Discourse, Ideology and Power: From Archeology towards Genealogy

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Abstract

Identity is an essential, cognitive, and socialized phenomenon known as discursive one. Identity is relocation from private and cognitive experience to public and other semiotic experience which is discursive system of meaning making. Therefore, it is argued that identity can be found in discourse that entails power and directs individuals. Marx also proposed that identity shapes through the authoritative voice that language carries. On the other hand, Foucault posited the arrangement and practices of social discourse since discourse–based approach indicates identity as a dynamic process that can reproduce or destabilize discursive order. Thus, systematic discourse analysis offers powerful and systematic structures of ideologies although general properties of language and identity are not marked.

1. Introduction

According to van Dijk [1] the theory of ideology includes a cognitive component which describes ‘belief’ and ‘belief system’. It also implies that ideology does not need the ideological practices; thus, there is no private ideology, and the system of belief shares among members collectively. That is to say, ideology refers to the system of shared belief among social community regarding the ways of existence which can be defined by professions, political groups, and so forth. Moreover, ideology can be considered in terms of more ‘axiomatic’ which organizes the socially shared beliefs, and carries abstract nature.

Ideology, on the contrary, may undergo some gradual changes through history. Therefore, the stability of ideology seems to be relative. Ideology sometimes may appear gradually by members that may cause ‘disintegration’; however, in case of wide acceptance of the community ideological beliefs can be widely accepted. At this point, it is possible to name ideology as accepted beliefs of a community such as human right, gender equality and so forth. Hence, this common ground may lead to disappearance of varieties in the entire society.

A question may raise that what the ‘structure of identity’ really is. It is assumed as general schema comprising basic necessary categories which define self–identity of each group (e.g., typical activities, aims, values, and so forth). That is to say in order to acquire ideology some basic ‘organizations’ are vital. However, this does not imply that these are consistent since they can be changed for the sake of enhancing the coherence of the structure. For instance, many racists are of the opinion that many immigrants are not hardworking; therefore, they attempt to mitigate this inconsistency.

Another point here is that whether ideology conceived as ‘foundational beliefs’ or any other ‘group attitudes’. To delve into this issue, it is possible to say ideology may develop in different social groups that promote a wide variety of languages with different cultures, for instance. As a result, a core ideological foundation shapes. It is worth mentioning that neither can all members of a group explicitly formulate the beliefs since they are merely considered as the user of acquired beliefs.

The kind of collectivity is the other worth noting issue in a social group which divides into two categories that are ‘social group’, and ‘cultural community’. The former implies goals and interests in relation to other groups which carries ideology, whereas the latter refers to values and knowledge with other general beliefs. For example, a teacher of English is a member of social group whereas the speaker of English is the member of a cultural community. Therefore, ideology can be defined as ‘a shared social representation of a specific kind of social group’. And, one thing to assume here is that ideologies are ‘at the bases’ of discourse to provide some theories of ‘actual process’ so as to ‘know’
exact how biased discourse is. Some scholars also considered identity from different views, as follows:

A discursive view of identity divided into two terms that are historical set of predetermined structures which carry regulatory power on identity, and discursive performance or construction of identity in interaction. In the former, two models ‘predominate’ that of the individual who tends to remain sovereign, and ‘autonomous’ in structuring others identity. And the latter is ‘an unfinished product of discourse’, or ‘sociocultural’ in which individual engages with potential obstacles to ‘self-determination’.

According to Althusser [2], the Marxist critic, individual may accept the social norms through language as the effect of authoritative voice. Butler [3] posited that through accepting ‘the discursive production of subject’ discourse can take place. Gramsci [4] believed that power exists not only in ‘repressive institutions’, but also in ‘the bourgeois culture industries’ such as art and media. Hall [5] also proposed hegemony as ‘a way of representing the order of things which appear universal with reality itself’. Foucault [6] indicated that identity is the ‘discursive production of the subject’ which is the product of dominant discourse. Moreover, Howard [7] defined identity as the byproduct of a colonizing force shaping and directing the individual. For Derrida [8], language can merely shape the “I” through all meanings situated in a language, and not within the self. This issue also accentuated by Laclau and Mouffe’s [9] in ‘Discourse Theory’ in which ‘self is no longer an essence rather a description’. Similarly, Butler [3] purported ‘subjection precisely consists in this fundamental dependency on a discourse; we never choose but that, paradoxically, initiates and sustains our agency’. In what follows, some assumptions of discourse and identity are proposed by van Dijk [1].

