Public Pension Reforms and Fiscal Foresight:
Narrative Evidence and Aggregate Implications*

Huixin Bi† and Sarah Zubairy‡

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Abstract

We explore the evolution of pension policy across countries and investigate the macroeconomic impact of structural pension reforms in recent decades. We first document changes in pension policy for 10 OECD countries between 1962 and 2017, with a rapid expansion of pension systems between 1960s and 1980s followed by policy retrenchments since 1990s. Structural pension reforms, which are motivated by long-run sustainability concerns, often come with prolonged phase-in periods, close to 10 years on average. We find that in response to structural pension retrenchments implemented without delay, people close to retirement stay in the work force longer, potentially to compensate for expected lower pensions, leading to a decline in old-age pension spending. News about future pension retrenchment, however, is more likely to lead this marginal group of population to exit the labor market prior to the reform being implemented. A fiscal foresight channel prevails over the income effect in this case. The decline in the labor force participation rate of the marginal group is particularly pronounced for pension reforms that change the fundamental aspects of pension systems and ones that come with longer implementation delays, which point towards amplification from associated uncertainty. Old-age pension spending subsequently increases, rather than decreases, over the medium term.

Keywords: Fiscal foresight, pension reform, narrative approach

JEL Codes: E62, H30, H55

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†Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City; huixin.bi@kc.frb.org.
‡Department of Economics, Texas A&M University; szubairy@tamu.edu.
1 Introduction

Over the last half century, public spending on old-age pensions in OECD countries has been increasing, albeit at a varying pace across countries, as shown in Figure 1.\(^1\) With aging societies, policymakers have increasingly focused on pension retrenchment reforms to keep their pension systems solvent. More recently, countries around the world have taken unprecedented fiscal interventions as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, which will weigh on governments’ fiscal capacity and may motivate further pension reforms in the future.

In this paper, we focus on two questions. Firstly, what kind of role, if any, have government pension policies played in the rise of old-age pension spending since 1960s? While aging societies have certainly contributed to the rise in pension spending, government pension policies in the early period may have also boosted the trend. Secondly and more importantly, what impact do structural pension reforms have on the labor market and pension spending? We are particularly interested in addressing this question by exploiting cross-country variation.

In this paper, we construct a new data set and document changes in public pension policy for 10 OECD countries between 1962 and 2017. By mainly relying on annual/bi-annual OECD Economic Surveys for each country and supplementing with legislative documents from country-specific sources, we collect information on four aspects: 1) the sign of pension changes, whether they made pension programs more or less generous; 2) policy tools associated with changes in pension policy, whether through changes in payment, coverage, indexation policy, or retirement age; 3) motivation behind policy changes; and 4) implementation lags, which is the time elapsed between when a policy change is initially enacted and when it is fully phased in. To the best of our knowledge, our data set provides the first comprehensive documentation of pension policy changes across a broad set of countries spanning six decades and, more importantly, of motivation behind pension policy changes.

\(^1\)Figure 1 plots pension spending for 6 countries, for which the data is available starting in 1960. For most countries, old-age pension spending data is available only after 1980.
and information about implementation plans. The latter two aspects have received little attention in the literature, as it is challenging to systematically collect such data over a long period of time, and are a major contribution of our database.

The new data set uncovers that besides aging society, the expansion in pension programs between 1960s and 1980s played an important role in the rapid increase in pension spending across countries. Over this period, pension programs offered more generous payments to the elderly population and also extended them to a broader segment of population. This expansion was partially motivated by cyclical reasons. For instance, many European countries adopted early retirement programs between 1970s and 1980s in response to high unemployment rates, particularly among the youth, during recessions. Part of the expansion was also carried out to raise the living standard for elderly population to keep up with economic growth. The expansion, however, significantly increased pension liabilities.

In order to keep their pension systems solvent, governments have undertaken significant pension retrenchment reforms since the 1990s, many of which come with prolonged implementation lags. These phase-in periods are needed to ease the impact of pension reforms on retirees by providing them time to adjust their retirement plans. In addition, implementation lags make pension retrenchments more satiable for the public, as they are politically challenging to enact. For instance, phase-in periods associated with major structural changes, which are driven by long-run concerns, are close to 10 years on average. These prolonged delays slow the progress of scaling back governments pension spending, possibly raising long-run fiscal risks. Understanding the effects of these phase-in periods is important as governments contemplate pension reforms going forward.

Some existing databases have documented pension policy changes, but have abstracted from motivation and implementation delays associated with those changes. Beetsma, Klaassen, Romp, and van Maurik (2020) construct a database of pension reforms using narrative methods for several OECD countries for the period 1970-2017. The International Labor Organization’s NATLEX, a database of national labor, social security and related human rights legislation, provides information starting in the 1970s, but social security reforms are not covered for all countries. The LABREF database, managed by the European Commission in cooperation with the Employment Committee, has all labor market reforms starting in 2000. Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti (fRDB) also has data on reforms of public pension systems in Europe starting in the mid-1980s.
Thus we study the impact of pension policy changes on labor market and pension spending using panel data, for the sample period starting 1980 based on data availability. In order to understand the macroeconomic effects, a fundamental issue is the endogeneity of policy changes to prevailing economic conditions. In documenting the motivation behind pension policy changes, we distinguish between policies driven by short-run cyclical or purchasing power concerns from those driven by long-run forces such as fiscal sustainability, which can be thought of as structural pension reforms. The latter type of policy changes are at the heart of the narrative identification and, in the spirit of Romer and Romer (2010), allow us to make inference on the causal effects of public pension policy changes in the short to medium run.

Importantly, we distinguish between pension policy changes that are implemented immediately following announcements from those implemented with delays. Those delays associated with structural pension reforms, which are the focus of our empirical analysis, are typically long, close to a decade on average. Differentiating policy changes with implementation delays from those without allows us to explore the effects of pension reform on labor market during the prolonged phase-in periods.3

Employing local projection methodology of Jordà (2005), we find that structural pension reforms, depending on whether they come with phase-in periods or not, can have distinct impact on the government budget and also the labor decisions of people who are close to retirement. If structural pension retrenchments are implemented immediately, labor force participation rates (LFPR) for groups between the age of 55 and 64 years rise. Less generous pension benefits, in combination with a higher LFPR for the older population, leads to a decline in the old-age pension spending. In response to news about structural pension retrenchment in the future, however, this marginal group of population are more likely to exit

3While it would be interesting to assess the long-run consequences, we would potentially run into endogeneity issues, as structural reforms are motivated by long-run concerns. In addition, we also face data limitations: given the availability of data on old-age pension spending and LFPRs by age group, our empirical analysis starts in 1980; on the other hand, most of the retrenchments started during or after the 1990s, and many have not been fully implemented within our sample. Thus, we have insufficient data to convincingly assess whether the reforms ultimately achieve their objectives.
the labor market prior to the reform being implemented. Therefore, government spending on old age pensions increases, rather than decreases, over the medium run. Importantly, these distinct responses are particularly prevalent for pension reforms that come with exceedingly long delays, in the order of 15 years or longer, and ones that change the fundamental aspects of pension systems, such as retirement age and contribution years.

Why would people close to retirement respond differently to pension policy changes with and without phase-in periods? It is because the two types of pension changes can affect the marginal group through potentially different channels. First, with less generous pension benefits under retrenchments, agents may choose to stay in the labor force longer to save more for their retirement. This income effect channel applies to pension retrenchments in general, regardless of whether they are phased in or implemented immediately. Second, if pension retrenchments are announced well ahead of time, agents may respond to news about future pension policy changes by retiring earlier if these future reforms would take away certain pension options that are available to retirees in the pre-reform regime. This fiscal foresight channel, which captures the idea that due to legislative and implementation lags agents in the economy respond to signals about future fiscal policy in advance, applies only to pension retrenchments with phase-in periods. Finally, pension retrenchments, in particular more fundamental reforms, can demonstrate governments’ political willingness and fiscal need to scale back pension systems and may signal further pension changes down the road. Uncertainties associated with changes in future pension benefits can prompt the marginal group to retire earlier. This uncertainty channel can be particularly powerful for reforms that change the fundamental aspects of the pension system.

Our empirical analysis highlights that through the income effect channel, the LFPR of the marginal group rises in responses to structural pension retrenchments that are implemented immediately following announcements. On the other hand, the fiscal foresight channel may dominate the income effect channel if pension reforms are phased in over a period of time. Therefore, people close to retirement are more likely to exit the labor market and to lock
in their pension benefits in response to the news about future pension retrenchments. Finally, reforms that change the fundamental aspects of pension systems also come in with exceedingly long delays. In this case, the uncertainty channel, interacted with the foresight channel, can lead to a significant decline in the LFPR of people close to retirement.

Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we create a new data series on changes in pension policy that goes back to the early 1960s, while the existing literature has largely focused on pension reforms since 1990s. The longer data set uncovers that a rapid expansion of pension systems between 1960s and 80s followed by contractions. We also document that pension retrenchments often come with prolonged phase-in periods. Second, we highlight that implementation delays associated with structural reforms can have unintended consequence on pension spending and the labor market. Policy makers face a tradeoff between reining in pension spending and providing retirees time to respond to pension reforms.4

The paper is structured as follows. Section 3 explains how we compile the data set. In Section 4, we explore the evolution of pension policy changes, showing that pension retrenchments in recent decades often come with prolonged phase-in periods. Section 5 explains the empirical approach. Section 6 shows that the impact of structural pension retrenchments on the labor market and pension spending depends on whether reforms come with implementation delays or not. Section 7 shows various robustness checks, while Section 8 concludes.

