Privacy-Aware Adversarial Network in Human Mobility Prediction

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ABSTRACT
As mobile devices and location-based services are increasingly developed in different smart city scenarios and applications, many unexpected privacy leakages have arisen due to geolocated data collection and sharing. User re-identification and other sensitive inferences are major privacy threats when geolocated data are shared with cloud-assisted applications. Significantly, four spatio-temporal points are enough to uniquely identify 95% of the individuals, which exacerbates personal information leakages. To tackle malicious purposes such as user re-identification, we propose an LSTM-based adversarial mechanism with representation learning to attain a privacy-preserving feature representation of the original geolocated data (i.e., mobility data) for a sharing purpose. These representations aim to maximally reduce the chance of user re-identification and full data reconstruction with a minimal utility budget (i.e., loss). We train the mechanism by quantifying privacy-utility trade-off of mobility datasets in terms of trajectory reconstruction risk, user re-identification risk, and mobility predictability. We report an exploratory analysis that enables the user to assess this trade-off with a specific loss function and its weight parameters. The extensive comparison results on four representative mobility datasets demonstrate the superiority of our proposed architecture in mobility privacy protection and the efficiency of the proposed privacy-preserving features extractor. We show that the privacy of mobility traces attains decent protection at the cost of marginal mobility utility. Our results also show that by exploring the Pareto optimal setting, we can simultaneously increase both privacy (45%) and utility (32%).

KEYWORDS
LSTM neural networks, mobility prediction, data privacy, adversarial learning

1 INTRODUCTION
Geolocation and mobility data collected by location-based services (LBS) [32], can reveal human mobility patterns and address various societal research questions [34]. For example, Call Data Records (CDR) have been successfully used to provide real-time traffic anomaly as well as event detection [54, 56], and a variety of mobility datasets have been used in shaping policies for urban communities [19] and epidemic management in the public health domain [44, 45]. From an individual-level perspective, users can benefit from personalized recommendations when they are encouraged to share their location data with third parties or other service providers (SPs, e.g., social platforms) [16]. Human mobility prediction based on users’ traces, a popular and emerging topic, supports a series of important applications. For instance, one of the prerequisites for a successful LBS-recommendation system is the ability to predict users’ activities or locations ahead of time, tracking their intentions and forecasting where they will go [22].

While there is no doubt about the usefulness of predictive applications for mobility data, privacy concerns regarding the collection and sharing of individuals’ mobility traces have prevented the data from being utilized to their full potential [6, 35, 51]. A mobility privacy study conducted by De Montjoye et al. [13] illustrates that four spatio-temporal points are enough to identify 95% of the individuals, which exacerbates the user re-identification risk and could be the origin of many unexpected privacy leakages. Additionally, with increasingly intelligent devices and sensors being utilized to collect information about users’ locations, a malicious third party can derive increasing intimate details about users’ lives, from their social life to their preferences. Hence, a mechanism capable of decreasing the chance of user re-identification against malicious attackers or untrusted SPs can offer enhanced privacy protection in mobility data applications, as human mobility traces are highly unique.

In the past decade, the research community has extensively studied the privacy of geolocated data via various location privacy protection mechanisms (LPPM) [20, 21]. Some traditional privacy-preserving approaches (e.g., k-anonymity and geo-masking) have shown to be insufficient to prevent users from being re-identified [13, 23, 39, 53]. Differential privacy (DP), another popular notion, is shown to be a limited metric for location trace privacy since temporal correlations are not taken into account [51]. [16] also states that DP and k-anonymity are meant to ensure the privacy of a single data point in time. In general, many DP for LBS (DP-L) mechanisms [2, 11, 28] attempt to protect the user’s location instead of the user’s identity, which is different from our problem’s scope. More recently, some related works have successfully applied machine-learning- or deep-learning-based approaches to explore effective LPPMs. Rao et al. proposed a model based on Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [24] to generate privacy-preserving synthetic mobility datasets for data sharing and publication [48]. Feng et al. investigated human mobility data with privacy constraints via federated learning, achieving promising prediction performance while preserving the personal data on the local devices [18]. Though these works provide promising architectures to protect location privacy, the mobility data’s privacy protection and utility degradation have not been thoroughly investigated, especially in reducing the chance of user re-identification. Our work extends these machine-learning-based mechanisms and explores...
the privacy-utility trade-off on mobility data in terms of declining the effectiveness of privacy inference attacks while maintaining its predictability. Moreover, research on human mobility shows that the predictability of users’ location trajectories or mobility, and the particular constraints of users’ movements, are sufficient to reconstruct and/or identify anonymous or perturbed locations [52]. This specific confrontation makes the trade-off between mobility predictability and users’ identity more challenging.

Consider a scenario, shown in Figure 1, where users share their daily traces to a trusted mobile network operator, which then aggregates these traces in a privacy-preserving approach and sends them to third parties or other SPs with/without users’ consent. These users may want to minimize the risk of being re-identified and trajectory reconstructed by those who will access these released data. However, they would like to keep receiving potential effective services from SPs. Therefore, a privacy-preserving mechanism, which can release required information for the services (i.e., utility) while features or patterns that facilitate fully data reconstruction or user re-identification are obscured (i.e., privacy), is beneficial. The compressed data encoded by this privacy-preserving mechanism is freely accessed to SPs for the inference tasks, and SPs are free to use any prediction algorithms of their choice.

To this end, we propose a privacy-aware adversarial network to train a feature extractor $\text{Enc}_L$ for mobility privacy, namely Mo-PAE. It is based on representation learning and aims to ease data sharing privacy concerns from privacy inference attacks. Inspired by PAN (privacy adversarial network) [37], we employ adversarial learning to better balance the potential trade-off between privacy and utility. In contrast to PAN, which focuses on the privacy of images, our approach is designed for complex time-series data that exhibits spatial-temporal characteristics. At the core of our architecture lies an auto-encoder (AE) and long short-term memory (LSTM) layers with three branches, corresponding to the three training optimization objectives of the feature extractor $\text{Enc}_L$: i) to maximize the loss associated with the reconstructed output by generative learning, ii) to minimize the prediction loss using the learned representation from the $\text{Enc}_L$ by discriminative learning, and iii) to minimize the percentage of users who are re-identifiable through their trajectories by discriminative learning. We explore and quantify the privacy-utility trade-off provided by Mo-PAE in terms of data reconstruction risk, user re-identification risk, and mobility predictability. The results show that our proposed mechanism achieves a better privacy level with the same utility loss and vice versa.

The contributions of our work are the following:

- We propose a privacy-aware adversarial network to train an effective feature extractor $\text{Enc}_L$ for mobility privacy, namely Mo-PAE;
- We report the analysis of Mo-PAE by a comprehensive evaluation of four real-world representative mobility datasets;
- We provide an extensive analysis of different inference tasks and quantify the privacy and utility bound of the target mobility dataset, along with a trade-off analysis between these contrasting objectives;
- We compare our model with, i) a famous DP notion that developed on the idea from Geo-indistinguishability [2] (namely GI-DP); ii) a state-of-the-art GAN-based mechanism that attempts to generate synthetic privacy-preserving mobility data (namely TrajGAN [48]); iii) as well as the optimal LSTM-based inference models, and obtain favourable results.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: we review the related work in Section 2; the proposed Mo-PAE is described in detail in Section 3; we describe the experimental settings in Section 4; we demonstrate an evaluation of our mechanism over four mobility datasets with baseline comparisons in Section 5; Section 6 reports an in-depth discussion of our setting; finally, we conclude the paper with future work directions in Section 7.

