VideoFACT: Detecting Video Forgeries Using Attention, Scene Context, and Forensic Traces

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Abstract

Fake videos represent an important misinformation threat. While existing forensic networks have demonstrated strong performance on image forgeries, recent results reported on the Adobe VideoSham dataset show that these networks fail to identify fake content in videos. In response, we propose VideoFACT—a new network that is able to detect and localize a wide variety of video forgeries and manipulations. To overcome challenges that existing networks face when analyzing videos, our network utilizes both forensic embeddings to capture traces left by manipulation, context embeddings to control for variation in forensic traces introduced by video coding, and a deep self-attention mechanism to estimate the quality and relative importance of local forensic embeddings. We create several new video forgery datasets and use these, along with publicly available data, to experimentally evaluate our network’s performance. These results show that our proposed network is able to identify a diverse set of video forgeries, including those not encountered during training. Furthermore, we show that our network can be fine-tuned to achieve even stronger performance on challenging AI-based manipulations. (Code is available at: https://github.com/ductai199x/videofact-wacv-2024)

1. Introduction

Detecting fake and manipulated content in videos is critical in the fight against misinformation, online fraud, and many other threats. Traditional editing software enables users to convincingly add, remove, and alter virtually any object in a video. Furthermore, recent advances in AI-based video editing have caused dramatic advancements in how videos can be falsified. For example, AI-based video inpainting makes it possible to seamlessly remove an object from a video and replace it with a visually convincing background.

To combat forgeries, researchers have developed a wide variety of general purpose forgery detection and localization techniques. These networks operate by directly learning to detect several known forgery types [1, 2, 7, 29, 45, 46, 73, 76, 77, 81], or by searching for localized anomalies in forensic traces [12, 16, 31, 49, 72]. This research has focused nearly exclusively on images.

Most existing video-specific forensic techniques are aimed at detecting manipulations such as frame deletion or addition [22, 23, 60, 61, 70], speed manipulation [26], source camera model identification [25, 48], etc. [51, 64] Other research makes specific assumptions about the video’s content and forgery type, e.g., detecting deepfake videos of a human speaker’s face [24, 28, 30, 32, 43, 68, 74, 78], authenticating video with a still background [58], etc. Currently, there are no deep learning approaches designed to detect general content forgeries in modern video [58]. This research is further limited by the lack public datasets of general video forgeries. To the best of our knowledge, the first such dataset is Adobe’s VideoSham dataset, which was published in 2023 [52].

Surprisingly, VideoSham’s benchmarking results have revealed that existing general forgery detection and localization networks all fail when applied to video [52]. This finding, which is further reinforced by results presented in this paper, can be attributed to the effects of video compression. Modern video codecs, such as H.264, utilize different coding parameters and compression strengths for different macroblocks within a single frame [56]. This introduces local variations into the forensic traces in a frame. Forensic networks misinterpret these variations as anomalous traces, causing them to false alarm. Furthermore, stronger coding in
We exploit this by introducing the concept of context em-
works. We show that VideoFACT achieves the best reported
work that is able to detect and localize a wide variety of fake
video coding parameters are dependent upon contextual in-
utilized hand-crafted mathematical models of editing oper-
tent in images and videos. Early image forensic algorithms
perform an ablation study showing the importance of each
more, we show that our network can be fine-tuned to achieve
existing approaches fail due to video coding effects. Further-
both our proposed network and state-of-the-art forensic net-
forensic algorithms, thus helping to enable further research.
Our datasets can be used to both train and benchmark video
forgeries that they are not trained for because: 1) They have inherent input restrictions (e.g. deepfake detec-
tion algorithms need to process a cropped out face), and 2) Their designs are purposefully made for a particular manip-
ution type (e.g. inpainting localization techniques extract specifically inpainting traces). Therefore, to fulfill the urgent
need for a general video forgery detector, we propose a new anomaly-based detection network which can analyze a wide
variety of manipulations.

