Islamic orientations in contemporary Indonesia: Islamism on the rise?

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Indonesia has approximately 240 million people, and more than 85\% of the population are Muslims. Whilst incidents of religious intolerance have frequently been reported in the mass media, political Islam in Indonesia, represented by Islamic political parties, seems to have failed to gain popular support. Against this conflicting standing of Islam and Islamic organizations in Indonesia, this study focuses on Muslim religiosity and perceptions of the role of Islam in contemporary Indonesia. Based on our survey of 1500 Muslims in Indonesia in 2010, and case studies in regional Indonesia, this paper shows that, due to sociocultural change in regional Indonesia, and the diffusion of religious authority through media use, Indonesian Muslims are becoming less political Islamists, and more sociocultural Islamists who are attempting to advocate Islamic morality. This trend is in line with scholarly observations of post-Islamism prevalent in other parts of the Muslim world.

\textbf{Keywords:} Islamism; Indonesia; regional identity; shariah by-laws; media; Islamic study groups

Introduction

This article examines Islamic orientations held by Muslims in Indonesia. Indonesia has approximately 240 million people and more than 85\% of the population are Muslims. This study is important because there are currently conflicting views on the political influence and social role of Islam in Indonesia. For example, several high-profile interfaith intolerance incidents have been reported in the media. Examples of such incidents include an Indonesia Ulama Council (MUI) edict banning religious pluralism in 2005,\textsuperscript{1} attacks on worship sites and followers of Ahmadiyya, and violations of the right of Indonesian Christian church members (GKI Yasmin) to hold religious services in Bogor, despite the Supreme Court Order in 2010 that guaranteed the right for Christians to worship. Towards the end of the fasting month in 2011, a documentary TV programme depicting religious pluralism in Indonesia was targeted by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), and eventually they stopped the programme being aired. The FPI claimed that the movie would incite hatred against Islam.\textsuperscript{2} Whilst incidents of religious intolerance have frequently been reported in the mass media, political Islam in Indonesia, represented by Islamic political parties, seems to have failed to gain popular support. Scholarly evidence of this is provided by the fact that radical Islamic groups remain marginal in post-authoritarian Indonesia.\textsuperscript{3} Furthermore, Islamist political parties, such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), are struggling to grow politically stronger. Scholars analysing the policies of PKS\textsuperscript{4}
have shown that they have shifted from Islamist ideas to ‘religious–nationalist’ positions in order to become a mainstream political party.

This article examines religious orientations of Muslims against this conflicting standing of Islam and Islamic organizations in contemporary Indonesia. We aim to gain insights into the causes and factors affecting Islamic orientations, particularly Islamism. There are a number of definitions of Islamism. For example, some scholars have emphasized its totalitarian nature, including political Islamic fundamentalism aiming to impose Islamic law and to establish an Islamic state and polity.5 Other scholars6 have highlighted that Islamism may be divided into two different phases, the first phase focusing on political Islamic movements and the second phase articulating its concern on cultural and social orientations away from political movements. However, this change does not mean that Islamism is less political; rather, it is more strongly permeating into the public sphere.

Reflecting the scholarly debates of the changing nature of Islamism, we hold the view that Islamism is not limited to, and nor is it necessarily expressed through, affiliations with an organization. However, studies of Islamism in Indonesia have been mainly conducted on Islamist groups including political parties and Islamist groups such as PKS, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and FPI.7 Consequently, the existing approaches have several problems. Firstly, we cannot hold an assumption that Islamists belong to any particular Islamist organizations. In Indonesia, personal relationships, such as kinship, friendship and teacher–student relations, tend to form the basis of key human networks and for social organizations, removing the need for formal institutional links. In view of this, if we only focus on organized groups and their leaders, we may be excluding individual and family connections, which have been crucial in the spread of Islam in Indonesia.8 Secondly, prominent Islamist groups such as PKS and HTI tend to have leaders who are university-educated Muslims. However, the census data in 2010 in Indonesia show that approximately 11 per cent of the population are university educated, and a focus on university-educated Islamists, as shown by headscarf use among university students (i.e. Smith-Hefner9) may exclude the majority of ordinary Indonesian Muslims, who may be inclined to be Islamists, but are not university educated.

In view of the current research, focused on university-educated Islamist groups, and as a complement to the existing studies of the phenomena of Islamism and Islamists in Indonesia, this paper utilizes data deriving from a questionnaire survey taken in 2010 involving 1500 randomly selected Muslim respondents.10 We utilize similar mass questionnaire data results on Islamism in 2002 by Mujani and Liddle (2004) to understand the current situation of Islamism in Indonesia. Our key questions are as follows:

(1) Has the percentage of the Indonesian Muslim population categorized as Islamists increased since 2002?
(2) If it has, what factors can we identify as causes of the rise of Islamism in Indonesia?
(3) Are there any variables deriving from local contexts?

For case study sites, we have identified Aceh, West Sumatra, South Sulawesi, North Sulawesi and Banten as hot spots for Islamism.11 We have not included Aceh in our case study due to its special autonomy status through which Islamic law has been implemented. Therefore, the strong presence of Islamism and Islamists in Aceh is already anticipated and has received sufficient scholarly attention.12 In order to narrow down our analysis, we have focused on Banten, South Sulawesi and North Sulawesi and conducted follow-up interviews and observations in 2012. These three regions, Banten, West
Sumatra, and South Sulawesi, share similarities such as having a strong regional Islamic background. South Sulawesi in particular has also shown Islamism in the form of recent political movements such as KPPSI (Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Shariah) and the implementation of Islamic by-laws.\(^{13}\) Due to our resource constraints, we selected South Sulawesi over West Sumatra as we wanted to explore recent political moves to implement Islamism in South Sulawesi that have affected the Muslim orientation in the region in general. We have focused on North Sulawesi as it is a region where the Muslim population traditionally constitutes a minority in the region and a recent increase in Islamism in there requires further analysis. The structure of this paper is as follows: following a brief section on methodology and samples of our data, the first section presents the main findings on Islamists and Islamism orientations in Indonesia. The second section provides an analysis of factors that influence those orientations taken from three regions.

This paper shows that Islamism in Indonesia has increased since 2002. We argue that several factors have played a major role in the rise of Islamism and that the increase of Islamists in Indonesia is a result of ordinary Muslims turning to Islam as a reference to regulate their life. The Islamic media, such as TV preaching programmes, and local Islamic study groups (majelis taklim or pengajian)\(^{14}\) offer opportunities for Muslims to gain Islamic knowledge independently for ethical self-improvement.\(^{15}\) The existence of diverse Islamic teachings available in Indonesia shows the religious authorities in Indonesia are diffusing,\(^{16}\) and are providing greater opportunity for Muslims to gain Islamic knowledge. Rather than directly involving themselves in political Islamic movements, Muslims in Indonesia are seeking to implement an Islamic way of life in a challenging and secularizing world.

