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The Location Privacy Preserving of Social Network based on RCCAM Access Control

Xueqin Zhang and Qianru Zhou and Chunhua Gu. Liangxiu Han

Xueqin Zhang and Qianru Zhou is with the College of Information Science and Engineering, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, China (e-mail: zxq@ecust.edu.cn).

Chunhua Gu was with University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai, Shanghai,China (e-mail: guchunhua@usst.edu.cn).

Liangxiu Han is with the School of Computing, Mathematics and Digital Technology, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK (e-mail: l.han@mmu.ac.uk).

ABSTRACT
Location-based services in social networks provide much convenience for people but bring much risk of location privacy disclosure. Aiming at this problem, a location privacy preservation algorithm based on RCCAM access control model is proposed to assign the accessing users of the access permission and the visibility level of location information through the combination of conflicts resolution strategy, permission allocation strategy and location generalization strategy. RCCAM is a relationship-based multi-users cooperation access control model, which takes the same shared contents that may involves the privacy profits of multi-users into consideration. The core of the algorithm is the value of open tendency which depends on the location sensitivity and the intimacy between users. Conflicts resolution strategy adopts the value of open tendency to vote for concessions. Permission allocation strategy and location generalization strategy to obtain the specific access permission and the location visibility level for accessing users according to the value of open tendency. The algorithm can achieve fine-grained control of location publishing of the shared content which involves stakeholder’s privacy profit and maintain the sharing will of promulgator as possible.

Keywords:
Social Network, Privacy Preservation, Location Privacy, Access Control, Location Sensitivity, Location Publishing Strategy

1. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of the internet has promoted the widespread use of social network. In recent years, the internet has provided users with rich and personalized services such as location-based services. All these services can be applied to share photos, videos and texts associated with location information which provide users with better experience and more convenience. The behavior of sharing actually is an active behavior of privacy disclosure. Thus, the leakage of user’s privacy cannot be inevitable when user shares location information to others if the user has low privacy protection awareness. Naini F et al[1] considers that users can be identified by attracters through the exposure of location information which will result in incalculable losses[2]. Many users are concerned about the leakage of their location privacy. Therefore, the preservation of location privacy is important. This paper proposes an access control based method to protect location privacy.

2. RELATED WORK
The protection of location privacy in social network just started. [3] introduces the concept of location and reviews many methods which can be categorized into heuristic privacy measurement, probability deduction and private information retrieval based technologies. But all these methods are based on traditional protection methods of LBS-based services, not fully applicable in location privacy sharing by content. Access control is one of the most common methods in view of this situation. There are many types of access control models proposed to adapt to different needs. Chen T Z et al[4] reviews the current access control models for social network and show that it mainly includes relationship-based, attribute-based etc. Relationship is the core of social network so the relationship-based access control model which uses the relationship between users to resolve the problem of authorization is very suitable. However, Most of the prior research didn’t pay attention to the fact that shared content may involves multiple users’ privacy. Thus Hu and Ahn [5] proposes a multi-authorization framework based on a vote-based resilience mechanism. Pang J et al [6] proposes an access control mechanism based on user-to-user relationships and shared information. But they are not focus on the location privacy preservation. Chao L I et al [7] proposes a CS-LPPM model based on the combination of the above deficiencies to achieve a fine-grained location privacy protection based on access control method. Inspired by it, this paper proposes a relation-based multi-users corporative access control model (RCCAM) and combines conflicts resolution strategy, permission allocation strategy and location generalization strategy to achieve the RCCAM-based location publishing strategy. Finally provides users with fine-grained protection of location privacy and resolves the issue of the same shared

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content involves multi-user’s privacy to provide the location privacy protection of other users.

3. RCCAM ACCESS CONTROL MODEL

3.1 Description of Location Privacy Issue

Suppose there are four users in the social network, named Alice, Bob, Carol and David. The relationship between these four users is shown in Figure 1. Alice, Bob and Carol are friends, Bob, Carol and David are friends, Alice and David are indirect friends.

Alice and Bob meet together then Alice uploads a content which including the information of location to the social network and "@" Bob. Carol forwards after commenting it. For this content, Alice is a promulgator, Bob is a stakeholder, Carol and David are accessing users. Assume that the location is a non-sensitive location for Alice, but sensitive to Bob. However, since Alice uploaded the location, Carol obtained the sensitive information of Bob and because of the forward of Carol, David could obtain the sensitive location of Bob. Thus, the location privacy of Bob was indirectly leaked. The process is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The components of RCCAM

However, in the most current access control strategies for social networks, owner has absolute control over the content while other stakeholders have no control over it. Due to the interactivity of social networks, a content often indirectly leaks other users’ privacy. Aiming at the above problem, this paper proposes a location publishing strategy based on multi-user corporation access control model (RCCAM) to solve the problem of how to protect the privacy of other users when the content influence multiple users’ privacy.

