The Repercussions of the Global Crisis on the Middle East

Dr. Mohammad Salim Al-Rawashdeh

Abstract

The end of the Cold War formed a new stage in the history of international relations, characterized by rebuilding many of the concepts that had existed since the age of mankind and giving them priority in political speeches because of their direct connection to international phenomena. Among the vast amount of these concepts we find "the term crisis" Which is one of the most used terms in our time that can be described as the era of crises. Today's crises have touched all aspects of life and are present at all levels and levels, whether at the individual level, when the individual faces psychological and social crises in his daily life, or at the national level in the face of governments and institutions for political crises And economic, as well as at the international level, the emergence of what is known today as international crises of transnational extensions and is the subject of study in this research paper. As for the term international crisis, it was not used in international politics except in the nineteenth century, with the contributions of John Krieg Und Friended, which came to express the transition period between peace and war. In the sense that there is a crisis, there is no war and at the same time there is no peace. In this sense, it refers to the stage of no-war, no peace. The Middle East is not only defined by trade relations, diplomatic interaction, or regional organizations, more than any other region in the world, but also by its tough power and military capability. This has been the case in the region's recent history and will remain so for the foreseeable future. However, since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire a century ago, the Middle East has not witnessed convulsions, regional turmoil and internal conflict as it is witnessed today.

Keywords: Global crisis, Middle East, Political Interactions, Arab National Security

Introduction

The regional scene in the last quarter of the twentieth century seemed confused in the face of major challenges, and with the light of the successive events, a state of strategic exposure of some States' attitudes towards regional security emerged which has turned the region into an arena for many international crises. Despite what happened in the world of the variables, the majority of Arab countries remained captive to the state of bipolarity that ended with the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989, the only international variable after the Second World War. The Middle East is one of the hottest regions in the world. It is the fatty substance of the media in its daily bulletins, as well as a field for the study of international theories and a test of political interactions. Its territory even erupts further within its borders, making it the center of the international conflict and the ongoing conflict is dominated by the form of civil wars or what became known as the proxy war and sometimes with an enemy coming from behind the Middle East border and leaving after planting his agents. The Middle East is characterized by the looseness of its borders, and there are no fixed physical boundaries for it, and it widens and narrows according to the events taking place between the regions of the heart and the edges of the regions, and sometimes its borders become based on national sentiments. Throughout history, this area has been a conflict zone between itself and its neighbors in geography. Sometimes this bloc is stepping up and sometimes it is exposed to invasion...The control of the Middle East is a national endeavor for the great powers, as it enjoys a set of characteristics and advantages that make it the covetousness and attention of the world powers and some of these characteristics include: holy places, geography, resources, and population density. The Middle East is not only defined by trade relations, diplomatic interaction, or regional organizations, more than any other region in the world, but also by its tough power and military capability. This has been the case in the region's recent history and will remain so for the foreseeable future. However, since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire a century ago, the Middle East has not witnessed convulsions, regional turmoil and internal conflict as it is witnesses today.
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In the midst of this collapse in the regional system, the ongoing civil wars, particularly in Syria and Yemen, as well as in Libya, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, seem intractable. Regional conflicts of influence, such as competition between Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Israel, are widely seen as complicating factors. While these rivalries are indeed significant, broader dynamics have prolonged these conflicts. In particular, four factors have combined to escalate and perpetuate these conflicts. First, the regional balance of power began to be uncertain in the wake of the 2011 uprisings and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. The second factor is that local conflicts have become the scene of continued regional rivalries in the form of broader and more deadly conflicts. Third, the supply of arms to the region has grown sharply, in which the United States and its European allies are actively competing for making arms deals. Fourth, the Middle East suffers from a dearth of standards of war and conflict resolution mechanisms compared to other regions of the world. As a result, the region was transformed into a den of wasps from military interventions.

Here we would like to mention the events of September 2011, when the Middle East entered two circles: the first internal conflicts and the second external. The internal circle is known for its reasons and motives such as the deteriorating economic conditions in many Middle Eastern countries, including oil, security and political. Therefore, at the end of 2019 and the beginning of 2020, the world must consider new ways of conflict in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to prepare for a Middle East free from conflict and war, even at the expense of state great military companies and their profits.

Is there a new way of looking at the conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa?

The international community, the major powers and the United Nations have great responsibilities to understand the roots of the real problems that have generated conflicts in the Middle East, from the Israeli entity to the problems of borders and neutral zones between a number of states and the rights of minorities, nationalities and sovereignty on the ground in accordance with the laws of International and customs of the United Nations The first of these dilemmas is the Arab-Israeli conflict, which would not have been without the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916. Today, a hundred years after those promises, the problem still lies in front of us and we do not see a horizon for a solution. What is required is the application of an equation: a people without land for a land without a people. What is meant here is the transfer of Palestinians from their homeland.

The second dilemma lies in the Arab political dealings with the fateful and crucial issues, including the issue of Syria, terrorism in the Arab world and foreign interference in the affairs of its people to draw new borders and policies that serve only the project (CISCO PICO-2). Strangely enough, foreign states that claim their keenness for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace ultimately enforce de facto policy through the engines of regional conflict by drawing up escalatory paths that prevent peaceful coexistence among peoples and fuel the sectarian, regional, tribal, and factional flames. Of course, these countries cannot do anything or build on it unless it exists in the people of the region since there are sick souls living among us that can be exploited to achieve these goals. It is important to be aware of those schemes that are drawn.

The world cannot live safely as long as the cradle of the celestial religions does not enjoy them because the curse of those wars and conflicts will move to their homes if they continue. A new methodology is needed to address these conflicts and wars in 2019 because fragmented solutions are useless given the files of interdependence and conflicts. It is the region of the Middle East that is the puzzle itself...For example, the problem of Iraq cannot be solved without solving the problem of Syria, without solving the problem of Yemen, without solving the problem of Libya and without solving other problems in other parts of the Arab world, because none of its people who live in these countries can enjoy security and safety as long as his brother is under bombing and violence. The time has come for the international community to realize that the solution is not more wars, but a comprehensive dialogue that is not imposed on the outside parties and is not politicized according to sectarian agendas to sell more rusty weapons in their warehouses that are killing the people of the region and destroying their infrastructure. Regarding the nature of the struggle for the Greater Middle East, the overall picture is bleak on the southern side of NATO. There is a general failure of governance where the Eastern Mediterranean and its adjacent areas remains unsteady and highly unstable region. The security environment continues to reflect the concept of Hobbesian, which means selfishness of the individual, the international community and Government. This selfishness has been the cause of civil conflict throughout history, allowing the emergence of fragile, unstable or even failed states with the possibility of a realistic border change in different parts of the Middle East amid sectarian tensions, jihadist terrorism, social inequality in income distribution and the inability of regional states to adopt a democratic system.
It allows the proliferation of internal conflicts and allows external players to accumulate weapons in the region in preparation for the mad ambitions that lead to regional and international conflicts in line with the ambitions of each country and the obsession of some of its leaders. One such ambition is to compete for energy resources in the absence of a regional security structure, which could cause a gusty storm that strikes the greater Mediterranean region, which extends from Afghanistan in the east to Morocco and Mauritania in the west. There are scenarios for the future of the Middle East that could lead to a gradual evolution towards a multi-polar security system. As a result, the West and NATO may have to adapt to a new reality where their influence in this region will be relatively low, and that will reflect the global balance of power. Of course, China is implementing a multifaceted policy with resource-rich countries in Africa and the Gulf region, and is undoubtedly an emerging player in both the Eastern Mediterranean and southern Europe. What China is doing through initiatives and projects such as the Silk Road Belt, which to date includes 16 countries as well as China; means that Beijing is seeking to acquire ports and other strategic infrastructure throughout the Mediterranean region. It also tries to increase its economic size. Here we see its political footprint in areas it seeks to control economically, politically and militarily. The new US tariff on China is a security protection tax provided by the United States to China to obtain resources from countries that contribute to the development of Chinese industries.

