ABSTRACT: There is a twofold crisis in Europe: While mass migration is a serious challenge to the whole EU, we also have member-states striking at the EU itself. Our research shows that Hungary, with its overwhelming political communication, became the first post-socialist EU member state to run official anti-Western propaganda since the end of the Cold War and it seems that other CEE-countries will follow its lead. The campaign does not go against Brussels directly: the real message is hidden between the lines. We analyzed 644 pro-government articles on migration issues. The research shows that anti-Brussels narratives were strikingly frequent, and a new “war vocabulary” propaganda campaign started, stating that the EU is fighting against Hungary, so Hungary has to strike back.

KEYWORDS: political communication, anti-Western propaganda, media bias, populism, migrant crisis.

INTRODUCTION

What is wrong with propaganda? What is the problem with the fact that sometimes the government informs the public, and of course this communication entails broadcasting the values and ideology of the ruling party? The problem is, as is well known, propaganda distorts reality by design, to put it clearly, it lies (Fawcett, 2007). As has been argued by many scholars, the tenor and function of public media is that it should serve adequate and important information to the audience (Durham & Kellner, 2006). Of course it is illustrative of democracies only, since “a democratic society is one in which the public has the means to participate in some meaningful way in the management of their own affairs and the means of information are open and free” (Chomsky, 1997, p. 3). Instead of helping the people to make their own opinions from the plurality of facts, propaganda tries to engineer opinions, and it tends to substitute reality with artificial representations. In the article by
David Welch (Cull, Culbert, & Welch, 2003, p. 317) we could read countless definitions of propaganda: Some of them state that propaganda is neutral in the sense that it could be equally used with good or bad purposes (Lasswell, 1971); others say that since propaganda is biased information, it is always bad in the sense that it prevents the audience understanding reality in its genuine complexity. Since this article deals with the communication and control aspects of political propaganda, we will use the expression ‘propaganda’ in the following sense. First of all, propaganda always makes a tool of mass media for controlling the audience (Demeter, 2017). As opposed with pure information or reference, propaganda always has its direct intention, and most importantly, its real purpose is different from its apparent purpose. The apocalypses of reality behind the propaganda, the revelation of its real political purposes (Manning, 2004, p. 13): That makes sense to any critical media analysis. In a basically historical article, John Corner also investigates the change of propaganda’s concept in the course of its history. He also stresses its most important properties in relation to communication: 1) Lying, 2) The withholding of information, 3) strategic selectivity, 4) exaggeration, 5) explicit or covert affective appeals to desire or to fear and 6) Use of a “rhetoric of visual display and/or linguistic structure which seek to manage phatic contexts (e.g., of trust, of intimacy) and to organize the flow of meaning and of value in ways not arising out of the rational content of the communication” (Corner, 2007, pp. 674–675).

POST-SOCIALIST AND HUNGARIAN PROPAGANDA

Eastern European (or post-socialist) propaganda also has a history of its own. The most important feature here is the strong interrelations between the state and the media, the rise of the radical right and a frequent use of nationalist and anti-immigrant rhetoric (Cull, Culbert, & Welch 2003, p. 32). According to the classical theory of Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956), socialist countries followed the Russian or Soviet media model. It means that propaganda was not a defect of the media system but its inherent and important feature. The socialist states wanted to control the total media and they stated that totalitarian media would serve the interests of the people. But as Bajomi-Lazar puts it (2014), there are at least two variances of Eastern European media models. According to the latest Freedom House reports (2017), in some more fortunate countries like the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, or Latvia the press is relatively free, while in Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, or Romania the press is only partially free. The report explicitly states that

Politicians in democracies such as Poland and Hungary shaped news coverage by undermining traditional media outlets, exerting their influence over public broadcasters, and raising the profile of friendly private outlets. (Freedom House Report, 2017, p. 62)

As Oates puts it, a Neo-Soviet model of the media emerges, which includes the
rejection of balance or objectivity; flaws in media law; self-censorship; government interference and harassment of media outlets; the lack of journalistic professionalism; and an atmosphere of violence against journalists. (Oates 2007, p. 1279)

It is not surprising then, that state persuasion in Eastern European countries with Neo-Soviet media models could be easily accomplished.

