Analysis of patron-client political communication in building a network of political power in the village community

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How to Cite This Article: Suyono, S., et al. (2021). Analysis of patron-client political communication in building a network of political power in the village community. Jurnal Studi Komunikasi, 5(1). doi: 10.25139/jsk.v5i1.3099

Received: 25-09-2020, Revision: 15-01-2021, Acceptance: 20-01-2021, Published online: 16-02-2021

Abstract This study aimed to explore political communication in the building of political power networks in Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency during the village head elections (village head election) from 1998 to 2019 from patron-client relations perspective. Political communication occurs through village elites and village community leaders. Political communication happens between the village head and his community members. This study was a descriptive study using a qualitative research method. This study sought to understand the processes and facts about political communication that shapes community loyalty and the leaders in Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District who have economic and non-economic power. The findings and conclusions of this study supported Max Weber's notion on Charismatic Leadership as well as Sartono Kartodirjo's research which stated that the loyalty of village communities (clients) is formed because of village heads (patrons) for material (economic) and non-material (non-economic) reasons, such as authority and charisma of the leader; distribution of benefits from individuals or groups in exchange for political support; the loyalty of village communities, according to Jonathan Hopkins; also material factors such as financial aid, village physical infrastructure development assistance, or other economic assistance, according to James C. Scott and Ahimsa.

Keywords: political communication; patron-client; the role of local actors; power in village; leadership authority and charisma

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INTRODUCTION

This study aimed to explore the role of political communication in building political power networks. Building political communication networks is growing better and more intensive, both related to material and non-material factors, in Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency from 1998 to 2019 from the patron-client relations perspectives. In Jordan's case, patron-clientelism tends to function in the dominant service fundamental social groups and at the expense of subaltern classes (Hashemi, 2019). Excessive reliance on clientelism because winning electoral strategies limited political elites' ability to apply and enforce taxes (Sy-Sahande, 2019). The study concludes that parliamentarians' dual function as legislators and executors after a flood disaster raises concerns about accountability, effectiveness, and fairness (Adams & Neef, 2019). This study indicates that both roles and cultural suitability can fully explain citizen participation in development programming (Jackson, 2018). Furthermore, elements of the patron-client relationship (such as resources, special/personal relationships, and mutually beneficial arrangements) that have been previously considered exploitative tend to be rationalised (Radjab, 2019). The role of political patronage in flood responses in the Salomon Islands focused more on political communication from economic aspects in patron-client relations. Thus, this study attempted to see that political communication of patron-client relationships between the families of the Jenggrik Village Head and the community is caused more by the economic or non-economic factors of the Village Head. Finally, this communication forms group loyalty and solidarity within the Jenggrik Village community, similar to Sartono Kartodirjo's research which stated that the loyalty of the village community (client) is formed because the village head (patron) has authority and charisma (Sartono kartodirdjo, 2014).

Studies on patron-clients are still important in anthropology, sociology, and political sciences. For patron-client political communication to run smoothly, certain elements are needed. First, what is given by one party must be valuable in the eyes of the other party. It could be in the form of goods or services whose benefits can be estimated. Second, the patron-client relationship is a reciprocal relationship between the patron (giver) and the client (receiver) (Fitriyah et al., 2019).

This study departed from James Scott's research which stated that patronage has specific characteristics, namely no equality in exchange, face to face, and is flexible and broad. However, there is an imbalance in this relationship because the patron is in the position of the giver of goods and services, while the client has a sense of obligation to repay patron services. Most village elites are highly dependent and influenced by the village and global governance's power in making policies related to development and society. As stated by (Joshua Leis, 2017), the patron-client relationship is a patron's
relationship as the protector of international relations with more significant influence and more stable conditions for the client. So, a large and powerful country's policy will affect a small and powerless nation's policy. Although clientelism gives the urban poor some access to the state, the benefits are often inadequate and unfair. However, there are also small countries which are not affected by dominant global powers in making foreign policies.

The incumbent truly understands the communities' needs, mostly farm labourers whose livelihoods depend on farmers who own agricultural fields. Therefore, the incumbent gave his rice field to be worked by farm labourers in a revenue-sharing scheme. Deuskar stated that the patron-client relationship in the form of providing benefits to the poor is a reward for the client's support in achieving the patron's goal (Deuskar, 2019). Providing free benefits to the poor in return for political support is known as clientelism. Often, patrons provide revenue sharing in paddy fields labours and other services for the poor in informal hamlets to build democracy and provide support. The patron-client relationship between the leader and his subordinates is in the form of legal protection and allowing his subordinates to commit corruption. This situation is in line with the opinion of (Jiang, 2016), who stated that patron-client relations often involve an extra-legal exchange of assistance. Furthermore, the need to retain active followers and loyalties often forces parties to turn a blind eye to clients' illegal activities, such as corruption.

Sartono Kartodirjo added that the emergence of signs of patronage in the villages was also caused by village heads who were village elites having personal authority derived from their charisma (Sartono kartodirdjo, 2014). In the eyes of the people, the village head is a sacred figure (pious) and magic because he has received 'revelation.' Based on that authority, the leader can count on followers' loyalty to be a revelation for specific purposes. Followers have a total commitment to leaders, so that group solidarity is not in doubt. In patron-client relationships, the relationship between leaders and followers is based on group solidarity as a unifying tool (Sartono kartodirdjo, 2014). The leader intends to attract the people's sympathy to increase political participation, especially when approaching general or local elections. Communication relations between village heads and their people are built in a planned and unequal manner. This condition is similar to Rosser & Fahmi's statement that in the school management system, teachers are included in a network of patronage and politics in logic that positions them as clients, chooses mobilisation, and agents of political control, not agents of education and equity (Rosser & Fahmi, 2016). In gaining support from their village residents, village head candidates compete with one another for support from their village residents as a form of clientelism. Previous studies have found something similar in Malta's political characteristics, including sharp polarisation between parties, high participation,
profound executive dominance, and corruption scandals (Veenendaal, 2019).

