Securitization of memory, in its broad sense, considers the understanding of collective memory as one of the components of national security. Taking into account the obvious connection between collective memory and identity, some political actors believe that taking protective measures that would prevent “their” historical narrative from internal and external threats is rational. Rapid politicizing and mediatization of history, along with memory utilization for discursive justification of some political decisions, including those of an international nature from a comprehensive perspective create immediate preconditions for securitization. On the other side, securitization itself, as one of the most radical traits of historical politics, expands instrumentalist utilizing of historic memory.

The connection between security and historical memory mediated by identity from one side and politics from the other side is a recently determined theoretical problem. The given article aims to determine a certain theoretical framework for studying a particular case of securitization. Constructivist perception of security that has been systematically documented in the research of representatives of the Copenhagen school was taken as a theoretical and methodological background. The Copenhagen school considers security as a socially constructed phenomenon and defines identity protection to be one of the primary goals. Following the aforementioned approach, this paper presents a correlation between memory and security from two perspectives. Foremost, collective memory as well as security is socially determined and presents a definite construct. In the second instance, collective memory is the essence of various forms of identity including a national one.

In accordance with the securitization triangle model, described by V. Apryshchenko, security content is created by collective memories (Apryshchenko, 2018: 29). Memory, therefore, arises from the social nature and political processes that run in society. The model, in which the security level is measured by official indices and

1 The memory triangle model includes three components – security (S), identity (I) and memory (M) that form the space within the context of which society builds up the meanings of security. Collective memory is simultaneously an element of identity creation and is used in the process of determining the degree of danger of a particular phenomenon.
individual emotions and associated with various forms of identity and mechanism of memory formation, was taken into consideration in order to originate an algorithm for studying the particular pattern of securitization.

The Latvian case has been selected to define a theoretical framework of the memory securitization model. In prospects, it can be applied/extrapolated to researching particular juridical and political mechanisms of memory securitization in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Our choice is based on the fact that Latvian politics combines some typical and unique traits of memory securitization. In one respect, the goals and conditions of post-communist transit, in general, complied with Roger Brubaker’s model of nationalizing state, which was typical for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Brubaker, 1996: 104). The model suggested that the titular nation would securitize an official national historical narrative primarily documenting its anti-communist focusing.

On the contrary, Latvian ethnic bi-community, which is more vivid than in other states of the Baltic region, is resulting from the presence of a considerable number of Russian speaking population that has its own identity and collective memory. The bi-community, in return, has built an alternative narrative securitized with the help of unofficial memory agents – a sort of “counter-memory.” It should be noted that the Russian speaking community perceives the protection of “counter-memory” as a measure for their ontological security. Last, enabling historical politics of the Russian Federation with its single-source approach to the history of the region and neighboring Baltic states enhances a controversy of two narratives and boosts securitization spiral for both of them.

Mindful that a number of studies devoted to the problem of memory securitization contain clearly defined estimation of its destructiveness from the point of view of political discourse and sustainability of Foreign relations (Mälksoo, 2015: 225), we aim at making theoretical mechanisms of securitization clear.

The paper consists of three parts. The first part considers theoretical frameworks of security and securitization based on the approaches of the Copenhagen security school. The special focus is on the social security sector where identity and historical memory, as its constituting part, are the major reference agents of securitization. Besides, the article provides grounds for the theoretical link between security and memory as sense bearing phenomena created by society.

The second part inquiries into theoretical approaches to understanding collective memory that explain its formation and functioning. We extrapolate concepts of memory social frameworks developed by Maurice Halbwachs and four memory formats developed by Aleida Assmann to the security-related concerns and reveal the potential and capability of collective memory securitization.

The third part focuses on the politics of memory or historical politics, as a system of political decisions on establishing a certain vision by the society of its past. We make the case that memory securitization is the most radical manifestation of the politics of memory. It is stated that the Brubaker’s model of “nationalizing state,” the concept of “memory regime” by Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik, and the model of security triangle by Victor Apryshchenko are applicable for the Latvian case study.
SECURITY AND SECURITIZATION

The concept of securitization gained a foothold within the framework of the Critical Security Studies, in which the Copenhagen School was a key player, having created a strong alternative to the “classical” realistic security theories in the context of postmodernism. The Copenhagen school has proposed a radical approach to the security research, which implies refocusing from the military-strategic security of the state to the security of an individual as a member of a social community that exists in a certain cultural and ideological entity (Tambovtseva, 2017: 185).

Nevertheless, it was not referred to eliminating the national security from being a subject of the research but was supplemented with one more aspect – an ability to ensure the identity of the society and the state, which has become relevant in the context of globalization (Buzan, 1991: 18; Ozolina, 2010: 18).

