New approach for network monitoring and intrusion detection

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Abstract

The approach for a network behavior description in terms of numerical time-dependant functions of the protocol parameters is suggested. This provides a basis for application of methods of mathematical and theoretical physics for information flow analysis on network and for extraction of patterns of typical network behavior. The information traffic can be described as a trajectory in multi-dimensional parameter-time space with dimension about 10-12. Based on this study some algorithms for the proposed intrusion detection system are discussed.

Key words: Network monitoring, Intrusion detection, Information flow

1 Introduction

Information systems are threatened today as never before. Evolving network technologies have provided powerful information-transfer applications that have increased our reliance on computerized information systems at the same time that public access to the internet has increased the number and sophistication of those who seek to compromise these systems. The diversity of existing software are hardware devices make the problem of the network the protection very more difficult.

There are many approaches to study the attack tolerance of networks. These approaches usually include the study of dependance of the network stability

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on the network complexity and topology (see, for example [1,2] and references therein), and signature-based analysis technique and statistical analysis and modelling of network traffic (see, for example [3–6]). Some methods to study spatial traffic flows traversing the network [7] and correlation functions of irregular sequences of numbers occurring in the operation of computer networks [8] have been proposed recently.

In this paper we will not discuss properties related to network structure and topology, but rather concentrate on the information flow on the network. The main difference between this paper and the existing methods is that we are interested in general properties of information flow on a network. We suggest a new approach for network monitoring and intrusion detection based on complete network monitoring. The term “complete” will be clarified later. Since, the process of information exchange is extremely complicated for detailed analysis, we apply some methods for analysis of complex systems in physics to the information flow on networks. This gives us the powerful tools for the analysis and provides a guideline for the application of the obtained result for practical purposes.

We will start from a careful analysis of information exchange on networks to choose the appropriate method of the information flow description. It will give us the basis for network simulations in terms of mathematical description of information exchange processes. Also, the understanding of information flow on the network is necessary for real time network monitoring and for solutions of difficult problems of intrusion detection[9] in real time.

2 Information flow description

To describe the information flow on a network, we work on the level of packets exchanging between computers. The structure of the packets and their sizes vary from each to another and depend on the process. In general each packet consists from a header and attached (encapsulated) data. Since the data part does not affect the packet propagation through the network we consider in this paper only information included in headers. We recall that the header consists of encapsulated protocols related to different layers of communications: from a link layer to an application layer. The information contained in the headers controls all network traffic. To extract this information one can use tcpdump utilities, developed with the standard of LBNL’s Network Research Group [10]. This information is used to analyze network traffic, to find a signature of abnormal network behavior and to detect possible intrusions.

The important difference of the proposed approach from traditionally used methods is the presentation of information contained in headers in terms of
well-defined mathematical functions. To do that we have developed software to read binary tcpdump files and to represent all protocol parameters as corresponding time-dependent functions. This gives us the opportunity to analyze complete information (or a chosen fraction of complete information: a combination of some parameters) for a chosen time and time window. The ability to vary the time window for the analysis is important since it gives the possibility to extract different scales in the time dependence of the system. Different scales have different sensitivities for particular modes of the system development and, for an example, could be sensitive to different methods of intrusions.

It should be noted that not all parameters are reliable for the description of the information flow. The protocol parameters for host-to-host communication could be divided into two separate groups[11] in respect to the preservation or changing of their values during the packet propagation through the network. We call these two groups of parameters as dynamic and static. The dynamic parameters may be changed during the packet propagation through the network (internet). For example, a “physical” address of a computer, which is the MAC parameter of the Ethernet protocol, is a dynamic parameter because it can be changed if the packet has been re-directed by a router. On the other hand, the source IP address is an example of static parameter because it does not change its value during the packet propagation. To describe the information flow, we use only static parameters since they may carry intrinsic properties of the information flow neglecting the network (internet) structure.

Now, using packets as a fundamental objects for information exchange on network and being able to describe them in terms of functions of time for static parameters, we can apply methods, developed in physics and applied mathematics to study complex dynamical systems, for the network traffic analysis.

To demonstrate the power of these methods we recall an important result for future applications which has been obtained in the framework of the presented approach. It was shown[11] that to describe the information flow on network one can use a small number (10 - 12) of parameters. In other words, the dimension of the information flow space is less or equal to 12 and the information flow properties are independent on network structure, size and topology. To estimate the dimension of the information flow on the network one can apply the algorithm for analysis observed chaotic data in physical systems suggested in paper[12] (see also ref.[13] and references therein). The main idea is related to the fact that any dynamical system with dimension $N$ can be described by the set of $N$ differential equations of the second order in configuration space or by the set of $2N$ differential equations of first order in phase space.

