Boats and Tides and “Trickle Down” Theories: What Economists Presume about Wellbeing When They Employ Stochastic Process Theory in Modeling Behavior

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Abstract    Aphorisms that “Rising tides raise all boats” or that material advances of the rich eventually “Trickle Down” to the poor are really maxims regarding the nature of stochastic processes that underlay the income/wellbeing paths of groups of individuals. This paper looks at the implications for the empirical analysis of wellbeing of conventional assumptions regarding such processes which are employed by both micro and macro economists in modeling economic behavior. The implications of attributing different processes to different groups in society following the club convergence literature are also discussed. Various forms of poverty, inequality, polarization and income mobility structures are considered and much of the conventional wisdom afforded us by such aphorisms is questioned. To exemplify these ideas the results are applied to the distribution of GDP per capita in the continent of Africa.

JEL   C22, I32, D63, D91, O47
Keywords   Stochastic processes; poverty; inequality; wellbeing measurement

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Introduction.

The aphorism that “a rising tide raises all boats” and the theory that advances in economic well-being of the rich ultimately trickle down to the poor have frequently been cited as reasons for believing that growth elevates poor from poverty. These are essentially notions regarding the nature of income or consumption processes as stochastic processes. Economists interested in growth, consumption and convergence issues of various forms have a long tradition of modeling income or consumption as a stochastic process (either of a stationary or of a random walk variety), presumably because such processes provide simple and effective descriptions of income and consumption paths for modeling purposes but also because such formulations, in the form of consumption and growth regressions, provided a useful way of relating consumption trends and growth rates to initial conditions.

A microeconomic literature that built on Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Freidman (1957) developed models of agents who maximized the present value of lifetime happiness \(\int_0^T U(C(t))e^{-r^{*}t}dt\) subject to the present value of lifetime wealth \(\int_0^T Y(t)e^{-rt}dt\) where \(U(\cdot)\) is an instantaneous felicity function, \(Y\) is income, \(r^{*}\) is the individuals rate of time preference and \(r\) is the market lending rate. (Browning and Lusardi (1996)) show that this taken together with the assumption of a constant relative risk aversion and no bequest motive preference structure leads to a consumption smoothing model of the form:

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1 Recently there has been considerable interest in the “rising tides” notion (Freeman (2001) Hynes et. al. (2001) Burgess et. al. (2001)) which the Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (2004) attributes to the Kennedy family. Anderson (1964) is responsible for the “trickle down” theory.
\[ C(t) = e^{(r-r^*)t/\zeta} C(0) \]

where \( \zeta \) is the risk aversion coefficient and by implication \( g = (r-r^*)t/\zeta \) is the consumption growth rate. The empirical counterpart of this equation is the familiar (non-stationary) random walk model:

\[ \ln C(t) = \ln(C(t-1)) + g + e(t) \]

These types of formulations are also close to those used by macro modelers in developing savings and income equations in a growth literature that yields a stationary process. Here the usual empirical model of conditional convergence in the growth literature comes from a first-order Taylor series approximation to the dynamic path of capital and/or output around its steady-state growth, it is a proposition about mean reversion, not about unit roots (See e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Temple (1999)). So, given a Cobb – Douglass technology \( Y=K^{a}H^{b}(AL)^{(1-a-b)} \) where \( Y \) is output, \( H \) is human capital stock, \( A \) is technology and \( L \) is labour letting \( y(t) = Y(t)/L(t) \) the first order Taylor Series expansion of \( \ln y(t) \) around its steady state \( \ln y^* \) yields:

\[ \frac{d\ln y(t)}{dt} = \lambda[\ln y^*-\ln y(t)] \]

where \( \lambda=(n+g+\delta)(1-\alpha-\beta) \) with \( n \) and \( g \) being respectively exogenous labour and technology growth rates and \( \delta \) is the physical capital depreciation rate. This leads to a stationary version of the above per capita consumption equation (in terms of income) of the form:

\[ \ln y(t)-\ln y(0)=(1-e^{-\lambda t})\ln y^* - (1-e^{-\lambda t})\ln y(0) \]
Surprisingly, for the link does not appear to have been made very often in the income size
distribution and economic well being literatures\(^2\), such models have implications for, and
provide predictions as to, the progress of inequality, poverty and polarization that would
be of interest to those interested in various aspects of empirical well-being.

Stochastic process theory also provides a motivation for fitting particular size
distributions of income or consumption (since the nature of the stochastic process has
strong implications for the nature of the size distribution of income). There are
advantages associated with fitting size distributions parametrically. Poverty calculations
of the non-parametric variety can be difficult, especially when sample sizes are small or
the poverty group is small in number relative to the size of the population because
information on the relevant tail of the distribution is sparse and changes in the tails of
distributions can be very difficult to get a handle on (see Davidson and Duclos (2008) for
a discussion that highlights this problem). A parametric distribution that fits the data well
can provide substantive information about the nature of such tails. Furthermore if
incomes are truly governed by such processes poverty, inequality or polarization policies
need to focus on changing the structure of the processes or at least mitigating their effects
and obviously a full understanding the processes and their implications will help in this
regard. Indeed some policies, such as defining a poverty frontier (social security net) or
lower boundary below which incomes are not permitted to fall, can become part of the
process, changing its structure and the nature of the resultant size distribution of income.

\(^2\) (Battistin, Blundell, Lewbel, (2009), Deaton and Paxson (1994), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Meyer and
Sullivan (2003), O’Neill (2005) and Osberg (1977) are exceptions)
This in turn provides a powerful test of the effectiveness of such a policy in terms of the extent to which the distribution conforms to that predicted by the process structure.

Alternatively one may construe the population as a collection of subgroups each with their own process with the poor as a particular subgroup, an entity in itself, with a unique stochastic process defining its path as opposed to the paths of the other presumably more advantaged groups in society. The societal income distribution then in effect becomes a mixture distribution governed by the variety of processes defining the separate groups and the mixture coefficients which define the respective memberships. This imposes additional strictures on rising tides and trickle down theories in the way they impact the separate groups. Anti poverty policies can then focus on the changing the nature of the processes governing the poorest groups and ideas from the convergence literature become relevant in understanding the relative poverty process. In these circumstances the way poverty is measured also needs to be reviewed since poverty is now about the changing membership of a class and the way the stochastic process describing that class proceeds through time.

Before examining what such models imply for the progress of wellbeing one needs to be clear as to what sort of poverty or inequality it is that is in question. There has been considerable debate about the nature of poverty measurement as to whether it should be an absolute or a relative measure. The issue entertained the minds of the founders of the discipline. Adam Smith (1776) can be interpreted to have had a relative view of poverty viz: “….. By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensably
necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even the lowest order, to be without.” Similarly Ferguson (1767) states “The necessary of life is a vague and relative term: it is one thing in the opinion of the savage; another in that of the polished citizen: it has a reference to the fancy and to the habits of living”. Marshall (1890) on the other hand had a very clear idea of income poverty as an absolute concept, his comment on poverty in the introduction to The Principles being “…for with £150 the family has, with £30 it has not, the material conditions of a complete life.”. More recently Townsend (1985) (the major advocate of the relative measure in recent times) and Sen (1983) (who favours a basic needs formulation) have lead the debate regarding the two approaches, both claim consistency with the intent of Smith’s thoughts largely via different interpretations of the words decent, creditable etc.

