Abstract

Many dependability techniques expect certain behaviors from the underlying subsystems and fail in chaotic ways if these expectations are not met. Under expected circumstances, however, software tends to work quite well. This paper suggests that, instead of fixing elusive bugs or rewriting software, we improve the predictability of conditions faced by our programs. This approach might be a cheaper and faster way to improve dependability of software. After identifying some of the common triggers of unpredictability, the paper describes three engineering principles that hold promise in combating unpredictability, suggests a way to benchmark predictability, and outlines a brief research agenda.

1 Introduction

Dependability has traditionally been defined as the confluence of reliability, availability, security, and safety \cite{14}; a system is not dependable when any of these properties is lacking. Most unplanned violations of dependability properties trace their roots to some subsystem’s unpredictable behavior in the face of unpredicted stressors. If the designer or administrator of a system could accurately reason about the system’s reaction to both known and unknown stimuli, then she could assess a priori whether that system will satisfy its users’ dependability requirements. Predictable behavior facilitates accurate provisioning and enables failure management infrastructures that avert system-wide failure.

Much deployed software, however, is not predictable. When given their expected ranges of input and resource availability, programs generally output results that conform to their users’ expectations. Unexpected conditions, however, can lead to cascading failures: an initial fault perturbs one module’s input, which make its output and resource consumption erratic; this deprives nearby modules of resources and provides wrong inputs to other modules, which fail and increase the amplitude of the propagating failure wave. The ensuing chaos blurs the cause of failure, making diagnosis progressively more difficult. A dependable system should never behave unpredictably in the face of failure; it is OK to fail, but should do so in well-understood, controlled ways.

Based on the assumption that software works well when not pushed to unexplored boundaries, this paper posits that system predictability can be improved by providing programs with the environment they expect, along with damping circuits to control propagation of failure. Compared to developing new technology for tolerating failures, improving predictability may provide a cheaper, faster way to achieve the level of dependability we seek, because it allows existing techniques to be leveraged effectively.

2 Unpredictable Behavior

To control unpredictability, we need to first understand the sources of such unpredictability—they can be internal (e.g., deterministic bugs), or external. The proposed approach focuses on external triggers of unpredictability, so here I survey three categories of such triggers: unexpected inputs, undue resource utilization, and unusual failure modes.

Unexpected Inputs

Inputs to a system can be unexpected in at least three ways: in terms of size, content, and the rate at which input arrives.

Unexpected size: The vast majority of CERT’s 142 alerts regarding security and availability compromises since year 2000 are due to buffer overflows, in which input longer than expected overwrites the program’s stack with attacker-provided code. One of the most visible cases was SQL Slammer \cite{3}, a stack-overwriting worm that attacked Microsoft SQL Server’s resolution service, gaining control of the machine and then self-replicating to other hosts. Set against SQL Slammer’s estimated impact of more than $1 billion, specifying and enforcing the maximum size of each type of network packet SQL Server accepts seems trivial.

Unexpected content: A recent exploit in Mailman, the GNU mailing list manager, allowed attackers to crash it by using a specially crafted e-mail message that exploited a bug in the message parsing component \cite{17}. Similar denial-of-service vulnerabilities, this time related to HTML parsing, have plagued the Apache web server and the Squid proxy cache \cite{3}. Recently, the most widely used DNS server (BIND) had a bug that allowed a remote attacker to poison its
name resolution cache \cite{17}. In all of these cases, separately verifying the validity of the inputs before delivering them to the vulnerable programs was straightforward, but required thought and, perhaps, a slight loss in performance.

**Unexpected rate of arrival:** Internet services often fail due to overload conditions. A notorious example is CNN.com, the online news provider: On the morning of September 11, 2001, accesses to its front page increased from 1,400 requests/sec to 3,800 requests/sec within 15 minutes \cite{15}. In spite of CNN.com’s load balancers, dynamic server provisioning systems, and procedures for reducing HTML complexity for front-page news in response to high demand, the site collapsed. Administrators were unable to access the machines remotely because of thrashing and the network of number sessions having reached the maximum supported number. After a few hours, the site came back up; on that day, CNN.com’s estimated peak load exceeded 30,000 requests/sec. The system would have been able to handle this peak load, but was not able to adapt fast enough when workload was doubling every 5 minutes; suitable admission control would have allowed CNN.com to stay within operating range. Although large Internet services have several mechanisms in place to control the magnitude of request load, few (if any) check for how the rate of arrival evolves.

