SWIFT: Super-fast and Robust Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning

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Abstract—Performing ML computation on private data while maintaining data privacy aka Privacy-preserving Machine Learning (PPML) is an emergent field of research. Recently, PPML has seen a visible shift towards the adoption of Secure Outsourced Computation (SOC) paradigm, due to the heavy computation that it entails. In the SOC paradigm, computation is outsourced to a set of powerful and specially equipped servers that provide service on a pay-per-use basis. In this work, we propose SWIFT, a robust PPML framework for a range of ML algorithms in SOC setting, that guarantees output delivery to the users irrespective of any adversarial behaviour. Robustness, a highly desirable feature, evokes user participation without the fear of denial of service.

At the heart of our framework lies a highly-efficient, maliciously-secure, three-party computation (3PC) over rings that provides guaranteed output delivery (GOD) in the honest-majority setting. To the best of our knowledge, SWIFT is the first robust and efficient PPML framework in the 3PC setting. SWIFT is as fast as the best-known 3PC framework BLAZE (Patra et al. NDSS’20) which only achieves fairness. We extend our 3PC framework for four parties (4PC). In this regime, SWIFT is as fast as the best known fair 4PC framework Trident (Chaudhari et al. NDSS’20) and twice faster than the best-known robust 4PC framework FLASH (Byali et al. PET’S’20).

We demonstrate the practical relevance of our framework by benchmarking two important applications- i) ML algorithms: Logistic Regression and Neural Network, and ii) Biometric matching, both over a 64-bit ring in WAN setting. Our readings reflect our claims as above.

I. INTRODUCTION

Privacy Preserving Machine Learning (PPML), a booming field of research, allows Machine Learning (ML) computations over private data of users while ensuring the privacy of the data. PPML finds applications in sectors that deal with sensitive/confidential data, e.g. healthcare, finance, and in cases where organisations are prohibited from sharing client information due to privacy laws such as CCPA and GDPR. However, PPML solutions make the already computationally heavy ML algorithms more compute-intensive. An average end-user who lacks the infrastructure required to run these tasks prefers to outsource the computation to a powerful set of specialized cloud servers and leverage their services on a pay-per-use basis. The Secure Outsourced Computation (SOC) paradigm is thus an apt fit for the need of the moment. The goal is to achieve malicious security against the collusion of an arbitrary number of users with some of the servers. Many recent works [1]–[9] exploit Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) techniques to realize PPML in the SOC setting where the servers enact the role of the parties. Informally, MPC enables $n$ mutually distrusting parties to compute a function over their private inputs, while ensuring the privacy of the same against an adversary controlling up to $t$ parties. Both the training and prediction phases of PPML can be realized in the SOC setting. The common approach of outsourcing followed in the PPML literature, as well as by our work, requires the users to secret-share their inputs between the set of hired (untrusted) servers, who jointly interact and compute the secret-shared output, and reconstruct it towards the users.

In a bid to improve practical efficiency, many recent works [6]–[17] cast their protocols into an input-independent preprocessing phase, and input-dependent online phase. Using this paradigm, the input-independent (yet function-dependent) computationally heavy tasks can be computed in the pre-processing phase in advance, resulting in a fast online phase. This paradigm suits scenario analogous to PPML setting, where functions (ML algorithms) typically need to be evaluated a large number of times, and the function description is known beforehand. To further enhance practical efficiency by leveraging CPU optimizations, recent works [15], [18]–[21] propose MPC protocols that work over 32 or 64 bit rings. Lastly, solutions for a small number of parties have received a huge momentum due to the many cost-effective customizations that they permit, for instance, a cheaper realisation of multiplication through custom-made secret sharing schemes [6]–[9], [22], [23] (that do not scale for a large number of parties).

We now motivate the need for robustness aka guaranteed output delivery (GOD) over fairness, or even abort security, in the domain of PPML. Robustness provides the guarantee of output delivery to all protocol participants, no matter how the adversary misbehaves. Robustness is extremely crucial for real-world deployment and usage of PPML techniques. Consider the following scenario wherein an ML model owner wishes to provide inference service. The model owner shares the model parameters between the servers, while the end-users share their queries. A protocol that provides security with abort or fairness will not suffice as in both the cases a malicious adversary can act in a way so that the protocol results in an abort which means that the user will not get the desired output. This leads to denial of service and heavy economic losses for the service provider. For data providers who want to collaboratively build a model on their data, more training data leads to a better, more accurate model, which enables them to provide better ML services and, consequently, attract more clients. A robust framework encourages active involvement from multiple data

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1Fairness ensures either all or none receive the output, whereas GOD ensures guaranteed output delivery no matter what.

2The threshold of the secret-sharing is decided based on the number of corrupt servers so that privacy is preserved.
providers. Hence, for the seamless adoption of PPML solutions in the real-world, the robustness of the protocol is of utmost importance. The hall-mark result of [24] suggests that an honest-majority amongst the servers is necessary to achieve robustness (in fact, to achieve fairness which is a weaker goal than robustness).

Consequent to the discussion above, we focus on the honest-majority setting with a small set of parties, especially 3 and 4 parties with one corruption, both of which have drawn enormous attention recently [6]–[9], [22], [23], [25]–[30]. Our protocols work over rings, cast in input-independent and dependent phases, and achieves GOD.

Before we move on to discuss the related work, we state the challenges for stretching MPC techniques for PPML.

a) Challenges in PPML: MPC protocols, while a potential solution for SOC, cannot be directly plugged in to achieve the goal of PPML. This is because, ML algorithms involve decimal values that need to be embedded into rings, resulting in doubling of the fractional part after every multiplication. This was handled in previous works via secure truncation [1], [4], [6], [8], [9]. Secondly, ML algorithms require techniques to efficiently alternate between boolean and arithmetic computations, as some operations like secure comparison are better realized in boolean representation, while operations like dot product are better realized in arithmetic representation. These challenges call for customized MPC protocols for truncation, comparison, dot product, and many others.

b) Related Work: We restrict the relevant works with a small number of parties and honest-majority, focusing first on MPC, followed by PPML. MPC protocols for a small population can be cast into orthogonal domains of low-latency protocols [27], [31], [32], and high throughput protocols [6], [9], [18], [22], [23], [26], [28], [30], [33]–[35]. In the 3PC setting, [6], [22] provide efficient semi-honest protocols wherein Astra [6] improved upon [22] by casting the protocols in the preprocessing model and provided a fast online phase. Astra further provided security with fairness in the malicious setting with an improved online phase compared to [23]. Later, a maliciously-secure 3PC protocol based on distributed zero-knowledge techniques was proposed by Boneh et al. [29] providing abort security. Further, building on [29] and enhancing the security to GOD, Boyle et al. [30] proposed a concretely efficient 3PC protocol with an amortized communication cost of 3 field elements (can be extended to work over rings) per multiplication gate. Concurrently, Blaze [9] provided a fair protocol in the preprocessing model, which required communicating 3 ring elements in each phase. However, Blaze eliminated the reliance on the computationally intensive distributed zero-knowledge system (whose efficiency kicks in for large circuit or many multiplication gates) from the online phase and pushed it to the preprocessing phase. This resulted in a faster online phase compared to [30].

In the regime of 4PC, Gordon et al. [36] presented protocols achieving abort security and GOD. However, [36] relied on expensive public-key primitives and broadcast channels to achieve GOD. Trident [8] improved over the abort protocol of [36], providing a fast online phase achieving security with fairness, and presented a framework for mixed world computations [20]. A robust 4PC protocol was provided in Flash [7] which requires communicating 6 ring elements, each, in the preprocessing and online phases.

In the PPML domain, MPC has been used for various ML algorithms such as Decision Trees [37], Linear Regression [38], k-means clustering [40], [41], SVM Classification [42], [43], Logistic Regression [44]. In the 3PC SOC setting, the works of ABY3 [4] and SecureNN [5], provide security with abort. This was followed by ASTRA [6], which improves upon ABY3 and achieves security with fairness. Astra presents primitives to build protocols for Linear Regression and Logistic Regression inference. Recently, Blaze improves over the efficiency of Astra and additionally tackles training for the above ML tasks, which requires building additional PPML building blocks, such as truncation and bit to arithmetic conversions. In the 4PC setting, the first robust framework for PPML was provided by Flash [7] which proposed efficient building blocks for ML such as dot product, truncation, MSB extraction, and bit conversion. The works of [1], [4]–[9] work over rings to garner practical efficiency. In terms of efficiency, Blaze and respectively Flash and Trident are the closest competitors of this work in 3 and 4 party settings. We now present our contributions and compare them with these works.

A. Our Contributions

We propose a robust maliciously-secure framework for PPML in the SOC setting, SWIFT, with a set of 3 and 4 servers having an honest-majority. At the heart of our framework lies highly-efficient, maliciously-secure, 3PC and 4PC over rings (both $\mathbb{Z}_q$ and $\mathbb{Z}_{2^l}$) that provide GOD in the honest-majority setting. We cast our protocols in the preprocessing model which helps to push the computationally intensive tasks into the preprocessing phase, resulting in a fast online phase. Apart from PPML, our framework also supports biometric matching.

To the best of our knowledge, SWIFT is the first robust and efficient PPML framework in the 3PC setting and is as fast as the best known fair 3PC framework Blaze [9]. We extend our 3PC framework for 4 parties. In this regime, SWIFT is as fast as the best known fair 4PC framework Trident [8] and twice faster than best known robust 4PC framework Flash [7]. We next detail our framework, followed by an overview of technical novelties:

a) Robust 3/4PC frameworks: The framework consists of a range of primitives realized in a privacy-preserving way which is ensured via running computation in a secret-shared fashion. Secret-sharing tolerating up to one malicious corruption is the basis for all our constructions. We use the sharing over both $\mathbb{Z}_q$ and its special instantiation $\mathbb{Z}_{2^l}$ and refer them as arithmetic and respectively boolean sharing. Our framework consists of realizations for all primitives needed for general MPC and PPML such as multiplication, dot-product, truncation, bit extraction (given arithmetic sharing of a value $v$, this is used to generate boolean sharing of the most significant bit (msb) of the value), bit to arithmetic sharing conversion (converts the boolean sharing of a single bit value to its arithmetic sharing), bit injection (computes the arithmetic sharing of $b \cdot v$, given the boolean sharing of a bit $b$ and the arithmetic sharing of a ring element $v$) and above all input sharing and output reconstruction. The performance comparison in
terms of concrete cost for communication and round, for the preprocessing and online phase of PPML primitives, for both 3PC and 4PC, appear in Table I. Akin to our earlier claim, SWIFT is neck to neck with BLAZE for each primitive (while improving security from fairness to robustness). The same is true for SWIFT and Trident in the 4-party case. On the other hand, SWIFT is doubly faster than FLASH.

We now point out a few lucrative features that our framework offers, some of which are shared with the earlier works on PPML. First, by resorting to the preprocessing model, we achieve dot product with online cost completely independent of vector size. This brings a massive gain since dot product is one of the most invoked primitives in PPML. The other primitives also show improved performance in the online phase in the preprocessing paradigm. The multiplication protocol gives a technical basis for our dot product protocol. Instead of using the multiplication of [30] (which has the same overall communication cost as that of our online phase), we build a new protocol that gives rise to a dot product with the above feature. Also, the multiplication protocol of [30] involves distributed zero-knowledge protocols. The cost of this heavy machinery gets amortized over, only for large circuits having millions of gates, which is very unlikely for inferences, and moderately heavy training in the PPML domain. Second, extending to the 4-party setting brings to the table a flurry of performance improvements over 3PC. Most prominent of all is a dot product with cost totally independent of vector size, which remains as a challenging open question in 3PC setting. Third, the only two tasks, input sharing and output reconstruction, carried out by the users of our framework are very light-weight, in spite of offering GOD. As a final remark, we note that the roles of the servers in our framework are asymmetric and consequently, we only require active participation from two of the servers, while the remaining server(s) is(are) brought in just for the verification towards the end of each phase. In a cloud setting, this may provide additional benefit in terms of monetary cost [45].

We demonstrate the practicality of our protocols by benchmarking Biometric Matching and PPML. For the latter, Logistic Regression (training and inference) and Neural Networks (inference) are considered. The NN training requires mixed-world conversions [4], [8], [20], which we leave as future work. Our PPML blocks can be used to perform training and inference of Linear Regression, Support Vector Machines, and Binarized Neural Networks (as demonstrated in [6]–[9]).

**b) Overview of Techniques:** Robustness is known to be desirable, yet a costly goal. We work against the pre-assumption on cost, at least for our concerned setting. Starting from BLAZE [9], we overcome a series of hurdles to achieve GOD.

**Relay primitive with rate-1 communication.** We introduce a new primitive called Joint Message Passing (jmp) that allows two servers to relay a common message to the third server such that either the relay is successful or an honest server (or a conflicting pair) is identified. The striking feature of jmp is that it offers a rate-1 communication i.e. for a message of \( \ell \) elements, it only incurs a communication of \( \ell \) elements (in an amortized sense). Without any extra cost, it allows us to replace several pivotal private communications, that may lead to abort, either because the malicious sender does not send anything or sends a wrong message. Being two-sender primitive, it has one guaranteed honest sender who (in some sense) guards the correct send. Using this primitive, we create a win-win scenario as below. Either the send is successful (and consequently the computation) or an honest server is identified. All our primitives invoke jmp and as a result, the final protocol, either for a general 3PC or a PPML task, requires invocations

| Building Blocks | 3PC | 4PC |
|-----------------|-----|-----|
|                 | Ref. | Pre. | Online | Security | Ref. | Pre. | Online | Security |
|                 | Comm. (\( \ell \)) | Rounds | Comm. (\( \ell \)) | | Comm. (\( \ell \)) | Rounds | Comm. (\( \ell \)) | |
| **Multiplication** | | | | | | | |
| BLAZE | 1 | 1 | 2 | Abort | Trident | 3 | 1 | 3 | Fair |
| SWIFT | 3 | 1 | 3 | GOD | FLASH | 6 | 1 | 6 | GOD |
| **Dot Product** | | | | | | | |
| BLAZE | 3n | 1 | 3 | Fair | FLASH | 6 | 1 | 6 | GOD |
| SWIFT | 3n | 1 | 3 | GOD | SWIFT | 3 | 1 | 3 | GOD |
| **Dot Product with Truncation** | | | | | | | |
| BLAZE | 3n + 2 | 1 | 3 | Fair | FLASH | 6 | 1 | 3 | Fair |
| SWIFT | 3n + 2 | 1 | 3 | GOD | SWIFT | 4 | 1 | 3 | GOD |
| **Bit Extraction** | | | | | | | |
| BLAZE | 9 | 1 + \( \log \ell \) | 9 | Fair | FLASH | \( \approx \frac{8}{\log \ell + 1} \) | \( \approx \frac{7}{\log \ell} \) | Fair |
| SWIFT | 9 | 1 + \( \log \ell \) | 9 | GOD | SWIFT | \( \approx \frac{7}{\log \ell} \) | \( \approx \frac{7}{\log \ell} \) | GOD |
| **Bit to Arithmetic** | | | | | | | |
| BLAZE | 9 | 1 | 4 | Fair | FLASH | 6 | 1 | 3 | GOD |
| SWIFT | 9 | 1 | 4 | GOD | SWIFT | \( \approx \frac{3}{\log \ell} \) | \( \approx \frac{3}{\log \ell} \) | GOD |
| **Bit Injection** | | | | | | | |
| BLAZE | 12 | 2 | 7 | Fair | FLASH | 8 | 2 | 10 | GOD |
| SWIFT | 12 | 2 | 7 | GOD | SWIFT | \( \approx \frac{6}{\log \ell} \) | \( \approx \frac{6}{\log \ell} \) | GOD |

– Notations: \( \ell \) - size of ring in bits, \( n \) - size of vectors for dot product, \( \kappa \) - computational security parameter.

**TABLE I:** 3PC and 4PC: Comparison of SWIFT with its closest competitors in terms of Communication and Round Complexity
of many jmp primitives. To leverage amortization, the primitive is designed to have two phases, send and verify, where the send phase is carried out on the flow of the protocol and the verify phase takes place once and for all in the end. If the verification goes through (meaning all sends via jmp are successful) the computation carried out already achieves GOD. In the latter case, our computation completes by labelling the honest server as a trusted third party and allowing it to simply carry out the computation centrally. To shoot for GOD, our next step is to conform to all the protocols to be able to use jmp primitive.

Conforming protocols. Among all our protocols, the major challenge came from the multiplication protocol of BLAZE (which is our starting point). Our approach is to manipulate and transform some of the protocol steps so that the information required by a server in a round can be locally computed by two other servers. But this transformation is not straightforward since BLAZE was constructed with a focus towards providing only fairness. We demonstrate with an example below. We consider the online phase of multiplication in BLAZE at a very high level. Let \( P_0, P_1, P_2 \) be the three servers. \( P_1, P_2 \) need to locally compute additive shares of value \( v \), denoted by \( v_1, v_2 \) and mutually exchange the shares to obtain \( v \) in clear. To prevent \( P_1, P_2 \) from cheating, \( P_0 \) is equipped with preprocessing data that allows it to compute \( v^* = v + \delta \) locally. Here \( \delta \) is a common value possessed by both \( P_1, P_2 \) and is unknown to \( P_0 \). \( P_0 \) then sends \( v^* \) in clear to both \( P_1, P_2 \) who abort in the case of any inconsistency. It is only \( P_0 \) who has enough information to compute \( v^* \), and such an arrangement makes it difficult to achieve GOD in BLAZE. Hence, we modify the online phase in such a way that the pairs \( (P_0, P_1) \) and \( (P_0, P_2) \) can locally compute one of the two additive shares of \( v^* \). Servers then communicate the missing share using jmp primitive. Upon obtaining \( v^* \), \( P_1, P_2 \) locally compute \( v \) using \( \delta \) which is known to them. This transformation in the online phase of the multiplication protocol demands a fresh preprocessing phase from scratch. Thus, it is the combination of jmp primitive, a new preprocessing phase, along with the restructuring of the online phase that helps us to obtain higher security guarantee of GOD without affecting the communication cost.

Improved jmp primitive for 4PC. In a 4-party setting, we provide an improved instantiation of the jmp primitive, which forgoes the broadcast channel, while retaining the rate-1 property. Whereas, our 3-party instantiation uses a broadcast. We note that, in the 4PC case, our jmp primitive achieves a goal similar to the “bi-convey primitive” of FLASH [7]. However, jmp is more efficient. Further, it allows identifying an honest server, as opposed to two honest servers locally identifying each other in bi-convey, helping to craft a clean and swift completion after this event. We defer other details to §IV. Using jmp, we present better/simpler protocols than 3PC counterparts, specifically the multiplication and dot product.

Robust and Improved Input Sharing and Output Reconstruction. We provide robust protocols for the input sharing and output reconstruction phase in the SOC setting, wherein a user shares its input with the servers and the output is reconstructed towards a user. The need for robustness and light-weightless together makes these slightly non-trivial. As a highlight, we introduce a super-fast online phase for the reconstruction protocol, which gives \( 4 \times \) improvement in terms of rounds (apart from improvement in communication as well) compared to BLAZE. We make sure that a user neither takes part in a jmp protocol nor in a broadcast, both of which need several rounds of communication and are relatively expensive than atomic point-to-point communication.

B. Organisation of the paper

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §II we describe the system model, preliminaries and notations used. §III and §IV detail our constructions in the 3PC and respectively 4PC setting. These are followed by the applications and benchmarking in §V. The appendix §A elaborates on the preliminaries. Protocols to complete the PPML framework and detailed cost analysis for all the 3PC and 4PC protocols are provided in appendix §B and §C respectively. The security proofs for our constructions follow in appendix §D.

II. Preliminaries

We consider a set of three servers \( \mathcal{P} = \{P_0, P_1, P_2\} \) that are connected by pair-wise private and authentic channels in a synchronous network, and a static, malicious adversary that can corrupt at most one server. We use a broadcast channel for 3PC alone, which is inevitable [46]. For ML training, several data-owners who wish to jointly train a model, secret share (using the sharing semantics which appear in the latter part of the paper) their data among the servers. For ML inference, a model-owner and client secret share the model and the query, respectively, among the servers. Once the inputs are available in the shared format, the servers perform computations and obtain the output in the shared form. In the case of training, the output model is reconstructed towards the data-owners, whereas for inference, the prediction result is reconstructed towards the client. We assume that an arbitrary number of data-owners may collude with a corrupt server for training, whereas for the case of prediction, we assume that either the model-owner or the client can collude with a corrupt server. We prove the security of our protocols using standard real-world / ideal-world paradigm. We also explore the above model for the four server setting with \( \mathcal{P} = \{P_0, P_1, P_2, P_3\} \). The aforementioned setting has been explored extensively [1], [4], [6]–[9].

Our constructions achieve the strongest security guarantee of GOD. A protocol is said to be robust or achieve GOD if all parties obtain the output of the protocol regardless of how the adversary behaves. In our model, this translates to all the data-owners obtaining the trained model for the case of ML training, while the client obtains the query output for ML inference. All our protocols are cast into: input-independent preprocessing phase and input-dependent online phase.

For 3/4PC, the function to be computed is expressed as a circuit, whose topology is public, and is evaluated over an arithmetic ring \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell} \) or boolean ring \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell} \). For PPML, we consider computation over the same algebraic structure. To deal with floating-point values, we use Fixed-Point Arithmetic (FPA) [1], [4], [6]–[9] representation in which a decimal value is represented as an \( \ell \)-bit integer in signed 2’s complement representation. The most significant bit (MSB) represents the sign bit and \( x \) least significant bits are reserved for the fractional part. The \( \ell \)-bit integer is then treated as an element of \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell} \) and operations are performed modulo \( 2^\ell \). We set \( \ell = 64 \) and \( x = 13 \), leaving \( \ell - x - 1 \) bits for the integral part.
The servers use a one-time key setup, modelled as a functionality $F_{\text{setup}}$ (Fig. 14), to establish pre-shared random keys for pseudo-random functions (PRF) between them. A similar setup is used in [3, 4, 6, 9, 23, 26, 30] for 3 server case, and in [7, 8] for 4 server setting. The key-setup can be instantiated using any standard MPC protocol in the respective setting. Further, our protocols make use of a collision-resistant hash function, denoted by $H()$, and a commitment scheme, denoted by $\text{Com}()$. The formal details of key setup, hash function, and the commitment scheme are deferred to §A.

