A Secure Infrastructure For System Console and Reset Access

Andras Horvath, Emanuele Leonardi, Markus Schulz
CERN IT/ADC, Geneva, Switzerland

During the last years large farms have been built using commodity hardware. This hardware lacks components for remote and automated administration. Products that can be retrofitted to these systems are either costly or inherently insecure. We present a system based on serial ports and simple machine controlled relays. We report on experience gained by setting up a 50-machine test environment as well as current work in progress in the area.

1. Area of operation

Our LHC Grid system consists of several thousand ‘worker nodes’, namely Linux-based PCs, connected via Ethernet network and used for large distributed calculations. These nodes have different designated administrators who reinstall them rather often according to current user needs. It is mainly during installation or when system administrators experiment with new kernel patches etc. that console access is most important.

Moreover, these computers can not be considered reliable and experience shows that sometimes PCs tend to ‘hang’ without any reproducible reason. In this case (or when, for example, the kernel encounters an internal programming error) nodes may need to be restarted by some hardware means, e.g. pushing their reset button.

Up to now both these operations have been done ‘by hand’, e.g. by having to go physically to our Computer Center to connect a monitor/keyboard to the nodes in question or to push their reset button. In addition to being inconvenient and time-consuming, this practice increases the possibility of a human mistake.

We have moved the machines’ console from the VGA screen and keyboard to using a serial line. Serial console systems are easy to implement, have been long since supported by Linux as well as being a ‘tradition’ in the computer industry.

The drawback of having a serial console instead of connecting a monitor to the node is that most BIOSes are unable to operate on a serial line, therefore at least the Linux boot loader has to start before the serial line can be used as console.

On the other hand, a ‘normal’ PC console provides an interface for human access only. But why is machine control important? For example, an automated monitoring system could restart non-responding machines a number of times (within a given time period) before raising an alarm, thus reducing the necessary amount of human intervention in case of ‘spontaneous hangs’. An automated installation system could watch over the console of the nodes being installed and take appropriate action based on pattern-matching on console messages.

Our system offers controlled remote access for administrators to the consoles and reset buttons of the nodes they are in charge of.

2. Implementation

2.1. Hardware architecture

We wanted the smallest amount of and possibly the cheapest extra hardware to be added. In principle, it would be possible to have two serial ports in each computer and ‘daisy-chain’ them using null-modem serial cables so that one of the ports is the node’s own console and it acts as a console server to one other node. Provided that the console server is accessible via the network, console operations can be performed on its client remotely.

Having as many console servers as worker nodes is not generally a good idea though, as apart from possible scaling problems, taking down e.g. ten daisy-chained nodes would mean that only the first one’s console remains accessible from the network (the console server of which is outside these ten nodes).

Therefore we utilised special 8-port PCI serial boards and have successfully installed up to three of them in the same PC, which means that 24 ports can be served from a single console server. These provide standard RS-232 DB9 serial lines similar to the ones usually on PCs.

Reset button pressing is implemented using serial-line-controlled programmable relay boxes. These have eight relay ports each and can be cascaded into a chain of eight boxes, allowing up to 64 potential clients controlled via a single reset server serial port. The relays are programmed to give a one-second impulse to the reset connector on the machines’ mainboard.

---

1 Current estimates show that our farm will grow to about 6000 machines by 2007.

2 Currently: ExSys EX-41098 [http://www.exsys.ch]
2.2. Software and user interface

Users connect to a single web/application server using any HTTPS and X.509 capable browser. Authentication is done via X.509 user certificates, issued by CERN’s own CA, and authorisation information is stored in the same database as other system data. This interface is where reset requests are submitted (e.g. 'I want to reset this-and-that node for a given reason') as well as where serial console interconnection information is retrieved from the database. A user can then connect to the console server responsible for given node at the push of a button with a Java-based SSH client offered on the web page or use his/her own SSH program to do so.

On the console/reset servers themselves Linux file access control and permissions are used to separate privileges. For each serial port a local Linux user is created under the same name (e.g. user ttyS5 for /dev/ttyS5) and its password is set so that the only way to log in is via key-authenticated SSH. These users have their login shell set to a very minimalistic terminal program and the permissions on the TTY devices are set so as to make it accessible only to the corresponding user.

RSA keys are used to let users in into the console server as the given ‘tty-user’. The RSA public keys are stored in the database and distributed to console servers whenever authorisation data changes. This is work in progress and we consider using two keys for each user (see Section 3 for the current status).

The same web interface is used for administrative tasks (adding new users, modifying authorisation information etc). A console client detection procedure can also be run from here which helps maintaining a consistent interconnection database.

The system is scriptable through direct database queries (and SSH in case of console access). We use Oracle 8i as database backend.

2.3. Network security

Our network is far too large to be considered trusted and, therefore, encrypted and authenticated communication is in use.

The web interface can be reached via HTTPS. Both users and the server hold a certificate issued by the CERN CA the validity of which is checked.

Console services (from user’s machine to console server) and internal data communication between web server and console servers use SSH (protocol version 2) with RSA authentication.

Secure connections to the database server are implemented using SSH tunnels (we tried to use the built-in SSL capability of Oracle 8i on our Linux boxes but failed). The server’s identity is ensured by checking its host key.

2.4. Costs (as of March 2003)

Serial consoles:

- 8-port serial boards and cabling: CHF32.25 / node = $23.54 / node
  (compare: standard console MUX with SSH access: $110-$300 / node)

Remote reset:

- Hand-made cables, connectors, relay boxes: CHF23.2 / node = $17 / node

3. Work in progress

The early deployment and test systems were considered a success as ‘proof-of-concept’ and we have learned much from the first version. Now we have started the general integration of the system into CERN’s already working services.

We aim at the utilisation of a still-in-development system which provides a generic solution, based on a central information store, to the distribution (and update) of configuration files to our nodes. Both interconnection data and user authorisation information can be managed this way thus eliminating the need for a separate database and a separate access control method.

That is, we distribute SSH key files for console access and small text-based configuration files (about which host is on which TTY port, needed for logging). The same distribution system will pass the results of the automatic detection procedure, generated into a file, back to the central information store.

Moreover, the system will not be as much ‘distributed’ as we first aimed at. Instead of using our PC farm nodes themselves to act as console/reset servers for each other, we dedicate machines for management purposes, one for each of our ‘rack’ units (about 44 machines). This solution is more costly as it needs an extra PC and special serial hardware but these management nodes will be used for purposes other than being console servers as well.

We have also dropped the web based management interface — Linux command line tools are going to be more easily scriptable. All configuration etc. will be

---

3 Of course, reset button interconnections can not be automatically detected.

4 Digi Acceleport Xem, for example [http://www.digi.com]
done through the generic data modification interface to the central information store.

Our software was re-written in order to increase efficiency and simplify the code (removing database access parts etc). Certain parts though, especially most of the low-level serial port access and client detection code were reused from the previous version.

Currently, major features include:

- Constant serial console logging (via syslog)
- Automatic console client detection (on request)
- Full integration into local environment, authentication/authorisation systems
- High security — controlled access to consoles and restarting
- Command line interface for enhanced scriptability

In the near future, we plan to roll the system — the above-mentioned second version — out on a larger scale.

4. Contact information

Please feel free to direct any questions or comments to Andras.Horvath@cern.ch.

Acknowledgments

Guner Passage and Preslav Konstantinov wrote the initial version of the software for controlling the relay boxes.