MODERN ASPECT OF UKRAINIAN POPULISM: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECT

The study of populism is actualized by the presence of a social order from interested political actors who use populism to implement their programs and in the struggle for power, focusing on the possibilities of change and reform. The relevance of the study is obvious given the lack of comprehensive study of populism in Ukraine, proper political evaluation of previous studies, rethinking some theses of individual researchers, and especially in connection with its actualization as one of the popular principles in action, behavior in modern political practice and our state.

Today in Ukraine, the intensification and emergence of new manifestations of populism have become a sign of a general long-term failure on the path of technological modernization, in efforts to achieve rapid economic growth and in the fight against corruption. The tendency to the increasingly negative attitude of many citizens to complex and compromise procedures of democratic institutions, the desire for quick and simple solutions, intolerance of different views contain a double threat - to roll into anarchy or establish an authoritarian regime.

In Ukrainian literature interest in populism appeared in the late 1990s. The initial study was the basis of his reception of analytical findings Western scholars. Today domestic historiography populism presented a number of papers in the form of articles. Amid the general characteristics of the phenomenon of populism, based primarily on the legacy of Western political scientists, highlights particular issues such as manifestations of populism in the Ukrainian national movement, modern Ukrainian politics populist methods of political struggle, philosophical discourse of the concept.

Thus, populism can be considered an inevitable companion of political freedom and democracy. In some places, it is a force that promotes political par-
participation and reform in the interests of many low-status social groups. By inclining to oppose the rights of the majority to the interests and rights of certain minorities, populism can be a threat to the rule of law and basic political and civil liberties. Wherever populist leaders gained power, it became authoritarian, accompanied by abuses and oppression (but not destruction) of the opposition. Key words: populism, election, political leader, political regime, democracy.

1. INTRODUCTION

Analyzing the current state of populism, its impact on the lives of citizens, it should be noted that populism is most prevalent among the population with a low level of political and legal culture, as well as in the conditions of unstable structures of democracy. The inability of the masses to distinguish demagoguery from realistic proposals, a black-and-white vision of the world, a willingness to adore another idol and hate his competitors – all these symptoms of low political culture are widely used by populist leaders to mobilize public support.

The danger of pure populism for the politician himself, who is inclined to this strategy, is that by putting forward a few popular slogans, he quickly becomes their hostage, and any attempt to adjust or change course is perceived by his electorate as a betrayal. Therefore, since the mood of the masses is known to be volatile, populist politics seem like a pointless throw from one side to the other. In fact, there is an accurate and subtle calculation to always be in the «team» of the majority. The minority of populists are not interested because they do not «make the weather» in the elections. As a result, the populist is always the enemy of pluralism and consensus, which is achieved through dialogue with all social groups and their political representations.

The main methodological basis of the our article were approaches that characterize the essence of the phenomenon of «populism» through aspects of rationalism (as a concept of theoretical thinking), irrationalism (as a reflection of belief, behavior and ideology), technology (as a consciously constructed institutional framework in policy based on populist principles.

Analysis of Recent Research and Publications. Ukrainian scientists such as P. Ilyashenko, A. Kolodiy, O. Kramar, E. Laclau, O. Lisnychuk, V. Lytvyn, T. Lyutyi, D. Mykhailynina, A. Romanyuk, A. Petraschuk, K. Vasilevsky, D. Yablonsky, and others.

An important emphasis on the path of transformation is the readiness of citizens for self-organization, for the manifestation of civic activity at the local level. A significant challenge of post-Sovietism is paternalism – the belief
of citizens in the omnipotence of the state; the belief that it is the state that must solve all their problems.

As a result, such civic passivity allows the authorities to play on the voter’s paternalistic tendencies (politicians find it easier to «bribe» citizens with their promises). Such indifference leads to stagnation, lack of reforms or their weak implementation. The same passivity provokes a decrease in the level of accountability of politicians from the local to the central level.

The more active citizens are in defending their own interests, the more responsible the politicum will become; the greater the civic activity, the stronger the democratic traditions in society will become. In liberal democracies, there is a noticeable attempt to shift the decision-making lever towards the regions, towards empowerment.

In our opinion, there are several factors of considerable and long-lasting influence of populism in independent Ukraine. One of them, which we have already mentioned, is the quality of political culture, first of all its component, such as lack of ability of many citizens to critically comprehend complex socio-economic and political realities, tendency to draw immediate and very simple conclusions about difficult and contradictory things. The foundations were laid during several decades of the Soviet period of Ukrainian history, when, in the absence of fundamental freedoms, real public policy and debate, a sufficient culture of argumentation, evidentiary analysis, obviously, could not be formed.

