Abstract

This paper discusses the basic structures necessary for the generation of reference to objects in a visual scene. We construct a study designed to elicit naturalistic referring expressions to relatively complex objects, and find aspects of reference that have not been accounted for in work on Referring Expression Generation (REG). This includes reference to object parts, size comparisons without crisp measurements, and the use of analogies. By drawing on research in cognitive science, neurophysiology, and psycholinguistics, we begin developing the input structure and background knowledge necessary for an algorithm capable of generating the kinds of reference we observe.

1 Introduction

One of the dominating tasks in Natural Language Generation (NLG) is the generation of expressions to pick out a referent. In recent years there has been increased interest in generating referential expressions that are natural, e.g., like those produced by people. Although research on the generation of referring expressions has examined different aspects of how people generate reference, there has been surprisingly little research on how people refer to objects in a real-world setting. This paper addresses this issue, and we begin formulating the requirements for an REG algorithm that refers to visible three-dimensional objects in the real world.

Reference to objects in a visual domain provides a straightforward extension of the sorts of reference REG research already tends to consider. Toy examples outline reference to objects, people, and animals that are perceptually available before the speaker begins generating an utterance (Dale and Reiter, 1995; Krahmer et al., 2003; van Deemter et al., 2006; Areces et al., 2008). Example referents may be referred to by their color, size, type (“dog” or “cup”), whether or not they have a beard, etc.

Typically, the reference process proceeds by comparing the properties of the referent with the properties of all the other items in the set. The final expression roughly conforms to the Gricean maxims (Grice, 1975).

However, when the goal is to generate natural reference, this framework is too simple. The form reference takes is profoundly affected by modality, task, and audience (Chapanis et al., 1977; Cohen, 1984; Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), and even when these aspects are controlled, different people will refer differently to the same object (Mitchell, 2008). In light of this, we isolate one kind of natural reference and begin building the algorithmic framework necessary to generate the observed language.

Psycholinguistic research has examined reference in a variety of settings, which may inform research on natural REG, but it is not always clear how to extend this work to a computational model. This is true in part because these studies favor an analysis of reference in the context of collaboration; reference is embedded within language, and language is often a joint activity. However, most research on referring expression generation supposes a solitary generating agent. This tacitly assumes that reference will be taking place in a monologue setting, rather than a dialogue or group setting. Indeed, the goal of most REG algorithms is to produce uniquely distinguishing, one-shot referring expressions.

Studies on natural reference usually use a two person (speaker-listener) communication task (e.g., Flavell et al., 1968; Krauss and Glucksberg, 1969; Ford and Olson, 1975). This research has

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1 A notable exception is Heeman and Hirst (1995).
shown that reference is more accurate and efficient when it incorporates things like gesture and gaze (Clark and Krych, 2004). There is a trade-off in effort between initiating a noun phrase and refashioning it so that both speakers understand the referent (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), and speakers communicate to form lexical pacts on how to refer to an object (Sacks and Schegloff, 1979; Brennan and Clark, 1996). Mutual understanding of referents is achieved in part by referring within a subset of potential referents (Clark et al., 1983; Beun and Cremers, 1998). A few studies have compared monologue to dialogue reference, and have shown that monologue references tend to be harder for a later listener to disambiguate (Clark and Krych, 2004) and that subsequent references tend to be longer than those in dialogues (Krauss and Weinheimer, 1967).

Aiming to generate natural reference in a monologue setting raises questions about what an algorithm should use to produce utterances like those produced by people. In a monologue setting, the speaker (or algorithm) gets no feedback from the listener; the speaker’s reference is not tied to interactions with other participants. The speaker is therefore in a difficult position, attempting to clearly convey a referent without being able to check if the reference is understood along the way.

Recent studies that have focused on monologue reference do so rather explicitly, which may affect participant responses. These studies utilize 2D graphical depictions of simple 3D objects (van Deemter et al., 2006; Viethen and Dale, 2008), where a small set of properties can be used to distinguish one item from another. The expressions are elicited in isolation, typed and then submitted, which may hide some of the underlying referential processes. None of these studies utilize actual objects. It is therefore difficult to use these data to draw conclusions about how reference works in naturalistic settings. It is unclear if these experimental settings are natural enough, i.e., if they get at reference as it may occur every day.

