Audit Games with Multiple Defender Resources

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Abstract

Modern organizations (e.g., hospitals, social networks, government agencies) rely heavily on audit to detect and punish insiders who inappropriately access and disclose confidential information. Recent work on audit games models the strategic interaction between an auditor with a single audit resource and auditees as a Stackelberg game, augmenting associated well-studied security games with a configurable punishment parameter. We significantly generalize this audit game model to account for multiple audit resources where each resource is restricted to audit a subset of all potential violations, thus enabling application to practical auditing scenarios. We provide an FPTAS that computes an approximately optimal solution to the resulting non-convex optimization problem. The main technical novelty is in the design and correctness proof of an optimization transformation that enables the construction of this FPTAS. In addition, we experimentally demonstrate that this transformation significantly speeds up computation of solutions for a class of audit games and security games.

1 Introduction

Modern organizations (e.g., hospitals, banks, social networks, search engines) that hold large volumes of personal information rely heavily on auditing for privacy protection. These audit mechanisms combine automated methods with human input to detect and punish violators. Since human audit resources are limited, and often not sufficient to investigate all potential violations, current state-of-the-art audit tools provide heuristics to guide human effort (Fairwarming 2011). However, numerous reports of privacy breaches caused by malicious insiders bring to question the effectiveness of these audit mechanisms (Ponemon Institute 2011 Ponemon Institute 2012).

Recent work on audit games by Blocki et al. (2013) approaches a piece of this problem using game-theoretic techniques. Their thesis is that effective human audit resource allocation and punishment levels can be efficiently computed by modeling the audit process as a game between an auditor and auditees. At a technical level, their audit game model augments a well-studied Stackelberg security games model (Tambe 2011) with a configurable punishment parameter. The auditor (henceforth called the defender) can audit one of $n$ potential violations (referred to as targets). The defender’s optimal strategy is a randomized auditing policy—a distribution over targets such that when the attacker best responds the defender’s utility is maximized. The novel ingredient of the audit games model is a punishment level, chosen by the defender, which specifies how severely the adversary will be punished if he is caught. The defender may try to set a high punishment level in order to deter the adversary. However, punishment is not free. The defender incurs a cost for punishing, e.g. punishments such as suspension or firing of violators require maintaining resources for hiring and training of replacements. Blocki et al. (2013) provide an efficient algorithm for computing an optimal strategy for the defender to commit to.

While this work distills the essence of the defender’s dilemma in auditing situations, it is too restricted to inform real-world audit strategies. In typical audit settings, the defender has multiple resources using which she can audit a subset of the targets (not just one target). Furthermore, each resource may be restricted in the targets that it can audit. For example, some organizations follow hierarchical audit strategies in which a manager is only required to audit potential violations committed by her direct reports. Similarly, specialized audits are common, for example, employing disjoint audit resources to detect finance-related and privacy-related violations.

Our Contributions. We present a generalized Stackelberg audit game model that accounts for multiple audit resources where each resource is restricted to audit a subset of all potential violations, thus enabling application to the practical auditing scenarios described above. Our main theoretical result is a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) to compute an approximate solution to the resulting non-convex optimization problem.

To arrive at this FPTAS, we begin with a simple fixed parameter tractable (FPT) algorithm that reduces the non-convex optimization problem to a linear programming problem by fixing the punishment parameter at a discrete value. Since we perform a linear search over all possible discrete values of the punishment parameter over a fixed range in increasing intervals of size $c$, we get an FPT algorithm once the bit precision is fixed.

Next we present an optimization transformation that reduces the number of variables in the optimization problem at the cost of generating additional constraints. We also provide sufficient conditions that guarantee that the number of
constraints is polynomial in size. Significantly, these conditions are satisfied in important practical auditing scenarios, including the hierarchical and specialized audit settings discussed earlier. The design and correctness proof of this optimization transformation constitutes the central novel technical contribution of this paper. Finally, we present an FPTAS to compute the defender’s strategy leveraging the output of the optimization transformation when it generates a polynomial number of constraints.

In addition to its role in enabling the design of an FPTAS, a practical motivation for designing the optimization transformation is its promise of speeding up computing game solutions using the FPT algorithm. We experimentally demonstrate that the transformation produces speedups of up to $3\times$ for audit game instances and over $100\times$ for associated security game instances. In general, the speedups are higher as the problem size increases.

As an additional contribution, we consider audit scenarios where the defender can set a different punishment level for each target instead of setting a single, universal punishment level. We provide an FPT algorithm for this problem by designing a novel reduction of this setting to a second order cone program (SOCP).

Related Work. Our work is most closely related to the paper of Blocki et al. (2013). We elaborate on the technical connections in the exposition and analysis of our results.

Our work is also closely related to work on security games (Tambe 2011). The basic approach to solving security games, and Stackelberg games more generally (where a leader chooses an optimal strategy, i.e., one that maximizes its utility assuming that the follower best responds) was introduced by Conitzer and Sandholm (2006); it does not scale well when the number of defender strategies is exponentially large, as is the case in most security games. Typical algorithms rely on formulating a mixed integer linear program, and employing heuristics; these algorithms do not provide provably running-time guarantees (see, e.g., Paruchuri et al. (2009); Kiekintveld et al. (2009)). Often the problem is solved just for the coverage probabilities or marginals (probability analysis), hardware (e.g., cameras) placed in strategic locations, among many other examples. The exact nature of these resources will depend on the specific audit problem considered. Rather than focusing on a specific type of audit, we denote resources available to the defender for audit as inspection resources. The defender has $k$ inspection resources $\{s_1, \ldots, s_k\}$ at her disposal, with $k < n$. Each inspection resource can be used to audit at most one target. Inspection resources are further constrained by the set of targets that they can audit: for instance, a human auditor may not have the expertise or authority to audit certain targets. We define a set of tuples $R$ such that a tuple $(j, i) \in R$ indicates that inspection resource $s_j$ cannot be used to audit target $t_i$.

A pure action of the defender chooses the allocation of inspection resources to targets. A randomized strategy is given by a probability distribution over pure actions. We use a compact form to represent a randomized strategy as a matrix of probabilities, with $p_i^j$ the probability of inspection resource $s_j$ auditing target $t_i$, subject to the following constraints

$$p_i = \sum_{j=1}^k p_i^j \leq 1, \quad \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^j \leq 1 \text{ for all } i, j \text{ and } p_i^j = 0 \text{ for all } (j, i) \in R \text{ and } \forall (j, i), p_i^j \geq 0 .$$

where $p_i$ denotes the probability that target $t_i$ is inspected. These constraints can be represented as grid constraints as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
  & t_1 & \cdots & t_n \\
 s_1 & p_1^1 & \cdots & p_1^n \\
 \vdots & \vdots & \cdots & \vdots \\
 s_k & p_k^1 & \cdots & p_k^n \\
\end{array}
\]

Such a matrix can be decomposed into pure actions efficiently. (See the full version for the Birkhoff-Von Neumann (1946) result presented in Korzhyk et al. (2010), which enables the decomposition.) Furthermore, for every distribution over pure actions we can define an “equivalent” strategy using our compact representation: the distributions will be equivalent in the sense that for every target $t_i$, the probability $p_i$ that that target is inspected is the same.

Similarly to the basic audit games model of Blocki et al. (2013), the defender also chooses a punishment “rate” $x \in [0, 1]$ such that if auditing detects an attack (i.e., violation), the attacker is fined an amount $x$. The adversary attacks one target such that given the defender’s strategy the adversary’s choice of attack is the best response.

We follow the notations of earlier papers on security games: let the utility of the defender be $U_D^p(t_i)$ when audited target $t_i$ was found to be attacked, and $U_D^p(t_i)$ when unaudited target $t_i$ was found to be attacked. We assume

2 The Audit Games Model

An audit game features two players: the defender ($D$), and the adversary ($A$). The defender wants to audit $n$ targets $t_1, \ldots, t_n$, but has limited resources which allow for auditing only some of the $n$ targets. Concretely, these resources could include time spent by human auditors, computational resources used for audit (e.g., automated log analysis), hardware (e.g., cameras) placed in strategic locations, among many other examples. The exact nature of these resources will depend on the specific audit problem considered. Rather than focusing on a specific type of audit, we denote resources available to the defender for audit as inspection resources. The defender has $k$ inspection resources $\{s_1, \ldots, s_k\}$ at her disposal, with $k < n$. Each inspection resource can be used to audit at most one target. Inspection resources are further constrained by the set of targets that they can audit: for instance, a human auditor may not have the expertise or authority to audit certain targets. We define a set of tuples $R$ such that a tuple $(j, i) \in R$ indicates that inspection resource $s_j$ cannot be used to audit target $t_i$.