**Methodology**

This article combines two types of data on Islamic orientations in contemporary Indonesia, a national survey of 1500 Muslims conducted in ten provinces in 2010,\(^{17}\) and field observations and interviews with key informants conducted between 2006 and 2012. The 2010 survey used residents from local neighbourhood units as its sampling framework. Our survey identified four categories of regions for this survey\(^{18}\):

1. Provinces with a strong structural Islamic tradition (Aceh, Banten, and South Sulawesi),
2. Provinces with strong cultural Islamic roots (East Java and West Sumatra),
3. ‘Melting pot’ provinces where a variety of ethnic groups and religions coexist (Jakarta, North Sumatra, and East Kalimantan), and
4. Provinces with Muslims as a minority population (Bali and North Sulawesi).

The respondents answered 55 mostly closed questions in face-to-face interviews relating to demography, Islam in the public sphere, Muslim identity and democracy. The survey data were analysed in 2011 using statistical a package for social science to find factors for the rise of Islamism.\(^{19}\) Based on the survey findings, in December 2011 we carried out follow-up interviews with 15 respondents (from a total of 319 Islamists surveyed) that came from three strongly Islamic regions of South and North Sulawesi and Banten. These informants have been chosen because they were identified as Islamists from the previous survey in 2010. The interviews sought to find out how Islamist orientation has been created and supported. We also have sought data to analyse the role of media and
sociocultural factors surrounding the respondents. We have selected Islamist respondents in Banten, South Sulawesi and North Sulawesi, as these areas have a combination of a high percentage of Islamists, strong cultural and historical background and influence, and the existence of *shariah* or Islamic by-laws. In addition, we have also included data from our field observations in stages between 2006 and 2012, when both authors had conducted on the impact of implementation of regional by-laws in the research locations.

In analysing the result of the survey, we have used cluster analysis and correlational analysis of the Pearson Chi-Square test. The survey used stratified random sampling, with a 95% level of confidence and a 2.5% margin of error. Following Muzaffari,20 we distinguish Islamists from non-Islamists by their belief in three tenets:

1. Agreement that *Khilafa Islamiya*21 or an Islamic state should be established in Indonesia.
2. Agreement that the use of violence is permissible to fight for Islam.
3. Agreement that according to Islam, Muslim women should wear a *cadar* (a veil that covers the entire face).22

We hold the view that support for these ideas represents Islamic totalitarian ideology, that is, Islamic values and jurisprudence at the community/state level regulating the personal sphere. Islamists have inclinations towards radical thoughts that may lead to permissibility of the use of violence to fight for Islam, but only Jihadist-type Islamists will follow it by action. A Jihadist is a person who does *jihad* (fight in the cause of religion); this concept has been wrongly interpreted to refer to terrorist actions. The section that follows discusses our findings on the growing nature of Islamism in Indonesia.

**Islamic orientations at the national level in 2010**

Our 2010 national survey found that the number of Islamists in Indonesia was 20%. This result indicates an increase of 6% compared to the results of a similar survey conducted in 2002.23 Furthermore, our analysis has shown five important findings.

First, Mujani and Liddle24 stated that Islamism was higher among lower income and less educated people. However, our survey results show that there is no association between lower income and being an Islamist. Muslims with lower incomes are not necessarily more prone to Islamism than Muslims with higher incomes. The general membership of two emergent Islamist organizations in Indonesia, PKS and HTI, has demonstrated this trend. Followers of these organizations are supported by highly educated Muslims who are keen to have discussions and training sessions.25 PKS also draws its supporters mainly from the middle class.26

Second, having an Islamic educational background does not necessarily lead to support for Islamism. Our data shows that only 10% of Islamists attended Islamic schools or universities. Observations by authors on the use of a *cadar* may also support this finding. For example, face-veiled women are frequently found in secular state universities, such as Bandung Institute of Technology, much more than in Islamic state universities, such as State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. Followers of Islamist organizations are generally from secular universities. However, a conflicting fact is that there were some Islamist jihadist (terrorist perpetrators) who were educated in Islamic boarding schools; Ali Gufron, Imam Samudra, and Amrozi attended pesantren Al-Mukmin Ngruki. Masterminds and perpetrators of the book bombs used in many places surrounding Jakarta in 2011 were graduates of an Islamic university too. In general, we
argue that there is no certain pattern showing that religious education or secular education is associated with Islamism. This argument on the lack of correlation between education and Islamism is supported by many studies on terrorism. Alan Krueger\textsuperscript{27} and the same author with Jitka Maleckova\textsuperscript{28} argue that there is no correlation between the act of terrorism and low incomes and less educated people. Krueger’s studies show that terrorists tend to have better incomes and better education.

Third, there is no indication that Islamists are mainly Muslims with little education, or religious education. From the total 319 Islamist respondents of our survey, only 3% of them did not attend school, 10% went to Islamic schools, and the rest attended public schools with varying levels of education. In terms of economy, similar to the general picture above, there is no indication that Islamists come from Muslims with lower incomes. Our data show that approximately half of the Islamist respondents came from Muslims with sufficient economic resources to meet their needs (48%).

Fourth, there is no indication that Islamism is associated with a certain gender or age. 50% of Islamists are male and 50% are female, and they come from all age groups.

Fifth, our analysis shows that respondents who are members of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), a large traditionalist mainstream Islamic organization in Indonesia, tend to be non-Islamists. We argue that Islamic tradition created by the NU does not support Islamism.

**Islamic orientations from the national data**

Now let us turn our attention to our findings on Islamist orientations based on national data. We present three main findings:

First, Islamists tend to live in areas where Islamic local culture and Islamic by-laws do exist. Islamism is related to regions that have strong Islamic culture and Islamic by-laws. Our survey finds that there is a correlation between provinces and Islamism. Provinces that have a strong Islamic tradition and the presence of Islamic by-laws have the highest percentage of Islamists, as shown in Table 1. Our statistical analysis shows that Aceh and Banten have the first and second highest percentages of Islamists. Bali, where the Hindu tradition prevails, has the smallest number of Islamists. Provinces with a high number of Islamists have legislated Islamic by-laws – except North Sulawesi. Aceh, Banten, West Sumatra, and South Sulawesi have had a history of supporting an Islamic state (the Darul Islam and Permesta movements) and have legislated Islamic by-laws within their province and some at district levels.\textsuperscript{29} ‘Melting pot’ areas where Islamic culture has been contested have a smaller number of Islamists.

| No. | Provinces         | % Islamists |
|-----|-------------------|-------------|
| 1   | Aceh              | 50          |
| 2   | Banten            | 34          |
| 3   | North Sulawesi    | 25          |
| 4   | West Sumatra      | 19.8        |
| 5   | South Sulawesi    | 16.5        |
| 6   | East Java         | 16          |
| 7   | North Sumatra     | 15.4        |
| 8   | East Kalimantan   | 14.3        |
| 9   | Jakarta           | 14          |
| 10  | Bali              | 0.0         |
It is noteworthy that a quarter of Muslims in North Sulawesi are Islamists. As there is no strong regional Islamic tradition or Islamic by-laws that exist in North Sulawesi, the emergence of a new Islamist region deserved further investigation, and so we have chosen North Sulawesi as one of our case study sites.

