Making states work: State failure and the crisis of governance

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Introduction: Making states work

Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur

[Globalization and interdependence compel us to] think afresh about how we manage our joint activities and shared interests, for many challenges that we confront today are beyond the reach of any one state to meet on its own. At the national level we must govern better; and at the international level we must govern better together. Effective states are essential to both tasks. (Kofi A. Annan, “We the Peoples”)

In the wealth of literature on state failure, curiously little attention has been paid to the question of what constitutes state success and what enables a state to succeed. This book seeks to fill that gap through examining the strategies and tactics of international actors, local political elites and civil society groups to build or rebuild public institutions before they reach the point of failure – to make the state work.

It is frequently assumed that the collapse of state structures, whether through defeat by an external power or as a result of internal chaos, leads to a vacuum of political power. This is rarely the case. The mechanisms through which political power are exercised may be less formalized or consistent, but basic questions of how best to ensure the physical and economic security of oneself and one’s dependants do not simply disappear when the institutions of the state break down. Non-state actors in such situations may exercise varying degrees of political power over local populations, at times providing basic social services from education to medical care. Even where non-state actors exist as parasites on local populations, political life goes on.
How to engage in such an environment is a particular problem for policy makers in intergovernmental organizations and donor governments. But it poses far greater difficulties for the embattled state institutions and the populations of such territories. The present volume examines how these various actors have responded to crises in the legitimacy and viability of state institutions, with a particular emphasis on those situations in which the state has been salvaged or at least kept afloat.

Basic concepts of political philosophy in this area remain contested, including sovereignty, power, authority and legitimacy. As Sebastian von Einsiedel’s chapter demonstrates, there are wide variations in the definitions not merely of “state failure” but of the very idea of the state itself. For present purposes, the state is considered to be an abstract yet powerful notion that embraces a network of authoritative institutions that make and enforce top-level decisions throughout a territorially defined political entity. The modern state is a manifestation of political power that has been progressively depersonalized, formalized and rationalized; the state is the medium through which political power is integrated into a comprehensive social order. In idealized form, the state embodies the political mission of a society; its institutions and officials express the proper array of techniques that are used in efforts to accomplish that mission. When those institutions and officials cease to function, this abstract idea of the state collapses and the political power that had been channelled through such structures finds alternative, less ordered, means of expression.

State failure is not, therefore, a static concept. Rather, it denotes a continuum of circumstances afflicting states with weak institutions; this continuum extends from states that do not or cannot provide basic public goods through to Somalia-style collapse of governance.

Definitions are important politically as well as analytically. The institution of the modern state and much of the theoretical literature about it originated in Europe; so too did nationalism as it is presently understood. Yet the relationship between “nation” and “state” is historically contingent rather than logically necessary. In particular, in many “post-colonial” states, wars of national liberation and state formation have been followed by even more destructive wars of national debilitation and secession, as James Mayall’s chapter demonstrates. The difficulty for most post-colonial societies was that state-building and nation-building (as well as economic development) had to be pursued simultaneously: at times they worked against one another, leading to crises of state legitimacy and the weakening of state institutions.

One of the most important requirements for making states work, therefore, is the creation of apolitical bureaucratic structures (civil service, judiciary, police, army) supported by an ideology that legitimates the role of neutral state authority in maintaining social order through prescribed
procedures and the rule of law. This is a theme that runs through the volume – especially the “successes” described in part IV – and is revisited by the editors in the concluding chapter.

The book is organized in five parts. The first two parts outline the major issues confronting international engagement in this area and the regional dynamics that create “bad neighbourhoods” and cultivate dysfunctional states. The third and fourth parts turn to case-studies of states on the edge of failure that have yet to tumble over the precipice and of states that have returned from the brink to achieve varying degrees of success. The final part examines specific policy options available to international actors.

The choice of cases – including the Solomon Islands instead of Somalia, Singapore instead of Sierra Leone – intentionally runs counter to the accepted wisdom in the discourse of state failure. Whereas most accounts of state failure tend to undertake autopsies of states that have failed or collapsed, the interest here is in building or rebuilding institutions before they reach that point. This requires a broader frame of reference than is typically used in the literature, but the lessons of Singapore in the 1960s or the Solomon Islands today have important implications for efforts to establish functioning states or simply generate the political will to try.

Part I provides the intellectual, historical and political context of contemporary engagement to support states with weak institutions. In the first chapter, Sebastian von Einsiedel presents an overview of current policy and analytical approaches to state failure. The 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States transformed the security environment within which such questions are considered, epitomized in the bald statement in the 2002 US National Security Strategy that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones”. Seeking to make states work in the interests of national security, however, both underestimates the nature of the problem posed by weak institutions and overstates the capacity of intervention to resolve it. Einsiedel examines theories of the state and its collapse, emphasizing the need to tailor international responses to the specific circumstances of a case. As always, prevention is preferable to cure. But it is hard to generate the political will to justify concerted action to respond to the causes of state failure rather than merely to protect oneself from its consequences.

James Mayall’s chapter examines the legacy of colonialism – a common (and commonly misunderstood) factor in the history of states that develop weak institutions. Colonial structures did not merely define the boundaries of many states but also reified internal divisions along ethnic or religious lines. Nevertheless, the most lasting impact of a colonial past may well be the form of political struggle that was required to end it.
Anti-colonial nationalism provided a potent rallying cry for overthrowing foreign institutions, but it did not provide an ongoing social basis for organizing political activity and structures in the post-colonial state. How this tension was resolved in each case depended largely upon local factors, in particular the political culture and social structures in place before, during and after the period of colonial rule.

In chapter 3, Michael Ignatieff examines the ways in which human rights have been used to justify regime change, “nation-building” and military intervention for human protection purposes – three methods used by intervening powers to make recalcitrant states “work”. His chapter focuses in particular on how human rights have figured in the exercise and rationalization of US power, with the 2003 intervention in Iraq providing a troubling bookend to his narrative. If human rights are invoked opportunistically to justify convenient foreign policy choices, and if the outcomes are testimony to the low ranking that human rights assume in those foreign policy priorities, does this mean that such interventions should be abandoned in future? Not entirely, he argues, but the failure of such “nation-building” projects to live up to the rhetoric should make us sceptical as to our capacity to make states work from the outside.

Part II examines the regional context of states with weak institutions. Even so-called intra-state wars are typically transnational in character, involving the dark side of globalization or elements of uncivil society (arms flows, refugees or illicit commodity flows such as drugs and diamonds, for example). These three chapters consider overlapping factors that can influence – both positively and negatively – government capacity, such as regional conflicts, transborder criminal networks, porous borders and economic instability. The regional context may also determine the international response to these situations, ranging from the greater engagement with Central Asia after 11 September 2001 to the relative lack of interest in the South Pacific.

In chapter 4, Barnett Rubin and Andrea Armstrong provide an analytical framework within which to examine these factors: regional conflict formation. Regional competition for political and economic influence may lead to the establishment of networks that are more significant than weak state institutions. By examining how these dynamics played out in two otherwise very different regions – the Great Lakes region of Africa and South Central Asia – Rubin and Armstrong put the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Afghanistan into a regional context. This context is important not merely in understanding how the descent into conflict took place; it provides some suggestions as to how regional approaches can be an important part of conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction. Importantly, the authors warn against an agenda that focuses only on state-building of the weak state in ques-
It is not the simple lack of a state that undermines human security in these regions, but the incentives that dictate how power is wielded and to what ends. Shaping these incentives may demand an approach that adapts to existing networks and that supports institutions not just in one state but in other key states in a given region.

Regional dynamics played a more subtle role in the phenomenon of weak states in Latin America. Using Colombia as a departure point, Mónica Serrano and Paul Kenny argue in chapter 5 that Latin American states have traditionally enjoyed at best a tenuous monopoly of violence. In such an environment, the legitimacy of the state as the primary provider of security is called into question. Rather than berating the weak state and seeking to bolster its capacity to respond to alternative sources of violence, however, Serrano and Kenny argue for a “critical weak state perspective”, focusing on realistic goals for the state in question. Such a perspective would challenge utopian visions of radical reform in short order, but also undermine opportunistic military support from outsiders in furtherance of a domestic political agenda – most notably US support for the counter-narcotic Plan Colombia.

In chapter 6, Benjamin Reilly and Elsina Wainwright examine a different form of regional dynamic among the troubled island states of the South Pacific. Until recently seen as comprising relatively prosperous and stable countries, this region is now termed an “arc of instability”. The region suffers from factors common to other regions with weak states – ethnic divisions, unequal distribution of resources, civil–military tensions, proliferation of small arms – but these are compounded by questions of viability. For some island states, rising sea levels make this question a physical one; for others, their small size and dispersed populations challenge conventional forms of governance. Central to international involvement in the South Pacific is the role of Australia, though until recently it has been reluctant to engage deeply in the region. The possibility of terrorist activity in failed states has contributed to a policy shift, but the key problems confronting the South Pacific are not military. Rather, police support and further economic integration are needed to address the more systemic problems confronting the island states. This demands a long-term commitment from Australia, for there is no viable exit strategy from one’s own region.

