Strategic Bidding of Private Information for Dynamic LQ Networks under Moral Hazard *

Yasuaki Wasa* Kenko Uchida*

* Waseda University, Tokyo, 169-8555 JAPAN (e-mail: wasa@aoni.waseda.jp, kuchida@waseda.jp).

Abstract: This paper investigates the whole system behavior caused by the influence of the agents’ strategic behavior while utilizing their individual control and private information for a dynamic linear-quadratic (LQ) network in the presence of a principal-agent relationship. The principal aims at integrating agents’ behavior into the socially optimal one based on private information bid by the agents. To avoid a moral hazard on agents’ controls, the principal must give a reward to the agents. The reward induces the agents to choose their controls achieving the social objective under the true private information case, but the reward cannot prevent the strategic bidding of the agents’ private information. Under this situation, the case is considered that all the agents minimize their net cost composed of their own private cost and the reward from the principal, which is called the strategic bidding problem under moral hazard. Then, the strategic bidding problem is formulated and the optimal design of the problem is analytically derived. Their effectiveness and limitations are also discussed through a simulation.

Keywords: Strategic bidding; principal-agent problems; moral hazard; LQ dynamic game; incentives.

1. INTRODUCTION

Social infrastructure systems have human/machine-in-the-loop controls. Such humans and machines are regarded as agents. The economically rational agent, which is called homo economicus in economics, intends to minimize his own individual cost reflecting his objective. In the social infrastructure systems, each agent has a different goal. To integrate all the agents’ strategic behaviorrationally and impartially, it is required to introduce an integration mechanism, which is managed by a principal. In economics (see, e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)), the agents’ strategic behavior is divided into two parts: adverse selection (hidden information) and moral hazard (hidden action). Without an appropriate incentive from the principal to the agents, the system behavior led by such strategically selfish behavior of the agents differs greatly from the socially optimal one which is the principal’s objective.

The typical example of control problems in the presence of a principal-agent (PA) relationship is in power network systems. In the literature of electricity markets, the strategic bidding problem of private information for competitive agents has been addressed since the late 1990s. Wen and David (2001) propose an optimal bidding strategy for competitive power suppliers in the early days. Steeger et al. (2014) make recent surveys of the strategic bidding problem for hydro-electric producers in day-ahead electricity market. Ghamkhari et al. (2017) point out that one of the unsolved problems in electricity markets is to solve an optimal bidding strategy efficiently. Towards the realization of smart society projects all over the world, it is expected that the strategic bidding problem will occur in a variety of social infrastructure systems including energy management, traffic, and cyber-physical systems.

In this paper, a PA-type dynamic linear-quadratic (LQ) network is considered. The network is constituted by a principal and multiple heterogeneous agents. In the engineering literature of strategic bidding in dynamical systems, Berger and Schwepp (1989) proposed pioneering problem formulation in electricity markets. For the last several years, in order to reform the electricity regulation markets, dynamic incentive mechanisms based on mechanism design are proposed in Tanaka et al. (2012), Taylor et al. (2013) and Murao et al. (2015, 2018). Murao et al. (2015) handle a strategic bidding problem with a dynamic LQ network system, but they do not discuss the performance analysis of the strategic bidding. Wasa et al. (2019b) investigate an optimal design problem for strategic bidding of private parameters without moral hazard in a dynamic LQ network. Many kinds of researches including these five papers focus on only adverse selection without moral hazard. Hence, many academic challenges in strategic bidding problems still remain.

Regarding the moral hazard problem in engineering, there are relatively few papers (Chen and Zhu (2018); Venkitasubramaniam and Gupta (2019); Wasa et al. (2018, 2019a)). The incentives, sometimes called rewards, in moral hazard problems lead the agents’ controls to a socially optimal state. The incentive synthesis problem under moral hazard is motivated by the PA problem in contract theory (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987); Bolton...
and Dewatripont (2005); Sannikov (2008); Cvitanić et al. (2018)). Chen and Zhu (2018) apply a PA-type moral hazard problem to a differential game between single-principal and single-agent in dynamical cybersecurity management. Wasa et al. (2018) propose an optimal control and incentive synthesis under moral hazard between single-principal and multi-agents in dynamic electricity regulation markets. However, Chen and Zhu (2018) and Wasa et al. (2018, 2019a) do not consider strategic bidding problems of private information under moral hazard. Our objective in this paper is to consider the case integrating both adverse selection and moral hazard. Venkitasubramaniam and Gupta (2019) consider both adverse selection and moral hazard between single-principal and single-agent in static systems, whereas our problem in this paper addresses a strategic bidding problem between a principal and two-agents in dynamical LQ model.

