Corrections of the NIST Statistical Test Suite for Randomness

Song-Ju Kim, Ken Umeno, and Akio Hasegawa

Chaos-based Cipher Chip Project, Presidential Research Fund, Communications Research Laboratory, Incorporated Administrative Agency
4-2-1, Nukui-kitamachi, Koganei-shi, Tokyo 184-8795, Japan
{songju, umeno, ahase}@crl.go.jp

Abstract. It is well known that the NIST statistical test suite was used for the evaluation of AES candidate algorithms. We have found that the test setting of Discrete Fourier Transform test and Lempel-Ziv test of this test suite are wrong. We give four corrections of mistakes in the test settings. This suggests that re-evaluation of the test results should be needed.

Key words: Pseudo-Random Bit Generator, Statistical Test, Discrete Fourier Transform, Lempel-Ziv Compression Algorithm, Cellular Automata

1 Introduction

Random and pseudorandom bit generators (RBGs, PRBGs) are used for many purposes including cryptographic, modeling, and simulation applications. For cryptographic purpose, they are required in the construction of encryption keys, other cryptographic parameters, and so on. One of the criteria used to evaluate the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) candidate algorithms was their demonstrated suitability as PRBGs. That is, the evaluation of their outputs utilizing statistical tests should not provide any means by which to computationally distinguish them from truly random sources [1–3].

Cryptographically secure pseudorandom bit generator is defined as a PRBG that passes the next-bit test [4]. A PRBG is said to pass the next-bit test if there is no polynomial-time algorithm which, on input of the first \( l \) bits of an output sequence \( s \), can predict the \((l+1)\)st bit of \( s \) with probability significantly greater than \( \frac{1}{2} \). It is known that a PRBG passes the next-bit test if and only if it passes all polynomial-time statistical tests. Although a few PRBGs such as RSA, BBS are known as cryptographically secure PRBGs under the assumption that RSA problem and integer factorization are intractable, it is difficult to prove that some PRBG is cryptographically secure in general. Practically, we only subject a sample output sequence of the PRBG to various statistical tests, and evaluate that the sequence possesses a certain attribute that a truly random sequence would be likely to exhibit. Although various kind of statistical tests are
proposed so far [5–7], we will focus on NIST 800-22 statistical test suite [8] in this paper because this test suite was used for the evaluation of AES candidates.

Some statistical tests are based on a statistical hypothesis $H_0$ which is that a given binary sequence was produced by a random bit generator. The test only provides $P$-value which is a measure of the strength of the evidence provided by the data against the hypothesis. The significance level $\alpha$ of the test of a statistical hypothesis $H_0$ is the probability of rejecting $H_0$ when it is true. If $P$-value $\geq \alpha$, then the hypothesis $H_0$ is accepted, i.e., the sequence would be considered to be random with a confidence $1 - \alpha$. If $P$-value $< \alpha$, then the hypothesis $H_0$ is rejected, i.e., the sequence would be considered to be non-random with a confidence $1 - \alpha$.

If the significance level $\alpha$ of a test of $H_0$ is too high, then the test may reject sequences that were, in fact, produced by a random bit generator (such an error is called a Type I error). On the other hand, if the significance level $\alpha$ of a test of $H_0$ is too low, then there is the danger that the test may accept sequences even though they were not produced by a random bit generator (such an error is called a Type II error). It is, therefore, important that the test be carefully designed to have a significance level that appropriate for the purpose at hand. However, the calculation of the Type II error is more difficult than the calculation of $\alpha$ because many possible types of non-randomness may exists. Therefore, NIST statistical test suite, which includes 16 tests, adopts two further analyses in order to minimize the probability of accepting a sequence being produced by a good generator when the generator was actually bad [9]. First, For each test, a set of sequences (sample size $m$) from output is subjected to the test, and the proportion of sequences whose corresponding $P$-value satisfies $P$-value $\geq \alpha$ is calculated. If the proportion (success rate) is close to $1 - \alpha$, then the test is passed, i.e., the set of sequences is accepted. Second, the distribution of $P$-values is calculated for each test. And, if these $P$-value are uniformly distributed (no obvious bias), then the test is passed. These two analyses are the crucial difference from the other statistical test suite.

