IS QUANTUM SUICIDE PAINLESS? ON AN APPARENT VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLE

Milan M. Ćirković

Astronomical Observatory Belgrade
Volgina 7, 11160 Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro
mcirkovic@aob.bg.ac.yu

Received ...; accepted ...

Abstract. The experimental setup of the self-referential quantum measurement, jovially known as the "quantum suicide" or the "quantum Russian roulette" is analyzed from the point of view of the Principal Principle of David Lewis. It is shown that the apparent violation of this principle—relating objective probabilities and subjective chance—in this type of thought experiment is just an illusion due to the usage of some terms and concepts ill-defined in the quantum context. We conclude that even in the case that Everett’s (or some other "no-collapse") theory is a correct description of reality, we can coherently believe in equating subjective credence with objective chance in quantum-mechanical experiments. This is in agreement with results of the research on personal identity in the quantum context by Parfit and Tappenden.

1 Introduction: Principal Principle in the multiverse

The so-called Principal Principle (henceforth PP) introduced by David Lewis (1986) suggests, roughly, that our credence in a proposition A, given all admissible evidence, should equate with one’s best estimate of the objective chance that A will come true. Precisely, \( \text{Cr}(A, XE) = x \), where A is a proposition, X is the proposition that the chance of A being true is x, x is a real number between 0 and 1, E is any “admissible” evidence, and \( \text{Cr}(.) \) is a reasonable credence function. From this general formulation we conclude that
If \( \text{Cr}(XE) = 1 \) then \( \text{Cr}(A) = x \). Applied to physical experiments, PP tells us that we should believe one of the possible outcomes of an experiment, say \( A_i \), with credence

\[
\text{Cr}(A_i) = p_i,
\]

where \( p_i \) is the physical chance of this outcome, provided we possess only admissible information about the experiment. This is especially convenient for experiments in quantum mechanics, like the stock example of radioactive decay of a heavy nucleus, since the underlying physical mechanism is usually thought of as being irreducibly stochastic; thus, the possibility of some inadmissible information slipping in unnoticed is remote. (Refinements of the PP, criteria of admissibility, and suggested alternative chance-credence relations often appear in the literature, but we shall not consider them here.) Usually, PP is just an embodiment of our common sense intuitions; we simply follow (1) in everyday life as well as in physics, with routine success. But, PP can be—at least apparently—violated if the so-called “no-collapse” versions of quantum mechanics (e.g. Everett 1957; Deutsch 1985; Tegmark 1998) turn out to be correct. Here is the recipe.

Let Hugh, an experimental physicist, prepare a simple coherent state of, say, spin \( z \)-projection of a fermion:

\[
|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\uparrow\rangle + |\downarrow\rangle),
\]

(any other quantum superposition will do equally well). The spin measuring device is coupled to a revolver in such way that, after Hugh or anybody else pulls the trigger, spin measurement will take place. The measured eigenstate \( |\downarrow\rangle \) will result in firing the revolver, and the measured \( |\uparrow\rangle \) will result in a harmless “click”. One important proviso is that the duration of measurement (including the reaction time of the revolver) should be short in comparison to any timescale characterizing human perception. If the revolver is aimed at any target other than Hugh himself, he expects to see a seemingly random outcome of each individual measurement: either “bang” or “click” with the probability of a coin toss. If we suppose that measurements are taken in series of \( n \) consecutive measurements (pullings of the trigger), probability of achieving any individual combination of “bangs” and “clicks” is given by the simplest binomial distribution; in particular, the probability of obtaining “click” \( n \) consecutive times is \( p(n \uparrow) = 0.5^n \). There is no observed—or observable—difference between collapse and “no-collapse” quantum theories at this point.\(^1\)

---

\(^1\)Metaphysically, Hugh is aware that the complete description is certainly different in these two cases; notably, on the “no-collapse” quantum mechanics he believes in, both
Things take a strange turn when Hugh decides—perhaps upon advice of some respectable quantum theorists—to point the revolver to his own head. The state of the entire system, after the first measurement, now evolved from (2) to (symbolically)

\[
\hat{U} |\psi\rangle \otimes |\text{experimenter}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\uparrow\rangle + |\downarrow\rangle) \otimes |\text{experimenter}\rangle = (3)
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\uparrow\rangle \otimes |\text{"click"}\rangle + |\downarrow\rangle \otimes |\text{"dead"}\rangle). (4)
\]

