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To cite this version:
Nora Cuppens, Salaheddine Zerkane, Yanhuang Li, David Espes, Philippe Le Parc, et al.. Firewall Policies Provisioning Through SDN in the Cloud. 31th IFIP Annual Conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy (DBSEC), Jul 2017, Philadelphia, PA, United States. pp.293-310, 10.1007/978-3-319-61176-1_16. hal-01684362

HAL Id: hal-01684362
https://inria.hal.science/hal-01684362v1
Submitted on 15 Jan 2018

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Firewall Policies Provisioning through SDN in the Cloud

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Abstract. The evolution of the digital world drives cloud computing to be a key infrastructure for data and services. This breakthrough is transforming Software Defined Networking into the cloud infrastructure backbone because of its advantages such as programmability, abstraction and flexibility. As a result, many cloud providers select SDN as a cloud network service and offer it to their customers. However, due to the rising number of network cloud providers and their security offers, network cloud customers strive to find the best provider candidate who satisfies their security requirements. In this context, we propose a negotiation and an enforcement framework for SDN firewall policies provisioning. Our solution enables customers and SDN providers to express their firewall policies and to negotiate them via an orchestrator. Then, it reinforces these security requirements using the holistic view of the SDN controllers and it deploys the generated firewall rules into the network elements. We evaluate the performance of the solution and demonstrate its advantages.

Keywords: Security Policies, Software Defined Networking, Cloud Computing, Orchestration, Firewall, OpenFlow, Service Providers, ABAC

We implement our solution into an existing SDN Firewall solution by enhancing its orchestration layer. Then, we deploy a use case for our proposition in an SDN infrastructure. The scenario compounds a NSC and 3 different NSPs. Each provider delivers a type of SDN firewall whether it is a stateful proactive SDN firewall [36], a stateful reactive SDN firewall [37] or a stateless SDN firewall [16], [31]. All the peers express their firewall policies using our language. The Orchestrator mediates between them, selects the best provider and runs a negotiation process in order to reach a mutual agreement with the customer. Afterwards, it sends the contract to the chosen firewall service. The latter interprets it into OpenFlow [1], [12], [25] rules and installs them in the network elements. We evaluate the performance of our framework by setting a test-bed for the aforementioned scenario.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 reviews existing proposals on policy-related solutions. Section 2 describes the formalism and all the
processes from policy expression till the interpretation process of the firewall policies into OpenFlow rules and their deployment. Section 3 presents the integration of our solution into an existing SDN firewall environment and its performance experimentation results. Section 4 concludes the paper and outlines future work.

1 Related Work

The literature lacks of propositions that integrate to SDN security applications (especially SDN firewalls) firewall policy provisioning in the orchestration layer. There is an open research field on the subject in terms of SDN as a service and firewall policies orchestration in the cloud. To the extent of our studies the majority of SDN security solutions do not support negotiation between firewall policies, neither propose mutual agreement processes between providers nor reinforcement function of the client-provider agreement. CloudWatcher [32], FRESCO [33], [13] and OpenSec [17] are three famous SDN propositions that rely on specific policy script languages. They lack interoperability and openness since they are platform specific. In addition, they do not integrate a policy management process in order to interact with the cloud level. Other solutions focus on policy expression and enforcement. Tang et al. [34] develop a service oriented high level policy language to specify network service provisioning between end nodes. Batista et al. [2] propose the PonderFlow, an extension of Ponder [9] language to OpenFlow network policy specification. EnforSDN [3] proposes a management process that exploits SDN principles in order to separate the policy resolution layer from the policy enforcement layer in network service appliances. The concept improve the enforcement management, network utilization and communication latency, without compromising network policies. However, it can not handle stateful security applications like stateful firewalls.

Many solutions have been proposed for selecting NSP in the cloud. There are two trends in the literature. The major one focusses on NSC’s security requirements without taking into consideration NSP’s constraints. [18], [23] define the selection strategy exclusively on NSC’s capacity. Bernsmed et al. [4] present a security SLA (Service Level Agreement) framework for cloud computing to help potential NCSs to identify necessary protection mechanisms and facilitate automatic service composition. In [6], different virtual resource orchestration constraints are resumed and expressed by Attribute-Based Paradigm from NSC perspective. The other trend which is part of our work takes into consideration NSP capacities and offers in order to perform the selection. In [20], both NSP and NSC can express security requirements in SLA contract then these security requirements are transformed to OrBAC [15] policies. Li et al. [21] proposes a method to measure the similarity between security policies and suggest using the solution in SP selection process.

Most of the work in the literature define security policies negotiation based on access control negotiation. The literature is classified in 3 types of negotiations: (1) negotiation with no constraints, (2) negotiation with global constraints, (3)
negotiation with local constraints [11]. For example, [5] examines the problem of negotiating a shared access state, assuming all negotiators use the RBAC [30] policy model. Based on a mathematical framework, negotiation is modeled as a Semiring-based Constraint Satisfaction Problem (SCSP) [7]. In [35], authors argue that the guidance provided by constraints is not enough to bring practical solutions for automatic negotiation. Thus, they define an access control policy language which is based on Datalog [14] with constraints and the language can be used to define formal semantics of XACML [28]. Towards the need for human consent in organizational settings, Mehregan et al. [22] develop an extension of Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC) model [10] to support multiple ownership, in which a policy negotiation protocol is in place for co-owners to come up with and give consent to an access control policy. Some authors consider security policy negotiation as a process of contract establishment. For example, Li et al. [19] propose to integrate policy negotiation in contract negotiation by introducing bargaining process. An extension of the negotiation model is proposed in [29] and the model is designed for privacy policy negotiation in mobile health-Cloud environments. In our work we combine the 3 negotiation types and adapt them to negotiate SDN firewall policies in the cloud.

