INTRODUÇÃ0

The modern world is characterized by a large number of wars and conflicts. Conflicts over natural resources, one of which is water, are the cause of many of them. According to the Pacific institute as of May 16, 2021, there have been 926 wars, armed conflicts, and other conflicts in history where people have confronted each other over access to water resources. Since 2010, there have been 466 clashes (36 armed) over the distribution of water resources worldwide (PACIFIC INSTITUTE, 2021). Researchers estimate a 75-95% chance of more occurring in the next 50-100 years (FARINOSI et al., 2018). To prevent this kind of confrontation between states in the future, among other things, we can use the study of history and analysis of conflicts over access to water resources. This becomes especially important if the findings provide an opportunity to avoid violence: to recognize the region, territory and object (river, lake, well, etc.) where such a situation could potentially arise, as well as to determine the timing of their possible aggravation and the time to prevent possible conflict. Available works in contemporary historiography divide water disputes into two types: domestic and international (BOYARKINA, 2015; LE-HUU, 2001; WOLF, YOFFE, GIORDANO, 2003). At the same time, LASSERRE (2006) determines that international conflicts over water are rarely resolved by force (the exception can be considered the war between the two city-states of Lagash and Umma in the land of Sumer, in lower Mesopotamia, dating back to about 2500 B.C.E. So far, the parties have tried to solve the problems by nonviolent means - diplomatically. When conflict arises that threatens human violence, famine, ecological disaster, or significant economic and economic losses, it tends to take place at the subnational level, that is, within states (GLEICK, ICELAND, TRIVEDI, 2020; LASSERRE, 2006). Agreeing with this position, we aim to elaborate on the historical examples of water conflicts, which occurred within one state, to determine the specifics of their occurrence and the possibilities of settlement or solution.

METHODOLOGY

To realize this goal, we plan to solve the following research tasks: to analyze the set of historiographic sources that speak of existing or possible conflicts over water, and to distinguish from them those events related to the shortage of its drinking water component; to describe some actual examples of confrontation of people (groups, economic entities, etc.) over water resources within one country; to outline possible variants of the disputes that have arisen around hydrogels, and to identify the parties to the conflict in them; propose possible ways of solving the problems in each of the “water conflict” options under consideration; identify common problems characterizing the lack of drinking water at the subnational level.
Given the state of scientific study of the presented topic, we used the following research methods: The analytical method made it possible to distinguish from the total number of conflicts those that contained the “water aspect” at their core, and those in which water acted not as a “weapon” to resolve contradictions, but as a resource, the lack of which caused disputes (violence). The method of induction made it possible to go from understanding the general problem of water in the world to the specifics of its deficiency and the consequences of this in each individual case. The method of deduction made it possible to establish common and distinctive features of disputes over access to water resources on the most high-profile facts in different countries, to generalize them according to certain features and to form the author’s vision of variants of possible causes of conflicts. The historical-typological method made it possible to identify research schemes for the study of hydrographic problematic issues. The historical and comparative - to determine the similarities and differences of “water” disputes in order to derive analogies. The historical-systemic approach was used in order to holistically cover the recognizable historical reality by its components. For the development of the topic, we also used the methods: content analysis, which allowed to summarize modern views in the assessments of problems with drinking water, and analysis-discourse, which contributed to the active joining of the author to the scientific discussion. Appeal to the above-mentioned methods of cognition allowed coverage of the considered in the study and lay out the material in a clear sequence and logical completeness.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

Researchers speak of increasing competition for natural resources, particularly water, both between states and between societies. And tensions will only grow as populations and nation-states grow (KASYMOV, 2011). The trend of such conflicts is demonstrated by the data collected by the Pacific Institute for Environmental and Security Studies. In particular, this organization has compiled information and formed a chronology of water conflicts that occurred in the world from 3000 BC to the present (PACIFIC INSTITUTE, 2021). This topic is important not only for scientists, or authorities of the world. Problems of access to water resources and the conflicts surrounding it are often covered by the media.

