Orientation of religiosity and radicalism: the dynamic of an ex-terrorist’s religiosity

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Abstract

Recognition of the religious motives and orientations of acts of radicalism and terrorism are often preached by mass media. The religious motive in the context of Islamic radicalism is often referred to the term *jihad*, it is the act of seeking Allah’s blessings. The motive or religious orientation in the view of Religious Psychology is called an intrinsic religious orientation, turning religion into a goal of action because of religion itself. This is distinguished from the extrinsic religious orientation that makes religion a tool for obtaining subjective goals. We aim to understand to what extent the consistency of recognition is viewed from the perspective of religious orientation theory. This is because there is often an inconsistency between claimed motives with attitude. To examine this issue more deeply, we raised the case of the dynamics of religious orientation of a former terrorist, Yusuf Adirama, who experienced the dynamics and religious orientation changes from a radicalist and terrorist into a moderately religious person. This research reveals that in the case of Yusuf Adirama, the meaning of *jihad* could change over time following his life experience. *Jihad*, originally interpreted as taking up arms against the enemies of God, has turned into opposing various acts of violence and helping the needy (*Dhuafa*) who need help, including those caused by terrorism, both for the perpetrator and victim.
Pengakuan tentang motif dan orientasi yang bersifat keagamaan dari tindakan radikalisme dan terorisme kerap diberitakan media. Motif agama yang dimaksud dalam konteks radikalisme Islam sering disebut dengan istilah jihad, mencari ridho Allah atau Lillahi ta’ala. Motif atau Orientasi agama seperti ini dalam pandangan Psikologi Agama disebut dengan Orientasi agama intrinsik, yaitu sebuah orientasi yang menjadikan agama sebagai tujuan suatu tindakan karena agama itu sendiri. Hal ini dibedakan dengan orientasi agama ekstrinsik yang menjadikan agama sebagai alat untuk memperoleh tujuan subyektif. Peneliti tertarik untuk mengetahui sejauh mana konsistensi pengakuan tersebut ditinjau dari perspektif teori orientasi agama, karena kerap terjadi inkonsistensi antara orientasi atau motif yang diklaimnya dengan sikap dan perilakunya. Untuk mengkaji lebih dalam tentang masalah ini, penulis mengangkat kasus dinamika orientasi keagamaan seorang mantan teroris Yusuf Adirama, yang mengalami dinamika dan perubahan orientasi agama dari seorang radikalis bahkan teroris menjadi seorang yang cinta damai (pasifis). Penelitian ini mengungkapkan bahwa dalam kasus Yusuf Adirama orientasi keagamaan yang sama yaitu jihad seiring perjalanan waktu, karena berbagai dinamika kehidupan yang dialami, dapat berubah pemaknaannya. Jihad yang semula dimaknai mengangkat senjata melawan musuh-musuh Allah, berubah menjadi melawan berbagai tindak kekerasan dan menolong para dhuafa yang membutuhkan pertolongan, termasuk dhuafa akibat peristiwa terorisme baik pelaku maupun korbannya.

Keywords: Religious orientation; Terrorism; Radicalism; Jihad

Introduction

Since 9/11 Tragedy, research on Islamic religious radicalism has abounded. Approaches and perspectives were used to discuss the factors of radicalism in Islam. This study attempts to uncover the case of radicalism and terrorism from the point of view of Psychology, especially Religious Psychology. Jeff Victoroff suggests that psychology holds an important role in mitigating the risk of catastrophic attacks through long scientific research on terrorist mentality.¹ John Horgan examines counter terrorism through

¹Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: a Review and Critique of Psychological
understanding the psychological processes and stages of acts of terrorism.\textsuperscript{2}

In addition, Annette Schaefer studies the terrorists physically to see the motive behind their exceptional acts.\textsuperscript{3} Regarding motives of terrorism, Assaf Moghadam observed the motives of martyrdom of notorious terrorists who were members of Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad and suicide bombers.\textsuperscript{4} The reasons behind the martyrs are investigated by Arie W. Kruglanski et al, who state that there are personal reasons, such as trauma, embarrassment, or social isolation as well as other ideological factors, such as independence, the defense of the state or religion, and social pressure factors.\textsuperscript{5} The profiles of Middle Eastern terrorists who turn out to have similar psychosocial traits to authoritarianism and pathological hostility are studied by Michael Gottschalk and Simon Gottschalk.\textsuperscript{6} According to Jerrold M. Post, M.D. there is no sufficient psychological theory to explain the problem of terrorism. Cultural, historical, and political contexts must serve, especially against two types of terrorism: nationalist-separatist terrorism and extremist religious terrorism.\textsuperscript{7}

Among religious radicalism studies with a psychological approach, it is very unusual to examine the religious orientation, attitudes, and actions

