Towards Formal Verification of HotStuff-based Byzantine Fault Tolerant Consensus in Agda: Extended Version *

Harold Carr¹, Christopher Jenkins², Mark Moir¹, Victor Cacciari Miraldo³, and Lisandra Silva⁴

¹ Oracle Labs, USA and New Zealand
² University of Iowa, USA
³ Tweag, The Netherlands
⁴ Runtime Verification, USA

Abstract. LibraBFT is a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus protocol based on HotStuff. We present an abstract model of the protocol underlying HotStuff / LibraBFT, and formal, machine-checked proofs of their core correctness (safety) property and an extended condition that enables non-participating parties to verify committed results. (Liveness properties would be proved for specific implementations, not for the abstract model presented in this paper.)

A key contribution is precisely defining assumptions about the behavior of honest peers, in an abstract way, independent of any particular implementation. Therefore, our work is an important step towards proving correctness of an entire class of concrete implementations, without repeating the hard work of proving correctness of the underlying protocol. The abstract proofs are for a single configuration (epoch); extending these proofs across configuration changes is future work. Our models and proofs are expressed in Agda, and are available in open source.

1 Introduction

There has been phenomenal interest in decentralized systems that enable coordination among peers that do not necessarily trust each other. This interest has largely been driven in recent years by the emergence of blockchain technology. When the set of participants is limited by permissioning or proof of stake [11, 22], Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus—which tolerates some byzantine peers actively deviating from the protocol—is of interest.

Due to attractive properties relative to previous BFT consensus protocols, implementations based on HotStuff [41] are being developed and adopted. For example, the Diem Foundation (formerly Libra Association) was until recently

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developing LibraBFT based on HotStuff \[5, 36\]. (LibraBFT was renamed to DiemBFT before being discontinued; other variants are emerging.)

Many published consensus algorithms, including some with manual correctness proofs, have been shown to be incorrect \[12, 37\]. Therefore, precise, machine-checked formal verification is essential, particularly for new algorithms being adopted in practice. Some of the papers on HotSTUFF / LibraBFT include brief correctness arguments, but they lack many details and are not machine checked. Furthermore, LibraBFT uses data structures, messages and logic, that differ significantly from versions on which those informal proofs were based.

Our contributions are as follows:

– a precise, abstract model of the protocol underlying HotSTUFF / LibraBFT;
– precise formulation of assumptions; and
– formal, machine-checked proofs of core correctness (safety) properties, plus a novel extended condition that enables additional functionality.

Proving correctness for an abstraction of the protocol enables verifying any concrete implementation by proving that its handlers ensure the assumptions of our abstract proofs. Our contribution is thus an important step towards proving correctness for an entire class of concrete implementations. However, this class does not include all possible variants. In particular, DiemBFT recently added an option for committing based on 2-chains, rather than 3-chains, as our work assumes (see Section 3.1). Adapting our techniques to accommodate 2-chain-based implementations is future work.

This paper focuses on the metatheory around an abstraction of a system of peers participating in the HotSTUFF / LibraBFT protocol, and assumptions about which peers can participate, rules that honest peers obey, and the intersection of any two quorums containing at least one honest peer. We state and prove key correctness properties, such as that any two committed blocks do not conflict (i.e., they belong to the same ordered chain of committed blocks).

Our ongoing work \[7\] aims to use the results presented in this paper to verify a concrete Haskell implementation that we have developed based on the Diem Foundation’s open-source Rust implementation \[17\]. We have built a system model that can be instantiated with data types and handlers, yielding a model of a distributed system in which honest peers execute those handlers and byzantine ones are constrained only by being unable to forge signatures of honest peers. We have ported this implementation to Agda, using a library we have developed \[13\] to enable the ported code to closely mirror the original, thus reducing the risk of error. We have made substantial progress towards proving that the resulting Agda port satisfies the assumptions established in this paper.

LibraBFT supports configuration changes (also known as epoch changes), whereby parameters such as the number and identities of participating peers can be changed. The contribution described in this paper is an abstract model for a single epoch and formal, machine-checked proofs of its correctness conditions. Stating and proving cross-epoch properties is future work. Nevertheless, the Haskell implementation we are verifying supports epoch changes, and our
verification infrastructure is prepared for multiple epochs. In particular, our abstract modules are parameterized by an “epoch configuration” structure.

Our models, definitions and proofs are expressed in Agda \cite{1,31}, a dependently-typed programming language and proof assistant. We chose Agda for this work because its syntax is similar to Haskell’s, making it easier to develop and have confidence in a model of the implementation we aim to verify. This paper is intended to be reasonably self contained and does not require the reader to know Agda. To that end, we will explain Agda-specific features and syntax that are important for following the paper. We encourage interested readers to explore the open source proofs in detail, and we hope that this paper will provide a useful overview and guide that will make them more accessible. For readers who would like to learn about Agda, we recommend starting with the tutorial in \cite{39}.

In Section 2, we overview salient aspects of HotStuff / LibraBFT to motivate our approach to abstractly modeling the protocol and formally verifying correctness properties. In Section 3, we present the definitions used to develop the formal abstract model of a system of peers participating in the protocol, and to define traditional and extended correctness properties. We also describe their proofs, which are available in open source \cite{7}. Related work is summarized in Section 4 and concluding remarks and future work appear in Section 5.

2 An Overview of HotStuff / LibraBFT

The following overview does not fully describe HotStuff and LibraBFT: it highlights aspects that our abstraction must accommodate to enable our proofs. Details are in the relevant papers and repositories \cite{5,7,17,36,41}.

Peers participating in the HotStuff / LibraBFT protocol repeatedly agree to extend a chain of blocks that is initially empty (represented by a genesis record). Each block identifies (directly or indirectly) the block that it extends (or the genesis record if none) via one or more cryptographic hashes. This common hash chaining \cite{35} technique ensures that each block uniquely identifies its predecessor, unless an adversary finds a hash collision (e.g., two different blocks that hash to the same value); it is a standard assumption that a computationally bounded adversary cannot do so \cite[Chapter 9]{29}.

We require that two (honest) peers that faithfully follow the protocol cannot be convinced to extend the chain in conflicting ways: if honest peer $p_1$ (resp., $p_2$) determines that block $b_1$ (resp. $b_2$) is in the chain, then the chain up to one of the blocks extends the chain up to the other. This must hold even if some (byzantine) peers (up to some threshold, as discussed below) actively misbehave.

A peer can propose to add a new block to a chain, and others can vote to support the proposal. A proposed block can include a special reconfiguration (epoch change) transaction, which would change the set of peers participating and/or other parameters. To prevent impersonation, messages are signed.