Interestingly enough no such debate seems to have taken place regarding relative versus absolute inequality, though invariably relative inequality measures (Coefficient of Variation, Gini and Shutz coefficients for example) seem to have been favored and recently the concept of polarization which is related to, but distinctly different from, relative inequality has gained favour (see Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) for details). Some absolute inequality measures (variance levels and quantile differences for example) have currency and absolute measures of polarization are also a possibility.

Here the theoretical implications of stochastic processes for absolute and relative wellbeing measures will be outlined and the results employed in looking at the stochastic
processes underlying the per capita GDP of African nations and considering what they imply for the progress of poverty and inequality on that continent. After a consideration of the implications of some aspects of relatively simple stochastic processes for the progress of poverty and inequality in section 2 mixtures are considered in section 3. These ideas are considered in the light of data on per capita GDP for African nations over the period 1985 to 2005 in section 4 and conclusions are drawn in section 5.

2. Gibrat’s Law, Kalecki’s Law, The Pareto Distribution and notions of absolute and relative poverty and inequality.

Two early front runner’s for describing the size distribution of income or consumption were the Pareto distribution and the Lognormal distribution\(^3\), subsequently it has been learned that they are linked via stochastic process theory. Pareto (1897) felt that his distribution was a law which governed the size distribution of incomes, Gibrat (1931), working with firm sizes, used statistical central limit theorem type arguments to demonstrate that a sequence of successive independent proportionate “close to one” shocks to an initial level of a variable would yield an income the log of which was normally distributed regardless of the distribution governing the shocks\(^4\). Gabaix (1997), working with city size distributions, highlighted the link in showing that if a process such as that proposed by Gibrat was subjected to a reflective lower boundary, bouncing back the variable should it hit the boundary from above, the resulting distribution would be

\(^3\) Conventional wisdom was that Pareto fit well in the tails whereas the lognormal fit well in the middle, (Harrison (1984), Johnson, Kotz and Balakrishnan (1994)).

\(^4\) Kalecki (1945) showed that Gibrat’s result could be obtained from a stationary process as well.
Pareto. Obviously a social security net of some kind, such as a legislated low income cut-off below which no one was permitted to fall, would constitute such a boundary for an income process. Both of these notions regarding the shape of income size distributions draw on theories of stochastic processes which, if empirically verified, will also tell us much about the progress of poverty and or inequality however defined.

Starting off with Gibrat’s law of proportionate effects in a discrete time paradigm suppose that $x_t$, the income of the representative agent at period $t$, follows the law of proportionate effects with $\delta_t$ its income growth rate in period $t$, $T$ the elapsed time period of earnings with $x_0$ the initial income. Thus:

$$x_i = (1 + \delta_{i-1})x_{i-1}; \quad \text{and} \quad x_T = x_0 \prod_{i=1}^{T-1} (1 + \delta_i) \quad [1]$$

Assuming the $\delta$’s to be independent identically distributed random variables with a small (relative to one) mean $\mu$ and finite variance $\sigma^2$ it may be shown that for an agents life of $T$ years with starting income $x_0$ the log income size distribution of such agents would be linked systematically from period to period in terms of means and variances in the form:

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5 This has been established before, Harrison (1987) and Champernowne (1953) demonstrate a somewhat similar result. Reed (2006) provides an alternative link between the Lognormal and Pareto and provides rationales from stochastic process theory for more complex size distributions.

6 The Millenium goals and $1 and $2 poverty frontiers may be construed as such potential frontiers.

7 The same result can be achieved in the continuous time paradigm by assuming a Geometric Brownian Motion for the $x$ process of the form:

$$dx = \mu x dt + \sigma x dw$$

Where $\mu$ is the mean drift $\sigma$ is a variance factor and $dw$ is the white noise increment of a Weiner process.
\[ \ln(x_T) \sim N(\ln(x_0) + T(\mu + 0.5\sigma^2)), T\sigma^2) \] [2]

These types of models are consumption process literature except that the properties of the error processes they engender are usually ignored in cross-sectional comparisons, in particular the variance of the process is heteroskedastic increasing in a cumulative fashion through time implying increasing absolute inequality. Note that [2] could also be the consequence of a process of the form:

\[ \ln(x_t) = \ln(x_{t-1}) + \psi + e_t \]

which had started at \( t=0 \) and had run for \( T \) periods where \( e_t \) was an i.i.d. \( N(0,\sigma^2) \) and where \( \psi = \mu + 0.5\sigma^2 \). Indeed the i.i.d. assumption regarding the \( \delta \)'s is much stronger than needed, under conditions of 3\(^{rd}\) moment boundedness, log normality can be established for sequences of non-independent, heteroskedastic and heterogeneous \( \delta \) (see Gnedenko (1962)) where the variance of the process still grows as \( O(T) \). The power of the law, like all central limit theorems, is that a log normal distribution prevails in the limit almost regardless of the underlying distribution of the \( \delta \)'s (or \( e \)'s).

Clearly for a needs based (absolute) poverty line (say \( x^* \)) and growth exceeding \(-0.5\sigma^2\) the poverty rate would be 0 in the limit (i.e. \( \lim_{T \to \infty} \Phi(\ln(x^*/x_0)-T(\mu+0.5\sigma^2))/(\sigma\sqrt{T}) \) where \( \Phi(z) \) is the cumulative density of the standard normal distribution) and for growth less than \(-0.5\sigma^2\) the poverty rate would be 1. For a relative poverty line, for example 0.6 of median income (note median income will be \( \exp(\ln(x_0)+T(\mu+0.5\sigma^2)) \) and the poverty cut-off will be .6 of that value), the poverty rate would be \( \Phi(\ln(0.6)/(\sigma\sqrt{T})) \) which obviously increases with time reaching .5 at infinity. The income quantiles in such an
income process will not have common trends and, provided growth is sufficiently small, such a society exhibits increasing inequality by most measures that are not location normalized (hereafter referred to as absolute inequality). For aficionados of the Gini what really matters is the growth rate, Lambert (1993) shows that for the Log Normal Distribution with mean and variance $\theta, \gamma$ respectively and with a distribution Function $F(z | \theta, \gamma)$ the Gini coefficient may be written in the present context as:

$$2F(\exp(\ln(x_0)+T(\mu+0.5\sigma^2)) \mid \exp(\ln(x_0)+T(\mu+0.5\sigma^2)),T\sigma^2) - 1$$

This will tend to zero as $T \rightarrow \infty$ when $\mu < -0.5\sigma^2$ and will tend to 1 otherwise, note particularly for zero growth Gini will tend to 1. Note this is purely a function of the Gini being a relative inequality index that is normalized on the mean (it may be interpreted as the average distance between individual incomes normalized by the mean income). If the average distance between individuals were normalized by one of the income quantiles the results would be quite different with a greater propensity to increasing inequality when normalized by a low income quantile and a smaller propensity when normalized by a high income quantile.

