IS GAME SEMANTICS NECESSARY?

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ABSTRACT. We discuss the extent to which game semantics is implicit in the basic concepts of linear logic.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to show that a version of game semantics for linear logic is implicit in the logic itself and the basic intuitions underlying the logic. Like the talk at CSL'93 on which it is based, the body of this paper is intended to be accessible to people with little or no previous knowledge of linear logic or game semantics. Comments that do presuppose such prior knowledge have been relegated to a series of notes at the end of the paper.

PROPOSITIONS AS TYPES

The relevance of various constructive propositional logics, including linear logic, to computation and particularly to type theory is largely based on the propositions-as-types paradigm, also often called the Curry-Howard isomorphism [8, 9, 13]. In its simplest form, this paradigm involves a correspondence between the constructive logic of implication and simple typed combinatory logic. Constructive logic of implication can be axiomatized by the schemes

\[ A \to (B \to A) \]
and

\[ [A \to (B \to C)] \to [(A \to B) \to (A \to C)] \]

and the rule of modus ponens

\[
\begin{array}{c}
A \to B \\
A \\
\hline
B
\end{array}
\]

Curry and Howard [9] noticed that, if one reads the letters as referring to sets (or types) rather than propositions and reads \( A \to B \) as the set of functions from \( A \) to \( B \) rather than implication, then the two schemes are the types of the basic combinators \( K \) and \( S \), defined by

\[
(Kx)y = x \quad \text{and} \quad ((Sx)y)z = (xz)(yz),
\]

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and the rule of modus ponens corresponds to the typing of the basic construction of combinatory logic, application of functions to arguments. All combinators definable in the simple typed lambda-calculus can be obtained from $K$ and $S$ by repeated application; this is the type-theoretic analog of the fact that all constructively valid formulas involving only implication can be obtained from the two schemes above by repeated use of modus ponens.

The correspondence between propositions and types can easily be extended to include other connectives on the propositional side and more constructions than the simple typed lambda-calculus on the types side. In particular, conjunction and disjunction of propositions correspond to the cartesian product and the disjoint union of types, respectively.

Very similar ideas are contained in the intended interpretation of the propositional connectives in intuitionistic mathematics [4, 8, 14]. There, the meaning of a proposition is specified by telling what is required in order to prove the proposition, and connectives are explained by telling how they affect proofs. Specifically, a proof of $A \& B$ is an ordered pair consisting of a proof of $A$ and a proof of $B$, a proof of $A \lor B$ is a proof of $A$ or a proof of $B$ together with the information which disjunct is being proved, and a proof of $A \rightarrow B$ is a construction that converts any proof of $A$ into a proof of $B$. If one identifies a proposition with the set of its proofs, then this Brouwer-Heyting explanation of the connectives exactly matches the proposition-as-types interpretation described above, at least if we regard “construction that converts” as an intuitionistic way of referring to functions.

## Linearity

One of the (two) fundamental ingredients of Girard’s linear logic [6] is a computational refinement of the type-theoretic notion of function, paying attention to how many times the input is used in computing the output. In both classical and constructive mathematics, the argument of a function is regarded as being permanently available for arbitrarily repeated access during the computation of the function’s value at that argument, but it is clear that, if one is interested in the efficiency of computation, it can be useful to know how often an argument needs to be accessed (and even whether it is accessed at all). Motivated by these (and other) considerations, Girard introduced $A \rightarrow B$ as the type of functions from $A$ to $B$ in whose computation the argument in $A$ is accessed exactly once; such functions are called linear. (This sort of access counting is hard to define if one thinks of functions in classical terms, but Girard showed that it makes good sense in suitable computational situations, specifically for a special kind of Scott domain called a coherence space.) Girard also associated to each type $A$ another type $!A$, the type of arbitrarily accessible objects (or permanently stored objects) of type $A$. A single access of $!A$ consists of an arbitrary number of accesses of $A$. Thus, the traditional function space $A \rightarrow B$ can be described in this linear framework as $(!A) \rightarrow B$.

Girard developed a logical system [6], a sequent calculus for linear logic, which can be regarded as a variation of the standard sequent calculi for propositional logic but which becomes much more intuitive if viewed as being about types in the sense just explained (and to be explained further below) rather than about propositions.