Correlational analysis shows that there is an association between residential areas and Islamism (Table 2). Islamists are found in rural areas rather than in urban zones. This data confirms Mujani’s findings (2004) that more Muslims who live in rural neighbourhoods tend to be Islamists compared to those living in urban areas.

The rural environment is closely associated with orientations of cultural Islamism. However, we should not attribute this trend to Islamic educational institutions in rural areas because secular and religious educational institutions are also available in rural settings. Nationally, only 13% of Muslim school-age children attend Islamic schools in Indonesia, and secular education is the preferred mode of education in contemporary Indonesia.30

Secondly, Islamists tend to use media more actively than non-Islamists. Media is an important source of information. Muslims tend to seek information on theology, rituals, and ethics rather than on Islamist issues, such as forming an Islamic state, from media. For example, 94% Muslims sought knowledge on confession of faith, prayers, charity, fasting, and performing hajj, but only 39% Muslims have received and sought information related to Islamic shariah or states from media. Muslims also tend to seek mainstream, entertaining, apolitical information, provided by moderate and popular Muslim figures in Indonesia.31 Preaching by Muslim moderate preachers such as Mamah Dedeh is popular among both Islamists and non-Islamists. Follow-up interviews with Islamist respondents in three provinces show that almost 100% of the respondents have watched Mamah Dedeh’s programme on TV.32

Other important findings are that Islamists tend to seek Islamic knowledge through the use of media more frequently than non-Islamists, as shown in Table 3. Exposure to certain types of media (namely radio, VCD, the internet, bulletins, banners, discussions, and seminars) was strongly correlated to Islamism. However, Islamic knowledge transferred through TV, magazines, and newspapers does not necessarily influence Muslims to become Islamists. Islamic knowledge in the media is strongly influenced by mainstream Islam in Indonesia. Based on our data, we argue that Islamist ideology is hard to be conveyed in mainstream TV programmes, magazines, and newspapers, as they have to compete with the mainstream non-Islamist agenda. Therefore, Islamists tend to seek Islamist information from other media, such as local radio programmes, VCDs, and websites. Islamists tend to use new technology such as the internet to obtain information about Islam. Our interviews with a leader of an Islamist organization in South Sulawesi

| Residential areas | Urban | Rural | Total |
|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Muslim religious orientation | Non-Islamist | Count | 374 | 829 | 1203 |
| | | % | 85.8% | 77.9% | 80.2% |
| Islam | Count | 62 | 235 | 297 |
| | % | 14.2% | 22.1% | 19.8% |
| Total | Count | 436 | 1064 | 1500 |
| | % | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
also confirmed the advance in the use of technology, including the internet, radio, and discussions or seminars for Islamic propagation (dakwah) by Islamist groups. Follow-up interviews with Islamists in Banten confirm these findings about the use of internet.33

There is no correlation between newspaper coverage and Islamism orientations. There is only a small percentage of (Islamist) Muslims who sought information through newspapers, due to the small number of Islamic national newspapers that exist. In general, only 13% of Muslim respondents stated they read the Islamic national newspaper Republika. When we analyse this figure more, by comparing Islamists and non-Islamists, we find that more Islamists read Republika. This means that Islamists sought information from this newspaper more diligently than non-Islamists.

Islamists’ passion for knowledge related to Islam is also seen in the types of information they sought (Table 4). Islamists and non-Islamists have the same concerns relating to Muslim suffering and struggles in conflict areas, calling for jihad in Palestine, activation of deviate sects and cults in Islam, and support for a fatwa (edict) prohibiting secularism, pluralism, and liberalism.

Islamists are far more eager to seek information that can make all aspects of their life Islamic, such as Islamic finance, Islamic criminal law, establishment of a khilafah islamiyah/Islamic state, and the implementation of Islamic by-laws. Non-Islamists are not enthusiastic to seek this information. These four kinds of information lead to the totalitarian way of being Muslim.

Thirdly, Islamists and non-Islamists both regularly attend Islamic study groups but the tendency to attend Islamic study groups for Islamists is higher. Our survey has shown that Islamic study groups are emerging as an important source for information for both Islamists and non-Islamists in contemporary Indonesia. The types of Islamic study groups

| Types of media                  | Percentage of total respondents | Non-Islamist (%) | Islamist (%) |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|--------------|
| Television                     | 89                             | 89               | 91           |
| Radio                          | 42                             | 40               | 50           |
| Internet                       | 9                              | 8                | 14           |
| Pengajian in public places     | 78                             | 76               | 86           |
| Banner                         | 36                             | 33               | 48           |
| Discussion/Seminar             | 18                             | 14               | 34           |

| Types of information                              | Non-Islamist (%) | Islamist (%) |
|--------------------------------------------------|------------------|--------------|
| Islamic finance, such as Islamic banks            | 34.7             | 63.1         |
| Islamic criminal law                              | 38.4             | 68.9         |
| Establishment of Khilafah Islamiyah/Islamic state | 29.5             | 61.9         |
| Enactment of Islamic shariah through laws and by-laws | 32.6             | 64.2         |
| Movies (VCD/DVD) on Muslims who suffer and struggle in conflict areas | 22.6             | 45.3         |
| Deviate sects and cults in Islam                  | 63.0             | 74.2         |
| Calls for jihad for Palestine/Afghanistan         | 42.1             | 51.8         |
| Demonstration supporting fatwa of Indonesia Ulama Council (MUI) on prohibiting secularism, pluralism and liberalism | 24.8             | 38.1         |
Our data show that while 41% of Indonesian Muslims actively attend Islamic study groups, 47% of Islamists have attended Islamic study groups. This shows that Islamists regularly seek knowledge on Islam by attending Islamic study groups more frequently than non-Islamists. However, our data analysis finds that there is no correlation between attending Islamic study groups and supporting Islamism. This is because Islamists tend to go to Islamist Islamic study groups and non-Islamists tend to go to non-Islamist study groups. Examples of Islamist study groups are those organized by PKS Wahdah Islamiyah. A small Islamic mass organization like Wahdah Islamiyah (it has 70 branches, mainly in Sulawesi), claimed to have hundreds of Islamic study groups organized at their schools, offices, and in neighbourhoods. Examples of non-Islamist study groups are those organized by Muhammadiyah and NU.

Exploring Islamism in regional Indonesia
Let us now closely look at factors affecting Islamism in three regions: Banten, South Sulawesi and North Sulawesi. In order to examine the causes of support for Islamism in these three regions, we conducted follow-up interviews with some respondents who had originally participated in the survey in 2010 to gauge why they think support for Islamism is important. In addition, we have included our interviews with other key Islamic figures, and internet and publication analysis to support our study of the rise of Islamism in regional Indonesia. The interviews were unstructured, but they also contained some key questions asking their views on:

1. media (TV, Radio, the internet, VCDs)
2. local by-laws and regional policies
3. Islamic teaching and studying opportunities (Islamic study-group participation, schools, etc.)

