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SAGE: Stealthy Attack Generation in cyber-physical systems

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ABSTRACT

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have been increasingly attacked by hackers. CPSs are especially vulnerable to attackers that have full knowledge of the system's configuration. Therefore, novel anomaly detection algorithms in the presence of a knowledgeable adversary need to be developed. However, this research is still in its infancy, due to limited attack data availability and test beds. By proposing a holistic attack modeling framework, we aim to show the vulnerability of existing detection algorithms and provide a basis for novel sensor-based cyber-attack detection. Stealthy Attack GEneration (SAGE) serves as a tool for cyber-risk assessment of existing systems and detection algorithms for practitioners and researchers alike. Stealthy attacks are characterized by malicious injections into the CPS through input, output, or both, which produce bounded changes in the detection residue. By using the SAGE framework, we generate stealthy attacks to achieve three objectives: (i) Maximize damage, (ii) Avoid detection, and (iii) Minimize the attack cost. Additionally, an attacker needs to adhere to the physical principles in a CPS (objective (iv)). The goal of SAGE is to model worst-case attacks, where we assume limited information asymmetries between attackers and defenders (e.g., insider knowledge of the attacker). Those worst-case attacks are the hardest to detect, but common in practice and allow understanding of the maximum conceivable damage. We propose an efficient solution procedure for the novel SAGE optimization problem. The SAGE framework is illustrated in three case studies. Those case studies serve as modeling guidelines for the development of novel attack detection algorithms and comprehensive cyber-physical risk assessment of CPSs. The results show that SAGE attacks can cause severe damage to a CPS, while only changing the input control signals minimally. This avoids detection and keeps the cost of an attack low. This highlights the need for more advanced detection algorithms and novel research in cyber-physical security.

1. Introduction

Cyber-physical attacks are a category of cyber-attacks that also adversely affect the physical space. Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are characterized by the interaction of physical assets and computational capabilities with information transfer. The rapid digitalization and utilization of CPSs lead to the widespread use of sensors, networked devices, and data acquisition systems. Since CPSs are deployed for high-value and safety-critical systems, the security of those systems is essential. Any successful attack leads to severe economic loss, equipment damage, or even loss of human life. We find that the limited attack data availability in cyber-physical systems hinders the research on cyber-physical attack detection methods. To develop effective cyber-physical attack detection methods, it is essential to understand the attacker’s capabilities and methods. Existing methods to generate an attack utilize random perturbations, which do not integrate the system topology and objectives of an attacker. We find that detection methods using existing types of attack data are not robust to stealthy attacks. This motivates us to develop a general-purpose framework for generating stealthy attacks. Stealthy attacks are characterized by malicious injections into the CPS through input, output, or both, which produce bounded changes in the detection residue.

Although stealthy, adversarial attacks have received some attention in the computer vision community, we are the first to holistically integrate the requirements and topology of CPSs for the design of stealthy attacks. Attacks in the CPS domain require stealthy attacks beyond image data and the consideration of a wide range of system inputs, models, and tasks (Li, Liu, Chen, Xiao, Li and Wang (2020)). Therefore, the scope of this article is to propose a general-purpose optimization framework to find the best strategy to attack a CPS and show the implications of such worst-case attacks on existing detection methods. Our framework provides a steppingstone to develop more effective attack detection methods in the future, that are robust to stealthy, worst-case attacks. Worst-case perturbations are defined in terms of the limited information asymmetry between attackers and defenders: Although the attacker might not know the specific detection model and its associated parameters, all other data and system information is...
assumed to be known to the attacker (i.e., insider attacker). This allows us to understand the maximal conceivable damage (i.e., worst-case detection performance) to a CPS for a given system setup and detection strategy.

By formulating a novel optimization problem, the "Stealthy Attack GEneration" (SAGE) framework considers the three main objectives of an attacker (maximize damage, avoid detection, and minimize attack cost), as well as the physical laws in CPSs. By applying small, worst-case perturbations to the system input variables, the SAGE attack will lead to unexpected and malicious misbehavior of the system output, while staying undetected by the systems detection algorithms.

To show the generality of our approach, we generate stealthy attacks and validate the SAGE framework on two data modalities: functional curves and image data. For functional curves, we utilize a hot rolling process simulated in MATLAB Simulink. In this setting, we evaluate the performance of seven off-the-shelf supervised machine learning models to detect SAGE attacks. In the image case studies, we use the SAGE methods to attack two state-of-the-art methods for image anomaly detection by using a large steel surface defect dataset.

The results provide a case for the severe consequences of stealthy attacks in CPSS. This research is intended to serve as a cornerstone for the development of more robust and effective detection algorithms for CPS attacks. Furthermore, by evaluating existing systems and detection models, SAGE can be utilized for the cyber-risk assessment of a CPS for practitioners and researchers alike.

The contributions of our SAGE framework are as follows:

- We introduce a comprehensive and general-purpose framework for reliability generating stealthy, worst-case attacks on CPSs. Our model formulation is intuitive and easy to understand, which allows the adaptation to a wide range of CPSs. We find that many detection methods are unable to detect stealthy SAGE attacks, even when the attacker is oblivious to the specific defense used.

- Our results highlight the need for more comprehensive detection methods: our SAGE framework provides researchers with a common baseline of attack generation, a description of attack techniques, and common evaluation pitfalls, so that future detection methods can avoid falling vulnerable to these same attack procedures.

The remaining parts of this article are organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide a review of related literature to highlight the necessity of this research. Section 3 presents the mathematical descriptions of CPSs, formulates the optimization problem, and proposes an algorithm for solving this problem. In Section 4, we illustrate the methodology with three case studies, which serve as guiding examples for the modeling of stealthy attacks. Finally, Section 5 concludes this article.

2. Literature review

Due to the rise of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) and smart manufacturing, CPSs have been increasingly exploited by cyber-attacks (Ervural et al., 2018). A CPS has grown from stand-alone systems with little security protection to a highly interconnected system that can be easily targeted by attackers over the internet. Attacks, like the computer worm "Stuxnet" attacking Siemens industrial software in 2010, or the phishing attack on a German steel mill leading to severe equipment damage in 2014, are some of the most prominent examples of the vulnerability of a CPS to cyber-physical attacks. Even though the field of information technology is developing new methodologies for cyber security, the unique characteristics of a CPS require specific attention (Zhang et al., 2019).

In general, an attack on a CPS is conducted via three steps. The first step of an attacker is to gain knowledge of the system by identifying the network topology, software, critical targets, and monitoring schemes against cyber-attacks (Han et al., 2014). Then, the attacker needs to bypass the first line of defense consisting of the firewall and an intrusion prevention system. After that, the attacker has full access to the CPS to achieve the goal by perturbing the control systems and making as much damage as possible while staying undetected. This article focuses on modeling the last step of a CPS attack, which is how to perturb the system inputs to make maximum damage to the system response and stay undetected with minimum cost.

2.1. Attacks on CPSs

In the attack domain, attacks on CPSSs can be classified into three main methods: disclosure, disruption, and deception attacks as visualized in Figure 1.

