Disinformation Order and Social Media Algorithmic Trap: New Challenges for Sustainability of the Indonesia’s United Nation-State Narrative and Liberal Democratic Norms

Nyarwi Ahmad, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia*

Abstract

The Internet and social media have been increasingly adopted by political entities across the globe. The consequences of such adaptations on the Indonesia’s nation-state narrative and liberal democratic norms have been under-researched, however. This article argues that in democratic countries, such adaptations are likely to pave the way for the emergence of disinformation order and social media algorithmic trap. Within the specific context of Indonesia’s democracy, these disinformation order and social media algorithmic trap are likely to polarize political spheres and jeopardize not merely Indonesia’s united nation-state narrative, but also Indonesia’s liberal democratic norms that evolved since the post-reform era. To evaluate such propositions, this article adopts a desk study and selects Jakarta’s 2017 Gubernatorial Election as a study case. Learning from these desk study and study case, this article proposes the following arguments. To manage the consequences of disinformation order and social media algorithmic trap on politics and democracy, we need formulate new political communication and policy research agenda based on the following dictum: who get lost by what/whom in which channel/medium and with what effects. Taking such effort may give us an opportunity to keep the current Indonesia’s united nation-state narrative prevailing and liberal democratic norms flourishing.

Keywords: Disinformation order; Liberal democratic norm; Nation-state narrative; Political polarization; Social media algorithmic trap

INTRODUCTION

The idea of this work comes from the following observations. Firstly, within the last two decades, while traditional politics has been prevailing, digital politics has been taking shape robustly as well. Whilst political engagement, mobilization and participation have been evolving through digital platforms (Postill, 2012; Wells, 2015; Koc-Michalska & Lilleker, 2017), politics, democracy and citizenship have been transforming into digital forms (Dahlberg, 2011; Simon, Bass, Boelman, & Mulgan, 2017; Bennett and Livingston, 2018). As the Internet and social media have been increasingly adopted by political actors, activists, organisations and ordinary citizens in the political sphere, the traditional political communication system has been destabilizing (Dahlgren, 2015) and the democratic system has been undermining as well (Morgan, 2018).

*Correspondence: Kabupaten Sleman, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta 55281 Indonesia.
Email: nyarwi.ahmad@ugm.ac.id.

Received June 24, 2022; Revised August 11, 2022; Accepted August 15, 2022
Secondly, some authors argued that such adaptation of the Internet and social media platforms in the political spheres allow political actors to easily disseminate political agenda and information and advocate particular discourses (Eriyanto and Ali, 2022). Such adaptation leads to not merely political polarization (Asmolov, 2018) and global disinformation order evolving (Bennett and Livingston, 2018; Bradshaw & Howard, 2019), but also social media algorithm procedures increasingly governing and defining our politics and political affairs (Just & Latzer, 2016; Trere, 2016). However, while such developments have been evolving in either the developed or the developing countries, the consequences of these developments on sustainability of the nation-state narrative and liberal democratic norms that exist in these countries has been under-researched, however.

Focusing on such issue, this article proposes the following propositions. At first, the Internet and social media platforms adaptations in the political spheres are likely to allow not merely digital democracy and citizenship taking shape, but also political communication, participation and activism transforming into digital forms. Secondly, these adaptations are likely to pave the way for the emergences of not only disinformation order, but also social media algorithmic trap. Within the specific context of the emerging democracy of Indonesia, these disinformation order and social media algorithmic trap are likely to polarize Indonesian political spheres and endangers sustainability of the Indonesian nation-state narrative and liberal democratic norms as well.

To evaluate the above-mentioned propositions, this article organizes a desk study and selects Jakarta’s 2017 Gubernatorial Election as a study case. To start with, this article would discuss the following points.

**Digital Democracy and Citizenship**

It has been argued that adaptations of the Internet and social media platforms in the political fields transformed traditional form of democracy into ‘digital democracy’ (Van Dijk, 2012). Some efforts so far, have been taken to define what elements that constitute digital democracy and how to understand these elements properly. For example, Van Dijk (2012) defined it as ‘the pursuit and the practice of democracy in whatever view using digital media in online and offline political communication’ (Van Dijk 2012: 48). Simon et al (2017) instead, considered it as ‘the practice of democracy using digital tools and technologies’ (Simon, et al. 2017: 11). A slightly different from Van Dick (2012), Simon et al. (2017) accounted it for as a multidimensional phenomenon that incorporates the ‘representative, participatory and direct digital forms of democracy’ and includes both the minimalist and the maximalist digital forms of democracy 1(Simon, et al. 2017: 11-12).

