Jakarta’s WARTEG food stall phenomenon: Constraints and opportunities for integration

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Warung Tegal or wartegs are food stalls which sell food and beverages along Jakarta’s streets, catering to the city’s middle and low-income population. Consumers, both locals and blue and white-collar office workers choose wartegs for their convenience, location and affordability. Government extension agents from the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) have incorporated warteg owners in their business development programs, with the ministry’s centre actively coaching and mentoring owners and managers to improve their food quality, hygiene and service. Moreover, the country’s MSME are also actively involved with warteg associations to mentor their micro-financing and revolving fund schemes. Prerequisites for advancing small and medium enterprises include psychological empowerment and the emergence of leaders from within the working-class community. Active citizenship, when coupled with integrity and psychological empowerment, leads to the endurance of social capital for protecting collective interests such as the local economy, the nation’s food security and the neighbourhood safety and social welfare. This can propel Jakarta’s working class as active citizens and agents of social inclusion and economic transformations.

Key Words: WARTEGS, community empowerment, gastronomy, entrepreneurship, urban stratification, linkages, social inclusion, equity.

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Characteristics of Jakarta’s WARTEG food stalls and their owners

Warung Tegal or warteg food stall is a form of small and medium enterprise in the gastronomy sector which sells foods and beverages in ‘stalls’ at a very
affordable price for Jakarta’s middle and low-income population. Wartegs are usually located along Jakarta’s streets, occupying modest buildings with little facilities and amenities. Foods and beverages served in wartegs are simple, catering to the population’s penchant for savoury, spicy and sweet dishes served with steamed rice and over-sweetened drinks. Simple dishes such as instant noodles, fried rice, fried chicken and tofu are served with tea, coffee or lime water.

Readily available Indonesian dishes such as satay (meat grilled in skewers), beef rendang (cooked beef in coconut milk), chicken gulai (cooked chicken in coconut milk and spices) and fish pepes (fried fish in coconut milk, spices and chilies) are on the menu, along with spicy stir-fried vegetables, assorted soups and steamed jasmine rice. Consumers, both locals and blue and white-collar office workers seeking low-cost meals, choose wartegs for their convenience, speed, strategic locations and affordability. There are currently 34,000 wartegs in Jakarta’s urban agglomerations alone that are recorded by the warteg associations; thousands more are lining the streets of Jakarta unrecorded by both government institutions and private associations. Warteg owners receive plenty of income from their business, ranging from $1,000 to $7,000 per month, with employees and managers from their extended family members.

The size of income depends on the location, business size and number of wartegs owned by the family. Extended family members take turn coming to Jakarta every three to four months from towns such as Tegal, Wonogiri, Purwokerto, etc. in Central Java to manage and work in the wartegs in Jakarta that are owned by the extended family. Some wartegs such as the Warung Padang Wartegs which sell spicy meals similar to those in the city of Padang, Sumatra and the Ayam Goreng Wartegs which sell fried chickens and ducks have franchises all over Jakarta and are owned, managed, and run by owners and employees from outside the extended family in a franchise manner. The warteg tradition in Jakarta was initiated by community members in the districts of Sidapurna and Sidakaton in the city of Tegal in the mid1970s. Warteg owners affiliate and incorporate themselves into associations called Koperasi Warung Tegal or Kowartegs across Jakarta. These warteg associations provide political endorsements, social support, and financial assistance to both owners and employees, with some providing additional functions such as that of savings and loans for members and non-members. The authors’ research in Jakarta’s warteg business incorporated one hundred warteg managers and employees located in East, West, Central and South Jakarta, ranging from owners, managers, chefs, chef assistants, attendants, waitresses and dishwashers.

Data was collected from May to August 2018. Figure 1 illustrates the opening hours of warteg stalls included in the sample. The opening hours show that wartegs aim to fulfil consumer demands for main meals during breakfast, lunch and dinner, as well as for in-between meals such as brunch and late-afternoon nourishments. Several wartegs in the samples are open twenty-four hours a day, catering to late-night blue-collar workers, after-dark migrant labourers and/or white-collar workers awaiting traffic jams to dissipate before returning home in suburban Jakarta. The ages of warteg owners are depicted in Figure 2.
Many warteg owners are between 49 to 60 years old. Resistance to interventions, change and development are commonplace among them. External interventions suggesting the need for more hygienic methods of cooking and utilising utensils have been met with resistance among owners aged between 49 and 60. In addition, changes and innovations in the warteg enterprise are most often introduced through external interventions by the government and private sector. Recently, young warteg owners and employees, in conjunction with government extension agents and social entrepreneurs, have teamed up and started using financial technology platforms such as GOFOOD and OVO in order for customers to pay online.

