"Here (...) Practical Anthropology becomes pure art": Kant on the distinction between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology

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ABSTRACT

Among the many stages of Kant’s problem of a reciprocal collocation of the human knowledges, Encyclopedism, quite unsurprisingly, is one of the most relevant; and yet, quite surprisingly, it is Anthropology which plays here one of the lead parts, insofar as the complex ascertainment of its definition, its position, its task proves to be of irrefutable importance towards solving the greater problem at hand. The question arises as the association – or dissociation – between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology, and their inclusion in, or exclusion from, their greater or lesser relation with Metaphysics; a problem which, to the careless eye, seems to have been promoted by Kant himself. Here, opinions diverge as to the nature of the relation between the two sciences, from their total inter-dependence to their complete separation. We, in turn, propose a different approach. Our objective is to reenact Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, as presented not only in the only extant Lecture on Encyclopedism, but in various others dimensions of Kant’s academic activity; and here, to propose a contrasting analysis between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology; one, however, based not on the assumption of their consonance or dissonance through their characteristics, rather on their re-
spective position and scope amid the field of human knowledges. As such, it is our intention to consider Kant’s Lectures in their interconnection, namely, in their apparently dubious simultaneous collocation of an Empirical Psychology as Anthropology; and, based on their specific position in the scheme of human knowledges, and what this position entails in terms of their scope and task, to ascertain to what extent Empirical Psychology is indeed Anthropology, and from what extent Empirical Psychology is no longer Anthropology – not, at least, Pragmatic Anthropology. In other words, we shall labor towards defining a dividing line in Kant’s scheme of human knowledges; one which for Kant represents a third dimension of knowledge and stands between rational and empirical, Metaphysics and the historical sciences; that line, in our view, being that of a cosmopolitical prism.

**Keywords:** Kant, encyclopedism, anthropology, empirical psychology, cosmopolitanism.

**RESUMO**
Entre os muitos palcos do problema kantiano de uma colocação recíproca dos conhecimentos humanos, o Enciclopedismo, sem surpresa, é um dos mais relevantes; e, no entanto, deveras surpreendentemente, é a Antropologia que aqui desempenha um dos papéis principais, na medida em que a complexa aferição da sua definição, da sua posição e da sua tarefa provam ser de irrefutável importância para a resolução do problema em pauta. A questão emerge sob a forma da associação – ou dissociação – entre Psicologia Empírica e Antropologia Pragmática, e a inclusão – ou exclusão – destas de uma relação com a Metafísica; um problema que, ao olhar incauto, parece ter sido fomentado pelo próprio Kant. Aqui, as opiniões divergem com respeito à natureza da relação entre as duas ciências, desde a sua total interdependência até a sua completa separação. Nós, por nossa parte, propomos uma abordagem diferente. O nosso objectivo é reconstituir o esquema fundamental dos conhecimentos humanos, como ele é por Kant apresentado não só na Lição sobre Enciclopedismo, mas em várias outras dimensões da actividade lectiva de Kant; e aqui, propor uma análise contrastiva entre Psicologia Empírica e Antropologia Pragmática; análise essa, porém, baseada não na suposição da consonância ou dissonância destas mediante as suas características, mas sim baseada na posição e escopo destas no campo dos saberes humanos. Assim, é nossa intenção considerar as lições kantianas na sua interconexão, a saber, na sua aparentemente dúbia e simultânea colocação de uma Psicologia Empírica enquanto Antropologia; e, em vista da posição específica de ambas no esquema dos conhecimentos humanos, e do que esta posição comporta para o escopo e a tarefa de ambas, aferir até que ponto Psicologia Empírica é de facto Antropologia, e a partir de que ponto Psicologia Empírica não mais é Antropologia – não, pelo menos, Antropologia Pragmática. Por outras palavras, trabalharemos tendo em vista definir uma linha divisória no esquema dos conhecimentos humanos de Kant; linha essa que para Kant representará uma terceira dimensão do conhecimento e que se afirmará entre racional e empírico, a Metafísica e as ciências históricas, como um novo prisma cosmopolita.

**Palavras-chave:** Kant, enciclopedismo, antropologia, psicologia empírica, cosmopolitismo.

**Introduction**

As is known, prior to any critical clarity on the subject, the young Kant struggled with a complex internal conflict: that of delimitating the boundaries of scientific knowledges and defining their individual and common place within the immense field of human knowledge. The problem, of course, arises not
due to Kant’s insipience regarding the individual objects at hand, or their limits – for, as a Professor of such subjects, Kant knew the latter full well; nor should it be owed to Kant’s youth, and much less to the non-critical, early phase of his career. Instead, the true difficulty lay firstly in the correct collocation of these fields of knowledge, which in itself had to be flawless; and, ultimately, in the much more arduous all-reciprocal, or systematical ascertainment of the position, the boundaries and task of all these individual knowledges within one and the same whole, the soil of human knowledge. Regarding this internal conflict, several examples of inevitable (terminological and theoretical) oscillations, advancements and retrocessions, even inconsistencies emerge throughout Kant’s work. Yet one of the most visible facts, and perhaps one of the most central, is that of the pair Empirical Psychology-Anthropology, a pair whose ambivalent designation now begins to draw the attention of Kantian scholars, and whose complex position in the table of sciences, a position which Kant deemed as having a synergetic effect over all the sciences, and therefore as being of key importance, perfectly embodies the difficulty which the philosopher then experienced.

