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Face threat sensitivity in distributive negotiations: Effects on negotiator self-esteem and demands

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ABSTRACT

Face threat sensitivity (FTS) is defined as reactive sensitivity to threats to one’s social self-worth. In negotiations, such threats may come from a counterpart’s competitive behavior. We developed and tested the argument that individuals high in face threat sensitivity, when negotiating with a competitive (vs. cooperative) counterpart, exhibit psychological responses that inhibit them from claiming value in distributive negotiations. Employing a face-to-face interaction paradigm, Study 1 revealed that higher counterpart competitiveness was negatively associated with high (but not low) FTS negotiators’ global self-esteem, which in turn led them to be less demanding and obtain worse negotiation outcomes. In Study 2, employing a simulated on-line interaction paradigm, we manipulated counterpart’s behavior (cooperative vs. competitive) to establish causality and examined specific aspects of negotiator global self-esteem that may account for the effect. We found that the effect of counterpart’s competitiveness on high FTS negotiators’ demand levels was mediated by their performance self-esteem, but not by their social self-esteem. In Study 3, we manipulated performance self-esteem to establish it as a causal underlying psychological mechanism. For high FTS negotiators, when performance self-esteem was low, demand levels were significantly lower with a competitive (vs. cooperative) counterpart. However, when performance self-esteem was high, there was no significant difference in demand levels depending on counterpart’s behavior. This finding suggests that negotiating with a competitive (vs. cooperative) counterpart reduces high FTS negotiators’ performance self-esteem, which in turn leads them to make lower demands. The implications of these findings are discussed.

1. Introduction

The notion of face constitutes a significant aspect of social interactions as people seek to establish and maintain a favorable public image that is recognized and valued by others (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Face is the sense of positive social self-worth that individuals want others to hold about them (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Earley, 1997; Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998). Face maintenance considerations pervade all sorts of social and organizational interactions (Goffman, 1955, 1959, 1967; Kim & Nam, 1998). Threats to one’s face challenge individuals’ identities, self-esteem, and social images, and evoke negative psychological and behavioral responses (Brett et al., 2007; Brown & Levinson, 1987; Cupach & Metts, 1994). Negotiations are one form of social interaction in which face issues are prevalent (e.g., Brett et al., 2007; Deutsch, 1961; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; White, Tynan, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2004; Wilson, 1992), as parties pursue not only material outcomes but social and relational interests as well (Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008; Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O’Brien, 2006; Kong, Dirks, & Ferrin, 2014; Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010). In addition to exchanging economic resources, negotiators exchange regard, esteem, and status (Foa & Foa, 1980), which are central to the notion of face (Brett et al., 2007). According to Brown and Levinson (1987), behaviors indicating a lack of care for or indifference to others’ feelings and wants are face threatening. Negotiations, especially those...
in which parties have opposing interests (i.e., distributive negotiations) thus provide the potential for face threats to arise via competitive offers, refusals, and disagreements (e.g., Brett et al., 2007; Capach & Carson, 2002; Deutsch, 1961; White et al., 2004). In this research, we focus on a counterpart’s competitive negotiation behavior as one form of face threat, examining its effects on negotiators’ global self-esteem as well as their demands.

Competitive behavior is characterized by a high level of focus on self-interest and low regard for the counterpart’s interests (Pruit & Rubin, 1986). Studies have demonstrated the various and conflicting ways negotiators respond to counterparts’ competitive behaviors, including reciprocating it in kind (e.g., Weingart, Prietula, Hyder, & Genovese, 1999) or responding with complementarity (Brett et al., 2007; Wiltermuth, Tiedens, & Neale, 2015). From a person-situation interaction perspective (Endler & Magnusson, 1976; Shoda, 1999), these varying reactions to competitiveness may arise from individual differences in reactivity to face threats. Specifically, some individuals could display “too much perceptiveness [to face threats] or too much pride and [become] someone who is thin-skinned” (Goffman, 1967, p. 40). These responses are reflected in negotiators’ face threat sensitivity (White et al., 2004), defined as reactive sensitivity to threats to one’s social self-worth (i.e., such as disregard, disapproval, insults, lies, disrespect, contempt and rudeness). We examine negotiators’ face threat sensitivity as a lens that filters through counterpart’s competitive behavior, prompting a self-evaluation process and influencing negotiators’ psychological (i.e., global self-esteem) and behavioral (i.e., demands) responses.

White et al. (2004) provided the first comprehensive examination of face threat sensitivity, particularly in integrative negotiations, finding that when a negotiator’s face was on the line, high face threat sensitivity negotiators were more competitive and less cooperative, resulting in fewer agreements or reduced joint gains when an agreement was reached. The conclusion from this research was that face threats reduce efficiency by making people more competitive in situations that require some level of cooperation (p. 118).

We build on the initial explorations by White et al. (2004), but take a different approach by focusing on distributive negotiations, a context in which face threats are particularly prominent. Within this context, we systematically examine the behavioral responses of high face threat sensitivity negotiators to their counterpart’s behavior and their underlying psychological mechanism. Unlike integrative negotiations, which entail both value creation and value claiming processes, distributive negotiations only entail value claiming processes whereby parties come to the table with opposing interests (Walton & McKersie, 1965). Thus, this context highlights negotiators’ performance-related concerns, such as maximizing own gain, rather than highlighting their relational concerns, which are important in integrative negotiations (Pruit & Rubin, 1986).

As a result, the psychological processes that negotiators experience in integrative versus distributive negotiation contexts likely differ from each other, producing different behavioral responses (Walton & McKersie, 1965).

We focus on an observable and pertinent contextual factor in distributive negotiations—counterparts’ competitiveness—and examine how it affects the psychological experiences and behaviors of high face threat sensitivity negotiators. Specifically, we argue that counterparts’ behaviors are the primary signaling mechanism that informs negotiators of their value as a negotiator and their perceived social worth (Brett, Northcraft, & Pinkley, 1999). Higher levels of competitiveness from others signal a disregard for negotiators’ interests and can thereby lower negotiators’ global self-esteem (vanDellen, Campbell, Hoyle, & Bradfield, 2011). Since high (vs. low) face threat sensitivity negotiators are more reactive to face threats (Tynan, 2005; White et al., 2004), we expect them to experience lower global self-esteem in response to counterparts’ competitive (vs. cooperative) behaviors, ultimately leading them to make lower demands (Study 1). We also tease apart which aspect of their self-esteem (i.e., performance or social) is influenced most, providing further insight into the inner experiences of high face threat sensitivity negotiators (Studies 2 and 3).

Collectively, our studies make a threefold contribution to extant research in negotiation. First, negotiations are situations in which the self is implicated (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; Thompson, 1990). In addition to economic outcomes, negotiators are concerned about how they feel about themselves, including their negotiation skills, social representation and self-image (Curhan et al., 2006). Even though enduring self-perceptions, such as self-concept clarity (Bechtold, Dreu, Nijstad, & Zapf, 2010; Dreu & van Knippenberg, 2005), self-efficacy (Sullivan, O’Connor, & Burris, 2006), and self-esteem (Hermann & Kogan, 1977; Kramer, Newton, & Pommerenke, 1993) have been examined in negotiation research, the study of self-related psychological states, such as state based global self-esteem, has largely been neglected in negotiation research. This omission is problematic as momentary psychological states are important in shaping negotiator behavior (e.g., Elfenbein, 2015). By focusing on counterpart’s competitiveness as a trigger, we unpack the unique psychological experiences of high face threat sensitivity negotiators and specify which aspect of their global self-esteem (performance or social) drives their behavior in response to competitive counterparts. This approach also addresses White and colleagues’ call for research that more closely examines the ways in which high face threat sensitivity affects negotiation processes and outcomes (p. 118).

Second, our work departs from prior studies taking a main effect approach to examining the effects of personality in negotiation (see Sharma, Bottom, & Elfenbein, 2013 for a meta-analytical review). This line of research found small effects of broad personality traits, such as the Big Five, on negotiation behaviors and outcomes. We argue that the effects of face threat sensitivity are context-dependent and that counterpart’s behaviors, as a characteristic of the negotiation context, determine when and why high face threat sensitivity negotiators exhibit conciliatory or competitive responses.

Third, broadly speaking, the present research highlights the value of examining narrow (vs. broad) personality traits through a person-situation interaction lens whereby narrow traits, such as face threat sensitivity, could have greater validity in predicting specific negotiation behaviors—such as demand levels—which ultimately affect the relative slice of the pie negotiators claim. Our findings also have broader implications for understanding processes of cooperation and competition in organizations. For example, in the context of teams, high face threat sensitivity individuals may easily give in to competitiveness from other team members due to their reduced self-esteem, potentially sacrificing decision quality within the team (e.g., Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Korschreiter, & Frey, 2006). Similarly, when competing for status and power (Charness, Masclet, & Villeval, 2014; Greer & Van Kleef, 2010), high face threat sensitivity individuals may be particularly susceptible to self-esteem threats, ultimately keeping them from demanding more resources and power. Thus, the insights from this research expand our understanding of differential responses to competition in organizations.

2. Face and face threat sensitivity

Face is a sense of favorable social self-worth that a person wants others to hold about them (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Earley, 1997; Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998). Face, as a social resource, cannot be claimed unilaterally. Rather, it is maintained, enhanced, or lost through interpersonal interactions (Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998; White et al.,

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1 Here and throughout, we use the term global self-esteem to refer to negotiators’ momentary (state) global self-evaluations (Curhan et al., 2006). We also tease apart its agentic and communal components and refer to them as performance self-esteem and social self-esteem, respectively (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991).
2004). Socially constructed, face is “on loan” to individuals from society; it will be withdrawn unless the individuals conduct themselves in a way that is worthy of it (Goffman, 1967).

