Abstract: Law No. 2 of 2018 on MD3 (MPR, DPR, DPRD, and DPD), caused plenty of controversy in public and a lawsuit to the Constitutional Court, due to several problematic articles. Like Article 122k, Article 73, Article 245, and several other articles on the addition of legislative leaders. It indicated the DPR’s inability to formulate and explain the regulations before the media and the public. As such, effective communication management was needed to build public trust in the DPR through media relations. The objective of this study was to review the media relations between the DPR and the journalists in the implementation process of the MD3 Law, as well as how a policy communication process was formed based on the Randall B. Ripley Policy Analysis unit. Researchers used a qualitative method with two analysis models, which were the Randall B. Ripley model of public policy analysis and the media relation concept. The results of the study showed that the formation and implementation of the MD3 Law did not run smoothly from the start, due to the high political interests and the DPR’s poor communication. The role of the DPR News Bureau as the DPR’s Media Relations Officer (MRO) was not optimal. It was encumbered by the normative-administrative work system, the overlapping media relations tasks with the DPR members, and the domination of the Pressroom (parliamentary journalist).

Keywords: media relations; public policy analysis; Randall B. Ripley; DPR RI
1. Introduction

This study focused on the policy formulation process through Randall B. Ripley Policy Analysis and its implementation in media relations. As of February 2, 2018, the DPR has enacted Law No. 2 of 2018, the second amendment of Law No. 17 of 2014 on MD3 (MPR, DPR, DPRD, and DPD). In the bill, several articles become a controversy in the media and the public.

The articles were: Article 73 on the forcible summons of any citizen in collaboration with the Indonesian police, Article 122k on Contempt of the DPR, Article 245 on the House Immunity where any investigation concerning a member of the House, law enforcement authorities must acquire permission from the president and be reviewed by MKD (the House’s Ethics Council) not the president, and several articles on the addition of leadership at the MPR, DPR, and DPD (Sukmana, 2018).

These articles were under the scrutiny of the media and the public. In Kompas.com, for example in the article titled “MD3 Law, a Gift of Concern for the Two Decades of Reform” (02/14/2018), Kompas highlighted the three articles that are in direct contact with the public: Article 73, Article 122k, and Article 245 (DPR RI, 2018).

Some reports in the mass media believed that should this law continues to be enacted, it would legalize the stronger power of the DPR (Sukmana, 2018).

The mass media reported the amendment of the MD3 Law with these taglines: “The House is More Powerful,” “The House of the Almighty,” “The House of Superpower,” and others.

The three controversial articles were considered curbing the freedom of the public to criticize members of the legislature, the DPR also could summon anyone with the help of the police, and they were immune from the law because their criminal actions can only be investigated with the permit of the MKD, which also part of the DPR (Sukmana, 2018).

The massive news coverage on the controversy of these articles also made President Joko Widodo decided not to sign the amendment of the MD3 into Law, although in the end the bill was still enacted after 30 days of the issuance without the president’s signature (see Article 73 paragraph 2 of Law No. 12 of 2011 regarding the Formation of Legislation).

The public, represented by the Universitas Indonesia alumni, Zico and Joshua, then filed a lawsuit to the Court. In June 2018, the Court granted their lawsuit with the decision of the Court No. 18/PUU XVI/2018. As such, the three controversial articles ceased to be applicable (Ridhoi, 2018).

Policy analysis expert William N. Dunn considered that, in every failed process of public policy implementation, there was an indication of the inability of policy communication between the members of parliament and the public or the media, giving rise to a poor perception of the DPR’s image (Dunn, 2000).

According to Dunn, every policy needs to be analyzed, through public policy analysis, to prevent failure in solving problems through public policy. Randall B. Ripley describes the four stages of the public policy communication process, from policymakers to policy implementors, which are 1) Agenda Setting, 2) Policy Formulation, and 3) Policy Implementation and 4) Policy Evaluation so that the failure of policy implementation can be identified (Ripley & Franklin, 1986).

The public trust, and the dignity and the integrity of the institution and its members are very important for the DPR. With it, the House of Representatives as an institution that produces nation policies will have strong legitimacy, and the policy would be accepted by the public when it is enacted (Ruslan, 2006). However, it is not easy to achieve. The DPR has different characteristics from other state institutions, especially in public communication activities (Tim Kehumasen Setjen DPR RI & Tim CEPP UI (Center for Election and Political Party), 2014).

