Struggle against financing terrorism in the world and Ukraine by the way of strengthening the state financial control and audit system

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Abstract

As the title implies the article describes essential world problem – financing of terrorism. It is specially noted the role state finance control in the predictions of financing of terrorism. During the 21st century the topic of terrorism has become one of the most dangerous and large-scale global challenges to the world community. Since the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States of America, the phenomenon of terrorism has become more violent, bloody and cynical. The number of states that have experienced the horrific consequences of acts of terrorism is on the rise, and in turn, bears human toll, destruction of infrastructure, intimidation of people and more.

The article shows how terrorist organizations are adapting to the current situation and finding new methods and ways of meeting their specific goals with the use of different sources of funding, and what the methods of counteracting them in international practice and in Ukraine. Also, It draws our attention to to analyze the notion of terrorist financing and international experience in opposing it.

Much attention is given to analyze the manifestations of terrorist financing in Ukraine.

Keywords: terrorism, financing, problem, specific, anti-terrorism.

Introduction

Today, terrorism is a complex global problem that needs to be addressed by a scientific system-integrated approach. In the lead-up to the 2018 World Economic Forum on Existing Global Risks, terrorist attacks are one of the most dangerous of the existing threats in the world (Figure 1).

The number of terrorist attacks and the threat of their occurrence are increasing every year, and the ways of financing terrorist organizations are constantly transforming and changing. Ukraine is not exempt to this phenomenon. Thus, since 2014, the vulnerability of Ukraine’s financial system has increased significantly, largely due to hybrid war and the transfer of monetary assets to territories controlled by terrorist groups in eastern Ukraine. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to determine the degree of risk of involvement of different countries, including Ukraine, in terrorist financing processes.

The purpose of this article is to research, analyze and summarize identified (typical and advanced) methods, financial instruments and terrorist financing schemes, as well as to study the threats and vulnerabilities contributing to terrorist financing in Ukraine.

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It is proposed to divide the research into separate objectives to achieving this aim: to analyze the notion of terrorist financing and international experience in opposing it; to analyze the manifestations of terrorist financing in Ukraine.

Fig. 1. Global risks in 2018 (The Global Risks Report, 2018)

**Material and Method**

During the research, the following scientific methods were used:
- analysis – throughout research the scientific developments in this field and statistics of some countries of the world were considered;
- systematic approach – systematization of existing achievements in studying the process of counteraction to the financing of terrorism; on this basis formed recommendations for further research;
- synthesis – examined existing methods and methods of financing terrorism to form appropriate conclusions;
- generalization and grouping – systemic view of the development of counteractive approaches to the financing of terrorism on the basis of past research.

**Results and discussion**

In the present context, each country applies measures to ensure public safety and international security. Unfortunately, the phenomenon of international terrorism has become an international practice, greatly complicating international relations, disrupting the harmonious development of the countries of the world, as well as international peace and security. In such circumstances, the fight against terrorism has become one of the priority areas of the UN and other international organizations.

One of the main areas in the fight against terrorism is the fight against money laundering and its financing. The UN was the first international organization to take significant measures to combat money laundering, as it became the first sign of funding for this phenomenon. The conduct of illegal money laundering fraud generally precedes terrorist acts, funding training and associated equipment.

Terrorist financing is the financing of acts of terrorism, terrorists and terrorist organizations, including providing or raising funds in any way, directly or indirectly, with the intent to use them or the knowledge that they will be used for
terrorist activities, acts committed for the financial or material support of an individual terrorist or terrorist group/organization, preparation or commission of a terrorist act, involvement in the commission of a terrorist act, public calls for an act of terrorism, assistance in committing a terrorist act, the creation of a terrorist group (organization) and providing or collecting any assets with the knowledge that they will be used in full or in part (OSCE, 2019).

Engaging the UN to counter terrorist financing is important for several reasons. First, the UN is the international organization with the largest number of member states; secondly, the UN is actively working to combat money laundering and terrorist financing (such as the Global Anti-Money Laundering Program (GPML)); finally, and perhaps most importantly, the UN has the ability to adopt international treaties or conventions that have the force of law in those countries that have signed, ratified and applied these conventions.