Part III looks at marginal cases: states with weak institutions that have either not failed or have fared better than expected. Pakistan, with a history of conflict, Islamic extremism and nuclear weapons, is too important to allow it to fail and it has been the recipient of extensive external support, most importantly from the United States. As Samina Ahmed argues in chapter 7, however, this support for the status quo, in particular the military’s monopoly over power, is itself largely responsible for
Pakistan’s crisis in state legitimacy. Challenging the authoritarianism and centralization that have undermined the state will require concerted international support for new, representative institutions. As long as the United States, among others, supports direct military rule, meaningful change in Pakistan will be impossible. But, as long as the military remains unaccountable to political processes, the state will continue to lose the allegiance of its citizens, incrementally eroding its stability and thus escalating the risk that Pakistan poses to the international community.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) – more commonly known as North Korea – is generally viewed as bad, mad or sad, or all three. In chapter 8, Hazel Smith provides a more nuanced account of the DPRK as a state that was never intended to “work” in the way that the liberal model of institutions distinct from governing political authority suggests. Instead, the DPRK was established as a fusion of party and society permanently mobilized for self-defence activities. When this party/society complex began to disintegrate during the food shortages of the mid-1990s, it became possible that a state in its modern sense could emerge, but the contours of foreign engagement with the DPRK must be mapped by reference to this unusual political heritage.

Afghanistan is suggestive of the opportunities and dangers of modern state-building – and of the importance of seizing opportunities for meaningful change when they arise. As Amin Saikal shows in chapter 9, despite the challenges to Afghanistan as a state since the late 1970s, Afghans still demonstrate a strong sense of society. Remarkably, despite a generation of almost unceasing conflict, there is no serious secessionist movement. Instead, Afghanistan is dominated by a web of overlapping micro-societies, whose personalized power structures long undermined the formation of coherent state institutions, ultimately creating the political space for extremist unifying forces such as the Taliban. The 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States thrust Afghanistan onto the international agenda, but efforts to secure a lasting peace were soon overtaken by the crisis in Iraq. Plans to create a strong centralized state in Afghanistan are intended to overcome divisions between the micro-societies, but they run the risk of merely papering over the political dynamics that these micro-societies represent. The only way to secure a stable political environment is to embrace those dynamics and design political structures around them accordingly, but international actors appear to be more focused on exit deadlines – exit without a strategy.

Part IV turns to three states that are now broadly considered successful but that experienced a basic crisis in their legitimacy or effectiveness, or had to establish themselves against a backdrop of deep initial scepticism, and it examines how that crisis and scepticism were overcome.

Mozambique is frequently touted as a relatively successful case of in-
ternational intervention to turn a state from war to relative stability. As Michel Cahen argues in chapter 10, however, the conclusion of war is far from identical with the achievement of peace. In examining whether Mozambique actually “works”, he suggests that early assumptions that the conflict was driven by external factors – most importantly South Africa’s policy of destabilization – are mirrored in present assessments of Mozambique’s relative economic success based on models advocated by the international financial institutions. Just as the causes of what was ultimately an internal conflict were overlooked for many years, so today the economic figures mask a fragile social and political balance. Cahen’s central argument is that building up institutions of the state has, for too long, overshadowed the need for engagement at the level of the nation.

Costa Rica, discussed in chapter 11, has achieved a remarkable level of stability in a notoriously bad neighbourhood. As Abelardo Morales-Gamboa and Stephen Baranyi explain, this exceptionalism has historical roots in the relatively marginal role that colonialism played in the country’s early development. Stable political parties and a culture of tolerance laid the foundations for the present pillars of Costa Rican democracy, consolidated after a brief civil war in 1948: political institutions based on inclusive liberal democracy, demilitarization, a mixed economy, a welfare state and a strong sense of nationhood. These factors and enlightened leadership enabled Costa Rica to escape the civil wars and foreign intervention experienced by its neighbours in the 1980s, but more recent drives for further economic liberalization have challenged the consensus that lies at the heart of Costa Rican politics.

Singapore, with a stable government and a gross domestic product per capita that rivals that of Britain, is today an unambiguous success. But the strength of today’s city-state belies its fragile beginnings and concerns for its future. A number of chapters in the present volume discuss international intervention, but less has been said about the implications of foreign withdrawal. Chapter 12, by Patricia Shu Ming Tan and Simon Tay, examines how Singapore managed the withdrawal of British troops from the former colony soon after its unexpected separation from Malaysia. Preparations for the departure of an external actor served in themselves as an important state-building exercise. Importantly, Singapore fought to manage its own timetable and development plans, drawing upon foreign expertise but always under local leadership. The security threat posed by the British withdrawal was also used as a springboard for nation-building, with compulsory National Service together with housing and education programmes designed as pan-ethnic institutions to encourage Singaporeans to identify Singapore as state, nation and home. Thus, Tan and Tay argue, Singapore may not have assumed a strictly liberal democratic form but it is nonetheless a stakeholder society that works.
Part V turns to forms of engagement available to interested outsiders, with four chapters examining distinct trends in recent international practice: prevention, humanitarian action, transitional justice and international administration.  

Chapter 13, by I. William Zartman, outlines the web of policy options confronting international actors seeking to prevent the downward spiral of dysfunctional states. Each stage has its own difficulties, from diagnosis of the problem and the mandate to intervene before things get too late, to the question of what one does when the political will to act exists. Political will lies at the heart of the problem: early warnings are plentiful, but this does not always lead to early awareness or early determination to act. Various regimes governing non-military forms of early intervention have emerged in recent years, ranging from human rights and democratization to anti-corruption and fiscal responsibility. All too often, however, it is only the final phase of failure that draws international attention, by which time more intrusive measures may be required.

Whether or not strategies are in place to address the political consequences of weakened state institutions, vulnerable populations require humanitarian assistance. Those providing such relief, however, are frequently confronted by an array of overlapping and conflicting political authorities in the recipient state. As Thomas Weiss and Peter Hoffman argue in chapter 14, humanitarian actors must therefore become more flexible in dealing with a wider variety of actors – a challenge that presents both doctrinal and political challenges. Non-state actors may impede access to populations at risk or distort the provision of assistance through their economic interests, but they may also provide the seeds of future peace-building networks. A central dilemma for humanitarians, then, is to distinguish between spoilers and civil society, as well as dealing with those non-state actors that embody qualities of both. Responding to this challenge demands a better understanding of non-state actors (“humanitarian intelligence”) and operating strategies better tailored to the environment within which humanitarians now find themselves. In this way, it may be possible to make humanitarianism “work”.

Getting the state itself to work is another question. Although the forms that state failure assumes vary widely, it is almost always characterized by weak judicial institutions. Building or rebuilding institutions demands a reckoning with past injustices that were perpetrated in the absence or with the connivance of those institutions. In chapter 15, Alex Boraine examines the transitional justice options available to states emerging from violent conflict. How that transition comes about has important ramifications for the appropriateness of different judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. This is, however, only one aspect of the need to tailor such mechanisms to local requirements: unless transitional justice mechanisms are
seen as enjoying local legitimacy, the outcomes themselves may be called into question. This demands flexibility on the part of international actors, including on the controversial question of amnesties.

Chapter 16, by Simon Chesterman, examines the most extensive form of intervention in the service of making a state or territory work: international administration. Is it possible to establish the basis for legitimate and sustainable self-rule through a period of benevolent autocracy? Focusing on the experiments conducted by the United Nations in the 1990s, and those pursued by the United States in the name of its war on terror, there are reasons to be modest. Transitional administration combines an unusual mix of idealism and realism: the idealist project that people can be saved from themselves through education, economic incentives and the space to develop mature political institutions; together with the realist basis for that project in what is ultimately military occupation. In this way, the international community is exposed at its most hypocritical: the means are inconsistent with the ends, they are frequently inadequate for those ends, and in many situations the means are simply inappropriate for the ends.

The final chapter, by the editors, brings together the policy implications of the earlier chapters. Not surprisingly, the key insight is that states cannot be made to work from the outside. As the cases examined in this volume show, success in maintaining the viability and legitimacy of a state requires enlightened local leadership, coherent institutional coordination and international assistance – including simply providing the necessary space – for consolidating a national response. For international actors, this is a humbling conclusion: assistance is often a necessary but never a sufficient factor in achieving success. But for local actors this should be seen as an opportunity to seize responsibility – “ownership” in the present jargon – and use the brief window of international interest to foster conversation among the population about what sort of state it wants.

Notes

1. Kofi A. Annan, “We the Peoples”: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 2000, p. 7.
2. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: President of the United States, September 2002, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html], p. iv.
3. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, para. 18.
4. The list is not exhaustive – notably, different forms of economic engagement are not considered in the present volume. See, for example, Mats R. Berdal and David M. Malone,
eds, *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000; Hernando de Soto, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*, New York: Basic Books, 2000; Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003; Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds, *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003; Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper, *War Economies in a Regional Context: The Challenge of Transformation*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004.
Tolstoy wrote that all happy families are happy alike, whereas every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. It is tempting to say the same thing of states, as successful states enter an increasingly homogeneous globalized economy and weaker states slip into individualized chaos. As this volume has shown, that would be only partly true. Although all the cases considered here demonstrate the importance of local context – history, culture, individual actors – they still outline some general lessons that may be of assistance in addressing problems confronting states with weak institutions. Put another way, structural problems and root causes are part of the problem of “state failure”, but this volume shows that a key question for policy makers is how weak states deal with crisis.

