How Images and Social Representations are Fixed in Consumers' Minds and Memories

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I. Presentation

This work is a theoretical overview of the postulates of authors of Image, Imaginary, Social Representation and Memory. The aim is to understand in light of theory how images and representations are fixed in the minds and memories of our consumers.

It is considered that the authors cited in this article, when approaching their assumptions about images and representations and how to fix them in memory, clarify this process so that we can understand it and use it in the most varied areas. The work is composed of 4 parts for each theme addressed. And later for final considerations.

II. Development

a) Image

Santaella and Nöth (2001) divide the concept of image into two spheres. The first is that of the image in the sense of visual representation, with drawings, paintings, audiovisual images and so on. The images, in this conception, are material objects or “signs” that represent the visual sphere. The second meaning refers to the subjective (mental) of images in the human mind. In this sphere, images are visions, imaginations, schemes, models and, in general, as mental representations. It is worth mentioning that these two areas of the image do not exist separately, since they are very interconnected.

The brand image has been an important concept in researching consumer behavior and in Marketing management. There are many studies that confirm that the images that consumers have about the product's brand influence their buying behavior (DOBNI; ZINKHAN, 1990). According to Levy (1989) products are sometimes having an impact on the buyer's self-esteem, thus, the probability of products being purchased if there is a convergence between the image of their brands and some characteristics of the individual's self-image (DE TONI, 2000).

Stern, Zinkhan and Jaju (2001) make five brand/product image classifications. These classifications are congruent regarding the brand image being a construct derived from Gestalt (therefore homogeneous, organized and structured), also converge on that the image is a negotiation operation between the stimuli offered by the brand and the perception of them by the consumer. The image of a product or a brand enables the consumer to efficiently code his functional and emotional values in his mind. Thus, a product image is basically a perception about a product or brand, reflected by the association organized in human memory about this product or brand (MARTINEZ; CHERNATONY, 2004).

The way images are organized in the consumer's memory find three prominent approaches: the Theory of Social Representations (TRS) which is a range of meanings arranged around some central elements, the Central Core Theory (TNC) regarding psychological factors and emotional based on the feeling of individuals and the principle related to the concept of complex configuration ("Gestalt"), in which...
image is seen as a transitive and not static process, in which subjects respond to stimuli that activate continuously the knowledge structure. There are many ways to understand how mental representations are organized in an individual’s cognitive system. In this perspective, to understand how mental models operationalize information and form images, three approaches can be highlighted: Schema Theory, Semantic Network Model and Associative Modeling. (TAMIOSSO, 2018)

Schema Theory indicates how concepts are organized. Schemas are mental structures for significantly organizing various interrelated concepts. They are structured groupings of concepts composed of several relationships. In parallel to the Schema Theory, there is the approach that deals with the connection between the elements of an image. This perspective is worked a lot in Social Psychology, mainly in the field of social representations. Thus, the attributes will be closer to a collective image the higher the number of individuals treat them in the same way (DE TONI, 2005).

Mental schemas reveal the network of relationships between data (attributes) contained in human memory, which are the fundamental components of the images that the individual has about a given object. Thus, a product or brand schema can be conceptualized as including a set of expectations regarding different brand attributes and the union between these attributes. These expectations provide a framework for interpreting and understanding information about an object that reaches the subject. The lack of an object schema then implies the lack of a cognitive framework to interpret this information about the object that was received. Several factors can contribute to the absence or reduction in the cognitive structure about the object. The product/brand may be new, the person may not have heard or not have experience with the product, etc.

b) Imaginary

Regarding the concept of the imaginary, there is the imaginary “from within”, which are images that emanate from the individual. This recurs to the extent that the archetypes of their unconscious updated in their individuality are used to recall a given event according to their inner imagination and the facts are read. With regard to the imaginary “from the outside”, this vision represents the expression that turns to the outside, to the social reality, providing approximately the opportunity for a conscious construction of the imaginary. In which we can draw a parallel with individual memory “from within”, collective memory and social memory, “from outside” (Santos 2005).

Baczo (1982) believes that symbolic goods are the target of cruel disputes and conflicts, in addition to the fact that power drives a hierarchy among them, seeks the monopoly of certain categories of symbols, as well as seeking to control others. The control mechanisms that the constituted powers use to preserve the prominent place assigned to themselves in the symbolic realm prove the imaginary, but not illusory, characteristic of the goods thus protected. Thus, for Baczo (1982) the protectors of the social imaginary are, at the same time, protectors of the sacred. This is explained by the fact that the frontier of freedom and novelty in the construction of collective representations, especially of social imaginaries, is especially restricted. The symbolism of the social order is quantitatively limited, and its character is, at the same time, quite constant (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012).

Furthermore, the manipulation practices of these symbols are mixed with those of rites that reproduce the mythical essence, and this is valid both for bodily procedures as well as for art and language. Only with the establishment of state power that centralizes and with the relative autonomy that is accorded to political exercise, is that the practices of manipulation of social imaginaries become deritualized, becoming autonomous and differentiated.

