This article aims to explore the current measures related to the prevention of violent radicalization that leads to violence and terrorism, exploring the different dimensions of the phenomenon of radicalization and extremism, which cannot be applied to certain stigmatized communities but to a wider spectrum of different political violent ideologies. At this point the proper use of terminology in this field can help us to understand how to address this challenge as a whole. Countries such as the USA and different International Organizations have carried out a set of measures to prevent violent radicalization but not always in a successful or effective way, although many initiatives at a local level are showing promising results. There is still a lot of work to be done not only in the field of prevention, but also in the de-radicalization one, measures should be more efficient.

UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TERMINOLOGY

The knowledge of the terminology related to terms such as extremism, radicalization, violent radicalization or terrorism is fundamental in discerning one term from the other; each term has a different definition. Knowing this fact, the adoption of radical ideas does not imply direct violence. Even violent extremism does not have direct correlation to terrorism.
Marc Sageman (2017) mentions that:

The process of turning to political violence is commonly called radicalization. However, this term has a double meaning: it refers both to the acquisition of extreme or radical ideas and to the readiness to use violence. The two are not the same. Many people share radical ideas, but the vast majority do not go on to use violence in their pursuit. The literature unfortunately confuses these two very separate processes and assumes that belief in racial ideas inevitably leads to violence. (p. 9)

On the other hand, terms like extremism has been described by authors like Shmidt (2013) affirming that:

In terms of historical precedents (e.g. Fascism, Communism), extremists can be characterized as political actors who tend to disregard the rule of law and reject pluralism in society [...] Extremists strive to create a homogeneous society based on rigid, dogmatic ideological tenets; they seek to make society conformist by suppressing all opposition and subjugating minorities. That distinguishes them from mere radicals who accept diversity and believe in the power of reason rather than dogma. [...] Extremists on the political left and right and those of a religious-fundamentalist orientation as well as those of an ethno-nationalist political hue tend, in their struggle to gain, maintain or defend state power, to show a propensity to prefer, on their paths to realize their political programs: Use of force/violence over persuasion; Uniformity over diversity; Collective goals over individual freedom; Giving orders over dialogue. (p. 8-9)

Other authors like Aron Kundnani (2015) comments that “It is worth noting that the term “extremism” has long been used as a way of denouncing political dissent.”
Even violent extremism does not have direct correlation to terrorism
Terms like terrorism are explained by the EUROPOL in the TESAT report 2018 as such:

The definition of the term ‘terrorist offences’ is indicated in Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA), which all EU Member States have implemented in their national legislation. This Framework Decision specifies that terrorist offences are intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization when committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing an act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization. (p. 63)

There are many definitions of terrorism but there is no definition that is widely accepted. The same happens with term such as extremism and radicalization. The Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence of Canada describes radicalization leading to violence as “a process whereby people adopt an extremist belief system – including the intent to use, encourage or facilitate violence – in order to promote an ideology, a political project or a cause as a means of social transformation” (Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, 2016 in YOUTH WORK AGAINST VIOLENT RADICALISATION Theory, concepts and primary prevention in practice, 2018, p. 15).

Schmid (2013) differentiate between radicalism and extremism saying that “In the past, radicalism has reformed our political systems, allowing fringe movements to become mainstream movements” (p.55), the author is stating that even if radicals share characteristics with extremists there are differences such as the willingness to engage in critical thinking.

Berger (2018) explains about radicalization that leads to extremism that “the escalation of an in-group’s extremist orientation in the form of increasingly negative views about an out-group or the endorsement of increasingly hostile or violent actions against an out-group” (p. 172). It is very important to differentiate and understand all these terms so we can take it into account once we start designing policies and putting in place measures for the prevention of violent radicalization.