As explained in the Introduction, this volume is the final product of a project that grew out of the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). ICISS acknowledged that state sovereignty is the bedrock principle on which the modern international system – a society of states – is founded. It pointed to the problem of incapacitated and criminalized states, but argued that the best solution was to strengthen and legitimize states rather than overthrow the system of states. A world of capable, efficient and legitimate states will help to achieve the goals of order, stability and predictability and promote national and human security.

The end of the Cold War was not just a defeat of the Soviet Union as the superpower rival of the United States. It also marked the defeat of
the ideology of communism and the collapse of the ideology of the command economy by the forces of liberal democracy and market economy. The enterprise of state-making since the end of the Cold War reflects these broader contextual realities. Political correctness aside, the major concerns with regard to state incapacity, failure and criminalization have focused on developing countries and in particular the former colonies. The colonial powers must accept their share of the blame for having ruptured the social development, arrested the political development and retarded the economic development of their wards. But that is history, and by itself does not help us much in pointing the way forward to a better future.

It does, however, attest to an enduring problem. In Western societies, the democratic franchise came after the liberal society and the liberal state were firmly established. In the post-colonial countries, democracy could not be installed as an adjunct of the liberal state, for the latter itself had not been established. In these societies, the rhetoric of democracy often involved, and the logic of the empirical reality occasionally implied, opposition to establishing the liberal capitalist state. Where the traditional culture is little attuned to political competition, the market polity of a competitive political party system may fail to take root and comprise instead just the “top dressing” of a political system.

State nationalism, too, originated in Europe. The state used its institutions and resources to promote national identity in order to consolidate and legitimize itself by manipulating these powerful new symbols. The campaign was so successful that national self-determination became a shorthand for the idea that nationalism requires the creation of a sovereign state for every nation. The nation-state became the focus of cultural identity. Yet the relationship between “nation” and “state” too has been historically contingent rather than logically necessary. The difficulty for most post-colonial societies was that state-building and nation-building had to be embarked on simultaneously. If “post-colonial” is to mean something other than post-independence, then it must entail some enduring legacy of colonial rule for the state that came into being with independence.

In development theory, the state was viewed as autonomous, homogeneous, in control of economic and political power, in charge of foreign economic relations, and possessing the requisite managerial and technical capacity to formulate and implement planned development. In reality, in many developing countries the state was a tool of a narrow family, clique or sect that was fully preoccupied with fighting off internal and external challenges to its closed privileges. In most of the literature, development has meant a strengthening of the material base of a society. A strong
state would ensure order, look after national security and intervene actively in the management of the national economy. Yet the consolidation of state power can be used in the name of national security and law and order to suppress individual, group or even majority demands on the government and to plunder the resources of a society.

Three theoretical strands in particular are worth mentioning for explaining the relationship between group struggle and state power. The pluralist theory of democracy views democratic public policy as the outcome of a struggle between organized groups for control of the state. Stability is the outcome of cross-cutting cleavages: when individuals belong to multiple groups, the disruptive consequences of group conflict are attenuated; conversely, of course, where groups are homogeneous and individuals belong to mutually exclusive functional associations, social conflict is intensified. The Marxist theory of the state holds that two or more classes involved in economic relations of dominance and subordination are necessary for the existence of a state. Threats to the social order and the stability of the state result from an intensification of the class struggle. The dictatorship of the proletariat signifies the capture of social and political power by one class; class antagonisms disappear because there is only one class; and the state as the instrument and embodiment of the rule of one class over another withers away. The third theory of state is that of the plural society, a social order in which institutionally segmented groups coexist in one political unit without significant intermingling, and political power is monopolized by one cultural group. In this theory, the most salient feature of the post-colonial state is not its previous history of conquest by an alien culture but the persistence of the cultural incompatibility of its plural parts. This nullifies efforts to forge bonds of common citizenship and instead leads one group to use the state as an instrument of domination over other groups.

As Sebastian von Einsiedel’s chapter in this volume emphasized, much discussion of state failure elides a series of definitional problems, most obviously about the nature of the state itself. If the state is understood as the vehicle for fulfilling a social contract, then state failure is the incapacity to deliver on basic public goods. If the state is defined by its capacity to exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in its territory, state failure occurs when authority structures break down. Or, if the state is constituted by its legal capacity, state failure is the incapacity to exercise such powers effectively.

Rather than choosing between these Lockean, Weberian and juridical lines of thought, this volume demonstrates that such definitional questions are misleading: it is not generally the state that “fails”, it is the government or individual leaders. In extreme cases, the institutions of gover-
nance themselves may be severely undermined. But it is only through a more nuanced understanding of the state as a network of institutions that crises in governance may be properly understood and, perhaps, avoided or remedied. In many situations the remedy will depend upon variables that are political rather than institutional, though the sustainability of any outcome depends precisely upon institutionalizing procedures to remove that dependence on politics and personality.

Not all weakening of state institutions is the same. Across the continuum of strength and weakness of states, the points at which crisis may occur vary. Two broad classes of crisis-prone states highlighted by I. William Zartman are states that are weak and soft and states that are hard and brittle. Weak/soft states lack the capacity to provide internal and external security and are prone to endemic weakness. Hard/brittle states are precisely the opposite, enjoying a strong and often oppressive capacity to maintain stability but organizing that order around a central individual; the displacement of that figure creates a vacuum of leadership that introduces a period of instability or conflict.

The key actors in these situations are, as the foregoing chapters have demonstrated, almost always local. Nevertheless, international actors may also play a critical role, if only in creating the opportunity for local actors to establish legitimate and sustainable governance. This concluding chapter will address these two sets of actors in turn.

Local actors

In efforts to strengthen state capacity, it is necessary to strike a balance between the responsibilities of local and international actors. Sometimes only international actors have the resources to assist with state-building, economic development, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. But they must take care not to confiscate or monopolize political responsibility, not to foster state dependency on the international community, and not to impede but to facilitate the creation and consolidation of local political competence. In the literature and policy work on failed states, terms such as legitimacy and ownership are frequently invoked as touchstones for local involvement in building or rebuilding state institutions. Both terms are typically underspecified and their lack of clarity contributes to incoherent policy responses to the practical consequences of the weakening of state institutions. After reviewing the use and abuse of these terms, this section examines how states have sought to institutionalize political structures to protect them from the whims of powerful individuals and the pernicious influence of regional actors.
Legitimacy

Legitimacy is sometimes used simultaneously in reference to a government, a regime or a state itself. Its characteristics are sometimes descriptive, akin to “effectiveness”, or normative, denoting “good governance”. Max Weber’s description of different forms of legitimate authority provides a useful departure point for a more rigorous analysis. The obedience of officials and subjects to a legally established impersonal order – Weber’s definition of legal authority – may be contrasted with the exercise of power on the basis of coercion or personal affiliation. This is an elaborate way of describing the rule of law. Nevertheless, if governance is also to be effective, it is clear that a broader definition of legitimacy than respect for the rule of law is required.

In significant part, the legitimacy of state institutions may be bound up with the population’s historical experience of it. The divergent experience of colonialism, for example, colours post-colonial states in different ways. Costa Rica’s relative success is owed, as Abelardo Morales-Gamboa and Stephen Baranyi show in chapter 11, at least in part to a colonial legacy that encouraged liberal democracy and empowered political parties. Pakistan’s precariousness, especially in contrast to its neighbour, may be traced to the legacy of a colonial history that differed from India’s in a very interesting way. The same British Indian army, with shared social and organizational characteristics and military traditions, took over the reins of government in Pakistan not long after independence, whereas in India it has remained under civilian control. In Pakistan, the military and bureaucratic elites joined forces against the politicians. In India, the political and bureaucratic elites joined forces against the military. In India, the repository of nationalism was the Congress Party, which led the struggle for independence; the military stayed out of politics. In Pakistan, the military quickly became the guardian of the national interest in terms of the perceived threat to the new nation from the much bigger and therefore menacing neighbour, and its role is pervasive in the politics and economy of the country.

Singapore, in Patricia Shu Ming Tan and Simon Tay’s account in chapter 12, emerges as a rare instance of the colony using the language and institutions of the colonial power against it. For other states, the act of independence – whether from colonial rule or not – may itself be a defining moment for the governance of a state. Some states in periods of crisis may draw on the crisis itself to generate legitimacy. Precisely those conditions that threaten the viability of the state may present opportunities to demonstrate its relevance to the population. This has been done to shore up Singaporean national identity or to mobilize the North Korean
population. As chapter 2 on colonialism explained, some foreign elites also saw a vested interest in keeping a population dependent on the beneficence of its leaders.

But how can the positive aspects of nationalism, or a sense of nationhood, be encouraged without trapping a population with an autocratic leader or opening ethnic cleavages? This shared sense of nationhood was an important part of Costa Rica’s success. In Afghanistan, the belief in the Afghan state and the absence of secessionist movements are probably the only reasons it has continued to exist through a generation of civil war, foreign occupation, banditry and theocracy.

“Enlightened leadership” – a theme that runs through a number of the previous chapters, Costa Rica and Singapore most obviously – is a partial answer. It is also a challenge to the idea that international assistance is the key to successful state-building. Strong and charismatic leadership may be essential to the success of an independence movement or to seeing a country through the instability that independence can bring, but for every Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore) and Nelson Mandela (South Africa), there is a Ne Win (Burma/Myanmar), Idi Amin (Uganda), Mobutu Sese Seko (Congo/Zaire), Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), and many others.