Such a broad interpretation of security made it possible for the representatives of the Copenhagen School to identify several security sectors: economic, social, political, military, and environmental. The interconnection of the sectors is obvious, however, the values and identity issues, including historical memory, are spread throughout the social and political life.

The aforementioned issues were set as the main field for our research. Social security has been determined by Representatives of the Copenhagen School as sustainability, acceptable conditions for the evolution, traditional language models, culture, religious and ethnic singularity, and customs (Waever, 1993). Emphasizing the aforementioned it should be noted that this approach is the core in their study of social security. The scientists stressed that social security in Europe, above all, is the security of the nation, ethnic groups, ethnic minorities, and regions. (Buzan, 1997: 132). Thus, security refers not only to national but to the group identity survival.

Concerning the Latvian case, the focus to be drawn towards group identity in the context of ethnic bi-community of the country, as it has been determined as the widest field of study. In this regard, the Latvian researcher Z. Ozolina applies the concept of three types of social security dilemmas on ethnic communities, identified by Paul Roe as an acute, persistent and weak social dilemma (Roe, 2005: 72).

By extrapolating this formula to the relationship between the Latvian state and ethnic Latvians with the Russian-speaking community, Z. Ozolina recognizes all three security dilemmas (Ozolina, 2016: 26). After independence was declared in the early 1990s, when Latvians were seeking their renewed identity, based on European values, representatives of the Russian community perceived their attempts as a threat to their identity.

Therefore, a regular social security dilemma has become dominant. After Latvia joined the EU and NATO, the Latvian community took it as the irreversibility of the state sovereignty and nation sustainability, whereas a reaction of the Russian-speaking community was mixed. It was defined as a threat to the people, the national identity of which is connected to Russia. As a consequence, the severe dilemma of public security always existed and remains prevailing (Ozolina, 2016: 27).

We would presume to amend the above extrapolation in the context of the historical memory of two communities. The search for a Latvian new identity implied its adapta-
tion to the European values, but the development of the national historical narrative, which on the one part, drew a line of continuity from interbellum statehood to its restoration in 1990’s; and on the other part, explicitly appraised the Soviet period as an occupation that interrupted the natural course of national history (Zelče, 2009: 52). It was contrary to the perception of history in the spirit of the Soviet narrative immanent in the Russian-speaking community. It seems that it was the trigger, and not just the Europeanization of Latvia, that made the Russian-speaking population feel threatened and to reject changes. We highlight that aggression is a historical policy of the Russian Federation that has become very active recently; its main tool is propaganda about the “fascistization” of Latvia and its inability to state-building not only deconstruct the national narrative in the Russian-speaking community but also pose a direct threat to national security. That is, the weak security dilemma, as a threat manipulation, leads to a severe dilemma and give place to protective measures.

Since the severe security dilemma is closely connected to the multi-directional perception, we recognize not just a permanent actualization of issues related to the national identity in the aspects of domestic and foreign policy, but to a certain extent its subjective dimension. It is advisable to apply the approach of the Copenhagen School, associated with constructivist and subjectivist nature of security to interpret it (Ozolina, 2010: 35). According to it, security is thought as of being an intellectual construct that is sold the line the general public.

In this setting, subjective threats can not only be posited by politicians but also be sprouted by public opinion and flow in it. Formation of the public opinion depends on many factors among which the influence of another state plays an essential part. Thus, Russian propaganda, permanently maintaining the risks for Russian identity in Latvia, sustains a certain level of threat to the social security of the Russian community. It is yet more proof that confirms the thesis of the relativity of security subjectivity. Intersubjectivity means that since people live in groups, their decisions about whether something is a security issue or not are their individual conclusions (Buzan, 1997: 31; Rostoks, 2010: 64). On the other hand, the subjective nature of security postulated by the Copenhagen school should not sidetrack us from the recognition of a threats objectivity and reality. This is particularly well illustrated by the example of an eternal factor of social security – when another country can turn one group of society against another. The annexation of Crimea and the hybrid war against Ukraine with a “hot spot” component in the Donbas, the aggressive information war, and the policy of compatriots in Latvia provide sufficient grounds to confirm the fact of creating a rivalry between social groups (Ozolina, 2016: 19).

Thus, awareness of the threat by the reference security object (in the present case it is historical memory) determines its securitization. On the one hand, securitization is an analytical underpinning that has been developed as a part of security study; on the other hand, it is a set of practical measures taken for mitigating existential threats, which jeopardize valuable fiducial objects, particularly identity (Rostoks, 2010: 70).