Variants of Ukrainian populism. The rise of populism in recent years is due, in our opinion, another factor. It is the current political bankruptcy of Ukraine’s leftist forces, linked in one way or another to the Soviet past. The most influential of them, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, had different views on Ukraine’s democracy, Ukrainian independence and European orientations, and the reasons for their failures were different, but the lack of visible left-wing forces in today’s Ukrainian party spectrum is a fact. With the concentration of power in the hands of centrists and center-right, the public demand for social justice, more equal access of citizens to basic social goods has lost the usual mechanisms of political representation in previous decades. That is why the populists turned to this topic, filling the empty socio-political niche.

There is a de facto consensus in the expert community, at least in its segment, which is not involved in current political competitions. We think that it would be appropriate to mention a number of recommendations on possible ways to counter populism, proposed, according to the study, by the analytical group of BA «Tektum». Most of them relate primarily to the environment that
Tektum analysts describe as an «active and competent public» – scientists, NGOs, the media, and civic activists [1].

They could appeal to the potential electorate of populist politicians, arguably showing the possible consequences of their irresponsible statements and proposals, the impossibility of fulfilling their promises. The dominance of populism became especially threatening during the war and aggressive military pressure on the Ukrainian state by Russia. It is in this context that populism on a modern scale, forms and influences becomes the main threat to Ukraine's national security.

This spread of populism means not only the use of certain rhetoric, but also the formation of a special picture of the world, the creation of a specific social reality. Populism (especially in recent scales and forms) has ceased to be a competitive technology to fight for voter commitment. Currently, it is a factor that decisively affects the structuring, the direction and dynamics of political and social change, the activities of state, political, economic, social institutions, the transformation of the old and the creation of new ones.

The vast majority of influences and changes resulting from the dominance of populism are destructive in terms of Ukraine’s democratic development prospects and (especially in recent months) its preservation of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Let’s call the most threatening: as a result of the influence of populism, an oversimplified picture of socio-political reality, existing problems and tasks, social needs, interests and identities is formed.

Populist discourse tends to replace them with an amorphous, unstructured entity, which he refers to as the «people». Populism slows down and then blocks the articulation of the interests of social groups, complicates the possibilities of representation and protection. Similarly, it affects the definition and implementation of national interests. Populist discourse conducts and supports the internal frontier, dividing the whole society into «righteous» and «others» (who are mostly also «enemies»). Thus, the state of constant confrontation is maintained and nurtured in the public consciousness.

Populism is based on self-sufficient critique of the existing status quo and causes permanent delegitimization of the existing political and social order [2]. Populism-based political programs are based on a two-dimensional («people’s» «enemies») picture of the world and offer «simple solutions to complex problems». Attempts at comprehensive reforms are being vulgarized. In the end, almost any category, concept, or meaning that is passed through populist discourse becomes depleted, loses its meaning, and becomes «empty signifiers» [3].

Populism makes Ukrainian politics meaningless, and this is obviously its greatest destructive force and its most negative influence. There is an obvious
need to reduce the level of populism in Ukrainian socio-political life, weaken its influence on the struggle for power and management decisions (although they may have relatively less than the election campaign, the populist burden) [4]. Also, experts and non-partisan journalists, predicting key topics of election campaigns, could saturate the information space with high-quality analytical material, which would increase the level of public awareness of relevant issues.

Experts noted the lack of relevant media platforms, the possibility of direct discussion with representatives of the political class, in particular, and the need for responsibility-oriented television projects than in the now common format of television talk shows, discussion. Among analysts’ recommendations is a proposal to increase attention to party programs, which they consider less burdened by populism than election campaigns. In their opinion, it would be possible to establish a legal requirement to harmonize the proposals of party programs with their requirements and positions, which are broadcast in media advertising [5].

In our opinion, it is worth recognizing the validity, the potential usefulness of the proposals listed here. In particular, it could be added that the media platform potentially capable of counteracting populism could be public television. We believe that its organization should provide guarantees of a fairly high proportional level of involvement in the discussion of socially important issues of experts, including foreign, members of the public [6].

Note that these proposals on ways to combat populism are in the nature of recommendations from the public and experts. This raises the question: is it possible, what could be the institutional measures that would help reduce the level of populism in Ukrainian politics, and thus – to improve the entire system of Ukrainian political management, its ability to find and implement solutions that would be an adequate response on numerous economic and social challenges?

Could a constitutional solution be proposed? Our analysis of world and domestic experience allows us to conclude that, unlike the political regime, the very model of government does not significantly affect the level of populism. In Ukraine, in particular, populism was an important factor in socio-political life until 1996, when the state system was a hybrid of the Soviet system with the basic elements of a democratic system, both under the 1996 Constitution and the current Constitution adopted in 2004 [7].

