FROM DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO DEMOCRACY
ASSISTANCE: UNDERSTANDING JAPAN’S AID POLICY FOR PROMOTING DEMOCRACY

Asra Virgianita
Meiji Gakuin University, asra_virgianita@yahoo.com

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FROM DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: UNDERSTANDING JAPAN'S AID POLICY FOR PROMOTING DEMOCRACY

AsraVirgianita
PhD Student  Graduate School of International Studies
Meiji Gakuin University, Yokohama, Japan
E-mail: asra_virgianita@yahoo.com

Abstrak

Tulisan ini akan menganalisa kebijakan bantuan Jepang dalam mempromosikan demokrasi yang mencuat ke tatanan global setelah berakhirnya Perang Dingin. Hal ini penting dan menarik dikaji mengingat bantuan Jepang selama ini dipahami sangat berorientasi pada kepentingan ekonomi. Ada tiga pertanyaan utama dalam tulisan ini yaitu, satu, bagaimana Jepang merespon perkembangan internasional yang mengaitkan antara bantuan luar negeri dan promosi demokrasi? Kedua, bagaimana Jepang menformulasikan kebijakannya/pendekatannya dalam mengimplementasikan bantuan demokrasinya dan faktor-faktor apa saja yang mempengaruhi pendekatan tersebut. Terakhir, dengan menganalisa kasus Indonesia, bagaimana Jepang dalam membantu demokratisasi di Indonesia. Tulisan ini menemukan bahwa Jepang tidak mempunyai pilihan terkecuali mengikuti perkembangan internasional, akan tetapi merumuskan program bantuan demokrasinya secara hati-hati. Bantuan demokrasi Jepang sangat dipengaruhi oleh pendekatan pembangunan dan menekuskan program-programnya di level pemerintah. Kepercayaan bahwa stabilitas ekonomi yang utama perlu dibangun, serta pertimbangan ekonomi dan politik, mempengaruhi rumusan kebijakan dan pendekatan bantuan demokrasi di Jepang.

Kata Kunci: Bantuan ekonomi, Jepang, bantuan demokrasi, pendekatan donor

Introduction

Since 1990s, the United States has raised the "enlargement of the democratic community" as a key element of U.S foreign policy. As consequences, almost all donor countries and organizations have focused on democracy and human rights as prerequisites of assistance and stressing conditionality on political and administrative reform in the recipient countries. Democracy, human rights and good governance became objectives of aid conditionality of donor countries and democracy assistance became a substantial element of
development cooperation (Ottaway and Carothers, 2009:5) and a tool of international community’s role playing in democratization process in a country.

Previously, World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) was introduced other forms of conditionality which called Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) with market liberalization as the primary objective. The main distinction between two is that SAPs aimed in reforming recipient countries’s economic policy, while the aid conditionality in 1990s aimed at political reform involving both systemic and substantive aspects (Stokke, 1995:1). SAPs were initially implemented by Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL) program of World Bank in 1979. The emergence of SAL has caused by the rapid deterioration of economic conditions in the developing countries during the late of 1970s and early 1980s.

Japan, since 1986 has helped the World Bank SAPs programs by starting structural...
This paper will be divided into three sections. Section one will explore the framework of Japanese democracy aid policy which initially by explaining some definition of democracy assistances. Section two will investigate the implementation of Japan’s democracy aid to Indonesia. Final part contains conclusions which reached in this study.

Democracy Assistance: Definitions, Approaches and Types

Definitions

The concept of democracy assistance has been understood in various ways. Some scholars generalize democracy assistance as foreign aid or part, and others put democracy assistance as a specific concept arguing that there are different strategies and approaches in the implementation of democracy assistance and others foreign aid. Foreign aid is defined as transfer capital, commodities and expert from developed countries to developing and late developing countries which can be distributed through bilateral and multilateral organizations. The phase of foreign aid can be divided into two period: first, during the Cold War (1950s-1990) and second, after the end of Cold war.

In the first period, the conflict between the US and Soviet has colored the motives of foreign aid at that time. Political and national security could be seen as the main motives of donor countries in the early of this era. Then, after the end of Cold war that the US has become a hegemonic power, democratization, human rights and environmental consideration became important issues for distributing donor’s aid.

