ℓ∞-Robustness and Beyond: Unleashing Efficient Adversarial Training

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Abstract

Neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks: adding well-crafted, imperceptible perturbations to their input can modify their output. Adversarial training is one of the most effective approaches in training robust models against such attacks. However, it is much slower than vanilla training of neural networks since it needs to construct adversarial examples for the entire training data at every iteration, which has hampered its effectiveness. Recently, Fast Adversarial Training was proposed that can obtain robust models efficiently. However, the reasons behind its success are not fully understood, and more importantly, it can only train robust models for ℓ∞-bounded attacks as it uses FGSM during training. In this paper, by leveraging the theory of coreset selection we show how selecting a small subset of training data provides a more principled approach towards reducing the time complexity of robust training. Unlike existing methods, our approach can be adapted to a wide variety of training objectives, including TRADES, ℓp-PGD, and Perceptual Adversarial Training. Our experimental results indicate that our approach speeds up adversarial training by 2-3 times, while experiencing a small reduction in the clean and robust accuracy.

1. Introduction

Neural networks have achieved great success in the past decade. Today, they are one of the primary candidates in solving a wide variety of machine learning tasks, from object detection and classification [11, 41] to photo-realistic image generation [13, 37] and beyond. Despite their impressive performance, neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [3, 35]: adding well-crafted, imperceptible perturbations to their input can change their output. This unexpected behavior of neural networks prevents their widespread deployment in safety-critical applications including autonomous driving [7] and medical diagnosis [24]. As such, training robust neural networks against adversarial attacks is of paramount importance and has gained lots of attention.

Adversarial training is one of the most successful approaches in defending neural networks against adversarial attacks.1 In this approach, a perturbed version of the training data is constructed first. Then, the neural network is optimized using these perturbed inputs instead of the clean samples. This procedure needs to be done iteratively as the perturbations depend on the neural network weights. Since the weights are optimized during training, the perturbations also need to be adjusted for each data sample in every iteration.

Various adversarial training methods primarily differ in the ways that they define and find the perturbed version of the input [21, 25, 43]. However, they all require repetitive construction of these perturbations during training which is often cast as another non-linear optimization problem. As such, the time/computational complexity of adversarial training in neural networks is massively higher than their vanilla training. In practice, neural networks require massive amounts of training data [1] and need to be trained multiple times with various hyper-parameters to get their best performance [15]. Thus, reducing the time/computational complexity of adversarial training is critical to enable the environmentally efficient application of robust neural networks in real-world scenarios [33, 34].

Fast Adversarial Training [40] is a successful approach proposed for efficient training of robust neural networks. Contrary to the common belief that building the perturbed versions of the inputs using Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [9] does not help training arbitrary ro-

1Note that adversarial training in the literature generally refers to a particular approach proposed by Madry et al. [25]. For the purposes of this paper, we refer to any method that builds adversarial attacks around the training data and incorporates them into the training of the neural network as adversarial training. Using this taxonomy, methods such as TRADES [43], ℓp-PGD [25] or Perceptual Adversarial Training (PAT) [21] are all considered as different versions of adversarial training.
catastrophic overfitting, it was shown that Fast Adversarial Training exhibits unexpected behavior under different settings. For instance, it was shown that Fast Adversarial Training suffers from catastrophic overfitting where the robust accuracy during training suddenly drops to 0% [2, 40]. A more fundamental issue with Fast Adversarial Training and its variations such as GradAlign [2] is that they are specifically designed for \( \ell_\infty \) adversarial training. This is because FGSM, which is particularly an \( \ell_\infty \) perturbation generator, is at the heart of these methods. As a result, the quest for finding a unified approach that can reduce the time complexity of all types of adversarial training is not over.

Motivated by the limited scope of Fast Adversarial Training, in this paper we take an important step towards finding a general yet principled approach for reducing the time complexity of adversarial training. We notice that repetitive construction of adversarial examples for each data point is the main bottleneck of robust training. While this needs to be done iteratively, we speculate that perhaps we can find a subset of the training data that is more important to robust network optimization than the rest. Specifically, we ask the following research question: Can we train an adversarially robust neural network using a subset of the entire training data without sacrificing clean or robust accuracy?

In this paper, we show that the answer to this question is affirmative. In particular, we draw an elegant connection between adversarial training and adaptive coreset selection algorithms. To this end, we use Danskin’s Theorem and show how we can effectively approximate the entire training data with an informative subset. To conduct this selection, our study shows that one needs to build adversarial examples for the entire training data and solve a respective subset selection objective. Afterward, training can be performed on this selected subset of the training data. We show that our adaptive coreset selection process is only required every few epochs, hence, effectively reducing the time complexity of robust training algorithms. We show how our proposed approach can be used as a general framework in conjunction with different adversarial training objectives, opening the door to a more principled approach for efficient training of robust neural networks in a general setting. Our experimental results show that one can reduce the time complexity of various robust training objectives by a factor of 2-3 times without sacrificing too much clean and robust accuracy.

