The Slovak Troops in Ukraine propagandist ideological support at the initial stage...

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Abstract. The purpose of the research is to analyze the main theses of Slovakia’s ideological and propaganda preparation for the war against the USSR and to evaluate the effectiveness of this training. The methodology of the research is based on the principles of objectivity, historicism, as well as the use of methods of analysis, synthesis, generalization. The scientific novelty is that for the first time in the Ukrainian historiography of World War II the features of the propaganda-ideological support of the Slovak troops in Ukraine in 1941 were found out. The main theses of Slovak propaganda have been examined and its effectiveness has been evaluated on the basis of official and unofficial documents.

The Conclusions. Unlike Germany’s allies such as Romania and Finland, Slovakia had no territorial claims on the USSR. The only motive for participating in the war was a commitment to allied duty. Therefore, Slovakia’s entry into the German-Soviet war required thorough propaganda and ideological training. It relied on several basic points: loyalty to allied duty to Germany; protection of the Slovak state against the aggressive plans of the Bolsheviks; protecting Christianity from atheistic Bolshevism;
the liberation of the peoples of the USSR from under Bolshevik tyranny; nurturing the best of military traditions. Their effectiveness in the early stages of the war was quite high. This was facilitated by the military chaplains’ activities, who enjoyed considerable authority among personnel. Also, the Slovak soldiers were able to see clear confirmation of some above-mentioned theses in the Ukrainian lands (the Soviet punitive bodies victims’ mass graves, spoiled religious buildings, etc.). In many localities the Slovaks were hailed as the liberators. This had a strong impact on the soldiers’ moral and psychological state. The army, at least in the initial stages of the war, managed to keep away from the common-law and pro-communist sentiments in Slovak society. This was facilitated not only by appropriate ideological and advocacy support, but also by the removal of unreliable elements enrolled during mobilization.

**Key words:** propaganda and ideological support, World War II, Slovakia, Ukraine, army.

**The Problem Statement.** In addition to the German troops, the Allied armies – Romania, Hungary and Slovakia – also participated in the fighting of the German-Soviet War on the territory of Ukraine. The participation of each of them in the war required appropriate ideological justification and advocacy training. The situation in Slovakia was particularly difficult in this regard. Given the lack of territorial claims on the USSR and the Russophile sympathies prevalent among Slovak society, the propaganda-ideological preparation of the population and the army for war against the Soviet Union required special approaches. This aspect of World War II history has so far been neglected by the Ukrainian researchers. However, it is of considerable interest, since the Slovak troops at the initial stage of the German-Soviet war acted precisely on the territory of Ukraine. The effectiveness of the
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propaganda-ideological treatment largely determined not only their fighting qualities but also their attitude to the local population.

**The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches.** The Slovak troops’ propaganda-ideological support issue at the initial stage of the German-Soviet War has not yet been the subject of a comprehensive study. However, some of its elements are considered in the works conducted by the Slovak researchers. The publications written by P. Mičianik should be noted for the material completeness (Mičianik, 2004; Mičianik, 2007). His work depicts in details the organizational aspects of the Slovak army’s involvement in hostilities, as well as partially reflects security issues, including propaganda and ideology. S. Kliment and B. Nakládal’s research focuses mainly on the Slovak’s army organization and armaments, but they hardly pay attention to the ideological and propaganda aspects. (Kliment & Nakládal, 2003). The works written by I. Baka, J. Bystrický are more balanced in this respect (Baka, 2008; Bystrický, 1999). Z. Katrea’s articles on Slovakia’s preparation for war, including the ideological propaganda, also deserve attention (Katrea, 2000a; Katrea, 2000b).

In order to analyze the role of key figures in the military and political leadership of Slovakia, the authors considered biographical studies on Ferdinand Čatloš (Marjina, 1996) and Alexander Mach (Vnuk, 1991).

The advocacy’s effectiveness assessment and the ideological support measures made on the basis of the memoirs of Slovak servicemen (Belko, 1965; Sokolovský, 2007). The Slovak publications of the German-Soviet War period are also used, dedicated to participation in this war (Gajdos-Breza, 1941; Cincik & Doránsky, 1943).

**The Purpose of the Article.** In the research, we aim at analyzing the main points of Slovakia’s ideological and propaganda preparation for the war against the USSR and to evaluate the training’s effectiveness. For this purpose, we have considered both official documents of the Slovak military-political leadership and the soldiers’ unofficial testimonies, who participated in hostilities in the territory of Ukraine.

