This article aims for revisiting the terrorism studies from different perspective. The terror attacks itself cannot be hundred percent zero but it just fluctuated trend. More specifically, terrorism always adaptive in following trends. While terror attacks still to target innocent civilians, the perpetrators could be closest relatives and neighbors. The way terror attack to reach out that group of people basically shows the silent role of returning foreign fighters (RFF)/returnees nurturing dan breeding terror ideologies. By using critical literature review especially historical narrative analysis, this study wants to examine the current terror trend that utilizes social media. It can spread terror narration and also affecting people to join. The way to analyze data is making clear connection from each literature. The findings of this study are: the RFF is adept at social media in nurturing terror ideologies and then making their home country and new terrorist cells to be breeding grounds.
Introduction

The global war on terror has been going on for almost two decades. It has started in 2001 after the fall of World Trade Centre, New York during the September 11 attacks. This incident encouraged the global war on terrorism campaign discourse around the world. It includes not only military strikes but also security fund assistance. This campaign mainly targets terrorists who can be a lone wolf or groups. For the military strikes, this mostly operates in overseas military action rather than domestic military. Meanwhile, security fund assistance often in advances training for those polices and military to become special anti-terror forces in their home countries.

During the 20-year time-span of more so today than ever before, the western countries-led coalition has achieved three remarkable points that affecting international constellation. First, the prominent terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Levant has been relatively powerless due to continuous western military actions in their home country bases like Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Second, the decline of death toll from terrorism has significantly plummeted over half percent, falling from 33,555 become 15,952 deaths between 2014 until 2018 (IEP, 2019, p. 12). Third, most of countries have been strengthening their security surveillance by doubling security budget. The first two of three achievements remark the success of global war on terrorism so far.

Although global alliances have kept terrorists in check, the recent victim statistic remains high in the author’s mind. Another recent issue like the takeover of Afghanistan by extremist Taliban from the democratically-elected government is also one factor that shows terrorism still remaining. These two current problems lead the author to ask a question: do we believe that terrorism poses a real threat to states? This type of question draws us out into an ongoing classical debate on the possibility of deadly terror attacks in the advanced security system within the countries.

In this study the author argues, while most of countries have strengthened their internal security system or overseas military deployment to target terrorists at their home, terrorism is still potentially a threat to every nation in the world. This means violence cannot be in zero percent, but it can be under control condition. More importantly, the author underscore terrorism is a latent risk in a global context. The main finding of this research is the returning foreign fighters (RFF) can still committed to violence actions in domestic and international arena. Moreover, the RFF or returnees presumably important to nurture terrorism ideologies in a home or abroad. Sometime they can be a lone wolf or become a mastermind behind the series of deadly terror attacks in this meantime. These two intentions are widely believed that will likely be stronger after the current victory of Taliban in Afghanistan.

Method

The method the author used in this research is analytical review. This method means analyzing meanings behind the information to make new findings from previous similar studies. Furthermore, this method allowed the author to pick up certain information piece in order to make findings that base on own data interpretation. Furthermore, this method also enabled the author to do an inductive process from several selected literatures from books, reports, and journal articles. The author tried to synthesis every argument and information from the literature review process to become the coherent whole findings. It is important to note that the juncture is crucial in shaping the narration of returning foreign fighter.
Therefore, both context and content are important to analyse the rise of returning foreign fighter from bottom-up level. More specifically, the author selected the relevant information from literatures and then made novelty from gaps after re-reading the previous findings.

Results and Discussion

This section will outline the possibility terror attacks by returning foreign fighters (RFF) in home country. To be more specific, the author would like to focus on the use of social media in spreading terror content for netizens. It has been widely believed that public/netizens will be easily get affected by that content particularly young people. When it comes to religion issue or jihad, some young people or migrants are vulnerable to blindly accept an invitation to attack other people. Here, the role of returning of foreign fighter is to be buzzer and sleeper cell. By producing terrorist content, they want to indirectly recruit new terrorists in order to perform terror attacks sometime.

To begin with, the author will briefly explain the connection between root causes of terrorism and the emergence of returning foreign fighter (RFF) in home country. And then, the shift of terrorist movement from bombing to online narration. Lastly, the author will wrap up the counterterrorism policies plan to do.

