Spatial and historical determinants of separatism and integration

1. Qualitative analysis

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Abstract Separatism is examined in a long-run perspective. Accordingly, many political or economic factors which may be crucial in dealing with short-term episodes can be safely disregarded. Extending an approach pioneered by J. Jenkins, the paper assesses the role of spatial and historical factors. It shows that the means used to stage a separatist struggle are to a notable extent borrowed from former historical episodes, an analysis which supports and illustrates C. Tilly’s thesis of restricted repertoires of action. The purpose of the present paper is to introduce the model, to make it plausible and to demonstrate its potential usefulness by examining a number of critical examples. A more systematic analysis is carried out in a follow-up paper by using a data set that includes about 40 cases of separatist struggles.

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“The people are the land, and the land is the people.”
Fijian proverb, cited in Robie (1989)

“Language is the essence of human existence.”
Maori proverb, cited in Fleras et al (1992)

“To speak the same language as one’s neighbours expresses solidarity with those neighbours; to speak a different language from one’s neighbours expresses social distance or even hostility”
Leach (1954)

Introduction

In the introduction of “Language and ethnic relations in Canada” Stanley Lieberson pointed out that “the book stems from a curiosity about why groups in contact maintain their distinctive languages over the centuries in some countries, but elsewhere give up their native tongues in a few generations”. This question is at the heart of the present paper. What makes it perhaps even more important in the late twentieth century is the following observation. Throughout the twentieth century the number of sovereign countries has grown steadily, at first slowly and then, after the Second World War, more and more rapidly (Figure 1). The current trend sharply contrasts with the evolution during the nineteenth century. Although the latter has been referred to as the century of nationalities, a significant fall in the number of sovereign states occurred between 1850 and 1900, mainly as a result of the formation of the German Empire. The obvious question then is whether in a long term perspective the current trend will continue or whether a new coalescence cycle may set in. True, especially between 1950 and 1970, the decolonization process accounted for the emergence of a great number of independent states. Yet, a substantial number of new sovereign states came into being through the disintegration of former federations. While being the most obvious illustration, the case of the USSR (Dec 1991) is not the only example; the secession of Iceland from Denmark (1944), of Bangladesh from Pakistan (1971), of Somaliland from Somalia (1991) and the scission of Czechoslovakia (January 1993) are other well known examples. Furthermore, given the number of separatist movements that are currently in progress, there is a substantial probability that the number of sovereign states will continue to increase in the near future. Surprisingly enough, while the trend in the political sphere has

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1Such a question is in fact beyond the scope of the present paper; it requires a dynamic model whereas the one developed here is a static, equilibrium model.

2Although the term “disintegration” is commonly used, in fact it was rather an orderly separation in the sense that the Republics which became independent (one can remember that Ukraine had already been one of the founding members of the United Nations) had the constitutional right to do so, whereas those which, like the Chechen Republic, did not have that right remained in the Federation. One must recognize that the fact that the two types of entities were called “Republic” (albeit of different kinds) does not help to understand this distinction.
Figure 1  Evolution in the number of independent states. The huge decrease that occurred in the first half of the nineteenth century was mainly due to the progressive unification of Germany. In 1803 there were about 500 sovereign or autonomous kingdoms, bishoprics and other ecclesiastical territories; a first step was the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806; in 1833 there were still 31 German states. The independence of India in 1947 occurred simultaneously with the disappearance of about 140 local kingdoms and principalities; it is unclear to what extent these entities could be considered as really independent within British India which is why they were not taken into account in the present chart. Sources: Statesman’s Year-Book (various years); Passant (1960); Quid (1997); U.N. information leaflet about membership and admission dates.

been toward a greater degree of autonomy and federalism, in the economic sphere there has been a general drift toward greater centralization.

There is already a vast literature on integration factors and on separatist movements; a short review is given in section 2. In general terms the two distinctive features of the present paper are the following.

(1) The paper examines the long-term effect of spatial factors. Only little attention has so far been given to the spatial determinants of separatism, a notable exception being the work of Jenkins (1986) about Jura separatism in Switzerland. His conclusion is worth quoting for it provides so to say the starting point for the present study: “This work concludes that two geographical variables, the physical geography of the Bernese Jura and distance were fundamental during the period of approximately nineteen century following the birth of Christ in developing a distinctive identity for the region which became the Bernese Jura in 1815”. What tends to hide the impact of spatial factors is the fact that in short intervals (10 or 20 years) the role played by
economic, cultural and political factors is so conspicuous that it tends to blur the slow but steady influence of geographical factors. Furthermore, the latter do not usually give rise to many spectacular events, a circumstance which makes them even less visible. They operate at microhistorical rather than at macrohistorical level. Even a life-time may be too short a period to observe any significant effect of geographical factors; it is their steadiness which makes them important. Political and economic factors may change, but geographical conditions remain inva riable. For instance, in the 19th century the French-speaking part of Belgium was economically the leading province; unemployment was on average much higher in Flanders. By the end of the 20th century the situation is reversed. In contrast, an island remains an island, a peninsula remains a peninsula.\footnote{Man-made transportation means may of course play a role; yet the effect of such agencies is very slow in general. With a tunnel under the English Channel, Britain is “less” an island than before. However, for the time being, the fare is about the same whether one takes the tunnel or a ferry.}

(2) Our approach is very much in line with the approaches of Connor (1972), Lieberson (1970, 1975) and Tilly (1986, 1993). More specifically, it owes much to Connor’s emphasis on historical factors; it relies on Lieberson’s analysis of language and demographic determinants; and at the methodological level our strategy in implementing events analysis follows rather closely the methods pioneered by Tilly and Olzak (1992).

(3) Our primary objective is to confront our model with empirical quantitative evidence. It is chiefly for the purpose of testability that our model uses only a small number of parameters. In so doing we do not wish to deny that other causes are present. Many ethnic, cultural or political factors are left aside, not because they are unimportant but because it would be difficult to include them in a comparative analysis based on quantitative data. While being probably unacceptable in a short-term perspective, such a drastic selection is less questionable in a long-run analysis.

