REFLOW

ZERO KNOWLEDGE MULTI PARTY SIGNATURES WITH APPLICATION TO DISTRIBUTED AUTHENTICATION

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ABSTRACT
Reflow is a novel signature scheme supporting unlinkable signatures by multiple parties authenticated by means of zero-knowledge credentials. Reflow integrates with blockchains and graph databases to ensure confidentiality and authenticity of signatures made by disposable identities that can be verified even when credential issuing authorities are offline. We implement and evaluate Reflow smart contracts for Zenroom and present an application to produce authenticated material passports for resource-event-agent accounting systems based on graph data structures. Reflow uses short and computationally efficient authentication credentials and can easily scale signatures to include thousands of participants.

1 Introduction
Multi-party computation applied to the signing process allows the issuance of signatures without requiring any of the participating parties to disclose secret signing keys to each other, nor requires the presence of a trusted third-party to receive them and compose the signatures. However, established schemes have shortcomings. Existing protocols do not provide the necessary efficiency, re-randomization or blind issuance properties necessary for the application to trust-less distributed systems. Those managing to implement such privacy preserving features are prone to rogue-key attacks [Boneh et al., 2020] since they cannot grant that signatures are produced by legitimate key holders.

The lack of efficient, scalable and privacy-preserving signature schemes impacts distributed ledger technologies that support ‘smart contracts’ as decentralized or federated architectures where trust is not shared among all participants, but granted by one or more authorities through credential issuance for the generation of non-interactive and unlinkable proofs.

Reflow applies to the signature process a mechanism of credential issuance by one or more authorities for the generation of non-interactive and unlinkable proofs, resulting in short and computationally efficient signatures composed of exactly two group elements that are linked to each other. The size of the signature remains constant regardless of the number of parties that are signing, while the credential is verified and discarded after signature aggregation. While being signed, duplicates may be avoided by collecting unlinkable fingerprints of signing parties, as they would invalidate the final result. Before being able to sign, a one-time setup phase is required where the signing party collects and aggregates a signed credential from one or more authorities.

Our evaluation of the Reflow functions shows very promising results: basic session creation takes about 20 ms, while signing 73 ms and verification 40 ms on average consumer hardware.

Overview
Reflow provides a production-ready implementation that is easy to embed in end-to-end encryption applications. By making it possible for multiple parties to anonymously authenticate and produce untraceable signatures, its goal is to leverage privacy-by-design scenarios that minimize the information exchange needed for document authentication.

The participation to a signature will be governed by one or more issuers holding keys for the one-time setup of signatures credentials. The steps outlined below are represented in figure 1:

1. Participant generates keys
2. Participant sends a credential request to Issuer
3. Issuer signs the credential request and sends it back
4. Participant can create anonymous credential proofs

Following this setup any participant will be able to produce a zero-knowledge proof of possession of the credential, which can be verified by anyone anonymously on the blockchain.

The base application of Reflow is the privacy preserving collective signature of digital documents for which the signed credential proof is a requirement to participate to any signature process.

A Reflow signature process is best described in 3 main steps: session creation, signature and verification.

1. **Anyone creates a session** A session may be created by anyone, no credentials are required, but only information that should be public: the public keys of participants holding a credential to sign, the public verifier (public signature key) of the issuer who has signed the credentials and at last a document to be signed. The steps below are represented in figure 2 and illustrate how a signature session is created:

   ① Participants will publish their public keys, available to anyone
   ② Anyone may indict a signature session by selecting a document, the public keys of signing participants and the issuer
   ③ The signature session is then published without disclosing the identity of any participant

A Reflow signature session can then be published for verification and its existance may be confidentially communicated to the participants elected to sign it. The possession of the session will allow to disclose the identity of the participants, but only that of the Issuer and the document (or the hash of it) signed.

2. **Participants sign the session** Only elected participants that were initially chosen to sign the session may sign it, this is forced through credential authentication. Whenever they know about the existance of a session requesting their signature, they may chose to sign it. The steps below are illustrated in figure 3.

   ① Participants may be informed about the signature session and may create an anonymous signature to be added to the session
   ② Anyone may check that the anonymous signature is authentic and not a duplicate, then adds it to the session
   ③ Anyone may be informed about the signature session and be able to verify if the document is signed by all and only all participants

A delicate aspect of BLS signatures is avoiding double-signing: if a participant signs twice then the whole signature will never be valid. Relying on a stateless credential authentication alone does not avoid this case in Reflow, therefore we use a list of anonymous "fingerprints" of the signature related to the document being signed. Each signature will produce a participant fingerprint saved in a list that is checked against duplication before adding a new signature. This procedure adds significant computational complexity but is necessary to avoid double-signing.
overhead for sessions with a large number of participants, but it can be switched off in a system that avoids double-signing in its own architecture.

Anyone verifies signatures Until the session will have collected all the signatures of participants, its verification will not be valid. It is also impossible to know if all participants have signed the session or how many are missing. Anyone can verify the state of the signature session in any moment just by having the document and the session, as illustrated in figure 3 along with the signature process.

Configurable features may be introduced in the Reflow signature flow that may or may not disclose more information, for instance who has indicted the signature session, what documents are linked to signatures and how many participants were called to sign: this depends from the implementation and the metadata it may add to signature sessions or the communication protocols adopted. In any case the basic signature and verification flow of Reflow requires that only one identity is really made public and is that of the issuer.

Applications

Moving further in envisioning the possibilities opened by Reflow is important to state the possibility to aggregate (sum) signatures into compact multi-signatures, a core feature of our BLS based signature scheme [Boneh et al., 2018a].

Need to Know. The base implementation exploiting this feature is that of a signature scheme for a single document split in separate sections to be signed by different participants: all the signatures can be later aggregated in a single one proving the whole document has been signed by all participants, without being disclosed to all of them in its entirety. This application helps to enforce the principles of need-to-know and least privilege to the access of information [Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975] and is useful for the realization of privacy-aware applications in various sectors, for instance for medical and risk mitigation analysis.

Disposable Identities A Disposable Identity is based on four properties common to other authentication and identification systems: verifiability, privacy, transparency, trustworthiness; then in addition introduces a fifth property: disposability. Disposability permits purpose-specific and context-driven authentication, to avoid linking the same identity across different authentication contexts [Goulden et al., 2021].

Reflow can be adopted by such an application to remove the need of context-free identifiers and implement authentication functions through a disposable identity whose traceability is bound to a context UID. Furthermore, being a signature scheme, Reflow can add the feature of context-free verifiable signatures (and multi-signatures) that are untraceable in public, but can be traced and even revoked in a known context by the means of context-specific signature fingerprints.

This scenario is relevant for the implementation of privacy-preserving public sector applications that allow authentication and signatures through disposable identity systems [Kranenburg and Gars, 2021].

Material Passport. Drawing on feature of multiple signature aggregation, Reflow can be used to implement a material passport for circular economy applications [Luscuere, 2017] to maintain the genealogy of a specific product, providing authenticated information about the whole set of actors, tools, collaborations, agreements, efforts and energy involved in its production, transportation and disposal [Dyne.org, 2020].

