Can Deliberative Policy Reconcile Religious Conflict?  
A Construction from the Insight of Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia

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Abstract
The state has failed to manage religious conflicts. Not only from the side of the government apparatus, which helped provoke the mass to the loss of life, but also weak and biased central regulations. The fact is that national policies do not complete the agenda and content of interests. This study argues that an important deliberative policy is made in each conflict area as a reinforcement for national policy. We construct a deliberative policy flow for religious conflicts based on academic guidelines and the case of the Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) in Colo Village, Kudus Regency, Central Java Province. This study is sourced from data collected in November 2018 through documentation, interviews, and observations. We have interviewed the village government, religious leaders, active congregations, and residents. The results of the interviews were processed through the process of transcription, determining keywords, categorizing, and defining. Data refined in October 2020 through literature studies and news clipping. We have described policies as triggers of conflict, identified four patterns of JAI conflict in Indonesia, and explained the dynamics of Ahmadiyya diversity with local Muslims in Colo. Primarily, this study contains a deliberative policy-making process. The key to this policy is a participatory, informative, balanced, and thorough discussion of all parties. The task in the future is the need to examine the deliberative policy flow that we have constructed to ensure that this can be applied.

Keywords: Konflik agama; Kebijakan deliberatif; Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia.

Abstrak
Negara telah gagal menangani konflik agama. Tidak hanya dari sisi aparatur pemerintah yang turut memprovokasi massa bingung korban jinak, tetapi juga regulasi pusat yang lemah dan bias. Faktanya, kebijakan nasional tidak melengkapi agenda dan muatan kepentingan. Kajian ini berargumen bahwa kebijakan deliberatif penting dibuat di setiap wilayah konflik sebagai penguat kebijakan nasional. Kami membagikan alur kebijakan deliberatif untuk konflik agama berdasarkan studi literatur dan kasus Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) di Desa Colo, Kabupaten Kudus, Provinsi Jawa Tengah. Kajian ini bersumber dari data yang dikumpulkan pada bulan November 2018 melalui dokumentasi, wawancara, dan observasi. Kami telah mewawancarai pemerintah desa, tokoh agama, jemaah aktif, dan warga. Hasil wawancara diolah melalui proses transkripsi, penentuan kata kunci, kategorisasi, dan penafsiran. Data disempurnakan pada Oktober 2020 melalui studi literatur dan kliping berita. Kami telah menggunakan kebijakan sebagai pemicu konflik, mengidentifikasi empat pola konflik JAI di Indonesia, dan menjelaskan tentang dinamika keberagaman Ahmadiyah dengan umat Islam lokal di Colo. Pada intinya, kajian ini bertujuan untuk proses pembuatan kebijakan yang bersifat deliberatif. Kunci dari kebijakan ini adalah diskusi yang partisipatif, informatif, seimbang, dan menyeluruh dari semua pihak.
INTRODUCTION

Theoretically, religion and conflict are two opposing phenomena. Religion brings balance, whereas conflict brings destruction to life. When met, a series of studies in various countries show the goodness of religion as a tool to rationalize violent behavior (Appleby 2015; Rakodi 2013; Gopin 2002), although there is evidence to the contrary (Türkmen 2018; Isaacs 2016; Basedau et al. 2011). According to Abo (2000), the contradiction between religion and conflict is caused by the overlapping needs of adherents. Religious doctrine is packaged in such a way as to support attitudes including violence. This is in line with Basedau et al (2016) collecting data from 130 developing countries using logistic regression, finding that armed religious conflict is precisely the call of their religious leaders. There is fact justification for Huntington’s (1996) thesis that religion is a source of conflict in a post-cold war state.

