Retraction

Retraction: Social and Islamic diffusion in the Nordic countries with the example of Sweden by year 2050 (IOP Conf. Ser.: Earth Environ. Sci. 302 012071)

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IOP Publishing Limited (“IOPP”) is retracting this paper following an investigation which resulted from a reader complaint. The paper makes a number of unsubstantiated claims and, in the opinion of IOPP, lacks scientific rigour, clarity and objectivity. Although the paper was subject to peer review via the conference organisers, unfortunately these issues were not identified on this occasion. IOPP also has concerns regarding the discriminatory tone and sentiment of the paper, which are not appropriate in a scientific journal.

IOPP expresses its thanks to the readers and independent advisors who have shared their thoughts regarding this paper during the course of the investigation.

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Social and Islamic diffusion in the Nordic countries with the example of Sweden by year 2050

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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to study the Muslim migration flow on the territory of Northern Europe in the last quarter of XX – first half of XXI centuries, the analysis of pattern and genesis of a new geopolitical reality in the region on the example of Sweden, as applied to its state by year 2050. In the process of writing the paper, the authors relied on advanced achievements of scientific thought, described in geographers' fundamental research (the study was based on the theory of innovations’ diffusion by a Swedish geographer T. Hagerstrand), in sociologists' works (theory of innovations’ diffusion by G. Tarde and E. Rogers), historians, anthropologists, economists and philosophers’ research. It is the example of Sweden which fully illustrates the paradox of the whole situation and, at the same time, allows to make the main conclusion on the basis of the study conducted in this paper. Thus, in 1975, the Muslim population of the Kingdom was 0.25%; in 2017, according to official data, every tenth citizen is Muslim. Currently, in 2019, Sweden only has a Muslim population exceeding five populations of Iceland. If the same trend continues (without repetition of the European migration crisis of 2015), by 2025-2027 every fifth, and by 2035-2040 every fourth citizen will be Muslim (Fig. 1-9 illustrate this idea). We have studied, analyzed and presented all stages of migration processes development in Sweden from 1995 to 2020 on the generalized cartographic material and predicted it for the period from 2020 to 2050, respectively. By 2020, the Muslim population of Sweden will be more than 20%. This migration diffusion will affect, first of all, 13 of the 25 largest municipalities, where the ethnic, autochthonous Swedish population will appear the minority. And in just a few years, the same situation will happen in the remaining three largest municipalities: Westeros, Ourebro and Norrköping. 70% of Stockholm's residents and every second resident of southern Sweden will be Muslims. By 2050, it is possible to split the Muslim part of Sweden, up to the administrative and territorial change of interstate borders, especially between Sweden and Denmark, where a Muslim agglomeration has already been formed between Copenhagen and Malmö.

1. Introduction

With all the ephemeral "unity" of Muslims in the world, there is no uniformity among them. In addition to the division into currents and sects, there is a division into four main madhhabs, whose representatives are not evenly represented in the Nordic European countries, which has already begun to generate quite big problems within local Muslim communities, including in the Nordic countries with a small Muslim population (for example in Iceland).
In addition, Muslims’ cultural, everyday and political views on such important, fundamental social pillars as the role of women and their image, the role of Islam in the society, the place of the Muslim community in the space of the municipality, city, country are very strong and diverse, among themselves and among the Muslims that have already been living, that have integrated and assimilated into the European society. Thus the separation is taking place in levels but the problem itself has both horizontal and vertical fault lines. West and South-East Asia, North Africa and Central and South Asia are predominantly Muslim. Only for the period from 2015 to 2017, the Muslim population of Sweden, in comparison with the 2009-2011 period, increased according to official data by 2, according to non-official — by 4 times and now accounts for at least 17% of the total population of the country. The entire Muslim population of the Nordic countries increased 7-fold over the same period. The available statistical data suggest that the Muslim part of the population of Europe becomes the second largest religious community after the Christian (Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox); and Islam, respectively, has become the second largest practicing religion, both in Sweden and throughout the Arctic region.

2. Analytics
The essence of the problem in France more and more begins to resemble the Swedish story. Every 5th citizen of the 5th Republic is a Muslim, and every third of them votes for Sharia in France. If we discard the absolutely unnecessary allusions of the paper authors about the relatively happy historical prospects of cohabitation of the French and Muslims in Algeria and this experience’s transfer onto the territory of France itself, these figures are very serious. Past experience of checks and contradictions will not work in the present. Not understanding this while realizing the full gravity of the possible consequences is not a mistake, but in fact a crime. Secular projects, at least in the Arab world, have shown their incapacity and have either collapsed or are close to collapse. The balance is destroyed in the Muslim world countries themselves: it is now torn apart by the ideas that compete among themselves only in the degrees of their radicalism.