---

1 The former is considered as a type of democracy that focuses on giving citizens access to governmental information and enabling them to interact with government through, such as online
The emergence of digital democracy makes politics, political communication and participation evolving through digital platforms (Postill, 2012; Koc-Michalska & Lilleker 2017). It provides citizens as well as political actors and organizations opportunities to develop global networks beyond national boundaries, advance free associations, formulate and share ideas and information and adopt global and local political identities (Hague & Loader, 1999). It transforms the nature of citizenship from traditional into digital forms (Bennett, 2008; Jones and Mitchell, 2015).

Unlike wise to the traditional form of citizenship, the digital form of citizenship is commonly understood as a type citizenship performed by digital citizen, who adopt not only respectful online behaviour, but also online civic engagement (Jones & Mitchell, 2015). This type of citizen adopts the ‘norms that regulate behaviours of using, abusing and misusing of the technology’ (Ribble & Bailey, 2004: 12). There are some specific elements that define the nature of citizenship in the digital era. They include standard conduct or procedures in using technologic and doing electronic exchange of information, process of teaching and learning electronic participation in the society, buying, and selling of goods and responsibility for actions and deeds, defining freedoms extended to everyone in a digital world and managing physical well-being in a digital technology and safety and self-protection while using technology (Ribble & Bailey, 2004: 12-13).

Digital Political Communication, Participation and Activism

Despite of allowing digital democracy and citizenship to taking shape, adaptations of the Internet and social media in the political spheres also transformed the practices of political communication, participation, and activism (Dahlgren, 2005, 2015). These adaptations not merely destabilize the existing horizontal and vertical traditional political communication systems (Dahlgren, 2005: 150-151), but also define the structural, representational, and interactional dimensions of communication spaces of democracy (Dahlgren, 2005: 148-149). These adaptations reconstruct modes of political communication and interactions carried out by political actors and organizations (Dahlgren, 2005: 29), but reduce the quality of public communication (Noveck, 2000: 27-28).

The existing literature indicated that the ordinary people, citizens, and electorates gradually adopted the Internet and social media platforms to transform the traditional form of political participation into the online form of political participation. Traditional form of political participation is commonly associated with ‘an activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action–either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the collaborate with government officials as well as make their own decisions about how they and their local communities are governed’ (Simon, et al. 2017: 11).
selection of people who make those policies’ (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995: 38). While Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) lacked explanation regarding type of political participation evolving in the digital environment, Gibson and Cantijoch (2013: 706-708) proposed the offline and the online forms of political participation. Gibson and Cantijoch (2013) classified these offline forms into two categories: active and passive offline political participation. Moreover, Gibson and Cantijoch (2013) also grouped the online forms into the active and the passive online political participation. Active online political communication refers to political participation and activities organized through online platforms, such as: e-voting, signing up as supporter/volunteer, joining SNS group to support the party, donate online, e-mailing to a politician, joining a social media networks/group around a political issue and e-boycotting. Passive online political communication instead, incorporates reading online newspapers, blogging, and commenting politics in online platforms, posting, forwarding/sharing and embedding political content through online platforms and following political party, member of Parliament and political candidate on online platforms (Gibson & Cantijoch, 2013: 706-708).

Despite of that, adaptations of the Internet and social media planforms by citizens in democratic countries also transformed the roles of such citizens in politics and democracy. As regards with this point, Gibson, Greffet and Cantijoch (2017) highlight that those who adopted these platforms could exercise the following roles. At first, they could be members of the passive audience, who receive political message delivered by political actors, without necessarily being a part of any political organization or community. Secondly, they could be friends of political party or its leader and politicians by joining and engaging in political activities, events and discussion organized by this political party or its activists. Finally, they could be members of a minority of digital activists, who are strongly engaged in advocating particular political issues and policies (Gibson, Greffet & Cantijoch, 2017).

Nonetheless, as the Internet and social media platforms have been adopted robustly in the political sphere, political activism has been evolving as well. In this respect, political activism has been no longer merely related with an offline activism that consists of ‘boycotting a company or product, joined/re-joined a political party, contacted an elected representative and taken part in a demonstration’ (Lilleker & Koc-Michalskha, 2017: 27). More than that, it keeps evolving into the following forms, which are ‘petitioning governments, contacting elected representatives, and taking part in demonstrations’, commenting ‘about politics on social media’, following ‘a political non-governmental political organization or charity on social media’, sharing and advocating political issues and endorsing political party and the party’ candidates through social media platforms (Lilleker & Koc-Michalskha, 2017: 27).
The Emergences of Digital Networks, Disinformation Order and Social Algorithmic Fabricated Consent