According to the Copenhagen School, at the very core of securitization is a “speech act” that is a declaration that some reference security object (in terms of the social sector – memory, identity, language) is under specific threat (Buzan, 1998: 24). It is the first phase of securitization. When the reference object and the threat to it are set in
a speech act, it is necessary to convince the public of the existence of the threat, and then take appropriate political or legal decisions.

E. Gaufman suggests the following structure of securitization, specifying its structure and phases: 1) government (or another object of securitization with positional power) lays down an existential narrative threat; 2) media verify it (or not), and the public accepts it (or not) through rethinking and action; 3) government takes necessary measures – “political actions,” aimed at combating the threat; 4) taken measures legitimize the narrative threat as such and launch the next round of securitization (Gaufman, 2017: 16).

The crucial components in the structure of securitization are the subject(s) of securitization, reference object, a created threat, and the public that accepts the threat as such (Gaufman, 2017: 15).

The key step in the process of securitization is the persuasion of the public. The general public must recognize the threat to the very essence of its being, that is, its ontological security: “…confidence that most of the people have within the continuality of their self-identification and in the permanence of the social and physical environment that surrounds them” (Giddens, 1990: 92). Ontological security, as an entity in this sense, correlates with the expanded approach of the Copenhagen school. On the one hand, a sense of threat arises in society when a part of it begins to feel ontological anxiety in connection with the loss or change of some values, guidelines, and well-established social status, which is especially a case for the transitional periods; in Latvian case, it was during the post-communist period. On the other hand, J. Mitzen, transferring Giddens’ reasoning to the level of large social groups and states, claims that they also participate in the ontological search for a security, the main core of which is self-identification and awareness of one’s place in the past (Mitzen, 2006: 342).

Mälksoo complements this idea by highlighting the two-level security of the state: security as survival (protection of the “body” of the state i.e. territory, people, sovereign institutions) and security as an essence (protection of the idea – a biographical self-description of the state, including its historical memory) (Mälksoo, 2015: 224).

The general public accepts securitization if it feels threatened to their ontological security and, above all, their identity. Thus, the protection of the anti-Soviet narrative was associated with a sense of ontological security in Latvia, and the current geopolitical reality enforces the feeling of being threatened (Kapräns, 2016: 75).

Security as essence implies awareness in the process of self-identification of the division into “one’s own” – safe, and “alien’s” – the other – dangerous. “Alien’s” plays a key role in awareness of the threat. That is why the “friend or foe” dichotomy, which is at the root of the process of determining identity, is the conceptual basis of securitization and involves contrasting one individual with another (alien) and the possible withdrawal of the alien beyond the legal boundaries. Gaufman emphasizes that under the process of identifying “alien” as a threat, its image is transformed into the spectre of an enemy, which is personified, discursively formed, and visually presented. Collective memory has a leading part in this process as it contains images, stereotypes, and narratives of historical enemies (Gaufman, 2017). Thus, an abstract threat is easier to create if it is attached to a person or group of people (personification) and if it threatens your very survival (existential nature).
In addition, the threat must resonate with previous threat constructs (collective memory) and be conveyed at the government level in order to be successful (Gaufman, 2017).

For Apryshchenko, the constructivist building up the meanings for security and collective memory, this is the main precondition for their interconnection and inter influence (Apryshchenko, 2018: 29). At the same time, the discourses of memory, and not the relevance of political and social life, are the basis for securitization by national governments and international organizations in terms of the binary logic “I versus alien” (Strukov, 2018: 15). In point of fact, Soviet deportations and repressions form the basis of the Latvian collective memory, which determines the initial framing of such security meanings in which the main threat comes from Russia. However, let us disagree that the binary logic “I versus alien” securitization is based solely on memory discourses, and not on actual reality. Memory discourses would hardly have been a success for securitization on their own if they had not been correlated to some extent with current threats. Thus, the assignment of historical memory to the subject area of national security in Latvia was a reaction to Russia’s actions in disavowing the historical narrative of Latvia. On the other hand, a number of aspects of this narrative are a sharp contraversion to the Russian official narrative and are perceived as a threat to the collective memory of the Russian community.

Obviously, due to varying degrees of political capacity, the state is the main actor in securitization. However, if we expand our understanding of securitization and move it beyond the scope of legal decisions, then in this sense, securitization actors can be in a wide range of social and political framework, including opposition forces, which propose their own alternative version of both a reference security object and threats to it. In our case, they are counter-memory agents in Latvia that actualize the Russian narrative of historical memory, declaring its extrusion a threat to their existential security. V. Strukov and V. Apryshchenko, understanding the securitization itself as a social, economic, and cultural practice, also consider agents who promote and transform the concept of security. Among them are journalists, representatives of the clerisy and the public, who can work both in cooperation with the state and independently (Strukov, 2018: 7). Therefore, looking into securitization memory, it is important to keep in mind the diversity of agents and their status which is not always formally institutionalized.