The Polarization index proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994) may be seen as closely related to the discrete version of the Gini Index since, given $\pi_i$ is the probability of being in the i’th cell, it is of the form:

$$P_{\alpha} = K \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} |x_i - x_j| \pi_i^{1+\alpha} \pi_j$$

A continuous version of this index is given in Duclos Esteban and Ray (2004) as:

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8 Many inequality measures are location normalized measures of dispersion they are in effect relative inequality measures, (for example the Coefficient of Variation and Gini) if the location is increasing slow enough and the dispersion is increasing fast enough inequality by any measure will be increasing.
\[ P_\alpha = K \int f(x)^\alpha \mid y - x \mid dF(x)dF(y) \]

where in each case \( \alpha > 0 \) is the index of polarization aversion (when \( \alpha = 0 \) we have the Gini index) and \( K \) is a scale factor. In the Gini version \( K \) is the inverse of mean income giving it its relative flavour thus the effects on this index will be much the same as for the Gini coefficient.

With respect to relative poverty measures should a “civil society” protect its poor in maintaining its “relative status”, for example by defining a poverty cut off such that the poorest 20% of society were considered the poor, then the cut off would exhibit a lower growth rate than mean income. One may thus engage propositions such as those mooted in Freidman (2005) by considering the dynamics of the poverty cut off relative to the mean income.

To somewhat muddy the waters Kalecki (1945) generated a lognormal size distribution from a stationary process of the form:

\[ \ln x_t - \ln x_{t-1} = \lambda (f(w_t) - \ln x_{t-1}) + e_t \quad [3] \]

With \( 0 < \lambda < 1 \) this corresponds to a partial adjustment model to some equilibrium \( f(w_t) \), (which in the context of incomes would be a “fundamentals” notion of long run log incomes). These models are close to the cross-sectional growth (or Barro) regressions familiar in the growth and convergence literature (see Durlauf et.al.(2005) for details). This is essentially a reversion to mean type of process where the mean itself could be a description of the average income level at time \( t \) (which incidentally may well be trending through time) but here the variance of the process (and concomitantly absolute
inequality) stays constant over time. For $e_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$ in the long run $\ln(x_t) \sim N(f(w_t), \sigma^2/\lambda^2)$. There are several observations to be made.

Firstly the pure integrated process story associated with Gibrat’s law is not even a necessary condition for lognormality of the income size distribution, such distributions can be obtained from quite different, more generally integrated or non-integrated processes. Secondly stationary processes are in some sense memory-less in that the impacts of the initial value of incomes $f(w_0)$ and the associated shock $e_0$ disappear after a sufficient lapse of time. On the other hand integrated processes never forget, the marginal impact of the initial size and subsequent shocks remain the same throughout time. Thirdly if $f(w_t)$ were itself an integrated process (if the $w$’s were integrated of order one and $f(w)$ was homogenous of degree one for example) [3] would correspond to an error correction model and incomes would still present as an integrated process in its own right with $x$ and the function of the $w$’s being co-integrated with a co-integration factor of 1. This is the key to distinguishing between “Kalecki’s law” and Gibrat’s law, the cross-sectional distribution of the former only evolves over time in terms of its mean $f(w_t)$, its variance (written as $\sigma^2/\lambda^2$) is time independent, whereas the cross distribution of the latter evolves in terms of both its mean and its variance overtime. The distinction has major implications for the progress of poverty and inequality.

Clearly for a needs based (absolute) poverty line (say $x^*$) the poverty rate will depend upon the time profile of $f(w_T)$ in the limit (i.e. $\lim_{T \to \infty} \Phi(((x^* - f(w_T))/\sigma/\lambda)$) for positive growth it will be 0 and for negative growth it will be 1. For a relative poverty line, 0.6 of
median income for example (note median income will be $\exp(f(w_T))$ and the poverty cut-off will be .6 of that value), the poverty rate would be $\Phi(\ln(0.6)/\sigma/\lambda]$ which obviously remains constant over time. Inequality measures that are not mean income normalized will remain constant over time location normalized inequality measures will diminish with positive growth and diminish with negative growth since the Gini coefficient may be written as:

$$2F(\exp(\ln(x_0)+T\mu),\sigma^2/\lambda^2) - 1$$

which will be 0 for negative growth, 1 for positive growth and constant for zero growth.

**Where does Pareto’s Law fit in?**

Suppose the income process is governed by [1] but now, should $x_t$ fall below $x^*$ which is a lower reflective boundary (such as an enforced poverty frontier for example a mandated social security benefit payment), then the process is modified to [1] plus:

$$x_t = x^* \text{ if } (1+\delta_{t-1})x_{t-1} < x^* \quad [1a]$$

Gibrat’s Law will no longer hold, in fact after a sufficient period of time the size distribution of $x$ would be Pareto ($F(x) = 1-(x^*/x)^\theta$) with a shape coefficient $\theta = 1$. In the literature on city size distributions this distribution is known as Zipf’s Law and in that literature Gabaix (1999) showed that Zipf’s law follows from a Gibrat consistent stochastic process (essentially a random walk) that is subject to a lower reflective boundary. In fact this phenomena, that a random walk with drift that is subject to a lower
reflective boundary generates a Pareto distributed variable, has been known in the statistical process literature for some time (see for example Harrison (1987))\(^9\). In the present context this has many implications, the Pareto distribution has a very different shape from the log normal and it would be constant through time, all relative poverty measures, absolute poverty measures and inequality measures\(^{10}\) would be constants over time so that Pareto based predictions provide very powerful tests of the effectiveness of a mandated social security safety net.

These stochastic theories also have something to say about societal mobility. From a somewhat different perspective than is usual, mobility in a society may be construed as its agents opportunity for changing rank. Suppose that opportunity is reflected in the chance that two agents change places and consider two independently sampled agents \(x_{it} = x_{it-1} + e_{it}\) and \(x_{jt} = x_{jt-1} + e_{jt}\), so that \(E(e_{it} - e_{jt}) = 0\) and \(V(e_{it} - e_{jt}) = 2\sigma^2\). For the Gibrat model the probability that agents switch their relative ranks in period \(t\) is given by:

\[
P(x_{it} > x_{jt} \mid x_{it-1} < x_{jt-1}) = P(e_{it} - e_{jt} > x_{jt-1} - x_{it-1})
\]

By noting that the Gini coefficient is one half the relative mean difference between agents and that, for the log normal distribution, this may be written as twice the integral of a standard normal curve over the interval \([0, (\sqrt{V(x)/2})]\), the average distance between two agents = \(4E(x)(\Phi(\sqrt{V(x)/2})-\Phi(0))\) and this probability may be written as:

\[
= P((e_{it} - e_{jt})/(\sigma/\sqrt{2}) > 4exp(ln(x_0)+T(\mu+0.5\sigma^2))(\Phi(T^{0.5}\sigma/\sqrt{2})-\Phi(0))/(\sigma/\sqrt{2}))
\]

\[
= P(Z > 4exp(ln(x_0)+T(\mu+0.5\sigma^2))(\Phi(T^{0.5}\sigma/\sqrt{2})-\Phi(0))/(\sigma/\sqrt{2}))
\]

\(^9\)Champernowne (1953) discovered as much in the context of income size distributions.

