Ideological Influences on Intergroup Attitudes in the Context of the Hague Court Boundary Dispute between Peru and Chile

Influencias ideológicas de las actitudes intergrupales en el contexto de la disputa fronteriza entre Perú y Chile ante la Corte de la Haya

Influências ideológicas das atitudes intergrupais no contexto da disputa fronteiriça entre Peru e Chile frente à Corte de Haia

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Abstract

In the context of the border dispute presented by Peru against Chile in the The Hague Court, this study analyzes the influences of two ideological motivational dimensions: Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) on a set of intergroup attitudes that involve both nations. To this end, a survey study of 196 Chileans and 223 Peruvians participants was conducted. The instruments used to measure ideology and political attitudes are the following ones: RWA Scale; SDO Scale; Scale of Intergroup attitudes between Chile-Peru and specific questions on interest in the Hague litigation and willingness to fight for one's country. The results show that in the Peruvian case attitudes of belligerence and alert and a greater willingness to fight for the country are better explained by the RWA, while in the Chilean case these same attitudes are explained both by the RWA as well as the SDO. On the other hand, pacifist attitudes are explained inversely by SDO in both countries. These findings support the hypothesis that intergroup dynamics between both
Resumo
Este estudo analisa as influências de duas dimensões motivacionais ideológicas: o Autoritarismo de Direita (RWA) e a Orientação à Dominação Social (SDO) em um conjunto de atitudes intergrupais que envolvem Perú e Chile, no contexto da disputa fronteiriça apresentada pelo primeiro contra o segundo na Corte de Haia. Para isso, foi desenvolvido um estudo com 196 participantes do Chile e 223 do Peru. Os instrumentos utilizados para medir a ideologia e as atitudes políticas são os seguintes: Questionário de RWA; questionário de SDO; questionário de atitudes intergrupales entre Chile é Peru e itens de interesse na disputa ante A Haia e a vontade de lutar pelo próprio país. Os resultados mostram que, no caso peruano, as atitudes de beligerância e alerta, e uma maior disposição de lutar pelo país são explicadas pelo RWA, enquanto no caso chileno, essas mesmas atitudes são explicadas tanto pelo RWA quanto pela SDO. Por outro lado, as atitudes pacifistas são diminuídas pela SDO nos dois países. Estos resultados corroboram á hipótese da dinâmica intergrupal entre os dois países, marcada por ações explícitas do expansionismo chileno versus revanchismo peruano; os resultados também sugerem que as ideologias igualitarias poderão promover atitudes de respeito e cooperação entre os dois grupos, alterando os esquemas expansionista e revanchista para uma cultura de paz.

Palavras-chave: ideologia política; autoritarismo de direita (RWA); social dominance orientation (SDO); intergroup relations.

Resumen
En el contexto de la disputa fronteriza presentada por Perú contra Chile ante la Corte de la Haya, este estudio analiza las influencias dos dimensiones motivacionales ideológicas: el Autoritarismo de Derecha (RWA) y la Orientación a la Dominancia Social (SDO) en un conjunto de actitudes intergrupales que involucran a ambas naciones. Con esta finalidad, fue desarrollado un estudio por encuestas con 196 participantes de Chile y 223 de Perú. Los instrumentos utilizados para medir la ideología y las actitudes políticas son los siguientes: Escala de RWA; Escala de SDO; Escala de actitudes intergrupales entre Chile-Perú y preguntas especificas sobre el interés en el litigio de La Haya y la disposición de luchar por el propio país. Los resultados muestran que en el caso peruano las actitudes de beligerancia y alerta, y una mayor disposición a luchar por el país son explicadas por el RWA, mientras en el caso chileno,
Introduction

From a multidimensional perspective, psychological theories on political ideology consider the existence of observable empirical regularities, tie psychological motives and political ideological contents (e.g. Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Jost, Kay, & Thorisdottir, 2009). Based on this assumption, the model of political conservatism, as motivated social cognition, is built principally on the basis of (a) theories of personality and individual differences (e.g. Napier & Jost, 2008; Sibley & Duckitt, 2010), (b) theories related to satisfaction of epistemic and existential needs (e.g. Livi, Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & Kenny, 2015); and (c) socio-political theories with respect to rationalization of social systems (e.g. Jost & Banaji, 1994; Cichocka & Jost, 2014).

In this perspective psychological variables that predict political conservatism are related to such aspects as anxiety toward death, system instability, dogmatic intolerance toward ambiguity, openness to experience, tolerance toward uncertainty, need for order, structure, and cognitive closure, integrative complexity, fear of threat and loss, and defense of self-esteem. In effect, the central notion about political conservatism from this approach is related to a resistance to change and a justification of inequality; and with a motivation for needs that vary situationally and dispositionally with the aim of managing uncertainty and threats (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, 2003b).