The provision of the information that forms the content of the material passport should be done by every actor in the supply chain and among the most important technical necessities for such an application are the confidentiality issues regarding access to information and the guarantees of the quality of information [Damen, 2012].

As an ideally simple and effective ontology we adopt a Resource-Event-Agent model [Laurier et al., 2018] and the ValueFlows vocabulary [Foster et al., 2017] to organize knowledge in a graph made of 3 main type of nodes:

1. Events that are the means of creation and transformation of Resources
2. Agents capable of creating Events and Processes
3. Processes where more than one Agent can consume and create Events

We then consider Resources as material passports made of the track and trace of all nodes - Events, Agents and Processes - they descend from. The material passport is an authenticated graph structure: in figure 4 the Resources on the right side have a UID which is the aggregation of all UIDs of elements leading to their existance.

The integrity of the material passport can be verified by recalculating the UID aggregation and see it matches the signed one attached to the Resource. In case one or more
We implement an efficient end-to-end encryption
We implement a Zencode scenario of Reflow to be exe-
cuted on and off-chain by the Zenroom VM, complete
with functions for public credential issuance, signature
session creation and multi-party non-interactive signing
(Section 4). We evaluate the performance and cost of
this implementation on on-site and on-line platforms
leveraging end-to-end encryption (Section 5).

We also require defining the notion of a cryptographic
pairing. Basically it is a function $e : G_1 \times G_2 \to G_T$, where
$G_1, G_2$ and $G_T$ are all groups of same order $n$, such
that satisfies the following properties:

i. **Bilinearity**, i.e. given $P_1, Q_1 \in G_1$ and $P_2, Q_2 \in G_2$, we have

$$e(P_1 + Q_1, P_2 + Q_2) = e(P_1, P_2) \cdot e(Q_1, Q_2)$$

ii. **Non-degeneracy**, meaning that for all $g_1, g_2 \in G_2,
\ e(g_1, g_2) \neq 1_{G_T}$, the identity element of the group $G_T$;

iii. **Efficiency**, so that the map $e$ is easy to compute;

iv. $G_1 \neq G_2$, and moreover, that there exist no efficient
homomorphism between $G_1$ and $G_2$.

For the purpose of our protocol we will have $G_1 = E_T$ and
$G_2 = E$, and $G_T \subset \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ is the subgroup containing
the $n$-th roots of unity, where $n$ is the order of the groups $E$ and $E_T$. Instead $e : E_T \times E \to G_T$ is the
**Miller pairing**, which in our work is encoded as the method

\begin{verbatim}
miller(\text{ECP2 P, ECP Q})
\end{verbatim}

To conclude, the credential scheme in section 3 uses non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs (for short NIZK proofs)
to assert knowledge and relations over discrete logarithm
values. They will be represented using the notation intro-
duced by Camenisch and Stadler [1997] as

\begin{verbatim}
NIZK\{(x, y, \ldots) : textstatementsaboutx, y, \ldots\}
\end{verbatim}

2 Signature

A **BLS signature** is a signature scheme whose design ex-
plains a cryptographic pairing. As for other well known
algorithm such as ECDSA, it will work following these
three main steps:

**Key Generation phase.** For a user who wants to sign
a message $m$, a secret key $sk$ is randomly chosen
uniformly in $\mathbb{F}_n$, where $n$ is the order of the groups
$G_1, G_2, G_T$. The corresponding public key $pk$ is the
element $sk \cdot G_2 \in E_T$;

**Signing phase.** The message $m$ is first hashed into
the point $U \in E$, which in our scheme is done by
the method hashtopoint; the related signature is then
given by $\sigma = sk \cdot U$;
• **Verification phase.** For an other user that wants to verify the authenticity and the integrity of the message $m$, it needs to

1. parse $m$, $pk$ and $\sigma$
2. hash the message $m$ into the point $U$ and then check if the following identity holds,

$$e(pk, U) = e(G_2, \sigma)$$

If verification passes it means that $\sigma$ is a valid signature for $m$ and the protocol ends without errors.

**Proof of the verification algorithm:** By using the definitions of the elements involved and exploiting the property of the pairing $e$ we have

$$e(pk, U) = e(sk \cdot G_2, U)$$
$$= e(G_2, U)^{sk}$$
$$= e(G_2, sk \cdot U)$$
$$= e(G_2, \sigma)$$

BLS signatures present some interesting features. For instance, the length of the output $\sigma$ competes to those obtained by ECDSA and similar algorithms; in our specific case, by using BLS-383 [Scott, 2017], it will be 32 Bytes long, which is typically a standard nowadays. Then, since this curve is also pairing-friendly, meaning that (with the assumption made on $e$) signature and verification are obtained in very short time. Moreover, BLS supports also aggregation, that is the ability to aggregate a collection of multiple signatures $\sigma_i$ (each one related to a different message $m_i$) into a singular new object $\sigma$, that can be validated using the respective public keys $pk_i$ in a suitable way. This is possible thanks to the fact that $\sigma_i \in G_1 \forall i$, giving to the algorithm an homomorphic property. We will show now how this last feature can be attained in the context of a multi-party computation using the same message $m$ but different participants.

**Session Generation**

After the key generation step we introduce a new phase called **session generation**, where the signature is initialized: anyone willing to start a signing session on a message $m$ will create:

1. a random $r$ and its corresponding point $R = r \cdot G_2$
2. the sum of $R$ and all $pk$ supposed to participate to the signature such as $P = R + \sum_i pk_i$
3. the unique identifier $UID$ of the session calculated as hash to point of the message $m$, such as $U = H(m) \in E$, where $H$ is a combination of a cryptographic hash function (treated as a random oracle) together with an encoding into elliptic curve points procedure
4. the first layer of the signature $\sigma \leftarrow r \cdot U$, later to be summed with all other signatures in a multi-party computation setup resulting in the final signature as $\sigma \leftarrow r \cdot U + \sum_i sk_i \cdot U$
5. the array of unique fingerprints $\zeta_i$ of each signature resulting from the credential authentication (see section 3)

After this phase is terminated, every participants involved in the session start their own signing phase during the session, producing (from the same message $m$) their respective $\sigma_i$’s. The final signature $\sigma$ is then computed in this way: first of all let us call $\sigma_0 = r \cdot U$, then supposing $k$ participants have already aggregated their $\sigma_i$, obtaining a partial signature $S_k$, the $(k + 1)$-th one will compute

$$S_{k+1} = S_k + \sigma_k = \sum_{i=0}^{k+1} \sigma_i$$

Finally, the resulting output will be $\sigma = S_N$, where $N$ is the total number of the signers of the session. In order to verify that $\sigma$ is valid we compute $P = R + \sum_{i=0}^{N} pk_i$, where $R = r \cdot G_2$, working as a public key with respect to the nonce $r$, which instead is kept secret. Verification is then performed by checking if the following identity holds

$$e(P, U) = e(G_2, \sigma)$$

If verification passes without errors it means that $\sigma$ is a valid aggregated signature of $m$.