## 2 RELATED WORK

### 2.1 Notions of Location Privacy

Diverse privacy notions, direct or indirect, for the LBSs have been proposed and evaluated in the literature. In [2], various direct notions of location privacy and the techniques to achieve them are examined and concluded, including but not limited to expected distance error, k-anonymity, differential privacy (DP), and other location-privacy metrics. First, the expectation of distance error reflects the accuracy when an adversary guesses the user’s real location in a location-obsfuscation mechanism by using the available side information. In [52], an optimal LPFM strategy and its corresponding optimal inference attack are obtained by formalizing the mutual optimization of user-adversary objectives (location privacy vs correctness of localization). Second, k-anonymity is the most widely used privacy notion for the LBSs [55]. These systems aim to protect the user’s identity, requiring that the attacker cannot infer the correct user among a set of k different users. Third, DP [14] is an emerging notion initially formulated in the context of statistical databases and aims to protect an individual’s data while publishing aggregate information about the dataset. More precisely, a randomization mechanism $M$ gives $e$-differential privacy for all neighbouring datasets $D$ and $D'$, and the difference between $D$ and $D'$ is within a bound of $e^\epsilon$. One of the popular mechanisms to achieve DP perturb the original query result using random noise that is calibrated with the privacy budget $\epsilon$ and defines a global sensitivity for all neighbouring $D$ and $D'$ [15]. The work in [17] reviews research works done in differential privacy targeted toward location
data from a data flow perspective, including collection, aggregation, and mining. [2] proposed a Geo-indistinguishability notion based on differential privacy and a planar Laplace mechanism. Significantly, different from the systems in k-anonymity category aim at protecting user’s identity, DP mechanisms are interested in protecting the user’s locations [2, 11, 26, 28]. Apart from three mainstream approaches, the location cloaking mechanism tries to define the uncertainty region and measure privacy by the size of the cloak and by the coverage of sensitive regions; the inaccuracy of the sensing technology tries to achieve a certain level of privacy by increasing uncertainty; and transformation-based approach tries to make user’s location invisible to the service provider.

On the other hand, indirect notions of location privacy arise with the emerging machine learning-based mechanism, which assesses the privacy guarantee by measuring the effectiveness of target privacy inference attacks [25, 30, 39, 40]. For instance, in [39], the authors access the privacy guarantee by measuring the difference between an adversary’s belief about sensitive inferences before and after observing the released data. In [30], the proposed mechanism provides privacy guarantees by capturing how well an adversary does in terms of inferring the private variables. In general, for any LBS, their main privacy concerns can be summarized in two categories. One is the attack on the user’s identity, which can be re-identified maliciously. For instance, even if the adversary is assumed to be unaware of the user identity of a trace, they can infer user’s identity or additional sensitive information due to the location information leakage based on publicly accessible background information. The other attack is the one on user’s location while the adversary has legible access to user’s identity. In this manner, user’s locations are sensitive, which could exert a significant impact on other sensitive personal details, such as religious affiliation, sexual orientation, economic condition, health status, and so on.

In our work, we are interested in protecting user’s identity as the privacy scope, which is similar to the location privacy notion defined by the k-anonymity, and taking the real/distorted user’s location as input for the personal recommendation model to provide contextual services for their future travels. In general, DP paradigms have the most formal privacy guarantee when compared with the others, however, they are not immune to inference attacks [10, 27]. We will also compare our proposed model with one popular DP paradigm on location privacy to illustrate the ineffectiveness of DP to our research question. More details on our privacy definitions are in Section 3.

2.2 Privacy Preserving Techniques for Spatial-Temporal Data

Current privacy-preserving techniques for spatial-temporal data focus on two research streams. One is the DP approach to grouping and mixing the trajectories from different users so that the identification of individual trajectory data is converted into a k-anonymity problem [1, 2, 57]. For example, a recent Privacy-Preserving Trajectory Framework (PPTPF) [60] applies the k-indistinguishability to anonymize trips for each user by condensing them into k – 1 trajectories and determining k – 1 anonymized clusters of trips.

The other stream focuses on synthetic data generation [9, 31, 46, 49]. Synthetic data generation methods have been extensively studied in recent years as a way of tackling privacy concerns of location-based datasets. The majority of existing mobility synthesis schemes are mainly categorized into two approaches: one is a more traditional, simulation-based approach, while the other is a more recent, neural network-based generative modeling approach that utilizes recurrent autoencoders and generative adversarial networks to produce realistic trajectories [50]. Simulation-based approaches generate mobility traces by modeling overall user behavior as a stochastic process, such as a Markov chain model of transition probabilities between locations, and then drawing random walks, potentially with additional stochastic noise added, as demonstrated in Xiao et al [58]. These approaches require considerable feature engineering effort and struggle to capture longer-range temporal and spatial dependencies in the data [38] and are thus limited in their ability to preserve the utility of the original datasets. In contrast, the generative neural network approach synthesizes user mobility traces by learning via gradient descent back-propagation, and then the optimal weights are utilized for decoding a high-dimensional latent vector representation into sequences that closely resemble the original data. Such traces can maintain important statistical properties of the original data while taking advantage of noise introduced in the reconstruction process, to improve data subject anonymity. Huang et al [31] demonstrates the use of a variational autoencoder network to reconstruct trajectory sequences, while Ouyang et al [46] utilizes a convolutional GAN, but neither work directly makes a quantitative assessment of the extent of privacy protection that their algorithms provide [31, 46]. The TrajGAN by Rao et al [48] is a state of the art example of the generative trajectory modeling approach, which quantifies its privacy protection by demonstrating a significant decline in the performance of a second user ID classifier model on the synthetic outputs compared to the original input trajectories. For these reasons, we used TrajGAN as a baseline for comparison.

Our proposed model takes the neural network-based generative modeling approach, but differs from existing methods, where we utilize a combined, multi-task adversarial neural network to simultaneously reconstruct trajectories, predict next locations, and re-identify users, from the same learned latent vector representation. We seek an optimal trade-off between the three tasks’ individual losses by optimizing a sum loss function with per-task weights, improving the controllability of the relative utility and privacy of the outputs.

3 DESIGN OF MO-PAE

3.1 Definition of Important Terms

3.1.1 Mobility Trace. The raw geolocated data or other mobility data commonly contain three elements: user identifiers u ∈ U, timestamps t ∈ T, and location identifiers l ∈ L. Hence, each location record r could be denoted as \( r(u_i) = [u_i, t_i, l_i] \), while each location sequence S is a set of ordered location records \( S(u, n) = \{r(u_1), r(u_2), \ldots, r(u_n)\} \), namely mobility trace of user u. Therefore, given the past mobility trace \( S(u, n) \), the mobility prediction task is to infer the most likely location \( l_{u,n+1} \) at the next timestamp \( t_{u,n+1} \) for the user u. The data fed into the proposed architecture are a list of traces with a specific sequence length (i.e., SL). For instance, if the sequence length is 10, that indicates each trace contains 10 history
location records \( r, S_{10} = \{r_1, r_2, r_3, \ldots, r_{10}\} \), and \( SL = 10 \). In this paper, we assume that different users' mobility traces are collected and aggregated (denoted as data \( X \)) by trusted telecom operators or social platforms and shared with third-party SPs.

