한국 내 한국 TV 프로그램 소비에 대한 이론적 배경 연구: 
국제성, 근접성, 현대성을 중심으로

Investigating a Theoretical Background of the Consumption of Korean TV Programs in China: Focused on Globalism, Proximity, and Modernity

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요약

본 연구는 중국내 한류 컨텐츠 소비를 설명할 수 있는 이론적 배경을 살펴보고자 한다. 특히, 기존의 연구에서, 한류의 이론적 배경으로 제시되었던 국제성, 근접성, 현대성이 어떻게 중국내 한류 소비 동기에 영향을 미치고, 결국 한국 TV프로그램 (드라마, 버라이어티 쇼 등) 소비에 영향을 주는지 알아보고자 한다. 연구 결과, 첫째, 국제성 및 근접성이 한류 소비 동기에 긍정적 영향을 미친 반면, 현대성은 부정적 영향을 미쳤다. 즉, 국제적 가치관을 보일수록, 중국과 한국의 근접성이 높다고 생각할수록, 전통적인 가치관을 지닐수록 한류를 소비하고자 하는 동기가 더 크게 나타났다. 둘째, 한류 소비 동기는 실험적인 한국 TV프로그램 소비에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 수정된 연구 모델에서, 근접성, 그 다음으로 국제성이 한류 소비 동기에 가장 큰 영향을 끼치는 것으로 드러났다. 이러한 결과는 중국내 한류 현상을 설명하는데 있어서 근접성에 가장 타당한 이론적 접근임을 시사한다. 또한 인구통계학적 변인과 한류 소비 동기의 관계에서, 남성보다는 여성이, 기족 수입이 높을수록, 교육 수준이 낮을수록 한류 소비 동기에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다.

중심어 : 한류, 중국, 국제성, 근접성, 현대성

Abstract

The current study attempts to empirically identify a theoretical background that effectively explains Korean pop-culture consumption in the Asian Pacific region; particularly, in China. Specifically, this study investigates how globalism, proximity, and modernity, which have been suggested in literature as key theoretical backgrounds for the Korean wave, influence China’s motivation to consume the Korean wave and its subsequent consumption of Korean TV programs (e.g., dramas, variety shows, etc.). The findings suggest that the motivation to consume the Korean wave is positively related to globalism and proximity. Modernity, however, is found to have a negative influence on the motivation to consume the Korean wave. That is, the more one holds international values, the more one perceives Korea as similar to China, and the more one holds traditional values, the more motivation one shows to consume the Korean wave. The study also finds that the motivation to consume the Korean wave has a significant impact on the consumption of Korean TV programs. In the revised model, the study suggests that proximity, followed by globalism, has the strongest positive relationship with motivation. Such a finding suggests that a proximity approach could serve as a better theoretical perspective to explain the phenomenon of the Korean wave in China. Regarding the relationships of the demographic/socio-economic variables and the motivation to consume the Korean wave, females, rather than males, the higher the family income one gains, and the lower education level one has had, the more motivation one will show to consume the Korean wave.

keyword : Korean Wave, China, Globalism, Proximity, Modernity

* This project was supported by C-Grant of the School of Journalism and Communication, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
I. INTRODUCTION

Globalization has excited many about the notion of a shrinking, more accessible world. In shaping the global mindset of specific audiences across borders, a critical role is played by global media. Global media is media that delivered (via satellite, cable, the Internet, DMB, and so forth) to an international audience. For the past couple decades, global media has mainly referred to Western-based media. The dissemination of Western-based media to non-Western audiences (e.g., Asian countries) has been identified by some as cultural imperialism. However, since the mid-1990s, another notable form of global media has emerged in the Asian Pacific region, popularly known as the Korean wave/ Hallyu. The Korean wave has found not just receptive but avid audiences in the Asian Pacific region, including populations in such countries as China, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, and others. The Korean drama, Lover from Another Star, for example, was a mega hit last year in China.

Many consider the rise and popularity of the Korean wave to be closely linked to the process of globalization[1-4]. Still being debated, though, is whether the Korean wave is a repeat of cultural imperialism or a new culture generated from an authentic locality encountering other cultures[4][5]. Despite the ongoing debate about a theoretical approach to understanding the popularity of the Korean wave, few studies have empirically investigated the theoretical background of Korean pop-culture consumption in the Asia Pacific region. Rather, the discussion of a theoretical approach to the Korean wave has been mainly based on case studies or critical reviews.

