CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL REALITY: FROM "LEBENSWELT" OF HUSSERL TO GARFINKEL'S "PRACTICAL THINKING"

The issue is devoted to the possibilities of social reality's interpretations. Edmund Husserl's and Alfred Schutz's conceptions of "lifeworld" are analyzed as well as a place of common life in Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodology. The author highlights the exceptional role of social order constitution in social phenomenology. Social reality, its definitions and characteristics play a crucial role in development of humanitarian science. Understanding of social reality is fundamental for social and phenomenological directions of modern philosophy; nevertheless the issue has not had sufficient theoretical considerations in Ukraine. The aim of the issue was to determine the ways of social reality's constitution within the works of Husserl, Schutz and Garfinkel. The constitutional ways of social reality were systematically analyzed for the first time at the work programme through Schutz's philosophy to Garfinkel's ethnomethodology. As a result the characteristics of social reality were determined in phenomenological and ethnomethodological studies. Moreover, it was pioneering to demonstrate history and transformational changes in social reality understanding from "lifeworld" in phenomenology to "practical thinking" in ethnomethodology. The presented work, based on Ukrainian and Western scientific studies and original sources, offers the main conclusions about characteristics of social reality in the abovementioned works. Theoretical value of a study refers to the further scientific thought development about phenomenology, ethnomethodology as well as to the fundamental meaning of social reality for these spheres. Practical value of a study affects the opportunities to apply the defined features of social reality and its constitution to practical activity.

Key words: society; phenomenology; social order; constitution; lifeworld; ethnomethodology; pre scientific knowledge.

Introduction

The studies of social reality's conceptions from Edmund Husserl's and Alfred Schutz's "lifeworld" to Harold Garfinkel's "everyday society" highlight a number of philosophical, sociological, epistemological, and methodological issues connected with a social order establishment, and sociological and philosophical knowledge development. Special attention is paid to the ways of social reality building, the essence of its establishment process and to a divergence between the approaches of social phenomenology and ethnomethodology. Social reality, its definitions and characteristics play a crucial role in the development of humanitarian science. Understanding of social reality is fundamental for social and phenomenological directions of modern philosophy; nevertheless the issue has not had sufficient theoretical considerations in Ukraine.

The issue was considered by the following Ukrainian scientists: E. Andros - an issue of philosophy and cognition, A. Loy - an issue of consciousness and situational intelligence, M. Popovich - rationality and dimensions of human being, V. Tabachkovsky - social laws and their implementation. S. Kosharnyy's work "Near the sources of philosophical hermeneutics (W. Dilthey and E. Husserl)" (Kosharnyy, 2005) is essential for the article.

According to S. Proleev: "Phenomenology is an authentic form of philosophy, it is philosophy performed as an exact science. We have a logic sequence: phenomenology is philosophy; philosophy is a science; a science is an ultimate goal of European spirit; a spirit is a reality of European humanity which raises it from fluidity of historical being. Consequently, phenomenology is a savior of European humanity from captivity of false, non-authentic existence" (Proleev, 2009: 132).

E. Prichepiy's book "Phenomenological theory of E. Husserl's consciousness" (1971), V. Kebuladze's work "Inter-subjectivity's conception of E. Husserl as transcendental background of phenomenological conception of experience of A. Schutz" (1998) should be mentioned. The crucial for the issue is a thought of V. Kebuladze: "social reality is designed due to the senses which stated the social agents in intersubjective interactions. The senses' revelation is possible owing to temporal and intersubjective analysis of a social action based on a theory of transcendental subjectivity" (Kebuladze, 1998).

E. Bystrytsky writes the following: "The whole persistent and fearless Husserl's work was aimed at maximum purification of intentional acts, intentional activity of a subject from everything given by "substantial-secular" nature and dominant attitudes of human life. A project, a basic objective of phenomenology..."
relates to the conscious structures' consideration according to which usually ultimate experience obtains a transcendent possibility of "epiphany"; "understanding" or "essence contemplation" (Wesensschau, Wesenserschauung). As a consequence, a concept of experience in the light of phenomenological experience (that is the goal of Kebuladze's research) begins and ends at the point where transcendental subjectivity endures impossibility of conducting phenomenological reduction "to the end". Regarding to this experience has an ultimate nature, is an integral part of human awareness, existence (Bystritsky, 2012: 129).

The abovementioned works underline the necessity of interdisciplinary discourse's synthesis and the concept significance of social reality. Social philosophy precisely provides an opportunity to comprehend social as an essential part of human nature and existence.