**Populism’s Technology in Ukrainian Society.** In Ukraine, the influence of populist technologies and populist forces is rooted not in the shortcomings of existing political institutions, not in the legal framework of political activity, but primarily in the peculiarities of the current state of political culture.
of Ukrainian society. It is important to emphasize that populism, as shown in the study, is possible and arises in the course of interaction of politicians with a mass participant in the political process. Thus, it is always, albeit to varying degrees, the response of a politician interested in broad support to a particular request from citizens to whom they are trying to send exactly the «message» they want to receive.

This circumstance leads to the conclusion that efforts to counter populism can be effective if they are also aimed at changing this popular demand. So, about mass political culture and its populist component. Unfortunately, for the reasons outlined above, in the space of modern Ukrainian politics, populist algorithms for finding solutions to complex social problems are far too characteristic of Ukrainian citizens [8].

According to our observations, the stereotypical reaction of many non-specialists, especially in crisis situations, is the symptomatic populist desire to immediately find those guilty whose evil will and selfishness caused these problems, unwillingness to accept more complex explanations (which, of course, a priori do not exclude subjective component). errors, incompetence or even crimes as part of a list of possible causes). In this context, perhaps the first category to which many «ordinary people» turn, seeking, for example, an explanation of the causes of the economic crisis, is the category of «deception», «theft», the belief that «all this» is completely artificial and malicious. did «they», «power». Such examples could be continued [9, p.161].

In this context, it is worth noting the need for some revision of certain elements of the populist vision of history, which modern Ukrainian textbooks have inherited from Soviet and, in part, from Ukrainian populist historiography. This is an overly critical image of the higher strata of society (especially non-ethnic), and on the other hand – a certain idealization of the people as a set of «ordinary people».

We believe that history textbooks and textbooks should clearly state not only the privileges, abuse of power, negative characteristics of the upper social strata, but also certain important functions of the elite for the whole society, its positive role in the development of culture, science, state and law. art, ie its social responsibility. This proposal should not be construed as a call for a formal encouragement of a conservative interpretation of the historical process. Perhaps the broader context of such a «depopulation» of mass historical education could be its modernization, based on the formation of a more «inclusive», ethnic, socio-cultural, as well as gender, views, version of Ukrainian history [10].

In the context of the fight against populism, it may be more appropriate to talk about countering this phenomenon than overcoming it, because populism is a necessary «companion» of politics and cannot be completely overcome. How-
ever, its manifestations need to be limited, because they lead to destabilization in society and politics, with a destructive effect on the political system of the country [11].

The key problem in counteracting the phenomenon of populism is the extremely limited capabilities of the state in this area. It is usually not the populist actions themselves that are directly destructive, but their social consequences, and the legal link between them is very difficult to trace, except in isolated cases that call for the overthrow of the existing regime or incitement to interethnic or interfaith hatred. Thus, the main subject of opposition to populism is, in fact, civil society and its institutions. However, the state should provide support to civic institutions in the process of combating populism, and sometimes even initiate appropriate action [12].

Populism is a reaction to various – social, economic, ethnic and other – social problems, it feeds on them, parasitizes on them. Accordingly, social crises are a promising ground for its development. This is exactly the situation in Ukraine now. It is clear that the main mechanism for counteracting populism is to raise the level of political culture. However, in the context of socio-economic and foreign policy crisis, this is not enough. The state and civil society institutions should intensify their efforts in this area, and the state should assume the functions of synchronization and systematization.

An important direction of such actions – «game in advance» – should saturate the information space with current issues. Although the main burden of this task falls on public institutions, the state can provide them with informational assistance, realizing its considerable scientific potential, identifying the main problems that have the greatest reason to be the object of populist parasitism. Relevant state scientific resources can become a basis for explanatory work through public media channels [13].

Given that the main media resource is in private hands and, inevitably politically engaged (to some extent), the problem of introducing public television and radio, potentially the most independent information distribution channel at the moment, is relevant in the crisis. It is he who could carry out impartial monitoring of populist actions and produce objective content. However, the implementation of such a project in a country with a low average standard of living is impossible without state aid. The state should not only allocate the necessary frequencies, but also provide financial and technical assistance for the creation of public channels.

Unfortunately, so far we do not see the state will in this matter, because the law «On the system of Public Television and Radio Broadcasting» of 1997 has remained unimplemented, as well as the law «On Public Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine», which came to him on change in April 2014.
In our opinion, a potentially promising direction of counteracting populism is to acquaint the population with the programs of political parties. Programs usually carry a much smaller «burden» of populism than public statements by individual party representatives. The most glaring discrepancies are to be monitored by public institutions, but the printing of party programs, the increase in their circulation and their distribution among the population are actions that the state must take.

