ABSTRACT

This study intends to make a comprehensive analysis of the intertwined roles of the politics of belonging and political socialization in the modern political world. In this sense, basic hypothesis behind this study is that while mankind’s need to belong is regarded as among the innate traits, the politics of belonging, on the other hand, is a modern phenomenon like the nation is. In simple terms, transition from pre-modernity to the modernity basically refers to emergence of subjective rights in favour of the individual who became right-bearer entity. That also means transformation of the legal ground in which any individual could have multiple social positions in a non-stratified societal construction instead strictly depending on only one lifetime fixed social position a peculiar social layer or hierarchy as apparently seen in the pre-modernity. Therefore, the emergence of the politics of belonging is strictly associated with that of the modernity, because of the fact that the main subject of the politics of belonging is basically the modern right-bearer individual whose political preferences are formed by his/her political socialization processes. Apparently, studying the politics of belonging in the context of the modernity and taking into account its intertwined relations with the political socialization eventually makes us rethink all the modern political conceptions like nation(ism), ethnicity, gender, terrorism, religious fundamentalism, migration and refugee issues and so on.

Keywords: need to belong, politics of belonging, social exclusion, political socialization, subjective rights

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ÖZET
Bu makalede, aidiyet siyaseti ve siyasal sosyalleşmenin modern siyasal dünyada iç içe geçmiş olan rollerinin kapsamını bir analizinin ortaya konulması amaçlanmıştır. Çalışma temel olarak, aidiyet ihtiyacı insan doğasının temel özelliğini ifade etmesine karşın, aidiyet siyasetinin, ulus gibi, modern dünyaya özgü bir oлуğu olduğu hipotezine dayanmaktadır. Başlık ifade edilecek olursa, modern öncesi dönemde moderniteye geçiş, temel olarak, bireyi belirli haklara sahip olan siyasal bir varlık dönüşümlü subjektif hakların ortaya çıkışıyla ilgilidir. Bu, aynı zamanda, belirli bir sosyal tabaka ya da hiyerarşi içindeki bireyi, ömür boyu sabit bir sosyal konumda bırakarak modern öncesi yasal zeminin ve sosyal düzenin dönüşmesi ve bireyin artık tabaksız ya da hiyerarşik olmayan modern toplumsal yapıda çoklu sosyal konumlar elde edebilmesi anlamına gelmektedir. Bu nedenle aidiyet siyasetinin ortaya çıkışı moderniteye ve modern toplumsal yapıda çoklu sosyal konumlar elde edebilmesi anlamına gelmektedir. As a modern phenomenon politics of belonging refers to all the political projects by which borders and boundaries particularly organized, effectively governed and permanently reproduced by referring the modern facilities. In other words, as Yuval-Davis (2006) points out “the politics of belonging comprises specific political projects aimed at constructing belonging in particular ways to particular collectivities that are, at the same time, themselves being constructed by these projects in very particular ways” (p. 197). As clearly seen in both definitions, politics of belonging can only be observed through the specific political projects by which the particularity of the belonging community is emphasized, and particular policies are constructed. In that sense, once a political project defines its own belonging community with its peculiar belonging component, and then it has to focus on governing membership issues by which boundaries between “us” and “them” could be drawn. Thus, governance of the membership policies is very crucial for any belonging community and for any political project as well. In that reason, membership should be defined, governed and reproduced for the sake of political project itself no matter it is about nation, citizenship, ethnicity, gender, religion and so on. Through membership policy in which all the criteria can be determined and clarified as possible, the specific values and boundaries of the belonging community could be defined, constructed and reproduced as soon as possible. Under the pre-modern conditions there was only a total/overall belonging status for a person which was strictly depended on his/her own fixed social position. By the advent of the modernity, however individuals became right-bearer entities whose social bonds are ensured through partial and multifunctional belonging status which can be experienced through multiple societal sub-systems. Accordingly, the belonging in the sense of modernity is also quite different than that of pre-modernity. In that sense, transformation of the individual from being a fixed part of a social layer or hierarchy into being a dynamic right-bearer subject made him/her being positioned at the centre of the political projects that aim to develop, govern and reproduce their own peculiar belonging community.

Anahtar sözcükler: aidiyet ihtiyacı, aidiyet siyaseti, sosyal dışlanma, siyasal sosyalleşme, subjektif haklar

INTRODUCTION
As a modern phenomenon politics of belonging refers to all the political projects by which borders and boundaries particularly organized, effectively governed and permanently reproduced by referring the modern facilities. In other words, as Yuval-Davis (2006) points out “the politics of belonging comprises specific political projects aimed at constructing belonging in particular ways to particular collectivities that are, at the same time, themselves being constructed by these projects in very particular ways” (p. 197). As clearly seen in both definitions, politics of belonging can only be observed through the specific political projects by which the particularity of the belonging community is emphasized, and particular policies are constructed. In that sense, once a political project defines its own belonging community with its peculiar belonging component, and then it has to focus on governing membership issues by which boundaries between “us” and “them” could be drawn. Thus, governance of the membership policies is very crucial for any belonging community and for any political project as well. In that reason, membership should be defined, governed and reproduced for the sake of political project itself no matter it is about nation, citizenship, ethnicity, gender, religion and so on. Through membership policy in which all the criteria can be determined and clarified as possible, the specific values and boundaries of the belonging community could be defined, constructed and reproduced as soon as possible. Under the pre-modern conditions there was only a total/overall belonging status for a person which was strictly depended on his/her own fixed social position. By the advent of the modernity, however individuals became right-bearer entities whose social bonds are ensured through partial and multifunctional belonging status which can be experienced through multiple societal sub-systems. Accordingly, the belonging in the sense of modernity is also quite different than that of pre-modernity. In that sense, transformation of the individual from being a fixed part of a social layer or hierarchy into being a dynamic right-bearer subject made him/her being positioned at the centre of the political projects that aim to develop, govern and reproduce their own peculiar belonging community.
That’s why in modern societies political socialization is not only about individuals and their acquirement of ‘politically relevant social patterns corresponding to societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society’ as Froman (1961, p. 342) points out; it is also about reproduction of boundaries in generations through politics of belonging. Therefore, in addition to politics of belonging, political socialization should also be conceived in that manner. For that reason, it seems very important to analyse the intertwined roles of politics of belonging and political socialization in terms of the modern political projects.