In studies of political conservative ideology two of the more consistent predictors are Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) (Altemeyer, 1981) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Mallé, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar, & Levin, 2004). It has been observed that right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation might be good predictors of the expression of a generalized prejudice, but based on different motivations (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003).

Right-wing authoritarianism consists of three attitudinal dispositions related to submission to authority and to social norms represented by the authorities considered legitimate, high levels of social conventionalism and by a predisposition to authoritarian aggression against deviations...
from the legitimated norms (Duriez, Van Hiel, & Kossowska, 2005; Stone, 2001). In this way, authoritarian attitudes would be induced by a perception of threat to one’s situation (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) and produce an anxiety with respect to authority and an aggression toward subordinates and deviants (Wilson & Sibley, 2013; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007).

Authoritarianism is seen as a response to ambiguous and uncertain situations that cause anxiety and insecurity (Oesterreich, 2005). Levels of threat perception in surroundings depend on right-wing authoritarianism in as much as authoritarians would be less able to deal with threatening and uncertain situations (Cohrs & Ibler, 2009). In addition, right-wing authoritarianism correlates with such human values as security, tradition, and conformism (Altemeyer, 1998), which are associated with self-preservation and ingroup interests (Schwartz, 1992; Smith & Schwartz, 1996).

Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Mallé (1994) developed the Social Dominance Orientation Scale aimed at measuring the attitudinal orientation that individuals have in their intergroup relations, with regard to their preferences for hierarchical or egalitarian relations. Social dominance depends on socio-structural aspects of situations, such as resource scarcity, power relations and the level of group competition (Duckitt, 2001; Liu, Huang, & McFedries, 2008; Sidanius et al., 2004); and self-categorization as a dominant group member or one of a disadvantaged group (e.g. Dru, 2007) as well as personality characteristics (e.g. Sibley, & Duckitt, 2008). Jost and Thompson (2000) showing that the social dominance construct predicts political attitudes such as support for the law and order, military spending, and the death penalty as measures that buttress unequal power arrangements in intergroup and inter-individual relations (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; Sidanius, & Pratto, 1999). Studies have shown that SDO correlates positively with power and achievement values (Altemeyer, 1998) and negatively with such values as benevolence and universalism (Moya & Morales-Marente, 2005). There has been established a small but significant relationship between SDO and RWA, while at the same time these are separate and independent ideological motivational dimensions (Duckitt, 2001; Van Hiel, & Mervielde, 2002).

Social worldviews according to RWA and SDO, from the dual motivational model, are influenced by socialization, personality, and individual situations. Consequently, when the social world is perceived as more threatening and dangerous these individuals should be more authoritarian. On the other hand, when social situations are highly inequal and competitive for power, status, and resources; individuals will perceive the world as a hostile environment where is necessary to compete and, consequently, it will generate attitudinal support for social domination (Jost, Kay, & Thorisdottir, 2009, p. 299). Since political conservatism depends on historical, social, political and economic factors of each culture (or society) (Matthews, Levin, & Sidanius, 2009; Aspelund, Lindeman, & Verkasalo, 2013), it is necessary to continue developing studies on this issues in Latin America (e.g. Cárdenas, Meza, Lagues, & Yáñez, 2010; Cárdenas & Parra, 2010;
Rottenbacher, Espinosa, & Magallanes, 2011) with the aim of clarifying the ties, inconsistencies and convergences related to political ideology and the different ways of analyzing it.

**Ideology and Intergroup Dynamics between Peru and Chile**

In Latin America, the relation between ideological and identity attributes has been insufficiently explored in Social Psychology. Nonetheless, recent studies in various countries of the region indicate that aspects related to country identification are associated to authoritarian attitudes, suggesting that conservative ideology appears to be tied, at least among socioeconomical middle-class samples, to a greater adherence and national ingroup cohesion (Espinosa et al., 2017).

On the other hand, the ideological spectrum of conservatism expressed in the SDO, is related with a negative representation of national ingroups in some Latin American countries, like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, which seems to be associated with a self-perception of the majority of the countries of the region as low-status groups (Espinosa, 2011; Espinosa et al., 2017; Monsegreg, Espinosa, & Beramendi, 2014), except for the case of Chile, (Espinosa et al., 2017). This is understandable since there is a tendency among people who score high in SDO to express esteem and positive affects towards high status groups and a negative affect towards groups of a lower status, independently of the social category with which the individual identifies himself (Levin & Sidanius, 1999), being, possibly, one of the antecedents of the altercentrism phenomena observed in several countries of Latin America, which consists into favoring national outgroups perceived as more developed and of higher status than ingroup (Montero, 1992, 1996).