Anomaly-based Detection Methods. Recently, re-
searchers are able to train general image forgery detectors
by looking for anomalous traces in the residual domain of images. Notably, Forensic Similarity Graph [49], EXIF-
Net [31], and Noiseprint [32] do this by divided the full-size image into small patches, then compute patch-wise differ-
ence of forensic features and cluster patches into real and fake groups. ManTraNet [72] computes the anomaly score
by measuring the consistencies of the features within a kernel. MVSS-Net [12] scores the consistencies of the features in an analysis window with a multi-resolution approach. Inspired by the anomaly detection concept, our method works by: 1) Extracting not only forensic, but also context traces to ac-
count for inconsistent compression effects in modern video, and 2) Using a deep self-attention mechanism to weight and
discover the manipulated region with anomalous traces.

3. Effect of Video Coding on Forensic Traces

Although state-of-the-art forensic networks are able to
correctly identify fake content in images, these networks all fail when used to analyze video. This surprising behavior is
due to effects that video coding has on forensic traces.

One important effect is that video coding introduces local-
ized variations into the forensic traces within a frame. This is
because modern video codecs, such as H.264, do not use the
same coding parameters or compression strength for every
macroblock in a frame [56]. Instead, these vary depending on
several factors, including the content of a macroblock, the
bit budget, the level of prediction error, etc. Because

2. Background and Related Work

Image and Video Forensics. Researchers have devel-
oped multiple forensic algorithms to fight against fake con-
tent in images and videos. Early image forensic algorithms
utilized hand-crafted mathematical models of editing oper-
ations like JPEG compression [21, 33, 36, 53, 63], resam-
pling [37, 55], median filtering [9, 38], contrast enhance-
ment [8, 41], etc. As image editing became more sophis-
ticated, machine learning and deep learning were used to
create stronger detection algorithms [2, 7, 10, 45, 46, 69, 73, 81].
However, these techniques typically encounter difficulties
when detecting new manipulations outside of their respective
training dataset [67].

Similarly, existing deep-learning based algorithms built
for videos can only detect or localize specific types of falsified content. A recent survey suggested that there exists no
algorithm that can detect general video forgeries [58]. De-
spite the fact that an extensive body of works have dedicated
to detecting splicing [11, 34, 35], inpainting [71, 75, 82], and
deepfakes [30, 43, 59, 74, 78–80], these algorithms cannot be
used on forgeries that they are not trained for because: 1)
Their designs are purposefully made for a particular manip-
ulation type (e.g. inpainting localization techniques extract
specifically inpainting traces). Therefore, to fulfill the urgent
need for a general video forgery detector, we propose a new
anomaly-based detection network which can analyze a wide
variety of manipulations.

(2) We develop multiple new video forgery datasets, com-
posed of both standard video manipulations such as splicing,
and advanced manipulations such as AI-based inpainting.
Currently, there are no general video forgery datasets made
for network training, and only VideoSham for benchmarking.
Our datasets can be used to both train and benchmark video
forensic algorithms, thus helping to enable further research.

(3) We provide an extensive set of experiments to evaluate
both our proposed network and state-of-the-art forensic net-
works. We show that VideoFACT achieves the best reported
video forgery detection and localization performance, while
existing approaches fail due to video coding effects. Further-
more, we show that our network can be fine-tuned to achieve
even stronger performance on AI-based manipulations. We
perform an ablation study showing the importance of each
component of VideoFACT.

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compression is well-known to significantly alter forensic traces [3,38,55], this causes traces in some authentic regions to differ significantly from those in others. These traces will then appear anomalous to forensic algorithms, which will cause them to false alarm.

Another important effect is that video coding reduces the quality of forensic traces in some regions. This is because some macroblocks are subjected to stronger compression, which is well-known to reduce the quality of forensic traces [33,44,62,63]. Existing forensic networks weight all local features equally and do not account for local variations in quality. As a result, low-quality local forensic traces can cause forensic algorithms to make incorrect decision.

We can see the effects of video compression in Fig. 2. This figure shows the distribution of pairwise differences between forensic embeddings in authentic and falsified regions obtained using Noiseprint [16] and FSG [49] on the widely benchmarked Carvalho dataset [17]. The top row shows these distributions before H.264 compression, while the bottom row shows them after compression. We observe that video coding alters these distributions such that manipulated regions become indistinguishable from authentic ones. In our experiments below, this adverse effect is proven to be detrimental for existing anomaly-based forensic networks.

