INTRODUCTION

Studies of black resistance to slavery have often discussed the case of maroons, or runaway slaves, as an instance of defiance of established systems of social control. Yet historians and other social scientists have only recently begun the systematic investigation of maroon societies as a sociological phenomenon. Part of the impetus for this new trend has been the recognition that the former slaves did not only organize themselves into groups, thus creating ongoing Afro-American cultures on the frontiers of European habitation. In forming alternative, nearly independent societies at various levels of social and political organization, runaways also challenged the authority of New World governments. Maroons embodied an Afro-American consciousness that refused to be limited by the whites' conception and attempted manipulation of it.
While the renowned Iberianist Salvador de Madariaga may be justified in claiming that "...The Negroes never constituted a serious threat to the Spanish in the Indies," evidence continues to accumulate that rebellious slave groups throughout the Americas plagued the Europeans on a continual basis. The attempt to destroy fugitive settlements over the years depleted the colonists of manpower and substantial revenues. Most degrading of all for them, the colonists were occasionally forced to come to terms with their former bondsmen. As the French scholar Yvan Debbasch concluded for Antillean cases of peace-making, "Slave societies only emerged [from dealings with the maroons] by [granting them] amnesty, or at worst, by negotiation."

Where maroon communities existed long enough to become viable, their options grew regarding how to confront, or avoid, the colonial governments ideologically committed to their extinction. Constraints acted upon them as well. Maroon communities had to be sufficiently apart from the European settlements to assure the runaways of a large measure of physical independence, yet near enough to permit return in case of need or desire for tools, weapons, and often, women. At the same time, the proliferation of different European groups, comprised of rival economic interests — pirates, planters, ranchers, tradesmen — prompted certain Europeans to view the fugitives in a new light. By preference and perhaps by necessity, the maroon settlements held intercourse with particular groups of whites whom they found willing to defy the strictures of the ruling orders, which prohibited commerce with fugitive blacks. Together the two groups sought profit, as well as mutually exclusive benefits.

This essay attempts to shed light upon the conditions favoring exchange between maroon communities and particular European groups, at the expense of other European interests. Attention will equally be given to the consequences of such intercourse. Four instances will be presented, although cases could have been additionally drawn from the southern colonial frontier of the United States, Cuba, Dominica, the Guianas, and other locales. First described are alliances and their consequences between Isthmian maroons and English pirates against the Spanish colonists of...
Panama in the late 16th century; the shifting loyalties of “Spanish” maroons during and after the English conquest on Jamaica in 1655-1660 are then discussed. Hushed support of various moradores or Portuguese settlers for the maroons of Palmares, the bane of Pernambucan governors in the years 1603-1697, provides a third example. The final instance is the commercial entente between largely “French” maroons on the frontiers of Saint-Domingue on Hispaniola, with the Spanish settlers of rural Santo Domingo during the 18th century.

Discussion of the four case studies must be prefaced by a few remarks. European interests competing for resources in New World colonies were typically divided at two levels, one along national lines, the other along lines defined by different types of economic pursuits. In the first instance, for example, Spanish colonists attempted to inhibit the growth of French and English mercantile interests in the 16th century near their own centers of production and trade. A watchful eye was thus extended over rebellious slaves who attempted to co-operate with French and English pirates in order to pillage or circumvent the Spanish commercial monopoly in the Americas.

Maroon communities took full, organized advantage of such divisions between European powers for over three centuries. Because they needed or preferred to obtain female slaves and goods from the colonial settlements, the runaways kept themselves informed of European activities. Maroons remained a part, however peripheral, of European colonial systems. When opportunities presented themselves to side with one European nation against another, the fugitive black groups were not slow to weigh the costs and benefits of alliance-making. In some cases, pacts were made. The maroons, at least for a time, consequently tilted the balance in favor of the European group whose side they joined in international struggles for resources or commercial markets. In turn, the fugitive communities received goods and won the reputation, touted or infamous, of being staunch partners of the European interests whom they aided.

The second level of inter- and intra-national European competition, that between types of economic pursuits, becomes relevant here. Particular economic features, that is, characterize the
European groups with whom the maroons made alliances — and the groups against whom the maroons fought. The white partners — English pirates, the Spanish farmers, ranchers, and merchants of Jamaica and Santo Domingo — represented certain kinds of national interests opposed to other kinds of interests of different national groups.

The maroons' allies, in brief, were engaged in less labor- and capital-intensive enterprises than were their common enemies in local contests. Their interests focused on "settlement" activities, on subsistence, petty trade, and even piracy, rather than long-term, large-scale investments in labor and capital epitomized by plantation monocultures. What is at issue here are competitive schemes of colonization, or at least of colonial economic pursuits. The partners of the maroon societies were underdogs in economic and political struggles against greater labor- and capital-intensive European interests, or what has been called "exploitative" forms of colonial enterprise. These include the Spanish commercial monopolists on the Isthmus in the 16th century, the English monoculturist-invaders of mid-17th-century Jamaica, and the French planters of 18th-century Saint-Domingue. There is little wonder, then, that the "underdog" Europeans were constantly on the lookout to gain leverage over other European competitors; the maroons, through exchange and joint attacks on their common enemies, provided one such means of leverage.

The importance of the socioeconomic factor in alliances between maroons and Europeans unfolds more dramatically in the intra-national struggle for goods and markets discussed below, that is, the case of Palmares. Here, differences in nationality were not in question; English and French pirates did not battle Spanish vecinos or colonists as in Panama, nor did Spanish ranchers and merchants quarrel over land with French habitants, chiefly planters, as in Hispaniola. Instead, certain Portuguese moradores, notably those engaged in ranching and subsistence activities on farms on the colonial frontier, held commercial intercourse with the black fugitive settlements at the expense of other Portuguese moradores, especially large-scale sugar cane planters and millers. The maroons, that is, were in general the escaped slaves of the planters. The fugitives' continued existence in freedom meant the continued loss
in labor and capital for their owners.\textsuperscript{9}

At issue here is the intra-colonial competition between different forms and degrees of capital- and labor-intensive pursuits; between different approaches to the uses of land; in short, the classic contest involving cattlemen, small-scale farmers, and large-scale planters. These groups vied for land and resources as colonial expansion moved the frontier farther inland, closer to the maroons' own burgeoning holdings.\textsuperscript{10} The palmaristas, as these maroons of Pernambuco were called, took advantage of the internal divisions between the Brazilian moradores and used them for their own ends. They traded with the frontier settlers who needed their produce, game, and handicrafts, yet repulsed those who pressed too far onto those lands which they considered their own. Such commerce took place throughout the 17th century, despite the stated policy of the Pernambucan captaincy to return the maroons to servitude in the planters' regime.\textsuperscript{11}

One should not overstress the conscious concern of maroons or their European partners and antagonists regarding the specific nature of the economic pursuits in which each group was engaged. What mattered crucially were the actual goods and services which the groups offered each other, or which could be seized from their mutual enemies. Europeans and maroons changed sides in these international battles for resources, markets, and political control. Opportunism, in short, characterizes each of the four sets of alliances described below, tempered in the case of the pirate-maroon pacts by a spirit of friendship transcending the reciprocities of deal-making.

It should be noted, for example, that maroons even allied with their former masters, when sufficient rewards were offered or when the safeguarding of their independence necessitated such action. Such is the case described below for Spanish Jamaica. In the wake of the English invasion, the Spaniards faced extradition or imprisonment in the event of an English victory, while the largely autonomous maroons were threatened with re-enslavement. The masters and their former slaves thus co-operated in the struggle against the imperialist designs of the English for five years.

When compacts of this kind were established, moreover, the former masters were engaged in less capital- and labor-intensive
pursuits than were the European groups to whom they were opposed. The ex-slaveholders on Spanish Jamaica were largely ranchers and small farmers who needed the maroons’ aid for their economic survival, as well as political leverage over the English invaders; the latter arrived on the island with many more soldiers and supplies than the Spaniards had. Maroon groups who later joined the English forces only did so when threatened with the destruction of their resources for survival. As stated above, few maroon allegiances were so steadfast as to jeopardize the physical security of the fugitive communities.\textsuperscript{12}

Although the data employed to depict comparable social and economic relations in this essay are admittedly sparse, it is abundantly clear that colonial groups of all statuses were constantly obliged to reckon with maroon societies as a potent force. But to pretend that the disparate maroon groups described here always acted in similar ways would be an oversimplification; there were as many differences between the organization of the settlements of the maroons in Panama and Pernambuco as there were between those of the slaveowners. Nevertheless, the essay tries to elaborate the uniqueness of each of these situations to the extent the data warrant while, at the same time, attempting to demonstrate that recurrent problems and solutions for maroons, their allies, and antagonists, make for meaningful comparisons.

\textbf{Panama}

To begin with the earliest of the four cases, one must examine the nature of the fluctuating alliance between English pirates and the maroons of the Isthmus in the late 16th century. The Argentine student of Africans in the New World, CARLOS GUILLOT, believes that sporadic contacts had been made between corsairs and rebel slaves in the Caribbean as early as the 1520’s.\textsuperscript{13} Runaways occasionally joined the crews of vessels pillaging gold and silver from the Spanish commercial monopoly. More often, however, they served the freebooters on land as informers, scouts, and guides.\textsuperscript{14} Maroons did not fill these capacities unthinkingly, however. They were aware that these very corsairs often made their
fortunes as slavers and kept bondsmen in their Caribbean haunts. In raids on Spanish towns, moreover, the freebooters often killed both white and black defenders. What, then, ever attracted Panamanian maroons to take up, if intermittently, the cause of the English pirates?

Some knowledge of the social and economic organization of the Panamanian colony is necessary as background to answering this question. From the early decades of the 16th century onward, the Isthmus was exploited for its own mineral resources. After the discovery of larger deposits of ores farther south in Peru, however, Panama became the major thoroughfare for Spaniards in transit between the metropolis and the Pacific colonies. The search for gold and silver continued on the Isthmus itself, nonetheless. A number of important industries grew up around the bullion traffic and the mines, including shipbuilding, freight handling, road construction, and outfitting and hostelry services for the Peru-bound settlers. Hundreds of blacks were employed in these burdensome tasks and in agricultural pursuits.