3.2 RCCAM Model Components

In RCCAM, subject is user, object is the content with location information, strategy determines whether the subject has the permission to the object and can be divided into system strategy and customized strategy. Elements are shown in Figure 2.

Content m The content can be texts, videos, or pictures. Each user has their own content set $M_u$. Unless otherwise specified, the content contains real location information.

Participant User $U$ For a specific $m$, all related users are the participant users.

Promulgator $u_{post}$ For a specific $m$, if $m \in M_u$, user $u_i$ is the $u_{post}$ of content $m$.

Stakeholder $u_{rel}$ For a specific $m$, find($m$) is an abstract function that can identify the content-related users by the function of "@". All these content-related users are stakeholders. $U_{rel}$ is the set of all stakeholders.

Figure 2. The components of RCCAM

Accessing user $u_{acc}$ For a specific $m$, the user who send an access request is an accessing user of $m$.

System Strategy $P_{sys}$ As a default strategy made by the network operator that applies to all users who are included in the social network.

Customized Strategy $P_{def}$ In a social network, each user can set personalized privacy strategy according to their own privacy needs and privacy preferences. And the customized strategy can be further divided into promulgator’s strategy $P_{post}$ and stakeholder’s strategy $P_{rel}$ according to the relationship between user and content.

3.3 LOCATION SENSITIVITY

Location sensitivity ($Sen$) is an indicator that judges whether the location is user’s privacy. The higher the $Sen$ is, the stronger the user is unwilling to share it with other users.

3.3.1 The Definition of Location Sensitivity

$Sen$ is different in different scenarios [8].

a. $Sen$ of the same location is different for different users.

b. $Sen$ of the same location is different for the same user at different time.

c. $Sen$ of the same location is different for the same user when the accessing user is different.

Thus, location sensitivity depends on four elements: location $l$, user $u$, time $t$ and the type of relationship $r_u$. Using function $Sen(l, u, t, r_u)$ to set the location sensitivity, $Sen \in [0, 1]$.

E.g. $Sen(l, Alice, t1, family) = 0.9$ means that location $l$ in the period of $t_1$ if the relationship between accessing user and Alice is family, the sensitivity is 0.9.

3.3.2 The Acquisition of Location Sensitivity

When the accessing user send an access request, the social network system will identify the related stakeholders then performs the sensitivity matching using the function
4. LOCATION PUBLISHING STRATEGY BASED ON RCCAM

This chapter proposes a location publishing strategy based on RCCAM model which combines conflict resolution strategy, permission allocation strategy and location generalization strategy.

4.1 Location Publishing Strategy Construction

Figure 3 shows the frame of location publishing strategy.

- $U_{pr}$ The set of $u_{pos}$ and $u_{rel}$ of the same content $m$. $u_{rel}$ can be one or multiple.
- $t_r$ Valid time of the sensitivity for a location information. It can be a specific time or can be represented by a fuzzy set, e.g. $t_r \in \{\text{morning, afternoon, evening}\}$.
- $L$ The location information set of user.
- $P_u$ A set of customized strategy set by user selves. Each user's customized strategy can be more than one. E.g. $P_{\text{diver}} = \{p_1, p_2\}$ represents the customized strategy of Alice. $p_1 = <\text{open, friend}>$ is a customized grouping strategy means this $m$ only open to friend. $p_2 = L[\text{morning, friend} : 0] >$ is a customized location sensitivity strategy means in the morning, the location information belongs $L$ is 0-sensitivity to the user whose relationship is ‘friend’.
- $R_y$ A set of the relationship between user and user. $R_y \subseteq U \times U = \{r_1, r_2, ..., r_n\}$ represents different type of user-to-user relationship, such as ‘close friend’, ‘family’ etc. [9].
- $R$ A set of the relationship between user and the content. $R_y \subseteq U \times R = \{y_1, y_2, ..., y_n\}$ represents the different type of user-to-resource relationship. This paper divides the relationship of user-to-resource into owner, sharer, creator and disseminator [8].

- $P = \{P_{\text{read-only}}, P_{\text{read-forward}}\}$ is the permission of $u_{rel}$ to access the content, $P_{\text{read-only}}$ represents read-only permission and $P_{\text{read-forward}}$ represents that the user can read and forward it. Specific permission can be classified as Table 1.