Formal institutions in village government do not function optimally. Therefore, informal institutions, Volleyball communities, Majelis Taklim in each hamlet are needed as an alternative to meeting the basic needs of clients. According to Anismasawun, patron-client relations occur when formal institutions do not function optimally. In this network of relationships, especially in places where formal institutions are weak or absent, client-protective relationships act as alternative governance modes that qualify as governors of human infrastructure (Anismasawun, 2016). Patron-client relations occur in exploring social structures; these relationships grow and develop due to mutual trust and transactions between incumbents and village residents continuously, following their opinions (Radjab, 2019). In strengthening the patron-client relationship in the seaweed production system, the deliberate action of intentional relationship construction is built by the patron on the client through an exploration of social structures. Meanwhile, social structure is a belief, power, network, and social norms that are articulated in the form of patronage transactions. To strengthen the Patron-client relationship and apart from exploring social structure, it requires trust from the client even though the patron has not been supported with sufficient competence. In Corriveau's opinion, Patronage is not a matter of the most competent candidates, but it is very realistic to assume that people in positions of authority will appoint subordinates who are trusted, worthy, and ready to make a tug of war between competencies and trust of the appointed person (Corriveau, 2018).

The rapid development of devices is used to communicate between the incumbent and community members widely and continuously. So, from this communication will be established close and extensive communication relations that will add support to the incumbent. This is following findings from (Flores, 2018), about political communication where politicians can more often and directly deal with village residents through gadgets, which creates communication and closeness perceptions unseen in the past political climate. Garden is not only used as a communication tool between village elites. Effective communication establishing more close relations with the community is now done through cell phones. Therefore, the reach of society is broader and more effective than the political climate of the past. In addition to being a communication media, gadgets also play a role as broadcast media for communication between incumbents and village residents, especially regarding infrastructure development information in the villages. Gadgets also broadcast news of village development and assistance from incumbents to dukuh received through village development programs, such as donations from Sibel wells that help people get drinking water for free. In addition to communication with village residents, gadgets can also function as
broadcast media, according to research from Tettey. Tettey proved that Ghana had witnessed a rich convergence between cell phones and broadcast media with an open political environment. This convergence has significantly changed the ecology of political communication in Ghana (Tettey, 2017). Council communication networks can send information about the benefits of associations to specific groups. This form of indirect access simultaneously protects companies from the same cost-based resources. This perspective can enhance our understanding of the established relationship between board networks and performance (Carney et al., 2020).

Patronage-client relationships can provide motivation and social resilience to meet community members' basic needs. Patronage and client relations can also increase social power and reform drought responses at the country level, reducing rent hunting and clientelism related to several sources when compared to authoritarian periods. However, on the other hand, the persistence of certain forms of paternalism, patronage, and clientelism has created undesirable social resilience of the state which opposes attempts to change (Bedran-martins & Carmen, 2017). Patron-client relations are a top priority for the efficiency and security of election funding. The leader can control the resources of the State funds to the private sector centrally. These changes can create a system for individual leaders. The relationship between incumbents and village residents is more populist. Funds from incumbents can benefit each individual, according to Elliott. The incumbent seeks new ways to connect with voters who weaken local leaders and lead to a populist political shift towards programmatic politics that benefits individuals rather than collectively in patron-client relationships that emphasise individual leadership (Elliott, 2016).

In family marriages, incumbents are always reported with close relatives who can boost kinship and support for incumbents, as revealed by Sabloff. The royal marriage is a strategy used by the authorities to increase the probability because a thoughtful and particular marriage exchange will extend the Patron-client relationship. In a patron-client relationship, marriage alliances help the authorities form a support network that helps win the contestants. Marriage alliances reveal a critical difference between alliances and patron-client relations, a distinction that is often blurred in archaeological literature (Sabloff, 2018).

The victory of the Jenggrik Village Head's incumbent family in the village head election, which has lasted more than 20 years, proves that the Jenggrik Village community has high loyalty to the patron, namely the family of the Jenggrik Village Head. Besides, the community also has high social solidarity to assist the families of the village head jointly. The victory of the incumbent's family brought them to power for 20 years. The incumbent's family's victory in maintaining power for more than 20 years shows the decline of democracy. The incumbent conducts rigorous control if media is
coming into the village. This is consistent with Coduneanu-Huci and Hamilton's opinion who dismantled the decline of democracy and the threat of security where governments and other social actors increasingly use censorship to control the media (Coduneanu-Huci & Hamilton, 2018). In seizing and maintaining power, the incumbent also agreed with the villagers to develop the village. Lowwe, Zintl and Houdret guarantee that social contracts are some informal institutions intended to make state-society interactions more important so that politics can be predicted and thus more stable (Loewe et al., 2020). To get support from its village residents, the incumbent needs to expand communications and networks with village residents continuously so that support remains in favour of the incumbent's family. Mendez-Lemus, Vieyra, and Poncela explore the structures and processes of intra-government networks that lead actors to work together to improve the quality of life of local village residents and control urbanisation expansion of agricultural land (Méndez-Lemus et al., 2017).