In some cases, the UN Security Council may impose binding measures on all UN member states by adopting a UN Security Council resolution, regardless of other measures taken by individual countries. The fight against the financing of international terrorism involves complex measures of organizational, legal, economic and political nature in the international and domestic territories, carried out by subjects of international law in order to prevent terrorist acts. Another major contribution to improve the fight against terrorist financing in the world has been the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which was adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 54/109 of 9 December 1999 (2019).

According to the decision of the Big Seven, an Anti-Money Laundering (FATF) Group was created in 1989 by the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), to examine money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as to assess the compliance of national systems with these standards (sdfm.gov.ua). The FATF Recommendations are a comprehensive and coherent system of measures to be implemented by countries to combat money laundering, in particular for the financing of terrorism.

The FATF Recommendations set out the key measures that countries should take to:

- Identify risks in the area of counter-terrorism money laundering and developing anti-government policies and coordinating appropriate actions at national level;
- Recognize money laundering, terrorist financing;
- Apply precautionary measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing (O.Ye. Korystyn & Yu.M. Pavlyutin, 2017).

In turn, the European Society also responded to the global challenges of modern terrorism. In 1997, a Council of Europe Special Committee of Experts on Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (MONEYVAL) was set up under the Council of Europe. At its meeting of the Committees on 13 October 2010, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe approved Resolution CM / Res (2010) 12 on the Statute of the Special Committee of Experts of the Council of Europe on Mutual Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (MONEYVAL).

On 1 January 2011, under the new Charter, the MONEYVAL Committee became an independent monitoring mechanism within the Council of Europe, reporting directly to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. In 2017, MONEYVAL conducted the fifth round of money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessment in Ukraine. The results of this risk assessment identified the widespread use of cash, communication between counter-terrorism intelligence agencies and civil servants and the private sector, as well as the lack of monitoring of international commitments on compliance terrorism with the use of non-profit organizations as a possible source of financing for terrorist organizations, the lack (Yu.B. Danil’chenko, 2018).

Efforts to legalize criminal funds and subsequently finance terrorism have acquired a global international character in today’s context, posing a real threat to the national security of
many countries. Credit and financial institutions remain particularly popular for the legalization of proceeds of crime and terrorist financing in the world. Basically, launderers use banks of underdeveloped countries for their machinations, where legislation to combat these crimes is either absent or only partially functioning. Illegal finances are acquired through deposits, securities and even insurance policies as well as foreign exchange offices with their significant cash flow and access to the international financial system. (One of the most common ways to legalize the proceeds of crime is through the use of conversion centers to exchange cashless cash (national and foreign currency) without attracting attention of foreign bank accounts.) As such, existing banking systems leave a lot of room for crime.

The FATF Guidelines stipulate that countries should identify, evaluate and understand the risks associated with money laundering and terrorist financing for the country, as well as take measures, including designating a body or mechanism to coordinate risk assessment activities, and use targeted resources to effectively reduce risks.

Terrorist financing methods and methods continue to be developed and refined to take in account technology developments or deliberate attempts to circumvent the measures taken by law enforcement and other competent authorities to counter terrorist financing. The risk of using the latest terrorist financing systems is quite high and increasing due to the rising overall use of such systems. Many of these systems are available worldwide and are used to transfer funds quickly. In addition, a number of online payment systems, as well as digital currencies, by themselves provide anonymity, which makes them attractive for terrorist financing, especially if the payment system's head office is located in a country with relatively weak anti-money laundering and terrorist financing arrangements.

The widespread availability and anonymity of the Internet has informed the rapid use of a variety of measures that require terrorist groups to provide equipment to their supporters around the world and people at risk of contradiction during terrorism. Terrorist organizations make extensive use of social networks and the Internet to conduct terrorist propaganda and establish contacts with supporters. He has often increased his work for terrorism and extremized, obeying legitimate charitable or humanitarian activities, and doing charities with this need. Fundraising can be done secretly or under the cover of humanitarian assistance. Very often donors are unaware of the ultimate purpose of using the funds raised. The movement of the collected funds is done in several stages: the collected money is sent as part of a series of electronic transfers and then withdrawn in cash for further transportation by cash couriers. Sometimes cash is deposited into other accounts. The purpose of such schemes is to break the chain and hide the source of money and their final recipients.

