them like a flood,
We went out among their cities,
We tore down the idol-temples,
We shit on the Buddha’s head!

Everlskog, 2011: 95

Obviously, the modern Uyghur with Islam belief has a considerable cultural distance from the ancient Uyghur. Linguistically Sir Gerard Clauson also argued that the true descendant of ancient Uyghur language is the Western Yugur speaks by the minority Yugur live in the Gansu Province of China, (Clauson, 1965) while the modern Uyghur speaks the Karluk language from Karakhanids dynasty, (Tilbury & Tood, 2008: 145) although their script did originate from the ancient Uyghur.

In 1514, Mongol invaders in South Xinjiang, whom already have accepted Islam, founded the Yarkand Khanate in the traditional land of Khotan, while their Mongol brothers in northern Xinjiang maintained Buddhism and founded the Zunghar Khanate in the year 1635. Zunghar conquered Yarkand in the year 1678, (Everlskog, 2011: 225), transferred many Yarkand people to the north, used them and called them as “Taranchi” - means the farmer - without forcing them to change religion. (Millward, 2007: 93). Also, during the rule of Mongolian, a new script named the Chagatai script was introduced in Xinjiang, which turned to be the traditional script for the modern Uyghurs. (Tilbury & Tood, 2008: 145)
We already know the Zunghar Khanate was fully defeated by Qing dynasty in the year 1759. Due to the long war and the accompanying plague, the population in northern Xinjiang decreased to a very low level, therefore Qing dynasty began its official immigration to fulfill the vacuum. Except for immigration of Han ethnicity from China Proper, Qing also continued the Taranchi policy of Zunghar. Until 1768, only in the city Yili, there were about 6,383 families

17 of Taranchi, and the immigration of Taranchi was repeated a few more times in the future. (Wang Xilong, 1985: 47-48) For the first time, Islam expanded its influence throughout the Xinjiang Province, so Henry Schwarz proposed that “the Qing victory was, in certain sense, a victory for Islam”. (Liu & Faure, 1996: 72) These Taranchi people in northern Xinjiang formed the mass basis of the Three Regions Rebellion.

Taranchi - Uyghur was not the only Muslim group in China, for example the Hui (回) ethnic group is also Muslim. But before the nationalism penetrated into China, all Muslims were officially treated as one same group - Hui Group (回部), or Huihui (回回). Inside the Hui Group, there were several forms for the more detailed classification. For example, the army which suppressed the Uyghur rebellion of 1933 was from Ma Huizi (回子), because the most common surname among them is Ma (马). The Taranchi, with other Muslim groups from northwest China, for their classic desert dress – the wrapped turban on their head, was also called as Chan Hui (Chan - 繪 - Wrapped). That is to say, before the nationalist era, among the Muslim group in China, their main difference was based on the family original and the living environment, politically they were all Hui Group.

During the regimen of Yaqub Beg and the second reconquest of Xinjiang, about one hundred thousand Taranchi fled to Russia. After the foundation of the Soviet Union, these Taranchi people learned a new ideology under communist education, the nationalism, about the “nation” and its classification. So those most leftist of the Uyghur refugees in Russia began the construction of their own nationality. (Brophy, 2006) Although at the beginning due to the lack of common understanding, these activists failed to reach a true feasible resolution to create a nation, but the situation changed after the warlord Sheng Shicai took over the power and governed Xinjiang since 1933. In the early years, Sheng’s rule was very unstable and he needed the support from the Soviet Union, so except invited Soviet advisers to guide his government, Sheng also tried to approach the Soviet Union ideologically. With the direct participation of the Russians, he pushed the trend of Classification of Nationality in Xinjiang. (Millward, 2007: 208)

Russian scholars proposed that the people of Yarkand Khanate, were Uyghur by virtue of descent from the ancient Uyghur Khanate, Sheng partly took this definition, he permitted the officially currency of the term “Uyghur” for the Turki-speaking, non-nomad population of southern Xinjiang, while continuing the use of “Taranchi” for people in north Xinjiang. (Millward, 2007: 208) Sheng governed Xinjiang till 1944, dismissed by the central government after the Three Regions Rebellion. Among his governance, the dream of Uyghur leftist mostly came to true: driven by the official admission and the Soviet influence, their people were gathered together, and a stable national government had been formed.

After the CPC took control of Xinjiang, the Soviet influence was admitted and inherited, the only substantial change of ethnic classification, was the incorporation of Taranchi into the Uyghur, thus the modern Uyghur ethnic group was formed. (Millward, 2007: 244-245) And during the 70 years of governance of the current Chinese government, the conception of Uyghur has been fortified by its public education, especially after the government added “Uyghur” into Xinjiang’s official name the year 1955.

