A key scientific challenge during the outbreak of novel infectious diseases is to predict how the course of the epidemic changes under countermeasures that limit interaction in the population. Most epidemiological models do not consider the role of mutations and heterogeneity in the type of contact events. However, pathogens have the capacity to mutate in response to changing environments, especially caused by the increase in population immunity to existing strains, and the emergence of new pathogen strains poses a continued threat to public health. Further, in the light of differing transmission risks in different congregate settings (e.g., schools and offices), different mitigation strategies may need to be adopted to control the spread of infection. We analyze a multilayer multistrain model by simultaneously accounting for i) pathways for mutations in the pathogen leading to the emergence of new pathogen strains, and ii) differing transmission risks in different settings, modeled as network layers. Assuming complete cross-immunity among strains, namely, recovery from any infection prevents infection with any other (an assumption that will need to be relaxed to deal with COVID-19 or influenza), we derive the key epidemiological parameters for the multilayer multistrain framework. We demonstrate that reductions to existing models that discount heterogeneity in either the strain or the network layers may lead to incorrect predictions. Our results highlight that the impact of imposing/lifting mitigation measures concerning different contact network layers (e.g., school closures or work-from-home policies) should be evaluated in connection with their effect on the likelihood of the emergence of new strains.

The recent outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, fueled by the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 led to a devastating loss of human life and upended livelihoods worldwide (1). The highly transmissible, virulent, and rapidly mutating nature of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus (2) led to an unprecedented burden on critical healthcare infrastructure. The emergence of new strains of the pathogen as a result of mutations poses a continued risk to public health (3, 4). Moreover, when a new strain is introduced to a host population, pharmaceutical interventions often take time to be developed, tested, and made widely accessible (5, 6). In the absence of widespread access to treatment and vaccines, policymakers are faced with the challenging problem of taming the outbreak with nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) that encourage physical distancing in the host population to suppress the growth rate of new infections (7–9). However, the ensuing socioeconomic burden (10, 11) of NPIs, such as lockdowns, makes it necessary to understand how imposing restrictions in different social settings (e.g., schools, offices, etc.) alter the course of the epidemic outbreak.

Epidemiological models that analyze the speed and scale of the spread of infection can be broadly classified under two approaches. The first approach assumes homogeneous mixing, i.e., the population is well mixed, and an infected individual is equally likely to infect any individual in the population regardless of location and social interactions (12, 13). The second is a network-based approach that explicitly models the contact patterns among individuals in the population and the probability of transmission through any given contact (14–16). Structural properties of the contact network such as heterogeneity in type of contacts (17), clustering (e.g., presence of tightly connected communities) (18), centrality (e.g., presence of superspreaders) (19, 20), and degree-degree correlations (21) are known to have profound implications for disease spread and its control (22, 23). To understand the impact of NPIs that lead to reduction in physical contacts, network-based epidemiological models have been employed widely in the context of infectious diseases, including COVID-19 (24–26).

In addition to the contact structure within the host population, the course of an infectious disease is critically tied to evolutionary adaptations or mutations in the pathogen. There is growing evidence for the zoonotic origin of disease outbreaks, including COVID-19, SARS, and H1N1 influenza, as a result of cross-species transmission...
and subsequent evolutionary adaptations (27–31). When pathogens enter new species, they are often poorly adapted to the 
physiological environment in the new hosts and undergo mutations to adapt to the new hosts (27). The resulting variants 
or strains of the pathogen have varying risks of transmission, commonly measured through the reproduction number or \( R_0 \), which quantifies the mean number of secondary infections triggered by an infected individual (32, 33). Moreover, even when a sizeable fraction of the population gains immunity through vaccination or natural infection, the emergence of new variants that can evade the acquired immunity poses a continued threat to public health (3, 4). A growing body of work (27, 34–44) has highlighted the need for developing multistrain epidemiological models that account for evolutionary adaptations in the pathogen. For instance, there is a vast literature on phylodynamics (38–41) which examines how epidemiological and evolutionary processes interact to impact pathogen phylogenies. The past decade has also seen the development of network-based models to identify risk factors for the emergence of pathogens in the light of different contact patterns (27, 34, 42, 43). Further, a recent study (34) demonstrated that models that do not consider evolutionary adaptations may lead to incorrect predictions about spreading processes with mutations.

Most existing network-based approaches that analyze the spread of contagions with mutations center on single-layered contact networks, where transmissibility, i.e., the probability that an infective individual passes on the infection to a contact, depends on the type of strain but not on the nature of link/contact over which the infection is transmitted (27, 34, 43). However, different congregate settings such as schools, hospitals, offices, and private social gatherings pose varied transmission risks (45). Recently, multilayer networks have been used to model human contact networks (24–26, 33, 46), where each layer represents a different social setting in which an individual participates. While multilayer contact networks (20, 47–57) and multistrain contagions (27, 34–37, 43) have been extensively studied in separate contexts, there has been a dearth of analysis on simultaneously accounting for the multistrain network structure and multistrain spreading.

In this paper, we build upon the mathematical theory for the multistrain model proposed in refs. 27 and 34 to account for the multilayer structure typical to human contact networks, where different network layers correspond to different social settings in which individuals congregate. Specifically, we assume that the transmissibility depends not only on the type of strain carried by an infective individual but also on the social setting (modeled through a network layer) in which they meet their contacts. The proposed framework allows us to study how closing/opening different network layers impacts the spreading characteristics of a contagion.

While the bulk of our discussion is on spreading processes with mutations in the context of infectious diseases, our results also hold promise for applications in modeling social contagions, e.g., news items circulating in social networks (34, 58). Similar to different strains of a pathogen arising through mutations, different versions of the information are created as the content is altered on social media platforms (59). The resulting variants of the information may have varying propensities to be circulated in the social network. Moreover, with the burst of social media platforms, potential applications of our multilayer analysis of evolving contagions include analyzing multiplatform spread of misinformation where the information gets altered across different platforms.

**Materials and Methods**

**Contact Network.** We consider a population of size \( n \) with members in the set \( \mathcal{X} = \{1, \ldots, n\} \). Patterns of interaction in the host population are encoded in the contact network where an edge is drawn between two nodes if they can come in contact and potentially transmit the infection. To account for variability in transmission risks associated with different social settings (e.g., neighborhood, school, workplace), we consider a multilayer contact network (47), where each network layer corresponds to a unique social setting. For simplicity, we focus on the case where each individual can participate independently in two network layers denoted by \( F \) and \( W \), respectively. For instance, the network layer \( F \) can be used to model the spread of infection between friends residing in the same neighborhood, while the network layer \( W \) can model the spread of infections among individuals who congregate for work.

