Abstract. Secure multi-party computation (MPC) enables a set of mutually distrusting parties to cooperatively compute, using a cryptographic protocol, a function over their private data. This paper presents Wys⋆, a new domain-specific language (DSL) for writing mixed-mode MPCs. Wys⋆ is an embedded DSL hosted in F⋆, a verification-oriented, effectful programming language. Wys⋆ source programs are essentially F⋆ programs written in a custom MPC effect, meaning that the programmers can use F⋆’s logic to verify the correctness and security properties of their programs. To reason about the distributed runtime semantics of these programs, we formalize a deep embedding of Wys⋆, also in F⋆. We mechanize the necessary metatheory to prove that the properties verified for the Wys⋆ source programs carry over to the distributed, multi-party semantics. Finally, we use F⋆’s extraction to extract an interpreter that we have proved matches this semantics, yielding a partially verified implementation. Wys⋆ is the first DSL to enable formal verification of MPC programs. We have implemented several MPC protocols in Wys⋆, including private set intersection, joint median, and an MPC-based card dealing application, and have verified their correctness and security.

1 Introduction

Secure multi-party computation (MPC) enables two or more parties to compute a function $f$ over their private inputs $x_i$ so that parties don’t see each others’ inputs, but rather only see the output $f(x_1, ..., x_n)$. Using a trusted third party to compute $f$ would achieve this goal, but in fact we can achieve it using one of a variety of cryptographic protocols carried out only among the participants [12 26 57 64]. One example use of MPC is private set intersection (PSI): the $x_i$ could be individuals’ personal interests, and the function $f$ computes their intersection, revealing which interests the group has in common, but not any interests that they don’t. MPC has also been used for auctions [18], detecting tax fraud [16], managing supply chains [33], privacy preserving statistical analysis [31], and more recently for machine learning tasks [19 21 30 38 44].

Typically, cryptographic protocols expect $f$ to be specified as a boolean or arithmetic circuit. Programming directly with circuits and cryptography is
painful, so starting with the Fairplay project \[40\] many researchers have designed higher-level domain-specific languages (DSLs) in which to program MPCs \[6,14,17,19,23,27,29,34,37,39,45,48,49,52,55,60\]. These DSLs compile source code to circuits which are then given to the underlying protocol. While doing this undoubtedly makes it easier to program MPCs, these languages still have several drawbacks regarding both security and usability.

This paper presents Wys*, a new MPC DSL that addresses several problems in prior DSLs. Unlike most previous MPC DSLs, Wys* is not a standalone language, but is rather an embedded DSL hosted in F* \[58\], a full-featured, verification-oriented, effectful programming language. Wys* has the following two distinguishing elements:

1. A program logic for MPC. (\(\S 2\) and \(\S 3\)). In their most general form, MPC applications are mixed-mode: they consist of parties performing (potentially different) local, in-clear computations (e.g. I/O, preprocessing inputs) interleaved with joint, secure computations. Wys* is the first MPC DSL to provide a program logic to formally reason about the correctness and security of such applications, e.g., to prove that the outputs will not reveal too much information about a party’s inputs \[41\].

To avoid reasoning about separate programs for each party, Wys* builds on the basic programming model of the Wysteria MPC DSL \[52\] that allows applications to be written as a single specification. Wys* presents a shallow embedding of the Wysteria programming model in F*. When writing Wys* source programs, programmers essentially write F* programs in a new Wys effect, against a library of MPC combinators. The pre- and postcondition specifications on the combinators encode a program logic for MPC. The logic provides observable traces—a novel addition to the Wysteria semantics—which programmers can use to specify security properties such as delimited release \[54\]. Since Wys* programs are F* programs, F* computes verification conditions (VCs) for them which are discharged using Z3 \[2\] as usual.

We prove the soundness of the program logic—that the properties proven about the Wys* source programs carry over when these programs are run by multiple parties in a distributed manner—also in F*. The proof connects the pre- and postconditions of the Wys* combinators to their distributed semantics in two steps. First, we implement the combinators in F*, proving the validity of their pre- and postconditions of against their implementation. Next, we reason about this implementation and the distributed runtime semantics through a deep embedding of Wys* in F*. Essentially, we deep-embed the Wys* combinator abstract syntax trees (ASTs) as an F* datatype and formalize two operational semantics for them: a conceptual single-threaded semantics that models their F* implementation, and the actual distributed semantics that models the

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\(3\) Our attacker model is the “honest-but-curious” model where the attackers are the participants themselves, who play their roles in the protocol faithfully, but are motivated to deduce as much as they can about the other participants’ secrets by observing the protocol. \(2,3\) makes the security model of Wys* more precise.
multi-party runs of the programs. We prove, in F*, that the single-threaded semantics is sound with respect to the distributed semantics (§3). While we use F*, the program logic is general and it should be possible to embed it in other verification frameworks (e.g., in Coq, in the style of Hoare Type Theory [46]).

2. A full-featured, partially verified implementation (§3) Wys*'s implementation is, in part, formally verified. The hope is that formal verification will reduce the occurrence of security threatening bugs, as it has in prior work [15, 36, 50, 62, 63].

We define an interpreter in F* that operates over the Wys* ASTs produced by a custom F* extraction for the Wys effect. While the local computations are executed locally by the interpreter, the interpreter compiles secure-computation ASTs to circuits, on the fly, and executes them using the Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson (GMW) multi-party computation protocol [26]. The Wys* AST (and hence the interpreter) does not “bake in” standard F* constructs like numbers and lists. Rather, inherited language features appear abstractly in the AST, and their semantics is handled by a foreign function interface (FFI). This permits Wys* programs to take advantage of existing code and libraries available in F*.

To prove the interpreter behaves correctly, we prove, in F*, that it correctly implements the formalized distributed semantics. The circuit library and the GMW implementation are not verified—while it is possible to verify the circuit library [4], verifying a GMW implementation is an open research question. But the stage is set for verified versions to be plugged into the Wys* codebase. We characterize the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of the Wys* toolchain in §3.5.

Using Wys* we have implemented several programs, including PSI, joint median, and a card dealing application (§4). For PSI and joint median we implement two versions: a straightforward one and an optimized one that improves performance but increases the number of adversary-observable events. We formally prove that the optimized and unoptimized versions are equivalent, both functionally and w.r.t. privacy of parties’ inputs. Our card dealing application relies on Wys*'s support for secret shares [56]. We formally prove that the card dealing algorithm always deals a fresh card.

In sum, Wys* constitutes the first DSL that supports proving security and correctness properties about MPC programs, which are executed by a partially verified implementation of a full-featured language. No prior DSL provides these benefits (§5). The Wys* implementation, example programs, and proofs are publicly available on Github at https://github.com/FStarLang/FStar/tree/stratified_last/examples/wysteria

2 Verifying and deploying Wys* programs

We illustrate the main concepts of Wys* by showing, in several stages, how to program, optimize, and verify the two-party joint median example [32, 53]. In

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2 This development was done on an older F* version, but the core ideas of what we present here apply to the present version as well.
this example, two parties, Alice and Bob, each have a set of \( n \) distinct, locally sorted integers, and they want to compute the median of the union of their sets without revealing anything else; our running example fixes \( n = 2 \), for simplicity.

