India’s Major Power Status and its Impact on the Relations with the Neighbors Pakistan and China

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Abstract

With the consideration of India’s rise as a great power and acquisition of major power status at international level, this paper trying to focus on India’s relations with the neighbors who haves the natural impact on its strategy or foreign policy. With the increasing influence and accession of important role in international politics consequently, India, posed a Challenge for the regional dynamics and stable bilateral relations with the neighbors. Although there are rare chances for the change in this fundamental balance, Pakistan is overwhelming and being anxious by the growing military power of India. So the strategic outlook of Pakistan is unchanged towards India. In the case of China it is a matching rival for India hases strong military capabilities as well as nuclear weapons. By the ultimate overview we can see these evenly conventional, diplomatic and nuclear forces are ensuring the relative regional stability.

Keywords: India’s rise as great power; Strategic problems neighbors Pakistan and China; Relative regional stability

The Problem of Pakistan

By the partition in 1947, India has its Prodigal twin Pakistan placed at its very close geographically. So India has most frequently troubled and problematic political ties with this traditional antagonist Neighbor. India’s rise as a great power or its major power role will have its most immediate impact on the extremely dangerous stalemate exists in between these two neighbors. There are many security concerns for Pakistan itself, as Pakistan was one of the key supporter state of Taliban in Afghanistan but the turn of time taken place while the Pak army is fighting a de facto civil war against these radicals now a day. Most recently the Teharik-e-Talibans did very inhuman and coward attack on Pakistan’s Army public school in Peshawar which caused a massive loss of lives counted 125 children. Even now Pakistan is failed to control the elements supporting to terrorist organizations inside the country, which are also responsible for the periodic terrorist attacks on India. Just after the two days of Peshawar incident The Pakistani court announced the bail for Lakhvi it was complete double standard policy of Pakistan who assumed that the attack on Pakistani lives is sin made by those satins and the same kind of attack takes place in Mumbai, whether is it Jehad?. And an accused person as a mastermind is innocent? These types of several reasons are responsible for the distress in the relationship of these states. Also it leads to the regional crisis.

India and Pakistan were engaged in the wars at regular intervals since 1965, 1971, 1998 due to Pakistan's support to the extremist ant insurgents in the disputed Indian Territory Jammu and Kashmir. The unrest continues after nuclear tests from both sides in the year of 1998 following the Isalmabad’s statement by Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shamsahd Ahmed that, ‘We will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity’. Major terrorist attack on Jammu and Kashmir in Oct 2001 followed by the attack on Parliament in Dec 2001 threatened the war, though merely resulted in major military manoeuvres by India, code-named Operation Parakram [1]. The lack of military retaliation by India despite grave provocation seems to suggest that India is successfully deterred by Pakistan's nuclear capability and this in turn only fuels the eagerness of some elements within Pakistan to provoke India. Pakistan has adopted an "asymmetric nuclear escalation posture", which has deterred Indian conventional military power and thus enabled Pakistan’s 'aggressive strategy of bleeding India by a “thousand cuts” with little fear of significant retaliation'. If we will try to compare these states, Pakistan is not even one fourth of India while checking the numbers India is more than four time of Pakistan in size and in terms of population it is 8 times greater than Pak [2]. “As Pakistan averages only 300 miles in width, it is susceptible to a central assault that would split the country in two. A number of important Pakistani cities are close to the international border in the Indus River basin. As Pakistan is thus extremely vulnerable to conventional attack by India's larger military, it defines such an attack as an existential threat to the Pakistani state [3].” Pakistani Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai thus outlined that Pakistan would use its nuclear weapons if; India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory; India destroys a large part of Pakistan's land or air forces; India blockades Pakistan in an effort to strangle it economically; or, India pushes Pakistan into a state of political destabilization. This asymmetric escalation posture is designed for a rapid first use of nuclear weapons against conventional attacks, thus leaving India without the ability to punish terrorist attacks through conventional retaliation [4]. As elements within Pakistan continue to provoke India, this creates an extremely dangerous imbalance reliant on India’s restraint to maintain peace. Vipin Narang notes that, 'Scholars who study the South Asian nuclear balance have argued that if a limited clash between India and Pakistan were to expand into a full-scale conventional war, escalation to the nuclear level would likely result.’ Most of the “war-game” scenarios played out by the US military also foresee any conventional conflict between India and Pakistan escalating to the use of nuclear weapons within the first 12 days. A new analysis in this regard revealed the probable threats for entire globe as...
if the conflict between India and Pakistan leads to use 100 nuclear bombs to drop on main industrial and crowded cities from both sides would turn in to slaughter of 20 million innocent people by blasts, fire and radiations [5]. Moreover the explosions can produce the massive smoke which would cripple global farms and environment this "nuclear winter" would reduce or eliminate agricultural production over vast areas, simultaneously decreasing crop yields nearly everywhere. Approximately one billion people worldwide today live on marginal food supplies and would be directly threatened with starvation. While some analysts maintain that nuclear weapons would be used in only a measured way, the chaos, fear and interruption of communications that would follow nuclear war's commencement leads some to doubt that attacks would be limited in any rational manner [6]. ‘Additionally, Pakistan could face a decision to use its entire nuclear arsenal quickly or lose it to Indian forces which seize its military bases. Thus, unrestricted nuclear war in South Asia potentially has cataclysmic regional and global consequences’. Aftermath of Pakistani stand off by operation Parakram in 2001 Indian army announced a strategy for nuclear war called ‘Cold Doctrine’. The aim was quite clear that it would allow to conventional retaliation without posing a threat to nuclear utilization in war or an existential threat to Pakistan. Under this doctrine Indian army would avoid major blow to Pakistan, instead make a mere territorial gains of 70-80 km that could provide the asset for negotiations after the conflict. This doctrine was the counterstrategy against the justification of "regime survival" of Pakistan for the use of Nuclear weapons. . However, Walter Ladwig III foresees that, ‘An operational Cold Start capability could lead Pakistan to lower its nuclear red line, put its nuclear weapons on a higher state of readiness, develop tactical nuclear weapons, or undertake some equally destabilizing course of action’. The support of China for Pakistan to improving its nuclear ability is the problem on one hand and the danger of Pakistani nuclear weapon could fall in the unsafe hands like militant elements, is on another. The joint activities of China and Pakistan against India are counter balanced by the US support to India since 2008, immediately after the 26/11/2008 attack on Mumbai by Pakistani Militants of Lashkar-e-Taiba. India was unable to respond with the conventional military strikes because any attack by India might accentuate the chances of nuclear war. India is always at the two steps ahead but Pakistan proved itself immature again while sanctioned bail for the mastermind in Mumbai attacks.

