Modeling Tool for Decision Support during Early Days of an Anthrax Event

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Health officials lack field-implementable tools for forecasting the effects that a large-scale release of Bacillus anthracis spores would have on public health and hospitals. We created a modeling tool (combining inhalational anthrax caseload projections based on initial case reports, effects of variable postexposure prophylaxis campaigns, and healthcare facility surge capacity requirements) to project hospitalizations and casualties from a newly detected inhalation anthrax event, and we examined the consequences of intervention choices. With only 3 days of case counts, the model can predict final attack sizes for simulated Sverdlovsk-like events (1979 USSR) with sufficient accuracy for decision making and confirms the value of early postexposure prophylaxis initiation. According to a baseline scenario, hospital treatment volume peaks 15 days after exposure, deaths peak earlier (day 5), and recovery peaks later (day 23). This tool gives public health, hospital, and emergency planners scenario-specific information for developing quantitative response plans for this threat.

Population exposure to aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores is one of the most potentially catastrophic public health emergencies (1). The 2001 US anthrax attack, in which inhalation anthrax (IA) affected 11 persons and killed 5, led to multiple mass antimicrobial prophylaxis campaigns and considerable healthcare activity (2). Data in the first few days of such an event may be limited, leading to uncertainty regarding the scale of the event and difficulty making response decisions.

Public health officials lack widely available tools for rapidly estimating the number of cases, projecting medical surge, and evaluating response options during an anthrax event. Several efforts have evaluated response options in predefined scenarios, which are useful for planning but not during a response (3–6). Two other models have attempted to predict the number and timing of IA cases after exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores; 1 evaluated response options (7,8). However, neither model estimates the surge of patients in the healthcare system, and both models have constraints that limit their practical utility. Walden and Kaplan built a model that presumes equal probability of various event sizes and requires at least 5 days of case data before robust estimates of final attack sizes can be calculated (8). This timing may be insufficient given the US Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) guideline that postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) dispensing be completed within 48 hours of event detection (9). The back-calculation techniques of Egan et al. permit estimation of the final outbreak size after a certain number of observed cases under different PEP assumptions (7,10). Although these models can be reconciled with the CRI timeline, they were not designed for direct use by public health practitioners (use requires the R coding language and understanding of maximum-likelihood functions), and the earlier work assumes 90% PEP uptake by the infected population, which is an overestimation (≥25%) of the probable public response (11).

An alternative method for predicting the scale of IA events is plume modeling, which calculates the number of exposed persons by estimating the geographic spread of dispersed B. anthracis spores. Plume models require knowledge (or estimates) of the number of spores released, release timing and location, population densities, meteorologic data (e.g. wind speed and direction), and inhaled spore volume. It is unclear whether plume modeling is sufficiently timely and robust to guide local response decisions.

We therefore developed a modeling tool, called Anthrax Assist, to provide public health officials with rapid projections of IA cases and response decision support during an aerosolized anthrax event. This tool can assist with responding to an anthrax event (or designing and conducting locally tailored training exercises) by providing critical information in the first few days of response.

Methods

Tool Overview
We used Excel 2010 (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA, USA) to construct Anthrax Assist (online Technical Appendix 1, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/23/1/15-1787-Techapp1.pdf). Anthrax Assist is composed of

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3 linked models (Table 1). The Epidemic-Curve model combines daily case counts with incubation distributions to project the future number and timing of symptomatic IA cases in a nonvaccinated population. The PEP Impact model estimates the potential decrease in the projected trajectory of future cases (output from the Epidemic-Curve model) resulting from a PEP dispensing campaign. The Healthcare Impact model uses the projected unmitigated or PEP-mitigated incidence curves to project the size and timing of peak healthcare utilization and associated patient outcomes. Users can readily change a number of input values to reflect a desired attack scenario or response strategy (Table 2). To illustrate the models, we developed an attack scenario and used it to evaluate estimates resulting from various outbreak detection scenarios (using 1, 2, or 3 days of initial case count data) and PEP response strategies (Table 3).

### Calculations

#### Epidemic-Curve Model

We base our IA incubation distribution on the Wilkening model, which plots the probability of becoming symptomatic over a 60-day period for a given infectious dose of *B. anthracis* spores (online Technical Appendix 2, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/23/1/15-1787-Techapp2.pdf) (13). We combine this incubation probability distribution with the number of detected IA cases at a given time to calculate the total projected number of ill persons (final case count [FCC]) by using the following equation:

\[ \text{FCC} = \text{no. cases detected by day } t / \text{proportion of infected persons expected to become symptomatic by day } t \]

where \( t \) is the number of days from the date of the first symptomatic case to the time of analysis. The numerator is obtained through public health disease surveillance, and the denominator is obtained from the incubation probability distribution. We then generate an epidemic curve by distributing the FCC over each day of the outbreak according to the incubation probability distribution.

We assume a single, localized release that causes near-simultaneous population exposure. Because public health authorities will probably not know the average inhaled spore dose among affected persons, we designed the model to calculate a range of plausible outbreak sizes from a range of spores inhaled per person. To illustrate the model, we used a median value of 360 spores/person (range 1–8,000), resulting in a median incubation period of 6.9 days (range 10.3–5.0) (Table 2; online Technical Appendix 2).

#### PEP Impact Model

The PEP Impact model uses median projected daily case counts (output from the Epidemic Curve model) to estimate the potential effects of a PEP campaign. This effect is calculated as the product of the number of persons who become symptomatic on any given day \( t \); the effectiveness of PEP on day \( t \) (which is a product of antimicrobial efficacy and adherence); and the probability that an infected, asymptomatic person receives antimicrobial prophylaxis on or before day \( t \). We calculate the probability that a person receives PEP on day \( t \) by multiplying the PEP uptake (proportion of persons seeking antimicrobial drugs) by the daily antimicrobial dispensing throughput and then dividing by the population targeted for PEP (Table 2). The FCC with a PEP campaign is the sum of detected cases and daily PEP-mitigated case count projections. We express PEP effect as both a difference measure (cases averted) and as a proportion (cases averted divided by the unmitigated FCC). We assume that symptomatic persons seeking PEP are referred for medical treatment and do not receive PEP (21). We further assume that all of the population suspects to be exposed would be targeted for PEP because there is no definitive PEP triage process for IA beyond exposure risk (Table 2).