Experience in many developing countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Bangladesh, India, shows that religion is a source of norms, values, and attitudes that influence the legal, economic, and political order. Countries with ties to religion must accept the consequences that come later. Intra and extra-religious conflicts within one country have often occurred (Basedau and Koos 2015; Svensson 2007; Ellingsen 2005; Juergensmeyer 1993). Especially in the Islam-Christian conflict (Horowitz 2009). In local Indonesia, Islam-Christian conflicts have occurred in Poso of Sulawesi and Ambon of Maluku (Qurtuby 2013), and Tolikara (Ridwan 2018). Also found in internal Islam: Sunni-Shia (Rokhmad 2019), Gafatar (Makin 2019), Majlis Tafsir Al-Qur’an (Alfandi 2013), and proper attention to the continuation of the conflict of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Jamaat (Suyatman 2017).

The prolonged religious conflict indicates that the state has failed to manage. State failure is not only caused by weak regulations (Hasan 2017), but also state actors come into play. Suryana (2019) and Hicks (2014) found that state officials played a role in mass mobilization to launch protests against the Ahmadiyya group which ended up taking the law into their own hands. State officials not only provoke but also fabricate violence to gain access to state resources (Hilmy 2015; van Klinken 2007). Hilmy (2015) specifically highlighted the Sunni-Shia conflict found that apart from theological, political, and economic elements also played in which the role of the government together with the Kiai became the main focus. This in turn hampers the law enforcement process because state actors are entangled in relationships with the attackers.

Laws and regulations do not guarantee the resolution of religious conflicts. Public policy from a top-down perspective has weaknesses in the area of control and supervision (Purwanto and Sulistiyastuti 2018; Dewi 2016; HM, Mualimin, and Nurliana 2018). Government regulation at one time is easily enforced in pockets of conflict, sometimes the other way around. Considering that Indonesia’s territory is inhabited by people who have different ethnic, social, and cultural features, local solutions are needed. We consider it very necessary to present a deliberative policy (bottom-up perspective).

This study argues that the deliberative policy is very important to be made in each conflict area. This will reinforce national policies that are considered incapable of resolving the agendas and other interests of the conflict. This argument will be proven through the reconciliation case of the conflict between the Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) and local Muslims in Colo Village, Kudus Regency, Central Java Province.
Muhammadiyah declared Ahmadiyah as an infidel group in 1929 with the main reason that “there is no Prophet after Prophet Muhammad (Crouch 2009), followed by MUI (Indonesian Ulama Council) in the Second National Conference in 1980 with the status of Ahmadiyya as Heretical (reaffirmed in fatwa number 11/MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005). This fatwa has become a guideline for Islamic groups to carry out several protests which often end up being anarchist. So that the government represented by the Minister of Religion, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the Attorney General reduced the conflict by issuing a Joint Ministerial Decrees (SKB 3 Menteri) in 2008. The SKB had no significant impact. Data from Tempo (2011) there have been 15 cases of violence, arson, and killings on the part of JAI. In 2020 there were 213 reports related to Ahmadiyya regarding the sealing of mosques, intimidation, accusations of heresy, and prohibition of socializing.

This paper begins with an explanation of policies that should reconcile conflict but instead, turn around. Then, we tried to find patterns of JAI conflict in Indonesia, followed by field findings of the dynamics of diversity in Colo Village. These three sub-themes were presented to support our discussion which seeks to construct a deliberative policy flow for religious conflicts. This important finding is expected to guide policy. Thus, encouraging the government in conflict locations as facilitators to promote local communication. The study objectives were answered using qualitative methods with two data sources. Primary data were obtained from interviews in the form of explanations of the situation in Colo Village, conditions when conflicts occurred in other areas, patterns of interaction between residents, routine worship in each religion, and others. Then the observation was in the form of a description of the situation in Colo Village, the mosques around Colo Village, especially the Ahmadiyah mosque, including the religious situation. Secondary data were obtained through online news access, literature searches, and documentation related to JAI. Primary data was processed following the directions of Miles and Huberman (1994) and Creswell (2014): data transcripts, search for keywords in each interview sentence, categorization between keywords, and meaning. This data processing process is accompanied by triangulation.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Policy in the Ahmadiyya Conflict Circle
This section tries to explain the condition of public policy in the context of religious conflict. Policies are born as government actions to solve various public problems. This official goal must be able to allocate the values contained in it. This is a challenge in policy, because every problem is inseparable from interests, desires, and values, whether they are directly related to citizens or policymakers.

