A Prunable Blockchain Consensus Protocol Based on Non-Interactive Proofs of Past States Retrievability

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Abstract

Bitcoin [1] is the first successful decentralized global digital cash system. Usefulness of the mining process requiring a lot of computational resources to be wasted, though, remains disputable. One of possible alternatives for useful Proof-of-Work schemes, Permacoin [2], is using non-interactive proofs of a static dataset retrievability thus providing a mechanism to store a huge dataset being spread across miners collectively.

In this paper we present a new consensus protocol for Bitcoin-like peer-to-peer systems, where the right to generate a block is given to the party which provides non-interactive proofs of retrievability for the past state snapshots. This Proof-of-Work scheme has better resistance to specialized hardware than Bitcoin and Permacoin. Unlike blockchain systems being used today, a network using the protocol of ours is safe if majority of nodes are rational in terms of storing full blocks. By using that we also show that one useful application of our protocol is the construction of a prunable blockchain system without a security loss.

1. Introduction

Bitcoin whitepaper [1] defines a way a common ledger could be maintained within a trustless peer-to-peer network by using moderately hard computational puzzles [3] and the blockchain datastructure. Since then a lot of research has been done about Bitcoin and alternative systems. Nevertheless, there are still many open problems in the field, and performance is one of the most crucial [4]. Another threat to blockchain-based systems of today is the lack of reward for any activity supporting network other than for block generator self-election via finding a partial hash collision. In particular, there is no reason for nodes in network to store all the blocks since genesis until few newer ones.

In this paper we present a consensus protocol alternative to the Proof-of-Work used in Bitcoin. In our protocol a participant is rewarded for archiving only a few state snapshots amongst n states a network aims to store collectively. That is, if a miner is storing a state snapshot for height \( h \), then on a new block appears she will need to replace it with a snapshot for height \( h + 1 \). Thus a miner needs to store some number of blocks also. We show how a scalable and safe trustless blockchain based ledger system could be built from our protocol.

1.1. The Blockchain Model

A blockchain could be seen as a linked list where an element (a block) is a tuple \((\Delta S_i, \Delta C_i)\), where \(\Delta S_i\) is a transactional state modifier and \(\Delta C_i\) is a consensus state modifier. The tuple of state modifiers could be applied to a state which results another state whenever the modifiers are valid. We denote a state modifier application by \(\circ\), then \((S_i, C_i) = (S_{i-1}, C_{i-1}) \circ (\Delta S_i, \Delta C_i)\). Every network participant knows the predefined transactional and consensus state \((S_1, C_1)\) resulted from the genesis block. Then each participant knows exactly the same state \((S_i, C_i) = (S_1, C_1) \circ (\Delta S_2, \Delta C_2) \circ \cdots \circ (\Delta S_i, \Delta C_i)\) if all the
blocks are the same. The order of modifiers is defined via immutable link from each modifier to the previous one, where the first modifier in the history must be linked to the genesis state. For a block \((\Delta S_i, \Delta C_i)\) we refer to \(i\) as to height of the block.

Consensus state modifier changes rules on block validation not related to transactions stored in it (for example, it contains difficulty explained in the next subsection). A transactional state modifier being atomic in terms of its application itself contains a sequence of transactions. We will ignore this fact further. We will refer to state snapshot or just state for height \(i\) as to transactional state \(S_i\).

1.2. The Consensus and the Mining Lottery

The Bitcoin blockchain is generated in a worldwide peer-to-peer network without any central authority. In such an environment, the next block determination process requires a protection against Sybil attacks.

The Proof-of-Work mining process \[1\] eliminates Sybil attacks and also enforces a rational miner to choose a single version of the history out of possible options.

The Proof-of-Work mining process could be seen as a lottery as described in \[2\]. A mining software iterates over changeable blockheader field values until it finds a solution to \(\text{hash(blockheader)} < \text{difficulty}\), where difficulty is a publicly known value. Iterations could not be precomputed because of the epoch-dependent unique puzzleID which is known to all the participants and stored into a block header. Each iteration result could be interpreted as a ticket, and a ticket could be the winning one for an epoch if the predicate above holds, giving its owner the right to generate the new block.