2. Context

Context or situation can be defined as ‘context model’ which controls many aspects of discourse processing and make sure that ‘appropriately’ discourse occurs in social context. Therefore, biased context models may lead to biased discourse based on their lexical choice or their tone of speech.

2.1. Model

Subjective interpretation of language determines the mental model regarding the events which happened. Thus, news on the war helps to subjectively develop a mental model. This event viewed as a biased mental model in which the actors describe the scene negatively or positively based on their biased mental model. This may occur in everyday news, editorials, and personal life experiences. Table 1 presents some cognition kinds in discourse.

Table 1. Various kinds of Cognition in Discourse (Adopted from van Dijk, 2000) [10]

| Discourse and Interaction |   |
|---------------------------|--|
| Episodic Memory            | Mental Model          |
| Social Memory              | Knowledge             |
|                           | Attitudes             |
|                           | IDEOLOGY              |
|                           | Common Grounds        |

2.2. Knowledge

In stark contrast to subjective nature of context and model, knowledge defines as the general beliefs and attitudes which determines and controls the construction of a specific model. This knowledge is also presupposed by the all competent members of a community. That is to say knowledge stratified with different types of expertise.

2.3. Group beliefs

General beliefs, attitudes, knowledge and ideologies of different groups with variety of interests, aims, and goals may shape group beliefs. In this sense, the underlying concept predetermined in advance. Group beliefs can cause some problems, whereas in some occasions may strengthening the norms like the medical practices of doctors.

2.4. Strategic processing

On the basis of the ideologically biased models and socially shared beliefs; strategically, language produces. In this case, all the variables like phonological, lexical and syntactic forms may cautiously be controlled by the underlying assumptions. The manifestation of this issue found in topic choice, turn taking, politeness, and implicitness. Therefore, the final processing would be the mitigation of ‘our bad things’ and ‘others good things’. Thus, sociocognitive processes, and ideological discourse can develop the complicated relation between the concepts of ideology and discourse. Some expressions of ideology in discourse are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Some Expressions of Ideology in Discourse  
(Adopted from Van Dijk, 2006) [1]

| Context | Text, discourse, conversation |
|---------|------------------------------|
| Speaker speaks as a member of a social group; and/or addresses recipient as group member; ideologically biased context models: subj. representations of communicative event and its participants as members of categories or groups. | Overall strategy: positive presentation/action of Us, negative presentation/action of Them |
| • Emphasize Our good things, and Their bad things, and De-emphasize Our bad things, and Their good things | |

**MEANING**

**Topics (semantic macrostructures)**

- Select/Change positive/negative topics about Us/Them.

**Local meanings and coherence**

- Positive/Negative Meanings for Us/Them are
  - Manifestation: Explicit versus Implicit
  - Precision: Precise versus Vague
  - Granularity: Detailed/fine versus Broad, rough
  - Level: General versus Specific, detailed
  - Modality: We/They Must/Should...
  - Evidentially: We have the truth versus They are misguided
  - Local coherence: based on biased models
  - Disclaimers (denying Our bad things): 'We are not racists, but...'

**Lexicon**: Select Positive/Negative terms for Us/Them (e.g. 'terrorist' versus 'freedom fighter')

**FORM**

**Syntax**: (De)emphasize Positive/Negative Agency of Us/Them

- Cleft versus non-cleft sentences (‘It is X who...’)
- Active versus Passives (‘USA invades Iraq’ versus ‘Iraq invaded by USA’)
- Full clauses/propositions versus nominalizations (The invasion of Iraq').

**Sound structures**: Intonation, etc., (de)emphasizing

**Our/Their Good/Bad things**

**Format (schema, superstructure: overall form)**

- Positive/Negative meanings for Us/Them in
  - First, dominant categories (e.g. Headlines, Titles, Summaries, Conclusions) versus last, non-dominant categories.
  - Argumentation structures, topoi (stereotypical arguments, e.g. ‘For their own good’) Fallacies that falsely conclude Our/Their Good/Bad things, e.g. overgeneralizations, authority, etc.

**Rhetorical structures**

- Emphasizing or de-emphasizing Our/Their Good/Bad things by
  - Forms: Repetition
  - Meanings: Comparisons, metaphors, metonymies, irony; euphemisms, hyperboles, number games, etc.

