“Governance of public spending avenues by oil prices, oil revenues, and GDP in Saudi Arabia: proportionate sensitivity and trend analysis”

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Anis Ali (Saudi Arabia)

GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC SPENDING AVENUES BY OIL PRICES, OIL REVENUES, AND GDP IN SAUDI ARABIA: PROPORTIONATE SENSITIVITY AND TREND ANALYSIS

Abstract

Saudi Arabia is a petroleum resource-rich country, and half of the GDP of Saudi Arabia is based on the Oil Sector Revenue (OSR). The OSR is governed by the Oil Prices (OP), while GDP is also affected by the OSR in petroleum exporting companies. The volatility of OP governs the OSR and GDP positively and perfectly as the oil sector contributes approximately half of the GDP of Saudi Arabia. The study analyzes the governance of the Public Spending Avenues (PSA) by the OP, the OSR, and GDP in the long and short run and based on the secondary data taken from the website of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA). Coefficient of Variations (CV), Chain-based Index (CBI) numbers, Fixed-based Index (FBI) numbers, and Analysis of Variances (ANOVA) of OP and other dependent variables calculated to get the normality, sensitivity, trend, and significance difference among the sensitivity and trend of variables, while Pearson’s correlations establish the cause-effect relationship among the variables. The study reveals that oil price volatility does not affect the OSR, GDP, and ultimately public spending in the long run. However, there is governance of volatility of OP that can be seen on OSR, GDP, and ultimately on PSA in the short run. Saudi Arabian government enhances its spending on PSA and especially on education while lowering the OP. There is a need to diversify the income resources to minimize the reliability of oil prices and budget deficit and consider the sensitivity of oil prices on the economy by the policymakers to formulate the policies to minimize the impact of volatility of OP on the economy.

Keywords oil prices, public spending, oil sector revenue, Saudi Arabia, proportionate governance, optional resources

JEL Classification Q40, Q41, I10, I20, I30

INTRODUCTION

In Saudi Arabia, OSR constitutes more than 50% of the GDP (Saudi Arabia, facts and figures, 2020), and the export of the oil products and their prices governs the economy (Dreger et al., 2016; Nyangarika, 2018) and indirectly governs the PSA. The negative variations of OP lower the economy and obstacles in developing the oil-exporting economies (Ebrahim et al., 2014). In Saudi Arabia, it was found that the OP of the oil products lowering since 2014 and affects the OSR, and lowers the expected growth of the Saudi economy (Al Rasasi et al., 2019; Alharbi, 2020). The OSR and PSA govern employment in Saudi Arabia (Alkhteeb et al., 2017) that assures the balanced development and optimum utilization of human resources. For sustainable development in any nation, dependency or reliance on a specific resource is not appropriate for the economy in the long run. Saudi Arabia is opening its wings to attain the goals of Vision 2030 to make itself more self-reliant and opportunity to all the sectors of the economy. In achieving the goals of Vision 2030, the vitality of the OSR cannot be
underestimated as the Saudi economy is based upon the OSR, which is governed by the international OP. Lowering oil prices reduces the OSR and lowers the contribution to the GDP. However, as per Vision 2030, different sectors raise the private sector’s contribution to the economy. To diversify the sources of income, the Saudi government plans to raise the non-oil exports to 50% of the GDP as it is based on the OSR. Like other developed nations, Saudi Arabia is much concerned about society’s welfare by providing them with better education, medical facilities, residential facilities, social security, and other community services. However, the feasibility of spending on PSA, i.e., education, medical, housing, and social security services, depends on the revenue, based on the OSR up to a larger extent in Saudi Arabia. So, normally, it is expected that the PSA is based on the prosperity of the GDP, which is governed by the OSR and OSR ultimately governed by the OP in Saudi Arabia. So, there is a need to assure that the OP governs the OSR and GDP proportionately and finally its impact on the PSA in the long and short run.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

