Quantum key distribution based on frequency-time coding: security and feasibility

Bing Qi

Center for Quantum Information and Quantum Control (CQIQC),
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
University of Toronto, Toronto, M5S 3G4, Canada

(Dated: June 15, 2011)

Abstract

We establish a security proof of frequency-time coding quantum key distribution (FT-QKD) protocol by showing its connection to the squeezed state quantum key distribution protocol, which has been proven to be unconditionally secure. We also extend the prepare-and-measure FT-QKD protocol to an entanglement based FT-QKD protocol which is more appealing in practice. Furthermore, we propose a correlated frequency measurement scheme of entangled photon pair by using time resolving single photon detector. Simulation results show that the FT-QKD protocol can be implemented with today’s technology.

PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION

One important practical application of quantum information is quantum key distribution (QKD), whose unconditional security is based on the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics [1, 2]. While QKD has been conducted through both optical fiber and free space, the availability of a worldwide fiber network suggests that single mode fiber (SMF) could be the best choice as the quantum channel for practical QKD systems.

Two basic requirements on the quantum channel are low loss and weak decoherence. While the loss of standard SMF is relatively low, the decoherence introduced by a long fiber link depends on the coding scheme. Most practical QKD systems are based on either polarization coding or phase coding. Unfortunately, these two coding schemes suffer from polarization and phase instabilities in optical fiber induced by environmental noise. On the contrary, the frequency-time coding QKD (FT-QKD) scheme proposed in [3] is intrinsically insensitive to the polarization and phase fluctuations. This suggests that the FT-QKD could be a more robust solution in practice.

In [3], the security of the FT-QKD protocol was intuitively interpreted as a result of the energy-time uncertainty relation. In this paper, we provide a security proof of the FT-QKD protocol by connecting it to the squeezed state QKD protocol [4, 5] whose security against the most general attack has been proven in [6]. This connection is built upon the observation that the frequency and arrival time of a photon is connected to its momentum and spatial position. In quantum mechanics, the commutation relation between position and momentum operator is the same as that between the two quadratures of an oscillator. So, mathematically, the FT-QKD is equivalent to the squeezed state QKD, thus Gottesman-Preskill’s security proof in [6] can be applied. We remark that one nice feature of Gottesman-Preskill’s proof is that both the BB84 QKD protocol and the squeezed state QKD protocol (thus the FT-QKD protocol) are studied under the same scope. This allows us to apply many important results developed in the BB84 QKD, such as decoy state idea [7] and the squash model of threshold single photon detector (SPD) [8], into the FT-QKD protocol.

We remark that single-photon continuous-variable QKD protocols exploring the spatial freedom of photons have also been investigated [9]. However, it could be difficult to implement those protocols over a long distance.

Section II is a review of the prepare-and-measure FT-QKD protocol [3]. In Section
III, we show that mathematically, the FT-QKD is equivalent to the squeezed state QKD, therefore Gottesman-Preskill’s security proof [6] can be applied. In Section IV, we propose an entanglement based FT-QKD protocol which is more appealing in practice. In Section V, we discuss the feasibility of implementing the FT-QKD with today’s technology. We end this paper with a brief conclusion in Section VI.

II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE PREPARE-AND-MEASURE FT-QKD PROTOCOL [3]

Following the cryptographic convention, the two legitimate users in QKD are named as Alice and Bob, and the malicious eavesdropper is named as Eve. In the prepare-and-measure FT-QKD, Alice randomly chooses to use either “frequency-basis” or “time-basis” to encode her random bits. In the frequency-basis, one or more random bits can be encoded on the central frequency of a single-photon pulse which has a very small linewidth; In the time-basis, one or more random bits can be encoded on the time delay (defined relatively to a synchronization pulse) of a single-photon pulse which has a very small temporal duration. Upon receiving Alice’s photon, Bob randomly chooses to measure either its frequency or its arrival time. After the quantum transmission stage, Alice and Bob compare their bases through a public authenticated channel and they only keep the results when they happen to use the same basis. Given the conditional variance of Bob’s measurement results is below certain threshold, they can further generate secure key by performing error correction and privacy amplification.