It is almost self-evident that no probability (objective or otherwise) makes sense for Hugh in his |"dead"\rangle state (but see Papineau 2003 and comments below). Since we have exactly one observer before and after the measurement, and since the decoherence of branches—the two terms in parenthesis in (3)—occurred much faster than our experimenter could notice, we may be certain that he will observe spin "up", and therefore hear a harmless "click". And the same could be repeated arbitrarily often! Notice that only physical collapse—as in the "orthodox" Copenhagen interpretation or the dynamical reduction theories—is actually harmful from Hugh’s point of view. Since in the "no-collapse" view there is no actual collapse, just fast decoherence between the branches, Hugh will find himself in the strange situation of impossibility of committing suicide, although the revolver is loaded and fully functional! This is different from the "outsider" view of, say, assistant in the experiment, who will perceive the bloody deed after at most several repetitions of the experiment (being in one of the decohered branches of the universal wavefunction and being able to perceive the measured spin “down”).

This is, of course, the “quantum suicide” experiment of Squires (1986), Moravec (1988), Zeh (1992), Price (1996) and Tegmark (1998)—it seems that many people have arrived independently at the same idea, although the late Euan Squires seems to be the first who wrote about it, and only with Tegmark’s (1998) paper it received proper attention. Recently, it has attracted a lot of attention in philosophical circles either (Lewis 2000, 2004; Papineau 2003, 2004; Tappenden 2004). Of course, different variations of the experimental setup are possible. It can be even cast in Moravec’s form
of the “collective” quantum suicide (quantum genocide?), i.e. running a potentially catastrophic experiment on the new super-duper accelerator. In all these cases one thing is clear: while the objective chance of measuring spin ”up” in Hugh’s single measurement is, of course, $p_\uparrow = 0.5$, subjective probability of the same ("surviving") outcome is $Cr(\uparrow) = 1$. Obviously, this violates (1) and Hugh finds PP misleading. Moreover, by repeating the measurement, our experimenter can obtain arbitrary large PP violation (and, simultaneously, obtain an arbitrarily large degree of confidence in the validity of the no-collapse theory).

One rather obvious way out of the difficulty is to contest the usual death-defying conclusion of the quantum suicide thought experiment. This has been recently argued in extenso, though with somewhat different motivation, by Papineau (2003, 2004). In reply to a paper by Peter J. Lewis (2000), he proposes effectively assigning a (negative) utility value to Hugh’s ”dead” state. Without going into details of the argument (soon diverted to the issue of life-staking degree of belief in physical theories which, though of paramount general importance, is irrelevant for our purposes here), we notice at least its rather ad hoc nature. Further, it has been, in our view, strongly and correctly criticized by Tappenden (2004) whose arguments, in conjunction with the original Lewis (2000) claim, vindicate the legitimacy of the conventional quantum suicide on most versions of Everettian theories. Of course, Peter J. Lewis and Tappenden have quite different views on whether this bodes well or not for such theories, but it is also less relevant from our point of view. It would, of course, be more important and interesting to discuss any issues related to the quantum multiverse if a no-collapse theory turns out to be true, perhaps by some radical new experiment like the one proposed by Deutsch (1985); but even if things turn otherwise, the general puzzle seems interesting enough.

2 Analysis

Should we reject PP because it seems apparently violated in the quantum suicide experiment? Not really. After all, as with all principles, PP should be understood primarily as a "guideline" in our probabilistic considerations. It perceives objective chances as concise, informative summaries of patterns of local empirical facts. The violation described above arises because conventional guidelines are unavoidably geared toward experiments performed objectively, without real participation of an individual observer. Subjectively defined outcomes are, naturally, somewhat more difficult to analyze in the physical context; we shall show below how we ought to actually analyze various positions in respect to the issue of personal identity in the
no-collapse theories, in order to explain how PP remains valid. This seems like another instance of the necessity of taking into account the “anthropic bias” (cf. Bostrom 2002), necessarily limiting the entire space of *prima facie* possible experimental outcomes. Whenever it is possible to infer the outcome of the chance experiment with certainty, the value of objective chance becomes irrelevant. What is so striking here is that “no-collapse” quantum theories give us a perfectly scientific opportunity to reach such knowledge at the fundamental level, without recourse to proverbial “crystal balls” and other non-physical devices used in the literature to exemplify inadmissible evidence (e.g. Vranas 1998). The simple insight which the experimenter (if knowledgeable about the “no-collapse” theories, as Hugh certainly is!) possesses about the outcome of the experiment entails that he will not believe the PP-favored value of 50% chance.