The current study, therefore, attempts to empirically identify a theoretical background that well explains Korean pop-culture consumption in the Asian Pacific region, specifically, in China. This study identifies antecedents that influence the motivation to consume Korean pop-culture and that lead from there to watching Korean TV programs (e.g., dramas, variety shows, and so forth). Based on various perspectives from Korean wave studies, the study examines as antecedents globalism, proximity, and modernity. By comparing the relations between consumption motivation and these three antecedents, the study attempts to identify the most significant theoretical approach that can explain the phenomenon of the Korean wave in China. This study helps fill, with empirical evidence, a theoretical gap found in the literature on the ongoing debate about the theoretical backgrounds of the Korean wave. Furthermore, it legitimizes a particular theoretical approach to the Korean wave in a Chinese context.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Korean Wave in China

In the 1990s, the Korean wave, or Hallyu, began to sweep mainland China[6]. The term Hallyu (Korean wave) was first used by the newspaper Beijing Youth in November of 1999 to describe the great impact of Korean pop cultural products[7]. In 1993, the first Korean drama Jildu (Jealousy) was imported and screened on CCTV – the official state TV. In 1997, when Aiqing Shi Shenme (What Is Love) was screened on CCTV8, Korean dramas had grown in popularity among Chinese people, gaining an audience rating of 4.2%[8]. Then, Zaotang Laoban Jia de Nanrenmen (The Bathhouse People), Huangshoupa (Yellow Handkerchief), Kan Le You Kan (Can’t Take My Eyes Off You) and other dramas were successively broadcast on CCTV, among which Kan
Le You Kan was re-broadcast at least five times due to its popularity[8].

Local TV channels followed this trend and helped boost the ratings for Korean dramas. Unlike CCTV, local TV preferred trendy dramas. Several widely favored dramas such as Xing Meng Qi Yuan (Star in My Heart), Tianqiao Fengyun (Model), Xiawa de Youhuo (All about Eve), and others were first imported and screened on local TV channels. In 2002, 67 Korean dramas appeared on Chinese screens. Among the most famous and representative, Lanse Shengsilian (Autumn Fairy Tale) was screened on 21 TV channels in China. The actors Seung-Heon Song, Hye-Kyo Song, and Bin Won quickly accumulated a huge following of Chinese fans. Another popular drama Da Chang Jin (Dae Jang Keum) was exclusively imported and shown on Hunan TV in 2005, and was the top-ranked program in terms of program ratings[8].

2. Theoretical Approaches to the Korean Wave

Many in Korean wave studies have been interested in identifying the theoretical backgrounds to explain the phenomenon of the Korean wave in Asian countries. One of the most prominent approaches in explaining the Korean Wave is globalization. Globalization, in one aspect, refers to the blurring of borders with an increasing intensiveness and interconnectedness of time, space, and people[13–16]; another aspect of globalization is the massive capital, material, cultural and informational flows across borders[17][18]. That is, deeply rooted in political-economic globalization is cultural imperialism[5].

The term “global media” has long referred mainly to Western-based media. The transference of Western-based media to non-Western audiences (e.g., Asian countries) has been identified by some as cultural imperialism. With this assumption, the global culture map has changed greatly during the process of globalization: with its large export of cultural products, Western culture, particularly American popular culture, has become dominant in regions around the world, resulting in, according to critics, an imperialism of Western values, beliefs, and lifestyles[19][20]. The world has thus witnessed in past decades the spread of consumerism and the process of cultural homogenization[21–23].

Some argue that the Korean wave has taken advantage of a changing market situation in Asia, where many Asian countries have opened their cultural markets—after having been pressured to do so by the IMF and WTO[2][4]. Along with the political changes in this region, others simply view the Korean wave as a commodity to be traded between countries. The Korean wave is nothing more than the product of the cultural industry and capitalism because it is the outcome of the expansion of capital, modernity, and homogenized global culture from Western countries to non-Western areas[1]. That is, the Korean wave can be regarded as the Asian version of Hollywood products and American culture. Thus, the Korean wave itself has become part of global cultural imperialism[3].

