Artificial Intelligence in Election Party of Broker Clientelism Joxzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die)

Yeyen Subandi¹⁵, Zuly Qodir³, Hasse Jubba³, Achmad Nurmandi⁴

¹Student of Doctoral Program of Political Islam of Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta
Email: yeyensubandi@gmail.com
²Lecturer of Doctoral Program of Political Science of Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta
³Lecturer of Doctoral Program of Political Science of Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta
⁴Lecturer of Doctoral Program of Political Science of Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta
⁵Lecturer of Department of International Relations of Universitas Respati Yogyakarta

Abstract

Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY) is a sultanate area led by a king or sultan. In the government, the sultan is the governor, whose duty is a lifetime. Regarding clientelism brokers, the emergence of patronage and political patronage practices still occurs in the government system of kingdom territory. Yogyakarta is known as the city of education and culture. Besides, Yogyakarta has a legendary community organization since the 1980s with its strength and power both in social and political as clientelism brokers. The organization is Joxzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die). Joxzin always supports the legislative candidates or the president promoted by Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). Their support in the 2019 general election parliamentary candidates succeeded in making the candidate be the Regional Representative Council of the City of Yogyakarta (DPRD Yogyakarta). Joxzin, with its power, could appoint Anang to become the Chairperson of PPP’s Party Branch Development Board in Yogyakarta (DPC PPP Yogyakarta). The two examples refute the majority of previous research, whereas previous studies found that the client’s position was weak, and their resources were below the patron's. However, the research done by the Joxzin’s client showed that Joxzin had resources above the patron represented by PPP. This research is important because of the era of big data in the 4.0 industrial revolution, AI as a search tool assisted by using the Nvivo 12 Plus analysis tool. In this study, the authors applied Social Network Analysis (SNA) with the assistance of the NVivo 12 Plus analysis tool to see the Joxzin social network as a mass organization and also the clientelism broker practice that was carried out by Joxzin in the 2019 elections with PPP. From the NVivo 12 Plus analysis, the results of the clientelism variable obtained several indicators. They are as a messenger, economic benefits, buying and selling votes, reciprocation, and a political party agent with the 2019 election. The five indicators are not all the same as the results of studies or research done by other experts.

Keywords: Clientelism brokers, political patronage, Joxzin, PPP, 2019 general election in Indonesia

1. Introduction

In the era of the Industrial Revolution 4.0 regarding artificial intelligence (AI) familiar we hear, the development of AI originated with the emergence of computers around the 1940s. At this time, attention is focused on the ability of computers to do something that can be done by humans (Warwick, 2012). In AI, there are many fields of artificial intelligence, AI can be viewed from various perspectives, one of which is that AI is said to be a group of useful tools,
and a methodology that uses these tools to solve problems (Brigida, 2012). Therefore, the author here will focus on AI as a tool to find big data information about AI that focuses on political patronage between community organizations and political parties.

Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY) is a sultanate led by a king or sultan. In the system of government, the sultan is the governor, whose duty is a lifetime. Clientelism brokers led to the emergence of patronage, and political patronage practices still occur in the sultanate. In \[^1\] states that patronage is a term that shows a special relationship between someone who protects (aristocrats) with a protected person (commoners). Clientelism broker is one of the factors causing political patronage relations that continue to occur in the era of development and the current era of democracy, local, national, or global democratic systems in poor and developing countries \[^2\] ; \[^3\] ; \[^4\] ; \[^5\] ; \[^6\] . Clientelism and political patronage brokers also occur in Yogyakarta.

Joyzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die) is a community and also an Islamic organization in Yogyakarta. Their members are around in the districts of Bantul, Sleman, Kulonprogo, Gunungkidul, Yogyakarta, and Central Java. So far, these organizations have supported the winning of the presidential, mayor, regent, and also candidates for legislative members who will run in the election of DPRD and DPR. Joxzin, in the beginning, established its social base from among “Gali,” an acronym from the Gabungan Anak Liar or “a group of young thugs” in the 1985s that combined “criminal” with “political.” After New Order in 1998, the liberalization of the existing political system in Indonesia and the “bouncers” or “thugs” competed with each other over patronage territory \[^7\] . Joxzin which exists now, becomes the face of “political Islam,” especially in Yogyakarta, by accommodating Muslim youths to explore the potential in channeling political expression and aspirations and actions \[^8\] ; \[^9\] . The current social base of Joxzin is students who hold still to Islam, but not students who have studied at “Islamic boarding schools” because their mass bases are mostly in the south of Yogyakarta, where there are several Islamic boarding schools \[^9\] . Political parties deliberately form part of CSOs as a sub-contract network in expanding social control and political control in society \[^7\] . The post-New Order hegemony crisis caused elite political parties to look for allies with existing “thug” groups by developing ideological closeness to facilitate future integration in power structures \[^10\] .

The founding of the Golkar Party which in the early days consisted of several organizations such as SOKSI (Indonesian Employee Organization Centers), GAKARI (Movement of the Republic of Indonesia Employees), BPPK (Work Potential Development Agency), KOSGORO (Cooperative Save Mutual Cooperation), and MKGR (Family Mutual Cooperation), OPK (Defense and Security Community Organization), and GP (The Development Movement) \[^8\] . Golkar was originally known as the Golkar Joint Secretariat. The establishment of Golkar was initially a youth organization, among others KNPI (Indonesian Youth National Committee), AMPI (Young Generation of Indonesian Reform), PP (Youth of Pancasila), and IPK (Youth of Karya Association) which are militant towards their political parties, as well as political parties others in Indonesia emerged from several mass organizations, and have a unit of officers, paramilitary units, or wing organizations \[^8\] . In 2014, Joxzin, as a clientelism broker supported Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), many legislative candidates backed by Joxzin, succeeded in winning a seat in the DPRD of Yogyakarta for the 2014-2019 period. Below is a table of winning congressional members from PPP supported and Joxzin.
2. Literature Review

The relationship of political patronage that occurs between CSOs and political parties, in this case, sometimes the position of CSOs or CSO elites becomes a liaison between voters and political elites. It can also be CSO elites and on behalf of CSOs become clients of clientelism in terms of being agents of political parties in elections [25]. The leader or the head of the CSO group can act as a broker by distributing benefits to its members to encourage the winning of political parties or elite political parties (politicians) to be promoted and supported. The CSO chairperson is often associated with the political parties he argues, with political alliances run to mutually agree on winning mobilization votes in exchange for benefits [26].

The existence of mass organizations in politics with the intention and purpose of the social and community sphere is to get recognition and presence in other social and political spaces [31]. The patronage of political parties works as a short exchange between the political elite and the people. Therefore all patronage relations can be done without exception [13]. Political racialization carried out by political parties has formed a route to political power, then expanded political patronage to other regions, because the two-way relationship of patronage already exists and occurs in any region [32]. The two-way relationship of patronage that happens in politics, one of the causes is the emergence of political alliances due to the struggle for patronage. Anyone can do patronage by not looking at the rich or deprived of the resources owned [33]. From previous studies, there are several variables and indicators of political patronage, below is a table of variables and indicators as well as from the pattern of political patronage relations between CSOs and political parties.

3. Methodology

This research is using Natural Language Processing (NLP), robotics and navigation systems, games, and theorem proving. This research is important because of the era of big data in the 4.0 industrial revolution, AI as a search tool assisted by using the Nvivo 12 Plus analysis tool.

4. Basic Theory of Patronage

According to (Giaratanno, 2005) in Artificial Intelligence (AI) there are many fields studied, this can be seen in the image below:

![Figure 1. Domain Area AI](image)

From the picture above, it can be used as a reference to see the types of AI, including about: Expert systems, computer vision, In research here, AI is a point of view and perspective
of a research tool, therefore in theory use does not use theory in AI studies, but uses the theory of a two-way patronage relationship.

5. Findings and Discussion on Clientelism and Political Patronage Brokers between Joxzin Islamic Society Organization (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die) with Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)

The role of community organizations (mass organizations) can be as clientelism brokers to enter the grassroots circles that make the bargaining power of voters in political patronage. In the description of the Indonesian political system, there are only a few researchers discussing terms patronage and clientelism so far. They can also be CSO elites and on behalf of CSOs become clients of clientelism in terms of being agents of political parties in elections. The position of CSOs is weak in its existence, due to the legitimacy of political patronage and elites’ group presence with interest in monopolizing society with their political control. The previous study has different results from the current research; precisely, the client represented by Joxzin in the city of Yogyakarta has power and strength.

