Homonationalism in Europe? A Quantitative Comparison of the Values of Europeans

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Published online: 6 December 2019
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Abstract
In the context of growing interest in sexual dissidence, academic and social movements are discussing homonationalism as the combination of tolerance towards lesbians and gays, racism and nationalism in a neoliberal globalised world. In this article we aim to quantitatively compare European nation states on homonationalist values using data collected through the European Value Study (2008–2010), through correlations and cross tabulation analysis. We ask to what extent homonationalism is reflected in the values of Europeans and if there is any difference among European countries. The results indicate that homonationalism is not reflected in the values of all Europeans. Those who are more tolerant to homosexuality tend to be less racist and nationalist. However, our results confirm the existence of groups of people in western European countries who combine tolerance to LGB people, racism and nationalism and consequently must be qualified as homonationalists.

Keywords Homonationalism · Nationalism · LGBTI · Queer theory · Feminism · Racism · Homosexuality

Introduction
Europe is experiencing a new awakening of racist and nationalist movements—the islamophobic reaction to the arrival of the refugees seems to be the latest culminating point. In some countries, the new extreme right is dominating the discourse, in others they join part of the government. But something has changed in their appearance. Feminisms and movements of lesbians, gays, trans*, bisexuals, interex*, queers and other sexual dissidents (LGBTQ+) were quite successful in putting their struggles on the agenda: their demands of recent decades had an impact on even the far right’s treatment of sexual orientation and gender identity. We have seen an openly gay man next to Marine Le Pen of the French Front National, or the lesbian
mother Alice Weidel as the top candidate of the German *Alternative für Deutschland* both instrumentalising their sexuality for racism and islamophobia.

Jasbir K. Puar introduced the term homonationalism to academy with the publication of her book *Terrorist Assemblages—Homonationalism in queer Times* in 2007. There she outlined homonationalism as the interplay of normative tolerance by and through LGBT people, racism, and nationalism (Puar 2007). In this sense homonationalism presupposes a shift in the relation of nation states and homosexuality, bisexuality and transsexuality: years ago, homosexuality, and especially queerness, were conceived as the antithesis of norm and state power. In a context of important cultural shifts and neoliberalism, homosexuality is normalised (or normalises itself) up to that point at which the state embraces queers moralizing and uniting the rear-guard in times of the ‘War against Terror’.

In this context we wondered if Jasbir K. Puar’s biopolitical concept homonationalism could be applied to people’s values, specifically the values of Europeans. That is to say, if homonationalism could be conceived and measured as the expression of tolerance to LGTBI, racism and nationalism. This definition varies from Puar’s conceptualisation: whereas Puar outlines complex and exclusioLGBTQ, affirming claims aligning with racist and xenophobic positions in institutions and discourses as well as on collective imaginary on LGTBQ, queer social movements and gay racism, we centre on a very well circumscribed, extreme and for some maybe superficial definition of homonationalist values. We reviewed almost one hundred articles that included the word homonationalism on the Web of Science. We selected on the one hand those articles deepening the theoretical debate and on the other hand articles dealing more empirically with Europe. In this regard and taking into account previous theoretical aspects related to Puar’s work, we propose a way to measure LGTBI+ tolerance, nationalism and racism quantitatively. To do so, we count on the latest data available of the European Values Study (2008–2010), the only European survey that contains questions dealing with the three variables. Then, based on this work and using a correlation analysis we aim to compare homonationalism in Europe. Therefore, in this article, we ask firstly, the extent to which the values of the Europeans are homonationalist and, secondly, if there are differences among countries.

Therefore, this article aims to contribute to previous work in several aspects. Firstly, it is one of the very few, if not the only attempt to work quantitatively on homonationalism. This work represents a proposal for an operalisation of homonationalism in variables, which are measurable quantitatively. Secondly, it considers the impact of homonationalism in the values of European people. Working with a standardised database that gathers a huge amount of European countries gives us, thirdly, the chance to trace major comparisons between European countries and their population’s values. Finally, homonationalism is an emerging topic, not only in academic fields, but also in politics, both for institutions and for social movements. In this sense, we hope that our results give interesting hints for future emancipatory policies.

On the following pages we will first explain Puar’s concept, homonationalism, and basic consensus and dissensus on homonationalism in Europe in the academic discussion, as well as the results of previous research on homonationalism.
Afterwards we introduce—on the ground of feminist methodology—the quantitative and comparative methodology and the techniques applied. Then we present our main results and conclude the article with some more global reflections on our findings.

**Homo… What?: Three Central Elements of Homonationalism**

Since its appearance the concept homonationalism has been discussed enthusiastically in the academic context. Puar (2007) sketches homonationalism as a multifaceted and relatively complex issue. Nevertheless she and other academics seem to agree on a strategic reduction to the triad of normative tolerance to LGBT people, racism and nationalism. Indeed, this strategic reduction is extremely helpful for the application of homonationalism in secondary quantitative data.

But what do the three elements of normative tolerance to LGBT people, racism and nationalism mean? And who are the academic authorities they are based on? Normative tolerance to LGBT people is what the (post-)feminist scholar Duggan (2001) christens homonormativity. The concept relies on the foucaultian postulation that power is not necessarily repressive and negative, but can be positive and creative (Foucault 1996; Ruffig 2008; Larrauri 2005). Actually, Foucault shows how power in modern times starts to regulate, discipline and produce ways of life (Foucault 1996; Ruffig 2008; Larrauri 2005). Decades later Butler (1990) denominates queers trying to escape established gender norms and trying to dynamite the heterosexual matrix. Equally, 10 years later Duggan (2001) observes that dissident sexualities assume, and/or have to assume, heteronormative lifestyles. In other words: sexual dissidence becomes normative by heteronormative projection and self-assumption. Duggan conjugates queerness in terms of the foucaultian biopower this way: it is “a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depolitised gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption” (Duggan 2001, p. 50). This homonormativity gets specified in the standard family (Crosby et al.), the universal and almost compulsory coming out narrative (Jivraj and de Jong 2011) as the image of the gay business man living in the hip city centre (Hubbard and Wilkinson 2015; El-Tayeb 2012).

The second thread which weaves the fabric of homonationalism is racism. The two bibliographic landmarks are Foucault and his *Genealogy of Racism* (Foucault 1996; Ruffig 2008) on the one hand and postcolonial studies (Chakravorty Spivak 2009; Said 2005) on the other. Thus homonationalism is a racism which divides the population in two groups: whites and others, civilisation and Barbary, West and East. The first of them is determined to die and the other one is targeted as an object of discipline in order to improve the productiveness of its members. Gayness becomes associated to whiteness, whereas racial otherness is linked to homophobia and intolerance, or as it puts Jasbir K. Puar: “the sexual other is white and the racial other is straight” (Puar 2007, p. 32). By this way, some (white) gays stopped being objects of necropolitics and enter to the sphere of normativising biopolitics. For Puar this sexualised racism is based on geopolitics, precisely on the ‘War against Terror’—and therefore mainly, but not only, islamophobic.
This is why she situates the core of homonationalism in the US, Israel and Western Europe.

