Democracy Requires Organized Collective Power*

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Democratic institutions awaken and flatter the passion for equality without ever being able to satisfy it entirely.1 Alexis de Tocqueville

To turn from mechanisms and concepts to the social forces in play ... 2 Karl Polanyi

What is the value and function of democratic institutions? One prominent answer could be broadly called “liberal proceduralist”: democratic institutions, by embodying fair procedures for resolving disagreements, contribute to a politically valuable ideal of relating to each other as equals.3 As attractive as it is, this view falters, because it rests on a flawed understanding of democratic institutions. In

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1Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. George Lawrence (New York: Harper, 2006), p. 198.
2Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), p. 206.
3Representative defenses of this view include Elizabeth S. Anderson, “What is the point of equality?”, *Ethics*, 109 (1999), 287–337; Charles R. Beitz, *Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Harry Brighouse, “Egalitarianism and equal availability of political influence,” *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 4 (1996), 118–41; Allen Buchanan, “Political legitimacy and democracy,” *Ethics*, 112 (2002), 689–719; Thomas Christiano, *The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Christopher G. Griffin, “Democracy as a non-instrumentally just procedure,” *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 11 (2003), 111–21; Niko Kolodny, “Rule over none, I: what justifies democracy?”, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 42 (2014), 195–229; Niko Kolodny, “Rule over none, II: social equality and the justification of democracy,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 42 (2014), 287–336; Daniel Viehoff, “Democratic equality and political authority,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 42 (2014), 337–75; Jeremy Waldron, *Law and Disagreement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); James Lindley Wilson, *Democratic Equality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).

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place of the liberal proceduralist view of democratic institutions, I develop a
democratic power approach. The democratic power approach advances a dynamic
account of democratic institutions, one that focuses on how procedures and
outcomes, taken together as having effects on the organization of power in society,
sustain valuable relationships of equality. Like liberal proceduralism, the democratic
power approach affirms that the value of democratic institutions resides in how
they help sustain relationships of equality. However, according to the democratic
power approach, that equality cannot be realized primarily by the internal, formal
structure of democratic institutions or by ensuring equal effective power within a
decision-making procedure. Instead, the democratic power approach treats such
institutions as simultaneous formal procedures and substantive mechanisms for
organizing different actors, interests, and groups in society.

I contend that by appreciating the distinction between democratic institutions
seen as formal procedures versus substantive mechanisms, we can challenge
the binary that has dominated recent debates about the value of democratic
institutions—that is, the debate surrounding whether to emphasize democratic
institutions either as fair procedures or as producing reliable outcomes. This
either/or obscures the fact that democratic institutions instantiate (virtuous or
vicious) recursive feedback loops between formal rules and the broader balance
of social forces. Consequently, the binary between procedure and outcome fails
to capture what democratic actors should care about: the integrity of political
equality over time, an integrity that is, under realistic conditions, sustained only
by virtuous feedback loops between institutional procedures and the ongoing
organization of the generally disorganized majority of a society’s members.

From this perspective, an institutional order is democratic insofar as it satisfies
minimal criteria of inclusion and equal consideration while also organizing popular
constituencies such that its institutional order has endogenous tendencies towards
equalizing political power. Even granting, as the following does, that democratic
institutions are intrinsically valuable because of how they help realize the value
of political equality, the question remains of how those institutions realize the
value. Liberal proceduralists argue that democratic institutions realize the value
of equality through fair procedures. But this misapprehends the nature of such
institutions. Democratic institutions are both formal procedures and mechanisms
for organizing collective power. Further, while at times these two functions of
democratic institutions will align, in many cases achieving the organization of
collective power will require relaxing the principle of procedural fairness. Evaluating
the relationship between democratic institutions and political equality thus requires
intersecting normative and empirical analysis of the dynamic relationship between
the structure of procedures and the context in which those procedures operate.

To advance the democratic power view, I first identify why even those liberal
proceduralists concerned with substantive fairness nevertheless fail to adequately
address how such fairness is instantiated. I argue that the impoverished liberal
conception of power neglects the need for the organized collective power that
democratic institutions require. I then turn to the architecture of the democratic power approach itself, which depends on an alternative view (1) of the people, the agents of democracy, and, (2), of the state, the medium through which the people act, as infrastructures of power. The democratic power approach begins from the sociological generalization that political majorities, as larger groups, face collective action problems and so are less organized than smaller and more cohesive powerful minorities. Given those background conditions, democratic institutions both constitute fair decision-making procedures and organize the naturally disorganized citizenry, enabling them against powerful individuals and more cohesive and powerful social groups. Organized collective power enables the people to act on and through the state, even as particular powerful actors threatened by democracy will use state institutions to seek to assert their interests and disorganize the people. The model is recursive in that democratic institutions help organize virtuous or vicious feedback loops among organized collective power, the people, and the state.

My argument provides a framework for evaluating and comparing competing institutional designs for democratic procedures. Such evaluations require comparative analyses of how different democratic institutions facilitate or thwart the organization of popular power. To illustrate this, I show that the democratic power approach can better justify the importance of majoritarianism for democracy. Put most bluntly, democracy may be a more partisan ideal—associated with certain political actors and underlying interests, those of the majority as opposed to the relatively powerful and wealthy—than liberal proceduralists acknowledge. My argument also suggests a different method by which democratic theory can be realistic. The following contends that a theory of democracy is realistic if it encompasses both the normative principles that animate democracy and the structure of the political avenues, coalitions, and equilibriums that could sustain the institutional realization of those principles in large-scale, modern societies.

