Security Issues, Attacks and Vulnerabilities for Virtualization in Cloud Computing and their Solutions

1Ahmed Ibrahim Turki, 2Alyaa Hasan Zwiad and 3Rafah M. Almuttairi
1Department of Physics, University of Samarra, Samarra, Iraq
2Department of Computer Science, University of Technology, Baghdad, Iraq
3Department of Studies and Planning, University of Babylon, Babylon, Iraq

Abstract: Cloud computing is a new technology designed to meet business requirements, reduce expenditure and solve IT management problems. Cloud computing relies on many applications such as virtualization but at the same time inherits its security problems. Virtualization architecture provides a powerful and integrated platform for system building. The use of virtualization depends on the layer of encapsulation software (Virtual machine monitor/hypervisor) that provides the operating system inputs and outputs and at the same time surrounds the operating system. The virtual machines does not depend on the state of the actual hardware as several virtual machines are installed on one set of devices. Virtualization inherits security issues inherent in the disconnection between logical and physical situations, causing security issues related to security and attacks on virtual machines. This survey presents and discusses security issues, attacks and vulnerabilities related to virtualization. Finally, range of solutions and appropriate security measures have been offered and applied to have secure virtualization.

Key words: Cloud computing, virtualization, virtual machine, security issues, attacks, VMM, vulnerabilities, countermeasures

INTRODUCTION

Cloud computing has recently emerged as a model that provides rapid elasticity on-demand self-service, measured service, resource pooling (Manna, 2018; Ganghisetti et al., 2011). According to NIST cloud computing is divided into four deployment models are public, private, community and hybrid clouds. In addition, the definition divides service models into three models, software as a service, infrastructure as a service and platform as service. The NIST definition of cloud computing provides a clear view of common characteristics like service orientation, geographic and allocation, virtualization and homogeneity, etc (Mell and Grance, 2009). Cloud computing offers a lot of services to both organizations and users, in terms of reducing operating expenses and capital expenditures. However, there are limitations on the use of cloud computing that stand in the way of its total adoption, security is the main concern of organizations and users (Subramanian and Jeyaraj, 2018). Virtual machines for users can be created, transferred, retrieved, copied and shared through virtualization, allowing users to run many applications (Jasti et al., 2010). Despite the virtualization features, the additional layer provides new opportunities for attackers, so, they must be secured (Owens, 2010). Any defect in the security of the physical device affects the security of the virtual machine, so, security is the biggest obsession because it adds more complexity of the link and more entry points. VM have many security issues in addition to being exposed to many attacks that lead to data protection violation, theft-of-service, bad manipulation of data and denial-of-service (Khan, 2016). In this study, we will present a number of previous work on security issues in cloud computing as well as identifying gaps in them. The study by Takabi et al., 2010) discusses many security issues such as data storage, privacy, trust, secure service tool, identity management, access control, authorization and authentication, variance, hypervisors, virtualization, resource sharing, applications and finally, outsourcing. But it does not provide any solutions to these issues in addition to the absence of open problems. The study by Pearce et al. (2013) presents a comprehensive and extensive study of security virtualization problems, providing an explanation of virtualization as well as a detailed framework. Then present the most important emerging issues of weak implementation and virtualization characteristics. The security problems in this study (Fernandes et al., 2014) have been very extensive when compared to other studies. Researchers provide very important recommendations for various open future challenges. The study by Khorshed et al. (2012)
In this study, a comprehensive review of the literature on virtualization security was conducted. Many security issues related to virtual devices will be addressed to cover gaps in previous research as well, as summarize the appropriate solutions in Table 1. Identify attacks on virtualization through a broader analysis that includes all information and countermeasures that are reliable and in compliance with applicable regulations, laws and standards. In addition, identify vulnerabilities of virtualization systems, security measures and cloud service models that are affected by them. Some surveys focus on cloud security problems in general, here, we provide a comprehensive survey of all security problems related to virtualization. For this reason, the research question will be: what are the security issues and the most important attacks and vulnerabilities on virtualization which should be examined and studied in depth in order to handle with them?