This is in line with Max Weber's conception of power, which explains that power will run effectively and smoothly if supported by authority and legitimacy. In this case, Max Weber divides authority into three types, namely traditional, charismatic and legal-rational authority (Epley, 2015). Traditional authority is based on the belief that old traditions and positions of authority based on tradition are reasonable and should be respected. Charismatic authority is based on the trust of community members in the power and mystical or spiritual power.

Political power in the village is something unique because the village can be said to be a democratic entity that already has an autonomous power in managing the village government in accordance with the wants and needs intended by its own village residents. The village is a democratic society that bases itself on its sovereignty (Kuswanto, 2014). The incumbent's leadership style has its characteristics, such as always being committed to what is said and programmed for village development, always ready to help the community and never rejects if the village residents need, both day and night. This leadership style is consistent with Gadavanij said that the discourse projects a confident and challenging leadership style that strengthens the bond between Thaksin and his supporters (Gadavanij, 2020). Village democracy is fascinating to study. The village has its characteristics in terms of social, economic and political culture. Various local wisdom can be found from ancestors in villages in Java. Learning democracy in village communities according to Evans and Yuan experienced a slight increase in the standard deviation of increased learning if held unsustainably over time, and vice versa, might have a considerable impact on individual income and poverty reduction if learning is conducted periodically and into non-metric education to help policymakers and non-specialists better understand the potential benefits of increased learning (Evans & Yuan, 2019).
There have been many studies that have portrayed the relationship between patron-client in economic relations. Jonathan Hopkins believes that clientelism is a term that explains the distribution of benefits from individuals or groups in exchange for political support (Hopkin, 2016). Assistance provided to village residents does not have to be in the form of cash because the community is getting smarter. If assisted with cash, they will take the money but choose another candidate. Therefore, the leader assists in accordance with the community's needs in the form of 5 kg of rice groceries, sports equipment for the volleyball community, study groups, and equipment for groups of farmers. This is consistent with what was revealed in the Aspinall and Sukmajati studies (Sukmajatii, 2013) that there is a use of the material in the form of patronage which can be in the form of cash, goods, services, and other economic benefits. The gift is intended for individuals and groups who come from their own funds or the Village Fund Allocation or ADD. The practice of social funds given to community members from incumbent entrepreneurs is practised continuously and extensively in the hamlets. The practice of social funds in companies that are developing rapidly and widely impacts villages in the context of political settlement. Frederiksen's findings show how large metal mining companies' CSR practices impact extraction governance; while they have limited social impacts, they have important local impacts. The resulting inclusion and development resulted from the interaction of two main processes of elite bargaining and the coalition in exclusive political settlement (Frederiksen, 2019).

The incumbent always involves relationships between village elite figures and entrepreneurs who reside in the village in making village development programs at the Development Planning Deliberations village meeting is an essential and fundamental social fact in the Patronage relationship in governance dealing with infrastructure development in the village. This is in line with what Kusumawati and Visser said about the government's need to be included in local business decision making, which is indirectly their responsibility in decentralised coastal government (Kusumawati & Visser, 2016). The current research had been carried out in Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency and was more focused on non-economic and economic relations in the relationship between the Head of Jenggrik Village and his community. Some considerations based on preliminary observations showed that Jenggrik Village has a unique Javanese traditional character. There is loyalty from the majority of the community towards the village head and his family. Although, it cannot be denied that there is also an economic relationship between the Head of Jenggrik Village and his community, in the form of several activities, including; providing assistance in the form of bridge construction material that connects two hamlets, providing loans in the form of land facilities for Volleyball sports activities for young people in each hamlet, providing Sibel wells to be used together in each hamlet where village residents experience drought in the dry season, and giving loans for people whose families are hospitalisation and have difficulty with
medical expenses. This study was conducted to focus more on portraying the inequality of relations between patrons and clients in non-economic aspects, which is undoubtedly different from what is conveyed by Christian Pelras that patron-client relations, in general, can be categorised as unequal (but theoretically not binding) the relationship between superiors (patron or leaders) and several subordinates (clients or followers), based on asymmetric service exchanges, were de facto dependence on patron-client, for which unpaid services may include economic bonds, paid or unpaid work, armed services, political support and other services.

This is interesting because maintaining that power is not carried out by physical force and violence as in ancient times, but through a democratic process developed to the village level in Indonesia. The village head elections (village head election) manifest the conception of democracy at the Local Level. Village head election should have made the Village community democratic and equal, but the democratic process instead ‘plunged’ the community in the village of Jenggrik to Ngawi Regency to the point of unequal relations, in the concept of relations between patrons and clients. The dynamics of the role of local actors who won the village head election in Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency in this study was seen in the perspective of patron-client relations. Village head election in Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency was seen as an arena that brings people together with potential rulers. In this case, the relationship between potential rulers, called patron, and the community, which in this study is referred to as the client, is interesting to study for several reasons.

First, how the patron defines the meaning of power as well as how to influence potential voters (clients), so they want to vote for him in the village head election, second, how do people in Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency want to accept the presence of the patron and choose him in the village head election? Third, how is the relationship between patron and client produce a symbiotic mutualism (a mutually beneficial relationship)? The relationship between the ruler (patron) and the community (client) in the village head election in Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency in 2019 is interesting to study. The former Head of Jenggrik village, Wiwik Wijayanti, has led Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency for two periods, from 1998 to 2006, and then continued until 2013. This power was then continued by her husband, Suparni, who won the village head election in 2013. Suparni won back the village head election Ngawi Regency in 2019. Thus, the Suparni-Wiwik Wijayanti family has led Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency for more than twenty years. This is one reason why the people of Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency have the enthusiasm to use their voting rights in the village head election simultaneously in Ngawi Regency on 29 June 2019. One of the indications is the 24% vote number, which indicates village residents' enthusiasm to participate in the village head election in Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency in 2019 is relatively high. The high level of voting participation in Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency, certainly gives particular
meaning to the former Head of Jenggrik Village family, Wiwik Wijayanti, husband of Suparni.