In accordance with US CRI guidelines, we assume that PEP dispensing is completed in 2 (range 1–2) days after the...
Table 2. Inputs and parameter values for all Anthrax Assist models*

| Parameter | Baseline value | Range† | User adjustable‡ | Reference |
|-----------|----------------|--------|-------------------|-----------|
| Epidemic-Curve model | | | | |
| Case counts for days 1, 2, 3§§ | 20, 10, 70 | 1–4 days of data | Yes | (12) |
| Median inhaled spore count, no.¶¶ | 360 | 1–8,000 | Yes | (13,14) |
| Median incubation, d ± SD | 6.9 ± 1.8 | 10.3–5.0 ± 2.2–1.6 | Yes | (13) |
| Population size of the impacted jurisdiction, no. | 500,000 | | Yes | Assumed |
| PEP impact model | | | | |
| Size of population to receive prophylaxis | 500,000 | | Yes# | Assumed |
| PEP throughput at full capacity, daily | 250,000 | | Yes | Assumed** |
| Delay to PEP campaign start, d†† | 2 | 1–2 | Yes | (9) |
| Ramp-up period until PEP campaign throughput reaches full capacity, d | 0 | | Yes | Assumed** |
| PEP campaign duration at full throughput capacity, d | 2 | 1–4 | Yes | Assumed** |
| PEP uptake, %‡‡‡ | 65 | 40–90 | Yes | (11) |
| Antibiotic efficacy, % | 90 | | Yes | (15–17) |
| Adherence to PEP regimen at event day 60, % | 40 | 25–80 | Yes | (18) |
| Time until antimicrobials are protective, d | 1 | | No | (15–17) |
| Healthcare Impact model | | | | |
| Public health messaging starts, d of event§§§ | 2 | | Yes | Assumed |
| Proportion seeking care relative to public health message timing, by disease state | | | | |
| During prodromal stage, % | 40 before; 80 after | | Yes | (2) |
| During fulminant stage, % | 95 before; 95 after | | Yes | |
| Daily transition fraction from prodromal to fulminant illness, by outcome | | | | |
| Eventually recover, % | 20 | | No | (19) |
| Eventually die, % | 50 | | No | (19) |
| Maximal length of prodromal illness, by outcome | | | | |
| Eventually recover, d | 5 | | No | (19) |
| Eventually die, d | 2 | | No | (19) |
| Length of fulminant illness among untreated, d | 0 | | No | Assumed |
| Length of fulminant illness among treated who die, d¶¶¶ | 1 | | No | (19) |
| Median ± SD of normal distribution of length of treatment among those who recover, d¶¶¶ | 18 ± 3 | | No | (19) |
| Recover with treatment, by stage of illness when treatment initiated, %### | | | | |
| Prodomal, % | 80 | | Yes | (2) |
| Fulminant, % | 20 | | Yes | |
| Prodomal who recover after fulminant illness, %### | 50 | | Yes | |

*Amberthax, anthrax attacks in the United States during 2001; CRI, Cities Readiness Initiative; PEP, postexposure prophylaxis.
†Values provided were used in our evaluation of the influence of the number of days of case data on Epi-Curve projections (case counts parameter), to create high and low final case count estimates (median inhaled spore count and median incubation parameters), and to evaluate various PEP scenarios (all PEP-Impact model parameters) (Table 3). Range values used in the univariate sensitivity analysis of PEP parameters differ (Table 4).
‡Anthrax Assist user can readily change the input value.
§Case counts from the first 3 days of the 1979 Sverdlovsk (USSR) anthrax event epidemic curve inflated by a factor of 10. When 4 days of case counts are used (Table 4), the fourth day of counts is 40.
¶360 spores is a dosage estimated to have occurred during the 1979 Sverdlovsk (USSR) anthrax event (13). One spore represents the minimum possible infectious dose, and 8,000 is a plausible high dose (14).
#Cannot exceed the value of the Epidemic-Curve model “Population size of the impacted jurisdiction” parameter. When less, proportionately fewer infected persons are eligible for PEP protection.
**Value chosen so that PEP dispensing is in accordance with US CRI guidelines and is completed within 2 days after the decision to initiate PEP (9).
††Determined by counting days from date of earliest illness onset (i.e., event day 1).
‡‡Percentage of population targeted to receive PEP who actually obtain and start PEP.
§§Public health messaging only influences treatment-seeking behavior in the absence of a PEP campaign or prior to campaign initiation.
¶¶Same length assumed for patients initiating treatment in the fulminant versus prodromal stage of illness.
##Assumes an improved treatment effectiveness compared with the 2001 US anthrax attacks as a result of clinical experience gained in treating inhalation anthrax cases in the United States since and the recent availability of intravenous antiboxin; in addition to the full complement of medical resources used during the 2001 attacks: an acute-care bed and the associated medical care staff (including respiratory therapists), pleural fluid drainage, mechanical respiratory ventilation, and intravenous antimicrobial drugs. In the United States in 2001, 6 (67%) of 9 persons who sought treatment during the prodromal stage of illness recovered (however, 2 who died did not receive antimicrobial drugs with activity against Bacillus anthracis until they exhibited fulminant illness), and both persons who sought care during fulminant illness died (2,20).
###On the basis of 6 survivors during the 2001 Amerithrax attacks who sought treatment during the prodromal illness stage: cases 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 (2,20). Progression to fulminant illness was defined as severe symptomatic disease characterized by respiratory distress requiring pleural effusion drainage, or mechanical ventilation, marked cyanosis, shock, or meningoencephalitis.

 decisión to initiate PEP (9). Following SteelFisher et al., we also assume that of the population targeted to receive PEP, 65% (range 40%–90%) actually start taking PEP (11). Everyone starting PEP is assumed to fully adhere to the regimen on the first day. After that, adherence decreases linearly to 40% (range 25%–80%) at the conclusion of the event (online Technical Appendix 2) (18). Last, we assumed 90% (range 10%–90%) antimicrobial drug efficacy and that this level of protection is achieved 1 day after initiation of the regimen (15,16) (Table 2).
Modeling Tool for Anthrax Event

Healthcare Impact Model

To calculate the demand for medical care, we used a compartmental model (based on one reported by Zaric et al.) and used the review of IA cases by Holty et al. to select the rates of patients’ transitions through illness stages (6,19) (Figure 1; online Technical Appendix 2). This model is used to calculate daily patients initiating treatment, peak daily treatment caseload (i.e., census of hospitalized patients receiving treatment for IA), and the day of peak treatment caseload.