At present, China, from its regional involvement in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, is mainly seeking to invest in the economic sphere, believing that it will no longer accept that the United States monitor those supply lines. On the other hand, the reality will change when China decides that it alone wants to play the role of policeman in the region to protect its interests and not be vulnerable to international piracy from major countries. At the same time, Russia was also trying to regain some of its former influence in the region. Even if Russian influence compared to the US was limited, the scene allowed Moscow to become a major player in Syria and in the eastern Mediterranean in general. It also succeeded in projecting the image of the superpower using Syria's paper to negotiate with the West from the position of relative power and to exchange an agreement on Syria with a compromise in the Ukrainian crisis (in the hope that the West would accept the annexation of Crimea to Russia as a fait accompli).

NATO also fears that Russia may try to use its relationship with Turkey, or tensions between Greece and Turkey as tools to undermine NATO cohesion while Moscow does not allow tensions to exceed a certain level between Ankara and Athens. On the other hand, the EU has lost some of its regional influence and appears to lack a coherent and comprehensive policy and vision towards the southern and eastern Mediterranean basin. The United States, in turn, shifted its strategic weight to Asia and was trying to limit its military presence in the Mediterranean by delegating responsibility to EU countries to monitor Western Mediterranean countries and parts of Africa while giving roles to regional states in the Eastern Mediterranean. Although the current US foreign policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean lacks strategic focus and clarity, including US decisions to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital and, most importantly, withdrawing from the nuclear deal with Iran and imposing economic sanctions on Russia Wholesales and taxes on goods imported from China and other countries, this will pose a major security challenge not only to the big countries but to other players because the repercussions will be at the expense of the region. Thus, the Middle East, as a great strategic value in the international strategic relations, has been the scene of a fierce and violent conflict between the major oil monopolies, and the competitive conflict between the imperialist states contradicting their economic interests and their political strategy, especially between the US imperialism and the rest of the colonial Western European countries. The First World War brought about a major change in the political and regional map of all the countries of the Middle East. From this perspective, the overlap of the struggle for control of the Middle East has been closely linked to the oil conflicts that have been waged by the American, British and French oil monopolies to control oil resources. Economically, there are signs looming that the world is becoming more volatile politically and more economically fragile than in previous years, with these words describing the British Economist in its annual publication forecasts and economic changes that will occur globally in 2019 and 2020. It seems that this economic fragility may lead to a major economic crisis like the one that preceded it in 2008, and perhaps the most violent according to economists' expectations will certainly reflect on the region in general. Today, the global economy is facing severe accumulated challenges that may lead to this explosion, the most important of which are the global trade wars, the slowdown in the growth of the global economy, the fluctuations of oil prices, the inflation of the public debt globally, as well as the continued decline of global stock exchanges, and the decline in trade and manufacturing rates globally. Emerging severe pressure in global financial markets.
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But in light of these expectations, which may be harsh and we do not know where it will stop and where the location of the Arab countries from all this, and how the impact of this big crisis on the economies of these countries, which suffer most of the imbalance in the public budget and inflation in public debt, and if these States can avoid the crisis before it occurs.

The dimensions of competition between regional powers

The "Arab Spring" protests in the region gave Iran the opportunity to expand its influence in the region, which emerged in the speeches of the Iranian leader "Ali Khamenei" during the outbreak of Arab protests, who was urging the revolution against corrupt regimes, and encourage the establishment of Islamic regimes compatible with the Islamic Republic of Iran which is considered a reference according to him. Iran considered the "Arab Spring" revolutions as an extension of its Islamic revolution, but that Iranian belief is quite far-fetched, given the time difference between the two events on the one hand, as well as the difference between the Iranian Shiite doctrine and Sunni doctrine which is the core of the most of the Arab countries.

First, the Syrian crisis

Syria is located in one of the most important strategic areas in the world. It is the point of intersection of the Persian, Turkish and Arab worlds, which made it a fertile area for the aggravation of the Middle East crises between the various regional powers, and therefore the Syrian crisis has worsened rapidly and very complex, especially after the Iranian and Turkish involvement in Syria, as Iran is a major actor in the Syrian crisis. Iran is a key supporter of the Syrian regime, which is the survival of "Bashar al-Assad" in power on the one hand, and a strong ally of Russia in the Syrian crisis on the other hand, because Syria's geographical location is a fertile field for Iran in which Iran felt that Syria is a vital area for its influence in the region, as it fears the fall of the "Assad" regime and the division of Syria and the transformation of a federal system of government, or even bring a regime contrary to its ideas and policies in the region, which may hinder its extension, and extend its influence and arms to the main Iranian arm and control of all the Lebanese situation through Hezbollah, which means that the settlement of the conflict in Syria according to its interest will be achieved only through the survival of "Assad" in power.

This led to widening the gap between Tehran and Ankara, especially after the direct Russian and Iranian intervention in defending the Syrian regime, and also at a time when the opposition forces were supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and under the Turkey support and military coverage of the Islamic State. Turkey saw in ISIS a fundamentalist group with its weight in the crises of the region. Turkey saw that rapprochement and understanding with it can be achieved. Turkey can come into agreement with it on the Syrian north, which is crowded with the Kurds, the anti-Turkish regime, and thus the Russian and Iranian intervention supported by Hezbollah (Lebanese) forces greatly influenced a qualitative shift in the balance of power, and impose the equation. The political crisis of the Syrian crisis in Geneva seen by Turkey and its Arab allies is unfairly against the Syrian opposition, these military and political transformations deem Turkey working against its ambitions in Syria, specifically in the Syrian north, this Sunni partnership between (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, ISIS) has faced a real challenge after Russian military intervention in the Syrian crisis in light of the success of Russian aviation, and then put a tragic end to the Turkish ambitions to impose a no-fly zone in northern Syria or imposed a buffer zone in northern Syria under Turkish influence, namely Aleppo province, which still controls the concerns and ambitions of the Turks in Syria. Turkish President Erdogan has always been talking about the Turkish heritage in the Syrian north in most of his conferences. The most important challenge that the Russian intervention in Syria poses to Turkey is related to a major Turkish goal focused on weakening the Syrian Kurds, and behind them the Kurds of Turkey and the opposition of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The Russian intervention in Syria represents a major gain for the Syrian Kurds allied with the Syrian regime, especially when Known as the “Kurdish Protection Units” that fought ISIS in the Arab Einof Kobani and remained a major challenge to ISIS in northern Syria, but all these challenges from the presence of international weight such as Russia and a regional such as Iran in their support of the Syrian regime in addition to the internal crisis situation through Acts’