Studies in Latin America have focused on analyzing relations of ideology with identity and intragroup processes, however considering that the ideological dimensions also appear as good predictors of intergroup processes, such as prejudice towards outgroups, it makes interesting to study the influence of ideology in international dynamics as those established between Peru and Chile. In this regard, Valencia-Moya, Espinosa, Jiménez-Benítez and Romero (2018), find that authoritarian ideology in both, Peru and Chile, tend to increase a positive representation of their respective national ingroups; additionally, in Chile this also occurs, although in a more limited way, with the dominant ideology. On the contrary, the negative representation and valuation of the corresponding national outgroups is associated with authoritarianism and dominance in both Peru and Chile. However, from the cited study it is also clear that, there is a positive relationship between favorable ingroup and outgroup representations in both countries (Valencia-Moya et al., 2018).

Consistently, several authors have identified that these processes of outgroups representation will be framed by historical, political, and social processes, aligned with hegemonic ideological narratives on which the processes of construction of nationalism have taken place in both
countries (Espinosa, János, Páez, & Lewis, 2021; González, 2014; Rodríguez-Elizondo, 2004; Valencia-Moya, 2018).

Historically, the way relations between Peru and Chile have developed, are characterized by the prevalence of some hostile perceptions between citizens of both countries, whose origins can be found in past conflicts in which the Pacific War has prominent position and could be considered the first conflict that implied nationalist sentiments in the context of independent America (Hosiasson, 2011) and one of the most remembered events in the representation of Peruvian history (Robles & Espinosa, 2020; Espinosa, 2011; Rottenbacher & Espinosa, 2010).

The nineteenth century Chilean historian, Diego Barros Arana (1879-1881/1979) notes that Chile, shortly after Independence, began a development process that distinguished it from the other South American nations that became independent after Chile, like Peru. The notion that permeates a whole series of explanations about the Chilean victory and the corresponding Peruvian and Bolivian defeat are based on racist arguments found in many historiografic sources of the last century (McEvoy, 2012; Cid, 2012), which butresss moral and ideological justification set forward by Chilean political and social elites in order to develop and reproduce a nation-state project in accordance to their own class interests (Salazar, 2005; Cancino, 2006; Valencia-Moya, 2018). This expansionist posture was summarized in the 1940´s by the Chilean liberal intellectual Ricardo Donoso in the following way: “Chile closed in by natural barriers, the sea and the mountains, there was no other direction for expansion except for the Atacama Desert,” in addition it was distinctive for having “a uniform, strong, rough, armed population of an ardent and exalted patriotism pressing down on the influences of aboriginal roots” (Donoso, 1940, cited in Sansoni, 2012, p. 20).

On the other side, González Prada (1894-1908/1976) expressed the Peruvian avengeful narrative marked by a strong critique of his own country’s ruling elites and national character, but to which he also added:

“We are fallen, but are not nailed to a stone; mutilated, but not impotent; bleed, but not dead. Some years of good sense, a saving of forces, and we shall be in condition to act with efficacy. Let´s be a continual threat, since, for now, we can not be more. With our rage always alive, with our severe manly attitude, we shall keep the enemy in continuous uneasyness, making him spend gold in huge amounts of armaments consuming his energies. A calm day in Peru is a nightmare evening in Chile. Talk about immediate revenge, of the next armed demand, touches on delirium; for sure, I admit, is see it as a task for tomorrow. Let us work with the patience of the ant, and will tackle with the prowess of the hawk. Let the greed of Chile swallow guano and saltpetre; the time will come when their flesh will take iron and lead.” (González Prada, 1894-1908/1976, p. 55).
As a result, the history between Peru and Chile has experienced scenes in which nationalistic sentiments have been exalted through the exageration of the perception of threat from the respective national outgroup (Genna, Espinosa, & Páez, 2010; González, 2014). Recent studies have detected hostile contents with respect to attitudes based on Chilean expansionism and Peruvian avengefulness though there have been found pacifist contents in relation to the strengthening of integration between Peru and Chile (González, 2014; Rodríguez-Elizondo, 2004).

Research conducted among Peruvian university students suggest that they perceived Chile as a country with better weapons, and as a result makes it more threatening for Peru. (Genna et al., 2010). Considering the process of social comparison, Chile has been a significant outgroup of comparison with Peru since the end of the Pacific War and because of this it would be expected that many relevant aspects of identification with the national Peruvian ingroup would be associated to a constant comparison with Chile (Genna et al., 2010).

With regards to the representation and respect for the other one as antecedents to intergroup attitudes, Ibáñez (2013) examines in an experimental study the role of provided information plays in the representations about Peruvian ingroup and Chilean outgroup when introducing intergroup conflictive and intergroup cooperative situations as experimental stimuli. The results reveal that the salience of a threatening intergroup situation, related to the Chilean outgroup, increases the Peruvian ingroup cohesion and identification with the country.