1.3. The Blockchain Storing Rationale

In Bitcoin Core, the reference implementation of the Bitcoin protocol \[3\], a node is storing all the blocks with all the transactions since the genesis block. In addition, the current state snapshot in form of unspent transaction outputs list is stored as well.

The main benefit for the network in storing all the full blocks is the ability for new nodes to download them since the genesis and re-validating all the transactions ever included to the blocks. Being useful for the network, storing all the full blocks is the altruistic activity for a blockchain holder.

A rational participant can have all the full node merits with all the blocks and state snapshots being deleted, except of last few ones needed to perform possible rollbacks. A node could become rational by switching to an implementation of a Bitcoin protocol supporting that. Then if the network has no altruistic participants the only way to get into it is to download the current state snapshot and trust it.

2. Related Work and Preliminaries

This section is divided into three parts: (1) We start by reviewing a few related works. (2) Next we review the motivation for a new protocol. (3) Here, we recall the Permacoin protocol which our construction is based.

2.1. Related Work

2.1.1. The Permacoin Cryptocurrency. The key idea behind Permacoin \[2\] is to make the mining process dependent upon the storage resources rather than the computational capabilities. In order to achieve the condition that every miner stores a random subset of a known static dataset, Permacoin requires that the dataset is generated by a trusted dealer.

The trusted dealer also announces the root hash value of a Merkle tree data structure \[6\] which is built on the top of the dataset. A miner iterates over some random nonce value to find chunks whose indexes are dependent on the value. A ticket contains the nonce value and the chunks with Merkle paths for them being attached.

The winning ticket gives the right to generate the next block and is to be included into the block.

2.1.2. Ethereum. Ethereum \[7\] has state representation as an authenticated data structure being fixed by the protocol with a root hash to be included into a block. But as there is no any incentive to store past state snapshots, the state proof in a block header is useful only to help light nodes to get state elements from full nodes along with Merkle paths and does not solve the storing rationale problem stated in the section \[1,3\].

Ethereum is contending with specialized hardware by using Ethash algorithm, which is proposing to use pseudo-random dataset generated from blockheaders in the past in a Proof-of-Work mining process. Usefulness of EthHash is the same as of Bitcoin scheme. The disadvantage of the algorithm is heavy validation.
2.1.3. Cryptonite. Cryptonite [8] utilizes mini-blockchain scheme [9] to prune full blocks before a constant numbers of last ones, thus having a proof chain of length $h_{pc}$ (the chain of block headers only), a state for a height $h_{pc}$ and full blocks for heights from $h_{pc} + 1$ till current. It is not clear from the paper [9] how the protocol enforces this scheme.

2.2. The Motivation For a New Protocol

Next, we detail the four main points which our protocol addresses.

2.2.1. Incentives to Keep a Full Node. The only rewarded activity in Bitcoin is the iteration over values for certain fields in the block header. However, if a mining software includes transactions into the block, it needs to validate them, which can be carried by presenting the current state snapshot. No storing blocks is needed in order to mine. Our particular goal is to develop a protocol providing incentives to run a node storing sufficiently enough number of full blocks for network viability, thus making the network safer in the long run. Furthermore, we denote such a node a full node.

2.2.2. Solving The Blockchain Storing Rationale Problem. A full node is a node which stores a state snapshot for current moment of time and sufficiently enough blocks in the past. For the blockchains of today “sufficiently” means all and this is enforced by an implementation as stated in the section 1.3.

As the growth of the blockchain is not bounded, in the long run such a peer-to-peer system can survive only if the storage and processing power of an ordinary computer grows not slower than the storage and processing requirements of a blockchain system. As a practical consequence, it is hard to say whether a new full node will be able to process new blocks few years after, or whether it will be possible to rebuild the state by processing a blockchain since its genesis block in case of need.

As storing enough blocks is the activity with no reward, eventually most of full nodes will purge blocks from their disks except last ones having non-negligible probability to be rolled back. This means a system where blocks are needed but not stored due to a practical impossibility. We aim to develop protocol rewarding for storing collectively sufficiently enough number of blocks.