The relationship between root of terrorism and the emergence of returning foreign fighter (RFF)

The root causes of terrorism remain unanswered between scholars until now. Previous terror attacks had different reasons why the perpetrators commit acts of violence. This situation gives the challenge to frame the root of causes of terrorism. Methodologically terrorism studies also difficult scientific undertaking. Terror attacks are not a linear social phenomenon like modernism. Instead, terror attacks are engaged with grievances due to unfair modernism effect like unfair incomes. In this sense, terrorism is more likely an ups and downs phenomenon. More precisely, terror actions depend on the certain issue the perpetrators have raised concerns with.

Grievances and supporting social environment like economic injustice provide the basic concept of root terrorism causes. Newman argues the human insecurity often shapes that grievances (Newman, 2006, p. 751). People worried about oppression, food shortages, or discriminations. These three examples encourage people to act with violence. This is the structural factor of why people rebel, but it does not answer the motivational factors. To understand the root causes of terrorism, we need the structural factor like poverty and underlying grievances (Newman, 2006, p. 751). The latter factor is more likely the motivational factors. It could be a political issue driven-factors.

The context of structural factors might depend on how the terrorist perceives the current social conditions and different state conditions. The first issue deals with the many social issues in society that might be nothing to do with terrorism (Herring, 2008, p. 201). Many issues facilitate terrorism causes such as ethno-nationalism, religious matters, globalization, and modernity (Newman, 2006, p. 753). These issues give a justification motivation to the terrorists that they act to save people (Newman, 2006, p. 755). However, the above-mentioned qualitative arguments did not meet the quantitative research requirements. Several independent variables like poverty, civil liberties, and political rights give the unsatisfactory statistical analysis result. Alternatively, Newman says “focusing on
the objectives of the terrorist organization and the social environment from which they emerge” will be the best potential explanation to understand the root causes of terrorism (Newman, 2006, p. 767). The different state condition factor represents the relationship between state and non-state actors. The key issue of that relationship is how the state treats the citizen like democracy and fair public good distribution. More importantly, the corrupt government system is the violence trigger. Schmid argues the violent response, which either committed by state and non-state actors, depends on power resources (Schmid, 2005, p. 131). Therefore, the root causes of terrorism rely on the method, tactics, and financial support.

The connection between religion and terrorism seems to give the best potential root causes of terrorism. Hoffman argues the number of religious terrorist groups is higher than ethno-nationalist/separatist groups (Hoffman, 2017, p. 87). More importantly, the religious terrorist often called their action as a divine duty to eliminate “bad people” (Hoffman 2017, 90). This trend eventually has been growing up. Interestingly, Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism becomes a role model among extremists.

Figure 1: Relationship between Terrorism and Returning Foreign fighters (RFF)
Source: data elaborated by own
From the above-mentioned explanations, it seems the grievances of something, particularly unfair economic redistribution is the major terrorism source. This narration subsequently sounds like emotional messages when it combines with religion narration. This linear relationship particularly affects the returning foreign fighters (RFF) when they are at home. The high tense of economic domination and social discrimination due to religion narration still keeps on their mind. This condition conveys messages that jihad against western as the common enemy should be continuing in home country after finishing jihad missions in abroad. These unresolved terror attack on behalf jihad surely make cautious for public because the sudden terror is possible to happen.

In brief, the relationship between the root causes of terrorism and the rise of the returning foreign fighters (RFF) in the Figure 1 below.

The above figure explains the chronological arrangement of new terrorism pattern. It seems that there is a shift in terms of terror attacks from anti-Western militaries to anti-Western interests/minorities. While Western is the object of terrorism, the subject is likely expanded – not only Westerners but also those people take benefits from Western/minorities like non-Muslims. As a result, the latter transformation subsequently changes the terror method to be passive actors in real life, but still to be active actors in online world. This condition surely makes people worried because the new terrorists can be returning foreign fighters (RFF) or new terrorists that get brainwashed by RFF. For the latter actors could be closest relatives, family, and even neighbors. These surely makes people worries whether or not terror attack will be going soon.