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We follow the notations of earlier papers on security games: let the utility of the defender be $U_D^p(t_i)$ when audited target $t_i$ was found to be attacked, and $U_D^p(t_i)$ when unaudited target $t_i$ was found to be attacked. We assume
that the attacks on unaudited targets are discovered by an external source. Similarly, define the utility of the attacker as $U^A_A(t_i)$ when the attacked target $t_i$ is audited, and $U^A_A(t_i)$ when attacked target $t_i$ is not audited, excluding any punishment imposed by the defender. Attacks discovered externally are costly for the defender, thus, $U^A_D(t_i) \geq U^A_D(t_i)$. Similarly, attacks not discovered by internal audits are more beneficial to the attacker, thus, $U^A_A(t_i) \geq U^A_A(t_i)$.

We can now define the full utility functions. The probabilities $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ of each target being audited are given by $p_i = \sum_{j=1}^k p^j_i$. Then, the utility of the defender when target $t_s$ is attacked is $p_s(U^A_D(t_s) + (1 - p_s)U^A_D(t_s)) - ax$. The defender pays a fixed cost $ax$ regardless of the outcome, where $a$ is a constant. The losses captured by the $-ax$ term includes loss due to creation of a fearful work environment and cost incurred in maintaining a surplus of employees in anticipation of suspension. In the same scenario, the utility of the attacker when target $t_s$ is attacked is $p_s(U^A_A(t_s) - x) + (1 - p_s)U^A_A(t_s)$. The attacker suffers punishment $x$ only when attacking an audited target.

A possible extension of the model above is to account for immediate losses that the defender suffers by imposing a punishment, e.g., firing or suspending an employee requires time and effort to find a replacement. Mathematically, we can account for such losses by including an additional term within the scope of $p_s$ in the payoff of the defender: $p_s(U^A_D(t_s) - a_s) + (1 - p_s)U^A_D(t_s) - ax$, where $a_s$ is a constant. All our results (FPT and FPTAS algorithms) can be readily extended to handle this model extension, which we present in the full version.

Equilibrium. Under the Stackelberg equilibrium solution, the defender commits to a (randomized) strategy, followed by a best response by the adversary; the defender’s strategy should maximize her utility. The mathematical problem involves solving multiple optimization problems, one each for the case when attacking $t_s$, is in fact the best response of the adversary. Thus, assuming $t_s$ is the best response of the adversary, the $s^{th}$ optimization problem $P_s$ in our audit games setting is

$$\max_{P_s \neq x} \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} p_sU^A_D(t_s) + (1 - p_s)U^A_D(t_s) - ax, \\
\end{array} \right.$$ 

subject to

$$\forall i \neq s, p_s(U^A_A(t_s) - x) + (1 - p_s)U^A_A(t_s) \leq p_s(U^A_D(t_s) - x) + (1 - p_s)U^A_D(t_s),$$

$$\forall j, 0 \leq \sum_{i=1}^n p^j_i \leq 1,$$

$$\forall i, 0 \leq p_i = \sum_{j=1}^n p^j_i \leq 1, \forall (j, i), p^j_i \geq 0,$$

$$\forall (j, i) \in R, p^j_i = 0, \quad 0 \leq x \leq 1.$$ 

The first constraint verifies that attacking $t_s$ is indeed a best response for the adversary.

The auditor solves the $n$ problems $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ (which correspond to the cases where the best response is $t_1, \ldots, t_n$, respectively), and chooses the outcome among all these solutions to obtain the final strategy to be used for auditing. This is a generalization of the multiple LPs approach of Conitzer and Sandholm (2006).

For ease of notation, let $\Delta_{D,i} = U^A_D(t_i) - U^A_D(t_i)$, $\Delta_{A,i} = U^A_A(t_i) - U^A_A(t_i)$, and $\delta_{i,j} = U^A_A(t_i) - U^A_A(t_j)$. Then, $\Delta_{D,i} \geq 0$, $\Delta_{A,i} \geq 0$, and the objective can be written as $p_s, \Delta_{D,s} - ax, \ldots, p_s, \Delta_{D,s} - ax,$ subject to the quadratic constraint

$$p_s(-x - \Delta_i) + p_n(x + \Delta_i) + \delta_{i,s} \leq 0.$$ 

Without loss of generality we will focus on the $n^{th}$ problem $P_n$, that is, we let $s = n$.

Inputs. The inputs to the above problem are specified in $K$ bit precision. Thus, the total length of all inputs is $O(nK)$.

3 Fixed-Parameter Tractable Algorithms

In this section, we present our FPT algorithm for optimization problem $P_n$, followed by the optimization transformation that improves the FPT algorithm and enables the FPTAS in the next section. Finally, we briefly describe an extension of our algorithmic results to target-specific punishments.

We start with the FPT for $P_n$. Our algorithm is based on the following straightforward observation: if we fix the punishment level $x$ then the $P_n$ becomes a linear program that can be solved in polynomial time. We therefore solve the optimization problem $P_n$ for discrete values of $x$ (with interval size $\epsilon$) and take the solution that maximizes the defender’s utility. This approach provides the following guarantee:

Theorem 1. The above approach of solving for discrete values of $x$ is a $\text{FPT} \Theta(\epsilon)$-additive approximation algorithm for the problem $P_n$ if either the optimal value of $x$ is greater than a small constant or $\Delta_n \neq 0$; the bit precision is the fixed parameter.

Proof Sketch. The proof proceeds by arguing how much the objective changes when the value of $x$ is changed by less than $\epsilon$. The exact algebraic steps are in the full version.

We emphasize that fixing the bit precision is reasonable, because inputs to the game model are never known with certainty, and therefore high-precision inputs are not used in practice (see, e.g., Nguyen et al. (2014), Kiekintveld et al. (2013), Blum et al. (2014)).

A naive approach to improving our FPT algorithm is to conduct a binary search on the punishment rate $x$. This approach may fail, though, as the solution quality is not single-peaked in $x$. We demonstrate this in the full version using an explicit example. Instead, we describe a transformation of the optimization problem, which will enable a FPTAS for our problem under certain restrictions.

3.1 Extracting constraints for $p_i$’s

The transformation eliminates variables $p^j_i$’s and instead extracts inequalities (constraints) for the variables $p_i$’s from the constraints below (referred to as grid constraints)

$$\forall i, 0 \leq p_i = \sum_{j=1}^k p^j_i \leq 1, \forall (j, i), p^j_i \geq 0,$$

$$\forall (j, i) \in R, p^j_i = 0, \quad 0 \leq x \leq 1.$$ 

Consider any subset of inspection resources $L$ with the resources in $L$ indexed by $s_1, \ldots, s_L$ ($\vert L \vert \leq k$). We let $M = \text{OnlyAuditedBy}(L) \subseteq \{t_1, \ldots, t_n\}$ denote the subset of targets that can only be audited by a resource in $L$ (e.g., for every target $t_i \in M$ and every resource $s_j \notin L$ the resource $s_j$ cannot inspect the target $t_i$). For notational convenience
we assume that $M$ is indexed by $t_1, \ldots, t_{|M|}$. Then, in case $|L| < |M|$, we obtain a constraint $p_{t_1} + \ldots + p_{t_{|M|}} \leq |L|$ because there are only $|L|$ resources that could be used to audit these $|M|$ targets. We call such a constraint $c_{M,L}$. Consider the set of all such constraints $C$ defined as

$$ \{c_{M,L} | L \in 2^S, M = \text{OnlyAuditedBy}(L), |L| < |M| \} \quad \text{where } S = \{s_1, \ldots, s_k\} \text{ and } T = \{t_1, \ldots, t_n\}. $$

**Lemma 1.** The optimization problem $P_*$ is equivalent to the optimization problem obtained by replacing the grid constraints by $C \cup \{0 \leq p_i \leq 1 \}$ in $P_*$.

**Proof Sketch.** We present a sketch of the proof with the details in the full version. As the optimization objective depends on variables $p_i$’s only, and quadratic constraints are identical in both problems we just need to show that the regions spanned by the variables $p_i$’s, as specified by the linear constraints, are the same in both problems. As one direction of the inclusion is easy, we show the harder case below.

Let $C^+$ denote the convex polytope $C \cup \{0 \leq p_i \leq 1 \}$. Given a point $(p_1, \ldots, p_n) \in C^+$ we want to argue that we can find values $p_i$’s satisfying all of the grid constraints. We first note that it suffices to argue that we can find feasible $p_i$’s for any extreme point in $C^+$ because any point in $C^+$ can be written as a convex combination of its extreme points (Gallier 2008). Thus, we could find feasible $p_i$’s for any point in $C^+$ using this convex combination.

