Federated learning with incremental clustering for heterogeneous data

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**Abstract**—Federated learning enables different parties to collaboratively build a global model under the orchestration of a server while keeping the training data on clients’ devices. However, performance is affected when clients have heterogeneous data. To cope with this problem, we assume that despite data heterogeneity, there are groups of clients who have similar data distributions that can be clustered. In previous approaches, in order to cluster clients the server requires clients to send their parameters simultaneously. However, this can be problematic in a context where there is a significant number of participants that may have limited availability. To prevent such a bottleneck, we propose FLIC (Federated Learning with Incremental Clustering), in which the server exploits the updates sent by clients during federated training instead of asking them to send their parameters simultaneously. Hence no additional communications between the server and the clients are necessary other than what classical federated learning requires. We empirically demonstrate for various non-IID cases that our approach successfully splits clients into groups following the same data distributions. We also identify the limitations of FLIC by studying its capability to partition clients at the early stages of the federated learning process efficiently. We further address attacks on models as a form of data heterogeneity and empirically show that FLIC is a robust defense against poisoning attacks even when the proportion of malicious clients is higher than 50%.

**Index Terms**—Federated learning, clustering, non-IID data, poisoning attacks

I. INTRODUCTION

Federated Learning (FL) is a new distributed machine learning paradigm that enables multiple clients to build a common model under the orchestration of a central server. This paradigm functions while keeping the training data on clients’ devices. McMahan et al. [1] introduced FL in order to preserve privacy and reduce the overhead communication costs due to data collection. Contrary to traditional server-side approaches which aggregate data on a central server for training, FL distributes learning tasks among clients and aggregates only locally-computed updates to build a single global model. Therefore, the global objective function $f$ to be minimized is formulated as a weighted sum of the local objective functions $f_k$:

$$\min_w f(w) = \min_w \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{n_k}{\sum_{q=1}^{K} n_q} f_k(w)$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (1)

where each of the $K$ clients has $n_k$ samples and $\sum_{q=1}^{K} n_q$ is the total number of data points belonging to all clients. The local objective function $f_k$ measures the empirical risk over client-$k$’s local dataset. Its $n_k$ samples are drawn from a distribution $P_k$:

$$f_k(w) = \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim P_k}[l(w; x, y)]$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (2)

where the local loss function $l(w; x, y)$ measures the error of the model $w$ in predicting a true label $y$ given an input $x$.

FL was formalized by the algorithm FedAvg [1]. In FedAvg, the server randomly initializes a global model $w_0$, typically a deep neural network. At round $t$, the server selects a subset $C_t$ of $C \cdot K \leq K$ clients that take part in training and sends them the current global model $w_{t-1}$. Each participant $k$ runs several epochs of minibatch stochastic gradient descent to minimize its local loss function. Afterwards, each client sends back to the server its update $\delta^k_T$ that is the difference between $w_{t-1}$ and the optimized local parameters $w^k_T$. Finally, the server averages the received updates to obtain the global model $w_t = w_{t-1} - \frac{1}{\sum_{k \in C_t} \lambda_k} \sum_{k \in C_t} \lambda_k \delta^k_T$ where $\lambda_k = \frac{1}{\sum_{q=1}^{K} n_q}$ is the weight associated to the client $k$, thereby concluding a round of collaborative learning. The aggregation rule thus gives more weight in the weighted sum to clients having a higher number of examples. The FL process consists of multiple successive rounds.

Throughout the learning processes, the independent and identically distributed (IID) sampling of training data is a key point for training accurate models. It ensures that the stochastic gradient is an unbiased estimate of the full gradient. However, in FL scenarios where clients generate personal data from different locations and environments, it is unrealistic to assume that clients’ local data is IID, i.e., each client’s local data is...
uniformly sampled from the entire training dataset composed of the union of all local datasets. In non-IID scenarios, the global performance of FedAvg is severely degraded [2] because the heterogeneity of data distribution across clients results in weight divergence during the collaborative training. At a round \( t \), the difference between the data distribution of two clients \( i \) and \( j \) causes locally trained weights \( w_i^t \) and \( w_j^t \) to diverge and the convergence rate, precision and fairness of the federated model to degrade by comparison with homogeneous data. Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon, simulating here a simple case of 1-D linear regression in a FL context with two clients. In this toy problem, each client performs 10 local epochs with 50 samples, and the server executes 10 global rounds. In the IID case, the clients collaborate to infer the same parameter equal to 45. In the non-IID case, the parameters to be inferred of the first and second client are 20 and 70 respectively. For the IID case, both clients’ weights follow the same direction and converge to the same optimum, whereas for the non-IID case, clients’ weights point to different directions and make the global model converge to a parameter different from their own optimums, which is the center of both parameters.

