Defending or Challenging the Status Quo: Position Effects on Biased Intergroup Perceptions
The default ideological position is status quo maintaining. Strategies justifying the status quo include undermining challenging arguments, and challengers are judged more negatively than defenders by observers. The current study examined perceptions of challengers and defenders of status quo taking into account perceivers’ own position. Experiment 1 showed that challengers undermined, by ascribing more externality and less rationality, the position of defenders to a larger extent than defenders did of challengers’ position. Experiment 2 tested if effects were driven by the implied minority status of the challenging position. Results revealed no effects of experimentally manipulated numerical status, but challengers were again more biased than defenders. Hence, the driving force behind challengers’ negative attitudes towards opponents seems to lie in the challenging position per se rather than numerical status. Possibly, challenging what is generally considered to be good demands more from the individual in terms of gearing up for fight and protection against attacks.

Keywords: intergroup biases; status quo; position effects; numerical status
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The default ideological position is conservative and status quo maintaining (Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson & Chamberlin, 2002). People seem to strongly prefer keeping things the way they are, and to resist change (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Despite the status quo maintaining default, there are always groups and individuals who choose to challenge it and fight for their cause. However, challenging the status quo does not come without social costs. For example, studies show that spokesmen of change may be accused with allegations of being driven primarily by self-interest (O’Brien & Crandall, 2005). Moreover, research has demonstrated that people evaluate challengers of the status quo as less flexible, less reasonable, more contributing to the conflict (Kray & Robinson, 2001), and more extreme than defenders (Keltner & Robinson, 1997).

The negative view on status quo challengers may be a result of negative biases motivated by people’s general tendency to prefer status quo over change. This negative view is something that challengers are likely to be aware of (Kray & Robinson, 2001), and that could possibly lead them to feel an increased need to defend and justify their own position more than defenders. One way to investigate this is by looking at the reasons people give for others’ attitude positions. People generally attribute more self-interest to those who disagree rather than agree with them (Reeder, Pryor, Wohl, & Griswell, 2005). Moreover, people make more favorable attributions about the origins of the attitude position of those holding a position that corresponds with, as opposed to differs from, their own attitude (Bäck, Gilljam, Esaiasson & Lindholm, 2010; Kenworthy & Miller, 2002; Reeder et al, 2005). This can be seen more generally as a case of in-group favoritism (Pettigrew, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Robbins & Kreuger, 2005). Thus, with group boundaries defined by attitude position (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002), people may make more favorable judgments of their attitude allies, the in-group members, as compared to their opponents, the out-group members.
The main objective of the current research was to explore how people who want to keep the status quo and those who want to change it perceive the origins of the attitudes of their allies and opponents.

**Position effects on intergroup perceptions**

Defending the status quo is associated with increased positive affect, decreased negative affect and making people happier in general (Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Napier & Jost, 2008). Moreover, Crandall and colleagues (2009) recently showed that people are less forgiving and accepting of events framed as new, than if an event or method is framed as traditions and keeping things the way they are. In addition, research within political psychology shows that conservatives in general show less tolerance for others in that they prefer to keep the (inegalitarian) status quo (Jost et al., 2007). Based on these findings, it seems reasonable that defenders of the status quo would show relatively strong biases in perceptions of their attitude allies and opponents. There are, however, reasons to assume strong intergroup biases among challengers as well. Given the generality and psychological benefits of conserving the status quo, the choice to challenge should be accompanied with heightened personal risk of others questioning one’s viewpoint. Consistent with this, several authors argue that challengers are in general in a more vulnerable position than defenders (De Dreu, Kluwer & Nauta, 2008; O’Brien & Crandall, 2005). Being in such vulnerable and exposed position, probably aware of the general negative view on change (Kray & Robinson, 2001), challengers should experience a need to justify or defend own position. Typically, such need for defending own position is associated with increases in intergroup biases (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). For example, in their comparative study on conflict resolution in symmetrical and asymmetrical dyad conflict structures, De Dreu and colleagues (2008, Experiment 2) found that in asymmetrical structures (where one party wants to change and one party wants to keep the status quo),
challengers perceived defenders as less friendly and more dominant than defenders perceived challengers. However, as the main purpose of this study was not to compare the attitudes of challengers and defenders towards their allies and opponents it is unclear whether the findings extend to social attitude issues, groups rather than specific persons in dyads, or other kinds of biased perceptions. In sum, although the literature indicates that challengers of the status quo may be viewed in a negative light, it is yet an open question how challengers of the status quo themselves perceive their allies and opponents.