Conflicts between competing powers prompted the creation of new practices in the realm of the imaginary. For the author, these new practices aimed to build a devalued image of the adversary, seeking especially to invalidate its legitimacy, but also extolled, through grandiose representations, the power they defended and for which they intended to achieve the greatest number of acceptances. The creation of new practices, allied to their improvement and differentiation, entailed the passage from a simple influence of social imaginaries to their increasingly sophisticated and specialized maneuver through the intervention of the mass media (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., BACZO, 1982).

According to Barros (2007), the history of the imaginary has as its object essentially the images produced by a society, but not only visual images, but also verbal images and, finally, mental images. For him, the imaginary is reality as effective as “concrete life”. This is based on the assumption that the imaginary has the capacity to restructure the society that builds it. Here, recalling the Middle Ages, in which many dedicated themselves to the Crusades less for economic or political reasons than because of a Christian and chivalrous imagination. In this sense, the imaginary has a range of meaning for human societies equal to what is said as effective reality.

For him it is also possible to speak of symbolic: (…) only when an object, an image or a representation are referred to a given reality, idea or value system that one wants to become present (the sword as a symbol of justice). An image, therefore, can be seen coated with symbolic meaning (…) (BARROS, 2007 p.33).

Although for Baczo (1982), about the meaning of the word imaginary and its social adjective: The adjective “social” adds little precision. In effect, it
designates a double phenomenon. On the one hand, it is about the orientation of imaginative activity towards the social, that is, the production of representations of the “social order”, of social actors and their reciprocal relationships (hierarchy, domination, obedience, conflict, etc.), as well as social institutions, in particular those related to the exercise of power, the images of the “boss”, etc. On the other hand, the same adjective designates the participation of individual imaginative activity in a collective phenomenon. (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012; BACZKO, 1982).

But Baczos (1982) still talking about the term social imaginary that encompasses individual performance in a collective scope says that keeping these terms, in the absence of better ones, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that studies on social imagination, in opposition to vision traditional, they are not intended to establish an independent psychological “faculty” or “power”. But they approach an angle of social life, of the global activity of social agents, with specificities that are presented in the diversity of their products. Social imaginaries make up several other points of relationship in the broad symbolic system that a collectivity creates (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012).

Thus, for Baczo (1982) the social imaginary is one of the moderating forces of collective life. Due to the fact that the social imaginary is an efficient element of the apparatus for controlling collective life, especially the practice of authority and power. Simultaneously, it becomes the location and target of social conflicts. The social imaginary becomes understandable and communicable through the creation of discourses in which, and, through which the union of collective representations in language is consummated. The signs attributed by the imaginary are equivalent to several other symbols.

And, in this way, social imaginaries are based on a symbolism that is, at the same time, production and mechanism. The purpose of the symbol is not only to establish a categorization, but also to establish values, forming individual and collective behaviors and signaling the success alternatives for their actions. The more fixed symbols are based on deep needs and become a reason to exist and act for individuals and social groups. The symbolic systems on which the social imaginary is based and through which it operates are formed based on the experience of social agents, but they also originate from what they aspire to and what motivates them. For the author, the imaginary apparatus guarantees a social group both a collective scheme for interpreting individual, complicated and varied experiences, and a cataloging of expectations. (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012; BACZKO, 1982).

Thus, in an effective way, the social imaginary communicates about reality, simultaneously, it composes a call to action, to behave in a certain way. Interpretation structure, as well as valuation, the imaginary apparatus causes the agreement to a value system and efficiently interferes in the procedures of its internalization by individuals, outlining behaviors, taking over individuals and even inducing them to a common action. (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012; BACZKO, 1982).

For Baczo (1982), the control of the social imaginary, its reproduction, diffusion and practice, guarantees, at varying levels, an effective influence on both individual and collective behaviors and actions, making it possible to achieve desired functional results, direct efforts and coordinate expectations. As all social choices result from experiences and hopes, from knowledge and rules, from information and values, social agents seek, even more in situations of crisis and serious conflict, to cancel out the uncertainties inherent in the act of choosing. It is in this way that these choices mentioned can be imagined as the only suitable ones or as the imposition of an inevitable destiny. (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012)

Thus, one of the functions of social imaginaries is the organization and control of collective time at the symbolic level. These imaginaries actively intervene in collective memory, for which, as we said, events often count for less than the representations they give rise to and which frame them. Social imaginaries operate even more vigorously, perhaps, in the production of future visions, namely in the projection of collective anguishes, hopes and dreams about the future (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., BACZKO, 1982).

Thus, the mass media not only expand the flow of information, but also format its attributes. Baczo (1982) finds that information is continuously incorporated several times a day, covering the entire planet, gathering data with images and reaching all fields of social life. As it is based on the present, it becomes fragmented, and the fact of today is forgotten and repressed tomorrow. Thus, due to its quantity and quality, this information serves in a special way for manipulations. And, consequently, the transmission of this information forces the issuers to make a selection that cannot be avoided, as well as a hierarchy. What happens when the state has a monopoly on broadcasting is that it is easy to practice censorship, abolish unwanted information, while spreading targeted words and images. (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012).