To date, the control of Muslim youth and hence the entire Muslim community in any of the European countries both by the state and by the local sheikhs, or in a broader sense – by the older generation is if not lost, then is largely ephemeral. We must also be aware of the fact that to this day almost all of them are a black box, and any riots in European cities (mainly, Western Europe) can be reborn into full-fledged hostilities in any moment, and most often the most unexpected moment for the opposite side.

The dynamics of the Muslim population growth in Sweden will be presented below with the example of cartographic material. This is the share and concentration of immigrants (mainly from the Islamic world) in Sweden, in dynamics (1995-2050):
Figure 1. Share and concentration of immigrants (mainly from the Islamic world) in Sweden in 1995

Figure 2. Share and concentration of immigrants (mainly from the Islamic world) in Sweden in 2000

Figure 3. Share and concentration of immigrants (mainly from the Islamic world) in Sweden in 2010

Figure 4. Share and concentration of immigrants (mainly from the Islamic world) in Sweden by 2020
Figure 5. Share and concentration of immigrants (mainly from the Islamic world) in Sweden by 2030.

Figure 6. Share and concentration of immigrants (mainly from the Islamic world) in Sweden by 2040.

Figure 7. Share and concentration of immigrants (mainly from the Islamic world) in Sweden by 2050.

Share and concentration of immigrants from the Islamic world in Sweden, in the dynamics (2000-2015) before the European migration crisis:
In 1995-1997, for the first time, a problem was fixed, which by 2017 got the status of actually unsolvable: municipalities with a predominantly Muslim population, a share of 45-51%, appear on the territory of Sweden. The first of them was Södertälje, a district in Stockholm. The Muslim population of Sweden is no more than 5%. However, a trend toward ghettoization of the territory is already taking shape. This is especially evident in the major cities of the country (Stockholm, Gothenburg and Uppsala).

In 2000, the Muslim population of Sweden is more than 5%. The first tendencies and features to its settlement are made out:
• These are major cities in southern Sweden;
• These are areas already predominantly "settled" by Muslim communities;
• Close to the border communities;
This period is characterized by the fact that the Muslim population begins to visually transform their habitats;
- Malmö city with 41.6% of the Muslim population, becomes the first city in the EU located on the European continent with a predominantly Muslim population.

In 2020, the Muslim population of Sweden is more than 20%. During the European migration crisis of 2015, Northern Europe became one of the most attractive regions of Europe and the world for refugees. According to the official statistics of Sweden, only in 2016 it officially registered and issued 162,877 residence permits on its territory, 4/5 of which are in the above-mentioned regions with predominantly for Muslim population. Only for the period from 2015 to 2017, the Muslim population of Sweden, in comparison with 2009-2011 period, increased by 2 times, according to official data.

By 2030 the Muslim population of Sweden can make 25%. According to this indicator, Sweden will be equal to France. Every 3rd resident of Stockholm, and every 4th inhabitant of the South of Sweden is Muslim. The development and settlement of the Central and Northern territories of Sweden will begin due to the objective concentration. By 2030, the Muslim population will exceed 75% in some areas of Stockholm and 90% in Malmö city. Most Muslims in Northern Europe will be concentrated in Swedish agglomerations: in Stockholm and Uppsala — 50%, Gothenburg — from 10% to 15% and in Malmö 5-7%.

By 2040 the Muslim population of Sweden is 30-35%. According to this indicator, Sweden is the EU leader. Every 2nd resident of Stockholm and every 3rd resident of southern Sweden is Muslim. The Swedes will probably relocate from the territories of southern Sweden to the Central and Northern part of Sweden, so that the Muslim population concentration will not be so noticeable in these regions of Sweden.

By 2040 Sweden may be divided into a Muslim and a Christian part. The same fate can be expected in Stockholm city, which by that time will have a special status, and Sweden will be a kind of "Northern Belgium". The majority of Muslims in Northern Europe will be concentrated in the Swedish Metropolitan areas, however, the Øresund bridge connecting the Danish capital Copenhagen and the Swedish city of Malmö, in the absence of boundaries, creates a single region.

By 2050 the Muslim population of Sweden is over 50%. According to this indicator, Sweden is the EU leader. The Swedes will be in the minority in 13 of the 25 largest municipalities. And in just a few years, the same situation will be in the municipalities of Westeros, Orebro and Norköping. 70% of Stockholm residents and every 2nd resident of southern Sweden is Muslim. By 2050 it is possible to split the Muslim part of Sweden into parts. It may even come to the administrative-territorial change of interstate borders, first of all, between Sweden and Denmark. Most Muslims in Northern Europe will be concentrated in Swedish-Danish megalopolises. By 2050 the total population of modern Sweden will increase to 18-20 million people. Malmö, Helsingborg, Lund, Gothenburg and partly Stockholm will be fully Islamic cities.