**Intergroup biases in attributions of attitude origins.** Kenworthy and Miller (2002) explored three dimensions of reasons people use when trying to understand and explain why others hold the attitudes they do; external, rational, and emotional. Attitudes may be cognitively based on objective evaluation of facts and rational thought (Huskinson & Haddock, 2004). Alternatively, attitudes may be held due to external factors such as influence from family, friends, or media (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). Further, people may hold certain attitudes because it is a way to experience emotions (Maio & Haddock, 2007). These dimensions have evaluative implications indicating their different social value creating a foundation for attributional biases. Thus, a person may be biased in his or her judgments of the origins of other people’s attitudes as a function of whether these people hold the same or opposite opinion as themselves. In general, people tend to attribute less rational, and more external and emotional origins of the attitudes of those who disagree as compared to agree with themselves (Bäck et al., 2010; Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). In the present research, we explore how people who want to keep the status quo (defenders) and those who want to change it (challengers) attribute the attitude origins of those who agree and disagree with them. We have not limited challengers and defenders of the status quo to a specific attitude issue, but rather adopted a higher-level definition in that any individual choosing a standpoint
that opposes the status quo is defined a challenger and any individual choosing a standpoint in agreement with the status quo is defined a defender.

Experiment 1

To examine how challengers and defenders of the status quo attribute the attitude origins of their allies and opponents, participants in Experiment 1 were presented with a hypothetical scenario regarding a decision on a potentially important issue. The issue was supposed to be involving to the participants, at the same time as preference for or against the status quo should vary considerably. Hence, in the present experiment, high school students were asked if teachers should be allowed to confiscate students’ cell phones during class hours in cases where they disturb the class. This issue has been debated somewhat in Sweden during the past years, as this has become a problem. The status quo maintaining position, the defending position, in this case was to not allow this. We expected that both challengers and defenders would show intergroup biases in attitude attributions, and ascribe more favorable origins of preferences of those who agree with them as opposed to those who disagree with them. We further tentatively predicted that challengers of the status quo, due to their exposed and vulnerable position, would be more biased than defenders.

Method

Participants and design

Participants were 311 high school students (46 % males) from the larger Stockholm area. Mean age was 17 years ($SD = 0.81$), ranging from 16 to 20 years. The design was a 2 (target group: agree/disagree with own preference) X 2 (position: challenging/defending the status quo position) mixed design with target group being the repeated factor and position varied between participants. The dependent variables were ratings of the origins of preferences of those who agreed and disagreed with own preference for both challengers and defenders. The
distribution of preferences were 208 defenders (67.0 %), and 100 challengers (32.0 %). Three
(1.0 %) participants did not state a preference. These were excluded from further analyses.

Procedure and variable description

The experimental session took place in participants’ schools and was integrated into the
lessons. The experiment was part of another study, which was introduced as a study on
decision-making in school. The experimenter handed out the questionnaires, which began
with a brief description of the issue of whether teachers should be allowed to confiscate
students’ disturbing cell phones during class hours, or not. To make participants elaborate on
the issue, they were instructed to list three values that they believed should be considered in
relation to keeping or changing the status quo (e. g. to create a good learning environment,
that each individual should be respected in school, that the school should be characterized by
tolerance, etc). After some unrelated items, participants stated their own position in the issue
(challenging or defending the status quo). Following this were further unrelated items, and
then participants were asked to argue for their position. This was ostensibly to be used in a
coming study on persuasion but the purpose was rather to increase participants’ involvement.
This was followed by some more unrelated items. Then participants were instructed to answer
questions about the origins of preferences of (a) students who shared their preference on the
issue of confiscating disturbing cell phones (their allies), and of (b) students who did not share
their preference (their opponents). Following the procedures first outlined by Kenworthy and
Miller (2002), and later used by Bäck and colleagues (2010), the questions included four of
the items measuring the rationality and externality dimensions of origins of attitudes derived
by Kenworthy & Miller (2002). These items constituted the main dependent variables in the
study. Two externality ratings asked participants to indicate to what extent they perceived the
target as being influenced by (a) friends and family (i.e. the opinion of those who have [a
different preference than I do/the same preference as I do] is influenced by what their family
and friends prefer), and by (b) the potential disapproval of others if the target had the opposite preference. The two rationality items assessed to what extent they perceived that the target based their preference on (a) careful consideration of decision alternatives, and (b) on own, independent thinking about the issue. The items were assessed on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). The emotionality dimension was excluded in the current research since it yielded only weak effects in the Kenworthy and Miller (2002) study.