Graff et al (2016) believe that the existence of interests, values, plus limited resources in policies are 'buttons' that trigger conflict. So it can be said that public policy can raise two prevalences, namely as a problem solver on the one hand and a trigger for the problem on the other. Rationally correct, public policy exists as an authoritative mechanism for managing conflict (Lele 2016; de Graaf and Paanakker 2015). However, all conflicting values and interests of actors who are not coordinated when carrying out the agenda-setting often create new conflicts or add to conflicts.

Religious conflicts that were resolved by top-down mechanisms, if a closer look were made, could not fulfill the expectations of each actor. There are at least five contradictions that can be identified according to Lele (2016): 1) satisfying one actor and making another actor win-lose; 2) does not satisfy all lose-lose actors; 3) creating new conflicts between actors; 4) pushing the government into conflict, or the latter happened in the case of JAI; 5) The existing conflict policy is used to punish other actors who are experiencing losing conflicts. These five contradictions in public policy are the impact of limitations in
allocating existing values and resources. Thus, practice in the field usually forces policy-making actors to provide interests that are deemed unnecessary to accommodate larger interests. This does not mean that lesser interests need to be ignored - it usually occurs in minorities. In some cases, it shows that there will be separate (special) policies that will be taken to accommodate these minority values or interests, such as the policy of assimilation or multiculturalism that is specifically given to ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.

The Ministerial SKB 3 as a policy has disadvantaged JAI. This policy contradicts its primary objective of mediating conflict and protecting the rights to diversity and life. We suspect that there has been bounded rationality or limited information held by the formulating actors or policymakers. Simon (1997) said, "...limits of human capability to calculate, the severe deficiencies in human knowledge about the consequences of choice, and the limits of the human ability to adjudicate among multiple goals." So that the SKB 3 Minister creates new conflicts from this perspective, is something that is in line. Computational limitations that humans have are the cause of various values not being able to be fully accommodated in a policy text.

This explanation does not intend to isolate public policy, on the contrary. This explanation tries to open discourse space for public policy to see conflict as an inseparable part of the policy itself. It is realized that looking at policy from the point of view of conflict seems to erode the essence of the policy itself. On the other hand, policies view conflict as something that must be avoided and even eliminated if necessary. The facts on the ground keep opening the eyes that conflicts in policy must get serious attention. Studies must be reproduced as a learning mechanism because policy and conflict are human civilizations.

**Ahmadiyya Conflict Pattern**

We started this discussion by tracing the series of conflicts of the Ahmadiyya Jamaat in various regions in Indonesia, then explaining the pattern of the conflict. This is intended as a comparison for later discussions between JAI's experiences in several parts of Indonesia and Colo Village, Central Java. Initially, Ahmadiyah was an Islamic movement that was born in India in the late 19th century under the leadership of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. This movement was born as a response to the development of reformist and progressive Hinduism (Lavan 1974). All provided support for Ahmad's work, at least until Orthodox Muslims found various teachings that deviated from Islam (Batubara 2019). Ahmadiyah's heresy has split into two groups: Lahore and Qadian. The Lahore section accepted Ahmad as a reformer but not as a prophet, while Qadian accepted both. In its development, both Qadian and Lahore were opposed through deviant fatwas by Islamic scholars in India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia (Crouch 2011).

In Indonesia, Ahmadiyah has been present since 1923 and has grown rapidly until 2000. The number of followers has reached 400,000 or 0.02% of the total Sunni Muslims, according to the Association of Religion Data Archives (2015). The movement remains divided into two parts: Ahmadiyah Qadian is called the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Jamaat (JAI), and the Ahmadiyya Lahore is called the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Movement (GAI). At the beginning of the spread, Ahmadiyah synergized with Muhammadiyah in building Islamic education and fighting Christianization. In 1929, Muhammadiyah considered the "infidels heretical" teachings brought by Ahmadiyah through a fatwa (Beck 2005). Crouch (2009) recorded that from 1929 to 2007 there were nine deviant Ahmadiyah fatwas from Islamic groups: Muhammadiyah, Nahdatul Ulama, and MUI. The central and local governments from 1976-2008 issued 26 regulations. Fatwas and regulations have not been issued since the SKB 3 Ministers were issued.