In the full version we prove that each extreme point in $C^+$ sets the variables $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ to 0 or 1. Let $k'$ denote the number of ones in an extreme point. Note that $k' \leq k$ because one of the inequalities is $p_1 + \ldots + p_n \leq k$. Consider the undirected bipartite graph linking the inspection nodes to the target nodes, with a link indicating that the inspection can audit the linked target. This graph is known from our knowledge of $R$, and each link in the graph can be labeled by one of the $p_i$ variables. Let $S'$ be the set of targets picked by the ones in any extreme points. We claim that there is a perfect matching from $S'$ to the the set of inspection resources (which we prove in next paragraph). Given such a perfect matching, assigning $p_i = 1$ for every edge in the matching yields a feasible solution, which completes the proof.

We prove the claim about perfect matching by contradiction. Assume there is no perfect matching, then there must be a set $S'' \subseteq S'$, such that $|N(S'')| < |S''|$ (N is the neighbors function — this follows from Hall’s theorem). As $S'' \subseteq S'$ it must hold that $p_i = 1$ for all $i \in \text{index}(S'')$ (function index gives the indices of the set of targets). Also, the set of targets $S''$ is audited only by inspection resources in $N(S'')$ and, by definition of $C$, we must have a constraint $\sum_{i \in \text{index}(S'')} p_i \leq |N(S'')|$. Using $|N(S'')| < |S''|$, we get $\sum_{i \in \text{index}(S'')} p_i < |S''|$. But, since $|\text{index}(S'')| = |S'''|$, we conclude that all $p_i$ for targets in $S''$ cannot be one, which is a contradiction. □

Observe that obtaining $p_i$’s from the $p_i$’s involves solving a linear feasibility problem, which can be done efficiently.

Importantly, the definition of $C$ is constructive and provides an algorithm to compute it. However, the algorithm has a worst-case running time exponential in $k$. Indeed, consider $k$ resources $s_1, \ldots, s_k$ and 2$k$ targets $t_1, \ldots, t_{2k}$. Each resource $s_i$ can inspect targets $t_1, t_2, t_{2i-1}, t_{2i}$. For each set of $k/2$ resources $L \subseteq \{s_2, \ldots, s_k\}$ we have $M = \text{OnlyAuditedBy}(L) = \{t_1, t_2, \cup \{t_{2j-1}, t_{2j}\} \}$. Observe that $|M| = k + 2 > k/2 = |L|$ for each such $L \subseteq \{s_2, \ldots, s_k\}$ we get a new constraint $c_{M,L}$. Thus, we get $(k-1)/k$ constraints.

### 3.2 Conditions for Poly. Number of Constraints

Motivated by the above observation, we wish to explore an alternative method for computing $C$. We will also provide sufficient conditions under which $|C|$ is polynomial.

The intuition behind our alternative algorithm is that instead of iterating over sets of inspection resources, we could iterate over sets of targets. As a first step, we identify equivalent targets and merge them. Intuitively, targets that can be audited by the exact same set of inspections are equivalent. Formally, $t_i$ and $t_j$ are equivalent if $F(t_i) = F(t_j)$ where $F(t_i) = \{s_j | (j, i) \notin R\}$.

The algorithm is formally given as Algorithm 1. It builds an intersection graph from the merged targets: every merged set of targets is a node, and two nodes are linked if the two sets of inspection resources corresponding to the nodes intersect. The algorithm iterates through every connected induced sub-graph and builds constraints from the targets associated with the nodes in the sub-graphs and the set of inspection resources associated with them. The next lemma proves the correctness of the Algorithm 1.

**Algorithm 1:** CONSTRAINT FIND($T, R$)

Compute $F$, the map from $T$ to $2^{\{s_1, \ldots, s_k\}}$ using $R$.

Merge targets with same $F(t)$ to get set $T'$ and a map $W$, where $W(t') = \#\text{merged targets that yielded } t'$

Let $PV(t')$ be the set of prob. variables associated with $t'$, one each from the merged targets that yielded $t'$

Form an intersection graph $G$ with nodes $t' \in T'$ and edge set $E = \{\{t'_i, t'_j\} | F(t'_i) \cap F(t'_j) \neq \emptyset\}$

$L \leftarrow \text{CONNECTEDSUBGRAPHS}(G)$

$C \leftarrow \phi$

for $l \in L$ do

Let $V$ be all the vertices in $l$

$P \leftarrow \bigcup_{v \in V} PV(v)$

$k \leftarrow \sum_{v \in V} W(t')$

if $|P| > k$ then

$C \leftarrow C \cup \{\sum_{p \in P} p \leq k\}$

return $C$

**Lemma 2.** CONSTRAINT FIND outputs constraints that define the same convex polytope in $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ as the constraints output by the naive algorithm (iterating over all subsets of resources).
The proof appears in the full version. The algorithm is clearly not polynomial time in general, because it iterates over all connected subgraphs. The next lemma provides sufficient conditions for polynomial running time.

**Lemma 3.** \textsc{ConstraintFind} runs in polynomial time if at least one of the following conditions holds:

- The intersection graph has \(O(\log n)\) nodes.
- The intersection graph has constant maximum degree and a constant number of nodes with degree at least 3.

**Proof Sketch.** The detailed proof is in the full version. It is not hard to observe that we need sufficient conditions for any graph to have polynomially many induced connected subgraphs. The first case above is obvious as the number of induced connected subgraphs in the worst case (fully connected graph) is \(2^N\), where \(N\) is number of nodes. The second case can be proved by an induction on the number of nodes in the graphs with degree greater than 3. Removing any such vertex results in a constant number of disconnected components (due to constant max degree). Then, we can argue that the number of connected subgraphs of the given graph will scale polynomially with the max number of connected sub-graphs of each component. The base case involves graphs of degree less than two, which is a graph with paths and cycles and such a graph has polynomially many connected sub-graphs.

**Why Are These Conditions Realistic?** The conditions specified in Lemma 3 capture a wide range of practical audit scenarios.

First, many similar targets can often be grouped together by type. In a hospital case, for instance, rather than considering each individual health record as a unique target worthy of specific audit strategies, it might make more sense to have identical audit policies for a small set of patient types (e.g., celebrities, regular folks,...). Likewise, in the context of tax audits, one could envisage that individuals are pooled according to their types (e.g., high income earners, expatriates,...). In practice, we expect to see only a few different types. Each type corresponds to a single node in the intersection graph, so that a constant number of types corresponds to a constant number of nodes. That is, both of the lemma conditions are satisfied, even though only one is required.

Second, auditing is often localized. For instance, when considering audits performed by corporate managers, one would expect these managers to primarily inspect the activities of their direct subordinates. This means that the inspection resources (inspection actions of a manager) auditing a node (activities of its subordinates) are disjoint from the inspection resources auditing any other node. Thus, our intersection graph has no edges, and the second lemma condition is satisfied. Slightly more complex situations, where, for instance, employees’ activities are audited by two different managers, still satisfy the second condition.

### 3.3 Target-Specific Punishments

We present a brief overview of target-specific punishments with the details in the appendix. We extend our model to target-specific punishments by augmenting the program \(P_n\): we use individual punishment levels \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\), instead of using the same punishment \(x\) for each target. The new optimization problem \(P_{X_n}\) differs from \(P_n\) only in (1) objective: \(\max_{p_n} p_n \Delta D, n - \sum_{j \in \{1, \ldots, n\}} a_j x_j\) and (2) quadratic constraints: \(p_n(-x_i - \Delta_i) + p_n(x_i + \Delta_i) + \delta_{i,n} \leq 0\).

The naïve way of discretizing each of the variables \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) and solving the resulting sub-problems is not polynomial time. Nevertheless, we show that it is possible to design an FPT approximation algorithm by discretizing only \(p_n\), and casting the resulting sub-problems as second-order cone problems (SOCP), which can be solved in polynomial time (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004). We first present the following intuitive result:

**Lemma 4.** At the optimal point for \(P_{X_n}\), \(x_n\) is always 0. Further, discretizing values of \(p_n\) with interval size \(\epsilon\) and solving resulting sub-problems yields a \(\Theta(\epsilon)\) approximation.

The proof is in the appendix. Next, we show that for fixed values of \(x_n\) and \(p_n\), \(f_{X_n}\) reduces to an SOCP. We first describe a general SOCP problem (with variable \(y \in R^m\)) that maximizes a linear objective \(f^T y\) subject to linear constraints \(F y \geq g\) and \(m\) quadratic constraints of the form

\[
\forall i \in \{1, \ldots, m\}. \|A_i y + b_i\|_2 \leq c_i^T y + d_i
\]

In particular, the constraint \(k^2/4 \leq y_i (y_i + k)\) is the same as \(\|k (y_i - y - k')\|_2 \leq y_i + y_j + k\), which is an instance of the quadratic constraint above for appropriate \(A, b, c, d\).