“PKK” which is the anti-Turkish regime and the failed coup attempts against President Erdogan led to the failure of the Turkish side in the Syrian crisis, forcing it to reformulate its policy on Syria and restructure the maps of interests by changing the network of regional alliances, especially with Iran." Iran's territorial strength and Shiite doctrine, however, the interest requires to negotiate their presence in Syria, and the settlement of the Syrian situation on basic Russian conditions, and this was expressed by Ahmed Daoud Oglu, Prime Minister of Turkey before he announced his resignation in his press conference with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani (5/3/2016): That Turkey and Iran are geographically and historically sufficient to secure a strong cooperative relationship between the two
countries. "We may also have different views, but we cannot change our history and geography." During this period, Turkey sought to obtain Iranian support in its overall policy in Syria, in addition to seeking a Russian green light to begin its air and ground attack on Afrin in the north of Syria. Also, the head of Turkish intelligence, "Hakan Fidan" met with both the Russian Chief of Staff "Valery Gerasimov" and Russian Defense Minister "Sergei Shoigu" in the Russian capital, "Moscow" to discuss the Turkish military operation in the city of Afrin, Turkey also asked Russia to close air defense systems "$400 "published in the bases" Hmeimim "and" Latakia " Turkey's efforts have succeeded in obtaining Russian approval. On January 20, the Russian Defense Ministry announced the withdrawal of its troops from the Afrin area to the Tal Rifat area to prevent possible provocations and to rule out the threat to life. At the same time, Russia blamed the United States for the military operation launched by Turkey in Afrin because it was the result of US provocative steps aimed at isolating Kurdish-populated areas by establishing a "border security force" in neighboring areas to Turkey.

The implied Russian approval came immediately after the Syrian regime announced full control of the strategic military airport, which the regime and its allies have been seeking to control since the beginning of January, but failed more than once due to resistance of the Turkish-backed factions, which points to the possibility of making a deal between Turkey on the one hand and Russia and the regime on the other hand to relinquish the airport in exchange for allowing it to enter the city of Afrin, similar to the deal "Aleppo versus the Al Bab" in December 2016 when Turkey abandoned the Syrian opposition in the city of Aleppo, which was controlled by the Syrian regime and its allies in return To The Syrian opposition, backed by Turkey, took control of the city of al-Bab.

Perhaps one of the most important Turkish goals that forced it to launch this military operation on Afrin and before it the Operation Euphrates Shield in Syria is to reduce the separatist trends where Turkey aims through the military operation in Afrin to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state or an autonomous Kurdish region along the Turkish border in northern Syria, and the dismantling of troops in the boarders. The Turkish military operation comes in response to the US-led international coalition's plan to establish the Syrian Border Security Force in northern and eastern Syria with the aim of protecting the borders with Turkey and Iraq, in addition to strengthening nationalism. In the political use of the military operation in Afrin for Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party in the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for next year 2019, by winning more Turkish voters by provoking their nationalism. On the other hand, a dangerous regional power such as Israel and its interests in the region in general, and Syria in particular, cannot be overlooked. Israel in its rush to dominate and control the Middle East region can only be achieved through participation and even participate in resolution of some Middle East issues, especially the crisis. If the primary interests of Israel's presence in the region are to control, calm and secure its borders, there are two opinions inside Israel regarding Syria. The first is that Assad's stay in power is best for Israel, as the alternative could be either chaotic, Islamist or jihadists will take over. The second view is that Assad's stay in power will leave Israel in the face of a dangerous alliance on its northern border that includes Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah, especially since the anniversary of the 2006 Lebanon War (the Battle of the True Promise) did not shatter the minds of the leadership. Thus, the Israeli reaction to the Syrian issue remains very cautious and accurate until now.

The Iraqi crisis

Since the fall of the Iraqi regime and the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions, in addition to the Syrian crisis, the Middle East region witnessed very important events that have greatly affected the shape and character of the region, which led to the exposure of the interests of regional powers and challenges, especially in the light of the emergence of forces and non-state actors. The spread of the phenomenon of terrorist organizations within a tense regional environment witnessing chaos, wars, conflicts and alliances between major regional powers and military interventions, whether regional or international, under the pretext of imposing international peace and security and combating terrorism, and the fact that these developments constitute a reality and a key supporter of regional powers, the struggle for domination and hegemony, international powers and their plans in the Middle East aiming at reshaping the Middle East map by dividing and fragmenting it according to "the Bernard Lewis Project 1979", the original view of the creative chaos policy. Therefore, the problem of Iraq became more complicated as there are more conflicts within the Iraqi region between the various regional powers, where each seeks to win more moves, and extend influence on the Iraqi chess patches, which enhances its drive towards domination within the Middle East region. On the Iranian side, its arms are extended and permeate within Iraqi territory very significantly through the "Popular Mobilization Militia", which always tries to get rid of the presence of any rival Sunni forces. It seeks to form an Iraqi political system commensurate with the foundations and reference of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and this was demonstrated through the participation of The Popular Mobilization Militia, and the Iraqi government in the
battle of Mosul, and the extent of the violations that were committed against the Iraqi Sunnis. This participation was essentially so as to get rid of Sunni ISIS forces that pose a major threat to the presence of Shiite Iranian influence in Iraq. Also, when we mention Iraq, we cannot ignore a large ethnic faction which is the Kurds who live in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

Iran completely rejects the idea of the independence of the Kurdistan region of Iraq, because this is a major threat to its influence in Syria, in addition to that the separation of Iraqi Kurdistan will make the task of Iran is very difficult, as it cannot extend its influence and supply to its main arm, Hezbollah, in Lebanon.

On the other hand, Tel Aviv, aims at spreading chaos, increasing the sectarianism and nationalism in the region in general - and Iraq in particular, working to encourage nationalist and religious separatism so that it can declare Jewish statehood and resolve the Palestinian issue at the expense of the states that will arise, which will be preoccupied with inter-conflict. Israel could become a regional officer of conflict to achieve Tel Aviv's interest in controlling the region's capabilities and wealth. The Tudor Herzl project aims to achieve control over the fertile agricultural areas of southern Syria. Turkey is seeking to support the Iraqi Kurds in Iraq so as to get rid of the Shiite state and control of the Iranians inside Iraq, and thus dreams of domination and the restoration of its former Ottoman glories through Turkey and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Its control over the Fertile Crescent, and hence its alliance with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, is a sanctuary in its domination to the region.

Turkey is also playing contradictory roles in Iraq, which contributed to the complexity of the regional scene and confused several parties in its communication with the Turkish side, especially after expressing the latest position on the Syrian crisis, especially since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, Turkey is seeking to exploit terrorist groups such as (Al-Nusra Front, ISIS) as a tool to overthrow the Syrian regime, making it a haven and a corridor for these groups. Turkish intelligence has been implicated in its support for these groups by ignoring the transit of fighters from different regions of the world during their journey to Syria. Turkey also sought to employ those groups to fight the Kurds of Syria. All these Turkish calculations put Ankara in the circle of dispute with Russia and America at a time when the atmosphere of the Cold War between the poles of the international, and intensified competition between them. Regarding the subject of the Kurds there is tension and attraction between Turkey and its US ally, while Ankara moves to prevent Strengthening the Kurds' power and influence in the region, especially in areas adjacent to its borders. On the other hand, Washington considers them a key ally in its strategy to fight "IS" and provide them with weapons and training, which sometimes led to a clash, especially when Turkey was attacking the positions of the Kurds instead of an attacker Sites of "ISIS "Daesh".