The emergence of Wiwik Wijayanti family who had previously led Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency for 21 years became an interesting theme to study, especially in the relationship between Wiwik Wijayanti Family as patrons and Jenggrik Ngawi Regency as clients. Wiwik Wijayanti led Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency for two periods. The first period was from 1998 to 2006, which was chosen by the direct choice of Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency, and the following period was from 2006 to 2013. In 2006 Wiwik Wijayanti was elected as the Head of Jenggrik Village by a procession of direct village head election and defeated the candidate pair of candidates Other Village Head Candidates. In the next period the leadership of Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency was still held by the Wiwik Wijayanti Family. From 2013 to 2019, the leadership of Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency was held by Suparni. Suparni won the village head election in Jenggrik Village in 2013 by defeating other candidates. Therefore, the leadership of Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency from 2013 to 2019 is still held by Suparni. During the election, Suparni received support from the community and won by defeating another pair of candidates for the Village Head in Jenggrik Village. The following table is the Village head elected in Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency since 1998 until now.

The Wiwik Wijayanti - Suparni family's strong leadership in Jenggrik Village is an interesting phenomenon to be studied. How did the people of Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency interpret the elections? What is in the minds of the people of Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency as clients of the patron's performance? Wolf said that the Patron-Client relationship is different from kinship because kinship is the result of socialisation in which there is a mutual trust to achieve goals, whereas patron-client relations are instrumental friendships and relationships that occur. After all, each party has an interest (Wozf & Wou, 1968). The purpose of establishing a Patron-Client relationship is nothing but the provision of underlying social security and security. Thus, clients might consider the patron's relationship to be unfair and coercive, so it is not surprising that there are requests from clients for their patron to fulfil their promises or basic needs according to their role and function.

Patron-client relationships are formed because they need each other. Patrons are usually portrayed as being more potent in everything than clients. Therefore, the patron's function is to guarantee the client's needs and needs, while the client helps the patron achieve their targets or desires. The presence of a client is beneficial for the patron in everyday life. Vice versa, the patron, is needed by clients to help clients meet their needs. According to Muhammad Risal, structural poverty occurs due to several factors, namely the Patron-client relationship and modernisation development. The form of survival strategy undertaken by the fishing
community in the village of Bonde is by reducing the consumption patterns of family life and working in other sectors creatively as a form of fighting structural poverty (Rizal, 2016).

(Widayanto, 2013) Kinship has a descriptive nature, in terms of helping, it is a natural thing and does not have to be paid. Whereas, in the Patron-client relationship, the norm applies that any assistance must be paid back. Patron-Client Relations can be identified because of differences in the mastery of resources and ownership of property and power. In this case, the relationship between patron and the client in Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency is the dominance of the Wiwik Wijayanti family in 'controlling' the Jenggrik Village in Ngawi Regency. Administratively, Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency is located in East Java Province. The population of this village is around 8078 people and has a land area of 993.55 Ha. Most of the village residents of Jenggrik Village are primarily farmers although some home industries have also developed in Jenggrik Village.

Jenggrik Village is divided into seven hamlets: Sidowayah, Jenggrik, Jarakan, Watukaras, Tumang, Blemben and Ngarengan. In 2019, there were 6,244 voters, with a breakdown of 3,094 male voters and 3,150 female voters. Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency has potential in several sectors, including the Gadung mango sector, the agricultural sector (soybeans, corn and rice), and the plantation sector (sugar cane, teak). With so much potential in Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency, many people want to rule in Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency. The head of Jenggrik Village in the period 2013-2019 was no exception, Suparni, husband of Wiwik Wijayanti, who ran for the Head of Jenggrik Village as an incumbent in the simultaneous village head election in June 2019.

In Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency, Patron-client relations in politics have also taken place, especially in the 2019 village head election. This relationship occurs between the Wiwik Wijayanti Family as Patron (someone who has power, authority and influence) and the community in Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency as the client (subordinate). This pattern of relationship occurs between two communities or individuals who are not of the same class. The Patron-Client relationship in the village head election of Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency developed a mutually beneficial relationship for Wiwik Wijayanti through her husband Suparni by providing security protection for economic assistance and intensifying development in the community in Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency.

In 1998 to 2006, Wiwik Wijayanti was elected as the Village Head of Jenggrik Village from the direct village head election. Wiwik Wijayanti defeated incumbent candidate Suratno. Then, Wiwik Wijayanti ran again in the 2006 village head election. As a result, she was re-elected as the Village head of Jenggrik. At the end of her position in 2013, it was her husband's turn to step up to become the Head of Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency. Finally, Suparni (66 years old), Wiwik Wijayanti's husband, was elected as the Head of Jenggrik Village until now. During the Village Head's
campaign, the strongman in Ngawi Regency Village, Wiwik Wijayanti, always accompanied Suparni. He was never absent in the campaign. In the election of the Village head of Jenggrik in 2013, Suparni won a landslide victory. Suparni controls seven hamlets in Jenggrik village. Since Suparni was re-elected, family politics has been going on for two decades. Suparni’s wife, Wiwik Wijayanti was elected to the Ngawi Regency Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) and at the same time the PDPC Board of the Ngawi Regency. In 2019, Suparni returned forward as a candidate for village head. He received the blessing of his family, relatives and friends. Wiwik Wijayanti continues to support Suparni. The tendency of the political elite prioritises opportunity. There is an opportunity because the mother is in power, so the mother bequeathed similar power to her child, husband, or other family members (Priyono, 2014).