When non-IID is mentioned in the FL setting, it typically means that for two clients \( i \) and \( j \), \( P_i \neq P_j \). Based on [3], [4] and knowing that for client \( i \), \( P_i(x,y) = P_i(y|x)P_i(x) = P_i(x|y)P_i(y) \), different cases of non-IID data can be distinguished. Concept shift cases occur when conditional distributions vary across clients:

- **Concept shift on features:** marginal label distributions are shared \( P_i(y) = P_j(y) \) but conditional distributions vary across clients \( P_i(x|y) \neq P_j(x|y) \). This can arise in handwriting because some people might write “7” with bars or without and so, features might be different for a same label (number). We can also refer to this case as “different features, same labels”.

- **Concept shift on labels:** marginal features distributions are shared \( P_i(x) = P_j(x) \) but label distributions conditioned on features vary across clients \( P_i(y|x) \neq P_j(y|x) \). This can occur in sentiment analysis : for the same features, people can have different preferences (labels). This case can be referred as “same features, different labels”. It is also illustrated by the non-IID case in Figure 1 because for the same inputs i.e. features, linear models will have different results i.e labels because their parameters are different (in this example the parameters are 20 and 70).

This paper focuses on concept shift cases that can be addressed by clustering, deliberately omitting cases where marginal distributions vary across clients, because, on the one hand, machine learning is inherently robust to feature distribution skew \( P_i(x) \neq P_j(x) \) when \( P(y|x) \) is shared. Typically, one of the advantages of a convolutional neural network is to be robust to variant features through convolutions and pooling. On the other hand, clustering data with label distribution skew \( P_i(y) \neq P_j(y) \) when \( P(x|y) \) is shared would group clients who only have a certain number of labels. Methods inspired by the incremental learning literature (FedProx [5], SCAFFOLD [6] and SCAFFNEW [7]) are more suitable to address this latter case.

Another setting that can degrade the performance of a federated model is when it is attacked by malicious clients that try to poison the model during training-time [8]. Under the strong assumption that a malicious client \( k \) has full knowledge of the aggregation rule used by the server and of the updates of others, it can make the aggregation result equal to an arbitrary value \( U \) at any round \( t \) by submitting the following update:

\[
\delta_k = \frac{1}{\lambda_k} U - \sum_{i \in C_t, i \neq k} \frac{\lambda_i}{\lambda_k} \delta_t
\]  

FedAvg, and more specifically the mean aggregation rule, are inherently vulnerable to these attacks, as shown by (3). However, in practice clients do not have a full knowledge of the system. That is why the standard model poisoning attacks often consist in sending an update containing random weights, null weights, or, more efficiently, the opposite of the true weights. The impact of the attack can also be strengthened when several clients collude with each other. Such attacks can be considered as a form of data heterogeneity because the poisoned updates are different of other updates as they try to hinder the global model convergence.

II. RELATED WORK

Improving FL models while dealing with non-IID data is an active field of research. Most of the approaches in literature try to personalize the global FL model to improve performances of individual clients. In works based on transfer learning [9], [10] and meta-learning [11], the global model is trained using FedAvg and afterwards each client fine-tunes the shared model using its local data. In multi-task learning, the clients’ models are trained simultaneously by exploiting commonalities and differences across the learning tasks. MOCHA [12] uses the correlation matrix among tasks as a regularization term while FedEM [13] considers that the data distribution of each client...
is a mixture of unknown but shared underlying distributions and uses the Expectation-Maximization algorithm for training.

FedAvg learns to collaboratively learn a unique model while personalized approaches provide one model per client. We consider that clustering-based methods can be a relevant compromise between collaboration and personalization. Several works [14]–[16] have already considered that it is possible to find a cluster structure in order to gather clients with similar data distributions and perform classical FedAvg training per cluster. Thus, there are as many models as clusters. In [14], the number of clusters is estimated a priori and each client is assigned to one of them before performing local training. Once the cluster of each client is identified, the server averages the parameters of each clusters separately. Determining each client’s cluster requires high communication costs and may be unsuitable for large deep learning models.