### 2.1 Secure computations with \texttt{as\_sec}\footnote{The runtime representation of \texttt{sealed a v} at b’s host is an opaque constant \( \bullet \).}

In Wys*, as in its predecessor Wysteria \[^2\], an MPC is written as a single specification that executes in one of two \textit{computation modes}. The primary mode is called \texttt{sec} mode. In it, a computation is carried out using a MPC protocol among multiple principals on separate hosts. Here is joint median in Wys*:\footnotetext{The runtime representation of \texttt{sealed a v} at b’s host is an opaque constant \( \bullet \).}

```plaintext
1 let median a b in_a in_b =
2 \texttt{as\_sec \{a, b\} (fun () \rightarrow let cmp = fst (reveal in_a) > fst (reveal in_b) in}
3 \hspace{1em} let x3 = if cmp then fst (reveal in_a) else snd (reveal in_a) in
4 \hspace{1em} let y3 = if cmp then snd (reveal in_b) else fst (reveal in_a) in
5 \hspace{1em} if x3 > y3 then y3 else x3)
```

The four arguments to \texttt{median} are, respectively, principal identifiers for Alice and Bob, and Alice and Bob’s secret inputs expressed as tuples. In Wys*, values specific to each principal are \texttt{sealed} with the principal’s name (which appears in the sealed container’s type). As such, the types of \texttt{in\_a} and \texttt{in\_b} are, respectively, \texttt{sealed \{a\} (int * int)} and \texttt{sealed \{b\} (int * int)}. The \texttt{as\_sec ps f} construct indicates that thunk \( f \) should be run in \texttt{sec} mode among principals in the set \( ps \). In this mode, the code has access to the secrets of the principals \( ps \), which it can reveal using the \texttt{reveal} coercion. As we will see later, the type of \texttt{reveal} ensures that parties cannot \texttt{reveal} each others’ inputs outside \texttt{sec} mode.\footnote{The runtime representation of \texttt{sealed a v} at b’s host is an opaque constant \( \bullet \).} Also note that the code freely uses standard \texttt{F*} library functions like \texttt{fst} and \texttt{snd}. The example extends naturally to \( n > 2 \).\footnote{The runtime representation of \texttt{sealed a v} at b’s host is an opaque constant \( \bullet \).}

To run this program, both Alice and Bob would start a Wys* interpreter at their host and direct it to run the \texttt{median} function upon reaching the \texttt{as\_sec} thunk. The interpreters coordinate with each other to compute the result using the underlying MPC protocol.\[^2\] provides more details.

### 2.2 Optimizing median with \texttt{as\_par}

Although \texttt{median} gets the job done, it can be inefficient for large \( n \). However, it turns out if we reveal the result of comparison on line 2 to both the parties, then the computation on line 3 (resp. line 4) can be performed locally by Alice (resp. Bob) without need of cryptography. Doing so can massively improve performance: previous work \[^3\] has observed a 30× speedup for \( n = 64 \).

This optimized variant is a \textit{mixed-mode} computation, where participants perform some local computations interleaved with small, jointly evaluated secure computations. Wys*’s second computation mode, \texttt{par} mode, supports such mixed-mode computations. The construct \texttt{as\_par ps f} states that each principal in \( ps \) should locally execute the thunk \( f \), simultaneously; any principal not in
the set \( ps \) simply skips the computation. Within \( f \), while running in \( \text{par} \) mode, principals may engage in secure computations via \( \text{as}_\text{sec} \).

Here is an optimized version of \( \text{median} \) using \( \text{as}_\text{par} \):

```fstar
let median_opt a b in\_a in\_b =
1 let cmp = as\_sec \{a, b\} (fun () → fst (reveal in\_a) > fst (reveal in\_b)) in
2 let x3 = as\_par \{a\} (fun () → if cmp then fst (reveal in\_a) else snd (reveal in\_a)) in
3 let y3 = as\_par \{b\} (fun () → if cmp then snd (reveal in\_b) else fst (reveal in\_b)) in
4 as\_sec \{a, b\} (fun () → if reveal x3 > reveal y3 then reveal y3 else reveal x3)
```

The secure computation on (line 2) only computes \( \text{cmp} \) and returns the result to both the parties. Line 3 is then a \( \text{par} \) mode computation involving only Alice in which she discards one of her inputs based on \( \text{cmp} \). Similarly, on line 4 Bob discards one of his inputs. Finally, line 5 compares the remaining inputs using \( \text{as}_\text{sec} \) and returns the result as the final median.

One might wonder whether \( \text{par} \) mode is necessary. Could we program the local parts of a mixed-mode program in normal \( F^* \), and use a special compiler to convert the \( \text{sec} \) mode parts to circuits and pass them to a GMW MPC service? We could, but it would complicate both writing MPCs and formally reasoning that the whole computation is correct and secure. In particular, programmers would need to write one program for each party that performs a different local computation (as in \( \text{median}\_\text{opt} \)). The potential interleaving among local computations and their synchronization behavior when securely computing together would be a source of possible error and thus must be considered in any proof. For example, Alice’s code might have a bug in it that prevents it from reaching a synchronization point with Bob, to do a GMW-based MPC. For \( Wys^* \), the situation is much simpler. Programmers may write and maintain a single program. This program can be formally reasoned about directly using a SIMD-style, “single-threaded” semantics, per the soundness result from §3.4. This semantics permits reasoning about the coordinated behavior of multiple principals, without worry about the effects of interleavings or wrong synchronizations. Thanks to \( \text{par} \) mode, invariants about coordinated local computations are directly evident since we can soundly assume about lockstep behavior (e.g., loop iterations in the PSI example in §4).

### 2.3 Embedding a type system for \( Wys^* \) in \( F^* \)

Designing high-level, multi-party computations is relatively easy using Wysteria’s abstractions. Before trying to run such a computation, we might wonder:

1. Is it realizable? For example, does a computation that is claimed to be executed only by some principals \( ps \) (e.g., using an \( \text{as}_\text{par} \) \( ps \) or an \( \text{as}_\text{sec} \) \( ps \)) only ever access data belonging to \( ps \)?
2. Is it correct? For example, does \( \text{median}_\text{opt} \) correctly compute the median of Alice and Bob’s inputs?
3. Is it secure? For example, do the optimizations in \( \text{median}_\text{opt} \), which produce more visible outputs, potentially leak more about the inputs?
By embedding \( Wys^* \) in \( F^* \) and leveraging its extensible, monadic, dependent type-and-effect system, we address each of these three questions. We define a new indexed monad called \( Wys \) for computations that use MPC combinators \( \text{as}_\text{sec} \) and \( \text{as}_\text{par} \). Using \( Wys \) along with the \textit{sealed} type, we can ensure that protocols are realizable. Using \( F^* \)’s capabilities for formal verification, we can reason about a computation’s correctness. By characterizing observable events as part of \( Wys \), we can define trace properties of MPC programs, to reason about security.

To elaborate on the last: we are interested in \textit{application-level} security properties, assuming that the underlying cryptographic MPC protocol (GMW \cite{GMW} in our implementation) is secure. In particular, the \( Wys \) monad models the \textit{ideal} behavior of \( \text{sec} \) mode—a secure computation reveals only the final output and nothing else. Thus the programmer could reason, for example, that optimized MPC programs reveal no more than their unoptimized versions. To relate the proofs over ideal functionality to the actual implementation, as is standard, we rely on the security of the cryptographic protocol and the composition theorem \cite{GMW} to postulate that the implementation securely realizes the ideal specification.

\textit{The Wys monad.} The \( Wys \) monad provides several features. First, all DSL code is typed in this monad, encapsulating it from the rest of \( F^* \). Within the monad, computations and their specifications can make use of two kinds of \textit{ghost state}: \textit{modes} and \textit{traces}. The mode of a computation indicates whether the computation is running in an \( \text{as}_\text{par} \) or in an \( \text{as}_\text{sec} \) context. The trace of a computation records the sequence and nesting structure of outputs of the jointly executed \( \text{as}_\text{sec} \) expressions—the result of a computation and its trace constitute its observable behavior. The \( Wys \) monad is, in essence, the product of a reader monad on modes and a writer monad on traces \cite{reader,writer}.

Formally, we define the following \( F^* \) types for modes and traces. A mode \( \text{Mode } m \ ps \) is a pair of a mode tag (either \( \text{Par} \) or \( \text{Sec} \)) and a set of principals \( ps \). A trace is a forest of trace element (\( \text{telt} \)) trees. The leaves of the trees record messages \( \text{TMsg } x \) that are received as the result of executing an \( \text{as}_\text{sec} \) thunk. The tree structure represented by the \( \text{TScope } ps \ t \) nodes record the set of principals that are able to observe the messages in the trace \( t \).

\begin{verbatim}
  type mtag = Par | Sec
  type mode = Mode: m:mtag -> ps:prins -> mode
  type telt = TMsg: x:α -> telt | TScope: ps:prins -> t:list telt -> telt
  type trace = list telt

  Every Wys* computation \( e \) has a monadic computation type \( Wys \ t \ pre \ post \). The type indicates that \( e \) is in the \( Wys \) monad (so it may perform multi-party computations); \( t \) is its result type; \( pre \) is a pre-condition on the mode in which \( e \) may be executed; and \( post \) is a post-condition relating the computation’s mode, its result value, and its trace of observable events. When run in a context with mode \( m \) satisfying the pre-condition predicate \( pre \ m \), \( e \) may produce the trace \( tr \), and if and when it returns, the result is a \( t \)-typed value \( v \) validating \( post \ m \ v \ tr \). The style of indexing a monad with a computation’s pre- and post-condition is a standard technique \cite{reader,writer}—we defer the definition of the monad’s bind and
\end{verbatim}
return to the actual implementation and focus instead on specifications of Wys* specific combinators. We describe \texttt{as\_sec}, \texttt{reveal}, and \texttt{as\_par}, and how we give them types in F*, leaving the rest to Figure 10 in the Appendix. By convention, any free variables in the type signatures are universally prenex quantified.