Results and discussion

Target group effects. Two repeated measures ANOVAs (one for each dimension) showed that there was a significant main effect of target group, such that allies were rated as more rational and less external than were opponents, regardless of participants’ own position (F(1,294)=46.56, p < .001, \( \eta^2_p = .14 \), and F(1,298)=37.38, p < .001, \( \eta^2_p = .11 \), for rationality and externality respectively). Means and standard deviations are shown in Table 1. These analyses confirmed earlier demonstrations (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002; Bäck et al., 2010) that people in general explain the opinions of those who agree with them in a more positive way than the opinions of those who disagree.

Position effects. There was a significant interaction effect between target group and own position, such that challengers showed stronger intergroup biases than did defenders. As can be seen in Table 1, this held true for both dimensions (F(1,294)=20.25, p < .001, \( \eta^2_p = .06 \), and F(1,298)=22.57, p < .001, \( \eta^2_p = .07 \), for rationality and externality, respectively). Hence, being a challenger seems to elicit stronger intergroup biases than being a defender of the status quo.

Previous research has shown that the default ideological position is conservative, and that challengers tend to be perceived more negatively than defenders by observers (Crandall et al. 2009; O’Brien & Crandall, 2005). In the current study we demonstrated that asking those identifying as challengers and defenders themselves to make judgments of their allies and
opponents moderated this pattern. In line with studies on attribution of attitude origins (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002; Bäck et al., 2010), we found that both challengers and defenders of the status quo attributed more rational reasons for the attitudes of those with whom they agreed, and more external reasons for the attitudes of those with a different opinion. This result is also in agreement with research on naïve realism, stating that people tend to perceive those who do not agree with one self as biased or misguided (Ross & Ward, 1996).

In the current study, we further found that challengers undermined, by ascribing more externality and less rationality, the position of defenders to a larger extent than defenders do of challengers’ position. This result supports our notion that when being in the vulnerable, challenging position people become increasingly aware of the possibility that others will question their position, and leading to an increased motivation to justify and defend their choice. The results also extend findings by De Dreu and colleagues (2008) showing that challengers perceive defenders more negatively than the other way around on the group-level as well as in dyad interactions.

In previous research (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Stephan et al., 2002; Kenworthy & Miller, 2002) it has been shown that perceived threat to social identity leads to increased biases. One factor associated with feelings of threat is the perceived numerical status of one’s group. Kenworthy and Miller (2002) showed that when participants were told they were in the minority, they displayed stronger intergroup biases of the same kind as was found in the current study. Even though numerical status was never communicated to the participants it is possible that being on the challenging side also implicitly suggests being in the minority, while being on the defending side suggests being in the majority. Keltner and Robinson (1997) showed that both challengers and defenders of the status quo underestimated the actual prevalence of challengers and overestimated the actual prevalence of defenders. Hence, our
finding of increased biases among challengers may not have been an effect of position per se, but rather an effect of the perceived numerical status.

Experiment 2 was designed to disentangle the effect of numerical status and position.