Considering all the above, the present context of bilateral relations between the two countries is influenced by the action presented by the Peruvian Government on January 16, 2008, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague with the intent of demarcating the maritime boundaries between both countries and resolved by a decision handed down on January 27, 2014 (López, 2014). Specifically, the dispute consisted in the demarcation of the Pacific maritime boundaries between both countries from a coastal point named Landmark of Concordia where the land borders were established in the 1929 Treaty. The International Court of Justice judged in favor of Peru recognizing a maritime zone extending for 200 miles from the Peruvian coast belonging to Peru and which Chile considers open sea (Corte Internacional de Justicia, 2015, p. 28).

Noteworthy is the fact that in a 2010 survey conducted by the Instituto de Opinion Publica de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (IOP) and the Instituto de Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad Diego Portales (ICSO) that inquired as to whether the public felt about the other country in terms of whether it would abide by International Court’s verdict on maritime boundaries. Briefly the study revealed that a minority in Chile (36%) and a majority in Peru (60.4%) perceived that, authorities of the other country would not abide by the verdict if it were to their disadvantage. In addition, 8% of the Chileans and 20% of the Peruvians believe in the possibility of armed conflict between the two countries (Díaz, 2014). Another survey conducted
by Growth from Knowledge-Adimark [GFK-ADIMARK] in Chile in February of 2014 found that 52% of Chileans interviewed considered that the Court’s verdict did not favor either country while 32% felt that it favored Peru and only 10% declared that the verdict favored Chile. With respect to the future bi-national relations after the ICJ verdict, 64% considered that relations would remain the same and 25% felt that relations would worsen and just 8% believed that bilateral relations would become better than before (GFK-ADIMARK, 2014).

In this geopolitical scenario the main objective of the present study was to analyze the influence of conservative ideological dimensions, mainly SDO and RWA, on intergroup attitudes observed in Peru and in Chile samples days before the ICJ announced its verdict about Peruvian-Chilean maritime boundaries. This study is relevant, since the literature reviewed, these ideological dimensions would condition intergroup attitudes and thus explaining the motivational bases of the conflict between the two countries. This study pretends to research those ideological factors that tend to generate hostile dynamics, with the expectation of contributing to the overcoming of them and to develop a culture of peace between citizens of both nations.

**Method**

This research has a cross-sectional design, with convenience sampling. The scope is correlational and predictive. Due to the above, it is not possible to claim causal relationships or generalize the results to the population. The study had a total of 419 participants. The Peruvian sample consisted of 223 participants and the Chilean sample of 196. In the case of the Peruvian sample 52% were men and the ages ranged from 18 to 71 years old (\(M=33.44; SD=11.31\)); in the Chilean sample 49% were men and ages ranged between 17 to 70 years (\(M=29.42; SD=11.31\)). It is important to mention that the Peruvian sample is mostly composed of higher education students from an elite university at the national level as well as related people to those students. While the Chilean sample is mostly composed of higher education students from a public university that does not belong to the national elite in terms of higher education, and also participated people related with those students. In relation to this, in the Peruvian sample, 96.9% perceive themselves as middle or upper socioeconomical class. Only 3.1% perceive themselves as lower middle class. In the Chilean sample, 68.4% self-perceived themselves as middle class or upper middle class. 31.6% self-perceive themselves as lower middle class and lower class. In sum, the Peruvian sample tends to have a high social status compared to the Chilean sample. However, in the historical context of Latin America, in terms of conflicts between nations -specifically since the end of the war between both nations (1884), the Peruvian national group would historically have a lower social status compared to the social status of the Chilean national group (Valencia et al., 2018).

**Measures and Data Collection Instruments and Scales**

*Social Dominance Orientation/SDO Scale* (Pratto et al., 1994): The scale measures the levels of orientation toward social dominance of respondents. A version validated with a Chilean population by Cárdenas, Meza, Lagues and Yáñez (2010) was used in the study. The SDO scale
consisted of 16 items each with a response Likert scale of 1 to 6 between totally disagreeing and totally agreeing. Internal consistency of the scale was very good for both the Chilean sample ($\alpha=.83$), and for the Peruvian sample ($\alpha=.88$).

*Right-Wing Authoritarianism/RWA Scale* (Altemeyer, 1998): The scale measures the levels of right-wing authoritarianism of participants. The study used an abbreviated version of the scale consisting of 12 items validated in Chile by Cárdenas and Parra (2010). Each item of the scale was responded to with a six-point Likert scale that ranges from 1 (totally in disagreement) to 6 (totally in agreement). Internal consistency levels for both samples were acceptable: Chilean sample ($\alpha=.70$) and Peruvian sample ($\alpha=.76$).

*Intergroup Attitudes between Peru-Chile*: For this study a 12-item scale was developed. This scale would measure the opinions about Peruvian-Chilean relations in the context of the IJC decision. Each item registered the response using a Likert 1-to-7 alternatives in which 1 was “totally in disagreement” and 7 was “totally in agreement”.

