The Essence of 'Aql as Kamāl Al-Awwal in the view of Ibnu Sīnā and its Relation to Education

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Abstract: This article aims to examine the essence of 'aql as kamāl al-awwal in Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy. In this article, the author uses a qualitative research method with a descriptive-analytical and philosophical approach. This study found several important points which include: first, 'aql by Ibn Sīnā is defined as a potential of nafs insāniyyah or nafs nāṭiqah which helps humans to achieve knowledge and truth; secondly, the essence of 'aql for Ibn Sīnā is kamāl al-awwal, therefore it is immaterial and not material; third, the essence of 'aql as kamāl al-awwal makes it correlate with the nafs, rūḥ, and qalb which are human spiritual entities; fourth, 'aql as kamāl al-awwal also shows its potential as a tool to gain knowledge, where the process begins with the capture of phenomena through the five senses and then digested by 'aql and assisted in conceptualizing it through the emission of 'Aql Fa'āl; fifth, Ibn Sīnā’s idea of the essence of 'aql may have been influenced by earlier Muslim philosophers such as al-Kindī and al-Fārābī, besides having undergone several explorations. In addition, he also succeeded in influencing later Muslim philosophers such as al-Ghazālī, is something that settles in life and appears in the action easily without the need of thinking first. Morals are not deeds, strengths, and knowledge. Morals are "Haal" or conditions of the soul and the inner shape

Keywords: 'Aql, Ibn Sīnā, Kamāl Al-Awwal, Immaterial, Knowledge.

Abstrak: Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji esensi 'aql sebagai kamāl al-awwal dalam filsafat Ibnu Sīnā. Dalam artikel ini, penulis menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif dengan pendekatan deskriptif-analitis-filosofis. Dalam penelitian ini ditemukan beberapa poin penting yang meliputi: pertama, 'aql oleh Ibnu Sīnā didefinisikan sebagai suatu potensi dari nafs insāniyyah atau nafs
nāṭiqah yang membantu manusia untuk mencapai ilmu dan kebenaran; kedua, esensi 'aql bagi Ibnu Sīnā ialah kamāl al-awwal, oleh karenanya ia bersifat rohani bukan materi; ketiga, esensi 'aql sebagai kamāl al-awwal menjadikannya berkorelasi dengan nafs, rūḥ, dan qalb yang menjadi entitas rohani manusia; keempat, 'aql sebagai kamāl al-awwal juga menunjukkan potensinya sebagai alat untuk meraih ilmu pengetahuan, dimana prosesnya bermula dari penangkap fenomena melalui panca indera dan selanjutnya dicerna oleh 'aql dan dibantu mengkonsepsikannya melalui pancaran 'Aql Fa‘āl; kelima, gagasan Ibnu Sīnā tentang esensi 'aql ini kiranya mendapat pengaruh dari filosof Muslim sebelumnya seperti al-Kindī dan al-Ībāḍ, disamping telah mengalami beberapa eksplorasi. Selain itu, dia juga berhasil mempengaruhi filosof Muslim setelahnya seperti al-Ghazālī.

Kata Kunci: ‘Aql, Ibnu Sīnā, Kamāl al-Awwal, Immaterial, Ilmu.

INTRODUCTION

Understanding the essence of ‘aql in the correct perspective at this time was considered necessary. This was because the hegemony of rationalism in Western philosophy has reduced the ability of ‘aql to be limited to the ability of reason.¹ This showed that the principle of Western philosophy was to accept only rational knowledge and exclude knowledge of irrational things. The West also believed in the existence of a metaphysical realm (Kant: the world of phenomena), but knowledge about it was only based on the subjectivity of each individual.² This view was the background behind rationalism and the emergence of various Western schools of thought which until now have become the basis of Western civilization.³ In addition, the ideology of materialism had obscured the

¹ Harol H. et al., Persoalan-Persoalan Filsafat (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984), 242.
² Bryan Magee, The Story of Philosophy (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Kanisius, 2008), 135.
³ There were at least 5 schools of thought that form the basis of Western civilization: rationalism, secularism, empiricism (positivism), dualism or dichotomy, and humanism which was based on ratios and philosophical speculation. See: Hamid Fahmy Zarkasyi, Liberalisasi Pemikiran Islam: Gerakan Bersama Missionaris, Orientalis Dan Kolonialis (Ponorogo: CIOS ISID, 2009), 11.
metaphysical dimension of nature which affects the human perspective on metaphysics. This was contrary to the Islamic view that knowledge and truth were not only limited to the material world (real) but also believed in the knowledge and truth of the metaphysical (unseen) world with clear concepts.

Among the Muslim scholars who were authoritative in discussing the concept of 'aql was Ibn Sīnā. He was a Muslim philosopher whose work was widely recognized and used as a reference by later philosophers from both Muslim and Western circles. In his philosophy, 'aql was related to the nafs. The discourse on 'aql was a discourse on the nafs insāniyyah which has potential power which was called 'aql or nafs nātīqah. 'Aql by Ibn Sīnā was referred to as kamāl al-awwal. The reason was that it has the potential to give perfection to perception and various activities. Kamāl al-awwal was perfection that gave actuality to the jins, just as form gave actuality to the sword. This was in contrast to kamāl al-thāniyyah, the perfection which gave actuality to the actions and reactions that accompany the jins, like the cutting power of the sword. So, in Ibn Sīnā's thought the discussion of 'aql cannot be separated from the study of the nafs.

Ibn Sīnā distinguished the substance of 'aql with the substance of the body. 'Aql is the potential of the nafs insāniyyah was separate from the body, where its existence was not always imprinted in the material of the body. Ibn Sīnā himself said that although the form was perfection for the body, it does not mean that all perfection was a form. So, 'aql for Ibn Sīnā was an immaterial substance (spiritual) not material (physical). Another reason was that he catch rational things

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4Syah Reza, “Konsep Nafs Menurut Ibnu Sīnā,” Kalimah: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama Dan Pemikiran Islam 12, no. 2 (2014): 265. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.21111/klm.v12i2.239.
5Diana Sari, “KUASA DAN MORAL: Refleksi Filosofat Sosial Dan Politik Islam Ibnu Sīnā,” Dialogia: Jurnal Studi Islam Dan Sosial 16, no. 2 (2018): 204. doi:https://doi.org/10.21154/dialogia.v16i2.1503.
6Ibnu Sīnā, Rasā’il Al-Falṣafah (Ma’had al-Ṭarīq al-‘Ulūm al-’Arabiyyah al-Islāmiyyah, 1999), 89.
7Ibn Sīnā, Al-Najāt Fi Al-Manṭiq Wa Al-Ilāhiyyāt (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīdah, 1982), 158.
8Ibnu Sīnā, Al-Shifā Al-Ṭabī‘iyyūt Al-Nafs, Vol. 1 (Kairo: Hay’at Miṣrīyyah al-ʿĀmmah li al-Kitābah, 1975), 11.
9Ibn Sīnā, Ahwāl Al-Nafs, ed. Aḥmad Fuād Al-Αhwañī (Paris: Dār Bābīlūnia, 2007), 52.
10Ibnu Sīnā, Kitāb Al-Najāt Fi Al-Ḥikmah Al-Manṭiqiyyah Wa Al-Ṭabī‘ah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah, ed. Majīd Fākhir (Beirut: Dār al-ʿAfāq al-Jadīd, n.d.), 157.
and captured himself without using tools. Meanwhile, the outer senses and the inner senses do not catch anything except with tools. Neither of them could catch themselves. This meant that Ibn Sīna did not only limit 'aql to one dimension. However, it covered all aspects that correlate well with the nafs, rūḥ, and qalb. These four aspects signified the spiritual identity of man, all of which were intertwined and influence each other.¹¹ So, even though science and truth were following logic, they must still be in line with these four aspects. Thus, true knowledge was not only rational but also irrational.