Previous research has predominantly studied face threats as contextual factors (e.g., Brett et al., 2007; Brown, 1970; Tjosvold & Huston, 1978). Yet recently, the notion that some individuals are more sensitive to face threats than others has gained research momentum. Tynan (1999) proposed that sensitivity or reactivity to face threats is a stable personality trait. Subsequently, White et al. (2004) noted that face threat sensitivity is perceived as slights (p. 106). One who is high in face threat sensitivity will tend to have more automatic and “hair trigger” reactions to perceived face threats, but will not necessarily be more likely to perceive the face threats in the first place. Thus, we define face threat sensitivity as a reactive sensitivity to threats to one’s social self-worth, in which high face threat sensitivity individuals experience more negative psychological responses.2

A social construct, face is as much a property of the social interaction as it is an attribute of the individual (Goffman, 1967). The dynamics of face maintenance are determined not only by who and what individuals hold themselves to be, but also by how others respond to them (White et al., 2004, p. 103). Through verbal and non-verbal behaviors, criticism, and negative feedback, other people can reinforce or threaten an individual’s face, conferring or denying the positive social value claimed by the individual (White et al., 2004). Thus, others’ responses to one’s self-presentation are critical to the notion of face threat sensitivity. As high (vs. low) face threat sensitivity negotiators are more susceptible to negative behaviors and expressions from others, in the context of negotiations, we expect them to experience more intense negative psychological responses when facing high levels of competitiveness (vs. cooperativeness) from their counterparts.

2.1. Face threat sensitivity as a distinct personality trait

Social evaluation is central to face threat sensitivity and distinguishes it from related constructs, such as self-efficacy, stress and anxiety. Self-efficacy refers to one’s ability to exercise control over events (O’Connor & Arnold, 2001). Although self-efficacy can be influenced by evaluation from others, it is also shaped by factors unrelated to social evaluation. One example is previous task performance which can shape self-efficacy without any involvement of social evaluation (e.g., Ashford, Blatt, & Vandewalle, 2003). Stress, similarly, can be differentiated from face threat sensitivity. Stress is defined as “a relationship between the person and the environment that is appraised by a person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering his or her well-being” (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 21). Social evaluation can be a source of stress, but stress also can occur in the absence of social evaluation. For example, individuals may feel stressed about failing to meet their self-set goals even when there are no social expectations around their performance. Finally, anxiety is a state of distress and/or physiological arousal in reaction to stimuli, including novel or uncertain situations with the potential for undesirable outcomes (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). Anxiety does not mandate social evaluation, although social evaluation can cause anxiety. Anxiety also can be triggered by other factors, such as personal risks (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). For individuals high in face threat sensitivity, negative feedback and evaluation can trigger stress, anxiety, and other negative affective reactions. However, these affective states are less likely to be triggered in the absence of social evaluation for high face threat sensitivity individuals (cf. Miles, 2010). To support these arguments, we conducted a construct validation study, which empirically demonstrates the distinctiveness of face threat sensitivity from these and other related constructs (see Supplemental Materials).

3. Face threat sensitivity in negotiations

Intrinsic threats to face, including disapproval, disagreement, challenge and non-cooperation can be interpreted as signaling a lack of regard for the receiver’s interests (White et al., 2004), potentially threatening one’s face. Competitive negotiation tactics such as disputing the stated value of an item, providing alternative anchors and frames, questioning interests and underlying motives, criticizing arguments, and disregarding appeals also could be characterized as face threats (Brown & Levinson, 1987). In this research, we specifically focus on counterpart’s self-interested (i.e., competitive) acts that clearly disregard the other party’s interests. We expect high face threat sensitivity negotiators to experience stronger negative psychological reactions in response to such competitiveness displays by others. We highlight the important role of negotiators’ global self-esteem as an intermediary mechanism and investigate how high face threat sensitivity negotiators respond to different levels of competitiveness from their counterparts.

3.1. Face threat sensitivity, counterpart’s behaviors, and negotiator global self-esteem

Symbolic interactionist theory maintains that the social self develops and evolves through relationships with others (e.g., Goffman, 1959; Mead, 1934; Stryker, 1980). It is through these relationships that the self is challenged and modified and actors come to understand themselves. Global self-esteem, as part of the social self, also is relational and emergent as actors consider ways of viewing and knowing themselves through the eyes of others. Thus, social evaluation provides a consensual (in)validation of our self-feelings (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). Given the malleability of global self-esteem to social feedback, we expect these effects to be particularly pronounced for individuals high in face threat sensitivity as they attend to and use social cues to inform themselves about their perceived value. Notably, global self-esteem can be a relatively stable trait or a fluctuating psychological state. In this research, we focus on the effects of counterparts’ behaviors on negotiators’ state global self-esteem.

Since high face threat sensitivity negotiators are likely to make internal rather than external attributions for other’s (competitive) behaviors, we argue that higher levels of competitiveness from counterparts would decrease their global self-esteem. Based on these arguments, we propose that face threat sensitivity moderates the relationship between counterpart’s behaviors and negotiators’ global self-esteem such that high face threat sensitivity negotiators experience lower global self-esteem when negotiating with a competitive rather than cooperative counterpart (Hypothesis 1). We expect no effects of counterpart’s competitive (vs. cooperative) behavior on low face threat sensitivity negotiators’ global self-esteem.

3.2. Negotiator global self-esteem and demands

Negotiators’ self-views guide their behaviors (Curhan et al., 2006). Previous research has provided different explanations regarding how negotiators’ self-views may influence their behavior. One line of research suggests that negative self-feelings trigger a self-enhancement motivation, leading people to be less attuned to the needs and feelings of others (Crocker & Park, 2003, 2004) and to use dominance and anger.
to establish superiority (Baumeister, 1998; Toch, 1993). In the negotiation context, making high demands can be a form of aggression when used to gain power, status, and control (Wiggins & Broughton, 1985). Hence, the self-enhancement model suggests that negotiators with lower global self-esteem would engage in compensatory actions such as higher demands to establish a stronger presence and view themselves more favorably. These behaviors, in turn, would result in better negotiation outcomes.

On the other hand, one could also argue that lower negotiator global self-esteem translates into lower demands and outcomes. According to self-verification theory (Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992), individuals tend to prefer information that confirms their self-views. When receiving negative information about the self, one is motivated to verify or confirm negative aspects of the self. This helps individuals enhance their sense of control (Swann et al., 1992; Taylor, Neter, & Wayment, 1995). More generally, self-verification motives aside, research evidence suggests that lower self-esteem is associated with lower ambition, lower expectations, and lower performance. For example, vanDellen et al. (2011) meta-analytic examination provided support for this argument by revealing that individuals with low self-esteem responded to self-esteem threats with negative self-evaluations, decreased aggression, lower motivation, less persistence, and/or poorer performance.

Demo’s (1985) findings also concur with the view that individuals with lower self-esteem tend to be conciliatory in their interactions (e.g., speaking in softer voice, showing compliance, being accommodating). Such behaviors act as an appeasement strategy, prompting counterparts to de-escalate the conflict and to mitigate harm (Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004); as a result, a more cohesive relationship may be created in which the self is protected from further damage. Thus, adopting a conciliatory stance can be an adaptive response to threats to one’s self-esteem.

In a distributive negotiation context, one party’s needs and interests are in direct opposition to their counterpart’s and thus any offer a negotiator makes is likely to be either rejected or met with resistance. In this threat-laden context, we expect that the self-verification (vs. self-enhancement) motivation would be more prominent in negotiators with low global self-esteem as persistence through making higher demands is likely to be met with resistance, which further damages self-esteem. As a result, we propose that negotiators’ lower global self-esteem is associated with a tendency to make lower demands and obtain worse negotiation outcomes (Hypothesis 2).

4. Study 1

We first tested our hypotheses in a face-to-face union-management negotiation over hourly wages for employees. Hourly wage reflects the value of resources employees bring to the table and is a direct indication of employees’ worth to management. Accordingly, in this negotiation task, management’s competing claims, disagreements, and non-cooperation would constitute a threat to the union negotiators’ identity and face (White et al., 2004). Thus, we expect to find a role effect such that the union negotiators will identify with the issue more strongly than management. As a result, union negotiators will be more susceptible to the potential adverse effects of face threats during the negotiation than the management negotiators, for whom hourly wage is less self-relevant.

4.1. Pilot study

4.1.1. Method

4.1.1.1. Participants and Procedure. We first tested the notion that hourly wage would be more self-relevant as a negotiation issue to the union negotiators than it would be to the management negotiators. To this end, in a pre-registered study (AsPredicted #36609), we recruited 279 undergraduate students (127 female) from a Southeastern university who participated in the study in exchange for course credit. Average age was 19.89 years ($SD = 2.50$).

We randomly assigned the participants to either the management or union role. We asked them to imagine that they were negotiating the hourly wage for employees in their respective roles and presented the negotiation scenario that we used in the main study (adapted from the Leckenby negotiation by Lax & Weeks, 1985). After reading the scenario, participants answered the attention check, perceived self-relevance, face threat sensitivity, and demographics questions.

4.1.1.2. Attention check questions. We asked the participants to identify their negotiation role (i.e., union or management) as well as the negotiation issue (i.e., employees’ hourly wage). In total, 46 participants failed either one or both of the attention check questions and were dropped from the study, thus leaving 233 (111 female) participants in the final sample ($M_{age} = 19.90$ years, $SD = 2.61$).

4.1.1.3. Perceived self-relevance. We used a six-item measure adapted from Houston and Walker (1996) to assess the perceived self-relevance of the hourly wage as a negotiation issue. We averaged six 7-point bipolar scales (unimportant to me—important to me, of no concern to me—of concern to me, irrelevant to me—relevant to me, means nothing to me—means a lot to me, doesn’t matter to me—matters to me, insignificant to me—significant to me) to compose the perceived self-relevance scale ($\alpha = 96$).