**MATERIALS AND METHODS**

**Virtualization:** Through virtualization, users can create, migrate, retrieve and share virtual machines, as well as running a range of applications (Jasti et al., 2010). At the same time gives the attacker a new chance of attack because of the virtual layer. Any security defect in the physical device affects the security of the virtual machine (Ertaul et al., 2010). All types of attacks on natural infrastructures can affect virtual environments. That’s why security is a big challenge for virtualization because it adds more interconnection complexity to connectivity and more entry points.

**Shared resources:** Virtual machines can share I/O, CPU, memory and others on the same server. Virtual machines on the same server can share the input and output unit, CPU, memory and more. Sharing resources can reduce the security of virtual machines. A malicious virtual machine can infer some information about virtual machines that share shared resources and memory without having to put the virtual machine monitor at risk (Hashizume et al., 2013).

**Public virtual machine image repository:** Virtual machines can be created by configuration files which are a pre-filled program template called virtual machine image (Hashizume et al., 2013). The user may use his stock image in advance in the provider’s repository or create his own image. Amazon, for example, provides a public repository of images that official users can download or upload a virtual machine image. At the same time, images containing malicious code stored in the repository can be stored by malicious users who misuse these codes for the cloud system or for users (Subashini and Kavitha, 2011; Morsy et al., 2010; Jansen, 2011). In a valid account, an attacker could add
viruses such as trojans to the image. When this image is reused by another user, the VM will be infected with hidden viruses, resulting in inadvertent data leaks (Subashini and Kavitha, 2011).

**Life cycle of VM:** It is necessary to understand and know the life cycle of the virtual machines and the changes that occur in their situations as they move through the environment. The discovery of harmful programs is very difficult because the virtual machines can be ON or suspended and OFF. Moreover, virtual machines can be vulnerable even when they are not connected to the internet (Morsy et al., 2010).

**Virtual machine rollback:** If an error occurs, VM can be rolled back to their previous state. However, rolled back VM to the previous state but this procedure makes them re-enable the passwords or accounts disabled or display the security vulnerabilities that have been addressed. The virtual machine can be rolled back by a so-called “snapshot” but can lead to weaknesses or other configuration errors (Rittinghouse and Ransome, 2009).

**Security issues of virtualization:** Virtual cloud computing is heavily used in the industrial field, making it highly reliable for cloud computing, especially, for business purposes. Virtual machines, therefore, require a lot of confidence from the cloud provider. Virtualization is a prerequisite for any service in cloud environments. The concept of virtualization and multi-tenancy modeling offers a lot of profit but it brings in many attacks and threats. Virtual and logical isolation is the most important thing researchers do today. Creating virtual images and services through the virtual simulation program brings several viruses that cause damage to the virtual code. This study discusses security topics related to virtualization: malware, issues in virtual machine, mobility, network virtualization, virtual machines monitor and VMs image management. Table 1 offers all topics, issues and its solutions through efficient and reliable virtualization in the cloud.

**Malware:** Dependence on infrastructure encourages the help of malware. Virtualization and sand boxing technique is an open door to many malware programs, although, it offers many advantages. There is a difficulty in the success of malware on the VM but if successful, it is very harmful, especially, the reliable of virtual machines. Hypervisor works on several platforms such as VMware, Microsoft Hyper-V, Virtual-PC and some Linux systems making it vulnerable to malicious attacks. Security experts at the University of North Carolina puts an appropriate solution to protect the hypervisor from malware (Sood and Enbody, 2012).