The aim of the issue is to determine the ways of social reality's constitution within the works of Husserl, Schutz and Garfinkel. According to the aim the following objectives are defined:
- To identify and generalize the main scientific findings related to the issue;
- To highlight the fundamental items in Husserl's concept of "lifeworld";
- To examine the peculiarities of social and phenomenological interpretation of Schutz's "lifeworld";
- To analyze Garfinkel's work about "practical thinking";
- To determine the common and distinctive features in social reality understanding by the abovementioned authors;
- To provide conclusions via the ways of social reality's constitution in phenomenology and ethnomethodology.

Methods

The following methods were used for a presented aim implementation and objectives realization: logical method (was used in the review process of historiography of a research), systematic and structural methods (were applied to the social reality's characteristics in phenomenology), analytical and synthetic methods (were used to determine particular features of "lifeworld" from different authors for defining a list of characteristics), historical method (was crucial for scientific historiographical search of an issue), research analysis of scientific literature, induction method (applied to some particular data from "lifeworld" understanding to social reality's constitution), comparative method (was embodied into a general search of common issues in the works of Husserl and Schutz) and generalization method (consisted in the identification of common features of an object and its peculiarities). Additional attention was drawn to methodological value of E. Husserl's (1970), A. Schutz's (2003), H. Garfinkel's (2002) and T. Parsons's (2002) works.

Results

The constitutional ways of social reality were systematically analyzed for the first time from Husserl's conception via Schutz's philosophy to ethnomethodology of Garfinkel. As a result characteristics of social reality were determined within phenomenological and ethnomethodological doctrine. It was pioneering to demonstrate history and transformational changes in social reality understanding from "lifeworld" in phenomenology to "practical thinking" in ethnomethodology. The presented work, based on Ukrainian and Western scientific studies and original sources, offers the main conclusions about characteristics of social reality in the abovementioned works. Theoretical value of a study refers to the further scientific thought development about phenomenology, ethnomethodology as well as to the fundamental meaning of social reality for these spheres. Practical value of a study affects the opportunities to apply the defined features of social reality and its constitution to practical activity.

Discussions

A social reality is an actual reality of social world with all social phenomena and processes. Social is particularly realized via interpretation and individual social actions related to the current situations. It is not coordinated by any internal or external structure.

The definition derives from Husserl's and Schutz's conceptions of "lifeworld", namely the universal positions take their place in life space and begin to play various roles only through they are empowered with sense and value by the subjects (Schutz, 2003). According to Garfinkel a leading role of such universal positions is given to "instructor" which are varied owing to different situations. The concepts are to be analyzed in detail.

Before Husserl an issue of lifeworld was developed by W. Eucken in the work "To know and relive", where the concept was opposed to being. In the writings of R. Ave-narius, particularly, "the human life definition" presents in the late work "Der menschliche Weltbegriff" ("The Human Concept of the World") that covers human relationships, social life and culture. Philosophy of life should be mentioned, in particular the works of Georg Simmel (1996). He is similarly to H. Bergson, puts a concept of life in the center of his philosophical and sociological studies. However the starting point is not a life in nature, but a human life in society.

The concept of "lifeworld" is one of the crucial in Husserl's late phenomenology, especially in the work "The Crisis of the European Sciences" where the author offers a new "science about spirit" creation, the subject of which is lifeworld as a fundamental part of conscious activity. "A world's transcendental sense should be finally discovered to us in his full meaning according to which it generates the constantly existed lifeworld for us. It relates to all special forms of outside world in which it is revealed before us due to our personal education and development, or our affiliation to particular nation, cultural environment" (Husserl, 1970).

Consequently, lifeworld is a sphere of human confidence presented in the light of essential and practically realized basis. Lifeworld experience is initial one, regarding to the absence of special attempts of knowing it. Husserl's lifeworld can be considered in three dimensions: as a source of all sciences and human practice activity, as a superstructure based on an ordinary world and as a world included all separate particular worlds.

Proximate evidence, intuitive credibility and "anonymous subjectivity" (which sense is not in subject's activity, however in the world's subjective and intersubjective phenomena) are inherent in lifeworld. Lifeworld is the world which is shared. It does not completely belong to me; still I have a part of lifeworld shared with other people. It should be stressed that the own experience is accepted within lifeworld as a structured past, alternatively the actions of others are considered as a present state towards to which the past is a given position (Ricoeur, 1967).

"For phenomenological philosophy the experience
descriptions "demonstrate" an orientation on the evidences that are in the base, as a result they construct our human world. Such characteristics are "nomadic descriptions" as they do not only "depict" the external side of the things; they "reveal" their senses which discover that they can be experienced in a specific way. The presented experience understanding, that in turn provokes phenomenology reconsideration, means phenomenology anthropologizing. Definitely, phenomenology can completely become as anthropology whereas a recipient of a world in its "how" is implemented and explained in experience descriptions, and simultaneously it is stressed on the specific of such way of existence which differs from all others (animal and vegetable states). At first sight, a stress on consciousness and the consciousness acts descriptions does not imply a human. Consequently, phenomenology reveals "disability" of the descriptions and requires particularly about experience, that can be called as "experience of other", where other people - Other can be found except objects and phenomena. This type of experience phenomenology names intersubjective experience" (Kotsyuba, 2017: 91).