4.1.1.4. Face threat sensitivity. Participants completed White et al. (2004) three-item face threat sensitivity measure on a 7-point scale from 1 (extremely inaccurate) to 7 (extremely accurate). The three items were: 1) I don’t respond well to direct criticism; 2) My feelings get hurt easily; and 3) I am pretty thin-skinned. We averaged participants’ responses to these questions to compose a face threat sensitivity scale ($\alpha = 0.86$). Higher values on the scale indicated higher face threat sensitivity.

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3 In addition to demands, other negotiation behaviors that have implications for the final outcome are exit tendencies and concession making. A variety of motivations underlie negotiators’ exit tendencies, including being conciliatory, withdrawal or disengagement and competitiveness. First, negotiating fewer rounds before reaching an agreement is an indication of a stronger exit tendency, characterized as a ‘flight’ response by Brooks and Schweitzer (2011). This conceptualization of exit tendency is consistent with the notion of making low first offers to close and leave the negotiation early. Second, early exit in a negotiation may also be an indication of withdrawal or disengagement. Negotiators who do not have a vested interest in the situation and a prospect of a long-term relationship with their counterpart may withdraw from the interaction and leave early (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). In addition, negotiators may exit early to distance themselves from a (face) threatening situation, thus protecting themselves from being hurt (Goffman, 1967). Third, negotiators may exit early as part of a competitive ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ approach (White et al., 2004). They could make aggressive demands and walk away from the negotiation upon getting their offers rejected (White et al., 2004). Or, if they have a stronger alternative, they may leave the negotiation to maximize their self-interest. Since there are multiple motivations underlying negotiators’ exit tendencies, rendering interpretation of any effects uncertain, we examined such tendencies for exploratory purposes only and report the results in Supplemental Materials. Furthermore, it also is not unambiguously clear whether making smaller (larger) concessions is indicative of a competitive (cooperative) tendency. For instance, a negotiator who starts out low and subsequently makes no concessions may be more cooperative than a negotiator who starts out high and makes no concessions, even though their concession pattern would be the same. Because of this ambiguity, we also examined concession making for exploratory purposes and report the results in Supplemental Materials.

4 We pre-registered 200 subjects for the study. We exceeded this number to accommodate students’ need to earn course credit during the COVID-19 shutdown. The results were the same when we analyzed responses from the first 200 subjects only.
4.1.2. Results
As predicted, participants in the union role perceived the hourly wage as more self-relevant (M = 6.12, SD = 1.31) than those in the management role (M = 5.64, SD = 1.26); t(231) = 2.88, p = .004. In addition, there was no interaction effect of face threat sensitivity and role on the perceived self-relevance of the hourly wage (p = .24). Thus, in the main study, we focused on the results for union negotiators.

4.2. Main study

4.2.1. Method

4.2.1.1. Participants. A total of 158 undergraduate students (78 female) at a Midwestern university participated in the study as part of class activities and completed all parts of the study. Average age was 18.75 (SD = 0.87). All students in the class participated in the study.

4.2.1.2. Task and procedure. Two weeks before the negotiation, participants completed an online questionnaire that included a measure of face threat sensitivity as well as demographic questions. We used a task, as described above, that involved negotiations between management and the union, paralleling the Leckenby (Lax & Weeks, 1985) negotiation modified to reflect the context of the Federal Aviation Administration (See Appendix 1 for details about the task instructions and study measures). We randomly paired participants and randomly assigned them to a role.

We provided participants with information regarding the negotiation context in their task materials. Materials indicated that the Federal Aviation Administration (management) and the Air Traffic Controller’s Union had been negotiating over a labor contract for several months and reached an agreement on all issues except for the hourly wage. Their goal in this negotiation was to reach a settlement on the hourly wage – which was currently $50/hour. In order to draw participants’ attention to the competitiveness conveyed by the negotiation offers, the parties were not allowed to communicate verbally, but were asked to exchange numbers written on a sheet of paper. Each exchange of bids represented one day of negotiation.

If an agreement was not reached after two days of negotiation, strike costs were incurred. This strike would be costly for the union, but even more costly for management. We told participants that the negotiation would continue until the union’s bid was equal to or lower than management’s. If an agreement was not reached after 20 strike days (22 rounds), the union had to accept management’s final offer. The goal in this negotiation was to reach a settlement on the hourly wage – which was currently $50/hour. In order to draw participants’ attention to the competitiveness conveyed by the negotiation offers, the parties were not allowed to communicate verbally, but were asked to exchange numbers written on a sheet of paper. Each exchange of bids represented one day of negotiation.

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4.2.1.3. Measures. As anticipated, findings were significant for union but non-significant for management negotiators. Thus we only report the measures for the union negotiators (n = 79). Eight dyads reached impasse, meaning that they negotiated 22 rounds without reaching agreement. Dyads reaching impasse did not differ significantly from the other dyads in terms of the key variables of interest, nor did excluding them in the analyses affect the significance of our results. Thus, we kept these dyads in the final sample.

Counterpart’s competitiveness. Participants reported their perceptions of management’s competitiveness using five items on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). The items were: 1) My counterpart treated the negotiation as a win-lose contest; 2) My counterpart did not want to compromise; 3) My counterpart tried to take advantage of me; 4) My counterpart did not want to give in to my demands; 5) My counterpart tried to get the upper hand. We averaged participants’ responses to these questions to assess perceptions of counterparts’ competitiveness (α = 0.86). Higher values on the scale indicated higher perceived competitiveness.

Face threat sensitivity. Participants completed the same face threat sensitivity measure used in the pilot study (α = 0.76).6

Global self-esteem. We used the Subjective Value Inventory’s (Curhan et al., 2006) self subscale, which taps into negotiators’ overall evaluation of their competence and social value. Participants responded to the four items on 7-point scales. The scale items were: 1) Did this negotiation make you feel more or less competent as a negotiator? (1 = it made me feel less competent; 4 = it did not make me feel more or less competent; 7 = it made me feel more competent); 2) Did this negotiation positively or negatively impact your self-image or your impression of yourself? (1 = it negatively impacted my self-image; 4 = it did not positively or negatively impact my self-image; 7 = it positively impacted my self-image); 3) Did you “lose face” (i.e., damage your sense of pride) in the negotiation? (1 = not at all; 4 = moderately; 7 = a great deal) (reverse-scored); 4) Did you behave according to your own principles and values (1 = not at all; 4 = moderately; 7 = perfectly). We averaged participants’ responses to the scale items to compose a scale (α = 0.80). Higher values on the scale indicated higher global self-esteem.

Average demand level. We calculated union negotiators’ early demands by averaging the offers made in the first five rounds (α = 0.96), with a higher average indicating a higher demand level. We considered the first five rounds as the “thin slice” from the negotiation (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992; Curhan & Pentland, 2007), reflecting the general pattern of demands. Additionally, as a considerable number of participants (37%) finalized their negotiations (i.e., reached an agreement or impasse) on or before the fifth round, we considered the fifth round as an appropriate cut-off.8,9

Negotiation outcome. The final wage constituted our individual outcome measure. The higher the wage, the better the negotiation outcome for the union negotiators.

4.2.2. Results

We first conducted post-hoc power analyses to ensure that our sample size was big enough to detect the hypothesized effects. The correlation between global self-esteem and perceived counterpart competitiveness was r = −0.30, and the achieved power for this effect was 0.78. The correlation between global self-esteem and average demand level was r = 0.38, and the achieved power for this effect was 0.94. Therefore, we concluded that we had adequate statistical power for detecting our hypothesized effects.

4.2.2.1. Preliminary analyses. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations among the study variables. Face threat sensitivity was not significantly correlated with global self-esteem (p > .05), suggesting that the constructs are distinct. We also conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (maximum likelihood estimation) in LISREL 8.80 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006) to ensure construct distinctiveness. When comparing the two-factor model to the one-factor model (Anderson & Gerbing, 1986), we found that the former (χ²(13) = 13.05, CFI = 1.00, SRMR = 0.04, factor loadings > 0.40)

6 We also collected data on other personality traits that are conceptually related to face threat sensitivity (e.g., extraversion, neuroticism). Controlling for these traits did not affect the significance of our results. These analyses are presented in Supplemental Materials.

7 Although Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem measure has been extensively used in previous psychological research, it is a trait measure. Since we focused on state global self-esteem, we used Curhan et al. (2006) self-subscale, which measures individuals’ global self-view in the negotiation context.

8 We also tested our hypotheses considering the 3rd and 4th rounds as a “thin slice” and replicated our results. These results are presented in Supplemental Materials.

9 We tested our hypotheses using negotiators’ demand level in each of the five rounds. The pattern and significance of our results did not change. Supplemental Materials include these results.
fit the data significantly better than the latter ($\chi^2(14) = 112.67$, CFI = 0.64, SRMR = 0.16) ($\chi^2 (1) = 99.62, p < .001$) (see Kline, 2005 about the recommended cut-off values of the fit indices). Therefore, we concluded that global self-esteem and face threat sensitivity are distinct constructs.

4.2.2.2. Hypothesis testing. The interaction effect of union negotiators’ face threat sensitivity and management’s competitiveness on union negotiators’ global self-esteem was significant ($b = −0.18, SE = 0.07$, $p = .01$). Fig. 1 displays the interaction effect. Simple slope analyses (Hayes, 2013) revealed that the slope for high face threat sensitivity negotiators (+1 SD)$^{10}$ was significantly different from zero ($b = −0.37, SE = 0.10, t = −3.85, p < .001$), whereas the slope for low face threat sensitivity negotiators (−1 SD) was not significantly different from zero ($b = 0.03, SE = 0.12, t = 0.22, p = .83$). Thus, when faced with higher levels of competitiveness, high (but not low) face threat sensitivity negotiators experienced lower global self-esteem. These results support Hypothesis 1.

Union negotiators’ global self-esteem was positively related to their average demand level ($b = 1.32, SE = 0.37, p = .001$) and final wage ($b = 1.77, SE = 0.26, p < .001$). These results support Hypothesis 2.