Actually, using foreign aid for political development goals has been avoided by donor for many years because it would be seen as a part of intervention. However, since 1990s, this goal explicitly formulated with argument that “a democratic form of government and good governance promote economic development, and that respect for human rights is an integrated part of poverty orientation.” (Degnbol et.all, 2003:30). As impact, since that time, political aid conditionality, democracy promotion and democracy assistance, has emerged in the work of international development. For example, the World Bank formulates good governance as a development goal and the US emphasized democratic government as a part of major goal of the US aid.

However, Bearce and Tirone (2010: 840) noted that each donor has their own strategic goal, for example, “the US aid have been driven by the goal of developing military relationship, while British and French aid has been directed towards maintaining political
influence *vis-a-vis* former colonies. ...Japanese and German aid has been motivated by the goal of increasing their economic and commercial power.” The philosophy or framework of aid of each donor country which then translated into distribution of aid can be used as an indicator of each donor’s goal. For example, Japan’s developmental aid has been formulated as *keizai kyoryoku*, means, economic cooperation. Consequently, economic intentions can be seen as the core of Japan’s aid.

Related to the relations between aid and democracy, Knack (2004) found that “no evidence is found that aid promotes democracy.” Furthermore, he argues that improving education and increasing per capita incomes are more conducive to democratization rather than through technical assistance (for election, strengthening legislature and judiciaries, etc.) and aid conditionality.

Although some scholars found the negative or insignificant relations between aid and democracy, in fact democracy assistance are still distributed by donors with various strategies and approaches. Burnell (2000:5) in his work emphasized three conditions which should be considered before democracy assistance is defined. “First, democratic advance must be a primary objective of democracy assistance. Second, the methods of democracy assistance must be peaceful. Third, democracy assistance is negotiated on a not-for-profit basis (a commercial market transaction). Consequently, democracy assistance should be funded on a grant basis.” In addition, Schoofs and Zeeuw (2007) stressed that there are two main ‘entry points’ for external actors to promote democracy: one is to focus on the state; the other is to focus on civil society. When the international community is serious in helping countries to become more democratic, both entry points should be used.²

There are various definitions on democracy assistance. Carothers and Ottaway (2000:5-6), define democracy assistance is “aid programs specifically designed either to help non democratic countries become democratic or to help countries that have initiated democratic transition consolidate their democratic system.” In parallel, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has defined democracy assistance as the support (as funds or technical assistance) for efforts which have the intention of bringing democratic structure to the developing world (JICA Study Report, 2003).

As a result, this study defines democracy assistance as an aid program provided by international community through bilateral or multilateral organizations, to assist non democratic countries become democratic countries (and to strengthen it), by using peaceful
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direct or indirect method, channelled through both government and community level, and be based on non profit oriented (grant basis) and the country needs.

Regarding the areas of democracy assistance, electoral support (democratic elections) is recognized as one of the oldest and most widely accepted forms of democracy assistance. In both political and financial terms, support for elections has probably been the most prominent sector for democracy assistance, human rights came secondly and, significantly, less attention was given to the media sectors.³

In case of Indonesia, in the early of political reform, democracy assistance has also been directed towards democratic elections. This can be understood because in the Soeharto era, the election was a tool for him to legitimize his power. Therefore, after his fall, there was a great support from donor countries for the 1999 transitional election. Almost sixty million dollars fund has been provided by donor countries including Japan, the US and the EU, to support the first Indonesia democratic election in reform period.

However, the focus of donor democracy aid to elections has been criticized by many scholars. They argue that it had better and more valuable for donor countries to support long term projects for democratization. Carothers recognizes that “any effort to strengthen democracy must necessarily be long term, if the intention is to produce discernible results.” For example, there have been a variety of programs that have had a direct and indirect impact on the development of democracy in Southeast Asia. However, the distribution of aid for development of democracy is less than economic and military assistance. He pointed out “whether an emphasis on political development should have preceded the emphasis on economic development. The question is important in deciding where best to focus the donors’ resources.”

