Problems Concerning Āptamīmāṃsā 59

SHIGA Kiyokuni

1. Introduction

The Āptamīmāṃsā (ĀM) is a work written by a Jaina philosopher, Samantabhadra (ca. 6–7th century). 1) It is frequently quoted by other schools, especially Buddhists when they introduce and criticize the views of Jainas. As seen in Buddhist treatises such as the PVSVṬ, DMP, and HBṬĀ, it is often the case that the three verses, i.e., ĀM 57, 59, and 60, are quoted together. Among those three verses, ĀM 59 is quoted most frequently. It is also quoted by the Naiyāyikas 2) and the Jainas themselves. 3) The aim of this paper is to: (1) observe how and in what context ĀM 59 is quoted in Buddhist treatises, (2) clarify the relationship between the ĀM and the Ślokavārttika (ŚV) by comparing and analyzing similar passages found in both works, and (3) examine the relationship between the Jaina thought seen in ĀM 59 and the Sāṃkhya doctrine.

2. Quotations from the ĀM in the Buddhist Treatises

The quotation from the ĀM appears in Karṇakagomin’s commentary on PV 1.176, which constitutes a part of Dharmakīrti’s critique of the Sāṃkhyas. 4) He regards the view that a single entity has two aspects, i.e., the universal (sāmānya) and the particular (viśeṣa), as the thought common among the Sāṃkhyas, Mīmāṃsakas, and Naiyāyikas, and tries to criticize those three schools simultaneously with a similar strategy. 5) The quotation from the ĀM in the PVSVṬ is found after the contents of the verses quoted subsequently are explained: 6)

This person feels sorrow for a pot’s destruction, [another person] feels delight at the generation of a crown and [yet another person] takes a neutral attitude on gold’s continuance. [These three notions] have [their own] causes.
There is no sorrow without destruction, there is no pleasure without generation, and there is no
neutral attitude without continuance. Therefore, a real entity has all three natures. Those who observe the vow to have only milk do not have yoghurt. Those who observe the vow to have only yoghurt do not have milk. Those who observe the vow not to have any milk product do not have either [milk or yoghurt]. Therefore, [in the same manner] a real entity has [those] three natures (i.e., generation, destruction, and continuance).

The following is evident: an existence neither arises nor disappears in terms of its universal nature, because [the universal nature] accompanies [all modes]. [Such an existence] disappears and arises in terms of its particular [nature]. [Thus,] what exists has [three natures] such as generation at the same time in one and the same [entity].

The quotation from the ĀM is presented as statements supporting the definition of an existence or real entity given by the Jainas in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra (TAAS) and other works. Compared with other Buddhist treatises, the PVSVṬ quotes the largest number of verses (three verses) from the ĀM. To my knowledge, Karṇakagomin (ca. 800) is the first among Buddhists to quote the verses from the ĀM explicitly. The above quotation raises the question why Karṇakagomin and other Buddhist logicians incorporated one verse from the ŚV in the series of the verses taken from the ĀM, although “a view of the Jainas” (digambaramata) is introduced and criticized by them. We will examine this point later.

Jitāri also introduces the view of the Jainas in DMP 81,10–15. He quotes ĀM 59, ŚV (Vanavāda) 23, and ĀM 57 in this order as descriptions that corroborate the Jainas’ claim that existence has two natures or aspects, i.e., substance (dravya) and modes (paryāya); substance is intrinsically concomitant (anugata) with modes, and existence is defined as having generation, destruction, and continuance as its characteristics at the same time. Like Karṇakagomin and Durvekamīśra, Jitāri mentions the definition of existence (DMP 81,3) while introducing his quotation of the verses in question.

In another of his works, the Jātinirākr̥ti (JāN), Jitāri introduces and criticizes the views of the Mīmāṃsakas and the Jainas without making any distinction, after having rejected the Sāṃkhya view with regard to the relationship of “difference and non-difference” (bhedābheda) between sāmānya and viśeṣa. He quotes ĀM 59, 57, ŚV (Ākṛṭivāda) 57cd–58ab; 62cd–63ab, and ŚV (Śūnyavāda) 219cd–220ab in this order after the introduction: “The Jainas and the Mīmāṃsakas claim that a universal [both] differs [from particulars] and does not differ [from them] as well.” Concerning the relationships between the Jainas, the Mīmāṃsakas, and the Sāṃkhya, Shirasaki 1983
remarks that in the Jātinirākṛti, Jitāri locates the bhedābheda-relation between sāmānya and viśeṣa claimed by Kumārila on the same level as that of the Jainas, and Jitāri also regards the relation as the same as that of the Śāmkhyas.\(^{14}\)