From this perspective, the factor of state identity and community within the state is one of the key factors in postmodern security theories and the most important reference object for securitization. In turn, one of the key pillars of identity is historical memory, which thus also appears as an independent object of securitization.

MEMORY

References to Maurice Halbwachs’ “Memory social frameworks” have become a sort of ritual in all works regarding memory studies. We also cannot avoid referring to it as the conceptual foundation laid by French sociologist not only helps to understand a mechanism of formation and functioning of collective memory but to detect the connection between memory and security from constructivist point of view.
The following three main theses of Maurice Halbwachs have the most impotence: 1) Individual memory is socially built; 2) Collective memory is mediated by groups (families and social class); 3) Existence of “large” collective memory on societies and civilizations level.

The first thesis bears a meaning of mediating any individual memory by social framework i.e. values, up to date goals, perceptions, identity of a social group to which an individual belongs. (Hallbwachs, 1992). It forms social essence of memory and makes it possible to trace it through socially built group memories.

Under the second thesis, to define memory of a group, M. Hallbwachs uses term “collective memory”, which is his second postulate. Collective memory is not a compilation of different individual memories, but is a collective perception, a symbolic system, that structures memories of each group members and consists of memories endorsed by group members. The mutual memories serve as reference points for organizing individual memories of each group member (Hallbwachs, 1992). However, the mutual memories have selective and developed nature; within the general memories a group attempts to reflect the way it understands its place in the past as well as those characteristics which group considers to be of importance for defining its selfhood. That is, collective memory is not a plain copy of the past; the group chooses those images of its past which better meets the requirements of the present selfhood. Thus, memory projects the future and is directly related to the needs and challenges of the present. Katrin Hodgkin and Susan Radstone (2003) state: “Our perception of the past has strategic, political and ethical implications. Competition over the meaning of the past is also a contest regarding the meaning of the present and ways in which the past is promoted” (Hodgkin, 2003; Verovsek, 2016: 531).

The third thesis, containing idea of memory availability within big social communities, brings to a concept of memory instrumentalization aimed to build nation and enhance national and state identity. Classics of the constructivist approach give proof of the aforementioned concept; in particular, B. Anderson and his concept of the nation as an imaginary community; E. Hobsbawm with his “invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm, 1992), the ethnosymbolist E. Smith, who placed crucial importance on history (Smith, 1996: 383), stating that identification with the past is a vital element in creating a nation, because only “remembering the past a collective identity can arise. Pierre Nora, one of the founders of the memory studies, used the French nation as a pattern to show a formation of collective memory and identity by means of so-called “places of memory” (Nora, 1996). Separating memory and history P. Nora noted that memory is emotional in contrast to historical and academic analysis; it contains fears, fantasies and tends to create and maintain myths. This contributes to both the awareness of the existential threat and measures to its neutralizing, that is, securitization. Thus, the constructivist understanding of collective memory, its special role in the formation of national identity theoretically brings the concept of memory closer to the concept of “security” and makes their convergence possible.

To understand the securitization of memory as a bilateral process, associated not only with state measures, but also with public approval, acceptance and mutual influence, we turn to the concept of Aleida Assmann, which identifies four memory formats: individual, social, political and cultural (Assmann, 2014: 19). Individual memory “is
a dynamic means of working out individual experience,” but also has a social basis and functions within interpersonal communication. According to the author, the boundary between the individual and the collective is permeable, therefore social memory is dynamic and mobile. It is generated “from below” in the social environment during specific time frames, resulting in numerous approvals, discussions and disputes (Assmann, 2014: 29).

Social memory is first of all a memory of generation, namely the memory of three or four generations being in communicative interaction to each other. The dynamics of the memory of society is essentially determined by the change of generations. Successive generations, which occur over a period of approximately thirty years, noticeable change the profile of societal memories. Positions that previously dominated or were considered representative gradually move from the center to the periphery. Social memory is characterized by a limited time horizon. Social and individual memories are poorly structured. These types of memory, as a rule, fit into the life span of three generations, and fade away with their change and increase in the “statute of limitations” of their original forms. Individual and social memories can be designated as ascending memories that are transmitted between groups or individuals (Assmann, 2006: 212).

