READING THE WRECKAGE OF ISOLATED HUMANITY OR SHAPING THE CALVINIST TRUTH IN DEFOE’S ROBINSON CRUSOE

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ABSTRACT
When Edgar Allan Poe described Robinson Crusoe as: “a poem of […] a man on the run, who considers himself saved by Providence, should always however struggle, recognizing that his salvation is also in war, violence and murder,” he pointed to a theoretical commensurability between the two edges of the narrative: namely the Calvinistic outlook of a penitent and the overarching aspirations of the man facing the perils of primitive nature. Synonymous with the incident of the shipwreck as expedient to the rebirth of a Calvinist faithful was the tale of Crusoe—the diligent tradesman—who is also a Hobbesian individual in embryo.

I chose Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe as a propitious ground to dissect this built-in dualism of two diametrically opposite worldviews—namely the Calvinist and the Hobbesian—with special focus on the oxymoronic (rather than synonymous) nature of Crusoe’s experience whereby the two persist in their struggle while the outcome of this struggle remains forever beyond our ken.

KEYWORDS: Hobbesian, Calvinist, identity, dilemma

LITERATURE REVIEW
Despite the extensive critical reviews of Crusoe as the first English novel, most of the critics tended to seek a clear-cut approach to it, whether as a journey of religious recovery or as the nationalistic tale of expansionism. In so doing, they disowned the more engaging task of viewing Robinson Crusoe as a crossroad of these two initially-divergent parameters of identity which do not address themselves to rigid partition but rather to a state of inarticulacy.

In an article entitled “Calvin and Hobbes: Providence and Politics in Robinson Crusoe,” Ben Faber goes some distance in answering the question whether Crusoe embodies a spiritual or a scientific sense of Being only to land on the assuring certainty that Crusoe’s autobiography is a sad tale of a man plagued by “inconsistency” in his attempts at self-definition. Faber eludes the more impassioning category of the narrative as an interminable struggle between two organic facets of one and the same human individual. Similarly, James O. Foster forms his conception of Robinson Crusoe fully in light
of how Locke retains the fact that political legitimacy presumes a Christian sensitivity as its very ruling structure.

It is Faber’s stirrings of a clear-cut distinction between those two impulses (the Calvinist and the Hobbesian): of how Crusoe’s Calvinistic nostalgia ultimately encroaches upon his Hobbesian ambition as rebel and adventurer which invited my introspection of his position as a fallacy. Foster’s surfeit in his account of a Calvinistic subtext at the disposal of Crusoe’s experience on the island also demanded my skepticism about how to reveal his claim as something beyond the bounds of logic.

My article is therefore illuminated by my realization of Faber’s—as of Foster’s—oversight of the characteristically insoluble rapport between the Calvinistic and the Hobbesian compartments of Crusoe’s mindset.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
In so far as the narrative of Crusoe achieves its aesthetic purpose as the tale of self-reliance, it also typifies the improbable encounter between the Calvinist and the Hobbesian systems of thought.

Deconstructing Crusoe’s sense of providence as metaphysics of presence is the first step towards finally accepting the uncompromising nature of this encounter between a Calvinistic intuition of a sinner taking a lifelong trek towards redemption (on the one hand) and the Hobbesian legitimation of the licentiousness of the sovereign as head to a paranoid body of subjects (on the other).

The following essay recognizes the built-in ideology of the book not as a hybrid kind of structure but rather as one in which the Calvinistic and the Hobbesian, deeply in trouble, do not come to each other’s aid.

Research questions

The study is an attempt to answer the following questions:

- To what extent is Crusoe’s rebellion a cognitive method of knowing the world?

- Is Crusoe’s crisis of survival distinguished as one of confusion or of inconsistency?

- What marks the inefficiency of Hobbes’ ethico-political system of thought in the case of Crusoe?

- What converts Crusoe’s Calvinistic model of thought into an instance of metaphysics of presence?

* * *
Rebellion: the phase of anagnoricism

An act of rebellion was the trigger of Crusoe’s adventure against his father’s will. The same is true of the writer, Daniel Defoe, who defied the choice made by his father for him – that of becoming a preacher—and favored the secular orientation of trade which led him to travel to many European destinations. In both cases, rebellion is involved with antagonism to the extant religious legacy embodied in the family. Hence the interest of the present paper to question the validity of Crusoe’s marooned experience on the island as a religious pilgrimage in light of its groundless play between certainty and skepticism and—by extension—between a Calvinistic providence and the Hobbesian materialist worldview.