Haque and Khan (2019) found that government expenditure and exports of oil products significantly affects the Human Development Index (HDI). Al-Qudair (2005) studied the relationship between government expenditures and revenues in the KSA and found a long-term equilibrium relationship. Akoum et al. (2012) examined the relationship between the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) basket oil price and the stock market returns of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries from 2002 to 2011. They found that the OP and stock returns of GCC countries are not strongly correlated. Nusair (2016) found a positive relationship between the OP changes and the GDP in GCC countries and explained the efficacy of positive prices than the negative OP on GDP. Hemrit and Benlagha (2018) preferred non-oil GDP to oil GDP and explained the positive relationship between the government expenditure and growth of the non-oil GDP of Saudi Arabia. Sultan and Haque (2018) found a positive relationship between economic growth and exports and government expenditures and a negative relationship between the economic growth and imports of Saudi Arabia. Alsamara et al. (2017) analyzed and compared the effect of asymmetric OP on the GDP of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. They have seen the effects of OP shocks on economic growth positively and negatively. The positive OP shocks govern the economy more than the negative shocks in Saudi Arabia, while a reverse situation exists in Turkey. Al-Sasi et al. (2017) studied the impact of the demand for petroleum volatility on the economic growth of Saudi Arabia and found that the petroleum demand growth is doubled the economic growth rate and explored that crude oil accounts for 40.6% of globally produced energy. OP change governs the unemployment status and is influenced by the economic growth rate and explains government measures’ efforts. Sarrakh et al. (2020) found that removing the subsidies from the energy sector would negatively affect the Saudi GDP. The suggested compensatory measures to cover the low-income households applying the social security network to face the oil price volatility. Mahalik et al. (2017) explored the relationship between energy consumption and financial development and found that financial development helps in energy demand in Saudi Arabia. Baumeister and Kilian (2016) studied lowering the OP and its impact on the US economy and found a very slow response of OP changes on the economy and that there is no negative impact of oil-related investment on non-oil related investment. Nyangarika et al. (2019) explored the impact of the OP shocks on the Russian economy. They found the world oil price is the main consideration while found the positive relationship between the OP and the Russian GDP. They suggested the low dependence on the energy resources and diversification of the economy by attracting foreign investments. Mohaddes and Pesaran (2017) stated that the recent lowering prices of the oil are good for the US and global economy. They found a stable negative relationship between OP and real dividends. The low price negatively affects the oil-producing economies and forces them to enhance oil production to compensate for the loss of low OP. Aregbeyen and Kolawole (2015) found no relationship between public spending and economic growth in Nigeria and suggested that the government should invest more in capital projects to enhance oil production to enhance the economy. Gazder (2017) explained that the oil sector of Saudi Arabia affects the other pillars of the economy as the traditional fossil-based energy sources are depleting fast. He studied energy con-
sumption and the factors affecting the energy consumption in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and found that economic development, population, industries, and transportation factors affect energy consumption. He explained that energy consumption is driven by economic development in Saudi Arabia, while the population governs energy consumption in Pakistan. Jawad (2013) analyzed the OP volatility on the economic development of Pakistan and suggested that government should make a proper plan to maintain a balance between demand and supply to lower the impact of OP volatility on the economy. Jung and Park (2011) studied the impact of the OP changes on the Norwegian and Korean markets and found that small economies depend up to a larger extent on the oil-dependent technology and poor access in the global financial market. Bashir et al. (2018) studied the OP shocks in the oil-exporting countries for domestic and international investors. They found that the OP shocks affect the stock market in Russia, Kuwait, Norway, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Eid (2015) found that the real lagged government expenditure positively impacts real non-oil private GDP, while the contemporary effect is negative. Demirbas et al. (2017) explained that the macroeconomic and geopolitical conditions influence the OP volatility. They indicated that the OP depends on the cost factors, ancillary factors, and external business environmental factors that can affect the oil price. But, the internal and external factors affecting the OP vary from country to country. Maji et al. (2017) examined the impact of the OP shocks on the Malaysian economy and found that recent price changes affect the economy and suggest diversification to save the economy. Ho et al. (2019) found the unidirectional relationship between energy consumption, population, and GDP and suggested Vietnam promotes the population and energy for economic growth. Majidli and Guliyev (2020) studied the relationship between real OP real non-oil GDP growth of Azerbaijan and found that the increase in OP also enhances the real GDP and exchange rates. Giri and Joshi (2017) found that the crude OP influenced the stock prices negatively and suggested the government to take some corrective steps to control the crude OP in India, and investors’ trust can be boosted by the appropriate policy formation. Nonejad (2020) found that short volatility in the crude OP in predictive regression and suggested considering the volatility of OP for the policymakers. Sarwar et al. (2017) studied the relationship between OP, economic growth, electricity consumption, gross fixed capital formation, and population. They obtained the bidirectional relationship between electricity consumption, OP, fixed capital formation, population, and GDP. The countries applying non-renewable energy sources negatively affect their economic growth. Van et al. (2019) investigated the results of the OP changes in the GDP of 17 OECD countries. The study of volatility is divided between two, i.e., pre and post-World War II, to measure the volatility of the world OP and found that the real oil volatility is negatively correlated with the aggregate economic activity. They supported and suggested that the improved monetary policy is the shield to face the OP volatility’s negative impact. Balke and Brown (2018) found the less elastic impact of the OP changes on the economy. Based on all the above studies, the governance process of PSA by the OP, OSR, and GDP can be depicted as follows:

Figure 1 explains that the higher prices of the oil products directly and positively affect the GDP, while the lower prices negatively and indirectly affect the public spending as OSR is the major ingredient of the GDP of Saudi Arabia. The previous studies explored the relationship between OP and PSA, OP and GDP, OP, GDP, public spending, and other dependent variables. There is no study available to explain the proportionate contribution sensitivity and trend of OSR and GDP to PSA in Saudi Arabia. There is a need to consider the impact of OP shocks on OSR and GDP of Saudi Arabia and

![Figure 1. Process of governance of public spending by the oil prices](http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.17(4).2020.15)
ultimately on PSA in the short and long run. To achieve the objectives of the study and based on the past relevant studies, the following hypotheses were developed:

1.1. Hypotheses

H₁: There is no significant difference among the trend of OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA.

H₂: There is no significant difference in the sensitivity of OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA.

H₃: There is no positive governance of OSR and GDP by the OP.

H₄: There is no significant difference among the comparative governance of PSA sensitivity proportionate to OSR and GDP.

H₅: There is no significant difference among the comparative variability of the trend of PSA proportionate to OSR and GDP.

H₆: There is no significant difference among the comparative proportionate governance of sensitivity and trend of PSA proportionate to OSR and GDP.

2. AIMS

The objective of the study is to get the comparative sensitivity and trend of the OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA and proportionate governance of PSA by the OSR and GDP in Saudi Arabia. The study also tries to find out the over- and under-allocation of PSA based on the proportional governance and explores the optional resources to reduce the dependency on OSR and hedge the economy from the shocks of the OP.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Data available on the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) website from 2011 to 2018 is the basis of study and analysis. Oil Prices (OP), Oil Sector Revenue (OSR), and GDP are considered independent variables, while Public Spending Avenues (PSA) is a dependent variable for analysis. The Coefficient of Variations (CV) is applied to get the normality of the variability of all variables to get mutual comparability (Ali, 2020b).

\[
CV = \frac{\sigma}{\text{Mean}},
\]

where \(\sigma\) is the standard deviation and \(\text{Mean}\) is the average of the distribution. Pearson’s correlation coefficient was calculated to assure the cause and effect relationship among the OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA. Chain-based Index (CBI) numbers and Fixed-based Index (FBI) numbers of all variables and correlation coefficient between the CBI of OP, and dependent variables calculated to get the sensitivity impact of the variability of OP on the other dependent variables. Also, the correlation coefficient between the FBI of OP and dependent variables was calculated to get the long-term impact of OP’s volatility on the other dependent variables (Ali, 2020a).

\[
\text{CBI} = \frac{\text{Value in the current year}}{\text{Value in the previous year}} \cdot 100,
\]

\[
\text{FBI} = \frac{\text{Value in the current year}}{\text{Value in the base year}} \cdot 100.
\]

Note: 2011 is the base year for the FBI calculation.

Pearson’s correlation coefficient between CBI of the percentage of PSA to OSR and GDP and FBI of the percentage of public spending to OSR and GDP calculated to know the sensitivity and trend of PSA governance in the short run and long run. To know the similarity of the governance of the public spending avenues by the OSR and GDP, the proportionate contribution of the OSR and GDP to PSA calculated:

\[
\text{PSA to OS}(\%) = \frac{\text{Public spending avenues}}{\text{OS}} \cdot 100,
\]

\[
\text{PSA to GDP}(\%) = \frac{\text{Public spending avenues}}{\text{GDP}} \cdot 100.
\]

FBI and CBI between the proportionate contribution of the OSR and GDP to PSA calculated to get the symmetry in the contribution by the OSR and GDP to the PSA in the short and long run. To know the significant difference in the trend and sensitivity of OP, OSR, GDP, and the PSA, Fisher’s ratio \(F\) is calculated and compared with the critical value \(F_{\alpha}\) (Ali, 2020a).
\[ F = \frac{Bss/df_1}{Wss/df_2}, \]  
where \( F \) is Fisher’s ratio, and \( Bss, Wss, df_1, df_2 \), are sum of squares between samples, sum of squares within samples, degree of freedom 1 and degree of freedom 2, respectively. The \( df_1, df_2 \) obtained as follows:

\[ df_1 = K \times 1 \] \[ df_2 = N - K, \]

where \( K \) – number of samples, and \( N \) – number of all variables.

4. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

As per the objective of the study, the analysis of the OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA of Saudi Arabia can be divided into three categories, i.e., normality of variables, cause and effect relationship, and proportionate governance of OP on dependent variables and governance of GDP on the PSA in Saudi Arabia.

4.1. Normality of variables

The normality of variables facilitates comparison between the data and assures that the variables are unaffected by the abnormal factors, or the deviations of the variables are insignificant.