**ACTION**

**Speech acts, communicative acts, and interaction**

- Speech acts that presuppose Our/Their Good/Bad things: promises, accusations, etc.
- Interaction strategies that imply Our/Their Good/Bad things: Cooperation, agreement

3. Discourse, Ideology and Power

Discourse, ideology and power can be considered from Michel Foucault theories which addressed the relationship between power and knowledge. He rejected the labels post-structuralist and postmodernist since he preferred to present his thought as ‘a critical history of modernity’ which has been of paramount importance in ‘cultural studies, contemporarily sociology, and activist group’.

A ‘discourse’ was also defined by him as a ‘way of speaking’; thus, it is the ‘things said’ in emergence and transformation without any speculation over the collective meaning of discourse. Foucault presented power as a basis for shaping knowledge; moreover, it can recreate its own fields through knowledge. Foucault [11] posited that

“Knowledge linked to power, not only assumes the authority of ‘the truth’ but has the power to make itself true. All knowledge, once applied in the real world, has effects, and in that sense at least, ‘becomes true.’ Knowledge, once used to regulate the
conduct of others, entails constraint, regulation and the disciplining of practice. Thus, ‘there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations’ (p. 27).

According to Foucault [12] ‘power comes from everywhere’; hence, it is neither a structure nor an agency rather it is a ‘metaphor’ or ‘regime of truth’ that pervades the society through dispersed and accepted forms of ‘knowledge, scientific perception and truth’. Foucault as cited in Rabinow [13] indicated that truth as the result of scientific discourse can induce ‘regular effects of power’, which is the byproduct of multiple forms of constraints. Hayward [14] also focused on power which shapes the boundaries and imposes and defines those constraints on people’s capacities. On the contrary, Foucault recognized power as ‘a necessary, productive and positive force’ in society, rather than being ‘coercive and repressive’ [15]. Here, power entails reality, it produces ‘domains of objects and rituals of truth’ [16], which can be the result of scientific discourse and education system, media, the flux of political and economic ideologies since the battle of truth is the separation of truth on the basis of the rules of true and false. Foucault [11] believed that ‘Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it… We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby a discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart” (pp. 100–1).

Power was also defined with knowledge in discourse. From Foucault points of view, the nature of power exists in society. He also added that power ‘affects individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives’ [17]. In addition, knowledge is a step after power which can be produced through observation, because it acts as a type of ability secretly shapes the behavior of others. This observation cited as Panoptican (see Figure 1), an archeological design by Jeremy Bentham in the mid–19th century for prisons, insane asylums, schools, hospitals, and factories, offered unseen constant observation of prisoners that manifested as a powerful and sophisticated internalization.

![Figure 1. Foucault’s Panoptican](image)

This concept led Foucault towards power knowledge concept, and disciplinary system of social control. By panoptic discipline, internalization and inculcation of reality to population can be met. Foucault [10] also believed that ‘new objects of knowledge are over all the surfaces on which power is exercised’. Thus, oppression of individuals can be a possibility, and the concepts of ‘one group at a time and one place at a time’ can act properly as the agents of change.

### 3.1. Archaeology and genealogy

Foucault proposed that the determination of ‘the historical a priori’ is ‘Archaeology’ during the history for the appearance of ideas, science, and philosophies. ‘A Priori’ refers to independent conditions which is free from experience; on the other side of the continuum is the ‘Genealogy’ as a tactical way of ‘brining subjects from of knowledge’ into play and the last concept is ‘Episteme’ as the ‘understanding of constraints imposed on discourse’ at all time.

Foucault also proposed that archaeology and genealogy determine power in the discourse of knowledge. He believed that a counter discourse may lead into ‘counter standard systems of knowledge’ which confines the forms of knowledge as a foundation for disqualifying knowledges. A genealogy also tries to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection.

Foucault clearly proposed archeology as the history of thought. This premise operates beyond the consciousness of individuals (those of grammar and logic) to systems of thought and knowledge. It is worth noting that mere archeology does not delve into the cause of the transition of thought from one to
another; however, it can show differences or effectiveness of different forms of thinking in the past which allowed the ‘primacy of unconscious level within an individual’. Foucault [18]; moreover, attempts to define genealogy as the result of the turn of the history, and not the outcome of ‘the rationally inevitable trend’.

In Foucault’s genealogy, attempts have been made to go beyond the account of its scope towards the conditions of their possibility. This has been considered as the continuation of Nietzsche’s works. However, genealogy is in total contrast with the Marxist definition to explain the totality of historical discourse within the time period in question. From Foucault perspective, genealogy is the concept beyond the development of people and societies which traces throughout history. He [19] was also influenced by the work of Nietzsche ‘the development of morals through power’. Here, genealogy can be explored by three axes that are truth, power and the subject. It also scrutinizes the past to reveal the contradiction and influences that power has had on truth. Foucault argues that truth can be observed by chance, the discovering of interest and consideration of power knowledge. Therefore, the reliability of all truths is questionable.