This difficulty – in a word, Kant’s difficulty to present a fix table of all human knowledges – therefore involves, as well as is directly involved, by the field of Anthropology, its boundaries, its location and the repercussion these have upon other knowledges, just as these knowledges must necessarily exert equal influence upon the Anthropology. Quite unsurprisingly, or as a proof of this, the problem of Anthropology, here under the guise of the problem of Empirical Psychology, is reconsidered and reworked time and time again during the decades of Kant’s lecturing activity in Königsberg, often reemerging in lectures of different subjects, especially when the task was to ascertain the scientific fields of human knowledge in the light of each of these subjects. At times prior to the inauguration of the Anthropology course, in 1772, others later, Kant’s anthropological thought – the delimitation of this new domain, its connections and task – is thereby brought to light, now more, now less explicitly, but always conveying the sense of a multiform and multidisciplinary image of Anthropology; and, at the same time, this heterogenous genesis and formation of an anthropological domain itself opens to a clearer comprehension of different forms of systematicity in Kant and the importance of the latter in his work.

Now, among Kant’s various lectured disciplines where the problem of Anthropology, and therefore important determinations in the form and design of the field of Anthropology surface – Geography, Logic, Cosmology, Metaphysics – all are unequivocally important, but only one is to be granted theoretical primacy, and by it can and must begin the study of the pre-history of Kant’s problem as presented here. We refer to the field of Encyclopedism. Encyclopedism, so Kant, is just “a brief excerpt of the whole science” (AA 29.1: 6); and hence, it does not earn its epithet due to its scientific prominence – from Encyclopedism, only concession and generality is to be expected – nor due to its formal precedence regarding the remaining sciences, which, given its character, is impossible. Indeed, none of these characteristics pertain to the nature of Encyclopedism. Its primacy, the reason why it merits our attention, rather derives from its naturally systematizing nature: namely, from the fact that, given its object, it is supposed to delineate a sketch of an ordered whole of scientific knowledges – among which Anthro-

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1 The question on the non-existent, partial or complete dissociation between Empirical Psychology and Anthropology, if based upon the study of their positions regarding one another and other sciences in the field of human knowledges – as is here the case – has hitherto received insufficient attention by Kantian scholars. However, if based on the study of their convergent and/or divergent properties and scope, the question has summoned some attention recently; on this complementary dimension of the problem, see Pérez, 2017, p. 51-61; Sturm, 2001, p. 163-184; Blanc-Brude, 2011, p. 321-329; Frierson, 2014; Hatfield, 1992, p. 200-227; McNulty, 2018, p. 2707-2714.

2 See, among others, the “Prolegomena” and “Proemia” sections in the Lectures on Anthropology; the text “Entwurf und Ankündigung eines Colegii der Physischen Geographie” (AA 2: 3-12), as well as the much contested “Geographie-Rink” (1802), and “Geographie-Vollmer” (1801-1805); or the text “Immanuel Kant’s Logik. Ein handbuch zu Vorlesungen”, better known as Logik-Jäsche (AA 9: 1-87).

3 “Philosophische Enzyklopädie” (AA 29.1: 5-45).

4 All citations will be presented in a traditional manner (abbreviation of work, volume of work, number of page(s)). The abbreviation of each work cited finds correspondence in the final bibliographical section. All citations have been translated from their original German language into English.
pology – while collocating all of them in relation to one another and in relation to a common theoretical axis: in this case, Philosophy. In this sense, Encyclopedism provides us with a first general framework of Kant's problem of a reciprocal delimitation of knowledges in the human spirit. It is, in a word, Kant's attempt to systematize each of the micro-systems that is each of the different sciences: to, per say, erect a system of systems, thus reflecting on the nature of the systematicity of the system in general. And, as such, it is a privileged manner of dealing with the underlying, fundamental issue in Kant’s spirit, as well as the perfect setting to definitively expound and determine Anthropology in its heterogenous, interdisciplinary relations, as a key element towards that greater resolution.

Hence, because such is the aim, as well as the nature of Encyclopedism, we shall focus in it our effort towards understanding the systematic reciprocal disposition of the various knowledges in Kant's spirit, with special focus on the ascertainment of the role played by Anthropology in the elucidation of this greater picture of things.

1. Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges

Kant lectured the subject of Encyclopedism ten times between 1767 and 1782. The only surviving transcription of these lectures, to be found in AA 29.1: 5-45, is of uncertain date (either 1777/78, or 1779/80, or 1781/82). However, notwithstanding this uncertainty, this unique item must serve as evidence for all of Kant's prior lectures on the topic, as well as indication for subsequent ones.