Examining Islamism in North Sulawesi
North Sulawesi is traditionally a province in Indonesia with a Muslim minority (about 30% Muslims). Christians and Muslims have lived together in this same area for a long time. Muslim-populated areas in North Sulawesi include: (1) Jawa Tondano (called Jaton by local residents for short) located in the District of Minahasa, (2) Kampung Arab (Arab Village) located in the old port area in Manado City, (3) Bitung, located in the port area of Manado, and (4) Mataindo in the District of Bolaang Mongondow, close to Gorontalo Province. Muslims in Jawa Tondano are predominantly originally from Java, namely followers of Kyai Mojo, chief commander of the Diponegoro War (1825–1830). When Kyai Mojo was defeated, he and his followers were exiled to Tondano.

Muslim leadership in North Sulawesi has been dominated by moderate Islamic figures. Culturally, North Sulawesi Muslims are close to NU, in terms of Islamic ritual and tradition, but they accept the Muhammadiyah organization, which is active in providing social and educational services. The Muhammadiyah organization (including Aisyiyah, its women’s wing) has been relatively active in North Sulawesi. Figures of Arab descent have a significant role in North Sulawesi, especially under the Al-Khairat organization. Al-Khairat tends to be close to NU.

Living as a Muslim minority in a Christian dominated area, Muslims generally support a moderate type of Islam to facilitate their coexistence with Christians. Not only Muslim leaders, but also common Muslims hold these views. For example, comments related to
Islamic militant groups, religious conflicts, and new rising Salafi organizations reflect their intention to blockade elements that may change the moderate and tolerant configuration of Islam in North Sulawesi. Muslims are afraid that radical Islam may create conflicts between Christians and Muslims. Therefore, in general, they welcome Salafi groups such as Jamaah Tabligh (JT), as long as they do not disturb the relatively peaceful, multireligious coexistence there.

One significant factor explaining the peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians are the inter-religious family relationships. We have observed that religious conversion and inter-religious marriages are common in North Sulawesi. Family relationships have facilitated informal dialogue and adaptations to the different religions to avoid conflict. For example, people of different faiths usually visit their families at the times of *Idul Fitri* and Christmas, although they do not necessarily share the belief in the significance of these times.

Such harmonious relations have changed over the last decades due to three factors. Firstly, conflicts in the Ambon and Maluku areas have created internally displaced populations. Most of the Christian internally displaced people (IDP) fled to Manado due to its Christian-dominated population. The sudden increase of the Christian population has made the local Muslim population feel marginalized in their hometown. The Christian IDPs from Maluku were given facilities to resettle themselves in Manado municipalities and this created jealousy among the local populations of both Christians and Muslims. Some of the IDPs were radical Christians. Those Christian IDPs provoked resentment between Muslims and Christians in the area of Jawa Tondano, Minahasa. A group of Muslims and a group of Christians had been moved and were ready to fight. Local religious leaders of both Muslims and Christians had anticipated potential conflict, and stopped the incident before it broke out.

Secondly, the Muslim population in North Sulawesi has also seen the rise of Muslim identity in the neighbouring Gorontalo province. Gorontalo is a strongly Islamic region that broke off from the Christian-dominated mother province of North Sulawesi and formed a new province in 2000. The formation of a new province was designed to speed up its regional socioeconomic development, but the majority of the local population in Gorontalo are Muslims, and the religious identity issue also underpinned the creation of the Gorontalo province. Since the formation of the Gorontalo province, the government has been undertaking activities and imposing regulations to encourage Islam. These include a regular Qur’an recitation competition (MTQ) and various Islamic by-laws. For example, by-law No. 22 passed in 2005 (Perda Prov. Gorontalo No. 22/2005 tentang Wajib Baca Tulis Al-Quran Bagi Siswa Yang Beragama Islam) was implemented to encourage students to recite the Qur’an. In March 2012, the governor made it compulsory for Muslim civil servants on duty to wear a headscarf as part of their uniform.

Thirdly, some prominent transnational Islamist groups such as JT, a transnational Islamic movement aimed at guiding mainstream Muslims to become more devout, recently became active in Manado. However, our interviews and observations in South Sulawesi indicate that interactions between the JT members and local Muslims remain fragmented. This is because locals see the members of JT as foreign and strange to them. Interviewees also highlighted that the use of violence by FPI and Jihadists has had a negative impact in Indonesia, and they did not personally participate in the activities organized by FPI. This seems contradictory to their original answers in our national survey, but we believe that their original responses should be interpreted as their in-principle normative responses to support Islamism. Muslims in North Sulawesi seem to make conscious efforts to become better Muslims by actively seeking Islamic knowledge.
Based on our follow-up discussions with informants, we can highlight the following matters affecting Muslim religious orientations in North Sulawesi.

Firstly, our survey found that Muslims in North Sulawesi regularly attend various types of Islamic study groups and obtain Islamic knowledge. The percentage of Muslims attending Islamic study groups in this area is 75% of the respondents, making North Sulawesi the fourth highest region for attendance of Islamic study groups in the 2010 national survey, ahead of two other regions in our case studies. Informants attend these study groups to actively seek Islamic knowledge, Islamic mysticism (tasawuf), and carry out Islamic giving (amal) for the needy. These Islamic groups are led by local Muslims: well-known Islamic preachers from Gorontalo, Makassar, and South Kalimantan. Two female respondents emphasized that they seek to increase their Islamic knowledge and to implement that knowledge and understanding in their daily lives to become better Muslims. Another respondent commented that he conducts social activities and practices Islamic mysticism in line of Islamic teaching through his participation in Islamic study groups. In the context of North Sulawesi, a Muslim minority area, Islamic study groups presumably have become a means of creating a solid Islamic identity as a minority group, differentiated from non-Islamic culture. Islamic study groups also have become a means for proliferating Islam as well as ethical self-improvement for individual Muslims.

Second, another important source of Islamic knowledge is Islamic TV and radio programmes. Women tend to watch popular Islamic shows on national TV stations. Respondents like watching Islamic study-group shows run by a popular female Islamic preacher, Mamah Dedeh. At home, Indonesian women rather than men tend to choose what programmes to watch on TV and their husbands follow their wives’ decision to watch Islamic programmes on TV. Mamah Dedeh is skilled in preaching, and her popularity led her to appear on radio talk shows in the 1990s. Since 2007, Mamah Dedeh has been the host of a TV programme. In her programme, she has discussions issues with female Muslims and gives advice mainly on how to make appropriate decisions relating to domestic affairs using Islam. Mamah Dedeh provides answers based on her interpretations of Islamic values and Islamic sources. She is a graduate of the current Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. Her message is simple and easy to understand.

Access to the internet is limited in rural areas in North Sulawesi. As the majority of the population are Christians, Manado has numerous Christian radio programmes which outnumber Islamic radio programmes. During the fasting month, Muslims tend to listen particularly to national radio programmes through the state radio station of North Sulawesi. These programmes are usually run by Muhammadiyah members. They are aimed at Muslims waking up early to prepare for a daily fast and preparing for breaking the fast during sunset. Radio Al-Khairat (RAL) is the only Islamic radio based in North Sulawesi established by Al-Khairat, but its coverage is limited to the Manado area. Therefore, none of the respondents listened to RAL and its impact seems less extensive.