**The Statement of the Basic Material.** Slovakia’s entry into the war against the USSR in June 1941 was an act that is difficult to find a rational explanation for. Unlike Germany’s allies such as Romania and Finland, Slovakia had no territorial claims on the USSR. The only motive for participating in the war was a commitment to allied duty. The Slovaks distinguished a relatively small contingent, based on two connections – the Moving Division (initially the group and the brigade) and the Security Division. At the initial stage of the war, they operated in Ukraine.

The Slovak’s population psychological preparation for the war began in the spring of 1941, following the German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece. The Light-masking regimes were introduced throughout the country, and the construction of the bomb shelters began. These measures were explained by the possibility of bombing Slovakia with Yugoslav or British aviation (Katrea, 2000b, pp. 50–51). On the 18th of June, part of the reservists were enrolled to serve, and on the 22nd of June (the day of Germany’s attack on the USSR), a covert mobilization began (Katrea, 2000a, p. 88). On the same day, the Slovak Armed Forces were fully alerted, and the Minister of National Defense, the General I Rank Ferdinand Čatloš, ordered the formation of the Moving Group (literally – the Rýchla Group, that is, the “Quick Group”), which was to take part in the war against the USSR (Mičianik, 2004, p. 49; Kliment & Nakládal, 2003, p. 83).

It should be noted that the position of the Slovak authorities on the country’s entry into the war against the USSR was not straightforward. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
of Slovakia, Vojtech Tuka, was known for his pro-German views, but President Jozef Tiso was more moderate. Not thrilled with the idea of the country joining the war was Defense Minister Ferdinand Čatloš (Marjina, 1996, pp. 679–680). In the end, V. Tuka managed to convince Ferdinand Čatloš. The main argument here was the need to maintain a favorable attitude of Germany. Tuka noted that when Hungary enters the war earlier than Slovakia, the Slovak authorities will lose the chance to return (with German support) the part of Hungary occupied by Hungary. The above-mentioned argument also proved to be decisive for President Tiso. The authorities (Tuka, Čatloš, President Tiso) discussed the issue up till the 23rd of June (Mičianik, 2007, pp. 48–49). Hence, the mobilization was already in process, but the final decision on entry into the war wasn’t made. Finally, at noon on the 24th of June, 1941, Slovak Interior Minister Alexander Mach read an address on the radio signed by President J. Tiso, Prime Minister V. Tuka, and Defense Minister F. Čatloš: “The Slovaks, citizens of the Slovak Republic, listen! In full solidarity with the Greater Germanic Reich, the Slovak people take their part in the European’s culture defense. Some parts of our army crossed the Slovak’s Republic borders in order to join Germany’s belligerent army” (Mičianik, 2007, p. 51). V. Tuka used the adage “voluntarily enters the war” in the original text of the appeal. President J. Tiso insisted on superseding the word “joining”, eloquently hinting that the entry into the war was under Germany’s pressure. In addition to it, there was no record concerning Slovakia’s declaration of war to the USSR. Due to the above-mentioned fact, Tiso managed to avoid the violation of the law that required the Parliamentary’s approval of the declaration of war. One more interesting fact is that the Parliament of the USSR did not declare the war to Slovakia, but only took into consideration the fact of Slovakia’s involvement in hostilities.

Taking everything into account, it is obvious that the quoted statement traces one of the main points of Slovak propaganda: the war broke out in order to protect the European culture, and it was the the Slovak people’s duty to participate in the struggle. At the same time, it was not enough to counterbalance the strong Russophile sentiment and Slovakia’s Communist Party influence. As a result, there were diverse inscriptions on the fences and walls of the houses, for instance: “Long live Russia!”, “Long live Stalin!” in Brezni, Zharnovitsa, Nova Banya and a number of other cities and towns. Furthermore, the anti-war postcards were distributed by communist centers (Gebhart & Šimovček, 1984, pp. 69–73). The so-called “preventive” detention of Slovakia Communist Party supporters (1,100 people) on the 21st of June did not avert this activity. Even the Minister of Internal Affairs, A. Mach acknowledged that the action was carried out mainly to meet the demands of the Germans. Within two or three weeks, most detainees were released (Vnuk, 1991, pp. 298–299).

The Slovak military-political leadership tried to separate the Russian people and the Bolsheviks in order to overcome the problem of Russophilism. The order issued by F. Čatloš on the 24th of June in 1941 is a vivid example of the above-mentioned situation. In particular, it noted: “The Red Bolshevism, which enslaved the great Russian people and, under the cover of false slogans about equality, bloodily oppresses even the most primitive demands of personal and religious freedom, wanted to conquer Europe in order to assert its authority over the Jewish red commissioners” (Cincik & Doránsky, 1943, p. 28). Further, Čatloš emphasized that the war broke out neither against the Russian people nor the Slavic people, but against the Bolsheviks. In the new Europe, Čatloš assured, the Russian people will find their future.

