African Regional Organisations in Rebuilding Conflict Nations in West Africa

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Abstract

The AU and ECOWAS have attained growing recognition for adopting the human security concept in promoting peace and development. They have transformed their activities towards achieving human security in conflict and post-conflict nations to protect civilian populations. The human-centred principles upheld by AU and ECOWAS have changed the security dynamics through the promotion of regional security to make lives more secure on the Continent. The conflict and post-conflict interventions of AU and ECOWAS have similarities to human security approaches. While these elements are clear in their instruments and policy responses, the lack of legitimacy, technical and financial capacity impedes their practical implementation for holistic delivery. Despite these shortfalls, this paper contests that the interventions in Cote D’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau showed commitment by African regional organisations to peace, reconstruction and human security. This paper examines their achievements and shortfalls among member countries, and importance in global perspectives.

Keywords: African Union, ECOWAS, Human Security, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau
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Introduction

African regional organisations have made repeated interventions in conflict and post-conflict situations on the continent. However, Aning and Edu-Afful (2016) argue that efforts of African Regional Organisations (AROs) seem to be obscured from international relations discourse. On the contrary, the HIPPO report acknowledges the contribution of regional bodies to peace and security.1 Other articles like Cedric de Coning, Gelot and Karlstrud (2016) also reinforces the role of AROs in peace and security on the continent. There are assertions that AROs are just a grouping of continental leaders. Ngoma (2003) refers to African regional blocs “at best, as mere clubs of political leaders and at worst, as clubs of dictators,” and argues that the impacts of these organisations are not felt on the continent (p. 20). While Aning and Aubyn (2012) suggest that there have been more co-operations between AROs in R2P interventions and promoting human security, Darkwa (2015) notes that regional organisations are heterogeneous, contributing to limited partnership and synergy between the AU and sub-regional bodies (RECs/RMs) to ensure peace and security. These bodies have contributed to the protection of civilians, despite their limited effectiveness in addressing insecurity and human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Darfur, Burundi, Somalia, South Sudan, Northern Uganda, North Eastern Nigeria and Lake Chad Basin regions, among others.

Following the shift to human security in discussions on peace and security, AROs especially the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have transformed their traditional methods of security in response to conflict and post-conflict crises. These organisations have made reforms, amendments and initiatives informed by the concept of human security. The 2000 AU Constitutive Act demonstrates the commitment and legal framework for intervention, as well as promotes democracy and good governance, protection of human rights, respect for human life and humanitarian law in Africa. Article 4(h) provides AU the authority to intervene in grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity to protect civilians and ensure human security. This has reversed its earlier state-centric principle of “non-interference” towards people-centric approach of “non-indifference”. Further, Article 4(m) emphasises the “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance”. Both Articles 4(h) and 4(m) empower the AU to prevent, respond and eliminate threats to the survival, life and dignity of people in Africa.

The 1999 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security extends earlier protocols by sanctioning intervention in internal conflicts of states, which can trigger humanitarian disasters, or threaten regional peace and security. In this regard, the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (MSC) can authorise interventions including deployment of military and political missions, give and review mandates and terms of reference, and inform the AU and UN of such decisions. The Protocol, under Chapter IV created the Early Warning Observation System, in accordance with Article 58 of the 1993 ECOWAS Revised Treaty, to collect, analyse and transmit information on potential

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1 United Nations, Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/70/95-S/2015/
African Solutions to African Problems

The coming together of African nations as regional and sub-regional bodies to promote co-operation, and protect citizens in member states demonstrates an increased collective security amongst African states (Bischoff, 2012). This means that African states have a collective responsibility to promote peace and security across the continent. Africa is criticised for not solving the challenges of the continent. Apuuli (2012) describes the reluctance of western institutions and actors to lend support to interventions on the continent, as key reason for African regional bodies to explore domestic solutions to African challenges. The AU and ECOWAS have adopted a revisionist; reformist and interventionist approach to make them active in the management of Africa’s problems. That is why the AU transformed from OAU in 2002 to make it effective in continental issues.