3. Conclusion
Simulation scenario for solving the problems of migrants is the most popular model today as a concept of integration policy in all five major European economies of the EU: Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy and Spain. By the way, in three of the above-mentioned countries, the same scenario applies to the parliamentary policy, in which representatives of some populist parties, forces and movements, touching upon the topic of migrants, turn in a hidden or veiled form of their not so distant fascist past. The imitativeness of the activities carried out in these states can be characterized, first of all, by the situation that has developed with the issue of integration and adaptation of migrants in the above-mentioned states, when huge funds aimed at various kinds of programs for the migrants’ assimilation (primarily cultural and social) are not justified by the results, due to the formalization of the approach, as well as due to the corruption component of the models themselves.
Its main goal is to use material means for the relief of cost arising from this scenario implementation, both in spiritual, social and geographical space instead of a comprehensive solution to the problems and tasks of migrants’ adaptation and integration. Northern Europe States aren’t exceptions to this. The general economic, political and social situation in Northern Europe by 2025 will be made up of a mosaic of contradictions and prospects “into the unknown” [1]. This is primarily due to such urgent problems of the present time as the growth of uncontrolled migration and a response to this growth - populist, right-wing and extremist parties and movements being really popular in the Northern Europe (see Fig. 10). In general, all of the above tells us that the "golden time" of post-war Northern Europe is coming to an end.

Between 20 % and 40 % of young people under the age of 25 have neither education nor permanent employment. However, even it can be now considered a relatively prosperous quarter in comparison with Stockholm Rinkebyu nicknamed a "little Mogadishu".

First of all, due to the fact that the proportion of people with African roots (mainly, of Somali community) varies at the level of 31.5%, while the share of the migrant population without education or permanent work in it is close to the indecent 97%. This area has already generated its own language, sociolect or ethnolect, which is widespread both in Rinkebyu and beyond it, and it even got its name "RinkebuSwiss". In Denmark, Nørrebro is one of the 10 city districts of Copenhagen. As of 1 January 2013, 26.7% of its residents had the nationality of Denmark and 19% had EU citizenship, and in one of its blocks, in Mjølnerparken, the proportion of migrants is 98%. Another neighborhood - Tingbjerg, located 6 km north-west of Copenhagen center, is the home for more than 65%. In Norway, the analogue of the Swedish Rinkebyu is Groenlann - the area in the center of Oslo, part of the city administrative unit of Gamle Oslo. It is located to the east of the central part of the Norwegian capital, a five-to-seven-minute walk from Oslo Central Station. 40% of its population is of immigrant origin, mainly from Pakistan and Somalia. For the same reason, it is considered one of the most dysfunctional and criminal in Norway.

With such indicators in percentage and proportional ratios, it is difficult to imagine what these and neighboring areas will become by 2025-2035. By 2025-2030, the primary map-projection of Muslim settlement in Northern Europe should be finally formed. This map should record the settlement of Muslims in Northern Europe for the next 50-70 years, in fact – until the end of the XXI century. By the same period, plans for the implementation of the most ambitious projects related to the construction of Islamic infrastructure in the states of the region should be completed and implemented in material form. One of such projects is, for example, the expansion of the Great mosque in Swedish Malmö, which is today the largest mosque in Scandinavia: from 2 thousand believers to 5-7 thousand, the construction of the Great mosque complex in Helsinki for 10-15 thousand and of the same complex in Reykjavik, equal in its equipment, but a little more modest in scale (1.5 – 2 thousand people (with a reserve)).

Table 1. The number of Christians in the countries of Northern Europe in 2006 and January 1, 2019 (in %). It is made by the author on the basis of statistical estimates’ processing

| Country                | Number of Christians as of 1 January 2017 | Number of Christians in 2006 |
|------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
|                        | Lutherans | Catholics | Other Christian beliefs |                           |
| Kingdom of Denmark     | 75,3% [2] | 1,0%      | -                       | 82,6%                      |
| Republic of Finland    | 69,7% [3] | 0,2%      | 2,5%                    | 84,2%                      |
| Republic of Iceland    | 67,1% [4] | 2,5%      | 11,3%                   | 76%                        |
| Kingdom of Norway      | 70,6 /53% [5] | 1,6% | 9,0-10,0% | 82,7%                      |
| Kingdom of Sweden      | 62 [6] / 41,0% | 2,0% | 9,0-10,0% | 84%                        |
Table 2. The number of Muslims in the Nordic countries in 1975, 1995, 2006, January 1, 2018 (in %). Comp. by the author on the basis of national statistical offices data processing