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2}John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism”, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 618, no. 1 (2008), 80, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716208317539, accessed 2 May 2018.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Annette Schaefer, “Inside the Terrorist Mind”, Sci Am Mind Scientific American Mind, vol. 18, no. 6 (2007), 73.
\item \textsuperscript{4}Assaf Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks”, International Security International Security, vol. 33, no. 3 (2009), 47.
\item \textsuperscript{5}Arie W. Kruglanski et al., “Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance”, POPS Political Psychology, vol. 30, no. 3 (2009), 332.
\item \textsuperscript{6}Michel Gottschalk and Simon Gottschalk, “Authoritarianism and pathological hatred: A social psychological profile of the middle eastern terrorist”, The American Sociologist, vol. 35, no. 2 (2004), 38, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02692396, accessed 2 May 2018.
\item \textsuperscript{7}Jerrold M. Post, “When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-Cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism”, Political Psychology, vol. 26, no. 4 (2005), 615, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792578, accessed 2 May 2018.
\end{itemize}
of the offender. This research explores the psychological mechanisms behind religious orientations. In order to discuss this, a case has been posed concerning the complexities of the religious orientation of the former terrorist, namely Yusuf Adirima (YA).8 He was a terrorist suspected for an attempt to bomb Sri Rejeki, a prostitution spot in Semarang, and was sentenced to ten years in Nusa Kambangan prison.

The theory of religious orientation has long been a milestone in the study of Religious Psychology.9 The theory, first discovered by Gordon W. Allport in the 1940s, was then developed by Allport and Ross in 1967 and became one of the most widely used methods of researching the association of religious behavior and health.10 There is a certain motive behind every religious behavior as Allport found in his research.11 Allport assumed that there is a mature and immature religious orientation, later understood as intrinsic and extrinsic.12 Extrinsic religious orientation is defined as a means to achieve subjective and selfish goals, such as social support, pleasure, and self-esteem. Meanwhile, the intrinsic religious orientation

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8 Yusuf was born as Machmudi Hariono on November 19, 1976. He was also known as Yoseph Adirima when was still involved in the jihad movement in Southeast Asia. Yusuf was arrested by police in the case of the plot to bomb Sri Rejeki Semarang. He was sentenced to 10 years for his involvement. After serving a period of detention, he lived in Gisikdrono West Semarang and turned into a moderate-minded person. The man with three children chose entrepreneurship as his new jihad. Now he also awakens ex-terrorists to abandon violence.

9 Niko Tiliopoulos et al., “The Means and Ends of Religiosity: A Fresh Look at Gordon Allport’s Religious Orientation Dimensions”, *Personality and Individual Differences*, vol. 42, no. 8 (2007), 851–63, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191886906004429, accessed 2 May 2018.

10 Gordon W. Allport and J. Michael Ross, “Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice”, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 5 (1967), 432–43.

11 Seward Hiltner, “The Individual and His Religion: A Psychological Interpretation. Gordon W. Allport”, *The Journal of Religion*, vol. 30, no. 4 (1950), 293–4, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/484044, accessed 2 May 2018.

12 Gordon W. Allport, “Behavioral Science, Religion, and Mental Health”, *Journal of Religion and Health*, vol. 2, no. 3 (1963), 187–97, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27504566, accessed 2 May 2018.
makes religion the ultimate goal to be close to God.\textsuperscript{13} Allport interpreted religious orientation as a person’s approach to his religion, in other words, what faith means in a person’s life.\textsuperscript{14} People with intrinsic orientation are defined as people living in or based on religion. Meanwhile, people who are extrinsically oriented are defined as people who utilize religion.\textsuperscript{15} In the Skinnerian perspective, extrinsic people participate in a religion as ‘reinforcement.’ Theoretically, if there is no reinforcement then it will leave the religion.

Although Allport’s theory is widely accepted, these two orientations are not sufficient to examine the existing religious orientation of humans. Batson’s study of this theory provides an additional category to Allport’s findings, but this addition does not dispel previously discovered orientation theories. Batson asserts that there is a third religious orientation, which aims to seek knowledge and answers to existential questions in life.\textsuperscript{16}

Departing from religious orientation theory, it is interesting to observe the orientation and motivation of the perpetrators of religious radicalism and terrorism. Most of them perceived their radical action to be motivated purely by religion, \textit{jihad} for Allah (\textit{lilla\text{"i} h\text{"i} ta\text{"a}la}). We aim to explore the extent to which the religious orientation is genuine, original and supported by evidence in the form of consistency of attitude and behavior, or whether it is merely recognition that is not supported by facts. What factors can influence a person’s religious orientation? And why do certain individuals experience a very dynamic religious orientation? As stated in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13}Peter Hills et al., “Primary Personality Trait Correlates of Religious Practice and Orientation”, \textit{Personality and Individual Differences}, vol. 36, no. 1 (2004), 61–73, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191886903000515, accessed 2 May 2018.
\item \textsuperscript{14}Raymond F. Paloutzian, \textit{Invitation to the Psychology of Religion}, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996, 200.
\item \textsuperscript{15}Raymond F. Paloutzian, \textit{Invitation to the Psychology of Religion...}, 202.
\item \textsuperscript{16}C. Daniel Batson, Patricia Schoenrade, and W. Larry Ventis, \textit{Religion and the Individual: A Social-Psychological Perspective}, Revised edition edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
\end{itemize}
the introduction, that to be able to analyze it more clearly and deeply, the research focuses on one case of religious radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia perpetrated by YA, a former terrorist.

Radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia

Radicalism is a view that demands dramatic changes or social and political reforms which are frequently even taken in violent ways. Radicalism is also understood as an attitude and act to change socio-political conditions using a form of violence. Nuraan Davids defined radicals as implicitly connoting extremism. One may have the tendency to regard radical terms as diametrically contrary to the moderate term. Radical is extremism which is opposite of moderation. Moderate is the centripetal force pushing strongly towards the center, whereas extremism is centrifugal, which pulls from the center to the outer or extreme edges of the subject. Terrorism is the systematic use of terror, especially as a means of violence. Thus, radicalism and terrorism have a close meaning. Radical action using violence and fear is called terrorism. This goes against the universal truth, obviously. The indication is that society rejects it; they question how humans can behave in such a way.

The root of Islamic radicalism is generally institutionalized in the Wahabi movement, an Islamic reform movement in the 18th century supported by Saud Family who establishes the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Since 1880, Saudi Arabia has become wealthy because of its oil, and at the

17Bilveer Singh and Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Jejaring Radikalisme Islam di Indonesia: Jejak Sang Pengantin Bom Bunuh Diri, Yogyakarta: Jogja Bangkit Publisher, 2011, 6.
18Nuraan Davids, “Islam, Moderation, Radicalism, and Justly Balanced Communities”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 37, no. 3 (2017), 309–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2017.1384672, accessed 2 May 2018.
19Mohammad Hashim Kamali and Tariq Ramadan, The Middle Path of Moderation in Islam: The Qur’anic Principle of Wasatiyyah, 1 edition edition, Oxford:New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
20John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes”..., 84.
same time the power of the Saud family is increasingly absolute, including the power to mainstream the Wahabi path (manhaj) both within their country and abroad. The current Wahabi movement is also associated with the idea of salafism, a notion that tends to follow the generation of salaf (the first three generations in Islamic history), which is considered the purest and unmixed heresy. Therefore, Wahabi people are also often equated with neo-salafi.

The linkage of Salafi theology with Islamic radicalism has been studied. Din Wahid examines Salafi ideology through the research of Salafi boarding school in various places in Indonesia.\(^\text{21}\) According to him, Salafi doctrine can be traced to the early period of the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ahmad ibn Hanbal. In the contemporary period Abdu Aziz Abdullah ibn Baz and Muhammad Nasir al Din al Albani are two very influential Salafi writers. The famous Salafi texts are *al Tawhid* and *al Ushul al Thalatha* by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab and *al Aqida al Wasitiyyah* by Ibn Taimiyah is a basic book in Salafi boarding school.\(^\text{22}\) The emergence of the prominent Salafi movement in Indonesia was the birth of *Laskar Jihad* led by Ja’far Umar Thalib, a group of military men who mobilized Muslim support for jihad in the Moluccas for defending Muslims from Christian attacks.\(^\text{23}\) The weakness of the salafi doctrine is the nature of its submission to the leader, therefore every time this salafi group is empowered, they will almost certainly misuse it.\(^\text{24}\) Roel Meijer. In his book, Global Salafism, divides Salafism into a type of quietist, politic,

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\(^{21}\)Din Wahid, “Nurturing Salafi Manhaj; A study of Salafi pesantrens in contemporary Indonesia”, *Wacana*, vol. 15, no. 2 (2014), 367–76, http://wacana.ui.ac.id/index.php/wjhi/article/view/413, accessed 2 May 2018.

\(^{22}\)Din Wahid, “Nurturing Salafi Manhaj ..., 368.

\(^{23}\)Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad, Islam, Militansi dan Pencarian Identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru*, Jakarta: Pustaka LP3ES, 2008.

\(^{24}\)Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad...*
and jihadist.\textsuperscript{25} Meanwhile, according to Din Wahid, Salafis in Indonesia can be divided into puritan groups (focus on education and da’wah), haraki (nonviolent political movements), and jihadis (extreme political movements with violence).\textsuperscript{26}