A valid proposal contains or identifies a quorum certificate that represents a quorum of votes supporting the previous block. Based on assumptions discussed below, we can be sure that any two quorums each contain a vote from at least one
honest peer in common. An honest participant will refuse to vote for a proposal if the requirements for the quorum certificate and previous blocks are not met. This ensures that the quorum certificate associated with each block in a chain satisfies these requirements, even though some peers that contributed votes to the quorum certificates may be dishonest. The conditions for committing a block are designed to ensure that honest peers never contribute votes to two quorums that cause conflicting blocks to be committed.

If a byzantine proposer sends different proposals to different peers, a quorum of votes for the same proposal may not be generated. In this case, waiting peers may time out, and initiate a new effort to extend the chain; this can result in competing proposals to extend the same chain with different blocks. To distinguish between proposals, each proposed block has an associated round, which must be larger than that of the block that it extends. Because competing proposals are possible, peers collectively build a tree of records, and follow specified rules to determine when a given proposal has been committed. The essence of the protocol is in the rules that honest peers must follow, and what information a peer must verify before committing a proposal.

The goal of this work is an abstract model of the protocol that is independent of all these details, capturing just enough detail to prove that, if the assumptions are not violated, then honest peers will not commit conflicting proposals.

3 Correctness properties and proofs

We prove our high-level abstract correctness properties in module LibraBFT.Abstract.Properties (in file LibraBFT/Abstract/Properties.agda), which receives several module parameters that can be instantiated in order to relate a particular implementation to the abstract machinery.

module LibraBFT.Abstract.Properties
(E : EpochConfig) (UID : Set)
(UID-r : (u₀ u₁ : UID) → Dec (u₀ ≡ u₁))
(V : VoteEvidence E UID)
where . . .

We first describe EpochConfig: the other module parameters are explained later. EpochConfig represents configuration information for an epoch, including: how many peers participate in the epoch (authorsN), their identities (toNodeId), and their public keys (getPubKey), as well as requirements such as each member having a different public key (PK-inj). Members are identified by values of type Fin authorsN; the natural numbers less than authorsN; for example, we have getPubKey : Member → PK where Member = Fin authorsN.

An EpochConfig also provides IsQuorum, a predicate indicating what the implementation considers to be a quorum. The type of IsQuorum is List Member → Set; Set is Agda’s way of representing an arbitrary type. This definition is then used to define another important field of an EpochConfig:
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\[ \text{bft-assumption} : \forall \{xs\, ys\} \rightarrow \text{IsQuorum} \; xs \rightarrow \text{IsQuorum} \; ys \rightarrow \exists [a] (a \in xs \times a \in ys \times \text{MetaHonestPK} (\text{getPubKey} \; a)) \]

Here, \text{bft-assumption} requires that the intersection of any two quorums contains at least one honest peer.\footnote{\text{MetaHonestPK} is a predicate representing whether a peer owning a key behaves honestly. The \text{Meta} prefix identifies this as being part of the formal model and not accessible to implementations, which must not depend on knowing who is honest.} Agda supports implicit arguments, listed in curly braces, which need not be provided explicitly if their values can be inferred from context, e.g., \text{IsQuorum} \; xs implies that \(xs\) is of type \text{List Member}. The \(\exists [a]::\) notation says that there is an \(a\) which satisfies the condition—a product of three conditions, in this case. The type of \(a\) must be implied by context; here, \(a \in xs\) implies that \(a\) is of type \text{Member}.

To inherit the correctness properties we prove, an implementation must provide an \text{EpochConfig} as a module parameter. Part of constructing it is proving \text{bft-assumption} based on whatever assumptions and definition of \text{IsQuorum} the implementation uses. One common approach is to assume \(n\) peers with equal “voting power”, at most \(f\) of which are byzantine, and to ensure that \(n > 3f\); in this case, a set of peers is a quorum if it contains at least \(\frac{2n}{3}\) distinct peers. \text{LibraBFT.Abstract.BFT} contains a lemma that can be used to prove that such assumptions imply \text{bft-assumption}. The lemma is sufficiently general to accommodate \text{LibraBFT}'s approach of assigning (potentially non-uniform) voting power to peers, and considering a set of peers to be a quorum if its combined voting power exceeds two thirds of the total voting power.

The remainder of this section is in context of a single \text{EpochConfig} called \(E\).

### 3.1 Abstract Records and RecordChains

A \text{Record} can be a \text{Block}, a quorum certificate (QC) or the epoch’s genesis (initial) \text{Record}; precise definitions are below. (These are abstract records that may not correlate closely to data structures and message formats used by an implementation; for example, in \text{LibraBFT}, blocks contain the previous QC.) HOTSTUFF-based algorithms grow a tree of \text{Records} rooted at the epoch’s genesis record, where nodes contain a \text{Block} or a \text{QC}. Paths (called \text{RecordChains}) from the root begin with the genesis record and then alternate between \text{Blocks} and \text{QCs}. For example, the existence of a path from the root to a record \(r\) is captured by the type \text{RecordChain} \(r\) being inhabited. Figure\footnote{Illustrates a tree of \text{Records}.} illustrates a tree of \text{Records}.

While typical implementations carry more information, abstractly, a \text{Block} comprises its round number, an identifier of type \text{UID} for itself and for the quorum certificate it extends, if any (a value of type \text{Maybe UID} is either \text{nothing} or \text{just} \(x\) for some \(x\) of type \text{UID}). \text{UID} can be any type that has decidable equality, as represented by the second and third module parameters; these are passed to other modules in the \text{Abstract} namespace as needed. Definitions below are in modules \text{LibraBFT.Abstract.Records} and \text{LibraBFT.Abstract.RecordChain}.\footnote{Illustrates a tree of \text{Records}.}
Typical implementations obtain a Block’s id by applying a cryptographic hash function to some or all of its contents; thus identifiers may not be unique. Our correctness properties are therefore proved modulo “injectivity failures” on (supposedly) unique ids. We do not assume that such injectivity failures do not exist, which would make our proofs meaningless because they can occur in practice, however unlikely. We elaborate below and in Sections 4 and 5.

Abstractly, a Vote is by a member of the epoch, for a round and Block id.

A quorum certificate (QC) represents enough Votes to certify that a Block has been accepted by a quorum of members. It includes the Block’s id and round, and a list of Votes and evidence that the QC is “valid” (representing properties that honest peers verify before accepting the QC), i.e.,:

1. The list of voting Members represents a quorum.
2. All Votes are for the Block’s id.
3. All Votes are for the same round.

Honest peers accept a (concrete) Vote only if it satisfies implementation-specific conditions captured by the module parameter $V$ of type VoteEvidence $E$ UID, an implementation-specific predicate on abstract Votes. To enable proofs to access the verified conditions, we add a fourth coherence clause to QCs:

4. For each Vote in the QC, there is evidence that a message was sent containing a concrete representation of the (abstract) Vote that satisfies the implementation-specific conditions.

