Simple Post-Training Robustness using Test Time Augmentations and Random Forest

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Abstract

Although Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) achieve excellent performance on many real-world tasks, they are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. A leading defense against such attacks is adversarial training, a technique in which a DNN is trained to be robust to adversarial attacks by introducing adversarial noise to its input. This procedure is effective but must be done during the training phase. In this work, we propose Augmented Random Forest (ARF), a simple and easy-to-use strategy for robustifying an existing pretrained DNN without modifying its weights. For every image, we generate randomized test time augmentations by applying diverse color, blur, noise, and geometric transforms. Then we use the DNN’s logits output to train a simple random forest to predict the class label. Our method achieves state-of-the-art adversarial robustness on a diversity of white and black box attacks with minimal compromise on the natural images’ classification. We test ARF also against numerous adaptive white-box attacks and it shows excellent results when combined with adversarial training. https://github.com/giladcohen/ARF.

1. Introduction

Deep neural networks (DNNs) achieve cutting edge performance in many problems and tasks. Yet, it has been shown that small perturbations of the network, which in many cases are indistinguishable to a human observer, may alter completely the network output [24, 60]. This phenomenon poses a great risk when using neural networks in sensitive applications and therefore requires a lot of attention.

Many defense techniques were developed to improve DNN’s robustness to adversarial attacks. Yet, repeatedly, after the proposal of a new successful defense, a new attack was proposed that found new breeches in the DNNs [8, 61].

An example of a very common and successful strategy for improving DNN robustness is adversarial training [24, 40]. In this approach, adversarial examples are added in the network training process along with the regular examples. It is shown to reduce significantly the network vulnerability to attacks. A major disadvantage of this approach and most of the other existing defense strategies is that they require retraining the network. This puts an additional computational time, which might be significant in some cases, as one needs to update the network frequently to resist novel attacks.

Even in techniques that just fine tune DNNs, there is a need to have an access to all the training data. The same holds for the current leading detection methods that aim at just spotting attacks and alerting about them (without changing the DNN) [15, 36, 39]. Besides storage issues, having access to all data is a problem when a user wants to improve its network robustness to new attacks that were not present during the development of the DNN but does not have access to that data due to privacy or proprietary issues.

Contribution. To mitigate these issues, we propose a novel approach for improving the robustness against adversarial attacks, named Augmented Random Forest (ARF), which only requires storage of logits vectors and not the images themselves. Also, it is very simple to use, does not require retraining, and can be employed with any machine learning classifier that produces logits, including an adversarially trained DNN, to improve its robustness. In
addition to ARF, we also introduce a novel white-box attack, A-PGD, that combines the PGD attack [40] with image augmentations. We show that this attack is superior than current state-of-the-art (SOTA) attacks on DNN ensembles.

In our approach, for each input image we generate N Test Time Augmentations (TTAs) as shown in Figure 1. We feed this batch of image transformations to the DNN and collect its logits output. In the training phase (done only once), we fit a simple random forest classifier using logits obtained from both natural and adversarial TTAs. The random forest learns to be robust against adversarial images by training on the entire set of TTAs’ logits distribution. In the inference phase, we generate N TTAs for a single image, obtain the DNN logits for it, and pass the logits to the random forest classifier. The inference executes a single forward pass on all the N TTAs at once, and thus is very fast.

We emphasize that the image transformations done in our pre-processing were used before for defense [26, 38, 45, 63]. These TTAs improve classifiers’ robustness due to obfuscated gradients, but this was later shown to be fake robustness which can be circumvented using adaptive attacks in white-box settings [2] (see Section 2). Yet, we use TTAs to enrich the input augmentations for the random forest; we find that they improve accuracy on natural (non-adversarial) images and also enhance robustness.

We compare the adversarial robustness of ARF to SOTA baselines on a diverse set of attack strategies and threat models, for CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, SVHN, and Tiny-ImageNet. ARF always succeeds to enhance the DNN’s robustness by many folds, without the need to retrain the network (the random forest training is negligible compared to a neural network training) or store the training data. The best results are obtained when applying ARF with an adversarially robust network. We show that this combination achieves SOTA defense and is robust to adaptive white-box attacks.

2. Related Works

Various attacks and defense techniques have been proposed for DNNs. Defense techniques may be divided into strategies that aim at increasing the network robustness and approaches that try only detecting the adversarial attacks; In this work we focus on the former ones and describe some of them. For a more a comprehensive survey of the existing strategies one may refer to [18, 42, 67].