**BELONGING AS A STRONG NEED OF HUMAN BEING**

In their noticeable work of ‘The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation’, Roy Baumeister and Mark Leary (1995) made a comprehensive analysis of belonging and its role in human nature. The basic idea behind the work is that “belongingness appears to have multiple and strong effects on emotional patterns and on cognitive processes...need to belong is a powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation” (p. 497), and therefore “belongingness can be almost as compelling a need as food and that human culture is significantly conditioned by the pressure to provide belongingness”, and thus by going further, Baumeister and Leary put forward the ‘possibility that much of what human beings do is done in the service of belongingness.’ (p. 498).

In fact, ideas on importance of belonging asserted by Baumeister and Leary are not totally new. More or less it can be seen in several classical works; such as in Durkheim’s (1995) egoistic suicide takes place in case there are weak social ties between individual and the community in which s/he lives, in Freud’s (1962) love and aim-inhibited love by which not only sexual-based relations but also social bonds can be developed, in Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs in which need for love and belonging comes only after basic physiological needs and safety needs as third category in the hierarchy, and finally in Bowlby’s (1982) Attachment Theory arguing that strong emotional bond between an infant and his/her caregiver determine his/her relationships with others across the life course. It can be said that, there is a huge amount of contemporary studies in the literature that directly or indirectly argue that the need to belong or in other words sense of belonging is one of the most important characteristics of human being. However, significance of Baumeister and Leary’s hypothesis is that they clearly put forward the need to belong at the very core of human nature. Furthermore and more importantly their hypothesis suggests two main features for the need to belong by which not only motivation of individuals in their social bonding activities can be explained more effectively, but also political socialization can be analysed more actively in terms of politics of belonging.

Thus, according to Baumeister and Leary (1995) the first main feature of the need to belong is that all the “people need frequent personal contacts or interactions with the other person(s). Ideally, these interactions would be effectively positive or pleasant, but it is mainly important that the majority be free from conflict and negative effects” (p.500). So, it is very important for a person to satisfy his/her need to belong by having frequent, positive and pleasant relations with other(s).

As for second main feature of the need to belong suggested by Baumeister and Leary, people strongly need to perceive that “there is an interpersonal bond or relationship marked by stability, affective concern, and continuation into the foreseeable future. This aspect provides a relational context to one’s interactions with the other person, and so the perception of the bond is essential in satisfying the need to belong” (p.500).

As clearly seen in its two main features, satisfying the need to belong is tied firmly to a person’s cognitive processes, perceptual experiences and emotional attachments with
particular other(s) in frequent, stable and foreseeable relations. So, both aspects are crucial to understand how belonging functions at all ages in one’s life, because as Yuval-Davis (2006) argues, in all their lifetime people belong “in many different ways and to many different objects of attachments. These can vary from a particular person to the whole of humanity, in a concrete or abstract way; belonging can be an act of self-identification or identification by others, in a stable, contested or transient way” (p.199).

To fully understand what the crucial role of belonging is in human life, it is very crucial to realize how it functions in the social contexts. Because human beings have the natural inclination for creating social bonds and the inner motivation to the belongingness, Baumeister at al. (2005) argue individuals firmly “rely on group life for their health, well-being, comfort, and other positive outcomes” (p. 589). In this regard, belonging also clearly refers to the social interaction between the individual and a particular social group depending on mutual acceptance and consent. In this way, “being accepted into a social group is therefore an almost indispensable goal of human striving” (p. 589); it also services the need to belong to be fulfilled. So, by being accepted by a social group, an individual’s sense of belongingness is ensured, and as Den Hartog et al. (2007) put forward that is more ‘likely to increase a person’s willingness to help others in the collective and to comply with the rules of the collective (p. 1132). Thus, individually being accepted into a social grouping and experiencing the belongingness towards that group eventually incorporate emotional attachments into the relations and interactions with the other members, and with the belonging community as a whole. Since as Yuval-Davis (2006) introduces “belonging is about emotional attachment, about feeling at home” (p. 197), and about perception of “us”, people instinctively feel more secure, more comfortable, happier and healthier when they have some specific social ties with a particular belonging community. As of Baumeister et al. (2005), several studies have proved that “being accepted versus rejected by social groups has a wide range of effects on individuals. Health, happiness, and well-being are strongly tied to whether one is accepted or rejected, such that people deprived of close social ties suffer more negative physical and psychological consequences than those with strong social networks” (p. 589). On that reason, DeWall et al. (2011) argue that “people developed traits that function to encourage acceptance and to prevent rejection” (p. 980). Therefore, being rejected, or rather being excluded from any belonging community has significant effects on individuals’ and social groups’ lives as being accepted, but in the reverse ways.

As a whole, the term social exclusion refers to all the rejection processes including exclusion, social rejection, ostracism and bullying (Williams, 2007). Because the need to belong has become among the basic component of human functioning in the human being’s evolution, social exclusion by thwarting the need to belong impairs emotional, behavioural and cognitive processes, and influences personal expressions (DeWall et al., 2011), therefore, people respond “strongly to social exclusion because it strikes at the core of human functioning” (p. 980).