An exploratory factor analysis with an orthogonal Varimax rotation permitted the identification of three attitudinal dimensions with a total of 58.95% explained variance. The dimensions identified were: (1) Attitudes of Alert and Belligerence, (2) Pacifist attitudes, and (3) Attitudes of Forgetting the Conflict. Statistically tests for sampling adequacy like Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin, $KMO=.824$, and a Bartlett test for sphericity, $\chi^2(66)=1482.226; p<.001$, showed a clear factorial structure of the scale. Table 1 presents the three dimensions with their corresponding factorial scores.

*Interest in the Hague Dispute*: Participants were asked a general question about the level of interest that a person had with regards to The Hague dispute between Peru and Chile. The question developed for this study was: “How interested are you about the topic of the dispute at the Hague that Peru and Chile have”. The response scale was a 1-to-7-scale in which 1 was “not at all interested” and 7 was “very interested”.

*Willingness to fight for the own country* (Bobowik et al., 2010): A general question that evaluates the willingness to fight for the own country in case of war was asked in the present study. The question was taken from the Bobowik et al. (2010) research and was enunciated in the following term for the present study: “Of course no one wants war, but if the situation appears, would you be willing to fight for your country against the aggression of another country?” The response scale was a 7-item scale in which 1 was “not at all willing” and 7 was “totally willing”.

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Enero – abril de 2022

IDEOLÓGICAS EN LOS PUNTO DE VISTA DE LA JURISDICCIÓN DEL CORTES DEL MUNDO DE RÉVALS: EL CASO DE LA DISPUTA DE LÍMITE ENTRE PERÚ Y CHILE.

In 2022, the Hague Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a decision regarding the boundary dispute between Peru and Chile. To understand the ideological influences on intergroup attitudes in this context, a questionnaire was designed and administered to participants from both countries.

The questionnaire consisted of 16 items each with a response Likert scale of 1 to 6 between totally disagreeing and totally agreeing. Internal consistency of the scale was very good for both the Chilean sample ($\alpha=.83$), and for the Peruvian sample ($\alpha=.88$).

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Table 1 presents the three dimensions with their corresponding factorial scores.
Table 1. Exploratory Factor Analysis of the Intergroup Attitudes between Peru and Chile.

| Items                                                                 | Alert and belligerence attitudes | Pacifists attitudes | Forgetting about the conflict attitudes |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| I think that the country should buy more armaments to defend itself or dissuade any intention of aggression from our neighbor. | 0.832                            |                     |                                         |
| If the International Court at the Hague decides in favor of our country, our armed forces should be prepared to enforce compliance. | 0.822                            |                     |                                         |
| With regard to our neighbor, we should always have an attitude of precaution and alertness. | 0.808                            |                     |                                         |
| We should not halt our arms build up until confirmation that our neighboring country has done it. | 0.781                            |                     |                                         |
| If there were to be an armed conflict between Peru and Chile, I would be willing to go to the front to defend my country. | 0.615                            |                     |                                         |
| We have to accept that Chile and Peru will never be friends.           | 0.560                            | -0.329              |                                         |
| A war between two fraternal countries, like Chile and Peru, should not be permitted. |                                  |                     |                                         |
| It would be stupid to go to a war between Peru and Chile; that makes no sense. |                                  |                     |                                         |
| We should appeal to pacifism and let the dispute at the Hague be resolved in the International Court. |                                  |                     |                                         |
| The real battle of Peru and Chile is against poverty and underdevelopment. |                                  |                     |                                         |
| It is not possible that Peru and Chile spend another 100 years discussing the same thing: we should not open again the boundary issue. |                                  |                     |                                         |
| The War of the Pacific is part of the past and there is where it should stay. |                                  |                     |                                         |
| Explained Variance                                                    | 32.69%                           | 17.75%              | 8.51%                                   |
| Internal consistency of the dimension (Cronbach Alpha)                | 0.84                             | 0.69                | 0.65                                    |

Procedure
Data collection was conducted through the Google.docs virtual platform in which the survey was sent to lists of email addresses and to different social networks in Peru and Chile, in order to have access to a general sample in both countries. The decision of administering the
questionnaire through the internet is understood as an equivalent method of sampling, and in fact with some advantages over face-to-face surveying such as the increased diversity of the sample, shorter time and lower costs in data collection, a lessening of the social instability in responses and a reduction in the process of tabulation of the databases (Lyons, Cude, Lawrence, & Gutter, 2005).

The data collection was conducted between January and February of 2014, prior to the verdict of the ICJ at The Hague over the Peru and Chile boundary dispute. Before responding to the questionnaire the participants were presented with an informed consent with relevant information about the study objectives, the voluntary nature of respondents’ participation, confidentiality of the responses guaranteeing the anonymous nature of participation and the use of the data only for strict academic purposes. Participants were no rewarded in any sense for their collaboration in the study.