In this model, medical intervention is required for recovery from symptomatic IA, and only patients with fulminant disease can die. We define treatment effectiveness as the percentage of patients who recover after receiving some type of medical intervention and pattern it after the 2001 US IA events. As such, treatment is 4 times more effective when started in the prodromal (80%), rather than fulminant (20%), stage of illness (Table 2). However, the probability that a patient in the fulminant stage seeks healthcare (95%) is roughly twice that for someone in the prodromal stage (40%) (22). In addition, we varied the likelihood that any patient seeks healthcare by the timing of public health messaging regarding screening and treatment recommendations. We assume that the proportion of persons in the prodromal stage who seek care would double as a result of widespread media attention (80% vs. 40%) (22). Last, we assume treatment effectiveness values based on full availability of medical countermeasures and resources at the time of treatment and no delay in access to care once sought (Table 2).

During the 2001 US IA event, treatment duration was highly associated with treatment outcomes (22). Thus, for those who recover, we assume a normal distribution with a

Table 3. PEP scenarios, by campaign logistics and antimicrobial drug use components

| Scenario (description) | Logistics components | Drug-use components |
|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Scenario 1 (no PEP)    | Not applicable       | Not applicable      |
| Scenario 2 (ideal)     | 1-day delay,† 1-day campaign | 90% uptake,‡ 80% adherence§ |
| Scenario 3 (practical: logistics follow CRI guidance, and utilization data based on the Amerithrax attacks) | 2-day delay,† 2-day campaign | 65% uptake,‡ 40% adherence§ |
| Scenario 4 (constrained) | 2-day delay,† 4-day campaign | 40% uptake,‡ 25% adherence§ |

*Amerithrax, anthrax attacks in the United States during 2001; CRI, Cities Readiness Initiative; PEP, postexposure prophylaxis.

†Delay days are determined by counting the days from the date of earliest illness onset (i.e., event day 1). Public health messaging also begins on the same day as the campaign. The delay dictates the number of days of case data potentially available as input. Two days of case data are available as input in Scenario 2, and 3 days are available as input in Scenarios 3 and 4.

‡Proportion of the population targeted by public health officials to receive PEP who actually obtain and start PEP (11).

§Proportion fully adhering to the PEP regimen on event day 60 (18).

Figure 1. Anthrax Assist model disease stages, intervention states, and transitions. Persons begin in the top Incubation state and may transition via the numbered arrows from one state to another until they eventually reach an outcome state (doubled-walled boxes). All persons with untreated infection will progress to deceased. Recovery is possible only through effective oral PEP (averted case) or anthrax-specific treatment (recovered). Transitions are governed by the 3 Anthrax Assist models as follows: Epidemic-Curve model, transition 1; PEP Impact model, transitions 2 and 3; Healthcare Impact model, transitions 4–11. Suspected, but Not Actually Exposed cases are shown here because of their role in diluting the incubating population seeking PEP (dashed transition arrow). PEP and Treatment queues (dashed outline boxes) are depicted to reflect the necessary interactions persons must have with the public health and healthcare systems to transition between treatment states. PEP, postexposure prophylaxis.
mean of 18 (SD 3) treatment days from the date of transition to the fulminant stage of illness or from the sixth day of prodromal illness for patients whose illness does not progress to the fulminant stage. For patients who eventually recover from fulminant illness (in treated and yet-nontreated populations), we assume a 20% transition each day so that all have transitioned to the fulminant stage after 5 days in the prodromal stage. Among those who eventually die, half transition to the fulminant stage on the first day of symptoms and the other half on the next day. When treatment is not sought, we assume that death occurs on the same day as the transition to fulminant illness.

Scenarios
To illustrate use of the models, we created an attack case series scenario patterned after the 1979 Sverdlovsk, USSR, event, in which at least 70 people died of IA after accidental aerosol release of *B. anthracis* spores from a bioweapons facility (Table 2) (12). We created this Sverdlovsk-like case series by multiplying each day’s case count from the Sverdlovsk event by 10, resulting in a 40-day, 700-patient case series (online Technical Appendix 2).

To illustrate the accuracy of the Anthrax Assist FCC projections under realistic conditions of limited reported case data in the first days of an event, we first ran the Epidemic-Curve portion of Anthrax Assist by using only the first 3 days of case data as input (20, 10, and 70 cases, respectively), then by using 2 days of case data, and then only the first day’s cases. To examine the effect of the number of days of case data on the accuracy of our FCC projection, we also incrementally added a day of case data, beyond the first 3 days, until the projection was within 10% of the true FCC.

Next, to evaluate prophylaxis response options, we developed 4 PEP scenarios by varying components of the PEP campaign implementation (logistics) and the public response to the campaign (utilization) (Table 3). Scenario 1 (no PEP) is an event without a PEP campaign. Scenario 2 (ideal) is an event wherein early detection of the event (e.g., through biosensors) and positive public perception results in a 1-day campaign starting 1 day after detection, 90% uptake, and 80% adherence at the event’s conclusion. Scenario 3 (practical) is an event in which PEP dispensing logistics follow current public health guidance and PEP utilization is based on data from the 2001 US IA event, resulting in a 2-day campaign starting 2 days after detection, 65% uptake, and 40% adherence at the event conclusion. Scenario 4 (constrained) is an event in which logistics hurdles (e.g., staffing shortages, traffic congestion [3,23]) and poor public perception impede rapid PEP coverage, resulting in a 4-day campaign starting 2 days after detection, 40% uptake, and 25% adherence at event conclusion. Hereafter, the baseline scenario comprises PEP scenario 3 and the Healthcare Impact model values in Table 2.

Sensitivity Analyses
We conducted 2 sensitivity analyses. We first evaluated the influence of individual PEP-related parameters on outputs from the models as follows: prophylaxis campaign duration of 1–6 days at full throughput capacity, delay of 3–6 days until PEP campaign starts, a range of 15%–90% for PEP uptake, a range of 10%–90% for antimicrobial efficacy, and a range of 15%–90% for adherence to the regimen at the conclusion of the event. These ranges encompass reported values (3,4,11,18,24).

In our second sensitivity analysis, we altered the Epidemic-Curve model inputs used in the baseline attack scenario to illustrate potential data limitations and surveillance inaccuracies that might occur during an actual event. Doing so involved comparing estimates using the full complement of the initial 3 days of case data with a scenario in which 60% of cases are reported. This level of underreporting represents the plausible difficulties often encountered when initially collecting outbreak data.

Results
For the scenario that uses the first 3 days of case data, no PEP campaign, and early public messaging, the tool projects a median 60-day FCC of 1,164 (66% higher than actual FCC, plausible range 675–1,612; Figure 2, panel A), 35% event mortality (408 deaths), and a peak hospital caseload of 2,871 on day 14. In contrast, when 4 days of case data are used, the FCC projection (median 750, range 435–1,175) falls within 10% of actual FCC.