Actually, social exclusion is the dark side of the belonging by which the “others” are otherized for the sake of “us”. Basically, the functions of social exclusion reveal that it has some strong influences on individuals and social groupings as well. Firstly, social exclusion is used as a form of behavioural control by which individuals, as group members are motivated to behave in ways that benefit the group as whole (Brewer, 2005). Such a control mechanism motivates group members to cooperate each other on the basis of the present social rules (Williams et al., 2007) for enforcing their own belonging status. Behavioural control can be ensured only by the thread of social exclusion on some members, or it can be actually used against some deviant members who resist the rules. Secondly, social exclusion has the group
norms maintenance function by which both disobedient members are ejected and entrance of the non-normative individuals into the group is prevented (Brever, 2005). The third function of the social exclusion, as Williams et al. (2007) argue, is “to increase the strength or cohesiveness of the excluding group. It is used to reduce vulnerability or weakness in the group” (p. 897). The fourth function is about distribution of the available resources to the group members. By this function it is determined which resources would be distributed to which members, and which members would be excluded from the distribution processes. Fifthly, emphasizing of group identity is one of the main functions of social exclusion, usually resulting in justification for discrimination (Williams et al., 2007). At societal level, for Williams et al. belonging is constructed on group identities (race, sex, social class, religion politics, values etc.) that “often lead to an “Us versus Them” mentality, serving as a way of solidifying group identity, and keeping dissimilar groups on society’s fringes” (p. 897). Sixthly and finally, social exclusion functions as a safety valve in social groups. In a belonging community membership statue of some individuals are often kept ambiguous. Those members might be marginalized members like the individuals from subcultures, some fundamentalist groups etc.; or they might be members who are deprived of some specific rights like ex-convicts. Groups may benefit from presence of those suspended members by having advantages of diversity, by forcing the other members to keep group identity and norms in mind. Furthermore, multiple experiments have showed that suspended members, to some extent have tendency to behave more cooperatively than usual members (Brever, 2005); such as normalization efforts of an ex-convict or a marginal member for re-becoming part of the majority is usually witnessed in our own lives, and also often handled in several books and movies.

However, although social exclusion with its all functions seems to operate for the benefit of belonging communities, it also clearly services to differentiation and disintegration of individuals and groups in social, political and economic life. Actually, as clearly seen in its functions, social exclusion is not only about exclusionary affairs, it is also about re-construction of belonging by excluding the others who are categorized as outsiders of the belonging group. Thus, through its otherizing function social exclusion also services to re-activation of the counter-belonging narratives from sub-groups who are more or less suffered from the majority’s exclusionary policies. As pointed out by Yuval-Davis (2006) as a rule “belonging tends to be naturalized, and becomes articulated and politicized only when it is threatened in some way” (p. 197). Sources of the threat can be in the form of direct physical threats or can be in the form of any other kind of exclusionary manner including rejection, ostracism or bullying. The threat can arise from real conditions or from imagined situations; can depend on personal or collective experiences, perceptions, feelings, memories or beliefs. No matter what its source is, any sort of threat reactionary has the potential to become the main motivating component for any political project focusing on a peculiar belonging narrative targeting a peculiar community. This politicization of belonging narratives brings us into the realm of politics of belonging in which belonging is handled through the political projects.

Hereby, in addition to the interrelated roles of belonging and social exclusion some other points should also be noted to analyse belonging in a more proper manner. In social groups belonging has such a dynamic and comprehensive characteristic that it is crucial to understand how belonging is constructed. As it is pointed out before the need to belong is located within the core of human functioning (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and group identity is often applied for fulfilling this need (Williams et al., 2007). According to Turner (1982) a social group basically refers to “two or more individuals who share a common social identification of themselves or, which is nearly the same thing, perceive themselves to be member of the
same social category” (p. 15). Turner’s definition implies two important points; firstly, a social group provides an interactive atmosphere for its members. Thus, as Singleton Jr. (2007) suggests by becoming a social group, two or more individuals are “bonded together in some way, which generally means they interact and influence one another and share perceptions of themselves as a group” (p. 398). Secondly, in that social and psychological atmosphere common values are created. In that respect, as Hogg (2005) a social group also refers to a group of “people who share a definition and evaluation of who they are—they have a common social identity” (p. 245). To Hogg and Abrams (1998) group identity, or rather social identity and group belongingness are ‘inextricably linked in the sense that one’s conception and definition of who one is (one’s identity) is largely composed of self-descriptions in terms of the defining characteristics of social groups to which one belongs” (p.7).

Hence, not surprisingly construction of belonging is firmly linked to the shared social identities by which social categories become the locations for fulfilling the need to belong, and so, social groups turn into belonging communities. Social identity categories can be formed on biological attributes, like race, sex, ethnicity; or socially constructed entities, like nationality, social class, occupation, gender; or personal beliefs and opinions, like religion, politics, values. According to Williams et al. (2007), all these categories ‘often lead to an “Us versus Them” mentality, serving as a way of solidifying group identity, and keeping dissimilar groups on society’s fringes” (p. 897). Accordingly, formation of the social identity categories in both intergroup and intra-group relations and interactions also means formation of the power relations within the context of the belonging. For that reason, also by referring social identity categories Yuval-Davis (2006) suggests three complementary analytical levels on which belonging is constructed. Those interrelated levels are classified by her as social locations; identifications and emotional attachments; and values both ethical and political.