The main focus, in this lecture in particular as in Encyclopedism in general, is the same as in other lectures on Metaphysics or Geography – indeed, proof that we are dealing here with a fundamental scheme in Kant’s spirit. One such focus is that of the opposition between system and aggregate – or, in the specific case of Kant, Professor of Encyclopedism, that of system, as an ordered construction of sciences, in its opposition to the notion of aggregate, as a random set of knowledges. Kant is clear on this distinction; so clear that he builds upon it a principal thought – a fundamental scheme – which will be at the basis of his consideration of the problem. As such, so Kant, in a system the idea of whole precedes and rules over the idea of the parts, and hence must be an “a priori idea of whole” (AA 29.1: 5); in an aggregate the idea of connection between the parts precedes and determines the idea of whole, and hence “cognitions are derived a posteriori, insofar as they arise only through that which is given” (AA 29.1: 5). In light of this distinction, Kant subsequently divides human knowledge, according to its form, in two main dimensions: in “historical sciences” and “sciences of reason”, which he considers as two lines separated in all its extension – a separation which, as is natural, is all the greater depending on one’s progression along those lines. Namely, historical sciences are those in which knowledge is given a posteriori, in which cognitions, as parts which precede the whole, constitute an aggregate of knowledges: the sciences of erudition (Wissenschaften der Gelahrtheit (AA 29.1: 5)), such as History, Natural History, Medicine, Psychology, Aesthetics, among others. And because historical sciences are centered around the parts, because they are constituted through an infinite addition of cognitions and because this addition is based on experience, they constitute a horizontal line in Kant's division of human knowledges. As to rational sciences, they are the ones where knowledge is given independently from experience. Here, cognitions, which are preceded by an idea of whole, constitute a system: the sciences of insight (Wissenschaften der Einsicht - AA 29.1: 5), such as the metaphysical or mathematical sciences. And, in turn, because the sciences of reason envisage a whole, because they are constituted by subsumption and such a constitution is of a rational order, they constitute a vertical line in Kant's scheme of the division of human knowledges. This means that human knowledge, as it is presented by Kant, is first and foremost

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Footnotes:
5 “Encyclopedism is a brief excerpt of the whole science. It befits Encyclopedism that one draws the concept of whole from it. The overview of the whole is its first aim, and this is an important utility it creates” (AA 29.1: 6).
6 Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, as presented below, emerges not only in our lecture on Encyclopedism, but also in Metaphysik-Mrongovius (AA 29.1.2: 747-940), Metaphysik-Volckmann (AA 28.1: 355-459), Metaphysik-voßmann (AA 28.1: 355-459), Metaphysik L2 (AA 28.2: 525-610) or Metaphysik-Dohna (AA 28.2: 615-702), as well as in the aforementioned Geography lectures (see Annotation 2 of this article).
bidimensional. For, on the one hand, there is a vertical line which ascends and descends between experience and transcendence, a line composed of rational sciences, or rational systems, which compose the system of “pansophy” (id.); on the other hand, there is an horizontal line which transits between reason and the infinite of experience, a line composed of experiential clusters, composing “polihistory” (AA 29.1: 5).

Kant, however, does not end here his scheme of the division of human knowledges, nor could it be seen as such; and, in consonance, he amplifies both lines and presents the scheme in greater detail, now with regard to the position and role of Philosophy in the whole. Kant starts by the vertical line of knowledge. Namely, the vertical line is composed of sciences of insight, and these, in turn, are subdivided into mathematical sciences and philosophical sciences: that is, sciences constituted by construction, intuitive sciences; and sciences constituted by concepts, hence discursive sciences. This means that reason proceeds now through construction, non-discursively, now through concepts, philosophically or discursively; a sub-division which not only thematically, but even temporally, is very close to Kant’s presentation of the topic in his first Critique, and therefore is well-known. However, so Kant, there is a difference in the rational application of such sciences; for whereas mathematical sciences do not interfere with the empirical, and therefore stand atop in the vertical line of human knowledge, the philosophical ones are in greater or lesser contact with the historical, horizontal plane of human knowledge, and hence stand below in the vertical line of human knowledge. A fact which is confirmed when we think of the non-discursivity of mathematical sciences, which detach it from the empirical, and the discursivity of philosophical ones, which precisely pins them to the historical.

Now, what does this sub-division entail? Surely, that the vertical line of knowledge is divided, that there is here an inferior and a superior, among other obvious conclusions. But, above all that, this means something much more important for the composition of Kant’s framework of knowledges: namely, that, in the vertical line, Philosophy expands from the end of mathematical knowledge, the supreme rational knowledge, to the very end of Rational Physiology. That is, in a first analysis, bearing in mind its form only, Philosophy goes from transcendental philosophy, which is supreme within discursive knowledge, and where the object of Philosophy is the object of pure reason, to the end of that line, in applied or empirical Metaphysics, where the object of Philosophy is already the object of the senses. But not just this. Since, according to Kant, there are knowledges whose form is philosophical, yet bear an historical content, and others whose content is historical, yet bear a philosophical form, then, it is not difficult to understand that not only is there at least a possibility of contact between the vertical and horizontal lines of human knowledge, but Philosophy is certainly the discourse, the conceptual construction that congregates those two lines, the first and ulterior promotor of this contact. Namely, Philosophy expands first and foremost from its transcendental dimension to the end of rational physiology. But given the hybridity of some sciences under the formal or material wing of Philosophy, and/or under the formal or material wing of history, then one can easily conclude that the end of Rational Physiology, or the apparent end of philosophical knowledge, is after all also the onset of Empirical Physiology and all the other historical sciences. And if this is so, then Philosophy, instead of ceasing in its last formal moment, that of Rational Physiology, rather prolongs itself, its discursivity, its influence (if formal) and its receptivity (if material) into the horizontal line of human knowledge, thereby connecting itself, or encompassing the so-called sciences of erudition. Philosophy is, so to say, the glue that holds together the two dimensions of human knowledge, and those lines, in turn, are the two operating dimensions of Philosophy.