Our work resembles more the one of [15], [16] who cluster clients based on their model parameters after FedAvg training. However, these approaches perform a communication round $T$ involving all clients to build the clusters. In a cross-device setting where the number of clients is considerable [17], this step is impractical in terms of clients’ availability and communication costs. To prevent such a bottleneck and to adapt to real-world applications, our method takes advantage of the updates received during FedAvg rounds and builds an adjacency matrix incrementally as clients are sampled for training.

Concerning model attacks, existing methods try to prevent the influence of the malicious clients by replacing the averaging step on the server-side with robust estimates of the mean, such as coordinate-wise median [18] or Krum, an aggregation rule based on a score using couples of closest vectors [19]. However, these approaches remain robust to model poisoning attacks while the proportion of adversaries that participate in each round of learning is strictly below 50% [20]. In Section IV, we will compare our cluster-based approach to the median aggregation rule method [18], an efficient defense which we will refer to as median defense.

### III. Incremental Clustering

Similarly to prior works, we tackle the issue of heterogeneous data by extending FedAvg and adding a clustering step to separate clients into groups. We next train them independently to reach homogeneous data performance. However, contrary to [15], [16], we avoid performing the burdensome round mentioned in Section II by taking advantage of the local updates we already have access to at each round. Specifically, at round $t$ of FedAvg, when $|C_t|$ clients finish local training, each client $k$ sends to the server its updates $\delta_k = w_{t-1} - w_{t}$. This is a good indication of how clients’ weights differ from the global model. As seen in Algorithm 1 (l.7) and Figure 2, these values are stored by the server in a matrix $M$ in order to fill in an adjacency matrix $S_{t}$ afterwards. This matrix contains the similarities between clients: $S_{t} = (s(\delta_i, \delta_j))_{1 \leq i, j \leq K}$ where $s(\delta_i, \delta_j)$ is the similarity measure between the updates of client $i$ and $j$. During next round $t+1$, the server stores the new updates of clients belonging to $C_{t+1}$. In order to compute the most similarities between clients, the server calculates $s$ between recent and previous updates kept in memory. To this end, it keeps the most recent update if a client has already been sampled and does not forget previously stored updates. If a client has never been sampled, the values of its corresponding row and column in $S_t$ will be equal to zero. Furthermore, if a similarity between two clients has already been computed, we keep the most recent one (see Figure 3).

Once FedAvg stabilizes, the second part of Algorithm 1 (l.14) begins: we cluster clients by creating a graph from $S_t$ and applying the Louvain method algorithm [21]. Once we have detected different communities, that we call clusters, we resume separately FedAvg per clusters. Within a cluster, we expect that clients should have the same data distribution and the performances should reach the one of identically distributed data.

It should be noted that our incremental method adds two biases in comparison with approaches requiring all clients to take part in the same round:

- The coefficients of $S_t$ are not all calculated at the same round because the matrix fills in during rounds. Thus,
round

difference between these points for a certain

are associated with distances defined as the

(Euclidean, Manhattan, Minkowski,...) between two points

we consider for simplicity that clients perform a single local

and SGD with a learning rate

Let us consider for simplicity that clients perform a single local

and that we perform no additional communications between

model corresponding to the clients’ clusters.

Note that

does not influence in the computing of FedAvg

but we use the updates received at each

round to perform clustering because we consider that they

contain relevant information about the clients’ direction in the

optimization process.

Given that we consider a cross-device context with a high

number of clients, it is possible that during federated training

not all clients will be sampled. If it is the case, no value will

be present in its corresponding row and column in

$S_t$, thus it will not be clustered. Following [14], to assign them to a

cluster, we perform no additional communications between

the server and the clients than what classical FL requires. The

central server performs the supplementary calculations due to

the adjacency matrix. We consider that in a decentralized

setting where the server computational capacity is significantly

higher than the clients’, this extra work is not critical.

As we will see in Section IV, our method can tackle the

statistical challenge inherent to FL and find the correct

clustering structure for different cases of non-IID data. It also

avoids the step in which all clients send their updates to the
servers, which is very demanding in terms of communications costs.