There has been a growing concern about the possibility of returnees and their new terrorist cadre will be conducting terror attacks. This issue come into prominence when a series of suicidal bombings targeted the innocent citizens in some countries recently. After ISIL and Al-Qaeda have been almost defeated, their ex-combatants would either go back to their home countries or perpetuate terrorist activities in another country. What makes the returning foreign fighters (RFF) orchestrating future terror attacks is the main focus among several scholars. Malet and Hayes argue potential attacks by individual terrorist often occurs in less than three years after their return (Malet & Hayes, 2018, p. 10). Moreover, he or she would re-engaged in terrorist activity once finishing prison service (Malet & Hayes, 2018, p. 10). Despite their findings are doubtful because of not covering organized terrorists, the terrorism re-engagement is still possible. In this sense, re-engagement means become re-radicalized soon after joining other terror groups. See argues returnees often suffer emotional instability and stress disorder after their return (See, 2018, p. 9). The two plausible factors that elucidate that both psychological conditions are their homes states renounce citizenship that eventually make them in limbo. Another factor is their families already banished them from homes. Both factors surely encourage re-radicalization would reappear among abandoned returnees while in a home or overseas. In addition, See also believes the RFF will organize their own terrorist cells to make friends due to that double abandonment (See, 2018, p. 11). Obviously, that cells are the way to keep their followers remain adhere to the terror ideologies. The recent terror attacks in several Western, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asian, Southeast Asian countries have showed us, the ISIL and al-Qaeda remnants are still an indefinite global threat.
The declining major terror groups and the rise of the RFF as home-grown terrorist

The home-grown terrorist character is geographically different between countries. They would like to launch attacks at home or going abroad for jihad (Zekulin, 2013, p. 4). These two motives should make different counter-terrorism measures. The US case shows deradicalization process by “neutralizing many of those responsible radicalizing fellow Americans” (Zekulin, 2013, p. 21). Canada and Australia have been less successful in that way. Americans realize that their soil is vulnerable to getting retaliation from either home-grown terrorists or returnee foreign fighters. Therefore, they put preventive counter-terrorism plans for those suspected people. Canada and Australia are less frequent terror incidents than the US because terrorists go overseas. The Canadian case shows unstable home-grown terrorist action due to unclear terror method. Therefore, counter-terrorism measures should follow the social condition of each different country. Deradicalization would be effective in a country whose got many homeland terrorist cases.

The counter-terrorism should put more soft approaches like mental counselling than striking terrorists in force action. Home-grown terrorists often put personal grievances or being empathetic to outside conflicts to justify terror attacks (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014, pp. 73 & 77). These two different sources, however, have not a close relationship with the religion. Instead, “right-wing extremists were responsible for substantially more fatalities” (Ellis et al., 2016, p. 9). I believe people who identified as right-wingers have social trauma like getting bullied at school or workplace. This issue affects deradicalization focusing on a past personal problem.

The above-mentioned recent terror incidents basically show the terrorism is still remaining. These often makes policymakers mistakenly assessing the terrorism. As a result, measurement of how terrorism ends sometimes misleading. Most major terrorist groups have been declining because 1) people are not interested with terror ideologies due time-wasting actions, 2) capture/killing of the leaders, 3) failure of leadership succession, 4) accepting governmental provisions, and 5) military repressions (Cronin, 2006, pp. 17–18). Those factors lead governments believing terrorism will end up. However, the recent terrorist groups have uniqueness itself beyond the government’s calculation. This means “social bond, not ideology, play more important in Al-Qaeda organization” (Cronin, 2006, p. 35). It also affects recruitment model, modus operandi, and also funding sources. More importantly, the recent terrorist movement is opportunistic (Cronin, 2006, p. 41). As long as they can cause social disruption, that is their victory. This intention certainly needs grievances as the new narration of terrorism. This new source of terrorism is arguably can recruit more people regardless of their identity’s backgrounds.

Perception of grievances is more important than radicalization. This pattern challenges current counter-terrorism which always looking at the account of certain ideologies or religions. Hoffman argues “people will always be attracted violence in different ways” (Hoffman, 2017, p. 308). Another issue is the relationship at works, schools, or even neighborhoods will stress people to become potential terrorists (Hoffman, 2017, p. 309). Even if they do not take Al-Qaeda, Taliban, or even ISIL’s terrorism model into their account, but it inspires the current terror actors, namely lone-wolves committing violence. The Al-Qaeda itself, particularly the remnant of
the organization, is still existing. According to Hoffman, the movement has expanded into two dozen countries (Hoffman, 2017, p. 318). This condition thus encourages the government to revise current counter-terrorism strategies. The two strategies are negotiation to make peace talks and also state provision to dismantle terrorist member loyalty (Crenshaw, 1991, pp. 4–5). Although, state counter-terrorism strategies now focus on the lone-wolves committing violence, this not focuses on how the narration of grievances can able to spread into individuals and groups.