The emergence of virtual and digital currencies has helped to attract large amounts of money into payment mechanisms designed to provide a new, faster and more convenient way to transfer funds using the Internet. At the same time, virtual currency-based payment products and services pose risks of money laundering and terrorist financing (2019). On the one hand, cryptocurrencies such as bitcoins offer great opportunities for innovation in the financial sector. But they also attract the attention of various criminal groups and may present terrorist financing risks.

While investigating the problem of money laundering and terrorist financing, one should pay attention to how the fight against terrorist financing is carried out in the leading countries of the world. According to the author, the most effective monitoring system is the activity of law enforcement agencies of the United States of America, which is as close as possible to the financial sphere. For example, the Treasury Department, in addition to its classic finance departments, is endowed with financial crime and terrorist financing functions (2020). Structurally, the US Treasury Department includes the Office of Counter-Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (Fig. 2).
Headed by an Under Secretary, the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) marshals the Treasury Department’s policy, enforcement, regulatory, and intelligence functions to sever the lines of financial support to international terrorists, WMD proliferators, narcotics traffickers, money launderers, and other threats to our national security.

Two components of TFI are led by Assistant Secretaries:

- the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC) is responsible for policy and TFI outreach incentives;
- the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) is responsible for TFI intelligence functions, integrating the Treasury Department into the larger intelligence community (IC), and providing support to both Treasury leadership and the IC.

TFI also oversees several component offices and bureaus:

- the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions;
- the Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF) administers the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF), (which is the receipt account for the deposit of non-tax forfeitures) and is responsible for administering the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and other regulatory functions; and
- the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), one of Treasury’s bureaus, supports law enforcement investigative efforts and fosters interagency and global cooperation against domestic and international financial crimes. It also provides U.S. policy makers with strategic analyses of domestic and worldwide trends and patterns. The director of FinCEN reports directly to the Under Secretary. TFI also works in close partnership with the IRS Criminal Investigative Division (IRS-CI) to enforce laws against terrorist financing and money laundering, including the Bank Secrecy Act.

According opinions of M. Freeman and M. Ruhsen (2019), the most common methods of terrorist financing are the following: cash couriers; payment systems; organizations providing financial services; formal banking operations; billing for dummy trading transactions; overpriced goods.

Thus, in 2011, one of the financing schemes of the Hezbollah terrorist organization, which was multilevel in its organization and had a complex scheme of money laundering and transfer (Fig. 3), was opened. A drug trafficking network was overseen in North America, overseen by Ayman Jumaa. The proceeds from the sale of drugs went to buy used cars in the US from Lebanese dealers. The cars then moved to Africa where they were sold for cash which was then sent to financial institutions in Beirut, namely the Elissa Exchange and the Hassan Ayash Exchange, which had their accounts with Lebanese Canadian Bank Lebanese Canadian Bank. Subsequently, financial institutions received some remuneration for money laundering assistance, and all proceeds went to the Hezbollah terrorist organization's treasury. As a result of the disclosure of this scheme, financial institutions were closed.
In the hybrid war in eastern Ukraine, the fight against terrorist financing is a pressing issue. To this end, Ukraine has repeatedly made relevant statements to the UN General Assembly. As a result, on March 29, 2019, the UN Security Council approved a resolution to combat the financing of terrorism. Ukraine was one of the co-authors of this resolution. The resolution instructs all countries to ensure that their national legislation is sufficient to punish those responsible for funding “terrorist organizations, or individual terrorists who act for any purpose”. The resolution also ensured that all measures taken to combat terrorism comply with international human rights and refugee laws (2019).

The phenomenon of terrorism, as one of the threats to the integrity of the state and its financial stability, requires certain instruments of supervision and influence dominated by financial monitoring. These measures taken by financial entities are designed to monitor prevention and counteract legalization, including income obtained through crime, terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the conduct of state financial monitoring and primary financial monitoring.