This article will examine further the essence of 'aql as kamāl al-awwal according to Ibn Sīnā. In addition, this article will discuss the relationship between 'aql, nafs, qalb, and rūḥ, and finally, the position of 'aql in the process of achieving and receiving knowledge will be discussed. In several discussions, the author will also trace the position of Ibn Sīnā's thought on 'aql among other Muslim philosophers.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Definition of The Term Of “'Aql” According to Ibnu Sīnā

Ibn Sīna had a detailed idea of 'aql. According to Ibn Sīnā, 'aql was part of the potential of the nafs which provides readiness for the nafs to receive knowledge and truth.¹² Therefore, 'aql was called al-nafs al-insāniyyah (human soul). Besides being called al-nafs al-insāniyyah, 'aql by Ibn Sīnā was also referred to as al-nafs al-muṭmainnah, al-nafs al-nāṭiqah, al-nafs al-qudsiyah, sirr

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¹¹ Amber Haque, “Psychology from an Islamic Perspective,” Global Psychologies, 2018, 146, doi:https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95816-0_8.
¹² Sīnā, Kitāb Al-Najāṭ Fī Al-Hikmah Al-Manṭiqiyyah Wa Al-Ṭabī‘ah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah, 197.
ilāhiyyah, and nūr mudabbir. With ‘aql humans could think, daydream, perceive things and conclude everything they think about. Through ‘aql also humans could distinguish good and bad, right and wrong, beautiful and ugly, and everything that was partial (juz’iyyah). Although the potential of the human’s nafs consists of the hayawāniyyah nafs and the nabātiyyah nafs, it was the ‘aql or nafs nāṭiqah that becomes its basic potential. ‘Aql was what makes humans special compared to other creatures. is something that settles in life and appears in the action easily without the need of thinking first. Morals are not deeds, strengths, and knowledge. Morals are "Haal" or conditions of the soul and the inner shape

The definition of ‘aql presented by Ibn Sīnā had similarities with other Muslim philosophers such as al-Fārābī, al-Ghazālī, and Fakhruddīn al-Rāzī. Al-Fārābī defines ‘aql as a part of the power of the nafs which could produce various knowledge and convincing premises, it was the principle and source of theoretical knowledge. Al-Ghazālī even considers ‘aql as the key to happiness in this world and the hereafter, because with it humans could gain different kinds of knowledge, to an understanding of the nature of a science. Meanwhile, al-Rāzī assumed that ‘aql was the cause of taklīf for humans, because through ‘aql humans could reason and gain knowledge. The definition put forward by the philosophers indicated the importance of the role of ‘aql for humans. Thus, humans should not completely disengage all their affairs from the consideration of ‘aql.

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13 Sīnā, Alwāl al-Nafs, p. 195: When compared with al-Fārābī, it seems that Ibn Sīnā has more names for ‘aql. Al-Fārābī only mentions ‘aql as al-nafs al-insāniyyah and al-nafs al-nāṭiqah. See: Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, Iḥṣāl ‘Alīlam (Beirut: Dār wa Maktabah al-Hilal, 1996), p. 36.
14 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Nafs Min Kitāb Al-Shifā, ed. ‘Abdullāh Ḥasan Zādah (Iran: Maktabah al-l’lām al-Islāmī, n.d.), 285.
15 Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī, Risālah Fī Al-‘Aql (Beirut: Al-Maṭba’a al-Kaṭūlīkiyyah, 1938), 36.
16 Abū Hamīd Muḥammad Al-Ghazālī, Iḥṣā’ Ulām Al-Dīn, Juz 3 (Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, n.d.), 7.
17 Abū Hamīd Muḥammad Al-Ghazālī, Mishkāh Al-Anwār, ed. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ‘Izzuddīn Al-Sirwānī (Beirut: ‘Ālam al-Kutub, n.d.), 124.
18 Fakhruddīn Al-Rāzī, Mafāṭīḥ Al-Ghayb: Tafsīr Al-Kabīr, Juz 11 (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā al-‘Arabī, 1420), 350.
19 Fakhruddīn Al-Rāzī, Al-Maghālīl Al-‘Aliyyah Wa Huwa Al-Musammā Fī Lisān Al-Yunāniyyah Bi Uḥsulātī Fī Fī Lisān Al-Muslimīn Al-‘Ilm Al-Kalām Al-Falsafah Al-Islāmīyyah, ed. Āhmad Ḥijjāzī Al-Saqā (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 1988), 42.
The Essence of ’Aql: Material or Immaterial?

Tracing the essence of ’aql in Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy can be seen from his assumption that ’aql was part of the faculty of the nafs. As one of the faculties of the nafs, ’aql by Ibn Sīnā was referred to as kamāl al-awwal (primary perfection).

In the book of al-Najāt it was written as follows:

“’Aql was al-nafs al-insāniyyah. It is the primary perfection (kamāl al-awwal) for the mechanistic jisim źabi’ī (natural body) that mechanistic (āliyyīn) in terms of the ability to carry out activities with the effort of the mind, to conclude ideas, and because he is able to know things that are universal (kulliyyāt).”

It was called kamāl because it had the potential to give perfection to perception and various activities. Ibn Sīnā also argued that the nafs were kamāl al-awwal (primary perfection). Thus, the nafs were judged as the cause for the jins that come after it to become other jins. The level below kamāl al-awwal was kamāl al-thāniyyah (secondary perfection) which was the binding attribute of jins. Apart from these two kamāls, in Ibn Sīnā's term, there was jism which was used in the sense of its genus rather than its physical material, while the word źabi’ī was used to distinguish it from jism šina’ī (artificial). This idea indicated the essence of ’aql, namely the rational soul (nafs nāṭiqah) which had no form and was separate from the body or does not control the body directly. It was also a spiritual substance and not a body because it grasped rational things and captures itself without the use of tools. If ’aql was active outside the body then it

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20 Sīnā, Kitāb Al-Najāt Fī Al-Hikmah Al-Manṭiqīyyah Wa Al-Ṭabīʿah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah, 158.
21 Imron Mustofa, “Konsep Kebenaran Ibnu Sina,” Kalimah: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama Dan Pemikiran Islam 15, no. 1 (2017): 8, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.21111/klm.v15i1.818.
22 Muhammad ‘Ālī Abū Rayyān, Al-Falsafah Al-Islāmiyyah (Iskandariah: Dār al-Qawmiyyah, 1967), 486–87.
23 Ahmad Daudy, Kuliah Filsafat Islam (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1986), 82.
24 Sīnā, Kitāb Al-Najāt Fī Al-Hikmah Al-Manṭiqīyyah Wa Al-Ṭabīʿah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah, 294.
remained ‘aql, but if ‘aql was active inside the body then it became nafs.\footnote{Miska Muhammad Amien, *Epistemologi Islam: Pengantar Filsafat Pengetahuan Islam* (Jakarta: UI Press, 2006), 50.} In essence, ‘aql for Ibn Sīnā was seen as a spiritual or immaterial substance, not a physical one. This he symbolized with a king as the perfection or completeness of the state, but it was not a form of the state.

Al-Farobi asserted that the Islamic worldview is not just a view of the human mind to the physical world or human involvement in it in the historical, social, political, and cultural term, but includes aspects of al-dunya and al-Ékhirah, where al-dunya aspect must be closely and deeply related with aspects of the Ékherat (afterlife), while aspects of Ékhirat should be placed as the final aspect\footnote{Ibid.}. This means that the Islamic worldview explanation relies heavily on (wałyu) revelation because explanation contained in revelations includes aspects of the world and the afterlife.

Ibn Sīnā's interpretation of 'aql as the entity of the nafs which became human perfection was different from Aristotle's thought. Perfection was interpreted by Ibn Sīnā not in the sense of "ṣūrah" or form as Aristotle assumed, namely an element that cannot be separated from matter. Because the consequences if the nafs were interpreted as rah then after death the nafs will experience destruction along with the body. Thus, perfection by Ibn Sīnā was defined as jawhar (substance) that was separate from matter (māddah).\footnote{Sīnā, *Al-Shifā’ Al-Ṭabī’īyyāt Al-Nafs*, 7.} The form of the nafs nāṭiqah was not material matter, but an independent substance (jawhar qā'im bi dhātihi) and has no form.\footnote{Sīnā, *Kitāb Al-Najāt Fi Al-Ḥikmah Al-Maṭṭiqīyyah Wa Al-Ṭabī‘ah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah*, 157–58.} It was a spiritual substance that will continue to exist even though it was later separated from the body.\footnote{Ali Rahmat, "Konsep Manusia Perspektif Filosof Muslim: Studi Komparatif Pemikiran Ibn Sina Dengan Al-Ghazali," *Kariman* 4, no. 2 (2016): 46, doi:10.30736/kuttab.v1i1.97.} His immortality is something that had a beginning but had no end.\footnote{Reza, "Konsep Nafs Menurut Ibn Sina," 275.} Indirectly, Ibn

\begin{itemize}
\item[25] Miska Muhammad Amien, *Epistemologi Islam: Pengantar Filsafat Pengetahuan Islam* (Jakarta: UI Press, 2006), 50.
\item[26] Ibid.
\item[27] Sīnā, *Al-Shifā’ Al-Ṭabī’īyyāt Al-Nafs*, 7.
\item[28] Sīnā, *Kitāb Al-Najāt Fi Al-Ḥikmah Al-Maṭṭiqīyyah Wa Al-Ṭabī‘ah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah*, 157–58.
\item[29] Ali Rahmat, "Konsep Manusia Perspektif Filosof Muslim: Studi Komparatif Pemikiran Ibn Sina Dengan Al-Ghazali," *Kariman* 4, no. 2 (2016): 46, doi:10.30736/kuttab.v1i1.97.
\item[30] Reza, "Konsep Nafs Menurut Ibn Sina," 275.
\end{itemize}
Sīnā’s thought about the *nafs nāṭiqah* rejected the materialism approach as applied in the West.

