Appendix

Swaying Citizen Support for EU Membership: Evidence from a Survey Experiment of German Voters

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1 Original Survey Questions

1.1 Dependent Variable (GIP W24, W28)

The original German question, which serves as the basis for our dependent variable $\Delta \text{Remain}$, as well as the two alternative dependent variables $\Delta \text{Leave}$ and $\Delta \text{DK}$, was fielded in wave 24 (July 2016) and wave 28 (March 2017).

(Question ID: ZJ24020 and ZJ28020)

On the 23rd of June 2016, the population of the United Kingdom voted on their country’s European Union membership. Imagine that a vote on Germany’s European Union membership was held next Sunday. How would you vote?

You can only give one answer to this question.

- Germany should remain a member of the EU
- Germany should leave the EU
- I do not know
- I would not vote
- I am not allowed to vote (Not old enough to vote / no German citizenship)
- I do not want to say

Using this question, first, we code two dummy variables \textit{wave24\_remain} and \textit{wave28\_remain}. These variables are equal to 1 if the respondents indicate that they would vote remain, and 0 if the respondents indicate that they would vote to leave or indicate they didn’t know how they would vote.
To calculate the dependent variable $\Delta \text{Remain}$, we then subtract $\text{wave24\_remain}$ from $\text{wave28\_remain}$. As a result, $\Delta \text{Remain}$ equals 1 if participants change their vote intention from ‘Leave’ or ‘Don’t know’ to ‘Remain’, 0 if the participants do not change their vote intention or only switched between ‘Leave’ and ‘Don’t know’, and -1 if they change their vote intention from ‘Remain’ towards ‘Don’t know’ or ‘Leave’ between the two waves.

The mean of this dependent variable corresponds to the percentage point change in the Remain vote between the two survey waves as it captures the difference in the percentage of voters supporting Remain in wave 2 and the percentage of voters supporting Remain in wave 1. To illustrate, our total sample consists of 2214 respondents who completed both survey waves. Of those, 1825 (or 82.4%) indicated they would vote Remain in an EU membership referendum in wave 1, and 1862 (or 84.1%) did so in wave 2. The Remain vote thus increased by 1.7 percentage points between the two waves. The mean of our dependent variable measures this percentage point change. In our dependent variable, 104 cases of a switch from ‘Remain’ to either ‘Leave’ or ‘Don’t know’ were coded as ‘-1’, 141 cases of a switch from either ‘Leave’ or ‘Don’t know’ to ‘Remain’ were coded as ‘1’, and 1969 cases of no such switches were coded as ‘0’. Taking the mean of this distribution — $(-1*104 + 1*141 + 0*1969)/2214$ — yields a value of 0.017, which reflects the above-mentioned 1.7 percentage point increase in the Remain vote.

We create analogously two additional dependent variables — $\Delta \text{Leave}$ and $\Delta \text{DK}$ — to measure respectively changes towards/away from ‘Leave’ and ‘Don’t know’ responses between the waves. We use these alternative dependent variables in the robustness checks in Table A10-A12 in Section 5 below.
1.2 Treatments (GIP W28)

We display the vignettes for each treatment in their original German wording and an English translation below. Each participant is part either of the treatment or the control groups. Each treatment group receives only one argument. Note that the positive and negative arguments have a similar structure and always start with a common introduction.

Peace & Security Arguments

German

Positive: Ein wesentlicher Grund für die Gründung der Europäischen Union (EU) war die Erhaltung des Friedens und der Sicherheit in Europa. Die EU soll die wirtschaftliche und politische Integration sowie die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den europäischen Staaten fördern und damit Kriege untereinander weniger erstrebenswert machen. Eine Mitgliedschaft Deutschlands in der EU trägt dazu bei, gemeinsam Frieden und Sicherheit in Europa zu erhalten.

Negative: Ein wesentlicher Grund für die Gründung der Europäischen Union (EU) war die Erhaltung des Friedens und der Sicherheit in Europa. Allerdings führen offene Grenzen innerhalb der EU dazu, dass Menschen unkontrolliert und illegal nach Deutschland einreisen können. Würde Deutschland die EU verlassen, könnte Deutschland seine Grenzen besser schützen und besser verhindern, dass Kriminelle einreisen.

English

Positive: An important reason for founding the European Union (EU) was to maintain peace and security in Europe. The EU fosters political and economic integration and cooperation among its member states, which decreases the incentive for war between each other. German membership in the EU contributes to maintaining peace and security together in Europe.

Negative: An important reason for founding the European Union (EU) was to maintain peace and security in Europe. However, open borders within the EU lead to a situation where people can enter Germany uncontrolled and illegally. If Germany were to leave the EU, it could better protect its borders and prevent criminals from entering.

Economic Arguments

German

Positive: Ein Ziel der Europäischen Union (EU) ist die Förderung des wirtschaftlichen Wachstums und des Wohlstands der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten. Dazu bilden die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten
Positive: Ein Ziel der Europäischen Union (EU) ist die Förderung des wirtschaftlichen Wachstums und des Wohlstands der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten. Deshalb zahlen die wirtschaftlich stärkeren EU-Mitgliedsstaaten finanzielle Beiträge, um wirtschaftlich schwächere Mitgliedsstaaten zu unterstützen. Deutschland ist der größte Beitragszahler. Würde Deutschland die EU verlassen, könnte Deutschland bedürftige Menschen und Regionen in Deutschland statt bedürftiger Menschen und Regionen in anderen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten unterstützen.

Negative: Eines der Grundprinzipien der Europäischen Union (EU) ist die sogenannte Freizügigkeit. Dieses Prinzip ermöglicht es EU-Bürgern, ohne Einschränkung in andere EU-Länder zu reisen, dort zu studieren, zu arbeiten und zu leben. Die Freizügigkeit erlaubt auch einen unkontrollierten Zuzug von Bürgern aus EU-Mitgliedsstaaten nach Deutschland, der etablierte gesellschaftliche Werte und Regeln des Zusammenlebens in Deutschland gefährden kann. Würde Deutschland die EU verlassen, könnte es seine kulturellen Werte und Normen besser schützen und erhalten, da Bürger aus anderen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten nicht mehr uneingeschränkt nach Deutschland einwandern könnten.
Positive: A fundamental principle of the European Union (EU) is the free movement of persons. This principle is encoded in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. German membership in the EU allows German citizens to travel, study, work and live in other EU countries without constraints.

