Russia’s Eurasian union dream

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Russia's Eurasian union dream: A way forward towards multipolar world order

Shahzada Rahim Abbas

Abstract

Since the disintegration of USSR Eurasia has gained a new geopolitical and strategic significance. Fifteen countries emerged as result of disintegration, among which only Russian Federation was the successor state. The post-soviet era, especially the era of 1990s, was a political and economic trauma for the Russian Federation and the post-soviet space. But Eurasianists were well aware of American unilateralism and the American “Grand Chessboard strategy” that was solely aimed at encircling Russian geography. With these concerns, the Eurasianists advised the Russian political and military elites to initiate the Eurasian Union Project. This paper briefly sketches Russian historical Eurasian dream, which is deeply rooted in Russian imperial history, and discusses the importance of Eurasian philosophy for the political and economic stability of Russia-Eurasia. The paper also illustrates the challenges and opportunities for the Eurasian integration and for the establishment of a multipolar world order. The paper also briefly outlines the geopolitical rationale behind the Eurasian project as a key objective of the contemporary Russian foreign policy and geopolitics.

Key words: Russian foreign policy, Eurasian Economic Union, neo-Eurasianism, Russian geopolitics

Introduction

The fall of Soviet Union was not only a calamity for Russia but greatly impacted the peace and stability of Eurasia – especially the post-soviet space. It was the ascension of President Boris Yeltsin to the Russian presidency that led to the disintegration of Soviet Union and gave birth to the fragile commonwealth of the independent states (Shlapentokh, 2018). Moreover, the secret Belavezha Accords signed by the President Boris Yeltsin with Belarus and Ukraine, on American dictation, that brought economic and security consequences for Russia in the years to come (Salenko, 2015). The fragile Commonwealth of the independent states failed to rescue the post-soviet space from economic and security apocalypse. In the face of dire economic and security challenges, Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed the establishment of Eurasian Union modeled on the pattern of the European Union (Mostafa, 2013). Basically, he proposed the reintegration of the post-soviet space with Russia in the wake of crisis in order to ensure the future security of Eurasia (Mostafa, 2013). His proposal was cordially encouraged by Russia, Armenia, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan.

It cannot be denied that the relationship of Russia with the countries in the Eurasian region is rooted in the history of shared identity (Hierman, 2018). The Eurasianists want to construct a new ideology that will ensure the identitarian unity among the Eurasian communities. For Eurasianists, Russia can shape a new binding ideology to reclaim the geographical and cultural sphere of the post-soviet space (Bassin, 1991). With the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s presidency in Russia, Eurasianists received both political and economic support from the government to construct the Eurasian integration project (Bassin, 2017). Basically, the ideology of Eurasianism can be traced in the writings of famous Russian exiles in the 1920s, who speculated about the Eurasian ideology. A group of Soviet exiles such as

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geographer Piotr Savitskii and ethnologist Lev Gumilev began speculating about Russia-Eurasia by asserting that 'Russian world is neither Asian nor European rather Eurasian' (Lewis & Wigen, 1997). Throughout the course of 20th century, the Russian exiles stressed the distinctive nature of Russia-Eurasia. The Eurasianist Movement accentuated the civilizational identity of Eurasia. Similarly, recent neo-Eurasianists, such as Alexander Penarin and Alexander Dugin, have reaffirmed the idea of Eurasia and the ideology of Eurasianism (Bendle, 2014).

In this paper I will contend that Eurasianism is an inherent part of Russian history and identity and then I will establish a link between Russian Eurasianism and multipolarity. In this respect, the multidimensional conceptual framework of "Revisionist theory" has been applied to develop the geopolitical analysis about the futurist prospects of the integration of Russia-Eurasia. Various Western geopolitical experts consider the Russian Eurasian project as an excuse to revive its historical imperial ambition, what they call a Russian obsession with the establishment of the "Fifth Rome." But geopolitics has its own diverse strategic implications and the Western speculation about the Russian neo-imperialism narrative is not fully justified.

As far as the methodology is concerned this paper solely uses the contemporary geopolitical dynamics of neorealism from the standpoint of classical and neo-Eurasianism. The classical Eurasianist school was pioneered by famous Russian historian Lev Gumilev and the neo-Eurasianist school is pioneered by contemporary Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin.