Officially, the DPR spokesperson was the Chair of the House itself or the Secretary General, in this case the News Bureau. However, in reality, the 560 members of the DPR often spoke directly to the media, as the DPR’s “unofficial spokesperson” (Tim
Meanwhile, the media is not responsible for writing or describing the public about perceptions or information about the good or bad performance of the House members. Their responsibility is to write and report accurately what they see and know. With such conditions, the relationship between the Parliament and the media was often conflicting (Kehumasan Setjen DPR RI & Tim CEPP UI (Center for Election and Political Party), 2014).

In the concept of media relations, communicative relations activities are utilized to maintain the reputation of an organization/institution.

The most important part of communication relations is to create public impressions, knowledge, and understanding of the organization, creating interest, and creating acceptance by explaining an event as clearly as possible so that if something negative happens it can be turned into considerations, acceptance, and sympathy (Nova, 2009).

The main task of the MRO (Media Relations Officer) is to provide media services, establish a reputation for trustworthiness, supply good information, provide good cooperation in providing information material, provide adequate facilities, and build personal relationships with the media. As such, the relationships that are built and developed with the media to reach the public are very important (Iriantara, 2011).

The policy implementers must have a good understanding of the policy’s substance, meaning, and objectives so that when it is disclosed to the public through the media, the interpretation of the policy does not mislead the public (Permatasari, 2015).

In a study, a literature review is important to guide the researchers in analyzing, assisting, formulating problems, and finding the result of the previous studies. There were many studies on media relations between government agencies, the state, and the media. However, studies on the policy implementation process or case study were limited.

A study by Wahyun (2000) on "Relasi Media-Negara-Masyarakat dan Pasar dalam Era Reformasi", reviewed the government’s media relations in a historical perspective during some period to map its development after the collapse of the New Order. Her study was different from this study because Hermin reviewed the government’s media relations from a historical perspective during some period to map its development after the collapse of the New Order, although the detail of her study was very interesting and became reference material for this study.

Another study by Alam titled “Analisis Kebijakan Publik Kebijakan Sosial di Perkotaan Sebagai Sebuah Kajian Implementatif”. The study was on street vendors in Makassar. Alam analyzed the social policy based on the implementation of social policy measured through three analysis models (prospective, retrospective, and integrative) (Dunn, 2000), and the social policy was viewed as a performance as the unit of analysis (Alam, 2009). His study was different from this study. The object studied were social policies in direct contact with the community, while the policies in this study were political policies because they regulate the Main Tasks and Functions of the legislative body.

Many studies focused on media relations and analysis or implementation of policies separately. Such as studies on the implementation of policies by Kurniawan (2011), Hutagaol & Asmara (2008), Rofik (2012), or studies on media relations by Febriyansyah et al. (2016), Anggraini (2017), Simanjuntak (2015), Carlina & Paramita (2017), and Zheng et al. (2018), which used Van Meter’s analysis of the policy implementation, or the concept of media relations on certain cases.

However, a study that linked policy implementation and media relations were difficult to find, even though the media relations process is very closely related to the success of public policy implementation. Through the media, public trust and also the dignity and the integrity of the institution and its members can be established, so that
For this reason, this study focused on two problems: how policies were formed in Randall B. Ripley’s policy analysis, and how it was implemented through the media seen from the concept of media relations. The results and discussion of this study answered the study problem: a) the process of forming the MD3 Act on Media policy based on Randal B. Ripley’s policy analysis, and b) how to implement it through the media with the concept of media relations.

2. Methods

The method chosen in this study was a qualitative method by using the Randall B. Ripley policy analysis model and the media relation concept. The qualitative method has the characteristics of the natural setting or natural environment of the parties interviewed. The analysis was carried out with data derived from various interview results and document sources, which was linked to the ideal concept of public policy analysis and media relations (Creswell, 1994).

Qualitative methods were very suitable for a study on public policy and media relations because the study was intended to explore the actions that have been taken by the government, why those actions were carried out or not carried out, in what ways and what mechanisms, for the benefit of who, and what was its results, consequences, and impacts (Djonet, 2017).

