Rejoice in the victory of the king. 
The end of the Catalan revolt in the Neapolitan political debate (1652-1653)

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Abstract

The news of the surrender of Barcelona and the subsequent end of the war in Catalonia reached Naples in a unique political and social context. The viceroy at the time, the Count of Oñate, energetically approached the task of restoring normality in a kingdom that was disrupted by the revolt from 1647-1648, and in doing so he found himself in conflict with various figures, in particular the Cardinal and Archbishop of Naples, Ascanio Filomarino. On the other hand, the connections between the kingdom and Catalonia had been assiduous in the previous years, and a unique personality like Alexandre Ros i Gomar, Catalan but sided with the loyalists, had lived in Naples. This paper proposes an analysis of how the news of the end of the siege of Barcelona had political repercussions on the Neapolitan political scene, on the conflict in course between viceroy and archbishop and more generally, on the debate surrounding the responsibility of the revolt of 1647-1648, destined to last in the years that followed.

Keywords: Kingdom of Naples; Barcelona; Alexandre Ros i Gomar; Ascanio Filomarino; Count of Oñate; Revolt

Resum. Alegrar-se per la victòria del rei. La fi de la revolta catalana en el debat polític napoli-
tà (1652-1653)

La notícia de la rendició de Barcelona i la conseguent fi de la guerra a Catalunya va arribar a Nàpols en un context polític i social únic. El virrei aleshores, el comte d’Oñate, es dedicà enèrgicament a restaurar la normalitat en un regne encara pertorbat per la revolta des de 1647-1648 i, en fer-ho, es va trobar en conflicte amb diverses figures, en particular amb el cardenal i arquebisbe de Nàpols, Ascanio Filomarino. D’altra banda, les connexions entre el regne i Catalunya havien estat assidues els anys anteriors i una personalitat única com Alexandre Ros i Gomar, català però del costat filipista, havia viscut a Nàpols. Aquest article proposa una anàlisi de com les notícies de la fi del setge de Barcelona van tenir repercussions polítiques a l’escena política napolitana, en el conflicte en curs entre el virrei i l’arquebisbe i, en general, en el debat sobre la responsabilitat de la revolta de 1647-1648, destinat a durar en els següents anys.

Paraules clau: Regne de Nàpols; Barcelona; Alexandre Ros i Gomar; Ascanio Filomarino; comte d’Oñate; revolta

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**Resumen.** Alegarse por la victoria del rey. El final de la revuelta catalana en el debate político napolitano (1652-1653)

La noticia de la rendición de Barcelona y el consiguiente fin de la guerra en Cataluña llegó a Nápoles en un contexto político y social único. El virrey en ese momento, el Conde de Oñate, se consagró enérgicamente a restaurar la normalidad en un reino todavía perturbado por la revuelta desde 1647-1648 y, al hacerlo, se halló en conflicto con varias figuras, en particular con el cardenal y arzobispo de Nápoles, Ascanio Filomarino. Por otro lado, las conexiones entre el reino y Cataluña habían sido asiduas en los años anteriores y una personalidad única como Alexandre Ros i Gomar, catalán pero del lado filipista, había vivido en Nápoles. Este artículo propone un análisis de cómo las noticias del fin del asedio de Barcelona tuvieron repercusiones políticas en la escena política napolitana, en el conflicto en curso entre el virrey y el arzobispo y, en general, en el debate sobre la responsabilidad de la revuelta de 1647-1648, destinado a durar en los años que siguieron.

**Palabras clave:** Reino de Nápoles; Barcelona; Alexandre Ros i Gomar; Ascanio Filomarino; Conde de Oñate; revuelta

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When the news of the end of the siege of Barcelona, in October 1652, reached the kingdom and the city of Naples, it was going through a period of bitter political conflict and heightened tension. Even though four years had passed since the conclusion of the revolt of 1647-1648, the debate around it was still alive. Furthermore, numerous unanswered questions, relative to the government of the kingdom and the contrast between political power and ecclesiastical authority, fueled a burning context that was dominated by the charismatic viceroy of the time, the Count of Oñate, and the growing support for his opposition. The aim of this paper is to show how the news of the surrender of Barcelona and the reaction of the city to that news should be looked at within a specific political context at the time, in which a role in the frontline was carried out by the Cardinal and Archbishop of Naples, Ascanio Filomarino.

**Naples after the revolt of 1647-1648**

The surrender of the rebels and the Spanish reconquest of the city, on April 6, 1648, signaled the beginning of a new governing phase of the kingdom. Soon left
alone in Naples after the departure of don Juan de Austria — destined to the vice-regency of Sicily —, the Count of Oñate had decisively and securely guided the complicated post-revolt period (Galasso, 1982, 2006; Minguito Palomares, 2011). With regards to heads of the revolt he used an iron fist, as evidenced by the arrest on June 12 and the subsequent execution on June 22 of Gennaro Annese, the Generalissimo of the people who had represented the most extreme, anti-Spanish and pro-French wing of the rebels and that had abandoned the Torrione del Carmine, on April 6, only after having been guaranteed a general pardon by the king of Spain for all the rebels. Headless of the promised made, and notwithstanding the general pardons of April 8, 11 and 20, in the months that followed the viceroy had hundreds of people arrested and, in some cases, executed. A large part of their power and influence was lost by important aristocrats like the Duke of Maddaloni and the Count of Conversano (Russo, 1976; Spagnoletti, Patisso, 1999; Martino, 2012; Mrozek Eliszezynski, 2017a). In general, the eye of the storm was reserved for the part of the aristocracy accused of holding onto the hope of a French intervention if not of openly plotting and conspiring to overthrow the Spanish government. If some of the leaders of the revolt managed to escape, dying in exile, and often in poverty, above all in Rome, as in the case of Camillo Tutini and Francesco Campanile, they were put on trial and condemned to prison or executed in public squares a notable number of people, amongst whom were also the people who had taken part in the sending of the Prince Thomas of Savoy (Carignani, 1881). At the same period, another famous trial was that of the Prince of Montesarchio Andrea d’Avalos, a point of reference for a plot eager to proclaim the independence of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily from Spain and willing to entrust their rule to don Juan de Austria (Schipa, 1918, 1919, 1920). Instead the Duke of Guise, the French noble who had unsuccessfully tried to establish himself as sole and undisputed leader of the revolt starting from November 1647, was captured after trying to escape and was kept in luxurious captivity in Capua and then Gaeta, before being invited to Spain (Volpicella, 1876; D’Alessio, 2015).

