A Trust Management Model Based on Bi-evaluation in P2P Networks

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1. Introduction

In recent years, P2P file-sharing has gained wide applications, such as Maze, Gnutella, Naspter and BitTorrent. The application of these file-sharing systems composes of a series of P2P networks, where a peer can perform as a provider of resources or a consumer. Despite the autonomous and open nature of P2P networks facilitate peer activities, it also makes P2P networks very vulnerable to abuse by malicious peers [1]. For example, VBS.Gnutella [2] can spread in Gnutella. It is necessary to find an efficient way to prevent viruses from spreading in resource exchanges among peers.

To enhance the security among peers, trust management theories in social networks are introduced to construct trust models, which can effectively suppress malicious behaviors, such as resource-abusing, fraud, and so on [3]. In most trust models, trustworthiness of peers is used to prevent untrustworthy resources from spreading by malicious providers [4].

However, this approach has some effects on the simple identifying of malicious providers, but has few effects on coping with denial-of-service attacks of malicious consumers and free riding of selfish peers. For example, the request resolution of consuming resources may tend to exhaust the provider’s serving capabilities (like processing capacity and bandwidth) [5]. One of the simplest attacks of malicious consumers could be achieved by bombarding a provider with lots of requests so as to reduce its capabilities to respond to other normal requests and provide resources, resulting in denial-of-service attacks. Furthermore, free riding may lead to degradation of the network performance. It has been established that nearly 70% of Gnutella users share no files, and nearly 50% of all responses are returned by the top 1% of sharing hosts [6]. Consequently, malicious behaviors and free riding, which are very unfavorable to the survival and development of P2P networks, must be suppressed. In order to make the P2P networks secure, the availability of trust management theories is necessary to apply in the existing access control mechanism [7]. A provider should classify consumers and assign different access rights to each consumer, even if the consumers were previously unknown [8]. In conclusion, the trust relationship among peers should be bidirectional evaluation. While consumers guard against malicious providers, providers must also provide resources selectively.

With these research problems in mind, we develop BiTrust, a P2P trust model using bidirectional evaluation. This model utilizes service and request trustworthiness to implement the bidirectional evaluation of trust relationship in the initialization of an exchange. ST (Service Trustworthiness) shows the service of reliability of providers. RT (Request Trustworthiness) reflects the right that consumers obtain resources. According to their own trust beliefs, both of the participants will observe the trustworthiness of the other party to decide whether to perform the exchange after the initialization or not. Should ST show that the provider is malicious, the consumer may give up the provider and find a new one instead. Should RT show that the consumer is malicious, the provider may refuse to respond to the exchange request so as to guard against denial-of-service attacks from malicious consumers. Thus, malicious peers who can nei-
ther provide untrustworthy resources nor obtain resources from other peers could be isolated from P2P networks. At the same time, the result that RT restricts the right of selfish peers to obtain resources would make them share resources actively to improve their RT.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, related work is briefly introduced. We present the approach of evaluating ST and RT in Sect. 3. Section 4 describes implementation strategies of BiTrust, including trust-based exchange selection scheme and performing algorithms for the model. Section 5 simulates our model. Finally, we conclude in Sect. 6.

2. Related Work

In an open P2P network, there is no centralized authority for maintaining and distributing trustworthiness data. With a trust management model, a peer in a P2P network can evaluate each other’s trustworthiness. Some of previous studies are related on trust management in P2P networks.

EigenTrust[3] aggregated trustworthiness scores by a weighted sum of all raw trust recommendations, and assumes pre-trust peers and uses majority voting to check faulty recommendations reported. Wang et al. [9] designed the incentive-compatible trustworthiness feedback scheme based on well-known economic model, and characterized the social features of trust network in terms of efficiency and cost. Wang’s model could combat the selfish and malicious peer behaviors, and could efficiently increase successful exchange rate. PowerTrust[10] dynamically selected small number of power peers that are most credible using a distributed ranking mechanism to improve aggregation speed. GossipTrust[11] offered the very first attempt to extend the gossip protocol for trustworthiness aggregation in P2P networks without any structured overlay support.

However, these traditional models have few effects in suppressing malicious consumers and selfish peers. It is available to build trust management using bi-evaluation to suppress selfish peers, malicious providers and consumers simultaneously. The study of bi-evaluation first appeared in trust management model for e-Commerce. Participants at eBay’s auctions rate each other after each transaction, and use completely centralized mechanisms for storing and exploring trustworthiness data [12]. Mul et al. [13] described the relationship between trust and reciprocity, and encouraged two concerned agents to cooperate.