All these three levels also help us rethinking the belonging in terms of the politics of belonging. Briefly, as the first level, social locations basically refer to social categories and/or social divisions people belong to in accordance with their positions, places or some other distinctive features. In other words, they point to the social groups in which their member’s need to belong is met in a particular way that can be in the form of race, gender, social class, ethnicity, age, profession, ability, kinship, religion, sexual orientation and so on. A social location therefore provides a person to explain and situate his/her being in the social and political world around. In fact, by helping us to construct our own belongingness in our own belonging community, as Kirk and Okazawa-Rey (2013) put forward, a social location basically “places us in particular relationships to others, to the dominant culture…, and to the rest of the world. It determines kinds of power and privilege we have access to and can exercises, as well as situation in which we have less power and privilege” (p. 14). However, it should be pointed out that people live with multiple both enriching and contradictory identities in several social locations. As Yuval-Davis (2006) asserts “even in their most stable formats”, social locations “are virtually never constructed along one power axis of difference” (p. 200) of belonging. Nevertheless, as one of the analytical levels of belonging, social locations provide remarkable contribution to the discussions on how belonging is constructed in social and economic conditions in terms of each member’s roles, current norms and rules; present power relations, privileges and legitimating affairs.

As for the second level suggesting by Yuval-Davis (2006), individual’s identifications and emotional attachments to various social groups or collectivities is the other important analytical level on which belonging is constructed. Identically, Saavedra (2007) argues that a social “identity refers to a person’s sense of belonging to a particular group” (p. 393). Identities, therefore are formed through cognitive processes like stories, narratives and
collective experiences on the axis of “who we are” or “who we are not”. Belonging however, is beyond cognitive processes. As it originates from a deep emotional need of human being, it is about emotions, perceptions and feelings. Basically, as Yuval-Davis (2004) suggests belonging cannot be “reduced to identities and identifications, which are about individual and collective narratives of self and other, presentation and labelling, myths of origin and destiny” (p. 215). As a matter of fact, Bhambra (2006) asserts that identities can be “seen as cognitive boundaries based on an exclusive sense of belonging in which one either belongs or does not belong” (p. 32). People have multiple identities and belonging/s at same time; such as one simultaneously can be woman, British, Christian, middle age, engineer, mother, photographer etc. However, as Yuval-Davis (2006) indicates “not all belonging/s are as important to people in the same way and to the same extent. Emotions, like perceptions, shift in different times and situations...as a rule, the emotional components of people’s constructions of themselves and their identities become more central the more threatened and less secure they feel” (p. 202). As seen in several cases, drastic terror attacks or like that increase usage of emotional narratives and approaches towards a peculiar belonging and membership, and make people more and more emphasizing on their own collective identities different than that of “other(s)”.

Thirdly, to Yuval-Davis (2006) belonging is not just about social locations, collective identities and emotional attachments, it also needs some ways in which values and judgments are processed for the sake of belonging itself. So, the third and final analytical level of belonging is ethical and political values that are related to the ways in which, for Yuval-Davis (2010), “specific belonging/s are evaluated and judged” (p. 268). In other words, for Yuval-Davis (2006) those values define the ways in which “specific attitudes and ideologies concerning where and how identity and categorical boundaries are being/should be drawn, in more or less exclusionary ways, in more or less permeable ways” (p. 203). Furthermore, and more importantly by playing a complementary role with social locations and identity narratives, ethical and political values make us relocate our analysis from scope of belonging into that of the politics of belonging and inevitably into that of the political socialization with which individuals are integrated into their peculiar belonging communities.

As a whole, all the three levels are interrelated, and any construction of belonging in a community is often combined by all that levels in different proportions. Ones there is a specific belonging narrative on a particular community, there is some conception on social locations like race, social class, gender etc.; some imagination on identities fostered with emotional components like social identities providing social-self as nationhood, religious brotherhood, partisanship etc.; and finally there is some emphasis on various ethical and/or political values. Political projects therefore differ from each other in the combinations on which level they mainly prefer to arrange their belonging construction. As a rule, political belonging narratives that tend to put more emphasis on social locations or identities in their belonging combination like race, social class, religion, ethnicity etc. can be more exclusionary than the belonging narratives that give the priority to the particular values in their combination like peace, democracy, freedom etc. Such as a racist political narrative would be more exclusionary and stricter than a religious one, and similarly a nationalist political narrative would be more exclusionary than a narrative that advocates democratic values (see also Yuval-Davis, 2006).
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN RE-PRODUCING BELONGING AND MEMBERSHIP

In the modern societies, political socialization has a significant role in constructing and reproducing belonging through its all three analytical levels in support of politics of belonging. Harry Eckstein (1963) defines political socialization “the processes through which values, cognitions, and symbols are learned and internalized” (p. 26); and thus, through those processes “operative social norms regarding politics are implanted, political roles institutionalized, and political consensus created” (p. 26). Furthermore, by emphasizing its crucial role in reproducing the next generations Roberta Sigel (1965) argues that “political socialization refers to the learning process by which the political norms and behaviours acceptable to an ongoing political system are transmitted from generation to generation” (p. 1). As parallel to the Eckstein’s and Sigel’s definitions LeVine (1963) clarifies political socialization process as the “acquisition by an individual of behavioural dispositions relevant to political groups, political systems, and political processes” (pp. 280-81). Those behavioural dispositions can be observed in the “attitudes concerning the allocation of authority, the legitimacy of the regime, and political participation; patterns of decision making and deference; images of leaders and foreign nations; group loyalties, antagonisms, and stereotypes” (p. 281). By going further, Almond (1960) defines political socialization as “the process of induction into the political culture. Its end product is a set of attitudes –cognitions, value standards, and feelings toward the political system, its various roles, and role incumbents” (pp. 27-28).