Furthermore, by addressing the security challenge, our objective is to separate the updates from malicious and loyal clients and then, to build a global model from a cluster containing only loyal clients. We show in Section IV that our approach is a robust defense even if there are a majority of adversaries.

IV. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSION

A. Dataset and model

We propose to use the community detection algorithm Louvain method [21] for clustering. Contrary to [14]–[16], we want to avoid having a cluster dependent parameter because we assume that we do not know a priori the cluster structure or the number of clusters we can expect. Louvain is a greedy algorithm that does not require such parameter. The basic Louvain algorithm considers graphs with positive weights. To this end, we define the following similarity, positive, upper bounded by 2 and that uses the cosine distance as in [15], which gives a good sense of the direction gradients take during training:

\[ s(\delta^i, \delta^j) = 1 + \cos(\delta^i, \delta^j) \]  

(7)

Our approach is however agnostic to the clustering method and could be applied with other clustering algorithms.

We realize two types of experiments. The first ones simulate non-IID cases by artificially forming groups of clients with similar properties. These cases are verifiable in the sense that after we apply our method, we can verify if clients following same data distributions are effectively grouped together. We will refer to this as the correct clustering. Experiments are done with the MNIST dataset [22] dedicated to identify handwritten digits from pixel data. The dataset is partitioned into 100 clients, each having 600 training samples and 100 test samples. We simulate a user experience context with heterogeneous data by forming groups of clients following different data distributions. The non-IID case “same label, different features” is simulated by partitioning the data into four groups. Within each group the images are rotated of 90 degrees. We will refer to this experiment as image rotation. Similarly, for the non-IID case “same features, different labels”, we partition the clients into 5 groups and within each group two digit labels are swapped. This will be referred to as label swap. For instance, a client of the first group will have 0 and 1 images labeled with 1 and 0 respectively. A client of the second group will have the correct labels for 0 and 1 images but will have labels 3 and 2 for 2 and 3 images.

The second type of experiments concern the application of our method as a defense to poisoned models. We continue to use the MNIST dataset [22] split into 100 clients, from which a certain number of them will be attackers. An attacker is a malicious client that sends \(-\delta^i\), i.e. the opposite of its true update, in order to cause the global model to diverge. This attack will be referred to as minus grad attack. The more clients are attackers, the more the global model will be perturbed. We set the strength of the attack by varying the number of adversaries and we realize experiments for 30, 40, 50 and 60 malicious clients out of the 100 total clients. We implement an existing defense that replaces the typical mean aggregation by a median aggregation [18] in order to compare its results to the ones of FLIC as a defense. As in the previous experiments, we can also speak of a correct clustering if all malicious clients are separated from loyal clients. It should be noted that our method is agnostic to the aggregation rule. In our experiments we use the weighted mean, but a median aggregation could be used in order to combine both defenses.

Following [1], we build a convolutional neural network of two convolutional layers followed by a fully connected layer with a ReLu activation and a final softmax output layer. This architecture is used by both the server and the clients. We perform SGD with a learning rate of \(\alpha = 0.01\). Unless specified otherwise, the number of local epochs \(E\) and the size of mini-batches \(B\) are 5 and 10 respectively.

### Algorithm 1 FL through incremental clustering

\[ T \] rounds of FedAvg are performed before clustering and \( T_f \) rounds after. \( S_t \) is the adjacency matrix at round \( t \) and matrix \( M \) stores clients updates.