Conflicts over water are distinct from conflicts over other resources because water is necessary to sustain human life (ID4D, 2018) GLECK, ICELAND, TRIVEDI (2020) provide solutions to unique water problems and adapt them on a case-by-case basis. It should also be noted that the cause of conflict may be the treatment of water only as an economic and infrastructural resource, while little attention is paid to its cultural and social significance (CORDERO, 2009). The International Committee of the Red Cross notes that national governments must accept the responsibility to provide drinking water. And when governments are unable to do so for political reasons, populations can find themselves in a feigned humanitarian disaster (ICRC, 2014). And in more developed countries, populations are willing even to restore water quality at their own expense (JARAMILLO-VILLANUEVA, GALINDO-DE-JÉSÚS, BUSTAMANTE-GONZÁLEZ, CERVANTES-VARGAS, 2013) KRUSE (2005) shows that civic initiative and cohesion can restore social justice in water access, even if it goes against the interests of transnational corporations. LEMUS (2018), using Mexico as an example, shows that often the cause of water scarcity and conflicts around it is not natural scarcity, but regional governance models giving advantages to individual businesses. According to this author, the problem of access to water in Mexico has recently become even more acute than corruption and drugs (LEMSUS, 2020). SZELIGOWSKI (2020) notes the uncertainty of international legislation on the provision of fresh water in the occupied territories. ALEXFORD (2020), using the example of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea, occupied by the Russian Federation, notes that the lack of water resources can lead not only to natural disasters but also to technological ones, including chemical plants. The problems of water supply in the occupied territories give rise to opposing views on the ways to solve them. For example, part of the population, even in conditions of water scarcity, is ready to tolerate the inconveniences that arise from it, as long as it would help get rid of the occupation (UCMC, 2020). The Climat Diplomacy review focuses on the experience of resolving disputes over access to the resources of the Kaveri River between the Indian states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu and demonstrates how difficult this process can be, even with the involvement of government officials, the public, and professional mediators (Climat Diplomacy). In addition to global and local conflicts over water, Le-Huu highlights conflicts between upstream and downstream communities. The National Research Council
notes the impact of urbanization and industrialization on water resources, and demonstrates, using Mexico as an example, that this can lead to conflicts of interest between industry and population (NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 1995). The sources reviewed, first, provide an opportunity to trace different views on hydro conflicts, and second, once again demonstrate that this topic is relevant and of concern even in those countries that do not currently have one. Individuals highlight general issues related to water disputes (ZABLOTSKY, 2020; DANS LA PLUPART DES CAS, IL N’Y A PAS DE GUERRE DE L’EAU: INTERVIEW AVEC S. MCCAFFREY, 2018; LASSERRE, 2006; WOLF, YOFFE, GIORDANO, 2003). Others deal with the specific facts of disputes over the purity and access to Nigeria’s hydro resources (PIRIG, 2018; BACA, 2015; UWA, MARY, OLUWATOB, 2019; CRIMEA HAS CLAIMED 100% WATER SUPPLY FOR THE PENINSULA, INTERFAX, 2017; KOVAL, 2020; NAEV: BECAUSE OF THE THREAT OF RUSSIAN INVASION, TWO REGIONS HAVE STRENGTHENED INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, UKRINFORM, 2020; OCCUPIERS WANT TO ARTIFICIALLY INCREASE RAINFALL IN CRIMEA, GORDON, 2020; OCCUPIERS WANT TO DESALINATE SEAWATER IN CRIMEA, GORDON, 2020; REMAINS OF CRIMEAN AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES ARE LIVING OUT THEIR LAST SEASONS. 2020 WILL BE THE LAST YEAR FOR MANY, GORDON, 2020; CRIMEA: WATER SUPPLY BECOMING A TOOL FOR POLITICAL PRESSURE, UCMC, 2020; SZELIGOWSKI, 2020). The remnants of Crimea’s agrarian enterprises are living out their last seasons. 2020 will be the last year for many (GORDON, 2020; CRIMEA: WATER SUPPLY BECOMING A TOOL FOR POLITICAL PRESSURE, UCMC, 2020; SZELIGOWSKI, 2020). To clarify certain provisions, materials of legal (Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 1949) and reporting nature (EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SECURITY SITUATION, 2017; STATE WATER POLICY GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA, 2002) were also served. The above sources and information, the sources of which we have not reflected due only to the contact with our scientific research, set the stage for the reflections and generalizations that are outlined below.

RESULTS

As a result of the data obtained in the study, we can distinguish the following types of conflicts with hydro-resources and access to drinking water sources: interethnic and inter-clan within the country, between administrative territorial units within the same country, between the people and the government, between citizens and industrialists, between the citizens and the authorities in the occupied territory.