### 3.1.2 User Re-identification
The user re-identification risk arises because of the high uniqueness of human traces \([13]\) and could be the origin of many unexpected privacy leakages. We assume each trace \( S \) is originally labeled with a corresponding user identifier \( u \), and the user re-identification is to infer the user \( u \) to whom the target trace \( S_n = \{r_1, r_2, r_3, \ldots, r_n\} \) belongs. We thereby leverage the user identifiers \( u \) as the ground-truth values for the user identity classes. This identity information is what we want to protect in the proposed adversarial network.

### 3.2 Problem Definition

#### 3.2.1 Definition of Utility and Privacy
On the one hand, mobility datasets are of great value for understanding human behaviour patterns, smart transportation, urban planning, public health issues, pandemic management, etc. Many of these applications rely on the next location forecasting of individuals, which in the broader context, can provide an accurate portrayal of citizens' mobility over time and inform the allocation of public resources and community services. Therefore, we focus on the capability of mobility prediction (next location forecasting) in this paper, and leverage the accuracy of the prediction as an important metric for quantifying the data utility. On the other hand, with increasing intelligent devices and sensors being utilized to collect information about human activities, the traces also increasingly expose intimate details about users' lives, from their social life to their preferences. In this manner, the capability of user re-identification is important to balance the risks and benefits of mobility data usage, for all data owners, third parties, and researchers. We then leverage the efficient reduction of data reconstruction risk and user re-identification risk as the privacy protection metrics. Moreover, research in \([52]\) shows that the predictability of users' mobility and the particular constraints of users' movements, are sufficient to reconstruct and/or identify anonymous or perturbed locations \([52]\). This confrontation makes the trade-off between keeping mobility predictability and reducing the chance of user re-identification more interesting. For instance, an adversary can re-identify anonymous users' traces given the users' mobility profile \([12]\); infer the users' next activities from the frequency of location visits \([22]\); even obtain the personal home or working address from the trajectories \([47]\).

In this work, we design a model to protect location privacy regarding users' identity and data integrity while simultaneously minimizing the service quality (i.e., accuracy of next location forecasting) degradation stemming from the obfuscation of true data. Specifically, users' mobility traces are collected and fed into this proposed model, encoded as privacy-preserving representations that allow third parties and other SPs freely access. At the same time, two built-in adversaries, which try to achieve maximum accuracy in user re-identification and trace reconstruction during the adversarial training, are simulating the strong privacy adversaries that can attain disclosed sensitive information and examine the quality of feature representations instantly. Overall, the encoded privacy-preserving representations should retain as little user identifiable information as possible, as well as the data reconstruction information, to decrease the user re-identification accuracy and increase the location obfuscation.

Hence, we summarize the Utility, Privacy I and Privacy II of the encoded feature representations as follows:

**Utility (U):** the encoded representations should retain information about mobility predictability (i.e., forecasting accuracy, higher accuracy indicates higher utility).

**Privacy I (PI):** the encoded representations should contain little information advantage to the data reconstruction (i.e., more information loss in the reconstruction process); represented as the distortion increment (i.e., Euclidean \([3]\) and Manhattan distance \([7]\) between the reconstructed data \( X' \) and the original data \( X \)).

**Privacy II (PPI):** the encoded representations should contain little information advantage to the user re-identification task (i.e., the user de-identification effectiveness); measured by the degradation of the user re-identification accuracy.

#### 3.2.2 Privacy vs. Utility Trade-off
An effective LPPM must consider three fundamental elements: i) the privacy requirements of the users (namely privacy gain); ii) the adversary’s knowledge and capabilities; iii) and maximal tolerated service quality degradation stemming from the obfuscation of true locations (namely, utility loss) \([52]\). There is an inherent trade-off between location privacy protection and utility degradation \([33]\). That is, achieving a better level of privacy protection may require sacrificing the service quality provided by the data. Such trade-off is omnipresent in various privacy protection mechanisms, especially in location obfuscation mechanisms. Higher privacy protection is achieved when the probability of an adversary inferring the true location of the user decreases, however, the result of a query based on the obfuscated location is significantly different from the actual interest of the user. The privacy-utility trade-off, hence, needs to be examined and analyzed to guarantee the efficiency of the privacy protection mechanism.

In this work, utility loss denotes the accuracy degradation after the proposed privacy protection mechanism is applied, and the privacy gain (in terms of PI and PPI) quantifies the protected privacy information. To be specific, a more obfuscated dataset will tend to perform better at preserving privacy, but worse at preserving utility, and vice versa. Hence, monitoring these two performance metrics in tandem allows users to select the optimal privacy-utility trade-off for their use cases, given their hyperparameter selections. Our Mo-PAE model is designed to train a features Encoder \(Enc_L(X)\) that could convey more information on the utility but less on privacy and investigate a better trade-off between them. More details will be discussed in the following sub-section.

### 3.3 Mo-PAE Overview
Our proposed privacy-preserving adversarial feature encoder on mobility data, denoted as the Mo-PAE, is based on representation learning and adversarial learning and aims to ease data sharing privacy concerns. Figure 2 presents the basic workflow of the proposed Mo-PAE. It composes of three crucial units: data reconstruction risk unit (DRU), mobility prediction unit (MPU), and user re-identification risk unit (URU).
As a prominent variant of the recurrent neural network, LSTM (i.e., 
\[ \text{LSTM} \]) is employed as a robust built-in adversary. To compare with baseline models 
\[ \text{Enc} \] of our encoder 
\[ \text{LSTM} \], and an output part with the softmax 
\[ \text{Dec} \] function. First, the user identity list is converted into one-hot 
\[ \text{Enc} \] of the input part with the one-hot embedding of user identity, the 
\[ \text{Dec} \] activation function. As per the definition mentioned earlier, the 
\[ \text{Enc} \] and timestamps \( t \) are converted into one-hot vectors. We then employ LSTM layers to model the mobility patterns 
and sequential transition relations in these mobility traces. As a prominent variant of the recurrent neural network, LSTM 
\[ \text{Dec} \] networks exhibit brilliant performance in modeling the entire data 
sequences, especially for learning long-term dependencies via gradient descent [61]. Following the sequential module, the softmax 
layer outputs the probability distribution of the prediction results. This probability distribution is converted to the top-n accuracy 
metrics to illustrate the unit performance.