Some authors argued that in the digital political spheres, citizens and political activists who strategically adopted the Internet and social media platforms are likely to be capable of developing the logics of connective and collective actions (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012: 748). This article argues that such adaptations allow the individual citizens and political actors and organizations to establish not merely these logics of connective and collective actions (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012), but also the ‘digital networks’ within and across the individual, group/organisational and global levels (Van Dijk, 2006: 25-26). The first one is a type of network advanced by individual person with those who are associated with ‘family members, friends, acquaintances, neighbours, colleagues, fellow sportsmen, and so on’ through either the offline or online communication platforms (Van Dijk, 2006: 25). The second one is a type of network established by groups/organizations internally to develop ‘network organizations’ with large independent teams and projects and externally ‘to form network organizations cooperating in the execution of a particular task’ (Van Dijk, 2006: 26). The third one is a type of network set up by either individual or group/organization, which ‘goes for all subsystems of society’, economy, culture, and politics (Van Dijk, 2006: 26-27). The last one is a type of network that exists ‘in the world system of societies and international organizations’ (Van Dijk, 2006: 27).

Political actors or entities who established these digital networks through the Internet and social media platforms are likely to be capable of spreading ‘unfiltered information through their own media channels’ (Hameleers et al., 2020: 284). This allows disinformation² order to taking shape (George, 2018; Bennett and Livingston, 2018). Exploiting these social media platforms strategically also allow them to get what Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson (2017: 1281) called as ‘online opportunity structures. It is associated with factors that are inherent to the online media system, which did not yet exist in the traditional/mass media system (Engesser, Fawzi & Larsson, 2017: 1282). These factors include direct and personal connections, the rises of non-institutionalized masses and democratizing political message and information increasing roles of non-elite actors within political communication processes and the emergence of homophilic or like-minded groups of not only political actors, but also people/citizens/electorates (Engesser, Fawzi & Larsson, 2017: 1282-1284).

This article assumes that once these political actors or entities and ordinary citizens increasingly strived to harness these ‘online opportunity structures’, not merely disinformation order (George, 2018; Bennett and Livingston, 2018), but also the algorithmic uncertainty, apathy, distrust, and paranoia’ (Jackson, 2017).

---

² Disinformation, in this respect, is understood as spreading inaccurate information purposively and deceptively by any political actor or organization to ‘engender public cynicism,
governmentality of social media platforms (Just & Latzer 2016; Lutzer & Just, 2015; Enggesser et al., 2017). These make the powers of the mainstream media as public agenda setter declining and the algorithmic power of the social media in defining politics and political narratives and undermining the liberal democratic norms increasing substantially (Bennett and Livingston, 2018; Hameleers et al., 2020).

**RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS, METHOD, AND MATERIALS**

This article argues that the Internet and social media adaptations by political entities in the political sphere not merely transform the practices of political communication, participation, and activism into digital forms, but also pave the way for the emergences of disinformation order and social media algorithmic trap. Within the specific context of the emerging democracy of Indonesia, social media algorithmic trap is likely to not merely polarize political sphere, but also endanger sustainability of the united nation-state narrative and liberal democratic norms that exist in this country since the post-reform era.

To evaluate such propositions, this article adopts a desk study and a case study as a research method (Creswell, 2014). The desk study was carried out by extracting the journal and manuscript publication materials collected using the following criteria. *At first*, such materials discuss the consequences of the Internet and social media adaptations by political actors and organizations on politics and democracy within either the developed or the developing countries. *Secondly*, such materials uncover the Internet and social media adaptations and their consequences on disinformation order and social media algorithmic manufacturing consent and trap in these countries. *Thirdly*, such materials disclose the uses of the Internet and social media by political actors and organisations as a political communication platform in Indonesian politics—in general—and Jakarta’s 2017 Gubernatorial election—in particular. *Finally*, such materials evaluate transformations of Indonesia’s nation-state formation and narrative and liberal democracy.

Desk study was organized through the Google Search webpage in the second week of February 2018. The following key words were deployed to select these abovementioned materials. These key words include ‘the Internet use in politics’, ‘social media adaptation in politics’, ‘digital democracy’, ‘disinformation order, ‘social media algorithm’, ‘Indonesian nation-state’, ‘liberal democracy’, ‘Indonesia’s democracy in the Post-Soeharto New Order’, ‘political polarisation’, ‘polarized political sphere’ and ‘the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election’ or ‘Jakarta’s 2017 Gubernatorial Election’. 96 qualified articles published by peer-reviewed journals were collected through this procedure. But only 29 of them were selected as the materials in this desk study since they are needed to evaluate the abovementioned propositions.

The selected-materials were extracted using traditional qualitative content and thematic analyses (Boyatzis, 1998; Butler-Kisber, 2010). Such analyses are conducted through the following
procedures, which are familiarising with the materials, generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining, and naming themes and producing the reports (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Such procedures were conducted to generate the following findings.