**Adversarial attacks.** The core strategy in adversarial attacks is to look for the smallest perturbation of an input that causes the network to change its prediction. The main difference between different existing attacks is the metric used to define the size of the change and the search strategy that is used for finding the perturbation. In addition, attacks may be targeted, i.e., aiming to change the output to a specific given class, or untargeted that just try to flip the network prediction. Another difference is the threat model of the attacks. Black-box adversaries can merely access the network outputs, while white-box adversaries have full access to the architecture and parameters, algorithm used for training and classification, and training data [11].

The fast gradient sign method (FGSM) changes the input in the direction of the gradient of the cross-entropy loss [24]. It is a fast single-step attack that is very easy to deploy. The Jacobian-based saliency map attack (JSMA) aims to find only a selected few input pixels, which induce the largest loss increase [49]. It is stronger but iterative and slow.

Deepfool is a non-targeted attack that searches for the closest decision boundary of the network for the given input example [44]. The work in [9] proposed a novel targeted attack (known as CW), which overcame the distillation defense method that was very successful till then [47]. Their approach was further improved in [8], where they formulated an optimization framework to construct loss functions for attacks that are defense specific. The work in [17] demonstrated using an ensemble of parameter-free attacks.

The work in [5] introduced the Boundary attack, a decision-based attack used in black-box settings. Their method only requires the final model prediction and can be employed where the output logits do not exist or inaccessible. A more efficient black-box attack, the square attack [1], used much fewer queries than the Boundary attack, and it was shown to even outperform several gradient-based white-box attacks. These two attacks do not rely on gradient information and can be applied on any machine learning classifier.

In order to evaluate the performance of a novel defense approach, it is not sufficient to check robustness on the above attacks but rather design adaptive attacks to the developed defense [7, 23]. In our work, we evaluate our proposed defense against several tailored adaptive attacks.

**Adversarial robustness.** Many techniques where proposed to improve the adversarial robustness of DNNs. Some add a regularization during the network training such as penalizing the network input gradients [52] or Jacobian [29] to improve robustness; scaling the gradients in a batch based on their magnitude [54]; penalizing the network output so it has a smaller Lipschitz constant [28]; requiring similarity between logits of pairs of input examples [31]; requiring the linear and convolutional layers in the network to be approximately Parseval tight frames [14]; or using the mixup regularization [69, 71].

Other approaches rely on gradient masking [6, 19, 26, 55]. They make it harder for attacks (especially black-box) to find the gradient direction for producing the adversarial examples. However, masking the model gradient’s cannot guarantee robustness against adaptive white-box attacks, as shown in [2]. They proposed BPDA, which estimates masked gradients in the classifier, and replaces them with approximated gradients in the backward pass by replacing any non-differential layer.

Another strategy to improve robustness is adding noise
to the data or perturbations to the network features during training [16, 30, 66]. A different approach performs a k-NN search, perhaps using external datasets or the web, to make a decision on the input [21, 58]. Knowledge distillation was also used to improve robustness [47]. It was improved by using gradient information [12, 48].

A leading method is adversarial (re)training with its many variants [24, 34, 40, 43, 57, 62, 64]. It trains the network using adversarial examples in addition to the regular data and thus improves robustness. Adding unlabeled data in the adversarial training improves performance on the clean data [10, 68], which is deteriorated many times due to the adversarial training.

One disadvantage of adversarial training is that it is computationally demanding. "Free adversarial training" propose an accelerated version [56]. The Virtual Adversarial Training (VAT) work [43] used a regularization term to smooth the output logits distribution of the model within a small environment surrounding the input image. The TRADES approach [70] added a regularizaion term to the cross-entropy loss in the training phase to improve robustness inside the \(l_p\) ball \(B_p(x, \epsilon) = \{x' : \|x - x'\|_p \leq \epsilon\}\). By adjusting this term one can control the trade-off between the accuracies on the normal and adversarial samples [59].

Unlike ARF, all the above methods require changing the DNN training and cannot be used for a trained network.

**Test-time augmentation (TTA).** Some works used transformations on the input image to yield a robust classifier [22, 25, 26, 37, 38, 41, 50, 63, 65]. Yet, the work in [3] found that these methods are susceptible to the EoT attack in white-box settings, where the transformation distribution is considered in the attack loss. Later, the BPDA attack was shown to circumvent non-differential transformations as well [2].