As well as the post-revolt repression, Oñate had to nevertheless deal with the problems in a kingdom and a capital which had suffered from nine months of armed conflict and an economic crisis that had already affected the population for some decades. The combined necessity of reconstructing the city, taking down fortifications and trenches, as well as giving relief to a kingdom that had become depopulated and impoverished, thus avoiding the application of new taxes or re-establishing those in place before the revolt, clashed with the reality of an uncertain international political scene. The peace of Westphalia, had in fact brought an end to the Thirty Years War, but not to the lavish conflict between Spain and France, and in fact the kingdom of Naples remained a fundamental source of troops and money to be sent to the battlefields of Europe. Furthermore, as it had been foreseen, the avant-garde of the French fleet arrived in the gulf of Naples on June 4 1648, followed by the rest of the fleet on August 4, under the command of the Prince Thomas of Savoy. The secondary importance given to the kingdom of Naples by Mazzarino was indirectly confirmed by the ease with which the Span-
ish reaction was able to get the better of the French ships and troops, forced to retreat on August 14. Another source of glory for the viceroy, albeit more difficult, was instead the reconquering of Portolongone (1650), stronghold of the Tyrrhenian Sea and fundamentally important strategically, which had fallen under French control some years earlier. Once again, notwithstanding the fact that the command of the fleet was entrusted to don Juan de Austria, Oñate was able to carve out his merits, without obscuring the prestige of the son of the king. The request proposed by the viceroy which was accepted, for his return to Naples, the triumphant welcome met with a straight refusal, by a large slice of the nobility, the reason behind this refusal was probably down to the desire that the celebration of military success in Tuscany was not transformed into a celebration of the «victory» of Oñate against the revolt of two years earlier. The subsequent lack of a triumphant welcome, which the same viceroy decided against so as not to further fuel talk of his excessive ambition to Madrid, reveals a lot about the opposition that the action of the government of the Count generated in those years. On February 11, 1649, on the occasion of the official ceremony of the inauguration of the viceroy, a large section of the nobility had abandoned the customary «parade», not just because they were on trial, in exile or, in many cases, as an explicit protest against the actions of Oñate (Galasso, 1982: 3-26).

In fact, the viceroy energetically faced the many problems troubling the kingdom, caught up with a complicated reconstruction, a social situation as well as public order that was difficult to control: he was able to definitively quash the revolt in the province, and to advance a policy of urban renewal and cultural renaissance (Minguito Palomares, 2001), bring the plebs of Naples under control, facing the age-old problem of the provision of supplies, and in general pursuing a tiring return to normality with the financial and administrative running of the kingdom. However in doing this Oñate did not hesitate to pressure many aristocrats that were accused with siding with the rebels and with the French; he decided to confirm the «favours» (grazie) of April 11 that he conceded to the people regarding the suppression of the tallage and other fiscal rights, provoking a predictable protest from the nobility and those who lost their source of income that was derived from the collection of the taxes; overall, Oñate followed up on the agreement that allowed the return of the Spanish to the kingdom, guaranteeing the political and institutional ascent of the class of the jurists — the so-called «togati» (Rovito, 1981, 1986, 2003) — and at the same time choosing as representatives of the people, men who were loyal to him, above all, Giuseppe Volturnale. His rule brought about a strong opposition on behalf of the aristocracy, as was proven by the sending of an ambassador to Madrid, which in the short term did not have any effect. More in general the Neapolitan urban patriciate closed its ranks even more so to impede access to other families, completely abandoning the commercial and speculative activity in order to concentrate on their own land holdings and agricultural production. Alongside the many nobles who were punished, or experienced a period of serious financial hardship, there was however also a part of the aristocracy that enjoyed, under the rule of Oñate a position of privilege: this was the case for those people who showed their loyalty to Spain
Rejoice in the victory of the king, like the Duke of Monteleone and the Marquis of Fuscaldo, sent by the viceroy to Calabria to restore order, and like above all, Giovanni Tommaso Blanco, the Marquis of Oliveto, and Achille Minutolo, the Duke of Sasso, who became the most trusted advisors to Oñate (Sodano, 2018).

There was someone who did not have an easy relationship with Oñate, and that was the Cardinal and Archbishop of Naples Ascanio Filomarino. The prelate was one of the main protagonists of the years leading up to the revolt (1641-1647), a true symbol of the jurisdictional conflict that marked Italy during the 17th century. Filomarino did not just limit himself to the defense of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and not even to fulfill his pastoral obligations linked to his role, family demands and personal objectives were constantly intertwined with his public actions. Some of the more famous episodes told by the chroniclers at the time and historians of the periods that followed, saw him opposing the viceroy of the time, above all to the Duke of Medina de las Torres who represented more than anyone else, together with his predecessor the Count of Monterrey, the politics of Olivares in Naples. More in general, the Cardinal and his family were part of that varied front, made up of aristocrats, togati, intellectuals and populists that initiated various episodes of protest, if not open insubordination towards the Spanish rule and harbored a certain sympathy for the French enemy (De Blasiis, 1880, 1881; Musi, 2014; Mrozek Eliszezynski, 2017a).