*Defining \texttt{as\_sec} in Wys*.\n
1. \texttt{val as\_sec: ps:prins \to f:(unit \to Wys a pre post) \to Wys a}
2. \hspace{1em} (\texttt{requires (fun m -> m=\text{Mode Par ps} \land \text{pre (Mode Sec ps))}})
3. \hspace{1em} (\texttt{ensures (fun m r tr -> tr=[\text{TMsg r}] \land \exists t. \text{post (Mode Sec ps r t))}})

The type of \texttt{as\_sec} is dependent on the first parameter, \texttt{ps}. Its second argument \texttt{f} is the thunk to be evaluated in \texttt{sec} mode. The result’s computation type has the form \texttt{Wys a (requires \phi) (ensures \psi)}, for some pre-condition and post-condition predicates \texttt{\phi} and \texttt{\psi}, respectively. We use the \texttt{requires} and \texttt{ensures} keywords for readability—they are not semantically significant.

The pre-condition of \texttt{as\_sec} is a predicate on the mode \texttt{m} of the computation in whose context \texttt{as\_sec ps f} is called. For all the \texttt{ps} to jointly execute \texttt{f}, we require all of them to transition to perform the \texttt{as\_sec ps f} call simultaneously, i.e., the current mode must be \texttt{Mode Par ps}. We also require the pre-condition \texttt{pre} of \texttt{f} to be valid once the mode has transitioned to \texttt{Mode Sec ps}—line 2 says just this.

The post-condition of \texttt{as\_sec} is a predicate relating the initial mode \texttt{m}, the result \texttt{r.a}, and the trace \texttt{tr} of the computation. Line 3 states that the trace of a secure computation \texttt{as\_sec ps f} is just a singleton \texttt{[\text{TMsg r]}}, reflecting that its execution reveals only result \texttt{r}. Additionally, it ensures that the result \texttt{r} is related to the mode in which \texttt{f} is run (\texttt{Mode Sec ps}) and some trace \texttt{t} according to \texttt{post}, the post-condition \texttt{pre} of \texttt{f} to be valid once the mode has transitioned to \texttt{Mode Sec ps}—line 2 says just this.

*Defining \texttt{reveal} in Wys*. As discussed earlier, a value \texttt{v} of type \texttt{sealed ps t} encapsulates a \texttt{t} value that can be accessed by calling \texttt{reveal v}. This call should only succeed under certain circumstances. For example, in \texttt{par} mode, Bob should not be able to reveal a value of type \texttt{sealed \{Alice\} int}. The type of \texttt{reveal} makes the access control rules clear:

\texttt{val unseal: sealed ps \alpha \to \text{Ghost} \alpha}

\texttt{val reveal: x:sealed ps \alpha \to Wys \alpha}

\hspace{1em} (\texttt{requires (fun m -> m.mode=\text{Par} \implies m.ps \subseteq ps \land m.mode=\text{Sec} \implies m.ps \cap ps \neq \emptyset)})

\hspace{1em} (\texttt{ensures (fun m r tr -> r=unseal x \land tr=[])})

The \texttt{unseal} function is a \texttt{Ghost} function, meaning that it can only be used in specifications for reasoning purposes. On the other hand, \texttt{reveal} can be called in the concrete Wys* programs. Its precondition says that when executing in \texttt{Mode Par ps}, all current participants must be listed in the seal, i.e., \texttt{ps’ \subseteq ps}. However, when executing in \texttt{Mode Sec ps}, only a subset of current participants is required: \texttt{ps’ \cap ps \neq \emptyset}. This is because the secure computation is executed jointly
by all of \(ps\), so it can access any of their individual data. The postcondition of \(\text{reveal}\) relates the result \(r\) to the argument \(x\) using the \(\text{unseal}\) function.

**Defining \(\text{as\_par}\) in \(\text{Wys}^*\).**

1. \(\text{val as\_par: } ps:prins \rightarrow (\text{unit} \rightarrow \text{Wys} \ a \ \text{pre} \ \text{post}) \rightarrow \text{Wys} \ (\text{sealed}\ ps\ a)\)
2. \(\text{(requires } (\text{fun m} \rightarrow m.\text{mode=}\text{Par} \land ps \subseteq m.ps \land \text{can\_seal ps a} \land \text{pre (Mode Par ps)})\))
3. \(\text{(ensures } (\text{fun m r tr} \rightarrow \exists t. \ tr = [TScope ps t] \land \text{post (Mode Par ps) (unseal r) t})))\)

The type of \(\text{as\_par}\) enforces the current mode to be \(\text{Par}\), and \(ps\) to be a subset of current principals. Importantly, the API scopes the trace \(t\) of \(f\) to model the fact that any observables of \(f\) are only visible to the principals in \(ps\). Note that \(\text{as\_sec}\) did not require such scoping, as there \(ps\) and the set of current principals in \(m\) are the same.

### 2.4 Correctness and security verification

Using the \(\text{Wys}\) monad and the \(\text{sealed}\) type, we can write down precise types for our \(\text{median}\) and \(\text{median\_opt}\) programs, proving various useful properties. We discuss the statements of the main lemmas and the overall proof structure. By programming the protocols as a single specification using the high-level abstractions provided by \(\text{Wys}^*\), our proofs are relatively straightforward—in all the proofs of this section, F* required no additional hints. In particular, we rely heavily on the view that both parties execute (different fragments of) the same code, thus avoiding the unwieldy task of reasoning about low-level message passing.

**Correctness and security of \(\text{median}\).** We first define a pure specification of median of two int tuples:

\[
\text{let median\_of (x1, x2) (y1, y2) = let } (\_, m, \_, \_) = \text{sort x1 x2 y1 y2 in } m
\]

Further, we capture the preconditions using the following predicate:

\[
\text{let median\_pre (x1, x2) (y1, y2) = x1 < x2 \land y1 < y2 \land distinct x1 x2 y1 y2}
\]

Using these, we prove the following top-level specification for median:

\[
\text{val median: } \text{in\_a:sealed } \{a\} \ (\text{int} \ast \text{int}) \rightarrow \text{in\_b:sealed } \{b\} \ (\text{int} \ast \text{int}) \rightarrow \text{Wys} \ \text{int}
\]

\[
\text{(requires } (\text{fun m} \rightarrow m = \text{Mode Par } \{a, b\})) (* \text{should be called in the Par mode} *)
\]

\[
\text{(ensures } (\text{fun m r tr} \rightarrow \text{let in\_a, in\_b = unseal in\_a, unseal in\_b in}
\]

\[
(\text{median\_pre in\_a in\_b } \implies r = \text{median\_of in\_a in\_b}) \land (* \text{functional correctness} *)
\]

\[
\text{tr = [TMsg ra]]) (* \text{trace is just the final value} *)
\]

This signature establishes that when Alice and Bob simultaneously execute \(\text{median}\) (in Par mode), with secrets \(\text{in\_a}\) and \(\text{in\_b}\), then if and when the protocol terminates, (a) if their inputs satisfy the precondition \(\text{median\_pre}\), then the result is the joint median of their inputs and (b) the observable trace consists only of the final result, as there is but a single \(\text{as\_sec}\) thunk in \(\text{median}\), i.e., it is \(\text{secure}\).
Correctness and security of \texttt{median\_opt}. The security proof of \texttt{median\_opt} is particularly interesting, because the program intentionally reveals more than just the final result, i.e., the output of the first comparison. We would like to verify that this additional information does not compromise the privacy of the parties’ inputs. To do this, we take the following approach.