Associated with the origins of radicalism in Indonesia, some authors argue that Islamic radicalism in Indonesia cannot be separated from the phenomenon of global Islamism. The momentum of the victory of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, seen as a sign of Islamic revivalism, began to manifest itself. At the same time, neo-salafism became the most influential Islamic interpretation. With the full financial support from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, neo-salafism spread to various parts of the world, especially with the institution of Rabithah ‘Alam Islami (RAI). In Indonesia, it was the Council of Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) and the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences (LIPIA) that contributed to spread salafism. Middle East Salafi spread in Indonesia in the era of the 80s such as Ikhwanul Muslimin (IM), Hizbut Tahrir, and other Salafi movements.\textsuperscript{27} This phenomenon helped “harden” Islam in Indonesia and spread a wide potential of radicalism. In addition, historical events of Indonesian Islamism in the early independence of Indonesia such as the Darul Islam (DI) and the Indonesian Islamic Army (TII) Kartosuwiryo, Kahar Muzakkar and others have a link to at least the inspiration for the emergence of this radical Salafism and movement.\textsuperscript{28} This phenomenon, initially named “Islamism”, is an ideology that believes in Islam as (or should be) the basis of national politics. This idea has gained more space

\textsuperscript{25}Roel Meijer (ed.), \textit{Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement}, 1 edition edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

\textsuperscript{26}Din Wahid, “Nurturing Salafi Manhaj…, 373.

\textsuperscript{27}Muhammad Wildan, “Harmonitas Kultur Agama Pedesaan dan Gejala Radikalisme”,\textit{ Institute for Research and Empowerment (IRE)}, vol. 1, no. 1 (2013), 66.

\textsuperscript{28}Noorhaidi Hasan, \textit{Laskar Jihad…, 19–21.}
since the fall of the New Order power, where the crisis at the time was the pretext of proof that Western-style democracy is fragile and unloved by God. Thus, the idea of Islamism strengthened and mutated into a more realistic political movement. This then transformed into forms of radicalism.²⁹

Unlike the others, Adam James Fenton drew the roots of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia long before independence, namely from the 1780s when some people who returned from the pilgrimage caused a friction with a long-lived Sufistic Islam in the archipelago. Padri War of 1821, Java War, or the Diponegoro War of 1825-1830 were examples. This political spirit continued to the declaration of the Jakarta Charter a century later—a charter that failed to become the foundation of the nation. The division of the charter adds to the wounds of political Islam in Indonesia to bring up Darul Islam (DI) rebellion under the leadership of S.M. Kartosuwiryo from the 1940s to the 1960s. DI is also the embryo of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI)—one of the radical organizations in Southeast Asia, who are responsible for a number of terror acts including the Bali Bombing.³⁰

Muhammad Wildan proposes another perspective. Social changes, modernization, and globalization exclude religious values and are replaced by Western secular culture. Islamic da’wah is conventionally no longer able to offset and stem the influence outside. As a result, religious movements that are resistant to modernization and globalization are emerging. The desire to apply the Shari’a of Islam also surfaced. It is this condition that paves the way for the growth of radicalism.³¹

²⁹Akh Muzakki, “Islamic Radicalism in Southeast Asia: With Special Reference to the Alleged Terrorist Organization, Jamā‘ah Islāmiyyah”, AlJami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 42, no. 1 (2004), 61–87, http://www.aljamiah.or.id/index.php/AJIS/article/view/1026, accessed 2 May 2018.

³⁰Adam James Fenton, “Change and Continuity in Indonesian Islamist Ideology and Terrorist Strategies”, AlJami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 52, no. 1 (2014), 10–1, http://www.aljamiah.or.id/index.php/AJIS/article/view/52101, accessed 2 May 2018.

³¹Muhammad Wildan, “The Nature of Radical Islamic Groups In Solo”, Journal of Indonesian Islam, vol. 7, no. 1 (2013), 51, http://jiis.uinsby.ac.id/index.php/JIIs/article/
Not all radical movements begin with religious motives. For example, the Abu Sayyaf Group in the southern Philippines was originally a military-formed movement that turned into a pirate crew, and later mutated into a terrorist organization. The group originated from the Defense Intelligenence Group (DIG) military agent who had been hiding in the southern Philippines. Because the group is notorious for its KRAs (kidnap for ransom activities), the Abu Sayyaf Group is better infamous as a pirate mob. It is almost unarguable, however, that the group’s track record of engaging in the war in Afghanistan and Iran has made them close to the Islamic movement when it started adopting some of its ideologies, thus becoming known as a terrorist group.\(^\text{32}\)

**Religious and radicalist orientation**

Religious orientation should create peace, not violence. However what happened was, in fact, a paradox. In November 2001, Osama bin Laden stated: “This war is essentially religious. It should not be forgotten that what we are fighting is unbelievers.” He also invited Muslims to fulfill this “call of Allah”.\(^\text{33}\) Osama bin Laden issued a statement (\textit{fatwa}) to fight against both military and civil Americans under the pretext of fighting infidels in the name of Allah.\(^\text{34}\) Abdullah Azzam, the main ideologue of Al Qaeda spread his radical doctrine and religious motivation. Azzam mentions that the mujahideen (fighters) are those who die in the name of God, and for them a reward has been prepared in paradise. Abdulllah Azzam insists that being a mujahid is the most effective way to remove one’s sins and bestow

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\(^{32}\)Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism”, \textit{Southeast Asian Affairs} (2006), 247–62, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27913313, accessed 2 May 2018.

\(^{33}\)Assaf Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom”..., 55.