**Notation II.1.** The $i^{th}$ element of a vector $x$ is denoted as $x_i$. The dot product of two $n$ length vectors, $x$ and $y$, is computed as $x \cdot y = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i y_i$. For two matrices $X$, $Y$, the operation $X \circ Y$ denotes the matrix multiplication. The $i^{th}$ bit of an $\ell$-bit value $v$ is denoted by $v[i]$.

**Notation II.2.** For a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$, we use $b^R$ to denote the equivalent value of $b$ over the ring $\mathbb{Z}_2$. $b^R$ will have its least significant bit set to $b$, while all other bits will be set to zero.

### III. Robust 3PC and PPML

In this section, we first introduce the sharing semantics for three servers. Then, we introduce our new Joint Message Passing ($\text{jmp}$) primitive, which plays a crucial role in obtaining the strongest security guarantee of $GOD$, followed by our protocols in the three server setting.

#### a) Secret Sharing Semantics

- **[-] sharing:** A value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^R}$ is [-]-shared among $P_1$, $P_2$, if $P_1$ for $s \in \{1, 2\}$ holds $\left| \sum_{x_i} x_i \right| \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^R}^s$ such that $v = |v_1| + |v_2|$.
- **( )-sharing:** A value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^R}$ is ( )-shared among $P$, if there exists $v_0, v_1, v_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^R}$ such that $v = v_0 + v_1 + v_2$.
- $P_s$ holds $(v, v_{(s+1)%3})$ for $s \in \{0, 1, 2\}$.
- **[ ]-sharing:** A value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^R}$ is [ ]-shared among $P$, if there exists $\alpha_v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^R}$ that is [ ]-shared among $P$, $P_2$.
- $P_s$ holds $(\alpha_v, \beta_v, \gamma_v)$ in $\mathbb{Z}_{2^R}$ such that $\beta_v = v + \alpha_v$ and $P_0$ holds $(\alpha_v), \beta_v, \gamma_v)$ while $P_s$ for $s \in \{1, 2\}$ holds $(\alpha_v), \beta_v, \gamma_v)$.

#### b) Arithmetic and Boolean Sharing

**Arithmetic sharing** refers to sharing over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^R}$ while **boolean sharing**, denoted as $\left[ \right]^B$, refers to sharing over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^R}$.

**c) Linearity of the Secret Sharing Scheme:** Given the $\left[ \right]$-shares of $v_1, v_2$, and public constants $c_1, c_2$, servers can locally compute the $\left[ \right]$-share of $c_1 v_1 + c_2 v_2$ as $c_1 \left[ v_1 + v_2 \right]$. It is trivial to see that the linearity property is satisfied by $(\cdot)$ and $\left[ \cdot \right]$-sharing as well.

### A. Joint Message Passing primitive

The $\text{jmp}$ primitive allows two servers to relay a common message to the third server such that either the relay is successful or an honest server (or a conflicting pair) is identified. The striking feature of $\text{jmp}$ is that it offers a rate-1 communication i.e. for a message of $\ell$ elements, it only incurs a communication of $\ell$ elements (in an amortized sense).

![Fig. 1: 3PC: Joint Message Passing Protocol](image)

The task of $\text{jmp}$ is captured in an ideal functionality (Fig. 1) below and the protocol (Fig. 2) realizing the functionality appears subsequently followed by an overview.

**Functionality $F_{\text{jmp}}$**

$F_{\text{jmp}}$ interacts with the servers in $\mathcal{P}$ and the adversary $S$.

**Step 1:** $F_{\text{jmp}}$ receives $(\text{Input}, v_s)$ from $P_s$ for $s \in \{i, j\}$, while it receives $(\text{Select}, \text{ttp})$ from $S$. Here ttp denotes the server that $S$ wants to choose as the TTP. Let $P^* \in \mathcal{P}$ denote the server corrupted by $S$.

**Step 2:** If $v_i = v_j$ and ttp $= \bot$, then set $msg_i = msg_{ij} = \bot$, $msg_k = v_i$ and go to Step 5.

**Step 3:** If ttp $\in \mathcal{P} \setminus \{P^*\}$, then set $msg_i = msg_{ij} = msg_k = \text{ttp}$.

**Step 4:** Else, TTP is set to be the honest party with smallest index. Set $msg_i = msg_{ij} = msg_k = \text{TPP}$.

**Step 5:** Send $(\text{Output}, msg_s)$ to $P_s$ for $s \in \{0, 1, 2\}$.

![Fig. 2: 3PC: Joint Message Passing Protocol](image)

Given two servers $P_i, P_j$ possessing a common value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^R}$, protocol $\Pi_{\text{jmp}}$ proceeds as follows. First, $P_i$ sends $v$ to $P_k$ while $P_j$ sends a hash of $v$ to $P_k$. The communication of $v$ is done once and for all from $P_i$ to $P_k$. In the simplest case, $P_k$ receives consistent (value, hash) pair, and the protocol terminates. In all other cases, a TTP is identified as follows without having to communicate $v$ again. Importantly, this part can be run once and for all instances of $\Pi_{\text{jmp}}$ with $P_i, P_j, P_k$ in the same roles, invoked in the final 3PC protocol. Consequently, the cost relevant to this part vanishes in an amortized sense, making the construction rate-1.

Each $P_s$ for $s \in \{i, j, k\}$ maintains a bit $b_s$ initialized to 0, as an indicator for inconsistency. When $P_k$ receives inconsistent (value, hash) pair, it sets $b_k = 1$ and sends the bit to both $P_i, P_j$, who cross-check with each other by exchanging the bit and turn on their inconsistency bit if the bit received.
from either $P_k$ or its fellow sender is turned on. A party broadcasts a hash of its value when its inconsistency bit is on.\footnote{This hash can be computed on a combined message across many calls of jmp.} $P_k$'s value is the one it receives from $P_k$. At this stage, there are a bunch of possible cases and a detailed analysis determines an eligible $TTP$ in each case.

When $P_k$ is silent, the protocol is understood to be complete. This is fine irrespective of the status of $P_{-k}$—an honest $P_k$ never skips this broadcast with inconsistency bit on and a corrupt $P_k$ implies honest senders. If either $P_i$ or $P_j$ is silent, then $P_i$ is picked as $TTP$ which is surely honest. A corrupt $P_k$ could not make one of $\{P_i, P_j\}$ speak as the senders (honestly in this case) are on agreement on their inconsistency bit (due to their mutual exchange of inconsistency bit). When all of them speak and (i) the senders’ hashes do not match, $P_k$ is picked as $TTP$; (ii) one of the senders conflicts with $P_k$, the other sender is picked as $TTP$; and (iii) if there is no conflict, $P_i$ is picked as $TTP$. The first two cases are self-explanatory. In the last case, either $P_i$ or $P_k$ is corrupt. Because a corrupt $P_i$ can have honest $P_k$ speak (and hence turn on its inconsistency bit), by sending a $v'$ whose hash is not same as that of $v$ and so inevitably the hashes of honest $P_j$ and $P_k$ will conflict.

As a final touch, we ensure that, in each step, a party raises a public alarm (via broadcast) accusing a party who is silent when it is not supposed to be, and the protocol terminates immediately by labelling the party as $TTP$ who is neither the complainer nor the accused.\footnote{Notation III.1. We say that $P_i, P_j$ jmp-send $v$ to $P_k$ when they invoke $\Pi_{\text{jmp}}(P_i, P_j, P_k, v)$.}

Using jmp in protocols. As mentioned in the introduction, the protocol for jmp needs to be viewed consisting of two phases ($\text{send}, \text{verify}$), where send phase consists of $P_i$ sending $v$ to $P_k$ and the rest goes to verify phase. Looking ahead, most of our protocols use jmp, and consequently our final construction, either of general MPC or any PPML task will have several calls to jmp. To leverage amortization, the send phase will be executed in all protocols invoking jmp on the flow, while the verify for a fixed ordered pair of senders will be executed once and for all in the end. The verify phase will determine if all the sends were correct. If not, a $TTP$ is identified, as explained, and the computation completes with the help of $TTP$, just as in the ideal-world.

B. 3PC Protocols

We now describe the protocols for 3 parties/servers.

a) Sharing Protocol: Protocol $\Pi_{\text{sh}}$ (Fig. 3) allows a server $P_i$ to generate $\llbracket v \rrbracket$-shares of a value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_2^d$. In the preprocessing phase, $P_0, P_j$ for $j \in \{1, 2\}$ along with $P_i$ sample a random $\alpha_j \in \mathbb{Z}_2^d$, while $P_1, P_2$ sample random $\gamma_j \in \mathbb{Z}_2^d$. This allows $P_i$ to know both $\alpha_j$ and $\gamma_j$. Depending on the online phase, if $P_i = P_0$, then $P_0$ sends $\beta_0 = v + \alpha_j$ to $P_1, P_2, P_i$ then jmp-send $\beta_0$ to $P_2$ to complete the secret sharing. If $P_i = P_1$, $P_i$ sends $\beta_1 = v + \alpha_j$ to $P_2, P_0, P_i$ then jmp-send $\beta_j$ to $P_0$ to complete the secret sharing. If $P_i = P_2$, $P_i$ sends $\beta_2 = v + \alpha_j$ to $P_0, P_1, P_i$ then jmp-send $\beta_j + \gamma_j$ to $P_0$. The case for $P_i = P_0$ proceeds similar to that of $P_i$. The correctness of the shares held by each server is assured by the guarantees of $\Pi_{\text{jmp}}$.

b) Joint Sharing Protocol: Protocol $\Pi_{\text{sh}}$ (Fig. 16) allows two servers $P_i, P_j$ to jointly generate a $\llbracket - \rrbracket$-sharing of a value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_2^d$ that is known to both. Towards this, servers execute the preprocessing of $\Pi_{\text{sh}}$ to generate $\alpha_j$ and $\gamma_j$. If $(P_i, P_j) = (P_1, P_0)$, then $P_0, P_1$ jmp-send $\beta_0 = v + \alpha_j$ to $P_2$. The case when $(P_i, P_j) = (P_0, P_1)$ proceeds similarly. The case for $(P_i, P_j) = (P_2, P_2)$ is optimized further as follows: servers locally set $\alpha_j = \gamma_j = 0$. $P_1, P_2$ together sample random $\gamma_j \in \mathbb{Z}_2^d$, set $\beta_j = v + \gamma_j$ and jmp-send $\beta_j + \gamma_j$ to $P_0$. We defer the formal details of $\Pi_{\text{sh}}$ to §B-C.

c) Addition Protocol: Given the $\llbracket - \rrbracket$-shares on input wires $x, y$, servers can use the linearity property of the sharing scheme to locally compute $\llbracket x + y \rrbracket$-shares of the output of addition gate, $z = x + y$ as $[z] = [x] + [y]$.

d) Multiplication Protocol: Protocol $\Pi_{\text{mult}}(P, [x], [y])$ (Fig. 4) enables the servers in $P$ to compute $\llbracket xy \rrbracket$, given the $\llbracket - \rrbracket$-sharing of $x$ and $y$. We build on the protocol of BLAZE [9] and discuss along the way the differences and resemblances. We begin with a protocol for the semi-honest setting, which is also the starting point of BLAZE. During the preprocessing phase, $P_0, P_j$ for $j \in \{1, 2\}$ sample random $\alpha_j \in \mathbb{Z}_2^d$, while $P_1, P_2$ sample random $\gamma_j \in \mathbb{Z}_2^d$. In addition, $P_0$ locally computes $\Gamma_j = \alpha_j \alpha_j$ and generates $\llbracket - \rrbracket$-sharing of the same between $P_1, P_2$. Since

\[
\beta_j = z + \alpha_j = xy + \alpha_j = (\beta_j - \alpha_j)(\beta_j - \alpha_j) + \alpha_j = \beta_j \beta_j - \beta_j x \beta_j - \beta_j x \alpha_j + \Gamma_j \alpha_j + \alpha_j
\]  

holds, servers $P_1, P_2$ locally compute $\beta_j = (j - 1) \beta_j \beta_j - \beta_j \alpha_j \beta_j - \beta_j \alpha_j z_j + [\Gamma_j x_j] + [\alpha_j z_j]$ during the online phase and mutually exchange their shares to reconstruct $\beta_j$. $P_1$ then sends $\beta_j + \gamma_j$ to $P_0$, completing the semi-honest protocol. The correctness that asserts $z = xy$ or in other words $\beta_j - \alpha_j = xy$ holds due to Eq. 1.

The following issues arise in the above protocol when a malicious adversary is considered:

1) When $P_0$ is corrupt, the $\llbracket - \rrbracket$-sharing of $\Gamma_j x_j$ performed by $P_0$ might be correct, i.e., $\Gamma_j x_j \neq \alpha_j \alpha_j$.

2) When $P_1$ (or $P_2$) is corrupt, the $\llbracket - \rrbracket$-share of $\beta_j$ handed over to the fellow honest evaluator during the online phase might not be correct, causing reconstruction of an incorrect $\beta_j$.

3) When $P_1$ is corrupt, the value $\beta_j + \gamma_j$ that is sent to $P_0$ during the online phase may not be correct.
All the three issues are common with BLAZE (copied verbatim), but we differ from BLAZE in handling them. We begin with solving the last issue first. We simply make $P_1, P_2$ jmp-send $\beta_z + \gamma_z$ to $P_0$ (after $\beta_z$ is computed). This either leads to success or a TTP selection. Due to jmp’s rate-1 communication, $P_0$ alone sending the value to $P_1$ remains as costly as using jmp in amortized sense. Whereas in BLAZE, the malicious version simply makes $P_2$ to send a hash of $\beta_z + \gamma_z$ to $P_0$ (in addition to $P_1$’s communication of $\beta_z + \gamma_z$ to $P_0$), who aborts if the received values are inconsistent.

For the remaining two issues, similar to BLAZE, we reduce both to a multiplication (on values unrelated to inputs) in the preprocessing phase. However, our method leads to either success or TTP selection, with no additional cost.

We start with the second issue. To solve it, where a corrupt $P_1$ (or $P_2$) sends an incorrect $[\cdot]$-share of $\beta_z$, BLAZE makes use of server $P_0$ to compute a version of $\beta_z$ for verification, based on $\beta_z$ and $\beta_y$, as follows. Using $\beta_x + \gamma_x$ and $\beta_z + \gamma_z$, which are already available to $P_0$ as a part of $[\cdot], [\cdot]$, $P_0$ computes:

$$\begin{align*}
\beta_x^* &= -(\beta_x + \gamma_x)\alpha_y - (\beta_y + \gamma_y)\alpha_x + 2\Gamma_y + \alpha_z \\
&= (\beta_x - \beta_x\psi) - (\gamma_x\alpha_y + \gamma_y\alpha_x - \Gamma_y + \psi + \psi) \quad \text{[by Eq. 1]} \\
&= (\beta_x - \beta_x\psi + \psi) \quad \text{[where $\chi = \gamma_x\alpha_y + \gamma_y\alpha_x - \Gamma_y + \psi]$}
\end{align*}$$

Assuming that (a) $\psi \in \mathbb{Z}_{2\ell}$ is a random value sampled together by $P_1$ and $P_2$ (and unknown to $P_0$) for securing the $\beta$ values from $P_0$ and (b) $P_0$ knows the value $\chi$, $P_0$ can send $\beta_x^* + \chi$ to $P_1$ and $P_2$ who use the knowledge of $\beta_x, \beta_y$ and $\psi$ can verify the correctness of $\beta_x$ by computing $\beta_x^* - \beta_x\psi$ and checking against the value $\beta_x^* + \chi$ received from $P_0$. The rest of the logic in BLAZE goes on to discuss how to enforce $P_0$ (a) to compute a correct $\chi$ (when honest) and (b) to share correct $\Gamma_y$ (when corrupt) via a single multiplication of two values in the preprocessing phase. Tying the ends together, one of their innovations goes in identifying the precise shared multiplication triple and mapping its components to $\chi$ and $\Gamma_y$ so that these are correct by the virtue of the correctness of the multiplication relation.

We differ from BLAZE in several ways. First, we do not simply rely on $P_0$ for the verification information $\beta_x^* + \chi$, as this may inevitably lead to abort when $P_0$ is corrupt. Instead, we find (a slightly different) $\beta_x^*$ that, instead of entirely available to $P_0$, will be available in $[\cdot]$-shared form between the two teams $\{P_0, P_1\}$, with both servers in $\{P_0, P_1\}$ holding $i$th share $[\beta_x^*]_i$. With this edit, the $i$th team can jmp-send the $i$th share of $\beta_x^*$ to the third party which computes $\beta_x^*$. Due to the presence of one honest party in each team, this $\beta_x^*$ is correct and $P_1, P_2$ directly use it to compute $\beta_x$, with the knowledge of $\psi, \beta_x, \beta_y$. This means, departing from BLAZE and the starting semi-honest construction, $P_1$ and $P_2$ compute $\beta_x$ from $\beta_x^*$. Whereas, BLAZE suggests computing $\beta_x$ from the exchange $P_1, P_2$’s respective share of $\beta_x$ and use $\beta_x^*$ for verification. The outcome is a win-win situation i.e. either success or TTP selection. Our new $\beta_x^*$ and $\chi$ are:

$$\begin{align*}
\chi &= \gamma_x\alpha_y + \gamma_y\alpha_x + \Gamma_y + \psi \\
\beta_x^* &= -(\beta_x + \gamma_x)\alpha_y - (\beta_y + \gamma_y)\alpha_x + \alpha_z + \chi \\
&= (-\beta_x\alpha_y - \beta_y\alpha_x + \Gamma_y + \alpha_z - \psi = \beta_x - \beta_x\beta_y - \psi
\end{align*}$$

Clearly, both $P_0$ and $P_2$ can compute $[\beta_x^*]_i = -(\beta_x + \gamma_x)\alpha_y/(\beta_y + \gamma_y)\alpha_x] + [\alpha_z] + [\chi]$, given $[\cdot]$. The rest of our discussion explains how (a) $i$th share of $[\chi]$ can be made available to $\{P_0, P_1\}$ and (b) $\psi$ can be derived by $P_1, P_2$, from a multiplication triple. Similar to BLAZE, yet for a different triple, we observe that $(d, e, f)$ is a multiplication triple, where $d = (\gamma_x + \alpha_x), e = (\gamma_y + \alpha_y), f = (\gamma_x\gamma_y + \psi) + \chi$ if and only if $\chi$ and $\Gamma_y$ are correct. Indeed,

$$\begin{align*}
d &= (\gamma_x + \alpha_x)(\gamma_y + \alpha_y) = \gamma_x\gamma_y + \gamma_x\alpha_y + \gamma_y\alpha_x + \Gamma_y \\
f &= (\gamma_x\gamma_y + \psi) + (\gamma_x\gamma_y + \gamma_y\alpha_x + \Gamma_y - \psi) \\
&= (\gamma_x\gamma_y + \psi) + \chi = f
\end{align*}$$

Based on this observation, we compute the above multiplication triple using a multiplication protocol and extract out the values for $\psi$ and $\chi$ from the shares of $f$ which are bound to be correct. This can be executed entirely in the preprocessing phase. Specifically, the servers (a) locally obtain $(\cdot)$-shares of $d, e$ as in Table II, (b) compute $(\cdot)$-shares of $f$ (= $de$), say denoted by $f_0, f_1, f_2$, using an efficient, robust 3-party multiplication protocol, say $\Pi_{mulPre}$ (abstracted in a functionality Fig. 17) and finally (c) extract out the required preprocessing data locally as in Eq. 2. We switch to $(\cdot)$-sharing in this part to be able to use the best robust multiplication protocol of [30] that supports this form of secret sharing and requires communication of just 3 elements. Fortunately, the switch does not cost anything, as both the first and third steps involve local computation and the cost simply reduces to a single run of a multiplication protocol.

| $(d)$ | $(\alpha_x)_1, (\alpha_x)_2$ | $(\alpha_y)_1, (\alpha_y)_2$ | $(\gamma_x, \alpha_y)_1, (\gamma_x, \alpha_y)_2$ |
| $(e)$ | $(\alpha_x)_1, (\alpha_y)_1$ | $(\alpha_y)_1, (\gamma_x)_1$ | $(\gamma_x, (\gamma_y)_1)$ |

**Table II:** The $(\cdot)$-sharing of values $d$ and $e$

$$\begin{align*}
[x]_2 &\leftarrow f_0, [x]_1 \leftarrow f_1, \gamma_x\gamma_y + \psi \leftarrow f_2.
\end{align*}$$

According to $(\cdot)$-sharing, both $P_0$ and $P_1$ obtain $f_1$ and hence obtain $[x]_1$. Similarly, $P_0, P_2$ obtain $f_0$ and hence $[x]_2$. Finally,
$P_1, P_2$ obtain $f_2$ from which they compute $\psi = f_2 - \gamma x \cdot y$. This completes the informal discussion.