Hopefully it would be the beginning of new era that both states will rely on the path of peaceful settlements of disputes and would be dependent on the diplomatic means to gain the mutual interests instead of conflicts, promoting the militants and terrorists. With the rise of India as a great power positive perception of Pakistan would help to improve its bilateral cooperation with India and it would help Pakistan to attain its gradual economic development.

The Challenge of China

On the greater strategic stage, we can underscore very strong implications of India’s rise as a great power in this region specifically when we will study the relationship of these two Asian giants. Besides the significant interdependence between these states, there is a sharp rivalry for the dominance is going on. China is one of the major trading partner of India with more than 60 billion bilateral trade while Indian Raw material and Chinese technology and Manufacturing contributes very large share in International economy. China has very vast and mutual economic gain from India. But, strategically, a strong and influential India helps to create a multi polar world, consistent with Chinese interests, although China increasingly regards India as its main Asian rival. China is thus involved and busy in a complex power game to encircle India by supporting Pakistan, by provoking Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh against India. India has armed Pakistan with nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology, and has built ‘strong military-to-military ties with Burma, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka as part of what Indians see as a strategy to tie India down, Gulliver-like, in its region’ [8]. One of the very serious moves of china in this regard is its “String of Pearls Policy” in Indian Ocean Region [9]. It is organized effort of China to arrest the Indian natural dominance over this region. Comparatively China is ahead of India in the numbers of Warheads and ships but the actual application and
Blazevic argues that, following “defensive realist” strategies, each side has raised a challenge for regional balance of power in South Asia. Meanwhile, China and India have adopted nuclear “assured retaliation” postures (what they sometimes refer to as “credible minimum deterrence”), which rely on a small but secure and survivable nuclear force that assures a retaliatory strike against a primary opponent. In many ways, this seems like the most stable aspect of the competition between India and China. Meanwhile, analysts like Stephen Walt expect that China will follow a consistent but non-provocative build-up of its military capabilities and diplomatic alliances over the long-term, aiming to gradually edge the United States out of a hegemonic position. India is likely to mirror this build-up and thus tension, and possible low-level confrontation, may result on the India-China border and in the Indian Ocean region.

**Conclusion**

India’s rise as a great power in this region and major power status at the international level is quite clear after the recognition and belief of US in India that it could help to maintain the global peace and balance of power. India projected its power beyond its borders especially in IOR which is the central stage of world politics now days. India successfully protected its interests against China’s String of Pearl policy by Look East and Act East policy Proclaimed by Indian officials. The ascending power score of India lays sure strategic impact on the neighbors, Pakistan and China. For contrasting reasons, however, this impact may not change the fundamental power balance that exists today. Pakistan is already overwhelmed by the military strength of India, and thus its primary defences are the threat of nuclear exchange or state disintegration – neither of which will definitely be undermined by rising Indian power.

In contrast, China and India will have increasingly complex and intertwined relations, but the economic and strategic issues that bind them and the evenly-matched nature of their conventional and nuclear forces are likely to maintain relative peace and strategic stability. India sees itself as an emerging great power in an increasingly multi-power world, and is thus maintaining a strategy of poly-alignment. With the balance of forces developing as they are, that ambition is likely to become a reality. Ultimately the overlapping of interests and undisputed dominance over this region are the uncertain situations which are not possible to arrive in near future.

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