If the approach of globalization is applied to the current context, the Korean wave in China could be explained by the enjoyment of imported cultural products. If people have a tendency to be open-minded about global cultures, they will enjoy global cultural products regardless of their country of origin. Therefore, based on the literature review, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H1: Globalism is positively related to a motivation to consume the Korean wave.

However, this dominant perspective has been criticized as ignoring local acceptance and resistance. Local audiences have their own interpretations of and
choices about dominant cultures. Moreover, they
rediscover their own unique cultures by encountering
global and local cultures[20]. Meanwhile, the regional
cultural flows have risen, forming a backlash to the
dominant one-way flow of Western pop
culture[17][24]. Studies of the Korean Wave have
reflected, to some extent, the impact and conflicts of
globalization. Shim[4] suggested that the rise and
popularity of the Korean wave is very much linked to
the process of globalization. The debate continues as
to whether the Korean wave is a repeat of cultural
imperialism or a new culture generated from an
authentic locality encountering other cultures.

Some studies point out the heterogeneity inside the
Korean wave[3][25], stressing how it demonstrates
the quality of a pluralistic cultural formation. The
Korean wave is also deemed as a backlash or
resilience to the homogenized culture dominated by
Western political, economic, and cultural powers since
it leads to significant transnational cultural flows at
both global and regional levels[3][4][26]. Globalization
has also been questioned for failing to account for the
unusual vigorous growth of the Korean wave among
Asian neighboring regions, particularly in Japan, a
country more powerful than Korea[5].

In this regard, proximity provides another
explanation; it highlights how audiences prefer
programs in close proximity to their own cultures,
languages, and habits to those from culturally
unfamiliar ones[27]. Even before the Korean wave
swept across Asia, Japan's popular culture profited
from its cultural similarity to its Asian neighbors.
Iwabuchi[28] found that cultural similarity was one
prominent factor in attracting Taiwanese to watch
Japanese dramas. Profoundly influenced by Japanese
popular culture, the Korean wave learned to promote
itself to its cultural neighbors in the same way[4][29].
Chinese Confucian ethics and traditional values
including assigning deep significance to family ties,
harmony, and community. The Korean wave,
pregnant with similar cultural values, seems to touch
the right chord with Chinese sentiments. This
similarity encourages Chinese audiences to identify
themselves with characters on these Korean TV
programs[4][30].

Along with the cultural proximity between the two
countries, racial proximity has also been suggested to
contribute to the popularity of the Korean wave.
Racial proximity refers to the shared values and ideas
within similar racial groups, such as “the perception
of beauty, mannerism, styles in clothing, and a sense
of Asian-ness in contrast to perceived western
outlooks, and so on”[31][32, p.48]. Chinese audiences,
according to this notion, are more likely to embrace
the “Asian-ness” shown in the Korean wave; they
would be likely to more closely relate to the physical
characteristics of the Korean characters. Thus, it is
plausible to assume that proximity between the two
countries is an antecedent to the motivation to
consume the Korean wave in China. The following
hypothesis is therefore posited:

H2: Proximity is positively related to a motivation
to consume the Korean wave.

However, the proximity approach has been
criticized for not being able to capture the whole
picture. Hence, in recent Korea wave studies, scholars
have given attention to another theoretical
perspective, the modernity and hybridization
approach. Modernization has its roots in the rising
capitalism of the late 1600s and it accelerated with the
advent of globalization[17]. The two key elements of
modernization - American efficient and standardized
mode of production (e.g. McDonaldization), as well as
the fast consumption style and consuming culture -
have permeated the world by globalization[22].
Nowhere in the world, however, is modernization identical or balanced; rather, it shows various levels and forms due to national differences. From this perspective, some countries still try to improve their degree of Westernized modernization, while others struggle with the fierce conflict between traditional and modernized cultures[17].

Cultural hybridization refers to the generation of new culture containing both global and local cultural characteristics[33]. It is closely connected to the modernization process across the world, and only occurs when a local and traditional culture comes across a global one. Cultural hybridization sustains the local identity, values, and norms in a global context[3]. Cultural hybridization has been put forward as a way to account for the popularity of the Korean wave, which refers to cultural products with hybridity and transnational characteristics, understating the Korean-ness[34]. By quoting a Chinese K-pop fan as saying that the attractive part of K-pop was its modern fashion and Western style, Shim[4] questioned the explanatory power of cultural proximity, and suggested that cultural hybridization would be a better perspective when analyzing the Korean wave in Asia. Instead of just emphasizing “Asian-ness,” the Korean wave is combined with contemporary, Western modernity to create a different model of modern fashion. This model, it turns out, is widely favored and has spread quickly across borders[4][36][35].