Western propaganda against the East, or more precisely against the ‘Orient’ (Said, 1978), is a well-known and widely discussed phenomenon since the late 1970’s. The “Orientalist Other”, as Eric Steuter and Deborah Wills put it, is the opposite of the civilized European citizen, and Western propaganda is the “mechanism by which governments persuade the public about the evil of the enemy and the justness of its own cause.” (Steuter & Wills, 2008, p. 18). The so-called “War on terror” gave a new drive to the scientific investigation of Western propaganda against Islamic communities and culture as well; the most common method for understanding and denouncing official propaganda is the content analysis of news articles (DiMaggio, 2009). But the study of propaganda against Islamic communities and culture started to culminate since the beginning of 2015, when the so-called refugee-crisis began (Peters & Besley, 2015). The main area of research was of course the impact that mass migration caused on European societies: many studies have been written on this topic, and many of them investigate, besides other social factors, the media representation of refugees (Leander & de Haan, 2015; Hadgu et al., 2016). No government could afford not to inform its people on what was and is happening with refugees across Europe, because of “the high levels of public anxiety about immigration and asylum across Europe” (Berry et al., 2016, p. 4). Moreover

it is impossible to ignore the role of the mass media in influencing public and elite political attitudes towards asylum and migration. The mass media can set agendas and frame debates. They provide the information which citizens use to make sense of the world and their place within it. (Berry et al., 2016, p. 5)

Notwithstanding that in the last few years, the issues of the migration and refugee crisis have been evolving into a hot topic in Europe and the world. The anti-migration politics of Hungary has held center stage since the second half of 2015, and it has three main causes. First, Hungary was the first country — besides Spain — which started to build barbed-wire fences against so-called illegal migrants. As we will see later, the expression “illegal migrant” is a consciously constructed propaganda term which aims to blur the differences between economic migrants and refugees. Second, Hungary was the first member of the European Union which spectacularly opposed the majority’s opinion as regards the management of migration issues. Finally, more and more political analysts started to think that the attitude of Hungary could serve as a role model for other CEE countries. (For a great recapitulation of this topic see the New York Times article of Niels Muiznieks (2016).
It is not surprising then, that there are many scientific analyses which try to examine the political communication of the Hungarian mass media, and especially of the government. Most of them could be conceived as antecedents of the current study, in spite of the fact that we have a very different hypothesis than other researchers.

An exceedingly precise and detailed article of Kallius et al. (2016) describes the whole story of the 2015 summer crisis in Budapest through the eyes of the “participant observer”, namely, or in other words, from an anthropological point of view. This thick description (Geertz, 1973) allows other scientists to have an insight of the real events, and then the facts could be contrasted with the pictures and texts of the mass media. It is very important to emphasize that most Hungarians never even caught sight of a refugee because refugees had been accommodated in very special and distinct areas of the country. Without having real life experience or knowing the relevant facts from the media, Hungarians never had the chance to resist the overwhelming powers of state propaganda. Of course, as Manuel Castells points out, every power provokes some counter-power (Castells, 1997): in the case of Hungary we can speak of counter-activism and of counter-media as well. The counter-activists organizations were NGOs, like Migration Aid and the Helsinki Committee, and the counter-media was social media, namely those Facebook groups which organized the life of the whole civil pro-refugee community. Their communication methods and social actions are fully analyzed in Dessewffy-Nagy (2016). Unfortunately, government’s propaganda was, and still is, overwhelming: it defines not just the public discourse but also media semantics, and there were no real and wide opportunities and publicity for alternative semantics.

Current research on Hungarian anti-migration propaganda (Bernáth & Messing, 2015; Mong, Nagy, Polyák, & Urbán, 2016) reveals many aspects of the government’s communications. The frames of interpretation had been fully developed in the first period of 2015. As already mentioned, the campaign of government communication presented a new category, namely the “economic migrant”, which made it possible both to evoke emotional associations and to juggle facts. Because of the strict regulation of immigration in Hungary, immigration is absolutely insignificant compared to European Union standards. The empirical data also shows (Bernáth & Messing, 2015) that (in contrast to the statements of the Hungarian government) from the viewpoint of most immigrants, Hungary is not a well-developed country and it does not attract immigration. As opposed to the number of immigrants, the number of refugees who came from war zones increased sharply. It is very important to realize that the vast majority of refugees would like to go further to Western Europe (see also Janky, 2016, p. 3). Nonetheless, the government campaign talks about “economic migrants” while it discloses data and ideas about asylum seekers. In addition, in Hungarian the attribute “economic” is strongly suggestive and used exclusively in negative contexts like “economic criminal” or “economic childbearing” (the first expression refers to a criminal who commits...
crimes for his livelihood, the second one refers to someone who bears children only to received family support from the state). Moreover, the use of a given category has a great expressive power. The word ‘refugee’ or ‘asylum seeker’ evokes compassion, solidarity, and a desire to help, while the word ‘migrant’ means simply an alien, an unknown, a foreigner.