Moreover, the younger generation of warteg owners and managers have taken advantage of an online platform called WARTEG ONLINE to connect with farmers, raw material wholesalers, retailers, logistic transporters, motorcycle Ubers and even regular customers. This platform has proven to improve speed, strengthen business partnerships and allow owners to record their business operation. The educational attainment of warteg owners is depicted in Figure 3.
Warteg owners and managers are relatively skilled in preparing various Indonesian dishes. Nonetheless, their quality and hygiene are substandard. Government extension agents from the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises in Jakarta have incorporated warteg owners in their business development programs, with its centre actively coaching and mentoring owners and managers to improve their food quality, hygiene and service.

Moreover, the country’s Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises is actively involved with warteg associations to mentor their micro-financing and revolving fund schemes. The Ministry has attempted to monitor and control the growth of wartegs in Jakarta, while also imparting grants to wartegs under its mentoring programs, hoping to initiate, secure and maintain a revolving fund scheme for their innovation and development. This is important to strengthen the business, improve service and food quality, and expand their potential and captive market. Cutthroat competition is ever-present. The roles of Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) or local private banks for the development of small and medium enterprises are crucial in providing owners with low-interest loans for their growth and development.

The need for collaborations with local government departments and social entrepreneurs to form a public-private partnership is inevitable. The income of the various warteg enterprises included in the sample is depicted in Figure 4. Incomes are quite wide-ranging, with the median monthly income being more substantial than the median monthly salary of Indonesia’s civil servants at the lower echelons. Indonesia’s warteg enterprise has proven to be effective for community empowerment, rural-urban linkages and local economic development. Jakarta’s warteg industries have played important roles in decreasing the asymmetric relations between Indonesia’s urban and rural areas by promoting rural-urban linkages and economic growth in rural areas where warteg owners originate.
Local farm products such as rice, onion, garlic, chilli, and legumes are transported from rural areas in Central Java to Jakarta by both warteg owners and associations to be resold and utilised as food ingredients in stalls all over Jakarta and its vicinities. This is crucial for linking small scale rural producers to a broader market base and larger wholesalers and retailers outside their areas. This also stimulates a ‘market-driven’ production of products and services that are bottom-up, tailored to local opportunities and constraints, and purposed by social capital across landscapes. Moreover, incomes generated this way have become a major source of funding and capital for developing farming and small businesses in Central Java through individual remittances.

The government, the private sector, and the NGO groups all have important roles to play. The private sector, with its interests in profit acquisition and the commercialisation of resources, can provide the urban working class with financial resources, vocational education, knowledge, skills, technology, and access to economic bases such as cooperatives for savings and loans and commercial banks for local economic development. The government, with its goals of economic and infrastructure development, is in charge of local and regional policies and legislations imparts land-use policies and strategic development plans, creates laws, and has the rights to govern, educate and mobilise the community through programs and projects.

The government needs to partner up with the private sector due to the government’s lack of resources, skills and experience in the commercial sector. The NGOs, whose interests are to make money, to participate in regional development and to improve the living standards of the working-class community, can impart community members with knowledge, skills and access to national and international government networks. Nonetheless, NGOs also need to collaborate with the private sector to acquire commercialisation rights, experience and expertise. The presence of wartegs is crucial for the survival of the city’s working-class and low-income groups. The Government of Indonesia, through the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises, has sought to diversify the menus available in wartegs for food security purposes.

Warteg owners and managers under the supervision of the ministry were taught to utilise and serve cassava, maize, corn and other local fruits and
vegetables endemic to the island to ‘replace’ the overutilization of rice, flour and imported ingredients such as beef, chicken and grains. This has resulted in the diversification of menu choices in some wartegs albeit the difficulties in replicating them in other districts due to the perceived antiquity of cassava, maize, corn, legumes and other endemic ingredients among Jakarta’s population.

The degree of citizens’ involvements, ranging from non-participation to sovereignty, can be categorized into manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power and citizen control (Sager, 1994). Manipulation and therapy are set up by the elites to substitute for genuine participation with the objectives of educating or curing the participants. While officials may inform and consult citizens, citizens still lack the power to ensure that their views will be heeded by the powerful. Placation is similar to tokenism. Tokenism is symbolic participation where the poor are given the opportunities to hear and voice their concerns since they have the right to advise, nonetheless the power holders ultimately have the right to decide.

Symbolic participation runs the danger of debasing citizen participation into rubber stamps. Partnership enables negotiations for trade-offs with traditional power holders. In the case of delegated power and citizen control, the urban working class obtain the majority of decision-making seats and full managerial power (Sager, 1994). Psychological empowerment in the form of self-awareness, self-confidence and self-motivation is crucial in obtaining other power bases such as social, political and economic power. A prerequisite in delegating power and instilling partnership for promoting small and medium enterprises is psychological empowerment and the ability to lead from within the working-class community. Psychological empowerment begins with the need to reward groups and individuals with recognition, validation, and differentiation for their stewardship in safeguarding collective interests within communities of social practice. Socially inclusive and psychologically nurturing communities practice self-confident individuals with benign character and stewardship who give back to the social and ecological landscapes.