This paper contains four major themes, which are closely related with the current expansive nature of the Russian foreign policy. The first theme deals with the historical collective identity of Russia-Eurasia, which existed for centuries through a common "Eurasian Ethos." The second theme deals with the Russian neo-Eurasianist approach which was shaped by Alexander Dugin’s famous geopolitical treatise “The Foundation of Geopolitics”. The third theme emphasizes the contemporary Russian foreign policy approach towards building a new network of grand alliances with key countries across the Eurasian region, such as Germany, Japan, and Iran. Lastly, the fourth theme contemplates the contemporary Russian grand strategy for the establishment of Eurasian union and multipolarity.

Reconstructing the Eurasian ethos and identity

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the geopolitical and cultural significance of Eurasia has emerged as a new project for Russian reintegration with the post-soviet space. Eurasianists across Russia stressed the development of the “Eurasian Ethos” to rebridge the diverse communities across Eurasia into the mold of single Eastern civilization (Bassin, 2017). Basically, the major objective of the Eurasianists was to shape new cultural and ideological foundation for the reintegration of the post-soviet states with Russia. It was Alexander Dugin’s milestone geopolitical treatise “The Foundation of Geopolitics” which shaped contemporary Russian geopolitics, stressing the reunification of the Eurasian “heartland” with Russia (Upton, 2018). In addition, under the reign of President Vladimir Putin, Russian political and military elites have embraced the ideology of neo-Eurasianism developed by the writings of Professor Dugin (Kushnir, 2018). According to Dugin, Russia is the only leading nation in the Eurasian landmass which can reintegrate the Eurasian communities, and to make it happen, he founded the International Eurasia Movement.

According to Dugin, the liberal internationalism championed by the United States since the end of Second World War, is suffering from a fatal crisis. In the nihilistic postmodern age, liberalism has detached itself from rational thought and molded itself into fascism (Laruelle, 2015). In the neo-Eurasianists’ view, liberalism has caused a degeneration of human biology, ethics, morality, identity, and civilization. Dugin said:
We need to return to the being, to the logos, to the fundamental ontology, to the sacred, and to the middle Ages – thus to the empire, religion and the institution of traditional society. All the content of modernity is Satanism and degeneration. Nothing is worth; everything is to be cleansed off. The modernity is absolutely wrong – science, values, philosophy, art, society, modes, patterns, and truths, understanding of being, time and space. All is dead with modernity; so it should end – we are going to end it. (Ratner, 2016)

In contrast, the whole Eurasianist treatise in the “Foundation of Geopolitics” stresses the development of the Eurasian Union from Dublin to Vladivostok. The neo-Eurasianists advocate national bolshevism to reclaim the pride and glory of historical Russia in the context of Eurasian anthropology and history (Bassin, 2017). They condemned racial-ethnic nationalism in Russia and hassled on the creation of historic-cultural based regional nationalism by embracing the meta-culture of the Eurasian region. Neo-Eurasianists declare Russia as the ideological core for the Eurasian integration, and advocate an initial integration with White Russians (Belorussia), and little Russians (Ukraine) (Tchantouridze, 2001). Russian Slavic culture and history has close ties with East Slavs, Turkic, and Mongols, who have lived across the Eurasian steppes for centuries with distinctive culture and identities.

Close cultural cooperation between the Russian Slavs and the East Slavs is significant for the construction of the Eurasian ethos. Likewise, the classical Eurasianist, Lev Gumilev, claimed that during the Middle Ages the Mongols and peasant Slavs were living in cultural hybridity, with shared identity. It was only the westernization project of the Peter the Great in Russia which dragged the “black legend” of the Mongol yoke to Russia (Gumilev, 1987). Thus, Lev Gumilev traces the foundation of the Eurasian identity in the Middle Ages, during which the hard-core Islamic Mongols preferred to integrate into orthodox Christian civilization in order to preserve the Eurasian identity (Glebov, 2015). The classical Eurasianists also envisage cultural hybridity between Russian Slavs, East Slavs, and Central Asian Mongols as a necessary step for the establishment of the Eurasian bloc.