The data collection techniques were in-depth interviews with the officers of the DPR News Bureau, which served as the DPR MRO, namely the Head of the News Bureau, the Head of Public Relations and staff, and the Head of the Print Media, Analysis and Social Media. The researchers also interviewed the Chairperson and Treasurer of the Pressroom (Journalist covering the DPR) to confirm the DPR media relations activities in the implementation of the MD3 Law.

In-depth interviews were conducted in one to two hours duration covering more than 20 questions on the public policy processes, and how the media relations were developed at that time.

Some supporting documents, such as the MD3 Law minutes of deliberation, the mass media coverage, and the News Bureau documentation, were also used in supplementing the information in this study.

3. Results and Discussion

The amendment of Law No. 2 of 2018 on MD3 experienced many political situations, both internally and externally. During the period leading up and during 2014-2019, the law had undergone three amendments. In the third amendment, the legislature stated that the amendment was aimed to improve performance through the amendment of the law that regulates them. However, mass media and the public deemed that the amendment was for the pragmatic interests of the DPR (Hakim, 2018).

Based on the results of interviews with several sources and supporting documentation such as the minutes of deliberation in the amendment of the MD3 Law, the political processes within the House of Representatives was very turbulent. From the Randal B. Ripley Public policy analysis, the process of forming the MD3 Law starting from the agenda-setting to its implementation through media relations was as follows:

3.1. The MD3 Law Formulation Process and Its Implementation

3.1.1. Agenda-Setting

After the end of the SBY administration, the Indonesian legislative body was split into two coalitions, namely KIH (Great Indonesian Coalition) and KMP (Red and White...
Coalition). The split formed two big interests in the political process. The Legislative body, as the policymaker, tried to accommodate all of these interests.

Ramdony, Chair of the DPR Pressroom, said that the amendment of the Law was caused by the DPR’s internal problem on the distribution of positions for the political parties. It started when PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) was declared as the winning party for the 2014 election. The existing DPR immediately changed the mechanism to elect the DPR leaders, from the proportional system to the package system. This means that the winning party did not automatically become the leader of the DPR. The leader must go through an election mechanism within the legislative body. According to Doni, the reason that was given at that time was that once they were sworn in as the members of the house, all members have the same position, regardless of which party won the most votes (in the general election). This was the ground used to amend the MD3 Law during the transition of the DPR term from 2009-2014 to the 2014-2019 era led by Marzuki Alie (interview on 12 April 2019).

In the second amendment, relations between KIH and KMP began to improve, as marked by the migrations of several parties from KMP to KIH, such as Golkar, PPP (United Development Party), and PAN (National Mandate Party) (which in August 2018 returned to KMP). This amendment was marked by the accommodation of KIH in the DPR Working Structure (AKD) in several commissions and bodies. Before the amendment, the leadership of the DPR’s commission and the bodies were only filled by KMP representatives. With the amendment of Law 17 of 2014, in December 2014 KIH representatives began to fill some of the positions. The amendment added one position in the AKD leadership to cater for a KIH representative. Many media considered it to be the end of the conflict between KIH and KMP in parliament (Hakim, 2018).

The last amendment, which was the focus of this study and lay the foundation for Law No. 2 of 2018, was related to the addition of 3 deputy chairman positions for the People’s Consultative Assembly, 1 deputy head position of the DPR, and 1 deputy head position of the DPD, and 1 deputy head position of the MKD (Hakim, 2018).

The significant changes to the leadership were made by the DPR when it was only 1.5 years away from the end of their term. PDIP and other parties still insist on fighting for the position. As such, the amendment of the MD3 Law merely stemmed from the fights for the leadership of the DPR, MPR, and DPD.

Unfortunately, in the agenda-setting process, many DPR members did not pay attention to all of the articles that will be presented to the public. All of them only focus on the articles on leadership and their political interests. The controversial three articles received less attention from the policymakers. They considered that the controversial articles discussed by the media and the public were old articles, which only need to be slightly revised, and there was no need to over-react to it (DPR RI, 2018).

3.1.2. Formulation and Legitimacy of MD3 Law

With this problem, the DPR experienced very difficult political dynamics in the amendment process. The political temperature increased, as political communication between the DPR and the government is getting worse (Nugroho, 2001).