Anchoring psychological empowerment initiatives within emerging social capital, just reciprocity and identity validation imbue community members with enduring confidence and a sense of meaning, importance and direction in their existence and everyday engagements. This, in turn, propels community members to take actions for safeguarding their social and ecological landscapes in the face of risks and unpredictable changes and adversities. Working-class community members are always appreciative of the recognition, respect and admiration received from others. Psychological empowerment also entails an understanding and appreciation for the need to become active citizens within the context of ethics and integrity marked by continuous reflections and contemplations. Active citizenship, when coupled with integrity and psychological empowerment, leads to the endurance of social capital for protecting collective interests such as the local economy, the nation’s food security and the neighbourhood’ safety and social welfare. Thus, Jakarta’s working class can become active citizens and agents of social and economic transformations.
Government policies for empowerment and inclusion through entrepreneurship

In general, government officials and donor agencies perceive Jakarta’s urban working class as homogeneous and impoverished. According to officials, it is such perceptions that lead to their reluctance to initiate entrepreneurial activities and engage in the region’s service economy. Contending public interests, complicated institutional settings and external barriers such as political exclusion and social marginalisation also play a role in impeding an amicable atmosphere for developing the entrepreneurial culture among Jakarta’s working class.

The difficulty for planners and officials to penetrate Jakarta’s working-class and provide consistent legal, financial and entrepreneurial support for business startups has made officials and planners venture into new roles and positions as ‘business partners’, ‘patrons’ and ‘social entrepreneurs’ in conjunction with other stakeholders. Nowadays, government officials and planners practice community empowerment and business startup efforts in relation to a variety of special interest groups and regulatory systems. Moreover, planners and officials practice local economic development schemes under a variety of new or modified roles such as that of mentors, spokespeople, strategists, or technical staffs for parties to the regulatory and financial processes. In these intermediary roles, learning in process and knowledge in practice are instilled through the need to understand the field of actors and their interests within the potential for mutual satisfaction, mutual constraints and mutual enhancements. Hence, the need exists for mediation, formulating specific targets to be negotiated, creating conditions for control and subversion and maintaining the credibility and legitimacy of the foundations for mediations and negotiations.

Figure 5. A Warteg on the Side of a Street
The relationships among districts are pertinent to the resilience of cities and regions, with the city centre as it is the growth locus and the peripheries as nodes and poles feeding with networks and resources as they flow intermittently. These flows embody capital, innovations, the mobility and migration of the whole populations, investments in the form of tangible and intangible assets, as well as information. These networks are enriched with nodes which act as feeders for comprehensive and integrated growth in part and as a whole. Cities in Indonesia provide three categories of services, namely consumer services, production services and public and government services.

Consumer services include trade in the form of wholesalers and retailers, entertainment and recreation services and private services such as barbers, spas, event organisers. Services relating to production encompass transportation, communications, utilities, finance, insurance, real estate, advertising, labour supply, consultant services. Public and government services include public administration, human and social services, health services, education. Effective measures for economic development, poverty alleviation and social inclusion of the urban working-class are threefold, namely through improved welfare, social integration and spatial integration. To improve the welfare of the urban working-class, the productivity and economic outputs of the working class need to be increased. Moreover, the rate of production must be higher than the rate of population increase.

To improve social integration among the urban working-class, advocacy and platforms are required for it to participate in decision making over government policies and programs and to participate in the economic sector. In order to promote spatial integration, there is the need to instil social and economic development at the districts, towns and regions through balanced network and exchange systems. Policies to promote linkages and social inclusion can be direct and indirect. Direct policies include the implementation of projects and programs
to revitalise and develop stalled areas of the cities and regions, programs and projects to build and develop new nodes as emerging platforms for inclusion, and programs and projects to distribute growth and development to other parts of the cities and regions.

Indirect policies include taxes, tariffs, transportation, and others. The Indonesian government, especially government municipalities for urban agglomerations such as Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Makassar and Manado, have incorporated (i) infrastructure development to facilitate local economic growth and social redistribution, (ii) development of new nodes and trade centers within these nodes to facilitate city growth in areas which are dilapidated, stagnant, impoverished and excluded, (iii) the development of growth poles and the development of suburban areas for intra-regional trade, financial redistribution, political inclusion and social justice, and (iv) the formation of urban hierarchical systems in urban areas to protect land prices in certain areas and to increase land prices in other areas. The last intervention approach has pushed land and rent prices upwards, relegating middle-income housing to the periphery and suburbs, lower-income housing to slums and illegal government sites, and strategic urban areas captive by land speculates and developers.

