Secure self-calibrating quantum random bit generator

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Random numbers are commonly used in computer simulations, lotteries, and, most importantly, cryptographic applications. Cryptographically strong random numbers need to have two properties: good statistical behavior and unpredictability. The numbers need to be distributed according to a uniform distribution, and an attacker should not be able to predict the corresponding sequence of bits. Unpredictability is quantified using the entropy content of a sequence generated by a random-bit generator (RBG) [16].

The entropy content can be used to grade RBG security, i.e., the ability of the generator to withstand attacks. Most applications generate long strings of bits using algorithms known as pseudo-random number generators, with seeds chosen by the user. The entropy content of the strings generated in this fashion is small and is ultimately determined by the length of the (short) seed. This deficiency makes pseudo-random numbers unsuitable for the most demanding cryptographic applications. This fact has been recognized by both the information theory community and the computer security industry [11, 12]. Hardware RBGs are an alternative to pseudo-RBGs because they harvest and distill entropy from physical systems. The most recent examples of hardware RBGs stress the importance of directly measuring the entropy content of the source [3].

In principle, random bits could be produced by classical physical processes that are too complicated to predict perfectly over long times, such as thermal noise. For example, Denker has used thermal noise fluctuations in a resistor as a randomness source, and relied on an estimate of the entropy of the noise process to extract a random bit sequence from digits derived from that source [3]. Further, sufficiently powerful data processing systems with appropriate models or algorithms may become able to predict chaotic or thermal processes, even if only for a short time.

In quantum phenomena the outcome of a class of measurements is governed by probabilistic laws: the statistical properties of repeated measurements can be predicted, but the result of each measurement is random. This irreducible randomness of the quantum phenomena is postulated here and is the basis of our RBG. Distinguishing between irreducible quantum randomness and classical randomness, that can in principle be controlled and influenced, is at the basis of our RBG security.

Quantum measurements can be easily used to generate random bits. For example, if we detect the transmission and reflection of a 45°-polarized photon (a "qubit") on an horizontal-vertical (H-V) polarizing beam-splitter with two photomultipliers, each detector has the same probability to register an event, but at any given time we cannot predict which detector will record the next event. By assigning the value 0 to a detection in one of the detectors and 1 to the other we can build sequences of random numbers. Similarly, we can use pairs of polarization-entangled photons that are described by

$$|\psi^+\rangle = \frac{|H_1V_2\rangle + |V_1H_2\rangle}{\sqrt{2}},$$

so that appropriately balanced coincidence measurements in the $H_1$-$V_2$ and $V_1$-$H_2$ basis yield equiprobable outcomes. This type of quantum coin tossing has already been exploited for the generation of random bits [4, 5, 6]. None of those quantum RBGs presented a security analysis or a method to verify integrity.

In this work we demonstrate a quantum random-bit generator (QRBG) based on measurements made on
quantum states that span a $2 \times 2$ Hilbert (sub)space. While there are a number of quantum systems that could readily satisfy this constraint, we have emphasized an optical implementation because of the ease with which quantum states can be generated and measured. We follow recent work on entropic statistical analysis of random sources [3, 8, 9], and we measure a quantity known as “min-entropy,” $H_\infty$, and use the value of $H_\infty$ to distill a random sequence of bits from a series of detection events using a hash function.

Our approach has two main advantages over existing QRBGs. First, we are able to measure and monitor continuously the randomness of the bits, relying on a physical property of the system. We do not rely on a-posteriori statistical tests of generated bit sequences, because these tests cannot prove randomness unless they analyze infinite sequences. Second, using this protocol allows us to endow an attacker with more capabilities than any other RBG: even if she takes complete control of the source of optical states, so long as $H_\infty > 0$ a sequence of bits nevertheless can be extracted that is arbitrarily close to a string of bits that is perfectly random. [9]

To define and measure the security of a RBG we must define the adversarial context in which it operates. In such scheme one has to assume that the attacker has complete knowledge of the protocol used and can, in principle, control or influence part of it. This is similar to the scenarios used for quantum key distribution in which the attacker has complete control of the communication channels and knowledge of the protocol but has no access to the transmission stations.

