An Online Defense Framework against Cyber Attacks on Automatic Generation Control

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Abstract—We propose an online framework to defend against cyber attacks on Automatic Generation Control (AGC). A cyber attack detection algorithm is designed based on the approach of Dynamic Watermarking. The detection algorithm provides a theoretical guarantee of detection of cyber attacks launched by sophisticated attackers possessing extensive knowledge of the physical and statistical models of targeted power systems. The proposed framework is practically implementable, as it needs no hardware update on generation units. The efficacy of the proposed framework is validated by a four-area synthetic power system.

Index Terms—Dynamic watermarking, cyber-physical security (CPS), automatic generation control (AGC).

I. INTRODUCTION

The role of Automatic Generation Control (AGC) in large power systems is indispensable. It maintains nominal frequency while minimizing generation costs. The operation of the AGC involves close interaction between the cyber and the physical layers. By tracking Area Control Error (ACE) deviation collected from distributed sensors, the power outputs of generators are modified via AGC to balance random fluctuation of loads, and the electric grid frequency is thereby maintained within a tight range around the nominal value (50/60 Hz). However, due to the consequent tight coupling between the cyber and physical layers, there arises a vulnerability in that both grid stability and security can be compromised by malicious attacks on the cyber layer for sensing. Rather than compromising the strongly secured cyber layers of the control centers, cyber attacks on distributed measurements feeding the AGC might in fact significantly disrupt the operational goals of the power system [1]. There have been several efforts at examining the potential mechanisms by which such cyber attacks on AGCs can be carried out and their negative impacts on the system operation. For example, as described in [2], several attempts for cyber attacks on AGCs, namely, scaling, ramp, pulse, and random attacks, may compromise both the physical system stability and the electricity market operation. Experiments based on CPS testbeds suggest that the corrupted measurements feeding the AGC might bring power systems to under-frequency condition and cause unnecessary load shedding [3], [4]. By replacing the original measurements with an “optimal attack sequence”, the malicious attackers can disrupt the system frequency in the shortest time without triggering certain pre-defined data quality alarms [1]. Besides cyber attacks on AGC, potential risks can also be posed from the load side: adversaries may be able to trip targeted generators by manipulating the controller parameters of the loads offering emulated inertia control services [5], [6]. This paper focuses on the detection of cyber attacks on AGC.

All of the above attack strategies on AGC are based on the assumption that the cyber layer of the AGC transporting the physical measurements is vulnerable to attacks, so that a malicious adversary can manipulate these measurements. Unfortunately, this assumption is validated by several recent real-world incidents. Examples include computer viruses such as Dragonfly [7] and Stuxnet [8] targeting Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Therefore, although no real-world attack specifically targeting the AGC has been reported thus far, the aforementioned attack strategies on AGC are more than theoretical concerns. As grid operation becomes more and more data-dependent, it is imperative to prepare the operators with an online defense mechanism against all possible cyber attacks on AGCs.

There have been several detection techniques for cyber attacks on AGCs. In [2], cyber attacks following predefined attack strategies are detected by checking the statistical and temporal characterization of area control errors (ACE). In [9], a statistical model learned from frequency and tie-line flow measurements is exploited to predict their short-term values. Measurements in the vicinity of their corresponding predictions are tagged as normal measurements. Otherwise, alarms are triggered. In [1], the compromised tie-line flow measurements are detected by capturing the discrepancy between the meter readings of frequency deviation and its predicted value based on reported tie-line flow measurements and an identified linear-regression model. Also, DC state estimation (SE) is modified to be executed every AGC cycle and serves as an additional layer for data purification in [1].

Although the aforementioned approaches increase the attack costs to some extent, the measurements feeding the AGC may still be compromised by an attacker equipped with the following capabilities. First, the malicious adversaries are not constrained to follow the prescribed attack templates in order to cause significant impact on the grid [1]. Although the anomaly detection engine proposed in [2] is capable of identifying the predefined attack templates, there is no theoretical
guarantee that the proposed algorithm can detect arbitrary cyber attacks. Second, extensive information on the system model might be exposed to the adversary. There are two ways by which a malicious adversary can obtain information about the power system model: 1) The detailed physical model may be directly leaked to the attacker via disgruntled employees or malicious insiders [10]; 2) The statistical model of the power system can be learned using mathematical tools based on the leaked system operating data. The attackers in the former case can bypass the SE-based detection algorithm by conducting “unobservable attacks” described in [11] or by conducting the packet-reordering integrity attack reported in [12], whereas the adversaries in the latter case can tamper with the measurements without triggering the alarm defined in [9] by replacing the actual measurement sequence with a different sequence that still conforms to the learned statistical model [13]. Besides, the authors of [11] exclude the attacks on frequency sensors from their framework. Therefore, a subtle but malicious distortion of frequency measurements based on the physical/statistical model of the power system is not likely to be detected by the algorithm proposed in [1].

