DISCUSSION OF “ESTIMATING THE HISTORICAL AND FUTURE PROBABILITIES OF LARGE TERRORIST EVENTS” BY AARON CLAUSET AND RYAN WOODARD

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1. Introductory remarks. In developing a new algorithm for estimating probabilities for tail events Clauset and Woodard have provided an important new tool for understanding social events that are rare and momentous. Such upper-tail large-scale events are notoriously hard to predict because there is obviously less certainty relative to more typical events. So even unbiased estimates, which are difficult, are likely to have large confidence intervals. This is further exacerbated by the measurement error challenges inherent in nearly all aggregated social science data.

The safety of millions of people depends on understanding the intentions and actions of terrorist groups. To protect citizens, governments and non-governmental organizations invest enormous amounts of time and energy attempting to detect malevolent covert groups and to thwart terrorist attacks. These terrorist events vary dramatically in scope, but are usually measured in terms of casualties (injuries and fatalities). However, the effect of terrorist attacks can be quite substantial even with modest casualties; the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013 had “only” three fatalities and yet had a great effect on the nation’s psyche. So it is considered to be a successful terrorist event by observers and scholars of terrorism. Why is this? It is because the real intention of a terrorist is not just to kill people; this is an intermediate step. The real intention of terrorists is to make citizens feel that their government cannot protect them. This is designed to create unrest and lead to a change of government policies in a direction favored by the terrorists, or a failure of government, presumably to be replaced with one that is preferred by the terrorists. Therefore, the more grisly (blood, gore, beheadings, hanging bodies, etc.) and the more seemingly random the victims, the greater the psycho-social effect on the population. Examples are unfortunately plentiful throughout the world: the Taliban wants to replace
the current US-supported Afghan government, the Moro Island Liberation Front wants to topple the government in Manila to create a separate Islamist government in the South Philippine islands, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb wants to overthrow the government of Algeria and neighboring countries to form an Islamic state in Northern Africa, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is still active in trying to destabilize the current government and replace it with a Marxist—Leninist alternative. The US State Department actually lists 51 active “official” Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

The quantity and quality of events data to understand this problem (where the unit of analysis is a single attack) have improved dramatically, but are still poor relative to other social science data. Modeling with these data has yielded some information about the determinants and timing of terrorist incidents [Enders (2007), Enders and Sandler (1995) and Li and Schaub (2004), for example]. However, our ability to empirically model terrorist activities currently is limited because these data consist mostly of observed and recorded terrorist events only. Exceptions include Ed Mickolus’ (1982) ITERATE biographical data set of terrorists. So these data do not constitute the complete set of the activities of these actors since attacks may get canceled or altered, governments are sometimes motivated not to report thwarted activities. This dependence on events-only data violates the standard admonition in the social sciences of not selecting on the outcome variable [King, Keohane and Verba (1994)]. Measurement issues are also often a serious problem: the estimated number of casualties for a single attack can be uncertain, the attacking group may not be obvious, eyewitnesses can vary in their description, terrorists are motivated to hide processes, methods and capabilities. However, researchers have little choice but to contend with such data challenges. I have personally confronted these methodological issues [Gill and Freeman (2013), Kyung et al. (2012, 2011)].

So into this literature we have a new contribution. Clauset and Woodard provide a novel method for understanding an important feature of terrorist data: what is the probability of a catastrophic large-scale event over some period of time? Their paper provides a new and highly-valuable tool for assessing risk based on an empirical distribution of known events. This will enable academic and government analysts to effectively assess, and perhaps plan for, extremely large (e.g., successful) attacks. Their paper is a major contribution to this substantive area. Furthermore, this work is a classic contribution to the Annals of Applied Statistics in the sense that it combines a critical real-world problem with a new statistical method to produce new insights.