In its all definitions and explanations, it is clearly inferred that the political socialization has direct effects both on individuals’ political development, and on the present political systems in which they live. It has long been recognized that, as Bender argues, all the “organizations, societies, and nations have entrusted the critical task of socializing their members to various sub-units or agencies of their social systems” (p. 392). Because as Almond (1960) points out all those social entities “tend to perpetuate their cultures and structures through time, and they do this mainly by means of the socializing influences of the primary and secondary” (p. 27) agencies. In these agencies family, as nucleus or extended, has the role of being the primary agency in political socialization. Secondary agencies, on the other hand, comprise all the outer world like schools, religious groups, political parties, mass media, occupations, voluntary or compulsory participations etc.

As the primary agency, the role of family especially of the parents is crucial in structuring one’s political socialization. As a matter of fact, Murrey and Mulvaney’s (2012) findings reveals that several researchers have “identified a number of agents that transmit information to individuals concerning citizenship, politics, and government, but first and foremost, among the agents of socialization are parents. There is substantial evidence that consequential political orientations such as party identification and political ideology are reliably transmitted between generations” (p. 1107). So, by seeing it under the intensive influence of parents, Merelman (1972) describes childhood “as a time when the world is experienced afresh each day and when nascent talents press upon each other” (p.134). Thus, it becomes more important in political socialization, because ‘childhood is also a time of faith and enthusiasm: faith in the natural order of family and society, enthusiasm for the living and learning of life” (p.134).

Therefore, evaluating one’s political socialization, especially the crucial roles of parents in his/her childhood, make us rethink Baumeister and Leary’s (1995) hypothesis proposing two main features of the need to belong, and then Yuval-Davis’s three analytical levels on which belonging is constructed. By starting to have frequent, stable, emotional and foreseeable
relations with the family members and then with the close circle of people around, a child by means of the primary and secondary agencies, also experiences learning and internalizing ethical and political values, recognizing identities, developing emotional attachments to various social groups, and realizing his/her socio-political positions. In other words, childhood is not only the period in which political socialization is sparked; it also means the period by which the direction of one’s political perception is mostly determined in accordance with his/her own belonging experiences. Because of the fact that, as Pandey (2011) suggests, in their both usual and political lives “people feel secure when the checkpoints and markers – language, race, skin, colour, dress, mannerism, citizenship – clearly separate the familiar from the unfamiliar” (p. 99). Those familiarities are constructed through the agencies from childhood to adulthood, as such the world is categorized between “us” and “them”.

Consequently, at all its levels belonging is indispensible constructed along with political socialization. By experiencing his/her own belonging processes through relations and interactions with the others around, one is recognizing his/her own position and place in a given belonging community, internalizing related identity narratives, engaging in emotional attachments, learning politically relevant values, cognitions and symbols. In fact, all of which are also directly related to what political socialization comprises. More importantly, both belonging and political socialization is about emotions and perceptions; just as belonging inevitably comprises emotional attachments to social groupings, because as Almond (1960) mentions “all political socialization involves an affective component - the inculcation of loyalty to, love of, respect for, and pride in the political system” (p. 30).

As a rule any particular political system can only be survived through reproducing itself generations to generations by inculcating particular political values, attitudes, beliefs etc. Inculcation, therefore, is not only about governance of political socialization of the members, it also and more importantly about maintaining members’ belongingness to the peculiar political community. Accordingly, the complementary and inseparable relationship between belonging and political socialization brings our sense of politics of belonging into a relatively new analytical level on which politics of belonging also refers to governing and reproducing of every single member’s political socialization processes by influencing both individuals and agencies through political belonging projects.

POLITICS OF BELONGING: THE NEW WAY OF BELONGING NARRATIVES IN THE MODERN POLITICS

In the sense of modernity, political socialization should be understood and analysed not only by belonging but also by the politics of belonging. It is already implied in its definitions that political socialization functions at both individual and societal levels. As Bender (1967) already points out at the individual level it clearly refers to the “process through which the individual internalizes politically relevant attitudes, beliefs, cognitions, and values” (p.392) through the assistance and influence of the agents around like family members, school, peers, workmates, religious fellows etc. At the societal level, on the other hand, in Langton’s (1969) words it connotes the “way by which any society transmits its political culture from generation to generation” (p. 4) through the peculiar political apparatuses imposed on social agents and individuals as well. Thus, at its both interrelated levels, political socialization has a formative role on the formation of an individual’s politically relevant belongingness, and on the reproduction of the peculiar belonging community as well. By this role, therefore, the political socialization has become one of the basic determiners of the belongingness in its modern sense, and thus it has become the integral part of the politics of belonging revealed by the modern political projects appeared by the modernity.
Here, the concept modernity is very important because by which the individual has been brought into the centre of the political processes as subject. As Luhmann (cited in Verschraegen, 2006) points out “in pre-modern societies individuals were not rights-bearing entities” (p. 104). During the Antiquity and the Middle Ages only the legal basis and the source of legitimization was the law by which objectivity of the social order could be ensured. Accordingly, as Verschraegen (2006) refers, the law “mostly meant nothing more than the factual legal order itself: that is, the totality of norms, laws and institutions that defined the rights and duties of social groups or the specific roles that persons were expected to assume” (p. 104). It basically means that the main emphasis during the pre-modern era was not individual or individual rights; it was the law and social order. Actually, it was only about “an intricate pattern of specific freedoms, privileges and corresponding duties that one can only obtain on the ground of membership of a specific social group: royal rights and duties, monastic rights, the freedoms of the nobility, city freedoms, and so on” (p. 104).