1: procedure FLINCREMENTALCLUSTERING(K)
2: initialize \( w_0 \)
3: for \( t \) in \( 1, ..., T \) do
4: \( C_t \leftarrow \) random subset of all clients \( K \)
5: for each client \( k \) in \( C_t \) do
6: \( \delta^k, n_k = CLIENTUPDATE(w_{t-1}, k, E, B, \alpha) \)
7: \( M_k = \delta^k \) \triangleright Server stores update
8: end for
9: \( w_t = w_{t-1} - \sum_{k \in C_t} \frac{n_k}{n} \delta^k_t \)
10: for \( i, j \) in \( K \) do
11: \( S_{i,j} = s(M_i, M_j) \) \triangleright Update \( S_t \) matrix
12: end for
13: end for
14: \( P \leftarrow LOUVAINMETHOD(S_T) \)
15: for cluster \( c \) in \( P \) do
16: initialize server \( c \) with weights \( w_{c,T} = w_T \)
17: for \( t \) in \( T + 1, ..., T + T_f \) do
18: \( C_{c,t} \leftarrow \) random subset of clients in cluster \( c \)
19: for each client \( k \) in \( C_{c,t} \) do
20: \( \delta^k_{c,t}, n_k = CLIENTUPDATE(w_{c,t-1}, k, E, B, \alpha) \)
21: end for
22: \( w_{c,t} = w_{c,t-1} - \sum_k \frac{n_k}{n} \delta^k_t \)
23: end for
24: end for
25: end procedure
26: procedure CLIENTUPDATE(w, k, E, B, \alpha)
27: initialize \( w_k = w \)
28: for \( e \) in \( e = 1, ..., E \) do
29: Divide \( n_k \) samples into batches of size \( B \) : set \( B \)
30: for \( b \) in \( \mathcal{B} \) do
31: \( w_k = w_k - \alpha \nabla l(w_k, b) \)
32: end for
33: end for
34: \( \delta_k = w - w_k \)
35: return \( (\delta_k, n_k) \) \triangleright Send update and number of samples
36: end procedure
For both non-IID cases, all clients were correctly clustered as in [16] but without the necessity of sampling all clients at round 200. Figure 4 shows that after clustering, the mean accuracy of the models increases of 24% and 5% for the label swap case and the image rotation case respectively. We reach the same performances as in the IID case, which proves our method is well adapted to tackle the problem of heterogeneous data. Finally, Table I indicates that the variability between clients’ results has decreased because the standard deviation after clustering decreases. This contributes to improve the fairness of the federated models.

For our second set of experiments (Figure 5), we evaluate the capability of our method to well cluster heterogeneous data at early rounds i.e. before convergence. To this end, we cluster clients at every round - without training per cluster as in Algorithm 1 (1.15-24). We focus only on the label swap case and change parameters $E$ and $B$ to 3 and 50 in order to slow down the convergence rate and to better analyze the behavior of Algorithm 1.

In Figure 5, we plot in green the cluster purity. We define this quantity as the percentage of clients grouped with others who follow the same data distributions. If it is equal to 1, it means that FLIC formed groups of clients who all follow the same data distribution.

We notice in Figure 5 that at the beginning of the training, the cluster purity is equal to 1 and the number of clusters represented by the violet curve starts at 10. At the beginning of the training, the graph is small because not many clients have yet been sampled. For instance at round 1, since $C = 0.1$, the graph contains only 10 nodes with similar edges. The Louvain method can not seem to find clear communities among nodes and forms 10 communities each containing a single client, which explains the obtained purity.

As new clients are sampled and trained, more communities are found, but they sometimes contain clients of different data distributions, which makes the cluster purity decreases from its optimal value 1. Before round 34, the lowest round for which a client $k$ was sampled is in average equal to 1 i.e., $\delta^k_t$ is used for the update of the adjacency matrix. Some clients have thus performed few epochs of local training and their updates are not clearly distinguishable. After round 34, clusters purity reaches 1, so performing training per cluster can enhance performances as clients per group follow same data distributions. Yet, these partitions are not optimal as not all clients with same distributions are grouped together. As shown in Figure 5 by the violet curve, starting from round 49, five pure groups are found, making the clustering correct.

We used GPUs with specifications INTEL Skylake AVX512 support, 192Go RAM and at least 48 threads. The wall-clock time of computation for parameters $E = 5$, $B = 10$, $C = 0.1$ and 200 rounds was in average of one hour.

### B. Results on the statistical challenge

In this section, we lead two sets of experiments realized 20 times each to reduce randomness. During our first set of experiments, we assess the performance of our method when clients have heterogeneous data. Firstly, 10% of the clients are randomly sampled at each round. Then, at round 200 when FedAvg reaches convergence, we cluster clients thanks to the adjacency matrix built during the 200 rounds. After clustering, each group performs 5 rounds of FedAvg.

