Abstract—We consider the problem of secure distributed matrix multiplication (SDMM) in which a user wishes to compute the product of two matrices with the assistance of honest but curious servers. We construct polynomial codes for SDMM by studying a recently introduced combinatorial tool called the degree table. Maximizing the download rate of a polynomial code for SDMM is equivalent to minimizing $N$, the number of distinct elements in the corresponding degree table. We propose new constructions of degree tables with a low number of distinct elements. These new constructions lead to a general family of polynomial codes for SDMM, which we call GASP. GASP, (Gap Additive Secure Polynomial codes) parametrized by an integer $r$, outperforms all previously known polynomial codes for SDMM. We also present lower bounds on $N$ and show that GASP achieves the lower bounds in the case of no server collusion.

Index Terms—Secure distributed matrix multiplication, polynomial codes, degree table, additive combinatorics, sumsets.

I. INTRODUCTION

We consider the problem of secure distributed matrix multiplication (SDMM): A user has two matrices, $A$ and $B$, and wishes to compute their product, $AB$, with the assistance of $N$ servers, without leaking any information about either $A$ or $B$ to any server. We assume that all servers are honest but curious, i.e., any $T$ of them may collude to try to deduce information about either $A$ or $B$.

The primary performance metric used in the literature to compare different schemes for SDMM is the download rate, which we denote by $R$. This rate $R$ is defined as the ratio of the amount of information about $AB$ (in bits) the user downloads from the servers to the total number of downloaded bits. The goal is to construct an SDMM scheme with rate $R$ as large as possible, given some limit on the number of servers or on their computational power.

The main technique used for constructing polynomial codes for SDMM can be summarized as follows. We partition the matrices $A$ and $B$:

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ \vdots \\ A_K \end{bmatrix}, \quad B = \begin{bmatrix} B_1 & \cdots & B_L \end{bmatrix},$$

so that

$$AB = \begin{bmatrix} A_1B_1 & \cdots & A_1B_L \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ A_KB_1 & \cdots & A_KB_L \end{bmatrix}.$$ (1)

making sure that all products $A_iB_t$ are well-defined and of the same size. Computing the product $AB$ is equivalent to computing all subproducts $A_iB_t$. One then constructs a polynomial $h(x) = f(x) \cdot g(x)$ whose coefficients encode the submatrices $A_iB_t$, and utilizes $N$ servers to compute the evaluations $h(a_1), \ldots, h(a_N)$ for certain $a_1, \ldots, a_N$. The polynomial $h$ is constructed so that every $T$-subset of evaluations reveals no information about $A$ or $B$ ($T$-security), and that the user can reconstruct all of $AB$ given all $N$ evaluations (decodability).

The partition parameters $K$ and $L$ are inversely proportional to the amount of computation that each of the servers will have to perform. Mathematically, it is convenient to think of the number of servers, $N$, as a function of $K$, $L$, and the security parameter $T$. In this way, maximizing the download rate $R$, and even the upload rate, is equivalent to minimizing $N$ as a function of $K$, $L$, and $T$. Consider polynomials of the following type:

$$f(x) = \sum_{k=1}^K A_k x^{\alpha_k} + \sum_{t=1}^T R_t x^{\alpha_{K+t}}$$

$$g(x) = \sum_{t=1}^L B_t x^{\beta_t} + \sum_{t=1}^T S_t x^{\beta_{L+t}}.$$ (2)

The $R_t$ and $S_t$ are random matrices used to guarantee privacy. The exponents of the terms in $h(x) = f(x) \cdot g(x)$ will be given by the sum of the exponents, denoted by the vectors $\alpha$ and $\beta$, in $f(x)$ and $g(x)$.

The degree table was first introduced in [1]. The degree table of $h(x)$, depicted in Table I, shows the exponents in $h(x)$ as a function of $\alpha$ and $\beta$. In Theorem 1 of [1], it is shown that if the degree table satisfies the following conditions: (i) the numbers in the red block are unique in the table and; and (ii) numbers in the green/blue block are pairwise distinct, then there exists evaluation points such that the polynomial code in Equation (2) is decodable and $T$-secure. More so, the number of servers, $N$, is the number of distinct terms in the table. Thus, the main question we are interested in is how to choose the degree table, i.e., $\alpha$ and $\beta$, to minimize the number of servers, $N$.