Our problem can be cast as an SOCP by rewriting the quadratic constraints as

\[
p_n(x_i + \Delta_i) + \delta_{i,n} \leq p_i(x_i + \Delta_i)
\]

Using our approach (discretizing \(p_n\), \(x_n = 0\)) the LHS of the above inequality is a constant. If the constant is negative we can simply throw out the constraint — it is a tautology since the RHS is always positive. If the constant is positive, we rewrite the constraint as a second-order constraint as described above (e.g., set \(k = 2 \sqrt{\Delta_n} \Delta_i + \delta_{i,n} \) and set \(k' = \Delta_i\)). The rest of the constraints are linear. Thus, the problem for each fixed value of \(p_n, x_n\) is an SOCP. Putting everything together, we get the following result.

**Theorem 2.** The method described above is an FPT additive \(\Theta(\epsilon)\)-approximate algorithm for solving \(P_{X_n}\).

### 4 Fully Polynomial Time Approximation

Our goal in this section is to develop an FPTAS for problem \(P_n\), under the condition that the set \(C\) returned by \textsc{ConstraintFind} has polynomially many constraints.

Our algorithm builds on an earlier algorithm (Blocki et al. 2013) for the restricted auditing scenario with just one defender resource. Since we solve the defender’s problem after extracting the constraints \(C\), the variables in our problem are just the \(p_i\)’s and \(x\).

\[
\max_{p_n, x} p_n \Delta D, n - ax, \quad \forall i \neq n.
\]

subject to

- \(p_n(-x - \Delta_i) + p_n(x + \Delta_i) + \delta_{i,n} \leq 0\),
- \(c \in C, \forall i. 0 \leq p_i \leq 1, \quad 0 \leq x \leq 1\).
Property of optimal points. We state the following property of some optimal points $p_i^*$’s and $x^*$ of the optimization:

**Lemma 5.** There exists optimal points $p_i^*$’s and $x^*$ such that if $p_i^*(x^* + Δ_n) + δ_{j,n} ≥ 0$ then $p_i^*(x^* + Δ_n) + δ_{j,n} = p_i^*(x^* + Δ_j)$ (i.e., quadratic constraint is tight) else when $p_i^*(x^* + Δ_n) + δ_{j,n} < 0$ then $p_i^* = 0$.

**Proof Sketch.** The quadratic constraint can be written as $p_i^*(x^* + Δ_n) + δ_{j,n} ≤ p_i$. At the optimal point if $p_i^*(x^* + Δ_n) + δ_{j,n} ≥ 0$ then if we have $p_i^*(x^* + Δ_n) + δ_{j,n} < p_i^*$, we can always reduce $p_i^*$ without affecting the objective value till we get an equality. Also, for the case $p_i^*(x^* + Δ_n) + δ_{j,n} < 0$ we can reduce $p_i^*$ to 0.

We focus on finding one of the optimal points with the property stated above. Next, we sort $δ_{j,n}$’s to get a sorted array $δ_{j,n}$ in ascending order. Then, we split the optimization problem $P_e$ into sub-problems $EQ_{(i,j)}$, where in each problem $EQ_{(i,j)}$ it is assumed that $p_n$, $x$ lies between the hyperbolae $p_n(x + Δ_n) + δ_{j,n}$ (open boundary) and $p_n(x + Δ_n) + δ_{j+1,n}$ (closed boundary) in the plane spanned by $p_n, x$. Thus, in $EQ_{(i,j)}$, $p_n(x + Δ_n) + δ_{j,n}$ is non-negative for all $(k) > (j)$ and negative otherwise. Using the property of the optimal point above, for the non-negative case we obtain equalities for the quadratic constraints and for the negative case we claim that for all $(k) ≤ (j)$ we can set $p(k) = 0$. The optimal value for $P_n$ can be found by solving each $EQ_{(i,j)}$ and taking the best solution from these sub-problems.

The optimization problem for $EQ_{(i,j)}$ is as follows:

$$\begin{align*}
& \text{max } \quad p_nΔ_{j,n} - ax, \\
& \text{subject to } \quad \forall(i) > (j), 0 ≤ \frac{p_n(x + Δ_n) + δ_{i,n}}{x + Δ_n} = p(i) ≤ 1, \\
& \quad p_n(x + Δ_n) + δ_{j,n} < 0, \\
& \quad p_n(x + Δ_n) + δ_{j+1,n} ≥ 0, \\
& \quad c ∈ C, \forall(i) ≤ (j), p(i) = 0, \quad 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
\end{align*}$$

As no $p_i$ (except $p_n$) appears in the objective, and due to the equality constraints on particular $p_i$’s, we can replace those $p_i$’s by a function of $p_n, x$. Other $p_i$’s are zero. Next, by a series of simple algebraic manipulations we obtain a two-variable optimization problem:

$$\begin{align*}
& \text{max } \quad p_nΔ_{j,n} - ax, \\
& \text{subject to } \quad \forall(b) \in \{1, \ldots, B\}, p_n ≤ f_b(x) \quad 0 ≤ p_n ≤ 1, \quad 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
\end{align*}$$

where $B$ is the total number of constraints, which is of the same order as $|C|$. The details of the algebraic steps are in the full version.

Solving the sub-problem. Our two final lemmas are not hard to prove. Their proofs appear in the full version.

**Lemma 6.** Problem $EQ_{(i,j)}$ can be solved efficiently for a fixed value $x$ or fixed value of $p_n$.

**Lemma 7.** The optimal point for $EQ_{(i,j)}$ cannot be an interior point of the region defined by the constraints, i.e., at least one of the inequalities is tight for the optimal point.

**Proof Sketch.** It is easy to see that if all constraints are non-tight at the optimal point, then $p_n$ can be increased by a small amount without violating any constraint and also increasing the objective value. Thus, some constraint must be tight.

**Algorithm 2: APX_SOLVE($l, EQ_{(j)}$)**

Solve the problem for $p_n = 0, 1$ and $x = 0, 1$

Collect solutions $(p_n, x)$ from the above in $M$

for $b ← 1$ to $B$ do

Replace $p_n = f_b(x)$ in the objective to get $F(x) = f_b(x)Δ_{j,n} - ax$

Take the derivative to get $F'(x) = \frac{∂F(x)}{∂x}$

$R ← \text{ROOTS}(F'(x), 2^{-l}, (0, 1))$

$R' ← \text{MAKEFEASIBLE}(R)$

From $R'$ obtain set $M'$ of potential solutions $(p_n, x)$

$M ← M ∪ M'$

for $(b, b') ∈ \{(b, b') \mid b ∈ B, b ∈ B, b' > b\}$ do

Equate $f_b(x) = f_{b'}(x)$ to get $F(x) = 0$

$R ← \text{ROOTS}(F(x), 2^{-l}, (0, 1))$

$R' ← \text{MAKEFEASIBL}(R)$

From $R$ obtain set $M'$ of potential solutions $(p_n, x)$

$M ← M ∪ M'$

$(p_n^*, x^*) ← \arg \max_{p_n} \{p_nΔ_{j,n} - ax\}$

return $(p_n^*, x^*)$

We are now ready to present the FPTAS, given as Algorithm 2. The algorithm first searches potential optimal points on the boundaries (in the first loop) and then searches potential optimal points at the intersection of two boundaries (second loop). The roots are found to an additive approximation factor of $2^{-l}$ in time polynomial in the size of the problem representation and $l$ (Schönage 1982). As shown in Blocki et al. (2013), the case of roots lying outside the feasible region (due to approximation) is taken care of by the function MAKEFEASIBLE. The first loop iterates a maximum of $n$ times, and the second loop iterates a maximum of $\left(\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ l \end{array}\right)$ times. Thus, we have the following result.

**Theorem 3.** The optimization problem $P_n$ can be solved with an additive approximation factor of $Θ(2^{-l})$ in time polynomial in the input size $n$ and $l$, i.e., our algorithm to solve $P_n$ is an FPTAS.

### 5 Experimental Results

In this section, we empirically demonstrate the speedup gains from our optimization transformation for both audit games and security games. We obtained speedups of up to $3×$ for audit game instances and over $100×$ for associated security game instances.