The authors have cleverly combined a threshold specification and alternative parametric model comparison, with nonparametric bootstrapping. The threshold here, $x_{\text{min}}$, is simply a value that allows us to dispense with the left-hand side of some PDF for modeling purposes. Thus, the right-hand tail
only is modeled over \([x_{\text{min}}, \infty)\), which gives added flexibility by avoiding fitting the more common occurrences at the same time. Obviously, this still leaves a wide range of parametric specifications defined of this support with declining density moving to the right, so Clauset and Woodard test common alternatives with standard likelihood ratio tests. Unfortunately, this is not enough since the parameters of these PDFs are sensitive to instability in the empirical data over this region, requiring another step whereby the models are weighted by their likelihood from a (nonparametric) bootstrap distribution. This allows them to construct extreme value confidence intervals from standard theory.

The core of the approach is establishing \(p_{\text{tail}}\) as the observed proportion of events equal to or larger than \(x_{\text{min}}\) in each of the bootstrapped samples. Thus, \(n_{\text{tail}}\) is simply a binomial outcome from \(m\) bootstrap samples with probability \(p_{\text{tail}}\). From an assumed distribution, this leads to the probability of observing a large-scale event (or events). The problem of course is the selection of this distribution, and the authors compare the discrete power-law distribution to the log-normal and the stretched exponential distributions for this purpose. What fixed value of \(x_{\text{min}}\) should be used? The lack of a theoretically driven threshold suggests that an effective strategy would be to estimate the starting point of the upper tail used. Unfortunately, the authors’ bootstrap models return about half of the estimates of \(\hat{x}_{\text{min}}\) around 9–10 but with a large proportion also at 4–5. Apparently 10 is a good value in that continuous and discrete tail models produce similar up tail structures, and this value is used throughout most of the empirical work, except where it is estimated (e.g., \(\hat{x}_{\text{min}} = 39\) in Section C.2). An extension where estimation of \(x_{\text{min}}\) is conditional on covariates, informed prior distributions or other relevant information would be a welcome addition to the existing model.

2. Discussion questions. This section discusses some important issues raised by Clauset and Woodard. As noted, terrorism data is extremely difficult to model and this section is not intended to diminish the progress made in their paper.

2.1. Why focus on outlier events? Are bigger events in terms of the number of fatalities really the “bigger” events? Since the purpose of terrorism is to exert psychosocial instability, more deaths might not be bigger events. The key is distance and circumstance. Consider two events in the same month of May 2013. On May 22 a single off-duty British soldier in the Woolwich district in South East London was run down by two assailants with their car and then brutally hacked apart with knives and a machete. A week earlier a coordinated series of attacks in Iraq killed 449 people. Nearly every citizen of westernized countries (and more) immediately knew about the May 22 event, and only a small fraction paid attention to the earlier event, despite the fact that it was 449 times more deadly. Obviously, the London attack
spread more “terror” because it was closer to supposedly safe citizens and because Iraq is still perceived as a distant war zone by many. Since all major terrorist attacks result in psychiatric morbidity for some of the population [Crimando (2004)], the question is whether in the context of the attack (place, casualties, damage, media coverage) the number killed is always the most important factor. Certainly this is not true.

2.2. Is it I.I.D.? The finding that $\hat{x}_{\text{min}}$ is bimodal when estimated in the context of the bootstrap models suggests that there may be two or more eras of terrorism in the data. The RAND-MIPT data used covers 1968 to 2007, which is a long period to assume that terrorism is stable and consistent in strategy, effectiveness and methods. Furthermore, RAND-MIPT data is based on a very broad definition of what constitutes a terrorist event, where some are better labeled as war crimes. These types of data-labeling distinctions are a major reason why different terrorism data sets report different events. The authors discuss the i.i.d. issue in the fourth paragraph of page 16, stating that the “i.i.d. assumption appears to be statistically justified at the global spatial and long-term temporal scales studied here.” But this is clearly not the case empirically, as major home-grown terrorism in Western Europe has declined dramatically since the demise of the PIRA, Baader-Meinhof and other groups. Terrorism was virtually unknown in Eastern Europe before the collapse of the Soviet Union, but now Chechen and Chechen-inspired terror is a regular (and now exported) phenomenon. India has lately emerged as a major attractor of terrorism. Also, during the cold war era major powers tended to suppress the definition of terrorism if it suited their purposes. For instance, the Contras in Nicaragua were never considered by the US to be terrorists (despite the opposite finding by the International Court of Justice), even though their alleged acts fall under the RAND-MIPS definitions.