Putting this all together, we have:
record QC : Set where  
constructor mkQC  
field qRound : Round  
  qCertBlockId : UID  
  qVotes : List Vote  
  qVotes-C1 : IsQuorum (List-map vMember qVotes)  
  qVotes-C2 : All (λ v → vBlockUID v ≡ qCertBlockId) qVotes  
  qVotes-C3 : All (λ v → vRound v ≡ qRound) qVotes  
  qVotes-C4 : All ∀ qVotes

All (from the Agda standard library) accepts a predicate and a list, and requires that each element of the list satisfies the predicate.

Next, we define a Record to be either a Block, a QC, or the special genesis record I. There is a constructor for each case, and the B and Q constructors take arguments of the appropriate type to form a Record.

data Record : Set where  
  I : Record  
  B : Block → Record  
  Q : QC → Record

We then say that a record $r'$ extends another record $r$, denoted $r ← r'$, whenever one of the following conditions is met:

1. $r$ is the genesis Record and $r'$ is a Block for round greater than 0 and not identifying any previous Block.
2. $r$ is a QC and $r'$ is a Block with a round higher than $r$’s and with a $b$PrevQC field identifying $r$.
3. $r$ is a Block and $r'$ is a QC certifying $r$.

We capture these conditions in the following Agda datatype; $←$ indicates that $←$ is an infix operator with two arguments. Values of this type can be constructed using one of three constructors ($I←B$, $Q←B$ or $B←Q$), each of which requires several arguments to establish a value of $←$ for a pair of Records.

data ← : Record → Record → Set where  
  I←B : ∀ { b } → 0 < getRound b → b$PrevQC b ≡ nothing  
      → I ← (B b)  
  Q←B : ∀ { q b } → getRound q < getRound b  
      → just (qCertBlockId q) ≡ b$PrevQC b  
      → Q q ← B b  
  B←Q : ∀ { b q } → getRound q ≡ getRound b → bId b ≡ qCertBlockId q  
      → B b ← Q q

RecordChains are in the reflexive, transitive closure of $←$, starting at the genesis record I. Sometimes, we reason about paths starting at records other than I; we therefore define RecordChain using the more specific RecordChainFrom.
data RecordChainFrom (o : Record) : Record → Set where
  empty : RecordChainFrom o o
  step   : ∀{r r’} → RecordChainFrom o r → r ← r’ → RecordChainFrom o r’

RecordChain : Record → Set
RecordChain = RecordChainFrom I

Next, we present definitions needed to specify when a Block can be committed. For \( k > 0 \), a \( K \)-chain is a sequence of \( k \) Blocks, each of which is extended by a QC, such that each Block (except the first) extends the QC that extends the previous Block. Furthermore, each adjacent pair of Blocks must satisfy the relation \( R \), which can be instantiated with Simple (which holds for any pair of Blocks) or Contig (which holds only if the rounds of the two Blocks are contiguous: the second Block’s round is one greater than that of the first; the first parameter to \( R \) enables a definition of Contig that does not require a predecessor for the first Block; see module LibraBFT.Abstract.RecordChain). \( K \)-chains are defined as follows.

data K-chain (R : N → Record → Record → Set) :
  (k : N) {o r : Record} → RecordChainFrom o r → Set where
  0-chain : ∀ {o r} {rc : RecordChainFrom o r} → K-chain R 0 rc
  s-chain : ∀ {k o r} {rc : RecordChainFrom o r} {b : Block} {q : QC} →
  (re-b : r ← B b) → (prf : R k r (B b)) →
  (be-q : B b ← Q q) → K-chain R k rc
  → K-chain (suc k) (step (step rc re-b) be-q)

Block \( b_0 \) (and those preceding it) are committed if \( b_0 \) is the head of a contiguous 3-chain: there is a RecordChain that contains \( b \) followed by blocks \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \), such that the rounds of blocks \( b_0 \), \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \) are consecutive. This is called a CommitRule (kchainBlock \( n \) \( c_3 \) is the \( n \)th Block from the end of \( c_3 \)):

data CommitRuleFrom {o r : Record} (rc : RecordChainFrom o r) (b : Block) : Set where
  commit-rule : (c_3 : K-chain Contig 3 rc) → b ≡ kchainBlock 2 c_3
  → CommitRuleFrom rc b

3.2 First correctness property: thmS5

We can now explain the first high-level property we prove for our abstract model, \textit{thmS5}. (Because our work has been influenced by versions of the HotStuff \cite{HotStuff} and LibraBFT papers \cite{LibraBFT,LibraBFT2}, some of our properties are named after properties presented informally in those papers. For example, \textit{thmS5} is named after Theorem S5 in \cite{LibraBFT}.) It states that, if two blocks \( b \) and \( b’ \) are committed via CommitRule \( rc b \) and CommitRule \( rc’ b’ \), respectively, then one of the blocks is contained in the record chain of the other. This property ensures that all committed Blocks are on a single non-branching path in the tree of Records.
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\(\text{thmS5} : \forall \{q \ q'\} \to \{rc : \text{RecordChain} (Q \ q)\} \to \text{AllInSys} \ rc \)
\(\to \{rc' : \text{RecordChain} (Q \ q')\} \to \text{AllInSys} \ rc'\)
\(\to \{b \ b' : \text{Block}\} \to \text{CommitRule} \ rc \ b \to \text{CommitRule} \ rc' \ b'\)
\(\to \text{Either PrefixNonInjective} = (\text{Either} ((B \ b) \inRC \ rc') ((B \ b') \inRC \ rc))\)

\text{AllInSys} \ rc \text{ means that each record in } rc \text{ is “in” the abstract system according to an implementation-specific predicate over abstract } \text{Records} \text{ called } \text{InSys}, \text{ which is provided as a module parameter. For purposes of } \text{AllInSys}, \text{ a record } r \text{ being “in” a record chain } rc \text{ is captured by a simple recursive definition: if } rc \text{ is formed by extending record chain } rc' \text{ by record } r', \text{ then } r \text{ is “in” } rc \text{ iff } r = r' \text{ or } r \text{ is “in” } rc'. \text{ On the other hand, as explained in Section 3.4, } eRC \text{ represents a more complicated notion of a record being “in” a record chain.}

Note that \(\text{thmS5} \) requires that either \(\text{PrefixNonInjective} \neq\) holds or one of the committed \text{Blocks} \text{ is in a } \text{RecordChain} \text{ ending at the other. The } \text{PrefixNonInjective} \neq \text{ disjunct—which is shared by many of the properties discussed below—reflects that we prove } \text{thmS5} \text{ modulo injectivity of } \text{Block} \text{ ids, as discussed above.}

In Section 3.6, we explain how we refine the definition of \(\text{thmS5} \) and other properties in order to relate our abstract proofs to the security properties of a concrete implementation that is proved correct using them. For now, however, we can think of the following simplified definition of \(\text{PrefixNonInjective} \neq\):

\(\text{PrefixNonInjective} \neq = \Sigma (\text{Block} \times \text{Block}) (\lambda \{(b_0, b_1) \to b_0 \neq b_1 \times bId b_0 \equiv bId b_1\})\)

The \(\Sigma\) notation is similar to the \(\exists[\cdot]\) notation introduced earlier, except that it specifies the \text{type} of the existentially quantified value (not just a name, as with \(\exists[\cdot]\)) and the condition on the value of that type is expressed as a predicate on that type. Thus, a value of type \(\text{PrefixNonInjective} \neq\) comprises a \text{pair} of (abstract) \text{Blocks}—\(b_0\) and \(b_1\)—that are \text{different} but have the \text{same} id.