This paper extends the framework proposed in Wasa et al. (2019b) to a strategic bidding model under moral hazard by merging the concept of the strategic bidding problem presented in Wasa et al. (2019b) and the idea for moral hazard problem proposed in Wasa et al. (2018). Specially, private parameter bidding problems of the agents’ cost function are handled. The objective is to analytically seek equilibrium for the agents’ strategic bidding problem under moral hazard on agents’ control. First, an optimal reward is designed to avoid moral hazard action of agents’ controls in a PA type dynamic LQ network, following the approach in Wasa et al. (2018). Under the situation, all the agents minimize their own costs without the principal’s intervention and an optimal bidding strategy of the agents is characterized. The effectiveness, implementation and limitations of the proposed mechanism are also discussed through a simulation.

2. DYNAMIC LQ NETWORK MODEL IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP

2.1 Network Model

This paper considers an LQ dynamic network model. The manager is managed by two types of participants: Principal and Agent. The principal harmonizes the agents’ individual behavior to achieve a socially optimal state by providing each agent with an appropriate pricing information on the basis of their private information bid strategically. Each agent executes suitable control according to the price. Following Wasa et al. (2019b), this paper considers a two-agent model so as to avoid complex technical discussions. The problem can be extended to any number of agents. The state evolution of agent $i$ ($i = 1, 2$) obeys

$$
\dot{x}_i = A_i x_i + B_i u_i, \quad x_i(t_0) = x_{i0},
$$

with the individual cost:

$$
J_i = \int_{t_0}^{t_f} \left[ \theta_i - C_i x_i \right] \top Q_i \left[ \theta_i - C_i x_i \right] + u_i \top R_i u_i \right] dt,
$$

where $Q_i$ and $R_i$ are positive-definite symmetric matrices. Agent $i$ can observe his own state $x_i(t)$ online and has private information $\theta_i(t)$, $t \in [t_0, t_f]$ a priori. The private information $\theta_i(t)$ is continuous functions of time $t$. The system parameters and cost parameters $A_i(t), B_i(t), C_i(t), Q_i(t), R_i(t)$, $t \in [t_0, t_f], i = 1, 2$ in (1) and (2) are continuous functions of $t$ and common information to all the participants in advance.

The state evolution of the principal, which indicates various imbalance outcomes on the network, obeys

$$
\dot{x}_0 = A_0 x_0 + A_{01} x_1 + A_{02} x_2, \quad x_0(t_0) = x_{00},
$$

with the imbalance cost

$$
J_0 = \int_{t_0}^{t_f} x_0 \top Q_0 x_0 dt,
$$

where $Q_0$ is a semi-positive-definite symmetric matrix. The principal can observe all the states $x_i(t), i = 0, 1, 2$, online. All the system and cost parameters in (3) and (4) are common information to all the participants as well.

2.2 Social Optimal Control Problem

To evaluate the efficiency over the network, the social cost is defined by

$$
I_s = J_0 + J_1 + J_2,
$$

where the collective dynamics for the state $x = [x_0 \top, x_1 \top, x_2 \top]$ with the controls $u = [u_1 \top, u_2 \top]$ is described as

$$
\dot{x} = Ax + Bu, \quad x(t_0) = [x_{00}, x_{01}, x_{02}] \top,
$$

$$
\begin{bmatrix}
A_0 & A_{01} & A_{02} \\
0 & A_1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & A_2
\end{bmatrix}, \quad \begin{bmatrix}
B_1 \\
B_1 \\
0 & B_2
\end{bmatrix}.
$$

Using (6), the social cost (5) is rewritten as

$$
I_s = \int_{t_0}^{t_f} \left( x \top C x - 2\theta \top Q C x + \theta \top Q \theta + u \top R u \right) dt,
$$

where $\theta = [\theta_1 \top, \theta_2 \top] \top$, $C = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & C_1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & C_2
\end{bmatrix}$, $Q = \begin{bmatrix}
Q_0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & Q_1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & Q_2
\end{bmatrix}$, $R = \begin{bmatrix}
R_1 & 0 \\
0 & R_2
\end{bmatrix}$.