Presentation of the model’s main orientations

There are two rather distinct part in this study. Our objectives in the first part are (i) To delineate the scope of the model by distinguishing those phenomena to which it applies and those which are outside its field of applicability (ii) To motivate our selection of the model’s parameters by a number of arguments. In so doing, we frequently proceed by way of illustrations and examples; our aim is to suggest rather than to prove. Although these examples could possibly be omitted in a more formal presentation of the model, they are intended to emphasize its empirical roots. Illustrations cannot replace statistical tests however; the latter are provided in the second part of the study where the model is confronted with a fairly systematic body of empirical evidence.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the properties and the implications of what could be called the blend of language and homeland. The last term refers to a territorial base which has been occupied for a “long time” by a people. The importance of these elements is obvious: language is the medium of communication and, especially in rural societies, there is a strong connection between a people and its homeland. As a matter of illustration let us consider the example of the United States versus Switzerland. Both countries have a federal organization; yet, in terms of integration they turn out to be very different. The linguistic frontier of the two main components of the Swiss confederation, the French- and the German-speaking peoples, have remained practically unchanged for centuries. As will be shown subsequently the linguistic frontier is also a very effective barrier to domestic migration; even worse, opinions on major political issues such as the European construction are largely determined by language subdivisions. In short, integration seems to have made little progress. The situation is completely different in the United States. In order to emphasize how strongly many American national subgroups tried their best to preserve their mother tongue, it is perhaps of some interest to recall the following quotes.

“Few of their children learn English. Of the six printing houses in the province [Pennsylvania], two are entirely German, two half German-half English. They have one German newspaper. The signs on the street have inscriptions in both languages.”[In 1787 German Americans represented about 9 percent of total population.]

Letter of B. Franklin to a British Member of Parliament, May 9, 1753; cited in Crawford (1992).

“In 1840 parents in Cincinnati demanded and obtained bilingual education for their children. Not only in Cincinnati, but in many communities in the latter half of the 19th century, education using the native tongue of the non-English-speaking immigrants flourished.”

Thernstrom (1980.p.619)

“By 1914 the National German American Alliance had an impressive membership of approximately two million people. At that time the German American press included over 500 German-language publications. In 1918 over 7,000 enemy aliens were arrested by the Justice Department, many of them German Americans. Of the 200 German-language publications that survived World War I, only 24 remained in 1976.”

Thernstrom (1980.p.685)

These few facts remind us that the attachment of the German community to its lan-
guage and to its “Vaterland” did not disappear easily. At the same time it shows the strength of an integration process that was able to overcome the nationalist feelings not only of the Germans but of many other peoples who were no less attached to their language and to their homeland. Why did the melting-pot process work in the American case and not at all in the Swiss case? Many specific reasons certainly can and have been invoked to explain that particular case. In this paper we are rather interested in general factors, that is to say causes which can be shown to be at work in a large variety of similar situations. In that spirit one may mention the following differences:

(1) The linguistic border between American Germans and the rest of the population was of much greater length than in the case of Switzerland, the main reason being that the area covered by American Germans was made up of several small domains; in Switzerland on the contrary it formed (more or less) one domain.\(^4\)

(2) The American German community always represented a small share (less than 15 percent) of the total American population; in contrast the Swiss French-speaking community accounted for 20 to 30 percent of the Swiss population.

(3) Finally one may mention an historical reason. The time interval between emigration and assimilation was to short for American Germans to constitute a homeland in the United States. On the contrary in the case of Switzerland there was plenty of time for the cement between homeland and language to set hard.

The above example suggests three factors of significance:

(1) The length of the linguistic frontier (along with its width, see below)

(2) The relative proportion of the subgroup in the total population.

(3) The degree of identification a people has established in the course of history with its territorial base.

We posit that these factors account for a large number of separatist movements in industrialized as well as in developing countries. The influence of the mobilization parameter which has been thoroughly studied, in particular by K. Deutsch, is represented in our model by the width of the linguistic frontier. One should note that the model does not apply to minorities characterized by non-linguistic ethnic factors. Thus, for instance, the following minorities fall outside the scope of the model: Mormons, Hutterites, Jews and in general all religious minorities (the question of the respective roles of religion and language is discussed below), Blacks in the United States, Burakumins in Japan, etc.

Methodological preparation

\(^4\)In mathematical terms, the first domain would be referred to as a multiply connected domain, while the second domain is said to be simply connected.
Short survey of the literature

Although there is a vast literature on national integration and separatist movements, the studies focusing on the bond between mother tongue and homeland are not so numerous. It is hardly possible in the framework of this paper to give an account of the various models that have been proposed: comprehensive and very readable reviews are to be found in Connor (1994) and Premdas (1990) for instance. In this paragraph we propose a classification of recent contributions according to the kind and extent of the empirical evidence with which the models have been confronted. It is possible to distinguish four categories in that respect.

(1) Purely theoretical models, i.e. models which have not yet been confronted with any piece of empirical evidence.

(2) Models that have been confronted with qualitative evidence.

(3) Models that have been confronted with a limited amount of quantitative evidence.

(4) Models that have been confronted with extensive statistical evidence.

Three contributions in the last category will be discussed specifically because of their direct connection with the models developed in this paper.

Lieberson et al. (1975) This pioneering study examines the determinants of mother tongue diversity. It analyzes the evolution of language diversity in 35 states and over periods ranging from a century to a few years, depending on data availability. Various national characteristics are considered in relation to changes in language diversity. Two factors, the spatial isolation of language groups and official educational policies turn out to have a significant influence on language diversity. Spatial isolation was estimated through an index proposed by Bell (1954). In a sense, given the reliance on indexes and aggregated figures it can be said that the analysis by Lieberson et al. considered the problem in a macrosociological perspective. In contrast, through its emphasis on basic mechanisms, the present paper rather presents a microsociological view.