In our scenario, the user (Alice) can choose the quantum system on which she makes a measurement to generate random bits but the adversary (Eve) controls the state of the quantum system but has no access to the measurement apparatus (the tomography setup, in our case). Notice that Alice is not allowed to exploit other degrees of freedom different from the ones under Eve’s control. This restriction is due to the fact that one must assume an attacker has knowledge of the protocol and will try to gain control of the degrees of freedom that are actually being used for generating the random numbers. Even using such unfavorable scenario for Alice we demonstrate that a secure RBG can be built using such assumptions. This is a worst-case scenario: our protocol is secure a fortiori if Eve has less than total control of the state of the system or if she tries to exploit failures in the system to gain knowledge of the random bits.

One could argue that our adversarial scenario is somewhat contrived because Eve is not likely to gain control of the source. There are two arguments to counteract such objection. First, protocol robustness is increased if one shows that it is resilient against a larger class of attacks. Second even if Eve does not control directly the degree of freedom used to generate the random numbers she can nevertheless take advantage of a system failure to gain knowledge of the bits being generated. In this respect our protocol is more secure than any other hard-wire random number generator we know of.

In our protocol Alice picks the simplest quantum system, a qubit, and makes a projective measurement to generate random bits. In this contest, we believe, simplicity is a virtue and this is the reason for using a qubit. This allows a complete analysis and excludes the possibilities of extra degrees of freedom used as “back-doors” by Eve. More complicated systems might have similar security but are outside the scope of this paper.

Here we implement the qubit in the polarization of photons. The polarization state of the photons is controlled by Eve, but she has no knowledge of the sequence of measurements made by Alice except for the basis used for the projection measurement used to generate the random bits. [7] For any other hardware RBG one requires that Eve has no control over the randomness source while in our adversarial scenario she completely controls one component (i.e. state preparation) of the source.

Alice’s measurement strategy is consistent with the provision of a $2 \times 2$ Hilbert space (i.e. a qubit), and that any state Eve sends to Alice can be represented by a $2 \times 2$ complex density matrix $\hat{\rho}$. For any density matrix $\hat{\rho}$, Eve can try to bias the output of the QRBG in a way that is known to her, but appears random to Alice, by sending a collection of pure states $|\psi_i\rangle$ with corresponding probabilities $p_i$ such that

$$\hat{\rho} = \sum_i p_i |\psi_i\rangle \langle \psi_i| ;$$

i.e., she can use any decomposition of $\hat{\rho}$. Eve cannot control the outcome of a measurement on the pure state $|\psi_i\rangle$ (because these probabilities are governed solely by the laws of quantum mechanics), but knows at each time the state Alice is measuring. How much information can Eve obtain in this case about Alice’s random sequence? Or, in other words, how can Alice separate the quantum randomness from the classical one?

We begin to answer these questions by defining an entropic quantity known as the min-entropy [9]:

**Definition 1** The min-entropy of a random variable $X$, denoted by $H_\infty(X)$, is

$$H_\infty(X) \equiv -\log_2(\max_{x \in X} P(x))$$

where $P(x)$ is the probability of a particular outcome of the random variable $X$. For a secure implementation the probabilities $P(x)$ should be calculated from the attacker point of view and a worst-case scenario regarding the amount of her knowledge. When so defined the min-entropy can be used to determine the quality of a source of randomness. For a binary variable, $H_\infty = 1$ corresponds to a completely random process, and $H_\infty = 0$ to a deterministic one.