In this paper, we introduce a first-of-its-kind online defense framework against false data injection attacks in power systems. The recent dynamic watermarking technique [13], [14] is employed in the framework and serves as the core algorithm to detect any tampered measurements feeding the AGC. Through deliberately superimposing a private signal of small magnitude upon the control commands sent by the AGC, we “watermark” the measurements feeding the AGC with certain indelible characteristics [13], by which cyber attacks on the AGC can be identified. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first time that the dynamic watermarking technique has been applied to address cybersecurity issues in power systems. The proposed framework has the following advantages. 1) The detection algorithm used with the dynamic watermarking is theoretically rigorous and ensures that any manipulation of the measurements feeding the AGC can be detected regardless of the attack strategy that the attackers follow, as long as the controlled generators can execute commands from AGC honestly; 2) the algorithm can be used when attackers possess detailed information of the physical/statistical models of the power system; 3) the proposed framework is practically implementable, as it needs no hardware update on generation units.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II formulates the problem of detection of cyber attacks by mathematically describing a system equipped with AGC and by presenting typical attack models; Section III presents the dynamic watermarking-based detection algorithm in the context of AGC; Section IV validates the efficacy of the proposed algorithm via an illustrative example; Section V concludes the paper.

II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

In this section, a power system equipped with multiple AGCs is described mathematically, and typical attack templates are presented.

A. The Model of a Multi-area Power System without AGC

The dynamics of a multi-area power system in the vicinity of an operating condition can be described approximately by a continuous state-space model:

\[
\dot{x}(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + \gamma'(t), \quad (1a)
\]

\[
y(t) = Cx(t) + n'(t), \quad (1b)
\]

where \(x(t) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 1}\), \(u(t) \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times 1}\) and \(y(t) \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times 1}\) are states, inputs and measurements vectors in the time instant \(t\), respectively, and the matrices \(A\), \(B\) and \(C\) are system parameters of appropriate dimensions. Above \(\gamma'(t) \sim \mathcal{N}(0, Q')\) and \(n'(t) \sim \mathcal{N}(0, R')\) denote the white process noise and the measurement noise respectively that are independent of each other (A more mathematical description would entail stochastic differential equations). Suppose that there are \(r\) control areas. Then, the measurement vector \(y(t)\) in (1) can be reorganized as \(y(t) = [y_1(t)^T, y_2(t)^T, \ldots, y_r(t)^T, \ldots, y_r(t)^T]^T\), where \((\cdot)^T\) is the transpose operation, and \(y_r(t)\) is a column vector incorporating all tie-line flow deviations \(p_{di}(t)\), as well as the frequency deviation \(\omega_i(t)\) in the control area \(i\), i.e.,

\[
y_r(t) = [p_{di}(t)^T, \omega_i(t)^T]. \quad (2)
\]

Similarly, the variables in \(u(t)\) can be grouped area-wise into \(u(t) = [u_1(t)^T, u_2(t)^T, \ldots, u_i(t)^T, \ldots, u_r(t)^T]^T\), where the column vector \(u_i(t)\) includes the load reference setpoints \(p_{di}(t)\) in \(\mathbb{R}^{d \times 1}\) of all generators participating in AGC in the area \(i\), as well as local load fluctuation \(p_{loads}(t) + jq_{loads}(t)\) at time instant \(t\), i.e.,

\[
u_i(t) = [p_{di}(t)^T, u_{load}(t)^T]^T, \quad (3)
\]

where \(u_{load} = [p_{load}(t)^T, q_{load}(t)^T]^T\).