Table 1: The classification and the representation of permissions.

| Description | $P_{\text{read-only}}$ | $P_{\text{read-forward}}$ |
|-------------|----------------------|--------------------------|
| No-permission | 0                     | 0                        |
| Read-only   | 1                     | 0                        |
| Read-forward| 1                     | 1                        |

- Decision The final access control decision for specific $u_{rel}$.

Decision $\leftarrow (l, u_{rel}, d, P)$ represents that the specific $u_{rel}$ has the $P$ permission to access the content and the location $l$ will be shown at the $d$ visible level.

4.2 Conflict Resolution Strategy

Due to the existence of stakeholders, each $u_{rel}$ has independent access customized strategy which will result in strategy conflicting. E.g. Alice is $u_{pos}$ and Bob is the $u_{rel}$. As for the same location, Alice set the 0-sensitivity and Bob set the 1-sensitivity which means a non-sensitive location is extremely sensitive to Bob. Obviously, the strategies of Alice and Bob have conflicts.

- $U_{\text{conflict}}$ Set of $u_{rel}$ who has conflict with $u_{pos}$.
- Identify($u_{rel}, P$) The function to identify the conflict between $u_{pos}$ and $u_{rel}$. Identify=1 means there is a conflict.

Table 2: The different case of the sensitivity between promulgator and stakeholder.

| Alice $u_{pos}$ | Description |
|-----------------|-------------|
| 0 0             | L is both not sensitive to $u_{pos}$ and $U_{rel}$ |
| 1 0             | L is sensitive to $u_{pos}$ but not sensitive to $U_{rel}$ |
| 0 1             | L is not sensitive to $u_{pos}$ but $\exists u_r \in U_{rel}, L$ is sensitive |
| 1 1             | L is sensitive to $u_{pos}$, and $\exists u_r \in U_{rel}, L$ is sensitive |

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According to the sensitivity of location, the situation is shown as Table 2. There, 0 indicates that the location is insensitive and 1 indicates that the location is sensitive. For the first two cases in Table 2, there is no conflict. The final decision follows the principle of the owner priority and executes as the strategy of \( u_{acc} \). As for the latter two cases in the table need to be solved by voting based on Open Tendency (OT).

OT represents the willingness that how much the user is willing to share the location to a certain \( u_{acc} \), depending on the sensitivity of location and the intimacy between users. The calculation of intimacy refers to [10]. Intimacy do not necessarily be the same even if the users are in the same group. For each \( u_{acc} \), each \( u_{post} \) or \( u_{rel} \) has its own OT. There, the Intimacy is the intimacy between \( u_{acc} \) and \( u_{post} \), the intimacy between \( u_{acc} \) and \( u_{rel} \). OT is defined as follow:

\[
OT = w_1 \cdot (1 - Sen(u_{acc}, u_{acc})) + w_2 \cdot close(u_{acc}, u_{acc})
\]

(1)

\( u_i \in [u_{post} \cup u_{rel}], w_1 + w_2 = 1, Sen(u_{acc}, u_{acc}) \) represents the location sensitivity set by \( u_i \) for \( u_{acc} \), close\( (u_{acc}, u_{acc}) \) represents the intimacy between \( u_i \) and \( u_{acc} \). Then the definition of the voting function shown as follow.

\[
V_{ot} = \sum w_n \cdot OT_n
\]

(2)

\( V_{ot} \in [0,1] \) is the voting results of \( u_{acc} \) according to the OT. \( n \) is the total number of people who participant in the vote. Due to the relationship between each participant and the content, assign different weights \( w_n \) of different \( R_i \). Therefore, the assignment of weights is based on the principle of the priority of \( u_{post} \) and the principle of the importance of relationship. The intimacy of \( u_{post} \), itself is 1. \( w_n \) is assigned as follow:

\[
w_n = \begin{cases} 
\alpha, & \text{if } u_i = u_{post} \\
\frac{close(u_{acc}, u_{post})}{\sum_{u_{rel}, \forall} close(u_{acc}, u_{post})}, & \text{if } u_i \in U_{rel} 
\end{cases}
\]

(3)

\( \alpha \in (0,1) \) is the weight of \( w_n \) when \( u_i \) is \( u_{post} \cdot close(u_{acc}, u_{post}) \) represents the intimacy between \( u_i \) and \( u_{post} \) when \( u_i \) is the stakeholder. \( w_n \) represents the weight of \( u_{rel} \). The degree of concessions is different while the different importance between \( u_{post} \) and different \( u_{rel} \). The more close\( (u_{rel}, u_{post}) \) is, the higher intimacy between \( u_{rel} \) and \( u_{post} \), \( u_{rel} \) is more important to \( u_{post} \) and the more the disclosure of the location will damage the privacy profit of \( u_{rel} \) will be taken into account. Therefore, \( u_{post} \) is more willing to make concessions in terms of OT.