Our solution fills the aforementioned gaps. It meets key-functional requirements for user-centric clouds as (1) it addresses the firewall service configuration at the management layer. (2) it offers a language for firewall policies expression. (3) It supports multiple policy models in order to translate attribute-based security expression to concrete policies. (4) It selects the best SDN Firewall NSP. (5) It provides a negotiation protocol for NSC and NSP based on 3 types of negotiations. (6) it establishes a service level agreement between NSC and NSP. (7) It reinforces the contract according to SDN infrastructure configuration. (8) Then, it interprets it into OpenFlow rules and deploys them inside the network. To the best of our knowledge, there is no method in the literature that considers all these points together.

## 2 SDN firewall policy provisioning model

Both NSC and NSPs specify their firewall policies using our proposed expression Language. Then the Orchestrator assesses the expressions by comparing NSP’s service templates with NSC’s policies after receiving them. It ranks the NSPs and selects the best one which fulfills the most NSC’s requirements. It starts a negotiation process with NSC in the case it is necessary. A successful negotiation generates a firewall policy agreement. This contract is derived from high-level firewall policies and sent to the chosen SDN firewall service. The latter reinforces the received policies according to its view (topology, previous security policies and other network configurations) and translates them into OpenFlow rules. Afterwards, it sends the OpenFlow rules to the SDN controllers. Each one of them deploys the received OpenFlow rules on its network elements.
2.1 Scenario Description

We introduce a use case to experiment our concept. The subjects involved in the scenario are NSC, SDN orchestrator and 3 NSPs. NSC requires an SDN Firewall service that meets its firewall policies (Requirements). Each NSP provides a type of SDN firewalls and a set of firewall policies (Obligations). The three SDN firewall services are as follows:

1. **NSP1: SDN Reactive Stateful Firewall** [37]. It forwards systematically all the packets to the stateful firewall Application over the SDN controller. The application verifies each packet using its access control table and reacts to these network events by installing the proper stateful firewall OpenFlow rules in the Network Elements. It relies on the Finite State Machine of all the connections. This service spares Network elements resources. However, it shifts the computing and memory loads on the controller. As a result, the latter became vulnerable to some DDoS attacks.

2. **NSP2: SDN Proactive Stateful Firewall** [36]. The service is based on a white list approach. It closes all the accesses and opens only the routes to the authorized connections while tracking their states. The service pre-installs all the Stateful firewall OpenFlow rules in the Network Elements. The latter sends each time a copy of their events to the Firewall service. The proactive service protects against DDoS attacks. It delegates also the access control to the Network Elements.

3. **NSP3: Stateless SDN Firewall** [16],[31]. The service does not track the connections states and it is vulnerable to DDoS attacks. However it consumes fewer resources in the Network Elements and in the Controller comparing with the above services.

2.2 Expression of Firewall Policies

We propose an SDN firewall policy language to homogenize NSP’s obligations and NSC’s requirements. The proposed language is inspired from the Attribute-Based Access Control Model (ABAC) [8]. It allows expressing firewall policies based on a common template. These unification guarantees the interoperability between the Obligations and the Requirements. The grammar of our language is as follows:

- $\Pi$ is the set of all the firewall policies. It describes the access controls within the dynamic environment of the allocated cloud resources: $\Pi = \{\pi_1, \pi_2, ..., \pi_m\}$ where $\pi_{i=1..m}$ are firewall policies.
- $\Theta$ is a set of Obligations. It encompasses all the firewall policies of $\Pi$ expressed by NSPs: $\Theta = \{\theta_1, \theta_2, ..., \theta_k\}$
- $\Phi$ is a set of Requirements. It encompasses all the firewall policies of $\Pi$ expressed by NSC: $\Phi = \{\phi_1, \phi_2, ..., \phi_j\}$

Where $\Pi = \Theta \cup \Phi$ and $\pi_{i=1..m} \equiv \theta_{i=1..k} \lor \phi_{i=1..j}$

Each firewall policy $\pi_i$ is formed by many atomic elements $\varepsilon_{i=1..n}$: $
\pi_{i=1..m} \equiv \varepsilon_1 \land \varepsilon_2 \land ... \land \varepsilon_n$
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\(\varepsilon_{i=1..n}\) is defined by a preposition of predicates. Each predicate defines a property of the element.

**Theorem 1.** \(A(\varepsilon_{i})\) and \(B(\varepsilon_{i})\) are two predicates defining \(\varepsilon_{i}\) proprieties. Predicates equivalence is determined by the preposition : \(A(\varepsilon_{i}) \in \Omega, B(\varepsilon_{i}) \in \Psi \mid (\Psi = \Omega) \rightarrow (A(\varepsilon_{i}) \equiv B(\varepsilon_{i}))\).