Alice generates $n$ bits by measuring the states provided by Eve. If the bits were generated by measuring $n$ times a qubit in the pure state $|\psi\rangle$ in the computational basis
three lemmas, which are easily established:

\[ H_\infty(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|^n) = -n \log_2(\max(|0\rangle\langle0|^2, |1\rangle\langle1|^2)) \]
\[ = -n \log_2(\max(P_0, P_1)). \]  

(4)

This definition can be extended to a decomposition such as the one on the RHS of Eq. 2:

\[ H_\infty\left[\left(\sum_i p_i |\psi_i\rangle\langle\psi_i|\right)^n\right] \]
\[ = -n \sum_i p_i \log_2(\max(p_i)) \]
\[ = n \sum_i p_i H_\infty(|\psi_i\rangle\langle\psi_i|). \]

(5)

Since Alice does not know anything about the decomposition that Eve may be using, we will define the min-entropy of a state \( \hat{\rho} \) (denoted \( \tilde{H}_\infty(\hat{\rho}) \)) to be the minimum value of the min-entropy taken over all possible decompositions of \( \hat{\rho} \). This approach allows us to put an upper bound on the amount of information Eve can obtain about Alice’s sequence, and to determine the worst-case parameters for the randomness extractor that is used below.

By assumption, \( \hat{\rho} \) is a \( 2 \times 2 \) density matrix, so that without loss of generality we can write

\[ \hat{\rho}(S_1, S_2, S_3) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \begin{array}{cc} 1 + S_3 & S_1 - i S_2 \\ S_1 + i S_2 & 1 - S_3 \end{array} \right) \]  

(6)

where \( S_{1,2,3} \) are the real Stokes parameters (for \( S_0 = 1 \)) for the qubit space. The point \((S_1, S_2, S_3)\) lies inside or on the Poincaré sphere for physical density matrices.

**Definition 2** We define the function \( f(\hat{\rho}) \), which is real valued for all physical density matrices, as

\[ f(\hat{\rho}) = -\log_2\left(1 + \sqrt{1 - |S_1 - i S_2|^2}/2\right). \]  

(7)

We can now state the theorem that is the centerpiece of our QRBG algorithm:

**Theorem** The min-entropy of a system described by an arbitrary density matrix \( \hat{\rho} \) is

\[ \tilde{H}_\infty(\hat{\rho}) = f(\hat{\rho}). \]  

(8)

This theorem can be demonstrated using the following three lemmas, which are easily established: 10

**Lemma 1** For each pure state \( |\psi\rangle \)

\[ H_\infty(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|) = f(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|). \]  

(9)

**Lemma 2** The two pure states represented by the density matrices

\[ |\eta_+\rangle\langle\eta_+| = \frac{1}{2} \left( \begin{array}{cc} 1 + S_1' & S_1 - i S_2' \\ S_1 + i S_2 & 1 - S_1' \end{array} \right) \]  

\[ S_1' = \sqrt{1 - S_1^2 - S_2^2}, \]  

are a valid decomposition of the density matrix in Eq. 6.

**Lemma 3** The function \( f(\hat{\rho}(S_1, S_2, S_3)) \) is a convex function of \( S_1, S_2, \) and \( S_3 \) in the Poincaré sphere.

Using the convexity of \( f \) we can write

\[ f(\hat{\rho}) \leq \sum_i p_i f(|\psi_i\rangle\langle\psi_i|) \]  

for each decomposition of \( \hat{\rho} \). Using Eq. 6 and the result of Lemma 1 we obtain

\[ f(\hat{\rho}) \leq \tilde{H}_\infty\left(\sum_i p_i |\psi_i\rangle\langle\psi_i|\right) \]  

(12)

indicating that \( f(\hat{\rho}) \) is a lower bound for \( \tilde{H}_\infty(\hat{\rho}) \). Using Lemma 1, we can show that the decomposition of Lemma 2 has a min-entropy equal to \( f(\hat{\rho}) \), and therefore that \( f(\hat{\rho}) \) is equal to the minimum of \( H_\infty \) over all possible decompositions of \( \hat{\rho} \), i.e., \( f(\hat{\rho}) = H_\infty(\hat{\rho}) \). From this demonstration, it follows that the decomposition of Lemma 2 is the optimal choice for Eve, since it leads to the most pessimistic estimate of the min-entropy of the source.