An important illustration of propaganda narratives was President Tiso’s speech delivered on the 30th of June in 1941 to Slovak troops who were leaving for Ukraine. (Mičianik, 2007, pp. 56–57). The main theses of the speech were the following:
– Slovakia was in proper place concerning the European peoples’ defense line against the Bolsheviks;
– the Bolsheviks sought to turn Slovakia into a desert without God, without culture and without morality;
– the war is a crusade against the Bolsheviks for God and the people.

The crusade’s motto proved to be quite apt in propaganda as it made it clear that Slovakia had no material or territorial incentives to enter the war. In addition, it found its response among the Slovaks, most of whom belonged to the Catholic Church. It should be noted that the church, in general, had a significant impact on the political and social life of Slovakia. Hence, it comes as no surprise that some researchers define the political order of this state as “clerical fascism” (Szabó, 2018, p. 892). The Bishop Military Curate, Michal Buzalka, also commented on the issue the following: “... we are concerned about preserving the most precious treasures of our national life: faith, the Christian Catholic Church, and independence; in short, the heritage of our fathers, St. Cyril and Methodius...” (Mičianik, 2007, p. 57).

And the Minister of Internal Affairs, A. Mach in his address criticized the Slavophiles – the USSR’s supporters: “The argument about the Slavism? Comrades, we are not talking about the Slavism here. If we cared about the Slavism, we would have had to wage a war against the Bolshevism a long time ago”. In addition to the Russian people, A. Mach’s speech also mentioned the Ukrainians, who also suffered from the Bolshevism. (Mičianik, 2007, p. 57).

Another propaganda’s slogan popular with the military elite was the following “the Third War against the Bolsheviks”. The First was the war in the Czechoslovak Corps in Siberia (1918), the Second was the war against Red Hungary (1919), and the war against the USSR was to become the last, decisive victory over the Bolshevism. The appeal to the military traditions associated with the name of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik, one of the organizers of the Czechoslovak Legion during the First World War and the First Minister of Defense of Czechoslovakia, Slovak nationality, played an important role (Juriček, 1990, pp. 152–156). General Čatloš appealed to his figure eagerly as just like Štefánik, F. Čatloš was not only a Slovak by nationality but also the Evangelical Protestant by religion (in Catholic Slovakia, Protestants were a minority). In one of the articles, Čatloš pointed out the following: “Štefánik’s posture against the Bolshevism is relevant today” (Mičianik, 2007, p. 58).

All the heralded theses echoed by the soldiers and officers, but their effectiveness varied. The propaganda slogans, which appealed to the religious sentiments and motivated for the home protection, were best perceived. The researcher, P. Mičianik quotes Slovak soldiers’ series of quotations taken from the letters and diaries at the initial period of the war: “We understand what we are fighting for. We, the Slovaks, are struggling to fulfill our primal aspirations for freedom, free national life, fighting for a dignified place among the peoples of Europe...”;
“In this gigantic battle, the Slovak nation knows that it is fighting for the victory of Christianity over the dangers of Communism, which seeks to capture the whole world”; “The war against the Bolshevism is morally and Christianly justified” (Mičianik, 2007, pp. 67–70).

The propaganda’s evidence effectiveness may be the Slovak soldiers’ behavior in captivity. For example, the shooter F. Khlobik, who was captured on the 22nd of July in 1941 near Lypovtsi, questioned in response to a question as to why he was fighting against the “Russian brothers”, stated that the Slovaks were fighting “against the Bolshevism, which crippled the great Russian people” (Mičianik, 2007, p. 127).

The propaganda’s theses on the Bolshevik’s regime inhuman nature were confirmed in practice – of what the Slovak soldiers saw on the territory of Western Ukraine. Already in
the first town on the territory of the USSR, Kirov, the Slovak soldiers saw a monastery, transformed into a barracks. The church had a club. The statues of the saints were thrown into the courtyards, used as shooting targets, and were replaced by the Bolshevik’s “gods” busts – Marx, Lenin, Stalin (Gajdos-Breza, 1941, pp. 32–34). And while in the territory of Western Ukraine it was still possible to find some cult buildings that were used for their intended purpose, after the Slovaks crossed the old Polish-Soviet border, they almost did not come across the existing churches. As a result, those pictures were painfully perceived by religious Slovaks and clearly showed the anti-religious nature of the communist ideology.