The atomic rule element \(\varepsilon_{i=1..n}\) is formed by the following predicates:

1. **Type:** \(type(\varepsilon_{i}) \equiv subject(\varepsilon_{i}) \lor action(\varepsilon_{i}) \lor object(\varepsilon_{i}) \lor context(\varepsilon_{i})\)
2. **Domain:** \(domain(type(\varepsilon_{i})) \in \{protocol, time...\}\). Domain restricts the unit of an element.
3. **Value:** \(value(type(\varepsilon_{i})) \equiv variable(type(\varepsilon_{i})) \lor non-variable(type(\varepsilon_{i}))\). Variable has not an assigned value while non-variable has an already assigned value. Both variable and non-variable can be assigned by three kinds of data types:
   
   (a) **constant:** numeric or semantic value, ex. \(value(type(\varepsilon_{i})) = TCP\).
   
   (b) **interval:** numeric interval, ex. \(value(type(\varepsilon_{i})) = [8 : 00, 20 : 00]\).
   
   (c) **set:** a collection of values, ex. \(value(type(\varepsilon_{i})) = \{15 : 00, 16 : 00\}\).

For simplification, we use \(x_{i}\) to present a variable, \(x_{i} \equiv variable(type(\varepsilon_{i}))\).

4. **Scope:** it defines the access to the values of a variable. It can be:
   
   (a) **Public preference:** \(pub_{pre}(x_{i})\) a public preference variable is accessible as public information.
   
   (b) **Private preference:** \(pri_{pre}(x_{i})\) a private preference variable is a local configuration that cannot be disclosed.

If *context* is not specified in a policy we add a universal context element \(\top\). It indicates that all the obligations for the context are acceptable.

\((context(\varepsilon_{i}) \equiv \top) \rightarrow ((domain(context(\varepsilon_{i})) \equiv \top) \land (value(context(\varepsilon_{i})) \equiv \top))\)

Finally we write:

\(\varepsilon_{i} \equiv type(\varepsilon_{i}) \land domain(type(\varepsilon_{i})) \land value(type(\varepsilon_{i})) \land (pub_{pre}(x_{i}) \lor pri_{pre}(x_{i}))\)

When the scope is not defined: \(\varepsilon_{i} \equiv type(\varepsilon_{i}) \land domain(type(\varepsilon_{i})) \land value(type(\varepsilon_{i}))\)

The firewall policies given in 2.1 using our language are defined in Table 1.

2.3 **Assessment of Firewall Policies**

The assessment of firewall policies is based on matching the Obligations with the Requirements in order to determine which NSPs’ policies satisfies NSC’s requests. This process depends on two level of relationships. Element-Element relation which relies on corresponding the predicates of the firewall policies elements. The second level (Policy-Policy relation) focuses on finding the relationships between the matched elements.
Table 1. Firewall Policy Expression for NSC, NSP1, NSP2 and NSP3

| Element | $\phi_1$ | $\phi_2$ | $\phi_3$ |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| **type** | subject | action | object |
| **domain** | firewall operation | protocol | context |
| **value** | {NSC, NSP} | {HTTP, TCP, ICMP} | time |
| **Scope** | - | - | ⊤ |

| Element | $\theta_1$ | $\theta_2$ | $\theta_3$ |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| **type** | subject | action | object |
| **domain** | firewall operation | protocol | context |
| **value** | {NSC, NSP} | pre({quarantine, block, alert}) | attack, detection |
| **Scope** | - | pre({TCP, HTTP, SSH, ICMP}) | ⊤ |

| Element | $\theta_4$ |
|---------|---------|
| **type** | subject |
| **domain** | firewall operation |
| **value** | {NSC, NSP} |
| **Scope** | pre({pass, block}) |

| Element | $\theta_4$ |
|---------|---------|
| **type** | subject |
| **domain** | IP_address |
| **value** | {NSC, NSP} |
| **Scope** | pre({pass, block}) |

| Element | $\theta_4$ |
|---------|---------|
| **type** | subject |
| **domain** | protocol |
| **value** | {NSC, NSP} |
| **Scope** | - |

| Element | $\theta_4$ |
|---------|---------|
| **type** | subject |
| **domain** | protocol |
| **value** | {NSC, NSP} |
| **Scope** | - |
Element-Element relation. There are five relations between the elements:

1. **inconsistent**: \( (\text{type}(e_i) \neq \text{type}(e_j)) \rightarrow (e_i \not\equiv e_j) \). If two rule elements \( e_i \) and \( e_j \) have no equivalent type predicates then they are in **inconsistent** relation denoted: \( e_i \not\equiv e_j \). For example, in Table 1, \( \phi_1, e_1 \not\equiv \theta_1, e_2 \) because \( \text{subject}(\phi_1, e_1) \neq \text{action}(\theta_1, e_2) \).