A. Related Work

One distinguishing factor of the SDMM problem is that both matrices, $A$ and $B$, must be kept secure. In the case where
Table I: The Degree Table. The $\alpha_i$’s and $\beta_i$’s are the exponents of the polynomials $f(x)$ and $g(x)$ in (2) used to encode $A$ and $B$, respectively. The table entries are the monomial degrees to minimize the number of distinct entries in the table subject to: (i) Decodability, the numbers in the red block must be distinct to all the other ones; (ii) $T$-security, all numbers in the green/blue block must be pairwise distinct.

|   | $\beta_1$ | $\beta_L$ | $\beta_{L+1}$ | $\beta_{L+T}$ |
|---|-----------|-----------|---------------|---------------|
| $\alpha_1$ | $\alpha_1+\beta_1$ | $\alpha_1+\beta_L$ | $\alpha_1+\beta_{L+1}$ | $\alpha_1+\beta_{L+T}$ |
| $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ |
| $\alpha_K$ | $\alpha_K+\beta_1$ | $\alpha_K+\beta_L$ | $\alpha_K+\beta_{L+1}$ | $\alpha_K+\beta_{L+T}$ |
| $\alpha_{K+i}$ | $\alpha_{K+i}+\beta_1$ | $\alpha_{K+i}+\beta_L$ | $\alpha_{K+i}+\beta_{L+1}$ | $\alpha_{K+i}+\beta_{L+T}$ |
| $\alpha_{K+i}$ | $\alpha_{K+i}+\beta_1$ | $\alpha_{K+i}+\beta_L$ | $\alpha_{K+i}+\beta_{L+1}$ | $\alpha_{K+i}+\beta_{L+T}$ |
| $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ |
| $\alpha_{K+T}$ | $\alpha_{K+T}+\beta_1$ | $\alpha_{K+T}+\beta_L$ | $\alpha_{K+T}+\beta_{L+1}$ | $\alpha_{K+T}+\beta_{L+T}$ |

We start by introducing our main contribution, GASP$_r$ codes.

**Definition 1.** Given the partitioning parameters, $K$ and $L$, the security parameter $T$, and $1 \leq r \leq \min\{K,T\}$, we define the polynomial code GASP$_r$ as the polynomials in Equation 2 with exponents $\alpha$ and $\beta$ given as

- $\alpha = (0, 1, \ldots, K-1, KL, KL+1, \ldots, KL+r-1, KL+K, KL+K+1, \ldots, KL+L+r-1, \ldots)$ of length $K+T$,
- $\beta = (0, K, \ldots, K(L-1), KL, KL+L, \ldots, KL+T-1)$, if $L \leq K$. If $K < L$ we just interchange the roles of $K$ and $L$ in the definition.

We call the parameter $r$ the chain length.

In the remainder of this work, we assume, without loss of generality, that $L \leq K$. In the case where $K < L$ one needs only to interchange the roles of $K$ and $L$ in all the expressions.

The following example will make Definition 1 clearer.

**Example 1.** For $K = L = T = 4$ we have four GASP$_r$ codes, all of which have the same $\beta = (0, 4, 8, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19)$.

- For $r = 1$: $\alpha = (0, 1, 2, 3, 16, 20, 24, 28)$.
- For $r = 2$: $\alpha = (0, 1, 2, 3, 16, 17, 20, 21)$.
- For $r = 3$: $\alpha = (0, 1, 2, 3, 16, 17, 20, 20)$.
- For $r = 4$: $\alpha = (0, 1, 2, 3, 16, 17, 18, 19)$.

This family of codes are a generalization of the codes GASP$_{small} = GASP_1$ and GASP$_{big} = GASP_{\min\{K,T\}}$ presented in [1].

We are interested in finding the best chain length $r$, i.e., the one which minimizes the number of servers needed, for any given parameters.