B. The Model of a Multi-area System Regulated by AGC

From a system-theoretic perspective, the AGC can be regarded as a multi-variable feedback loop added to the plant described in (1). In order to achieve independent regulation for the local tie-line flows and frequency, the Balancing Authority in one area only actuates the local generators participating in AGC without interference from generators in other areas. Therefore, the multi-area control policy can be decentralized area-wise as

\[
u_l(t) = f(y_l) = f_1(y_1)^T, f_2(y_2)^T, \ldots, f_i(y_i)^T, \ldots, f_r(y_r)^T]^T, \quad (4)
\]

where \(y_i\) is the telemetered measurement sequence up to time \(t\) at area \(i\). To elaborate on the control policy, suppose that there are \(\psi\) local generation units in the AGC and \(\phi\) measurements in area \(i\), then the control policy of AGC \(f_i(\cdot) : \mathbb{R}^\phi \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^\psi\) consists of the following operations between two successive economic dispatches:

1) Area control error (ACE) is calculated from the telemetered tie-line flows and frequency measurements sampled every two to four seconds as

\[
ACE_i = \sum_{s=1}^\phi p_{ti,s} + \beta_i \omega_i,
\]
where the adjustable parameter $\beta_i$ is a bias factor.

2) The ACE is smoothed by passing it through a low-order filter in order to mitigate the fatigue of generation device models, e.g., turbine valves and governor motors \[15\].

3) At the balancing authority, a control command is computed from the ACE according to the control policy reported in \[16\], and is executed every two to four seconds \[15, 10\]. We denote by $\kappa_i \tau$ the time period between two consecutive commands.

4) The control command computed by AGC is sent to the \(\psi\) local generation units and its magnitude for each controlled generator is proportional to the coefficient updated by the economic dispatch algorithm \[17\], \[18\].

The above procedure (also summarized in Fig. 1) indicates that only the measurements at the chosen sample instants contribute to the computation of the control commands sent by the AGC at area \(i\). The sequence \(y_i^t\) formed by these measurements is denoted by

\[
y_i^t := \left\{ y_i(0), y_i(\kappa_i \tau), \ldots, y_i\left( \left\lfloor \frac{t}{\kappa_i \tau} \right\rfloor \kappa_i \tau \right) \right\}
\]

where \(\lfloor \cdot \rfloor\) is the floor function. The above control policy yields the load reference setpoints \(p_{\text{ref}}(t)\), so that

\[
p_{\text{ref}}(t) = f_i(y_i^t) \quad \forall i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, r\}. \tag{6}
\]

The above equation couples the physical infrastructure (generation units) and the cyber layer (control centers) together. In summary, \(1\), \(4\) and \(6\) constitute a hybrid model for a multi-area power system regulated by AGCs.

C. Discretization of the Hybrid AGC Model

Suppose that the time period between two consecutive control commands of AGC in each area is an integer multiple of a sampling time \(\tau\), namely, \(\kappa_i \tau\) is assumed to be an integer. Then the continuous-time state space model \(1\) can be discretized at \(\tau\) using the approach reported in \[19\]. For the sake of convenience, the discrete state-space model is denoted as \(M_i^\tau\). Similarly, the AGC control policies in area can also be sampled at \(\tau\). We denote the discrete control policies by \(f_{di}(\cdot)\) for all \(i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, r\}\). It is worth noting that all areas are sampled with the same interval \(\tau\), and the AGC in area \(i\) sends control signals only after every \(\kappa_i \tau\) seconds, for \(i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, r\}\).

For the control area \(i\), we temporarily open its AGC feedback loop and keep the AGC loops in other areas \(j\) connected, for \(j \in \{1, 2, \ldots, r\}\) and \(j \neq i\). As shown in Fig. 1, we focus on modeling the open-loop behavior of the system for area \(i\) in terms of its inputs, i.e., the setpoints \(p_{di}\) of the controlled generators in the area \(i\), and all load fluctuations \(u_{\text{load}}\) for all \(j \in \{1, 2, \ldots, r\}\), and its outputs, i.e., all tie-line flow deviations \(p_{di}\) and frequency deviations \(\omega_i\) in \[2\]. As is standard in linear control theory \[20\], the discrete model of the aforementioned open-loop system can be obtained by interconnecting the entire system model \(M_i^\tau\) and the discrete AGC control policies \(f_{di}(\cdot)\), where \(j \in \{1, 2, \ldots, r\}\) and \(j \neq i\). We denote the resulting interconnected state-space model for area \(i\) by \(M_{di}^\tau\). It is worth noting that the state variables of \(M_{di}^\tau\) include all state variables in both state-space model \(M_i^\tau\) and discrete control policies \(f_{dj}\), where \(j \in \{1, 2, \ldots, r\}\) and \(j \neq i\). We specify setpoint \(p_{di}\) as the control inputs of system \(M_{di}^\tau\), and further assume \(M_{di}^\tau\) is stabilizable \[19\]. Finally, the discrete state-space model \(M_{di}^\tau\) can be minimally realized by a controllable and observable model \(M_{di}\) with reduced order \[19\], namely,