Irrespective of the number of days of case data available, the estimated effects of PEP ranged from ≈25% cases averted in scenario 4 (constrained) to 79% in scenario 2 (ideal) (54). These PEP effects are equally reflected in the percentage of averted deaths (Table 5). Even with rapid event detection, an aggressive PEP campaign, and unlimited treatment resources one-third of deaths expected under the unmitigated scenario will still occur (calculated as the ratio of deaths in PEP scenario 2 [ideal] to deaths in PEP scenario 1 [no PEP], using 3 days of case data) (Table 5).

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In the baseline scenario, treatment initiation and deaths peak early in the event (days 4 and 5, respectively), and treatment load and recoveries peak later (days 15 and 23, respectively) (Figure 3). The treatment load curve exhibits a plateau-like shape because of the extended length of time required to treat and recover from IA.

**Sensitivity Analysis**

**Influence of Individual PEP Campaign Factors**

The decision to take PEP (uptake) is the most influential PEP-related parameter (Figure 4). Projected cases averted differ as much as 59% when results using the lowest and highest...
plausible PEP uptake values (12% and 71%, respectively) are compared (Table 4). In contrast, adherence (at day 60) to the PEP regimen exhibits the least direct influence on averted cases and deaths. Averted cases differ by only 5% when the lowest and highest plausible adherence values are used (50% and 55%, respectively) in the baseline scenario. This small difference results from the fact that most infected persons become symptomatic well before declining adherence can affect PEP effectiveness (online Technical Appendix 2).

Effects of Data Limitations
Because of the underlying model structure, case count inaccuracies are reflected in the final event size projections proportionately to the level of overreporting or underreporting. For example, when the first 3 days of detected cases are 40% underreported in the Sverdlovsk-like scenario (60 cases instead of 100: 12 cases with illness onset event day 1, 6 cases on day 2, and 42 cases on day 3), the median event size case-load was projected to be 698 (range 405–967), 40% less than the 1,164 cases projected in the original scenario.

Discussion
Our modeling tool provides estimates of future IA case-loads over time and quantifies the effects of various prophylaxis and treatment response options. By integrating projections of the event scale with interventions reflecting healthcare utilization and patient outcomes, our tool permits evaluation of responses during the first days of a real or simulated event.

The accuracy of our FCC projections improves with the number of days of case data available and may provide estimates sufficient for response decisions when 3 days of data are available (Figure 2, panel B). FCC projections made before day 3 probably overestimate the eventual FCC, which may be informative for policymakers (online Technical Appendix 2).

The results of our PEP and Healthcare Impact models are consistent with reports showing the benefits of initiating PEP as early as possible after exposure recognition (3,4,6,7,25). Zaric et al. (6) calculated 45.3% event mortality if a 65% effective PEP campaign was completed within 3 days after a 2-day detection delay; our comparable event mortality is 37.1% (by adjusting the associated parameter values in our baseline scenario). In highly effective PEP scenarios, Brookmeyer et al. (25) and Baccam et al. (3) separately calculated 16%–17% event mortality (we calculated 11% by adjusting our baseline PEP scenario to match theirs), if 100% effective drugs were used after a 2-day delay, 2-day dispensing campaign, 25% final adherence, and 90% inferred uptake (from 90% initial adherence used by Baccam et al., because uptake was not a parameter in either the Baccam or Brookmeyer model).

Unlike prior efforts to evaluate PEP strategies (3,4,6,7,25), our model includes a PEP uptake parameter in our evaluation of PEP strategies (Table 3; Figure 4). In our model, daily PEP uptake percentage by infected persons deteriorates as the number of unexposed persons requiring PEP increases and when the daily campaign throughput capacity cannot accommodate the increase (because uninfected persons dilute the infected population seeking PEP) (online Technical Appendix 2).

The hospital occupancy estimates generated with our Healthcare Impact model are unique among published IA models (Figure 3). This output can support pre-event and intra-event collaboration between public health officials and healthcare system leaders. It also suggests that balancing efforts to allocate countermeasures between public health and healthcare delivery will be a dynamic process that would benefit from daily reassessments of caseloads and responder capabilities.

Our baseline scenario results in lower mortality than was reported for the 2001 US anthrax attacks (37% vs.}

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Figure 4. Final case count estimates comparisons to the baseline scenario estimate (614 cases) for selected PEP campaign parameter ranges. The base case estimate was produced using data from the first 3 days of the 1979 Sverdlovsk (USSR) anthrax outbreak (12), inflated by a factor of 10. All other values used in calculations are shown in Table 2. PEP, postexposure prophylaxis.
45%) (22), a result of our assumption of improved treatment effectiveness for persons initiating treatment during the fulminant stage of illness (20% vs. 0) (Table 2). In a large event, in which FCC exceeds treatment resources, treatment effectiveness would deteriorate. Anthrax Assist allows responders to alter effectiveness values (assume crisis standards of care) with regard to local treatment capacity.

Anthrax Assist has limitations. We do not account for gastrointestinal and cutaneous forms of *B. anthracis* infection (online Technical Appendix 2). We assume a uniform exposure dosage and a consistent relationship between dose and incubation period across patient types, which may mask logistically relevant temporal variability of illness onset (earlier cases associated with higher inhaled spore counts and vice versa); furthermore, some evidence suggests that certain populations (e.g., children, pregnant women) may be more susceptible to infection or may progress through disease stages differently. Similarly, we do not fully address the consequences of a surge of worried-well patients or the routine demands for healthcare by new and existing patients. Last, although the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommends anthrax vaccine as part of the PEP regimen (26), we do not include vaccine in our PEP Impact model under the assumption that adherence to the full 60-day PEP regimen effectively protects against infection and to assess the effects of decreasing adherence.

Some limitations result from data uncertainties. For example, our Epidemic-Curve model does not pinpoint the timing and location of a release and cannot distinguish between prolonged, short, or multiple releases (online Technical Appendix 2). This model is also sensitive to case surveillance uncertainty. To address this uncertainty, Anthrax Assist accepts simultaneous input of up to 3 case series variations. Therefore, users can inflate or deflate counts on the basis of perceived underreporting or overreporting, can assign cases to different illness-onset dates, and can examine the influence on outputs. Last, in the absence of a compelling alternative, we rely on the Wilkening analyses of the Sverdlovsk outbreak for our incubation distribution (13,27), which is not without criticism (online Technical Appendix 2). By definition, our Epidemic-Curve model FCC estimates demonstrated high accuracy when applied to the Sverdlovsk-like attack scenario (Figure 2). Use of a Sverdlovsk-like

