Quantum Key Distribution with vacuum–one-photon entangled states

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We present a scheme to realize a quantum key distribution using vacuum–one-photon entangled states created both from Alice and Bob. The protocol consists in an exchange of spatial modes between Alice and Bob and in a recombination which allows one of them to reconstruct the bit encoded by the counterpart in the phase of the entangled state. The security of the scheme is analyzed against some simple kind of attack. The model is shown to reach higher efficiency with respect to prior schemes using phase encoding methods.

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Quantum cryptography, or, more correctly, quantum key distribution (QKD), allows two parties (Alice and Bob) to generate a secret key, which can be used as a one-time pad, with the guarantee that nobody else can significantly access the key. Whereas in the case of classical key distribution the security is connected with the computational complexity needed to acquire information, QKD secrecy is based on the laws of quantum mechanics [1]. The first mechanisms exploited is the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, suggested by Bennett and Brassard in Ref. 2 (BB84), while the other main proposal, introduced by Ekert 3, relies on the use of entangled states. The BB84 protocol 2 is based on the use of two nonorthogonal bases, and has to be distinguished by other schemes, such as the so-called B92 (Ref. 3) using only two nonorthogonal states, and different schemes which involve six states 4, 5. More recently, a lot of attention has been devoted to the possibility of using the same criteria of secrecy to realize protocols for deterministic secure direct quantum communication 6, 7. The polarization encoding technique in BB84 is limited by birefringence effects when optical fibers are used as channels, and thus phase encoding seems to be preferable for stability in long-distance communication 8, 9, 10. More recently, a differential phase-shift mechanism has been introduced [11] which shows higher efficiency with respect to the previous models.

Here we propose a new scheme of phase encoding based on vacuum–one-photon entangled states, which involves a complete symmetry between Alice and Bob, and is designed for stable transmission. A very different proposal for quantum cryptography which uses also single-particle entanglement appears in Ref. 12. The scheme is depicted in Fig. 1. Alice wants to create a QKD and to share it with Bob. She uses a single-photon source which injects the photon either on the mode $a_1$ or on the mode $a_2$. The modes $a_1$ and $a_2$ are mixed in a beam splitter ($BS_a$) and then the single photon is entangled on the two output modes $a'_1$ and $a'_2$. In terms of field operators the $BS_a$ action on the input-output modes is represented by

$$ a'^1_1 = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left( a'^\dagger_1 + a'^\dagger_2 \right) \quad (1) $$

and

$$ a'^1_2 = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left( a'^\dagger_1 - a'^\dagger_2 \right). \quad (2) $$

($a'^\dagger_i$ creates a photon on the mode $a'_i$). Thus the output state is $2^{-1/2} (|01\rangle + |00\rangle)$ if the photon is put in the mode $a_1$ or $2^{-1/2} (|01\rangle - |00\rangle)$ if the photon is put in the mode $a_2$. These two possible choices represent the logic values (the bit) which Alice wants to add in the QKD.
Therefore the bit is encoded in the phase of the entangled state emerging from \( BS_a \) which we conveniently rewrite as \( 2^{-1/2} (|01⟩ + n |10⟩) \) with \( n = -1, 1 \) (\( n = 1 \) will correspond to the logic value 1, \( n = -1 \) will correspond to the logic value 0).

Bob, being far apart, realizes the same operation through his own apparatus and creates the state \( 2^{-1/2} (|01⟩ + m |10⟩) \) (again, \( m = -1, 1 \)) on the modes \( b'_1 \) and \( b'_2 \). Obviously, \( n \) and \( m \) are completely uncorrelated.

Afterwards, Alice (Bob) stores the mode \( a'_1 \) (\( b'_1 \)) and sends to Bob (Alice) the mode \( a'_2 \) (\( b'_2 \)). Each of them has a second beam splitter (\( BS_{ab} \) and \( BS_{ba} \)) which is used to mix the mode previously stored with the mode received from the counterpart.