The inputs described in this section originated at sources that were outside the receiver’s administrative realm (e.g., end users, remote systems). The next section addresses another category of input: the output of software modules that the receiver directly interacts with, within the same realm of control.

**Unaudited Output**

In order to manage behavior of large programs, software engineers developed the concept of modules with well-defined interfaces, which isolate code within a known set of behavior boundaries. Over time, however, module behavior changes in subtle ways as internal code gets modified and optimized. Even if behavior did not change, programmers use modules in ways that the modules’ original designers had not envisioned, exercising poorly tested paths that lead to unexpected behavior. Programmer churn compounds these dynamics, because new programmers modify and/or use code they do not understand. In a study of a high-end IBM operating system \cite{22}, code reuse has been given as one explanation for the high incidence (56%) of boundary condition bugs that had a high impact on the system’s user population.

Misbehaving modules’ outputs become other modules’ inputs and can lead to unexpected effects outside the system. A recent survey of email administrators \cite{11} found that botched upgrades and misconfiguration caused 42% of all lost email incidents. Similarly, downtime in the US public telephone network increased from 15 million customer-minutes per month in 1992-1994 \cite{12} to 155 million per month in 2000 \cite{7} — one explanation is the widespread Y2K patches. If outputs could be kept conformant independently of patches, misconfiguration, and misuse, then software evolution would pose less of a risk.

**Reckless Resource Usage**

Software aging is the process by which the state of long-running programs degrades over time through exhaustion of system resources, data corruption, or numerical error accumulation. Aging may lead to a potpourri of unexpected behavior: performance degradation, crashes, hangs, etc. Exhausted resources can range from memory and disk space to CPU time and operating system structures like file descriptors. Software aging is particularly problematic for popular Internet services, because their resource consumption is workload-driven and they face large workloads on a regular basis; scientific applications suffer as well, because they run for a long time. A recent version of Apache leaks 80 bytes of memory every time an HTTP request has a linefeed on a line by itself (which is legal input); bombarded with large chunks of linefeeds, Apache runs out of memory and crashes within seconds \cite{17}. Software tends to become increasingly less predictable when faced with a shortage of resources, both because it may not check for such conditions and because code paths that are normally not exercised now get executed. In the Apache example, on Linux kernel 2.4.20, once the leaking process’ footprint exceeds the amount of swap space, a kernel bug in the swap code freezes the entire machine in about 50% of the cases.

Many server applications preallocate memory pools and do their own memory management. This suggests that, if there is a chance memory may be insufficient, they insist on knowing ahead of time—predictable resource availability is sometimes more important than resource availability itself.

Historically, simplicity has been the key to dependability, because simplicity begets predictability; simple systems tend to work, while complex ones don’t. The challenge is to build complex systems that are dependable; one way to do so is by preserving the simplicity of the interactions between their components. Having motivated the need for predictability, I will now argue for putting order in the seemingly anarchic universe of software.

**3 The Physics of Software**

Mature engineering disciplines are constrained and, at the same time, blessed with the immutable laws of physics. They take the form of macroscopic, descriptive laws that capture physical invariants (e.g., Joule’s heat dissipation law for electric circuits \( P = RI^2 \)). These are safe-to-make assumptions that engineers use to reason about the future behavior of an electric circuit, a steel structure, or a chemical process; no effort is required to preserve such invariants.

This paper argues that we restrict the inputs, outputs, and internal states of software, the same way laws of physics
constrain physical systems. Unlike the physical world, however, in software we need to formulate and enforce such invariants ourselves. The rest of this section describes three ways to define such invariants; although described with respect to individual modules, the three methods apply hierarchically at all levels of granularity within a system, from small components to large subsystems.

Fail Early

It is acceptable for a program to fail when given inputs that the designer had assumed impossible, but it is not acceptable for such inputs to be allowed. Electric circuits, for instance, malfunction if exposed to current exceeding their design point; their inputs, however, are controlled by fuses—wires that physically disintegrate when carrying current above a certain threshold. The absence of fuses and circuit breakers would make household electricity and many other applications impractical, due to the fire danger and other mayhem resulting from overloaded circuits. Laws of physics cannot prevent all power spikes and miswiring, but they can guarantee that excessive current will not flow through a fuse.