Even though there are many fatwas and official regulations on Ahmadiyyah, either JAI
or GAI, the fact does not prevent the congregation from praying. It is possible that this ongoing activity could be the initial trigger for certain Islamic groups, governments, and ordinary citizens to act aggressively. The Setara Institute recorded 15 violations against Ahmadiyah in 2007, 193 violations in 2008, 33 violations in 2009, and 50 violations in 2010 (Firdaus, Hasani, and Naipospos 2011). Violations increased in 2008 due to a wave of mass actions in various regions.

We updated the specific data on the violence experienced by Ahmadiyah from 2011 to 2019, totaling 33 cases. The data provides information on killings, expulsion, burning of congregational houses, burning mosques, destroying mosque facilities, sealing mosques, and psychological intimidation. These cases were spread across the islands of Java and Nusa Tenggara, more specifically in Bogor, Bekasi, Depok, Sukabumi, Pandeglang, Tasikmalaya, Kendal, West Lombok, Surabaya, East Lombok, West Lombok, and Mataram. Since Covid-19 hit Indonesia, all parties seem to be holding back on each other. Although there are still cases of sealing of mosques by the government (Simbolon 2020), this has decreased significantly compared to the previous year. This moment was used by JAI to report the acts of violence and psychological intimidation they experienced (BBC News Indonesia 2020).

Based on the data we have generalized, there are several patterns of conflict between Ahmadiyah vs certain Islamic groups that were formed. First, the conflict was triggered by the Ahmadiyah missionary movement. We suspect that there are “scouts” from certain Islamic groups to see the preaching of Ahmadiyah. In the context of government, it is known as Bakor Pakem (the Coordinating Board for the Supervision of Beliefs). When it is read, mass action will be carried out. According to them, the mass action was not only related to the SKB 3 Ministerial regulation regarding the dissemination of interpretations and activities that deviate from Islamic principles but also about religious jihad. Mass actions will run peacefully when there is an initial intention from the protesters to be peaceful, then guarding against the Police, and controlled speeches. When one element is not fulfilled, the action will likely end in violence. Sealing and vandalizing mosques belonging to Ahmadiyah are the options most frequently carried out by the masses.

The second pattern is the existence of the MUI Fatwa and the 3 Ministerial Decree which become a strong guide for certain Islamic groups and the government to start conflicts. Generally, action participants referred to these two sources of law. For law enforcement officials, a Governor Regulation (Pergub) or a Regent Regulation (Perbup) becomes a guideline that ultimately still refers to the two previous policies. The following shows some government narratives when asked about the reasons for sealing.

“To determine the status of Ahmadiyah and their religious rights, there are those who have more authority, such as MUI. This sealing is based on the decision of the Mayor of Depok which refers to the decision of the Governor of West Java” (BBC News Indonesia 2017)

“We only carry out our duties (Main Duties and Functions) ... Our actions are not illegal. There are binding rules. SKB 3 Minister, Patwa MUI 2005, and West Java Governor Regulation number 12 of 2011 regarding the prohibition of Ahmadiyah activities, and has been stated in the form of Bekasi Mayor Regulation number 40 of 2011.” (Simbolon 2020)

Third, conflicts occur because law enforcement officials are often late in anticipating mass actions. It was even worse when it was found that there were police officers who deliberately ignored the destruction of facilities belonging to Ahmadiyah. Hicks (2014) describes security engineering during a conflict where existing law enforcement officers do not act because there are only a few and are unable to control a large number of people. Fourth, there is no retaliation from Ahmadiyah when anarchism occurs. It is as if
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Ahmadiyah accepts every action taken by the action period as a consequence of their religious practice. This possibility is reasoned because of the position of Ahmadiyah as a minority that does not have power, either in terms of numbers or access to the law. We also note the absence of someone who is influential and has the power to ensure the safety of Ahmadiyah. The most common action taken is a complaint to the National Commission on Human Rights after an anarchist action has taken place. Since the MUI Fatwa and SKB 3 of the Minister were present as binding rules, these four patterns of conflict have always been repeated.