The study in this paper attempts to bring out information about reference in a number of ways. First, we conduct the study in-person, using real-world objects. This design invites referential phenomena that may not have been previously observed in simpler domains. Second, the referring expressions are produced orally. This allows us access to reference as it is generated, without the participants revising and so potentially obscuring information about their reference. Third, we use a relatively complicated task, where participants must explain how to use pieces to put together a picture of a face. The fact that we are looking at reference is not made explicit, which lessens any experimental effects caused by subjects guessing the purpose of the study. This approach also situates reference within a larger task, which may draw out aspects of reference not usually seen in experiments that elicit reference in isolation. Fourth, the objects used display a variety of different features: texture, material, color, size along several dimensions, etc. This brings the data set closer to objects that people interact with every day. A monologue setting offers a picture of the phenomena at play during a single individual’s referring expression generation.

The referring expressions gathered in this study exhibit several aspects of reference that have not yet been addressed in REG. This includes (1) part-whole modularity; (2) size comparisons across three dimensions; and (3) analogies. Work in cognitive sciences suggests that these phenomena are interrelated, and may be possible to represent in a computational framework. This research also offers connections to further aspects of natural reference that were not directly observed in the study, but will need to be accounted for in future work on naturalistic referring expression generation. Using these ideas, we begin formulating the structures that an REG algorithm would need in order to produce reference to real-world objects in a visual setting.

Approaching REG in this way allows us to tie research in the generation of referring expressions to computational models of visual perception and cognitively-motivated computer vision. Moving in this direction offers the prospect of eventually developing an application for the generation of natural reference to objects automatically recognized by a computer vision system.

In the next section, we describe our study. In Section 3, we analyze the results and discuss what they tell us about natural reference. In Section 4, we draw on our results and cognitive models of object recognition to begin building the framework for a referring expression algorithm that generates naturalistic reference to objects in a visual scene. In Section 5, we offer concluding remarks and outline areas for further study.
2 Method

2.1 Subjects

The subjects were 20 residents of Aberdeen, Scotland, and included undergraduates, graduates, and professionals. All were native speakers of English, had normal or corrected vision, and had no other known visual issues (such as color-blindness). Subjects were paid for their participation. Two recordings were left out of the analysis: one participant’s session was not fully recorded due to a software error, and one participant did not pick out many objects in each face and so was not included. The final set of participants included 18 people, 10 female and 8 male.

2.2 Materials

A board was prepared with 51 craft objects. The objects were chosen from various craft sets, and included pom-poms, pipe-cleaners, beads, and feathers (see Table 1). The motley group of objects had different colors, textures, shapes, patterns, and were made of different materials. Similar objects were grouped together on the board, with a label placed underneath. This was done to control the head noun used in each reference. The objects were used to make up 5 different craft “face” pictures. Subjects sat at a desk facing the board and the stack of pictures. A picture of the board is shown in Figure 1.

Subjects were recorded on a head-mounted microphone, which fed directly into a laptop placed on the left of the desk. The open-source audio-recording program Audacity (Mazzoni, 2010) was used to record the audio signal and export it to wave format.

2.3 Procedure

Subjects were told to give instructions on how to construct each face using the craft supplies on the board. They were instructed to be clear enough for a listener to be able to reconstruct each face without the pictures, with only the board items in front of them. A pilot study revealed that such open-ended instructions left some subjects spending an inordinate amount of time on the exact placement of each piece, and so in the current study subjects were told that each face should take “a couple” minutes, and that the instructions should be as clear as possible for a listener to use the same objects in reconstructing the pictures without being “overly concerned” with the details of exactly how each piece is angled in relation to the other.

Subjects were first given a practice face to describe. This face was the same face for all subjects. They were then allowed to voice any concerns or ask questions, but the experimenter only repeated portions of the original instructions; no new information was given. The subject could then proceed to the next four faces, which were in a random order for each subject. A transcript of a single face from a session is provided in Figure 2.