Disclosure attacks occur when sensitive or confidential information is exposed to the attacker. Disruption attacks aim at disrupting the physical processes in a CPS. Deception attacks aim to deceive the defender of a system to accept a specific incorrect version of reality (e.g., sensor measurements), causing the defender to act in a way that benefits the attacker (e.g., not raising an alarm). This article focuses on deception attacks, which can be further classified into five major subtypes of attacks:

- **Replay attack**: The attacker injects a sequence of normal control input into the system using previously recorded sensor data, while actually conducting malicious actions (Murakami et al., 2017).

- **False data injection attack**: The attacker compromises sensor readings in such a way that undetected errors are introduced into the calculation of state variables and values (Ahmed et al., 2020).

- **Zero dynamics attack**: The attacker alters the control output in a way that is consistent with the transmitted control input according to the dynamics of the system (Shim et al., 2022).

- **Covert attack**: The attacker disguises the manipulation of control actions by injecting expected sensor measurements calculated based on the system knowledge Li, Paynabar and Gebraeel (2020).
• **Stealthy/Adversarial attack**: The attacker adds small perturbations to the normal data input. In this way, the detection algorithm in the system will not detect the added perturbation. However, the composed input (normal input + perturbation) will cause a malicious system output and the system output can be precisely determined by the selection of appropriate perturbation by the attacker (Li, Paynabar and Gebraeel (2020)).

Some of those attack subtypes are highly related and not mutually exclusive. However, stealthy attacks are the hardest ones to detect. They do not solely alter or disguise sensor readings. On the contrary, stealthy attacks add small perturbations to the system control variables. Since those perturbations are so small that there is no need to disguise them. They appear to be caused by the system’s natural variability. On the other hand, they will have a detrimental effect on the system outputs. However, the effect on the system output could lead detection algorithms to raise an alarm. Therefore, we will assume that they are disgusted by false data injection or replay attacks or are not monitored.

We note that there are some existing tools for attack generation in CPSs (Jeon et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2021). Those methods carefully design attacks for certain subclasses of cyber-physical systems. With our stealthy attack generation framework, we extend this literature by providing a general-purpose modeling framework, which intuitively integrates all objectives and constraints of an attacker to a CPS and proposes a comprehensive optimization framework to solve this — in general — nonconvex problem to global optimality.

Furthermore, there exist several testbeds and datasets (Conti et al., 2021) for security research in CPSs in various fields such as electric grids (Hahn et al., 2013) or water treatment plants (Goh et al., 2016). However, those testbeds and datasets might not be well suited for a particular application scenario, such as a particular manufacturing system. Therefore, we see the SAGE framework as an extension to a much wider range of systems, which allows vulnerability assessment and robust attack detection development based only on the historic data and the system configuration of the CPS at hand.

### 2.2. Machine learning methods for CPS attack detection

In recent years, multiple detection algorithms have been developed by utilizing machine learning classifiers for the defense against cyber-attacks (Pasqualetti et al., 2013; Guan and Ge, 2017; Wu et al., 2019; Yang et al., 2019; Li, Li, Zhang, Kou, Ye, Song and Mantooth (2020)). Those algorithms have achieved state-of-the-art detection performance on existing types of attack generation schemes such as false data injection, replay, zero dynamics, and even covert attacks. However, those supervised learning techniques require strong assumptions and can be considered as the best-case scenario for the defender of the system: historical training data needs to be available with labels of in-control (e.g., no attack) and attack conditions. Additionally, the current attack needs to come from the same generative process as the historical attacks.

### 2.3. Adversarial machine learning and cyber-physical security

A large array of prior work has addressed the problem of generating adversarial examples for neural network image classifiers (Akhtar et al. 2018). However, the literature on adversarial data has mainly focused on the image domain, and limited efforts have been made to generalize the concepts to a wide range of data modalities and system models (Zizzo et al., 2019).

Existing works on cyber-physical adversarial attacks are overly specific to one particular system setup or neglect if those attacks are realizable according to the physical laws of the system (Feng et al. 2017; Zizzo et al., 2020). Several methods assume that only a subset of the sensors can be compromised, which tremendously limits the action space for the attacker Li, Lee, Yang, Sun and Tomsovic (2020).

Contrary to adversarial images, the attack generation scheme in CPSs needs to consider all three objectives of an attack (e.g., maximize damage, minimize detection, minimize attack cost) and also consider the system model and the physical laws of the system.

### 2.4. State-estimation-based attacks and defenses for CPS

There is a large body of work in state-estimation techniques for cyber-physical intrusion detection in various safety-critical CPSs, such as industrial control systems (Inayat et al., 2022) or power grids (Ashok et al., 2016; Guo et al., 2018;
Jin et al., 2018). Mo and Sinopoli. (2012) introduced a framework to generate integrity attacks by formalizing the adversary’s strategy as a constrained control problem. However, this method does not consider either the physical laws of the system, or the attack cost. Furthermore, a wide variety of methods have been proposed to attack a CPS by perturbing the state estimation (Kosut et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2014). In a response to those types of threats, robust state estimation techniques have become widespread in practice, nullifying this type of attack scheme (Ding et al., 2020).

In a nutshell, it is essential to investigate the modeling of stealthy attacks for designing more resilient systems and detection algorithms. We will demonstrate that if an attacker knows the current configuration of a CPS, most existing detection algorithms have vulnerabilities and can be bypassed by attackers. Given this fact, the existing attack and detection algorithms are based on too strong assumptions, which may not mimic the behavior of a knowledgeable attacker. Therefore, an effective detection algorithm requires the defenders to first change perspective and “think like a hacker” to identify the weaknesses of a system. By proposing the SAGE framework, we aim to provide a holistic modeling framework that can serve as a stepping stone for the development of more robust attack detection algorithms.

3. SAGE methodology

This section first describes the system used to model the dynamics of a CPS. Afterward, the SAGE framework is introduced, which considers the main objectives of an attacker consisting of maximizing the damage to the system while staying undetected and keeping the cost of an attack low. Finally, an efficient solution procedure for the nonconvex SAGE formulation is derived.

3.1. System modeling

This section describes the model used to characterize the system dynamics of a CPS. For a general CPS, the process outputs $Y_t$ at time $t$ can be in a format of multiple functional curves, images, structured point clouds, or categorical variables. We assume that the effect of the inputs on the outputs can have a hybrid or nonlinear relationship, which allows more realistic modeling of a complex CPS. The system model can be obtained with the best fit to the historical data from a variety of potential models, such as linear regression, Gaussian process model, or neural networks, and is represented as

$$ Y_t = g_1(u_i, \theta_1) + g_2(x_i, \theta_2) + \varepsilon \quad (1) $$

where $g_i(u_i, \theta_i)$, $i = 1, 2$ are some general functions (e.g., linear, nonlinear, varying with time) with parameter vector $\theta_i$, representing the effect of the control variables $u_i$ and the process variables $x_i$ (not controllable but observable) on the system output $Y_t$, respectively. $\varepsilon$ is the matrix containing the modeling error where every entry is a zero mean additive Gaussian noise with variance $\sigma^2$. The increasing integration of deep learning approaches into CPS, then model (1) aims to unify a wide variety of models to model stealthy attacks in nonlinear settings. This general formulation also allows for the hybrid settings of linearized and nonlinear perception pipelines that are fused in a deterministic or stochastic manner.