### Table 4. Effects of individual PEP campaign factors

| Variable                              | Median projected caseload with PEP campaign, no. | Projected averted cases from campaign start, no. (%)† | Projected averted deaths, no. (%)‡ | Peak hospitalizations, no. |
|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Days required to provide PEP to entire target population | 1: 580                                           | 583 (55)                                            | 190 (47)                          | 339                       |
|                                       | 2§: 614                                          | 550 (52)                                            | 183 (45)                          | 363                       |
|                                       | 3: 651                                           | 513 (48)                                            | 166 (41)                          | 385                       |
|                                       | 4: 680                                           | 483 (46)                                            | 160 (39)                          | 405                       |
|                                       | 5: 723                                           | 441 (41)                                            | 142 (35)                          | 431                       |
|                                       | 6: 749                                           | 415 (39)                                            | 135 (33)                          | 448                       |
| Delay to PEP campaign start, d¶       | 2§: 614                                          | 550 (52)                                            | 183 (45)                          | 363                       |
|                                       | 3: 681                                           | 482 (45)                                            | 156 (38)                          | 402                       |
|                                       | 4: 753                                           | 411 (39)                                            | 131 (32)                          | 450                       |
|                                       | 5: 821                                           | 343 (32)                                            | 107 (26)                          | 494                       |
|                                       | 6: 881                                           | 283 (27)                                            | 88 (22)                           | 535                       |
| PEP uptake, %#                        | 10: 1,034                                        | 130 (12)                                            | 47 (12)                           | 618                       |
|                                       | 50: 824                                          | 340 (32)                                            | 111 (27)                          | 489                       |
|                                       | 90: 614                                          | 550 (52)                                            | 183 (45)                          | 363                       |
| Antimicrobial efficacy, %             | 10: 1,099                                        | 64 (6)                                              | 19 (5)                            | 653                       |
|                                       | 50: 857                                          | 307 (29)                                            | 97 (24)                           | 508                       |
|                                       | 90§: 614                                         | 550 (52)                                            | 183 (45)                          | 363                       |
| Adherence to regimen at event day 60, %| 10: 631                                          | 533 (50)                                            | 174 (43)                          | 370                       |
|                                       | 50: 614                                          | 550 (52)                                            | 183 (45)                          | 363                       |
|                                       | 65: 597                                          | 566 (53)                                            | 184 (45)                          | 353                       |
|                                       | 90: 581                                          | 583 (55)                                            | 192 (47)                          | 342                       |

†Estimates were calculated by using values shown in Table 2. Base case scenario is the same as PEP evaluation scenario 3 (practical) using 3 days of case data (Table 3). Without a PEP campaign, the median projected caseload would be 1,164 (Table 3, Scenario 1 [no PEP]) using 3 days of case data. PEP, postexposure prophylaxis.

‡Projected averted deaths/(median attack size estimate without a PEP campaign). This calculation assumes no deaths within the first 3 event days.

§Baseline scenario value (Table 2).

¶Delayed by counting days from date of earliest illness onset (i.e., event day 1).

#Percentage of population targeted to receive prophylaxis who actually obtain and start prophylaxis.
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Table 5. PEP effects by number of days of surveillance data available and different scenarios of PEP distribution, uptake, and adherence*

| Days of baseline case data, scenario | Median projected caseload, no. | Cases averted by PEP, no. (%) | Peak treatment load, no. | Median projected deaths, no. | Deaths averted by PEP, no. (%) |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 2†                                 |                                |                                |                          |                             |                                |
| Scenario 1 (no PEP)                 | 1,441                          | Not applicable                  | 856                      | 506                         | Not applicable                  |
| Scenario 2 (ideal)                  | 324                            | 1,117 (79)                      | 188                      | 124                         | 382 (75)                        |
| Scenario 3 (practical)              | 760                            | 681 (48)                        | 447                      | 279                         | 227 (45)                        |
| Scenario 4 (constrained)            | 1,084                          | 358 (25)                        | 648                      | 385                         | 121 (24)                        |
| 3‡                                 |                                |                                |                          |                             |                                |
| Scenario 1 (no PEP)                 | 1,164                          | Not applicable                  | 692                      | 408                         | Not applicable                  |
| Scenario 2 (ideal)                  | 323                            | 841 (79)                        | 191                      | 123                         | 283 (70)                        |
| Scenario 3 (practical)              | 614                            | 550 (52)                        | 363                      | 225                         | 183 (45)                        |
| Scenario 4 (constrained)            | 875                            | 289 (27)                        | 521                      | 316                         | 92 (23)                         |
| 4§                                 |                                |                                |                          |                             |                                |
| Scenario 1 (no PEP)                 | 750                            | Not applicable                  | 440                      | 270                         | Not applicable                  |
| Scenario 2 (ideal)                  | 269                            | 481 (79)                        | 161                      | 103                         | 165 (62)                        |
| Scenario 3 (practical)              | 481                            | 332 (54)                        | 244                      | 163                         | 107 (40)                        |
| Scenario 4 (constrained)            | 572                            | 178 (29)                        | 334                      | 215                         | 55 (20)                         |

*Case data are from the 1979 Sverdlovsk (USSR) anthrax outbreak (12), inflated by a factor of 10. Estimates were calculated by using values shown in Table 2, except for the selected PEP Impact model parameters varied to create the PEP scenarios analyzed here; these are identified in Table 3. PEP, postexposure prophylaxis.
†Day 1, 20 cases; day 2, 10 cases.
‡Day 1, 20 cases; day 2, 10 cases; day 3, 70 cases.
§Day 1, 20 cases; day 2, 10 cases; day 3, 70 cases; day 4, 40 cases.

In conclusion, Anthrax Assist gives public health officials the ability to examine the future scale and consequences of alternative responses to a newly detected anthrax event. This modeling tool mirrors public health practice by using disease surveillance data and permits responders to update projections as new data arrive from the field. The results of our illustrative scenarios underscore the value of integrating epidemic curve projections with decision-based modeling of PEP use and healthcare resource planning. Furthermore, Anthrax Assist highlights the realistic benefit of public health countermeasures and the value of optimizing public perception of PEP.

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Modeling Tool for Decision Support during Early Anthrax Event

Technical Appendix 2

Further details on the methods used as well as additional results.

Epidemic Curve Model

Calculations: Following Wilkening’s 2006 mathematical analysis of the 1979 Sverdlovsk event (1), we assume that the incubation periods of inhalation anthrax follow a log-normal distribution in time, with the probability distribution function, \( f(t) \), given by:

\[
f(t) = \frac{1}{t\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{(\ln t - \mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}}
\]

where \( t \) is the outbreak event day [1 to 60], and \( \mu \) is the median incubation period, and \( \sigma \) is the standard deviation. The dose dependence of the incubation period was modeled using the following similar equations for \( \mu \) and \( \sigma \):

\[
\mu = \alpha + \beta \log(D)
\]

\[
\sigma = \gamma + \delta \log(D)
\]

where \( D \) is the exposure dose and \( \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \text{and} \ \delta \) are parameters with values 10.3, -1.35, 0.804, and -0.079, respectively, derived from Wilkening’s least square fit to the Sverdlosk data at the low-end of the dosage spectrum and several nonhuman primate experiments at the high dose-end.