The theorem provides a link between the density matrix and the source min-entropy. The latter quantity is interesting because of the vast computer science literature on entropy extractors (see, e.g., the review papers 4, 8). An entropy extractor—such as the example given by Ref. 4 used in our work here—is an algorithm that accepts an imperfect source of random bits and outputs a sequence arbitrarily close to a uniformly distributed sequence 18. Given a raw \( n \)-bit sequence the algorithm allows one to extract an \( m \)-bit privacy-enhanced sequence which is arbitrarily close to a uniform distribution, where

\[ m = \tilde{H}_\infty n - 4 \log_2(1/\epsilon) - 2 \]  

(13)

and \( \epsilon \) is the statistical distance between the distribution of the \( m \) bits and a uniform distribution. We refer the reader to Ref. 4 for a proof of the security of the extraction algorithm, and to Ref. 14 for the technical details of the particular algorithm we implemented.

We realized the two implementations of the QRBG shown in Fig. 1. The first implementation [Fig. 1a] uses a linearly polarized source with average intensity at the single-photon level. We used photons extracted from pairs generated by spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) in a periodically-poled potassium titanyl phosphate (PPKTP) crystal; however, either an attenuated laser or LED could have been used instead. We used parametric down-conversion in a 10-mm crystal manufactured by Raicol Crystals with a poling period of 10 μm. In the crystal a photon from the violet laser diode (13 mW at a wavelength of 405 nm, Sacher Lasertechnik, TEC-100-405-20) is split into a pair of orthogonally polarized infrared photons with a wavelength...
FIG. 1: Schematics of the QRBGs using single-photons (a) and entangled pairs (b). PPKTP is the nonlinear crystal, PBS the bulk polarization beam-splitter, FPBS the fiber polarization beam-splitter.

FIG. 2: Real and imaginary part of the density matrix for the photon pair polarization state used to generate the random-bit sequence.

of 810 nm and a 1-nm bandwidth defined by an interference filter. The photons are coupled into a single-mode fiber, propagate through a polarization-controlling stage and are split in two approximately equal parts on a fiber polarization beam-splitter. The photons are recorded by photodetectors, and each detection event is recorded as a random bit (0 for horizontally polarized photons, and 1 for vertically polarized photons). The photons’ density matrix is tomographically reconstructed off-line \[12\]. Using the density matrix and our theorem, we compute the min-entropy \(\tilde{H}_\infty = 0.96\), and we input this value to the randomness extractor \[9\]. The raw-bit generation rate is 60 kbits/s, and the bits are passed to the randomness extractor to obtain a bit-generation rate of approximately 57 kbits/s. A sample file containing 100 million random bits thus obtained is available online \[13\].

The second implementation [Fig. 1(b)] uses polarization-entangled photon pairs described by the state of Eq. 1. The entangled photons, generated by SPDC in the PPKTP crystal followed by post-selection \[11\], are sent to polarization controllers, fiber polarization beam-splitters, and single-photon detectors for analysis. Coincidence events are recorded as random bits (0 for \(H_1-V_2\) and 1 for \(V_1-H_2\)). By restricting the measurement to the coincidences, we effectively restrict the 2-qubit space of the photon pair to a 2-dimensional Hilbert subspace described by an effective-qubit state. By carrying out a complete tomography of the 2-qubit state \[12\] we can extract the effective-qubit density matrix and the relative min-entropy. Figure 2 shows a reconstructed density matrix corresponding to a min-entropy of \(\tilde{H}_\infty = 0.38\). Figure 2 shows that the fiber birefringence changes the state without affecting the min-entropy, and we do not subtract accidental coincidences from the tomographic data. (Such a correction, in fact, would increase the min-entropy, but weaken the security of the protocol). The raw bit rate for this QRBG is 14 kbits/s, while the random-bits rate is 5.3 kbits/s. Again, a sample file with 100 million random bits is available online \[13\].

