Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Pakistan’s Full-Spectrum Punitive Offensive Conventional Military Strategy and Punitive Nuclear Retaliation

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ABSTRACT

TNWs have ranges less than 500 kilometers. TNWs are traced to Cold War era. Pakistan introduced TNWs in response to General V.P. Malik’s CSD. Malik introduced it to reduce involvement political hierarchy in Indian military strategic planning during crisis situation. Only this study claims that CSD is replica of Clausewitz’s indirect military strategy. Qualitative approach, Waltz’s philosophy of nuclear deterrence and vertical extended deterrence are applied for the completion of this academic research. Objective of this study is to highlight Pakistan’s development of Full Spectrum Punitive Offensive Conventional Military Strategy (FSPOMS) or Full Spectrum Punitive Nuclear Retaliation. Author claims revolution in Indian military is resulting in changes e.g. change No First Use to first use. Indian Strategic Forces Command will authorize first-strike against Pakistan’s counterforce and counter value targets. India is deploying nuclear weapons to adopt super-ready status. It increases chances of nuclear war in South Asia.

Keywords: Clausewitz, Deterrence, Strategy, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Theoretical

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Introduction

Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) are low yield non-strategic nuclear weapons have range less than 500 kilometers (Khan & Abbasi, 2013). TNWs are developed and designed for battlefield usage or targeted against enemy’s combat machinery, infrastructure, logistic support areas, headquarters, communication centers, air bases and aircraft careers (Ahmed, 2012). Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) consider development of TNWs necessary to enhance credibility of nuclear
deterrent. Genesis of TNWs is traced to United States-Soviet Cold War era rivalry. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military planners believed TNWs can play deterrent role against enemy’s large scale advancing military forces. NATO deployed TNWs as Quick Reaction Alert Force (QRAF) (Kanwal, 2013) to deter Soviet Union.

US deployed 500 TNWs (Chossudovsky, 2013) in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. According to estimates 350 TNWs were pointed against Russia in 2007 while in 2013 another 180 were targeted against Iran. Russia is believed to have developed 2000 TNWs. But it is unknown that how many TNWs have been exactly deployed (Sokov, 2002).

This publication claims Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) is rooted in Herman Kahn’ teachings and it is replica of Clausewitz’ s indirect military strategy; second General V.P. Malik introduced CSD to reduce Indian government’s involvement in military’s strategic planning during crisis situation. Indian military leadership wants to hold either field commanders or Indian political leadership responsible for failure to achieve military and political objectives of CSD. Thirdly, CSD destabilizes South Asian strategic stability. Fourth section discusses strategic rationale behind Islamabad’s development of TNWs and emergence of Positive and Negative (nuclear) Command in Pakistan. A variety of theoretical frameworks including vertical extended deterrence, capped deterrent, Buzan’s maximum deterrence, Kahn’s “retortions,” Clausewitz’s indirect approach and honorable defeat are applied for the completion of this study.

The Cold Start Doctrine (CSD)

India launched, ‘Operation Parakaram,’ on October 1, 2001 to deploy its forces and punish Pakistan for its alleged involvement for perpetrating terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament (Kalyanaraman, 2002). India failed to achieve its objectives due to the delayed mobilization of entire Indian army, Pakistan’s rapid counter mobilization and US’s involvement to defuse crisis (III, 2007/08). In April, 2004 the then General V.P. Malik announced Indian military’s CSD. This offensive doctrine aims at speedy mobilization of Indian military within 72-96 hours to penetrate and destroy Pakistan counterforce targets near border. It is designed to carry-out first-strike and occupy 30 to 80 Kilometers of Pakistani territories. Indian government will then coerce Pakistan to fulfill Indian demands through coercive bargaining. It is designed to prevent major powers involvement through swift operations, punish adversary, achieve political and military objectives rapidly.