**Results**

**Political Ideology**

The average scores of the SDO indicator were low both for the Peruvian sample ($M=2.03; SD=.80$) and the Chilean sample ($M=1.74; SD=.66$) in which the mid-point of the scale is 3.5. In spite of the low scores of both samples, it should be noted that the score for the Peruvian sample was larger than the Chilean one, $t(372.85)=3.95, p<.001, d=.40$.

Similarly, with the RWA indicator where there is a moderate average score of the Peruvian sample ($M=3.18; SD=.84$) and a lower average score for the Chilean sample ($M=2.76; SD=.83$) in which the mid-point of the scale is 3.5. In this case the level of authoritarianism of the Peruvian sample is statistically greater that the Chilean, $t(399)=5.03, p<.001, d=.50$.

The SDO and RWA indicators are moderately correlated in both the Peruvian sample, $r(195)=.32, p<.001$, as in the Chilean sample, $r(165)=.45, p<.001$.

**Intergroup Attitudes, Interest in The Hague Dispute and Willingness to Fight for the Own Country**

With regards to intergroup attitudes, there were low mean scores for the variable of attitudes of Alert and belligerence both for the Peruvian, ($M=3.23, SD=1.27$), as for the Chilean sample, ($M=2.88; SD=1.21$) considering that the mid-point of the scale was 4. These results suggest that there are relevant differences between both samples in which the Peruvian sample was more agreement in attitudes of Alert and belligerence toward the Chilean outgroup, $t(387)=2.73, p<.01, d=.28$.

Pacifist attitudes are more consensual in so far that there is a greater support for them both in the Peruvian, ($M=6.52; SD=.86$), as in the Chilean sample, ($M=6.29; SD=1.11$) in which the mid-
point for the scale is 4. In this case, the score of the Peruvian sample on this variable is statistically greater than the one of the Chilean sample, $t(356.77)=2.37, p<.05, d=.23$

In looking at attitudes towards Forgetting the conflict, both, the Peruvian sample ($M=5.87; SD=1.52$) and the Chilean sample ($M=5.78; SD=1.58$) mean scores are high considering that the mid-point of the scale is 4, and there are no significant differences between the two countries on this variable.

In addition, the study measured the level of interest with respect to The Hague dispute and the willingness to fight for the own country in case of an extern conflict. With respect to interest in The Hague dispute, the data show medium to high mean scores in both the Peruvian ($M=4.87; SD=1.73$) and Chilean ($M=4.55; SD=1.94$) samples with no significant differences between them.

On the other hand, with regard to the willingness to fight for the own country, the Peruvian sample showed a low mean score ($M=3.34; SD=2.27$) while in the Chilean case the mean score was even lower than in the Peruvian sample ($M=2.23; SD=1.98$). Statistically the differences between the samples on this variable are significant, $t(416)=5.37, p<.001, d=.52$.

Pearson Correlation analysis were done to determine the degree of association between intergroup attitudes, interest in The Hague dispute and willingness to fight for the own country. The following table presents the correlations between these variables for the Peruvian (above) and the Chilean (below) samples.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Attitudes of Alert and Belligerence | 1 | -.23*** | -.34*** | .29*** | .48*** |
| 2. Pacifist Attitudes | -.34*** | 1 | .37*** | -.01 | -.07 |
| 3. Attitudes of Forgetting the Conflict | -.04 | .44*** | 1 | -.28*** | -.20** |
| 4. Interest in The Hague dispute | .39*** | -.08 | -.04 | 1 | .37*** |
| 5. Willingness to Fight for the own country | .59*** | -.35*** | .04 | .26*** | 1 |

***$p<.001$, **$p<.01$.  
Note correlations above the diagonal line are from the Peruvian Sample and below the diagonal line are from the Chilean Sample.
Relations between Ideology and Intergroup Attitudes

Considering the ideological measures on SDO and RWA as independent variables and intergroup attitudes as dependent variable, several regressions analyses were carried out to observe these relations. In the first place, we analyzed the effect of SDO and RWA on attitudes of Alert and belligerence for both the Peruvian and Chilean samples. In both cases, the regression models were significant, and it is noteworthy that in the Peruvian case hostile attitudes of Alert and belligerence toward the Chilean outgroup were explained by the RWA, while in the Chilean sample these same hostile attitudes toward the Peruvian outgroup were explained by both RWA and SDO.

