Oblivious Transfer and Quantum Non-Locality

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Abstract

Oblivious transfer, a central functionality in modern cryptography, allows a party to send two one-bit messages to another who can choose one of them to read, remaining ignorant about the other, whereas the sender does not learn the receiver’s choice. Oblivious transfer the security of which is information-theoretic for both parties is known impossible to achieve from scratch. — The joint behavior of certain bi-partite quantum states is non-local, i.e., cannot be explained by shared classical information. In order to better understand such behavior, which is classically explainable only by communication, but does not allow for it, Popescu and Rohrlich have described a “non-locality machine”: Two parties both input a bit, and both get a random output bit the XOR of which is the AND of the input bits. — We show a close connection, in a cryptographic sense, between OT and the “PR primitive.” More specifically, unconditional OT can be achieved from a single realization of PR, and vice versa. Our reductions, which are single-copy, information-theoretic, and perfect, also lead to a simple and optimal protocol allowing for inverting the direction of OT.

1 Introduction

1.1 Oblivious Transfer and Oblivious Keys

Oblivious transfer [11], OT for short, is a functionality of great importance [8] in cryptography or, more precisely, secure two-party computation, where two parties, who mutually distrust each other, want to collaborate with the objective of achieving a common goal, e.g., evaluate a function to which both hold an input—but without revealing unnecessary information about the latter. In (chosen one-out-of-two bit) OT, one of the parties, the sender, inputs two bits \(x_0\) and \(x_1\), whereas the other party has a choice bit \(c\). The latter then learns \(x_c\), but remains ignorant about the other message bit \(x_{1−c}\). The sender, on the other hand, does not learn any information about \(c\).

Various ways, based on public-key encryption, for instance, have been proposed for realizing OT, where the security for one of the parties, however, is only computational. In fact, oblivious transfer is impossible to achieve in an unconditionally secure way for both parties—even when they are connected by a quantum channel [9]. On the other hand, it has been shown that unconditionally secure OT can be reduced to weak information-theoretic primitives such as simply a noisy communication channel [5], [6] or so-called universal OT [3].

A recent result [14] shows that OT can be stored: Given one realization of OT, a sample of distributed random variables \(X\) (known to \(A\)) and \(Y\) (known to \(B\)) can be generated, where the joint distribution \(P_{XY}\) is such that \(X\) and \(Y\) can be used to realize an instance of OT. We will call the distributed pair of random variables \((X,Y)\) an oblivious key or OK for short; in some sense, as we will see, this is the local (hidden-variable) part of OT (as opposed to non-local systems and behavior, see Section 1.2). Another consequence—observed in [14]—is that, since OK is symmetric, OT is, too. This solved a long-standing open problem posed in [7].

1.2 Quantum Non-Locality and the Popescu-Rohrlich Primitive

Entangled but possibly distant two-partite quantum systems can show a joint behavior under measurements that cannot be explained by “locality” or hidden variables, i.e., distributed classical information; such behavior is called non-local. There exists, for instance, a so-called maximally entangled state \(|\psi^−\rangle = (|01\rangle − |10\rangle)/\sqrt{2}\) with the following properties. If the parties \(A\) and \(B\) controlling the two parts of the system both choose between two fixed possible bases for measuring their system in (where this

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pair of bases is not the same for the two parties), where the measurement outcome can be 0 or 1 in both cases, then the following statistics are observed. (Here, the two possible bases for each party are called 0 and 1, too.)

\[
\begin{align*}
p_{00} &:= \text{Prob}[\text{outcome } A = \text{outcome } B | \text{basis } A = 0, \text{ basis } B = 0] = 0, \\
p_{01} &:= \text{Prob}[\text{outcome } A = \text{outcome } B | \text{basis } A = 0, \text{ basis } B = 1] = 1/4, \\
p_{10} &:= \text{Prob}[\text{outcome } A = \text{outcome } B | \text{basis } A = 1, \text{ basis } B = 0] = 1/4, \\
p_{11} &:= \text{Prob}[\text{outcome } A = \text{outcome } B | \text{basis } A = 1, \text{ basis } B = 1] = 3/4. 
\end{align*}
\]

It has been shown that such statistics are impossible to achieve between two parties who cannot communicate when they share arbitrary classical information only (i.e., agree on a classical strategy beforehand). More precisely, the so-called CHSH Bell inequality is violated since

\[p_{00} + p_{01} + p_{10} < p_{11}\]

holds. It is, on the other hand, important to note that this non-local behavior is “weaker” that communication between A and B and does not allow for such—fortunately, since such a possibility would be in contradiction with relativity.