The Slovak soldiers were shocked and depressed due to the thousands of the Soviet punitive bodies victims’ sight in Drohobych, Sambir, Dobromyl, Lutsk, who were executed before the Red Army’s retreat. The above-mentioned information was reported even in the publications of the Communist period. For example, in the memoirs “Zápisník z východného frontu” published in 1965, their author J. Belko depicted the picture that the Slovak soldiers found in prison in Drohobych: “…corpses were everywhere: women, men, young, old … The frost sent a shiver down the spines when we saw the mutilated human bodies” (Belko, 1965, p. 15). Thereafter, however, it was indicated that the tragedy was a matter of the Germans, what else could be expected from a publication issued in the time of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The contemporary researcher P. Mičianik quotes an archival document, a military diary of one of the Slovak units, which depicted a sight caught by the Slovaks in the Salina tract near Dobromyl: “The civilian population met us weeping. Men were killed by the communists, as were some women. They cut off their heads, their hands, and their eyes. The skin was removed from the bodies and dumped into the salt mine. There were 1080 of them killed” (Mičianik, 2007, p. 156).

It should be noted that the positive perception of the propaganda slogans among the Slovak servicemen in the territory of Ukraine was not entirely complete. L. Sokolovský’s memoirs are illustrative in this context. Recalling the early days of the war, he pointed out that among the Slovak soldiers there was a quiet hatred towards the Germans and a reluctance to fight against the “Russian brothers”. According to Sokolovský, the reservists’ influence was considered to be the main reason for this phenomenon as they enrolled to the army from the reserve. When the reservists were sent home, the soldiers served as conscripts during 1939 and 1940, which remained active in Ukraine mostly, and discipline was restored. L. Sokolovský emphasized the military chaplains’ significant contribution, who not only performed the worship but also fulfilled the functions of the “educational officers”. The military chaplains gave clear explanations to the soldiers concerning the need to fight against the Bolshevism effectively (Sokolovský, 2007, p. 100). Taking into consideration the above-mentioned, the decision made by the Slovak military-political leadership to limit the number of troops, deployed to participate in the war against the USSR, seems quite justified. At the outset of the campaign, an Army Group (essentially an Army Corps) was sent to the terrains of Ukraine as a part of two full-fledged divisions, two separate artillery regiments and a number of other units, as well as a mobile unit – the Moving Group (deployed in a brigade). Their total number exceeded 50 thousand people. However, at the turn of July and August in 1941, there remained two separate divisions: the Security Division and the Moving Division. The Security Division consisted of four infantry battalions in two regiments, while the divisions of the Army Group had nine battalions in three regiments. The personnel of the Security Division comprised of 8.9 thousand of people, compared to 14 thousand people, who served at the Army.
Group Division. (Bysrický, 1999, pp. 29–30). The Moving Division had about the same organization (8,500 people served). The paramount difference was the fact that the Moving Division was fully motorized, it had nearly 1300 cars and motorcycles (Mičianik, 2007, pp. 191–192). Hence, reducing the number of the Slovak military contingent significantly (35,000 servicemen returned to their homeland), they managed to get rid of a significant part of the unwanted elements and increase its combat capability. (Baka, 2008, p. 54). On the other hand, the need for reservists’ demobilization was determined by economic factors. Since the declaration of independence, the problem of labor shortages, caused by the Czechs' departure and the industrialization, has gradually escalated in Slovakia (Tišliar, P., Šprocha, B. & Škorvanková E., 2019, p. 91).

In general, the Ukrainians had the favorable attitude towards the Slovak army in the summer of 1941, as they did not regard the Slovaks as an occupation power (Gajdos-Breza, 1941, p. 23). Moreover, Drohobych’s newspaper “Vilne Slovo” (“Free Word”) wrote the following: “The Slovak army is not an occupation army in Ukraine. The Slovaks’ struggle with the Bolsheviks has a universal character. The Slovaks’ attitude towards the Ukrainians is cordial and brotherly” (Mičianik, 2007, p. 165). The Slovak units’ command emphasized in their issued orders that the local population should see the Slovak soldiers as the Bolshevik yoke liberators. At the beginning of the campaign, numerous attempts were made to segregate the prisoners of war – separating the Ukrainians from other nationalities and liberating the Ukrainians, but soon such kind of practice was banned by the German command. At the same time, it was required to prosecute those civilians strictly, who assisted the Red Army – by hiding them, providing food or civilian clothes (Pejs, 2009, pp. 80–83).

The Conclusions. Slovakia’s entry into the German-Soviet War required thorough propagandist ideological support at the initial stage...

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