During the deliberation process for the amendment, 8 out of 10 factions agreed to the content of the amendment, which were PDIP, Hanura, PKB, Golkar, Democrat, PKS, Gerindra, and PAN (which at that time was part of the KIH), while PPP and Nasdem walked-out due to disagreement in the addition of DPR leadership position by the winning parties (DPR RI, 2018).

The formulation of the amendment of MD3 Law was full of political turmoil. There were five meetings in formulating the new amendment of MD3 Law. The 174 pages of its minutes of meetings contain notes of the conversation during the formulation process of the amendment of MD3 Law. However, not all meetings are recorded or
In the notes of negotiation process conducted by several parties, such as the DPR factions, representatives of the DPD, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, and the Ministry of the Interior, none reveal how the three controversial articles were formulated.

For example, in Article 245 (DPR Immunity) which stated, “Summons and requests for information to members of the DPR in connection with criminal offenses not related to the implementation of the tasks referred to in Article 224 must obtain written approval from the President after being considered by the House Ethical Council.”

Overall, all members of the meeting agreed that investigation of criminal acts carried out by the DPR must obtain the approval of the MKD, not the President, considering that the MKD understood the DPR’s activities better than the President’s. They were concerned that the “House member” who committed a crime was in the middle of the House sessions (DPR RI, 2018).

Likewise, in Article 122k, which states “In carrying out the functions referred to in Article 121A, the MKD is tasked with: (k) taking legal steps or other steps against individuals, groups of people, or legal entities that undermine the dignity of the DPR, and members of the DPR.” There was no long debate during the formulation of the article in these meetings. According to the DPR, Article 122k was made to regulate the functions of the MKD. There was no meaningful debate because the DPR members also do not read all the points in detail, so the discussion went smoothly without objections, unlike the one in the article on adding the leadership position.

Article 73 stated:

1. The DPR in exercising its authority and duties has the right to summon any person in writing to attend the DPR session.
2. The person summoned as referred to in paragraph (1) must present themselves following the summon.
3. In the event that any person as referred to in paragraph (2) failed to present themselves after being summoned 3 (three) times in a row without proper and valid reasons, the DPR has the authority to summon them by force with the help of the National Police.

The deliberation of Article 73 by members of the Working Committee and the government who attended the five meetings recorded in the minutes was tough because it involved the honor of the DPR, which had been underappreciated by related officials. According to the minutes, the original Law already had Article 73. The basis of the article was to call the government or public officials who are often not presenting themselves when they were asked for information by the DPR (DPR RI, 2018).

As in the case of the Governor of Lampung and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). This article was formulated as part of the DPR’s rights to request the government to explain the government’s policy and to investigate its implementation (Hak Interpelasi and Hak Angket).

However, the government (Ministry of Law and Human Rights and Ministry of Home Affairs) suggested that the word ‘official’ should be replaced with the word ‘anyone,’ to make it felt more ‘fair.’ The Working Committee (Panja) agreed and the article formulated with the word ‘anyone,’ which later caused multiple public interpretations about the article (DPR RI, 2018).

Generally, the heated debates at these sessions were related to articles that regulate their internal political interests. Such as the addition of leaders, strengthening the function of the Legislation Body, budget management, DPD position, and the addition of AKD (DPR RI, 2018).
The findings showed that the DPR did not have a deep understanding and seriously considers each word and sentence in every article during the formulation process of the policymaking. There are so many ambiguous words or sentences that have multiple interpretations in the media and causing controversy.

In addition, communication relations, either between the house members, between the house and the government, and with the various levels of society, ranging from constitutional law experts, the media, and NGOs (non-governmental organizations), were not well maintained and needed to be enhanced further (Riswanto, 2016). This is important in the policy formulation process so that the issued policies are not merely issued to prompt public reactions (Shihab, 2018).

3.1.3. Implementation and Evaluation of MD3 Law

For a program to work, a variety of resources are needed, including the MRO in the policy-making body. Policies need to be interpreted with various plans, and routine organization should be carried out. This process also requires certain groups, such as mass media, to deliver the policy to the public.

Implementation includes actions by various parties that are intended to ensure that the program is running properly, including the MRO creative communication ways (Ripley & Franklin, 1986).