Disinformation Order and Social Media Algorithmic Trap: New Challenges for the Democratic Countries

Extractions of the selected materials indicate that adaptations of the Internet and social media platforms in the political sphere lead the following developments to taking place. First at all, such adaptations allow ‘disinformation order’ to taking shape, not merely in the Western advanced democracies, but also in the non-Western less established democracies (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2018; Bradshaw & Howard, 2019). It is associated with an action of spreading of false information and propaganda performed by political actors or entities intentionally (George, 2018). It is also defined as ‘intentional falsehoods spread as news stories or simulated documentary formats to advance political goals’ (Bennett and Livingston, 2018: 124). It is a deliberative attempt made by political actors or entities ‘to spread false information or sow doubt in people’s mind’ through either offline or online communication platforms (Morgan, 2018: 39).

In countries, which are ruled under the non-democratic political regime, the disinformation order is likely to be established by those who ruled the government to ‘consolidate their power and expand it beyond borders’ (Michaelsen & Glasius, 2018: 3788). In countries, which are ruled by the democratic political regime, this disinformation order is instead, likely to be advanced by those who did not rule the government or the parliament to destabilize establishments of political system and order (Bennett & Livingston, 2018). Those who favoured establishing disinformation order commonly advanced a strategic deception to advocate distrust in the democratic and political institutions (Nery, 2019: 3) and downgrade political legitimacy and authority of such institutions (Bennett & Livingston, 2018: 124). The main goals they want to achieve are to disrupt the institutional order, undermine politicians and political organizations they associated with and political discourse they formulated and even ‘create confusion around elections’ (Bennett & Livingston, 2018: 130). These make such disinformation has been widely recognized as not only entailing ‘a corrosive effect on public discourse in the longer term, especially if unchecked’ (Fried & Polyakova 2018: 2), but also deteriorating sustainability of liberal democratic political system (Nery, 2019: 3).

Despite of that, such adaptations also allow what Bellanova (2017) called as the ‘algorithmic governmentality’ to taking shape. It refers to ‘a governance steered by learning machines and intelligent computing systems that are able to automatically capture and process data from multiple sources, using statistical calculations that humans and socio-political institutions are by and large no longer able to understand and master’ (Bellanova, 2017: 330). It becomes the digital regime of truth in defining and
constructing the digital reality (Rouvroy & Stiegler, 2016); it evolves based on the algorithmic calculations. Since such algorithmic calculations ‘operate in big data contexts’, we are likely to face a condition wherein ‘the amount of information that we create and leave behind when reading, liking and sharing online has been multiplying, not the least because of computers and their storing and tracking capabilities’ (Klinger & Svensson, 2018: 4655).

Any algorithmic governmentality has influential power to determine not merely our politics and political reality, but also the ways we recognized and deal with them in the digital environment (Just & Latzer 2016; Lutzer & Just, 2015). Domination of the power of this algorithmic governmentality in shaping politics and political affairs paves the way for the emergence of ‘algorithmic manufacturing of consent’. Once it took place, the powers of the mainstream media as public agenda setter and manufacturing public consent are likely to be replaced by the algorithmic power of the social media (Trere, 2016; Klinger & Svensson, 2018). This algorithmic governmentality may not fully undermine the power of the media logic in constructing politics and political affairs (Klinger & Svensson, 2018). This algorithmic governmentality is, however, likely capable of destabilizing traditional political communication system (Dahlgren, 2005) and democratic system (Morgan, 2018).

Extractions of the selected materials also indicate that increasing uses of diverse social media platforms in the political sphere could generate not merely social algorithmic governmentality (Just & Latzer, 2016; Lutzer & Just, 2015). More than that, they could also pave the way for the emergence of social media algorithmic manufacturing consents, which endanger the ordinary people and political actors, especially those who lacked sufficient social media and digital literacy, fluency, and competency. The ways these people and actors acted and interacted in the digital political spheres could be easily trapped by the social media algorithmic governmentality (Just & Latzer, 2016; Lutzer & Just, 2015).

These social media algorithmic manufacturing consent and trap are intrinsically resulting from the algorithmic powers of these social media platforms. These powers are generated from the algorithmic logics of collective and connective actions (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012) and the innate powers of social media features and algorithmic mechanism of communication processes existing in these features (Engesser et al., 2017). These powers consist of the networking power, network power, networked power, and network-making power (Castells, 2011: 773-774). The first one refers to ‘the power of the actors and organizations included in the networks that constitute the core of the global network society over human collectives and individuals who are not included in these global networks. The second one is ‘the power resulting from the standards required to coordinate social interaction in the networks’, which ‘is exercised not by exclusion from the networks but by the imposition of the rules of inclusion, while the third one is ‘the power of social actors
over other social actors in the network’ (Castells, 2011: 773). The last one is ‘the power to program specific networks according to the interests and values of the programmers, and the power to switch different networks following the strategic alliances between the dominant actors of various networks.