It is possible to distinguish the “traditional” attempts of terrorists to move criminal funds through legal financial and financial-economic operations:

- using intermediary companies, correspondent accounts, a system of settlements, counter payments, and other settlement obligations;
- using multilateral payments and payments or transaction involving a large number of participants, geographically separated from each other;
- conducting double bookkeeping by the subject of business activity and/or banking institution through fake accounts registered in banking institutions;
- conducting financial and economic transactions using fictitious firms;
- applying new technologies in the banking sector, in particular, the “cyber currency” system;
- temporarily placing funds in the bank accounts of business entities;
- placing funds with small deposits into numerous bank accounts;
- artificial fragmenting a financial, financial and economic transaction of large or large size into several small (usually fictitious) transactions, etc. (Loshyts’kyy M. V., 2014).

In 2014, terrorist and separatist groups in the east and south of Ukraine successfully used the tense situation to achieve destabilization processes in the country. Significantly, financial
transactions consisted of daily legal fund transfers to accounts of people involved in terrorism in Ukraine. Recently, a crime ring capable of extensively handling large fund transfers to the non-controlled areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions has been created in Ukraine and abroad.

A significant role in combating money laundering and terrorist financing (including separatism) is played by the State Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine which is the central executive body, whose activity is directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine through the Minister of Finance state policy in the field of preventing and counteracting the legalization (laundering) of proceeds of crime, terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. State Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine annually reports on its activities. The reports usually state the main results of the past year; issues related to the development of the legislative framework, including on combating money laundering and terrorist financing; statistics of the work of the body; the main list of financial investigations; summary data on interaction with other agencies, including and international; directions of realization of international cooperation and strategic directions of development for the next year, etc.

As reported in 2018, the State Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine, together with law enforcement agencies, implemented measures aimed at preventing and countering the financing of terrorist activities and separatism. As a result, during 2018 the State Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine sent to the law enforcement agencies 100 cases (44 confirmed cases and 56 cases on the watchlist) concerning potentially illegal financial transactions possibly related to the financing of terrorism, separatism and/or involving persons publicly calling for a violent change or the overthrow of the constitutional order or change of boundaries of the territory or state border of Ukraine (2020). Historically, in 2018 the State Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine blocked funds in 51 cases related to financial transactions of persons who, according to law enforcement agencies, were likely related to the financing of terrorism, separatism, for a total amount of $4 million USD.

Also, the Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine noted that the main instruments of financial flows for the activities of terrorist organizations are: cash; payment systems; financing under the guise of financial aid (loans, grants).

International organizations with which SCFM of Ukraine cooperates include: FATF; Egmont Group; The Moneyval Committee; Eurasian Group; UN; The Basel Committee; The World Bank; IMF; Interpol; Wolfsburg Group; others.

As such, the Ukrainian financial monitoring system is vested with considerable powers, not only receiving information but also independently conducting financial investigations (published in the annual report of SCFM). Its activities, aimed at protecting national interests, should ensure a normal business atmosphere in the economy, without interfering with the operation of the business in a lawful manner, and must ensure the confidentiality of financial information, which it possesses considerable volumes. A successful fight against the legalization of criminal proceeds and the financing of terrorism is impossible without close interaction with the banking sector, as it is through banks that a significant mass of financial flows flows. It is therefore unfortunate that banks are used to “launder” money to finance terrorist organizations in Ukraine (Moskalenko N.V., 2009) to a great extent.

It should be noted that in December 2017, the 5th round of mutual evaluation of Ukraine in the field of anti-money laundering and terrorist financing took place. The Report on the Results of the Fifth Round of Mutual Assessment of Ukraine was approved by MONEYVAL during its 55th Plenary Session (Strasbourg) and outlines anti-money laundering and terrorist financing activities in Ukraine from March 27 to April 8, 2017. The document analyzes the level of compliance with the FATF Recommendations, the level of effectiveness of the anti-money laundering and terrorist financing system in Ukraine, and provides recommendations for strengthening the system. The Moneyval Mutual Assessment Report by the European Commission made it clear that by 2013, Ukraine had a small index of terrorist threats.
However, since 2014, it has become a transit area for those seeking to join the ISIL fighters in Syria (2019). That is, according to the estimates of the International Expert Commission, the priority in the fight against terrorist financing is to take measures to prevent the establishment of the ISIL terrorist organization in Ukraine. The document did not take into account events taking place in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, demonstrating independence, neutrality and, perhaps most importantly, the prudence of the European community on any domestic political events in the countries in which they monitor their activities.