The researcher took the research location in Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency because of the patron-client relationship between Wiwik Wijayanti - Suparni families as Patrons and the people of Jenggrik Village as clients that have happened for a long time. This is evidenced by the fact that the Wiwik Wijayanti-Suparni family has given the rice fieldwork to the community with profit-sharing system; lend help to the community without collecting services fee; visit bereaved families first while bringing one slob of Gudang Garam cigarettes; lending private funds for infrastructure development, both in the form of Sibel wells for each hamlet at no charge dan roads in alleys of 7 hamlets; and providing Volleyball field for each hamlet that does not yet have land from the village government. In return, the community gave their voting rights to Wiwik Wijayanti-Suparni's family in the village head election for more than 22 years. The Wiwik Wijayanti-Suparni Family's strong leadership led to an increase in the level of community participation in the Village of Jenggrik in the village head elections.

The village head election is a better development of democracy in Indonesia. Elections are determined based on the ability, competence, and capability of village heads in carrying out administrative, leadership, coaching and service functions and other tasks that become their obligations and responsibilities (Rudiadi & Herawati, 2017). However, democracy at the local level is increasingly capitalist, pragmatic, and transactional in its course. For this reason, the community needs to be reminded of the importance of democracy to run better, be efficient, be reasoned with common sense, and compete competitively and not reduce people's sovereignty.

From some of the research that has been described previously, the authors have not seen a specific study that looks at the relationship between the family of the incumbent village head (patron) who has been in charge for more than 20 years and the village community (client). With Patron-client theory, the research focused on the non-material aspects of local actors (village heads) in the patron-client relationship in Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency, East Java Province. The question raised in this study was
how actors built a patron-client relationship in Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency to gain and maintain political power during 1998-2019 using a non-economic and economical approach.

**METHODODOLOGY**

This study used a qualitative research method with a political communication approach where the researcher acted as the main instrument in collecting field data. Data collection was done naturally by researchers to get meaning from the data obtained directly in the field through a qualitative research approach.

The researcher focused on material and non-material aspects in understanding the patron-client relationship in Jenggrik Village, Ngawi. Some questions explored by researchers included what has been done by the Village Head and his family to gain the authority of the Jenggrik Village community and what has been done by the Jenggrik Village Head's family so that they could preserve power for more than twenty years. The researcher also tried to understand the social and cultural life of the people of Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency from their perspective. Researchers also visited the village in person to observe the object of research in its natural setting. The interaction of the people of Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency, with the natural environment, the social environment becomes important because community interaction shows the knowledge, values, and culture of the people of Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency.

The study was conducted in East Java, precisely in Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency. The location was chosen with several considerations. First, voter participation was relatively low. Another consideration was that the people in Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency, have traditional relatively culture whose primary livelihoods is agricultural and plantations and has not mingled with migrant communities. So, it was hoped that the information obtained was more accurate and credible. The number of respondents and informants was determined based on scientific considerations and can be accounted for academically.

This study used data sourced from primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected directly from the data source, namely the results of direct research in the field, such as observation, interviews, and focus group discussions on community leaders, local elites, activists, non-governmental organisations, public figures religion, Suparni’s campaign team, and the village community. Respondent’s data was taken from each hamlet's files in Jenggrik Village, which gave many votes to Suparni. Meanwhile, secondary data was data obtained from several sources that already existed. Secondary data in this study were obtained from various sources, such as the village head election committee in Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency; Ngawi Regency BPS; as well as books, reports, journals, magazines, bulletins, articles,
documents, photographs and videos about the socialisation and implementation of the village head election in Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency that was relevant to this research.

Table 1. Characteristics of Informants

| No | Subject Characteristics | Research subject |
|----|-------------------------|------------------|
| 1  | Village Administration  | Village head     |
|    |                         | Village Chief    |
|    |                         | Government Apparatus |
|    |                         | Head of the village deliberative body |
| 2  | Village Elite           | Religion Teacher |
|    |                         | Head of youth organisation |
|    |                         | Islamic religious figures |
|    |                         | The Head of the farmer group |
|    |                         | The chairman of the mosque management |
| 3  | Villagers               | Parmin (the Farmer) |
|    |                         | Samin (bricklayer) |
|    |                         | Ibu Umi (Traders) |
| 4  | Village head election committee | Head of the village head |
|    |                         | Head of the district head election Committee |

Source: Data Processing by Author (2020)

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Elite and Power on Political Communication

Hartati (2019) found similarities with the practice of power at the level above the village by showing that there was a contestation between the village elite and the patronage network of power in the elections in Central Java. The same finding can also be seen from Hidayat's research (Hidayat et al., 2019) focusing on the shift in the local elite and the emergence of an economic elite that dominated the Bangkalan district election. In the battle to win the hearts of the people, assistance should be given to all members of the community who are in need, but MPs are stepping into the vacuum of service delivery abandoned by most of the 'overseas countries', serving most of the needs of their own support bases (Adams & Neef, 2019). The emergence of the Patron-Client relationship phenomenon begins with the existence of a patronage relationship. Patronage relationship is a full emotional personal relationship between servant and servant owners. The pattern of relationships in this context is between two individuals; namely the patron and the client. There is a reciprocal interaction by exchanging resources owned by each party. The patron has resources in the form of power, position or position, protection, attention and affection and not infrequently resources in the form of material (wealth, arable land and money). Meanwhile, clients have resources in the form of energy, support and loyalty. The patron-client
relationship has also been worked on based on various attachment factors, such as superiors and subordinates, equality of loyalty to the same party, and other things such as ethnic and hereditary similarities strengthened Patron-Client relations within the Regional Government.