The Approaches and Types of Democracy Assistance

Carothers (2009) has divided the approach of democracy aid providers into two categories namely; political approach and developmental approach. He notes that the both approaches are resulted by the process of differentiation of the strategic of democracy aid providers. He argues that the US democracy aid as part of political approach, while the EU’s democracy aid as part of developmental approach. He makes the comparison between the two approaches by using several dimensions as following:
Table 1. The Political Approach and Developmental Approach of Democracy Aid

| Dimension                  | Political Approach                                                                 | Developmental Approach                                                                 |
|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Value of democracy         | Believe that the advance of democracy in a country will contribute to social and economic development (the socio economic aspect is secondary) | Believe in supporting democracy based on the conviction that basic feature of democratic governance- transparency, accountability, and responsiveness- contributes to more equitable socioeconomic development. This approach values democracy as contributing factor in the larger process of national development. |
| Concept of democracy       | The importance of genuine, competitive elections and sufficient respect for political and civil rights to ensure that citizens can participate meaningfully in democratic political process. | Looks beyond an exclusively political definition of democracy to broader conception that incorporates socioeconomic concerns and tends to see economic and social rights as being no less important than political and civil rights. |
| Concept of Democratization | Democratization as a process of political struggle in which political actors who can be clearly identified as democrats contend with non democratic forces. | This approach conceives of democratization as a slow, iterative process, measured in decades and marked by the gradual accumulation of small gains. They holds that it is better to achieve a certain basic level of social and economic development, including an effective state and the rule of law before proceeding with democratization. |
| Method of supporting democracy | Directly through assistance (training, advice, moral, support or funding) to the political actors themselves. | This approach always stresses the importance of partnership with host government and inclines toward indirect methods of assisting democracy. |

| Method of supporting democracy | Indirectly through support to key institutions- an independent media, an independent judiciary, etc- |

Source: Carothers, (2009: 6-9), table created by Author

In addition, Sugiura who wrote about "Japanese Foreign Diplomacy on Democratization" divided the approaches of international democracy assistance into three categories as following: coercion, persuasion, and consensus (Sugiura, 2006: 25-27). Coercion is the approach of donor countries in demanding political reform in recipient country through aid conditionality, sometimes by suspending aid, economic sanctions or diplomatic sanctions. Furthermore, donor countries sometimes implemented the military action and have also strongly supported the pro-democracy groups to support democratic movement in recipient country. In other hand, donor approach which is based on partnership with the government of recipient countries and focusing on the request from the government...
could be categorized as persuasion and consensus approaches. In these approaches, donors and host governments have to cooperate under economic development scheme which believed has indirectly affected the process of democratization. He argued that the Japanese approach to promote democracy is based on persuasion and consensus (Sugiura, 2006: 40).

Other scholars, Stephen J. Golub in his work “Democracy and Development”, by using the US aid for democracy and governance as the case study, divides democracy aid into two types (Golub, 2000:136-137); democracy with Big D and democracy with small d (the D or d means democracy). The assistance which is directed at formal systems of governance such as elections, judiciaries, legislatures, political parties, and other core democratic institutions, could be categorized as democracy with a “Big D”. In contrast, assistance which is distributed with a focus on democracy with a “small d” aims in part at socioeconomic progress for disadvantaged people, aspiring to have an impact on specific policies, practices, and populations. The disadvantaged people here are defined by Golub as citizen who participates little in governance and benefit little from development. He considered the importance of the role of civil society organizations whose primary focus is socioeconomic development to achieve both development and democratization. Therefore, he argues democracy aid should support “small d” over “Big D” initiatives.

| Dimension          | Big D                                                                 | small d                                                                 |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Core Activities    | Democratic Political system/Democratic institutions reform such as elections, judiciaries, legislature, etc. | Socioeconomic Development, for example, civic education and advocacy |
| Aims               | Progress on democracy and the rule of law on the national level     | Aiming at having impact on specific policies, practices and populations, especially to achieve socio economic progress for disadvantaged people |
| Focus of entry point | State level                                                          | Community level                                                        |
| Method of assisting democracy | Direct                                                              | Indirect                                                               |

Source: Golub (2000: 136-138), table created by Author

Therefore, related to research questions and the explanations of democracy assistance, the study offers two hypotheses. *First*, Japan has given a positive response towards the idea
of democratic community enlargement (democracy promotion), but limit themselves to engage in democracy promotion activities. Second, the economic interest and the belief that prioritizing economic development was necessary to achieve democratic development have influenced the pattern of Japanese democracy aid policies. Third, the pattern of Japanese democracy assistance in Indonesia is focused on the Big D, and affected by the developmental approach. As the largest investor in Indonesia, Japan has been implemented this approach to keep and maintain a good relationship with Indonesian government which is directly or indirectly expected to secure Japan's interest in Indonesia.