My argument builds on recent work emphasizing the pro-wealthy bias of current political institutions and the contemporary threat of oligarchic elites; Gordon Arlen, “Aristotle and the problem of oligarchic harm: insights for democracy,” *European Journal of Political Theory*, 18 (2019), 393–414; Jeffrey Edward Green, *The Shadow of Unfairness: A Plebian Theory of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); John P. McCormick, *Machiavellian Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

This contrasts with “realist” theories of democracy that begin from more minimal normative principles, such as legitimacy, or focus on democracy as elite competition. For accounts of democracy that begin from the problem of legitimacy under conditions of deep moral disagreement, see Richard Bellamy, *Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defense of the Constitutionality of Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Laura Valentini, “Justice, disagreement and democracy,” *British Journal of Political Science*, 43 (2013), 177–99; for recent critiques of citizen competence and fruitful rejoinders, see Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Samuel Bagg, “The power of the multitude: answering epistemic challenges to democracy,” *American Political Science Review*, 112 (2018), 891–904; Lachlan Montgomery Umbers, “Democratic legitimacy and the competence objection,” *Res Publica*, 25 (2019), 283–93. For a critique of elitist realism that focuses on the value of popular mobilization for democracy, see John Medearis, *Democracy Is Oppositional* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). I depart from Medearis in emphasizing the positive role democratic institutions play in facilitating the organization of collective power that is the precondition for oppositional mobilization.
I. LIBERAL PROCEDURALISM AND THE VALUE OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

Are democratic institutions valuable because of the structure of their internal procedures or because they tend, over time, to produce outcomes that maximize normative values? Liberal proceduralism, as I understand it, is the family of views that defend the first answer: democratic institutions are intrinsically valuable because of how they constitute or contribute to certain valuable relationships or embody a principle, such as equality, that can only be realized relationally. While they variously refine the idea, liberal proceduralists generally agree “that a fair procedure has value that derives from the contribution that the outcome-independent qualities of the procedure make to certain other things that are of value: for instance, treating our fellow citizens with respect, as equals, and so on.”

Defenses of the intrinsic value of democratic institutions position themselves against instrumentalist views, according to which democratic institutions, as the distribution of rights to coercion, are justified only insofar as they reliably produce outcomes that accord with some normative standard. Liberal proceduralists contend that such instrumental justifications of democracy miss part of the essential meaning of democracy: organizing decision-making in a way that is fair to everyone is a way of providing equal respect to the members of a democratic society. And it is this realization of a principle through an institutional procedure that explains the obligation to obey the discrete decisions of such institutions, even if we may disagree with the decision vis-à-vis some substantive normative standard.

While the debate between intrinsic and instrumental views of democracy focuses on the justification of democracy, it also entails a theory of how to apply whatever value justifies democracy to political institutions. Implicit in such a theory is a view of what political institutions are, how they function, the relationship between formal rules and their actual operation, and, finally, how they relate to or realize different normative values. That is, a theory of what justifies democracy also contains an implicit account of the characteristic features of the institutions that realize those principles. Democratic theories provide stylized descriptions of the facts of political life to show how normative values relate to different institutional options. These competing stylizations have implications for ranking...

6By democratic institutions, liberal proceduralists mean, most characteristically, electoral and voting procedures that lead to a collective choice. Many also focus on the inclusive and egalitarian quality of the deliberative and agenda-setting aspect of those institutions. The democratic power approach shares this focus, while also being more open to alternative institutions, such as differential voting rights, group-based representation, and sortition, if they can be shown to enhance the organization of collective power.

7Daniel Viehoff, “The truth in political instrumentalism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 117 (2017), 273–95, at p. 277.

8See, for example, Richard J. Arneson, “Democracy is not intrinsically just,” Keith Dowding, Robert E. Goodin, and Carole Pateman (eds), Justice and Democracy: Essays for Brian Barry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 40–58; Viehoff, “The truth in political instrumentalism”; Steven Wall, “Democracy and equality,” Philosophical Quarterly, 57 (2007), 416–38.
features of institutions and so evaluating democratic institutions. In particular, both the intrinsic and the instrumentalist views of democracy concur that the internal procedure of a democratic institution can be evaluated separately from the outcomes of the institution.

We should note that, to varying degrees, liberal proceduralists are attuned to how different forms of social or economic inequality could undermine the fairness of democratic procedures. They worry about the gap between the formal promise of a democratic institution and their actual fairness, with whether such institutions do genuinely guarantee equal opportunities to influence or roughly equal power over the outcome of a collective decision. I do not assume that liberal proceduralists take formal procedures at face value. My concern is that they tend to take such potential threats to the fairness of a procedure as ex ante inequalities that are exogenous to the procedure itself, undermining individual-level genuine influence or power within that procedure. As a result, liberal proceduralists are limited to two primary responses to such threats to procedural fairness: to insulate the procedure from such inequalities or to provide ceteris paribus arguments whereby we could only identify a procedure as fair under conditions of social and economic equality. In each case, they maintain the distinction between procedure and outcome. What the democratic power approach adds is a theory of the dynamic interaction between democratic institutions and the organizational structure of the actors that seek to sustain or undermine existing distributional patterns in society.

The very idea of relational equality should lead theorists to question the distinction between procedure and outcome as a description of democratic institutions. If we are after the constitution of broad relationships of equality throughout society, then we must inquire into the effects of both procedures and outcomes on the organization of different social groups and collective activities. The question is whether procedures and outcomes together, over time, produce and preserve broad social relations of equality. The following argument focuses then, not just on what justifies democracy, but also on how democratic institutions realize the value that is taken to justify them.

Elena Ziliotti provides a useful distinction between political egalitarian and relational egalitarian defenses of the intrinsic value of democracy. Political egalitarians, like Christiano, argue that fair procedures directly realize equality. Relational egalitarians see democratic institutions as a necessary constituent of, but not reducible to, equality. Similarly, contractualists, like Beitz, admit that both procedure and outcome have a constituent role in realizing political equality. The political egalitarian view would have a harder time accommodating my argument, as deviations from procedural fairness would undermine the public recognition of equality. Relational egalitarians and contractualists, on the other hand, could be more open to such deviations under non-ideal conditions. Kolodny, for example, argues his position could be open to deviations from procedural fairness under non-ideal conditions. But this creates a tension within the relational egalitarian framework. If what explains obligation is that fair procedures realize relational equality, then departures from procedural fairness would seem to undermine the legitimacy of the legal order for those who are burdened by those deviations. See Kolodny, “Rule over none, II,” p. 309; Elena Ziliotti, “Democracy’s value: a conceptual map,” Journal of Value Inquiry, 54 (2019), 407–27.
My core claim is that liberal proceduralist views fail to apprehend the conditions under which democratic institutions can realize valuable political goods. The democratic power approach shares the core intuition that there is something intrinsically valuable about the relationships democratic institutions can help constitute and sustain. But it provides a different account of how democratic institutions can realize such value; and so rejects the underlying theory of institutions on which the liberal proceduralist view rests—a theory that separates procedure and outcome. From my perspective, democratic institutions are mechanisms that function through recursive feedback loops between procedures and outcomes. Insofar as the operation of procedures depends on the background organization of social actors and how they relate to the procedure, the general outcomes of the procedure will alter the potential fairness or integrity of the procedure itself. But to bring this insight into democratic theory, we must begin, not from an ideal of procedural fairness, but from a theory of collective power whereby such power gets actualized through procedures that organize the generally more disorganized majority. This view of collective power and democratic institutions points to a revised concept of the people and the state, articulating how both relate to the constitution of political equality over time.