4.3 Permission Allocation Strategy

Permission allocation strategy is one of the system strategies and it is for the further allocation of the user’s permission of read and forward, which is achieved through the permission allocation table. In social network, communication has multiple directions. In order to implement finer access control and minimize privacy leakage in the process of dissemination, the social network system should develop a permission allocation table shown as Table 3 to do some permission division according to the \( V_{ot} \) which has been calculated.

Table 3: The table of permission allocation.

| \( V_{ot} \) | \([0,X]\) | \([X,X_s]\) | \([X_s,1]\) |
|---|---|---|---|
| \( P \) | \( P = [0,0] \) | \( P = [1,0] \) | \( P = [1,1] \) |

Here, \( P = [0,0] \) represents that the \( u_{acc} \) cannot see the content. \( P = [1,0] \) represents that the \( u_{acc} \) can only see the content but cannot forward. \( P = [1,1] \) represents that \( u_{acc} \) can see the content and forward.

4.4 Location Generalization Strategy

Location generalization strategy also belongs to the system strategy, which is used to classify the visible level of the location so as to strengthen the location privacy preserving of user under the premise of retain promulgator’s willingness to share. It is achieved through the location generalization table shown as Table 4 by dividing the scope of visibility of location at all levels based on \( V_{ot} \), which is uniformly formulated by the social network operator. E.g. \( V_{ot} \in [0,1] \), the location will be generalized to the level L1. Location is not necessarily divided into only three levels, according to the different grained requirements of different social networks, more levels can be divided.

Table 4: The table of location generalization.

| \( V_{ot} \) | L1 | L2 | L3 |
|---|---|---|---|

4.5 Rccam-based Location Publishing Strategy

When \( u_{acc} \) sends an access request for the content \( m \) containing the real location information \( l \) to the server, the permission of \( u_{acc} \) will be controlled through the location publishing strategy, and finally the system returns the authority of \( u_{acc} \), and the \( u_{acc} \) ’s visibility level of \( l \). RCCAM-based location publishing strategy is shown as Table 5.

Table 5: The algorithm of location publish strategy based on RCCAM model.

1. \( U_{post}, u_{post} \leftarrow \text{find}(m) \) // identify participants and get the set of content stakeholders
2. \( P_{post} \leftarrow \text{get police}(u_{post}) \) // get the customized strategy \( P_{post} \) of \( u_{post} \)
3. \( U_{acc}, \text{flag} \leftarrow \text{identify}(u_{acc}, P_{post}) \) // identify the strategy conflicts and set of stakeholders who get conflict.
4. \( U_{post} = u_{post} \cup U_{rel} \)
5. If \( \text{flag} = 1 \) and \( u_{acc} \) satisfies \( P_{post} \) do
6. For each \( u_i \in U_{rel} \) do
   - \( P_{rel} \leftarrow \text{get police}(u_i) \) // get the customized strategy \( P_{rel} \) of \( u_{rel} \).
5.1 Two-user Application Analysis

Assume that Alice uploads a content and "@" friend Bob as shown in Figure 4. a. The location information is 'Star-bucks, Shanghai South Railway Station'. Therefore, Alice is u_post, Bob is urel and friend Carol is u_acc.

p_a = l[open, friend]

b. The customized strategy of Bob:

p_b = l[read, friend] indicates that 1 is 1-sensitivity for u_acc whose relationship with Alice is 'friend' in the morning.

c. The relationship between Alice and Carol, Bob and Carol is 'friend'.

d. Establish the location generalization table shown as Table 6.

e. The intimacy between accessing user and promulgator, between accessing user and stakeholder are both 0.5.

f. The intimacy between Alice and Bob respectively equals to 0.1 and 0.8 to verify the different concessions when there is low/high intimacy with Bob.

g. Establish the location generalization table shown as Table 6.

The result of voting by conflicts resolution strategy is shown as Table 7. It’s obvious that there is a conflict.