We note that to facilitate a fast online phase for multiplication, our preprocessing phase leverages a robust multiplication protocol [30] in a black-box manner to derive the necessary preprocessing information. A similar black-box approach is also taken for the dot product protocol in the preprocessing phase. This leaves room for further improvements in communication cost, which can be obtained by instantiating the black-box with an efficient robust dot product protocol, coupled with the fast online phase.

e) Reconstruction Protocol: Protocol $\Pi_{rec}$ (Fig. 5) allows servers to robustly reconstruct value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^t}$ from its $[\cdot]$-shares. Note that each server misses one share of $v$ which is held by the other two servers. Consider the case of $P_0$ who requires $\gamma v$ to compute $v$. During the preprocessing, $P_1, P_2$ compute a commitment of $\gamma v$, denoted by $\text{Com}(\gamma v)$ and jmp-send the same to $P_0$. Similar steps are performed for the values $[\alpha_1]_2$ and $[\alpha_2]_1$ that are required by servers $P_1$ and $P_2$ respectively. During the online phase, servers open their commitments to the intended server who accepts the opening that is consistent with the agreed upon commitment.

**Protocol $\Pi_{rec}(P, [\cdot])$**

**Preprocessing:**
- $P_0, P_1, P_2$, for $j \in \{1, 2\}$, compute $\text{Com}([\alpha_j]_1)$, while $P_1, P_2$ compute $\text{Com}(\gamma v)$.
- $P_1, P_2$ jmp-send $\text{Com}(\gamma v)$ to $P_0$, while $P_0, P_1$ jmp-send $\text{Com}([\alpha_1]_2)$ to $P_2$, and $P_0, P_2$ jmp-send $\text{Com}([\alpha_2]_2)$ to $P_1$.

**Online:**
- $P_0, P_1$ open $\text{Com}([\alpha_1]_1)$ to $P_2$.
- $P_0, P_2$ open $\text{Com}([\alpha_2]_2)$ to $P_1$.
- $P_1, P_2$ open $\text{Com}(\gamma v)$ to $P_0$.
- Each of the servers accept the opening that is consistent with the agreed upon commitment. $P_1, P_2$ compute $v = \beta_3 - [\alpha_1]_2 - [\alpha_2]_1$, while $P_0$ computes $v = (\beta_4 + \gamma v) - [\alpha_2]_2$. 

Fig. 5: 3PC: Reconstruction of $v$ among the servers

f) The Complete 3PC: For the sake of completeness and to demonstrate how GOD is achieved, we show how to compile the above primitives for a general 3PC. The main purpose is to explain the usage of jmp in a complete computation. A similar approach will be taken for 4PC and each PPML task (both training and inference) and we will avoid repetition. In order to compute an arithmetic circuit over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^t}$, we first invoke the key-setup functionality $\mathcal{F}_{setup}$ (Fig. 14) for key distribution and preprocessing of $\Pi_{sh}, \Pi_{mult}$ and $\Pi_{rec}$, as per the given circuit. During the online phase, $P_1 \in P$ shares its input $x_i$ by executing online steps of $\Pi_{sh}$ (Fig. 3) protocol. This is followed by the circuit evaluation phase, where serves evaluate the gates in the circuit in the topological order, with addition gates (and multiplication-by-a-constant gates) being computed locally, and multiplication gates being computed via online of $\Pi_{mult}$ (Fig. 4). Finally, servers run the online steps of $\Pi_{rec}$ protocol (Fig. 5) on the output wires to reconstruct the function output. All the building blocks above invoke jmp, except the online phase of reconstruction. To leverage amortization, only send phases of all the jumps are run on the flow. At the end of preprocessing, and right before the reconstruction in the online phase, the verify phase for all possible ordered pair of senders are run. We carry on computation in the online phase only when the verify phases in the preprocessing are successful. Otherwise, the servers simply send their inputs to the elected TTP who computes the function and returns the result to all the servers. Similarly, depending on the output of the verify phase at the end of the online phase, either the reconstruction is carried out or a TTP is identified. In the latter case, computation completes as mentioned before.

C. Building Blocks for PPML using 3PC

This section provides details on robust realizations of the following building blocks for PPML in 3-server setting– i) Dot Product, ii) Truncation, iii) Dot Product with Truncation, iv) Secure Comparison, and v) Non-linear Activation functions– Sigmoid and ReLU. We begin by providing details of input sharing and reconstruction in the SOC setting.

a) Input Sharing and Output Reconstruction in the SOC Setting: Protocol $\Pi_{soc}^{sh}$ (Fig. 6) extends input sharing to the SOC setting and allows a user $U$ to generate the $[\cdot]$-shares of its input $v$ among the three servers. Note that the necessary commitments to facilitate the sharing are generated in the preprocessing phase by the servers which are then communicated to $U$, along with the opening, in the online phase. $U$ selects the commitment forming the majority (for each share) owing to the presence of an honest majority among the servers, and accepts the corresponding shares. Analogously, protocol $\Pi_{rec}^{soc}$ (Fig. 6) allows the servers to reconstruct a value $v$ towards user $U$. In either of the protocols, if at any point, a TTP is identified, then servers signal the TTP’s identity to $U$. $U$ selects the TTP as the one forming a majority and sends its input in clear to the TTP, who computes the function output and sends it back to $U$.

**Protocol $\Pi_{soc}^{sh}(U, v)$ and $\Pi_{rec}^{soc}(U, [\cdot])$**

Input Sharing:
- $P_0, P_s$, for $s \in \{1, 2\}$, together sample random $[\alpha_s]_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^t}$, while $P_1, P_2$ together sample random $\gamma_s \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^t}$.
- $P_0, P_1$ jmp-send $\text{Com}([\alpha_1]_1)$ to $P_2$, while $P_0, P_2$ jmp-send $\text{Com}([\alpha_2]_2)$ to $P_1$, and $P_1, P_2$ jmp-send $\text{Com}(\gamma_2)$ to $P_0$.
- Each of the servers sends $(\text{Com}([\alpha_1]_1), \text{Com}([\alpha_2]_2), \text{Com}(\gamma_s))$ to $U$ who accepts the values that form the majority. Also, $P_0, P_s$, for $s \in \{1, 2\}$, open $[\alpha_s]_2$, towards $U$ while $P_1, P_2$ open $\gamma_s$ towards $U$.
- $U$ accepts the consistent opening, recovers $[\alpha_1]_1, [\alpha_2]_1, \gamma_s$, computes $\beta_s = v + [\alpha_1]_1 + [\alpha_2]_2$, and sends $\beta_s + \gamma_s$ to all three servers.
-Servers broadcast the received value and accept the majority value if it exists, and a default value, otherwise. $P_1, P_2$ locally compute $\beta_s$ from $\beta_s + \gamma_s$ using $\gamma_s$ to complete the sharing of $v$.

Output Reconstruction:
- Servers execute the preprocessing of $\Pi_{rec}(P, [\cdot])$ to agree upon commitments of $[\alpha_1]_1, [\alpha_2]_2$ and $\gamma_s$.
- Each of the servers send $\beta_s + \gamma_s$ as well as commitments on $[\alpha_1]_1, [\alpha_2]_2$ and $\gamma_s$ to $U$, who accepts the values forming majority.
- Now, $P_0, P_1$ open $[\alpha_1]_1$ to $U$, $P_0, P_2$ open $[\alpha_2]_2$, while $P_1, P_2$ open $\gamma_s$ to $U$.
- $U$ accepts the consistent opening and computes $v = (\beta_s + \gamma_s) - [\alpha_1]_1 - [\alpha_2]_2 - \gamma_s$.

Fig. 6: 3PC: Input Sharing and Output Reconstruction in SOC Setting
b) MSB Extraction, Bit to Arithmetic Conversion and Bit Injection Protocols: Here we provide a high-level overview of three protocols that involve working over arithmetic and boolean rings in a mixed fashion and are used for the PPML primitives. The Dot Product Protocol, $\Pi_{dot}$, allows servers to compute the arithmetic sharing of the most significant bit (msb) of a value $v$ given its arithmetic sharing $[v]$. The Bit2A Protocol, $\Pi_{bit}$, given the boolean sharing of a bit $b$, denoted as $[b]_B$, allows servers to compute the arithmetic sharing $[b]_A$. Here $b^R$ denotes the equivalent value of $b$ over ring $\mathbb{Z}_{2^R}$ (see Notation II.2). Lastly, the Bit Injection Protocol, $\Pi_{bit}$, allows the servers to compute the arithmetic sharing $[b]_v$ given the boolean sharing of a bit $b$, denoted as $[b]_B$ and the arithmetic sharing of $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^R}$.

The core techniques used in these protocols follow from BLAZE [9], where the multiplication calls are instantiated with $\Pi_{mult}$, and several private communications are replaced with jmp-send to ensure either successful run or TTP selection. The PPML building blocks above can be understood without the details of the constructs and hence they are moved to §B-F.

c) Dot Product: Given the $[\cdot]$-sharing of vectors $\vec{x}$ and $\vec{y}$, protocol $\Pi_{dot}$ (Fig. 7) allows servers to generate $[\cdot]$-sharing of $z = \vec{x} \odot \vec{y}$ in a robust fashion. By $[\cdot]$-sharing of a vector $\vec{x}$ of size $n$, we mean that each element $x_i \in Z_{2^R}$ in the vector, for $i \in [n]$, is $[\cdot]$-shared. We borrow ideas from BLAZE for obtaining an online communication cost independent of $n$ and use jmp primitive to ensure either success or TTP selection. Similar to our multiplication protocol that offloads one call to a robust multiplication protocol in the preprocessing, our dot product does the same for a robust dot product.

$$\text{Protocol } \Pi_{dot}(P; \{[x_i], [y_j]\}_{i \in [n]}).$$

**Preprocessing:**
- $P_0, P_1, P_2$, for $j \in \{1, 2\}$, together sample random $[\alpha_j]_j \in Z_{2^R}$, while $P_1, P_2$ sample random $\gamma_2 \in Z_{2^R}$.
- Servers locally compute $\langle \cdot \rangle$-sharing of $\vec{d}, \vec{e}$ with $d_i = \gamma_{\alpha_i} + \alpha_{\chi_i}$ and $e_i = \gamma_{\chi_i} + \alpha_{\gamma_i}$, for $i \in [n]$ as follows:
  \[
  \langle d \rangle_n \left( \langle \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \rangle \right) = \langle \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \rangle, \quad \langle d \rangle_n = \langle \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \rangle
  \]
  \[
  \langle e \rangle_n \left( \langle \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n \rangle \right) = \langle \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n \rangle, \quad \langle e \rangle_n = \langle \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n \rangle
  \]

- Servers execute $\Pi_{dot}(P; \langle \vec{d}, \langle \vec{e} \rangle \rangle)$ to generate $(f) = (\vec{d} \odot \vec{e})$.
- $P_0, P_1$ locally set $[x_1] = f_1$, while $P_0, P_2$ locally set $[x_2] = f_0$.
- $P_1, P_2$ locally compute $\psi = f_2 - \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_{\chi_i} \gamma_{\gamma_i}$.

**Online:**
- $P_0, P_j$, for $j \in \{1, 2\}$, compute $\langle \beta^*_2 \rangle_2 = -\sum_{i=1}^n (\langle \beta \chi_i, + \gamma_{\gamma_i} \rangle \langle [\alpha_{\chi_i}]_1 \rangle + \langle \beta_2, + \gamma_{\gamma_i} \rangle \langle [\alpha_{\gamma_i}]_1 \rangle + \langle [\chi_i]_1 \rangle)$.
- $P_0, P_1$ jmp-send $\langle \beta^*_2 \rangle_2$ to $P_2$ and $P_0, P_2$ jmp-send $\langle \beta^*_2 \rangle_2$ to $P_1$.
- $P_1, P_2$ locally compute $\beta^*_2 = \langle \beta^*_2 \rangle_2 + \sum_{i=1}^n (\beta_2 \chi_i)$ and set $\beta_2 = \beta^*_2 + \sum_{i=1}^n (\beta_2 \chi_i) + \psi$.
- $P_1, P_2$ jmp-send $\beta_2 + \gamma_{\epsilon_2}$ to $P_0$.

Fig. 7: 3PC: Dot Product Protocol ($z = \vec{x} \odot \vec{y}$)

To begin with, $z = \vec{x} \odot \vec{y}$ can be viewed as $n$ parallel multiplication instances of the form $z_i = x_i y_i$, for $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, followed by adding up the results. Let $\beta^*_2 = \sum_{i=1}^n \beta^*_2$. Then,
\[
\beta^*_2 = -\sum_{i=1}^n (\beta_2 \chi_i + \gamma_{\gamma_i}) \alpha_{\gamma_i} - \sum_{i=1}^n (\beta_1 + \gamma_{\gamma_i}) \alpha_{\chi_i} + \alpha_{\gamma_i} + \chi
\]
where $\chi = \sum_{i=1}^n (\gamma_{\chi_i} \alpha_{\gamma_i} + \gamma_{\gamma_i} \alpha_{\chi_i} + \Gamma_{x_i, y_i} - \psi_i)$.

Apart from the aforementioned modification, the online phase for dot product proceeds similar to that of multiplication protocol. $P_0, P_1$ locally compute $\langle \beta^*_2 \rangle_2$, as per Eq. 3 and jmp-send $\langle \beta^*_2 \rangle_2$ to $P_2$. $P_1$ obtains $\beta^*_2$ in a similar fashion. $P_1, P_2$ reconstruct $\beta^*_2 = \langle \beta^*_2 \rangle_2 + \langle \beta^*_2 \rangle_2$ and compute $\beta_2 = \beta^*_2 + \sum_{i=1}^n \beta_2 \chi_i$. Here, the value $\psi$ has to be correctly generated in the preprocessing phase satisfying Eq. 3. Finally, $P_1, P_2$ jmp-send $\beta_2 + \gamma_{\epsilon_2}$ to $P_0$.

We now provide the details for preprocessing phase that enable servers to obtain the required values $(\chi, \psi)$ with the invocation of a dot product protocol in a black-box way. Towards this, let $d = [d_1, \ldots, d_n]$ and $e = [e_1, \ldots, e_n]$, where $d_i = \gamma_{\gamma_i} + \alpha_{\gamma_i}$ and $e_i = \gamma_{\gamma_i} + \alpha_{\gamma_i}$ for $i \in [n]$, as in the case of multiplication. Then for $f = d \odot \epsilon$,
\[
f = \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_{\chi_i} \gamma_{\gamma_i} + \psi_i + \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_{\chi_i} \gamma_{\gamma_i} + \psi_i + \chi
\]
\[
= \sum_{i=1}^n (y_i \gamma_{\gamma_i} + \psi_i) + \chi_1 + \chi_2 = f_2 + f_1 + f_0.
\]

where $f_2 = \sum_{i=1}^n (\gamma_{\chi_i} \gamma_{\gamma_i} + \psi_i)$, $f_1 = [\chi_1]$ and $f_0 = [\chi_2]$.

Using the above relation, the preprocessing phase proceeds as follows: $P_0, P_1$ for $j \in \{1, 2\}$ sample a random $[\alpha_j]_j \in Z_{2^R}$, while $P_1, P_2$ sample random $\gamma_2$. Servers locally prepare $(\vec{d}), (\vec{e})$ similar to that of multiplication protocol. Servers then execute a robust 3PC dot product protocol, denoted by $\Pi_{dot}$, that takes $(\vec{d}), (\vec{e})$ as input and compute $(f)$ with $f = \vec{d} \odot \vec{e}$. Given $(f)$, the $\psi$ and $[\chi]$ values are extracted as follows (ref. Eq. 4):
\[
\psi = f_2 - \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_{\chi_i} \gamma_{\gamma_i}, \quad [\chi_1] = f_1, \quad [\chi_2] = f_0.
\]

It is easy to see from the semantics of $(\cdot)$-sharing that both $P_1, P_2$ obtain $f_2$ and hence $\psi$. Similarly, both $P_0, P_1$ obtain $f_1$ and hence $[\chi_1]$, while $P_0, P_2$ obtain $[\chi_2]$.

In this work, we instantiate $\Pi_{dot}$ using $n$ black-box in $\Pi_{mu}$-invocations. In the $i^{th}$ invocation, servers compute $[\alpha_j, e_i)$ and obtain the respective $\psi_i$ and $[\chi_i]$ values. Finally, servers locally set $\psi = \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_i$ and $[\chi] = \sum_{i=1}^n [\chi_i]$. The aforementioned method results in communication of $3n$ elements in the preprocessing phase. A protocol for $\Pi_{dot}$ with better cost, when plugged into our $\Pi_{dot}$, would bring down the preprocessing cost further while maintaining a fast online phase. We defer the formal details of $\Pi_{dot} \rightarrow \Pi_{3PC}$.

d) Truncation: Working over fixed-point values, repeated multiplications using FPA arithmetic can lead to an overflow resulting in loss of significant bits of information. This put forth the need for truncation [1], [4], [6], [7], [9] that re-adjusts the shares after multiplication so that FPA semantics are maintained. As shown in SecureML [1], the method of truncation would result in loss of information on the least significant bits and affect the accuracy by a very minimal amount only.

For truncation, servers execute $\Pi_{trunc}$ (Fig. 8) to generate a random pair of the form $\{[\bar{r}], [\bar{r}']\}$. Here, $r$ denotes a random
ring element, while \( r^d \) represents the truncated value of \( r \). By truncated value, we mean that the value is right-shifted by \( d \) bit positions, where \( d \) is the number of bits allocated for the fractional part in the FPA representation. Given \((r, r^d)\), the truncated value of \( v \) denoted by \( v^d \) can be computed from \( v \) as \( v^d = (v - r)^d + r^d \). As shown in ABY3 [4], this method ensures the same correctness of SecureML and the accuracy is affected by a very minimal amount.

To generate \([r], [r^d]\), servers proceed as follows: \( P_0, P_1 \) for \( j \in \{1, 2\} \) sample random \( R_j \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^{d_j}} \), \( P_0 \) locally computes \( r = R_1 + R_2 \) and truncates \( r \) to obtain \( r^d \), \( P_0 \) then executes \( \Pi_{\text{bit}} \) on \( r^d \) to generate \([r^d]\). As shown in BLAZE, the correctness of sharing performed by \( P_0 \) is checked using the relation \( r = 2^{d_j} r^d + r_d \), where \( r_d \) denotes the ring element \( r \) with the higher order \( d - d \) bit positions set to 0. In detail, \( P_0, P_j \) for \( j \in \{1, 2\} \) locally computes \([a]_j \) for \( a = (r - 2^{d_j} r^d + r_d). P_0, P_1 \) then jump-send \( H([a]_j) \) to \( P_2, P_3 \) checks if the received hash value matches with \( H([-a]_j) \). In case of any inconsistency, \( P_2 \) accuses \( P_0 \) and then \( P_1 \) is identified as the TTP. The correctness of \( \Pi_{\text{gen}} \) follows from BLAZE.

**Protocol \( \Pi_{\text{gen}}(P) \)**

- \( P_0, P_j \) for \( j \in \{1, 2\} \) together sample random \( R_j \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^{d_j}}. P_0 \) sets \( r = R_1 + R_2 \) while \( P_j \) sets \([r]_j = R_j. P_0 \) sets \([r_d]_j \) as the ring element that has last \( d \) bits of \( r \) in the last \( d \) positions and 0 elsewhere.
- \( P_0 \) locally truncates \( r \) to obtain \( r^d \) and executes \( \Pi_{\text{bit}}(P_0, r^d) \) to generate \([r^d]\).
- \( P_0, P_1 \) set \([r^d]_1 = \beta_d - [\alpha_v]_1 \), while \( P_0, P_2 \) set \([r^d]_2 = -[\alpha_v]_2 \).
- \( P_0, P_1 \) compute \( u = [r]_1 - 2 [r^d]_1 - [r_d]_1 \). \( P_0, P_1 \) jump-send \( H(u) \) to \( P_2 \).
- \( P_2 \) locally computes \( v = 2^d [r^d]_2 + [r_d]_2 - [r_d]_1 \). If \( H(u) \neq H(v) \), \( P_3 \) broadcast "(accuse, \( P_0 \) )" and \( P_1 \) is chosen as the TTP.

**Fig. 8:** 3PC: Generating Random Truncated Pair \((r, r^d)\)

e) Dot Product with Truncation: Given the \([\cdot, \cdot]\)-sharing of vectors \( \mathbf{x} \) and \( \mathbf{y} \), protocol \( \Pi_{\text{dot}} \) (Fig. 20) allows servers to generate \([z^d]\), where \( z^d \) denotes the truncated value of \( z = \mathbf{x} \odot \mathbf{y} \). One naive way is to compute the dot product using \( \Pi_{\text{dot}} \) first, followed by performing the truncation using the \((r, r^d)\) pair. Instead, we follow the optimization of BLAZE where the online phase of \( \Pi_{\text{dot}} \) is modified to integrate the truncation using \((r, r^d)\) at no additional cost.

The preprocessing phase now consists of the execution of one instance of \( \Pi_{\text{gen}} \) (Fig. 8) and the preprocessing corresponding to \( \Pi_{\text{dot}} \) (Fig. 7). At a high level, the online phase proceeds as follows: \( P_0, P_j \) for \( j \in \{1, 2\} \) locally compute \([z^d]_j\) instead of \([\beta^j_z\]) as in \( \Pi_{\text{dot}} \), where \( z^d = \beta^z_d - [\alpha_z]_d \). \( P_0, P_1 \) jump-send \([z^d]_1\) to \( P_2 \), while \( P_0, P_2 \) jump-send \([z^d]_2\) to \( P_1 \). Both \( P_1, P_2 \) then compute \( (z - r)^d \) locally, truncate it to obtain \((z - r)^d\) and execute \( \Pi_{\text{bit}} \) to generate \([z - r]^d]\). Finally, servers locally compute the result as \([z^d] = [(z - r)^d] + [r^d]\). We defer the formal details of the protocol \( \Pi_{\text{dot}} \) to §B.1.

f) Secure Comparison: Secure comparison allows servers to check whether \( x < y \), given their \([\cdot, \cdot]\)-shares. In FPA representation, checking \( x < y \) is equivalent to checking the msb of \( v = x - y \). Towards this, servers locally compute \([v] = [x] - [y] \) and extract the msb of \( v \) using \( \Pi_{\text{bit}} \) (§B.1). In case an arithmetic sharing is desired, servers can apply \( \Pi_{\text{bit}2A} \) (Fig. 18) protocol on the outcome of \( \Pi_{\text{bit}} \).

g) Activation Functions: We now elaborate on two of the most prominently used activation functions: i) Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) and (ii) Sigmoid (Sig).