From the definitions, the matrices $Q$ and $R$ are symmetric positive-definite matrices and $I$ is the identity matrix. The social optimal control problem solved by the principal is to find an optimal control minimizing (5). This social optimal control problem is one of the standard LQ control problems. Each agent bids his private information $\theta_i(t)$, $t \in [t_0, t_f]$. Then, the agents’ optimal controls are given by

$$
u_i^* = -\frac{1}{2} R_i^{-1} B_i \top p_i, \quad i = 1, 2,
$$

where $p_i$ is the adjoint variable (afterward it is called (shadow) price), and the price vector $p = [p_0 \top, p_1 \top, p_2 \top]$ obeys the adjoint equation

$$
\dot{p} = -A \top p - 2C \top Q C x + 2C \top Q \theta, \quad p(t_f) = 0.
$$

The optimal pair $(x, p)$ of state and price can be determined uniquely by solving the two point boundary value (TPBV) problem given by the forward equation (6) and the backward equation (8) (see Bryson and Ho (1975) and Ascher et al. (1995)). Ideally, the optimal control $u^* = [u_1^* \top, u_2^* \top] \top$ is implemented as follows. If agent $i$ bids his private information $\theta_i$, the principal solves the TPBV problem offline and determines the price $p_i$, which is optimal from the point of view of the social cost (5). The principal dispatches the price $p_i$ to each agent $i$ and the agent $i$ performs his control (7) in a distributed fashion.

From Bryson and Ho (1975) and Ascher et al. (1995), the price as well as the control can be realized in a state
feedback form with the backward sweep formula for the TPBV problem:
\[ p_i = 2P_ix + 2g_i, \quad i = 1, 2, \]  
(9)
where \( P = [P_1^T \quad P_2^T]_T \), \( P_i = [P_{i0} \quad P_{i1} \quad P_{i2}] \), \( i = 0, 1, 2 \), is the solution to the Riccati equation:
\[ \dot{P} + PA + A^TP - PBR^{-1}B^TP + C^TQC = 0, \quad P(tf) = 0, \]  
(10)
and \( g = [g_0^T \quad g_1^T \quad g_2^T]_T \) obeys the linear equation:
\[ \dot{g} = -(A^T - PBR^{-1}B^T)g + C^TQ\theta, \quad g(tf) = 0. \]  
(11)
Here the implementation is discussed to realize the state feedback laws for the price (9) and the control (7). All the model information (all participants’ system and weighting variables) except the private information \( \theta_i \), \( i = 1, 2 \) is available to all the participants in common. Any disturbance is not considered in the model. Hence, the principal can calculate the price and the controls in the open-loop form by solving the TPBV problem defined by (6), (7) and (9)–(11) and in the state feedback form as well, as the principal gets the private information bid by all the agents and the state information of all participants’ dynamics.

3. OPTIMAL REWARD DESIGN PROBLEM UNDER MORAL HAZARD

3.1 Problem Formulation

As pointed as Wasa et al. (2019b), the agents have a potential to behave strategically and the principal cannot achieve the social cost minimization without an appropriate incentive. To incentivize an agent’s behavior, the principal uses a reward functional \( W_i(x; u_i, \theta_i, h_i) \), \( i = 1, 2 \) with a parameter \( h_i \). By combining the reward functional \( W_i \) with the individual functional constraints \( J_1, J_2, J_9 \) and \( J_2 \), the agent’s net cost functional \( I_i \) and the principal’s net cost functional \( I \) are defined as
\[ I_i(x; u, \theta_i, h_i) = J_i(x; u) + W_i(x; u_i, \theta_i, h_i), \quad i = 1, 2, \]  
(12)
\[ I(x; u, \theta, h) = J_0 - W_1(x; u, \theta_1, h_1) - W_2(x; u, \theta_2, h_2), \]  
(13)
where \( h := [h_1^T \quad h_2^T]_T \). Then, our reward design problem under moral hazard is formulated as follows: Given an initial condition \( x(t_0) = x \) and private information \( \theta = [\theta_1^T \quad \theta_2^T \quad h^T]_T \), the principal finds an optimal parameter \( h = [h_1^T \quad h_2^T]_T \) that implements an optimal control \( u = [u_1^T \quad u_2^T]_T \) in an admissible set, such that
\[ \min_{u=[u_1^T \quad u_2^T]^T} I(x; u, \theta, h) \]  
subject to \( I_i(x; u_i, u_{-i}, \theta_i, h_i) = \min_{v_i} I(x; v_i, u_{-i}, \theta_i, h_i), \quad i = 1, 2, \)  
(15)
\[ I_i(x; u_i, u_{-i}, \theta_i, h_i) \leq 0, \quad i = 1, 2, \]  
(16)
where the subscript notation \( u_{-i} \) is \( 1 \) or \( 2 \) if \( i = 1 \) and \( 2 \), vice versa. The optimal reward functional \( W_i \) and the agents’ optimal controls are obtained from the solution to this problem. Assuming the private information \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) is reported in all sincerity, constraint (15) claims that the optimal reward functional incentivizes each agent to adopt the optimal control that minimizes its own net cost. This constitutes a Nash equilibrium together with the other agents’ control. Constraint (16) ensures the prescribed level of each agent’s net cost, which is set as 0 in this paper. The above formulation (14)–(16) is an application of the moral-hazard problem, particularly the PA problem, in contract theory (e.g. see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)); using the terminology of contract theory, (15) is called the incentive-compatibility constraint and (16) is the individual-rationality constraint.