2.4 Analysis

The recordings of each monologue were transcribed, including disfluencies, and each face section (“eyes”, “chin”, etc.) was marked. First reference to items on the board were annotated with their corresponding item numbers, yielding 722 references. Initial references to single objects were extracted, creating a final data set with 505 references to single objects.

3 Results

Each reference was annotated in terms of the properties used to pick out the referent. For example, “the red feather” was annotated as containing the \texttt{<ATTRIBUTE:value>} pairs \texttt{<COLOR:red, TYPE:feather>}. Discerning properties from the modifiers used in reference is generally straightforward, and all of the references produced may be partially deconstructed using such properties.

\footnote{This corpus is available at \url{http://www.csd.abdn.ac.uk/~mitchema/craft_corpus}.}
Okay so this face again um this face has um uh for the chin, it uses (10 a gold pipe-cleaner in a V shape) where the bottom of the V is the chin. <CHIN>

The mouth is made up of (9 a purple feather). And the mouth is slightly squint, um as if the the person is smiling or even smirking. So this this smile is almost off to one side. <MOUTH>

The nose is uh (5 a wooden bead, a medium-sized wooden bead with a hole in the center). <NOSE>

And the eyes are made of (2,3 white pom-poms), em just uh em evenly spaced in the center of the face. <EYES>

Em it’s see the person’s em top of the person’s head is made out of (1 another, thicker pipe-cleaner that’s uh a grey color, it’s kind of uh a knotted blue-type pipe-cleaner). So that that acts as the top of the person’s head. <FOREHEAD>

And down the side of the person’s face, there are (7,8 two ribbons) on each side. (7,8 And those are silver ribbons). Um and they just hang down the side of the face and they join up the the grey pipe-cleaner and the top um of the person’s head to the to the chin and then hang down either side of the chin. <HAIR>

And the person’s ears are made up of (4,6 two beads, which are um love-heart-shaped beads), where the points of the love-hearts are facing outwards. And those are just placed um around same em same em horizontal line as the nose of the person’s face is. <EARS>

The mouth is slightly squint, um as if the the person is smiling or even smirking. So this this smile is almost off to one side. <MOUTH>

The nose is uh (5 a wooden bead, a medium-sized wooden bead with a hole in the center). <NOSE>

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And the person’s ears are made up of (4,6 two beads, which are um love-heart-shaped beads), where the points of the love-hearts are facing outwards. And those are just placed um around same em same em horizontal line as the nose of the person’s face is. <EARS>

Of the references that mention size, 35 (6.9%) use a vague modifier that applies to one or two dimensions. This includes modifiers for height (“the short silver ribbon”), width (“quite a fat rectangle”), and depth (“the thick grey pipe-cleaner”). 87 (17.2%) use a modifier that applies to the overall size of the object (e.g., “big” or “small”). Table 3 lists these values. Crisp measurements (such as “1 centimeter”) occur only twice (0.4%), with both produced by the same participant.

| Comparative/Superlative: | 40 (7.9%) |
|--------------------------|----------|
| Base:                    | 82 (16.2%)|
| Height/Width/Depth:      | 35 (6.9%) |
| Overall size:            | 87 (17.2%)|

Table 3: Size Modifier Breakdown.
Participants produce such modifiers without sizes or measurements explicitly given; with an input of a visual object presentation, the output includes size modifiers. Such data suggests that natural reference in a visual domain utilizes processes comparing the length, width, and height of a target object with other objects in the set. Indeed, 5 references (1.0%) in our data set include explicit comparison with the size of other objects.

(5) “a red foam-piece...which is more square in shape rather than the longer rectangle”

(6) “the grey pipe-cleaner...which is the thicker one...of the selection”

(7) “the shorter of the two silver ribbons”

(8) “the longer one of the ribbons”

(9) “the longer of the two silver ribbons”

In Example (5), height and width across two different objects are compared, distinguishing a square from a rectangle. In (6) “thicker” marks the referent as having a larger circumference than other items of the same type. (7) (8) and (9) compare the height of the target referent to the height of similar items.