2.2.2 Conception and its Politicization of East Turkestan

Turkestan, a word originated from Iranian geographers, at first it was used to describe the place where Turkic people lived, without a stationary geographical reference as the Turkic people were mainly nomadic. But after the expansion of Russians in Eurasia, the term Turkestan was appointed as the official name of this new conquest territory. According to the observation of Annette Meakin, a famous female travel author at the time who traveled on board the Trans-Siberian Railway: “A little to the north of Tashkent there lies a small town called Turkestan. On their way southward from Siberia in 1864, the Russians took it, and many writers affirm that, mistaking its name for that of the entire region, they adopted the appellation of “Turkestan” for their new territory. Up to that time, they assure us Khanates of Bokhara, Khiva and Kokand were known by these names alone.” (Meakin, 1915: 44) A later study by the Central Asian Research Centre and St. Antony’s College also confirmed that “the name Turkestan is of Persian origin and was apparently first used by Persian geographers to describe ‘the country of the Turks’. The Russian Empire revived the word as a convenient name for the governorate-general established in 1867; the terms Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, etc., came into use only after 1924.” (Central Asian Research Centre& St. Antony's College, 1968:3)

17 Family is a traditional statistical unit used in China, which contains at least 5 inhabitants, including two male adults.
But not all Turkic people in Eurasia lived under Russian rule, inside China there were also lots of Turkic. So the western geographical scholars used the term “Russian Turkestan” and “Chinese Turkestan” to distinguish the Governorate-General of Russia at the west and the Chinese Xinjiang at the east, thence the “East Turkestan” is the synonym of “Chinese Turkestan”. However, as the appellation “Turkestan” was invented by foreigner scholars, it was seldom, if ever, used by the actual inhabitants. Even those Pan-Turk Movement’s activists of the 19th century didn’t use Turkestan to describe the conception “Turkish Homeland”, but Turan and Türk Yurdu. (Central Asian Research Centre & St. Antony’s College, 1965:5)

Things changed after Uyghur refugees fled to Russia and some activists accepted the nationalism from the Soviet Union, the term Turan and Türk Yurdu were replaced by Turkestan, and in order to emphasize their anti-Chinese Character, the “Chinese Turkestan” was abandoned and “East Turkestan” fully took over. As we can see the Muslim Rebellion of 1864’s result was Yaqub Beg’s Yetteshahar in Xinjiang, but in 1933 the motherland of Uyghur secessionist was already the East-Turkestan Republic. That’s to say, from the perspective of Uyghur secessionist, a newly geographical conception invented by western scholars could be easily politicized and turned to be a self-evident nation-state.

![Figure 2: The Ideal East Turkestan Republic](image)

During the Century of Humiliation, as the Russian power grew in Eurasia, it seized more than 700 thousand km² territory from China along the frontier, so technically a considerable part of the traditional “Chinese/East Turkestan” is occupied by Russian Empire/Soviet Union and its successors in Eurasia. But according to Figure 2 the map of an ideal East Turkestan Republic, which is directly cited from the International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation’s website, obviously the Uyghur secessionist approval their frontier with Russia which was drawn by Chinese-Russian governments. A very probable reason is not that the Uyghur secessionists agree with the Chinese government, but because they can’t disagree with the Russian government. This confirms once again our early finding that “the ethnic conflicts in Xinjiang are generally the result of the confrontation between China and another extraterritorial power”.

2.2.3 Result of 2nd Hypothesis

Until here, we have reviewed the main process of the formation of the modern Uyghur ethnic group and the origin of East Turkestan, our findings are:

1. From the perspective of anthropological theory, the connection between the ancient Uyghur Khanate and the modern Uyghur ethnic group is very suspicious and doubtful. While certainly, some survivors of the ancient Uyghur Khanate are the ancestor of the modern Uyghur people, the indigenous of Xinjiang, the later Mongolians also were fundamental to its formation. Same evolution happened in the Uyghur language.

2. The important cultural basis of Uyghur people, the Islam religion, not only was violently planted in Xinjiang but also mainly been limited in southern Xinjiang throughout the history, where the traditional Buddhist and Manichaean culture were wiped out. Besides, the expansion of Islam in Xinjiang deeply depended on the Chinese military victory, negatively and also positively.

3. The historical homeland of the Turki-speaking, non-nomadic with Islam belief population of southern Xinjiang, the Yarkand Khanate, was the most Sinicized kingdom – Khotan in all the western territory; and the ideal homeland claimed by Uyghurs, the East Turkestan, is a geographical conception invented by foreigner scholars, which never was the exclusive sacred homeland of Uyghur people, but a deliberate result of political operation.
4. The traditional identity of Uyghur people was the tribal form, which lacked common understanding and had no big difference in comparison with other Muslim groups in China. The beginning of the nationalist movement was controlled by a few numbers of the leftist elite in exile, and the massive construction of “Uyghur Nation” barely began since the 1930s by two Han Chinese regimens. All this process was under the full influence of the Russian/Soviet regional hegemony.

All these findings, if we analyzed them with the western paradigm, we can see that the “nationalist movement” of Uyghur fits more into the instrumentalism, (Anthony Smith, 2013: 58) On one side it lacks solid historical backtracking: if we recognize the ancient Uyghur as the main ancestor of the modern Uyghur, so the modern Uyghur can’t be indigenous of Xinjiang. On the other hand, if modern Uyghur ethnic group was formed since Xinjiang, then it not only can’t have more than 4000 years of history like some Uyghur scholars claimed, and also its resident history in Xinjiang is much shorter than many other ethnicities. On the other side, Uyghur elites manipulated the nationalist movement while the massive participation was passive and driven by an external force. In fact, without the approval of two Chinses Han regimens in Xinjiang since the 1930s, it’s impossible for the Uyghur ethnic group to gain some national characteristics. Besides, as Benedict Anderson emphasized, the nationalist movement is limited by the sovereign sphere, but Uyghur people never founded a tribal regimen which covered all the Xinjiang Province, not to mention a sovereign one.