Typical issues in using bi-evaluation in trust management for P2P networks include the measure of finding providers with high-quality resources and responding to requests from consumers. Some of analogous models have been proposed, which assign each user different access rights on the basis of isolating untrustworthy resources. L. Wang et al. [7] presented a recommendation trust model and described some access policies based on trust, in which the peers with higher trust level can get higher access authority. But the model only evaluates consumers’ trustworthiness to assign them access rights. Tran et al. [8] proposed a trust based access control framework, in which the procedure in a typical interaction between a consumer and a provider is presented. But the access values they evaluate are used to select credible providers. William et al. [14] proposed a decentralized access control system that implements sociological trust constructs in a quantitative system to evaluate interaction partners. However, there are no effective trust metric and no experimental results to validate their approach. Above all, these models can not bi-evaluate the trustworthiness of both the participates completely.

The trustworthiness of a peer is divided into service and request trustworthiness in this paper. Participates in an exchange then evaluate each other with the help of the two metrics. Specially, our model which integrates trustworthiness, access authority and trust-based exchange selection scheme leads to several advantages in a P2P network. In our model, a peer who wants to obtain more resources has to firstly supply other peers with high-quality resources. Also, peers who provide corrupted resources could be isolated and their access requests would be refused. Thus, a peer has to actively share resources to get enough access authorities that make it obtain their desired resources.

3. The Bi-evaluation of Trustworthiness

P2P networks are formed by the topology among peers joining P2P file-sharing systems, where peers communicate with each other and exchange resources. With trust management theories, consumers obtain reliable resources and providers receive the evaluation of its credible behavior after an exchange. However, it is not enough to suppress malicious consumers and selfish peers. This problem can be solved by introducing ST and RT to implement bi-evaluation among peers. In this section, we formalize the two trust metrics and explain how to evaluate them.

3.1 Evaluating Service Trustworthiness

In order to obtain reliable resources, peer $i$ firstly sends some requests to the network and then finds a credible provider among the set of responding providers in the light of ST. Let peer $j$ denote the provider and $ST_{ij}$ denote the service trust value from peer $i$ to peer $j$. $ST_{ij}$ is defined in Eq. (1).

\[ ST_{ij} = \alpha DST_{ij} + \beta IST_{ij}, \alpha + \beta = 1 \] (1)

where $DST_{ij}$ is the direct service trust value from peer $i$ to peer $j$ and $IST_{ij}$ is the indirect service trust value. $\alpha$ and $\beta$ denote the normalized weight factors for $DST_{ij}$ and $IST_{ij}$, respectively. The calculation of $\alpha$ is in Eq. (2).

\[ \alpha = \frac{1}{N(j)} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{N(i) + M(i)} \right) \] (2)

Obviously, $\alpha$ is proportional to $N(i)$ and $M(i)$, and inversely proportional to $N(j)$. The three parameters will be explained in the subsection.
3.1.1 Direct Service Trustworthiness

DST (Direct Service Trustworthiness) is the direct credible opinions from one peer to another peer. The calculation of DST$_{ij}$ mainly depends on the satisfaction that peer $i$ obtains resources from peer $j$.

With respect to the satisfaction of resources, there are five kinds of situation that should be taken into account. [15]: $S_1$ (There are malicious resources such as Trojan Horses and viruses.), $S_2$ (False resources), $S_3$ (No response or rejecting exchange), $S_4$ (The quality of resources is general), $S_5$ (The quality of resources is good). The numerical description of this pattern is shown in Table 1.

| $S_1$ | $S_2$ | $S_3$ | $S_4$ | $S_5$ |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| $0 \leq S_1 < 0.2$ | $0.2 \leq S_2 < 0.4$ | $0.4 \leq S_3 < 0.6$ | $0.6 \leq S_4 < 0.8$ | $0.8 \leq S_5 < 1$ |

3.1.2 Indirect Service Trustworthiness

IST (Indirect Service Trustworthiness) is the indirect credible opinions from one peer to another peer through other peers’ recommendations. If peer $i$ is not sure about the DST of peer $j$, it would ask the other peers to make recommendations for peer $j$. These recommendations are used to formalize the evaluation of IST from peer $i$ to peer $j$ in succession. Let $\Psi$ denote the set of recommending peers, peer $w$ denote one of them. DST$_{ij}$ is defined in Eq. (3).

$$DST_{ij} = \sum_{k=1}^{N(ij)} S_k m_k f_k = M(ij) \sum_{k=1}^{N(ij)} f_k$$

where we define $M(ij) = \sum_{k=1}^{N(ij)} m_k$ and $f_k = e^{-N(ij)}$.