According to Luhman (2004) by the modernity, however, “the pivotal difference can be defined as the personalization of legal matters. It is connected to what is probably the most important achievement of the evolution of law in modern times: the concept of subjective rights” (p. 269). The concept of subjective legal rights “has allowed the “personalization” of the law… Legal capacity independent of status and birth has been achieved through this legal form, and with this the general access of law to all of the population (p. 30). Consequently, by the advent of the modernity, individual has become bearer of the subjective rights. Those rights, according to Verschraegen (2006), “have legal quality, because they are due to a subject and therefore need no further foundation” (p.104) Thus, “the legal ground is no longer the social order, but the individual itself, here conceived of as a juridic subject; and rights are no longer seen as an objective thing as law in pre-modernity but as an attribute of the subject itself (p. 104) by which one has the capacity to define himself/herself around his/her own personal partiality without being exposed to any given social status.

Table 1: Transition to the modern societies

| Societies  | Rights                  | Legal grounds                  | Social Positions | Inclusionary/Belonging Status |
|-----------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|
| Pre-modern| objective-exclusive     | social order- objective law    | fixed            | total/overall-inclusive       |
|           |                         | ‘after the law’                |                  |                               |
| Modern    | subjective-individual   | individual with subjective     | dynamic/         | partial and                  |
|           |                         | rights                         | changeable       | multifunctional               |
|           |                         | ‘before the law’               |                  |                               |

As already pointed out that human beings have a strong motivation towards belonging and as Baumeister et al. (2005) put forward people “survive, flourish, and reproduce by means of inclusion” (p. 590) into various social groupings. Before going further, it is important to note that in multiple studies, as in this one, the terms belonging and inclusion are used interchangeably (see also Brewer, 2005). As clearly seen in the Table 1, by transition to the modern societies the form of inclusionary status and of belonging status has been changed drastically. According to Luhman (2013) the conditions of inclusion in modern society “have to provide for more possibilities than in traditional societies and can no longer be organized hierarchically, that is, linearly” (p. 17). The society accordingly became more complex by appearing “to dissolve classical, fixed inclusion patterns and to individualize inclusion more strongly” (p. 17).
This change has also brought about significant consequences in the context of the law as Luhmann puts forward. In stratified and hierarchical pre-modern societies, as Verschraegen (2006) argues “objective law suffices to regulate social interaction, and subjective rights are not necessary. This is because the individual here has a fixed social position; he or she is comprehensively embedded in social contexts. The relation between society and individual is determined by this total-inclusion: individuality and social position are identical” (p. 105). Thus, one’s belonging to a social entity like family, tribe, corporation, social location and so on, eventually comprises all his/her aspects.

The total-inclusion status makes multiple memberships impossible, and membership basically means total-inclusive belonging to only one social entity often granted by birth. This overall inclusion, on the other hand provides its member “advantage of delivering a stable and protected position for the individual. Precisely because the individual is defined in all spheres of life by his or her fixed social position, he or she is at the same time included in and protected by a network of social bonds” (p. 105). However, for a member the overall inclusion also has the disadvantages of being excluded from his/her own sole belonging status. Within this total inclusionary context, as DeWall et al. (2011) point out, exclusion or social rejection, “could have resulted in death, or at least being severely deprived of basic needs. Early civilizations, such as the Greeks, considered exile and death as equivalent punishments, presumably because social exclusion dramatically increased one’s chances of early mortality” (pp. 979-80). Socrates, no wonder, had to choose drinking the hemlock poison instead being an exile. As asserted by Allen (2000) an exile exactly was the man “who lost his community once he was expelled from networks of social memory. He became, in the words of Antiphon, a beggar in a strange land, an old man without a city” (pp. 203-04), a unidentified monster basically. Thus, it can be argues that in premodernity, as Verschraegen (2006) argues, “there was no security except through group protection and no freedom that did not recognize the constant obligations of a corporate life. One lived and died in the identifiable style of one’s class and one’s corporation” (p. 105).

In modern society on the other hand, as Luhmann (cited in Verschraegen 2006) points out, “with the formation of functionally differentiated society, this order had to be abandoned. Social differentiation can no longer be based on dividing “whole persons” into distinct groups, it is no longer group of people that are differentiated, but types of communication” (pp. 105-06) by which to Luhmann (2004) “society communicates and in so doing delineates itself from an external environment” (p. 233). Since, as Knodt (1995) argues, the process of modernization is conceptualized “in terms of a transition from a primarily “stratified” to functionally differentiated society” (p. xxxvi), so the conception of modernity is firmly based on the systems differentiation. According to Luhmann (cited in Verschraegen, 2006) in these modern conditions “the singular person can no longer belong to one and only one societal subsystem. He can engage himself professionally in the economic system, in the juridical system, in politics, in the educational system; and so on...he cannot live in only one functional subsystem” (p. 106). Correspondingly, as noted by Knodt (1995), the reproduction of society has been “distributed among a plurality of non-redundant function systems...each of which operates on the basis of its own, system-specific code, [and here] functional differentiation means, among other things, that no function system can control, dominate, or substitute for any other” (p. xxxvi).

As Luhmann (cited in Verschraegen, 2006) argues “this new form of partial and multifunctional inclusion based on the functional differentiation can be connected with the introduction of subjective rights” (p. 106). In a modern society therefore “to ensure the multiple and partial inclusion, individuals should be freed from strong all-inclusive social
groups and become entitled to rights and claims to participate in the economy, politics, law, education, religion, etc. (p. 106). As a consequence, “subjective rights can be understood as a sort of compensation for the loss of total inclusion and a fixed social position” (p. 106). In this modern form of inclusion everyone has been equal for accessing to the “different function systems in the sense that no general institutionalised social discriminations can exist which prevents access (p. 117). Everyone has the right to marry, to work, to travel, to own property, to access education and healthcare and so on. Furthermore advent of subjective rights has drastically changed the discourses by legal orders upon the individuals and whole society as well. In this way, to Luhmann (2004) “as soon as it was possible to formulate subjective rights in terms of natural law, human rights (or at any rate civil rights) could be seen as preconditions, which every legal order had to respect if it wanted to qualify as law” (p. 414).