Generally speaking, disinformation order and social media algorithmic trap are likely to take place once ordinary people/citizens/electorates fail in managing and controlling these networking, network, networked and network-making powers. As these disinformation order and social media algorithmic trap increasing defined the natures of political communication and interaction in the digital political communication spheres, they could instigate what Bluhdorn called as ‘the proliferation of anti-democratic sentiments’ (Bluhdorn, 2020: 400).

This social media algorithmic trap was quite visible in Indonesia’s democracy, more specifically during Jakarta’s 2017 Gubernatorial Election. The way it was evolving in this election and carrying out consequences on Indonesia’s united nation-state narrative and liberal democracy will be briefly chronicled as follows.

Social Media Algorithmic Trap and Its Consequences on Indonesia’s United Nation-State Narrative and Liberal Democracy: A Lesson Learn from Jakarta’s 2017 Gubernatorial Election

Diverse social media platforms have been used by political actors and organizations in Indonesia’s democracy not merely as a tool for dissemination of political agenda and information, but also to ‘dominate the public conversation’ (Eriyanto & Ali, 2022).

The uses of these social media platforms by such political actors and organisations have been visible not merely during Jakarta’s 2012 gubernatorial election (Author removed, 2014), but also during Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial election. Focusing on the latter, Lim (2017) reported the following evidences. In facing this election, not merely political actors, but also the ordinary citizens and electorates in this country were interested to exploit these social media platforms as a mean ‘to exercise the freedom to hate’ (Lim, 2017: 11). Instead of exercising the freedom of speech, they actively attempted to silence others by exploiting the religious and ethnicity sentiments.

Social media algorithmic trap started emerging once they ‘are exposed not only to information based on their own political preferences but also their contacts’ preferences’ (Lim, 2017: 11-12). This social media algorithmic trap paved the way for the emergence of what Lim called as ‘algorithmic enclave’. It is a type of ‘imagined community’, which is techno-socially constructed by a group of individuals based on ‘collective identities like Islamists and liberals’ (Lim, 2017: 14). These individuals were interacted each other based on social media algorithm with a primary goal to ‘create a (perceived) shared identity online for defending their beliefs and protecting their resources from both real and perceived threats’ (Lim, 2017: 13). As regards with such point, Lim stated as follows.

‘Within these enclaves, small-scale online deliberation takes place,
furthering consensus among members and amplifying any pre-existing sentiments, beliefs, and opinions they share. It is not the information per se that facilitates amplification processes but the sharing and discussion of the information within the enclave, whether negatively or positively, that correlates with their pre-existing opinions’ (Lim, 2017: 12-13).

As reported by Lim (2017), these algorithmic enclaves were visible since the few months before such election was being held. They generated not merely ‘multiple forms of tribal nationalism’, but also the logics of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ (Lim, 2017: 14). Adaptations of such logics by political actors and ordinary citizens in this country paved the ways for not merely the rises of illiberalism and nationalist and Islamic populism in Indonesian politics (Hadiz, 2008; Hadiz & Robison, 2017), but also development of democratic regression (Hadiz, 2017). Increasing adaptation of these logics was also visible and propelling polarization of Indonesian political sphere in the few months before Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election was being held (Author removed, 2019). Such developments have been seen as jeopardizing sustainability of not merely the united nation-state narrative in this country, but also liberal democratic system, as enacted in Indonesia’s Constitution (Hara, 2017).

Indonesia is a unitary nation-state established in 1945s based on nationalism consciousness. This nationalism consciousness has been evolving since the early struggle for independent era. Development of such conscious was very much reliant on the print-language used in the Indonesian mainstream media, particularly, the newspapers (Anderson, 2006: 132). Anderson (2006: 133) stated that ‘in principle, anyone can learn any language’ and such ‘print-language’ invents nationalism (Anderson, 2006: 134).

Since the independent era, total number of Indonesia people who learnt and adopted ‘Bahasa Indonesia’ as an official language has increased substantially. Such development has been influenced by increasing access of these people to the Indonesian mainstream media. Most of the mainstream media have been commonly managed by the gate keeping procedures (Author removed, 2019). Journalists who worked for these media also usually adopted such procedures when they produced present and broadcast political information, issues and events related with not only Indonesia as an imagine community (Anderson, 2006), but also sustainability of Indonesia’s democracy (Author removed, 2019). Since the influence of the mainstream media in this country has been declining, social media platforms have been used as a web of hate (Lim, 2017).