When one pays attention, as in linear logic, to the number of times a data object is accessed, one discovers an ambiguity in the explanation above of conjunction as cartesian product. A data element of type $A \& B$ should consist of a data element of...
type $A$ and one of type $B$. But does one access to $A \& B$ yield both components of the ordered pair or just one? At first sight, “both” might seem the more reasonable answer, and in many contexts it is, but there are also situations where one needs a type such that, in accessing it, one specifies one of $A$ and $B$ and receives a data element of the specified type. For example, it is this sort of conjunction, not the “both” version, that yields a product in a category of types and linear functions. Therefore, Girard included both versions of conjunction (or product) in his system, using the notation $A \otimes B$ for the “both” version and $A \& B$ for the “only one” version. (See Note 1. The former connective is usually called “times” and the latter “with”.)

The logical rules of inference for these two connectives are

\[
\frac{\Gamma \vdash A \quad \Delta \vdash B}{\Gamma, \Delta \vdash A \otimes B} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash A \quad \Gamma \vdash B}{\Gamma \vdash A \& B},
\]

where $\Gamma$ and $\Delta$ are finite lists of hypotheses. Both of these are commonly used as introduction rules for conjunction in sequent calculi, and they are equivalent in the presence of the structural rules of thinning and contraction. But these two structural rules are not admissible in linear logic, for their effect is precisely to alter the number of occurrences of a hypothesis, a number to which linear logic insists on paying attention, as it corresponds to the number of times input data are accessed. Thus, in linear logic, $\otimes$ and $\&$ are genuinely different connectives.

**Access Protocols**

The introduction of the $\&$ operation on types forces a revision in the basic intuition of what a data type is. Until now, we have regarded types as essentially synonymous with sets. Computationally, a type could be regarded as a server from which a client can get, in one access, an element of that type; the client need not do anything more than show up. We shall call such types *simple* to distinguish them from the more general types about to be introduced. (I thank Dexter Kozen for suggesting the “client-server” terminology; in my lecture I had talked about a “user” and a “data resource”.) For a type of the form $A \& B$, however, the situation is different, for the client must specify whether he wants an element from $A$ or one from $B$. (For the disjunction which, following Girard, we write $A \oplus B$, the client need not do anything, for the server will choose one of $A$ and $B$, announce which it chose, and then provide a data element.) Thus, $\&$ types provide a first example of a non-trivial access protocol and a non-simple type.

Calling the transmission of one bit (the choice of $A$ or $B$) a protocol may seem like undesirable jargon, but once the client has to do anything at all we soon arrive at situations where the word “protocol” seems quite reasonable. Consider, for example, what happens when a client accesses a server for the data type

\[
[(A\&B) \oplus (C\&D)] \& [(E\&F) \oplus (G\&H)]
\]

First, the client must specify which of the two types in square brackets he wishes to access, as the overall data type is constructed from these by $\&$. Suppose the client chooses to access the second component, $(E\&F) \oplus (G\&H)$. Then, as this is a disjunction (disjoint union), the server will choose one of the disjuncts, announce its choice, and provide an element of that disjunct. Suppose it chooses $E\&F$. After announcing that choice but before providing a data element, the server must await...
In view of this situation, we regard a data type as consisting not only of a set of possible data elements but also as the access protocol that is to be run before a data element is provided. Of course simple data types, where the client merely shows up and the server provides a data element, are included in this scheme; they are types with trivial access protocols. (This generalization of the notion of data type seems to be quite independent of the generalization by admitting partially defined data elements that is the intuitive basis for domain theory. See [11] for a combination of the two generalizations.)

We could even incorporate the transmission of data at the end of the client-server interaction into the access protocol. Instead of having the server provide, after the access protocol is complete, an element of a set $S$ of possible data, we can regard that last transmission from the server as just another step of the access protocol, a choice of one disjunct in an $S$-indexed disjunction.