\(^{34}\)Jerrold M. Post, “When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone”..., 621.
blessings.  

Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al-Jihad in Egypt, asserted that the mujahids were not actually killing themselves, but surrendering to God. The motivation of suicide bombers is because of Allah. Therefore, the use of religious motives in radical orientation is quite clear.

Bryan Caplan explains that the motivation of radical groups is more than just an ordinary motive commonly held by humans as homoeconomicus. Radical groups and terrorists have their own rationality that may be considered irrational to others. For example, one of their motivations is “going to heaven with 72 angels.” The clear motivation embodied in religious texts is an important driver that exceeds the economic and other motivations. Arie W. Kruglanski et al. reported that a Hamas fighter named Nasra Hasan called his jihad’s motivation to go to heaven, to feel the presence of God, and to meet the Messenger of Allah. Perpetrators of terror near London Bridge UK in June 2017 that killed 7 people and injured dozens of others shouted “this for God” before blowing themselves up. This event also proves that their violent orientation is religiously motivated.

Radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia have the same orientation and motive. Starting from the perpetrators of the Bali Bombing. In various confessions, they always called his actions as jihad fi sabilillah. In a letter found by the police from the terrorist hand in Jatiluhur, it was found that the purpose of their terror was to uphold God’s law. One of the sentences in the letter read: “the world is indeed Allah’s property and it is

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35 Assaf Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom”,..., 59.
36 Assaf Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom”,..., 60.
37 Bryan Caplan, “Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model”, Public Choice, vol. 128, nos. 1–2 (2006), 91–107, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-006-9046-8, accessed 2 May 2018.
38 Eko Ari Wibowo, “Teror Jembatan London, Penyerang Berteriak ‘Ini untuk Allah’”, Tempo (4 Jun 2017), https://dunia.tempo.co/read/881289/teror-jembatan-london-penyerang-berteriak-ini-untukallah, accessed 2 May 2018.
39 Abdul Aziz, Aku Melawan Teroris!, Solo: Jazeera, 2004.
not appropriate for you to be punished other than the law of God.” The letter was found along with the arrest of four terrorists from the Jamaah Ansharud Daulah network led by Aman Abduurrahman, a convicted terrorist who was serving a prison term at Nusakambangan.40

The perpetrator of the Bom Panci (cooker bomb), Dian Yulia Novi also stated a religious motive. In her will she wrote: “Please pray that my trades also be accepted by Him, and (that I) receive the grace of syahid (martyr)... Amiin Allohumma Amiin.” Dian states that her act is an act of trade with Allah with the grace of shahid as a reward.41 Kruglanski also places martyrdom as one of the many terrorism motives he has inventoried.42 Radical action is also a result of frustrating hopes and losses caused by socio-economic conditions.43 Radicalism arises from marginalization in domestic politics and foreign political injustice by Western countries.44 According to Jeff Victoroff, radical acts and terrorism are very likely a combination of biological factors, early childhood development factors, cognitive factors, temperaments, external influences or groups.45 According to Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono, the various motives of terrorism range from mere copycat acts to extreme jihad, which includes the willingness to sacrifice

40Ambaranie Nadia Kemala Movanita et al., “Ini Isi Surat Terduga Teroris yang Ditemukan Polisi di Jatiluhur”, Kompas.com (Desember 2016), https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/12/26/14242251/ini.isi.surat.terduga.teroris.yang.ditemukan.polisi.di.jatiluhur, accessed 2 May 2018.

41Mei Amelia R, “Ini Isi Surat Wasiat Lengkap Perempuan Teroris Calon Pengantin”, detiknews (Desember 2016), https://news.detik.com/read/2016/12/11/125552/3368625/10/ini-isu-wasiat-lengkap-perempuan-teroris-calon-pengantin, accessed 2 May 2018.

42Arie W. Kruglanski et al., “Fully Committed”..., 332.

43Domenico Tosini, “Agents and Mechanisms of Terrorist Campaigns. A contribution to a general theory of rationality”, European Journal of Social Sciences, nos. 49–2 (2011), 60, http://journals.openedition.org/ress/973, accessed 2 May 2018.

44Anouar Boukharbs, “Islam, Jihadism, and Depoliticization in France and Germany”, International Political Science Review, vol. 30, no. 3 (2009), 297–317, https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512109105642, accessed 2 May 2018.

45Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist”..., 34.
lives for the sake of the victory of Islam. Some people were radical because they wanted to learn more about Islam, but met with radical guides, those who had already demonstrated loyalty (bai’at) to their religious mentor. There were also those who were caught by a transport order that turned out to be ordered by the terrorists. But there are still those that are induced by hatred, emotions, and persecution of the West and Christians. However, all subjects felt that they wanted to be involved in correcting the situation they considered unfair and inconsistent with Islam.