Our methodological approach does not include any mathematical fitting of the incubation distribution to user inputs. Instead, as shown in the equation in the main text, we arrive at the daily and final case counts by combining available case count data (by date symptoms began) with the projected cumulative distribution function (CDF, which is obtained from the original Wilkening Sverdlovsk calculation just above) describing incubation length. For example, if the CDF suggests that by day 3, 20% of cases should have become symptomatic, and 10 total cases
have been detected by day 3, we assume that the observed 10 cases represents 20% of all cases. This results in a final case count of 50 (from 10 x 100 / 20). Our results are discretized, because rather than solving the continuous log-normal function describing incubation distribution length we calculate the proportion of infected that should be symptomatic for each 24-hour time interval on the basis of the selected lognormal incubation distribution. This is in some senses the opposite of the approach taken by Egan et al (2), although our methods share fundamental features of with this more sophisticated model (Equation 3.6 in the Egan et al paper). We account for uncertainty (create high/median/low estimates) in this calculation in several ways: 1) we assume various CDFs based on different average inhaled spore counts, and 2) we permit up to 3 case series of data as input. A user can “fit” their case data to these calculations by altering their case series or the average inhaled spore counts so that the projected results align with their entries.

Considerations in choosing exposure values: To illustrate the model, we used a median value of 360 spores/person (range 1–8,000). One spore represents the minimum possible infectious dose and also provides an upper bound on the Final Case Count; 360 spores is the median dosage estimated to have occurred during the 1979 aerosol release of B. anthracis spores in Sverdlovsk, USSR; and 8,000 spores is a plausible high-dose (and therefore lower case-count) estimate (1,3). For more on the implications of this choice, see the section further below: Further Limitations Detail, Uniform Exposure Dosage.

Considerations in choosing an incubation distribution: The reliance upon the Sverdlovsk event at the low-dose end of the spectrum is seen as one limitation of the 2006 Wilkening incubation model, among the following two others, as cited by Toth et al. (3) (in a more recent comprehensive review of IA dose response models): Wilkening’s 2006 model is 1) derived mathematically, rather than mechanistically from assumptions having a biological basis (i.e. spore germination and clearance in the lungs), and 2) it assumes an infectivity dose (ID) probability (ID$_{50}$=8,600) following a report by Glassman (4) on data from unpublished work, which does not allow an evaluation of how other model types may fit the data. Toth et al. also proposes a model of their own (an exponential mechanistic model with ID$_{50}$=11,000 [7,200-17,000]) which was shown to be consistent with the Sverdlovsk event’s autopsy-confirmed cases [not the entire set of cases identified by Meselson et al.’s (5) analysis of the event, upon which the 2006 Wilkening distribution is based]. In 2008, Wilkening published a similar exponential mechanistic model which is indistinguishable from Toth et al.’s model, but only when applied to
the first eight days of the Sverdlovsk event (due to Toth’s use of just confirmed cases) (6). After the eighth day of case reports, it appears that the 2008 Wilkening distribution fits the Sverdlovsk data better. In Wilkening’s 2008 analysis, he also compares the fit of his 2006 log-normal model to his 2008 exponential model and claims the following: “a log-normal model fits the data just as well as the [exponential mechanistic model]…Therefore, aside from inferring the value of several parameters associated with disease progression in the host (i.e. lung clearance rate, the spore germination rate, and the bacterial generation time), there would not be much value added”. He also goes on to state, that while his exponential mechanistic model was the more accurate model it is also more analytically intractable. Given the apparent equal empiric fit of both model types to the available data and our desire to implement this work in a spreadsheet model using the best, least mathematically intensive method (so that they are more readily understood and accepted by public health officials), we had a preference for Wilkening’s 2006 log-normal model.

*Influence of capping the event at 60 days:* We capped the length of the event at 60 days in order to simplify tool construction and focus graphical output on the event period with most cases. In doing so we prevent 0.02% of infected individuals from contributing to our median projections based on solving the cumulative incubation distribution function at time equals 60 days [result is 99.98]. Capping the event length was irrelevant for our low FCC estimate (all cases occur before then), but in our high FCC estimates (resulting from the lowest calculable exposure assumption of 1 spore) this caused the exclusion of 1.4% of cases (98.6% become symptomatic on or before day 60).

*Additional Analyses and Results:* To determine the maximal projection accuracy, we also ran the model using the entire 40-day Sverdlovsk-like case series as input. We then compared these results with the actual “Sverdlovsk-like” case count. When the entire Sverdlovsk-like case series is used, the tools projects 701 symptomatic patients (1 more than the actual case count, plausible range: 700-736 cases), mortality of 38% (264 deaths), and a peak hospital caseload of 366 patients on day 19.

*Interpreting Accuracy in an Outbreak Situation:* Users of Anthrax Assist are cautioned that there may be notable differences between actual case counts and the median estimated cases counts curves. Such differences can be anticipated in the course of model use during an outbreak.
(such as when updating the model daily with new case information from the field) as a result of the under-reporting of cases and different sub-populations within the impacted area being exposed to different levels of inhaled spores. A mismatch between the Epidemic Curve projections and the event’s line list data may provide a hint that the exposure is not the result of a single point-source one-time release (for which Anthrax Assist is designed). Such issues are not likely to be noted until four or more days of data are used as input, but can be dealt with by altering the values of the average inhaled spore counts, and utilizing different case series as input (Anthrax Assist permits up to 3 case series of data as input) to account for various degrees of potential under-reporting. In such a way a user can “fit” the projections to their case data or their case data to the projections. Such user-controlled adjustments accomplish the type of curve-fitting that can be performed automatically by more sophisticated statistical methods (e.g., the “back-calculation” software of Egan et al [2]).