The presence or absence of a strong, capable and honest leader can be a major factor in state-building, but it is not clear what the policy implications of such a finding might be. It is not possible to organize the response to East Timor or Afghanistan on the basis that one has to find a Xanana Gusmão or Hamid Karzai – indeed, it is questionable whether international engagement with a state experiencing a basic crisis in legitimacy should be focused on the elites at all.

A basic question confronting outside actors is whether to engage in top–down or bottom–up policies: to strengthen institutions and leaders, or to foster a functioning civil society in the hope that this will cultivate enlightened leadership in the long term. The sobering assessment that emerges from the chapters in this book is that state-building works best when a population rallies behind an enlightened leader, but very little at all will work if they rally behind one who is not. Term limits are one way of minimizing this problem, but determined leaders who identify their survival with the survival of the state itself may nevertheless subvert such limits.

There is a surprising dearth of interest in the literature in the best “fit” between type of political system and local circumstances. International policy responses to the financial crises in many parts of the world since the 1990s have drawn criticism for trying to impose a “one size fits all” framework on all troubled states. A similar caution may be warranted with respect to political prescriptions, but less forcefully advanced for
fear of being branded a cultural relativist. Yet, in the stable, mature and advanced democracies, there is a comparable commitment to the values and principles of liberal democracy and market economy, but there is no uniformity of pattern in the structures, institutions and processes. Some have presidential government; others are parliamentary republics or constitutional monarchies. Some of the most stable European nations are leading examples of consociational democracy, whereas the United States and Australia are prime examples of robust adversarial politics. There is great diversity of electoral systems, party systems, periodicity of voting and terms of government. All such institutional differences reflect the particular historical patterns of political evolution in the European, American and Australasian settings. Yet the international policy community has been singularly hesitant to explore the connection between differences in institutional arrangements and local variables with a view to maximizing the prospects of liberal democracy and market economy taking root and flourishing.

Ownership

The importance of “ownership” is frequently asserted by international actors in both the political and economic processes of transition, though its meaning is unclear. Often it does not mean control – or even a direct input into decision-making structures. Sometimes qualified by “a sense of”, ownership at times bears more psychological than political import. This meaning in English, however, does not always translate well into local languages; in the languages of the Balkans, for example, “ownership” makes sense only in the way that one might own a car.3

It is noteworthy that the states included in this volume as relative successes – Mozambique, Costa Rica and Singapore – all enjoyed strong leadership on the part of local elites. Each demonstrates the importance of foreign assistance being tailored to local needs, where possible channelled through local hands. Indeed, not only did Singapore not embrace an externally dictated template for development, some of its policies did not conform to the prevailing international consensus at the time on state-building. In extraordinary circumstances it may be necessary for legitimate international actors to make certain decisions on behalf of a population. As Simon Chesterman argues in chapter 16, such an arrangement should only ever be temporary and there should be clarity about why local control has been suspended and when and how it will be restored.

Such caveats concerning ownership should not be misunderstood as an argument against widespread participation. As chapter 9 by Amin Saikal on Afghanistan shows, social bonds may in some cases be far stronger
than institutional ties to the state. The most optimistic aspect of Afghan-
istan’s recent past is that its endemically weak state coincides with a
relatively robust society. Tapping into its ethnic, tribal, sectarian and lin-
guistic networks – what Saikal terms “micro-societies” – is an important
element of building a stable state.

A key dilemma is how to strike the balance between necessary decen-
tralization (in recognition of the division of power through disparate
actors) and the importance of building a centralized state that can itself
provide certain basic public goods for the population. Politics is often de-

defined in terms of the struggle for power. Democracy is a means of coming
to terms with political power, taming it and making it subservient to pop-
ular wishes. Federalism is a means of bifurcating it territorially. A unitary
system of government concentrates all legal power in a central govern-
ment, with subordinate units of government being the creation of and
subject to the will of that central government. A federal structure is one
solution to the dilemma of the balance between centralizing and centri-
gugal pressures. But fragile societies such as Afghanistan may resist such an
approach because of fears either that it would simply confirm the position
of local commanders or warlords, or that it would open the possibility of
a federal sub-unit seceding from the whole.

Many countries have had to grapple with the difficult question of
maintaining unity amidst considerable diversity through appropriate and
adaptable power-sharing arrangements that recognize but are not over-
whelmed by the different social groups. States with regionally based
ethnic divisions are, as a rule, more stable under federal rather than unit-
ary structures. A curious sub-literature exists on the precise number of
sub-units that is desirable: systems with two are highly unstable (as in
Pakistan until 1971 and Czechoslovakia until 1992), and systems with
four also appear to struggle; five units and above are believed to be about
right, with another band of stability around 20–25. The foundation of this
esoteric calculus is the ability of federal structures to diffuse decision-
making power through different layers of government, increasing the
number of arenas for peaceful resolution of political differences. The
stability of such power-sharing arrangements, however, relies less on
the structures themselves than on the willingness of parties to operate
within them. Where elite groups have relatively clear and loyal constitu-
encies organized as political parties, labour unions or other institutions,
structured political life will be more stable. These institutions rarely exist
in a post-conflict environment, however, and the strategic questions of
whether or not to opt into the peace process may be revisited by belliger-
ent groups periodically through the transition. This was the case in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina: despite powerful international pressure to coerce
parties into power-sharing arrangements, parties to the conflict simply
refused to cooperate with the new multi-ethnic and inter-entity institutions.  

**Political parties**

The organization of political elites into parties, then, can be a helpful step in moving the exercise of power from individuals to institutions, but it may be a damaging step in infecting the institutions with inter-group conflict. Parties can also help to move power from the military to civilian actors. In Pakistan, as Samina Ahmed shows in chapter 7, the dysfunction of the political elite reinforces the role of the military. Costa Rica offers a radical solution to this problem, having disbanded its military in 1949. Not all countries have such an option, however – and, in any case, the ability to disband the military was evidence of the strength of civilian leadership rather than its cause. In Haiti, for example, disbanding the military in 1995 laid the foundation for state collapse nine years later when the regime was unable to defend itself against well-armed militias. And in Iraq the hasty and comprehensive disbandment of Saddam Hussein’s security forces seriously hampered the postwar stabilization effort.

Parties are an important tool for recruiting candidates, organizing constituencies and aggregating public preferences for expression in political forums. Nevertheless, post-conflict elections can serve as a catalyst for the creation of political parties that are primarily – and sometimes solely – vehicles to provide local elites with access to governing power. Such parties may be little more than a repackaging of the armed groups that fought the original conflict.

In some circumstances, international actors may collude in efforts to repackage armed groups as political parties. The decision by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to treat the Khmer Rouge as a recalcitrant political party rather than an enemy of the peace process was deeply controversial at the time. Including the Khmer Rouge within the process and then isolating it when it withdrew from the elections – while tactically ignoring violence carried out by Hun Sen’s State of Cambodia – contributed to the collapse of the Khmer Rouge after the elections, at which point most of its soldiers sought amnesties and abandoned Pol Pot. This might have been an exceptional situation, however. When UNITA withdrew from elections in Angola and the Revolutionary United Front withdrew from the peace process in Sierra Leone, they were ultimately defeated – but only after military confrontations.

Different problems arise when parties coalesce around former liberation movements, such as the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (Fretilin). Support for the party may be cultivated as being identi-
cal to nationalism or a national identity, which is an unhealthy basis for multi-party democracy. The temptation to transform an independence movement into the natural party of government is understandable, but the danger is that such a party comes to view itself as the “natural” party of government – and the leader may come to regard himself or herself as indispensable. Nevertheless, this should not be taken as an inevitable consequence. In India, the first great post-colonial state, the Congress Party led the independence movement and held a monopoly of power in New Delhi and in almost all states for two decades after independence; since then, however, alternation of governments by peaceful ballot has been a regular staple of political diet in the country.

One way of avoiding these problems is to remove political parties from the process. Democracy is commonly assumed to require a party system, although the United States itself did not develop functioning political parties until well into the nineteenth century. Without parties, however, political life is dominated exclusively by the elite personalities involved; this is the danger of a “no-party democracy” such as that embraced in Yoweri Museveni’s Uganda, or the “permanent campaigning political movement” that Hazel Smith describes in North Korea in chapter 8. Such a system may be attractive to a population in a country with a history of political violence, where party divisions are seen less as divergent opinions on how the state should be governed than as fault lines that threaten a return to civil war. This was the case in East Timor, where many Timorese questioned the need for parties, an uncertainty born of the belief that divisions between Timorese independence parties had been exploited by Indonesia in 1974–1975. If it is not possible to mobilize political activity around structured arguments for how the state should be governed, however, the issues on which political argument will turn are likely to be the inherently unstable factors of personality or of ethnic or religious affiliation.