Negative: A fundamental principle of the European Union (EU) is the free movement of persons. This principle allows EU citizens to travel, study, work and live in other EU countries without constraints. Freedom of movement also allows uncontrolled migration of citizens of other EU countries to Germany, which can endanger established societal norms and rules of coexistence in Germany. If Germany were to leave the EU, it could better protect and preserve its cultural values and norms since citizens from other EU member states could no longer migrate without constraints to Germany.

Political Arguments

German

Positive: In der Europäischen Union (EU) treffen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten und das Europäische Parlament wichtige politische Entscheidungen in verschiedenen Politikbereichen wie zum Beispiel Handel, Wettbewerb, Landwirtschaft, Gesundheit, Migration, Umwelt und Justiz. Diese Entscheidungen haben einen direkten Einfluss auf das Leben der EU-Bürger. Eine Mitgliedschaft in der EU ermöglicht es Deutschland, politische Entscheidungen in der EU mitzustalten und somit deutsche Interessen einzubringen.

Negative: In der Europäischen Union (EU) treffen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten und das Europäische Parlament wichtige politische Entscheidungen in verschiedenen Politikbereichen wie zum Beispiel Handel, Wettbewerb, Landwirtschaft, Gesundheit, Migration, Umwelt und Justiz. Diese Entscheidungen haben einen direkten Einfluss auf das Leben der EU-Bürger. Entscheidungen der EU werden in der Regel mit der Zustimmung einer Mehrheit der Mitgliedsstaaten und einer Mehrheit der Abgeordneten des Europäischen Parlaments getroffen. Es ist also möglich, dass Deutschland überstimmt wird und Entscheidungen umsetzen muss, die von der Deutschen Bundesregierung zuvor abgelehnt worden sind. Würde Deutschland die EU verlassen, würde es die Freiheit zurückgewinnen, eigenständig Entscheidungen zu treffen, die ausschließlich deutschen Interessen entsprechen.

English

Positive: In the European Union (EU), the EU member states and the European Parliament make important political decisions in different policy areas such as trade, competition, agriculture, health, migration, environment and judicial affairs. These decisions have a direct influence on the life of EU citizens. Membership in the European Union allows Germany to shape political decisions in the EU and thereby advance German interests.
Negative: In the European Union (EU), the EU member states and the European Parliament make important political decisions in different policy areas such as trade, competition, agriculture, health, migration, environment and judicial affairs. These decisions have a direct influence on the life of EU citizens. These decisions are usually made in accordance with a majority of the member states and a majority of members of the European Parliament. It is, therefore, possible that Germany will be outvoted and has to implement decisions which the German government previously rejected. If Germany were to leave the EU, it would regain the freedom to make decisions independently that are solely in German interest.

1.3 Subsample Variables

The variables used to define the subsamples for our conditional analyses were fielded in wave 24 (July 2016) and wave 25 (September 2016). In the following, we list each question in the original German language and English translation (own translation) and discuss our coding.

EU Moderates, Against EU (GIP W24)

Question ID: CQ24040

German

Im Großen und Ganzen, wie denken Sie über die Europäische Union (EU)?

- sehr negativ
- eher negativ
- weder negativ noch positiv
- eher positiv
- sehr positiv
- weiß ich nicht

English

Generally speaking, how do you perceive the European Union (EU)?

- very negatively
- mostly negative
- neither negatively nor positively
• mostly positive
• very positive
• I don’t know

The variable *EU Moderates* is equal to 1 if the respondents answer ‘eher negativ’ (mostly negative), ‘weder negativ noch positiv’ (neither negatively nor positively), or ‘eher positiv’ (mostly positive). The variable is equal to 0 if the respondents answer ‘sehr negativ’ (very negative) or ‘sehr positiv’ (very positive). We code the answer ‘weiß ich nicht’ (I don’t know) as missing.

The variable *Against EU* is equal to 1 if the respondents answer ‘eher negativ’ (mostly negative), ‘very negativ’ (very negative). The variable is equal to 0 if the participants answer ‘eher positiv’ (mostly positive) ‘sehr positiv’ (very positive). We code the answers ‘weder negativ noch positiv’ (neither negatively nor positively) and ‘weiß ich nicht’ (I don’t know) as missing.

**Political Engagement, Anti Party (GIP W25)**

**Question ID: AA25039**

**German**

*Wenn am nächsten Sonntag Bundestagswahl wäre, welche Partei würden Sie dann mit Ihrer Zweitstimme wählen? Die Zweitstimme ist die Stimme, mit der Sie eine Partei wählen.*

*Bei dieser Frage können Sie nur eine Antwort geben.*

• Würde nicht wählen
• Nicht wahlberechtigt (nicht volljährig/keine deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft)
• CDU / CSU
• SPD
• Die Linke
• Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen
• FDP
• AfD
• Piratenpartei
• NPD
• Andere Partei, und zwar (bitte eintragen):*
If there would be a parliamentary election next Sunday, which party would get your secondary vote? The secondary vote is the vote you use to select a party.

For this question you can only give one answer.

- I would not vote
- I am not allowed to vote (Not old enough to vote / no German citizenship)
- CDU / CSU (Christian democrats)
- SPD (labor)
- Die Linke (Socialist)
- Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen (green party)
- FDP (conservative-liberal)
- AfD (right-wing)
- Piratenpartei (Pirate party)
- NPD (Nationalist party)
- A different party, namely (please provide the name):
  - don’t want to say
  - don’t know

The variable Anti Party is equal to 1 if the respondents would vote for the AfD, NPD or Die Linke. The variable is coded 0 if the participant would vote for a pro-EU party (CDU/CSU, SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, FDP, Piratenpartei). The remaining answers are coded as missing.