In summary, the recent sociopolitical changes taking place in this region are making North Sulawesi Muslims engage with Islamic activities more consciously. This situation explains why cultural Islamists make up 25% of the population in North Sulawesi, the third highest ranked in our survey, after Aceh and Banten.

**Examining Islamism in Banten**

Banten is a port city located in western Java where strong Islamic culture has prevailed through the Islamic kingdoms of Java, namely Cirebon and Demak, since the sixteenth
century. The sultanate of Banten flourished in the mid seventeenth century, as one of the prosperous port states during the age of commerce in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{45} The Banten Sultanate was in competition and conflict with the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC)/Dutch, and subsequently it was abolished in 1813. Images of the prosperous sixteenth and seventeenth century Banten under the sultanate were kept alive among the Banten Muslims under Dutch colonial administration in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{46} Therefore, Islam (including Islamic organizations) became a way to express social and political grievances. For example, tarekat orders or Islamic mysticism were used for peasants’ movements against the Dutch.\textsuperscript{47} During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Banten was the centre of West Javanese culture, in which Islam played an important social and political role. Even after Indonesia became an independent state, the Banten people supported the Darul Islam movement, whose aim was to establish an Islamic state.

Banten became a province in 2000, breaking off from the mother province of West Java. It is a densely populated area, and it has key transport facilities, such as sea ports, connecting Java and Sumatra, and the Sukarno-Hatta international airport. Banten has thriving manufacturing industries as illustrated by the Krakatau steel company in Cilegon which started to operate in 1966. The development of Krakatau progressed throughout the New Order period. Manufacturing has become one of the main economic activities in Banten. Due to the proximity to Jakarta and manufacturing industries, some areas, such as Tangerang, in Banten have become residential areas for people commuting to Jakarta, which it is connected to by toll roads. However, the influx of immigrants and its proximity to Jakarta has also created social problems including illicit drug use and prostitution in towns such as Tangerang and Cilegon.\textsuperscript{48}

The development of manufacturing industries and the emergence of social problems are threatening to the local Islamic identity held in the region. For example, West Java, including Banten, supported a political movement to create an Islamic state in Indonesia (Darul Islam) in the late 1950s. Even after the Darul Islam movement was put down, the region was not very accepting of non-Muslims. An illustration of such sentiment may be found in an anecdote about life before the construction of the Krakatau steel plant in Cilegon. Islamic scholars, who had owned the land the factory is built on, only agreed to release the land for the steel company on the condition that they would only welcome nationalists, and that they would not allow a church to be built in Cilegon. As a result, Christian workers in the factory had to accept that they had to travel by bus to Serang for Sunday church services.\textsuperscript{49}

Religious exclusiveness among Muslims in Banten recently resulted in some religious conflict. Some prominent cases included opposition to the church services at a Catholic church, St Bernadet in Ciledug in Banten. An Islamic group called Islamic Defenders Front at Karang Tengah (Front Pemuda Islam Karang Tengah) disrupted its church service in October 2004.\textsuperscript{50} In 2011, in Cikeusik, Banten three followers of Ahmadiyah, a sect which has been declared as blasphemous by the MUI, were attacked by the locals.\textsuperscript{51}

Religious exclusiveness in Banten has also been demonstrated by the issuing of a statement by the local MUI in 2006\textsuperscript{52} that they hold the view that so-called ‘Islamic by-laws’ are acceptable under the Indonesian constitution. Prior to the issuing of this statement, Islamic organizations in Banten, including the two dominant main stream Islamic organizations NU and Muhammadiyah, held a meeting in Serang to offer their support for regional Islamic by-laws in Banten and in other places in Indonesia. For instance, in Tangerang in 2005 the sale of alcohol in some public places was banned by Islamic by-law of Tangerang city No. 7/2005, and law No. 8/2005 of Tangerang city prohibits prostitution in Tangerang. As a result, in 2006, a woman working on a night shift
was arrested, as stipulated in this by-law, as she was suspected to work as a prostitute. As a province-wide by-law, in 2004 the Banten Province began to regulate Islamic alms (zakat) and Pandeglang District issued a statement by the district head (SK Bupati Kab. Pandeglang No. 9/2004) to force female students to wear a headscarf. Although respondents showed Islamist orientations in the questionnaire survey in 2010, at the time of the interviews, no respondents out of the seven Islamists we followed up in 2011 supported the use of violence in the name of jihad as conducted by terrorists. They said that jihad should be conducted peacefully. They held the view that if the government can effectively enforce civil law to regulate prostitution and sale of alcohol, community members do not have to take action, using force to solve social problems in the name of religion. If the government is not enforcing the law, violence in the name of religion could be tolerated. On the use of a headscarf, only two respondents encouraged their female family members to use a headscarf in their daily life and none of them were wearing a cadar. However, most respondents were aware of a by-law forcing female students to wear a headscarf as part of their school uniform and generally supported the idea, as they do not like to see younger female Muslims show off their body shape. They supported Islamic criminal law as it is part of shariah, but they did not agree with such laws being implemented in their own place of residence.

Based on our examination, we can highlight the following matters affecting Islamism in Banten:

Firstly, the source of knowledge on Islam is Islamic education taught at home. Respondents attended Islamic study groups and activities at their village mosques or at home at some stage in their life. However, Islamic study activities have focused on gaining the ability to recite the Qur’an rather than interpretations of the Qur’an. As the majority of the population in industrial areas such as Cilegon and Serang work during the day, Islamic study activities during the day have lost popularity.

Secondly, media, particularly TV programmes, have emerged as popular sources of Islamic knowledge in the region as explained earlier in the North Sulawesi section. Two respondents said that they use the internet every day and seek Islamic knowledge, such as good Islamic names for their children, through this source. However, the informants rarely read magazines or newspapers, and only sometimes listened to radio programmes.

Thirdly, no respondents mentioned their direct interactions with political Islamic organizations such as PKS. One respondent mentioned that a local chapter of Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia, an Islamic organization designed to propagate strict forms of Islam including the use of a cadar, is located in the vicinity, but he did not have any contact with his family.

Examining Islamism in South Sulawesi

South Sulawesi Province shares a similar Islamic background with Banten Province. In the 1950s Kahar Muzakkar led the Darul Islam movement in South Sulawesi. Political support to implement Islamic law gained traction in 2000. A prominent gathering, the Islamic Community Congress (Kongress Umat Islam), was held in the region in 2000. This meeting resulted in the formation of KPPSI, an Islamic umbrella organization seeking special autonomy for the Province of South Sulawesi. KPPSI expressed South Sulawesi Muslims’ aspiration to implement Islamic law to the DPRD, South Sulawesi Province peoples’ legislative assembly, in 2000.53 The KPPSI was led by Abdul Azis Qahar Mudzakar, a son of the former rebel, Kahar Muzakkar.54 In 2004, Abdul Azis Qahar Mudzakar secured his first political position by being successfully elected as a
representative from South Sulawesi to the newly created state institution, the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD). Since 2004, he has been a DPD member representing South Sulawesi, and he became an official candidate for the South Sulawesi provincial governorship in 2007 supported by the coalition of national Islamic parties. He was not successfully elected, but is reported to be preparing for the next election in 2013.