From this perspective, the Korean wave is neither more globalized (globalization) nor localized (proximity/Asian-ness), but a totally new hybridized culture that is part modernity and part locality. Its modernized characteristics have lured Chinese audiences who pursue modern values and lifestyles, while its local cultural characteristics offer an Eastern way of being modern, distinct from Western. The following hypothesis is thus posited:

H3: Modernity is positively related a motivation to consume the Korean wave.

According to Use and Gratification Theory, audiences are active communicators, not passive recipients of a media message. Hence, communication behavior (e.g., the selective exposure to media) is not casual, but motivated by certain purposes[36]. People initiate the selection and use of communication vehicles to satisfy their needs or desires. Motivation determines media behavior. In the current context, people highly motivated to consume the Korean wave are likely to spend more time watching Korean TV programs. The following hypothesis is thus put forward:

H4: The motivation to consume the Korean Wave is positively related to the amount of time Chinese spend consuming Korean TV programs.

Some Korean wave studies have attempted to identify a theoretical perspective that can explain the Korean wave in the Asia Pacific region. However, their research approach has been done mostly based on critical reviews. Theoretical approaches to the Korean wave have initiated a discussion on possible theoretical explanations of its consumption by Asian audiences. However, the debate has gone on with a lack of empirical studies to inform it. Therefore, the current study attempts to identify the most significant antecedent that can serve as a theoretical perspective for the phenomenon of the Korean wave in China.

RQ1: What is the most significant theoretical approach that can explain the phenomenon of the Korean wave in China?

III. METHOD

1. Sampling
A web-based survey was administered via Wenjuanxing (sojump.com), one of the largest online survey platforms in China. Although the online panel of Wenjuanxing is not 100% representative of the target population, it is widely used in academic studies of China. For this study, residents in Beijing were recruited because Beijing, as China’s capital, is the center of the media industry. Beijing residents are more likely to be exposed to a variety of global media/contents compared to residents in the rural areas of China.

A total of 994 subjects participated in the study. Of them, 46.9% (n = 466) were males and 53.1% (n = 528) were females. The age ranged from 13–69 years old with the mean age being 30.3 years old. Further demographic and socio-economic descriptions of the sample are presented in [Table 1]. In terms of viewing habits, the largest portion (34.9%, n = 347) watched Korean TV programs for 1–5 hours per week, followed by less than 1 hour (23.9%, n = 238), 6–10 hours (18.2%, n = 181), 11–15 hours (8.6%, n = 85), 16–20 hours (5.1%, n = 51), more than 20 hours (4.0%, n = 40), yet 5.2% (n = 52) never watched Korean TV programs.

### Table 1. Demographic and Socio-economic Descriptions

|                              | N  | %   |
|------------------------------|----|-----|
| Gender                       |    |     |
| Male                         | 466| 46.9|
| Female                       | 528| 53.1|
| Age                          |    |     |
| Under 18                     | 15 | 1.5 |
| 19–25                        | 305| 30.7|
| 26–30                        | 231| 23.2|
| 31–40                        | 342| 34.4|
| Above 41                     | 101| 10.2|
| Education                    |    |     |
| Middle school                | 7  | 0.7 |
| High school                  | 36 | 3.6 |
| College/University           | 788| 79.3|
| Post–graduate school         | 163| 16.4|
| Working status               |    |     |
| Working now                  | 850| 85.5|
| Not working now              | 144| 14.5|

2. Data Collection Procedures

A web-based survey designed for the study opened with an informed-consent notice; participants were asked to click the “proceed” button if they agreed to participate in the study. Participants were then presented questions measuring proposed antecedents (i.e., globalism, proximity, modernity), the motivation to consume the Korean wave, and the consumption of Korean TV programs (i.e., the amount of time spent watching Korean TV programs). Finally, they were asked to answer demographic questions such as age, gender, education, income, and so forth.