The variable Disengaged is equal to 1 if the respondents indicate ‘würde nicht wählen’ (I would not vote), or ‘möchte ich nicht sagen’ (don’t want to say), or ‘weiß ich nicht’ (don’t know). The variable is equal to 0 if the participant indicate that he would vote for a party. We code the answer ‘I am not allowed to vote’ as missing.
EU Knowledge (GIP W24)

Question ID: CG24041

German

Wie gut kennen Sie sich Ihrer Meinung nach mit dem Entscheidungsverfahren in der Europäischen Union aus?

1 sehr gut

...

10 gar nicht

• weiß ich nicht

English

In your own opinion, how well do you know the decision-making procedures of the European Union?

1 very well

...

10 not at all

• I do not know

The variable Low EU Knowledge is equal to 1 if the respondents give an answer above or equal six, and 0 if the respondents gave an answer smaller than six. We code the answer ‘weiß ich nicht’ (I do not know) as missing.
2 Size of Treatment and Control Groups and Statistical Power

We estimate what size of treatment effects we can detect given the samples sizes of the controls and treatment groups, i.e. how big a difference has to be before our tests can detect it. For the OLS difference-in-differences analyses, this power calculation is based on a Z-test. Our main dependent variable, $Y$, is the change in opinion between wave 24 and 28 coded on the scale -1 till 1. For our control group the mean value (variance) of $Y$ is: 0.038 (0.381) indicating a small positive trend. Assuming equal variances of treatment and control groups (i.e. under the null-hypothesis all variances are equal to that of the control group) our Z-test for equality of the change in opinion at 5% confidence level is:

$$1.96 < \frac{|\hat{Y}_{treatment} - \hat{Y}_{control}|}{\sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{N_{treatment}} + \frac{\sigma^2}{240}}}$$

$$1.96 < \frac{|\hat{Y}_{treatment} - \hat{Y}_{control}|}{\sqrt{\frac{0.1450313}{N_{treatment}} + \frac{0.1450313}{240}}}$$

$$1.96 \times \left( \sqrt{\frac{0.1450313}{N - treatment}} + \frac{0.1450313}{240} \right) < |\hat{Y}_{treatment} - \hat{Y}_{control}|$$

Since we have different numbers of observations in each treatment group, we have slightly different rejection regions for the null-hypothesis in each treatment. For each treatment we, therefore, calculate how big the difference-in-differences compared to the control would have had to be, for our test to find a significantly different trend (i.e. what is the critical value for dif-in-dif on the right-hand side of the inequality just above). This is reported as the cut-off value in the table below. As the numbers of observations are very similar in all treatments, this cut-off value is almost the same in all treatments. Since the cut-off value is very small in all cases, the coefficients in the regressions are quite well defined and the confidence intervals are very small, which is also visible in Figure 4 in the main text. So the fact that we do not find an effect is most likely caused by there being only small effects, and not by a lack of power in the test per se.

| Group       | Respondents | % Total N | cut-off value |
|-------------|-------------|-----------|---------------|
| Control     | 240         | 10.84     | -             |
| +Political  | 245         | 11.07     | 0.06779       |
| -Political  | 253         | 11.43     | 0.06726       |
| +Cultural   | 246         | 11.11     | 0.06772       |
| -Cultural   | 248         | 11.20     | 0.06759       |
| +Economic   | 233         | 10.52     | 0.06865       |
| -Economic   | 248         | 11.20     | 0.06759       |
| +Peace      | 248         | 11.20     | 0.06759       |
| -Peace      | 253         | 11.43     | 0.06726       |
Any treatment where the change in opinion is outside of the interval $0.0375 \pm 0.068644624 \rightarrow \{-0.031144624, 0, 0.106144624\}$ is considered statistically different from 0 at the 5% level. This means we can detect deviations in the average trend of opinion in a treatment group of about $1/6$ of the standard deviation of the change in opinion that we observe.
3 Randomization Checks and Subgroups

Figure A1 uses evidence from 80 t-tests to show that the randomization works well. Each t-test compares a given treatment group (columns) to the untreated group (control group) in terms of a variable of interest (rows).

White cells indicate that the corresponding t-test does not find sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of equal means at the 95% confidence level. Coloured cells indicate statistically significant differences in means.

The group treated with the positive cultural treatment, for instance, had statistically significant fewer ‘Leavers’ (as of wave 1) than the control group. By construction, we would expect up to 5% of the t-tests to return statistically significant results when the randomization works well. In fact, exactly 5% of the t-tests return statistically significant results. The smallest p-value found equals 0.00123. The results are even more reassuring when using a Bonferroni correction for multiple testing. In this case, none of the experimental groups is considered to be statistically different from the control group. Hence, we are confident that our results are not driven by the random assignment of respondents into treatment groups.

![Figure A1. Significance and sign of balance tests](image)

In the paper, we use subgroups, for subsampling or interactions, quite often. The following tables report, for each of these subgroups, the number of observations we have in every category.
Table A2. Size of groups: treatments

| Group   | N   | %     |
|---------|-----|-------|
| Control | 240 | 10.84 |
| +Political | 245 | 11.07 |
| -Political | 253 | 11.43 |
| +Cultural | 246 | 11.11 |
| -Cultural | 248 | 11.20 |
| +Economic | 233 | 10.52 |
| -Economic | 248 | 11.20 |
| +Peace   | 248 | 11.20 |
| -Peace   | 253 | 11.43 |

Table A3. Size of groups: support wave 1

| Group   | N   | %     |
|---------|-----|-------|
| Remain  | 1825| 82.4  |
| Leave   | 273 | 12.3  |
| Don’t Know | 116 | 5.2   |

Table A4. Size of groups: support wave 2

| Group   | N   | %     |
|---------|-----|-------|
| Remain  | 1862| 84.1  |
| Leave   | 253 | 11.4  |
| Don’t Know | 99  | 4.5   |

Table A5. Size of groups: EU extremists

| Group   | N   | %     |
|---------|-----|-------|
| Moderates | 1907| 86.1  |
| Extremists | 268 | 12.1  |

Table A6. Size of groups: disengaged

| Group   | N   | %     |
|---------|-----|-------|
| Engaged | 1533| 69.2  |
| Disengaged | 518 | 23.4  |

Table A7. Size of groups: low EU knowledge

| Group      | N   | %     |
|------------|-----|-------|
| Low Knowledge | 1493| 67.4  |
| High Knowledge | 647 | 29.2  |

Table A8. Size of groups: against EU

| Group      | N   | %     |
|------------|-----|-------|
| Pro EU     | 1340| 60.5  |
| Against EU | 468 | 21.1  |

Table A9. Size of groups: Eurosceptic party supporter

| Group       | N   | %     |
|-------------|-----|-------|
| Eurosceptic | 358 | 16.2  |
| Pro-European | 1754| 79.2  |
4 Main Analyses

Our main results follow from a series of OLS regression reported in Table A10-Table A12. The dependent variables are the same $\Delta \text{Remain}$, $\Delta \text{Leave}$ and $\Delta \text{DK}$ that measure the change in vote intentions for the three vote options studied in all three tables.