The initial state is

\[
|\phi⟩ = \frac{1}{2} \left( |0_{a'_1}1_{a'_2}⟩ + n |1_{a'_1}0_{a'_2}⟩ \right) \left( |0_{b'_1}1_{b'_2}⟩ + m |1_{b'_1}0_{b'_2}⟩ \right).
\]

Because of the unitary operation associated to \( BS_{ab} \) and \( BS_{ba} \), which consists of field mode relations analogous to Eqs. (1) and (2), the state \( |\phi⟩ \) becomes

\[
|\phi⟩ = \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} \left[ m (|0_{ab'_1}0_{ab'_2}⟩ - |0_{ab'_1}0_{ab'_2}⟩) + n (|1_{ab'_1}0_{ab'_2}⟩ - |0_{ab'_1}2_{ab'_2}⟩) + (mn - 1) (|1_{ab'_1}0_{ab'_2}⟩ + |1_{ab'_1}0_{ab'_2}⟩) \right] + (mn + 1) (|0_{ab'_1}1_{ab'_2}⟩ + |1_{ab'_1}0_{ab'_2}⟩). \tag{4}
\]

The protocol provides a measure realized both by Alice and Bob on the output modes of \( BS_{ab} \) and \( BS_{ba} \). The scheme works if and only if one and only one photon is detected by Alice and one and only one photon is detected by Bob. Thus the terms corresponding to two photons entering in one beam splitter and zero photons entering in the other beam splitter do not contribute, fixing to 1/2 the efficiency of the model.

Here we note that, in order to observe quantum interference on \( BS_{ab} \) and \( BS_{ba} \), and this is exactly the situation from which Eq. (4) is derived, the wave packets impinging the input arms of the beam splitters are required to be completely indistinguishable. To create such a situation the stored modes have to be opportunely delayed.

Let us suppose that Alice measures one photon on the mode \( ab_1 \). The state corresponding to this result is

\[
|\phi⟩ = \frac{1}{2} \left[ (mn + 1) |1_{ab_1}0_{ab_2}⟩ + (mn - 1) |1_{ab_1}0_{ab_2}⟩ \right]. \tag{5}
\]

As a consequence, Bob will detect his photon on the mode \( ba_1 \) if \( m = n \) or on the mode \( ba_2 \) if \( m = -n \). If Alice had counted “1” on the mode \( ab_2 \) the role of Bob’s detectors would change with respect to the relation between \( m \) and \( n \).

Then, Alice sends on the public channel her result to Bob, who, comparing the two results, is able to identify the value of \( n \) to add to the key. Due to the complete randomness of the output Alice’s result, there is no connection between the information sent on the public channel and \( n \). We assume that Alice and Bob perform the measurements in time coincidence. The public statement of which detector has counted one photon can take place after the entire key has been realized, as usual in QKD schemes, in analogy with basis reconciliation in the BB84.

Analyzing the scheme, one can state that the bit exchange is realized via entanglement swapping from the modes \( a'_1, a'_2 \) and \( b'_1, b'_2 \) to the modes \( ab_1, ab_2 \) and \( ba_1, ba_2 \), as already suggested in the framework of quantum cryptography. The scheme described is in some aspect related to a cryptographic system recently realized: also in that system both Alice and Bob create and exchange the key. The main differences concern the encrypting method (the polarization of photons) and a time hierarchy between Alice’s and Bob’s operations. As we shall later, this aspect will appear significant in the security of the scheme.

As in any QKD scheme, we need to consider the possibility that an eavesdropper (Eve) is trying to gain information, or simply to disturb the transmission in order to create errors in the reception.

Then, a control procedure has to be introduced. The simple idea is as follows: for a random subset of bits, during the public discussion, Alice can claim both which detector has recorded the photon and the value of \( n \) encoded, giving to Bob the possibility to verify that the global state was not affected by external interactions.

Apart from limitations on QKD arising from experimental imperfections regarding generation, transmission, and detection of qubits, we shall focus our attention on some simple attack strategy by some external eavesdropper.