3.2 Evaluating Request Trustworthiness

As the credential of a consumer to obtain resources, its RT (Request Trustworthiness) is utilized by the provider to provide resources selectively. The evaluation of RT corresponds with the past behaviors when the consumer was a provider. For example, the RT of peer $i$ would be enhanced by its past active behaviors, and vice versa. In other words, the evaluation of $i$’s RT is affected by its past binary behaviors. Consequently, our model uses the Bayesian probability to represent the RT from peer $j$ to peer $i$. Bayesian systems take binary ratings as input, namely, positive and negative.

Given a recent time window, let $pos$ and $neg$ represent the amount of positive and negative ratings respectively. These binary ratings about peer $i$ come from peer $j$ itself or other peers’ recommendations. It is reasonable to expect that the greater the number of peers that peer $i$ has interacted with by active behaviors, the more the amount of $pos$ it would have. And then the beta PDF denoted by $beta(pos, neg)$ can be expressed with the gamma function:

$$beta(pos, neg) = \frac{\Gamma(pos + neg)}{\Gamma(pos)\Gamma(neg)}(1 - \theta)^{neg-1} \theta^{pos-1}$$

where $0 < \theta < 1$, $pos, neg > 1$.

By observing the amount of positive and negative ratings, the RT of peer $i$ maintained at peer $j$ is given by: $RT_{ji} = beta(pos + 1, neg + 1)$, which is related to the probability that peer $i$ cooperates with peer $j$ in next exchange. Otherwise, the probability expectation value of the beta distribution is given by: $E[beta(pos, neg)] = pos/(pos + neg)$ [18]. Thus, $RT_{ji}$ can be further described as follows:

$$RT_{ji} = \frac{pos + 1}{pos + neg + 2}$$
has two kinds of identity: malicious provider and malicious consumer. Without centralized control in P2P networks, it is difficult to suppress malicious providers and malicious consumers synchronously. Thus, a key objective of trust-based exchange selection scheme is to select a credible consumer and provider. The ST and RT produced by bidirectional evaluation give a secure platform for the exchanging peers. In the subsection, let peer \( i \) also represent a consumer, peer \( j \) represent a provider.

While an exchange is initialized, ST plays an important role in the process of \( i \)'s selecting a credible provider. With ST, peer \( i \) estimates on trust relationship about peer \( j \) to determine whether to perform an exchange. A decision rule for peer \( i \) to form a trust action on peer \( j \) is described as \( ST_{ij} > ST_{\text{threshold}(i)} \), where \( ST_{\text{threshold}(i)} \) is the ST threshold for peer \( i \) to trust another peer. By doing so, it reduces the risk of obtaining inauthentic or corrupted resources from malicious providers. On being selected as the provider, peer \( j \) will receive an access request from peer \( i \). Subsequently, peer \( j \) decides how to respond to the request.

To identify malicious peers and selfish peers, peer \( j \) must supply different peers with different authorities. Generally speaking, good peers have higher authority than the other two kinds of peers. This would inspire peers to perform active behaviors and increase their RT, such as providing high-quality resources. Peers who provide low-quality resources will get lower RT, and then will have very limited authorities while accessing other peers.

Let \( R = \{0, \text{common}, \text{priority}\} \) denote the set of peer \( j \)'s access authorities, \( RT_{\text{threshold}(1)(j)} \) and \( RT_{\text{threshold}(2)(j)} \) denote two types of RT threshold for peer \( j \) to provide resources selectively. By comparing the two types of threshold, peer \( j \) gives peer \( i \) the access authority \( r \):

- **Prior access authority:**
  For \( RT_{ji} > RT_{\text{threshold}(2)(j)} \rightarrow r = \text{priority} \), peer \( i \) is a good peer. Thus, peer \( j \) gives peer \( i \) the prior access authority and feedback tuple \((\text{priority}, RT_{ji})\). While several peers sent access requests, peer \( j \) would respond to these requests from high to low.