Although in the Tattvasaṃgraha (TS) and the Tattvasaṃgrahapāṇijīka (TSP), we do not encounter an explicit quotation from the ĀM,\(^{15}\) a statement whose content is almost the same as ĀM 59 is found in TS 1776 (= ŚV [Vanavāda] 21) and 1777 (= ŚV [Vanavāda] 22). After these two verses, ŚV (Vanavāda) 23 is quoted as TS 1778, which is also quoted in the PVSVṬ, HBṬĀ, and DMP. Kamalaśīla does not ascribe the view presented in TS 1776–1778 to the Jainas, but to Kumārila (TSP 611,16).\(^{16}\)

3. The Relation between the ĀM and Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika

Uno 1999 discusses the ontological affinity between the Mīmāṃsaka and Jainas in detail, especially concerning the theory of ātman and the relationship between sāmānya and viśeṣa. Recently, Balcerowicz 2016 has examined the relative chronology of Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra, and concluded that Samantabhadra knew and reacted to Dharmakīrti, and that the ĀM was written after the PV.\(^{17}\) Although the chronology of Samantabhadra and Kumārila, who has been considered to be Dharmakīrti’s contemporary, is still uncertain, most of the previous studies maintain that the ĀM or Jaina ontology preceded the ŚV or Mīmāṃsaka ontology.\(^{18}\) In that case, is there no possibility that Samantabhadra knew Kumārila, or that they shared a certain earlier source?\(^{19}\) When we compare the texts of the two works, the following points become clear:

(a) The correspondence relations among the elements of the three compounds seen in ĀM 59abc (ghaṭa-mauli-suvarna-arthin, vināśa-utpāda-sthiti, śoka-pramoda-mādhyasthya) are not necessarily apparent, whereas the relations among the elements are clarified in ŚV (Vanavāda) 21–22a (vardhamānaka-bhaṅga-śoka, rucaka-kriyate [utpāda]-prīti, hema-[sthiti]-mādhyasthya). From this fact, we can assume that the contents of ĀM 59abc are paraphrased or expounded in ŚV (Vanavāda) 21–22a.\(^{20}\) The examples of milk and yoghurt in ĀM 60 are not seen in the ŚV.

(b) We can say that the statement: “[The three notions, i.e., sorrow, delight, and a neutral attitude] have their own causes (sahetuka)” in ĀM 59d is paraphrased in a logical way: “There is no sorrow without destruction, there is no delight without generation,
and there is no neutral attitude without continuance” (na nāṣena vinā śoko notpādena vinā sukham / sthityā vinā na mādhyastham) in ŚV (Vanavāda) 22cd.

(c) The phrase: tasmāt tattvaṃ trayātmakam in ĀM 60d is almost identical with the phrase: tasmād vastu trayātmakam in ŚV (Vanavāda) 22b. This common expression suggests that either of the two authors might know and consult the other. 21)

From these observations, we can hypothesize that Kumārila authored ŚV (Vanavāda) 21–23 with ĀM 57 and 59–60 in mind while he commented on the passages of the Śabarabhāṣya and explained that the universal form (ākṛti) is the object of a word and perceived directly. This presumption is also confirmed by a later Jaina logician, Vādirājasūri (ca. 1025). He states what follows in his NVinVi:

[What] is stated by the Learned Samantabhadra, [i.e., delight arises on the basis of generation, etc.,] is also [stated] by Bhaṭṭa[-Kumārila] who relies on his (= Samantabhadra’s) view. 22)

He then quotes ĀM 59 and ŚV (Vanavāda) 21–22ab in succession. Furthermore, as an earlier form of the definition of existence formulated in TAAS 5.29 is already seen, for example, in a work by Kundakunda, 23) which is reported to have belonged to the age of the Jaina scripture, it is likely that this view that existence simultaneously has three natures is to be ascribed to the Jainas, not to the Mīmāṃsakas.

Now we can address why the Buddhist logicians incorporated ŚV (Vanavāda) 23 when they introduced the Jaina view. It is possible to assume that they knew both ĀM 57–60 and ŚV (Vanavāda) 21–23, and that Karṇakagomin, Jitāri, and Durvekamiśra intended to present their opponent’s view as belonging to the Jainas and thus mainly based themselves on the Jaina source. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, on the other hand, considered almost the same objection as one belonging to Kumārila and presented it on the basis of the Mīmāṃsaka source. Because ĀM 59 alone is not necessarily understandable, however, Karṇakagomin and others inserted ŚV (Vanavāda) 23 in order to supplement or expound the meaning of ĀM 59. 24)

4. The Relation with the Sāṃkhya Thought

The idea that a single entity simultaneously has three natures and that those three natures or states cause corresponding notions or feelings is also seen in the Šaṣṭitantra by Vārṣagānya. 25) As the Sāṃkhya hold their unique doctrine, the ontological

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that Primordial Matter (pradhāna), or possessing the three qualities (traiguṇya), corresponds to the concept of substance (dravya) or the universal (sāmānya); and distinct things (vyakti, bheda) unfolded in various forms owing to the combination of the three guṇas correspond to the concept of modes (paryāya) or the particular (viśeṣa). We can safely state here that the descriptions in the Buddhist treatises suggest that there were ontological and epistemological similarities among the views of the Sāṃkhyas, the Jainas, and the Mīmāṃsakas. We can assume that Samantabhadra and Kumārila had a certain common source in some earlier Sāṃkhya works or view.