4. Proposed Approach

An overview of VideoFACT’s architecture is shown in Fig. 3. VideoFACT is designed to overcome challenges posed by video compression, and to accurately detect and localize a variety of fake content in video. To accomplish this, our network includes several important and novel aspects.

We utilize forensic feature embeddings specifically designed to capture traces in video. These embeddings are generic so as to detect a wide variety of manipulations. We introduce the novel use of context embeddings to control for variation in forensic traces caused by video coding. These context embeddings capture relevant information, such as scene content, texture, lighting conditions, etc. in order to approximate local variations in compression strength. They are used to condition forensic embeddings and build a better forensic model of a local region, so that our network can accurately distinguish between authentic content and anomalies caused by forgery.

Additionally, we use a novel deep self-attention mechanism to estimate the quality and relative importance of local embeddings. This mechanism de-emphasizes embeddings from regions with low-quality traces, such as those strongly affected by compression. Similarly, it emphasizes embeddings from regions of high importance, such as those with high-quality traces or potentially anomalous traces. While other works use attention to weight the relative importance of different forensic feature subsets within an embedding, we use self-attention, which captures how relevant forensic embeddings are with respect to one another.

4.1. Low-Level Feature Extraction

VideoFACT consists of two low-level feature extractors working in tandem: the Forensic Feature Extractor (FFE) and the Context Feature Extractor (CFE). Our method first divides a frame into non-overlapping analysis blocks of size $128 \times 128$ pixels, then passes each analysis block $b_k$ through both extractors to produce a forensic feature embedding $f_k$ and a context feature embedding $c_k$.

**Forensic Feature Embeddings.** We use Bayar and Stamm’s forensic network $g(\cdot)$ with learned high-pass filters [4] to produce dedicated forensic feature embeddings. Importantly, $g$ is first pre-trained with a cross-entropy loss to discriminate between a video’s source camera using a separate camera model identification dataset [27]. After pre-training, the final classification layer is discarded. This pre-training approach has been shown to be important for learning transferrable forensic embeddings [15,16,31,47,49,50]. We note that this branch is fixed during Training Stage 1, but is allowed to evolve during subsequent fine-tuning stages.

**Context Feature Embeddings.** The context feature extractor $h(\cdot)$ produces embeddings $c$ that approximate local variations in compression strength and contextualize their forensic counterparts. To extract context information, we implement $h$ using an Xception [13] network backbone that is modified to use only a single middle flow module, followed by a $1 \times 1$ layer to reduce the feature embedding dimension. Importantly, $h$ is not trained until after $g$’s pre-training is complete, so that the resulting context embeddings can provide conditional information about the distribution of $f_k$’s. Denote $\theta$ as other layers in the network, this is equivalent to:

$$\min_{h,\theta} \mathcal{L}_T(h, g, \theta; b_1, ..., b_k, ..., b_N)$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (1)

where $\mathcal{L}_T$ is VideoFACT’s total loss defined in (6).

**Joint Feature Extraction.** After obtaining both embeddings, we produce the joint feature embeddings $x$ by concatenating $f$ and $c$, i.e.,

$$x_k = \text{concat}(f_k, c_k)$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (2)

This process is repeated for every analysis block in the video.
This is achieved by using 1-D learnable positional embeddings that contain higher-quality forensic information. Regions with low-quality forensic information are given small weight (shown in blue), and illumination, etc. By contrast, regions known to contain low-quality forensic information such as the sky are de-emphasized. Often, these regions will cause false alarms because their low-quality forensic traces will appear anomalous with respect to other high-quality forensic regions.

4.2. Deep Self-Attention Module

The sequence of joint embeddings is passed to the Deep Self-Attention Module (DSAM), which is designed to produce a series of $L = 5$ different spatial attention maps that estimate the quality and relative importance of local embeddings. A vector of 1-D learnable positional embeddings is added to the joint embeddings before being passed through twelve Transformer encoder blocks stacked on top of one another. The output of these blocks is passed to an “Attention Squeeze” layer that consists of $L$, $1 \times 1$ convolutional kernels. This “squeezes” down the high dimensional output to a series of $L$ different $M \times N$ spatial attention maps $m_i$. Each entry of the $L$ maps $m_i$ is the network’s attention score for the corresponding joint feature embedding at that position.