It was Ben Faber who, in an article entitled “Calvin and Hobbes: Providence and Politics in Robinson Crusoe” portrays the relationship between a Calvinistic sense of Providence in Robinson Crusoe and a Hobbesian understanding of the same narrative as no less than a dilemma. In his analysis of this tension, Faber argues that Hobbesian political discourse is what eventually destabilizes the formation of a purist Calvinist truth in the novel:

Other Hobbesian notions in Crusoe,” argues Ben Faber, “include the importance placed on formal covenants, as in Crusoe’s requirement that Xury swear to him; the dread of competition, as in Crusoe’s instinctive fear at the sight of a man’s footprint on his island; and the absolute sovereignty of Crusoe as governor, as in Crusoe’s complete control over those who come under his power on the island. But when other characteristics seem at odds with Hobbes, one begins to wonder how monolithic Crusoe’s materialist philosophy really is. (Ben Faber, 5)

Ben Faber examines the gradual migration from Calvinism to the thrill of a Hobbesian political experience of incessant rivalry and mutual warfare. It is clear therefore that Crusoe’s religious mission is obsessively intercepted by the more practical need of how to manage the wild island together with potential human threats. This intersection between two initially distant worldviews—namely the Calvinist and the Hobbesian—tolls the death knell to Crusoe’s very puritanical allegations.

In his “Preface to the Reader”, Defoe persists in his claim that every episode of his journey is a realization of God’s cosmic design: “to justify and honour the wisdom of Providence, in all variety of our circumstances, let them happen how they will” (RC, 7). This defeatist undertone will soon be distorted by his encounter with Friday. Crusoe’s religious self-congratulation portrays him as a puppet whose strings are pulled by god’s hands, which is also a denial of his self-will. It is interesting, however, to note the paradox inhabiting Crusoe’s very worldview. Indeed, his encounter with Friday will send him into a
panic of survival and self-preservation hence his making of Friday as his domestic and industrial slave: that is as the one who caters for Crusoe’s needs and also who makes profit for him by attending to his agriculture.

Crusoe’s maturation process transpires clearly from the way he fiddles respectively with religion and politics. Even his discourse of calculated self-affirmation is not rarely superseded by a religious consciousness:

My reason began now to master my despondency, [...] and I stated it very impartially, like debtor and creditor, the comforts I enjoyed against the miseries I suffered thus:

| Evil | Good |
|------|------|
| I am divided from mankind, a solitaire, one banished from human society. I have no soul to speak to, or relieve me. | But I am not starved and perishing on a barren place, affording no sustenance. But God wonderfully sent the ship in near enough to the shore. (RC, 69) |

The Calvinistic disposition of Crusoe’s mind appears in his constant recourse to the Christian deity to account for his state of affairs on the island. However, the association persists in Crusoe’s mind between religion and a scientific method of cataloguing loss next to profit: something he claims to have done “very impartially like debtor and creditor”. The association of these two polarized worldviews puts the claim by Ben Faber into question. Ben Faber examines Crusoe’s migration to and fro between religion and a pseudo-scientific survey of his predicament after the shipwreck in terms of “inconsistency” (Faber, 6). Ben Faber therefore lays down his criticism as an attempt: “to account for the incommensurability of spiritual and material aspects of the novel in terms of a dialogue in Robinson Crusoe between John Calvin and Thomas Hobbes” (Faber, 6). I shall counter-argue this claim by demonstrating how Crusoe yields to both temptations simultaneously which—in my opinion—is more arresting than mere “inconsistency”. Crusoe undergoes a crisis of identity in his inability to be neither a full-fledged Calvinist nor an atheist farmer or slaveholder.