Kanwal asserts that Indian IBGs after occupying 1 to 5 kilometers of Pakistani territory in different areas would then halt their advance. New Delhi will use these strips in bargaining (Kanwal). It is not a new concept as Kahn discussed similar scenario in 1960, in context of Soviet possible moves to occupy a small portion of allies administered Germany and then declare ceasefire (Kahn,
Kanwal failed to understand or completely ignored that Indian presence on Pakistani occupied territory will be viewed as an Indian attempt to dismember Pakistan or destruction of Pakistani defence mechanism. Secondly, Pakistan will not accept a ceasefire on Indian terms and conditions because agreeing to ceasefire will affect morale of Pakistani forces and nation. Instead, Pakistan will continue fighting to deny Indian coercive diplomacy, nuclear blackmail and political advantages secured by New Delhi. Intense fight, Indian continued illicit occupation of Pakistan’s sovereign territory, international community’s failure to compel New Delhi to withdraw its forces and Pakistan refusal to surrender will increase chances of deterrence failure.

India can arm its armed forces and authorize barely use TNWs due to the fear of deterrence failure at tactical levels or fear of losing element of surprise (Krepon, Haider, & Thomson, 2004). It will result in rifts in New Delhi based civilian policymakers and military bureaucracy. Secondly, Pakistan’s declared First Use Policy will endow India to cheat and use TNWs in the pretext of Islamabad’s asymmetric nuclear posture to secure advantages of preemptive strike. New Delhi will endeavor to convince the world that Pakistani nuclear attack was imminent threat hence it launched first strike. Third, India can cheat to deliberately carry nuclear first strike against Pakistan in pretext of accidental use. It will prevent international condemnation. India will convince Islamabad that operatives responsible for accidental use will be punished. Conversely, New Delhi will urge Islamabad to dissuade from deliberate use of nuclear weapons in-return it will compensate Pakistani losses. Or New Delhi can threaten Pakistan to dissuade from attacking Indian targets in-case of Pakistan’s second strike India will climb up the escalation ladder. In this scenario Pakistan’s leftover nuclear forces will restore credibility of its nuclear deterrent.

A clear message should be sent to New Delhi that Pakistan will not tolerate and respond with massive retaliation to accidental or deliberate first use by India. Central argument of ‘punitive nuclear retaliatory strategy,’ is Pakistan will respond to Indian accidental or unauthorized first strike with massive retaliation. It aims to prevent possible deterrence failure during military confrontation with India and Andre Beaufre strategy, “force the enemy to accept the terms we wish to impose on him,” (Beaufre, 1972). Third probable use of Indian nuclear weapons use can result from Pakistan’s actual first use in the light of Article 51, of the United Nations (UN) Charter. If, Pakistan uses TNWs against Indian forces on Pakistani soil in ‘self-defence. It will certainly oblige Pakistan to keep the advantage of time and target selection for carrying out first strike against Indian advancing or occupant forces. It will provide justification to Indian military for carrying out massive retaliation against Pakistani counterforce and counter value targets. Operationalizing the CSD hence will be suicidal mission and “run greater risk” of strategic or TNWs use.
The CSD’s Force Structure and Sanghe Shakti Military Exercises

CSD is composed of three strike corps including 1 Corps Mathura, 2 Corps Ambala and 21 Corps Bhopal under single command (Indian Army and Air Force Conduct Joint Exercise in Rajasthan). Strike corps are divided into eight division sizes “Integrated Battle Groups,” (IBGs) supported by air force are equipped with artillery, armor, infantry (Joshi, 2013). Additional features include Command and Control (C2) Network, Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Electronic Warfare (EW). Indian military from to 2004 to 2011, conducted thirteen exercises in Indian Punjab and Rajasthan to incorporate and test efficacy of new military hardware and coordination of the armed services.

In May, 2006, Indian military conducted Sanghe Shakti exercise under the then General Daulat Shekhawat’s command. General Shekhawat cynically stated that “we firmly believe that there is room for a swift strike even in case of a nuclear attack, and it is to validate this doctrine that we conducted this operation,” (Indian Army Tests its New Cold Start Doctrine, 2006). It is a notorious doctrine deliberately coerce antagonists to adopt policy of confrontation rather than conflict avoidance. CSD aims to demoralize enemy’s echelon through surprise attacks on C2 systems, counterforce assets, exploit enemy vulnerabilities, protect personal troop formations and territory through effective coordination of own forces. It increases crisis instability, fear of aggression and likelihood of breaking the taboo of nuclear weapons non-use. It coerce Islamabad to increase reliance on nuclear weapon for self-defence.