Fig. 4 shows an example of a spatial attention map produced by our DSAM, as well as the corresponding the unaltered video frame. We can see that VideoFACT attends to regions containing high-quality forensic traces, i.e. regions with lower compression strength, sufficient texture and illumination, etc. By contrast, regions known to contain low-quality forensic information such as the sky are de-emphasized. Often, these regions will cause false alarms because their low-quality forensic traces will appear anomalous with respect to other high-quality forensic regions.

4.3. Attention-Informed Feature Refinement

This module enables the network to attend to feature embeddings that contain higher-quality forensic information. This is achieved by using $L$ attention maps, produced by DSAM, to weight the low-level joint feature embeddings.

The joint feature embedding $x_k$ at the $k^{th}$ spatial location is weighted by the corresponding $k^{th}$ entry in the $l^{th}$ attention map. This process is repeated for all $L$ spatial attention maps. Then the resulting features are element-wise summed to produce the attention-refined features $y$, such that:

$$y_k = \sum_{l=1}^{L} x_k m_{k,l}$$

4.4. Detection and Localization

VideoFACT produces two outputs: a frame-level detection score and a pixel-level localization mask. The localization mask is disregarded if the detection score indicates no forged content exists. Our network separately analyzes the attention-refined feature embeddings using two different subnetworks for localization and detection.

Detection Network. The detection network $p(\cdot)$ consists of two $1 \times 1$ Conv + ReLU layers for dimension reduction with 200, and 2 kernels, respectively, followed by a fully connected and a softmax layer to output two neurons, one corresponds to pristine and the other corresponds to being falsified. The detection loss for this subnetwork is the cross-entropy loss between the label and the predicted output:

$$\mathcal{L}_D = -\sum_{n=1}^{2} w_n \log(p_n)$$

where $p_n$ is the output of $p(\cdot)$ and the $w_n$ is the one-hot vector indicate whether the video is manipulated.

Localization Network. The localization network $q(\cdot)$ is composed of four $1 \times 1$ Convolutional layers with 192, 96, 12, and 1 kernel, respectively. We use ReLU activation except in the last layer, which uses sigmoid activation to output the block-wise probability of being manipulated.

The localization loss is built on top of this subnetwork which we define as

$$\mathcal{L}_L = -\sum_{k} \left( \sum_{i,j \in \mathbb{P}_k} \frac{M_{i,j}}{\|k\|} \log(q_k) + \left(1 - \sum_{i,j \in \mathbb{P}_k} \frac{M_{i,j}}{\|k\|} \log(1 - q_k) \right) \right)$$

where $q_k$ is the prediction of $q(\cdot)$ for the corresponding block $\theta_k$. Because a block could contain a partial of manipulated region, $\mathbb{P}_k$ is the set of pixel coordinates that belong to block $k$, and $M$ is the ground-truth binary mask.

Localization Mask Generation. During inference, we achieve the pixel-level predicted mask from the block-wise
prediction. We first threshold the block-level prediction probabilities. Typically, there are two peaks in this histogram of block-level probabilities, one due to unaltered blocks and the other due to manipulated blocks. The threshold is chosen as the location of the first minima to the right of the first histogram peak (i.e. the one induced by unaltered blocks). After thresholding, we use the flood-fill morphology algorithm to remove holes from the localization mask. A final pixel-level mask is produced by scaling the block-level mask to the full video frame size using bilinear interpolation.

**Total Loss.** To train VideoFACT, we define the total loss as a linear combination of the detection & localization losses:

\[ L_T = \alpha L_D + (1 - \alpha) L_L \]

where \( \alpha \in (0, 1) \) is the weight to balance the frame-level detection loss and the block-level localization loss.