YA, a former convicted terrorist involved in this study, admits that the orientation of his radical act is motivated by a sincere desire to help the weak or dhu’afa. This is enforced by the command of religion (Allah), which says “whoever helps his neighbour, Allah will be his helper.” As a person who engaged himself from such a young age, about 22 years old, he confessed that a lot of things he wanted to know and do are great things done by people he idolized. His involvement in the Spiritual Islamic organization (Rohis) when he was in high school in SMA 2 Jombang and the Teens of the Mosque (Remaja Masjid) became the beginning of his exploration of particular hard-core Islamic ideals. His curiosity as a critical youth, the chaotic social situation after the fall of Suharto, mixed with his economic limitations and his failure to continue his studies at Airlangga University’s (UNAIR) Pharmacy Faculty which he had long been craving, deepened his determination to fight against injustice perpetrated by the oppressive regimes and rulers. All of these circumstances triggered his zeal for jihad to uphold Islam, which he believed to be a political system that could provide a solution to all that depravity. Inspired by lectures,

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46 Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono and Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Perdamaian (LaKIP) Jakarta, TERRORISME DI INDONESIA: DALAM TINJAUAN PSIKOLOGI, Tangerang: Pustaka Alvabet, Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Perdamaian (LaKIP), 2012, 46.

47 Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono and Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Perdamaian (LaKIP) Jakarta, TERRORISME DI INDONESIA..., 45–7.
he believed to be an Islamic fighter such as Abu Bakar Baashir, Mukhlas, Amrozi, and friends that have strengthened his resolve to volunteer as a manifestation of a deep sense of empathy towards the oppressed and persecuted weak.

The various humanitarian events that he followed through various media at that time such as the suffering of the victims of the civil war in Bosnia, the victims of Russia’s invasion of Afghanistan, the Muslim community of Moro in the Philippines, mixed with provocative readings from magazines such as Sabili, Hidayatullah, Qolam bulletins and Amrozi’s speeches and comrades have been able to raise the spirit of jihad. All of these reasons, if judged in terms of language or semantics, certainly belong to the intrinsic religious orientation group, where the ultimate goal of action is for the sake of religion itself. However, in a psychological perspective, judging a person’s orientation is not enough only from oral expression.

Assessment of a religious orientation, whether it is purely intrinsic or extrinsic, must also be attributed to the attitudes and behaviors that result from the orientation. Whether or not the orientation raises attitudes or behaviors that are aligned with the orientation in the context of seeking Allah’s approval, or even raises an attitude or behavior that is not intended by Him. Doing evil, violence or even murder, especially to innocent people is not condemned by religion. It can only be done when there are conditions of war and Muslims are expelled from their homes. What happened from the various acts of radicalism and terrorism above

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48Widodo Kainan. interview (Mar 2018). Widodo was born in Semarang on July 10, 1986. His last education was the Diploma 1 of the Royal Season Hospitality Education Institute at The Sunan Hotel, Solo. He also learnt English at LBPP LIA Semarang for 1 year and LBPP LIA Solo for 3 years. He became familiar with Yusuf because both worked at Dapoer Bistik Semarang. Widodo now manages Dapoer Bistik in Solo; the place where ex-terrorists learn entrepreneurship.
is the opposite. Most of the perpetrators of this religious radicalism were aggressive and committed violence not in a state of war, but in peaceful environments. Only causing losses and defamation their own religion as a result of the fall many innocent victims. This is evidence of the inconsistency of intrinsic religious orientation with religious attitudes and behaviors.⁴⁹

This inconsistency between orientation and religious attitudes is also acknowledged by YA, who is deeply saddened and resentful of seeing terrorism victims, such as the Bali bombings alike. This then became one of the factors that caused him to reconsider his involvement in radicalism and terrorism movements. One thing that always disappointed him was the lack of a sense of solidarity from the terrorist network he joined. The network did not even worry about him when he was imprisoned. However, the family he was lying to genuinely cared about him. This made him think again about his family and leave his terrorist network.⁵⁰

The social impact of religious radicalism

The rise of radicalism resulted in the increasing threat of public peace because many emerging suicide bombers do not hesitate to do the action in public places and injure innocent civilians. For Ehud Sprinzak, suicide bombers are the last link of a radical ideology that involves many actors.⁵¹ The bomber is like a spear, while the spear stick and the thrust are hidden behind them. So it is not appropriate to call suicide bombers a lone wolf (independent warriors).

Radicalism also has an unfavorable impact on the Muslim community itself. Some Muslim societies, for example in the case of youth in Europe, often position themselves as victims of prejudice.⁵² This implies the notion

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⁴⁹Raymond F. Paloutzian, *Invitation to the Psychology of Religion...*, 201.
⁵⁰Yusuf Adirima, “Wawancara tentang......”, interview (Mar 2018).
⁵¹Ehud Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics”, *Foreign Policy*, vol. 120 (2000), 66.
⁵²Jessica Stern, “Mind Over Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists”, *Foreign
that Muslims who actually love peace should bear the negative stigma of the actions of radical groups and terrorists who uphold the name of Islam.