The approaches in [4, 26] compute the KL divergence between a pair of augmentations to detect adversarial attacks. The strategy in [53] proposed to utilize TTA to detect adversarial images. The TTAs were used to aggregate statistics on the input image and detect anomalies associated with adversarial attacks. They showed that in some cases the correct label can also be predicted. Their approach requires an extensive statistical analysis on the dataset and tuning parameters and thresholds. Thus, it is not simple and easy to use with any arbitrary pretrained classifier.

The closest work to us added a random forest after a DNN for improving robustness to adversarial attacks [20]. Unlike ARF, their methodology includes a tedious analysis on the relative \(L_2\) distance between original and adversarial samples, whereas ARF simply attaches the output of any learning classifier to a vanilla random forest. They showed robustness on simple MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, whereas we use more complex datasets (e.g., Tiny-ImageNet).

Figure 2. All the transforms used for the test-time augmentation (TTA). The left column illustrates the geometric transforms: Rotation, translation, scaling, and horizontal flips (not used on SVHN). The middle column illustrates the color transforms: Brightness, contrast, saturation, hue, and gamma. The right column illustrates a Gaussian blur and an addition of Gaussian white noise. All the above transformations are randomized to generate \(N\) TTAs samples.

### 3. Method

We turn to present ARF. We start by describing the TTAs generation prior to feeding them to the DNN. Then we show how their logits are used to train the random forest classifier.

#### 3.1. Test-time Augmentations

We hypothesize that even if the adversary succeeds to attack a specific image, the close neighborhood around the image still holds enough information for reverting the predicted (wrong) label back to the correct label. To that end, for each image we generate \(N\) TTAs, using a variety of color, geometrical, blur, and noise transforms (see Fig. 2).

The color transforms include: Brightness, contrast, saturation, hue, and gamma; the geometrical transforms include: Rotation, translation, scaling, and horizontal flipping; the blur transform convolutes the image with a 2D Gaussian kernel \(G_{2D}(u, v; \sigma_b)\) where \(\sigma_b\) is uniformly distributed for every TTA image between 0.001 and a positive constant: \(\sigma_b \sim U(0.001, \sigma_{b_{max}})\). The noise transform adds a white Gaussian noise \(n\) to the image, where \(n \sim N(0, \sigma)\), and \(\sigma\) is uniformly distributed for every TTA image between 0 and a positive constant \(\sigma_{max} : \sigma \sim U(0, \sigma_{max})\).

All the transforms including their parameters are randomized in test time. More details on the transforms definitions and parameters distributions appear in sup. mat. We chose to apply these transforms because they were shown to improve the classification accuracy significantly in self-supervised and semi-supervised learning [13]. Similarly to them, all the transforms parameters were chosen to alter the image until a human struggles to perceive the images on the dataset. We also added the Gamma transform since it showed small improvement (data not shown).
3.2. TTA Classifier

We generate $N$ randomized TTAs and feed them to the DNN (Figure 1), and collect their logits output (of size $N$). Formally, we denote $x$ as the original image, the generated TTAs are denoted as $\{x_t[i]\}_{i \in [0,N-1]}$, and the DNN outputs are $\{l[i, c]\}_{i \in [0,N-1]}$, where $l[i, c]$ is the logit corresponding to class $c$ of the transformed image $x_t[i]$. When using only the TTAs for making the prediction, the inferred label is a simple argmax of the logits summation:

$$c_{\text{pred}} = \arg\max_c \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} l[i, c]. \quad (1)$$

3.3. ARF Classifier

We split the official test set into two: val and test (see Sec. 4 - Random forest training). Let $M$ be the val size. The augmented random forest (ARF) employs the aforementioned DNN logits of val to train a random forest classifier. We generate in val $N$ TTAs for the normal (unperturbed) images and additional $10N$ TTAs for adversarial images generated using ten generic (non-adaptive) adversarial attacks (see Sec. 4 - Adversarial attacks), denoted by $\{x_t[k, i]\}_{k \in [0,M-1]}$, $\{x_t'[k, i]\}_{k \in [0,M-1]}$, respectively. $k$ indicates the image index in the val set, and $i$ is the augmentation index. These TTAs are fed to the DNN and their logits output for the normal and adversarial images are denoted as $\{l[k, i, c]\}_{k \in [0,M-1], i \in [0,N-1]}$, $\{l'[k, i, c]\}_{k \in [0,M-1], i \in [0,N-1]}$, respectively, or $\{l[k]\}$ and $\{l'[k]\}$ in short for clarity. We then fit the random forest classifier using the pairs $\{l[k], y[k]\} \cup \{l'[k], y[k]\}$ where $y[k]$ is the true label of the image $x[k]$, i.e., it learns to infer correct labels both from regular and adversarial logits.