**Definition 2.** Let $K$ and $L$ be the partitioning parameters, $T$ be the security parameter, and $N(r)$, the number of distinct terms in the degree table constructed by GASP$_r$. The optimal chain length is defined as

$$
r^* = \arg\min_{r \in \{1, 2, \ldots, \min\{K,T\}\}} N(r).
$$

In Theorem 1 we show how to calculate the number of distinct terms in the degree table, i.e., the number of servers previously known and outperforms them for many parameters.

- We give a formula for the number of servers, $N$, in GASP$_r$.
- We give lower bounds on $N$ in general and show that GASP$_r$ is asymptotically optimal for certain parameters, namely when $K = L = T = n^2 \geq 4$.

• In Section III, we demonstrate our polynomial code GASP$_r$ via an explicit example, in order to show the subtleties of the construction.
• In Section IV, we show the idea of the proof ultimately leading to a formula of the $N$ parameter of GASP$_r$ and for certain parameters, we prove the optimal choice of $r$.
• In Section V, we give lower bounds on the constructions using the degree table and show the optimality of GASP$_r$ for certain parameters.
needed for the scheme, for GASPₜ. Due to space constraints, we relegate the proof of this theorem to [16].

**Theorem 1.** Let $K$ and $L$ be the partitioning parameters, $T$ be the security parameter, and $r$ be the chain length. Then, the degree table constructed by GASPₜ has the number of terms given by $N = KL + K + T - 1 + T(L + T) - S$, where

$$S = \max\{0, \min\{r, \varphi\}\}L + 2\max\{0, r - z + 1\} + \gamma + (T - r)L + \max\{0, K + T - KL - 1\} + \eta \max\{0, T - K + r - 1\} + (T - 1 - \eta)(T - 1),$$

$$\varphi = T - 1 - KL + 2K, \eta = \left\lfloor \frac{T - 1}{r} \right\rfloor, z = \max\{1, \varphi + 1\},$$

$$\gamma = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } r < z \\ K(x - a)(x + a - 1)/2 - ab + xy + x & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

with $a, b, x, y$ defined by

$$T - 1 - r = aK + b \text{ and } 0 \leq b \leq K - 1,$$

$$T - 1 - z = xK + y \text{ and } 0 \leq y \leq K - 1.$$

The key to proving Theorem 1 is to determine the parameter $S$, called the score of the chain. In Section III, we give insights, using an example, on what $S$ represents in the degree table, and in Section IV, we show how to compute it.

Theorem 1 allows us to infer the optimal chain length, $r^*$, by calculating $S$ for every $1 \leq r \leq \min\{K, T\}$.

Under some conditions we are able to give a simple expression for the optimal chain length. A particularly revealing special case of this is presented in Corollary 1.

**Corollary 1.** In the setting of Theorem 1, if $K = L = T = n^2$ for $1 \leq n$, then $r^* = n$. Hence, for $n = 1, N = 3$ and for $n \geq 2$, we have $N = n^4 + 2n^3 + 2n^2 - n - 2$.

In Theorem 2 we give three lower bounds for the number of distinct terms, $N$, of any degree table.

**Theorem 2.** Let $K$ and $L$ be the partitioning parameters, $T$ be the security parameter, $\alpha$ and $\beta$ be vectors such that the degree table in Table I is decodable and $T$-secure, and $N$ be the number of distinct terms in this degree table. Then the following three inequalities hold.

1) $KL + \max\{K, L\} + 2T - 1 \leq N$.  
2) If $3\max\{K, L\} + 3T - 2 < KL$ or $2 \leq K = L$, then $KL + \max\{K, L\} + 2T \leq N$.  
3) $KL + K + L + 2T - 1 - T\min\{K, L, T\} \leq N$.

We note that Inequality 3 in Theorem 2 is stronger than Inequality 1 if and only if $T^2 < \min\{K, L\}$. Inequality 2 is always stronger than Inequality 1 by one if its condition is met and hence Inequality 3 is stronger than Inequality 2 if its condition is met and if only if $T^2 + 1 < \min\{K, L\}$.