Radicalism has also divided Muslims into at least two classes. The pro-radical political agenda and those who oppose and even condemn it. This can be seen from the public response to the Bali Bombers. There are some who consider Amrozi, Imam Samudra, and Ali Gufron to be heroes, but others think of them as criminals. From the social effects of religious radicalism it can be inferred that these acts are unfavorable and even catastrophic for other citizens who are victims of this radical act of terror and for the internal struggle of the Muslims themselves. If this is the case, can they still call themselves defenders of Islam?

Regarding the social effects of terrorism, YA acknowledges that terrorism creates social problems, not only to the victims and the public, but also to the perpetrators. The perpetrator must be imprisoned, while the family at home is ignored and suffers social discrimination. YA was thrown into prison for charges of storing large quantities of explosives in his rented house and alleged attempts to bomb the localization of Sri Rejeki in Semarang, resulting in a sentence of ten years in Nusa Kambangan. Although during his time in jail his status was still unmarried, the suffering experienced by the family of his fellow criminal terrorist friends who were married was very heartbreaking to him.

As a result of this experience, after being released from prison, YA helped the family of imprisoned friends to earn a living for their families. Occasionally, YA also invited the family of imprisoned friends to visit their husbands and fathers in prison. And for friends who recently came out of

Affairs, vol. 89 (2010), 99.

53Yuyun Sunesti, “The 2002 Bali Bombing and the New Public Sphere: The Portrayal of Terrorism in Indonesian Online Discussion Forums”, AlJami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 52, no. 1 (2014), 231–52, http://www.aljamiah.or.id/index.php/AJIS/article/view/52110, accessed 2 May 2018.
prison, YA always attempted to help find and create jobs to support their families after their time in prison. These types of humanitarian work are things he does as a way to give meaning to his jihad religious orientation. In order to help these friends, he is now known as a motivator as well as an entrepreneur trainer, especially for ex-prisoners of terrorism acts and various people from other circles. One form of business he owns now is a car rental business and restaurant called Dapoer Bistik Solo, which he manages together with former terrorists.  

**Psychological analysis on radicalist act**

According to Gottschalk, after studying several former terrorists from various ethnicities, religions, political affiliations and genders from East Timor, authoritarianism and pathological hatred were found to be the main contributing factors towards terrorist act. In other words, a radicalist group from East Timor has pathological hatred that encourages them to go against the people they hate. This is strengthened by the tendency to act authoritatively.

Sarouglo argued that authoritarian behavior is considered a form of a typical closed-mindedness. He believed that the main cause for religious prejudice, including radicalism, is personality dispositions. Meanwhile, fundamentalism or religion itself is only considered to be additional factors. Religiosity alone would not be enough to activate anti-social behavior (i.e. terrorism). Instead, it needs to be combined with a closed-minded personality, including authoritarian and submissive acts, as well as religious lessons that approve of anti-social and vengeage behavior.  

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54 Widodo Kainan, “Wawancara Tentang......”, interview (Mar 2018).
55 Gottschalk and Gottschalk, “Authoritarianism and Pathological Hatred.....”, 38–59.
56 Vassilis Saroglou, “Intergroup Conflict, Religious Fundamentalism, and Culture”, *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, vol. 47, no. 1 (2016), 34, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022115621174, accessed 2 May 2018.
The analysis that Saroglou did on a terrorist from East Timor, particularly YA case, resulted in findings that are far from his initial hypothesis. YA has been known to be a very open-minded person since a young age, including when he started to gradually enter the terrorist network. Plenty of evidence showed that YA has high curiosity, coupled with his hobby of reading and having discussions. However, in the context of group or congregation formation, YA is strongly influenced by people closest to him who happen to follow strict teachings. In this case, the environmental influence has a strong role in the formation of his personality. Unfortunately, because his readings and discussions are limited to those from strict teachings, he gradually follows that specific teaching. He confessed that during the peak of his involvement in terrorism, he became a volunteer (jihadisti) who traveled from Ambon, Poso, Malaysia, the Phillipines, and Indonesia. Upon his return to Indonesia, he was accused as the person behind the bombing in Semarang, leading his imprisonment.57

Sarouglo analysed that religion is an additional factor that lacks the strength to activate anti-social terrorist act—a belief that is once again rebutted during YA’s case. According to witnesses and YA, religion was the inspiration for all his actions, from when he was a terrorist to his conversion to a pacifist. This is because all the readings and lectures that he follows are related to the religion that he believes in. The difference lies in how he appraises it.