The Framework of Japan's Development Aid for Promoting Democracy

In contrast to the US policies on “enlargement of the democratic community”, Japan appeared unwilling to make political aid a condition for its assistance as other donor countries do. The Japanese Foreign Ministry explained, “Japan has a principle of refraining from attaching political conditions to its aid” (Akaha, 2002:98). However, after the end of Cold War, almost all of Development Assistance Countries (DAC) members have put democracy and good governance as a basis of legitimacy of rendering their assistance.

As a consequence, in 1991, Japanese government changed its aid policy by introducing “Four Guidelines of Official Development Assistance (ODA).” At this time, Japan announced the ODA Charter 1992, which clearly emphasizes democratization as one of main pillars of Japan's aid policy (Japan ODA Annual Report, 1992). The Japanese
Since that time, Japan started to support system building in the legal system in Vietnam, strengthening civil society by focusing on electoral support in Zambia, Cambodia and other countries, and human rights including women in development program.

Considering the widespread of democratization movement in the early 2000s, JICA organized a study group which expected to formulate the proposal for democracy assistance of Japanese ODA. The study group began their work by examining three main elements of democratization; democratic political system, institutions which make democracy work (governance), and an effective socioeconomic foundation for democracy. This group concluded that Japan can play a role by focusing their assistance on the governance and the socioeconomic foundation (JICA Study Report, 2003:12 and 24).

Meanwhile, the Japanese democracy aid has been continually debated by many scholars. As Juichi Inada (Inada, 2005:14) says, “Japan has tended to disconnect the three factors of development, democracy and security (conflict)-which are closely linked to one another in fact.” Moreover he also argues Japan’s ODA still clearly prioritizes development and the Japanese government justifies this policy by emphasizing the positive impact of development on the other two factors, security and democracy.

In addition, Kazuo Inoue, a former of House of Representatives Members, said that the limitations of Japanese approach to promote democracy could be explained by two reasons (Jakarta Post, Oct. 19, 2004). First is civil society and the non-governmental sector are not as strong in Japan as other countries such as the US. Second is the initiatives to organize a democracy assistance organization are not supported by the bureaucracy. Since the Japanese government has a principle do not interfere the political affairs of other countries, the kind of organization which having a political intention has a difficult to be constructed.

Some scholars also argue that the long history of the US NGOs, the Western religious prescription for charity and the Japanese belief in the overarching role of government affected the gap between the US and Japanese NGOs. Moreover, the relationship between NGOs and government in Japan and the US is quite different. The US government belief that the NGOs activities support a principle objective of the US foreign policy, and therefore the US government recognized the importance of NGOs in the policymaking and implementation process. While in Japan, the NGOs have faced the lack of government support towards their activities.
However, in the 1990s, the Japanese government came to realize the importance of Japanese NGOs as a partner. Then, the government has formulated some schemes in the areas of social and welfare such as health, education, and environment to build cooperation with Japanese NGOs. In the other hand, although there was some a positive progress towards the relationship between government and NGOs, the data shown the small components of NGOs in Japanese aid which only 3% of aid budget in 2008. A small distribution to NGOs has been identifying that “Japan tends not to make use of either Japanese or local NGOs as implementing partners” (DAC Peer Review of OECD 2010, p.17).

Based on DAC Report, if we compare the amount of aid in the area of government and civil society (GSC) between Japan, the US and the EU, Japan’s aid was far less than the US and EU’s aid distribution. In 2006, the trend of Japanese aid has increased about 150%, but the amount has still far less than the two countries. Moreover, if we look to the percentage of total aid, Japan’s GSC aid placed only about 1-2 percentage of total aid every year, except in the 2002. In the other hand, the US and the EU has more attention towards GSC program than Japan which is indicated by the percentage of their GSC aid as described in the table below.

In addition, the U.S. NGO "Democracy Coalition Project" (Democracy Coalition Project, the following abbreviated as DCP) explained three factors which influenced Japan’s limited approach to democracy promotion. First, based on Japanese experience before –