Hence, we ask: what results from this double orientation of Philosophy, which is a double orientation of the two lines of knowledge? In truth, several conclusions, all important and elucidating as to Kant’s understanding of the problem.

First of all, this means that Philosophy bears here a double role: on the one hand, Philosophy is “in elevated degree legislator of human reason” (AA 29.1: 7), a “doctrine of wisdom” (AA 29.1: 7), a “conductor of reason” (AA 29.1: 8) and this because, in the vertical line of human knowledge, it inquires in ascending manner for the capacities, the cognitive limits of and by human reason; on the other hand, Philosophy is the “organon which contains the means to aid cognitions” (AA 29.1: 5); that is, Philosophy...
is the organon of non-scientific discursivity or descriptiveness, in the case of knowledges which are extensive, aggregate, but whose content not only concerns but indeed matters to the rational dimension of thought: knowledges which are historical in form, yet philosophical in content, such as “History and Geography” (AA 29.1: 7), as well as Empirical Psychology, or Anthropology in a broad sense.

Secondly, this means that Philosophy is on the one hand creative – an artist – when it aligns the parts with the whole and from this extracts harmonious conformity, as is the case in “the use of reason with regard to ends” (AA 29.1: 8); which, according to Kant, is “its noblest application” (AA 29.1: 8). On the other hand, Philosophy is also a mere model for creation, when, as an organon, it draws closer to the empirical in its form, which is imitation: “History and Geography are a thing of imitation” (AA 29.1: 7).

But, above all, this means something far more important, indeed key towards grasping the ulterior significance of Kant’s propositions. For, let it be noted, if Philosophy is the glue that draws together the two lines of knowledge; if Philosophy is at once the legislator of rational knowledge and the organon of the empirical one; if Philosophy is at once artist and mold, this is not only due to, but also results from the fact that the vertical line is somewhat – or somehow – connected to the horizontal one. But, if this is so – which is proved by Philosophy itself – then what this means is no longer just a mere connection between the lines of human knowledge – which would be in itself important – but furthermore a vertex, a point of effective correspondence which foreshadows further points of connection between the rational and the empirical. And if there is a vertex between lines, then one can assert that from the whole arises not just any scheme, but a perpendicular scheme; a scheme which is important not only because it establishes a common ground between two opposing lines of knowledge, but because from it, that is, from the concave amplitude which is thus opened between lines, there arises the possibility of new connecting and disconnecting points between all rational and historical sciences. And hence, to reformulate what we ourselves stated previously, we affirm that the apparently disconnected, absolutely isolated lines which Kant seemed to propose earlier are, in fact, two converging lines, connected by a real point, and several latent ones – and such points are under the aegis of the double character, the singular elasticity of Philosophy. Furthermore, we assert that the bidimensional character of Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges is indeed real; but, as it seems, it is rather a dynamic bidimensionality: for between both lines, from the vertex between the latter, Kant thus opens a whole third dimension, an array of now forbidden, now recommendable, now sterile, now fertile relations between the empirical and the rational, in itself constitutive of other intermediate sciences, or hybrid knowledges, which Kant shall approach not just here, but also in the scope of other subjects. Hence, we conclude, it is between these two (or three?) planes, not only of Philosophy, but of this scheme of human knowledges, that Kant’s greater problem of the reciprocal delimitation of scientific knowledges unfolds; which is to say, it is in light of this double, or triple stage of human knowledge that Anthropology would have to receive its fundamental collocation, as well as indications on its true design and benefits for the advancement of the generic problem of human knowledge.

2. Anthropology and its relation to Kant’s Philosophy

2.1. Anthropology as Empirical Psychology, and its position in the scheme of human knowledges

Now that the position and role of Philosophy in Kant’s framework of a division of human knowledges are ascertained, it is our task to definitively amplify the focus of such a scheme, and there, amid the heart of this composition, discern the contours of Kant’s collocation of Empirical Psychology, or Anthropology; for, as was seen, this problem lies at the kern of Kant’s greater problem: that of determining the
reciprocal boundaries, task and destination of all scientific knowledges within one and the same plane of human knowledge.

As he considers Philosophy, Kant proceeds to its division; namely, regarding 1. the “forces of Man” – understanding and will (theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy) – regarding 2. the “principles” – a priori and a posteriori (pure philosophy and applied philosophy) – and regarding 3. the “object of knowledge”, which, as was seen, is either an object of pure reason or an object of the senses (Transcendental Philosophy and Physiology). Now, in the eyes of any Kantian reader, this sub-division appears to be crystal clear. But Kant does not end here his division of sciences, rather adduces, regarding Physiology, that this is further sub-divided into two dimensions, as many as the manners of human feeling: in internal sense, in which occasion I am object to myself, the object being “a thinking being” (AA 29.1: 11), or soul, and in external sense, in which occasion the object is exterior to me, the “world” (AA 29.1: 11). As such, namely, Physiology is divided into the doctrine of the soul (Seelen Lehre), or Psychology, and the doctrine of the body (Körper Lehre), or Physics. Psychology is divided into Rational Psychology, which “considers the soul not through experiments, rather through principles of pure reason” (AA 29.1: 11), and Empirical Psychology, the opposite of this, which is also designated as Anthropology; whereas Physics is divided into “rationalem and empiricam” Physics (AA 29.1: 11), the empirical one also going by the name of Geography. Indeed, Kant himself promptly explains this division: it is so undertaken because in truth Rational Psychology and Rational Physics are metaphysical sciences, whereas Empirical Psychology and Empirical Physics are historical sciences. And hence, it cannot come as a surprise that, for the sake of concordance, Kant subsequently proposes a final division for such a scheme. Namely, Kant divides Metaphysics, or “all the rational in Philosophy” (AA 29.1: 11) into 1. Transcendental Philosophy and 2. Rational Psychology and Physics: Transcendental Philosophy above and Rational Psychology and Physics below; and confining with these are Empirical Psychology and Physics, which, though in correspondence with their rational equivalents, are situated in the horizontal line of knowledge – for the latter are not a part of Metaphysics, whereas the first ones, rational in nature, are “genuine Metaphysics, which means that their object is given through experience, but considered through simple reason” (AA 29.1: 11).