Formally, a protocol is a pair consisting of (1) a non-empty set $H$ of finite sequences, the possible histories of the protocol up to any point in its execution, such that every initial segment of a sequence in $H$ is also in $H$ and such that no infinite sequence has all its finite initial segments in $H$, and (2) a function $N$ from $H$ into $\{c, s, t\}$. The intention is that, for any history $h \in H$, $N(h) = c$ if the next step after $h$ in the protocol is to be an action of the client, $N(h) = s$ if the next step is by the server, and $N(h) = t$ if the protocol is terminated at $h$. We require, in accord with this intention, that a node $h$ with $N(h) = t$ cannot be a proper initial segment of any other node in $H$; no history can go past a terminal condition. (We do not require the converse. It is permissible for $N(h)$ to be $c$ or $s$ even if there are no proper extensions of $h$ in $H$. This situation would mean that the client or server is expected to do something but cannot. The simplest example is the simple data type corresponding to the empty set, where the server is expected to provide an element but cannot.) Notice that, by requiring that no infinite sequence have all initial segments in $H$, we have chosen to consider only protocols that always end after finitely many steps. The theory could be expanded to allow or even require infinite runs (cf. [2]), but nothing of this sort seems to be implicit in the formalism or the underlying intuitions of linear logic. (But see the discussion of $!A$ below.)

As suggested by the title of this paper, the protocols considered here can be viewed as games (or debates or dialogs) between the client and the server [1, 2, 10, 11]. In this connection, the server is usually called the proponent or player, and the client is called the opponent. The protocol specifies who is to move (see Note 2) and what moves are legal at any point during a play of the game. Our protocols, unlike some versions of games [1, 2] but like the versions in [3, 11], do not specify winners and losers, but it seems reasonable to regard a server as “winning” if it succeeds in running the entire protocol (including the final step of delivering data) without ever being in a situation where it is expected to act but cannot.

Having extended the notion of data type to include access protocols, we must explain how the connectives of linear logic are to act on these data types. The so-called additive connectives, $\&$ and $\oplus$, are fairly easy to handle, as they were involved in the introduction of access protocols. Specifically, the data type $A \& B$ can be described by saying that its access protocol begins with a choice by the client's decision whether to access $E$ or $F$, as these are combined with $\&$. Thus the access protocol in this case consists of three bits transmitted between client and server before any actual data are provided. One can obviously build similar examples with longer access protocols.
client of either $A$ or $B$ and that the rest of the protocol (and the final data delivery, if that is construed separately from the protocol) is to be exactly as in $A$ or in $B$, according to the client’s initial choice. The description of $A \oplus B$ is exactly the same, except that the initial choice of $A$ or $B$ is made by the server rather than by the client.

The description of $A \otimes B$ is more complicated. The basic intuition is that the client is to get data of both types $A$ and $B$. So the client and server must carry out the access protocols for both $A$ and $B$. But should they be executed in parallel, or in sequence, or interleaved? If parallel, then synchronously or asynchronously? If interleaved then in what order? The formalism of linear logic itself provides some information about these questions. For example, it is provable in linear logic that

$$A \otimes (B_1 \oplus B_2) \vdash \dashv (A \otimes B_1) \oplus (A \otimes B_2).$$

Here $\vdash \dashv$ means that sequents in both directions are provable, and it follows that the left and right sides of such a double sequent are equivalent in the deductive system; any formula containing an instance of the left side is interdeducible with the result of substituting the corresponding instance of the right side. The left side of the displayed equivalence describes a $\otimes$ combination in which one of the two components, $B_1 \oplus B_2$, begins with a choice by the server. The equivalence says that this combination amounts to a protocol in which the server begins by choosing either $A \otimes B_1$ or $A \otimes B_2$ and then the protocol for the chosen constituent is executed. That is, the first thing that should happen in the protocol for $A \otimes (B_1 \oplus B_2)$ is a choice by the server of $B_1$ or $B_2$ to replace $B_1 \oplus B_2$ in the original combination. Summarizing: If one of the constituents of a $\otimes$ combination has a protocol beginning with a choice by the server, then the combination’s protocol begins with the corresponding choice by the server.