Allardt (1979) This short book analyzes 46 linguistic minorities in Western Europe, ranging from large subgroups such as the Catalans (5.7 million) to small minorities such as the Faroe islanders (46,000). As many as 18 variables are considered describing the minorities in various aspects: demography, education, welfare, politics, etc, but little attention is given to the historical background. Cross-correlations for all variables are systematically computed; most correlations turn out to be too small to be significant; yet, more embarrassing is the fact that no clear pattern seems to emerge from the few cross-correlations which are high enough to be significant.
Gurr (1993)  Ted Gurr’s analysis of communal mobilization relies on an impressive and unique statistical data base. Basic characteristics (population, ethnic classification, etc) are provided for 227 communal groups. It covers the whole period from Second World War to present. The statistical inquiry which we develop in the second part of this study in many respects follows Gurr’s approach. One marked difference is that Gurr does not restrict his study to minorities with a definite territorial base: religious minorities (Jews in Argentina for instance) or ethnic minorities (foreign workers in Switzerland for instance) are considered along with regional minorities. The task of modeling such a large class of minorities is probably even more complex than the one we take up in this paper.

“Doable versus undoable questions”
The distinction between so-called “doable” and “undoable” questions has been put forward by S. Lieberson (1985). We believe it to be very important. For policy purposes one would want to predict the outcome of separatist struggles that are currently in progress or to identify those that are likely to erupt in the future. These, however, are very difficult problems. An analogy proposed by S. Lieberson (1985, p.97) makes the matter very clear. “Suppose I wish to find out the factors that lead a small number of people to reach stardom in motion pictures. It might well be possible to find certain characteristics of the individuals which affect their chances, for instance personal attractiveness, persistence, connections, even acting talent. Efforts to go beyond the establishment of probability functions for each type of characteristics are doomed to failure. Sure, every special case could in a sense be ‘explained’; but the relevance of such ad hoc, a posteriori reasoning is doubtful”. In the same way as the achievement of stardom, the emergence or the success of a separatist struggle sequentially depends upon a large number of special circumstances. For instance even a charismatic leader is unable to play any political role unless the state has been compelled (usually by some external pressure) to renounce to ruthless repression.\footnote{A spectacular example of such a relentless repression is given by the suppression of the rebellion in East-Timor between 1976 and 1988.}

Thus, trying to answer questions of interest for policy purposes would probably make us waste time and energy on “undoable” questions. What is worse, it could lead us to disregard, as being of little interest, precisely those questions that may be settled conclusively.

For those who dislike analogies the above argument can be presented in a different, more mathematical way. Basically, separatist struggles are transient, non-equilibrium episodes. Roughly speaking one may say that there are two opposite forces at work: a tendency to centralization on one hand and an aspiration to liberty, autonomy and
independence on the other hand. So long as one factor checks the other there is an equilibrium and no change is to be expected. For instance the Peruvian or the Mexican Indians have remained for decades under the yoke of the landlords, the army or other paramilitary groups; possible troubles remained confined to individual villages, no collective consciousness came into being except perhaps under some special circumstances which lead to short-lived outbursts. On the other end of the spectrum is the case of a completely autonomous region; the people then is no longer subject to any coercive control by an alien state. The Finish Aland Islands are a possible illustration. The move from one extreme to the other represents a transient process; transient does not mean it should necessarily be short; the move may take several centuries (as in the case of Ireland) but a new equilibrium will be reached only after this process is completed. Now, it well known that non-equilibrium problems are more difficult to model than static situations; see in this respect Herbert Simon’s celebrated bowl metaphor (Simon 1959). Because the “characteristic times” of integration phenomena are very long (with a magnitude of several centuries) it would be desirable to perform time averages over a period of the same magnitude. For lack of adequate data bases this will not be possible however, and we shall be content with time averages covering the last fifty years. Under such conditions it will sometimes be difficult to distinguish between quasi-equilibrium situations and transient fluctuations.

Spatial factors

The model

No better description can be given of what we shall for short call Coupland’s diffusion effect than the following excerpt (Coupland 1954): “Few Englishmen want to anglicise Wales, but the pressure exerted by the mighty neighbourhood to absorb the Welsh into the English way of life is no less powerful because it is unconscious. The age-long invasion never ceases; more and more English tourists are haunting the mountains and the coasts of Wales. Aided by the motor-car they penetrate to those districts where Welsh life has hitherto been least affected by English contact.”

Fig.2 schematically represents the regions in six different countries where there have been active autonomist movements between 1965 and 1995. Their localization conforms the indications provided by the Switzerland/United States comparison in section 1. Indeed all the regions are located at the periphery of the countries in a way which minimize the length of the borderline with the rest of the country: two regions are islands (Corsica and Ulster), three are peninsula (Brittany, Scotland, Wales), five are in contact with communities which share the same minority language (Alsace,
Figure 2 Areas with autonomist movements in 6 countries. As a rule these areas are remote from the core of the country and have minimal spatial contact with it. Very often they are part of a linguistic entity straddling the national borderline. For the Canadian Province of New Brunswick, the map shows the zones where the proportion of French-speaking people is higher than 75%. Source: For New Brunswick, Verneix (1979).

Catalonia, Basque Country, Southern Malay province of Thailand, French-speaking areas in Canada’s Maritime Provinces, Chiapas state in Mexico). Together with the other observations made in section 1 this leads us to posit the following hypothesis.
The spatial determinants of separatist tendencies in a minority which occupies an area \( m \) in a country \( C \) can be summarized by the following spatial integration factor:

\[
D_s = \frac{p}{lw}
\]

(1)

where:
- \( p \) denotes the population of the minority (in proportion to total population).
- \( l \) denotes the length of the borderline between \( m \) and \( C \).
- \( w \) is a phenomenological parameter representing the facility of exchanges across the regional borderline.