This brings us directly to the third element, which is nationalism: for Foucault racism is the product of the modern nation-state and its racism; for Puar homonationalism is a sexualised racism in purpose of the nation-state. Particularly nationalist is the linkage between tolerant and diverse western nation-states with Marriage for all or a negative and passive anti-discrimination policy (instead of positive and active social policies) opposed to the violent and homophobic rest of the world. However, in the academic discussion some voices defend a subversive homonationalism: this is when all queers (or the state) use the (peripheral) nation for common goals in benefit of all of them (Kahlina 2015; Kulpa 2014a, b; Szulc 2015).

Considering the theoretical debate on homonationalism, Zanghellini (2012) is hard but honest when he denounces the “paranoid structuralism” detected in many applications of the term homonationalism. Indeed, poststructuralism could be a good starting point for a review over the constructive critique and our proposals to refine the concept homonationalism, permitting a quantitative analysis.

The first handicap is the explicative power of homonationalism. Structuralist approaches always tend to embrace it all, trying to give a global explanation. In this sense, we agree with Zanghellini when he indicates that homonationalism is not as explicative and normative as it appears to be yet. Maybe neoliberalism and racism driven forward by the ‘War against Terror’ does not push the LGBTQ community automatically to the right. Therefore, he proposes a more limited use of the concept, more descriptive and analytic.

Another limitation of structuralism is that in its circular logic it is never clear whether the direction of social dynamics is bottom-up or top-down. Actually, in the academic discussion centered on LGBTQ social movements (Sadurní Balcells and Pujol Tarrés 2015; Kulpa 2014a, b), public policies (Jivraj and de Jong 2011; Røthing and Svendsen 2011; Hubbard and Wilkinson 2015; Kahlina 2015) and discourse (Bracke 2012; Kulpa 2014a; Fischer 2016) the values of the general population are the elephant in the room. This is why for the purpose of the value study the proposals of dual theory (Flecha et al. 2010) appear especially useful: that means taking into account not just structure near subjectivity, but both (idem). Studying values through aggregated individual data coming from a previously designed questionnaire taking into account previous studies and discourse fits with the idea of mediating between and considering both, structure and subjectivity. Once we know, what are the people’s values are, we can investigate if these values are the product or the cause of the discourse.

The third handicap is also linked to a poststructuralist framework. Almost all the theory is laid on poststructuralist authors, which is at least curious when we consider the rich diversity generated by the social sciences concerning nationalism (Barrett 2013; Del Barrio et al. 2013; Caminal 2008; Esteban-Guitart et al. 2013; García 1994; Heitmeyer 2002). That means that in traditional social science there are at least two main articulations of nationalism: the first one is linked to origins, culture and race, and the second one, which is based on deliberated consensus and can be traced up to Habermas’ constitutional patriotism (Caminal 2008; Habermas 1990).
To put it in a nutshell, we can say that homonationalism emerges in times of neo-liberalism and ‘War against Terror’ and is constituted by three elements: homonormativity, racism and nationalism. The poststructuralist framework of the concepts has been criticised because of its excessive explicative claim. Due to this criticism, we include some approaches from modern social science in the analysis: this is, firstly, the idea of dual theory that social processes have to consider both, bottom-up and top-down-dynamics and secondly, that there has been research on nationalism beyond Foucault.

The State of the Art on Homonationalism

We reviewed previous research on homonationalism and we observed a clear focus on the USA, Canada and Israel as countries, mentioned directly in thirteen, eleven and seven articles respectively. In fourth place is the UK mentioned six times. Seen like this, Europe does not seem to be in the centre of interest when studying homonationalism. Once we compare the number of times countries are mentioned by region, this changes significantly: Europe is mentioned 24 times, whereas North America is mentioned 22 times. The rest of global regions does not go beyond ten mentions. In this sense, we can say that Europe is in the centre of interest of the academic debate on homonationalism, though the articles deal mainly with very particular issues in very particular countries. There are just a few articles relating to Europe as a whole and not just to some of its parts. In one of these Robert Kulpa observes a division between Eastern and Western Europe, highlighting how Eastern Europe is framed as permanently backward and homophoic, whereas Western Europe is constructed as tolerant and open minded, and with educator function (Kulpa 2014b): we will check of this east–west division can also be observed considering values. How far European institutions are involved in a homonationalist project is a question which is dealt with in three articles (Rexhepi 2016; Ammaturo 2015; Kahlina 2015), two of them working especially on Eastern European countries and their relationship with the European institutions (Rexhepi 2016; Kahlina 2015). It is also in Eastern Europe, where authors detect the possibility of subversion of homonationalism in order to achieve greater inclusion, acceptance and social change in favor of sexual orientations and gender identity (Kahlina 2015; Kulpa 2014a, b; Szulc 2016).

The analysis of previous research is methodologically diverse, but mainly qualitative. Some works are based on audiovisual analysis (Cherry 2018; Szulc and Smets 2015; Nebeling Petersen and Myong 2015; McCann 2015), others on analysis of the press (Jungar and Peltonen 2017; Travers and Shearman 2017; Serykh 2017). Some deal with pride parades and the LGBTQ+ and/or supporters’ communities (Kehl 2018; Yildiz 2017; Szulc 2016; Ammaturo 2016; Rexhepi 2016; Sadurní Balcells and Pujol Tarrés 2015; Hubbard and Wilkinson 2015; Kulpa 2014a; Bracke 2012; Jivraj and de Jong 2011) and urban spaces (Mepschen 2016; Hubbard and Wilkinson 2015). The analysis of public policies is central, as they are the field of interaction of population and state. Here we can find articles concerning asylum (Raboin 2017), as well as all these policies concerning a normalisation of LGBTQ+ for example in teacher education (Reimers 2017), textbooks (Røthing and Svendsen 2011) or sports
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(Travers and Shearman 2017; Hubbard and Wilkinson 2015; Bury 2015), but also other policies in less delimited areas (Yildiz 2017; Rexhepi 2016; Mepschen 2016; Hubbard and Wilkinson 2015; Kulpa 2014b; Santos 2013). There are also articles analysing the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (Ammaturo 2015). Research mainly affirms the existence of homonationalist discourses, though it sometimes proposes reconsiderations and amplifications of the original concept. Reconsiderations and amplifications tend to have a positive reading of homonationalism, in a sense of social transformation towards inclusion and diversity (Kulpa 2014a, b; Kahlina 2015). Also, the articles remind researchers that homonationalism has different faces depending on context (Hartal 2015; Hartal and Sasson-Levy 2017), especially in the case of Eastern Europe, where they detect subversion and resignification (Kulpa 2014a; Szulc 2015, 2016; Kahlina 2015). The authors observe discourses drawing a picture of a tolerant centre including the old EU, but also the Scandinavian countries, opposed to the intolerant European periphery of the post-Communist countries of the East (Kulpa 2014a, b; Szulc 2015, 2016; Kahlina 2015). Seen that homonationalism is widely detected in discourse and in certain countries, it seems to be interesting to go beyond that and carry out research, on the one hand, on people’s values, and on the other in several European countries, in order to get a global overview over people’s values in Europe, allowing comparisons as well.

In the review of the articles the use of qualitative methodology was striking: mainly all the articles have been based on discourse and/or narrative (Kehl 2018; Raboin 2017; Jungar and Peltonen 2017; Serykh 2017; Nebeling Petersen and Myong 2015; Sadurní Balcells and Pujol Tarrés 2015; Bury 2015; Kahlina 2015; Kulpa 2014a, b; Jivraj and de Jong 2011) or content analysis (Travers and Shearman 2017) and ethnographies (Mepschen 2016; Ammaturo 2016). Once we acknowledged the results, we will broaden the methodological tools used in analyzing homonationalism, promoting methodological pluralism (Domínguez Amorós and Simó Solsona 2003) in this field.