A software fuse is a filter that drops any input that does not meet the receiving program’s expectations. The input invariants encoded in fuses need to be explicit about at least the bounds on the length of acceptable input, content (e.g., only accept ASCII characters), and nature of workload—in effect stating acceptability properties \([2] \) for inputs. Stateful packet-inspecting firewalls are fuses: they enforce fairly sophisticated invariants on the kind of network traffic that passes through, such as blocking non-HTTP communication tunneled over the HTTP permitted by corporate firewalls. Input invariants do not have to be static: dynamic feedback loops between the system and its input fuses can parameterize adaptive invariants. Analogously to band-pass filters in analog circuits, input invariants should limit the rate at which workload varies, to prevent the kind of failure CNN.com experienced on Sep. 11, 2001. Input fuses can span inputs of multiple modules, to enforce higher granularity properties. Given the frequency with which systems fail due to bad inputs or overload, one can only conclude that programmers are pathological optimists.

Kill the Gluttons

A large fraction of downtime results from undue resource utilization, which deprives other modules of the resources they need; such resources consist of bits (memory, disk, network bandwidth, etc.) and time (CPU time, transaction commit time, etc.). Running out of resources is a normal occurrence and dependable applications must handle it. The fact that memory leaks are still rampant in garbage-collected J2EE applications shows that language constructs are not sufficient for taming resource unpredictability—instead, a congruency between the resource model and underlying reality is required. Exporting accurate resource models to application programmers without requiring them to perform explicit management (e.g., via malloc and free) is challenging, but necessary for predictability. Flexible resource models, such as leases \([9] \) and market-based node management \([4] \), can help, if their paradigm is assimilated in the programming languages or framework.

Once the constraints of the resource model are properly exposed in the form of known invariants, any violation can legitimately be considered evidence of a bug. Resource cops in the underlying execution framework can then promptly suspend or terminate the offender. The simplest form of resource control allows a system to execute until it runs out of some resource, or its utilization exceeds a threshold, and then reboots it. In multi-tiered systems, resource utilization can be tied to requests and each incoming request be given a time-to-live: should the time-to-live reach zero during processing, the request gets squashed and all associated resources are freed, thus coercing resource gluttony into a clean request failure. A watchdog is a good example of a resource cop: in PHP, a server-side scripting language, timers will terminate a script when it exceeds its allotted time, thus freeing the CPU and preventing further resource hogging.

Fail in Known Ways

When a system fails, either it provides strange results (Byzantine behavior), or becomes disabled and provides no answers until it is recovered (fail-stop behavior). A dependable system never exhibits Byzantine behavior and only fails into one of a small set of states, thus making recovery easier and halting further propagation.

Verifying that the output of a program has a desired property is often easier than producing output with that property (e.g., prime factorization of an integer). Programs can therefore have simple, orthogonal output guards that capture the invariants required of correct output, to as fine a granularity as is practical. Since verifying properties of a data set often requires different algorithms than producing the data set (e.g., sorting a list), output guards can legitimately increase confidence in the correctness of output, unlike N-version programming. For example, the U.S. National Security Agency locks up uncertified operating systems and applications inside virtual machines and monitors their network communication to ensure that the application inside does not violate desired security invariants \([21] \). When an output guard detects a violation, it can suspend or stop the module, thus coercing Byzantine into fail-stop behavior.

Output guards can enforce larger granularity constraints by spanning the output of multiple modules. Should enforcement of desired invariants become too expensive, output guards can sample the output, rather than check every single response. Sophisticated guards can enforce output invariants by correlating outputs to the inputs that generated them, as suggested in \([20] \).

Impending failure can sometimes be inferred by monitoring system aspects that are not related to output. For in-
stance, the earlier PHP watchdog timer example shows how hang failures can be coerced into crash failures. Another example maps observed low-level faults onto a set of faults known to be well tolerated by existing recovery code [13]. Checking data structures with assert()-like macros can turn runtime violation of data invariants into a suspend or reboot of the faulty module, thus preempting a wider disaster. In most systems, data structure inconsistencies are often indicators of much deeper problems, that are easier to deal with by stopping; limping along might further compromise indicators of much deeper problems, that are easier to deal with by stopping; limping along might further compromise system integrity and uselessly consume resources.

4 From Predictability to Dependability

Immediate detection of invariant violations in inputs, outputs, and resource usage enables fast fault detection, preventing further system failure. Admission control tuned to the CNN.com cluster’s ability to scale under load could have avoided its collapse on Sep. 11. Instead of fixing insidious bugs, one might simply prevent the bug-triggering inputs from entering the system. Most of the bug fixes addressing the SQL Slammer, Mailman, Apache, Squid, and BIND exploits (described in Section 2) took the form of more thorough input checking; the same effect could have been obtained out in the field by operators interposing input fuses.

