Contemporary Philosophical Debate on Globalization

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Abstract

The article aims to present one typology of the numerous theories of globalization, based on the following criteria: (1) genetic (typologisation of position of “start” and the stages of the globalization process); (2) convergent-divergent (typologisation form of the perspective of understanding that globalization leads to homogenization or heterogenization of the worldwide achieved integrity); (3) evaluation (typologisation form of globalization’s assessment); (4) philosophical and anthropological (typologisation form of notions of anthropological consequences from globalization).

Keywords: globalization, theories of globalization, criteria of the globalization process.

1. The beginning of the globalization

If we summarize the different positions on the genesis and stages of the globalization process, they can be subdivided into three groups.

According to the first group, the beginning of a globalization is in ancient times. These authors believe that globalization processes begin when major empires are formed. At the heart of such visions is the notion that the history of mankind is accompanied by the two opposing processes – of universalisation and particularization. At different stages of the history, one of the two processes may prevail, with processes of universalisation occurring as separate communities outside their own borders. The process of universalisation is connected e.g. the expansion of the great empires through the Antiquity and the Middle Ages. The great empires have a highly universalistic and homogenizing role. The Roman Empire includes a huge number of territories and ethnicities, is a typical example of the forces of political and economic universalisation.

Typically, in the “forced” type of universalisation, which creates an “artificial” system, a set of different ethnicities, different languages and large, difficult to control territories, universalization is not lasting and is followed by fragmentation processes, the already established system (empire) is broken down in pieces and fragments. A major obstacle to the world’s empires is the vast territory that can hardly be controlled. The political and economic universalisation evolves into cycles, and the state of transport and communication links during the given historical period is of great importance for the “durability” of the processes of the universalisation. Each of the cycles of universalisation has its technological base and its communications on which its durability depends, as well as its peculiarities. As we go back in history, the limitations of communications and the lack of a single market make the result of attempts at universalisation political and economic education less perishable, although they bear the signs of global trends.
Another group of researchers considered the time of the Great Geographic Discovery to begin the modern process of globalization. Jurgen Osterhamm and Niles Peterson (see in Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005) offer such a version of the roots of today’s globalization, in which these roots are found in the colonial role of Europe. Representatives of this group believe that globalization is a process that is triggered by the expansion of Western civilization, which has imposed its values and institutions on the rest of the world.

The contemporary global world is such, thanks to the invasions of the European-rich countries in the past, in the isolated and unknown world of the other continents. But along with the Western expansion of the West, globalization is also linked to internal transformations of Western society itself. It is this interaction between external expansion and domestic economic, political and cultural changes that involves the existence of several stages in the unfolding of globalization. The Great Geographical Discoveries are the beginning of world trade, but also the capitalist relations that set the beginning of capitalism. We use the combination of economic and idealized globalization, because it is possible to realize the conceptual projects of its members precisely with the most elementary propulsion of economic processes in a social space. This period may be called the first stage of globalization, which has been going on until the middle of the nineteenth century. This is a period of migration of vast masses of masses, the mixing of religions and cultures, the expansion of transatlantic trade, and the imposition of some political and economic prospects over others. Capitalism is essentially universal in character. He seeks to embrace the whole world. The ideologies created by capitalism – the liberal and the Marxist – are the typical ideologies of the Enlightenment. They are based on the idea of universal history, according to which history represents a unified and inclusive process of mankind (as a critique of this idea, see Spengler in Popova, 2016: 11-37). The idea of the universality of history can be found, as has already been noted, in the Christian idea of world history: humanity has a common origin, that is the premise of its unity as well as of its common history. The development of capitalism is going through several cycles because the processes of universalisation are shifted from processes of partiality, the processes of liberalization are replaced by those of protectionism. It can be said that the main driving force is the process of universalisation, which is followed by processes of protectionism or “closure” within the state (that is exactly what we are talking about about cycles because the expansion of capitalism does not proceed “smoothly”, the process of development is not linear but rather disrupted).

In the different cycles there is a group of countries or state that are “hegemons” carrying the processes of universalisation. The second stage of economic and ideological globalization has been going on since 1840 to the First World War. This is the time when big economic agents spread their influence around the world. This is also the time of the Industrial Revolution in Europe and North America. World economic and trade exchanges have increased many times. Since the end of World War I most countries have been shutting themselves down, international trade has fallen into recession, capital is not moving. There is a rapid decline in the standard of living, high unemployment, and huge social problems that are partly caused by the Second World War. The third stage of economic-idealizing globalization takes the time from 1940 to the present day. The commencement of this stage was given on 14 August 1941, when Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt signed the so-called Atlantic Charter for the Liberalization of World Trade. This process is marked by the application of liberal values and norms to an increasing part of the world, by the growing involvement of national economies by multinationals through trade, financial flows and direct investment. At this stage, there are also terms such as globalization, globalization, globality. In American Banker magazine in 1978, the term globalization was first used. As Martin Olbrow (Olbrou, 2001: 9) points out, the use of the notion of globality is becoming an avalanche in the late 1980s and early 1990s of the twentieth century. M. Olbrow also recognizes the extensions to which the term globalization, globalization, globalization, globality, etc., has been put forward, which signal the constitution of global processes and the creation of a kind
of globalist ideology. Globalization has begun to be considered as a marker for a profound social and cultural breakthrough.