**Methodological Strategies**

The objectives of this article are mainly to measure to what extent homonationalism is reflected in the values of Europeans and if there are any differences among European countries. Therefore, it has been necessary to detect the crucial elements of homonationalism following the theoretic roots of the concept. Our main research questions are, firstly, to assess what extent the values of Europeans are homonationalist and, secondly, if there are differences among countries. Taking into account the objectives of this article and especially the theoretic discussion around homonationalism we developed two hypotheses stating, firstly, that homonationalism can be detected in the values of Europeans and secondly, that the prevalence of homonationalist values does differ across Europe by country/region, being stronger in Western European countries.

The choice and limitation of the study field is marked by feminist ideas. This implies, firstly, the recognition of not only our scientific but also personal interest in the relationship between normative tolerance towards and by LGBT people, racism
and nationalism. Feminist methodology claims the potential of the diversity of points of view (Biglia and Vergés-Bosch 2016; Botía Morillas 2013; Haraway 1988; Harding 1987; Martin Palomo and Muñoz Terrón 2014). Our shared starting point is feminism—in universities and in the streets—and a quite European biography. We complement each other in terms of methodology and bring together different visions on nationalism (Heitmeyer 2002; Nowak 2013; Postone 1979; Schwandt 2010). This article reflects the tendency of feminisms to triangulate methods and epistemologies. Broader feminist concerns for equality and emancipation are, in that case, the basis for our claim against racism and sexual oppression. That is why we consider it necessary to link our results to political strategies of state policies, people and social movements.

The revision of scientific literature as also the feminist activism in Europe sensitised us to the urgency of the social issue of homonationalism. At the same time, though, the revision of scientific literature showed that all findings concerning homonationalism are based on very specific qualitative research. Therefore, we considered a more global and quantitative approach: comparing homonationalist values of the populations of European nation states, In this sense this article can be considered as a first comparative and qualitative glimpse on homonationalism, in order to diversify methods working on, knowledge about and strategies against homonationalism. We refer to values and not to attitudes or opinions, because they seem to us the proper sociological and long-term variable, whereas opinions and attitudes are the proper terms of political science or psychology (Bergman 1998).

The secondary data we have chosen is one of the most common databases for European Value Research. We opted for the latest European Value Study, firstly, because this questionnaire gathers answers concerning tolerance to LGBT people, racism and nationalism measured in a quantitative way. Secondly, because this database has the most extensive coverage of European countries and regions.¹ ²

Concerning the three variables, tolerance to LGBT people, racism and nationalism, we base our analysis on five questions of the EVS questionnaire (EVS 2011). LGBTI tolerance is measured on a scale from one to ten through the question 68 “Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card […] homosexuality”. This question excludes, as does the whole questionnaire, the dimensions trans* and intersex* as well as sexual options/orientations beyond lesbians and gays. The use of the clearly psychiatrical category homosexual in order to describe the sexual other inhibits normativity, though the homonormativity is mainly given through the combination with racism and nationalism.

¹ Including Albania, Armenia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus, Switzerland, Cyprus, Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot Community, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Georgia, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Macedonia, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Kosovo-Metohija, Kosovo, Russian Federation, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey and Ukraine.

² Though we are aware of the fact, that Northern Ireland is no nation-state, we maintain the country/region units of the original matrix. We do so for two reasons: firstly a simple addition of UK and Northern Ireland would alter the sample; secondly, because we consider that it is important to alert about the fact that nation-states can be composed by various nations. The faces of homonationalism in composed nation-states could be a field of future research.
Looking for a question to measure racism taking into account islamophobia and other kinds of cultural racism we opted for the questions 78 “Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views on this scale? A country’s cultural life is undermined by immigrants (1) and a country’s cultural life is not undermined by immigrants (10). This approach to racism is a first try to measure a more ethnic nationalism. Though the question does not cover the most traditional essence of racism—related to biology and inferiority—it gives us an idea about the new expressions of a “new racism” related to culture (van Dijk 2000).

We construct the variable nationalism in its French republican sense creating an index starting from three variables related to the question 277 “Some people say the following things are important for being a truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?: respecting the political institutions and laws, having been born in country and having lived for a long time in the country. We hope that this variable distinguishes conceptually an openly racist nationalism from a patriotism of the constitution and a more constructionist vision of the nation.

In order to respond to the research questions we applied two different techniques to the data: correlations and cross table analysis. On the one hand, correlations helped us to measure if the tolerance to LGBT people, racism and nationalism are aligned in the different countries. On the other hand, we calculated the number of persons who are tolerant to LGBT people, racist and nationalist at the same time for each country through cross tabulation.

The alignment of tolerance to LGB people, racism and nationalism was measured through two correlations (Domínguez Amorós and Simó Solsona 2003; SPSS 2001; Visauta Vinacua 1997): tolerance to LGB people with racism and tolerance to LGB people with nationalism. The correlation coefficient with the value 1 supposes a perfect representation of homonationalism in values: the more tolerant values to LGB people the more racist and nationalist values. The inexistence of a correlation or a negative correlation instead, supposes a lack of homonationalism in values.

In order to measure the weight of homonationalist values in the population we proposed creating a typology considering the extreme values of those who are tolerant to LGBT people, racist and nationalist. For this reason, we measured the number of people indicating 8, 9 or 10 in the three indicators of tolerance towards LGB people, racism and nationalism. Afterwards we were able to calculate the percentage of homonationalists over the different populations.

Tolerance LGB, Racism and Nationalism

In this part we are going to expose first of all the univariate results for the three core variables of homonationalism, as well as the correlations and the result of the newly created typology homonationalism.

The indicator for the LGB tolerance provided by the EVS matrix is a scale from 1 to 10 measuring whether homosexuality is always (10) or never (1) justified. Therefore, a country with a perfectly LGB-friendly population should score an average of 10 on the scale. Obviously, this is not the case in any country. Comparing the
univariates we can observe considerable variability, both within and between countries (“Appendix 1”, Table 1). Thirteen of forty-five countries account for a standard deviation above 3, which highlights an important internal dispersion (idem). Comparing between countries, Iceland (8.34), Sweden (7.76), Netherlands (7.53), Denmark (7.25) and Norway (7.18) stand out at the top of the LGB tolerance scale (idem). All other countries are below 7 (idem). Georgia (1.14), Armenia (1.19) and Kosovo (1.29) occupy the last places in the indicator of LGB tolerance. The difference between the lowest and highest average is more than 7 points (idem).

Retrieving the idea of a LGB-friendly discourse in Western European opposed to another Europe being permanently post-communist, in transition and homophobic (Kulpa 2014b), data on people’s values is not very clear about it. If values lower than 3 are deemed as extremely intolerant, it becomes clear that such generalizations cannot be made: Czech Republic (4.85) and Hungary (3.26), and the Republic of Slovakia (4.79) remained excluded (“Appendix 1”, Table 1). Doing the same exercise with a similar threshold for Western Europe—eight out of ten—we only spoke of Iceland (idem). Lowering the standards and considering a value of five already moderately tolerant Greece (3.71), Northern Ireland (4.3), Portugal (3.68) or Cyprus (2.19) still would not enter this club, which is marked by a tolerant Scandinavian-Dutch center (idem). However, it is important to remember that no country in Eastern Europe exceeds the 5 point arithmetic half (idem).