Operationalizing the CSD: Critical Analysis

CSD aims to punish Pakistan for use of proxies against India. However, offensive operations could not be launched against Pakistan despite India alleged Pakistan for its involvement in November, 2008, Mumbai attacks (Burke, 2010). Former US ambassador to India Tim Roemer on February 16, 2010 in a diplomatic cable to US State Department highlighted India’s (Congress led-government) lack of operationalizing CSD (WikiLeaks: US on Indian Army’s Cold Start Doctrine, 2010) in the wake of Mumbai attacks. Overall environment was conducive however India lacked operational capabilities so CSD could not operationalized. In addition Pakistan’s operational capabilities and asymmetric nuclear posture also deterred Indian military adventurism. Third, Indian military leadership including the then General V.K. Singh in September, 2010, publicly rejected (No Cold Start Doctrine, India Tells US, 2010) and detached Indian military from CSD. He asserted it is one of the contingency plans (Chari, 2011). The then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s administration did not own the CSD. Author believes General Singh issued statement to cover General Shekhawat’s statement and catch Pakistan by surprise. Indian government and security analysts have consolidated their efforts to assure the world that New Delhi has focused its energies and employing its efforts to
contain nuclear proliferation. India through its rhetoric wants to receive global appreciation and endeavoring to be recognized as a responsible nuclear weapon state. Contrarily, actual situation is different than the Indian rhetoric.

Several Indian strategists are exploring possibilities to avoid nuclear weapons use by Pakistan. Ahmed, suggests IBGs should penetrate and concentrate in Pakistani urban centers. Fear of mass murder of its own nationals will prevent Islamabad from using TNWs against Indian military (Ahmed, Cold Start: The Life Cycle of A Doctrine, 2012). Ahmed suggests India should raise mountain taskforce to occupy key areas in Kashmir to extract concessions from Islamabad during negotiations.

Qasim prescribes declaring Pakistan a terrorist state, nuclear weapons as a source of regional instability and establishment of Indian intelligence network in insurgent hit areas to galvanize protracted war and destabilize Pakistan prior to launching CSD (Qasim, Too Cold to Start, 2010). It will enable India to operationalise CSD without fear of first strike.

**Indian Military Bureaucracy Endeavors to Undercut Political Interference in Country’s Strategic Affairs during Crisis**

Indian political leadership directly controls Indian military. Political leaders lack expertise to understand the tactical, operational or battlefield requirements, short response time further complicates the situation. Fear of losing the battle followed by dire consequences for example losing public support, international humiliation and demand of the emotionally charged masses to resign from government offices leads to political leadership involvement in military affairs. Perhaps, General Malik designed the CSD to reduce political interference in Indian military planning and war fighting strategy during crisis situations. Consequently, military will enjoy greater autonomy during crisis particularly if CSD is operationalised. Military top brass can hold regional/sector commanders responsible for their incapability to achieve objectives after launching offensive operations. Field commanders as a result would play dominant role in applying and enjoy autonomy during crisis. In case political interference cannot be prevented military leaders will hold civilian leadership responsible for military defeat. Operationalisation of CSD inherits the potential of crossing of Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.

**Clausewitz’s Indirect Approach and Indian CSD**

Author claims that offensive CSD is replica of Clausewitz’s teachings for instance Clausewitz asserted that “select … one point of the enemy’s position and attack it… leaving the rest of his army in uncertainty but keeping it occupied.” Clausewitz’s strategy was based on (three) offensive and (two) defensive or reserve corps(Clauseswitz, 1942). Defensive/ reserve corps will primarily defend
motherland and if required launch offensive operations. Consequentially, coerce enemy to overstretch its forces by their deployments at unnecessary points.

Clausewitz advocated greater autonomy for corps commander, physical disruption and wearing down enemy’s morale through attacks on areas where enemy is less prepared. General Malik modified Clausewitz’s indirect strategy due to change in time and advances in military technology and renamed it as the CSD. It is replica of Clausewitz’s indirect military strategy. CSD based on Clausewitz’s strategy of indirect approach, first enables Indian military to quickly mobilize. Second, it capacitates India to wear down Pakistan army’s morale by launching surprise attack/ first strike. CSD. Third, IBGs commanders similar to Clausewitz’s corps commanders enjoy the privilege to operate freely and make autonomous decisions.