The use of size modifiers in a domain without specified measurements suggests that when people refer to an object in a visual domain, they are sensitive to its size and structure within a dimensional, real-world space. Without access to crisp measurements, people compare relative size across different objects, and this is reflected in the expressions they generate. These comparisons are not only limited to overall size, but include size in each dimension. This suggests that objects’ structures within a real-world space are relevant to REG in a visual domain.

### 3.1.2 Part-Whole Modularity

The role that a spatial object understanding has within reference is further detailed by utterances that pick out the target object by mentioning an object part. 11 utterances (2.2%) in our data include mention of an object part within reference to the whole object. This is spread across participants, such that half of the participants make reference to an object part at least once.

(10) “a green pom-pom, which is with the tinsel on the outside”

(11) “your gold twisty ribbon...with sequins on it”

(12) “a wooden bead...with a hole in the center”

In (10), pieces of tinsel are isolated from the whole object and specified as being on the outside. In (11), smaller pieces that lay on top of the ribbon are picked out. And in (12), a hole within the bead is isolated.

The use of part-whole modularity suggests an understanding that parts of the object take up their own space within the object. An object is not only viewed as a whole during reference, but parts in, on, and around it may be considered as well. For an REG algorithm to generate these kinds of references, it must be provided with a representation that details the structure of each object.

### 3.2 Analogies

The data from this study also provide information on what can be expected from a knowledge base in an algorithm that aims to generate naturalistic reference. Reference is made 16 times (3.2%) to objects not on the board, where the intended referent is compared against something it is like. Some examples are given below.

| Part-whole modularity | Relative size | Analogies |
|-----------------------|--------------|-----------|
| “a green pom-pom...with the tinsel on the outside” | “a red foam-piece...which is more square in shape rather than the longer rectangle” | “a natural-looking piece of pipe-cleaner, it looks a bit like a rope” |
| “your gold twisty ribbon...with sequins on it” | “the grey pipe-cleaner...which is the thicker one...of the selection” | “a pipe-cleaner that looks a bit like...a fluffy caterpillar” |
| “a wooden bead...with a hole in the center” | “the slightly larger one” | “the silver ribbon that’s almost like a big S shape” |
| “one of the green pom-poms...with the sort of strands coming out from it.” | “the smaller silver ribbon” | “a...pipe-cleaner that looks like tinsel.” |
| “the silver ribbon...with the chainmail detail down through the middle of it.” | “the short silver ribbon” | |
| 11 References | 122 References | 16 References |

Table 2: Examples of Observed Reference.
In (13), a participant makes reference to a **SHAPE** property of an object not on the board. In (14) and (15), participants refer to objects that may share a variety of properties with the referent, but are also not on the board.

Reference to these other items do not pick out single objects, but types of objects (e.g., an object **type**, not **token**). They correspond to some prototypical idea of an object with properties similar to those of the referent. Work by Rosch (1975) has examined this tendency, introducing the idea of **prototype theory**, which proposes that there may be some central, ‘prototypical’ notions of items. A knowledge base with stored prototypes could be utilized by an REG algorithm to compare the target referent to item prototypes. Such representations would help guide the generation of reference to items not in the scene, but similar to the target referent.

### 4 Discussion

We have discussed several different aspects of reference in a study where referring expressions are elicited for objects in a spatial, visual scene. Reference in this domain draws on object forms as they exist in a three-dimensional space and utilizes background knowledge to describe referents by analogy to items outside of the scene. This is undoubtedly not an exhaustive account of the phenomena at play in such a domain, but offers some initial conclusions that may be drawn from exploratory work of this kind.

Before continuing with the discussion, it is worthwhile to consider whether some of our data might be seen as going beyond reference. Perhaps the participants are doing something else, which could be called describing. How to draw the line between a distinguishing reference and a description, and whether such a line can be drawn at all, is an interesting question. If the two are clearly distinct, then both are interesting to NLG research. If the two are one in the same, then this sheds some light on how REG algorithms should treat reference. We leave a more detailed discussion of this for future work, but note recent psycholinguistic work suggesting that referring establishes (1) an individual as the referent; (2) a conceptualization or perspective on that individual (Clark and Bangerter, 2004). Schematically, referring = indicating + describing.