Assuming that the information flow can be described in terms of ordinary differential equations (or by discrete-time evolution rules) for some unknown
functions in a (parametric) phase space, one can analyze a time dependence of given scalar parameter \( s(t) \) which is related to the system dynamics (see, for details ref.[11]). Then one can build \( d \)-dimensional vectors from the variable \( s \) as
\[
y^d(n) = [s(n), s(n + T), s(n + 2T), \ldots, s(n + T(d - 1))] \tag{1}
\]
at equal-distant time intervals \( T \): \( s(t) \rightarrow s(T \cdot n) \equiv s(n) \), where \( n \) is integer number to numerate \( s \) values at different time. Now one can calculate a number of nearest neighbors in the vicinity of each point in the vector space and plot the dependence of the number of false nearest neighbors (FNN) as a function of time. The false nearest neighbors for the \( d \)-dimensional space are neighbors which move far away when we increase dimension from \( d \) to \( d + 1 \). This algorithm could be illustrated by the simple example for a two-dimensional circle. If we project the circle on one-dimensional space, we get interval with two degenerated points along the projection axis. Increasing the dimension by 1 we come to the original two-dimensional circle without the degeneracy. Thus, the degenerated points in 1-dimension which have moved to the opposite sides of the circle in 2-dimensions could be called a false nearest neighbors (FNN). Unfolding the space further, to 3-dimension, and further we will not get a false nearest neighbors anymore since a higher dimensional space covers the two-dimensional space to which the circle belongs.

The typical behavior a scalar parameter and corresponding FNN plot are shown on Figs. (1) and (2). From the last plot one can see that the number of false nearest neighbors rapidly decreases up to about 10 or 12 dimensions. After that it shows a slow, if any, dependence at all, on the dimension. This reflects the fact that by increasing the dimension \( d \) step-by-step, the number of false nearest neighbors (FNN), which come due to projection of far away parts of the trajectory in higher dimensional space, is decreasing up to the

![Figure 1. Protocol type ID in the IP protocol as a function of time (in \( \tau = 5 \text{ sec} \) units).](image)
level restricted by the system noise since the noise has infinite dimension.

The analysis of information flow on network has been done in paper[11] for a wide set of different network configurations and it was shown that it’s is about 10 or 12. It means one needs not more than 12 independent parameters for a complete description of the information flow and that its dynamics can be described as a trajectory in a phase space with the dimension about 10 - 12. It is also important that this dimension does not depend on the network topology, its size, and the operating systems involved in the network. Therefore, this characteristic is an universal and may be applied for any network.

However, we do not know these independent parameters. Moreover, due to the complexity of the system it is natural that these unknown parameters, which are real dynamical degrees of freedom, have very complicated relations with the parameters contained in the network protocols. Fortunately, these technique provide very powerful methods to extract general information about behavior of dynamical complex systems. For example, the obtained time dependence of only one parameter, the protocol ID, shown on Fig.(1) is enough to reconstruct the trajectory of the information flow in its phase space. The projection of the trajectory on 3-dimensional space is shown on Fig. (3), and further three projections of the trajectory on the 2-dimensional spaces are shown on Fig.(4). One can see that the complete description of the network information traffic in terms of small number of parameters is possible and the trajectory of information flow is rather well localized and will be a subject for further analysis and pattern recognition techniques.

Now we can obtain results for developing an approach to monitor the network in real time and to prevent possible intrusions.
Fig. 3. The projection of the trajectory of the information flow 3-dimensional phase space.

Fig. 4. The 2-dimensional projections of the trajectory represented on Fig.(3).
3 Real Time Network Monitoring and Detection of Known Intrusions

The direct consequences of the proposed approach for the network traffic description provides the possibility of a real time network monitoring and detection of all known network attacks. This is because the complete information about network traffic at any given point of the network is collected from tcpdump binary output. All header parameters are converted into time dependant numerical functions. Therefore, each packet for host-to-host exchange corresponds to a point in the multidimensional parametric phase space. The set of these points (the trajectory) completely describes information transfer on the network. It is clear that this representation provides not only the total description of the network traffic at the given point but rather a powerful tool for analysis in real time. Let us consider some possible scenarios for the analysis.