The whole ideology of Eurasianism focuses on the establishment of the Eurasian Union to ensure the economic prosperity and security of the Eurasian region. Although throughout the chaotic 1990s the post-soviet Russia was too weak to implement the Eurasian project on the wake of financial turmoil, with the rise of Vladimir Putin to Russian presidency, the pace of Eurasian integration accelerated (Monaghan, 2013). It was the former Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev who pioneered the Eurasian Union project and Belorussian President Alexander Lukashenko, who worked side by side with President Putin in the pursuit of this. Nazarbayev envisaged the process of Eurasian integration in three broad stages: economic, humanitarian, and security (Mostafa, 2013).

Towards Economic Integration

It was Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Belarus which formally inaugurated Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015, as an initiative to forge economic integration in the Eurasian region. In the same year Kyrgyzstan joined the Eurasian Economic Union to further strengthen trade relations of Central Asia with Russia (Bassin, 2017). In essence, it was a first major step to establish new series of economic relations among the Eurasian nations, as envisioned by President Nursultan Nazarbayev (Mostafa, 2013). According to Western geopolitical experts, the formation of Eurasian Economic Union will only serve the geopolitical interests of Russia.

Unfortunately, the analysis of the Western experts reveals bias, because the establishment of a Eurasian Custom Union under the EEU’s initiative will benefit all the members of the Eurasian Economic Union. Moreover, the creation of the Eurasian Custom Union will pave the way for a common and shared trade area between Russia and other members of the Union (Cadier, 2014). As a result, the “Eurasian Schengen” will serve as a
fully fledged platform for the development of common investment opportunities and common labour market that will directly benefit the labour-exporting members of the Eurasian Economic Union.

Members of the Eurasian Economic Union will also benefit from Russian advanced healthcare, medical technology, electricity from hydrocarbons, and financial services (Ustyuzanina, 2016). In the broad regional development perspective, the members of Eurasian Custom Union will benefit from China’s Belt and Road initiative in the form of transit taxes and regional connectivity (Sokolova & Makarov, 2016). In this way, according to Eurasianists, Russia will be able to defeat or neutralize the influence of the United States in international politics. By neutralizing American power, Russia will be able to lay down the foundation of the multipolar world order free from American liberal hegemony (Bugajski, 2003).

In the Eurasianists’ view, it is time for the international system to realize the Eurasian political model as the living reality of our age. According to Russian foreign policy experts, Dugin’s idea of neo-Eurasianism is necessary for the security of Russia and Eurasia (Bendle, 2014). The Russian geopolitics advocated by Alexander Dugin is based on the German geopolitical school of Karl Haushofer. In Dugin’s view, the establishment of the Eurasian Union will pave the way for the creation of buffer zone between the West and Russia that will ensure the economic and political security of Europe and Eurasia (Tsygankov, 1998).

**United States-led Atlanticism**

The Eurasianists, especially Alexander Dugin, believe that it was the Atlantic bloc led by the United States which plotted the destruction of Warsaw Pact and eventually the Soviet Union. The main objective of the United States was to destroy the Russian hegemony in the heartland and to push back the Russian expansion towards “world island” (Rywkin, 2000). In the wake of the Soviet apocalypse, the Eurasianists feared ethnic and cultural fragmentation in the post-soviet Russia. They began guiding the Russian political and military elites to reinvigorate the Russian strategic position in the global order by resurrecting the Eurasian Union (Ditrych, 2014).

Throughout Russia’s Eurasianist discussions, Dugin was an active geopolitical scientist, stressing the formation of the “Eurasian Ethos” to ensure ethnic and political harmony in Russia. In addition, the creation of Eurasian Union is clearly aimed at establishing an “Indo-European centric continental identity,” in which Russia with its diverse ethnic nationalities will retain a unique position (Dugin, 2014).

The Atlanticists in the post-cold war era relied on the advice of American pragmatic scholar Francis Fukuyama to establish the American-dominated liberal order and on the prescription of famous neo-con strategist Paul Wolfowitz to reduce Russia’s role as regional power (Zanegin, 1992). To achieve this objective, the Atlanticists gave a free hand to NATO to encircle Russia and attempted to foment ethnic separatism in Russia such as Chechnya and Dagestan. From the very beginning the Eurasianists warned the Russian political and military elites not to trust Western democratic camouflage. Eurasianists such as Dugin advised Russia to develop a counter-ideological strategy to compete with the Atlantic world order (Upton, 2018).