One might argue that the treatments differ only in whether they convey a positive or a negative message and that, thus, one has to analyse them jointly. We present evidence from two different approaches. First, we present in Table A10 the results from assuming that all positive and all negative treatments are identical. As can be easily seen, neither the positive nor the negative treatments are significantly correlated with a change in vote intentions in the framework.

Second, one may argue that these treatments are not necessarily identical, yet, because of multiple testing their p-values need to be (Bonferroni) corrected. We do so by multiplying the p-values by the factor 8 (i.e., the number of treatments we test). When we apply this correction to the models displayed in Table A12, we find that the negative political treatment is still statistically correlated with a change away from voting ‘Remain’ (Models 1 and 4), yet, not with a change towards voting ‘Leave’ (Models 2 and 5) (results with Bonferroni corrected p-values are not displayed).

Overall, we conclude that our results do not support an effect of positive or negative treatments in general (Table A10). When digging down deeper, we find an effect of the negative political and peace argument (Table A11). Digging further, the result is driven by the negative political argument (Table A12). This effect of the negative political treatment remains significant even when adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing in our most expansive model.
### 4.1 Collapsed Positive and Negative Treatments

Table A10. Difference-in-differences *OLS regression* analysis of changes between the waves in intention to vote ‘Remain’, ‘Leave’ or in not knowing how to vote: Full sample

| Dependent variable: | ∆Remain | ∆Leave | ∆DK | ∆Remain | ∆Leave | ∆DK |
|---------------------|----------|---------|------|----------|---------|------|
|                     | (1)      | (2)     | (3)  | (4)      | (5)     | (6)  |
| Positive Treatment  |          |         |      |          |         |      |
|                     | −0.019   | 0.006   | 0.013| −0.029   | 0.007   | 0.023|
|                     | (0.024)  | (0.020)| (0.018)| (0.025)  | (0.022) | (0.016)|
| Negative Treatment  |          |         |      |          |         |      |
|                     | −0.028   | 0.020   | 0.008| −0.028   | 0.014   | 0.014|
|                     | (0.024)  | (0.020)| (0.018)| (0.025)  | (0.021) | (0.016)|
| Female              |          |         |      |          |         |      |
|                     | −0.006   | 0.012   | −0.006| (0.015)  | (0.013) | (0.010)|
| East Germany        |          |         |      |          |         |      |
|                     | 0.013    | −0.011  | −0.002| (0.019)  | (0.016) | (0.012)|
| Schooling (up to 10 years) | 0.001 | −0.003 | 0.002 | (0.016) | (0.014) | (0.010)|
| 18-26 years old     | 0.046    | −0.009  | −0.037*| (0.032)  | (0.028) | (0.021)|
| 27-46 years old     | 0.029    | −0.016  | −0.012| (0.032)  | (0.028) | (0.021)|
| 47-66 years old     | 0.057**  | −0.051**| −0.006| (0.029)  | (0.025) | (0.019)|
| 67+ years old       | 0.045    | −0.029  | −0.015| (0.032)  | (0.027) | (0.021)|
| Pro EU              | −0.033***| 0.018** | 0.015***| (0.008)  | (0.007) | (0.006)|
| Eurosceptic party supporter | −0.025 | 0.006 | 0.019 | (0.021) | (0.018) | (0.014)|
| Left-right selfplacement | −0.008**| 0.006* | 0.002 | (0.004)  | (0.003) | (0.003)|
| Constant            | 0.038*   | −0.021 | −0.017| 0.160*** | −0.084* | −0.078**|
|                     | (0.021)  | (0.018)| (0.016)| (0.055)  | (0.047) | (0.036)|

Observations 2,214 2,214 2,214 1,762 1,762 1,762
R² 0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.016 0.013 0.009
Adjusted R² -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.001 0.009 0.006 0.002

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
### 4.2 Paired Treatments

**Table A11.** Difference-in-differences *OLS regression* analysis of changes between the waves in intention to vote ‘Remain’, ‘Leave’ or in not knowing how to vote: Full sample

| Dependent variable: | $\Delta$Remain | $\Delta$Leave | $\Delta$DK | $\Delta$Remain | $\Delta$Leave | $\Delta$DK |
|---------------------|----------------|--------------|------------|----------------|--------------|------------|
|                     | (1)     | (2)    | (3)       | (4)     | (5)    | (6)      |
| +Political/+Peace    | -0.011  | 0.009  | 0.002     | -0.024  | 0.006  | 0.018    |
|                     | (0.026) | (0.022) | (0.019)   | (0.027) | (0.024) | (0.018)  |
| -Political/-Peace    | -0.051** | 0.029  | 0.023     | -0.060** | 0.030  | 0.030*   |
|                     | (0.026) | (0.022) | (0.019)   | (0.027) | (0.024) | (0.018)  |
| +Cultural/+Economic  | -0.027  | 0.004  | 0.023     | -0.034  | 0.007  | 0.027    |
|                     | (0.026) | (0.022) | (0.019)   | (0.027) | (0.024) | (0.018)  |
| -Cultural/-Economic  | -0.003  | 0.011  | -0.008    | 0.004   | -0.002 | -0.002   |
|                     | (0.026) | (0.022) | (0.019)   | (0.027) | (0.023) | (0.018)  |
| Female              | -0.008  | 0.013  | -0.005    | (0.015) | (0.013) | (0.010)  |
| East Germany        | 0.016   | -0.012 | -0.003    | (0.019) | (0.016) | (0.012)  |
| Schooling (up to 10 years) | 0.001 | -0.003 | 0.002  | (0.016) | (0.014) | (0.010)  |
| 18-26 years old     | 0.041   | -0.007 | -0.034    | (0.032) | (0.028) | (0.021)  |
| 27-46 years old     | 0.026   | -0.015 | -0.011    | (0.032) | (0.028) | (0.021)  |
| 47-66 years old     | 0.054*  | -0.050** | -0.005   | (0.028) | (0.025) | (0.019)  |
| 67+ years old       | 0.043   | -0.028 | -0.014    | (0.032) | (0.027) | (0.021)  |
| Pro EU              | -0.033*** | 0.018** | 0.015***   | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.006)  |
| Eurosceptic party supporter | -0.025 | 0.006  | 0.019   | (0.021) | (0.018) | (0.013)  |
| Left-right selfplacement | -0.008** | 0.006* | 0.002  | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.003)  |
| Constant            | 0.038*  | -0.021 | -0.017    | 0.160*** | -0.084* | -0.078** |
|                     | (0.021) | (0.018) | (0.016)   | (0.055) | (0.047) | (0.036)  |