Pakistan’s Security Dilemma in the Light of Kenneth N. Waltz’s Philosophy

Indian military preparedness, quick mobilization, ability to launch surprise attack and overstretch Pakistan army heightens preexistent security dilemma and erodes Pakistan’s sense of security. It necessitated Pakistan’s countermeasures in light of Waltz’s teachings to thwart Indian military adventurism. Waltz asserts, “in anarchy, security is the highest end. Only of survival is assured can state seek such other goals as tranquility, profit and power,” (Waltz, 1979). Security means as an absence of foreign hostile involvement in a country’s domestic affairs and freedom to establish foreign contacts. Indian military’s qualitatively advance conventional and strategic weapons, preparedness to fight in nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological environments, exercises to perfect offensive war fighting strategy are equated by Pakistan with existential threat. Islamabad understands powerful military ensure state security, determines outcome of crisis and enables a state to live with dignity in international system.

Pakistan’s Conventional Response: Full Spectrum Punitive Conventional Offensive Military Strategy

Indian favoured military asymmetry creates an impression that Indian military will overrun Pakistan in future war. Existential threat requires Rawalpindi to set-aside reasoning and use all available resources to inflict maximum damage to India at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical) of conflict. In 2009, Pakistan finalized its offensive conventional military response through four years long Azm-e-Nau military exercise(Pakistan’s Ongoing Azm-e-Nau-3 Military Exercises Define Strategic Priorities, 2010)amid to preempt(Pakistan Army to Preempt India’s Cold Start Doctrine, 2013) the CSD. It emphasizes traditional concept of security and coherence among armed forces. It is termed here as a ‘Full Spectrum Punitive Offensive Military Strategy,’ (FSPOMS).Speedy mobilization of military personnel and hardware vis-à-vis Indian IBGs is nucleus of FSPOMS. It requires procurement of qualitatively advanced conventional military hardware to launch Full Spectrum Offensive.
Core objective of Full Spectrum Offensive is to use unprecedented conventional military might aimed to take the battle into and to occupy enemy’s territory, inflict maximum damage to enemy forces at tactical level and operational levels. This flexible response increases Pakistan’s nuclear threshold to avoid nuclear war and maintain strategic and deterrence stability.

Contrarily, Pakistan’s delayed use of nuclear weapons despite asymmetric nuclear posture and nuclear first use encourages Indian adventurism. February 26, 2019 Balakot attack affirms above claim. Ahmed believes Indian favoured military asymmetry and mere presence of nuclear weapons can result in nuclear exchange in future crisis (Ahmed, 2013). Modi’s proclamation of “Qatal-Ki-Raat,” affirms it. Pakistan requires to increase development and deployment of land, air and sea-based TNWs and strategic forces. The threat to use TNWs at battlefield levels is application of Windass’s “Vertically Extended Deterrence” (Windass, 1985). The idea is deterrence starts functioning when possible risk becomes greater than the perceived outcome(Beaufre, 1972). It rejects Indian fallacy to invade, fight limited war and swallow Pakistani territories. Surrender is out of question. Pakistan matured the audacious idea that it may cease to exist however it will be, as Clausewitz asserted, honorable defeat (Clausewitz, 1942). However, Islamabad should plan to fight “protracted nuclear war,” (PNW) (Halloran, 2008) in the light of US Undersecretary of Defence Fred C. Ikle. It means that “fighting and winning nuclear war.” In protracted war the objective is “to wear down enemy’s morale and tire him out,” (Andre Beaufre, 1972). It will increase credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. Islamabad should raise special squadron of air force vis-à-vis Indian mini-air force to deliver nuclear warheads against Indian urban centers and counterforce targets. It should be answerable to National Command Authority (NCA).

Indian Strategic Forces Command (SFC) approved mini-Indian Air Force (IAF) in 2012, to deliver nuclear weapons against targets in Pakistan (Hussain, 2017). Pakistan Air Force (PAF) inducted 50 Block-I, JF-17 thunder planes. It will annually induct 16 Block-II, JF-17s (Gady, 2015). Islamabad deployed 35 Block-II and producing advanced Block-III fighter jets. It indicates as if Pakistan is raising mini-air force to inflict maximum damage to the enemy. Development and deployment of massive nuclear force structure presently by India and probably in future by Pakistan is application of Buzan’s maximum deterrence posture-NWS have unconfined size of their deterrent forces against one another’s assured destructive capabilities (Buzan, 1987). If competition is halted or size or number of nuclear weapons is set by consensus or antagonists’ realization of inherited risks of arms race e.g. huge financial resources required, accidental or deliberate nuclear war or voluntarily by either one of the antagonist it is called as “capped deterrent.”