Interracial conflicts over water. It should be understood that in this case we are not referring to ethnic animosities as such, but to disputes between social groups that, due to historical development, lead a certain way of life and economy, dependent on the availability of water. A striking example of this is the clashes between the nomadic pastoralists of the Fulani ethnic group and the sedentary farmers, mostly ethnic Hausa in Nigeria. Because the former are Muslims and the latter are CHRISTIANS, UWA, MARY, OLUWATOB (2019) define the disputes between them as largely interreligious. However, we believe the cause of the problem is due to climate change. For example, the Fulani cattlemen, scattered in most of West and Central Africa, graze over large areas and spend most of their time in grassy terrain. Previously, they were tied to Lake Chad, which provided their animals with drinking water and the surrounding area with greenery in a certain way (PIRIG, 2018). Thus, data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs speak of its significant desiccation. The area of the lake has declined from 26,000 square kilometers in 1963. To less than 1,500 square kilometers today (OCHA, 2018). There is information that the sands of the Sahara Desert are moving southward at a rate of about 600 kilometers per year, causing the Fulani to move in the same direction in search of more wet land and water (Living organic news). This movement began as early as the 1960s, However, in the 21st century has begun to resemble a strategic annexation of not only the southern territories of Nigeria, but up to less than 1,500 square kilometers today (OCHA, 2018). There is information about the movement of the sands of the Sahara Desert southward at a rate of about 600 km per year, which caused the Fulani to move in the same direction in search of new wet lands and water (Living organic news). This
Movement began as early as the 1960s. However, in the 21st century has begun to resemble a strategic annexation of not only the southern territories of Nigeria, but up to less than 1,500 square kilometers today (OCHA, 2018). There is information about the movement of the sands of the Sahara Desert southward at a rate of about 600 km per year, which caused the Fulani to move in the same direction in search of new wet lands and water (Living organic news). This movement began as early as the 1960s. However, the 21st century has begun to resemble a strategic annexation not only of southern Nigeria but also of the western Sahel, which is a transitional zone between the Sahara Desert and the savannah (UWA, MARY, OLUWATOBI, 2019). It is worth noting that pastoralists and agrarians in Nigeria had a rather symbiotic relationship: the former offered animals and manure, while the latter offered crops. Over time, however, there were fatal clashes between the two, as herders and cattle made additional pressure on the land resources of the southern part of the country, the consequence of which was the displacement of farmers from their cultivated lands, the destruction of fields by cattle, the pollution of water sources, etc. (BACA, 2015). And with the drought, the influx of new people disrupts the existing livelihood dynamics of the area and often leads to violent actions. Clashes between herders-farmers have led to the death and displacement of thousands of people in this most populous country in Africa (UWA, MARY, OLUWATOBI, 2019).

There is a possibility that the problem of water scarcity in Nigeria could lead to serious food and refugee crises in the region if urgent action is not taken to ensure adequate security for people in rural communities throughout the country. If this is the case, the consequence could be that the conflict between herders and farmers could potentially spread throughout West Africa. We see that the upsurge of violence among pastoral farmers is due to the confluence of three events: first, climate change, which has caused a shortage of potable water; second, the steady expansion of cultivated land and cattle herds; and third, the passivity of the country’s political leaders in addressing and preventing conflicts over resources. Ways to address this issue could include the Nigerian government developing legislation to share the resources of Lake Chad while simultaneously implementing a green plantation program, targeted and integrated water resource management, and developing a livestock and farmland transformation plan. As a conflict prevention option, the Nigerian government should not only deploy more security units in critical areas, but also prosecute and punish perpetrators of violence and disarm parties to disputes. If necessary, the country’s leadership should seek support from neighboring countries and international donor agencies. And to do so, the federal government must recognize that the roots of conflict are resources (notably water), amplified by environmental problems.

Conflict over water between administrative-territorial units. Such territories, as a rule, have relative sovereignty in internal affairs and cede full authority at the national level to central governments. This is especially evident in cases where a natural water flow passes the lands of several provinces (states, provinces, etc.) and if one of them can manipulate the system of supply or level of liquid to the other. For example, the Kaveri River (India) originates among the Brahmagiri hills and flows through the states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu into the Bay of Bengal. In the Kaveri basin, which covers parts of three states and a small union territory, water from the river’s main drain and its tributaries no longer reaches the sea (SCHNEIDER, 2017). The main reasons for water scarcity in the region: the cultivation of water-intensive crops, particularly Janakarajan sugarcane (2016). Another reason cited is industrialization and urban growth in India’s Silicon Valley (Climat Diplomacy) and the associated population increase in the Kaveri Basin (more than 30% in the last generation). Researchers also note the impact of large-scale logging of water-absorbing forests in the Western Ghafa Mountains, the source of the waters of the Kaveri Basin (SCHNEIDER, 2017). The water conflict between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu dates back to the late nineteenth century, but another aggravation was caused by the distribution agreement in 1974. And the disputes dragged on for years. In 2007 These Indian states refused to accept the final result of these negotiations, which determined the new amount of water to be allocated to them (Climat Diplomacy). Although Karnataka and Tamil Nadu have sought for over a century to create an effective and usable water storage and allocation pact, and the Supreme Court of India has periodically acted as arbitrator, agreements between the states have broken down in times of drought, of which there are more and more (SCHNEIDER, 2017). The Supreme Court dismissed Karnataka’s appeal in 2013…, However, the state still fails to meet its obligations (Climat Diplomacy). As Karnataka state
leaders withhold water during the dry season from farmers and residents of Tamil Nadu, conflicts escalate. Moreover, next to violent deaths, suicides and heart attack victims have increased (SCHNEIDER, 2017). Thus, the existence of millions of people, both upstream and downstream, depends on the availability of water in the river. The destabilization of the water sector in the region seriously affects the hydrology, economy, and ecology not only of the states involved in water conflicts, but of India as a whole, and in an official report by the Government of Karnataka (GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA, 2002). In order to ease political tensions, measures should be taken to reduce water scarcity in both states. For example, in order to economize, it is necessary to modernize the canal network and improve water storage management; to encourage conversion to less water-intensive crops; to use drip irrigation more widely (which will reduce the use of water and pesticides and increase crop yields); and to try reclamation of already affected lands. In order to prevent violence between the people of the states, it is necessary to create a dialogue platform, because debates between representatives of all conflicting sides can significantly improve relations between the state and society, as well as between the people of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. Along with these urgent steps towards "water peace" in India, research on assessing the impact of climate change and developing strategies for adaptation to it should also help to reduce the impact of extreme weather phenomena.