3.2 Solution

In this section, the case is considered that all the agents report truthful private parameters \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) to the principal. Following Sannikov (2008) and Wasa et al. (2018), an appropriate reward functional and agents’ control policy satisfying the constraints (15) and (16) can be obtained straightforwardly. This paper focuses only on the primary results of the problem (14)–(16) in Wasa et al. (2018). See Wasa et al. (2018) for the mathematical assumptions and the rigorous proofs.

First, to solve the reward design problem (14)–(16), a form of the reward functional \( W_i \) with \( h_i \) is specified. Suppose that there is a Nash equilibrium \((u_1^*, u_2^*)\) defined by
\[ u_i^* = \arg \min_{u_i} I_i(x; v_i, u_{-i}^*, \theta_i, h_i), \quad i = 1, 2. \]  
(17)
for a pair of reward functionals \((W_1, W_2)\). Then, consequently, given an initial condition \( x(\theta_0) = x \) and optimal controls \( u_{-i}^* \) of the other agent, the reward functional \( W_i \) of the agent \( i = 1, 2 \) with arbitrary implementable control \( u_i \) has the form:
\[ W_i(x; u_i, u_{-i}^*, \theta_i, h_i) = \int_{t_0}^{t_f} \left[ h_i^T(t, x(t)) (Ax(t) + Bu_i^* + B_{-i}u_{-i}^* - \dot{x}(t)) + (\theta_i - C_{x_i}(x(t)) - Q_i(\theta_i - C_{x_i}(x(t))) + u_i^* R_i u_i^* \right] dt \]  
(18)
along the dynamics \( \dot{x}(t) = Ax(t) + Bu_i^* + B_{-i}u_{-i}^*, \quad t \in [t_0, t_f] \). By substituting (18) into (12) and (15), the optimality of the obtained reward functional (18) can be verified. Then, by taking the price parameter \( p_i \) (depending on time \( t \) and state \( x \) and the parameter
\[ h_i = [h_{i0}^T, h_{i1}^T, h_{i2}^T]^T, \quad h_{ij} = \begin{cases} p_i & \text{if } j = i, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad i = 1, 2, \]  
(19)
which is provided by the principal, the corresponding optimal control for \( u_{-i}^* \) is obtained as
\[ u_i^* = \arg \min_{u_i} \left[ \left( \theta_i - C_{-x}(x_i) \right)^T Q_i \left( \theta_i - C_{-x}(x_i) \right) + u_i^* R_i u_i^* + p_i (A_{x_i} x_i + B_{x_i} u_i) \right] = -(1/2)R_i^{-1}B_i^T p_i. \]  
(20)
Note that each agent’s control policy (20) with (9) is a function of state \( x \), i.e. a Markov control policy. Thanks

1. This approach is motivated by the reward-functional formulation in Sannikov (2008) and Cvetinović et al. (2018), which are investigated in the context of contract theory. Wasa et al. (2018) reveal that the reward design for the initial and terminal cost can be independent of that for the transient cost. Therefore, this paper focuses on the reward functional for only the transient cost, which is given by (18).
2. Since the control parameter \( u \) is composed of \((u_{-i}, u_{-i})\), \( i = 1, 2 \), we sometimes use \( I_i(x; u_i, u_{-i}, \theta_i, h_i) \) in place of \( I_i(x; u_i, \theta_i, h_i) \).
to the control structure and necessary conditions for Markov Nash equilibrium \((u^*_i, u^*_{-i})\) of the controls (20), the form of the reward functional (18) is acquired. Hence, by using (18), Proposition 1 is obtained regarding the relationship between the parameters \((h_1, h_2)\) with (19) and the constraints (15) and (16).