- ReLU: The ReLU function, \( \text{relu}(v) = \max(0,v) \), can be viewed as \( \text{relu}(v) = b \cdot v \), where the bit \( b = 1 \) if \( v \leq 0 \) and 0 otherwise. Here \( b \) denotes the complement of \( b \). Given \([v]\), servers first execute \( \Pi_{\text{bit}} \) on \([v]\) to generate \([b]B \). The \([b]B\)-sharing of \( b \) is then locally computed by setting \( b'E = \top \). Servers then execute \( \Pi_{\text{bit}} \) protocol on \([b]B \) and \([v]\) to obtain the desired result.

- Sig: In this work, we use the MPC-friendly variant of the Sigmoid function [1], [4], [6] (ref. §B.3). Note that \( \text{sig}(v) = b_1b_2(v + 1/2) + b_2 \), where \( b_1 = 1 \) if \( v > 1/2 \) and \( b_2 = 1 \) if \( v < 1/2 < 0 \). To compute \( \text{sig}(v) \), servers proceed in a similar fashion as the ReLU, and hence, we skip the formal details.

IV. ROBUST 4PC AND PPML

In this section, we extend our 3PC results to the 4-party case and observe substantial efficiency gain. First, the use of broadcast is eliminated. Second, the preprocessing of multiplication becomes substantially computationally light, eliminating the multiplication protocol altogether. Third and the most striking of all, we achieve a dot product protocol with communication cost completely independent of the size of the vector, as opposed to its 3PC counterpart (cf. \( \Pi_{\text{dot}} \) (Fig. 7)). At the heart of our 4PC constructions lies an efficient 4-party jnp primitive, denoted as jnp4, that allows two servers to robustly send a common value to a third server. We start with the secret-sharing semantics for 4 parties. We only use an extended version of \([\cdot, \cdot]\)-sharing defined below.

a) Secret Sharing Semantics: For a value \( v \), the shares for \( P_0, P_1 \) and \( P_2, P_3 \) remain the same as that of 3PC case. That is, \( P_0 \) holds \( (|\alpha_v|_1, |\alpha_v|_2, |\beta_v + \gamma_v|) \) while \( P_i \) for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \) holds \( (|\alpha_v|_1, |\beta_v \gamma_v|) \). The shares for the fourth server \( P_2 \) is defined as \( (|\alpha_v|_1, |\alpha_v|_2, |\gamma_v|) \). Clearly, the secret is defined as \( v = \beta_v - |\alpha_v|_1 - |\alpha_v|_2 \).

b) 4PC Joint Message Passing Primitive: The jnp4 primitive enables two servers \( P_0, P_1 \) to send a common value \( v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^m} \) to a third server \( P_k \), or identify a TTP in case of any inconsistency. This primitive is analogous to jnp (Fig. 2) in spirit but is significantly optimized and free from broadcast calls. Similar to the 3PC counterpart, each party maintains a bit and \( P_i \) sends the value, and \( P_i \) the hash of it to \( P_k, P_i \) sets its inconsistency bit to 1 when the (value, hash) pair is inconsistent. This is followed by relaying the bit back to the senders who exchange it to reach an agreement on the consistency bit. During this execution, if a party remains silent, then it triggers the recipient to turn on its bit. In case of any inconsistency, the fourth server, who was not a part of the computation, can be employed as the TTP. However, reaching agreement on whether the TTP is established or the protocol terminates successfully needs extra care. For this, \( P_1, P_2, P_k \) send their bits to \( P_0 \) who accepts to be a TTP when at least two parties’ bits are turned on including \( P_k \)'s. \( P_i \) relays a confirmation to all and a server accepts her if its inconsistency
bit is on and it receives the confirmation from $P_3$. Notice that an honest $P_1$ will always be accepted and a corrupt $P_1$’s deliberate attempt to become TTP will always be rejected.

**Protocol $\Pi_{jmp4}(P_i, P_j, P_k, v, P)$**

- $P_s$ for $s \in \{i, j, k\}$ initializes an inconsistency bit $b_s = 0$.
- $P_1$ sends $v$ to $P_2$ and $P_2$ sends $H(v)$ to $P_3$. $P_k$ sets $b_k = 1$ if the received values are inconsistent, or if either $P_1$ or $P_2$ remained silent.
- $P_k$ sets $b_k$ to $P_1$, $P_2$, $P_3$ sets $b_j$ to $b_2$ and to 1 when nothing is received from $P_k$. Similarly, for $P_j$.
- $P_j$ mutually exchange their bits. $P_i$ sets $b_i = b_l$ where $b_j$ is set to 1 when $P_j$ remains silent. Analogously for $P_j$.
- $P_s$ for $s \in \{i, j, k\}$ sends $b_s$ to $P_s$. If $P_1$ receives 1 from at least two servers among which one is $P_k$, $P_1$ sets $b_1 = 1$ and to 0 otherwise. It sends $b_1$ to all.
- $P_s$, for $s \in \{i, j, k\}$, sets TTP = $P_i$ if $b_a \land b_i = 1$, terminates otherwise.

**Notation IV.1.** We say that $P_i, P_j$ jmp4-send $v$ to $P_k$ when they invoke $\Pi_{jmp4}(P_i, P_j, P_k, v, P_i)$.

We note that the end goal of jmp4 primitive relates closely to the bi-convey primitive of FLASH [7]. Bi-convey allows two servers $S_1, S_2$ to convey a value to a server $R$, and in case of an inconsistency, a pair of honest servers mutually identify each other, followed by exchanging their internal randomness to recover the clear inputs, computing the circuit, and sending the output to all. Note, however, that jmp4 primitive is more efficient and differs significantly in techniques from the bi-convey primitive. Unlike in bi-convey, in case of an inconsistency, jmp4 enables servers to unanimously learn the TTP’s identity. Moreover, bi-convey demands that honest servers, identified during an inconsistency, exchange their internal randomness (which comprises of the shared keys established during the key-setup phase) to proceed with the computation. This enforces the need for a fresh key-setup every time inconsistency is detected. In the efficiency front, jmp4 simply halves the communication cost of bi-convey, giving a 2× improvement.

**A. 4PC Protocols**

In this section, we revisit the protocols from 3PC (§III) and suggest optimizations. While we provide details for the protocols that vary significantly from their 3PC counterpart in this section, the details for other protocols are deferred to §C.

**a) Sharing Protocol:** To enable $P_i$ to share a value $v$, protocol $\Pi_{sha4}$ (Fig. 10) proceeds similar to that of 3PC case with the addition that $P_3$ also samples the values $[\alpha_j], \gamma_j$, using the shared randomness with the respective servers. On a high level, $P_i$ computes $\beta_j = v + [\alpha_j] + [\gamma_j]$ and sends $\beta_j$ (or $\beta_j + \gamma_j$) to another server and they together jmp4-send this information to the intended servers.

**Protocol $\Pi_{sha4}(P_i, v)$**

**Preprocessing:**

- If $P_i = P_0 : P_0, P_3$, for $j \in \{1, 2\}$, together sample random $[\alpha_j]_2 \in Z_{2^7}$, while $P$ sample a random $\gamma_j \in Z_{2^7}$.

**Online:**

- If $P_i = P_1 : P_0, P_3, P_3$ together sample random $[\alpha_j]_2 \in Z_{2^7}$, while $P$ sample a random $\gamma_j \in Z_{2^7}$. Also, $P_1, P_2, P_3$ sample random $\gamma_j \in Z_{2^7}$.

- If $P_i = P_2$: Analogous to the case when $P_i = P_3$.

- If $P_i = P_3 : P_0, P_3, P_3$, for $j \in \{1, 2\}$, sample random $[\alpha_j]_2 \in Z_{2^7}$. $P_2, P_3$ together sample random $\gamma_j \in Z_{2^7}$.

**Fig. 10: 4PC: Generating $[v]$-shares by server $P_i$**

**b) Multiplication Protocol:** Given the $[\cdot]-$shares of $x$ and $y$, protocol $\Pi_{mut4}$ (Fig. 11) allows servers to compute $[z] = [x] [y]$. When compared with the state-of-the-art 4PC GOD protocol of FLASH [7], our solution improves communication in both, the preprocessing and online phase, from 6 to 3 ring elements. Moreover, our communication cost matches with the state-of-the-art 4PC protocol of Trident [8] that provides security with fairness only.

**Protocol $\Pi_{mut4}(P, [x], [y])$**

**Preprocessing:**

- $P_0, P_j, P_i$, for $j \in \{1, 2\}$, sample random $[\alpha_j]_2 \in Z_{2^7}$, while $P_0, P_3$ sample random $[\Gamma_{xy}]_2 \in Z_{2^7}$.

- $P_1, P_2, P_3$ sample random $\gamma_j, \psi, r \in Z_{2^7}$ and set $[\psi]_1 = r, [\psi]_2 = \psi - r$.

- $P_0, P_3$ set $[\Gamma_{xy}]_2 - [\Gamma_{xy}]_1$, where $[\Gamma_{xy}]_1 = \alpha_x \alpha_y$. $P_0, P_3$ jmp4-send $[\Gamma_{xy}]_2$ to $P_2$.

- $P_3, P_j$, for $j \in \{1, 2\}$, set $[\chi]_j = \gamma_0 [\alpha_j]_2 + \gamma_0 [\alpha_j]_2 + [\Gamma_{xy}]_1 - [\psi]_1$. $P_1, P_3$ jmp4-send $[\chi]_1$ to $P_0$, while $P_2, P_3$ jmp4-send $[\chi]_2$ to $P_0$.

**Online:**

- $P_0, P_j$, for $j \in \{1, 2\}$, compute $[\beta_j]_2 = (\beta_j + \gamma_j) [\alpha_j]_2 + (\beta_j + \gamma_j) [\alpha_j]_2 + [\chi]_1$.

- $P_0, P_3$ jmp4-send $[\beta_j]_2$ to $P_2$, while $P_2, P_3$ jmp4-send $[\beta_j]_2$ to $P_1$.

- $P_j$, for $j \in \{1, 2\}$, computes $[\beta_j]_2 = [\beta_j]_2 + [\beta_j]_2$ and sets $[\beta_j]_2 = \beta_j + \beta_j + \psi$.

- $P_0, P_2$ jmp4-send $[\beta_0 + \gamma_0]$ to $P_0$.

**Fig. 11: 4PC: Multiplication Protocol ($z = x \cdot y$)**

Recall that the goal of preprocessing in 3PC multiplication was to enable $P_1, P_2$ obtain $\psi$ and $P_3, P_3$ for $i \in \{1, 2\}$ obtain $[\chi]_i$, where $\chi = \gamma_0 \alpha_0 + \gamma_y \alpha_y + \Gamma_{xy} - \psi$. Here $\psi$ is a random value known to both $P_1, P_2$. With the help of $P_3$, we let the servers obtain the respective preprocessing data as follows: $P_0, P_3, P_3$ together samples random $[\Gamma_{xy}]_1 \in Z_{2^7}$. $P_0, P_3$ locally compute $\Gamma_{xy} = \alpha_x \alpha_y$, set $[\Gamma_{xy}]_2 = [\Gamma_{xy}]_1$ and jmp4-send $[\Gamma_{xy}]_2$ to $P_2$. $P_1, P_2, P_3$ locally sample $\psi, r$ and generate the $[\cdot]-$shares of $\psi$ by setting $[\psi]_1 = r$ and $[\psi]_2 = \psi - r$. Then $P_j$, $P_j$ for $j \in \{1, 2\}$ compute $\chi_j = \gamma_0 \alpha_j + \gamma_y \alpha_j + [\Gamma_{xy}]_1 - [\psi]_1$ and jmp4-send $[\chi]_j$ to $P_0$. The online phase is similar to that of 3PC, apart from $\Pi_{jmp4}$ being used instead of $\Pi_{mp}$ for communication. Since $P_3$ is not involved in the online
computation phase, we can safely assume $P_3$ to serve as the TTP for the $\Pi_{\text{jmmd}}$ executions in the online phase.

c) Reconstruction Protocol: Given $[v]$, protocol $\Pi_{\text{rec4}}$ (Fig. 12) enables servers to robustly reconstruct the value $v$ among the servers. Note that every server lacks one share for reconstruction and the same is available with three other servers. Hence, they communicate the missing share among themselves, and the majority value is accepted. As an optimization, two among the three servers can send the missing share while the third one can send a hash of the same for verification. Notice that, as opposed to the 3PC case, this protocol does not require commitments.

\begin{align*}
\Pi_{\text{rec4}}(P, [v])
\end{align*}

**Online**

- $P_0$ receives $\gamma_v$ from $P_1, P_2$ and $H(\gamma_v)$ from $P_3$.
- $P_1$ receives $[\alpha_v]_1, [\alpha_v]_2$ from $P_2, P_3$ and $H([\alpha_v]_2)$ from $P_0$.
- $P_2$ receives $[\alpha_v]_1$ from $P_0, P_3$ and $H([\alpha_v]_1)$ from $P_1$.
- $P_3$ receives $\beta_v + \gamma_v$ from $P_0, P_2$ and $H(\beta_v + \gamma_v)$ from $P_2$.
- $P_i \in P$ selects the missing share forming the majority among the values received and reconstructs the output.

![Fig. 12: 4PC: Reconstruction of $v$ among the servers](image)

**d) Input Sharing and Output Reconstruction in SOC Setting:** We extend input sharing and reconstruction in the SOC setting as follows. To generate $[\cdot]$-shares for its input $v$, $U$ receives each of the shares $[\alpha_v]_1, [\alpha_v]_2$, and $\gamma_v$ from three out of the four servers as well as a random value $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^t}$ sampled together by $P_0, P_1, P_2$, and accepts the values that form the majority. $U$ locally computes $u = v + [\alpha_v]_1 + [\alpha_v]_2 + \gamma_v + r$ and sends $u$ to all the servers. Servers then execute a two round byzantine agreement (BA) [47] to agree on $u$ (or $\bot$). On successful completion of the BA, $P_0$ computes $\beta_v + \gamma_v$ from $u$ while $P_1, P_2$ compute $\beta_v$ from $u$ locally. For the reconstruction of a value $v$, servers send their $[\cdot]$-shares of $v$ to $U$, who selects the majority value for each share and reconstructs the output. At any point, if a TTP is identified, the servers proceed as follows. All servers send their $[\cdot]$-share of the input to the TTP. The TTP picks the majority value for each share and computes the function output. It then sends this output to $U$. $U$ also receives the identity of the TTP from all servers and accepts the output received from the TTP forming majority.

e) Dot Product: Given $[\cdot]$-shares of two $n$-sized vectors $\vec{x}, \vec{y}$, protocol $\Pi_{\text{dot4}}$ (Fig. 26) enables servers to compute $[\vec{z}]$ with $\vec{z} = \vec{x} \odot \vec{y}$. The protocol is essentially similar to $n$ instances of multiplications of the form $z_i = x_iy_i$ for $i \in [n]$. But instead of communicating values corresponding to each of the $n$ instances, servers locally sum up the shares and communicate a single value. This technique helps to obtain a communication cost independent of the size of the vectors.

During the preprocessing phase, similar to the multiplication protocol $P_0, P_1, P_3$ sample a random $[\Gamma_{\vec{z} \odot \vec{y}}]_1$. $P_0, P_3$ compute $\Gamma_{\vec{z} \odot \vec{y}} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_x \alpha_y$ and $\text{jmmd-send}([\Gamma_{\vec{z} \odot \vec{y}}]_2 = \Gamma_{\vec{z} \odot \vec{y} - \Gamma_{\vec{z} \odot \vec{y}}})$ to $P_2, P_1, P_2, P_3$ sample a random $\psi$, and generate its $[\cdot]$-shares locally. Servers $P_3, P_j$ for $j \in \{1, 2\}$ then compute $[\chi_j]_1 = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\gamma_x [\alpha_y]_j + \gamma_y [\alpha_x]_j + [\Gamma_{\vec{z} \odot \vec{y}}]_j - \psi)]$, and $\text{jmmd-send}([\chi_j]_2)$ to $P_0$.

During the online phase, $P_0, P_1$ first compute $[\beta_v^*]_1$ where $\beta_v^* = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \beta_v^*$ directly as $[\beta_v^*]_1 = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\langle \beta_v + \gamma_v \rangle [\alpha_x]_j + (\beta_x + \gamma_x) [\alpha_y]_j + [\alpha_x]_j + [\chi_j]$]. Following this, $P_0, P_1, P_3$ $\text{jmmd-send}([\beta_v^*]_2)$ to $P_2$. $P_0, P_2$ proceed similarly to enable $P_1$ obtain $[\beta_v^*]_2$. Finally, $P_1, P_2$ compute $\beta_v^* = [\beta_v^*]_1 + [\beta_v^*]_2$ followed by computing $\beta_v = \beta_v^* + \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\beta_x \beta_y) + \psi$. $P_1, P_2$ then $\text{jmmd-send}([\beta_v]_2)$ to $P_0$.

V. APPLICATIONS AND BENCHMARKING

In this section, we empirically show the practicality of our protocols for two widely used applications: Biometric Matching and PPML.

a) Benchmarking Environment: We use a 64-bit ring ($\mathbb{Z}_{2^t}$). The benchmarking is performed over a WAN that was instantiated using n1-standard-8 instances of Google Cloud\(^4\), with machines located in East Australia ($P_1$), South Asia ($P_3$), South East Asia ($P_2$), and West Europe ($P_3$). The machines are equipped with 2.3 GHz Intel Xeon E5 v3 (Haswell) processors supporting hyper-threading, with 8 vCPUs, and 30 GB of RAM Memory and with a bandwidth of 50 Mbps. The average round-trip time (rtt) was taken as the time for communicating 1 KB of data between a pair of parties, and the rtt values were

| $P_0-P_1$ | $P_0-P_2$ | $P_0-P_3$ | $P_1-P_2$ | $P_1-P_3$ | $P_2-P_3$ |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 151.40ms  | 59.05ms   | 275.02ms  | 92.94ms   | 173.93ms  | 219.37ms  |

b) Software Details: We implement our protocols\(^5\) using the publicly available ENCRYPTO library [48] in C++. We obtained the code of BLAZE and FLASH from the respective authors and executed them in our environment. The collision-resistant hash function was instantiated using SHA-256. We have used multi-threading and our machines were capable of handling a total of 32 threads. Each experiment is run for 20 times and the average values are reported.

A. Biometric Matching

Biometric computation is central to many real-world tasks such as face recognition [49], [50] and fingerprint-matching [51], [52]. The objective is, given a database $D$ of $m$ biometric samples stored as vectors $(\vec{s}_1, \ldots, \vec{s}_n)$ each of size $n$, and a user with its own sample $\vec{u}$, identify the “closest” sample to $\vec{u}$ in $D$. This task can be accomplished by considering various distance metrics, the most prominent of which is the Euclidean Distance (ED). In this work, we consider ED as the metric, and hence the problem boils down to identifying a sample vector in $D$ which has the least ED for $\vec{u}$. Note that, in our setting, each entry in the database $D$ is $[\cdot]$-shared among the servers. The client with an input query $\vec{u}$ generates $[\cdot]$-shares of the same along with the servers.

Let $x_i$ denote the $i$th element in the vector $\vec{x}$. As was introduced in [1], ED between two $n$ length vectors $\vec{x}, \vec{y}$ is computed as ED$_{\vec{z}} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - y_i)^2 = \vec{z} \odot \vec{z}$ where $\vec{z} = (x_1 - y_1, \ldots, x_n - y_n)$. Hence, the servers first compute $[\cdot]$-shares for vector $\vec{z}$ locally, as $[z_i] = [x_i - y_i]$ for $i \in [n]$, followed by an execution of $\Pi_{\text{dot4}}$ on $[\vec{z}], [\vec{z}]$. For biometric computation, the servers create a distance vector $\text{DV}$

\(^4\)https://cloud.google.com/
\(^5\)The link to our code is not provided respecting the double-blinded submission policy. The code will be made publicly available once the work sees formal acceptance.
by computing the ED between $\bar{u}$ and every sample vector $\bar{s}_i$ in $D$, i.e. $D V_i = ED_{\bar{s}_i}$, for $i \in [m]$. The next task now is to find the minimum among the $m$ values in $D V$.

**Minimum among $m$ values:** Consider vector $\bar{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_m)$ of size $m$, where each element is $[\cdot]$-shared among the servers. We follow the standard tree based approach to compute the minimum element. This is as follows. First the elements of the vector are grouped into pairs, which are then securely compared to find the pairwise minimum. For instance, $[\cdot]$-shares of $(x_1, x_2), (x_3, x_4), \ldots, (x_{m-1}, x_m)$ are compared to obtain $[\cdot]$-shares of $y_1, \ldots, y_{m/2}$. Let $\bar{y} = (y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_{m/2})$. This process is recursively applied on $\bar{y}$, until a single element is obtained. This requires $O(\log(m))$ rounds of recursion to obtain the minimum value in $\bar{x}$.