First, we characterize the observable trace of \texttt{median\_opt} as a pure, specification-only function. Then, using relational reasoning, we prove a noninterference with delimited release property \cite{54} on these traces. Essentially we prove that, for two runs of \texttt{median\_opt} where Bob’s inputs and the output median are the same, the observable traces are also same irrespective of Alice’s inputs. Thus, from Alice’s perspective, the observable trace does not reveal more to Bob than what the output already does. We prove this property symmetrically for Bob.

We start by defining a trace function for \texttt{median\_opt}:

\begin{verbatim}
let opt_trace a b (x1, _) (y1, _) m = [
  TMsg (x1 > y1); (* observable from the first as_sec *)
  TScope {a} []; TScope {b} []; (* observables from two local as_par *)
  TMsg m]; (* observable from the final as_sec *)
\end{verbatim}

A trace will have four elements: output of the first as_sec computation, two empty scoped traces for the two local as_par computations, and the final output.

Using this function, we prove correctness of \texttt{median\_opt}, thus:

\begin{verbatim}
val median\_opt: in\_a:sealed {a} (int * int) → in\_b:sealed {b} (int * int) → Wys int
  (requires (fun m → m = Mode Par {a, b})) (* should be called in the Par mode *)
  (ensures (fun m r tr → let in\_a = unseal in\_a in let in\_b = unseal in\_b in
    (median\_pre in\_a in\_b ⇒ r = median\_of in\_a in\_b) ∧ (* functional correctness *)
    tr = opt\_trace a b in\_a in\_b m (* opt\_trace precisely describes the observable trace *))
\end{verbatim}

The delimited release property is then captured by the following lemma:

\begin{verbatim}
val median\_opt\_is\_secure\_for\_alice: a:prin → b:prin
  → in\_a\_1:(int * int) → in\_a\_2:(int * int) → in\_b:(int * int) (* possibly diff a1, a2 *)
  → Lemma (requires (median\_pre in\_a\_1 in\_b ∧ median\_pre in\_a\_2 in\_b ∧
    median\_of in\_a\_1 in\_b = median\_of in\_a\_2 in\_b)) (* but same median *)
    (ensures (opt\_trace a b in\_a\_1 in\_b (median\_of in\_a\_1 in\_b) = (* ensures .. *)
      opt\_trace a b in\_a\_2 in\_b (median\_of in\_a\_2 in\_b))) (* .. same trace *)
\end{verbatim}

The lemma proves that for two runs of \texttt{median\_opt} where Bob’s input and the final output remain same, but Alice’s inputs vary arbitrarily, the observable traces are the same. As such, no more information about information leaks about Alice’s inputs via the traces than what is already revealed by the output. We also prove a symmetrical lemma \texttt{median\_opt\_is\_secure\_for\_bob}.

In short, because the \texttt{Wys} monad provides programmers with the observable traces in the logic, they can then be used to prove properties, relational or otherwise, in the pure fragment of \textit{F} outside the \texttt{Wys} monad. We present more examples and their verification details in \S4.
2.5 Deploying Wys* programs

Having defined a proved-secure MPC program in Wys*, how do we run it? Doing so requires the following steps (Figure 1). First, we run the F* compiler in a special mode that extracts the Wys* code (say psi.fst), into the Wys* AST as a data structure (in psi.ml). Except for the Wys* specific nodes (as_sec, as_par, etc.), the rest of the program is extracted into FFI nodes that indicate the use of, or calls into, functionality provided by F* itself.

The next step is for each party to run the extracted AST using the Wys* interpreter. This interpreter is written in F* and we have proved (see §3.5) it implements a deep embedding of the Wys* semantics, also specified in F* (Figures 5 and 6, §3). The interpreter is extracted to OCaml by the usual F* extraction. Each party’s interpreter executes the AST locally until it reaches an as_sec ps f node, where the interpreter’s back-end compiles f, on-the-fly, for particular values of the secrets in f’s environment, to a boolean circuit. First-order, loop-free code can be compiled to a circuit; Wys* provides specialized support for several common combinators (e.g., fst, snd, list combinators such as List.intersect, List.mem, List.nth etc.).

The circuit is handed to a library by Choi et al. [22] that implements the GMW [26] MPC protocol. Running the GMW protocol involves the parties in ps generating and communicating (XOR-based) secret shares [56] for their secret inputs, and then cooperatively evaluating the boolean circuit for f over them.

One obvious question is how both parties are able to get this process off the ground, given that they don’t know some of the inputs (e.g., other parties’ secrets). The sealed abstraction helps here. Recall that for median, the types of the inputs are of the form sealed {a} (int * int) and sealed {b} (int * int). When the program is run on Alice’s host, the former will be a pair of Alice’s values, whereas the latter will be an opaque constant (which we denote as •). The reverse will
be true on Bob’s host. When the circuit is constructed, each principal links their non-opaque inputs to the relevant input wires of the circuit. Similarly, the output map component of each party is derived from their output wires in the circuit, and thus, each party only gets to see their own output.

3 Formalizing and implementing Wys*

In the previous section, we presented examples of verifying properties about WYS* programs using F*’s logic. However, these programs are not executed using the F* (single-threaded) semantics; they have a distributed semantics involving multiple parties. So, how do the properties that we verify using F* carry over?

In this section, we present the metatheory that answers this question. First, we formalize the WYS* single-threaded (ST) semantics, that faithfully models the F* semantics of the WYS* API presented in §2. Next, we formalize the distributed (DS) semantics that multiple parties use to run WYS* programs. Then we prove the former is sound with respect to the latter, so that properties proved of programs under ST apply when run under DS. We have mechanized the proof of this theorem in F*.

3.1 Syntax

Figure 2 shows the complete syntax of WYS*. Principals and principal sets are first-class values, and are denoted by $p$ and $s$ respectively. Constants in the language also include $(\cdot)$ (unit), booleans, and FFI constants $c$. Expressions $e$ include the regular forms for functions, applications, let bindings, etc. and the WYS*-specific constructs. Among the ones that we have not seen in §2 expression $\text{mkmap } e_1 \ e_2$ creates a map from principals in $e_1$ (which is a principal set) to the value computed by $e_2$. $\text{project } e_1 \ e_2$ projects the value of principal $e_1$ from the map $e_2$, and $\text{concat } e_1 \ e_2$ concatenates the two maps. The maps are used if an as_sec computation returns different outputs to the parties.

Host language (i.e., F*) constructs are also part of the syntax of WYS*, including constants $c$ include strings, integers, lists, tuples, etc. Likewise, host language functions/primitives can be called from WYS*—$\text{ffi } f \bar{e}$ is the invocation of a host-language function $f$ with arguments $\bar{e}$. The FFI confers two benefits. First, it simplifies the core language while still allowing full consideration of...
map m ::= \cdot | m[p \mapsto v] 
value v ::= p | s | () | true | false | sealed s v | m | v | (L, \lambda x.e) | (L, \text{fix } f.\lambda x.e) | \bullet
mode M ::= \text{Par } s | \text{Sec } s
context E ::= () | as\text{par } e | as\text{par } v () | as\text{sec } e | as\text{sec } v () | \ldots
frame F ::= (M, L, E, T)
stack X ::= \cdot | F, X
environment L ::= \cdot | L[x \mapsto v]
trace element t ::= T\text{Msg } v | T\text{Scope } s T
trace T ::= \cdot | t, T
configuration C ::= M; X; L; T; e

\text{Par component } P ::= \cdot | P[p \mapsto C]
\text{Sec component } S ::= \cdot | S[s \mapsto C]
protocol \pi ::= \cdot | P, S

\text{Fig. 3. Runtime configuration syntax}

\text{S-aspar}
e_1 = as\text{par } s (L_1, \lambda x.e) \quad M = \text{Par } s_1 \quad s \subseteq s_1
\quad X_1 = (M; L; \text{seal } s (); T), X

\quad M; X; L; T; e_1 \rightarrow \text{Par } s; X_1; L_1[x \mapsto ()]; \ldots; e

\text{S-parret}
\quad X = (M_1; L_1; \text{seal } s (); T_1), X_1
\quad \text{can\text{seal } s } v \quad T_2 = \text{append } T_1 [T\text{Scope } s T]

\quad M; X; L; T; v \rightarrow M_1; X_1; L_1; T_2; \text{sealed } s v

\text{S-assec}
e_1 = as\text{sec } s (L_1, \lambda x.e) \quad M = \text{Par } s
\quad X_1 = (M; L; () T), X

\quad M; X; L; T; e_1 \rightarrow \text{Sec } s; X_1; L_1[x \mapsto ()]; \ldots; e

\text{S-secret}
\quad is\text{sec } M \quad X = (M_1; L_1; (); T), X_1
\quad T_1 = \text{append } T [T\text{Msg } v]

\quad M; X; L; \vdots v \rightarrow M_1; X_1; L_1; T_1; v

\text{Fig. 4. Wys* ST semantics (selected rules)}

security relevant properties. Second, it helps the language scale by incorporating many of the standard features, libraries, etc. from the host language.