The American researcher Immanuel Wallerstein 1978, the creator of the world-system theory, occupies a specific intermediate position between the first two positions of the beginning of a globalization. According to his theory the human history has taken place within three stages. The first is the stage of “mini-systems” that existed from the birth of mankind to the emergence of agrarian civilizations. This is the era of not big isolated structural units that were self-sufficient and with an inwardly unified culture. The second stage is the age of the ”world empires”, which brings together the previous “mini-systems”. Integrating most often aggressively, related to wars and conquests. The third stage, the stage of the world economy, began in the 16th century. This is the time when the state is losing its general regulatory and protectionist role, giving it a priority place on the market. Because of its exceptional dynamism, capitalism is able to provide plenty of goods and become attractive to more and more people around the world. Began in Western Europe, he has a world over. But in this process there is a hierarchy of the world-like-system: the place of the empires is occupied by three different zones - central, peripheral and semi-peripheral. Whilst unified as a result of globalization, the world appears to be internally stratified, with different levels of development, wealth and potential for human development.

The third group of researchers as Roland Robertson, Ulrich Beck, Arjun Apadourai, Homer Baba, etc., believe that globalization is primarily a way of living in the world, a state of consciousness that has emerged since the 1950s. For these authors, it is important not only that the world becomes interconnected economically. What is decisive is that as a result of this process a kind of “global consciousness” is formed of individuals. In the course of the informatization of the world and the colossal acceleration of the means of transport, the space and the time of living fall into a state of “compression”, a transnational social space emerges, the fragmentation of the world disappears, and human consciousness acquires characteristics that never before existed – “Globalize” itself. In the opinion of these authors, the globalization of consciousness began to appear in the middle of the last century. That’s why the globalization process may have started in its economic dimension earlier, but in the true sense of the word it has only begun since the 1950s.

2. The globalization – Homogenization or heterogeneous

The theories of globalization as authors’ perspectives have developed over time. That is why we can talk about various “generations” (R. Robertson’s term – see in Robertsson, 2004: 63) in the debate. Among the theorists of globalization we can conditionally distinguish “first” and “second” generation. In the very “first” generation, they can be divided into “homogenists” and “heterogens”. The first is trying to build a vision for a world system. Assuming that universal is always present in the particle, they implicitly refer to a possible variant of convergent development. The latter question the existence of any system in the world. They deny the division of the universe and the particle, taking into account the dominant role of the West over the “rest of the world”, as a domination of one particularity over others. They dispute the convergence principle and, in general, the very notion of development. Heterogens can be called “postmodernists”. If we assume that globality is the state of divergent (in the sense of smooth, distant, progressive) modernization of the world, then universalism is the state of growing particularity.

Anthony Giddens is a typical representative of the so-called “first generation” globalists – homogenists. In order to highlight the differences in positions with the globalist – heterogeneous theorists, we will compare its basic theoretical concepts with that of Roland Robertson, which we could refer to the “heterogeneous”.
A. Giddens is one of the first to start talking about globalization and globalization as a variety of changes, not simply a single change. This thesis after it has been repeated many times in a variety of modifications. For him, globalization is a new stage in the modernization associated with the beginning of New Age. The globalization involves the division of space and time, the intersection of presence and absence over broad sections of them. For A. Giddens, the globalization is a comprehensive and inclusive change in societies, moreover, it is a catalyst for the processes of changing societies themselves. Today, people are less concerned about the traditions, enjoy the expanding living world, and in their everyday life they have access to consumables of all kinds, opportunities for social construction and regulation of the societies they create and live in. As a result, the individual becomes more independent.

For R. Robertson, globalization is “shrinking”, “collecting” or even “compressing” the world as a whole. Events or actions at any point on the planet affect or are a condition of social interactions at another point, too distant and at first sight nothing to do with the first. In this sense space is beginning to lose meaning, the world is “thickening”, it becomes “one”. R. Robertson views globalization as a two-person process. On the one hand, globalization leads to global institutionalization of the human life. People socialize and organize their lives not only, not even under the influence of the immediate social environment around them, but under the direct impact of world macrostructures.