By mid-century literally thousands of blacks worked for the several hundred whites, concentrated in the small fortified cities of Nombre de Dios on the Atlantic and Panamá on the Pacific. So lucrative was the slave trade and so troublesome the blacks that head taxes were placed on bondsmen entering and leaving the colony. The vecinos or white inhabitants provided themselves with police forces from these revenues to assure their own security.¹⁵ They had need to do so. With the discovery of new mines, fresh slaves were brought to the colony, industry of all sorts intensified, and so did the repercussions: slaves revolted from their masters as early as 1525. Palenques or runaway communities were formed and flourished for at least five decades thereafter. Prior to the alliance with the renowned pirate Sir Francis Drake in the 1570’s, these maroon settlements already contained hundreds of members. The largest, that of the "king" BAYANO, was comprised of 1200 "able-bodied" males and females, and sheltered young, old, and infirm maroons. Nearly six years of sustained fighting by the Spaniards were required to subdue BAYANO and his followers.
Yet within two years of their defeat, the new viceroy of Peru, the Count of Nieva, wrote to the Spanish king that "... through the mountains and wooded hills of this kingdom of Tierra Firme run great numbers of blacks called maroons and that these live without law and are so many and daring that they rob and kill those traveling with their gold and silver and merchandise in order to take these from them; and that these [maroons] have their treaties and secret confederations with other blacks in service and freemen that there are in... Nombre de Dios and Panama; that [all these together] are [three-fourths] of the people that [live] in this kingdom; and if they so desired [as each day it is feared that they will do] with great facility they could cause a rebellion which would be difficult to put down..."16

The upshot of these remarks refers to the hostile gulf between blacks and their masters in Panama. Laboring in the mines and transport industries was sufficiently brutalizing to press thousands of slaves to flee in the period 1525-1580. The Spaniards alternately attempted to apply harsh and tolerant legal measures to keep the blacks at work and to encourage the return of runaways, but to little avail.17

Indeed, by the time of the arrival of Drake and his successor John Oxenham, estimates of the numbers of maroons had swelled to 3000, while the Spanish population still numbered in the hundreds. One document, found in the Spanish Archives of the Indies by the English scholar Irene Wright, claimed that Ronconcholon, the principal stronghold of the fugitives in the interior Vallano region, contained 1700 fighting men alone in the 1570’s. Such figures may not be wildly egregious. In the depositions taken from the Spaniards following their attacks on the palenques, they reported having entered one village with some 217 large houses and many smaller ones. Other settlements included as many as 80 large houses and “numerous” small dwellings. Drake himself visited one maroon town with 55 houses, boasting streets, a wall for security on one side, and further protection from a dike eight feet wide. Cultivated fields and small livestock holdings adjoined these palenques.18

Despite the seeming autonomy of these settlements, Spanish correspondence reminds us that assaults by the maroons continued throughout the 1560’s and 1570’s. While their object primarily seems to have been the capture or cajoling away of black women and men, the maroons also stole gold and silver and killed the Spaniards who resisted them. Given their independent, relative success in committing razzias for obtaining what they could not
produce themselves, the question must be posed again. Why did the maroons periodically, and eagerly, join with the English pirates?

Some of the advantages of alliance are immediately clear. The corsairs represented a source of desired European goods in trade. The English would facilitate the maroons' acquisition of Spanish property on which the bullion-hungry pirates did not place highest priority, namely female slaves and scrap iron for tools and ritual purposes. Finally, the English pirates would serve the maroons as cohorts to visit vengeance on their common enemy.

Disadvantages of an alliance with the English corsairs were to be appreciated chiefly with bitter hindsight. While the maroons did not make all their resources available to DRAKE and later OXENHAM, their expectations from the partnership were not in the end realized. The maroons were in fact somewhat heady with regard to their fast friends. EDMUND MORGAN is quite right to conclude in his recent work on early English colonization that "The accounts suggest a camaraderie (between the pirates and the former slaves) that went beyond the mutual benefits of the alliance."19

The pact began fruitfully. DRAKE cultivated the maroons' friendship during reconnaissances of the Isthmus in the late 1560's with his fellow corsair SIR JOHN HAWKINS and on his own in 1570. It is evident from both Spanish and English contemporary documents that DRAKE simply could not have mounted his famous attack on the caravans carrying bullion overland in 1573 without the help of the maroons, led by their captains DIEGO and PEDRO. The English in fact had failed on their own to do so.

In the Anglo-maroon venture, however, several dozen blacks acted in the capacity of spies, trail-blazers, boat builders, porters, and soldiers for the pirates. The maroons also provided DRAKE and his crew of scarcely a dozen men with food and shelter during the winter months of preparation for the attack. The fugitives counseled the pirates on effective means of highwaymanship. Although it took two attempts to seize the mule train carrying the bullion, thanks to the bungling efforts of a few of the English, the unprecedented confiscation of gold and silver on land succeeded. Waves of delight and shock were sent through the courts of England and
Spain. The maroons were duly rewarded and Drake sailed away, promising to return.²⁰

The pirates' friendship had consequences unforeseen by the maroons, however. The Isthmian runaways' greatest feat, and their eventual capitulation, came about through renewing their alliance with Drake's successor, John Oxenham. With the blacks' help, Oxenham and his men were able to enter the Pacific — hitherto untouched by marauding English ships — to capture pearls and bullion before these had been loaded at Panamá for shipment over-land to Nombre de Dios.

Despite his apparent cordiality, bravery, and skill, Oxenham paled in comparison with Drake. From the onset, the novice captain suffered difficulties. Oxenham's flagship was captured by the Spaniards while he was away in the midst of contacting the maroons for aid. Such carelessness prompted the maroon captain Juan Vaquero to pact with Oxenham in a more deliberate, opportunistic fashion than had Pedro and Diego with Drake. The depositions given by Oxenham at the time of his capture by the Spaniards clearly show that the corsair had terms dictated to him by the ex-slaves. These conditions included the awarding of all slaves captured to the maroons, as well as the killing of all Spaniards whom they met in combat. In exchange for these stipulations, Oxenham was promised whatever bullion that he and the blacks captured together.²¹

The maroons were cautious enough to allot only limited supplies of men and goods to Oxenham. They did not realize, however, that the discovery of the English flagship hastened the Spaniards to launch the largest offensive ever against the combined forces of pirates and maroons.

One oidor or magistrate expressed the typical Spanish fear of the cimarrones and their European allies when he wrote "And although at all times they [the maroons] are very harmful, when they join with Frenchmen or Englishmen with whom they are friendly, they are noxious, availing themselves of the industry and arms of these foreigners, for which reason this city is exposed to great danger by these enemies."²²

Industry and arms were not the only qualities and goods which the maroons shared with Oxenham and his men. They let their own fortitude and resolve slip in the company of these Englishmen. At
one point, a party of pirates and maroons were captured by pur-
suing Spaniards who came upon the allies feasting merrily and
enjoying the shade. In another instance, a Spaniard captured by the
allies begged the English not to allow a Negro to beat him, as the
maroon prepared to do so. The pirates in fact did keep the maroon
from striking the Spaniard, thereby violating one of the conditions
of the accord between them.25

More significantly, the characteristic maroon concern with their
own security was unwittingly relaxed. The Panamanian colonists,
supplied with experienced troops from Peru, hunted down the Eng-
lish and the maroons with unprecedented determination. From the
Spanish viewpoint, the founding of an Anglo-maroon "colony" or
at least permanent alliance on the Isthmus was a distinct possibility.
The enemies had to be reduced before such an anomaly became a
reality.

Although the actual numbers of maroons caught by the Span-
iards were few, others gave themselves up to the Spaniards and in-
formed them of the whereabouts of the English. Needless to say,
the overwhelming majority of maroons ceased to give quarter to
the pirates and actually killed at least one of the English. Other
blacks sought to kill ANTON MANDINGA, another maroon leader,
who had helped the pirates. These maroons blamed him for the
troubled conditions into which they had fallen as a result of the al-
liance.

The Spanish colonial soldiers burned the houses and crops of the
maroons, obliging the ex-slaves to resume a true life-on-the-run.
OXENHAM and most of his few dozen English comrades were cap-
tured or hanged. Those few who made their escape promised re-
venges for their joint defeat to the equally few maroons who con-
tinued to help them. These corsairs pledged to return with rein-
forcements led by DRAKE himself.24

Two consequences followed the rout of the English and the
dispersal of their maroon allies. The remaining groups of runaways
were approached by the Spaniards and asked to settle in two towns
near Panamá and Nombre de Dios, under the indirect supervision
of colonial officials. They were guaranteed their liberty as well as
tools, livestock, and seed to raise their own crops. The maroons,
however, were obliged to return any runaways who might attempt
to join them. Negotiations took a number of years, but a few hundred maroons did take up residence in the settlements of Santa Cruz la Real de los Negros Cimarrones and Santiago del Principe de los Negros Mogollones.25

The black rationale for such a decision is not hard to understand. The maroons could not defeat the Panamanians reinforced with Peruvian soldiers and arms, or hold them off indefinitely. Neither could they rely upon the English as a constant source of military or political support. In terms of the few positive benefits offered, the maroons’ status as borros, or freemen, and means of livelihood, were assured.

Reasons behind the Spanish offer are less well understood. There seem to have been sufficient numbers of peaceable black borros living in the colony to convince the Spaniards that, given similar circumstances, the maroons would pursue an equally tranquil existence. A number of colonists, namely the military men who destroyed the maroons’ own settlements, stated that these towns had been amply well kept, and that encapsulated freedom would yield commerce between the groups, rather than razzias against the whites. Most likely, the actual pursuit of the maroons demonstrated to the Spaniards that the fugitives’ numbers were fewer than imagined; thus, the threat to Spanish life and property could best be reduced by containing at least some maroons in partly autonomous settlements.

As if to ensure further the end of substantial trouble with maroons, the Spanish Crown prohibited the importation of additional slaves into the colony, other than those in transit to colonies south of the Isthmus. With the former maroons in part encapsulated and the number of slave imports diminished, frequency of hostile maroon activities declined in the last two decades of the 16th century. The black population, slave and free, dipped to some 4000 by 1607, roughly a third of what it had been 25 years earlier. Maroons in that year were said to number only 94.26

The hopes to see the return of Drake and the revival of what Guillot has termed the belle époque de marronage in Hispanic America did not die totally. One of Oxenham’s captains, known as Peter Canoa or Chalona, arranged for the maroon Anton Mandinga to settle on the north coast of the colony. There he
was to await \textsc{DRAKE} or some other corsair. A signal — a black flag — was agreed upon to alert the maroons of his arrival.\textsuperscript{27}

More striking still is a Spanish report of the arrival of a small ship at the English port of "\textit{Fristol}" in January, 1581.

According to \textsc{Captain Sarmiento de Gamboa}, the ship "\textit{which [claimed] to come from the Indies... carried nine creoles of those parts, mulattoes, mestizos, and others, [who intended to hurry] the corsair Francis Drake, telling him how long he was taking in [returning to the site] where they were awaiting him."}\textsuperscript{28}

Despite the misfortunes that the maroons had suffered with \textsc{Oxenham}, the voyage of these "\textit{creoles}" — apparently fugitives of all kinds — reflects the degree to which \textsc{DRAKE} had been held in esteem by the Isthmian Negroes. The alliance had been only a temporary one, but circumstances in the Spanish colony prompted some individuals to go so far as to cross the ocean to seek its renewal! \textsc{DRAKE}, however, did not return to Panama for another 14 years and died during a series of attacks there on the Spaniards. He did not seek the aid of the maroons — or their descendants — who had been of such help to him before. There may simply have been too few of them in 1595 to reconstitute the "\textit{internal}" enemy hitherto so feared by the Spanish and so highly regarded by the English.\textsuperscript{29}

The Anglo-maroon alliance of the 16th century, despite its final lapse into disharmony, can tell us something about the nature of cultural contacts which were to recur throughout the period of European colonization in the New World. The Americas did not merely provide a new arena for playing out older Continental political rivalries, but offered a setting for the participation of African, Afro-American, and indigenous groups. However much they tried, Europeans could not unilaterally control the political or cultural definitions of the social situations involving black and red peoples. In the quest for bullion, land, and new sources of human labor, Europeans were obliged to accommodate themselves to the social organization of the very groups over whom they sought hegemony.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsc{DRAKE} and other English and French pirates thus reckoned with the Isthmian maroons as an independent, yet interdependent, party to the contest for effective political control of parts of the Panama-
nian colony. If the English were veterans of maritime competition with the Spaniards in European waters, the black fugitives had proved themselves to be powerful adversaries of the Spaniards on land — and it was there that the corsairs needed allies. In order to capture the highly prized Spanish bullion, then, Drake and Oxenham had to adapt themselves to the maroons’ programs and schedules for attacking the blacks’ former masters. Success depended upon an intimate knowledge of the Spaniards’ whereabouts and movements, on which the maroons — and their contacts among the slaves — typically kept a vigilant watch.