**PEP-Impact Model**

*Adherence Decay:* The proportion of individuals adhering to the prescribed twice daily antibiotic PEP regimen was based on an assumption that adherence degrades linearly between the campaign initiation, where it is 100%, and the user-specified adherence value on the final event day. This structure directly contributed to adherence exhibiting the least influence on averted cases and deaths (shown in the sensitivity analyses results). This was due to most infected already having become symptomatic in the event days before a decrease in adherence (even the most precipitous one) exerted its influence on PEP effectiveness. Even when we lengthened the incubation period to the greatest extent possible (based on an exposure using the minimum possible infectious dose [1 spore]), adherence was still the least influential PEP-related parameter on averted cases/deaths, although the span between the percent of averted cases at 15% and 90% adherence widened from 5% (Table 5) to 8% (the difference between 48% and 56%, respectively for a 1 spore exposure profile). We could not find any evidence to support a different method for modeling the change in adherence over time. One consideration (based on the findings of Egan et al. showing a dynamic relationship between the importance of the length of adherence and an event size) was to use the severity and size of the event as positive feedback for adherence (i.e. more deaths = better adherence), but we would be speculating in actually defining such a relationship (2).
Additionally, for the sake of simplicity, we assumed that 1) the proportion of individuals not fully compliant with the regimen on their calculated day of becoming symptomatic were 0% protected by PEP, and 2) individuals were 100% protected by PEP if it was taken on their calculated date of becoming symptomatic, even if they stopped taking antibiotics altogether anytime during the next 60 days. The first “simplifying” assumption ignores the potential for partial protection among individuals who have not stopped taking their antibiotics altogether, but who are ingesting less than the prescribed dose over the course of the entire event. During the 2001 Amerithrax event in the US, 42% of postal workers who began taking PEP were classified in this adherence category (7). However, estimating the efficacy of a partial dose would have been difficult as we could find no evidence of this in the literature. As such, we felt keeping PEP protection at “all or none” was justifiable. The second “simplifying” assumption disregards the potential for some proportion of the individuals who are initially compliant with the regimen, and who then stop the regimen, to experience a delay in symptomatic illness (i.e. lengthening of the calculated incubation period). This proportion is determined by the inhaled spore count (a higher count requires longer adherence to be protective, as shown by Egan et al. [2]) and the shape of our adherence decay curve over time. For example, in an experiment where non-human primates were exposed to ~400,000 spores (1,000 times the median dose in our baseline scenario), Friedlander et al. found that 10% of non-human primates still developed IA after a 30-day doxycycline regimen was completed (8). We suspect that in a large inhalation anthrax event (i.e. where the public witnesses illness and death in the community similar to our “Sverdlovsk-like” scenario), that our linear decay in PEP adherence overestimates adherence decay in the initial weeks of the event. Taking Friedlander’s results together with our conservative adherence decay rate, we theorize that any diminished impact of PEP resulting from our second “simplifying” assumption is small. Finally, since the influence of each “simplifying” assumption on our projected PEP impact offsets the other, we felt that accounting for the realities they address would unnecessarily complicate the value of the PEP Impact model outputs for decision-makers.

Relationship between the prophylaxis goal and PEP Uptake: In our model, the proportion of infected persons receiving PEP on each day of the campaign decreases as the number of unexposed individuals requiring prophylaxis increases and when the daily campaign throughput capacity cannot accommodate the increase. This occurs because we assume there is no way of
distinguishing infected, asymptomatic individuals from unexposed individuals at the point of
dispensation, causing infected individuals to be diluted among the population seeking PEP. As a 
result, a portion of infected persons will experience a delay in obtaining and starting PEP. In our 
base case scenario, we assumed public health responders target 500,000 to receive PEP (have 
enough antibiotics to do so), and can dispense 250,000 regimens daily over 2 days, resulting in 
52% of cases averted. For every additional campaign day required to provide PEP to a larger 
population (using our baseline scenario), responders sacrifice saving 2% to 4% of cases 
(Technical Appendix Table 1).

Relationship between adherence and PEP Uptake: In our evaluation of the PEP Impact 
model we compared scenarios with assumptions of both improved uptake and adherence 
(Scenario 2), or a decrease in both uptake and adherence (Scenario 4), to the baseline PEP 
scenario (Table 3). It should be noted, however, that in a real IA event, good uptake could be 
paired with poor adherence and vice versa.

Healthcare-Impact Model

In instances where multiple transition routes out of a single disease/treatment state are 
possible, our calculations were completed in the following order (each event day): Averted cases 
were removed from the incubating population each day before determining how many incubating 
infected transitioned to symptomatic illness; Untreated Prodromals transitioning to fulminant 
illness were removed before determining the number of prodromals entering treatment; 
Prodromals in treatment transitioning to fulminant were removed before determining the number 
recovering; and Fulminants transitioning to death were removed before determining the number 
of fulminants entering treatment.

Transition rates were selected to approximate the Weibull distribution modeled by Holty 
et al. (see Appendix Tables 3 and 4 in Holty et al) from a systematic review of IA cases since 
1900 (9). Technical Appendix Table 2 provides a summary of the daily transition rates between 
all possible disease stages. Our definition of fulminant illness, however, is less severe than the 
one used by Holty et al. (we replace “respiratory failure” with “respiratory distress requiring 
pleural effusion drainage”), and matches historical definitions: severe symptomatic disease 
characterized by respiratory distress requiring pleural effusion drainage and/or mechanical 
ventilation, marked cyanosis, shock, or meningoencephalitis (10). This choice does not impact
the overall time in hospital for survivors, which still approximates Holty et al.’s distribution, but it may overestimate the length of time patients spend in the fulminant stage of illness. In doing so, our definition of fulminant illness allows for an approach to medical resource planning (based on the census of hospitalized patients in the prodromal and fulminant stages) which errs on overestimating the need for resources to treat advanced IA illness at the expense of underestimating the resources needs for treating early IA illness. As the latter set of resources are likely more abundant or more easily obtained, we felt this the more conservative approach. Users of our model who prefer a different approach, however, may specify a “percent of prodromal patients which recover through fulminant illness” to match the definition of their choice (Table 2).

*Public health messaging impact:* The timing of public health messaging also impacted CFR, but its influence was limited to an event without a PEP campaign or an ineffective one, due to a logic constraint we imposed on a user’s PHM date input: PHM must occur on or before the date of a PEP campaign’s initiation because we assume PHM to occur as part of a PEP campaign’s “rollout”. When the first 3 days of case data were utilized for projections in an unmitigated scenario, and public health messaging was disseminated on the second event day [the base case without a PEP campaign], the Healthcare Impact model projected 51 fewer deaths (a 5% lower CFR) than when messaging occurred 1 week later. CFR improved (decreased) with earlier PHM by improving the ratio of symptomatic individuals seeking treatment in the prodromal illness stage to those seeking treatment in the fulminant illness stage.