A schematic diagram of the prepare-and-measure FT-QKD protocol is shown in Fig.1. In Fig.1, Alice holds two transform-limited single photon sources: $S_1$ (for frequency coding) can generate single-photon pulses with a narrow spectral bandwidth (but a large temporal duration); $S_2$ (for time coding) can generate single-photon pulses with a small temporal duration (but a broad spectral bandwidth). We assume that both $S_1$ and $S_2$ have Gaussian spectra and their spectral bandwidths are $\sigma_{\omega_1}$ and $\sigma_{\omega_2}$, respectively. In the frequency-basis, Alice encodes her bits by randomly modulating the central frequency of $S_1$. In the time-basis, Alice encodes her bits by randomly modulating the time delay of $S_2$. A beam splitter ($BS_A$ in Fig.1) is employed to combine the outputs of $S_1$ and $S_2$ together. At Bob’s side, passively determined by another beam splitter ($BS_B$ in Fig.1), he can either measure the arrival time
FIG. 1: Schematic diagram of the FT-QKD system: $S_1$-narrowband frequency tunable single photon source; $S_2$-broadband single photon source with tunable time-delay; $BS_A/BS_B$-beam splitters; $TSPD$-time-resolving single photon detector; $DG$-dispersive grating; $SPDA$-single photon detector array.

of the incoming photon with a time-resolving SPD, or its frequency (wavelength) with a dispersive element (such as a dispersive grating which is shown as DG in Fig.1) followed by a SPD array (SPDA).

Given the frequency-modulation profile of $S_1$ matching with the spectrum of $S_2$ and the time-delay-modulation profile of $S_2$ matching with the temporal pulse shape of $S_1$ (as shown in Fig.2), it can be shown that the density matrix of a frequency-coding photon is identical to that of a time-coding photon, thus Eve cannot distinguish them from each other [3]. The security of the FT-QKD protocol can be intuitively understood from the energy-time uncertainty relation which puts a constraint on Eve’s ability to simultaneously determine both the frequency and the arrival time of a photon. Mathematically, Eve’s time uncertainty $\Delta_t^{(E)}$ and frequency uncertainty $\Delta_\omega^{(E)}$ (defined as root mean square (RMS) values) satisfy the following relation

$$\Delta_\omega^{(E)} \Delta_t^{(E)} \geq \frac{1}{2}$$

(1)

On the other hand, Bob’s measurement uncertainties are not bounded by equation (1) since he randomly measures either the arrival time or the frequency of each incoming photon but not both. Alice and Bob can establish an information advantage over Eve by post-selecting the cases when they happen to use the same bases, thus secure key distribution is possible.

The FT-QKD protocol can be summarized as follows:

1. Alice generates a binary random number $a$. If $a = 0$, she generates another random number $b$ from the Gaussian distribution $f_1(b) = (\pi \sigma_{\omega_2}^2)^{-1/2} exp[-(b - \omega_0)^2/\sigma_{\omega_2}^2]$; then she
sets the central frequency of $S_1$ to $b$ and fires it. If $a = 1$, Alice generates a random number $b$ from the Gaussian distribution $f_2(b) = (\pi)^{-1/2} \sigma_\omega exp[-\sigma_\omega^2 b^2]$; then she sets the time-delay of $S_2$ to $b$ and fires it.

2. Upon receiving Alice’s photon, Bob randomly chooses to measure either its arrival time or its frequency (wavelength).

3. Alice and Bob repeat step 1 and step 2 many times.

4. Through an authenticated classical channel, Alice and Bob post-select the cases when they use the same bases. After this step, Alice and Bob share a set of correlated Gaussian variables, which are called “key elements”.

5. Alice and Bob convert the “key elements” into binary bit strings.

6. Alice and Bob can estimate the maximum information acquired by Eve from the observed quantum bit error rate (QBER). If the QBER is below certain threshold value, they can future perform error correction and privacy amplification to distill out a secure key.
III. SECURITY OF THE FT-QKD PROTOCOL

In this section, we provide a security proof of the FT-QKD protocol by connecting it to the squeezed state QKD protocol \cite{5}. Section III.A is a brief review of the squeezed state QKD protocol \cite{5} and Gottesman-Preskill’s security proof \cite{6}. In Section III.B, we apply Gottesman-Preskill’s security proof to the FT-QKD implemented with perfect single photon sources and ideal photon-number-resolving SPDs. In Section III.C, we discuss the FT-QKD implemented with weak coherent sources (attenuated laser source) and practical thresholds SPDs.