2 Literature Review

Our paper contributes to a growing literature that employs narrative methods to identify variations in policy variables of interest and motivations behind them to isolate ‘exogenous’ events. Notable examples include Romer and Romer (1989) and Romer and Romer (2004) for constructing monetary policy shocks based on the minutes of the Federal Open Market

4We focus on the pension spending from the perspective of government’s cash flow, rather than in terms of present value of government’s pension liability, the latter of which requires micro data and is left for future work.
Committee, Ramey (2011) for compiling defense news shocks based on articles from Business Week, and Romer and Romer (2010) for constructing narrative tax shocks based on tax legislative documents. More recent works include Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014) and Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2015) who identify fiscal consolidation events for a large set of countries.

Our paper closely connects to the literature on fiscal foresight. Ramey (2011) shows the importance of timing for government spending shocks, since news about changes in defense spending might be available to the public in advance of an actual change in spending. Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2013) formally illustrate that fiscal foresight can bias econometric estimations, as agents know about a fiscal policy change that is not yet realized and thus is not in the information set of the econometrician. In the most relevant work to ours, Mertens and Ravn (2012) distinguish between tax shocks based on implementation lags. They find that while unanticipated tax cuts lead to a rise in GDP, pre-announced tax cuts that are implemented with a delay lead to a fall in GDP in the short run.5

We rely on OECD publications as a primary source for identifying pension policy changes across a panel of countries, and therefore this paper is also related to previous studies which have used similar publications for identification purposes. For instance, Romer and Romer (2017) construct a semi-annual measure of financial distress for 24 OECD countries based on country-specific OECD Economic Outlooks. Duval and Furceri (2018) employ the OECD Economic Surveys for 26 individual advanced economies to build a data set of labor and product market reforms and study their effects on output, employment and productivity.

Given our focus on pension spending, our paper ties to the macroeconomic empirical literature related to social spending programs. Using a narrative approach, Romer and Romer (2010) find that a permanent increase in transfer payments leads to a significant but short-lived increase in consumption, but temporary changes have no significant effects.

5Our policy changes with delays in implementation can be viewed as fiscal announcements and there is work looking at the effects of fiscal consolidation announcements, though focusing on the short term consequences, like sovereign spreads and consumer confidence (see for example, Beetsma, Cimadomo, Furtuna, and Giuliodori (2015) and David, Guajardo, and Yepez (2019).)
In a closely related work to our paper, Beetsma, Klaassen, Romp, and van Maurik (2020) construct a database of pension reforms using narrative methods for several OECD countries for the period 1970-2017. Their main finding is that business indicators are important for the timing of pension policy changes, with contractionary measures more likely during bad times and expansionary measures less so.\(^6\) Importantly, they do not discuss motivations and implementation lags associated with those policy changes, which are at the heart of our paper.

Finally, our work contributes to a large literature on the impact of social security on retirement decisions and private saving behaviors, pioneered by Feldstein (1974).\(^7\) Many papers in this literature focus on individual pension reforms and use rich micro-data. Blundell, French, and Tetlow (2016) review the evidence on the role of incentives, including public pension policies in the retirement decision. The volume of Gruber and Wise (2004) adopts a micro estimation approach and provides a country-by-country analysis of social security program incentives and retirement behavior.\(^8\) Their simulations show that changes in social security program provisions can have large effects on the LFPRs of older employees. Our paper complements their study, as we provide supporting empirical evidence based on a panel analysis, as well as evidence on how people close to retirement responds differently based on how far in advance the policies are announced.

### 3 New Measure on Pension Policy Changes

We document changes in pension policy for 10 OECD countries - Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Spain and the United Kingdom - from

\(^6\)Beetsma, Klaassen, Romp, and van Maurik (2020) also show that demographic developments dictate the trend of pension policy changes but do not affect dynamics in the short-run.

\(^7\)While our focus is on the labor market decision, there is a vast literature on the impact of social security reforms on private saving and consumption behavior, see for example, Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) and Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003).

\(^8\)The micro estimation approach allows the calculation of present value of individuals’ pension wealth, providing insight on actuarial fairness and neutrality associated with pension system. We rely on macro data and abstract from discussion on actuarial neutrality.
1962 to 2017. This list includes countries that have successfully implemented far-reaching pension reforms (such as Belgium) and countries that still face challenges in reducing their pension spending despite repeated efforts with multiple pension reforms (such as Italy).

3.1 Data Source In compiling the data set, we rely on country-specific OECD Economic Surveys (the Surveys thereafter) published at an annual or bi-annual frequency. The Surveys discuss key economic challenges, policy changes that address those challenges, and, more recently, policy recommendations from the OECD to the targeted country.9

Discussions related to pension policy have been gaining prominence in the Surveys over the years. The average length of the Surveys across the 10 countries increased markedly from 80 pages in 1970 to 136 pages in 1991, and then 144 pages in 2010. Discussions on pension policy, nevertheless, have increased at an even faster pace. In 2010 Surveys, the word of ‘pension(s)’ was mentioned over 70 times on average across countries, compared to only 3 times in 1970 and 32 times in 1990.

The format of the Surveys has also changed over time. Before 1973, the Surveys provided only general discussions on fiscal policy. From 1973 to 2002, the Surveys provided chronologies of major economic policy events for most countries in our sample, including changes in pension policy. Since 2003, the Surveys have provided in-depth discussions on economic challenges and policy recommendations. Section B in the Appendix provides excerpts from the surveys during the three distinct time periods and further explains how we extract information from the Surveys.

In addition to the Surveys, we use a wide range of supplemental country-specific documents. For European countries, we cross check our data set with the NBER series on social security programs and retirement around the world, including Fraikin, Jousten, and Lefebvre (2018) for Belgium, Bingley, Gupta, Jorgensen, and Pedersen (2014) for Denmark, Lassila and Valkonen (2002) for Finland, Blanchet, Bozio, Rabate, and Roger (2019) for

9For some countries, like Australia and New Zealand, the OECD Surveys were less informative and we relied more heavily on legislative documents.
France, Franco (2002) and Brugiavini and Peracchi (2014) for Italy, Vegas Sánchez, Argimón, Botella, and González (2013) and Garcia-Gomez, Garcia-Mandico, Jimenez-Martín, and Castello (2018) for Spain, and Blake (2002) and Banks and Emmerson (2018) for the United Kingdom. For non-European countries, we use Nielson (2010) and Herscovitch and Stanton (2008) for Australia, and John and Willmore (2001) for New Zealand as reference. Also, we cross check our data set with Beetsma, Klaassen, Romp, and van Maurik (2020), in which the authors compile pension reform measures using the NATLEX database of the International Labor Organization, the International Social Security Association database, the European Commission’s Labour Market Reform database, and other sources.

3.2 Approach We take a narrative approach similar to that of Romer and Romer (2010) and Romer and Romer (2016) for tax and transfer policy changes in the United States, and Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2011) for defense spending changes in the United States. We extract changes in pension policy by reading through discussions related to subjects such as pensions, retirement, and social security in the Surveys for the 10 countries between 1962 and 2017. We collect information along four distinct aspects.

Sign: We first document the sign of pension changes, whether they made pension programs more or less generous. In general, it is straightforward to decide on the direction of pension changes. For instance, expanding the coverage of old-age pension or lowering the statutory retirement age makes pension program more generous. On the other hand, scaling back an early retirement program makes the pension system less generous.

Nevertheless, it is much more challenging to determine the budgetary impact of pension policy changes, and therefore we employ a dummy approach. The Surveys do not provide consistent estimates on the budget impact related to specific changes in pension policy, particularly with many of them phased in over a long period of time. More importantly,

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\(^{10}\)The publication start dates for the Surveys vary across countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Spain and the United Kingdom started in 1962, while Italy in 1963, Finland in 1969, Japan in 1964, Australia in 1972 and New Zealand in 1975.
pension policy changes can significantly alter people’s behaviors in the short and long term, in particular for those who are close to retirement, as we will further explore below. The dynamic and endogenous reactions distinguish changes in pension policy from those in defense spending and, to a less degree, those in tax policy. Therefore, it is very challenging to provide a budgetary estimate for each pension policy change as the literature typically does for changes in taxes and government spending, for instance in Romer and Romer (2010) and Ramey (2011). Instead, we take the dummy approach by constructing pension dummies and assigning an intensity value to each dummy, distinguishing reforms with multiple policy changes from those with a single policy change.11 For example, the Belgium government passed a comprehensive reform in 2015, which included five major changes in pension policy. In our data set, we classify the 2015 Belgium reform as “-5”, as all five policy changes made pension system less generous.12

**Motivation:** Next we identify the motivation behind each pension policy change by classifying them under three broad categories.

Some pension changes were motivated by concerns related to *purchasing power*, as they intended to maintain or improve the purchasing power of retirees, or ensure living standards of the beneficiaries. For instance, in 1974 the Belgium government decided to link social welfare benefits to changes in the general standard of living in addition to their linkage to price index. In 2000, pension was increased in Australia as part of a package to compensate for the introduction of a goods and services tax.

Some changes were driven by *cyclical* reasons, as they were undertaken to stimulate the economy in a recession or in response to the near-term economic conditions. For instance, the

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11This approach was commonly employed in the earlier literature identifying monetary and fiscal shocks, see for example, Romer and Romer (1989), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004). More recently, the dummy approach is employed, with or without intensity, in various applications, particularly for cross-country analysis, such as the financial distress measure of Romer and Romer (2017), labor and product reforms documented by Duval and Furceri (2018), and capital controls database constructed by Fernandez, Klein, Rebucci, Schindler, and Uribe (2016).