Table 3. Regression analyses of the influences of ideology on alert and belligerence attitudes.

|                      | Peru sample model |          |                   |          |          |                   |          |
|----------------------|-------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|----------|-------------------|----------|
|                      | R²                | ∆R²      | F                 | B        | R²        | ∆R²               | F        |
| SDO                  | .19               | .18      | 20.73***          | .09      | .23       | .40**             |          |
| RWA                  |                   |          |                   |          |          |                   |          |

***p<.001, **p<.01.

Subsequently, regression analyses relating the influence of SDO and RWA to Pacifist attitudes were done. In both cases the regression models were significant; the effect size of the relations in the Chilean model was moderate, while in the Peruvian case it was small. In both cases, the inverse effect of SDO on the Pacifist attitudes was observed.

Table 4. Regression analyses of the influence of ideology on pacifist attitudes.

|                      | Peru sample model |          |                   |          |          |                   |          |
|----------------------|-------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|----------|-------------------|----------|
|                      | R²                | ∆R²      | F                 | B        | R²        | ∆R²               | F        |
| SDO                  | .04               | .03      | 3.66*             | -.18*    | .13       | .12               | 11.40*** |
| RWA                  |                   |          |                   |          |          |                   |          |

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05.

In the case of the influences of the SDO and RWA on attitudes of Forgetting the conflict, the regression models for both the Peruvian and Chilean samples were not significant.
Relations between Ideology, Interest in The Hague Dispute and Willingness to Fight for the own country

Regression analyses were done where measures of SDO and RWA were used as predictor variables and interest with respect to The Hague dispute as dependent variable. The regression analyses were significant in the two countries, observing that in both cases it is the RWA that shows positive correlations with interest in The Hague dispute as shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Regression analyses of the influence of ideology on interest for the Hague dispute.

|                  | Peru sample model | Chile sample model |
|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
|                  | R²                | ΔR²                | F      | B     | R²    | ΔR²    | F      | B     |
| RWA              | .11               | .10                | 11.61*** | -.05  | .06   | 5.10** | .02    |
| RWA              | -                 |                    |        | .34***|       |        |        |       |

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05.

Finally, the regression analyses between the influence of the ideological measures and the willingness to fight for the own country resulted in significant models for the two samples. Specifically, in the Peruvian case attitudes favorable to fighting for the own country was explained by RWA, while in the Chilean case the willingness to fight for the own country is explained by both RWA and SDO as shown in the table below.

Table 6. Regression analyses of the influences of ideology on the willingness to fight for the own country.

|                  | Peru sample model | Chile sample model |
|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
|                  | R²                | ΔR²                | F      | B     | R²    | ΔR²    | F      | B     |
| RWA              | .11               | .10                | 11.41*** | -.07  | .14   | 12.95*** | .21*  |
| RWA              |                    |                    |        | .34** |       |        | .23**  |

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05.

Discussion

The main objective of this study was to analyze the influence of ideological dimensions, SDO and RWA, on intergroup attitudes observed in Peruvian and Chilean samples days before the ICJ announced its verdict about Peru-Chile maritime boundaries. As the data presented above shows, in the Peruvian sample, the levels of RWA and SDO are greater than in the Chilean sample. Nevertheless, what is noteworthy it the fact that the effect size of the relations
between RWA and SDO are higher in the Chilean sample, which suggests in this case there is a more homogeneous expression of conservatism.

The data point to a greater level of belligerence and alert in the Peruvian sample with respect to intergroup attitudes. This could be associated to an authoritarian response in which a potentially threatening stimulus, represented by Chileans, increases the levels of authoritarianism and viceversa (Oesterreich, 2005). On the other hand, the Chilean sample presents lower levels in the ideological indicators and, as such, a lower prevalence of belligerent and alert attitudes. None the less, the regression analyses suggest that the belligerence and alert attitudes in the Peruvian case are predicted for the RWA as a response to the Chilean outgroup as a potential threat, while in the Chilean case belligerent and alert attitudes toward the Peruvian outgroup are predicted by the RWA and by SDO as two aspects related not only to the classical authoritarian response to a threat but a dominant response to the Peruvian outgroup. Apparently, these results help to understand the motivational bases that authors like Rodríguez-Elizondo (2004) and González (2014) have analyzed as the Chilean expansionist dynamic, based on a response to the threat of revenge from the Peruvian outgroup through domination practices and of Peruvian revenge as a response to the threat of Chilean expansionism.

The above corroborates social psychological assumptions about the role of ideology as a predictor in hostile intergroup dynamics, based on power or threat on the part of relevant outgroups (Altemeyer, 1981, 1998; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; Duckitt, 2003; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). The responses, ideologically motivated, in the case of the relations between Chile and Peru, have certain support in historical narratives, such as those of Barros-Arana (1879-1881/1979), Donoso (1940) and Sansoni (2012) who introduced justifications for the Pacific War, based on a presumed Chilean moral superiority rooted in racist arguments and on the need to expand the borders for protection of the national ingroup.