In section 2, we investigate the randomness of sequences generated by various PRBGs including cellular automata (CA)-based PRBG using the statistical test suite provided by NIST, and show that results of Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) test and Lempel-Ziv Compression test are strange. This suggests that the NIST test setting of these two tests are wrong. In fact, we identify two mistakes in the NIST setting of DFT test in section 3. We also identify two mistakes in the NIST setting of Lempel-Ziv test in section 4. The corrections are also given in each section. This study is important because this NIST test suite was used for the evaluation of AES candidates.

1.1 NIST Statistical Test Suite

The NIST statistical test suite is a statistical package consisting of 16 tests that were developed to test the randomness of arbitrary long binary sequences produced by either hardware or software based cryptographic random or pseudorandom number generators. These tests focus on a variety different types of
Corrections of the NIST Statistical Test Suite for Randomness

non-randomness that could exist in a sequence. The 16 tests are listed in Table 1.

| Number | Test Name                                      |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------|
| 1      | Frequency                                     |
| 2      | Block Frequency                               |
| 3      | Runs                                          |
| 4      | Longest Run                                   |
| 5      | Binary Matrix Rank                            |
| 6      | Discrete Fourier Transform                    |
| 7      | Non-overlapping Template Matching             |
| 8      | Overlapping Template Matching                 |
| 9      | Universal                                     |
| 10     | Lempel Ziv Compression                        |
| 11     | Linear Complexity                             |
| 12     | Serial                                        |
| 13     | Approximate Entropy                            |
| 14     | Cumulative Sums                               |
| 15     | Random Excursions                             |
| 16     | Random Excursions Variant                     |

For each statistical test, a set of P-values, which is corresponding to the set of sequences, is produced. Each sequence is called success if the corresponding P-value satisfies the condition $P \geq \alpha$, and is called failure otherwise. For a fixed significance level $\alpha$, $100\alpha$ % of P-values are expected to indicate failure. For the interpretation of test results, NIST adopts following two approaches:

1. the examination of the proportion of success-sequences (Success Rate)

If the proportion of success-sequences falls outside of following acceptable interval, there is evidence that the data is non-random.

$$P' \pm 3\sqrt{\frac{P'(1-P')}{m}},$$

where $P' = 1 - \alpha$ and $m$ is the number of sequences. This interval is determined to be 99.73% range of normal distribution which is an approximation of the binomial distribution under the assumption that each sequence is independent sample.

2. uniformity of the distribution of P-values

\footnote{All the statistical tests of the NIST statistical test suite have the unique significance level $\alpha = 0.01$.}
This examination is accomplished by computing following χ² value,

\[ \chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{10} \frac{(F_i - m/10)^2}{m/10}, \]  

where \(F_i\) is the number of P-values in sub-interval \([(i-1)*0.1, i*0.1), \) and \(m\) is the number of sequences (sample size). And, the P-value of P-values is calculated such that \(P'-value = \text{igamc}(9/2, \chi^2/2)\), where \(\text{igamc}(n,x)\) is the Incomplete Gamma Function. If \(P'-value \geq 0.0001\), then the set of P-values can be considered to be uniformly distributed.

## 2 Results of the NIST Statistical Test Suite

In this section, we show the results of the NIST statistical test suite for four PRBGs (AES, SHA1, MUGI, and CA). For each statistical test, two further analyses described above are executed, and evaluate the set of sequences. We use 1000 samples of \(10^6\) bit sequences for each test. Consequently, \(10 \times 1000 \times 10^6\) (sequence) bits are used for each test in order to investigate the difference of the results between different keys\(^2\). The input parameters we use are listed in Table 2.

| Test Name                                      | Block Length |
|-----------------------------------------------|--------------|
| Block Frequency                               | 20,000       |
| Non-overlapping Template Matching             | 9            |
| Overlapping Template Matching                 | 9            |
| Universal (Initialization Steps)              | 7 (1280)     |
| Linear Complexity                             | 500          |
| Serial                                        | 10           |
| Approximate Entropy                           | 10           |

Table 3 shows the results of AES (128 bit key, OFB mode). All 16 tests are passed in four cases (key 1, key 2, key 4, and key 8). The success rates of the best case (key 1) and of the worst case (key 7) are shown in Figure 1. Dotted lines denote the acceptable interval specified by eq.(1). As we can see, some tests have many success rates. For example, the non-overlapping template matching test (number 7) has 148 success rates because one success rate corresponds to the one template (non-periodic pattern consisting of 9 bits) matching. If at least one success rates is out of the acceptable interval, then the test is not passed (see key 7 case). While all tests are passed in key 1 case, the non-overlapping template