It would be hasty, however, to conclude that relations between the English pirates and the maroons were totally asymmetrical, in terms of goals or even means. Each group possessed technological resources and expertise which complemented the other’s, sets of skills and materials functionally attuned to cope with the exigencies of the environment and the challenge of the Spaniards. Each in short marshalled elements from discrete cultural repertoires in order to gain leverage, if only temporarily, over a mutual foe.

The Anglo-maroon treaty thus reflected a joint awareness of the advantage of alliance in the face of Spanish military might and commercial wealth. Although the Panamanians and their reinforcements ultimately drove off the pirates, and dispersed or “encysted” many of the maroons, the pact against the Spaniards was not totally in vain. The treaty provided a precedent for alliance-making between corsairs and maroon communities over the course of three centuries of Caribbean history. Such alliances were concluded not only on the Isthmus during that period, but in 16th- and 17th-century Hispaniola, 19th-century Cuba, and in other locales at other times as well.31

JAMAICA

A significantly different situation between Spaniards, Englishmen, and maroons was played out in the installment of Oliver Cromwell’s forces in Jamaica in the mid-17th century. As part of the English Lord Protector’s imperialist “Western Design”, the English firmly intended to establish colonies devoted to mono-
culture in the Caribbean. The Spanish colonists in Jamaica, to the contrary, devoted themselves to "settlement" activities rather than those of labor- or capital-intensive "exploitation". The island was chiefly devoted to ranching industries and to a limited amount of crop raising and milling. The Spaniards scarcely held rein over their slaves as had their compatriots on the Isthmus a century earlier.

One of the best indicators of the more relaxed Spanish regime in Jamaica is the fact that the blacks left on the island at the onslaught of the English did not turn against their former masters. On the contrary, they supported co-operatively and autonomously the efforts of the Spaniards to defeat the English for nearly five years in the period 1655-60. The decision by the leader of a substantial community of independent ex-slaves to join the English, however, turned the tide of war firmly against the few remaining Spanish troops. In spite of the invaders’ victory, not all fugitive groups reached decisive accord with the English soldiers and planters. These maroons and their descendants troubled the new European occupants of Jamaica for many decades thereafter.

Historical background to this shifting wartime alliance can be only partially delineated here, given the sparsity of the documentation. Of the 2500-3000 residents of the island prior to the invasion in 1655, it is estimated that half of these were slaves. The majority was engaged in keeping and tracking cattle and hogs. These blacks possessed an intimate knowledge of the settler colony which would later serve them well against the invading English colonists. Few cases of marronage were reported, and there appear to have been no palenques formed before 1655. Those instances of maroon activity which did occur, cited in one of the extant memoirs of 1570, might have arisen as much as a result of the master’s poverty or indulgence as of his cruelty. The population at the time of invasion included creolized slaves, free blacks, and mulattoes who were not only allowed to carry weapons but who were trained to serve in the Spaniards’ militia. With the exception of a few leading families, or hidalgos, the Spaniards lived without large holdings of capital.

The English invasion brought freedom to many blacks in a unique way. While many Spaniards fled with their families, slaves,
and possessions to the nearby colony of Cuba, numbers of them were obliged to free their slaves or simply to abandon them on the island. Others may well have been under such limited control that they chose to remain on the island, regardless of the departure of the masters. The Spaniards lacked the means to compel such slaves to join them, while others could not afford to transport their former bondsmen.

As a result, then, some blacks of Spanish Jamaica became maroons, or at least "independent ex-slaves" by default. These remaining blacks numbered in the hundreds, but the nature of their legal status is less clear. DON CRISTÓBAL DE YSASSI, the last Spanish governor and leader of the resistance, claimed to have settled the blacks in three "stockades" and promised them clothes and their freedom as rewards if they fought with him.34 Alliance with the maroons was thus formally initiated and anxiously maintained by the Spaniards.

Extant English documents, however, emphasize another perspective, that of the blacks' independence from their former masters. Even if YSASSI had originally organized the fugitive blacks into their own communities, the latter not only proceeded to live apart from the Spaniards; they struck out against the invaders on their own as well. Evidence suggests that the black communities kept constantly on the move, rather than base their activities in a sedentary palenque or stockade. Although CROMWELL urged his forces to come to terms with the "Indians and Blacks," no entente was reached with the redoubtable maroons before 1660. Thousands of English soldiers and settlers, ravaged by disease and shortages of food, worried even more about attacks on their lives from the black guerrillas.

MAJOR-GENERAL SEDGWICK wrote that "Concerning the state of the enemy on shore here, the Spaniard is not considerable, but of the Blacks there are many who are like to prove as thorns and pricks in our sides, living in the mountains and woods, a kind of life both natural, and I believe, acceptable to them, and are enemies to us, looking upon us as a bloody people, giving no quarter... there scarce a week passeth without one or two slain by them, and as we grow secure, grow bold and bloody... they must either be destroyed or brought in upon some terms or other, or else they will be a great discouragement to the settling of a people here."35

S.A.G. TAYLOR's work The Western Design includes references to
the auxiliary performance of the blacks in the Spanish attacks. Their participation in the skirmishes was often crucial in giving victory to the Spaniards. Perhaps more significantly still, blacks seem to have been largely absent from the battles which the defenders lost.36

The problem of identifying which elements of the Hispano-maroon forces were most effective in defending the island is further complicated by the fact that some of these men were descended from both Spaniards and blacks. Groups attacking the English were occasionally cited as being comprised of members of mixed racial origin, although numbers of each in the combined forces are rarely clearly cited. In any case, the Spanish dependence on the autonomous fugitives was not limited to manpower alone. Resistance would have long since collapsed had the black troops not also supplied the defenders with meat and other provisions, taken from their fields in inaccessible locations in the hills.37

Three distinct fugitive communities are mentioned in the literature, although others may have existed as well. The first, "a palinco of 150," was led by a maroon named JUAN LUBOLO and maintained itself in the uplands above Guanaboa Vale, at the site today called Lluidas Vale. There, crops were tended and cattle grazed in a natural enclosure obscured by the hills. A man named JUAN DE SERRAS headed the second group which inhabited the hills at Los Vermejales. The third mobile community, about which little is known, roamed the valley between the Clarendon Plains and the settlement at Porus.38

It is important to note that these maroons made incursions upon the English for reasons different from those of the Spaniards. Having won de facto freedom from their former masters, the ex-slaves warily avoided falling into servitude at the hands of the new European invaders. The arrival of English colonists exerted different demographic pressures on the blacks than it did on the few remaining Spaniards. The maroons had too much invested in the island, in the form of their crops and livestock, to leave with the handful of Spaniards struggling to ward off defeat. The defenders, meanwhile, were obliged to offer "official" freedom to the blacks in 1658 and again in 1659, as if to assure themselves repeatedly of the maroons' loyalty.
The decisive indications of black advantage over the Spaniards — and perhaps English leverage over the maroons — dovetailed in events in 1660. In that year Lieutenant Colonel Tyson of the English forces reached Guanaboa Vale and discovered Luboło’s stronghold, with its hidden 200 acres under cultivation. Access to the valley had significantly affected the course of the war, since its fields had yielded produce to the blacks and Spaniards for nearly five years.

Luboło was caught between growing pressure from the English, in the form of their ever-increasing numbers and their physical dissemination over the island, and his loyalty to the Spaniards. The black leader could not afford the threatened loss of his community’s agricultural holdings at English hands, and thus came to terms with them. In exchange for freedom for his followers, loyal service to the English, and the title of Governor of the Vale for himself, Luboło joined the invaders’ forces. These rewards overshadowed the Spanish defenders’ offering of clothes and freedom. On the verge of losing the island, Ysasso was unable to keep his pledges to the maroons.

The Spaniards could not hope to hold out withoutJuan Luboło’s company. They had lost an ally too well acquainted with their own hidden camps to offer much effective resistance. Within two months of Luboło’s capitulation, Ysasso and the remaining Spanish forces fled to Cuba. As if to indicate which group genuinely constituted the most serious threat to the English, however, Luboło first marched against the maroon band led by Juan de Serras at Los Vermejales. De Serras had apparently not wavered in his support of Ysasso, or in his independent campaign against the invaders.

After the departure of the Spaniards, the Vermejales maroons continued to vex the English. New planters with their slaves were flocking to the island and had already begun to press upon Juan de Serras’ “territory”. The “exploitative” phase of English colonization, at least as far as the maroons were concerned, had already begun. Juan Luboło and some of his followers once more attacked his former black allies in 1663, but De Serras ambushed his troops and Luboło was killed. The rest of Luboło’s community either died out or migrated farther to the west.
The influx of English colonists and their slaves continued, however. Some 7500 blacks were brought to the island in the years 1662-64 alone, in order to work in the rapidly sprawling plantations. The Vermejales community did not look favorably upon the overtures for peace made to them by the English until 1667. As conditions for the cessation of hostilities, JUAN DE SERRAS asked not only for freedom for his group, but for the right to trade with the English. This crucial aspect of economic intercourse was to recur in Palmares, where the seemingly capitulating maroons also asked for the exchange of goods with the Pernambucans. JUAN DE SERRAS further requested to be settled apart from the incoming slaves, since, it is recorded. "They (the Vermejales community) should never well agree with the Negroes about town." Even in the event of surrender, maroon communities reserved the right to certain forms of autonomy.

The pact was short-lived, however. In 1668, the Vermejales group killed five hunters who had ostensibly come to their settlement to trade but who, they claimed, instead stole several back women. Two years later, the black community attacked and killed another five men in the Clarendon region. No motive was given for the action. One can speculate, however, that the advance of plantation cultivation, especially in the form of sugar cane monoculture, was regarded as trespass by the maroons who previously frequented such areas.

A similar sort of clash was to occur between the maroon communities of Palmares and le Maniel, with the encroaching planters and ranchers of Pernambuco and Saint-Domingue, respectively. When pressed for land on which to grow their provisions and graze their livestock, or even the preservation of a buffer area, maroons all over the Americas fought to preserve their independence by taking the offensive. Europeans learned at great cost to keep their distance, unless convinced that negotiation or total warfare alone could resolve the hostilities. Not all solutions were quickly devised, however. The Vermejales community, it should be noted, was never completely reduced by the English. Their descendants may well have been among the maroons who obliged the English to negotiate a major peace settlement in the 1730's.