At the same time, there are areas in which the state's capabilities are extremely limited. These are private channels of information dissemination, the most effective of which is still television. Television is the main media resource for spreading populist ideas. Unfortunately, in many cases, television political analytics is held hostage to market or simply rating factors. Therefore, in the process of combating populism, it is hardly worth placing high hopes on this segment of the information infrastructure.

Note that the fight against populism is a complex, long process, the key to the success of which is the systematic efforts of all – governmental and non-governmental - its subjects.

The mass consciousness and political ideologies of various states, including the post-Soviet space, periodically reproduce the desire of citizens to link positive socio-economic development with individuals and the so-called iron power. In this case, democracy is seen as a brake on economic stabilization and progress, which is stimulated by a certain share of national politics.

Quite often after sharp political events or so-called political turns – Maidan – 2004, Maidan – 2014, the population develops apathy, which often occurs after the violent activities of the community – the leader - the team. If there is no support in the majority of the population, then the leaders begin the process of active exhaustion, and they resort to the reaction of self-defense of their own ego, ie «populist slogans».

Therefore, the lack of the required level of social energy and public support contributes. The cause of apathy can be inconsistency, inadequacy of life forms to the internal fateful mood or the deep nature of man or society. This creates distrust of power or its complete absence, because trust is not only a sign of democratic life, but also a value, a psychological regulator of the social process. The so-called consolidation is lost – a central factor in the effectiveness of any social action that requires a collective mind or collective inspiration, not to mention a political goal, the achievement of which is impossible without the involvement of this factor. That is, it cannot but be a functional field.
2. CONCLUSIONS

Thus, populism can be considered an inevitable companion of political freedom and democracy. In some places, it is a force that promotes political participation and reform in the interests of many low-status social groups. By inclining to oppose the right of the majority to the interests and rights of certain minorities, populism can be a threat to the rule of law and basic political and civil liberties. Wherever populist leaders gained power, it became authoritarian, accompanied by abuses and harassment (but not destruction) of the opposition.

In the history of independent Ukraine, visions of populism have manifested themselves in different ways and on a large scale. Already during the years of the crisis of the socialist system, which became fatal for him, political agitation, not devoid of populist features, helped the national democratic forces to remove the Communists from power. After gaining independence, significant elements of populism became a constant in the political struggle in Ukraine. The de facto norm of political competition in Ukraine has become the generous and unrealistic socio-economic promises made by most parties and politicians.

Another populist feature of the Ukrainian election campaign, especially the presidential one, is the attempt to present political rivalry as a struggle between good and evil. This was facilitated by deep cultural and mental differences between different Ukrainian regions. It is possible to state the presence of populist traits in most significant Ukrainian political forces. For some of them, party ideology sometimes became just a decoration to cover the interests of certain business groups.

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СУЧАСНИЙ АСПЕКТ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ПОПУЛІЗМУ: ПОЛІТИЧНИЙ І СОЦІАЛЬНИЙ ВИМІР

У статті акцентовано увагу на популізмі як наявності соціального замовлення зацікавлених політичних акторів, які використовують популізм для реалізації своїх програм та в боротьбі за владу, зосереджуючись на можливостях змін і реформ. Актуальність дослідження очевидна з огляду на відсутність усебічного вивчення популізму в Україні, належної політичної оцінки попередніх досліджень, переосмислення деяких тез окремих ученів, й особливо у зв’язку з його актуалізацією як одного з популярних принципів дії, поведінки в сучасній політичній практиці нашій державі. Сьогодні в Україні активізація та поява нових проявів популізму стали ознакою загального довгострокового провалу на шляху технологічної модернізації, у зусиллях для швидкого економічного зростання й у боротьбі з корупцією. Тенденція до дедалі негативнішого ставлення багатьох громадян до складних і компромісних процедур демократичних інституцій, прагнення до швидких та простих рішень, нетерпимість до різних поглядів містять подвійну загрозу – упасти в анархію або встановити авторитарний режим.

В українській літературі інтерес до популізму з’явився наприкінці 90-х. Сьогодні вітчизняний історіографічний популізм представив
низку статей. Серед загальних характеристик явища популізму, що грунтується насамперед на спадщині західних політологів, висвітлюються такі проблеми, як прояви популізму в українському національному русі, сучасна українська політика, популістські методи політичної боротьби, філософський дискурс концепції.

Отже, популізм можна вважати неминучим супутником політичної свободи та демократії. Подекуди це сила, яка сприяє політичній участі й реформам в інтересах багатьох соціальних груп із низьким статусом. Намагаючись протистояти правам більшості інтересам і правам певних меншин, популізм може становити загрозу верховенству права та основним політичним і громадянським свободам. Скрізь, де популістські лідери здобували владу, вона ставала авторитарною, що супроводжувалось зловживаннями та утиском (але не знищенням) опозиції.

Ключові слова: популізм, вибори, політичний лідер, політичний режим, демократія.

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