**Proof.** By recalling that $\sigma = r \cdot U + \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_i$, $P = R + \sum_{i=1}^{N} pk_i$, by using the property of the pairing $e$ we have

$$e(P, U) = e(R + \sum_{i=1}^{N} pk_i, U)$$
$$= e((r + \sum_{i=1}^{N} sk_i) \cdot G_2, U)$$
$$= e(G_2, U)^r \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{N} sk_i$$
$$= e(G_2, (r + \sum_{i=1}^{N} sk_i) \cdot U)$$
$$= e(G_2, r \cdot U + \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_i)$$
$$= e(G_2, \sigma)$$

We conclude this section with a final consideration on this feature. We recall that in the generation of the aggregated signature $\sigma$ we used as a starting point the variable $\sigma_0 = r \cdot U$, but in literature it is also common to find instead simply the base point $G_2$. The choice of randomizing it (providing that the random number generator acts as an oracle) helps in preventing replay attacks, since the
signature generated by the process is linked to the session in which is produced, for if an attacker managed to get some information from \( \sigma \), it would be difficult to use it in order to forge new signatures.

3 Credential

Following the guidelines of Coconut, the credentials issuing scheme works as follows:

1. the issuer generates its own keypair \((s_k, v_k)\), where \( s_k = (x, y) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^2 \) is the pair of secret scalars (the signing key) and \( v_k = (\alpha, \beta) = (x \cdot G_2, y \cdot G_2) \) is the verifying key, made by the related pair of public points over \( E_T \);

2. the user \( i \), with its respective keys \((s_k_i, PK_i)\) make a credential request on its secret attribute \( ck_i \) to the issuer, represented by \( \lambda \) which contains a zero-knowledge proof \( \pi_\lambda \) of the authenticity of user \( i \);

3. the issuer, after having received \( \lambda \), verifies the proof \( \pi_\lambda \) at its inside, and if it passes, then releases to user \( i \) a credential \( \sigma_i \) signed using its own key \( s_k \).

Step 1. is self-explanatory. Steps 2. and 3. require a bit more effort, in fact in order to build a valid request \( \lambda \), and so also to a valid proof \( \pi_\lambda \), first of all the user must produce an hash digest for the attribute \( ck_i \), that we call \( h \), then computes two more variables \( c \) and \( s_h \) defined as:

\[
\begin{align*}
c &= r \cdot G_1 + h \cdot HS \\
sh &= (a, b) = (k \cdot G_1, k \cdot \gamma + h \cdot c)
\end{align*}
\]

where \( r \) and \( k \) are fresh randomly generated integers, \( HS \) is an hard-encoded point on the curve \( E \), and \( \gamma = ck_i \cdot G_1 \). These two variables are alleged in the credential request \( \lambda \) produced in \text{prepare\_blind\_sign} and are needed to the verifier to assure the authenticity of the user through the proof \( \pi_\lambda \), which requires as input \( h, k, r, c \). The Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof (for short NIZK proof) \( \pi_\lambda \) generated by the function \text{blind\_sign} is computed as follows:

- **Randomization phase.** Three new nonces \( w_h, w_k, w_r \in \mathbb{Z} \) are generated, each one related to the input variables \( h, k, r \) respectively as we will show soon;

- **Challenge phase.** The protocol creates three commitment values, namely \( A_w, B_w, C_w \) defined as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
A_w &= w_k \cdot G_1 \\
B_w &= w_k \cdot (\gamma + w_h \cdot c) \\
C_w &= w_r \cdot G_1 + w_h \cdot HS
\end{align*}
\]

Then these variables are used as input of a function \( \varphi \) producing an integer \( c_h = \varphi\{c, A_w, B_w, C_w\} \);

- **Response phase.** In order that the proof can be verified the protocol generates three more variables which are alleged inside the proof itself and link the nonces \( w_h, w_k, w_r \) with \( h, k, r \), i.e.:

\[
\begin{align*}
r_h &= w_h - c_h h \\
r_k &= w_k - c_h k \\
r_r &= w_r - c_h r
\end{align*}
\]

So basically the proof \( \pi_\lambda \) contains the three response variables \( r_h, r_k, r_r \) and also the commitment value \( c_h \), that can be used to prove a predicate \( \phi \) which is true when computed on \( h \). Once the verifier receives the request \( \lambda \), in order to check if the proof is valid it should be able to reconstruct \( A_w, B_w, C_w \) by doing these computations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{A}_w &= c_h \cdot a + r_k \cdot G_1 \\
\hat{B}_w &= c_h \cdot b + r_k \cdot \gamma + r_h \cdot c \\
\hat{C}_w &= c_h \cdot c + r_r \cdot G_1 + r_h \cdot HS
\end{align*}
\]

If the request is correct, then we will have that

\[
\varphi\{\hat{A}_w, \hat{B}_w, \hat{C}_w\} = \varphi\{A_w, B_w, C_w\} = c_h \quad (1)
\]

and verification is thus complete, meaning that the verifier has right to believe that the prover actually owns the secret attribute \( ck_i \) associated to the public variable \( \gamma \) and that consequently has produced a valid commitment \( c \) and (ElGamal) encryption \( s \); in other words,

\[
\pi_\lambda = \text{NIZK}\{\langle ck_i, h, r, k \rangle : \\
\gamma = ck_i \cdot G_1, \\
c = r \cdot G_1 + h \cdot HS, \\
s_h = (k \cdot G_1, k \cdot \gamma + h \cdot c), \\
\phi(h) = 1\}
\]

At this point the user will now have a blind credential \( \hat{\sigma} = (\hat{a}, \hat{b}) \) issued by the authority, where

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{a} &= y \cdot a \\
\hat{b} &= x \cdot c + y \cdot b
\end{align*}
\]

The user then will have to un-blind it using its secret credential key, obtaining \( \sigma_{ck} = (c, s) = (c, \hat{b} - ck_i(\hat{a})) \), which will use to prove its identity when signing a message. The procedure is similar to the one seen before with some extra details:

- **Setup.** As for the the BLS signature, an elliptic point \( U \), associated to the hash of the message to sign, is required as an Unique Identifier (UID) for the signing session;

- **Credential proving.** The user produces two graphographical objects \( \theta \) (containing a new proof \( \pi_\theta \)) and \( \zeta \) (which is unequivocally associated to \( U \)) through \text{prove\_cred\_uid}, taking as input its own credential \( \sigma \), the related secret attribute \( c_k \), the authority public key \( v_k = (\alpha, \beta) \) and the session point \( U \).