As a result of the emergence of Patron-Client culture, the government has made an irrational organisational culture (bureaucracy) and even made superiors' performance appraisal to subordinates, not objective. The impact, most subordinates will always follow the style and pattern of their superiors to get closer to their superiors. The local government bureaucracy becomes a patron-controlled organisation, and the clients make an imitation of behaviour that makes the signs of service more closely and affect the performance of the bureaucracy. The excellent performance carried out by the Swedish Pension in communication with retirement participants over the past decade; the main changes in the information submitted to improve the quality of individual retirement knowledge have helped them make more informed, better decisions about work (Boado-Penas et al., 2019).

Information that is always updated following the changing times and technology creates a very encouraging motivation - about 80 per cent of respondents rated the Italian Social Security Institute service at least ‘very helpful.’ Even if 42 per cent of the sample exaggerates their future pensions, 16–29 per cent express a willingness to change their expectations on retirement income after receiving new information (Boeri et al., 2019).

Besides, social phenomena that arise from the existence of Patron-Client relations in the local government bureaucracy result in the promotion and mutation of positions to be not objective because they do not see bureaucrats' capabilities and expertise. In addition, this will result in a lack of attention to developing staff capacity to produce expert staff in their fields. This phenomenon will continue to occur along with the spread of political party members or sympathisers of certain political parties at the level of local government (executive) and Regional House of Representatives (legislative), which in the process of interaction are interrelated with various relationships that occur within the framework of the interests of groups and parties with service relations (Bhavnani & Jensenius, 2019). These findings indicate that the distribution of politicised funds in the short term has no long-term effect (Bhavnani and Jensenius, 2019). Too often, leaders who hold the power of policymakers in government deliberately ignore technical advice that makes sense or cannot pursue it despite their best intentions, due to political constraints (Khemani, 2017).

According to (Yusoff, 2010), local politics in Indonesia are still held captive by the influence of local strongmen and roving bandits. Even though political transformation has been in effect for more than a decade, local-level democracy is still imprisoned by the local political elite's interests. Furthermore, Agustino added that village residents' lives became very bleak. Within five years in office, the regional head
must repay the loan taken along with interest (determined previously). Not only that, but the desire of regional heads to enrich themselves also becomes another motivation which can certainly make people suffer more (Yusoff, 2010). This study tries to understand the political dynamics in the village; the role of local actors, in this case referred to as patrons, to produce and reproduce power at the village level; actions of local actors in 'seizing' power and maintaining power in the village; and why people in Jenggrik Village want to follow and obey patrons. Put simply, the relationship between patrons and clients in Jenggrik Village is reflected in the results of the Election of the Jenggrik Village Head where the incumbent and his family have successfully 'seized' and retained power for more than 22 years.

This research follows Pauwelussen's findings of the role of local actors in defending their power, the performance of community networks outside the local scale, and how they maintain power through the association of social and material elements. This trans-local community has opposed conservation efforts to create place-based resilience (Pauwelussen, 2016). The incumbents’ network has sent useful information from the communities in each hamlet to expand their influence. This indirect access form simultaneously protects companies from the same resource-based costs (Carney et al., 2020). The incumbent continues to provide socialisation about the importance of village development and cooperation among individuals in villagers' lives. As Cabanes said about the sociality of communication, this paper conceptualises how fake news and online political troublemakers work in relation to people's shared understanding of social politics.

In the village, people live in harmony and help one another. There is an unbalanced reciprocal relationship between the community and the community, in accordance with a mutually beneficial relationship, but only benefits the patron because they do not need to carry out tasks or work that they feel is improper to do. For Taunna, by following a leader, they will be protected and get some other benefits to sustain life. According to social scientists, patron-client relations generally have two approaches. First, patron-client relations as a human effort to be able to survive in a particular situation. Second, patron-client signs arise because of certain conditions in society.

**Power Political Communication of Patron-Client and Village Elites**

In Jenggrik Village, Ngawi Regency, village elites have charisma and influence in the community. Besides, a Patron-client group also has charisma and influence in the Ngawi Regency community. Patron client communication in Jenggrik Village could be divided into two groups: 1) related power that can support the patron-client group; and 2) related to minority outreach. According to Jusmiati (2017), elite and patron-client alike use their power and influence of minorities.
However, their abilities in this matter are based on different powers. The most fundamental difference is that almost all minority forms of influence have been at stake through competition and democratic change.

According to theorists of elite political communication, there is no explanation why the patron-client political power is so sturdy against the challenges of democracy, except radical ones. The existing democratic concept prevents such relation.

Patron-clients can build communication networks and unite with the elite powers on a material basis. Thus, Patron-client can also be an elite class. However, the elite can not necessarily be a patron-client if they do not have and use strong material power. The communication of elite groups can vary, including, but not limited to socialisation, polite messages, reminders, formal political rights, coercion, formal office, and power to move. Meanwhile, the primary factor of patron-client relation is material power. Consequently, as long as they do not have material power and an extensive communication network, elite groups cannot be a patron-client relation. However, the patron-client relation can become an elite group. Thus, researchers concluded that that the factors that strengthen patron-client relationship are adequate resources that can be used for personal political competition

A significant result of the analysis reveals the existence of an intensive approach to communication factors and power that exacerbates the difference between the forms of power of the minority elite and Patron-client. Only village head candidates with extensive communication networks, abundant wealth, and control material resources can be categorised into patron-client in the rural context. Generally, the candidates for the head of Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency used material, and non-material powers in the village head election held simultaneously throughout the region in June 2019. The candidates' use of money as a bond of interest was very likely occurred in many modes, making it difficult to call it money politics.