Ibn Sīna’s explanation of the eternity of the *nafs* was no different from that of al-Kindī. Al-Kindī defined the *nafs nāṭiqah* as “the element which has honor and perfection has a high status and its substance came from the substance of the Creator like the sun’s rays that came from the sun.”\(^{31}\) That was the *nafs nāṭiqah* that came from the light of God.\(^{32}\) It was a simple substance that was incorruptible and only transmigrates after death to the realm of truth in which there was the light of God. That was the eternal place.\(^{33}\) Thus, the *nafs nāṭiqah* will remain eternal after death because its substance comes from the substance of God.

Ibn Sīnā was also impressed to follow al-Fārābī’s opinion. *Nafs* in al-Fārābī’s view was the first perfection of physical nature (*jism ṭabi‘ī*) which was organic and has lived in potential form.\(^{34}\) *Nafs insāniyya* or *nafs nāṭiqah* was an independent spiritual substance and it was a real human substance.\(^{35}\) In the book of *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* it was said:

> “You are composed of two substances, the first being formalistic, shaped, adaptive, mobile, stationary, tangible, and divided; while the second was different from the first in terms of its nature and nature of *dhār*, and is accepted by *aql* and contains waham. It is a combination of the realm of creation and the realm of *amr*, because you comes from God’s realm and your body comes from God’s creation.”\(^{36}\)

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\(^{31}\) Muḥammad ’Abd al-Ḥādī Abū Raydah, *Rasāil Al-Kindī Al-Falsāfiyyah* (Kairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, 1950), 273.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 274.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 275–76.

\(^{34}\) Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūṣ Al-Ḥikam*, ed. Muḥammad Hasan ʿĀlī Yāsīn (Baghdad: Maṭba’ah Ma’ārif, 1976), 71–72.

\(^{35}\) Muhammad Utsman Najati, *Jiwa Dalam Pandangan Para Filosof Muslim*, ed. Gazi Salomon (Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 2002), 63.

\(^{36}\) Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūṣ Al-Ḥikam*, 71–72.
Thus, humans consisted of two elements. *First*, the spiritual substance of the *amr* or divine realm (*lähūl*) *And second*, the body from the realm of creation (*khalq*) or the material realm. On the other hand, Ibn Sīnā's argument about the immortality of the *nafs nāṭiqah* was corroborated by al-Ghazālī. *'Aql* according to him was the essence of a human being that was subtle (*jawhar laṭīf*) as *qalb*.\(^{37}\) It was created but cannot disappear, therefore, it cannot be measured in terms of time and place.\(^{38}\) In the book of *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* it was said:

> “It is impossible for the *nafs* to be destroyed with the death of the body. *Because the body is not a place for the *nafs*, it is a tool used by the *nafs* with the potential that exists in the body. Therefore, damage to the tool does not require damage to the person who used it. Except for the condition of the *nafs* hayawaniyyah and physical potential.”\(^{39}\)

Just like Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī views *'aql* is the basic aspect that became human perfection.\(^{40}\) However, al-Ghazālī added one more ability of *'aql* as *kamāl* namely a tool to prevent lust and curb lust. This was because *'aql* was able to reason about all the consequences of all actions.\(^{41}\) This assumption was probably due to al-Ghazālī's Sufistic tendencies in his various thoughts. From this it was known that Ibn Sīnā's thoughts on the essence of *'aql* also contributed to later was Islamic philosophical thought although there were some modifications.

In contrast with the Islamic law, Aqeedah issues was not yet arise at the time, if there is, the problem is immediately solved by the Prophet as the messenger of God who brings revelation. Moreover, the Aqeedah is not a personal technical religious issue, but it is more likely to be the relationship between man and the Creator which is very essential in Aqeedah. That the discussion of the concept of God in the early period of Islam is paradigmatically just being constellated with concepts that had been contained in the Qur'an and described

\(^{37}\) Abū Ḥamīd Muḥammad Al-Ghazālī, *Maʿārij Al-Quds Fī Madārij Maʿrifah Al-Nafs* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1988), 17–18.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 22.

\(^{39}\) Abū Ḥamīd Muḥammad Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut Al-Falāsifah* (Kairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1321), 224.

\(^{40}\) Al-Ghazālī, *Maʿārij Al-Quds Fī Madārij Maʿrifah Al-Nafs*, 21.

\(^{41}\) Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyāʿ Ulūm Al-Dīn*, 8.
even directly practiced by the Prophet, the urgency of the concept of God’s explanation is only to know the one God (Tawhīd).

The conclusion from all the explanations above was that the essence of ‘aql as kamāl al-awwal indicated that it was immaterial or spiritual. Ibn Sīnā in his argument points out the error of assuming that ‘aql was a biological body. The reason was because if ‘aql could accept the forms of ma’qulāt (intelligible forms), then the substance was also the nature (ṭabi‘ī) of these forms. If the recipient of the ma’qulāt was the body, then it meant that these forms could be divided and the singular form could be ma’qulāt. This confirmed that ‘aql was an immaterial form. And the consequence was that ‘aql as nafs nāṭiqah was single because plurality lies in materiality. Thus, it cannot be corrupted because it was singular.

Ibn Sīnā’s opinion was the same as that described by al-Kind, al-Fārābī, and al-Ghazālī as explained above. However, there was a difference between Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī in terms of the eternal part of the nafs insāniyyah. Al-Fārābī believed that the nafs insāniyyah that was guaranteed from damage was only that which knew some material and immaterial realities and ‘Aql Fa’al—in other words, what was eternal was only ‘aql mustafād-. Meanwhile, those who have absolutely no such knowledge will be destroyed. Ibn Sīnā considers all nafs insāniyyah or nafs nāṭiqah to be incorruptible. For him, knowledge of the reality of things was only necessary for happiness, but not for existence after death.

**Relationship ‘Aql, Nafs, Rūḥ, and Qalb**

The discourse on the concept of ‘aql by Ibn Sīnā cannot be separated from studies related to the nafs, rūḥ, and qalb. The terms nafs, qalb, rūḥ, and ‘aql were

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42 Ibn Sīnā, ‘Uyūn Al-Ḥikmah (Kairo, 1954), 44–46.
43 Shams Inati, “Ibn Sīna,” in *History of Islamic Philosophy*, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman, Vol. 1 (Bandung: Mizan, 2003), 297.
all related to the essence of the soul that exists in humans and metaphysical. These four terms denoted an undivided and identical entity namely a spiritual or immaterial substance that became the reality of human essence.

Regarding nafs and rūḥ, Ibn Sīnā considered it to have the same meaning, as understood by al-Ghazālī and Ibn Ḥazm. Both were the initial perfection, which caused the organism to be perfect to form human existence into reality. However, Ibn Sīnā argued that the nafs and rūḥ were two levels of one entity called the nafs. On the transcendental level it was pure form, while on the phenomenal level, it was a form that entered the body and gave life to it. Ibn Sīnā categorized the study of the nafs at the first level as a discussion of metaphysics, meanwhile, the study of the nafs at the second level was part of the natural sciences. Therefore, the philosophers called the nafs is rūḥ that living and moving which was the substance that illuminates the body. When the body dies, the light reflected by rūḥ was released from the physical body and the metaphysical (abstract) body. And when one sleeps, rūḥ was only detached from the physical body, but not from the mental body. In essence, nafs and rūḥ were two entities that were the same in meaning, only differing in degree of form.