Opposite to them are cultural and political memories. Political memory is tapped into collectivity, tends to univocal interpretations and pragmatic use of the past by the state and political elites: “political or national memory turns out to be a long-term and much more unified construction, which is fixed by political institutions, influencing society “from above” (Assmann, 2014: 35). It is duplicated through rituals, national holidays, memorials and monuments, and also finds itself in grand narratives. In its turn, cultural memory is subdivided into functional and cumulative. If the first one provides repeatability, i.e. is realized through traditions, rituals, etc. (and, accordingly, it is limited by what is “in the field of attention,” i.e. what is relevant at the moment), then accumulative memory, the carriers of which are not symbolic practices, but material representations (books, paintings, archives, etc.), is capable of preserving the irrelevant and is a resource for “another memory,” “restored memory” and for critical verification of the remembered. Cultural memory is also determined by the individual from the outside, in this sense it is opposed to social memory, moreover, it can contract it. Cultural memory is part of the cultural identity of large groups and acts in relation to the individual as a form of identity. Political and cultural memories are defined as descending memories that are created and transmitted by cultural and political “elites.”

Obviously, co-optation of ascending and descending memories bring success to securitization. And vice versa: the gap between the ascending and descending memories can lead both to problems of securitization on the part of state, and to success of alternative memory of the opposition group. In view of this, one of the tasks of memory securitization is to neutralize a communicative memory in the case of its counter-orientation, to create conditions for its fading away for potential carries of succeeding generations. In this regard, securitization of memory is a tool that helps established memory communities (according to Elias Scotson’s typology) to neutralize communities of marginal memory. Established memory communities are supported by state authorities in the form of a national narrative (public holidays, national ceremonies) or official financing and recognition; they are built into memory mode. Communities of
marginal memory, by contrast, experience lack of support and recognition or may even be prohibited by state policy (Onken, 2010: 279).

Taking Latvia as example, we can see how established and marginal communities of memory changed places. If in Soviet times, the narrative of Soviet occupation and two totalitarianisms was marginalized and subjected to persecution and official obstruction, after Latvia gained independence the aforementioned narrative has established official community of memory, displacing the previously dominant Soviet marginal narrative.

Identity transformation requires memory reconfiguration. These transformations can occur intentionally or spontaneously in response to a particular challenge or threat, and it is another field that is based on memory and securitization (Strukov, 2018: 12).

Thus, May 9 – Victory Day until a certain time was not central to memory in commemorative practices of the Russian community of Latvia, but under the influence of internal (a search for a new identity due to the loss of the dominant position of its language and culture in Latvian society) and external factors (active historical policy of Russia) May 9 and the commemorations associated with it became fundamental both in the narrative of the Russian community and in demonstration of its identity (Zelče, 2018: 417).

POLITICS OF MEMORY

The definition of “politics of memory” is diverse in terms of the studied semantic field: “politics of memory,” “historical politics,” politics of recollection,” “symbolic politics,” etc. We propose such an interpretation of the politics of memory, which includes all practices related to the building up of collective/historical memory from formalizing historical narrative to memorial laws.

The comprehension of the function of politics of memory is various in different studies. One approach researches the actions of power elites and their opponents in constructing the meaning of the past and its wider dissemination or its imposing on other members of society. Another one studies a communicative dialogical approach that focuses on disputed interpretations of the past by officials of the state, and how these ideas are produced, influence, attract and conflict with other narratives that are present in society as a whole (Věrovšek, 2016: 542).

The attitude towards the politics of memory is just as skeptical in the academic environment as it is pragmatically demanded in the framework of political practices. Thus, A. Confino states that memory, if used politically, becomes a “prisoner of political reductionism and functionalism” and comes close to ideology (Confino, 1997: 1395). Malkoo strongly insists on the need to turn to an agonistic policy of memory in order to create a mutually respectful dialogue, which does not have to lead to consent and reconciliation about the past, but nevertheless to an understanding of the opponent, and not the antagonistic confrontation (Malksoo, 2015). However, according to A. Miller, the agonistic approach to the politics of memory is rather postulated for granted than is analyzed as an objective, or at least widespread phenomenon (Politika pamyati..., 2018: 174). M. Mälksoo herself, while intensely promoting the agonist vi-
sion of history, recognizes, firstly, that successful approval of the history of the state’s origin is unlikely to occur without using the power over what to remember and how. Secondly, the rapid adoption of the model of agonistic mnemonic politics in Eastern Europe remains rather far-fetched against the background of a significant imbalance of power between Russia and its former Soviet republics and state-approved mnemonic politics that determines the identity of the state in zero-sum game (Mälksoo, 2015: 229).