Thus, transition from the pre-modern total inclusionary status to the modern partial and multifunctional one also means the transformation from the old social bonds requiring total belonging in a fixed social position, to the modern societal networks in which belonging is based on the functional differentiation. As a result of this transformation, belonging gained a central importance in the modern “national order of the things”. Hence, belonging is no longer a fixed component of the present social order, conversely it has become a fact what can be constructed and reproduced politically in accordance with its present spatial and temporal dynamics comprising social locations, identifications and values. Accordingly, this transition made belonging to become one of the pivotal components at the heart of the modern politics. In a sense, it is politics of belonging functioning as a melting pot in which belonging and political discourses are melted down in support of political projects.

Hence, politics of belonging has emerged at the core of political struggles, because modern individuals have no longer been members who have the pre-given entities like total inclusion status and fixed social positions; conversely, they have their own rights and freedoms “before the law”. In other words, the legal context has been changed in favour of individuals from “after the law” to “before the law”. As individuals having rights “before the law”, as Verschraegen (2006) points out “we are first and foremost equal citizens, equally entitled to range of rights, and protections” (p. 107). So in the modern world, managing a political project is also means governance of those right-bearer entities’ belonging processes.

In other words, in the modern world any political project has also functioned as a tool for convincing or compelling the particular individuals to become a faithful member for his/her own peculiar belonging community. This function also forces any political project to develop various strategies on governing the membership of every single individual by governing his/her political socialization processes. In the sense of politics of belonging, this function performed by the political projects has been conducted in the contexts of modern citizenship and/or identifications along with some affective components; because of the fact that as Yuval-Davis (2006b) argues the politics of belonging “encompass and relate to both citizenship and identity, adding an emotional dimension which is central to the notions of belonging” (p. 1).

At this point it is very crucial to see how the politics of belonging functions in the contemporary world. According to Yuval-Davis (2006b) the politics of belonging “can be viewed as situated three different- but complementary- ways” (p. 7). Firstly, it is situated temporally by which it reflects characteristics of some specific developments comprising political, historical, technological, and economic aspects in a specific time span. Secondly, it is situated spatially. There is no any homogenous global structure and there are several different states and societies, so effects of any development cannot be experienced in similar ways in the global society as a whole. Thirdly, it is situated intersectionally that means “even
at the same time and in the same place, not all people affect and are affected by specific politics of belonging in the same ways” (p. 7) because of differentiated belonging perceptions they have. While social locations, identities and values by applying nationality, ethnicity, race, class, gender, age, occupation, religion or liberal democracy etc. make people to construct “us” around different political projects of belonging, they are not, in fact, stable in themselves. Basically, a person in a community has several intersecting and/or contested social locations, identities and values in which effects of the present politics of belonging is changed in accordance with the person’s present perception of the belonging. However, if politics of belonging is described, as Crowley (1999) does, as the ‘dirty work of boundary maintenance’ (p. 30), then it becomes crucial to see how it is situated in doing this “dirty work” through any given political project. Actually, as Pinson argues, in the real world “different groups of people are subject to different politics of belonging according to place and time; and in the same temporal and spatial contexts, various groups might be subject to different politics of belonging- depending on their positionality in terms of ethnicity, race, religion, class, gender and immigration status” (p. 31).

Thus, through the three unsteady ways on which both the politics of belonging is situated and its works of boundary maintenance is viewed, politics of belonging occurs at two levels in a given community. As Yuval-Davis (2006) suggests “politics of belonging involves not only the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political powers but also their contestation and challenge by other political agents” (p. 205). Therefore, the first level of politics of belonging includes political narratives conducted by dominant political powers of the community, like the narratives from governments, national-based institutions, major political parties, major religious groups, even from global powers. The second level, on the other hand, comprises counter narratives by some other political agents, like ethnic groups, marginal groups, relatively small political parties, sectarian communities etc. As a rule, as Pandey (2011) remarks any “counter narrative inevitably tries to construct a distinct cultural and national identity for its community of belonging, separate from, and in opposition to, the identity of the dominant community” (p. 100). In general, political life in a society is transformed by competition and struggles between and among those two levels of the politics of belonging. As Yuval-Davis (2006) points out both dominant powers and counter “political agents struggle both for the promotion of their specific projects in the construction of their collectivity and its boundaries and, at the same time, use these ideologies and projects in order to promote their own power positions within and outside the collectivity” (p. 205).

Furthermore, it is important to recognize that such competitions and struggles are also conducted by the political powers to directly affect political socialization processes in their intended belonging community. In this way, they can promote their own power positions by keeping present members and indoctrinating next generations as well.