By comparing the bounds in Theorem 2 to the number of distinct terms in GASPₜ, counted via Theorem 1, we show in

![Figure 1: Comparison of GASP-small = GASP₁, GASP_r⁻, with r⁻ = n due to Corollary 1, and GASP-big = GASP-min(K,T) in the setting of K = L = T = n². The term “LB” refers to the left hand side of Inequality 2 in Theorem 2.](image)

Corollaries 4 and 5 that GASP_r⁻ is optimal whenever one of the three parameters is one, $K = 1, L = 1$ or $T = 1$.

In the setting of Corollary 1, we can show that GASP_r⁻ is asymptotically optimal.

**Corollary 2.** In the setting of Corollary 1, if $K = L = T = n^2 \geq 4$, then the following lower bound on $N$ holds

$$N \geq n^4 + 3n^2. \quad (4)$$

Moreover, GASPₜ is asymptotically optimal and within 38% of the lower bound.

**Proof.** Inequality (2) in Theorem 2 is $KL + \max\{K, L\} + 2T = n^4 + 3n^2$ and the fraction of the size of the degree table constructed by GASPₜ divided by the left hand side of Inequality (2) in Theorem 2 is

$$\frac{n^4 + 2n^3 + 2n^2 - n - 2}{n^4 + 3n^2} \leq \frac{n^4 + 2n^3 + 2n^2}{n^4}$$

$$= 1 + 2n^{-1} + 2n^{-2} \in 1 + \Theta(n^{-1}),$$

i.e., the left hand side is asymptotically optimal and its maximum is $< 1.38$ by $n \approx 3$. □

In Figure 1, we draw GASP_small, GASP_medium, and GASP_big. The graphs are normalized to the left hand side of Inequality (2) in Theorem 2 and we draw the right hand side of Inequality 5.

**Remark 1.** The lower bounds presented here are with respect to the degree table construction. Thus, when we say a construction is optimal, we mean with respect to the degree table.

**III. A Motivating Example:** $K = L = T = 4$

In this example we consider the multiplication of two matrices $A$ and $B$ over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$, partitioned as:

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ A_2 \\ A_3 \\ A_4 \end{bmatrix}, \quad B = \begin{bmatrix} B_1 & B_2 & B_3 & B_4 \end{bmatrix}$$
Table II: The degree tables of GASP\(_r\) for all \(r\), in the setting where \(K = L = T = 2^2\). As per Corollary 1, \(r = 2\) achieves \(N = 36\). The lower bound for these tables, given in (4), is \(N \geq 28\). The gray region in the lower half of the degree table consists of the terms which have already appeared before. Their quantity is precisely the score, \(S\), appearing in Theorem 1.

| \(0\) | \(1\) | \(2\) | \(3\) | \(4\) | \(8\) | \(12\) | \(16\) | \(17\) | \(18\) | \(19\) |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| \(0\) | \(0\) | \(1\) | \(2\) | \(3\) | \(4\) | \(8\) | \(12\) | \(16\) | \(17\) | \(18\) | \(19\) |
| \(1\) | \(0\) | \(1\) | \(2\) | \(3\) | \(4\) | \(8\) | \(12\) | \(16\) | \(17\) | \(18\) | \(19\) |
| \(2\) | \(0\) | \(1\) | \(2\) | \(3\) | \(4\) | \(8\) | \(12\) | \(16\) | \(17\) | \(18\) | \(19\) |
| \(3\) | \(0\) | \(1\) | \(2\) | \(3\) | \(4\) | \(8\) | \(12\) | \(16\) | \(17\) | \(18\) | \(19\) |

(a) \(r = 1\), \(S = 14\), \(N = 41\)  
(b) \(r = 2\), \(S = 19\), \(N = 36\)  
(c) \(r = 3\), \(S = 18\), \(N = 37\)  
(d) \(r = 4\), \(S = 16\), \(N = 39\)

so that all the products \(A_k B_i\) are of the same size. The product \(AB\) is given by

\[
AB = \begin{bmatrix}
A_1 B_1 & A_1 B_2 & A_1 B_3 & A_1 B_4 \\
A_2 B_1 & A_2 B_2 & A_2 B_3 & A_2 B_4 \\
A_3 B_1 & A_3 B_2 & A_3 B_3 & A_3 B_4 \\
A_4 B_1 & A_4 B_2 & A_4 B_3 & A_4 B_4
\end{bmatrix}
\]

We construct a scheme which computes each term \(A_k B_i\), and therefore all of \(AB\) via polynomial interpolation. The scheme must be private for any \(T = 4\) servers colluding to infer any information about the \(A\) or \(B\).