Warung tegal (Warteg) is a locally-based small and medium enterprise, of which the owners come from a nearby town called Tegal. Warung tegal is closely linked to Jakarta’s urban migrant culture with its owner possessing food stall businesses serving "Indonesian fast-food" that are simple, affordable and always come in large portions. Warteg is not only a place to fulfil Jakarta’s need for fast, tasty and affordable meals, but also a place for people to share and discuss stories and information. There are currently 34,725 food stall vendors or warung tegals in Jakarta alone. The demand for fast food with variety, quality and affordability will continue to rise in Jakarta’s urban agglomeration in conjunction with the city’s rising population of various social and economic backgrounds.

Policies for the development of small and medium enterprises in the culinary sector for Jakarta’s working-class population started with the protection, mentoring and empowerment of warung tegals or food stall vendors through legislative processes, financial assistance, quality assurance training and increased accessibility to urban infrastructure and the banking sector. With time, government officials collaborated with investors and social entrepreneurs to incorporate warung tegals into digital platforms called Wartegs similar to that of Uber in order to promote cost-effective transactions for business owners and managers, raw material wholesalers and retailers, and regular customers all under one roof. This has consolidated previously marginalised members of the working-class within Jakarta’s informal sector, documented the scope of their economic activities and integrated them into the city’s mainstream economy marked by access to financial institutions, financial technology and political endorsements by government officials, the legislative body and the private sectors.

This has also strengthened the patron-client relations among the producers, wholesalers, retailers, as well as the labourers, managers, and owners of the various warung tegals. The presence of institutionally mentored and digitally
consolidated warung tegals have also led to nested dominations among the various stakeholders and the stratification of warung tegal owners marked by differences in access to political support, commercial space, urban infrastructure and amenities, capital and loans, and decision making power at the local cooperative (koperasi) level. This ultimately impacts their performance, growth, size, as well as their targeted and captive market.

In addition, Ministerial Decree No. 70/2013 promulgated in 2013 mandated that 20% of all spaces incurred in shopping malls and food courts be reserved for small and medium enterprises, especially small and medium enterprises in the culinary sector such as wartegs. Local government officials noted the incapacity and difficulty in implementing Ministerial Decree No. 70/2013 early on, with only 5% - 10% of the intended spaces occupied by small and medium enterprises. Obstacles include unaffordable rent prices, poor locations, substandard quality of service and meals, lack of consumer interest, stringent competition with nearby competitors and lack of integration with nearby town centres and urban amenities. As well, the shift from informal (food stall) to formal (shopping mall) settings with its accruing spatial and network alterations, cultural changes and expenditure increase leads to difficulties in mobilising support systems for the sustained growth and development of wartegs in newly intended settings.

Moreover, the incorporation of small wartegs into shopping malls and food courts may not be the best choice for empowerment and community development. An issue described by warteg owners with regard to their relocations into shopping mall food courts involves fear of adverse incorporation whereby newly relocated warteg owners would have to compete with existing warteg owners of larger capital, of better service quality and with a more extensive consumer base. Their inability to compete with others within the shopping mall and/or food court vicinities may lead to their marginalisation and bankruptcies.

The inadvertent and sporadic growth of wartegs along with their random locations have created problems relating to the encroachment of public space, larceny of common-pool goods such as electricity and tap water, and unsafe building constructions in prohibited locations by both warteg owners and employees. The promulgation of Law 26/2007 on Spatial Planning stipulated that municipal governments must include plans for the lay– a provision that informal street vendors could potentially use. Through kinship ties, warteg owners and employees collaboratively design their stalls, businesses and social environments to facilitate a social and economic space which is difficult to extrapolate and/or replicate in other settings.

The government contemplates a homogeneous warteg enterprise as a way of making collective existence intelligible and predictable to government planners and therefore controllable. Nonetheless, this runs the risks of ignoring the structural make-up of the social order, which perpetually shapes poverty and exclusion. The warteg enterprise should not be conceptualised solely as a state discourse for local economic development and regarded as the expansion of capitalism since warteg owners and employees have the potential to negotiate their conditions.
Moreover, a comprehensive and integrated policy on land-use, zoning and regional economic development runs the risk of the city being captured by central planning and the capitalist requirement for utilitarianism, profit and economic progress, relegating the social, political and humanitarian functions of the city to the background (Blakely, 2002).

Nonetheless, Jakarta’s ad-hoc and sectoral approaches to land use and regional development planning, if not linked through institutional alignments, legally binding coordinating mechanisms and interactive arenas may lead to a dichotomous and polarised city landscape with debilitating interconnectedness and little or no mutual gain between regions.