The political nuances and the continuous communication network with its village residents reflected the desire to obtain the village head's political position to balance the funding and material in the form of money given in various village head election activities. Intensive communication, good messages to its village residents, and giving money to villagers are some of the ways to significantly control the energy and needs of people who have transferable and anonymous characteristics. Women voters who routinely attend political communication lessons, albeit briefly, have a higher awareness of the importance of politics in life. A study concluded that women's exposure to politically-relevant information through mass broadcasting, although brief, can increase their political efficacy and participation in public life (Mvukiyehe, 2017).
In the village head election in Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency, there were four registered candidates. However, only two village heads candidates prepared financial capital and communication links with their village residents in the village head election, namely H. Suparni and Samino. Meanwhile, the other two candidates, Sutoyo and Sumadi, only wanted to measure whether the community still had the confidence in them to run for the village head election in Jenggrik Village, Kedunggalar District, Ngawi Regency. So, they did not give money, goods, or services to the community at all. Meanwhile, Suparni made a financial donation and communicated with cadres and villagers, especially to the people who were present at the village head election as a substitute for not working in a day.

During their time as head of the village from 1998 until now, the incumbent's family has established excellent and polite communication with its village residents. They have also helped many community needs. The incumbent village head often invites people to discuss and have a casual chat. Physically, they had built a bridge that connects two hamlets, namely Hamlet Jarakan and Hamlet Tumang. In addition, H. Suparni also donated land to seven hamlets in Jenggrik Village to make Volleyball Field from his banana plantation's spare land. The results of this development were intended for Karangtaruna (youth group) activities in the local hamlet. Moreover, the family of the incumbent village head also pays to replace broken volleyball equipment. Infrastructure development in the form of access roads to the hamlet was also built with additional personal funds. The incumbent family also rents out their rice fields with a profit-sharing system for the rice fields cultivators' village residents. Sibel drill wells were built in every hamlet of Jenggrik village. The wells' clean water was distributed to village residents' homes for their daily clean water needs. If a citizen dies, H. Suparni is always present. If he cannot attend due to other business, his wife will represent him and bring a big box of Gudang Garam cigarette. In addition, if there are village residents who are sick and must be hospitalised but do not have money, H. Suparni will finance with personal funds until they recover.

The community's high interest to take part in the competition for the position of village head had caused a high level of competition among the village head candidates in Jenggrik Village. As a result of intense competition, there were several winning strategies used by Jenggrik village head candidates to gain sympathy from the community. The factors used to win the Village Head election can be divided into two, namely the material and non-material power factors. All data from field research on the means of gaining power in the village head election by the four candidates for the Jenggrik Village showed that each candidate had a variety of strategies, including:

The first candidate for the village head, Sutoyo, was a military retiree. He rarely communicated with the community members, so the community considered him less sincere in conducting campaigns in the
village head election. Because of financial limitations, Sutoyo (2019) claimed he preferred to use the spiritual path through clerics, religious teachers, and shamans because, according to him, the method was more straightforward. From the interview, he admitted that he only spent a small amount of money for activities in the night before the election, for consumption, and witnesses at the TPS.

The second candidate for the village head was an entrepreneur. He was only just dabbling in the village head election. Based on in-depth interviews, we found that the third candidate’s winning strategy was by treating the village residents to eat and have a light chat in the stalls in each hamlet. Meanwhile, he held a village clean-up event at an old well in every hamlet in Jenggrik village for spiritual power. The second candidate chose to take those actions to win and increase confidence in the village head election in Jenggrik Village.

The third candidate for the village head was Samino. He is an active soldier. According to the community members, Samino was the most serious contender to the incumbent than the other two candidates. With tenacity capital, communication with individual village residents and groups, and material power from him who works as a soldier and his wife as a civil servant. Samino gave cash worth Rp 35,000 to the community as donation money. He also treated village residents to dinner at home the night before the election. Meanwhile, non-material power was also used to attract the sympathy of the village community. One of them was through a thanksgiving event at the well in every hamlet in Jenggrik village, together with the community. After thanksgiving, Samino did not go home immediately. He chatted lightly so that people would remember him, and to increase their confidence in competition with other potential village heads. In the village head election, Samino also used the services of shamans and clerics.

The fourth village head candidate is incumbent candidate, Suparni. He is a retired police officer. Suparni is the husband of Wiwik Wijayanti, a second-level legislative member in Ngawi Regency. Wiwik is a female figure, who has also served as head of Jenggrik Village for two consecutive periods, from 1998 to 2006. Wiwik communicates well with her village residents. She did many things, such as building a bridge connecting two hamlets, namely Jarakan hamlet and Tumang hamlet with private funds to boost the village community’s economy. Wiwik also built road infrastructure, waterways, and places of worship in the form of mosques and prayer rooms. From 2006 until now, Wiwik has served as a member of the Ngawi Regency Regional House of Representatives (DPRD –Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah).