\[
x_{di}(k + 1) = A_{di}x_{di}(k) + B_{di}^\tau p_{si}(k) + B_{di}^\text{load} u_{\text{load}}(k) + \gamma(k + 1) + n(k) \tag{7a}
\]

\[
y_i(k) = C_{di}y_{di}(k) + n(k) \tag{7b}
\]

where \(x_{di}(k) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 1}\) collects all state variables in the reduced-order model \(M_{di}\) and \(u_{\text{load}}(k) = [u_{\text{load}1}^T, u_{\text{load}2}^T, \ldots, u_{\text{load}r}^T]^T\). Vector \(\gamma(t) \sim N(0, Q)\) and \(n(t) \sim N(0, R)\) are the white process and measurement noises, where \(R\) is positive definite. We assume that the rank of matrix \(C_{di} B_{di}^\tau\) equals \(d\), which is the number of rows of \(C_{di}\).

D. Cyber Attack Models and Their Impacts

Due to the close interaction between the AGC and the generation units indicated by (6), the adversary can compromise the physical layer of the power system by distorting the control inputs of system \(M_{di}\), and further assume \(M_{di}\) is stabilizable \[19\]. Finally, the discrete state-space model \(M_{di}^\tau\) can be minimally realized by a controllable and observable model \(M_{di}\) with reduced order \[19\], namely,

\[
x_{di}(k + 1) = A_{di}x_{di}(k) + B_{di}^\tau p_{si}(k) + B_{di}^\text{load} u_{\text{load}}(k) + \gamma(k + 1) + n(k) \tag{7a}
\]

\[
y_i(k) = C_{di}y_{di}(k) + n(k) \tag{7b}
\]

where \(x_{di}(k) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 1}\) collects all state variables in the reduced-order model \(M_{di}\) and \(u_{\text{load}}(k) = [u_{\text{load}1}^T, u_{\text{load}2}^T, \ldots, u_{\text{load}r}^T]^T\). Vector \(\gamma(t) \sim N(0, Q)\) and \(n(t) \sim N(0, R)\) are the white process and measurement noises, where \(R\) is positive definite. We assume that the rank of matrix \(C_{di} B_{di}^\tau\) equals \(d\), which is the number of rows of \(C_{di}\).

Due to the close interaction between the AGC and the generation units indicated by (6), the adversary can compromise the physical layer of the power system by distorting the measurements \(y^i\). Denote by \(z^i\) the measurements reported by the sensors. The sensors are supposed to report the actual value measured, i.e., they are supposed to report truthfully with \(z^i = y^i\). However, an adversarial sensor might declare values that are different from the actual measurements, so that \(z^i \neq y^i\). The purpose of this paper is to detect the inconsistency between the actual and the reported measurements caused deliberately by the attacker. Before describing the remedy for the problem, we present three typical attack templates.

1) Replay Attack: Before the attack, the adversary records the measurements during normal operating condition for some duration. During the attack, the actual measurements observed by the adversarial sensors are replaced by the recorded measurements and reported to the control center \[21\].

2) Noise-injection Attack: Under this attack model, the adversarial sensors add a bounded random value to the actual measurement and then report it to the control center.
3) Destabilization Attack: In a destabilization attack, the compromised sensors of the AGC in area $i$ report a sequence \( \{z_i\} \) which is a filtered version of the actual measurement sequence \( \{y_i\} \). If \( M \) denotes such a filter, the attack consists of inserting the filter \( M \) to the system model, with \( M \) so chosen such that the original system becomes unstable.