3. Measures

First, globalism ($\alpha = .70$) was assessed based on a three-item, 7-point Likert-type scale[5]. The items included: 1) “China should limit importation of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.” 2) “China should follow its national interests even if these would lead to conflicts with other nations.” 3) “Increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging our own culture.” Second, proximity ($\alpha = .91$) was measured by eight items, using a 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from very strongly disagree to very strongly agree. Examples are: 1) “Korean culture has something in common with our own values, feelings, and experiences.” 2) “Korean culture has something in common with
Confucian ethics." 3) “Korean culture has something in common with our own value of respecting for family ties.” 4) “Korean culture shares norms of beauty with us.” This measure was developed from the relevant literature[4][5][32]. Modernity ($\alpha = .72$) was measured on a six-item, 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from very strongly disagree to very strongly agree. Examples include: 1) “It is not desirable to oppose an idea which the majority of people accept, even if it is different from one’s own.” 2) “I feel honored when people who come from the same town play an important role in society.” 3) “It is better to let capable leaders decide everything”[5]. Since these items were originally to measure the modernity-tradition variable, the negative items were then converted into positive scores to measure modernity, for example, if one got a score of 3 in traditional-orientation, it was converted into 4 in modernity-orientation. Next, motivation to consume the Korean Wave ($\alpha = .94$) was measured on a six-item, 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from very strongly disagree to very strongly agree, adopted from Chan and Chi[37]. Examples include: 1) “Korean entertainment news interests me.” 2) “I want to watch Korean TV dramas and movies.” 3) “I’m interested in Korean fashion.” Lastly, the consumption of Korean TV programs was measured by hours per week spent watching Korean TV programs over the past 12 months.

As control variables, this study included demographic, and socio-economic characteristics (gender, age, education, income, social status, and working status), and media consumption (TV consumption, social media consumption). For data collection in China, all of the scales selected for the study were carefully translated into Chinese by a bilingual doctoral student.

4. Data Analysis

All reliability and descriptive data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version (18.0). Partial correlations were computed to test each of the main hypotheses. Then, five variables (i.e., globalism, proximity, modernity, the motivation to consume the Korean wave, and the consumption of Korean TV programs) were first regressed with eight control variables and AMOS (18.0) was performed to test the proposed path model.

IV. RESULTS

1. Proximity Scale Development

Factor analysis was first conducted on the eight items through SPSS 18.0. A two factor structure was suggested by the eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule[38]. The eigenvalues of the first two factors were 5.00 and 1.11, which accounted for about 62.5% and 13.9% of variance of explanation, respectively. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .91, and the Bartlett’s test was significant ($X^2=5331.30, df = 28, p < .001$), indicating a good fit of this two-factor structure demonstrating the data. To better explain the two factors, oblique rotation with Kaiser Normalization was performed.

A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was then conducted to verify the factor analysis results. The indices indicated an acceptable fit ($X^2=122.82, df = 19, p < .001$; CFI = .98; IFI = .98; NFI = .98; RMSEA = .07), providing support for the proposed two-factor model. Shown in [Table 2] are the items and their factor loadings. Factor 1 demonstrates Cultural Proximity, while Factor 2 demonstrates Racial Proximity.
2. Hypotheses Tests

The relationships among globalism, proximity, modernity, the motivation to consume the Korean wave, and the consumption of Korean TV programs are shown in [Table 3], while controlling the effects of demographic, socio-economic characteristics and media consumption. Supporting H1, a positive relationship was detected between globalism and the motivation to consume the Korean wave ($r = .08, p < .05$). Exhibiting a positive relationship, proximity was positively related to the motivation to consume the Korean wave, as predicted ($r = .48, p < .001$). Thus, H2 was supported. H3, which assessed the relationship between modernity and the motivation to consume the Korean wave was significant, however the two variables were negatively related ($r = -.31, p < .001$), not supporting H3. Data also showed a positive relationship between the motivation to consume the Korean wave and the consumption of Korean TV programs, supporting H4 ($r = .40, p < .001$).