For both non-IID cases, all clients were correctly clustered as in [16] but without the necessity of sampling all clients at round 200. Figure 4 shows that after clustering, the mean accuracy of the models increases of 24% and 5% for the label swap case and the image rotation case respectively. We reach the same performances as in the IID case, which proves our method is well adapted to tackle the problem of heterogeneous data. Finally, Table I indicates that the variability between

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|                | Pre-clustering | Post-clustering |
|----------------|---------------|-----------------|
| IID data       | $0.99 \pm 0.01$ | $0.99(\times1.32) \pm 0.011$ |
| Label swap     | $0.75 \pm 0.075$ | $0.99(\times1.32) \pm 0.011$ |
| Image rotation | $0.93 \pm 0.061$ | $0.98(\times1.05) \pm 0.013$ |

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### TABLE I

ACCURACY EVOLUTION BEFORE AND AFTER CLUSTERING. WE DISPLAY THE MEAN OF CLIENTS’ ACCURACIES ± THE STANDARD DEVIATION AND IN PARENTHESIS THE RELATIVE INCREASE FROM BEFORE CLUSTERING.
the first simulations with attack and the median defense. For the experiments on FLIC, loyal clients reaching adequate performances, and the other should split into two curves at round its own corrupted model. If FLIC is a robust defense, its plot client will thus have poor performances if it is evaluated on 6 and Table II are evaluated on client’s test data. A malicious the coordinate-wise median aggregation rule defense [18]. 

IV.A, which is referred to as \( B \) = 50

E

B

E

we decided to perform more rounds after clustering than in the previous experiments in order to see if the new model, cleaned we implement the attack mentioned in Subsection minus grad attack

T

rounds before clustering and

T

rounds. As

100

clients, more than

(\( T \) = 50)

because we noticed that

attackers

40%

10

30

50

for instance at round

T

= 200, loyal clients reach good performances again.

Contrary, as FLIC correctly separates clients at round

40

attackers in Figure 6 is thus due to the changing number

malicious clients, can reach performances of models who have not been attacked.

As we can see in Figure 6 and Table II, when the number of malicious clients is not high, for instance 30, the median defense is robust and slightly outperforms FLIC. However, when the number of attackers is equal to 40, the median defense learns with difficulty the task at the beginning of the training, and then fails after approximately 100 rounds. As mentioned, the median defense is robust only if the majority of clients are loyal [20]. At a particular round, since there are 40\% of attackers, it is possible that out of the 10 sampled clients, more than 5 will be attackers, which makes the median defense fail. The variability of the median defense for 40 attackers in Figure 6 is thus due to the changing number of attackers at each round and for every simulation. On the contrary, as FLIC correctly separates clients at round \( T = 200 \), loyal clients reach good performances again.

When the proportion of attackers is of 50\% or higher, the effects of the minus grad attack become predominant and the median defense collapses. FLIC manages though to correctly separate clients. For 50 attackers, the new model after clustering reaches good performances in less than 100 rounds.

For the experiment with 60 attackers, we performed less rounds before clustering (\( T = 50 \)) because we noticed that if done later (for instance at round \( T = 200 \) as the other experiments), when FLIC successfully separated malicious clients of the rest, loyal clients restarted training with a model that was too degraded by the attack and could not learn the objective task in the remaining rounds. If clustering is performed at round \( T = 50 \), the new model of loyal clients has a lower convergence rate but the starting point of loyal clients’ training is not as distant from their objective as before \( (T = 200) \) and they can still rebuild an efficient model.

At this point, the mean lowest round at which a client was sampled is equal to 6. Most clients have thus updates that are representative of their local objective functions. We can thus leverage the information received by the clients’ updates during federated training even if they are computed at an early stage of their local optimization. In practice, the updates sent by clients at early rounds could be ignored for the clustering.

C. Results on the security challenge

We also realize 20 experiments and randomly sample 10\% of the clients at each round, with local parameters \( E = 1 \) and \( B = 50 \). We implement the attack mentioned in Subsection IV.A, which is referred to as minus grad attack. We evaluate our method FLIC as a defense and compare our results with the coordinate-wise median aggregation rule defense [18].

During FLIC training, we expect that after clustering, malicious clients are separated from loyal. The results in Figure 6 and Table II are evaluated on client’s test data. A malicious client will thus have poor performances if it is evaluated on its own corrupted model. If FLIC is a robust defense, its plot should split into two curves at round \( T \), one representing loyal clients reaching adequate performances, and the other representing malicious clients dropping to a poor accuracy.