Situated under the influence of global information flows, the expansion of Western goods, international institutions, etc., modern man lives both in his locality and in the “big world” – his life is both local and global. At the same time, R. Robertson emphasizes the other face of globalization, which he describes as “the localization of globality”. In his particular and individual life, modern man lives among representatives of various local cultures. Everyday life turns out to be a routine of interactions, involving elements from different cultures, from different social worlds. Thus, the process of “shrinking” the world is a process of connecting individual localities. In this context, R. Robertson reconsidered the notions of locality and globality. Locality itself is a product of globality. But it is true, and vice versa, globality is a network of local events. Much of today's global mass culture is in fact marked and wearing ideas, styles and genres that affect the religion, music and art of local nationalities. That is why R. Robertson proposes the concept of gloom as more adequate in his ability to describe the processes of the reciprocal integration of the local into the global one. He is even inclined to replace the use of the term globalization with the notion of glocalization. The glocalization reconciles the excessive tension that is being generated by analyzing globalization and local processes. The term very clearly expresses the inextricability between the global and the local and, at the same time, the incompetence of “global phenomena” to their “placement” in one or the other national state. Through the concept of the “glocalization”, R. Robertson tries not to treat global as something that is ready and “top”. In its conception, the global is the result of the collision and interaction between the localized elements of the local elements coming from or received from different localities.

R. Robertson is an expression of moderate “heterogens” with his concept of the “glocalization”. The position of the ultimate heterogeneous is expressed in the concept of Jan Nederen Peters (Peters, 2004), according to which globalization produces hybridization. According to Jan Peters, globalization is a process of hybridization, the production of a global mix of elements coming from different directions of the world. What are the arguments of Jan Peters to make this conclusion? Jan Peters believes that the concept of A. Giddens, according to which globalization is the natural and immanent continuation of modernization, is too dogmatic. He assesses it as a variant of the Marxist thesis on the spread of the world market. In A. Giddens’s theory, modernization is universalized, that is, transported from the West, where it is her “homeland” to the other ends of the planet. According to Jan Peters, this is a false thesis, because modernization is a stage that is historically evolving. For Jan Peters, globalization is a hybridization in which forms are detached from existing practices and combined with new forms
in new practices. For him, globalization does not at first include either universalisation or multiculturalism, but rather interculturality. With the notion of cultural hybrid, Jan Peters means blending different cultures: European, Asian, African, and so on. In this way, global culture is formed as a global mix of cultures. Peters gives the following example: “... the Catholic saints can be regarded as icons of Christianity but also as receptacles of pre-Christian paganism entered into the Christian canon. In this light, their use as masks of non-Christian gods is not so strange and rather reminiscent of the transcultural resemblance of paganism” (see in Peters, 2004). Jan Peters offers a cultural analysis of globalization to the point that hybridization is related not only to “culture (cultures)”, but also to biotechnology, virtual reality, electronic simulation, etc. Through hybridization intercultural differences can begin to fade and become relatively insignificant.

Differences between are called “Homogenists” and so on. “Heterogeneous” turn out to be ultimately derived from which aspect of the globalization process is prioritized. When the economic dimension is highlighted, the homogenization of the world comes to the fore. When globalization is viewed in a broader sense – as a unity of economic, information, cultural processes – then the emphasis on its internal diversity is reinforced. The idea of being seen as imposing the same model on different societies is instead treated as a unity of the local and global, i.e. as a process of heterogeneous/“glocalization”, “hybridization”, etc.).

3. Value typology of the theories of globalization

The theoreticians of the globalization differ among themselves not only from the point of view of the genesis of globalization, but also from the point of view of its evaluation. Against this criterion, the different concepts can be summed up into three groups, which we can conventionally refer to as “apologists”, “anti-globalizers” and “neutrals”. The differences between them are differences in the assessment of the effects on public and human development stemming from the globalization process. There is also differentiation in terms of whether or not the possibility of regulating or even stopping the globalization process is accepted or rejected. According to the apologists, it is neither necessary nor possible to stop this process. “Antiglobalists” think the opposite. Neutrals are trying not to take a definitive and unequivocal stance in this debate. They regard globalization as a multilateral flow, involving relatively independent processes, the consequences of which can be assessed differently.

The apologists of the globalization assume that it is not only an objective, spontaneous and unavoidable process but also a process that brings good to all. By interpreting globalization as “spontaneously emerging in the market, acting through the continuous development of the international division of labor, eliminating the limitations on individual freedom and integrating individuals more and more closely”, Ivan Varbanov believes that “the globalization is a process that pushes people towards voluntary unification and world peace” (Varbanov, 2010: 9). According to the same author, the negative effects of globalization are the result of abuses and attempts to regulate it. Ivan Varbanov believes that globalization is such a massive and complex process that: “It does not lend itself to the conscious control and planning of even the most powerful and democratic international, if not national, institutions. Whatever is desired, global governance by enlightened, honest, fair, compassionate international and national organizations is an utopian unthinkable” (Varbanov, 2010: 13). In his view, such attempts to intervene in managing the process of globalization are, in fact, utopian and dangerous attempts at social engineering and the manifestation of constructivist rationality of the Cartesian type.