Table 7: The results of concession voting.

| OT     | Vot low | Vot high |
|--------|---------|----------|
| Alice  | 0.75    | 0.4625   | 0.3875   |
| Bob    | 0.25    |          |          |

If the intimacy between Alice and Bob is high, the final decision is:

Decision = (L, Carol, L3, [1, 0]: read – only)

Carol is only authorized the read-only accessing permission of the content and the location is visible in L3 level means Carol can see the location as ‘Shanghai’. If intimacy between Alice and Bob is low, the final decision is:

Decision = (L, Carol, L2, [1, 1]: read – forward)

Carol is authorized the read-forward accessing permission of the content and the location is visible in L2 level that means Carol can see the location as 'Xuhui District'. If we consider Alice’s strategy only, the location is 0-sensitivity to Carol and the OT of Alice is 0.75. That is Carol has read-forward permission of the content and the location is visible in L_real level that means Carol can see the location as 'Shanghai South Railway Station'. Obviously, Alice takes the privacy needs of Bob into account and made some concessions. And the closer the intimacy between Alice and Bob is, the more concession Alice willing to make to protect the privacy of Bob.

5.2 Multi-users Application Analysis

This section discusses the scenarios of multusers based on the chapter 5.1 and as shown in Figure 4.b. Alice is u_post, friend Bob, Ella, David, Sophia, Ana, Susan and Zoe are u_rel, and Carol is u_acc.

Figure 4. Alice upload a content with location information and @ friends

(a) Alice upload a content with location information and @ friends

(b)
Two kinds of may be different, which and are different (the importance of Bob is higher than others), final decision is:

\[
\text{Decision} \leftarrow (L, \text{Car}ol, L1,[1,1]: \text{read} \rightarrow \text{forward})
\]

Carol is authorized the read-forward accessing permission of the content and the location is visible in L1 level that means Carol can see the location as ‘Lingyun Street’. And when the importance of \(u_{rel}\) are different (the importance of Bob is higher than others), final decision is:

\[
\text{Decision} \leftarrow (L, \text{Car}ol, L2,[1,1]: \text{read} \rightarrow \text{forward})
\]

Carol is authorized the read-forward accessing permission of the content and the location is visible in L2 level that means Carol can see the location as ‘Xuhui District’. From Table 9, taking the privacy needs of stakeholders into consideration, Alice makes some concessions in the visibility of location. But compared with the two case in which the stakeholder’s importance is the same and different, because the importance of Bob is higher, Alice makes more concession for him.

### 6. CONCLUSIONS

This paper proposes a multi-users cooperative access control model in order to provide fine-grained privacy protection for social network users while they share the content with location information. Location sensitivity and intimacy are the core elements to get the value of \(OT\) and the value of \(OT\) is the core of the total strategy of location publishing, which includes the conflicts resolution strategy, the permission allocation strategy and the location generalization strategy. Through the case analysis find that we can greatly solve the problem, when a content involves multiple users’ privacy, the location privacy of stakeholders can be greatly protected and maintain the sharing behavior of promulgator.

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**Authors**

Xueqin Zhang received the Ph.D. degree in Detection Technology and Automation Devices from East China University of Science and Technology (ECUST), Shanghai, China, in 2007. Since 1998, she has been in the Electrical and Communication Engineering Department, ECUST, where she is currently an ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR.

At 2006, she worked as a visiting scholar in University of Wisconsin Madison. Her research interests include pattern classification, information security and data mining etc.

Corresponding author. Email: zxq@ecust.edu.cn

Qianru Zhou received M.S. degree in Signal and information procession from East China University of Science and Technology (ECUST), Shanghai, in 2012. His research interests is privacy preservation of social network

Email: arrowz@gmail.cn

Chunhua Gu received the Ph.D. degree in Control Science and Engineering from East China University of Science and Technology (ECUST), Shanghai, China, in 2007. From 1992 to 2013, he was in the Computer Science and Engineering Department, School of Information Science and Engineering, ECUST, where he is currently a PROFESSOR. Now he is in University of Shanghai in Science and Technology.

At 2002, he worked as a visiting scholar in School of Computing and Information Sciences, Florida International University. His research interests include intelligent computing, software engineering and information security.

Email: guchunhua@usst.edu.cn

Liangxiu Han received the Ph.D. degree from Fudan University, Shanghai, China, in 2002. She is currently with School of Computing, Mathematics and Digital Technology, Manchester Metropolitan University Her research interests include pattern classification, information security and data mining etc. As a Principal Investigator (PI) or Co-PI, Han has been conducting research in relation to big data processing, data mining, parallel and distributed computing/cloud computing (funded by EPSRC, BBSRC, Royal Society, Innovate UK, Horizon 2020, Industry, Charity, Newton Fund, etc.).

Email: l.han@mmu.ac.uk