- **Common access authority:**
  For \( RT_{ji} \in [RT_{\text{threshold}(1)(j)}, RT_{\text{threshold}(2)(j)}] \rightarrow r = \text{common} \), peer \( i \) is a selfish peer. Thus, peer \( j \) gives peer \( i \) the common access authority and feedback tuple \((\text{common}, RT_{ji})\). The function of this authority is to reduce the chance that selfish peers get their desired resources. It makes peers believe that active participation in P2P networks means better chance to obtain the desired resources.

- **Zero access authority:**
  For \( RT_{ji} < RT_{\text{threshold}(1)(j)} \rightarrow r = 0 \), peer \( i \) is a malicious peer. As a result, peer \( j \) gives peer \( i \) the zero access authority and feedback tuple \((0, RT_{ji})\). The function of this authority is to suppress malicious consumers and abolish their right of obtaining resources.

### 4.2 Performing Algorithm

Our model is performed in the following two phases: 1) Initializing an exchange; 2) Updating the provider' trustworthiness at the end of an exchange. The first step is that the consumer selects the provider and sends an access request in the initialization of an exchange, which can be achieved by Algorithm 1. The provider responds to the request and feedbacks tuple \((r, RT_{ji})\) is the second step, which can be achieved by Algorithm 2.

**Algorithm 1. SendingRequest\((i, \Phi)\)**

**Input:** \(i, \Phi\) the set of providers

**Output:** Req

\[
\text{for } i \in \Phi \text{ do } \\
/* Peer i select peer j as the provider */ \\
\quad ST_{ij} \leftarrow \text{Eq. (1)}. \\
\quad \text{if } (ST_{ij} > ST_{\text{threshold}(i)}) \text{ then} \\
\quad\quad \text{Req} \leftarrow 1; \\
/* Peer i sends Req that is the access request */ \\
\text{else} \\
\quad\quad \text{Req} \leftarrow 0; \\
\quad Provider \leftarrow \Phi; \\
/* Peer i selects a new provider again */ \\
\text{end if}
\]

**end for**

**Algorithm 2. ProcessingRequest\((i, j)\)**

**Input:** \(i, j\)

**Output:** Ack

\[
\text{for } r = \text{priority, common, } 0 \text{ in } R \text{ do } \\
\quad \text{if } (RT_{ji} > RT_{\text{threshold}(2)(j)}) \text{ then} \\
\quad\quad \text{Ack} \leftarrow (r, RT_{ji}); \\
/* Peer j feedbacks Ack */ \\
\text{else if } (RT_{ji} \in [RT_{\text{threshold}(1)(j)}, RT_{\text{threshold}(2)(j)}) \\
\quad\quad \text{Ack} \leftarrow (0, RT_{ji}); \\
/* Peer j selects a new provider again */ \\
\text{end if}
\]

**end if**

Finally, the consumer must rate the provider’s behavior at the end of an exchange. During this period, the DST of the provider will be updated. Besides, pos and neg corresponding to the provider’s behavior will be recorded.

**Algorithm 3. RatingProvider\((i, j)\)**

**Input:** \(i, j\)

**Output:** \(DST_{ij}, \text{pos and neg}\)

\[
\text{for } r = \text{priority, common, } 0 \text{ in } R \text{ do } \\
\quad \text{if } (ST_{ij} < 0.6) \text{ do} \\
\text{/* Updating pos and neg */} \\
\text{\quad pos} \leftarrow 0; \\
\text{\quad neg} \leftarrow 1; \\
\text{else} \\
\text{\quad pos} \leftarrow 1;
\]

**end if**
Table 2 Description of simulation elements.

| Environment Setting | Description                                      | Default |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------|
|                     | Number of peers in the network                   | 100     |
|                     | Percentage of malicious peers                    | 10%     |
|                     | Percentage of selfish peers                      | 50%     |
|                     | Percentage of good peers                         | 20%     |

| Behavior Patterns   | Malicious peers provide inauthentic or corrupted resources and attack other peers by denial-of-service. Good peers execute active behavior and provide high-quality resources. |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Trustworthiness     | $ST_{threshold}(i)$                                                                                   | 0.4     |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Threshold           | $RT_{threshold}(i)$                                                                                   | 0.4     |
|                     | $RT_{threshold}(j)$                                                                                   | 0.6     |

5. Experimental Analysis

We performed three simulations to validate the BiTrust approach, and show its effectiveness and robustness. The first one validates effect of BiTrust in terms of its reducing malicious query responses. The second one validates effect of BiTrust in terms of its suppressing selfish peers. Last, by comparing BiTrust with EigenTrust, Wang’s model [9] and Random†, we analyze the successful exchanges rate of these models vary with the percentage of malicious peers.