Grievances are the chief sources across the current studies. However, the remaining problem is how the perpetrators develop the anger within extremist action. Crossett and Spitaletta argue there is two social behavior regarding radicalization, namely in-group and out-group (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010, p. 13). In-group is a personal radical person comfortable in one group, while the out-group means the acts of competing. This alternative explanation confirms with the other readings. For example, McCauley argues, own perception to be superior rather than the subordinate subject often becomes strong radical motivation (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014, p. 416). This leads to the pathways of perpetrators commit violence. The next radicalization step is to join the terror organizations because they offer effective bonds (Borum, 2012, p. 25). As a result, once they leave behind the organization, they could launch armed violence because of their weapon training in the organization. These steps refer to the way people or RFF can get radicalized in early stages.

The use of social media to spread new terror narration

In line with above-mentioned arguments, it seems that the RFF is the initial way to conduct terrorism. RFF is also a leaderless jihadist (Sageman, 2014, p. 568)(Parker & Sitter, 2016, p. 201–202). This step heavily requires the grievances as the new source of terror attacks. This condition, therefore, needs social media to spread grievances widely. Social media here can able to easily adapt the grievances into everyday informal languages. RFF as the newborn of terrorists seem to keen using this platform because it enables to reach out many people. Once the netizens get affected by terror content, it would lead them likely committed to the terror attacks. This promising chance surely makes the RFF get motivated to use social media in nurturing terrorism.

The most common way of transmitting terror ideologies is online media. The use of social media effectively keeps the existing followers and also recruit the potential bombers. Such advanced applications such as Facebook, Skype, and Zoom may enable an intensive meeting between the leaders and their members (See, 2018, p. 13). This platform is commonly familiar with public rather than Twitter or Telegram that might be suitable with upper middle class. Also, Twitter and Telegram may limit the word characters rather than long sentences. Both platforms cannot relay terror propaganda messages as if most popular platform to do so. The more frequent meeting they have, the much likely people become re-radicalized. This also affects to the rise of sleeper cells around the world. Upon their return from the battlefield, the RFF sometimes detached itself, but somehow, they can reunite. In this sense, the utilization of the online media keeps RFF in touch.

They may assimilate in a home, but at the same time, they could not attain proper social acceptance (Kennedy et al., 2008, p. 328). This unbalanced condition eventually leads the returnees to re-join the previous terrorist cell. As a result, the homegrown terrorist
possibly comes out with some fresh radical ideas. In this sense, the online media provides and nurtures them with terror ideologies. Although many governments have banned radical contents in streamline online website, the terrorists still find out an alternative way to spread their radical ideologies through another platform. For this reason, we should realize the current terrorists are also skilled computing technicians. These can be hackers whose expertise in online activities.

Online media is also the common way to attract the sympathizers to become upcoming terrorists. Byman argues the sympathizers often get impressed with returnees and online radical website (Byman, 2016, p. 79). The returnees frequently pose themselves as the brave warriors with the weapon and boast about their struggle against evil western forces. In this sense, the online media continuously broadcasts propaganda video that claims one of the believers or minorities have been in oppressed condition. It is important to note, the dichotomous strained relationship between Western and the rest always become the main story. Curiosity-driven intentions are the most likely factors why the sympathizers engage and stay informed with the new postings from the online media. Although the degree of online intensity is still uncertain, once you see it, you will not able to avoid it. The reason is the radical website also brainwashes the viewers.

A recent study from Nuraniyah, shows a mix of personal crisis identity and political grievances often leads the people get engaged with the radical activities (Nuraniyah, 2018, p. 891). More precisely, the targeted people can be poor and rich people, depending on the level of online engagement. The online radical media provides the kind of religious solutions that help people to solve their problem. In fact, that information is most likely brainwashing people become upcoming terrorists gradually. Nuraniyah also argues, the role of RFF often serves as the informal leader who foster the social bounding online and offline (Nuraniyah, 2018, p. 896). The small group of people arguably behaves anti-social in their social circumstances. Th RFF copied and pasted the same platform from previous terrorists. Ideologically, the group of sympathizers has intertwined online with the returnees and central terrorist command. Therefore, this process certainly makes other new sleeper terrorist cells within the home country. In other words, the more cells grow, the easier mobilization they have. Internet helps to locate each terror cells in whereabouts through undetected internet providers. Accordingly, the online media is not only fueling the terror info but also as a guidance to move people.