We can also analyze these findings with the “four common standards” used by Chinese scholars: The common language of Uyghur emerged no earlier than the Mongolian conquest of Xinjiang, and it lacks uniqueness and originality; before turned to settled and agricultural, no common territory can be defined as the homeland of Uyghur people, and after the change of their living form, the common territory of Uyghur people was limited in southern Xinjiang, with a mixed living with other local minorities; the common economic of Uyghur also is not a true argument, as the nomadic Uyghur people didn’t keep their traditional economic form but been absorbed by local agricultural people; in the case of common psychological make-up, which is the Islam religion. Obviously, Uyghur is not the only ethnic group with Islam religion in Xinjiang, so this commonality is too broad to be a national identity.

In fact, Chinese scholars’ opinions are strong arguments for an ethnic group, and after almost 90 years of continuous nationality education, today, of course, we must admit that Uyghur people can be fully considered as a unique ethnicity group which located in Xinjiang. But due to the many reasons mentioned before, we can also confirm that the Uyghur-East Turkestan Republic is not a potential nation-state, which means the independence movement of Xinjiang is not feasible both theoretically and practically.

2.3 Hypothesis 3 – Minority Policy of People’s Republic of China

The People's Republic of China is the current Chinese regimen, founded in 1949. In the first 30 years, PRC was more influenced by its Chairman Mao Zedong and his ideology, but the situation changed dramatically after Mao’s death. In order to understand the evolution of PRC’s minority policy, we also should divide the investigation into two phases: the Communist Phase, and the Indulgence Phase.

2.3.1 Communist Phase: Construction of the Modern Chinese Nationalities

As they declared, the CPC and the People’s Republic of China are a communist party and a socialist state. But the Chinese didn’t know how to build a socialist state before the triumph of the revolution. Their only object for learning was the Soviet Union. For the first few years after its founding, the PRC copied many policies from Russia, including their minority policy.
The first result of the copy is the foundation of the minority autonomous region. In the last phase of the war against the Kuomintang, the triumph was already foreseeable for CPC, but CPC’s next big problem was its commitment of national self-determination for minorities. There were two options on the table. The first option was the complete copy of the Soviet Republic of the Soviet Union, literally it meant that all the ethnic groups in China have the same sovereign right as true “nations”, and the form of the new regimen should be a confederation of ethnic republics; The second option emerged from the “China Nation” (中华民族, zhonghuaminzu), a conception proposed by several Chinese scholars during the Republic of China ruled by Kuomintang. (Ma, Sep.2012: 2-3) In the second option, only the “China Nation” is the unique sovereign holder in all China, and there were only 5 ethnic groups as compositions of the China Nation: Han, Hui, Tibetan, Manchu, and Mongolian, this was the theory of “Republic of Five Ethnicity” carried by Kuomintang. Although in the 1920s, the CPC did consider the possibility of dividing China into several ethnic republics and bringing them together in a union, but as the revolution process grows, the CPC finally chose to combine two options: degraded the system of the Soviet national republic into the system of the minority autonomous region, which emphasized more in the China Nation and its indivisibility; while expanded the composition of the China Nation (Chen, 2009: 54-55) Until 1965, 5 minority autonomous regions were founded in PRC: Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (1947), Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (1955), Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (1958), Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (1958), and Xizang Autonomous Region (1965).

According to CPC politicians, the Autonomous Region system perfectly balances the minority’s demand for self-determination and the integrity of China. In these autonomous regions, although minorities aren’t the absolute majority demographically, they receive many political preferential treatments. For example, all presidents of the autonomous regions must be a minority; a minimum amount of representation in all levels of Popular Assembly is granted for each minority, and all official documents should be written in both the Mandarin language and the minority language. On the other hand, these autonomous regions are also part of the centralized administrative structure, with the political level equal to the Province, they are directly led by the central government in Pekin.

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18 Except for Xizang, the Tibetans occupy 90% of the regional population.
In order to expand the composition of the China Nation, CPC launched a campaign of classification and identification of all ethnic groups in China. But as we have mentioned several times before, the concept of “nation” and nationalism was introduced to China after the 19th century, so where did the theoretical basis of this campaign come from? According to Professor Qi Jinyu of the Minzu University of China, in general, there were two sources: After the opium war, Western academics and explorers began to investigate the composition of the Chinese population with the western perspective, which connoted the purpose of dissolving the Qing dynasty. But because of the lack of modern sociology and anthropology knowledge, the western theory about the definition of the nation was almost completely accepted by Chinese scholars. On the other hand, after the triumph of CPC, Stalin's theory about the nationalism took the dominant place and guided most of the classification work. (Qi Jinyu, 2016: 24) And this ethnic classification campaign of the 1950s officially founded the basis of the existence of 56 ethnic groups in China. (Ma, Ago. 2012: 13)