Religious Dynamics in Colo Village

God bestows abundant natural wealth for Colo Village, Dewe District, Kudus Regency, Central Java Province. Located 11 km from Kota Kudus, Colo Village is located at an altitude of 700 m above sea level, which is included in the Muria Mountains area (Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Kudus 2020). Knowing the extraordinary natural potential, the Kudus Government worked on a tourist village through the excellence of Montikel Waterfall, the tomb of Sunan Muria, the tomb of Syech Nurrudin Abul Hasan Sadzali's grave, Goa Jepang, homestay in the hills, and other artificial tours. The income of Colo Tourism Village comes from tourism. Apart from farming and raising livestock, tourism has contributed to attracting a large workforce of 4174 people (Badan Pusat Statistik 2019).

Colo Village has multiple religions and religious rituals. There are three religions practiced by the people: Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism. Citizens who embrace Islam are further divided into three major groups: Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and Ahmadiyyah. The majority of residents are affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama, followed by Muhammadiyah and Ahmadiyyah. Ahmadiyyah members—only number 17 families. This has only increased by two family heads since 2013. In terms of the number of followers, there is no additional finding, only the administrative separation of family cards. Two things can be explained: first, Ahmadiyah in Colo Village only developed in the family sphere. When our team confirmed the question about followers, the Chairman of the Baitul Dzikir Mosque did not speak much, only explaining that they only wanted to practice Islamic law peacefully and had no intention of influencing the faith of others. This answer indicated that the protests and threats from external parties had a major impact on their preaching patterns. Then, there is an attitude of 'playing it safe' where the congregation puts personal safety first.

"...when we interact, we don't talk about religion (with other residents). We're talking about everyday life. (religion) It's sensitive. We are very close to our neighbors here. Keep each other calm. Often help each other too if someone has a celebration. In the mosque, we also don't use a mic when we lecture ... To keep everyone safe. We are afraid like what happened in other areas." (Interview with Ahmadiyah members in June 2018)

Second, there is no dissemination of religious understanding. Since there was pressure from religious authorities, the government, and certain Islamic groups, the Ahmadiyya religious orientation in Colo has changed. They only focus on increasing the faith of fellow congregation, then do not do da'wah outside the group. This is evidenced by the practice of preaching, which is very careful and deliberately closed to outsiders. Baitul Dzikir Mosque only uses loudspeakers when saying the call to prayer and performing the five daily prayers. The weekly lecture and other da'wah activities are more often carried out in the congregation's house in turn. This is also an adaptive strategy to reduce crowd activity in mosques. Furthermore, we learned that there was a stance to close the gap in the conflict when a member of Nahdatul Ulama started to attend Ahmadiyah's recitation. Wisely, the
Imam of the Baitul Dzikir Mosque advised these residents to temporarily not move closer to the Colo Ahmadiyah to avoid future slander. Efforts to save the life of the congregation take precedence over adding one new follower.

We found the keywords "safe and peaceful" throughout the interview transcripts. This indicates that Ahmadiyah members hope that the ripple of conflict will not reach their village. Many efforts have been made by various parties in Colo Village to ensure a peaceful life for all. We categorize these efforts: efforts of Ahmadiyya religious leaders, efforts of the village government, and efforts of Muslims around Colo Village. An initiative emerged from the central JAI to spread the vision of "love for all hatred for none, humanity first." The central JAI sends a religious teacher every month to various regions, including Kudus Regency. All JAI in Kudus will gather to get religious guidance and knowledge. This moment becomes the glue of information between the central and regional JAI.