What if both sides of $\otimes$ have protocols beginning with choices by the server? The distributive law of linear logic displayed above easily yields the equivalence

$$(A_1 \oplus A_2) \otimes (B_1 \oplus B_2) \vdash \dashv (A_1 \otimes B_1) \oplus (A_1 \otimes B_2) \oplus (A_2 \otimes B_1) \oplus (A_2 \otimes B_2).$$

This means that, if both protocols begin with choices by the server, then, in the combined protocol, the server should begin by making these choices in both components. (See Note 3.)

Thus, in a $\otimes$ combination, the client need not do anything until it is his turn to act in both constituents. What happens then is, however, not determined by the formal system of linear logic. There seem to be two reasonable options.

1. The client chooses one of the two constituents and performs the first action required by its protocol.
2. The client begins the protocols of both constituents.

In either case, after the client performs the first action it will (in general) be the server’s turn to act in one or both protocols, and the client would wait for the server’s action(s) before proceeding, as indicated by the distributive laws in the preceding paragraphs. Also, in option (1), it is to be understood that the client is obligated to make his choices, at each step where he is to act in both components, in such a way that the protocols for both components are ultimately completed. (See Note 4.) Another way to say this is that the protocol for $A \otimes B$ is terminated.
only when both sub-protocols are. If one sub-protocol is terminated and the other is not, then client and server continue to run the latter protocol.

There are several reasons for preferring option (1), but they do not seem entirely conclusive. One is that it provides greater flexibility to the client, who can act in one protocol and wait for the server’s response there before committing himself to a particular action in the other protocol. Regarding $\otimes$ as a very generous way (compared to $\&$) to supply data, we view such flexibility as natural.

Perhaps a stronger argument concerns the “translations” of the two options into the formalism of linear logic, analogous to the distributive laws above. These formalizations read

$$(A_1 \& A_2) \otimes (B_1 \& B_2) \vdash \neg X$$

where for option (1) $X$ is

$$X_1 = [(A_1 \& A_2) \otimes B_1] \& [(A_1 \& A_2) \otimes B_2] \& [A_1 \otimes (B_1 \& B_2)] \& [A_1 \otimes (B_1 \& B_2)]$$

while for option (2) $X$ is

$$X_2 = (A_1 \otimes B_1) \& (A_2 \otimes B_1) \& (A_1 \otimes B_2) \& (A_2 \otimes B_2).$$

Neither of these equivalences is provable in linear logic, though the direction $\vdash$ is provable in both cases. In fact, we have $(A_1 \& A_2) \otimes (B_1 \& B_2) \vdash X_1$ and $X_1 \vdash X_2$, but neither implication is reversible. To adopt either of the options above therefore involves going beyond what is provable in linear logic, as it involves adding an implication from $X_1$ or $X_2$ to $(A_1 \& A_2) \otimes (B_1 \& B_2)$. Since $X_1 \vdash X_2$, option (1) involves less of an addition to linear logic than option (2). In fact, if we were to adopt the implication corresponding to option (2), then the implication corresponding to (1) would be deducible.

Finally, we might give an argument “from consensus” for option (1), namely that this option was adopted by all authors on game semantics [1, 2, 3, 10, 11]. (Additional arguments will arise when we consider duality in the next section.)

We turn next to the description of the data type $A \rightarrow B$. Recall that this is the type of linear functions from $A$ to $B$. Thus the following description of its access protocol (and data delivery) seems reasonable. A server for $A \rightarrow B$ acts like a server of type $B$ (intuitively, it supplies a value of type $B$), provided it has access (once, as a client) to a server of type $A$ (intuitively, it is given a value of type $A$). The client of $A \rightarrow B$ must not only act as a client of type $B$ (to whom the server will ultimately supply the desired value) but must also provide (or act as) a server of type $A$, supplying the data from $A$ required as input. Thus, the client and server of $A \rightarrow B$ play the same roles in the sub-protocol for $B$ but opposite roles in the sub-protocol for $A$. Furthermore, the server should be permitted to switch from one sub-protocol to another whenever it wishes; this amounts to allowing a function-evaluator access to its argument (only once but) at a time chosen by the evaluator. It is fairly clear that denying the server such permission would unduly restrict it even in simple situations.