Let \(R_1, \ldots, R_4\) and \(S_1, \ldots, S_4\) be matrices picked independently and uniformly at random with entries in \(F_q\), of sizes equal to the \(A_k\) and \(B_i\), respectively. Define the polynomials

\[
f(x) = A_1 x^{a_1} + A_2 x^{a_2} + A_3 x^{a_3} + A_4 x^{a_4} + R_1 x^{a_5} + R_2 x^{a_6} + R_3 x^{a_7} + R_4 x^{a_8}
\]

\[
g(x) = B_1 x^{b_1} + B_2 x^{b_2} + B_3 x^{b_3} + B_4 x^{b_4} + S_1 x^{b_5} + S_2 x^{b_6} + S_3 x^{b_7} + S_4 x^{b_8}
\]

We recover the products \(A_k B_i\) by interpolating the product \(h(x) = f(x) g(x)\). Specifically, for some evaluation points \(a_n \in F_q\), we send \(f(a_n)\) and \(g(a_n)\) to server \(n = 1, \ldots, N\), who then responds with \(h(a_n) = f(a_n) g(a_n)\). These evaluations suffice to interpolate all of \(h(x)\). In particular, we are able to retrieve the coefficients of \(h(x)\), which in turn will allow us to decode all the \(A_k B_i\).

In [1], it was shown that if the degree table of \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) satisfy the conditions in Table I, then the number of evaluation points needed, \(N\), is equal to the number of distinct terms in the degree table.

In Table II, we show the degree tables of GASP\(_r\) for all \(r\). The upper half of the degree table coincides for every \(r\), and consists of the numbers from 0 to \(KL + K + T - 2 = 22\).

The gray region in the lower half of the degree table consists of the terms which have already appeared before, by ordering them up to down. The number of terms in the gray region is precisely the score, \(S\), appearing in Theorem 1.

We calculate the number of distinct terms in the degree table as follows. As seen previously, the upper half of the degree table has \(KL + K + T - 1 = 23\) distinct terms. The lower half has a total of \(T(L + T) = 32\) terms, of which appear elsewhere. Thus \(N = KL + K + T - 1 + T(L + T) - S = 55 - S\).

In Theorem 1 we show how to compute the score, \(S\), for any \(r\). In general, we can determine the best chain length, \(r^*\), by computing all \(\min\{K, T\} = 4\) possibilities for \(r\) and choosing the one which maximizes the score, \(S\). In this case \(r^* = 2\) which could have also been obtained directly through Corollary 1. Thus, for this case, GASP\(_2\) is the best known scheme requiring \(N = 36\) servers.

Using the best lower bound for this case in Theorem 2, we obtain \(N \geq KL + \max\{K, L\} + 2T = 28\).

IV. GASP\(_r\)

A. The Number of Distinct Terms in GASP\(_r\)

In this section we will show the key ingredient for proving Theorem 1, the computation of the score of, \(S\), of the chain.

Definition 3. Let \(K\) and \(L\) be the partitioning parameters, \(T\) be the security parameter, and \(r\) be the chain length of the code GASP\(_r\).

For \(1 \leq i \leq T\) we define \(L_i\) (and \(R_i\)) to be the set of integers that are in the first \(L\) (last \(T\)) entries of row \(K + i\) such that these integers appear in the first \(K + i - 1\) rows of the degree table constructed by GASP\(_r\).

We call the cardinalities, \(|L_i|\) and \(|R_i|\), the left and, respectively, right score of the row \(K + i\).

In Table II, the left scores are represented by the gray regions in the lower left side of the degree table, and the right scores by the gray regions in the lower right side.

Definition 4. In the setting of Definition 3, we define the score of row \(i\) as \(S_i = |L_i| + |R_i|\) and the score of the chain \(r\) as \(S = S_1 + \ldots + S_T\).