3.2 Single-threaded semantics

We formalize the semantics in the style of Hieb and Felleisen [24], where the redex is chosen by (standard, not shown) \textit{evaluation contexts} \( E \), which prescribe left-to-right, call-by-value evaluation order. The ST semantics, a model of the F* semantics and the Wys* API, defines a judgment \( C \rightarrow C' \) that represents a single step of an abstract machine (Figure 4). Here, \( C \) is a \textit{configuration} \( M; X; L; T; e \). This five-tuple consists of a mode \( M \), a stack \( X \), a local environment \( L \), a trace \( T \), and an expression \( e \). The syntax for these elements is given in Figure 3. The value form \( v \) represents the host language (FFI) values. The stack and environment are standard; trace \( T \) and mode \( M \) were discussed in the previous section.

For space reasons, we focus on the two main Wys* constructs \texttt{as\text{par}} and \texttt{as\text{sec}}. Appendix B shows rules for other Wys* specific constructs.
Observations during the reduction of e and starts evaluating e’s pals in pops the frame and seals the result, so that it is accessible only to the principals from the set S.

In the DS semantics, principals evaluate the same program locally and asynchronously until they reach a secure computation, at which point they synchronize to jointly perform the computation. The semantics consists of two parts: (a) a judgment of the form \( \pi \rightarrow \pi’ \) (Figure 5), where a protocol \( \pi \) is a tuple...

**3.3 Distributed semantics**

In the DS semantics, principals evaluate the same program locally and asynchronously until they reach a secure computation, at which point they synchronize to jointly perform the computation. The semantics consists of two parts: (a) a judgment of the form \( \pi \rightarrow \pi’ \) (Figure 5), where a protocol \( \pi \) is a tuple...

**Fig. 5.** Distributed semantics, multi-party rules

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{P-PAR} & \quad C \rightarrow C’ \quad \forall p \in s. P[p], e = \text{as\_sec} s (L_p, \lambda x.e) \\
& \quad P[p \rightarrow C]; S \rightarrow P[p \rightarrow C’]; S \\
\text{P-SEC} & \quad C \rightarrow C’ \\
& \quad P; S[s \rightarrow C] \rightarrow P; S[s \rightarrow C’]
\end{align*}
\]

**Fig. 6.** Distributed semantics, selected local rules (the mode \( M \) is always \( \text{Par} p \))

Rules S-ASPAR and S-PARRET (Figure 4) reduce an as\_par expression once its arguments are fully evaluated—its first argument \( s \) is a principal set, while the second argument \( (L_1, \lambda x.e) \) is a closure where \( L_1 \) captures the free variables of thunk \( \lambda x.e \). S-ASPAR first checks that the current mode \( M \) is \( \text{Par} \) and contains all the principals from the set \( s \). It then pushes a seal \( s \) frame on the stack, and starts evaluating \( e \) under the environment \( L_1[x \rightarrow ()] \). The rule S-ASPARRET pops the frame and seals the result, so that it is accessible only to the principals in \( s \). The rule also creates a trace element TScope \( s T \), essentially making observations during the reduction of \( e \) (i.e., \( T \)) visible only to principals in \( s \).

Turning to as\_sec, the rule S-ASSECRET checks the precondition of the API, and the rule S-ASSECRET generates a trace observation TMsg \( v \), as per the postcondition of the API. As mentioned before, as\_sec semantics models the ideal, trusted third-party semantics of secure computations where the participants only observe the final output. We can confirm that the rules implement the types of as\_par and as\_sec shown in [2]
(P; S) such that P maps each principal to its local configuration and S maps a set of principals to the configuration of an ongoing, secure computation; and (b) a local evaluation judgment C → C' (Figure 6) to model how a single principal behaves while in par mode.

Rule P-PAR in Figure 5 models a single party taking a step, per the local evaluation rules. Figure 6 shows these rules for as-par. (See Appendix B for more local evaluation rules.) A principal either participates in the as_par computation, or skips it. Rules L-ASPAR1 and L-PARRET handle the case when \( p \in s \), and so, the principal \( p \) participates in the computation. The rules closely mirror the corresponding ST semantics rules in Figure 4. One difference in the rule L-ASPARRET is that the trace \( T \) is not scoped. In the DS semantics, traces only contain TMsg elements; i.e., a trace is the (flat) list of secure computation outputs observed by that active principal. If \( p \notin s \), then the principal skips the computation with the result being a sealed value containing the opaque constant \( \bullet \) (rule L-ASPAR2). The contents of the sealed value do not matter, since the principal will not be allowed to unseal the value anyway.

As should be the case, there are no local rules for as_sec—to perform a secure computation parties need to combine their data and jointly do the computation. Rule P-ENTER in Figure 5 handles the case when principals enter a secure computation. It requires that all the principals \( p \in s \) must have the expression form as_sec \( s (L_p, \lambda x.e) \), where \( L_p \) is their local environment associated with the closure. Each party’s local environment contains its secret values (in addition to some public values). Conceptually, a secure computation combines these environments, thereby producing a joint view, and evaluates \( e \) under the combination.

We define an auxiliary combine function for this purpose:

\[
\text{combine}_v (\bullet, v) = v \\
\text{combine}_v (v, \bullet) = v \\
\text{combine}_v (\text{sealed } s v_1, \text{sealed } s v_2) = \text{sealed } s (\text{combine}_v v_1 v_2) \\
\ldots
\]

The rule P-ENTER combines the principals’ environments, and creates a new entry in the S map. The principals are now waiting for the secure computation to finish. Rule P-SEC models a stepping rule inside the sec mode.

The rule P-EXIT applies when a secure computation has completed and returns results to the waiting principals. If the secure computation terminates with value \( v \), each principal \( p \) gets the value slice_v p v. The slice_v function is analogous to combine, but in the opposite direction—it strips off the parts of \( v \) that are not accessible to \( p \):

\[
\text{slice}_v p (\text{sealed } s v) = \text{sealed } s \bullet, \text{ if } p \notin s \\
\text{slice}_v p (\text{sealed } s v) = \text{sealed } s (\text{slice}_v v p), \text{ if } p \in s \\
\ldots
\]

In the rule P-EXIT, the ⊲ notation is defined as:

\[
M; X; L; T; \_ ⊲ v = M; X; L; \text{append } T [\text{TMsg } v]; v
\]

That is, the returned value is also added to the principal’s trace to note their observation of the value.
3.4 Metatheory

Our goal is to show that the ST semantics faithfully represents the semantics of Wys\(^\star\) programs as they are executed by multiple parties, i.e., according to the DS semantics. We do this by proving simulation of the ST semantics by the DS semantics, and by proving confluence of the DS semantics. Our F\(^\star\) development mechanizes all the metatheory presented in this section.

Simulation. We define a slice \(sC\) function that returns the corresponding protocol \(\pi_C\) for an ST configuration \(C\). In the \(P\) component of \(\pi_C\), each principal \(p \in s\) is mapped to their slice of the protocol. For slicing values, we use the same slice\(v\) function as before. Traces are sliced as follows:

\[
slice_{tr} p (TMsg v) = \left[ TMsg (\text{slice}\_v p v) \right]
\]

\[
slice_{tr} p (TScope s T) = \text{slice}_{tr} p T, \text{ if } p \in s
\]

\[
slice_{tr} p (TScope s T) = [], \text{ if } p \not\in s
\]

The slice of an expression (e.g., the source program) is itself. For all other components of \(C\), slice functions are defined analogously.

We say that \(C\) is terminal if it is in Par mode and is fully reduced to a value (i.e. when \(C = \_X; \_e\), \(e\) is a value and \(X\) is empty). Similarly, a protocol \(\pi = (P, S)\) is terminal if \(S\) is empty and all the local configurations in \(P\) are terminal. The simulation theorem is then the following:

**Theorem 1 (Simulation of ST by DS).** Let \(s\) be the set of all principals. If \(C_1 \rightarrow^{\star} C_2\), and \(C_2\) is terminal, then there exists some derivation \((\text{slice } s C_1) \rightarrow^{\star} (\text{slice } s C_2)\) such that \((\text{slice } s C_2)\) is terminal.