Conflict with hydro resources between clans. In this case, by clans we mean kinship associations, which in modern conditions acquire a corporate image with the presence of armed militia. For example, let us choose the Federal Republic of Somalia, which today is one of the tensest spots on the globe. The civil war in this country, which began in 1988 and is still going on, has led to the de facto disintegration of the country and inter-clan fighting on its territory. The clashes, among other things, have unfolded around water resources. Note that the main sources of water in the country are groundwater and two rivers, the Sabel and the Juba. However, access to drinking water is limited; only 30 percent of Somalis have it (IOM). First, some Somalis left the major cities and moved to rural areas to seek refuge with their families. As a consequence, the population has increased in areas that were already suffering from a decline in agricultural production (ICRC, 2009). Second, individual residents who have been displaced from their homes in the cities are often settling on their outskirts, where access to drinking water is available but also limited (ISSAK, 2014). Third, refugees from neighboring countries: Ethiopia, Yemen, Syria, Tanzania, Eritrea, are constantly entering the country. Their numbers in 2019 alone was 34558 people. Fourth, and as a consequence of the previous, by, the formation of a large number of refugee camps (IAGUA, 2019; ICG, 2017). Ineffective state management on the water resource, lack of central planning, including irrigation projects, settled and corrupt taxation system, unsuitable market system and access to water (WAX, 2006); shortage of water systems and lack of services from the state that to the construction and support facilities that would provide drinking water to the population. (ISSAK, 2014) difficult (sometimes dangerous) conditions in the country for international organizations that want to provide humanitarian assistance (WAX, 2006).

To overcome the humanitarian crisis, the government needs to solve the conflict itself, which remains the main trigger of clashes. This can be solved by improving governance and taking steps to address the distribution of power and resources between the central government and other federal entities in accordance with the country’s constitution. Somali Muslim community leaders and clerics should try to convince clan leaders and Al-Shabaab to give access to areas under their control. When it comes to water supply in the country, the government should develop and implement long-term solutions to the drought, such as collecting rainwater from reservoirs, rehabilitating existing water sources and animal fountains, drilling new wells, supporting (if it is possible) more water facilities, building modern irrigation systems and using new methods of water exploration, providing the population with water purification facilities and the like. In case the clan militias fail to reach an agreement, the government forces should consider forceful options for dismantling roadblocks and armed protection of wells and provide paramilitary escorts for convoys with international aid.

Conflict between the people and the government over access to drinking water. Population growth and increase in the average air temperature over the last decades form new challenges for governments of all countries in the field of water resources management and, especially, in
water supply to the population. However, public policies in this area are not efficient enough and sometimes contain elements of corruption and monopoly in the market of such services provision, which, in turn, provokes citizens’ indignation and corresponding protests. An example are the events in the Bolivian department of Cochabamba. Thus, at the end of the twentieth century, this population suffered significantly from a lack of drinking water, which was influenced by the following factors: the lack of these sources of water, drought, population growth (in Cochabamba alone the number of households increased from 43,417 to 122,257 between 1976 and 2001), illegal connections to the water supply, dilapidated infrastructure, poorly calibrated meters, etc. (CORDERO, 2009). The water supply system could not provide all the inhabitants of the country with water from the public network, and consequently, a large part of the population depended on underground sources and drilling wells (over 400 wells have been drilled in the last twenty years in Cochabamba department alone) and the private sale of water from tankers that ply the south of the country (Kruse, 2005). Among the reasons that led to the conflict over water in the Bolivian department of Cochabamba in 2000.