III. Dynamic Watermarking-based Defense

In this section, we apply the approach of dynamic watermarking reported in [13], [14] to secure the distributed measurements feeding AGC in power systems. The fundamental idea of Dynamic Watermarking is as follows. The actuators (generation units in this case) superimpose on the control policy-specified input, a “small” random signal chosen according to a certain probability distribution. While this probability distribution is made public, so that even the adversary knows it, the actual realization of the random signal is known only to that particular generation unit, and it doesn’t reveal that to any other party. For this reason, the random signal is also called the private excitation of the generators. In such a scenario, the honest sensors and the malicious sensors are distinguished by the following fact: the truthful measurements reported by the honest sensors exhibit certain statistical properties that are consistent with the statistics of the private excitation, whereas, as shown in [13], [14], measurements reported by the malicious sensors, if excessively distorted, do not exhibit these properties. Therefore, by subjecting the reported measurements to certain tests for these statistical properties, malicious activity in the system can be detected.

In this paper, we will demonstrate the application of this approach in the context of power systems. For control area $i$, an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) private excitation \( \{e_i(k)\} \) is superimposed on the control inputs \( \{p_{si}(k)\} \) [14]. Consequently, the input applied at time $k$ is

\[
p_{si}(k) = f_i(y_i^T) + e_i(k),
\]

where \( e_i(k) \sim N(0, \sigma_i^2 I) \). It is worth noting that (8) can be implemented by modifying the AGC software at the balancing authorities without any hardware updates on the generation units. With the private injection \( \{e_i(k)\} \), any attempt to distort the measurements fed to AGC will be detected by subjecting the reported measurements to the two tests [14] described below.

A. Two Indicators of Dynamic Watermarking

Given the input sequence \( u_i \) and measurement sequence \( y_i \) of the discrete system (7) up to the $k$th unit of time, the system state \( x_{di}(k|k) \) can be estimated by the Kalman filter as

\[
x_{di}(k+1|k) = A_{di}(I - L_{di}C_{di})x_{di}(k|k-1) +
\begin{bmatrix}
B_{ref} & B_{load}
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
p_{si}(k) \\
y_i(k)
\end{bmatrix},
\]

(9a)

\[x_{di}(k|k) = (I - L_{di}C_{di})x_{di}(k|k-1) + L_{di}y_i(k),
\]

(9b)

where \( L_{di} \) is the steady-state Kalman filtering gain given by

\[
L_{di} = P_{C_{di}}(C_{di}P_{C_{di}}^{-1} + R)^{-1},
\]

(10)

As before, we define

\[
W(T) := \frac{1}{T} \sum_{k=1}^{T} e(k-1)\zeta_k^T - L_{di}(I - \frac{1}{T}\sum_{k=1}^{T}\zeta_k)\zeta_k^T = 0.
\]

(15)

This measure can be calculated by the system operators. The reported measurements of interest, \( \{z_i(k)\} \), will pass both tests if \( z_i(k) \equiv y_i(k) \) for all $k$; if the sensors distort the measurements beyond adding a zero-power signal, then, as
shown in [14], at least one of the above tests will fail. While tests [12] and [15] are asymptotic in nature, they can be converted to statistical tests that can be performed in finite time. For example, we expect much bigger entries in W or V during cyber attacks, than their counterparts when no attack happens. This leads naturally to a threshold test for detecting malicious distortion.

B. Online Algorithm for Detection of Cyber Attacks

The computation of the aforementioned indicators requires a sequence of reported measurements \{z_i\}, private injections \{e_i\}, load fluctuations of the whole grid \{u_{load}\} and AGC command signals \{f_i(z_i^{k-1})\} over a period of time. Therefore, in order to check whether the reported measurements pass the two tests [12], [15], the generation unit processes a block of \{z_i\}, \{e_i\}, \{u_{load}\} and \{f_i(z_i^{k-1})\} within a time window \(T\). Suppose that each block of the above sequences includes \(T\) samples. Then, up to time \(t = j \times T \times \kappa_i\), we will have \(j\) blocks of above sequences. The \(j\)th block of above sequences in area \(i\) are denoted by \(z_{i}^{BL_j}, e_i^j, u_{load}^j\) and \(f_i^j\), respectively:

\[
z_i^{BL_j} := \{z_i((j-1)T), z_i((j-1)T+1), \ldots, z_i(jT)\},
\]

\[
e_i^j := \{e_i((j-1)T), e_i((j-1)T+1), \ldots, e_i(jT)\},
\]

\[
u_{load}^j := \{u_{load}((j-1)T), u_{load}((j-1)T+1), \ldots, u_{load}(jT)\},
\]

and

\[
f_i^j := \{f_i(z_i^{((j-1)T-1)}), f_i(z_i^{(j-1)T}), \ldots, f_i(z_i^{j(T-1)})\}.
\]