The Yemeni crisis

The interests and objectives of regional powers, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia, have varied in the Yemeni affairs, as a result of the inevitability of these two competing regional powers in terms of sectarian conflict and the vital importance of Yemeni territory to Saudi national security. The Yemeni geographic position is very important as a vital geopolitical axis for Iranian hegemony, as a result of Yemen's control of the Bab al-Mandab Strait. On the one hand, Iran can act as a bloc that would repel and encircle the hostile Sunni regional powers, which is Saudi Arabia, on the other. Based on the foregoing, and in 2015, an Arab alliance of Sunni Arab states - led by Saudi Arabia, with US support and blessing - was formed and launched a so-called "storm of decisiveness" against the Houthis and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, in response to the request of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, supported On the part of Saudi Arabia to intervene - its mission is mainly to encircle Iran and its Shiite expansion in the region, especially after the Houthi group fired several ballistic missiles on Saudi Arabia, but on April 21 of the same year the coalition announced the end of the "storm of decisiveness" and the start of "restoration of hope," especially after the United Nations penned The Arab Coalition in the black list of violators of the rights of children in conflict zones.

In this resolution, which is driven by the interests of the major powers that are clear and explicit from the issue of these major countries of the formation of Arab alliances in the region that would weaken their presence in the region? While Turkish President Erdogan supported the Sunni Arab alliance in international forums in his attempt to get rid of Iran as a regional power to compete in the domination of the Middle East region, and its excessive expansion in the region. Also on the Israeli side, Tel Aviv fears the victory of the Houthis and their control over Yemen because this would strengthen Iranian influence and control in the region, especially its control in the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, which connects the Gulf of Aden and the Atlantic Ocean on the one hand, and the Red Sea on the other hand, which serves as a geopolitical cordon threatening the Israeli presence and even the Egyptian Red Sea, Israel supports the Arab alliance and the positions of the Arab countries against the Iranian arm extended in Yemen.
It is worth mentioning in this regard that the focus of the conflict refers to the crises and problems of the region that is a conflict of non-Arab regional powers on Arab lands. This raises the question in this regard: Is there a strong Arab role in the management of the Middle East crises, and the ability to put solutions and initiatives and the settlement of conflicts in the region or not.

As for the Syrian crisis, Saudi Arabia has been in the first supporting the rebels and the Free Syrian Army against the regular army, in an attempt to get rid of the regime of Bashar al-Assad with Shiite origins and its alliances with Iran, and the Lebanese Hezbollah place since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011. Saudi Arabia's position on the Syrian crisis is almost close to the Turkish position in Syria, but the tools and policies of the two countries differ in the exercise of the interest, also Egypt's stance on the Syrian crisis remains somewhat calm and cautious in contrast to the Saudi position on the Syrian crisis. Egypt prefers the survival of "Bashar Assad, in fear of the chaos that may arise in Syria in particular and the Arab region in general after the departure of the Syrian regime, and fears of the division of Syria and the transformation of autonomous cantons on the basis of ethnic and sectarian, which will support terrorist groups and the serious threat to the region and Egyptian National Security.

However, the Egyptian foreign policy in its current and dealing with all the crises and problems of the region in any case seeks to be a manifestation without substance, as a result of the deterioration of economic and social conditions on the one hand, and its preoccupation in addressing terrorism and combating terrorism on the other hand. It is also clear that Egypt in the light of rapprochement and cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the intertwined positions with the UAE and Bahrain on the Qatari positions in support of terrorism and Iran in the region, is afraid of expressing its positions explicitly on the Syrian crisis because it does not agree with the positions of Saudi Arabia, which may portend a deterioration in relations with them, so Egypt currently favors the lack of clarity and declared explicitly. Regarding the Iraqi problem, there is a somewhat similar Arab role. Arab powers on Iraq are trying to calm the situation and stability in Iraq not only since the Arab Spring protests, but since the collapse of the Iraqi regime in 2003, and the emergence of a more chaotic and more regional Middle East format. The role of non-state actors represented by terrorist groups, especially ISIS, is strongly present in Syria and Iraq. Therefore, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the majority of Arab countries strongly support the Iraqi government in its fight against ISIS. This position was evident in the battle to liberate Mosul from ISIS. In addition, the majority of Arab powers are seeking to inflict heavy losses on Iran by restricting its influence and eliminating the Iranian Revolutionary Guard penetrating the region through its arms in Syria and Iraq as well as Yemen ...

 Determinants of future competition among regional powers

It is also necessary in this regard, that the regional powers possess the elements of comprehensive power, which qualifies them to play more roles in the region and achieve their objectives and secure their interests. Thus, achieving their domination and control over the region, this will lead to an unusual arms race among regional powers, which may cause a local austerity policy that would increase the size of military spending at the expense of the developmental field. This will lead to a decline in the monetary reserves of countries, which may expose their economies to serious fluctuations. In order to achieve the principle of regional balance of these forces, the regional powers are unable to accurately recognize each other's intentions. One of the most important characteristics of this new Middle Eastern format is the spread of mistrust in all movements and orientations of any regional powers in the region, which threatens the fundamental objective of all regional power and survival, and will force the regional powers to act and work with the network of relations and alliances in the region, and then forming an alliance under their leadership and re-cooperating with other countries to maintain their central position within the heart of the regional format that may affect weakness and in the overall interactions. This urges us to monitor the overall strength of the most important factors for the forces of regional Middle Eastern actors within the pattern.

1. Iran and its revolutionary message in the region

Iran has huge military capabilities in the region, where the Iranian armed forces are composed of two basic infrastructures: The Iranian army, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and what is known as the "Basij", which is involved in the work of advocacy, promotion and training of civilians who engage in the Revolutionary Guard units at the time of the crisis. Thus, the total number of Iranian armed forces according to the estimates of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2017 exceeded 545 thousand troops, and the reserve strength of about 350 thousand people, and Russia's share in Iranian military imports about 85% between 2000: 2007, Also in April 2016, Russia has handed over to Iran the first batch of S-300 air defense system, and the Iranian side has about seven industrial groups producing weapons, equipment and ammunition for the army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, as it hopes to achieve its political project in the Middle East as a regional power seeking hegemony and control of the new regional
format. This is highlighted through the functions of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and its external actions in neighboring countries and the Gulf, especially after the "Arab Spring" revolutions that paved the Iranian arms and rush strongly towards the region in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Bahrain, to renounce conflicts on the basis of a revolutionary Shiite Iran has a better international and regional status.

Although there are other regional forces competing for domination within the region, especially Turkey, Israel. Iran is less clear in the map of enemies and friends, it gives priority to hostility with Israel. At the same time, it is not in favor of the presence of an Arab force leading the Middle Eastern region. It prefers cooperative relations and competition with Turkey and other Arab powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia rather than conflict with them, but does not rule out the conflict if it is imposed from the perspective of understanding its interests and the requirements of national security.