II. ORGANIZED COLLECTIVE POWER

Democratic institutions are always more than procedures. Like all political institutions, they are both procedures and mechanisms. As procedures, democratic institutions consist of explicit rules that distribute decision-making authority within the institution—how inputs get translated into outputs—as well as rules that determine who has standing in the decision-making process and so are the relevant actors—where the relevant inputs come from. But as mechanisms, political institutions are also nodal points in the broader organization of power in society, shaping the identities, interests, and organizational capacities of the actors who form the “inputs” into their formal procedures. This section develops, first, an account of political institutions as social mechanisms and, second, the conceptions of power and organization that inform the democratic power approach. Liberal proceduralists are concerned with how informal inequalities of power or influence could undermine the promise of procedures. What they miss is the collective dimension of political power—the “power-with” that emerges through ongoing cooperative practices. But to capture this aspect of power requires a more sociological approach to democratic institutions, one that relates formal procedures to the formation of organized collectivities, ranging from relatively formalized organizations like labor unions and political parties to more diffuse actors such as the people.
A. Institutions are Procedures and Social Mechanisms

Political institutions are social mechanisms as well as procedures. As I understand it, an institution is a social mechanism insofar as it structures patterns of activity both within and outside of that institution in a relatively stable and predictable manner. If we want to know what sort of relationships a political institution realizes, we need to examine more than the fairness of its procedures or how those formal procedures interact with individual-level inequalities of wealth or influence. We also need to inquire into how it functions as a social mechanism to organize cooperative activity—what I am calling organized collective power. Only then can we determine whether the procedures constitute the sort of relationship in question. As mechanisms, democratic institutions coordinate diverse actors into more organized groups who will then act through formal procedures. In empirical political science, scholars point to how “policy makes politics”—institutional procedures have broader effects on society, creating new political constituencies who will then either sustain or seek to challenge different political procedures, or find ways to alter their practical functioning. These effects of democratic institutions are not outcomes, discrete from procedures. Instead, the effects of institutions, in redefining the collective actors that interact with a procedure, affect the ongoing functioning of the procedure itself.

The language of mechanisms is helpful because it reminds us that certain features of institutions will have relatively consistent effects even in otherwise different contexts, even as we must examine more than their formal rules to determine those effects. When examining a democratic institution as a mechanism, we have to inquire into its structuring effects on the organization of different actors in society. These effects are distinct from both the internal procedures of those institutions and the immediate outcomes of those procedures. Rather, the effects of democratic institutions as mechanisms only become clear in the context of recursive feedback loops between procedures, outcomes, and the interests and identities of different social actors. As mechanisms, democratic institutions organize and constitute collective actors that can then work through them—ranging from different groups and constituencies through to the people as a whole. But those actors then exert influence on those same institutions. Democratic institutions constitute political agents like the people insofar as those institutions function as mechanisms that rearrange power in the broader social world, enabling the political activity of different collective actors. But this entails a view of power that extends beyond individual-level influence or rights within decision-making procedures—the sort of power on which liberal proceduralists focus.

10Andrea Louise Campbell, “Policy makes mass politics,” Annual Review of Political Science, 15 (2012), 333–51.
B. Organized Activity and Collective Power

As mechanisms, democratic institutions affect the organization of power in society. But how should we understand this sort of power? In this section, I argue that the power in question here is the power that arises from organization and cooperation, and not the coercively backed power of the law, the equal control of which is the focus of liberal proceduralists. Scholars of power often distinguish between “power-over,” in which power indicates the capacity to cause another agent to do something they would not otherwise do, and “power-with,” where power refers to a more general capacity to realize one’s goals through co-operation with others.11 Liberal proceduralists focus on “power-over” at the expense of “power-with.” In part, this is an understandable impulse: legally sanctioned “power-over,” insofar as it implies the potential for coercion, needs particular justification. For liberal proceduralists, democratic institutions realize equality insofar as they guarantee something like equal power over the authoritative rules that arise from collective decision-making. Their disagreement then flows from how narrowly or broadly to define such power—whether it needs to correct for inequalities in natural talents (such as persuasive ability), whether we should focus on equality of actual influence, or of opportunities for influence, or of the probability of being the decisive influence.

Yet if the justification of such coercion resides, even if in part, in how democratic institutions sustain relations of social equality, and if we are examining such institutions under any but the most idealized conditions, then democratic theorists need to expand their purview to also examine power as “power-with.” Formal democratic procedures will impact the organization of such power—and so too which social actors and social collectivities have their capabilities and organizational capacity enhanced, and which find their power-with impeded. Power-with, as I understand it, requires organized collective activity. It arises through the deliberate coordination of disparate plans of action and goals. Hannah Arendt puts the point nicely: “What keeps people together after the fleeting moment of action has passed (what we today call ‘organization’) and what, at the same time, they keep alive through remaining together is power.”12

More technically, we can define collective power as a situation where an individual has the ability to affect an outcome if and only if some other individual(s) voluntarily assist, without that (those) other individual(s) being directed by the power of the first individual. 13 To take a mundane example, we see that our

11 For the distinction between power-over and power-with, see Arash Abizadeh, “The grammar of social power: power-to, power-despite, and power-over,” *Political Studies*, online first; Amy Allen, “Rethinking power,” *Hypatia*, 13 (1998), 21–40; and Jürgen Habermas, “Hannah Arendt’s communications concept of power,” trans. Thomas McCarthy, *Social Research*, 44 (1977), 3–24.

12 Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 201.