Besides the above quoted research, which deals with the semantic aspects of the anti-migration propaganda in Hungary, there are also inquiries which investigate the bias presented in the Hungarian media. As the quantitative research of Democracy Reporting International (DRI 2016) demonstrated; Hungary’s public TV backed the government position, was one-sided 95% of the time during the EU-refugee referendum, despite a legal duty to show balanced coverage. As the report suggests,

Michael Meyer-Resende, DRI Executive Director, says:
The biased tone and lack of balanced debate makes M1 seem like an extension of the ruling party’s ‘no’ campaign. For six years Viktor Orbán has systematically dismantled democratic checks and balances. We’re seeing the results of that now. (Hungary’s public, 2016)

As can be seen by the results of contemporary research, propaganda works well. A recently unpublished inquiry of the Institute of Minority Studies states that in recent years, surveys have shown an increase in xenophobia in Hungary. Now, most people in Hungary are afraid of migrants, refugees, strangers, and foreigners.

THE ANTI-QUOTA CAMPAIGN

After the culmination of the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015, the European Commission planned to share the settlement of asylum seekers across EU states. Hungary started to fight against the EU relocation scheme, which will set quotas for each EU country to host a share of the migrants over two years. Hungary started to campaign against the resettlement quota and announced an anti-quota referendum.

The outcome of the anti-quota referendum on the 2nd of October clearly shows that the great majority of the voters would refuse to accept refugees. Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, announced on 24 February 2016 that Hungary would hold a referendum on whether to accept mandatory EU quotas for relocating migrants. As the BBC News put it, “In September, the EU agreed to relocate an additional 120,000 migrants across the continent — a move Hungary opposed. Under the plan, Hungary will now have to take in a share of migrants”. But this was already known, months before the referendum. Why should the government spend more than 20 billion HUF (65,000,000 EUR) on a campaign against the resettlement quota? Knowing that a former campaign about a year ago was very successful in drastically increasing xenophobia in Hungary (Feischmidt & Hervik, 2015), we had to form a hypothesis on the real point and aim of the current campaign. Since to campaign against refugees and migrants seemed to be redundant and unneces-
sary, we had to find other reasons. The main sloganeer of the recent propaganda was “Send a message to Brussels”, and the hypothetical scenario was that if the referendum is valid and negative, then Brussels will change its mind as regards the resettlement quota. That’s why our hypothesis says that

— H1: The main target of the anti-quota campaign and the referendum itself was not the refugees, nor the migrants, but the EU itself: the West as such, with its political philosophy, its values and its slant on life.

In this article, we will empirically test this hypothesis to show the real goal of the Hungarian government. But why do we think that the propaganda did not work against the migrants, refugees or Islamic culture? As has been mentioned earlier, surveys show that most Hungarians already reject migrants and refugees to a great extent, so it is not necessary to run an expensive campaign against them. What’s more, even if the referendum had turned out to be valid, it surely would not cause the EU to change its mind, so the referendum was also unnecessary from this point of view. Since the last campaign chiefly referred to — besides migration — Brussels and the EU, we started to think that the target was, and still is, the European Union.

Propaganda against the European Union is not a new thing in the case of Hungarian political communication. First, Hungary had 40 years of Soviet oppression where the official propaganda told people that the West is dying, in decline and would fall. So the story is old, just the scenery changes (Wodak, Kroshravinik, & Mral, 2013). Second, since the beginning of 2015, more than one hundred propaganda websites started in Hungarian which were associated with Russian organizations. Many authors started to think that behind the powerful yet unofficial propaganda against the West, we would find Russia. There are more and more articles which point to the dangers of Russian disinformation, see for example the article of Anne Applebaum and Edward Lucas in The Washington Post (2016) or Neil McFarquhar’s article in The New York Times (2016). This problem is especially serious in the case of CEE countries, which had been Soviet ‘colonies’ in the not too distant past. See for example the situation in the Czech Republic, where the interior minister claimed a propaganda-war by Russia. The Czech counter-intelligence service said in September 2016 that Russia was conducting “an information war” in the Czech Republic, putting in place propaganda agents to destabilize the country (The Guardian, 21 October, 2016). But there is a capital difference between the attitude of Hungary and other CEE countries: While the latter — at least pro forma — condemn the propaganda against Europe, the Hungarian government agrees: “in Hungary, it is the government itself that’s pushing such falsehoods” (Muiznieks, 2016). In one of his most important yearly speeches the Hungarian prime minister directly said that “The bureaucrats in Brussels are an obstacle for us, not Islam” and “Europe’s current political leadership has failed” (Bloomberg, 2016). In this extremely astounding speech, Orbán buried the Western world, and said that the future is Eastern European, which in contrast with the old, dying
and falling West, is energetic and viable. “The Great European Dream has been broken” and “we have to finish the idealization of Europe”, he said.