This article uses a regional community framework to demonstrate the co-operation between independent sovereign nations as a unit for promoting common interests and African solutions. Nathan (2012) describes a security community as the joining of independent states in a sense of belonging via shared identity and interests for peace, security and development. This paper limits its discussion on co-operation of states to pursuing common aims or goals of achieving human security and development. This means that members of African regional and sub-regional bodies come together for one or more of the identified factors. As Oluwadare (2014) indicates, the regional grouping of African nations has strengthened socio-political and economic integration, and interventions on the continent. Despite the sense of collectiveness and co-operation, the low level of commitment to “common values, mistrust, different identities and regimes” in architectures on the Continent challenges regional organisations including the AU and ECOWAS from realising their goals (Nathan, 2012, p. 152). The lack of sustainable and reliable financing for AU and ECOWAS activities, and reliance on external donors put these institutions in subordinate positions to other international actors. These conditions thwart the efforts of the continental and regional security communities. However, the re-admission of Morocco into the AU and increased financial allocation by emerging powers including Angola, Chad, Kenya and Rwanda is likely to shift the balance of power amongst states, and improve the financial position of the AU. The 27th AU summit in Rwanda in 2016 approved the new Import Levy and Peace Fund models to enable the AU provide effective interventions in African problems (Louw-Vaudran, 2016). The AU seeks to control its own destiny, and become complementary partner to the UN by striving to end its dependency on western funding through the Peace Fund and Import (community) Levy of 0.2% on imports from outside Africa by member states (Namata, 2016). The implementation of these models would contribute about US$400 million to the AU’s budget on peace and security operations by 2020 (AU, 2016). The AU adopted the import levy model from the successes of the
Common External Tariff (CET) mechanism implemented by ECOWAS in 2006 to fund its internal activities and security challenges.

In spite of the bottlenecks, African regional bodies have made strides in promoting human security in conflict and post-conflict nations. The AU and ECOWAS have contributed to making lives more secure, emphasising the need to promote human security, especially after the NATO led intervention in the Libyan crisis, which generated criticism against AROs as not capable of taking ownership of R2P interventions. Even though international institutions particularly the United Nations (UN) have contributed to peace and security in the region, AU and ECOWAS have also demonstrated commitments to conflict and post-conflict crises (Aning, 2013). Oluwadare (2014) explains how the AU transformed from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to widen its scope from “conflict anticipation and prevention to combine peacemaking and peace building during conflicts, with peacemaking and peace building in post-conflict situations” (p. 108). The re-branding of the AU has brought it to the centre stage of conflict management, resolution, security, stability and peace that has reduced the heavy burden on UN and ECOWAS in large-scale peacekeeping programmes in Africa. From the perspective of international relations, the goals of these regional organisations could be described as agenda for human security. This emphasises the paradigm shifts from the state as referent object in security to protecting people after the Cold War, because of the change in warfare from inter-state to a predominance of intra-state dimensions (Smythe, 2013).

Human Security
The idea of human security came up in African discourses on security at the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) in 1991 in Uganda in search of a new definition of security on the Continent by “decoupling sovereignty and security,” as participants envisioned security as a “multi-dimensional phenomenon” than a restrictive concept (Stensland, Lotse and Ng, 2012, p. 23). This means that security goes beyond state or military protection to involve all issues of human existence consisting of “social, political and economic” factors which affect “people’s lives, families, communities and nations” (p. 23). The discussions in Kampala gave birth to the idea of human security, earlier before the Human Development Report (HDR) in 1994, which is mentioned as the source of the concept (p. 23). The HDR (1994) describes human security as a universal principle that ensures “freedom from fear,” “freedom from want” and “right to human dignity”. This envisages the protection of people from the threats to human rights, “political security, community security, personal security, economic security, health security, food security and environmental security” (HDR, 1994, p.24). The Commission for Human Security (2003) also refers to human security as the protection of “vital core of all human lives to enhance freedoms and human fulfillment” (p. 4). Human security as a people centred concept has shifted the focus of security to protecting individuals, extending its dimensions to dealing with their needs and threats for improved wellbeing. It provides a wide spectrum of protection from various threats including environmental, economic and health issues, among others. It protects, and empowers societies (individuals) as means of security, where people become parts of decision-making and solutions to insecurity.