In the Eurasianists’ perspective, Russian is a potential partner in the East with its vast natural resources and strategic location, which can serve as a counter-hegemonic force against the US-dominated Atlantic order (Tsygankov, 2003). According to Eurasianists, the Russian Eurasian project should expand its horizons into the Latin America in order to free the continent from the American imperialism. Unity and harmony in the Eurasian region is a prerequisite to compel the United States and its traditional ally Britain to abandon the shores of Eurasia (Dugin, 2015).
To be more precise, for the new world disorder, the United States must be forced to withdraw from the shores of South Asia, Central Asia, Europe, the Far East, and Africa by limiting its geopolitical influence across these regions.

Forging new geopolitical alliances

Stability in Eurasia is vital for the geographic and geopolitical security of Russia. Eurasia is a huge landmass with strategic chock points and the heartland (Dugin, 2015). Moreover, for the security of Eurasia, the Eurasianists propose Russia’s new axis of “Grand Alliance” with Berlin, Tokyo and Tehran (Clover, 2016). As Dugin writes; “the task of Moscow is to tear Europe away from the control of the United States” (The Conversation, 2017). In this regard, Russia must open a new chapter of economic and strategic alliances with the countries in Central Europe, West Asia, and the Far East. In addition, it is a geopolitical reality that, in order to create a buffer zone between Eurasia and Europe, Russia needs united and friendly European partners (Cornell & Starr, 2014).

The active presence of NATO on European shores will remain a major strategic and foreign policy challenge for Russia. Drawing strategy from the eventual security concerns, Russia should extend its support for the European new right, which is against the Americanization of European foreign and defence policy and anti-NATO (Werleman, 2018). Moscow’s new strategy can be termed as the “Politics of opportunity,” because the European new right approach towards Russia is soft and friendly.

In the light of friendly Eurasia–Europe relations, the neutrality of Europe and its exit from NATO is a prerequisite to regain the trust of Russia (Monaghan, 2013). From the geopolitical perspective, the new grand alliance between Moscow and Berlin will contribute to the expansion of Eurasian project by creating a buffer zone between the Eurasian and European sphere of influence. In “The Foundation of Geopolitics” Dugin’s geopolitical calculation presents a grand strategy for both Europe and Russia to reclaim their geographical realm through shared interests. In the meantime, through the new grand axis, Russia will represent the interests of Eurasia and Germany will represent the interests of Europe (Bugajski, 2008). As Dugin writes; ”Russia and Germany must decide all the disputed questions in advance” (Dunlop, 2004).

For the success of Moscow–Berlin axis, Dugin suggests a firm anti-Atlanticist political environment in both Germany and France, the two prominent powers within the EU (Miller, 2019). But there are still existential strategic barriers that might disrupt the grand Moscow–Berlin axis. First and foremost, the countries along the Baltic Sea will remain a major barrier. Dugin suggests that Estonia must be declared a German sphere of influence while Lithuania must be considered as Russia’s sphere of influence (Dunlop, 2004).

Secondly, since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine became a major political deadlock between Russia and Europe. According to Dugin, Ukraine has no separate political history and geopolitical importance because it lacks geographic elegance. For Dugin and other Eurasianists, Ukraine as an independent nation with moribund geographical ambitions is a strategic danger for Eurasian region and continental stability (Tolstoy & McCaffray, 2015).

Similarly, the new grand Moscow-Tokyo axis is also crucial for the expansion of Eurasian Union and for the stability of Eurasian continent. In this regard, Dugin suggests a new phase of Eurasian relations with the Far East, in which Russia must strive to build a new strategic and diplomatic alliance with Japan through the principle of common interest (Rangsimaporn, 2006). Russia has historical and cultural ties with the Pacific region through its Far East province of Vladivostok (Ossipova, 2005). Russia can use the strategic geography of its Far Eastern province to establish a new grand alliance with Tokyo.
In the meantime, to achieve the Moscow-Tokyo axis, Russia must promise Japan a strategic sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Likewise, Russia must engage Japan through the diplomacy of shared interest to neutralize the influence of the United States in Japan (Clover, 1999). There are also regional challenges that can disrupt Moscow-Tokyo axis. For instance, China is major regional contender in the Asia-Pacific that might challenge the Moscow-Tokyo alliance. Therefore, for the success of Moscow-Tokyo axis, China should be convinced to compromise in the East China Sea in order to overshadow the influence of the United States in the South Pacific (Elias & Grønning, 2019). In Dugin’s view: “China verges upon being an Atlanticist Factotum.” Moreover, in the chapter titled “The Fall of China” in the “Foundation of Geopolitics” Dugin declares China as the most dangerous geopolitical contender of Russia in Central Asia and Eastern Siberia (Dunlop, 2004). Even Robert D. Kaplan opines that Russia has historical fears about China’s expansion into the Eastern Siberia that might pave the way for the invasion of Russia in the near future (Kaplan, 2010).