Observations: 2,214 2,214 2,214 1,762 1,762 1,762  
R²: 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.021 0.014 0.012  
Adjusted R²: 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.013 0.007 0.004  

*Note:* p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
### 4.3 Individual Treatments

Table A12. Difference-in-differences *OLS regression* analysis of changes between the waves in intention to vote ‘Remain’, ‘Leave’ or in not knowing how to vote: Full sample

|                | ΔRemain | ΔLeave | ΔDK | ΔRemain | ΔLeave | ΔDK |
|----------------|---------|--------|-----|---------|--------|-----|
|                | (1)     | (2)    | (3) | (4)     | (5)    | (6) |
| +Political     | -0.017  | 0.009  | 0.009 | -0.016  | -0.002 | 0.018 |
|                | (0.030) | (0.025) | (0.022) | (0.032) | (0.027) | (0.021) |
| -Political     | -0.081*** | 0.056** | 0.025 | -0.089*** | 0.057** | 0.032 |
|                | (0.030) | (0.025) | (0.022) | (0.032) | (0.027) | (0.021) |
| +Cultural      | -0.025  | 0.005  | 0.021 | -0.026  | -0.002 | 0.028 |
|                | (0.030) | (0.025) | (0.022) | (0.031) | (0.027) | (0.021) |
| -Cultural      | -0.013  | 0.009  | 0.005 | 0.0002  | 0.004  | -0.005 |
|                | (0.030) | (0.025) | (0.022) | (0.031) | (0.027) | (0.021) |
| +Economic      | -0.029  | 0.004  | 0.025 | -0.043  | 0.017  | 0.026 |
|                | (0.031) | (0.026) | (0.023) | (0.032) | (0.028) | (0.021) |
| -Economic      | 0.007   | 0.013  | -0.020 | 0.008  | -0.008  | 0.00004 |
|                | (0.030) | (0.025) | (0.022) | (0.032) | (0.027) | (0.021) |
| +Peace         | -0.005  | 0.009  | -0.003 | -0.032  | 0.014  | 0.018 |
|                | (0.030) | (0.025) | (0.022) | (0.032) | (0.027) | (0.021) |
| -Peace         | -0.022  | 0.001  | 0.021 | -0.032  | 0.004  | 0.028 |
|                | (0.030) | (0.025) | (0.022) | (0.031) | (0.027) | (0.021) |
| Female         | -0.008  | 0.013  | -0.020 | 0.008  | -0.008  | 0.00004 |
|                | (0.015) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.016) | (0.014) | (0.010) |
| East Germany   | 0.017   | -0.013 | -0.003 | 0.003  | 0.002  | 0.002 |
|                | (0.019) | (0.016) | (0.012) | (0.016) | (0.014) | (0.010) |
| Schooling (up to 10 years) | 0.0003 | -0.003 | 0.002 | 0.016 | (0.014) | (0.021) |
| 18-26 years old | 0.041   | -0.007 | -0.034 | 0.032 | (0.028) | (0.021) |
|                | (0.032) | (0.028) | (0.021) | (0.032) | (0.028) | (0.021) |
| 27-46 years old | 0.027   | -0.016 | -0.011 | 0.029 | (0.025) | (0.019) |
|                | (0.032) | (0.028) | (0.021) | (0.029) | (0.025) | (0.019) |
| 47-66 years old | 0.056*  | -0.051** | -0.005 | 0.029 | (0.025) | (0.019) |
|                | (0.032) | (0.028) | (0.021) | (0.032) | (0.028) | (0.021) |
| 67+ years old  | 0.043   | -0.029 | -0.014 | 0.032 | (0.027) | (0.021) |
|                | (0.032) | (0.027) | (0.021) | (0.032) | (0.027) | (0.021) |
| Pro EU         | -0.033*** | 0.018** | 0.015*** | 0.008* | 0.006* | 0.002 |
|                | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Euroscptic party supporter | -0.026 | 0.006 | 0.019 | 0.021 | (0.018) | (0.014) |
| Left-right selfplacement | -0.008** | 0.006* | 0.002 | 0.055 | (0.047) | (0.036) |
| Constant       | 0.038*   | -0.021 | -0.017 | 0.161*** | -0.083* | -0.078** |
|                | (0.021) | (0.018) | (0.016) | (0.055) | (0.047) | (0.036) |
| Observations   | 2,214   | 2,214 | 2,214 | 1,762 | 1,762 | 1,762 |
| R²             | 0.005   | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.023 | 0.017 | 0.012 |
| Adjusted R²    | 0.002   | -0.0001 | -0.0002 | 0.013 | 0.007 | 0.002 |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

18
5 Conditional Characteristics Analysis

Since the effect on voting choices is most clearly identified on the variable $\Delta \text{Remain}$, we look for moderation of the effect our treatment had on voting intentions via this variable. The following tables present the interaction models that were used to create Figure 4 in the main text. This means that each regression is of the form:

$$\Delta \text{Remain}_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \times \text{Treatment}_i$$
$$+ \beta_2 \times \text{Respondent\_Characteristic}_i$$
$$+ \beta_3 \times \text{Treatment}_i \times \text{Respondent\_Characteristic}_i$$
$$+ \epsilon_i$$