To state confluence, we first define the notion of strong termination.

**Definition 1 (Strong termination).** If all possible runs of protocol \(\pi\) terminate at \(\pi_t\), we say \(\pi\) strongly terminates in \(\pi_t\), written \(\pi \Downarrow \pi_t\).

Our confluence result then says:

**Theorem 2 (Confluence of DS).** If \(\pi \rightarrow^{\star} \pi_t\) and \(\pi_t\) is terminal, then \(\pi \Downarrow \pi_t\).

Combining the two theorems, we get a corollary that establishes the soundness of the ST semantics w.r.t. the DS semantics:

**Corollary 1 (Soundness of ST semantics).** Let \(s\) be the set of all principals. If \(C_1 \rightarrow^{\star} C_2\), and \(C_2\) is terminal, then \((\text{slice } s C_1) \Downarrow (\text{slice } s C_2)\).

Now suppose that for a Wys\(^\star\) source program, we prove in F\(^\star\) a post-condition that the result is sealed alice \(n\), for some \(n > 0\). By the soundness of the ST semantics, we can conclude that when the program is run in the DS semantics, it may diverge, but if it terminates, alice’s output will also be sealed alice \(n\), and for all other principals their outputs will be sealed alice \(\bullet\). Aside from the correspondence on results, our semantics also covers correspondence on traces. Thus the correctness and security properties that we prove about a Wys\(^\star\) program using F\(^\star\)’s logic, hold for the program that actually runs.
The formal semantics presented in the prior section is mechanized as an inductive type in F\(^{\star}\). This style is useful for proving properties, but does not directly translate to an implementation. Therefore, we implement an interpretation function \texttt{step} in F\(^{\star}\) and prove that it corresponds to the rules: i.e., that for all input configurations \(C\), \(\texttt{step}(C) = C'\) implies that \(C \rightarrow C'\) according to the semantics. Then, the core of each principal’s implementation is an F\(^{\star}\) stub function \texttt{tstep} that repeatedly invokes \texttt{step} on the AST of the source program (produced by the F\(^{\star}\) extractor run in a custom mode), unless the AST is an as\_sec node. Functions \texttt{step} and \texttt{tstep} are extracted to OCaml by the standard F\(^{\star}\) extraction process.

Local evaluation is not defined for as\_sec, so the stub implements what amounts to P-\texttt{ENTER} and P-\texttt{EXIT} from Figure 5. When the stub notices the program has reached an as\_sec expression, it calls into a circuit library we have written that converts the AST of the second argument of as\_sec to a boolean circuit. This circuit and the encoded inputs are communicated to a co-hosted server that implements the GMW MPC protocol [22]. The server evaluates the circuit, coordinating with the GMW servers of the other principals, and sends back the result. The circuit library decodes the result and returns it to the stub. The stub then carries on with the local evaluation. Our FFI interface currently provides a form of monomorphic, first-order interoperability between the (dynamically typed) interpreter and the host language.

Our F\(^{\star}\) formalization of the Wys\(^{\star}\) semantics, including the AST specification, is 1900 lines of code. This formalization is used both by the metatheory as well as by the (executable) interpreter. The metatheory that connects the ST and DS semantics is 3000 lines. The interpreter and its correctness proof are another 290 lines of F\(^{\star}\) code. The interpreter \texttt{step} function is essentially a big switch-case on the current expression, that calls into the functions from the semantics specification. The \texttt{tstep} stub is another 15 lines. The size of the circuit library, not including the GMW implementation, is 836 lines. The stub, the implementation of GMW, the circuit library, and F\(^{\star}\) toolchain (including the custom Wys\(^{\star}\) extraction mode) are part of our Trusted Computing Base (TCB).

## 4 Applications

In addition to joint median, presented in §2, we have implemented and proved properties of two other MPC applications, dealing for on-line card games and private set intersection (PSI).

**Card dealing.** We have implemented an MPC-based card dealing application in Wys\(^{\star}\). Such an application can play the role of the dealer in a game of online poker, thereby eliminating the need to trust the game portal for card dealing. The application relies on Wys\(^{\star}\)’s support for secret shares [56]. Using secret shares, the participating parties can share a value in a way that none of the parties can observe the actual value individually (each party’s share consists of
some random-looking bytes), but they can recover the value by combining their shares in sec mode.

In the application, the parties maintain a list of secret shares of already dealt cards (the number of already dealt cards is public information). To deal a new card, each party first generates a random number locally. The parties then perform a secure computation to compute the sum of their random numbers modulo 52, let’s call it $n$. The output of the secure computation is secret shares of $n$. Before declaring $n$ as the newly dealt card, the parties needs to ensure that the card $n$ has not already been dealt. To do so, they iterate over the list of secret shares of already dealt cards, and for each element of the list, check that it is different from $n$. The check is performed in a secure computation that simply combines the shares of $n$, combines the shares of the list element, and checks the equality of the two values. If $n$ is different from all the previously dealt cards, it is declared to be the new card, else the parties repeat the protocol by again generating a fresh random number each.

Wys* provides the following API for secret shares:

```
type Sh: Type → Type

type can_sh: Type → Type

assume Cansh_int: can_sh int

val v_of_sh: sh:Sh α → Ghost α
val ps_of_sh: sh:Sh α → Ghost prins

val mk_sh: x:α → Wys (Sh α) (requires (fun m → m.mode = Sec ∧ can_sh α))
(ensures (fun m r tr → v_of_sh r = x ∧ ps_of_sh r = m.ps ∧ tr = []))

val comb_sh: x:Sh α → Wys α (requires (fun m → m.mode = Sec ∧ ps_of_sh x = m.ps))
(ensures (fun m r tr → v_of_sh x = r ∧ tr = []))
```

Type $\text{Sh} \alpha$ types the shares of values of type $\alpha$. Our implementation currently supports shares of int values only; the $\text{can_sh}$ predicate enforces this restriction on the source programs. Extending secret shares support to other types (such as pairs) should be straightforward (as in [52]). Functions $\text{v_of_sh}$ and $\text{ps_of_sh}$ are marked $\text{Ghost}$, meaning that they can only be used in specifications for reasoning purposes. In the concrete code, shares are created and combined using the $\text{mk_sh}$ and $\text{comb_sh}$ functions. Together, the specifications of these functions enforce that the shares are created and combined by the same set of parties (through $\text{ps_of_sh}$), and that $\text{comb_sh}$ recovers the original value (through $\text{v_of_sh}$). The Wys* interpreter transparently handles the low-level details of extracting shares from the GMW implementation of Choi et al. ($\text{mk_sh}$), and reconstituting the shares back ($\text{comb_sh}$).

In addition to implementing the card dealing application in Wys*, we have formally verified that the returned card is fresh. The signature of the function that checks for freshness of the newly dealt card is as follows ($\text{abc}$ is the set of three parties in the computation):

```
val check_fresh: !list (Sh int){∀ s’. mem s’ l → ps_of_sh s’ = abc}
```
→ s:\text{Sh} \{ \text{ps} = \text{abc} \}
→ \text{Wys} \ \text{bool} \ (\text{requires} \ (\text{fun} \ m \to m = \text{Mode Par abc}))
   \ (\text{ensures} \ (\text{fun} \ r \to r \iff (\forall s'. \text{mem} s' l \implies \neg (v_{\text{of_sh}} s = v_{\text{of_sh}} s'))))

The specification says that the function takes two arguments: \( l \) is the list of secret shares of already dealt cards, and \( s \) is the secret shares of the newly dealt card. The function returns a boolean \( r \) that is true iff the concrete value \( (v_{\text{of_sh}}) \) of \( s \) is different from the concrete values of all the elements of the list \( l \). Using \( \text{F}^* \), we verify that the implementation of check\_fresh meets this specification.

**PSI.** Consider a dating application that enables its users to compute their common interests without revealing all of them. This is an instance of the more general private set intersection (PSI) problem \cite{28}.