| Country            | Number of Muslims in the Nordic countries | 1975 | 1995 | 2006 | 2018 |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Kingdom of Denmark |                                          | 0,6% | 2,1% | 4,2% | 5,5% |
| Republic of Finland|                                          | 0,001% | 0,2% | 4%   | 5,5-7,7% |
| Republic of Iceland|                                          | -    | -    | 0,01% | 0,33-0,67% |
| Kingdom of Norway  |                                          | 0,001% | 1,3-1,5% | 3% | 9% / 25,2% |
| Kingdom of Sweden  |                                          | 0,25% | 2,3% | 5%   | 14,5 – 19,5% |

1 The Danish authorities do not register the religious affiliation of people other than members of the National Church (the Church of the Danish People). While local researchers take into account only members of the registered communities. 2 25,5% of all Norwegian active believers [8].

Table 3. Religions in the Nordic countries as of November 1, 2018 (in %) according to official statistics. Comp. by the author on the basis of national statistical offices data processing

| Country            | Christianity | Islam | Buddhism | Judaism | Atheists or agnostics |
|--------------------|--------------|-------|----------|---------|-----------------------|
|                    | Lutheranism  | Catholicism / Orthodoxy | Other Christian beliefs |         |                       |
| Kingdom of Denmark | 73,5         | 1,3   | 5,5-7,3  |  -      | 19,7                  |
| Republic of Finland| 70,9         | 0,2 / 1,1 | 1,2      | 5,5-6,5 |  -                   |
| Republic of Iceland| 67,2         | 3,8   | 0,33-0,67 | 0,3     | 0,1                  |
| Kingdom of Norway  | 72,9         | 2,5-5 | 9        | 3,1     | 1,01                 |
| Kingdom of Sweden  | 58           | 2     | 9,0-10,0 | 14,5-17 | 1                    |

1 Phil Zuckerman, associate professor of sociology at Pitzer College, writes that in recent years several scientific, academic sources have placed the data proving that the percentage of atheists in Sweden is divided between 46 and 85%, although officially, only 17% of respondents identified themselves as "atheists" [9]. Something similar, as a trend, adjusted for the figures, differing in percentage, can be clearly seen in Iceland [4] and Norway [10].

Table 4. The share of Muslims in the Nordic countries from 1975 to 2050 in % of the total population. Comp. by the author on the basis of national statistical offices’ data processing

| Country            | Number of Muslims in the Nordic countries |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------|
|                    | 1975 | 1995 | 2006 | 2016 | 2050 |
| Kingdom of Denmark | 0,6% | 2,1% | 4,2% | 5% / 9,4 - 11,2% | 18 - 25% |
| Republic of Finland| 0,001% | 0,2% | 1% | 3,5 - 4,7% | 7 - 9% |
| Republic of Iceland| - | - | 0,01% | 0,33 - 0,67% | 1 – 1,5% |
| Kingdom of Norway  | 0,001% | 1,3-1,5% | 3% | 5,7 - 7,3% | 13-15% |
| Kingdom of Sweden  | 0,25% | 2,3% | 5% | 10,7 - 14,5% | 23 - 27% |
By 2025-2030, we should expect significant amendments to the Constitution and other significant legal documents relating to Islam and Muslims in the territory of the Northern European States. It is reasonable to expect disputes, problems and conflicts on this issue, including — on a clear delineation of boundaries and areas of their actions. It should not be surprising if entire territories, or even regions, refuse to participate and drop out of this process, for example, the most likely candidates for this are the Alands or the Faroe Islands, which already have significant autonomy. It is possible that others will join them. All this in one way or another should finally fix, formalize and form "new citizens" of the Northern European society, socialize and adapt them to a new cultural, political, social, climatic – in the most widely humanitarian and geographical reality. However, they will also formulate a new agenda and reality in the region, which will inevitably become a problem for migrants who have their roots, rhizome foundations including those in Islamic culture, based on sometimes formal, ritual, but still unshakable traditions. On the one Muslim hand, this will be the so-called "light versions" of traditional practices, but this will be also waqf property, Sharia courts, Halal trade and Islamic banking, etc. On the other hand, from the autochthonous population representatives’ point of view, it will mean pressure and adjustment of these traditions, framing them into a new framework, the forms of which will create a completely different image of a Muslim. These neighborhoods, centers, districts and even entire cities will form a new cross-cultural reality, which will be reflected in linguistics, art, culture, etc. And most importantly in people who will be not a mono-ethnic, homogeneous structure, but a multi-ethnic structure-organization.

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