We can mention the privatization of water resources and the lack of a legal framework that would regulate cooperation between private property entities and water consumers. The first “war for water” began rather peacefully. Residents of Cochabamba protested against privatization by organizing marches and demonstrations in the city streets, chanting “Long live water, death to the privatizers” (PERREAULT, 2006). Thus, on February 4, 2000, protesters marched to Cachabamba’s main square, the symbolic center of power. Over the next three months, the authorities initiated an escalation of violence in the central square of the country. There were arrests and beating of protesters. It ended with the signing of a peace agreement, partially satisfying the demands of the protesters. Subsequently, problems with another company, Aguas de Illimani in La Paz and El Alto led to rate increases in 2005. Before the second “water war. It began with the fact that after the implementation of privatization, the profits of private companies did not meet expectations, and water sales to citizens did not cover the cost of the contractual rent. In 2002 the transnational company Suez (which owns 55% of Aguas de Illimani) decided to implement tariff changes, and in June 2003 it unveiled projects to reduce the number of customers from 15,000 to 8,000. In March 2004 it stopped connecting new users altogether (VOROTNIKOVA, 2010). When the strikes began, the government, already experienced in the events of 2000, tried to avoid an escalation of violence. Despite three days of social unrest in El Alto, the central government announced the termination of the contract with Aguas de Illimani. Private campaigns left the water facilities and their protection from protesters was withdrawn (VOROTNIKOVA, 2010). The second “war for water” in Bolivia was an even more significant victory than the first. The struggle for social rights and social control over natural resources in El Alto took on the features of a “battle for democracy” and the restoration of social justice (VOROTNIKOVA, 2010).

Conflicts between people and industrialists. The twentieth century is characterized by the intensive development of industry and, as a consequence, anthropogenic impact on the environment. And although the water resource belongs to the category of inexhaustible natural resources, its quality is significantly reduced. Quite often hydropower plants are so polluted that their complete or partial degradation is observed. This, in turn, leads to a lack of drinking water and to conflicts between people and industrialists. The situation in Mexico falls into this category of disputes. It is true that there the concern for the environment officially began with the publication in 1971 of the Federal Law “Ley Federal para Prevenir y Controlar la Contaminación Ambienta” (Environmental Pollution Prevention and Control Act), which was in force until 1982 Since 1988 another regulatory document on the general legislation of environmental issues and balance protection (Ley general de le quilibrio ecologico y la proteccional Ambient) came into force, which was amended several times (the last in 2021). With the adoption of these documents, Mexican enterprises tried to comply with their requirements, but the periodic economic crises in the country led to the avoidance of companies from environmental projects (TORREGROSA, AGUILAR, 2010). As a consequence, water, air, soil, and food contamination by toxic chemicals is on the rise in Mexico. Of greatest concern are nitrates, toxic metals and other inorganic pollutants, various light and beverage organic solvents, agricultural pesticides, herbicides and radiochemicals. In addition, toxic leachates from improperly disposed chemical residues, leaks from underground storage of industrial or energy products, and wastes from mining activities are potential contributors
(MEXICO CITY’S WATER SUPPLY. IMPROVING THE OUTLOOK FOR SUSTAINABILITY, 1995). Consequently, indigenous communities and peoples are in conflict with companies over the right to hydro resources throughout the national territory. For example, as of 2018, there are 916 social conflicts in Mexico arising from a dispute over water reserves between groups and companies with economic development projects in mining, agribusiness, power generation, and urbanization (LEMUS, 2018). According to CartoCritica, a nonprofit Mexican social organization, in 2018 almost 75% of the conflicts with mining companies broke out in the communities of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Colima, Durango, Michoacán, Nuevo León, Sonora, Veracruz and Zacatecas. Regarding hydrological basins, the most congested are the Balsas, Bravo, which, San Lorenzo, Colorado, Sonora, Panuco, Asunción, Coatzacoalcoce, Marabasco, Jampapa, Lerma Chapala, Papaloapan and Coahuayana rivers (LEMUS, 2018). The most famous of these confrontations took place in the municipalities of Cuetzalan (northern Puebla), Mazapil (Zacatecas), Saltillo (Coahuila), Gabriel Tepepa (Cuautla municipality) and others (LEMUS, 2018). This imperfection of the Mexican legislation on water has enabled the development of ruling class corruption: an “exclusive” approach to its distribution, the promotion of “specific business”, etc. (LEMUS, 2018, 2020). This pattern of corruption, in turn, gave rise to the emergence of organized crime in water conflicts. In particular, it is revealed that in 2020 there were less than 16 criminal organizations (among them: the Sinaloa Cartel, Knights Templar, Los Zetas, and Hermanos Beltran Leyva groups) that sold their criminal services to large water monopoly companies. Their job was to repel social movements by harassing and intimidating water activists.