3.3 Precisely defining protocol rules

Module \text{LibraBFT.Abstract.RecordChain.Properties} contains the proof of \(\text{thmS5} \), which requires module parameters representing assumptions about \text{Records} that are \text{InSys}. These assumptions capture the key properties that an implementation must ensure. Part of our contribution is to precisely define these assumptions in an abstract way, independent of any particular implementation.

Implementations described in various papers [5, 36, 41] are all based on the same core ideas, but differ substantially in detail. None of these papers gives a precise definition of the core protocol. Early versions of the LIBRA BFT papers [3] come closest, providing explicit statements of two “voting constraints”.

These voting constraints (“Increasing Round” and “Preferred Round”) were a starting point for us, but they are not entirely suitable for our purposes. For example, the “Increasing Round” constraint is originally stated as: \text{An honest node that voted once for } B \text{ in the past may only vote for } B' \text{ if round } (B) < \text{round } (B').
However, to interpret this as a protocol rule, we would need to define precisely what it means to have “voted in the past”. Our proof efforts revealed that it suffices to require that an honest peer does not sign and send different (abstract) votes for the same round (regardless of order). This can be stated as:

\[
\text{VotesOnlyOnceRule : Set } \ell \\
\text{VotesOnlyOnceRule } = (a : \text{Member}) \rightarrow \text{MetaHonestMember } a \\
\quad \rightarrow \forall \{ q q' \} \rightarrow \text{InSys } (Q q) \rightarrow \text{InSys } (Q q') \\
\quad \rightarrow (v : a \in QC q) (v' : a \in QC q') \\
\quad \rightarrow \text{vRound } (\in QC\text{-Vote } q v) \equiv \text{vRound } (\in QC\text{-Vote } q' v') \\
\quad \rightarrow \in QC\text{-Vote } q v \equiv \in QC\text{-Vote } q' v'
\]

For generality, \(\text{InSys}\) is assumed to return a type from some arbitrary universe \([40]\) with level \(\ell\). The \(v\) parameter is evidence that there is a \(\text{Vote}\) by member \(a\) represented in \(q\) (a \(QC\)), and \(\in QC\text{-Vote } q v\) is that (abstract) \(\text{Vote}\). Thus, \(\text{VotesOnlyOnceRule}\) requires that, if there are two \(\text{Votes}\) for the same round by an honest member \(a\) in \(QC\)s in the system, then the \(\text{Votes}\) are equal.

The second constraint—\(\text{PreferredRoundRule}\)—is more complicated. It is based on the voting constraint called “Locked Round” in early versions of the LibraBFT paper \([5]\); similar constraints on voting are followed by HotStuff \([41]\) and by later versions of LibraBFT \([36]\). The essence of this rule is that, if an honest peer contributes a \(\text{Vote}\) to \(q\) (a \(QC\)) that commits a \(\text{Block}\) (\(c_3\) is essentially a \(\text{CommitRule}\) that commits the \(\text{Block}\) identified by \(k\text{chainBlock } 2 c_3\)), then it does not vote in a higher round for a \(\text{Block}\) unless the round of the previous \(\text{Block}\) is at least that of the committed \(\text{Block}\). This is a key requirement to avoid voting to commit another \(\text{Block}\) that conflicts with the first.

\[
\text{PreferredRoundRule : Set } \ell \\
\text{PreferredRoundRule } = \forall a \{ q q' \} \rightarrow \text{MetaHonestMember } a \rightarrow \text{InSys } (Q q) \rightarrow \text{InSys } (Q q') \\
\quad \rightarrow \{ rc : \text{RecordChain } (Q q) \} \{ n : \mathbb{N} \} \rightarrow (c_3 : \mathbb{K}\text{-chain Contig } (3 + n) rc) \\
\quad \rightarrow (v : a \in QC q) (rc' : \text{RecordChain } (Q q')) (v' : a \in QC q') \\
\quad \rightarrow \text{vRound } (\in QC\text{-Vote } q v) < \text{vRound } (\in QC\text{-Vote } q' v') \\
\quad \rightarrow \text{Either NonInjective-} \equiv \\
\quad \quad (\text{getRound } (\text{kchainBlock } (\text{suc } (\text{suc zero})) c_3) \leq \text{prevRound } rc')
\]

Interestingly, LibraBFT updates the \text{preferred\_round} variable used to comply with this rule even if a \(3\text{-chain}\) resulting from including the vote in a \(QC\) would not have contiguous rounds (and thus would not result in a \(\text{CommitRule}\)). Thus, our development shows that the implementation could be less conservative without violating correctness.

### 3.4 The proof of \text{thmS5}

Our proof of \text{thmS5} is similar to the manual proof presented an early version of the LibraBFT paper \([3]\). However, a formal, machine-checked proof must address many details that are glossed over in the manual proof. Furthermore, as
Towards formal verification of HotStuff-based BFT consensus in Agda discussed in Section 3.3, making our assumptions about honest peers’ Votes precise and implementation-independent required somewhat different assumptions.

To help the reader approach the formal, machine-checked proofs in our open-source development [7], we describe below some of its key proofs and properties.

We first introduce two key lemmas. Roughly speaking, lemmaS2 states that there can be at most one certified Block per round. Its proof depends on the bft-assumption: for two QCs, there is some honest peer with Votes in each. By the assumption that honest peers obey VotesOnlyOnceRule, if the blocks certified by the two QCs have the same round, then both Votes are for the same BlockId. However, this does not imply the QCs certify the same Block. For this reason, the conclusion of lemmaS2 is that either bId is non-injective or \( b_0 \equiv b_1 \).

\[
\text{lemmaS2} : \forall \{ b_0, b_1 : \text{Block} \} \{ q_0, q_1 : \text{QC} \} \rightarrow \text{InSys} (Q q_0) \rightarrow \text{InSys} (Q q_1) \\
\rightarrow (p_0 : B b_0 \leftarrow Q q_0) (p_1 : B b_1 \leftarrow Q q_1) \\
\rightarrow \text{getRound} b_0 \equiv \text{getRound} b_1 \\
\rightarrow \text{Either NonInjective} \equiv (b_0 \equiv b_1)
\]

Similarly, lemmaS3 makes the PreferredRoundRule apply to QCs.