5.1 Simulation Setup

We implemented these simulations through QueryCycle developed by Stanford University [19]. In this subsection, we describe the general simulation setup, including the environment setting, behavior patterns and trustworthiness threshold.

The simulation setting includes three types of peers: malicious peers, selfish peers and good peers, and their behavior patterns are given in Table 2. The experiments initiate as peers perform random exchanges with each other. After a few exchanges, a trusted network topology is gradually formed by trust management. The participating peers then use the trusted-based exchange selection scheme and algorithms to select the provider or consumer with high trustworthiness to perform an exchange, and update DST, pos and neg on related peers.

5.2 Simulation Results

In the first and second simulation, we validate the effectiveness of BiTrust in terms of comparing BiTrust with Baseline which is an unidirectional trust model with only considering ST. By doing so, we can test that BiTrust based on bi-evaluation is more effective than unidirectional trust model to suppress two types of peers. To ensure the authenticity of simulating the effectiveness of BiTrust, the two simulations are performed in the case of the percentage of malicious peers by 40%. Finally, we validate the robustness of BiTrust.

Simulation 1. Figure 1 shows the effectiveness of reducing malicious query responses. Malicious peers provide inauthentic or corrupted resources and attack other peers by denial-of-service, which generates a large amount of malicious query responses. So, the best measure to suppress malicious peers is to reduce the number of malicious query responses. As shown in Fig. 1, the curve of BiTrust is lower than that of Baseline. Baseline makes a consumer only abandon a malicious provider by its ST and pick up a new provider on the basis of Algorithm 1, whereas BiTrust can further utilize Algorithm 2 to make a provider feedback the zero access authority to a malicious consumer by its ST. As a result, malicious peers in BiTrust can neither obtain resources nor provide resources, which will make them lose the ability to survive in the network. Consequently, the function of BiTrust’s suppressing malicious peers is better than Baseline.

Simulation 2. Figure 2 shows the effectiveness of suppressing selfish peers. These peers become leeches and drain resources from the network [20]. With an incentive measure, selfish peers can be transformed into good peers. As shown in Fig. 2, the rate of selfish peers decreases gradually by 250 cycles, and the curve of BiTrust is lower than that of Baseline. The reason is that BiTrust makes a few selfish peers change their past behaviors to share resources on the basis of Algorithm 3, which enhance their ST and RT. Then, these peers are transformed into good peers. However, Baseline only inspires selfish peers to improve their ST by active behaviors. Without RT, selfish peers are insufficiently encouraged to share more resources in the unidirectional trust model. Thus, BiTrust is more effective than Baseline to suppress selfish peers.

Simulation 3. Figure 3 shows successful exchanges rate vs. the percentage of malicious peers. An exchange is

†Random is the case when there is no trust management in a P2P network.
Fig. 2 Suppressing selfish peers.

considered to be successful if both of the participants cooperate. A successful exchange rate is defined as the ratio of the number of successful exchanges over the total number of exchanges in a P2P network up to a certain time [9]. Specifically, the successful exchanges rate of a trust model reflects its robustness, namely, the ability of the model to prevent malicious attacks.

To ensure the accuracy of the simulation results, each trust model is implemented 60 cycles. Besides, we gather data for every cycle and calculate their mean. As shown in Fig. 3, the successful exchanges rate of Random descends quickly. This is because the network might not prevent malicious peers without a trust model. Compared with traditional trust model EigenTrust and Wang’s model, the curve slope of BiTrust is much slower as it can suppress malicious consumers and providers simultaneously. In conclusion, BiTrust can reduce the total number of unsuccessful exchanges through suppressing malicious peers, and enhance the total number of successful exchanges through suppressing selfish peers. So its successful exchanges rate is better than other models.

6. Conclusion

We have presented a bi-evaluation trust model to suppress malicious peers and selfish peers for P2P networks. The trustworthiness of a peer consists of ST and RT, which are used to evaluate the trust relationship between the participants of an exchange. Also, we have described the implementation strategies of BiTrust. While a consumer selects a credible provider by its ST, the selected provider establishes the consumer’s access authority. Simulation results show that our model can suppress malicious peers and selfish peers effectively, and has much better successful exchanges rate than other models. Furthermore, the detailed threat analysis in P2P networks and the detailed bi-evaluation of trust relationship among peers under large scale network environment remain for further studies.

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