Table 2 shows that the variations in the OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA are normal and not driven by affected by any abnormal factor. OP and OSR variability are higher than the other variables from 2011 to 2018, comparatively. Overall, the variability of all variables is not affected by any abnormal factor. So, there is comparability among OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA of Saudi Arabia.

Cause and effect relationship between OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA.

The cause and effect relationship explains the effect of changes in the dependent variables on the other independent variables. The high degree correlation between the OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA explains the high impact of changes of OP on the GDP and public spending in Saudi Arabia, while low degree or no correlation reflects the negligible or no impact of price volatility on the GDP and public spending.

Table 2 explains that oil prices affect positively and perfectly OSR \((r = 0.99)\) and GDP \((r = 0.51)\) as the OSR contributes 50% approximately while PSA negatively. The negative governance of the OP and OSR varies from avenues to avenues of public spending. Education expenditures of the Saudi Arabia government are only highly and negatively \((r = 0.61)\) governed by the OP and OSR, while other government spending avenues are negatively governed. The GDP of Saudi Arabia positively contributes to all the PSA but not absolutely while oil prices decrease. This refers to the shifting pattern of the economy from oil to the non-oil economy. The Saudi government contributes to public

| Year | OP   | OSR  | GDP  | PSA |
|------|------|------|------|-----|
|      |      |      |      | Education | Health | Hous. and Commu. | Soc. Secu. and Welf. | Oth. Commu. and Soc. Ser. |
| 2011 | 107.46 | 1276416 | 2517146 | 141859 | 62663 | 24662 | 2039 | 9317 |
| 2012 | 109.45 | 1376576 | 2759906 | 159235 | 75752 | 26075 | 3210 | 10950 |
| 2013 | 105.87 | 1290789 | 2799927 | 186605 | 94479 | 39620 | 4300 | 12711 |
| 2014 | 96.29 | 1197414 | 2836314 | 199370 | 105826 | 42531 | 5221 | 15551 |
| 2015 | 49.49 | 659670  | 2453512 | 211716 | 101059 | 38093 | 4216 | 14722 |
| 2016 | 40.76 | 595493.6| 2418508 | 189416 | 81573  | 30219 | 3022 | 11144 |
| 2017 | 52.43 | 7535302.4| 2582198 | 193419 | 81512  | 30643 | 3240 | 11923 |
| 2018 | 69.78 | 985899.8| 2949457 | 222585 | 93971  | 34737 | 4203 | 14367 |
| Mean | 78.94 | 1014695 | 2664621 | 188025.6| 87104.38| 33322.5 | 3681.38 | 12585.63 |
| SD   | 28.99 | 313899.8| 197005.3 | 26396.91| 14317.29| 6475.84 | 989.97 | 2152.18 |
| CV   | 0.37 | 0.3 | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.27 | 0.17 |

Table 1. Variability of OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA in Saudi Arabia

Source: Own calculations based on data of National account statistics and oil statistics (annual statistics 2019) (available at http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/EconomicReports/Pages/YearlyStatistics.aspx).
spending avenues while the oil prices are lowering and OSR is diminishing its contribution to the economy. There is a cause-and-effect relationship between the OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA.

4.2. The similarity of trend and sensitivity of OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA

The trend of variables reflects the long-term co-movement, and sensitivity indicates the variables’ short-term variation. The similarity of trend and sensitivity of OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA of Saudi Arabia reveals the long term and short term variability.

Table 3 reveals that OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA movement in the long term are significantly different (Table 3, $H_{01}$) and no significant differences in the sensitivity of all variables (Table 3, $H_{02}$). This implies that the OP, OSR, and GDP do not affect the movement trend of PSA, and shocks of OP, and OSR, GDP yearly affect the PSA of Saudi Arabia.

4.3. Contribution of the oil sector to GDP of Saudi Arabia

It is evident that OSR is a major ingredient of GDP and plays a vital role in the Saudi economy. Low OP affects the OSR and finally decreases the contribution to GDP. There was a downfall in the absolute amount of oil sector contribution due to a heavy downfall in the OP in Saudi Arabia. As per the law of supply, the prices of the products govern the sales revenue positively and proportionately.

Table 4 explains the governance of the OSR by the OP positively and proportionately ($rx_1, x_2 = 0.99$). The OSR of Saudi Arabia governs the GDP positively and up to a great extent ($rx_2, x_3 = 69.78$). Hence, $H_{03}$ is rejected. Due to low oil prices, the OSR lowers its contribution to the GDP of Saudi Arabia year by year. Recently, it was seen that the contribution of the oil sector to GDP was enhanced last year. There is weak symmetry found in the sensitivity and movement trend of the oil sector and GDP of Saudi Arabia.