3.2. Stealthy Attack GEneration (SAGE) formulation

This subsection will first discuss the threat model, which is a structured representation of all the information and assumptions that affect the security of a CPS. Afterward, the SAGE attack formulation and solution procedures are presented.

3.2.1. Threat model

To model the worst-case scenario for a defender, we assume that the attacker knows the system configuration in a gray box setting. In particular, it is assumed that the attacker has bypassed the first line of defense (i.e., the firewall) and has full access to the system. Thus, the attacker can inject control actions at any point and time. It is assumed that an attacker has an intention to negatively affect the system output. Examples of such damage to the system include a reduction in the production rate, production quality, system efficiency, equipment degradation, or failure. We assume that the attacker has full knowledge of the system model. In the white box setting, the attacker directly knows the model $g_i$ and its parameters $\theta_i$. In the gray box setting, the attacker estimates a surrogate model for $g_i$ based on historical data. For the detection algorithm used in the CPS system, we assume a black-box or gray-box setting:

1. If the attacker does not know the systems detection algorithm (black box), they can generically minimize the difference in distribution between normal and attack data as illustrated in the steel rolling case study in Section 4.1.

2. (ii) In the gray box setting, we assume that the attacker knows the detection algorithm, but not the specific detection model parameters. In this setting, an attacker can only estimate the detection model parameters based on historical data. The attacker does not know the specific out-of-control or attack data utilized during model training by the defender. We assume that all the systems control and process variables are being monitored. The system output measurements are either (i) disguised through false data injection or covert attacks, (ii) not monitored, or (iii) monitored far downstream in a multi-stage (manufacturing) system, which already would have caused severe upstream damage until its detection.

We note that this threat model restricts the attackers’ capabilities as little as possible. Therefore, it is extremely stealthy and hard to detect.
3.2.2. Attackers optimization problem – “Think like a hacker”

Based on the threat model, which summarizes the attackers’ capabilities, we will “think like a hacker” (Esteves et al., 2017) and define three key attacker’s objectives when generating stealthy attacks on a CPS:

1. Maximize damage: The goal of an attacker is to cause damage to physical components such as machines, equipment, parts, assemblies, and products in a CPS. Thus, the cyber attacker can cause severe damage to the CPS by increasing the wear, breakage, scrap, or any other changes to the original design.

2. Avoid detection: An attacker aims to manipulate a CPS in such a way that the altered control actions stay undetected. Most equipment has some hard-wired safety modes that will shut down the machines once they reach a safety-relevant operating condition. Therefore, staying undetected will directly contribute to the first objective to maximize damage.

3. Minimize attack cost: Attacking all control actions might be costly or complicated, because different sensing data are saved in different databases or governed by different operating systems or security protocols. Therefore, the attacker will want to keep the cost of an attack low by identifying very few control actions that have the biggest impact on the system outputs.

4. Physical limits: Any changes to the system need to adhere to the physical limits of the CPS.

Consequently, the attacker’s optimization problem is formulated as Equation (2), which exploits the CPS system model and the weaknesses of the detection algorithm while considering the physical constraints of the system:

$$\min_{u^t} - \left\| d(g_1(u^t, \theta_1) + g_2(x_{ph}^t, \theta_2)) - d(g_1(u_{IC}^t, \theta_1) + g_2(x_{ph}^{IC}, \theta_2)) \right\|_p$$

s.t.

$$\|f(u_{IC}^t) - f(u^t)\|_p \leq \varepsilon_1$$

$$C(u^t) \leq \varepsilon_2$$

$$\|ph(u^t)\|_p \leq \varepsilon_3$$

(2a)

(2b)

(2c)

(2d)

where \(d(\cdot)\) denotes a damage function corresponding to some undesirable outputs of a system given the in-control and attack-control actions, respectively. Furthermore, \(u^t\) are the perturbed control inputs by the attacker, which should be close to the normal or in-control control inputs \(u_{IC}^t\). The process variables, which are not controllable, are denoted by \(x_{ph}^t\). The distances are denoted in terms of the \(\ell_p\)-norm to allow for flexible modeling requirements. \(\varepsilon_1\) denotes the maximal allowable distance (i.e., decision boundary) between some general detection or monitoring function \(f(\cdot)\) applied to \(u^t\) and \(u_{IC}^t\); \(\varepsilon_2\) denotes the maximal allowable cost of an attack strategy \(u^t\), and \(\varepsilon_3\) denotes the maximal allowable range from the physical laws modeled by a general function \(ph(\cdot)\) of the attack.

The detailed explanation of each term in Equation (2) is as follows:

1. The objective function (2a) incorporates the first objective of the attacker, which is to maximize the damage to the system. This is equivalent to minimizing the negative difference between the damage function \(d(\cdot)\) for the in-control and the attacker’s control actions respectively. If only the system output deviation is of concern, \(d(\cdot)\) reduces to the identity function. In cases where the state space has significant asymmetries, the \(d(\cdot)\) functions can be defined as a (binary) mapping to a dangerous state. Note, that the process variables will cancel in this formulation since those are not controllable and therefore should be kept at their in-control values during the attack.

2. The first constraint (2b) term corresponds to the second objective of the attacker, which is to avoid detection. A detection algorithm is represented by a general function \(\cdot\). By ensuring the \(\ell_p\)-norm distance between the output of the detection function \(\cdot\) applied to both attackers and in-control control actions falls below the detection threshold \(\varepsilon_1\), the attacker can avoid detection.

3. The second constraint (2c) term corresponds to the last objective of an attacker, which is to minimize the attack cost. This term considers how costly it is to attack a particular control action. The executed changes to the control variables should be within the attacker’s (computational) budget \(\varepsilon_2\). Examples of increased attack costs could be cases in which different control subsystems are secured by different mechanisms (e.g., firewalls) with different levels of security or the computational effort to execute changes to control variables is high.

4. The last constraint (2d) term ensures that the physical limits of the CPS are met via a physics function \(ph(\cdot)\). The function \(ph(\cdot)\) maps the attacker’s actions to the physical constraints. Control actions can only change within physical limits \(\varepsilon_3\) (e.g., the magnitude of change in consecutive time steps should be small). This term requires physical knowledge of the process, which can be obtained from domain experts or prior research findings.

The system model in Equation (1) is known in advance or at least the predictions are accessible in a black box manner. The functions \(\cdot\) and \(ph(\cdot)\) are also known in advance. In Table 1, several common monitoring statistics and physical constraints are introduced as guiding examples for the choice of \(\cdot\) and \(ph(\cdot)\). If the monitoring scheme or physical constraints are not known, the functions can be chosen as the identity and variance function by default as introduced in the steel rolling case study in Section 4.1. To further enhance this strategy, a distributional distance such as the Kullback-Leibler or Wasserstein could be selected as the monitoring function \(\cdot\). Without knowing any particular
details about the applied detection model, this approach is still able to fool common machine learning classifiers as illustrated in the case study.