Some additional explanations are required regarding the evaluations of \( l \) and \( w \).

**Evaluation of \( l \)** In the case of Wales, Scotland and Brittany, \( l \) is simply the length of the borderline with the rest of Great Britain or France. But how should we take into account the border between Alsace and Germany for instance. The local dialect in Alsace is a German dialect very similar to the one spoken in Baden. Hence Coupland’s diffusion argument applies: Alsatians are able to receive German TV programs, many work in Germany, etc. The contact between Alsace and Germany therefore counters the French influence; consequently that part of the border should be counted negatively. The same reasoning holds for the French Basque Country, the south of Thailand or for the American Mexicans living in the vicinity of the Mexican border. The rule for the evaluation of \( l \) may be stated in the following form:

The length of the borderline with a region sharing the language of the minority should be subtracted from the length of the borderline with the rest of the country; the corresponding factors \( w_1 \) and \( w_2 \) describe the relative strength of both diffusion processes.

A further comment is in order regarding islands. Clearly it would be inadequate to take \( l \) as being equal to zero; in the case of Corsica for instance that would mean that there are no privileged connections between Corsican ports and French ports such as Marseilles or Nice which is clearly not true. We shall in such cases take for \( l \) a conventional length which represents the density of sea- and air- routes between the island and the mainland. More technical details are provided in the second paper.

**Evaluation of \( w \)** In our model \( w \) is a phenomenological parameter which can be roughly estimated. Broadly speaking it represents the effectiveness of transportation and communication means\(^6\). In other words \( w \) reflects the degree of mobilization in a given society. For the sake of simplicity we shall restrict ourselves to the following three-level scale:

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\(^6\)Here is an example: in 1880 it took 11 hours to go from Paris to Strasbourg (500 kilometers) by train; in 1980 it took only 4 hours; in 2010, thanks to a new high speed train it took only 2 hours and a half.
(1) $w = 1$ for “traditional” economies; examples: borderline between Biafra and Nigeria or between West and East Timor.

(2) $w = 2$ for rural economies; example: borderline between Thailand and its southern Malay (Muslim) province.

(3) $w = 3$ for industrialized countries; example: borderline between Quebec and the rest of Canada.

**Application to the comparison: Switzerland/United States.**

By way of illustration let us apply our previous definitions to the comparison of the process of integration in the United States and in Switzerland that we already discussed in section 1. The parameter $w$ is the same for both countries and it can therefore be dropped for the purpose of comparison. In the case of Switzerland $l$ and $p$ have remained almost unchanged during the last centuries: $l \approx 200 \text{ km}$, $p = 20\%$.

On the contrary in the United States, the situation of the people of German ancestry has changed drastically in the course of time; therefore a specific date has to be selected for the evaluation of the spatial integration factor $D_s$; let us take 1900. The exact geographical repartition of the American Germans is not known (most certainly it would show a fractal pattern); this does not matter however for an educated guess is sufficient for our purpose. The American German community numbered about 14 million (this figure has been extrapolated from the proportion of people of German ancestry given in subsequent censuses); this leads to $p = 15\%$. Let us consider that, being mainly an urban population, it was distributed in urban groups of about 50,000 people; this gives about 320 groups. Let us consider that the density in such cities was of the order of 2,500 inhabitants per square kilometer. The length of the borderline of one group with the rest of the country thus turns out to be equal to 15.8 km and for the total borderline we get: $l = 320 \times 15.8 = 5,056 \text{ km}$. As a consequence we get the following integration factor:

|                  | USA (1900) | Switzerland |
|------------------|------------|-------------|
| German-speaking Americans | 25,000     | French-speaking Swiss |
| French-speaking Swiss |

Thus, the integration pressure thus was 42 times larger in America than in Switzerland, an observation which is of course consistent with subsequent evolution. To conclude our demonstration it remains to document our assertion about the poor level of integration in Switzerland. Two important elements are provided in Fig.3. The first one shows that there is a very small residential mobility between the French- and the German-speaking parts; the second shows that there is a major fracture between the two regions regarding a problem of cardinal importance for the future of the country. One could add that the French- and Italian-speaking minorities are under
Figure 3  Linguistic compartmentalization versus migration and political choices. The map on the left-hand side shows the linguistic zones in Switzerland (1980). The map in the upper right corner shows the net migration between different so-called employment regions 1975–1980. The conclusion which can be drawn is that there are no substantial migration flows across linguistic frontiers. The map in the lower right corner shows the results by canton of the referendum of 6 December 1992 on the project of European Union membership. A majority of voters in the hatched zone voted yes; the results closely followed linguistic subdivisions. A more precise analysis would require electoral results at the communal rather than at the cantonal level, especially for Valais (which is French-speaking in the proportion of 60 percent). Sources: Bassand et al. (1985), Jenkins (1986), Racine (1994).

represented at the level of the high federal administration:

| Minority                | Percentage in total population | Percentage in the high federal administration |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| French-speaking minority| 20%                            | 12.5%                                         |
| Italian-speaking minority| 6%                            | 2.7%                                          |

Sources: Gazette de Lausanne (June 6, 1955); Le Monde (May 29, 1978)

Moreover, in the German-speaking part of Switzerland the usage of Swiss-German, once restricted to domestic and casual communication, is becoming more and more widespread even for instance in the classroom or in advertisements. As a result, a French- or Italian-speaking Swiss would have to learn three languages in addition to his own mother tongue, namely: English (imperative in the present world), German and Swiss-German. This is a very demanding task and it is doubtful that it could be
carried out successfully by a large proportion of the population.

**Discussion of apparent counter-examples**

Before examining to what extent the previous model is supported by statistical evidence, it is perhaps worthwhile to discuss what could seem to be obvious counter-examples.