### Table 2. Cause and effect relationship among OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA in Saudi Arabia (2011–2018)

| OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA | Oil prices | Oil sector Revenue | GDP | Education | Health | Hous. and Commu. Ameni. Ser. | Soc. Secu. and Welf. | Oth. Commu. and Soc. Ser. |
|-----------------------|------------|--------------------|-----|-----------|--------|---------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| Oil prices            | 1.00       |                    |     |           |        |                           |                      |                        |
| Oil sector            | 0.99       | 1.00               |     |           |        |                           |                      |                        |
| GDP                   | 0.51       | 0.59               | 1.00|           |        |                           |                      |                        |
| Education             | –0.61      | –0.56              | 0.27| 1.00      |        |                           |                      |                        |
| Health                | –0.22      | –0.20              | 0.38| 0.83      | 1.00   |                           |                      |                        |
| Hous. and Commu. Ameni. Ser. | –0.08 | –0.08              | 0.38| 0.71      | 0.96   | 1.00                       |                      |                        |
| Soc. Secu. and Welf.  | –0.01      | 0.02               | 0.57| 0.73      | 0.97   | 0.94                       | 1.00                 |                        |
| Oth. Commu. and Soc. Ser. | –0.22 | –0.19              | 0.44| 0.85      | 0.97   | 0.89                       | 0.95                 | 1.00                   |

### Table 3. Similarity among the oil prices, oil sector revenue, GDP, and PSA in Saudi Arabia (2011–2018)

| $H_p$, No. | Hypotheses | $F^*$ | $F_a^{**}$ | Decision: $H_p$ (If $F \geq F_a$, reject $H_p$) |
|------------|-------------|-------|------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| $H_{01}$   | There is no significant difference in the trend of OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA. | 13.44479 | 2.178156 | Reject $H_{01}$ |
| $H_{02}$   | There is no significant difference in the sensitivity of OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA. | 0.436802 | 2.178156 | Do not reject $H_{02}$ |

Note: (a): $F_a^{**}$ taken from the t-table at 5% significance level, (b): $F^*$ values are the Fisher’s ratios values and calculated using EXCEL’s calculation.
4.4. Comparative sensitivity of PSA proportionate to OSR and GDP

The comparative sensitivity explains the variability impact of the independent variable on the dependent variables. The high degree of comparative sensitivity reveals the high dependency of dependent variables on independent variables and governance of the dependent variables by the independent variables in the short run.

Table 5 explains the sensitivity and governance of public spending avenues proportionate to OSR and the GDP of Saudi Arabia. The sensitivity of education spending of Saudi Arabia proportionate to the oil sector and GDI is positive and highly correlated, or the variations of oil sector contribution and GDP highly govern the education ($r = 0.87$) in the short run. The sensitivity of health ($r = 0.67$), housing and community amenities services ($r = 0.73$), social security and welfare ($r = 0.66$), and other community and social services ($r = 0.60$) is positive and moderately correlated or governed by the oil sector or GDP of Saudi Arabia in the short run. Hence, $H_0$ is rejected. Overall, all the public spending is positively correlated, but the degree of relationship education with the oil sector and GDP is higher than the other public spending avenues, while other community and social services are the lowest in the long run.
4.5. The comparative trend of PSA proportionate to OSR and GDP

The comparative movement reveals the variability impact of the independent variable on the dependent variables. The high degree of comparative movement reveals the high dependency of dependent variables on independent variables and governance of the dependent variables by the independent variables in the long run.

Table 6 explains the trend and governance of public spending avenues proportionate to the oil sector and GDP of Saudi Arabia. The movement of education spending of Saudi Arabia proportionate to the oil sector and GDI is positive and highly correlated, or the variations of oil sector contribution and GDP highly govern the education \( r = 0.93 \) in the short run. The sensitivity of health \( (r = 0.77) \), housing and community amenities services \( (r = 0.69) \), social security and welfare \( (r = 0.69) \), and other community and social services \( (r = 0.77) \) is positive and moderately correlated or governed by the oil sector or GDP of Saudi Arabia in the long run. The proportionate governance of OSR and GDP to health and other community and social services is similar in the long run. Hence, \( H_05 \) is rejected. Overall, all the public spending positively correlated, but the degree of relationship education with the OSR and GDP is higher than the other PSA, while housing and community amenities services are the lowest in the long run.

4.6. Summary of comparative sensitivity and trend of PSA proportionate to OSR and GDP

The comparative sensitivity and movement of public spending proportionate to OSR and GDP explain the short and long-term governance of the public spending by the OSR and GDP.