Experiment 2

Results from the first experiment suggest that both challengers and defenders of the status quo display intergroup biases in their perceptions of allies and opponents. Moreover, participants’ position moderated intergroup biases, such that challengers differentiated more than defenders in their attributions of the attitude origins of their allies and opponents. A possible confounder to the latter result is the implied numerical status of challengers and defenders. Kenworthy and Miller (2002) argued that numerical status may be used as a threat manipulation, such that knowing that one belongs to the minority may increase the need to defend and justify own position by increasing intergroup biases (Experiment 2). This reasoning is based on false consensus (Kelley, 1967), that the preference mostly shared, that is, the preference held by the majority, is the objectively correct one. Holding an incorrect preference threatens one’s positive self-image (Festinger, 1954) and one’s positive in-group image (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), in this case one’s allies. This manipulation has been successfully used in several empirical studies (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002; Bettencourt, Miller & Hume, 1999; Corneille, Yzerbyt, Rogier & Buidin, 2001; Kenworthy & Miller, 2001; Otten, Mummenday & Blanz, 1996). Further evidence that numerical status is important comes from O’Brien and Crandall (2005), who showed that majorities are seen as less driven by self-interest than are minorities (Experiment 1). Hence, in Experiment 2 we manipulated numerical status in order to separate the effects of numerical status from position. Further, we wanted to extend Experiment 1 by using other potentially important attitude issues. In addition to the cell phone issue we added an issue that has been widely discussed in many European countries lately; whether students in school should be prohibited from wearing
religious symbols, such as a veil or a necklace with a crucifix, or not. The third issue concerned if gay couples should be allowed to be tried for adoption of children from foreign countries. At the time of the study the status quo was that teachers were not allowed to confiscate cell phones, religious symbols were not prohibited, and gay couples were not allowed to be tried for adoption.

**Method**

**Participants and design**

One hundred and thirty-five undergraduate university students (31% males) at Stockholm University participated in exchange for course credits or lottery tickets. Mean age was 28 (SD = 11.41). Participants were randomly assigned one of the three issues, the cell phone issue (n = 44), the religious symbols issue (n = 45), or the gay couples issue (n = 46). About one third of participants in each issue were informed that there was a large majority in favor of the proposition, one third was informed that there was a large majority against the proposition, and one third were given no numerical status information. The design was thus 2 (target group: allies/opponents) X 3 (issue: cell phones, religious symbols, gay couples) X 3 (numerical status: majority, minority, no information), with repeated measures on the first factor. All other variables were measured between participants.

**Procedure and variable description**

Participants were recruited through experimenter visits at lectures. The experimenter waited after the lectures for the students to fill out the questionnaires and for this they were given either course credits (if they were psychology students) or lottery tickets (other students at the University). First, participants were provided information about the issue, asked to think about the issue for a while before stating their own preferred alternative, which was followed by some unrelated items. Then they were given numerical status information. Participants in the majority in favor of the proposition read the following text:
Before you continue it may be interesting to know that we have conducted an earlier study regarding this issue. It turned out that there was a clear majority in favor of the proposition that *teachers should be allowed to confiscate disturbing cell phones*.

In the majority against condition the words “majority in favor” was replaced with “majority against”. In the other two issues, the italicized text was replaced with *religious symbols should be prohibited and, homosexual couples should be allowed to adopt children from other countries*. In the no information condition, the text was completely omitted. After this, participants rated the origins of preferences for both their allies and their opponents on both the rationality and the externality dimension, as in Experiment 1. This was followed by some unrelated items, and then a manipulation check, adapted from Kenworthy & Miller, (2002), asking participants how they felt about there being a clear majority in favor (against) the proposition that teachers should be allowed to confiscate disturbing cell phones (religious symbols should be prohibited in school, or homosexual couples’ should be allowed to adopt). Participants answered on a 7-point Likert-scale ranging from *1 = very bad* to *7 = very good*. If participants had understood the manipulation they should report feeling bad when the majority was against their own preference and good when the majority was in favor of their own preference.

In total, 68 participants (50.5 %) were defined as challengers, that is they were pro the given proposition, and 65 (48.0 %) were defenders. Two people (1.5 %) did not state their position and were hence excluded from further analyses.

Results and discussion

Manipulation check. An independent samples t-test showed a significant difference between those who were informed that the majority shared their preference as opposed to those informed that the majority had the opposite preference as themselves with respect to
how they felt ($t = 8.25, p < .001$). Those whose preference was shared by the majority felt significantly better ($M = 5.83, SD = 1.09$) than those whose preference was not shared by the majority ($M = 2.93, SD = 1.99$).