The new objects \( \theta \) and \( \zeta \) are derived as follows:
• as before the user hashes \( ck \) into \( h \), and this time generates two random values \( r \) and \( r' \);

• next, it randomizes its credential \( \sigma_{ck} \) into \( \sigma'_{ck} = (c', s') = (r' \cdot c, r' \cdot s) \) and then computes two elliptic curve points \( \kappa \) and \( \nu \) as
  \[
  \kappa = \alpha + h \cdot \beta + r \cdot G_2 \\
  \nu = r \cdot c'
  \]

• finally, \( \theta \) will be the \( t \)-tuple \( (\kappa, \nu, \pi_v, \phi') \), where \( \pi_v \) is a valid zero knowledge proof of the following form

\[
\pi_v = \text{NIZK}\{(h, r) : \kappa = \alpha + h \cdot \beta + r \cdot G_2, \nu = r \cdot c', \phi'(h) = 1\}
\]

with \( \phi' \) being a predicate which is true on \( h \);

• \( \zeta \) will be instead the elliptic curve point obtained as \( h \cdot U \in E \).

Building the proof \( \pi_v \), requires similar steps as seen for \( \pi_s \), in fact we create three commitment values \( A_w, B_w, C_w \) defined as

\[
A_w = \alpha + w_h \cdot \beta + w_r \cdot G_2 \\
B_w = w_r \cdot c' \\
C_w = w_h \cdot U
\]

where \( w_h, w_r \) are fresh generated nonces; then we set the challenge as the computation of \( c_h = \varphi(\{\alpha, \beta, A_w, B_w, C_w\}) \) with the related responses

\[
r_h = w_h - hc \\
r_r = w_r - rc
\]

The values of \( r_h \) and \( r_r \) are stored inside \( \pi_v \), which will be then sent through \( \theta \) (together with \( \zeta \)) from the prover to the verifier. In order to check that the user has legitimately generated the proof and at the same time is the owner of the credential the following steps must be made:

1. extracting \( \kappa, \nu, \pi_v \) (which is \( (r_h, r_r, c_h) \)) from \( \theta \);
2. reconstructing the commitments \( A_w, B_w, C_w \) as

\[
\hat{A}_w = c_h \cdot \kappa + r_r \cdot G_2 + (1 - c_h) \cdot \alpha + r_h \cdot \beta \\
\hat{B}_w = r_r \cdot c' + c_h \cdot \nu \\
\hat{C}_w = r_h \cdot U + c_h \cdot \zeta
\]

3. checking either that

\[
\varphi(\{\alpha, \beta, \hat{A}_w, \hat{B}_w, \hat{C}_w\}) = \varphi(\{\alpha, \beta, A_w, B_w, C_w\}) = c_h,
\]

that \( c' \neq O \), the point at infinity, and that

\[
e(\kappa, c') = e(G_2, s' + \nu)
\]

Actually the predicate \( \phi \) in the definition of \( \pi_v \) can be thought as performing steps 2. and 3. and, if any of these fails the protocol will abort returning a failure, otherwise verification passes and the user can finally produce the signature.

**Proof of the verification algorithms.**

We now show for the proof \( \pi_s \) that actually by using the responses \( r_h, r_k \) and \( r_r \), together with \( c_h \) and the other parameters inside \( \lambda \), i.e. \( s = (a, b, c) \) and \( \gamma \), using also the hard coded point \( HS \), it is possible to reconstruct the commitments \( A_w, B_w, C_w \):

\[
\hat{A}_w = c_h \cdot a + r_k \cdot G_1 = c_hk \cdot G_1 + r_k \cdot G_1 \\
\hat{B}_w = c_h \cdot b + r_k \cdot \gamma + r_h \cdot c \\
\hat{C}_w = c_h \cdot (r \cdot G_1 + h \cdot HS) + r_r \cdot G_1 + r_h \cdot HS
\]

Regarding the second proof \( \pi_v \), we have to prove both the identities (2) and (3) hold. We will focus only on the latter since the former requires a similar approach on what we have done for \( \pi_s \), but with different parameters involved (\( \kappa, \nu, \) etc.). The left-hand side of the relation can be expressed as

\[
e(\kappa, c') = e(\alpha + h \cdot \beta + r \cdot G_2, c') \\
= e(x \cdot G_2 + hy \cdot G_2 + r \cdot G_2, \hat{r} \cdot G_1) \\
= e((x + h y + r) \cdot G_2, \hat{r} \cdot G_1)
\]

using the substitution \( c' = \hat{r} \cdot G_1 \), with \( \hat{r} \in \mathbb{F}_p \) since we know that \( c' \in E \). For the right-hand side we have instead

\[
e(G_2, s' + \nu) = e(G_2, r' \cdot s + r \cdot c') \\
= e(G_2, r'(x \cdot c + y \cdot b - ck_iy \cdot a + r \cdot c))
\]

The second argument of the pairing can be rewritten as

\[
r'(x \cdot c + y \cdot b - ck_iy \cdot a + r \cdot c) = \\
r'(x \cdot c + y(h \cdot c + yk(ck_i \cdot G_1 - yk(ck_i \cdot G_1 + r \cdot c)) = \\
r'(x + yh + r) \cdot c
\]
So, at the end
\[ e(G_2, s' + \nu) = e(G_2, r' (x \cdot c + y \cdot b - dy \cdot a + r \cdot c)) \]
\[ = e(G_2, r' (x + yh + r) \cdot c) \]
\[ = e(G_2, (x + hy + r) \cdot G_1) \]
\[ = e(G_2, G_1) (x + hy + r) \]
and (3) is finally proved.

Security considerations.

As mentioned in Coconut [Sonnino et al., 2018], BLS signatures and the proof system obtained with credentials are considered secure by assuming the existence of random oracles [Koblitz and Menezes, 2015], together with the decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDH) [Boneh, 1998], the external Diffie-Hellman Problem (XDH), and with the Lysyanskaya-Rivest-Sahai-Wol Problem (LRSW) [Lysyanskaya et al., 1999], which are connected to the Discrete Logarithm. In fact, under these assumptions, we have that our protocol satisfies unforgeability, blindness, and unlinkability.

Reserves can be made about the maturity of pairing-based elliptic curve cryptography despite various efforts to measure its security and design curve parameters that raise it, it is reasonable to consider this as a pioneering field of cryptography in contrast to well tested standards.

In addition to considerations on the maturity of EC, the future growth of quantum-computing technologies may be able to overcome the Discrete Logarithmic assumptions by qualitatively different computational means. Reflow then may be vulnerable to quantum-computing attacks, as well hard to patch, because the pairing-based design sits at its core with the adoption of ATE / Miller loop pairing of curves in twisted space, a practice that is not covered by research on quantum-proof algorithms and will eventually need more time to be addressed; however this is all speculative reasoning on what we can expect from the future.

The Reflow implementation we are presenting in this paper and that we have published as a Zenroom scenario ready to use is based on the BLS383 curve [Scott, 2017] that in the current implementation provided by the AMCL library has shown to pass all lab-tests regarding pairing properties, a positive result that is not shared with the slightly different BLS381-12 curve adopted by ETH2.0. Debating the choice of BLS381 is well beyond the scope of this paper, but is worth mentioning that our lab-tests have proved also the BLS461 curve to work in Reflow: it is based on a 461 bit prime and hence upgrades our implementation to 128 bit security [Barbulescu and Duquesne, 2019] against attacks looking for discrete logs on elliptic curves [Lim and Lee, 1997].