As MRO in a legislative institution, they certainly very familiar with the proper ways to introduce and explain the policies to the public through media relations. This socialization or advocacy is intended to disseminate the policies produced by the policymaker. Either through print media, or other media, such as TV, radio, public hearings, campaigns, testimonials, seminars, and others (Nova, 2014).

According to several sources at the News Bureau which were Yoi Titikary (Head of the News Bureau), M. According to several sources at the News Bureau, Yoi Titikary (Head of the News Bureau), M. Djazuli (Head of the Print, Social and Analysis Media Section (Medtaksos)), and Erna Agustina (Head of Public Relations), the News Bureau was always involved in socializing every policy, especially in the drafting of the MD3 Law, through Parliament TV, websites, and social media, both live and delayed broadcast. This can be seen starting from the Legislative Body Level I meeting, the consultation meeting with the DPD, the Panja meeting, and the consultation Meeting with the Government (Ministry of Law and Human Rights and Ministry of Home Affairs), involving parliamentary TV in socializing the amendment of MD3 Law, and inviting several media in an open meeting to discuss the amendment of the MD3 Law.

However, the News Bureau did not hold specific events, such as dissemination or press conferences, on the issuance of the new MD3 Law (Law No. 2 of 2018). The exposure merely to the extent of airing the DPR sessions through the internal media supplemented by direct interviews (doorstop) with several speakers when the meetings were over, and in the DPR RI website.

In the concept of Media Relations, the MRO’s activities in dealing with communication media are to publicize or respond to the media’s interests in the organization. In short, media relations related to communication, provision of information, and responding to the media (Masduki, 2014).

At the policy implementation stage, the MRO should be managing the publicity that can introduce the organization and its positioning on public issues. The MRO must emphasize the strategic position of the organization or institution in the minds of the public and civil society partners. Therefore, media relations should include understanding and actively serving the need of the media, not passively allowing the media to cover activities without direction and feedback (Masduki, 2014).

Moreover, according to the Chairman of the Parliamentary Journalists (Pressroom), Ramdoni, during the delivery of the implementation of Law No. 2 of 2018 on MD3, DPR journalists were not involved in the event, and the event was seemingly closed to the public. The media had difficulty in getting access to the draft amendment of Law No. 2 of 2018 on MD3. They admitted that, in the end, they received the draft from the DPR
leaders via a lobbying process, not officially from the News Bureau. According to him, journalists were used to getting access to data from the DPR members (not official), not from the News Bureau as the MRO of the DPR (results of an interview with Ramdoni on 12 April 2019).

When asked to confirm the claim of public disclosure made by the News Bureau through Parliamentary TV and the website, Doni and other media colleagues replied that they had never accessed the DPR internal media, let alone to observe or use it as a reference to their reporting.

The News Bureau’s slow pace considered by Doni and other journalists as obstacles to their work. As a result, parliamentary journalists asked their questions directly to the DPR members or leaders rather than going through the News Bureau (results of an interview with Ramdoni on 12 April 2019).

This certainly not in line with the public policy implementation process and hinder the work of the DPR’s MRO, that is very familiar with the policy socialization in the legislative body. The DPR leaders and the News Bureau, as the parties who are responsible for introducing the policy to the public, should be able to implement the policy in creative ways, so that the policies issued do not conflict with its objectives (Suharto, 2005).

3.2. The Issues of The DPR Media Relations in Policy Implementation

The failure of the implementation of the MD3 Law in the media was caused by several issues. According to interviews with the News Bureau and the Chair of the Pressroom, media relations activities in the DPR were unclear and not managed properly. There were overlapping of the MRO role by the DPR members who spoke directly in the media without the MRO involvement, although the role of media relations was clearly stated in Article 232 of the DPR RI Secretary General Regulation No 6 of 2015 on the Organization and Work Procedures of the Secretary-General and the DPR RI Expertise Body (Peraturan Sekretaris Jenderal DPR RI No. 6 Tahun 2015 tentang Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Sekretaris Jenderal dan Badan Keahlian DPR RI, 2015).