From the above mentioned reasons, we could hypothesize that the new, overwhelming, and extremely expensive campaign of the government trends directly against the EU and the West. Note, that this is the first time since the fall of the Soviet regime when a post-socialist EU-member state officially runs propaganda against the EU.

RESEARCH DESIGN

As an empirical test, we examined the official pro-government articles of the last two weeks before the referendum by content analysis. We know well that “language does not simply name the world, but constructs a view of the world” (O’Shaughnessy, 1999, p. 34) so a language analysis of a given corpus could show the intended meaning-giving. In the case of political naming, it is more obvious that terms and phrases could be used by any political power to construct its artificial reality for a given purpose. In most cases, as Richard Dyer puts it, we don’t even have the chance to experience reality without representations: in the 21st century we learn most information from the news media (Dyer, 1993). Texts and messages of mass media could be analyzed by both theoretical and empirical methods, but currently social scientists prefer a combination of the two:

Typically that means that these researchers identify questions or problems (either derived from scholarly literature or occurring in applied mass communication), identify concepts that “in theory” may be involved or at work, and propose possible explanations or relationships among concepts. Implausible explanations are discarded, and viable ones tested empirically, with theoretical concepts now measured in concrete observable terms. (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2014, p. 3)

SAMPLING

To measure official government communications as regards the referendum, we selected the most obviously pro-government online platforms to analyze their content from 19–31 September, 2016, excluding weekends. Pro-government platforms are those which a) demonstrably established by pro-government contractors or loyal friends and b) supported and maintained by state advertisements (Bevált, 2016). The pro-government nature of the selected online platforms has been demonstrated in many reports (Urbán, 2016). As a result of our selection process, we selected three online journals, namely, kormany.hu, magyaridok.hu, and 888.hu. We have two main reasons for not selecting too many platforms, and instead of this, we endeavored to perform an in-depth analysis and a thick description of the content of the selected media. Unfortunately, the pro-government media galaxy in Hungary seems to behave like “if you’ve seen one, you’ve seen them all”. There are not serious differences between the content of the unofficial pro-government media, and even
the different medium types relay the contents of each other. So, for example, if we have an article on kormany.hu, we will listen to the same on Radio Kossuth and watch the same on M1 News. Instead of the superficial and only quantitative description of the whole field, we decided to concentrate on a narrower, but consciously selected target.

Table 1. Total frequency of the selected words

| English equivalent | Hungarian expression | Total frequency in articles |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|
| Migrant            | Migráns             | 159                        |
| Migrant            | Bevándorló          | 86                         |
| Migration          | Migráció           | 53                         |
| Refugee            | Menekült            | 42                         |
| Asylum seeker      | Menedékkérő         | 9                          |
| Referendum         | Népszavazás         | 120                        |
| Quota              | Kvóta               | 78                         |
| October 2          | Október 2           | 31                         |
| Brussels           | Brüsszel            | 79                         |
| EU                 | EU                  | 29                         |
| Union              | Unió                | 37                         |
| Europe             | Európa              | 162                        |
| Islam              | Iszlám              | 32                         |
| Terror             | Terror              | 111                        |
| Muslim             | Muszlim             | 23                         |

Source: Author.