In summary, we make the following contributions:

- We propose a practical, yet principled algorithm for efficient training of robust neural networks based on adaptive coreset selection. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use coreset selection for robust training of neural networks at scale.

- We show that our approach can be applied to a variety of robust learning objectives, including TRADES [43], \( \ell_p \)-PGD [25] and Perceptual [21] Adversarial Training. As such, our approach encompasses a broader range of robust models, unlike Fast Adversarial Training which is specifically designed for \( \ell_\infty \) robustness.

- Through our extensive experiments, we show that the proposed approach can result in a 2-3 fold reduction of the time complexity in adversarial training, with only a small reduction in the clean and robust accuracy.

2. Background and Related Work

In this section, we review the related background to our work.

2.1. Adversarial Training

Let \( \mathcal{D} = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^n \subset \mathbb{X} \times \mathbb{C} \) denote a training dataset consisting of \( n \) i.i.d samples. Each data point contains an input data \( x_i \) from domain \( \mathbb{X} \) and an associated label \( y_i \), taking one of \( k \) possible values \( \mathbb{C} = [k] = \{1, 2, \ldots, k\} \). Without loss of generality, in this paper we focus on the image domain \( \mathbb{X} \). Furthermore, assume that \( f_\theta : \mathbb{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^k \) denotes a neural network classifier with parameters \( \theta \) that takes \( x \in \mathbb{X} \) as input and maps it to a softmax value \( f_\theta(x) \in \mathbb{R}^k \). Then, training a neural network in its most general format can be written as the following minimization problem

\[
\min_{\theta} \sum_{i=1}^n \Phi(x_i, y_i; f_\theta).
\]  

(1)

Here, \( \Phi(x, y; f_\theta) \) is a function that takes a data point \( (x, y) \) and a function \( f_\theta \) as its inputs, and its output is a measure of discrepancy between the input \( x \) and its ground-truth label \( y \). By writing the training objective in this format, we can denote both vanilla and robust adversarial training using the same notation. Below we show how various choices of the function \( \Phi \) amounts to different training objectives.

2.1.1 Vanilla Training

In case of vanilla training, the function \( \Phi \) is a simple evaluation of an appropriate loss function over the neural network output \( f_\theta(x) \) and the ground-truth label \( y \). In other words, for vanilla training we have

\[
\Phi(x, y; f_\theta) = \mathcal{L}_{CE}(f_\theta(x), y),
\]

(2)

where \( \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\cdot, \cdot) \) is the cross-entropy loss.
2.1.2 FGSM, $\ell_p$-PGD, and Perceptual Adversarial

Training

In these cases, the training objective is itself an optimization problem

$$\Phi(x, y; \theta) = \max_{\tilde{x}} L_{CE}(f_\theta(\tilde{x}), y) \text{ s.t. } d(\tilde{x}, x) \leq \varepsilon$$

where $d(\cdot, \cdot)$ is an appropriate distance measure over image domain $\mathcal{X}$, and $\varepsilon$ denotes a scalar. The constraint over $d(\tilde{x}, x)$ is used to ensure visual similarity between $\tilde{x}$ and $x$. It can be shown that solving Eq. (3) amounts to finding an adversarial example $\tilde{x}$ for the clean sample $x$ [25]. Different choices of the visual similarity measure $d(\cdot, \cdot)$ and solvers for Eq. (3) results in different adversarial training objectives.

- FGSM [9] assumes that $d(\tilde{x}, x) = \|\tilde{x} - x\|$. Using this $\ell_\infty$ assumption, the solution to Eq. (3) is computed using one iteration of gradient ascent.

- In $\ell_p$-PGD, Madry et al. [25] utilize $\ell_p$ norms as a proxy for visual similarity $d(\cdot, \cdot)$. Then, several steps of projected gradient ascent is taken to solve Eq. (3).

- Finally, Perceptual Adversarial Training [21] replaces $d(\cdot, \cdot)$ with Learning Perceptual Image Patch Similarity (LPIPS) distance [44]. Then, Laidlaw et al. [21] propose to solve this maximization objective using either projected gradient ascent or Lagrangian relaxation.

2.1.3 TRADES Adversarial Training

This intuition behind this method is creating a trade-off between clean and robust accuracy. In particular, the TRADES [43] objective can be written as

$$\Phi(x, y; \theta) = L_{CE}(f_\theta(x), y) + \max_{\tilde{x}} L_{CE}(f_\theta(\tilde{x}), f_\theta(x)) / \lambda$$

such that $d(\tilde{x}, x) \leq \varepsilon$. Here, $\lambda$ is a regularization parameter that controls the trade-off.

2.2. Coreset Selection

Adaptive data subset selection, and coreset selection in general, is concerned with finding a weighted subset of the data that can approximate certain attributes of the entire population [8]. Traditionally, coreset selection has been used for different machine learning tasks such as $k$-means and $k$-medians [10], Naïve Bayes and nearest neighbor classifiers [38], and Bayesian inference [4].