In order to model participation in each network layer, we first independently label each node as nonparticipating in network layer \( a \) with probability \( \alpha_a \) and participating in network layer \( a \) with probability \( 1 - \alpha_a \), where \( 0 \leq \alpha_a \leq 1 \), and where \( a \in \{F, W\} \). Next, for each node that participates in network layer \( a \), the number of its neighbors in layer \( a \) is drawn from a degree distribution, denoted by \( \{p^a_k, k = 0, 1, \ldots, \infty\} \), where \( a \in \{F, W\} \). Under this formulation, the degree of a node in layer \( a \), denoted by \( \{p^a_k, k = 0, 1, \ldots\} \), with \( a \in \{F, W\} \), is given by

\[
p^a_k = (1 - \alpha_a)p^F_k + \alpha_a 1(k = 0), \quad k = 0, 1, \ldots,
\]

where \( \{1\} \) denotes the indicator random variable, admitting the value one when \( k = 0 \) and zero when \( k \geq 1 \). We generate both layers independently according to the configuration model (60, 61) with the degree distribution given through Eq. 1. For notational simplicity, we say that edges in network \( F \) (respectively, \( W \)) are of type \( f \) (respectively, type \( w \)). The multilayer contact network, denoted as \( \mathbb{H} \), is constructed by taking the disjoint union (1L) of network layers \( F \) and \( W \) (Fig. 1). We assume that the network \( \mathbb{H} \) is static and focus on the emergent spreading behavior in the limit of infinite population size \( (n \rightarrow \infty) \).

**Spreading Process.** We adopt a multistrain spreading process (27) to the multilayer network setting as follows. For each layer, the evolutionary adaptations in the pathogen are modeled by corresponding mutation matrices. Let \( m \) denote the number of pathogen strains coexisting in a population. For network layer \( F \) (respectively, \( W \)), the mutation matrix, denoted by \( \mu^F \) (respectively, \( \mu^W \)) is an \( m \times m \) matrix. The entry \( \mu^F_{ij} \) (respectively, \( \mu^W_{ij} \)) denotes the probability that strain \( i \) mutates to strain \( j \) within a host who got infected through a type \( f \) (respectively, type \( w \)) link, with \( \sum_j \mu^F_{ij} = 1 \) (respectively, \( \sum_j \mu^W_{ij} = 1 \)).

Given that an individual carrying strain \( i \) makes an infectious contact through a type \( f \) (respectively, type \( w \)) edge, the newly infected individual acquires strain \( j \) with probability \( \mu^F_{ij} \) (respectively, \( \mu^W_{ij} \)). For infectious diseases where the epidemiological and evolutionary processes occur at a similar timescale and mutations of the pathogen occur within the host and each new infection offers
an opportunity for mutation (27), the mutation matrices do not depend on the network structure (27) and \( \mu^w = \mu^w \). In the succeeding discussion, we focus on the setting where two strains of the pathogen are dominant and assume \( m = 2 \). We denote

\[
\mu^f = \begin{bmatrix} \mu_{11}^f & \mu_{12}^f \\ \mu_{21}^f & \mu_{22}^f \end{bmatrix}, \quad \mu^w = \begin{bmatrix} \mu_{11}^w & \mu_{12}^w \\ \mu_{21}^w & \mu_{22}^w \end{bmatrix}.
\]

We consider a SIR spreading process wherein each individual is susceptible (S), meaning that they have not yet been exposed to the contagion; infectious (I), meaning that they have received the contagion and are currently spreading it to their contacts; or recovered (R), meaning that they are no longer spreading the contagion. We first describe how the time scale of interactions are modeled in the multilayer setting. We assume that an infectious individual \( v_i \) transmits the infection to a susceptible contact \( v_j \) with probability \( T_{xy} \), which is given by

\[
T_{xy} = 1 - e^{-\tau_{xy} r_{xy}},
\]

where \( \tau_{xy} \) denotes the average rate of being in close-enough contact over the link from \( v_i \) to \( v_j \), and \( r_{xy} \) is the time \( v_i \) keeps spreading the contagion; i.e., the time it takes for \( v_i \) to become recovered.

In a multilayer setup, the spread of a contagion is expected to vary across different layers due to different interaction rates \( \tau_{xy} \). For example, due to different time scales or rates of interactions across layers, two nodes \( v_i \) and \( v_j \) may have a very different rate of being in close-enough contact in the social network layer versus the neighborhood layer. In the context of viral propagation, it would be expected that the recovery time \( \tau_{xy} \) of individuals is the same across different layers. With this model, we can also see that the emergence of a new strain will affect the transmissibility across a given link between nodes \( v_i \) and \( v_j \), potentially by the modification of both the rate of interaction and the recovery time. For example, a new strain may have better spreading capabilities in certain distances between individuals, which may change the rate at which \( v_i \) and \( v_j \) come into close-enough contact (given that the threshold of being close enough depends on the characteristics of the strain). Similarly, a new strain may cause individuals to have a shorter or longer recovery period.

We let the probability that an infective individual passes on the infection to their neighbor be a function of the type of strain and the type of link over which the transmission occurs. For example, a new strain may have better spreading capabilities in certain distances between individuals, which may change the rate at which \( v_i \) and \( v_j \) come into close-enough contact (given that the threshold of being close enough depends on the characteristics of the strain). Similarly, a new strain may cause individuals to have a shorter or longer recovery period.

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size. ii) The epidemic threshold defines the critical boundary of the region in the parameter space where a phase transition occurs, leading to the possibility of an epidemic outbreak. Specifically, the epidemic threshold defines a region in the parameter space inside which the outbreak dies out after a finite number of transmissions, while outside that region, the epidemic occurs with a positive probability. iii) Finally, we derive the epidemic size as the conditional mean of the fraction of individuals infected by each type of strain, given that an epidemic outbreak has occurred.

We supplement our theoretical findings with analytical case studies and simulations for different patterns of interaction in the host population and different types of mutation patterns in the pathogens. The multilayer multistrain modeling framework allows for understanding trade-offs, such as the relative impact of countermeasures, including lockdowns that alter the network layers on the emergence of highly contagious strains. For cases where the spread of infection starts with a moderately transmissible strain, we study how imposing/lifting mitigation measures across different layers may alter the course of the epidemic by increasing the risk of mutation to a highly contagious strain. We derive the probability of mutation to a highly transmissible strain which in turn provides a lower bound on the probability of emergence. Through a case study for one-step irreversible mutation patterns, our results highlight that reopening a new layer in the contact network may be considered low-risk based on the transmissibility of the current strain. Still, even a modest increase in infections caused by the additional layer can lead to an epidemic outbreak to be triggered with a much higher probability. Therefore, it is important to evaluate mitigation measures concerning different network layers in connection with their impact on the likelihood of the emergence of new pathogen strains.