Fortunately or unfortunately, there is not a single definitive data set for terrorism events. In addition to RAND-MIPT, frequently used alternatives include the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland (describing over 104,000 attacks from 1970 to 2011), ITERATE, the Big, Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) Database 1 [Asal, Rethemeyer and Anderson (2009), aggregating worldwide lethal attacks from 1998–2005], the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) from the National Counterterrorism Center starting in 2004, data sets collected by government agencies and more. All of these show various trends over time, and countless articles have been written about eras of terrorism. For example, Kyung et al. modeled suicide attack events data in the Middle East and Northern Africa from 1998 to 2004 using a Dirichlet process random effects model and found that 1998 was an exception year that could not be considered as coming from the same distribution as the other years in the study (there were 273 major terrorist attacks worldwide in 1998 with an astonishing 741 killed and 5952 injured).
Consider also incidents from the Global Terrorism Database II [LaFree and Dugan (2008)] as shown to the right. The plot gives a kernel density for the number of killed by day of the year across the years 1998–2004 with the 9/11 attacks removed for scale purposes [see Gill and Hankgartner (2010) for details of circular analysis for social science data]. Clearly the data show a nonuniform pattern by time with a particular bulge around September. So for this short 7-year period there is both a yearly trend (1998 and 2001 are exceptional) and a within-year trend. Enlarging the time period makes this effect worse because national and international trends undoubtedly add more heterogeneity. This issue is addressed in the authors’ Sections 3 with a discussion of covariates. The authors rerun the tail models under different circumstances as a means of controlling for the following: different time periods, same/different country for attacker/target, country economic status and type of weapon used. Instead of separate models, it would be more satisfying to see a GLM-style development, which would be easier with the provided log-normal specification since $\mu = X\beta$ is a natural parameterization in that context.

2.3. Why not be Bayesian about this? Clauset and Woodard state that “a Bayesian approach would be inconsistent with our existing framework” (page 6). This may not be necessarily true. Recall the ability in Bayesian inference for serial updates as new information arrives. That is, posterior distributions for parameters of interest that were produced from data and a prior distribution can serve as priors for the same process in a future period as new data arrives. The resulting second-stage posterior is the same form as if both sets of data had arrived at the same time. This learning process could be used to update the parameters of the tail models specified in the paper. For instance, Table 1 shows that the log-normal tail
model performs poorly relative to the alternatives. However, if $\mu$ and $\sigma$ in $p(x|\mu,\sigma) \propto x^{-1} \exp[-(\log x - \mu)^2/2\sigma^2]$ were updated over time (and there is plenty of time in these data), it may outperform less parametrically flexible alternatives.

2.4. Distributional forms. The requirement of a specific PDF for the tail model here is a big convenience. The question is whether any of the alternatives tried here, or others, are appropriate for these kinds of tails. Consider the histograms in Figure 2 that show: (1) fatalities in the BAAD data for allied terrorist groups 1998–2005, (2) suicide attacks in Israel in the early period of the first “Intifada” November 6, 2000 to November 3, 2003 [see Kyung et al. (2012) for details], (3) the Global Terrorism Database II fatalities discussed above, and (4) fatalities from the ITERATE data set 1968–1977. The $y$-axis of the last two is truncated in order not to obscure the distribution of the tail values with a large range. Obviously these are only a small set of examples, but it is clear from the heterogeneity of forms that a single parametric tail model would not be appropriate in all of these circumstances. This issue is briefly noted in the authors’ Section 5, and is obviously related to the i.i.d. above discussion.
3. Final words. I congratulate Clauset and Woodard for taking on a difficult problem and making substantial progress. This is an excellent contribution to two literatures. My concerns above are mild and primarily reflect the difficulty in dealing with data that comes from a complex social and political process with violent actors attempting to hide information about their characteristics. The heterogeneity in methods, tools, geography and successes is also not helpful to the statistical modeler. Despite these challenges, we have learned something about the occurrences of extreme terrorist events over time from this excellent paper.

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