In terms of online application, we denote \(W\) and \(V\) calculated within the \(j\)th time window as \(W^j = [w_{g,h}^{j}]\) and \(V^j = [v_{g,h}^{j}]\), respectively. Then the indicator scalars \(\xi_1^j\) and \(\xi_2^j\) are defined as follows

\[
\xi_1^j := \text{tr}(W^j) \quad \text{(17a)}
\]

\[
\xi_2^j := \sqrt{\sum_{y=1}^{d'} \sum_{k=1}^{n} (v_{g,h}^{j})^2} \quad \text{(17b)}
\]

where \(\text{tr}(\cdot)\) is the trace operator. As mentioned in [2] and [7]. \(d'\) is the number of the controlled generators in AGC of area \(i\) and \(n\) is the order of the reduced-order model in [7]. Finally, we expect \(\xi_1^j \geq \eta_1\) or \(\xi_2^j \geq \eta_2\), if attacks are launched in the \(j\)th time window, where \(\eta_1\) and \(\eta_2\) are pre-defined thresholds. Algorithm 2 specifies the subroutine for computing the two indicators \(\xi_1^j\) and \(\xi_2^j\) for the \(j\)th block of measurements.

For area \(i\), private signals \(e_i\) are superimposed upon the AGC commands according to [8] and Fig. 2. Then Algorithm 1 enables the balancing authority of area \(i\) to detect cyber attacks on the measurements feeding the AGC. Once attacks in area \(i\) are detected, the balancing authority stops sending commands to the generators in the AGC. Similarly, attacks to other areas can be detected by the corresponding balancing authorities similarly equipped with Algorithm 1.

\begin{algorithm}
\caption{Online Algorithm for Detection of Cyber Attack}
1: \(H \leftarrow L_0 \Sigma_i L_0^T; \ j \leftarrow 1\)
2: \(\text{while } k = 1, 2, \ldots, \text{do}\)
3: \(\text{if } k \geq jT \text{ then}\)
4: \(\text{Obtain the sequence } z_i^{BL_j}, e_i^j, u_{load}^j, f_i^j;\)
5: \(\text{Compute } x_c := \{x(z')^k\} \text{ by (6) and (9)} \text{ for all } k' = (j-1)T, (j-1)T+1, \ldots, jT;\)
6: \(\xi_1^j, \xi_2^j \leftarrow \text{Indicators}(x_c^j, e_i^j, u_{load}^j, f_i^j, j, H);\)
7: \(j \leftarrow j + 1\)
8: \(\text{if } \xi_1^j \geq \eta_1 \text{ or } \xi_2^j \geq \eta_2 \text{ then}\)
9: \(\text{Claim attacks and stop sending commands to }\)
10: \(\text{the generators on AGC; }\)
11: \(\text{end if}\)
12: \(\text{end while}\)
\end{algorithm}

\begin{algorithm}
\caption{Computation of \(\xi_1^j\) and \(\xi_2^j\) at the \(j\)th block}
1: \(\text{function } \text{Indicators}(x_c^j, e_i^j, u_{load}^j, f_i^j, j, H)\)
2: \(\Sigma_{s1} \leftarrow 0; \Sigma_{s2} \leftarrow 0\)
3: \(\text{while } k = (j-1)T, (j-1)T+1, \ldots, jT, \text{ do}\)
4: \(\text{Compute } \zeta_k \text{ by (11)}\)
5: \(\Sigma_{s1} \leftarrow \Sigma_{s1} + \zeta_k \zeta_k^T; \Sigma_{s2} \leftarrow \Sigma_{s2} + e(k-1)\zeta_k^T\)
6: \(\text{end while}\)
7: \(W^j = \frac{1}{T}\Sigma_{s1} - H; \ V^j = \frac{1}{T}\Sigma_{s2}\)
8: \(\text{Obtain } \xi_1^j \text{ and } \xi_2^j \text{ via (17)}\)
9: \(\text{return } \xi_1^j, \xi_2^j\)
10: \(\text{end function}\)
\end{algorithm}

IV. Numerical Examples

This section presents the results on the efficacy of the dynamic-watermarking-based online defense algorithm on a four-area power system. The malicious attacks to the synthetic system will be launched based on the attack templates presented in Sec. [13]. As will be shown, these attacks can be detected in a timely manner via the proposed approach without sacrificing the performance of the system.