We have applied a battery of \textit{a posteriori} software statistical tests to the privacy enhanced output, but we stress that these tests are only used to verify that the QRBG has been correctly implemented: the guarantee of the QRBG security and randomness relies on the measurement of \(H_\infty\). We used the NIST test suite \[14\], which consists of a set of 15 statistical tests of random numbers for cryptographic applications. Our QRBGs pass...
the test, and the detailed test results are given online [13].

A comparison between the two implementations of the QRBBG makes it obvious that the single-photon implementation is simpler and has much higher bit flux. The entangled-photon implementation has the advantage that, by using coincidences, much of the stray-light noise is suppressed. However, by carefully screening the detection apparatus, the effect of stray photons can be made negligible even in the single-photon case.

Let us review here the advantages of our quantum RBG when compared with other implementations. Compared with pseudo-random number generators our hardware RNG has the advantage of generating bit sequences with full entropy. Other hardware random number generators are based on chaotic systems [3] that can be, in principle, predicted or influenced; our quantum RNG relies on quantum measurements that are, as far as we know, fundamentally random. In addition Ref. [3] uses an estimate of the Shannon entropy (not the min-entropy) that is realized once for all: the user cannot continuously monitor the entropy to verify the security and integrity of the RBG. Compared with other quantum RBGs [4, 5, 6] our implementation is the first that explicitly takes into account security. To guarantee security the min-entropy has to be measured and filtering has to be applied in a way that is analogous to the error correction and privacy amplification routine used in quantum key distribution protocols. References [4] and [5] use an experimental setup that is conceptually similar to the single photon setup of Fig. 1 whereas the polarization beam splitter is substituted with a non-polarizing 50/50 beam splitter. For these implementations an attack scenario equivalent to the one we have analyzed would involve giving Eve control over the beam splitter. She could, for example, substitute the beam splitter with a switch and therefore completely control the outcome of the RBG. To guarantee security and integrity of this kind of RBG Alice needs to verify that the photons are coherently split among the output arms of the beam splitter and that the coherence is collapsed by her measurement. She can do so by making interferometric measurements that are formally analogous to the one we make but are more complicated from an experimental point of view. For these reasons we used the polarization scheme to implement our secure RBG.

A number of improvements in our setup are possible. The raw bit rate is currently limited by the data acquisition hardware, so dedicated hardware can speed up the acquisition and eliminate this bottleneck. Eventually the bit rate will be limited by the dead time in the detectors. Based on a comparison with existing QRBGs [4] we expect that rates up to several Mbits/s can be achieved. Using off-line tomography relies on the assumption that the system state does not change in the interval between the measurement of $H_\infty$ and the acquisition of the random bits. While this is the case in the current implementation, on-line tomography will both relax this assumption and increase the bit rate. We are currently engineering a high-performance system in which on-line tomography is carried on at the same time as the raw bits are acquired. We also observe that at this point the security of the protocol is limited to individual attacks; further analysis is needed to extend the security proof to attacks in which Eve sends Alice clusters of entangled photons.

In conclusion, we have defined the worst-case min-entropy of a qubit and introduced a method to measure it using quantum tomography. Based on the properties of the min-entropy, we constructed two implementations of a self-calibrating random number generator which is secure against a large class of attacks. We believe that our RBG will have important technological impact in the area of secure communications and that, properly extended, the min-entropy defined here could prove to be an important tool in defining the security of qubit-based communication protocols.

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It has been shown (see e.g. Ref. [1]) that min-entropy is the entropic quantity to be used to characterize RBG. We will define min-entropy rigorously in this paper and show how it can be measured in a particular system, in this introduction we will use entropy content in a loose sense as a measure of the randomness.

This adversarial scheme includes the case in which Eve uses an entangled state to prepare remotely Alice's state. This more complicated preparation scheme does not give Eve any advantage.

The impossibility proof of Ref. [15] does not apply in this case because we are using a probabilistic extractor.