Recently, coreset selection algorithms are developed for neural network training [15, 16, 27, 28]. The main idea behind such methods is to give an approximation of the full gradient using a subset of the training data. These algorithms start with computing the gradient of the loss function with respect to the neural network weights. This gradient is computed for every data sample in the training set. Then, an objective function is formed. The goal of this optimization problem is to find a weighted subset of the training data that can approximate the full gradient.

It can be shown that this problem is NP-hard [27, 28]. Roughly speaking, various coreset selection methods differ from each other in how they approximate the solution of the aforementioned objective. For instance, CRAIG [27] casts this objective as a submodular set cover problem and uses existing greedy solvers to get an approximate solution.

As another example, GRAD-MATCH [15] analyzes the convergence of stochastic gradient descent using adaptive data subset selection. Based on this study, Killamsetty et al. [15] propose to use Orthogonal Matching Pursuit (OMP) [31] as a greedy solver of the data selection objective. More information about these methods is provided in Appendix.

The aforementioned coreset selection algorithms can only be used for vanilla training of neural networks. As such, they still suffer from adversarial vulnerability. Different from these methods, in this paper we extend coreset selection algorithms for robust training of neural networks, and show how they can be adapted to various robust training objectives including TRADES [43], $\ell_p$-PGD [25] and Perceptual [21] Adversarial Training.

3. Proposed Method

As discussed in Section 1, the main bottleneck in the time/computational complexity of adversarial training stems from constructing adversarial examples for the entire training set at each epoch. Fast Adversarial Training [40] tries to eliminate this issue by using FGSM as its adversarial example generator. However, this simplification 1) may lead to catastrophic overfitting [2, 40], and 2) is not easy to generalize to all types of adversarial training as FGSM is specifically designed for $\ell_\infty$ attacks.

Instead of using a faster adversarial example generator, here we take a different, orthogonal path and try to effectively reduce the training set size. This way, the original adversarial training algorithm can still be used on this smaller subset of training data. This approach can reduce the time/computational complexity while optimizing the same objective as the original training. In this sense, it leads to a more unified method that can be used along with various types of adversarial training objectives; including the ones that already exist, and the ones that are going to be proposed in the future.

The main hurdle in materializing this idea is the following question: How should we select this subset of the training data without hurting either the clean or robust
To answer this question, we propose to use coreset selection on the training data to reduce the sample size and improve training efficiency. However, the issue with existing coreset selection methods such as CRAIG [27] or GRAD-MATCH [15] is that they are specifically designed for vanilla training of neural networks, and they do not reflect the requirements of adversarial training. As such, we should modify these methods to make them suitable for our purpose of robust neural network training. Meanwhile, we should also consider the fact that the field of coreset selection is still evolving. Thus, we aim to find a general modification that later can be used alongside newer versions of greedy coreset selection algorithms.

To find this general modification, recall from Section 2.2 that coreset selection can be seen as a two-step process. First, the gradient of the loss function with respect to the neural network weights is computed for each training sample. Then, based on the gradients obtained in step one, a weighted subset (i.e., the coreset) of the training data is formed. This subset is obtained such that the weighted gradients of the samples inside the coreset can provide a good approximation of the full gradient.

We notice that various coreset selection methods proposed for vanilla neural network training only differ in the second step of the aforementioned process. As such, we can narrow down the changes that we want to make to the first step of coreset selection: gradient computation. Then, existing greedy solvers can be used to find the subset of training data that we are looking for. To this end, we draw a connection between coreset selection methods and adversarial training using Danskin’s Theorem as outlined next.

3.1. Coreset Selection for Efficient Adversarial Training

As discussed above, the first step in finding a weighted subset of training data is the computation of the loss gradient with respect to the neural network weights. This computation needs to be done for the entire training set. In particular, using our notation from Section 2.1, this step can be written as

\[ \nabla_{\theta} \Phi(x_i, y_i; f_\theta) \quad \forall \ i \in V, \]

where \( V = [n] = \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \) denotes the training set indices.

For vanilla neural network training (see Section 2.1) the above gradient is simply equal to \( \nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(f_\theta(x_i), y_i) \) which can be computed using standard backpropagation. In contrast, for the adversarial training objectives in Eqs. (3) and (4), this gradient requires taking partial derivative of a maximization objective. To this end, we use the famous Danskin’s (1969) Theorem as stated below.

**Theorem 3.1 (Theorem A.1 [25])** Let \( \mathcal{S} \) be a nonempty compact topological space, \( \ell : \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathcal{S} \to \mathbb{R} \) be such that \( \ell(\cdot, \delta) \) is differentiable for every \( \delta \in \mathcal{S} \), and \( \nabla_{\theta} \ell(\theta, \delta) \) is continuous on \( \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathcal{S} \). Also, let \( \delta^*(\theta) = \{ \delta \in \arg \max_{\delta \in \mathcal{S}} \ell(\theta, \delta) \} \). Then, the corresponding max-function

\[ \phi(\theta) = \max_{\delta \in \mathcal{S}} \ell(\theta, \delta) \]

is locally Lipschitz continuous, directionally differentiable, and its directional derivatives along vector \( h \) satisfy

\[ \phi'(\theta, h) = \sup_{\delta \in \delta^*(\theta)} h^T \nabla_{\theta} \ell(\theta, \delta). \]

In particular, if for some \( \theta \in \mathbb{R}^m \) the set \( \delta^*(\theta) = \{ \delta_\theta \} \) is a singleton, then the max-function is differentiable at \( \theta \) and

\[ \nabla \phi(\theta) = \nabla_{\theta} \ell(\theta, \delta_\theta). \]

In summary, Theorem 3.1 indicates how to take the gradient of a max-function. To this end, it suffices to 1) find the maximizer, and 2) evaluate the normal gradient at this point.