Two aspects of the changing alliance between fugitives and
Europeans prompt additional comment, despite the incomplete historical record. One is first struck by the tenacity with which Ysassi pursued his defense of the island, having at one point only 40 Spaniards in his company. The source of his resolution seems to have been his black allies. Informed of Lubolo’s desertion and subsequent attacks on Juan de Serras and on his own camp, the Spanish governor immediately wrote to the English, asking for terms of capitulation.46

Noteworthy, too, is the intensity of Juan Lubolo’s dedication to the English cause, having previously served the Spaniards so well. Nothing has come to light in the historical record that the maroon leader was coerced into attacking his former ally Juan de Serras; rather, he seems to have done so willingly. The capture of runaways by former maroons occurs frequently in different places and at different times in the Americas, as mentioned in the case of the resettled maroons of Panama. Yet rarely did two groups of blacks, gaining their de facto freedom simultaneously and under identical circumstances, attempt to eradicate each other. The example of Juan Lubolo and Juan de Serras is a significant reminder that maroons in the same colony could and did pursue disparate strategies in confronting the same groups of Europeans.

Pernambuco

Not only the maroons of Palmares, but the moradores living alongside them as well, devised different approaches for dealing with each other in the interior of Pernambuco, Brazil, in the 17th century. The fact is not surprising, given that the network of quilombos or runaway communities comprising “os Palmares” stretched over several thousand square miles and numbered between 16,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. Documentary evidence on the nature of the black communities is admittedly scanty. Sufficient data exist, however, for inferring that various sorts of commerce took place in the frontier between the black and white settlements. Despite the ideological commitment of the Pernambucans to keep slaves at their tasks, third parties of moradores put their immediate economic interests above those of the captaincy and traded with the
Such intercourse was to take place for many decades during the lifetime of Palmares.

A lengthy historical sketch of the development of the black communities will help elucidate the form that alliance-making took with individuals outside. It should first be noted that as early as 1580, prior to Brazil's sugar boom, the black population of the colony had already reached 10,000. By 1630, Pernambuco alone imported some 4400 African slaves annually, many of whom worked in the captaincy's burgeoning cane fields and its 150 engenhos or sugar mills. Conditions in the captaincy for blacks were extremely harsh. As CHARLES BOXER has remarked, "If Pernambuco was an earthly paradise for the extravagant sugar-planters, it was also... an earthly hell for their Negro slaves."* 

Numbers of blacks were trained to fight the Dutch invaders who occupied the colony in the first half of the 17th century, winning freedom promised for their efforts; the majority of the slaves, however, had no such avenues for gaining liberty and were kept in agricultural tasks. Some slaves fled to join the Dutch, but most blacks abstained from taking sides in these intra-European contests. Among these slaves, nonetheless, were many awaiting their chance to flee to the black stronghold Palmares. Over the course of the century, fresh numbers of slaves would do the same.*

As early as 1603, the third governor-general of Brazil, DIOGO BOTELHO, sent an expedition against the young fugitive settlement of Palmares. Mention is made of the quilombo again in 1613.

This citation in a "Report on the State of Brazil" claimed that "... some 30 leagues inland, there is a site between mountains called Palmares which harbors runaway slaves fleeing from work whose attacks and raids force the whites into armed pursuits which amount to little for they return to raid again... This makes it impossible to... end the transgressions which gave Palmares its reputation."* 

Although no additional mention is made of the quilombo, or quilombos, during the subsequent two decades, the intrusion of Dutch forces into the captaincy gave some slaves the opportunity to flee into the bush. In their own pursuit of blacks, Dutch reconnaisances made significant inroads into the hinterlands, including a survey of the fugitive black communities. The Dutch found that the Palmares of the 1640's was comprised of two large quilombos.
of 5000 inhabitants, and a number of smaller settlements whose total population was estimated at 6000. Prior to the entrance of the Dutch into the quilombos, the king of Palmares had been warned from unnamed contacts in the principal Pernambucan town of Alagoas that the European invaders were on their way toward the fugitive communities. The black leader thus proceeded to scatter his subjects into the bush. These tactics of espionage and evasion were to prove typical of Palmares’ military strategy — as well as that of maroon communities throughout the New World — for years to come.

In their accounts of the explorations of the quilombos, the Dutch marveled at the “church,” forges, and council house in the principal settlement, and at the richly planted fields of maize, manioc, beans, sugar cane, and other crops nearby. Admiration, however, did not preclude destruction. As the Spaniards had struck at their black enemies in Panama, so did the Dutch soldiers in Pernambuco. They burned the palmaristas’ holdings in the hopes of reducing the threat from the maroons.31

With the retreat of the occupying forces in 1654, the Portuguese largely busied themselves with the rebuilding of the captaincy for the next decade, as did the palmaristas in their own settlements. Several historians of Palmares, including EDISON CARNEIRO, M.M. DE FREITAS, and DÉCIO FREITAS, state that in such periods of relative tranquility commerce of all sorts flourished between the palmaristas and various sectors of the moradores. The maroons traded produce, game, and handicrafts in exchange for tools, clothes, firearms, manufactured goods, and information regarding Europeans’ movements against them.

Even town merchants, according to the noted Brazilianist ARTHUR RAMOS, joined in handling commerce on behalf of the palmaristas.32 The historian SEBASTIÃO DA ROCHA PITTA, writing in 1730, claimed that some of the moradores exchanged firearms for gold and silver that the blacks had captured in razzias against the whites.33 CARNEIRO goes so far as to say that “The blacks lived well with the moradores, ..., so long as the latter did not become interned, with their corrals (corrais) and plantations (plantações), in the free lands of Palmares.”34

Which sectors of moradores, however, were the maroons’ actual
trading partners? The term *moradores* is a general one; it refers to all settlers in Brazil, from subsistence farmers to the *senhores do engenho*, the wealthy millers and planters of Pernambucan sugar cane. Likewise, the *plantações* mentioned in the quotation from CARNEIRO denotes cultivated areas, "plantings" of any sort, whether these were the garden patches of ranchers or poor settlers, or the large scale monocultures. It is not recorded that any *senhor do engenho* ever held intercourse with the *palmaristas*, nor is such an economic alliance likely to have occurred. The large scale planters and millers were the principal owners of slaves in the captaincy, the local "exploitative" interests, who sought the return of the maroons rather than their economic flourishing.

We can only tentatively conclude, then, that those engaged in ranching and subsistence activities were the frontier allies of the *palmaristas*, to the total exclusion of any cane planter. The ranchers and farmers, however, would themselves have had interests at least spatially opposed to the large scale planters’ regime, given the competition for land between planters and ranchers or small farmers. The ranchers, employing fewer slaves in less labor-intensive tasks than sugar cane cultivation and milling, were more likely than the planters to have entered into trading relations with the *palmaristas* for three reasons. First of all, the maroons had fled principally from the harsh discipline of the plantocracy, not from work on the cattle ranges. They would thus have borne few specific grudges against the ranchers, from whom the domesticate-less *palmaristas* obtained supplies of meat. Secondly, some sort of working relations would have to have been established on the frontier, given that the ranchers could not demarcate the boundaries of their holdings as clearly as the millers and planters. As will be discussed below, however, even treaty-making in these instances between maroons and ranchers did not stop incursions between them. Finally, the poorer farmers and ranchers would have been eager to trade for the *palmaristas’* produce and goods which circumvented the standard — and costly — Pernambucan mechanisms of production and exchange.

Despite these reasons for reaching informal compacts, ranchers and farmers were obliged to weigh the benefits of trade against the costs of impinging on lands which the maroons considered to be in their purview. As CARNEIRO suggests, overstepping of these
bounds prompted retaliation. More conclusive evidence cannot be offered here, given the lack of data delimiting the actual distribution of ranches, small farms, mills, and large-scale plantations on the Pernambucan frontier in the 17th century.\textsuperscript{35}

DÉCIO FREITAS, the Brazilian historian who spent five years researching the growth and defeat of Palmares, claims that Pernambucans were not the only colonists to hold commercial intercourse with the palmaristas. Cattle breeders from Bahia to the south did the same. In their expansion northward, Bahian herds were driven across the S\£o Francisco River and onto lands within the domain of the escaped slaves. In exchange for informal grazing rights, the palmaristas demanded and received tools, arms, salt, and information. The alliance was one formed for pure convenience, mutually benefiting both parties.\textsuperscript{36} The Bahian evidence, furthermore, supports the contention that ranchers, rather than senhores do engenho, were disposed to making pacts with the maroons.

Extended periods of peace between palmaristas and moradores were rare, however. By the mid-1660’s relations between the groups were actively hostile once more. The reasons behind the revival of the cycle of entradas, or attacks by Europeans on the black settlements, and razzias, or those by blacks themselves, are no doubt varied, but several factors can be indicated. Competition with the growing sugar industries in Antillean colonies kept prices down in Brazil, while the price of slaves rose. Blacks were reported to run away on their own in greater numbers as well, partially in response to the intensified rigor de cautivero, the harshness of the slave regime.

In order to regain slaves who had fled or been abducted to Palmares in previous years and to avoid buying new Africans at inflated costs, moreover, greater pressure to attack the quilombos was brought to bear by the majority of moradores. Such a move coincided with the general expansion into new lands away from the coast, a thrust that had been retarded during the Dutch occupation. The advance of the frontier inland into Pernambuco did not stop until after the 1690’s. The palmaristas, meanwhile, descended upon the plantations to take arms and seek slaves with a fury unparalleled in earlier periods.\textsuperscript{37}

Following the devastating attacks by CAPITÃO-MOR FERNÃO
CARRILHO in 1676, a major wing of the palmaristas led by their king GANGA-ZUMBA sued for peace. In exchange for the cessation of hostilities and the return of all blacks not born in the quilombos, the palmaristas were promised their freedom and the desired right to trade with the moradores. The recent absence of such commerce, in addition to shortages of black women, were given as two principal reasons for the maroons’ partial capitulation. Commercial intercourse, it seems, was a regular feature of peacetime social life on the borderlands between Palmares and the rest of Pernambuco. The palmaristas were to be resettled in Cucaú, a reportedly fertile site some 32 kilometers from the town of Serinhaém. The Pernambucans, it is clear, were eager to seize the even richer lands of Palmares as quickly as possible.

Conflict did not come to an end, however. GANGA-ZUMBA had been overlord of ten major quilombos, but did not represent the only political sector of his populace. Led by his nephew ZAMBI, thousands of blacks refused to agree to the conditions for peace. ZAMBI’s faction included many African-born maroons, who would have been returned to slavery under the stipulations of the treaty. The Pernambucans, ZAMBI’s faction claimed, had failed to comply with the articles of the pact, by carrying off blacks from Cucaú. The desired commerce with whites had also proved to be a dead letter. GANGA-ZUMBA was poisoned by a conspiracy of black opposition leaders and ZAMBI returned to Palmares to make preparations for war.

By the late 1680’s, the Pernambucans committed themselves to a policy of razing the quilombos. No attempts at peace-making or even waging a limited war were to be made. Messages were sent to the famous bandeirante or frontiersman DOMINGOS JORGE VELHO, offering lucrative terms if he agreed to lead the struggle against the maroons. JORGE VELHO, himself a mestizo, was promised supplies and numerous troops for battle; payment for each of the captured slaves; entitlement to the royal portion of the slaves captured in Palmares; impunity from punishment for any crime committed in the attacks; and most significantly, a portion of the lands in Palmares itself.

The call to JORGE VELHO was a last-ditch effort to dislodge the blacks from Palmares. The half-Indian bandeirante led a force of
some 800-1300 bush-trained Indians and mestizos, and 50-80 paulistas, or inhabitants of the southern province of São Paulo. The Pernambucans considered JORGE VELHO’s troops to be at best unruly, and at worst, intruders, spoilers, and thieves. More pointedly, those Pernambucans who had been promised lands in Palmares for services rendered in the past to the Crown looked unfavorably upon the carpetbagging paulistas. The bandeirantes were unforeseen competitors for the lucrative booty of Palmares.