At last the complexity and flexibility of Reflow in its different applications, its optional use of fingerprint lists, multiple UIDs saved from aggregation and other features covering the different applications also represent a security risk in the technical integration phase. We believe that the adoption of Zenroom and the creation of a Zencode scenario addresses well this vulnerability by providing an easy to use integrated development environment (apiroom.net) and a test-bed for the design of different scenarios of application for Reflow that can be deployed correctly granting end-to-end encryption and data minimization according to privacy by design guidelines [Hoepman et al., 2019].

4 Implementation

In this section we illustrate our implementation of Reflow keygen, sign and verify operations outlining for each:

- the communication sequence diagram when necessary
- the Zencode statements to operate the transformation

Zencode is actual code executed inside the Zenroom VM, behind its implementation the algorithms follow very closely the mathematical formulation explained in this article and can be reviewed in the free and open source code published at Zenroom.org. The Reflow Zencode scenario implementation is contained inside the Zenroom source code.

To execute an example flow on one’s own computer it is enough to visit the website ApiRoom.net and select the Reflow scenario examples, pressing play it will execute zencode and show input and outputs in JSON format.

Credential Setup

The Credential Setup sequence which has to be executed only once to enable participants to produce signatures. This sequence is briefly illustrated with a diagram and it consists in the creation of keypair for both the Issuer, who will sign the participant credentials, and the participant who will request an issuer credential.

\begin{verbatim}
Listing 1: Issuer Keygen

Given I am 'The Issuer'
When I create the issuer key
Then print my 'keys'

\end{verbatim}

Executed by the Zencode utterance:

\begin{verbatim}
When I create the issuer key

Scenario credential : publish verifier
Given that I am known as 'The Issuer' and I have my 'keys'

\end{verbatim}
When I create the issuer public key
Then print my 'issuer public key'

**Credential signature:** Generate a credential request and have it signed by an Issuer, as well generate all the keys used to sign documents. This procedure will generate private keys that should not be communicated, as well BLS keys whose public section should be communicated and can be later aggregated to create a seal (signature session) and verify one.

Figure 5 illustrates how this process unfolds in a sequence of communication. An interactive exchange takes place between the Signer and the Issuer that verifies the possession of the secret Reflow key and signs a credential to witness this condition.

The public key of the Issuer which is used to sign the credential should have been public and known by the Signer at the beginning of the Keygen process.

This code is executed in multiple steps by the Zencode utterances:

1. **When I create the reflow key and I create the credential key**
   will create inside the keys data structure two new secret keys: the credential and the bls keys both consisting of BIG integers. Secret keys are randomly chosen uniformly in $\mathbb{F}_n$, where $n$ is the order of the group $G_1$.

2. **When I create the credential request**
   will use the secret keys to create a new credential request consisting of a $\lambda$ containing a zero-knowledge proof $\pi_s$ of the authenticity of Signer $i$ owning keys $(sk_i, PK_i)$ and requesting the Issuer to sign its secret attribute $ck_i \in \mathbb{Z}$. The Issuer may request additional communications held on a side channel in order to establish proof-of-possession and the authenticity of the Signer, for instance a challenge session in which a random message is demonstrably signed by the secret credential key using an El-Gamal signature [ElGamal, 1985] and verified by the public key.

3. **Given I have a 'credential request'**
   When I create the credential signature and I create the issuer public key
   will be executed by the Issuer to sign the credential after the proof-of-possession challenge is positive. It consists of a $\sigma$ signed used the Issuer’s own secret key $sk$ after verifying the proof $\pi_s$ inside the received $\lambda$.

4. **Given I have a 'credential signature'**
   When I create the credentials
   will be executed by the Signer to aggregate one or more credential signature into the secret keys structure. The credentials consist of a $\sigma_{ck}$ that should be stored locally and secretly as it will be later required to create the zero-knowledge proof components $\theta$ and $\zeta$ that authenticate the Reflow signature against rogue-key attacks.
4.1 Signature

The Reflow signature consists into a multi-signature that can be indicted by anyone who selects multiple participants. It requires no interaction between participants and it results into what we call a Seal collecting all the signatures.

Both the credential to sign and the signatures in the reflow seal are non traceable. The credentials are zero-knowledge proof of possessions bound to the seal identifier; the public keys of participants are blinded and known only by the one who indicts the signature, who may or may not be among participants.

The signatures are non-interactive and made in a multi-party computation setup: any participant with a credential to sign can do so without interacting with others, just by adding the reflow signature to the reflow seal.

Every signature in a seal produces a fingerprint unique to the seal and the signer consisting in a $\zeta$ that is also non traceable. Using fingerprints a check may be enforced to avoid double signing and invalidate the reflow seal.

When a seal is created a session is opened for multiple participants to add their signature, anyone opening such a process needs to have an array of public keys of all desired participants.

Listing 3: Create reflow seal

```
Scenario reflow: create a new signing session (seal)
Given I have a "reflow public key array" named 'public keys'
and I have a "string dictionary" named 'Event'
When I aggregate the reflow public key from array 'public keys'
and I create the reflow identity of 'Event'
and I create the reflow seal with identity 'reflow identity'
Then print the 'reflow seal'
```

When a seal is signed there are two different steps to be performed: one by the participant publishing the signature and one by anyone aggregating the signature to the seal. This is necessary since we are in a multi-party computation session where each step forward in the process can be performed independently and without requiring anyone to disclose any secret.

Listing 4: Create a reflow signature

```
Scenario reflow: participant signs a seal by producing a signature
Given I am 'Alice'
and I have the 'credentials'
and I have the 'keys'
and I have a 'reflow seal'
and I have a 'issuer public key' from 'The Issuer'
When I create the reflow signature
Then print the 'reflow signature'
```

Listing 5: Add a signature to a seal

```
Scenario reflow
Given I have a 'reflow seal'
and I have a 'issuer public key' in 'The Authority'
and I have a 'reflow signature'
When I aggregate all the issuer public keys
and I verify the reflow signature credential
and I check the reflow signature fingerprint is new
and I add the reflow fingerprint to the reflow seal
and I add the reflow signature to the reflow seal
Then print the 'reflow seal'
```

The session may be considered terminated at any moment by anyone: the seal can be validated in any moment as-is and it will simply return false validation if signatures are wrong or incomplete.
Scenario reflow: compare two different objects using reflow IDs
Given I have a 'reflow seal'
Given I have a 'string dictionary' named Event
When I create the reflow identity of 'Event'
When I rename the 'reflow identity' to 'EventIdentity'
When I verify 'EventIdentity' is equal to 'identity' in 'reflow seal'
Then print the string 'The seal really belongs to this Event'

Scenario reflow: verify a seal contains all valid signatures
Given I have a 'reflow seal'
When I verify the reflow seal is valid
Then print the string 'SUCCESS'
and print the 'reflow seal'

At this point the seal may be marked as closed as the session is completed succesfully and all correct signatures have been collected without duplicates. In case this optional status will be attributed to the seal then is also possible to remove the fingerprints array from it by reducing its size.