A. The squeezed state QKD and its security proof

In the prepare-and-measure squeezed state QKD protocol \cite{5}, Alice randomly prepares a single mode electromagnetic field either squeezed at amplitude quadrature ($X_1$) or phase quadrature ($X_2$). For a $X_1$-squeezed state, its amplitude quadrature is well defined (while its phase quadrature has a large variance). Alice can randomly modulate the mean value of amplitude quadrature $\langle X_1 \rangle$ to encode her bits; Similarly, for a $X_2$-squeezed state, its phase quadrature is well defined (while its amplitude quadrature has a large variance). Alice can randomly modulate the mean value of phase quadrature $\langle X_2 \rangle$ to encode her bits. At Bob’s end, he randomly chooses to measure either the amplitude quadrature or phase quadrature with a homodyne detector. After the quantum transmission stage, Alice and Bob compare their bases for each transmission and only keep the results when they happen to use the same basis (“key elements”). If the $\langle X_1 \rangle$-modulation profile of the $X_1$-squeezed state matches with the distribution of $X_1$ of the $X_2$-squeezed state, and the $\langle X_2 \rangle$-modulation profile of the $X_2$-squeezed state matches with the distribution of $X_2$ of the $X_1$-squeezed state, then Eve cannot tell which type of squeeze state Alice has prepared.

Quantum mechanically, the two operators $X_1$ and $X_2$ are not commute with each other thus the uncertainty relation applies: $X_1$ and $X_2$ cannot both be defined to arbitrarily high accuracy for a given quantum state. This is the foundation of the security of the squeezed state protocol. Its security against the most general attack is given by Gottesman and Preskill in \cite{6}.

Instead of presenting its details, we simply remark that Gottesman-Preskill’s security
proof employs quantum error-correcting codes that encode a finite-dimensional quantum system in the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space of an oscillator [10]. Note, in [6], a pair of dimensionless position and momentum operators $q$ and $p$ are used to encode information. The commutation relation between $q$ and $p$ is given by

$$[q, p] = i \tag{2}$$

and the corresponding uncertainty relation is

$$\Delta_q^{(\text{rms})} \times \Delta_p^{(\text{rms})} \geq \frac{1}{2} \tag{3}$$

where $\Delta_q^{(\text{rms})}$ and $\Delta_p^{(\text{rms})}$ are defined as RMS values.

To convert key elements into binary random numbers, the following distillation protocol is adopted [6]: Alice broadcasts her data modulo $\sqrt{\pi}$, i.e. $m = \text{mod}(S_A, \sqrt{\pi})$; Alice and Bob subtract $m\sqrt{\pi}$ from their data and correct the remainders to the nearest multiples of $\sqrt{\pi}$; They extract binary bit values based on whether the above integers are even or odd.

The secure key rate $R$ of the squeezed state QKD is given by [6]

$$R = \frac{1}{2}[1 - f(e)H_2(e) - H_2(e)]. \tag{4}$$

Here the factor 1/2 is due to the fact that half of the time, Alice and Bob use different bases. $e$ is the observed QBER, $f(x)$ is the bidirectional error correction efficiency, and $H_2(x)$ is the binary entropy function, which is given by

$$H_2(x) = -x \log_2(x) - (1-x) \log_2(1-x). \tag{5}$$

Given a perfect error correct code ($f(x) = 1$), Equation (4) shows that as long as the QBER is below 11%, secure key distribution is possible.

The QBER in (4) is determined by [6]

$$e \leq \frac{2\Delta}{\pi} \exp(-\pi/4\Delta^2) \tag{6}$$

where $\Delta^2$ is a measure of the conditional variance of key elements,

$$\text{Prob}(q_A - q_B) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi\Delta^2}} \exp[-(q_A - q_B)^2/\Delta^2] \tag{7}$$

Here we assume the conditional variance in q-basis ($\Delta_q^2$) is the same as that in p-basis ($\Delta_p^2$). In the case of $\Delta_q^2 \neq \Delta_p^2$, by slightly modifying the protocol and defining $\Delta^2 = \Delta_q\Delta_p$, (6) is still applicable [6]. In Section III.B, we apply Gottesman-Preskill’s security proof to the FT-QKD protocol.
B. The FT-QKD based on perfect single photon sources and ideal photon-number-resolving SPDs

We first study the case where Alice holds perfect single photon sources and Bob has ideal photon number-resolving SPDs.

Note that the energy time uncertainty relation, which has been used to intuitively understand the security of the FT-QKD protocol, is fundamentally different from the one applied to a pair of non-commuting operators, such as $q$ and $p$. This is because in quantum mechanics, conventionally, time is not treated as an operator. We remark that there have been great efforts on establishing a “time-of-arrival” operator in quantum mechanics [11]. Here, instead of touching this deep question in quantum physics, we simply take an operational interpretation of the time and frequency measurement. In practice, it is reasonable to assume that the speed of light in Alice and Bob’s station is well defined and cannot be manipulated by Eve. By choosing a suitable time reference, the arrival time $t$ and the frequency $\nu$ (or wavelength $\lambda$) of a single photon are related to its spatial position $X$ and wave vector $K_X$ (which is proportional to its momentum $P_X$ as $P_X = \frac{h}{2\pi} K_X$) by

$$X = ct/n$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

$$K_X = \frac{2\pi \nu}{c/n} = \frac{2\pi n}{\lambda}$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

where $n$ is the refractive index, $h$ is the Planck constant and $c$ is the speed of light in vacuum.