The second variable, racism, is also measured on a scale of 1–10. In this case, people have to evaluate if their country’s culture is undermined by immigrants, indicating a ten in such an answer. Compared to LGB tolerance, the indicator of racism is much more homogeneous, both at the intra-state level and at the inter level (“Appendix 1”, Table 2). That means, that the responses do not vary that much, both in the countries and between the countries. However, there is a variation within the countries; in seven countries the standard deviation surpasses the three. Regarding the differences between countries, the subtraction of the highest and the smallest index is less than four points: in Malta, the racism index is 7.68 and in Finland 3.95 (“Appendix 1”, Table 2). Apart from Malta, Turkey (6.59), Russia (6.17), Kosovo (6.55) and Great Britain (6.38) also stand out. They score values above six, meanwhile Germany (5.95) remains tightly under six (idem). In this case, it seems to be impossible to draw clear boundaries between European countries, although issues such as ethnic and national conflicts, immigration and inertia seem to play a role.

The third element of the analysis is nationalism (Puar 2007), in this case measured on a scale of 1–10, with 10 being the most extreme value of nationalism. A 10 indicates the opinion that in order to have the nationality it is important to respect laws and political institutions, to have been born in the country and to have lived there a long time. Compared to the variables analyzed above, the dispersion between countries is very low: it hardly exceeds two points (“Appendix 1”, Table 2). One extreme is occupied by Cyprus, with an average of 8.62, and the other extreme by the Netherlands, with about 6.58 points (idem). Within countries there is little spread: only five countries point to a standard deviation above two (idem). Again, it seems difficult to draw borders, since the averages are too similar. It seems though that there is less disagreement on nationalism than on homophobia and racism. From there, you have to control to which extent it comes with LGB tolerance.
Homonationalist Values: Relations Between LGB Tolerance, Racism and Nationalism

Correlating tolerance to LGB and racism, on the one hand, and tolerance to LGB and nationalism, the data reveals that in some cases there is an association and in others the is no real association (“Appendix 2”). The point is that almost every relation is negative, which means: the more tolerance there is to LGB, the less racism and less nationalism there is (idem).

Considering the correlation between tolerance LGB and racism, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Northern Ireland show the strongest association, whereas Kosovo, Albania and Byelorussia indicate smaller, but still statistically significant, values (“Appendix 2”, Table 3). Only Macedonia, Russia, Romania, Latvia, Georgia, Estonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Armenia do not have statistically significant relationships (idem). It is important, however, that the relationship between racism and LGB tolerance is negative, which implies that the greater the LGB tolerance the less racism there is. Northern Cyprus is the only country where a positive correlation (0.201**) is significant (idem).

Taking into account the second crucial correlation of this work, measuring the relationship between LGB tolerance and nationalism, it can also be indicated that in the vast majority of cases there is a strong relationship, as in the cases of Norway (-0.327**) and Slovenia (-0.308**), although there are also less intense relationships such as Macedonia (-0.091*), Russia (-0.07), Lithuania (-0.068*), Moldova (-0.064*) and Kosovo (-0.051*) (“Appendix 2”, Table 4). Only in Armenia, Northern Cyprus and Montenegro can a non-significant relationship (idem) be observed. In the case of Cyprus it is the only positive relation (0.038) (idem). That said, it is important for emancipatory movements that the relationships are negative: the more LGB tolerance, the less nationalism.

In both cases, the introduction of control variables does not entail any major change, but rather a strengthening or weakening of existing relationships. This change never exceeds, however, the second decimal place. That is why we will not go further in this matter.

Linking the two correlations we observe that they have a high degree of association (0.712 **) and therefore it seems that the association between nationalism and LGB tolerance on the one hand and the association between racism and LGB tolerance on the other are deeply interconnected (“Appendix 3”, Table 5).

The second technique was based on the analysis of the variable homonationalism, a variable that collects extremely tolerant values with LGB people (on a scale of 1–10 are values from 8 to 10), extremely racist values (on a scale from 1 to 10 are the values from 8 to 10) and extremely nationalist values (on a scale of 1–10 are the values from 8–10). The variable measures how many ‘homonationalists’ are in every country.

In “Appendix 3”, we can see that in the vast majority of countries there are homonationalist groups (“Appendix 3”, Table 5). In the same way, we must admit that the combination of LGB tolerance, racism and nationalism does not build a statistically significant group in Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Cyprus, Estonia,
Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, Kosovo and Northern Ireland (idem). In the rest of the cases the relationship has global and/or local statistical significance.

Among the countries with the largest homonational populations, there is Britain (5.4%), Malta (5.2%), Austria (5.1%) and Sweden (4.5%). Germany (3.9%), Switzerland (3.6%), Belgium (3.4%), Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway (all three 3.3%), and Spain and Luxembourg (with 3.2%) score lower but still important values (idem).

**To What Extent are Europeans Homonationalist?**

Given the data above, we now consider our hypothesis and answer our main research questions. The first of the two theses has been that homonationalism can be detected in the values of Europeans. The hypothesis that homonationalism is anchored in the values of Europeans has been elaborated based on Puar (2007) taking into account empirical works on European contexts (Røthing and Svendsen 2011; Jivraj and de Jong 2011; Petzen 2012; El-Tayeb 2012; Kulpa 2014a, b; Szulc 2015, 2016; Hubbard and Wilkinson 2015; Kahlina 2015; Sadurní Balcells and Pujol Tarrés 2015; Ammaturo 2015; Szulc and Smets 2015) and represents the heart of analysis.

In order to confirm that homonationalism is present in the values of Europeans, LGB tolerance, racism and nationalism LGB tolerance should be positively correlated.

As shown above there is a significant relationship, but it is almost always negative. Therefore, we have to refute the main hypothesis if it refers to Europeans as a whole: homonationalism is not expressed in the values of the people, at least if it is considered a representative sample of the general population. Only in Northern Cyprus the correlation between racism and LGB tolerance is statistically significant. It is extremely interesting why it is so in Northern Cyprus where tolerant values with LGB people correlate with racist values and should be further investigated.

However, one particular and complex case must be considered on its own, a task that cannot be undertaken in this comparative and exploratory work. Taking into account the amount of homonationalists—those who are tolerant with LGB, racist and nationalist—this hypothesis must be affirmed partially; though at the level of the total population, homonationalism cannot be observed, we detected some countries where parts of the population have homonationalist values. Thus it can be concluded that what has been detected in public speeches and policies by Puar (2007), Røthing and Svendsen (2011), Jivraj and de Jong (2011), Petzen (2012) El-Tayeb (2012), Kulpa (2014a, b), Szulc (2015, 2016), Hubbard & Wilkinson (2015), Kahlina (2015), Sadurní Balcells and Pujol Tarrés (2015) and Ammaturo (2015) and is only reflected in the values of a few people in certain countries of Western Europe.

Moreover, there is a considerable group of people with homonationalist values in twelve countries. These countries are Great Britain, Malta, Austria, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Luxembourg, but definitely not in all the analyzed countries.
Does Homonationalism Differ Across Europe?