The anti-globalists occupy a pole opposite. For them, globalization is a degrading process. We can divide the anti-globalization in both directions: left and right. But this division is conditional because the ideas of these currents often intersect, as also because in the so-called left-hand anti-globalization there are practically incompatible ideas shared by different groups and
organizations. Charles Meyer rightly notes that it is strange to speak of left and right anti-globalization because globalization is per se – neither left nor right (see in Meier, 1997).

The term “anti-globalization” has been imposed by corporate media since the protests in Seattle in 1999. Richard Saage argues that recently, criticism of globalization is so numerous that it leaves the impression that she has no advocates at all. However, the same author is of the opinion that globalization as we know it is without an alternative, and its purpose is to realize the capitalist utopia, which will be the last utopia.

We can find the left anti-globalizationists among the advocates of the left-liberal, social-democratic, extreme-left and pseudo-anarchist models of public organization and governance of the world as a whole. Ideologically, they offer two options to solve the problems that accompany globalization: (a) By means of protectionist barriers and other state control mechanisms, to reduce or even completely reduce the detrimental effects and effects of risky operations in transnational business, international competition, international financial capital, etc.; and (b) Actual functioning of the international institutions set up to strictly monitor and control globalization. The anti-globalists believe that only this way can the global neo-imperial capitalism, which is mitigated and socially oriented, can be prevented. Left-handed anti-globalization movements are Human Rights Watch, the Socialist Workers Party, the world forum in Porto Alegre and others. These movements seek to something that we can call “capitalism with a human face”. Their propensity for nationalism is obvious. In addition to these movements, left-wing anti-globalization is embodied in other organizations and movements that deny not only globalization but also the social model of capitalism and the state in all its manifestations, regardless of whether it adopts protectionist, statist or neoliberal models of government. To them belong most groups of anarchists, radical ecological and liberal-communist groups. Anarchists are not against globalization in its entirety. On the contrary, they take advantage of it in the area of free movement in space and expression of opinion, but are against the corporate globalization of capitalism. Anarchist models defend the principles of direct democracy and direct action and refuse any representation through the model of parliamentary democracy.

A powerful anti-globalization motif appears when a nation-wide crisis occurs as a result of mass immigration waves. American researcher Pat Buchanan justifies his critical theory of globalization, analyzing the demographic situation and trends in the United States. According to him, the American society, which has traditionally been perceived as a typical example of a global multicultural nation, is about to show that it is not such that in it, like in all other societies around the world, there is a process of fragmentation, and it is impossible determine at what point the cultural and racial differences that have always existed will begin to transform into social anarchy. This, he said, will be the case for more severe economic shocks or even recessions or the first major waves of immigrants from Africa, South America or the Middle East. “Among the most serious problems America has to deal with is the huge Third World human wave”. Current immigrants crossing borders do not intend to change their identity – on the contrary, they try to impose their culture and mentality in the neighborhoods where they settle. This is also a reason to think about a possible withdrawal from the processes of globalization and the formation of something like translocalism (see in Buchanan, 2006). Another reason for anti-globalization is that globalization is accompanied by increased conditions for organized cross-border crime and an increasing sense of insecurity. Hence the desire for more protectionism, for more national “enclosures”. German researcher Claus Leggewie (2007: 64) writes on this occasion: “The national protectionism, which neither raises borders nor builds customs, spreads through a widespread sense of insecurity and nervousness: even America, an exemplary and transnational imperial republic, after 11 September regresses to classical national state; so-called anti-terrorist packages allow for more serious border and visa controls, which even stops the entry of emergency doctor-requiring doctoral students. Stopping ‘potential’ terrorists can harm mobility and the world-wide communication and thus remove the decisive preconditions for the fall of the world’s borders”. In
other words, by generating growing fears and thirst in the strong hand of the state, globalization actually generates anti-globalization sentiment.

Many extreme nationalist, fundamentalist and even fascist movements can be included in the right anti-globalization. Here is what the Italian philosopher Antonio Negri writes on this question: “Fundamentalism should be understood not only by radical Islam. Here are different versions of Christian fundamentalism in the United States, nationalistic trends in Europe, similar to the French National Front, groups of the type of the Russian ultra-right and the Orthodox Church. The common in all these movements is one: proclaiming the values of traditional religions, nations, races, or all together, asserting purity, closeness, and proclaiming these purposes sacred and unchangeable”. Fundamentalism opposes its values against the values of global capital and postmodernism, including racial or ethno-cultural diversity. In the field of economics, domestic and foreign affairs, social policy, they usually support protectionism and conservatism, including variants – e.g. the idea of an Islamic trading community for some fundamentalists. Especially, fundamentalism is opposed to the free movement of labor as an indivisible feature of free trade. Fundamentalist currents also oppose the free movement of capital, information and production capacities. This creates a halo of defenders on the national markets, labor, and therefore enjoys a great influence in the proletarian quarters and regions.