Let us consider now what exactly the controversial proposition is in the above-described experiment. Obviously, in conjecturing that PP is violated, our proposition has been the following:

\[ A: \text{Hugh will survive the quantum suicide experiment.} \]

Seemingly, this proposition violates PP, as stated above. However, this is an illusion, stemming from uncritical use of our conventional notions of existence and survival in the inappropriate context of the no-collapse theories. Spin measurement causes the universal wavefunction to “branch”; what happens to Hugh during the branching process? The answer to this question depends on our theories of personal identity in the multiverse, the issue recently clearly investigated by Tappenden (2000; see also Parfit 1984). We have stated the necessity of timescales for the apparatus and the gun to be restricted; however, we can always find a small temporal interval between the spin measurement and the actual firing/clicking of the gun, and pose our question in that time interval. There are several at least superficially plausible answers, notably: (i) Hugh exists in all branches, (ii) Hugh exists in none of the branches, and (iii) Hugh exists in some of the branches, but not in others. Let us analyze these cases from the point of view of chances in the quantum suicide experiment, and *neglecting other problematic features* some of these options may have for other reasons.\(^4\)

If Hugh exists in all branches, then we may be certain that he will

\[^4\text{For instance, the difficulties can consist in the implied account of the tensed discourse. If Hugh survives in one wavefunction branch and not in the other (case i.), doesn’t that make it the case that “Hugh will survive the quantum suicide experiment” and “Hugh will not survive the quantum suicide experiment” are both true, while their conjunction “Hugh will survive the quantum suicide experiment and he will not survive the quantum suicide experiment” is false?}\]
survive the experiment, and it is with this case in mind that Squires and others have actually suggested the quantum suicide thought experiment in the first place. This is in accordance with the idea of reductionism of Parfit or person-reductionism of Tappenden, i.e.

the idea that there is no more to the identity of a person over time than that there is a series of personal states linked by some relation, where personal states are identified in a way which does not require their attribution to a person. A personal state can be thought of as a group of mental characteristics which all belong to what we would normally think of as history of a single waking human body over a short period of time. The duration of this period is the amount of time we think of as being the present moment, the minimal time-frame in which we have experiences; it is often called the specious present. ... We can think of the duration of a typical personal state as being something around a fifth of a second.\(^5\)

What sense do we make of the proposition A here? It is reasonable to understand it as a claim that Hugh survives in at least one world (of the multiverse), which has a chance of 100%, and as PP states, and Squires, Tegmark and other infer, Hugh should be certain that the proposition is true. This, of course, does not mean that Hugh should think that the fermion spin could not be in the eigenstate \(|↓⟩\), but this is another proposition, different from A; we shall consider this fine point below.

If the case (ii) is correct, then Hugh is substituted for some other individual(s), say Hugh\(_1\) in the branch in which the spin is "up", and Hugh\(_2\) in the branch where the spin is "down". (This is, parenthetically, a nice illustration of the Tappenden’s concept of distinction along the superslice dimension. On the other hand, this case is antithetical to the entire idea of the quantum suicide experiment, and is considered here just for the sake of completeness.) However, now the proposition A above is obviously wrong, since Hugh \(\neq\) Hugh\(_1\) and Hugh \(\neq\) Hugh\(_2\). Thus the chance of proposition A being true is zero and, as PP states, Hugh should be certain that he would not survive.

Finally, we have the case (iii), where we suppose that Hugh exists in the wavefunction branch in which the gun clicks. In the other one, presumably, he is replaced with (dead) individual Hugh\(_1\). Now, the chance of the proposition A is just the quantum-mechanical probability 50%, and, as PP says, Hugh should have credence 50% in this proposition. Note that this

\(^{5}\text{Tappenden (2000), pp. 106-107.}\)
case is completely analogous to the case of quantum suicide in the collapse quantum theories.

We conclude that PP remains entirely valid. Now, why is this so counter-intuitive? The answer is that we have confused the proposition A above with the different proposition, say B, stating that

B: The result of spin measurement is the eigenstate $|\uparrow\rangle$.

In contrast to A, the proposition B obviously does not depend on the issue of personal identity; it is completely objective statement about physical system. However, it also can be understood in various ways, depending on the sort of quantum theory we accept. In the no-collapse theories considered here, we may understand B to mean that the result of measurement will be spin “up” in at least one world. This obviously has the chance of 100%, and agrees well with the outcome of our analysis of the case (i) above for the proposition A. Now, if we define the entire quantum suicide experimental setup as $B \implies A$, there is no contradiction. Problems may arise when we interpret B as the statement that the spin is “up” in this particular branch of the universal wavefunction. Obviously such proposition has chance of 50%, but on the level of subjective probabilities, this corresponds not to Hugh, but to his laboratory assistant.