Suparni was the candidate for village head who has the most economical power. Suparni explained that he was able to make a donation of Rp 60,000 per voter. In addition, he built volleyball field for seven hamlets in Jenggrik Village on private land, at the spare land from his banana plantation land whose yields were used for
Karangtaruna activities in each hamlet. Suparni also always buys volleyball equipment if something is broken. He built the infrastructure for the hamlet entrance and always added his funds aside from the village funds. The Suparni family also rents out rice fields with a production sharing system for farm labourers. Sibel drill wells were built in every hamlet in Jenggrik village. The clean water is then distributed to people's homes for daily necessities free of charge. Suparni also built a place of worship in the form of a mosque and mosque in every hamlet. If a community member dies, Suparni is always present. If he were busy, his wife would be represented by carrying a cigarette slop of Gudang Garam. Meanwhile, if there are village residents who are sick and have to be hospitalised but do not have costs, Suparni will pay the hospital fees with personal funds until they recover. Non-material power, among others, conducts thanksgiving at the village well every month Dhulhijjah. Suparni admitted that he was often visited by supernatural beings who spread Islam religion in every hamlet. The supernatural creature gave a message to defend the land and increase village development. In addition, Suparni also used the services of the Kyai who are already very close to his family and other village community leaders.

The four village head candidates in Jenggrik Village used non-material power, which is closely related to the Javanese concept of power, namely the concept of magical power (Anderson, 2000) and the power that believed to have come from God for a person or group to lead. Deities or revelations about the authority to rule come from divine forces (Andrian in Surbakti, 1992). Therefore, all the candidates for the Jenggrik village head who competed in the Jenggrik village head's election used magic powers. Some village head candidates also claimed to have Javanese leadership symbols in the form of revelation and descendants of the Village head to increase the campaign team's confidence and get sympathy from voters.

**Pragmatic Village Voters on Money Politics in village head elections**

Village communities tended to be pragmatic in dealing with village head elections. Before the village head election, the villagers communicated a lot between the community groups and the village head candidates. The residents also claimed to have received money which confused them. One candidate for village head, Samino, explained that the leader's sign was a revelation in his parents' days. However, now, the sign has changed to the way a person eats by hand. Now, those in power or leaders are people who have much money and communicate a lot with the community. Samino’s opinion is in accordance with the opinion of Sutoyo, another village head candidate. He felt that in today's world, charismatic people are those who have money and can speak politely and soothingly. It often happens that members in one family get money from several different
candidates. In the end, the family would choose the village head candidate who gave the most money. Amid a village head election competition, the community often chose a village head candidate based on several things. In addition to conscience, the community also assessed the village head candidate's competence and capabilities and the village head candidate who gave the most money and established the best communication. In the village head election, besides relying on family, friends, religion, and groups, some relied on religious groups such as NU, Muammadityah, Nationalists, as well as money and other services.

This research showed that the money given by village head candidates was very influential on people's choices. On the other hand, when the village head candidates did not spend money on village residents, they would most likely not get sympathy and attention from the community. Finally, they were unable to obtain a significant vote to win the village head election. Money politics is the practice of giving money, goods, services or luring the masses of individuals or groups to gain political benefits. Money politics and communication are done consciously, both by the perpetrators and the recipients. Giving nine staple food (Sembako) to the people who need them is not necessarily a form of money politics. If the motive is merely to help people in need, indeed it is not money politics, but noble and caring actions.

Prospective village heads had specific strategies to buy votes with money politics. They had special ways to ensure that voters had received the money in Jenggrik village. According to Samino, one of the village head candidates, it was common knowledge that the money might not reach the voters. Therefore, the village head candidates must ensure that the voters' money is not lost, and is handed over to the voters. This was especially true for the hamlet that supported the election of particular candidates for village heads. Prospective village heads used a reasonably good strategy to overcome this. For example, village head candidates established intensive communication and divided the campaign team into three groups. The campaign team group had various tasks, such as finding successful members, giving envelopes, and ensuring whether the money has been received well. For example, the day before the election, the campaign team met with village residents to give a certain amount of money in the morning. Later that night, different cadres would visit village residents to ensure they have received the intended money.

CONCLUSION

Viewed from the perspective of political communication and Patron-client and elite theory, in the context of the village head election in Jengkrik village, Kedunggalar subdistrict, Ngawi regency, the Patron-client group from each candidate for village head strived to become a village elite. Although material and non-material superiority from Wiwik Wijayanti's family, who supported her husband, Suparni,
surpassed other candidates. In addition, incumbents always maintain continuous communication with their village residents. In this case, Suparni was a Patron supported by his wife, who strived to gain power through material and non-material means. Suparni, as a candidate for the village head, was expected to be able to use non-material power to influence voters, namely villagers (clients), through cultural approaches.

Village voters (clients) interpreted money from village head candidates in a variety of ways. There were several ways in which villagers (clients) interpreted the money given by the prospective village head (patron). First, some members of the community interpreted the money obtained as a blessing. Secondly, some people interpreted money as a substitute for one day off. So, even though people did not work for one day because they had to vote, they still had an income. Several other community members interpreted the gift money as a form of the village head candidates' sincerity to compete in the village head election. Some villagers interpreted the money as the public money that had been received by the candidates for the village head, especially the incumbent candidates because all this time they had the privilege of being in the form of crooked land. Some community members also argued that village development continued and continued to obtain life security in addition to earning money. The villagers also argued that if the position was held by Suparni (patron), the problem of drought and village residents (clients) difficulty in obtaining clean water could be overcome without any cost.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

Researchers would like to thank all those who have contributed to the completion of this research. The researcher thanks Dr Falih Suaedi, M.Si, who gave advice, scientific contributions, research methods, and criticism. He also provided solutions for writing procedures and sentence structure. Thanks, are also given to Dr Phill. Koesbardiati Toetik, who provided motivation, advice, and direction for completing this research. Thanks are given, especially to my beloved wife, Suharti, S.Pd., M.Pd., who always provides motivation and accompanies researchers to complete this research.

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