Finally, $!A$ should be a re-usable version of $A$. One access to $!A$ should be an arbitrary number of accesses to $A$, the arbitrary number being chosen by the client. Thus, a run of the access protocol for $!A$ should consist of several runs of the access protocol of $A$, the initiation of new sub-runs being at the discretion of the client. It is reasonable to require that, as long as the client makes the same
choices in two of the sub-runs, so does the server. This requirement corresponds to
the intuition that a data element of type !A is a single, stored element of type A, so
that repeated accesses give the same result. The formalism of linear logic does not
demand this sort of consistency — it would permit a form of storage resulting in a
different element at each access — but we regard this as contrary to the intuitions
underlying the ! concept. (See Note 5.) We also allow the client to switch freely
from one sub-run to another and to resume previously abandoned sub-runs.

It is not clear when a run of the protocol !A should be regarded as terminated,
since the client could always start a new run of the sub-protocol A. A sensible
convention, in view of the idea that the client of !A can access A as often as
he wishes, is that a run of !A is terminated only when the client declares it to
be terminated. This convention, unfortunately, allows infinite sequences in which
every finite initial segment is a permissible history of !A, with the client never
declaring termination. There are several ways around this difficulty, none of which
I consider entirely satisfactory in the present context of extracting a semantics
from the formalism and underlying intuitions of linear logic. One possibility is to
simply allow protocols to have infinite runs. Another is to work with games, where
there are winners and losers, rather than protocols, and to declare any play of !A
which the client never terminates as won by the server (as a penalty for the client’s
cheating). And a third is to require the client to announce, at the beginning of the
protocol for !A, how many accesses of A he will use; then the !A protocol would be
terminated when the announced number of A sub-protocols have been terminated.

With the interpretations above for → and !, we obtain the following, quite rea-
sonable interpretation of A → B, which we recall was expressed in linear logic as
(!A) → B. A server of type A → B is prepared to act as a server of type B provided
it has repeated access (as client) to a consistent server of type A.

Negation and Duality

The second fundamental idea of linear logic (after the access counting represented
by linearity) is linear negation or duality. The intuition behind linear negation (and
other connectives derived from it) is considerably less clear than that behind the
connectives discussed in the preceding sections. When discussing linear logic in
terms of a flow of questions and answers in a network, Girard [6, 7] has indicated
that questions and answers of type A are to be regarded as answers and questions,
respectively, of the negated type, written A⊥. It seems natural to identify the
questions and answers in Girard’s discussion with the actions of the client and the
server, respectively, in our protocols. Thus, linear negation amounts to interchang-
ing the roles of the client and the server in a protocol. In this connection, it is
convenient to adopt the viewpoint, mentioned earlier, that the actual delivery of
data by the server at the end of the protocol is considered as just another piece of
the protocol. Thus, in the negated data type, this final action would be performed
by the client.

It is part of the formalism of linear logic [6] that negation is involutive, i.e.,
A⊥⊥ = A. In addition, Girard introduced De Morgan-style duals and for ⊗ and !, respectively, i.e.,

\[ A \mathcal{R} B = (A^\perp \otimes B^\perp)^\perp \quad \text{and} \quad A = (!A^\perp)^\perp. \]

The connectives & and ⊕ are dual to each other in the same sense, so

\[ (A \otimes B)^\perp = A^\perp \otimes B^\perp \quad \text{and} \quad (A \oplus B)^\perp = A^\perp \oplus B^\perp. \]
Also, in Girard’s system, the linear implication can be expressed in terms of \( \otimes \) and negation as
\[
A \rightarrow B = (A \otimes (B^\perp))^\perp = A^\perp \mathcal{G} B.
\]

To the extent that they involve only negation and the connectives discussed in previous sections, these equations are correct when read as descriptions of protocols. For example, \((A \oplus B)^\perp = A^\perp \& B^\perp\) amounts to the fact that \(\oplus\) is interpreted just like \& except that the first choice is made by the server instead of the client. The correctness of the protocol reading of \(A \rightarrow B = (A \otimes (B^\perp))^\perp\) constitutes additional support for our decision to use option (1) in designing the protocol for \(\otimes\). Had we used option (2), then to keep \(A \rightarrow B = (A \otimes (B^\perp))^\perp\) correct we would have to modify the protocol for \(\rightarrow\) by imposing an unnatural synchronization requirement on how the server runs the two sub-protocols.