\[
\text{lemmaS3} : \forall \{ r_2, q' \} \{ rc : \text{RecordChain} r_2 \} \rightarrow \text{InSys} r_2 \\
\rightarrow (rc' : \text{RecordChain} (Q q')) \rightarrow \text{InSys} (Q q') \\
\rightarrow (c_3 : \text{kchain Contig} 3 rc) \rightarrow \text{round} r_2 < \text{getRound} q' \\
\rightarrow \text{Either NonInjective} \equiv (\text{getRound} (\text{kchainBlock} (\text{suc} (\text{suc zero})) c_3) \leq \text{prevRound} rc')
\]

The proof of thmS5 depends on a non-symmetric variant of it called propS4:

\[
\text{propS4} : \forall \{ q, q' \} \{ rc : \text{RecordChain} (Q q) \} \rightarrow \text{AllInSys} rc \\
\rightarrow (rc' : \text{RecordChain} (Q q')) \rightarrow \text{AllInSys} rc' \\
\rightarrow (c_3 : \text{K-chain Contig} 3 rc) \\
\rightarrow \text{getRound} (\text{kchainBlock} (\text{suc} (\text{suc zero})) c_3) \leq \text{getRound} q' \\
\rightarrow \text{Either NonInjective} \equiv (B (\text{kchainBlock} (\text{suc} (\text{suc zero})) c_3) \in \text{RC} rc')
\]

Recall that \( \in \text{RC} \) is a specific representation of what it means for a Record to be “in” a RecordChain that is precisely defined later, and note that \( c_3 \) is a \( \text{K-chain Contig} 3 rc \), for some rc, i.e., a CommitRule.

Proof overviews for thmS5 and propS4 are below.

**Overview of proof for thmS5:** The proof of thmS5 can be found in LibraBFT(Abstract,RecordChain,Properties). It constructs arguments for propS4 and establishes the proof obligation using case analysis on its return value. As with Lemmas lemmaS2 and lemmaS3, propS4 returns either evidence that the bId function is not injective, or the desired property; in the former case, thmS5 returns the evidence of the injectivity failure too.

The arguments for propS4 are determined by comparing the rounds of the Blocks committed by the two CommitRules provided to thmS5, and choosing the one with the smaller round (call it the first committed Block) to provide to propS4 as the required CommitRule \( c_3 \) (or the first if their rounds are equal). The
other record chain \( rc' \) provided to \( \text{propS}_4 \) is derived from the other \( \text{CommitRule} \). Evidence that the round of the last record of this \( \text{RecordChain} \) is at least that of the \( \text{Block} \) committed by \( c_3 \) is determined by transitivity, using the result of the above-mentioned comparison and a simple lemma \( k\text{chain-round-\leq-lemma}' \); this lemma inductively applies the constraints on the \( \leftarrow \) components to show that the round of the last \( \text{QC} \) in the other \( \text{CommitRule} \) is at least that of the \( \text{Block} \) that it commits.

\[ \square \]

**Overview of proof for \( \text{propS}_4 \):** The proof of \( \text{propS}_4 \) can also be found in \( \text{LibraBFT.Abstract.RecordChain.Properties} \). It inductively removes a pair of records from the second record chain \( rc' \), invoking itself recursively and adding the pair of \( \text{Records} \) back to the result to construct final proof that the \( \text{Block} \) that is committed by the provided \( \text{CommitRule} \) (that is, \( K\text{-chain Config 3 rc} \))—call it \( B_0 \)—is “in” the second \( \text{RecordChain} \); we discuss \( \inRC \)—which represents a \( \text{Record} \) being “in” a \( \text{RecordChain} \)—below. During this induction, \( \text{lemmaS3} \) is used to determine that the round of the last \( \text{Record} \) after the pair of \( \text{Records} \) is removed is at least that of \( B_0 \) (unless there is an injectivity failure), enabling the recursive call. The result from \( \text{lemmaS3} \) is also used in conjunction with the fact that \( \text{Blocks} \) in a \( \text{RecordChain} \) cannot have round 0 to ensure that we still have a \( \text{RecordChain} \) ending in a \( \text{QC} \) after removing the pair of records, as is required for the recursive call to \( \text{propS}_4 \).

When the last \( \text{QC} \) (\( q' \)) in \( rc' \) has a round that is at most that of the last \( \text{Block} \) in \( c_3 \), we use \( \text{prop4base} \), which determines via case analysis which of the three \( \text{Blocks} \) in \( c_3 \) has the same round as \( q' \). One of them—call it \( B_{j} \)—does due to the hypothesis that the round of \( q' \) is at least that of the committed block \( B_0 \); \( \text{propS}_4\text{-base-lemma-1} \) determines which \( \text{Block} \) is \( B_{j} \). For each case, \( \text{propS}_4\text{-base-lemma-2} \) is invoked with appropriate parameters, enabling the use of \( \text{lemmaS2} \) to determine that, because \( B_{j} \) has the same round as \( q' \) (and therefore of the \( \text{Block} \) that precedes \( q' \) in \( rc' \)), these are the same \( \text{Block} \). This fact is used along with \( K\text{-chain-\inRC} \) to determine that \( B_0 \) is “in” \( rc' \), as required.

\[ \square \]

Finally, we explain what it means for a \( \text{Block} \) to be “in” a \( \text{RecordChain} \), as captured by the \( \inRC \) predicate. It is tempting to think that, if \( \text{RecordChains} \) \( rc \) and \( rc' \) both end at block \( b \), then the requirements of \( \leftarrow \) ensure that \( rc \) and \( rc' \) are the same \( \text{RecordChain} \). However, suppose we have \( q \leftarrow b \) and \( q' \leftarrow b \), where \( q \) and \( q' \) are \( \text{QCs} \). The definition of \( \leftarrow \) requires that \( \text{just} (q\text{CertBlockId} q) \equiv b\text{prevQC} b \equiv \text{just} (q'\text{CertBlockId} q') \). This does not imply that \( q \equiv q' \) because \( q \) and \( q' \) may be two valid \( \text{QCs} \) that include different \( \text{Votes} \), reflecting the reality that two peers may be convinced to extend the same \( \text{Block} \) by two different valid \( \text{QCs} \).

Therefore, we cannot prove that \( rc \equiv rc' \) just because both \( \text{RecordChains} \) end at the same \( \text{Record} \). Instead, we need a notion of \( \text{equivalent RecordChains} \) that contain the same \( \text{Blocks} \) and equivalent \( \text{QCs} \): two \( \text{QCs} \) are equivalent iff they certify the same \( \text{Block} \) (i.e., their \( q\text{CertBlockId} \) components are equal). These notions are captured by \( \approxRC \) (defined in \( \text{LibraBFT.Abstract.RecordChain} \)).
which requires the two RecordChains to be “pointwise equivalent” meaning that the corresponding Records in the two RecordChains are equivalent. A lemma RC-irrelevant shows that, if two record chains rc and rc’ end at the same Record, then they are equivalent (i.e., rc ≈ RC rc’), unless there is an injectivity failure.