At the same time, the greatest presence of organized crime and such skirmishes was in the states of Sonora, Michoacán, Puebla, Veracruz, Mexico and Zacatecas (LEMUS, 2020). It is clear that the problem faced by Mexican industry in its water and wastewater management systems is the result of a failure to fulfill the roles and responsibilities assigned to both government and industry. To solve it, the government must take the path of fighting corruption at all levels of government, adjusting the legal framework to account for climate change, environmental requirements and the needs of the conflicting parties. Companies that violate legal restrictions on the use of water resources must be held accountable for their criminal actions. In turn, industrial companies must understand and comply with the requirements for the use, management and treatment of water; effectively use it during the industrial process, pay attention to the reuse of industrial wastewater (as it is easier to treat than domestic), use raw materials, is safe for the environment (the so-called “clean production”).

The conflict over water in the occupied territory. The current situation in Ukraine, related to the blocking of the North Crimean Canal by this state in connection with Russia’s occupation of the Crimean Peninsula, stands out from the overall picture of the struggle for water. On the one hand, it is possible to consider the actions of official Kiev as a political tool of pressure, and in the framework of the Russian-Ukrainian war - as a type of modern unconventional weapons. However, the water problems of the inhabitants of both the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the adjacent mainland Kherson region can already be called internal. By the construction of the North-Crimean Canal in 1963. (In 1971 its last branch to Kerch was completed) the existence of plants and animals in the Crimea was completely dependent on weather conditions. In dry years, a significant number of plants and animals died. In 1833. As a result of the mass drought not only animals died, but also people.

It was then that the idea of building a canal to supply water to the Crimea (KoloKrai) first appeared. If we consider the events that preceded the blocking of this artificial waterway, we note that in early 2014, the Russian Federation began actions (first of a political nature, and then with the use of military force) to seize the Ukrainian territory - the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC). In Ukraine, the date of the beginning of the temporary occupation of this territory is February 20, 2014 (On ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens and the legal regime in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine. Law of Ukraine from 15.04.2014 № 1207-VII), and already in the spring of the same year it was decided to stop water supply from Ukraine to this peninsula by blocking the North-Crimean Canal - as an act of protest against the illegal occupation (KOVAL, 2020; UCMC, 2020). The Ukrainian government blocked the Severo-Krymsky Canal in two stages: the first stage involved building and strengthening the locks at the Kakhovka reservoir; the second stage resulted in the construction of a powerful
dam on the administrative border between the Kherson Oblast of Ukraine and Crimea (near the Kalanchak checkpoint). The construction of this hydraulic structure was completed in mid-2017, and the North Crimean Canal, which previously supplied up to 85% of fresh water to Crimea, dried up for good (KOVAL, 2020). The existing problems with water supply, drought and low-snow winter led to the fact that some settlements of the peninsula had to impose restrictions on water supply or reduce the pressure in the water supply networks. Residents of rural areas in settlements that still do not have a centralized water supply have also been subjected to water shortages due to a sharp decline in the level of rivers and underground water sources (Remains of Crimean Agrarian Enterprises Living Out Their Last Seasons, 2020).

The Russian Federation has been trying in every possible way to provide water to the ARC it occupies over the years: there have been projects to drill wells, desalinate seawater (THE OCCUPIERS WANT TO DESALINATE SEAWATER IN CRIMEA, 2020), artificially increase precipitation over the peninsula (THE OCCUPIERS WANT TO ARTIFICIALLY INCREASE PRECIPITATION IN CRIMEA, 2020), install water intake facilities, lay an underwater pipeline and so on. However, none of these projects were put into practice: the construction of a water pipeline that would have brought water to Crimea from Krasnodar, or the water supply system that was supposed to be built on the bridge across the Kerch Strait. But all these projects were deemed inexpedient. The construction of desalination plants was assessed as too expensive and unprofitable (AXELROD, 2020; CRIMEA: WATER SUPPLY BECOMING A TOOL FOR POLITICAL PRESSURE, 2020). As of 2021, the Russian Federation is increasing the number of occupation troops in Crimea and is resettling its own citizens in Crimea. This only exacerbates the water situation. The Ukrainian government states that it will resume the work of the North Crimean Canal only after de-occupation. As for the fears of a humanitarian disaster due to the lack of water, according to Ukrainian scientists, the peninsula’s own resources are quite sufficient to meet the needs of the population. About 101-105 million m3 of water was used annually for drinking and household needs of the residents of Crimea, which is about 9 times less than the water reserves on the peninsula (KALCHEVA, IVANOVA, 2020).