The frontiersmen further angered the moradores by grazing their cattle on the lands outside Pernambucan towns, inciting clashes with the residents there. The complaints about JORGE VELHO and his men were so intense in the early 1690’s that the Overseas Council of Portugal grumbled, “The paulistas are worse than the very Negroes of Palmares.”60 These objections notwithstanding, the Pernambucan government “could not do without the support of (these) undesirable auxiliaries.” Whatever difficulties they did arouse, however, as DÉCIO FREITAS noted, “The paulistas ended up invariably submitting to the constituted authorities.”61

Six years were required to achieve the aims of the captaincy to disperse the maroons. Despite valiant defensive measures on the part of ZAMBI and his men, they could not match the force of arms mustered under JORGE VELHO by the colonial government after 1691. The last major campaign three years later involved a siege of the quilombos lasting 22 days, and ended in the death or capture of nearly 1000 maroons. ZAMBI himself was taken prisoner and beheaded in 1695. An additional two years were necessary to reduce the remaining blacks.62

In the long years of settlement of claims for “war prizes” following the defeat of Palmares, DOMINGOS JORGE VELHO proved to be an astute litigant as well as a superior bush fighter. It is obvious that the legal case that he and his assistants prepared was in every way designed to depreciate the claims of other petitioners while putting his own in the best light. JORGE VELHO’s contentions, nonetheless, support the scant evidence that the palmaristas had been involved in intercourse of various commercial sorts with different moradores. The bandeirante’s statements provide a useful point of departure for examining the nature of the collusion between particular sectors of white Brazilians and palmaristas.
One of the best examples of his accusations against other litigants for the spoils of Pabnares is the following: ‘‘... when they [certain moradores] went out to settle them [the frontier lands adjoining Palmares] their ambition made them ‘‘colonists’’ [colonos] of the blacks, and actual enemies of the [borderland] settlements; for, so that the said blacks would consent to their settling such lands, they [the colonists] paid them tribute, in tools, in powder, in lead, in arms, and in everything else what they asked for; and when they abandoned them [the lands], it was because the said colonists defaulted in these things, or [in] the loyalty that they professed to them, and not because of the mere rebellion of the blacks; and these contributions have been the more occasional [mais ocasional] cause of the increase and strength of the said blacks; and as a result the hostilities, robberies, deaths, destruction, and expense that have occurred in this case...’’

JORGE VELHO went on to say that no less than one of the highest judicial authorities of Bahia, CRISTOVÃO DE BURGOS E CONTREIRAS, maintained cattle alongside or on the palmaristas’ dominions. The livestock were supervised there by one MANUEL DE SOUZA. Failing to pay the customary fee alluded to by JORGE VELHO, DE SOUZA was forced to flee the region for fear of the blacks’ reprisals. The bandeirante also stated that the palmaristas received lead and powder from certain moradores in exchange for bullion carried off in the razzias. JORGE VELHO further pointed accusingly to other moradores involved with the maroons, besides those acting as receivers of stolen goods. ‘‘Certain persons,’’ he claimed, were ‘‘interested in the preservation of it [Palmaras] for the convenience and emoluments which they obtained from its existence, some in the benefits of farms [da fazenda], others for the execution of their misdeeds [malefícios] and vengeance.’’

While there is little evidence supporting JORGE VELHO’s claims that particular moradores used palmaristas as henchmen, or some comparable role, in personal quarrels, additional legal and contractual evidence for the other alliances mentioned by JORGE VELHO can be cited. Historian R.K. KENT clearly attributed a Pernambucan proclamation of 1670 prohibiting the carrying of firearms to the fact that these were being passed surreptitiously to the palmaristas. The colonial government awarded a commission in February, 1680, to one ANDRES DIAS, morador of San Miguel, to apprehend fugitive slaves wherever he found them, even if they were sheltered in the homes of moradores.

In the same year, Pernambucan governor AIRES DE SOUZA DE CASTRO issued a written proclamation to the effect that ‘‘those persons who by whatever means [are] able to communicate with
'Captain Zambi' [are] to instruct him that he was pardoned by the [Portuguese] king" for his part in events following the capitulation of GANGA-ZUMBA in 1678. Given that the document was printed, the government apparently recognized that some of its literate constituents did have dealings with the black renegade leader. Finally in 1687, the Pernambucans awarded JORGE VELHO the power to apprehend any morador merely suspected of aiding the palmaristas, however high the station of that morador.  

The documentation, in short, points to complicity on the part of numbers of Pernambucans with the maroons.

No one was exempt from suspicion of collusion with the palmaristas. CAPITÃO-MOR FERNÃO CARRILHO, the leader of major entradas, was at one point accused of more than the mere failure to make effective “cruel war” on the fugitive blacks, following an unsuccessful campaign. According to charges brought against him by Governor JOÃO DE SOUZA in 1684, CARRILHO had not only agreed to a cease-fire requested by the palmaristas “in order to safeguard [porem em côbra] their baggage and supplies [;] he even allowed the enemy blacks into his settlements...”

The palmaristas, it was further charged, had reportedly been warned of CARRILHO’s impending attack following the cease-fire. They therefore abandoned the site that they had been occupying and assaulted the colonial forces instead. Although two other officers independently claimed that CARRILHO had strictly and dutifully carried out his orders, the charges were upheld by the judiciary of the captaincy. Governor JOÃO DE SOUZA had CARRILHO removed in disgrace from campaigning against Palmares, and transferred without salary out of Pernambuco.

The majority of Pernambucans, however, wished to rid of the quilombos which attracted their slaves and which cost them a fortune over the years in war taxes; commerce with the maroons was not available, or did not appeal, to the general white citizenry. They instead insisted upon the destruction of the black strongholds, claiming that any other course would establish a dangerous precedent for the proliferation of quilombos. Unlike the case of Panama, the attempts at peaceful encapsulation of the maroons had failed. There was no other course except to uproot the settlements.

To accomplish that task, it was estimated that the captaincy
spent the substantial sum of 1,000,000 cruzados — the contemporary price of some 2000-2500 adult slaves — on defensive and offensive measures in the campaign against Palmares. The towns of Porto Calvo, Alagoas, Serinhaém, and Penedo complained for years to the Crown about the razzias. Attacks were so fierce after the 1670’s that the Pernambucan towns pledged mutual support in time of crisis. Clearly, given the fortune in supplies, revenue, and manpower that these Pernambucans were obliged to pay in the wars against Palmares, few would have been ardent, if secret, defenders of the quilombos.71

Although the government-controlled entradas against the network of maroon communities sapped the financial strength of the urban citizenry, wealthy moradores repeatedly mustered their own resources to send troops into Palmares, either to bring back their slaves or to take new ones. It is interesting to note that, despite reports of white lives being taken in the razzias, neither the historian ERNESTO ENNES nor EDISON CARNEIRO cites a substantiated case of a morador being killed in such an incursion. Ironically enough, deaths did occur in the moradores’ private ventures into Palmares.72 So long as the white Pernambucans kept their distance, it seems, trouble between the European and black communities was less likely to erupt. Intercourse between peaceable parties could then flourish.

The characteristic state of affairs between palmaristas and moradores was confrontation, however, and conclusions regarding the history of Palmares must account for the success the maroons had in staying off the Portuguese and the Dutch for as long as they did. The palmaristas held leverage over the Pernambucan government and its forces in at least three ways, even after the campaign for the total destruction of the quilombos had begun. In the first place, ties were kept with the slave community, like the ones which bound Panamanian maroons and slaves. However strong or tenuous their connections were with various moradores, the slaves who fled to Palmares informed the maroons there of activities in the white-controlled sectors of the colony. Those slaves who remained behind were considered the domestic or “internal” enemy of the Pernambucans, the potential if not active partners of the ma-
roons. The "Alagoans" who warned the palmaristas in 1654 that the Dutch were approaching may have been black, rather than white, allies of the fugitive slaves.73

Secondly, the Pernambucans' indecision and occasional ineptitude regarding effective procedures to reduce the blacks, constantly worked in the palmaristas' favor. Solutions of pacification and limited escalations were tried and discarded. The employment of outside auxiliaries such as JORGE VELHO cost Pernambuco dearly and gave the maroons time to consolidate their troops. The whites' ancillary forces also served to divide the political and economic interests of the non-black constituencies. As outlined above, at least some of the moradores took advantage of the buffer between the core areas of whites and blacks to make alliances mutually beneficial to the maroons and themselves.

Finally, the palmaristas were engaged in a struggle for their freedom. Ultimate defeat meant death or the return to servitude. Whatever may have been the role of European third parties in relations between white and black Pernambucans, the maroons in the end alone engineered their program for survival. Even after the palmaristas' dispersal, they left their stamp on relations between masters and slaves in Brazil. During the course of the subsequent two centuries, the colonial government consciously maneuvered to prevent the spread or conglomeration of quilombos to the degree which of Palmares had achieved.

Hispaniola

Another instance of alliance-making between maroons and Europeans, united against a common economic and political adversary, arose on the island of Hispaniola in the 18th century. There, slaves fleeing the rigors of the French plantation regime in Saint-Domingue established contacts for trade with settlers and merchants in the town of Neybes in Santo Domingo, the eastern Spanish part of the island. While it is not known when the commerce began between the fugitives of the maroon community le Maniel and the Neybeans, it is recorded that Spaniards had "'stolen,'" or cajoled away slaves from the French as early as 1691.
and again in 1695. Given that the maroons of le Maniel were only granted their freedom in 1786, amity between Spaniards and runaways from the French may well have lasted over 90 years.

In order to appreciate how the commercial understanding between maroons and Spanish settlers was initiated, it is necessary to examine briefly the contrasting nature of French and Spanish schemes of colonization on the island. The Treaty Rijswijk of 1697 between the European powers in effect legitimized French claim to the western third of the island, which had been used as a pirates’ haunt and privateering base from which to attack Spanish ports and ships. The French regime thereafter devoted itself to monocultural expansion and intensification, in indigo, cotton, coffee, and above all sugar plantations. The Spaniards, to the contrary, progressively involved themselves in “settler” activities based on livestock raising. Their own plantations had declined steadily during the 17th and early 18th centuries, due in part to the rigid Spanish commercial policies favoring the metropolis at the expense of certain colonies. With the expansion of French holdings, however, small-scale Spanish commercial activity increased. A market was created for salted meats, hides, and other products of animal husbandry.

The contrasts between the two sectors of the island during the 18th century can be placed in greater relief still. In 1701, on one hand, 35 sugar plantations were in operation in Saint-Domingue, while 110 others were in preparation. By 1789, some 6500 sugar, coffee, and indigo plantations were producing revenues of $200 million livres, sustained by the labor of well over 450,000 slaves. The white population and that of the gens de couleur or people of mixed racial parentage on the eve of the French Revolution numbered 30,000 and 28,000, respectively in the French colony.