By the arguments in Section III, we showed that \(N = KL + K + T - 1 + T(L + T) - S\). Thus, determining \(N\) is a matter of determining \(S\) which is a function of left and right scores. In Lemma 1 we show how to find these scores.

Lemma 1. In the setting of Definition 3, it follows that

\[
|L_i| = \begin{cases} 
\min\{L, 2 + \lceil(T - 1 - i) / K\rceil\} & \text{if } 1 \leq i \leq r \\
L & \text{if } r + 1 \leq i \leq T
\end{cases}
\]
and

\[ |R_i| = \begin{cases} 
\max\{0, K + T - KL - 1\} & \text{if } i = 1 \\
\max\{0, T - K + r - 1\} & \text{if } 2 \leq i \\
T - 1 & \text{if } i \equiv 1 \pmod{r} \\
& \text{and } i \equiv 1 \pmod{r} \\
& \text{if } i \not\equiv 1 \pmod{r}
\end{cases} \]

The proof is rather technical and can be found in [16]. This allows us to compute the score of GASP, in a straightforward but technical way ultimately leading to Theorem 1.

B. Determining the Optimal Chain Length, \( r^* \)

As stated previously, the optimal chain length, \( r^* \), can be found by calculating \( S \), using Theorem 1, for every \( 1 \leq r \leq \min\{K, T\} \).

In Corollary 1 we showed that for \( K = L = T = n^2 \), \( r^* = n \). The proof of this follows from Theorem 1.

Proof of Corollary 1. Plugging \( K = L = T = n^2 \) in the terms of Theorem 1 yields \( \gamma = -1 \) if \( r = n^2 \) and \( \gamma = 0 \) if \( r \leq n^2 - 1 \). Then,

\[
arg\max_r(S) = \arg\min_r\left\{ \frac{n(n^2 - 2) + \eta(n^2 - r) - \gamma}{n^2 - r} \right\} = \arg\max_r(r)
\]

so that a comparison of \( g(n) \) to \( g(n^2) \) (to eliminate \( \gamma \)), the application of \( x - 1 < |x| \) in \( \eta \), and a comparison of \( g(n) \) to \( g(r) \) in general complete the proof. \( \square \)

The following corollary also follows from Theorem 1.

Corollary 3. In the setting of Theorem 1, if \( r < z \), then \( r^* = \min\{K, T, \varphi\} \). In particular, if \( \max\{K, 1 + K(L - 1)\} \leq T \), then \( r^* = K \). If \( T \leq K \) and \( L = 1 \), then \( r^* = T \).

V. LOWER BOUNDS FOR THE DEGREE TABLE

In this section we will prove Inequality 1 in Theorem 2. The proof for Inequalities 2 and 3 in Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, 4, and 5 can be found in [16].

We will need the following lemma from the theory of sunsets (see [15, Lemma 5.3, Proposition 5.8]).

Lemma 2 ([15]). Let \( A \) and \( B \) be sets of integers. Then \( |A| + |B| - 1 \leq |A + B| \) and if \( 2 \leq |A|, |B| \), then equality holds iff \( A \) and \( B \) are arithmetic progressions with the same common difference.

Using this lemma, we can prove Inequality 1 in Theorem 2.

Proof of Inequality 1 in Theorem 2. Without loss of generality, let \( L \leq K \). Due to the decodability property, all integers in the first \( K \) rows and first \( L \) columns are distinct among themselves and among all other entries in the table, so that we count \( KL \) for the bound and omit these integers. Next, we omit all integers in the last \( T \) rows and first \( L \) columns. The remaining entries correspond to a sunset formed by all entries of \( \alpha \) and the last \( T \) entries of \( \beta \). The minimum size of this sunset is bounded by Lemma 2 as greater or equal than \( (K + T) + (T - 1) \).

Inequality 1 in Theorem 2 shows that GASP is optimal for \( K = 1 \) or \( L = 1 \).

Corollary 4. If \( K = 1 \) or \( L = 1 \), then the GASP is optimal.

Inequality 3 in Theorem 2 shows that GASP is optimal for \( T = 1 \).

Corollary 5. If \( T = 1 \), then GASP is optimal.

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