One of the risks of financing terrorism in Ukraine is the activity of the media in certain regions of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Local television has a significant impact on the consciousness of the population, “distorting” the information flow through convenient channels for separatist propaganda. As a result, media supports efforts to raise voluntary funds in the territory of neighboring states for the so-called “militias” and volunteers who illegally enter Luhansk and Donetsk regions.

Other efforts in this region include illegal mining by terrorist groups (primarily coal), smuggling and illegal trade with enterprises of neighboring countries and some unscrupulous Ukrainian companies, ending with the looting of the private sector (2019). The Security Service of Ukraine is actively involved in the detection of crimes related to the illegal extraction, transportation and sale of coal in the occupied territories (2019).

Given that there is no full-fledged banking system in the territory of Luhansk and Donetsk regions for citizens to transfer funds to Ukraine or a neighboring state and vice versa, a money transfer system similar to Khavalia is actively organized in these areas, which is also actively used for financing of individual terrorists and terrorist groups. (Background: Hawala is an informal financial and settlement system between brokers; a system of funds transfers).

In the course of the study of money laundering and terrorist financing, the following vulnerabilities characterize Ukraine’s current realities, which contribute to the spread and financing of terrorism:

- insufficient control over migration flows of persons and inventory from and to the territory of Luhansk and Donetsk regions;
- significant circulation and use of cash;
- possibility of registration of economic entities on front persons;
- insufficient regulation of the non-profit sector;
- ease of use of payment systems;
- shadow economic activity;
- drug trafficking, weapons, trafficking in human beings;
- formation of anti-government and anti-state sentiment among the population.

The main sources of funding, terrorism and separatism are:

- income from various criminal activities;
- assistance from individuals;
- charitable contributions;
- assistance from international extremist organizations;
- assistance from States interested in supporting instability in Ukraine; and
- assistance from representatives of foreign formations that support participants in regional armed conflicts. Anti-money laundering and terrorist financing is not possible without identifying and researching the financial instruments used to do so.

The information obtained in this study suggests that the most requested terrorist financing instruments are: cash; assistance to relatives; charitable contributions; providing financial assistance; replenishment of card accounts; replenishment of mobile phones; and securities, in particular, promissory notes, shares and investment certificates.

According to the Unified Report of the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine (2019), on criminal offenses in the state under Art. 258-5 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (“Financing of terrorism”) lists the following reported criminal offenses: 2015 – 138; 2016 – 84; 2017 – 74; 2018 – 51; and January – September 2019 – 22.

As we can see, the dynamics of terrorist acts are gradually declining. This demonstrates the consolidation of various political forces, the intensification of the actions of law enforcement...
agencies to combat this phenomenon.

The most influential institution in the banking sector operating at the supranational level is the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereinafter referred to as the Basel Committee) (2019). One of the major studies is the Basel Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Index, which was first published in 2012 in the form of a report. To date, the Basel Index remains the only index published by an independent center to rank countries according to their money laundering and terrorist financing risks. AML is a composite index. It means that the total score is a weighted average of 14 indicators, which in turn are grouped into 5 categories.

In a report published by the Basel Committee for 2018, Ukraine ranks 37th among 125 countries in the world (2019). This indicates that Ukraine has a rather weak anti-money laundering and terrorist financing system coupled with high levels of corruption, a weak judicial system and unacceptable financial sector standards. In this case, special attention should be paid to the banking sector. The biggest concern of banking institutions engaged in the process of criminal income laundering is that it significantly worsens the state of the financial system of Ukraine and impedes the state implementation of effective economic policy.