The chairman of the Baitul Dzikir Mosque also issued various internal policies such as continuing to spread information about 'God is the same, the Prophet we are the same' and on one of the walls of the mosque was written the words of tauhid. These two things are considered the most important to be conveyed as a sign that JAI in Colo Village does not question Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's status as a Prophet or a Mujadid. Then, Ahmadiyah members continue the tradition of mingling in society, especially for muamalah, social and cultural activities. Before the conflict broke out, social capital in Colo Village had been very well developed. Ahmadiyah members and Nahdatul Ulama mingle like neighbors. So it is considered difficult to create conflict in the village unless there is pressure from external parties.

"Maybe because this is a village. The people are very close to one another. This condition has been around for a long time. Alhamdulillah, residents here are not affected by news and incitement from outside parties. Next to my house is an NU (Nahdatul Ulama) person, he has a wedding, we help him. Together we participate in village cooperation to celebrate Indonesia's independence day. Every day we interact, it can be in the fields, at home, or meet on the road… But we are aware that we are afraid that what is happening here in Bogor, we anticipate by spreading commonalities. From the village government and other Islamic leaders, we were also invited to talk they reminded us to refrain."
(Interview with influential Ahmadiyah figures in June 2018)

The village government anticipates through policies that have been decided together. Participating in the discussion were influential JAI figures in Colo Village, the chairman of the Baitul Dzikir mosque, religious figures from Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, and Babinsa (Village Guidance Officer). The policy is stated in a "Collective Agreement" signed by all participants present. In summary, the contents of the collective agreement are 1) all parties must not be influenced by incitement, slander, issues, and news from outside parties who want to destroy the peace in Colo Village; 2) if there is a problem related to harmony between religious communities, it must be reported to the village or village security; 3) always prioritizes deliberation and justice for all parties; 4) the village government has the right to impose sanctions on parties that trigger religious conflicts; 5) Ahmadiyah members are prohibited from spreading their understanding or preaching outside the group, and; 6) all Village residents must maintain an attitude of tolerance and promote an inclusive attitude.

The village government is considered responsive to the development of the conflict. This is evidenced by the making of a collective agreement long before the SKB 3 Minister is issued. At least until this research is done, there has never been any conflict. This proves that all parties consistently adhere to common rules. Ahmadiyah has been very careful in this regard. They considered that a joint decision with the village was not enough, therefore
internally they made various rules. The chairman of the Baitul Dzikri Mosque explained that all efforts were made so that all Ahmadiyah members could continue to live normally. This is not only a matter of religion but also a person's survival.

We consider the Collective Agreement as a precautionary step from all elements of the village. However, that is not the only indicator of success. There are still many small policies and social capital that play a role. In terms of numbers, Ahmadiyah in Colo is classified as very small, with 17 households out of a total population of 4,174 people. This small number is easier to monitor. They are the original inhabitants of Colo Village and are still one large family who have long decorated village life. From the perspective of Nahdhiyn and Muhammadiyah residents, close social and economic relations have played down the differences in religious understanding between them. There is an attitude of reluctance to interfere in someone's faith. Moreover, Nahdhiyn residents are known for their Wasathiyah (moderate) Islamic principles.

**Deliberative Policy as Local Solutions: A Discussion**

This *sub-discussion* extracts several important points to clarify the field and literature findings of our argument. We have proven that national policy is not able to resolve conflicts in various regions. The assumption is that if the top-down perspective is successful, then the conflict will be much reduced. The presentation of the four patterns of JAI conflicts that keep repeating along with data on the increase in the number of conflicts is considered sufficient to support this. It is difficult to reduce conflict by only relying on one policy because of the many interests that must be accommodated, value battles, and contested resources. Unpreparedness during the implementation of the policy, which in turn questions the policy output. This causes policies to trigger new conflicts because there is public dissatisfaction with the impact of the policies in terms of values, opportunities, or needs.