12Section B in the Appendix explains how we construct pension dummies in more detail. We also have more discussion about the role of these intensity measures in our estimation results and an example of how they line up with data in Section 5.1.
Belgian government created three early retirement programs from 1975 to 1978 and expanded those programs in the early 1980s to stimulate economic growth following a recession. In 1984, the Finnish government decided to skip the indexation adjustment of pensions as it adopted a counter-cyclical restrictive policy stance.

Last but not least, we categorize some pension changes as structural policy changes, as they have been taken to address long-run issues like fiscal sustainability and aging demographics. For instance, the Belgian government rolled back early retirement programs gradually between 1997 and 2019 by increasing the minimum age for early retirement from 55 to 63 years through a sequence of reforms.

**Policy Tools:** We also document policy tools associated with changes in pension policy. Although the specific tools vary, they can largely be categorized into one of the four types.

Some changes were associated with pension coverage, which include changes in the number of service years required for retirement or changes in regulations related to means or assets test. For instance, in 2006, Belgium announced a plan to increase the number of service years required to qualify for early retirement from 25 to 30 years by 2008 and from 30 to 35 years by 2012. In 1975, Australia abolished its means test for retirees between 70 and 74 years.

Some changes were related to benefit formulas, which include direct changes to pension payments or changes in number of years that form the calculation basis for pension payments. For example, pension benefits in Japan were increased from 2,300 to 3,300 Yen per month in 1972.

There are also changes in pension payment indexation, which involve moving away from indexing benefits to wages or earnings and toward indexing benefits to prices. For instance, in 1992, the Italian government announced a switch in the indexation of pensions from wages to prices.

Finally, many countries have changed the pension eligibility age at which workers can
retire. For example, in 2000 Finland decided to raise the age limit of the individual early retirement pension from 58 to 60 years for those born after 1944. In 2015, the Denmark government decided to limit the average time of individuals spending in retirement to 14.5 years, and therefore it would adjust the retirement age in response to changes in life expectancy every five years.

**Implementation Delays:** Lastly, we track implementation delays, which is the time elapsed between when a policy change is initially enacted and when it is fully phased in. Mertens and Ravn (2011) and Mertens and Ravn (2012) highlight the importance of differentiating unanticipated and anticipated tax changes, as preannounced but not yet implemented tax cuts give rise to contractions in output. Implementation delays in pension policy changes are significantly longer than those documented in tax changes, which can be important as we investigate the economic impact of pension reforms.

4 Overview of Pension Policy Changes

This new data set shows that changes in pension policy have come in waves: many countries that expanded their pension systems between 1960s and 1980s have scaled them back since the 1990s. Figure 2 shows that the period between 1960s and 1970s was entirely dominated by pension expansions, as countries in our data set passed more than 100 policy changes during the two decades by lowering retirement age, broadening pension coverage, providing more favorable indexation, and raising benefit payments. The turning point arrived in the 1980s, with some countries continuing to expand their pension systems while others starting to dial back their pension expansions. The pace of pension retrenchments peaked in the 1990s: together, these countries adopted close to 70 policy retrenchment changes from 1990 to 1999, partly driven by actions taken by European countries prior to joining the European Union. More recently, countries have adopted a similar number of pension retrenchments in 2000s and 2010s. It is notable that countries have been adopting both expansionary
and contractionary changes to pension systems since 1990s – even though they have been continuing to scale back their pensions system, the pace of pension expansions has also remained at an elevated level during the past three decades.

Focusing on the motivation behind pension policy changes, we find that pension expansions in early decades were typically driven by cyclical and purchasing power considerations, while policy changes since the 1990s have been dominated by structural reforms. As shown in Figure 3, about half of pension expansions between 1960s and 1980s were driven by considerations related to purchasing power and living standards of retirees. Japan was an prominent example, as the government increased the old-age pension from 3% of average earnings of workers in 1972 to 10% in 1975.\footnote{The old-age pension payment was 2,300 yen per month in 1972 and increased to 10,000 yen in 1975, compared to average earnings of workers of 100,000 yen per month at the time, see the OECD Economic Surveys of Japan (1972 and 1973)} In addition, about one third of pension expansions during the same period were motivated by cyclical reasons, as many European countries created and expanded early retirement programs to combat economic recessions and high unemployment during this period. Since the 1990s, changes in pension policy, including both expansions and retrenchments, have been largely driven by long-run structural concerns. For instance, the French government passed an important reform package in 2003, raising the minimum number of contribution years and scaling back pension benefits. At the same time, it also raised the minimum pensions and introduced an early retirement program for people who started working at a young age, making pension system more generous for some beneficiaries.

Compared to the notable shift in motivation over time, changes in policy tools during the past six decades have been more muted. Governments lowered retirement age and broadened pension coverage in 1970s and 80s, as show in Figure 4. Those policy tools have also played a significant role in pension retrenchments since the 1990s. More than half of the pension changes in the 1960s and 70s were through changes in pension payments or benefit calculation formulas, which remained important in recent decades.

Turning to implementation delays, we find that pension retrenchments often come with
significant phase-in periods. In our data set, we have identified 142 pension changes with implementation delays since 1962, out of which over 70 percent are pension retrenchments. Figure 5 shows that implementation delays for those policy changes have a wide range with an upper bound of 39 years and an average of over 8 years, where each dot represents the delay associated with one change.\(^{14}\) The majority of delayed policy changes are pension retrenchments, as shown in green dots. The 1993 pension reform in Finland can shed light on the gradual pace of implementing pension policy changes. As an attempt to end the favorable pension treatment of civil servants, the government introduced an increase in the retirement age of public sector workers from 63 to 65 years. The change, however, was introduced very gradually with the transition period ending in 2032, as it only applied to new civil servants. In 1995, the government sped up the reform by applying the new change to civil servants aged 55 or below. The transition, nevertheless, would still take 10 years.

We provide three case studies to further illustrate the challenges of adopting pension retrenchment reforms and the potential impact of structural changes on the labor market. The evolution of early retirement programs in Continental Europe has provided a good lab in that regard. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many European countries created and expanded early retirement programs to combat economic recessions and high unemployment, which significantly increased pension liabilities. Despite tremendous political challenges, those programs have been rolled back over the years in many countries.

4.1 Belgium The early retirement programs in Belgium had a significant impact on the labor market and pension spending. The government created and expanded early retirement programs in the 1970s and 80s to stimulate economic growth. The unemployment rate rose from a little above 2 percent in 1974 to 12 percent in 1983. In an attempt to reduce the unemployment rate, older workers were offered early retirement pensions, so that their jobs could be released to young workers. Belgium introduced three early retirement programs: in

\(^{14}\)For major structural changes, the implementation delays associated with are even longer with an average of more than 9 years as shown in Figure A.4 in the Appendix.
1975, the Conventional Early Retirement Pension was introduced, allowing laid-off workers over age 60 to receive an allowance in addition to unemployment benefits; in 1976, the Statutory Early Retirement Pension was enacted and applied to male workers age 60 and female workers age 55 if they were replaced by persons under age 30; and finally the Special Early Retirement Pension was introduced in 1978 to enable older people out of work for more than a year to take early retirement. As a result, the population in early retirement programs was more than 4 percent of total labor force by the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{15}

Since then, those programs have been scaled back, but at an extraordinarily slow pace. Spending on early retirement as a share of GDP has been trending down since the mid 1980s in Belgium, driven by a series of pension retrenchments. In 1987, early retirement age eligibility for women was raised from 55 to 60 years. However, one step backward was taken in 1994 when the age limit for early retirement was lowered to 55 years for two years; during the same period, the early retirement spending ticked up. In 1997, the early retirement age limit was raised from 55 to 58 years. Then the government announced a rise in the age limit to 60 years in 2006 (phased in by 2008), to 62 in 2012 (phased in by 2015), and to 63 years in 2015 (phased in by 2019). These pension retrenchment reforms lowered government spending on early retirement successfully but very gradually, from 1.4% to less than 0.5% of GDP over 30 years.

4.2 Denmark The early transitional retirement scheme in Denmark, which was active only for a short period, highlights that a change in pension policy can potentially have a significant impact on the LFPR of workers close to retirement. The program, which applied to long-term unemployed (12 months or more) aged between 50 and 59 years, was introduced in 1992 and expanded in 1994. Entrance to the scheme, however, was closed in early 1996. LFPR for the population between 50 and 59 years declined sharply from 81 percent in 1992 to 72 percent in 1996.\textsuperscript{16} The early retirement spending, on the other hand, increased from

\textsuperscript{15}Further details are shown in Figure A.1 in the Appendix.
\textsuperscript{16}Figure A.2 in the Appendix shows the evolution of these variables.
0.6 percent of GDP in 1992 to more than 1 percent in 1996. The rise was particularly sharp following the expansion in 1994. It shows a high elasticity between the change in LFPR of older workers and the change in pension spending.

4.3 France The early retirement program in France conveys a similar message. In 1981, the French government extended the income guarantee for early retirement, and also provided incentives for firms to introduce early retirement through solidarity contracts. Government spending on “incentive to withdraw from labor market” increased from 0.4 percent of GDP to 1.3 percent between 1981 and 1985. The LFPR for the group between 55 and 59 years declined by 8 percentage points from 62.8 to 54.8 percent during the same period. This case highlights that at the margin, changes in pension policy can significantly shift people’s incentive to stay in or exit the labor force.