However, the author emphasizes that information can be manipulated through other means besides censorship, because they are in the form of particles and do not make up a whole, which generates constant concerns and tensions, and emphasizes two needs: unification and that of appreciation. In other words, people are no longer able to coordinate the pulverized and dispersed mass of information and have a greater need for global and unifying representations. Something that is created by the mass media, that expands new opportunities for advertising while satisfying that need. It can be seen that these facts
observed by the author are current and more accentuated in internet times (HAMMERSCHIT, A. BACZO, 1982).

As, for example, information that is continuously incorporated several times a day, encompassing the entire planet, gathering data with images and reaching all social life, in a fractional way serving certain directions, even because people are no longer able to account for the pulverized and dispersed volume of information and have a greater need for general representations. In this way, the traditional means of communication allied to the new media that is the internet, despite the freedom of communication it provides, try to direct the social imaginary at all times (HAMMERSCHMITT, A. 2012, BACZO, 1982).

Thus, the image that a person makes of a product, when shared by more people, and disseminated, for example, via social networks, where diffusion is quick and instantaneous, tends to become a social imaginary around this brand. It is believed that it is up to marketers to identify the anxieties, dreams and hopes of their consumers in relation to their products and/or brand, to create a favorable environment within the imagination of the society in which they are inserted, as well as project opportunities and challenges futures.

c) Representation

The Social Representations Theory was elaborated by Moscovici (1978), having the role of being one of the main theories that clarify the processes of social influences and how individuals acquire and store their mental models (TAMIOSSO, 2018; BREAKWELL, 2001). Theory of representations is a theory based on the information of how a group of people forms their daily knowledge and how this knowledge influences their behavior (DE TONI 2005; MOSCOVICI, 1978, 1988).

This theory postulates that behind man's actions is a representation of the world, which is not only rational, but rather, a set of socially created and shared meanings, beliefs and values. People's actions are governed by the representations they have of the world, and these representations are, in part, socially created within the culture and interaction of social groups. (DE TONI 2005; MOSCOVICI, 1978).

Thus, the theory of Social Representations seeks to analyze the phenomena from the subject (internal causes) and the social context (external causes). For these authors Moscovici (1978), sees the social representation is neither the collective nor the unconscious, but the movement of interaction between people, being a form of individual knowledge that only occurs in the interaction with ‘the other’, in the same moment in which this interaction takes place. The concept of Social Representations is at the center of the individual-social axis, linking the two realities. (DE TONI, 2005; MOSCOVICI, 1978).

For Moscovici (1978) collective representation, or how society sees itself and the world around it, arises from associated, grouped and combined consciousnesses. (DE TONI, 2005; MOSCOVICI, 1978). That with a similar argument is the thought of Bourdieu, who sees representations as visions of the social world, how it is divided, how it is classified, how it works. The representations for him are of two forms: 1° Self-representation - which in a first process is for conformity, but also for conflict. And 2° these are the representations that groups make of themselves and others.

The criticism that Chartier (2002) develops, on the other hand, points out that mentalities forget about the process of representation, appropriation, attribution of meaning. He proposes not to cast the cultural as separate, autonomous, or determinant of the social. For this author, there is no social prior to representation, there is only class if individuals recognize themselves as such.

There is also the postulate that social representations have some characteristics that appear to be contradictory, but that are very present in this form of socially directed knowledge. The first is that representations are stable and flexible to the same extent. The second characteristic is that the representations are consensual but characterized by great individual differences. In the opinion of Abric (1994), social representations are socio-cognitive constrictions, having cognitive elements and social components at the same time. (DE TONI, 2005; ABRIC 1994)

According to Jean-Claude Abric (1984, p.170), […] every representation is organized around a central nucleus […], formed by one or a few elements that give the representation its meaning, occupying in the structure of representation a singular position. It is defined, on the one hand, by the nature of the object, on the other, by the relationship that the subject, or the group, maintains with this object. (DE TONI 2005; ABRIC 1984)

The central core has two main functions: 1- generating function: this function defines the meaning of the representation as a whole; and 2- organizing function; it is the central nucleus that determines the nature of the characteristics that unite the components of the representation together. The so-called nucleus is also the component that unifies, stabilizes and gives meaning to representations. The result of these two functions is stability as a fundamental characteristic of the central core. In this way the nucleus forms the most stable element of the representation. (DE TONI 2005; ABRIC 1984, 1996).

Social representations have an internal organization, in which man organizes and processes information in a dynamic and evolutionary way, forming
groups of information that are more closely related. The central core is defined by historical, social and ideological conditions, in a dynamic connection between subject and object. Thus, representations strongly carry the collective memory of a group. However, for this very reason, they are one of the most stable and resistant to change components. In this way, any modification of the central core leads to a complete transformation of the representation. (DE TONI, 2000; MOLINARI; EMILIANI, 1993).