The random forest training procedure needs to be carried out only once. For every new (unseen) image we generate TTAs, obtain their logits $l[i, c]$ (as in Section 3.2) and feed them to the random forest classifier to predict the class label.

3.4. Adversarial Attacks

To inspect our defense against adversarial images, we employed extensive and diverse attacks in a variety of threat models, and then evaluate them using our ARF classifier and compare them to the robustness obtained using equivalent adversarially trained TRADES/VAT networks, and to an ensemble of networks.

Black-box. A threat model where the adversary has access only to the DNN output, but neither to the DNN nor to the random forest classifier. In this setup we apply targeted Boundary [5] and untargeted Square [1] attacks on the DNN.

Gray-box. In this threat model the adversary has full access the DNN parameters, but is oblivious to the pre-processing (transformation) and post-processing (random forest) defenses. We apply FGSM, JSMA, PGD, Deepfool, and CW on the DNN. All, except Deepfool, are targeted.

Adaptive black-box. In this setting, the adversary does not have information on the DNN and random forest parameters. They can only query the final output (predicted label) of the random forest and perturb the input image without any gradients knowledge. We use the Square attack, which was shown to be more efficient compared to the popular Boundary attack, and achieved SOTA results, even compared to white-box attacks. Also, we set an untargeted setting since this attack excels on it [1].

Adaptive Gray-box. In this threat model the adversary has access to the DNN’s parameters and has full knowledge about the distributions of the test time augmentations. The adversary is still oblivious to the post-processing (random forest). We formulate two adaptive attacks for this setting:

1) A-FGSM: This attack applies the FGSM attack on every one of the generated TTAs in $\{x_t[i]\}_{i \in [0,N-1]}$. All the gradients are then averaged and the mean gradient map is added to the original input image. Formally, we define $X_t$ to be the distribution of the generated TTA transforms on an image $x$. Given a loss function $J(x, y; w)$, where $x$ is the input image, $y$ is the adversarial label and $w$ are the DNN weights, the A-FGSM creates an adversarial image $x'$ by:

$$x' = x + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} \text{sign}(\nabla_{x[i]} J(x_t[i], y; w)). \quad (2)$$

2) A-PGD: Similarly to the gradient averaging shown for A-FGSM, this adaptive attack employs PGD but in every iteration it projects the adversarial perturbations after the addition of the averaged TTAs gradients. Formally, let $\delta_k$ be the perturbation added to input image $x$ in step $k$ and $\alpha$ be the perturbation step size. The vanilla PGD attack is:

$$\delta_{k+1} = \mathcal{P}(\delta_k + \alpha \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_{\delta_k} J(x + \delta_k, y; w)),$$

where $\mathcal{P}$ is the projection operator, clipping every perturbation inside a ball of interest defined by a given norm $\|\cdot\|$ (we use $L_\infty$). For a general norm $\|\cdot\|$ it simply reads as:

$$\mathcal{P}(\delta) = \begin{cases} \delta, & \text{if } \|\delta\| > \epsilon \\ \delta, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Our adaptive PGD attack is defined as:

$$\delta_{k+1} = \mathcal{P}(\delta_k + \alpha \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_{\delta_k} J(x_t + \delta_k, y; w))),$$

which can be written as:

$$\mathcal{P}(\delta_k + \frac{\alpha}{N} \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} \text{sign}(\nabla_{\delta_k} J(x_t[i] + \delta_k, y; w))), \quad (3)$$

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i.e., similar to PGD but averaging the gradients over the batch of augmentations. The TTAs are generated randomly for each iteration. We initialize $\delta_0$ as a zero gradient map and set the generated adversarial image as $x' = x + \delta_N$.

**Adaptive white-box** In this threat model the adversary has full knowledge about the DNN, the distribution of the transformations, and the random forest’s parameters. The adversary knows everything about our defense method, including the training data (logits) used to fit the DNN and the random forest classifier. In this harsh settings we employ the BPDA attack [2] detailed in sup. mat.

### 4. Experimental Setup

We turn to detail the datasets we used, the DNN and random forest training, and inference computation time. Our hardware setup is thoroughly detailed in sup. mat.

**Datasets.** We perform our tests on 4 datasets: CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 [33], SVHN [46] and Tiny ImageNet [35].