The article states that the news support, information services, and public relations are the task of the News Bureau, not the DPR members. In this article, it is clear that the News Bureau’s tasks are meant to be technical and strategic tasks. This means that the House of Representatives public relations does not only act as mere technical work, but also strategic work in providing input, advance, and recommendations to the DPR in “Maintaining Relations with the Media” (Peraturan Sekretaris Jenderal DPR RI No. 6 Tahun 2015 tentang Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Sekretaris Jenderal dan Badan Keahlian DPR RI, 2015).

However, the results of interviews with all staff of the DPR News Bureau showed that the DPR News Bureau were mostly carried out administrative works, such as reporting in internal media, supporting media dialogue events (arranging the location, setting up cables and microphones for press conferences), education with kindergarten/elementary school children and others.

Although some strategic works were also carried out by the News Bureau in the form of providing speaking notes to the Chairperson of the DPR before speaking to the media, it was still not optimal and merely a formality. Sometimes DPR leaders use it as a statement in the WhatsApp group with the Pressroom reporters, and other times it was only considered as a recommendation (Results of an interview with M. Djazuli Head of Medtaksos Section on February 19, 2019).

The second problem in the media relations between the News Bureau and the Pressroom was that the DPR members think that they have legal rights to speak directly to the media without going through the News Bureau. In the DPR RI Regulation No. 1 of 2015 concerning the DPR RI Code of Ethics, Article 13 stated that (1) DPR members must maintain professional relations with journalists. (2) Members may explain the data and information obtained at the meeting to reporters unless the member does not attend the meeting, or if the data and information were confidential.
The article was causing the dilemma for the News Bureau to prohibit the members from speaking directly without going through the News Bureau (Results of an interview with DPR’s Public Relations Staff, Andini Perwitasari on February 20, 2019), though the phrase “must” in that article was only relating to the DPR internal ethic regulations, not to MD3 Law. If that phrase was attached to the MD3 Law, which is to regulate the duties, principles, and functions of the DPR, then the members of the DPR does indeed have a duty as DPR’s public relations. Since the phrase is in the code of ethics, it should be interpreted as “an obligation to maintain ethics” not as a “duty of the profession” (see DPR RI Ethical Code No. 1 of 2015).

The media relations that were carried out were between the 560 DPR members and the Pressroom. Thus, there was an overlapping role in media relations activities between the News Bureau and Members of Parliament.

The DPR MRO, in this case, the News Bureau, should be an official gateway in ensuring the image of the institution to the public. This is what is referred to as a one door system, to prevent multiple information from various sources. This system was not implemented in the News Bureau (Nova, 2014).

Third, the results of the study involving interviews from both the News Bureau and the Pressroom of the DPR, acknowledged that the position of the DPR journalists was more dominant than the DPR itself as the host, especially in creating the discourse or issues to be raised in the DPR.

Doni admitted, as the Chair of the Pressroom, he was able to determine the theme of the discussion or issue in the news that would be covered in the DPR. He organized 343 journalists from more than 100 media in covering the DPR (results of an interview with Ramdoni on 12 April 2019).

Interview with Djazuli affirmed that at the time of the implementation of the MD3 Law, Ramdoni’s media was the one who created the bombastic title, and then followed by other media and became a controversy. There was a possibility that Doni was the one behind the news generated by the Pressroom, by steering the public opinion or the selection of certain themes that will then be developed by the Pressroom journalists (the result of an interview with M. Djazuli pada 19 February 2019).

However, when the researchers re-confirmed this to Doni, he was reluctant to be named as the cause of the MD3 Law controversy issue in the public and the media. For him, he only conveyed criticism and clear information on the performance of the DPR. He was not aware of how the other media followed up on it (results of an interview with Ramdoni on 12 April 2019).

The dominant position of the pressroom was also motivated by their “comfort of working” in the DPR. Doni admitted that there were a large number of journalists covering the DPR. Some journalists were willing to move from media A to media B because they did not want to be transferred from their DPR assignment. Doni and his colleagues admitted that this was due to the conveniences of working in the DPR Pressroom. The Pressroom journalists enjoyed plenty of facilities (computer, Wi-Fi, comfortable pressroom room), assistants to type releases, transcribe interviews, or an office boy. These facilities, combined with the potential issues or news discourse that was easier to get from the DPR members who are free to speak to the journalist, also made the Pressroom posting more comfortable. It was not surprising that the number of Pressroom journalists was so large compared to the number of journalists covering the Ministries and other Institutions. (results of an interview with Ramdoni on 12 April 2019).