   **Theorem 2.** Not equivalence of type is defined as follows:
   \[
   \text{type}(e_i) \in \Omega, \text{type}(e_j) \in \Psi \mid ((\Omega \nsubseteq \Psi) \land (\Psi \nsubseteq \Omega)) \rightarrow (\text{type}(e_i) \neq \text{type}(e_j))
   \]

2. **comparable**: \( ((\text{type}(e_i) \equiv \text{type}(e_j)) \land (\text{domain}(e_i) \equiv \text{domain}(e_j))) \rightarrow (e_i \sim e_j) \). If two rule elements \( e_i \) and \( e_j \) have equivalent type predicates and their domain predicates are in congruence, then they are in **comparable** relation. It is denoted with \( e_i \sim e_j \). For example, in Table 3, \( \phi_1, e_2 \sim \theta_1, e_2 \) because their subject predicates are equivalent and their domain predicates are congruent.

   **Theorem 3.** Domain congruence is defined as follows:
   \[
   \text{domain}(e_i) \in \Omega, \text{domain}(e_j) \in \Psi \mid ((\Omega \subseteq \Psi) \lor (\Psi \subseteq \Omega)) \rightarrow (\text{domain}(e_i) \equiv \text{domain}(e_j))
   \]

3. **equal**: \( ((e_i \sim e_j) \land (\text{value}(\text{type}(e_i)) \equiv \text{value}(\text{type}(e_j)))) \rightarrow (e_i = e_j) \). If two rule elements \( e_i \) and \( e_j \) are comparable and their value predicates are in congruence, then they are in **equal** relation denoted with \( e_i = e_j \). For example, in Table 1, \( \phi_2, e_3 = \theta_3, e_3 \) because both elements are comparable and their value predicates are congruent \( \{TCP\} \subseteq \{HTTP, TCP, SSH, ICMP\} \).

   **Theorem 4.** Value congruence is defined as follows:
   \[
   \text{value}(\text{type}(e_i)) \in \Omega, \text{value}(\text{type}(e_j)) \in \Psi \mid ((\Omega \subseteq \Psi) \lor (\Psi \subseteq \Omega)) \rightarrow (\text{value}(\text{type}(e_i)) \equiv \text{value}(\text{type}(e_j)))
   \]

4. **unequal**: \( ((e_i \sim e_j) \land (\text{value}(\text{type}(e_i)) \neq \text{value}(\text{type}(e_j)))) \rightarrow (e_i \neq e_j) \). If two rule elements \( e_i \) and \( e_j \) are comparable but do not have equivalent value, they are in **unequal** relation denoted with \( e_i \neq e_j \). For example, in Table 1, \( \phi_1, e_2 \neq \theta_3, e_2 \) because both are comparable however they have not equivalent values \( \text{pass} \neq \text{block} \).

   **Theorem 5.** Not equivalence of value is defined as follows:
   \[
   \text{type}(e_i) \in \Omega, \text{type}(e_j) \in \Psi \mid ((\Omega \nsubseteq \Psi) \lor (\Psi \nsubseteq \Omega)) \rightarrow (\text{value}(\text{type}(e_i)) \neq \text{value}(\text{type}(e_j)))
   \]

5. **incomparable**: \( ((\text{type}(e_i) \equiv \text{type}(e_j)) \land (\text{domain}(e_i) \neq \text{domain}(e_j))) \rightarrow (e_i \nottilde{\sim} e_j) \). If two rule elements \( e_i \) and \( e_j \) have equivalent type predicates and not equivalent domain predicate, then they have **incomparable** relation denoted with \( e_i \nottilde{\sim} e_j \). For example, in Table 1, \( \phi_1, e_3 \nottilde{\sim} \theta_4, e_3 \) because they have congruent type predicates but their domains are not equivalent \( \text{protocol} \neq \text{IP address} \).

   **Theorem 6.** Congruence of type is defined as follows:
   \[
   \text{type}(e_i) \in \Omega, \text{type}(e_j) \in \Psi \mid ((\Omega \subseteq \Psi) \lor (\Psi \subseteq \Omega)) \rightarrow (\text{type}(e_i) \equiv \text{type}(e_j))
   \]
Policy-Policy relations. We derive from Element-Element relations, three relations between policies. These relations are as follows:

1. **match:** \((P_1 \land P_2 \land \ldots \land P_n) \rightarrow (\pi_\alpha \bowtie \pi_\beta)\)
   
   \(P_i \equiv ((\pi_\alpha.\varepsilon_i = \pi_\beta.\varepsilon_i) \lor \ldots \lor (\pi_\alpha.\varepsilon_i = \pi_\beta.\varepsilon_n)) \mid \pi_\alpha, \pi_\beta \in \Pi, i = 1..n\)
   
   If any element of a policy \(\alpha\) is in equal relation with another element of a policy \(\beta\), then the two policies are in **match** relation denoted with \(\pi_\alpha \bowtie \pi_\beta\).
   
   For example, in Table 1, \(\phi_3 \bowtie \theta_3\) because \((\phi_3.\varepsilon_1 = \theta_3.\varepsilon_1) \land (\phi_3.\varepsilon_2 = \theta_3.\varepsilon_2)\).