Output guards and input fuses can dampen the domino effect of a propagating fault through containment. This is particularly important in large scale enterprise systems, where a major source of failures results from poor integration of new code with legacy software. Connection frameworks, such as JCA (Java Connector Architecture [23]), are a good vehicle for implementing fuses and guards, that turn poorly understood behavior of legacy components into predictable behavior. Resource cops can reside inside J2EE application servers, which are frequently used for legacy integration. Engineering away unpredictability with guards, fuses, and resource cops is often easier than rewriting old software (which may sometimes not even be an option), and hence cheaper. Enforced predictability could also encourage more frequent reuse of debugged software modules.

Prompt fault detection plus fast recovery is the recipe for high availability. Well-understood failure states enable the development of fast and effective recovery procedures; the success of the transaction model [10] is testimony to how a simple, well-defined fault model can improve the dependability of applications.

The threat of program termination when outputs or resource consumption do not meet expectations should motivate developers to write correct and complete input fuses for their modules. The mere formulation of input invariants improves a developers’ understanding of the system and helps find bugs in the module’s logic. Guards and fuses that catch wrong assumptions also provide immediate feedback and facilitate debugging during development.

Rigorously developing fuses and guards can improve the effectiveness of testing, thus increasing software quality. By excising the task of input and output validation from the main code into separate fuses and guards, we essentially develop live testing modules. Since they are considerably simpler, their correctness could be verified using formal methods (in fact, their simplicity automatically makes them less prone to bugs). Then, the system itself need only be tested on filtered inputs, which can be considerably fewer than unfiltered ones, depending on the application.

Predictably faulty behavior can be efficiently compensated for, thus turning expensive unplanned downtime of buggy software into planned downtime. For instance, a web server that leaks memory at a constant rate can be rebooted shortly before its predicted failure point. Unpredictability calls for overprovisioning to accommodate variations, which means more resources to be purchased and managed; predictable systems may allow for lower error margins and require less human oversight. For example, in the US public telephone system, 30% of failures are due to hardware, yet hardware causes only 19% of total downtime [7]. Switching hardware has simple failure semantics and replacement procedures, enabling technician crews to recover it quickly.

Predictable behavior can reduce the chances for operator errors and improve a system’s perceived availability. Various psychological studies have shown that, when acting under pressure, humans are poor at analyzing the situation and making intelligent decisions [19]; most human operator errors result from such hasty actions. Predictable failure behavior offers opportunities to accumulate experience with similar failures through repetition, as well as to develop automated procedures for failure management. Predictability may also reduce the number of system “knobs,” which means less risk for error. Additionally, end user perception of the system’s dependability could increase with predictability; a study of computer users has found that increased predictability of terminal response time gave rise to more productive and satisfied users than unpredictable access, even when response time was as high as 5 seconds [16].

5 Variance as a Predictability Benchmark

Improving predictability may take a toll on some system properties (e.g., performance), and reward the designer with improvements in other areas (e.g., recovery time). Choosing the right combination of predictability, performance, cost, etc. requires a way to measure changes in predictability. Sometimes predictability is not important, while in other cases it may yield high value. For example, in a triple-modular redundant design, the system mean-time-to-failure MTTF is reduced, because the system stops when any one of its 3 modules fails, but mean-time-to-recover MTTR from a single faulty value is predictably zero.

The definition of “right tradeoff” generally relates to user expectations or cost. It has been argued that reducing MTTR improves availability if MTTF stays the same, because avail-
ability is MTTF/(MTTF+MTTR) \[5\]. However, a small MTTR does not guarantee fast recovery, if the TTR distribution is heavy-tailed. Failures under high load usually lead to the longest recovery times, thus affecting even more users, so a lower-variance TTR distribution might actually be more useful, even if it entails a higher mean. A web-based service with an end-to-end \{MTTR, standard deviation\} of \{\mu = 6\ \text{sec}, \sigma = 2.5\} will have better end-user perceived availability if it reduces variance to zero, even if that requires raising MTTR: \{\mu = 8\ \text{sec}, \sigma = 0\}. In the latter case, an observed outage will never last more than 8 sec (which is known to be the patience threshold for humans using web-based services \[2\]). The former system (\mu = 6\ \text{sec}) allows a significant fraction of outages to last longer than 8 seconds, or allows a few outages to take excessive amounts of time.