While social media algorithmic trap is evolving, the roles of the mainstream media in exercising these gate keeping procedures are diminishing. In similar vein, the powers of journalists who worked for the mainstream media in managing these gate keeping procedures seem continuously weakening as well.
Such developments jeopardize not merely the unitary nation-state narrative established by founding fathers of this country (Anderson, 2006), but also liberal democratic political system that exist in this country (Hara, 2017).

The Importance of Developing New Political Communication Research and Policy Agenda

Hameleers et al. (2020: 284) argued that diverse political actors, such as politicians and ordinary citizens who exploited social media platforms could easily disseminate disinformation and allow disinformation order to take shape in democratic countries. He and his colleges pointed out that disinformation order could take shape once these political actors evolved as the ‘agents of disinformation’ (Hameleers et al., 2020: 284). Having conducted a desk study, this article reported that disinformation order took place in either the advanced or the developing democratic countries. It also endangered sustainability of liberal democratic norms that exist in these countries.

In consideration of this issue, this article argues that political actors in either the developed or the developing countries need to develop a collective effort to manage diverse factors that could drive disinformation order. Two of these factors are intentions of and actions carried out by any political entity in this country to spread ‘false information’ (Bennett and Livingston, 2018: 124; Morgan, 2018: 39). In the digital era, these two factors seem being increasingly visible in these counties. To resolve this problem, these countries need to develop and enact a workable public communication regulation, which is specified to prohibit ‘the ordinary citizens to spread falsehoods across society’ (Hameleers et al., 2020: 284) and political actors and the media to spread unverified and ‘unfiltered information through their own media channels’ (Hameleers et al., 2020: 284).

Nonetheless, based on a desk study report, this article also highlighted that the Internet and social media platforms adaptations by political actors and organizations and the ordinary people/citizens paved the way for the emergences of social media algorithmic manufacturing consent and trap. While evaluating Jakarta’s 2017 Gubernatorial Election, this article also chronicled that such adaptations, allowed social media algorithmic trap to taking shape within the few months before this election was being conducted. This trap not merely polarized Indonesian political sphere, but also endangered sustainability of Indonesia’s united nation-state narrative and liberal democratic norms.

Having reflected on such development, this article highlights the following suggestions. At first, not merely political actors and organizations that exist in the democratic countries, but also policy makers and communicators employed by these actors and organizations need to establish new political communication research and policy agenda. While doing so, they however, could no longer reliant on traditional paradigm of communication as coined by either Laswell’s (1936) axiom, which is who say what to whom in which channel to whom and with what effect or Chaffee’s (2001) aphorism, which is who gets to say what to whom. They alternatively, need to adopt a following
dictum, which is who get lost by what/whom in which channel with what effect, when, under what conditions and how? Secondly, as these political actors and organizations followed such dictum, they need to evaluate the nature and forms of social media algorithmic traps resulting from various social media platforms adaptations in the digital political (communication) spheres. They also need to focus on who get lost due to such disinformation orders and in such social media algorithmic traps.

Adopting the ideas of Freelon and Wells (2020), this article argues that further investigations need to be taken focusing on two following issues. The first one is the Internet and social media’s contents that drive disinformation order and social algorithmic trap. The second one is the reception processes of such Internet and social media’s contents. Political actors and organizations and the ordinary citizens that exist in democratic countries, which are suffering from disinformation order and social algorithmic trap also need to explore what or who make them getting lost and why they did so. They also need to examine the effects of such developments on formation of nation-state narrative and sustainability of liberal democracy in these democratic countries.

This article also advocates that we, as either professionals or scholars, could adopt the abovementioned dictum as we want to help the ordinary citizens who are suffering from disinformation order and social algorithmic trap to manage theirselves as ‘governable citizens’ (Williamson, 2016: 53). Taking such dictum as a research paradigm and an analytical framework may also allow us to systematically capture and explore the structural factors and conditions that determine modes of social media algorithmic traps and the ways they did evolve within or across democratic countries. Following such dictum may also give us new knowledge regarding these points.

In consideration of that such social media algorithmic trap could carry out substantial consequences on politics and democracy across the globe, this article concludes that the main question we need to address is no longer whether ‘democracy dies in the darkness’, as highlighted by the owner of the Washington Post (Farhi, 2017). The more important question is instead whether democracy could die in the social media algorithmic trap. If that the case, subsequent questions we need to consider are how can we capture the structural factors and conditions that propel tendency and how can we, as ether practitioners or scholars, do to manage and resolve this tendency strategically and effectively?