2. **mismatch:** \(\exists \varepsilon_i \exists \varepsilon_j (\pi_\alpha.\varepsilon_i \bowtie \pi_\beta.\varepsilon_j) \rightarrow (\pi_\alpha \bowtie \pi_\beta) \mid \pi_\alpha, \pi_\beta \in \Pi\).
   
   If there are at least *incomparable* elements \(\varepsilon_i\) and \(\varepsilon_j\) from two policies \(\pi_\alpha\) and \(\pi_\beta\), then the two policies have **mismatch** relation denoted with \(\pi_\alpha \bowtie \pi_\beta\).
   
   For example, in Table 1, \(\phi_3 \bowtie \theta_2\) because \(\phi_3.\varepsilon_3 = \theta_2.\varepsilon_4\).

3. **potential match:** \((\forall \varepsilon_i \forall \varepsilon_j (\pi_\alpha.\varepsilon_i \bowtie \pi_\beta.\varepsilon_j)) \land (\exists \varepsilon_k \exists \varepsilon_l (\pi_\alpha.\varepsilon_k \neq \pi_\beta.\varepsilon_l)) \rightarrow (\pi_\alpha \bowtie \pi_\beta) \mid \pi_\alpha, \pi_\beta \in \Pi\).
   
   If all the elements of the policies \(\pi_\alpha\) and \(\pi_\beta\) are *comparable* but it exists at least an *unequal* relation between two of their respective elements then the two policies are in a **potential match** relation denoted \(\pi_\alpha \bowtie \pi_\beta\).
   
   For example, in Table 1, \(\phi_1 \bowtie \theta_1\) because \((\phi_1.\varepsilon_1 \bowtie \theta_1.\varepsilon_1) \land (\phi_1.\varepsilon_2 \bowtie \theta_1.\varepsilon_2) \land (\phi_1.\varepsilon_3 \bowtie \theta_1.\varepsilon_3) \land (\phi_1.\varepsilon_4 \bowtie \theta_1.\varepsilon_4)\).

**NSP Ranking.** The orchestrator ranks each NSP based on the relations between the **Requirements** and the **Obligations** (see Section 2.3). This process enables selecting the most compliant NSP according to the algorithm [1].

### 2.4 Establishment of contract

**Negotiation Protocol.** When an agreement is not reached between the peers, the orchestrator negotiates the offers of the chosen NSP with NSC. We propose the Rule-Element Based Negotiation Protocol (RENP) in order to manage the negotiation process. Our protocol specifies for each element the next action regarding the proposed values \(v_{rec}\) of NSP and the local configuration \(v_{loc}\) of NSC. The protocol contains three types of actions:

1. **accept:** it indicates that the proposed value is agreed.
2. **refuse:** it indicates that the proposed value is aborted.
3. **propose:** it generates a counter-offer.

Table 4 in the Appendix presents the detail of RENP protocol. \((vp)\) is the proposed variable upon negotiation. The results of the assessment and negotiation processes for the example defined in Section 2.3 are as follows. The orchestrator finds **potential match** relations between the pairs: \((\phi_1, \theta_1)\), \((\phi_2, \theta_2)\) and \((\phi_3, \theta_3)\). NSP1 does not meet the firewall requirement of \(\phi_3\) and NSP3 does not fulfill \(\phi_3\). As a consequence, the resulting relations are **mismatch**. The orchestrator puts NSP2 into the ranking list.

The orchestrator conducts then policy negotiation with NSC on behalf of NSP2. It accepts the obligations \(\theta_1\) for \(\phi_1\) and \(\theta_3\) for \(\phi_3\). However, it proposes
Algorithm 1 NSP Ranking

1: rank_list is Empty {Initial ranking list is Empty}
2: for All NSPs do
3: rank ← 0 {Default ranking value}
4: matching ← True {To make sure that there are only matches for Gold ranking}
5: for i=0, i≤Length(Requirement), i++ do
6: for j=0, j≤Length(Obligation), j++ do
7: if Match(Requirement[i], Obligation[j]) = True then
8: rank ← 2
9: Break
10: else if Potential_Match(Requirement[i], Obligation[j]) = True then
11: rank ← 1
12: matching ← False
13: Break
14: else if Mismatch(Requirement[i], Obligation[j]) = True then
15: matching ← False
16: end if
17: end for
18: if rank = 0 then
19: Break
20: end if
21: end for
22: if (rank = 2) and (matching = True) then
23: Add (rank_list, (NSP, NSP\_gold)) {Tag NSP as NSP gold and add it to the ranking list}
24: else if rank = 1 then
25: Add (rank_list, (NSP, NSP\_silver)) {Tag NSP as NSP silver and add it to the ranking list}
26: else
27: print NSP is not compliant with NSC, it will not be add to the ranking list
28: end if
29: end for
30: return rank_list

a counter offer for \( \phi_2 \). This case corresponds to column 5 in row 4 of table [4] because the received value (in \( \phi_2 \) \( v_{rec} :\) quarantine) has no intersection with \( pri_{preloc} :\) \{block, alert\} (in \( \theta_2 \)). Thus, the orchestrator chooses another value \( = block \) in \( pri_{preloc} \) as a new proposition. After receiving the proposition, NSC accepts the new value because block belongs to the local private configuration of \( \phi_2 \). Then the orchestrator establishes the contract between NSC and NSP2 (Table [2]).