We implement a straightforward version of PSI in Wys*:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{let} & \ psi \ a \ b \ (\text{input} \ a = \text{sealed} \ \{ a \} \ (\text{list} \ \text{int})) \ (\text{input} \ b = \text{sealed} \ \{ b \} \ (\text{list} \ \text{int})) \ (l_a: \text{int}) \ (l_b: \text{int}) = \\
\text{as} \ \text{sec} \ \{ a, b \} \ (\text{fun} () \to \text{List}.\text{intersect} \ (\text{reveal} \ \text{input} a) \ (\text{reveal} \ \text{input} b) \ l_a l_b)
\end{align*}
\]

where the input sets are expressed as lists with public lengths.

Huang et al. \cite{28} provide an optimized PSI algorithm that performs much better when the density of common elements in the two sets is high. We implement their algorithm in Wys*. The optimized version consists of two nested loops -- an outer loop for Alice’s set and an inner loop for Bob’s -- where an iteration of the inner loop compares the current element of Alice’s set with the current element of Bob’s. The nested loops are written using \text{as} \ \text{par} so that both Alice and Bob execute the loops in lockstep (note that the set sizes are public), while the comparison in the inner loop happens using \text{as} \ \text{sec}. Instead of naive \( l_a \ast l_b \) comparisons, Huang et al. \cite{28} observe that once an element of Alice’s set \( a_x \) matches an element of Bob’s set \( b_x \), the inner loop can return immediately, skipping the comparisons of \( a_x \) with the rest of Bob’s set. Furthermore, \( b_x \) can be removed from Bob’s set, excluding it from any further comparisons with other elements in Alice’s set. Since there are no repeats in the input sets, all the excluded comparisons are guaranteed to be false. We show the full code and its performance comparison with \text{psi} in Appendix A.

As with the median example from \S 2, the optimized PSI intentionally reveals more for performance gains. As such, we would like to verify that the optimizations do not reveal more about parties’ inputs. We take the following stepwise refinement approach. First, we characterize the trace of the optimized implementation as a pure function \text{trace}_{\text{psi_opt}} \ la \ lb (omitted for space reasons), and show that the trace of \text{psi_opt} is precisely \text{trace}_{\text{psi_opt}} \ la \ lb.

Then, we define an intermediate PSI implementation that has the same nested loop structure, but performs \( l_a \ast l_b \) comparisons without any optimizations. We characterize the trace of this intermediate implementation as the pure function \text{trace}_{\text{psi}}, and show that it precisely captures the trace.

To show that \text{trace}_{\text{psi}} does not reveal more than the intersection of the input sets, we prove the following lemma.

\[
\Psi \ l_{a_0} l_{a_1} l_{b_0} l_{b_1} \overset{\text{def}}{=} (* \text{possibly diff input sets, but with } *)
\]
\( \text{length } l_{a0} = \text{length } l_{a1} \land (\ast \text{lengths the same } \ast) \) \\
\( l_{a0} \cap l_{b0} = l_{a1} \cap l_{b1} \land (\ast \text{intersections the same } \ast) \)

\[
\text{val psi\_interim\_is\_secure: } l_{a0} : \rightarrow l_{b0} : \rightarrow l_{a1} : \rightarrow l_{b1} : \rightarrow \text{Lemma}
\]

\( (\text{requires } (\Psi l_{a0} l_{a1} l_{b0} l_{b1})) (\text{ensures } (\text{permutation } (\text{trace}_{\text{psi}} l_{a0} l_{b0}) (\text{trace}_{\text{psi}} l_{a1} l_{b1}))) \)

The lemma essentially says that for two runs on same length inputs, if the output is the same, then the resulting traces are permutation of each other\(^\text{5}\). We can reason about the traces of \text{psi\_interim} up to permutation because Alice has no prior knowledge of the choice of representation of Bob’s set (Bob can shuffle his list), so cannot learn anything from a permutation of the trace.\(^\text{7}\) This establishes the security of \text{psi\_interim}.

Finally, we can connect \text{psi\_interim} to \text{psi\_opt} by showing that there exists a function \( f \), such that for any trace \( tr = \text{trace}_{\text{psi}} l_{a} l_{b} \), the trace of \text{psi\_opt}, \( \text{trace}_{\text{psi\_opt}} l_{a} l_{b} \), can be computed by \( f(\text{length } l_{a})(\text{length } l_{b}) tr \). In other words, the trace produced by the optimized implementation can be computed using a function of information already available to Alice (or Bob) when she (or he) observes a run of the secure, unoptimized version \text{psi\_interim} \( l_{a} l_{b} \). As such, the optimizations do not reveal further information.

5 Related work

Source MPC verification. While the verification of the underlying crypto protocols has received some attention\(^\text{4,5}\), the verification of correctness and security properties of MPC source programs has remained largely unexplored, surprisingly so given that the goal of MPC is to preserve the privacy of secret inputs. The only previous work that we know of is Backes et. al.\(^\text{9}\) who devise an applied pi-calculus based abstraction for MPC, and use it for formal verification. For an auction protocol that computes the \text{min} function, their abstraction comprises about 1400 lines of code. Wys*, on the other hand, enables direct verification of the higher-level MPC source programs, and not their models, and in addition provides a partially verified toolchain.

\text{Wysteria}. Wys*’s computational model is based on programming abstractions of a previous domain-specific language, Wysteria\(^\text{52}\). Wys*’s realization as an embedded DSL in F* makes important advances. In particular, Wys* \((a)\) enhances the Wysteria semantics to include a notion of observable traces, and provides the novel capability to prove security and correctness properties about mixed-mode MPC source programs, \((b)\) expands the programming constructs available by drawing on features and libraries of F*, and \((c)\) adds assurance via a (partially) proved-correct implementation.

\(^\text{6}\) Holding Bob’s (resp. Alice’s) inputs fixed and varying Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) inputs, as done for \text{median} in \[^\text{2,4}\] is covered by this more general property.

\(^\text{7}\) We could formalize this observation using a probabilistic, relational variant of F*\(^\text{10}\).
Verified MPC toolchain. Almeida et al. [4] build a verified toolchain consisting of (a) a verified circuit compiler from (a subset of) C to boolean circuits, and (b) a verified implementation of Yao’s [64] garbled circuits protocol for 2-party MPC. They use CompCert [36] for the former, and EasyCrypt [11] for the latter. These are significant advances, but there are several distinctions from our work. The MPC programs in their toolchain are not mixed-mode, and thus it cannot express examples like median_opt and the optimized PSI. Their framework does not enable formal verification of source programs like Wys* does. It may be possible to use other frameworks for verifying C programs (e.g. Frama-C [1]), but it is inconvenient as one has to work in the subset of C that falls in the intersection of these tools. Wys* is also more general as it supports general n-party MPC; e.g., the card dealing application in §4 has 3 parties. Nevertheless, Wys* may use the verified Yao implementation for the special case of 2 parties.

MPC DSLs and DSL extensions. In addition to Wysteria several other MPC DSLs have been proposed in the literature [14,17,27,29,34,37,39,48,49,52,55,60]. Most of these languages have standalone implementations, and the (usability/scalability) drawbacks that come with them. Like Wys*, a few are implemented as language extensions. Launchbury et al. [35] describe a Haskell-embedded DSL for writing low-level “share protocols” on a multi-server “SMC machine”. OblivC [65] is an extension to C for two-party MPC that annotates variables and conditionals with an obliv qualifier to identify private inputs; these programs are compiled by source-to-source translation. The former is essentially a shallow embedding, and the latter is compiler-based; Wys* is unique in that it combines a shallow embedding to support source program verification and a deep embedding to support a non-standard target semantics. Recent work [19,21] compiles to cryptographic protocols that include both arithmetic and boolean circuits; the compiler decides which fragments of the program fall into which category. It would be interesting work to integrate such a backend in Wys*.

Mechanized metatheory. Our verification results are different from a typical verification result that might either mechanize metatheory for an idealized language [8], or might prove an interpreter or compiler correct w.r.t. a formal semantics [36]—we do both. We mechanize the metatheory of Wys* establishing the soundness of the conceptual ST semantics w.r.t. the actual DS semantics, and mechanize the proof that the interpreter implements the correct DS semantics.