The findings above take us to the next hypothesis, based on the work of Puar (2007) analysing homonationalism especially in the USA and Israel, but also claiming that it may exist elsewhere under different conditions. These different conditions are discussed, especially for Eastern Europe, where the authors detect subversion and resignification (Kulpa 2014a; Szulc 2015, 2016; Kahlina 2015). That is why we considered that the prevalence of homonationalist values does differ across Europe according to the country and region. This affirmation has two facets. On the one hand, we have observed that the relationship between tolerance LGB, racism and nationalism differs in all the countries analysed; though its sense is almost anywhere negative, the degree of the relation is quite different. Thus it can be concluded that in the West nationalist and racist values are still antagonistic to sexual diversity—as the traditional theory of the link between nation and sexuality implies (Puar 2007; Kulpa 2014b; Szulc 2016), while in the East this antagonism is not given in such a strong way because LGB tolerance is generally more residual and/or racism and nationalism have other antagonists. On the other hand, we have a strong dispersion concerning magnitude of the homonationalist group: in some countries it exceeds 5 percent, in others there is a considerable statistically significant group, while there are other countries without any considerable homonationalist segment of the population. It is interesting that those countries where, generally speaking, LGB tolerance, racism and nationalism are antagonistic values, are the same countries where the homonationalist groups are minimally developed. The subversion and resignification which has been detected in some discourses (Kulpa 2014a; Szulc 2016; Kahlina 2015) is not reflected in the values of the Eastern European countries.

Having said that, western European Countries can be considered as a centre of homonationalism. Literature identifies discourses which differentiate between LGB-friendly nations and homophobic nations in Europe. These discourses draw a picture of a tolerant centre including the old EU, but also the Scandinavian countries, opposed to the intolerant European periphery of the post-Communist countries of the East (Kulpa 2014a; b; Szulc 2016; Kahlina 2015; Szulc and Smets 2015). If the centre of homonationalism is the association of LGB tolerance, racism and nationalism in the population as a whole, then there is no homonationalist population in Europe. If the centre of homonationalism is considered as the magnitude of a homonationalist segment in the population of the different European countries, its centre is definitely in Western Europe. In this sense, the discourse of gay friendly nations and homophobic nations has materialised in the values of some but is far from being generalised: it represents only a small group of the population.

Conclusions

In this article we aimed to unveil to what extent the values of Europeans expressed homonationalism. To do so we applied the concept homonationalism to the values of Europeans and analysed data from the European Values Survey.
Through our analysis it emerged that LGB tolerance, racism and nationalism tend to be opposed, but that there are some Western European countries where small groups combine the three values and, therefore, can be considered homonalists. This is an important contribution to our current knowledge on the topic since homonalism was never studied quantitatively nor in terms of the values of individuals. This means that what has been included in laws, public policies, activisms and news had some kind of representation in people’s values.

However, there is very good news for emancipatory activists and academics concerned with social transformation: the worst face of homonalist values—a combination of LGB tolerance, racism and nationalism—is far from being hegemonic. Those who combine tolerance for gays and lesbians with racism and nationalism are a very small group in any of the analyzed countries. In any case, this should not be understood as an all-clear: changes in values are slow. Therefore, we must continue to be attentive to sexualised racism. The small segment of people with homonalist values exemplifies that struggles for sexual and gender dissidence are not necessarily emancipatory or left wing oriented anymore; this small segment of homonalists provides evidence of the need for an intersectional approach and the construction of broader alliances. In this sense, we understand homonalism as a warning, which should encourage us to work on emancipatory social movements for social transformation: gather differences, work together and weave a complex fabric of social change. In this direction the results greatly reassured us in the sense that struggles for sexual and gender dissidence are not necessarily bound by the political right, but connected on the contrary with non-racist and non-nationalist values.

For all this, our results imply a significant contribution, as well as a new starting point to continue investigating issues surrounding homonalism. With this in mind, we hope to continue generating new information and results useful for movements and policies in order to struggle for emancipation, especially in relation to gender issues.

Acknowledgements  This research has been developed in the framework of the International Network for Comparative Analysis of Social Inequalities (INCASI), funded by the Horizon 2020 programme of the European Comission [Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA), Research and Innovation Staff Exchange (RISE) Project Number: 691004]. Leon Freude hold a grant of the Universitat de Barcelona (APIF 401) and is now financed through a grant from the Ministry of Science, Innovation and University (FPU18/02501).

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of interest  We, Leon Freude and Núria Vergés Bosch, declare that we do not have conflict of interest.

Ethical approval  This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.

Appendix 1

See the Tables 1 and 2.
### Table 1: Descriptive statistics on LGB tolerance

| Country                   | N  | Average | SD  |
|---------------------------|----|---------|-----|
| Albania                   | 1414 | 2.11    | 2.073 |
| Austria                   | 1430 | 5.42    | 3.335 |
| Armenia                   | 1479 | 1.19    | 0.85  |
| Belgium                   | 1490 | 5.83    | 3.01  |
| Bosnia–Herzegovina        | 1482 | 1.73    | 1.721 |
| Bulgaria                  | 1313 | 2.78    | 2.486 |
| Belarus                   | 1421 | 2.74    | 2.369 |
| Croatia                   | 1492 | 2.49    | 2.614 |
| Cyprus                    | 951  | 2.19    | 2.079 |
| Northern Cyprus           | 482  | 2.23    | 2.243 |
| Czech Republic            | 1694 | 4.85    | 3.356 |
| Denmark                   | 1478 | 7.25    | 3.178 |
| Estonia                   | 1453 | 2.3     | 2.158 |
| Finland                   | 1058 | 6.67    | 3.441 |
| France                    | 1465 | 5.65    | 3.198 |
| Georgia                   | 1451 | 1.14    | 0.708 |
| Germany                   | 1999 | 5.69    | 3.124 |
| Greece                    | 1461 | 3.71    | 2.948 |
| Hungary                   | 1471 | 3.26    | 2.906 |
| Iceland                   | 785  | 8.34    | 2.668 |
| Ireland                   | 930  | 5.2     | 3.335 |
| Latvia                    | 1415 | 2.41    | 2.223 |
| Lithuania                 | 1356 | 1.95    | 1.924 |
| Luxembourg                | 1537 | 6.51    | 3.518 |
| Malta                     | 1298 | 3.87    | 3.15  |
| Republic of Moldava       | 1446 | 1.72    | 1.702 |
| Montenegro                | 1458 | 1.73    | 1.967 |
| Netherlands               | 1521 | 7.53    | 2.912 |
| Norway                    | 1071 | 7.18    | 3.221 |
| Poland                    | 1433 | 2.86    | 2.55  |
| Portugal                  | 1391 | 3.68    | 2.797 |
| Romania                   | 1413 | 2.1     | 2.021 |
| Russian Federation        | 1391 | 2.23    | 2.238 |
| Serbia                    | 1475 | 1.82    | 1.9    |
| Slovakia                  | 1317 | 4.79    | 3.178 |
| Slovenia                  | 1325 | 3.91    | 3.43  |
| Spain                     | 1415 | 6.01    | 3.237 |
| Sweden                    | 1047 | 7.76    | 3.203 |
| Switzerland               | 1223 | 6.35    | 3.321 |
| Turkey                    | 2300 | 1.48    | 1.415 |
| Ukraine                   | 1343 | 1.61    | 1.594 |
| Macedonia                 | 1424 | 2.05    | 2.204 |
| Great Britain             | 1511 | 5.4     | 3.349 |
| Northern Ireland          | 469  | 4.3     | 2.852 |
| Kosovo                    | 1577 | 1.29    | 1.257 |
Table 2  Descriptive statistics on nationalism. Source: Prepared by the authors based on EVS (2011)