5 Effects of Structural Pension Reforms: Empirical Approach

In this section, our goal is to estimate the impact of pension policy changes on the labor market and public pension spending, and the key to estimation is the identification strategy. We follow the tradition in the narrative literature, see Romer and Romer (2010), and focus solely on structural changes in pension policy, which are motivated by long-term concerns, rather than cyclical or purchasing power considerations.

5.1 Major Structural Pension Reforms We categorize all structural changes to pension policy into two groups: major or marginal changes. For instance, the Italian government adopted temporary measures to freeze inflation adjustments for the highest pensions in 1997, which we count as a marginal change to pension policy. In the same package, the government also passed new legislation to speed up the increase in early retirement age, which had a broad impact on old-age pension system and therefore is categorized as a major policy change. We focus on major structural pension changes in the baseline analysis, and

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17This is shown in Figure A.3 in the Appendix.
extend to all structural changes in a robustness check.

We distinguish major structural reforms that are implemented immediately following announcements from those with phase-in periods to highlight the channel of fiscal foresight. Figure 6 illustrates the time series of the two reform dummies. For instance, in 2000 the Japanese government passed three major policy changes to its pension system to alleviate fiscal burdens: 1) the once-every-5-year wage-indexing of benefits was eliminated; 2) a 5 percent reduction of Employees Pension Insurance (EPI) benefits was phased in for new beneficiaries; 3) finally, the minimum age to receive a full EPI benefit would be raised from 60 to 65 years over a 12-year period starting in 2013 (2018 for women) and fully phased in by 2025 (2030 for women). The first change was implemented right after the announcement and is captured by the “-1” dot in 2000 in top panel of Figure 6, the no-delay dummy series. The two retrenchment changes related to benefits and retirement age, which were gradually phased in over time, are reflected by the “-2” dot in 2000 in the bottom panel, the delay dummy series. Implementation delays associated with major structural changes are on average longer than 9 years as shown in Figure A.4 in the Appendix, which is longer than the average for all pension policy changes together as shown in Figure 5.

The intensity measure is our attempt to capture the scope of an reform, since it is challenging to assess the projected budgetary impact from pension reforms as discussed in Section 3.2. In order to gauge the overall success of our approach, we consider the case of Italy which saw a series of major pension reforms in the 1990s and 2000s. Considering all major structural reforms together (with and without delay), the 1992 Amato and 1995 Dini reforms dominated the reforms that came after, according to our major reform dummy. Alesina, Barbiero, Favero, Giavazzi, and Paradisi (2017) use contemporaneous OECD and country legislative files, and document the projected budgetary impact as a percent of GDP for these changes in pension policies in the given year and for up to 5 years out. Those budgetary

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18 Each dot in figure 6 may capture multiple dummy observations if multiple countries have the same reform dummy in the same year.

19 Alesina, Barbiero, Favero, Giavazzi, and Paradisi (2017) extend the narrative data set of fiscal consolidations by Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014) for 18 OECD countries and, in addition, distinguish
estimates are a good candidate for us to cross check our dummy approach, although they abstract from potentially important long-run impact of these policies.\textsuperscript{20} As detailed in Section C in the Appendix, our reform dummy lines up reasonably well with the projected budgetary impact from their study. This example is reassuring in establishing that the relative magnitude of our structural reform dummy with intensity can do a reasonable job in matching reforms based on their scope or assessed projected budgetary impact.

We also test the exogeneity of major structural changes to short-run economic conditions. Table 1 shows the Granger causality test results for these structural changes with and without implementation delays. The regressions include one lag of the pension policy change and the aggregate variable, along with country and year fixed effects. Notably, these structural changes, regardless of with or without implementation delays, can not be predicted by lagged aggregate variables that capture the state of the economy, including the unemployment rate, the growth rate of real GDP, OECD recession indicator, or the CPI inflation. This is further validation of our identification strategy. We also test Granger causality for some additional variables, some of which we will be analyzing in the coming sections. There is no evidence of structural changes being Granger caused by LFPR for the age group between 55 and 64 years and old-age pension spending as a share of GDP. The only variable that shows some degree of significance is the share of elderly population for major structural changes with delays, potentially capturing demographic pressures driving major structural reforms. We control for this variable in our regressions that follow.

5.2 Econometric methodology We apply the local projection method proposed in Jordà (2005) to estimate the effects of structural pension policy changes on variables of interest. The Jordà method requires estimating a series of regressions for each variable at each horizon, \( h \). We distinguish structural changes without implementation delays from consolidation measures based upon government spending cuts, transfers cuts and tax hikes. Many of their transfer cuts for these OECD countries include pension retrenchment measures.\textsuperscript{20} This would be a particularly relevant issue for reforms with long implementation delays. For instance, the 1995 reform made the switch towards a notional defined-contribution system and was projected to have the largest impact on pension expenditures after 2025, according to the OECD (see details in Appendix C).
those with delays, the latter of which can be thought of as news shock about pension changes to be implemented in the future. The existing literature has highlighted the importance of foresight channel in the presence of fiscal news, as households respond to news ahead of policy implementation. The following model captures potential differential effects on macroeconomic variables:

\[ z_{i,t+h} = \alpha_{i,h} + \gamma_{t,h} + \beta_{n,h} R_{i,t}^{\text{nodelay}} + \beta_{d,h} R_{i,t}^{\text{delay}} + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \delta_{n,h}^k R_{i,t-j}^{\text{nodelay}} + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \delta_{d,h}^k R_{i,t-j}^{\text{delay}} + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \theta_{n,h}^k z_{i,t-j} + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \lambda_{n,h}^k y_{i,t-j} + \varepsilon_{i,t+h}, \text{ for } h = 0, 1, 2, \ldots \]

where \( i = 1, \ldots, N \) denotes the countries under consideration. Here \( z \) is the variable of interest. \( R \) is the pension measure that we have created using the narrative approach, with \( R^{\text{nodelay}} \) for changes without implementation delays and \( R^{\text{delay}} \) for those with delays. \( \alpha \) is country fixed effect to control for country-specific time-invariant factors, while \( \gamma \) is time fixed effect for controlling for economic developments that affect all countries in a given year. The coefficient \( \beta_h \) represents the response of the variable \( z \) at time \( t + h \) to the respective pension dummy at time \( t \), capturing the average response across countries and time to reforms without delay \( (\beta_{n,h}) \) and to those with delays \( (\beta_{d,h}) \). The impulse responses are constructed as a sequence of the \( \beta_h \)'s estimated in a series of separate regressions for each horizon. We also include lags of the pension dummy and the variable of interest on the right hand side, where we consider \( J = 2 \) in our baseline specification. Here \( \varepsilon_{i,t+h} \) is an idiosyncratic error term. In addition, we also include life expectancy and the share of elderly population in the total population in the set of control variables \( y \) to account for the fact that countries face aging populations with varying degrees over time.

We run our regressions from 1980 onwards, given the availability of data on old-age pension spending and LFPRs by age group. The sample of 1980 onwards captures all structural pension retrenchments and the majority of structural pension expansions, as shown in figure 6. By setting the horizon \( h = 1, \ldots, 10 \) in equation 5.1, our estimation captures the impact
of structural pension changes on labor market for 10 years, calibrated to match the average length of phase-in periods associated with structural policy changes.\textsuperscript{21}

6 Impact of Structural Pension Reforms on Pension Spending and Labor Markets

In this section, we study how pension reforms impact public spending on old-age related pensions and the LFPR of population close to retirement.

Figure 7 shows that structural public pension policy changes, depending on whether they come with phase-in periods or not, can have different impact on people who are close to retirement. In response to news about pension retrenchment in the future (blue solid line), this group of population are more likely to exit the labor market prior to changes being implemented, leading to a decline in their LFPRs. For the group between 55 and 59 years, the response is insignificant on impact, but declines over time and reaches its trough close to 6 years following the fiscal news. For the group between 60 and 64 years, who are closer to retirement, the response is more front-loaded, as the LFPR drops on impact and the decline reaches 0.5 percentage points 2 years following the fiscal news. As a result, we see a sustained drop in the overall LFPR for the population between 55 to 64 years.\textsuperscript{22}

On the other hand, in response to a retrenchment policy change being implemented immediately (red dashed lines), people close to retirement stay in the work force longer to compensate for the decline in their pensions. Compared to the group between 60 and 64 years, the rise in the LFPR for the group between the age of 55 and 59 years is more pronounced: an increase of about 1.5 percentage points at the peak compared to 0.75 percentage points for the group between 60 and 64. The increase in the LFPRs is hump-shaped, particularly for those between the age of 60 and 64, rather than remaining elevated for the entire

\textsuperscript{21}The primary data source is the OECD Database. More details on the data and sources are given in Table A.1.

\textsuperscript{22}The response of LFPR are the average dynamic response over time for people in the given age group, rather than cohort-specific responses as in micro data analysis.
ten year horizon considered. This dynamic response can be potentially attributed to the nature of policy changes. Among reforms without phase-in periods 30 percent are associated with changes in indexation, while only 15 percent of them change retirement ages. In contrast, only 5 percent of major reforms with phase-in periods change indexation, and more than 35 percent of them adjust retirement age. Changes in indexation rules tend to be more transitory, while changes in retirement ages are less likely to be reversed.23

Regardless of the phase-in periods, structural reforms have an insignificant impact on the LFPR of young and mid-aged population between age 20 and 49 years across all horizons. Therefore, the responses in the LFPRs of the elderly population transmits to the aggregate LFPR, which rises in response to policy changes implemented with no delays but declines in response to changes with phase-in periods.