As it seems, then, Kant’s previous description of Philosophy entails two further, rather fruitful results. On the one hand, it offers a closer, more detailed vision of the lines of human knowledge, and by so doing provides us with a preliminary sketch of the reciprocal position and relation between rational sciences and historical sciences (and both amongst themselves). But on the other, and most importantly, it conveys a first hint at the position of Anthropology, here as Empirical Psychology, in this scheme of sciences. Namely, what Kant states here, AA 29.1: 11-12, is that in the vertical line Metaphysics is divided into Transcendental Philosophy and Rational Psychology and Physics, in an order that has nothing to do with pre-established preeminence, rather merely with their degree of distance from the empirical. Transcendental Philosophy, or the critique of reason, prime in this order of things, includes Ontology (see AA 29.1: 12). Then follow Rational Cosmology and Natural Theology (and, latently, Logic), and finally the abovementioned Rational Physiology, which is divided into Rational Psychology and Physics – all such sciences instituting applied Metaphysics. In the horizontal line, that of historical sciences, the division is much simpler: and even though it is not explicitly mentioned in the Lecture on Encyclopedism, we can easily reconstruct it from other lectures: namely, it is based on the empirical application of philosophy, between the knowledge of the I in the world (Empirical Physics, or Geography), the knowledge of the I in the world and time (Empirical Psychology, or Anthropology) and the knowledge of the I in time (History). Kant deems the latter simply knowledge or description of the world (Weltkennenwis, Weltbeschreibung), and adds that they constitute Empirical Cosmology – in fact, just as Rational Physiology, that is, Rational Psychology and Rational Physics, are already part of a Rational Cosmology in the vertical line of human
knowledges. Both lines, metaphysical and empirical knowledge of the world, considered not as one, but as inter-relatable, are what Kant calls Philosophy.

Now, one such division allows for some conclusions, all regarding the position that Kant ascribes Anthropology (seen as Empirical Psychology) within this division of Philosophy. Let us enunciate them according to the order of their importance.

Firstly, in view of such a framework of sciences, one discerns natural discordance, yet also, within such discordance, emerging concordance in Kant's alignment of sciences. Namely, it is factual that in the rational line of knowledge Mathematics is supreme, and that in the historical line of knowledge History is infinite. This means that even with these Philosophy stands in a singular relation, and the more one ascends and the other progresses, the further apart these grow from each other. Hence, there cannot be express concordance between the latter, just as there cannot be concordance between transcendental philosophy, or Logic, or Ontology, with anything in the horizontal line, and vice-versa. And yet, within this discordance there is also concordance. This concordance is veiled while we deal with sciences which are strictly empirical, or rational, both in their form and in their content. But it can and should be taken into account regarding those sciences which are hybrid both in their form and in their content: sciences which, for this reason, precisely set reason and the empirical in mutual connection. Of this sort, not by chance, is Cosmology. Cosmology, which is first and foremost Rational Cosmology, but whose acquisition of knowledge depends on empirical data, therefore finds direct correspondent in the descriptive, empirical line of knowledge, in Empirical Cosmology. And hence, Rational Cosmology, under which, or within which, stand Rational Psychology and Rational Physics (which compose the inferior part of the vertical line of knowledge) are, due to that very associative/dissociative vertex, connected with its respective correspondents: namely, Empirical Cosmology, which is subdivided into Empirical Physics and Empirical Psychology, or Anthropology. And, let it be noted, if the further two sciences are the greater their separation is, then one may conclude that, conversely, the closer they are from each other, through this vertex, the more probable (and probably fertile) will have to be their connection – which, in fact, only proves an undeniable link between rational and empirical sciences.

Secondly, and as a result of this, one confirms that Anthropology, be it seen under the guise of Empirical Psychology or not, must have here a double role. For, let it be noted, the two lines which compose the perpendicular relation of human knowledges not only are not fortuitous, but their relation is so pungent that they cannot be thought independently. And even within such lines, the sciences which compose them are naturally interconnected amongst themselves, for so must be in a system. But if so, and if one such bidimensionality is furthermore a dynamic one – this meaning the suggestion of a third plane in the scheme – then one asks: what position does Anthropology, as Empirical Psychology, initially hold within this double and synergetic interconnectivity?

The answer to this question is a double one.