According to professor Mullaney of Stanford University, although it was a significant job with many successes, the classification campaign of 1954 was defective for three problems: it was more of “categorization” than “self-identification”; it emphasized too much in the language factor; many small minority groups were incorporated into the big ones, only to facilitate the founding and functioning of the Popular Assembly. (Mullaney, 2011) Chinese academics also admitted the flaws of the campaign: “We started the ethnic identification of minorities, just to build a socialist state of poly-ethnicity like the Soviet Union.” (Ma, Aug. 2012: 13), “During the process of identification, there were several errors, for example, people from the same ethnic group but lived in different provinces were categorized into two different ethnic groups.” (Qi Jinyu, 2016: 26) “The party led the creation of the language of minorities.” (Wang Aiyun, 2013: 71-72). “The Soviets politicized and institutionalized the concept of the nation, and we copied it without thinking carefully, we even allowed the Soviets to participate directly in the classification campaign.” (Ma, Aug. 2012: 21) That is to say, the Chinese government started an ethnic identification campaign without its own localized theory while allowing foreign scholars led the process. For example in the Xinjiang autonomous region, CPC admitted the classification made by the Soviets during the Sheng’s governance.

Figure 4: A set of stamps of the 56 ethnic groups

19 Minzu (民族) is the Chinese translation of the word Nation.
20 The Han ethnic group didn’t incorporate any ethnic group during the campaign.
The final result of the ethnic identification campaign was the confirmation of 56 ethnic groups, but many western scholars doubt the reliability of this result, for example Katherine Palmer Kaup wrote the book “Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China” questions the Zhuang as an ethnic group and Professor Dru Gladney wrote a book “Ethnic Identity in China: the Making of a Muslim Minority Nationality” questions the reliability of ethnic Hui, both ethnic groups questioned have their own autonomous region. But an interesting phenomenon is, although the Uyghur and the Tibetan incorporated several small ethnic groups during the classification, not enough western critics about their identification were found.

Besides the theories and experiences copied from the Soviet Union, CPC also invented some new theories about minority policy during the communist phase, one of the most famous was the Ethnic Debt Theory, which was proposed by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai. According to Zhou’s explanation, the Han ethnic group mainly held the upper place throughout history, and minorities were always been exploited. As PRC is a socialist state, Han people is obligatorily helping the minorities in all aspect, because it is an act of paying back the debt made by the ancestor of Han, moreover, the feeling of carrying debts could contribute to the ethnic unity while Han encounters a minority. This is a very subjective theory without any solid theoretical base, but it turns out that its impact is deeper than all Russian experiences; one of its impacts is the countless investment into the autonomous regions. For example, from 1950 to 2001, the state invested more than 500 billion yuan (almost 60 billion euros) in fixed assets in Xinjiang, transferred hundreds of thousands of educated personnel to the region and provided huge annual budget subsidies. (Millward, 2007: 296)

Generally, during the communist phase, PRC learned many minority policies from the Soviet Union. Directed by communism and the theory of Class-Struggle, the CPC didn’t fear the tendency of clarification among different ethnic groups, on the contrary, the CCP encouraged this tendency, because it was the proof of the fulfillment of national self-determination, and also was the medal of the development of human rights in China. From a communist point of view, these policies certainly were modern and progressive, but on the other hand, the founding and strengthening of ethnic differences obviously diminished the centripetal force toward the central government, especially when the common political roof is abandoned. After Mao’s death in 1976, not only the fever of communism was lowered, the communism also lost its dominant place as public ideological belief. Especially after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the communism can no longer support the common political roof. Now the Chinese central government had to appease “55 politicized and institutionalized minorities” without using the communist paradigm and slogans. Since then, we entered the Indulgence Phase.

### 2.3.2 New Era, New Policies

The core principle of the Indulgence Phase is simple, Privilege minorities to keep them happy, which mainly started since President Hu Yaobang (1980-1987). In the year 1980, when Hu visited Tibet, he explained in detail his plan for minorities, which can be assumed in two aspects: Allows religious figures to participate in the administration while the central government taxes no more in the autonomous regions (central subsidy was kept), which was the de facto reconstruction of the Beg system of Qing dynasty. The second aspect was the total withdrawal of Han personnel from the autonomous regions. According to his explanation, minority cadre must occupy 80% of the provincial positions and 100% in the county level. The total population of Han should not exceed 20% in the autonomous regions and the free flow of population from China Proper to the autonomous regions should be restricted. We can conclude Hu’s idea in one sentence: Using political concessions in exchange for an attitude of no objection of the minority.

Although his strategical plan caused tremendous panic among all five autonomous regions, Hu insisted in his word and fostered several detailed policies, which influence almost every aspect of a Chinese citizen’s daily life. And even after Hu’s resignation in 1987, those minority policies are inherited and expanded by the following Chinese presidents.