Our experiments were run on a desktop with quad core 3.2 GHz processor and 6GB RAM. Code was written in Matlab using the built-in large scale interior point method implementation of linear programming. We implemented two FPT algorithms—with and without the optimization transformation. For both the algorithms, we used the same problem inputs in which utilities were generated randomly from
We ran experiments for audit games and security games with varying number of targets and resources. The resources were divided into equal sized groups such that the targets any group of resources could inspect was disjoint from the target set for any other group. Table 1 shows our results with the varying number of targets, resources and size of the group of targets. The results are an average over 5 runs of the optimization with random utilities in each run. Audit games take more time to solve than corresponding security games with a similar number of targets as we run the corresponding LP optimization 200 times (the discrete interval for \(x\) with a similar number of targets as we run the correspond-
ting randomized policies for increasing security of agent systems.

We do not scale up to the number of targets that heuristic approaches such as ORIGAMI (Kiekintveld et al. 2009) achieve (1,000,000 targets). ORIGAMI works by iteratively building the optimal attack set, i.e., the set of targets that the adversary finds most attractive at the optimal solution point. However, ORIGAMI considers only coverage probabilities (marginals). Thus, its output may not be implementable with scheduling constraints on resources. In contrast, our approach guarantees that the coverage probabilities output are implementable. Wedding the two approaches to obtain scalable and provably implementable audit and security game solutions remains an interesting direction for future work.

Table 1: FPT algorithm running times (in min) with our optimization transformation (T) and no transformation (NT).

| Game     | #Target | (GroupSize) | Time (min) |
|----------|---------|-------------|------------|
| Audit    | 100     | 10 (2)      | 12         | 15         |
| Audit    | 200     | 100 (10)    | 81         | 234        |
| Security | 3,000   | 500 (10)    | 28         | 8,500\(^1\) |
| Security | 5,000   | 1,000 (20)  | 119        | 110,000\(^2\) |

\(^1\)These data points are extrapolations from runs that were allowed to run 12 hours. The extrapolation was based on the number of optimization problems solved vs the total number of optimization problems (3000/5000 total problems for 3000/5000 targets).

\(^2\)We ran experiments for audit games and security games with varying number of targets and resources. The resources were divided into equal sized groups such that the targets any group of resources could inspect was disjoint from the target set for any other group. Table 1 shows our results with the varying number of targets, resources and size of the group of targets. The results are an average over 5 runs of the optimization with random utilities in each run. Audit games take more time to solve than corresponding security games with a similar number of targets as we run the corresponding LP optimization 200 times (the discrete interval for \(x\) is 0.005). Hence we solve for larger security game instances.

Our implementations did not optimize for speed using heuristics because our goal was to only test the speedup gain from our optimization transformation. Thus, we do not scale up to the number of targets that heuristic approaches such as ORIGAMI (Kiekintveld et al. 2009) achieve (1,000,000 targets). ORIGAMI works by iteratively building the optimal attack set, i.e., the set of targets that the adversary finds most attractive at the optimal solution point. However, ORIGAMI considers only coverage probabilities (marginals). Thus, its output may not be implementable with scheduling constraints on resources. In contrast, our approach guarantees that the coverage probabilities output are implementable. Wedding the two approaches to obtain scalable and provably implementable audit and security game solutions remains an interesting direction for future work.

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Appendix

A Birkhoff-von Neumann

For the sake of completeness, we state the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem from Korzhyk et al. (Korzhyk, Conitzer, and Parr 2010), that is used to decompose the probability matrix into pure actions efficiently.

(Birkhoff-von Neumann (Birkhoff 1946)). Consider an \( m \times n \) matrix \( M \) with real numbers \( a_{ij} \in [0, 1] \), such that for each \( 1 \leq i \leq m, \sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{ij} \leq 1 \), and for each \( 1 \leq j \leq n, \sum_{i=1}^{m} a_{ij} \leq 1 \). Then, there exist matrices \( M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_q \), and weights \( w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_q \in (0, 1) \), such that:

1. \( \sum_{k=1}^{q} w_k = 1 \)
2. \( \sum_{k=1}^{q} w_k M_k = M \)
3. for each \( 1 \leq k \leq q, the elements of M_k are a_{ij}^k \in \{0, 1\} \)
4. for each \( 1 \leq k \leq q, we have: for each \( 1 \leq i \leq m, \sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{ij}^k \leq 1 \), and for each \( 1 \leq j \leq n, \sum_{i=1}^{m} a_{ij}^k \leq 1 \).

Moreover, \( q \) is \( O((m+n)^2) \), and the \( M_k \) and \( w_k \) can be found in \( O((m+n)^{4.5}) \) time using Dulmage-Halperin algorithm (Dulmage and Halperin 1955).

Clearly, our variables \( p_{ij}^k \)'s can be considered as the matrix \( M \) in the result above, and hence can be decomposed into pure actions efficiently.

B Obtaining the two variable optimization

The optimization problem for \( EQ(J) \) is as follows:

\[
\text{max} \quad p_n \Delta_{D,n} - ax \\
\text{subject to} \quad \forall (i) > (j), \quad 0 \leq \frac{p_n(x + \Delta_n) + \delta_{(j,n)}}{x + \Delta_{(i,n)}} = p(i) \leq 1 \\
\quad p_n(x + \Delta_n) + \delta_{(j,n)} < 0 \\
\quad p_n(x + \Delta_n) + \delta_{(j+1,n)} \geq 0 \\
\quad c \in C, \forall (i) \leq (j), \quad p(i) = 0, \quad 0 \leq x \leq 1.
\]

As no \( p_i \) (except \( p_n \)) shows up in the objective, and due to the equality constraints on particular \( p_i \)'s, we can replace those \( p_i \)'s by a function of \( p_n, x \). Other \( p_i \)'s are zero. Denote by \( c(p_n, x) \) the inequality obtained after substituting \( p_i \) with the function of \( p_n, x \) (or zero) in the constraint \( c \in C \). Thus, we get the following two variable optimization problem

\[
\text{max} \quad p_n \Delta_{D,n} - ax \\
\text{subject to} \quad \forall (i) > (j), \quad \frac{p_n(x + \Delta_n) + \delta_{(j,n)}}{x + \Delta_{(i,n)}} \leq 1 \\
\quad p_n(x + \Delta_n) + \delta_{(j,n)} < 0 \\
\quad p_n(x + \Delta_n) + \delta_{(j+1,n)} \geq 0 \\
\quad c(p_n, x) \in C, \quad 0 \leq p_n \leq 1, \quad 0 \leq x \leq 1.
\]

Observe that we removed the \( 0 \leq \) condition in the first set of constraints because that is implied by the next two constraints. Next, note that any constraint (indexed by \( b \)) with two variables \( p_n, x \) can be expressed as \( p_n \leq f_b(x) \) (closed boundary) for constraint-specific ratio of polynomials \( f_b(x) \) or by \( p_n < \frac{-\delta_{(j,n)}}{x + \Delta_n} \) (open boundary). However, we close the open boundary, i.e., \( p_n \leq \frac{-\delta_{(j,n)}}{x + \Delta_n} \), and solve the problem, returning an infeasible solution in case the solution is on the boundary \( p_n = \frac{-\delta_{(j,n)}}{x + \Delta_n} \). This is justified by the fact that the curve \( p_n = \frac{-\delta_{(j,n)}}{x + \Delta_n} \) is included in the other optimization problem \( EQ(j-1) \), and would be output by that sub-problem if it indeed is the global maximizer. Thus, we represent the optimization problem as

\[
\text{max} \quad p_n \Delta_{D,n} - ax \\
\text{subject to} \quad \forall b \in \{1, \ldots, B\}, \quad p_n \leq f_b(x) \\
\quad 0 \leq p_n \leq 1, \quad 0 \leq x \leq 1,
\]

where \( B \) is the total number of constraints described as above.

C Target-Specific Punishments

In this section we extend our FPT result to target-specific punishments. While the formulation of the extended problem is not that different, solving it becomes significantly more challenging.

In more detail, we augment the program \( P_n \) by using individual punishment levels \( x_1, \ldots, x_m \), instead of using the same punishment \( x \) for each target. The new optimization problem \( PX_n \) is

\[
\text{max} \quad p_n \Delta_{D,n} - \sum_{j=1}^{B} a_{j} x_j \\
\text{s.t.} \quad \forall i \neq n, \quad p_i (x_i - \Delta_i) + p_n(x_n + \Delta_n) + \delta_{i,n} \leq 0 \\
\quad \forall j, \quad 0 \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i \leq 1, \quad \forall i, \quad 0 \leq p_i = \sum_{j=1}^{B} p_i^j \leq 1, \\
\quad \forall (j, i), \quad p_i^j \geq 0, \quad \forall (j, i) \in R, \quad p_i^j = 0, \\
\quad 0 \leq x \leq 1.
\]

Note that the defender’s penalty term is now a linear combination of the target-specific punishment level.