During the revolt, the behavior of Filomarino raised more than a few suspicions. Near Masaniello and the moderate line that governed the initial phase of the revolt, the prelate assumed a more prudent behavior when the command of the rebel front fell into the hands of coarse populists and republican tendencies (Gennaro Annese) and French adventurers who reached Naples to lay claim to ancient family land holdings (the Duke of Guise). His identification as a «Barberinian creature», and consequently pro-French, the link with Masaniello and Giulio Genoino, the clashes with the viceroy of the previous years and with part of the Neapolitan aristocracy and a series of episodes recorded in the chronicles of the revolt, made him of the most suspicious figures in the eyes of Madrid and its representatives. Notwithstanding the good relationship enjoyed with don Juan de Austria, who arrived in Naples at the beginning of October 1647 at the command of an imposing fleet, and despite that his family members had a decisive role in the surrender of the city to the Spanish, on April 6, 1648, Filomarino was immediately identified as a leader of the rebels by the Count of Oñate, who arrived in March 1648 to take the place of the Duke of Arcos as viceroy.

The personal and political animosity between the archbishop and the viceroy constituted one of the most notable and characteristic points of 17th Century Naples. The scarlet hat and the protection from Rome impeded Oñate from punishing Filomarino as well, with whom the conflict exacerbated over the years around a series of issues: new episodes of jurisdictional conflicts, personal clashes with individuals (as was the case with the reggente Ettore Capecelatro) and with important institutions (the lengthy dispute with the Santa Chiara monastery for example), a controversy that arose from some debated edicts originating from the archbishop, numerous disputes that arose during religious
ceremonies (as was the case for the procession of the relic of San Gennaro in May 1652) as well as civil ones (Mrozek Eliszezynski, 2017a: 180-189). Regarding the latter ones, it is worth remembering how, before the arrival of Filomarino, it was customary for the viceroy and archbishop of Naples to meet on numerous occasions throughout the year, and not just when it was dictated by protocol, but also for informal occasions, such as parties, balls, comedies or boat trips. With Filomarino the occasions for meeting up were reduced to a bare minimum, as was the case for the grand party organized on July 3, 1649, to celebrate the arrival in Milan of Mariana of Austria, the young archduchess that was destined to be wed to Phillip IV of Spain. Another meeting, that was not foreseen by protocol, took place on the eve of Oñate’s departure for Tuscany, where he would conclude the reconquest of the State of the Presidi: May 3, 1650, the viceroy put all his powers and authority on display, which were at their heights at that time, for the archbishop who was seated astern of the lavishly decorated viceregal gondola and showed him the entire Neapolitan fleet. Nevertheless apart from this and another few occasions the meetings between Filomarino and Oñate were limited to the visits that were foreseen by protocol on occasion of religious and civil festivities, during which there were no lack of occasions, for both, to show off pomp and grandeur with lengthy processions of carriages and cortège in a ceremonial competition that was to continue under the subsequent viceroy (Novi Chavarria, 2013). The recurrence of significant dates as well as the equally important celebration of dates of military events and victories constituted moments of great political and symbolical importance, and once again the behavior of Filomarino was not appreciated by the Spanish authorities. In fact there were numerous complaints caused by the reluctance of the archbishop to celebrate, every April 6, the festivity that Oñate had institutionalized to remember the end of the revolt; the same reluctance arose on July 12, 1651, on the occasion of the birth of the king’s daughter, the infanta Margarita and, even more so for the victory of the Spanish troops at Portolongone (1650) and the reconquest of Barcelona (1652).

The news of the surrender of Barcelona arrived nevertheless at a time when tensions between Oñate and Filomarino had reached their boiling point, and when the strongest elements were raising their protests that they would have carried out the following year when the viceroy was substituted and recalled to Spain. Strengthened by his personal triumph achieved by the reconquest of the stronghold of Portolongone on the Tyrrhenian Sea, Oñate had already began exercising significant pressure in order to obtain the removal of the Cardinal from Naples, not just by bothering the Spanish ambassador to Rome (Cardinal Trivulzio), but also addressing on numerous occasions incessantly to Phillip IV, to the valido don Luis de Haro and to the Councils of State and Italy. The prelate, as far as he was concerned, did not only take advantage of the support of the papal nuncio in Madrid and Naples and of the Pope, Innocent X, but he also began a counterattack, producing a series of texts and final drafts that when combined with those originating from Oñate and his inner circle, gave life to what could be defined as an authentic «war of writings» (Mrozek Eliszezynski, 2017b).
The connections between Barcelona and Naples during the guerra dels Segadors

The developments during the course of the war in Catalonia almost immediately reached Naples and the Italian subjects of the king of Spain. Extremely vivid publications and historiography made the causes of the initial stages of the conflict in course well known: consider Historia de los movimientos y separación de Cataluña by Francisco de Melo, published in 1645, or even more so the works of the Genoese Luca Assarino, also edited in 1645, entitled Delle rivoluzione di Catalogna. The author, who was also an informant for the Spanish, presented a version of the facts that was quite hostile towards the rebels, especially creating a somber image of the personality of Pau Claris (Villari, 1987: 60-61; Comparato, 1998).