On the one hand, Anthropology, here as Empirical Psychology, is indeed situated along the horizontal, descriptive, historical-geographical line of human knowledge; and because it is precisely the study of the human being where it is, and how it is, it summons elements from Geography and History, just as it constantly reappears in these domains. For, as the study of the inner sense of the soul, it brings to question place – the human being in the world (Geography) – and time – the human being in time (History); a study which then is reflected, reapplied and reemerges under different shapes precisely in Man's application in place and time, in the exterior sense of his soul.

On the other hand, Anthropology, here as Empirical Psychology, must be in different, yet real and analyzable connections with several sciences in the vertical line of knowledge. Kant does not deny this, rather, from lecture to lecture, proves that Anthropology, as Empirical Psychology, and as a description of the human inner sense, must be directly connected with Rational Physiology and therefore with Rational Cosmology, more specifically with Rational Psychology – for it is part of Empirical Cosmology – as well as indirectly related to Logic and the remaining metaphysical sciences. A more or less intimate
connection to other sciences without which Anthropology, and its due position, cannot be explained, just as without the acknowledgment of the delimitation of Anthropology those sciences too fall short of a complete explanation.

Lastly – or thirdly – one concludes that Anthropology, or Empirical Psychology, which plays a double role and thus stands in more or less evident connection with both lines of knowledge, must form around itself a field of dialogue. And why? Because, as was said, between Anthropology, the study of Man in the world, and such rational sciences there must arise a convex angle, a fertile reflective wing which not only is not absurd – for here too labors Philosophy – but must be considered bearing in mind a better collocation of all fields of knowledge. For Man is not to be known only through the vertical line, or the horizontal line of knowledge. Man is divided between both lines, he is both lines, and what one can know from him emerges precisely in the ample angle generated between the latter – a new and definitive proof of the intimate reciprocity of those lines and their necessary inter-explanation.

2.2. The distinction between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology. Pragmatic Anthropology as a third dimension of knowledge

Considering the case of Empirical Psychology, here as Anthropology, the question is therefore definitively solved, and neither its position nor its task, not even its ulterior objectives, seem to raise further problems. In its psychological sense, Anthropology is empirical, it is situated along the horizontal line of knowledge, deals with phenomena and is in some sort of relation, now more, now less pertinent, not only with empirical but also with rational sciences. Conclusions which, in themselves, are indeed valuable regarding Kant’s anthropological thought.

The final question, however, regards neither Anthropology as Empirical Psychology, nor its common scientific traits. The question regards Kant’s seemingly indifferent, at times even carefree designation of Empirical Psychology as Anthropology, as opposed to Kant’s usage of the term “Anthropology” dissociated from “Empirical Psychology”, which forces us to ascertain whether Kant is indeed negligent to the point that he signifies the same in both cases, or whether he means two very different positions, scopes – in a word – fields of knowledge, or sciences. For – and such is our opinion – Kant is here everything but negligent in his conceptual usage; and if we leave aside the Anthropology which Kant presents as Empirical Psychology and consider the Anthropology which gradually comes to rise in the Lecture on Encyclopedism or the Lectures on Metaphysics, and then consummately in his Lectures on Anthropology – that is, Pragmatic Anthropology – then none of the previous attributes corresponds to this science, and the whole problem not only cannot be so linearly expounded, but in fact remains to be solved; and this because Kant’s very dissociation between rational and empirical sciences, creation and imitation, seems to almost deliberately expose itself to discussion.

Such a conclusion – for now only a conjecture – forces us to go back and resume a passage in our lecture on Encyclopedism. Here, it is Kant’s opinion that some sciences are simply apodictic, and others simply empirical, wherein there is no interference of experience, in the first case, and no interference of reason, in the second. Among these, namely, some sciences are philosophical regarding their form and yet historical regarding their matter, or object – in which Philosophy is creative – and other sciences are historical regarding their form, yet philosophical regarding their object – in which there is imitation. To the first kind belong, for example, applied Metaphysics and its sciences – Rational Cosmology, Rational Physics and Rational Psychology, to the second one belong Anthropology (as Empirical Psychology), Geography, or Natural History. For, in the first case, the object is given by experience and considered according to principles by mere reason – which means that rational principles judge on experience; in the second, one

10 “A psychology of observations could be deemed an anthropology” (AA 28.1: 367).
rather departs from experience until, through the concordance of phenomena, one obtains principles. That is, between transcendental philosophy, which labors with pure concepts of the understanding, and mere experience, which shuns the latter, Metaphysics and Physics, and their underlying sciences, labor upon one and the functional pair, that of (the connection between) experience and rational principles.