| Country                        | N   | Average | SD    |
|--------------------------------|-----|---------|-------|
| Albania                        | 1489| 7.1061  | 1.91718|
| Austria                        | 1476| 7.7378  | 1.8207 |
| Armenia                        | 1479| 7.4422  | 1.82429|
| Belgium                        | 1504| 6.8052  | 1.77622|
| Bosnia–Herzegovina             | 1468| 6.7146  | 2.38197|
| Bulgaria                       | 1444| 7.9861  | 1.75288|
| Belarus                        | 1457| 7.1675  | 1.6098 |
| Croatia                        | 1486| 7.0505  | 1.9163 |
| Cyprus                         | 981 | 8.6198  | 1.64105|
| Northern Cyprus                | 476 | 7.1197  | 1.76765|
| Czech Republic                 | 1771| 7.472   | 1.821  |
| Denmark                        | 1468| 6.8195  | 1.71269|
| Estonia                        | 1490| 7.2544  | 1.89137|
| Finland                        | 1093| 7.6496  | 1.62647|
| France                         | 1491| 6.9095  | 1.84551|
| Georgia                        | 1441| 8.1589  | 1.69325|
| Germany                        | 1962| 7.29    | 1.79892|
| Greece                         | 1473| 7.7502  | 1.70678|
| Hungary                        | 1501| 7.2958  | 1.89678|
| Iceland                        | 798 | 6.8434  | 1.58071|
| Ireland                        | 968 | 7.8905  | 1.80382|
| Italy                          | 1468| 7.9353  | 1.55535|
| Latvia                         | 1438| 7.3046  | 1.72553|
| Lithuania                      | 1387| 7.0036  | 1.66818|
| Luxembourg                     | 1581| 6.9715  | 1.71732|
| Malta                          | 1486| 8.5888  | 1.57501|
| Republic of Moldava            | 1499| 7.3936  | 1.71068|
| Montenegro                     | 1405| 6.9046  | 2.30897|
| Netherlands                    | 1534| 6.5847  | 1.58608|
| Norway                         | 1082| 7.0333  | 1.51612|
| Poland                         | 1466| 7.6357  | 1.66093|
| Portugal                       | 1523| 7.6967  | 1.83946|
| Romania                        | 1430| 8.0517  | 1.76193|
| Russian Federation             | 1442| 7.7712  | 1.80301|
| Serbia                         | 1448| 6.7327  | 2.14627|
| Slovakia                       | 1467| 7.4622  | 1.90688|
| Slovenia                       | 1347| 7.7476  | 1.8289 |
| Spain                          | 1440| 7.5347  | 1.85062|
| Sweden                         | 1100| 7.2436  | 1.71455|
Table 2 (continued)

| Country       | N  | Average | SD    |
|---------------|----|---------|-------|
| Switzerland   | 1197 | 7.2523  | 1.61458 |
| Turkey        | 2230 | 8.1117  | 2.15663 |
| Ukraine       | 1452 | 7.4442  | 1.96743 |
| Macedonia     | 1462 | 8.5834  | 1.5674  |
| Great Britain | 1512 | 7.6938  | 1.84818 |
| Northern Ireland | 481 | 7.343   | 1.93563 |
| Kosovo        | 1504 | 7.7547  | 2.01433 |

Appendix 2

See the Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3  Correlation coefficient on LGB tolerance and racism. Source: Prepared by the authors based on EVS (2011)

| Country                | Coefficient Autochthonous | Men | City | Right wing | Under 65 |
|------------------------|---------------------------|-----|------|------------|----------|
| Albania                | −0.067*                   | −0.063* | −0.066* | −0.08** | −0.078* | −0.063* | −0.091** |
| Austria                | 0.270**                   | −0.278** | −0.274** | −0.27** | −0.271** | −0.25** | −0.263** |
| Armenia                | −0.021                   | −0.021 | −0.018 | −0.017 | −0.039 | −0.021 | −0.035 |
| Belgium                | −0.183                   | −0.198* | −0.191** | −0.205** | −0.161** | (−0.209**) |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina    | 0.033                    | −0.0331 | −0.034 | −0.046 | −0.021 | −0.031 | −0.023 |
| Bulgaria               | −0.136**                 | 0.136** | −0.134** | −0.146** | −0.166** | −0.135** | −0.165** |
| Belarus                | −0.070**                 | −0.067* | −0.068* | −0.07** | −0.099** | −0.07* | −0.095** |
| Croatia                | 0.185**                  | −0.183** | −0.18** | −0.177** | −0.218** | 0.18** | −0.191** |
| Cyprus                 | −0.135**                 | −0.12** | −0.137** | −0.17** | −0.107** | (−0.111**) |
| Northern Cyprus        | 0.201**                  | 0.181** | 0.198** | 0.168** | 0.197** | (0.151**) |
| Czech Republic         | −0.167**                 | −0.169** | −0.167** | −0.174** | −0.157** | −0.152** | −0.147** |
| Denmark                | −0.289**                 | −0.293** | −0.284** | −0.29** | −0.278** | −0.266** | −0.26** |
| Estonia                | 0.051                    | 0.065*  | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.045 | 0.037 | (−0.43) |
| Finland                | −0.377**                 | −0.379** | −0.368** | −0.382** | −0.39** | −0.378** | −0.366** |
| France                 | −0.291**                 | −0.3**  | −0.293** | −0.286** | 0.284** | −0.27** | −0.271** |
| Georgia                | −0.01                    | 0.01    | 0.011 | 0.009 | 0.007 | 0.009 | 0.004 |
| Germany                | 0.295**                  | −0.305** | −0.291** | −0.295** | −0.268** | −0.288** | −0.269** |
| Greece                 | −0.214**                 | −0.214** | −0.215** | −0.214 | −0.219** | −0.186** | −0.206** |
| Hungary                | −0.247**                 | −0.247** | −0.248** | −0.247 | −0.245** | −0.244** | −0.245** |
| Iceland                | −0.293**                 | 0.291**  | −0.285** | −0.289** | −0.269** | (−0.283**) |
| Ireland                | −0.302**                 | −0.302** | −0.305** | −0.294** | −0.304** | (−0.306**) |
Table 3 (continued)