Next, we unravel conditions under which we can reduce the multilayer multistrain model to simpler models for accurately characterizing the epidemic outbreak. We show that while a reduction to a single-layer model can accurately predict the epidemic characteristics when the network layers are purely Poisson, a departure from Poisson distribution can lead to incorrect predictions with single-layer models. Moreover, we show that the success of approaches that coalesce the multilayer structure to an equivalent single layer is critically dependent on the dispersion indices of the network layers being perfectly matched. However, in practice, different network layers (representing different congregate settings) are expected to have different structural characteristics, further highlighting the need for considering multilayer network models for predicting the course of an outbreak. Our results further underscore the need for developing epidemiological models that account for heterogeneity among the variants of the contagions as well as the contact network layers.

**Probability of Emergence.** The first question that we investigate is whether a spreading process started by infecting a randomly chosen seed node with strain 1 causes an outbreak infecting a positive fraction of individuals, i.e., an outbreak of size $\Omega(n)$. Our results are based on multitype branching processes (27, 34, 62, 63). For computing the probability of emergence, we first define probability generating functions (PGFs) of the excess degree distribution. Let $d = (d_f, d_w)$ denote the joint degree over layer $f$ and layer $w$. We define $g(z^f, z^w)$ as the PGF for joint degree distribution $p_d = p_d^f \cdot p_d^w$ of a randomly selected seed node, where the parameters $z^f$ (respectively, $z^w$) correspond to its degree $d^f$ (respectively, $d^w$) in layer $f$ (respectively, layer $w$):

$$g(z^f, z^w) = \sum_d p_d (z^f)^d f (z^w)^d w. \quad [2]$$

For $a \in \{f, w\}$, we define, $G^a(z^f, z^w)$ as the PGF for excess joint degree distribution for the number of type $f$ and type $w$ contacts of a node reached by following a randomly selected type $a$ edge (later-generation infective/intermediate host). While computing $G^a(z^f, z^w)$, we discount the type $a$ edge that was used to infect the given node. We have:

$$G^f(z^f, z^w) = \sum_d \frac{d^f}{(d^f - 1)} p_d (z^f)^{d^f - 1} (z^w)^{d^w}, \quad [3]$$

$$G^w(z^f, z^w) = \sum_d \frac{d^w}{(d^w - 1)} p_d (z^f)^{d^f} (z^w)^{d^w - 1}. \quad [4]$$

The factor $d^f p_d/(d^f)$ (respectively, $d^w p_d/(d^w)$) gives the normalized probability that an edge of type $f$ (respectively, type $w$) is attached (at the other end) to a vertex with colored degree $d = (d^f, d^w)$ (14). Suppose, an arbitrary node $u$ carries strain 1 and transmits the infection to one of its susceptible neighbors, denoted as node $v$. Since there are two types of links/edges in the contact network and two types of strains circulating in the host population, there are four types of events that lead to the transmission of infection from node $u$ to $v$, namely, whether edge $(u, v)$ is

(i) type $f$ and no mutation occurs in host $v$;
(ii) type $f$ and mutation to strain 2 occurs in host $v$;
(iii) type $w$ and no mutation occurs in host $v$;
(iv) type $w$ and mutation to strain 2 occurs in host $v$.

In cases (i) and (iii), there is no mutation in the host node $v$, and $v$ infects their neighbors in layer $f$ (respectively, layer $w$) with $T^f_1$ (respectively, $T^w_1$). In cases (ii) and (iv), strain 1 mutates to strain 2, and $v$ infects its neighbors in layers $f$ and $w$ with transmissibility $T^f_2$ and $T^w_2$, respectively. For applying a branching process argument (14, 64) and writing recursive equations using PGFs, it is crucial to keep track of both the types of edges used to transmit the infection and the types of strain acquired after mutation. Therefore, we keep a record of the number of newly infected individuals who acquire strain 1 or strain 2 and the type of edge through which they acquired the infection. We define the PGFs for transmitted infections over four random variables corresponding to the four infection events (i) to (iv) as follows:

$$\gamma_1(z^f_1, z^f_2, z^w_1, z^w_2) =$$

$$g \left( 1 - T^f_1 + T^f_1 \left( \sum_{j=1}^{2} \mu^f_{i,j} z^f_j \right), 1 - T^w_1 + T^w_1 \left( \sum_{j=1}^{2} \mu^w_{i,j} z^w_j \right) \right).$$

For $a \in \{f, w\}$ and $i \in \{1, 2\}$, denote

$$\Gamma^a_z(z^f_1, z^f_2, z^w_1, z^w_2) =$$

$$G^a \left( 1 - T^f_1 + T^f_1 \left( \sum_{j=1}^{2} \mu^f_{i,j} z^f_j \right), 1 - T^w_1 + T^w_1 \left( \sum_{j=1}^{2} \mu^w_{i,j} z^w_j \right) \right).$$

We show that the quantity $\gamma_1(z^f_1, z^f_2, z^w_1, z^w_2)$ represents the PGF for the number of infection events of each type induced among the neighbors of a seed node when the seed node is infected with
strain 1; SI Appendix, 1.A. Furthermore, for \( a \in \{f, w\} \) and \( i \in \{1, 2\} \), we show that \( \Gamma_i^a(q_1^a, q_2^a, z_1^w, z_2^w) \) is the PGF for the number of infection events of each type caused by a later-generation infective (i.e., a typical intermediate host in the process) that received the infection through a type \( a \) edge and carries strain \( i \). Our first main result characterizes the probability of emergence when the outbreak starts at an arbitrary node infected with strain 1.

**Theorem 1 (Probability of Emergence).** It holds that

\[
\mathbb{P}[\text{Emergence}] = 1 - \gamma_1(q_1^f, q_1^w, q_2^w),
\]

where, \( (q_1^f, q_2^f, q_1^w, q_2^w) \) are the smallest nonnegative roots of the fixed point equations:

\[
q_1^f = \Gamma_1^f(q_1^f, q_2^f, q_1^w, q_2^w),
\]

\[
q_2^f = \Gamma_2^f(q_1^f, q_2^f, q_1^w, q_2^w),
\]

\[
q_1^w = \Gamma_1^w(q_1^f, q_2^f, q_1^w, q_2^w),
\]

\[
q_2^w = \Gamma_2^w(q_1^f, q_2^f, q_1^w, q_2^w).
\]

Here, for \( a \in \{f, w\} \) and \( i \in \{1, 2\} \), the term \( q_i^a \) can be interpreted as the probability of extinction starting from one later-generation infective carrying strain \( i \) (after mutation) which was infected through a type \( a \) edge; see SI Appendix, 1.A for a detailed proof.

Therefore, the probability of emergence of an epidemic is given by the probability that at least one of the infected neighbors of the seed triggers an unbounded chain of transmission events. We note that Theorem 1 provides a strict generalization for the probability of emergence of multistrain spreading on a single layer (27), and we can recover the probability of emergence for the case of single layer by substituting \( T_f = T_w \) and \( \mu_f = \mu_w \) in Eqs. 6–9.