With the objective of achieving a better understanding of such “non-local behavior,” Popescu and Rohrlich [10] defined a “non-locality primitive” behaving in a similar way, but where the probabilities \(p_{ij}\) are

\[p_{00} = p_{01} = p_{10} = 0, \quad p_{11} = 1.\]

In other words, both parties have an input bit (corresponding to the choice of the basis in the quantum model) \(U\) and \(V\) and get an output bit \(X\) and \(Y\), respectively, where \(X\) and \(Y\) are random bits satisfying

\[X \oplus Y = U \cdot V = U \text{ AND } V.\]

It is important to note, however, that the behavior of this “PR primitive” cannot, although it does not allow for communication either, be obtained from any quantum state—it violates a “quantum Bell inequality” that is even valid for the behavior of quantum states. On the other hand, the primitive does allow for perfectly simulating the behavior of a maximally entangled quantum bit pair under any possible measurement [4]. The latter has been shown possible, for instance, also between parties who may communicate one classical bit [12] [2], but the possibility of achieving the same with the PR primitive is of particular interest since this functionality does not allow for any communication.

### 1.3 Two-Party Information-Theoretic Primitives and Reductions

The three information-theoretic primitives or two-party functionalities described in the previous sections can be modeled by their mutual input-output behavior, i.e., by a conditional probability distribution \(P_{XY|UV}\), where \(U\), \(V\), \(X\), and \(Y\) are the two parties’ input and output, respectively (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1: Oblivious transfer, oblivious key, and the Popescu-Rohrlich primitive.](image)

In Section 2, we will show simple perfect and single-copy information-theoretic reductions between the three primitives—in some sense, they are, provocatively speaking, all the same.
More precisely, a single-copy reduction of a primitive $P_2$ to another $P_1$ means that the functionality $P_2$ can be realized given one instance of $P_1$. Hereby, no computational assumptions have to be made. Perfect means that no non-zero failure probability has to be tolerated.

Note, however, that the reduction protocol may use communication; of course, because from a “communication and locality viewpoint,” the three primitives are very different: OT allows for communication, PR does not, but is non-local, whereas OK is simply distributed classical information, i.e., “local.”

Although we keep an eye on this communication in the reductions—all our reductions minimize the required amount of communication—we are interested in privacy: When $P_2$ is obtained from $P_1$, say, then both parties must not obtain more information than specified for $P_2$. In other words, our viewpoint is the one of cryptography rather than of communication-complexity theory. Note that our reductions have the property that a party who is misbehaving in the protocol cannot obtain more information than specified (but possibly violate the privacy of her proper inputs).

2 Single-Copy Reductions Between OT, OK, and PR

2.1 PR from OT

Lemma 1. Using one instance of OT, we can simulate PR.

Proof. $B$ chooses $c = y$. $A$ chooses $a$ at random and sends $x_0 = a$ and $x_1 = x \oplus a$ with OT. $B$ receives $x_c$ and outputs $b = x_c$. $A$ outputs $a$. We have $b = x_c = a \oplus x_c = a \oplus xy$. \hfill \Box

2.2 OK from PR

Lemma 2. Using one instance of PR, we can simulate OK.

Proof. $A$ and $B$ choose $x$ and $y$ at random. $B$ outputs $C = y$ and $Y = b$. $A$ outputs $X_0 = a$ and $X_1 = a \oplus x$. We have $Y = b = xy \oplus a = X_C$. \hfill \Box

2.3 OK from OT

Lemma 3. Using one instance of OT, we can simulate OK.

Proof. Follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 2. We get the following protocol: $A$ and $B$ choose all their input at random. $A$ outputs her inputs, $B$ his input and his output. \hfill \Box

2.4 OT from PR

Lemma 4. Using one instance of PR, we can simulate OT using one bit of communication.

Proof. $A$ inputs $x = x_0 \oplus x_1$. $B$ inputs $y = c$. $A$ gets $a$ and $B$ gets $b$. $A$ sends $m = x_0 \oplus a$ to $B$. $B$ outputs $y = m \oplus b$. We have $y = m \oplus b = x_0 \oplus a \oplus b = x_0 \oplus (x_0 \oplus x_1)c = x_c$.

Since $A$ does not receive any message from $B$, she gets no information about $c$. $B$ only receives one bit, which is equal to $x_c$. \hfill \Box

In PR, no communication takes place, but we are able to send one bit using OT. Hence, at least one bit of communication is needed to simulate OT by PR.

2.5 PR from OK

Lemma 5. Using one instance of OK, we can simulate PR using two bits of communication.
Proof. A sends \( m_a = x \oplus X_0 \oplus X_1 \) to B. B sends \( m_b = y \oplus C \) to A. A outputs \( a = X_0 \oplus (X_0 \oplus X_1)m_b + m_a m_b \). B outputs \( b = Y \oplus C m_a \). We have \( X_0 \oplus Y = (X_0 \oplus X_1)C \). Hence

\[
a \oplus b = X_0 \oplus (X_0 \oplus X_1)m_b + m_a m_b \oplus Y \oplus C m_a = m_a m_b \oplus (X_0 \oplus X_1) m_b \oplus C m_a \oplus (X_0 \oplus X_1) C = (m_a \oplus X_0 \oplus X_1)(m_b \oplus C) = xy
\]

They both send their inputs “XORed” with \((X_0 \oplus X_1)\) and \(C\), respectively. Since the other party has no information about these values, this is a one-time pad, and they receive no information about the other’s input.