| Country              | Coefficient Autochthonous | Men | City | Right wing | Under 65 |
|----------------------|---------------------------|-----|------|------------|----------|
| Italy                |                           |     |      |            |          |
| Latvia               | −0.03                     | 0.036| 0.028| 0.027      | 0.068*   | 0.034   | 0.078* |
| Lithuania            | −0.094**                  | 0.094**| 0.091**| 0.092**   | 0.074*   | 0.092   | 0.073* |
| Luxembourg           | −0.069**                  | 0.085**| 0.065*| 0.078**   | 0.074**  | 0.074** | 0.097** |
| Malta                | −0.096**                  | 0.09**| 0.096*| 0.118**   | 0.049    | 0.1**   | 0.1*   |
| Republic of Moldova  | −0.093**                  | 0.092**| 0.095**| 0.081**   | 0.087**  | 0.089** | 0.07** |
| Montenegro           | −0.014                    | 0.012| 0.011| 0.239**   | 0.054    | 0.013   | 0.051  |
| Netherlands          | −0.237**                  | 0.239**| 0.237**| 0.239**   | 0.18**   | 0.229**| 0.218** |
| Norway               | −0.312**                  | 0.321**| 0.29**| 0.301**   | 0.303    | 0.298**| 0.265** |
| Poland               | −0.104**                  | 0.105**| 0.106**| 0.106**   | 0.116**  | 0.091* | 0.106** |
| Portugal             | −0.212**                  | 0.205**| 0.211| 0.21**    | 0.244**  | 0.195**| 0.223** |
| Romania              | −0.044                    |     | 0.041| 0.043     | 0.017    | 0.044  |
| Russian Federation   | −0.029                    | 0.029| 0.029| 0.035     | 0.026    | 0.03   | 0.034  |
| Serbia               | −0.074**                  | 0.074**| 0.077**| 0.07*    | 0.064    | 0.075**| 0.062  |
| Slovakia             | −0.166**                  | 0.164**| 0.166**|          | 0.162**  | 0.153  | (−0.148**) |
| Slovenia             | −0.219**                  | 0.225**| 0.21**| 0.219**   | 0.225**  | 0.218**| 0.222** |
| Spain                | −0.201**                  | 0.23**| 0.205**| 0.203    | 0.162**  | 0.18** | 0.208** |
| Switzerland          | −0.135**                  | 0.169**| 0.138**|          | 0.114**  | 0.131**| (−0.144**) |
| Turkey               | 0.153**                   | 0.148**| 0.152**| 0.13**   | 0.16**   | 0.153**| 0.135** |
| Ukraine              | −0.094**                  | 0.094**| 0.095**| 0.1**    | 0.086*   | 0.087**| 0.09*  |
| Macedonia            | 0.042                     | 0.041| 0.043| 0.014     | 0.034    | 0.05   | 0.016  |
| Great Britain        | −0.212**                  | 0.233**| 0.215**| 0.242**  | 0.228**  | 0.204**| 0.263** |
| Northern Ireland     | 0.200**                   | 0.199**| 0.217**| 0.203**  | 0.197**  | 0.213**| 0.217** |
| Kosovo               | 0.054*                    | 0.046| 0.055*| 0.057*    | 0.087*   | 0.052* | 0.089* |

*Sig. Bil. $P<0.05$; **Sig. Bil. $P<0.01$
### Table 4

Correlation coefficient on LGB tolerance and nationalism. *Source:* Prepared by the authors based on EVS (2011)

| Country                        | Coefficient | Autochthonous | Men | City | Right wing | Under 65 |
|--------------------------------|-------------|---------------|-----|------|------------|----------|
| Albania                        | −0.155**    | −0.152**      | −0.155** | −202** | −0.157**   | −0.151** | −0.228** |
| Austria                        | −0.287**    | −0.302**      | 0.293** | −0.288 | −0.28**    | −0.254** | −0.266** |
| Armenia                        | −0.01       | −0.009        | 0.01  | −0.008| −0.023     | −0.01    | −0.024   |
| Belgium                        | −0.177**    | −0.198        | 0.178**|      | −0.141**   | (−0.157**) |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina             | −0.062*     | −0.061*       | −0.064*| −0.069*| −0.068*    | −0.053*  | −0.067*  |
| Bulgaria                       | −0.241**    | 0.241**       | −0.239**| −0.207**| −0.217**   | −0.22**  | −0.161** |
| Belarus                        | −0.118**    | −0.115**      | −0.119**| −0.118**| −0.142**   | −0.106** | −0.119** |
| Croatia                        | −0.204**    | −0.2**        | −0.202**| −0.201| −0.228**   | −0.192** | −0.208** |
| Cyprus                         | −0.228**    | −0.216**      | −0.228**| −0.237**| −0.202**   | (−0.190**) |
| Northern Cyprus                | 0.038       | −0.002        | 0.038 |      | −0.095     | 0.046    | (−0.129**) |
| Czech Republic                 | −0.122**    | −0.125**      | 0.124**| −0.119**| −0.073*    | −0.107** | −0.057*  |
| Denmark                        | −0.254**    | −0.262**      | −0.247**| −0.24**| −0.246**   | −0.226** | −0.208   |
| Estonia                        | −0.045      | −0.068        | 0.048 |      | 0.033      | −0.017   | (−0.038) |
| Finland                        | −0.287**    | −0.288**      | −0.309**| −0.291**| −0.279**   | −0.288** | −0.299** |
| France                         | −0.282**    | −0.295**      | −0.285 | −0.278**| −0.269**   | −0.241** | −0.254** |
| Georgia                        | −0.093*     | −0.093*       | −0.093**| −0.092*| −0.139**   | −0.092*  | −0.138** |
| Germany                        | −0.253**    | −0.273**      | −0.255**| −0.249**| −0.224     | −0.244** | −0.236** |
| Greece                         | −0.129      | −0.128**      | −0.139**| −0.134**| −0.145**   | −0.076** | −0.101** |
| Hungary                        | −0.229**    | −0.228**      | −0.222**| −0.226**| −0.24**    | −0.21**  | −0.221** |
| Iceland                        | −0.222**    | −0.216**      | −0.227**|      | −0.22**    | −0.185** | (−0.187**) |
| Ireland                        | −0.251**    | −0.009        | −0.246**|      | −0.259**   | −0.215** | (−0.240**) |
| Italy                          | −          | −            | −         |      | −         | −        | −         |
| Latvia                         | −0.154**    | 0.168**       | −0.155**| −0.149**| −0.143**   | −0.215** | −0.128** |
| Lithuania                      | −0.068*     | −0.075**      | −0.068**| −0.067**| −0.099**   | −0.046   | −0.076*  |
| Luxembourg                     | −0.093**    | −0.12**       | −0.088* |      | −0.096*    | −0.084*  | (−0.077*) |
| Malta                          | −0.117**    | −0.101**      | −0.117**| −0.203**| −0.153**   | −0.103** | −0.203** |
| Republic of Moldova            | −0.064*     | −0.06*        | −0.066*| −0.044| −0.133**   | −0.059*  | −0.094*  |
| Montenegro                     | 0.005       | 0.003         | 0.005 |      | −0.033     | 0.012    | (−0.031) |
| Netherlands                    | −0.209**    | −0.215**      | −0.206**| −0.211**| −0.17**    | −0.182** | −0.149** |
| Norway                         | −0.327**    | −0.337**      | −0.325**| −0.325**| −0.328**   | −0.301** | −0.311** |
| Poland                         | −0.215**    | −0.215**      | −0.216**| −0.192**| −0.234**   | −0.196** | −0.192** |
| Portugal                       | −0.161**    | 0.156**       | −0.162**| 0.159**| −0.159**   | −0.134** | −0.139** |
| Romania                        | −0.145**    | −0.144**      | 0.145**| −0.159**| −0.143**   | −0.141** |
| Russian Federation             | −0.07*      | −0.072*       | −0.073*| −0.072*| −0.086**   | −0.057*  | −0.081*  |
| Serbia                         | −0.108**    | −0.109**      | −0.107**| −0.121**| −0.093**   | −0.108** | −0.091** |
| Slovakia                       | −0.124**    | −0.122**      | 0.124** |      | −0.14**    | −0.121** | (−0.142**) |
| Slovenia                       | −0.308**    | −0.318**      | −0.322*| −0.31**| −0.317**   | −0.292** | −0.326** |
### Table 4 (continued)