Understanding the factors that can lead a priori to a process of radicalization or to a process of violent radicalization constitute an important tool in order to carry into effect the policies to prevent such procedures. Analyzing the context of the radicalized person and other crucial elements like his/her personality is extremely important too. Oliver Roy (2017) talks about the islamization of radicalism explaining that many youngsters in France related to terrorism had small curricula of petit crimes (p.17). From Roy’s ideas we can conclude that people don’t have to get violent because they adhere to a concrete religious ideology, separating terror from religion; although it could indicate that once someone commits a violent act the following one would become much easier and can indicate also that the commission of a violent act can also
be influenced by individual’s social, political, religious and economic context...which excludes also the theory of violent predisposition¹.

Diego Muro (2016) explains that “Radicalization towards violent extremism is a complex and multifaceted process that takes place at a variety of levels (individual, organizational and systemic)” (p. 2). From most of the explanation surrounding the studies related to the field of radicalization, like Moghaddam’s model of six steps that illustrates the process of radicalization (2005), Sagema’s (2017) explanation of self-categorization as “the core concept of a social science project analyzing the behavior of groups, known as the social identity perspective (SIP)” (p. 6) is the approach that entails a more complete sense from our point of view. The author mentions the works of other scholars like Tafjel “group bias involved identification with one’s group” and his student John Turner noted that “these minimal group conditions showed that loners spontaneously acted out on behalf of a group with which they had no contact” (p. 6). Berger (2018) also mentions The Social identity theory as pioneered by social psychologists Henri Tafjel and John C. Turner, this theory stipulates that people categorize themselves and others as members of competing social group (p.24), the in-group vs out-group explained above.

This reflection seems more adequate to the current events, I mentioned in other publications (Jalloul, 2018) that if we circumscribe our analysis to the European Muslim citizens that became radicalized and committed terrorist acts, we must not ignore the fact that they are European Muslim citizens. That is to say that those individuals who are radicalized toward violence and execute it along with terrorist groups, advocate a cause that geographically and, in some cases culturally, is alien to them. We can mention the circumstance of those individuals, having or not Arabic origins, who have never been in the Arab world in countries like Syria or Iraq, in which organizations like ISIS raised the capitals of their Caliphate. They identify themselves with causes that are not theirs, there is a misconception of the belonging identity.

¹ Sageman (2017a) explains that “this common cognitive bias neglecting contextual factors and reducing actors to stereotypes, driven by simple internal factors such as personality or ideology [...] two common explanations from this perspective are that terrorist are either criminals or mentally ill”. (pp. 92-93)
THE CATEGORIZATION OF TERRORIST OFFENDERS

When we talk about terrorism, we need to realize that terrorism as a consequence of a violent political action can be committed by groups with different political and religious ideologies, even carried out by political actors. We tend to think that terrorism only applies to individuals from specific religious communities, an example of this is when an individual of Muslim confession commits a terrorist act. On the other side, when the press publishes about other terrorists’ attacks committed by non-Muslim individuals, they are not labeled, in many cases, as terrorist.

Citing examples, we can mention the 2016 terrorist attack on a Berlin Christmas market. Terrorist group known as Islamic State claimed responsibility for the horrific attack which killed 12 and left up to 50 injured. If we considered Sageman’s definition on terrorism “as a public’s categorization of political violence by non-state actors during domestic peacetime” (p. 91), we can evidently agree that the German market attack was carried out by a terrorist. The same definition can be used when in the US, last year’s mass shooting took place in Las Vegas, a gunman opened fire in a concert killing 58 people leaving 851 injured, resulting one of the deadliest mass shooting in recent US history, in this case the perpetrator was described as a 64-year-old gambler and former accountant (BBC, 2017) or as a gunman, in the case where 12 people were killed in a shooting the 8th of November at a bar in California. (New York Times, 2018). Although both cases confirm every pattern related to the several definitions known of terrorism.