Table 3. Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Matrix of Independent and Dependent Variables

|                      | (1)  | (2)  | (3)  | (4)  | (5)  |
|----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| (1) Globalism        | 1.0  |      |      |      |      |
| (2) Proximity        | 1.0  | .04  |      |      |      |
| (3) Modernity        |      | .25***| .40***| 1.0  |      |
| (4) Motivation to consume the Korean wave | .08* | .48** | .31***| 1.0  |      |
| (5) Consumption of Korean TV programs | .00 | .19***| .40***| 1.0  |      |
| Cronbach’s Alpha     | .70  | .91  | .72  | .94  |      |
| Mean                 | 3.67 | 4.69 | 3.96 | 4.62 | 2.45 |
| SD                   | 1.20 | .10  | .93  | 1.46 | 1.34 |

Figure 1. Results for the test of the hypothesized model
model was further examined based on model fit indices. The overall fit indices for the model were not acceptable, indicating a weak fit between the model and the data ($\chi^2 = 270.844, df = 6, p < .001$; CFI = .636; IFI = .641; NFI = .637; RMSEA = .211).

The original model was thus rejected. In order to improve the model fit, the modification indices were examined[39]. They showed that the model fit could be improved by adding covariance paths among the three independent variables: globalism, proximity, and modernity. Considering that globalization brought modernization to the world[22] and that modernization developed quickly with the facilitation of globalization[17], it is plausible to think that modernity and globalism are positively correlated to one another. Literature on proximity suggests that people feel closer and more identical when they share traditional values, social structures or norms in styles, mannerism, etc.[32]. This suggests that proximity, in the current context, is rooted in Eastern traditional values, which are somewhat opposite to the concept of modernity as it has originated in Western cultures. Thus, negative correlations are expected between modernity and proximity. Therefore, covariance paths were justifiable. After the model modification, as presented in [Figure 2], the goodness of fit statistics demonstrated that the modified model provided a significantly better fit ($\chi^2 = 6.548, df = 3, p > .05$; CFI = .991; IFI = .995; NFI = .995; RMSEA = .035). The data showed that globalism and proximity were positively related to the motivation to consume the Korean wave ($\beta = .08$, $\beta = .42$, respectively), whereas modernity was negatively related to such a motivation ($\beta = -.17$). Consequently, the motivation to consume the Korean wave was positively related to the consumption of Korean TV programs ($\beta = .42$).

In addition, the path coefficient of globalism-modernity is .24 with a $t$-value of 7.32 ($p < .001$), suggesting that people who are globalized are more likely to be modernized, and vice versa. Study results further indicate that the proximity-modernity path coefficient is -.41 with a $t$-value of -11.92 ($p < .001$). It is plausible to assume that people who believe that Korea and China share traditional and cultural values are likely to be less modernized and vice versa. Data demonstrated, however, globalism and proximity were not significantly correlated to each other ($p > .05$).

The comparison of the strength of the relationships between audience motivation to consume the Korean wave and each of the antecedents answers RQ1. Globalism and proximity positively influenced the motivation to consume the Korea wave and subsequently the consumption of Korean TV programs. Modernity, unexpectedly, negatively affected the motivation to consume the Korean wave and thus led to less consumption of Korean TV programs. As shown in [Figure 2], the positive relationship between proximity and the motivation to consume the Korean wave was exhibited as the strongest; it was followed by globalism.

### 3. Additional Analyses

To test the relationship between demographic variables (i.e., gender, age, education, working status,
social status, and family income) and the motivation to consume the Korean wave, a study in linear regression was conducted. The overall model was significant and explained 20.5% of the variance (F = 43.77, p < .001). All demographic variables, except age (t = -0.60, p > .05), indicated a significant relationship with motivation: Gender (t = 6.60, p < .001), education (t = -2.93, p < .01), working status (t = -3.56, p < .001), social status (t = 6.61, p < .001), and family income (t = 7.24, p < .001). Results were listed in [Table 4].

Table 4. Linear Regression of Demographics on the Korea Wave Motivation

| Demographics     | Motivation |
|------------------|------------|
| Gender           | .19***     |
| Age              | -0.02      |
| Education        | -0.09**    |
| Working status   | -0.11***   |
| Social status    | .21***     |
| Family income    | .23***     |
| F                | 43.77***   |
| Final Adjusted R2| .21        |

Note: N = .994. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.