The naïve way to approach the above problem is to discretize each of the variables \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) and solve the resulting sub-problems, which are linear programs. However, such a discretization of size \( \epsilon \), even if yielding a \( \Theta(\epsilon) \) additive approximation, will run in time \( O((1/\epsilon)^n) \), which is not polynomial for constant \( \epsilon \).

Nevertheless, we show that it is possible to design an algorithm that runs in time polynomial in \( \epsilon \) and yields a \( \Theta(\epsilon) \) additive approximation, by discretizing only \( p_n \), and casting the resulting sub-problems as second-order cone programs (SOCP), which can be solved in polynomial time (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004). Letting \( S(n) \) denote the (polynomial) running time of the SOCP, we obtain a running time of \( O(S(n)/\epsilon) \), given fixed bit precision.

We first present the following intuitive result:

**Restatement of Lemma** At the optimal point for \( PX_n \), \( x_n \) is always 0. Further, considering discrete values of \( p_n \),
with interval size $\epsilon$ and solving the resulting sub-problems exactly yields a $\Theta(\epsilon)$ approximation.

The proof is in the Missing Proofs section of the appendix.

Next, we show that for fixed values of $x_n$ and $p_n$, the optimization problem $P\,X_n$ reduces to a second-order cone program. We first describe a general SOCP problem:

$$\max_y f^T y ,$$

subject to \quad $${\forall i \in \{1, \ldots, m\} \colon |A_i y + b_i|_2 \leq c_i^T y + d_i$$

where the optimization variable is $y \in \mathbb{R}^n$, and all constants are of appropriate dimensions. In particular, we observe that the constraint

$$k^2 / A \leq y_j (y_j + k')$$

can always be written as a second order inequality $|Ay + b|_2 \leq c^T y + d$ by selecting $A$ and $b$ such that $Ay + b = [k (y_j - y_j - k')]^T$ and $c, d$ such that $c^T y + d = y_j + y_j + k$. Our problem can be cast as a SOCP by rewriting the quadratic constraints as

$$p_n (x_n + \Delta_n) + \delta_{i,n} \leq p_i (x_i + \Delta_i)$$

Using our approach (discretizing $p_n$, $x_n = 0$) the LHS of the above inequality is a constant. If the constant is negative we can simply throw out the constraint — it is a tautology since the RHS of the LHS is always positive. If the constant is positive, we rewrite the constraint as a second-order constraint as described above (e.g., set $k = 2\sqrt{p_n (x_n + \Delta_n) + \delta_{i,n}}$ and set $k' = \Delta_i$). The rest of the constraints are linear, and can be rewritten in equality form by introducing slack variables. Thus, the problem for each fixed value of $p_n, x_n$ is an SOCP, and can be solved efficiently. Putting everything together, we get the main Theorem 2 of the target-specific punishment section in the paper.

D Missing Proofs

**Proof of Theorem 2** The quadratic constraint can be rewritten as

$$x (p_n - p_i) - p_i \Delta_i + p_n \Delta_n + \delta_{i,n} \leq 0$$

Suppose we have an optimal point $x^o, p_i^o$’s. First, we note that if $x^o = 1$ (resp. $x^o = 0$) then our algorithm will find the optimal solution exactly because $x = 1$ (resp. $x = 0$) is one of the discrete values of $x$ considered by our algorithm. In the rest of the proof we assume that $0 < x^o < 1$. Let $\epsilon' > 0$ denote the smallest value s.t. $x^o + \epsilon'$ is one of the discrete values of $x$ considered by our algorithm (e.g. $x^0 + \epsilon' \in \{0i | i \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{1\} \}$. We let

$$\tau = \max \left\{ 0, \max_{i \leq n} \epsilon' \left( p_n^o - p_i^o \right) \right\}$$

and we consider two cases.

**Case 1**: $p_n^o \geq \tau$. In this case we set $\hat{x} = x^o + \epsilon'$, $\hat{p}_n = p_n^o - \tau$ and $\hat{p}_i = p_i^o$ for each $i \neq n$. We first show that this is a valid solution. For each $i \neq n$ we have

$$\hat{x} (\hat{p}_n - \hat{p}_i) - \hat{p}_i \Delta_i + \hat{p}_n \Delta_n + \delta_{i,n}$$

$$\leq (x^o + \epsilon') (p_n^o - \epsilon^o - \epsilon^o) - p_i^o \Delta_i + (p_n^o - \epsilon^o) \Delta_n + \delta_{i,n}$$

$$\leq (x^o (p_n^o - p_i^o) - p_i^o \Delta_i + p_i^o \Delta_n + \delta_{i,n})$$

$$\leq (x^o (p_n^o - p_i^o) - \epsilon^o \tau - \tau) \Delta_n - \epsilon^o \tau$$

$$\leq \epsilon' (p_n^o - p_i^o) - \tau (x^o + \Delta_n + \epsilon')$$

$$\leq \epsilon' (p_n^o - p_i^o)$$

$$\leq (x^o + \Delta_n + \epsilon') \max_{k \leq n} \left\{ 0, \max_{k \leq n} \epsilon' (p_n^o - p_k^o) \right\}$$

$$\leq \epsilon' (p_n^o - p_i^o) - \max_{k \leq n} \epsilon' (p_n^o - p_k^o)$$

$$\leq 0 .$$

Note that the loss in utility for the defender is $\Delta_{D,n} \tau + \epsilon \epsilon'$ which is upper bounded by

$$\epsilon' \left( \max_{i \leq n} \left| p_n^o - p_i^o \right| + a \right) .$$

That is $eb$ for a constant $b$ when either $x^o$ is greater than a constant or $\Delta_n \neq 0$. Observe that due to the fixed bit precision assumption $\Delta_n \neq 0$ implies $\Delta_n$ is greater than a constant. We remark that the solution returned by our algorithm will be at least as good as the solution given by $\hat{x}$ and $\hat{p}_i$’s because $\hat{x}$ is one of the discrete values of $x$ considered. Thus, the defender’s utility in the solution given by our algorithm is $\theta(\epsilon)$-close to the defender’s utility in the optimal solution.

**Case 2**: $p_n^o < \tau$. In this case we set $\hat{p}_n = 0$, $\hat{x} = x^o + \epsilon'$ and $\hat{p}_i = p_i^o$ for each $i \neq 0$. We first show that this is a valid solution. For each $i \neq n$ we have

$$\hat{x} (\hat{p}_n - \hat{p}_i) - \hat{p}_i \Delta_i + \hat{p}_n \Delta_n + \delta_{i,n}$$

$$\leq (x^o + \epsilon') (p_n^o - p_i^o) - \hat{p}_i \Delta_i + (p_n^o - p_i^o) \Delta_n + \delta_{i,n}$$

$$\leq (x^o (p_n^o - p_i^o) - p_i^o \Delta_i + p_i^o \Delta_n + \delta_{i,n})$$

$$\leq (x^o (p_n^o - p_i^o) - \epsilon^o \tau - \tau) \Delta_n - \epsilon^o \tau$$

$$\leq \epsilon' (p_n^o - p_i^o) - x p_n^o - p_i^o \Delta_n$$

$$\leq 0 .$$

Note that the loss in utility for the defender is at most $\Delta_{D,n} \tau + \epsilon \epsilon'$ which is upper bounded by

$$\epsilon' \left( \max_{i \leq n} \left| p_n^o - p_i^o \right| + a \right) .$$

That is $eb$ for a constant $b$. We again remark that the solution returned by our algorithm will be at least as good as the solution given by $\hat{x}$ and $\hat{p}_i$’s because $\hat{x}$ is one of the discrete values of $x$ considered. Thus, the defender’s utility in the solution given by our algorithm is $\theta(\epsilon)$-close to the defender’s utility in the optimal solution.

**Proof of Lemma 2** Since the optimization objective depends on the variables $p_i$’s only, and the quadratic constraints are same in both problems we just need to show that the regions spanned by the variables $p_i$’s, as specified by the linear constraints, are the same in both problems.
First, let $p_i$’s, $p_i'$’s belong to region given by the grid constraints. Then, by the definition of $C$, for any $c_{M,L}$ we know $M$ is audited only by $L$. Thus, for $i \in \{t_1, \ldots, t_{|M|}\}$ the variables $p_i'$ are non-zero only when $j \in \{s_1, \ldots, s_{|L|}\}$. Therefore,

$$\sum_{i \in \{t_1, \ldots, t_{|M|}\}} p_i \leq \sum_{i \in \{t_1, \ldots, t_{|M|}\}} \sum_{j \in \{s_1, \ldots, s_{|L|}\}} p_i' \leq |L|$$

Hence, $p_i$’s satisfies all constraints in $C \cup \{0 \leq p_i \leq 1\}$, and therefore $p_i$’s belong to region given by $C \cup \{0 \leq p_i \leq 1\}$.