There was no doubt that we had to choose the only official platform of the Hungarian government, where we could daily find 11 to 15 articles. Most pro-government and even opposition media receive articles from this official platform, because this is the place where official government news appears first. The publisher of www.kormany.hu is the Administration Office of the Hungarian Government. Our second observation target was www.magyaridok.hu, which also has a print version with almost the same content. It is a fresh, new, conservative, and admittedly pro-government journal which obviously serves for political propaganda. The third and last analyzed platform was www.888.hu, which is also a newly-established pro-government online journal, and the government consecrated it as the opposite of the liberal portal www.444.hu which attracts many educated younger people. It is noteworthy that both portals (888.hu and magyaridok.hu) are very successful financially, because of the extremely frequent and expensive state advertisements in
them. In Hungary, because of the very narrow market opportunities, almost no professional media could survive without state advertisements, and this is what the government uses to control them. That is why we also note state advertising during our research. Since we examined only the front pages, we took into consideration titles, headlines, and leads which were published on the front page. During our ten-day long research, we selected content from a total of 1248 articles, and the corpus also entails 34 state advertisements. Every article was snapshot at 10 pm on the corresponding day, so the content of any given day means the totality of the titles and headlines of front page articles at 10 pm. Then we selected all the articles for further content analysis where the connection with migration issues and/or the referendum was ascertainable. As a main rule, we selected articles which contain at least one of the following words in the appropriate context (see Table 1). For query making, frequency check, and further analysis we used the CATMA (Computer Aided Textual Markup & Analysis) 5.0 software of the University of Hamburg.

Of course there were titles and headlines where more than one word was contained, and in very few cases (less than 1%) the nature of the content was easily deducible from the context without the tagged words. As a result of this pre-selection process, we found 644 articles pertaining to migration and/or the referendum.

CODING PROTOCOL

As we compiled the observation corpus, namely the above mentioned collection of articles, we started the coding process. We had a hierarchical classification (for the code system, see the first two columns of Table 2) which shows the class-structure of our categories (see the last three columns of Table 2). According to our hypothesis, we chose categories with which the semantic structure of the government campaign could be measured in relation to its messages in line with the EU, with Brussels, with the referendum and so on.

Of course we had to be aware of the reliability of our main categories, so we calculated Krippendorff-Alpha for our main and less obvious categories, namely ‘Against Brussels’, ‘Campaign for the referendum’, and ‘Present danger’. According to the reliability protocol (Krippendorff, 2004; Neuendorf, 2002) we randomly selected 50 examples from the corpus of 644 articles, and, after 15 minutes of explanation concerning the categories, asked 4 independent coders to categorize the articles. The estimated Nominal Krippendorff Alpha (generated with SPSS) was 0.8422, with much higher observed coincidence than it was expected, which shows the high reliability of our coding process.

The main categories were AB (against Brussels), CG (campaign for the referendum), AI (against Islam), ISIS and HR (Health Risks). There were many subcategories: under AB we have AGS (Against George Soros), AJ (against Juncker), and AM (against Angela Merkel); under CR we have AO (against the opposition), D (defense), SO (Speech of Viktor Orbán), and PD (present danger), which also have subcategor-
ies as A (aggression), B (blasting), OC (other crime), SR (social risk), HR (health risk), and T (terrorism). The third main category was AI (against Islam) with the following subcategories: T (terror), A (aggression), B (blasting), R (rape), OC (other crime), and I (integration issues), with subcategories SR (social risks) and NO-GO (NO-GO Zones). Finally, we have the ISIS category with the subcategories T (terror), B (blasting), and OC (other crime). We also have HR (health risks) as an independent category.

Table 2. Research categories and ordered subcategories

| Code | Meaning | Category | 1st subcategory | 2nd subcategory |
|------|---------|----------|-----------------|-----------------|
| AB   | Aggression | AJ       |                 |                 |
| AB   | Against Brussels | AM       |                 |                 |
| ACL  | Against civil and legal aid groups (NGO’s) | CR       | AO              |                 |
| AGS  | Against Georg Soros | D        |                 |                 |
| AI   | Against Islam |                      |                 |                 |
| AJ   | Against Jean-Claude Juncker | PD       |                 |                 |
| AM   | Against Angela Merkel |                 |                 |                 |
| AO   | Against the opposition |                 |                 |                 |
| B    | Blasting |                      |                 |                 |
| CR   | Campaign for the referendum |           |                 |                 |
| D    | Defense | AI       | SO              |                 |
| I    | Integration issues | ISIS     | T               |                 |
| HR   | Health risks | ISIS     | A               |                 |
| NO-GO| issues about NO-GO zones in Europe | R        |                 |                 |
| OC   | Other crime | OCR      |                 |                 |
| PD   | Present danger | I         | SR              |                 |
| SR   | Rape |                        |                 |                 |
| SO   | Speech of Orbán | ISIS     | T               | NO-GO           |
| T    | Terror, terrorism | ISIS     | B               |                 |
| HR   |                        |         |                 |                 |

Source: Author.