The results suggested that females, rather than males, had more interest in Korean wave consumption. The higher social status in one’s thoughts of self, the more motivation one showed to consume the Korean wave. Moreover, the higher family income the respondent gained, the more he/she was interested in consuming the Korean wave. When one attained a higher level of education, he/she was less interested in the Korean wave; while the respondents who currently had a job showed higher motivation to consume the Korean wave.

Hierarchical regression was then conducted to investigate how demographics and motivation influenced Korean wave consumption. For the equation, demographic characteristics were entered first, followed by motivation. K-wave consumption served the dependent variable.

The overall model was significant, explaining 32% of total variance (F = 64.23, p < .001). Among the demographic variables, family income (t = 3.13, p < .05) showed significant influence on consumption. However, gender (t = -1.64, p > .05), age (t = -1.33, p > .05), working status (t = -1.12, p > .05), and social status (t = 1.52, p > .05) failed to predict the dependent variable. In addition, motivation was found to be a significant predictor of consumption (t = 16.49, p < .001). [Table 5] shows the results in detail.

Table 5. Hierarchical Regression of Demographics and Motivation on the Korean wave Consumption

| Demographics     | K-wave | Consumption |
|------------------|--------|-------------|
| Gender           | .12*** | .03         |
| Age              | -.04   | -.05        |
| Education        | -.05   | -.01        |
| Working status   | -.08*  | -.03        |
| Social status    | .15*** | .05         |
| Family income    | .22*** | .10**       |
| Motivation       | .50*** |             |
| ΔR2              | .13    | .20         |
| F                | 22.99***| 64.23***    |
| Final Adjusted R2| .21    | .32         |

Note: N = .994. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.

The results demonstrated that family income was positively related to Korean wave consumption. It meant the higher income the respondent’s family gained, the more he/she watched Korean drama, which was consistent with the positive relationship between family income and motivation to consume the Korean wave. On the other hand, motivation had the most significantly predictive effect on consumption, indicating that the higher motivation one had to consume Korean wave products, the more one would actually consume them.
V. DISCUSSION

A theoretical contribution of the current study lies in the empirical investigation of theoretical perspectives that have been addressed and argued in the literature pertaining to the Korean wave, particularly in the context of China. Consistent with the previous studies that suggest cultural/racial similarities between Korea and other countries in the Asia Pacific region as a reason for the popularity of Korean cultural products[4][30–32], the proximity between Korea and China was found to have the greatest effect on the motivation to consume the Korean wave and the subsequent consumption of Korean TV programs. Globalism was also positively related to the motivation; however, its relationship was much weaker than that of proximity. These findings offer support to critics who argue that the phenomenon of the Korean wave in China may not be well explained from the Western media-focused perspectives, including cultural globalization or cultural imperialism. The study results suggest that, as some scholars argue, the most plausible theoretical perspective that explains the popularity of the Korean wave in China is one that considers the wave’s close proximity to China’s own culture, tradition, values, and norms.

On the other hand, the negative relationship stands as one of the study’s most interesting findings, suggesting further investigation. Many in Korean wave studies argue that modernization is one of the drivers leading to global media consumption[4][26][35]. However, this argument may not apply so well to the context of Korean wave consumption in the Asian Pacific region. For instance, Yang[5] found that modernity had no significant impact on watching Korean dramas. Even the negative impact of modernity on China’s motivation to consume the Korean Wave in the current study further suggests that respect for traditional/local values could be a factor that increases the motivation, inconsistent with the modernity approach in global communication research. This unexpected finding rather supports the proximity perspective by questioning whether Korean pop-culture is indeed perceived as a different type of modernity, one that combines Asian cultures with contemporary western modernity[4][26][35].