\(^{10}\)The Gini for a Pareto distribution is \(1/(2\theta-1)\) which is 1 when the shape coefficient is one because in this case the Pareto distribution has no moments or an infinite mean.
The point is this probability diminishes over time (the intuition being that under constant population size the agents are growing further and further apart on average) so that mobility diminishes over time. For Kalecki’s law note that the independently sampled agents processes may be written as \( x_{it} = f(w_t) + (1-\lambda)x_{it-1} + e_{it} \) and \( x_{jt} = f(w_t) + (1-\lambda)x_{jt-1} + e_{jt} \), so that \( E(e_{it} - e_{jt}) = 0 \) and \( V(e_{it} - e_{jt}) = 2\sigma^2 \), with the inequality being written as:

\[
P(x_{it} > x_{jt} \mid x_{it-1} < x_{jt-1}) = P((e_{it} - e_{jt})/(1-\lambda) > x_{jt-1} - x_{it-1})
\]

In this case using the Gini relationship to the population mean and the mean difference this probability may be written as:

\[
P((1-\lambda)(e_{it} - e_{jt})/(\sigma/\sqrt{2}) > (1-\lambda)4\exp(f(w_t))(\Phi(\sigma/(\lambda\sqrt{2}))-\Phi(0))/(\sigma/\sqrt{2}))
\]

\[
= P(Z > (1-\lambda)4\exp(f(w_t))(\Phi(\sigma/(\lambda\sqrt{2}))-\Phi(0))/(\sigma/\sqrt{2}))
\]

so that as long as the fundamentals process \( f(w_t) \) is constant then so will mobility be in that society. A similar result may be established for Pareto’s law. Table 1 summarizes all these results:

Table 1.

| Wellbeing Type | Type of Stochastic Process | Gibrat’s Law | Kalecki’s Law | Pareto’s Law |
|----------------|---------------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| Absolute Poverty | Increasing or decreasing dependent upon growth rate | Increasing or decreasing dependent upon growth rate | Constant if the reflective boundary is at the poverty cut-off. |
| Relative Poverty | Increasing with time | Constant | Constant if the reflective boundary is at the poverty cut-off. |
| Non-Normalized Inequality | Increasing | Constant | Constant |
| Location Normalized Inequality and Polarization | Decreasing with +ve growth rate | Decreasing | Constant |
| Mobility | Diminishing | Constant (if the fundamentals are constant) | Constant (if the fundamentals are constant) |
Mixture Distributions and Trickle Down Theories (Anderson (1964))

The popularity of the “Rising Tide Raises All Boats” argument for the alleviation of poverty through growth has already been alluded to. For basic needs based definitions of the poverty cut-off this is no doubt true though it is not true if relative poverty is the measurement criterion. A slightly more sophisticated development of this argument is the “Trickle Down” effect (Anderson (1964)). The idea is that it is necessary for economic growth to initially benefit the higher income groups (because they make the marginal product of labour enhancing investments that increased the incomes of the poor) but it transits downward to the lower income groups over time. However this idea is predicated on the notion of economically different groups in society (with different investment behaviours for example) and it is not unreasonable to presume that different stochastic processes govern their respective behaviours. In effect one is “modeling” different groups, one of which would be the poor group, which will perhaps calls for a different approach to measuring poverty and inequality. The poor are identified by the extent to which their income processes are noticeably different from the income processes of other groups in society rather than because their income is less than some pre-specified boundary. It follows that some identifiably “rich” individuals may have, at least temporarily, incomes that are lower than some of the members in the poor group.

To explore the implications of this structure imagine the societal income process to be that of a mixture of $K$ normal distributions corresponding to the $K$ income classes so that:

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Sen’s functionings and capabilities approach (see Grusky and Kanbur (2006) for an extensive discussion) can also be construed as arguing for different processes describing rich and poor group behaviours distinguished by their different sets of circumstances.
\[ f_k(\ln(x_{kT})) = N((\ln(x_{k0}) + T(\mu_k + 0.5\sigma_k^2)), T\sigma_k^2) \quad k = 1, ..., K \]

The classes are distinguished by their initial conditions in the sense that \( \ln(x_{k0}) > \ln(x_{j0}) \) for all \( j < k \) where \( j, k = 1, ..., K \) and the proportion of the population in each class is given by \( w_k \). Note that:

\[ \int_0^\infty (f_i(z) - f_j(z))dz \leq 0 \ \forall \ x > 0 \ \text{and} \ i > j. \]

The class \( k=1 \) may be thought of as “the Permanently or Chronically Poor” so that CP, the Chronic Poverty rate is \( w_1 \). In this form there will be chronically poor agents whose incomes will be, at least temporarily, higher than some non-poor agents since the poor and non-poor distributions will overlap. The extent to which the Permanently Poor distribution overlaps the distribution of the other classes those members of those classes may be considered the transitorily poor, so that the Transitorily Poor rate \( TP \) may be written as:

\[ TP = \sum_{k=2}^{K} w_k \int_0^\infty f_1(x_k)dx_k \]

For momentary convenience assume \( \mu_k = \mu \) and \( \sigma_k = \sigma \) for all \( k \) (i.e. the various classes are distinguished by their initial conditions alone). So here the poor are class \( k=1 \) and the rich are class \( k=K \). Assume now that at period \( T_1 \) society moves to a new higher growth rate \( \mu^* > \mu \), if all classes move together the income groups would have size distributions of the form:

\[ \ln(x_{kT}) \in N((\ln(x_{k0}) + T_1(\mu - \mu^*) + T(\mu^* + 0.5\sigma^2)), T\sigma^2) \quad k = 1, ..., K, \ \text{and} \ T > T_1 \]
All classes retain their mean differences over time, the extent to which class A first order dominates class B remains constant and there is no change in the degree of polarization between the classes. However if in the first period only the highest income group (K) moves, j periods later only the next highest group (K-1) moves, j periods later only the next highest group (K-2) moves etc… Then the new societal income process will be the same mixture of K normal distributions corresponding to the K income classes but with:

\[
\ln(x_{tT}) \sim N((\ln(x_{t0}) + (T_i + jK - jk)(\mu - \mu^*) + T(\mu^* + 0.5\sigma^2)), T\sigma^2) \quad k = 1,..,K, \text{ and } T > T_i + K
\]

There are several observations to make. The distribution of average log incomes of the classes will be more widely spread initially and these initial differences will only be dissipated asymptotically (If the growth rates differ between the classes with the differences increasing with income class the differences will not dissipate asymptotically). In the short term the income size distribution of high income groups will more strongly first order dominate that of lower income groups increasing the polarization or lack of identification between poor and rich groups and the effect will be larger the longer is the lag in the trickle down effect (j). In effect there will be greater absolute inequality in the short run. When poverty lines are defined relative to an income quantile this will increase the probabilities of both transient and chronic poverty for the lower income classes. All of this is predicated on all income groups differing only in their initial incomes, should there be heterogeneity in growth rates and variances as well as starting incomes then anything is possible.
It should be said that in this model structure so-called poverty cutoffs are superfluous since the poverty group is better defined as those agents governed by the process that is dominated by all other processes. Issues concerning measuring the plight of the poor would centre upon $w_1$, the mixture coefficient for the poor group, and measuring the differences between the poor group sub-distribution and the other distributions in the mixture. Inequality can also be measured in terms of these concepts or it can be measured in terms of the general variability characteristics (variance or coefficient of variation for example) of the overall mixture distribution. Similarly, issues concerned with addressing the plight of the poor may then be seen in terms of influencing the weights attached to each class as well as changing the nature of the process that governs the poor group outcomes.