Every area that has the opportunity for conflict must make a deliberative policy to strengthen the national policy. Deliberatives are policy that is decided through interactions between citizens, leaders, and decision-makers. This policy brings together all interests through participatory policymaking. So that the essence of a deliberative policy is communication, group discussion, and consensus. Interestingly, all parties in the deliberative room were allowed to participate in discussing issues and proposing policy points. Habermas in *Hardiman (2009)* emphasized that the deliberative axis is in deliberation, exploring problems through dialogue, and sharing experiences between the parties.

![Scheme 1. Deliberative policy flow for religious conflicts](image)

The Colo Village Government has gathered various interested parties to produce a joint policy. This policy is contained in a Collective Agreement document or 'Perjanjian Bersama'. On the one hand, this study supports *Fishkin (2015)* that deliberative policy

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requires representation from various parties, a substantial balance, careful consideration of participants' arguments, and open information (Simon 1997). But based on field evidence, what Fishkin called "equal considerations" was not found. We see that there are several points in the collective agreement that are detrimental to JAI. However, it is true what was conveyed by Lele (2016) policy has led to a win-lose.

Based on Perjanjian Bersama, it is when considering the flow of public policymaking in general (Dunn 1981; Nugroho 2017). We try to build a deliberative policy flow for religious conflicts. It starts with the work of the policy analyst as the party who defines the problem, then explains the possible intersections between the problems. Early problem analysts conduct various academic and field studies to ascertain the sources of the problem. Information can develop from the results of deliberations of all parties because this is one of the differences in deliberative patterns that use participatory elements. The final policy paper drafted by an analyst is presented during the dialogue.

The government takes a position as a facilitator of dialogue. This has been practiced in cases. Neither the government nor policy analysts must stay out of dialogue to ensure decisions are not intervened by any party. All actors must convey all the available information. The closure of information will affect policy points and possibly have an impact on win-lose. The result of the actor's dialogue is policy points. Policy analysts can help build appropriate sentences for each policy point so as not to generate multiple interpretations at a later date. Policies can only be decided by all actors involved in the conflict, while the government is the party that ratifies the policy. The responsibility for the policy is not in the hands of the government, but all actors are obliged to maintain a common commitment. Therefore, in a deliberative policy, it is necessary to explain the sanctions for actor violations. Finally, the deliberative policy that has been decided must be able to support national policy.

CONCLUSION

Religion is the staple of life for the people of Indonesia. This urgency allows for conflicts to develop with ease. A person will be willing to die when something he believes is tarnished. This seemingly simple reason triggered a series of JAI conflicts. Groups that feel Islam is being tarnished have carried out various actions with almost the same pattern throughout the year. We found four patterns of JAI conflict: the existence of the Ahmadiyya da'wah movement, the MUI Fatwa, and Joint Ministerial Decrees (SKB 3 Menteri) as a strong guide to initiating conflict, negligence of law enforcement officials in anticipating mass actions, and the resignation of Ahmadiyah members. In Colo Village, the life of Ahmadiyah members tends to be safe and peaceful. This is inseparable from various anticipations from the Ahmadiyah and the village government. Ahmadiyah leaders do not spread understanding, campaign for equality rather than difference, and preserve a culture of participatory socialization with villagers. The government took the initiative to gather various parties to make a collective agreement or Perjanjian Bersama. We also found other supporting factors: the number of Ahmadiyah members is very small and spread only in the family environment, they are indigenous people who have been socializing for a long time, Nahdiyin members speak out for Islam Wasathiyah, and the village's social capital has been built with strongly.

Perjanjian Bersama that has been decided by various parties in Colo Village is a best practice to support the SKB 3 Menteri. The findings of this study fully support our argument. For this framework, we conclude relevant deliberative policies for the context of the Ahmadiyah conflict in Indonesia. This is due to two things: a deliberative policy in line with the principles of decentralization and Indonesian society which has a communal character. We have constructed a deliberative policy flow for religious conflicts. This is
based on practices in Colo Village and public policy academic guidelines. This study has expanded the research area in the future. The interdisciplinary theme between public policy and religious conflict still needs to be explored. We emphasize the need for testing the deliberative policy flow constructed.
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