The current problem of democracy still exists, both done by individual, group entrepreneurs, and also by political investors. The practice of the clientelism broker between Joxzin and PPP had already taken place since the 2014 election, and it paid off with the passing of legislative candidates supported by Joxzin winning a seat in the DPRD Yogyakarta for the 2014-2019 period. During the new order era, when the political parties still consisted of three big parties: Golongan Karya (Golkar), Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI), and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), in DIY, these parties already had their respective organizations or gangs. Golkar was with Trah Buthex (TRB), PDI with Qizruh (Qzr), and PPP with its Joxzin (Jxz). The three mass organizations dominated the political campaigns. After the fall of the new order, youth forces emerged with their organizations in Indonesian politics, including Joxzin. With the power of youth who have basic principles of Islam (political Islam), Amma’ruf naﬁ munkar, Joxzin becomes a force for PPP. PPP itself once had regeneration named Gerakan Mahasiswa Persatuan Indonesia (GMPI) but did not last for a long time. Besides, the leader or the party’s branch or Pimpinan Anak Cabang (PAC) in Yogyakarta did not run the organization’s structure optimally. Therefore, Joxzin reappeared in the 2019 elections.

Clientelism is a variable in this study with several indicators of clientelism political patronage between Joxzin and PPP. The indicators in this variable are the messenger, economic benefits, buying and selling votes, returning the favor, and as a political party agent with a period of voters. The variables obtained will be analyzed with the following NVivo 12 Plus tools.
Figure 2. Periodically Voters as Clientelism

From the figure 2, the indicators for the practice of reciprocation result in Joxzin are 20%. For PPP, the result is 0%. Then, the vote-buying and selling indicators of the practice regarding these matters, Joxzin with 7% results and 16% PPP, the PPP results are more significant than Joxzin. From these results, PPP conducts the practice of buying and selling votes. Furthermore, in terms of economic benefits with results for Joxzin 7% and PPP 5%, in the relationship of political patronage in 2019, the interests in commercial matters are still dominating, whether for individuals or groups.

The involvement of Joxzin’s clientelism brokers political patronage with PPP in the 2019 elections had a base on competition from mass organizations or paramilitary groups. It was to win the candidates (legislative or presidential) from PPP. In the future, Joxzin has the goal to establish PPP, without seeing the figure of the chairman. Still, Joxzin has the principle of the desired chairman. In other words, it must have a similar vision and mission. Unfortunately, the organizational structure of PPP in DIY and its districts are still not running optimally. If it was, Joxzin might not have appeared in the 2019 elections.

The impact of Joxzin’s involvement on PPP in supporting legislative candidates brought from PPP in the 2019 general elections was Hasan (M. Hasan Widagno Nugroho) from the electoral district (electoral area 5) Kotagede, Yogyakarta. He won the seat of the Regional Representative Council (DPRD) of the city of Yogyakarta for the period 2019-2024.

6. Conclusion

The result was an indicator of similarity or compatibility between results from several previous authors in the literature review with the results of research, such as the client as a messenger and political party agent with the voter period and reciprocation. Besides, there are also inequalities or discrepancies in the matter of client power and power, where most previous studies said that the client’s resources are under the patron. Several factors caused Joxzin’s involvement in political patronage and clientelism broker in the 2019 elections with PPP in the city of Yogyakarta. First is the historical factors of first-generation Joxzin that only dominated political campaigns. Second generation Joxzin also mobilizes the masses to vote and cast their votes in PPP winning. Second, the competition of the old Joxzin gang (1980s Joxzin) to date has an impact on the second generation Joxzin (Joxzin era of the 2001s). Third, competition between paramilitaries or political party organizations (political parties, both competing parties, and existing organizations under the PPP structure). Fourth, the PPP structure in the city of Yogyakarta is less than optimal due to the internal chaos of political parties, divided into Khitah...
and Non-Khittah PPP. Fifth, the branch subsidiary (PAC) leader as the spearhead that is directly in contact with the voters is not running optimally, and sixth, there is no regeneration in student organizations that have affiliations with PPP.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the editorial board for their invaluable comments and constructive criticism, without which this article would not be in its present form. The author would also like to thank the Islamic Society Organization of Joxzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die) and also Political Party Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP).