It should be pointed out that the SAGE attack is designed for patient adversaries, who have collected historic data about the process, or insider attackers. Therefore, the SAGE attacker is an expert of the CPS to be attacked. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the system model $g_1(\cdot)$ and $g_2(\cdot)$, the monitoring function $f(\cdot)$, and physical limits $ph(\cdot)$ are known in advance before conducting the optimization for stealthy attack control actions. This assumption does not artificially limit the capabilities of an attacker. It rather leads to extremely stealthy attacks, which may be considered the worst-case scenario for the defender. However, if a defender constantly changes the monitoring algorithm or even the system setup, SAGE attacks may not be able to simultaneously fulfill their four objectives. Also, in cases where the detection model that monitors the system is not fully characterized, this attack framework might not lead to stealthy attacks. Another limitation is the possibly nonconvex formulation, which has an optimality guarantee only under certain conditions as discussed in the next section.

Using the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions, we can reformulate Equation (2) to alleviate the burden of explicitly computing inequality constraints as follows:

$$\min_{u_t^k} -d\left(g_1(u_t^k, \theta_1) + g_2(x_{tC}^k, \theta_2)\right) - d\left[ g_1(u_t^{IC}, \theta_1) + g_2(x_{tC}^{IC}, \theta_2) \right]_p \nonumber$$

$$+\lambda_1||f(u_{tC}^k) - f(u_t^k)||_p + \lambda_2 C(u_t^k) + \lambda_3 || ph(u_t^k) ||_p$$

(3)

where $\lambda_1$, $\lambda_2$ and $\lambda_3$ denote the Lagrange multipliers that correspond to the constraints (2b), (2c) and (2d), respectively.

The global minimum of the original constrained optimization problem (Equation (2)) corresponds to a saddle point in the Lagrangian function (Equation (3)), provided that the necessary regularity conditions of stationarity, primal feasibility, dual feasibility, and complementary slackness are satisfied. For a more detailed explanation of this widely used approach, interested readers are referred to Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (2001). We note that for nonconvex optimization problems, the Lagrange multipliers $\lambda_1$, $\lambda_2$ and $\lambda_3$ may not be unique. Therefore, we resort simultaneously solving for the optimal solution and the appropriate Lagrange multipliers by utilizing the Branch-and-Reduce framework introduced in Subsection 3.2.3.

### Table 1. Modeling examples for monitoring function ($f(\cdot)$) and physical constraint ($ph(\cdot)$).

| Monitoring Scheme | $f(\cdot)$ | Physical Constraint | $ph(\cdot)$ |
|------------------|------------|---------------------|-------------|
| X-bar & S Charts | Identity + Variance | Smooth changes over time | $u_{tC}^k - u_{tC}^{k-1}$ |
| Hotelling $T^2$ Control Chart | $T^2$ statistic | Sparse changes over time | $||u_{tC}^k - u_{tC}^{k-1}||_1$ |
| Kernel Methods (e.g., SVM or PCA) | Corresponding Kernel function | Limited variation patterns | $||u_{tC}^k - u_{tC}^{k-1}||_2$ |
| Gradient Boosting | Weighted sum of weak learners | Piecewise constant changes | Fused lasso penalty (Tibshirani et al. 2005) |
| Neural Network Architectures | Inverse network function via back-propagation | Variables within physically possible limits | $||u_{tC}^k||_2$ with appropriate Lagrange multiplier $\lambda_2$ |

### 3.2.3. Solution procedure

The SAGE problem formulation is an inherently nonconvex and NP-hard problem. To make the SAGE framework applicable to a wide range of general nonconvex functions, the Branch-And-Reduce Optimization Navigator (BARON) algorithm is utilized to solve the nonconvex formulation to global optimum (Liu et al., 2019).

The output dimension of the nonconvex constraint functions is denoted by $m_1$, $m_2$ and $m_3$, respectively, and $X$ denotes a set of constraints for the search space. For example, $X$ could denote the $6\sigma$ limits of the attacked control variables, because any attack outside of those limits can very easily be detected. The standard Lagrangian subproblem of Equation (2) is given in Equation 3. However, for the dual approach to yield any computational advantage, the so-called Lagrangian subproblem must be much easier to solve than the primal problem.

For simplicity of the problem presented in the remainder of this article, we use the following notations to replace the related terms in Equation (2):

$$x = u_t^k \in \mathbb{R}^n,$$

$$o_1(x) = -\left( d(g_1(u_t^k, \theta_1) + g_2(x_{tC}^k, \theta_2)) - d(g_1(u_t^{IC}, \theta_1) + g_2(x_{tC}^{IC}, \theta_2)) \right)_p : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R},$$

$$o_2(x) = ||f(u_{tC}^k) - f(u_t^k)||_p \leq \epsilon_1 : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^{m_1},$$

$$o_3(x) = C(u_t^k) \leq \epsilon_2 : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^{m_2},$$

$$o_4(x) = || ph(u_t^k) ||_p \leq \epsilon_3 : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^{m_3}$$

Then, Equation (2) can be defined as the Lagrangian subproblem:

$$\inf_{x \in X} \ell(x, (\lambda_0, \lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3)) = \inf_{x \in X} \{ -\lambda_0 o_1(x) - \lambda_1 o_2(x) - \lambda_2 o_3(x) - \lambda_3 o_4(x) \},$$

(4)

where $(\lambda_0, \lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3) \leq 0$. The additional dual variable $\lambda_0$ homogenizes the problem and allows us to reformulate the SAGE attack into a unified BARON range-reduction problem. The constraints $\epsilon_1$, $\epsilon_2$ and $\epsilon_3$ enter the Lagrangian subproblem as $\lambda_1 \epsilon_1$, $\lambda_2 \epsilon_2$, and $\lambda_3 \epsilon_3$, respectively. Therefore, they are constants that do not alter the optimal solution and only need to be considered in the Lagrangian master problem (Equation (3)). Assume that $b_0$ is an upper bound on
the optimal objective function value of Equation (2) and consider the following range-reduction problem:

\[
h^* = \inf_{x_i, u_0, u_1, u_2, u_3} \{ h(u_0, u_1, u_2, u_3) \} | \alpha_i(x) \leq u_0 \leq b_0, \]
\[
o_2(x) \leq u_1 \leq c_1, o_3(x) \leq u_2 \leq c_2, o_4(x) \leq u_3 \leq c_3, x \in X, \]

where \( h \) is assumed to be some semi-continuous functions. Then, Equation (5) can be restated as

\[
h^* = \inf_{x_i, u_0, u_1, u_2, u_3} \{ h(u_0, u_1, u_2, u_3) \}
\]

s.t.
\[
-\lambda_0 o_1(x) - u_0 - \lambda_1 (o_2(x) - u_1) - \lambda_2 (o_3(x) - u_2) - \lambda_3 (o_4(x) - u_3) \leq 0
\]
\[
(\lambda_0, \lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3) \leq 0
\]
\[
(0, u_1, u_2, u_3) \leq (b_0, c_1, c_2, c_3)
\]