#### 2.3.2.1 Criminal Policy.

In 1984, the CPC pushed through a directive criminal policy, “In case of minority criminals, we must insist on the principle of less arrest, less death sentence, and more indulgence.” (Zheng, 2009: 53) This is the famous policy “Two Less One Indulgence” (两少一宽, TLOI), which officially categorizes crimes in China into two groups: of Han ethnic, or of the minority. Directed by TLOI, security authorities tend to ignore the minority criminals or accuse them with maximum tolerance. Among

21 Special contribution of Zhou Enlai in ethnic affairs. [http://www.tibet.cn/cn/rediscovery/201807A20180706_6035547_2.html](http://www.tibet.cn/cn/rediscovery/201807A20180706_6035547_2.html).

22 He Fang, 2009. Hu Yaobang and the System of Autonomy Region. [http://www.aisixiang.com/data/29752.html](http://www.aisixiang.com/data/29752.html)
inland provinces of China, the urban legend has already emerged that all minorities have three homicide quotas annually. The Uyghur sociologist Abudu Hade also wrote an article that verified “inland province’s police dare not stop Uyghur thieves, for fear of causing an ethnic conflict” (Hade, 2018: 17). Another news of 2016 said a Muslim minority destroyed the barbecue restaurant next to his flat, only because Han owner used pork during cooking. After the mediation by police, the Muslim asked the owner for forgiveness but pays no compensation, and the Han owner gave up his right to bring a lawsuit, promised not more use of any pig ingredient.

A serious, but not isolated case happened in 2000, in the province Shandong, the home of Confucius. Two Muslims killed a pork shop owner because he sold pork and beef at the same time, before the escape these Muslims deliberately threw a pig head before the local mosque, so their religious brothers were enraged and gathered more than 1000 to “raid” the County town, where only 26 policemen were at service. Those 26 policemen set up a roadblock and fired warning shooting, but still been attacked by sticks and shovels, during the chaos one policeman inadvertently pulled the trigger again and four Muslims were killed. After the conflict, not plenty of compensation was paid to the deceased Muslim but all chief of local authorities were prosecuted criminally. (Ye, 2007: 243-246)

2.3.2.2 Reproductive Policy.

The “One Child” policy was already known by the entire world. It’s a policy that the Chinese government only allows each family to have one son/daughter, which officially began in 1980 when the National Population and Family Planning Commission was founded. With no surprise, the minority population is privileged. The Chinese government does not obligate but only “encourages” the minority families to have no more than “2 children”, while each autonomous region can modify this proposed number according to the local needs. After 15 years since the implementation, Chinese government proudly declared that the minority population grew 35.81% within 8 years when Han grew 15.77 %25. According to the population census of 2010, the minority population has already risen from 5.8% (1964) to 8.5% (2010), in the case of the population under age 14, the minority already occupied 11.3 %26. And when Han’s family suffers economic fine and political pressure for the violation of “One Child” policy - for example the famous director of Red Sorghum, Zhang Yimou was fined seven million yuan (one million euros) – minority families not only are immune to this side effect of violation, they can even receive more subsidies and state aid to relieve the pressure of raising their children. In the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, a Muslim family reproduced 6 children within 6 years, but the official presses described them as “the model family among their neighbors” and called on social donation to help them.

2.3.2.3 Educational Policy.

After the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, the Chinese government resumed the National College Entrance Examination (NCEE), which is considered as the best path for social mobility in China. Once again, minorities occupy the best position on the rising ladder for simply being a minority. According to the Notice of the Enrollment of University by Ministry of Education (2016)29, each province can offer a different preferential policy for minorities, which usually carried out in the form of bonus

23 Wang Chong, 2017. A Mongolia boy in Shanghai. http://wemedia.ifeng.com/32774289/wemedia.shtml. While searching杀人名额 (homicide quota) on Chinese search engine, we can find thousands of results, and all are linked to the minority or the autonomous region.

24 https://www.douban.com/group/topic/87750836/?start=0. The original link to the newsletter is http://taian.sdnews.com.cn/xyxw/201606/t20160622_2098393.htm, but it was already censored.

25 The State Council Information Office of the PRC. China’s Family Planning Policy, 2000. http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/1995/Document/307993/307993.htm

26 2010 Population Census of PRC. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndtj/2010/307993/307993.htm

27 Financial Times, 2014. Zhang Yimou was fined more than 7.48 million yuan for have more than one child. http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001054348?archive

28 People.cn, 2014. A Couple from Ningxia Having Three Pairs of Twins in Six Years. http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0801/c70731-25384996.html

29 Ministry of Education, 2016. Notice of the Enrollment of University of 2016. http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A15/moe_776/s3258/201603/t20160307_232202.html
points for minority students during the NCEE. For example, in the Hunan province, minorities can get 20 bonus points in NCEE.\(^{30}\) Take notice that in Hunan province there were more than 400 thousand participants of NCEE in 2016, and the full score was 750, so 20 bonus points meant the overcoming of more than 10,000 students.\(^{31}\) In fact, this policy of bonus points is very similar to the Affirmative Action in the USA, which already caused several debates and a judicial confrontation, (Stephens, 2018)