The K-chain∈RC property used in the proof of propS4 states that, if a RecordChain rc₁ ends at a block b that is in a K-chain based on another record chain rc, then another Block that is earlier in the K-chain is also “in” rc₁.

To enable proving this, the definition of ∈RC must allow for the possibility that the other Block is contained in an equivalent RecordChain. The definition of ∈RC therefore has an additional constructor beyond the two obvious ones, which enables the Record in question to be “transported” from an equivalent RecordChain:

```
data ∈RC { o : Record } { r₀ : Record } : 
  ∀ { r₁ } → RecordChainFrom o r₁ → Set 
where
  here : ∀ { rc : RecordChainFrom o r₀ } → r₀ ∈RC rc
  there : ∀ { r₁ r₂ } { rc : RecordChainFrom o r₁ } → (p : r₁ ← r₂) → r₀ ∈RC rc → r₀ ∈RC (step rc p)
  transp : ∀ { r } { rc₀ : RecordChainFrom o r₀ } { rc₁ : RecordChainFrom o r } 
    → r₀ ∈RC rc₀ → r₀ ≈RC rc₁ → r₀ ∈RC rc₁```

3.5 Traditional and extended correctness properties

Our core correctness property CommitsDoNotConflict is thmS5 without the NonInjective≡ disjunct. It is proved in LibraBFT.Abstract.Properties, which receives an additional module parameter no-collisions-InSys providing evidence that there are no injectivity failures between Blocks that satisfy InSys. Note that, if an implementation reaches a state in which this does not hold, then there is an injectivity failure between concrete Records at the implementation level; for a typical implementation, this signifies a collision for a cryptographic hash function among Records that are actually in the system, contradicting the standard assumption that a computationally bounded adversary is unable to find such collisions. To prove CommitsDoNotConflict, we invoke thmS5 and then use no-collisions-InSys to eliminate the possibility of an injectivity failure.

To invoke CommitsDoNotConflict for a particular implementation, we need to provide AllInSys rc, where rc is the RecordChain for the first CommitRule (and similarly for rc’). To enable this, honest voters in typical implementations will vote to extend a Block only after verifying that the Block extends a QC (or the initial Record) that the peer already knows is in the system. Thus, a peer that verifies a CommitRule based on a record chain rc that ends in a QC (q) knows that every Record in rc is “in the system”: AllInSys rc.

Extended correctness condition We are also interested in enabling parties that do not participate in the protocol to verify commits. Suppose a peer p provides to a client c the contents of a CommitRule that c can verify. In this case, c
cannot invoke \textit{CommitsDoNotConflict} (or \textit{thmS5}), because it does not know the \textit{RecordChain} on which the \textit{CommitRule} is based.

For this purpose, we define and prove a variant of \textit{CommitsDoNotConflict} called \textit{CommitsDoNotConflict’}. This condition ensures that even a party that does not participate in consensus can confirm commits and will not confirm conflicting commits.

\textit{CommitsDoNotConflict’} does not require \textit{CommitRules} based on full \textit{RecordChains}; instead, \textit{CommitRuleFroms} based on \textit{RecordChainFroms} suffice. This property shows that a party can validate just the \textit{Records} required to form a \textit{CommitRuleFrom}, and confirm that the \textit{Block} it claims to commit has indeed been committed, and that there cannot be another commit that conflicts with it. Here, \((B \ b) \in RC\) is a predicate over values of type \textit{RecordChain \(Q\ q’\)}, so \textit{CommitsDoNotConflict’} says that, if there are two \textit{CommitRuleFroms} based on \textit{RecordChainFroms} that end with a \textit{QC} and have all of their \textit{Records} in the system, then (unless there is an injectivity failure), one of committed \textit{Blocks} is in a \textit{RecordChain} that contains the other.

To prove this property, we require an additional assumption about the implementation, which is provided as a module parameter \(\epsilon QC \Rightarrow \text{AllSent}\), of type \textit{Complete InSys}, where:

\[
\text{Complete} : \forall \{\ell\} \rightarrow (\text{Record} \rightarrow \text{Set} \ \ell) \rightarrow \text{Set} \ \ell
\]

\[
\text{Complete} \in \text{sys} = \forall \{a \ q\} \rightarrow \text{MetaHonestMember} \ a
\rightarrow a \in QC \ q \rightarrow \in \text{sys} \ (Q \ q)
\rightarrow \exists[b] (\Sigma (\text{RecordChain} (B \ b)) \ \text{AllInSys} \times B \ b \leftarrow Q \ q)
\]

Here, \textit{Record} \rightarrow \textit{Set} \ \ell is a predicate on (abstract) \textit{Records} representing what \textit{Records} an implementation considers to be “in the system”.

This assumption (indirectly) requires that an honest peer sends a \textit{Vote} for a \textit{Block} id (which may subsequently be represented in a \textit{QC}) only if it knows that there is a \textit{Block} with that id and a \textit{RecordChain} up to that \textit{Block} whose \textit{Records} are all “in the system” (for example the peer may have validated all of those \textit{Records} itself, or it may have validated sufficient information to be confident that all of them have been validated by some honest peer, unless there is a hash collision among \textit{Records} that are in the system).

Next, we overview the proof for \textit{CommitsDoNotConflict’}, and for a lemma \textit{crf⇒cr} on which it depends.

\textbf{Overview of proof for \textit{CommitsDoNotConflict’}:} The proof of this property can be found in \textit{LibraBFT.Abstract.Properties}. It constructs arguments suffi-
cient to invoke \textit{CommitsDoNotConflict} (aka \textit{thmS5}) and uses its return value to construct the necessary result.

It first uses the \textit{bft-assumption} provided by the \textit{EpochConfig} to determine an honest peer represented in both \textit{QC}s (\textit{Q} \textit{q} and \textit{Q} \textit{q}'), and then invokes the $\in_{\text{QC} \Rightarrow \text{AllSent}}$ module parameter to obtain a \textit{Block} \textit{b} and a \textit{RecordChain} up to $B \textit{b}$ whose \textit{Records} are all \textit{InSys}, as well as evidence that \textit{q} extends \textit{b}. It similarly uses $\in_{\text{QC} \Rightarrow \text{AllSent}}$ to obtain analogous information for \textit{q}'.

We are not yet ready to invoke \textit{CommitsDoNotConflict}, however, because there is no guarantee that the \textit{RecordChain}s acquired using $\in_{\text{QC} \Rightarrow \text{AllSent}}$ are identical to the ones on which the relevant \textit{CommitRuleFrom}s are based.

To solve this, we invoke a lemma \textit{crf$\Rightarrow$cr}, which proves that if we have a \textit{RecordChain} $(Q \textit{q})$ and a \textit{RecordChainFrom} $(Q \textit{q})$ (call it \textit{rcf}), and a \textit{CommitRuleFrom} \textit{rcf} \textit{b} for some block \textit{b}, then we can construct a \textit{CommitRule} \textit{rc} \textit{b} (unless there is an injectivity failure).

\textit{Overview of proof for crf$\Rightarrow$cr:} The proof of this property is also in \textit{LibraBFT.Abstract.RecordChain}. It uses properties about \textit{RecordChainFrom}s like those for \textit{RecordChain}.

A lemma \textit{RCF-irrelevant} shows that, given two \textit{RecordChainFrom}s that end at the same \textit{Record}, one is pointwise equivalent to a suffix of the other (as usual, modulo injectivity failures).

For the case in which the \textit{RecordChainFrom} is a suffix of the \textit{RecordChain}, we invoke a lemma \textit{transp-k-chain$\subseteq$} to “transport” the \textit{kchain} on which the \textit{CommitRuleFrom} is based to a \textit{CommitRule} based on the \textit{RecordChain}, and another lemma \textit{kchainBlock$\subseteq$RC}, which shows that this transporting does not change the committed \textit{Block}. We then use the results of these invocations to construct a \textit{CommitRule} based on the \textit{RecordChain}, as required to invoke \textit{CommitsDoNotConflict}.