Currently, the US is witnessing a huge growth of extreme right movements. In fact, as the Washington post published recently (Barret, Zapotosky, Stead Sellers, 2018), after the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting on the 27 of October that left 11 people dead, calls for the federal government to update its laws to put the kind of violence targeting minorities, religious groups and the public in the same category as terrorists inspired by overseas groups. The same article mentions that “A 2017 report by the Government Accountability Office found that since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, far-right violent extremists were responsible for 106 killings in the United States, while Islamist-inspired violent extremists had killed 119. The GAO found that while the number of deaths were roughly similar, the number of incidents were not; far-right extremists committed almost three times as many attacks – 62, compared with 23 by Islamist extremists.”
There is an acceptance of a certain type of violence used by political actors, like states, who are radicalized in their fight against those non-state actors whom they categorize as terrorists. This reality offers a dimension of conflict less clear, also compels us to think of the “other” as the “real terrorist”
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), according to a document of the European Commission (2015) could be defined as: “The fight against violent extremism, or CVE, constitutes all actions that strengthen the resilience of individuals and communities to the appeal of radicalizers and extremism”
Other articles, (The Conversation, 2018), state that from 1990 to the present, far-right extremists have committed 217 ideologically-motivated homicides. 19 of these homicides targeted religious institutions or individuals thought to be associated with a particular religion. Eleven were motivated by anti-Semitism, specifically.

Europe witnessed one of its deadliest terrorist attacks in the Norwegian Island of Utøya in 2011 perpetrated by a far-right extremist, Anders Behring Breivik who killed 69 young people.

The council of Europe released a report last April 2018 (p. 16), based on the report by the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, in which several forms and manifestations of radicalization leading to violence are described. We find right-wing extremist violence, left-wing extremist violence, politico-religious extremist violence and single-issue extremist violence. In all the mentioned cases the range of violent actions can vary from verbal violence to terrorist attacks, damage to public goods, physical aggression or murders, amongst others.

On the other hand we should not forget that not only individuals but also political actors can radicalize toward violence. There is an acceptance of a certain type of violence used by political actors, like states, who are radicalized in their fight against those non-state actors whom they categorize as terrorists. This reality offers a dimension of conflict less clear, also compels us to think of the “other” as the “real terrorist”, Jalloul (2018). Examples can be Guantanamo, the persecution, torture and murder of the Rohingya minority by Myanmar’s security forces and other religious groups. Civilians killed in Syria by Russian bombings and the US-led military coalition against Daesh. Civilian’s death toll by the NATO air campaign in Libya in 2011, among others.

We cannot misjudge the fatal consequences of the jihadist terrorism in our society that tried over and over to undermine our democratic values, but also we cannot forget that in the field of prevention of radicalization that leads to violence and to terrorism, as its ultimate consequence, other types of terrorism are as dangerous as the jihadist’s type. As we said before, terrorism has several manifestations and the religious one is just one of them. The field of prevention of radicalization should take all of them into account in order to make our societies more resilient to the radicalizer’s discourses and ideology.

**PREVENTIVE STRATEGIES TO FIGHT VIOLENT RADICALISATION THAT LEADS TO VIOLENCE**

Different policies have been put in place for the fight against violent radicalization, they are known as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), according to a document of the European Commission (2015) could be defined as: “The fight against violent extremism, or CVE, constitutes all actions that strengthen the resilience of individuals and communities to the appeal of radicalizers and extremism” (p. 9). Its objectives are to prevent radicalization and also to achieve the de-radicalization of some individuals, before the latter could travel to fight with terrorist groups such as ISIS; or once they return after fighting with them. These programs have not always been effective as intended, it is worth mentioning that within these programs there are online counter narratives programs (counternarratives). Different institutions at European level, as well
as different civil organizations and different projects and institutions financed by the EU, have launched several projects and research groups related to the prevention of radicalization\(^2\). In 2016 the European Commission presented a communication for the prevention of violent extremism\(^3\).

The Council of Europe approved last July a Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2018-2022) based mainly on prevention, prosecution and protection, including assistance to victims (Council of Europe, 2018). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe launched in 2015 the initiative #NoHateNoFear, calling on politicians “to shoulder their responsibility to speak out publicly against fear and hatred, and to promote fundamental freedoms and the values of tolerance, non-discrimination and respect for human dignity. Through practical action in their parliaments and in their constituencies, parliamentarians can help immunize society against fear and hatred.” The United Nations also launched an action plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalism at the end of 2015. The projects have been carried out by organizations, even by the States. The fight against violent extremism (CVE) is also known as prevention of violent extremism (PVE-Preventing Violent Extremism) term coined by the United Nations, although in reality both are largely identical; in recent years they have been presented as alternatives to reduce the risks derived from radicalization processes toward violence and the commission of terrorist acts. The OSCE refers to the fight against violent extremism as “the fight against violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism”, or VERLT - another term that is, again, largely similar to that of the CVE (Neuman, 2017, p. 19).