Now that we have stated Danskin’s Theorem, we are ready to show how it can provide the connection between coreset selection and the adversarial training objectives of Eqs. (3) and (4).

3.1.1 \( \ell_p \)-PGD and Perceptual Adversarial Training

Going back to Eq. (5), we know that to perform coreset selection we need to compute this gradient term for our objective in Eq. (3). In other words, we need to compute

\[ \nabla_{\theta} \Phi(x, y; f_\theta) = \nabla_{\theta} \max_{\hat{x}} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(f_\theta(\hat{x}), y) \]

under the constraint \( d(\hat{x}, x) \leq \varepsilon \) for every training sample. Based on Danskin’s Theorem, we can deduce

\[ \nabla_{\theta} \Phi(x, y; f_\theta) = \nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(f_\theta(x^*), y), \]

where \( x^* \) is the solution to

\[ \max_{\hat{x}} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(f_\theta(\hat{x}), y) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad d(\hat{x}, x) \leq \varepsilon. \]

Note that the conditions under which Danskin’s Theorem hold might not be satisfied for neural networks in general. This is due to the existence of discontinuous functions such as ReLU activation in neural networks. More importantly, finding the exact solution of Eq. (8) is not straightforward as neural networks are highly non-convex. Usually, the exact solution \( x^* \) is replaced with its approximation, which is an adversarial example generated under the Eq. (8) objective [17]. Based on this approximation, we can re-write Eq. (7) as

\[ \nabla_{\theta} \Phi(x, y; f_\theta) \approx \nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(f_\theta(x_{\text{adv}}), y). \]
In other words, to perform coreset selection for $\ell_p$-PGD [25] and Perceptual [21] Adversarial Training, one needs to add a pre-processing step to the gradient computation. During this step, adversarial examples for the entire training set need to be constructed. Afterwards, the coresets can be built as in vanilla neural networks.

3.1.2 TRADES Adversarial Training

For TRADES [43], the gradient computation is slightly different as the objective in Eq. (4) consists of two terms. In this case, the gradient can be written as

$$
\nabla_\theta \Phi (x, y; f_\theta) = \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{CE} (f_\theta(x), y) + \nabla_\theta \max_x \mathcal{L}_{CE} (f_\theta(x), f_\theta(x)) / \lambda, \tag{10}
$$

where $d(\tilde{x}, x) \leq \varepsilon$. The first term is the normal gradient of the neural network. For the second term, we apply Danckin’s Theorem to obtain

$$
\nabla_\theta \Phi (x, y; f_\theta) \approx \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{CE} (f_\theta(x), y) + \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{CE} (f_\theta(x_{adv}), f_\theta(x)) / \lambda, \tag{11}
$$

where $x_{adv}$ is an approximate solution to

$$
\max_x \mathcal{L}_{CE} (f_\theta(x), f_\theta(x)) / \lambda \text{ s.t. } d(\tilde{x}, x) \leq \varepsilon. \tag{12}
$$

Then, we compute the second gradient term in Eq. (11) using the multi-variable chain rule. To show this, let us assume that $w(\theta) = f_\theta(x_{adv})$ and $z(\theta) = f_\theta(x)$. We can write the aforementioned gradient as

$$
\nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{CE} (f_\theta(x_{adv}), f_\theta(x)) = \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{CE} (w(\theta), z(\theta)) + \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_{CE}}{\partial w} \nabla_\theta w(\theta) + \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_{CE}}{\partial z} \nabla_\theta z(\theta)
$$

$$
+ \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{CE} (f_\theta(x_{adv}), \text{freeze} (f_\theta(x))) + \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{CE} (\text{freeze} (f_\theta(x_{adv})), f_\theta(x)). \tag{13}
$$

Here, step (1) is derived using the multi-variable chain rule. Also, step (2) is the re-writing of step (1) by using the freeze$(\cdot)$ kernel that stops the gradients from backpropagating through its argument function. Putting Eqs. (11) and (13) together, we can write the TRADES gradient as

$$
\nabla_\theta \Phi (x, y; f_\theta) = \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{CE} (f_\theta(x), y) + \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{CE} (f_\theta(x_{adv}), \text{freeze} (f_\theta(x))) / \lambda
$$

$$
+ \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{CE} (\text{freeze} (f_\theta(x_{adv})), f_\theta(x)) / \lambda. \tag{14}
$$

After the gradient is computed for the entire training data using the above formulation, one can use coreset selection algorithms to find the weighted subset of the training data.