**DNN training.** We randomly split the training set of all the datasets into two subsets, *train* and *train-val*. The former is used to back-prop gradients from the loss to the inputs and train the DNN, whereas the latter is used for metric calculation to decay the learning rate. The size of the *train-val* set is chosen to be 5% of the official training set.

We trained three Resnet architectures [27], Resnet-34, Resnet-50, and Resnet-101, with global average pooling layer before the embedding space. The embedding vector was multiplied by a fully connected layer for the logits calculation. We trained CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, SVHN, and Tiny ImageNet with 300, 300, 200, and 300 epochs, respectively; For the TRADES method (adversarial training) we trained them with 100, 100, 100, and 300 epochs, respectively, since we observed that fewer epochs obtain higher adversarial accuracy with TRADES (see sup. mat.). Early stopping was not used. All TRADES adversarial robust networks used $1/\lambda = 1$, $\epsilon = 0.031$, $\alpha = 0.007$ ($\epsilon$ step size), on $L_\infty$ norm to match the settings in [70] for fair comparison. The VAT adversarial networks were also trained using $\epsilon=0.031$, with $\alpha = 1$ and $\epsilon = 1, 1, 3, 1$ for CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, SVHN, and Tiny ImageNet, respectively [43].

We use an $L_2$ weight decay regularization of 0.0001 in all our DNN training; a stochastic gradient descent optimizer with momentum 0.9 with Nesterov updates, and a batch size of 100. The training starts with a learning rate of 0.1, which decreases by a factor of 0.9 after 3 epochs of no improvement on the *train-val* accuracy (2 epochs for SVHN).

**Random forest training.** We split the test set of all the datasets into two subsets, *val* and *test*. The *test* size is 2500, and the *val* is the official test set without these 2500 samples, i.e., 7500, 7500, 23500, and 7500 for CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, SVHN, and Tiny ImageNet, respectively. The only exception is the Boundary attack. Due to long processing time, we selected for it only 750, 250 samples from *val*, *test*, respectively. The random forest classifier was trained with 1000 trees, using the Gini impurity criterion. The training time was 71 seconds and was done only once for all the normal/adversarial images on the *val* subset.

**Adversarial attacks.** The adversarial attacks detailed in Sec. 3.4 were set to the following norms and powers: (1) FGSM$^1$: $(L_\infty, \epsilon = 0.01)$; (2) FGSM$^2$: $(L_\infty, \epsilon = 0.031)$; (3) JSMA: $(L_0, \gamma = 0.01)$; (4) PGD$^1$: $(L_\infty, \epsilon = 0.01)$; (5) PGD$^2$: $(L_\infty, \epsilon = 0.031)$; (6) Deepfool: $(L_2, \epsilon$ is unconstrained); (7) CW$^{L_2}$: $(L_2, \epsilon$ is unconstrained); (8) CW$^{L_\infty}$: $(L_\infty, \epsilon = 0.031)$; (9) Square: $(L_\infty, \epsilon = 0.031)$; and (10) Boundary: $(L_2, \epsilon$ is unconstrained).

PGD was applied with a step size of $\alpha = 0.003$ with 100 iterations. The above attacks were selected due to their norm diversity, effectiveness, and popularity. Many attacks employ $\epsilon = 0.031$ to match the settings in the TRADES baseline [70], which is the current SOTA. For all the targeted attack we randomly switched the ground-truth label to one of the different labels in the dataset.

We also apply the following adaptive attacks detailed in Sections 3.4: (i) A-FGSM($L_\infty, \epsilon = 0.031$); (ii) A-PGD($L_\infty, \epsilon = 0.031$); (iii) A-Square ($L_\infty, \epsilon = 0.031$); and (iv) BPDA: BPDA($L_\infty, \epsilon = 0.031$). A-FGSM, A-PGD, A-Square, and BPDA were set with $N = 256$ generated TTAs. A-PGD, A-Square and BPDA are very time consuming and thus were set with only 10 iterations; Therefore, we set their step size to $\alpha = 0.007$.

**Testing.** All the metrics we show in this work were calculated on the *test* subset. For both TTA and ARF we set $N = 256$ unless stated otherwise, i.e., we generate 256 TTAs in inference time, which allows the models to run in a single forward pass on the GPU. The majority of the computation time is devoted to the TTAs generation, which is done on the CPU and takes $3.32 \pm 0.33$ seconds for a single Tiny ImageNet image (calculated over 20 runs). The DNN and random forest forward pass times are negligible - 250 ms and 4 ms, respectively.