| Country          | Coefficient Autochthonous | Men     | City     | Right wing | Under 65  |
|------------------|---------------------------|---------|----------|------------|-----------|
| Spain            | −0.166**                  | −0.169**| 0.172**  | −0.166**   | −0.102**  | −0.136**  |
| Switzerland      | −0.182**                  | 0.218** | −184**   | −0.169**   | −0.151**  | (−0.176**)|
| Turkey           | −0.14**                   | −0.14** | 0.137**  | −0.115**   | −0.137**  | −0.106**  |
| Ukraine          | −0.164**                  | −0.162**| −0.167** | −0.164**   | −0.134**  | −0.16**   | −0.147**  |
| Macedonia        | −0.091*                   | −0.092* | −0.092** | −0.09*     | −0.074**  | −0.088**  | −0.069    |
| Great Britain    | −0.192**                  | 0.225** | −0.189** | −0.216**   | −0.234**  | −0.133**  | −0.186**  |
| Northern Ireland | −0.171**                  | −0.167**| −0.172** | −0.213**   | −0.175**  | −0.242**  |
| Kosovo           | −0.058*                   | 0.057*  | −0.057*  | −0.022     | −0.082*   | −0.057*   | −0.081    |

*Sig. Bil. $P<0.05$; ** Sig. Bil. $P<0.01$

### Appendix 3

See the Table 5.
Table 5 Percentage of persons with homonationalist values in Europe. Source: Prepared by the authors based on EVS (2011)

| Country                | Percentage | Autochthones | Men  | City  | Right wing | Under 65  |
|------------------------|------------|--------------|------|-------|------------|-----------|
| Albania                | 0.2        | 0.2          | 0.1  | 0.4   | 0.2        |           |
| Austria                | 5.1 (**/sig)| 5.4          | 3.5  | 3.3   | 6.1        | 5.8       |
| Armenia                | 0.1        | 0.1          | 0.2  | 0.2   | 0.2        |           |
| Belgium                | 3.4 (**)   | 3.6          | 3.3  | 4.3   | 3.7        |           |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina     | 0.3        | 0.3          | 0.4  | 0.2   | 0.3        |           |
| Bulgaria               | 0.2 (**)   | 0.2          | 0    | 0.3   | 0.2        |           |
| Belarus                | 0.1        | 0.2          | 0    | 0.2   | 0.2        |           |
| Croatia                | 0.2 (**)   | 0.1          | 0.2  | 0.4   | 0.2        |           |
| Cyprus                 | 0.8        | 0.8          | 0.5  | 1.1   | 1.1        |           |
| Northern Cyprus        | 1.6 (**)   | 2.6          | 1.1  | 1.7   |            |           |
| Czech Republic         | 1.3 (/sig) | 1.4          | 1.6  | 3.5   | 1.8        | 1.4       |
| Denmark                | 3.3 (**)   | 3.5          | 2.1  | 2.9   | 3.7        | 3.2       |
| Estonia                | 0.5        | 0.5          | 0.2  | 0.2   | 0.6        |           |
| Finland                | 2.3 (**)   | 2.3          | 0.5  | 2.3   | 1.1        | 2.5       |
| Germany                | 3.9 (**)   | 4.1          | 3.3  | 6.9   | 4.3        | 4.5       |
| Greece                 | 1.9 (**)   | 2.1          | 2.2  | 3.2   | 1.7        | 2.3       |
| Hungary                | 0.7 (**)   | 0.7          | 0.6  | 1.2   | 0.7        | 0.8       |
| Iceland                | 2.5 (**)   | 2.6          | 2    | 2.1   | 2          |           |
| Ireland                | 3.3 (**)   | 3.5          | 1.5  | 2     | 3.7        |           |
| Italy                  |            |              |      |       |            |           |
| Latvia                 | 0.3        | 0.2          | 0    | 0.6   | 0.2        | 0.3       |
| Lithuania              | 0.3        | 0.3          | 0.3  | 0.3   |            |           |
| Luxembourg             | 3.2 (**)   | 4.6          | 3.4  | 4.6   | 3.3        |           |
| Malta                  | 5.2 (sig)  | 5.2          | 5.7  | 4.9   | 6.6        |           |
| Republic of Moldava    | 0.1        | 0.1          | 0    | 0.1   |            |           |
| Montenegro             | 0.3        | 0.4          | 0.3  | 0.4   | 0.3        |           |
| Netherlands            | 3.3 (**/sig)| 3.3         | 2.9  | 5.7   | 3.6        | 3.8       |
| Norway                 | 3.3 (**/sig)| 3.5         | 3.2  | 4.7   | 4.6        | 3.5       |
| Poland                 | 0.1 (*)    | 0.1          | 0    | 0.3   | 0.2        |           |
| Portugal               | 0.3        | 0.3          | 0.2  | 0.2   | 0.4        |           |
| Romania                | 0.2        | 0.2          | 0.2  | 0.3   | 0.2        |           |
| Russian Federation     | 1.2        | 1.2          | 1.6  | 2.1   | 1.6        | 1.4       |
| Serbia                 | 0.2        | 0.2          | 0.1  | 0.5   | 0.3        | 0.2       |
| Slovakia               | 1.1 (*)    | 1.2          | 1    | 0.9   | 0.8        |           |
| Slovenia               | 1.7 (**/sig)| 1.8         | 1.1  | 1.6   | 2          |           |
| Spain                  | 3.2 (**/sig)| 3.6         | 2.7  | 0.4   | 3.9        | 4.1       |
| Sweden                 | 4.5 (**/sig)| 5.2         | 4.3  | 3.8   | 5.8        | 5         |
| Switzerland            | 3.6 (/sig) | 4.5          | 2.9  | 6.6   | 4.2        |           |
| Turkey                 | 0 (**/sig) | 0            | 0.3  | 0     |            |           |
Table 5 (continued)

| Country      | Percentage | Autochthones | Men | City | Right wing | Under 65 |
|--------------|------------|--------------|-----|------|------------|----------|
| Ukraine      | 0.1        | 0.2          | 0.4 | 0.3  | 0.2        |          |
| Macedonia    | 1.2 (*)    | 1.2          | 1.4 | 2.7  | 1.3        | 1.2      |
| Great Britain| 5.4 (**)   | 6.1          | 3.8 | 10.4 | 5.1        | 6.6      |
| Northern Ireland | 0.8    | 0.9          | 0   | 0.6  | 0.1        | 1.1      |
| Kosovo       | 0.2        | 0.2          | 0.1 | 0.5  | 0.1        |          |

* Sig. Bil. \( P < 0.05 \); ** Sig. Bil. \( P < 0.01 \); sig residu corregit \( \pm 1.96 \) (la prova d’hipòtesis fa referència al grau d’associació entre les tres variables racisme, tolerància LGB i nacionalisme)

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