5. Conclusion

The PVSVṬ, DMP, HBṬ, and NBhūṣ quote ĀM 59 as a Jaina objection, whereas the JĀN quotes it as that of the Jainas and Mīmāṃsakas. Although the contexts where ĀM 59 and other verses are quoted differ according to each treatise, it is evident that ĀM 59 is quoted as a source that confirms the Jaina definition of existence, or the theory that a single entity has the two aspects. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, on the other hand, do not quote ĀM 59. Kamalaśīla ascribes TS 1776–1777 (= ŚV [Vanavāda] 21–22), whose content is almost identical with that of ĀM 59, to Kumārila. We can assume that Karṇakagomin and others incorporated ŚV (Vanavāda) 23 in the presentation of the Jaina objection in order to make clear or understandable the meaning and structure of ĀM 59. Indeed, the chronology of Samantabhadra and Kumārila is still open, but it is probable that Kumārila, consulting the ĀM or being somehow influenced by it, arranged it and wrote the verses in question in the ŚV as his own view. The exposition by Vādirājasūri also confirms this hypothesis. Apart from the chronology of the two persons, we can safely state that Samantabhadra and Kumārila hold similar views regarding the theory of sāmānya and višeṣa. In addition, according to the descriptions in the Buddhist treatises, and especially those in the JĀN, we find that the ontology of the Jainas and Mīmāṃsakas concerning the relationship between sāmānya and višeṣa has a similar structure to that of the Sāṃkhya.
Notes
1) For the dating of Samantabhadra and past studies on it, see Balcerowicz 2016: 457, 469. See also Fujinaga 2001: 17–18, 114–116, 167–175. 2) NBhūṣ 553,2–3. 3) For example, ŚVS 478–479, TRD 350.5–8, etc. 4) PVSVT 320,25–339,10 ad PV 1.163–180. For a translation of this portion, see Ota 1981. 5) PVSVT 332,24–27. 6) PVSVT 332,28–333,7. 7) PVSVT 333,9–16: ghaṭamaulisuvānārthī vināsotpādasthitisyāvam āyam / sākrapramodāmādhayastham jano yāti sahetukam // (= ĀM 59) na nāśena vinā śoko notpādena vinā sukham / sthitiyā vinā na mādhyastham tasmād vastu trayātmakam // (= ŚV [Vanavāda] 23, cf. TS 1778) payovrato na dadhy atti na payo ’tti dadhīvratataḥ / agorasavratro nobhe tasmād vastu trayātmakam // (= ĀM 60) na sāmānyātmanoṇeti na vyeti vyaktam anwayāt / vyety ude ti viśeṣena sahaikatrodhayādī sat // (= ĀM 57) For the translation of this portion, see also Uno 1999: 428 and Shiga 2013: 33 with nn. 55–65. 8) Cf. HBṬĀ 369,19–25. Durvekamiśra quotes ĀM 59, ŚV (Vanavāda) 23, and ĀM 60 in this sequence. As in the PVSVT, the quotation from the ĀM appears in the objection related to the Jaina definition of existence. 9) Cf. Balcerowicz 2016: 461–462. 10) DMP 81,10–15. 11) JĀN 34,15–35,17. 12) JĀN 36,5–10. 13) JĀN 35,20–21. 14) See Shirasaki 1983: 6–7. 15) Cf. Shiga 2013: 29–35. The Jaina idea seen in TS 313, DMP 82,3–5, and HBṬ 98,16–23 can be traced back to that of ĀM 71–72. 16) It is to be noted here that all the verses quoted in the JĀN from the ŚV can also be found in the TS (ŚV [Ākr̥tivāda] 57cd–58ab = TS 1744, ŚV [Ākr̥tivāda] 62cd–63ab = TS 1745, ŚV [Śūnyavāda] 219cd–220ab = TS 1986), all of which Kumārila ascribes to Kumārila (TSP 602,8, 606,19), whereas the two verses quoted from the ĀM (ĀM 57, 59) can be found neither in the TS nor in the TSP. 17) For the argument on the relationship among Samantabhadra, Dharmakirti and Kumārila, see Balcerowicz 2016: 460–462. 18) See Shah 1967: 86–87, Uno 1999: 420, and Fujinaga 2001: 167–172. 19) Cf. Shiga 2013: 33–34. 20) It seems that the examples of a golden plate (vardhamāna) and necklace (rucaka) come from the words in ŚBh 40,14–16. 21) See also Wakahara 1996: 81–82 and Yamazaki 1968: 8–9. 22) NVinVi, vol. 1, 438,26–27: tata utpādādīnām naḥ avyāsātmaḥśhātmaṇāyāḥ sāmānyābhāvāt, tannibhangāh prātīyādayo bhavanī eva, na na bhavantīty upapannam uktam svāmīsamanantabhadhāraḥ tanmatopajīvinā bhāṭṭenāpi . . . . 23) For example, Kundakunda’s PAS 10. 24) Or Karṇakagomin and others might be somehow influenced by Sāntarakṣita’s quotation of the ŚV-verses in TS 1776–1778. 25) See Frauwallner 1958: 125,18–24 (= NĀA 12,17–20). 26) Cf. Shiga 2016: (216)–(218).