Russia must forge new geopolitical alliances in the Asia-Pacific region through strategic power balancing between Japan and China (Elias & Grønning, 2019). In my opinion, this will be the most difficult task for the Russian foreign policymakers in the implementation of Eurasian Project.

Next, Russia’s grand alliance with Iran (the successor of the Great Persian Empire) is also a key determinant of the Eurasian expansionism. In the light of complex strategic and geopolitical concerns in the South, the Eurasianists propose a strong strategic Moscow-Tehran axis. Consequently, Iran as the successor and custodian of Great Persian imperial heritage retains a significant position in Eurasia (Donlop, 2001). It has close cultural ties with the countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus. For Eurasianists, the new Moscow-Tehran axis should be based on traditional character of historical ties between the orthodox Christian and Islamic civilization (Curanović, 2012). Furthermore, it cannot be denied that Islam is the geopolitical reality of the greater Eurasian empire.

According to Dugin, the new grand alliance between Moscow and Tehran will fulfill the historical Russian dream of the warm waters (Dunlop, 2004). But the establishment of a new grand alliance between Moscow and Tehran will also remain a major challenge for the Russian foreign policymakers:

1. First, Iran’s dream of reviving the ancient Persian Empire is a direct challenge for Russia in Central Asia and South Caucasus.
2. The vast oil and gas resource in the Caspian Sea, where Iran claims to be a riparian state is a challenge to Eurasian energy security.
3. Iranian proxy operations in the Middle East threaten regional stability.
4. The aggressive and offensive nature of Iranian revisionism is a direct threat to the Russian dream.
5. In the last 500 years, Iran in the Persian spirit has remained a Eurasian and Caucasian great power.

Despite these challenges, Russia’s grand alliance with Iran is decisive for the Eurasian project to ensure the full security of the “Anaconda Ring.”

Towards the multipolar world order

In the wake of the disintegration of USSR, the Eurasianists feared American-led liberal internationalism. Moreover, the disintegration of Soviet Union marked the end of bipolar world order, with the balance of power being replaced by unbalanced unipolar power (Tsygankov, 2003). The Eurasianists began speculating about the coming disorder and chaos surrounding Russia because the American elites were obsessed with “Grand Chessboard strategy” of the cold war to encircle Russia (Tsygankov, 2008). As a result, Dugin actively advised the Russian
political and military elites to support the Eurasian project. One of the major objectives of the Eurasian project was Russian revisionism to make Russia again a predominant global actor and allow a return to a multipolar world order (Bendle, 2014).

It cannot be denied that the establishment of the Eurasian Union on the new horizon will become a direct contender with the American-led Atlantic order. In the Eurasians’ perspective, the establishment of the Eurasian Union aims at ensuring multipolarity by directly balancing the sphere of influence between Europe and Russia (Bugajski, 2008). In order to achieve this objective, Russia must strive to create a buffer zone in Eastern Europe, should expel NATO from European shores to neutralize American influence, and should balance China in the Pacific region (Dunlop, 2004).

As an illustration, the establishment of the Eurasian Union will disrupt the global hegemony of the American-led liberal internationalism, which in the Eurasians’ view is necessary for the stability of the international system. As a result, the international system will transform from unbalanced unipolarity towards multipolarity, with contesting patterns of ideological and political development (Arakelyan, 2016). In the context of multipolarity, the geopolitical interests of major global players such as United States, China, and Turkey in inner Eurasia is a direct challenge to the Russia’s Eurasian integration project.