We also examined whether global self-esteem mediated the interactive effects of management’s competitiveness and union negotiators’ face threat sensitivity on union negotiators’ demand level and negotiation outcome. To test moderated mediation, we performed 5,000 bootstrap re-samples using Model 7 of the Hayes (2013) PROCESS macro. Union negotiators’ global self-esteem mediated the relationship between counterpart’s competitiveness and average demand level when their face threat sensitivity was high ($b = −0.60, SE = 0.24, 95% CI [−1.16, −0.21]$), but not when their face threat sensitivity was low ($b = 0.04, SE = 0.20, 95% CI [−0.35, 0.50]$). The bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the index of moderated mediation did not include zero, 95% CI [−0.61, −0.06]. Similarly, union negotiators’ global self-esteem mediated the relationship between management’s competitiveness and the negotiation outcome when their face threat sensitivity was high ($b = −0.62, SE = 0.22, 95% CI [−1.15, −0.25]$), but not when it was low ($b = 0.05, SE = 0.20, 95% CI [−0.33, 0.47]$). The bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the index of moderated mediation did not include zero, 95% CI [−0.63, −0.06].$^{11}$

$^{10}$ High face threat sensitivity represents one standard deviation above the sample mean while low face threat sensitivity represents one standard deviation below the sample mean.

$^{11}$ In addition to these tests, we tested the alternative model in which final wage mediates the relationship between management’s competitiveness and union negotiators’ global self-esteem for high face threat sensitivity negotiators and did not find a significant mediating effect, 95% CI [−0.18, 0.02]. We also ran this analysis with average demand level as a mediator and did not find a significant mediating effect, 95% CI [−0.13, 0.01].

4.3. Discussion

As expected, we found significant interactive effects of counterpart’s competitiveness and negotiator’s face threat sensitivity on global self-esteem, demands, and negotiation outcomes for union negotiators, who perceived the negotiation issue as self-relevant, but not for management negotiators, who perceived the negotiation issue as less self-relevant. This role effect suggests that face threat sensitivity is an important personality trait to consider for negotiators who are highly identified with issues at stake and perceive those issues as self-relevant (i.e., union negotiators; a home designed by the seller, etc.).

The results provide preliminary support for the person-situation interaction framework (Endler & Magnusson, 1976; Shoda, 1999) as applied to counterpart’s competitiveness and face threat sensitivity in a face-to-face negotiation context. As union negotiators’ face threat sensitivity increased, higher competitiveness from management resulted in lower global self-esteem, ultimately leading them to make lower demands and get worse negotiation outcomes. Our results provide support for the notion that a blow to people's global self-esteem decreases (rather than increases) value claiming in negotiations. It seems that for high face threat sensitivity negotiators, competitive behavior from others registers as a self-esteem threat, thus keeping them from reaping larger benefits in negotiations. This suggests that a wounded self-view could be a liability, especially in distributive negotiations.

Besides a global approach, self-esteem can be broken down into agentic and communal components (Grant & Gino, 2010; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Agency refers to feelings of being skillful, competent, and goal-directed. Communion, on the other hand, refers to feelings of being connected to and valued by others (for a review, see Judd, James-Hawkins, Zebryt, & Kashima, 2005). Agentic feelings of self-esteem refer to one’s sense of competence (e.g., intellectual abilities, self-regulatory capabilities, self-confidence, and agency) in a certain task, whereas communal feelings of social self-esteem refer to people’s perceptions of their value in the eyes of others (Grant & Gino, 2010; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). This distinction begs the question of whether the responses of high face threat sensitivity negotiators to counterparts’ competitive behaviors are driven by reduced performance self-esteem, reduced social self-esteem, or both. We examined this question in Study 2.

5. Study 2

According to the Dual Perspective Model (Wojciszke, Baryla, Parzuchowski, Szymkow, & Abele, 2011), individuals’ global self-esteem is predominantly driven by agentic rather than communal considerations. When people look at themselves, they typically assume an agentic perspective, which increases the relative importance of agentic considerations (Wojciszke et al., 2011, p. 619). Indeed, when asked to recall and describe events that influenced their self-esteem, people
We set the sample size to 300 subjects, however since multiple participants expressed interest in a pre-registered study (Wojciszke et al., 2011; Abele, Rupprecht, & Wojciszke, 2008). These studies demonstrated that agentic traits were stronger predictors of global self-esteem than communal traits.

Distributive negotiations are situations that highlight the importance of agentic goals such as feelings of being in control and doing well as parties seek to maximize their value claimed. Consistent with the Dual Perspective Model (Wojciszke et al., 2011), we argue that negotiators, including those high in face threat sensitivity, would have greater agentic (vs. communal) concerns in distributive negotiation contexts. First, we tested this argument in a pilot study. In the main study, we used a simulated salary negotiation to examine the notion that it is the agentic (vs. communal) considerations that explain why high face threat sensitivity negotiators reduce their demand levels in response to counterpart’s competitive behavior. Negotiators with low face threat sensitivity are less likely to rely on counterparts’ behaviors for information about their agentic self-worth, thus we expect their performance self-esteem to be affected to a lesser extent by variations in counterparts’ cooperative and competitive behaviors.

5.1. Pilot study

5.1.1. Method

5.1.1.1. Participants and procedure. In a pre-registered study (AsPredicted #42289), 29712 individuals (115 female; Mage = 37.21 years, SD = 10.88) participated in a study posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were native English speakers, residents in the United States, and had previous experience in negotiating their salary or wage. They were paid $0.50 to complete the study. We chose MTurk, an online community in which individuals participate in studies in return for monetary compensation, because it is more diverse than a typical American college sample and thus enhances the generalizability of our results (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Participants first responded to face threat sensitivity items used in Study 1 (White et al., 2004) and then were asked to write about how they approached salary or wage negotiations in general. Specifically, they were asked to describe in detail the top three concerns they had in salary or wage negotiations. The study ended with basic demographic questions.

5.1.2. Results and discussion

We used LIWC 2015 (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) (Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015) to code participants’ written descriptions of their top three concerns in salary or wage negotiations. Specifically, we compared participants’ use of achievement- (i.e., agentic) and affiliation- (i.e., communal) related words in describing their concerns, using a paired t-test. These categories are included in the default dictionary of LIWC 2015.

Achievement-related words were used more frequently (M = 4.51%, SD = 7.95%) than affiliation-related words (M = 1.11%, SD = 4.53%; t (296) = 6.83, p < .001), when participants described their concerns in salary or wage negotiations. In addition, high (≥ +1 SD) face threat sensitivity participants (n = 58) also used achievement-related words (M = 3.89%, SD = 8.26%) more frequently than affiliation-related words (M = 1.14%, SD = 2.83%; t(57) = 2.29, p = .026) in describing their concerns. These results support the notion that negotiators, including those high in face threat sensitivity, have more accessible thoughts and stronger concerns about agentic (e.g., performance) rather than communal (e.g., social) aspects of salary negotiations.

5.2. Main study

5.2.1. Method

5.2.1.1. Participants. We conducted an a priori power analysis to estimate the sample size sufficient to achieve adequate power. In Study 1, the correlation between global self-esteem and perceived competitiveness was r = −0.30 (d = −0.63), indicating a medium effect size. Considering that we used a simulated on-line interaction paradigm (vs. face-to-face negotiation), we conservatively assumed a small to medium effect size (d = −0.35), along with an alpha value of 0.05. The minimum sample size calculated by G*Power for achieving adequate statistical power was 260 subjects. As we conducted our study on MTurk, with a potential for subjects exiting the negotiation and/or realizing that they received pre-programmed responses, we recruited more subjects than necessary.

Three hundred and one adult participants13 (151 female) from the United States were recruited from MTurk and paid $0.70 to complete this study. The mean age was 38.10 years (SD = 13.05; range 19–76 years). Participants had to be 18 years of age or older, be native English speakers (to ensure full comprehension of task instructions), and reside in the United States (to minimize cultural differences). MTurk samples produce high quality results for ostensibly interactive decision making tasks (Summerville & Chartier, 2013), which we used in this study.

5.2.1.2. Task and procedures. We adopted a between-subject design, manipulating counterparts’ behaviors (competitive vs. cooperative). Participants engaged in a simulation that involved negotiating a raise with their employer (see Appendix 2 for the task instructions and study measures). All participants were told that they were randomly assigned to the employee role and would be matched with another participant who was assigned to the employer role. In reality the employer’s responses were simulated by the computer to maximize experimental control (e.g., Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Participants were asked to imagine that they had been working for a company for several years and felt that they were paid under their market value. Their current salary was $2200/month but they could make as much as $4000/month, depending on their qualifications. They were also told that, given their skill level, they should be expecting to be paid as much as $3500/month. Thus, they would be negotiating with the employer to get a raise.

In order to increase engagement in the task and reinforce the mixed-motive nature of the negotiation, participants were told that three individuals who reached an agreement with the employer would be randomly selected and awarded 0.1% of the agreed upon salary as a bonus payment (the incentive range varied from $2.22 and $4.50). Before the negotiation started, participants answered attention-check questions to ensure their understanding of the task instructions.

We manipulated the competitiveness versus cooperativeness of the employer’s messages to the employee during the negotiation. When the negotiation started, participants received a first message from the employer. Those in the competitive counterpart condition read:

“I got the impression that you’d like to get a significant increase in your salary… It’s absurd that you are asking for a raise under the circumstances. I’ll be honest, your salary is not a priority for me. Finances are tight these days, so I cannot justify giving you such a big jump. I care about the company’s profitability and would like to cut costs as much as I can. In short, I am focused on increasing the company’s financial standing, your raise is not as important. Anyway, just give me your proposal and I will think about it…”

12 The data collection stopped when we reached 300 subjects, however we noticed that 3 participants failed to answer the face threat sensitivity questions, thus they were dropped from the study.