We assert that in characterizing politics of memory and securitization, the aspect view should be switched from the evaluative component to one that clarifies and comprehends the whole complex of factors being responsible for a certain formation of collective memory. In the case of Latvia, on the one hand, the concept of “memory regime” of Kubik and Bernhard will help us and on the other, the concept of a “nationalizing state” by Brubaker (Bernhard, 2013; Brubaker, 1996). M. Bernhard and J. Kubik define the memory regime or “mnemonic regime” as the dominant pattern of memorial politics that currently exists in a given society in relation to a specific, very significant past event or process. Memory regimes, in turn, make up the building blocks for the official field of (collective or historical) memory (Berhnard, 2013: 8).

The main criterion for determining the memory regimes is the type of “mnemonic actors” and the interaction between them. Mnemonic actors are political forces that are interested in a specific interpretation of the past. According to Bernhard (y) and J. Kubik (y), their diversity comes down to three types: a) mnemonic warriors, b) mnemonic pluralists, c) mnemonic abnegators, and perspectivists (Bernhard, 2013: 13). Mnemonic warriors are prone to a single, unidirectional mythological vision of the past, while mnemonic pluralists insist on a different vision of history. Mnemonic abnegators shy away from the politics of memory as such, while mnemonic perspectivists suggest that they have solved the problems of history and therefore found the key to a better future (Bernhard, 2013: 14). The authors determine the type of memory regime as an actor constellation, which suggests that the presence of at least one mnemonic warrior in the field gets the regime broken (fractured). The regime in which no warriors are present and at least one actor is a pluralist is called a reference regime. The regime when none of the participants is a warrior or pluralist (that is, all are abnegators) is considered unified. The essence of the analysis is how to encode mnemonic actors in different contexts of the country in order to come to the point of feeling the prevailing memory regime.

Based on the aforementioned, the mnemonic regime of Latvia, and the Baltic countries as a whole, is defined by researchers as fractured. In addition, the existence of mnemonic warriors along with their active efforts is caused by a number of factors (researchers define them as structural and cultural limitations) and, first of all, by the nature of post-communist transit (and even more precisely – a way out of the old regime) as well as by the ethnic division of society (Bernhard, 2013: 165).

Obviously, the presence of mnemonic warriors creates all the conditions for the securitization of memory. Reference to R. Brubaker (y) takes us beyond the wide and diverse field of memorial studies, but nevertheless allows us to understand the mnemonic securitization of Latvia (and all countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States) as an element of the policy of a “nationalizing state.” “Nationalizing”
states adopt nationalisms, which include the demands made on behalf of the “titular”
nation, defined in ethnocultural terms and are in stark contrast to the set of require-
ments of citizens as a whole. In this context, the titular nation is interpreted as a legal
“possessor” of a state, which in turn, is considered as a state belonging to this nation.
Despite the possession of “one’s own” state, the titular nation is in weak cultural, eco-
nomic or demographic position within the given state due to discrimination of this na-
tion until it wins independence. That is what is used as an excuse for “indemnification”
or a kind of “compensating” project to use the state power in order to defend certain
(previously unsatisfied) interests of the titular nation (Brubaker, 1996).

The securitization of memory and, more broadly, identity also came under influ-
ence of cross-border nationalism of the “external national homeland” which approves
the rights and responsibilities of the “host” state to observe the conditions in which
“its” ethnonational “compatriots” are. It also is to make stand for their well-being,
support their activities and organizations, protect their interests. Thus, the nationalism
of the “national homeland” arises and dynamically interacts with the “nationalizing”
nationalism (Brubaker, 1996).

In the Latvian case, the nationalism of ethnic minorities is infused with the na-
tionalism of national homeland. The Nationalistic positions of minorities are usually
characterized by self-identity in national rather than in ethnic terms, as well as by re-
quirements for the state to recognize their special “ethno-nationality” and to establish
certain collective, cultural and political rights based on nationality.

Several intersecting influences of nationalism and securitization can be traced. At
first sight, it seems to be obvious that the position of the nationalizing state results in
securitization of the titular nation as a goal, as well as in securitization of memory
of the national minorities as a protest reaction. On the other hand, the nationalism of
“external national homeland,” rousing the minority nationalism, very often becomes
decisive factor in the securitization of titular nation that feels a threat to its security.