It can be seen that some categories occur more than once: for example HR could be an independent main category and also a subcategory of PD; or T could be included in PD and also in AI. It means that a given semantic unity or a theme could occur independently, and also as an embedded content in a wider context. Con-
sider terrorism: if we have news which reports an Islamic terror attack in South Africa, then we should code it as a subcategory under Against Islam. But if it supposes that there can be a terrorist attack in Hungary anytime, than we should code it as a present danger.

Categories start with ‘against’ are the complex of some negative predicate (NP₁) and the related argument (aᵢ). For example, the category ‘against Brussels’ could be generated from ‘fault of’ and ‘Brussels’ or ‘hazard’ and ‘Brussels’ and so on. We will see many concrete examples later. On CR (campaign for the referendum) we mean texts which say (implicitly or explicitly) that one should 1) participate in the referendum 2) say NO for the mandatory resettlement quota initiated by the EU. The meaning of the other categories is quite obvious: they express the dangerous aspects of migration in some ways.

RESULTS

Before we start discussing the results of our analysis, we have to mention that we already have our first interesting issue when we received the relevant content from the whole sample. Here we found that more than 51% of the articles of the analyzed pro-government media dealt with migration and/or referendum issues during the last two weeks before the referendum. As we can see in Figure 1, the official government portal (kormany.hu) was the most biased: migration and referendum issues were sometimes overrepresented up to 82% and the ratio of propaganda issues had never been less than 55%.

The course of the curves show that the last weekday before the referendum was the most biased day with more than 71% average migration content. In spite of the fact that our research wasn’t a comparative investigation, we made a mini-control test with the two main opposition media, in which we asked for the ratio of migration issues in Index.hu and 444.hu on 30.09.2016 at 10 pm. We found that despite migration and the referendum itself, there were also hot topics in the two leading opposition platforms, the ratio was far lower than it was in the government media: in the case of Index.hu it was 17%, and migration issues occurred only in 40% of the articles of 444.hu (see Figure 2).

Then we checked the frequencies of our main categories (Table 1) to see whether the anti-EU articles were dominant in the sample. Note that our hypothesis was that the covert intention of the analyzed content was its anti-Brussels propaganda under superficial migrant issues. Figure 3 shows the results.
Figure 1. Migration issues during the last two weeks before the referendum (in percent)
Source: Author.

Figure 2. Migration issues on the last day of the quota-campaign (in percent)
Source: Author.
We can see now that even if we consider only the individual categories, against Brussels (AB) is the most frequent among them with almost 180 occurrences. It means that the 28% of the articles which thematize migration issues also include some anti-Brussels content. It is a very high percentage: note that only the immediate aim of the campaign, namely the direct campaign for the referendum could approach it with its 27% frequency, and other, obviously very important topics like defense (6%) present danger (14%) and terror (12%) could hardly at all reach them. With subcategories AGS, AM, AJ and ACL, the ratio of anti-Brussels articles reaches 35%.

To verify our analytical results, we also made simple frequency probes with CATMA-5 where we asked for word occurrences in the whole corpus (n = 16655). Then we used a similarity = 80 query to obtain all the phrases which contain the most frequent words. Finally, we made a semantic grouping according to our ana-
lytical categories. As can be seen in Figure 4, this simple quantitative computer-aided analysis produced similar results as our precious content analysis.

![Figure 4. The frequency of the most prevalent semantic groups in the whole corpus (analyzed with CATMA 5.0)](image)

Source: Author.

In most cases, the reasons for classification are unambiguous, only the last grouping needs to be explained: why the words ‘mandatory’ and ‘resettlement’ have been assigned to the group ‘Brussels, European, Union, and EU’? It should be mentioned here that the complex expression “mandatory resettlement quota” was one of the most frequent collocations during the campaign. According to the official propaganda, it means that the EU or Brussels forces the Hungarian government to settle immigrants in Hungary, so these terms are always in connection with Brussels or the European Union. To check this, we also made a double-tree analysis on the word ‘mandatory’ and it turned out that the most frequent collocations of ‘mandatory’ were ‘resettlement’, ‘quota’, and ‘Union’ indeed.

Since both our classification-based content analysis and the CATMA-5 quantitative analysis clearly show the significant predomination of anti-EU topics in the relevant campaign texts, we found our hypothesis corroborated, and we should state that according to this current research, the campaign against migration and mandatory resettlement quota may be in fact, propaganda against the European Union, against Brussels, and against the West. Knowing this, we should analyze the concrete content of this propaganda in more detail.
As a result of our in-depth analysis we searched for collocations of the most frequent words, and we also made double-tree analyses with CATMA 5.0 which shows the context of a given expression. Of course this mainly quantitative data only underlies the more interesting and instructive qualitative analysis which we also did after the statistical research. The main themes and narratives with their occurrence rates can be found in Table 3.