A more complete picture of the conflict arose over the following years and often in terms of comparison with respect to other revolutions of those turbulent years, the Forties (Gualdo Priorato, 1651; Bisaccioni, 1653; Birago Avogadro, 1654), but more immediate and direct sources of news came from all those groups of Neapolitans, both aristocrats and non, who were involved in the guerra dels Segadors often on the front line and naturally enough on the side of the Hapsburgs. From autumn 1640 fighting under the command of the Marquis of Los Vélez were the maestre de campo general Carlo Andrea Caracciolo, Duke of Torrecuso, as well as the teniente general de caballería Carlo Maria Caracciolo, Duke of San Giorgio and son of the former (Florensa i Soler, Güell, 2005: 132, 137, 141-145); originating from the kingdom of Naples was also the viceroy of Aragon, and already viceroy of Navarra, Francesco Maria Carafa, Duke of Nocera, arrested after the defeat at Valls and died in prison in 1642 (Croce, 1937; Solano Camón, 1984; Florensa i Soler, Güell, 2005: 164-165); he originated from one of the most prestigious families of Rome but lived in Naples (together with his consort, Margherita Branciforte y Austia, granddaughter of the first don Juan de Austria) Federico Colonna, fifth Duke of Tagliacozzo, appointed initially as viceroy to Valencia in 1640 and then the following year as viceroy to Catalonia; under the orders of Colonna, in particular in the victorious defense of the square of Tarragona, was fought by a number of soldiers from Naples, as well as the tercios de infantería under the command of Luigi Poderico and Luigi de Ruggiero, as well as the cavalry entrusted to Ferrante delli Monti (Gualdo Priorato, 1674). Finally, when remembering the group of soldiers that came from the kingdom of Naples and distinguished themselves in the Catalan conflict we cannot forget Vincenzo Della Marra, general de la caballería de Aragón (Filamondo, 1694: II, 620-630); Leonardo Moles, whose tercio destroyed the church of Riudarenes and, for this reason, he was later excommunicated; the maestre de campo Gerominio Tuttavilla (Elliott, 1963; Zudaire Huarte, 1964; Simon i Tarrés, 2019); Francesco Toraldo, Prince of Massa. The latter, in particular, held a prominent position in the discussion examined in this paper: military governor of the square of Tarragona, ready to rescue Perpignan at the end of 1641 and finally imprisoned by the French, Toraldo gained a prestigious military reputation in Catalonia that was
also recognized in Naples, and even by the rebels who named him *Generalissimo del Popolo*, the same title that had already been bestowed on Masaniello. His good fortune however did not last very long, since Gennaro Annese decided on his arrest and beheading on October 21 as he had remained the only obstacle to his definitive ascent to the command of the rebels as the new *Generalissimo* (Crasso, 1683: 227-230).

Apart from the military, the direct connection between Naples and Catalonia during those turbulent years was guaranteed by other figures. In particular the Franciscan Giovan Battista Visco, who was elected bishop of Tortosa in June 1640, was physically present in Barcelona during the days of the uprising of the *Corpus de Sang*, the initial act of the *guerra dels Segadors*. He arrived at Tortosa in September of the same year, within the «fidelíssima y exemplar» city that had just been restored to the loyalist cause and pardoned by Phillip IV, and he played a key role in the front line: controlling the internal divisions among the élites of Tortosa, cultivating the relationships with the Neapolitan nobility present in the army of the king, as well as insisting greatly on the «militant» character to be impressed on the cult of Immaculate Conception as an emblem of the Spanish monarchy (Mauro, 2019).

If there were numerous Neapolitans present in Catalonia, there were also no shortage of Catalans in Naples. Amongst these, recognition must surely go to the leading role occupied by the preacher, writer and dean of the Tortosa Chapter Alexandre Ros i Gomar (Simon i Tarrés, 2016). After having left the Society of Jesus in 1638, he was established the following year at Rome, in the court of Pope Urban VIII and, especially, in the close circle surrounding his Cardinal-nephew Francesco Barberini. His loyalty to the Hapsburg Crown and the subsequent condemnation of the French intervention in favour of the Catalans pushed him away from the pro-French court of Urban VIII, offering his services to Manuel de Moura, the Marquis of Castel Rodrigo and Spanish ambassador to Rome: during the two-year period from 1640-1642 he wrote a series of texts that attracted the animosity of both the French and the Catalans, in particular *La estrecha amistad que profesamos*, that invited the Catalans to not separate from Spanish rule and it was the first writings by a Catalan *filipista* in the war of writings that was sparked by the revolt of 1640. Probably for his personal safety he decided to move to Naples in 1642, serving the Princess of Stigliano Anna Carafa and her husband the Duke of Medina de las Torres. In the same year of 1642, during what was to be the final and most debated convening in the history of the Neapolitan parliament, the war in Catalonia was also discussed in Naples, enumerated amongst the numerous reasons behind Phillip IV asking his subjects for a further economic sacrifice by way of the approval of an extraordinary tax on donations that was without precedent, of 11 million ducats (Carignani, 1883; Mrozek Eliszezynski, 2019a).

During the six years that he spent in the viceregal capital, Ros demonstrated an undoubted political ability, even maintaining a privileged position when Medina was replaced by the *antiolivarista* Almirante de Castilla (once again serving the vicereine, the granddaughter of the Duke of Lerma, Luisa Gómez de Sandov-
al y Rojas), but above all he finished his most celebrated work. In fact, in 1646 Cataluña desengañada was published, a text that was structured in three discussions in which he tried to demonstrate how the Catalan revolt against Spain with the support of the French was not only difficult to win and justify, but how it was also not very convenient for the Catalans themselves (Ros i Gomar, 1646). The writing became particularly significant because in the following year, 1647 it was translated into Italian. The circulation of Catalogna disingannata probably had the aim of casting a doubt over the graciousness of the French option in the eyes of the part of the Neapolitan nobility that had looked kindly on the Cristianissimo king, but at the same time it could have inspired, albeit indirectly, the actions of those who, beginning on July 7 started the so-called Masaniello revolt (Ros i Gomar, 1647). Ros was a firsthand witness to this revolt, initially by the side of the viceroy the Duke of Arcos and then, from October, of don Juan de Austria. His bond with the son of Phillip IV remained strong even over the years that followed, after the return of Ros to Spain (in December 1648), but his bond with Naples was just as strong: in Memorial al rey en nombre de la nobleza napoletana, written under the patronage of don Juan de Austria but certainly well appreciated by the new viceroy the Count of Oñate, he argued that the best solution to maintain peace in the kingdom of Naples was to reward the nobility of the kingdom that had remained loyal to Spanish rule, thusly keeping away the advances of French monarchy, as well as the Popolo and the emerging togati (Ros i Gomar, 1649). He also authored a Discurso sobre la forma de reducir a la obediencia de su Majestad a Barcelona y Cataluña. Ros, due to ill health was unable to take part in the siege of Barcelona, but at the beginning of October 1652 he was ready to celebrate the enormous success of his patron don Juan de Austria, and to play a role at the center of numerous religious and civil ceremonies. In particular, he was given the honor of preaching the sermon of the Immaculate Conception on December 8, 1652 in the cathedral of Barcelona, before the same don Juan de Austria, the viceroy Mortara and the Catalan institutions. Published a short time later (Ros i Gomar, 1653), Ros’ sermon depicted Phillip IV as a Christian prince, loving and caring, who in order to find his lost sheep, that was Catalonia, had sent his own son, don Juan de Austria, in the same way that God sent Christ to save humanity. In such a context of great uncertainty, when the war was over, but on behalf of Madrid, there was a lack of faith in the Catalan elites and their future behavior, the celebration of some and the recrimination of others were closely intertwined. At the same time in Naples, the news of the surrender of Barcelona sparked contrasting reactions there as well: the joy, at least apparent, of many but also the frostiness of some.