### 4.5. Multi-Stage Training Protocol

Our proposed network training protocol consists of five stages. In the first three stages, the training datasets consist of videos falsified with manipulations that are successively more difficult to detect. This enables the network to progressively learn better features by refining those learned in the previous stage. In Stage 1, we use the Video Camera Model Splicing dataset (VCMS), which contains spliced content from other videos. In Stages 2 and 3, we train the network with the Video Perceptually Visible Manipulation dataset (VPVM) and Video Perceptually Invisible Manipulation datasets (VPIM), respectively. As described in Section 5, these videos contain basic manipulations with different strengths. In Stage 4, we fine-tune the network using all three previous datasets simultaneously (VCMS, VPVM and VPIM). In Stage 5, we further fine-tune the model by incorporating three auxiliary datasets made from images in the Camera Model Identification Database [4, 5] to diversify our content distribution. These datasets are made using the same process used to create the three video datasets, resulting in one dataset with spliced content (ICMS), visible manipulations (IPVM), and invisible manipulations (IPIM).

### 5. Video Forgery Datasets

Currently, there are no publicly available datasets of manipulated video large enough to train general content forgery detection and localization networks. Similarly, there are almost no datasets suitable to evaluate such networks, with the notable exception of the Adobe VideoSham dataset, which was released in 2023 [52]. To address this issue, we created a series of new video manipulation datasets for training and evaluating our network. These are divided into two subsets. Set A contains videos modified using standard manipulations, e.g. splicing and local editing, etc. Set B contains “In-the-Wild” videos made using sophisticated editing operations such as inpainting, deepfakes, etc. All datasets will be made publicly available upon publication of this paper.

| Stage | Dataset                  | Optimizer | Epochs | Initial Lr | Decay rate | Decay step |
|-------|--------------------------|-----------|--------|------------|------------|------------|
| 1     | A                        | SGD       | 6      | 1.0e-4     | 0.75       | 2          |
| 2     | B                        | SGD       | 6      | 8.5e-5     | 0.85       | 2          |
| 3     | C                        | SGD       | 23     | 8.5e-5     | 0.85       | 2          |
| 4     | A, B, C                  | SGD       | 10     | 8.5e-5     | 0.85       | 2          |
| 5     | A, B, C, D, E, F         | SGD       | 9      | 5.0e-5     | 0.85       | 2          |

Table 1. Training parameters for different training stages of our model. We denote: A=VCMS, B=VPVM, C=VPIM, D=ICMS, E=IPVM, F=IPIM.

### 5.1. Set A: Standard Video Manipulations Datasets

We made three datasets by applying different sets of standard manipulations to videos from the Video-ACID [27] dataset. All three datasets were made using a common procedure. First, we created binary ground-truth masks specifying the tamper regions for each video. These tamper regions correspond to multiple randomly chosen shapes with random sizes, orientations, and placements within a frame. Fake videos were created by choosing a mask, then manipulating content within the tamper region. Original videos were retained to form the set of authentic videos. All video frames of both sets were re-encoded as H.264 videos using FFmpeg [66] with 30 FPS and constant rate factor of 23.

Each dataset in Set A corresponds to a different manipulation type. The Video Camera Model Splicing (VCMS) dataset contains videos with content spliced in from other videos. The Video Perceptually Visible Manipulation (VPVM) dataset contains content modified using common editing operations, e.g. contrast enhancement, smoothing, sharpening, blurring, etc. applied with strengths that can be visually detected. The Video Perceptually Invisible Manipulation (VPIM) dataset was made in a similar fashion to VPVM, but with much smaller manipulation strengths to create challenging forgeries. For each dataset, we made 3200 videos (96000 frames) for training, 520 videos (15600 frames) for validation, 280 videos (8400 frames) for testing.

### 5.2. Set B: In-the-Wild Manipulated Datasets

We use both publicly available datasets and datasets created by us to evaluate our network. These datasets contain advanced, challenging video forgeries with scene content that significantly differs from our training datasets.

#### Public Datasets

We evaluate on three publicly available datasets: VideoSham [52], DeepfakeDetectionDataset (DFD) [19], and FaceForensics++ (FF++) [57]. VideoSham contains high-quality videos manipulated by professional editors using multiple techniques. Because this work focuses exclusively on identifying fake content, we excluded videos with audio track or temporal manipulations. Both DFD and FF++ are popular deepfake benchmarking datasets that contain original videos and videos which were deepfaked using different algorithms (Face2Face [65], FaceSwap [39], etc.).