**Issues in VM:** The cloud infrastructure contains VM which is necessary for each client but it brings more security threats. Malicious software injection through eavesdropping allows malicious code to be entered into a VM or SaaS or PaaS. These codes execute malicious instructions that direct the user to a malicious site. Some attackers use arbitrary commands, private key, plain text to get a copy of the data on the virtual machines. Another security problem in shared environments is the elimination of deduplication which reduces physical memory. Moreover, there is a problem resetting virtual machines where they work on VirtualBox and VMware, it can result in random repetition or reuse of virtual machines (Yilek, 2010).

**Mobility:** The process of moving and copying virtual machines is called cloning. This process is a problem because copying virtual machines trusts the same initial state and software. So, the owner’s private information and secret key can be leaked to another virtual machine (Pearce et al., 2013).

**Network virtualization:** Radio networks and Ethernet networks are difficult to manage due to deformities and discontinuities. Security problems can be caused by traffic in the network. Because of heavy traffic in virtual networks, traditional network solutions may not work. Firewalls and VLANs are less secure in virtual infrastructure. For example, the Amazon EC2 network suffers from an abnormal packet delay, inadequate network connectivity, instability UDP and TCP. These problems are abnormal and bring an administrative access issue in addition to network tailoring, allowing attackers to cause serious damage to the virtual infrastructure, putting user’s data at risk. In addition, there are other security issues that the virtual network suffers like network based VM attack, spoofing, packet sniffing (Pearce et al., 2013).

**Virtual machine monitor:** VM is a software that organizes the connection of virtual machines to hardware, isolates and manages all virtual machines that are running and manages all virtual resources. Entry points and interconnect complexity in VMM can increase attack vectors. The guest user needs trust on VMMs and underlying virtual machines. The transparency of VMM may cause rootkits attacks based on VMM which affects trust. The path of non-linear or erroneous execution in virtual machines is a problem of VMM that can stop the implementation of the linear program. For example, restoring some snapshots or virtual machines can cause loss of log files, database information, application setup and monitoring data. A problem can arise in data storage during the snapshot operation. Inspection, separation and
isolation are all areas of concern. Finally, VM escape where hypervisor and VMM are under the attacker’s control (Perez-Botero et al., 2013; Bahram et al., 2010).

**VMs image management:** The provider can create, copy and modify images for virtual machines because of the dynamic nature and flexibility of the cloud. The volatile environment of the cloud can bring several problems. The database contains images of default devices that can be saved and commented on easily. Users can create new images for virtual machines or use old images because of the dynamic of the cloud. This causes problems where a malicious user or attacker can upload a malicious image that can cause serious damage because it contains malicious software which puts user data at risk (Vaquero et al., 2011).

**RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

**Virtualization based attacks:** In cloud computing, loopholes in virtualization are exploited to violate them adversely affecting cloud services. Virtual machines cause many security risks to the system you are working on. We will explain below the types of attacks.

**VM scheduler attack (A1):** A few weaknesses in the scheduler are sufficient to theft of service or drop in resources (Rong et al., 2013). The time slot balance is maintained in order to execute virtual machines by scheduling virtual machines after a specified time. Improved versions of scheduler (Zhou et al., 2011) can improve the security aspect of monitoring programs while retaining efficiency.

**VM rollback and migration attacks (A2):** The contents of virtual machines become vulnerable to different attacks when they are migrated to a new physical host. During migration, the saved status log for the undo application is accessed. The resume/suspend activities make the migration of virtual machines more secure (Szefer and Lee, 2012).

**VM creation attacks (A3):** During the creation of VM. It is possible to place malicious code that is repeated within the image of virtual machines. Security breaches can be detected and avoided through scanners and filters provided by the VIMS (Virtual Image Management System) (Fernandez et al., 2013).

**Cross-VM side channel attacks (A4):** Information related to cryptographic keys, resource usage, etc. can be extracted from the target virtual machine that is on the same physical device by the side channel attack. Time information can be exploited from shared memory or cache by these attacks. Compulsory implementation algorithms and encryption and authentication mechanisms are countermeasures through which these attacks can be mitigated (Tandon and Agrawal, 2014).