The consequences of the news of the surrender of Barcelona in the Filomarino-Oñate conflict

The surrender of Barcelona and the subsequent end of the conflict in Catalo-
nia became a major event in Naples in the space of a few weeks (Simon i Tarrés, 2007). Already by November 12, the papal nuncio Alessandro Sperelli reported
to Rome that the news had become common knowledge, and that the viceroy Oñate was already being congratulated in private for the success of the Spanish armies, but the beginning of the official celebrations had not yet been given the go ahead, while waiting on a direct communication from don Juan de Austria (AAV, Segreteria di Stato, Napoli, 48, ff. 335r-336r). According to what was written in the *Diari dei cerimonieri* (Strazzullo, 1961), the news was only made public and celebrated on November 18, as was tradition, by the canons of the castle and the ringing of the bells (ASDN, Diari dei cerimonieri, 4, f. 51r). Preparations got underway immediately for the stately parade that would have celebrated the victory: it was an official occasion that required the presence of a *sindaco* (mayor) that represented the capital, and that on this particular occasion was Donato Coppola, knight of the *Seggio* of Montagna and Duke of Canzano, an individual who was closely liked to the viceroy (AAV, Segreteria di Stato, Napoli, 48, f. 366r). The preparations for the making of carriages, livery, clothes and decorations were accelerated by the fervent will of Oñate who wanted to celebrate the victory, beginning with a series of events organized for the month of December 1652. There were fireworks and light displays for nine consecutive days (AAV, Segreteria di Stato, Napoli, 48, f. 376r), the stately parade was conducted by the viceroy to the church of Santa Maria del Carmine on December 21 (AAV, Segreteria di Stato, Napoli, 48, f. 397r-v; ASDN, Diari dei Cerimonieri, 4, f. 54v), followed by a grand feast at the palace (AAV, Segreteria di Stato, Napoli, 48, f. 404r): these were the main stages of the celebrations drawn up by the Spanish authorities in Naples to celebrate which were soon to be told in detail by numerous anonymous accounts. Among these we can find *Relación de lo sucedido en el sitio de Barzelona desde los 4 de septiembre, hasta los 13 de octubre, que se rindió la plaça*, which was published in Naples in the weeks immediately after the occasion by the royal printer Egidio Longo (a copy was sent to Rome to the papal nuncio Sperelli; AAV, Segreteria di Stato, Napoli, 48, ff. 351r-354v), proposing not just a concise narration of the final days of the siege of Barcelona, but above all the elation of the value and ability of don Juan de Austria and the Marquis of Mortara, as well as the predisposition of Philip IV and his men to welcome back with open arms and pardon the subjects who, after the rebellion, showed remorse and were ready to once again swear loyalty to the king. In December 1652 Oñate wanted to present in the royal palace *La Veremonda*, an opera with a strong symbolic content, in which the Catalan rebels were explicitly compared to the Turkish infidels (Bianconi, Walker, 1975: 390; Palos, 2005: 131).

1. The Court of San Lorenzo (so called because it met in the convent of San Lorenzo) was the organ that exercised the city government in the Spanish Naples. In it there were five groups, called *Seggi, Sedili or Piazze*, in which the urban patriciate was divided, namely Capuana, Nido, Montagna, Porto and Portanova. A sixth component was later added, namely the *Seggio del Popolo*, which represented the rest of the inhabitants of the capital. On official occasions, for civil or religious ceremonies, the *Seggi* elected a *sindaco* (mayor) in charge of representing the city: he was a member, in rotation, of one of the six *Seggi*. 
In this scene of festivities and celebrations there was one signification absence that did not go unobserved. The nonappearance of the archbishop at the festivities for the surrender of Barcelona and the subsequent end to a long and complicated conflict constituted another episode within a conflict that had already been alluded to between Filomarino and the viceroy. An episode that, not by chance, was almost totally ignored in the works that in those same years celebrated Oñate and his political and military undertaking: both Innocenzo Fuidoro in his *Successi del governo del conte d’Oñatte*, and Giovan Battista Piacente (*Governo dell’Ecc.mo Sig.r Conte d’Oñatte Viceré del Regno di Napoli*, in BSNSP, XXVI.A.1) as well as Francesco Tartaglia (*Diario per il Governo del Conte d’Oñatte, Viceré del Regno di Napoli*, in BSNSP, XXII.A.13) in their respective writings, ignored this and many other causes for the clashes between viceroy and archbishop, certainly so as not to overshadow the merits of the Castilian aristocrat. Instead the episode is dealt with in detail, and from a viewpoint in clear favour of Filomarino, in the *Difesa per il s.r Car- din.le Filamarino alle doglienze del s.r conte d’Ognatte V.Re di Napoli per occas.e della conquista di Barcellona*, a text that remains handwritten and currently preserved in the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana (BAV, Chigiano, N. III.74, ff. 74r-80v).