Now, not by chance, the question resides precisely in this pair and the necessary interaction between both, which, in fact, represents the general interaction between sciences. According to Kant, in Metaphysics, as a rational science, “the object is given by experience, and considered, according to principles, by mere reason” (AA 29.1: 11) – which means that the object, though given by experience, is handled by rational principles. And, in opposition to this, Anthropology departs from phenomena and, by gathering such experiential data, conveys matter – empirical principles – which are to result in rational principles, as those of Metaphysics – which means that such rational principles serve themselves from, or must resort to, anthropological matter. Now, if we read both Kantian propositions attentively, we realize that this is ultimately a circle around a single axis, the axis of experience-principles; not a deceitful axis, such as that of a discursive subtlety, but a circle characteristic of a problem which seems to have two dimensions, yet two dimensions which, in fact, pertain to one and the same circular problem. Indeed, to say one thing and its opposite means the same: namely, that, at least in the perpendicular sub-field that unites applied Metaphysics and Empirical Physics, all rational principles are founded upon experiential data, as well as are reapplied upon experiential data, regardless of our consideration of the problem through the point of view of departing from experience to principles or from principles to experience. And why is this so? It is so because, we reiterate with Kant, “according to the form (…) all sciences are either historical sciences or rational sciences” (AA 29.1: 5); and whether they are historical or rational, that is, whether formally philosophical, such as those of Metaphysics, or materially philosophical, as is Anthropology as Empirical Psychology, both must follow the previous disposition, only seen from two different prisms. This means, then, that the empirical requires the rational as does the rational the empirical; creation needs imitation, just as imitation always tends towards creation, and this completes the functions of each kind of sciences, while also limiting their relation to a single axis of human perception.

Now, until this point, we have expounded Anthropology as well as its adjacent sciences precisely in the light of its form – and its form only. And in this light, we conclude that the location of Anthropology, as Empirical Psychology, is quite evident: it is formally historical and materially philosophical. However, upon referring to historicity or materiality of sciences, Kant does not do so with regard to the latter, rather states that sciences have – or do not have – a further supplementary dimension which must be considered alongside their materiality and/or formality. Kant designates this supplementary dimension as a consideration of sciences according to their system: “all sciences are, according to the form, but not according to the system, either historical sciences or rational sciences” (AA 29.1: 5). Now, this means that if regarding their form (or object) all sciences are either historical or rational, thus relating to one another through the previous circularity between experience and principles, regarding the system, or their systematicity – and the position of this system within the grander system of sciences – the same is not the case, rather there are so many hybrid or singular positions as the specificity of each science. Indeed, as if various systems could exist – and do in fact exist – within the great bilinear framework of human knowledges.

Hence, to definitively formulate the question, we could say the following: when, as is the case of Metaphysical sciences, it is the form and not the content that is philosophical, this determines the nature of such sciences and forbids them from contacting with the empirical. Their form is therefore shut from the horizontal line of knowledge; they may transform and do transform, but merely amongst themselves, in their own line of knowledge and their contact is limited to its reapplication in the empirical. And when, as is the case of historical sciences, it is the object and not the form that is philosophical, this equally determines the nature of such sciences and prevents them from contacting with pure reason. Their form is therefore equally shut from the vertical line and their contact restricted to aspiring to the rational. How-
ever – and here is the core of Kant’s problem – if taken in its form and/or in its object, Anthropology, as Empirical Psychology, is indeed empirical, non-metaphysical – precisely this renders Anthropology an Empirical Psychology, and this is why Kant insistently designates Anthropology as Empirical Psychology. But if, instead of this, Anthropology is understood regarding its system, that is, regarding the manner how its systematicity is inscribed within the greater system of human knowledges, then Anthropology finds itself dissociated from the Anthropology which is Empirical Psychology and places itself in a quite singular, indeed unsuspected position within the field of sciences. Anthropology, in a word, ascends at last as Pragmatic Anthropology, which is not at all related with Empirical Psychology apart from the fact that the latter is one of its parts, but never the other way around. How to explain this?

Kant provides examples and thus definitively dissociates both sciences.

Hence, let it be noted, Pragmatic Anthropology just as Empirical Psychology are indeed empirical: this much is dictated by their above-mentioned partial interpenetration. But Empirical Psychology is limited to the facts of experience, it is unable to convey cognitions to reason; whereas Pragmatic Anthropology has in this precisely its distinctive trait, laboring towards rational principles.

On the other hand, so Kant in Metaphysik-Mrongovius and Volckmann, Empirical Psychology “does not pair with reason” (AA 28.1: 757) and this because, as was seen, it is philosophically pertinent regarding its object, but formally historical, and hence it is restricted to the horizontal line of knowledge, confined to dealing with the remaining extensive sciences – but no more than this. This, however, is not the case with Pragmatic Anthropology. Pragmatic Anthropology stands well above Empirical Psychology in this matter: it gathers empirical data which through their concordance are conveyed to reason for the latter’s benefit, as a resource of pure Philosophy. And hence, if in its form and/or object Anthropology is indeed an empirical science, regarding its system – that is, if seen pragmatically – it stands in intimate contact with reason and must occupy a position other than that of Empirical Psychology.

Furthermore, as a consequence of the above mentioned, it is Kant’s view that Empirical Psychology, as a properly historical science, has no place among Metaphysics and should therefore be excluded from it; something which Kant recurrently states. Quite on the contrary, however, Pragmatic Anthropology not only bears real connections with Metaphysics (through Philosophy) but provides Metaphysics (most visibly applied Metaphysics) with its experiential sustenance, thus forging a link between the rational and the empirical lines of knowledge.

