SECURECONFIG: NFC and QR-Code based Hybrid Approach for Smart Sensor Configuration

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Abstract—In smart factories and smart homes, devices such as smart sensors are connected to the Internet. Independent of the context in which such a smart sensor is deployed, the possibility to change its configuration parameters in a secure way is essential. Existing solutions do provide only minimal security or do not allow to transfer arbitrary configuration data. In this paper, we present an NFC- and QR-code based configuration interface for smart sensors which improves the security and practicability of the configuration altering process while introducing as little overhead as possible. We present a protocol for configuration as well as a hardware extension including a dedicated security controller (SC) for smart sensors. For customers, no additional hardware other than a commercially available smartphone will be necessary which makes the proposed approach highly applicable for smart factory and smart home contexts alike.

Index Terms—Near Field Communication; Internet of Things; smart sensor; configuration; security controller.

I. INTRODUCTION

For smart sensors [1] that are connected to the Internet it is crucial that their configuration and firmware can be updated in a secured and efficient way. Such smart sensors can be deployed in a wide range of fields such as in a smart factory or in a smart home.

Smart Factory [2]: In smart factories it is essential to perform maintenance operations of sensors involved in the production process. By introducing a secured and easy to use configuration interface, even untrained staff can perform firmware updates or configuration changes. However, it is very important to protect the confidentiality and authenticity of configuration data as employees applying the configuration updates could be potential adversaries. By enabling any employee or external person to perform configuration operations, the flexibility of the already deployed sensors will be increased while the associated maintenance costs will be decreased [3].

Smart Home [4]: Also in a smart home context, configuration and firmware updates for devices need to be performed using a secured and easy to use configuration interface. Devices not only include smart sensors but also other electronic devices such as WiFi routers. Similar to the smart factory use-case, also in a smart home context the configuration data must be secured against various attacks for sustaining the proper functionality of the configured devices. A configuration interface included into smart home devices enables any customer to perform firmware and configuration updates. These updates could, for instance, even be provided by a vendor’s helpdesk. By including such configuration interfaces into smart sensors, also the Bring Your Own Key (BYOK) principle [5] can easily be applied in both the smart factory and smart home context. BYOK would allow customers to change vendor supplied cryptographic keys, and thus, give them the certainty that no third party is able to access their data.

The approach presented in this paper not only is able to transfer cryptography keys but also arbitrary configuration data and firmware updates. To transfer data, NFC technology is chosen for three reasons. (i) NFC offers some security advantages compared to other wireless technologies [6]. Also, certain kinds of attacks such as man-in-the-middle are harder to conduct due to the limited communication range of NFC. (ii) The update process can be performed without an internal power source, if the necessary hardware is powered by the NFC field. (iii) NFC is easy and intuitive to use. Humans easily understand the principle of bringing one device near to another to transfer data [7].

If NFC is used to transfer data from a backend to a mobile device and from the mobile device to smart sensors, at least three NFC-enabled devices would be necessary. While smart sensor and mobile device must be equipped with an NFC interface in any case, needing an additional NFC-enabled device such as an NFC reader for the backend is inconvenient at least in a smart home context. Therefore, a combination of NFC and QR-Codes is used in the approach presented in this paper. The presented approach also relies on the functionalities provided by a security controller (SC). We propose to use a SC to protect the confidentiality and authenticity of configuration data that is stored on the SC. To the best knowledge of the authors, no other publication described a combination of these techniques to perform updates for smart sensors. The main contributions of this paper are:

1) The presented configuration approach allows arbitrary configuration data including firmware updates to be transferred in a secured manner.
2) The presented approach therefore is suitable for industrial as well as smart home use-case scenarios.
III. SecureConfig

Configuring smart sensors in a smart factory as well as in a smart home context is desirable. For a solution that is suitable for both contexts, a couple of requirements need to be fulfilled. To be usable in a smart factory context, a central instance that manages all active configurations is needed. In a smart home context, no additional hardware besides a mobile device and sensors should be necessary to make the proposed approach feasible for many users. Therefore, the system architecture shown in Fig. 1 is proposed. It comprises three components.

1) **Backend**: Configurations are created, updated and securely stored at the backend.

2) **Mobile Device**: The mobile device is used to transfer configuration data provided by the backend to the smart sensor. In our prototype we used a smartphone.

3) **Smart Sensor**: The smart sensor receives the provided configuration update.

| Related Work | Necessary Hardware | Supported Payload | Security Considerations |
|--------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| [18] RFID Card Reader, CRFIDs | Firmware Only | None |
| [19] NFC-enabled Phone, and Sensor | Arbitrary Data | Encryption used except for initial update; No encryption on mobile device |
| [20] At least 2 Android Devices for P2P | Arbitrary Data | None |
| [21], [22] RFID tags, 2 NFC devices to pair | Pairing information | None |
| This Work | NFC-enabled phone and sensor | Arbitrary Data | Discussed in Section III |

## Table I

### Table I

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In the context of this paper, it is assumed that the data stored on the backend is secured by appropriate security mechanisms such as a hardware security module (HSM), and thus, data stored at the backend is efficiently protected from loss or manipulation.