\(^2\) The key is the initial configuration \(\{S_i\}^{t=0}\) in CA case.
Table 3. Results of AES.

| Key | Success Rate | Uniformity |
|-----|--------------|------------|
| 1   | pass         | pass       |
| 2   | pass         | pass       |
| 3   | 15           | pass       |
| 4   | pass         | pass       |
| 5   | 7            | 10         |
| 6   | 14           | 10         |
| 7   | 7, 8         | pass       |
| 8   | pass         | pass       |
| 9   | pass         | 10         |
| 10  | pass         | 10         |

Fig. 1. Success rates of AES for 16 tests. Key 1 (best) and key 7 (worst) cases are shown in up and down figures, respectively. Dotted lines denote the acceptable interval (eq.(1) with $\alpha = 0.01$).

matching test (number 7) and the overlapping template matching test (number 8) are not passed in key 7 case. It is noted that the uniformity of P-values are not passes only for the Lempel-Ziv test (number 10). The reason why this test is not passed frequently will be explained later.

A one-dimensional 5-neighborhood CA consist of a line of cells with value $S_i = 0$ or 1 for $i = 0, 1, 2, \cdots, N$. These cell values are updated in parallel in discrete time steps according to a fixed rule of the form,

$$S_{i}^{t+1} = F(S_{i-2}^{t}, S_{i-1}^{t}, S_{i}^{t}, S_{i+1}^{t}, S_{i+2}^{t}),$$

where $S_{i}^{t}$ denotes the $i$ cell value at time $t$ [10–12]. We use following rule 535945230 as a CA-based PRBG [13].

$$S_{i}^{t+1} = S_{i-2}^{t} \oplus S_{i-1}^{t} \oplus S_{i+1}^{t} \oplus S_{i+2}^{t} \oplus$$

$$S_{i-1}^{t} \cdot S_{i+1}^{t} \oplus S_{i-1}^{t} \cdot S_{i+2}^{t} \oplus S_{i}^{t} \cdot S_{i+1}^{t} \oplus$$
\[ S^t_i \cdot S^t_{i+2} \oplus S^t_{i+1} \cdot S^t_{i+2} \oplus S^t_{i-1} \cdot S^t_{i+1} \cdot S^t_i \cdot S^t_{i+1} \cdot S^t_{i+2}. \]

(4)

Table 4, 5 and 6 show the results of SHA1, MUGI, and CA, respectively. In CA case, we use the cell values \( \{ S^t_i \} \) with fixed cell number \( i \) as a sequence, and also use the system size \( N = 1000 \) and periodic boundary condition \( S^t_1 = S^t_{N+1} \).

**Table 4. Results of SHA1**

| Key | Success Rate | Uniformity |
|-----|--------------|------------|
| 1   | pass         | pass       |
| 2   | pass         | 10         |
| 3   | 7            | pass       |
| 4   | 7            | 6          |
| 5   | pass         | 10         |
| 6   | 7, 15, 16   | pass       |
| 7   | 7            | pass       |
| 8   | 7            | pass       |
| 9   | pass         | pass       |
| 10  | pass         | 10         |

**Table 5. Results of MUGI**

| Key | Success Rate | Uniformity |
|-----|--------------|------------|
| 1   | 7            | pass       |
| 2   | pass         | 10         |
| 3   | 10           | 10         |
| 4   | pass         | pass       |
| 5   | 7            | pass       |
| 6   | pass         | pass       |
| 7   | pass         | pass       |
| 8   | pass         | pass       |
| 9   | 7            | pass       |
| 10  | pass         | 6          |

As we can see, all tests are passed in two cases (SHA1), in four cases (MUGI), and six cases (CA), respectively. It is noted that results of CA-535945230 case is better than the cases of well-known good PRBGs such as AES, SHA1, and MUGI.