The study results are consistent with the essence of the historical narratives about Peru and Chile relations: from the Peruvian perspective an understanding that the Chilean outgroup is threatening and has historically offended the Peruvian national ingroup, which certain historical narrative demand necessarily revenge of Chilean agressions (González-Prada, 1894-1908/1976), and which more recently been expressed by an authoritarian response of an avengeful nature (González, 2014) in the presence of a threatening outgroup as the Chileans (Genna et al., 2010).

Noteworthy is the fact that the ideological motivational bases for belligerent and alert attitudes constitute the same motivational bases for the willingness to fight for the own country in the case of an external armed conflict. That is to say the authoritarianism in the case of the Peruvian sample and the authoritarianism and social dominance in the case of the Chilean sample, are
good predictors of an intention to use military action against the respective national outgroup. This reaffirms the role that those conservative ideological expressions play in the process of exacerbating conflicts.

On the other hand, pacifist attitudes are predicted in both the Peruvian and the Chilean samples in an inverse manner by dominant ideology, though the effect size for the Chilean case is greater than in the Peruvian case. This means that the agreement with egalitarian relations between groups would help develop dispositions toward actions of respect and cooperation with the other group, especially in the Chilean case, breaking with the image of expansionism reflected in the narrative of dominance. It is important to point out that statistically the level of agreement with these attitudes is greater than the level of agreement with belligerent and alert attitudes in both samples, apparently related to the low levels of authoritarianism and dominance, as well as the predominant agreement that the relations between the two groups ought to point to regional integration (González, 2014). This is consistent with the findings of this study in the Peruvian sample, where one finds that at the present time historical aspects of the relations with Chile no affect neither the construction of a Peruvian national identity nor contribute to a belittling of the Chilean outgroup, but instead of belligerence predominates certain attitudes of regional integration (Espinosa, 2011).

Attitudes towards forgetting the past do not seem to be influenced by any of the ideological indicators. In both the Chilean and Peruvian cases, forgetting could be acting as a defense mechanism of the ingroup image. Thus, forgetting the past allows Peruvians to avoid the recognizing the conditions that gave rise to the military defeat in the Pacific War (González-Prada, 1894-1908/1976); while in the Chilean case, forgetting may be a defense mechanism against the collective guilt for abuses committed in that conflict (cf., Páez, Marques, Valencia, & Vincze, 2006).

Contextualizing the study results the eve of the International Court’s verdict in favor of the Peruvian position on the maritime border dispute, attitudes of interest in the dispute are associated with a greater prevalence of belligerent and alert attitudes in both the Peruvian and Chilean samples, and with attitudes towards forgetting the past in the Peruvian group. Nevertheless, interest in the dispute is predicted in both samples by RWA. It should be pointed out that the statistical effect of the model in the case of Peru is greater than in the Chilean case, making it a reasonable deduction that interest in the dispute, accompanied by nationalist narratives expressed in some media, may appear in the Peruvian case as some form of avenging and under a greater prevalence of negative expectations about how Chile may react if the verdict in the International Court is against them (Díaz, 2014).

In sum, it is important to emphasize that intergroup relations, such as Peruvian-Chilean one, must be framed in historical, political and social processes that make the dynamics between these groups more understandable. It is noteworthy in this scenario, the need to pay attention
to some hegemonic and ideological narratives on which the representation of national groups and their antagonists has been built, in order to get an accurate diagnosis of the factors that attempt against the consolidation of a peace culture in the region and the opportunities to face and overcome the negative aspects of the conflict between countries (Espinosa et al., 2021; González, 2014; Rodríguez-Elizondo, 2004; Valencia-Moya, 2018).

**Limitations and future trends**

Although the research identifies that the belligerent narratives between Peruvians and Chileans seem to be explained by a mixture of conservative ideology with the narratives about the conflict that have been constructed in both nations (González, 2014; Rodríguez-Elizondo, 2004), it is important to highlight that the generalization of the results to the Peruvian and Chilean population is limited by the nature of the samples used (not representatives). As well, the causal temporality of the relationships is limited by the cross-sectional design. In this sense, there are still questions to be answered in this line, particularly how the socioeconomic status of individuals, and the group they belong, influences the relationship between political conservatism and attitudes towards out-groups. It is also relevant in future research to consider a person-centered approach rather than a variable-centered approach, in order to study the homogeneity and heterogeneity of ideology in different subgroups within the population (Osborne & Sibley, 2017).

Finally, the study points to the need of promoting policies aimed at bettering through the mass-media the mutual images of both countries and foment more international cooperation in the fields of education, commerce and culture (cf. Ibáñez, 2013). In this light, the study points for the need of mitigating narratives of an authoritarian nature in the Peruvian case and of an authoritarian and dominating nature in the Chilean case with the intent of promoting more egalitarian relations of mutual respect and cooperation and reduce the cycles of perceived Chilean expansionism and Peruvian avengefulness by promoting a culture of peace between the two nations (González, 2014; 2019).

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