Table 3. Main topics and narratives during the quota-campaign

| Themes and main narratives          | Number of occurrences (n = 178) | Total number (%) of occurrences (n = 178) |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Sovereignty                        | 29                             | 16%                                     |
| Stubborn                           | 28                             | 16%                                     |
| Illegality                         | 7                              | 4%                                      |
| Jeopardize                         | 31                             | 17%                                     |
| Europe                             | 6                              | 3%                                      |
| Hungary                            | 25                             | 13.5%                                   |
| Migrants                           | 1                              | 0.5%                                    |
| Impotency                          | 17                             | 10%                                     |
| Unpopularity                       | 2                              | 1%                                      |
| War against Hungary                | 43                             | 24%                                     |
| world power                        | 2                              | 1%                                      |
| Brussels                           | 23                             | 13%                                     |
| Scandinavian countries             | 2                              | 1%                                      |
| Georg Soros                        | 5                              | 3%                                      |
| NGO's                              | 4                              | 2%                                      |
| Western media                      | 5                              | 3%                                      |
| opposition                         | 1                              | 0.5%                                    |
| Hungarophobia                      | 1                              | 0.5%                                    |
| Hungary’s holy war against Brussels| 51                             | 29%                                     |
| George Soros                       | 12                             | 7%                                      |
| Merkel                             | 17                             | 10%                                     |
| NGO’s                              | 13                             | 7%                                      |

Source: Author.

DISCUSSION

It is easy to see that, among the anti-EU articles, there is a well-defined bunch of narratives, but the most frequent use well-known war-terminology (Clark, 2015). Hungarians have to fight against Brussels, just as Brussels made war against Hungary in return. Hungarian people have to fight for their sovereignty, for their culture, for their values, for their future and so on. In the other direction, Brussels is up
against Hungary. The “impotent Brussels bureaucrats” want to send migrants, refugees, and even terrorists to Hungary, they want to change their 1000-year-old culture. Their strategic partners are the western liberal media, the Soros-aided pro-migrant organizations and other NGOs, and, of course, the world powers. It is time for Hungary to show that it can stop the EU from ruining Europe.

The above described narrative is not new: we all know it from conspiracy theories. But it is the first time since the end of the Cold War that this kind of anti-Western conspiracy became the official voice in the political communication of an Eastern European EU-member state. In addition, beside the narratives according to which Brussels actively jeopardizes European countries and the impotency topic, the war-narrative is overwhelming (see Figure 5).

![Figure 5. The main narratives of anti-EU articles](source: Author)

We could have established other terminological groups within the sub-categories. We created the “war terminology” group, from “war against Hungary”, “Hungary’s holy war against Brussels” and from the “sovereignty” sub-categories. We could also construct the “Responsibility terminology” group from the “threats” and “Impotence” sub-groups. Similarly, Angela Merkel, George Soros, and NGOs constitute the “Liberalism” terminology-group, and ‘Stubborn’ is an independent category.

The narratives behind the above-labeled categories are very simple: war terminology reminds the audience that Hungary has been attacked by Brussels, so Hungarians also have to mobilize their forces. The most illustrious example for war-terminology is the sword-metaphor of the Prime Minister: he said that the result of the referendum would show how strong a sword can be made by Hungarians against Brussels. On the other part, responsibility-terminology suggests that Brussels cannot handle the situation, and it jeopardizes the future of the whole continent. The bet is the future of Europe, but Brussels bureaucrats and the Brussels elite,
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the leaders of the EU are impotent, weak, and cowards. Moreover, according to the liberalism category, liberals want to destroy the traditional picture of Europe. It should be mentioned, that for the Hungarian government and its devotees, liberalism is a swear-word: it involves everything which is against nationalism and conservatism. According to the standard propaganda, liberals don’t respect tradition, virtues, spirituality; they — with world powers, liberal NGOs, and unpopular antagonists like George Soros — respect only global commercialism and money.

It is noteworthy that 53% of the articles used war terminology (29%: Hungary’s holy war against Brussels, 24% War against Hungary). Examples for “war against Hungary” are those which state that Brussels wants to threaten or even kill Hungary: “Global world-powers want to squeeze Central Europe”, “Hungary will be under pressure because of the referendum”. Pro-government media even coined the word hungarophobia: “The hungarophobia of the Commissioner of Human Rights is crushing.” In the category “Hungary’s holy war against Brussels”, we could find statements like “We have to save Europe against the Brussels plans!” or “Hungary doesn’t fear! Our 1000-year history could show the EU that we are capable of defending the country and the whole continent!”.