### 5. Results

We evaluate the performance of ARF on adversarial attacks and compare it to other robust methods. We also present ablation studies conducted to improve the model performance and computation time. Lastly, we show accuracies on adaptive black-box and white-box attacks. In sup. mat. we present the distortions created by the different attacks. Alternative simple machine learning classifiers such as logistic regression and SVM were found to be inferior to random forest; This comparison appears in sup. mat.

#### 5.1. Adversarial Robustness

Table 1 shows the accuracy on the normal (not attacked) and adversarial examples obtained for all the non-adaptive
attacks (black-box and gray-box) we employed on Resnet-34. Tables for Resnet-50 and Resnet-101 are in sup. mat.

"Plain" corresponds to the non-robust, simple DNN accuracy, without any adversarial defense. "Ensemble" uses nine different DNNs with the same architecture and the pre-trained weights. These DNNs were the parameters we used in this work. It is interesting to note that the highest adversarial accuracy was obtained for logits vectors, and the DNN's logits, the DNN's hard vectors, and the DNN's soft vectors in the DNN penultimate layer.

Note that for all datasets, ARF has better robustness than TTA and both VAT and TRADES on JSMA, Deepfool, and CWL2. It is not surprising as TRADES employed a regularization term on a ball with an L∞ norm and these attacks use other norms. Also, VAT regularizes logits distribution smoothness within the image's local surrounding, which is problematic when the norm is unconstrained in L∞.

In the vast majority of the attacks and datasets, the ARF classifier outperforms the VAT networks. However, when combining the DNNs, their accuracy usually achieve the highest adversarial robustness accuracy. This robust accuracy trumps even the ensemble score, except for Tiny Imagenet.

Lastly, observe that the normal accuracy obtained by ARF is much better than TRADES, and is comparable to the normal accuracy of VAT. ARF scores almost as the plain classifier for normal images on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and SVHN.

**Transferability.** In the sup. mat. we show that our ARF defense is characterized with excellent transferability, being able to generalize to new (unseen) attacks.

### 5.2. Ablation Studies

We conducted two ablation studies to analyze ARF.

**ARF classifier ablation.** We tested three parameters governing the ARF accuracy:

1. **Features:** The inputs to the random forest classifier. We used three candidates: The DNN's logits, the DNN's probabilities (softmax over logits), and the embedding vectors in the DNN penultimate layer.

2. **Gaussian noise power:** We checked three different noise filters with max standard deviation (σ_max) of 0, 0.005, and 0.0125. The 0 value is equivalent to no noise.

3. **Strength of transforms:** We tested two sets of transforms from the transforms in **Fig. 2:** soft vs hard. The soft transforms span over shorter parameter intervals. For example, the hard brightness transform randomizes a brightness factor in the interval [0(0.6, 1.4) whereas the soft transform randomizes it in [0(0.8, 1.2). The full interval sets of these transforms are in sup. mat.

Table 2 shows the normal and adversarial accuracies (A_{norm} and A_{adv}) on CIFAR-10, trained by Resnet-34, attacked by CWL2 and evaluated using ARF with N = 1000. The highest adversarial accuracy was obtained for logits vectors, hard transforms, and σ_max = 0.005. Thus, these were the parameters we used in this work. It is interesting to
We select $N$ with very high confidence. 

TTA size ablation. The computational bottleneck in our Table 1, as the plain DNN does not apply any transform. TTA and ARF classifiers is the generation of the Table 2. Ablation study on 3 parameters used for ARF. 1) Random 256 for our experiments since it achieves good robustness val). Ablation of the TTA size on CIFAR-100 and SVHN is easy comparison, the performance on the corresponded non-bust classifiers for all the adaptive attacks in Section 3.4. For our experiments, we select $N=256$ for our experiments since it achieves good robustness with very high confidence.

Figure 3 shows the adversarial accuracy on CIFAR-10 for three selected attacks: PGD, Deepfool, and CW. Although the ARF defense is susceptible to the BPDA attack, an adaptive white-box attack that fails when attacked with an adaptive gray-box or white-box attack. For example, the white-box BPDA attack decreases the ARF accuracy on CIFAR-10 to 8.8%. The VAT+ARF combination demonstrates SOTA robustness for all non-adaptive attacks, however, the vanilla TRADES or VAT perform better on adaptive attacks. Notice that these results may suggest that ARF may be considered as a gradient masking approach as revealing the gradients of these results may suggest that ARF may be considered as a gradient masking approach as revealing the gradients of

point out that the best normal accuracy was obtained for soft transforms with $\sigma_{max} = 0$ (for all features). This observation conforms with the high normal accuracy presented in Table 1, as the plain DNN does not apply any transform.

