by Heinroth and Jacobi respectively), though it clearly generated significant contemporary dispute, disguises an essential unity of philosophical motive. A long chapter on Griesinger then illustrates the transition to a biomedical motive. Griesinger's method (inspired by physiological medicine) is carefully separated from his implicit ontology, a separation which distanced Griesinger (like Helmholtz or Du Bois-Reymond) from vulgar materialist mechanism. Verwey's patient drawing of distinctions, and above all his rigorous concern with the historical philosophical context, make his discussion continuously enlightening. And, since a contrast between anthropological and biomedical orientations remains of fundamental significance in both psychiatry and its historiography (notably, in contrasted accounts of Freud), these distinctions have wide relevance.

From the point of view of medical history, one might wish that there was more attention to the range of positions, rather than the few central figures, and to Griesinger's contemporaries and later physicalists. Instead, Verwey is more concerned with the pattern of philosophical assumptions, particularly those related to Kant and Schopenhauer, and this leads to a long discussion of the background of neo-Kantianism and anti-mechanism, giving a lop-sided weighting to the main theme (though certainly of interest in its own right). But I found some of the specific commentaries on general psychology—on Kant's ambiguity about the possibility of a "science" of psychology, or on Herbart's ontological psychology, for example—enormously helpful. For the reader interested in conceptions of what psychology might be, or in what historically has been thought to be rationally required to make psychology possible, this book is an invaluable resource. For the philosophical issues covered, it is an accurate and sensitive historical guide.

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JEFFREY MOUSSAIEFF MASSON (editor), The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887–1904, Cambridge Mass., and London, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985, 8vo, pp. xv, 505, illus., £19.95.

Publication of these letters, letters which "stand as one of the high points of intellectual achievement and insight of our time", has attracted considerable comment. The double story of how the letters came into the hands of Freud's close associate, Marie Bonaparte, and how she saved them from destruction by both the Nazis and Freud himself, and then how Masson acquired the contract to publish them, only to have the most melodramatic conflict with the Freud Archive, adds a truly exotic dimension. Few readers, then, are likely to be unaware of the letters' significance.

The publication (in German 1950, in English 1954) of selected and edited letters from Freud to Fliess, along with the previously generally unknown "Project for a scientific psychology" (drafted 1895), provided quite exceptionally rich sources for what has become an academic industry on "the origins" of psychoanalysis. It was always clear that the editors of this edition, who included Anna Freud as well as Marie Bonaparte, tried to separate the public "scientific" and the private "personal" dimensions in the correspondence. They were intimate with Freud's own fears about the public representation of psychoanalysis, a representation which had always a prominent historical dimension. But the public/private distinction is just what is always problematic to anyone reconstructing patterns of meaning — whether as a historian or as a psychoanalyst. Hence a complete edition of the letters (which has appeared simultaneously in German) is obviously of great value. It is also necessary to historians, since the original materials remain closed to access well into the next century.

How Masson gained access to these materials has been documented, with all its passion and conflict, by Janet Malcolm, first in the New Yorker, and then in In the Freud archives (1984). Using the skills and commitment of a team of translators and assistants, Masson has established what seems to be generally accepted as an accurate transcription of the letters and an accurate translation. The correspondence is one-sided, since Freud appears to have destroyed Fliess's letters to himself. There are 284 letters over the period of the
correspondence, including 133 previously unpublished (though not all those previously published appeared in full). In this setting of an intense emotional attachment, Freud had the confidence to let his thoughts go, to allow prejudice, intuition, and imagination, as well as evidence and argument, to construct theory from his patients, current psychopathology, and—perhaps especially—his own emotional life. Since these letters cover the great moments of psychoanalysis’s self-creation, they are indeed almost without rival as a record of intellectual creativity. There is also humour, some intended and some not, and many intimate touches about family life.

In his introduction, Masson states he has “avoided the temptation to speculate or to interpret” in his annotations. Whether he has indeed done this, particularly in the light of his very strongly held view about Freud’s lack of intellectual integrity over the seduction theory of the origin of neuroses (argued in The assault on truth: Freud’s suppression of the seduction theory, 1984), has been seriously questioned by Sander Gilman (‘Dubious relations’, London Review of Books, 7: no. 11, 20 June 1985). I think it is still unclear whether the publication of all of Freud’s letters will substantially alter our understanding of the origins of psychoanalysis.

There is already considerable disagreement about how to read what was published earlier. To interpret letters, where expression is complicated by all the idiosyncracies of personality, mood, pressures of time, sub-texts of intention or emotion, and sheer play, is an extraordinarily difficult matter. Freud and Fliess also drew upon a great range of medical and psychological literature, not to mention their experiences with patients in cultural settings quite remote from our own. Being fascinated and stimulated by the letters is one thing; using them to reconstruct a single, persuasive account of some “real” way in which psychoanalysis was created is another. Certainly, the letters do not speak for themselves, and any annotation beyond the formal identification of factual references must be considered interpretative.

The letters should finally confirm that Fliess was much more than just a convenient recipient for the more brilliant Freud’s overflowing intellectual and medical ambitions. Freud needed Fliess emotionally; but, in ways that are difficult for us to recapture (not only because of Fliess’s missing letters, but also because we are unwilling to accept how far Freud was a man of his time and place), he needed him intellectually.

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MARTIN S. PERNICK, A calculus of suffering. Pain, professionalism and anesthesia in nineteenth-century America, New York, Columbia University Press, 1985, 8vo, pp. xv, 421, illus., $45.50.

This mild-mannered book takes on the iconoclastic task of placing the introduction of anaesthesia, the “triumph over pain”, within the social and professional context of mid-nineteenth-century American medicine. In the process, anaesthesia is displaced from its once heroic role as a leading indicator of medical progress to become one more mediator of intraprofessional conflict and professional authority. Pernick uses the debate over anaesthesia for a careful exploration of value conflicts within a divided medical profession. While heroic practitioners and naturalistic healers both, if for different reasons, tended to avoid anaesthesia, conservative physicians developed a new utilitarian ethic, a balancing of the costs (the dangers of anaesthetics) and the benefits (the relief of pain) in each individual case. Pernick presents the conservative synthesis—the “calculus of suffering”—as a compromise position that permitted the judicious use of anaesthetics while preserving and enhancing the professional status of the surgeons.

Pernick’s argument is an endorsement of moderation in both medical behaviour and historical interpretation. If anything, he seems overly generous to the surgeons by arguing that their actions were a result of a more or less rational calculus: to this reviewer, they seemed rather to be “muddling through” on the basis of a mix of personal experiences, social prejudices, and professional interests. In the process, however, they collectively produced a social hierarchy of sensitivity to pain: manly men seldom needed anaesthesia, sensitive (white)