13 For more detailed discussions of the sort of power that arises from social cooperation, see Abizadeh, “The grammar of social power”; Alvin I. Goldman, “Toward a theory of social power,” *Philosophical Studies*, 23 (1972), 221–68. Following Abizadeh, my definition does not make joint intentions or shared goals a necessary precondition for collective power, although, in the context of democracy, organized collective power with shared goals will be more significant.
individual power, in the sense of our capacity to realize certain goals, is enhanced through organized patterns and structures such as traffic rules. But while collective power includes coordination, from the perspective of democratic institutions we will be interested in the subspecies of social power that unites organization with persuasion.14 Persuasion becomes effective insofar as there are organized opportunities for collective action that enable people to channel their persuasive capacities in an organized and united direction.

The shift to “power-with” entails a change in how democratic theorists think about equalizing power. The liberal proceduralist view of fair institutions presupposes that such institutions distribute non-cooperative power-over at an individual level: that is, they provide equal influence over decisions understood as the equal ability of each individual to influence that decision independently of the specific voting decisions of others. The liberal proceduralist view can turn power into an object of fair distribution only insofar as it presupposes that power is exercised as (a share of) control over the outcome of an institutional procedure, where your (share of) control over that outcome is not conditioned on the activities or choices of others.15 This reduction of power to power-over is compatible with the idea that what we are equalizing is not just formal procedural equality, but a more substantive equality based on effective political power, encompassing the role of wealth, persuasive ability, and so on. The point remains that the distribuenda is equal effective power holding constant the activities or choices of others.

In contrast, collective power cannot be distributed at the individual level, because it presupposes an ongoing cooperative activity, even as we may still say that an individual’s power is enhanced by cooperation.16 Organized political power does not necessarily have to mean the distribution of relative control over decision-making outcomes. Rather, the power in consideration here is an inter-subjective phenomenon that emerges from the ongoing domain-specific cooperation. The power that arises from organization does not give any individual

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14For the discursive and communicative aspect of power, see Rainer Forst, “Noumenal power,” *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 23 (2015), 111–27.

15See, e.g., Kolodny’s definition of equal influence as “equal a priori chances of being decisive over the decision,” i.e., a situation where every individual has the same probability of being the decisive vote “on the assumption that no pattern of [voting] by others is more likely than any other pattern”; Kolodny, “Rule over none, II,” pp. 320–1, emphasis in original.

16In this respect, organized collective power is also distinct from the concept of influence. Following Dworkin’s discussion, some liberal proceduralists have argued we should focus not on formal procedural fairness, but on genuine equal influence or equal opportunities for influence, where influence includes things like persuasive ability. But one can exercise influence without cooperation. A particularly charismatic individual may be able to influence a stranger and so exercise power over them, understood as the probability of getting the stranger to do what the charismatic individual wants. This is different from influencing someone within the context of an ongoing cooperative activity, where the existence of that cooperative activity then alters the probability of influencing someone else’s behavior. In that context, someone’s power as influence has been enhanced, but the source of the increase in social power is the cooperative activity. See Brighouse, “Egalitarianism and equal availability of political influence”; Ronald Dworkin, *Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
unconditioned control or probability of control over the course of events or affairs, as is more clearly the case when someone wins a vote.

Take, as an example, the power of a labor union. Some of this power will arise from “power-over,” insofar as there is a legal regulatory framework that, for example, sanctions firms if they try to circumvent a legal strike. This legal framework will distribute power on an individual level to each worker through his or her right to vote on the decision to strike. Yet much, if not most, of the power of a union comes not from this legal framework, but through its ability to organize and mobilize its members. The significance of each worker’s right to vote on the strike is enhanced by the fact that their union has high organizational capacity; workers have solidarity and will cooperate, and so on. The enhanced power of each worker only arises through this ongoing collective activity—as soon as the cooperation ceases, the power vanishes. And while in some broad way this collective organization of power enhances the power of workers as a group vis-à-vis their employer, it would be a mistake to speak of it as a redistribution of power on an individual level, as each individual’s enhanced power requires the ongoing cooperation of every other individual.

Another operative example is a political campaign. While the voting procedures prized by liberal proceduralism may specify a distribution of decision-making power, a political campaign spills beyond formal procedures and towards the activity of organizing collective power, so as to ensure people exercise that individual procedural right in an organized manner. An electoral victory then has implications for the organization of collective power that go beyond the structure of the rules that determine a winner.

If we cannot determine the fair distribution of organized collective power at the individual level, how ought we to conceive its equalization? Since organized collective power is a form of power that requires ongoing cooperation from others and so cannot be distributed at an individual level, we have to analyze large-scale shifts in the balance of organizational capacity and so the relative equalization of organized collective power at an aggregate level. I propose we conceptualize the equalization of collective power in terms of virtuous feedback loops between formal decision-making procedures and the collective organization of power-with. The formal procedures of democratic institutions distribute

17Insofar as they enable this sort of coordination and organization, parties and partisanship may then be a valuable precondition for the constitution of political equality. For a recent defense of partisanship along these lines, see Jonathan White and Lea Ypi, The Meaning of Partisanship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

18This raises challenging issues about the measurement of power, as well as how to compare individuals’ power along different dimensions (i.e., individual power-over versus collective power-with). We may also value different types of power for different reasons, so we would also weigh different values. A certain amount of individualized power-over relative to coercive lawmaking may help protect negative liberty, which would then need to be balanced against political equality. I cannot resolve all these questions of measurement and balancing. My claim is just that theorists of democracy need to attend to both types of power, which challenges the implicit image of democratic institutions that informs the debate about the value of democracy. Such conceptual effort can then pave the way for these additional considerations.
power-over. That is, they ideally give each individual person the equal probability of being decisive over the outcome of a collective choice, thereby giving everyone the equal capacity to exercise power over each other. At the same time, though, such institutions will affect the organization of collective power. Here, we should think not in terms of a stable, individual-level distribution that holds over time, but of feedback loops. Most generally, I understand a feedback loop as any social process where an output of the process is reused as an input. Feedback loops operate through social mechanisms. A virtuous feedback loop is one where a normatively desirable result of a process also strengthens one of the causal inputs that contribute to that outcome. Conversely, a vicious feedback loop is one where a normatively undesirable result strengthens a causal input that contributes to that outcome or weakens a causal input that could lead to an alternate, normatively desirable output.