Given these figures, Ukraine perceives the supply of water as ensuring the militarization of its adversary, with whom it is fighting in Donbass. The above data also shows that there is enough water on the Crimean Peninsula to meet the needs of the population. At the same time, the Ukrainian state is not able to exercise power in this occupied territory and guarantee certain rights to its residents. Therefore, the position of the Ukrainian authorities is that the state that occupied the peninsula of Crimea, namely the Russian Federation, has the right to ensure these rights, including the provision of water. In this, Ukraine refers to its own and international legislation. Namely the law "On ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens and the legal regime in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine", the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 and the UN Additional Resolution on the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, adopted by the General Assembly of this organization on 27 March 2014 (CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, GENEVA, 1949; "ON ENSURING THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF CITIZENS AND THE LEGAL REGIME IN THE TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED TERRITORY OF UKRAINE", KIEV, 2014; UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2014). The Crimean Peninsula is not the only occupied territory of Ukraine. There are also ORDLO - certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled by pro-Russian armed formations. The water supply system in ORDLO operates on the same principle as the water supply system in Crimea. Water is supplied there by the Seversky Donets - Donbass canal. But unlike in Crimea, the Ukrainian authorities do not take any steps to stop the operation of this channel. On the contrary, it makes a lot of efforts to maintain its working condition (BUGLAK, BOYKO, LUNEVA, 2019).

Ukrainian officials explain this by the fact that the country is bound by obligations under the UN convention, and also because Mariupol, controlled by Ukraine, may be left without water, which takes water from the same canal “Seversky Donets - Donbass” (PIRIG, 2018). However, this does not mean that the population living in the ORDLO does not have problems with access to water. Fighting leads to frequent damage to water pipes and makes it difficult to repair and maintain them. Therefore, international organizations record numerous problems of residents of the occupied territories with access to water (SEVEN YEARS WITHOUT WATER SUPPLY, UNICEF, 2021; ACCESS TO WATER IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS OF DONETSK AND LUHANSK REGIONS. REPORT OF THE OBSE MONITORING MISSION, OSCE, 2015).
Therefore, the issue of free access to water supply facilities for representatives of the enterprise “Voda Donbassa”, which serves the entire water supply infrastructure of the region, should be resolved as soon as possible. For water supply to be stable, the company notes the need to introduce a five-kilometer ceasefire zone around water infrastructure facilities (BUGLAK, BOYKO, LUNEVA, 2019).

**DISCUSSION**

The problem of distribution of and access to water resources is becoming increasingly important for countries around the world (PACIFIC INSTITUTE, 2021). Population growth, urbanization and industrialization are contributing to this (KASYMOV, 2011). Political, social, war, and armed conflicts worsen the situation. But disputes over water also provoke various conflicts, sometimes even armed ones, with human casualties (GLEICK, ICELAND, TRIVEDI, 2020; LASSERRE, 2006). So far, these conflicts are overwhelmingly internal, but researchers do not rule out large-scale international clashes over water access and management (FARINOSI at al., 2018). The immediate challenges are to find effective and workable methods of resolving subnational conflicts for the sake of preventing conflicts over water between states. This problem emerged in the early 1990s, when numerous conflicts over the shortage of drinking water led the international community to consider that governments too seldom commit themselves to providing access to clean water. As early as 2003, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 15 on the right to water recognized that such right falls under articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on the Right to Life and Health (UN COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, 2003). According to this observation, the right to water consists of “an adequate, physically accessible supply of safe water of acceptable quality for the personal and domestic use of everyone” (DANS LA PLUPART DES CAS, IL N’Y A PAS DE GUERRE DE L’EAU: INTERVIEW AVEC S. MCCAFFREY, 2018).

**CONCLUSION**

So, as a result of the study we can state: problems of access to drinking water may become a global challenge to humanity in the XXI century. This is a problem that touches different places on planet Earth and could become a universal problem of humanity if no concrete work is done to solve it. At the same time, we have given specific examples of already existing problems, each of which has its own roots and, accordingly, different ways out of the situation. Thus, the solution to the inter-ethnic conflict over Lake Chad can be found in concluding agreements on the joint use of its water resources and in working to prevent its further desiccation. The solution to the conflict between the states is obviously to strengthen the role of the federal government in the regulation of hydro resources, possibly transferring control of the river to the central government. The same solution can obviously apply to solving inter-clan conflicts. After all, in transforming climatic conditions, only the construction of irrigation infrastructure can solve the problems of droughts. And only the central government can raise sufficient funds for this, or in the case of Somalia, international organizations can take on this role.

Conflicts over water between the government and the people and the people and industrialists lie on the same plane. It is the improvement of legislation in the context of the development of a strong civil society in the regions where these problems exist. The situation with water in the occupied territories is an appendix to the problem of the occupied territories themselves. The problem of water shortage there will disappear with the change of the status of these territories when they return under the control of Ukraine. The generalized factual material underscores the idea that a universal solution to the problem of citizens’ access to drinking water in all countries cannot be found, because: in each country, rather different reasons have influenced the emergence of this problem; it is difficult to establish the boundary of “water poverty” because of climatic differences (people in arid Africa need more water per day than, say, in Europe); in some countries, water supply issues can be resolved peacefully (through judicial decisions, government programs), while in others, escalating the issue requires lengthy internal negotiations and international support (intervention).