Note that the minimum of any two elements, say $x_1, x_2$ can be computed as $y_1 = b \cdot (x_1 - x_2) + x_2$, where $b = 0$ if $x_1 > x_2$, or $1$, otherwise. This can be achieved using one invocation of bit extraction protocol $\Pi_{\text{BExt}}$ on $(x_1, x_2)$ to obtain $[\cdot]$-shares of $b$, followed by one execution of bit injection $\Pi_{\text{BInj}}$ on $b$ and $(x_1 - x_2)$.

| Setting | Ref. | $m = 1024$ | $m = 16384$ |
|---------|------|------------|-------------|
|         | Com [KB] | R | Pre. | Online | Com [KB] | R | Pre. | Online |
| 3PC     | BLAZE | 1127.1 | 102 | 151.1 | 18036.9 | 142 | 2419.9 |
|         | FLASH | 1128.3 | 103 | 151.9 | 18037.8 | 143 | 2420.7 |
| 4PC     | SWIFT | 223.9 | 71 | 239.8 | 3583.8 | 99 | 3839.8 |
|         | SWIFT | 127.1 | 71 | 103.2 | 2035.9 | 99 | 1651.9 |

**TABLE III:** Minimum ED distance. The values are reported for biometric samples of size 40.

Table III presents the benchmarking for biometric matching over 3PC and 4PC setting. Following SecureML [1], we chose the size of the biometric sample $n$ to be 40. As is evident from the Table III, in 3PC, we incur a minimal loss in performance over BLAZE but guarantee the security of GOD instead of fairness. For the case of 4PC, we observe $\approx 2x$ improvement over the state-of-the-art protocol of FLASH [7] in terms of communication cost.

**B. Privacy-preserving Machine Learning**

We consider training and inference for Linear Regression and Logistic Regression and inference for Neural Networks (NN). As pointed out in BLAZE, NN training requires additional tools to allow mixed world computations, which we leave as future work. We refer readers to SecureML [1], ABY3 [4], and BLAZE [9] for a detailed description of the training and inference steps for the aforementioned ML algorithms. All our benchmarking is done over the publicly available MNIST [53] dataset that has $n = 784$ features. For training, we used a batch size of $B = 128$.

In 3PC, we compare our results against the best-known framework BLAZE in this setting that provides fairness. Our results imply that we get GOD at no additional cost compared to BLAZE. For 4PC, we compare our results with two best-known works FLASH [7] (which is robust) and Trident [8] (which is fair). Our results halve the cost of FLASH and are on par with Trident.

1) **Benchmarking Parameter:** We use throughput (TP) as the benchmarking parameter following BLAZE and ABY3 [4] as it would help to analyse the effect of improved communication and round complexity in a single shot. Here, TP denotes the number of operations (“iterations” for the case of training and “queries” for the case of inference) that can be performed in unit time. We consider minute as the unit time since most of our protocols over WAN requires more than a second to complete. An iteration in ML training consists of a forward propagation phase followed by a backward propagation phase.

In the former phase, servers compute the output from the inputs while in the latter, the model parameters are adjusted according to the difference in the computed output and the actual output. The inference can be viewed as one forward propagation of the algorithm alone.

2) **Logistic Regression:** In Logistic Regression, one iteration comprises updating the weight vector $\bar{w}$ using the gradient descent algorithm (GD). It is updated according to the function given below: $\bar{w} = \bar{w} - \frac{\alpha}{B}[X_i^T \odot (\text{sig}(X_i \circ \bar{w}) - Y_i)]$, where $\alpha$ and $X_i$ denote the learning rate, and a subset of batch size B, randomly selected from the entire dataset in the $i$th iteration, respectively. The forward propagation comprises of computing the value $X_i \circ \bar{w}$ followed by an application of a sigmoid function on it. The weight vector is updated in the backward propagation, which internally requires the computation of a series of matrix multiplications, and can be achieved using a dot product. The update function can be computed using $[\cdot]$ shares as: $[\bar{w}] = [\bar{w}] - \frac{\alpha}{B}[X_i^T \odot (\text{sig}(X_i \circ [\bar{w}] - [Y_i])]$.

We summarize our results in Table IV.

**TABLE IV:** Logistic Regression training and inference. TP is given in (#it/min) for training and (#queries/min) for inference.

We observe that the online TP, for the case of 3PC, is slightly lower compared to that of BLAZE, though the amortized online communication cost is the same for both. This is because the total number of rounds for both training and inference phase of Logistic Regression is slightly higher in our case due to the additional rounds introduced by the verification mechanism (aka verify phase which also needs broadcast). This gap becomes less evident for protocols with more number of rounds, as is demonstrated in the case of NN (presented next),
where verification for several iterations is clubbed together, making the overhead for verification insignificant.

For the case of 4PC, our solution outperforms FLASH in terms of communication as well as throughput. For the case of logistic regression inference, the improvement over FLASH is not $2\times$ as claimed theoretically. This stems from the limited processing power in our benchmarking environment and can be addressed by increasing the processing capacity of the servers. Hence, to be fair, we limit the bandwidth to 34 Mbps and obtain a $2\times$ improvement in TP over FLASH. At 34 Mbps, the TP of FLASH turns out to be $1389.93 \times 10^3$ queries/min. This highlights the efficiency improvements with reduced communication over lower bandwidths. We now compare with Trident [8]. Here, we observe a drop of 12.49% in TP for inference and a drop of 10.91% in TP for training. This is due to the extra rounds required for verification to achieve GOD. We point out that this drop becomes less significant for protocols involving more number of rounds, as will be evident from the comparisons for NN inference. Note, however, that the loss in TP is traded off with stronger security and the gain in saving the runtime of one server by $\approx 73\%$ owing to the presence of 2 active servers in our case, as opposed to 3 in Trident, thereby resulting in monetary gains in the cloud setting.

3) NN Inference: In this work, we consider a NN with two hidden layers, each consisting of 128 nodes each and an output layer with 10 nodes [4], [9]. Each of the layers is fully connected. Inference in NN requires several dot product calls followed by an application of the ReLU function. This process will be carried out for each layer in a sequential manner. Table V summarises our benchmarking results for NN inference.

| Setting | Ref. | Pre. | Online (TP in $\times 10^3$) |
|---------|------|------|-----------------------------|
|         |      | Com [MB] | Latency (s) | Com [MB] | TP |
| 3PC Inference | BLAZE | 351.70 | 2.81 | 4.91 | 26.40 |
| 4PC Inference | SWIFT | 7.79 | 2.71 | 7.79 | 14.21 |
|         | FLASH | 4.39 | 2.71 | 3.35 | 36.96 |

**TABLE V:** NN Inference. TP is given in (#queries/min).

As illustrated in Table V, the performance of our 3PC framework is comparable to BLAZE. In the 4PC setting, when compared to Trident [8], we observe a minimal loss of 0.36% in the online throughput. The drop surfaces due to the extra rounds involved in our verification. However, as pointed out earlier, the difference in TP closes in due to the large number of rounds required for computing NN inference, which results in amortizing the extra rounds required for verification. As mentioned earlier, this loss is traded-off with the stronger security guarantee and saving in the runtime of one server by $\approx 85\%$ owing to the presence of 2 active servers. Moreover, we outperform FLASH in every aspect. This establishes the practical relevance of our work.

VI. CONCLUSION

In this work, we presented an efficient framework for PPML that achieves the strongest security of GOD or robustness. Our 3PC protocol builds upon the recent work of BLAZE [9] and achieves almost similar performance albeit improving the security guarantee. For the case of 4PC, we outperform the best-known—(a) robust protocol of FLASH [7] by $2\times$ performance-wise and (b) fair protocol of Trident [8] by uplifting its security.

We leave the problem of extending our framework to support mixed-world conversions as well as to design protocols to support algorithms like Decision Trees, k-means Clustering etc. as open problem. The problem of making the communication cost of dot product entirely independent of the feature size is another challenging question.

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Suppose $P_0, P_1$ wish to sample a random value $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^k}$ non-interactively. To do so they invoke $F_{k,01}$ (id01) and obtain $r$. Here, id01 denotes a counter maintained by the servers, and is updated after every PRF invocation. The appropriate keys used to sample is implicit from the context, from the identities of the pair that sample or from the fact that it is sampled by all, and, hence, is omitted.

### Functionality $F_{setup}$

$F_{setup}$ interacts with the servers in $\mathcal{P}$ and the adversary $S$. $F_{setup}$ picks random keys $k_{ij}$ for $i, j \in \{0, 1, 2\}$ and $k_{P}$. Let $y_s$ denote the keys corresponding to server $P_s$. Then

- $y_s = (k_{01}, k_{02}, k_{1})$ when $P_s = P_0$.
- $y_s = (k_{01}, k_{12}, k_{P})$ when $P_s = P_1$.
- $y_s = (k_{02}, k_{12}, k_{P})$ when $P_s = P_2$.

**Output:** Send $(\text{Output}, y_s)$ to every $P_s \in \mathcal{P}$.

Fig. 14: 3PC: Ideal functionality for shared-key setup

The key setup is modelled via a functionality $F_{setup}$ (Fig. 14) that can be realised using any secure MPC protocol. Analogously, the key setup functionality for 4PC is given in Fig. 15.
**APPENDIX B**

**3PC PROTOCOLS**

In this section, we provide a detailed communication cost analysis for our protocols in the 3PC setting. Also detailed information regarding some of the protocols are provided.

**A. Joint Message Passing**

**Lemma B.1** (Communication). Protocol $\Pi_{jmp}$ (Fig. 2) requires 1 round and an amortized communication of $\ell$ bits overall.

**Proof:** Server $P_i$ sends value $v$ to $P_k$ while $P_j$ sends hash of the same to $P_k$. This accounts for one round and communication of $\ell$ bits. $P_k$ then sends back its inconsistency bit to $P_i, P_j$, who then exchange it; this takes another two rounds. This is followed by servers broadcasting hashes on their values and selecting a TTP based on it, which takes one more round. All except the first round can be combined for several instances of $\Pi_{jmp}$ protocol and hence the cost gets amortized.

**B. Sharing Protocol**

**Lemma B.2** (Communication). Protocol $\Pi_{sh}$ (Fig. 3) is non-interactive in the preprocessing phase and requires 2 rounds and an amortized communication of $2\ell$ bits in the online phase.

**Proof:** During the preprocessing phase, servers non-interactively sample the $[\cdot]$-shares of $\alpha_v$ and $\gamma_v$ values using the shared key setup. In the online phase, when $P_i = P_0$, it computes $\beta_v$ and sends it to $P_1$, resulting in one round and $\ell$ bits communicated. They then jmp-send $\beta_v$ to $P_2$, which requires additional one round in an amortized sense, and $\ell$ bits to be communicated. For the case when $P_i = P_1$, it sends $\beta_v$ to $P_2$, resulting in one round and a communication of $\ell$ bits. Then, $P_1, P_2$ jmp-send $\beta_v + \gamma_v$ to $P_0$. This again requires an additional one round and $\ell$ bits. The analysis is similar in the case of $P_i = P_2$. □

**C. Joint Sharing Protocol**

The formal details for $\Pi_{sh}$ protocol appears in Fig. 16.

**Protocol $\Pi_{sh}(P_i, P_j, v)$**

**Preprocessing:**
- If $(P_i, P_j) = (P_0, P_0)$: Servers execute the preprocessing of $\Pi_{sh}(P_i, v)$ and then locally set $\gamma_v = 0$.
- If $(P_i, P_j) = (P_2, P_0)$: Similar to the case above.
- If $(P_i, P_j) = (P_1, P_2)$: $P_1, P_2$ together sample random $\gamma_v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$. Servers locally set $[\alpha_v]_1 = [\alpha_v]_2 = 0$.

**Online:**
- If $(P_i, P_j) = (P_1, P_0)$: $P_1$ computes $\beta_v = v + [\alpha_v]_1 + [\alpha_v]_2$. $P_0, P_1$ jmp-send $\beta_v$ to $P_2$.
- If $(P_i, P_j) = (P_2, P_0)$: Similar to the case above.
- If $(P_i, P_j) = (P_1, P_2)$: $P_1, P_2$ locally set $\beta_v = v$. $P_1, P_2$ jmp-send $\beta_v + \gamma_v$ to $P_0$.

When the value $v$ is available to both $P_1, P_2$ in the preprocessing phase, protocol $\Pi_{sh}$ can be made non-interactive in the following way: $\mathcal{P}$ sample a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$ and locally set their share according to Table VI.

| $(P_1, P_2)$ | $(P_1, P_3)$ | $(P_2, P_3)$ |
|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| $[\alpha_v]_1 = 0$, $[\alpha_v]_2 = 0$ | $[\alpha_v]_1 = -v$, $[\alpha_v]_2 = 0$ | $[\alpha_v]_1 = 0$, $[\alpha_v]_2 = -v$ |
| $\beta_v = 0$, $\gamma_v = r - v$ | $\beta_v = 0$, $\gamma_v = r$ | $\beta_v = 0$, $\gamma_v = r$ |
| $P_0$ | $P_0$ | $P_0$ |
| $(0, 0, r)$ | $(-v, 0, r)$ | $(0, 0, r)$ |
| $P_1$ | $P_1$ |
| $(0, v, r - v)$ | $(-v, 0, r)$ | $(0, 0, r)$ |
| $P_2$ | $P_2$ |
| $(0, v, r - v)$ | $(-v, 0, r)$ | $(0, 0, r)$ |

**Table VI:** The columns depict the three distinct possibility of input contributing pairs. The first row shows the assignment to various components of the sharing. The last row along with three sub-rows, specify the shares held by the three servers.

**Lemma B.3** (Communication). Protocol $\Pi_{sh}$ (Fig. 16) is non-interactive in the preprocessing phase and requires 1 round and an amortized communication of $\ell$ bits in the online phase.

**Proof:** In this protocol, servers execute $\Pi_{jmp}$ protocol once. Hence the overall cost follows from that of an instance of the $\Pi_{jmp}$ protocol (Lemma B.1). □

**D. Multiplication Protocol**

**Lemma B.4** (Communication). Protocol $\Pi_{mult}$ (Fig. 4) requires an amortized cost of $3\ell$ bits in the preprocessing phase, and 1 round and amortized cost of $3\ell$ bits in the online phase.
Proof: In the preprocessing phase, generation of $\alpha_x$ and $\gamma_y$ are non-interactive. This is followed by one execution of $\Pi_{mulPre}$, which requires an amortized communication cost of $3\ell$ bits. During the online phase, $P_0, P_1$ jmp-send $[\beta_x^j]_0$ to $P_2$, while $P_0, P_2$ jmp-send $[\beta_x^j]_1$ to $P_1$. This requires one round and a communication of $2\ell$ bits. Following this, $P_1, P_2$ jmp-send $\beta_z + \gamma_z$ to $P_0$, which requires one round and a communication of $\ell$ bits. However, jmp-send of $\beta_z + \gamma_z$ can be delayed till the end of the protocol, and will require only one round for the entire circuit and can be amortized.

The ideal functionality for $\Pi_{mulPre}$ appears in Fig. 17.

**Functionality $F_{MulPre}$**

$F_{MulPre}$ interacts with the servers in $P$ and the adversary $S$. $F_{MulPre}$ receives $(\cdot)$-shares of $d, e$ from the servers where $P_s$, for $s \in \{0, 1, 2\}$, holds $(d)_s = (d_s, d_{s+1})\%3$ and $(e)_s = (e_s, e_{s+1})\%3$ such that $d = d_0 + d_1 + d_2$ and $e = e_0 + e_1 + e_2$. Let $P_l$ denote the server corrupted by $S$. $F_{MulPre}$ receives $(f)_l = (f_i, f_{i+1})\%3$ from $S$ where $f = de$. $F_{MulPre}$ proceeds as follows:

- Reconstructs $d, e$ using the shares received from honest servers and compute $f = de$.
- Computes $f_i(f_{i+2})\%3 = f_i - f_{i+1}\%3$ and set the output shares as $(f_0 = f_0, f_1, f_2) = (f_0, f_1, f_2)$.
- Send $(Output, (f_i))$ to server $P_s \in P$.

Fig. 17: 3PC: Ideal functionality for $\Pi_{mulPre}$ protocol

E. Reconstruction Protocol

**Lemma B.5** (Communication). Protocol $\Pi_{rec}$ (Fig. 5) requires 1 round and a communication of $6\ell$ bits in the online phase.

Proof: The preprocessing phase consists of communication of commitment values using the $\Pi_{imp}$ protocol. The hash-based commitment scheme allows generation of a single commitment for several values and hence the cost gets amortized for multiple instances. During the online phase, each server receives an opening for the commitment from other two servers, which requires one round and an overall communication of $6\ell$ bits.

F. Special protocols

Here we provide details regarding the special protocols - i) Bit Extraction, ii) Bit2A, and iii) Bit Injection.

1) Bit Extraction protocol: Protocol $\Pi_{bitext}$ allows servers to compute the boolean sharing of the most significant bit (msb) of a value $v$ given its arithmetic sharing $[v]$. To compute the msb, we use the optimized 2-input Parallel Prefix Adder (PPA) boolean circuit proposed by ABY3 [4]. The PPA circuit consists of $2\ell - 2$ AND gates and has a multiplicative depth of $O(\ell)$. Let $v_0 = \beta_i, v_1 = -[\alpha_v]_1$ and $v_2 = -[\alpha_v]_2$.

| $v_0[i]$ | $v_1[i]$ | $v_2[i]$ |
|----------|----------|----------|
| $[B]$    | $[B]$    | $[B]$    |
| $P_0$    | $(0, 0, 0)$ | $(0, v_0[i], v_0[i])$ | $(0, v_0[i], v_0[i])$ |
| $P_1$    | $(v_1[i], 0, 0)$ | $(v_1[i], 0, 0)$ | $(0, 0, 0)$ |
| $P_2$    | $(0, v_2[i], 0)$ | $(0, 0, 0)$ | $(0, v_2[i], 0)$ |

**TABLE VII:** The $[\cdot]^B$-sharing corresponding to $i^{th}$ bit of $v_0 = \beta_i, v_1 = -[\alpha_v]_1$ and $v_2 = -[\alpha_v]_2$. Here $i \in \{0, \ldots, \ell - 1\}$.

Then $v = v_0 + v_1 + v_2$. Servers first locally compute the boolean shares corresponding to each bit of the values $v_0, v_1$ and $v_2$ according to Table VII. It has been shown in ABY3 that $v = v_0 + v_1 + v_2$ can also be expressed as $v = 2c + s$ where $FA(v_0[i], v_1[i], v_2[i]) \rightarrow (c[i], s[i])$ for $i \in \{0, \ldots, \ell - 1\}$. Here $FA$ denotes a Full Adder circuit while $s$ and $c$ denote the sum and carry bits respectively. To summarize, servers execute $\ell$ instances of $FA$ in parallel to compute $[c]^B$ and $[s]^B$. The $FA$’s are executed independently and require one round of communication. The final result is then computed as $msb(2[c]^B + [s]^B)$ using the optimized PPA circuit.

**Lemma B.6** (Communication). Protocol $\Pi_{bitext}$ requires a communication cost of $9\ell - 6$ bits in the preprocessing phase and require $\log \ell + 1$ rounds and an amortized communication of $9\ell - 6$ bits in the online phase.

Proof: In $\Pi_{bitext}$, first round comprises of $\ell$ Full Adder (FA) circuits executing in parallel, each comprising of single AND gate. This is followed by the execution of the optimized PPA circuit of ABY3 [4], which comprises of $2\ell - 2$ AND gates and has a multiplicative depth of $O(\ell)$. Hence the communication cost follows from the multiplication for $3\ell - 2$ AND gates.

2) Bit2A Conversion protocol: Given the boolean sharing of a bit $b$, denoted as $[b]^B$, protocol $\Pi_{bit2A}$ (Fig. 18) allows servers to compute the arithmetic sharing $[b]^R$. Here $b^R$ denotes the equivalent value of $b$ over ring $\mathbb{Z}_2$. As pointed out in BLAZE, $b^R = (\beta_b + \alpha_b)^R = \beta^R + \alpha^R - 2\alpha^R\beta^R$. Also $\alpha^R = (\alpha_0^1 + \alpha_2^1)^R = \alpha_0^R + \alpha_2^R - 2\alpha_1^R\alpha_2^R$. During the preprocessing phase, $P_0, P_2$ for $j \in \{1, 2\}$ execute $\Pi_{sh}$ on $[\alpha_b]^R$ to generate $[[\alpha_b]^R]$. Servers then execute $\Pi_{mult}$ on $[[\alpha_0^1]^R]$ and $[[\alpha_2^1]^R]$ to generate $[[\alpha_0^1][\alpha_2^1]^R]$ followed by locally computing $[\alpha_0^R]$. During the online phase, $P_1, P_2$ execute $\Pi_{sh}$ on $\beta^R$ to jointly generate $[\beta^R]$. Servers then execute $\Pi_{mult}$ Protocol on $[\beta^R]$ and $[\alpha_0^R]$ to compute $[\beta^R\alpha_0^R]$ followed by locally computing $b^R$. The formal details for $\Pi_{bit2A}$ appears in Fig. 18.

**Protocol $\Pi_{bit2A}(P, [b]^B)$**

**Preprocessing:**

- $P_0, P_2$, for $j \in \{1, 2\}$ execute $\Pi_{sh}$ on $[\alpha_b]^R$ to generate $[\alpha_b]^R$.
- Servers execute $\Pi_{mult}(P, [\alpha_0^1], [\alpha_2^1])$ to generate $[u]$ where $u = [\alpha_0^R][\alpha_2^R]^2$, followed by locally computing $[u] = [[\alpha_0^1]] + [[\alpha_2^1]] - 2[u]$.
- Servers in $P$ execute the preprocessing phase of $\Pi_{mult}(P, \beta^R, \alpha_0^R)$ where $\nu = \beta_0^R\alpha_0^R$.

**Online:**

- $P_1, P_2$ execute $\Pi_{sh}(P_1, P_2, \beta^R)$ to generate $[\beta^R]$.
- Servers execute online phase of $\Pi_{mult}(P, \beta^R, \alpha_0^R)$ to generate $[v]$ where $v = \beta_0^R\alpha_0^R$, followed by locally computing $[b]^R = [\beta^R] + [\alpha_0^R] - 2[v]$.