One of the most prominent representatives of anti-globalization in philosophical circles are Antonio Negri and Michael Hard. In their works they justify the fact that the imperialist phase of national capitalist states has come to an end and has been replaced by the so-called “Empire”. It dominates the whole world without a separate geographic power center, and in its insatiable expansion has already absorbed all nations. This perfect empire in its totalitarianism does not allow the appearance of any “external” critical views, since it controls everybody and everything. With the term “Empire” these two well-known authors understand a globally bound economic, information and political system that rules everything without specific boundaries and a distinct center. In contrast to the national imperialism of the individual countries of the past, which have always had their own external borders, the global capitalist empire has no way to expand, because it has the power The “Empire” is a globally interoperable network structure consisting of supranational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, etc., by giant private media companies, and by so it is capable of encompassing the whole world and preserving its power by influencing people’s consciousness and thoughts, and thus the “Empire” imposes control over them and suppresses their social dissatisfaction still in the fetus. And when it becomes necessary, Empire also applies a “hard force” through state administration, police, and even the army, and Hardy and Negri call this kind of overwhelming dominance – Biopower, but this totally controlling structure is not invulnerable, optimistically referred to by the authors of “Empire”. Since all the organizations and power structures of this global system have been transformed from hierarchical structures into decentralized networks, their separate links can be torn apart, and in this sense “Empire” the next book, "Multitude," do not represent works that view the system of global capitalism as a doomed system. Even today, the "majority" of the masses have a chance to change the course of history, and the authors believe that the hope of change arises in areas of insecure working conditions as well as in new high-tech industries and services where intellectual knowledge and skills: M. Hard and Anne Negri broaden the concept of working people on all employed and call them the “new proletarian” (see in Negri & Hardt, 2004).

The antiglobalization has a particularly recent manifestation in the recent “criticism of the streets”, which has inherited momentum in the United States and Europe from the coming waves of economic recession, Euroscepticism and anti-Americanism in the period from 2009 to 2012. This street critique has been given the unspecified “The Outraged”. Political analysts of this political-social phenomenon placed it on the left-hand scale of anti-globalization, while others interpreted it as the “centerless center”. The anti-globalization of the “Indignants” has “fuzzy"
arguments, vague goals, and lack of alternative solutions to tackle the drama of the apparent economic and political crises prevailing in liberal-democratic societies. Rebellions rebellion is rather an expression of unconscious anarchist anger over the “collapsing”, the familiar and orderly socio-political order in the “rich West” societies, rather than a rebellion to the ever-spreading and unhurried consumer spirit in our societies. Thus, on 15 October 2011, people around the world united against the power of banks in an effort to “put an end to the power of banks and corporations”. This demanded hundreds of thousands of demonstrators around the world with their protests. Protests of the “Indignants” on that date covered 720 cities in over 70 countries around the world (see in Torrent, 2001), which suggests that we are witnessing the emergence of a new global public opinion - no center, no spokespeople and no on the occasion of these events, Ivaylo Dichev writes: “It is the same discontent, though manifested in very different contexts: Political power all over the world is beginning to be outraged – in the Arab world, there are decades of dictators who have gradually turned in its policy of management development, social benefits, and equality to ordinary Eastern despotism In America, dissatisfaction comes from the neo-liberal course taken over by Reagan to benefit the rich, deindustrialize the economy and stretch of social scissors. In Europe, increasingly neoliberals talk about it, that the social state, the result of the post-war compromise between labor and capital, has spent its time, what is the profile of the protesters? These are people who are opposed to any policy - they refuse to have a leader, a program or even some minimal vision for the future. The Spanish ‘outraged’ is a good illustration – the emotion of indignation is a substitute for a rational political analysis, more equity, lower taxes, human rights and immigration, and security, freedom, freedom ...” (see in Dichev, 2012).

The antiglobalization does not solve the problems of globalization, nor is it able to stop it. But its existence makes sense if “criticism” produces more prudence and sobriety in political classes. Because citizens suffer not only from the possible negative effects of globalization but also from its misuse. Against this background, Amartya Sen’s words: “Doubts against globalization will drop out when the world is globalizing. The demonstrations themselves against globalization are part of a global process that has no escape, whatever motives to look for. But to support this process in its goodie, politicians and institutions have to convince us that they are acting properly. Otherwise, the doubts will remain” (see in Sen, 2002).