The anonymous author begins his reasoning by explaining how in reality it was the viceroy who was in the wrong, with respect to the archbishop for not having returned, as etiquette would dictate, a visit dating back to some time before by the prelate. In fact the latter had always honored Oñate for his military success as well as for the events that saw the royal family in a prominent role or even the viceroy himself, who for his part was not so blameless.\(^2\) Oñate then accused the archbishop of not having visited him to offer his congratulations (*enhorabuena*) for the happy result of the battle of Barcelona, and for not having rung the bells of the archbishop’s church or even have lit fires or light displays in his palace.\(^3\) However the reply of Filomarino was clear and directed precise accusations against the viceroy and his bad faith, beginning with the unusual decision

\(^2\) BAV, Chigiano, N.III.74, *Difesa per il s.r Card.in.le Filamarino*, ff. 75v-76v: «Il sig.r Card.le per occasione di qualunque successo ha compiuto sempre qua col s.r Conte d’Ognatte, e detto sig.re ha corrisposto a S.Em.a. Per le Nozze di S.M.tà fu subito S.Em.a a rallegrarsene; il s.r V.Re gli restituì la visita. Nel ritorno da Portolongone fu parimente a complire con S.Ecc.za, et questa lo rivisitò. Per la morte del s.r Beltrano suo fratello il sig.r Card.le andò a dargli il pesame, et n’hebbe la restitut.ne della visita. Nella Nascita dell’Infantina fu a rallegrarsene; Ma il s.r V.Re non gli restituì questa visita. Venuto appresso il Natale il s.r V.Re complì per le buone feste al s.r Card.le, e questi con puntualità gli restituì il complimento, et nello stesso tempo tanto il Coppiere, quanto il Cavallerizzo di d.a Em.a significarono a D. Baldassarre M.ro di cerimonie del s.r V.Re, che S.Em.a è puntuale, et che allo stesso modo dovea essere seco l’Ecc.za sua, insinuandogli, che fin all’hora non gl’havea restituita la visita già fattagli per la Nascita dell’Infantina. Col debito di questa visita non mai sodisfatto dal s.r V.Re, e il s.r Card.le n’è rimasto sempre suo creditore. Di più S.Em.a alcuni mesi doppo sendo assalita dal suo male di sciatica, che lo tenne in letto lo spatio di due mesi, e tredici giorni, il s.r V.Re in tutto questo tempo non lo visitò mai».

\(^3\) Ivi, f. 76v.
to end the parade and sing *Te Deum Laudamus* not in the cathedral as was tradition, but rather in the church of Carmine: a gesture that was so strange that it could only be considered to have been done on purpose to impede or make it difficult for Filomarino to participate. The lack of a return visit for one received in the past made one further think that the viceroy was not happy to exchange compliments and congratulations with the Cardinal Archbishop, even considering the aversion that he seemed to have developed towards all the cardinals. The presumed resentment of Oñate was down to the scarlet hat that was never granted to him despite his continued insistence during his mandate as ambassador to Rome, which was also confirmed by sources close to the same Spanish aristocrat, namely Fuidoro (1932) and Piacente (*La presa di Portolongone di Gio. Batta Piacente. Libro settimo che segue ai precedenti*, in BSNSP, XXVI.A.1, 62-63). That resentment was on the other hand clearly shown, according to the author, on occasion of the visit of Cardinal Montalto to Naples, when Oñate was the only one who did not pay the required visit to the prelate. Beyond the resentment of the viceroy towards the cardinals, the author underlines that there were no existing precedents, in the history of the Neapolitan capital, that would have justified the use of fires and light displays for a similar event, not even in recent times, for the reconquest of Portolongone, for the birth of the king’s daughter or for the end of the Neapolitan revolt of 1648, when not even the same Oñate or don Juan de Austria complained about it. The bad faith of the viceroy was proven, according to the author, by the delay in which the news of the surrender of Barcelona was com-

4. *Ivi*, ff. 76v-77r: «Alla prima doglienza si risponde, ch’il solito d’andare S.Em.a a fare col s.r V.Re il complimento per occasioni simili, è all’hora quando, dopo d’essersi cantato il Te Deum nella sua Cathedrale, le feste dell’allegrezza si sono fatte publiche. Come dunque S.Em.a poteva andarvi prima per questa ragione? Et come doppo? Mentre il s.r V.Re contro l’inveterato, e consueto stile di quelle funzioni, che si fanno con sindico come questa, non è stato a cantare il Te Deum nella Cathedrale, ma in quella di Nostra Sig.ra del Carmine».

5. *Ivi*, f. 77r-v: «[…] mentre non vuole restituire la Visita, che deve, et rendere la pariglia al s.r Card.le di visitarlo ne’ suoi accidenti, come è stato nell’infermità da S.Em.a patita, et detta di sopra, di due mesi, et giorni tredici. Da questi termini, che da certo tempo in qua il s.r V.Re col s.r Card.le, si può argomentare, che S.Ecc.za non habbia gusto, che S.Emin.za vada a sua Casa a fare simili complimenti seco; et pare anco, come da molti si discorre, che egli habbia scemata la grande openione, che dimostrava havere nel principio, che venne dalla Corte Romana qua, della Porpora, et de Porporati; ancorché dalla prattica, et dall’attioni di S.Em.a dovesse più tosto accrescerla; Quella Porpora, della quale anche li Regi si pregiano, et honorano di vederne vestiti, et hornati i soggetti del loro sangue».