We show that the two bits of communication are optimal in this case. Let us assume that there exists a protocol using only one-way communication from A to B. Since B can calculate his output \( b_0 \) for both inputs for \( y = 0 \) and \( b_1 \) for \( y = 1 \), we have \( a \oplus b_0 \oplus a \oplus b_1 = x(1 \oplus 0) \), and, therefore, \( b_0 \oplus b_1 = x \).

\[ \Box \]

2.6 OT from OK

Lemma 6. Using one instance of OK, we can simulate OT using three bits of communication.

Proof. Follows directly from Lemmas 4 and 5. Alternatively, we can use the BCCS protocol \([1]\), which requires three bits of communication as well. Here, B sends \( m = c \oplus C \) to A, whereas A sends \( m_0 = x_0 \oplus X_m \) and \( m_1 = x_1 \oplus X_{1 \oplus m} \) to B. B outputs \( y = m_c \oplus Y \). We have \( y = m_c \oplus Y = x_c \oplus X_{c \oplus m} \oplus Y = x_c \oplus X_C \oplus Y = x_c \).

B’s message does not give any information about \( c \) to A, since it is “one-time-padded” with the value \( C \) about which A has no information. B knows either \( X_0 \) or \( X_1 \) but has no information about the other value. So, either \( x_0 \) or \( x_1 \) gets “one-time-padded,” and B obtains information about that value, even if he is given the other value.

Three bits of communication are optimal: First of all, two-way communication is needed. If A would send less than two bits, but still in such a way that B would get the bit he wants, then A would have to know which bit B has chosen.

3 Optimally Reversing OT

OT is a priori an asymmetric functionality, and the possibility of inverting its orientation has been investigated, for instance, in \([7]\), where a protocol was given using \( n \) realizations of OT from \( B \) to \( A \)—called TO—in order to obtain one realization from \( A \) to \( B \), where a failure probability exponentially small in \( n \) has to be tolerated. Since, however, PR is a symmetric functionality, our reductions imply that OT is as well. More precisely, the reductions of OT to PR and vice versa can be put together to the following protocol inverting OT. This reduction of OT to TO given in \([14]\), is single-copy, information-theoretic, perfect, and minimizes the required additional communication.

3.1 OT from TO

Lemma 7. Using one instance of TO, we can simulate OT using one bit of communication.

Proof. A inputs \( x_0 \oplus x_1 \) to TO. B chooses a random bit \( r \) and inputs \( r \) and \( r \oplus c \) to TO. A receives \( a \) and sends \( m = x_0 \oplus a \) to B. B outputs \( y = r \oplus m \). We have \( y = r \oplus m = r \oplus x_0 \oplus r \oplus (x_0 \oplus x_1)c = x_c \).

A does not get any message from B, so she does not get any information about \( c \). B get one message by A, which is either equal to \( b_0 \), if the XOR of his input values is 0, and \( b_1 \) otherwise. If he does not choose \( r \) at random, A might be able to get the value \( c \), but there is no advantage for B.

The protocol is obviously optimal since A can communicate one bit with B using OT—which she cannot using TO.
3.2 OK from KO

Finally, we show that an OK can easily be reversed, without any communication.

Lemma 8. Using one instance of KO, we can simulate OK without any communication.

Proof. A gets $X_0$ and $X_1$ from KO, and B gets C and Y. A outputs $\overline{C} = X_0 \oplus X_1$ and $\overline{Y} = X_0$, and B outputs $\overline{X}_0 = Y$ and $\overline{X}_1 = Y \oplus C$.

We have $Y = X_C$ and $\overline{X}_C = Y \oplus C(X_0 \oplus X_1) = X_0 \oplus (X_0 \oplus X_1)C \oplus C(X_0 \oplus X_1) = X_0 = \overline{Y}$. □

The OK primitive can also be defined in a symmetric way: It is the distribution that we get when both A and B input a random bit to PR.

4 Concluding Remarks

We have shown a close connection between the important cryptographic functionality of oblivious transfer and quantum non-locality, more precisely, the “non-locality machine” of Popescu and Rohrlich: they are, modulo a small amount of (classical) communication, the same—one can be reduced to the other. As a by-product, we have obtained the insight that OT is symmetric: One instance of OT from B to A allows for the same functionality from A to B in a perfect information-theoretic sense. Figure 2 shows the reductions between the different functionalities discussed above. The (optimal) numbers of bits to be communicated are indicated.

![Diagram](attachment:figure2.png)

Figure 2: The reductions between OT, TO, PR, OK, and KO, and their communication costs. All reductions are prefect and optimal.

In has been shown in [4] that the behavior of an EPR pair can be perfectly simulated without any communication if one realization of the PR primitive is available. However, this reduction, although it yields the correct statistics with respect to the two parts’ behavior, is not “cryptographic” or “private” in the sense of our reductions: The parties are tolerated to obtain more information about the other party’s outcome than they would when actually measuring an EPR pair. We state as an open problem to simulate, in this stronger sense, the behavior of an EPR pair using the PR primitive.

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