(1)

Where the treatment variable is a dummy indicated at the top of each column. Of most interest are the coefficients on the interaction terms, $\beta_3$. The characteristics are all dummy variables based on the answers participants gave in relevant survey questions. Based on our expectations we interact our treatment with EU extremism (see Table A5), political engagement (see Table A14), EU knowledge (see Table A15), general attitude towards the EU (see Table A16), support for a Eurosceptic party (see Table A17).
Table A13. Treatment effect conditional on EU extremism

|                      | +Political | -Political | +Cultural | -Cultural | +Economic | -Economic | +Peace | -Peace |
|----------------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|--------|
| Treatment            | -0.010     | -0.075**   | -0.024    | -0.014    | -0.018    | 0.017     | -0.015 | -0.015 |
|                      | (0.031)    | (0.030)    | (0.030)   | (0.034)   | (0.034)   | (0.033)   | (0.032) | (0.035) |
| EU extremist          | -0.033     | -0.033     | -0.033    | -0.033    | -0.033    | -0.033    | -0.033 | -0.033 |
|                      | (0.064)    | (0.063)    | (0.062)   | (0.072)   | (0.070)   | (0.070)   | (0.068) | (0.074) |
| Treatment × EU extremist | -0.026  | 0.046      | 0.052     | 0.071     | 0.052     | -0.017    | 0.063  | 0.015  |
|                      | (0.090)    | (0.086)    | (0.083)   | (0.096)   | (0.097)   | (0.100)   | (0.101) | (0.100) |
| Constant             | 0.033      | 0.033      | 0.033     | 0.033     | 0.033     | 0.033     | 0.033  | 0.033  |
|                      | (0.022)    | (0.021)    | (0.021)   | (0.024)   | (0.024)   | (0.023)   | (0.023) | (0.025) |

| Observations         | 477        | 485        | 481       | 481       | 467       | 481       | 476    | 486    |
| Adjusted R²          | -0.003     | 0.007      | -0.005    | -0.005    | -0.006    | -0.004    | -0.005 | -0.005 |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A14. Treatment effect conditional on respondents’ political engagement

|                      | +Political | -Political | +Cultural | -Cultural | +Economic | -Economic | +Peace | -Peace |
|----------------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|--------|
| Treatment            | -0.011     | -0.052     | -0.012    | 0.011     | -0.023    | 0.020     | -0.023 | -0.006 |
|                      | (0.036)    | (0.034)    | (0.033)   | (0.039)   | (0.039)   | (0.038)   | (0.036) | (0.039) |
| Disengaged respondent | 0.066     | 0.066      | 0.066     | 0.066     | 0.066     | 0.066     | 0.066  | 0.066  |
|                      | (0.051)    | (0.049)    | (0.048)   | (0.056)   | (0.054)   | (0.054)   | (0.052) | (0.056) |
| Treatment × Disengaged | -0.027  | -0.141**   | -0.077    | -0.117    | -0.066    | -0.078    | 0.023  | -0.084 |
|                      | (0.071)    | (0.069)    | (0.071)   | (0.079)   | (0.077)   | (0.074)   | (0.073) | (0.078) |
| Constant             | 0.023      | 0.023      | 0.023     | 0.023     | 0.023     | 0.023     | 0.023  | 0.023  |
|                      | (0.025)    | (0.024)    | (0.024)   | (0.028)   | (0.027)   | (0.027)   | (0.026) | (0.028) |

| Observations         | 454        | 463        | 454       | 463       | 443       | 457       | 457    | 463    |
| Adjusted R²          | -0.001     | 0.021      | -0.00004  | -0.001    | -0.0003   | -0.003    | 0.004  | -0.002 |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
| Table A15. Treatment effect conditional on respondents’ EU knowledge |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| **+Political**     | **-Political** | **+Cultural** | **-Cultural** | **+Economic** | **-Economic** | **+Peace** | **-Peace** |
| Treatment          | 0.067         | 0.013         | 0.013         | 0.057         | 0.028         | 0.013      | -0.020     | 0.051      |
| (0.052)            |              |              |              |              |              |            |            |            |
| Not EU Knowledgeable | 0.064        | 0.064        | 0.064        | 0.064        | 0.064        | 0.064      | 0.064      | 0.064      |
| (0.045)            |              |              |              |              |              |            |            |            |
| Treatment × Not EU Knowledgeable | -0.111*      | -0.124**     | -0.045       | -0.083       | -0.072       | 0.005      | 0.015      | -0.090     |
| (0.063)            |              |              |              |              |              |            |            |            |
| Constant           | -0.013       | -0.013       | -0.013       | -0.013       | -0.013       | -0.013     | -0.013     | -0.013     |
| (0.037)            |              |              |              |              |              |            |            |            |
| Observations       | 472          | 478          | 472          | 469          | 463          | 473        | 469        | 482        |
| Adjusted R²        | 0.001        | 0.015        | -0.0004      | -0.003       | -0.002       | 0.003      | 0.003      | -0.002     |

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

| Table A16. Treatment effect conditional on respondents’ EU attitude |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| **+Political**     | **-Political** | **+Cultural** | **-Cultural** | **+Economic** | **-Economic** | **+Peace** | **-Peace** |
| Treatment          | -0.066        | -0.198***    | -0.039       | -0.040       | -0.035       | -0.125*    | -0.061     | -0.126*    |
| (0.055)            |              |              |              |              |              | (0.063)    | (0.063)    | (0.065)    |
| Pro EU Attitude    | -0.160***     | -0.160***    | -0.160***    | -0.160***    | -0.160***    | -0.160***  | -0.160***  | -0.160***  |
| (0.045)            |              |              |              |              |              | (0.053)    | (0.052)    | (0.054)    |
| Treatment × Pro EU Attitude | 0.080        | 0.207***     | 0.035        | 0.061        | 0.034        | 0.172**    | 0.082      | 0.121      |
| (0.063)            |              |              |              |              |              | (0.071)    | (0.074)    | (0.073)    | (0.075)    |
| Constant           | 0.146***      | 0.146***     | 0.146***     | 0.146***     | 0.146***     | 0.146***   | 0.146***   | 0.146***   |
| (0.039)            |              |              |              |              |              | (0.046)    | (0.045)    | (0.045)    | (0.046)    |
| Observations       | 381          | 401          | 391          | 394          | 375          | 389        | 388        | 391        |
| Adjusted R²        | 0.033        | 0.032        | 0.042        | 0.026        | 0.032        | 0.016      | 0.023      | 0.019      |