Note that $X$ and $K_X$ satisfy the same commutation relation as $p$ and $q$ do

$$[X, K_X] = i$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

So, mathematically, the FT-QKD is equivalent to the squeezed state QKD and Gottesman-Preskill’s security proof in [6] can be applied.

In practice, there are some technical issues to be resolved. First of all, in the squeezed state QKD, Bob uses a homodyne detector to detect Alice’s signals. Regardless of the transmission loss, the homodyne detector always outputs an effective detection result. On the other hand, SPDs are employed in the FT-QKD. A SPD either detects nothing or an intact photon. Thus, in the FT-QKD, for each transmission, Bob has to inform Alice whether he detects a photon or not. Alice keeps her data only when one of Bob’s SPDs clicks. To
take into account of this “post-selection” process, we can define an overall gain $Q_1$ as the
ratio of the number of Bob’s detection events to the number of signal pulses sent by Alice.
Equation (4) is then replaced by

$$R = \frac{1}{2} Q_1 [1 - f(e_1) H_2(e_1) - H_2(e_1)].$$

(11)

Here, we use subscript 1 to emphasis the fact that in the FT-QKD, only single-photon signals
contribute to the secure key. Note (11) is the same as the secure key rate of the BB84 QKD
protocol given in Shor-Preskill’s security proof [12]. This is because the same approach has
been adopted in the security proofs of [12] and [6].

Secondly, in [6], it is assumed that the conditional variance defined in (7) is solely de-
termined by the squeeze factor of the source while the contribution of detection system has
been neglected. This is reasonable in the case of the squeezed state QKD because it is very
difficult to prepare highly squeezed state in practice. However, in the FT-QKD, the un-
certainty in quantum state preparation could be much less than that in the quantum state
detection. For example, both a narrow-band laser pulse with a spectral linewidth much less
than 1 pm and an ultrashort laser pulse with a temporal duration less than 1 ps can be easily
generated in practice. On the other hand, achieving a temporal resolution better than 10 ps
or a spectral resolution better than 10 pm in single photon detection are very challenge. So,
in this paper, we assume that the conditional variance defined in (7) is determined by the
finite temporal and spectral resolutions of the detection system.

C. The FT-QKD protocol based on weak coherent sources and threshold SPDs

The security analysis in Section III.B is based on the assumption that Alice has perfect
single photon sources and Bob holds ideal photon number resolving SPDs. Unfortunately,
these ideal devices are not available yet. A more practical approach is to implement the
FT-QKD with weak coherent sources (heavily attenuated laser sources) and threshold SPDs
(which can distinguish vacuum from non-empty pulses, but cannot resolve photon number).
Fortunately, security proofs of the BB84 QKD protocol implemented with weak coherent
source and threshold SPD have been developed. As we have remarked before, one nice
feature of Gottesman-Preskill’s proof [6] is that both the BB84 QKD protocol and the
squeezed state QKD protocol (thus the FT-QKD protocol) are studied under the same
scope, so many results developed in the BB84 QKD protocol can be applied to the FT-QKD protocol directly. Instead of presenting details of previous results, we simply remark that the decoy state idea \cite{7} can be applied to a FT-QKD protocol implemented with weak coherent sources and the squash model of SPD \cite{8} could be incorporated to resolve the security issue of using threshold SPDs.

The FT-QKD protocol is interesting in principle. However the system shown in Fig.1 is too complicated to be attractive in practice. In Section IV, we extend the FT-QKD to an entanglement based scheme. In Section V, we discuss the feasibility of implementing the FT-QKD with today’s technology.

IV. THE ENTANGLEMENT BASED FT-QKD PROTOCOL

The prepare-and-measure FT-QKD protocol shown in Fig.1 can be extended into an entanglement based QKD protocol, as shown in Fig.3. A source generating energy-time entangled photon pairs can be placed either at Alice’s station or between Alice and Bob. The energy and time of the two photons in the same pair are Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) \cite{13} correlated. One photon from each EPR pair is sent to Alice and the other one is sent to Bob. Passively determined by a beam splitter, Alice (Bob) randomly measures either the arrival time or the frequency (wavelength) of each incoming photon. After the quantum transmission stage, Alice and Bob compare their measurement bases for each photon pair and only keep the results when they happen to use the same basis. The distillation protocol for the entanglement FT-QKD is the same as the one for the prepare-and-measure FT-QKD. The entanglement based FT-QKD is closely related to the squeezed state QKD protocol implemented with two mode Gaussian entangled squeezed state, whose security has also been proven in \cite{6}.