Fig. 18: 3PC: Bit2A Protocol

**Lemma B.7** (Communication). Protocol $\Pi_{bit2A}$ (Fig. 18) requires an amortized communication cost of $9\ell$ bits in the preprocessing phase and requires 1 round and an amortized communication of $4\ell$ bits in the online phase.
Proof: In the preprocessing phase, servers run two instances of Π_{ab}, which can be done non-interactively (ref. § B-C). This is followed by an execution of entire multiplication protocol, which requires 6ℓ bits to be communicated (Lemma B.4). Parallely, the servers execute the preprocessing phase of Π_{mult}, resulting in an additional 3ℓ bits of communication (Lemma B.4). During the online phase, P_1, P_2 execute Π_{ab}, once, which requires one round and ℓ bits to be communicated. In Π_{ab}, the communication towards P_0 can be deferred till the end, thereby requiring a single round for multiple instances. This is followed by an execution of the online phase of Π_{mult}, which requires one round and a communication of 3ℓ bits.

3) Bit Injection protocol: Given the binary sharing of a bit b, denoted as [b]_B, and the arithmetic sharing of v ∈ Z_2^ℓ, protocol Π_{bit2a} computes [·]-sharing of bv. Towards this, servers first execute Π_{bit2a} on [b]_B to generate [b]. This is followed by servers computing [bv] by executing Π_{mult} protocol on [b] and [v].

Lemma B.8 (Communication). Protocol Π_{bit2a} requires an amortized communication cost of 12ℓ bits in the preprocessing phase and requires 2 rounds and an amortized communication of 7ℓ bits in the online phase.

Proof: Protocol Π_{bit2a} is essentially an execution of Π_{bit2a} (Lemma B.6) followed by one invocation of Π_{mult} (Lemma B.4) and the costs follow.

G. Dot Product Protocol

The ideal world functionality for realizing Π_{dotpr} is presented in Fig. 19.

Fig. 19: 3PC: Ideal functionality for Π_{dotpr} protocol

Lemma B.9 (Communication). Protocol Π_{dotp Pre} (Fig. 7) requires an amortized communication of 3nℓ bits in the preprocessing phase and requires 1 round and an amortized communication of 3ℓ bits in the online phase, where n denotes the size of the underlying vectors.

Proof: During the preprocessing phase, servers execute the preprocessing phase of Π_{mult} corresponding to each of the n multiplications in parallel, resulting in a communication of 3nℓ bits (Lemma B.4). The online phase follows similarly to that of Π_{mult}, the only difference being that servers combine their shares corresponding to all the n multiplications into one and then exchange. This requires one round and an amortized communication of 3ℓ bits.

H. Truncation

Lemma B.10 (Communication). Protocol Π_{trgen} (Fig. 8) requires 2 rounds and an amortized communication of 2ℓ bits.

Proof: In Π_{trgen}, the additive shares of r are sampled non-interactively. P_0 then executes Π_{ab} protocol on r^d, which requires two rounds and a communication of 2ℓ bits (Lemma B.2). P_0, P_1 then jmp-send the hash of u, followed by a broadcast from P_2. Note that the cost of broadcast, and Π_{jmp} (as it involves sending a hash), gets amortized over multiple instances.

I. Dot Product with Truncation

The formal details for Π_{dotpt} protocol appears in Fig. 20.

Fig. 20: 3PC: Dot Product Protocol with Truncation

Lemma B.11 (Communication). Protocol Π_{dotpt} (Fig. 20) requires an amortized communication of 3nℓ + 2ℓ bits in the preprocessing phase and requires 1 round and an amortized communication of 3ℓ bits in the online phase.

Proof: During the preprocessing phase, servers execute the preprocessing phase of Π_{dotpt}, resulting in a communication of 3nℓ bits (Lemma B.9). In parallel, servers execute one instance of Π_{trgen} protocol resulting in an additional communication of 2ℓ bits (Lemma B.10).

The online phase follows from that of Π_{dotpt} protocol except that, now, P_1, P_2 compute additive shares of z − r, where z = x ⊕ y, which is achieved using two executions of Π_{jmp} in parallel. This requires one round and an amortized communication cost of 2ℓ bits. P_1, P_2 then jointly share the truncated value of z − r with P_0, which requires one round and ℓ bits. However, this step can be deferred till the end for multiple dot product with truncation instances, which amortizes the cost.
I. Activation Functions

Lemma B.12 (Communication). Protocol relu requires an amortized communication of \(21\ell - 6\) bits in the preprocessing phase and requires \(\log \ell + 4\) rounds and an amortized communication of \(16\ell - 6\) bits in the online phase.

Proof: One instance of relu protocol comprises of execution of one instance of \(\Pi_{\text{bitext}}\), followed by \(\Pi_{\text{bitini}}\). The cost, therefore, follows from Lemma B.6, and Lemma B-F3.

The formal details of the MPC-friendly variant of the Sigmoid function [1], [4], [6] is given below:

\[
\text{sig}(v) = \begin{cases} 
0 & v < -\frac{1}{2} \\
\frac{1}{2} & -\frac{1}{2} \leq v \leq \frac{1}{2} \\
1 & v > \frac{1}{2}
\end{cases}
\]

Lemma B.13 (Communication). Protocol sig requires an amortized communication of \(39\ell - 9\) bits in the preprocessing phase and requires \(\log \ell + 4\) rounds and an amortized communication of \(29\ell - 9\) bits in the online phase.

Proof: An instance of sig protocol involves the execution of the following protocols in order– i) two parallel instances of \(\Pi_{\text{bitext}}\) protocol, ii) once instance of \(\Pi_{\text{mult}}\) protocol over boolean value, and iii) one instance of \(\Pi_{\text{bitini}}\) and \(\Pi_{\text{bit2a}}\) in parallel. The cost follows from Lemma B.6, Lemma B.7 and Lemma B.8.

APPENDIX C

4PC PROTOCOLS

In this section, we give the formal details for the 4PC protocols along with communication cost analysis.

A. 4PC Joint Message Passing Primitive

The ideal functionality for jmp4 primitive appears in Fig. 21.

**Functionality \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{jmp4}}\)**

- \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{jmp4}}\) interacts with the servers in \(\mathcal{P}\) and the adversary \(\mathcal{S}\).
- **Step 1.** \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{jmp4}}\) receives (Input, \(v_j\)) from senders \(P_i\) for \(s \in \{i, j\}\). It interacts with the servers in \(\mathcal{P}\) and the adversary \(\mathcal{S}\). Here \(\text{tpp}\) is a boolean value, with a 1 indicating that TTP is \(P_i\) should be established.
- **Step 2.** If \(v_i = v_j\) and ttp = 0, or if \(\mathcal{S}\) has corrupted \(P_i\), set \(msg_t = msg_f = msg_k = \bot\), and go to **Step 4**.
- **Step 3.** Else : Set \(msg_t = msg_f = msg_k = \text{tpp}\).
- **Step 4.** Send (Output, \(msg_k\)) to \(P_s\) for \(s \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}\).

Fig. 21: 4PC: Ideal functionality for jmp4 primitive

Lemma C.1 (Communication). Protocol \(\Pi_{\text{jmp4}}\) (Fig. 9) requires 1 round and an amortized communication of \(\ell\) bits in the online phase.

Proof: Server \(P_i\) sends the value \(v\) to \(P_k\) while \(P_j\) sends hash of the same to \(P_k\). This accounts for one round of communication. Values sent by \(P_j\) for several instances can be concatenated and hashed to obtain a single value. Hence the cost of sending the hash gets amortized over multiple instances. Similarly, the two round exchange of inconsistency bits, along with the two round signalling to the TTP can be combined for multiple instances, thereby amortizing this cost. Thus, the amortized cost of this protocol is \(\ell\) bits.

B. Sharing Protocol

Lemma C.2 (Communication). In the online phase, \(\Pi_{\text{sh4}}\) (Fig. 10) requires 2 rounds and an amortized communication of \(2\ell\) bits when \(P_0, P_1, P_2\) share a value, whereas it requires an amortized communication of \(3\ell\) bits when \(P_3\) shares a value.

Proof: The proof for \(P_0, P_1, P_2\) sharing a value follows from B.2. For the case when \(P_3\) wants to share a value \(v\), it first sends \(\beta_v + \gamma_v\) to \(P_0\), which requires one round and \(\ell\) bits of communication. This is followed by 2 parallel calls to \(\Pi_{\text{jmp4}}\) which together require one round and an amortized communication of \(2\ell\) bits.

C. Joint Sharing Protocol

Protocol \(\Pi_{\text{sh4}}\) enables a pair of (unordered) servers \((P_s, P_j)\) to jointly generate a \(\lfloor\cdot\rfloor\)-sharing of value \(v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}\) known to both of them. In case of an inconsistency, the server outside the computation serves as a TTP. The protocol is described in Fig. 22.

**Protocol \(\Pi_{\text{sh4}}(P_s, P_j, v)\)**

- **Preprocessing:**
  - If \((P_s, P_j) = (P_1, P_2)\) : \(P_s, P_2, P_3\) sample \(\gamma_v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}\). Servers locally set \(\alpha_v = 0\). If \((P_s, P_j) = (P_3, P_0)\), for \(s \in \{1, 2\}\) : Servers execute the preprocessing of \(\Pi_{\text{sh4}}(P_s, v)\). Servers locally set \(\gamma_v = 0\).
  - If \((P_s, P_j) = (P_0, P_s)\), for \(s \in \{0, 1, 2\}\) : Servers execute the preprocessing of \(\Pi_{\text{sh4}}(P_s, v)\).

- **Online:**
  - If \((P_s, P_j) = (P_1, P_2)\) : \(P_s, P_2\) set \(\beta_v = v\) and jmp4-send \(\beta_v + \gamma_v\) to \(P_0\).
  - If \((P_s, P_j) = (P_s, P_r)\), for \(s \in \{1, 2, 3\} : P_s, P_0\) compute \(\beta_v = v + [\alpha_v]_1 + [\alpha_v]_2\) and jmp4-send \(\beta_v\) to \(P_0\), where \(k \in \{1, 2\}\) \(\land k \neq s\).

When \(P_0, P_0\) want to jointly share a value \(v\) which is available in the preprocessing phase, protocol \(\Pi_{\text{sh4}}\) can be performed with a single element of communication (as opposed to 2 elements in Fig. 22). \(P_0, P_2\) can jointly share \(v\) as follows: \(P_0, P_3, P_1\) sample a random \(r \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}\) and set \([\alpha_v]_1 = r\). \(P_0, P_3\) set \([\alpha_v]_2 = -(r + v)\) and jmp4-send \([\alpha_v]_2\) to \(P_2\). This is followed by servers locally setting \(\gamma_v = \beta_v = 0\).

We further observe that servers can generate a \(\lfloor\cdot\rfloor\)-sharing of \(v\) non-interactively when \(v\) is available with \(P_0, P_1, P_2\). To do this, servers set \([\alpha_v]_1 = [\alpha_v]_2 = \gamma_v = 0\) and \(\beta_v = v\). We abuse notation and use \(\Pi_{\text{sh4}}(P_0, P_1, P_2, v)\) to denote this sharing.

**Lemma C.3 (Communication).** In the online phase, \(\Pi_{\text{sh4}}\) (Fig. 22) requires 1 round and an amortized communication of \(2\ell\) bits when \((P_s, P_r)\) for \(s \in \{0, 1, 2\}\) share a value, and requires an amortized communication of \(3\ell\) bits, otherwise.
Proof: When $(P_3, P_s)$ for $s \in \{0, 1, 2\}$ want to share a value $v$, there are two parallel calls to $\Pi_{\text{mp4}}$ which requires an amortized communication of $2\ell$ bits and one round. In the other cases, $\Pi_{\text{mp4}}$ is invoked only once, resulting in an amortized communication of $\ell$ bits.

D. $(\cdot)$-sharing Protocol

In some protocols, scenarios arise where $P_3$ is required to generate $(\cdot)$-sharing of a value $v$ in the pre-processing phase, where $(\cdot)$-sharing of $v$ is same as that defined in 3PC (where $v = v_0 + v_1 + v_2$, and $P_0$ possesses $(v_0, P_1)$, $P_1$ possesses $(v_1, v_2)$, and $P_2$ possess $(v_2, v_0)$) with the addition that $P_3$ now possesses $(v_0, v_1, v_2)$. We call the resultant protocol $\Pi_{\text{shb4}}$ and it appears in Fig. 23.

**Fig. 23:** 4PC: $(\cdot)$-sharing of value $v$ by $P_3$

Note that servers can locally convert $(v)$ to $[v]$ by setting their shares as shown in Table VIII.

|  | $P_0$ | $P_1$ | $P_2$ | $P_3$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $v$ | $(-v_1, -v_0, 0)$ | $(-v_1, v_2, -v_2)$ | $(-v_0, -v_2, -v_2)$ | $(-v_0, -v_1, -v_2)$ |

TABLE VIII: Local conversion of shares from $(\cdot)$-sharing to $[\cdot]$-sharing for a value $v$. Here, $[\alpha_1] = v_1$, $[\alpha_2] = v_0$, $[\beta] = v_2$, $[\gamma] = -v_2$.

**Lemma C.4** (Communication). Protocol $\Pi_{\text{shb4}}$ (Fig. 23) requires 2 rounds and an amortized communication of $2\ell$ bits.

Proof: Communicating $v_2$ to $P_3$ requires $\ell$ bits and 1 round. This is followed by one invocation of $\Pi_{\text{mp4}}$ which requires $\ell$ bits and 1 round. Thus, the amortized communication cost is $2\ell$ bits and two rounds.

E. Multiplication Protocol

**Lemma C.5** (Communication). $\Pi_{\text{mult4}}$ (Fig. 11) requires an amortized communication of $3\ell$ bits in the pre-processing phase, and 1 round with an amortized communication of $3\ell$ bits in the online phase.

Proof: In the pre-processing phase, the servers execute $\Pi_{\text{mp4}}$ to jmp4-send $[\Gamma_{\text{sy}}]_{1,2}$ to $P_0$ resulting in amortized communication of $\ell$ bits. This is followed by 2 parallel invocations of $\Pi_{\text{mp4}}$ to jmp4-send $[\chi]_{1,2}$ to $P_0$ which require an amortized communication of $2\ell$ bits. Thus, the amortized communication cost in pre-processing is $3\ell$ bits. In the online phase, there are 2 parallel invocations of $\Pi_{\text{mp4}}$ to jmp4-send $[\beta_1^2]_{1,2}$ to $P_0$ which require amortized communication of $2\ell$ bits and one round. This is followed by another call to $\Pi_{\text{mp4}}$ to jmp4-send $\beta_2 + \gamma_2$ to $P_0$ which requires one more round and amortized communication of $\ell$ bits. However, jmp4-send of $\beta_2 + \gamma_2$ can be delayed till the end of the protocol, and will require only one round for multiple multiplication gates and hence, can be amortized. Thus, the total number of rounds required for multiplication in the online phase is one with an amortized communication of $3\ell$ bits.

F. Reconstruction Protocol

**Lemma C.6** (Communication). $\Pi_{\text{rec4}}$ (Fig. 12) requires an amortized communication of $8\ell$ bits and 1 round in the online phase.

Proof: Each $P_s$ for $s \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ receives the missing share in clear from two other servers, while the hash of it from the third. As before, the missing share sent by the third server can be concatenated over multiple instances and hashed to obtain a single value. Thus, the amortized communication cost is $2\ell$ bits per server, resulting in a total cost of $8\ell$ bits.

G. Special protocols

Here we provide details regarding the special protocols - i) Bit Extraction, ii) Bit2A, and iii) Bit Injection.

1) Bit Extraction Protocol: This protocol enables the servers to compute a boolean sharing of the most significant bit (MSB) of a value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$ given the arithmetic sharing $[v]$. To compute the MSB, we use the optimized Parallel Prefix Adder (PPA) circuit from ABY3 [4], which takes as input two boolean values and outputs the MSB of the sum of the inputs. The circuit requires $2(\ell - 1)$ gates and has a multiplicative depth of $\log \ell$. The protocol for bit extraction ($\Pi_{\text{bitext4}}$) involves computing the boolean PPA circuit using the protocols described in §IV. The two inputs to this boolean circuit are generated as follows. The value $v$ whose MSB needs to be extracted can be represented as the sum of two values as $v = \beta + (\alpha \cdot v)$, where the first input to the circuit will be $\beta$, and the second input will be $-\alpha \cdot v$. Since $\beta$ is held by $P_1$, $P_2$, servers execute $\Pi_{\text{jsh4}}$ to generate $[\beta] = B$. Similarly, $P_0$, $P_3$ possess $\alpha$, and servers execute $\Pi_{\text{jsh4}}$ to generate $[-\alpha] = B$. Servers in $P$ use the $[\cdot] = B$-shares of these two inputs $(\beta, -\alpha)$ to compute the optimized PPA circuit which outputs the $[\text{msb}(v)] = B$.

**Lemma C.7** (Communication). The protocol $\Pi_{\text{bitext4}}$ requires an amortized communication of $7\ell - 6$ bits in the pre-processing phase, and $\log \ell$ rounds with amortized communication of $7\ell - 6$ bits in the online phase.

Proof: Generation of boolean sharing of $\alpha_\ell$ requires $\ell$ bits in the pre-processing phase (since $\Pi_{\text{mp4}}$ with $P_0$, $P_3$ can be achieved with $\ell$ bits of communication in the pre-processing phase), and generation of boolean sharing of $\beta_\ell$ requires $\ell$ bits and one round (which can be deferred towards the end of the protocol thereby requiring one round for several instances) in the online phase. Further, the boolean PPA circuit to be computed requires $2(\ell - 1)$ gates. Since each AND gate requires $\Pi_{\text{mult4}}$ to be executed, it requires an amortized communication of $6\ell - 6$ bits in both the pre-processing phase and the online phase. Thus, the overall communication is $7\ell - 6$ bits, in both, the pre-processing and online phase. The circuit has a multiplicative depth of $\log \ell$ which results in $\log \ell$ rounds in the online phase.
2) Bit2A Protocol: This protocol enables servers to compute the arithmetic sharing of a bit b given its boolean sharing. Let $b^R$ denote the value of b in the ring $Z_{2^l}$. We observe that $b^R$ can be written as follows: $b^R = (\alpha_b \oplus \beta_b)^R = \alpha^R_b + \beta^R_b - 2\alpha\beta_{\text{bit}2A} R$. Thus, to obtain an arithmetic sharing of $b^R$, the servers can compute an arithmetic sharing of $\alpha^R_b$, $\beta^R_b$ and $\alpha\beta_{\text{bit}2A} R$. This can be done as follows. $P_0$, $P_3$ execute $\Pi_{\text{shb}}$ on $\alpha^R_b$ in the preprocessing phase to generate $[\alpha^R_b]$. Similarly, $P_1$, $P_2$ execute $\Pi_{\text{shb}}$ on $\beta^R_b$ in the online phase to generate $[\beta^R_b]$. This is followed by $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$ on $[\beta^R_b]$, $[\alpha^R_b]$, followed by local computation to obtain $[b^R]$. 

![Fig. 24: 4PC: Bit2A Protocol](image)

While the above approach serves the purpose, we now provide an improved version, which further helps in reducing the online cost. We observe that $b^R$ can be written as follows: $b^R = (\alpha_b \oplus \beta_b)^R = ((\alpha_0 \oplus \gamma_0) \oplus (\beta_0 \oplus \gamma_0)) = (\alpha \oplus \gamma)^R = e^R + c^R - 2e^R c^R$, where $e = \alpha_0 \oplus \gamma_0$ and $c = \beta_0 \oplus \gamma_0$. Thus, to obtain an arithmetic sharing of $b^R$, $P_3$ generates $\langle \cdot \rangle$-sharing of $e^R$. To ensure the correctness of the shares, the servers $P_0$, $P_1$, $P_2$ check whether the following equation holds: $(e \oplus r_0)^R = e^R + r^R_0 - 2e^R c^R$. If the verification fails, a TTP is identified. Else, this is followed by servers locally converting $\langle e^R \rangle$, $\langle c^R \rangle$ and locally computing $[b^R] = [e^R] + [c^R] - 2[e^R c^R]$. Note that during $\Pi_{\text{shb}}(P_0, P_1, P_2, c^R)$ since $\alpha^c$ and $\gamma^c$ are set to 0, the preprocessing of multiplication can be performed locally.

Lemma C.8 (Communication). $\Pi_{\text{bit2A}}$ (Fig. 24) requires an amortized communication cost of $3l + 4$ bits in the pre-processing phase, and 1 round with amortized communication of $3l$ bits in the online phase.

Proof: During preprocessing, one instance of $\Pi_{\text{shb}}$ requires 2l bits of communication. Further, sending $x_1$ requires 1 bit, while sending $y_1$ requires $l$ bits. Sending of $H(y_2)$ can be amortized over several instances. Finally, communicating flag requires 3 bits. Thus, the overall amortized communication cost in preprocessing phase is $3l + 4$ bits. In the online phase, joint sharing of $c^R$ can be performed non-interactively. The only cost is due to the online phase of multiplication which requires $3l$ bits and one round. Thus, the amortized communication cost in the online phase is $3l$ bits with one round of communication.

3) Bit Injection Protocol: Given the boolean sharing of a bit b, denoted as $[b]^B$, and the arithmetic sharing of $\in Z_{2^l}$, protocol $\Pi_{\text{bitinj}}$ computes $\langle \cdot \rangle$-sharing of bv. This can be naively computed by servers first executing $\Pi_{\text{bit2A}}$ on $[b]^B$ to generate $[b]$, followed by servers computing $[bv]$ by executing $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$ protocol on $[b]$ and $[v]$. Instead, we provide an optimized variant which helps in reducing the communication cost of the naive approach in, both, the preprocessing and online phase. We give the details next.