(6)

However, the computational complexity of Equation (6) is the same as Equation (4). Therefore, we lower bound \( h^* \) with the optimal value of the following problem:

\[
h_l = \inf_{x_i, u_0, u_1, u_2, u_3} \{ h(u_0, u_1, u_2, u_3) \}
\]

s.t.
\[
-\lambda_0 o_1(x) - u_0 - \lambda_1 (o_2(x) - u_1) - \lambda_2 (o_3(x) - u_2) - \lambda_3 (o_4(x) - u_3) \leq 0
\]
\[
(\lambda_0, \lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3) \leq 0
\]
\[
(0, u_1, u_2, u_3) \leq (b_0, c_1, c_2, c_3)
\]

(7)

This domain reduction problem can be leveraged for efficiently solving the SAGE attack by restricting \( h(u_0, u_1, u_2, u_3) \) to \( a_0 u_0 + a_1 u_1 + a_2 u_2 + a_3 u_3 \), where \( (a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3) \geq 0 \) and \( (a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3) \neq 0 \). Using Fenchel–Rockafellar duality, the BARON algorithm derived in (Tawarmalani, 2001) can be applied to iteratively obtain lower and upper bounds on the range-reduction problem of the SAGE attack formulation.

In step 2 of the algorithm, \((\lambda_0, \lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3) \leq 0 \) implies that \( u_k^g = f(x^k), u_k^c = g_1(x^k), u_k^e = g_2(x^k), \) and \( u_k^e = g_3(x^k) \). Furthermore, the relaxations of the BARON framework enjoy quadratic convergence properties and are an efficient procedure for obtaining global optima to nonlinear programs (Tawarmalani and Sahinidis, 2004). In particular, the theorem for optimality-based range reduction (Tawarmalani, 2001) applies to the derived BARON algorithm for solving the SAGE attack:

**Theorem 1** (Tawarmalani, 2001). Suppose the Lagrangian subproblem in Equation (5) is solved for certain dual multipliers \((\lambda_0, \lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3) \leq 0 \). Then, for each \( i \) such that \((\lambda_0^i, \lambda_1^i, \lambda_2^i, \lambda_3^i) \neq 0 \), the cuts \( g_k^i(x) \geq (b_0 - \inf_{x} f(x, \lambda_0, \lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3)/\lambda_p, p = 0, 1, 2, 3) \) do not chop off any optimal solution of the initial Equation (4).

This theorem implies that the solution will eventually converge to a global optimum, due to the quadratic convergence of the BARON algorithm. For a detailed discussion, related proofs, and generalizations we refer interested readers to Tawarmalani (2001).

The BARON algorithm to solve the SAGE formulation is also available as commercial software (Sahinidis, 1996). For readers interested in generating a SAGE attack with no in-depth optimization knowledge or no commercial nonlinear solver licenses, we recommend solving the SAGE formulation using efficient and widely used algorithms, such as Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). In the literature, several convergence guarantees are provided for SGD algorithms in the nonconvex setting (Nguyen et al., 2018). When using SGD on common software platforms, a few best practices should be considered. The attacks should be initialized with historic, in-control data. This will lead to much faster convergence. Furthermore, choosing upper and lower bounds within the physical limits of the data (e.g., image pixel values from 0 to 255, control variables within 60 limits) will reduce the probability of detection and drastically reduce the solution space of the problem.
The choice of Lagrange multipliers of the SAGE formulation is crucial to the efficacy of the attack. Binary search can be adapted to find the optimal set of parameters for any arbitrary choice of algorithm. The binary search should consider the three main objectives of the attacker and tune the hyperparameters \( \lambda_i, \ i = 1, 2, 3 \) until the Attack Effectivity (AE), Average Perturbation (AP), and Attack Cost (AC) are within prescribed limits. The attack effectivity can either be computed by the first SAGE term or by an attack-specific metric considering the attacked system model. Similarly, the average perturbation can be derived from terms (2b) and (2d) or the defender’s monitoring algorithm. The attack cost is directly calculated from the third SAGE term.

4. Case studies

In this section, we use three case studies to illustrate and validate the SAGE methodology proposed in Section 3. Those case studies are intended as modeling guidelines for the application to other CPSs. We will demonstrate how to use the proposed framework for two data modalities: functional curve and image data. All the case studies follow the same SAGE framework proposed in Equation (2). However, the formulations need to be adapted to the specific case. To summarize the procedure, we provide a pseudo-code with the respective inputs and outputs of each case study. The case studies are intended to serve as guiding examples for the generation of stealthy attacks in a wide range of systems.

4.1. Case study with functional curve data – Hot steel rolling process

To show the vulnerability of common CPSs to stealthy attacks, a MATLAB Simulink testbed (MathWorks, 2022) for one-stage plate rolling is used to illustrate the devastating effect of small, but worst-case, perturbations on functional curves in a CPS. The testbed models a two-axis rolling mill. In a rolling process, steel rollers are used to press sheet metal to a specific thickness and add strength via strain hardening to improve surface finish. The four control inputs to this system are the roller gap and roller force in the x-direction and the y-direction, respectively. The testbed uses a Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) LQG regulator to control the horizontal and vertical thickness of a steel plate in a hot steel rolling mill. For further details on the testbed setup, interested readers are referred to the corresponding Simulink documentation (MathWorks, 2022). The only modification to the testbed is the addition of four “import” blocks to link the attacker’s control signals generated from the SAGE formulation to the simulated CPS as shown in Figure 2. The import blocks allow us to verify the accuracy of the system model. We will report the actual output signal obtained from the simulation after injecting the attackers’ control actions. This is more accurate and realistic than simply plugging the attacker’s control actions back into a data-driven system model, which is only an approximation of the true system dynamics.

The monitoring of multivariate signals via multivariate control charts is a standard practice in the industry and also in some recent research papers. Therefore, we use the first case study to illustrate the potential of SAGE to deceive a very popular detection model based on a multivariate- Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) control chart.

4.1.1. Attack on multivariate-EWMA chart

A Multivariate Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (MEWMA) control chart is commonly used to monitor CPSs. We first calculate \( Z_t = \Lambda X_t + (1-\Lambda)Z_{t-1}, \) where \( Z_t \) is the \( t \)th observation vector, \( Z_0 \) is the vector of variable values from historic data, \( \Lambda \) is the \( \text{diag}(\lambda_1, \lambda_2, ..., \lambda_p) \), which is a diagonal matrix with \( \lambda_1, \lambda_2, ..., \lambda_p \in (0, 1) \) on the main diagonal, and \( p \) is the number of control variables. Then the test statistics of the MEWMA is given by \( T_t = Z_t^T \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} Z_k \). The alarm will be triggered whenever \( T_t \) is above the 1-\( \alpha \)-95% quantile of its empirical distribution under normal conditions, and \( \alpha \) is the desired Type-I error rate. We incorporate this test statistics directly into the framework by minimizing the monitoring static on the attacker’s control to avoid detection:

\[
\min_{\mathbf{u}} - \left\| Y_t^{ref} - B_0 - \sum_{j=1}^{4} \beta_j u_{j,t}^{ref} \right\|_2^2 + \lambda_1 \left\| T_t^2(u_t^{A}) \right\|_2^2 + \lambda_2 \left\| u_t^{A} \right\|_2^4 \quad u_t^{A} - u_{t-1} + \lambda_3 C(u_t^{A}),
\]