Structural policy changes with implementation delays can thus have unintended consequences for the government fiscal position. When pension retrenchments are implemented immediately, less generous pension benefits, in combination with higher LFPRs for the elderly population, lead to a decline in the cumulative growth rate of old-age pension spending, reaching 2 percent at its trough as shown in the last panel of Figure 7. Overall, the response of pension spending closely mimics the dynamics of the LFPR of the population between the age of 55 and 64 years. On the other hand, as some people in the marginal group exit the labor market in response to pension retrenchment news, government spending on old age pensions does not change much in the short-run and slightly increases, rather than decreases, over the medium run.24 In terms of pension spending-to-GDP, an average pension retrenchment reform with no delay leads to a decline of about 0.16 percentage points about 4 years

23For instance, in 2002 the United Kingdom introduced the double-lock indexation, which indexed pensions according to the higher of inflation rate or 2.5 percent. It was abolished in 2007, when the earnings-link indexation was restored. Three years later, a triple-lock indexation, which index pensions according to the higher of inflation rate, growth in earnings, or 2.5 percent, was introduced. In 1993, Finland changed the indexation rule to give 50% weight to consumer prices and 50% to earnings net pension contribution. Three years later, the indexation was changed again with the weight on wages being reduced to 20%.

24We abstract from discussing the present value of pension liability, as it is challenging to even gauge the cash flow impact of pension reforms, as detailed in Section 3.2 and Section C. Therefore we abstract from discussion related to pension actuarial neutrality or fairness, which is often discussed in papers using micro data, for instance Gruber and Wise (2004).
after the reform is enacted. On the other hand, in response to reforms with implementation lags, the pension spending-to-GDP ratio rises by between 0.03 to 0.05 percentage points at various horizons.\textsuperscript{25,26}

In addition to different age groups, we further examine whether the distinct effects of policy changes with and without delays are driven by gender. Many countries in our sample started with lower retirement ages for women, and some of the policy changes are focused on women workers specifically. For instance, the 1995 Pension Act in United Kingdom equalized the state pension age for men and women, raising the age requirement for women from 60 to 65 years and phasing in the policy change between 2010 and 2020. Figure 8 shows that the effects on the LFPRs of the marginal population are similar across gender, with the LFPRs for women being more responsive to policy changes overall. The LFPRs between the ages of 55 and 64 years, of both men and women, rise in response to pension retrenchments enacted with no delay and fall in response to those with delays, with the drop more statistically significant for women.

Why would people close to retirement respond differently to pension policy changes with vs. without phase-in periods? In Sections 6.1 - 6.4, we explore the potential channels at play.

\section*{6.1 Transmission Channels} Pension retrenchment reforms can affect the marginal group close to retirement through potentially three distinct channels. First, with less generous pension benefits under retrenchments, agents may choose to stay in the labor force

\textsuperscript{25}The responses are shown with a one standard error band, where the standard errors are estimated using a clustered-robust covariance matrix estimator. We show 90\% confidence bands in Figure A.7 in the Appendix, and while the responses for pension spending overlap, but those of the LFPR between 55 and 64 years are still statistically significantly different across many horizons. This is further validated by formally testing whether the coefficients for reforms implemented with and without delay are equal and we can reject the hypothesis of equality at the 10\% level (and at 5\% level for a subset) for LFPR between 55 and 64 for horizons between 4 and 8 years after the shock.

\textsuperscript{26}Herbst and Johannsen (2020) argue that impulse responses estimated by local projection can be biased in small samples given the high-degree persistence in macroeconomic variables, which could potentially be a concern for our analysis. Therefore, we follow the adjustment proposed in Herbst and Johannsen (2020) to correct for the small sample bias. Figure A.5 in the Appendix shows that compared to the baseline case, the bias-adjusted impulse responses are larger in magnitude for all variables, suggesting if anything an even bigger difference between responses to policy changes with and without delay.
longer to save more for their retirement, which is the *income effect channel*. Second, if pension retrenchments are announced well ahead of time, agents may respond to news about future pension policy changes by retiring earlier if these future reforms would take away certain pension options that are available to retirees in the pre-reform regime. This is the *fiscal foresight channel*. Finally, pension retrenchments, in particular more fundamental reforms, can demonstrate governments’ political willingness and fiscal need to scale back pension systems and may signal further pension changes down the road. Uncertainties associated with changes in future pension benefits can prompt the marginal group to retire earlier, which is the *uncertainty channel*.

The income effect channel applies to pension retrenchments in general, regardless of whether they are phased in or implemented immediately. When governments enact reforms to scale back their pension systems, retirees face lower future pension benefits, which either materialize immediately or phase in over a period of time. Lower expected income in the future may prompt people to push back their retirement plans and stay in the labor force longer.

The fiscal foresight channel, however, applies only to pension retrenchments with phase-in periods. If announced reforms would take away certain pension options in the future, people may decide to exit the labor market and lock in the current benefits during the phase-in period. For instance, in 1997, the Belgian government decided to gradually raise the minimum working period of early retirement from 24 to 35 years, which would be fully phased in by 2005. The news of the pension reform may create incentives for those with 24 years of working years to exit the labor force prior to when the new longer working period rules started binding. Similarly, in 2004, the United Kingdom decided to raise the earliest age that a pension may be taken from age 50 to age 55, starting from 2010. People who were 50 or close to it may have a strong incentive to retire prior to the implementation of the law, as this option would be no longer available to them in 2010. In 1997, Spain decided to increase the calculation period for pension payments from the last 8 to 15 years, effective in
2002. In this case, people who were eligible for retirement would have the incentive to retire early to earn higher pensions. Essentially, these are all examples of policy changes that take away an option and create incentives for agents to lock in current benefits.

Finally, the uncertainty channel is most relevant for reforms that change the fundamental aspects of pension systems. A prominent example is the 1995 Dini reform in Italy. The reform made great strides towards a contribution-based pension system in an attempt to put the system on a more financially viable footing. The change, nevertheless, would only be completely phased in by 2032. The exceedingly long transition associated with the 1995 reform, joint with the subsequent reforms in attempt to speed up the progress, may have prompted people close to retirement to exit the labor market earlier, as the OECD Economic Survey of Italy (2007, pg 96) points out: “Many workers decided to retire as early as possible as a consequence of the public perception about the direction of change and uncertainty about the reform process. Indeed, the defined-benefit scheme is not actuarially fair, and it has thus been economically convenient to retire as early as possible.” These potentially unintended consequences of the pension reforms in Italy have also been discussed by others. For example, through the lens of an overlapping-generations model, Santoro (2006) shows that early announcement of Italian pension reform in 1992 led to a drop in employment rate of workers aged 55 and older.

6.2 LENGTH OF IMPLEMENTATION DELAYS

In order to further explore the fiscal foresight and uncertainty channels, we investigate whether the response to fiscal news depends on the length of phase-in periods. Implementation delays vary widely in our data set from a couple of years to close to 40 years, and we split the delayed reforms into those with phase-in periods

\[27\text{Major pension reforms in Italy started in 1992 (Amato reform) and continued in 1995 with the adoption of a contribution based regime (Dini reform), though with a lengthy transition period. Since pension expenditure continued to rise more rapidly than expected, the Prodi Agreement of 1997 brought forward the harmonisation of public and private pension regimes and also accelerated the increase in the early retirement age. This was followed by the 2004 Maroni-Tremonti reform which made the eligibility requirements more stringent. Within this context, OECD Economic Survey of Italy (2007, pg 95) observes, “Constant tinkering with reforms has only exacerbated such uncertainty. For example, frequent revision of the pension reform may have pushed people into early retirement because they want to lock in benefits.”}\]
shorter than 15 years from those with longer delays. Overall, about one third of major structural changes are implemented without delays, another half are phased in within 15 years, while the remaining changes come with implementation delays of 15 years or longer.

Figure 9 highlights that the responses to fiscal news are much stronger for reforms with longer delays. In the case of major reforms with shorter implementation delays (green dot-dashed lines), the responses – both the LFPR for population close to retirement and pension spending – are largely muted. On the other hand, in response to reforms with longer delays (solid blue lines), the LFPR goes down significantly, more than 1 percentage point at the trough, relative to 0.5 percentage points in our baseline case, shown in Figure 7. The pension spending response is consistent with the LFPR response: public spending on pensions increases in the short to medium run, as more people exit the labor market.

This finding may appear to be counterintuitive at first glance. One may think that reforms with longer phase-in periods, of the order of 15 years and longer, should be less relevant to the marginal group today than those with shorter delays. Therefore, one may expect that people close to retirement should react more strongly to pension changes with shorter, rather than longer delays, contrary to what Figure 9 illustrates.

The key to reconcile this argument with our finding is considering it through the lens of the uncertainty channel, as most policy changes with exceedingly long delays are also the ones that change the fundamental aspects of pension system. Since they are politically challenging to pass, these fundamental reforms tend to come with prolonged implementation lags to make them more satiable for the public. As discussed in previous section, the 1995 Dini reform in Italy provides a good example, as the government announced a change from the defined-benefit system to a notional contribution-based system with a phase-in period of 37 years. For pension retrenchments with shorter implementation delays, the muted responses reflect that the income effect channel and the fiscal foresight channel potentially offset each other.