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table A17. Treatment effect conditional on Eurosceptic party support

|                  | +Political | -Political | +Cultural | -Cultural | +Economic | -Economic | +Peace | -Peace |
|------------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|--------|
| Treatment        | -0.009     | -0.070**   | -0.026    | 0.019     | -0.036    | 0.017     | -0.016 | -0.021 |
|                  | (0.032)    | (0.031)    | (0.030)   | (0.035)   | (0.033)   | (0.034)   | (0.033) | (0.037) |
| Eurosceptic Party Supporter | -0.008 | -0.008 | -0.008 | -0.008 | -0.008 | -0.008 | -0.008 | -0.008 |
|                  | (0.058)    | (0.057)    | (0.055)   | (0.063)   | (0.062)   | (0.062)   | (0.060) | (0.067) |
| Treatment × Eurosceptic Party Supporter | -0.040 | -0.033 | 0.044 | -0.066 | 0.037 | -0.011 | 0.105 | 0.017 |
|                  | (0.077)    | (0.078)    | (0.075)   | (0.082)   | (0.089)   | (0.092)   | (0.085) | (0.091) |
| Constant         | 0.036      | 0.036      | 0.036*    | 0.036     | 0.036     | 0.036     | 0.036  | 0.036  |
|                  | (0.023)    | (0.022)    | (0.021)   | (0.025)   | (0.024)   | (0.024)   | (0.023) | (0.026) |
| Observations     | 462        | 473        | 469       | 465       | 446       | 465       | 466    | 469    |
| Adjusted R²      | -0.004     | 0.010      | -0.004    | -0.002    | -0.004    | -0.006    | -0.001 | -0.006 |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
6 Robustness Checks

In the main analysis, we use a difference-in-differences analysis and an OLS regression model and because this model facilitates the interpretation of the results. First, we take the difference in support between the two waves, so that only the second difference is done in the statistics. Second, we use a linear regression for which the marginal effects are easily calculated based on the coefficients, but strictly speaking, the dependent variable is an ordered discrete variable and not a continuous variable. In this section of the Appendix we show the models that we would have obtained if we had made different choices, namely if we had done both levels of differences in the statistical model (see Table A19), or used an ordered logit model that specifically assumes the dependent variable is discrete (see Table A18). In both models, we focus on the effect of the negative political treatment (\(-\text{Political}\)) and show that our main conclusions would also have been obtained with these specifications.

6.1 Ordered Logistic Regression

In ordered logistic regression models, the sign and significance of the coefficients have the same interpretation as in the linear models underlying Figure 4 in the main text (see also Table A12 in the Appendix), however the size of the coefficient is more difficult to interpret. Since we are primarily interested in whether or not a difference can be found, the sign and significance are the most important. Table A18 shows the results of regressions with the same variables as in Table A12, but now in an ordered logit specification. As before we find a relatively clear and significant effect, in the expected direction, of the negative political treatment and not of the other treatments.
Table A18. Difference-in-differences *ordered logistic regression* analysis of changes between the waves in intention to vote ‘Remain’, ‘Leave’ or in not knowing how to vote (replicates models from Table A12)

| Dependent variable: | ΔRemain | ΔLeave | ΔDK | ΔRemain | ΔLeave | ΔDK |
|---------------------|---------|--------|-----|---------|--------|-----|
|                     | (1)     | (2)    | (3) | (4)     | (5)    | (6) |
| +Political          | −0.170  | 0.120  | 0.150 | −0.180  | −0.021 | 0.440 |
|                     | (0.290) | (0.340) | (0.380) | (0.340) | (0.390) | (0.510) |
| −Political          | −0.780*** | 0.760** | 0.430 | −0.970*** | 0.820** | 0.820 |
|                     | (0.290) | (0.340) | (0.380) | (0.340) | (0.390) | (0.510) |
| +Cultural           | −0.250  | 0.068  | 0.360 | −0.290  | −0.017 | 0.700 |
|                     | (0.290) | (0.340) | (0.380) | (0.340) | (0.390) | (0.500) |
| −Cultural           | −0.120  | 0.120  | 0.079 | −0.006  | 0.075  | −0.098 |
|                     | (0.290) | (0.340) | (0.380) | (0.330) | (0.390) | (0.470) |
| +Economic           | −0.280  | 0.053  | 0.450 | −0.480  | 0.260  | 0.640 |
|                     | (0.290) | (0.340) | (0.390) | (0.350) | (0.400) | (0.510) |
| −Economic           | 0.063   | 0.180  | −0.320 | 0.087  | −0.110 | −0.007 |
|                     | (0.280) | (0.340) | (0.370) | (0.330) | (0.390) | (0.480) |
| +Peace              | −0.051  | 0.120  | −0.057 | −0.360  | 0.210  | 0.440 |
|                     | (0.290) | (0.340) | (0.380) | (0.340) | (0.400) | (0.510) |
| −Peace              | −0.210  | 0.015  | 0.360 | −0.350  | 0.060  | 0.690 |
|                     | (0.290) | (0.340) | (0.380) | (0.340) | (0.390) | (0.500) |
| Female              | −0.080  | 0.180  | −0.120 | (0.160) | (0.190) | (0.240) |
|                     | (0.200) | (0.230) | (0.300) | (0.200) | (0.230) | (0.300) |
| East Germany        | 0.180   | −0.200 | −0.089 | (0.170) | (0.200) | (0.260) |
| (up to 10 years)    | (0.350) | (0.400) | (0.520) | (0.350) | (0.400) | (0.530) |
| 18-26 years old     | 0.460   | −0.100 | −0.820 | (0.310) | (0.350) | (0.470) |
|                     | (0.350) | (0.400) | (0.530) | (0.350) | (0.400) | (0.530) |
| 27-46 years old     | 0.290   | −0.220 | −0.290 | (0.310) | (0.350) | (0.470) |
|                     | (0.350) | (0.400) | (0.530) | (0.350) | (0.400) | (0.530) |
| 47-66 years old     | 0.620** | −0.760** | −0.140 | (0.310) | (0.350) | (0.470) |
|                     | (0.340) | (0.390) | (0.520) | (0.340) | (0.390) | (0.520) |
| 67+ years old       | 0.470   | −0.430 | −0.360 | (0.310) | (0.350) | (0.470) |
|                     | (0.340) | (0.390) | (0.520) | (0.340) | (0.390) | (0.520) |
| Pro EU              | −0.360*** | 0.260** | 0.350** | −0.360  | 0.360  | 0.360 |
|                     | (0.290) | (0.290) | (0.330) | (0.290) | (0.290) | (0.330) |
| Eurosceptic party supporter | −0.090** | 0.088* | 0.052 | (0.043) | (0.049) | (0.063) |
| Left-right self placement | −0.090** | 0.088* | 0.052 | (0.043) | (0.049) | (0.063) |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
6.2 Regressions with both Waves