The internet facilitated-radicalization as the fastest way to get re-radicalized

The internet facilitated-radicalization possibly mobilize the returnees and the sympathizers to commit terror actions in home and other countries. This process, however, is quite vague, particularly to what extent both groups still committed to radical ideologies. To answer that question, one thing should be bear in mind is the level of engagement between terrorism and social media in certain countries. Asongu says the countries which have low terrorism level are much significantly associated with online radicalization through Facebook (Asongu et al., 2019, p. 220). At the same time, the countries who have strong online terrorism level, the more planned terrorist groups are. Following their thought, the terror attacks apparently could be everywhere and anytime terrorist wants. It is worth to note, the possibility of returnees to step up overseas terrorism is least likely than in
home. The money and weapon often become the main reason. Despite waging war in overseas, domestic terror attacks have a potential deadly risk. The terrorists could be hit and run after the attacks and pretend to be normal citizens. In this regard, no matter a nation has a good security system, terror attack still remains a latent threat because nobody predicts when the terrorists launch their attacks.

The one thing to analyze is the lapse of time between engaging with online radical websites and orchestrating terror attacks. Sometime the perpetrators need time to launch terror attacks after being online radicalized. Ideally, this factor takes much time. As argued by Malet and Hayes before, less than three year is the normal period. But it could be early than that time. In this sense, the characteristic of an actor is the main considerations regarding that time gap. This factor closely relates with the preparedness and logistic mobilization before launching the terror attacks. Mass-funded groups might have a long time to prepare their attacks than self-funded single fighters that launch their attacks recklessly. Given that suicidal bombings and shootings have been a new terror strategy recently, it seems the single fighter is the most online affected people than group. They are capable to single-handedly shoot or bomb the victims and strategic buildings. RFF can serve itself as the mentor for the single fighters.

**The emergence of RFF from online to lone-wolf terrorism**

The influence of social media on terrorist returnees is the lone-wolf terrorism. This term simply defines the lone fighters commit acts of terrorism because of engage in online and offline sphere (Schuurman et al., 2019, p. 774). The lone fighter is combining online understandings and social interactions. This makes RFF is hardly to define as a terrorist (Goodwin, 2006, p. 2028). This similar with former ISIS combatants can rely on the unofficial online forum when their official social media is down (al-Ubaydi et al., 2014, pp. 50–51). In this sense, the role of returnees become the leaders who subsequently encourage radical activists. RFF actually can also become the lone-wolfer, but it seems they want to be master mind instead. The small group of people may be more effective than big groups. The group of terrorist people who have been belong to this trend is homegrown terrorists. This trend primarily inspired by the RFF who fought bravely against Western forces. In this case, they believe the fighting is still in ongoing albeit ISIL and Al-Qaeda has been unpowered. A single fighter is the next radicalization stage after being a sympathizer.

There a few sympathizers that would transform themselves as the bombers. The reason is the sympathizers might have not fully radicalized or they partially agree with the online radical website. To fuel spirit of single fighters, the returnees show the recorded footage that show they shot down the planes or other military installations. This intention arguably aims at encourage the fighters to take action as the returnees did (Schuurman et al. 2019, 774). Of course, the online footages can eventually convince their action. They would determine to commit terrorism. Both the fighters and returnees sometime cooperate each other to launch attacks, but the single fighters often take action solely. Driven by their ideologies, the single fighter could give disastrous impacts than the terrorist group. He or she may can targets mass civilians’ group than targeted group as the terror organization have done before. As a result, the impact of terrorism action is not only resulting the death tolls, but also long terms psychological damage. Whether their action will successful or
failed, the main aim is how to make people being terrorized. Therefore, it is important to record every terror attack that including bloodshed, piece of bodies, and maybe traumatized victims. This is the way of lone-wolf terrorism works in this meantime. For this reason, footages are really remarkable sign to understand lone-wolfer. Perhaps, by spreading footages, they want to seek public attentions, albeit in the wrong way.