The Theory of Social Representations can be seen as the collected image of various conceptual objects that come together and also complement each other, generating a concept or mental scheme. Thus, “anchoring” and “objectification” are ways of dealing with memory. When identifying something new (a new object or concept), the associated experiences and memories are evoked so that the individual can build a new image and associate it with their repertoire of experiences. The connection to pre-existing concepts originates the understanding due to the association and incorporation of the new concept or the way the subject will act on the new. (TAMIOSSO, 2018; STERNBERG, 2000).

Chartier (20021), on the other hand, states that representation represents something in a reflexive way through practice/action. And this reflective form of representation tends to fade away so that belief appears as if this believed reality were a truth. In which it is the logic of the practical sense that is at work, which is a logic of representation.

The aforementioned author states that representation as an analytical concept has been organized by the social sciences since the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He postulates that the foundation with which he tries to understand social representations is how through them one seeks to give a universal, natural format to what is culturally, economically, socially constructed, such as individuals’ thought schemes, the perception of reality or the social relations.

d) Memory

Memory is the dynamic mechanism associated with the retention and retrieval of information about past experiences. It is the means through which human beings evoke their past experiences to use them in the present. For contemporary Cognitive Psychology, there is not just one, but several memories, with different functions. Three types or levels of memory in image processing are identified: sensory memory, short-term memory and long-term memory (DE TONI, 2005; JOHNSON-LAIRD, 1988; LÉVY, 2000; DAVIDOFF, 2000; STERNBERG, 2000; HEALY, 2001; LEDOUX, 2001; LEMOS, 2002; IZQUIERDO, 2002, 2004).

The Atkinson-Shiffrin memory model concludes that the information that marks the sense organs remains momentarily retained by a storage mechanism called sensory memory. If the individual pays attention to the information, it is transferred to the short-term memory (center of consciousness) (DE TONI, 2000; Davidoff 2000; Izquierdo 2004).

Short-term memory retains all the thoughts, information, and experiences that a person becomes aware of at any given time. In addition to storage, short-term memory also works as a central executive. It introduces material and takes data from a third more or less durable memory system, which is long-term memory, there is permanent communication between the two systems. Izquierdo (2004) states that memory comes from 87 experiences or insights. Thus, both short-term and long-term memories begin immediately after experiencing an experience or an insight. Although the Atkinson-Shiffrin model is practical to understand the processing of information, the retrieval of stored information does not always occur in a separate and linear way (DE TONI, 2000).

Short-term memory - Short-term memory can be seen as the center of human consciousness. It is like a central executive who manages the mechanism as a whole. It contains all the thoughts, information and experiences that are in an individual's mind at any given time. It has two elementary functions: temporary storage and general storage. Which is to say, it transfers experiences to long-term memory and retrieves information from the various memory systems (VALLAR, 2001). But short-term memory or also called work, is not only a temporary storage system, but active processing that is used in thinking and reasoning (LEDOUX, 2001). Information from short-term memory cannot be retrieved quickly after about fifteen to twenty seconds have passed, unless it has been repeated or saved to long-term memory. In other words, the storage time in short-term memory is only fifteen or twenty seconds (DE TONI, 2000).

Thus, working memory can serve different phases of the cognitive system, and many of these functions have yet to be fully discovered. According to Ledoux (2001), short-term memory is not purely a product of the here and now. It is conditioned on what the person knows and the type of experience they had in the past, that is, it also depends on long-term memory (DE TONI, 2000).

Long-term memory - The long-term memory mechanism gives the individual the ability to remember large amounts of information for significant periods. It is the place where one's knowledge of the world is stored. It is the material of long-term memory that enables the human being to remember events, solve problems, recognize patterns, which, in short, enables the person to think. Thus, all knowledge, the meaning of words and facts that depend on man's cognitive capacity is stored in long-term memory. (DE TONI, 2000; JOHNSON-LAIRD, 1988; DAVIDOFF, 2000; LÉVY, 2000; LOGIE; SALA, 2001; LEMOS, 2002).
Long-term memory is classified into three types: semantic memory, procedural memory and episodic memory. - semantic memory is related to the decontextualized memory of facts (DE TONI; KLATZKY, 1980; LÉVY 2000; DAVIDOFF, 2000; STERNBERG, 2000) Semantic memory operates with concepts, ideas that a person can associate with different characteristics and that he can connect with many other ideas. Episodic memory refers to outstanding episodes and events that occurred in a specific period in time. Subjective experiences are included, referring to the context in which the person lived and temporally organizes codes and events, information about how memories arise and when they occurred. (DE TONI; KLATZKI, 1980; SCHACTER, 1996; GLENBERG, 1997; RELATIVE; CAPUANO; NESPOULOUS, 1999).

For some researchers, differentiating memory types is just a set of rules. Modern Psychology admits that the two forms of memory come together. Within which, episodic memory contains the concrete parts of a semantic memory. (episodic and/or semantic experience) (GLENBERG, 1997; STERNBERG 2000). Images, hypotheses and representations of the order of events are in long-term memory (JOHNSON-LAIRD, 1988). For Lévy (2000), the problem of long-term memory is how to find a fact, a hypothesis or an image that is very far from the area of attention, information that has not been in an active state for a long time (DE TONI, 2000).