Proposition 1. (a) For the reward functionals (18) with parameters \((h_1, h_2)\) based on (19), a pair of controls \((u_1, u_2)\) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the control has the form defined by (20).

(b) For the reward functionals (18) with reward parameters \((h_1, h_2)\) and the Nash equilibrium \((u^*_i, u^*_{-i})\) obtained by (20), the constraint (16) is fulfilled.

Proof. See Wasa et al. (2018).

From this result, as long as all the agents report truthful private parameters \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) to the principal, the reward functional given by (18) guarantees the incentive-compatibility constraint (15) and the individual-rationality constraint (16) on the agent’s input \(u_i\). Moreover, the Nash equilibrium (20) and the reward functional (18) with the parameter \((h_1, h_2)\) defined by (19) and (9) achieve social cost minimization (Wasa et al. (2018)).

4. STRATEGIC BIDDING PROBLEM UNDER MORAL HAZARD

4.1 Problem Formulation

When each agent bids his own private information \(\theta_i(t)\), \(t \in [t_0, t_f]\), the principal can determine an optimal reward functional led by (18) with (19) for the hidden private information \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) and the social optimal control preventing agents’ moral hazard control behavior for \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) is guaranteed as above. Meanwhile, each agent can bid his private information strategically. Let us denote by \(\theta_i(t), t \in [t_0, t_f]\) the true private information of agent \(i\), \((i = 1, 2)\). As long as each agent implements (20), the prescribed level of agent’s net cost and the social optimal control for \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) are guaranteed. The input constituted by Nash equilibrium (20) is independent of the strategic bidding information \(\theta_i\). Afterward, it is assumed that each agent always implements his control led by (20) and the strategic bidding problem of his information \(\theta_i\) is handled.

The main objective of the strategic bidding problem is to find a Nash equilibrium in a parameter space of the \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\). To describe the strategic bidding problem clearly, the state \(x\), the price \(p\), and the parameter \(g\) in the backward sweep are determined dependently on the bid parameter \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) from the foregoing discussion. From (11), \(g\) is determined by

\[
g = -(A - BR^{-1}B^TP)^Tg + \begin{bmatrix}
0
C_1^TQ_1
0
0
C_2^TQ_2
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
\theta_1 \\
\theta_2
\end{bmatrix},
\]

\(g(t_f) = 0\). \hspace{1cm} (21)

For the optimal control (7) with (9) in the state feedback form, the state equation (6) is also described by

\[
\dot{x} = (A - BR^{-1}B^TP)x - BR^{-1}Bg,
\]

\(x(t_0) = [x_{00}^T, x_{01}^T, x_{02}^T]^T\). \hspace{1cm} (22)

By combining (2), (9), (12), (18), (19) and (20), the agent’s net cost \(I_i\), \(i = 1, 2\) is given by

\[
I^*_i(\theta_1, \theta_2) = \int_{t_0}^{t_f} \left[ (\dot{\theta}_i - C_i x_i)^T Q_i (\dot{\theta}_i - C_i x_i) - (\theta_i - C_i x_i)^T Q_i (\theta_i - C_i x_i) \right] dt
\]

\[
= \int_{t_0}^{t_f} [\theta_i^T Q_i \dot{\theta}_i - 2(C_i x_i)^T Q_i (\dot{\theta}_i - \theta_i) - \theta_i^T Q_i \theta_i] dt, \hspace{1cm} (23)
\]

where \(x\) in (23) and \(g\) depend on \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) and obey (22) and (21), respectively. As \(Q_i\) is defined as a positive-definite matrix, the private information \(\theta_i\) minimizing the cost (23), particularly \(-\theta_i^T Q_i \theta_i\), takes a value on the boundary in parameter space. As long as all the agents implement Nash equilibrium (20), all the agents’ estimated (enormous) costs with bid information \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) are shared with the principal and the agents will make a large profit.