**Epidemic Threshold.** Next, we characterize the epidemic threshold, which is commonly studied as a metric to characterize an epidemic and ascertain risk factors (65). Let \( \lambda_f \) and \( \lambda_w \) denote the first moments of the distributions \([p_{dw}^f]\) and \([p_{dw}^w]\), respectively. Let \( (d_1^f) \) and \( (d_2^f) \) denote the corresponding second moments for distributions \([p_{dw}^f]\) and \([p_{dw}^w]\). Further, define \( \beta_f \) and \( \beta_w \) as the mean of the excess degree distributions respectively in the two layers. We have

\[
\beta_f := \frac{(d_2^f) - \lambda_f}{\lambda_f} \quad \text{and} \quad \beta_w := \frac{(d_2^w) - \lambda_w}{\lambda_w}.
\]

**Theorem 2 (Epidemic Threshold).** For

\[
\rho(\mathbf{J}) = \rho_f \times \rho(\mathbf{T}_f \mathbf{\mu}),
\]

let \( \rho(\mathbf{J}) \) denote the spectral radius of \( \mathbf{J} \). The epidemic threshold is given by \( \rho(\mathbf{J}) = 1 \).

The above theorem states that the epidemic threshold is tied to the spectral radius of the Jacobian matrix \( \mathbf{J} \), i.e., if \( \rho(\mathbf{J}) > 1 \), then an epidemic occurs with a positive probability, whereas if \( \rho(\mathbf{J}) \leq 1 \), then with high probability, the infection causes a self-limited outbreak, where the fraction of infected nodes vanishes to 0 as \( n \to \infty \). The matrix \( \mathbf{J} \) is obtained while determining the stability of the fixed point of the recursive equations in Theorem 1 by linearization around \( q_1^w = q_2^w = q_1^f = q_2^f = 1 \) (SI Appendix, 1.B). We note that when the mutation matrix is indecomposable, meaning that each type of strain eventually may lead to the emergence of any other type of strain with a positive probability, the threshold theorem for multitype branching processes (27) guarantees if \( \rho(\mathbf{J}) \leq 1 \), then \( q_i^a = 1 \), whereas if \( \rho(\mathbf{J}) > 1 \), then \( 0 \leq q_i^a < 1 \), where \( i \in \{1, 2\} \) and \( a \in \{f, w\} \). For decomposable processes, the threshold theorem (27) guarantees extinction \( q_i^a = 1 \) if \( \rho(\mathbf{J}) < 1 \); however, the uniqueness of the fixed-point solution does not necessarily hold when \( \rho(\mathbf{J}) > 1 \).

Our next result reveals the interplay of the network structure and the transmission parameters in determining the threshold for emergence of an epidemic outbreak.

**Lemma 1.** When \( T_f^w / T_f^1 = T_w^w / T_w^2 = c \), where \( c > 0 \), and let \( \mu = \mu_f = \mu_w \), we get,

\[
\rho(\mathbf{J}) = \rho \left( \frac{\beta_f c \mu_f}{\lambda_f c \mu_w} \right) \times \rho(\mathbf{T}_f \mathbf{\mu}).
\]

Lemma 1 follows from the observation that with \( T_f^w / T_f^1 = T_w^w / T_w^2 = c \), we can express \( \mathbf{J} \) as a Kronecker product of two matrices (denoted by \( \otimes \)), as below.

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbf{J} &= \begin{bmatrix}
T_f^1 \mu_{11} \beta_f & T_f^1 \mu_{12} \beta_f & T_f^1 \mu_{11} \lambda_w & T_f^1 \mu_{12} \lambda_w \\
T_f^2 \mu_{21} \beta_f & T_f^2 \mu_{22} \beta_f & T_f^2 \mu_{21} \lambda_w & T_f^2 \mu_{22} \lambda_w \\
T_w^1 \mu_{11} \lambda_f & T_w^1 \mu_{12} \lambda_f & T_w^1 \mu_{11} \beta_w & T_w^1 \mu_{12} \beta_w \\
T_w^2 \mu_{21} \lambda_f & T_w^2 \mu_{22} \lambda_f & T_w^2 \mu_{21} \beta_w & T_w^2 \mu_{22} \beta_w
\end{bmatrix} \\
&= \left[ \beta_f c \mu_w \right] \otimes (\mathbf{T}_f \mathbf{\mu}).
\end{align*}
\]

The first assumption \( T_f^w / T_f^1 = T_w^w / T_w^2 \) is consistent with scenarios where the ratio of the transmissibility of the two strains in each layer is a property of the contagion, not the contact networks. This is supported by the assumption (26) that interventions such as social distancing measures reduce the transmissibility of the disease by a specific coefficient for the entire network layer. The second assumption \( (\mu_f = \mu_w) \) in Lemma 1 is motivated by the occurrence of mutations within individual hosts (27).

Lastly, we observe that Lemma 1 provides a unified analysis for the epidemic threshold for the case with a single strain or a single layer (27, 47). To obtain the epidemic threshold for multistrain spreading on a single-layer network, we first obtain the spectral radius of \( \mathbf{J} \), denoted by \( \rho^{\text{MS-}f} \). Next, invoking Eq. 12 with \( \mathbf{J}_f = \mathbf{T}_f^w \) and setting the mean degree of one of the layers as zero gives \( \rho^{\text{MS-}f} \). For instance, we can set \( \lambda_w = \beta_w = 0 \), yielding

\[
\rho^{\text{MS-}f} = \beta_f \times \rho(\mathbf{T}_f \mathbf{\mu}),
\]

where \( \beta_f \) corresponds to the mean of the excess degree distribution for the contact network with a single layer \( f \). For single
strain spreading on a multilayer contact network, we substitute $T_1^f = T_2^f$ in Eq. 12, which gives $\rho(T^f \mu) = T^f \rho(\mu) = T^f$, yielding the corresponding spectral radius, denoted as $\rho^{SS-ML}$,

$$\rho^{SS-ML} = \rho \left( \begin{bmatrix} \beta_f & \omega \mu \rho \end{bmatrix} \right) T^f. \tag{14}$$

The corresponding epidemic thresholds are obtained by setting the above spectral radii $\rho^{MS-ML}$ and $\rho^{SS-ML}$ to one.

**Mean Epidemic Size.** Next, we compute the mean epidemic size and the mean fraction of nodes infected by each strain. Knowing the fraction of individuals infected by each strain is vital for cases when different pathogen strains have different transmissibility and virulence. In such cases, predicting the expected fraction of the population hit by the more severe strain can help scale healthcare resources in time.