28 The responses look very similar if we use 10 years as a threshold, given that the average implementation lags for major reforms in our sample is 9.4 years.
In addition, our finding on pension changes is consistent with the anticipation effects of tax changes identified in Mertens and Ravn (2011) and Mertens and Ravn (2012). They find that preannounced but not yet implemented tax cuts give rise to contractions in output. The longer the anticipation horizon, the deeper is the pre-implementation downturn. Similarly, we find a pension reform with a longer phase-in period leads to a larger decline in the LFPR for people close to retirement.

6.3 Policy Tools  
We next investigate whether the response to fiscal news depends on policy tools. Within delayed major structural changes, 30 percent are related to modifying benefit formulas or indexation rules, while 70 percent are associated with changes in retirement age or required contribution years. Splitting delayed reforms based on these tools is finer than the baseline, but still broad enough to ensure reasonable inference in our econometric analysis. Therefore, we include three types of reform dummies in Equation 5.1: reforms without delay, delayed reforms associated with changes in age and contributions, and delayed reforms using other policy tools.

Fiscal foresight is particularly pronounced for reforms that change the fundamental aspects of pension systems, with the uncertainty channel interacting with the foresight channel. As shown in figure 10, the responses to age- and contribution-based reforms with delays (blue solid lines) are similar to, but more pronounced than, our baseline responses to all delayed reforms. The drop in the LFPR of the marginal group reaches 0.8 percentage points at its trough, while the pension spending turns positive between year 2 and 6. In addition, these responses are more precisely estimated and statistically significant at more horizons compared to the baseline results.

On the other hand, people are less likely to exit the labor market in response to delayed reforms using other policy tools. The green dot-dashed lines in figure 10 show that in this case, the LFPR of the marginal group declines in the first couple of years and then turns positive after year 4, suggesting that the fiscal foresight channel is at play only in the short run, while the income effect channel dominates over the medium term. This is largely
consistent with the observation that many of those reforms were implemented fairly quickly.

6.4 Interaction Between Length of Implementation Delays and Policy Tools

One remaining question might be whether the effects of policy tools and length of implementation delays are being confounded. Overall, 85 percent of the reforms with longer delays are associated with changes in age and contribution, while the share is 60 percent for reforms with shorter delays. In this section, we investigate whether age- and contribution-based reforms have different impact depending on the length of implementation delays.

To address that question, we now consider 4 different types of reforms in our empirical analysis: reforms with no delays, age- and contribution-based reforms with short delays (less than 15 years), age- and contribution-based reforms with long delays (15 or longer years), and delayed reforms based on other tools. As shown in Figure 11, the response of the LFPR of the marginal group are largely muted to age- and contribution-based reforms with short delays. Delayed reforms using other policy tools, the majority of which come with short delays, lead to a decline in LFPR on impact, which turns positive at medium to long horizons. On the other hand, age- and contribution-based reforms with long delays see a large drop, of 1.6 percentage point, in the LFPR for the marginal group. The comparison highlights that the fiscal foresight channel is most prevalent for reforms characterized by both long delays and changes in age and contribution.

Overall, this analysis provides policy insights on how to design pension reforms. Phase-in periods ease the impact of pension reforms on retirees by providing them time to adjust their retirement plans. However, delays slow the process of scaling back government pension spending, which may be further compounded through the fiscal foresight channel. This channel is particularly prevalent for pension reforms that change retirement age and contribution years, and that come with longer implementation delays. When designing pension reforms, the length of phase-in periods and the associated policy tools, thus, should be a first-order

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29 Given the small number of policy changes based on other tools and a majority of them being implemented with short delays, it is not feasible to divide them between short and long delays for estimation purposes.
7 Robustness Checks

In the following section, we explore the robustness of the distinct impact of structural retrenchments with and without implementation delays on the relevant labor market variables and public pension spending.

7.1 Accounting for the State of the Economy

Our structural policy changes are motivated by long-run sustainability concerns, rather than current macroeconomic conditions. However, one might wonder if the policy changes implemented with and without delay have different characteristics based on the state of the economy when they are enacted. Both types of structural changes are on average more likely to be enacted in good times than bad times.\(^{30}\) Close to 60 percent of both types of reforms are introduced when GDP growth rates are above the country-specific average growth rate. This finding is robust to alternative definitions of good and bad times, considering positive versus negative GDP growth rates, OECD recession indicators, and also unemployment rate above and below the country-specific averages.\(^{31}\)

We take one step further to test whether the responses to policy changes are different based on the state of the economy when they are enacted. Figure 12 compares the responses of all major structural changes enacted during high-growth periods (red dashed lines) versus low-growth periods (blue solid lines). Firstly, since we include all major structural changes, the responses of LFPRs are now largely muted as they are the average responses to policy changes with and without implementation delays. The comparison between Figures 7 and 12 highlights the importance of differentiating policy changes along the dimension of im-

\(^{30}\)This is shown in Figure A.6 in the Appendix.

\(^{31}\)Beetsma, Klaassen, Romp, and van Maurik (2020) find that pension retrenchments are more likely during business cycle downturns, while pension expansions are more likely during good times. Compared to our approach, the major difference is that we focus on structural reforms that are motivated by long-term concerns, while they include all pension policy changes that may have different motivations.
plementation delays. Secondly, there are no statistical differences in the responses of LFPR and pension spending across both high- and low-growth periods, confirming that the distinct responses captured in the baseline case are driven by implementation lags rather than the underlying state of the economy.\textsuperscript{32}

As a further robustness check, we include economic activity indicators as an additional control variable in our regression equation 5.1. In Figure 13, the top panel shows the cases with lagged GDP growth rate and OECD recession indicator as control variables. Our baseline results are virtually unchanged.\textsuperscript{33}

7.2 Accounting for Coincidence of other Fiscal Consolidation Measures

One could be concerned that the responses to our structural policy measures are confounded by other fiscal austerity actions taken during the same period. Most countries have witnessed a wave of pension retrenchments since 1990s. Many of them have also conducted other fiscal austerity measures during the same period, motivated by concerns over sustained budget deficits or dictated by the Maastricht Treaty with the formation of the European Union.

We first check whether our policy dummies overlap with other fiscal consolidation measures in the literature. Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014) present the budgetary impact of fiscal consolidations, in terms of changes in both expenditures and revenues, which are not motivated by short-term or cyclical concerns between 1978 and 2009. Their data set considers 13 OECD countries, which includes all of the countries in our data set except New Zealand. For the most part, the correlation between our major reform dummies and their fiscal consolidations plans is low. Some countries have no overlap, such as Denmark and Spain. For other countries, like Italy and Finland, the correlation is as high as 0.3 and 0.4 respectively.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{32}When we distinguish between major reforms with delays enacted in good versus bad times, we do not find significant differences across those responses. For major reforms with no delays, the LFPR of the marginal population tends to rise more during bad times than in good times, but the differences are not statistically significantly different across most horizons.

\textsuperscript{33}Figure 13 shows the case where we include one lag of the economic activity variable, but the figures look very similar if we put in the contemporaneous values as controls.

\textsuperscript{34}This is true for major structural reforms all grouped together and also if we separately consider changes
We include the fiscal consolidation shock from Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014) as a control variable in our estimation. The bottom panel of Figure 13 shows that our baseline results for the LFPRs of the marginal groups and pension spending are preserved for both changes implemented with and without delays.

In addition to accounting for fiscal consolidations, we also include other fiscal variables such as the growth rate of government spending and tax revenues as controls. One concern might be that changes in pension spending could crowd in/out other types of spending, or are accompanied by major tax changes, which are potentially relevant for the marginal groups. The bottom panel of Figure 13 shows that our baseline results are robust to the inclusion of all these fiscal controls.

### 7.3 Accounting for Coincidence of other Major Labor Reform Measures

In addition to public pension policy, the LFPRs for people close to retirement might also be affected by labor market reforms. Using the OECD Surveys as a primary source, Duval and Furceri (2018) have recently constructed a database of product market and labor reforms spanning 1970-2013 for 26 OECD countries. We use all the labor reforms documented in their data appendix that apply to regular workers, including employment protection legislation reforms and unemployment benefit reforms. With the exception of Denmark, there is very little overlap between major pension dummies in our data set and their labor market reforms. In Denmark, the correlation is 0.3 for major pension changes with delay and 0.17 for those implemented without delays. Importantly, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 13, the responses of pension spending and LFPRs of marginal workers do not change when the labor market reform dummy is included as an additional control variable.

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35 We use the lag of the fiscal consolidation shock, but results are unaffected if we put in the contemporaneous value or additional lags of this variable as controls.

36 The overlapping years with labor and public pension reforms are 1996, 2000 and 2011.
7.4 Alternative Specification of the Pension Reform Shock  In the baseline case, we have made two assumptions to improve identification and thus inference of our structural reform dummies. Firstly, as discussed in Section 3.2, we assign intensity to structural reforms to account for the fact that some reforms are more comprehensive, with multiple policy changes. Secondly, as discussed in Section 5.1, we only consider major structural changes to pensions, excluding marginal ones. In this section, we relax them to see how these assumptions, driven partially by our judgement, affect our results.

We first abstract from assigning intensity to reform dummies. Specifically, we assign all structural reform dummies as being in the set of \(-1, +1\), so that we treat all major reforms the same, regardless of multi-dimensional policy reforms or one policy change by itself. The top panel of Figure 14 shows that our results are robust overall. The responses of pension spending and the LFPR of 55-64 years have slightly larger confidence bands in the case of reforms implemented with delay (blue solid lines).