**Effects of attacks:** Attacks on the cloud cause services and data to deteriorate on the cloud platform. The consequences of these attacks can be divided as follows:

**Theft-of-service:** The service theft attack causes the scheduler to have vulnerabilities. Where the attacker targets the scheduling policy, so, that, he can get free services or steal resources (Rong et al., 2013).

**Denial-of-service:** To disable customer service delivery, the attacker targets platform of cloud. For example, a malicious source inside the cloud platform would respond to a service request from customers on the pretext of resource availability (Karnwal et al., 2012; Almuttairi et al., 2018).

**Malicious manipulation-of-data:** The connection between the cloud and user interface includes SOAP&HTTP protocols with some scripting languages, making communication vulnerable to threats. Therefore, an attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to manipulate data maliciously (OWASP, 2015).

**Violation-of-data protection:** The availability of data to non-owner users makes them vulnerable to infringement. Data protection is violated by several threats and techniques such as third-party clouds and data deduplication (Tandon and Agrawal, 2014).

**Analysis of virtualization based attacks and their countermeasures:** Services are provided using the service delivery model in the cloud computing platform. The cloud platform in each of its layers is subjected to many attacks, causing degradation of the quality of service and violation of data protection for malicious purposes. This study provides a contribution to the detection of all attacks based on virtualization and their countermeasures (Table 2).

**Countermeasures for A1: VM scheduler attack**

**HyperSafe:** The flow control of hypervisor is provided by HyperSafe. It provides protection by two techniques: conversion of control data to index indexes using restricted indexing, protection of memory pages using unbreakable lock to ensure that protected writing is not manipulated. To verify the effectiveness of these measures, there were four attacks on hypervisor such as manipulating the return schedule, modifying the page table, executing the injected code and modifying the
Table 2: Comparison of virtualization-based attacks in the cloud

| Attacks/Mechanisms                                                                 | Vulnerable components | Effects                                                                 | Layers | Counter measures                                                                 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| A1 Scheduling timed using hypervisor Relocation and access to VM image by insecure hypervisor VM hopping and VM escape to impact hypervisor execution and get information of other virtual machines Detect virtual machines hosted through energy consumption logs | VM scheduler Hypervisor, VM image Hypervisor and VM Storage and VM | Theft of service Malicious manipulation of data, violation of data protection Denial of service, violation of data protection Violation of data protection | SaaS IaaS IaaS IaaS | Hyper safe (Wang and Jiang, 2010) Offensive decoy technology (Stolfo et al., 2012) Noise injection and enables overlapping (Liu et al., 2014) Offense decoy technology Stolfo et al. (2012) |
| A2 Connections for memory access and VM migration                                   | Network and hypervisor | Denial of service and violation of data protection                       | IaaS SaaS and PaaS | VNSS (Xiaopeng et al., 2010) |
| A3 VM creation/VM replication                                                      | VM image              | Violation of data protection                                            | SaaS and IaaS | Authentication mechanism (Fernandez et al., 2013) |
| A4 Side-channel attack to gain access to a cache of virtual machines Virtual machine side-channel attack | Shared caches Time shared caches | Violation of data protection                                            | IaaS IaaS | VM police (Su, 2013) |

Offensive decoy technology: This technique monitors data access to the cloud and detects abnormal patterns. When unauthorized data are suspected, challenge questions are used to verify them, as well as a misleading attack by using large amounts of decoy information against the attacker. This way the data is protected by the user’s truth of abuse. The results of a local file show that this technology provides high levels of user data security in the cloud environment (Stolfo et al., 2012).

Noise injection and enables overlapping: In this technique attacks are mitigated, especially, potential side channels. The scheduler can insert the noise periodically, as well as control the interoperability time with the different virtual machines. This process is performed through a proposed prototype that allows for noise injection and inter-control. Initial assessments show success by reducing side channel attacks, as well as reducing overhead, balancing security and performance (Liu et al., 2014).