### Table 3. GSC Aid from Japan, the US and the EU 2000-2009

| Year | JPN GSC Aid | % of Total Aid | US GSC Aid | % of Total Aid | EU GSC Aid | % of Total Aid |
|------|-------------|----------------|------------|----------------|------------|----------------|
| 2000 | 176.91      | 1.2            | 620.98     | 6.1            | 645.22     | 8.9            |
| 2001 | 60.77       | 0.5            | 1,283.26   | 13.3           | 390.43     | 6.9            |
| 2002 | 375.82      | 4              | 1,085.45   | 8.5            | 847.25     | 14             |
| 2003 | 260.43      | 1.7            | 2,918.78   | 13             | 971.07     | 11             |
| 2004 | 276.28      | 2.1            | 5,032.49   | 21             | 2,937.68   | 22             |
| 2005 | 102.73      | 0.58           | 4,625.24   | 16             | 3,214.92   | 16             |
| 2006 | 378.16      | 2.7            | 2,705.74   | 11             | 2,479.56   | 19             |
| 2007 | 290.5       | 2.2            | 4,604.87   | 18             | 2,483.57   | 18             |
| 2008 | 277.33      | 1.5            | 4,864.50   | 15             | 2,691.79   | 12             |
| 2009 | 342.92      | 2.2            | 5,530.56   | 18             | 2,099.10   | 13             |
| Total| 2,541.85    |                | 33,271.87  |                | 18,760.53  |                |

Source: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ODA_SECTOR
World War II, when the global economic depression in the late of 1920’s, emerging democracy in Japan gave a way to the rise of non democratic government, Japan has a firm belief that economic development should become the priorities in order to build a strong social foundation for democracy. Second, The Japanese “economic miracle” in 1970s-1980s under strong and centralized leadership became a role model of other countries to develop their countries. These kinds of countries sometimes have been ruled under authoritarian way. Since at that time the world has faced threat of communism, Japan tolerated and even supported authoritarian regime who sought to achieve economic and social stability. Third, social or political region instability that might be occurred during democratization which would not create a situation conducive to Japan’s national economic and security interests has influenced the passivity of Japan’s support for democratization.

Furthermore, Akaha identified an important reason to understand the passive of Japanese political aid. The reason is that its foreign policy has long been geared toward promoting economic and commercial interest, and its foreign aid policy has been a means of achieving this goal (Akaha, 2002:89-92). In addition, in line with the idea of Japanese foreign aid as keizai kyooryoku (economic cooperation) and the slogan seikei bunri, which means “the separation of the economic from the political”, the Japanese government tends to avoid the political area for their aid implementation (Clear, 2002:137).

From those perspectives above, this study pointed out that Japanese democracy aid has not been formulated enthusiastically. The Japanese democracy aid has been limited by two main factors, the belief that economic stability should be developed first and the principle to avoid interfere the political affairs of recipient countries or non-intervention principle.9

Japan’s Aid to Indonesia from Soeharto to the Reform Period: From Development to Democracy Assistance

The introduction of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter 1992 and the Initiative of PPD in 1996 represented the change in Japanese aid policy. However, even after adopting the ODA Charter and PPD, the aim of Japanese assistance to support democratization and human rights in Indonesia has not realized in the method of distribution of Japan’s ODA. The distributions of Japanese aid to Indonesia were still focused on the infrastructure and manufacture sectors and dominated by loans (ODA White Paper, 2007).
Considering the political aid programs are often formulated under grants and technical cooperation, dominance of yen loans in Japan's aid policy which focused on infrastructure development became one of the signs of the lack of attention to the political development in Indonesia.

However, due to the economic crisis in 1997, the political situation in Indonesia went from bad to worse that marked by a clash between students and security forces on May 12, 1998, which put a great pressure, both domestic and international on Soeharto to leave office. The Japanese government showed concern about the political chaos in Indonesia, but it refrained from taking strict measures. Although some Japanese NGOs demanded the Japanese government suspend aid to Indonesia, they were ignored, and the government continued providing aid to Indonesia (Furuoka, 2007: 14).

The fall of Soeharto, paralleled with instability of economic and political situation, had given a chance for international community playing a role to facilitate political reform in Indonesia. Japanese government itself had tried to help Indonesia by giving aid package bilaterally and multilaterally in order to keep and maintain Soeharto’s regime. As a large investor to Indonesia, Japan was enjoyed the stability of Indonesia under Soeharto dictatorship. Therefore, the Japanese government seemed to believe or to hope that Soeharto could overcome current problems and maintain his power (Furuoka, 2006:187). Moreover, the former Japanese Ambassador to Indonesia, Kimio Fujita said that the policy of Soeharto which emphasized on development was compatible with the way of Japanese thought on development (Asahi Shimbun, June 2nd, 1999).