As a preventive mechanism, AROs have embraced the all-inclusive concept of human security in their strategies and policies. For example, Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act situates human security under its purview to include elements such as “respect for democratic principles, human rights, rule of law and good governance, promotion of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities, and gender equality.” In promoting human security, the AU intervenes in member countries in periods of “genocide, unconstitutional changes of government, war crimes, conflicts and crimes against humanity,” which threaten regional security (Herbst & Mills, 2003, p. 21). The AU PSC serves as the decision making body, collective and early warning system arrangements that facilitate timely and efficient response to African conflicts (note). In this regard, Article 7 of the PSC Protocol mandates the PSC:

- to anticipate, and prevent dispute (conflicts), as well as genocide and crimes against humanity; undertake peace-making and peace-building functions to resolve conflicts;
- authorise the mounting and deployment of peace support missions; recommend to the assembly interventions in member states with respect to grave circumstances, in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act; and support and facilitate humanitarian action in violent conflicts or natural disasters.

The AU adopted the PCRD policy as effort to enhance linkages with development policies in promoting effective co-ordination of post-conflict activities. It has also designed a Humanitarian Action Policy (HAP) to complement the work of the Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons Division (HARDPD) under the Political Affairs Department. ECOWAS demonstrates the principle of human security in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, positing the concept as the protection and promotion of human rights.
and development (Bamfo, 2013). It adopted the 2008 Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) as a guiding light for preventing conflicts and disputes to avert insecurity. Section II (6) of the ECPF posits human security as the “creation of conditions to eliminate the pervasive threats to people’s and individual rights, livelihoods, safety and life; the protection of human and democratic rights and the promotion of human development to ensure freedom from fear and freedom from want”. Section V (6) reinforces human security by stressing the promotion of democracy and sustainable development as critical elements of conflict prevention and peace building, as well as enhancing humanitarian crisis prevention and preparedness. To achieve this, ECOWAS requires effective interventions to prevent conflicts, and support post-conflict peace building and development processes. Section VIII (42), further, highlights “Early warning; Preventive Diplomacy; Democracy and Political Governance; Practical Disarmament; Women, Peace and Security; Youth Empowerment; ECOWAS Standby Force; Humanitarian Assistance; Peace Education,” as initiatives to prevent conflicts for human security.1

In pursuant of Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act, the AU established the Peace and Security Council (PSC) to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts on the continent. Article 3 (a) of the PSC Protocol envisages peace, security and stability to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, as well as the well-being of people, their environments and creation of conducive conditions to sustainable development. Also, Article 3(b) of the Protocol anticipates and prevents conflicts, giving PSC the responsibility to perform peacemaking and peace building functions in conflict resolution. Article 3(c) of the Protocol promotes AU’s peace building and post-conflict reconstruction programmes to consolidate peace, and prevent resurgence of violence. Consequently, Article 7(m) mandates the PSC to initiate actions within its conflict prevention framework, and responsibility to promote democratic practices, good governance, rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law.2 These articles encourage the AU to develop an operational structure for effective decisions in peace making, peace support operations and peace building, as well as humanitarian actions (intervention), disaster management and post-conflict reconstruction as key activities of the PSC. In this regard, Article 14(3) of the PSC Protocol extends such mandate in conflict states to include:

- consolidation of the peace agreements that have been negotiated; establishment of conditions of political, social and economic reconstruction of the society and Government institutions; implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, including those for child soldiers; resettlement and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons; assistance to vulnerable persons, including children, the elderly, women and other traumatised groups in the society.

The PSC Protocol shows a linkage between conflict prevention and peace consolidation. The AU and ECOWAS have proved their commitments to social and political rebuilding of post-conflict nations in Africa. Key features of the rebuilding and reconstruction processes of these bodies are restoring democracy and state authority, security sector reforms, demobilisation, disarmament and rehabilitation of ex-rebels and ex-combatants to reintegrate them into society. In 2005, the AU mandated its commission to outline a framework for an African Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), as a blueprint for re-building communities affected by conflict crises.3 The framework revolves around security and political transition, participatory governance, socio-economic development, justice and reconciliation, human rights and coordination, management and resource mobilisation (NEPAD, 2005). The AU adopted the PCRD policy in 2006, as a strategic and normative framework that postulates comprehensive activities to consolidate peace. It serves as the guidelines for delivering AU’s PCRD strategies in nations affected by conflicts to play effective roles in the processes of reconstruction and development. The PCRD policy seeks to enhance timeliness, effectiveness and co-ordination in post-conflict nations, as well as secure social justice and sustainable peace, in line with Africa’s vision of renewal and growth.