Meanwhile, 'aql in Ibn Sīnā's thought was one part of the potential of the nafs which was called al-nafs al-nāṭiqah. 'Aql was the union between practical power (quwwah 'āmilī) and theoretical power (quwwah 'ālimī) that existed in

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44 Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition of the Fundamental Element of the Worldview of Islam (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1995), 148.
45 Haque, “Psychology from an Islamic Perspective,” 139; Mohammad Shakir Bin Ramli, “Understanding Motivation from Islamic Perspective, Theoretical Implications and Research Gaps,” in PROSIDING PERSIDANGAN SERANTAU SAINS SOSIAL DAN KEMANUSIAAN, ed. Mohd Nasir bin Masroom, Wan Mohd Azam bin Wan Mohd Yunus, and Zulkiifli bin Khair (Johor: Faculty Pengurusan, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, 2018), 66.
46 Sīnā, Al-Shifā’ Al-Ṭabī‘iyyāt Al-Nafs, 9.
47 Al-Ghazālī, Ma’ārij Al-Quds Fī Madārij Ma’rifah Al-Nafs, 19; Ibnu Ḥazm, Al-Faṣl Fī Al-Milāl Wa Al-Ahwā’ Wa Al-Nihāl, Juz 1 (Mesir: Maktabah wa Maṭba‘ah ‘Alī Ṣābiḥ, n.d.), 58.
48 Jarman Arroisi and Rahmat Ardi Nur Rifa Da’i, “Konsep Jiwa Perspektif Ibn Sina,” ISLAMICA: Jurnal Studi Keislaman 13, no. 2 (2019): 330, doi:https://doi.org/10.15642/islamica.2019.13.2.323-345.
49 M.M. Syari, A History of Muslim Philosophy (Jerman: Wiesbaden, 1963), 489.
50 Muḥammad ʿĀmin Aḥmed Al-Kurdi, Tanwīr Al-Qulūb Fī Mu’āmalah ‘Allām Al-Ghuyūb (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-’Ilmiyyah, 1995), 448.
51 ‘Ālī Ibn Muḥammad Aḥmed Al-Jurjānī, Kitāb Al-Ta’rifū (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-’Ilmiyyah, n.d.), 312.
humans. 52 'Aql was the form of the nafs which was formless and did not exist in the body or does not directly control the body. However, it was called nafs if it resided in the body and controls it. 53 If 'aql was active outside the body, then it remains 'aql, while if 'aql was active inside the body, then it was called nafs. Thus, it can be concluded that the nafs according to Ibn Sīnā was 'aql which was active in the body. 54 Therefore, in essence 'aql was a form of potential nafs called al-nafs al-nāṭiqah (rational soul) or al-nafs al-insāniyyah (human soul) and both were immaterial.

The explanation of the nafs, rūḥ, qalb, and 'aql in Ibn Sīnā's view, the fourth were a different entity. However, when they touched the human physique, these four things became undivided and identical entities. 55 They indicated the principle of unity called “kamāl” or perfection of being. 56 This entity as al-latīfah al-rūḥaniyyah was something that was created but did not perish. The entity cannot be measured using the size of space and time, or quantity. 57 These entities had their names when associated with their respective accidental positions and conditions (aḥwāl). When the entity was involved in the thought process, it was called “'aql”. When governing the body, that entity was called "nafs". Meanwhile, if it related to being the recipient of intuitive illumination, it was called "qalb". And when it returned to its world of abstract entities, it was referred to as "rūḥ". In conclusion, 'aql, nafs, qalb, and rūḥ were essentially the same, only different in the conditions in which they were actualized according to their respective functions.

52 Sīnā, Kitāb Al-Najāt Fī Al-Hikmah Al-Manṭiqiyyah Wa Al-Ṭabī’ah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah, 202.
53 Cyril Glasse, Ensiklopedi Islam Ringkas, ed. Gufron A. Mas’adi (Jakarta: PT. Raja Grafindo Persada, 1999), 199.
54 Amien, Epistemologi Islam: Pengantar Filsafat Pengetahuan Islam, 50.
55 Muhammad Faiz Al Afify, “Konsep Fitrah Dalam Psikologi Islam,” TSAQAFAH: Jurnal Perabadan Islam 14, no. 2 (2018): 287, doi:https://dx.doi.org/10.21111/tsaqafah.v14i2.2641.
56 Sīnā, Al-Shifā’ Al-Ṭabī’īyyāt Al-Nafs, 9.
57 Sīnā, Kitāb Al-Najāt Fī Al-Hikmah Al-Manṭiqiyyah Wa Al-Ṭabī’ah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah, 197.
The equalization made by Ibn Sīnā regarding 'aql, with the nafs, qalb, and rūḥ as immaterial substances that referred to the essence of man above was the same as al-Ghazālī's assumption. According to him, the four human elements were only different in name.58 These elements were equated as human entities that were immaterial, subtle, and secret, in the sense that most humans 'aql themselves cannot grasp their essence.59 In addition to quoting Ibn Sīnā's opinion, al-Ghazālī also detailed the meaning of qalb and rūḥ into two meanings, respectively. There were two meanings of qalb, namely: 1) physical, in the form of a fist of flesh located on the left chest; 2) latīfah rabbāniyyah rūhaniyyah, which functions to reveal divined secrets. Meanwhile, the meaning of rūḥ also had two meanings, which include: 1) the spiritual element located in the heart that made it beat; 2) spiritual elements whose meaning was known only to Allah.60 Another difference was that al-Ghazālī was more inclined to regard the qalb as the center of the nafs. He believed that the majority of human signification processes occurred within the qalb.61 He defined the qalb as a divine entity that was spiritual in nature because one of the functions of the qalb was to reveal the secrets of rūḥ.62 This was in contrast to Ibn Sīnā who always mentions 'aql is the most important element of the nafs and discussed the heart a little.

Al-Attas is the contemporary Moslem scholar or we may call him contemporary Sufi who reinterprets intensively this verse based on Sufis' explanation. In his book "Prolegomena to the Metaphysic of Islam" he explains that humans are being indebted to God who has created him and made him exist. This nature of the debt of creation and existence requires him to return the debt means to give himself up in service or khidmah to his Lord and Master; to abase himself before Him. Further, he says that return is regulated by the conceptual

58 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn, 6.
59 Al-Ghazālī, Ma‘ārij Al-Quds Fi Madārij Ma‘rifah Al-Nafs, 21.
60 Abū Ḥamīd Al-Ghazālī, Kīmiyā Al-Sā‘ūdah (Kairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 2010), 126.
61 Hisham Abu-Raiya, “Towards a Systematic Qura’nic Theory of Personality,” Mental Health, Religion & Culture 15, no. 3 (2012): 222, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13674676.2011.640622.
62 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā ‘Ulūm Al-Dīn, 6.
structure of *din*. Moreover, he asserts, the term *din* in this sense of *return* is custom or habit, or tradition. However, it is worth noting that is not meant that kind of custom, habit or tradition here originated and evolved in human history and culture and had its source in the human mind. It is, rather, what God has revealed and commanded and taught His prophets and Messengers.

Based on Sufis thought of human nature above, the real freedom of human beings according to them is to allow him to become enslaved by God that is by performing His Divine Law. Regarding this, Qusyairy says that:

> Know that the True Reality of freedom lies in the perfection of one's servanthood (*ubudiya*). When one's servant hood before God is sincere, one’s freedom is cleansed from attachment to anything other than God. Those who fathom that the servant may occasionally remove the bridle of servant hood and turn his sight away from (God’s) commands and prohibitions in the realm of the Divine Law (*dar al-taklif*), while being of sound mind, (are deluded,) for this is nothing but forfeiting one’s religion.\(^{64}\)

Finally, it can be concluded that Ibn Sīnā so does al-Ghazālī did not limit *‘aql* in only one dimension. Thus, the discourse of *‘aql* in Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī's thought not only centered on behavior, words, or other empirical aspects. Rather, it included all aspects related to the nafs, qalb, and rūḥ. Of course, the entity was always linked to manifest itself in all its conditions.

**Relationship of *‘Aql* with Knowledge And Education**

\(^{63}\) The word “*dien*” with its various forms is mentioned in the Qur’an about 94 times in sura Makkīyah and Madaniyah. Muhammad Fu’ad Abd Al-Baqi, *Al-Mu'jam al-Mufahras li-alFazh al-Qur’an al-Karim*, (Beirut, Dar-al-Fikr, 1987), p. 267-269. According to al-Attas, the word *dien* can be reduced to four: 1) indebtedness; 2) submissiveness; 3) judious power; 4) natural inclination or tendency. See: Naquīb al-Attas, *Prolegomena to The Metaphysics of Islam…*, p. 41-42

\(^{64}\) al-Qusyairi, *ar-Risalah al-Qusayriyah…*, p. 219
The essence of 'aql as kamāl al-awwal showed its relation as a means of attaining and acquiring knowledge. The urgency of 'aql in acquiring this knowledge had been emphasized by many scholars. Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī said that 'aql was an instinct that Allah had given to humans to acquire knowledge.\(^{65}\) In line with al-Muḥāsibī, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā argued that 'aql became human power/potential to be able to produce different knowledge by using certain laws.\(^{66}\) Even al-Ghazālī assumed that the ability of 'aql in conceptualizing knowledge could touch the essence of knowledge.\(^{67}\) Which was the function of knowledge according to Fakhruddīn al-Rāzī to be able to serve and obey Allah, properly and correctly, and to maintain clarity of heart from the temptations of worldly and material things.\(^{68}\) So it was emphasized here, that the main ability of 'aql was to perceive abstract things so that it became a science with which humans could undergo obedience to Allah and stay away from His prohibitions.