CONCLUSION

In his work of the Imagined Communities, just after defining the nation as an imagined political community of the modern world, Anderson (2006) propounds some other notable arguments to support his definition (pp. 5-7). Firstly, according to him it is imagined because, while it is impossible for its members to meet, to know, to see or even to hear all the familiar others even in the smallest nation, each member, in his/her mind, has the image of their own peculiar community. In a similar way, it is very important that through this imagined
configuration, people’s need for belonging has been fulfilled on the assumption that the interactions and relations with the other familiar members would be frequent, stable, and affective, and be perceived as foreseeable. In other words, as an imagined community of the modern world the nation is also a very proper apparatus for making right-bearer individuals to satisfy their need to belong in accordance with the two main features of the need to belong suggested by Baumeister and Leary (1995). As a result, the uncertainty that arose from loss of the total-inclusion/overall belonging and fixed social position of the pre-modernity has been eliminated by the modernity through the national belonging in which individuals have subjective rights “before the law”. Furthermore, in addition to appeasing the uncertainty by carrying the belonging to a more complex but imagined level, the nation through politics of belonging has also functioned as a more developed apparatus by which political socialization of the present members and that of the next generations is governed and reproduced.

Secondly, according to Anderson the nation is imagined as limited. Hence, the boundaries of the ‘familiar others’ on which national belongingness is constructed has been unavoidably limited and by this limitation unfamiliar or strange others can be excluded. Thirdly, because it is emerged in the modern world by which ‘national order of the things’ has been developed, the nation is imagined as sovereign by emphasizing sovereignty of the states and their borders. By reinforcing borders and boundaries, sovereignty services to national unity and solidarity, and it represents strength or cohesiveness of the belonging community called nation. Finally, it is imagined as a belonging community through which the members of a nation tolerate inequalities by seeing and perceiving ‘familiar others’ in the boundaries of “us”.

However, different than that of Anderson’s anthropological view of nation, Wallerstein (1991) argues that in the modern world the “nation is supposed to be a socio-political category, linked somehow to the actual or potential boundaries of a state” (p.77) and “the concept of nation is related to the political super-structure” (p. 79) of the capitalist world economy. Thus, all the “states that are today members of the United Nations are all creations of the modern world-system” (p. 80). Although they have different point of views, both Anderson’s anthropological and Wallerstein’s systemic views share the same argument that the emergence of the nation has coincided with that of the modern world, and somehow its legitimacy has been accepted and supported by all the political actors in the modern world, no matter they are dominant or opponent in the national order of the modern politics.

More importantly in addition to the nation, the emergence of the politics of belonging has also corresponded to that of the modernity. Regardless of the nation is an anthropologically imagined or systemically designed community of the modern world, it is a reality and this reality is basically governed and reproduced through the politics of belonging. In fact, the politics of belonging has functioned through the political projects that aim to re-construct or empower belonging, and that aim to govern the political socialization processes of every individual and grouping by applying the ways based on consent or coercion.

Since, by the modernity individuals have become bearer of their own subjective rights and get partial belonging status based on functional differentiation, it became the requirement for modern political projects to make the members of the belonging community to become their own agents or proponents. This requirement also made the modern individuals to become political agents with rights, and made the membership politically relevant status. Thus every member’s political participation or at least favourable attitude towards the present political system should be ensured and reproduced by means of political socialization. Therefore, the politics of belonging on one hand enables construction of belonging in political ways through political projects; and on the other hand, it ensures the reproduction of the belonging
community through governance of the political socialization processes generation to generation.

As a whole, although it has been an integral part of the modern politics, the politics of belonging has displayed a very dynamic and unsteady character with its temporal, spatial and intersectional dimensions. However, this feature is not only about nature of the politics of belonging or construction of the belonging politically at desired components; it is also directly about modern conditions in which the politics of belonging has emerged as a result of introduction of subjective rights and formation of inclusion from all-inclusive to partial and multi-functional ones based on functional differentiation. So, it has become impossible for a political belonging project to embrace all the members of any belonging community equally and homogeneously in any given time, geography or at any belonging component. This impossibility necessarily leads to some members of the community easily perceive, feel or think being excluded even by the most inclusionary belonging narratives. Thus, by virtue of this impossibility the politics of belonging has been experienced at two contending levels. Thereby, in a given community political narratives have been varied between and among dominant political power(s) and various opponent political agents. Because the politics of belonging is situated unsteadily in any given belonging community, any belonging narrative propounded through any political project eventually perceived as threat by some others. As a rule, when it is threatened or being in a perception of threat, belonging becomes central, and eventually it is politicized. In that sense, the nation or any other socio-political entity has been far from being homogeneous, and being total-inclusive for all members of any so-called belonging community; no matter on which component the belonging narrative is mainly constructed; such as today’s the most inclusionary belonging narratives like liberal democratic values are often mentioned as threats by some local, racist, religious or some other political agents.

In fact, any political belonging project by any dominant power or by any opponent agent spontaneously becomes an exclusionary party on the political sphere in which political conflicts and struggles are conducted. In other words, a political project eventually situates itself into one of the levels of politics of belonging as dominant power or opponent agent by determining its peculiar boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, by arranging its construction of belonging in accordance with its goals and objectives, and by defining its own prototypical members against outsiders. As a result, all those determinations, constructions, situating(s) and identifications by the politics of belonging make the others other, and eventually brings the politicization of the otherized one(s) around their peculiar belonging component. Because producing “others” does not only services to reinforcing “us” in favour of any political belonging community, but also eventually causes emergence of miscellaneous threats, exclusionary attitudes, behaviours and judgments against others. And that unpleasant condition makes the excluded others reorganize around their peculiar belonging component through which perceptions, feelings and thoughts are formed according to their own political goals and strategies.

Consequently, considering the intertwined roles of the politics of belonging and political socialization in the modern societies provides a multidisciplinary analysis level on which, on one hand attitudes, attitudes and behaviours of individuals and groupings in political processes are explained by referring mankind’s basic need to belong; on the other hand it might be rather useful to develop new approaches especially on the twenty-first century’s rising issues including nationalism, terrorism, religious fundamentalism, ethnic conflicts, gender issues, migration and refugee issues, and so on.
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