2.2.3. A Prunable Blockchain. Considering the storing rationale problem has been solved means some number of blocks and states are archived by the network in order to mine new blocks. This number $n$ could be sufficiently large to assume any rollback caused by a fork could be of negligible depth in comparison with it. For example, $n = 100,000$ blocks gives approximately 694 days of history to be stored if a block is generated every 10 minutes on average. Any rollback imaginable is about a negligible depth in comparison with that.

In such a system we can assume overwhelming majority of nodes (except of tracking tools and other special applications) to be rational so to remove blocks not needed for mining having a freedom of choice given. A rational node has predictable storage resources consumption. A network of rational nodes is also sending less blocks, and bandwidth being saved could be repurposed for other tasks improving system performance.

2.2.4. Fast Trustless Bootstrap. A new full node in Bitcoin needs to download and process all the blocks since the genesis block. This results into an unreasonably long and resource-consumptive initial processing phase. In order to reduce the burn of this phase, a trusted Bitcoin state snapshot generated by a notable community member could be downloaded [10]. This approach reinstates trust-related issues solved by Bitcoin.

In Ethereum the state proof is constructed via of a Merkle-Patricia tree root hash value stored into the block header. Then a party joining the network could download a state from $n_e$ blocks earlier and then apply $n_e$ blocks to it in order to verify the resulting state against the proof stored in the blockchain.

There is a problem with the Ethereum approach as well: as there is no reward for storing previous states, it is unlikely that the new node could find a state from a week or two months ago amongst its peers. Therefore having a protocol which provides an incentive to store sufficiently enough states within the network is also solving the bootstrapping issues in a trustless manner.

2.3. Permacoin Issues To Fix

Our protocol is derived from Permacoin [2]. During careful analysis we have found few possible threats and open questions in the protocol.

2.3.1. Trusted Dealer. The Permacoin consensus requires a trusted dealer to encode a huge dataset and to build a Merkle tree on top of that. We would like to eliminate trusted dealer notion at all.
2.3.2. Vulnerability to Specialized Hardware. As a subset of a static dataset a miner stores is static as well, it is possible to put in into dynamic or static RAM and then connect specialized hardware to the memory. With such a scheme companies could get the same advantage over individual miners as in Bitcoin with the same degree of centralization we would like to avoid.

2.3.3. Storage Optimization Strategy. It is possible to iterate over miner’s public key aiming to store less data segments (see “Setup” formula in “A simple POR lottery” figure of the Permacoin paper [2]). This could give even more advantage to a company with vast computational resources over individual miners.

3. The Protocol

Our protocol is designed to create an incentive for the miners to store collectively the last \( n \) states and blocks, where each miner stores at least \( k \) states and also \( \frac{k}{b+1} \) blocks on average in order to generate a block. The protocol reminds the “Local-POR lottery” algorithm in the Permacoin paper [2].

Before detailing our construction, it is convenient to introduce the notation that will be used from this point.

3.1. The Notation

We denote by \( \text{hash} \) a regular cryptographic hash function with a uniformly distributed output. Furthermore, given two strings \( z \) and \( w \) we denote by \( z \cup w \) the string which results from the concatenation of \( z \) and \( w \).

An arbitrary array of \( k \) values is represented by \( u[i] \) where \( 1 \leq i \leq k \), whose the minimum value, among all possible \( k \), is denoted by \( \min(u[i]) \).

Given a state \( S \), we denote an i-th element of it as \( S[i] \) and a Merkle path for \( S[i] \) as \( \pi(S, S[i]) \).

We assume all the miners know value \( \text{puz} \) specific for a current blockchain state, and that value could not be predicted in prior by a computationally bounded party.

We assume that mining rewards could be given to an owner of a public key \( k_{pub} \). We do not specify a signature scheme for \( k_{pub} \).

3.2. The Fixed State Representation

A state representation is not fixed by the Bitcoin protocol. A full node implementation usually stores a list of unspent outputs and also some node-specific additional information. By applying valid transactions from a new block, a node software takes unspent outputs out of the list and puts there outputs from the transactions [1].

Abstracting the Bitcoin-like model, a state could be represented as a list of closed boxes of size \( n_S \). Each box has a value associated with it. A transaction contains keys to open \( n_b \) boxes and also creates \( n_b \) new closed boxes. The resulting state set has the size of \( n_S - n_k + n_b \) after applying the transaction to it.