Feedback loops bridge “procedure” and “outcome.” This is because one of the “outputs” of a feedback loop could be the actual functioning of the procedure itself. If a democratic institution rearranges the relative organizational capacity of the different collective actors that interact with a procedure, then the nature of the procedure itself changes—powerful actors could use unforeseen procedural tactics to advance their interests or, conversely, less powerful actors could use the procedural mechanism as a site of organization building. To return to the union example, take it as given that unions increase voter turnout among less wealthy individuals. If a majoritarian democratic procedure makes it more likely that a polity will create a pro-union regulatory environment, this could then enhance the political organization of the majority of citizens, who will then protect the integrity of that majoritarian procedure—generating a virtuous feedback loop between unionization and political equality. Democratic institutions with procedural rules are then nodal points in these larger feedback loops: the site where the organization of collective power intersects with the distribution of formal decision-making power, directing and potentially redirecting such feedback loops.

III. THE STATE AND THE PEOPLE AS POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

So far, I have argued that democratic institutions are both procedures and mechanisms with predictable social and political effects, effects that will then feed back into the integrity of the institutional procedure. The value of democratic institutions arises in large part from how the organization of collective power enables the people to act through the state and preserve, through recursive feedback loops between procedure and outcome, relationships of political

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19Feedback loops have been extensively studied in economic theories of increasing returns and cumulative causation and political science theories of path-dependency. For a representative discussion that draws together economics and political science, see Paul Pierson, “Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics,” American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 251–67.
equality. Seen in this light, democratic institutions not only distribute power as decision-making rights, but also realize power by organizing the disorganized over and against the already organized, such as the wealthy and incumbent state actors. Part of what gives democracy its dynamic is that these egalitarian modes of organizing power are in constant competition with pre-existing, non-democratic forms of organization, as well as with challengers who wish to exert control over democratic forms of organization via formal procedures and the state. Thus, state formation propels the formation of new political institutions that also seek to organize popular constituencies as a counterweight to pre-existing, aristocratic hierarchies.

Charles Tilly called the state a protection racket—but this fact means it is an accountable protection racket, one that supplants other, less accountable rackets. This possibility was recognized by one of the earliest observers of state formation, Machiavelli, who saw that aspiring princes could forge an alliance with the people over and against incumbent elites. Similar dynamics have played out historically, because of state actors’ dependence on monetary and military resources of the people (taxation and military conscription, respectively). This dependence meant that those state actors had to organize the people through taxation or military conscription, creating a new source of democratic power that could assert itself when the old order collapsed.

With this in mind, here I further motivate the democratic power approach by showing it can better make sense of two key concepts in democratic theory: the people and the state. The liberal proceduralist theory has difficulty with both. Such theories implicitly conceive of the people as just the aggregate members of a society and of the state as a delegate that directly implements the outcomes of collective choice. Because of its attention to the interaction between formal procedural institutions and the organization of power in society, the democratic power approach can articulate the importance of both the people and the state for democratic theory. From the point of view of organized collective power, the people stands for the relatively less organized majority of society and the state for an infrastructure of power through which the people can act.

A. The People

As scholars like Josiah Ober remind us, democracy originally meant something like the power (kratos), in the sense of an organized capacity to act together, wielded by the people (demos). But who or what are the people? To the extent
that the liberal proceduralist view provides a notion of the people, it is a minimal one—the people are those subject to the jurisdiction of a particular political community. The people stand for the aggregate members of a political community who owe each other, as individuals, treatment as free and equal citizens. Because the liberal proceduralist view focuses on equality constituted through the individual-level distribution of power-over, its concept of the people focuses on *formal membership*, encompassing all members of a polity, and so not the organized collective activity of the less powerful members of that society. But the democratic power approach, with its attention to the organization of collective power, approaches the people differently: as the political organization of the ordinary, non-elite, and less visible members of a political community—those who abjure or fail to achieve highly visible forms of economic and political power. Democratic institutions function as social mechanisms to organize the people, enabling them to exercise collective power. This collective power can be *enabled* and *enhanced* through democratic procedures, but only if those democratic procedures initiate a virtuous feedback loop between formal rules and the organization and mobilization of the people.

Liberal proceduralist views are heirs to the notion of the people that arose with the modern concept of popular sovereignty. The development of the idea of popular sovereignty required a reinterpretation of the nature of the people: from the view of the people as the non-powerful majority that is one source of power within a political community to the idea that the people are all citizens of the community acting together as an authorizing power. According to early modern theories of popular sovereignty, the people comes into existence insofar as everyone, as an individual, formally authorizes a juridical order. Political legitimacy thus rests on an equal distribution of authority over the laws. The democratic vision of the people is reinterpreted through the lens of individual consent, such that the people is dissolved into a distribution of individual voting rights.

We can see this shift in the reinterpretation of the Athenian understanding of democracy in early modern European thought. The Athenian ideal of the supremacy of the demos did not necessarily imply a notion of absolute sovereignty, one realized through the people authorizing the constitution or the government. Rather, it gained political traction because of a crucial ambiguity in the notion of the demos—an ambiguity between the demos as tyrant and as *idiōtēs*. The demos as *idiōtēs* stood for the demos as ordinary people who lack relative social, economic, and political power. The supremacy of the demos meant not just the...
supremacy of the Assembly as a legislative body representing the desires or wishes of the demos (demos as tyrannos), but also the supremacy of non-elite Athenians over elite Athenians (demos as idiōtēs). An implication of this ambiguity is that the regulation of political competition in Athens focused not on the adequate representation of individual components of the populace, but on the prevention of any one individual or group amassing so much power that they could dominate the demos.\textsuperscript{27}

As Kinch Hoekstra has shown, early modern theories of sovereignty deployed an interpretation of Athenian democracy that focused only on the tyranny of the demos—the idea of the Assembly as the supreme, authorizing legislative body—while neglecting the other meaning of the demos in Athenian democratic ideology.\textsuperscript{28} The rise of the idea of popular sovereignty thus marked a shift in views of the people: from the people as the less powerful members of the polity to the people as all individuals within the jurisdiction of the state who retain ultimate sovereignty whatever specific form the government took. Here, the medieval interpretation of the Roman lex regia, the supposed act whereby the Roman people transferred their sovereign power to Emperor Vespasian, provided additional support to this shift. In this grant of power, the people were sovereign only insofar as they retained an ultimate power to authorize the emperor.