In the other case, when the \textit{RecordChain} is a suffix of the \textit{RecordChainFrom}, we use some simple properties to conclude that the \textit{RecordChainFrom} must also be a \textit{RecordChain}, and then use \textit{transp-CR} to transport the original \textit{CommitRuleFrom} (which is in fact a \textit{CommitRule} in this case) to the original \textit{RecordChain}. 

\textbf{3.6 Relating non-injectivity to security properties}

Recall from Section 3.2 that we prove our abstract properties modulo injectivity of \textit{Block} ids. However, the simplified \textit{NonInjective-}$\equiv$ disjunct used in the property definitions presented so far is insufficient. The reason is that it is \textit{trivial} to construct two different abstract \textit{Block}s with the same id, meaning that we could prove \textit{thmS5} with a single-line proof, independent of the actual protocol. Worse, we could accidentally do the same in context of legitimate-looking proofs.

The issue is that the abstract \textit{Blocks} we could trivially construct bear no relation to any real \textit{Blocks} and ids produced in the execution of a concrete implementation. To resolve this problem, we strengthen the first disjunct of \textit{thmS5} to \textit{NonInjective-}$\equiv$-\textit{InSys}, defined as follows:
\[ \text{NonInjective-=} - \text{InSys} : \text{Set} \]
\[ \text{NonInjective-=} - \text{InSys} = \]
\[ \Sigma \text{NonInjective-=} \lambda \left( \left( (b_0, b_1), \ldots, \ldots \right) \rightarrow \text{InSys} (B b_0) \times \text{InSys} (B b_1) \right) \]

This definition requires that the proof not only provides different Blocks \( b_0 \) and \( b_1 \) with the same id, but also proof that the implementation considers the Records \( B b_0 \) and \( B b_1 \) to be “in the system”. The meaning of “in the system” is specified by the implementation-provided predicate \( \text{InSys} \) and is thus beyond the scope of this paper. However, in ongoing work, we are proving a real implementation correct using the results presented here. In that broader context, we instantiate \( \text{InSys} \) with a predicate that holds only for Blocks that are contained in network messages that have actually been sent. In this way, from the perspective of that concrete implementation, we ensure that our correctness properties hold unless and until an adversary actually finds a hash collision and introduces it into the system. We contrast this approach to some related efforts in Section 4.

The \( \text{NonInjective-=} \) and \( \text{NonInjective-=} - \text{InSys} \) definitions stated above are actually simplified versions of more general definitions we use in our proofs; details are available in our open source development \[7\]. These more general definitions are required because, at different stages of our proofs, we use different predicates to capture evidence collected so far about the conflicting Blocks, so that we can build up to the proof for \text{thmS5} that both Blocks satisfy \( \text{InSys} \).

4 Related work

4.1 HotStuff/LibraBFT

Before open sourcing our work in December 2020 \[7\], we were not aware of any formal verification work related to the HotStuff / LibraBFT protocols beyond manual proof sketches \[5, 36, 41\]; these are useful and have influenced our work significantly, but are far from detailed, precise proofs. We have since learned of two other pieces of work involving mechanical proofs of correctness of variants of the HotStuff/LibraBFT algorithm, and one involving model checking.

Librachain \[19\] is a Coq-based model of the data structures used in LibraBFT. It contains a single commit from May 2020, described as “experimental”; we are not aware of any paper describing this work. The Librachain model commits to some structural details that are not central to the core protocol underlying HotStuff and LibraBFT. For example, it assumes that the QuorumCert that a new Block extends is included in the Block record; this is one implementation choice, but certainly not fundamental. Furthermore, the proofs assume various conditions have been validated for the data structures, and are thus intimately tied to the particular implementation types. In contrast, we model an abstraction of the core protocol, and establish precise requirements for any implementation to enjoy the correctness properties we prove. Thus, we
enable proving correctness for a variety of practical implementations by proving only that they satisfy these requirements. The Librachain development also uses a hypothesis that the hash function used is injective, which is not true of hash functions that are used in practice. Our properties are proved to hold unless and until a specific injectivity failure exists between (abstract) Records that are actually “in the system” (see Section 3.5); when instantiated with implementations that use cryptographic hash functions to assign ids, this ensures that the result holds unless and until a peer succeeds in finding a specific hash collision, violating the assumption that a computationally bounded adversary cannot do so.

More recently, Leander [21] has described work modeling and proving correctness for one specific, simplified variant of HotStuff. Hashes are not explicitly modeled, but the way the relationship between blocks is modeled amounts to an assumption that hashing is injective. Leander modeled this simplified variant in TLA+ and Ivy, and the paper is focused on comparing the tools for this purpose.

Kukharenko et al. [24] use TLA+ [25] to model check basic HotStuff, but not the more practical chained variant used by LibraBFT. Again, our work applies to an abstraction of the protocol that can be instantiated for all versions of HotStuff and LibraBFT, as well as variants that may not yet exist.

Model checking has the advantage of requiring less work (defining a model and correctness properties and then “pushing the button”) than developing precise, machine-checked correctness proofs. It can also provide insight into errors found. Kukharenko et al. ran one of their models with seven participants of which three are byzantine (correctness is not guaranteed in this case), and found a counterexample showing how the byzantine peers can violate correctness.

However, there are also some drawbacks to the model checking approach. To limit the state space, Kukharenko et al. developed a restricted model, in which a node (analogous to our Record) can be extended only by one of two nodes, and a more general model in which any node can extend any other (from some fixed set). The restricted model, configured with just four peers (one of which is byzantine), took over seven hours to check. The more general model took over 17 days. Our approach imposes no such limitations, and Agda checks our proofs in under one minute. Finally, for the more general model, TLA+ estimates an “optimistic” probability of 0.3 that it has in fact not explored the entire state space due to hash collisions on states, leaving open the possibility of an unfound bug even for this minimal configuration. We consider that Kukharenko et al.’s work complements ours, but does not obviate the need for the machine-checked correctness proofs.

### 4.2 Other BFT consensus protocols

Pirlea and Sergey present Toychain [32, 33], which models Nakamoto consensus [30] and proves correctness properties about it using Coq. Although Nakamoto consensus differs substantially from HotStuff/LibraBFT, including that it is not actually consensus in the traditional sense, because agreement is not final, Toychain is the closest prior work to ours in terms of modeling
structures (collections of trees of records) and reasoning about their properties. Specifically, their model can be instantiated with different implementation components, and they prove that any implementation that provides components satisfying certain requirements is correct. In contrast, each of the LibraBFT-related efforts mentioned above [13, 21, 24] proves properties about one particular model of HotStuff/LibraBFT.