4.2 Material Passport

The Reflow material passport consists in a REA model track-and-trace [Laurier and Poels, 2012] listing. It aggregates Reflow seals by means of collecting their signed UID (unique identifier). The list of fingerprints in a material passport is not to be confused with that of a seal: it is the list of all UID being traced in one seal, which adds its own UID resulting from the hash to point of the new message.

The complexity of this implementation requires the adoption of a small ontology, the Valueflows vocabulary [Foster et al., 2017], that briefly distinguishes between roles of the nodes represented and organizes their interaction.

A seal may still be signed by one or more participants which are the Agents in the ValueFlows REA model. Agents may be signing a new Event or Process alone or toghether with more agents. All signatures will still be blinded and non-traceable to satisfy Reflow's privacy requirements, while the UID composing the material passport may be listed in a fingerprint section to authenticate the track-and-trace graph and perform deeper verification of all nodes.

Scenario reflow
Given I am 'Alice'
and I have the 'keys'
and I have the 'credentials'
and I have a 'issuer public key' in 'The Authority'
and I have a 'reflow identity'
and I have a 'string dictionary' named 'EconomicEvent'
When I create the material passport of 'EconomicEvent'
Then print the 'EconomicEvent'
and print the 'material passport'

What follows is the representation of the output, which shows how a material passport is formatted, keeping the same variable names used in the mathematical formulas and indicating the type of members ("ecp" stands for elliptic curve point and a 2 is added to indicate those on a twisted curve) and their size in bytes.

```
material_passport = {
    proof = {
        kappa = ecp2[192] ,
        nu = ecp[49] ,
```
pi_v = {
    c = int[32],
    rm = int[32],
    rr = int[32]
},
sigma_prime = {
    h_prime = ecp[49],
    s_prime = ecp[49]
},
seal = {
    SM = ecp[49],
    fingerprints = [1] <table 1>,
    identity = ecp[49],
    verifier = ecp2[192]
},
zeta = ecp[49]

As hinted by the optional presence of a list of fingerprints, as well optional record of the agent’s credential, Proof inside the material passport, this implementation is extremely flexible and opens up a range of possible solutions in the field of privacy-enhanced graph authentication, allowing import and export operations between federated graph data bases, also considering each data silo may be an Issuer publicly identified and granting agent credentials.

The verification of a material passport implicitly verifies that the the hash to point of the objects’s contents result in the same reflow identity, then executes a cryptographic verification that the given material passport is the valid signature of that identity:

Listing 10: Verify a material passport

Scenario reflow
Given I have a 'string dictionary' named 'EconomicEvent'
and I have a 'issuer public key' in 'The Authority'
and I have a 'material passport'
When I verify the material passport of 'EconomicEvent'
Then print the string 'Valid Event material passport'

To avoid confusion is important to keep in mind that identities are UIDs and fingerprints are zetas.

The simple signature and verification of a single object is not enough to implement a material passport, we need to authenticate the track and trace of it eventually validating all the complex history of transformations that lead to the current object. In order to do so our implementation exploits the aggregation property of elliptic curve points by making a sum of all object identities present in the track and trace. Following the ValueFlows logic then, every Event or Process identity will result from the sum of all identities of previous Agents, Events and Processes. By recalculating this sum and checking its signature then one can authenticate the integrity of the track and trace.

For example, assuming we have an array of seal objects found in material passports of a track and trace result of one level depth:

Listing 11: Example material passport data

Seals = [2] { {
    SM = ecp[49],
    fingerprints = [1] { ecp[49] },
    identity = ecp[49],
    verifier = ecp2[192]
}, {
    SM = ecp[49],
    fingerprints = [1] { ecp[49] },
    identity = ecp[49],
    verifier = ecp2[192]}

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Then we can calculate a new identity using aggregation (sum value) with Zencode statements:

Listing 12: Aggregate reflow seal identity

*Given* I have a 'reflow seal array' named 'Seals'
*When* I create the sum value 'identity' for dictionaries in 'Seals'
*Then* print the 'sum value'

Which will output an elliptic curve point corresponding to the sum of all identity elements found in the "Seals" array. The fact that the verification happens to a sum that cascades down aggregating further depth level of parent objects allows to modularize the track-and-trace implementation making its depth configurable.
5 Evaluation

The goal of this section is to produce benchmarks of the implementation of the cryptographic flow, in realistic conditions of use, so in a way that is similar to how a software solution would use the software.

Our approach was opposite to testing algorithms in a sandbox or a profiler, instead we tested Zenroom scripts, written in Zencode, that include also loading and parsing input data from streams or file system, as well as producing output as a deterministically formed JSON object.

Platforms

The three target platforms used for the benchmarks were:

- **X86-64** on Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5300U CPU @ 2.30GHz, running Ubuntu 18.04 (64 bit)
- **ARM 32bit** on Raspberry Pi 4 board, running Raspberry Pi OS (32bit, kernel version: 5.10)
- **ARM 32bit** on Raspberry Pi 0 board, running Raspberry Pi OS (32bit, kernel version: 5.10)

The X86-64 machine runs on a Lenovo X250 laptop, with 8GB of RAM. The Raspberry 0 and 4 have been chosen as benchmarking platforms because of their similarities to, respectively, very low-cost IoT devices (5 USD) and very low cost mobile phones (sub 100 USD).

Builds

Being a self-contained application written in C, Zenroom can be built for several CPU architectures and operative systems, both as command line interface (CLI) application and as a library. The configurations we chose for this benchmark are:

- Two binary Zenroom CLI, compiled using the GCC toolchain in native 32bit ELF binaries, once for the X86-64 platform and once for the ARMv7-32bit. We refer to these builds as Zenroom CLI.
- One mixed library, trans-compiled to WASM using the Emscripten tool-chain [Zakai, 2011], then built into an NPM package along with a JavaScript wrapper. After trans-compilation, the WASM library is converted to base64 and embedded inside the JavaScript wrapper, which unpacks it at run-time. The library runs in browsers (using the native WASM support, currently present in Chromium/Chrome, Firefox and Safari), as well in node JS based application. We refer to this build as Zenroom WASM.

CLI and WASM use cases

The use case for Zenroom CLI is typically a server-side application or micro-service. The WASM library can run in the browser, in the front end of a web application or in a server-side application (running on node JS) or a mobile application.

Zenroom can also be built as a native library for Android and iOS (on ARM 32bit, ARM 32bit or X86), but no benchmarks of the Reflow cryptographic flow have been performed using Zenroom as a native library. In previous benchmarks, we noted similar performances for the native CLI and the native library versions of Zenroom, we therefore assume that performances would be comparable between the CLI builds we are using and the native library builds.