II. Data Reconstruction Risk Unit (DRU):
The DRU is the encoder \( \text{Enc}_L \) unit in reverse, also denoted as \( \text{Dec}_L \), which is regarded as the first privacy discriminator \( P^1_D \) in the proposed architecture. It is designed to evaluate the distance \( d(\cdot, \cdot) \) (i.e., Privacy I) between the reconstructed data \( X' \) and the original input data \( X \). A malicious party is free to explore any machine 
\[ \text{Dec} \] learning model and reconstruct the data if they have the shared extracted features \( f \). We use a layer-to-layer reverse architecture of our encoder \( \text{Enc}_L \) to build the data reconstruction unit to act as a robust built-in adversary. To compare with baseline models 
and keep the comparison in a line, we measure the distance \( d(\cdot, \cdot) \) between the \( X \) and \( X' \) by leveraging the Euclidean and Manhattan 
distance as our metrics. Both of them are widely used in location 
\[ \text{Enc} \] privacy literature [2, 16].

III. User Re-identification Risk Unit (URU):
The URU is regarded as the second privacy discriminator \( P^2_D \) in the proposed architecture. The unit is composed of three parts, the 
\[ \text{Enc} \] input part with the one-hot embedding of user identity, the 
\[ \text{Dec} \] sequential part with LSTM layers, and an output part with softmax function. First, the user identity list is converted into one-hot 
vectors. Similar to the MPU, the URU also applies LSTM layers to 
better extract the spatial and temporal characteristics of the context. A softmax function with a cross-categorical entropy loss function 
is applied to output a categorical probability distribution of the user re-identification task. We then use the top-n accuracy of this 
classifier as the metric of user re-identification privacy risk (i.e., Privacy II). The more accurately a classifier can re-identify the user 
given a trajectory, the higher the risk of disclosing private data. Same as \( P^1_D \), \( P^2_D \) is designed as the built-in adversary to 
\[ \text{Enc} \] infer the ability of generated features in protecting users’ sensitive information.

The overall architecture eventually learns to fool both built-in adversaries, \( P^1_D \) and \( P^2_D \), while maintaining mobility predictability. 
In this manner, both adversaries are assumed to be free to access the 
ome exclusive feature representations and the entire encoder network, 
\[ \text{Dec} \] which allows them to have the optimal decoder setting. We will discuss the effectiveness of two privacy inference attacks in Section 5.3.

3.3.2 Overall Design.
When three units train concurrently, the MPU is regarded as the 
utility discriminator \( U_D \), while DRU and MPU act as two built-in adversaries 
and are regarded as the two privacy discriminators, \( P^1_D \) and \( P^2_D \), respectively. The built-in adversary has been used as an 
effective adversarial regularization to prevent inference attacks, e.g. 
in the classification setting [43] or in various GAN models [42] 
for privacy-preserving purpose. In this work, \( P^1_D \) and \( P^2_D \) are simulating malicious SPs, who attempt to obtain sensitive information 
(i.e., maximize the accuracy of privacy inference tasks), while the 
coder \( \text{Enc}_L \) is trained to produce feature representations \( f \) to the 
\[ \text{Enc} \] advantage of \( U_D \) but to the disadvantage of \( P^1_D \) and \( P^2_D \), by jointly 
\[ \text{Dec} \] optimizing the hybrid losses of the DRU, MPU, and URU simultaneously, 
during adversarial training. Therefore, in the Mo-PAE, the 
encoder \( \text{Enc}_L \), and three discriminators \( U_D, P^1_D, P^2_D \) play a multi-player 
\[ \text{Enc} \] game to minimaximize the value function \( V(\text{Enc}_L, U_D, P^1_D, P^2_D) \):

\[
V(\text{Enc}_L, U_D, P^1_D, P^2_D) = V_{\text{Enc}_L} + V_{U_D} - V_{P^1_D} - V_{P^2_D}
\]
As described in the Eq.1, we design a multi-task adversarial network to learn an LSTM-based encoder $Enc(X; \theta)$ with parameter set $\theta \in \Theta$, which can generate the optimized feature representations $f = Enc(X; \theta)$ via lowering the privacy disclosure risk of user identification information and improving the task accuracy (i.e., mobility predictability) concurrently. Two potential malicious privacy leakages from URU and DRU are attempted to retrieve sensitive information from the feature representations $f$. As built-in adversaries, they have full access to the feature representations $f$ and the entire encoder network with parameter set $f = Enc(X; \theta)$. In this manner, they have the optimal decoder setting. Hence, the notion of privacy (privacy gain), is measured by the decline of the effectiveness of target inference attacks (i.e., user re-identification attack and data reconstruction attack).

### 3.3.3 Details of Mo-PAE.

We define the raw mobility data we want to protect as $X$, trained features as $F$, and reconstructed data as $X'$. Given mobility raw data $X$ for $P_D^1$ (DRU), the ground-truth label $z_i$ for $P_D^2$ (URU), and the ground-truth label $y_i$ for utility $U_D$ (MPU), we train the encoder $Enc$ to learn the representation $F = Enc(X; \theta_E)$. We design a specific loss function, namely $sum loss L_{sum}$, for this optimization process.

Specifically, when reconstructing the data $X'$, a decoder $Dec$ attempts to recreate the data based on the features $F$, that is $Dec(F; \theta'_D) : F \rightarrow X'$. This DRU, the first privacy discriminator $P_D^1$, is trained as a built-in adversary and tries to achieve sensitive information as much as possible. Hence, the DRU is primarily trained by minimizing the reconstruction loss $L_R$:

$$
\min_{F; \theta'_D} L_R = L_R = d(X, X') = \text{argmin}_{F; \theta'_D} \| Dec(F; \theta'_D) - X \|^2 \tag{2}
$$

The URU, the second privacy discriminator $P_U^2(F; \theta')$, is trained to re-identify whom the target trajectory belongs to. It outputs a probability distribution of predicted user identifiers among Z potential classes. Then in this privacy discriminator, the user re-identification loss $L_P$ is primarily trained to minimize, denoted as $min L_P$:

$$
\min_{F; \theta'_U} L_P = \text{argmin}_{F; \theta'_U} \sum_{i=1}^{Z} z_i \log(P_U^2(F; \theta'_U)) \tag{3}
$$

The MPU, the utility discriminator $U_D(F; \theta')$, is trained to output a probability distribution of the next location of interest, and this distribution has Y potential classes. Discriminative training of $U_D$ maximizes the prediction accuracy by minimizing the utility loss $L_U$ concurrently with minimizing the $L_{sum}$, denoted as $min L_U$:

$$
\min_{F; \theta'_U} L_U = \text{argmin}_{F; \theta'_U} \sum_{i=1}^{Y} y_i \log(U_D(F; \theta'_U)) \tag{4}
$$

### Algorithm 1: Training of the Mo-PAE (Model II)

**Input**: Mobility data $X$, real mobility prediction labels $Y$, real user identification labels $Z$, weights: $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3$

**Output**: Adversarial Encoder $Enc(X; \theta_E, \theta_U, \theta_R, \theta_P)$

1. Initialize model parameters $\theta_E, \theta_R, \theta_U, \theta_P$.

2. for $n$ epochs do

3. for $k = 1, \cdots, K_t$ do

4. Sample a mini-batch of mobility trajectories $x$, prediction labels $y$, identification labels $z$

5. Update $\theta_E$ with Adam optimizer on mini-batch loss $L_{sum}(\theta_E, \theta_R, \theta_U, \lambda, \lambda_2, \lambda_3)$