Suppose we are looking for known network intrusions. The signature of the intrusion is a special set of relations between the header parameters. For example[9], the signature for the attempt to identify live hosts by those responding to the ACK scan includes a source address, an ACK and SYN flags from TCP protocol, a target address of internal network, sequences number, and source and destination port numbers. The lone ACK flag set with identical source and destination ports is the signature for the ACK scan, since the lone ACK flag set should be found only as the final transmission of the three-way handshake, an acknowledgement of receiving data, or data that is transmitted where the entire sending buffer has not been emptied. From this example one can see that the intrusion signature could be easily formulated in terms of logic rules and corresponding equations. Then, collecting the header parameters (this is the initial phase of network monitoring) and testing sets of them against the signatures (functions in terms of the subset of the parameters) one can filter out all known intrusions. Since we can collect any set of the parameters and easily add any signature function, it provides the way for a continuous upgrading of the intrusion detection system (IDS) built on these principles. In other words, such ID system is universal and can be used to detect all possible network intrusions by adding new filter functions or macros in the existing testing program. It is very flexible and easily upgradable. The flexibility is important, however, and in principle could be achieved even in existing “traditional” IDS’s. What is out of scope of traditional approaches is the minimization of possible false alarms and maximal optimized and controlled sensitivity to intrusion signals. These features are an intrinsic feature of our approach.

The important feature of the approach is the presentation of the parameters in terms of time dependant functions. This gives the opportunity to decrease the
false alarm probability of the IDS as best possible for the particular network. This can be done using sophisticated methods already developed for noise reduction in time series. Moreover, representation of the protocol parameters as numerical functions provides the opportunity for detailed mathematical analysis and, as a consequence, for the optimization of the signal-to-noise ratio using not only time series techniques but also numerical methods for analysis of multi-dimensional functions. The combination of these methods provides the best possible way, in terms of accuracy of the algorithms and reliability of the obtained information, for detection of known intrusions in real time.

Also, the description of the information flow in terms of numerical functions gives the opportunity to monitor the network traffic for different time windows without missing information and without overflowing storage facilities. One can suggest some different ways to do it. One example is the use of a parallel computer environment (such as low cost powerful Linux clusters) for the simultaneous analysis of the decoded binary tcpdump output. In this case the numerical functions of the header parameters, being sent to different nodes of the cluster, will be analyzed by each node using similar algorithms but different scales for time averaging of signals (or functions). Thus each node has separate time window and, therefore, is sensitive to the network behavior in the particular range of time. Choosing time averaging scales for the nodes from microseconds to weeks, for example, one can trace and analyze the network traffic independently and simultaneously in all these time windows. It is worthwhile to remember that the optimal signal-to-noise ratio is achieved for each time window independently providing the best possible level of information traffic analysis for the whole network. There are at least three obvious advantages for this approach. The first one is the possibility to detect intrusions developed on different time scales simultaneously and in real time. The second one is the automatic decreasing of the noise from a short time fluctuations for long time windows due to time averaging. This provides detailed information analysis in each time window without lost information and, at the same time, discards all noise related information, drastically reducing the amount of information at the storage facilities. The third advantage is the possibility to use (in real time) output from short time scale analyzed data as an additional information for the long time scale analysis.

Let us estimate how many parameters are used to describe signatures of currently known intrusions. One analyzes the comprehensive (but probably not a complete) list of known attacks: smurf [14], fraggle [15], pingpong [16], ping of death [17], IP Fragment overlap [18], BrKill [19], land attack [20], SYN flood attack [21], TCP session hijacking [22], out of band bug [23], IP unaligned timestamp [24], bonk [25], OOB data barf [26] and vulnerability scans (FIN and SYN & FIN scanning) [27]. The frequencies of the parameters involved in signatures for these intrusions are shown on Fig.(5) and the numeration of the parameters is explained in Table 1. One can see that the small number of
The parameters involved in intrusion signatures as shown on Fig.(5).

| Number | Protocol | Parameter                  | Frequency |
|--------|----------|----------------------------|-----------|
| 1      | IP       | Destination IP Address     | 3         |
| 2      | IP       | Source IP Address          | 1         |
| 3      | IP       | Length                     | 1         |
| 4      | IP       | More Fragment Flag         | 2         |
| 5      | IP       | Don’t Fragment Flag        | 2         |
| 6      | IP       | Options                    | 1         |
| 7      | TCP      | Source Port                | 1         |
| 8      | TCP      | Destination Port           | 1         |
| 9      | TCP      | Urgent Flag                | 1         |
| 10     | TCP      | RST Flag                   | 1         |
| 11     | TCP      | ACK Flag                   | 2         |
| 12     | TCP      | SYN Flag                   | 2         |
| 13     | TCP      | FIN Flag                   | 1         |
| 14     | UDP      | Destination Port           | 2         |
| 15     | UDP      | Source Port                | 1         |
| 16     | ICMP     | Type                       | 2         |
| 17     | ICMP     | Code                       | 2         |

parameters that are used for signatures of intrusions. This fact simplifies the procedure of the analysis.