13 We set the sample size to 300 subjects, however since multiple participants completed the study at the same time before the study was closed, our final sample size was 301.
Participants in the cooperative counterpart condition received the following message:

“I got the impression that you’d like to get a significant increase in your salary… It’s reasonable that you are asking for a raise under the circumstances. I’ll be honest, your salary is a priority for me. Finances are tight these days, but I think I can justify giving you some raise. I care about your satisfaction and would like to accommodate your interests as much as I can.

In short, giving you a raise is important to me, but I also need to keep an eye on the company’s financial standing. Anyway, just give me your proposal and I will think about it…”

After reading the employer’s response, participants could either make an offer or exit the negotiation. Those who opted to exit the negotiation answered the post-negotiation questions. Participants who made an offer to the employer received another response from the employer.

The competitive counterpart condition participants read:

“I will think about your offer… I will get back to you about it. As I said, your salary is not my priority at this point. It doesn’t make sense that you are asking for such a raise… If you want a deal, you need to make significant concessions.”

The cooperative counterpart condition participants read:

“I will think about your offer. I will get back to you about it… As I said, your salary is a priority for me. It makes sense that you are asking for a raise… We can reach a deal that works for both of us if we both compromise a little.”

After this second response from the employer, participants could either make an offer or exit the negotiation. Then, participants were directed to answer the post-negotiation questions. Those who made a second offer were told that they would be answering some questions while the employer was evaluating their offer. After they completed the post-negotiation survey, participants who made a second offer were told that their offer was accepted.

5.2.1.3. Measures. Manipulation check of perceived competitiveness/cooperativeness. After the negotiation, participants indicated to what extent they perceived their counterpart to be competitive, aggressive, selfish, unwilling, and demanding during the negotiation on a 7-point scale (1 = completely disagree; 7 = completely agree) (α = 0.88). Higher values indicated higher levels of perceived competitiveness. Participants also indicated to what extent they perceived their counterpart as cooperative, collaborative, compromising, accommodating, and agreeable during the negotiation on a 7-point scale (1 = completely disagree; 7 = completely agree) (α = 0.98). Higher values indicated higher levels of perceived cooperativeness.

Perceived face threat. After the negotiation, participants indicated the extent to which their counterpart’s actions were demoralizing, insensitive, rude, disrespectful, and disapproving using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = greatly) (adapted from Capuch & Carson, 2002). Higher values indicated a higher level of perceived face threat.

Deception check. At the end of the experiment, we asked participants to write comments about their negotiation counterpart’s personality and negotiation style to assess whether they suspected that they received pre-programmed responses. None of the participants voiced suspicion that they might have been negotiating with a computer.

Face threat sensitivity. As in Study 1, participants completed White et al. (2004) three-item face threat sensitivity scale before the negotiation (α = 0.90).15

Global self-esteem. After the negotiation, participants filled out the same global self-esteem measure used in Study 1 (α = 0.70).

Performance self-esteem. After the negotiation, participants answered four questions tapping into their performance self-esteem (adapted from Heatherton & Polivy, 1991), using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent). The items were: 1) I felt confident about my abilities in this negotiation; 2) I felt frustrated or rattled about my performance in this negotiation (reverse-scored); 3) I felt confident that I understood what was going on in this negotiation; 4) I felt like I was not doing well in this negotiation (reverse-scored) (α = 0.78). Higher values on the scale indicated higher performance self-esteem.

Social self-esteem. After the negotiation, participants answered four questions tapping into their social self-esteem (adapted from Heatherton & Polivy, 1991), using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent). The items were: 1) I was concerned about the impression I was making on the employer (reverse-coded); 2) I was worried about what the employer thinks of me (reverse-coded); 3) I felt displeased with myself (reverse-coded); 4) I was worried about looking foolish (reverse-coded) (α = 0.89). Higher values on the scale indicated higher social self-esteem.

Average demand level. We averaged participants’ first and second offers to measure their average demand level. Higher values indicated higher demand level.15

5.2.2. Results

Of the 301 subjects who participated in the study, 22 left the negotiation without making a first offer to the employer. Of the remaining 279 subjects, 66 exited without making a second offer. There was no significant effect of counterpart’s behavior (competitive vs. cooperative) on negotiators’ exit (p = .57). The interaction effect of negotiators’ face threat sensitivity and counterpart’s behavior on exit was also non-significant (p = .47).

5.2.2.1. Manipulation checks. Participants assigned to the cooperative counterpart condition perceived their counterpart as more cooperative (M = 4.94; SD = 1.57) and less competitive (M = 2.51; SD = 1.15) than those assigned to the competitive counterpart condition (Mcoop = 1.88; SD = 1.28, t(282.60) = 18.37, p < .001; Mcomp = 5.34; SD = 1.14, t(298) = −21.34, p < .001). Participants in the competitive counterpart condition also perceived their counterpart’s behaviors as more face threatening (M = 5.23; SD = 1.73) than those in the cooperative counterpart condition (M = 1.68; SD = 1.11, t(259.58) = 21.17, p < .001), supporting our prediction that competitors’ competitive (vs. cooperative) behaviors were perceived as a face threat. There was no significant interaction effect of negotiators’ face threat sensitivity and counterpart’s behavior on counterpart’s perceived cooperativeness (p = .40) and competitiveness (p = .91). Taken together, these results indicated that our manipulations created the desired psychological effects.

5.2.2.2. Preliminary analyses. Negotiators’ face threat sensitivity was significantly correlated with their global self-esteem (r = −0.19, p = .001), performance self-esteem (r = −0.26, p < .001), and social self-esteem (r = −0.39, p < .001). Therefore, we first established the distinctiveness of face threat sensitivity as a trait from these psychological states that result from the negotiation process.

We conducted confirmatory factor analyses (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988) in LISREL 8.80 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006) to ensure construct distinctiveness. First, we compared the two factor model of face threat sensitivity and global self-esteem to the one-factor model. We found that the former (χ² = 49.41, df = 13, CFI = 0.96, SRMR = 0.07) fit

14As in Study 1, we measured other personality traits correlated with face threat sensitivity. Controlling for these traits did not change the significance of our results. These analyses are presented in Supplemental Materials.

15We also examined negotiators’ first and second offers separately as indicators of their demand level. These results replicated those with average demand level. We include those analyses in Supplemental Materials.
In addition, simple effects analyses revealed that counterpart’s competitive (vs. cooperative) behavior led to lower performance self-esteem among high face threat negotiators \( (b = -1.36, SE = 0.20, t = -6.85, p < .001) \). Counterpart’s competitiveness also reduced low face threat sensitivity negotiators’ performance self-esteem \( (b = -0.58, SE = 0.20, t = -2.97, p = .003) \), though not as strongly (as indicated by a significant interaction effect, cf. Dawson, 2014). These results revealed that, for high face threat sensitivity negotiators, performance self-esteem and global self-esteem vary in the same direction in response to counterpart’s competitiveness (vs. cooperative-ness).

Negotiators’ global self-esteem was positively related to their average demand level \( (b = 112.87, SE = 28.79, p < .001) \). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported. There was also a positive relationship between negotiators’ performance self-esteem and their average demand level \( (b = 81.44, SE = 21.91, p < .001) \) as well as their social self-esteem and average demand level \( (b = 57.42, SE = 18.92, p = .003) \).

We tested whether global and performance self-esteem mediated the interactive effect of counterpart’s competitiveness and negotiators’ face threat sensitivity on their average demand level. We performed 5,000 bootstrap re-samples using Model 7 of the Hayes (2013) SPSS PROCESS macro. Negotiators’ global self-esteem mediated the relationship between counterpart’s competitiveness and their average demand level for high \( (b = -102.10, SE = 40.26, 95\% CI = [-196.06, -37.10]) \), but not for low \( (b = -27.22, SE = 22.19, 95\% CI = [81.04, 9.39]) \) face threat sensitivity negotiators. The bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the index of moderated mediation did not include zero, 95% CI = [−57.67, −4.36].

Negotiators’ performance self-esteem mediated the relationship between counterpart’s competitiveness and their average demand level for both high \( (b = -106.28, SE = 43.85, 95\% CI = [-207.38, -32.99]) \) and low \( (b = -52.88, SE = 23.76, 95\% CI = [-111.41, -15.85]) \) face threat sensitivity negotiators. However, more importantly, the conditional indirect effect of competitiveness on average demands through performance self-esteem was significantly stronger for high than low face threat sensitivity negotiators, \( b = -16.15, SE = 11.31, 95\% CI = [-45.83, -0.73] \).

5.3. Discussion

We first demonstrated that negotiators, including those high in face threat sensitivity, have stronger agentic than communal concerns in the context of salary/wage negotiations. Then, in our main study, we manipulated the counterpart’s behavior and found that high face threat sensitivity negotiators’ reduced global and performance self-esteem accounted for the effects of counterpart’s competitiveness on their lower average demands. The communal mechanism of social self-esteem did not have an explanatory effect. This suggests that counterpart’s competitiveness triggers stronger agentic (e.g., feelings of being in control and doing well) than communal (e.g., being socially valued by their counterpart) considerations for high face threat sensitivity negotiators, which in turn lead them to reduce their demand levels in the face of competition.

6. Study 3

In our final study, we manipulated, rather than measured, the mediating mechanism of performance self-esteem (low vs. high) to gain further confidence that it is indeed an underlying causal mechanism (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). We predicted that negotiating with a competitive (vs. cooperative) counterpart reduces high face threat sensitivity negotiators’ demand levels only when their performance self-esteem is low. When their performance self-esteem is high, there should

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**Fig. 2.** The Interactive Effect of Negotiator’s Face Threat Sensitivity (FTS) and Counterpart’s Behavior on Negotiator’s Global Self-Esteem (Study 2). Note: Coop represents counterpart’s cooperativeness; Comp represents counterpart’s competitiveness.