Regional influences

An important additional local dynamic that is frequently overlooked in analyses of state failure is how a state’s governance problems relate to its regional context. Conflicts – and the economic incentives that foster them – may spill across borders and in some cases international efforts to bring peace may only displace conflict into another area. Andrea Armstrong and Barnett Rubin discuss this in the context of Central Asia and the Great Lakes region of Africa (chapter 4); Mónica Serrano and Paul Kenny outline the regional dynamics affecting Colombia (chapter 5); Benjamin Reilly and Elsina Wainwright examine the South Pacific (chapter 6). These differing accounts demonstrate how a region may impact on
the evolution of conflict, the nature of state institutions in a region and the relative interest of external actors to support them.9

Adopting a regional analysis of a problem, however, will not always lead to a regional response. Importantly, the regional characteristics of a conflict – and of the proper response to it – may not overlap with regional institutions. The weakening of state institutions may itself give rise to new regional dynamics, often beginning with trade networks that respond to economic demand more than to political form. It became something of a cliche to say of Yugoslavia, for example, that despite its fragmentation it nevertheless continued to form a single black market.10 South Asia, where political tensions have thwarted all efforts to date of regional integration, may nonetheless form a de facto single market for trafficking in women, exploiting common and persistent weaknesses in state capacity for border control. Trade networks may rely on social networks that extend across borders; these networks may be useful not merely in understanding the flow of resources into a conflict region but also in ensuring that a peace settlement lasts.

In addition to the malevolent policies of neighbouring states – such as South Africa’s policy of destabilization in Mozambique – weak institutions in one state may have a direct impact on institutions in those near it. This is clearest when a state becomes a transit point for the illicit flow of money or weapons, as in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, but may also serve a demonstration effect for what is expected in neighbouring states. Colombia, as Serrano and Kenny observe in chapter 5, is far from the weakest state in the Andean region, but it nonetheless has had a corrosive effect on its neighbours.

At the same time, building up the institutions of one state in isolation from its neighbours may not address the causes of conflict. Indeed, insofar as criminal enterprises in some regions see the state as an asset to be captured, state-building without regard to regional dynamics may simply increase the value of a particular prize. Strengthening regional and international governance structures, including formal and informal forums for cooperation and collaboration, may support the emergence of virtuous circles of accountability. More ambitiously, efforts to strengthen institutions in one state may need to be accompanied by efforts to strengthen institutions in key neighbours, perhaps along the lines of Zartman’s “early” and “early-late” prevention strategies (see chapter 13).

In other situations, regional context may affect the state’s capacity even to sustain itself. Chapter 6 by Reilly and Wainwright on the South Pacific points to very different forms of state failure, including environmental collapse. Nauru’s exhausted phosphate mines and the impact of rising sea levels on several low-lying atoll states may make these territories literally uninhabitable. These are merely the most extreme examples
of a question that is implicit in many discussions of response to state failure – whether a state in a given territory is even viable.

However, the remoteness of these island states has had its own impact, with some otherwise bankrupt states marketing the one commodity they have left: sovereignty. Laundering money and selling passports or flags of convenience have opened the possibility of exploitation by non-state actors, perhaps including terrorists. This has increased the willingness of states in the region – notably Australia – to strengthen regional institutions and use them as the framework for any action in response to threatened state failure. This regional response is in part necessary to avert accusations of neo-colonialism, but it also strengthens regional ties that may provide early warning of trouble in other states and facilitate quick assistance at the political, economic and military level in the event of that trouble evolving into a crisis.

*Think local, act global*

Though some states are, indeed, islands, dysfunctional or non-existent governance structures can have effects far beyond their shores. Only a decade after the end of the Cold War, the United States redefined its National Security Strategy to warn that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones”. Strategic interests may at times coincide with humanitarian concerns about the impact of state failure on a population. But, as Michael Ignatieff warns in chapter 3, there are reasons to be wary about the capacity of external action to address internal governance problems. Indeed, much external action either undermines governance structures or puts in place structures that are unsustainable. A first priority when generating policy for such action must therefore be to ensure that it does not undermine the local factors at work.

Diaspora groups, in particular, have generated considerable interest for their potential contribution to state-building – most prominently with the return of large numbers of Afghans to Afghanistan from 2002 onwards. And yet this is an area on which little systematic research has been undertaken. In severely depressed economies, the return of well-educated and motivated exiles could help overcome gaps in the civil service with greater legitimacy than importing large numbers of foreign personnel. That legitimacy is not unlimited, however, and the emergence of the diaspora as a new political elite may itself give rise to more political tensions. In addition, as Saikal points out in chapter 9, a vicious circle may emerge where educated members of the diaspora wait for a stable political and security environment before returning to the homeland,
when it is precisely their involvement that is necessary to achieve political stability.

External action

In 1944, Judge Learned Hand spoke at a ceremony in Central Park, New York, to swear in 150,000 naturalized citizens. “Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women,” he observed; “when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it.” Building or rebuilding faith in the idea of the state requires a transformation in mentality as much as it requires a change in political structures. The idea that one could generate a rigid template for reconstructing the institutions of law and order in a post-conflict environment is wrongheaded. As Judge Hand recognized, the major transformation required is in the hearts of the general population; any foreign involvement must therefore be sensitive to the particularities of that population at the level both of form and of substance.

The UN Charter is no longer a barrier to international engagement in states with weak institutions. In the past decade, the Security Council has authorized military interventions in states unable to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe (Somalia), following the deposition of the elected head of government (Haiti), and in the wake of economic collapse and social disorder (Albania). This interventionism has not simply been coercive. From the end of the Cold War, electoral assistance has become an accepted feature of the international political landscape, with the Electoral Assistance Division of the UN Department of Political Affairs receiving over 200 requests for assistance from member states. Development actors have a longer history of intrusive engagement in weak states.

This section will consider the motivations for foreign actors becoming involved in state-building, and then turn to the issue of early warnings that indicate that involvement might be required. This is followed by a consideration of the political context within which humanitarian action – typically the first response to a crisis – takes place, before examining the other carrots and sticks that are available to international actors. Finally, the section discusses exit strategies for when the crisis is averted or international attention moves elsewhere.

Responsibility and national interest

Although local actors will typically play the most important role in addressing a crisis in the institutions of governance, this should not be un-
derstood as an argument that international actors bear no responsibility for preventing state failure or ameliorating its consequences. In different ways, James Mayall and Michael Ignatieff outline in chapters 2 and 3 the historical and moral arguments for constructive engagement in such states.

There is much to learn from history, but the wrong lessons are frequently the ones most enthusiastically embraced. If the history of colonialism teaches us anything, it is that the imposition of foreign rule can produce widely divergent results. Mayall’s chapter examines the lasting effects of grafting state institutions onto pre-existing political structures through colonial expansion; this imposition was often alien in both the form of the state and the manner in which it was imposed upon a population. Nonetheless, it is striking – and rarely commented upon – that the majority of post-colonial states did not, in fact, collapse. How the legacies of anti-colonial nationalism, the territorial settlement accompanying independence, economic development, and the match between political culture and social structure played out depended on local dynamics. But, reinforcing the positive aspects of nationalism, those that encourage the emergence of a state-wide national community and tailor economic development and constitutional structures to the reality of a given society rather than an ideal model seem uncontroversial starting points for external engagement in post-colonial territories.

Ignatieff’s chapter outlines the moral argument for greater such engagement – as well as important reasons to be wary of enthusiasm for intervention for motives that are said to be humanitarian. The transformed strategic environment after the 11 September 2001 attacks encouraged some to think that countries led by the United States would be more willing to take on human rights violators if a regime also posed a threat to Western interests. As the war in Iraq came to demonstrate, neither of these factors was essential to some decision makers, and the capacity to follow through on intervention was substantially lacking. Humanitarian arguments in favour of removing the dictator Saddam Hussein were embraced by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in support of the goals of regime change and disarmament advocated by his US counterpart. As the existence of unauthorized weapons of mass destruction remained unproven, the failure to plan for post-conflict operations to reconstruct the country weighed heavily on those who had supported the war not because of any fear that Iraq posed a threat but precisely because the war was supposed to make Iraq a better place. Thus, Ignatieff argues, the use of human rights arguments to rationalize regime change is both intensely problematic and yet unavoidable. If the human rights discourse is to avoid being either idle rhetoric or mere window-dressing on the foreign policy agenda of major states, it needs to reconcile these tensions. This
is a prescription for modesty about the capacity of external coercive intervention to make a state work; it is not a recipe for inaction.

Indeed, inaction is peculiarly inappropriate because there is much evidence that the dynamics of certain forms of globalization actively undermine state institutions. The vulnerability of exposed markets to fluctuations in commodity prices may provide a flashpoint for political opposition or a more prolonged decay in support for the state. Even in relatively successful states, such as Mozambique and Costa Rica, the impact of globalization has been ambiguous.

How, then, should action be guided? It would be naïve to expect international efforts to be driven by unvarnished altruism, but there is now some evidence that pursuit of foreign policy objectives in isolation from coherent state-building strategies is at best a waste of resources. Reconstruction in Afghanistan, for example, was driven by the desire to remove that country as a threat to the United States after the 11 September 2001 attacks; on the ground, this military strategy has been pursued in the absence of a similarly clear political strategy. There is a real danger now, as Saikal shows in chapter 9, that the failure to deal with the underlying causes of Afghanistan’s weakness could cause it to fail once again. The most perilous aspect of any exit strategy from Afghanistan is the similarity between the current domestic political constellation and the situation in 1992, when the Soviet-backed Najibullah regime collapsed and international interest began to wander from Afghanistan. Then, as now, a weak central government sought to hold the country together: Rashid Dostum wielded power in the north, Ismael Khan held the west, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar lurked in the wings. The disorder to which this gave rise – and, importantly, the disruption such disorder caused to trade routes – was an important factor in the emergence of the Taliban in 1994. If international attention wanders from Afghanistan again, this downward spiral could be repeated.