Let $z = b^R v$, where $b^R$ denotes the value of b in $Z_{2^l}$. Then, during the computation of $[z]$, we observe the following:

$z = b^R v = (\alpha_b \oplus \beta_b)^R (\beta - \alpha) = ((\alpha_0 \oplus \gamma_0) \oplus (\beta_0 \oplus \gamma_0))^R (\beta_v - \alpha_v) = (\alpha_0 \oplus \gamma_0)^R (c_0 - e_v) = (e^R + e^R - 2e^R c^R)(c_v - e_v) = c^R e^R - c^R e^R c^R + c_v - 2c^R c^R e^R + (2c^R - 1)e_v e_v$

where $e_0 = \beta_0 \oplus \gamma_0$, $e_v = \alpha_0 \oplus \gamma_0$, $c_v = \beta_0 + \gamma_0$, and $e_v = \alpha_0 + \gamma_0$. The protocol proceeds with $P_3$ generating $\langle \cdot \rangle$-shares of $e^R$ and $c_0 = e^R c^R$, followed by verification of the same by $P_0$, $P_1$, $P_2$. If verification succeeds, then to enable $P_2$ to compute $\beta_0 = z + \alpha_0$, $P_1$, $P_0$ jmp4-send the missing share of $\beta_0$ to $P_2$. Similarly for $P_1$. Next, $P_1$, $P_2$ reconstruct $\beta_0$, and jmp4-send $\beta_0 + \gamma_0$ to $P_0$ completing the protocol.

Lemma C.9 (Communication). Protocol $\Pi_{\text{bitinj}}$ requires an amortized communication cost of $6l + 4$ bits in the pre-processing phase, and requires 1 round with an amortized communication of $3l$ bits in the online phase.

Proof: The preprocessing phase requires two instances of $\Pi_{\text{shb}}$ which require 4l bits of communication. Verifying correctness of $\langle e^R \rangle$ requires $l + 1$ bits, whereas for $\langle e_0 \rangle$ we require $l$ bits. Finally, communicating the flag requires 3 bits. This results in the amortized communication of $6l + 4$ bits in the preprocessing phase. The online phase consists of three calls to $\Pi_{\text{jmp4}}$ which requires $3l$ bits of amortized communication. Note that the last call can be deferred towards the end of the computation, thereby requiring a single round for multiple instances. Thus, the number of rounds required in the online phase is one.

![Protocol $\Pi_{\text{bitinj}}(P, [b]^B, [v])$](image)

Let $e_0 = \beta_0 \oplus \gamma_0$, $e_v = \alpha_0 \oplus \gamma_0$, $c_v = \beta_0 + \gamma_0$, $e_v = \alpha_0 + \gamma_0$ and $e_v = e^R c^R$.

Preprocessing:

- $P_0$, $P_3, P_j$ for $j \in \{1, 2\}$ sample $[\alpha_2]_1 \in Z_{2^l}$ while $P_3, P_2, P_3$ sample $[\alpha_2]_j \in Z_{2^l}$.
- Servers execute $\Pi_{\text{mult}}(P_3, \alpha_2^R)$ and $\Pi_{\text{shb}}(P_3, e_0)$. Shares of $\langle e_0 \rangle$ are set locally as $e_v = [\alpha_2]_2$, $e_v = [\alpha_2]_1$, $e_v = [\alpha_2]_1$. $e_0 = \alpha_0 + \gamma_0$.
Lemma C.10

Phase C.1

Proof: The preprocessing phase requires three calls to \( \Pi_{\text{jmp4}} \), one to \( \text{jmp4-4send} [\beta_2^1] \) to \( P_2 \), and two to \( \text{jmp4-4send} [\beta_2^2] \) to \( P_0 \). Each invocation of 4PC requires \( \ell \) bits resulting in the amortized communication cost of preprocessing phase to be \( 3\ell \) bits. In the online phase, there are 2 parallel invocations of \( \Pi_{\text{mp4}} \) to \( \text{jmp4-4send} [\beta_2^1, \beta_2^2] \) to \( P_2, P_3 \), respectively, which require amortized communication of \( 2\ell \) bits and one round. This is followed by another call to \( \Pi_{\text{mp4}} \) to \( \text{jmp4-4send} [\beta_2^2, \beta_2^3] \) to \( P_3 \), which requires one more round and amortized communication of \( \ell \) bits. As in the multiplication protocol, this step can be delayed till the end of the protocol and clubbed for multiple instances. Thus, the online phase requires one round and an amortized communication of \( 3\ell \) bits.

I. Truncation

Given the \([\cdot]\)-sharing of a value \( v \), this protocol enables the servers to compute the \([\cdot]\)-sharing of the truncated value \( v^d \) (right shifted value by \( s, d \) positions). Given \([v]\) and a random truncation pair \([\langle r \rangle, [r^d]\]) , the value \((v - r)\) is truncated and added to \([r^d]\) to obtain \([v^d]\). The protocol for generating the truncation pair \([\langle r \rangle, [r^d]\]) is described in Fig. 27.

Fig. 27: 4PC: Generating Random Truncated Pair \((r, r^d)\)

Lemma C.11 (Communication). \( \Pi_{\text{trgen}} \) (Fig. 27) requires 1 round and an amortized communication of \( \ell \) bits in the online phase.

Proof: The cost follows directly from that of \( \Pi_{\text{sh4}} \) (Lemma C.1).

J. Dot Product with Truncation

Protocol \( \Pi_{\text{dot4}} \) (Fig. 28) enables servers to generate \([\cdot]\)-sharing of the truncated value of \( z = x \odot y \), denoted as \( z^d \), given the \([\cdot]\)-sharing of \( n \)-sized vectors \( x \) and \( y \).

Fig. 28: 4PC: Dot Product Protocol with Truncation
Lemma C.12 (Communication). \( \Pi_{\mathrm{dotp4}} \) (Fig. 28) requires an amortized communication of \( 4\ell \) bits in the preprocessing phase, and 1 round with amortized communication of \( 3\ell \) bits in the online phase.

Proof: The preprocessing phase comprises of the preprocessing phase of \( \Pi_{\mathrm{dotp4}} \) and \( \Pi_{\mathrm{gen4}} \) which results in an amortized communication of \( 3\ell + \ell = 4\ell \) bits. The online phase follows from that of \( \Pi_{\mathrm{dotp4}} \) protocol except that, now, \( P_1, P_2 \) compute \([-\cdot]+\) shares of \( z-r \). This requires one round and an amortized communication cost of \( 2\ell \) bits. \( P_1, P_2 \) then jointly share the truncated value of \( z-r \) with \( P_0 \), which requires 1 round and \( \ell \) bits. However, this step can be deferred till the end for multiple instances, which results in amortizing this round. The total amortized communication is thus \( 3\ell \) bits in online phase.

K. Activation Functions

Lemma C.13 (Communication). Protocol for \( \mathrm{relu} \) requires an amortized communication of \( 13\ell - 2 \) bits in the preprocessing phase and requires \( \log \ell + 1 \) rounds and an amortized communication of \( 10\ell - 6 \) bits in the online phase.

Proof: One instance of \( \mathrm{relu} \) protocol comprises of execution of one instance of \( \Pi_{\mathrm{bitext4}} \), followed by \( \Pi_{\mathrm{bitinj4}} \). The cost, therefore, follows from Lemma C.7, and Lemma C.9.

Lemma C.14 (Communication). Protocol for \( \mathrm{sig} \) requires an amortized communication of \( 23\ell - 1 \) bits in the preprocessing phase and requires \( \log \ell + 2 \) rounds and an amortized communication of \( 20\ell - 9 \) bits in the online phase.

Proof: An instance of \( \mathrm{sig} \) protocol involves the execution of the following protocols in order– i) two parallel instances of \( \Pi_{\mathrm{bitext4}} \) protocol, ii) one instance of \( \Pi_{\mathrm{mul4}} \) protocol over boolean value, and iii) one instance of \( \Pi_{\mathrm{bitinj4}} \) and \( \Pi_{\mathrm{bit244}} \) in parallel. The cost follows from Lemma C.7, Lemma C.8 and Lemma C.9.

APPENDIX D

SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OUR PROTOCOLS

In this section, we provide detailed security proofs for our constructions in both the 3PC and 4PC domains. We prove security using the real-world/ideal-word simulation based technique. We provide proofs in the \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{setup}4} \)-hybrid model for the case of 3PC, where \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{setup}} \) (Fig. 14) denotes the ideal functionality for the three server shared-key setup. Similarly, the proofs for 4PC are provided in the \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{setup}4} \)-hybrid model (Fig. 15).

Let \( \mathcal{A} \) denote the real-world adversary corrupting at most one server in \( \mathcal{P} \), and \( \mathcal{S} \) denote the corresponding ideal world adversary. The strategy for simulating the computation of function \( f \) (represented by a circuit \( \text{ckt} \)) is as follows: The simulation begins with the simulator emulating the shared-key setup \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{setup}} \) functionality and giving the respective keys to the adversary. This is followed by the input sharing phase in which \( \mathcal{S} \) extracts the input of \( \mathcal{A} \), using the known keys, and sets the inputs of the honest parties to be 0. \( \mathcal{S} \) now knows all the inputs and can compute all the intermediate values for each of the building blocks in clear. Also, \( \mathcal{S} \) can obtain the output of the \( \text{ckt} \) in clear. \( \mathcal{S} \) now proceeds simulating each of the building block in topological order using the aforementioned values (inputs of \( \mathcal{A} \), intermediate values and circuit output).

In some of our sub protocols, adversary is able to decide on which among the honest parties should be chosen as the Trusted Third Party (TTP) in that execution of the protocol. To capture this, we consider corruption-aware functionalities [54] for the sub-protocols, where the functionality is provided the identity of the corrupt server as an auxiliary information.

For modularity, we provide the simulation steps for each of the sub-protocols separately. These steps, when carried out in the respective order, result in the simulation steps for the entire 3/4PC protocol. If a TTP is identified during the simulation of any of the sub-protocols, simulator will stop the simulation at that step. In the next round, the simulator receives the input of the corrupt party in clear on behalf of the TTP for the 3PC case, whereas it receives the input shares from adversary for 4PC.

A. Security Proofs for 3PC protocols

The ideal functionality \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{3PC}} \) for evaluating \( \text{ckt} \) in the 3PC setting appears in Fig. 29.

**Functionality \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{3PC}} \)**

\( \mathcal{F}_{\text{3PC}} \) interacts with the servers in \( \mathcal{P} \) and the adversary \( \mathcal{S} \). Let \( f \) denote the functionality to be computed. Let \( x_i \) be the input corresponding to the server \( P_i \), and \( y_i \) be the corresponding output, i.e \( (y_0, y_1, y_2) = f(x_0, x_1, x_2) \).

**Step 1**: \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{3PC}} \) receives \((\text{Input, } x_s)\) from \( P_s \in \mathcal{P} \), and computes \((y_0, y_1, y_2) = f(x_0, x_1, x_2)\).

**Step 2**: \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{3PC}} \) sends \((\text{Output, } y_s)\) to \( P_s \in \mathcal{P} \).

Fig. 29: 3PC: Ideal functionality for evaluating a function \( f \)

Now we provide the simulation for each of the sub-protocols.

1) Joint Message Passing (jmp) Protocol: This section provides the security proof for the jmp primitive, which forms the crux for achieving GOD guarantee in our constructions. Let \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{jmp}} \) (Fig. 1) denote the ideal functionality and let \( \mathcal{S}_{\text{jmp}}^{\mathcal{F}} \) denote the corresponding simulator for the case of corrupt \( P_s \in \mathcal{P} \).

We begin with the case for a corrupt sender, \( P_i \). The case for a corrupt \( P_j \) is similar and hence we omit details for the same.

**Simulator \( \mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{F}}_{\text{jmp}} \)**

- \( \mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{F}}_{\text{jmp}} \) initializes \( \text{tt} = \bot \) and receives \( v_i \) from \( \mathcal{A} \) on behalf of \( P_k \).
- In case, \( \mathcal{A} \) fails to send a value \( \mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{F}}_{\text{jmp}} \) broadcasts \((\text{accuse, } P_i)\) *, sets \( \text{tt} = P_j \), \( v_i = \bot \), and skip to the last step.
- Else, it checks if \( v_i = v \), where \( v \) is the value computed by \( \mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{F}}_{\text{jmp}} \) based on the interaction with \( \mathcal{A} \), and using the knowledge of the shared keys. If the values are equal, \( \mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{F}}_{\text{jmp}} \) sets \( b_i = 0 \), else, sets \( b_i = 1 \), and sends the same to \( \mathcal{A} \) on the behalf of \( P_k \).
- If \( \mathcal{A} \) broadcasts \((\text{accuse, } P_k)\) *, \( \mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{F}}_{\text{jmp}} \) sets \( v_i = \bot \), \( \text{tt} = P_j \), and skips to the last step.
- \( \mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{F}}_{\text{jmp}} \) computes and sends \( b_j \) to \( \mathcal{A} \) on behalf of \( P_j \) and receives...
\[
\text{Preprocessing: } S_{\text{sh}}^0 \text{ emulates } F_{\text{setup}} \text{ and gives the keys } (h_{01}, k_{02}, k_F) \text{ to } A. \text{ The values that are commonly held along with } A \text{ are sampled using appropriate shared key. Otherwise, values are sampled randomly.}
\]

**Online:**

1. If the dealer \( P_s = P_0 \),
   - \( S_{\text{sh}}^0 \) receives \( \beta_0 \) on behalf of \( P_1 \) and sets \( \text{msg} = \nu \) accordingly.
   - Steps for \( \Pi_{\text{mp}} \) protocol are simulated according to \( S_{\text{mp}}^a \) (Fig. 30), where \( P_0 \) plays the role of one of the senders.
2. If the dealer \( P_s = P_1 \),
   - \( S_{\text{sh}}^0 \) sets \( \nu = 0 \) by assigning \( \beta_0 = \alpha_0 \).
   - Steps for \( \Pi_{\text{mp}} \) protocol are simulated similar to \( S_{\text{mp}}^a \) (Fig. 31), with \( P_0 \) acting as the receiver.

The case for a corrupt \( P_1 \) is provided in Fig. 33. The case for a corrupt \( P_2 \) is similar.

![Simulator S_{sh}^0](image)

**Simulator S_{sh}^0**

![Preprocessing](image)

**Preprocessing:**

- \( S_{\text{sh}}^0 \) emulates \( F_{\text{setup}} \) and gives the keys \((h_{01}, k_{02}, k_F)\) to \( A \). The values that are commonly held along with \( A \) are sampled using appropriate shared key. Otherwise, values are sampled randomly.

**Online:**

- If the dealer \( P_s = P_0 \), \( S_{\text{sh}}^0 \) receives \( \beta_0 \) from \( A \) on behalf of \( P_2 \).
- If \( P_s = P_1 \), \( S_{\text{sh}}^0 \) sets \( \nu = 0 \) by assigning \( \beta_0 = \alpha_0 \) and sends \( \beta_0 \) to \( A \) on behalf of \( P_1 \).
- If \( P_s = P_2 \), similar to the case where \( P_s = P_0 \).
- Steps of \( \Pi_{\text{mp}} \) in all the steps above, are simulated similar to \( S_{\text{mp}}^a \) (Fig. 30), i.e. the case of corrupt sender.

The case for a corrupt \( P_1 \) is provided in Fig. 33. The case for a corrupt \( P_2 \) is similar.

![Simulator S_{sh}^0](image)

**Simulator S_{sh}^0**

![Preprocessing](image)

**Preprocessing:**

- \( S_{\text{sh}}^0 \) emulates \( F_{\text{setup}} \) and gives the keys \((h_{01}, k_{02}, k_F)\) to \( A \). The values that are commonly held along with \( A \) are sampled using appropriate shared key. Otherwise, values are sampled randomly.

**Online:**

- If the dealer \( P_s = P_0 \), \( S_{\text{sh}}^0 \) receives \( \beta_0 \) from \( A \) on behalf of \( P_2 \).
- If \( P_s = P_1 \), \( S_{\text{sh}}^0 \) sets \( \nu = 0 \) by assigning \( \beta_0 = \alpha_0 \) and sends \( \beta_0 \) to \( A \) on behalf of \( P_1 \).
- If \( P_s = P_2 \), similar to the case where \( P_s = P_0 \).
- Steps of \( \Pi_{\text{mp}} \) in all the steps above, are simulated similar to \( S_{\text{mp}}^a \) (Fig. 30), i.e. the case of corrupt sender.

The case for a corrupt \( P_1 \) is provided in Fig. 33. The case for a corrupt \( P_2 \) is similar.

![Simulator S_{sh}^0](image)

**Simulator S_{sh}^0**

![Preprocessing](image)

**Preprocessing:**

- \( S_{\text{sh}}^0 \) emulates \( F_{\text{setup}} \) and gives the keys \((h_{01}, k_{02}, k_F)\) to \( A \). The values that are commonly held along with \( A \) are sampled using appropriate shared key. Otherwise, values are sampled randomly.

**Online:**

- If the dealer \( P_s = P_0 \), \( S_{\text{sh}}^0 \) receives \( \beta_0 \) from \( A \) on behalf of \( P_2 \).
- If \( P_s = P_1 \), \( S_{\text{sh}}^0 \) sets \( \nu = 0 \) by assigning \( \beta_0 = \alpha_0 \) and sends \( \beta_0 \) to \( A \) on behalf of \( P_1 \).
- If \( P_s = P_2 \), similar to the case where \( P_s = P_0 \).
- Steps of \( \Pi_{\text{mp}} \) in all the steps above, are simulated similar to \( S_{\text{mp}}^a \) (Fig. 30), i.e. the case of corrupt sender.

The case for a corrupt \( P_1 \) is provided in Fig. 33. The case for a corrupt \( P_2 \) is similar.
4) Reconstruction Protocol: Here we give the simulation steps for $\Pi_{\text{rec}}$. The case for a corrupt $P_0$ is provided in Fig. 52. The case for a corrupt $P_1, P_2$ is similar.

**Simulator $S_{\text{rec}}$**

**Preprocessing:**
- $S_{\text{rec}}$ computes commitments on $[\alpha_2], [\alpha_2], \gamma_2$ on behalf of $P_1, P_2$, using the respective shared keys.
- The steps of $\Pi_{\text{imp}}$ are simulated similar to $S_{\text{imp}}^{P_1}$ with $A$ acting as the receiver for Com$(\gamma_2)$, and $S_{\text{imp}}^{P_0}$ with $A$ acting as one of the senders for Com$([\alpha_2])$ and Com$([\alpha_2])$.

**Online:**
- $S_{\text{rec}}$ receives openings for Com$([\alpha_2])$ on behalf of $P_2$ and $P_1$, respectively.
- $S_{\text{rec}}$ opens Com$(\gamma_2)$ to $A$ on behalf of $P_1, P_2$.

Fig. 36: Simulator $S_{\text{rec}}$ for corrupt $P_0$

5) Joint Sharing Protocol: Here we give the simulation steps for $\Pi_{\text{jsh}}$. The case for a corrupt $P_0$ is provided in Fig. 37. The case for a corrupt $P_1, P_2$ is similar.

**Simulator $S_{\text{jsh}}$**

**Preprocessing:** $S_{\text{jsh}}^{P_0}$ emulates $F_{\text{setup}}$ and gives the keys $(k_{101}, k_{102}, k_{111})$ to $A$. The values that are commonly held along with $A$ are sampled using appropriate shared key. Otherwise, values are sampled randomly.

**Online:**
- If $(P_1, P_2) = (P_1, P_2)$: $S_{\text{jsh}}$ computes $\beta_1 = u + \alpha_1$ on behalf of $P_1$. The steps of $\Pi_{\text{imp}}$ are simulated similar to $S_{\text{imp}}^{P_1}$, where $A$ acts as one of the senders.
- If $(P_1, P_2) = (P_2, P_1)$: Similar to the case when $(P_1, P_2) = (P_1, P_0)$.
- If $(P_1, P_2) = (P_1, P_0)$: $S_{\text{jsh}}$ sets $u = 0$ by setting $\beta_2 = \alpha_1$. The steps of $\Pi_{\text{imp}}$ are simulated similar to $S_{\text{imp}}^{P_1}$, where $A$ acts as the receiver.

Fig. 37: Simulator $S_{\text{jsh}}$ for corrupt $P_0$

6) Dot Product Protocol: Here we give the simulation steps for $\Pi_{\text{dotp}}$. The case for a corrupt $P_0$ is provided in Fig. 38.

**Simulator $S_{\text{dotp}}$**

**Preprocessing:** $S_{\text{dotp}}^{P_0}$ emulates $F_{\text{dotp}}^{P_0}$ and derives $\psi$ and respective $[\cdot]$-shares of $\chi$ honestly on behalf of $P_1, P_2$.

**Online:**
- $S_{\text{dotp}}^{P_0}$ computes $[\cdot]$-shares of $\beta_1^*$ on behalf of $P_0, P_2$ the steps of $\Pi_{\text{imp}}$ required to provide $P_1$ with $[\beta_1^*]_1$ and $P_2$ with $[\beta_1^*]_2$, are simulated similar to $S_{\text{imp}}^{P_0}$, where $P_0$ acts as one of the sender in both cases.
- $S_{\text{dotp}}^{P_0}$ computes $\beta_2^*$ and $\beta_2$ on behalf of $P_1, P_2$. The steps of $\Pi_{\text{imp}}$ required to provide $P_0$ with $\beta_2 + \gamma_2$, are simulated similar to $S_{\text{imp}}^{P_0}$, where $P_0$ acts as the receiver.