Next, we include all changes in pension policy that are motivated by long-term concerns, both major and marginal ones. Considering the fact that some of the marginal ones are relatively small policy changes, we put 50% weight on the marginal policy changes; otherwise, giving equal weights to all policy changes may yield a very noisy measure of structural reforms.\(^{37}\) The responses of the labor market variables and pension spending to the broader reform dummies are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 14. It is not surprising that confidence bands are much larger in this case, since minor policy changes are given significant weight. The qualitative results, however, still hold, as the LFPRs of marginal groups and pension spending respond differently in response to reforms with and without lags at a subset of horizons.

\(^{37}\)For example, in 2010 the French government eliminated the option for parents with three children to leave the work force with pensions after 15 years’ service. This is a marginal change to pension in our database, as it only affects a small fraction of pensioners. In the same reform act, the minimum legal retirement age was raised from 60 to 62 years, which is classified as a major change.
8 Conclusion

By tracking pension policy for 10 OECD countries over the past several decades, we document that a rapid expansion of pension systems between 1960s and 80s was followed by successive retrenchments since 1990s. Structural pension reforms, which are motivated by long-run fiscal sustainability concerns, often come with long implementation delays.

We find that people close to retirement have distinctly different responses to pension retrenchments with phase-in periods from those without. Notably, the LFPRs of those close to retirement rises in response to pension retrenchments with no implementation delays and falls in response to pension retrenchment news. This channel of fiscal foresight also has consequences for pension spending, with pension spending rising in response to delayed retrenchment reforms in the medium run.

We provide further evidence that these unintended consequences of pension reforms are exacerbated with longer implementation delays and changes in retirement age and contribution years. These effects of delayed pension reforms are likely driven by multiple factors, including the desire to lock in current benefits before the implementation of policy changes. In addition, major policy reforms driven by dire fiscal projections might also lead to uncertainty about future reforms, amplifying the fiscal foresight channel. A further understanding of the transmission mechanism at play and also the impact on government’s pension liability from the perspective of present value may require more micro-level data, which is left for future work.
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### Table 1: Granger causality tests

| Variable                        | Major No delay | Major Delay |
|---------------------------------|----------------|-------------|
| GDP growth                      | 0.650          | 0.258       |
| Inflation                       | 0.574          | 0.237       |
| Unemp. Rate                     | 0.131          | 0.336       |
| OECD recession                  | 0.467          | 0.567       |
| Pension spend./GDP              | 0.896          | 0.550       |
| LFPR-marginal                   | 0.529          | 0.997       |
| Share of Elderly pop            | 0.153          | 0.019       |

This table shows the p-values associated with the Granger causality tests where a high p-value implies that it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the aggregate variable does not predict the pension reform measure. Each entry shows the result of regressing our pension reform measure (of a given type) on one lag of the reform measure and the aggregate variable, along with country and year fixed effects. The aggregate variables are the labor force participation rate for the age group between 55 and 64, pension spending as share of GDP, unemployment rate, growth rate of real GDP, share of elderly population, CPI inflation, and government deficit as share of GDP. Note, that the regression for all macro variables are run based on earliest data availability for each country, which is not uniformly starting in 1960 for all.
Figure 1: Public spending on old-age pensions has been rising across countries, even though the pace varies.

Figure 2: Changes in pension policy have come in waves with expansions to pension systems between 1960s-80s following by retrenchments since the 1990s. Each bar shows the number of policy changes for each decade. Blue bars represent policy changes that made pension scheme more generous, while green bars show pension retrenchments that were adopted to scale back pension schemes.
Figure 3: Motivations associated with pension policy changes. Expansions between 1960s and 1970s were largely driven by cyclical and purchasing power considerations, while recent policy changes since the 1990s have been dominated by structural reforms.

Figure 4: Changes in policy tools during the past six decades.
Figure 5: Pension implementation delays (measured in years). Each dot represents the implementation delay associated with one policy change. Green dots are associated with pension retrenchments, while blue dots are for pension expansions.
Figure 6: Measures on major structural pension reforms without and with implementation delays.

(a) Measure without phase-in periods

(b) Measure with phase-in periods
Figure 7: Responses of labor market and pension spending to structural pension retrenchments for data between 1980 and 2017. The blue solid lines show the responses to reforms implemented with delays and red dashed lines correspond to reforms implemented without delays. The corresponding bands show one standard deviation confidence bands.

(a) Labor force participation rates

(b) Old-age pension spending
Figure 8: Gender breakdown of the responses in the labor market to structural pension retrenchments. The blue solid lines show the responses to reforms implemented with delays and red dashed lines correspond to reforms implemented without delays. The corresponding bands show one standard deviation confidence bands.
Figure 9: Responses of labor market and pension spending to structural pension retrenchments for data between 1980 and 2017. The figure shows responses to delayed reforms with implementation lags of 15 years and longer (blue solid lines), reforms implemented with delays less than 15 years (green dot-dashed lines) and reforms implemented without delays (red dashed lines).

Figure 10: Responses of labor market and pension spending to structural pension retrenchments for data between 1980 and 2017. The figure shows responses to age- and contribution-based reforms with delays (blue solid lines), all other delayed reforms (green dot-dashed), and reforms implemented without delays (red dashed lines).
Figure 11: Responses of labor market and pension spending to structural pension retrenchments for data between 1980 and 2017. The figure shows responses to age- and contribution-based reforms with long delays of 15 years and longer (blue solid, right panel), age- and contribution-based reforms with short delays of less than 15 years (green dot-dashed lines, right panel), all other delayed reforms (black dotted, left panel), and reforms implemented without delays (red dashed lines, left panel).
Figure 12: Responses to all major structural reforms enacted during high GDP growth periods (red dashed) and low growth periods (blue solid).
Figure 13: Robustness to controlling for additional variables: the blue solid lines show the responses to reforms implemented with delays and red dashed lines correspond to reforms implemented without delays in the baseline case with corresponding one standard deviation confidence bands. The top panel shows additional specifications when controlling for state of the economy, including GDP growth rate and OECD recession indicator. The bottom panel shows results for controlling for fiscal consolidation events, fiscal consolidation dates with additional fiscal controls and lastly labor market reforms.

(a) State of the economy controls

(b) Fiscal consolidation and labor market reform controls
Figure 14: Robustness to alternative definitions of the pension reform measure: the blue solid lines show the responses to reforms implemented with delays and red dashed lines correspond to reforms implemented without delays. The grey bands show one standard deviation confidence bands.

(a) Excluding intensity

(b) Major and marginal policy changes
## A Additional Figures and Tables

| Data                              | Description                                                                 | Data Source       |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| LFPR                              | Labor force participation, aggregate, by age: 20-49, 55-59, 60-64, 55-64, gender and age: Female/Male 55-59, 60-64, 55-64 | OECD              |
| Pension spending                  | Old age public spending as percent of GDP                                    | OECD              |
| GDP                               | National accounts, expenditure approach, GDP                                 | OECD              |
| CPI                               | National account, expenditure approach, government expenditure              | OECD              |
| Government spending               | Total tax revenues as percent of GDP                                         | OECD              |
| Tax revenues                      | People aged 65 and over as share of total pop.                              | OECD              |
| Elderly population share          |                                                                             | World Bank        |
| Life expectancy                   |                                                                             | Guajardo et al. (2014) |
| Fiscal consolidation variable     | Employment protection legislation reforms and unemployment benefit reforms for regular workers | Duval & Furceri (2018) |
| Labor reform dummy                |                                                                             |                   |

Table A.1: Our analysis is conducted for the sample period 1980-2018, as the old-age pension spending data starts in 1980. The LFPR data starts at later dates for some countries: in 1983 for Belgium and Denmark, 1984 in UK and 1986 in New Zealand. All other data covers this time period unless indicated in the text.
Figure A.1: Belgium: early retirement programs had a significant impact on the labor market and pension spending.

(a) Early retirement programs were introduced in response to rising unemployment rate in the late 1970s. The gray bar highlights the introduction of three early retirement programs in 1975, 1976 and 1978. The blue line shows the unemployment rate, and the green line shows the population in early retirement as a share of the total labor force.

(b) Early retirement programs have been scaled back since the late 1980s, and the spending on early retirement as a share of GDP has been trending down at a very gradual pace. The dashed lines show that retrenchment measures were taken in 1987, 1997, 2006, 2012, and 2015, while an expansionary measure was taken in 1994.
Figure A.2: Denmark: the early transitional retirement scheme and the LFPR for elderly population. The early program was introduced in 1992 and expanded in 1994, with entrance to the scheme shutting off in 1996. The blue line shows the LFPR for population between age 50 and 59 years, and the green line shows the early retirement spending as share of GDP.

Figure A.3: France: the early retirement program and the LFPR for elderly population. Incentives to encourage early retirement were provided in 1981. The blue line shows the LFPR for population between age 55 and 59 years, and the green line shows the early retirement spending as share of GDP.
Figure A.4: Implementation delays associated with major structural pension changes (measured in years). Each dot represents the implementation delay associated with one policy change. Green dots are associated with pension retrenchments, while blue dots are for pension expansions.