Furthermore, so Kant in his Lectures on Metaphysics, Empirical Psychology cannot convey a complete knowledge of the soul, for it has not yet grown to this condition, nor does it possess enough knowledge for this. This means that Empirical Psychology does not yet possess enough information to form principles useful to reason, nor does it allow its user to fully cognize its inner sense, that is, the manifestations of their soul. But here too Empirical Psychology falls short of Pragmatic Anthropology, which, according to Kant, Metaphysik Pölitz 3.2, stands for the question on “What is Man?”, a question which engulfs, not at all coincidentally, the question regarding Metaphysics, “What can I know?”, Moral, “What should I do?” and Religion “What should I expect?” Hence, because it is not confined to the

11 See AA 28.1: 175, AA 28.2: 541; AA 29.1: 750; AA 28.1: 367.
12 Pragmatic Anthropology, so Kant, gives us “the subjective principles of all sciences” (AA 25.2: 734-735).
13 “We see that Philosophy begins with speculation and then elevates itself to its true destination: it becomes the conductor of human reason (. . .). Here the Metaphysics of Morals and Practical Anthropology become pure art. (. . .) One must not always speculate, rather also think on the exercise” (AA 29.1: 12).
14 Kant in his Lectures on Metaphysics: “The genuine empirical doctrine of the body most certainly does not belong in Metaphysics; for I cannot speak of air, etc., in Metaphysics, for the latter requires empirical principles and therefore belongs to Empirical Physics. The same must I say from the doctrine of the soul; so is Psychology, which serves itself from empirical principles, no pure philosophy” (AA 28.1: 367). Also in the Lectures on Anthropology: “Metaphysics has nothing to do with knowledges of experience. Hence, Empirical Psychology belongs to Metaphysics as little as Empirical Physics” (AA 25.1: 8).
15 As seen above in Annotation 12 of this article.
16 “( . . .) because Psychology has not yet grown to the point that it may convey sufficient data for the knowledge of the soul, so that from it one may create a separate collegium” (AA 28.1: 367).
17 “The field of Philosophy in sensu cosmopolitico is to be reconduted to the following questions: 1) What can I know? This much
empirical nor to the rational (form/object), then, with regard to its system, Pragmatic Anthropology must be endowed with an amplitude much greater than that of Empirical Psychology.

Lastly, so Kant, Empirical Psychology could not yet be elevated to the condition of a philosophical science, that is, to the condition of an academic discipline\(^{18}\). But again, such is not the case with Pragmatic Anthropology, which was by then a philosophical science and had been instituted by Kant himself, in 1772, as an academic discipline at the University of Königsberg; which means that also regarding their status, one must differentiate Empirical Psychology and the much nobler, much more fertile Pragmatic Anthropology.

As such, Pragmatic Anthropology is not Empirical Psychology, rather has regarding that Anthropology three important differences: a different position, a greater scope and a more elevated status in the scheme of human knowledges. Namely, a different position, insofar as Pragmatic Anthropology holds a unique place in such a framework. For Pragmatic Anthropology is not to be found in the vertical line of human knowledge, and yet neither is it to be found along the horizontal line of human knowledges. Instead, it holds a special position, anchored upon the vertex that unites – and separates – the two dimensions of human knowledge, opening for a concave wing which therein expands between the rational and physiological dimensions of philosophy. A greater scope, insofar as the scope of Pragmatic Anthropology is not subsumptive, as in Metaphysics, nor associative, as in the sciences of erudition, rather labors upon the intermediate, hybrid field that expands between the two; and this field is that which, departing from the vertex and gradually gaining in shape and amplitude, truly forms and fills the perpendicular form of Kant’s scheme of human knowledges. And finally, a more elevated status, insofar as Pragmatic Anthropology is not a metaphysical science, just as it is not an historical science; nor is it a merely receptive, imitative science, nor a merely emissive, creative science. Pragmatic Anthropology is precisely a mediating science between the empirical and the rational, which not only greatly contributes towards its distinction among the human knowledges but does so with regard to its undeniable utility.

For Pragmatic Anthropology, unlike its antipodal sciences, which are formally philosophical, and its congeneric ones, which are formally historic, can and must, with regard to its systematicity, contemplate more than mere historicity or mere rationality, rather hold a special, systematic role, a privileged formal-material hybridity which allows it to establish all kinds of relations, to influence as well as be influenced by all the sciences of both dimensions of human knowledge. In a word, it is a whole third dimension of Kant’s scheme of fundamental knowledges, at the kern of a possible dialogue, or a forbidden dialogue between the two extreme, opposing dimensions of the human being.

Hence, we conclude, Pragmatic Anthropology, a science at the threshold between antipodal sciences, thus finds itself endowed with a function and a position of special relevance within the scheme of human knowledges. Pragmatic Anthropology is, first and foremost, the glue that holds together theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, just as Philosophy was the glue that held together rationality and the empirical, and in a sense constitutes the perpendicular scheme expounded in Section II of this article. And hence, we could state, imbued with a Kantian spirit, that Pragmatic Anthropology harbors the driving force which enlivens and interconnects the two necessarily opposing, yet necessarily convergent visions which compose Man in its internal and external existence. A driving force which especially in the 1770s, but even before, would promote a greater interpenetration between Anthropology and Metaphysics, History, Politics, Cosmology and Moral in Kant’s spirit and work, thus opening the way and laying the path for the consolidation of what we now know to be Kant’s cosmopolitical, or anthropo-cosmological thought; a dimension of Kant’s thought which, in itself, is to be seen and identified as a third dimension of human knowledge.

\(^{18}\) Empirical Psychology “has not yet grown to the point that it could constitute a special collegium” (AA 29.1: 757).
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