Table A19 shows the results of an alternative difference-in-differences specification. Here, we directly use respondents’ answers to the hypothetical referendum item in both waves as the dependent variable. That is each respondent appears twice in the dataset. We then distinguish between answers from different waves using a dummy variable (wave 2), and interact it with the different treatment groups. These interactions support our expectations if they are statistically and substantively significant in the expected way. A quick inspection of the interaction between the negative political treatment and the wave 2 dummy indicates that the conclusions we draw in the main text are also supported by this model specification. Only in the linear model without additional controls, we cannot fully replicate the effect.
Table A19. Treatment effects in an alternative difference-in-differences specification

|                        | OLS    | ordered logistic |       |
|------------------------|--------|-----------------|-------|
|                        | (1)    | (2)             | (3)   | (4)   |
| +Political             | 0.027  | 0.026           | 0.089 | 0.160 |
|                        | (0.060)| (0.052)         | (0.240)| (0.340)|
| -Political             | 0.080  | 0.094*          | 0.290 | 0.800**|
|                        | (0.060)| (0.052)         | (0.240)| (0.380)|
| +Cultural              | 0.061  | 0.045           | 0.240 | 0.490 |
|                        | (0.060)| (0.052)         | (0.240)| (0.360)|
| -Cultural              | −0.070 | −0.035          | −0.260| −0.096|
|                        | (0.060)| (0.052)         | (0.220)| (0.330)|
| +Economic              | −0.023 | −0.016          | −0.089| −0.004|
|                        | (0.061)| (0.053)         | (0.230)| (0.340)|
| -Economic              | 0.043  | −0.001          | 0.060 | 0.008 |
|                        | (0.060)| (0.052)         | (0.230)| (0.340)|
| +Peace                 | 0.087  | 0.064           | 0.330 | 0.490 |
|                        | (0.060)| (0.052)         | (0.250)| (0.370)|
| -Peace                 | −0.011 | −0.027          | −0.025| −0.033|
|                        | (0.060)| (0.052)         | (0.230)| (0.340)|
| Wave 2                 | 0.058  | 0.056           | 0.270 | 0.450 |
|                        | (0.061)| (0.052)         | (0.250)| (0.360)|
| +Political × Wave 2    | −0.026 | −0.020          | −0.120| −0.170|
|                        | (0.085)| (0.074)         | (0.350)| (0.510)|
| -Political × Wave 2    | −0.140 | −0.150**         | −0.580*| −1.200**|
|                        | (0.085)| (0.074)         | (0.340)| (0.530)|
| +Cultural × Wave 2     | −0.030 | −0.031          | −0.160| −0.330|
|                        | (0.085)| (0.073)         | (0.360)| (0.520)|
| -Cultural × Wave 2     | −0.022 | 0.004           | −0.130| −0.025|
|                        | (0.085)| (0.073)         | (0.330)| (0.480)|
| +Economic × Wave 2     | −0.033 | −0.056          | −0.200| −0.430|
|                        | (0.086)| (0.074)         | (0.340)| (0.500)|
| -Economic × Wave 2     | −0.006 | 0.010           | 0.037 | 0.053 |
|                        | (0.085)| (0.073)         | (0.350)| (0.500)|
| +Peace × Wave 2        | −0.014 | −0.051          | 0.018 | −0.300|
|                        | (0.085)| (0.074)         | (0.370)| (0.540)|
| -Peace × Wave 2        | −0.023 | −0.041          | −0.150| −0.360|
|                        | (0.085)| (0.073)         | (0.340)| (0.500)|
| Female                 | 0.017  |                | −0.170|       |
|                        | (0.018)|                | (0.120)|       |
| East Germany           | −0.100***|              | −0.590***|       |
|                        | (0.022)|                | (0.140)|       |
| Schooling              | −0.041**|              | −0.340***|       |
| (up to 10 years)       | (0.019)|                | (0.130)|       |
| 18-26 years old        | −0.011 |                | −0.250|       |
|                        | (0.038)|                | (0.280)|       |
| 27-46 years old        | −0.016 |                | −0.290|       |
|                        | (0.038)|                | (0.270)|       |
| 47-66 years old        | 0.054  |                | 0.230 |       |
|                        | (0.033)|                | (0.250)|       |
| 67+ years old          | 0.130***|              | 0.950***|       |
|                        | (0.037)|                | (0.300)|       |
| Pro EU                 | 0.300***|              | 1.500***|       |
|                        | (0.010)|                | (0.069)|       |
| Eurosceptic party supporter| −0.280***|        | −1.000***|       |
| Left-right self placement| −0.040***|        | −0.200***|       |
| Constant               | 0.680***|              | −0.087|       |
|                        | (0.043)|                | (0.069)|       |
| Observations           | 4,428  | 3,524           | 4,428 | 3,524 |
| R²                     | 0.006  | 0.360           | 0.002 | 0.360 |
| Adjusted R²            |        |                 |       |       |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01