Countermeasures for A2: VM rollback and migration attacks

VNSS: A security framework has been proposed to allocate security policies for VM and also protects the virtual machine from direct migration. An initial system was implemented based on the Xen hypervisors used userspace tools such as (conntrack-tools, xm commands program and iptables) and stateful firewall technology. The empirical results showed that security policies are successful for application as well as migration to FTP applications is done securely (Xiaopeng et al., 2010).

Countermeasures for A3: VM creation attacks

Authentication mechanism: In this mechanism, a warehouse is created for the purpose of securing images of virtual machines in the cloud. This repository is used an authenticator to authenticate official users, check for image access tracking and screen to scan images. Developers can use this repository to address attacks (Fernandez et al., 2013).

Countermeasures for A4: Cross-VM side channel attacks

VM police: Virtual machines police are used to prevent side channel attacks. Where the host to launch the virtual machines police containing the components of the programs as an anti-attack. Control of scheduling of virtual machines police is done through security, load and performance requirements (Su, 2013).

Vulnerabilities of virtualization: Flaws that allow a successful attack on the system can be called vulnerabilities. According to the open group’s risk classification, vulnerabilities arises where there is a difference between the object’s resistance and the agent’s threat (AlZadjali et al., 2015). Cloud computing relies on a lot of technologies such as virtualization, web browsers and web services in developing cloud environments. Therefore, the presence of any gap in any of these techniques reflected the impact on...
Table 3: Vulnerabilities in virtualization

| Vulnerabilities in Virtualization | Descriptions | Layers | Countermeasures |
|----------------------------------|--------------|--------|----------------|
| Virtual networks                 | Virtual bridges are shared by VM Wu et al. (2010) | I      | Virtual network security Wu et al. (2010) |
|                                  | Complicated hypervisor code Wang and Jiang (2010) | I      | FRS techniques Wylie et al. (2001) |
|                                  | Exploit the flexible configuration of the hypervisors in order to meet the needs of the organization Wang and Jiang (2010) | I      | Digital signatures Somani et al. (2010) |
| Hypervisors                      | Difficulty patching images of virtual machines because they are inactive artifacts | I      | TVDe Berger et al. (2009) |
|                                  | Uncontrolled placement of virtual machine images in public storehouses Morsy et al. (2010) | I      | TCCP Santos et al. (2009) |
| Virtual machine images           | Possible covert-channels in the collocation of virtual machines Ranjith et al. (2012); Zhang et al. (2012) | I      | Hyper safe Wang and Jiang (2010): |
|                                  | Absolute allocation/deallocation of resources with virtual machines Ranjith et al. (2012) | I      | FRS techniques Wylie et al. (2001) |
|                                  | Unlimited migration: virtual machines can be emigrated from server to another because of hardware maintenance, fault tolerance or load balance Dawoud et al. (2010) | I      | Digital signatures Somani et al. (2010) |
|                                  | Uncontrolled snapshots: flexibility can be provided by copying virtual machines which leaks data, Garfinkel and Rosenblum (2005) | I      | Encryption Harnik et al. (2010) |
| VMS                              |                                                         | I      | Homomorphic encryption Tebaa et al. (2012) |
|                                  |                                                         | I      | TCCP Santos et al. (2009) |
|                                  |                                                         | I      | VNSS Xiaopeng et al. (2010) |
|                                  |                                                         | I      | PALM Zhang et al. (2008) |

the cloud significantly. Table 3 provides a detailed analysis of vulnerabilities in virtualization. Including a brief description of vulnerabilities, the cloud service model that is affected as well as countermeasures.

**Countermeasures for virtual networks**

**Virtual network security:** Communication between virtual machines is ensured by a virtual network framework based on the Xen. This framework provides two default configuration modes for virtual networks: “routed” and “bridged”. There are three layers of the virtual network model: shared networks, routing layers, firewalls and pores that prevent virtual machines from spoofing and sniffing (Wu et al., 2010).