But the Chinese Affirmative Action is not limited only in the educational area. Like many other countries, in China the government official also has to pass a series of exams before being recruited, it is called the Civil Service Recruitment Examination (CSRE). Similar to NECC, minorities receive bonus points in the CSRE, too. For example, in the Ningxia Autonomous Region, according to the official confirmation of the Provincial HR Department, the Muslim minority will receive 10 bonus points with the purpose of “balancing the ethical composition ratio in the administrative system.”\(^{32}\) But is it true that 10 bonus points in the CSRE only works as a balancing factor? Now we will make a quantitative analysis with the data of the year 2011, which has 5000 samples in total.\(^{33}\)

According to the original data: the highest score was a minority candidate with 232.6; Among the top 50 candidates, 9 were Han and 41 were minority; Among the top 100 candidates, 23 were Han and 77 were minority; Among the top 200 candidates, 62 were Han and 138 were minority; among the top 500 candidates, 197 were Han and 303 were minority; Among the first 1000 candidates, 473 were Han and 527 were minority.

Then we exclude the influence of the ethnic bonus point, the result becomes: the highest score was a Han candidate with 224.4; Among the top 50 candidates, 37 were Han and 13 were minority; Among the top 100 candidates, 74 were Han and 26 were minority; Among the top 200 candidates, 148 were Han and 52 were minority; among the top 500 candidates, 364 were Han and 136 were minority; Among the first 1000 candidates, 747 were Han and 253 were minority.

\(^{30}\) Educational Department of Hunan, 2016. Planning of 2016 University Enrollment. [http://jyt.hunan.gov.cn/sjyt/zxgk/zcfl/gfxwj/201702/t20170214_3990781.html](http://jyt.hunan.gov.cn/sjyt/zxgk/zcfl/gfxwj/201702/t20170214_3990781.html)

\(^{31}\) Participant Statistics of Hunan NCEE, 2016: [http://gaokao.eol.cn/hu_nan/dongtai/201606/t20160625_1421427.shtml](http://gaokao.eol.cn/hu_nan/dongtai/201606/t20160625_1421427.shtml)

\(^{32}\) The Person in Charge of the Human Resource Department Answered Questions on the Bonus Points of the Hui Candidates in the Civil Service Recruitment Examination, 2018. [http://search.nxnews.net:8080/was5/web/detail?record=10&channelid=233143&searchword=%E5%85%AC%E5%8A%A1%E5%91%98%E6%8B%9B%E8%80%83+%E5%8A%A0%E5%88%86&keyword=%E5%85%AC%E5%8A%A1%E5%91%98%E6%8B%9B%E8%80%83+%E5%8A%A0%E5%88%86](http://search.nxnews.net:8080/was5/web/detail?record=10&channelid=233143&searchword=%E5%85%AC%E5%8A%A1%E5%91%98%E6%8B%9B%E8%80%83+%E5%8A%A0%E5%88%86&keyword=%E5%85%AC%E5%8A%A1%E5%91%98%E6%8B%9B%E8%80%83+%E5%8A%A0%E5%88%86)

\(^{33}\) List of Civil Service Examine Notes of Ningxia, 2011. [http://dl.offcn.com/2012dl/file/p/2011/05/09/e70be541f868060f923798b890585d2b.xls](http://dl.offcn.com/2012dl/file/p/2011/05/09/e70be541f868060f923798b890585d2b.xls)
Obviously, in each series of the data, the influences of the ethnic bonus point respectively are 28 (56%), 51 (51%), 86 (43%), 167 (33.4%), 273 (27.3%). Ironically but reasonably, the result which excludes the influence of the ethnic bonus point corresponds to the ethnic composition of total Ningxia population with more accuracy, where 64% are Han and 34.4% are the minority. So 10 bonus point works much more than a “balancing” factor, especially when we notice that in 2011, the Ningxia government only offered 816 positions for 27683 participants. That’s to say, the policy of ethnic bonus point fundamentally influences the result of the recruit and the ethnic composition of the regional government.

2.3.2.4 Economic Policy.

Except for the aforementioned privileges, minorities also have economic privileges, especially those minority companies linked with Islam. For example, we know that Muslims have a special requirement on the meat consumed, which requires a special production line separated from other companies. This is how the total-halal company emerged, which receives economic preferential policy from the government. According to the research of Professor Yang Qiong and her cooperator Yang Zhongjian in 2015, the preferential policy was carried out in 4 different forms:

1. Discount in obtaining the industrial/commercial land. The Halal food Companies automatically enjoy a 50% discount off the price in obtaining an industrial/commercial land.
2. Tax preference, the halal company not only automatically enjoy a 15% discount on business tax, but also for the first 5 years a 100% tax refund will be given to the company and a 50% tax refund after 5 years.
3. Business subsidy. Between 1-3 years, the government subsidizes 10% of the total investment back to the halal company annually, and the companies which obtain an international of Halal certification will receive extra subsidies.
4. Financial discount. It is a typical policy of China, means that the government will pay the loan interest of Halal companies.

All those preferential policies are been executed from central government till local municipal government, means a considerable part of the national income will be used in support the Halal companies, considering China is a socialist – atheism state, and merely very few Chinese Han people are Muslim, it’s hard not to believe that this is a disguised form of religious tax, and not to mention its damage in the fairly market competition.