For expositional convenience suppose there are 2 groups in society governed by processes which dictate their poor or non-poor status, these two processes result in a poor wellbeing distribution $f_p(x)$ of the measurable characteristics $x$ (for expositional convenience the analysis will be performed in terms of a univariate distribution but is should be stressed that the analysis can be readily performed in a multivariate environment), and a rich wellbeing distribution $f_r(x)$, the proportions of agents under these distributions are $w_p$ and $1-w_p$ respectively so that the size distribution of incomes in this society is:

$$f(x) = w_p f_p(x) + (1-w_p)f_r(x) \quad [4]$$

For understanding the plight of the poor the components of interest are $w_p$ (which is essentially the proportion of people governed by the poor process which can be viewed as
the real poverty rate) and the nature of the distribution of incomes among the poor, \( f_p(x) \) (its mean gives us the average incomes of the poor, its variance gives us a measure of inequality amongst the poor and will permit generation of indices akin to FGT2 and FGT3 indices (Foster Greer Thorbeke (1984)).

Suppose identification of the poor was pursued by employing an arbitrarily determined poverty cutoff \( c \), then:

\[
P_{rpm} = \int_{-\infty}^{c} f_p(x)dx \quad \text{proportion of the rich miss-identified as poor}
\]

\[
P_{pmr} = \int_{c}^{\infty} f_p(x)dx \quad \text{proportion of the poor miss-identified as rich}
\]

and the calculated poverty rate would be \( w_p(1-P_{pmr})+(1-w_p)P_{rpm} \neq w_p \) (unless the proportion of the misidentified that are rich identified as poor is equal to the real poverty rate i.e. \( w_p = P_{rpm} / (P_{pmr} + P_{rpm}) \)).

To the extent that the distributions overlap, for the sake of argument just in the region \([a,b]\), so that both distributions have support in that interval, then there is potential for agents to not be point identified as either poor or rich. Essentially the interval contains those people who got a bad draw from the rich distribution and those people who got a good draw from the poor distribution. The overlap of the two weighted distributions, a measure of the extent of polarization of the two groups (Anderson, Linton and Wang (2009)), is given by \( \int_{a}^{b} \min(w_p f_p(x),(1-w_p)) f_r(x) dx \) and here corresponds to a measure of the potential for the lack of point identification. Suppose we could estimate the mixture distribution and by so doing identify \( w_p, f_p(\cdot), f_r(\cdot) \), \( a \) and \( b \) then we could identify some of the rich and some of the poor. We could assert that all agents with \( x \) below “a” would
be point identified as poor, all with x above “b” would be point identified as rich. All agents with x in the interval [a,b] we would not know for sure, however more could be said in the sense that in this segment agents are partially identified, if the sub distributions could be estimated it would be possible to attach to each agent a probability that they were in one of the particular groups, very much in the spirit of the partial identification literature (see for example Manski (2002)).

An allocation rule.

Consider the interval x+dx, the probability that someone from this interval is poor is given by $\theta_p(x, dx)$ where:

$$\theta_p(x, dx) = \frac{\int_{x}^{x+dx} w_p f_p(z) dz}{\int_{x}^{x+dx} (w_p f_p(z) + (1 - w_p)f_r(z)) dz}$$

Note that:
\[
\lim_{dx \to 0} \theta_p(x, dx) = \theta_p(x) = \frac{w_p f_p(x)}{w_p f_p(x) + (1-w_p)f_r(x)} \quad [5]
\]

This corresponds to the probability that a person with \( x \) is poor so that \((1-w_p)f_r(x) / (w_p f_p(x) + (1-w_p)f_r(x))\) corresponds to the probability that a person with \( x \) is rich. Given estimates of \( w_p, f_p(x) \) and \( f_r(x) \), these probabilities can be estimated. Note also that, given a poverty line \( c \), analogues to the FGT indices for the “poor” who are below the poverty line can be generated, thus:

\[
\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \theta_p(x)f(x)dx = w_p \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} x\theta_p(x)f(x)dx = \mu_p \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{1}{1-w_p} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} x(1-\theta_p(x))f(x)dx = \mu_r
\]

are respectively the poverty rate, the mean income of the poor and the mean income of the non-poor which may respectively be estimated by:

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{x_i - \hat{\mu}_p}{n} \] \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \hat{\theta}(x_i) / n \) and \( \frac{1}{1-\sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{\theta}(x_i) / n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i (1-\hat{\theta}(x_i)) / n \)

Furthermore

\[
\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{(x - \mu_p)^2}{W} \theta_p(x)f(x)dx = \sigma_p^2 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{1}{1-w_p} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{(x - \mu_r)^2}{W} (1-\theta_p(x))f(x)dx = \sigma_r^2
\]

correspond to the poor and non-poor income variances respectively which may be respectively estimated by:

\[
\frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{\theta}(x_i) / n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - \hat{\mu}_p)^2 \hat{\theta}(x_i) / n \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{1}{1-\sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{\theta}(x_i) / n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - \hat{\mu}_p)^2 (1-\hat{\theta}(x_i)) / n
\]

Finally the j’th order Foster Greer Thorbeke index for the poor and its estimator is given by:

\[
FGT(j) = \int_{0}^{c} \left( \frac{c-x}{c} \right)^j \theta_p(x)f(x)dx / w \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} I(x_i < c)(\hat{\theta}_p(x)(\frac{c-x_i}{c})^j / n\bar{w}, j = 1,...}
\]
The Experience of Africa 1985-2005

To illustrate these issues data on per capita GDP for 47 African countries together with their populations were drawn from the World Bank African Development Indicators CD-ROM for the years 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 were used. An issue immediately arises as to whether the raw data or population weighted data should be employed. At the statistical level the parameters of interest will be estimated as though the data were an independent random sample and the properties of those estimators predicated upon that assumption. If the population of interest is that of Africa then this is not so and sample weighting is necessary to adjust for the under sampling of highly populated countries and over sampling of sparsely populated countries. A similar argument prevails at the economic theoretic level if some sort of representative agent model is presumed and the wellbeing of all Africans is of interest. For the purposes of comparison, and to highlight the substantive differences the distinction makes both will be reported here.