Along with these two positions – a completely uncritical and totally critical interpretation of globalization – there is also a third position that does not focus on the final aspects of global processes. We can conditionally call it a “neutral” position. It can best be expressed in the assessment of the British social thinker Martin Olbrow (see in Олбров 2001), according to which such a position “offers neither comfort nor apocalypse” in interpreting and evaluating the processes by which the era of modernity is transformed in the age of globality, according to M. Olbrow, modernity dominates our thinking to such an extent that the detachment from it proves to be extremely difficult, but in the present day there is a historical transition, a change of epochs, so we must learn to get rid of the tradition The modern age is stimulated by the desire to impose human control over nature, the economy, and the human race itself. The basic social construction that the “modern age” carries is the national state, but the expansion of the national state ultimately faces the limitation of global resources, while the expansion of rationality increases the complexity of the action. And the expansion of force means reduces the rationality of the world from the point of view of the individual and increases the sense of risks and insecurity. The opportunities for crises in industrial societies are getting ever more profound.

The national societies are placed at two main problems that pose difficulties for the theories of national societies: the first problem is for borders; the second problem concerns units of analysis. All this suggests that the epoch of modernity is exhausted. Against this backdrop, the challenge of understanding the historical breakthrough – life beyond modernity, stands out. M. Olbrow describes the shifting of modernity to globality as follows: “There can be listed at least five basic ways through which globality has already pushed us beyond the assumptions of modernity.
These include: the global environmental consequences of aggregate human actions; the loss of security in a situation where the weapon is characterized by global destruction; the gloablity of communication systems; the emergence of the global economy; the reflexivity of globalization, in which people and groups of all kinds view the globe as a framework for the sacrifice of their beliefs” (Олбров, 2001: 14). The British social thinker emphasizes that the exhaustiveness or end of the modern age cannot stop or stop a development whose roots are far back in the past and in the field of different cultures. The advent of the global age simply deprives modernity of its defining function within the modern era. What is characteristic of the “global age” is the scope of life of the modern individual. The impacts of an individual's individual environment, wherever they are in the world today, can be linked to the functioning of processes that are world-wide in their reach. M. Olbrow concludes that globalization is a process that “cannot be diverted by simply rejecting it as another narrative”. Globality involves a new kind of interconnection where events can have concurrent effects anywhere in the world where a message can be answered immediately and the answer is immediate, regardless of the distance where products and services are the result of a global division of labor. By listing the main manifestations of the global age, M. Olbrow points to the transition from transnational to global institutions, the denationalization of the economy, the emergence of global social movements, the relativisation of human identity, the emergence of new inequalities and new stratification, etc.

In each of these events, M. Olbrow sees both chances and threats, difficulties, challenges for society and for man. That is why globalization cannot be said either as a “comfort” or as an “apocalypse”. The position of “neutrals” has yet another manifestation – the protection of regionalism as a mediator between the limitations of the nation state and the difficult challenges of globalization. The regionalism is an expression of a historical need to coordinate the actions and the development of a larger number of countries for the achievement of certain goals. And immediate goals are primarily in the economic sphere but inevitably involve political, cultural, environmental and other goals. On the other hand, regionalism is more attractively attuned to its greater realism and reach than globalization. In fact, regionalism is a form of manifestation of globalization, but in geographically limited regions. We could distinguish between two types of regionalism. One is formed and determined on the basis of historical, natural and geographic features and is recognized and recognized as such by the specifics of its culture. The second type of regionalism, whose perimeter expands and encompasses different countries, is in view of the need to solve common problems. This type of regionalism builds on the orientation towards the achievement of universal values: openness to others, gradual abolition of national borders; respect for human rights, regardless of its ethnic, religious or national affiliation, solidarity in solving large-scale social, environmental, economic problems, etc. The theorists advocating a neutral approach to globalization point out that regional unions are able to minimize the distortions and negative effects of the objective move of globalization by using the power of the united supranational social. United States-based countries generate systemic interest, which in most cases opposes the expansion of the global hegemony in the globalization process.

The defenders of the regionalism point to another positive effect of its implementation. The decline in the political participation of individuals at national level, combining with values of modern man defined outside of national politics, leaves the old political communities of the national state in a state of legitimate deficit. National politicians strive to compensate for this deficit by intensifying the symbolic attractiveness of national identity or by highlighting national forms of control over legitimate violence. As a result, the dangers of aggressive nationalism are rising. Regionalism as a form of integration of many national nations is an appropriate response to the threat of aggressive nationalism. The global scale is too large for the ordinary person to feel comfortable, and the scale of the nation state too small to solve the problems and challenges of modern man. In the middle there is the space of the regional unification.
4. About the anthropological implications of globalization

What are the consequences of globalization for the conditions of human existence? The vast literature on globalization has given different answers to this question. Here we will briefly address three of the many versions to answer this cardinal, a key issue for our topic. One belongs to A. Giddens, the other to Arjuna Apudarei, and the third to Z. Bowman. Their choice is dictated by the fact that these authors are to some extent the “normalizing” authors in the contemporary anthropological discourse on globalization. A. Giddens focuses on globalization as a factor that causes de-traditionalization of human identity. A. Apudaray develops the theory of “imaginary worlds” in whose center is the de-territorialized man. Z. Bowman, in turn, emphasizes the changes in attitude towards the Other and the need for morality without the existence of a moral consensus. Of course, the theories of these social thinkers are not limited to these topics and their respective decisions. But for the purposes of the book, we can afford to reduce them in this way.