3.1.3 Practical Considerations

Following the above discussion, to effectively reduce the training set size using coreset selection we need to compute the loss gradient for the entire training data. For adversarial training this amounts to adding a pre-processing step where we need to build perturbed versions of the training data using their respective objectives in Eqs. (8) and (12). Then, the gradients can be computed using Eqs. (9) and (14). Afterwards, greedy subset selection algorithms can be used to construct the coresets based on the value of the gradients. Finally, having selected the coreset data, one can run adversarial training only on the data that remains in the coreset. As can be seen, we are not changing the essence of the training objective in this process. We are just reducing the training size to enhance the computational efficiency of our proposed solution and as such, we are able use it along with any adversarial training objectives. We stress once again that our approach is orthogonal to the existing work around efficient adversarial training in the sense that it can also be combined with those approaches to make them even faster. We leave this direction for future work.

Since coreset selection depends on the current values of the neural network weights, it is important to update the coresets as the training evolves. Prior work [15, 16] has shown that this selection needs to be done every $T$ epochs, where $T$ is usually greater than 15. Furthermore, there are small, yet important practical changes that we employ while using coreset selection to increase efficiency. We summarize these practical tweaks below. Further detail can be found in [15, 27].

**Gradient Approximation.** As we saw, both Eqs. (9) and (14) require computation of the loss gradient with respect to the neural network weights. This is equal to backpropagation through the entire neural network, which is not very efficient. Instead, it is common to replace the exact gradients in Eqs. (9) and (14) with their last-layer approximation [14, 15, 27]. In other words, instead of backpropagating through the entire network, one can backpropagate up until the penultimate layer. This estimate has an approximate complexity equal to forwardpropagation, and it has been shown to work well in practice [15, 16, 27, 28].

**Batch-wise Coreset Selection.** As discussed in Section 3.1, data selection is usually done in a sample-wise fashion where each data sample is separately considered to be selected. This way, one needs to find the data candidates out of the entire training set. To increase efficiency, Kilamsetty et al. [15] proposed the batch-wise variant. In this type of coreset selection, the data is first split into several batches. Then, the algorithm makes a selection out of these batches. Intuitively, this change can increase efficiency as
the sample size reduces from the number of data points to the number of batches.

**Warm-start with the Entire Data.** Finally, as we shall see in the experiments, it is important to warm-start the training using the entire dataset. Afterwards, the coreset selection is activated and training is only performed using the data that remains in the coreset.

### 3.1.4 Final Algorithm

Figure 1 and Algorithm 1 summarize our coreset selection approach for adversarial training. As can be seen, our proposed method is a generic and principled approach in contrast to existing methods such as Fast Adversarial Training [40]. In particular, our approach provides the following advantages compared to existing methods:

1. The proposed approach does not involve any specific hyper-parameter tuning, algorithmic level manipulations, and dependency on certain training attributes such as $\ell_{\infty}$ bound or cyclic learning rate.

2. The simplicity of our method makes it compatible with any existing/future adversarial training objectives. Furthermore, as we will see in Section 4, our approach can be combined with any greedy coreset selection algorithms to deliver robust neural networks.

These characteristics are important as they increase the likelihood of applying our proposed method for robust training of neural networks no matter what the training objectives are. This is in stark contrast to existing methods that solely focus on a particular training objective.

### 4. Experimental Results

In this section, we present our experimental results. We show how our proposed approach can efficiently reduce the time complexity of various robust training objectives in different settings. To this end, we train our approach using TRADES [43], $\ell_p$-PGD [25] and Perceptual [21] Adversarial Training on CIFAR-10 [18], SVHN [30], and a subset of ImageNet [32] with 12 classes. For TRADES and $\ell_p$-PGD training, we use ResNet-18 [11] classifiers, while for Perceptual Adversarial Training we use ResNet-50 architectures. Further implementation details can be found in Appendix.

#### 4.1. TRADES and $\ell_p$-PGD Robust Training.

In our first set of experiments, we train ResNet-18 classifiers on CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets using TRADES, $\ell_{\infty}$ and $\ell_2$-PGD adversarial training objectives. In each case, we set the training hyper-parameters such as the learning rate, the number of epochs, and attack parameters. Then, we train the network using the entire training data as well

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**Algorithm 1 Adversarial Training with Coreset Selection**

**Input:** dataset $D = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^n$, neural network $f_\theta()$.

**Output:** robustly trained neural network $f_\theta()$.

**Parameters:** learning rate $\alpha$, total epochs $E$, warm-start coefficient $\kappa$, coreset update period $T$, batch size $b$, coreset size $k$, perturbation bound $\epsilon$.