The new connectives \(\mathcal{G}\) and \(?\) defined above seem rather unnatural in computational terms, as they allow the server to make choices that servers don’t ordinarily make. For example, the protocol for \(A \mathcal{G} B\) consists of interleaved runs of the protocols for \(A\) and for \(B\), with the client required to act in one or both protocols whenever he can and the server required to act in one protocol whenever it is due to act in both. Thus, whenever the server acts, it can choose which sub-protocol to act in (unless one is already terminated). Since our definition of \(\otimes\) required the client to ultimately finish both subprotocols, the same requirement is automatically imposed on the server in a \(\mathcal{G}\) combination. In other words, the server in \(A \mathcal{G} B\) will ultimately have to provide data of both types \(A\) and \(B\). Thus, although it is De Morgan dual to a sort of conjunction, \(\otimes\), the connective \(\mathcal{G}\) is computationally more like a conjunction than like a disjunction.

By duality, the distributive law for \(\otimes\) over \(\oplus\) implies a distributive law for \(\mathcal{G}\) over \&. This fact leads to another (weak) argument against option (2) in the interpretation of \(\otimes\). Indeed, the sequent formulation of that option, namely \((A_1 \& A_2) \otimes (B_1 \& B_2) \vdash X_2\), says that \(\otimes\) behaves, with regard to a particular instance of distributivity, as if it were an entirely different connective \(\mathcal{G}\). (Incidentally, these distributive laws were the reason for Girard’s notation for the connectives, in which dual connectives do not have analogous symbols. They also provide one motivation for the terminology “additive” for the connectives \& and \(\oplus\) and “multiplicative” for \(\otimes\) and \(\mathcal{G}\), but I believe the original motivation for this came from the coherence space interpretation of these connectives.)

We close this section by recording for reference the nullary analogs of the binary connectives \&, \(\oplus\), \(\otimes\), and \(\mathcal{G}\). Girard’s notation for these constants is \(\top\), \(0\), \(1\), and \(\bot\) respectively. The protocol for \(\top\) is that the client is expected to act first but no action is possible. (In any \& combination, the client acts first and chooses one of the types being combined by \&; our description of \(\top\) is the special case where the number of types being combined is zero.) So \(\top\) is a data type that simply cannot be accessed. Dually, \(0\) is a data type in which the server is expected to act first but has no possible action; it is the empty (simple, i.e., with trivial access protocol) data type. The other two constants, \(1\) and \(\bot\), are both interpreted as data types for which the access protocol is vacuous, i.e., the protocol is already terminated without either participant doing anything. (This protocol is therefore even shorter than the simple ones, for in the latter the client does nothing but the server is expected to provide a data element.) If, as is customary in linear logic, one regards \(\mathcal{G}\) as a sort of disjunction, then \(\bot\) is a sort of “false” (the empty disjunction), while \(1\) is a sort of “true” (the empty conjunction).
of “true” (the empty conjunction), so giving them the same interpretation seems very unreasonable. It becomes reasonable in interpretations oriented more toward computations than toward logic (more toward types than propositions); indeed this identification of 1 and ⊥ occurs both in Girard’s coherence space semantics [6] and in the Abramsky-Jagadeesan version of game semantics [1]. It becomes even more reasonable in our present situation since, as pointed out above, ⊥, though logically like a disjunction, is computationally more like a conjunction.

**Truth and Validity**

In the preceding sections, we have described how to interpret as a protocol any combination of atomic formulas, built using the connectives of linear logic, provided an interpretation of the atomic subformulas as protocols is given. The interpretation extends easily to sequents, for in linear logic a one-sided sequent ⊢ A₁, A₂, ..., Aₙ is treated exactly like the formula A₁ ⊣ A₂ ⊣ ... ⊣ Aₙ, and a two-sided sequent A₁, ..., Aₘ ⊢ B₁, ..., Bₙ is treated exactly like the one-sided sequent ⊢ A₁ ⊣, ..., Aₘ ⊣, B₁, ..., Bₙ.