(8)

where \( Y_t^{ref} = [Y_x, Y_y] \) denotes the engineering specification of quality response and is a constant value in this case. The four control variables are denoted by \( \mathbf{u} = [x_{\text{force}}, x_{\text{gap}}, y_{\text{force}}, y_{\text{gap}}] \). In this setting, \( d(g_1(u_t) + g_2(x_t)) = d(g_1(u_t) + B_0) = Y_t^{ref} \) and \( d(\cdot) \) reduces to the identity function (i.e., \( d(\cdot) = Id(\cdot) \)). Since the system response, in this case, is measured in terms of \( x \)- and \( y \)-axis thickness variation, the...
goal would be to have no variation so \( Y_{t}^{\text{ref}} = \overline{0} \). In this case, \( u_{j}^{IC} \) is chosen as historic data of the same length as the attack to mimic a replay attack. Furthermore, the cost function is chosen as

\[
C(u_{j}^{A}) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{for } j = 1, 3 \\ 2, & \text{for } j = 2, 4 \end{cases}
\]

This represents the fact that the roll gap \((j = 1, 3)\) is easy to attack while the roller force \((j = 2, 4)\) requires more effort because they are protected through different security protocols. The monitoring statistic \( f(\cdot) \) is set to the MEWMA monitoring statistic \( T_{n}^{f} \).

The optimization problem was solved using the proposed BARON algorithm for the SAGE formulation in Section 3.3.2. For better visualization, only 150-time steps of the attack are visualized in the following figures. The attack avoids detection by the MEWMA chart as visualized in Figure 3.

On the other hand, the attack leads to maximal damage to the system response, which is far away from the normal system response (Figure 4).

### 4.1.2. SAGE attack performance evaluation and comparison with other methods

To show that small perturbations of the control variables can lead to a large change in the system response, the Attack Effectivity (AE) and Average Perturbation (AP) are computed as follows:

- Attack effectivity \( AE = \sum_{j=1}^{4} \frac{\left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} |Y_{j}^{t} - u_{j}^{IC}| \right)}{\sigma_{Y}} \)
- Average Perturbation \( AP = \sum_{j=1}^{4} \frac{\left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} |Y_{j}^{t} - Y_{j}^{IC}| \right)}{\sigma_{Y}} \)

where \( n \) denotes the length of the attack, \( \sigma_{u_{j}^{IC}} \) is the in-control standard deviation of control variable \( j \), \( \sigma_{Y} \) is the in-control standard deviation of the system responses, and \( Y_{j}^{t} \) is the resulting system response to the attack. Those metrics essentially measure the absolute distance between in-control and attack in terms of the number of in-control standard deviations. The results are summarized in Table 2 showing the small perturbation levels of the attacks while achieving very effective attacks.

To further evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed SAGE attack, seven machine learning techniques commonly used in the literature for cyber-attack detection algorithms in CPSs are evaluated for their effectiveness to detect stealthy attacks (see Table 5, which is presented later in the article). The hyperparameters of the respective methods were tuned via grid search to achieve the best possible detection results. In particular, a Support Vector Machine (SVM), k Nearest Neighbor (kNN), Random Forest (RF), Bagging, Gradient Boosting Machine (GBM), Decision Tree (DT), and a Deep Neural Network (DNN) were used to classify the presence of an attack. The labels for those supervised machine learning methods are obtained as follows: The normal operating conditions are labeled as no attack, and the generated attack signals obtained via our SAGE framework are labeled as an attack. This shows the potential of our method: using our stealthy attack framework, sophisticated attacks can be generated, which can be utilized for supervised learning approaches.

We note that the proposed SAGE attacks were not aware of those detection algorithms when we formalized the SAGE optimization problem. In particular, those detection functions were not considered as a detection function \( f(\cdot) \) during the optimization of the attack. We simply enforce the MEWMA, which will incapacitate most of the detection methods. Note that not even distributional distances such as Kullback-Leibler or Wasserstein distances had to be utilized to fool those detection methods.

The results in Table 3 show that if the SAGE attack considers the MEWMA statistic, which ensures that the attack and in-control data are similar in terms of their first two distributional moments (mean and (co)variance), none of those six methods can achieve satisfactory detection performance. While the DNN performs the best, its detection accuracy of 54.79% is not sufficient for reliable and fast attack detection. Note that a random coin flip (i.e., attack, no attack) at each time point would result in a 50% accuracy.

This example shows how flexible the SAGE formulation can be adjusted to make the existing detection algorithms ineffective even if the detection algorithm such as the machine learning classifiers are not known a priori.

### 4.2. Case study with image data

In this subsection, we will provide a generalization of the SAGE attack to learning-enabled CPSs utilizing two state-of-the-art anomaly detection algorithms. Another goal of this case study is to illustrate the potential of the SAGE framework on other data formats, in particular image data. We provide a case for the severe consequences of small, but intentional, perturbations to control variables on image responses in CPSs. Therefore, we will attack both the Smooth Spare Decomposition (SSD) method (Yan et al., 2017), which is a benchmark image denoising and anomaly detection algorithm in the field of manufacturing, and a Convolutional Neural Network in combination with Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (Ribeiro et al., 2016), which is a state-of-the-art method in the field of classification and object detection.

The dataset used for both attacks is the Northeastern University (NEU) surface defect database (Song and Yan, 2013), which contains six typical surface defects of hot-rolled steel strips. The dataset includes 1800 grayscale images, with 300 samples of each of the six different surface defects (i.e., rolled-in scale (RS), patches (Pa), crazing (Cr), pitted surface (PS), inclusion (In) and scratches (Sc)).

#### 4.2.1. SAGE attack on smooth-sparse-decomposition

Firstly, we attack the SSD method (Yan et al., 2017), which decomposes an image into three components: A smooth image background, sparse anomalous regions, and random noise, as illustrated in Figure 5.
The goal of the attack is to add small perturbations to the image, which are indistinguishable from the original image for the human eye. To make this perceived image loss more objective, we measure the distance between normal and attacked images in terms of a $L_2$-norm perturbation, which is a standard procedure in computer vision.

However, those perturbed attack images should lead to a bad system response. In this case, the system response is the anomaly region. We want to change the anomaly region as much as possible. When decomposing the image into background, anomaly, and noise via SSD, we want to

| Table 2. AE and AP of SAGE attacks. |
|------------------------------------|
| MEWMA Attack | AE  | AP   |
|------------- |-----|------|
|             | 11.024 | 0.123 |

Figure 2. SAGE attack to a hot rolling process.

Figure 3. Attackers’ control actions (red) and in-control data (black) are both within the control limits of the MEWMA chart.