A. Giddens defends the thesis (see in Giddens, 2001) that globalization questions the importance of tradition in the formation of human identity. The man in these conditions of globalization has a very mobile life. His mobility is predetermined by the fact that he has to periodically change professions, travel and communicate with strangers, “anonymous” people, encounter an environment whose historical and cultural roots are completely alien to him, to be daily piled up by media with information streams, reflecting the world without regard to distances, to stay daily in the virtual world of the Internet, and so on. In this way, globalization multiplies the individual’s social ties, but also makes them more anonymous and transient.

All this provokes the de-traditionalisation of the life of the globalized man – he is less and less affiliated with his own ethnicity, with his nation. Traditions, that is, well-known and time-tested values, norms and moral categories cease to act as traditions. Globalized society is a post-modern society. In such a situation, man becomes freer – he can choose the “screen” of all sorts of traditions, but at the same time weaker from the belief in the past. Traditions, which have been a fundamental element in regulating an individual in a pre-globalized society, can no longer prevent either contact with other traditions or alternative forms of life. The “other” as such can no longer be ignored, just as someone who has no influence on our own lives. Thus, a cosmopolitan perspective is revealed, but A. Giddings does not consider it to be a problem. For A. Giddens, the conflict in public and conceptual terms is between the cosmopolitan perspective and fundamentalism. The latter, according to the author, is a new phenomenon (despite the widespread view that fundamentalism has always existed) and is a reaction to globalization. It is not part of any religious or other belief, but is related to the question: how is the claim to the truth of a belief protected, and how does it stand out? It’s not about what people believe, but why they believe and justify their beliefs. Fundamentalism, according to A. Giddens, is a “encapsulated tradition” – a tradition “traditionally protected by reference to its ritual truth”. Fundamentalism returns the guardians of tradition as the only interpreters of truth and gives them new power. It does not represent a resistance to traditional cultures against Westernization (which are the most common interpretations), and a food environment to preserve tradition “in a traditional way”. Fundamentalism does not take into account ambivalences, multi-faceted interpretations, complex identities. This, according to the author, leads to the rejection of dialogue in an increasingly globalizing world whose peace and continuity are based on dialogue.

The fundamentalism is dangerous because it does not exclude violence as a means of achieving its goals and rejects cosmopolitan values. However, it raises many questions about global modernity. One of the most important is the question of values: “Can we live in a ‘world’ in which nothing is ‘holy’ in a world without any values?” For A. Giddens, the answer is negative: “None of us would have something for which it is worth living if there was nothing worthwhile to die for” (Giddens, 1996: 316). However, the values to be defended in a global world are those that have universal nature and validity. For A. Giddens, this is tolerance and dialogue. It is precisely
tolerance and dialogue that would counter the opportunities and dangers of the forms of fundamentalism. According to A. Giddens, tradition can continue to exist and even flourish in the post-rendition order. However, this would be possible if it defends itself discursively, if it justifies its values in competition with many other values. This may lead to a multilayer reflexivity, in cases where religion protects with the argument of how difficult it is to live with a radical doubt. Discursive protection of tradition does not necessarily even put the unchanging truth into question, but it must take into account the consequences of this. The only requirement, according to A. Giddens, is the readiness to engage in dialogue and to exclude violence. Otherwise, tradition becomes a fundamentalist one that affirms an immutable truth without regard to the consequences. Not the belief in unchanging truth, and the readiness for violence “in the name of the truth” becomes a hallmark of fundamentalism in our post-modern world. With the sunset of tradition and the development of individualization, the attitude of people towards themselves, as well as the building and functioning of the institutional structure of modern societies, is changing. A. Giddens notes this process of transformation as a direct dependence and the fruit of emancipation from tradition. A. He sees the consequences of these changes in the following way. On the one hand, identity is no longer predetermined, but chosen, the individual must build and maintain his/her freedom. But on the other hand there are radical changes in the mechanisms of trust without which human life is like a boat without anchor. In the modern world, trust becomes a problematic reality. The traditional scheme of previous societies “trust = personal qualities”, besides being under-questioned about the functioning of modern day life, man has to “trust” many abstract systems, the monetary system to work with the absent, the anonymity of man in this vast global entity. A. Giddens calls this kind of new process of trust to give rise to a tangled trust that creates a new “self-indebtedness without purpose”. “Strong Trust” blocks and even eliminates the committed clash with abstract systems that define the content of everyday life.