In the case of Jakarta’s best practices in promoting small and medium enterprises, dynamic and collaborative forms of governance facilitate public innovations, as they promote knowledge sharing between interdependent actors (Sorensen, 2014). In collaborative forms of governance, “…the ongoing dialogue between a meta-governor (usually state institutions) and the decentered self-governing actors (usually the private sector or non-government associations) establishes feedback loops between goal innovation and implementation innovations…[moreover] the governance strategy subscribes to bottom-up forms of self-evaluation rather than to top-down performance assessments” (Sorensen, 2014: 221).

In the context of mutual validation and reciprocity, there is a need for policymakers to be diplomats and negotiators. Brokering is important for promoting devolution of rights and responsibilities and for instilling participative engagement in urban governance. They promote adaptive management capacity while decreasing tensions between benefits and costs (Ostrom, 2003).
Challenges and opportunities for empowerment and inclusion of Jakarta’s WARTEG food stall

Indonesia’s Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises noted that the country’s small and medium enterprises make up 99.99% of the total enterprises in the country, with 62.9 million units in 2017, whereas large enterprises make up 0.01% of the country’s entire enterprises with just around 5,400 units. Micro enterprises employ 107.2 million individuals or 89.2% of the country’s total labour force, whereas small enterprises employ 5.7 million individuals or 4.74%, and medium enterprises employee 3.73 million individuals or 3.11%; whereas large enterprises only employ 3% of Indonesia’s labour force. Hence, the country’s small and medium enterprises make up the backbone of its economy, and their acknowledgement, inclusion and resilience are crucial to the country’s financial and political security. The criteria of Indonesia’s small and medium enterprises as classified by the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprise are illustrated in Table 1.

In total, the country’s micro, small and medium enterprises contribute 60% (or about Rp 8,160 trillion) of the country’s domestic income, which in 2017 amounted to Rp 13,600 trillion. The micro-enterprises altogether contribute around Rp 5,000 trillion per year, whereas the small enterprises contribute Rp 1,300 trillion, the medium enterprises altogether contribute around Rp 1,800 trillion, and the large enterprises contribute around Rp 5,400 trillion per year. Table 2 depicts the incomes and contributions by micro, small and medium enterprises in Indonesia. The country’s warteg industry is encompassed within the micro and small enterprise classification under the food and beverage category. In 2019, the food and beverage category consisted of 6% of the country’s total domestic income, external to the country’s oil and gas subdivision.

The 2018 ban of Indonesia’s palm oil export by the European Union has had significant impacts on the country’s GNP, relegating the government’s boosting Indonesia’s service sector to complement its dwindling GNP from oil and gas and agricultural commodities. The resilience of the warteg enterprise is attributed to relational ties and structural networks, that are embedded not only in contemporary institutions but also in a particular moment in time and space (Granovetter, 2017).

Original Chinese family firms, for example, expanded not by getting larger but setting up branches as independent companies or by buying already established businesses. Authority remained highly centralised across component companies. Reputation and personal trustworthiness are crucial, and contracts became unimportant. Complex strategies are used to ensure the family’s control over larger numbers of firms. Trustee companies are set up to hold the family’s interest, and control is maintained through pyramids-family firms which oversee other firms through dense interlocking directorates.
Table 1. Criteria of Indonesia’s Small and Medium Enterprises

| Business size | Criteria                           | Assets (excluding land & buildings) | Incomes (in 1 year) |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|
| Micro         |                                   | Max 50 million IDR                 | Max 300 million IDR |
| Small         |                                   | 51 - 500 million IDR                | 301 - 2.5 billion IDR|
| Medium        |                                   | 501 - 10 billion IDR                | 2.51 - 50 billion IDR|
| Big           |                                   | More 10 billion IDR                 | More 50 billion IDR |

Table 2. Incomes and Contributions of Indonesia’s Small and Medium Enterprises

| Categories | Units       | Percentage | Income (Trillion per Year) | Contribution to Domestic Income | Average Income per Year |
|------------|-------------|------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Micro      | 62,106,900  | 98.70%     | 4,727.99                   | 34.12%                          | 76,126,646              |
| Small      | 757,090     | 1.20%      | 1,234.21                   | 8.91%                           | 1,630,202,485           |
| Medium     | 58,627      | 0.11%      | 1,742.44                   | 12.57%                          | 29,720,777,116          |
| Large      | 5,460       | 0.01%      | 5,136.22                   | 37.07%                          | 940,699,633,699         |
| Total      | 62,928,077  | 100%       | 12,841                     | 93%                             |                         |

This embedded network of kinship ties and social relationships offer competitive advantage whereby warteg enterprises become “adept at innovating and organising a shifting network of talent, product and resources, producing positive and unique outcomes that are highly difficult to imitate via other means” (Granovetter, 2017: 236). In the context of social inclusion and social justice in Jakarta’s urban areas, repercussions of embedded networks and their associated social and economic outcomes can propel allocative efficiency, investments, complex adaptations and pareto improvements among city dwellers of different groups and backgrounds, with these promoting “a reallocation of resources that makes at least one person better off without making anyone worse off” (Granovetter, 2017: 230). Integration policies of Jakarta’s warteg enterprise are not without unintended consequences capable of adverse incorporation.