For computing the mean epidemic size, we consider the zero-temperature random-field Ising model on Bethe lattices (66), as done in ref. 34. We refer to a node as being active if it is infected with either of the two strains (strain 1 or strain 2), and inactive otherwise. Since $H$ is locally tree-like (67), we consider the following hierarchical structure, such that at the top level, there is a single node (the root). The probability that an arbitrarily chosen root node is infected with strain 1 (respectively, strain 2), gives the mean fraction of individuals infected by strain 1 (respectively, strain 2). Let $Q_1$ (respectively, $Q_2$) denote the probability that the root node is active and carries strain 1 (respectively, strain 2). We label the levels of the tree from level $\ell = 0$ at the bottom to level $\ell = \infty$ at the top, i.e., the root. We assume that coinfection is not possible. Specifically, if a node receives $x_1^f$ (respectively, $x_2^f$) infections of strain 1 through type $f$ (respectively, type $w$) links and $x_2^f$ (respectively, $x_2^w$) infections of strain 2 through type $f$ (respectively, type $w$) links, then after mutation, it becomes infected by strain $i$ with probability

$$\frac{\mu_1^f x_1^f + \mu_2^f x_2^f + \mu_1^w x_1^w + \mu_2^w x_2^w}{x_1^f + x_2^f + x_1^w + x_2^w},$$

where $i \in \{1, 2\}$. For an $a \in \{f, w\}$, and $i \in \{1, 2\}$, let $q_{2+1,i}^a$ denote the probability that a node at level $\ell + 1$ is active, carries strain $i$, and is connected to a node at level $\ell + 2$ through a type $a$ edge. Our next result characterizes the mean fraction of individuals infected by each type of strain during an epidemic outbreak. As a crucial step toward deriving the mean fraction of infected individuals, we first show that for $i = 1, 2$, we have

$$q_{\ell+1}^f = \sum_{d} \frac{d!}{(d-1)!} p_d^f f_i(q_{\ell+1}^f, q_{\ell+1}^w, q_{\ell+1}^w, d^f, d^w) - 1, d^w), \tag{15}$$

$$q_{\ell+1}^w = \sum_{d} \frac{d!}{(d-1)!} p_d^w f_i(q_{\ell+1}^f, q_{\ell+1}^w, q_{\ell+1}^w, d^f, d^w, d^w - 1). \tag{16}$$

We let $q_{\infty,i}^a$ denote the limit of $q_{\ell,i}^a$ as $\ell \to \infty$.

**Theorem 3 (Epidemic Size).** For $i = 1, 2$, we have

$$Q_i \equiv \sum_{d} p_d^f \left( q_{\infty,1}^f, q_{\infty,2}^f, q_{\infty,1}^w, q_{\infty,2}^w, d^f, d^w \right), \tag{17}$$

with the mean epidemic size

$$Q = Q_1 + Q_2.$$

where $f_i(u_1^f, u_2^f, u_1^w, u_2^w, z^f, z^w)$ is given in SI Appendix, 1.C.

Here, $f_i(u_1^f, u_2^f, u_1^w, u_2^w, z^f, z^w)$ denotes the probability that an arbitrary node $u$ at level $\ell + 1$ gets infected with strain 1 through neighbors in level $\ell$ such that there are $z^f$ and $z^w$ neighbors of node $u$ in layers $f$ and $w$, respectively. A precise definition of $f_i(u_1^f, u_2^f, u_1^w, u_2^w, z^f, z^w)$ and a proof of Theorem 3 is presented in SI Appendix, 1.C.

**Experimental Evaluation.** In this section, we present numerical studies on different contact structures and transmission patterns. We focus on the setting where the fitness landscape consists of two types of strains and two types of network layers. The two network layers are independently generated using the configuration model after sampling degree sequences from the distributions $(\rho^f_k, k = 0, 1, \ldots)$ and $(\rho^w_k, k = 0, 1, \ldots)$. We first investigate the case when the network layers follow a Poisson degree distribution. Additionally, we consider the power-law degree distribution (SI Appendix, 1.D), which is widely used in modeling the structure of several real-world networks, including social networks. Further, to account for mitigation measures that limit the number of people who can congregate in the different layers, we let the degree distributions for the two layers follow the power law degree distribution with an exponential cutoff, SI Appendix, 1.D.

The spreading process starts when a randomly chosen node is selected as the seed carrying strain 1 (Fig. 2). In subsequent time steps, each node independently infects its neighbors with a transmission probability that depends on both the type of strain carried and the nature of link through which contact occurs. After infection, the pathogen mutates within the hosts with probabilities given by the mutation matrices. In cases where a susceptible node comes in contact with multiple infectious neighbors, we resolve exposure to multiple infections as follows. If a node receives $x_1^f$ (respectively, $x_2^f$) infections of strain 1 through type $f$ (respectively, type $w$) links, and $x_2^f$ (respectively, $x_2^w$) infections of strain 2 through type $f$ (respectively, type $w$) links, then after mutation, it becomes infected by strain $i$ with probability

$$\frac{\mu_1^f x_1^f + \mu_2^f x_2^f + \mu_1^w x_1^w + \mu_2^w x_2^w}{x_1^f + x_2^f + x_1^w + x_2^w},$$

where $i \in \{1, 2\}$. For an $a \in \{f, w\}$, and $i \in \{1, 2\}$, let $q_{2+1,i}^a$ denote the probability that a node at level $\ell + 1$ is active, carries strain $i$, and is connected to a node at level $\ell + 2$ through a type $a$ edge. Our next result characterizes the mean fraction of individuals infected by each type of strain during an epidemic outbreak. As a crucial step toward deriving the mean fraction of infected individuals, we first show that for $i = 1, 2$, we have

$$q_{\ell+1}^f = \sum_{d} \frac{d!}{(d-1)!} p_d^f f_i(q_{\ell+1}^f, q_{\ell+1}^w, q_{\ell+1}^w, d^f, d^w) - 1, d^w), \tag{15}$$

$$q_{\ell+1}^w = \sum_{d} \frac{d!}{(d-1)!} p_d^w f_i(q_{\ell+1}^f, q_{\ell+1}^w, q_{\ell+1}^w, d^f, d^w, d^w - 1). \tag{16}$$

We let $q_{\infty,i}^a$ denote the limit of $q_{\ell,i}^a$ as $\ell \to \infty$.

**Theorem 3 (Epidemic Size).** For $i = 1, 2$, we have

$$Q_i \equiv \sum_{d} p_d^f \left( q_{\infty,1}^f, q_{\infty,2}^f, q_{\infty,1}^w, q_{\infty,2}^w, d^f, d^w \right), \tag{17}$$

with the mean epidemic size

$$Q = Q_1 + Q_2.$$

where $f_i(u_1^f, u_2^f, u_1^w, u_2^w, z^f, z^w)$ is given in SI Appendix, 1.C.
with mean degrees \( T_f \) for a different initialization for the transmission parameters with results corresponding to averaging over 500 independent experiments. Specifically,

\[
\rho(I) = T_f^2 \times \rho \left( \frac{\beta_f}{\lambda_f}, \frac{c_{f\lambda}}{\beta_w} \right). 
\]

A proof for Lemma 2 is provided in SI Appendix, 2.A.