Next, let $p_i$’s belong to region given by $C \cup \{0 \leq p_i \leq 1\}$. We first show that the extreme points of the convex polytope given by $C \cup \{0 \leq p_i \leq 1\}$ sets the variables $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ to either 0 or 1.

**Extreme points 0/1**

We prove this result with additional (redundant) constraints in $C$. These redundant constraints are the ones that were dropped due to $|L| \geq |M|$. As these constraints are redundant, the polytope with or without them is same, and so are the extreme points. Thus, for this part (extreme points) we assume $C$ includes these redundant constraints.

We will do this by induction on the size of the restricted set $R$. The base case is when $|R| = 0$, then the only constraint in $C$ is $\sum_i p_i \leq k$, i.e., $A_C$ is $\tilde{I}$. It can be checked directly the extreme points have $k$ ones and other zeros.

Next assume the result holds for all $R$ with $|R| = w$. Consider a restriction $R$ with $|R| = w + 1$. Choose any particular restriction, say $(j, i) \in R$. Suppose when this restriction does not exist, we have the restriction $R' = R \setminus (j, i)$ of size $w$ and by induction hypothesis with $R'$ the extreme points are 0/1. We proceed to do the induction by checking how the constraint set $C$ and $C'$ differ. We divide the proof into two cases.

**Case 1** First, suppose with restriction $R'$, $t_j$ could be inspected only by $k_j$, then with $R$, $t_j$ is not inspected at all. Recall that any constraint $c_{M,L}$ denotes a set of resources $L$ and targets $M$ such that the targets are inspected only by resources. We construct the set of constraints $C$ and $C'$ by iterating through all subsets of resources. If for any subset of resources $L$, $k_j \notin L$ then the set of targets inspected only by $L$ does not include $t_j$ for both $R$ and $R'$ and is the same set for both $R$ and $R'$. Thus, $c_{M,L} \in C$ and $c_{M,L} \in C'$ and $p_i$ does not show up in these constraints. On the other hand, if $k_j \in L$, then for $R$ we have $t_j \notin M$ but for $R'$ we have $M' = M \cup t_j$. Thus, for such a subset $L$ we know that

- (differ1) $C$ and $C'$ include these constraint with the difference that $c_{M',L}$ has the additional variable $p_i$ on the LHS.

Thus, the constraints $C$ are formed from constraints $C'$ by setting $p_i = 0$. But, setting $p_i = 0$ is the intersection of $p_i = 0$ and the polytope given by $C'$. $p_i = 0$ is a $k - 1$-face of the polytope given by $C'$. Thus, the extreme points of this intersection polytope must be a subset of extreme points of polytope given by $C'$ and hence integral.

**Case 2** In the second case with restriction $R'$, $t_i$ is inspected by at least one resource other than $k_j$, then with restriction $R$, $t_i$ is still inspectable. Let the set of resources that can inspect $t_i$ with restriction $R$ be $K_i$. We construct the set of constraints $C$ and $C'$ by iterating through all subsets of resources. If for any subset of resources $L$, $k_j \notin L$ then there are two cases possible:

- $K_i \subseteq L$ which implies $t_i \in M$ and $t_i \notin M'$ and $M = M' \cup t_i$. For this scenario we know that
  - (differ2) $C'$ and $C$ both include these constraint with the difference that $c_{M,L}$ has the additional variable $p_i$ on the LHS.

- $K_i \notin L$ which implies $t_i \notin M$ and $t_i \notin M'$, i.e., the set of targets inspected only by $L$ is same for both $R$ and $R'$.

On the other hand, if $k_j \in L$, then there are two cases possible:

- $K_i \subseteq L$ which implies $t_i \in M$ and $t_i \notin M'$, i.e., the set of targets inspected only by $L$ is same for both $R$ and $R'$.

For the cases where the set of targets inspected is same for both $R$ and $R'$, as argued earlier, $c_{M,L} \in C$ and $c_{M,L} \in C'$. Thus, the only scenario to reason about is differ2. We do a step-by-step proof, by modifying constraints in $C'$ one by one to obtain the constraints $C$, in the process showing for each step that the extreme points are 0/1. Thus, at each step we modify the polytope with 0/1 extreme points (say $R_l$) given by $C_l$ to obtain the polytope $(R_{l+1})$ given by $C_{l+1}$ by modifying one constraint $c$ that did not have $p_i$ on the LHS to one $c_{+p_i}$ that has $p_i$ on the LHS. Clearly, $R_{l+1} \subseteq R_l$. First, we take care of some trivial cases. If the constraints $c_{+p_i}$ is redundant (then $c_i$ must also be redundant) then it does not contribute to extreme points. Thus, the relevant case is when $c_{+p_i}$ is not redundant.

Now, we need to only consider those extreme points that lie on the constraint $c_{+p_i}$, as the other extreme points for $R_{l+1}$ will be same as for $R_l$ and hence integral. Consider the extreme point $p^*$ that lies on the constraint $c_{+p_i}$. Wlog, let the variables in $c_{+p_i}$ be $p_1, \ldots, p_n$. We must have $\sum_{j=1}^n p_j = |L|$. Now, from the polytope $R_l$ remove all extreme points that have $\sum_{j=1}^n p_j = |L| + 1$, and consider the convex hull $R_l^-$ of remaining extreme points. Note that all extreme points of $R_l^-$ are in $R_{l+1}$, thus $R_l^- \subseteq R_{l+1}$. There could be two cases: one if there are no extreme points with $\sum_{j=1}^n p_j = |L| + 1$ in $R_l$, then $R_l = R_l^- \subseteq R_{l+1}$, and since $R_{l+1} \subseteq R_l$ we get $R_l = R_{l+1}$. Thus, all extreme points of $R_{l+1}$ will be 0/1. The second (more interesting case) is when there are extreme points in $R_l$ with $\sum_{j=1}^n p_j = |L| + 1$ that get removed in $R_l^-$. Since $p^*$ is a point in $R_l$ it can be written as convex combination of extreme points. If all these extreme points satisfy $\sum_{j=1}^n p_j \leq |L|$, then $p^*$ can be written as convex combination of extreme points of $R_l^-$ and since $R_l^- \subseteq R_{l+1}$, $p^*$ cannot be an extreme point. Or else, if one of the extreme points (in the convex combination) $P$ has $\sum_{j=1}^n p_j = |L| + 1$ with $p_s = 1$ ($1 \leq s \leq i$) then we can write $P$ as sum of two points within $R_l^-$: one which is same as $P$ except
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The function does not change the region defined by the set \( \text{RHS} \). By the description of the naive algorithm, this constraint must be a non-implied constraint, i.e., if \( c \) is given by \( \text{LHS}(C) \leq \text{RHS}(c) \) then it cannot be written as \( \sum_{j=1}^{n} \text{LHS}(c_j) \leq \sum_{j=1}^{n} \text{RHS}(c_j) \) for any \( c_1, \ldots, c_n \). Note that such a restriction does not change the region defined by the set \( C \). By the description of the naive algorithm, this constraint must correspond to a set of inspection resources, say \( S \), and the set of targets \( T_S \) inspected only by inspection resources in \( S \), and there exists no subset of \( T_S \) and \( S \) such that the subset of targets is inspected only by the subset of inspection resources. The constraint \( c \) is of the form \( \text{LHS}(C) \leq \text{RHS}(c) \) where \( \text{LHS}(T_S) \) is the sum of the probability variables for targets in \( T_S \). Now, for the intersection graph representation, every node \( x \) represents targets that are inspected by a given subset \( x_s \) of inspection resources. For our case, we claim that every target \( t \in T_S \) is either equivalent to or linked to another target in \( T_S \), otherwise we have the subset \( \{ t \} \subset S \) inspected only by \( t_s \in T_S \). Thus, the targets in \( T_S \) form a connected induced sub-graph. Thus, we conclude that the \( \text{CONSTRAINT}_F \) algorithm will consider this set of targets and find the non-implied constraint \( c \).

Next, assume that \( \text{CONSTRAINT}_F \) finds a constraint \( c \). As this corresponds to a connected induced sub-graph (with targets as nodes), we obtain a set of targets \( T \) and a set of inspection resources \( \cup_{t \in T} \text{F}(t) \) such that targets in \( T \) are audited by \( \cup_{t \in T} \text{F}(t) \) only. Thus, by the definition of the construction of \( c \), this constraint is same as the constraint \( c' \) obtained by the naive algorithm when it considers the set \( \cup_{t \in T} \text{F}(t) \). That is, \( c \) will also be found by the naive algorithm.