*The American Civil War* The most spectacular case is the American Civil War. In French it is referred to as the “Guerre de Sécession” [Secessionist war] but was it really a secessionist struggle of the kind considered in this paper? One element, the attachment to a land that has been occupied for generations, was certainly present in the South. Yet, neither language nor religion was much of an issue. In other words we have here the worryingly situation of an allegedly separatist struggle of first magnitude (600,000 deaths, Richardson 1960) that seems to fall outside the scope of our model. Our contention is that it was *not* a separatist struggle of the kind analyzed in this paper; The matter would certainly deserve a detailed discussion in its own; let us here restrict ourselves to the following, schematic arguments.

(1) In an ethnic conflict defeat does not mark the end of the struggle. A comparison with other wars that occurred at about the same time will illustrate the point. In 1830 the first Polish rebellion was suppressed without mercy (16,000 deaths); in 1848-1849 the Hungarian uprising met the same fate (1,500 deaths). Yet, both the Polish and the Hungarian engaged in other attempts until eventually they won their independence.

(2) How then, if it was not a separatist struggle, should the American Civil War be categorized? It was the last fight of a minority (5.5 million against 22 million) for the defense of its way of life and its political autonomy; in other words it was a war for political leadership, not for ethnic survival. More or less of the same type are the wars of Vendée in Revolutionary France or the war between Bavaria (allied to Austria and other German states) against Prussia (1866); the latter can be considered as the last feat of a sovereign nation before accepting its absorption in a larger entity. Incidentally, it can be noted that the magnitudes of the respective populations were about the same than for the American Civil War: Prussia: 20 million, Bavaria: 5 million.

*The Amish* The next example is more embarrassing. The Amish are a small American community which has maintained its faith *and its language* (a German dialect) since the time they arrived in America in the 19th century. Let us first estimate the magnitude of the integration factor for the Amish as compared to that for the entire American German community: in 1900, if we assume that the Amish settled

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7True, there have been other short-lived separatist attempts in Bavaria (1918,1923), but none that was of much consequence.
in urban communities of the same size as the average German Americans, we get the same integration factor (indeed this factor turns out to be independent of the size of the minority under consideration). In fact two corrections should be introduced: firstly, given their rural way of life it is more reasonable to assume that the Amish settled in smaller communities than other German Americans; this would result in a larger integration factor than for German Americans; secondly, since the Amish conserved their nineteenth century way of life (no cars, electricity, radio, or television) the value of their mobilization factor \( w \) did not increase in the same way as that of other American Germans; this would reduce the value of the integration factor, at least for the twentieth century. By and large it is probably not unreasonable to admit that these increase and decrease approximately cancel each other. Consequently, if the integration factor is to be taken at its face value the Amish should have lost their mother tongue in the same conditions as other American Germans. Yet, that did not happen. Why?

Two elements of answer can be given.

1. The Amish constitute a special case in the sense that they managed to establish a strong and durable connection between their religion, their way of life and their language. Not surprisingly, they had no difficulty in maintaining their faith, but because of the close connection between their faith and their language the latter was maintained too.

2. There is in fact a substantial emigration rate out of the Amish community; but because of fairly high birth rates, this does not imperil the community’s future.

### The integration process at parochial level

Why did social mobilization often stimulate nationalist feelings instead of curtailing them? Such an observation has been made repeatedly (communal revivals in Western Europe are obvious examples) and it seemed to challenge K. Deutsch’s mobilization thesis. This was all the more puzzling because the mobilization thesis had a firm, clear and convincing basis at the microsociological level; how could increased interaction may have the effect of seemingly reducing integration? One explanation to this paradox consists in distinguishing between several processes of integration taking place at different spatial levels. About one or two centuries ago a region of the size of Brittany did not constitute a homogeneous ethnic entity. In the case of early nineteenth century France, E. Weber (1976, p.45) notes that “the least of the village considered itself a specific homeland in its language, legends, customs, ways”. He shows persuasively that acute parochialism was a general “disease” in most French

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8 This “explanation” merely displaces the problem: why indeed did the Amish succeed in maintaining such a close link between faith and language? The answer is not obvious. The Mormons for instance once tried to introduce a special writing; but for all their organizational skills the tentative did not meet with much success and had eventually to be abandoned.
provinces of that time. For instance real hostility existed between Lower and Upper Brittany, a division based on the Celtic speech of the former and the French dialect of the latter. Very often, either in Brittany or in other French provinces, local “wars” broke out between different parishes that gave rise to real (albeit small) battles, most of which did not leave any record in historical archives (see however the “Statistiques du département du Lot” 1831). Similarly in its systematic analysis of French rebellions, C. Tilly (1986) came to the conclusion that “broadly speaking, the repertoire of the mid-seventeenth to mid-nineteenth centuries has a parochial scope. The repertoire that crystallized in the nineteenth century and prevails today is, in general, more national in scope.” In Ireland too the divergent interests of various clans (the O’Rourke, the O’Donnel, etc) undermined any permanent coalition. Thus, a precondition for an effective nationalist struggle was the completion of a reasonable degree of regional integration. This conclusion has been summarized in the following way by C. Tilly in a recent work (1993): “During the 16th and 17th centuries the effective units of collective action in Ireland consisted largely of patron-client chains led by warlords. Only during the 19th century, as class-coalition and national revolutions were generalizing elsewhere in Europe, do we see a popularization of the Irish cause at a national level.” In short one of the keys to the solution of the problem under consideration is the fact that (at least) two integration processes were under way simultaneously:

- a national integration which concerned the urban components of the society
- a regional integration which concerned rural areas, especially those with inadequate transportation networks.