Neighbouring Pakistan is being supported far more vigorously, though precisely with a view to supporting the status quo rather than encouraging any form of transformation into a form of government more sustainable than direct military rule. This highlights a paradox of such state-building activities: the very act of supporting them may, when the state is collapsed into the status quo regime, further undermine their legitimacy in the eyes of the general population. It need not be so. As Ahmed argues in chapter 7, ongoing US support for Pakistan’s military actively undermines movement towards functioning democracy. If support were conditioned on democratic reforms, this would strengthen the political elite’s capacity to shift power from military to civilian hands. Such support is neither sufficient nor, indeed, necessary for such reforms to take place. But it would certainly help.
In Colombia, too, opportunistic military support for a weak state has more to do with the pursuit of a domestic political agenda – the war on drugs, like the war on terror, is waged primarily for the benefit of an American audience – than with the sustainability and legitimacy of the state in question. Taking a longer view on the importance of institutions for regional stability may be inadequate to satisfy such domestic political imperatives, a symptom of the “attention deficit disorder” in foreign policy that afflicts many states.\(^{14}\)

The record of the United Nations in such situations is far from unblemished, but it does offer two important qualities that unilateral assistance – whether invited or imposed – lacks. These have nothing to do with capacity or experience, but rather concern the political context within which the United Nations operates. First, greater UN involvement may remove accusations of self-interest on the part of the acting country. This was seen most prominently in the elaborate dance performed by the United States and the United Nations through 2003–2004 concerning the latter’s role in Iraq. Apart from securing greater international support for post-conflict reconstruction, it was hoped that an increased role for the United Nations in the political process would be a way of distancing incoming Iraqi leaders from the taint of being US puppets. Second, the involvement of the United Nations may help with the “attention deficit disorder” problem. Repeated accelerations of US plans for the transfer of political and security authority in Iraq have been an indication less of the stability of Iraq than of the need to demonstrate achievements in Iraq prior to the November 2004 presidential elections in the United States.

This raises a more general point that runs through the case-studies considered here. Whereas a crisis that thrusts itself onto the international agenda tends to be focused in time, the most important work of building up state institutions takes years or decades:\(^{15}\) 10 years after a relatively successful operation in Mozambique, that country’s own “success” remains uncertain; Singapore remained fragile for decades. And, though Costa Rica experienced moments of crisis, a key factor in its success was the institutional arrangement established after the 1948 civil war. Effective state-building takes time and it is disingenuous to suggest otherwise to domestic publics.

*Early warning and analysis*

At what point should international actors become concerned about a particular state? The literature on predicting state failure provides a wealth of models, pointing to political, economic and public health indicators that correlate with a high risk of political crisis.\(^{16}\) These structural variables must, however, be tempered by attention to local context.
The problem in relation to early warning, as Zartman stresses in chapter 13, is not generally a lack of information. The problem is inadequate analysis and a lack of political will. The need for new early warning systems is far outweighed by the need to use the information already being gathered. In Rwanda, for example, there were a number of warnings prior to the genocide in 1994. The first came from human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Then the UN human rights system picked up on them, including a report by the Special Rapporteur on Summary and Extra-judicial Executions that raised the spectre of genocide in August 1993. And yet the requisite political will just could not be mustered in the UN Security Council in April 1994 to help stop the killings.\(^\text{17}\)

Greater analysis and coordinated dissemination of key information may therefore be more important than access to more information as such. States have nonetheless been reluctant to give the United Nations (or other intergovernmental organizations) any form of independent analytical capacity. This was most evident in the rejection of the Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat recommended in the Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations in 2000.\(^\text{18}\) For the time being, much reliance is placed on information and analysis provided by states; on the independent capacity of the UN Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Security Council “any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security;”\(^\text{19}\) and on the work of NGOs such as the International Crisis Group.

**Humanitarian action**

When a state enters a period of crisis and its capacity to care for vulnerable populations diminishes or disappears, the first responders are usually humanitarian relief workers. The absence or ineffectiveness of state structures, however, complicate efforts to provide relief. As Thomas Weiss and Peter Hoffman show in chapter 14, the international humanitarian system was designed with an eye to responding to the horrors of inter-state conflict. The new environment in which humanitarians find themselves requires them to interact with a far wider array of actors, and to make decisions about which of those actors would be helpful and which would hinder efforts to restore stability. Key questions surround the actors who may go either way – leaders of political movements, legitimate businesses, individuals seeking employment, and private military companies – and how to engage with them most constructively. This “humanitarian intelligence” requires a change in tactics but also a doctrinal shift in thinking about the role of humanitarians. At the very least, it has triggered a debate on the extent to which humanitarians can remain outside politics.
Donors have an obvious role to play as well. Humanitarian assistance is notoriously supply rather than demand driven, with the result that it is more influenced by donor politics than by the politics of the recipient communities. The fact that donor countries wish to retain control over how their money is spent is not, in itself, controversial. In most cases, this money comes from taxes paid by constituents who hold their government accountable for how tax revenue is spent. Although donor behaviour may be rational from the donor government’s perspective, however, the sum total of donor policies rarely presents a rational whole. A particular problem emphasized by Weiss and Hoffman is that short donor time-lines encourage short-term thinking on the part of local actors, often bringing out the worst in those who might otherwise become natural partners. These choices have consequences that go far beyond the emergency phase of humanitarian relief.

There is also a need to be creative about the manner in which humanitarian relief to states in crisis takes place at the intergovernmental level. As Smith shows in chapter 8, the caricature of North Korea as “bad, mad, or sad” is both incorrect and unhelpful. It never functioned as a traditional “Weberian” state because it was not designed to be one. Foreign policy engagement with North Korea currently focuses on its presumed nuclear capacity, but failing to address the weakness of state functions that have begun to disaggregate from the party may foster corruption and further weaken local coping mechanisms for the natural and man-made disasters that have afflicted the country. Security is a key part of this – not least because the fear of invasion is used by Kim Jong Il’s regime to justify continued mobilization and the diversion of resources from civilian to military functions.

*From persuasion . . .*

If humanitarian assistance is coming to be seen as political in nature, development assistance has long been regarded as such. Reconstruction aid, in particular, is one of the carrots that may be held out in the course of peace negotiations, with the promise of a pledging conference to come afterwards.

But are such economic levers the most appropriate instruments for driving a state towards success, rather than simply enticing it away from the abyss? And how should success be measured? As Weiss and Hoffman warn in chapter 14, providing assistance in isolation from political strategies runs the risk of extending conflict or reinforcing the structural violence that encourages conflict to return. And, as Michel Cahen argues in chapter 10 in the case of Mozambique, formal criteria for success viewed from the outside – the absence of conflict, the embrace of internationally
approved economic models – may not correspond to how success on the
ground is likely to be experienced by the local population.

The Marshall Plan, which followed the Second World War, is com-
monly held out as a model reconstruction programme. Between 1948
and 1951, Europe's aggregate gross national product (GNP) jumped by
one-third, agricultural production increased 11 per cent and industrial
output increased 40 per cent over pre-war levels. The Plan is variously
attributed with laying the foundations of a prosperous European Union
and launching the opening salvos of the Cold War; today it is invoked
like a mantra in the response to social and economic problems across
the globe.20

The Marshall Plan was an act of enlightened self-interest not unvar-
nished altruism. Marshall himself stressed the impact that Europe's
continuing weakness could have on the US economy: an injection of US
funds would remedy the “dollar gap” and enable Europe to purchase US
raw materials and parts necessary for the continent's reconstruction.21
And, although Marshall had emphasized that the policy was “directed
not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, despera-
tion and chaos”, US officials were deeply concerned about the leftward
turn in European politics. Writing in 1947, George Kennan argued that
the Marshall Plan would be an effective tool in the strategy of contain-
ment.22 The Soviet blockade of Berlin from 1948 to 1949 actually saved
the Plan for West Germany, because it undermined British and French
efforts to use US contributions to their respective zones of occupation as
a source of funds for war reparations.23

Speaking in April 2002, US President George W. Bush likened recon-
struction efforts in Afghanistan to Marshall’s programme for Europe,
though the analogy was criticized for being stronger on rhetoric than on
cash.24 The experience of Bosnia suggests that the success of reconstruc-
tion is not dependent on funds alone: far more has been spent per capita
there than under the Marshall Plan, yet the economy remains feeble.25

The scale of the funding was certainly important – Senator Arthur Van-
denberg responded to an early report of the proposed figures for Mar-
shall’s initiative by suggesting that a mistake must have been made, as
Congress would never appropriate that amount of money to save any-
body.26 Equally significant, however, was the multilateral nature of the
assistance and the fact that it was channelled through local institutions.
It is easy to overstate the level of European ownership; in private, US
intervention was said to be “frequent, often insistent”. But appearances
had to be and were preserved. These appearances were bolstered by a
public relations campaign that may represent the largest international
propaganda operation in peacetime.27 This use of local institutions com-
bined with a due regard for propaganda was repeated in the reconstruc-
tion component in Afghanistan in 2002. Such genuine and tactical forms of ownership – at least in the area of economic reconstruction – have generally been more effective than mere reliance on its rhetoric.