Banking institutions, non-bank lending and financial institutions and other financial services institutions form the financial sector of the state and, by their very nature, are intermediaries that ensure the functioning of the state’s economy. One of the main activities of these institutions is the transfer of funds through both international money transfer systems and their own payment systems or small alternative money transfer systems. The speed and ease of carrying out financial transactions, combined with their large number, create the preconditions for the risk of using the state’s legal financial system to finance terrorism. Further, through ATMs or branches of Ukrainian banks, funds were transferred to cash and transferred to the temporarily uncontrolled territory of the Luhansk region.

The use of legal financial intermediaries, combined with the use of non-transparent entities (such as offshore companies), enables terrorists to conceal their actions and to legalize criminal proceeds. According to the Ukrainian financial monitoring system materials in the territory of Ukraine, criminal groups involved in the financing of terrorist activities of illegal armed groups in Luhansk and Donetsk regions regularly use national money transfer systems.

Citizens of Ukraine register businesses to serve as a front organization, allowing business to be conducted in temporarily unchecked territories of Luhansk region, creating fictitious contracts or bill of sales for goods or services. In turn, under the guise of executing these fictitious contracts, enterprises operating in the temporarily occupied territories of the Luhansk region transfer money to the bank accounts of commercial entities located in Kyiv. In the future, the funds will likely be transferred directly to the bank card accounts of the persons involved, as well as other individuals involved in criminal activity (up to 30 persons were installed in total).

During the investigation, about $40,000 USD worth of cash was identified and seized as well as fictitious financial documents, company seals, and stamps, as well as firearms and ammunition.

Another group of individuals, opening accounts with Ukrainian banking institutions, carried out currency-exchange transactions in the territory of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, as well as transfers to their own accounts through online banking. The proceeds were channeled to support terrorist groups in Luhansk and Donetsk regions.

Therefore, a banking institution, like any commercial institution, aims to maximize profits when conducting its business. This is generally used by individuals who are involved in terrorist financing schemes and operate not only in Luhansk and Donetsk regions but also throughout Ukraine. Thus, a separate and deeper study is required to further examine the activities of individual financial institutions (organizations) operating outside Ukraine.
Conclusions

At present, Ukraine is embroiled in an armed conflict in the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions causing some economic instability in the country and increasing the complexity of identifying money laundering sources and terrorist financing activities. Effectively counteracting these activities can only be achieved through the united efforts of the State Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine, law enforcement agencies and deposit-taking corporations. A scientifically sound approach to understanding the phenomenon of “terrorist financing” will help broaden the range of counter-terrorism financing measures and increase the effectiveness of combating such a negative phenomenon. The peculiarity of counteraction the financing of terrorism and separatism is the implementation of the financial monitoring procedure. However, there has not yet been a unified standard for identifying terrorist financing and banking risks, as the fact that banks are present in terrorist financing operations as a “blind trust” is obvious. That is, de facto, the risk of terrorist financing also applies to banking risks, although it is not regulated at the legislative level.

Due to the international support and involvement of Ukraine in the world programs for combating money laundering and terrorist financing, professional activity of employees of special services, certain categories of government, employees of the State Financial Monitoring Service, Ukraine has significantly increased its rating in the fight against terrorism over the last 5 years (according to Global Data Index, Basel Anti-Money Laundering).

At the same time, threaten the economic and financial security of Ukraine, so it is now necessary to integrate law enforcement and financial authorities with the private sector in order to work out mechanisms to enable financial institutions to play an appropriate role in identifying terrorist financing risks. This requires the following steps:

- effective detection of terrorist financing operations;
- overcoming corruption, raising the level of responsibility of officials (institutions) for corruption acts;
- combating the shadow economy;
- tight control of financial institutions;
- the application of harsh sanctions to financial enterprises (individuals) involved in financial fraud with terrorism;
- control of circulation of digital currencies.

The experience of developed countries shows that transitioning to international standards is a long and complicated process that requires considerable financial costs and intellectual effort that requires: improving the stability of banks, improving anti-terrorism legislation and influencing the human consciousness in the prevention of acts of terrorism. Only with the purpose of joint, dedicated work and concentration of all the necessary resources for this, will Ukraine be able to reach a new level.

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