First we describe the possibility of an attack only aimed to create errors in the key. If the disturbance consists in the subtraction of one photon the protocol automatically fails and there are no effects on the QKD creation. Better, Eve can act modifying the phase of the photons traveling in the public channel by an amount between 0 and \( \pi \). In such a circumstance the control procedure is able to detect the interference: if the phase change is \( \pi \) the role of detector pairs with respect to \( m \) and \( n \) is completely inverted, and when Alice announces...
both the result and \( n \), Bob immediately discovers Eve’s action. More significant is the case of phase change equal to \( \pi/2 \): now just about in 50\% of cases the action induces an error, and it is possible that when Alice launches the control routine Bob does not note the introduction of a third part. However, after \( \nu \) control steps, the probability that Eve is not revealed is \((1/2)^{\nu}\) and can be arbitrarily reduced. In the case of phase variation less than \( \pi/2 \) the number of control routines to get a given confidence level increases, but the probability that Eve’s action influences the key decreases.

Let us consider the case that Eve wants actually to get the key. Since the secret is encoded in the phase of an entangled state, and one of the components of the state is not accessible to anyone but Alice, there is no way to get information acting only on the public mode. Formally, this feature is expressed stating that the reduced density matrix of a single mode is diagonal and corresponds to a one-qubit maximally mixed state. The simplest method Eve can use is the intercept/resend strategy using the same setup as Bob. Naturally, Eve does not know either \( n \) nor \( m \) and has to create a different one-photon entangled state \( 2^{-1/2} (|01\rangle + n |10\rangle) \) (\( p = -1,1 \)), to mix her state with Alice’s state and to wait for Alice’s announcement about the measurement result to conclude the operation. As in the regular procedure between Alice and Bob, the scheme fails in half the number of cases, while in the remaining cases Eve acquires the bit. The quantum bit error rate (QBER) introduced by Eve in the sifted key (here represented by all bit exchanges with quantum bit error rate (QBER) introduced by Eve in) can be detected, due to lack of correlation between \( n \) and \( p \), while the amount of information gained by Eve is 1/2 per bit. Thus, comparing our model with the BB84, we conclude that, while Eve gets the same amount of information, she induces a QBER which is twice, and this feature strongly improves the robustness of the system against these attacks.

On the other hand, even when the eavesdropping action is performed, Bob needs to receive a mode from Alice. This aspect involves the resending strategy that Eve can choose. Eve used one photon to copy Bob’s operation, and whichever is the number of photons sent to Bob (0, 1, a combination of 0 and 1) the total number of photons revealed by Alice and Bob is no longer 2, but depends on the measurement process. Hence, by checking the numbers of contemporary clicks, Alice and Bob discover the presence of an eavesdropping action and abort the transmission. Moreover, even if the total photon number is 2, by the control routine mentioned above, Eve can be detected, due to the complete absence of correlation between \( n \), \( m \), and \( p \). One can argue that the eavesdropper can first find \( n \) and then send to Bob the correct state \( 2^{-1/2} (|01\rangle + n |10\rangle) \), but Alice’s announcement happens after Bob’s measurement, so that the use of coincidence measurements guarantees against this kind of action.

A more detailed analysis of eavesdropping influence on the counting rate can be formulated as follows. At the time of her own measurement, Eve learns how many photons Alice will count. Let us suppose that she is able (Eve is a quantum devil) first to perform the measurement and successively choose the resending strategy. The following situations are possible: (i) Eve knows that Alice will measure two photons: in such a case the best choice she can make is to send nothing to Bob; (ii) Alice measures zero photons: now the choice to minimize the error is to send one photon to Bob; (iii) Alice measures one photon: now the resending strategy does not matter. As a result, eavesdropping modifies the number of detected photons in half of the cases.

Therefore the control about the counting rate represents a powerful method to reveal eavesdropping to add to the control routine. Actually, in order to exploit this feature, a multiphoton resolution is needed, and this not yet fully available in the present laboratory technology, although some important step has been made.

Naturally, Eve can use an alternative strategy. She can create in any circumstance two entangled states to share with Alice and Bob, and, moreover, she can prepare other fake photons to send in order to enforce both Alice and Bob to count one photon. The cost to pay for this strategy is the following: due the probabilistic nature of projections, Alice and Bob expect to measure one photon just in 1/2 of cases; then Eve should simulate such behavior leaking a big amount of information. Thus this strategy is not convenient.