Then, although the principal’s objective is to minimize the social cost for evaluating the efficiency of the network, the principal will pay enormous money and the network is unstabilized at its worst. From the point of view of the budget, as the incentive cost \(W\) led by (18) is born by the principal, it is realistic not to exceed a prescribed level of the principal’s budget \(k\). Hence, a revised strategic bidding problem adding the inequality constraint on the principal’s net cost

\[
I^*(\theta_1, \theta_2) \leq k \hspace{1cm} (24)
\]

is reformulated. The constraint (24) is an integral constraint. Therefore, given a Lagrange multiplier \(\rho \geq 0\), which is independent of time \(t\), the constraint (24) is equivalent to

\[
\rho(I^*(\theta_1, \theta_2) - k) = 0, \hspace{0.5cm} \rho \geq 0 \hspace{1cm} (25)
\]

(e.g., see Liberezon (2011)). From (9), (13) and (18)–(20), the cost functional \(I^*\) is given by

\[
I^*(\theta_1, \theta_2) = \int_{t_0}^{t_f} \left[ x_0^T Q_0 x_0 + \sum_{i=1,2} (\theta_i - C_i x_i)^T Q_i (\theta_i - C_i x_i) + (P x + g)^T B R^{-1} B^T (P x + g) \right] dt. \hspace{1cm} (26)
\]

The feasible space of the bidding parameter \(\theta_i\) of the agent \(i\) \((i = 1, 2)\) is limited to the space satisfying the budget constraint (24). Hence, it is assumed that each agent \(i\) minimizes his own net cost \(I^*_i\) subject to the principal’s budget constraint (24). Considering the necessary condition of the constrained nonlinear optimization problems, the agent \(i\) modifies his objective function to the sum of the original net cost and the penalty functional on \(I^*_i\) led by (25), i.e.,

\[
I^*_i(\theta_1, \theta_2) := I^*_i(\theta_1, \theta_2) + \rho_i(I^*(\theta_1, \theta_2) - k), \hspace{0.5cm} \rho_i > 1 \hspace{1cm} (27)
\]

along the dynamics (21) and (22). \(^4\) The parameter \(\rho_i\) in (27) can be regarded as a penalty parameter. The objective function (27) can be interpreted as balancing the agents’ individual rationality and the principal’s budget for the suitable incentive by using \(\rho_i\) and \(k\). Substitute (23) and (26) into (27), then

\[
I^*_i(\theta_1, \theta_2) = \int_{t_0}^{t_f} L_i(x, g, \dot{\theta}_i, \theta_i, \rho_i, k, t) dt, \hspace{1cm} (28)
\]

\(^4\) The constraint \(\rho_i > 1\) instead of \(\rho_i \geq 0\) is led by the necessary condition in Theorem 2. See Section 4.2 for more details.
where
\[
L_i(x, g, \bar{\theta}_i, \theta, \rho, k, t) = (\bar{\theta}_i - C_i x_i)\top Q_i (\bar{\theta}_i - C_i x_i) + \rho_i x_i\top Q_0 x_0 + (\rho_i - 1)(\theta_i - C_i x_i)\top Q_i (\theta_i - C_i x_i)
\]
\[
+ \rho_i (P x + g)\top B R^{-1} B^\top (P x + g) - \frac{\rho_i k}{t_f - t_0}
\]
\[
= \bar{\theta}_i \top Q_i \bar{\theta}_i - 2 \bar{\theta}_i \top Q_i C_i x_i + x_i \top C_i \top Q_i C_i x_i + \theta_i \top Q^\rho \theta_i - \theta_i \top Q^\rho C_i x_i + x_i \top C^\top Q^\rho x_i
\]
\[
+ \rho_i (P x + g)\top B R^{-1} B^\top (P x + g) - \frac{\rho_i k}{t_f - t_0}
\]  

Let us seek \((\theta^*_i, \theta^{\dagger}_i)\) constituted by (30). The strategic bidding problem formulated in Section 4.1 is an open-loop LQ Nash game with the strategies \(\theta^*_i, \theta^{\dagger}_i, i = 1, 2\), and has the dynamic constraints (21) and (22) defined with a TPBV condition. As \(Q_i\) is a symmetric positive-definite matrix and \(\rho_i > 1\), the cost \(J^*_i\) led by (28) and (29) is strictly convex with respect to \(\theta_i\). Then, Theorem 2 is obtained.

Theorem 2. Suppose that, for \(\rho_i > 1, i = 1, 2\), there is an (open-loop Nash) equilibrium \((\theta^*_i, \theta^{\dagger}_i)\) led by (30) and let us set \(k := I^*(\theta^*_i, \theta^{\dagger}_i)\). Then, given parameters \(\rho_i > 1\), (I) the strategic bidding problem defined by (21)–(23) and (26)–(30) has a unique equilibrium \((\theta^*_i, \theta^{\dagger}_i)\) in \(\Theta_1 \times \Theta_2\); (II) the unique equilibrium \((\theta^*_i, \theta^{\dagger}_i)\) is given by