We have not yet said anything about validity of formulas or sequents. (By the preceding equivalences, it suffices to consider only formulas.) It is as if, in many-valued logic, we had provided the truth tables for the connectives but had not indicated which truth values are the distinguished ones. We have postponed the issue of defining validity because linear logic seems to give us less guidance here than in interpreting the connectives and because we find a greater divergence between the logical and computational points of view.

From the point of view of logic, validity of a formula should mean that, no matter how its atomic subformulas are interpreted as protocols, the protocol denoted by the formula is true. This merely shifts the problem to defining “true” for protocols, but here the Brouwer-Heyting description of intuitionistic truth can provide some guidance. That description calls a formula true if and only if there is a proof of it. Thinking of propositions as types, in this case simple types of proofs, we find truth identified with non-emptiness of a simple data type. So in this special situation, A is true if and only if the server can run the protocol for A without getting stuck (i.e., without being expected to act and having no action available). This description makes sense also for more elaborate protocols, so one could identify truth of a protocol with the existence of a behavior of the server that contains answers whenever required by the protocol. In game-theoretic language, this amounts to a winning strategy for the server in the game where the server’s objective is just to execute the protocol without getting stuck. Formally, a behavior for the server in a protocol (H, N) is a subset B of the set H of histories such that

1. The empty sequence is in B.
2. If h ∈ B with N(h) = c, then every one-term extension of h is also in B.
3. If h ∈ B with N(h) = s, then exactly one one-term extension of h is in B.

Intuitively, B is the set of histories that can arise when the server behaves in a particular way. (We could also consider non-deterministic behaviors, or partial strategies, where “exactly one” is replaced with “at least one” in (3).) Thus, we regard a formula (or sequent) as true in a particular interpretation if it admits a behavior for the server, and we regard it as valid if it is true in every interpretation.

This approach to validity, motivated by standard ideas from logic, was used, for example, in [2]. It works well in the context of infinite games (as in [2]), but seems
seriously deficient when games are required to terminate after a finite number of moves. The reason is that, by a classical theorem of Gale and Stewart [5], such finitely long games always admit winning strategies for one or the other player. This means that, for any protocol $A$, either there is a behavior (a winning strategy in the sense mentioned above) for the server in $A$ or there is a winning strategy for the client, i.e., a strategy by which the client can force the server to get stuck. But such a strategy for the client is a winning strategy for the server in $A^\perp$. Thus, for any $A$, the server has a behavior in the protocol $A^\perp \oplus A$, namely to initially choose whichever of $A$ and $A^\perp$ has a winning strategy for the server and then to follow that strategy. Thus $A^\perp \oplus A$ is valid in the sense of the preceding paragraph. I regard this as a deficiency of the semantics because $A^\perp \oplus A$ seems quite unreasonable in the context of linear logic, both at the intuitive level and at the formal level. To make the point more explicit, we point out that from $A^\perp \oplus A$ and the rule of thinning one can deduce in linear logic the rule of contraction (see Note 6), whereas these are normally regarded as quite different matters, thinning being more innocuous than contraction [7].

The behaviors that witness the validity of $A^\perp \oplus A$ are of a rather complicated sort. To determine its first move, the server must completely analyze the game associated to $A$. It seems reasonable to require that validity entail the existence of simpler, more uniform strategies, not depending on a detailed analysis of subgames. (Consider, for example, the behaviors for the provable formula $A^\perp \& A$, which consist of merely copying the client’s actions from one component to the other.) Instead of asking that a formula “(have a behavior) independently of the interpretation of atomic subformulas” we ask that it “have (a behavior independent of the interpretation of atomic subformulas).” It is not entirely clear what independence in the second sense should mean. Abramsky and Jagadeesan [1] have introduced a strong notion of independence, namely that when additional moves are added to the atomic subgames, the new strategy should be an extension of the old. They show that this requirement, in conjunction with a requirement of history-freeness (meaning that the server’s action at any stage should depend only on the client’s immediately previous action, not on the earlier history) forces strategies to do nothing more complex than immediately copying the client’s moves between the various subgames. Their work shows that such a restriction, which may seem too strong at first sight, works well in multiplicative linear logic. They also observed, however, that history-freeness does not work well in the presence of the additive connectives. One possible meaning for “independence” is the Abramsky-Jagadeesan notion of uniformity (without history-freeness). Another possibility, a modification of an idea of Lorenzen [12], is that the server should never find itself expected to act in an atomic subgame $A$ unless the client has previously had to act in a corresponding $A^\perp$. All these speculations need considerably more work in the direction of soundness (and if possible completeness) theorems. I have not (yet) pursued this, partly because this line of thought seems to be getting more into technical adjustments of the semantics and farther from the theme of what the intuitions and formalism of linear logic tell us about its semantics.