1: Initialize $\theta$ randomly.
2: $\kappa_{\text{epochs}} = \kappa \cdot E$
3: $T_{\text{warm}} = \kappa_{\text{epochs}} \cdot k$
4: for $t = 1, 2, \ldots, E$ do
5: if $t \leq T_{\text{warm}}$ then
6: $S \leftarrow D$
7: else if $t \geq \kappa_{\text{epochs}}$ & $t \% T = 0$ then
8: $I = \text{BATCHASSIGNMENTS}(D, b)$
9: $Y = \{f_\theta(x_i) \mid (x_i, y_i) \in D\}$
10: $G = \text{ADVGRADIENT}(D, Y) \backslash \backslash$ Eqs. 9 & 14
11: $S \leftarrow \text{GREEDYSOLVER}(D, I, G, \text{coreset size } = k)$
12: else
13: $\text{Continue}$
14: end if
15: for batch in $S$ do
16: $\text{batch}_{\text{adv}} = \text{ADVENAMEGEOGEN}($batch, $f_\theta, \epsilon$)
17: $\theta \leftarrow \text{SGD}(\text{batch}_{\text{adv}}, f_\theta, \alpha)$
18: end for
19: end for

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Figure 1. Overview of neural network training using coreset selection.
as using our adversarial coreset selection approach. For our approach, we use batch-wise versions of CRAIG [27] and GRADMATCH [15] with warm-start. We set the coreset size (the percentage of training data to be selected) to 50% for CIFAR-10 and 20% for SVHN to get a reasonable balance between accuracy and training time. We report the clean and robust accuracy (in %) as well as the total training time (in minutes) in Table 1. For our approach, we also report the difference with respect to full training in parenthesis. As can be seen, in all of the cases we can reduce the training time by more than a factor of two while keeping both the clean and robust accuracy almost intact.

Note that in these experiments, all the training attributes such as the hyper-parameters, learning rate scheduler, etc. are the same among different training schemes. This is important since we wanted to clearly show the relative boost in performance that one can achieve just by using coreset selection. Nonetheless, it is likely that by tweaking the hyper-parameters for our approach one can obtain even better results in terms of clean and robust accuracy.

4.2. Perceptual Adversarial Training and Robustness vs. Unseen Attacks.

As discussed in Section 2, Perceptual Adversarial Training (PAT) [21] replaces the visual similarity measure \( d(\cdot, \cdot) \) in Eq. (3) with LPIPS [44] distance. The logic behind this choice is that \( \ell_p \) norms can only capture a small portion of images that are similar to the clean one, limiting the search space of adversarial attacks. Motivated by this reason, Laidlaw et al. [21] proposes two different ways of finding the solution to Eq. (3) when \( d(\cdot, \cdot) \) is the LPIPS distance. The first version uses PGD, and the second one is a relaxation of the original problem using the Lagrangian form. We refer to these two versions as PPGD (Perceptual PGD) and LPA (Lagrangian Perceptual Attack), respectively. Then, Laidlaw et al. [21] proposed to utilize a fast version of LPA to enable its usage in adversarial training. More information about this approach can be found in Laidlaw et al. [21].

For our next set of experiments, we show how our approach can be adapted to this unusual training objective. This is done to showcase the compatibility of our proposed method with different training objectives as opposed to existing methods that are carefully tuned for a particular training objective. To this end, we train ResNet-50 classifiers using Fast-LPA. In this case, we train the classifiers on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-12 datasets. Like our previous experiments, we set the hyper-parameters of the training to be fixed, and then train the models using the entire training data and our adversarial coreset selection method. For our method, we use batch-wise versions of CRAIG [27] and GRADMATCH [15] with warm-start. The coreset size for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-12 were set to 40% and 50%, respectively. As in Laidlaw et al. [21], we measure the performance of the trained models against unseen attacks during training, as well as the two variants of perceptual attacks. The unseen attacks for each dataset were selected in a similar manner to Laidlaw et al. [21], and the attack parameters can be found in Appendix. We also record the total training time taken by each method.

Table 2 summarizes our results on PAT using Fast-LPA. As can be seen, our adversarial coreset selection approach can deliver a competitive performance in terms of clean and average unseen attack accuracy while reducing the training time by at least a factor of two. These results indicate the flexibility of our adversarial coreset selection that can be combined with various objectives. This is due to the orthogonality of the proposed approach with the existing efficient adversarial training methods. In this case, we see that using our approach we can make Fast-LPA even faster.
Table 2. Clean and robust accuracy (%), and total training time (mins) of Perceptual Adversarial Training for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-12 datasets. The training objective uses Fast Lagrangian Perceptual Attack (LPA) [21] to train the network. At test time the networks are evaluated against attacks that were not seen during training, as well as different versions of Perceptual Adversarial Attack (PPGD and LPA). In each dataset, the unseen attacks were selected similar to Laidlaw et al. [21]. For more information about the settings, please see the Appendix.