**Fig. 3.** The Interactive Effect of Negotiator’s Face Threat Sensitivity (FTS) and Counterpart’s Behavior on Negotiator’s Performance Self-Esteem (Study 2). Note: Coop represents counterpart’s cooperativeness; Comp represents counterpart’s competitiveness.
be no significant effect of a counterpart’s competitive (vs. cooperative) behavior on high face threat sensitivity negotiators’ demand levels. These simple effects were pre-registered (AsPredicted #39102).

6.1. Method

6.1.1. Participants

We conducted an a priori power analysis to estimate the sample size sufficient to achieve adequate power. Given the correlation between counterpart’s competitiveness and average demand level in Study 2 ($r = -0.13, d = -0.26$), we assumed a small effect size ($d = -0.26$), along with an alpha value of 0.05. The minimum sample size calculated in G*Power was 468 subjects.

One thousand and seventy-three (660 female) individuals from the United States were recruited from Prime Panels to complete the pre-registered study. The mean age was 41.83 years ($SD = 15.76$ years; range 18–86 years). We used the same screening criteria used in Study 2.

6.1.2. Task and procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of a 2 (counterpart’s behavior: competitive, cooperative) × 2 (performance self-esteem: low, high) full factorial design.

After answering the personality questions, participants were asked to answer questions tapping their negotiation competencies in the salary negotiation context (adapted from Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011) (see Appendix 3). They read:

“Salary negotiations often involve balance. For example, some people are too aggressive and some are too passive. Some people focus too much on relationships and some focus too much on their own interests. Though there are often no perfect answers, the Negotiation Aptitude Test (NAT) has been validated on a large US based sample. For example, NAT scores have been linked to a number of real-world outcomes such as performance in negotiating starting salaries and salary increases. In the next section, you will answer questions from the NAT. When answering the questions, carefully think about the situations and choose the best answer.”

After completing the test, there was a short pause during which participants’ responses to the test questions were ostensibly evaluated. We then gave them feedback on their test performance. Participants assigned to the low performance self-esteem condition read:

“We evaluated your answers to the Negotiation Aptitude Test questions. These questions are relevant to your upcoming salary negotiation with the employer. Those who scored high in the Negotiation Aptitude test in the past were likely to succeed in achieving their goals in salary negotiations, whereas those who scored low in this test were likely to fail in achieving their goals in salary negotiations. Based on your score, you were ranked in the top 15% of the participants who took the test. This means that you have strong negotiation skills and will likely excel at achieving your goals in your negotiation with the employer.”

Then, in the second part of the experiment, participants were presented with the salary negotiation scenario used in Study 2. All characteristics of the task were identical to those of Study 2, except that the exit option was removed in order to generalize our findings to situations in which leaving the negotiation is not possible or is not a desirable option for the employee. All participants were assigned to the employee role, negotiated with a competitive or a cooperative employer, and were asked to make two offers to the employer.

6.1.3. Manipulations

Counterpart’s behavior. Counterpart’s competitiveness and cooperativeness were manipulated using the same pre-programmed messages used in Study 2.

Performance self-esteem. Performance self-esteem was manipulated using the pre-programmed feedback presented above.

Deception check. At the end of the experiment, we asked participants to write comments about their negotiation counterpart’s personality and negotiation style to assess whether they suspected that they received pre-programmed responses. Two participants suspected that they might have been negotiating with a computer. The skeptical participants were dropped from the sample.

6.1.4. Measures

Manipulation check of perceived competitiveness/cooperativeness. After the negotiation, participants answered the same manipulation check questions used in Study 2 to measure perceived competitiveness ($\alpha = 0.81$) and perceived cooperativeness ($\alpha = 0.96$).

Perceived face threat. After the negotiation, participants completed the same measure of perceived face threat as in Study 2 ($\alpha = 0.97$).

Performance self-esteem manipulation check. After the negotiation, participants completed the same performance self-esteem measure used in Study 2 ($\alpha = 0.71$).

Face threat sensitivity. As in Studies 1 and 2, participants completed White et al. (2004) three-item face threat sensitivity scale at the beginning of the study ($\alpha = 0.86$).

Social self-esteem. After the negotiation, participants completed the same social self-esteem measure used in Study 2 ($\alpha = 0.89$).

Average demand level. As in Study 2, we averaged participants’ first and second offers to measure their average demand level. Higher values indicated higher demand level.

Attention check question. In order to make sure that participants paid attention to the performance self-esteem manipulation, at the end of the study we asked them to indicate their ranking in the Negotiation Aptitude Test. The options were: top 15%; bottom 15%; top 30%, bottom 30%, and average. Six hundred fifty-four participants answered this question inaccurately, thus were dropped from the sample. This exclusion criterion was also included in the pre-registration. The final sample included 418 subjects (261 female), with a mean age of 42.39 years ($SD = 15.79$ years; range 18–84 years).

6.2. Results

6.2.1. Manipulation checks

Participants assigned to the cooperative counterpart condition perceived their counterpart to be more cooperative ($M = 5.36, SD = 1.22$) and less competitive ($M = 2.78, SD = 1.27$) than those assigned to the competitive counterpart condition ($M_{competition} = 2.88; SD = 1.75, t (393.75) = 16.54, p < .001; M_{competition} = 4.63; SD = 1.25, t
(416) = −14.99, p < .001). Participants in the competitive counterpart condition also perceived their counterpart’s behaviors as more face threatening (M = 4.68; SD = 1.73) than those in the cooperative counterpart condition (M = 1.73; SD = 1.24), t(398.61) = 20.323, p < .001, supporting the notion that counterparts’ competitive (vs. cooperative) behaviors are perceived as a face threat. There was also no significant interaction effect of negotiators’ face threat sensitivity and counterpart’s behavior on counterpart’s perceived cooperativeness (p = .74) and competitiveness (p = .75).

Participants assigned to the low performance self-esteem condition had significantly lower performance self-esteem (M = 4.85, SD = 1.25) than those assigned to the high performance self-esteem condition (M = 5.31, SD = 1.22), t(416) = −3.81, p < .001. However, these groups did not significantly differ in terms of their social self-esteem (M_{low PSE} = 4.40, SD = 1.67 vs. M_{high PSE} = 4.67, SD = 1.63; t(416) = −1.65, p = .10). These results indicated that our manipulation created the desired psychological effects.

6.2.2. Hypothesis testing

If the interactive effects of face threat sensitivity and counterpart’s competitiveness on negotiators’ demand levels are driven by performance self-esteem, as suggested by the results of Study 2, then these effects should be attenuated by an exogenous manipulation of performance self-esteem. Specifically, when performance self-esteem is exogenously enhanced, we should no longer find significant differences in high face threat sensitivity negotiators’ demand levels between the competitive and cooperative counterpart conditions. Conversely, when performance self-esteem is not exogenously enhanced, the significant difference in high face threat sensitivity negotiators’ demand levels in response to a competitive (vs. cooperative) counterpart should remain.

Using Model 3 of the Hayes (2013) SPSS PROCESS macro, we tested the three-way interaction effect of counterpart’s behavior (competitive vs. cooperative), performance self-esteem (low vs. high), and face threat sensitivity on negotiators’ average demand level. This interaction effect was not significant (p = .84), however analyses of the pre-registered simple effects revealed support for our prediction (see Fig. 4).

Counterpart’s competitiveness (vs. cooperativeness) reduced high face threat sensitivity negotiators’ average demand levels when their performance self-esteem was low (b = −255.48, SE = 89.47, 95% CI = [−431.35, −79.61]), but not when their performance self-esteem was high (b = −104.22, SE = 90.93, 95% CI = [−282.98, 74.53]). As predicted, counterpart’s competitiveness (vs. cooperativeness) did not significantly affect low face threat sensitivity negotiators’ average demands when their performance self-esteem was low (b = −129.42, SE = 91.01, 95% CI = [−308.33,49.50]) or high (b = −14.49, SE = 89.67, 95% CI = [−190.77, 161.80]). No other pairwise comparisons were significant. These results provide support for the notion that performance self-esteem is the underlying causal mechanism that explains why high face threat sensitivity negotiators make lower demands when negotiating with a competitive (vs. cooperative) counterpart.

7. General discussion

In three studies, using different populations, study designs and types of negotiations, we found consistent support for the argument that higher levels of competitiveness from counterparts decrease high face threat sensitivity negotiators’ global and performance self-esteem, leading them to make lower demands. Next we discuss the theoretical contributions of our findings, followed by a discussion of the study limitations and directions for future research.

7.1. Theoretical contributions

The present findings make a number of theoretical contributions. First, we unpack the process by which face threat sensitivity affects negotiator behavior in distributive negotiations. White et al. (2004), focusing on the integrative negotiation context, concluded that face threats impair efficiency by making high face threat sensitivity negotiators more competitive. Our results reveal an opposite pattern in the context of distributive negotiations. That is, high face threat sensitivity negotiators become more conciliatory in response to counterpart’s competitive behavior, which is a form of face threat. In addition, our results uncover when and why high face threat sensitivity negotiators demand less by highlighting the role of performance self-esteem in this process.

Second, we explicitly varied an important contextual element—counterpart’s behaviors— to understand what drives high face threat sensitivity negotiators to be more or less conciliatory. We demonstrated that counterparts’ behaviors affected high face threat sensitivity negotiators’ behavioral responses through the agentic mechanism of performance self-esteem. Identifying the mediating role of performance self-esteem is a noteworthy contribution to negotiation research. Whereas self-related traits such as self-concept clarity (Bechtoldt et al., 2010; De Dreu & van Knippenberg, 2005) and self-efficacy (Sullivan et al., 2005) have been examined in negotiation research, the effects of self-related transient states, such as state-based global self-esteem, on negotiator cognition and behavior are under-examined. This lack of research is in stark contrast to a vast amount of research on state self-esteem in other interpersonal contexts (e.g., Leary, Tambor, T冷笑al., 1995; Leary, Haupt, Strasser, & Chokel, 1998). Indeed, Elfenbein (2015) maintained that it is essential to understand negotiators’ transient psychological states to predict and change their behaviors, and thus called for more research in this area. The present research follows this call by demonstrating the critical role negotiators’ state performance self-esteem plays in explaining their demands.