In Santo Domingo, on the other hand, the total population of the colony in 1723 was recorded to be a mere 5000. Settlers had been steadily leaving the Spanish part of Hispaniola for other islands, since enforcement of the asiento laws limited the numbers of slaves permitted to enter the colony. By 1785, due to the stimulus of the French markets, Spanish population and commercial activity grew. In that year some 15,000 slaves worked for a non-slave population.
of 100,000, including whites, free blacks, and free people of mixed parentage.

Envy of French plantation growth and the intensity of its production regime was widespread. A Spanish royal decree of 1785 expressed regret at the fact that only 760 Spanish slaves were employed in mills and another 314 engaged in the production of cane syrup. These figures represent less than ten per cent of the total slave population. The rest worked as herders on the small ranches, or _batos_, in the colony, as domestics, or in other non-labor-intensive tasks. The royal decree went on to outline a program for the intensification of the Spanish slave regime, with the French plantation model in mind.  

Other differences between the orientation of the juxtaposed colonies can be mentioned, including attitudes toward manumission. While the numbers of _affranchis_ or freed blacks and people of mixed parentage rose in Saint-Domingue over the course of the 18th century, the historian MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY wrote that a still more liberal atmosphere regarding color status and emancipation thrived in Santo Domingo. The Spanish decree of 1785, which attempted to make the slave regime in Santo Domingo more disciplined, accused the free blacks and slaves of "laziness, independence, pride, robberies, and the excesses due to these." MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY, who was acquainted with both sides of the island, however, believed that the harsh new Spanish code would or could not be enforced. Throughout the course of the 1700's, moreover, freedom seems to have been worked for, and bought, with greater ease in Santo Domingo than in Saint-Domingue.

Finally, as in 17th-century Pernambuco, Saint-Domingue imported thousands of new slaves annually in the second half of the 18th century. In Santo Domingo, Spaniards were able to buy far more limited numbers of slaves. The Spanish colony constantly on the look-out for additional sources of capital growth and above all, labor.

Maroons from the French colony provided a periodic supply of individuals to work on the eastern side of the island, or as MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY put it, "to share in Spanish indolence there." Blacks could purchase their freedom after five years' work in military guard duty; other slaves became eligible to gain their liberty
after a few years of tending the Spanish ranchers’ herds. The French were deeply worried by the potential, constant loss of labor to the Spanish side of the island in the form of runaway slaves. They were also preoccupied by the political consequences of *maroonage* and the Spaniards’ welcome of the phenomenon.

As early as 1721, administrators in Saint-Domingue complained that: “... this favorable reception [of the maroons in Santo Domingo] being spread among all the others, either by Spanish emissaries, or by the very Negroes themselves returned to foment this desirion, had created in the morale of the slaves an impression which tends toward a general revolt.”

Such officials were not speaking on an isolated incident. On numerous occasions the Spaniards and blacks on the island joined to harass the French. One such memorable event occurred in 1719. The Spanish colonial governor, RAMIREZ, wrote to the neighboring sector, inviting officials to take charge of the slaves sequestered away in the early raids of the 1690’s into the French colony. The Spanish governor had been obliged to make the offer by an order from the Bourbon king PHILIP V. Yet at the moment when then the French arrived to apprehend the blacks, the Spaniards drew their weapons and armed their charges. The Spanish soldiers proceeded to declare the ex-slaves to be free, who in turn attacked the French party. After the skirmish, from which the French barely escaped with their lives, the blacks chose to settle as an independent district of the capital of Santo Domingo called San Lorenzo de Las Minas.

The course of relations between the French and the Spanish colonists on the island is in fact marked by decrees and treaties related to the return of maroons. These sets of prescriptions, established in 1714, 1740, 1751, and 1762, were agreed to — and violated — repeatedly by the inhabitants and officials of Santo Domingo. Actual extraditions, according to Yvan DEBBASCH, were a dead letter throughout this period. The boundary between the colonies was not firmly established until the Franco-Spanish Treaty of Aranjuez delimited the line in 1777. Even then, Spanish settlers of the interior continued to aid the maroons in the frontier region.

If conditions existed for an alliance between the Spaniards and the maroons, these conditions did not merely arise because of the presence of the fugitive slaves, or because of historical national
enmities. Competition between the French habitants and the Spanish settlers, to recapitulate, also derived from the differences in economic orientation, one colony based on plantation agriculture, the other on small-scale farming and ranching. Clashes between Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo stemmed from the ranging of cattle onto French holdings beyond the highly ambiguous colonial frontier, or, put another way, advances inland by coffee, cotton, and sugar planters impinging upon the Spanish areas devoted to grazing livestock.

Yet not all factors contributed to widespread cooperation between fugitive blacks and Spaniards. Two reasons can be cited here. As stated above, direct hostilities between many of the Spaniards and the French ceased when the thrust eastward of French holdings turned to the advantage of Spanish herdsmen and merchants, in the form of a market for the products of ranch industries. This change of affairs notably appears in the third quarter of the 18th century.83

Secondly, if maroons did abandon the French plantations in order to start a new life elsewhere, not all of them headed for employment in the Spanish colony. Large numbers of slaves — especially creoles, or those born in the colony and those faits au pays, or those long-term residents “seasoned” there — sought work and shelter in urban areas of Saint-Domingue, especially Cap Français and Port-au-Prince.84 Such slaves possessed skills which could best be marketed in populated areas; life on Spanish ranches or in a maroon community in the wilderness would not have appealed to them.

Still in all, hundreds of maroons attempted to pursue a viable, Afro-American existence in the interior of the island; they traded if they desired, or when they could, with favorably disposed Spaniards. Such maroon communities, trusting ultimately to themselves, organized their life-ways as autonomously as possible, drawing upon both skills learned in diverse African cultures and on the plantations. These societies, founded by runaways, fed by new recruits, and strengthened by members born into the groups, constituted an independent — yet interdependent — party to relations and growth on the frontier between the colonies.

If not all areas on the border between the Spanish and French
colonies provided a haven for slaves in flight, other niches had been exploited by maroons from the earliest period of colonization on the island. As early as 1519, fugitive slaves concentrated themselves in the southern area known as Bahoruco. In that year, a band headed by an Indian leader ENRIQUILLO found refuge from the rigors of captivity imposed by the first generation of European colonists on the island, vigors first abandoned by indigenous and later African and Afro-American bondsmen. ENRIQUILLO, now a subject for Dominican literature as well as Caribbean history, held off the Spaniards from his stronghold for 14 years before being captured. 

The maroon nemesis for French Hispaniolan colonists was the "transient" community of le Maniel, whose home base was the rugged fastness of Bahoruco. The French first sent regiments against their fugitive slaves clustered there in 1702. For the next 84 years or more, a single band or bands of maroons, now organized into partially autonomous maroon societies, effectively kept the planters from expanding their holdings into the area. Further attacks by the French in 1728, 1733, and 1740 failed to dislodge the maroons, among whose numbers were individuals "born in the woods." As MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY would later report, certain members of the Bahoruco group negotiating peace terms with the French in 1786 had lived all their 60-year lives in the region. These were bearers of an Afro-American culture forged in part independently of both direct experience on European plantation life and the multi-cultural African heritage.

The maroons of le Maniel employed various strategies to ensure their economic and social survival. They cultivated patches of sweet potatoes, bananas, and other crops, kept dogs and small livestock, and supplemented diet with hunting and fishing. If sufficiently pressed by French marshalries or colonists, the maroons would take refuge well within the Spanish side of the border, into which their adversaries could not follow them. While their huts and small fields might be destroyed — as has those of the maroons of Panama, Palmares, and had been so threatened in Jamaica — the existence of le Maniel as an ongoing community would not be terminated by their pursuers. DEBBASCH calls the maroons' mobility the "trump card" which they played repeatedly in avoiding the Europeans, a mobility also employed by Panamanian, Pernambucan, and Jamai-
can fugitives. The members of le Maniel only carried out raids onto plantations for female and male slaves, arms, and tools, in dire circumstances.

When their cultivating and hunting activities yielded a surplus, the maroons traded the goods with the Spanish inhabitants of the interior, especially those of the town of Neybes. The Spaniards in turn provided tools, arms, powder, bullets, and information concerning the whereabouts of French troops and colonists. At times, the Spanish even purchased the manufactured goods for the runaways in the French sector, little to the knowledge of the Frenchmen seeking those very runaways. The reasons behind the alliance were clear enough: the inhabitants of the interior “probably [aided the maroons] less out of sympathy with them than to protect the commercial exchange that had been set up at Neybes for small tradesmen, both among the settlers of the region and in the maroon community.” Such a situation resembles that of the entente between palmaristas and moradores in Pernambuco.

In time, however, the expansion of French plantations into the Bahoruco area forced their colonial officials to offer terms of peace to the le Maniel maroons. Fear that their enemy numbered in the thousands probably lay behind the French decision to initiate a formal treaty. Realistic appraisal of the size of their black adversaries typically followed the Europeans’ commitment to making a settlement or all-out warfare. Through the mediation of certain Spanish colonists of mixed European and black ancestry, a tentative, bicolonial agreement was reached with the maroons in 1785. Those fugitives of “Spanish” origin, numbering five in the actual band of 130, were immediately given their freedom. The 125 “French” maroons were offered liberty if they pledged to live peacefully in French territory and to return any new slaves running to them. The maroons were to be paid a set fee for such service by colonial officials.

Despite initial agreement with the plan, the maroons proceeded to retract their accord soon afterwards. The Spanish settlers at Neybes convinced the le Maniel maroons that some sort of trap was involved. The motives behind the Spaniards’ deceit were abundantly plain. The maroons’ commerce had become too valuable to give up; their departure from the area would bring French colonists
instead, colonists who were the market, not the source, for the goods for which the Spanish merchants traded. It was thus expedient for at least some Spaniards to have the maroons continue residing where they had been in the borderlands.

Eager for freedom and weakened by disease, nevertheless, the maroons finally capitulated in 1786. The French thus escaped the humiliation of having to plead for terms or the expense of having to disperse the maroons definitively. French colonial leaders were merely bound to enforce the legal recognition of a social reality. While it is not precisely clear where the maroons of le Maniel ultimately settled, the black community prompted no immediate hostilities afterwards. Their very proximity, together with reports of additional runaways in the area, continued to keep some French planters away.

Little has come to light of specific aspects of the Afro-American culture of le Maniel — what language they spoke, how many had been born in the woods, or what constituted their socio-political organization. From the scant amount of evidence that exists, the society seems comparable to that of the Jamaican maroons, in terms of numbers, subsistence activities, and mutual alliances with Spaniards themselves largely engaged in "settlement" activities. Both communities, it should be recalled more importantly still, were among those who most saliently demonstrated mobility, independence, and adaptability in the light of the advance of hard-pressing Europeans.

The maroons of le Maniel, in short, found leverage between two competing groups of European colonists. They joined forces with the Spaniards against the French when it seemed worthwhile, and maintained their independence until recognition of freedom was finally conceded by the French in 1786. Within the next decade, moreover, the Europeans on the western part of Hispaniola were to witness the long-range consequences of having restricted the rights of the majority of the black population: they were to be expelled from the territory which would become the black republic of Haiti. Whatever the role of the maroons was in the uprisings of 1791-1804, their example had provided a stimulus and a model for action of which the rebellious slaves en masse could make use.
CONCLUSIONS

The existence of maroon communities in the Americas represented a contradiction in slave societies. Those black individuals bound to their masters fled, declared themselves free, and created, or attempted to create, Afro-American cultures. The viability of these new social entities was hindered in at least two ways. In the first place, the maroons lacked or preferred personnel and goods which they could not produce themselves. They would or could not detach themselves from the colony at large — or the metropolis to which it was tied.