The government’s ad-hoc, piecemeal approaches to business start-ups focusing on subsidies and lending for Jakarta’s working-class community overlook issues of land access and land security. The formalisation of informal land, urban spaces and the environment has led to stern commercialisation and loss of control of community assets to investors who demand that the land and housing be put on the formal market where their investments can be protected (Deininger, 2003). Cases in bottom-up warteg business start-ups also suggest that working-class residents are creative in their own ways and their creativity mobilises them to individualise their own space and take pride in the construction of their stalls, businesses and communities.

Warteg owners usually rent and/or lease the land they occupy from friends, families or neighbours at a fraction of the cost from that of formal developers. They pay land taxes (i.e. pajak bumi bangunan) to landowners who subsequently pay to the tax office or kantor pajak. Constructing warteg stalls, land grabbing and squatting on public roads and public facilities is not uncommon due to lack of available urban land.
Table 3. Differences between wartegs mentored and wartegs not mentored by the Ministry of Micro & Small Enterprises

|                                      | Wartegs mentored                                      | Wartegs not mentored                                      |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| Location                             | Safe and appropriate but expensive locations           | Strategic but often unsafe and inappropriate locations    |
| Ownership of Land & Building         | Land and building owned by the government or private developers. | Land and building owned by large family members displaying co-ownership if not squatting. |
| Infrastructure/Amenities Available   | All basic infrastructure/amenities available upon regular payments. | Infrastructure and amenities such as roads, sewerage, toilets, running water are sometimes absent with electricity larceny being common. |
| Rent Price (Land & Building)         | Moderate to high.                                      | Low to moderately low.                                    |
| Permits Acquired (Land & Building Permits) | Land and building permits acquired.                  | Land and building permits often absent.                  |
| Suitability of Location & Building (in accordance to EHS standards) | Location and building are most often according to EHS standards. | Location/Building are very often not according to EHS standards. |
| Price of Food                        | Moderate to high.                                      | Low to moderately low.                                    |
| Range of Menu                        | More diversified range of menus.                      | Limited range of menus.                                   |
| Food Quality                         | Better ingredients and more elaborate cooking methods. | Low quality ingredients and simple food preparations.    |
| Food & Cutlery Hygiene               | Moderately low to moderate hygiene.                   | Low to moderately low hygiene.                            |
| Cleanliness of the Indoor and Outdoor Environment | Relatively clean and organized.                      | Dirty and disorganized.                                  |
| Flexibility in Opening Hours         | Inflexible.                                            | Very flexible.                                            |
| Flexibility in Management            | Somewhat inflexible.                                   | Flexible upon consent from elders.                       |
| Flexibility in Service to Consumers  | Somewhat inflexible.                                   | Flexible upon consent from elders.                       |
| Availability of Quality Assurance Surveillance Measures | Sometimes available.                                  | Almost always unavailable.                               |
| Level of Formality and Degree of Commercialization Involved | Moderate to high level.                               | Low to moderately low.                                    |
| Degree of Competition with other Wartegs | Stringently high.                                     | Moderate.                                                |
| Ease for Mobilizing Support Systems from Family/Community | Moderately and highly difficult. | Easy and relatively easy. |
|----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Level of Technology Used                                  | Moderate (e.g. internet, fintech, cash register) | Low with the use of calculator. |
| Access to Government Funding and Banking Resources        | Moderate.                         | Difficult and rare.      |
| Required Degree of Alteration in the Management Culture   | Moderate to high.                 | Low.                     |
| Level of Initial Capital Required                         | Moderate to high                  | Low to moderately low.   |
| Risk of Marginalization and Risk of Adverse Incorporation | Moderate to high.                 | Low to moderately low.   |
| Risk of Being Evicted & Persecuted                        | Moderate to high.                 | Moderate to high.        |
| Risk of Being Harassed by Local Gangsters and Unruly Authorities | Low to moderate.                  | Moderate to high.        |
| Sovereignty in Decision Making Regarding to Management   | Low to moderate.                  | High upon consent from elders. |
| Integration with Nearby Communities and Urban Centers     | Low to moderate because of relocation. | Moderately high to high. |
| Market/Consumers                                          | Lower middle income to higher middle-income group | Low income to middle income group |
| Food Suppliers                                            | More heterogeneous and more variety of suppliers | Homogeneous and relatively the same/stable |

These public facilities include drainage, sidewalks, green belts, riverbanks and the side of railroad tracks. These warteg owners also claim they pay fees to local government officials to avoid evictions and threats. Cases of local gangsters working with local police and local officials to extort money from warteg owners for squatting in public places and using public facilities such as tap water and electricity while simultaneously protecting owners from eviction threats and outside gangsters can happen.