In practice, the above energy-time entangled photon pairs can be generated through nonlinear optical processes, such as spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC). As shown in Fig.4, in this process, a pump photon spontaneously decays into a pair of daughter photons in a nonlinear crystal. The conservation of energy and momentum implies that the generated daughter photons are entangled in spectral and spatial domains. We assume that the pump pulse has a narrow spectral bandwidth of $\delta \nu_P$ and a relatively large temporal width of $\delta t_P$. We denote the central frequency of the pump pulse by $\nu_P$. The central frequency of
FIG. 3: Schematic diagram of the entanglement based FT-QKD system. (a) The EPR source is placed at Alice’s station; (b) The EPR source is placed between Alice and Bob. EPR-energy-time entangled source; BS-beam splitter; TSPD-time-resolving single photon detector; DG-dispersive grating; SPDA-single photon detector array.

FIG. 4: Spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) process

Alice (Bob)’s photon is $\nu_A(\nu_B)$ and its spectral bandwidth is $\delta_{\nu A}(\delta_{\nu B})$. Furthermore, Alice (Bob)’s photon is generated at time $t_A(t_B)$ with a temporal uncertainty of $\delta_{t A}(\delta_{t B})$.

Note the spectral bandwidths $\delta_{\nu A}$ and $\delta_{\nu B}$ of the down-converted photons are determined by the phase matching condition and the actual experimental setup. The following condition can be satisfied in practice

$$\delta_{\nu A} \approx \delta_{\nu B} \gg \delta_{\nu P}$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

On the other hand, the temporal widths $\delta_{t A}$ and $\delta_{t B}$ of the down-converted photons are mainly determined by the temporal width $\delta_{t P}$ of the pump photon

$$\delta_{t A} \approx \delta_{t B} \approx \delta_{t P}$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

So each individual photon of an EPR pair has both a broad spectral bandwidth and a large temporal width, as shown in Fig.4. This suggests that when Alice and Bob perform
time or frequency measurement, individually, they will observe large uncertainties in their measurement results. However, if Alice and Bob use the same basis, their measurement results are highly correlated, i.e.

\[ \nu_A + \nu_B \simeq \nu_P \quad (14) \]
\[ t_A \simeq t_B \quad (15) \]

The uncertainty in (14) is determined by the line-width \( \delta_{\nu P} \) of the pump laser, which can be less than 10 MHz. This corresponds to a wavelength uncertainty in the order of 0.1 pm at telecom wavelength (\( \simeq 1550 \text{nm} \)). The uncertainty in (15) depends on the spectral bandwidth \( \delta_{\nu A} \) of down-converted photon. In practice \( \delta_{\nu A} \) can be larger than 100 GHz, the corresponding time uncertainty in (15) is less than 10 ps. For the detection system, achieving a temporal resolution better than 10 ps or a spectral resolution better than 10 pm at single photon level are very challenge. So we can assume that the conditional variance defined in (7) is fully determined by the finite temporal and spectral resolutions of the detection system.

Comparing with the prepare-and-measure FT-QKD protocol based on the complicated Gaussian modulation scheme, the entanglement based FT-QKD explores the intrinsic energy-time correlation of an EPR pair. This greatly simplifies the whole QKD system. Furthermore, in the FT-QKD system shown in Fig.3, no random numbers are needed during the quantum transmission stage. This mitigates the requirement for high speed random number generator [14]. The main technical challenge left is how to achieve high resolution spectral measurement at single photon level. In Section V, we will discuss two practical FT-QKD schemes.

V. FEASIBILITY OF THE FT-QKD PROTOCOL

A. The prepare-and-measure FD-QKD protocol with discrete modulation

The FT-QKD protocol shown in Fig.1 can be simplified by using discrete modulation scheme [15], which is shown in Fig.5.