We assume that a closed box has some standard binary representation. Consider we put boxes in a deterministic way into a list of size \( L = 2^h \), filling positions not taken by boxes with special value \( \perp \) also having some standard binary representation. Then we can compute hashes of list elements to build then a Merkle tree of height \( h \) upon the hashes. A root hash value of the tree and its height \( h \) is to be included into a corresponding block.

Note that our construction of a state representation is fixed and is a part of the protocol, unlike Bitcoin.

3.3. The Setup

Consider a blockchain whose length is \( h_c \) and miner Alice having a public key \( k_{pub} \). She is willing to start mining at that moment in time. For every \( i \in [1 \ldots k] \) she calculates random heights as follows:

\[
u[i] = \begin{cases} (\text{hash}(k_{pub} \cup i) \mod n) + (h_c - n), & \text{if } n \leq h_c; \\ (\text{hash}(k_{pub} \cup i) \mod h_c), & \text{if } n > h_c, \end{cases}
\]

where \( n \) is the number of state snapshots a network aims to store collectively.

She stores a subset of states \( S_{k_{pub}} = S_{u[i]} \). All the \( u[i] \) values must be unique, otherwise no valid block could be generated. We enforce such a requirement to prevent malicious iteration over public key space to find as much repeating \( u[i] \) values as possible. When a new block at height \( h_c + 1 \) arrives Alice needs to recalculate at least \( k \) states. Thus Alice must store blocks since \( \min(u[i]) \) also.

3.4. The Scratch-off

For a scratch-off attempt seeded by a chosen seed \( s \) a miner iterates over the states \( S_1, \ldots, S_k \) to get random boxes for each of them.

\[
e_1 := S_1[\text{hash}(s \cup k_{pub} \cup \text{puz}) \mod L_1].
\]

For \( i = 2,3,\ldots,k \):

\[
e_i := S_i[\text{hash}(e_{i-1} \cup k_{pub} \cup \text{puz}) \mod L_i],
\]
where states $S_1, \ldots, S_k$ are represented as lists of boxes having sizes $L_1, \ldots, L_k$, accordingly, as described in Section 3.2.

A ticket is tuple $(k_{\text{pub}}, s, (\forall i \in 1 \ldots k, \{e_i, \pi(S_i, e_i)\})).$

3.5. The Winning Ticket

Like Bitcoin, we introduce epoch-dependent difficulty parameter $D$, a positive number known to every participant. Then we distinguish winning tickets from others by using the following formula:

$$\text{hash}(s \cup e_k) < D.$$  

3.6. The Ticket Validation

In order to validate a ticket, one should replay the scratch-off algorithm (from Section 3.4) with the value $s$ provided in the ticket. The validation procedure requires $2 \cdot k + k \cdot ((h_1 + 1) + \cdots + (h_k + 1)) + 1 = k^2 + k \cdot (h_1 + \cdots + h_k + 2) + 1$ hash calculations, where $h_1 \ldots h_k$ are Merkle tree heights for the states the ticket is proving retrievability for.

3.7. The Formula for the $puz$ Value

The $puz$ value in the protocol algorithm must not be predictable before a beginning of a new epoch, so before a winning ticket generation, and also must be resistant to iterations.

Based on these requirements, the best option is to have it dependent on the $s$ value included into the last block, as $s$ value is costly to replay. Therefore, by denoting $puz$ and $s$ values for last epoch (block) with $lpuz$ and $ls$ accordingly, the formula for $puz$ value for current epoch is as follows:

$$puz := \text{hash}(lpuz \cup ls).$$

4. Discussion of The Protocol

In this section we analyze the property of our protocol regarding a well known model and also further relate our constructions with potential issues.

4.1. The Protocol Properties

In order to study the protocol properties we refer to the model in [11]. The formula for the winning ticket in our protocol (Section 3.5) precisely corresponds to the $\text{validblock}$ predicate in [11] Section 3.

Our proposal does not add anything to break the compatibility with all the stated algorithms and their analysis, therefore our protocol has the same properties as the Bitcoin protocol in that model.