Ironically, illicit/prohibited land parcels currently occupied by warteg stalls have been handed down through generations with their ‘user rights’ ‘bought’ and ‘sold’ at below market price in the black market. The gaps between intended government policies in land management and their actual practices led to a third space for land grab and the capture of common space by community members. Community members and warteg owners remarked the need to seize and capture opportunities before the country’s developers do so.
In Indonesia, land policy has not performed effectively in enabling low and middle-income urban dwellers to obtain and secure land and housing. In practice, complicated national and local regulations for obtaining permits led to land acquisition delays and the lack of land security for low and middle-income dwellers. This encouraged developers to violate and manipulate procedures by underhandedly acquiring urban land before they obtained the requisite permits. Due to inconsistent land regulations and unclear property rights, warteg owners most often build their stalls on land that are rented informally from other residents who possess a right to build on or use the land through the Hak Guna Bangunan or building permits which they acquire.

The demand for land tenure for the urban working class is difficult to pursue in practice. The quest for land tenure for Jakarta’s working-class is pursued by politicians of all backgrounds and influence if it is within their interest and favour to do so. Upon the right political conditions, land tenure and its legalisation may be introduced. By advocating land tenure security for Jakarta’s weak, political and governing elite side with the masses. Jakarta’s politicians are very much aware that siding with the masses has severe political liabilities. It invites oppositions from the commercial/industrial elites and encourages the masses to go beyond land issues and into broad-based social issues incapable of being surmounted by the ruling elites.

Stakeholders within Jakarta’s warteg enterprise development programs are illustrated in Figure 8. When campaigning for the position of Indonesia’s vice president in 2018, the losing candidate Sandiaga Uno embarked on business start-up initiatives in the culinary sector for Jakarta’s working class, highlighting the need to empower and integrate Jakarta’s warteg enterprise into the city’s lifeblood and formal economy. The momentum initiated then quickly lost is fervour, lacking enduring political support, legal foundations and institutional coordinating mechanisms. During Basuki Purnama’s period as governor of Jakarta in 2016, he evicted warteg stalls and street vendors in illicit public places, established a designated warteg zone, eradicated local gangsters, and abolished briberies and the extortion of illegitimate charges/fees from Jakarta’s warteg owners, street vendors and merchants in traditional markets. This resulted in Jakarta’s increasingly sustainable public areas, improved governance of Jakarta’s traditional markets and small enterprises, and decreased bribes, extortions and corruptions associated with land and commercial taxes/levies. Nonetheless, Basuki Purnama’s policies struck out of favour with Jakarta’s business and religious elites, and in 2017 his initiatives stalled.

Due to affiliations with the official's culture of elitism, some government and non-government officials perceive Jakarta’s working class as passive and reactive. Hence, empowerment and development are equated with the need to define targets, priorities and strategies for them. Research findings suggest that warteg owners when participating in government policies and programs, align to the bits and pieces which pertain to their needs and interests whilst jettisoning others. Moreover, not all warteg owners can participate due to power imbalance and information gap.
The landscape which warteg owners have to navigate in is marked by complexity, unpredictability, stringent competition and is overall an uneven playing field. Jakarta’s warteg enterprises are heterogeneous in nature, capacity and resilience, and require such intervention approaches for their empowerment and development. There is a tendency to treat participation, empowerment and inclusion as a technical ticked box rather than a political methodology of empowerment. This results in the avoidance of a real analysis of the structure and agency at the community level, capable of marginalising the most marginalised groups of Jakarta’s working class. Intervention approaches for empowerment, incorporation and integration of wartegs are best made bottom-up, incrementally, and within the community’s terms and conditions.

A number of issues beset the government’s effort to protect and empower warteg owners, among others: (i) empowering with grants, subsidies and loans without a strategic program and clear goals which take into account the heterogeneity of the warteg business, (ii) focusing on the tools and relegating the comprehensive strategic plans to the background, (iii) following current fads in Jakarta’s fast-paced and ever-changing socio-technological landscape, and (iv) overlooking development capacity within real-world contexts. Firstly, through the use of government-induced templates, officials often attempt to make local needs fit national government programs rather than basing approaches on local assets, needs and economic development limitations.