From Table 7, it can be summarized that the correlation between the CBI of PSA to OSR and PSA to GDP explains that the short-term variations in OSR and GDP govern the PSA positively. There is a high degree of symmetry between the governance of education by the OSR and GDP. It implies that the Saudi government is much concerned \( (r = 0.87) \) about the education comparatively other PSA while less \( (r = 0.60) \) concerned about the other community and social services in the short run.

Table 6. Comparative movement of public spending proportionate to OSR and GDP

| Year | Education - FBI | Health - FBI | Hou. and Com. Ame. Ser. - FBI | Soc. Secu. and Welf. - FBI | Oth. Commu. and Soc. Ser. - FBI |
|------|----------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
|      | % to OSR | % to GDP | % to OSR | % to GDP | % to OSR | % to GDP | % to OSR | % to GDP | % to OSR | % to GDP |
| 2011 | 100    | 100    | 100    | 100    | 100    | 100    | 100    | 100    | 100    |
| 2012 | 104.12 | 102.30 | 112.08 | 110.23 | 98.14  | 96.41  | 145.74 | 145.39 | 108.97 | 107.23 |
| 2013 | 130.12 | 118.17 | 149.07 | 135.52 | 159.04 | 144.39 | 208.21 | 201.97 | 191.97 | 184.90 |
| 2014 | 149.87 | 124.63 | 180.00 | 149.84 | 184.04 | 153.01 | 272.51 | 230.10 | 177.91 | 148.18 |
| 2015 | 288.88 | 153.00 | 312.01 | 165.42 | 299.20 | 158.43 | 399.44 | 214.79 | 305.72 | 162.17 |
| 2016 | 286.30 | 138.86 | 278.99 | 135.46 | 262.93 | 127.50 | 317.17 | 156.19 | 256.35 | 124.54 |
| 2017 | 236.77 | 132.81 | 225.77 | 126.77 | 215.93 | 121.09 | 275.40 | 156.84 | 222.12 | 124.79 |
| 2018 | 203.21 | 133.81 | 194.12 | 127.95 | 182.56 | 120.18 | 266.44 | 178.13 | 199.62 | 131.65 |
| Mean | 187.41 | 125.45 | 194.01 | 131.40 | 187.73 | 127.63 | 248.11 | 171.68 | 188.20 | 127.66 |
| SD   | 77.48  | 18.13  | 75.52  | 20.70  | 71.18  | 23.02  | 95.14  | 41.43  | 72.45  | 20.19  |
| CV   | 0.41   | 0.15   | 0.39   | 0.16   | 0.38   | 0.18   | 0.38   | 0.24   | 0.39   | 0.16   |

\[ r = 0.93 \quad r = 0.77 \quad r = 0.69 \quad r = 0.69 \quad r = 0.77 \]

Table 7. Summary of comparison of CBI and FBI between OSR and GDP of Saudi Arabia

| \( r \) between % of pub. spend. to OS and GDP \ | Public spending |
|--------------------------------|----------------|
| Education | Health | Hou. and Commu. Amen. Ser. | Soc. Secu. and Welf. | Oth. Commu. and Soc. Ser. |
| CBI (OSR and GDP) | 0.87 | 0.67 | 0.73 | 0.66 | 0.6 |
| FBI | 0.93 | 0.77 | 0.69 | 0.69 | 0.77 |

Source: Own calculations of FBI of the percentage of public spending to OSR and GDP based on the proportionate percentage given in Appendices A3 and A4.

Source: Based on calculations of Tables 6 and 7.
In the long run, OS and GDP also govern public spending positively. OS and GDP govern the education highly \((r = 0.93)\), while the housing and community amenities services and social security and welfare services moderately \(r = 0.69\). Hence, \(H_6\) is accepted, and there is no significant difference among the comparative governance of sensitivity and trend of PSA proportionate to OSR and GDP.

5. DISCUSSION

The OP governs the OSR and GDP positively and proportionately, while all the PSA govern them negatively (Maghrebi et al., 2018; Algahtani, 2016). The impact of OP can be seen in the economy of oil-importing and exporting countries (Alsamara et al., 2017; Ghalayini, 2011). Lowering OP (Baumeister & Kilian, 2016) was favorable for the US and global economy (Mohaddes & Pesaran, 2017). The OSR lowers its contribution to the GDP of Saudi Arabia every year (Vohra, 2017). Public spending on education is highly and negatively governed by the volatility of OP, while another public spending negatively but negligibly governed by the OP (Abdel-Latif et al., 2018). This indicates that the Saudi Arabian government is much concerned about the PSA, especially on education, and moderately on other PSA, while the OP is lowering. The movement trend of all the variables, i.e., OP, OSR, GDP, and PSA is significantly different while sensitivity is similar to all the variables. It reveals the OP shocks do not affect the OSR, GDP, and PSA in the long run but governs the OSR (Al-Qudair, 2005), GDP, and PSA in the short run in Saudi Arabia. The OP governs the OSR and GDP positively and perfectly. This refers to the stagnation of the demand or exports of oil while prices decrease. Also, the variations of OSR and GDP contribution highly govern education spending while the OSR and GDP positively and moderately govern other spending in the short and long run.