A. NFC Enhancement

To equip any arbitrary sensor with NFC capability and a SC, we propose a hardware component named NFC Enhancement. The component is shown in Fig. 2. As can be seen there, it comprises two controllers and various interfaces. The reasons for suggesting a dedicated NFC enhancement module are:

1) By designing a dedicated hardware module with an explicit interface to sensors, currently available (legacy) sensors can easily be transformed into a smart sensor. The NFC enhancement module can easily be offered as a single PCB which is easy to integrate for sensor vendors.

2) By including two controllers, responsibilities can be split perfectly according to the properties of both controllers. The sensor host controller provides interfaces to the sensor and optionally to a network while also offering computational power and memory for any kind of application. The less powerful but energy efficient SC on the other hand offers a secured execution environment and protected storage for configuration data as well as an NFC interface.

3) The NFC interface connected to the SC allows for ad-hoc connectivity instead of opening the configuration interface to a potential network connection. Also, the SC can be powered through the NFC field which allows for configuration updates independent of the sensor’s and host controller’s power supply.

B. Hybrid Communication Approach

As shown in Fig. 1, different technologies for data transfer are proposed in our approach. To transfer configuration data from the backend to the mobile device, QR codes are used. The configurations stored on the mobile device are then transferred to the smart sensor using NFC. The reasons for using this hybrid approach are:

1) By using QR codes to transfer configurations to the mobile device, no additional hardware (aside from the mobile device) such as an NFC reader is needed by customers. Configurations are imported by simply scanning the QR codes. This makes our approach especially suitable for smart home contexts while not limiting its usefulness in industrial contexts. Configurations could be printed for maintenance workers or displayed in web based configuration interfaces for customers.

2) NFC is suggested to transfer configuration data from the mobile device to the smart sensor. Reasons for using NFC for this data transmission are the additional security resulting from the limited communication range as well as the possibility to also configure sensors that are disconnected from their power supply. This also allows the initial configuration of sensors by the vendor during their assembly where no power supply is available. This property adds additional usefulness to our approach.

As a result of using two different technologies for data transfer, two separate data structures and methodologies need to be applied which are discussed for both variants.

C. Quick Response Code

Due to the size limitations of a QR code’s maximum payload, two different modes for transferring configuration data to the mobile device are suggested.

1) The whole configuration payload is stored in the QR code, which allows to store about 2900 bytes of data. We denote this type as inline QR code. Inline QR codes do not require the mobile device to have an active network connection, thus, those codes can be distributed, for instance, to a maintenance worker without restrictions.

2) If the configuration data is larger than the size limit of 2900 bytes, only an URL pointing to the backend is
included in the QR code. The mobile device then needs to fetch the configuration data from the backend using a secure channel (TLS). This type is denoted as URL QR code. For the download process, the mobile device needs to have a network connection through which the backend can be reached.

The type that is used to transport configuration data however, does not solely depend on the configuration data’s size. A second factor is the desired security level, as no active connection to the backend is needed for the inline type. Therefore, some of the security measures mentioned in Section III-E can not be applied.

D. Near Field Communication

To transfer configuration data via NFC, the NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) [23] that uses the NFC Forum reader/writer mode is used. NDEF abstracts the contactless communication and is supported by mobile platforms such as Android [24]. The proposed structure for NDEF packages is shown in Fig. 3. As can be seen there, various security related fields are included in addition to the (encrypted) configuration data.

E. Security Measures

To provide confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the transferred configuration data, authenticated encryption (AE) [25] is used. As can be seen in the NDEF packet structure shown in Fig. 3, the transferred packet comprises a couple of security related fields as well as the encrypted payload, and a MAC; the later two are calculated by applying AE. The AE method of operation considered as having the best security properties is encrypt-then-MAC [26] which is the reason why this approach is used in our work. When using AE it is also important to not use the same key for both encryption and hashing; therefore, a cryptographic key derivation [27] is applied to generate separate encryption and hashing keys from a master key.

In addition to the aforementioned cryptographic principles, additional information regarding the configuration data is included in the NDEF message (see Fig. 3). This information is used by the SC at the smart sensor to decide if a configuration update is rejected or accepted and consequently applied. As the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of this information also needs to be protected, all but two fields are included in the encryption process. The two unencrypted fields are:

- Sensor ID: If the specified sensor ID does not match, the configuration update is rejected.
- Realtime: The time in milliseconds since the mobile device was started.

As there is no time synchronization between the backend and the smart sensor, the process of verifying the configuration’s validity needs to be discussed in detail. Whenever a configuration is fetched from the backend, the following steps are performed:

1) For each configuration, a validity period \( \Delta \) needs to be specified at the backend.
2) The mobile device sends a request to the backend, containing the current realtime \( \vartheta \).
3) Upon encrypting the configuration data, the included validity \( \nu = \vartheta + \Delta \) is calculated.
4) The encrypted configuration data is sent to the mobile device.

For our approach to function properly, we assume a secured time source in the mobile device. In the case of an inline QR code, no connection to the backend is established; therefore, no validity can be specified for the included configuration data. Due to this, the inline mode needs to be considered as less secure than the URL mode.