Third, and more broadly speaking, the present findings demonstrate the importance of examining negotiators’ psychological experiences and behaviors within a person-situation interaction framework (see Elfenbein, 2013 for a review). Traditionally, personality traits have been under-investigated to the extent that some researchers deem personality traits irrelevant to negotiation behaviors. For example, Thompson (1990) claimed that “personality and individual differences appear to play a minimal role in determining bargaining behavior” (p. 515). Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, and Valley (2000) claimed that “simple individual differences offer limited potential for predicting negotiation outcomes” (p. 281). Indeed, Sharma et al.’s (2013) meta-analysis found that personality traits and individual differences, overall, had modest or null correlations with negotiation behaviors and outcomes. They found that the five broad personality traits, specifically, had very modest (rs ≤ 0.15) correlations with negotiators’ cooperative tendencies and null or very modest (rs ≤ 0.15) correlations with negotiation performance (economic outcomes or supervisor-rated performance) and subjective perceptions about the counterpart. However, we argued that, compared to broad personality traits, narrow personality traits such as face threat sensitivity could be more valuable in explaining negotiation behaviors and outcomes. Based on the present findings, we encourage negotiation researchers to adopt a person-
situation interaction approach and investigate how narrow personality traits (e.g., face threat sensitivity) act as boundary conditions, which help explain when a specific situation is likely to evoke specific responses in negotiators.

Finally, our findings illuminate differential responses to competitive moves in other organizational settings, such as competition within teams, competing for jobs, and competing to gain influence on decision making. While some individuals tend to thrive in such competitive contexts (e.g., Brown, Cron, & Slocum, 1998; Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010), our findings reveal that this may not be the case for high face threat sensitivity individuals. Specifically, these individuals are likely to struggle navigating in competitive environments, may claim less than their fair share, and fail to exert influence on important decisions. By identifying performance self-esteem as an explanatory mechanism for this effect, our research paves the way to future research studies examining the factors that could mitigate such conciliatory tendencies.

7.2. Study limitations and directions for future research

Like all studies, those reported here have a number of limitations that point to directions for future research. First, since our goal was to understand when and why high face threat sensitivity negotiators exhibit conciliatory (or competitive) responses, we focused on negotiators’ demand levels as the main dependent variable, without necessarily focusing on their individual gain (e.g., see Van Kleef et al., 2004). However, given that we focused on distributive negotiations, negotiators’ demand levels would largely affect their own outcomes (see Hüffmeier, Freund, Zerres, Backhaus, & Hertel, 2014 for meta-analytical evidence). Thus, we would expect high face threat sensitivity negotiators to get lower individual outcomes in Study 2 when negotiating with a competitive (vs. cooperative) counterpart. That said, future research should replicate and extend the present findings by examining negotiators’ individual outcomes.

Second, we do not have a directional argument for low face threat sensitivity negotiators, because our argument revolves around the notion that it is the situation (i.e., counterpart’s competitiveness) that triggers a process of self-evaluation in negotiators. Since low face threat sensitivity negotiators are less likely to infer self-related information based on others’ actions, there is no strong theoretical basis to suggest that their performance self-esteem would be influenced by their counterpart’s behaviors. That said, future research is needed to fully understand how low and high face threat sensitivity negotiators differ in their psychological and behavioral responses.

We offer three additional directions for future research. First, we suggest that researchers further explore the implications of face threat sensitivity for value creation in negotiations. White et al. (2004) found that face threat sensitivity could be a barrier to value creation. Given that face threat sensitivity is a stable personality trait, future research should examine the situational factors that could mitigate this negative effect. For example, would interventions that enhance negotiators’ performance self-esteem be effective in integrative negotiations as well as in other settings in which people may encounter face threats? Could counterparts’ appropriate face work (e.g., apology, flattery, compliments, etc.) mitigate the threat posed by the counterpart’s competitiveness (vs. cooperativeness) and thus lead high face threat sensitivity negotiators on a path to cooperation? Answers to these questions not only would advance negotiation research, but also would provide better guidance to negotiation practice.

Second, as noted earlier, negotiation researchers have limited knowledge of the effects of negotiators’ self-views in the negotiation process. Yet self-esteem is an important interpersonal monitor (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary et al., 1995) as it informs individuals about how they feel about themselves in relation to others. External feedback from others informs negotiators about how they are perceived, thus influencing their self-esteem and subsequent behaviors (cf. Leary et al., 1998). Our research demonstrated that (performance) self-esteem explains how high face threat negotiators respond to competitive behavior from others. Given that self-esteem has such explanatory power, we encourage negotiation researchers to devote more attention to the role of self-related considerations in the negotiation process.

Third, in this research we focused on counterpart’s competitiveness as a face threat in the context of distributive negotiations. Brown and Levinson (1987) discussed other types of face threat which could be prevalent in negotiation settings, such as not paying attention to the addressee (e.g., avoidance) or interrupting the addressee’s speech (e.g., disrespect). All of these acts signal a disregard for the addressee’s needs and are non-cooperative in nature. Thus, they could potentially lead to similar effects as competitive behavior in high face threat sensitivity negotiators. Future research should examine whether different types of face threats operate differently in the context of negotiations and beyond.

Finally, while face constitutes an important “currency” of exchange in intra-cultural negotiations (Brett et al., 2007; Foa & Foa, 1980), it is perhaps even more important in inter-cultural negotiations. Individuals in certain cultures may be more reactive to face threats (Friedman, Chi, & Liu, 2006). It would be valuable for researchers to better understand the implications of face threat sensitivity in inter-cultural negotiations.

8. Conclusion

We investigated the effects of face threat sensitivity in distributive negotiations. Our results revealed that counterparts’ competitive (vs. cooperative) behavior reduces the performance self-esteem (but not the social self-esteem) of negotiators higher rather than lower on face threat sensitivity, which ultimately leads them to claim less value. This finding emphasizes the importance of understanding high face threat sensitivity negotiators’ agentic (rather than communal) considerations in predicting their behaviors in competitive environments. Moreover, the findings highlight the value of adopting a person-situation interaction perspective to illuminate the complex social dynamics of negotiation.

Disclosure

Data can be assessed at https://osf.io/47j/.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Ece Tuncel: Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis, Investigation, Writing - original draft, Project administration, Funding acquisition. Dejun Tony Kong: Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis, Investigation, Writing - review & editing. Judi McLean Parks: Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing - review & editing, Funding acquisition. Gerben van Kleef: Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing - review & editing.

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Appendix 1

1. Negotiation task and measures

Pre-Negotiation Questions

Face threat sensitivity (1 = extremely inaccurate, 7 = extremely accurate)
Please indicate how accurately each statement describes you.

1- I am hurt when others cannot accept who I am.
2- My feelings get hurt easily.
3- I am pretty thin-skinned.

Extraversion (1 = extremely inaccurate, 9 = extremely accurate)
Indicate how accurately each trait describes you using the scale.

1- Talkative
2- Extroverted
3- Bold
4- Energetic
5- Shy (r)
6- Quiet (r)
7- Bashful (r)
8- Withdrawn (r)

Neuroticism (1 = extremely inaccurate, 9 = extremely accurate)
Indicate how accurately each trait describes you using the scale.

1- Jealous
2- Moody
3- Temperamental
4- Envious
5- Touchy
6- Fretful
7- Not envious
8- Relaxed (r)

Openness to experience (1 = extremely inaccurate, 9 = extremely accurate)
Indicate how accurately each trait describes you using the scale.

1- Creative
2- Imaginative
3- Philosophical
4- Intellectual
5- Complex
6- Deep
7- Uncreative (r)
8- Unintellectual (r)

Conscientiousness (1 = extremely inaccurate, 9 = extremely accurate)
Indicate how accurately each trait describes you using the scale.

1- Organized
2- Efficient
3- Systematic
4- Practical
5- Disorganized (r)
6- Sloppy (r)
7- Inefficient (r)
8- Careless (r)

Agreeableness (1 = extremely inaccurate, 9 = extremely accurate)
Indicate how accurately each trait describes you using the scale.

1- Sympathetic
2- Warm
3- Kind
Negotiation Task

Air Traffic Controller’s Strike

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Air Traffic Controller’s Union have been negotiating the labor contract for several months. They have reached an agreement on all issues, except for the hourly wage.

Currently, the standard hourly wage for the workers is $50/hour. The FAA is reluctant to increase the wage. Negotiations have been going on for a while and the union has threatened to strike if a resolution cannot be reached after 2 days of negotiation. Such a strike is costly for the union, but more costly for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) at this point.

The parties must come to an agreement on an appropriate wage rate for the controllers. So far, negotiations have been contentious, so the parties agreed that contact should be limited to passing back and forth numbers written on a sheet of paper. To come to an agreement, this unusual negotiation procedure will be used and the procedure must be strictly followed:

- Each round of negotiations represents one day. Bids will be exchanged on a paper, with each exchange equal to one day. The only information to be written on the paper is the proposed hourly wage. No talking during the negotiation – the only communication is the bid written on the paper.
- The FAA’s opening bid cannot be less than $50/hour and the union’s opening bid cannot be more than $70/hour.
- If the union’s bid is higher than FAA’s, the negotiations continue.
- If FAA’s bid is higher than the union’s, the agreement is reached. The two bids will be added together and divided by two. The resulting wage will be the hourly wage.
- If an agreement is reached in two negotiating periods, then there will be no strike and no penalties accrue. The strike automatically begins on the third period, at which point penalties accrue.
- After 20 strike days (22 rounds) the FAA will force the controllers back to work. At that time, the union must accept the FAA’s final offer. If no agreement is reached at the 22nd exchange, the union must settle at the FAA’s 22nd offer and the full strike penalty will be imposed on both parties.