\[
\dot{x}_i = (A - B P) x_i - A y_i, \quad x_i(0) = x_{i0} = [x_{i01}, x_{i02}]\top
\]

\[
J_i = \int_{0}^{15} (10(\bar{\theta}_i - x_i)^2 + u_i^2) \, dt
\]

where \(\mu_i\) is an element of \(\mu^* = [\mu^*_{i1}, \mu^*_{i2}]\top, i = 1, 2\), and \(\mu^*\) is determined as a unique solution of the TPBV (linear) equations led by \(\theta^*_i, i = 1, 2\):

\[
\dot{x}_i = (A - B P) x_i - A y_i, \quad x_i(0) = [x_{i01}, x_{i02}]\top, \quad (32a)
\]

\[
\dot{y}_i = - (A - B P) y_i + A C x_i
\]

\[
\lambda^i = \theta^*_i - A C \mu_i - 2(\rho_i P^T A B g - 2(\rho_i P^T A B P) + A' C) x + 2 c_0, \quad (32c)
\]

\[
\mu^i = (A - B P) \mu^i + A B \lambda^i - 2(\rho_i A B) g - 2(\rho_i A B P) x, \quad (32d)
\]

where \(A = BR^{-1} B^\top, A_C = A_C^i + A_C^2\),

\[
\begin{align*}
A_C^1 &= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & C_1^T Q_1 C_1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \\
A_C^2 &= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \\
A_C^3 &= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \\
A_C^4 &= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}
\end{align*}
\]

Proof. Since the open-loop Nash equilibrium is considered and the parameters \((\rho_1, \rho_2)\) are fixed, the necessary condition for \((\theta^*_i, \theta^{\dagger}_i)\) can be derived by using the maximum principle (Bryson and Ho (1975); Liberzon (2011)). From Basar and Olsder (1999), the necessary condition is given as the TPBV problem composed of (21) and (22) and their adjoint equations (32c) and (32d) with the equilibrium (31). Thus, by using the existence and uniqueness theorem of the TPBV problem for linear differential equations (Asher et al., 1995, Theorem 3.26b) with \(\rho_i > 1\), the TPBV problem (32) has a unique solution and the equilibrium \((\theta^*_i, \theta^{\dagger}_i)\) is given by (31) and (32). This completes the proof.

Theorem 2 indicates that the necessary (and sufficient) condition of the Nash equilibrium (30) led by the minimization problem with (27) is given as the unique solution of the TPBV problem (32) under \(I^*(\theta^*_i, \theta^{\dagger}_i) = k\). However, Theorem 2 does not theoretically find the principal’s maximum budget \(k\) and the corresponding parameters \(\rho_1\) and \(\rho_2\) satisfying the budget constraint \(I^*(\theta^*_i, \theta^{\dagger}_i) = k\) and the individual-rationality constraint \(I^*_i(\theta^*_i, \theta^{\dagger}_i) \leq 0\). This theoretical issue including convergence properties remains as one of the future works and it will be discussed in a separate paper. In Section 5, a heuristic computational method will be proposed to seek suitable parameters \(k\) and \(\rho_i, i = 1, 2\).

5. SIMULATION

In this section, the quantitative influence of the proposed strategic bidding under moral hazard is analyzed through a simulation. Each agent \(i (i = 1, 2)\) has the local dynamics obeying \(\dot{x}_i = u_i, x_i(0) = x_{i0} = 1\) with the individual strategic cost \(J_i = \int_{0}^{15} [10(\bar{\theta}_i - x_i)^2 + u_i^2] \, dt\) and his actual cost \(J_i = \int_{0}^{15} [10(\bar{\theta}_i - x_i)^2 + u_i^2] \, dt\), that is \(t_0 = 0, t_f = 15\).
Due to risk-neutral agents and principal, it is expected to directly solve the problem by using the mathematical technique in Wasa et al. (2018) and this paper.

Before discussing the strategic bidding problem in Section 4, the case of the social optimal control is verified. The case is also the solution of the optimal reward design problem under moral hazard with true private information, based on Proposition 1 in Section 3. Then, the time evolution of $\theta$, $x$, and $u$ is shown in Fig. 1 and the resulting costs are $I^* = 7.3580$ and $I_1^* = I_2^* = 0$. From Fig. 1, Proposition 1 holds.