*Attitude issue.* To control for potential differences in attributions with respect to attitude issue two indices were created, one for each dimension, where in-group ratings were subtracted from out-group ratings. The indices were used as dependent variables in two separate one-way ANOVAs, one for each dimension, with issue as independent variable. As expected, issue there was no difference in biases across issues, ($ps > .47$). Hence, in the following analyses, all issues were collapsed.

*Target group, position and numerical status effects.* Two separate ANOVAs, one for each dimension, with position (challenger/defender) and numerical status (majority/minority/no information) as between subjects factors, and target group as a repeated measure, replicated the effect of target group from Experiment 1, such that allies were rated more positively than were opponents ($F(1,124) = 35.97, p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .23$, and $F(1,121) = 7.18, p = .008$, $\eta^2_p = .06$, for rationality and externality respectively). Means and standard deviations are shown in Table 1. Moreover, analyses revealed main effects of position ($F(1,124) = 4.83, p = .04$, $\eta^2_p = .03$, and $F(1,121) = 8.42, p = .004$, $\eta^2_p = .07$, for rationality and externality respectively). Again challengers showed stronger intergroup bias than did defenders, supporting results from Experiment 1. Means and standard deviations are shown in Table 1. Numerical status did not significantly affect biases, nor did the interaction between numerical status and position. However, looking at the means broken down by numerical status, shown in Table 2, one can see that the results were generally in the expected direction, such that those in the minority were slightly more biased than those in the majority, and defenders in minority showed slightly more biased as opposed to defenders in the majority. This result held true for rationality but were more inconsistent for externality. Results typically are stronger for the
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rationality dimension (Bäck et al., Kenworthy & Miller, 2002), which could be interpreted as a more general priority of in-group favoritism to out-group derogation (Brewer, 2007).

In sum, Experiment 2 confirmed findings from the first experiment showing that challengers of the status quo tended to be more biased in their perceptions of their allies and opponents than were defenders. Further, the results suggest that numerical status is secondary to status quo position. We can only speculate why this is the case, but it seems plausible that given the widespread negative view on change (Crandall et al., 2009; De Dreu et al., 2008; Jost et al., 2004; O’Brien & Crandall, 2005; Skitka et al, 2002), actively choosing to violate the good and true status quo elicit a need for justifying oneself.

General discussion

In line with previous studies (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002; Bäck et al., 2010), the present research has shown that people tend to be biased in their perceptions of others whom they agree as opposed to disagree with, such that people tend to attribute more positive motives to those holding the same as opposed to different opinion as oneself. Specifically, those sharing own opinion are seen as more rational and less externally influenced than those who do not share own opinion, whom are instead seen as more externally influenced and less rational.

The results have implications for people’s tolerance, respect, and understanding of conflicting perspectives, with potential important consequences for how they behave towards disagreeing others.

In the current research, we further demonstrated what we label a challenger bias; People who challenge the status quo are more biased than are people who want to keep the status quo. We argue that one potential explanation to this finding is that challengers are in a vulnerable and exposed position (De Dreu et al., 2008; O’Brien & Crandall, 2005), increasing the need to justify and defend themselves. One way to accomplish this is by increasing biases, and hence undermining the validity of the opponents’ preferences (O’Brien & Crandall,
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2005). Another explanation may be that such a position is associated with perceptions of threat, previously shown to increase biases (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002; Stephan et al., 2002). Our results indicate that challengers’ perceptions of their allies and opponents are in fact more extreme than defenders’, which could explain why challengers in previous research have been rated as less reasonable, less flexible, and more contributing to the conflict (Kray & Robinson, 2001).

One potential confounder of the position effect found in Experiment 1 was the implied numerical status of the groups. Thus, the differences between challengers and defenders may actually have been due to challengers perceiving themselves to be in the minority, a factor shown to increase biases (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). Our results indicate that this is not the case. Even though challengers were informed that the majority shared their position, biases did not decrease. Hence, being in the challenging position per se seems to override possible effects of numerical status. For the future, this finding is particularly interesting as it suggests that position and numerical status may carry qualitatively different information. The way these mechanisms operate need future attention.