Secondly, and of equal importance, the majority of Europeans in the New World would not tolerate the rivalry of these alternative societies. Communal maroonage to them implied the substantial loss of labor and capital, the flaunting of their individual and social authority, and the threat of organized, effective retaliation by the fugitives. On the whole, they committed themselves to the extinction of the nascent or mature Afro-American societies.

If the social division between whites and blacks in slave societies was predominant, it was far from complete, however. While these groups were distinct socially, economically, and politically, each was internally divided along these lines as well. Such intragroup differences fostered alliances across the lines of color and servitude. Through such connections, maroon communities received economic and political support and returned it to their partners. It is the nature of these ties to which this essay devotes attention.

Three of the four cases cited above — Panama, Jamaica, and Hispaniola — deal principally with relations between maroons and different European national groups in the Americas. Political divisions among the European groups allowed the maroons to enter the conflicts in order to seek their own ends. It is evident that the fugitive blacks joined the side of the European nation with fewer capital-intensive resources and less manpower; that is, they collaborated with the less “exploitative” colony or faction. They did not join necessarily or immediately with the colonists attacking their former masters, as is shown in the case of Jamaica. There again, the maroons’ first allies were engaged in “settlement” activities.91
The common factor in the Euro-maroon alliance, as far as the whites were concerned, was the salient usefulness, even need, for maroons' aid. If only for a time, the fugitive blacks' technology and resources contributed to the success or survival of the less "exploitative" groups. Different kinds and degrees of need, however, were involved for each co-operating European group.

While Sir Francis Drake and John Oxenham might have been able to capture bullion on the Spanish Main by themselves, they were not able to carry out ventures which involved crossing the Isthmus alone. The English pirates thus took full advantage of black skills in scouting and raiding to reach their ends. Spanish resistance to the English on Jamaica would have been crushed far sooner if Juan Lubolo and Juan de Serras had not collaborated with Cristóbal de Ysassi. There, European need for maroon auxiliaries provides the most striking example of alliance-making, albeit a temporary one. The commercial networks established in the interior of Hispaniola in the 18th century depended in part upon the maroons' supplying of game and provisions for the Spanish inhabitants. In that case, expediency more than necessity prompted a Hispano-maroon commercial understanding.

In turn, each group of maroons had wants or needs fulfilled by their pacts with Europeans. The runaway slave communities discussed above expected that these alliances would yield more desired goods than they could obtain alone. One notes, however, an absence of urgency on the part of maroons which better characterizes the European search for accord with fugitives in the first place. Alliances, from the perspective of maroons, were mechanisms which generally facilitated access to valuables, rather than creating that access.

Differences between maroon communities arose in the kind of materials that the fugitives sought as a benefit of alliance with the Europeans, as a result of disparate economic and social conditions prevailing in each colony and each maroon group. Despite — or perhaps because of — their large numbers, Panamanian maroons were most eager to obtain substantive gains, such as female slaves, scrap iron for metal-working, and to carry out vengeance on the Spaniards. The Jamaican blacks, to take another case, were significantly fewer in numbers, and had been organized far less time in
palequés, than had the Panamanian maroons. Given fewer resources of all sorts in the Jamaican colony, together with the autonomy of the Jamaican maroons, they seem to have desired little more than European clothes from the Spaniards — to say nothing of the crucial recognition of freedom from them. The maroons of le Maniel, as a final instance, survived without Spanish commercial aid through the first half of the 18th century. Economic intercourse with the Spanish settlers seemed all the more desirable, however, in order to obtain the tools, arms, and other goods so often mentioned in connection with maroons’ needs.

That certain groups of Europeans were ready or compelled to overlook their partners’ former slave status in forming alliances against common enemies provides the upshot of these remarks. Each group was obliged to reckon with the total set of social, economic, and political roles which its fellow actors were playing. The degree of European disposability to pact with the maroon communities was characteristically a product of the fewer resources wielded by less powerful European groups vis-à-vis those of more “exploitative” European national interests.

One should thus not correlate frequency of alliance-making with maroons on the part of any particular European group. Far more fruitful is the examination of the particular economic fortunes of that group at any given time, for understanding their readiness to hold intercourse. The wealthy vecinos of Panama, for example, who attempted to disband or encapsulate the maroons through much of the 16th century, formed a crucial link in the Spanish commercial monopoly of that era. They viewed maroons as lost property, not as potential partners in efforts to drive away marauding French and English pirates. The more humble economic conditions of other Spaniards in Jamaica and Hispaniola in the 17th and 18th centuries — vis-à-vis the economic and political strength of English and French competitors, respectively — suggested the usefulness of an alliance with runaway slaves, however. “Exploitative” colonial interests, whatever their nationality, envisioned intercourse or negotiation with maroon communities as distasteful, while “settlement”-oriented groups more readily saw the advantages of pact-making with them.

The last statement obtains not only in competitions between dif-
ferent European national interests in the New World, but also in intra-national, sectarian contests. The case of Palmares reminds us that Portuguese farmers, ranchers, merchants, and other settlers held intercourse with the palmaristas at the cost of more “exploitative” planter and miller interests within the same colony. Economic self-interest on the part of certain groups of moradores was placed above that of the captaincy’s avowed pledge to exercise strict social controls over enslaved blacks.

The instance of Pernambuco compels us to abandon any idea of a monolithic divide between moradores and palmaristas, Euro-Americans and Afro-Americans, whites and blacks, in intra-colonial relations. Instead one must seek to understand the social and economic conditions existing in 17th-century Pernambuco which made commerce with the quilombos not only viable, but perhaps preferable, for certain sectors of the population. Was economic instability so great, the circumspection of markets so limited, that all moradores, other than the senhores do engenho, kept open the possibility of trading with Palmares? How was this possibility to change over time? Was trading in kind, the reported norm of palmarista exchange, an effective means for ranchers and farmers to overcome shortages in capital? Was trading encouraged by the less agreeable alternative of paying high interest rates charged by middlemen in dealings within the captaincy and with sectors outside? How did the actual patterns of settlement in the frontierlands, the real social and economic distribution of moradores, affect commercial relations?

These sorts of concerns, when investigated, will provide a deeper understanding of the significance of Palmares in Brazilian history and for maroon studies, than the vignettes presented above. With more data coming to light, additional questions can be asked of the social and ethnic nature of relations between relevant constituencies. What role, if any, did free blacks and mulattoes play on the frontier between the quilombos and the moradores’ holdings? How did the presence of Indians on nearly all sides affect relations between these groups? Again, the social composition of Pernambuco was different in the 1690’s than it had been in 1603. How did race and class relations change in that century, and what effect did these have on the history of Palmares?
The quilombos of Pernambuco do not comprise an isolated instance of social and historical complexity. The questions posed above apply also to the economic and social relations between the maroon communities of Panama, Jamaica, and Hispaniola, and the engulfing European colonies. Although those instances present us with groups of Europeans seemingly less internally divided, differences did exist among the Spanish vecinos, English colonists, and French habitants. How did these internal, intra-colonial divisions affect the course of relations with the maroons? In each case, more significant similarities and differences will become clear with continued research.

Other themes treated above require fuller elaboration. More comparisons need to be drawn regarding similarities and differences between the maroon communities themselves. The available data are sparse, but additional patterns suggest themselves concerning the black societies’ mobility, leadership, religious and horticultural practices, militant stance, and so forth. Richard Price’s “Introduction” in the collection Maroon societies offers insight into the importance of each of these factors for cross-cultural analysis.92 The role of non-white ethnic groups, too, especially those of Indians, free blacks, and free people of mixed parentage, bear to varying extents upon the cases of Panama, Hispaniola, and Palmares. Attention needs to be paid to the actions of non-white allies of the colonial government, such as the black regiments employed on occasion to attack the quilombos.

The present essay has limited itself to the investigation of relations between maroon communities and various European parties in the development of European systems of colonization in the Americas. Such groups did not ally themselves at random but rather pursued common, and mutually exclusive goals. These ends, in turn, are a product of compatible and disparate economic and political orientations of each of the parties involved, given their varied commitments to more or less labor- and capital-intensive economic pursuits, to “settlement” and “exploitative” schemes of colonial activity. It is hoped that some appreciation of the options and constraints under which different groups of maroons and Europeans acted has been advanced.
NOTES
1 See, among many others, BAUER & BAUER 1942, STAMPP 1956, FREDERICKSON & LASCH 1967, PATTERTSON 1967, BLASSINGAME 1972. A previous version of this essay was presented to the Seminar in Atlantic History and Culture, The Johns Hopkins University, May 4, 1976. Comments from participants in the Seminar are gratefully appreciated, particularly those of IRA LOWENTHAL, GARY MCDONOUGH, SIDNEY MINTZ, and TREVOR PURCELL. Special thanks are due to Professor RICHARD PRICE, for his warm encouragement in each step of preparation of this essay. The author assumes responsibility for its present content, however.

2 For the most comprehensive overview, see PRICE's "Introduction" in Maroon societies, 1973, pp. 1-30.

3 MADARIAGA 1945, p. 639. Translations made in the essay are mine.

4 DEBBASCH 1962, Part II, p. 118.

5 For the North American case, see PORTER 1971, and CRANE 1956; for discussions of the interplay between maroons, English colonists in South Carolina and later Georgia, and Spanish colonists in Florida. For Cuba, see FRANCO 1968, and PÉREZ DE LA RIV 1946 and 1952, for brief discussion of relations between maroons, settlers, and pirates. English and French competition and alliance with maroons are described in ATWOOD 1791. DEBBASCH 1962, II, discusses European rivalries and alliances with maroons in the Guianas and other Caribbean locales under French influence.

6 GUILLOT 1961, pp. 168-170.

7 I will employ the term 'settlement' activities to refer to those enterprises involving limited amounts of labor and capital, in which the allies of the maroons were typically engaged. I recognize full well that such enterprises include those of the early corsairs in the Caribbean, who, strictly speaking, never aimed originally at continuous, long-term settlement or subsistence in the New World. The pirates' activities in Panama are comparable to those of the Spanish settlers in Jamaica and Hispaniola, however, in the sense that these groups attempted to take advantage of gaps in the monopolistic schemes of European powers characterized by continuous large-scale capital inputs. I use the term 'exploitative' activities to refer to these latter cases of large-scale inputs, often in the form of agro-industries. While 'exploitative' activities or 'exploitation' are ambiguous denotata, and while, too, all colonial activities contained elements of 'settlement' and 'exploitation,' I believe we can draw at least some distinction between the two. With regard to the exploitation of slave labor, for example, one can point to differences between less and more 'exploitative' activities, between what was required of slaves employed as ranch hands, on one hand, and as miners or plantation field hands, on the other. The former enjoyed greater freedom of movement, less supervision, and less repetitiveness in their everyday tasks than did the latter. Ranch hands, at least in the case of Santo Domingo, were also eligible to win their freedom after a few years' service on the range. The greater frequency of marronage from areas devoted to labor- and capital-intensive pursuits, than from those employing less capital and labor, or a less intensive regime, is one indication that greater exploitation of labor did indeed occur in Saint-Domingue than in Santo Domingo. See below.
I readily acknowledge, however, that it is more difficult to determine where conditions for slaves were most harsh among the recognized cases of "exploitative" regimes — whether these were to be found in Isthmian mines or bullion transport, or in the cane fields of Saint-Domingue and Pernambuco. In addition to actual physical labor, evaluation of the harshness of a slave regime must take into consideration slaves' day-to-day living conditions, their margins for independent action, and the accessibility of winning liberty, before firm conclusions can be drawn regarding the comparative intensity of systems of slave control. For a discussion of these themes see GENOVESE 1969, pp. 202-210.