In this scheme [15], Alice randomly chooses to use either the frequency-basis or the time-basis to encode her random bit. In the frequency-basis, Alice uses frequency \( \nu_1 \) (\( \nu_2 \)) to encode bit “1” (bit “0”), while in the time-basis, she uses time delay \( t_1 \) (\( t_2 \)) to encode bit
FIG. 5: The basic scheme of the FT-QKD protocol with binary modulation

“1” (bit “0”). At Bob’s end, he randomly measures either the arrival time or the frequency (wavelength) of each incoming photon. After the quantum transmission stage, Alice and Bob compare their measurement bases for each transmission and only keep the results when they happen to use the same basis. If the QBER is low, they could further generate secure key by performing error correction and privacy amplification.

Intuitively, to make this protocol secure, Alice’s photons in different bases should at least partially overlap with each other in both time domain and spectral domain, so Eve cannot distinguish them faithfully. Furthermore, to apply the energy-time uncertainty relation to bound Eve’s information, the condition of \((\nu_2 - \nu_1)(t_2 - t_1) \leq 1\) may be required. This puts some constraints on the minimal resolution of Bob’s detection system.

From implementation point of view, the FT-QKD with binary modulation is attractive. However, a security proof for this protocol is still missing.

**B. A practical entanglement based FT-QKD scheme**

Recall that one major technical challenge in the FT-QKD is how to achieve high resolution spectral measurement at single photon level. One intuitive idea is to use a highly dispersive element followed by a time resolving SPD. The dispersive element introduces a frequency-dependent time delay, thus information encoded in spectral domain will be transferred into time domain. Thus a time resolving SPD can be employed to decode the frequency of the incoming photon by measuring its arrival time. However, this idea cannot be applied directly. This is because each individual photon has an intrinsic time uncertainty (for example, in the order of ns) which cannot be distinguished from the frequency-dependent time delay.
FIG. 6: Schematic diagram of a practical entanglement based FT-QKD system: EPR-frequency-time entangled source; BS-beam splitter; F-spectral and temporal filters; $D_A$-dispersive component with positive dispersion coefficient; $D_B$-dispersive component with negative dispersion coefficient; TSPD-time-resolving single photon detector.

Fortunately, the two photons in an EPR pair are entangled in both spectral and time domain, so the intrinsic time uncertainty of each individual photon can be canceled out.

As shown in Fig.6, a dispersive element with a dispersion coefficient of $D_A$ ($D_B$) is placed at Alice (Bob)'s side for frequency measurement. The dispersion coefficients of the two dispersive elements are chosen to satisfy $D_B = -D_A$. By using a suitable time reference, the detection time $T_A$ of Alice’s SPD in frequency-basis is given by

$$T_A = t_A + D_A(\nu_A - \nu_0) \quad (16)$$

where $\nu_0$ is the central frequency of the spectral distribution of down-converted photon from the SPDC source. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the two down-converted photons from each EPR pair have the same spectral distribution, so $\nu_0 = \nu_{P0}/2$, where $\nu_{P0}$ is the central frequency of the pump pulse.

Similarly, Bob’s detection time $T_B$ in frequency-basis is given by

$$T_B = t_B + D_B(\nu_B - \nu_0) \quad (17)$$

Using equations (14-17) and the facts that $D_B = -D_A$, $\nu_0 = \nu_{P0}/2$, we can see that $T_A$ and $T_B$ are highly correlated, i.e. $T_A - T_B \cong 0$ with a small variance.

We remark that the above frequency correlation measurement scheme is the same as the one proposed by J. D. Franson in nonlocal cancellation of dispersion [16].

As a side note, in (16-17) if we choose $D_B = D_A$, then we have $T_A - T_B = D_A(\nu_A - \nu_B) = D_A(2\nu_A - \nu_P)$. Since $D_A$ and $\nu_P$ can be treated as constants, this provides a practical way to measure the spectrum of down-converted photons from a SPDC source.
In section III, we connected the arrival time and frequency of a single photon with its spatial position \( X \) and wave vector \( K_X \). Similarly, the measurement defined in (16) can be treated as a measurement of a combination of \( X \) and \( K_X \). In general, the above measurement can be represented by \( W = aX + bK_X \), where \( a \) and \( b \) are nonzero constants. Since the commutation relation between \( X \) and \( W \) is the same as the one between \( X \) and \( K_X \) (except a scale factor), Gottesman-Preskill’s security proof is still applicable.

Fig.6 is a schematic diagram of the entanglement FT-QKD based on this new frequency measurement scheme. To evaluate its performance, equations (6) and (7) can be used to calculate the intrinsic QBER. As we have discussed above, the conditional variance (thus the intrinsic QBER) of the FT-QKD is mainly determined by the finite temporal and spectral resolutions of the detection system. Specifically, in the entanglement FT-QKD scheme shown in Fig.6, given the dispersion coefficient of the dispersive elements, the intrinsic QBER is mainly determined by the time jitter of time resolving SPDs. For example, commercial dispersion compensation module based on fiber Bragg grating (FBG) technology can provide a dispersion coefficient as large as \( D_\lambda = 7000 \text{ps/} \text{nm} \) with a moderate loss of 5\( \text{dB} \) [17]. If the time resolution of the SPD is 50\( \text{ps} \), then the spectral resolution will be about 7\( \text{pm} \).