We now turn to a discussion of how the observed phenomena may be best represented in an REG algorithm. We propose that an algorithm capable of generating natural reference to objects in a visual scene should utilize (1) a spatial object representation; (2) a non-spatial feature-based representation; and (3) a knowledge base of object prototypes.

#### 4.1 Spatial and Visual Properties

It is perhaps unsurprising to find reference that exhibits spatial knowledge in a study where objects are presented in three-dimensional space. Human behavior is anchored in space, and spatial information is essential for our ability to navigate the world we live in. However, referring expression generation algorithms geared towards spatial representations have oversimplified this tendency, keeping objects within the realm of two-dimensions and only looking at the spatial relations between objects.

For example, Funakoshi et al. (2004) and Gatt (2006) focus on how objects should be clustered together to form groups. This utilizes some of the spatial information between objects, but does not address the spatial, three-dimensional nature of objects themselves. Rather, objects exist as entities that may be grouped with other entities in a set or singled out as individual objects; they do not have their own spatial characteristics. Similarly, one of the strengths of the Graph-Based Algorithm (Krahmer et al., 2003) is its ability to generate expressions that involve relations between objects, and these include spatial ones (“next to”, “on top of”, etc.). In all these approaches, however, objects are essentially one-dimensional, represented as individual nodes.

Work that does look at the spatial information of different objects is provided by Kelleher et al. (2005). In this approach, the overall volume of each object is calculated to assign salience rankings, which then allow the Incremental Algorithm (Dale and Reiter, 1995) to produce otherwise “underspecified” reference. The spatial properties of
the objects are kept relatively simple. They are not used in constructing the referring expression, but one aspect of the object’s three-dimensional shape (volume) affects the referring expression’s final form. To the authors’ knowledge, the current work is the first to suggest that objects themselves should have their spatial properties represented during reference.

Research in cognitive modelling supports the idea that we attend to the spatial properties of objects when we view them (Blaser et al., 2000), and that we have purely spatial attentional mechanisms operating alongside non-spatial, feature-based attentional mechanisms (Treue and Trujillo, 1999). These feature-based attentional mechanisms pick out properties commonly utilized in REG, such as texture, orientation, and color. They also pick out edges and corners, contrast, and brightness. Spatial attentional mechanisms provide information about where the non-spatial features are located in relation to one another, size, and the spatial interrelations between component parts.

Applying these findings to our study, an REG algorithm that generates natural reference should utilize a visual, feature-based representation of objects alongside a structural, spatial representation of objects. A feature-based representation is already common to REG, and could be represented as a series of \(<\text{ATTRIBUTE}:\text{value}>\) pairs. A spatial representation is necessary to define how the object is situated within a dimensional space, providing information about the relative distances between object components, edges, and corners.

With such information provided by a spatial representation, the generation of part-whole expressions, such as “the pom-pom with the tinsel on the outside”, is possible. This also allows for the generation of size modifiers (“big”, “small”) without the need for crisp measurements, for example, by comparing the difference in overall height of the target object with other objects in the scene, or against a stored prototype (discussed below). Relative size comparisons across different dimensions would also be possible, used to generate size modifiers such as “wide” and “thick” that refer to one dimensional axis.

4.2 Analogies

A feature-based and a spatial representation may also play a role in analogies. When we use analogies, as in “the pipe-cleaner that looks like a caterpillar”, we use world knowledge about items that are not themselves visible. Such an expression draws on similarity that does not link the referent with a particular object, but with a general type of object: the pipe-cleaner is caterpillar-like.

To generate these kinds of expressions, an REG algorithm would first need a knowledge base with prototypes listing prototypical values of attributes. For example, a banana prototype might have a prototypical color of yellow. With prototypes in the knowledge base, the REG algorithm would need to calculate similarity of a target referent to other known items. This would allow a piece of yellow cloth, for example, to be described as being the color of a banana.

Implementing such similarity measures in an REG algorithm will be challenging. One difficulty is that prototype values may be different depending on what is known about an item; a prototypical unripe banana may be green, or a prototypical rotten banana brown. Another difficulty will be in determining when a referent is similar enough to a prototype to warrant an analogy. Additional research is needed to explore how these properties can be reasoned about.