In addition, there is always controversy in the Iranian foreign policy file about Iran's nuclear potential through its nuclear agreement with the group of (5 + 1), which gained Iran several things at the same time, as Iran has won the trust and support of the major powers (5 + 1) Iran will be opened to the world again after many years of isolation, and drowning in the midst of economic and trade sanctions with the outside world, and therefore Iran will not allow to miss this opportunity of major powers and for the first time against the American will. The Iranian nuclear agreement has several motives and interests for The European Union and cannot relinquish it as a result of the amount of European funds invested in accordance with the "comprehensive plan of Iran" in several sectors in Iran such as oil, gas, and hotels. Germany may also be able to acquire Iran a nuclear power in the region, as it can at any time modify the Iranian program and make nuclear warheads and missiles that will flip the balance of power to its advantage in the region.

From the economic point of view of Iran, the Iranian economy is distinguished from the economy of other countries by adopting a domestic strategy entitled "Resistance Economy", which made Iran follow austere economic policy in its entirety, which has provoked strong protests inside Iran in the past. Through this strategy, Iran was able to develop and improve its internal expertise, and made the Iranian economy flexible and protected from external shocks and pressures that Western countries were trying to impose. Iran's reliance on this kind of economy after the nuclear agreement means its success in implementing it and harnessing it to reveal the internal sources that have been able to give the Iranian economy a state of self-sufficiency, since Iran has been able to eliminates oil from the pillars of its economy, and this has made the Iranian economy more immune to the changes of the international market than the economy of other oil-producing countries, and therefore Iran is determined to follow this plan, especially after the nuclear agreement on the one hand, and after the deterioration of oil prices in the world market on the one hand. Tehran also believes that the only way to develop the Iranian economy depends mainly on the interior, and the lifting of sanctions is a non-foundation pillar of the structure of the Iranian economy, in addition to that the nuclear agreement with Western countries has allowed Iran to achieve a growth rate of 6.6% during the last Persian year. As of March 2017, the budget deficit in 2016 fell to about 5.1% of GDP, according to the IMF report, which noted that the continued Iranian tension with the US Trump administration, which continues to attack the nuclear deal with Iran may herald the collapse of the agreement which will enter the Iran's economy is in a recession, and direct investment and capital inflows will decline, and Iran will be cut off from the global financial system once again, which is not desired and not wanted in form and substance.

2. Turkey and its new Ottoman region

Turkey is in complex relations within the Middle East region, because of its Ottoman cloudy history. It was the seat of the Ottoman rule, and therefore it is trying hard to restore the old Ottoman glory and historical heritage in the region, as a result of Turkey's huge military capabilities and it is the second largest force NATO, after the United States according to the estimates of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2017, and it has a huge economic strength according to the report of the International Monetary Fund, which showed the Turkish economy ranked 13th in the world and fifth in Europe. In addition, We can't ignore Turkey's important strategic position as a gateway to the geopolitical conflict between the superpowers and even regional ones, all of which qualify Turkey to play a strong and effective regional role as a channel for its regional influence not only in the Middle East but also in the Central Europe.

Turkey has also presented a model of democracy, represented by the success of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is a model for governments and Islamic groups in the Middle East that it can be followed as a model, and to move forward under Turkish leadership and domination, especially after the revolutions of the "Arab Spring" and the rise of the "Muslim Brotherhood" in Egypt to power and authority. In 2012, the international and
regional changes witnessed in the region following the Arab Spring revolutions contributed to Turkey's strategic choices ranging from the absence and isolation of an Islamic and Arab world that is geographically and historically linked to the intransigence and rejection of an unacceptable European. However, the European countries fear that Turkey will be left to an international force that is essentially hostile to them as Russia.

Therefore, Turkey is currently pursuing a foreign policy that favors strategic depth with the Middle East and the Islamic world. Therefore, Turkey sought to dominate and impose its will within the region by following President Erdogan's "zero-sum politics" in the region with neighboring countries, especially with moderate Sunni countries, especially Qatar, which includes the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, and to strengthen its push in the region. President Erdogan followed the principle of soft power in dealing with the Arab countries which is not accepted by the Arab Countries, and this principle has been met with strong opposition from the Arab side, which proved that it is difficult to have a real impact on the whole events through this principle, the Syrian crisis was the best proof of failed Turkish principle.

Consequently, after Turkey found itself in a clash with two rival powers for hegemony in the region, such as Israel and Iran, Turkey adopted a foreign policy towards these two rival powers, which would shift from a balanced state between Israel and Iran to an aspiring power to dominate regional hegemony, and consequently its overall conflict in various Middle Eastern crises. This has forced it to schedule conflicts with Israel on the one hand, and heating up with Iran on the other, especially after the deterioration of the Turkish position in the management of the Syrian crisis in the presence of an international force such as Russia, and Iran as a regional power. The Turkish internal situation was backwards - as a result of the PKK's terrorist acts against the regime and the attempts of a military coup against the Turkish regime - has somewhat hampered its foreign policy in the region, but the ability of the Turkish regime to counter and deter these internal attacks has been as a motive for the regime to move forward. Turkey has worked to restore alliances and amendment of the status quo in the majority of the files of the region, especially the Syrian crisis. So, the new policy came to dominate by focusing on the establishment of an alliance with Sunni Arab states dream of leadership and equality. However, its aggressive practice in the region of its support for some terrorist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, has greatly confounded its calculation as a result of these policies being inconsistent with Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy orientations and Egyptian foreign policy on the other hand.

3. Israel and the incentive of regional presence in the region

Israel has been trying to maintain its regional presence in the Middle East, and not to disturb the regional balance based on the multiplicity of regional powers. Although Israel in its regional presence is a regional power, it remains a diminished force, because in its conflict with the Arabs on the Palestinian cause that has limited its ability to demonstrate power and authority, and it has allowed others to oppose it, even though it is able to build bilateral relations with other countries. But the issue is not that way. Although the Arab-Israeli conflict takes place within a specific geographical area, it is of international concern, because it is linked to a problematic issue centered on the right of the Zionist movement to seize the Palestinian territories. Thus, the status of Israel in the region and in its constant conflict with the Arabs continues to hinder it from establishing alliances and good relations with the Arab countries by strengthening its push to exist on the one hand, and regional hegemony on the other. In this context, Israel will need to pursue a foreign policy that would make it pretend to minimize its adherence to the Jewishness of the state and activate the real peace process with the Arabs and the Palestinians in order to break the barriers of caution, and thus reassure the Arab neighbors some of the danger of its regional presence on Arab national security. Israel is not facing a conventional military threat, as it is at peace with most Arab countries, as it faces new challenges in the region that have replaced traditional threats, especially after the Arab Spring revolutions, the fall of some Arab allies, and the rise of non-loyal regimes. The emergence of a group of non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda and Daesh, as well as its fear of the Iranian Shi'ite tide in the region, where Iran is the real existential threat to Israel, Iran does not recognize it. Although Iran does not demand its removal from existence, it is promoting it tactically. Therefore, Israel considers its alliances in the region that its interests require an alliance with moderate Sunni countries such as the majority of Arab countries, especially Qatar, with which it practices a swing policy as a result of Qatar's support for Palestinian Hamas and economic cooperation with Israel. It seeks to maintain open bridges with Qatar as a Gulf power strike in the region as a result of its use of the principle of "soft power"
and Israel does not rule out the possibility of its alliance with armed fundamentalist groups if required by the Israeli interest compared to its alliance with Iran.