CONCLUSION

Based on all analyses, results, and discussion, it can be concluded that OP governs the OSR and GDP positively and perfectly as the oil sector contributes approximately half of the GDP of Saudi Arabia. However, there is a negative correlation between the OP variations and the PSA in Saudi Arabia. The impact of low OP can be seen on the OSR and GDP since 2014. Saudi Arabian government enhances its spending on public avenues and especially on education while there was a lowering of the OP. The volatility of OP does not affect the OSR, GDP, and ultimately public spending in the long run. However, there is governance of volatility of OP that can be seen on OSR, GDP, and ultimately on PSA in the short run. So, there is a need to change the oil-based economy pattern to a knowledge-based economy in Saudi Arabia. Education, employment, innovation, information and communication technology (ICT), human capital are the areas where the Saudi government can put additional efforts to change the pattern of the economy. The conventional source cannot be considered suitable for economic growth in the long run. In Saudi Arabia, opportunities can be explored in the field of renewable energy and innovative technologies by the research initiatives of the experts and scientists from the advanced countries. There is a need to diversify the income resources to minimize oil prices’ reliability and the budget deficit. Solar, wind sources, nuclear power, and hydrogen fuel cell sources can be the alternatives to oil resources in the near future. The spending on unproductive education can be minimized to balance other spending and save the budget from negativity. There is a need to consider the sensitivity of OP on the economy by the policymakers to formulate the policies to minimize the impact of volatility of OP on the economy. The improved and appropriate monetary policy saves the economy from the negative impact of the OP. The study considers only quantitative data, and there should be consideration of other qualitative factors to get the variations in GDP and public spending in the short and long run. There is scope for further studies by considering the impact of OP and other qualitative factors on OSR, GDP, and PSA. There should be consideration of the number of oil products along with OP and OSR.
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APPENDIX A

Table A1. FBI of oil prices, oil sector revenue, GDP, and public spending

| Oil prices | Oil sector | GDP | Education | Health | Hous. and Commu. Ameni. Ser. | Soc. Secu. and Welf. | Oth. Commu. and Soc. Ser. |
|------------|------------|-----|-----------|--------|----------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| 100.00     | 100.00     | 100.00 | 100.00   | 100.00 | 100.00                     | 100.00              | 100.00                  |
| 101.85     | 107.85     | 109.64 | 112.25   | 120.89 | 105.73                     | 157.43              | 117.53                  |
| 98.52      | 101.13     | 111.23 | 131.54   | 150.77 | 160.65                     | 210.89              | 136.43                  |
| 89.61      | 93.81      | 112.68 | 140.54   | 168.88 | 172.46                     | 256.06              | 166.91                  |
| 98.52      | 107.85     | 109.64 | 112.25   | 120.89 | 105.73                     | 157.43              | 117.53                  |
| 96.73      | 93.77      | 101.45 | 117.19   | 124.72 | 151.95                     | 133.96              | 116.08                  |
| 90.95      | 92.77      | 101.30 | 106.84   | 112.01 | 107.35                     | 121.42              | 122.34                  |
| 51.40      | 55.09      | 86.50  | 106.19   | 95.50  | 89.57                      | 80.75               | 94.67                   |
| 82.36      | 90.27      | 98.57  | 89.47    | 80.72  | 79.33                      | 71.68               | 75.70                   |
| 128.63     | 123.48     | 106.77 | 102.11   | 99.93  | 101.40                     | 107.21              | 106.99                  |
| 133.09     | 134.08     | 114.22 | 115.08   | 115.28 | 113.36                     | 129.72              | 120.50                  |