In cases where the initial strain by itself is not transmissible enough to cause an epidemic and the course of the epidemic is tied to the emergence of a highly transmissible strain, it is of interest to ascertain the probability that at least one mutation to strain 2 occurs in the chain of infections initiated by the introduction of strain 1 to a susceptible population. Note that the above quantity is different from the probabilities given by the mutation matrix Eq. 18, which defines the probability of mutation to a different strain (within each host) after every transmission event.

**Discussion**

Joint Impact of Layer Openings and Mutations. In this section, we discuss the interplay of layer openings and mutations on the probability of emergence of epidemic outbreaks. We consider the case where the fitness landscape consists of two strains. The process starts when the population is introduced to the first strain (strain 1) which is moderately transmissible and initially dominant in the population. In contrast, the other strain (strain 2) is highly transmissible and initially absent in the population but has the risk of emerging through mutations in strain 1. For modeling mutations that occur within hosts, we assume that the mutation probabilities depend on the type of strain but not on the type of link over which the infection was transmitted. We let \( \mu \) denote the mutation matrices in the two layers (\( \mu = \mu_f = \mu_w \)), and let \( \mu_{22} \rightarrow 1 \), wherein with high probability, once the pathogen mutates to strain 2, it does not mutate back to strain 1. In particular, we consider the mutation and transmission matrices below:

\[
\mu = \begin{bmatrix} \mu_{11} & 1 - \mu_{11} \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad 0 < \mu_{11} < 1, \quad [18]
\]

\[
\begin{bmatrix} T_f^w & 0 \\ 0 & T_2^w \end{bmatrix} = \epsilon \begin{bmatrix} T_1^f & 0 \\ 0 & T_2^f \end{bmatrix}, \quad \epsilon \geq 1; \quad T_1^w < T_2^w, T_1^f < T_2^f. \quad [19]
\]

The above mutation and transmission parameters in Eq. 18 correspond to the one-step irreversible mutation scheme, which is used widely (27, 69) to model scenarios where a simple change is required for the contagion to evolve to a highly transmissible variant. We first derive a result characterizing the epidemic threshold for one-step irreversible mutations.

**Lemma 2.** For the one-step irreversible mutation matrix given by Eq. 18 and transmissibilities satisfying Eq. 19, the epidemic threshold does not depend on \( \mu_{11} \) or \( T_1^f \). Specifically,

\[
\rho(I) = T_f^2 \times \rho \left( \frac{\beta_f}{\lambda_f}, \frac{c_{f\lambda}}{\beta_w} \right). 
\]

A proof for Lemma 2 is provided in SI Appendix, 2.A.

In cases where the initial strain by itself is not transmissible enough to cause an epidemic and the course of the epidemic is tied to the emergence of a highly transmissible strain, it is of interest to ascertain the probability that at least one mutation to strain 2 occurs in the chain of infections initiated by the introduction of strain 1 to a susceptible population. Note that the above quantity is different from the probabilities given by the mutation matrix Eq. 18, which defines the probability of mutation to a different strain (within each host) after every transmission event.

**Lemma 3.** For the one-step irreversible mutation matrix given by Eq. 18 and transmissibilities satisfying Eq. 19, we have

\[
\mathbb{P}[\text{at least 1 mutation to strain 2}] = 1 - g(1 - T_1^f + T_1^f \mu_{11} q^f, 1 - T_1^w + T_1^w \mu_{11} q^w). \quad [21]
\]

where

\[
q^f = G_f^f(1 - T_1^f + T_1^f \mu_{11} q^f, 1 - T_1^w + T_1^w \mu_{11} q^w), \quad [22]
\]

\[
q^w = G_w^w(1 - T_1^f + T_1^f \mu_{11} q^f, 1 - T_1^w + T_1^w \mu_{11} q^w). \quad [23]
\]

Here, for \( a \in \{f, w\}, q^a \) corresponds to the probability of there being no mutation to strain 2 in the chain of infections emanating from a later generation infective that was infected through a type \( a \) edge (SI Appendix, 2.B). Using Lemma 3, we derive a lower bound on the probability of emergence highlighting the role of mutations in SI Appendix, 2.C.

Next, we provide a parameterization of the multilayer multistrain model to jointly characterize the transition from a single layer to a multilayer setting and a single strain to a multistrain setting. We note that under the one-step irreversible mutation
matrix Eq. 18, as $\mu_{11}$ approaches one, it corresponds to the case of the spread of contagions without mutations. Thus, the deviation of $\mu_{11}$ away from one provides a way to characterize the departure from the case where no mutations take place. Similarly, to characterize the transition from a single layer to a multilayer network, we consider the following degree distributions for the two layers:

$$
\begin{align*}
    d^f &\sim \begin{cases} 
        0 & \text{w.p. } \alpha_f \\
        \text{Poisson}(\nu_f) & \text{w.p. } 1 - \alpha_f,
    \end{cases} \\
    d^w &\sim \text{Poisson}(\nu_w).
\end{align*}
$$

As $\alpha_f \to 1$, no nodes participate in layer $f$, and the contact network $H$ comprises only a single layer $W$. While, when $\mu_{11} \to 1$, no mutations to strain 2 appear with high probability (whp) starting from strain 1 as described in Fig. 5.

Next, we investigate the joint impact of layer openings and mutations on the probability of emergence of an epidemic outbreak. For the domain $(\alpha_f, \mu_{11}) \in [0, 1) \times [0, 1)$ in Fig. 5, we plot the corresponding probability of emergence of an epidemic as given by Theorem 1 in Fig. 6. We set the degree distribution of the two layers as per Eq. 24 with $\nu_f = \nu_w = 1.2$. We let $c = 1, 1.5$ and plot the probability of emergence for different transmissibility values. In the light of Lemma 2, which states that the epidemic threshold is not affected by $\mu_{11}$, it may be tempting to consider a single-strain model as being sufficient to capture the epidemic characteristics. However, in Fig. 6, we observe that adding an additional network layer can increase the risk of an epidemic by providing additional pathways for mutation.

Moreover, there is a spectrum of intermediate values that the probability of emergence admits across the domain, with the single-layer or single-strain cases capturing only the limiting cases where $\alpha_f$ and $\mu_{11}$ respectively approach one. We observe that for regions where there is effectively just a single layer ($\alpha_f \to 1$), the probability of emergence remains relatively low despite the possible emergence of a highly contagious strain. Likewise, in cases where only a single, moderately transmissible strain

![Fig. 4. Probability of emergence and the expected epidemic size for a contact network comprising two Poisson layers with mean degrees $\lambda_f$ and $\lambda_w$, respectively. The fixed parameters are $T_f^1 = 0.5$, $T_f^2 = 0.7$, $T_w^1 = 0.3$, $T_w^2 = 0.4$, $\mu_{11} = 0.2$, $\mu_{22} = 0.2$, $n = 10,000$, and we vary $\lambda_f$ and $\lambda_w$ in the interval $[1, 3]$.](https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2302245120)