For instance, in the Transcaucasia, the countries like Azerbaijan and Georgia are under the direct influence of Turkey and the United States. Moreover, there is possibility that Georgia and Azerbaijan might resist the Eurasian integration by acting as allies of other global players. In the Eurasians’ perspective, Georgia and Azerbaijan might act as “Resistant factor” in Eurasian integration and, hence, in the development of multipolar world order (Arakelyan, 2016). In the meantime, the Russian foreign policymakers must find common grounds to convince the resurgent Transcaucasia to integrate in the Eurasian Union. So far, Russia can offer the following commitments and guarantees:

1. Russia can offer political and economic security to Georgia and Azerbaijan with certain compromises.
2. Russia should offer a significant position to both Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Eurasian Custom Union.
3. Russia should guarantee the security of the vast natural resources of Azerbaijan and Georgia.
4. Russia should enter into defence ties with Azerbaijan and Georgia to resist NATO’s expansionism.
5. Russia should guarantee the transfer of technology and investment to Georgia and Azerbaijan.

To achieve the objective of multipolar world order, Russia should develop a multidimensional foreign policy approach to strengthen political and economic ties with Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus by balancing the shared interests of other regional powers.

The way forward

Across the West, there is ambiguity about the Russian integration plans because of the Russian weak economic health to manage the integration process (Laruelle, 2012). But the fact cannot be denied that, besides various hurdles and challenges, Russia has pursued a multi-vector diplomatic approach towards post-soviet states with the objective of reintegration (Delcour et al., 2015). Since 2000, there have been significant developments in the Eurasian integration process.

First and foremost, the establishment of Eurasian Economic community took place as a result of treaty between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan with an
aim of creating a common economic space (Tarr, 2016). Secondly, in 2006, the establishment of the Eurasian development bank took place, to provide investment capital in the form of loans and grants for the development of the Eurasian region (Salikhov & Agibalov, 2012). Likewise, the establishment of Eurasian Custom Union was a major milestone in the integration process that might in the near future give birth to a Eurasian Schengen (Tarr, 2016). According to President Putin, the establishment of the Eurasian Union will be modeled on the European Union, while designing a different geopolitical and geo-economic infrastructure for Eurasia with vibrant global effect (Lagutina, 2014).

Finally, in May 2015, the Eurasian Economic Union was established as a result of a treaty between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan to expand the horizon of the common economic sphere (Tarr, 2016). For Russian foreign policy experts and observers, the establishment of Eurasian Economic Union will serve as a “political seduction” to embolden the Russian Eurasian project in the post-soviet space (Delcour et al., 2015). Moreover, through this platform, Russia will be able to expand its economic space by offering economic incentives and opportunities to the countries in the Eurasian region.

In the last three years, significant political steps have been taken by Russia and Belarus for the creation of “Union between Belarus and Russia” (Shraibman, 2019). The integration documents have been finalized by the presidential teams of both countries and there is a possibility that Russian President Vladimir Putin might contest the first presidential elections of union between Belarus and Russia (Vieira, 2016). Western media outlets like the New York Times and Atlantic Council have speculated about this possibility in their editorial sections (Åslund, 2016). It seems that the Russian dream of Eurasian Union and multipolar world order is on the verge of success.

Conclusion

Since 2000, the political and economic developments in the Eurasian region indicate a clear picture of successful integration in years to come. However, o Atlanticists the Eurasian Project is an excuse of Russia to reassert neo-imperialism in the post-soviet space. Since the ascension of Vladimir Putin to the Russian Presidency, the state institution became serious and committed about the implementation of Eurasian Project. The Eurasian Union is modeled on the European Union in aiming at ensuring political and economic benefits for the countries in post-soviet space. The countries of Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and Eastern Europe need Russian defense and economic support to ensure their survival in the Eurasian region. Since 2004, many East European countries joined the European Union for economic restructuring but failed to initiate reforms. Today the Russian Eurasian Project promises a prosperous and multipolar future to the countries on the periphery and to the countries in the Eurasian region. Moreover, the re-emergence of Russia as a global and regional power is a geopolitical reality of our time, whose global influence must be recognized with respect. Furthermore, Russia seems constructivist in her contemporary foreign policy approach, which is an opportunity for the ailing countries in the post-soviet space to build a new economic and security alliance with Russia.

Today the global profile of Russia is more future-focused and dynamic than any other power in the international politics. If the post-soviet space wants to avoid the fate of chaos and to achieve lasting regional stability, then it should embrace the Russian constructivist Eurasian Union project.

Note

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