However, after Soeharto stepped down, the new government was under pressure to carry out democratic reform. A transitional election was soon organized, and consequently, the Japanese government has no choice but to support democratic reform and started to allocate their aid to support the transitional election in Indonesia. Japan announced its commitment to provide technical and financial assistance on March 16, 1999. It was the first time Japanese aid to Indonesia had been used directly for political activities. Since the support had been channeled through UNDP, it meant Japan kept away from the political nature of aid and avoiding the possible negative effect in its bilateral relations with Indonesia (Clear, 2002: 116).

The decision to support the general election in 1999 seemed a belated response while others countries signed a memorandum for Indonesian electoral assistance through UNDP
right away. The JICA officials explained that since supporting election was a first time for Japan to be involved in Indonesian political activities, the belated response of the Japanese government should be understandable. The Japanese government first had to design what kind of aid scheme could be used and what activity could be proposed to support the Indonesian political reform process (Interview with JICA Southeast Asia Division, June 11, 2003). From their statement, it can be summarized that Japan had never arranged and designed their aid to be involved in supporting political reform in Indonesia.

Following the implementation of Japanese democracy aid to Indonesia, the study found the limited programs directly connected to democracy and governance areas funded by Japanese aid. The election assistance package received the greatest funding. In the 1999 election, most of the Japanese fund (US$30, 97 million) channelled through UNDP, has distributed to cover the technical and material needs such as voter registration, press center, electoral ink, ballot printing, etc. The remaining funds about US$3, 49 million was intended to be used for monitoring and voter education by Indonesian NGOs, and for other purposes such as sending international observer, and dispatch of experts to the central and local General Election Commissions (Komisi Panitia Pemilu/KPU) for technical advice in the field of training and IT technical support.

In the 2004 Legislative and Presidential election, however, Japan did not channel their funds to UNDP again. The Japanese fund has been channelled under bilateral cooperation scheme. Considering the change of Japanese method to distribute their fund, it could be indicated as a way of the Japanese government to look more active and serious in supporting democratic process in Indonesia. Besides providing the financial assistance which distributed to KPU for the procurement of electoral equipment (bullet boxes and pooling booths), Japanese fund also designated to support the voter education program which conducted by Indonesian NGOs. By coordinating with Indonesian government, there were some Indonesian NGOs (Pemuda Muhammadiyah, LP3ES, Parwi Foundation and LSI, JAMPPPI) has been selected to conduct that program in Java, Sulawesi, Sumatera, and West Nusa Tenggara. The program was aimed at disseminating information on the new election system, and voting system through distributing PR materials, organizing seminars, and through talk show in radio. For the 2009 election, Japan’s also distributed their aid for NGOs, however, the amount was still less than aid which has channelled to government. The involvement of NGOs in Japanese aid could be seen as a positive response toward some criticism on the low of NGOs element in Japanese aid. However, considering the most of funds has still
distributed for logistics/material supply, the way of Japanese democracy aid, especially for electoral assistance, has not changed substantially.

**Table 4. Japan’s electoral Assistance to Indonesia**

| Year of Election | Contents of Assistance                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Amount  | Total Amount/scheme |
|------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|---------------------|
| 1998             | Financial assistance to cover technical and material support such as ballot printing (400 million pieces), electoral ink (600 bottles), guideline book for (2.8 million books), Radio Single Side Band (1,060 sets) and others materials for vote tabulation. Financial assistance for voter education and election monitoring | $30,970,000 | $34,450,000/ Emergency Assistance |
|                  |                                                                                              | 3,480,000, |                     |
| 2004             | Financial assistance for bullet boxes (623 boxes) and pooling booths (112 million sets) Financial assistance for domestic and international NGOs; and Voter Education                                                                                       | $22,000,000 | $22,270,000/ Governance Aid |
|                  |                                                                                              | $270,000  |                     |
| 2009             | Financial assistance for socialization through Government of Indonesia (Ministry of Home Affairs) Financial assistance for domestic and international NGOs; and Voter Education                                                                 | $3,338,190 | $3,466,068/ Governance Aid |
|                  |                                                                                              | $127,878  |                     |

Source: UNDP [http://www.undp.or.id/press/view.asp?FileID=19990604-1&lang=id](http://www.undp.or.id/press/view.asp?FileID=19990604-1&lang=id) and [http://www.mofa.go.jp/Mofaj/area/indonesia/04/shien.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/Mofaj/area/indonesia/04/shien.html)

In addition, although during the latter half of the 1990s, JICA began to strengthen its cooperation with NGOs, however, the element of NGOs both Japanese and local, are still limited in Japanese aid compared to other donor countries. For Japanese NGOs, most of them have activities which have not connected directly toward democracy in Indonesia. Considering this fact, this study argues that concentrating the analysis on direct assistance for democracy by government it may be possible that we can figure out the policy orientation of Japanese government by restricting the analysis on its direct involvement in assistance. If a certain policy were regarded important, the government would directly engage themselves in it, given that the Japanese government has been characterized as ‘Statist’.