Halbwachs (1990) says that there are other people who have memories in common with us, they help us to remember, because for us to remember better, we resort to them, we accept, for a moment, their points of view, we enter their groups, which we still are part. We are thus influenced by them, and we have ideas that we would not have come up with on our own, through which we keep in touch. Thus, according to Halbwachs (1990), to prove or recall a certain memory it is necessary to use witnesses, individuals who witnessed the facts (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012).

But sometimes, even in this way, we don't remember anything, because having lived something that other people also experienced is not enough so that, when they do the reconstruction of what happened, it becomes a memory for us. A testimony will not make us remember anything if we do not keep in our being some trace of what happened in the past, something that is being remembered at that moment. This does not mean that the memory, or part of it, should literally stay with us, but as we and the witnesses were in the same group, we thought in common about something and kept in touch with that group, we are still able to identify with it and mix our past (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012).

In order for our memory to be helped by that of others, it is not enough for them to bring us their testimonies: it is also necessary that they have not stopped agreeing with their memories and that they have many points of contact between one and the other for the memory that others remind us that it can be reconstructed on a common foundation (HALBWACHS, 1990).

According to the author, in order to reconstitute memories, it is necessary that it takes place using data or perceptions common to us and others as a source, as they are always moving in both directions, something that is only possible if they have done and still do part of the collective. If we are no longer able to access these memories, it is because they have had nothing in common between our partners and ourselves for a long time. A broader collective memory that encompassed mine and theirs disappeared. (HAMMERSCHMITT, A, HALBWACHS, 1990)

As for Lévy (2000), every time one looks for a memory or information, or the activation and retrieval of information, one must remember from the current facts to the facts one wants to find. Thus, the information stored in the long-term memory form the essential basis for the formation of images (KÖSSLYN et. al., 1996). For this, two situations are needed. First, there must have remained a representation of the fact being sought. And second, there must be possible paths of connections that lead to this representation (DE TONI, 2000).

Cognitive psychologists locate three basic memory operations: encoding, storing and retrieving (STERNBERG, 2000). Lévy (2000) believes that repetition is not the most effective strategy for storing information in long-term memory. Lévy found that the retention of material in memory is greater when there is a greater involvement of new information with those already permanent in the individual’s memory, relating to past phenomena (DE TONI, 2000). Here we can reflect with the thought of Halbachs (1990) when he says that memories are related to the groups we relate to, and that we still keep in touch or make sense to us.

Certain experiments, for example, have shown that under the circumstance that some people were asked to memorize lists of words by repeating them, the memory of the target information remained for twenty-four hours, after which it tended to fade out. On the other hand, when asked to remember the list by building small stories or images linked to the words to be remembered, they persisted for a long time (DE TONI, 2000; LÉVY, 2000, p. 79).

Generally speaking, there is no way to organize information that is better than any other way. People form their own organization, according to subjective units they create. Emotional impacts (liveliness) can trigger the system that converts a short-term memory item into a long-term memory item. Repetition and many other mnemonic techniques can also be used, which are specific knowledge that help the individual to memorize arbitrary information (DE TONI, 2000 LÉVY, 2000).
Information will also be more easily remembered when the coded or understood material has a connection with something known, with something that makes sense to the individual, or with something that is the result of emotional excitement (DE TONI, 2000; LOGIE; SALA, 2001; LOCKHART, 2001; LEDOUX, 2001). The emotional intensity with which the message was sent to memory produces more vivid presences of this material in the mental model. Such data can easily and spontaneously come to mind and may be manifested in their words or language and behavior (DE TONI GLUCKSBERG, 1971; SCHACTER, 1996; STERNBERG, 2000).

The best retrieval of some information occurs when the type of memory desired and the environment of the phenomenon to be remembered have some characteristics in common. It seems that human beings have a greater capacity to evoke information when they are in the same physical context in which they learn the content. In addition to the external environment, the subject’s emotions, moods and states of consciousness, at the time of encoding, affect memory retrieval (DE TONI, 2000; STERNBERG, 2000).

Lockhart (2001) believes that memory is not like a book in the library or a computer file that, when looking for information, uses a command or stimulus for the data to appear as it was stored. On the contrary, the retrieval of materials in memory is flexible, constructive and vulnerable to the individual’s physical and mental context. Thus, memory retrieval is the consequence of a complex communication between information already stored and new stimuli. The retrieval or recall of information in long-term memory can be done through different strategies (DE TONI, 2000).

We reiterate that, according to Halbwachs (1990), for our memory to help with that of others, it is necessary that it has not stopped agreeing with the memories of the groups we are part of and that there are enough points of contact between them for the memory that remind us of can be reconstructed on a common foundation. Thus, for this author, in order to reconstruct memories, it needs to take place from data or perceptions common to us and to others, as they circulate in both directions, something that is only possible if they were made and are still part of the collective. If we can’t remember something anymore, it’s because we haven’t had anything in common between our partners and ourselves for a long time. A broader collective memory, mine and theirs, no longer exists.