General Agreement. Algorithm [2] illustrates the contract building process conducted by the orchestrator. It chooses the \( NSP_{top} \) in the top of \( rank\_list \). The orchestrator accepts directly without negotiation \( NSP_{gold} \) and establishes contract with NSC. While for \( NSP_{silver} \), it starts a negotiation process with NSC by executing the proposed negotiation protocol (see Table [4]). It transforms potential match relations into match relations. If the negotiation fails NSP is deleted from \( rank\_list \) and the negotiation process is re-conducted.
Algorithm 2 Establishment of contract
1: \texttt{rank\_list} ← call (NSP Ranking) \{Making NSP Ranking List\}
2: \texttt{while} NSP in \texttt{rank\_list} \texttt{do}
3: \quad Best_{NSP} = NSP_{top}\{Choose NSP\_top from \texttt{rank\_list}\}
4: \quad \texttt{if} Best_{NSP} is NSP\_gold \texttt{then}
5: \quad \quad \texttt{Accept} (Best_{NSP}.Obligation\() \{\text{Accept NSP\_top offer}\}\)
6: \quad \texttt{Contract} = \texttt{Generate\_Contract} \ (Best_{NSP}, NSC) \{Establish contract with NSC\}
7: \quad \texttt{return}
8: \quad \texttt{else}
9: \quad \quad \texttt{Negociate} (Best_{NSP}.Obligation\(), NSC.Requirement\() \{\text{Start negotiation with NSC}\}\)
10: \quad \quad negotiation\_Result = \texttt{RENP} (potential match) \{Execute negotiation protocol between potential match rule pairs\}
11: \quad \quad \texttt{if} negotiation\_Result = Accepted \texttt{then}
12: \quad \quad \quad \texttt{Contract} = \texttt{Generate\_Contract} \ (NSP, NSC) \{Establish contract with NSC\}
13: \quad \quad \texttt{return}
14: \quad \quad \texttt{else}
15: \quad \quad \quad \texttt{Delete} (NSP\_top, \texttt{rank\_list}) \{Delete NSP\_top from \texttt{rank\_list}\}
16: \quad \texttt{end if}
17: \texttt{end if}
18: \texttt{end while}

Table 2. Final agreement between NSP and SDN Orchestrator

| Policy 1 | NSC | Domain | Value | Type | Element \(\epsilon_1\) | \(\epsilon_2\) | \(\epsilon_3\) | \(\epsilon_4\) |
|----------|-----|--------|-------|------|----------------|----------|----------------|----------|
|          |     |subject | action| firewall operation | NSP | pass | protocol {HTTP, TCP, ICMP} | [0:00, 24:00] |
|          |     |object | context | time |                 |           |                |          |

| Policy 2 | NSC | Domain | Value | Type | Element \(\epsilon_1\) | \(\epsilon_2\) | \(\epsilon_3\) | \(\epsilon_4\) |
|----------|-----|--------|-------|------|----------------|----------|----------------|----------|
|          |     |subject | action| firewall operation | NSP | pass | protocol TCP | [connection\_exc] |
|          |     |object | context | time |                 |           |                |          |
|          |     |TCP | [connection\_exc] | Time | [Time>30] |

| Policy 3 | NSC | Domain | Value | Type | Element \(\epsilon_1\) | \(\epsilon_2\) | \(\epsilon_3\) | \(\epsilon_4\) |
|----------|-----|--------|-------|------|----------------|----------|----------------|----------|
|          |     |subject | action| firewall operation | NSP | pass | protocol ICMP | [attack\_detection] |
|          |     |object | context | time |                 |           |                |          |
|          |     |ICMP | [attack\_detection] | DoS\_detection |

2.5 Enforcement of Security Policy

Policy Transformation. SDN NSP contains two levels of policy abstraction: (1) a service level abstraction which defines the business logic. This high level is expressed by administrators and tenants. (2) An OpenFlow level which interprets the high-level abstraction into infrastructure specific rules. The abstraction at the service level hides the details of the network configuration and service deployment. It simplifies the expression of the service policies. While the OpenFlow level ensures deploying the policies into the network elements according to the network state.
The orchestrator sends the high level policies to SDN Firewall Applications. Each one interprets the high level policies into OpenFlow rules and sends them to the controller.

The interpretation process is based on mapping the elements of the high level policy model with OpenFlow elements. A high level policy can be interpreted to more than one OpenFlow rule.

OpenFlow is based on flow rules. Mainly, it structures policies into 6 parts. (1) OF.Type can be Flow ADD rules, Flow MODIFY rules and Flow DELETE rules. (2) Matching Fields define the characteristics of the traffic. They describe the header of a packet in order to identify network flows. (3) Actions specify the operations on the matched. These actions can be Drop traffic, Forward to controller, Forward to Port. (4) Timers indicate the lifetime of the rule (Hard Timeout) or the ejection time if the rule is not matched for a time interval (Idle Timeout). (5) Metadata can be used to save any extra information. (6) Counters allow to specify rules based on traffic statistics. Table 3 shows the interpretation of the final agreement (table 2) into OF rules. We applied the following mappings.