The psychoanalytical perspectives that dictate radical behavior relating to psychological problems in children to exist in the 1980s have been refuted. Terrorists are people who have successfully built a logical and ideal mission. In the beginning, they were interested in a particular problem, which was then radicalized by the community that recruits them. These people were simply integrated into the new community to be changed

57Yusuf Adirima, “Wawancara tentang......”, interview (March 2018).
ideologically later on.\textsuperscript{58}

Although radical and terrorist groups are perceived as problems, terrorists claim that their action is driven by humanitarian causes. Their action is to defend the oppressed and the weak, more precisely Muslims. In the view of terrorist groups, Muslims as ummah are in a condition that deserves to be defended by real actions, not just with a pacifist attitude. This was similar to the case of YA. The beginning of his involvement in the acts of radicalism and terrorism is due to the intention of defending weak and oppressed Muslims both under the rule of the dzolim ruler he sees in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Their statement is in fact counter-productive—defending humanity at the expense of greater humanity.

All information about the negative social impacts of radicalism and terrorism reinforces the judgment that their orientation is essentially extrinsic. What they say as jihad in the name of religion is a lot that proves to hide subjective agendas, both psychological (i.e. hatred, hostility, arbitrariness) and political (i.e. power, rewards, and other material or political benefits). However, there are also some hidden motivations behind the vividly realistic motive, such as the need for self-identity, the need for recognition, and the need for self-esteem. Their demographic is predominantly middle and lower economic classes with no permanent jobs. They need status to increase their self-esteem through a specific group. In their opinion, their status would be clearer, higher and more recognized if they join a community that can enforce Sharia law in Indonesia. Jihad is the only way to do that.\textsuperscript{59} In the case of YA, he has the implicit desire to be great as the people he idolized, and then he found acts of terrorism as a way to be great (behind his desire to help the poor).\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{58}Anette Schaefer, “Inside the Terrorist Mind”, 78.
\textsuperscript{59}Sarwono and Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Perdamaian (LaKIP) Jakarta, Terorisme di Indonesia..., 48–9.
\textsuperscript{60}Yusuf Adirima, “Wawancara tentang......”, interview (Mar 2018).
Sarlito Wirawan’s opinion supports Noorhaidi, who said jihad is the only way to express jihadist hate and anger. By entering the jihad drama, the members of this unsatisfied party have the opportunity to demonstrate their religious identity and to negotiate for real strength. For them, jihad is not only a language of resistance in their attempt to vent their grievances, but also a message that is blown against the marginalization that overshadows their lives. Furthermore, Noorhaidi views Jihad as a drama; as it is more of a Salafi attempt to boost their self-image as a leading advocate of Islam that will strengthen their identity. All of these campaigns can be conceptualized as the recognition politics that the Salafis want to achieve in order to gain a high place in the Salafi da’wah network in Indonesia as well as internationally.

The above data, both in the form of documentary data and in the field, are evidence of the implicit and veiled orientation and motives behind the embellished words of radical jihadis as fighting for God to effect justice and prosperity on earth. This evidence is more than enough to show that their religious orientation is extrinsic, because behind the action is full of subjective and even political interests.

It is therefore not difficult to equate the religious orientation of religious extremists to an extrinsic religious orientation. The same is true if we try to show their theological incompatibility with the third category of religious orientation (quest). This search for religious orientation addresses critical and metaphysical approaches to religion. Usually, such an attitude is a characteristic of a liberal progressive religious party, the group that agrees with a rational religious approach to religion. The act of radicalism, particularly in the context of Islam, is very difficult to distinguish from Salafi’s very rigid and textual theology in interpreting scripture. Their black-and-white approach to religion is accused of being a hindrance to

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61 Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad...*, 330.
objective religious research that defines secular, progressive Muslims. It is almost assured, therefore, that it is very difficult to get closer to involving them in search-based religious groups.

**Conclusion**

Religious radicalism is a very popular topic among scholars who have studied religion, especially Islam in the last few decades. Various scientific backgrounds with different approaches enliven the discussion and debate about the discourse of religious radicalism. Some of them use the Psychological approach. This article is one of the few that examines religious radicalism from the perspective of Psychology, specifically the Psychology of Religion.

We used the monumental and classic psychology theory of religion by G.W. Allport. Religious orientation that consists of intrinsic and extrinsic categories commonly used to assess the motives behind religious attitudes and behavior of religious people. It also employs Batson’s theory that adds one more category of religious orientation as quest.

By borrowing the above-mentioned orientation theory to unravel and dissect the events of religious radicalism, both in Indonesia and globally, we find evidence that there is a disparity and inconsistency between the characteristics of religious attitudes and actions with an intrinsic religious orientation. The verbal expressions of those who claim to be fighting for God and upholding the faith of God, or destroying the enemies of God in order to preserve justice in the world, have proven to be inconsistent with their attitudes and activities and their consequences. More in-depth analysis reveals their implicit orientation and intentions which are not only extremely subjective but also political. This also refers to YA’s religious orientation while he was still involved in the act of radicalism and terrorism. Later, YA repented and interpreted his jihad orientation
differently. Because of the various interpretations of faith, YA has changed his orientation from a terrorist to a pacifist.

In addition, we find that there is no relationship between the act of religious radicalism and quest. This is because Islamic radicalism, generally associated with Salafi theology that is both textual and rigid in interpreting religion, is seen to be contrary to the very open and critical quest orientation characteristics.

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