The scale of the Marshall Plan, its regional focus and the channelling of funds through local institutions certainly bear some lessons for contemporary efforts. But these factors were linked to the circumstances in which the Marshall Plan was formulated and implemented. The very different circumstances in which aid is delivered today suggest the limits of this analogy.

Four themes stand out. First, the resolution of the Second World War provided a clear military and political context for reconstruction. Strategic concerns dominated, ensuring greater resources and a sustained commitment; the clarity of the outcome of the war and the recognition of most borders in Europe also ensured that the legitimacy of recipient governments was, for the most part, uncontested. More recent conflicts have tended to be localized, frequently involving irregular forces and leading to an inconclusive peace. The absence of a common threat and the prominence of actors other than the United States have meant that multiple donors pursue independent objectives, at times inconsistently. Domestic considerations may thus complicate coordination between different governments, with each seeking to finance “pet” projects.

Second, postwar Europe was very different from recipient countries today. The Marshall Plan targeted relatively wealthy democracies with advanced capitalist economies and highly educated populations; the challenge was recovery, not creation. The approach was regional in character and built upon political and military alliances. Recipients now tend to be fragile democracies at best, usually of limited long-term interest to donors. The economies in question are constrained in their capacity to absorb a sudden influx of aid, which tends to be concentrated over a relatively short period. Where state institutions are weak or non-existent, this aid may be largely in the form of emergency humanitarian relief at the expense of development-oriented assistance.

Third, the number of actors has greatly increased, most obviously with the rise of NGOs. This proliferation has fostered niche assistance that contributes targeted assistance in some sectors but further complicates coordination. Many NGOs now function more as service providers for donor agencies rather than as programming agencies in their own right. This encourages some to become “ambulance chasers”, deploying to a crisis situation with little or no funding. Though they may bring skills and commitment to the emergency, considerable initial effort is spent raising funds from local donor missions and UN agencies. One Afghan analyst in Kabul wryly observes that “NGOs are cows that drink the milk themselves”. Reliance upon multiple sources of funding has also
increased the influence of the media, encouraging a focus on crises that are the subject of public attention and sometimes limiting assistance to the duration of that attention. A further consequence is the rise of “flag-waving” activities on the part of donors and NGOs, which seek to gain maximum credit for their activities. This may in turn lead to competition for telegenic projects and a reluctance to engage in mundane or unattractive projects.

Finally, the Marshall Plan took place in an era when the benefits of government intervention were generally uncontested. Donor scepticism today about the appropriate role of government in economic activity at home has, at times, challenged approaches to foreign assistance abroad. The prevailing view in the industrialized world now is that the function of government is to do little more than facilitate a market economy and provide a very few public goods. This is at odds with the widespread view that a strong government often lies at the heart of economic and political reconstruction.

The context within which assistance is delivered to post-conflict territories is therefore quite different from the aftermath of the Second World War. Political considerations continue to play a major part in the decision to provide assistance, but the purposes that assistance is intended to serve are less coherent than the grand strategy envisioned in the Marshall Plan. This is, of course, if the assistance arrives at all. Funds for post-conflict relief may not arrive, or may arrive only very slowly. Actors implementing programmes on the ground must take this into account when they construct budgets, which often requires them to engage in fictional accounting for targets that they know will not be met. This makes responsible financial planning still more difficult.29

... to tools of dissuasion

There are not many coercive tools available to international actors to deal with state failure. Zartman provides a catalogue of options in chapter 13 but, if a situation goes beyond the point where words are sufficient, sanctions may be imposed or force may be used (with or without the blessing of the UN Security Council). Both have been the subject of extensive research in their own right,30 though some lessons concerning the nature of the force deployed bear emphasizing here. Two recent additions to this very limited quiver are international criminal law and transitional administration.

Weber has been mentioned on various occasions through this book and so it is worth stressing that the claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of force should normally be understood as a requirement for a functioning police capacity. States where that monopoly has been called into
question will generally require a robust policing – as opposed to military – response. The South Pacific, where few states face serious external threats from neighbours, is a clear example of this: most states have no real military capacity, but it is the failure of the police forces that has caused problems.31

These lessons are not new. When the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was deployed in 1960, the absence of an effective government led it to assume many of the law and order functions of a civilian police force, including the apprehension and detention of criminals, establishing and enforcing curfews, and conducting short- and long-range patrols.32 These functions were carried out despite the absence of a clear power of arrest, of jails or of functioning courts. It was also unclear what law ONUC was to uphold, because the newly independent state had not had time to codify a Congolese version of the old Belgian law. Such problems were compounded by the inadequacy of troops for such tasks; it became increasingly clear that highly trained riot police would have been more suited to such tasks than military regiments – where civilian police from Ghana and Nigeria operated, they were regarded as worth “twenty times their number of the best fighting infantry”.33 Over 40 years later, the slowness to deploy civilian police continues to afflict UN missions.34

By contrast, one area of state-building that has seen an explosion of activity – and, to some extent, learning – is transitional justice. The creation of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone was, at least in part, designed to address the incapacity of existing institutions to deal with past atrocities. As chapter 15 by Alex Boraine warns, however, it is vital that transitional justice be understood both widely and deeply. It must be understood widely in that it embraces not merely accountability through judicial trials but also truth-seeking and truth-telling, reconciliation, institutional reform, and reparations.35 Transitional justice must also be seen deeply, for, unless processes and institutions are tailored to address local concerns and draw upon local resources, they are unlikely to be effective or sustainable.

Ideally, all such decisions would be made by local actors. But states with weak institutions are perhaps most prone to undermining faith in the rule of law. A key dilemma, highlighted by Boraine, is how to balance the need for accountability for the past against the need for reconciliation in the future. In the mid-1990s, the widely held view appeared to be that any post-conflict environment should hold war crimes trials today and elections tomorrow. Mozambique provides some evidence that a peace process can work without trials, though perhaps it is too early to make a firm conclusion on this. Spain after Franco is another challenge to the argument that all peace processes must be accompanied by elabo-
rate transitional justice processes. In East Timor there have been public hints of disagreement between the president and the foreign minister over whether to privilege peace and reconciliation or retributive justice in relations with Indonesia. In parts of Latin America we may yet witness transitional justice mechanisms instituted after a delay of over a decade.

How the balance between the past and the future is struck will depend upon local actors. Two general trends can be identified, however. First, if peaceful coexistence is a stated goal of the transition, the transitional government is likely to be restricted in its choices. Second, where such governments are restricted, societies in transition tend to move away from purely retributive models and towards more restorative models of justice. In addition to trials by national, international or hybrid tribunals, Boraine provides an account of the two other major institutional responses to transitional justice issues: truth and reconciliation commissions and vetting.

A more extreme form of international engagement is the one that Chesterman describes in chapter 16: transitional administration. For international actors to assume some or all powers of government is antithetical to many of the lessons discussed here, in particular the need for local input and ownership. But if ownership is not possible in the short term – owing to the inability of local actors to work peacefully together or where institutions simply do not exist – it is better to acknowledge that ownership will be the end rather than the means.

There has been much reluctance to embrace this practice and dignify it with theory. In the case of Iraq, for example, it was sometimes argued that greater involvement of the United Nations would have avoided some of the mistakes made by the Coalition Provisional Authority in its first year of occupation. Three of the most egregious errors in Iraq – failing to provide for emergency law and order, disbanding the Iraqi army, and blanket de-Baathification – ran counter to lessons from previous operations. However, the greatest mistake by US planners may have been the assumption that previous UN state-building efforts have achieved mixed successes because of UN incompetence, rather than owing to the inherent contradictions in building democracy through foreign military intervention.

Exit strategies

In his April 2001 report on the closure or transition of complex peacekeeping operations, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that the embarrassing withdrawal of peacekeepers from Somalia should not be repeated in future operations. “No Exit without Strategy”, the report was called. For the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor,
elections provided the basis for the transfer of power to local authorities; they also set in place political processes that would last well beyond the mission and the development assistance that followed. In Kosovo, where the UN operation was determinedly called an “interim” administration, the absence of an agreed end-state has left the territory in political limbo. Reflection on the absence of an exit strategy from Kosovo, following on the apparently endless operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, led some ambassadors to the Security Council to turn the Secretary-General’s phrase on its head: “No strategy”, the rallying cry went, “without an exit”.

Singapore’s experience of the withdrawal of British troops is an example of the need to manage exit strategies carefully. In chapter 12, Tan and Tay contrast Singapore’s efforts to stagger the departure of foreign troops with the popular call in the Philippines for US troops to depart immediately. Domestically popular, the latter strategy left a vacuum of equipment, revenue and skills. The unmanaged withdrawal of foreign security forces may also lead to a resumption of conflict. This fear drives the maintenance of large security presences in Bosnia and Kosovo, and it explains the decision never to send such numbers to Afghanistan.

Elections are frequently cited as the appropriate end-point for international engagement in a crisis. As a medium-term peace-building strategy, there is implicit deference to the “democratic peace” thesis, which holds that democracies are statistically less likely to go to war than are states that are undemocratic. Overemphasis on this empirical argument (which has itself been contested) obscures a secondary finding in the democratic peace literature that an autocratic state in the process of democratization may in fact be more likely to descend into conflict, especially internal conflict. More often, however, elections may simply be a short-term tactic that is used to encourage actors to buy into a peace process.