1. **Object** corresponds to OF Matching Fields. It is the first element which is mapped to its OF counterparts. The interpretation of the object element will generate at least an OF rules for each object value.

2. **Action** of the high level policy corresponds to OF Action Field. OpenFlow offers also the possibility to express many actions (ACTION List) and to associate them to the same OF rule. The orchestrator verifies that there is no contradiction between actions (for example: block and allow) in the same policy. For example, block corresponds to the OF action: DROP.

3. **Context** element is mapped to OF components such as TIME OUTs and OF Counters but also to firewall specific functions. The interpretation to firewall function triggers a condition in order to execute the OF rule of the Context. For example, the context: TCP Failed Time > 30 in Policy2 triggers TCP connection counting function and when it exceeds 30 connections it installs the corresponding rule for policy2.

4. NSP is mapped to the topology of the service provider. For each link between the nodes, the interpretation module generates the corresponding OF rules taking the 3 aforementioned mappings. The OF Matching fields that correspond to the topology are at least IP src, IP dst, PORT src, and PORT dst. If the topology is not provided, the Firewall Application installs the OF rules without specifying the topology matching fields.

5. The default type of OF rule is ADD. The firewall application verifies firstly that the rule is not a duplicate of a previous interpreted rule by comparing both matching parts. If only the contexts are different, then the OF rule type is set to MODIFY. If the firewall application receives from the Controller an error upon sending a MODIFY rule, the firewall application changes the MODIFY rule to ADD rule and re-sends it to the controller.

**Policy Deployment.** The controller opens a secure channel with the data plane devices (network elements) and communicates by exchanging OpenFlow
Table 3. Interpretation of the Final Agreement into OpenFlow Rules

| OF Type | Matching Field          | Action | Timer          | Firewall Function |
|---------|-------------------------|--------|----------------|-------------------|
| Policy 1 | ADD ETH_Type=2048 IP_Prot0=6 DST_P=80 | Forward Controller | Idle_Timeout=0 Hard_Timeout=0 |
| Policy 1 | ADD ETH_Type=2048 IP_Prot0=6 | Forward Controller | Idle_Timeout=0 Hard_Timeout=0 |
| Policy 1 | ADD ETH_Type=2048 IP_Prot0=1 | Forward Controller | Idle_Timeout=0 Hard_Timeout=0 |
| Policy 2 | MODIFY ETH_Type=2048 IP_Prot0=6 | DROP | | TCP_Count(30) |
| Policy 3 | MODIFY ETH_Type=2048 IP_Prot0=1 | DROP | | SNORT_ALERT = DDOS |

messages. Upon receiving OF rules from SDN firewall, the controller sends them to the corresponding data plane devices which then install the rules. The rules are parsed and their elements are saved in the Flow tables of the data plane devices. At this level, the OF rules become Flow entries in the data plane devices. When the data plane devices receive network packets, they parse their headers and match the contents with all the matching fields of each flow entry. Once a matching is found, the corresponding action is executed on the packet. If a match is not found, the data plane device drops the packet or sends it to the controller.

3 Evaluation

We implement the proposed solution using Python programming language. The Framework has an orchestrator layer which integrates the firewall provisioning model. In addition, it has a stateful SDN firewall application that executes the security policies and the finite state machines of stateful network protocols.

We deploy our solution in the B-Secure platform which is a cloud environment to test the performance of SDN security solutions. It consists of a central machine (16 Gb of RAM and Intel i7 processors), a data plane device machine (16 Gb of RAM, Intel i7 processors, 6 physical network interfaces of 1 Gb/s) connected to the central machine, and two machines (4 Gb of RAM and Intel i3 processors) connected to the data plane device.

We install the orchestrator, the firewall application and the SDN controller RYU [24] in the central machine. In the data plane device machine, we run the OpenVswitch (OVS) [26, 27]. It is a virtual switch framework widely used in both industry and research. The physical network link between the controller and the OVS is 1 Gb/s.

In the central machine, we deploy NSC and NSP2 of the use case (see Section 2.1). The orchestrator generates the contract and sends the high level policies to
the SDN firewall Application. Then the latter interprets the policies to OpenFlow rules and asks RYU controller to install them on OVS. We vary the number of NSC’s Requirements from 1 to 2500 policies. We measure the following performance metrics:

1. **Policy Processing Time (PPT)** is the time that the orchestrator needs to process the policy expression.
2. **Orchestrator Processing Time (OPT)** is the total time taken by the orchestrator from the first policy expression to sending the last policy.
3. **Firewall Application Processing Time (FAPT)** is the total time taken by the firewall application to process the policies.
4. **Controller Processing Time (CPT)** is the total time taken by the controller to send all the OpenFlow rules.
5. **Infrastructure Processing Time (IPT)** is the total time that the infrastructure (Controller-OVS link and OVS) needs to install all the OF rules.
6. **Policy Processing Total Time (PPTT)** is the total policy provisioning time.
7. **Orchestrator Setup Rate (OSR)** is the speed of the orchestrator:
   \[
   OSR = \frac{OPT}{\text{Number of Policies}}
   \]
8. **Firewall Setup Rate (FSR)** is the speed of the firewall Application:
   \[
   FSR = \frac{FAPT}{\text{Number of Policies}}
   \]
9. **Controller Setup Rate (CSR)** is the speed of the Controller:
   \[
   CSR = \frac{CPT}{\text{Number of Openflow Rules}}
   \]
10. **Infrastructure Setup Rate (ISR)** is the speed of the Infrastructure:
     \[
     ISR = \frac{IPT}{\text{Number of Openflow Rules}}
     \]