If we focus on the uniformity of P-values, only the DFT test (number 6) and Lempel-Ziv test (number 10) are not passed frequently. If we choose the
sample size $m$ greater than 10000, we cannot find any PRBGs that pass these two tests even in SHA1 (SHA1 is used for the mean-value and the variance-value in the distribution of the Lempel-Ziv test [8]). Figure 2 shows that $P'$-values (the uniformity of the distribution of $P$-values) of these two tests rapidly decrease as the number of samples increases. In other words, these distributions of $P$-values indicate an apparent deviation from randomness although we use well-known good PRBG (SHA1). This observation suggests that these two tests can be considered as an underdeveloped statistical test. Since many statistical tests are based upon asymptotic approximations, careful work needs to be done to determine how good an approximation is. However, we originally found that these two tests have not only approximation problems but also mistakes in theoretical setting.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Results of CA-535945230}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Key & Success Rate & Uniformity \\
\hline
1 & pass & pass \\
2 & pass & 10 \\
3 & pass & pass \\
4 & pass & 6, 10 \\
5 & pass & pass \\
6 & pass & pass \\
7 & pass & 7 \\
8 & pass & pass \\
9 & pass & 10 \\
10 & pass & pass \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{sha1_uniformity.png}
\caption{The uniformity of $P$-values in SHA1 case.}
\end{figure}
3 Corrections of Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test

In this section, we focus on the DFT test, and show two mistakes found in the NIST test setting. The focus of this test is the peak heights in the Discrete Fourier Transform of the sequence. The purpose of this test is to detect periodic features in the tested sequence that would indicate a deviation from the assumption of randomness. The intention is to detect whether the number of peaks exceeding the 95% threshold is significantly different than 5%. The test description in the NIST document are follows.

1. The zeros and ones of the input sequence (ε) are converted to values of -1 and +1 to create the sequence \( X = x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n \) where \( x_i = 2\epsilon_i - 1 \)
2. Apply a Discrete Fourier Transform on X to produce: \( S = DFT(X) \). A sequence of complex variables is produced which represents periodic components of the sequence of bits at different frequencies.
3. Calculate \( M = \text{modulus}(S') \equiv |S'| \), where \( S' \) is the substring consisting of the first \( n/2 \) elements in \( S \), and the modulus function produces a sequence of peak heights.
4. Compute \( T = \sqrt{3n} \) is the 95% peak height threshold value. Under the assumption of randomness, 95% of the values obtained from the test should not exceed \( T \).
5. Compute \( N_0 = 0.95n/2 \). \( N_0 \) is the expected theoretical (95%) number of peaks that are less than \( T \).
6. Compute \( N_1 \) as the actual observed number of peaks in \( M \) that are less than \( T \).
7. Compute \( d = \frac{N_1 - N_0}{\sqrt{n(0.95)(0.05)/2}} \).
8. Compute P-value = \( \text{erfc}(\frac{|d|}{\sqrt{2}}) \).

3.1 The derivation of the threshold \( T \)

First, we show the derivation of the threshold \( T = \sqrt{3n} \). For a frequency \( j \), DFT are defined by following equation.

\[
S_j = \sum_{k=1}^{n} x_k \cos(2\pi \frac{(k-1)}{n}j) + i \sum_{k=1}^{n} x_k \sin(2\pi \frac{(k-1)}{n}j). \quad (5)
\]

Let us consider the square of modulus of \( S_j \),

\[
|S_j|^2 = c_j^2 + s_j^2 \quad (6)
\]

where

\[
c_j = \sum_{k=1}^{n} x_k \cos(2\pi \frac{(k-1)}{n}j) \quad (7)
\]

\[
s_j = \sum_{k=1}^{n} x_k \sin(2\pi \frac{(k-1)}{n}j). \quad (8)
\]
Here, we can simply prove that $c_j$ and $s_j$ converge to the normal distribution whose mean $\mu$ is zero and variance $\sigma^2$ is $n/2$ under the assumption of $x_k$ ($-1$ or $+1$ for $k = 1, 2, \cdots, n$) randomness. Therefore, $Y = (\frac{c_j}{\sigma})^2 + (\frac{s_j}{\sigma})^2$ converges to following distribution function ($\chi^2$ distribution with 2 degree of freedom),

$$P(Y) = \frac{1}{2} \exp\left(-\frac{Y}{2}\right).$$ (9)

If we transform $Y$ to $Z = \frac{Y}{2}$, we can get following distribution,

$$P(Z) = \exp(-Z).$$ (10)

The threshold $T$ is defined such that the number of peaks exceeding the threshold $T$ should be 5% under the assumption of randomness. Since

$$\int_{Z_C}^{\infty} \exp(-Z)dZ = \exp(-Z_C) = 0.05,$$ (11)

we can get the value $Z_C = -ln(0.05) = 2.995732274$. From $|S_j| = \sqrt{nZ}$, we conclude that

$$T = \sqrt{2.995732274n}.$$ (12)

We have found that the deviation of $\sqrt{3n}$ from $\sqrt{2.995732274n}$ makes the distribution invalid. Figure 3 shows the distribution of $N_1$ in SHA1 case (300000 samples of $n = 10^6$ bit sequence). Note that the expected value of $N_1$, that is, $N_0 = \frac{0.95n}{2}$ is 475000 in this case. If we set the threshold $T = \sqrt{3n}$, then the distribution is shifted to the right. So, we have to set the threshold $T = \sqrt{2.995732274n}$. This is the first mistakes in DFT test.