Table 1 reports summary statistics (means and variances) for the sample years and clearly indicates the implicit over sampling of higher income nations in the un-weighted

---

12 The countries in the sample were: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Arab Rep., Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, The, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
estimates. Notice the un-weighted estimates record a growth of 14% over the period whereas the weighted results report less than 8% growth, a substantial difference.

Table 1. ln(GDP per capita)

| Year | Un-weighted Means | Variances | Weighted Means | Variances |
|------|-------------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|
| 1985 | 6.1820771         | 0.92778351| 6.0692785      | 0.90744347|
| 1990 | 6.1784034         | 0.98733961| 6.0827742      | 0.88023763|
| 1995 | 6.1113916         | 1.1495402 | 6.0053685      | 0.95556079|
| 2000 | 6.2174786         | 1.2386242 | 6.0488727      | 1.0276219 |
| 2005 | 6.3223021         | 1.3481553 | 6.1461927      | 1.0300315 |

Diagrams 2 and 3 present the beginning of period and end of period size distributions of ln(GDP per capita) again in un-weighted and weighted form. The shifts in location and spread discerned in Table 1 can readily be perceived in these diagrams.

13 These are essentially Epetchanikov kernel estimates of the respective size distributions.
Pearson Goodness of Fit Tests of the hypothesis that these distributions are Log Normal or Pareto, performed for both weighted and unweighted samples, are reported in Table 2. At the 1% critical value there is a preponderance of evidence favouring the Log Normal formulation (it only gets rejected twice in the un-weighted sample and once in the weighted sample and pretty marginally so at that) whereas the Pareto gets solidly rejected in every instance. This is slightly surprising since, to the eye, diagrams 1 and 2 suggest mixtures of 2 normals (one large poor group and a much smaller rich group), but the evidence does not appear strong enough in the data to really reject pure normality. Indeed the joint test of normality over the 5 observation periods does not reject normality at the 1% level for the weighted sample. Interestingly enough the populations are clearly log – normally distributed so that it may be inferred that gdp's
are themselves log-normally distributed since the difference or sum of two normally
distributed variables is also normally distributed.

Table 2.

| Ln GNP per capita | Un-weighted | Normal χ²(4), [P(Upper Tail)] | Pareto χ²(4), [P(Upper Tail)] |
|-------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
|                   | 1985        | 12.320748 [0.015118869]       | 599.37137 [2.1196982e-128]    |
|                   | 1990        | 18.172132 [0.0011420720]      | 648.71719 [4.4178901e-139]    |
|                   | 1995        | 7.2879022 [0.12143386]        | 254.88561 [5.7677072e-054]    |
|                   | 2000        | 10.035066 [0.039841126]       | 413.23135 [3.8477939e-088]    |
|                   | 2005        | 19.439149 [0.00064419880]     | 418.01949 [3.5518925e-089]    |
|                   | All years χ²(20) | 67.254997 [5.0783604e-007] | 2334.2250 [0.00000000] |
|                   | Weighted    | Normal χ²(4), [P(Upper Tail)] | Pareto χ²(4), [P(Upper Tail)] |
|                   | 1985        | 5.4247526 [0.24642339]        | 850.67992 [8.0715931e-183]    |
|                   | 1990        | 10.882507 [0.027916699]       | 890.92447 [1.5416785e-191]    |
|                   | 1995        | 3.7072456 [0.44707297]        | 389.07173 [6.3881404e-083]    |
|                   | 2000        | 2.8078575 [0.59047714]        | 869.74574 [5.9768551e-187]    |
|                   | 2005        | 13.992590 [0.0073187433]      | 935.78289 [2.9403608e-201]    |
|                   | All years χ²(20) | 36.814952 [0.012314284] | 3936.2047 [0.00000000] |

Ln Population

| Un-weighted | Normal χ²(4), [P(Upper Tail)] | Pareto χ²(4), [P(Upper Tail)] |
|-------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1985        | 2.6979621 0.60957127          | 194.39270 6.0291654e-041      |
| 1990        | 3.4815355 0.48069145          | 193.84403 7.9101295e-041      |
| 1995        | 2.5274974 0.63971883          | 308.86671 1.3243132e-065      |
| 2000        | 2.9924681 0.55908664          | 250.28037 5.6645137e-053      |
| 2005        | 3.7924813 0.43481828          | 245.77727 5.2865977e-052      |

Given the joint normality of the 5 observation periods is accepted, the restrictions implied by [2] can be examined. Under the heroic assumption that the 5 year periods are independent the Likelihood for the sample may be written as:

\[
L = \prod_{j=0}^{4} \prod_{i=1}^{n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi(\theta + j)\sigma^2}} e^{-\frac{(x_j - \ln(x_o) - (\theta + j)(\mu + 0.5\sigma^2))^2}{2(\theta + j)\sigma^2}}
\]

and the null and alternative hypotheses may be written as:

\[H_0: f(x_{T+i}) \sim N((\ln(x_o) + (\theta+i)\mu + 0.5\sigma^2), (\theta+i)\sigma^2) \text{ versus } H_1: f(x_{T+i}) \sim N(\mu_i, \sigma_i) \text{ for } i=0, 1, \ldots, 4;\]
Table 3. Estimates and Tests of Restrictions

|                  | Un-weighted Sample       | Weighted Sample         |
|------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| ln(x₀)           | 5.7827258                | 4.0511799               |
| θ (# of five year intervals) | 9.9694699                | 103.01656               |
| μ                | -0.012055759             | 0.014659728             |
| σ²               | 0.094224026              | 0.0091376682            |
| X²(6)            | 0.19646781               | 0.78654360              |
| P(>χ²(6))        | 0.99985320               | 0.99242963              |

Here ln(x₀) and θ are parameters thus implying 6 restrictions on the alternative. Table 3 reports the estimates of ln(x₀), θ, μ and σ² for the weighted and un-weighted samples, together with the test of the restrictions. In both cases the restrictions are not rejected implying that, conditional on the underlying normality of the distributions, Gibrat’s law is an adequate description of the data.

To examine what these different approaches imply for poverty measurement headcount measures of both the absolute and relative type are considered, the former based upon the popular dollar and 2 dollar a day cut offs (which for our sample become 5.8749307 6.5680779 respectively) and the latter based upon the also popular 50% and 60% of the median cutoffs. As expected in general absolute poverty measures decline with economic growth and relative poverty measures decline.

As for mobility the transitions can be evaluated for each of the five year intervals via the distance of the joint density matrix from that of a diagonal. The statistic

\[
\sum_{ij} \min(p_{ij}, \text{diag}(p_i)).
\]
provides an index of immobility, where \( p_{ij} \) is the probability of a country being in category \( i \) in period \( t \) and in category \( j \) in period \( t+1 \), diag(\( p_i \)), a square matrix with the vector of probabilities of being in category \( i \) in period \( t \) on the diagonal corresponds to complete immobility (Anderson and Leo (2008) establish that this is asymptotically normal). Splitting this sample into 5 equal sized categories the four 5 year transitions generate statistics (standard errors) 0.87234 (0.04868) for the first three transitions and 0.82979 (0.05482) for the fourth. This corresponds to very high immobility consistent with Gibrat’s law though it was expected to be increasing rather than staying constant.