Given that challengers are less tolerant of their opponents’ point of view, they may be perceived as strenuous and stubborn, rather than innovative. This could possibly decrease the likelihood that defenders will take them seriously, which in turn may lead challengers to employ more extreme convincing methods. In line with this reasoning it has been shown that revisionists are often stereotyped as extremists (Keltner & Robinson, 1997). On the political arena, challengers are sometimes also seen as extremists. One example of this is the recent development in the U. S., where the oppositional political Tea Party movement has received a lot of attention in relation to their aggressive rhetoric, accusing their opponents of irrationality. However, this phenomenon is not new. Negative campaigning, such as smearing, for example in the form of attribution of mental defects to opposing candidates, has been
practiced in the U. S. since 1796 (Felkner, 2001). It has even been proposed that without such
negative campaigning challengers of the incumbents have little opportunity to gain power
(Felkner, 2001).

The fundamental driving force of negative attitudes towards opponents seems to lie in the
challenging position rather than the numerical status. Perhaps the essence of challenging
could be considered a more conscious act of choosing a point of view, rather than finding
oneself to belong to a minority. To challenge what is generally considered to be good and true
demands more from the individual in terms of gearing up for fight and protection against
attacks.
### Table 1. Means and standard deviations of rationality and externality ratings for challengers and defenders of the status quo

|                  | Study 1                                      | Study 2                                      |
|------------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
|                  | Rationality | Externality                                      | Rationality | Externality                                      |
|                  | Challenger | Defender | All   | Challenger | Defender | All   | Challenger | Defender | All   |
| Allies           | 5.15 (1.11) | 4.92 (1.24) | 4.99 (1.21) | 2.66 (1.11) | 2.82 (1.36) | 2.78 (1.28) | 4.73 (1.07) | 4.72 (1.24) | 4.73 (1.15) | 3.26 (1.29) | 3.75 (1.23) | 3.50 (1.28) |
| Opponents        | 4.19 (1.40) | 4.72 (1.30) | 4.54 (1.35) | 3.63 (1.55) | 2.96 (1.40) | 3.18 (1.49) | 3.89 (1.15) | 4.32 (1.27) | 4.10 (1.23) | 3.84 (1.45) | 3.75 (1.42) | 3.80 (1.43) |
| Difference<sup>a</sup> | 0.96***    | 0.20*    | -0.44*** | -0.97***   | -0.14    | 0.41***    | 0.85***    | 0.41*     | 0.63***    | -0.58***   | -0.01   | -0.30**    |

<sup>Note</sup>. Rationality and externality rated on 7 point Likert-scales, where higher values indicate more ascribed rationality and externality. Higher values on the rationality and lower values on the externality difference indices imply more bias.

<sup>a</sup> Paired samples t-tests

* p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of rationality and externality ratings for challengers and defenders of the status quo divided by numerical status

|                   | Rationality |                   | Externality |                   |
|-------------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|-------------------|
|                   | Challengers | Defenders         | Challengers | Defenders         |
|                   | Majority    | Minority          | No info     | Majority          | Minority          | No info     |
|                   | n=21        | n=23              | n=22        | n=18              | n=21              | n=22        |
| Allies            | 4.43 (1.10) | 4.83 (1.15)       | 4.93 (0.93) | 4.31 (0.77)       | 4.68 (1.17)       | 4.74 (1.34) |
| Opponents         | 3.64 (1.12) | 3.83 (1.30)       | 4.18 (0.99) | 4.24 (0.61)       | 3.95 (1.52)       | 3.18 (1.49) |
| Difference        | 0.79        | 1.00              | 0.75        | 0.07              | 0.73              | 1.56        |

|                   | Majority    | Minority          | No info     | Majority          | Minority          | No info     |
|                   | n=21        | n=23              | n=22        | n=18              | n=21              | n=22        |
| Allies            | 3.60 (1.09) | 3.41 (1.53)       | 2.78 (1.08) | 3.69 (1.02)       | 3.71 (1.03)       | 3.84 (1.57) |
| Opponents         | 4.38 (1.08) | 4.00 (1.68)       | 3.16 (1.29) | 3.36 (0.85)       | 4.00 (1.31)       | 3.82 (1.84) |
| Difference        | -0.78       | -0.59             | -0.38       | 0.33              | -0.29             | 0.02        |
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