Figure 1 and Figure 2 display the different measured processing times during the experiment. The processing times in all the figures increase with the rise of rule number. In Figure 1, we observe that PPT increases slowly with a starting value of 0.00236s for 10 policies to a maximal value of 0.6421s for 2500 policies. In addition, PPT’s values are the lowest among all processing times. FAPT is slightly higher than CPT. Moreover, OPT is slower than both FAPT and CPT. For example, the values for 2500 policies are: 2.700s, 2.254s and 2.141s. However, the largest processing times are those of IPT as shown in Figure 2 (10, 0.0034s) and (2500, 11.02s).

The reasons are the amount and nature of the processing that each layer performs. The orchestrator runs many processes in order to generate the final agreement. The firewall application performs the interpretation to OF rules and the controller deploys the generated OF rules in the network element. The infrastructure is impacted by the performance of OVS and the data link with the controller. Our solution accumulates a processing time of 7.96s with 2500 rules, while the infrastructure processing time is 1.5 times higher (2500, 11.02s).
Around 50% (in Average) of \textit{PPTT} is taken by the infrastructure to deploy the rules. For example, for 2500 rules, it takes 18.12s from the time of releasing the initial policy request in the orchestrator to the time of deployment of the final OF rule in the network element. 60% of this time is taken by the infrastructure alone (see Figure 2).

Figure 3 displays the different policy setup rates in the infrastructure. We observe 3 different states. In the first state, \textit{CSR}, \textit{FSR}, \textit{OSR} and \textit{ISR} increase to reach their top values respectively (100, 5186), (100, 4838), (50, 3150), (10, 2941). In the second stage, all the rates decrease rapidly. The diminution is linear for \textit{CSR}, \textit{FSR} and \textit{OSR} while fluctuating for \textit{ISR}. In the third stage, we observe
that all the rates reduce with the increase of the number of policies. The rates of our solution reach a value around 1000 Policies/s at 2500 while ISR continues to hold lower values. This observation comforts the previous results. ISR low rates are caused by the load on the link Controller-OVS. We observe that the orchestrator has lower performance than the firewall application. This observation consolidates the explanations provided previously. Our solution has good performances with around 1000 policies/s. In practice, the number of firewall rules depends on the size of the topology and the granularity of each rule. Furthermore, policies changes do not need the repetition of all the process because OpenFlow enables to update directly the installed rules.

![Solution’s Policy Rates](image)

*Fig. 3. Solution’s Policy Rates*

4 Conclusion and Perspectives

We propose a solution to express firewall policies, assess NSC’s requirements with NSPs’ obligations, select the best NSP candidate, negotiate and agree on a common policy contract then deploy the agreement in a SDN cloud platform. We integrate and deploy the solution in an existing SDN firewall framework. Moreover, we evaluate its performance and scalability. The evaluation shows promising results with a rate of 1000 deployed policies/s.

Our framework brings many advantages. It offers interoperability between different NSCs and NSPs through a unified language that simplifies administrator’s tasks. It abstracts the complexity of the network by hiding the infrastructure details. In addition, it automatizes firewall policies orchestration.

In order to improve our solution, we plan to include in the process new elements such as quality of service, pricing and NSP’s reputation. This improvement will resolve specific cases in our ranking algorithm. For example, the empty rank list or multiple matching and potential matching NSPs.
Acknowledgement

The work of Nora Cuppens and Frédéric Cuppens reported in this paper has been partially carried out in the SUPERCLOUD project, funded by the European Unions Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant N643964.

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A RENP Protocol

Table 4. RENP protocol

| $v_{recv}$ | non variable | variable $pub_{recv}$ | variable $ pri_{recv}$ | proposed value $vp$ |
|------------|--------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| non variable | $v_{recv} = v_{act}$ | $\{v_{recv}\} \subseteq \{pub_{recv}\}$ | $\min$ | $-\$ |
| non variable | $v_{recv} \neq v_{act}$ | $\{v_{recv}\} \not\subseteq \{pub_{recv}\}$ | $\max$ | $-\$ |
| variable $pub_{recv}$ | $\{v_{recv}\} \subseteq \{pub_{recv}\}$ | $\max$ | $\min$ | $-\$ |
| variable $pub_{recv}$ | $\{v_{recv}\} \not\subseteq \{pub_{recv}\}$ | $\min$ | $\max$ | $-\$ |
| variable $pri_{recv}$ | $\{v_{recv}\} \subseteq \{pri_{recv}\}$ | $\max$ | $\min$ | $-\$ |
| variable $pri_{recv}$ | $\{v_{recv}\} \not\subseteq \{pri_{recv}\}$ | $\min$ | $\max$ | $-\$ |