It is possible to remember the characteristics of a product by repeating the benefits of the product in the various contacts that the consumer has with it, from physical contact with the true presence of the product, to any marketing communication campaign. (DE TONI, 2000; LOGIE; SALA, 2001).

Another strategy for an attribute to be remembered quickly when the consumer thinks about the product is to ensure that this characteristic has a living and important meaning for this consumer. Because of this, it is necessary to distinguish, among the product attributes, which are only prominent, and which are important, since an attribute that is not perceived as important to the consumer will tend to be located in a peripheral area of the image, in which it will not be quickly recalled, when the product memory appears. Yet another way to facilitate the recall of attributes favorable to the image of a product, when its memory is evoked, is to create analogies, that is, to link the image of a product to the image of another that is already well established with positive characteristics in the minds of consumers (DE TONI, 2000; LOGIE; SALA, 2001).

It is also possible to create analogies with other objects and beings, as a way to lend some of its characteristics, such as the image of the product that you want to disseminate (eg, comparing a car to a tiger, it adds strength and attributes to the image of this car, majesty, by analogy). In this way, the data that make up memory can be retrieved or recalled in a more or less powerful way, according to three basic principles: frequency, recentness and vividness. These three principles are from the psychological theory of Associationism. For associationists, the human being stipulates connections between ideas when he perceives them frequently linked, when he has recently perceived them linked or when the experience of perceiving them linked has been very lively, powerful and exciting (DE TONI, 2000; SCHULER et al., 2004).

Images have the ability to be stored, retrieved and resist a longer period of time when: a) images are repeated and accessed frequently; b) the comprehension of information happens recently and spaced over time (frequency); c) the data are organized in such a way that they have liveliness, meaning and meaning for the individual; d) some mnemonic techniques are used such as categorical grouping, interactive image and others (STERNBERG, 2000); e) the information refers to concrete and familiar knowledge, so that they are interrelated with schemes already contained in memory (LEVY, 2000); f) representations that maintain close ties with "problems of life" are full of emotion, which includes the expectations and tendencies of the one who remembers (LEDOUX, 2001; DE TONI, 2000).

Frequency is related to how many times an information has been experienced or repeated by the person. The basis of frequency is that new information forms part of one or another information network if it is perceived often linked to data from that network. According to this foundation, data are linked in a stronger way the more often they are perceived together.

Thus, according to Kosslyn (1996), images are retained over time by the repeated activation of the
adequate representation. For Klaztky (1980), the two essential functions of frequency or repetition are to keep the data in short-term memory and to pass part of the repeated data to long-term memory. Within this, one of the basic inferences is that repetition strengthens recall (DE TONI, 2000).

However, the three basic memory operations – encoding, storing and retrieving – do not operate in sequence. These are procedures that interact in a reciprocal way and are interdependent (STERBERG, 2000). Within this, marketers can try to combat forgetfulness by repeating ads. But the repetition itself is limited, for the reason that repeating the same ad over and over can irritate the consumer. The model of excellence to escape oblivion is to have, in addition to a good product, messages that are meaningful, attract the consumer's attention, so that the data can be stored and organized in memory with vividness (DE TONI, 2000). And yet, according to Halbachs, for these memories not to be forgotten, they have to have a point of contact, with the groups we relate to. Make sense to us. To which we can add that this “liveliness” said by (Sterberg, 2000) is related to the maintenance of memories in the groups of which we relate to a broader collective memory that encompasses my memory and that of others in contact to make it alive and palpable for each one of us.

It is also worth considering memory within the individual, as stated by Bergson (1999, p. 31) about memory, “[...] while covering with a layer of memory a background of immediate perception, and also while it contracts a multiplicity of moments, constitutes the main contribution of individual consciousness in perception, the subjective side of our knowledge of things […]” (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012)

The process of remembering memory in this one reports to Benjamin (1998, p. 239) in Escavando e Rememberando, when he states that memory “is the medium where the experience took place, just as the soil is the medium in which the the ancient cities are buried. Anyone who wants to get closer to his own buried past must act like a man who digs”. However, for this to happen Benjamin (1998) states that, before any conception, one should not be afraid of always returning to the same event, pouring it as one does with the earth, stirring it as one does with the soil. “For facts”, they are nothing more than layers that only to the most careful exploration deliver what rewards the excavation” (HAMMERSCHMITT, A.; BENJAMIN, p. 329).

For Bergson (1999) there are two categories of memory: habit-memory and remembrance-memory. The first, the author says that he does not have any sign that demonstrates where it originates and that he should categorize it in the past, as it is part of the present. But beyond it, there is the representation memory or memory-remembering, which works through images, it is the conscious recall of everything that happened to us, which was recorded in the unconscious, but it differs from the past that it is capable of preserving. This memory-remembrance refers to the permanence of unique images “[...] the image itself, considered in itself, was necessarily what it will always be at first”. This type of memory has no attribute of habit, on the contrary, it leads to discontinuity of habit. “To evoke the past in the form of an image, it is necessary to be able to abstract from the present action, it is necessary to know how to value the useless, it is necessary to want to dream” (HAMMERSCHMITT, A.; BERGSON, 1999, p. 90).