In Fig.6, both Alice’s and Bob’s detection system will make contributions to the measurement variance. If we assume noises from Alice and Bob’s systems are independent and have identical distribution (\( i.i.d \)), then the total variance \( \Delta^2 \) in (6) is given by

\[
\Delta^2 = 2\Delta_X \Delta_K
\]

(18)

where \( \Delta^2_X \) and \( \Delta^2_K \) are conditional variances in time-basis and frequency-basis, respectively.

From (8-9), \( \Delta_X \) and \( \Delta_K \) are determined by

\[
\Delta_X = \frac{c}{n} \Delta_t
\]

(19)

\[
\Delta_K = \frac{2\pi n}{\lambda^2} \Delta_\lambda = \frac{2\pi n}{\lambda^2D_\lambda} \Delta_t
\]

(20)

We remark that variance \( \Delta^2_t \) is defined as \( 1/e^2 \), while in practice, time jitter of SPD (\( \delta_t \)) is commonly defined in the fashion of full-width-half-amplitude (FWHA). For a Gaussian distribution, we have \( \Delta_t = \frac{1}{2\sqrt{\ln 2}} \delta_t \). Using (18-20), the conditional variance is given by

\[
\Delta^2 = \frac{1}{\ln 2} \frac{\pi c}{\lambda^2D_\lambda} \delta^2_t
\]

(21)
FIG. 7: Intrinsic QBER of the entanglement FT-QKD protocol. Here we assume $\lambda \simeq 1550\text{nm}$ and $D_\lambda = 7000\text{ps/nm}$. The QBER is about 5% for a time jitter of 70ps. The time jitter of a state-of-the-art superconducting nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD) can be as small as 40ps\cite{18}, and the resulting intrinsic QBER is about 0.05%. We also show the 11% security bound in the figure.

Using (6) and (21), we calculate the intrinsic QBER as a function of the time resolution $\delta_t$ of the SPD. Here, we assume that the QKD system is operated at telecom wavelength ($\lambda \simeq 1550\text{nm}$) and the dispersion coefficient $D_\lambda = 7000\text{ps/nm}$. The simulation results are shown in Fig.7: the QBER is about 5% for a time jitter of 70ps. The time jitter of a state-of-the-art superconducting nanowire SPD (SNSPD) can be as small as 40ps\cite{18}, and the resulting QBER is about 0.05%.

We remark the secure key rate given by (11) is derived based on perfect single photon sources (or in the case of entanglement based protocol, there should be no more than one EPR pair per pump pulse). However, in practice, multiple pairs could be generated by one pump pulse, so (11) cannot be applied directly. A similar problem has been studied in the entanglement based BB84 QKD protocol\cite{19}, where the SPDC source has been identified as a basis-independent source thus the security analysis given in \cite{20} can be applied. To apply the result in \cite{19} to the entanglement based FT-QKD system, an appropriate squash model of the threshold detector is needed.

In practice, the effective detection window of the QKD system may be limited: in the time-basis, photons arriving outside of a certain time window may be treated as noise pho-
tons and be discarded; in the frequency-basis, photons outside of certain spectral range may not be detected. Eve may take advantage of this imperfection and introduce basis-dependent detection efficiency. Similar security issues have been studied in the BB84 QKD by, for example, time-shift attack \cite{21}. To close this potential loophole, spectral and temporal filters (represented by $F$ in Fig.6) can be placed at the entrance of the QKD system to make sure that the incoming photons are within the desired spectral and temporal range.

VI. CONCLUSION

One major advantage of the FT-QKD protocol is its robust against environmental noise: the frequency/time coding scheme is intrinsically insensitive to the polarization and phase fluctuations. This could improve the stability of a practical QKD system dramatically. One may worry about the temporal broadening of a narrow laser pulse due to fiber dispersion. Fortunately, the dispersion of SMF at telecom wavelength has been thoroughly studied and various dispersion compensation technologies are available. For example, in \cite{22}, after passing through a 50km fiber, a 460fs pulse was only slightly broaden to 470fs. This is orders lower than the time resolution of today’s SPD.