34 Numbers of recruitment and participant of Civil Service in Ningxia since 2009. http://www.offcn.com/nxgwy/2018/0320/15822.html
Unfair competition no just happened for big companies, a tiny business holder can be also affected by the minority’s economic privilege. In the Hangzhou (where the 2016 G20 meeting was held) Municipal Public Complaint E-Mailbox, we found a petition letter from a veteran and member of the CPC, who was threatened by a group of Muslim minorities, because he wanted to run a noodle-soup restaurant. But the Muslim group already established a “Noodle Regulation”, which prohibited the opening of a second noodle restaurant within a radius of 400 meters from the first one. According to the response of the Hangzhou municipal government, neither the government nor the police department wanted to solve the problem, and the worst part was that the government, in fact, recognized the validity of the “Noodle Regulation”, which had never been proposed in any level of the Popular Assembly. In many cities, this so-called “Noodle Regulation” had already provoked violent conflicts, including the city Shanghai.

2.3.2.5 Cultural-Historical Policy.

Although we can simply conclude its main idea to secure the superior place of minority culture, we can’t find any official document or article that describes the policy clearly enough. So we will use a series of event to explain this policy: A Han Chinese was imprisoned for one year after he insulted the portrait of Genghis Khan, the hero of the Mongols, as he provoked the ethnic hatred; while a Muslim military leader Ma Bufang, who committed many crimes against the Han ethnic group and the CPC during the revolution era, his mansion became a memorial museum; (Stewart, 2017) A Taoist, Liang Xingyang, questioned the legitimacy of that museum, but immediately policeman from Xi'an asked him to an interview and warned him “not to express political opinions”; Xi'an, also named Chang'an the capital of the Han dynasty (210 BC - 220 AD) and five other Chinese dynasties, according to local Muslim’s slogan, will lose its soul if without the Muslim block. Although during the Muslim Rebellion of 1862, Xi'an was besieged and resisted 15 months against Muslim Rebellion without surrendering, but since the 2000s, Chinese government continually invites the descendants of the escaped rebellion - whom already has a new name, the Dungan people and live in Central Asia now - to knock on the gate of Xi'an, as the symbol of their “Coming Home”. It’s just like the Russians invite Nazis soldier to parade in Red Square.

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35 Petition and Response: http://www.hzxf12345.gov.cn/szxxBLH_szxxDetailInfo.do?id=8a7fbb8257ff9c80015819e7cf5a125b, original link was removed but the petition letter is popularly spread among the Internet website, like http://bbs.netbig.com/thread-2725141-1-1.html

36 New beef noodle restaurant in Shanghai harassed by competitors after violating unwritten code: http://shanghaiist.com/2016/07/27/noodle_gang.php

37 https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/chinese-man-jailed-for-insulting-genghis-khans-portrait/article21704561.ece.

38 Ifeng, 2016. A Taoist speak about Mabufang was interviewed by police. http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160426/48583049_0.shtml

39 Xi’an is a soulless city without its Muslim block. https://www.meipian.cn/9wmnn5z.

40 Dungan People Come Back to Their Home [Video file]. (2014, June 12). https://www.iqiyi.com/w_19rtghlexx.html
**Figure 5:** The Dungan People are knocking on the gate of Xi’an

In case of a specific term, the pig, we may also find out how the Cultural-Historical policy privileges the minority. The Chinese Zodiac is a tradition of China, which is a classification scheme that assigns an animal and its reputed attributes to each year in a repeating 12-year cycle. For example 2019, 2007 and 1995 are years of the pig. Another tradition of modern China is the China Central Television’s Spring Festival Gala, which will be watched by a thousand millions Chinese families through TV or the Internet. In the pig year 1995, Ye Xiaowen, the director of State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), attended the rehearsal of the annual gala the day before the performance, according to his own description, he called off the rehearsal from the very beginning because he saw a huge lamp with Chinese character “pig” above the hall, and some one hundred children danced with lamps of pig decoration. He told the gala director to “Remove all pig thing now because the Muslims dislike pig”, the gala director argued for the incoming deadline but finally obeyed, (Ye, 2007: 250) therefore the pig was fully absent from the 1995’s Gala. The same thing happened in 2007, after the Gala the director responded the question of the absence of pig --- because Muslim minorities dislike the pig41, and once again in 2019, only few pig themes were mentioned42.

### 2.3.2.6 Impact of preferential policies

There’re too many preferential policies that their total impact is almost unmeasurable. But two impacts are much more outstanding: The fortification of the ethnic boundary and the Reverse Discrimination.

A corresponding sovereign political entity is not always prerequisite for the existence and development of a nation, but clearly, for the most of minorities in China, their national self-awareness and national identification are mainly awaked, boosted and fortified by the Chinese central government, including the Uyghur people. Even a huge political-economic change happened, the Chinese government insists on the clarification between different ethnic groups, for example, there’s an ethnic identification on every Chinese citizen’s ID card, which is very uncommon. The other examples of ethnic identification on ID card are Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda before the genocide. Although in these cases the ethnic identification was used to discriminate and exclude the minorities, it did prevent the minorities from being assimilated by the main ethnic group with a huge population, especially for those minorities whose national identification are the result of the political operation and very unstable. When two persons with the same background are treated differently just because one holds a minority ID, a natural feeling of “we’re different” emerge, and when this situation happens to the nationwide, people will consider the meaning of their ethnic identification as a real boundary.