Figure A.5: Responses of labor market and pension spending to structural pension retrenchments for data between 1980 and 2017. The blue solid lines show the responses to reforms implemented with delays and red dashed lines correspond to reforms implemented without delays. The grey bands show one standard deviation confidence bands. In both cases, the black solid lines shows the bias corrected responses constructed as in Herbst and Johannsen (2020).
Figure A.6: Distribution of all major structural reforms: delay (blue bars) and no delay (orange bars), enacted across good (solid bars) and bad times (patterned bars). High/low GDP growth and unemployment are periods where GDP growth and unemployment rate are above/below the country-specific sample average.
Figure A.7: Responses of labor market and pension spending to structural pension retrenchments for data between 1980 and 2017. The blue solid lines show the responses to reforms implemented with delays and red dashed lines correspond to reforms implemented without delays. The corresponding bands show 90% confidence bands.

(a) Labor force participation rates

(b) Old-age pension spending
B Examples of Pension Policy Changes

In this section, we use three examples associated with pension policy changes in Belgium to explain how we extract information from the OECD Economic Surveys, and how we classify policy changes along the four aspects as laid out in Section 3.2.

B.1 Pension Change in 1968

According to the Survey of Belgium in 1970, the government formulated monetary and fiscal policy “with a closer view to the needs of short-term demand management” in the last couple of years. As shown in Figure B.1, while capital outflow required a shift to restrictive monetary policy in 1968, fiscal policy were eased to cope “with the slack in fixed investment.” Government adopted a wide range of measures, including increased pension payments, to support economic activity. We consider that the government expanded pension benefits through higher payments, and classify the change as motivated by cyclical concerns and implemented without delays.

B.2 Pension Change in 1994

The Survey of Belgium in 1995 provides a calendar of main economic events for the year 1994, as illustrated in Figure B.2. In December 1994, a major change in early retirement age was passed against the backdrop of historically high unemployment rate, 12.9 percent as the end-June official figure. The Survey further elaborated: “The interprofessional agreement (accord interprofessionnel) for 1995-96 concluded by the social partners late last year gave priority to the defence and promotion of employment.” The new agreement includes a range of policy changes, including a larger reduction in social contributions for firms that created more jobs, a new ‘hiring plan’ targeting the long-term unemployed, and lowering the age limit for early retirement for two years. We classify the change as motivated by cyclical concerns and implemented without delays. It was an expansionary policy change through lowering retirement age.

B.3 Pension Change in 2015

The Survey of Belgium in 2017 provides an in-depth discussion on the pension reform of 2015, which was viewed as “an important step towards
III ECONOMIC POLICIES IN BELGIUM

Economic policies seem to have had some stabilizing effect on demand during the phase of recovery of economic expansion in 1968, and perhaps during last year’s boom. In the former year, there had been a certain conflict between internal and external aims, with the expansionary policies adopted to support domestic demand contributing to the heavy, largely speculative, capital outflows. The conflict was removed last year, when internal as well as external considerations called for a shift to more restrictive policies. It is not possible to know precisely the role played by policy action, as distinct from autonomous factors, in strengthening demand during 1968 and containing last year’s boom, and the stabilizing effect of individual policies is difficult to judge. The policy mix relied on monetary and budgetary instruments in both periods, but with the adjustments in response to the changing circumstances affected more promptly in the monetary field than in that of the budget.

The expansionary policy phase had started with an active easing of monetary conditions from early in 1967 on. Early in 1968, then this had not yet succeeded in coping with the slack in fixed investment, and external influences made it technically difficult to pursue a policy of active monetary easing, expansionary fiscal action was taken. For this, the authorities relied on measures, such as public works, aid for dwellings and increased pension payments, which could be expected to involve a relatively small import leakage and quite strong employment and income effects. Combined with the continued easy posture of monetary policy, this was followed later in the year by the beginning of a revival of fixed investment. It is true, of course, that the revival was importantly influenced by autonomous factors as well, in particular, the continued buoyancy of exports, rising capacity utilization in industry and a marked improvement of business profit.

long-term fiscal sustainability.” As shown in Figure B.3, the reform took a wide range of measures, including

1. The statutory retirement age would be increased from 65 to 66 years in 2025 and to 67 years in 2030. This measure changes retirement age with a phase-in period of 10 to 15 years.

2. Early retirement conditions was made more stringent. The minimum age and number of career years required to qualify for early retirement would progressively increase:
starting from 62 years and 40 years respectively in 2016, they would increase to 62.5 and 41 years in 2017, then to 63 and 41 years in 2018 and finally to 63 and 42 years in 2019. We classify it into two changes, that associated with retirement age, and that related to contribution years. Both changes would be fully implemented within 4 years.

3. The terms for pre-pension benefits was also made more stringent. The minimum age was increased from 60 years to 62 years in 2015, subject to transitional arrangements. This measure changes retirement age with implementation delays.

4. In addition, the possibility to use a complementary pension to retire earlier and to bridge the income gap until being eligible to a full pension was abolished, subject to transitional arrangements. As the measure phased out a complementary pension plan,
we classify it as a change on pension coverage that come with some implementation delays.

We also categorize all the measures in 2015 as structural changes, as they were motivated by long-run concerns. As explained in Section 5.1, we give intensity score to our pension dummy to capture the scope of reforms. The 2015 reform in Belgium has an intensity of “-5”. The high intensity is qualitatively consistent with the assessment from the Survey, as it says that “(T)he Working Group on Ageing Populations and Sustainability projects pension spending to increase from 11.8% of GDP in 2013 to 13.1% of GDP in 2060, compared to an increase to 15.1% of GDP in 2060 in a no-reform scenario (EC, 2016b).” [OECD Economic Survey of Belgium (2017, pg 36)]
Figure B.3: The Surveys have been providing in-depth discussions on economic challenges and policy recommendations since 2003. Example: the Survey for Belgium (2017)

**Box 3. Main elements of the 2015 pension reform**

A number of measures were taken in 2015 to increase the effective average age of retirement from the labour market, thereby improving the sustainability of the pension system.

- The statutory retirement age will be increased from 65 to 66 years in 2025 and to 67 years in 2030.
- Early retirement conditions will be made more stringent.

- The minimum age and number of career years required to qualify for early retirement will progressively increase: starting from 62 years and 40 years respectively in 2016, they will increase to 62.5 and 41 years in 2017, then to 63 and 41 years in 2018 and finally to 63 and 42 years in 2019.
- Exceptions for long careers will also be tightened. The required career length to retire at 60 (61) will increase from 42 (41) years in 2016 to 43 (42) years in 2017 and 44 (43) years in 2019.
- In the civil servants scheme, the years of studies taken into account in the aforementioned career condition for early retirement will be progressively phased out as from 2016 (by steps of 4 to 6 months/year).

The terms for pre-pension benefits (unemployment benefits with employer top-up) have been made more stringent:

- The minimum age has been increased from 60 years to 62 years in 2015, subject to transitional arrangements.
- The age limit for pre-pension benefits for loss-making and restructuring companies is to increase from 55 years in 2015 to arrive at 60 years in 2020.
- The minimum age for pre-pension benefits after very long careers (40 years) has been increased from 56 years to 58 years in 2015.
- The minimum age for pre-pension benefits in case of night and shift work or incapacity to work in the building sector has been increased from 56 years to 58 years in 2015 and will be raised to 60 years on a date to be set by the National Labour Council.
- The minimum age for pre-pension benefits in case of arduous jobs will be raised to 60 years on a date to be set by the National Labour Council.

The possibility to use a complementary pension to retire earlier and to bridge the income gap until being eligible to a full pension has been abolished, subject to transitional arrangements.
C PROJECTED BUDGETARY IMPACT OF PENSION REFORMS: ITALY CASE STUDY

We rely on Alesina, Barbiero, Favero, Giavazzi, and Paradisi (2017) and their corresponding data appendix to construct the projected budgetary impact of major pension reforms in Italy since 1990s. Their study presents the budgetary impact in the year when the legislation was passed and also for up to 5 years out, i.e. $\sum_{j=0}^{5} \text{budgetary impact}_{t+j}$ for the reform that was passed at period $t$. The authors rely on contemporaneous sources including OECD Surveys and country-specific reports.$^{38}$ We include reductions in spending and transfers as a result of pension reforms in the relevant years from their database. As a first pass, we do not include savings from increased contributions. The top panel of Figure C.1 compares our major structural reform dummies (blue bars) to their 5-year projected budgetary impact of pension reforms for the corresponding years (orange bars). If we also include savings from increased contributions, the budgetary impact in some years, notably 1995, are increased, see the bottom panel of Figure C.1.

Overall, our reform dummies with intensity line up reasonably well relative to the short-run projected budgetary impact. However, this projected budgetary impact does not account for the projected long-run savings. It is particularly relevant for reforms with very long phase-in periods. For example, the OECD Economic Survey 1997 estimated that the largest expenditure savings associated with the 1995 Dini reform wouldn’t materialize until 2025, as shown in Figure C.2. This also illustrates the difficulty in summarizing the projected budgetary impact of pension reforms, because of added uncertainty with such long-run horizons.

$^{38}$They are given in terms of local currency in their Appendix and we convert them in terms of percent of GDP.
Figure C.1: Major structural reform (on the left axis) and the five-year projected budgetary impact as a percentage of GDP from Alesina, Barbiero, Favero, Giavazzi, and Paradisi (2017) (on the right axis) under alternative computations.

(a) Projected 5-year budgetary impact/GDP with expenditure savings.

(b) Projected 5-year budgetary impact/GDP with expenditure and contribution-based savings.
Figure C.2: Projected budgetary impact as a percentage of GDP of the 1995 pension reform in Italy in OECD Economic Survey 1997, pg 84.

Figure 29. TRENDS IN PENSION PAYMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Per cent of GDP

Source: OECD.