Syed Muhammad Naqib Al-Attas argue that the destruction of adab which is the result of the corruption of knowledge creates a situation in which false leaders appear in all aspects of life, therefore not only causing the corruption of knowledge, but also the loss of capacity and ability to recognize and acknowledge the true leader. Due to the intellectual anarchy that characterizes this situation, the common people become the determinant of the intellectual decision and are elevated to the level of authority on the subject of knowledge\(^{69}\).

Humans had a higher degree than other creatures because they have 'aql. Ibn Sīnā -as explained in the previous sub-chapter- asserts that 'aql was part of the power of the soul namely nafs nāṭiqah or nafs insāniyyah.\(^{70}\) Through 'aql humans could think, daydream, perceive, conceptualize, and conclude all things. With

\(^{65}\) Al-Ḥarīth al-Muḥāsibī, Al-ʿAql Wa Fahm Al-Qurʾān, ed. Ḥusain Al-Quwwatī (Dār al-Fikr, 1971), 201–2.

\(^{66}\) Al-Fārābī, Risālah Fī ʿAql, 8; Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī, Kitāb Al-Siyāsah Al-Madinah (Beirut: Al-.Maṭb’ah al-Ka’tābulikīyyah, 1998), 33; Sīnā, Kitāb Al-Najāt Fī Al-Ḥikmah Al-Manṭiqīyyah Wa Al-Ṭabī’ih Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah, 202; Sīnā, Al-Nafs Min Kitāb Al-Shīfā, 67.

\(^{67}\) Al-Ghazālī, Mishkāh Al-Anwār, 124.

\(^{68}\) Al-Rāzī, Mafāṭīḥ Al-Ghayb: Ṭafṣīr Al-Kabīr, 350.

\(^{69}\) Syed Muhammad Naqib Al-Attas, Prolegomena To The Metaphysics of Islam, (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1995), p. 19.

\(^{70}\) Sīnā, Al-Nafs Min Kitāb Al-Shīfā, 285.
'aql, humans can distinguish between right and wrong, good and bad, beautiful and ugly, honest and lying, and partial things (juz 'iyyah) through various imaginations and reflections.\textsuperscript{71} The ability to achieve knowledge of the partial things was what distinguished humans from other creatures.

Ibn Sīnā said that 'aql had a special potential that could not be separated from it to produce knowledge, namely the science of logic (manṭiq). Logic became a legal instrument that could prevent 'aql from making mistakes in the thought process.\textsuperscript{72} Ibn Sīnā's opinion was commensurate with al-Fārābī's assumption that logical activity was to guide humans to the right path. It became a legal instrument that tested the object of thought (ma'qulāt) so that 'aql did not misunderstand it.\textsuperscript{73} In essence, the logic of Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī was the key to obtaining the truth.

thought begins from his study of wujūd and its reality. His metaphilosophy is based on wujūd as the only constituent of reality. He states that other than its inability to be defined, wujūd is self-evident. In its relation to māhiyah, Šadrā asserts that wujūd is identical to reality, as māhiyah is a mental construction. Everything's reality is its wujūd and not māhiyah. Māhiyah is nothing. However, it is limits determined to wujūd. As a whole, Ibn Sīnā ontological and metaphysical system is based on three main principles: aṣālat al- wujūd, tashkīk al- wujūd, and wahdat al- wujūd. These three principles are related to each other and may be characterized as existential, holistic, dynamic, and systematic. Wujūd, which is the main thesis in Mullā Šadrā's system, is epistemologically reachable only through intuition. However, that intuition is applicable by rational procedure, as explained

\textsuperscript{71} Sīnā, Kitāb Al-Najāt Fī Al-Hikmah Al-Manṭiqiyyah Wa Al-Ṭabī‘ah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah, 202.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ishārāt Wa Al-Tanbīḥāt, Juz 1 (Kairo: Maṭba‘ah al-Khayriyyah, n.d.), 117–21.
\textsuperscript{73} Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, Ihṣā Al-‘Ulām, 27.
in his *al-asfār al-‘aqliyah*. Therefore, Ibn Sīnā is not only a philosopher or a mystic, rather he is a “rationalistic mystical philosopher”.

Basically, truth itself points to goodness. And kindness breeds happiness. In this case, Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī agreed that the ability of logic or *mantiq* was the key to happiness. On the other hand, happiness will not be achieved except with knowledge, whereas the way to obtain true knowledge was through a logical process.\(^4\) Therefore, the process of determining the truth of knowledge in logic cannot be separated from what Ibn Sīnā\(^5\) and al-Fārābī\(^6\) call it *tašawwur* (definition) and *taṣdīq* (proof). Because *tašawwur* and *taṣdīq* were processes of understanding, explaining, and defining rational objects essentially and substantially with the help of *'aql*.

The role of logic as the main tool for acquiring knowledge was emphasized by Ibn Sīnā. But, he also recognized the importance of sense perception in acquiring knowledge. In this regard, Ibn Sīnā's opinion differed from that of Aristotle who considered sensory perception as the basis of knowledge and thinking.\(^7\) Ibn Sīnā considered sensory perception only as of the first and opening stage that prepares the soul for rational knowledge which was not obtained through the sensory pathways, but was obtained through pathways outside the human *'aql*, namely the path of inspiration and emanation from the Active Intellect (*al-'Aql al- Fa'āl*) which was a separate mind from matter. Ibn Sīnā in the book *al-Najāt* says:

“Indeed, animal power helps the nafs nātiqah in various ways, among which the senses send partial things to him so that four partial things occur. One is the release of the universal and unique soul from partial things through the liberation of its meanings from matter and material relations; paying attention to similarities and differences, substantive forms and formal forms so that conceptual principles emerge for the nafs by utilizing fantasy and waham.”\(^8\)

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\(^4\) Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Risālah Al-Tanbih ʿalā Sabīl Al-Saʿādah*, ed. Subhān Khilāfah (Oman, 1987), 229; Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Shifā*: *Al-Mantīq: Al-Madkhal*, ed. Aḥmad Fuūd Al-Ahwānī (Kairo: Al-Ṭibāʿah al-Amīrīyyah, 1956), 58–59.

\(^5\) Sīnā, *ʿUyūn Al-Ḥikmah*, 13.

\(^6\) Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Risālah Al-Tanbih ʿalā Sabīl Al-Saʿādah*, 226.

\(^7\) Najati, *Jiwa Dalam Pandangan Para Filosof Muslim*, 171.

\(^8\) Sīnā, *Kitāb Al-Najāt Fī Al-Ḥikmah Al-Manṭiqtisyyah Wa Al-Ṭabīʿah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah*, 297–98.
In addition, Ibn Sīnā asserted that the many interactions of the nafs with sensory fantasies and symbols of meaning that existed in the power of conception and memory, by utilizing the power of delusion and thinking power will provide readiness for the nafs to accept abstract things from various substances. \(^7^9\) So, that sensory experience arose from 'Aql Fa'āl. Meanwhile, the task of the mind was to reflect and weigh these sensory experiences. This activity prepared the mind to receive the universal essence of 'Aql Fa'āl through an act of direct intuition.

It seemed that there were similarities between Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī in this regard. According to al-Fārābī, the senses were the way the nafs used to acquire knowledge. But sensory knowledge does not give man information about the essence of things, but only gave the outward side. Meanwhile, universal knowledge and the essence of everything can only be obtained through 'aql. \(^8^0\) Al-Fārābī concluded that the window of knowledge was the senses because knowledge entered man through the senses. Furthermore, knowledge obtained from the senses was conceptualized into complete knowledge through 'aql and assisted by the emanation of 'Aql Fa'āl. The ultimate goal of 'aql was continuity with the separate 'aql and identity with it. It meant that yaqīniyyah knowledge cannot be attained except through the emanation that came from 'Aql Fa'āl as the giver of knowledge and the giver of images. Therefore, it was called ma‘rifah ishrāqiyyah (illuminative knowledge). In other words, ḥusūlī knowledge or knowledge was only a form of preparation to achieve ḥudūrī knowledge and truth. It was this attainment of ḥudūrī knowledge and truth which was the goal of all knowledge processes. \(^8^1\) So, according to Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī knowledge began with the senses and ends with the change of knowledge into ishrāqi.