Conclusion
This article examines the consequences of the Internet and social media adaptations by political actors and organizations and the ordinary citizens in the political spheres on sustainability of the nation-state narrative and democratic norms in the democratic countries. Having conducted a desk study and selected Jakarta’s 2017 Gubernatorial Election as a study case, it chronicled the following points. Such adaptations paved the way for the emergences of not merely
disinformation order, but also social media algorithmic trap in either the developed or the developing democratic countries. Based on Jakarta’s 2017 Gubernatorial Election study case, it reported that transformation of social media algorithmic trap evolved within the few months before this election was being conducted carried out consequences on sustainability of Indonesia’s united nation-state narrative and liberal democratic norms. Learning from this case, it calls for the needs to consider new political communication and policy research agenda based on the following dictum: who get lost by what/whom in which channel with what effect, when, how and under what conditions. It advocates that such efforts are needed as we want to keep the united nation-state narrative existing and liberal democratic norms flourishing in the democratic country, such as Indonesia.

REFERENCES

Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Third Edition.

Asmolov, G. (2018). The Disconnective Power of Disinformation Campaign, Journal of International Affairs, 71 (15), 69-76.

Bradshaw, S., & Howard, P.N. (2019). The Global Disinformation Order: 2019 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation. Oxford: Oxford Internet Institute

Bellanova, R. (2017). Digital, politics, and algorithms: Governing digital data through the lens of data protection, European Journal of Social Theory, 20 (3), 329–347.

Bennett, W. L., & Livingston, S. (2018). The disinformation order: Disruptive communication and the decline of democratic institutions. European Journal of Communication, 33 (2), 122 –139.

Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2012). The logic of Connective Action. Information, Communication and Society, 15 (5), 739-768.

Bluhdorn, I. (2020). The dialectic of democracy: modernization, emancipation and the great regression, Democratization, 27(3), 389-407.

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology, Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3: 77–101.

Boyatzis, R. E. (1998) Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis and code development. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Butler-Kisber, L. (2010) Qualitative Inquiry: Thematic, Narrative and Arts-Informed Perspectives. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Castells, M. (2011). A Network Theory of Power, International Journal of Communication, 5, 773–787

Chaffee, S. (2001). Studying the new communication of politics, Political Communication, 18 (2), 237-244.

Creswell, J.W. (2014). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches. London: Sage Publication. Fourth Edition

Dahlgren, P. (2015). The internet as a civic space. In S. Coleman and D.
Freelon (Eds.), *Handbook of digital politics* (pp. 17–34). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

Dahlgren, P. (2005). The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation, *Political Communication*, 22 (2), 147-162.

Engesser, S., Fawzi, N., & Larsson, A. O. (2017). Populist online communication: introduction to the special issue, *Information, Communication and Society*, 20 (9), 1279-1292.

Eriyanto, E., & Ali, D.J. (2020). Discourse Network of a Public Issue Debate: A Study on Covid-19 Cases in Indonesia. *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication*, 36(3): 209-227.

Farhi, P. (2017, February 22). The Washington Post’s new slogan turns out to be an old saying. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-washington-posts-new-slogan-turns-out-to-be-an-old-saying/2017/02/23/cb199cda-fa02-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term=.3802ba4fe7ab, 25 January 2018.

Freelon, D., & Wells, C. (2020). Disinformation as Political Communication. *Political Communication*, 37(2), 145-156

Fried, D., & Polyakova, A. (2018). *Democratic Defense Against Disinformation*. Atlantic Council, EU DISINFO LAB.

George, C. (2018, February 21). *Disinformation: why it works and what can be done about it*. Retrieved from https://www.mediaasia.info/disinformation-why-it-works-and-what-can-be-done-about-it/, 25 January 2018, February 21.

Gibson, R., Greffet, F., & Cantijoch, M. (2017). Friend or foe? Digital technologies and the changing nature of party membership, *Political Communication*, 34 (1), 89–111.

Gibson, R., & Cantijoch, M. (2013). Conceptualizing and measuring participation in the age of the Internet: Is online political engagement really different to offline? *The Journal of Politics*, 75 (3), 701–716.

Hadiz, V. R. (2018). Imagine All the People? Mobilising Islamic Populism for Right-Wing Politics in Indonesia, *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 48 (4), 566–583.

Hadiz, V. R. (2017). Indonesia’s Year of Democratic Setbacks: Towards a New Phase of Deepening Illiberalism? *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 53 (3), 261-278.

Hadiz, V. R., & Robison, R. (2017). Competing populisms in post-authoritarian Indonesia, *International Political Science Review*, 38 (4), 488–502.

Hague, B. N., & Loader, B.D. (1999). *Digital Democracy Discourse and Decision Making in the Information Age*. NY: Routledge.