IV. Evaluation

A prototype was realized to evaluate the feasibility, usability, and functionality of the presented approach. This prototype, pictured in Fig. 4, contains the following components:

1) Sensor: An air pressure sensor is used in this prototype to demonstrate the configuration update process.
2) NFC Enhancement: The NFC enhancement prototype that was realized is based on a concept presented by Lesjak et al. [3] that uses an Infineon XMC4500 microcontroller (Cortex M4 family) as the general purpose controller. This controller offers connection interfaces such as USB and Ethernet, as well as I2C. Via this I2C interface, a common criteria [28] EAL5+ certified SC by Infineon is connected to the XMC4500. This SC provides security features such as secured data storage and code execution by using a self-checking dual CPU concept, integrity checks for data transfers and caches, and encrypted memory and calculations in the CPU. Furthermore, this SC also includes a contactless interface capable of NFC communication. The NFC antenna is integrated into the NFC enhancement module as well.
3) **Mobile Device:** A Nexus S smartphone was used as an NFC-enabled device in the presented prototype. On this device, Android 4.1.2 Jelly Bean was installed to use the latest NDEF functionality included with API level 14.

4) **Backend:** The backend was realized on a standard Windows PC in this prototype.

This prototype then was used to measure the time necessary for an update process. A configuration update containing 64 bytes of data, for example, took roughly 200ms on average which is similar to the time a TLS handshake would need on such hardware.

**A. Threat Analysis**

To demonstrate the achieved security level, a threat analysis which highlights Entities (E), Assets (A), Threats (T), applied Countermeasures (C), and Residual Risks (R) is conducted. Due to the higher security offered by the URL QR code, this mode is discussed in this threat analysis. An overview of the threat analysis in *goal structure notation (GSN)* is shown in Fig. 5. The attack possibilities that are analysed are the smart sensor interface as well as the mobile device which is seen as a data channel. The backend is assumed to be properly secured by measures such as an appropriate firewall and a HSM, the SC at the smart sensor is assumed to be certified to the security level EAL5+ according to the common criteria. The assets that need to be protected are configuration data (A1) and sensor functionality (A2).

Threats can be posed by the NFC enhancement vendor (E1), customer (E2), mobile device user (E3) and an external adversary (E4).

Threats resulting from intentional or unintentional backdoors (T1), weak cryptographic algorithms (T2) and bugs in cryptographic algorithms (T3) by the vendor (E1) are investigated in the common criteria EAL5+ certification process (C1) for the included SC. The initial encryption keys specified for each SC could be lost in a security breach (T4) or even disclosed in any form (T5) by the vendor (E1). This can be mitigated by changing the initial key (C2) as part of a configuration by the customer (E2). Any malicious mobile device user (E3) could try to manipulate configuration data (T6), try to apply outdated configurations (T7) or try to apply configurations to wrong sensors (T8). The presented security measures (C3), however, provide efficient mitigation of these threats. If the person responsible to update configurations (E3) does not apply the configuration at all (T9), a potential denial of service attack results if the sensor’s functionality is influenced by the missing configuration. There currently is no security measure implemented to counteract missing updates (R1). If the malicious mobile device user (E3) or an adversary (E4) with physical access to the sensor continuously tries to change a configuration which is rejected by the SC, a possible DoS attack (T10) could result. There is currently no security measure implemented against this kind of attack (R2). Attacks that passively try to eavesdrop (T11) configuration data are efficiently mitigated by the implemented security measures (C3) and the security features of NFC (C4).

**B. Overhead**

The overhead resulting from the implemented security measures can be split into a static and into a variable part. The static overhead, resulting from the information added to the encrypted configuration data and MAC, can easily be calculated by summing up all fields with specified sizes in Fig. 3. The resulting static overhead is $O_{\text{static}} = 16$ bytes. The variable overhead depends on the chosen cryptographic algorithms. For this evaluation, HMAC-SHA256 is assumed as hashing algorithm which adds an additional overhead of $O_{\text{variable}} = 32$ bytes. The resulting total overhead in that case would be $O = O_{\text{static}} + O_{\text{variable}} = 48$ bytes. An overview of the overhead relative to the configuration data size up to 4 kB of data is shown in Fig. 6. As can be seen there, when transferring configuration data of about 300 bytes, less than 15% of the transferred data will be security imposed overhead.
device and update the smart sensor’s configuration. Authenticated users could then read configuration parameters to require user authentication when applying updates. A password based key exchange protocol such as SPAKE presented in this work. As future work we plan to include module is presented. To mitigate potential security challenges imposed by such an additional configuration interface, appropriate security measures are included in our approach. It is also shown that by including those security measures, an acceptable amount of overhead is imposed. The feasibility of our approach is demonstrated as a prototype which is presented in this work. As future work we plan to include a password based key exchange protocol such as SPAKE [29] to require user authentication when applying updates. Authenticated users could then read configuration parameters from a smart sensor, directly modify them on their mobile device and update the smart sensor’s configuration.

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