The PCRD policy works on five principles, such as African leadership, natural and local ownership, inclusiveness, equity and discrimination, co-operation and cohesion, and capacity building for sustainability.4 These inform AU’s PCDR programmes in consolidating peace and preventing relapse of violence; helping to address the root causes of conflict; encouraging and fast-tracking planning and implementation of reconstruction activities, as well as improving complementarities and co-ordination between and among actors in processes. The policy situates the promotion of human security as the basis for PCDR initiatives; reconstituting and transforming social, political, economic and physical conditions of societies in crisis. In consistent with this, the AU/NEPAD post-conflict unit was established to work with civil society, private and external stakeholders in

1 See Regulation MSC/Reg.1/01/08, Sections 11 (6), V (6) and VIII (42) of The ECOWAS Conflict prevention Framework
2 See Articles 3 (b), 3 (c), 7 (m) and 14 (3) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of The Peace and Security Council of the African Union
3 AU Executive Council Decision, EX.CL/191/VII
4 See Report on the Elaboration of the Framework Document on Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development
Evaluating interventions of the AU and ECOWAS in conflict nations in West Africa

This section discusses the operations and interventions of AU and ECOWAS in Cote D’Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau, and how they contributed to peace, human security and development during and after conflicts.

Cote D’Ivoire

Cote D’Ivoire, once model of West African democracy engulfed itself in military and political crisis after the death of its first president Houphouet Boigny, over the use of “Ivoirite,” in discriminating against citizens (Zouande, 2011). These undercurrents brought tensions until 2011, when the spillover from post-election disputes over a presidential run-off between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara in 2010 turned into a humanitarian crisis (Bah, 2010). The AU and ECOWAS contributed in varied forms after the 2010 post-elections conflict to rebuild social and political structures in Cote D’Ivoire. The AU and ECOWAS consulted with opposition parties in January 2011, and assessed the post-electoral crisis to re-affirm their support for Ouattara as the elected president (Yabi, 2012), and called for peace and reconciliation at the Ouagadougou conference (AU, 2010). The AU PSC implored Gbagbo to step aside after rejecting his proposal of a unity government in 2011. Subsequently, the UNSC passed Resolution 1975 in March 2011 to endorse the decision of the AU PSC (Cook, 2011). ECOWAS also met in Abuja in March 2011 to order Gbagbo to relinquish power to Ouattara to avoid the use of force in accepting the outcome of the polls. The refusal of Gbagbo to cede power to Ouattara culminated into suspension of Cote D’Ivoire from activities of ECOWAS. The AU endorsed the sanctions of ECOWAS, and excluded the country from its activities until Ouattara assumed office.

In pursuance of R2P, given under Article 4 of the Constitutive Act, the AU intervened in the Ivorian crisis to ensure human security. The intervention was also in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council; and Ezulwini Consensus, encouraging the AU to invoke R2P to stop human rights violations, and mitigate violence against civilians. These instruments give AU the collective responsibility for ensuring regional peace and security. The AU used preventive diplomacy and varied mediation tools in addressing the Ivorian crisis. It engaged diplomats, special envoys and mediators to negotiate with parties in the electoral dispute, followed by sanctions, and deployment of peace support operations to facilitate transfer of power to the elected government. However, the inability of the AU to effectively resolve the crisis raised questions about its capability to exercise regional responsibility to protect in R2P interventions.

The Ivorian crisis revealed divisions, conceptual and institutional deficiencies in the AU, with respect to R2P implementation. There was no coherent strategy in dealing with the humanitarian crisis and insecurity in the post-electoral crisis. This created the lack of coherence and clarity, regarding the respective mandates, roles and responsibilities of AROs. This supports the view of Aning and Atuobi (2013) that “lack of unity of response (purpose), duplication of efforts, and confusion between the AU and ECOWAS hindered their leadership role and effectiveness in resolving the Ivorian crisis (p.13). This was manifested in the different approaches proposed by the AU and ECOWAS in handling the Ivorian crisis. More so, there were no consultative meetings between the AU PSC and UNSC on emergency measures when the crisis emerged. However, there was some level of cooperation between the AU, ECOWAS and UN in deploying the UN Mission in Cote D’Ivoire (MINUCI).

Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau’s coup in 2012 emerged from earlier unrest and failed attempts against its government in 2011 (Okeke, Sunday and Okechukwu, 2014). This resulted in bickering within the military in the country. In April 2012, the army staged a coup after first round of presidential elections to replace late President Malam Bacai Sanha. The army dissolved all state institutions, resulting in strikes by different groups, particularly the National Union of Workers of Guinea Bissau (NUWGB). The military regime under General Toure Kuruma formed a transitional government, but reiterated its control of the defense and interior ministries (Okeke, et al, 2014). It created an interim National Transitional Council (NTC) composed of members of the military and opposition parties, with the speaker of the national assembly, Serrifo Nhamadjo as interim president in May 2012 to run the country for two years before elections. The situations in Bissau put the civilian population into fear and panic because of uncertainty about future events. Before the 2012 crisis, ECOWAS had made strategic interventions in Guinea-Bissau since 1990s to 2004 to prevent tensions from deteriorating into violent conflicts (ICG, 2016). As a first step, ECOWAS condemned the coup, describing it as unacceptable. Upon the failure of diplomatic talks

1 See New Partnership for Africa’s Development (2005) African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, Midrand
2 See RESOLUTION A/RES.1/03/11
with political stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau on return to constitutional rule, ECOWAS imposed economic, diplomatic and financial restrictions on the country (Okeke, et al, 2014). The AU suspended allocation from its Peace Building Fund to Bissau after the coup in 2012; however, it restored the contribution in 2013 following the transitional regime. ECOWAS continued diplomatic negotiations in April 2012 in Cote D’Ivoire to resolve the impasse, and appointed the Guinean president as its mediator for the crisis.

The AU sanctioned the intervention by ECOWAS in Guinea-Bissau’s political crisis, in line with Article 4 of the Constitutive Act, and principle of “non-indifference”. The intervention was also in accordance with the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security,1 as well as the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance,2 to restore order for civilian protection. ECOWAS negotiated with the military and political parties in Bissau using its good office, diplomats and special mediators to resolve the disagreements and tension in 2012. It also imposed economic sanctions and deployed peace support operations to return constitutional rule, and forestall further military interference in electoral processes. There was not much co-operation in the Bissau crisis at the initial stages. ECOWAS acted unilaterally after the military takeover, but had support from the UN and international institutions after mediating peaceful elections. Subsequently, the AU, ECOWAS and UN have been working together in post-conflict reconstruction and development. For example, ECOWAS and AU have been working with the UN Integrated Peacekeeping Office in Guinea Bissau (UNIOGBIS) to implement the “Terra Ranka” programme in providing social services. However, the limited coherence has made it difficult for these organisations to secure long-term stability and sustainable peace in Bissau.

Conclusion
This article assesses the importance of AROs in peace and security by examining achievements and shortfalls in their interventions to protect civilians for human security in West Africa. The AU and ECOWAS have always acted first in regional crises before interventions by other international actors, particularly the UN. This demonstrates the importance of AU and ECOWAS in eliminating threats to human security, and promoting democracy, peace and security in the region. This is evidenced by their involvement in ending the political crises, restoration of democracy and transfer of power, as well as political and security sector reforms after the crises in Cote D’Ivoire and Guinea Bissau.

However, the AU and ECOWAS have financial constraints, lack sufficient domestic/ international legitimisation and independent capacity (resources) to intervene in regional conflicts, and undertake the development framework of human security in post-conflict reconstruction. This article concludes that, despite these notable challenges, AROs remain relevant from normative and policy standpoints in protecting and securing human lives. To increase effectiveness in interventions, the AU and ECOWAS need to develop a more viable framework than a Memorandum of Understanding in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU and RECs/RMs. Such framework should further aim at making African bodies complimentary partners to the UN, and guide the expected co-ordination between AROs and western actors to work out subsidiary relationships for stronger synergy in achieving objectives of peace operations.

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