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\(^7^9\) Sīnā, Al-Ishārāt Wa Al-Tanbīhāt, n.d., 116.
\(^8^0\) Jamil Şallībā, Tārīkh Al-Falsafah Al-'Arabiyyah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1973), 163.
\(^8^1\) Hasyiimsyah Nasution, Filsafat Islam (Jakarta: Gaya Media Pratama, 1999), 22.
Although Ibn Sinā and al-Fārābī asserted that the orientation of knowledge was ishrāqī knowledge, both of them still emphasize 'aql as the most important tool for achieving knowledge. This was what al-Ghazālī denied.\footnote{Al-Ghazālī, \textit{Tahāfut Al-Falāsifah}, 71.} According to him, knowledge compiled based on demonstration (burhān) did indeed succeed in bringing about certainty, but when dealing with religious matters in detail, it failed and also gave a lot of leeways.\footnote{Abū Hamīd Al-Ghazālī, \textit{Al-Manqūţ Min Al-Ḍalāl} (Turki: Ḥaqīqah Kitābavi, 1981), 36.} Although on the one hand, al-Ghazālī did not deny the function of 'aql as a means of achieving truth and understanding revelation,\footnote{Al-Ghazālī, \textit{Maʿārif al-Quds Fi Madārij Maʿrifah Al-Nafs}, 46.} On the other hand, he also emphasized the importance of the function of the qalb is the substance of spiritual cognition as a way of gaining knowledge. Through the qalb, humans had the potential to maʿrifatullāh or know God,\footnote{Al-Ghazālī, \textit{Iḥyāʿ Ulūm Al-Dīn}, 7.} where the potential for maʿrifatullāh was called human nature (fitrah).\footnote{Jarman Arroisi, Jamal, and Mohammad Khair Al-Fikry, “Fitrah According to The Qur’an: Personality Analysis of Islamic Psychology Perspective,” \textit{Dialogia: Jurnal Studi Islam Dan Sosial} 19, no. 1 (2021): 119, doi:https://doi.org/10.21154/dialogia.v19i1.2405.}

Isfahani emphasizes the integration of both ethics to reach happiness in this world and happiness in the hereafter. However, it was as great a mistake to have made no mention of such Islamic philosophers as ibn Sīna (Avicenna), al-Ghazali, and above all ibn Rushd (Averroes). And these absences were responsible for a further inadequacy in my treatment of Aquinas’ moral thought since Aquinas’ synthesis of theology with Aristotle was deeply and importantly indebted to Maimonides, Avicenna, and Averroes.\footnote{Al-Ghazālī, \textit{Maʿārif Qulūb Fi Ẓāhir=Wāḥisiyya Tullāh}, 19, no. 1 (2021): 119, doi:https://doi.org/10.21154/dialogia.v19i1.2405.} Hence, the researcher will emphasize the ethics concept according to Western and Islamic scholars.

In al-Ghazālī's thought, knowledge received by the qalb had advantages over 'aql because for him 'aql was only able to digest knowledge in a limited way, namely knowledge that was rational and empirical through the senses and ratio. Meanwhile, according to al-Ghazālī, the qalb can capture unlimited truth and knowledge. This ability was obtained by dhawq or intuition. Through this dhawq the qalb was able to receive 'ilm mukāshafah which cannot be achieved through
'aql.\textsuperscript{87} Intuitive knowledge was obtained through a long process including \textit{mujāhadah} and \textit{riyādah} as well as \textit{tajakkur} and \textit{tadabbur}.\textsuperscript{88} Here was also seen the difference between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā regarding the term intuition and how to achieve it. Al-Ghazālī was more inclined to call intuition as \textit{dhawq} than \textit{al-ḥads} and it lies in the \textit{qalb} and can be achieved by anyone, not only the Prophet through inner cultivation. Meanwhile, Ibn Sīnā tended to term intuition as \textit{al-ḥads} where it was the highest power of \textquote{aql} and was only owned by the Prophet and Apostle.\textsuperscript{89}

However, there is a figure who becomes a role model in every aspect, he is Prophet Muhammad. Annie Besant writes in his book, The Life and Teachings of Muhammad:

\begin{quote}
\text{\textquote{"It is impossible for anyone who studies the life and character of the great Prophet of Arabia, who knows how he taught and how he lived, to feel anything but reverence for that mighty Prophet, one of the great messengers of the Supreme. And although in what I put to you I shall say many things which may familiar to many, yet I feel whenever I read them, a new way of admiration, a new sense of reverence for that mighty Arabian teacher."}}\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

Seemed that Annie He admired the life and character of the Prophet and acknowledged the greatness of the Prophet as a model teacher in all aspects of life. Even many other figures and scientists who claim that the Prophet Muhammad is a perfect man mean he has multidimensional behaviors and

\textsuperscript{87} Al-Ghazālī, \textit{Ihya ʾUlūm Al-Dīn}, 21; Al-Ghazālī, \textit{Maʿārij Al-Quds Fī Madārij Maʿrifah Al-Nafs}, 74–75.

\textsuperscript{88} Amin Hasan, \textquote{"Menyusuri Hakikat Kebenaran: Kajian Epistemologi Atas Konsep Intuisi Dalam Tasawuf Al-Ghazali,"} \textit{Jurnal At-Ta’dib} 7, no. 2 (2012): 193, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.21111/at-tadib.v7i2.71; Hasan Mahfudh, \textquote{"Dari ′Abid Al-Jabiri Tentang Epistemologi Arab Islam,"} \textit{Dialogia: Jurnal Studi Islam Dan Sosial} 13, no. 1 (2015): 8–9, doi:https://doi.org/10.21154/dialogia.v13i1.275.

\textsuperscript{89} Further discussion of \textit{al-ḥads} will be presented in the sub-chapter below.
abilities in various fields both as a person and as a leader. In the field of diplomacy, of course, he also belongs among the world's top diplomats. He is a person who has the characteristics of shiddiq, amanah, tabligh, fatonah, and also he earned the title of al-amin which means the title for someone who can be trusted. Prophet Muhammad also has good ability in the field of communications. W Montgomery Watt is quoted to have written about Muhammad:

“His readiness to undergo persecution for his beliefs, the high moral character of the men who believed in him and looked up to him as a leader, and the greatness of his ultimate achievement all argue for his fundamental integrity. To suppose Muhammad is an impostor raises more problems than it solves. Moreover, none of the great figures of history is so poorly appreciated in the West as Muhammad.”

Appears to his writing, Watt wants to emphasize that the respect and high moral character of followers is a reflection of the high moral character of the In al-Ghazālī's view, the knowledge that was certain to be true was the result of God's inspiration. He said that "When God guards the qabl, the chest was enlightened and the mysteries of the malākūt world were revealed, the veil of guilt disappears and the reality of the divine things shone in the qabl." Therefore, when the qabl became the owner of the truth, then 'aql also obtains certainty. Al-Ghazālī positions the qalb and 'aql, as well as the nafs and rūḥ as the abode of knowledge, all of which were immaterial substances in humans. Here it can be seen that al-Ghazālī's efforts to integrate the principles of Sufism into his philosophical ideas about the nafs. It seemed that he was inspired by his intellectual and spiritual experiences as a faqīh, mutakallim, philosopher, and Sufi.

The Classification of ‘Aql’s Potential

'Aql is an important aspect of achieving knowledge and truth were divided into two namely practical reason ('aql al-āmilī) and theoretical reason ('aql al-

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90 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyāʿ Ulūm Al-Dīn, 8.
91 Al-Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition of the Fundamental Element of the Worldview of Islam, 143.
ālimī). 'Aql al-āmilī was a power that had the characteristic of thinking about partial things that must be done and abandoned, the beautiful and the bad, and the good and the bad. Therefore, morality belonged to the nafs from the side of 'aql al-āmilī.\(^92\) 'Aql al-āmilī tended to encourage people to consider actions that were appropriate or abandoned, in other words affecting behavior or morals.

First is characteristics of self. All of the basic distinctions between Transpersonalist and Sufi begin with their idea of noetic vis a vis fitrah as human nature.\(^93\) Former claims noetic as an initial condition, while Sufi is holding on fitrah. Noetic asserts human beings are born as blank paper with no innate mental but have spiritual potential that should be polished and all sources of knowledge are gradually gained through experience and perception of the world of the senses.\(^94\) Meanwhile, fitrah does not completely deny it, but it interprets spirituality in different ways of Transpersonalist. In technical terms; Fitrah maintains spirituality as the basis of behavior, instead of accepting it noetic brings behavior as the basis of spirituality.