Note that the examples of conflicts over water and means of overcoming them given in the research can be supplemented by other examples. In this case, the combination of several
types of conflicts at once with the classification of variants of collisions for this resource proposed by us is not excluded. The parties to a conflict may resolve "water problems" through violence, or by appealing to the judiciary, or as a result of a reasonable response of the authorities. These internal conflicts may concern only individual administrative units of one country, or they may erupt into nation-wide acts of indignation, or they may spread to neighboring countries or regions. But in any case, in disputes over water, one should see signs reflecting the existence of a problem and understand the necessity of its solution for the sake of safe existence of inhabitants of the territory where such conflict takes place and further development - social, economic, cultural. Concluding we want to note that in 2003 the general comment No 15 on the right to water adopted by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognized that such a right fall under the provisions of the Art. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on the Right to Standard of Living and Health. According to this comment, the right to water consists, according to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2003), of "an adequate, physically accessible supply of safe water of acceptable quality for personal and domestic use by everyone". This international document should be a guide for the governments of nation-states in the development of water allocation legislation and its actual implementation, since there is still a problem when governments in some states ignore their duty at the legislative level to ensure access to clean water for their populations.

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Intra-state water conflicts (second half of the XX- early XXI centuries): historical and geographic overview

UN COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (CESCR), GENERAL COMMENT NO. 15: THE RIGHT TO WATER (ARTS. 11 AND 12 OF THE COVENANT), 2003. Available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838d11.html. Access: May 12, 2021.

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Intra-state water conflicts (second half of the XX- early XXI centuries): historical and geographic overview

Conflitos hídricos intra-estaduais (segunda metade dos séculos XX- XXI): visão geral histórica e geográfica

Conflictos hídricos intraestatales (segunda mitad de los siglos XX- XXI): panorama histórico y geográfico

Resumo
O artigo revela e sistematiza os principais tipos de conflitos sobre a água potável, que eclodiram no mundo durante o final do século XX e início do século XXI. Para cada tipo de conflito, é dado um exemplo específico e brevemente divulgada a sua história, são analisadas as principais razões para a sua implantação. Note-se que a esmagadora maioria dos conflitos passados e presentes são locais e têm lugar dentro dos estados nacionais. Mas com o crescimento populacional, industrialização e urbanização, a procura de água está apenas a crescer, o que leva a um aumento da competição por ela e pode provocar novas disputas por este recurso. Separadamente, o conflito sobre o acesso aos recursos hídricos na Península da Crimeia ocupada pela Rússia é destacado. A experiência do estudo de conflitos sobre a água demonstra que mesmo disputas locais sobre recursos hídricos resultam frequentemente em baixas humanas, pioram as condições de vida das pessoas e acarretam riscos para a saúde, em particular fome e epidemias.

Palavras-chave: Recursos hídricos. Recursos naturais. Escassez de água potável. Competição pela água. Alterações climáticas.

Abstract
The article reveals and systematizes the main types of conflicts over drinking water, which broke out in the world during the late XX and early XXI centuries. For each type of conflict, a specific example is given and briefly disclosed its history, the main reasons for its deployment are analyzed. It is noted that the overwhelming majority of past and present conflicts are local and take place within national states. But with population growth, industrialization and urbanization, the demand for water is only growing, which leads to increased competition for it and can provoke new disputes over this resource. Separately, the conflict over access to hydro-resources on the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula is highlighted. The experience of studying conflicts over water demonstrates that even local disputes over hydro resources often result in human casualties, worsen people’s living conditions, and carry health risks, in particular famine and epidemics.

Keywords: Hydro resources. Natural resources. Drinking water scarcity. Competition for water. Climate change.

Resumen
El artículo revela y sistematiza los principales tipos de conflictos por el agua potable, que estallaron en el mundo a finales del siglo XX y principios del XXI. Para cada tipo de conflicto se ofrece un ejemplo concreto y se expone brevemente su historia, analizándose las principales razones de su despliegue. Se observa que la inmensa mayoría de los conflictos pasados y presentes son locales y tienen lugar dentro de los estados nacionales. Pero con el crecimiento de la población, la industrialización y la urbanización, la demanda de agua no hace más que aumentar, lo que lleva a una mayor competencia por ella y puede provocar nuevas disputas por este recurso. Por otra parte, se destaca el conflicto por el acceso a los recursos hídricos en la península de Crimea ocupada por Rusia. La experiencia del estudio de los conflictos por el agua demuestra que incluso las disputas locales por los recursos hídricos suelen provocar víctimas humanas, empeorar las condiciones de vida de la población y conllevar riesgos sanitarios, en particular hambrunas y epidemias.

Palabras-clave: Recursos hídricos. Recursos naturales. Escasez de agua potable. Competencia por el agua. Cambio climático.