After archeology break, Foucault concentrated on the concept of genealogy in two processes including ‘descent’ and ‘emergence’. Descent (Foucault) [10] ‘attached itself to the body’, and emergence is under the category of ‘stock’ that ‘sustained by the bonds of blood, tradition, or social class’. Thus for Foucault [10] genealogy resides ‘within the articulation of body and history’. The body, here, can be ‘molded and broken down by many distinct regimes, work, rest, holidays, and food habits, and finally constructed resistance’.

3.2. Marx–analysis of power

A materialistic philosopher, Karl Marx, argued that all ideas derived from life [20] implied the analysis of power. Marx believed that the underlying structure can determine the social reality. This underlying structure is an economic one and its foundation is ‘natural resources, means of production, and means of distribution’ [21]. Therefore, the socio–economical foundation is an ideological reflection of the forces at work. Marx also defined structuralism as the permanent hidden structure of society which considered ‘synchronic’; however, it is also ‘diachronic’ because of its obsession with history (Page) [22].

From Marx perspective, power is something that is owned by dominant class; thus, it has a top down approach which is repressive and can be exercised effectively by hidden coercion. Then, it would grasp by the middle class when they became as the ‘class for themselves’.

4. Conclusion

The term ideology defined as the ‘basic social beliefs’. It is the fundamental beliefs with the social representation of a group’s knowledge and attitudes. In this way, it is possible to link ideologies as social cognitions. According to van Dijk [9], basic norms and values defined through ideology. It also operates indirectly in politics, education and the labor market in social situation. Therefore, discourse is a means of conveying ideologies, and ideologies relate to knowledge. It is worth noting that ideological bias can be explained in terms of mental model and social representations.

Table 3 reviews the key bodies of theories and compares them in three dimensions including the institutional sites of ideological power, the character of ideological power, and the vision offered for resistance to ideological power [23].

| Theories of Ideology | Institutional Location of Ideological Production | Ideological Power | Potential for Resistance |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------|
| Marxist Theory of Ideology (Marx) | Economic institutions: markets and factories. | Ideological power is largely unidirectional, from capitalist class to subordinate classes. | The transformation of economic and political structures is more important than ideological resistance. The working class is the vehicle for social transformati on. |
| Frankfurt School and Ideology (Horkheim) | Mass media and scientific rationality. | Ideological power is largely unidirectional, from the capitalist class to subordinate classes. However, ideological power | Pessimism about the revolutionary potential of the working class. A ‘great refusal’ may |
er &
Adorno, Marcuse)

is diffused throughout a one-dimensional society that envelopes dominant and dominated classes alike. The cultural sphere may be politicized as a site of resistance.

| Gramscian Theories of Hegemony (Gramsci, Williams, Hall) |
|----------------------------------------------------------|
| Hegemonic power works as everyday common sense. Ideological unity is an inherently incomplete project, involving a tension between class domination and the resistance of subaltern groups. |
| Political class actors are constructed through a counter-hegemonic 'war of position' in the cultural sphere. Political transformati |
| on requires the cooperation of intellectuals and subaltern groups. |

| Post-structuralism and post-Marxism (Foucault, Laclau & Mouffe) |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Scientific knowledge (medicine, psychiatry, statistics), prisons, schools, government. |
| Power operates through multiple discourses that are taken up by subjects at a broad range of sites. Attention to the microsocial dimensions of power. Ideological power is more diffuse and web-like than envisioned by critical theory. |
| Resistance occurs at a multiplicity of microsocial sites. There is a multitude of subject positions, none of which is unitary. There is no universal political actor. Political opposition may be mobilized through the construction of chains of equivalence in a project of radical democracy. |

| Feminist Theories of (Foucault, Said, hooks) |
|--------------------------------------------|
| The family, corporations, schools, scientific |
| The gendered nature of social power is foregrounded. |
| Women’s shared experience of gendered power |

Foucault delineates power over bodies; discourse can exercise such power directly on bodies or indirectly on souls in order to ‘invent subjects’. In archeological phase, he defined communities of discourse in which particular codes define those communities under the influence of structuralism. In genealogical phase, examination of power is also defined. Generally, Foucault did not abandon this phase and concerned with the Christian idea of the self.

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