Apart from the prominent KPPSI movement, so-called Islamic by-laws have been legislated in various regions of South Sulawesi since 2000. Examples of this include the ban on the sale and consumption of alcohol, the institutions of the compulsory use of Islamic clothing, enforced payment of Islamic alms (zakat), and the duty to be able to recite the Qur’an, that were implemented in Bulukumba District under the leadership of District head, Patabai in 2003–2005. Apart from Bulukumba District, similar by-laws were implemented in other South Sulawesi districts and provinces.

In addition to Islamic regulations in the form of regional by-laws, South Sulawesi created some local militant Islamic groups such as Wahdah Islamiyah and Laskar Jundullah. These groups carried out a bombing in a MacDonald’s restaurant in Makassar killing three people in 2002. South Sulawesi also attracted transnational Islamic propagation organizations such as JT, which preaches that Muslims should become more pious. The South Sulawesi Province governor during the period of 2003–2007, Amin Syam, supported Islamic activities by encouraging South Sulawesi Muslims to actively organize Islamic study groups. As a result, during this period the activities of Islamic study groups became intensive, but the subsequent governor did not continue to support these activities as much as Amin Syam did.

Against this background, we conducted further interviews with the five Islamist respondents in 2011 combined with interviews conducted earlier. Combined with our observations and analysis, we highlight the recent erosion of morality reflected by alcohol abuse, domestic violence, illicit sexual relations and lack of civil law enforcement as key factors affecting Islamism in South Sulawesi.

For example, wedding receptions and parties are popular places for entertainment in rural places in South Sulawesi. This is because these parties are venues for ‘hot’ entertainment such as erotic singing and dancing. Early in the evening, the dancer-singer might be clad properly, but after most of the invited guests go home, the real entertainment starts. Singers typically sing dangdut songs like Candoleng-doleng, Cambolong-bolong, and Colak-colek, while the excited audience demands the singers take off their clothes. In response, the singers take off their top and bra, and the audience rushes to the stage, offering money as a tip in the expectation of touching the body of the singers. Even if the singer does not take off her clothes, her clothing tends to be minimal, made of strings, hardly covering the flesh. The increasing popularity of such erotic singing and dancing has been a blow to some religious people. Consequently, 26 organizations held a demonstration in front of the DPRD building in Sidrap District of South Sulawesi on 2 May 2006, complaining that the government was reluctant to control such immoral developments in the Sidrap District, which was known for its strong Islamic tradition in the region.

In response to the popularity of such erotic dancing, the Patabai government of the Bulukumba District legislated that the organizers of music performances should make sure that everyone wears Muslim clothing, including headscarves for women, through the introduction of by-law No. 5/2003 on Muslim clothing. During the time of the Patabai government, all brides also had to wear a headscarf in accordance with the by-law. However, after Patabai left office, the use of a headscarf declined.
In addition to the popularity of erotic dancing, people in South Sulawesi like drinking balo, an alcoholic drink similar to tuak made locally from palm coconut juice. It is a cheap but strong drink. Under the influence of alcohol, criminal conduct such as burglary, fighting and rape was rife in various parts of South Sulawesi, including Bulukumba. Before the by-law restricting alcohol was implemented, numerous karaoke cafes along the Merpati Beach, near the central shopping area of Bulukumba, sold alcoholic drinks, and fights among drunken people at night were frequent. The cafes were also thought to be frequented by prostitutes. According to the village head of Padang village, many people drank balo not only at cafes at night, but often during the day, neglecting their work. Drunken men also became violent towards their wives, causing domestic violence and destabilizing their marriages, contributing to social problems across Bulukumba.

After by-law No. 3/2002 restricting the consumption and sale of alcoholic drink was implemented, it was not legal to drink or sell alcohol within 1 km of residential areas, thus technically banning the sale of alcohol in the urban areas of Bulukumba. The café owners demonstrated against this by-law, but counter-demonstrations supporting the legislation also took place. Those who supported the by-law wore black clothes and demonstrated in the city of Bulukumba in 2003. In the end, the sale of alcoholic drinks was prohibited in the urban areas, which seems to have made Bulukumba safer. The beach area became noticeably less frequented at night after 2006. As a result, the Bira beach, located in Bulukumba District, once frequented by overseas tourists and promoted as the second-best tourist destination after Tanah Toraja, became less attractive to tourists and was deserted, despite the fact that the sale and consumption of alcohol was allowed there.

Despite the negative impact on tourism, the by-laws in Bulukumba seem to have been effective in reducing criminal conduct. Table 5 shows the number of criminal cases in Bulukumba during the period of 2002–2005. It can be seen that the number of criminal cases had decreased significantly by 2005.

Local residents in Bulukumba city expressed their relief as the city became relatively free from crimes.

People in Bulukumba pointed out that civil law enforcement in Indonesia has not been successful for a long time. This is because bribing the police is a daily routine in Indonesia, and people are not afraid of being punished for this. In responding to this situation, people see Islam as the only solution for solving social problems, particularly in relation to the erosion of public morals. People hope that Muslims will be fearful of God’s punishment.

| No. | Type of crimes       | 2002 R | S | 2003 R | S | 2004 R | S | 2005 R | S |
|-----|----------------------|--------|---|--------|---|--------|---|--------|---|
| 1   | Murder               | 10     | 9 | 8      | 9 | -      | - | 2      | 2 |
| 2   | Aggravated assaults  | 8      | 10| 11     | 7 | 5      | 5 | -      | - |
| 3   | Thefts               | 78     | 76| 75     | 68| 27     | 21| -      | - |
| 4   | Sexual violence      | 41     | 1 | 3      | 2 | 3      | 3 | -      | - |
| 5   | Drug use             | 3      | 3 | 1      | - | 3      | 1 | -      | - |
| 6   | Indecent acts        | -      | - | -      | - | 2      | 1 | -      | - |
| 7   | Animal thefts        | 32     | 17| 13     | 5 | 1      | 1 | -      | - |
| 8   | Gambling             | 9      | 11| 17     | 18| 9      | 6 | -      | - |
| 9   | Drinking             | 25     | 25| 17     | 17| 14     | 14| 9      | 9 |

Source: District Police in Bulukumba District.
Note: R = Reported; S = Settled.
Islamic activities of the respondents are generally influenced by an Islamic education and an Islamic social organization, Darul Dakwah wal Irsyad (DDI), originally founded by a charismatic Islamic teacher, KH. Ambo Dalle in South Sulawesi. Preachers affiliated with DDI are often invited to give sermons at Islamic study groups, and locals are keen to send their children to the DDI Islamic boarding schools. DDI does not support the institutionalization of Islamic law as proposed by KPPSI. DDI is culturally close to Islamic Traditionalist thoughts such as NU.