Figure 4. System response after an attack (red) and in-control system response (black).
detect the anomalies in different regions than where they actually do exist. This means, when the operators try to fix the problem, they will draw a wrong conclusion regarding the root cause of the anomalies and make the damage even worse by taking the wrong actions. In this circumstance, the SAGE attack formulation reduces to the following optimization problem:

$$\min_{y^A_t} -\|\theta - \theta^{SSD}_2 (y^A_t)\|_F^2 + \lambda_1 \|y^A_t - y^{original}_t\|_2 + \lambda_2 \|y^{original}_t - y^{A}_{t-1}\|_1 + \lambda_3 \|y^{A}_{t-1} - y^{original}_t\|_2$$

(9)

where $y^A_t$ denotes the image that the attacker will inject into the system at time $t$, $\theta$ denotes the fixed and known anomaly region of the normal image, $\theta^{SSD}_2$ is a function of $y^A_t$ and denotes the extracted anomaly region from the attacker’s image via the SSD method. The goal of the attacker is to maximize the damage by letting $\theta^{SSD}_2$ be as far away as possible from the ground truth anomaly $\theta$. Furthermore, to avoid being detected, the attackers’ image $y^A_t$ should be close to the original image before the attack $y^{original}_t$ in terms of a $L_2$-norm perturbation. The computational cost increases with the number of pixels attacked in an image. Therefore, the cost function is chosen as the $l_1$-norm to induce sparsity and attack as few pixels as possible. Since the monitoring of a process usually consists of streaming data from each time step $t$, the added perturbations in consecutive time steps should not be too different since this might be physically impossible. Furthermore, extreme changes over time might alert appropriate detection algorithms and lead to detection. This behavior is enforced by the third and the last terms in the formulation (Equation (9)).

The SAGE attack on SSD (Equation (9)) was solved using the BARON framework introduced in Section 3.2.3. As shown in Figure 6, the image before and after the attack is almost indistinguishable to the human eye.

On the other hand, the outputs of the SSD algorithm before and after the attack are significantly different (Figure 7). After the attack, the false alarm rate has increased significantly, due to many regions now being identified incorrectly as surface defects. This effect cannot be achieved by simply adding random noise to the images since the SSD method inherently decomposes the pictures in a smooth, sparse, and noise component.

| Method | MEWMA Attack |
|--------|--------------|
| SVM    | 48.28        |
| kNN    | 47.89        |
| RF     | 48.58        |
| Bagging| 48.49        |
| GBM    | 51.84        |
| DT     | 52.08        |
| DNN    | 54.79        |

Table 3. Detection results of different machine learning methods (bold marks best-performing).
To show the generality of the SAGE formulation in attacking multiple classes of anomalies, the entire data set of 1800 images is selected and the following metrics are defined corresponding to the objectives of the attacker:

- Attack effectivity: $AE = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( |w_i^{\text{pred}} - w_i^a| \right)$
- Average Pixel Perturbation: $APP = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{m=1}^{m} |r_{i,m}^{\text{pred}} - r_{i,m}^a|}{nm255}$

where $n$ and $m$ denote the height and width of the image, respectively. In this case study, the images have the size $n = m = 200$. The larger the AE value, the more damage the attacker can do to the anomaly region; and the smaller the APP value, the closer the attacked image will be to the original image. Note that the APP is scaled by 255 to account for the range of the pixel intensity values from 0 to 255. The averaged results of those metrics for the 1800 images are shown in Table 4.

As we can see from the results of the surface defects, after applying small, but intentional, perturbations via the SAGE framework, the SSD algorithm can be fooled by falsely adding and/or deleting anomaly regions, while generating an attack image that is virtually indistinguishable to the human eye. This case study shows the generality of the SAGE formulation in attacking multiple classes of anomalies, even for sophisticated anomaly detection algorithms such as SSD, which utilizes advanced optimization techniques. Therefore, our proposed framework can easily be adapted for other image anomaly detection methods, as long as the parameters of the detection algorithms are explicitly known or at least predictions from the detection algorithm can be accessed in a black box manner.

### 4.2.2. SAGE attack on CNN-LIME

This case study will use the SAGE strategy to attack a CNN-LIME (Ribeiro et al., 2016). A Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanation (LIME) explains the prediction of any classifier by treating it as a black box model and learning an interpretable model locally around the prediction. A LIME finds the region of an image that leads to the classification of that image to a particular class. Given this fact, it is related to object detection algorithms that locate objects of interest in an image by predicting a boundary around the object. Based on previous research, object detection algorithms are much more difficult to attack (Xie et al., 2017). Therefore, attacking CNN-LIME will demonstrate the immense capabilities of the proposed SAGE formulation in attacking a wide range of algorithms.

#### Development of a CNN-LIME model based on the NEU surface detection datasets:

In the modeling efforts, transfer learning with weights from the MobileNet is utilized to obtain a good classification model. A 99.9% model accuracy is achieved by initializing the CNN architecture with those weights and fine-tuning it from the MobileNet is utilized to obtain a good classification model. A 99.9% model accuracy is achieved by initializing the CNN architecture with those weights and fine-tuning it

### Table 4. AE and APP of SAGE attack applied to SSD.

| SAGE Attack | AEE (%) | APP |
|-------------|---------|-----|
|             | 40.534  | 0.0482 |

### Table 5. Exemplary classification results before and after the attack (highest-class probability bold).

| Class Label | RS | PS | Cr | Pa | In | Sc |
|-------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Before Attack | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.996 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| After Attack  | 0.041 | 0.107 | 0.021 | 0.0836 | 0.0836 | 0.6954 |

Figure 7. Exemplary recovered anomaly using SSD from the original and the attacked images.
region away from the original one to make the attacker
avoid any suspicion and justify the differently classified
malicious class prediction seems legitimate. To avoid detec-
tion, we minimize the $L_2$-norm perturbation between the
original and the attacker’s image $y_t^A$. Furthermore, the
changes in the image should be smooth to preserve the spa-
tial dependencies to avoid detection. Therefore, the smooth-
ness penalty $\lambda_{1,2}\|\text{vec}(y_t^{\text{original}} - y_t^A) \cdot D \cdot \text{vec}(y_t^{\text{original}} - y_t^A)^T\|_F^2$ is applied, where $D$ is the second-order smoother that applies to the vectorized difference between the original and the attacker’s image. Additionally, the increase in computa-
tional cost with each attacked pixel is penalized via a
$L_1$-norm sparsity constraint. Similar to the image attack on
the SSD algorithm, the attacker’s image can hardly be distin-
guished from the original one as shown in Figure 8.

In this attack formulation, the goal is to misclassify a
given true process anomaly class as any of the remaining
five class labels. From the results in Table 5, we can see that
the correct class patches (Pa) are identified with very high
confidence (99.6%) before the attack. After the attack, the
probability of the correct class reduces to 0.8%, and the class
inclusion (In) was chosen with the highest confidence (69.5%).
It can also be observed that the exemplary classification result changes significantly among different faulty
patterns in the NEU data sets as shown in Table 5.

Any other process anomaly class can be attacked similarly
as summarized for the 1800 images in the dataset in Table 6.
If the attacker not only wants to misclassify the anomalies,
but also assigns the picture to a specific prescribed class, the
first penalty term in Equation (10) can be adjusted
accordingly.