The European Union promotes initiatives through institutions such as RAN (Radicalization Awareness Network) funded by the European Commission, which brings together European experts to work on the prevention of radicalization; or with projects of the European Union such as CTMORSE, which provides policy monitoring and support for the actions of The European Union Instrument for Stability and Peace (IcSP), in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism in third countries.

Among many other projects pertaining to the prevention of radicalization we find The Counter-Islamophobia kit, funded by the European Commission-Directorate of Justice, which brings

\(^2\) For example, Quilliam Foundation, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Fida Management, RUSI, global network Against Violent extremism (AVE) formed by individuals who had been violent extremists, as well as by survivors of violent extremism, in the UK. British government also finance projects such as Imams Online, RAN y CTMORSE by the European Union, Counter Extremism Project, Impact Europe, ICCT, there is also a program form OSCE; in France the government supported the initiative Stop d’jihadisme. In Spain Plan Estratégico Nacional de lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta, a program to stop radicalization in prisons, both of the since 2015, and the platform STOP-radicalismos; nor very successful. While the the Plan Transversal por la Convivencia y la Prevención de la Radicalización Violenta in the city of Málaga has been successful. In the Middle East there are organizations like Sawab Center o Hedayah Countering Violent Extremism Center in Abu-Dhabi

\(^3\) COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism Brussels, 14.6.2016 COM (2016) 379 final. There other documents: Commission Communication on Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s Response, COM (2013) 941 final of 15 January 2014, European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2015 on the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organisations (2015/2063(INI)),
In the United States the first national strategy to prevent violent extremism was launched in 2011 under Obama’s presidency, this is known as *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*
In early 2017 the Trump’s administration announced the name change for Counter Islamic Extremism, which was widely criticized for being ineffective and for attacking Muslim communities.
experts from across Europe. The objective of this project is to critically review dominant anti-Muslim narratives, comparing the use and efficacy of prevailing counter-narratives to Islamophobia in eight European Union Member States.

In the United States the first national strategy to prevent violent extremism was launched in 2011 under Obama’s presidency, this is known as Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. In 2015 Obama’s administration held a conference regarding this program; In early 2017 the Trump’s administration announced the name change for Counter Islamic Extremism, which was widely criticized for being ineffective and for attacking Muslim communities; today the website of the Department of Security, which it seems to have opted not to adopt that name, shows the lines of work in terms of resources, research and programs on CVE. Authors such as Aziz Sahar F. (2017) criticizes considerably the effectiveness of CVE programs in the United States, a country that suffers from important conflicts such as the deaths perpetrated by supremacist groups and the mass shootings in schools.

Other authors have criticized the orientation that CVE Programs took with Trump's administration, where it seems that securitization weights more than policies that focus on prevention; mentioning also that (Stewart, 2017) “despite a wealth of data available to create an evidence-based policy, an American CVE policy grounded in scientific support has not yet been produced. Until these concerns are adequately addressed, CVE efforts in the United States remain in a state of disarray and uncertainty” (p. 45-46). These remarks stress the deficiency of this type of programs in the US.

In fact, having a look into the web page of the U.S. Department of State, The Global Counter Terrorism Forum specifies that “It provides a unique platform for senior counterterrorism policymakers and experts from around the world to work together to identify urgent needs, devise solutions and mobilize resources for addressing key counterterrorism challenges. With its primary focus on capacity building and countering violent extremism”; we cannot find the word preventing, although we know that the term used, CVE, has at one of its most important goals the prevention of radicalization that leads to violence. In the special briefing by Nathan A. Sales, coordinator for Counterterrorism on the Release of the Country Reports on Terrorism 2017, also at the U.S. Department of State’s webpage, he states that:

The report notes a number of major strides that the United States and our international partners made to defeat and degrade terrorist organizations in 2017. We worked with allies and partners around the world to expand information sharing, improve aviation security, enhance law enforcement and rule of law capacities, and to counter terrorist radicalization with a focus on preventing recruitment and recidivism.