4.3 Further Implications

A knowledge base containing prototypes opens up the possibility of generating many other kinds of natural references. In particular, such knowledge would allow the algorithm to compute which properties a given kind of referent may be expected to have, and which properties may be unexpected. Unexpected properties may therefore stand out as particularly salient.

For example, a dog missing a leg may be described as a “three-legged dog” because the prototypical dog has four legs. We believe that this perspective, which hinges on the unexpectedness of a property, suggests a new approach to attribute selection. Unlike the Incremental Algorithm, the Preference Order that determines the order in which attributes are examined would not be fixed, but would depend on the nature of the referent and what is known about it.

Approaching REG in this way follows work in cognitive science and neurophysiology that suggests that expectations about objects’ visual and spatial characteristics are derived from stored representations of object ‘prototypes’ in the inferior temporal lobe of the brain (Logothetis and
- A spatial representation (depicting size, interrelations between component parts)
- A non-spatial, propositional representation (describing color, texture, orientation, etc.)
- A knowledge base with stored prototypical object propositional and spatial representations

Table 4: Requirements for an REG algorithm that generates natural reference to visual objects.

Sheinberg, 1996; Riesenhuber and Poggio, 2000; Palmeri and Gauthier, 2004). Most formal theories of object perception posit some sort of category activation system (Kosslyn, 1994), a system that matches input properties of objects to those of stored prototypes, which then helps guide expectations about objects in a top-down fashion. This appears to be a neurological correlate of the knowledge base we propose to underlie analogies.

Such a system contains information about prototypical objects’ component parts and where they are placed relative to one another, as well as relevant values for material, color, etc. This suggests that the spatial and non-spatial feature-based representations proposed for visible objects could be used to represent prototype objects as well. Indeed, how we view and refer to objects appears to be influenced by the interaction of these structures: Expectations about an object’s spatial properties guide our attention towards expected object parts and non-spatial, feature-based properties throughout the scene (Kosslyn, 1994; Itti and Koch, 2001). This affects the kinds of things we are most likely to generate language about (Itti and Arbib, 2005).

We can now outline some general requirements for an algorithm capable of generating naturalistic reference to objects in a visual scene: Input to such an algorithm should include a feature-based representation, which we will call a propositional representation, with values for color, texture, etc., and a spatial representation, with symbolic information about objects’ size and the spatial relationships between components. A system that generates naturalistic reference must also use a knowledge base storing information about object prototypes, which may be represented in terms of their own propositional/spatial representations.

3Note that this is not the only proposed matching structure in the brain – an exemplar activation system matches input to stored exemplars.

5 Conclusions and Future Work

We have explored the interaction between viewing objects in a three-dimensional, spatial domain and referring expression generation. This has led us to propose structures that may be used to connect vision in a spatial modality to naturalistic reference. The proposed structures include a spatial representation, a propositional representation, and a knowledge base with representations for object prototypes. Using structures that define the propositional and spatial content of objects fits well with work in psycholinguistics, cognitive science and neurophysiology, and may provide the basis to generate a variety of natural-sounding references from a system that recognizes objects.

It is important to note that any naturalistic experimental design limits the kinds of conclusions that can be drawn about reference. A study that elicits reference to objects in a visual scene provides insight into reference to objects in a visual scene; these conclusions cannot easily be extended to reference to other kinds of phenomena, such as reference to people in a novel. We therefore make no claims about reference as a whole in this paper; generalizations from this research can provide hypotheses for further testing in different modalities and with different sorts of referents.

Our data leave open many areas for further study, and we hope to address these in future work. Experiments designed specifically to elicit relative size modifiers, reference to object components, and reference to objects that are like other things would help further detail the form our proposed structures take.

What is clear from our data is that both a spatial understanding and a non-spatial feature-based understanding appear to play a role in reference to objects in a visual scene, and further, reference in such a setting is bolstered by a knowledge base with stored prototypical object representations. Utilizing structures representative of these phenomena, we may be able to extend object recognition research into object reference research, generating natural-sounding reference in everyday settings.

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