6. Update $\theta_R$ with Adam optimizer on mini-batch loss $L_R(f; \theta_R)_{X, z}: \min L_R$

7. Update $\theta_U$ with Adam optimizer on mini-batch loss $L_U(f; \theta_U)_{y, z}: \min L_U$

8. Update $\theta_P$ with Adam optimizer on mini-batch loss $L_P(f; \theta_P)_{z, \hat{z}}: \min L_P$

9. end

10. Update with the gradient descent on $L_{sum}(\theta_E, \theta_R, \theta_U, \theta_P, \lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3): \min L_{sum}$

end

The overall training is to achieve a privacy-utility trade-off through adversarial learning on $L_R$, $L_U$, and $L_P$, concurrently. The encoder $Enc(X; \theta_E)$ should satisfy high predictability ($min L_U$) and low user re-identification accuracy ($max L_P$) of the mobility data when maximizing the reconstruction loss ($max L_R$) in reverse engineering, where the training objective transformed from Eq.1 can be written as:

$$
\min_{L_{sum}} \max_{\theta_E, \theta_R, \theta_U, \theta_P} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{X} (L_U(f_i), L_P(f_i), L_R(f_i)) \right) \tag{5}
$$

We use Eq. 5 to guide the first version of Mo-PAE, denoted as Model I. In order to fully investigate the range of trade-offs, we leveraged the Lagrange multipliers [4] as hyperparameters to control the privacy-utility trade-offs in the Mo-PAE, and this weighted-controlled model is denoted as Model II. Accordingly, the optimization function of the training objective is:

$$
\min_{L_{sum}} \max_{\theta_E, \theta_U, \theta_P} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{X} (\lambda_1 L_R(f_i), \lambda_2 L_U(f_i), \lambda_3 L_P(f_i)) \right) \tag{6}
$$

$$
= -\lambda_1 (max L_R(f_i)) + \lambda_2 (min L_U(f_i)) - \lambda_3 (max L_P(f_i)) \tag{6}
$$

Privacy I

Utility

Privacy II

$$
= -\lambda_1 ||Dec(F) - X||^2 + \lambda_2 \sum_{i=1}^{Y} y_i \log(U_D(F)) - \lambda_3 \sum_{i=1}^{Z} z_i \log(P_D(F)) \tag{6}
$$

where $y_i$ is the ground-truth label for $Utility$, $z_i$ is the ground-truth value for $Privacy II$; $\lambda_1, \lambda_2$ and $\lambda_3$ are non-negative, real-valued weights, as the hyperparameters that control the privacy-utility trade-off in the Mo-PAE.
As shown in the Algorithm 1, the gradient of the loss (i.e., $\theta_\mathcal{E}, \theta_\mathcal{R}, \theta_\mathcal{T}, \theta_\mathcal{P}$) back-propagates through the LSTM network to guide the training of the encoder $\text{Enc}_\mathcal{L}$. The encoder is updated with the sum loss function $L_{\text{sum}}$ until convergence. It is tricky to investigate all possible weight combinations practically, and we look for the optimal combinations through training [39] with the Eq.6 by brute-force evaluation. Then we approximate the required data utility reserved and reformulate the optimization problem in Eq.6 as a maxima privacy optimization problem.

$$
\min_{\text{Enc}(P_1^1,P_2^1)} \max_{\mathcal{L}_1,\mathcal{L}_2} E_{X}\rightarrow \mathcal{P} \left[ \log(1 - P_2^1) \left( \text{Enc}_\mathcal{L}(x) \right) \right] + E_{X}\rightarrow \mathcal{P} \left[ \log(1 - P_2^2) \left( \text{Enc}_\mathcal{L}(x) \right) \right] 
$$

Additionally, another key contribution is the flexibility of the sum loss function $L_{\text{sum}}$, which could be regulated to satisfy different requirements on privacy protection level and service quality. That is, different combinations of weights control the relative importance of each unit and guide the overall model to find the maxima or minima given the specific trade-off choices.

### 4 EXPERIMENTAL SETTING

#### 4.1 Datasets

Experiments are conducted on four representative mobility datasets: Mobile Data Challenge Dataset (MDC) [36], Priva’Mov [5], GeoLife [62], and FourSquare [59].

**MDC**: it is recorded from 2009 to 2011 and contains a large amount of continuous mobility data for 184 volunteers with smartphones running a data collection software in the Lausanne/Geneva area. Each record of the gps-wlan dataset represents a phone call or an observation of a WLAN access point collected during the campaign [36].

**Priva’Mov**: the PRIVA’MOV crowd-sensing campaign took place in the city of Lyon/France, from October 2014 to January 2016. Data collection was contributed by roughly 100 participants, including university students, staff, and family members. The crowd-sensing application collected GPS, WiFi, GSM, battery, and accelerometer sensor data. For this paper, we only used the GPS traces from the dataset [5].

**GeoLife**: it is collected by Microsoft Research Asia from 182 users in the four and a half year period from April 2007 to October 2011 and contains 17,621 trajectories [62]. This dataset recorded a broad range of users’ outdoor movements, including life routines like going home and going to work and some entertainment and sports activities, such as shopping, sightseeing, dining, hiking, and cycling. It is widely used in many research fields, such as mobility pattern mining, user activity recognition, location-based social networks, location privacy, and location recommendation.

**FourSquare NYC**: it contains check-ins in NYC and Tokyo collected during the approximately ten months from 12 April 2012 to 16 February 2013, containing 227,428 check-ins from 1,083 subjects in New York City [59].

Once imported into our architecture, each dataset was filtered and pre-processed individually to derive their respective train and test sets illustrated in Table 1. We filter locations to a bounding box defining a city or region of interest and then transform continuous GPS coordinates by tessellating the space and encoding location as a discrete grid position to attain the location identifiers (i.e., POI). In these spatial transformations, we convert the GPS coordinates to the discretizing locations via the Geohash algorithm [41] with rectangular cells. For instance, each bounding box defines the grid size of the interested region, and the grid granularity is 0.01 degrees, where each grid represents a 0.01 longitude x 0.01 latitude area.

#### 4.2 Baseline Models

| Dataset-City       | Bounding Box | Record Counts | Number |
|--------------------|--------------|---------------|--------|
|                    | Latitude     | Longitude     | Train  | Test  | User ID | POI |
| MDC-Lausanne       | 46.50        | 46.61         | 6.58   | 6.73  | 77393   | 19429 | 143 | 149 |
| Priva’Mov-Lyon     | 45.70        | 45.81         | 4.77   | 4.90  | 62077   | 16859 | 58  | 129 |
| GeoLife-Beijing    | 39.74        | 40.07         | 116.23 | 116.56| 95038   | 24578 | 145 | 960 |
| FourSquare-NYC     | 40.55        | 40.99         | -74.28 | -73.68| 43493   | 11017 | 466 | 1712|

Table 1: Overview of four mobility datasets after pre-processing. The bounding box represents the range of the considered locations/traces.
that forces the extracted representations \( f \) to convey maximal utility while minimizing private information about user identity via adversarial learning.