6. *Ivi*, f. 78r-v: «Le dimostrationi de fuochi, et luminari al Palazzo Arcivesc.le non si sono fatti, perché né dagli altri Arcivescovi, come li M.ri di Cerimonie di S.Em.a attestano, s’è già mai costumato per quals.a occasione publica, né S.Em.a medes.a coll’esempio de suoi predecessori l’ha mai fatti, come non li fece né per le Nozze di S.M.tà, né per la Nascita dell’Infantina, né tanpoco per la ricuperatione di Longone, né per la riduttione di questa Città, dove le allegrezze furono eccessive, et pareva, che il s.r Card.le per questa occas.ne si fosse possuto dispensare di farle essendovi egli stato cooperatore, et alla presenza del s.r V.Re, et del s.r D. Giovanni d’Austria col quale passò sempre ottima corrispondenza, et pure dal non haverli fatti, né S.Alt.za né il s.r V.Re se ne dolsero allhora, come se ne duole adesso S.Ecc.za». 
Municated to the archbishop with the deliberate aim of putting him in a difficult situation and not allowing him to celebrate the grand victory of the king’s army as he would have liked to. On the other hand Filomarino, the author would like to clarify, did send his congratulations, in writing, to Phillip IV, don Luis de Haro, don Juan de Austria, Cardinal Trivulzio Spanish ambassador to Rome as well as the Duke of Infantado viceroy of Sicily. Therefore there can be no doubting the sincere happiness of the Cardinal for the Hapsburg victory in Catalonia, the Cardinal was even too distinguished, according to the author, in ignoring the shortcomings of the viceroy and by not considering all the reasons that could have led him to legitimately complain about Oñate. Carrying out a visit in person to the viceroy on this occasion would have meant, given the previous events, diminishing the authority of the Cardinal vestments.

7. Ivi, ff. 78v-79v: «Che non si siano sonate le Campane della Chiesa Arciv.le quando si pubblicò per la Città l’avviso di tal successo ch’è la terza doglienza del s.r V.Re, non fu colpa del s.r Card.le, perché l’avviso pervenne a S.Em.a la mattina del lunedì a 18 del mese di Novembre passato. Egli ne mandò a dare subito parte al Nunzio Apostolico, et al s.r Card.le, che per ogni termine di convenienza, e rispetto, non essendo in questa Città Personaggio magg.re, né di più dignità di lui, doveva essere il primo; lo fe’ sapere ad un’hora quasi di notte per mezzo d’un suo Gentilhuomo; S.Em.a all’istessa hora inviò parimente altro suo Gentil’huomo a render il complimento a S.Ecc.za. Questa tardanza d’avviso dispiacque grandemente al s.r Card.le solo perché sel’havesse havuto il giorno, havrebbe dato gl’ord.i alli sagristani, che si fossero suonate (conforme il solito) le campane della sua Chiesa a gloria, al segno delle quali rispondono col suono tutte l’altra della Città, che pur suonarono il giorno; ma fu confusione e disordine notato da tutti, non però si deve attribuire al s.r Card.le per mancam.to et per rimonestranza del poco gusto intrinseco della Vittoria, mentre il tardo avviso datogli da S.Ecc.za n’è stata, come s’è detto, la caggione, né senza questo precedente avviso, dal quale dipendeva la sua certezza, poteva da sé farle suonare; né per questo dunque né per non haver fatto accender i lumi e fuochi al suo Palazzo Arcivesc.le, né per non esser stato alla Visita del s.r V.Re si può dire, che il s.r Card.le non habbia sentita allegrezza della Vittoria di Barcellona […]».

8. Ivi, ff. 79v-80r: «et per questo complimento fatto con S.M.tà, et con gl’altri, come sopra, chi non vede, che il s.r Card.le ha sodisfatto all’obligationi, che tiene di serv.re divoto della Corona, e dato bastante segno della sua allegrezza per il successo, ancorché non si siano suonate le campane, et accesi li fuochi, e lumi avanti il suo Palazzo?».

9. Ivi, f. 80r: «Che non habbia fatto di persona questo complimento col s.r V.Re com’ha preteso, et s’è dovuto, già s’è detta la caggione, ch’è per non havergli restituita la Visita, che gli fece per la Nascita dell’Infantina; obligandolo a star su questo rigore la pretensione del s.r V.Re di voler esser da lui visitato; mentre gl’è debitore della soprad.a visita raccordata dal Coppiere, e dal Cavallerizzo di S.Em.a a D. Baldassare M.ro di Cerimonie di S.Ecc.za, come s’è detto, che quando vi havesse voluto stare, ben havrebbe saputo il Card.le sodisfarsi, e non restituire al s.r V.Re la Visita del Natale, che con puntualità gli restituì».

10. Ivi, f. 80v: «Con tutto ciò pur anche l’havrebbe visitato in quest’occas.ne se si fusse possuto assicurare, che S.Ecc.za gl’havesse resa la visita; come ne poteva temere, e giustamente diffidare havendo l’esperienza avanti di quella dell’Infantina non restituita; ma se si fosse lasciato trasportare dall’eccesso di gentilezza a far questa Visita; et poi il s.r V.re non cel’havessse restituita, non sarebbe stato errore della prudenza di S.Em.a, et di riprensione degno, et con pregiudizio notabilissimo nel cospetto del Mondo, della Porpora, non più che di se stesso». 
Conclusions

The text analyzed in the previous pages is certainly not the most significant of many that were produced between 1651 and 1653 and clearly coming under the «war of the writings» between Oñate and Filomarino (Bray, 1990). As it clearly results, the complaints of the viceroy regarding the lack of festivities of the Cardinal Archbishop on occasion of the surrender of Barcelona constituted a pretext more than anything else, an alternative way of attacking the prelate and to highlight in the eyes of both Madrid and Rome, his infidelity to the king of Spain and the necessity to obtain his removal from his positions. Instead it was Oñate, as is known, who was moved away from Naples: the lengthy dispute with Filomarino probably carried its own weight, but it was the protests that were carried out by large sections of the nobility and the Neapolitan society that counted for more, they had been hit hard by the viceroy and disappointed by his failure to satisfy their requests after the frantic period of the revolt. The lack of affinity with don Luis de Haro, that sent the Count of Castrillo to Naples (Mazín, 2016; Malcolm, 2017), should be certainly taken into consideration to explain the sudden and somewhat inglorious conclusion of Oñate’s rule, despite having obtained undeniable results (Galasso, 2006: 519-552).