All the respondents had been actively participating in Islamic study-group activities. These activities are provided through local mosques and local village neighbourhoods. Most Islamic study groups are held for female Muslims during the day. Most of the contents of Islamic study groups focus on learning how to perform religious obligations correctly. For example, how to conduct ritual prayer correctly or how to conduct Islamic burials are among popular topics of Islamic learning activities mentioned by respondents. The respondents are all eager to implement their Islamic knowledge in their daily life so that they can become better Muslims. They think Islamic study groups will offer valuable directions and advice as to how to become a better person by learning to avoid bad behaviour and conduct. The motivation to attend Islamic study groups is to become better Muslims by gaining Islamic knowledge.

With the presence of transnational Islamic groups, such as JT, two respondents commented that they are aware of the presence of JT, but they did not particularly interact with the JT members, as the way JT preaches Islam is different from the Islamic tradition in the local contexts. Differences include the clothing and appearance of JT members. In addition, JT members do not participate in an Islamic gathering called *barzanji* as the local Muslims do. The practice of spending several nights (*mabit*) in a mosque by JT members is also seen as different from the local Islamic tradition. As a result, the respondents do not seem to interact with JT members. Islamic by-laws requiring a couple intending to marry to learn to recite the Qur’an is seen as a positive regulation, as the married couple can also teach their future children how to recite the Qur’an. The respondents are concerned that younger generations are not given opportunities to learn how to do this.

The sources of Islamic knowledge often mentioned by the respondents are popular Islamic programmes on TV. Ustadz Nur Maulana, a South Sulawesi native, is a host of an Islamic preaching programme called *Islam Itu Indah* (Islam is beautiful) on Trans TV, which is a popular programme. In addition, Mamah Dedeh is another preacher the respondents enjoy watching. The respondents stated that explanations by these preachers are easy to follow and their programmes are entertaining. No respondents made any specific references to political movements to implement Islamic law in their region, such as KPPSI.

Most respondents, however, do not agree with the use of *jihad* for violence such as terrorist bombings, demolition, or raids that cause human casualties and loss of property. Respondents mainly referred to people such as Amrozi and groups such as FPI. Although they agreed with the normative value of *jihad*, namely to fight for Islam, they prefer – if possible – to do it in non-violent ways.

**Conclusions**

Our paper has shown some key findings with regard to our understanding of Islamism in contemporary Indonesia. Firstly, the increase in support for Islamism, support for political Islam, and the use of violence to defend Islam and limiting women’s clothing,
does not always mean that identified Islamists are actively seeking to become militant and jihadist. In-depth observations in three regions of Indonesia – North Sulawesi, Banten, and South Sulawesi – have supported our general argument that Islamism in Indonesia is on the rise among Muslims because of increasing orientations towards cultural Islamism rather than political Islamism. Our follow-up interviews and observations have confirmed that support for Islamism is more inclined to the second phase of Islamism.

The respondents are actively turning to Islamic values to regulate their life through Islamic morals. Their concern is for becoming better Muslims more generally. Support for an Islamic polity seems to be an ideal shared among the Islamists in our survey, but in reality they are more concerned with implementing Islamic values in their daily life and in promoting Islamic values and symbols in the public sphere. A recent study has shown that ethical self-improvement is becoming an important notion for Muslims in Indonesia, and this research has further articulated the nature of Islamism shared among the Muslims in Indonesia.

Secondly, these people do not generally join or participate in the activities by JT or FPI, but respondents feel frustrated with the state’s lack of ability to enforce the law and solve social problems. According to our survey, the impact of transnational Islamism in disseminating Islamism is relatively limited in regional areas of Indonesia. Our findings have confirmed predictions by a leading Islamic scholar, Azra, that the influences of transnational Islamism are relatively limited and will lose momentum. The influence of the recent ‘Arab spring’ in Indonesia has not strengthened support for political Islamism in Indonesia. This is because the success of the Arab spring is seen by the majority of Indonesian Muslims as a political movement to overthrow the corrupt and unjust state, similar to their own experience of the fall of Suharto in 1998. Nonetheless, Islamism in Indonesia is on the rise because Indonesian Muslims are trying to discipline themselves by turning to Islam and popular Islamic preachers. The impetus for the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia derives from the variety of Islamic propagation methods, as many Muslims do not necessarily feel inclined to be involved in Islamic political movements, but rather they want to express their identities as good Muslims as a way of upholding their faith in secularizing societies.

The use of violence, such as ‘sweeping’, is seen as an alternative to the weak civil law enforcement, despite the fact social problems (prostitution, drinking) do exist. The sources of Islamic knowledge have become diverse beyond the traditional knowledge sources, such as family and local tradition. Islamic study groups are emerging as important avenues to gain Islamic knowledge. In addition, Islamic media, such as popular preaching TV programmes, have become an alternative source of Islamic authority. These preaching programmes feature new Islamic preachers who are not affiliated with dominant Muslim organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah. Islamic teaching presented in TV is appealing, as the content is presented in an entertaining way, made accessible for lower-class Muslims.

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Notes

1. Gillespie, “Current Issues in Indonesian Islam,” 202–40.
2. Aljazeera, “Indonesian Film Stirs Religious Controversy.”
3. Hadiz, “Political Islam in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia.”
4. Tomsa, “Moderating Islamism in Indonesia,” 1–13; Bubalo, Fealy and Mason, “Zealous Democrats”; and Okamoto, “The Rise of the ‘Realistic’ Islamist Party,” 219–54.
5. For example, see Roy, Globalized Islam; Muzaffari, “What Is Islamism?” 17–33.
6. Göle, “Islam in Public,” 173–90; Ismail, “Islamism, Re-Islamization and the Fashioning of Muslim Selves,” 1–21.
7. For recent studies on Islamic parties and Islamist groups in Indonesia, see Hamayotsu, “The End of Political Islam?” 133–59; Lim, “Radical Islamism in Indonesia,” 213–31.
8. For discussions on the change of various Islamic authority, see Azra, Van Dijk, and Kaptein, Varieties of Religious Authorities; Rasmussen, Women, the Recited Qur’an.
9. Smith-Hefner, “Javanese Women and Veil,” 389–420.
10. The survey entitled Islamization of Public Sphere: Identity and the Future of Democracy in Indonesia. The survey result on the role of Islam in the public sphere in Indonesia has been published as Islam di Ruang Publik: Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Demokrasi di Indonesia, edited by Noorhaidi Hasan and Irfan Abubakar (Jakarta: Center for the Study of Religion and Culture, 2011). The focus of the previous publication was at the national level and differentiates itself from this current focus.
11. West Java is an area where a significant number of religious intolerance and violence cases took place. For example, 21 cases from 39 reported incidents in the year report took place in West Java, see Bagir et al., Laporan Tahunan Kehidupan.
12. Salim and Sila, Serambi Mekah Yang Berubah; Aspinall, “From Islamism to Nationalism in Aceh,” 245–63; Millalos, “Muslim Veil as Politics,” 289–301.
13. Buehler, “The Rise of Shari’a By-Laws in Indonesian,” 255–85; Juhannis, “The Struggle for Formalist Islam in South Sulawesi.”
14. These terms refer to a general meeting of study groups. Pengajian is from the word ‘ngaji’, literally refers to learn the Qur’an. Majlis taklim is from Arabic words, literally means a place for learning.
15. Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape.
16. Watson, “Islamic Books and Their Publishers;” 177–210; Feillard, “From Handling Water in a Glass,” 157–76.
17. The survey on Islamization was conducted in 2010 by the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture, State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. The survey was generously funded by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
18. We did not include West Java province because it has similar religious characteristics with the Banten Province such as historical roots, and the presence of shariah by-laws. Banten broke off as from West Java province in 2000. Eastern part of Indonesia is represented by South Sulawesi (an area with Muslim majority), North Sulawesi (Muslim minority area with a relatively strong Christian communities), and Bali (Muslim minority area living with Hindu community).
19. We thank Andi Agung Prihatna for providing statistical consultation.
20. Muzaffari, “What Is Islamism?”
21. Khilafa Islamiya (Islamic caliphate) is a concept of Islamic governance led by a caliph who unites all Muslim countries under one political system. This concept has been supported mainly by Islamists.