4.2. The Possible Threats and Attacks

4.2.1. Specialized Hardware. The best strategy for a miner to earn more in our protocol (as well as for Permacoin) is to put a required for ticket generation subset into the random-access memory. Later the miner connects as much as possible computational units with specialized memory architecture in order to parallelize iterations over the $s$ values space.

We argue that our proposal has better protection against such a miner because the dataset is not static, therefore a general-purpose CPU is needed to be connected to the RAM in order to update the states.

For a better protection of our scheme we offer to adopt techniques from other Proof-of-Work schemes, such as asymmetric Proof-of-Work [12] and non-outsourceable puzzles [13].

4.2.2. The State Set Optimization. Due to the uniqueness requirement for the $u[i]$ values, it is not possible for a miner to iterate over the public key values with the goal to minimize the set of states to store. However, a miner could iterate over the public keys to find states closer to the current moment in time in order to store less blocks. We consider this as a minor issue.

4.2.3. The $\varepsilon$-consensus Attacks. Paper [14] describes the $\varepsilon$-consensus attacks where a miner includes heavy transactions into the block generated by herself (for free) in order to enforce other miners to spend some time to verify a block or to skip validation. For the protocol of ours such attacks could be more harmful as a miner needs to apply at least $k$ blocks, not one. However, a mining software could apply blocks in the past in advance, in this case $\varepsilon$-consensus attack is no more harmful than in other systems.

4.3. The Bootstrapping Scenarios

Consider that Alice is joining a network. In the Bitcoin network she would have two options: (1) download and process all the blocks since genesis or (2) download the trusted state snapshot for a predefined moment in time and then apply blocks to it since that point. With our protocol she can choose one out of many possible bootstrapping strategies and none of them includes a central authority. Next, we provide some examples:
4.3.1. Fast Bootstrapping. Alice asks her peers to find the most recent state, then downloads it and applies a minimal number of blocks to it. However if only a single peer holds the state, this strategy is vulnerable to communication abort.

4.3.2. Reliable Download. Alice finds the most popular state snapshot and downloads it in parallel from many peers. Then she downloads and applies blocks to it.

4.3.3. Fast Paranoid. Alice preferably looks for popular states from long time ago. For example, if \( n = 200,000 \) and a new block is generated every 10 minutes on average, then a network collectively stores states snapshots for 3.8 years, and Alice can download a popular state older than 6 months ago. It is hard to imagine a fork lasting for such a long time.

4.3.4. Classical Paranoid. As in Bitcoin, Alice can download all the blocks since genesis and process them. This strategy fails if all her peers are rational.

In addition to the strategies above, many others are possible. Note that Alice needs to download block headers in prior to check chain validity by checking tickets and also to get state proofs.

4.4. Archiving Guarantees

Consider Alice is joining a network at height \( h_c \) and sees \( p \) peers, all of them are rational miners. How many full blocks could Alice find by asking her peers?

For simplicity, we ignore the fact of \( u[i] \) values uniqueness for a peer. Then \( p \) peers have \( p \cdot k \) (possibly duplicate) values over \( n \) integer values. By using order statistics the expected minimum value is \( h_{\text{min}} = (h_c - n) + \frac{n}{p \cdot k + 1} = h_c - \frac{p \cdot k \cdot n}{p \cdot k + 1} \). Alice can download state snapshots and blocks since \( h_{\text{min}} \) on average from at least one peer.

4.5. A State Exchange Protocol

Consider Alice joining a network. She chooses a state snapshot at height \( h_d \) to download from her peers. The problem is, if a new block arrives during downloading the snapshot, her peers are to replace the snapshot with another one of height \( h_d + 1 \). To avoid this problem Alice needs to ask her peers to store the snapshot even if it is not needed for mining. Alice can propose a reward to her peers for doing this, thus some fair protocol is needed. We are not going to specify it in this paper.

5. Conclusion

We have presented a modification to Bitcoin and Permacoin that is intended to recycle computational resources in order to maintain decentralized database of ledger state snapshots. The protocol of ours has the same properties as Bitcoin protocol. It is better protected against specialized hardware usage that Bitcoin and Permacoin. The state snapshots archiving providing safety against rational participants removing full blocks not needed after processing. This feature of our protocol addresses the concerns around the viability of the system when regarding the increase in the amount of transactions within the network.

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