4.2.3 \( III. \) GI-DP [8]. The principle of geo-indistinguishability (i.e., GI) [2], is a formal notion of privacy that protects the user’s exact location with a level of privacy that depends on radius \( r \), which corresponds to a generalized version of differential privacy (DP). GI-DP is a mechanism for achieving geo-indistinguishability when the user releases his location repeatedly throughout the day. It fulfills desired protection level by perturbing the actual location with random noises and achieving an optimal trade-off between privacy and utility (i.e., service quality). We re-implement the geo-indistinguishability of optimal utility with graph spanner [8], namely GI-DP in this paper, to attain the released version data that satisfied the DP guarantees. We then train a series of Optimal-IMs to evaluate the effectiveness of target inference attacks on the released version data in a line to compare with our proposed mechanism.

4.3 Training

4.3.1 \( Training \) of Mo-PAE. The main goal of the proposed adversarial network is to learn an efficient feature representation based on the utility and privacy budgets, using all users’ mobility histories. In most experiments in this work, the trajectory sequences consist of 10 historical locations with timestamps (i.e., \( SL = 10 \)), and the impact of the varying sequence lengths is discussed in Section 6.2. After data pre-processing, 80\% of each user’s records are segmented as the training set and the remaining 20\% as the testing set. We utilize the mini-batch learning method with the size of 128 to train the model until the expected convergence. We take a gradient step to optimize the sum loss \( L_{sum} \) (i.e., Equation 6) in terms of \( L_{R}, L_{U}, \) and \( L_{P} \) concurrently. Meanwhile, the \( sum \) loss \( L_{sum} \) is optimized by using the Adam optimizer. All the experiments are performed with the Tesla V100 GPU; a round of training would take 30 seconds on average, and each experiment trains for 1000 rounds.

4.3.2 \( Training \) of the TrajGAN. To provide a state-of-the-art machine learning-based model for comparison, we re-implement the TrajGAN model described in [48] using the same hyperparameters, setting latent vector dimension to 100, using 100 LSTM units per layer, a batch size of 256, utilizing the Adam optimizer with learning rate 0.001 and momentum 0.5, and training for 200 epochs (where one epoch is a pass through the entire training set). We train TrajGAN independently on the training split of each benchmark mobility dataset, and then use it to generate synthetic trajectories from the test set. Then we train the proposed Mo-PAE on the same training data and use it to generate a feature extraction from the same test data. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the user re-identification unit and mobility prediction unit on the real and synthetic test sets generated by TrajGAN, and compare the changes in accuracy to assess the relative utility and privacy of the TrajGAN and Mo-PAE.

4.3.3 \( Training \) of the DP-GI. We re-implement the DP-GI model described in [8] using the default settings. That is, we set epsilon \( \epsilon = 0.5 \), dilation \( \delta = 1.1 \), the distance matrix \( d_x \) is defined by Euclidean distance. From [8], let \( X \) be a set of locations with metric \( d_x \), and let \( G(X, E) \) be a \( \delta \) — spanner of \( X \), if a mechanism \( K \) for \( X \) is \( \frac{\delta}{\epsilon} d_G \)-private, then \( K \) is \( \epsilon d_x \)-private. The dilution of \( G \) is calculated as:

\[
\delta = \max_{x \neq x'} \frac{d_G(x, x')}{d_x(x, x')} \quad (8)
\]

\[
d_G(x, x') \geq d_x(x, x') \quad \forall x, x' \in X \quad (9)
\]

We re-implement the GI-DP to attain the released version data that satisfied the DP guarantees. We then train a series of Optimal-IMs to evaluate the effectiveness of target inference attacks on the released version data in a line to compare with our proposed mechanism.

4.4 Metrics

We set Euclidean [3] and Manhattan distance [7] as our evaluation metrics for the DRU to evaluate the quality of the reconstructed data \( X' \) generated from extracted features \( f \). Both distance metrics are widely used in location privacy literature [2, 16]. For instance, the work introducing Geo-Indistinguishability [2] utilizes a privacy level that depends on the Euclidean distance. Euclidean distance gives the shortest or minimum distance between two points. In contrast, Manhattan distance applies only if the points are arranged in a grid, and both definitions are feasible for the problem we are working on. Note that these two distances have limited capability in showing the quality of the reconstructed data \( X' \), however, they intuitively capture the differences between the original data \( X \) and the reconstructed data \( X' \).

For both MPU and URU, we leverage the top-n accuracy as our evaluation metric. The accuracy of the MPU is one of the most important factors in evaluating the utility of the extracted feature representation \( f \), where predictability of the \( f \) increases as much as it can during the adversarial training. On the other hand, the competing training objective is to decrease the accuracy of the user re-identification unit to enhance the privacy of \( f \). The top-n metric computes the number of times the correct label appears among the predicted top \( n \) labels. The top-n metric takes \( n \) predictions with higher probability into consideration, and it classifies the prediction as correct if one of them is an accurate label. The top-1 to top-5 accuracies are leveraged in our paper to discuss the performance of the proposed model.

5 ARCHITECTURE EVALUATION

In this section, we present the comparison results between the proposed Mo-PAE and three baseline models under the same training setting. Our evaluation is mainly on the trade-off between U and PII, as the main contribution of the Mo-PAE is to protect users’ identities, while we also consider the scope of users’ locations as an auxiliary measurement.

5.1 Performance Comparison

We first compare our proposed models with the Optimal-IMs, TrajGAN, and DP-GI on four representative mobility datasets, as shown in Table 2. The overall performance is evaluated in terms of the utility level provided by the MPU and the privacy protection provided by DRU and URU. The \( Model I \) is our proposed architecture but without applying the Lagrange multipliers (i.e., where each unit is weighted equally). The \( Model II \) is the one with Lagrange multipliers (i.e., \( \lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3 \) ) and different weights are given to units.
Table 2: Performance comparison between Mo-PAE with other baseline models. The Model I is our proposed architecture without weights, and the Model II is the one with multipliers (λ₁ = 0.1, λ₂ = 0.8, and λ₃ = 0.1). The results shown in this table are all with trace sequence length 10 (i.e., SL = 10). The Privacy I intuitively shows the difference between the raw data and reconstructed data; the utility (%) represents the utility loss, and the Privacy II (%) represents the privacy gain calculated via the decline of the user re-identification accuracy.

(i.e., λ₁ = 0.1, λ₂ = 0.8, λ₃ = 0.1 for the results in Table 2). In this table, the sequence length of the input traces is 10, that is SL = 10. We will discuss why we choose SL=10 and the impact of the SL in Section 6.

As we mention in Section 4.2, Optimal-IMs are trained without considering the privacy-utility trade-offs; hence, they can be leveraged to explain the optimal inference accuracy achieved. That is, before any privacy-preserving mechanism applies, the accuracy of the target or private tasks with raw data. For instance, the accuracy of the Privacy II (0.9247 (MDC), 0.5643 (Priva’Mov), 0.6572 (GeoLife), 0.8780 (FourSquare)) demonstrates that an adversary can accurately infer user identity from raw data before any privacy protection.