To verify the performance of the strategic bidding based on Theorem 2, a parameter $\rho_1$ in the range of $1 < \rho_1 \leq 1000$ is selected and the TPBV problem (32) for the fixed parameter $\rho_1$ is solved. Fig. 2 shows the costs $I^*(\theta_1, \theta_2)$ and $I^*(\theta_1^*, \theta_2)$ and the corresponding information for $(\theta_1^*, \theta_2^*)$ given by the solution of the TPBV problem (32) with (31) in the range of $1 < \rho_1 \leq 1000$. We see from Fig. 2 that $I^*$ is a monotonically-decreasing function for $\rho_1$ and $I_1^*$ is a monotonically-increasing function. To satisfy the individual-rationality constraint $I_i^* \leq 0$, $i = 1, 2$, let us denote by $\rho_i^*$ the parameter $\rho_i$ such that $I_i^*(\theta_1^*, \theta_2^*) = 0$. From the center and right figures in Fig. 2, $\rho_1^* = 14.8$ and $\rho_2^* = 11.3$. Hence, as the principal finds $k = I^*(\theta_1^*, \theta_2)$ minimizing $I^*$ from $1 < \rho_1 = \rho_2 \leq \rho^* := \min(\rho_1^*, \rho_2^*)$, we obtain $k^* = I^*(\theta_1^*, \theta_2^*) = 9.7146$ at $\rho^* = 11.3$.

Figs. 3 and 4 show $\theta_i$, $x$, and $u$ given by the solution of the TPBV (32) with (31) for $\rho_1 = \rho^*$ and $\rho_1 = 1000$, respectively. We see from Fig. 3 that, compared with Fig. 1, $x_i$, $i = 1, 2$ goes to $\theta_i$ but $x_0$ converges to 0.2 not 0. This is caused by the influence of the agents’ strategic bidding taking the individual-rationality constraint into account. Hence, the results in Fig. 3 give the limitations of the strategic bidding case. Fig. 4 indicates that the principal sets a relatively small $k$ taking a sufficient large $\rho$ and prioritizes the minimization of $J_0$. As a result, the agents receive a small reward $W_1$ and pays a large cost due to the gap between $x_i$ and $\theta_i$. However, the individual rationality does not hold and the agents will not agree with the proposed mechanism from the principal.

6. CONCLUSION

This paper has investigated the whole system behavior caused by the influence of the agents’ strategic behavior while utilizing their individual control and private information. In particular, we have formulated a strategic bidding problem under moral hazard for a dynamic LQ network in the presence of a principal-agent relationship. Then, we have analytically derived an optimal design of the strategic bidding problem and discuss their effectiveness and limitations through a simulation. The resulting controls and strategic bidding give the construction of a (near)-optimal agreement between the principal and the agents while satisfying the individual-rationality constraint.

The problem formulation considered in this paper can be regarded as a special case of strategic bidding problems combining moral hazard and adverse selection. To achieve such a strategic bidding problem, Nash equilibrium on both $(\theta_1, \theta_2)$ and $(u_1, u_2)$ under $(W_1, W_2)$ should be sought. Another issue of the proposed approach is implementation in real systems. These are our next challenge. As the standard problem under moral hazard uses a stochastic system, another future direction is to extend our problem formulation to a stochastic model, e.g. LQG systems. Due to risk-neutral agents and principal, it is expected to directly solve the problem by using the mathematical technique in Wasa et al. (2018) and this paper.

Fig. 1. Time evolution of $\theta$, $x$ and $u$ for social optimal control with true private information ($\theta_1 = \bar{\theta}_1 = 0.1$, $\theta_2 = \bar{\theta}_2 = -0.1$). The resulting costs are $I^* = 7.3580$, $I_1^* = I_2^* = 0$, $W_1 = -2.8370$ and $W_2 = -4.1246$.

Fig. 2. Costs ($I^*$, $J_1$ and $I_1^*$) and incentive ($W_i$) for strategic bidding of private information at each $\rho_1 = \rho_2 > 1$.
Fig. 3. Time evolution of $\theta$, $x$ and $u$ for strategic bidding of private information with $\rho_1 = \rho_2 = \rho^* = 11.4$. The resulting costs are $I^* = 9.7146$, $I_1^* = -0.9046$, $I_2^* = -0.0180$, $W_1 = -4.2710$ and $W_2 = -4.4637$.

Fig. 4. Time evolution of $\theta$, $x$ and $u$ for true private information with $\rho_1 = \rho_2 = 1000$. The resulting costs are $I^* = 3.3973$, $I_1^* = 3.7660$, $I_2^* = 3.9416$, $W_1 = -1.2703$ and $W_2 = -1.2925$.

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