There is the need to induce self-financing as opposed to simply relying on external grants and funding, as well as the need to diversify the bases for self-
financing from a wide variety of public-private partnership sources. Research findings suggested that quality assurance measures of wartegs are best-implemented bottom-up and adapted incrementally in conjunction with better efforts at public-private partnerships in financing, marketing and supply chain management through on-line and real-world platforms.

Secondly, government officials often implement a particular development tool but not incorporate a more comprehensive strategy plan. Instruments such as small business assistance, quality control measures, on-line supply chain platforms, relocating stalls into shopping malls and warteg enterprise zones are ingredients of an economic strategy and not the comprehensive and integrated plan itself. The comprehensive and integrated plan connects nodes in urban areas through cross-cutting infrastructure, social and economic networks, enabling trade interconnectedness and pareto-improvements across social groups and economic backgrounds.

Thirdly, high technology, micro and small businesses and the service sector dominate Indonesia’s current municipal economic strategies. Communities are often forced to adopt trendy approaches on minimal economic resources and without the necessary infrastructure badly needed by these firms. External stimulants and inducements, without unique attributes, competitive advantage and adequate institutional linkages can be eroding and dismal.

Lastly, the success of community development initiatives depends on long-term commitments by enduring coalitions comprising of government officials, corporate leaders and community leaders to plan and implement policies, programs and activities based on local resources and existing capacities. Research findings suggest the need to nurture and mentor local leadership capacity marked by negotiation and managerial skills, technological abilities and innovative approaches to hygiene and gastronomy. This is essential when instilling distinctiveness, quality improvement and comparative advantage. Moreover, success stories in empowering warteg leaders, managers and employees rely on concerted effort to signify the city commons not only as an agent of social and economic life but also as the embodiment of the everyday life, in ecological and social balance with each other.

Conclusions and recommendations

The country’s warteg culinary business, a thriving business spanning since the early 1980s, is heterogeneous in nature, catering to a wide range of consumers from different social and economic backgrounds. The resilience of warteg stalls stems from their affordability, their popularity among the middle and working class, and their stern root in family and community life. Officials equate their empowerment and development with incorporation into malls and food courts, formalisation, standardisation, and access to funding, loans and information technology platforms. This runs the risk of demeaning their existence, sovereignty and broader roles in transforming the urban landscape.
Moreover, the meaning and significance which warteg owners attach to the urban landscape almost always elude the utilitarian and policy measures set out by officials. Moreover, planned changes within policy measures are most likely to result in highly restrictive environments, whereas social, psychological and political engagements are most likely to result in new spaces for empowerment, resilience and favourable incorporation into Jakarta’s social and economic life.

The lack of consideration of the complex social and cultural interdependencies among groups and its resulting land-use patterns undermines the roles which force such as capitalism, regulatory measures and the vernacular environment of the city’s working-class play in shaping relations of inequality and disintegration. Deliberative participation, inclusive governance and social equality constitute the pillars of empowerment, development and integration. Resilience, ecological sensibility and a socially responsible culture emerge within a devolved urban governance setting beyond unanimity rule and the assumption that “everyone has the same ranking of preferences over a set of alternatives” (Harvey, 1973).

Research findings suggest the need to focus on wages, fringe benefits and specific skills which adhere to and support community business processes and turnovers, as well as the need for sustained human resource training and market identification and development. The authors also indentified the need to incorporate the following to integrate warteg stalls and build a socially inclusive and politically enduring urban landscape: (i) recognition, validation and protection of warteg stalls by government officials and the public, (ii) building platforms, institutional ties and social and economic capital among stakeholders for sustainable warteg management and quality improvement, (iii) pro-poor land and infrastructure management policies, and (iv) the formation of warteg zones and the integration of zones, town centers and commercial/trade hubs through public-private partnerships (PPP), infrastructure development and trade activities. Entrepreneurial infrastructure needs to be incorporated and reverberated across the urban landscape for integration, change and responsible civic engagement.

This constitutes the partnerships between community members and external stakeholders, as well as their willingness to accept controversies and disagreements. It is necessary to not perceive disagreements as conflicts, as those who offer alternative solutions are not inherently evil as there is the need to explore and expand community boundaries. This is part of a responsible civic engagement important for building social cohesion and inclusive diversity. Community initiatives work best when community members learn to rely on their resources first rather than looking elsewhere such as government officials, non-local businesses and non-government organisations/foundations.

There is a necessity to cluster stalls in zones within their initial conception and imbue each stall and owner with their trademark to enable competitive advantage to flourish and avoid cut-throat competition with other similar wartegs within the vicinity. Thirdly, quality of networks marked by diversity, flexibility, retention and innovation are also highly important. It is within the above contexts that warteg
enterprises are empowered, improved and integrated into the city’s social and economic life.

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