The other Japanese democracy and governance programs were focused on projects to reform Indonesia’s National Police by promoting Indonesia’s civilian police force activities. Under the scheme of Support Program for Reform of Indonesian national police, this project...
is aimed to socialize a model police station, and designated the police station in Bekasi, West Java. Moreover, in order to promote citizen trust in the civilian police force, this project also established a citizen-police partnership center, which is used as a base for citizen police force activities at a local level.

This project shown the centre of program was the technical cooperation project which focused on the state level. In similar, another program such as judicial and bureaucracy reform were conducted on the state level rather than collaborating with civil society or NGOs. Japan's support for democratization in Indonesia, can be summarized as the table 5 below.

| No. | Name of Projects                                                                 | Years     | Amount       |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1.  | Electoral assistance                                                              |           |              |
|     | - Emergency Assistance for Democratization (The 1999 Transitional Election)       | 1999      | 30.97        |
|     | - Support for administrative reform and the 2004 election support package         | 2004      | 22.27        |
|     | - Support for local elections in Aceh (in the framework of human security project in the grassroots level) | 2006      | 0.014        |
|     | - Support for the 2009 General election                                           | 2009      | 3.46         |
|     |                                                                                   |           | (in US$ Million) |
| 2.  | Police reform assistance                                                          | 2002-2007 | 512          |
|     | - Capacity-building project of police activities                                  | 2007-2012 | (in million yen) |
|     | - The project capacity building activities in Bali police                          |           |              |
|     | - Indonesian police capacity-building projects                                    |           |              |
|     | - Citizen Police promotion of partnership projects                                |           |              |
| 3.  | Regional Development and Decentralization                                        | 2002-2007 | 512          |
In summary, based on some approaches of democracy assistance which explained in part 2, this study argues that although Japanese aid policy had placed the program for creating a democratic and fair society as one of pillars (Japan Country Assistance Program for Indonesia, 2004), in fact, Japan was still prioritized non political area in distributing their aid. It seems that the policy did not identifying specific area for democratization, but it defined broadly which was rooted on the developmental approach. Moreover, Japan had a firm belief that democracy could not be secured without economic development and social stability. Therefore they have pursued policies and program designed to help strengthen national economies over support for democracy directly. The Japanese efforts to avoid getting involved directly in political area as much as possible could also be identified that Japanese democracy promotion formulated carefully. The Japanese government worried that working in the democracy area might be interpreted as intervention. The approach of Japan’s democracy aid can be described at chart below.

**Chart 1. Japan’s Democracy Assistance Approach to Indonesia**

Conclusions

Looking at the framework and the implementation of Japan’s democracy aid to Indonesia, we can summarize that Japan has no choice except following the international trend which linking foreign aid and democracy. Japan’s democracy aid seems to be democracy with a “Big D” which influenced by developmental approach. The Japanese government formulated their democracy assistance broadly. It could be said that the Japanese aid has unenthusiastic to get involved in the political arena directly. Moreover, by focusing
aid program at the government level, the Japanese aid has been working more on Big D area. Japan looks strictly limited their approach on developmental approach. The economic and political reasons as explained above has affected the way of Japanese democracy aid.

In addition, the weakness of civil society and non-governmental sectors has been influenced the passivity of Japanese democracy aid. Moreover, considering the Japan’s belief that economic development is an indispensable precondition for democratic development, it could become a clear point how Japanese aid policy has been designed to involve in democracy promotion. Therefore, the first involvement of Japanese aid to support the 1999 Indonesia transitional election could be understood as the result of outside pressure, rather than their own willingness. Moreover, a small amount of Japanese democracy aid to civil society in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections could be indicated as a less attention of Japanese government to support civil society activities. However, considering the importance of civil society to build and maintain democratic election as a basis of democracy in Indonesia, civil society aid should become the priorities area of Japanese aid too. By supporting both levels, we can hope the sustainability of democracy in Indonesia.

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