In any case, Israel, as a regional power forcibly and forcefully in the Middle East in general and the Arab in particular, seeks to reject all political solutions, and does not believe in peace initiatives as long as the regional and international situation is in its favor, especially with regard to the Palestinian issue. The means of power and international support, as a result of the historical and cultural relations intertwined with the summit of the international system of the United States of America, which means the amount of military and economic deals that enabled it to regional supremacy. So Israel is now seeking to strengthen its international standing, and to get Its legitimacy for its regional presence which is not evidenced by its candidacy for the non-permanent membership of the Security Council for the period 2019-2020. This will be decided next year, and it is proceeding to this goal through a drawn-out and deliberate plan is not apparently coincidental, but has been prepared for several years. Israel has sought to penetrate the African continent, break historical African support for the Palestinian cause, and seeks to regain its status as an observer member of the African Union, as well as its participation in regional groupings. The participation of the Israeli Prime Minister in the 51st Summit of the Economic Community of West African States at June is an example to achieve these aims.

Not only the African continent; Israel seeks to strengthen its relations with Asian and European countries and win their support, as in the Indian Prime Minister's first visit to Israel last July without visiting Palestine, and the Israeli Prime Minister's attendance of the Visegrad Summit (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) in July, and their agreement to hold their next summit in Tel Aviv in 2018. So Israel seems to have nothing to lose in this regard. It is aware of the difficulty, not the impossibility of obtaining sufficient support for Security Council, but also aspires to receive credible support from many countries, even if it does not win membership of the security council, which also gives it international legitimacy and relieves it of increasing international pressure as a result of its illegal and provocative policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

4. Saudi Arabia and its religious authority in the region

Saudi Arabia has recently emerged as an effective regional Arab power within the Middle East region, especially after the revolutions of the "Arab Spring" as the new activity of the Saudi leadership after the "Arab Spring" seemed remarkable, as Saudi policy makers are well aware of the magnitude of security threats. In light of the emergence of new threats in the Arab world, as a result of the control of the Islamic State "ISIS" over large areas of Iraq and Syria on the one hand, and Iran's attempts to establish a state in Yemen, and therefore it was necessary that Saudi Arabia adopts a new defense policy that keeps peace on the Boundary of Saudi Arabia. As a regional superpower, Saudi Arabia has already proved its worth by building the coalition that carried out the Operation of Hazem Storm in Yemen, since the repercussions of the Yemeni crisis on Saudi national security. The entire Gulf region has major repercussions, and the prospect of an Iranian-backed militia, the Houthis, taking control of Yemen with its strategic location in southern Arabia was a red line for the kingdom.

However, due to its religious authority, Saudi Arabia's oil control is a huge economic and financial power in the region, as well as its position as the protector and guardian of the Two Holy Mosques, and thus makes it a natural candidate to play a leading role in a crisis-ridden Islamic world. With Iran, it is historic; however, it has gained great importance in the current situation. It has become a key determinant of the strategic landscape in the Middle East for several reasons, the most important of which are: attempts by Iran to assert itself as a regional Shiite power rejecting any Sunni Saudi presence in the region, and given what Saudi Arabia enjoys from convergence with the US side of the kingdom's policies in the region, as a result of the hostility that exists between Iran and the United States of America, especially after the arrival of Trump to the US administration.

In this context, the United States is trying to gradually withdraw from the US cover of allies in the region, and adopt a policy that is almost like the policy of isolation that followed in many stages of history, and therefore the United States found in Saudi Arabia as the place where it can seek to preserve the balance of regional power by choosing Saudi Arabia as a central Sunni forces in the Middle East region hostile to Iran, and then worked to increase its military power; where the amount of military spending of the Kingdom reached the third place in the world, in addition to signing a military deal with the United States a total value of 400 million On the economic side. Saudi Aramco has signed 16 agreements with 11 US companies to support the joint trade growth opportunities between the two countries with an added value of 50 billion dollars, which shows us the relations of cooperation and rapprochement between the Kingdom and The United States of America, therefore, in its political project in the
region finds Saudi Arabia a strong alliance with the moderate Sunnis to curb Iranian influence in the region, and thus came the Saudi keenness to form a Sunni Islamic alliance in the region, for example: alliance with Turkey, and seeking to include Egypt in this alliance, and then the formation of a Sunni bloc to ensure the fight against Shiite penetration in the region, which may happen through a military Saudi action with cooperation with Turkey under the American umbrella, and Egyptian support in Syria, entitled "war on terror."

5. Egypt: between the challenges of terrorism and its resumption of the regional role

The Arab role within the Middle East is not confined to Saudi Arabia; there is a strong and effective Egyptian role where Egypt has always been the heart of Arabism, and a balance of the Arab regional format that has been the focus of interactions within the Middle East until some have called it (the Nasserite). Egypt was preparing to play a prominent role outside its borders, but its resumption to play the role of regional leadership, which it practiced in many periods of history, especially in the Nasserite era, and Sadat era is considered many mistakes. The challenges facing the Egyptian national security have become very serious, in addition to the fact that the Egyptian foreign policy activity currently seeks to be a form without substance, and it is at least partly harnessed to distract the attention of the followers both at home and abroad from all social, economic and security problems in particular in the light of Egypt's relations with other regional powers, whether non-Arab (Iran, Turkey, Israel), or even with Saudi Arabia in nature, follow the same approach as it was over the past thirty years, which played a role to strengthen its cooperation and alliance with the United States of America; especially after the arrival of US President Trump to the White House, and the convergence of views between him and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.It has become clear that since the 1970s, Egypt's regional role has declined, not only because of its alliance with the United States, but also because of its alliance with Israel, which is a two-way weapon.

On the positive side, it has further reduced the conflict with the Israeli presence. In the region, on the negative side, this alliance has lost Egypt a lot of confidence among the Arab brothers, but with the advent of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has restored Egyptian-Arab relations, and indeed an Arab opinion emerged in this regard, that Egypt's alliance with the Israeli side (has protected Egypt and all Arabs from many wars in the region. Later, the Arab world has enjoyed a lot of approval and popularity, as the many Arab alliances with Israel, while maintaining consistent positions on the Israeli side on the Palestinian issue, have alleviated much of the conflict in the region, which is evident in the statements of President El Sisi and the visits of the Foreign Minister. The Egyptian government on the reconciliation agreement between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority in the past, to emphasize the Egyptian interest in ending the Palestinian issue, and that Egypt wanted to convey the message that despite the challenges faced, it "does not accept the spread of chaos in its neighborhood which it will strive to calm in the context of diplomatic policy and quiet contacts with neighboring countries.