**Respective roles of religion and language loyalties**

The spatial part of our model is specifically designed to account for the phenomenon of language maintenance. This may seem to be a serious restriction. In fact, as will be shown in this paragraph, this limitation is not so unmitigated as it could seem at first sight. We shall argue that, before the twentieth century, religions very much played the role languages have today in establishing national loyalties. Today, especially in industrialized countries, the mechanisms of religion and language maintenance are very different. Economic competition in the employment market produces a very effective incentive to speak the language of the dominant majority. Nothing of the sort exists for religions. As a result, as far as religions are concerned, the assimilation rates are expected to be much lower than for languages, intermarriage being in this case the main “assimilation” mechanism. Two or three centuries ago the situation was completely different for the very definition of citizenship was based on religion.

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9Even today, the nationalist fight of the Kurds is hampered by a chronical lack of solidarity between the different ethnic components of the Kurdish people (Premdas et al, 1990.

10At the level of capital cities a third process of international integration could be mentioned
This was not only true in Catholic or Muslim states, but also in those protestant states such as Denmark, Great Britain or Sweden which are usually considered as having been more tolerant in religious matters. Let us illustrate our proposition by three examples:

- In 1709 when the Whigs gained a clear majority in Parliament they passed an act that provided a simple procedure for the naturalization of foreigners. Aliens had only to swear allegiance to the Crown, prove they had received a Protestant sacrament in the preceeding three months and declare in open court against the doctrine of transubstantiation. A similar law was enacted in 1740 for the purpose of permitting foreigners in America to acquire subjectship (Thernstrom 1980). Similarly, by the Test Act (1673), every civil servant had to declare against the doctrine of transubstantiation (Mourre 1978, vol.1, p.246). It is in 1679 that the Catholics were explicitly excluded from the Parliament. Reference to the Christian faith was maintained until the late nineteenth century in the oath taken by members of the Parliament: it is only in 1866 that the expression “upon the true faith of a Christian” has been deleted (Doubnov 1933).

- In Denmark, the civil rights of the catholic minority had been severely curtailed by successive laws enacted in 1613, 1624, 1643; they were confirmed and strengthened by Christian V after his accession to the throne in 1660. In Sweden the discrimination against catholics, introduced by Charles X, was extended by Charles XI (1660-1697): conversion to the catholic religion was forbidden under pain of banishment and deprivation of all possessions (Daniel-Rops 1958)

- Our last example concerns Germany; in the numerous little kingdoms that composed Germany before 1870 the prevailing rule was “cujus regio, ejus religio” (the religion of the sovereign determines the religion of the citizens).

One should also recall that education, which has become so important an issue in modern societies, was closely connected with religion until the end of the nineteenth century. One of the major purposes of elementary education was to be able to read the Bible. This was particularly true in Protestant or Presbyterian regions. In the case of Wales for instance, R. Coupland (1954) relates the remarkable development of the so-called “Sunday schools”: “On Sunday the whole country was turned into a religious school; hour after hour these Welsh folk sat listening to the reading of the Bible and the geography of Palestine became more familiar to them than that of Wales itself”.

A last confirmation of the shift from religions to languages issues can be gained from the example of the Bernese Jura in Switzerland. Between 1830 and 1950 there have been five major outbreaks: 1834, 1867, 1873, 1917, 1947. The first three had religious mobiles, while the last two had linguistic causes; needless to say, the movement that began after 1965 and lead eventually to the creation of a new canton was
largely based on claims for linguistic rights.

Communal revivals in western industrialized societies may often be traced back to the survivance of religious traditionalism. In such cases as Ireland or even Wales the role played by religion is well known. Perhaps less known but quite as revealing are the origins of regional revivals in France. The proportion of the people attending Mass is notably higher than average in all the regions (the only exception being Corsica) where there has been a communal revival (Isambert and Terrenoire 1980,p.30; the figures refer to the period 1955-1962):

| Region           | Percentage |
|------------------|------------|
| Alsace           | 84%        |
| Basque Country   | 79%        |
| Brittany         | 67%        |
| **National average** | **35%**  |
| Corsica          | 25%        |

In conclusion one may say that, seen in historical perspective, the lack of integration pressure regarding religious matters is a very recent innovation in industrialized societies. In most developing countries religion still is a key factor in determining social and professional loyalties; besides, there is probably a much greater resemblance between the mechanisms governing religion or language maintenance, than may be suggested by the example of modern western societies.

**Semi-quantitative tests**

**Official languages**

It may be of interest to examine to what extent each sovereign country has its own distinctive official language. At first glance it may seem that many nations share one of the world’s dominant languages. To begin with, it should be noted that, in contrast to an overwhelming majority of nations, neither the United States (at least at the federal level) nor the United Kingdom have an official language. Furthermore, the official language of many former colonies still remains the language of the former colonizing power. In addition it is well known that many nations have Arabic as their official language. In order to assess the extent of these effects one has to look at the data in some detail. The results are summarized in Table 1 based on Banks (1995) and the “Europa World Yearbook” (1995).
Number of sovereign nations 193
Countries having at least one specific national language 92 48%
Former colonies (independent after 1945) 46
Countries having at least one specific national language (former colonies excluded) 92/(193 − 46) = 63%

Spanish as official language 15
Arabic as official language 17

Table 1: Official languages

It should be noted that there is a marked, albeit slow, tendency especially for former colonies to adopt proper mother tongues as official languages. Examples are: India (English is no longer an official language although it still has the status of an associate language for many official purposes), Luxembourg (Letzeburgish, 1982), Kenya (Kiswahili, 1974), Seychelles (Creole, 1981).

Island states

The lack of integration can manifest itself in two ways: in the existence of regional conflicts between a minority and a dominant majority, or in the existence of independent states, the latter being the obvious outcome of successful separatist struggles. In our model islands play a special role since, because of their minimal contacts with neighboring nations, they are characterized by a particularly small integration factor.