The formulation of "lifeworld" concept after Husserl had two ways of development: an existential way (presented by M. Merleau-Ponty, M. Scheller, M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre) and a social phenomenological way (presented by G. Gurvich, A. Schutz, P. Berger, T. Luckmann, H. Garfinkel).

For instance, A. Schutz's studies became a basis for a particular direction about human science and social behavior, as he posed an issue of Husserl's "lifeworld" on social and anthropological sphere.

Schutz highlighted a special understanding of human nature defined in Ch. Cooley's anthropological conception, which developed an idea of communication sources of human consciousness (Cooley, 1902). The author interprets lifeworld as a sphere of intuitive and spontaneous experience, as human beings among our own species, relive culture and society, treat the surrounding objects in a particular way, influence on them and are under their influence.

Schutz has borrowed from Husserl the concept "lifeworld" and added Max Weber's sociological studies to it. Unlike Husserl, Schutz considers the lifeworld as a world directly presented where "I" and "Others" are crossed. Consequently, his phenomenology is not limited by personal consciousness; it is realized in a broad world of natural positions. The author states: "The sciences about interpretation and explanation of human activity and thoughts should begin from the basic structures' description of pre scientific knowledge which is an understandable reality for people with natural positions. The described reality is a common life world" (American sociological thought, 1994: 496).

The concept "lifeworld" is delineated by Schutz's three definitions where the aspects are crystallized:

- This is a world of natural pragmatic position of consciousness according to which a person lives and acts, namely its characteristics are spontaneity, naturalness and subjectivity;

- It is an integral type of human behavior in society (every form of behavior is correlated with the previous experience): due to Schutz, lifeworld is embodied into communication situations between social subjects;

- It is a resource with the facilitation of which a person can navigate in life situations and achieve goals: as a result, "lifeworld" contains actual cases as well as previous experience that assist subjects to embody social reality (Schutz & Luckmann, 1974).

As we can notice, Schutz has offered a new glance on social reality. The proposed approach fundamentally differs from positivism where the only actual form of knowledge is scientific knowledge. Moreover it is distinct from Parsons's structural functionalism which considers society as a unity of elements with special functions. Furthermore, it varies from any conceptions that suggest examining social as a whole.

A researcher has payed attention to intersubjectivity of lifeworld to which Husserl applied: lifeworld is primarily accepted as a world which is common with other people; people understand their being and meaning for each other. Therefore we can create various social relationships with other people, and they, in their turn, with us (Kenneth, 2005).

Therefore, Alfred Schutz followed the path of problem solving of connection renewal between scientific theory and human lifeworld posed by Edmund Husserl. From the social phenomenology position lifeworld is a sphere of human experience, actions and guidelines according to which a man performs plans and deeds via communication with other people. As a result, social sense of "lifeworld" is in personal experience embodiment of human communication.

Schutz's phenomenological ideas were developed by American researcher Harold Garfinkel in the work "Ethnomethodological studies" where the methods of social anthropology and ethnography were suggested expanding on social life studies (Garfinkel, 2005).

It should be mentioned that the views of his teacher Talcott Parsons had a profound influence on Garfinkel in whose structural functionalism the main objective of sociology was an analysis of institutionalization of value orientations which was a guarantee of "social balance". Simultaneously the author was not centered on generalizations, but on empirical studies.

Garfinkel examines general individual activity where individuals, united by the common sense, perform practical actions and establish the own understanding of social. The basic is a way of social reality's creation as a result of interpretations and practical actions of individuals in each specific case. The reality is not determined by any internal or external structure (Ricoeur, 1967).

A continuation of Husserl's and Schutz's "lifeworld" idea can be seen here, where any structural options take their place in a living space and begin to play some role owing to their empower by common sense and content from the subjects.

An issue of social order was one of the crucial in Garfinkel's ethnomethodology. It was a starting point of all his experiments, namely about the actions of social being, the nature of intersubjectivity, and social constitution of knowledge.

According to the author, the objective of ethnomethodology is in a sense exposition of social actions based on the rational fundamentals. Consequently, an ethnical scientist ought to make structures of common activity a central concern of sociological analysis by examining the objects from their core which is "lifeworld". "Due to the main objectives, ethnomethodology is aimed at restructuring of a technical mind, on the way of the reform the urgent goal is the work's consideration of social and natural sciences as being the sciences of practical mind and practical actions" (Bystritsky, 2012: 144).