**Fragmentation-redundancy-scattering technique:** In this technique, sensitive data is fragmented into non-important fragments, so, one fragment cannot be used because the data will look vague and incomprehensible. These fragment are deployed in different locations and in a non-duplicate manner in the distributed system which provides intrusion tolerance (Wylie et al., 2001).

**Digital signatures:** The data can be secured while being transmitted over the internet by using the RSA algorithm in digital signature technology. RSA is one of the most widely used algorithms to protect data within cloud environments (Somani et al., 2010).

**Countermeasures for hypervisors**

**Trusted virtual datacenter:** Ensures integrity and isolation in cloud environments. It assembles VMS to have common goals in trusted virtual domains. Trusted virtual domains provides isolation between VLANs, hypervisor-based isolation and workloads. Trusted virtual domains provides system integration by using a load time documentation mechanism (Berger et al., 2009).

**Trusted cloud computing platform:** Help cloud service providers to provide implementation environments known as a closed box. Checks whether the environment is secure before users launch their virtual machines. The Trusted cloud computing platform adds two key elements: a trusted coordinator and a trusted VMM. The trusted nodes group is run by the trusted coordinator which in turn operates trusted virtual machines for the purpose of monitoring and maintaining them in a third party (Santos et al., 2009).

**Countermeasures for virtual machine images**

**Mirage:** This approach offers security features such as: tracking source maintenance, image filters, repository maintenance services, access control framework. Remove sensitive data from images or cannot scan images to get rid of malicious software one of the limitations of this approach. In addition, these filters can raise privacy concerns and breach the privacy of client data as content can be accessed (Wei et al., 2009).

**Countermeasures for virtual machine**

**Encryption:** Sensitive data has long been secured by powerful encryption algorithms such as AES. Storing or sending data in an encrypted manner that guarantees its security and integrity. The data can be protected while transferring using SSL technology (Harnik et al., 2010).
Homomorphic encryption: There are three basic processes for data in cloud: storage, processing and transport. For secure data transfer and storage encryption techniques can be used. Your service provider must decrypt this data to process it, thereby violating its privacy. But there is a coding method called homomorphic encryption that can be applied to secure the cloud. This type of encryption allows arbitrary computation of encrypted data without having to decrypt it (Tebaa et al., 2012).

Palm: To maintain privacy and integrity during and after migration, a safe framework for live migration has been proposed. The first model is based on the GNU Linux and Xen, the tests on this system showed good results but there is a slight down time in addition to the migration time due to encryption and decryption operations (Zhang et al., 2008).

CONCLUSION

In this survey, a lot of details about the virtualization system have been presented for cloud computing which means that it inherits its security problems. Although, virtualization is an old model, it has a vital role with current software architecture and hardware. The techniques related to virtualization were studied, especially, the security issues related to the integration of modern programs and devices. Virtualization for many users allows virtual server sharing for this to be a major focus of cloud computing users. The presence of different virtualization techniques is another challenge because each type needs different security mechanisms. Some attacks target virtual networks or virtual machine monitors, especially when communicating with VMs remotely.

This study also focuses on attacks and vulnerabilities that are important to understand, helping organizations to adopt cloud computing. Understanding and identifying security issues and vulnerabilities contributes to making the system more powerful and can mitigate attacks resulting from system vulnerabilities. Current security solutions and countermeasures that contribute to the prevention or mitigation of these attacks have also been listed. Here, novel security solutions are needed in addition, classical solutions that have been developed and may not work well because of the complexity of cloud environments.

Finally, virtualization can be considered a double-edged sword, so, it must be dealt with carefully, especially, on the security side. Virtualization optimizes software accountability and security isolation and provides security features for availability, confidentiality and integrity, if security solutions are implemented well.

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