22. We note that variables that may be supported by both Islamists and non-Islamists, such as agreement on wearing a headscarf, agreement for polygamous marriages and disagreement for democracy are not suitable to identify Islamist orientations.

23. Mujani and Liddle, “Politics, Islam and Public Opinion,” 109–203.

24. Mujani and Liddle, “Politics, Islam and Public Opinion.”

25. Munabari, “Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia,” 173–218.

26. Rinaldo, Pious Islam and Women’s Activism in Indonesia, 291.

27. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist.

28. Krueger and Maleckova, “Seeking the Root of Terrorism.”

29. Bush, “Regional ‘Sharia’ Regulation in Indonesia,” 174–91.

30. Hefner, “Islamic Schools, Social Movements,” 57.

31. Figures include Quraish Shihab (Muslim intellectual, former Minister of Religion), Abdurrahman Wahid (Muslim intellectual from Muslim Traditionalist background, and fourth president of Indonesia), and Abdullah Gymnastiar (founder and leader of pesantren, became the most popular preacher between 2000 and 2008) who all moderate Muslim figures. Only one per cent of the respondents sought information on Islam by listening and reading from Islamists figures through media.

32. Mamah Dedeh is one of the most popular Muslim preachers in Indonesia. Her preaching represents a moderate view of Islam.

33. Ustadz Ir. Idris Parakkasi, Msi, (one of leaders of Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar), interview, 5 April 2012.

34. Winn, “Women’s Majelis Taklim and Gendered Religious Practice.”

35. Salafi is ‘one who claims to draw his religious doctrines directly from the “Salaf al Salih”—the ancestors, the first three generations of Muslims.... Salafi claims to take his interpretation of Islamic doctrine directly from the Qur’an and the Sunna as they were understood and practised by the Salaf.’ Term salafism has become close to ‘fundamentalism’. Roy and Sfeir, The Columbia World Dictionary, 300–1.

36. KH. Arifin Asegaf (board member of MUI North Sulawesi, member of FKUB North Sulawesi), interview, 2 April 2010; Suhendro Boroma (chief editor, Manado Post), interview, April 5, 2010; Dani Panarang (chief, Department of Social and Welfare, Province of North Sulawesi), interview, April 3, 2010.

37. Ayu Asegaf (a local community leader of an Arab descent), interview March 30, 2010; Arifin Asegaf, interview.

38. Ayu Asegaf, interview; Arifin Asegaf, interview.

39. Duncan, “Unwelcome Guests,” 25–46.

40. Boroma, interview.

41. Arifin Asegaf, interview.

42. For spread of JT in Indonesia, especially Java and Papua, see Noor, “The Spread of Tablighi Jama’at,” 175; and Noor, “The Arrival and Spread of Tablighi Jama’at,” 191 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2010). For female members of JT see Amrullah, “Seeking Sanctuary in ‘the Age of Disorder’,” 135–60.

43. In North Sulawesi the operations of local TV stations remain stable and TV stations from Jakarta are broadcast and viewed frequently. See Hill, “Manoeuvres in Manado,” 5–28.

44. http://biografi-biodata-profile.blogspot.com.au/2012/03/biografi-mama-dedeh-rosidah-syarifudin.html, Accessed April 10, 2013.

45. Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce.

46. Boontharm, “The Sultanate of Banten AD 1750–1808.”

47. Kartodirdjo, Peasants’ Revolt of Banten in 1888.

48. “Lokalisasi harus jadi agenda besar,” Kabar Banten, June 22, 2011.

49. Rudnyckyj, Spiritual Economies, Islam, Globalization, 53.

50. CRCS, Kontroversi Gereja di Jakarta, 79–84.

51. “Ahmadiyah: Kami Diserang,” Kompas, February 6, 2011.

52. “MUI dan Ormas Islam Dukung Perda Syariah,” Radar Banten, June 29, 2006.

53. Nashir, Gerakan Islam Syariat, 288.
54. For detailed analysis of the KPPSI, see Juhannis, “The Struggle for Formalist Islam in South Sulawesi.”

55. “Pilkada Sulsel: Lima Pasang Cagub Resmi Mendaftar,” Suara Karya, August 13, 2007.

56. Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, 57.

57. “Gubernur minta TPA dikembangkan,” Harian Ujungpandang Ekspres, July 3, 2006.

58. “Goyang Sinchan Tengah Malam Kriminalitas,” Gatra, May 8, 2006.

59. Interview with a hairdresser in Bulukumba, January 27, 2007.

60. “Goyang Sinchan Tengah Malam Kriminalitas,” Gatra, May 8, 2006.

61. Interview with a hairdresser in Bulukumba, January 27, 2007.

62. One litre of balo is sold for around Rp. 5000 and Rp. 10,000, equivalent to A$0.90-S$1.5. People often drank as much as four litres at a time, according to the former head of sub-district of Ujung Loi, Bulukumba.

63. Information obtained in Bulukumba, March 2006.

64. Who these people were remains unclear, but at some state that they were the Laskar Jundullah, a military wing of the KPPSI, who conducted several “sweepings” before the New Year’s celebration in 2000. “Sweeping” is a term used to refer to violent actions or intimidation taken by militant Muslims. Under the pretext of upholding morality and Islamic values, they attack restaurants and bars that open during the fasting month. They also attack hotels that may facilitate illicit sexual relations. Occasionally they attack or intimidate foreigners who are regarded as against Islam. Sweeping is often carried out by radical Islamic organizations.

65. Interview with Saleh Tajuddin, an academic in the State Islamic University, UIN Makassar, January 2007.

66. Barzanji is a type of praising (shalawat) for the prophet, read by people in religious gathering, usually after reading the recitation of QS. Yasin or before. It is written as poems.

67. Sakai, “Ethical Self-Improvement in Everyday Life.”

68. Azra, “Globalization of Indonesian Muslim Discourse,” 31–50.

69. See Soares and Osella, “Islam, Politics, Anthropology,” S1–S23 for discussions of ways of being Muslim; Sakai, “Introduction for Islamic Propagation,” 1–7, for an example of Indonesian Islamic practices and propagation as ways of life.

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