![Fig. 5. A parameterization of the multilayer multistrain model as it transitions from the presence of one layer to two layers and one strain to two strains. Here, $\alpha_f \to 1$ corresponds to the case when there are no links in layer $f$, and the contact network $H$ effectively has a single layer $W$, whereas $\mu_{11} \to 1$ corresponds to the case where no mutations to a different strain occur starting from strain 1 with high probability. The horizontal lines correspond to contours with a constant epidemic threshold (Lemma 2).](https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2302245120)
circulates with a high probability ($\mu_{11} \rightarrow 1$), even the addition of another layer $f$ does not lead to a high probability of emergence. In contrast, when both network layers are present, and there is a nonzero probability of mutation to strain 2, the probability of emergence is high. In Fig. 6, for the network parameters under consideration, this effect is particularly pronounced in certain transmissibility values, e.g., with $c = 1$, $T_{f}^{1} = 0.4$, $T_{f}^{2} = 0.8$, where with only a single layer open ($\alpha_f \rightarrow 1$) or a single circulating strain $\mu_{11} \rightarrow 1$, the probability of emergence remains zero. However, as layer $f$ is opened ($\alpha_f \rightarrow 1$) and there is a positive probability of mutation to strain 2 ($\mu_{11} < 1$), the probability of emergence rises to greater than 0.5 as $\mu_{11}, \alpha_f \rightarrow 0$. Likewise, when $c = 1.5$, with $T_{f}^{1} = 0.3$, $T_{f}^{2} = 0.5$, we observe that the probability jumps to over 0.4 when $\mu_{11}, \alpha_f \rightarrow 0$. In SI Appendix, 2.D, we demonstrate that for a more general class of network parameters, there exists a range of transmissibility values where we observe the above phenomenon under the conditions in Eqs. 18 and 19.

The observations in Fig. 6 shed light on the impact of imposing/lifting mitigation measures concerning different contact network layers (e.g., school closures or many companies adopting work-from-home policies) on the emergence of more transmissible variants. For example, opening a new layer in the contact network may be deemed safe based on the transmissibility of the initial strain, but even a modest increase in infections caused by the new layer might increase the chances of a more transmissible strain to emerge, which in turn can make an epidemic more likely. Thus, by studying the mutations over a multilayer network, our results can help understand the comprehensive impact of layer closures/openings.

**Reductions to Simpler Models.** In this section, we propose and analyze approaches to reduce the multistrain multilayer (MS-ML) model into a corresponding single-strain multilayer (SS-ML) or a multistrain single-layer (MS-SL) model.

We first investigate whether, under arbitrary distributions for the network layers, we can systematically reduce the MS-ML model into an equivalent (yet simpler) MS-SL model (27) and get accurate predictions for key epidemiological quantities. In what follows, we show that when the degree distribution for the two network layers is Poisson with parameters $\lambda_f$ and $\lambda_w$, respectively, the following transformation to a MS-SL model can accurately predict the probability of emergence of an epidemic (SI Appendix, 3.A)

$$\lambda \leftarrow \lambda_f + \lambda_w.$$

$$T_1 \leftarrow \frac{\lambda_f T_f^1 + \lambda_w T_w^1}{\lambda_f + \lambda_w}; \quad T_2 \leftarrow \frac{\lambda_f T_f^2 + \lambda_w T_w^2}{\lambda_f + \lambda_w}.$$

Next, we illustrate the potential pitfall of mapping a multilayer network to a single-layer structure using the transformations Eqs. 25–26 when the Poisson assumption no longer holds. Specifically, we study how well the reduction to a single layer allows us to predict the epidemic threshold for a multilayer network for a more general family of distributions. We first consider the case when the ratio of the transmissibilities in the two network layers is one for both strains, i.e., $T_f^1/T_w^1 = T_f^2/T_w^2 = 1$.

In other words, the transmissibilities only depend on the type of strain and are agnostic of the type of link. Throughout, we let $\rho(\cdot)$ denote the spectral radius of the matrix supplied as its argument.
Let the single-layer network obtained by taking the sum of node degrees in the two layers be denoted by \( \tilde{H} \). Since the layers in the multilayer network have independent degree distributions, the degree distribution for \( \tilde{H} \) is given by \( \tilde{p} = p^f \ast p^w \), where \( \ast \) denotes the convolution operator. For \( a \in \{f, w\} \), recall that \( \lambda_a \) and \( \beta_a \), respectively, denote the mean degree distribution and the mean excess degree of distribution for network layer \( a \). Note that for network \( \tilde{H} \), the mean degree and mean excess degree, respectively, denoted by \( \tilde{\lambda} \) and \( \tilde{\beta} \) are given as

\[
\tilde{\lambda} = \lambda_w + \lambda_f, \tag{27}
\]

\[
\tilde{\beta} = \frac{\beta_f \lambda_f + \beta_w \lambda_w + 2 \lambda_f \lambda_w}{\lambda_f + \lambda_w}. \tag{28}
\]

From Eq. 12, it follows that for the multilayer network \( \tilde{H} = \tilde{W} \cup \tilde{F} \), the critical threshold for the emergence of the epidemic outbreak is

\[
\rho \left( \begin{bmatrix} \beta_f & \lambda_w \\ \lambda_f & \beta_w \end{bmatrix} \right) > 1. \tag{29}
\]

Upon mapping the transmissibilities as per Eq. 26, the critical threshold for the emergence of the epidemic outbreak in \( \tilde{H} \) (constructed using the configuration model with degree drawn from the distribution \( p^f \ast p^w \)) is given by

\[
\frac{\beta_f \lambda_f + \beta_w \lambda_w + 2 \lambda_f \lambda_w}{\lambda_f + \lambda_w} \times \rho \left( T^f \mu \right) > 1. \tag{30}
\]

Comparing the above thresholds in Eqs. 29 and 30, we see that the predicted thresholds are identical if and only if

\[
\rho \left( \begin{bmatrix} \beta_f & \lambda_w \\ \lambda_f & \beta_w \end{bmatrix} \right) = \frac{\beta_f \lambda_f + \beta_w \lambda_w + 2 \lambda_f \lambda_w}{\lambda_f + \lambda_w}. \tag{31}
\]

In SI Appendix, 3.B, we show that with \( \lambda_f, \lambda_w, \beta_f, \beta_w > 0 \), Eq. 31 holds if and only if

\[
\beta_f - \lambda_f = \beta_w - \lambda_w. \tag{32}
\]