We observe clearly that the US policy related to CVE is focused on the terrain of securitization more than in the prevention or de-radicalization.

If we study the efforts done with de-radicalization the perspective changes, taking into consideration that it is a step that must be taken when someone has been already radicalized: this
person even if radicalized does not have to manifest any sort of violence, or he can be a radical ready to administer any type of violence, in a nearby geography or in the battlefield of places like Syria or Iraq, or he can be a freedom fighter whose returning from fighting with a terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or ISIS in the battlefield. Or a person that is in jail in a place like Iraq or Syria. Omar Ashour (2009) comments that:

De-radicalization is another process of relative change within Islamist movements, one in which a radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals, while also moving towards an acceptance of gradual social, political and economic changes within a pluralist context. A group undergoing a de-radicalization process does not have to ideologically abide by democratic principles, whether electoral or liberal, and does not have to participate in an electoral process. De-radicalization is primarily concerned with changing the attitudes of armed Islamist movements toward violence, rather than toward democracy. Many de-radicalized groups still uphold misogynist, homophobic, xenophobic and anti-democratic views (P.5).

De-radicalization is now of utmost concern, especially once the caliphate of ISIS has fallen, in Syria and Iraq respectively. The main concern is focusing on those Europeans who have been fighting with radical Islamist jihadist militias in Syria, from Fatah al-sham, to ISIS and other factions in Syrian territory; we shouldn’t forget to add the hundreds of Europeans who joined militias not considered jihadists like the Kurds. According to an Egmont report, about 500 combatants have returned to the European Union (Renard and Coolsaet, 2018). With these foreign fighters returning to their European countries, it is crucial to socialize them and integrate them into society, which is a laborious task, taking into consideration the different criteria of each case individually. That depends on the individuals, families, ages, process of recruitment and action on the battlefield, as well as the rank within the terrorist organization. The process of socialization of children, who have been born or raised in these group’s territories, must be analyzed carefully and case by case. Many of them were not radicalized despite having socialized in the environment. On the other hand, there are adolescents who have participated in violent actions, and have been subjected to instructions and indoctrination. We must consider if those who returned wish to enroll in the de-radicalization process or program, or if the individual returned for economic or family reasons, because they were disappointed in what they have found within these groups, etc. We need to know how these people can reintegrate into society after spending time in such a hostile environment. In the European Union there is a determined framework of action for freedom fighters in each member state (European Parliament, 2017). There is also a common framework for action at EU level (European Parliament, 2016). It is not yet known how many combatants of terrorist’s groups, such as ISIS, are still alive, have died, have joined other jihadist organizations or have been captured (Jalloul, 2018).

Not every freedom fighter is returning to his country of origin, hundreds are kept in Syrian and Iraqi’s jails since their countries, not all, are reluctant to judge them in their home courts.
The US policy related to CVE is focused on the terrain of securitization more than in the prevention or de-radicalization
France has many nationals in jail controlled by the Kurds in Syria, at this stage the country prefers that inmates would be judged case by case there, not in France (El País, 2018). Human Rights Watch (2017) raised several concerns about due process in the screening process for people leaving ISIS-controlled areas, including vetting procedures for lists of suspects compiled by local security forces. Those wrongfully identified as suspects may spend months in arbitrary detention. The organization also gave numbers of those who were sentenced to death and executed. If we want our democratic system to remain impartial, we need to guarantee detainees’ fair trial, which by itself is a way of allowing them to be conscious of their mistakes, and it can work as a measure of de-radicalization.