The overlap between Crusoe’s mental calculations and his synchronic indulgence in religious thanksgiving immediately annuls the Hobbesian interpretation as the be-all and end-all of Crusoe’s journey on the island. Indeed, Crusoe is caught in the midst of a boundary situation with no visible demarcation between the Cartesian and the religious. However, Ben Faber insists on his observation of Crusoe’s distinct aversion to the Hobbesian political worldview: “That Crusoe begins to attend to these “secret” promptings of the mind, suggests that Defoe allows them credibility in the life of
obedient submission to God, which is at odds with Hobbes’s notion of the sovereign as the only legitimate interpreter of Scriptures and events” (Faber, 6). My response to this one-sided claim is that Crusoe is actually the failed Hobbesian project not because of the omnipresence of his Calvinistic consciousness but because of a destabilizing overlap between two antagonistic temptations: that of the calculating mind (on the one hand) and of the ascetic Calvinistic disciple (on the other). This failure of self-incorporation generates no less than a state of loss and lack of purpose. Crusoe’s case therefore is one of confusion rather than of “inconsistency”.

The crippling impact of Crusoe’s religious consciousness
What appears in the narrative as the total reliance on God’s grace hides another facet to it as the failure in the construction of Hobbesian materialism, especially in the absence of competition. This failure of socio-economic self-achievement justifies the preeminence given by Crusoe to religion as a substitute for the failure of the Hobbesian wolf in the making. Crusoe’s Calvinistic attention is also synonymous with his deep-seated sense of guilt: typical of the Puritans in their fixation on the myth of the original Sin, thus on man’s inherent rottenness: “In Adam’s fall, we sinned all”. Crusoe has been fully engrossed in his past, precisely in the memory of his former disobedience to his father as no less than his original sin. In so doing, he is drifted away from the stakes of the now-point of the present into the passivity of religious meditation and the conjuration of deep-lying family nostalgia.

Crusoe’s recourse to his Christian God in time of despair – “Lord look upon me! Lord pity me! Lord have mercy upon me!” (RC, 89)—is a striking feature of the primitiveness of his thought to come to his own rescue on the remote island. This is reminiscent of the Calvinist statement about the limitation of man whose journey towards peace and healing shall always end in chaos: “I know that nothing good lives in me, that is, in my sinful nature. For I have the desire to do what is good, but I cannot carry it out” (ROM. 7:18). Crusoe’s low self-esteem after the shipwreck shows that he is someone who faces his fate head on, admitting that life is not working with him in control.

In his book, A Short History of the World (and in a chapter entitled “Primitive Thought”), H. G. Wells surveys the earliest stages in the development of human intelligence with a special insight into religious superstition as its bête noire: “there is a sort of mental fossilization which we find in folklore and the irrational superstitions and prejudices that still survive among modern civilized people” (41). H. G. Wells is scrutinizing the traces of superstition in modern times thus bringing to light the danger presented by religion as a paralyzing legacy. H. G. Wells also describes the strong disposition in the primitive man to link up with metaphysics as in “the child’s aptitude for fear and panic” (Wells, 44). Similarly, Crusoe seems to embody a very primitive panic in the aftermath of his survival on the island: “I began to be sick and a leisurely view of the miseries of death came to place itself before me […] and nature was exhausted with the violence of the fever; conscience […] and I began to reproach myself with my past life.” It is clear that the qualms of Crusoe are centered on his past life: which validates his characteristically passive disposition. Crusoe’s religious prostration is part of his
retrograde movement towards the past, hence the primitiveness and lack of ambition typical of his discourse all the way through.

One of the most popular London preachers of the 1590s was William Perkins, whose Treatise of the Vocations (c. 1599) is a recapitulative statement about how Puritanism occupies more than one corner in the mind of an Englishman. According to Perkins, the God of Christianity has “ordained the society of man with man, partly in the commonwealth, partly in the Church, and partly in the family” (qtd. in Boris Ford, 40-41). More than being just a credo in the abstract, theology has its own bearing on the secular life of an English citizen in its entirety. Perkins also believes that a good Christian may receive messages from the Beyond and in considering those messages as something “imposed on man by God, for the common good” (40-41). Perkins points out an existing connection between social life and the otherworldly. Boris Ford observes that in so doing, “Perkins condemns usury and ambition” (41). I validate Ford’s decree for Crusoe whose fixation on theology impinges on his engagement in the very stakes and risks of his life after the shipwreck.