Different from Optimal-IMs, the other models consider privacy-utility trade-offs, and we measure the privacy protection and data utility by the effectiveness of the inference units. First, for the Privacy I, the distance indexes (i.e., "Euc" and "Man") are leveraged to intuitively represent the difference between the original data X and reconstructed data X', where a larger value indicates numerical differences between X and X'. For the distance index, we are interested in the distance between each trace, hence, we consider the quantity of trace for datasets X_D and get these distance indexes by averaging the corresponding record numbers N_D, that is (take "Euc" for example):

\[ Euc(X_D, X'_D) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_D} (x_i - x'_i)^2}{N_D}, \quad N_D = N'_D \]  

(10)

Different to the Privacy I, the Utility loss and Privacy II gain are in a percentage format (%), compared with the accuracy of Optimal-IMs. To compare the trade-off between them more intuitively, we list the "Utility-PII trade-offs" column, where "trade-off = Utility (%) + Privacy II (%) for gain". Table 2 demonstrates that our proposed models, especially Model II, outperform the TrajGAN and GI-DP across various datasets. For instance, with the MDC dataset, our Model II achieves the best trade-offs when compared with other models, as the utility loss is only 13.43% but with 65.51% privacy gain, while 46.32% utility loss and 20.32% privacy gain with the TrajGAN, and 97.34% utility loss and 97.47% privacy gain with the GI-DP. The extreme performance on the GI-DP illustrates that while the DP paradigm is a robust privacy-preserving technique in protecting user’s location, it is not appropriate in protecting the user’s identities.

More intuitively, in the column of "trade-off", Model II achieves all the best trade-offs among four datasets (52.08% (MDC), 24.48% (Priva’Mov), 34.36% (GeoLife) and 48.54% (FourSquare)). Model I has worse performance than Model II, in general, but is still superior to TrajGAN and DP-GI, where the latter two might even get negative trade-offs (i.e., TrajGAN got -26.00% with MDC and GI-DP got -5.71% with Priva’Mov). Moreover, for the Priva’Mov dataset, although the utility loss of the TrajGAN is 4.21% smaller than our Model II, both two privacy metrics of the TrajGAN are worse than the Model II. Again, our model has better overall trade-offs, as 23.66% for Model I and 24.48% for Model II. The performance on GeoLife and FourSquare are similar but inverse, where the utility of our...
model is better than TrajGAN and with slightly weaker privacy preservation.

In summary, GI-DP always has the highest privacy gain among the four datasets, however, the utility loss is also very high, resulting in inadequate and unexpected privacy-utility trade-offs. This trend also shows that the DP mechanism is not an appropriate metric for the location privacy of user’s identity, which is also in line with the conclusions from other related work [16, 51]. The comparisons between Model I and Model II also illustrate the importance of the Lagrange multipliers, which provides flexibility to our proposed architecture, enabling its application in different scenarios and enhancing the privacy-utility trade-offs in this case.

5.2 Trade-off Comparison

In this section, we present the privacy-utility trade-off analysis between the proposed Mo-PAE and TrajGAN in terms of mobility prediction accuracy (i.e., $U$) and user de-identification efficiency (i.e., $PI$). Figure 3 presents the trade-off comparisons of the four datasets, where the hollow squares and hollow diamonds show the trade-offs provided by the proposed Mo-PAE in SL = 5 and SL = 10, respectively. The solid points present the results of the TrajGAN under the same experimental setting. As can be seen from these results, in all four cases, the synthetic dataset generated by the TrajGAN is not Pareto-optimal. That is, the proposed Mo-PAE is able to achieve a better privacy level for a dataset with the same utility value. Compared with the TrajGAN, Mo-PAE improves utility and privacy simultaneously on four datasets. Especially for the performance of MDC, the privacy improves 45.21% more than the TrajGAN, while the utility also increases by 32.89%. These results illustrate that our proposed model achieves promising performance in training a privacy-sensitive encoder $Enc_L$, for different datasets.

After evaluating the superior performance of our proposed model, we discuss the privacy guarantee that Mo-PAE provided in terms of data reconstruction ($PI$, “Euc” in Table 3) and user re-identification ($PII$, privacy gain in Figure 4). As we mentioned in Section 2, the privacy guarantee of Mo-PAE differs from that of DP paradigms and is given in the declined effectiveness of inference attacks.

5.3 Privacy Guarantee Analysis: Effectiveness of Privacy Inference Attacks

In this section, we discuss the impact of Mo-PAE on the effectiveness of two privacy inference attacks (i.e., $PI$ and $PII$), respectively.

5.3.1 Effectiveness of Data Reconstruction Attacks - $PI$. Table 3 shows the impact of the proposed mechanisms on the data reconstruction accuracy($PI$). The “Euc” in the table follows the definition in Eq. 10. Overall, Model II performs better than Model I in limiting the accuracy of data reconstruction regardless of the value of weights. Take the result of GeoLife dataset as an example, Model II-i achieves bigger distance than Model I (i.e., 0.4343 > 0.0057), while it still gets better utility (i.e., -9.94% > -17.9%). Nevertheless, both Model I and Model II have effectively defended the data reconstruction attack (MDC: 0.0697 > 0.0017 > 0.0000; Priva’Mov: 0.0453 > 0.0009 > 0.0003; GeoLife: 0.4343 > 0.0057 > 0.0008; FourSquare: 0.7933 > 0.0069 > 0.0052), while only at the marginal cost of mobility utility (MDC: -12.55%; Priva’Mov: -2.71%; GeoLife: -9.94%; FourSquare: -1.64%). The data of the Optimal-IMs are in Table 2. We list four representative settings here to make a comprehensive comparison of PII and $U$. From setting i to iv, one can expect more original data features loss to result in a more significant utility loss. This trend is indeed the case with different weights’ combinations. However, as the results show, especially for setting i, the privacy of the traces attains decent protection at the marginal cost of mobility utility.

5.3.2 Effectiveness of User Re-identification Attacks - $PII$. Figure 4 presents the impact of the Model II on the user re-identification accuracy($PII$). In this figure, we list five different settings, I to V ($\lambda_1 = 0.1$, over the range of $\lambda_2 = \{0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9\}$), respectively. The Zero line (i.e., $y = 0$%) in each sub-figure is leveraged to indicate the original accuracy of the raw data (i.e., Optimal-IMs). The “Privacy Gain Rate” (blue square line) shows the effectiveness of the Mo-PAE in defending the user re-identification attacks. That is, after applying Model II, the decline range of effectiveness of user re-identification attacks. For instance, with the MDC dataset, in setting I, the effectiveness of user re-identification attacks declines as...
Table 3: Impact of Mo-PAE on the data reconstruction accuracy (PII) and relative utility loss (U) on four mobility datasets. We list Model I and four different settings of Model II’s weight combinations to discuss the potential range of the trade-offs.