A report of ICSR (2018) this year indicates that. Recorded up to 7,366 persons have now returned to their home countries (20%), or appear to be in repatriation processes to do so. Only 256 (4%) of total returnees are recorded as women, accounting for up to 5% of the women who travelled to Syria and Iraq. Up to 1,180 (17%) of total returnees are recorded as minors, accounting for up to 25% of minors who travelled to, or were born in, Iraq and Syria. South-Eastern Asia saw the highest proportion of female and minor returnees at up to 59%, followed by Western Europe (55%); Central Asia (48%); Sub-Saharan Africa (33%); Eastern Europe (18%); Americas, Australia New Zealand (8%); Southern Asia (<1%); and MENA (<1%). There were no returnees accounted for in Eastern Asia. Significant discrepancies in accounting for foreign citizens in Iraq and Syria – including those described above – rarely distinguish between men and women, adults and minors, making is particularly problematic to fully assess the current status of these distinct populations. Women and minors must be considered as distinct and complex categories, each with varying levels of agency. Do not reference them in singular categories (‘women and children’, ‘families’, and so forth). Minors in particular require nuanced consideration. Delineate all data of persons affiliated with terror and extremist groups by age and gender. (pp.3-5)

CONCLUSIONS

Drawing conclusions, we can say that the use of terminology is basic when we speak about prevention of radicalization that leads to violence, we cannot infer that a process of radicalization can lead to violence or terrorism, since not all violence implies terrorism, although every terrorist action implies violence; therefore, prevention in an early stage could prevent radicalization and violent radicalization.

Associating processes of radicalization with security measures or linking them to specific communities’ conduct lead us to some sort of confusion that does not address the approach that must be taken if we want to fight against radicalization with preventive measures. Not every process of radicalization must be associated with terrorism, as we just commented, and neither associated with Muslim communities, stigmatization is the only result if we don’t analyze such processes on
an individual level since each one can be subject to any type of radicalization. We need to reject the idea that there is a direct connection between processes of radicalization and religious ideology. That would imply that violence is inherent to any religious belief and that would mean that any person that embraces religion such as Islam can become a terrorist. It is a fact though that a biased interpretation of the religious texts, if we talk here specifically about Islamist violent-terrorist radicalization, and the efficiency of the religious discourses based on that interpretation has an important weight in the process of an individual’s radicalization, but radicalization per se depends on the person’s personality, his surroundings, his self-identification within a group. There are no general profiles for radical individuals, which depends on many factors.

We are experiencing the growth of far-right extremist groups, Sahar (2017) mentions that “From 2000 to 2015, the number of hate groups has increased by 56%, which include a large number of anti-immigrants, anti-LGBT, anti-Muslim, and antigovernment “Patriot” groups. And from 2014 to 2015 the number of radical right-wing groups increased by 14%”. He also makes allusions about the increase of white supremacist and White Nationalist online forums asserting that:

And yet we are not seeing government CVE programs targeting single white males in their thirties and forties who are the most common demographic committing mass murder. Nor are we seeing CVE programs for Christians due to right wing groups’ misappropriation of Christian doctrine in furtherance of their violent political ends. Government hearings are not being held to debate whether violence perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan, the Army of God, or the Lord’s Resistance Army should be called “radical Christian terrorism”. (p. 274)

Another remarkable thing is that, as John Horgan noted (Schmidt, 2013):

Not every terrorist holds radical views. It is also important to distinguish between terrorism as a political doctrine and terrorism as an act of political violence. Terrorist political crimes are in a way remarkably similar to war crimes as both involve, at their core, deliberate attacks on civilians and/or the taking of hostages. (p. 23)

The main thing we should think about is why there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism, as Sageman (2017a) asserts: “there is no consensus because different definers have different groups and different research question in mind” (p. 11). The term has been politicized many times, the same is happening with the term radicalization. Political and nonpolitical actors can be subject to a process of radicalization, some political actors exercise violence at the expense of our liberties, we need to be careful and apply our critical thinking about conflicts in our home and foreign countries. The war in Iraq, Syria or Libya has not made our planet more secure, at the contrary, it has contributed to the increase of frustration and violence.