A case study: the Aland islands

Before we undertake a systematic analysis let us first consider a special case, namely the Swedish minority in mainland Finland on one hand and in the Aland islands (which belong to Finland) on the other hand. In Finland a slow process of assimilation has been under way for decades as illustrated by the following data giving the vote for the Swedish People Party (Svenska Folkpartiet); the fall in the vote \( v \) can be modeled by: \( v = e^{-s/0.75} \) with \( s \) being expressed in centuries:

| Year | SPP (%) | Swedish-speaking people (%) |
|------|---------|-----------------------------|
| 1880 | 14.3    | 21,000                      |
| 1907 | 12.7    | 8.6                         |
| 1917 | 10.9    |                             |
| 1927 | 12.2    |                             |
| 1936 | 11.2    |                             |
| 1948 | 7.7     |                             |
| 1958 | 6.7     |                             |
| 1966 | 6.0     |                             |
| 1979 | 4.6     |                             |
| 1987 | 5.3     |                             |

Table 2: Votes for the Swedish People Party and proportion of Swedish-speaking people. Sources: Mackie and Rose (1982); Jansson (1961)

The situation is completely different in the Aland islands. Its population of about 21,000 is Swedish-speaking at 95 percent. Ceded to Russia in 1809, the Islands
were returned to Finland by the League of Nations in 1921 despite calls by the islanders for reunification with Sweden. The islands have been demilitarized since 1856 and are neutralized since 1921. In exchange of the engagement of the Finnish government to respect and preserve the Swedish language of the islanders Sweden agreed to withdraw its claim to sovereignty over the islands. Since that time, the islanders maintain a loyal attitude toward Finland but, in contrast with the mainland Swedish-speaking minority, there has been no further progress of their integration in the Finnish community.

Let us now examine the relationship between insularity and aspiration to sovereignty in a more general way. In the case of an island, the separatism factor is particularly high; accordingly one expects a large number of island-states. This effect should be particularly marked for small states since there are only few large islands (of the size of Britain or Japan for instance). In order to carry out our test we selected a threshold area of 14,000 square kilometer. While being of course somewhat arbitrary, this limit roughly corresponds to the category of what may be called “small countries”; as a matter of comparison, Belgium has an area of 11,778 square kilometer and Lebanon of 10,452 square kilometer. At first sight, especially from an European perspective, our conjecture may be found to be wrong; there are indeed quite a large number of small sovereign countries which are not islands: Andorra, Belgium, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Gibraltar, Monaco, Vatican. For the whole world, however, our conjecture is confirmed: there are 47 states of less than 14 000 square kilometer, of which 35 are islands, a proportion of 0.74 (Statesman’s Yearbook 1995).

**Historical factors**

**The model**

As has been persuasively argued by Connor (1972, 1994) or Jenkins (1986) history plays a fundamental role in shaping the collective psychology of peoples. For instance, if a nation has had the status of a sovereign state for a long time it will not easily accept to be incorporated in an alien state; Lithuania and Poland are illustrative examples. Similarly, if the conquest of a region has required a protracted and costly war, there is a high likelihood of subsequent rebellions: Algeria, Chechniya and Ireland are illustrative examples. Even once a nation has been subdued, the aspiration to sovereignty will remain strong for centuries. We shall generalize this kind of observation by assuming that those attitudes or actions that have been resorted to several times in the past will tend to repeat themselves in the future. This, in fact, has become a fairly standard assumption in a number of different contexts as we shall see now.
(1) Drawing upon a formidable array of empirical evidence, C. Tilly (1986, p.390) introduced the conception of a people’s repertoire of action: “Any population has a limited repertoire of collective action. People tend to act within known limits, to innovate at the margins of existing forms. People know the general rules of performance and vary the performance to meet the purpose at hand.”

(2) In the field of operational research our assumption is embodied in the observation that, at least in the start-up phase of the learning curve, the completion of a fairly complex task requires less and less time and effort as it is performed again and again; typically, it takes only half as much time to perform a task for the 10th time than it took for the first time (Baloff 1971, Hamblin et al 1973).

(3) In the field of history, it has been showed (Roehner 1993a, b) that the above principle plays a role in a wide range of historical actions. For the sake of brevity it has been referred to as the paronymy assumption (collusion and collision, or gradation and graduation are paronymic words). In mathematical terms it can be stated in the following form:

*The probability of a given action is in proportion to the number of its former occurrences.*

In the present study the paronymy assumption will play a dual role: (i) It provides a guide to the way empirical evidence should be recorded and aggregated; more specifically, we shall distinguish two periods: 1850-1945 on one hand, 1945-1995 on the other; and we shall examine if there are any similarities in the means used by separatist movements in those periods. (ii) By comparing the ways of separatist movements before and after 1945 we shall also be able to test the paronymy assumption. This will be done here in a rather qualitative way by examining three examples; in the second part of this study such tests are carried out in a more systematic way.

**The Bernese Jura in Switzerland**

Our analysis relies on two main sources: Jenkins (1986) and Rennwald (1984). Before and after 1945, separatism from the Bernese canton manifested itself in very similar ways: petitions, opposition displayed in general elections or in referendums, occasional outbursts of violence which brought about the deployment of Bernese troops. The only major innovation in the post-1945 period was the occurrence of bombing (at least the limited information that we have on the pre-1945 period does not mention such episodes). That innovation may largely be due to technical reasons which made bombs easier to store and to handle; this may explain why bombing has been used by almost all separatist movements in Western Europe. The high degree of historical continuity may also be emphasized by the fact that the border of the new Jura canton follows almost exactly the limit between the catholic and the protestant subregions as recorded in the Treaty of Aarberg of 1711 (Jenkins 1986).
A similar analysis could be conducted for a number of other regional movements in industrialized countries: Alsace, Belgium, Brittany, Scotland, Wales. The French Basque Country and Corsica are to some extent exceptions in the sense that there is no record of any significant and organized separatist movement between 1850 and 1945. Yet, in both regions the forms taken by separatist movements is consistent with their respective “traditions”: in the Basque Country it relied heavily on religious feelings and institutions, in Corsica it was channelled by the long-standing vendetta tradition.