Hameleers, M., Brosius, A., & de Vreese, C.H. (2022). Whom to trust? Media exposure patterns of citizens with perceptions of misinformation and
disinformation related to the news media. *European Journal of Communication*, 1-32. DOI: 10.1177/02673231211072667

Hameleers, M., Powell, T.E., Van Der Meer, T.G.L.A., & Bos, L. (2020). A Picture Paints a Thousand Lies? The Effects and Mechanisms of Multimodal Disinformation and Rebuttals Disseminated via Social Media. *Political Communication*, 37(2), 281-301

Hara, A. E. (2017). *Populism in Indonesia and its Threats to Democracy*, Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research (ASSEHR), Volume 129. Third International Conference on Social and Political Sciences (ICSPS)

Jackson, D. (2017). Distinguishing Disinformation from Propaganda, Misinformation, and “Fake News.” National Endowment for Democracy Issue Brief. Retrieved at: https://www.ned.org/issue-brief-distinguishing-disinformation-from-propaganda-misinformation-and-fake-news/

Jones, L.M., & Mitchell, K. J. (2015). Defining and measuring youth digital citizenship, *New Media and Society*, 18 (9), 2063–2079.

Just, N., & Latzer, M. (2016). Governance by algorithms: reality construction by algorithmic selection on the Internet, *Culture, Media and Society*, 39 (2), 238–58.

Klinger, U., & Svensson, J. (2018). The end of media logics? On algorithms and agency, *Culture, Media and Society*, 20 (12), 4653–4670.

Koc-Michalska, K., & Lilleker, D. G. (2017). *Digital Politics: Mobilization, Engagement, and Participation*, *Political Communication*, 34 (1), 1-5.

Laswell, H. D. (1936). *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*. Whittlesey House: McGraw-Hill book Company, Incorporated.

Latzer, M., & Just, N. (2015). *Automated and Commercialized Reality Constructions: Governance by Algorithms on the Internet*, Selected Papers of Internet Research 16: The 16th Annual Meeting of the Association of Internet Researchers, Phoenix, AZ, USA / 21-24 October 2015

Lilleker, D.G., & Koc-Michalska, K. (2017). What Drives Political Participation? Motivations and Mobilization in a Digital Age, *Political Communication*, 34 (1), 21-43.

Lim, M. (2017). Freedom to hate: social media, algorithmic enclaves, and the rise of tribal nationalism in Indonesia, *Critical Asian Studies*, 49 (3), 411-427.

Michaelsen, M., & Glasius, M. (2018). Authoritarian Practices in the Digital Age, *International Journal of Communication*, 12, 3788–3794

Morgan, S. (2018). Fake news, disinformation, manipulation and online tactics to undermine democracy. *Journal of Cyber Policy*, 3 (1), 39-43.

Nery, J. (2019). *Democratic Decay and Disinformation in the Digital Age: Asian Perspective*. Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom Southeast and East Asia.

Noveck, B. S. (2000). Paradoxical partners: Electronic communication and
electronic democracy, *Democratization*, 7 (1), 18-35.

Postill, J. (2012). Digital politics and political engagement. In H. Horst and D. Miller (eds) *Digital Anthropology* (pp. 165-184). Oxford: Berg.

Purvis, T., & Hunt, A. (1999). Identity Versus Citizenship: Transformations of the Discourses and Practices of Citizenship, *Social and Legal Studies*, 8 (4), 457-482.

Ribble, M., & Bailey, G. (2004). Digital Citizenship: Focus Questions for Implementation, *Learning and Leading with Technology*, 32 (2), 12-15.

Rouvroy, A., & Stiegler, B. (2016). The Digital Regime of Truth: From the Algorithmic Governmentality to a New Rule of Law, *LA DELEUZIANA-Online Journal of Philosophy*, 3, 6-28.

Simon, J., Bass, T., Boelman, V., & Mulgan, G. (2017). *Digital Democracy: The tools transforming political engagement*. Nesta: London.

Trere, E. (2016). The Dark Side of Digital Politics: Understanding the Algorithmic Manufacturing of Consent and the Hindering of Online Dissidence, *IDS Bulletin*, 47 (1), 127-138.

Van Dijk, J. (2006). *The Network Society: Social Aspects of New Media*. London: Sage Publication. Second Edition.

Van Dijk, J. (2012). Digital Democracy: Vision and Reality, in I. Snellen and W. van de Donk *‘Public Administration in the Information Age: Revisited’* (pp. 46-62). Amsterdam: IOS- Press.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L., & Brady, H.E. (1995). *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wells, C. (2015). *The Civic Organization and the Digital Citizen: Communicating Engagement in a Networked Age*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Wardle, C., & Derakshan, H. (2018). Thinking about ‘information disorder’: formats of misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information, in Cherilyn Ireton and Julie Posetti (Eds), *Journalism, ‘Fake News’ and Disinformation: Handbook for Journalism Education and Training* (pp. 43-54). Paris: UNESCO

Williamson, B. (2016). Political computational thinking: policy networks, digital governance and ‘learning to code’, *Critical Policy Studies*, 10 (1), 39-58.