The second term of the first objective of the attack (i.e.,
maximize damage) was to change the explanatory region
derived via LIME as far as possible from the original one to
avoid any suspicion and justify the differently classified
anomaly after the SAGE attack on the image. Figure 9 shows
an example of the severe change in the explanatory region
after the attack.

The small pixels around the identified regions after the
attack coincided with the inclusion anomaly, which has the
highest-class probability after the attack. This will avoid
detection by the defender while leading to wrong conclu-
sions about the underlying process anomaly.

The SAGE attack on CNN-LIME was applied to the
entire dataset of 1800 images. The evaluation metrics for
those attacks are as follows:

### Table 6. Average attack metrics of the SAGE attack applied to CNN-LIME.

| Attack Name | RACA for CNN (%) | AE for LIME (%) | APP |
|-------------|------------------|-----------------|-----|
| SAGE Attack | 22.495           | 69.534          | 0.0716 |

![Figure 8](image-url) Original image (left), added perturbations (middle), and attackers’ image (right) of exemplary surface defect.

![Figure 9](image-url) Original explanatory region computed via LIME (left) and attacked explanatory region (right) of exemplary surface defect.

The SAGE attack on the CNN-LIME: The SAGE attack for the CNN-LIME is formalized as the following:

$$
\xi(y) = \argmin_{y_t} \mathcal{L}(f, y_t, \Pi, \lambda) + \Omega(g) \tag{10}
$$

LIME has achieved state-of-the-art explanatory performance of CNN classification results on critical applications
such as tumor classification. Interested readers are referred
to the results in Ribeiro et al. (2016) for further details and
links to the corresponding code repository.

**SAGE attack on the CNN-LIME:** The SAGE attack for the CNN-LIME is formalized as the following:

$$
\min_{y_t} -\left(\theta_t^{\text{original}} - \theta_t^{\text{CNN}}(y_t^{A})\right)^2 - \lambda_0 \|\xi^{\text{original}} - \xi^{\text{LIME}}(y_t^{A})\|_F^2
$$

$$
+ \lambda_{1,1} \|y_t^{\text{original}} - y_t^{A}\|_2 + \lambda_{1,2} \|\text{vec}(y_t^{\text{original}} - y_t^{A}) \cdot D \cdot \text{vec}(y_t^{\text{original}} - y_t^{A})^T\|_2^2
$$

$$
+ \cdot \text{vec}(y_t^{\text{original}} - y_t^{A})^T \|_F^2 + \lambda_2 \|y_t^{\text{original}} - y_t^{A}\|_1 \tag{11}
$$

where $\theta$ denotes the predicted class probabilities and $\xi$ is
the explanation produced by LIME for the class predictions.
"Maximizing damage" in this setting consists of two parts:
first, the attacker aims to misclassify the anomaly images,
and second, the attacker aims to change the explanatory
region away from the original one to make the attacker’s
interpretability) of the explanation $g$ via the following
optimization problem:

$$
\xi(y) = \argmin_y \mathcal{L}(f, g, \Pi, \lambda) + \Omega(g) \tag{10}
$$

![Figure 8](image-url) Original image (left), added perturbations (middle), and attackers’ image (right) of exemplary surface defect.

![Figure 9](image-url) Original explanatory region computed via LIME (left) and attacked explanatory region (right) of exemplary surface defect.
The change of classification is denoted as the Ratio of Attacked to Clean correct class Accuracy (RACA) as follows:

\[ RACA = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in \text{Attack}} L(y_i^{\text{A}} | Y_i) \]

\[ \sum_{i \in \text{Original}} L(y_i^{\text{original}} | Y_i) \]

where \( L() \) denotes the accuracy loss of a single picture \( y_i \) with true class \( Y_i \) and \( n \) is the number of image samples. Note, a smaller score (RACA) indicates a better attack.

The change in the LIME explanatory region is denoted by the AE as defined earlier.

The attacker’s perturbation to the input image is denoted by the APP as defined earlier.

The averaged results for the entire dataset are reported in Table 6.

The results show the significant effectiveness of the general SAGE attack on a large number of image classification results computed via CNN-LIME. We note that the SSD algorithm is much more vulnerable to perturbations than CNN-LIME. The SSD attacks exploit very few weak spots in the image and change the pixel value significantly to destroy the smoothness of the background. The CNN-LIME attack has a slightly higher APP of 0.0716. To both change, the classification result and explanatory region, a much larger number of pixels need to be attacked. However, the SAGE formulation can exploit the weaknesses of both SSD and CNN-LIME very effectively. Due to this fact, the SAGE attack provides an effective generalization for existing adversarial example generation schemes in the setting of a black-box attack.

Even in the case of black-box attacks, where the detection algorithm is not known to the attacker, the proposed SAGE framework can cause severe damage to a system while staying undetected by commonly used machine-learning classifiers. This provides a strong case for the generality and effectiveness of the proposed framework. SAGE can not only exploit weaknesses of particular algorithms through its flexible formulation but also make replay non-essential for effective attacks by mimicking normal operating conditions.

5. Conclusion

We have introduced SAGE as a holistic framework for attack generation in a CPS, which incorporates the three main objectives of an attacker (maximize damage, avoid detection, and minimize the attack cost) and the physical constraints of the CPS. This research is intended as a stepping stone for researchers to develop new research methodologies for cyber-physical attack detection.

The results of this study make a case that by solving the proposed optimization problem then SAGE attacks can have devastating effects on CPS while staying undetected by the system’s monitoring algorithms. This directly highlights the urgent need for further research in the detection methodology that studies the stealthy and adversarial behavior of cyber-physical attacks. By proposing an efficient algorithm with convergence guarantees for solving this nonconvex optimization problem, we provide a comprehensive modeling platform for stealthy attacks on a CPS. We compare our SAGE framework with several mainstream attack detection techniques, which did not utilize stealthy attacks as their input data. We show that the performance deteriorates significantly under worst-case, stealthy attacks.

The SAGE framework can also be used to evaluate newly developed detection algorithms: By plugging the detection function back into the second objective of the attacker (avoid detection), the robustness of cyber-physical attack detection algorithms can be evaluated: If the detection performance degrades below a certain threshold (e.g., 50% corresponding to a random guess), it is an indication that the proposed algorithm is not robust towards stealthy attacks. As an intermediate sanity check, we suggest black-box attacks for a given system as illustrated in the hot-steel rolling case study: In this setting, we did not directly specify the detection algorithm during the SAGE attack generation. The attack data was just regularized to mimic the normal operating conditions in terms of the EWMA statistic. Newly developed detection schemes should have state-of-the-art performance on such types of benchmark attacks.

The limitations of the proposed framework are settings, in which a large number of detection methods are used to monitor the systems: In this setting, it becomes hard to find a globally optimal solution, that maximizes damage, avoids detection, keeps the attack cost low and stays within the physical limits of the system. However, in this setting, the false-alarm rate also might be inflated under normal operating conditions. Furthermore, SAGE currently is not able to dynamically adjust to changes in the detection method. Our future work will address those two limitations.

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