The condition Eq. 32 is equivalent to the dispersion indices of the constituent network layers being the same, where the dispersion index is defined as the ratio of the variance and mean of a degree distribution. For cases when the degree distribution of the constituent network layers is not from the same parametric family of distributions, depending on the magnitude of the dispersion index relative to one, the condition Eq. 32 may not hold. For instance, if the degree distribution of the two layers is respectively Poisson and Binomial, regardless of the choice of parameters of the distributions, the condition \( \beta_f - \lambda_f = \beta_w - \lambda_w \) will never hold since the dispersion index of the Poisson distribution and the Binomial distribution are respectively \( 1 \) and \( > 1 \). Likewise for the parameterization of the degree that accounts for nonparticipation in layer \( f \) through Eq. 24, as long as \( \alpha_f > 0 \), the dispersion indices of layers \( f \) and \( w \) do not match and thus reductions to MS-ML models can yield inaccurate predictions for the epidemic threshold.
So far, we have investigated reductions to a multistrain single-layer model (MS-SL). Then, a natural question is whether we can alternatively use a reduction to a single-strain multilayer (SS-ML) model to characterize the epidemic. It is known (15, 34) that when there are correlations between infection events, the predictions made by models that assume independent transmission events can lead to incorrect predictions. For the multistrain transmission model, the infection events are conditionally independent given the type of strain carried by a node and dependent otherwise. Therefore, models that do not account for correlation in infection events, such as single-strain spreading on multilayer networks (47), can lead to inaccurate predictions for multistrain settings; see ref. 34 for a detailed discussion. We evaluate reductions to SS-ML models, assuming

\[ T^w / T^f = T_2^w / T_2^f = \rho, \]

by considering the following two approaches. The first approach, denoted as \( T_x \), involves using Eq. 12 and defining the equivalent transmissibilities for the two layers as

\[ \rho(T^f \mu) \rightarrow \tilde{T}^f, \rho(T^w \mu) \rightarrow \tilde{T}^w (\equiv c \rho(T^f \mu) \rightarrow \tilde{T}^w). \]  

Through Eq. 12, the transformation Eq. 33 ensures that the epidemic threshold predicted by the corresponding SS-ML reduction is the same as the MS-ML model. The second approach, denoted as \( T_x - \rho \), is based on transforming to a single layer by directly matching the mean matrix, i.e., we ensure that the mean number of secondary infections stemming from any given type of infected individual is the same across the models (SI Appendix, 4).

Next, we evaluate the above reductions to SS-ML models. Following the network distribution in Eq. 24, we set \( \alpha_f = 0.2, \alpha_w = 0, \psi_f = \psi_w = 1.2, T_2^f = 0.8 \), and we assume \( T_2^w / T_2^f = T_2^w / T_2^f = \epsilon = 1.2 \). In Fig. 7A, we fix the transmissibility parameters and plot the predictions made by the above transformations to SS-ML models. We set \( \mu_{22} = 1 - \epsilon \) with \( \epsilon = 10^{-10} \) and vary \( \mu_{11} \) in the interval [0, 1]. From Lemma 2, we know that as \( \mu_{22} \rightarrow 1 \), \( \rho(T^f \mu) \) remains constant, and thus, the prediction made by the SS-ML under the \( T_x - \rho \) mapping remains constant. We note that one general shortcoming of the SS-ML transformations is that they predict the same probability of emergence and epidemic size; they can at best only predict one of these metrics accurately. Moreover, they do not shed light on the fraction of individuals infected by each strain type. Substituting \( T_1^f = T_2^f = \rho(T^f \mu) \) and \( T_1^w = T_2^w = c \rho(T^f \mu) \) and \( \psi^f = \psi^w = T_2^w \) in Theorem 1, we get the predictions for the SS-ML model under the \( T_x - \rho \) mapping. We note that while the SS-ML reduction through mapping the spectral radius (\( T_x - \rho \)) captures the size, it fails to predict the probability of emergence. This observation is consistent with the observation that reducing an MS-SL model to a bond-percolation model leads to inaccurate prediction for the probability of emergence but correctly predicts the total epidemic size (34).

In Fig. 7B–D, we vary the ratio \( T_1^f / T_2^f = T_1^w / T_2^w \), denoting it by \( T_1 / T_2 \) while keeping \( T_2^f \) constant at 0.8. We observe that mapping through \( T_x - \rho \) neither accurately predicts the epidemic size nor the probability of emergence. We observe that the gap in the prediction of the probability of emergence by the SS-ML models is less pronounced when \( T_1 / T_2 \rightarrow 1 \). Further, when \( \mu_{22} \rightarrow 1 \), the predictions made by mapping the spectral radius are constant in line with Lemma 2. As above, the SS-ML model under the \( T_x - \rho \) transformation captures the size and the epidemic threshold while failing to predict the probability of emergence accurately. We note that both the transformations (matching the epidemic threshold and the mean transmissibility parameters) critically relied on the decoupling Eq. 12, which only holds when \( T_1^f / T_1^w = T_2^f / T_2^w \). Our observations further highlight the importance of developing epidemiological models that account for the heterogeneity in network structure and pathogen strains.

**Conclusion**

This work analyzed the spreading characteristics of mutating contagions over multilayer networks. We derived the fundamental epidemiological quantities for the proposed multilayer multistrain model: the probability of emergence, the epidemic threshold, and the mean fraction of individuals infected with each strain. Our findings underscore that we should evaluate the impact of imposing/lifting mitigation measures concerning different contact network layers in relation to their effect on the emergence of new strains. We showed that transformations to existing models can inaccurately characterize the multilayer multistrain setting while also unraveling conditions under which simpler models can help make predictions.

An important future direction is to extend the network-based analysis of multistrain spreading (27) to allow for the case when the previous infection with one strain confers full immunity only with respect to that strain while leaving the individual susceptible to other strains, although possibly at a reduced level. While cross-immunity among different pathogen strains has been studied (37) in multispecies models that do not account for the contact network structure, it is of interest to research cross-immunity interference in the light of different contact patterns. Such an analysis will pave the way for evaluating the risk of the emergence of new strains that can evade immunity acquired from previous infections or vaccination in the light of different policy measures that alter the contact network.

Future work might also focus on extending the contact network model used in this paper to better capture the real-world spreading events. While the framework proposed here allows us to model networks with arbitrary degree distributions, future work can explore extending the framework to incorporate more modes of node heterogeneity, such as tunable clustering (18) and community structures (70). Further investigation of the multilayer framework can also shed light on the impact of superspreading events such as concerts and sports games. We can utilize the multilayer framework to model such events by incorporating an extra layer with a high degree of connectivity to the existing contact network. For a more realistic representation, the additional layer can be dynamic because nodes that participate in the layer may change over time, or the layer may exist only for a short period of time. The multilayer network model can also be leveraged to represent different connectivity patterns that might exist among different subgroups of individuals. More generally, we can construct a model where a base network layer includes every individual, with a certain level of connectivity among them. Overlaying this, we might have multiple layers, each representing a specific age group or a demographic to represent the additional connectivity we expect among that group. It is also of interest to investigate the impact of rare events of untraceable contacts and develop models to account for untraceable nodes and contacts in contact-tracing tools (71). Finally, in the context of social networks, a promising future application is to leverage models for multistrain spreading to combat the spread of misinformation across different social media platforms.
Data, Materials, and Software Availability. The code for the simulations in the paper is available in ref. 72. All proofs are available in SI Appendix.

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