In this paper, we establish a security proof of the FT-QKD protocol by showing its connection to the squeezed state QKD. We also extend the prepare-and-measure FT-QKD protocol to an entanglement based FT-QKD protocol which is more appealing in practice. Furthermore, we propose a correlated frequency measurement scheme by using time resolving SPD. Simulation results show the feasibility of the FT-QKD protocol.

As for future research directions, a rigorous security proof of the FT-QKD based on binary modulation scheme is highly desired. For the entanglement based FT-QKD, a suitable squash model for threshold SPDs is required. Furthermore, to fully take advantage of the continuous variable FT-QKD, a distillation protocol which can generate more than one bit from each transmission should be developed.

Acknowledgement: The author is very grateful to Hoi-Kwong Lo and Li Qian for their support and helpful comments. The author also thanks John Sipe, Eric Chitambar, Christian Weedbrook, Wolfram Helwig, Wei Cui, Luke Helt, and Sergei Zhukovsky for helpful discussions. Financial support from CFI, CIPI, the CRC program, CIFAR, MITACS,
NSERC, OIT, and QuantumWorks is gratefully acknowledged.

[1] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, Proceedings of *IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing*, (IEEE, 1984), pp. 175-179.

[2] A. K. Ekert, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **67**, 661 (1991).

[3] B. Qi, *Opt. Lett.* **31**, 2795 (2006)

[4] T. C. Ralph, *Phys. Rev. A* **61**, 010303(R) (2000)

[5] M. Hillery, *Phys. Rev. A* **61**, 022309 (2000)

[6] D. Gottesman and J. Preskill, *Phys. Rev. A* **63**, 022309 (2001)

[7] W.-Y. Hwang, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **91**, 057901 (2003); H.-K. Lo, in *Proceedings of IEEE ISIT 2004*, p. 137; H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, K. Chen, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **94**, 230504 (2005); X.-B. Wang, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **94**, 230503 (2005)

[8] N. J. Beaudry, T. Moroder, and N. Lütkenhaus, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **101**, 093601 (2008); T. Tsurumaru, K. Tamaki, *Phys. Rev. A* **78**, 032302 (2008); C.-H. F. Fung, H. F. Chau, and H.-K. Lo, [arXiv:1011.2982](http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.2982) (2010)

[9] M. P. Almeida, S. P. Walborn, and P. H. Souto Ribeiro, *Phys. Rev. A* **72**, 022313 (2005); S. P. Walborn, D. S. Lemelle, M. P. Almeida, and P. H. Souto Ribeiro, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **96**, 090501 (2006); L. Zhang, C. Silberhorn, and I. A. Walmsley, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **100**, 110504 (2008)

[10] D. Gottesman, A. Kitaev, and J. Preskill, *Phys. Rev. A* **64**, 012310 (2001)

[11] J. G. Muga and C. R. Leavens, *Phys. Rep.* **338**, 353-438 (2000); V. S. Olkhovsky and E. Recami, *Int. J. Mod. Phys. B* **22**, 1877-1897 (2008).

[12] P. W. Shor, J. Preskill, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **85**, 441 (2000)

[13] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, *Phys. Rev.* **47**, pp.777-780 (1935)

[14] A. Uchida, K. Amano, M. Inoue, K. Hirano, S. Naito, H. Someya, I. Oowada, T. Kurashige, M. Shiki, S. Yoshimori, K. Yoshimura and P. Davis, *Nature Photonics* **2**, 728 (2008); B. Qi, Y.-M. Chi, H.-K. Lo, and L. Qian, *Opt. Lett.* **35**, 312 (2010)

[15] C.-H Zhu, C.-X. Pei, D.-X. Quan, J.-L. Gao, N. Chen, Y.-H. Yi *Chin. Phys. Lett.* **27**, 090301 (2010)

[16] J. D. Franson, *Phys. Rev. A* **45**, 3126-3132 (1992)

[17] www.teraxion.com
[18] E. A. Dauler, N. W. Spellmeyer, A. J. Kerman, R. J. Molnar, K. K. Berggren, J. D. Moores, S. A. Hamilton, CLEO/QELS 2010, Paper QThI2

[19] X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, and H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 76, 012307 (2007)

[20] M. Koashi, J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 057902 (2003)

[21] B. Qi, C.-H. F. Fung, H.-K. Lo and X. Ma, Quant. Inf. Comput. 7, 73 (2007); Y. Zhao, C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen and H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 78, 042333 (2008)

[22] Z. Jiang, S.-D. Yang, D. E. Leaird, and A. M. Weiner, Opt. Lett. 30, 1449 (2005)