Table 4.

| Year | Year by year normality | Under Gibrats Law |
|------|------------------------|-------------------|
|      | Absolute (1 and 2 dollar a day cut-off) Un-weighted poverty rate estimates |                    |
| 1985 | 0.37491020 | 0.65569496 | 0.39532698 | 0.67353927 |
| 1990 | 0.38002613 | 0.65253180 | 0.38684395 | 0.65329716 |
| 1995 | 0.41272336 | 0.66492689 | 0.37893064 | 0.63472718 |
| 2000 | 0.37912189 | 0.62362764 | 0.37150161 | 0.61758498 |
| 2005 | 0.35000783 | 0.58381961 | 0.36449051 | 0.60167400 |
|      | Absolute (1 and 2 dollar a day cut-off) Weighted poverty rate estimates |                    |
| 1985 | 0.41916948 | 0.69972853 | 0.43567992 | 0.70969353 |
| 1990 | 0.41233910 | 0.69751462 | 0.42823308 | 0.70198016 |
| 1995 | 0.44692413 | 0.71757254 | 0.42088097 | 0.69425410 |
| 2000 | 0.43188059 | 0.69573737 | 0.41362387 | 0.68651911 |
| 2005 | 0.39462744 | 0.66118137 | 0.40646200 | 0.67878844 |
|      | Relative (50% and 60% median cut-off) Un-weighted Estimates |                    |
| 1985 | 0.23588005 | 0.29794024 | 0.23725235 | 0.29907775 |
| 1990 | 0.24272087 | 0.30359444 | 0.24768529 | 0.30767299 |
| 1995 | 0.25898028 | 0.31687954 | 0.25697797 | 0.31525458 |
| 2000 | 0.26670464 | 0.32312080 | 0.26532206 | 0.32200680 |
| 2005 | 0.27526233 | 0.32998688 | 0.27286739 | 0.32807031 |
|      | Relative (50% and 60% median cut-off) Weighted Estimates |                    |
| 1985 | 0.23341745 | 0.29589478 | 0.23743842 | 0.29926912 |
| 1990 | 0.23001494 | 0.29305958 | 0.23854875 | 0.30015083 |
| 1995 | 0.23913688 | 0.3063716 | 0.23960137 | 0.30102105 |
| 2000 | 0.24706083 | 0.30716108 | 0.24064154 | 0.30188005 |
| 2005 | 0.24731361 | 0.30736834 | 0.24166951 | 0.30272805 |
The African Distribution as a mixture of normals.

As observed earlier the diagrams are very suggestive of a mixture of normals one largish poor group and one smaller rich group and it is of interest to see the consequences of modelling the processes under this structure. First it is appropriate to examine the degree of mobility within the distribution over time. Table 5 reports the 20 year transition probability matrix and indicates that in essence there appears to be very little mobility over the period between 5 rank groups (the five rank cells were 1-10 11-19 20-28 29-37 38-47). Essentially 5 countries moved up from cell 1 to cell 2 and 4 moved down from cell 2 to cell 1, 1 moved up from cell 2 to cell 3, two moved up from cell 3 to cell 4 and one moved down from cell 4 to cell 3. The only change of more than one cell was Liberia who dropped from cell 4 to cell 1 over the period and one other original cell 4 Member moved up to cell 5 and one cell 5 member moved down to cell 4. In sum there appears to be some deal of mobility at the lowest end of the spectrum but very little elsewhere, certainly it is reasonable to assume that memberships of the large poor and small rich groups apparent in diagrams 1 and 2 (and hence the mixture coefficients) appear to be relatively constant.

Table 5. 20 year Transition Probability Matrix

| 1985 Cell | 1-10       | 11-19      | 2005 Cell | 20-28       | 29-37       | 38-47       |
|-----------|------------|------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| 1-10      | 0.10638298 | 0.10638298 | 0.00000000| 0.00000000  | 0.00000000  | 0.00000000  |
| 11-19     | 0.085106383| 0.085106383| 0.021276596| 0.00000000  | 0.00000000  | 0.00000000  |
| 20-28     | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.14893617 | 0.021276596 | 0.021276596 | 0.14893617  |
| 29-37     | 0.021276596| 0.00000000 | 0.021276596| 0.12765957  | 0.021276596 | 0.19148936  |
| 38-47     | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.021276596 | 0.021276596 | 0.00000000  |

Immobility Index 0.65957447 Standard Error 0.069118460
Techniques for estimating mixtures of normals are available (see for example Johnson Kotz and Balakrishnan (1994)) but tend to be complex and depend upon fairly large numbers of observations. Here, since there are a limited number of observations, an ad hoc method is used for simplicity and convenience, but it turns out to be quite successful in terms of replicating the empirical distribution. Given the evidence is that the membership of the groups is very stable over the period, countries are allocated into rich and poor groups as follows. Inspection of the 2005 distribution in diagram 1 suggests that the modal values of the respective poor and rich groups are approximately 6 and 7. Observations below 6 can be almost all be attributed to the poor group and similarly observations above 7 can be similarly attributed to the rich group and were allocated accordingly. Given the symmetry of the underlying log-normals around their modes, the relative size of the below six and above 7 observations can be used to establish the poor and rich group weights \(w_r (20/47)\) and \(w_p (27/47)\). Observations between 6 and 7 were allocated randomly according to these weights to the rich and poor groups. After an initial fit a below median poor country was switched with an above median rich country\(^{14}\) improving the fit and establishing the following two rich and poor subgroups.

### Disposition of Poor and Rich Countries.

| Poor Group                                                                 | Rich Group                                                                 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,  | Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Egypt, |
| Democratic republic of the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, The Gambia,    | Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria,  |
| Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, | Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tunisia.                      |
| Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zambia,     |                                                                            |
| Zimbabwe.                                                                 |                                                                            |

\(^{14}\) Relative to a normal distribution the initial poor country distribution appeared attenuated in the upper tail and the rich country distribution appeared attenuated in the lower tail.
Having partitioned the sample in this fashion estimation of the mixture distribution is quite simple in both unweighted and population weighted modes. Tables 6 and 7 and diagrams 3 and 4 report the results. In both cases the fits are extremely good and correspond to a more than adequate description of the data. The poor group has enjoyed zero economic growth and the rich group has enjoyed a steady one percent annual growth rate over the period. Differences between the un-weighted and weighted cases emerge when gdp per capita levels and variabilities are concerned. In the unweighted case income levels are generally higher and variances are lower but increasing over time.
whereas in the weighted case incomes are lower and variances are higher but diminishing over time. The restrictions implied by Gibrat’s law for the separate poor:

Table 7. Sample Weighted Mixtures

|       | Poor Mean | Rich Mean | Poor Variance | Rich Variance | $X^2(4)$ | [P(Upper Tail)] |
|-------|-----------|-----------|---------------|---------------|---------|----------------|
| 1985  | 5.4115    | 6.7584    | 0.6262        | 1.6988        | 3.0473  | 0.5499         |
| 1990  | 5.4146    | 6.7975    | 0.5422        | 1.4666        | 1.6053  | 0.8078         |
| 1995  | 5.3109    | 6.7532    | 0.5743        | 1.4099        | 4.3005  | 0.3669         |
| 2000  | 5.3423    | 6.8289    | 0.5671        | 1.2868        | 8.2530  | 0.0827         |
| 2005  | 5.4340    | 6.9527    | 0.4943        | 1.1327        | 5.9860  | 0.2002         |

and rich groups in both weighted and unweighted samples are rejected in all cases (frequently resulting in nonsense estimates such as negative variances and negative time parameters) though basic log normality is not rejected in any case suggesting that Kalecki’s Law is the best description of the data for the individual groups. Poor and rich groups appear to be moving apart, Table 8 reports a trapezoidal measure of bipolarization (Anderson et al (2008) Anderson et al (2009a)) for both weighted and un-
weighted samples illustrating the point. This may be interpreted as the poor becoming relatively poorer.

Table 8. Bi-Polarization Index = 0.5(\(f_p(x_{pmode})+ f_r(x_{rmode})\)) (\(x_{rmode} - x_{pmode}\))

| Year | Unweighted Sample | Weighted Sample |
|------|-------------------|-----------------|
| 1985 | 0.87249993 (0.027374440) | 0.54564641 (0.046480295) |
| 1990 | 0.96662956 (0.028177909) | 0.60239981 (0.042441864) |
| 1995 | 0.90342925 (0.028177909) | 0.62192838 (0.041522365) |
| 2000 | 0.95600414 (0.030424419) | 0.65517946 (0.039377304) |
| 2005 | 0.99116013 (0.032321510) | 0.71551955 (0.036396440) |

Table 9. Polarization Tests*

| Unweighted Sample | Comparison Years | Difference | ("t" test) | \(P(T<t)\) |
|-------------------|------------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| 1990-1985         | 0.094129622      | (1.6144785)| [0.94678816] |
| 1995-1985         | 0.030929320      | (0.53083245)| [0.70223256] |
| 1995-1990         | -0.063200302     | (-1.0761795)| [0.14092349] |
| 2000-1985         | 0.083504205      | (1.4159301)| [0.92160202] |
| 2000-1990         | -0.010625417     | (-0.1787883)| [0.42905197] |
| 2000-1995         | 0.052574885      | (0.88520127)| [0.81197595] |
| 2005-1985         | 0.11866019       | (1.9819244)| [0.97625615] |
| 2005-1990         | 0.024530571      | (0.40667537)| [0.65787679] |
| 2005-1995         | 0.087730873      | (1.4553093)| [0.92720818] |
| 2005-2000         | 0.035155988      | (0.57662100)| [0.71790225] |

| Weighted Sample | Comparison Years | Difference | ("t" test) | \(P(T<t)\) |
|-----------------|------------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| 1990-1985       | 0.056753398      | (0.79846297)| [0.78769906] |
| 1995-1985       | 0.076281972      | (1.0823101)| [0.86044263] |
| 1995-1990       | 0.019528574      | (0.28349312)| [0.61160057] |
| 2000-1985       | 0.10953305       | (1.5752869)| [0.94240488] |
| 2000-1990       | 0.052779657      | (0.7714642)| [0.78146381] |
| 2000-1995       | 0.033251083      | (0.49415344)| [0.68940109] |
| 2005-1985       | 0.16987315       | (2.4790814)| [0.99341394] |
| 2005-1990       | 0.11311975       | (1.6913645)| [0.95461639] |
| 2005-1995       | 0.093591173      | (1.4127973)| [0.9214233] |
| 2005-2000       | 0.060340090      | (0.92496252)| [0.82250730] |

*Tests are based on the trapezoid measure being asymptotically normally distributed with a variance \(\approx (f(x_{1m})+f(x_{2m}))/2 \cdot (f(x_{1m})/|f''(x_{1m})|^2+f(x_{2m})/|f''(x_{2m})|^2) | |K'| | |_2\) where \(x_{mj}\) = 1,2 are the modes of the respective distributions, where \(f()\) is the normal and \(K\) is the Gaussian kernel (Anderson, Linton and Wang (2009)).

In this circumstance the issue of population weighting makes a big difference, with no population weighting the poor group are becoming absolutely poorer and exhibiting
diminishing within group association, the source of polarization is the increased alienation or distance between the two groups. With population weighting they are not becoming absolutely poorer but are exhibiting increased within group association, there is a small amount of between group alienation but a substantial increase in within group association. The only significant changes in polarization in both comparison types were increases in polarization over time. In both cases the poor and rich groups are following distinct stochastic processes and there is no sense in which “the rising tide is raising all boats” or improvements in the well being of the rich African countries are trickling down to the poor countries. For the sample to hand with population weighted data we have poverty rates of:

| Year | Poverty Rate |
|------|--------------|
| 1985 | 0.51162747   |
| 1990 | 0.51682920   |
| 1995 | 0.51850631   |
| 2000 | 0.52472944   |
| 2005 | 0.53106760   |

This indicates a poverty group over the period that is not only declining relatively in its income status but is growing relatively in its size.

Conclusions.

It is not at all clear that boats and tides aphorisms and trickle down theories apply either in theory or practice when the well-being indicator is well described by some sort of stochastic process, especially when the process is one that is frequently observed in practice. It really depends on the nature of poverty or inequality being considered as well as the precise nature of the stochastic process(es) involved. Stochastic processes that are non-stationary engender distributions whose dispersion (absolute inequality)
increases over time, whether or not relative inequality increases depends upon the nature of the growth process. Similar statements can be made about poverty, but here the nature of the growth process affects both absolute and relative poverty. What is clear is that it is not unequivocally the case that rising tides raise all boats or that wellbeing unequivocally trickles down even in the simplest of circumstances. This is even more so the case when the progress of the poor and the non-poor are described by different stochastic processes.

In the case of Africa when GNP per capita is modelled over the recent two decades as a singular stochastic process the prediction of Gibrat's law appears to hold true regardless of whether the analysis is performed under a population weighting scheme or a non-weighted scheme in the sense that the distribution is log normal. Under this description absolute poverty is diminishing and relative poverty is increasing and absolute inequality is increasing and relative inequality is diminishing. Kernel estimates of the density indicated some evidence of bimodality suggesting a mixture of at least two distributions. When log GNP per capita is described by a mixture of two normals (which was not rejected by the data), one describing the poor country process and the other describing the rich country process, it is apparent that the two groups are polarizing, with the poor group in this sense becoming relatively poorer. In this circumstance the issue of population weighting made a big difference, with no population weighting the poor group are becoming absolutely poorer and exhibiting diminishing within group association, with population weighting they are not becoming absolutely poorer but are exhibiting increased within group association.
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