'Aql al-Amilī depended on his abilities on the various factions of the forces above him namely 'aql al-ālimī. It also practically required the body and energy of the body in all its actions. He controlled all the energy of the body by the direction of the law of 'aql al-ālimī. From this, it can be seen that 'aql is something that has a percentage and a metaphor for two aspects, namely the aspect below it and the aspect above it. Each aspect has a power that can regulate the relationship between 'aql and that aspect.\(^95\) Meanwhile, 'aql al-ālimī related to the power of

\(^{92}\) Sīnā, Al-Nafs Min Kitāb Al-Shifā, 184–86.
\(^{93}\) The term fitrah is derived from fitr means to open. Through his understanding of various Qur’an and Hadith and also of some early Moslem scholars, such al-Attas. See: Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1993), p.61-62
\(^{94}\) Edward J. Power, Educational Philosophy: A History from The Ancient World to Modern America, (USA: Taylor & Francis, 1996), p.76
\(^{95}\) Najati, Jiwa Dalam Pandangan Para Filosof Muslim, 168.
human knowledge. This ‘aql al-ālimī performed a figurative process on the aspects above in order to interact, utilize, and receive it. He perceived universal images that were independent of matter.\(^96\) In essence, ‘aql al-āmilī functions to do the jobs that were obtained after the reasoning process using ‘aql al-ālimī.

Starting from the two powers of ‘aql, the nafs insāniyyah has two functions. First, a function related to the part below it which was a function that was oriented to the body and this certainly did not receive the influence of the nature of the body. Second, functions related to those above namely functions that were oriented to sublime principles and ‘Aql Fa‘āl -the Tenth Intellect in Ibn Sina’s theory of emanation- and this form always received the influence and was influenced by what was there.\(^97\) In conclusion, ‘aql al-āmilī was a power that was responsible for regulating and dealing with the body, while ‘aql al-ālimī was a power that comes from various noble principles and ‘Aql Fa‘āl. All abstract images originated from it and with it the perfection of the nafs was formed.

Based on the stages of the process of perception of ‘aql, Ibn Sīnā classified ‘aql al-ālimī into four levels.\(^98\) First, al-‘aql al-hayūlānī (potential/material reason). Before perceiving rational things, ‘aql was only potential. ‘Aql hayūlānī was the absolute readiness that existed in humans to grasp rational things before readiness turns into action. ‘Aql only had the potential to think about abstract things.\(^99\) He simply could gain experience and knowledge so that he had not been trained to think even a little.

The second was al-‘aql bi-l-malakah (sense of talent/possession). At this stage, he had started to think about everything abstract.\(^100\) If ‘aql acquired the first intelligent or rational object (ma’qulāt al-ūlā), then it was called ‘aql mumkin or ‘aql bi-l-malakah. The first intelligibles were premises that were justified without going through any effort. These premises were in the form of primary rational

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96 Sīnā, Aḥwāl Al-Nafs, 65; Sīnā, Kitāb Al-Najāt Fī Al-Ḥikmah Al-Manṭiqīyyah Wa Al-Ṭabi‘ah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah, 269.
97 Sīnā, Aḥwāl Al-Nafs, 63–65; Sīnā, Kitāb Al-Najāt Fī Al-Ḥikmah Al-Manṭiqīyyah Wa Al-Ṭabi‘ah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah, 268–69.
98 Shams Inati, Ibn Sīnā’s Remarks and Admonition: Physics and Metaphysics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 18.
99 Sīnā, Kitāb Al-Najāt Fī Al-Ḥikmah Al-Manṭiqīyyah Wa Al-Ṭabi‘ah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah, 269.
100 Soheil M. Afnan, Avicenna: His Life and Works (Selangor: AAPSSB, 2009), 102.
principles that cannot be free from justification at all. This was what was called al-‘ilm al-ḍarūrī. This knowledge was an introduction to the second intelligentsia. Ibn Sīnā likens 'aql bi-l-malakah to the power of a child who knows pen, ink, and simple letters based on writing.

The Third was al-'aql bi-l-fi‘il (actual mind). This 'aql had already begun to perceive the secondary intelligible which were obtained with the help of the first intelligible. So at that time 'aql became the actual mind. However, 'aql was not studied and was caused by actuality but it can be studied at any time because it was an 'aql who thought at any time without the burden of effort. So this 'aql was able to think about abstract things.

The Fourth was al-'aql al-mustafād (reason of acquisition). When the intelligentsia was present in the 'aql actually and the 'aql examined it for real and thought that what he was thinking was actually, then he turned into 'aql mustafād. 'Aql at this stage has been able to think about abstract things without the need for effort. In other words, he had been trained so that abstract things were forever contained in 'aql like this. 'Aql mustafād had the readiness to accept rational things that were very strong so that they became responsive and able to receive the abundance of knowledge from 'Aql Fa‘āl (Active Intellect). 'Aql Fa‘āl shines its light on objects of human imagination which were originally obtained from the outside world. To make these objects can be seen by 'aql mustafād. 'Aql Fa‘āl was like the sun that emitted its light on external things, thus making those external things visible to human eyes. When the light of 'Aql Fa‘āl reached the objects of imagination, it transforms those objects into ma‘qulāt or can be understood by 'aql mustafād by abstracting the objects from matter. So, 'aql

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101 Sīnā, Alhwāl Al-Nafs, 63.
102 Sīnā, ‘Uyūn Al-Ḥikmah, 42–43.
103 Sīnā, Kitāb Al-Najāt Fi Al-Ḥikmah Al-Manṭiqīyyah Wa Al-Ṭabī‘ah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah, 269.
104 Sīnā, ‘Uyūn Al-Ḥikmah, 43.
mustafād was at the stage of the process of perception of 'aql which was already perfect which human perfection was realized.

According to Ibn Sīnā some people had a very large and strong 'aql hayūlānī. This great potential allowed them to easily get in touch with 'Aql Fa'āl and easily received light or revelation from God. Ibn Sīnā called it al-ḥads or intuition. 'Aql like this had a holy power (quwwah al-qudsiyyah), so that 'aql, in this case, was called the Holy Intellect (al-'Aql al-Quds), which 'aql was a type of prophecy. This was the highest and most sacred level of human power that only the Prophets have.

It should be noted, that 'Aql Fa'āl is the last form of 'aql from the degradation of Divine Intellectual beings (al-'Aql al-Ilāhī) in Ibn Sīnā's theory of emanation. 'Aql was caused by the aqliyyah emanation which began with God as the First Cause (Prima Causa), and ends in the nafs nāṭiqah. 'Aql Fa'āl was the last power of 'Aql Ilāhī and was responsible for governing the sublunar world (under the moon). Its main function was to give physical form to matter and intellectual form to the nafs nāṭiqah, therefore it was called wahib al-ṣuwar "former". And sometimes 'Aql Fa'āl was identified as the Angel Gabriel (Rūḥ al-Quds), in al-Fārābī's view and like al-Fārābī, al-Ghazālī put forward the identity of 'Aql Fa'āl as the Archangel Gabriel or Rūḥ al-Quds. In the book Ma’ārij al-Qudsī, al-Ghazālī cites three verses that prove the identity of 'Aql Fa'āl as Rūḥ al-Quds which included surah al-Shūrā (42) verse 51, sura al-Najm (53) verse 5 -6, and surah al-Takwīr (81) verses 19-20. Here it can be seen that al-

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105 Al-Ḥads was a way of gaining knowledge and understanding something without going through a line of thought or naẓar, but through light so that the soul can absorb knowledge. See: Ibnu Sīnā, Al-Ishārāt Wa Al-Tanbīhāt, Juz 2 (Kairo: Maṭba’ah al-Khayriyyah, n.d.), 371.
106 Sīnā, Al-Shifā Al-Ṭabī'iyyāt Al-Nafs, 67.
107 Sīnā, Kitāb Al-Najāt Fi Al-Ḥikmah Al-Mantiqiyyah Wa Al-Ṭabī’ah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah, 270.
108 'Aql Fa'āl (Active Intellect / Intellect Agent) in Islamic philosophy seems to have been used first by al-Fārābī. Because al-Kindī doesn't seem familiar with the term. Instead, al-Kindī called this 'aql with the term 'aql awwal (first intellect). See Seyyed Hossein Nast, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 215.
109 Sīnā, Kitāb Al-Najāt Fi Al-Ḥikmah Al-Mantiqiyyah Wa Al-Ṭabī’ah Wa Al-Ilāhiyyah, 310–14; Sīnā, Al-Shījā Al-Ṭabī’iyat Al-Nafs, 218.
110 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb Al-Siyāsah Al-Madīnah, 32.
111 Al-Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition of the Fundamental Element of the Worldview of Islam, 161.
112 Al-Ghazālī, Ma’ārij Al-Quds Fī Madārij Ma’rifah Al-Nafs, 123.
Ghazālī tried to lead some philosophical studies into a realm that was more in line with the Qur'an. That was, he tried to affirm some philosophical ideas in religious studies. levels of human consciousness which are based on noetic; physical, emotional, intellectual, personal integration, intuition, psychic, mystic, and the integration of transpersonal. Those levels bring Transpersonal to recognize empirical-spiritual as self-dimension. However, as the consequence; the meaning of spirituality becomes more empirically explored, as Grof says:

…The spirituality that emerges spontaneously at a certain stage of experiential self-exploration should not be confused with the mainstream religions and their beliefs, doctrines, dogmas, and rituals.