Fig. 3. The distribution of $N_1$ in SHA1 case (300000 samples of $n = 10^6$ bit sequence). Note that the expected value of $N_1$, that is, $N_0$ is 475000.
3.2 The theoretical distribution

Because we use the real values $x_k$, the symmetry such as $|S_j| = |S_{n-j}|$ appears in peaks. So, the NIST focus on the first $\frac{n}{2}$ peaks. The test description in the NIST documents use the theoretical distribution whose mean value $\mu$ is $\frac{np}{2}$ and variance value $\sigma^2$ is $\frac{npq}{2}$ where $p = 0.95$, $q = 0.05$, and $n = 10^6$ ($\frac{n}{2}$ times coin tossing with probability $p$ and $q$). However, this coin tossing is not independent process. The quantity $\sum_{j}^{n/2} S_j$ is conserved in this process. In this case, the variance $\sigma^2$ becomes $\frac{npq}{4}$. Figure 4 shows the fitting of the distribution of $N_1$ in SHA1 case with the threshold $T = \sqrt{2.995732274n}$ and two theoretical distributions. We can confirm that the distribution becomes to fit to the new theoretical distribution.

4 Corrections of Lempel-Ziv Compression Test

In this section, we focus on the Lempel-Ziv test, and show two mistakes found in the NIST test setting. The focus of this test is the number of cumulatively distinct patterns (words) in the sequence. The purpose of the test is to determine how far the tested sequence can be compressed. The sequence is considered to be non-random if it can be significantly compressed. A random sequence will have a characteristic number of distinct patterns. The test description in the NIST document are follows.

1. Parse the sequence into consecutive, disjoint and distinct words that will form a “dictionary” of words in the sequence. This is accomplished by creating substrings from consecutive bits of the sequence until a substring is created that has not been found previously in the sequence. The resulting substring is a new word in the dictionary.
2. Compute P-value = \(\frac{1}{2}erfc\left(\frac{\mu - W_{obs}}{\sqrt{2}\sigma^2}\right)\),
where \(\mu = 69588.2019\) and \(\sigma^2 = 73.23726011\) when \(n = 10^6\) (these values are updated Oct. 26, 1999). Note that since no known theory is available to determine the exact values of \(\mu\) and \(\sigma\), these values were computed using SHA1.

### 4.1 The asymmetric distribution

There are asymptotically well-approximated mean formula and the variance formula of the distribution of the Lempel-Ziv test [14, 15]. However, it is known that above formulas are invalid for the sequence of length less than \(10^7\) through a simulation study using BBS. Therefore, SHA1, which is one of well-known good PRBGs, is used instead for the mean-value and the variance-value in the NIST setting [8]. The accuracy of such empirical estimates depends on the randomness of the generator used. Figure 5 shows the distributions of the number of words in SHA1 case and CA case (\(10^6\) samples of \(n = 10^6\) bit sequence). Two distributions are almost the same although two algorithms are completely different. We can confirm the subtle asymmetries if we see Fig. 6 carefully. We conclude that this distribution can be used for the mean and variance values of new setting of the test. Through the fitting of the distributions, we got the mean value \(\mu = 69588.09\) and variance values \(\sigma^2_L = 75.574336518\) and \(\sigma^2_R = 72.42178447\), for the left branch and right branch, respectively. Consequently, we got the new empirical estimates (asymmetric distribution) which are better than the NIST setting.

![Figure 5](image-url)
Fig. 6. The distribution of the number of words (SHA1 case) in different scale. The horizontal axis denotes the square of distance from the mean value for both branches. The same data of Fig. 5 is used.