Testing

Benchmarking of Zenroom CLI and Zenroom WASM required using two different tools. Both tools performed chained execution of Zencode scripts that would simulate the whole cryptographic flow. Furthermore, the tool allowed to configure the amount of participants in the flow and the repeat the run of selected scripts in order to gather more data.

- The testing of Zenroom CLI was executed using a single, self-contained bash script. The script outputs the duration of the execution of each Zenroom scripts, along with the memory usage and size of output data, in a CSV formatted summary. The script also saves to files both the data and scripts for quality control reference.
- The testing of Zenroom WASM required building a JavaScript application, running in node JS. The application outputs the duration of the execution of each Zenroom scripts, along with the memory usage, it calculate averages and returns output in a JSON formatted summary.

Benchmarks for the cryptographic flow were run on both the CLI and the WASM builds of Zenroom, for each platform, for a total of six different data collections.

Scripts description

Our benchmarks provide measurements for the all the steps in the signature flow: for each of them we reported the time of execution (expressed in seconds) and the size of output (expressed in bytes) in different conditions with a progressive number of participants (5, 10, 50, 100, 1000 signatures).

The Zencode scripts used in the flow and for benchmarking can be divided in three categories:

- Scripts with **variable execution times** executed by anyone, marked with (A): they include the creation of the Reflow seal (Session start), the aggregation of the signatures (Collect sign) and the verification of the signatures on Reflow seal. Their duration is proportional to the amount of participants and can differ greatly. These scripts are the most calculation intensive and expected
to typically run server-side. The (A) stands for "Anyone" as they don’t need an identity or a keypair to run. These scripts are typically expected to run server-side.

- Scripts executed by each participant, marked with (P): they include participant’s setup and signing, their duration is not correlated with the amount of participants. These scripts are expected to typically run in the browser or on mobile devices.

- Scripts executed by the issuer, marked with (I): they include issuer’s setup and signing, their duration is not correlated with the amount of participants. These scripts are expected to typically run server-side.

Each script was executed 50 times, on each platform and each configuration, and the average execution time was extracted.

Findings

- The execution time of the scripts in the (A) group, grows linearly with the amount of participants.

- On a X86-64 machine, the benchmarks execute on Zenroom CLI have a comparable duration with their counterparts run on WASM. On the other hand, the execution times differ greatly on the ARM 32bit based Raspberry Pi 0 and 4 machine, when comparing Zenroom CLI and Zenroom WASM executions. While investigating the cause of the differences is beyond the purpose of this paper, we speculate this difference signals different levels of optimization, between the of WASM interpreters built for X86-64 on one hand, and ARM 32bit on the other.

- The most numerically outstanding benchmark is the execution time of the issuer’s keygen script on Raspberry Pi 0, in comparison with the other platforms. Once more, investigating the reason for this discrepancy is beyond the scope of this paper: we do anyway speculate that the ECP2 pairing performed in the script, may justify the large difference.

Benchmark conclusions

The ultimate goal of this benchmarks is to assess what parts of cryptographic flow are suitable for execution on each platform, both in terms of execution times as well as RAM usage. Concerning the RAM usage, the highest value recorded is in the 5 megabytes range, which we consider to be well within the acceptable range for any of the platforms used in the benchmarks. Future analysis will investigate the possibility to execute the less resource intense parts of the flow, on ultra low power chips such as the Cortex M4, for which a port of Zenroom is available.

Concerning the execution time, if we choose that the longest execution time acceptable for any script of the flow, is up to 1 second, we find that:

- Every script of the groups (P) and (I) have acceptable performances on any platform when using Zenroom compiled as CLI.

- With a few exceptions, we find a similar result when running scripts of the (P) and (I) groups, for Zenroom compiled in WASM. With this setup, only three scripts run over the 1 second limit, only on Raspberry Pi 0.

- The scripts in the group (A), when using Zenroom CLI, can be executed within one second for an amount of participants between 100 and 500 on the X86 machine and for a similar amount on a Raspberry Pi 4, while on a Raspberry Pi 0 the limit is between 10 and 50 participants.

- The scripts in the group (A), when using Zenroom WASM, can be executed within one second, for an amount of participants between 100 and 500 on the X86 machine and up to 100 on a Raspberry Pi 4, while on a Raspberry Pi 0 the limit is between 2 and 5 participants.
6 Benchmarks

Following are the benchmarks of the benchmarks for the (A) group of scripts (whose execution times change based on the amount of participants), running in CLI binaries, grouped by platform.

Zenroom CLI X86-64

| S/p       | 2    | 10   | 50   | 100  | 1000 | 5000 |
|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| (A) Session start | 0.0188 | 0.0253 | 0.0410 | 0.0623 | 0.1056 | 0.5039 |
| (A) Collect sign   | 0.0729 | 0.0730 | 0.1031 | 0.1373 | 0.7435 | 3.6061 |
| (A) Verify sign    | 0.0405 | 0.0515 | 0.0996 | 0.1619 | 1.3974 | 7.0460 |

Zenroom CLI Raspberry Pi 4

| S/p       | 2    | 10   | 50   | 100  | 1000 | 5000 |
|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| (A) Session start | 0.0516 | 0.0602 | 0.0674 | 0.0750 | 0.2762 |
| (A) Collect sign   | 0.2087 | 0.2273 | 0.3031 | 0.3942 | 2.1849 |
| (A) Verify sign    | 0.1049 | 0.1393 | 0.2978 | 0.4831 | 4.0688 |
Zenroom CLI Raspberry Pi 0

| s/p          | 2   | 10  | 50  | 100 | 1000 |
|--------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|
| (A) Session start | 0.2760 | 0.2936 | 0.3413 | 0.3725 | 1.3097 |
| (A) Collect sign  | 1.0439 | 1.1458 | 1.3688 | 1.7669 | 9.6403 |
| (A) Verify sign   | 0.5753 | 0.7199 | 1.3381 | 2.1971 | 17.8956 |

Zenroom CLI - all platforms

Following are the benchmarks of the benchmarks for the (P) and the (I) groups of scripts (whose execution times don’t change based on the amount of participants), with a comparison of all the platforms, running in CLI binaries.
Table 4: Execution timings on CLI of scripts in seconds per platform

| script/plat.f. | (P) Keygen | (P) Request | (P) Pub-Key | (P) Aggr. Cred. | (P) Sign Session |
|---------------|------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|------------------|
| X86-X64       | 0.0137     | 0.0391      | 0.0196      | 0.0219         | 0.0521           |
| Raspberry Pi 4| 0.0373     | 0.0883      | 0.0475      | 0.0579         | 0.1456           |
| Raspberry Pi 0| 0.2492     | 0.5165      | 0.3017      | 0.3469         | 0.6603           |

Table 5: Execution timings on CLI of scripts in seconds per platform

| script/arch   | (I) Keygen | (I) Pub-Key | (I) Sign Req. |
|---------------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| X64           | 0.0129     | 0.0223      | 0.0524        |
| Raspberry Pi 4| 0.0404     | 0.0597      | 0.1405        |
| Raspberry Pi 0| 0.2467     | 0.3766      | 0.7687        |

Table 6: Execution timings on WASM X64 in seconds per participant

| s/p           | 2   | 10  | 50  | 100 | 1000 |
|---------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|
| (A) Session start | 0.0324 | 0.0312 | 0.0373 | 0.0516 | 0.1749 |
| (A) Collect sign   | 0.1180 | 0.1092 | 0.1510 | 0.2467 | 1.1563 |
| (A) Verify sign    | 0.0695 | 0.0688 | 0.1495 | 0.2641 | 2.1554 |

Following are the benchmarks of the benchmarks for the (A) group of scripts (whose execution times change based on the amount of participants), running in WASM libraries, grouped by platform.