While Toychain indeed establishes some generality by enabling instantiation with specific components, we impose no structure whatsoever on an implementation: if the externally visible behaviour of honest peers for a given implementation complies with two precisely stated rules, then that implementation can inherit the correctness properties we have proved of the abstract model.

Toychain initially assumed an injective hash function. Because real hash functions are not injective, this would require trusting that the proofs do not abuse the power granted by depending on a false assumption. Interestingly, subsequent versions of Toychain addressed this issue by removing some unsatisfiable assumptions, including that the hash function used is injective. The bulk of Chapter 3 of Pirlea’s thesis [32] is devoted to describing the complexity that this undertaking involved, reporting that every proof had to be changed, and citing an example of one proof that grew from 10 lines to 150 to accommodate this enhancement!

In contrast, as described in Section 3.6, we have taken a different approach. Our abstract model is aware only of ids assigned to Blocks that an implementation instantiating our model considers to be “in the system”, not hash functions. Like Pirlea and Sergey, we too rested our initial development on an unsound foundation by assuming that ids were injective. However, because our abstraction freed us from reasoning about hash functions in our correctness proofs, it was not particularly disruptive to later augment our proofs to provide evidence of specific injectivity failures when necessary, tying those injectivity failures to Records that the implementation considers to be in the system. An implementation can then use our results to establish correctness properties that hold unless and until a peer actually finds a specific collision for the particular hash function used by the implementation. Recall that it is a standard assumption that a computationally bounded adversary cannot do so [29, Chapter 9].

The work that is perhaps closest to our broader project is Velisarios [34], which uses the Coq theorem prover [6] and provides a framework for modeling distributed systems with byzantine peers, analogous to our system model. It is based on a Logic of Events [28] approach, in contrast to our state transition system approach. Velisarios is instantiated with definitions modeling PBFT to prove PBFT correct. Coq supports extraction to OCaml, enabling an implementation to be derived from the PBFT model. Agda has support for extracting to Haskell or Javascript. However, we have not experimented with this. The goal of our ongoing work is to model our practical Haskell implementation in Agda and prove correctness for that model using the results presented in this paper. Asphalion [38] takes the direction of Velisarios further, enabling reasoning about hybrid system models in which different components require different failure assumptions, for example to model the use of trusted computing components.
Alturki et al. use Coq to formally verify correctness of Algorand’s consensus protocol. Their correctness condition is slightly different as Algorand’s protocol seeks to ensure that exactly one block is certified per round, implying a total order on all certified blocks. Crary reports on work towards verifying correctness for the consensus mechanism of Hashgraph in Coq. Losa and Dodds describe formal verification of safety and liveness properties for the Stellar consensus protocol using Ivy and Isabelle/HOL. Alturki et al. use Coq to formally verify properties for Gasper—Ethereum 2.0’s Proof of Stake consensus mechanism. Rather than assuming that any two quorums intersect on at least one honest node, they prove that, if (using our terminology) two conflicting blocks are committed, then there exist two quorums whose common members can have their stake slashed. This property would be satisfied if only the first offense results in slashing; presumably, a stronger property that ties the conflicting blocks to specific quorums related to committing those blocks could be proved.

There is also work model checking other BFT consensus protocols. For example, Tholoniat and Gramoli have used ByMC to model check RedBelly’s consensus algorithm; ByMC is a model checker designed to mitigate the state space blowup for algorithms in which processes wait for a threshold of messages. While basic HotStuff may fit this structure, chained HotStuff does not. Furthermore, LibraBFT defines quorums in terms of combined voting power, not just the number of peers voting.

Braithwaite et al. report on work in progress towards model checking Tendermint using TLA+; so far, they have gained useful insight into the algorithm using very small configurations, and have found and fixed some specification bugs as a result. Nonetheless, their experience again highlights the challenges and limitations of the model checking approach due to the need to limit the state space size to achieve acceptable execution time.

5 Concluding remarks and future work

We have presented a formal model of the essence of a Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus protocol used in several existing implementations, and proved its safety properties—including one that enables non-participants to verify commits—for a single epoch, during which configuration does not change. Extending our proofs to accommodate epoch changes (also known as reconfiguration) is future work.

Our contributions include precisely defining implementation assumptions and correctness conditions, and developing formal, machine-checked proofs of correctness properties for any implementation satisfying the assumptions. Our model, definitions, and proofs are all expressed in Agda, and are available in open source.

Our approach enables verifying implementations by proving only that honest peers obey the rules established by our abstract assumptions, without repeating the hard work of proving the underlying protocol correct each time.
Our \textit{thmS5} property establishes correctness unless it can provide \textit{evidence} of a \textit{specific} injectivity failure between \textit{Blocks} that are \textit{in the system}. Thus our proofs are independent of how specific implementations assign \textit{Block} ids, and ensure that they hold unless and until an injectivity failure actually occurs. In this way, our abstract proofs support proving that implementations that use cryptographic hash functions to assign ids behave correctly, based on the standard assumption that a computationally bounded adversary cannot produce a hash collision.

In our broader project \cite{7}, we have defined a system model that can be instantiated with types and handlers for a particular implementation, resulting in a model of a system operating with that implementation. Messages can be lost, duplicated and arbitrarily delayed, and dishonest peers are constrained only by their inability to forge signatures of honest peers. We have ported our Haskell implementation to Agda using a library we have developed \cite{13}, instantiated our system model with its types and handlers, and made substantial progress towards proving that it satisfies the required assumptions.

Beyond that, extending our system model to support proofs of liveness in the partial synchrony model \cite{18} is future work. A pragmatic intermediate point is to prove within our existing system model a temporal logic property stating that, from any reachable state that has \textit{Blocks} available to commit, there is some execution in which another \textit{Block} is committed (called \textit{plausible liveness} by Buterin and Griffith \cite{10}). These liveness properties would pertain to a model of a specific \textit{implementation}; liveness properties do not make sense for the abstract model presented in this paper.
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