We need to ask ourselves why nationalist-populist movements and discourses, like in Europe or the US, are growing profiting from the identity and economic crisis, and praising in their
speeches the importance of national borders while displaced populations are dying in its way to a “fortress Europe” and to a US “only for Americans”.

It’s important to remember that white supremacist terrorism and jihadi terrorism are undergoing a process of reciprocal radicalization, in which both become more extreme in response to each other's activity. The process of radicalization in both terrorist ideologies are very similar, on-line and off-line radicalization, activism, recruitment, the relevance of the leader, the use of important historical events in their narratives, propaganda through the web, etc.

Other concepts such as “radical” (Schmid, 2013) “has changed quite dramatically in little more than a century: while in the 19th century, ‘radical’ referred primarily to liberal, anti-clerical, pro-democratic, progressive political positions, contemporary use – as in ‘radical Islamism’ – tends to point in the opposite direction: embracing an anti-liberal, fundamentalist, anti-democratic and regressive agenda” (p. 7). That indicates that we use this kind of terms depend on the subjectivity of the interlocutor.

We need to use our terms very carefully because any misuse can lead to a confusion. We are in need to strengthen our societies to the call of radicalizers. Empowering our young people, investing in their resilience to violent ideologies. One of the best measures is fostering their critical thinking with an accurate use of the terminology related to radicalization that leads to violence.

Organizations such as the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization leading to violence has been working in prevention activities giving proper tools to actors affected by radicalization leading to violence. For example: public awareness workshops for young people, Public awareness workshops for parents, Community development and awareness activities and Development of prevention strategies to meet the needs of individual groups, communities or organizations, they have also training programs. They work also with women and violent radicalization and returnees. They invest also in providing support and psychosocial counselling for individuals who are radicalized or becoming radicalized (CPRLV, 2018). Many specific recommendations have been published in a document by the High-level Commission Expert Group on Radicalization (HLCEG-R), radicalization implies a multi-dimensional challenge that require multifaceted response (HLCEG-R, 2018).

Something noteworthy is that CPRLV talks about disengagement and social reintegration more that de-radicalization. As explained before, an individual can be de-radicalized from the mindset related to the use of armed violence, but it does not imply that they give up radical views or attitudes.

Another important aspect to deal with radicalization is the need to separate securitization processes form the prevention of radicalization, we are not fighting at first stages against terrorism, we are fighting against radicalization processes that lead to violence or terrorism through prevention.

Many measures should be implemented in an effective way if we want to succeed in preventing radicalization that leads to violence. Education is crucial, educators should be
Another important aspect to deal with radicalization is the need to separate securitization processes from the prevention of radicalization. We are not fighting at first stages against terrorism; we are fighting against radicalization processes that lead to violence or terrorism through prevention.
teaching terminology in the first place, preventive measures, working in group, detecting students’ frustrations, bullying etc. several projects in Germany, Sweden, Italy, Denmark, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other European countries have put in place empowering youth fighting radicalization. (YOUTH WORK AGAINST VIOLENT RADICALISATION) Theory, concepts and primary prevention in practice, p. 32-68). Talking with the families of radicalized individuals is important, trying to understand the pain that violence inflict in their lives, to the radicalized person and for everything surrounding it at physical, emotional, social, religious and intellectual level.

Testimonies of individuals disengaged from violent extremism are important to prevent the process of radicalization, testimonies of victims of terrorist attacks. Interreligious activities, fomenting interculturality, involve students’ families, working at community-local and municipal level.

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fomenting interculturality, involve students’ families, working at community-local and municipal level, promote the role of women in the prevention of extremism, control radical speeches and collaborating in projects with mosques, preventing radicalization in prisons with specific programs. Advice through campaigns of the danger of the false online profiles and chats of extreme right, left and religious individuals and organizations. Work in the deconstruction of islamist radical discourses through Islamic law. Keep working on counter-narratives through the internet and in educational centers (Jalloul, 2017).

Putting in force a proper guideline for the prevention of radicalization that leads to violence within governments’ policies would mean that we understand the needs of our societies in a successful way, that we fight against violent extremism and terrorism, that we simply fight against the fear of the unknown.
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