Galenism as the dominant medical philosophy in the later middle ages and early modern period. It is a history in turn that assumes that this was always an age of patient-led medicine. This was certainly the case in large parts of Europe in the eighteenth century (and not just in England), for medical corporations in many countries after 1700 lost their traditional power to police medical practice and limit access to medical information. In earlier centuries, in contrast, simply because the Galenists monopolized legitimate medical discourse, patient-freedom was heavily circumscribed: approved by the Church and easily internalized by the laity, Galenism could dominate the medical landscape, even to the extent of colouring popular culture, regardless of the fact that graduate Galenist physicians had only a small share of the medical market.

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Anne Harrington, Reenchanted science: holism in German culture from Wilhelm II to Hitler, Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. xxiv, 309, illus., £29.95, $39.50 (0-691-02142-2).

Little has been written systematically about the history of the brain sciences and western culture in the twentieth century, though these sciences offered great challenges to Christian and idealist conceptions of human nature. In this book, Anne Harrington, who earlier wrote on the history of the double brain, links studies of four major German-language scientists, Jakob von Uexküll, Constantin von Monakow, Max Wertheimer and Kurt Goldstein, and makes a major contribution to such a history. The book provides a most readable, interesting and controlled description of the work of scientists—Monakow and Goldstein, among others discussed, were of course also neurologists—who were intensely concerned that knowledge should encompass the values that give dignity to human existence. Quite what “should encompass” meant is the substance of the book, but all the chosen authors thought that values must in some way be in the content of the world objectively studied by science. Their belief was not the one conventional in the English-speaking world (and, after 1945, in much of continental Europe too), that scientific knowledge concerns facts not values, but rather that a true objectivity reveals values which are inherent in nature. This is Harrington’s “reenchanted science”, the holistic natural philosophy prominent in German-language responses to the perceived “crisis of culture” on either side of World War I.

The book is an introduction to the cultural value of “wholeness”, a value much remarked on by other historians, through four exemplars who have previously been poorly studied, along with comments on many others, such as Hans Driesch and Christian von Ehrenfels. (Wertheimer is also a major figure in Mitchell G Ash’s parallel study of gestalt psychology.) Much of the introduction covers familiar ground—such as the machine as metaphor for inhuman science, the fin de siècle malaise, the youth movement’s hunger “for life”, and the image of “the Jew”. But this is an excellent overview, especially as it seamlessly integrates the work of scientists into the picture. The four main chapters on holistic philosophies—each chapter is a short intellectual biography—informatively and without theoretical fuss show how the conceptual framework of each scientist’s thought is explicable by reference to wider cultural and political debates. The accounts of Monakow’s and Goldstein’s arguments for the organic unity of the brain, and against cerebral localization, followed by Monakow’s retreat into the Swiss mountains in search of spiritual enlightenment and Goldstein’s re-orientation to North-American culture, where he contributed to humanistic psychology, are especially valuable.

Like virtually all studies of the Germanic culture of this period, this book is overshadowed by the events of the Third Reich. Harrington is explicit about this and concludes with a chapter on ‘Nazi wholeness’. Her discussion is the result of much thought—and
ethical choices—but it raises challenges that have not been fully solved. The result creates an asymmetry. The earlier chapters include accounts of how each of the four main scientists discussed responded to National Socialism and fared under the Nazi state—Wertheimer and Goldstein were prominent members of the intellectual migration. The last chapter, however, attempts to examine “wholeness” as a value across a very broad front of biology and medicine, and indeed to ask whether the value was in some way contributory to the events of 1933–45, not least with murderous medicine. Not surprisingly, the discussion loses the focus of the earlier intellectual biographies; for instance, it tries to deal with crass Nazi slogans, with the opportunism of individuals who promoted themselves as Nazi biologists, and it enters into the deeply emotive debate about the role of particular scientists or physicians (the psychosomatic physician Viktor von Weizsäcker is the principal case here). There is an enormous literature on all of this, and “wholeness” does not perhaps serve well as a guiding thread. The last chapter is intended to show that the value of “wholeness” became entwined with diverse political agendas. But one would not, I think, expect a one-to-one correlation between a particular philosophical value and a particular politics. More deeply, any assessment of the relation of philosophies of life to political processes raises perfectly general questions about science and values which tend to get lost when discussed in relation to the special horrors of the Third Reich. Thus, in the earlier chapters, an elitist question is left unaddressed about the elitist values of scholars, an elitism exemplified by the opinions of the aristocratic von Uexküll, who welcomed the fall of Weimar. Elitism was also evident, though of course differently expressed, in Goldstein’s socialism. This suggests questions, not about what happened in 1933–45, but about what links particular conceptions of scientific truth, and the access to truth by only a restricted number of scholars, and undemocratic values before (and after).

Historians, physicians and students will all value this book, and it ought to be force-fed to anyone who fancies the word “holism”. It makes accessible to English-language readers, in a quietly informed history, a central body of writings in the struggle to sustain an idealist philosophical anthropology of man in the face of both technology and mass society. By linking biography and cultural history, it raises many questions about the ambivalent politics of that struggle.

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**Rosa María Medina Doménech, ¿Curar el cáncer? Los orígenes de la radioterapia española en el primer tercio del siglo XX,** Universidad de Granada, 1996, pp. 303, no price given (84-338-2176-8).

In this work Rosa María Medina sets out to analyse the origins of Spanish radiotherapy at the beginning of the twentieth century by breaking down the barriers between knowledge, profession and society. She largely achieves this thanks to her confident handling of sources and through using novel approaches to scientific rhetoric, sociology of the professions and medical specialization.

During the three decades which the author studies in great detail, Spanish radiologists were able to establish an ambit of work covering both therapeutic and diagnostic aspects, which, at least at first, relied on other more established disciplines such as therapeutics, electrology and hydrology. However, they did not achieve official recognition as specialists nor were they able to establish an ideal kind of radiotherapist. These achievements depended on the campaign against cancer, which like other health campaigns, was being launched in Spain at the time. Radiotherapists presented cancer as curable and wanted to establish a monopoly; this caused disagreements with surgeons, and especially, gynaecologists. Attempts were made to create a demand over which a monopoly could be established but, though there were frequent claims that this demand was high, it did not, in fact, grow. For this