Dilemma of Delegation of Authority: Positive-Negative Nuclear Command
Islamabad has to emulate Kahn’s concept of “retortions,” (Kahn, 2010) to deter Indian CSD by deploying nuclear weapons during peacetime, adopt ready status and delegate operational authority to field/sectors commanders. Pakistani C2 can manage nuclear forces through “positive command,” the decision to launch nuclear strikes made by the junior ranking field commander at the discretion of military or political leadership without any interruption. Or through “negative command,” field commander is authorized to deploy and launch strategic forces unless canceled by top leadership (George, 1984). Presumably Pakistan’s NCA exercises ‘negative command,’ to prevent unauthorized, accidental or deliberate use of nuclear weapons.

**Scenarios for Indian Nuclear Weapons Use**

Denial of robust military hardware to Pakistan and preferential treatment of India to procure it is widening conventional military asymmetry in Indian favour. It encouraged India to carry out surgical strikes. Over confident India can operationalize the CSD with inherited chances of deterrence (Robock & Toon, 2009). However, Pakistan alone cannot be held responsible for deterrence failure. In addition to above there are at least three additional scenarios which can result in nuclear weapons use by the Indian armed forces.

a. Indian nuclear doctrine warns enemies that India will retaliate with massive use of nuclear weapons if Indian mainland or its forces comes under Chemical, Biological or nuclear weapons attack. It poses existential threat to Pakistan. Nuclear deterrence theory necessitates increased production of weapons grade fissile material by Pakistan to increase production of nuclear warheads. Additional stocks of nuclear warheads will erode chances of decapitating strikes, increases chances of survivability of nuclear weapons and additional warheads will be used to penetrate Indian Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) in future war. In case of enemy attack to destroy Pakistan stored or deployed nuclear forces residual nuclear forces can be used against the aggressor to deny advantages of decapitating strike/ first-strike and nuclear weapons first use. Credible nuclear deterrent preserves strategic stability and thwarts enemy from operationalizing CSD sub-sequentially followed by massive retaliation.

b. Indian strategic community and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014, election manifesto called for changes in Indian nuclear doctrine. Their primary emphasis is to replace No-First Use posture with First Use. It will require India to maintain super-ready status. India is already moving in this direction as it is raising dedicated mini-Indian air force. Further, Indian navy deployed INS Arihant nuclear powered submarine equipped with nuclear weapons. Conversely, chances of deliberate or accidental nuclear weapons use by Indian forces increases.
c. Indian military is procuring conventional weapons from its allies and retrofitting it with nuclear capable missiles. It includes SU-30 MKIs, BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and MiG-21s. Conventional superiority encourages Indian military adventurism much claimed September, 2016 surgical strike and February 26, 2019 Balakot attack supports authors view. In this scenario, Indian military can carry out nuclear first strike against Pakistan. Or it may launch first strike due to Pakistan’s missile attacks.

Introduction of TNWs in South Asia

In the light of above definition of TNWs this paper contrary to established narrative that Pakistan introduced TNWs in South Asia holds India responsible for introducing TNWs. In 1983, the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) of India started developing Prithvi ballistic short range missile. Liquid fuel propelled Prithvi-I with 150 Kilometers (KMs) range was first successfully test fired on February 25, 1988 (Prithvi, 2002). It can be fired from transporter erector launcher (TEL) or road-mobile launchers. Prithvi-I entered into service in 1994. Its other variants include short range liquid fuel propelled Prithvi-II, 250 to 350 KMs. It was successfully tested fired on January 27, 1996. Initially it was entered into force by the Indian air force. In 2002, its land forces version was introduced for the Indian military (Prithvi-I/II/III, 2016). Prithvi-I could have targeted important Pakistani cities including Islamabad.

On April 19, 2011 Pakistan test fired Nasr 60 Kilometer short range nuclear capable cruise missile also known as Hatf-IX (Implications of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in India’s Neighbourhood, 2011). Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) issued a press release stating that the Nasr is “part of country’s new “full-spectrum” deterrent posture (Press Release No. PR94/2011-ISPR, 2011). Pakistani engineers thus mastered the technology to defeat anti tactical missile defence systems. Presently, Pakistan military is equipped with multi tube mobile missile launchers capable of firing TNWs.