A. System Description

The test system has four areas and ten generators, as shown in Fig. 3. The system is linearized about the given operating condition by Power System Toolbox (PST) [23], and the system matrices for the linear model, i.e., \(A, B\) and \(C\) in [1], are extracted. In order to mimic the behavior of AGC, in each area, we add a discrete proportional-integral (PI) feedback loop, where the proportional gain constant is set to \(-0.0745\) and the integral gain is set to \(-0.0333\). For each area, the PI controller takes its local measurements of tie-line power flows and frequency as its inputs and computes a control signal to change the load reference setpoint of the generator. This is done every 2 seconds, i.e., \(\tau = 2\) and \(\kappa_i = 1\) for \(i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}\). The load deviations around the scheduled values are modeled as independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian white noise with zero mean and covariance matrix \(\sigma_2^2 I_8\), where \(I_8\) is a \(8 \times 8\) identity matrix. The variance \(\sigma_2^2 = 0.0025\) is chosen such that the frequency fluctuates within the normal range, i.e., \(60 \pm 0.03\) Hz [24] with
high probability. The measurement noise of frequency and real power are normally distributed with zero mean. The variance of the frequency measurement noise, \( \sigma_f^2 = 9.1891 \times 10^{-12} \), is tuned such that the accuracy of frequency measurement falls within \( \pm 0.0005 \text{ Hz} \) with high probability, and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of deviation measurements of tie-line flow is 20 dB. The covariance matrix of the process noise \( Q' \) is \( 10^{-9} I_n' \), where \( I_n' \) is an identity matrix of dimension of \( n' \).

B. Parameter Setting of the Proposed Algorithm

For the implementation of Algorithms 1 and 2, we have the following settings of the parameters:

1) The number of samples in each block \( T \) is 30, so that \( \xi^j_1 \) and \( \xi^j_2 \) are computed every 60 seconds;
2) The threshold \( \eta_1 \) is set to \( 3.6010 \times 10^{-4} \);
3) the variance of the private injections \( \sigma_e \) in both Area 1 and Area 2 is set to \( 10^{-7} \).

We first examine the impact of the private injection on the performance of the AGC in terms of frequency regulation. Fig. 4 records the control commands from AGC 1, and it shows that the private injection does not cause significant deviation of the actual input from the control policy-specified input. The percentage of variance change of control command of AGC 1 and frequency are 0.26% and 1.73%, respectively, and the small change of the variance suggests negligible sacrifice of performance resulting from the private injection.

C. Detection of Replay Attack

We next demonstrate the efficacy of the dynamic watermarking approach for detecting replay attacks defined in Sec. II-D1. Figure 5 shows the frequency measurements in Area 1. Beginning at 30 min, the frequency sensor reports a pre-recorded sequence of measurements instead of the actual measurements. No anomaly can be identified from Fig. 5 as no frequency constraint is violated within the time period of interest.

Next, the proposed Algorithms 1 and 2 are applied to detect the replay attack. In each area, the online detection algorithms compute the indicators \( \xi^j_1 \) and \( \xi^j_2 \) based on their local measurements of frequency and tie-line flow. The evolution of \( \xi^j_1 \) over time in Area 1 is presented in Figure 6(a). It is seen that \( \xi^j_1 \) exceeds the threshold \( \eta_1 \) after 31 minutes, indicating that the attack starts between the 30th and 31st minutes. A similar result can be observed from Fig. 6(b) which presents the evolution of \( \xi^j_1 \) under the replay attack to tie-line flow measurement of Area 1.

D. Detection of Noise-injection Attack

In this section, we demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed approach for detection of noise-injection attacks. As mentioned in Sec. IV-D, additional noise is superimposed on the actual frequency measurement after the 30th minute, and it is chosen so that the frequency is still within the normal range. Fig. 7 shows the measurements of the frequency before and after the attack, and, again, we cannot notice any anomaly since the frequency is within the normal range all the time and no distinct feature ever appears after 30 minutes. Using the proposed algorithm, the noise injection attack on the frequency...
measurements (Fig. 8) is identified successfully between the 30th and 31st minutes.