All simulations perform 300 total rounds for the minus grad attack and the median defense. For the experiments on FLIC, the first simulations with 30, 40 and 50 attackers, run \( T = 200 \) rounds before clustering and \( T_F = 100 \) rounds after clustering. We decided to perform more rounds after clustering than in the previous experiments in order to see if the new model, cleaned of malicious clients, can reach performances of models who have not been attacked.

As we can see in Figure 6 and Table II, when the number of malicious clients is not high, for instance 30, the median defense is robust and slightly outperforms FLIC. However, when the number of attackers is equal to 40, the median defense learns with difficulty the task at the beginning of the training, and then fails after approximately 100 rounds. As mentioned, the median defense is robust only if the majority of clients are loyal [20]. At a particular round, since there are 40\% of attackers, it is possible that out of the 10 sampled clients, more than 5 will be attackers, which makes the median defense fail. The variability of the median defense for 40 attackers in Figure 6 is thus due to the changing number of attackers at each round and for every simulation. On the contrary, as FLIC correctly separates clients at round \( T = 200 \), loyal clients reach good performances again.

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![Fig. 6. Minus grad attack by 30, 40, 50 and 60 attackers out of 100 loyal clients, defended by the median defense and FLIC. The displayed results are obtained by evaluating the servers’ models on test images of the clients managed by them. For the FLIC defense, clusters containing malicious clients are evaluated on clean images, which explains the drop in accuracy for them. We display the mean result of all experiments with 0.95 confidence interval.](image)

|                | 30 attackers | 40 attackers | 50 attackers | 60 attackers |
|----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| FedAvg without attack | 0.99 ± 0.01  |              |              |              |
| FedAvg with attack     | 0.94 ± 0.003 | 0.91 ± 0.005 | 0.14 ± 0.14  | 0.00 ± 0.00  |
| Median defense         | 0.98 ± 0.002 | 0.67 ± 0.423 | 0.10 ± 0.04  | 0.10 ± 0.00  |
| FLIC - loyal clusters  | 0.95 ± 0.012 | 0.94 ± 0.004 | 0.91 ± 0.006 | 0.97 ± 0.004 |
| Mean number of loyal clusters | 3.5  | 1.09  | 1  | 1.1  |
| Mean number of clients in loyal clusters | 20 | 55 | 50 | 40 |
Clusters purity defined in Subsection IV.B now reflects the capability of FLIC to correctly split malicious and loyal clients. If a malicious client is grouped with loyal clients, it decreases the methods purity. For all of our experiments, FLIC clusters correctly clients (purity equal to 1).

In Table II we display the mean number of loyal clusters and the mean number of clients in loyal clusters. Ideally, all loyal clients should be grouped in one single cluster, in order to enhance the collaborative characteristic of FL. With 30 attackers, loyal clients are generally not grouped all together but rather in small clusters of 20 clients. Under this attack, the model can still learn the training task, and thus clients can more easily learn their own local objective before sending their updates to the server. Their updates are thus different from the attackers ones, but not sufficiently similar between themselves in order to be grouped in a single cluster. For the rest of the experiments, loyal clients are generally grouped together because the attacked model is distant from not only the global objective but from all local objectives. Clients have thus more difficulties to reach their local objective, and resemble more between themselves because they begin the new training at the same starting point.

V. Conclusion and Future Work

In this work, we apply clustering techniques to FL under heterogeneous data. During FedAvg, we exploit the available information sent by the sampled clients at each round to compute similarities between clients incrementally, which enables us to cluster clients without having to compute all their parameters at the same round. Our method is especially advantageous in a cross-device context where the number of clients is large, and the communication costs between them and the server are very high. We empirically show on a variety of non-IID settings that the obtained groups reach IID data performances. We also obtain partitions that effectively group clients following similar data distributions if most clients have performed enough rounds of local optimization. Moreover, we also address attacks on models as a form of data heterogeneity and apply our method as a defense technique consisting in separating malicious clients from the rest of the clients. We show that our method is a robust defense even when the malicious clients are in the majority, whereas existing methods fail to protect models in this case. Ongoing work consists in providing convergence proofs of our method. Other relevant future work is to check the adaptability of our method in differential privacy contexts where noise is added to parameters to reinforce clients’ confidentiality [23].

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