Notes

Note 1. In classical mechanics, a particle has position $\otimes$ momentum. In quantum mechanics, a particle has position $\&$ momentum. (Of course, this is an over-
simplification, ignoring the quantitative trade-off, given by the uncertainty principle, between partial information about position and momentum in quantum mechanics.

**Note 2.** Our protocols always specify which of the two participants is expected to initiate the interaction. In the terminology of [1], they have definite polarity. To obtain their completeness theorems for multiplicative linear logic, Abramsky and Jagadeesan [1] and Hyland and Ong [10] made essential use of non-polar games, i.e., games that either player can start (and that may have entirely different rules depending on who starts). As noted in [1], non-polarity does not work well in the presence of the additive connectives, which explains why we, starting from the behavior of additive connectives, arrived at polar games.

**Note 3.** In their analysis of game semantics for multiplicative linear logic, Abramsky and Jagadeesan [1] found that having the server begin both components of $A \otimes B$ when possible was the source of the excessive supply of valid formulas (including thinning) in [2]. So in their semantics, the server would act in only one component in such a situation. The other component would be started (if at all) by the client. This set-up depends on having non-polar games, so that the client can start the other component. Thus, as indicated in Note 2, it does not work as well in the presence of the additives. Indeed, the remarks about distributivity in the main text indicate that, if one wishes to deal with $\otimes$ and $\oplus$ together (and maintain the correctness of linear deductions, in particular of the distributive law), then one is forced to the convention that, when both sides of a $\otimes$ are to be started by the server then it should start them both before expecting the client to do anything.

**Note 4.** Requiring the client to finish both parts of $A \otimes B$ will (once we explain validity) make thinning invalid in this semantics of protocols. Thinning, which can be expressed as $A, B \vdash A$, is valid in the semantics of [2] because the server (there called proponent) can play a copying strategy between the $A$’s without ever entering the subgame $B$. The situation is different here, as the server must enter the subgame $B$ and my find itself called upon to move but having no move available there.

**Note 5.** Girard has pointed out [7] that, unlike the additive and multiplicative connectives, the exponentials are not determined by their introduction rules. That is, one could introduce into the sequent calculus a second (dual) pair of exponentials $!'$ and $?'$, with the same introduction rules as the original $!'$ and $?'$, and it would not be provable that they are equivalent to the originals. One possibility for such multiple exponentials would be to interpret one with a consistency requirement, as in the main text, and the other without such a requirement. Intuitively, the former describes storage of a single data element which can be reliably retrieved arbitrarily often, while the latter describes a source of a stream of data elements which can be accessed repeatedly and may provide different elements at each access. Notice that the approximation of $!A$ by iterated “times” of $1\&A$, suggested in [6], corresponds to the stream picture, not to reliable storage.

**Note 6.** The deduction of $\vdash A, \Gamma$ from $\vdash A, A, \Gamma$ in the presence of $\vdash A^\perp \oplus A$ and thinning proceeds as follows. Obtain $\vdash A^\perp, A, \Gamma$ by thinning from the axiom $\vdash A^\perp, A$. Combine it with the assumption $\vdash A, A, \Gamma$ by the $\&$ rule to get $\vdash A\&A^\perp, A, \Gamma$. Then cut the $A\&A^\perp$ in this last sequent against the assumption $\vdash A^\perp \oplus A$ to get the required $\vdash A, \Gamma$. 

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**IS GAME SEMANTICS NECESSARY?**
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