The United Nations and other bodies, notably the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, have developed an outstanding capacity to hold and monitor elections in the most challenging circumstances. Elections in conflict zones such as Cambodia and Bosnia, or in impoverished countries such as East Timor, are rightly regarded as technical triumphs. Technical triumph, however, has only rarely been matched by political success.

In general, the emphasis has been on form at the expense of substance. The transition to democracy requires a transformation in public mentality similar to that underpinning respect for the rule of law. Elections may provide evidence of this transformation, but they are only a small part of what is required to realize it. Building robust market economies and re-
silent civil societies is just as critical for embedding democracy in larger structures that can survive changes of leaders and parties.

Concluding thoughts

In his book *In My Father's House*, Kwame Anthony Appiah notes that the apparent ease of colonial administration generated an illusion among some of the inheritors of post-colonial nations that control of the state would allow them to pursue their much more ambitious objectives as easily. Once the state was turned to the task of massive developments in infrastructure, however, it was shown wanting: “When the postcolonial rulers inherited the apparatus of the colonial state, they inherited the reins of power; few noticed, at first, that they were not attached to a bit.”

Given the fraught history of so many of the world’s states, it is not remarkable that some states suffer basic crises in their capacity to protect and provide services for a population; on the contrary, it is remarkable that more do not. This book has sought to examine states in crisis and, in particular, to examine what internal and external factors led some states to avoid altogether going to the precipice, others to go over it, and a third group to return from it. As indicated in the Introduction to this volume, discussion of such institutional crises frequently suggests that, when a state “fails”, power is no longer exercised within the territory. In fact, the control of power becomes more important than ever – even though it is exercised in an incoherent fashion.

Engagement with such states requires, first and foremost, understanding the local dynamics of power. The much-cited Weberian definition of the state as claimant to a monopoly of the legitimate use of force is a definition less of what the state is than of what it does. The legitimacy and sustainability of local power structures depend, ultimately, upon local actors. Certain policies can help – channelling political power through parties rather than individuals, and through civilians rather than the military; imposing term limits on heads of state and government; encouraging and regulating political parties – but their implementation depends on the capacity of local leaders to submit themselves to the rule of law, and of local populations to hold their leaders to that standard.

For international actors, a troubling analogy is to compare engagement with weak states to previous models of trusteeship and empire. Current efforts at state-building attempt – at least in part – to reproduce the better effects of empire (inward investment, pacification and impartial administration) without reproducing its worst features (repression, cor-
ruption and confiscation of local capacity). This is not to suggest nostalgia for empire or that such policies should be resurrected. Only two generations ago, one-third of the world’s population lived in territory considered non-self-governing; the end of colonialism was one of the most significant transformations in the international order since the emergence of sovereign states. However, it is intended to suggest that a realistic assessment of power is necessary to formulate effective policies rather than effective rhetoric.

States cannot be made to work from the outside. International assistance may be necessary, but it is never sufficient to establish institutions that are legitimate and sustainable. This is not an excuse for inaction, if only to minimize the humanitarian consequences of a state’s incapacity to care for its vulnerable population. Beyond that, however, international action should be seen first and foremost as facilitating local processes, providing resources and creating the space for local actors to start a conversation that will define and consolidate their polity by mediating their vision of a good life into responsive, robust and resilient institutions.

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Notes

1. Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, transl. Louise and Aylmer Maude, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
2. See chapter 1 by Sebastian von Einsiedel in this volume.
3. The peculiarities of conceptual elision in translation are of course a more general phenomenon. In Hindi, for example, there are words for nation (*rashtra*) and kingdom (*rajya*) but not really for state. Thus the President of India is called the Rashtrapati (literally, “the husband or lord and master of the nation”), and the upper house of the federal parliament, the Council of States, is called the Rajya Sabha (literally, “the assembly of kingdoms”). Nor does the word for citizen come anywhere near the rich historical and conceptual connotations of the term in contemporary English theory and practice; rather, *nagarik* is closer to its literal meaning, “inhabitant or resident of”, which is closer conceptually to “national” than to citizen.
4. In a similar vein, Ramesh Thakur has argued that “All agree that India is slow to change. To modernization theorists that was its weakness; to many Indian political scientists that is its strength. Hinduism is distinctive among complex, highly differentiated civilizations for maintaining a cultural identity that is free of a given political frame-
work. This meant that political changes could be implemented without being impeded by religious resistance... Conversely, the establishment of new political institutions did not pose a threat to the core values of the established social order, and therefore did not unleash general instability" (The Government and Politics of India, London: Macmillan, 1995, p. 294).

5. See, e.g., Alfred C. Stepan, “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the US Model”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1999, p. 19; Nancy Bermeo, “The Import of Institutions”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2002, p. 96.

6. Terrence Lyons, “The Role of Postsettlement Elections”, in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousins, eds, Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002, pp. 220–221; Elizabeth M. Cousins, “From Missed Opportunities to Overcompensation: Implementing the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia”, in Stedman et al., eds, Ending Civil Wars, p. 531.

7. Sorpong Peou, “Implementing Cambodia’s Peace Agreement”, in Stedman et al., eds, Ending Civil Wars, p. 499.

8. Tanja Hohe, “Totem Polls: Indigenous Concepts and ‘Free and Fair’ Elections in East Timor”, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2002, pp. 73–74.

9. Such an analysis is, of course, applicable to other regions – most obviously West Africa and the overlapping conflicts of Liberia and Sierra Leone. See, e.g., John Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001.

10. See, e.g., “Robertson on Balkans: ‘Not a Hopeless Case’; NATO Secretary General Says Allied Successes Overlooked”, Washington Post, 22 June 2001.

11. See chapter 10 by Michel Cahen in this volume.

12. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: President of the United States, September 2002, available at ⟨http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html⟩, p. iv.

13. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, 3rd edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 190.

14. See chapter 16 by Simon Chesterman in this volume.

15. See William Maley, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur, eds, From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities in Disrupted States, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003.

16. See chapter 1 by Sebastian von Einsiedel in this volume.

17. See Colin Keating, “Rwanda: An Insider’s Account”, in David M. Malone, ed., The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004, pp. 500–511; Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, London: Zed Books, 2000; and Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide, New York: Perennial, 2003.

18. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, New York, 21 August 2000, paras. 65–75.

19. UN Charter, Art. 99.

20. See Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 431; Walt W. Rostow, “Lessons of the Plan: Looking Forward to the Next Century”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 3, 1997, p. 205; Peter Grose, “The Marshall Plan – Then and Now”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 3, 1997, p. 159.

21. See also Scott Jackson, “Prologue to the Marshall Plan: The Origins of the American Commitment for a European Recovery Program”, Journal of American History, Vol. 65, 1979, p. 1055.

22. “Policy Planning Staff Paper on Aid to Western Europe”, 23 May 1947, PPS/1. Kennan,
who directed the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, anonymously published the article that was the intellectual basis for US containment policy through the Cold War: “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1947, p. 566.

23. Diane B. Kunz, “The Marshall Plan Reconsidered: A Complex of Motives”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 3, 1997, p. 168.

24. Mike Allen, “Bush Resumes Case against Iraq: Democratic Nations Must Confront ‘Axis of Evil’, President Tells VMI Cadets”, Washington Post, 18 April 2002; “If Afghanistan Goes Down”, Washington Post, 9 July 2002.

25. Jacques Paul Klein, “What Does It Take to Make UN Peacekeeping Operations Succeed? Reflections from the Field”, paper presented at 10th Anniversary of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York, 29 October 2002.

26. Charles P. Kindleberger, “In the Halls of the Capitol”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 3, 1997, p. 186.

27. David Reynolds, “The European Response: Primacy of Politics”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 3, 1997, pp. 182–183.

28. See Susan L. Woodward, “Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation”, in Stedman et al., eds, Ending Civil Wars, p. 183; Joanna Macrae, Aiding Recovery? The Crisis of Aid in Chronic Political Emergencies, New York: Zed Books, 2001.

29. See, generally, Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick, eds, Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000.

30. On sanctions, see especially David Cortright and George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000. On coercive military intervention, see International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001, available at (http://www.iciss.gc.ca); Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

31. See chapter 6 by Benjamin Reilly and Elsina Wainwright in this volume.

32. Second Progress Report to the Secretary General from his Special Representative in the Congo, Mr Rajeshwar Dayal, UN Doc. S/4557, 2 November 1960.

33. Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote, Peacekeeping by UN Forces: From Suez to the Congo, New York: Praeger, for the Center for International Studies, Princeton, 1965, p. 185; Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence: January 1960 to December 1961, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 295.

34. See Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, eds, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001.

35. See Ramesh Thakur and Peter Malcontent, eds, From Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004.

36. No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2001/394, 20 April 2001.

37. See, generally, Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds, Debating the Democratic Peace, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996; Joanne S. Gowa, Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999; Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, eds, Democracy, Liberalism, and War: Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001.

38. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”, in Brown et al., eds, Debating the Democratic Peace, p. 301.

39. For UN efforts at promoting democracy, see Edward Newman and Roland Rich, eds,
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The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004.

40. See, e.g., An Agenda for Democratization, UN Doc. A/51/761, 20 December 1996, para. 13: “Democratization is predominantly a new area for technical assistance.”

41. Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 266. There is a similar saying in India, to the effect that “I’ve bought the reins, the bit and the saddle; all I need now is the horse.”