Concluding examining theoretical groundings that will be taken into account when
considering the Latvian case, we shall outline the specific content of the process of
memory securitization, that is, those measures which can be perceived as securitiza-
tion of historical memory and those that cannot. There is no clear position on this is-
issue. M. Mälksoo believes that memorial laws, especially those that criminalize some
single historical events and public attitude to them, make the securitization of memory
(Mälksoo, 2015). Miller states that the securitization is the perception of discussions
on history and collective identity through the prism of a threat to national security
(Miller, 2020). V. Apryshenko and V. Strukov consider securitization as a whole sys-
tem of mnemonic actions or multimodal declarations, including symbolic exchanges
and various types of iteration, such as art, cinema and others. Proceeding from this
theory, the authors put accent on non-verbal, discursive, multi-platform and transme-
dia manifestations of securitization such as artistic, cinematic and performative state-
ment (Strukov, 2018: 5).

However, the primary attention is paid to historical narrative. Mnemonic narra-
tives form the basis of securitization strategies, and conversely, securitization arises as
a system of narratives used by government officials, government representatives and
others. Conflicts, arising from contradictory narratives, pave the way for the further
steps to be taken in terms of securitization. (Strukov, 2018: 18). A narrative that gives a coherent picture of a chain of historical events is the major form in representing the past in both historiography and political discourse (Malinova, 2018: 37). According to the concept of the Polish historian J. Topolski, the linking of narrative wholes, which form horizontal projection of the narrative, happens at three levels: 1) Information, where information is mediated by a historian’s imagination; 2) rhetoric, where rhetoric is used as a mean of convincing the public in plausibility of the semantic scheme; 3) “politics” or “theoretical and ideological grounds” that include values world view of the authors of narrative (Topolskiy, 1999: 202; Malinova, 2018: 37).

Unlike professional historiography, “politics of memory” works with simplified narratives that reduce complex and contradictory historical processes to emotionally-colored patterns easier for perception. The narrative outlines the circle of “friends” and “aliens” contributing cultural and historical meaning to space and time, in that way securitizing the internal space of the community (Apryshchenko, 2016: 99–100).

CONCLUSIONS

Theoretical framework set within the study of the politics of memory securitization give opportunity to use the defined model for the Latvian case study. We perceive the securitization of memory as a diverse complex of measures aimed at establishing and setting a certain historical narrative, as well as convincing society of active loyalty to it. This complex of measures may contain some legislative decisions including those of prohibitive nature, and create a certain hegemony of narrative in public discourse, commemoration and historical education. The difference between the securitization of memory and politics of memory is that the first one has a more radical nature due to the ontological threat factor which determines this radicalism in more distinct contradictions of friend or foe. The same feature allows us to trace the securitization of marginal mnemonic groups, in which external actors play the role of mnemonic warriors.

Therefore, we suggest the following configuration of the Latvian case of memory securitization. We define the historical narrative as the main reference object, and memorial laws, institutions, commemoration and propaganda to be the instruments for its securitization.

The initial conditions for understanding the securitization of memory of Latvia as part of historical politics are: the post-communist transit, ethnocultural division of the society, and the external factor represented by Russia which promotes its historical narratives.

All three conditions enhanced and continue to reinforce the importance of identity as the main reference object of securitization. In the first case, it was a drastic demolition of official values, attitudes and narratives that were established in the Soviet era. This gave rise to a sense of uncertainty in society and pushed it to look for a new identity, which, in accordance with the nationalizing state, was considered within the ethnic categories. Ethnic division reinforced the ethnicization of identity that established controversies to the collective memory, while propaganda of the Russian of-
ficial historical memory provided grounds for strengthening national narrative and its further securitization.

Applying approaches to understanding memory as a resource for formulating security meanings, one can understand why the Latvian political elites, based on the past traumatic experience of the collective memory of the Soviet period (deportation, repression), have formed a downward political and cultural memory in the national narrative, in which Soviet occupation, two totalitarianisms and victimization were the concepts of main importance. On the one hand, the social frames of memory of the Ethnic Latvians included these meanings in collective memories at the level of individual and social memory, that is, memories with an upward orientation. On the other hand, they were reinforced by the aforementioned state policy of memory. In this case, anyone can see the cooptation of the ascending and descending memory, which is the key to the success of securitization.

For the Russian-speaking community, the security meanings of the Latvian state narrative remained alien, and under the influence of an active historical policy of Russia and the action of non-governmental opposition political actors, it rapidly securitized its narrative with an opposite understanding of key events in the history of the 20th century. This gave rise to the so-called social security dilemma, in which any action by the Latvian state on fixing national narrative is perceived at the internal level (the level of the Russian-speaking community) and especially at the external (level of the Russian Federation) as a threat to its historical memory and identity and causes a spiral of securitization. The securitization spiral is the mechanism that ensures the continued functioning of the separate memory regime in Latvia.