#### Datasets Created By Us

We also created three additional datasets to evaluate our proposed approach more comprehensively, including: E2FGVI Inpainted Videos, FuseFormer Inpainted Videos, and DeepFaceLab Deepfake
We first pretrained the FFE on the Video-ACID dataset using PyTorch and trained it using an NVIDIA RTX 3090. The two inpainting datasets were made by using a set of publicly available videos of celebrities downloaded from YouTube. Frame-level detection scores are calculated for a set of publicly available videos of celebrities downloaded from YouTube. This dataset consists of authentic and manipulated subsets with each containing 300 frames from 10 videos.

6. Experiments

Training Implementation. We implemented our network using PyTorch and trained it using an NVIDIA RTX 3090. The network input resolution is 1080 × 1920 pixels. We first pretrained the FFE on the Video-ACID dataset using the Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) with an initial learning rate of 1.0e−3, momentum of 0.95, and an exponential decay-rate of 0.9 for every 2 epochs. After pretraining the FFE, we trained VideoFACT following the five stages described in Section 4.5 with different training parameters shown in Table 1. Throughout the stages, we set α = 0.4.

Evaluation Datasets. We evaluated the frame-level performance of our proposed network and competing networks on the nine datasets described in Section 5.

Evaluation Metrics. For frame-level manipulation detection, we report the mean average precision (mAP) for every dataset. Also, we provide the average accuracy (ACC) per datasets using a unified threshold of 0.5 to reflect real-world’s performance. For forgery localization (i.e. pixel-level manipulation detection) we use F1 and MCC scores to evaluate the correlation between the ground-truth and predicted masks, which are binarized with a threshold of 0.5.

6.1. Detection and Localization Performance

We compared the performance of VideoFACT to several state-of-the-art (SOTA) image forensic networks including Forensic Similarity Graphs (FSG) [49], EXIFnet [31], Noiseprint [16], ManTra-Net [72], and MVSS-Net [12], representing a broad spectrum of successful techniques for performing general content forgery detection and localization in images. Frame-level detection scores are calculated for Noiseprint and ManTra-Net by computing the average normalized per-pixel detection probability. Additionally, we benchmarked against three SOTA deepfake detectors: Efficient ViT (E.ViT) [14], Convolutional Cross Efficient ViT (CCE.ViT) [14], and CNN Ensemble [6]. All three algorithms are trained on 100% of the deepfake training data, representing 75% of the total data from both FF++ [57] and DFDC [18] datasets. Meanwhile, VideoFACT-FT denotes a version of VideoFACT finetuned using only 10% of each relevant dataset.
challenging forgeries. From these results, we see that VideoFACT outperforms existing general forgery detectors and localizers. Additionally, VideoFACT can transfer to advanced manipulations by finetuning on a small amount of data.

Specifically, on the two Inpainted Videos datasets, VideoFACT outperforms existing forensic networks and deepfake detectors by a large margin. For example, we achieved mAP = 0.782 on E2FGVI and 0.652 on FuseFormer Inpainted Videos. Additionally, we obtain strong performance and outperform competing networks on VideoSham, which contains four difficult forgery types. Here, we achieved mAP = 0.691 for detection and F1 = 0.312 for localization. On the three deepfake datasets, we did not outperform deepfake detectors. This is expected because they leverage significant problem-specific information, while VideoFACT does not. Furthermore, the traces left by deepfakes and the content of these datasets differs significantly from our training data. However, through finetuning, we will show that VideoFACT can achieve strong performance on deepfakes.