Another possible reason for the negative effect of modernity on the motivation to consume Korean wave is the clash between traditional and modern values. Despite the spread of modernity alongside globalization, many localities have largely rejected Western culture. Hybridization takes place when different cultural forms and beliefs mix[40]. In Korea, the government set up a globalized goal for its media industry, one that welcomes advanced media formats from Western countries. As a result, dramatic modernization has taken root in hardware—media formats—traditional values such as Confucianism prevails in software—the media content that de-emphasizes social autonomy[41]. Thus, as a hybridized pop cultural product, Korean wave can claim modern trappings while conveying traditional values[4][5]. Korean drama, in particular, depicts the traditional values of Confucian society, such as the subordinate position of women and the importance of family. Thus, the attractiveness of Korean drama may be explained not by modern values but by modernity’s external factors such as fashion or the depiction of metropolitan life. A person who embraces modernity’s value system, namely, freedom, democracy, and so forth, may not appreciate the traditional values portrayed in Korean drama. Indeed, the two sets of values seem almost pitted against each other[41][42]. Future research should exercise caution in how it conceptualizes and operationalizes
Interestingly, globalism was positively related to the motivation; however, its relationship was much weaker than those of proximity. These findings offer support to critics who argue that the phenomenon of the Korean wave in China may not be well explained from the Western media-focused perspectives including cultural globalization/cultural imperialism. The study results suggest that, as some scholars argue\[4\][31][32], the most plausible theoretical perspective that can explain the popularity of the Korean wave in China is one that considers the wave’s close proximity to China’s own culture, tradition, values, and norms. In short, the study suggests that, out of the three theoretical perspectives drawn from the literature, the proximity approach best explains the phenomenon of the Korean wave in China.

The study results also suggest that the motivation to consume the Korean wave is found to have a significantly positive relationship with the amount of time spent watching Korean TV dramas, Korean TV variety shows, and so forth. In summary, the motivation to consume the Korean wave determines the amount of consumption of Korean TV programs. As Use and Gratification Theory suggests\[36\], motivation determines media behavior. This motivation is further affected by individual differences. In this study’s context, individuals’ different levels of globalism, proximity to Korea, and modernity determine their motivation to consume Korean pop-culture and consequently affect their consumption of Korean TV programs.

This study, like any other research, has its limitations. Limitations naturally provide a basis for further investigations of motivation of Korean wave consumption and its various consequences. First and foremost, this study limited its responses to online panels residing in Beijing, which may not be 100% representative of the population that consumes the Korean wave in China. For future research, broadening samples demographically by matching the age ratio with the target city or geographically by including other areas of China are essential to making the study results more representative and generalizable.

Second, this study only measured the consumption of Korean TV programs as a consequence of being motivated to consume the Korean wave. Other Korean cultural products such as Korean pop music and Korean movies, should be studied as other types of the Korean wave. Furthermore, excluding consequences of the Korean wave consumption in the current study hinder a better understanding of the whole picture of antecedents and consequences of the Korean wave. Hence, for further research, researchers considering the positive and negative outcomes of Korean pop-culture consumption need to look at them from three perspectives - psychological, economic, and political. An exploration of how Korean pop-culture consumption affects identity formation and change, consumer responses to Korean brands and Korean celebrities, and China’s perceptions of and attitudes toward Korea would provide theoretical as well as managerial implications to multiple disciplines of research including global communication, advertising, and consumer psychology.

Third, the findings are limited to a Chinese context. In other words, the study findings such as the antecedents of the motivation to consume the Korean wave may be limited to Chinese audiences. Today especially, the Korean wave has extended its reach to places beyond the Asian Pacific, such as the Middle East and South America. People from different areas may have different reasons for why they consume Korean pop-culture products. Future research could
focus on Korean wave consumption in different regions (e.g., a country in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or South America).

Lastly, another promising avenue to explore would be the similarities and differences of Korean pop-culture consumption and Western-based global media consumption. By comparing the theoretical flow regarding the antecedents and consequences of Korean pop-culture with that of Western-based media, researchers would be able to identify a theoretical approach that well explains the underlying behavior of each of the two types of global media.

VI. CONCLUSION

This study is designed to identify theoretical perspectives that explain the rise and popularity of the Korean wave in the Asian Pacific region; particularly, in China. Regarding the motivation to consume the Korean wave, this study considered three theoretical antecedents: globalism, proximity, and modernity. As evidence of being so motivated, this study considered the consumption of Korean TV programs (e.g., dramas, variety shows, and so forth), measured by the amount of the time spent watching them. Regarding the antecedents, the study findings suggest that globalism and proximity have positive impacts on the motivation to consume the Korean wave, while modernity was found to have a negative relationship with it. The motivation to consume the Korean wave was found to subsequently affect the consumption of Korean TV programs. In short, the study suggests that, out of the three theoretical perspectives drawn from the literature, the proximity approach best explains the phenomenon of the Korean wave in China.

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