For Santos (2013), the fusion of affection with its representation expresses memory as a process and creation, that is, a creative activity. In which, the individual has memory and representation together: the representation giving meaning to affection, enters the sphere of sensitivities. And from recreations comes the aestheticization of affection. According to Benjamin (1994), this happens because the facts do not appear in isolation but are informed and carry a delicate and valuable truth: the image. (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012).

Something that happens, because according to Santos (2013, p. 151): “memory produces subjectivities; and it is produced by subjectivities, one might add. There is always a subjectivity in them, which also mobilizes the deepest sensibilities of the experiences that were kept”. (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012.)

In the view of the researcher of this work, there is the choice to make an approach from the perspective of collective memory to verify the components of collective memory as postulated by Halbwachs (1990). For him, other people help us to remember, when they have memories in common with us, because we remember better, we appeal to them, we accept their points of view, we join their groups if we are still part of them. We are influenced by these groups, and we have ideas that we would not have reached on our own, which we keep in touch with. It is also considered, the author's thought that a statement will not make you remember anything if there is no trace of what happened in the past, something that is being sought at the moment in which you seek to remember.

However, this does not mean that the memory remains literally, but that we still have contact with a certain group, we identify with it and manage to blend our past. Regarding the scope of individual memory, it is worth saying that Halbwachs (1990) does not believe that there is individual memory as Bergson (1999) postulates as the main support of individual consciousness in perception, alongside the subjective side of our knowledge.

Halbwachs reflects whether there may be memories that are not possible to link to any group, because the fact occurred when we were really alone. And if we are really alone, not just apparently, we remember from a point of view that can only be ours,
even if this is not common, it could serve to postulate that collective memory does not explain all our memories. Thus "nothing proves that all notions and images taken from the social media of which we are a part, and that intervene in memory, do not cover, like a movie screen, an individual memory, even in the case where we do not perceive it" ([HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012; HALBWACHS, 1990, p. 37).

For Halbwachs (1990), the big question is whether such a memory can exist after all. And he believes that all recollection is based on an appeal to a purely individual state of consciousness, which he calls sensible intuition, to differentiate it from ideas in which they are charged with principles of social thought. Thus, Halbwachs himself admits that the individual is part of two types of memory, the individual and the collective, but individual memory is just a combination of the countless collective memories that the person participates in. For him, however, memories are not in bodies or minds, but in society, in the groups that are part of it. ([HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012].)

Regarding studies on society, Sarlo (2007) states that around the 1970s, there was a reorganization in the sociology of culture and cultural studies, in which the identity of subjects returned to the place occupied in the 1960s by structures. “The subject's reason was restored, which was, for decades, mere "ideology" or "false consciousness" [...]” ([SARLO, 2007, p. 19]). Thus, for this author, there was a “subjective turn” where the subjects and their testimonies were given a voice again, in a great appreciation of the individual memory of the witness. We linked the analysis with the authors Bergson (1999), Benjamin (1994), Santos (2013) who theorized about the subjectivity present in the subject's recollection ([HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012].)

Regarding questions about individual and collective memory, Roma and Birmingham state in Social Memory (1992), that they gave this name to the book to oppose its content to the memory of individuals. Because for them a large part of memory is grouped with participation in various social groups. They postulate that Halbwachs has already said that all memory is organized into group identities and that the individual's memory only exists when this is a unique result of a certain participation in groups ([HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012].)

Roma and Birmingham draws attention to the fact that Halbwachs was part of the Durkheim school and that for this reason he emphasized too much the collective nature of social conscience, relativizing the issues around the relationship between individual conscience and that of the collectivities of which these subjects were part. What for them resulted in a concept of collective consciousness disconnected from the real developments of the thought of a given person. Thus, for the authors, in relation to Halbwachs, it is to be able, through its postulate, to formulate a conception of memory that takes into account the collective side of each person’s life, but that does not elaborate the subject with an automaton, which follows from passio way the internalized collective desires ([HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012].)

So, Roma and Birmingham (1992) question how individual memory becomes social. In which they postulate that the memories we share with others are the ones that matter to us and them alike. They claim that Halbwachs was right in asserting that social groups create their own images of the world by generating a commonly agreed explanation of the past through communication. For these authors, our personal memories are undeniably social ([HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012].)

Here we can think about the question of how a brand or product, when we share information about them, is retained in the consumer’s memory. By the above postulates, the shared information that remains is the one that matters to us and to others.

But in Fentress and Wickham (1992, p. 32) they state that much of what we remember refers to ourselves personally, having no way of being anywhere else but in our heads. And if we tell a friend our memories, they remain our personal memories. “Personal memories are indissolubly ours, they are part of us” ([HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012].)