Next, our experiments show that VideoFACT can transfer to advanced manipulations by finetuning using only a small portion of data. Here, VideoFACT-FT denotes a version of VideoFACT finetuned using only 10% of each relevant dataset. By finetuning on the Inpainted Videos datasets, we achieved very strong performance: mAP = 0.908 on E2FGVI and mAP = 0.948 on FuseFormer. Finetuning for deepfake detection using DFD and FF++ data, we were able to achieve strong performance comparable with SOTA deepfake detectors. Notably, we achieved mAP = 0.937 on DFD, 0.916 on FF++, and 0.988 on our DeepFaceLab dataset. These results show that by only seeing very little deepfake data, our network can generalize well to this type of manipulation, achieving mAPs than dedicated deepfake detectors whose training dataset was nine times larger than ours. Here, we report frame-level deepfake detection results for fair comparison between algorithms. We note that no finetuning experiments were performed on VideoSham because it has only an evaluation set and no training set.

### 6.2. Discussion

From the results presented in Tables 2 and 3, we can see that existing approaches, which reported strong performance on image forgeries, largely fail on video. There are multiple reasons why this may occur.

The first reason, as mentioned in Section 3, is the effects of video compression. Video coding parameters vary for each macroblock, which induces localized inconsistencies in forensic traces. Another important reason is the false alarms effects in authentic regions. An example of this can be seen in Fig. 6. Here, existing networks produce false alarms in different ways depending on each network’s design. One set of existing approaches, such as EXIFnet, FSG, and
Noiseprint, identify fake content by searching for anomalous forensic traces. Hence, they produce false alarms in scene regions that contain low-quality forensic information such as the sky. Other approaches, such as ManTra-Net and MVSS-Net, learn forgery features by analyzing noise residuals and edge information. These techniques can false alarm when highly salient foreground objects, like the man on the rock in Fig. 6, naturally exhibit different statistics, i.e. sharper edges, from background objects.

How Our Network Overcomes These Effects. Our use of context embeddings and self-attention enables VideoFACT to be more resilient to the effects described above. Furthermore, because the Deep Self-Attention Module learns which scene regions contain high quality forensic information, VideoFACT can rely more heavily on these regions when making decisions and avoids many of the false alarm issues faced by other networks. Finally, local context information enables our network to control for local variations in forensic traces induced by video compression.

Failure Cases and Limitations. We identified several common failure cases experienced by our network. Our network often misses falsified regions that are very small, particularly smaller than our 128 × 128 pixels analysis window. Our network produces poor decisions when both the manipulated region and background have similar poor illumination. It also has difficulty detecting regions altered by color swaps. Additionally, our network’s current implementation is limited to analyzing video resolution of 1080p.

7. Ablation Study

We conducted multiple ablation experiments to validate the importance of various components in VideoFACT’s architecture and record them in Table 4. We trained each of the network variants using the same settings as the proposed method and assessed their performance on VideoSham.

The results show that each proposed components improve the performance of the model. By removing either FFE or CFE, every metric has a significant reduction. When removing the entire DSAM, the joint embeddings were fed directly into the detector and the localizer networks. This variant still resulted in a substantial performance drop across the board. The detection metrics suggest that this network only does slightly better than random guess.

We also measure the importance of the Transformer and Attention Squeeze in the DSAM. We first replace the Transformer encoders with six fully connected layers with ReLU as the activation function. In this scenario, the model performs at a level close to random guess. Therefore, this confirms the necessity of the Transformer for our network.

Besides, we also try removing Attention Squeeze and connect the output of the Transformer encoders directly to the detector and localizer. We see that this variant under-performs in both detection and localization. Finally, we try using 1, 3 (proposed) and 10 attention maps. Results show that using 3 attention maps yields the best performance.

For Feature Refinement approaches, we also try concatenating all three sets of weighted spatially contextualized forensic embeddings, instead of proposed approach. Results show that both detection and localization performance drop significantly. Therefore, the proposed method is optimal.

8. Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a new network, VideoFACT, to detect and localize a broad range of video forgeries and manipulations. Our network does this by utilizing both forensic embeddings to capture traces left by manipulation, context embeddings to control for variation in forensic traces caused by video coding, and a deep self-attention mechanism to estimate the local quality and relevance of forensic embeddings. We create several new video forgery datasets, which we used along with the Adobe VideoSham dataset to experimentally evaluate our network’s performance. Our results show that our proposed network is able to identify a diverse set of video forgeries, including those not encountered during training. Furthermore, our results show that existing image forensic networks largely fail to identify fake content in video.

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