3 Discussion

The difference between internal and external viewpoints regarding the relationship between observers and the quantum description (cf. Tegmark 1998) becomes starkly clear when compared to a similar apparent quantum-mechanical PP violation, now in the context of the "collapse" theories.

Bostrom (2001) describes a "Quantum Joe" thought experiment in which it is explicitly stipulated that "no-collapse" theories are false, and that the wavefunction collapse is real and stochastic (as in the orthodox Copenhagen form of quantum mechanics):

Quantum Joe

Joe, the amateur scientist, has discovered that he is alone in the cosmos so far. He builds a quantum device which according to quantum physics has a one-in-ten chance of outputting any single-digit integer. He also builds a reproduction device which when activated will create ten thousand clones of Joe. He then hooks up the two so that the reproductive device will kick into action unless the quantum device outputs a zero; but if the out-
put is a zero, then the reproductive machine will be destroyed. There are not enough materials left for Joe to reproduce in some other way, so he will then have been the only observer... Using the same kinds of argument as before, we can show that Joe should expect that a zero come up, even though the objective (physical) chance is a mere 10%.

Here we also perceive the apparent violation of PP, due to probabilistic expectations following the so-called \textit{Self-Sampling Assumption} (i.e. the assumption that every observer should reason as if they were a random sample drawn from the set of all observers). The violation is only apparent, since it is based on indexical information about Joe’s position in the human species, which is deemed inadmissible. In contradistinction to the Quantum Joe thought experiment, in the Quantum Hugh case the truth of "no-collapse" quantum mechanics is explicitly stipulated. Note that if some of the “collapse” theories, say the orthodox one or the one of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986), is correct description of reality, the validity of PP is straightforward and obvious. On the other hand, both sorts of apparent conflict, the one in the quantum suicide and the one in the Quantum Joe experiment, are not at all obvious, and ultimately depend on considerations related to the properties of intelligent observers themselves. It is interesting to speculate whether there are other sorts of "anthropic" evidence in different physical setups, but this goes beyond the scope of the present study.

We conclude that even in the case of Everett’s (or any other "no-collapse") theory being the correct description of reality, we can— with our experimenter—coherently believe in equating subjective credence with objective chance in quantum-mechanical experiments. This is true provided our \textit{insight} in the nature of experiment, definition of relevant concepts in the multiverse settings of the "no-collapse" theories, and relevant capacities of the experimenter is deep enough. We can then, in general, retain both PP and the "no-collapse" theories.

\textbf{Acknowledgements.} Two anonymous referees contributed interesting and provoking comments and criticisms, which contributed to the quality of the present manuscript.

\textbf{References}

Bostrom, N. 2001, \textit{Synthese} 127, 359.
Bostrom, N. 2002, *Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects* (Routledge, New York).

Deutsch, D. 1985, *International Journal of the Theoretical Physics* **24**, 1.

Everett, H. III 1957, *Reviews of Modern Physics* **29**, 454.

Ghirardi, G. C., Rimini, A. and Weber, T. 1986, *Physical Review D* **34**, 470.

Lewis, D. 1986, *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford University Press, New York).

Lewis, D. 2004, *Australasian Journals of Philosophy* **82**, 3-22.

Lewis, P. J. 2000, *Analysis* **60**, 22-29.

Moravec, H. P. 1988, *Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge).

Papineau, D. 2003, *Analysis* **63**, 51-58.

Papineau, D. 2004, *Australasian Journals of Philosophy* **82**, 153-169.

Parfit, D. 1984, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford University Press, Oxford).

Price, H. 1996, *Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point* (Oxford University Press, Oxford).

Squires, E. 1986, *The Mystery of the Quantum World* (Institute of Physics Publishing, Bristol).

Tappenden, P. 2000, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* **51**, 99.

Tappenden, P. 2004, *Analysis* **64**, 157-164.

Tegmark, M. 1998, *Fortschritte der Physik* **46**, 855.

Vranas, P. 1998, in *Sixteenth Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, Kansas City, Missouri.

Zeh, D. 1992, *The Physical Basis of the Direction of Time* (Springer-Verlag, Berlin).