Fig. 38: Simulator $S_{\text{dotp}}$ for corrupt $P_0$

The case for a corrupt $P_1$ is provided in Fig. 39. The case for a corrupt $P_2$ is similar.

7) Truncation Protocol: Here we give the simulation steps for $\Pi_{\text{jshg}}$. The case for a corrupt $P_0$ is provided in Fig. 40. The case for a corrupt $P_1, P_2$ is similar.

**Simulator $S_{\text{jshg}}$**

**Preprocessing:** $S_{\text{jshg}}^{P_0}$ emulates $F_{\text{dotp}}^{P_0}$ and derives $[\cdot]$-shares of $\psi, \chi$ honestly on behalf of $P_0, P_2$.

**Online:**
- $S_{\text{jshg}}^{P_0}$ computes $[\beta_2^*]_1$ on behalf of $P_0$, and $[\beta_2^*]_2$ on behalf of $P_0$ and $P_2$. The steps of $\Pi_{\text{imp}}$ required to provide $P_1$ with $[\beta_2^*]_2$, and $P_2$ with $[\beta_2^*]_3$, are simulated similar to $S_{\text{imp}}^{P_1}$, where $A$ acts as one of the sender in the former case, and as a receiver in the latter case.
- $S_{\text{jshg}}^{P_0}$ computes $\beta_2^*$ and $\beta_2$ on behalf of $P_2$. The steps of $\Pi_{\text{imp}}$ required to provide $P_0$ with $\beta_2 + \gamma_2$, are simulated similar to $S_{\text{imp}}^{P_0}$, where $A$ acts as one of the sender.

Fig. 39: Simulator $S_{\text{jshg}}$ for corrupt $P_1$

Fig. 40: Simulator $S_{\text{jshg}}$ for corrupt $P_0$

The case for a corrupt $P_1$ is provided in Fig. 41. The case for a corrupt $P_2$ is similar.

**Simulator $S_{\text{jshg}}^{P_1}$**

**Preprocessing:** $S_{\text{jshg}}^{P_1}$ samples $R_1, R_2$ using the respective keys with $A$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{jshg}}$ are simulated similar to the steps $S_{\text{jshg}}^{P_0}$ for corrupt $P_0$.

**Online:**
- $S_{\text{jshg}}^{P_0}$ samples $R_1, R_2$ using the respective keys with $A$.
- $S_{\text{jshg}}^{P_0}$ computes $u$, and steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{imp}}$ are simulated similar to $S_{\text{imp}}^{P_0}$.
- $S_{\text{jshg}}^{P_0}$ computes $v$. If $H(u) \neq H(v)$, $S_{\text{jshg}}^{P_0}$ broadcasts $\psi$ $(\text{accuse}, P_3)$ `s, and sets ttp $= P_1$.

Fig. 41: Simulator $S_{\text{jshg}}^{P_1}$ for corrupt $P_1$

Observe from the simulation steps, that the view of $A$ in the real world and the ideal world is indistinguishable.

B. Security Proofs for 4PC protocols

The ideal functionality $F_{\text{4PC}}$ for evaluating a function $f$ to be computed by ckt in the 4PC setting appears in Fig. 42.

**Functionality $F_{\text{4PC}}$**

$F_{\text{4PC}}$ interacts with the servers in $P$ and the adversary $S$. Let $f$ denote the function to be computed. Let $x_s$ be the input corresponding to the server $P_s$, and $y_i$ be the corresponding output, i.e. $(y_0, y_1, y_2, y_3) = f(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3)$.

**Step 1:** $F_{\text{4PC}}$ receives (Input, $x_s$) from $P_s$ in $P$, and computes $(y_0, y_1, y_3, y_3) = f(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3)$.

**Step 2:** $F_{\text{4PC}}$ sends (Output, $y_s$) to $P_s$ in $P$.

Fig. 42: 4PC: Ideal functionality for computing $f$ in 4PC setting
Now we provide the simulation for each of the sub-protocols.

1) Joint Message Passing: This section provides the security proof for the jmp4 primitive, which forms the crux for achieving GOD in our constructions. Let $\mathcal{F}_{\text{jmp4}}$ denote the ideal functionality and let $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_i}$ denote the corresponding simulator for the case of corrupt $P_s \in \mathcal{P}$.

We begin with the case for a corrupt sender, $P_i$, which is provided in Fig. 43. The case for a corrupt $P_j$ is similar and hence we omit details for the same.

**Simulator $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_i}$**
- $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_i}$ receives $v_i$ from $A$ on behalf of honest $P_k$. If $v_i = v_j$ (where $v_j$ is the value computed by $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_j}$ based on the interaction with $A$, and using the knowledge of the shared keys), then $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_i}$ sets $b_k = 0$, else it sets $b_k = 1$. If $A$ fails to send a value, $b_k$ is set to be 1. $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_i}$ sends $b_k$ to $A$ on behalf of $P_k$.
- $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_i}$ sends $b_j = b_k$ to $A$, and receives $b_i$ from $A$ on behalf of honest $P_i$. If $A$ fails to send a value, it is assumed to be 1.
- $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_i}$ receives $b_i$ from $A$ on behalf of honest $P_i$. If $b_i = 1$, $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_i}$ sets $b_i = 1$ and $\text{ttp} = P_i$, else it sets $b_i = 0$ and $\text{ttp} = \bot$.
- $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_i}$ sends $b_j$ to $A$ on behalf of $P_i$, $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_i}$ invokes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{jmp4}}$ with $(\text{Input}, v_i)$ and $(\text{Select}, b_i)$ on behalf of $A$.

Fig. 43: Simulator $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_i}$ for corrupt sender $P_i$.

The case for a corrupt receiver, $P_k$ is provided in Fig. 44.

**Simulator $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_k}$**
- $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_k}$ sends $v, H(v)$ (where $v$ is the value computed by $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_k}$ based on the interaction with $A$, and using the knowledge of the shared keys) to $A$ on behalf of honest $P_i, P_j$, respectively.
- $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_k}$ receives $b_{k,i}, b_{k,j}$ from $A$ on behalf of $P_i, P_j$, respectively. If $A$ fails to send a value, it is assumed to be 1.
- $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_k}$ receives $b_k$ from $A$ on behalf of honest $P_i$. If $A$ fails to send a value, $b_k$ is assumed to be 0. If $b_k = 1$ and $b_{k,i} \lor b_{k,j} = 1$, $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_k}$ sets $b_i = 1$ and $\text{ttp} = P_i$, else it sets $b_i = 0$ and $\text{ttp} = \bot$.
- $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_k}$ sends $b_j$ to $A$ on behalf of $P_i$, $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_k}$ invokes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{jmp4}}$ with $(\text{Input}, \bot)$ and $(\text{Select}, b_i)$ on behalf of $A$.

Fig. 44: Simulator $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_k}$ for corrupt receiver $P_k$.

The case for a corrupt receiver, $P_l$, which is the server outside the computation involved in $\Pi_{\text{jmp4}}$, is provided in Fig. 45.

**Simulator $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_l}$**
- $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_l}$ sends $b_l = b_j = b_k = 0$ to $A$ on behalf of $P_i, P_j, P_k$, respectively.
- $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_l}$ receives $b_i$ from $A$ on behalf of $P_i, P_j, P_k$, and sets $\text{ttp} = \bot$.
- $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_l}$ invokes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{jmp4}}$ with $(\text{Input}, \bot)$ and $(\text{Select}, b_i)$ on behalf of $A$.

Fig. 45: Simulator $S_{\text{jmp4}}^{P_l}$ for corrupt fourth server $P_l$.

2) Sharing Protocol: Here we give the simulation steps for $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}$. The case for corrupt $P_0$ is given in Fig. 46.

**Simulator $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_0}$**

Preprocessing: $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_0}$ emulates $\mathcal{F}_{\text{setup4}}$ and gives the keys $(\delta_{01}, \delta_{02}, \delta_{03}, k_{011}, k_{012}, k_{013}, k_{022}$ and $k_{123})$ to $A$. The values that are commonly held with $A$ are sampled using the respective keys, while others are sampled randomly.

Online:
- If dealer is $P_0$, $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_0}$ receives $\delta_0$ from $A$ on behalf of $P_1$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_1}$ where $P_0$ acts as one of the sender for sending $\delta_0$.
- If dealer is $P_1$ or $P_2$, $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_0}$ sets $\nu = 0$ by assigning $\delta_0 = \alpha_v$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}$ for sending $\beta_0 + \gamma_0$ to $A$ are simulated according to $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_0}$ where $P_0$ acts as the receiver.
- If dealer is $P_3$, $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_0}$ sends $\beta_0 + \gamma_0$ to $A$ on behalf of $P_3$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_0}$ where $P_0$ acts as one of the sender with $P_1, P_2$ as the receivers, separately.

Fig. 46: Simulator $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_0}$ for corrupt $P_0$.

The case for corrupt $P_1$ is given in Fig. 47. The case for a corrupt $P_2$ is similar.

**Simulator $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_1}$**

Preprocessing: $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_1}$ emulates $\mathcal{F}_{\text{setup4}}$ and gives the keys $(\delta_{01}, \delta_{02}, \delta_{03}, k_{011}, k_{012}, k_{013}, k_{022}$ and $k_{123})$ to $A$. The values that are commonly held with $A$ are sampled using the respective keys, while others are sampled randomly.

Online:
- If dealer is $P_1$, $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_1}$ receives $\beta_0$ from $A$ on behalf of $P_2$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_2}$ where $P_1$ acts as one of the sender for sending $\beta_0$.
- If dealer is $P_0$ or $P_2$, $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_1}$ sets $\nu = 0$ by assigning $\beta_0 = \alpha_v$. $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_1}$ sends $\beta_0 + \gamma_0$ to $A$ on behalf of $P_3$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_1}$ where $P_1$ acts as one of the sender with $P_1, P_2$ as the receivers, separately.

Fig. 47: Simulator $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_1}$ for corrupt $P_1$.

The case for corrupt $P_3$ is given in Fig. 48.

**Simulator $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_3}$**

Preprocessing: $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_3}$ emulates $\mathcal{F}_{\text{setup4}}$ and gives the keys $(\delta_{01}, \delta_{02}, \delta_{03}, k_{011}, k_{012}, k_{013}, k_{022}$ and $k_{123})$ to $A$. The values that are commonly held with $A$ are sampled using the respective keys, while others are sampled randomly.

Online:
- If dealer is $P_3$, $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_3}$ receives $\beta_0 + \gamma_0$ from $A$ on behalf of $P_0$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\text{sh4}}^{P_0}$ where $P_3$ acts as one of the sender with $P_1, P_2$ as the receivers, separately.
- If dealer is $P_0$ or $P_1$ or $P_2$, steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}$ are
simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ where $P_3$ acts as the server outside the computation.

Fig. 48: Simulator $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ for corrupt $P_3$

3) Multiplication Protocol: Here we give the simulation steps for $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$. The case for corrupt $P_0$ is given in Fig. 49.

**Simulator $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$**

**Preprocessing:**
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ samples $[\alpha_1], [\alpha_2], [\Gamma_{xy}]$ using the respective keys with $A$. $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ samples $\gamma_2, \psi, r$ randomly on behalf of the respective honest parties.
- Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ where $P_0$ acts as one of the sender for sending $[\Gamma_{xy}]$.
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ computes $[\chi_1], [\chi_2]$ honestly. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ where $P_0$ acts as the receiver for $[\chi_1], [\chi_2]$.

**Online:**
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ computes $[\beta'_1], [\beta'_2]$ honestly. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ where $P_0$ acts as one of the sender for sending $[\beta'_1], [\beta'_2]$.
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ computes $\beta_1 + \gamma_2$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ where $P_0$ acts as the receiver for receiving $\beta_1 + \gamma_2$.

The case for corrupt $P_1$ is given in Fig. 50. The case for a corrupt $P_2$ is similar.

**Simulator $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$**

**Preprocessing:**
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ samples $[\alpha_1], [\alpha_2], [\Gamma_{xy}]$ using the respective keys with $A$. $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ samples $\gamma_2, \psi, r$ randomly on behalf of the respective honest parties.
- Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ where $P_1$ acts as the sender outside the computation where communicating $[\Gamma_{xy}]$.
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ computes $[\chi_1]$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ where $P_1$ acts as one of the sender for $[\chi_1]$.
- Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ where $P_1$ acts as the server outside the computation where communicating $[\chi_2]$.

**Online:**
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ computes $[\beta'_1], [\beta'_2]$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ and $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ where $P_1$ acts as one of the sender for sending $[\beta'_1], [\beta'_2]$, and $P_1$ acts as the receiver for receiving $[\beta'_2]$.
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ computes $\beta_2 + \gamma_2$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ where $P_1$ acts as one of the sender for sending $\beta_2 + \gamma_2$.

Fig. 50: Simulator $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ for corrupt $P_1$

**Simulator $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$**

**Preprocessing:**
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ samples $[\alpha_1], [\alpha_2], [\Gamma_{xy}]$ using the respective keys with $A$. $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ computes $[\Gamma_{xy}]$ honestly.
- Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ where $P_3$ acts as one of the sender for sending $[\Gamma_{xy}]$.
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ computes $[\chi_1], [\chi_2]$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ where $P_3$ acts as one of the sender for sending $[\chi_1], [\chi_2]$.

**Online:**
- Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{mult}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{mult}}}^P$ where $P_3$ acts as the server outside the computation involving $[\beta'_1], [\beta'_2]$ and $\beta_2 + \gamma_2$.

The case for corrupt $P_3$ is given in Fig. 51.

4) Reconstruction Protocol: Here we give the simulation steps for $\Pi_{\text{rec}}$. The case for corrupt $P_0$ is given in Fig. 52. The cases for corrupt $P_1, P_2, P_3$ are similar.

**Simulator $S_{\Pi_{\text{rec}}}^P$**

**Preprocessing:**
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{rec}}}^P$ sends $\gamma_v$ to $A$ on behalf of $P_1, P_3$, and $H(\gamma_v)$ on behalf of $P_3$, respectively.
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{rec}}}^P$ receives $H([\alpha_1]), H([\alpha_2]), \beta_v + \gamma_v$ from $A$ on behalf of $P_2, P_1, P_3$, respectively.

Fig. 52: Simulator $S_{\Pi_{\text{rec}}}^P$ for corrupt $P_0$

5) Joint Sharing Protocol: Here we give the simulation steps for $\Pi_{\text{jsh}}$. The case for corrupt $P_0$ is given in Fig. 53.

**Simulator $S_{\Pi_{\text{jsh}}}^P$**

**Preprocessing:**
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{jsh}}}^P$ has knowledge of $\alpha_v$ and $\gamma_v$, which it obtains while emulating $\Pi_{\text{setup}}$. The common values shared with the $A$ are sampled using the appropriate shared keys, while other values are sampled at random.

**Online:**
- If dealers are $(P_0, P_1)$: $S_{\Pi_{\text{jsh}}}^P$ computes $\beta_v$ using $v$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{jsh}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{jsh}}}^P$ where $P_0$ acts as one of the sender for $\beta_v$.
- If dealers are $(P_0, P_2)$ or $(P_0, P_3)$: Analogous to the above case.
- If dealers are $(P_1, P_2)$: $S_{\Pi_{\text{jsh}}}^P$ sets $v = 0$ and $\beta_v = [\alpha_1] + [\alpha_2]$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{jsh}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{jsh}}}^P$ where $P_1$ acts as the receiver for $\beta_v + \gamma_v$.
- If dealers are $(P_1, P_3)$: $S_{\Pi_{\text{jsh}}}^P$ sets $v = 0$ and $\beta_v = [\alpha_1] + [\alpha_2]$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{jsh}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{jsh}}}^P$ where $P_1$ acts as the server outside the computation for $\beta_v$, and according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{jsh}}}^P$ where $P_0$ acts as the receiver for $\beta_v + \gamma_v$.
- If dealers are $(P_2, P_3)$: Analogous to the above case.

Fig. 53: Simulator $S_{\Pi_{\text{jsh}}}^P$ for corrupt $P_0$

The case for corrupt $P_1$ is given in Fig. 54. The case for corrupt $P_2$ is similar.
Preprocessing:

- $S_{\Pi_{	ext{impl}}}^{P_0}$ has knowledge of $\alpha$-values and $\gamma$ corresponding to $v$ which it obtains while emulating $F_{\text{setup}}$. The common values shared with $A$ are sampled using the appropriate shared keys, while other values are sampled at random.

Online:

- If dealers are $(P_1, P_1)$: $S_{\Pi_{	ext{impl}}}^{P_0}$ computes $\beta\nu$ using $v$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{impl}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ where $P_1$ acts as one of the sender for $\beta\nu$.
- If dealers are $(P_1, P_2)$: Analogous to the previous case, except that now $\beta\nu + \gamma$ is sent instead of $\beta\nu$.
- If dealers are $(P_3, P_1)$: $S_{\Pi_{	ext{impl}}}^{P_0}$ computes $\beta\nu$ and $\beta\nu + \gamma$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{impl}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ where $P_3$ acts as one of the sender for $\beta\nu$ and $\beta\nu + \gamma$.
- If dealers are $(P_0, P_2)$ or $(P_0, P_3)$ or $(P_3, P_2)$: $S_{\Pi_{	ext{impl}}}^{P_0}$ sets $v = 0$ and $\beta\nu = [\alpha_{x_1} + [\alpha_{x}]]$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{impl}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ where $P_1$ acts as the receiver for $\beta\nu$.

Fig. 54: Simulator $S_{\Pi_{	ext{impl}}}^{P_0}$ for corrupt $P_1$

The case for corrupt $P_3$ is given in Fig. 55.

Fig. 55: Simulator $S_{\Pi_{	ext{impl}}}^{P_0}$ for corrupt $P_3$

6) Dot Product Protocol: Here we give the simulation steps for $\Pi_{\text{dotp}}$. The case for corrupt $P_0$ is given in Fig. 56.

Preprocessing:

- $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ samples $[\alpha_{x_1}]_1, [\alpha_{x_2}]_2, [\Gamma_{x \otimes y}]_1$ using the respective keys with $A$. $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ samples $\gamma, \psi, \tau$ randomly on behalf of the respective honest parties, and computes $[\Gamma_{x \otimes y}]_2$ honestly.
- Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{impl}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ where $P_0$ acts as one of the sender for $[\Gamma_{x \otimes y}]_2$.
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ computes $\chi_1, \chi_2$ honestly. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{impl}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ where $P_0$ acts as the receiver for $\chi_1$ and $\chi_2$.

Online:

- $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ computes $[\beta_{x_1}^1], [\beta_{x_2}^2]$ honestly. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{impl}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ where $P_0$ acts as one of the sender for $[\beta_{x_1}^1], [\beta_{x_2}^2]$.
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ computes $\beta_{x_1}^1 + \gamma$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{impl}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ where $P_0$ acts as the receiver for $\beta_{x_1}^1 + \gamma$.

Fig. 56: Simulator $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ for corrupt $P_0$

The case for corrupt $P_1$ is given in Fig. 57. The case for corrupt $P_2$ is similar.

Fig. 57: Simulator $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ for corrupt $P_1$

Preprocessing:

- $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ samples $[\alpha_{x_1}]_1, [\alpha_{x_2}]_2, \gamma, \psi, \tau, [\Gamma_{x \otimes y}]_1$ using the respective keys with $A$. $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ samples $[\alpha_{x}]_2$ randomly on behalf of the respective honest parties.
- Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{impl}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ where $P_0$ acts as the server outside the computation for $[\Gamma_{x \otimes y}]_2$.
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ computes $\chi$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{impl}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ where $P_0$ acts as one of the sender for $\chi$.
- Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{impl}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ where $P_1$ acts as the server outside the computation for $\chi$.2.

Online:

- $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ computes $[\beta_{x_1}^1], [\beta_{x_2}^2]$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{impl}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ and $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$, where $P_1$ acts as one of the sender for $[\beta_{x_1}^1]$, and $P_1$ acts as the receiver for $[\beta_{x_2}^2]$.
- $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ computes $\beta_{x_1}^1 + \gamma$. Steps corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{impl}}$ are simulated according to $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ where $P_1$ acts as one of the sender for $\beta_{x_1}^1 + \gamma$.

Fig. 58: Simulator $S_{\Pi_{\text{impl}}}^{P_0}$ for corrupt $P_3$
7) **Truncation Pair Generation:** Here we give the simulation steps for \( \Pi_{\text{trgen}} \). The case for corrupt \( P_0 \) is given in Fig. 59. The case for corrupt \( P_3 \) is similar.

**Simulator** \( S_{\Pi_{\text{trgen}}}^{P_0} \)

- \( S_{\Pi_{\text{trgen}}}^{P_0} \) samples \( R_1, R_2 \) using the respective keys with \( A \).
- Steps corresponding to \( \Pi_{\text{jsh4}} \) are simulated according to \( S_{\Pi_{\text{jsh4}}}^{P_0} \) (Fig. 53).

Fig. 59: Simulator \( S_{\Pi_{\text{trgen}}}^{P_0} \) for corrupt \( P_0 \)

The case for corrupt \( P_1 \) is given in Fig. 60. The case for corrupt \( P_2 \) is similar.

**Simulator** \( S_{\Pi_{\text{trgen}}}^{P_1} \)

- \( S_{\Pi_{\text{trgen}}}^{P_1} \) samples \( R_1 \) using the respective keys with \( A \), and samples \( R_2 \) randomly.
- Steps corresponding to \( \Pi_{\text{jsh4}} \) are simulated according to \( S_{\Pi_{\text{jsh4}}}^{P_1} \) (Fig. 54).

Fig. 60: Simulator \( S_{\Pi_{\text{trgen}}}^{P_1} \) for corrupt \( P_1 \)

Observe from the simulation steps, that the view of \( A \) in the real world and the ideal world is indistinguishable.