| Dataset  | Training          | Clean | Unseen Attacks | Seen Attacks | Train. Time |
|----------|-------------------|-------|----------------|--------------|-------------|
|          |                   |       | Auto-ℓ₂ [5]    | Auto-ℓ∞ [5]  | JPEG [12]   | StAdv [42] | ReColor [20] | Mean PPGD | LPA |
| CIFAR-10 | Adv. CRAIG (Ours) | 83.21 | 39.98          | 33.94        | -           | 49.60     | 62.69        | 46.55    | 19.56 | 7.42 | 767.34 |
|          | Adv. GRADMATCH (Ours) | 83.14 | 39.20          | 34.11        | -           | 48.86     | 62.26        | 46.11    | 19.94 | 7.54 | 787.26 |
|          | Full PAT (Fast-LPA) | 86.02 | 43.27          | 37.96        | -           | 48.68     | 62.23        | 48.04    | 22.62 | 8.01 | 1682.94 |
| ImageNet-12 | Adv. CRAIG (Ours) | 86.99 | 51.54          | 60.42        | 71.79       | 37.47     | 44.04        | 53.05    | 29.04 | 14.07 | 2817.06 |
|          | Adv. GRADMATCH (Ours) | 87.08 | 51.38          | 60.64        | 72.15       | 35.83     | 45.83        | 53.17    | 28.36 | 13.11 | 2865.72 |
|          | Full PAT (Fast-LPA) | 91.22 | 57.37          | 66.89        | 76.25       | 19.29     | 46.35        | 53.23    | 33.17 | 13.49 | 5613.12 |

Figure 2. Relative error vs. speed up curves for different versions of adversarial coreset selection in training CIFAR-10 models using the TRADES objective. In each curve, the coreset size is changed from 50% to 10% (left to right). (a, b) Clean and robust error vs. speed up compared to full TRADES for different version of Adversarial CRAIG. (c, d) Clean and robust error vs. speed up compared to full TRADES for different version of Adversarial GRADMATCH.

4.3. Trade-offs.

Finally, we study the accuracy vs. speed-up trade-off in adversarial coreset selection. For this study, we train our adversarial coreset selection method using different versions of CRAIG [27] and GRADMATCH [15] on CIFAR-10 using TRADES. In particular, for each method, we start with the base algorithm and add the batch-wise selection and warm-start one by one. Also, to capture the effect of the coreset size, we vary this number from 50% to 10% in each case. Figure 2 shows the clean and robust error vs. speed-up compared to full adversarial training. As can be seen, in each case the combination of warm-start and batch-wise versions of the adversarial coreset selection gives the best performance. Moreover, as we gradually decrease the coreset size, we see that the training speed goes up. However, this gain in training speed is achieved at the cost of increasing the clean and robust error. Both of these observations are in line with that of Killamsetty et al. [15] around vanilla coreset selection.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed a general yet principled approach for efficient adversarial training based on the theory of coreset selection. We discussed how repetitive computation of adversarial attacks for the entire training data can impede the training speed. Unlike previous works that try to solve this issue by making the adversarial attack simpler, here, we took an orthogonal path to effectively reduce the training set size without modifying the attacker. To this end, we discussed how coreset selection can be viewed as a two-step process, where first the gradients for the entire training data are computed, and then greedy solvers choose a weighted subset of data that can approximate the full gradient. Using Danskin’s Theorem, we drew a connection between greedy coreset selection algorithms and adversarial training. We then showed the flexibility of our adversarial coreset selection method by utilizing it for TRADES, ℓ_2-PGD, and Perceptual Adversarial Training. Our experimental results indicate that adversarial coreset selection can reduce the training time by factors of more than 2-3 with only a small reduction in the clean and robust accuracy.
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Supplementary Materials

A. Greedy Subset Selection Algorithms

In this section, we briefly review the technical details of greedy subset selection algorithms used in our experiments. Further details can be found in [15, 27].

A.1. CRAIG

As discussed previously, the goal of coreset selection is to find a subset of the training data such that the weighted gradient computed over this subset can give a good approximation to the full gradient. Thus, CRAIG [27] starts with explicitly writing down this objective as

\[
\sum_{i \in V} \nabla_{\theta} \Phi(x_i, y_i; f_\theta) - \sum_{j \in S} \gamma_j \nabla_{\theta} \Phi(x_j, y_j; f_\theta)
\].

(15)

Here, \(V = [n] = \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}\) denotes the training set. The goal is to find a coreset \(S \subset V\) and its associated weights \(\gamma_j\) such that the objective of Eq. (15) is minimized. To this end, Mirzasoleiman et al. [27] find an upper-bound on the estimation error of Eq. (15). This way, it is shown that the coreset selection objective can be approximated by

\[
S^* = \arg \min_{S \subseteq V} |S|, \quad \text{s.t.} \quad L(S) \triangleq \sum_{i \in V} \min_{j \in S} d_{ij} \leq \epsilon.
\]

(16)

where

\[
d_{ij} \triangleq \max_{\theta \in \Theta} \| \nabla_{\theta} \Phi(x_i, y_i; f_\theta) - \nabla_{\theta} \Phi(x_j, y_j; f_\theta) \|
\].

(17)

denotes the maximum pairwise gradient distances computed for all \(i \in V\) and \(j \in S\). Then, Mirzasoleiman et al. [27] cast Eq. (16) as the well-known submodular set cover problem for which greedy solvers exist [26, 29, 39].