In the mind of a Christian faithful, the growing relationship with his creator gives them the courage to make an inventory of their life: past and present: thus, allegedly to redeem themselves from whatever sins they could have authored:

Submit ourselves, then, to God. Resist the devil, and he will flee from you. Come near to God and he will come near you. Wash your hands, you sinners, and purify your hearts, you double-minded. JAMES 4:7-8

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It is clear in this Biblical lesson that a Christian faithful shall embrace the future with single-mindedness: that is by learning from his past sins and focusing on the future. However, a paradox cannot help transpiring from this very Biblical verse which says that learning from past sins must produce a break with the past in order to avoid the charge of “double-mindedness”. The truth, however, is that man cannot be fully amnesiac of his past. Hence the insubstantiality of the Christian sense of time and –ipso facto—of Crusoe’s repentance for his past sins.

In more than one instance in the Bible, we discover the rather orphic sense of time. By the same logic, the text of Christianity is unable to provide a solid background for the duality of providence and politics in the case of Crusoe because –as long as he relies on religious consciousness—he is unable to project himself anywhere in his future “[…] neither did I see any prospect before me but that of perishing” (RC, 50); therefore to make a clear plan for the future as master of his new kingdom (the island) much less as a Christian penitent:
I remember my affliction and my wandering, the bitterness and the gall. I well remember them, and my soul is downcast within me. Yet this I call to mind and therefore I have hope: Because of the Lord’s great love we are not consumed, for his compassion never fail. LAM. 3: 19-22

Crusoe’s spiritual journey is actually not much of a religious statement. It takes rather from the notion of political providence in opposition to that of providential politics (Ben Faber, 12). Crusoe hardly abides by the precepts of his Christian faith because he is constantly on the horns of a dilemma between his past sin and the present danger on the island. More than that, the Christian text itself, is replete with paradoxes. One of them is obvious in the above lines from the Bible in the double-entendre surrounding the idea of man’s “double-mindedness”. God hardly makes a clear sense of man’s relation to historical time and in this sense, we cannot conclude on a congratulatory note about the reliability of the Bible as a subtext to the narrative of Crusoe. Nevertheless, we are left with one possible interpretation, which is to admit the text of Robinson Crusoe as a parody of the Christian faith in a world which invites nothing milder than competition and a sharp time-consciousness.

In his book entitled, Ideology and Structure in Robinson Crusoe: Defoe’s Resolution of the Trade-Morality Conflict, James O. Foster acknowledges the relationship between Crusoe’s Calvinistic discourse and his economic mindset as one of antagonism. He recalls Hobbes’ portrait of man in nature as a zoon politikon with no observance of the notion of an organized or civil society. In so doing, Hobbes conceives of man’s political mind in the state of nature as something typical of his wolfish—therefore purely individualistic—disposition:

In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently, no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account to time, no arts, no letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. (Hobbes, 186)

Hobbes’ chaotic representation of man has been instantiated in Crusoe’s struggle against fellow men and against nature. James O. Foster observes an analogy between the two texts in terms of the portrait drawn in each of man “motivated by two primary emotions: fear and desire” (Foster, 88). I should be inclined to partly argue against this claim by stressing Defoe’s interest in the instinct of “fear” rather than “desire”. Crusoe’s inventory of his own feelings on the island reveals his character as fear-ridden more than anything else:

I went and removed my boat, which I had on the other side of the island […] where I knew, by reason of the currents, the savages durst not […] come with their boats upon
any account whatsoever […] that there might not be the least shadow of any discovery, or any appearance of any boat or of any human habitation upon the island. Besides this, I kept myself, as I said, more retired than ever, and seldom went from my cell, other than upon my constant employment […] which was quite out of danger. (RC, 171-72)

Crusoe’s obsession with fear is seen in his instinctive resistance to potential competition on his island. As a first impression, his case can be apprehended as a model of Hobbesian political thought because for Hobbes, the state of nature invites the impulse to drive away potential rivals from one’s realm. However, despite his unflagging adversity to human intrusion upon his territory, the mindset of Crusoe is clearly at odds with the Hobbesian demarcation of man simply because it is marred by his religious—actually Calvinistic—consciousness.

The equation between morality and political reason in Crusoe’s worldview annuls the Hobbesian interpretation of his experience on the island. In this respect, I align with the observation made by James O. Foster that Crusoe’s outlook veers more towards Locke’s political theory which considers religious morality as an organic part of one’s knowledge of his political universe.