4 Detection of Unknown Intrusions

The suggested approach could be considered as a powerful and promising method for network monitoring and detection of known network intrusions. However, there is an even more important feature: the ability to detect previously unknown attacks on a network in a wide range of time scales. This ability is based on the method of description of information exchange on networks in terms of the exchange of packets provided by the header parameters as described in terms of numerical functions of time (or a trajectory in multidimensional phase space) as well as on existing methods in theoretical physics for the analysis of dynamics of complex systems. These methods lead to a
very useful result for the dimensionality of the information flow space. Since the number of parameters used in packet header is high (of the order of hundreds), the practical search for unknown (even abnormal) signal would be a difficult problem if possible at all. Therefore, the reported result [11] on the small dimension of the parametric space of the information flow is a crucial point for the practical approach for the detection of unknown intrusions.

To build a real time intrusion detection system, which is capable of detecting unknown attacks, we exploit the fact that one needs to analyze only a small number of parameters. Furthermore, as it is known from complex systems theory, the choice of the parameters is not important unless they are sensitive to the system behavior. The last statement needs to be explained in more detail. Generally, hundreds different parameters could be encapsulated in the packets headers. The question is which parameters we need to choose for the right description of the information flow. One can think, following the discussion in the previous section, that we need to make our choice from the known quoted 17 parameters. It may be a good guess. However, the number 17 is bigger than the dimension of the phase space which we are taking in mind, and it could be a suspicion that hackers will invent new attacks with new signature parameters which are not included in the set presented in the previous section. The right answer on these remarks follows from complex systems theory: for complete system description one needs only the number of parameters equal to the phase space dimension (more precisely, the smallest integer number which is larger than fractal dimension of the phase space). It could be set of any parameters which are sensitive to the system dynamics (and the 17 discussed parameters could be good candidates). We do not know, and do not suppose to know, the real set of parameters until the theory of network information flow is developed or a reliable model for information flow description is suggested. Nevertheless, a method developed to study non-linear complex
systems provides tools to extract the essential information about the system from the analysis of even a small partial set of the "sensitive" parameters. As an example, one can refer to the Fig. (3) which shows the 3-dimensional projection of the reconstructed trajectory from the time dependent behavior of only one parameter (the protocol ID) shown on Fig. (1). It means that the complete description of the network information flow could be obtained even from one "sensitive" parameter.

It should be noted that it is certainly not enough to analyze one parameter for intrusion detection in realistic situation. In the worst case, some analysis can be done using one parameter, but the reliability, signal-to-noise ratio and time efficiency of the analysis will be rather poor for it to be used as a search for an unknown attack. However, the above extreme example demonstrates the power of the method. The proper approach is to use as many parameters as possible (up to the dimension of the phase space). In that case one can reach the optimal sensitivity to an intrusion signal and speed up the analysis procedure.

One of the ways to the realize this approach is to use the multi-window method discussed in the previous section with the proper data analysis for each time scale. The method of analysis is out of the scope of the current paper and will be reported elsewhere. We will review only the general idea and the problems related to this analysis. To detect unknown attacks (unusual network behavior) we use a deviation of signals from the normal regular network behavior. For these purposes one can use a pattern recognition technique: as well to establish a normal behavior patterns so as to measure a possible deviation from the normal pattern. However, the pattern recognition problem is quite difficult for this analysis. According to our knowledge, it is technically impossible to achieve reliable efficiency in pattern recognition for rather large, such as a 10 dimensional space. On other hand, for our purposes, we cannot extract reliable information from the analysis of one parameter. Therefore, one can choose the optimal (compromised) solution to use pattern recognition technique in the informational flow subspaces with low dimensions. One can choose these subspaces as cross sections of the total phase space defined by applying appropriate constraints on some header parameters. In this case, we will have reasonable ratio of signal-to-noise and will simplify and also improve reliability for the pattern recognition technique. For pattern recognition we suggest using a 2-3 dimensional wavelet analysis chosen on basis of detailed study of the information traffic on the set of networks. The wavelet approach is promising because it simultaneously drastically reduces the computational time and memory requirements (which is very important for multidimensional analysis) and because it can be used for additional effective noise reduction technique.
5 Conclusions

We suggest a new approach for real time network monitoring which is based on the application of complex systems theory for information flow analysis on networks. The synthesis of the network traffic description, in terms of numerical time dependant functions, and methods of theoretical physics, for the study of complex systems, provides not only a robust method for network monitoring with detection of known intrusions, but it looks very promising for developing real systems for detection of unknown intrusions.

To apply innovative technology approaches that are measurably effective against practical attacks it is necessary to detect and identify the attack on reconnaissance stage. As an element for the future technology we presented the study of the possibility of building an automatic intrusion detector system, based on new methods of data analysis and pattern recognition. The system will be able to help maintain a high level of confidence in the protection of the networks.

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