**Aceh province (northern Sumatra, Indonesia)**

Our analysis relies on two main sources: Cribb (1992) and Zainu’ddin (1968). The record here is very different from that for the Bernese Jura: warfare and guerilla tactics are the main forms of separatist struggles in the Indonesian province of Aceh. According to official estimates the thirty-year war (1873–1908) waged by the Acehnese against the Dutch cost 100,000 deaths on the Acehnese side and 12,000 on the Dutch side. It is labelled as having been a “ferocious” war although no detailed historical record seems to be available. A similar pattern occurred once again under Indonesian (Javanese) occupation. In September 1953, there was an uprising lead by the former military governor Daud Bereuh. Until 1959 the region remained almost completely independent from Djakarta. A new separatist uprising broke out in 1990; within a single year the toll was estimated to about 2300 deaths. In July 1993, “Amnesty International” denounced the violation of human rights by the Indonesian army. A similar analysis could be conducted for a number of other regional movements in developing countries, for instance: for instance Jolo and Mindanao in the Philippines, the Sikh separatist movement in India, the struggles for Indian rights in Mexico (Chiapas), in Peru or in Bolivia. In many of these instances it is difficult to find detailed historical records for the period before World War II; from the few records that are indeed available one gets the impression of a strong historical continuity. Yet, it seems that there also a few exceptions: for instance the Maori struggle in New Zealand has not resumed the warfare form it assumed in three nineteenth century Maori wars. These exceptions will be examined more closely in the follow-up paper.

**Basque Provinces versus Catalonia (Spain)**

This case has captured the imagination of a number of researchers because the Basque movement is marked by terrorism while political negotiations prevailed in Catalonia. To explain this contrast several mechanisms have been proposed which are reviewed in Laitin (1995). Let us see if there is a definite answer to this
paradox in the general framework of the paronymy assumption. Our contention is that throughout their recent history Basques were more prone to resort to political violence and military solutions than were the Catalans. Let us limit ourselves to discussing how both peoples reacted to and took part in the many internal conflicts that affected Spain during the 19th and 20th centuries. There have been five main wars: the four so-called Carlist wars (1833-1839, June 1848–April 1849, 1860, 1872–1874) and the Spanish Civil War (1937-1939). Let us examine them in turn.

(1) Barres du Molard (1842) who was Charles V’s chief of staff gave a detailed account of the battles that have been fought in the First Carlist War (1833–1839). Out of 63 battles, 59 took place in the Basque Provinces (Navarra included) while 4 took place in Castille. In spite of a substantial amount of social agitation in Catalonia no battle was fought there.

(2) The Carlist attempts which took place in 1848–1849 and in 1860 were not very serious ones. In 1848, Alzda took command of the Carlists in the Basque Provinces; he was captured and shot (Clarke 1906, p.214). At the same time, Cabrera entered Catalonia through French Cerdagne (June 1848); he spent almost one year there without any significant fighting taking place; in April 1849 he abandoned hope and crossed the frontier again. In April 1860, Don Carlos Luis landed with 3,500 troops near Tortosa (mouth of the river Ebro). But the expected rising did not occur and he was captured without putting up any resistance.

(3) The protracted war of 1872–1874 was marked by the following major battles: Orioquieta (Navarra, May 1872), Estella (Basque Provinces, August 1873), Tolosa (Basque Provinces, November 1873), Vich and Olot (Catalonia, January and March 1874), Teruel and Cuenca (Castille, July 1874), siege of Bilbao and Irun (Basque Provinces, 1874). Thus, out of 9 battles only 2 took place in Catalonia.

(4) During the Spanish Civil War, the nationalists first subdued the Basque Provinces. From September 1936 to August 1937 nationalist forces proceeded from East (San Sebastian) to West (Santander). The campaign that took place in Catalonia (December 1938–February 1939) was one of the last phases of the war and was much shorter than the struggle in the Basque Provinces.

Broadly speaking, on the basis of the previous historical record, one may say that the repertoire of the Catalan people, although it included different varieties of general strikes, urban uprisings or self-promulgated autonomy proclamations was rather poorly endowed in terms of stubborn fighting or military upheavals. This may account for the difference between Basque and Catalan autonomist movements after

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13The latter is said to have cost 50,000 deaths (Davant 1975); we were unable to find a corresponding figure for the war in Catalonia.
1960. Such ways manifested themselves once again in the autonomy movements of the 1980s.

**Conclusion**

We have been interested in ethnic revivals based on homeland loyalties and in which linguistic factors usually play a prominent role. We presented a model aimed at describing the long-range trend of such phenomena. In a long-term perspective, spatial and geographical factors turn out to be of cardinal importance. In this paper our objectives were: (i) To describe the mechanisms we believe to be at work (ii) To discuss the validity and the implications of the model on some critical examples (iii) To emphasize that in the emergence of national loyalties there is a strong parallelism between the role once held by religions and the one languages play nowadays. In the second part of this paper we examined how and to what extent the historical legacy determines and shapes nationalist struggles. The present model has a number of straightforward implications. As an example let us come back to the integration process in the United States whose strength and effectiveness we emphasized in section 1. There are only two countries contiguous to the United States. Canada being an English-speaking country (with the obvious exception of Quebec) there can be no major minority problem on the northern frontier. On the basis of history and of language quite a different situation would be expected to prevail on the southern border with Mexico, a surmise which is indeed confirmed by the observation (Lieberson et al 1975, p.56) that in New Mexico only a small proportion of the Spanish-speaking people has shifted from Spanish to English since 1846.

In the follow-up paper we shall subject our model to more systematic tests using a data set based on 40 cases (over the period 1945–1995). Yet, as pointed out by K. Popper, no finite set of tests can ever validate a theory completely; ultimately, it is the absence of contradictory evidence which becomes proof of the theory. It is this very argument which gives its significance to the case studies reported in the present paper.
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