Daniel Lee brilliantly traces how debates about the lex regia informed the development of the doctrine of popular sovereignty. By taking this grant of power to the emperor as a hinge, Roman law “provided the necessary conceptual tools to present popular sovereignty as a constitutive doctrine of public authority without having to commit to a potentially controversial normative view on precisely \textit{how} such popular sovereignty ought to be administrated or exercised.”\textsuperscript{29} Such interpretations transformed the demos from a designation of an organized group that stands in contrast to economic and political elites and into a more abstract and general residual agent—one that could be a “sovereign” power insofar as they collectively authorize the laws. The liberal proceduralist view takes this idea of popular sovereignty and gives it a proceduralist twist. The people are sovereign insofar as they exist fair procedures that mean everyone can view themselves as equal authorities over a legal order.

Such views are far from the idea of the people as a mode of organized collective power. In this view, the people is always partially differentiated from both state actors and the members of powerful groups in society. The aggregate of individual citizens becomes the collective actor “the people” insofar as democratic institutions organize the collective power of the generally disorganized majority.

\textsuperscript{27}Alexander S. Kirshner, “Legitimate opposition, ostracism, and the law of democracy in ancient Athens,” \textit{Journal of Politics}, 78 (2016), 1094–106.
\textsuperscript{28}Kinch Hoekstra, “Athenian democracy and popular tyranny,” Richard Bourke and Quentin Skinner (eds), \textit{Popular Sovereignty in Historical Perspective} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 15–51.
\textsuperscript{29}Daniel Lee, \textit{Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 20, emphasis in original.
To this extent, the democratic concept of the people is a gradual concept, as the less powerful members of a society will, depending on their organizational context, exhibit different degrees of “peoplehood.” A minimal criterion is that the institutions enable a majority of citizens to exert ongoing political power in a recognizable way. Here, the question is: what are the institutional processes and mechanisms that help sustain the capacity of ordinary people to act in an organized manner?

The people is the result of political organization that coordinates the activities of these constituencies through broader social movements and over-arching institutional structures, producing a larger, cohesive, and organized movement that can lay claim to be the people. Realizing political equality will involve institutions that create a feedback loop between, first, organizing a “latent” people, which can be identified by sociological facts about a society (that is, who is a member of this less powerful majority?), and then second, institutionally empowering that people once organized. What this view of the people loses in conceptual abstraction it gains in both normative desirability and empirical tractability. It is more realistic, better capturing the connection between political institutions and the people, insofar as the people comes into existence through the collective organization of power. But in its realism, it also articulates the connection between the people and the value of political equality, insofar as political equality is sustained through the ongoing feedback between formal institutional procedures and the broader organization of collective power that constitutes the people.

B. The State

Once political decisions are made, they must be implemented. Liberal proceduralists focus on fairness in collective decision-making. But how should we move from simple, direct models of democratic decision-making to democracy at scale, democracy in large, complex societies? Recent liberal proceduralists, such as Kolodny, turn to a model of representation to solve this problem, contending that representation does not undermine political equality insofar as “the relationship between the citizenry and official—say, a representative in the legislature” is one of delegation.\(^\text{31}\) Political representatives should act as delegates, much like “lawyers, doctors, accountants, and financial planners.”\(^\text{32}\)

This view fails to appreciate the nature of the state. Political representatives are not just delegates or governed by formal procedural rules—they are nodal

\(^{30}\)Because I focus on the people as organized through institutions rather than a symbolic category, I can better accept that citizens can also be divided along other dimensions (ideologically, religiously, and so on) while still being part of the people, and there is no reason to think that political organization as peoplehood needs to be supreme relative to other forms of organized activity. Achieving organized collective power as part of the people will help realize the value of political equality, and this value needs to be balanced against other values that may require different organized activities.

\(^{31}\)Kolodny, “Rule over none, II,” p. 317.

\(^{32}\)Ibid.
points in larger feedback loops, and in particular those that mediate between the organized power of the people and the institutional infrastructure of the state. The state, the institutional context of representatives’ activity, does not stand to the people as an agent to a principal. Rather, the state is a set of structured institutions that empower individuals to pursue multiple, often contradictory, interests and imperatives. The relationship between the state and the people is one of both interdependence and antagonism. State actors depend on the people for resources, legitimacy, and even existential survival, and yet those actors have a strong interest in preserving their autonomous capacity to implement their ends. Astute empirical observers, such as Peter Mair, have shown how, over time, representatives and parties can become entrenched in the state, surviving off collusion and cartelization rather than popular mobilization, and so undermining the collective organization of power. State formation, then, is both a necessary precondition for the realization of political equality under modern conditions of pluralism and large-scale political orders and a continuous threat to political equality.

As with the people, we can distinguish two different ways to analyze the state: the first view is of the state as a concept or ideal, one derived from, for example, the idea of right or legitimacy; and the second approaches the state more sociologically and empirically, as an infrastructure of power. The first view is historically specific, referring to the ideological self-representation of the form that concentrations of public power took on, beginning in 16th-century Europe (developing alongside the doctrine of popular sovereignty), while the latter is a broader idea that encompasses all contexts in which the administration of power becomes relatively independent from particular individuals or groups. In this

33Empirically, this is a highly implausible view of political representation, as Kolodny grants. But the issue is not just practical. Representation undermines the idea that relational equality is tied to equal opportunity to influence political decisions. Representation is a temporal relationship. It means abandoning equal influence over a series of future individual decisions. Kolodny’s defense of representation leaves out the losers in electing the representative. In a “direct democracy,” if I lose a vote on a single decision, I can still view myself as others’ equal, as I know my odds of influencing future decisions are unchanged. But why should I view a representative elected by a majority in which I did not participate as my delegate? I have now given up my power over a series of future decisions. According to Kolodny’s own view of equal influence, the delegate view of representation fails. However, it could be that, from the democratic power approach, constructing institutions that approximate delegate representation—imperative mandates, binding party policies, and so on—would enhance virtuous feedback loops. For a further critique of Kolodny’s theory of representation, as well as an account of the relationship between political equality and the state similar to the one developed here, see Arash Abizadeh, “Representation, bicameralism, political equality, and sortition: reconstituting the second chamber as a randomly selected assembly,” Perspectives on Politics, online first.

34Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy (London: Verso, 2013). Such dynamics also undermine the sort of equality with which liberal proceduralists are concerned, yet democratic power and liberal proceduralists may disagree about the best institutional prescription: whether to try to strengthen and insulate formal procedural rights or whether to look to institutional innovations that would enhance popular mobilization.

35I borrow the idea of infrastructure from Michael Mann; Michael Mann, “The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results,” European Journal of Sociology, 23 (1984), 185–213; Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
broader view, the state is simply any institution that functions to implement collective choices (or enforce them as collective choices). It is hard to imagine a political community without some state apparatus, with democracy requiring an administrative state infrastructure that is independent of one family or ruling group. In this respect, Athenian democracy had a state, insofar as there was an institutional system for administering public goods and implementing decisions that did not merge with a single ruling family or group.

As a historically specific concept, however, the state only took shape in 16th-century Europe, alongside the philosophy of popular sovereignty, and stood in contrast to the sort of administration by amateurs and notables characteristic of Athenian democracy. As an ideal concept, the state indicated a permanent apparatus of professional government, one regulated by explicit, formal law and structured by the continuous pressure to rationalize its deployment of coercive power. The modern concept of the state developed in the context of a specific model of European authoritarianism. Scholar-administrators sought to derive the state from the concept of civil order and individual right as a way of justifying the jurisdiction of centralized authorities. The modern view of the people as the aggregate of individuals and of the state as derived from an individual right go together. In both cases, they derive a description of an institution from a conceptual principle—free and equal individuals, in the case of the people; fair procedures leading to authoritative laws, in the case of the state—and then use that conceptual ideal to justify political power. The concept of the state provided a powerful framework within which to legitimate the new form of power embodied in these rationalized structures of political administration—it had a “state effect” in drawing new boundaries between public and private and providing public power with new justifications.

The distinction between state as concept and state as infrastructure of power matters, because the liberal proceduralist view presupposes the modern concept of the state, taking it as, if not a reality, then a regulative ideal. Only with such a concept of the state can theorists like Kolodny argue that procedural fairness can realize political equality at scale, with the political actors in the state (representatives) being delegates who implement collective choices in a linear and seamless fashion. In contrast, the state as infrastructure helps to capture the relationship between organized collective power of the people and the authoritative enforcement of legal norms, with the state instead standing as particular nodal

36 For an overview of these views, see David F. Lindenfeld, *The Practical Imagination: The German Sciences of State in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
37 Timothy Mitchell, “The limits of the state: beyond statist approaches and their critics,” *American Political Science Review*, 85 (1991), 77–96.
38 The formal concepts of both the state and the people could still serve useful theoretical purposes. It may be preferable to live under a well-functioning administrative system, just as it may be better to secure the formal membership of all residents of a territory. I have two worries. First, these concepts have a tenuous at best connection to the ideal of democracy and political equality. Second, they are not sufficiently examined as an ideal within liberal proceduralism and so are taken as an already existing starting point for their institutional prescriptions.
points in the uneven organization of power throughout society. Against the liberal proceduralist ideal of the state as a neutral medium for implementing the results of egalitarian procedures, the state itself is an infrastructure of power that reshapes society. The activities of the state are going to affect the structure of democratic procedures themselves. Here, again, the distinction between procedure and outcome breaks down.

To the extent that the state figures into liberal proceduralist views, it is only under the auspices of the modern concept of the state. Yet the modern concept of the state is an idealized and ideological portrayal of the state geared towards the needs and aspirations of state-building authoritarian regimes in continental Europe. Political actors sought to portray themselves as engaging in the “depersonalization” of political power by dissolving it into the concept of right, on the one hand, or a functional, rule-governed administrative system, on the other. In reality, the construction of the modern state was only ever a partial, uneven process. There never was, nor could there be, complete depersonalization of power. The depersonalization of power simply means that the individuals exercising power have their field of activity increasingly structured by legal norms and demands for horizontal and vertical accountability, even as these norms and accountability structures are always underdetermined relative to specific choices and actions.

This realist point does not vitiate the importance of legality or representation. But it does mean that the state is always a site of struggle between competing political interests and not simply a linear instrument for implementing collective decisions. Even when it has been influenced by the modern ideology of the rational state, the state remains an infrastructure of concentrated power. The state is a (by no means seamless and coherent) agglomeration of political offices held together as much by inertia and informal practices as by conceptually derived legal or political principles. Indeed, democratic polities are often marked by a surprising lack of both rationalized administrative capacity and a weak, if non-existent, resort to Kantian constitutionalism as a legitimating rationale. This power is “public” insofar as it is relatively autonomous from continuous control by specific individuals and groups in society.

What does this mean for political equality and democracy? It challenges the implicit background of the liberal proceduralist view—the idea that one can segment procedure and outcome. The state is not a neutral medium for implementing collective decisions arrived at through procedures that, under suitable conditions, constitute political equality. Rather, the state is both a precondition for and a constant obstacle to realizing political equality—a set of institutional structures that shape the course of potentially virtuous egalitarian feedback loops. States are under pressure to respond to the people and even to help constitute the people through democratic mechanisms and institutions. Yet, at the same time, actors within the state seek to shield their power from public accountability so as to pursue their ends as autonomously as possible. Political equality, then, requires more than just the equalization of collective
decision-making procedures. It requires the ongoing organization of the majority that can enable the people to act on and through the state.

IV. CONCLUSION: EVALUATING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

Procedural fairness and equal influence within procedures is an important component of how democratic institutions constitute political equality. But liberal proceduralists risk fetishizing procedural norms as such. They abstract institutional procedures from the broader social balance of forces in which they operate, investing those procedures with a political purpose they cannot realize. To the extent that they bring such sociological considerations into their theories, it is to observe how various inequalities in wealth, education, or persuasive ability undermine the individual right to equal contribution to collective decisions. That is, they miss how those individual capacities are enabled or undermined by the constellation of larger social organizations that facilitate individuals’ participation in democratic institutions. Democratic procedures do help to realize political equality, but only insofar as they enable, rather than undermine, efforts to organize the people over and against entrenched, powerful elites and the state.