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**ABSTRACT**

The article suggests and argues a theoretical framework for studying a particular case of memory securitization. It is based on the constructivist perception of security that is systematically framed in the studies of representatives of the Copenhagen School, who consider security as a socially constructed phenomenon and define identity protection to be one of its primary goals.

Pursuant to this approach, the article presents a correlation between memory and security in at least three aspects. In the first instance, similar to security, collective memory is socially determined. In the second instance, collective memory lies at the core of various forms of identity, including national identity. In the third instance, collective memory is not only an object of protection but also a resource, which is used by securitization actors for threat identification, enemy image modeling as well as for defining the means of protection.

The Latvian case is applied for setting the theoretical framework of the memory securitization model. In future, it might be used to study specific juridical and political mechanisms of memory securitization in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The authors perceive the securitization of memory as a diverse complex of measures aimed at establishing and setting a certain historical narrative, as well as convincing society to be actively loyal to it. Accordingly, the policy of memory is defined as a mechanism for putting securitization in practice. The initial conditions for understanding this process in Latvia are the post-communist transition, ethnocultural divisions of the society, and the external factor represented by Russia, that promotes its historical narratives.

In one respect, R. Brubaker’s concept of the “nationalized” state is taken as a theoretical model of the politics of memory in Latvia. According to this concept, the official narrative of post-communist countries has been set as a nation-oriented one. On the other hand, the concept of the memory regime developed by M. Bernhard and J. Kubik is also considered. As per their theory, the memory regime in Latvia can be described as being divided into the official and alternative narrative of counter-memory, which is based on the Soviet legacy.

**Keywords**: security, securitization, identity, historical memory, politics of memory, Latvia, narrative, memory regime, security dilemma

**SEKURYTYZACJA PAMIĘCI: TEORETYCZNE RAMY BADANIA PRZYPADKU ŁOTEWSKIEGO**

**STRESZCZENIE**

Artykuł proponuje i uzasadnia teoretyczne ramy badania securytyzacji pamięci na konkretnym przypadku. Opiera się na konstruktywistycznym postrzeganiu bezpieczeństwa, syste-
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matycznie formułowanym w badaniach przedstawicieli Szkoły Kopenhaskiej, którzy traktują bezpieczeństwo jako zjawisko konstruowane społecznie, uznając ochronę tożsamości za jeden z głównych jego celów.

Zgodnie z tym podejściem artykuł przedstawia korelację między pamięcią a bezpieczeństwem w co najmniej trzech aspektach. W pierwszej kolejności, podobnie jak w przypadku bezpieczeństwa, pamięć zbiorowa jest zdeterminowana społecznie. Po drugie, pamięć zbiorowa leży u podstaw różnych form tożsamości, w tym tożsamości narodowej. Po trzecie, pamięć zbiorowa jest nie tylko przedmiotem ochrony, ale także zasobem, który jest wykorzystywany przez podmioty sekurytyzacyjne do identyfikacji zagrożeń, modelowania obrazu wroga, a także do definiowania środków ochrony.

Teoretyczne ramy modelu sekurytyzacji pamięci ustalono w oparciu o przypadek łotewski. W przyszłości może on posłużyć do badania konkretnych prawnych i politycznych mechanizmów sekurytyzacji pamięci w krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej.

 Autorzy postrzegają sekurytyzację pamięci jako zespół różnorodnych środków mających na celu ustanowienie i ustalenie pewnej narracji historycznej, a także przekonanie społeczeństwa do aktywnej lojalności wobec tej narracji. W związku z tym polityka pamięci jest definiowana jako mechanizm wprowadzania sekurytyzacji w praktyce. Warunki wstępne dla zrozumienia tego procesu na Łotwie obejmują transformację postkomunistyczną, podziały etniczno-kulturowe społeczeństwa oraz czynnik zewnętrzny, jakim jest promująca swoje narracje historyczne Rosja.

W jednym aspekcie teoretyczny model polityki pamięci na Łotwie odnosi się do koncepcji „unarodowionego” państwa R. Brubakera. Zgodnie z tą koncepcją oficjalna narracja krajów postkomunistycznych została określona jako narodowa. Z drugiej strony rozważono także koncepcję reżimu pamięci, opracowaną przez M. Bernharda i J. Kubika. Zgodnie z ich teorią reżim pamięci na Łotwie można opisać jako podzielony na oficjalną i alternatywną narrację kontrpamięci opartej na dziedzictwie sowieckim.

Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo, sekurytyzacja, tożsamość, pamięć historyczna, polityka pamięci, Łotwa, narracja, reżim pamięci, dylemat bezpieczeństwa