Morality, for Locke, “is the proper science and business of mankind” and “moral philosophy comprehends religion, too, or a man’s whole duty” (Locke, Book IV, Section XII, Paragraph 2). Locke’s political outlook incorporates religion as its very precondition: precisely the Christian belief in an omnipresent deity. James O. Foster diagnoses Locke’s view such that “reason can discover to us both natural law and divine law, since the two are essentially the same” (Foster, 92-93). Foster hypothesizes that the best way to codify the seventeenth century worldview in a so-called “rational” way is by constant reference to religion.

James O. Foster also postulates that Defoe has managed to present a faithful replica of the seventeenth century pattern of knowledge whose bases are to be found in the text of Christianity as a certainty for life. I opine that this typically moralistic method of reading literature casts on James O. Foster’s interpretation the charge of ideology as it seeks to implement the thought that religion is one and the same as reason.

One more flaw in James O. Foster’s line of logic is his misconception that setting the story of Robinson Crusoe in a natural space (which is the island) typifies the writer’s concern of how to depict man in a state of nature: which in my opinion is a misconception. Here is James O. Foster:

Poor Robinson Crusoe, isolated on a desert island, and forced to make do as best he can without the comfort and aid of a human society, is a paradigm of the natural man placed in a state of nature. (Foster, 86-87)
He adheres to Locke’s slant about the nature of man as one in which religion cohabitates peacefully with reason. Ultimately, Foster applies Locke’s worldview to Crusoe’s narrative as an apology of Christianity:

Part of the popularity of Robinson Crusoe in the eighteenth century results from Defoe’s ability to present concretely (i.e., through example and illustration) the rational basis of man’s belief in God, in a natural order, and in a society that would function most successfully by incorporating into its structure the principles of right reason and religious morality. (Foster, 86)

Foster’s reading of Crusoe in light of Locke’s political theory hardly exceeds a value judgment based on a purely Christian bias. “Locke’s view of nature is a bit more optimistic than Hobbes’, especially with his apparent incorporation of Christian principles into this state,” says Foster (91). Similarly, Foster’s established comparison between Locke and Hobbes casts doubt as to the soundness of his argument altogether. It is actually Foster’s erroneous sense of man’s nature which drags his statement to the threshold of an absurdity. I opine that the story of Robinson Crusoe depicts man in a state of nature neither because Crusoe is on a deserted island nor because he is observant of the omnipresence of his Christian god but because he is left face to face with a state of crisis. It follows that it is no longer necessary to blame himself or to invoke his God. His Hobbesian self is the only grantor of progress in his recovery. Crusoe is aware of his own desire to move away from religion towards the most urgent need of survival and self-empowerment.

Cannibalism as a primitive instantiation of Crusoe’s Hobbesian worldview

Robinson Crusoe is a scorn for spirituality which nonetheless cannot be substituted with a full-fledged Hobbesian interpretation. Crusoe’s autobiographical narrative unveils an aspiration towards the Hobbesian law of nature only as a precondition to self-preservation against the threats of hunger and death. It follows that the vital character of Crusoe’s instinct of survival is clearly at odds with his spiritual claims. The recurrence of imagery of eating in Robinson Crusoe conveys the fierceness of his political design—albeit primitive—of how to stave off the Other as a potential threat to his kingdom and consequently to his life. In the chapter entitled “We March out Against the Cannibals”, there is a recurrence of this leitmotif of eating:

I bade Friday [to] see if he could find a turtle or tortoise […] for the sake of the eggs as well as the flesh. (RC, 226)

—coupled with that of cannibalism:

I comforted [Friday] as well as I could, and told him I was in as much danger as he, and that they would eat me as well as him.” (RC, 226)
“[the cannibals’] whole business seemed to be the triumphant banquet upon these three human bodies (a barbarous feast indeed).” (RC, 227)

Crusoe’s life on the island is obsessed with this claim over the flesh as the symbol of life-preservation. The leitmotif of eating is fully deployed in the service of this idea. Similarly, as death is emblematized by the threat of the cannibals, Crusoe’s fixation on killing is a reactionary response to lurking threats and thus a means of survival on an island where life is continuously at stake.