The quotation is about to say that spirituality is not religious. Spirituality is simply a process of the interconnectedness of something sacred, or a purely psychological process of human beings. Simply put, the aspects of spirituality in the field of a specific religion, purposely or not are already abandoned from transpersonal psychology.

Regarding the division of levels of ‘aql al-ālimī in Ibn Sīnā’ thought seemed to follow al-Fārābī. However, there was a slight difference in the amount specified. In al-Fārābī philosophy, the stages of development between potential and actualization in ‘aql produced three levels which include al-‘aql bi-l-quwwah/al-‘aql al-ḥayūlānī, al-‘aql bi-l-fi’il, and al-‘aql al-mustafad. ‘Aql hayūlānī is a pure tendency to abstract the forms or qualities (māhiyyāt) of objects that can be known from their relationship with the five senses. When this ‘aql hayūlānī acquired the concept of an intelligent object, then it freed it from

113 For more see: Barry McWaters, Conscious Evolution: Personal and Planetary Transformation, (San Francisco: Evolutionary Press, 1982)  
114 Stanislav Grof, The Adventure of Self-Discovery: Dimensions of Consciousness and New Perspectives in Psychotherapy and Inner Exploration, (New York: SUNY, 1988) p.269  
115 Al-Fārābī, Risālah Fī Al-‘Aql, 12–13.
material attachment, then it changed from its pure potential to its actualization, and became the second type of 'aql, namely 'aql bi-l-fi'il.\textsuperscript{116} 'Aql bi-l-fi'il was active if it was related to the intelligent object that he thought about, while the rational object that he had not thought about was called potential.

When 'aql bi-l-fi'il produced all the objects of 'aql and was able to understand the object of 'aql that was free from matter such as the celestial intellect, then at that time it became 'aql mustafād.\textsuperscript{117} The level of 'aql mustafād was higher than 'aql bi-l-fi'il and more separate from matter, and closer to 'Aql Fa'āl. Since 'aql mustafād did not need material things and he understood different images directly from 'Aql Fa'āl, then he was actually part of the nafs which did not suffer damage like material damage. The mustafād soul was a real human being and he was the one who was immortal after the body was destroyed.\textsuperscript{118} It was at this point that al-Fārābī's argument was criticized by Ibn Sīnā. For Ibn Sīnā, the entire nafs insāniyyah/nafs nāṭiqah was eternal, not only in the 'aql mustafād part, as al-Fārābī said.\textsuperscript{119}

Viewed from this, it was known that there was a difference between al-Fārābī's and Ibn Sīnā's thoughts regarding the level of 'aql al-ālimī which was related to the number. Al-Fārābī assumed that there were three levels of 'aql al-ālimī, while Ibn Sīnā argues that there were four levels of 'aql al-ālimī. This was because Ibn Sīnā considered 'aql bi-l-malakah and 'aql bi-l-fi'il as two different levels in 'aql al-ālimī, while al-Fārābī considered them to be the same, i.e. the same level in 'aql al-ālimī. Another difference was about the eternal part of the nafs nāṭiqah and the theory of al-'aql al-quds and al-ḥads which Ibn Sīnā included in the division of levels of 'aql.\textsuperscript{120}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{116} Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī, \textit{Arāʾ Ahli Al-Madīnah Al-Faḍīlah}, ed. Albert Naṣrī Nādir (Beirut: Dār al-Mashrūq, 1973), 64–66.
\bibitem{117} Al-Fārābī, \textit{Risālah Fī Al-'Aql}, 21–22.
\bibitem{118} Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī, \textit{ʻUyūn Al-Masā’il} (Kairo, 1907), 64.
\bibitem{119} Inati, “Ibn Sīnā,” 297.
\bibitem{120} Al-Fārābī did not introduce al-'aql al-quds at the level of 'aql al-ālimī because of differences in the concept of prophethood. Al-'Aql al-quds by Ibn Sīnā was included in the concept of prophethood, it becomes the main aspect that distinguishes the Prophet from other humans. Meanwhile, al-Fārābī considers prophecy lies not in the power of 'aql, but in the power of human fantasy. See: Najati, \textit{Jiwa dalam Pandangan Para Filosof Muslim}, p. 81; Najati, \textit{Jiwa Dalam Pandangan Pura Filosof Muslim}, 81; According to al-Fārābī, Prophets and Apostles do not need
\end{thebibliography}
The division of 'aql al-ālimī made by Ibn Sīnā was adopted by al-Ghazālī. Like Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī divided the stages of the perceptual ability of 'aql al-ālimī into four parts which included 'aql ḥayālānī, 'aql bi-l-malakah, 'aql bi-l-fi'il, and 'aql mustafād. Al-Ghazālī also included al-'aql al-quds in the 'aql al-ālimī section as a sacred potential possessed by the Prophets and Apostles who showed the glory of their souls. The difference was that al-Ghazālī affirmed al-'aql al-quds into the Qur'an, specifically in Surah al-Nūr verse 35. He interpreted the verse as a parable of the Prophet's 'aql. In the book Ma‘ārij al-Qudsī it was written:

"'Aql of the Prophet is lit with amariyyah mubārakah nabawiyyah (God's commandment which is full of blessings and prophetic), zaitūniyyah ummiyyah lā sharqiyyah ṭabi‘iyyah wa lā gharbiyyah bashariyyah (lit with olive oil that does not lean east or west). Its oil can almost illuminate by nature even though it has never been touched by the fire of ideas. It was a light that comes from amr rubbūbī (God's command) above the light that comes from 'aql nubuwwah. Allah guides to His light to whom He wills."

So, it can be concluded that al-Ghazālī tried to elaborate Ibn Sīnā's philosophical thought with religious texts (al-Qur'an) which he thought could be accepted by religious principles. It can be seen here that al-Ghazālī's attempt to formulate a study of Islamic philosophy in accordance with the rules of Islam in the Qur'an and Sunnah.

121 Al-Ghazālī, Ma‘ārij al-Quds Fī Madārij Ma‘rifah Al-Nafs, 49–53.
122 Ibid., 53.
123 Ibid., 55–56.
CONCLUSION

Ibn Sīnā was a Muslim philosopher who studied ‘aql in detail and systematically. He defined ‘aql as part of the power of the nafs which provided readiness for the nafs to receive knowledge and truth. ‘Aql by Ibn Sīnā was called al-nafs al-inskāniyyah and several other names. The essence of ‘aql was kamāl al-awwal (primary perfection) for human beings who were spiritual or immaterial. This was because ‘aql has the potential to give perfection to perception and various activities. As part of the nafs it gave perfection to the human form so that it can exist in real terms.

‘Aql as kamāl al-awwal was interrelated with the nafs, rūḥ, and qalb. These four entities were essentially one or the same, namely as the primary perfection of human beings who have spiritual or immaterial substances. What distinguishes it was only in the condition of the accident and its mode, according to their respective functions and activities. As kamāl al-awwal, ‘aql played an important role in the attainment of knowledge. For this reason, Ibn Sīnā divides the power of ‘aql into two, namely ‘aql al-‘āmilī and ‘aql al-‘ālimī. Meanwhile, ‘aql al-‘ālimī was divided into four based on the process of the ability to perceive something and reason, which include: ‘aql ḥayūlānī, ‘aql bi-l-malakah, ‘aql bi-l-fi’il, and ‘aql mustafād. The potential possessed by ‘aql ḥayūlānī was different for each person, and the greatest potential was al-‘aql al-qudsī which was specifically owned by the Prophet and Apostle as a form of prophecy. According to Ibn Sīnā, in essence, the process of attaining knowledge began with the senses grasping the phenomena that occurred, then being perceived and perceived by ‘aql. Ibn Sīnā also asserted that knowledge will not reach ‘aql without the emanation of ‘Aql Fa’āl. Therefore, the essence of knowledge was the knowledge of ḥuḍūrī. This was also one of the consequences of the immaterial essence of ‘aql.

Ibn Sīnā's view of ‘aql showed that there was a mutual influence between him and the Muslim philosophers before and after him. Of course there was a process of adoption and modification in it. Ibn Sīnā in several of his concepts of ‘aql also seemed to revise what has been initiated by Aristotle. This kind of thing
proved that the discourse of Islamic philosophy was dynamic and did not really
take what has been conveyed by the ancient Greek philosophers.

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