| Settings | MDC              | Priva'Mov         | Geolife          | FourSquare       |
|----------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|
|          | λ1   | λ2   | λ3   |     | λ1   | λ2   | λ3   |     | λ1   | λ2   | λ3   |     | λ1   | λ2   | λ3   |     |
| Model I  | -    | -    | -    |     | +0.0017 | +0.0099 | +0.0057 | +0.0069 | -30.27% | -2.72% | -17.9% | -33.75% | +0.0822 | +0.0776 | +0.4889 | +1.4139 | -49.27% | -10.28% | -18.64% | -57.40% |
| i        | 0.1  | 0.8  | 0.1  |     | +0.0697 | +0.0453 | +0.4343 | +0.7933 | -12.55% | -2.11% | -9.49% | -1.64% | +0.4717 | +0.0782 | +0.5220 | +1.9586 | -58.10% | -16.56% | -29.95% | -60.71% |
| ii       | 0.2  | 0.6  | 0.2  |     | +0.0791 | +0.0738 | +0.4889 | +1.2722 | -33.29% | -10.72% | -18.21% | -50.50% | +0.4889 | +0.0889 | +0.5220 | +1.9586 | -58.10% | -16.56% | -29.95% | -60.71% |
| Model II | iii  | 0.3  | 0.4  | 0.3  | +0.0889 | +0.0782 | +0.4717 | +1.4139 | -58.10% | -16.56% | -29.95% | -60.71% | +0.4889 | +0.0889 | +0.5220 | +1.9586 | -58.10% | -16.56% | -29.95% | -60.71% |
| iv       | 0.1  | 0.6  | 0.3  |     | +0.0822 | +0.0776 | +0.4717 | +1.4139 | -49.27% | -10.28% | -18.64% | -57.40% | +0.4717 | +0.0776 | +0.4717 | +1.4139 | -49.27% | -10.28% | -18.64% | -57.40% |

Figure 4: Impact of Mo-PAE on the user re-identification accuracy (PII) and relative utility loss (U) on four datasets. The orange area represents the utility loss, while the light-green area represents privacy gain. The dark-green area represents the trade-offs between utility achievement and privacy budgets. The x-axis shows five different model settings, and the y-axis shows the trade-offs.

In this section, we further discuss the impact of the temporal granularity of traces, the varying sequence length and weights on the composition units on the Mo-PAE performance.

6 DISCUSSIONS

In this section, we further discuss the impact of the temporal granularity of traces, the varying sequence length and weights on the composition units on the Mo-PAE performance.

6.1 Impact of Temporal Granularity

The timestamp is one of the essential components of the mobility trace, and different choices on the temporal granularity affect the final performance of any dataset. Figure 5 shows the impact of the varying temporal granularity on the proposed architecture. We present the top-1, top-5, and top-10 accuracies for both utility and privacy dimensions. For instance, when temporal granularity is 10-min, it indicates a location record r is taken every 10 minutes from the raw data. When using more coarser temporal granularity, the number of points of interest decreases so does the difficulty of mobility prediction. However, the uniqueness of the trajectory decreases due to ignoring many of the unique locations of each user, resulting in better privacy. To summarize from Figure 5, the impact of temporal granularity on the Priva’Mov is minimal. In terms of utility (mobility prediction), Priva’Mov is the only dataset for which accuracy decreases with increasing temporal granularity. This subtle decline emphasizes the trajectory features only have a

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The performance of the utility discriminator $U_D$ (MPU) and the privacy discriminator $P_D$ (URU) exert a significant impact on the overall performance of the proposed Mo-PAE. The trace length is the most critical factor affecting these units’ performance. We use two representative datasets (i.e., MDC and Priva’Mov) to present the impact of the varying sequence length on both discriminators.

As shown in Figure 6, by changing the lengths of trace sequence $SL$ from $1$ ($SL = 2$) to $50$ ($SL = 50$), we observe that $SL$ has a significant impact on different tasks’ accuracy (i.e., mobility prediction accuracy for $U_D$ and user re-identification accuracy for $P_D$) of two different datasets. Overall, the impact in the MDC dataset is much higher than in the Priva’Mov dataset. Comparing the Figure 6a and Figure 6c, there is a much sharper increase on the MDC dataset. More specifically, when the sequence length is increased from 2 to 20, the top-1 mobility prediction accuracy on MDC increases from 0.473 to 0.978 (i.e., +50.5%), while accuracy on Priva’Mov increases from 0.918 to 0.959 (i.e., only +4.1%). Similarly, more rapid growth appears in the user re-identification accuracy on MDC, which is +68.0%, while the increase for Priva’Mov is only +30.8%. We conclude that the mobility predictability and user re-identification accuracy of a dataset might have a special link. The mobility predictability of Priva’Mov is very high, almost higher than 90%, but the user re-identification accuracy is always lower than 80%, which also means the uniqueness of trajectories in this dataset is low. This low uniqueness suggests that the users in this dataset might share similar daily routines, which is reasonable, as we know these trajectories are collected from students at the same university. For the MDC dataset, when $SL = 10$, the user re-identification accuracy is relatively high, indicating that the locations are more sparse in this dataset. However, the mobility predictability here is also high, which emphasizes that this sparseness does not affect predictability. These phenomena indicate that the deep training of MPU and URU might share similar extracted features, while our proposed architecture attempts to extract features more suitable for mobility predictability but less suitable for user re-identification.

We note that the varying trace sequence length not only exerts impacts on the model performance but also has a significant influence on the computation time. For instance, the computation
6.3 Impact of Varying Weights

As we discussed in Section 3.3, the sum loss function $L_{\text{sum}}$ of Model II is a linear combination of $L_R$, $L_U$, and $L_P$ with different weights (i.e., Lagrange multipliers). We evaluate the influence of different weights’ combinations ($\lambda_1$, $\lambda_2$, and $\lambda_3$) on the Model II, as the results shown in Figure 7.

We compare the overall model performance in $U_D$ and $P_D$ by fixing the $\lambda_3 = 0$, and vary the other two multipliers by subjecting to $\lambda_1 = 1 - \lambda_2$, as shown in Figure 7a. Figure 7b illustrates the effect between $U_D$ and $P_D$ by setting the $\lambda_1 = 0$. We could observe in both settings that the utility increases with a larger $\lambda_2$, which means when the MPU is given more weight in the Mo-PAE model, it would exert a positive impact on the data utility. We conclude that the privacy-utility trade-offs could be tuned by varying these weights; the results in Figure 7 also verify the effectiveness of our adversarial architecture. We note that the balance of three units is far more complicated than the balance of two. From the extensive experiment we conducted, initializing $\lambda_1 = 0.1$, $\lambda_2 = 0.6$, $\lambda_3 = 0.3$ can guide the model achieve the trade-off most efficiently. However, as the experiment results show, there is no dataset independent privacy interpretation for $\lambda_1$, $\lambda_2$ and $\lambda_3$, and we leave a more efficient approach using reinforcement learning to initialise these hyperparameters for different datasets in future work.

7 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we presented a privacy-preserving architecture Mo-PAE based on adversarial networks. Our model considers three different optimization objectives and searches for the optimum trade-off for utility and privacy of a given dataset. We reported an extensive analysis of our model performances and the impact of its hyperparameters using four real-world mobility datasets. The weights $\lambda_1$, $\lambda_2$, and $\lambda_3$ bring more flexibility to our framework, enabling it to satisfy different scenarios’ requirements according to the relative importance of utility requirements and privacy budgets.

We evaluated our framework on four datasets and benchmarked our results against an LSTM-GAN approach and a DP mechanism. The comparisons indicate the superiority of the proposed framework and the efficiency of the proposed privacy-preserving feature extractor $Enc_L$. Expanding this work, we will consider other utility functions for our models, such as community detection based on unsupervised clustering methods or deep embedded clustering methods. In future work, we will leverage automated search techniques, such as deep deterministic policy gradient algorithm and reinforcement learning, for efficiency in searching for optimal weight combinations.

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