**Attack Scenario: Sverdlovsk Adaptation:**

Our choice of attack scenario stemmed from a desire to illustrate the model with a plausible event that was also large enough to necessitate a wide-scale public health response. As such, we created an attack scenario case series patterned after the 1979 Sverdlovsk (USSR) event and inflated it into a larger event. We created this “Sverdlovsk-like” case series by multiplying each day’s case count from the Sverdlovsk event by a factor of 10 (Technical Appendix Figure). Using an historical event, vs. one manufactured mathematically, also avoids the issue of “fractional patients”. The resultant scenario was a 40-day, 700-patient case series that matched the daily proportional caseload of the 1979 event.
Further limitations detail

Other forms for anthrax infection: The cutaneous form accounted for half of all identified infections in the 2001 Amerithrax event. Although the cutaneous form is less severe, in a large event it can have healthcare requirement consequences, as up to 20% of cutaneous cases may have similarly intensive treatment requirements as the inhalational form (11), and up to 40% could require a hospital bed (based on the percent of cutaneous cases expected to develop “malignant edema”, which would require administration of IV steroids and antibiotics) (12,13).

Uniform exposure dosage: In a real population-wide anthrax event, different populations would likely be exposed to different amounts of aerosolized spores (e.g. based on proximity to a release source or time spent in an exposure zone), and even respond differently to the same exposure amounts, resulting in many different incubation distributions among the populations exposed. We chose to rein in these issues by assuming a singular incubation distribution based on an average exposure dosage (a median value of 360 spores/person [range 1–8,000]), and a consistent relationship between exposure dosage and patient types. These assumptions result in our projections both overestimating and underestimating the rapidity with which some groups of individuals in the impacted population would become symptomatic. Although there is not enough data to quantify the bias introduced from assuming a consistent relationship between dose and incubation across patient type, one could potentially express the direction of the bias on the model’s estimate based on any known differences between the demographics in the first cases and the general populace of the impacted region. We chose to use one spore as the minimum possible, average infectious dose, to generate a maximal possible upper bound on the Final Case Count projections. We chose 360 spores as the median dosage because it was the dosage estimated to have occurred during the 1979 aerosol release of B. anthracis spores in Sverdlovsk, USSR; and 8,000 spores is a plausible high-dose (and therefore lower case-count) estimate (1,3). Toth et al. notes that among 13 anthrax modeling papers reviewed, the ID1 (that is, the number of inhaled spores necessary to cause infection in 1% of exposed individuals) ranged from 1 to 9,900 (3). Such an exposure profile in an event seems extremely unrealistic (and it can be changed to user’s liking), but its use greatly improves the likelihood that this model will overestimate the actual event size. And this is our intention, as it is the authors’ opinion, that in a population-wide event, public health practitioners would rather deal with the repercussions of an ‘over-response’ than the loss of life from being under-prepared.
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**Technical Appendix Table 1.** Percent of projected cases averted by PEP associated with increasing the size of the population targeted for prophylaxis (in a jurisdiction of 5 million population)*

| Prophylaxis goal | Population targeted to receive PEP (%) | Campaign duration, d | Projected averted cases (% saved) |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|
| 250,000         | 5%                                    | 1                    | 55                               |
| 500,000         | 10%                                   | 2                    | 52                               |
| 750,000         | 15%                                   | 3                    | 48                               |
| 1,000,000       | 20%                                   | 4                    | 45                               |
| 1,250,000       | 25%                                   | 5                    | 41                               |
| 1,500,000       | 30%                                   | 6                    | 38                               |
| 1,750,000       | 35%                                   | 7                    | 36                               |
| 2,000,000       | 40%                                   | 8                    | 33                               |
| 2,250,000       | 45%                                   | 9                    | 31                               |
| 2,500,000       | 50%                                   | 10                   | 29                               |

*Assumes a maximal 250,000 person daily campaign throughput and that 100% of the exposed population are captured in the targeted population. Estimates were produced using data from the first 3 days of the 1979 Sverdlovsk (USSR) anthrax outbreak (5), inflated by a factor of 10. All other values used in calculations, except for the Prophylaxis Goal shown, are provided in Table 2.
**Technical Appendix Table 2.** Proportions of ill transitioned through Inhalation Anthrax illness stages by the number days in an illness stage and treatment classification (same for individuals who receive and do not receive PEP).

| Days in preceding illness state | Prodromal to Fulminant | Prodromal to Death | Prodromal to Fulminant, who will recover | Prodromal to recovered | Fulminant to Death | Fulminant to Recovered |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| 1                              | 0.2                    | 1                  | 0                                        | 0                      | 0                 | 0                     |
| 2                              | 0.4                    | 0                  | 1                                        | 0.4                    | 1                 | 0                     |
| 3                              | 0.6                    | 0                  | 0.6                                      | 0                      | 0                 | 0                     |
| 4                              | 0.8                    | 0                  | 0.8                                      | 0                      | 0                 | 0                     |
| 5                              | 1                      | 0                  | 1                                        | 0                      | 0                 | 0                     |
| 6                              |                        |                    | 0.01                                     |                        | 0.01              | 0.01                  |
| 7                              |                        |                    | 0.03                                     |                        | 0.03              | 0.03                  |
| 8                              |                        |                    | 0.06                                     |                        | 0.06              | 0.06                  |
| 9                              |                        |                    | 0.11                                     |                        | 0.11              | 0.11                  |
| 10                             |                        |                    | 0.19                                     |                        | 0.19              | 0.19                  |
| 11                             |                        |                    | 0.3                                      |                        | 0.3               | 0.3                   |
| 12                             |                        |                    | 0.43                                     |                        | 0.43              | 0.43                  |
| 13                             |                        |                    | 0.56                                     |                        | 0.56              | 0.56                  |
| 14                             |                        |                    | 0.69                                     |                        | 0.69              | 0.69                  |
| 15                             |                        |                    | 0.8                                      |                        | 0.8               | 0.8                   |
| 16                             |                        |                    | 0.88                                     |                        | 0.88              | 0.88                  |
| 17                             |                        |                    | 0.93                                     |                        | 0.93              | 0.93                  |
| 18                             |                        |                    | 0.96                                     |                        | 0.96              | 0.96                  |
| 19                             |                        |                    | 0.98                                     |                        | 0.98              | 0.98                  |
| 20                             |                        |                    | 0.99                                     |                        | 0.99              | 0.99                  |
| 21                             |                        |                    | 0.99                                     |                        | 0.99              | 0.99                  |
| 22                             |                        |                    | 0.99                                     |                        | 0.99              | 0.99                  |
| 23                             |                        |                    | 1.00                                     |                        | 1.00              | 1.00                  |

**Technical Appendix Figure.** Sverdlovsk-like case series for model testing, based on outbreak of inhalational anthrax in Sverdlovsk, USSR, in 1979 (1).