On the other hand, the “Arab Spring” revolutions have posed a new dimension in form and nature of the Egyptian political system. This was represented in the religious dimension. Where Egypt was ruled immediately by The Muslim Brotherhood after the Egyptian revolution in 2012, but soon the group failed to maintain its authority and rule, as this period was a black point in Egyptian history in all social, political and economic aspects that the Egyptians would not forget, for the sun to rise Freedom again in the fields of Egypt in the revolution of the thirtieth of June 2013 to drop the group from power, but the group's failure to manage the country's affairs was not only because of its political vision, but also because of its inability to enter the new climate beyond the "Arab Spring", in addition to its inability to make real progress In the conservation of Egypt. However, the situation has improved considerably since the revolution of June 30, 2013, when the people expressed their will and the right to self-determination and the people chose former Minister of Defense Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to become President of the Egyptian Republic. Egypt has a vision, goal and a balanced foreign policy of many Egyptian interests well on both the scale. As a result, Egypt has become a strong ally and a central ally for Saudi Arabia as a result of the similarities in the foreign policy of the two countries towards Qatar and its support for terrorism and extremism.

On the one hand, and also the danger of the Shiite Iranian tide in the region on the other, but the Egyptian-Saudi relations at the current stage is managed by Cairo "very delicate balance", and adopts a method similar to parallel tracks, so as not to overlap positions and policies on a particular crisis. Therefore, Egyptian-Saudi relations are not as far away as separation between the files, and this is normal since the agreement or difference in all files does not presume a single package, especially with regard to the Syrian crisis as mentioned earlier, and then there may be differences in positions or policies between the two sides, but there is consensus regarding the general rules and appreciation of what the two countries describe as the Iranian threat in the region in general and their intervention in
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Syria in particular. The approach of dealing with the file and the management of its partial components may not be identical and not necessarily required.

Moreover, the Egyptian state has succeeded through the General Intelligence Service to penetrate four important files and proved its active role in them: "Libya, Lebanon, Palestine, the Gulf crisis, South Sudan, finally Ethiopia ", despite the difficulty of some files, especially the Saudi file and The Gulf crisis for Egyptian diplomacy, as Egypt fears for alliances with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but also fears that the table will turn on it if reconciliation between the Gulf countries and Qatar, which means Egypt's involvement in the future reconciliation between the Gulf States, despite Egypt's military capabilities. The Egyptian president always reassures that the Egyptian side, as the heart of Arabism and the ship of peace among the peoples of the world, does not prefer violence and military action, but the military option remains on the table as long as there are threats to Egyptian national security. The Egyptian army is ranked first in the Arab world and the tenth in the world according to the classification of the site "Global Firepower", which specializes in monitoring the strength of the armies, where the total military personnel 1.329 million people, the number of active soldiers (defined by the site ready to fight) is 454.3 thousand while The number of reservists is 875,000. All of these factors pave the way for Egypt to restore its regional and achieving political vision calling for peace in the Middle East region.

Scenarios of competition between the regional powers in the future

This study tries to investigate the possibility of resolving the conflict between the regional powers since The Middle East is going through a period of revolutionary change in which the constituent countries of the regional complex are subjected to radical changes and transformations, which in practice defies the foreign policies of the great and big countries on the one hand, and the regional countries on the other hand. These troubled challenges have forced a number of regional and other powers in the region to protect their national interests and try to marginalize the aspirations and movements of their competitors in the same direction. Let us have three scenarios about the future of the regional power struggle, which are likely to be achieved over the next two years, that is, by 2020. Although the biggest events in the Middle East between now and 2020 may come unexpectedly and without warning; Most of the major and unpredictable crises are likely to be related to known disturbances arising from major regional issues, particularly in light of the (Syrian crisis, the Iraq problem, the Yemeni crisis), as well as the minorities' conflict with each other, whether ethnic or sectarian as follows:

- The first Scenario: Indicates the continuation of the conflict between the regional powers in the region without the ability of any of them to resolve the files of the actors in favor of any of them, which means the spread of a very serious arms race between the forces fall into the state in the midst of poverty and internal economic deficit, and putting the whole region in horror and destabilization of regional stability. This scenarios is clearly very successful and can be achieved for many reasons: Increase of the military spending of regional powers in the region at the expense of spending on development areas in the local scope of these countries, whether non-Arab countries (such as Iran, Israel, Turkey), or Arab countries, where the total military spending of Arab countries amounted to more than $800 billion according to the Arab Monetary Fund (IMF), between 2010 and 2015. That is equivalent to an annual average of $133.33 billion. This means that these countries will adopt austerity policies that will lift subsidies on energy and commodities necessary for their citizens, in addition to the indicators based on high rates of borrowing from the IMF, Serious economic fluctuations have ridded systems of these countries as a result of the revolution on the part of the people to the deterioration of economic conditions in them as (Egypt, and Iran) currently. On the other hand, this track is likely to be achieved on a large scale as a result of the geographical convergence, ethnic and cultural intertwining of the peoples of the region; the outbreak of terrorism and the control of some terrorist groups on vital areas in the region has made them the focus of polarization by regional powers aspiring to negotiate with and support them. Bargaining them against rival regional powers, and thus probably by 2020 we will have the phenomenon of (export of violence), where extremist violence will penetrate into the local states. Much of the violence in the Middle East, including terrorist violence is making this scenario more likely to be investigated in the future, since it may make the new format of the region more chaotic.

- The second Scenario: Concerns the possibility of ending the conflict by direct wars between the various regional powers, as a result of the very complex overlap of several parties of regional and international powers in many geographical areas in the region, mainly representing the areas of the aggravation of crises and problems within the Middle East regional format, especially in (Syria, Iraq). Resolving these files for any of these forces is an issue that has become the aspiration of each regional force aspiring to dominate and dominate the region, as the resolution of the conflicts of
the hot regional conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, in solidarity with the four determinants that have already mentioned: the useless Arab strategy and the Iranian rush to assume the position of a major power capable of competing for regional leadership, especially after winning its nuclear program and the abolition of international sanctions imposed on it, in addition to the American tendency to gradually withdraw from the region's concerns in exchange for the rush and accelerated progress of Russian influence. There is another factor: In this regard, the nature and specificity of the political project of each of these regional powers competing for leadership is determined, in particular, from the perspective of their primary threat sources, which may necessitate direct military interventions such as what Turkey has done in the north Syrian that is called "olive branch Operation "in Afrin area. The recognition of each of these regional powers (Israel, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt) of the most important threat to their higher interests, national security and regional political project in the region will force them to turn to the strategic choice of each of these forces that will control the patterns of their interactions in the new regional format, and advanced weapons, including possibly (nuclear weapons), are likely to be more widespread in the Middle East in 2020 than they are now. International efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons will slow their proliferation rather than stop them and most of the main motives. Nuclear weapons and other advanced weapons will continue even after regime change following the Arab Spring protests, as instability in Middle Eastern countries may even increase the motivation for arms proliferation, exacerbating intra-regional conflicts and wars ravaging the Middle East's security and peace. Increasing the likelihood of forming regional and counter-hubs that would ignite the regional conflict.