A.2. GRAD-MATCH

Killamsetty et al. [15] studies the convergence of adaptive data subset selection algorithms using stochastic gradient descent (SGD). It is shown that the convergence bound consists of two terms: an irreducible noise-related term, and an additional gradient error term just like Eq. (15). Based on this analysis, Killamsetty et al. [15] then proposes to minimize this objective directly. To this end, they use the famous Orthogonal Matching Pursuit (OMP) [31] as their greedy solver, resulting in an algorithm called GRAD-MATCH. It is then proved that since GRAD-MATCH minimizes the Eq. (15) objective directly, it achieves a lower error compared to CRAIG that only minimizes an upper-bound to Eq. (15).

B. Implementation Details

In this section, we provide the details of our experiments in Section 4. We used a single NVIDIA Tesla V100-SXM2-16GB GPU for CIFAR-10 [18] and SVHN [30], and a single NVIDIA Tesla V100-SXM2-32GB GPU for ImageNet-12 [22, 32]. Our implementation will be released later.

B.1. Training Settings.

Table 4 shows the entire set of hyper-parameters and settings used for training the models of Section 4.

B.2. Evaluation Settings

For the evaluation of TRADES and \(\ell_p\)-PGD adversarial training, we use PGD attacks. In particular, for TRADES and \(\ell_\infty\)-PGD adversarial training we use \(\ell_\infty\)-PGD attacks with \(\epsilon = 8/255\), step-size \(\alpha = 1/255\), 50 iterations, and 10 random restarts. Also, for \(\ell_2\)-PGD adversarial training we use \(\ell_2\)-PGD attacks with \(\epsilon = 80/255\), step-size \(\alpha = 8/255\), 50 iterations and 10 random restarts.

For Perceptual Adversarial Training (PAT), we report the attacks’ settings in Table 3. Note that for each case, we chose the same set of unseen/seen attacks for evaluation. However, since we trained our model with slightly different \(\epsilon\) bounds, we changed the attacks’ settings accordingly.

Table 3. Hyper-parameters of attacks used for the evaluation of PAT models in Section 4.

| Dataset   | Attack            | Bound | Iterations |
|-----------|-------------------|-------|------------|
| CIFAR-10  | AutoAttack-\(\ell_2\) [5] | 1     | 20         |
|           | AutoAttack-\(\ell_\infty\) [5] | 8/255 | 20         |
|           | StAdv [42]        | 0.02  | 50         |
|           | ReColor [20]      | 0.06  | 100        |
|           | PPGD [21]         | 0.40  | 40         |
|           | LPA [21]          | 0.40  | 40         |

| ImageNet-12 | AutoAttack-\(\ell_2\) [5] | 1200/255 | 20   |
|             | AutoAttack-\(\ell_\infty\) [5] | 4/255 | 20   |
|             | JPEG [12]         | 0.125 | 200  |
|             | StAdv [42]        | 0.02  | 50   |
|             | ReColor [20]      | 0.06  | 200  |
|             | PPGD [21]         | 0.35  | 40   |
|             | LPA [21]          | 0.35  | 40   |
| Hyperparameter                          | TRADES | ℓ∞-PGD | ℓ2-PGD | ℓ∞-PGD | ℓ2-PGD |
|----------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| **Dataset**                            | CIFAR-10 | CIFAR-10 | SVHN | CIFAR-10 | ImageNet-12 |
| **Model Arch.**                        | ResNet-18 | ResNet-18 | ResNet-18 | ResNet-50 | ResNet-50 |
| **Optimizer**                          | SGD | SGD | SGD | SGD | SGD |
| **Scheduler**                          | Multi-step | Multi-step | Multi-step | Multi-step | Multi-step |
| **Initial lr.**                        | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| **lr. Decay (epochs)**                 | (80, 100) | (75, 90, 100) | (75, 90, 100) | (45, 60, 80) |
| **Weight Decay**                       | 5.10⁻¹ | 5.10⁻¹ | 5.10⁻¹ | 5.10⁻¹ | 5.10⁻¹ |
| **Batch Size (full)**                  | 128 | 128 | 128 | 50 | 50 |
| **Total Epochs**                       | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 90 |
| **Coreset Size**                       | 50% | 50% | 50% | 40% | 50% |
| **Coreset Batch Size**                 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| **Warm-start Epochs**                  | 36 | 36 | 15 | 29 | 27 |
| **Coreset Selection Period (epochs)**  | 20 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| **Visual Similarity Measure**          | ℓ∞ | ℓ∞ | ℓ2 | ℓ2 | ℓ2 |
| **ε (Bound on Visual Sim.)**           | 8/255 | 8/255 | 0.5 | 0.25 | - |
| **Attack Iterations (Training)**       | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| **Attack Iterations (Coreset Selection)** | 1.25/255 | 1.25/255 | 8/255 | - | - |
| **Attack Step-size**                   | - | - | - | - | - |