Another version of the thesis that globalization affects people by breaking it from its traditions is being developed by A. Apadouray. In an anthropological perspective, he views globalization as a process of de-territorialisation of man and the introduction of human life into imaginary worlds. By virtue of globalization, modern man loses his social attachment to the particular physical space, to the local territory. The immediate personal environment of a person becomes different from the local community in which he lives. M. Olbrow, who develops this thesis by A. Apadouray, gives the following example as her view: “For the scholar, access to the Library of the American Congress can guarantee him the immediate personal environment, even if he lives in Toronto. For the London Dealer, the familiar contact via e-mail with his partner in Hong Kong is just as important for arranging everyday events. ... The immediate personal environment is therefore different from the local territory” (Oλβρω, 2001: 244). The local, this traditional place of habitation is treated by A. Apadouray as as much as a deteriorized as the global one. It turns out to be an “imaginary world”, as imaginative as the global one. Local and global are “things” that are not separated from actual distances, but from the degree of intensity of imagination. Local and global are treated in the theory of A. Apidari as the two sides of a process – the process of globalization.

Z. Baumann warns of the serious change and the monstrous alienation in interpersonal relations under the influence of life in a globalizing society. It is interpersonal relationships that actually build societies, and when these relationships are not built properly, there is a shortage of “humanity”. In his book Life in fragments, H. Bowman unfolds his thesis that “ownership has many forms”. By illustrating this thesis, he writes: “There is mobile cooperation – on a busy street or in a department store. Place of passage of immediate proximity and sudden division. The mobile place with fluid content; with the movement of that place the silhouettes enter (or are sucked in) and come out or are thrown out of it – some silhouettes are seemingly self-propelled; others are put in motion only by the movement of the mobile space itself. Only some silhouettes succeed in becoming strangers – in beings with intentions, beings whose intentions matter” (Bauman, 2000: 63). Further, Bowman sketches other forms of cohesion in
today’s globalized society – the stationary coupling of the train, the airplane, the receptionist, “the gathering together of strangers who know that they will soon leave each other on their way”; the measured association in an administrative building; “manifested cohabitation” (soccer crowd or disco, etc.). By characterizing and distinguishing these forms of sociality, Z. Bowman still finds something unifying in them, summarizing them – they are above all instrumental occasional occupations. They are “side by side”, to some extent be “be with”, but they do not usually have the most personal form of “being for”. These forms of association are episodic, with no history or no future, no “lasting inheritance of mutual rights and/or obligations behind them”. In another metaphysical ethic space, H. Bowman puts it in a “to be for”: it is a “leap from isolation to unity, not to blending ... but to an alloy whose invaluable qualities depend entirely on the preservation of diversity and the identity of its ingredients” (Bauman, 2000: 70-72). In the conditions of globalization, the instrumental forms of co-ownership prevail – the person lives among foreigners in the direct and transient sense of this word. That is why the forms of alienation are growing.

In this context, Z. Bowman defends the thesis that life in a global world requires us to “caring for the Other” (Bauman, 2000: 203), based on and in its otherness, self-esteem and self-identity. This could create the path to a new socialism. H. Bowman speaks of the fact that the moral choice must be made in the person of, for and by the other. Our morality as people is in our incessant question as to whether the choice we make towards the Other is good or bad. Good choice not only for me, but just the opposite – first of all for and against the Other because we can never know if my actions are positive or negative to it in full, nor how a positive choice today will be projected into tomorrow and in what direction. According to Bowman, a moral personality can be recognized by the fact that she is never satisfied with her moral behavior, she knows she can still and require more of herself. The more responsibility he assumes, the greater the possibilities for guilty behavior, hence the ambivalence of the possible consequences. This ambivalence, ambiguity, and the imperfect principles of self-criticism cannot be eliminated or corrected by learning rules or norms, or using advice, but only by the very unconditional conditions of our lives. Z. Bowman calls this the “soil” in which it has rooted and in which the moral person grows. This growth and its fate in this place where it is topped up, but not in the real life scale, as a social presence in the world, but in the mental plane, as a moral level. To such a type of moral personality he puts his hopes. This metaphysics of the morality that meets us face to face and implies our possible future actions in reality, first at this intersubjective level, makes us responsible for our actions in the real life world. The guarantee of the individual’s moral presence in the global life world is the individual, and the attitude towards the Other is the guarantee that the world will be ordered. In this way, Z. Bowman expressed not only his anxiety that a globalized world as a world among strangers is possible to become a world without moral consensus, but also the hope that a new moral is possible – possible, though very risky.

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