4.2 The effect of discreteness

Despite the best fitting of the distribution, the uniformity of P-values can not be improved. This is because the distribution of the number of words is too narrow (the variance is too small). Therefore, the effect of discreteness appeared. In other words, a variety of the appeared P-values is limited. Figure 7 shows the number of times of appeared P-values in SHA1 and CA cases. Because the variety of appeared P-values are two or three in centered bins, we never get the uniformity of P-values in this situation.

Fig. 7. The number of times of appeared P-values in SHA1 and CA cases. $10^9$ samples of $n = 10^6$ bit sequence are used. The numbers described in figure denote the variety of appeared P-values in each bin.
Because the purpose of checking the uniformity of P-value is to detect the deviation of the distribution from that of random sequence case, we re-define the uniformity of P-values only in this test case as the histogram of P-values itself which is produced by SHA1 and CA5 (10^6 samples). In other words, we use following formula for the checking of the uniformity instead of eq.(2),

\[ \chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{10} \frac{(F_i - mS_i)^2}{mS_i}, \]  

where \( m \) denotes sample size and \( S_i \) denotes the rate of each \( i \) bin which is computed from the histogram of P-values (10^6 samples of SHA1 and CA data), that is, \( S_1 = 0.1097085, S_2 = 0.079127, S_3 = 0.107691, S_4 = 0.084465, S_5 = 0.1369235, S_6 = 0.091115, S_7 = 0.0858035, S_8 = 0.1098615, S_9 = 0.1028565, \) and \( S_{10} = 0.0924485. \)

5 Conclusion

We corrected two points for DFT test setting,

1. The correction of the threshold \( T \) from \( \sqrt{3n} \) to \( \sqrt{2.995732274n} \).
2. The correction of the variance \( \sigma^2 \) of theoretical distribution from \( \frac{npq}{2} \) to \( \frac{npq}{4} \).

We also corrected two points for Lempel-Ziv test,

1. The setting of standard distribution which has no algorithm dependence. This asymmetric normal distribution has its mean value \( \mu = 69588.09 \) and variance values \( \sigma^2_L = 75.574336518 \) and \( \sigma^2_R = 72.42178447 \), for the left branch and right branch, respectively, in \( n = 10^6 \) case.
2. The re-definition of the uniformity of P-values as the histogram of P-values itself which is produced by SHA1 and CA5 (10^6 samples).

Figure 8 shows the P’-values behavior after corrections when the number of samples increases. As a result, P’-values of two test become improved (compare with Fig. 2).

Although the checking of the uniformity of P-values was not executed in the evaluation of AES candidate algorithms, the used P-value itself has nonsense in these two tests. This suggests that re-evaluation of the test results should be needed.

References

1. Juan Soto: Randomness Testing of the Advanced Encryption Standard Candidate Algorithms, (1999). http://csrc.nist.gov/aes/
2. J. Soto and L. Bassham: Randomness Testing of the Advanced Encryption Standard Finalist Candidates, NIST (2000). http://csrc.nist.gov/aes/
3. Juan Soto, Statistical Testing of Random Number Generators, NIST (2000). http://csrc.nist.gov/ aes/
Fig. 8. The improved uniformity of P-values in SHA1 case.

4. Menezes et al.: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press (1997)
5. G. Marsaglia: Diehard Test (1998) http://stat.fsu.edu/~geo/diehard.html
6. D. Knuth: Seminumerical Algorithms, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass. (1981)
7. Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, NIST (2001), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf
8. A. Rukhin, et al.: A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudo-random Number Generators for Cryptographic Applications, NIST (2001), http://csrc.nist.gov/rng/
9. S. Murphy: The power of NIST's Statistical Testing of AES Candidates, The Third AES Candidate Conference (2000). http://csrc.nist.gov/aes/
10. S. Wolfram: Random sequence generation by cellular automata, Advances in Applied Mathematics Vol. 7 (1986) 123–169
11. S. Wolfram: Cryptography with cellular automata, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 0218 (CRYPTO’85) 429–432
12. S. Wolfram: A New Kind of Science, Wolfram Media, Inc. (2002)
13. S. J. Kim, K. Umeno, A. Hasegawa: FPGA Implementation of Cellular Automaton-based Pseudo Random Number Generator, submitted for publication.
14. D. Aldous et al.: A diffusion limit for a class of randomly-growing binary trees, Probab. Th. Rel. Fields Vol. 79 (1988) 509–542
15. P. Kirschenhofer et al.: Digital search trees again revised: the internal path length perspective, SIAM J. Comput. Vol. 23 (1994) 598–616