However, Fentress and Wickham (1992) warn that the assumptions of objective ideas tend to contextualize memory as naturally divided into an objective face that contains the facts and a subjective face that encompasses information and feelings that make up individuals and are located just inside them. The first aspect is somewhat passive and boils down to storing knowledge. The second aspect is more active appreciates and memorizes for the conscience ([HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012].)

Thus, the difference between objective postulates and subjective interpretation is located in the structure of memory. But Fentress and Wickham (1992) believe that objective memory is basically the best transmitter of information, it is a form of memory more available to others. ([HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012].)

And, for Fentress and Wickham (1992, p. 20), this distinction in relation to subjective memory not being linked with the structure of memory is, above all, a social fact. Thus, in the correlation between the two sides of memory, the objective part itself does not appear, but its social characteristic. “This implicit acceptance of Durkheim's doctrine, which says that ideas held collectively are social facts and, as such, the result of social and historical forces. We affirm that memory is also a social fact” ([HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012].)

Furthermore, Fentress and Wickham, the distinction between personal memory and social memory is relative, as most of the time our memories
are mixed, having a social and a personal side. And this is insufficient to believe that one aspect of our memories is objective, and another is subjective. The authors postulate that memory is fundamentally subjective, but it is also structured by language, education, analysis, ideas that are collectively accepted, as well as ideas shared with others. And all of this, likewise, builds a social memory. (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012).

For Fentress and Wickham (1992, p. 242):

We are the ones who remember and it is us who, in the last analysis, refer to knowledge, emotions and images [...]. Whatever the nature of memory as a purely neurological or purely epistemological object, we cannot know or feel our memories unless we think of them “first”; and when we “think” our memories, evoking and articulating them, they cease to be objects and become parts of us. At that moment, we find ourselves indissolubly at the center. Only when our memories are part of us can we share them with others.

In this context, for these authors, memory plays a great social function by telling us who we are, incorporating our present to our past. Fentress and Wickham (1992) postulate that our memories are mixed, having a social and a personal side, they intersect. Thus, memory is individual and collective at the same time, being located within a larger aspect that encompasses the social, society in general.

Fentress and Wickham (1992) believe that it is obvious that memories that change past memories over time, but remain, are chosen from an infinite sum of possible memories, due to the importance they have for the individuals who remember. And exactly for what they help to build identity and personal relationships. For the authors, this is concrete both when individuals recall personal practices and when they recall events collectively stored. However, it is noticeable that the importance of memories for others is increased, when they are linked, when they are shared. And the procedure of sharing in itself, that is, the creation of narratives about the past, is what forms the meaning given by the group in which they are narrated (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012).

For Fentress and Wickham (1992) the transmission and diffusion of images of social memory can be compared to a type of trade in which ideas are actually traded. And even if these ideas are somehow unattainable, their transmission and dissemination is a concrete path. For them, social memory is defined by the law of supply and demand, in which it is necessary to offer memories and memories must arise in specific places (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012).

Here we can think that when marketers offer the image of a brand to a consumer audience, they are offering memories that can be remembered by that audience if what is offered makes sense to them and is retained in their memories in the long term.

But this offer, to go beyond the instantaneous present, and to survive transmission and exchange, must reflect a demand. It has to appear to the group that remembers as being only this one, the adequate version that includes sociological, cultural, ideological or historical elements (HAMMERSCHMITT, A., 2012). “The history of social memory is also the history of its transmission (...). (FENTRESS; WICKHAM, 1992, p. 243).

In this sense, for the present researcher, individual and collective memory is believed to be a social fact that mixes and encompasses a greater proportion, becoming social memory. That, in the same way as aforementioned authors postulate, needs to be offered to the society that composes it in a commerce of transmission and diffusion of images that build an imaginary around the offered memory.

III. Final Considerations

As said in the first part developed Stern, Zikhan and Jaju (2001) think the image is a negotiation operation between the stimuli offered by the brand and the perception of them by the consumer. As discussed here, based on Bazco’s thinking the image that a person makes of a product, when shared by more people, for example, on social media, where diffusion is quick and instantaneous, tends to become a social imaginary around this brand.

According Tamiosso (2018) the Theory of Social Representations can be seen as the collected image of various conceptual objects that come together and also complement each other, generating a concept or mental scheme. When identifying something new associated experiences and memories are evoked so the individual can build a new image and associate it with their repertoire of experiences.

For Santos (2013), the fusion of affection with its representation expresses memory as a creative activity. In which, the individual has memory and representation together, because the representation gives meaning to affection, enters the sphere of sensitivities.

Also meeting Halbachs’ thought that the memories that remain are those shared in a group, it is possible to consider that as said images are stored, retrieved and resist a longer period of time when are repeated and accessed frequently; they have meaning and meaning for the individual; are related to full of emotion (DE TONI, 2000). In the same way Roma and Birmingham (1992) said that the memories we share with others are the ones that matter to us and them alike.

So, also it possible to consider that memories should be offered aiming, therefore, to fix the desired image and imagery in the memory of target consumers of the products and services of our works that we produce in the society in which we live.
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