Why should we prefer the democratic power to the liberal proceduralist view of democratic institutions? At its core, my argument is that the democratic power approach better articulates what institutions are necessary to secure political equality under the conditions of modern politics. Democracy entails political equality, understood as relatively equal control over the terms of collective life. My argument implies we should realize this ideal by equalizing a combination of procedural fairness, substantive, individual-level equality of opportunity for influence (encompassing things like wealth), and organized collective power. We can equalize organized collective power both by enhancing people’s opportunities to join the organizations that coordinate their political activities and by enhancing the organizational capacity of those organizations that coordinate the activities of less powerful or wealthy individuals. But according to my argument, the further we deviate from ideal conditions, the more we should weigh institutional reforms that create virtuous feedback loops that equalize organized collective power relative to both procedural fairness and individual-level equality of influence. In other words, the more we should focus on empowering the people vis-à-vis powerful elites and the state, rather than pursuing procedural equality.

The democratic power view affirms the conditional importance of formal and substantive procedural fairness, but given the facts of modern political life, my theory will subordinate those procedural ideals when they undermine the organization of collective power in the pursuit of equality. Insofar as democratic institutions are more than formal procedures, then the justification of democracy should involve a comparative evaluation of different institutional options and the extent to which they will further or thwart the ongoing feedback loops that sustain the valuable relationships between equals that democracy requires.
Democratic theorists need to evaluate democratic institutions according to their substantive effects on the organization of power in society and not just their formal structures.

Take the importance of majority decision-making rules for democracy. Kolodny contends there is no inherent connection between political equality and majoritarianism. The typical argument for majoritarianism is that supermajority rules make one outcome (the status quo) more likely than alternatives. Yet, from the perspective of liberal proceduralism, such a public justification for a majoritarian procedure would unfairly burden certain citizens—namely, those who support the status quo. Under a supermajority rule, everyone still “has the same opportunity to influence the adoption of [a] decision as any other person.” “What matters for social equality,” Kolodny writes, “is that people have equal opportunity to influence decisions, not that decisions have equal opportunity of being made.” Supermajority rules are compatible with this principle, as would be lottery voting, in which everyone casts their vote and the winning vote is randomly selected.

I believe Kolodny is correct that, from a procedural perspective, majoritarian and supermajority decision rules are equally fair. However, this is not so when it comes to the broader effects of democratic institutions on the organization of power outside of the procedures. The democratic significance of majoritarian democratic institutions resides in how they enable the collective organization of power. One of the primary effects of majoritarian institutions is to enable the organization of the otherwise inert majority as the people with organized collective power. Such institutions help realize political equality, understood not as fairness within the procedure, but as the people’s capacity to sustain and exercise their organized power. Majority-based voting procedures—both referendums and ballot initiatives, as well as more majoritarian models of representative institutions—create incentives for intrepid actors and concerted social movements to constitute and mobilize political majorities, such that they can then exercise power through majoritarian institutions as part of virtuous feedback loops.

39Melissa Schwartzberg, Counting the Many: The Origins and Limits of Supermajority Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 121–5.
40Kolodny, “Rule over none, II,” p. 323.
41Ben Saunders, “Democracy, political equality, and majority rule,” Ethics, 121 (2010), 148–77.
42If the status quo realizes social and political equality, could a supermajority rule contribute to collective empowerment by protecting that egalitarian status quo? Only if we assume there are no intermediating institutions like the state, which I assume will exist even in a highly egalitarian polity. Under such conditions, majoritarian institutions will be more likely to contribute to the organization of democratic power vis-à-vis the threat that representatives acting within the state will, over time, undermine political equality.
43The concern here, of course, is that the likely outcome of general majoritarian procedures will be democratic action against vulnerable, weaker minorities rather than justifiable targets like the wealthy (justifiable insofar as targeting them fosters virtuous feedback loops). My argument leads to a presumption in favor of majoritarianism that could be overridden by specific historical circumstances. We see this, for example, in consociational, power-sharing institutions in societies with deep histories of religious strife. But such deviations should specify the minorities in question to prevent generic counter-majoritarian institutions from undermining the organization of collective power. See the discussion in Schwartzberg, Counting the Many, pp. 172–9.
Overall, my argument points to a much broader tension between liberal norms of procedural fairness and democratic notions of substantive political equality than liberal proceduralists currently allow. Once we assume democratic institutions will coexist with the state and large-scale political actors—ranging from lobbies and interest groups to global corporations and labor unions—then liberal ideals of procedural fairness will have to take a back seat to the pursuit of substantive organized power. Insofar as democratic institutions interact with the organization of power in society, there are conditions in which the realization of substantive political equality could require relaxing, if not violating, principles of procedural fairness. For instance, from the democratic power perspective, the connection between democracy and equal suffrage is contingent, not necessary, and dependent on the likely effects of changes in the structure of voting rights. Differential voting rights or special vetoes for the less powerful or wealthy could both help augment the collective organization of power. Evaluating institutions by these sorts of likely effects on these political projects, for liberal proceduralists, would be a failure to treat individuals as free—it would associate them with a particular social group or interest. If we see political equality as realized by the collective organization of power—neither intrinsic to procedures nor instrumental to their outcomes, but the result of ongoing feedback loops between procedures and organized social actors—we have to include knowledge of the different political projects in our evaluation of institutional alternatives.

A final implication of the democratic power view is that no single institutional procedure will guarantee the stable realization of the value of equality. Instead, democratic communities must rely on potentially unstable institutional feedback loops between procedures and outcomes. This follows from the theory of the second best: in a world in which the ideal preconditions for liberal proceduralism do not hold, there is no reason to think every move towards fairer procedures will help realize political equality. Rather, we need to incorporate empirical knowledge of the likely effects of such moves, holding other factors constant; and it could be...
that, given our current conditions, more perfectly neutral procedural fairness will undermine, not further, political equality. To aid in such comparative evaluations of democratic institutions, the democratic power approach introduces concepts, such as democratic institutions as mechanisms for organizing collective power, the people, and the state, that help synthesize the modern conditions under which institutional procedures operate. But the democratic power approach also contains a substantive lesson: democratic institutions will, at times, have to treat unfairly the projects of those who want to undermine the collective organization of power. As a result, democrats will often have to choose between procedural fairness and substantive political equality—and they should choose the latter.

48For more, see David Wiens, “Assessing ideal theories: lessons from the theory of second best,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 15 (2016), 132–49.