General DSL implementation strategies. DSLs (for MPC or other purposes) are implemented in various ways, such as by developing a standalone compiler/interpreter, or by shallow or deep embedding in a host language. Our approach bears relation to the approach taken in LINQ [42], which embeds a query language in normal C# programs, and implements these programs by extracting the query syntax tree and passing it to a provider to implement for a particular backend. Other researchers have embedded DSLs in verification-oriented host languages (e.g., Bedrock [13] in Coq [59]) to permit formal proofs of DSL programs. Low* [51] is a shallow-embedding of a small, sequential, well-behaved
subset of C in \( F^* \) that extracts to C using a \( F^*-to-C \) compiler. Low* has been used to verify and implement several cryptographic constructions. Fromherz et al. [25] present a deep embedding of a subset of x64 assembly in \( F^* \) that allows efficient verification of assembly and its interoperation with C code generated from Low*. They design (and verify) a custom VC generator for the deeply embedded DSL, that allows for the proofs of assembly crypto routines to scale.

6 Conclusions

This paper has presented Wys*, the first DSL to enable formal verification of efficient source MPC programs as written in a full-featured host programming language, \( F^* \). The paper presented examples such as joint median, card dealing, and PSI, and showed how the DSL enables their correctness and security proofs. Wys* implementation, examples, and proofs are publicly available on Github at https://github.com/FStarLang/FStar/tree/stratified_last/examples/wysteria.

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7 Appendix A: Optimized PSI

The function \(\psi_{\text{opt}}\) (line 12) begins by calling \(\text{for\_each\_alice}\), in \text{par} mode, which in turn calls \(\text{check\_each\_bob}\), for each element \(ax\) of Alice’s list \(la\). The function \(\text{check\_each\_bob}\) (which is also run by both Alice and Bob, as they are in \text{par} mode) iterates over Bob’s list \(lb\), and for each element \(bx\), it performs a secure computation to compare \(ax\) and \(bx\) (line 8). Importantly, at line 9 once we detect that \(ax\) is in the intersection, we return immediately instead of comparing \(ax\) against the remaining elements of \(lb\). Furthermore, we remove \(bx\) from \(lb\), excluding it from any future comparisons with other elements of Alice’s set \(la\). Since \(la\) and \(lb\) are representations of sets (no repeats), all the excluded comparisons are guaranteed to be false. Once all the comparisons are accumulated (as a matrix), Alice and Bob inspect them (line 14 and line 15) to determine which of their elements are in the intersection.

We evaluate the performance of the \(\psi\) (computing intersection in a single secure computation), and the \(\psi_{\text{opt}}\) (the optimized version) algorithms from §4. The programs that we benchmark are slightly different than the ones presented there, in that the local \text{col} and \text{row} functions are not the verified ones. The results are shown in Figure 7. We measure the time (in seconds) for per party set sizes 96, 128, and 256, and intersection densities (i.e. the fraction of elements that are common) 0.5, 0.75, and 0.9.

The time taken by the unoptimized version is independent of the intersection density since it always compares all pairs of values. However, as the intersection density increases, the optimized version performs far better – it is able to skip many comparisons. For lower densities (\(< 0.35\)), the optimization does not improve performance, as the algorithm essentially becomes quadratic, and the setup cost for each secure computation takes over.

We note that a similar performance profile was also noted by Rastogi et. al. [52], although they did not experiment with set size 256, like we did.
Fig. 7. Time to run (in secs) normal and optimized PSI for varying per-party set sizes and intersection densities.

8 Appendix B: Formalization
\[
\begin{align*}
S-\text{ASPAR} & \quad e_1 = \text{as\_par} \ s (L_1, \lambda x.e) \quad M = \text{Par} \ s_1 \quad s \subseteq s_1 \\
& \quad X_1 = (M; L; \text{seal} \ s(); T), X \\
& \quad M; X; L; T; e_1 \rightarrow \text{Par} \ s; X_1; L_1[x \mapsto ()]; ; e \\
S-\text{ASSEC} & \quad e_1 = \text{as\_sec} \ s (L_1, \lambda x.e) \quad M = \text{Par} \ s \\
& \quad X_1 = (M; L; () T), X \\
& \quad M; X; L; T; e_1 \rightarrow \text{Sec} \ s; X_1; L_1[x \mapsto ()]; ; e \\
S-\text{SEAL} & \quad M = \_ \ s_1 \quad s \subseteq s_1 \\
& \quad M; X; L; T; \text{seal} \ s v \rightarrow M; X; L; T; \text{sealed} \ s v \\
S-\text{MKMAP} & \quad M = \text{Par} \ s_1 \Rightarrow v = \text{sealed} \ s_2 v_2 \land s \subseteq s_1 \land s \subseteq s_2 \\
& \quad M = \text{Sec} \ s_1 \Rightarrow s \subseteq s_1 \land v_2 = v \\
& \quad M; X; L; T; \text{mkmap} \ s v \rightarrow M; X; L; T; [s \mapsto v_2] \\
S-\text{CONCAT} & \quad \text{dom}(m_1) \cap \text{dom}(m_1) = \phi \\
& \quad M; X; L; T; \text{concat} \ m_1 m_2 \rightarrow M; X; L; T; m_1 \uplus m_2 \\
S-\text{SUB} & \quad v = \text{exec\_ffi} f \bar{v} \\
& \quad M; X; L; T; \text{ffi} f \bar{v} \rightarrow M; X; L; T; v \\
\end{align*}
\]

\textbf{Fig. 8.} Wys' ST semantics (selected rules)
\[ L\text{-}\text{LET} \]
\[ X_1 = (M; L; \text{let } x = \langle \rangle \text{ in } e_2; T), X \]
\[ M; X; L; T; \text{let } x = e_1 \text{ in } e_2 \Rightarrow M; X; L; e_1 \]

\[ L\text{-}\text{APP} \]
\[ e_1 \rightarrow^1 M; X; L; T; (L_1; \lambda x.e) e_1 \Rightarrow M; X; L_1[x \mapsto e_1]; T; e \]

\[ L\text{-}\text{ASPAR 1} \]
\[ e_1 = \text{as\_par} s (L_1, \lambda x.e) \quad p \in s \]
\[ X_1 = (M; L; \text{seal} s \langle \rangle; T), X \]
\[ \text{Par } p; X; L; T; e_1 \Rightarrow \text{Par } p; X_1; L_1[x \mapsto \langle \rangle]; e \]

\[ L\text{-}\text{PARRET} \]
\[ X = (M; L_1; \text{seal} s \langle \rangle; T_1), X_1 \]
\[ T_2 = \text{append } T_1 T \quad v_1 = \text{sealed } s v \]
\[ \text{Par } p; X; L; T; v \Rightarrow \text{Par } p; X_1; L_1; T_2; v_1 \]

\[ L\text{-}\text{ASPAR 2} \]
\[ \text{Par } p; X; L; T; \text{as\_par} s (L_1, \lambda x.e) \Rightarrow \text{Par } p; X; L; T; \text{sealed } s \] \\[ \quad p \notin s \]

\[ L\text{-}\text{SEAL} \]
\[ p \in s \Rightarrow v_1 = \text{seal } v \quad p \notin s \Rightarrow v_1 = \text{seal } s \] \\[ p \notin s \]
\[ M; X; L; T; \text{seal } s v \Rightarrow M; X; L; T; v_1 \]

\[ L\text{-}\text{REVEAL} \]
\[ M; X; L; T; \text{reveal} (\text{sealed } s v) \Rightarrow M; X; L; T; v \]
\[ p \in s \]

\[ L\text{-}\text{MKMAP} \]
\[ v = \text{sealed } s_2 v_2 \]
\[ p \in s \Rightarrow p \in s_2 \land m = [p \mapsto v] \quad p \notin s \Rightarrow m = \cdot \]
\[ M; X; L; T; \text{mkmap} s v \Rightarrow M; X; L; T; m \]

\[ L\text{-}\text{PROJ} \]
\[ p = p_1 \quad m = [p \mapsto v] \]
\[ M; X; L; T; \text{project} m p_1 \Rightarrow M; X; L; T; v \]
\[ p_1 \]

\[ L\text{-}\text{CONCAT} \]
\[ \text{dom}(m_1) \cap \text{dom}(m_2) = \phi \]
\[ M; X; L; T; \text{concat} m_1 m_2 \Rightarrow M; X; L; T; m_1 \uplus m_2 \]

Fig. 9. Distributed semantics, selected local rules (the mode M is always \text{Par } p)
Fig. 10. Wys' API