SEE THE TABLE BELOW FOR STRIKE COSTS.

**FAA NEGOTIATORS MUST MINIMIZE THE SUM OF THE COST OF INCREASED WAGES AND STRIKE PENALTY.**

**UNION NEGOTIATORS MUST MAXIMIZE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BENEFITS OF INCREASE IN HOURLY WAGES FOR STRIKE COSTS.**

| Days on Strike | FAA Costs (in millions) | Union Costs (in millions) |
|----------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| 0              | $0.00                   | $0.00                     |
| 1              | $0.32                   | $0.07                     |
| 2              | $0.68                   | $0.15                     |
| 3              | $1.08                   | $0.25                     |
| 4              | $1.52                   | $0.37                     |
| 5              | $2.00                   | $0.50                     |
| 6              | $2.52                   | $0.65                     |
| 7              | $3.08                   | $0.81                     |
| 8              | $3.68                   | $0.99                     |
| 9              | $4.32                   | $1.19                     |
| 10             | $5.00                   | $1.40                     |
| 11             | $5.72                   | $1.63                     |
| 12             | $6.48                   | $1.87                     |
| 13             | $7.28                   | $2.13                     |
| 14             | $8.12                   | $2.41                     |
| 15             | $9.00                   | $2.70                     |
| 16             | $9.92                   | $3.01                     |
| 17             | $10.88                  | $3.33                     |
| 18             | $11.88                  | $3.67                     |
| 19             | $12.92                  | $4.03                     |
| 20             | $14.00                  | $4.40                     |

**COST/BENEFIT OF NEGOTIATED WAGE:**

w is the hourly rate negotiated by parties

Wage costs for FAA = (w-50) × $1 million
Wage benefits for the union = (w-50) × $0.7 million

**STRIKE COSTS:**

If negotiations go for more than 2 rounds, then strike costs apply as well.

r = (#rounds – 2)

Strike costs for FAA = ($300,000 * r) + ($20,000 * r²)
Strike costs for the union = ($60,000 * r) + ($8000 * r²)
Note: Participants exchanged bids until they reached an agreement or impasse.

Post-negotiation questions

Global self-esteem:
In the following, we ask you questions about your interaction with your counterpart.

During the negotiation:

1- Did you lose face (i.e., damage your sense of pride) in the negotiation? (1 = not at all; 4 = moderately; 7 = a great deal)
2- Did this negotiation make you feel more or less competent as a negotiator? (1 = it made me feel less competent; 4 = it did not make me feel more or less competent; 7 = it made me feel more competent)
3- Did you behave according to your own principles and values? (1 = not at all; 4 = moderately; 7 = perfectly)
4- Did this negotiation positively or negatively impact your self-image or your impression of yourself? (1 = it negatively impacted my self-image; 4 = it did not positively or negatively impact my self-image; 7 = it positively impacted my self-image)

Perceived competitiveness (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about your counterpart?

1- My counterpart treated the negotiation as a win-lose contest.
2- My counterpart did not want to compromise.
3- My counterpart tried to take advantage of me.
4- My counterpart did not want to give in to my demands.
5- My counterpart tried to get the upper hand.

Emotions (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely)

To what extent did you experience the following emotions during the negotiation?

1- Angry
2- Furious
3- Mad
4- Fearful
5- Scared
6- Afraid
7- Happy
8- Elated
9- Pleased
10- Disappointed
11- Let down
12- Anxious
13- Nervous
14- Tense
15- Contemptuous
16- Scornful
17- Disdainful

Appendix 2

Pre-negotiation questions

Face threat sensitivity (same measure as used in Study 1)
Extraversion (same measure as used in Study 1)
Neuroticism (same measure as used in Study 1)

Trait anxiety (0 = does not describe me at all; 4 = describes me very well)

The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate number on the scale.

1- I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter.
2- I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind.
3- I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests.
4- I have disturbing thoughts.
5- I feel nervous and restless.

Negotiation Task

Imagine that you have a job that you like, but you are not paid well. You feel you should be paid more given your skill set and experience... You had accepted a relatively low salary a few years ago because you needed the money and there weren’t other job opportunities... But, it is time to negotiate a salary increase since you have been working for this company for a few years and have always received positive performance evaluations.

Your current salary is $2200/month. You know that people in your field can make as much as $4000/month, depending on their qualifications. Given your skills and experience, you believe you should be paid as much as $3500/month. This means you need to negotiate a significant salary increase.
You let your supervisor know about your intentions to negotiate a raise. You know that you are a great asset to the company, you have a very strong skill set. Over the years, you have carried your responsibilities with success, so you deserve a raise. You also believe you are a good catch for other companies! So you may consider looking for other opportunities if you cannot get a raise.

Note: After reading the scenario, participants received cooperative versus competitive messages from the employer as explained in the paper (pp. 22-23). They then either made offers to the employer (on a scale of $1,500 to $4,500) or exited the negotiation.

Post-Negotiation Questions:

Global self-esteem (same measure as used in Study 1)

State social self-esteem (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree)
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
During my negotiation with the employer:

1- I was concerned about the impression I was making on the employer.
2- I was worried about what the employer thinks of me.
3- I felt displeased with myself.
4- I was worried about looking foolish.

State performance self-esteem (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree)
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
During the negotiation with the employer:

1- I felt confident about my abilities in this negotiation.
2- I felt frustrated or rattled about my performance in this negotiation.
3- I felt confident that I understood what was going on in this negotiation.
4- I felt like I was not doing well in this negotiation.

Emotions (1 = not at all; 7 = a great deal) (for exploratory purposes)
During the negotiation, to what extent did you experience the following emotions in response to the employer's responses to you?

1- Angry
2- Furious
3- Mad
4- Irritated
5- Frustrated
6- Annoyed
7- Fearful
8- Scared
9- Afraid
10- Anxious
11- Nervous
12- Tense
13- Happy
14- Elated
15- Pleased
16- Satisfied
17- Content
18- Disappointed
19- Joyful
20- Let down

Experienced power (1 = totally disagree; 7 = totally agree) (for exploratory purposes)
During the negotiation:

1- I felt that I had a strong negotiation position.
2- I felt I depended on the employer.
3- I had a better negotiation position than the employer.
4- I felt that I needed the employer to make a good deal.
5- I felt powerful in the negotiation.
6- I did not feel dependent on the employer.
7- I felt that I was in control of the situation.

Perceptions of face threat (1 = not at all; 7 = a great deal)
In this negotiation, the employer’s actions were:

1- Demoralizing
2- Insensitive
3- Disrespectful
Appendix 3

Negotiation task and measures

We used the same negotiation task used in Study 2, except that we dropped the exit option. So, participants had to make two offers to the employer. Before reading the negotiation task, participants filled out same pre-negotiation measures used in Study 2. After they filled them out, they answered the following “Negotiation Aptitude Test” questions (adapted from Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011).

Negotiation Aptitude Test

Salary negotiations often involve balance. For example, some people are too aggressive and some are too passive. Some people focus too much on relationships and some focus too much on their own interests. Though there are often no perfect answers, the Negotiation Aptitude Test (NAT) has been validated on a large US based sample. For example, NAT scores have been linked to a number of real-world outcomes such as performance in negotiating starting salaries and salary increases.

In the next section, you will answer questions from the NAT. When answering the questions, carefully think about the situations and choose the best answer.

1. Imagine you have been offered a new job. The company has offered you a salary of $70,000/year. New hires with similar experience, education, and skills are paid $75,000/year on average. If you do not take the new job, you will go back on the job market, and the unemployment rate is 10% (very high). You have no other outside options. Of the following choices, which is best?
   a. Tell the company you will only accept the job for $80,000/year.
   b. Tell the company you will only accept the job for $75,000/year.
   c. Accept the offer at $70,000/year.
   d. Reject the offer and go back on the job market.
2. Imagine that there is a new position in your company. Your current job pays $60,000/year. This new position requires you take on more responsibilities, so a salary of $75,000 would be reasonable. You are willing to accept as low as $70,000 for this position. You suspect that other employees are interested in the position. The manager does not seem to be eager to hire you. What amount would you ask for when you apply for this job?
   a. $70K.
   b. $75K.
   c. $72K.
   d. Ask the manager to make the first salary offer.
3. Imagine you have been offered a new job. The company has offered you a salary of $80,000/year. New hires with similar experience, background, education, and skills are paid $87,000/year on average. If you do not take the new job, you will go back on the job market, and the unemployment rate is 1% (very low). You have no other outside options. Of the following choices, which is best?
   a. Tell the company you will only accept the job for $90,000/year.
   b. Tell the company you will only accept the job for $87,000/year.
   c. Accept the offer at $80,000/year.
   d. Reject the offer and go back on the job market.
4. Imagine you have been working for a company for a few years. The company has offered you a 2% salary increase this year. Employees with similar qualifications and performance generally get a 5% salary increase on average in other companies. You are unlikely to have outside options if you looked for a job. Of the following choices, which is the best for you?
   a. Accept the offer at 2%.
   b. Reject the offer and go back on the job market.
   c. Tell the company you will only accept a 5% salary increase.
   d. Tell the company you will only accept an 8% salary increase.
5. Imagine that there is a new position in your company. Your current job pays $65,000/year. This new position requires you take on more responsibilities, so a salary of $80,000 would be reasonable. You are willing to accept as low as $78,000 for this position. You do not think other employees are interested in the position. The manager seems to be eager to hire you. What amount would you ask for when you apply for this job?
   a. $78K.
   b. $80K.
   c. $79K.
Appendix A. Supplementary material

Supplementary material to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2020.07.004.

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