TTA size ablation. The computational bottleneck in our TTA and ARF classifiers is the generation of the $N$ TTAs. Using $N = 1000$ images as done for Table 2 requires a long computation time so we searched for the minimal $N$, which achieves sufficient adversarial robustness. We select $N=256$ for our experiments since it achieves good robustness with very high confidence.

Figure 3 shows the adversarial accuracy on CIFAR-10 for three selected attacks: PGD, Deepfool, and CW in a logarithmic scale. The width of each line corresponds to the measured standard deviation of five repeated experiments. We select $N=256$ for our experiments since it achieves good robustness with very high confidence (narrow interval). Ablation of the TTA size on CIFAR-100 and SVHN is presented in sup. mat.

5.3. Is ARF A Masking Gradient Approach?

Table 3 shows the adversarial accuracies for different robust classifiers for all the adaptive attacks in Section 3.4. For easy comparison, the performance on the corresponded non-adaptive attack is shown next to each accuracy result. Note that our A-PGD attack is much more effective against the ensemble and TTA classifiers, surpassing all other adaptive and non-adaptive attacks by a large margin. Alas, it is not as powerful as the vanilla PGD against plain adversarial robust DNNs (TRADES/VAT). For all the other robust classifiers it achieves comparable results to the strong BPDA attack.

Observe that ARF is robust against the black-box adaptive attack, but fails when attacked with an adaptive gray-box or white-box attack. For example, the white-box BPDA attack decreases the ARF accuracy on CIFAR-10 to 8.8%. The VAT+ARF combination demonstrates SOTA robustness for all non-adaptive attacks, however, the vanilla TRADES or VAT perform better on adaptive attacks. Notice that these results may suggest that ARF may be considered as a gradient masking approach as revealing the gradients of

Visual Perceptibility. Although the ARF defense is susceptible to the BPDA attack, an adaptive white-box attack that was customly tailored to circumvent our specific random forest classifier, we show that BPDA fails to generate imperceptible images. We display some images generated using BPDA against ARF and demonstrate that a human observer can easily detect an unusual distortion in them.

Figure 4 exhibits clean images and adversarial images generated by BPDA for CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, SVHN, and Tiny ImageNet. "Clean" column corresponds to natural (undistorted) images; "ARF" column denotes images that fool our ARF defense; "TRADES+ARF" and "VAT+ARF" columns display images that fool our ARF defense when combined with TRADES and VAT adversarially trained

Table 2. Ablation study on 3 parameters used for ARF. 1) Random forest input features: Logits, softmax probabilities, and DNN embeddings. 2) Randomization level of transforms: hard for a larger randomization range (coarse transforms) and soft for a smaller range (mellow transforms). 3) Noise transform max power ($\sigma_{max}$). The adversarial score is computed for $\text{CW}_{L_2}$.

| Features | Transforms | $\sigma_{max}$ | $\hat{\delta}_\text{norm}$ | $\hat{\delta}_\text{ade}$ |
|----------|------------|----------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Logits   | soft       | 0              | 94.24                       | 83.56                       |
| Logits   | soft       | 0.005          | 94.20                       | 83.72                       |
| Logits   | soft       | 0.0125         | 93.88                       | 83.96                       |
| Logits   | hard       | 0              | 93.72                       | 84.64                       |
| Logits   | hard       | 0.005          | 93.80                       | 85.00                       |
| Logits   | hard       | 0.0125         | 93.08                       | 84.96                       |
| Probs    | soft       | 0              | 94.16                       | 83.36                       |
| Probs    | soft       | 0.005          | 94.04                       | 83.64                       |
| Probs    | soft       | 0.0125         | 93.80                       | 84.00                       |
| Probs    | hard       | 0              | 94.04                       | 84.00                       |
| Probs    | hard       | 0.005          | 93.80                       | 84.72                       |
| Probs    | hard       | 0.0125         | 93.00                       | 84.96                       |
| Embeddings | soft     | 0              | 94.16                       | 83.56                       |
| Embeddings | soft    | 0.005          | 93.96                       | 83.64                       |
| Embeddings | soft    | 0.0125         | 93.56                       | 83.88                       |
| Embeddings | hard   | 0              | 93.68                       | 84.88                       |
| Embeddings | hard   | 0.005          | 93.60                       | 84.80                       |
| Embeddings | hard   | 0.0125         | 93.04                       | 84.92                       |
VAT+ARF. Nonetheless, these visible distortions decrease ARF defense on BPDA compared to TRADES+ARF and ARF first generates many test-time augmentations, applying with an adversarially trained DNN. Ensemble is presented just as a reference as it has an unfair advantage (see text).