For minority groups in China, preferential policies can be considered as a positive factor in their ethnic identification process, but the Chinese Han is under a total Reverse Discrimination. As Dr. De Fraja already argued, reverse discrimination is inequitable, as white individuals are discriminated against even though they bear no personal faults for the past suffering of individuals from another ethnic group. (De Fraja, 2005: 1009-1010) In the case of China, the Chinese Han people are discriminated, or a good part of their rightful individual/collective interest has been transferred to the minority, or they are excluded out of fair competition in many areas. No wonder there is a famous complaint says “Foreigners come first while cadres come second, minority come third and Han always lowest”43. Without considering the previous sentence, Chinese Han people clearly acknowledge that their interests come after the satisfaction of the minorities. A direct result of this trend of reverse discrimination is the change of ethnic identification, although requires some complex paperwork and historical claim, but it’s possible for a Chinese Han to change his official ethnic registration, according to Dr. Han’s investigation, by converting to Islam or digging some historical connections, many Chinese Han has already successfully changed their official ethnic registration, even some local governments tried a whole ethnic change of their residents, so to ask for extra ethnic subsidy from the central government. (Han, 2012: 137-139) And these new converts, although their “common psychological make-up” is still of Chinese Han for in the short term, preferential policies will lead to a true convert in the long term. That’s to say, under the preferential policies, the Chinese Han ethnic group is not assimilating the minority, but the other way around.

But maybe we could say that the Chinese minority policy is a dangerous one because it’s pushing the majority population of China to full-objection against any minority, which implies a potential risk of the ethical hatred.

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41 Sina Interview with Spring Festival Gala’s Director. [http://ent.sina.com.cn/v/m/2007-02-18/ba1455345.shtml](http://ent.sina.com.cn/v/m/2007-02-18/ba1455345.shtml)

42 [https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-47143578](https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-47143578)

43 In Chinese: 一等洋人二等官，三等少民四等汉
2.3.3 Result of 3rd Hypothesis

After a systematical and detailed review of PRC’s minority policy, especial its application of recent decades, now we acquire a clear understanding of the situation of minorities in China:

1. Both the Chinese government and scholars don’t distinguish the difference between the ethnic group and the nation and are misusing them. But according to the practical application, clearly, the so-called 56 “nations” are de facto ethnic groups, although some unique characteristics of nationality can be founded among them.

2. The Chinese government plays a nuclear role during the self-awareness and identification of China’s minorities, and it’s still trying to fortify the boundary between different ethnic groups, especially between the Chinese Han and other minorities.

3. Chinese government applies numerous preferential policies to privilege its minorities, while the Chinese Han are discriminated, so the Chinese Han are assimilating by the minorities. But these preferential policies also could result in a controversy or even ethnical hatred.

3 CONCLUSIONS

Since the beginning of the proto-nationalism of Chinese Han, they have been a member of all the people who live in the Xinjiang region. The official governance of China in Xinjiang, although isn’t a process that lasts 2000 years like other parts of China, and is intermittent, but just like the reconquest movement in Iberia sharped and contributed to the modern Spanish nation, the loss and reconquest in Xinjiang do create a nationalistic-homeland connection for Chinese, especially the reconquest during Qing dynasty. Therefore, the first hypothesis is confirmed.

With regard to the second hypothesis, compared with the Chinese government, Uyghur’s secessionism movement based on the nationalism is highly questionable, even more, questionable when combined with the Islam flag. Their name is acquired from an ancient tribe which no direct inheritance can be confirmed; their expansion in Xinjiang was neither peaceful nor voluntary; and the name of their dreaming independent government, East Turkestan, was a geographical term invented by the Russian scholars to replace the term Chinese Turkestan after the 20th century. (Stein & Stein, 1907) So we can refute the hypothesis that Uyghur-East Turkestan is a nation-state, that both theoretically the demand of independence of East-Turkestan from China is weaker than a castle on the sand, not to mention its practical feasibility.

On the issue of the risk of existence, or human rights of Uyghur people. Our investigation confirmed the third hypothesis, that the Chinese government is privileging its minorities rather than assimilate them. Of course, the Chinese government does have many imperfections or bad records on its domestic human right, but no evidence shows it’s intentionally discriminating its minority groups. However, the reverse discrimination of Chinese Han people may cause and escalate a potential ethnical hatred movement, which endangering all ethnic groups in China, including Han and Uyghur.

For the western world, if the situation of Uyghur people is really under its concern, rather than encourage the Uyghur independent movement and escalate the conflict between the Chinese nationalism and Uyghur “nationalism”, it should find a true path to solve the problem, for example, cooperation with China on anti-terrorism issues. China is under huge changing, so does Xinjiang and Uyghur, work together a bright future is possible for every side.

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