Nasr test increased significance of Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation nuclear posture. Pakistani policy making circles have adopted rationally- irrational strategy. Pakistan wants to convey the message that “threat of retaliation, in order to be believable, must depend upon the potential irrationality of the retaliator,” (Kahn, 1965). Pakistan’s Punitive Proportional Deterrent Posture aims to meet the enemy with nuclear weapons at every level. Pakistan developed TNWs in response to Indian proactive military strategy the CSD. NASAR denies Indian military aspirations to fight limited conventional war and threats of accidental or unauthorized first strike. Development of Hatf-IX missile is categorical indication that there is no room for limited war and nuclear weapons are developed for deterrent purposes rather than military adventurism. On October 20, 2015 Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry categorically warned that Pakistan will use low yield
nuclear weapons in response to operationalisation of Indian CSD (Iqba, 2015). However, Pakistan will exercise restraint and not be the first to wage war.

Pakistan will respond with all available resources including First strike can also be launched if its existence is threatened. Pakistani civilian analysts Khan and Abbasi have termed Nasr missile as effective measure to carry nuclear warhead against advancing IBGs (Khan & Abbasi, 2013). Introduction of Pakistan’s TNWs though solidified punitive offensive defence policy. However, this scenario has yet to be tested due to available list of options, to both India and Pakistan.

This notion is in partial contradiction to S. Paul Kapur’s argument that despite Pakistan’s nuclear weapons there are minimal chances that Pakistan would launch strategic or conventional offensive strike to capture or withdraw Indian occupying forces from Pakistani territory. Kapur also endorsed that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have eroded India’s second strike capability (Kapur, 2013). Such scenario has been discussed in succeeding paragraph.

Islamabad tested 280 KMs Abdali, Hatf-II short range cruise missile on March 2, 2012. It will further enhance Pakistan’s deterrent capability against India. Pakistan’s deterrent posture is both offensive and defensive. In peace time Pakistan deterrent posture remains “defensive” because the primary duty of its deterrent capability is to prevent India from taking offensive actions as it inherits the potential of deterrence breakdown. Defensive posture is aimed to maintain normalization of relations between the two belligerents and to prevent escalation ladder. However, as soon as India starts crisis and climb the escalation ladder Pakistan will operationalize offensive deterrent posture.

In case Indian forces occupy Pakistani territory to use it as bargaining chip or destroy Pakistan’s conventional military capabilities Pakistan will have to adopt “punitive offensive deterrent posture.” Deterring Indian IBGs or CSD with Pakistani strategic or low yield weapons used for proportional punitive purpose. Punitive posture aims at stopping the further advance of Indian forces, to breakdown Indian resistance against Pakistan or to coerce Indian occupying forces to withdraw from Pakistani territory.

**Conclusion**

During the Cold War India signed agreement with Canada and US for the procurement of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. However, it changed the course of nuclear technology develop and tested nuclear device in 1974. India introduced nuclear weapons in South Asia. New Delhi is commingling nuclear warheads with conventional weapons and procuring advance military hardware. It is primary reason of conventional and nuclear arms race in the region. Rising asymmetry in South Asia in Indian favour is marginalizing the strength, value and importance of arms control and confidence and security building measures.
Indian steps are systemically linked with major powers and fueling arms race between US-China and US-Russia. Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth, weak conventional military and low defence budget in comparison to India coerces it to increasingly rely on nuclear deterrent for its defence.

Indian war planning decoy of Clausewitz military strategy erodes Pakistan’s sense of security. Indian military adventurism or operationalisation of the CSD will cross Pakistan’s threshold. It inherits the potentials first, to use nuclear weapons. Second, New Delhi will cheat Islamabad and international community and justify nuclear weapons use in the pretext of unauthorized or accidental use. The CSD poses existential threats to Pakistan’s security. It coerces Pakistan to execute realists’ teachings of self-defence to deal with notion of Waltz’s systematic anarchy. Introduction of TNWs by Pakistan aims at denying advantages to India at battlefield level secondly to deter India from operationalising CSD. Conversely preserve strategic stability and regional peace.
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