Garfinkel offers an idea that human interaction is based on common sense. The interaction is not always conscious and can be studied via reflection. According to the
philosopher social life understanding occurs not only outside, instead is formed inside. The fundamental thought of Garfinkel's ethnomethodology addresses to the local social order which is built by human personal practical rationality. Social structure has an influence on a person via background's expectations; still social life is structured by community members who attribute significance to everything happened within communication process.

Therefore, contrary to Schutz for whom intersubjectivity is an a priori characteristic of lifeworld, Garfinkel implements a construction of human interactions in every particular situation. To be included into social world interactions is possible particularly via common practical thinking. As a consequence explanations and conversations are only essays which understanding depends on human mental ability to construct a whole.

Conclusions
The ways of social reality's constitution in the works of Husserl, Schutz and Garfinkel were determined in the issue. Defining the social phenomenology objectives, the main issue of a process of social experience constitution should be mentioned. For instance, Schutz considered that a subject of social science was experience (namely, universal structures of a subject orientation) and a social action which was followed.

As a result of E. Husserl's conception analysis, the following fundamental things were defined: the lifeworld was inherent in direct obviousness, intuitive credibility and "anonymous subjectivity", which sense was not in subject's activity, however in the world's subjective and intersubjective phenomena; consequently the world was shared.

A. Schutz continues the issue of "lifeworld" which is primarily accepted as a common world with other people, who are aware of their being and meaning for each other. This is the reason of various human social interactions.

Garfinkel examines the common individual activity where social reality generates as a result of interpretations and practical personal activities in each particular case. The idea coordinates with E. Husserl's and Schutz's "lifeworld" where any structural positions have their own place in the life space and begin to play various roles only through they are empowered with sense and value by the subjects.

According to Husserl, a definition "constitution" contains transconditionality of transconditional being, a clear possibility of which is a base to clear consciousness.

The aim of social phenomenology is to study the process of human acquisition of lifeworld. The social sciences' objective is to define the basic characteristics of pre scientific knowledge in the light of understandable reality which is lifeworld.

The social order has obtained new sense of "practical thinking" in Garfinkel's theory. If at the beginning ethnomethodology studied rational characteristics of expressions and actions, than at the end of the study Garfinkel had defined the key concepts of reflexivity and index-based notion in the context of common society, connected the objectives of ethnomethodology with formal and analytical sociology. The sphere of ethnomethodology's interests is objective reality of social factors, the work on their establishment, description and definition.

Consequently, phenomenology studies social reality's acquisition by a human where he lives. To accede to it is to analyze structures of lifeworld and peculiarities of its functioning. The process of lifeworld discovering gives an opportunity to obtain an answer: how a man constitutes reality around himself.

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ШЛЯХИ КОНСТИТУВАННЯ СОЦІАЛЬНОЇ РЕАЛЬНОСТІ: ВІД "ЖИТТЄВОГО СВІТУ" ГУССЕРЛЯ ДО "ПРАКТИЧНОГО МИСЛЕННЯ" ГАРФІНКЕЛЯ

Стаття присвячена можливостям трактування соціальної реальності. Проаналізовано концепції "життєвого світу" Едмунда Гуссераля та Альфреда Шюца, а також місце "буденного життя" в етнометодології Гарольда Гарфінкеля. Автор акцентує увагу на виключній ролі конституювання соціального порядку у соціальній феноменології. Соціальна реальність, її тлумачення та характеристики відіграють велику роль у становленні гуманітарної науки. Розуміння соціальної реальності є принциповим для соціально-феноменологічного напряму сучасної філософії, але, разом з тим, це питання не мало достатнього теоретичного орієнтування на теренах України. Метою статті було обраховання шляхів конституювання соціальної реальності у працях Гуссераля, Шюца та Гарфінкеля. В результаті сформовано характеристики соціальної реальності у феноменологічному та етнометодологічному вченні. Також уперше демонструється історизм та трансформація розуміння соціальної реальності від "життєвого світу" у феноменології до "практичного мислення" у етнометодології. Спираючись на дослідження українських та закордонних науковців та опрацьовані першоджерела, авторка пропонує висновки щодо характеристик соціальної реальності у вказаних вченнях. Теоретичне значення дослідження полягає у подальшому розвитку наукої до феноменології, етнометодології, а також принципового для них розуміння соціальної реальності. Практичне значення дослідження полягає в можливості застосування у практичній діяльності вироблених ознак соціальної реальності та її конституювання.

Ключові слова: соціум; феноменологія; соціальний порядок; конституювання; життєвий світ; етнометодологія; донаукове знання.