As for Filomarino, there was a significant confrontation with another key individual within this story: Alexandre Ros. The two of them could have met one another previously in Rome, when the Catalan joined the inner circle of the Barberini family, which Filomarino had already been a member of for almost twenty years, when the Cardinal at the time Maffeo Barberini took him under his protection before he became Pope Urban VIII. Both of them had important roles in Naples, on that July 7, 1647 that started the revolt, being involved in the disorder right from the early hours. The same Ros wrote about it afterwards in a memorial in December 1652:

El día que sucedieron los tumultos de Nápoles fue el primero en asistir al virrey duque de Arcos, el qual saliendo de palacio a aquietar el pueblo se puso a su lado con gran riesgo de su vida, y no se apartó del hasta que se le puso a salvo y pudo escapar de la fúria de la plebe. Al tercero día de los motines salió a persuadir al pueblo se retirasse de los estragos que había fiado la autoridad y séquito que tenía en aquella ciudad, pero la plebe estaba desbocada y no solo hizo inútil su diligencia sino que quedó herido de un mosquetazo en el pie, con arta dicha de no quedar estropeado. (ACA, Consell d’Aragó, llig. 306, Don Alexandro Ros deán de Tortosa y predicador de V. Majestad…; Simon i Tarrés, 2016: 126).

Filomarino also wrote about his own impressions on that tumultuous day, especially in the famous seven letters he sent to Innocent X (Palermo, 1846). On the evening of July 7, 1647, word reached him about the attack on the royal palace while he was in a carriage with his nephews: according to version of events that recurs in almost all of the chronicles of the revolt, Filomarino decided to send his nephews home first and then made his way to the centre of the turmoil, despite the attempts of his friends and his patrons who he met along the way.
Recognized by the crows he was asked to intervene, after some considerable difficulty he finally managed to make his way to Convent of San Luigi, where Arcos was barricaded together with his family. Cardinal and viceroy managed to communicate with one another by exchanging notes: it was in this way that Filomarino could read a message in public that was summed up for him by the go-between the Marquis of Torrecuso, where Arcos agreed to abolish all the tallage, demolish all the toll gates in the city and to bake bigger loaves of the best quality bread for the following day. (Mrozek Eliszezynski, 2017a: 124).

Both Ros and Filomarino seemed to have the same objective on that July 7, that was to calm the crowd and secure the safety of the viceroy Arcos. The days and weeks that followed would show the profound difference between the views and the objectives of the two men: as had already been seen, Ros remained loyal to the Hapsburg cause both in the Neapolitan theatre as well as the Catalan theatre, aligning himself with don Juan de Austria, also outside Naples and after the revolt; the behavior of Filomarino was much more ambiguous and difficult to define (Manfredi, 1949-1950; Musi, 1989; Hugon, 2009; D’Alessio, 2012; Villari, 2012). If in the years preceding the revolt the Cardinal had put forward an image of himself as an unscrupulous and often provocative figure, during the nine months between July 7 and April 6, 1648 he demonstrated all his qualities of political cautiousness and shrewdness. Far from being a simple witness to the events, the Cardinal was one of the main protagonists in those days, always careful to observe the evolution of the situation and reposition himself on the basis of the interlocutors and the strong relationships at the time. He was certainly close to Genoino and the moderate flank that governed the initial phase of the revolt, he had an undeniable ascendency over Masaniello, but his relationships with the subsequent rebel leaders were much more unstable and controversial. While he communicated in secret, even through his relatives, to don Juan de Austria, he was also close to those personages, above all Vincenzo D’Andrea, who were the grand architects of the final agreement that allowed the Spanish to return to the city. Put on the spot by the Duke of Guise, he agreed to bless his sword in a gesture that, even if it had an evident symbolical value, it was thereafter given excessive importance by the Spanish, from the moment in which it did not certify the support of the Cardinal to the political plan of the French nobleman (Mrozek Eliszezynski, 2019b).

The years of Oñate’s rule were undoubtedly the most difficult and turbulent times for Filomarino, when the prelate had to defend himself from an enormous number of accusations and recriminations not just from the viceroy and Madrid, but also from various political and social components within the Neapolitan context. Beyond the many jurisdictional and ceremonial conflicts that constellated that period, it was above all the debate about the responsibility of the revolt that was the real problematic crux which caused the fracture between the Cardinal and the Spanish authorities that become more and more evident over time. The revolt was still talked about long after April 6, 1648, and actually its memory and the counterposed analysis of it were the fulcrum around which led to the development of the grand part of the political debate in Naples over the following years.
In the feverish context, filled with tension of Naples from 1651-1653, the news of the surrender of Barcelona certainly constituted a further hotbed of debate and a new opportunity for conflict between the protagonists of the Neapolitan political scene. It was an episode that caused the reemergence of contradictions and contrasts between those who had always opposed the revolts, both the ones in Barcelona and Naples, and those who had, if not openly favoured them, at least in part supported and shared them.

**Abbreviations**

ASDN: Archivio Storico della Diocesi di Napoli.
AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano (former Archivio Segreto Vaticano).
BAV: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana.
BSNSP: Biblioteca della Società Napoletana di Storia Patria.

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