**Zenroom WASM X86-64**
Zenroom WASM Raspberry Pi 4

Table 7: Execution timings on WASM Raspberry Pi 4 in seconds per participant

| S/P                  | 2   | 10  | 50   | 100  | 1000 |
|----------------------|-----|-----|------|------|------|
| (A) Session start    | 0.1065 | 0.1092 | 0.1269 | 0.1459 | 0.5432 |
| (A) Collect sign     | 0.3897 | 0.4170 | 0.5741 | 0.7654 | 4.3594 |
| (A) Verify sign      | 0.1880 | 0.2510 | 0.5621 | 0.9494 | 8.1078 |

Zenroom WASM Raspberry Pi 0

Table 8: Execution timings on WASM Raspberry Pi 0 in seconds per participant

| S/P                  | 2   | 10  | 50   | 100  | 1000 |
|----------------------|-----|-----|------|------|------|
| (A) Session start    | 0.8688 | 0.8711 | 1.0392 | 1.2257 | 4.7067 |
| (A) Collect sign     | 2.7272 | 2.8665 | 3.9580 | 5.1851 | 29.0912 |
| (A) Verify sign      | 1.3818 | 1.7820 | 3.8503 | 6.3604 | 53.8938 |
Zenroom WASM - all platforms

Following are the benchmarks of the benchmarks for the (P) and the (I) groups of scripts (whose executions don’t change based on the amount of participants), with a comparison of all the platforms, running in CLI binaries.

Table 9: Execution times on Zenroom WASM of scripts in seconds per platform

| script/plat f. | (P) Keygen | (P) Request | (P) Pub-Key | (P) Aggr. Cred. | (P) Sign Session |
|----------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|------------------|
| X86-X64        | 0.0213     | 0.0490      | 0.0262      | 0.0304          | 0.0745           |
| Raspberry Pi 4 | 0.169      | 0.3365      | 0.2095      | 0.173           | 0.2705           |
| Raspberry Pi 0 | 0.6275     | 1.291       | 0.7185      | 0.811           | 1.9435           |

Table 10: Execution times on Zenroom WASM of scripts in seconds per platform

| script/plat f. | (I) Keygen | (I) Pub-Key | (I) Sign Req. |
|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| X86-X64        | 0.0204     | 0.0317      | 0.0746        |
| Raspberry Pi 4 | 1.01       | 0.276       | 0.6585        |
| Raspberry Pi 0 | 9.958      | 1.101       | 2.6355        |
RAM usage

The benchmarking of the RAM has been performed on Zenroom CLI only. The RAM usage showed negligible differences among the X86 and the arm builds. The tables show the results of the X86 benchmarks.

Table 11: Execution timings on RAM Usage in KiloBytes per participant

| KB/Participant | 2   | 10  | 50  | 100 | 1000 | 5000 |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|
| (A) Session start | 500 KB | 507 KB | 534 KB | 589 KB | 1289 KB | 4543 KB |
| (A) Collect sign   | 520 KB | 548 KB | 665 KB | 817 KB | 1651 KB | 4368 KB |
| (A) Verify sign     | 507 KB | 532 KB | 653 KB | 801 KB | 1660 KB | 4695 KB |

Table 12: Execution times on RAM Usage in KiloBytes

| (P) Keygen | (P) Request | (P) Pub-Key | (P) Aggr. Cred. | (P) Sign Session |
|------------|-------------|-------------|------------------|------------------|
| 498 KB     | 512 KB      | 484 KB      | 497 KB           | 541 KB           |

Table 13: Execution times on RAM Usage in KiloBytes

| (I) Keygen | (I) Pub-Key | (I) Sign Req. |
|------------|-------------|---------------|
| 488 KB     | 491 KB      | 504 KB        |
7 Conclusion

This article and the referenced free and open source implementation made in Zencode successfully provides an easy, flexible and well performant way to realize anonymous signatures made by zero-knowledge proof credential holders and aggregated in multi-party computation decentralized environments.

The privacy-preserving features of Reflow signatures are protected from rogue-key attacks by enforcing credential issuance, at the price of requiring one or multiple authorities. From this approach it comes the feature of generating signature "fingerprints" that are contextual and become traceable only with the consensus of participants (for instance by replicating the signature). These fingerprints are also useful to avoid double-signing and to strengthen the track-and-trace features of the most advanced material passport use-case scenario.

The use-cases we observed haven’t required the adoption of multiple authorities, however it is possible to enhance our scheme by porting a threshold credential issuance mechanism based on Lagrange interpolation as described in Coconut’s paper [Sonnino et al., 2018].

Generally speaking the Reflow cryptographic system can be adapted to authenticate many sorts of graph data sets; this aspect goes well beyond the state of the art and its application may comes useful to an upcoming generation of non-linear distributed ledger technologies.

7.1 Future directions

This cryptographic scheme is named after the Reflow project and currently follows its path to serve the use-case of circular economy projects for which the integrity of accounting, the portability of data and the privacy of users are of paramount importance. We are proud of the priority this cryptography research gives to use-cases dealing with environmental responsibility and will carry on this ethos through its future developments.

Standardisation is an important point in order to establish federated and decentralised use of Reflow across a variety of contexts, so we have high incentives in integrating this signature in W3C standards as well submitting it to the attention of the Object Management Group.

As hinted in the overview, the discourse around disposable identities is also very interesting and deserves further interaction as it may open up more privacy preserving possibilities of development in the field of health-care and transportation as well public services and accounting traceability for KYC/AML practices.

The possibility to aggregate Reflow signatures may also be exploited to serve need-to-know schemes where different actors may be required to sign different parts of a document without knowing the whole until its final publication, a scenario present in peer-review processes that may improve their impartiality.

Being at the core of the Reflow project development of a federated database of information that serves the piloted circular-economy use-cases, the main deployment of the Reflow crypto model is inside the Zenpub software component and will refine its interaction to GUI and dashboard components through a GraphQL interface and ActivityPub event protocol, as well leveraging the federating capabilities of this scheme to a stable and replicable implementation.

The developments of next-generation DLT applications as Holochain [Harris-Braun et al., 2018] and Hashgraph [Green, 2019] are also very interesting, in particular Holochain is known have the ValueFlows REA approach in course of implementation and may soon provide a platform where to further distribute the graph data beyond the federated server provision currently implemented in ZenPub.

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