The most common themes in the category “Jeopardize” were “RIP Europe!” or “The end of this process will be a Muslim Europe” or even “Brussels condemned Europe to an active euthanasia!” Other articles in the category “Sovereignty” refer to the rights of Hungarians: “Brussels wants to decide our future without us” or “The EU should stay a Europe of nations” or “Only Hungary is entitled to decide whom Hungarians want to live with!” could be counted as examples. Ten percent of the articles refer to the impotency of the EU: “The tired Brussels bureaucrats couldn’t handle the situation”. Twenty-four percent of the articles blames George Soros (7%) Merkel (17%) or the NGO’s (7%), but in most cases NGO’s are associated with Soros in government propaganda: “Migrants buy marijuana plants from the money of Soros”, “A leader of a Soros-organization would accept all the migrants!”, “A civil organization helped the blasting expert of ISIS to leave Europe.” Finally, the category Stubborn refers to those articles which state that the leaders of the EU are pig-headed, and they will force their will on Hungary at whatever cost: “Brussels will never cancel the quotas”.

CONCLUSION

Our hypothesis was that the main target of the anti-quota campaign and the referendum itself was neither refugees nor migrants, but the EU itself: the West as such, with its political philosophy, its values and its slant of life. The empirical research shows that our hypothesis could be corroborated by the data we collected from official and unofficial government media: 1) the most popular topic of the campaign was the anti-Brussels agenda, 2) among anti-EU articles, most text used war-terminology.
Our research also reinforced former research on the subject: 1) Bernáth-Messing (2015) states that the anti-migrant campaign is overwhelming, and we can say the same in 2016: more than 51% of the pro-government articles in our sample dealt with migration issues. It is also corroborated by the current Democracy Reporting Research (DRI, 2016) which states similar biases as regards Hungarian television news.

But there is a very important change in the political agenda of the Hungarian government. Former research shows that, in 2015, the main topics were a) hazard, b) infection, c) crime, d) employment issues, e) cultural differences, f) invasion, g) Islamization, h) huge costs (Bernáth-Messing, 2015). Some categories remained, like crime, invasion and Islamization, and they constitute the narrative of ‘Present danger’ with approximately 13% frequency. Other categories like cultural differences and huge costs also remained but they lost their importance. The most significant difference is the following: many new categories appeared and started to dominate the government’s propaganda: among these the most popular were the anti-Brussels narratives. The target of the campaign somehow turned around: from East to West, from ISIS to Brussels, from radical Islam to liberalism. But what makes the government do it?

Of course this is a question we cannot answer yet, but we could draw some conjectures for future hypotheses. We know well that, theoretically, populism in general and right-wing populism in particular has a few permanent narratives, e.g., the narrative of exclusion, the narrative of nationalism, the narrative of charisma, and the narrative of patriarchy (Wodak, 2015). There are many factors which show favor right-wing populism: the migrant crisis and its putative or real consequences imbue the population with hatred and fear, and this is a very good substratum for extreme populism. As an answer to the apparent crisis, the popularity of radicalism in general and of right-wing populism in particular substantially increased all over Europe (Liang, 2016). But there are also differences between Western European and CEE countries: while radical right-wing populist parties are becoming increasingly influential in Western European democracies (Akkerman, de Lange, & Rooduijn, 2016), this process has already happened in Hungary. If we want to understand contemporary right-wing populism, we should keep tabs on Hungary’s official propaganda which is nationalist, populist, and exclusivist. Not just in the sense that it excludes the “historical other”, namely Islam: it started to exclude Europe, too, and the campaign which has been analyzed in this article could be one of the first steps to bring it into effect.

AFTERWORD

Since I finished this paper, the Hungarian prime minister issued two new “national consultations”. The dramaturgy of these consultations is always the same: the government starts to advertise its ideas on a given topic, and then ask the people the same questions the government already answered in its former propaganda.
The title of the first (in the spring of 2017) was Stop Brussels! and we have a forthcoming consultation in 2018. For the latter, we already have the official campaign with the title “National consultation on the Soros plan”. These two recent campaigns in 2017 reinforce our conjecture by which the Hungarian government will not stop its official propaganda against the ideas of the West, but it seems that it is becoming more and more brazen.

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