\text{Proof of Lemma 3}. The proof below lists sufficient conditions under which the number of induced connected sub-graphs is polynomial size. The proofs are constructive also, allowing extracting these sub-graphs in polynomial time.

- Graphs with \( O(\log n) \) nodes. The maximum number of connected induced sub-graphs in a graph with \( t \) nodes is \( 2^t \) (take any subset of vertices). Thus, clearly a graph with \( O(\log n) \) nodes will have polynomially many connected sub-graphs.

- Graphs with constant max degree and constant number of nodes with degree \( \geq 3 \). The number of connected induced sub-graphs in a tree with max degree \( d \) and \( t \) vertices with degree \( \geq 3 \) is bounded from above by \( 2(2(2d+1))^{t+1} n(d+1)^{t+1} \). To prove this result, denote by \( \text{T}(n,d,t) \) the worst case number of connected induced sub-graphs in a graph with \( n \) vertices, and max degree \( d \) and \( t \) vertices with degree \( \geq 3 \). Remove a vertex \( X \) with degree \( \geq 3 \) to get \( k \leq d \) disconnected components. Each connected sub-graph in any component that was linked to \( X \) could be combined with any connected sub-graph of any other component linked to \( X \), yielding a new connected sub-graph. Thus, considering every subset of the \( k \) components, we get

\[ \text{T}(n,d,t) \leq 2^k (\text{T}(n-1,d,t-1))^k \]

Observing that \( k < d + 1 \), and \( \text{T}(n-1,d,t-1) \leq \text{T}(n,d,t-1) \) we get

\[ \text{T}(n,d,t) \leq (2\text{T}(n,d,t-1))^{d+1} \]

Thus, we see that \( \text{T}(n,d,t) = 2^t (2(2d+1))^{t+1} (n(d+1))^{t+1} \) satisfies the above equation.

As part of the induction, the base case requires reasoning about a graph with max degree either 1 or 2 (\( t = 0, d = 1 \)}
or 2). Thus, we need to show that the connected subgraphs is less than \(n^{d+1}\), which is \(n^2\) for max-degree 1 and \(n^3\) for max-degree 2. The max-degree 1 case is trivial. For the max-degree 2 case, such graphs can be decomposed efficiently into paths and cycles, and the number of connected subgraphs on cycles and paths is less than \(n^2\).

Proof of Lemma 4 First, assume \(p_n^0\)'s and \(x_i^0\)'s are an optimal point of \(PX_n\). If \(x_n^0 > 0\) then reducing the value of \(x_n^0\) always yields a feasible point, as the quadratic inequality is still satisfied. Also, clearly reducing \(x_n^0\) increases the objective value. Thus, we must have \(x_n^0 = 0\).

Next, reducing the value of \(p_n^0\) by \(\epsilon_p (\leq \epsilon)\) always yields a feasible point, as the quadratic inequality is still satisfied and so are the linear inequalities. The values of \(\epsilon_p\) are chosen so that the new values of \(p_n\) lie on our discrete grid for \(p_n\). Thus, the new feasible point \(F\) is \(p_i^j\)'s for \(i = 1\) to \(n - 1\), \(x_i^0\) for \(i = 1\) to \(n - 1\) and \(p_n = p_n^0 - \epsilon_p\), \(x_n = 0\). The objective at this feasible point \(F\) is off from the optimal value by a linear combination of \(\epsilon_p\) with constant coefficients, which is less than a constant times \(\epsilon\). Then, the SOCP with the new values of \(p_n\) yields an objective value at least as high as the feasible point \(F\) on the grid. Thus, using our approach, we obtain a solution that differs from the optimum only by \(\Theta(\epsilon)\).

Proof of Lemma 5 observe that the quadratic inequality can be rewritten as

\[ p_n(x + \Delta_n) + \delta_{i,n} \leq p_i(x + \Delta_i) . \]

Suppose is an optimal point, and suppose for some \(j\) we have the strict inequality

\[ p_n^* (x^* + \Delta_n) + \delta_{j,n} < p_j^* (x^* + \Delta_j) . \]

Let \(p_j' = \min(0, p_n^*(x^* + \Delta_n) + \delta_{j,n})\). Then, we claim that \(p_1', \ldots, p_{j-1}', p_j', p_{j+1}', \ldots, p_n^*\) is also an optimal point. This is easy to see since decreasing \(p_j\) is not restricted by any inequality other than the quadratic inequality and the objective only depends on \(p_n\). As a result, we can restrict the problem to be equalities for all those quadratic constraints for which \(p_n^*(x^* + \Delta_n) + \delta_{j,n} \geq 0\), and restrict \(p_j = 0\) in case \(p_n^*(x^* + \Delta_n) + \delta_{j,n} < 0\).

Proof of Lemma 6 The fixed \(x\) case is obvious, since the problem is a linear program for fixed \(x\). The fixed \(p_n\) case is equivalent to minimizing \(x\) with constraints that are of the form \(f(x) \leq 0\), where \(f\) is a polynomial in \(x\). For any polynomial constraint \(f(x) \leq 0\), it is possible to approximate the roots of the polynomial with an additive approximation factor of \(2^{-l}\) (Schonhage 1982) and hence find the intervals of \(x\) that satisfies the constraint \(f(x) \leq 0\) within additive approximation factor of \(2^{-l}\). Doing so for the polynomially many constraints and finding the intersection of intervals yields the minimum value of \(x\) with additive approximation factor of \(2^{-l}\) that satisfies all constraints.

### Table 2: Utility values for the counterexample

| U_D | U_D^a | U_A | U_A^a |
|-----|-------|-----|-------|
| 0.614 | 0.598 | 0.202 | 0.287 |
| 0.719 | 0.036 | 0.869 | 0.999 |
| 0.664 | 0.063 | 0.597 | 0.946 |
| 0.440 | 0.322 | 0.023 | 0.624 |
| 0.154 | 0.098 | 0.899 | 0.902 |
| 0.507 | 0.170 | 0.452 | 0.629 |
| 0.662 | 0.371 | 1.000 | 0.999 |

Figure 1: Variation of maximum utility with \(x\) showing multiple peaks.

**Proof of Lemma 7** We can derive an easy contradiction for this scenario. Assume \(p_n^0, x\) is optimal. As \(f_x\) is continuous in \(x\), if all inequalities are strict, then it is possible to increase the value of optimal \(p_n^0\) by a small amount, without violating the constraints. Clearly, this increased value of \(p_n\) results in a higher objective value, contradicting the assumption that \(p_n^0, x^*\) is optimal.

### E Maximum Value of Objective is Not Single-peaked

As stated above, the solution of the optimization problem is not single peaked in punishment \(x\). Here we show the counterexample that proves this fact. We choose a problem instance with just one defender resource and 7 targets, and we consider only the case when the seventh target is the target under attack. The value of \(a\) was chosen to be 0.01, and \(x\) was discretized with interval size of 0.005. The various values of utilities are shown in Table 2. The variation of maximum utility with \(x\) is shown in Figure 1. It can be seen that the maximum value is not single peaked in \(x\).
F Model enhancement.

We state an extension to the model that captures immediate losses that the defender suffers by imposing a punishment, for example, firing or suspending an employee requires time and effort to find a replacement. Mathematically, we can account for such loss by including an additional term in the objective of our optimization:

\[ p_n(\Delta_{D,n} - a_1 x) - ax \]

where \(-a_1 x\) captures the loss from imposing punishment. It is not hard to check that we still get a FPT with the above objective. The reason for that is as because for any discrete change \(\epsilon\) in \(x\), the term \(-p_n a_1 x\) changes by at most \(\theta(\epsilon)\) amount given constant bit precision.

We also still get the same FPTAS result by a minor modification to Lemma 5. In that lemma, we need to consider the case of \(\Delta_{D,n} - a_1 x < 0\) separately, and it is not too hard to see that in this case the optimal \(p_n\) is 0. We can solve this case of \(p_n = 0\) using Lemma 6.

For target-specific punishment the objective would change to

\[ p_n(\Delta_{D,n} - a'_n x_n) - \sum_{j \in \{1, \ldots, n\}} a_j x_j \]

Again, using the exact same argument as in Lemma 4, it is not hard to see that at the optimal point \(x_n\) should be 0. Once \(x_n\) is 0, the objective is linear in the variables and we can apply the same SOCP reduction as earlier.