In my opinion, Crusoe is the archetypal puritan figure struggling to implement the Hobbesian political design on the deserted island but in vain. This is because of the inherent incommensurability of those two worldviews—namely the Calvinist and the Hobbesian—which can never converge in one and the same person unless by way of grotesquerie. What I have analyzed in the subsection above as the invalidity of a Calvinist interpretation for Crusoe’s state of affairs, does not immediately invite a Hobbesian reading in its stead. Similarly, the manifestations of Crusoe’s self-affirmation as king and slaveholder cannot be read as an attempt to secularize Crusoe’s state of nature: it is simply a caricature of the Hobbesian political design: one marred by the incessant interference of religious ideology.

The tale of adventure as a mask to a state of abstractionism

The love of adventure has a typical presence in the novel and shows how, despite the adversity experienced on the island, Crusoe’s return to England is not the dénouement to an extant crisis. On the contrary, Crusoe’s temptation to return to his island is ever keen: “This was in the year 1694. In this voyage I visited my new colony in the island, saw my successors the Spaniards, had the whole story of their lives, and of the villains I left there” (RC, 297). This love of adventure does lend credence to the novel as a trip of self-discovery which sounds distinctly realistic. However, Crusoe’s dilemma between a Hobbesian and a Calvinistic frame of mind leaves unconcealed the characteristic resistance of his narrative to being incorporated into a clear-cut pattern.

The novel offers large intervals of introspection (religious and secular) which, according to Ifor Evans, are at odds with the Englishmen’s interest for practical thinking. This charge of abstractionism invites a reconsideration of the acceptability of the novel among Defoe’s compatriots, especially with regard to its initial claim as the narrative of a journey of adventures:

The English have not as a nation been attracted to abstract thought; they have preferred to review life empirically in the terms of actual experience. (Evans, 73-74)

Ifor Evans casts doubt on the popularity of Defoe as a writer, therefore on the very credibility of his narrative. The charge of not being “a thinker” is a blow to the very orientation of Crusoe’s adventure: is it a Calvinist or a Hobbesian appraisal of man’s experience in times of crisis?
It is doubtful whether in England the extensive range and accomplishment of his work have ever been fully appreciated. He was an imaginative writer, a journalist and in no mean way a thinker. (Evans, 43)

Crusoe’s emotions keep returning with persistence principally in his lasting regrets of his disobedience to his father. Crusoe was first rebellious then he ended up undergoing an irreversible religious conversion joining other men to his Christian camp. It is probably this fixation on religion as the most obtrusive source of meaning to Crusoe which triggered Evans’ criticism of Defoe as straying into abstractionism, much less as a thinker:

I walked about on the shore, lifting up my hands, and my whole being, as I may say, wrapped up in the contemplation of my deliverance, making a thousand gestures and motions which I cannot describe. (RC, 50)

We discovered the beginning of Crusoe’s experience on the island as one of rebellion and of shaken belief. In the same way, his arrival on the island after the shipwreck triggers nothing but horror and misanthropy. Hence the perpetual overlap of two antagonistic trends of thought: the Calvinistic and the Hobbesian with no apparent resolution in the mind of Crusoe. Even his return to England as a convert is anticlimactic because it is still vulnerable to the abstract “religion”. His return to visit the island in 1694 is another striking concretion of the unknowability of his belief. It is therefore a metaphor of the insolubility accompanying Crusoe’s adventure as a so-called spiritual journey.

CONCLUSION
Crusoe’s settlement on the island was accidental. However, it was perpetually haunted by a quest for selfhood: a quest eventually thwarted by the absence of competition, hence the irrelevance of a properly Hobbesian interpretation of the tale of Robinson Crusoe. The commonplace of Crusoe’s island as his “kingdom” stretches back to the fact that Friday was defenseless: which actually gave free vein to Crusoe’s illusion of racial, economic and religious superiority. Crusoe’s superiority complex had for cover the domestication of a raw land with the utilitarian prospect of exploiting its riches. However, the truth underlying it was his failure to ascertain his own self-will without reference to God. The shipwreck in Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe becomes a pretext and a carrier of ideology about the European expansionist enterprise and the white man’s supremacy: which is nothing but another picture to their Christian dogmatism.

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