However, the scenarios of the rise or fall of a regional power in its region are due to a set of factors (constraints) that determine the chances of each state. These opportunities are represented by the state's ability to assume regional leadership based on the strengths of the state's possession, which may be: In terms of its political and security stability, its historical leadership balance, and its symbolic influence (cultural, religious), in terms of its position on crises and pivotal issues in the Middle East, and its relationship with emerging international powers such as Russia, China. The third Scenario: This scenario goes to the continuation of the conflict between the regional powers, but in a form and content is completely different from the first scenario. This scenario assumes the continuation of a kind of (mutual cooperative conflict regional roles), which requires the regional parties to negotiate, and exchange views on their presence in many crises and problems of the region. Thus, the possibility of sharing regional influence in the region, especially in (Syria, Iraq, Yemen), as happened in Syria between Turkey and Iran, where both sides realized that the geography and history of Turkey and Iran is sufficient to secure a strong cooperation relationship between the country in spite of the fundamental differences between them, and therefore believe that Turkey's entry to the Afrin region did not take place without the knowledge of the Iranian side and a green light from Russia. The best proof of this is the withdrawal of Iranian and Russian forces from the Afrin region to the Tal Rifat area to prevent touch that may occur between them, which is considered a clear challenge to the US project in the Syrian north on the Kurds, which has also received Israeli and Saudi support. This takes us to a new term (flexible alliances), which lies in the content that the realization of interests may require an alliance with competitors for a period until the pace of political interests of the parties, and quickly turn the alliance on itself to form other new alliances, and as a result of the above. The fact that each country does not want the rise of another rival that dominates the Middle East region. However, the obstacles to reality prevent one country dominating the region, due to the American role that prevents any ambition that is independent of the American logic in the region. America, however, does not want Nasser's new industry in the region. Based on the foregoing, we believe that the third scenario is the closest to be achieved in the coming period, due to the difficulty of dominance of one regional force over the region in light of its competing conflict with other regional powers, and because of the lack of most of the components of power in one particular country on the one hand, and the rejection of the emergence of major powers. Strategic force in the Middle East dominates and controls the situation within the new regional format on the other hand, foreshadowing the continuation of the conflict, but in the presence of cooperation between regional powers and the exchange of roles within the region, and the emergence of more flexible alliances and change from time to time.

Conclusion

The Middle East has always been a point of interest for international and regional powers alike because of its geostrategic, natural, human, political, economic, cultural and religious components, which pushed these forces to enter the field of competition and then struggle with each other to impose control and domination. The political changes that have taken place in the region have not been easy for the peoples of the region, especially the countries that have witnessed the change of regimes in (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria) and have been greatly affected. The Arab Spring revolutions were part of the thinking of the Western system, especially the American thinking to
control the region and bring it into chaos, under the name of supporting democracy at the expense of dictatorships. The result of this shift was the rise of radical Islamic parties, which led to the spread of Extremist armed groups have been able to take control of vast territories from some Arab countries. By studying the events in the political arena in the Middle East in general, and the Arab countries in particular, we reached some conclusions we can summarize in the following points:

• The Middle East is a very important strategic area, and this is why all the empires of the earth seek to control this region.
• At the beginning of the twentieth century, the countries of the Middle East suffered from the state of colonialism.
• The domination of dictatorial regimes, and their staying in power for long periods without developing the peoples of the region, which contributed to the increase of ignorance and backwardness.
• The political and military events that led to the so-called Arab Spring did not come from a vacuum, but are the result of a combination of internal political, social, and economic reasons.
• The Arab Spring revolutions led to the fall of four authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen, and thus will produce a new type of international relations between the countries of the region and Western countries, and will change political alliances at the regional level in particular and the international level in general.
• There is a clear role for the Arab Spring revolutions of events and revolutions, which had a major role in activating the Islamic movements in both extremes and moderate and the presence of force on the political arena, and this has pushed the region into the clutches of religious, national and sectarian intolerance as a result of external shipping and the situation of extreme poverty. The Islamic forces clearly realized that they could not implement all of their principles, especially the formation of the Islamic Emirate. Therefore, they will have to relinquish some of its principles. In order to preserve national interests; they must cooperate and align with liberal and democratic forces in forming governments.
• Although the political vision of the countries in which the revolution took place is not constituted by security and political instability, it will change the foreign policies of those countries towards the countries of the region and Western countries.

For a number of political, economic, cultural, religious and ideological reasons, the Middle East will remain a center of global conflict for a number of reasons. The conflict is likely to increase because of the internal and external support of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. The major powers could collapse, and could be divided into sectarian and national territories as planned in the so-called New Middle East Map, which aims to redistribute the region again to serve US interests, as the major powers through Sykes-Picot 1917, divided The Arab region to the countries that have dominated and shared the benefits of all Western countries. So, the peoples of this region have to pay attention to the dangerous scheme drawn for their countries. Finally, we would like to point out that all these conflicts in the heart of the Middle East and its suburbs, causing more blood, tears, mass destruction and thousands of victims, displaced persons, deportees, migrants and refugees, and practically exploding the moral foundations upon which the region and the positive and negative human values that have arisen, closing all the doors and paths leading to a harmonious and balanced natural development resulting from necessity and human need as well as people's convictions and the will to be free that may enter the region in a dramatic and hasty and crazy change without there on the horizon hope to end these bloody tidal conflicts. Once on the basis of respect for the will of the peoples of the region and their fundamental human rights to freedom, justice, peace and dignity, these peoples have just the right to die, to be killed and be tortured in favor of one party or another in a war of destructive direct or proxy conflicts. There is a question in mind: How long will blood bleed, waste of money, spread destruction and deny the peoples of the region to exercise their legitimate human right to self-determination and live in peace? Isn't it time for the civilized world to intervene to put an end to the rotten colonial ambitions and backward regional ambitions to rebuild empires, sultanates, the caliphate and other outdated and irreversible hoops?

Is it not supposed that the United Nations, the largest institution and international grouping, play its role for which it was established and enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and international laws and customs to stop the bloodshed? How long will this gathering and the international forum remain a mere echo of the interests of the elderly? The expected result of the continuation of these conflicts is the indulgence of new generations in acts of violence and counter-violence, even in transnational terrorist organizations as a result of bitter disappointment with the dictatorships of underdeveloped dictatorships and the international community and the systems that claim to defend the principles of democracy and human rights and most probably will pay a heavy price, whether through the
spread of infection, terrorism and suicide bombers in many regions and countries of the world or through the development of small wars currently dominated into an international catastrophe paid by mankind. It is time to end the border demarcation on the sand as a result of the disgraceful Sykes-Picot Agreement, which was and remains one of the most important reasons that led to the situation today throughout the Middle East as a result of its denial of the will of the peoples and components of the region and unless this will be respected will remain a dangerous focus not only threaten the interests and future of their people but threaten world peace and security.

For this reason, the Middle East has historically been subject to military colonial campaigns and imperialists' plundering of oilfields. It has come under the weight of oil monopolies, which have imposed very harsh and unfair conditions for their actions in the Gulf countries and Iraq. The unfair agreements and treaties under which concessions were granted to imperialist countries and monopoly companies to exploit natural resources and carry out various types of oil operations, the exploitation of the local labor force, and the domination of foreign capital were all the basis of the strategy of the colonial system. In the backwardness of the collapsed economic and social structure, imperialism found the material base of the relationship of colonial domination. Thus, the Middle East, as a great strategic value in the international strategic relations, has been the scene of a fierce and violent conflict between the major oil monopolies, and the competitive conflict between the imperialist states contradicting their economic interests and their political strategy, especially between the US imperialism and the rest of the colonial Western European countries. The First World War brought about a major change in the political and regional map of all the countries of the Middle East. From this perspective, the overlap of the struggle for control of the Middle East has been closely linked to the oil conflicts that have been waged by the American, British and French oil monopolies to control oil resources.

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