Abbreviations
ĀM Āptimāṁśā. Samantabhadra’s Āptimāṁśā: Critique of an Authority. Ed. Nagin J. Shah. Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamālā, no. 7. Ahmedabad: Jagruti Dilip Sheth, 1999.
JĀN Jātinirākr̥ti. Jītārī: Kleine Texte. Ed. Gudrun Bühnemann. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, no. 8. Wien: Universität Wien, 1985, 30–38.
TAAS Tattvārthādhiṃgamasūtra. Eine Jaina-Dogmatik: Umāsvāti’s Tattvārthādhiṃgama Sūtra. Ed. Hermann Jacobi. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1906.

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TRD  Tarkarahasyadipikā, Saḍdarsanasamuccaya of Haribhadra Sūri: With the Commentary Tarkarahasya-dipikā of Gunaratna Sūri and Laghuvyttī of Somatilaka Sūri and an Avacārṇī. Ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain. Jnanpith Murtdi Dev Jain Granthamala: Sanskrit Granth, no. 36. New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith Publication, 1989.

TS  Tattvasaṃgraha. Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kanalaśīla. Ed. Embar Krishnamacharya. 2 vols. Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, nos. 30, 31. Baroda: Central Library, 1926.

TSP  Tattvasaṃgrahapariṇājika. See TS.

DMP  Digambramataparīkṣā. Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda. Ed. H. R. Rangaswami Iyengar. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1952, 81–85.

NĀA  Nyāyāgamānasūrīṇi. Dwādasāṇam Nayacakram of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa: With the Commentary Nyāyāgamānasūrīṇi of Śrī Śiṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa. Ed. Muni Jambuvijaya. 3 vols. Śrī Ātmānand Jain Granthamālā, nos. 92, 94, 95. Bhavnagar: Śrī Jain Atmanad Sabha, 1996.

NBhūṣ  Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajñapraṇītasya Nyāyāsārasya Svapajñāṃ Vyākhyāṇaṃ Nyāyabhūṣaṇam. Ed. Yogindrananda. Varanasi: Caukambā Vidyābhavan, 1968.

NVinVi  Nyāyaviniścayavivarana. Nyāyaviniścayavivarana of Śrī Vādirāja Sūri, the Commentary on Bhātakalankadeva’s Nyāyaviniścaya. Ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain. 2 vols. Vidyābhavan Prācyavidyā Granthamālā, no. 13. Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith, 2000.

PAS  Pañcāstikāyasāra. Ācārya Kundakunda’s Pañcāstikāya-sāra. Ed. Chakravarti Nayanar. New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith, 2002.

PV 1  Pramāṇavārttika, 1st chapter. The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: The First Chapter with the Autocommentary; Text and Critical Notes. Ed. Raniero Gnoli. Roma: Istituto italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960.

PVSVṬ  Pramāṇavārttikasvavr̥ttiṭīkā. Karnakagomin’s Commentary on the Pramāṇavārttikavyttī of Dharmakīrti. Ed. Rāhula Sāṃkr̥tyāyana. Kyoto: Rinsen Book, 1982.

ŠBh  Śābarabhāṣya. Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā. Ed. Erich Frauwallner. Wien: Kommissionsverlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1968.

ŠVS  Śāstravārttāsamuccaya. Ācārya Haribhadrasūri’s Śāstravārttāsamuccaya (With Hindi Translation, Notes and Introduction). Ed. Kṛṣṇā Kumar Dikṣit. L. D. Series, no. 128. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology, 2002.

ŚV  Ślokavārttika. The Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Nyāyaratnākara of Pārthasārathimihira. Ed. Rāmaśāstrī Tailaṅga. Chowkambā Sanskrit Series, no. 3. Varanasi: Chowkambā Sanskrit Book-Depot, 1898.

HBṬĀ  Hetuśeṇṭikālōka. Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with Sub-Commentary Entitled Āloka of Dvārke Miśra. Ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Jinavijayaji. Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, no.
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（Associate Professor, Kyoto Sangyo University）