Table A2. CBI of oil prices, oil sector revenue, GDP, and public spending

| Oil prices | Oil sector | GDP | Education | Health | Hous. and Commu. Ameni. Ser. | Soc. Secu. and Welf. | Oth. Commu. and Soc. Ser. |
|------------|------------|-----|-----------|--------|----------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| 100.00     | 100.00     | 100.00 | 100.00   | 100.00 | 100.00                     | 100.00              | 100.00                  |
| 101.85     | 107.85     | 109.64 | 112.25   | 120.89 | 105.73                     | 157.43              | 117.53                  |
| 98.52      | 101.13     | 111.23 | 131.54   | 150.77 | 160.65                     | 210.89              | 136.43                  |
| 89.61      | 93.81      | 112.68 | 140.54   | 168.88 | 172.46                     | 256.06              | 166.91                  |
| 98.52      | 107.85     | 109.64 | 112.25   | 120.89 | 105.73                     | 157.43              | 117.53                  |
| 96.73      | 93.77      | 101.45 | 117.19   | 124.72 | 151.95                     | 133.96              | 116.08                  |
| 90.95      | 92.77      | 101.30 | 106.84   | 112.01 | 107.35                     | 121.42              | 122.34                  |
| 51.40      | 55.09      | 86.50  | 106.19   | 95.50  | 89.57                      | 80.75               | 94.67                   |
| 82.36      | 90.27      | 98.57  | 89.47    | 80.72  | 79.33                      | 71.68               | 75.70                   |
| 128.63     | 123.48     | 106.77 | 102.11   | 99.93  | 101.40                     | 107.21              | 106.99                  |
| 133.09     | 134.08     | 114.22 | 115.08   | 115.28 | 113.36                     | 129.72              | 120.50                  |

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Table A3. Public spending avenues proportionate to GDP (%)

| Year | GDP   | Education | Edu., % of GDP | Health | Health % of GDP | Hous. and Commu. Ame. Ser. % of GDP | Ho. and Com. Ame. Ser. % of GDP | Soc. Secu. and Welf., % of GDP | Oth. Commu. and Soc. Ser., % of GDP |
|------|-------|-----------|----------------|--------|----------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 2011 | 2517146 | 141859    | 5.64           | 62663  | 2.49           | 24662                               | 0.98                            | 2039                            | 0.08                             |
| 2012 | 2759906 | 159235    | 5.77           | 75752  | 2.74           | 26075                               | 0.94                            | 3210                            | 0.12                             |
| 2013 | 2799297 | 186605    | 6.66           | 94479  | 3.37           | 39620                               | 1.42                            | 4300                            | 0.15                             |
| 2014 | 2836314 | 199370    | 7.03           | 105826 | 3.73           | 42531                               | 1.50                            | 5221                            | 0.18                             |
| 2015 | 2453512 | 211716    | 8.63           | 101059 | 4.12           | 38093                               | 1.55                            | 4216                            | 0.17                             |
| 2016 | 2418508 | 189416    | 7.83           | 81573  | 3.37           | 30219                               | 1.25                            | 3022                            | 0.12                             |
| 2017 | 2582198 | 193419    | 7.49           | 81512  | 3.16           | 30643                               | 1.19                            | 3240                            | 0.13                             |
| 2018 | 2949457 | 222585    | 7.55           | 93971  | 3.19           | 34737                               | 1.18                            | 4203                            | 0.14                             |

Source: Own calculations based on the absolute values given in Table 1.

Table A4. Public spending avenues proportionate to oil sector revenue (%)

| Year | Oil sector revenue | Education | Edu., % of oil sector reve. | Health | Health, % of oil sector reve. | Hous. and Commu. Ame. Ser. % of oil sector reve. | Ho. and Com. Ame. Ser. % of oil sector reve. | Soc. Secu. and Welf. % of oil sector reve. | Soc. Secu. and Welf., % of oil sector reve. | Oth. Commu. and Soc. Ser. % of oil sector reve. | Oth. Commu. and Soc. Ser., % of oil sector reve. |
|------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 2011 | 1276416           | 141859    | 11.11                         | 62663  | 4.91                          | 24662                                         | 1.93                             | 2039                            | 0.16                             |
| 2012 | 1376576           | 159235    | 11.57                         | 75752  | 5.50                          | 26075                                         | 1.89                             | 3210                            | 0.23                             |
| 2013 | 1290789           | 186605    | 14.46                         | 94479  | 7.32                          | 39620                                         | 3.07                             | 4300                            | 0.33                             |
| 2014 | 1197414           | 199370    | 16.65                         | 105826 | 8.84                          | 42531                                         | 3.55                             | 5221                            | 0.44                             |
| 2015 | 659670            | 211716    | 12.09                         | 101059 | 15.52                         | 38093                                         | 5.77                             | 4216                            | 0.64                             |
| 2016 | 595494            | 189416    | 31.81                         | 81573  | 13.70                         | 30219                                         | 5.07                             | 3240                            | 0.51                             |
| 2017 | 735302            | 193419    | 26.30                         | 81512  | 11.09                         | 30643                                         | 4.17                             | 3240                            | 0.44                             |
| 2018 | 985900            | 222585    | 22.58                         | 93971  | 9.53                          | 34737                                         | 3.52                             | 4203                            | 0.43                             |

Source: Own calculations based on the values given in Table 1.