![Graph](image1.png)

**Fig. 6.** The evolutions of indicator $\xi_1$ under the replay attack to the (a) frequency measurement and (b) tie flow measurement of Area 1 starting at 30 min.

![Graph](image2.png)

**Fig. 7.** Frequency measurement in Area 1 (a) from 0 min to 60 min and (b) zoom-in frequency measurement from 25 min to 35 min, under the noise-injection attack to the frequency measurement of Area 1 launched at 30 min.

![Graph](image3.png)

**Fig. 8.** The evolutions of indicator $\xi_1$ under the noise-injection attack to (a) the frequency measurement, and (b) the tie flow measurement, of Area 1 starting at 30 min.

E. Detection of Destabilization Attack

This section deals with securing the system from destabilization attacks. A destabilization attack is carried out on the tie-line flow measurements in Area 1. The sensor reports to the control center the scheduled tie-line flow plus a scaled version of actual flow deviation, i.e., $p_{sch} + \lambda \Delta p$, as opposed to the actual flow measurement $p_{sch} + \Delta p$. Then, based on the scaled flow measurement $\Delta p$, the control command is computed according to the AGC control law, and the load reference setpoint of Generators 1, 5 and 6 are changed accordingly. The scalar $\lambda$ is $-0.89$, and the attack starts at the 10th minute. As evident from Fig. 9(a), the closed-loop system is unstable and the frequency grows in an unbounded fashion.

![Graph](image4.png)

**Fig. 9.** Frequency measurement in Area 1 from 0 min to 60 min (a) and its zoom-in frequency measurement (b), tie-line flow measurement in Area 1 from 0 min to 60 min (c), and its zoom-in tie-line flow measurement (d) under the destabilization attack to the tie-line flow measurement of Area 1 launched at 10 min.

Now we observe the process of destabilization attack from the perspective of the system operator. Suppose that the system operator keeps monitoring the reported frequency and tie-line flow measurements at the balancing authority of Area 1. Then, Fig. 9(b) and Fig. 9(d) are what the operator can observe from the 8th minute to the 20th minute. The operator might not realize the anomaly until around the 16th minute at which time several samples of frequency exceed the upper limit of the normal frequency range. However, the proposed approach can detect the destabilization attack between the 11th minute and 12th minutes, as we can see from Fig. 10.

One might wonder if the ACE will always ultimately exceed its limits under a destabilization attack, in which case the operator will notice it anyway, thereby rendering the proposed approach superfluous. The answer is that there are sophisticated destabilization attacks where the ACE might not exhibit instability. Consider an attack template which is the same as earlier, except that $\lambda$ is set to $-0.84$. This results in the frequency measurement in Area 1 shown in Fig. 11(a). It can be seen that though some frequency samples exceed the constraint occasionally, these violations might be attributed to measurement error, and consequently be ignored by the operators since the frequency reverts to the normal range after several abnormal samples. In contrast the indicator signals under watermarking exhibit the consecutive spikes shown in Fig. 11(b) thereby detecting the attack on Area 1.

V. Conclusion

In this paper, an online framework to defend cyber attacks on AGC is proposed. In the proposed defense framework,
work will investigate the scaling up of the proposed method. The efficacy of the proposed framework needs no hardware update of the generation units. Adversaries equipped with extensive and even complete knowledge of the physical and statistical models of the power system. The proposed framework is demonstrated in a four-area synthetic power system. Future work will investigate the scaling up of the proposed method to larger-scale power systems.

Fig. 10. The evolution of indicator $\xi_j$ under the destabilization attack on the tie flow measurement of Area 2 starting at 10 min.

Fig. 11. Frequency measurement under destabilization attack to the tie-line flow measurement in Area 1 (left), and the evolution of corresponding $\xi_j$ (right).

a theoretically rigorous attack detection algorithm based on dynamic watermarking is developed to detect sophisticated adversaries equipped with extensive and even complete knowledge of the physical and statistical models of the power system. The proposed framework needs no hardware update of the generation units. The efficacy of the proposed framework is demonstrated in a four-area synthetic power system. Future work will investigate the scaling up of the proposed method to larger-scale power systems.

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