The large number of Pressroom journalists made it harder to ascertain the credibility of the media covering the DPR (not verified by the press council). However, Doni guaranteed that at the time of the interview the journalists covering the DPR were verified by the press council, and there were no more journalists whose media were not registered in the press council (Doni’s interview on 12 April 2019).

The closeness of Pressroom journalists to the leaders or members of the DPR can also be seen from the “operational funding support” for journalists from the personal
pockets of members of the DPR or factions. That was also stated by the Chair and Treasurer of the DPR Pressroom during the interview.

The DPR Members often provided operational assistance for the Pressroom or donations to the journalist for certain events, such as their wedding, death of their families, or if they were sick. There was no fixed amount or timeframe for that assistance. The Pressroom stated that the value could be three million in a week, or a million a day, depending on what the DPR member would like to donate (Interview with Nailin Insaroh, Treasurer of the DPR Pressroom).

Giving ‘donations’ is not a problem if the source of money comes from the personal pockets of members as a form of personal relations. However, if the money comes from factions or the state budget, then it is feared that it would misuse the budget and violates the Journalistic Code of Ethics. The value of the donation might change the direction of the news.

This violates the journalistic code of ethics and Law No. 40 of 1999 concerning the Press, especially in Article 4 of the Journalistic Code of Ethics, which states that journalists must not receive compensation in any form that can affect the objectivity of the news (Dwicahyani & Astuti, n.d.).

Of course, in the concept of media relations, this practice is not in line with what MRO should be. Ideally, the relationship between the DPR and the media must be equal, no party has a higher position, because they need each other. Organizations or institutions need media to communicate with their public and maintain their integrity. The media need an organization/institution as a source of valuable information that they can deliver to the public. There should be no dominant party in the relationship, and there should be no transactional relationship between the parties (Iriantara, 2011).

According to Edward L. Bernays, in Nova (2014) MRO is “a profession related to the task as a spokesperson in conveying information to the public through a one door system. This is carried out to prevent multiple information from various sources (Nova, 2014). This system was not implemented in the News Bureau.

In terms of policy formulation communication, the negative reactions and controversies from the media and the public that have been presented in the earlier sections, clearly illustrate how the DPR failed to formulate and implement their policies. According to Ripley and Franklin, the success of a policy can be seen from what occurs after laws are enacted and is seen as giving authority of the program, benefits, or a real type of output, not controversy (Ripley & Franklin, 1986).

4. Conclusion

The study showed that the formation and implementation of MD3 Law No. 2 of 2018 were heavily influenced by political interests since its inception. The amendment process was marked by walkouts of two parties, and the lack of focus of the DPR members, which were only paying close attention on the article of the addition of leadership.

DPR communication during the policy formation process was also not well managed. Based on Randal B. Ripley’s public policy analysis, the DPR policy process started from the agenda-setting, formulation of legitimacy with the Government and the Regional Representative Council (DPD), to implementation and evaluation. Many DPR members did not understand the policy communication process and not paying attention to the articles to be presented. Some articles were ignored and caused great issues later on for the DPR.

The communication issue of the MD3 Law was caused by the sub-optimum media relations activities in the DPR News Bureau, that was influenced by three main factors: 1) The work system that was more administrative, 2) the News Bureau’s role of media relations was overlapped by the DPR members, and 3) the Pressroom dominated the media relations and the transactional relations. Thus, the role of the DPR News Bureau was more technical, not strategic.
The DPR needs to have a coordinator or a gatekeeper to handle the flow of information to the media from its 560 members. With a gatekeeper, there would be no overlapping roles of media relations between the News Bureau and the DPR members. The function of the gatekeeper is not to regulate or to silence the voice of the DPR as the people’s representative. Rather it acts as the source and active adviser to provide inputs and suggestions from its media monitoring on issues related to the House of Representatives. In this case, the role of the News Bureau is still not optimal, so the recommendations and work are only about administrative matters. If not addressed properly, all policy implementation processes in media relations activities will continue to experience heavy criticism and rejection from the media and the public.

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