However, the lone-wolfer can also easily detected by policies. The security officials can able to minimize threat from lone-wolfer that sometimes recklessly committed to violence. Although the actor could be under arrested physically, their products can virally in every online platform. The terror footages that go virally is one of the recent terrorism still apparent. The internet helps terrorist to gain global prominence by distributing the violent videos and photos. Most of the time, the footage contents have been uncensored materials. It has strong messages that terrorist still threat people anytime they want. More importantly, they can go around us in the school, office and neighborhood communities. Their movements are often opaque, nobody knows if our friends or neighborhood are truly terrorists. Footages are the current common method to intimidate people psychologically in both online and offline public spaces. The footages often unintentionally distributed by the terrorists and their followers in social media. At the same page, people also get curious to open the footages. Surely, there will be a mixed response from the people regarding to the viral terror footages. The more you forward and post the footages, the deeper terror feelings you would have. This is the thing the current terrorists want from us. Their action might cause unpleasant memories in our life. On the other side, the viral footages give a strong impression among the terror sympathizers. They will have more confidence to do more lethal actions than previous attacks. In this sense, the more victims become threatened, the more damage national image would be ruined. With help of advanced technologies, the footages can be an effective propaganda method than kidnapping the hostages in certain places. The latter method has been old-fashioned modus among terrorists because it just gives short terror damages.

Since the terror perpetrators have been using internet in their operation since mid-21st century, the footages have a lot of meanings for them. The recorded multimedia can show public the drama before and after attacks. Sensational and dramatic experiences are the main footages story. In this sense, buildings and people are still the main terror focus. They want people watching their action and then show how weak state capacity is (Galily et al., 2015, p. 999). As a result, the RFF and their sympathizers could claim their thoughts are better than state policies. Moreover, the online footages would give bad public opinion that state security can be vulnerable for terror attack (Galily et al., 2015, p. 1002). When the terrorists publicly broadcast themselves in recorded videos; they arguably give strong messages terrorism in social media never ends up unless the government follows up what they want. This is surely the challenging situation for the government’s side. The public officials should prioritize the people and national security. Since the government is in dilemma position, the terrorist can swiftly move to another target.

The governments itself often use counter-terrorism rhetoric to justify their action (Wolfendale, 2007, pp. 78–79). This motivation certainly inspires other terrorist attacks to take revenge. Recent terrorism actions always record their action lively. This already happened in a different part of the world, such as mass shootings in US,
New Zealand, and European parts. The perpetrators recorded itself the way of he/she shoots the innocent people and blowing up the buildings. That such terrible actions they made. The more casualties especially women and children will raise international condemnation (Byman, 2012, p. 836). Meanwhile, the domestic view will be mixed. The positive outcome is the government can keep their citizens safe (Byman, 2013, pp. 35 & 40). But the activists will speak human rights out louder regarding the casualties. This condition also affects the public perception of terrorism due to poor management counter-terrorism by state (Spaaij & Hamm, 2015, p. 170). The terrorists will use this situation to move terrorism going online. More importantly, “They regularly cast the leaders who are killed by drones as martyrs” (Cronin, 2013, p. 46). This condition will encourage terrorist sympathizers whether foreign fighters or even migrants to retaliate soon. In the end, knowing that remaining terrorism still evolves, it is important to remind us to be cautious with these latent threats.

**Conclusion**

In sum, terrorism still becomes the real global threat. After the major terror groups in Middle East roughly unempowered, their combatants came back to home to organize their own terror attacks. The role of returning foreign fighters or returnees has been important to make a plan and launch the attacks. Re-radicalization through online platforms is the trigger to what extent terror can be a nightmare to the innocent people. The internet helps the terrorists to coordinate and mobilize their own cells in different regions.

Rather than pursuing the number of victims, it seems the terrorism modus has shifted to damage public psychology and also national legitimacy. In this sense, the role of online footages is important to show their existence. When the footage goes virally on several online platforms, it can threaten the public and corners the state legitimacy. Concerning with all the above-mentioned evidences and arguments, it seems clear to us, terrorism still make up a real threat.

This study recommends the increasing use of online surveillance by government to monitor traffics on social media, particularly those who had close relationship with terrorist’s cell. It also suggests the linguist experts to interpret the meaning of suspected terror messages. This enables the government apparatus to capture the perpetrators correctly without wrongful arrests to innocent citizens.

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**Declaration of Ownership**

This article is my original work.

**Conflict of Interest**

There is no conflict of interest to declare in this article.

**Ethical Clearance**

This study was approved by the institution.
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