Another simple eavesdropping strategy is the so-called beam-splitting attack. Let us suppose that a coherent, weak source of photons is used instead of a single-photon source. Then, with a probability small but finite, the source can inject two (or more) photons. In BB84 schemes, the two photons contain the same information. Then, Eve can subtract one of them and, after the public discussion, perform the measurement selecting the right basis. In such a way she acquires the bit without introducing any kind of noise. Let us analyze what happens in our case, when, for example, Alice injects two photons onto \( BS_a \). The initial state is

\[
|\phi\rangle = \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} \left( |0a_1 2a_2\rangle + |2a_1 0a_2\rangle + n |1a_1 1a_2\rangle \right) \left( |0b_1 0b_2\rangle + m |1b_1 0b_2\rangle \right).
\]

A simple observation to make is that Eve should be able to factorize the state \(( |0a_1 1a_2\rangle + n |1a_1 0a_2\rangle) \) from \(( |0a_1 2a_2\rangle + |2a_1 0a_2\rangle + n |1a_1 1a_2\rangle) \), and to keep one copy. The global nonlocality and the inaccessibility of the mode \( a'_1 \) forbid this kind of eavesdropping strategy. Obviously, also the protocol fails due to the number of photons. What matters is that the security of the scheme is robust with respect to that situation.

Let us come back to analyze the differences between our proposal and the QKD realized by Degiovanni et al. \[17\]. In that case there is a time ordering between the
encoding operations of sender and receiver: that is, Alice create a secrete state, Bob acts on that state, and then resends it to Alice. Therefore an eavesdropper can extract some information by monitoring the state before and after Bob’s action. In our case we assume that Alice and Bob perform all operations in coincidence. Therefore all the information traveling on the public channel is not useful.

On the other hand, the presence of two senders and two receivers makes our scheme vulnerable versus a subtle strategy: Eve can short-circuit both Alice and Bob creating two Mach-Zehnder interferometers. In such a case the two speakers are separated and each single measurement result depends only, in a deterministic way, by the initial state created by the respective speaker. Thus Eve has only to wait for the public communication to perfectly eavesdrop the bit without introducing noise. Against this kind of attack, we are helped by the control method introduced by Degiovanni et al. Actually, checking the correlation between, for instance, the mode which Alice stores and the mode which she send to Bob, it is possible to reveal Eve’s presence in half of cases.

The theoretical efficiency $E$ of the scheme can be evaluated following the criteria introduced in Ref. [22]:

$$E = \frac{b_s}{q_t + b_t},$$

(7)

where $q_t$ is the number of quantum bit exchanged, $b_t$ is the number of classical bit exchanged, and $b_s$ is the number of secret bits added to the key. In our case, considering the “single shot” efficiency, and the fact that both Bob and Alice add one bit, one finds $q_t = 2$, $b_t = 1$, and $b_s = 1$, from which follows $E = 1/3$. If the same criterion is applied to Ref. [12], avoiding the use of active switches, that are not suitable for long distance fiber communication, we get $E = 1/6$. In the case of BB84 protocols the maximum efficiency that can be reached is $E = 1/4$. Thus our proposal seems to give some advantage. Actually, one should consider some unavoidable effect that could lower the practical efficiency of the scheme. For instance, our proposal requires the contemporary detection of two photons. Thus, the success probability scales with the square of detection efficiency, in contrast with the usual situation, where just one detection is needed.

To summarize, we have introduced a method to create a random QKD based on a mechanism of bit exchange between sender and receiver. The secret is encoded in the phase of a single-photon entangled state. Although the encoding is realized only through two orthogonal states, as in the Goldenberg-Vaidman protocol [23], quantum mechanics guarantees that no information is extracted acting just on a subsystem, and only the product between Alice’s and Bob’s states allows us to extract the key element. The security of the scheme against simple eavesdropping techniques, such as intercepting/resending strategy and beam-splitting attack, has been analyzed. Finally, a comparison with other phase encoding based schemes has been performed, showing the advantages of our proposal if addressed to long-distance optical fiber transmission. The scheme is completely symmetric with respect to the role of Alice and Bob, and is suitable for information exchange in a sort of quantum dialogue. Probably, the main obstacle towards a possible realization of the proposed protocol is represented by the difficulty to achieve photon number resolution.

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