8 I do not mean to suggest here, however, that any linear connection existed between the harshness of the "exploitative," labor- and capital-intensive regimes and the existence of maroon societies — or to the rate of the slaves running away. The factors contributing to the occurrence of marronage are many, and include indulgence on the part of slave-holders as well as punishments and the obligation to perform wearying tasks. The runaway communities discussed in the essay represent only one form of marronage; other maroons, especially skilled ones, chose to pass as free in urban areas where the availability of their skills often mattered more than the technicalities of their legal status. These individuals, moreover, ran away singly or in small groups, and rarely attempted to create new societies in inaccessible areas. The point here is that maroon communities did not flourish in "settlement" colonies where the overall slave regime seems to have been more lax. Where they existed, the fugitive communities grew in size and number until the perception of them as a threat to property and life prompted Europeans to reduce them. For a discussion of the relevant factors involved in the slaves' decision to run away, see PRICE 1973, pp. 3-4, 23-24, and 1976, pp. 6-29; WOOD 1975, Chapter 9; and MULLIN 1972, pp. 105-123.

9 CARNEIRO 1958, pp. 75-76.

10 KENT 1965, p. 171.

11 DE FREITAS 1954, I, p. 290; FREITAS 1973, pp. 85, 87, 132 et passim.

12 SCHAPER 1973, Chapter 1, passim.

13 GUILLOT 1961, pp. 168-170.

14 FRANCO 1968, p. 96; WRIGHT 1932, pp. 16, 45, 49-50, 69, 110-111, et passim.

15 GUILLOT 1961, pp. 138-139, and Chapters 9-12, passim.

16 Viceroy of Peru to H.M., August 30, 1560, quoted in GUILLOT 1961, pp. 163-164.

17 See the statutes and programs for reduction of the maroons cited by GUILLOT 1961, pp. 136, 138, 165-166, 185-186, and Chapters 9-12, passim.

18 J. LÓPEZ DE VELASCO, Geografía y descripción universal de las Indias, 1574, cited in GUILLOT 1961; WRIGHT 1932, pp. 72, 150-151, 162; NICHOLS 1653, pp. 51-52.

19 MORGAN 1975, p. 13.
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20 Cf. NICHOLS 1653, WRIGHT 1932, Introduction, xxxviii-xlv; GUILLOT 1961, pp. 171-175.
21 WRIGHT 1932, pp. 171-172.
22 ALONSO CRİADO DE CASTILLA quoted in GUILLOT 1961, p. 170.
23 WRIGHT 1932, note 1, pp. 121-122, 132-133.
24 WRIGHT 1932, p. 133, 150-151, 160, 177, 191, 201, 207, 211, 217, et passim.
25 WRIGHT 1932, pp. 235-239; GUILLOT 1961, pp. 191-192.
26 GUILLOT 1961, pp. 191, 299; WRIGHT 1932, p. 214.
27 WRIGHT 1932, pp. 240-241.
28 SARMIENTO DE GAMBOA, quoted in GUILLOT 1961, p. 169.
29 GUILLOT 1961, p. 195.

30 The role of Indians as third parties in relations between Europeans and maroons often seems to have been a crucial one, yet as a topic remains largely unanalyzed. It lies beyond the scope of this essay. Indians are mentioned sporadically in regard to the Isthmian maroons, for example, but references are so sparse that one cannot readily tell if particular fugitive communities treated neighboring indigenous peoples as allies, enemies, or both at different times. For a brief introduction to the question, see PRICE 1973, pp. 9, 13-16, and 19. Again Indians seem to have figured importantly in certain campaigns against Palmares, but the precise nature of their independent contribution to multi-racial relations on the Pernambucan frontier has yet to be analyzed. See also below.

31 The perspective presented here owes much to DENING 1975, and to MINTZ & PRICE 1976. See also PRICE 1973, pp. 14-15; FRANCO 1968, pp. 91-135, et passim; and MASEFIELD 1925, pp. 85-102, et passim.

32 PATTERSON 1970, p. 289.
33 MORALES PADRón 1952, pp. 270-271, 273-274.
34 The wish to obtain European clothing independently is shown in other instances. The Jamaican maroons attempted to kill the English with as little bloodshed as possible, so that the plundered garments would not be stained or infected with the diseases suffered principally by the Europeans. WRIGHT 1930, p. 143; TAYLOR 1968, pp. 98, 102, 149; SCHAER 1973, p. 16.
35 TAYLOR 1968, pp. 102-103.
36 TAYLOR 1968, pp. 99, 102, 105-106, 163, 179 et passim.
PATTERSON 1970, pp. 284-285. WRIGHT 1930, p. 119, believed that the Spanish leader YSASSI was himself of mixed racial parentage.

TAYLOR 1968, pp. 185-186.

Ibid.

WRIGHT 1930, pp. 143-145.

TAYLOR 1968, pp. 190-192.

PATTERSON 1970, p. 297.

SCHAFER 1973, p. 22.

SCHAFER 1973, pp. 23-25.

TAYLOR 1968, pp. 190-192.

WRIGHT 1930, p. 144.

KENT 1965, p. 161. Given that networks of quilombos comprised the multi-settlement of Palmares, the Portuguese term "os Palmares" or the "Palm Groves," more accurately depicts the nature of the spatial arrangement of the black communities. The term "Palmares" is employed here, however, in accordance with typical English usage.

BOXER 1957, p. 36.

KENT 1965, p. 161.

KENT 1965, p. 164; CARNEIRO 1958, p. 50.

CARNEIRO 1958, pp. 60-61, 255-258.

ARThUR RAMOS, cited in KENT 1965, p. 171.

SEBASTIÃO DA ROCHA PITAA, cited in KENT 1965, p. 170.

CARNEIRO 1958, p. 76.

Indirect support for the arguments advanced here can be drawn from comparable data on Hispaniola, where Spanish merchants and ranchers traded with the maroons who had fled largely from the French plantation in Saint-Domingue. See below.

FREITAS 1973, pp. 72-73.

FREITAS 1973, pp. 73-74, 85-90; KENT 1965, p. 171; CARNEIRO 1958, pp. 98-101.

CARNEIRO 1958, pp. 110-119.
59 Freitas 1973, pp. 111-120.

60 The Overseas Council of Portugal, quoted in Freitas 1973, p. 139, and pp. 139-142; Carneiro 1958, pp. 143-145.

61 Freitas 1973, p. 139.

62 Kent 1965, p. 174.

63 Domingos Jorge Velho quoted in Carneiro 1958, p. 75.

64 Domingos Jorge Velho, quoted in Carneiro 1958, pp. 74-76; Freitas 1973, p. 148.

65 Kent 1965, pp. 170-171.

66 Carneiro 1958, p. 122.

67 Carneiro 1958, p. 123.

68 Carneiro 1958, p. 145.

69 Carneiro 1958, pp. 124-125.

70 Carneiro 1958.

71 Kent 1965, pp. 173-174; Freitas 1973, pp. 71, 87-88.

72 Observation made by Kent 1965, p. 170;

73 "Diario da viagem do Capitão João Blaer aos Palmares em 1645", included in Carneiro 1958, p. 236.

74 Moreau de Saint-Méry 1796, A topographical descr. I, p. 161.

75 It was commented as the time that "in the same space where a Spaniard installed himself in two days, 100 Frenchmen with 5000 Negroes could only do so in several years." Few statements resume better the contrasting French and Spanish approaches to "settlement." Debrasch 1961, I, pp. 72-73; Moreau de Saint-Méry 1796, A topogr. descr. I, pp. 60-65.

76 Girod 1972, pp. 25-27, 37-38; de Vaissière, 1909, p. 165.

77 Sánchez Valverde 1947, p. 131 and note 170, pp. 142-144, 146, 169; Konetzke 1962, Vol. 3, Part 2, p. 58.

78 Konetzke 962, Vol. 3, Part. 2, p. 553; Moreau de Saint-Méry 1796, A topogr. descr. I, pp. 57-58.

79 Moreau de Saint-Méry 1796, Descr. topogr. II, p. 172. See also Debiens 1966, p. 30.
The name "Las Minas" derives from the West African site from which the former slaves had departed for the Americas. Moreau de Saint-Méry 1796, *Descr. topogr. II*, pp. 174-175.

Moreau de Saint-Méry 1796, *Descr. topogr. II*, pp. 175-177; Debbasch 1962, II, p. 148.

Debbasch 1961, I, p. 73.

Debbasch 1961, I, pp. 80-81.

Guillot 1961, pp. 79-80.

Moreau de Saint-Méry 1958, III, pp. 1131, 1135. See also Mintz & Price 1976; *passim*.

Debbasch 1961, I, pp. 76, 108.

Moreau de Saint-Méry 1958, III, pp. 1135-1136.

Debbasch 1961, I, pp. 187-190.

A powerful description and analysis of the role model of maroons for other blacks in Saint-Domingue is given in Fouchard 1972, Chapter 7; *passim*, especially pp. 450-462.

It is not implied here, however, that opposed, even warring, European factions never ceased hostilities long enough to show white solidarity vis-à-vis the maroons. As mentioned above, John Oxenham's men prevented one fugitive black from taking vengeance on a Spaniard, violating the Anglo-maroon accord. Décio Freitas cites similar cases arising in 17th-century Brazil. In one instance in Bahia in 1624-1625, a group of slaves fled to join the Dutch and fought well on their side. In the subsequent Dutch retreat, however, at least some of the blacks were returned to the Portuguese. The latter proceeded to quarter six of the blacks. In another case, Portuguese *senhores do engenho* of the 1630's asked for, and were given, arms by the "enemy" Dutch in order to suppress rebellious slaves in a Dutch occupied zone. See Freitas 1973, p. 55. The *palmas-ristas*, it would seem, had good reason not to join either the Dutch or the Portuguese in their struggle for Brazil.

Price 1973, Introduction, pp. 1-30; *passim*. 

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80 Debbasch 1961, I, pp. 51-53.
81 The name "Las Minas" derives from the West African site from which the former slaves had departed for the Americas. Moreau de Saint-Méry 1796, *Descr. topogr. II*, pp. 174-175.
82 Moreau de Saint-Méry 1796, *Descr. topogr. II*, pp. 175-177; Debbasch 1962, II, p. 148.
83 Debbasch 1961, I, p. 73.
84 Debbasch 1961, I, pp. 80-81.
85 Guillot 1961, pp. 79-80.
86 Moreau de Saint-Méry 1958, III, pp. 1131, 1135. See also Mintz & Price 1976; *passim*.
87 Debbasch 1961, I, pp. 76, 108.
88 Moreau de Saint-Méry 1958, III, pp. 1135-1136.
89 Debbasch 1961, I, pp. 187-190.
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92 Price 1973, Introduction, pp. 1-30; *passim*. 

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