To benchmark a system’s predictability, we would first need to establish an invariant and measure how close (heuristically) to that invariant the system’s behavior is. Consider measuring the predictability of recovery in an Oracle 9i database system: set the FAST\_START\_MTTR\_TARGET parameter \[13\] to \( t = 1 \) minute (representing a recovery time invariant). Then place the standard TPC-C load on the system, crash it, and measure recovery time. Repeat several times and compute the variance. Repeat the same experiment for other values of \( t \). The predictability metric tells us how tightly clustered the recovery times are around the chosen FAST\_START\_MTTR\_TARGET value. A low variance can offer confidence that, in production, the DBMS will provide recovery times within the predicted bounds.

6 Research Agenda

The most common approach to making programs work as expected consists of finding and fixing bugs in the source code. External invariant enforcers can treat programs as black boxes, but they are likely to be less effective against internal triggers of unpredictability than against external ones. This research agenda will focus on bringing predictability to existing software modules that must be treated as black boxes. The overhead of creating fuses, guards, or cops is best justified when modification of the software itself is difficult or impractical, thus making legacy software a prime candidate. Systems connected to the open Internet are particularly interesting due to the unpredictability of their workload.

Smart fuses in C++ and Java: The easiest software fuse is an \( if \) statement or a simple admission control rule; the more sophisticated invariants, however, require expressive declarative languages that can capture temporal properties. Unfortunately, programmers have enough trouble mastering their main programming language, so mandating additional languages with substantially different paradigms is impractical. Two artifacts that can be of real help to practitioners would be a set of parameterized fuse prototypes (e.g., that enforce tunable temporal properties of workload evolution) and libraries that allow programmers to write their own fuses, directly encoding input invariants. Model-checking and other formal methods can be used to increase confidence in the correctness of the fuse libraries.

Aids for invariants: Success of fuses, guards, and cops depends on the correctness and completeness of the invariants they enforce. Not only do common programmers not have good tools to formulate such invariants, but they don’t always realize all the assumptions they’re making. Recent work \[8, 9\] has made important progress in learning invariants by observing program behavior, but more remains to be done for these techniques to work with legacy black boxes. Deduced invariants could be presented to programmers, or enforced and verified on subsequent executions of the programs. Such tools could also be used standalone by developers to better understand the system they are assembling.

Nontrivial output guards: Substantially meaningful output invariants can most likely not be stated independently of the inputs generating that output. As such, the more sophisticated the output invariant, the more likely it becomes that the guard duplicates parts of the program itself. The solution lies in identifying abstract classes of modules that can share guard constructs (e.g., all Java EJBs support standard sets of methods that can be guarded by common invariants), and then using output sampling to statistically enforce the output invariants. Identifying optimality of when and how to sample output is another interesting challenge.

Reasonable resource models: Enforcing invariants on resource usage without making things worse could prove a challenge: resource limits tight enough to be useful might be too tight, and limits that avoid problems might be too loose. Global resource optimization problems have been studied at length in operating systems, but under a fairly restricted resource model. Exposing more flexible models could yield more efficient resource control. For example, exclusive use of leased resources \[9\] in a prototype J2EE application server could enable zero-downtime prophylactic rebooting of components to combat software aging.

System macrocompiler: Type safety has gone a long way in validating inputs and outputs of programs. Compilers have improved low-level predictability and correctness, as well as given us a way to reason about programs. Unfortunately, high level properties of heterogeneous systems cannot be verified by compilers. A macrocompiler would validate compatibility between assemblies of black boxes and the corresponding invariants captured by their fuses, guards, and resource cops. A macrocompiler might also enable safe composition of higher level invariants out of properties enforced at lower levels, such as type safety. Component properties, enforced by guards, could then be used to reason about emergent properties. A macrocompiler using aspect-oriented approaches \[11\] can automatically interpose fuses and guards on arbitrary classes of objects in heterogeneous environments ranging from C/C++ to Java and J2EE.

Metrics and deployment: Dependability benchmarking is still an elusive goal, but predictability metrics can bring us closer to a solution. I’ve suggested experimental variance as
a measure of predictability, but better, more analytical techniques are needed. Quantifying the tradeoffs involved in engineering predictability could also help with identifying the parts of a system that would most benefit from improved predictability; this would enable the incremental retrofitting of predictability into existing systems in a cost-effective way.

7 Summary

Software fuses and resource cops keep software within its comfort zone; if bugs continue to manifest, then output guards and other resource cops bring erratic behavior into compliance, transforming a black-box program into a fail-stop module. If programs behave better when external conditions match those envisioned by its designer, then such predictability begets dependability. Some types of fuses, guards, and cops are already in ad hoc use today; building smarter ones and systematically connecting them to programs can improve predictability of software. The proposed approach may be a productive alternative to fixing pernicious bugs or rewriting flakey software, and may ease the integration of imperfect software into complex systems.

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