Table 3. Adversarial accuracies (%) for various robust classifiers on adaptive attacks: A-Square (black-box), A-FGSM and A-PGD (gray-box) and BPDA (white-box), and their non-adaptive correspondents. FGSM$^2$ and PGD$^2$ are abbreviated to FGSM and PGD for clarity. ARF can maintain robustness only when combined with an adversarially trained DNN. Ensemble is presented just as a reference as it has an unfair advantage (see text).

| Dataset | Method         | FGSM   | VAT   | SVHN  | CIFAR-10 | CIFAR-100 | Tiny ImageNet |
|---------|----------------|--------|-------|-------|----------|-----------|--------------|
|         | Ensemble       | 64.20  | 41.60 | 46.64 | 5.76     | 10.44     | 10.40        |
|         | TRADES         | 75.80  | 79.20 | 71.84 | 77.76    | 80.92     | 80.90        |
|         | VAT            | 70.56  | 68.64 | 20.08 | 54.84    | 81.52     | 95.20        |
|         | ARF            | 68.76  | 33.32 | 72.76 | 5.12     | 85.52     | 87.60        |
|         | TRADES + ARF   | 70.20  | 37.80 | 77.88 | 5.48     | 87.64     | 89.20        |
|         | VAT + ARF      | 76.72  | 84.88 | 76.24 | 73.48    | 80.56     | 87.20        |
|         | Ensemble       | 20.16  | 25.04 | 33.28 | 19.24    | 65.56     | 66.40        |
|         | TRADES         | 41.52  | 48.76 | 46.44 | 48.44    | 45.96     | 52.80        |
|         | VAT            | 28.60  | 40.32 | 15.20 | 39.32    | 54.56     | 64.00        |
|         | ARF            | 28.80  | 13.20 | 42.08 | 10.16    | 56.28     | 56.00        |
|         | TRADES + ARF   | 44.16  | 46.44 | 46.28 | 47.60    | 47.48     | 47.20        |
|         | VAT + ARF      | 46.20  | 37.80 | 59.92 | 43.16    | 64.04     | 64.80        |

Figure 4. Adversarial images generated by BPDA circumventing our ARF defense. TRADES+ARF and V A T+ARF correspond to our ARF defense when applied on top of an adversarially trained DNN, TRADES/V A T, respectively. Adversarial images that fool our ARF defense can be easily spotted by the naked eye. Therefore, while they fool our network they do not meet the perceptual criterion of adversarial attacks. This shows that ARF is indeed a strong defense against adversarial attacks.

6. Conclusions

This work proposes a simple, fast, and easy to use method to classify adversarial images, named ARF. Our approach is applied on pretrained DNNs without the need to carry out adversarial training or updating the model’s parameters. ARF first generates many test-time augmentations, applying a wide variety of random color, geometric, blur and noise transforms on the input image, and feeds these augmentations to a pretrained DNN. Then it collects the DNN’s logits and feeds them to a vanilla random forest classifier which yields SOTA robust classification when combined with an adversarially trained DNN (V A T). This improvement in robustness comes at the cost of training the random forest model (only once). We tested ARF with a variety of attacks, where some of them were especially designed against ARF. One of them, A-PGD, which we proposed, is of interest by itself as it is very effective against DNN ensemble while not having access to any of its networks.

When tested on adaptive attacks, ARF applied on a non-robust DNN shows inferior robust accuracies compared to a plain adversarial training (V A T/TRADES), suggesting that ARF’s robustness is attributed to gradient masking. However, it was shown to perform well under the adaptive white-box threat model when combined with TRADES. Also, the white-box setting assumes full knowledge about our defense parameters, which can be easily changed by quickly re-training the simple ARF model upon every classification. Thus, hiding the ARF model can be considered as holding a secret key for “security through obscurity” [7, 32]. In addition, defending against new adaptive attacks is feasible by including them into the ARF fitting. Therefore, the use of ARF should be favored over adversarial training alone (although in the white-box setting tailored to ARF it was better alone) as in the non white-box setting ARF leads to a significant improvement. We believe that integrating ARF within the adversarial training can further boost the robustness as was shown for data augmentations in a very recent work [51].
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