References

[1] Kausar, Sistem Birokrasi Pemerintahan di Daerah Dalam Bayang-Bayang Budaya Patron-Klien, Bandung, Alumni, 2009.

[2] Luis Roniger, Review Article: Political Clientelism, Democracy, and Market Economy, Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Apr), pp. 353-375. Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York, Downloaded from http://www.istor.org/steady/4150135, 2004.

[3] Kristof Titeca, Political Patronage and Political Values: The Developmental Role of political Patronage and Its Impact on Shaping Political Values and Rural Uganda, Afrika Focus, Vol. 19, Nr. 1-2, pp. 43-67, Vakgroep.Studie Van de Derde Wereld Universiteit Gent, Universiteit 8, 9000 gent, Belgium, kristof.titeca@ugent.be, 2006.

[4] Petr Kopecky and Peter Mair, Political Parties and Patronage in Contemporary Democracies: An in Introduction, European University Institute, and Leiden University, Paper prepared for the workshop on Political Parties and Patronage, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Nicosia, 25-30 April, 2006.

[5] Petr Kopecky, Maria Spirova, and Gerardo Scherlis, Beyond the Cartel Party? Party Patronage and the Nature of Parties in New Democracies, Paper prepared for the joint IPSA/ECPR conference, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 16-19 February, 2011.

[6] Muhammad Ramli, Patronase Politik dalam Demokrasi Lokal-Analisis Terhadap Terpilihnya Hj. Marniwati Pada Pemilukades di Desa Jojiljo Kecamatan Bulukumpa Kabupaten Bulukumba, Fakultas Ushuluddin Filsafat dan Politik-Jurusan Ilmu Politik, UIN Alauddin Makassar, 2016.

[7] Ian Douglas Wilson, Politik Jatah Preman: Ormas dan Kuasa Jalanan di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, Tangerang, Marjin Kiri, 2018.

[8] Lewis Pramana Lubis, Laskar Joxzin Sebagai Instrumen Politik PPP Dalam Penegakan Amar Makruf Nahi Mungkar di Yogyakarta, Yogyakarta, Program Stuhi Hukum Islam, Pascasarjana Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga, 2016.

[9] Direct interview with I. C, a former member of Joxzin and GPK, located in Yogyakarta, on Tuesday, May 29, 2018.

[10] Schulte-Bockholt, The Politics of Organized Crime and the Organized Crime of Politics: a Study in Criminal Power, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2006.

[11] Hein-Anton V.D., Heijden, Political Partied and NGOs in Global Environmental Politics, International Political Science Review, Volume 23, No. 2, 187-201, 2004. 022193 c International Political Science Association, Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, and New Delhi, 2002).

[12] Adong, Florence Adora, Rising for The Ashes: The Rebirth of Civil Society in an Authoritarian Political Environment, International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law/ Vol. 10, No. 3, June/ 79. icnl-cordaid awards, 2008.

[13] Andreas Ufen, Lipset and Rockan in Southeast Asia: Indonesia in Comparative Perspective, Dalam Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Clientelism and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, edited by Dirk Tomas dan Andreas Ufen, 40-61, London: Routledge, 2012.

[14] Alisha C. Holland and Brian Palmer-Rubin, Beyond the Machine Clientelist Brokers and Interest Organizations in Latin America, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48 (9) 1186-1223. DOI:10.1177/0010414015574883, cpls.sagepub.com, 2015.

[15] James C. Scott, Corruption, machine politics, and political change. American Political Science Review, 63(4), 1142-1158, 1969.

[16] Chubb, J, Patronage, power and poverty in Southern Italy: A tale of two cities. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Chubb, 1982.

[17] Szwarcberg, M, Uncertainty, political clientelism, and voter turnout in Latin America. Comparative Politics, 45(1), 88-106. 2012b.

[18] Weitz-Shapiro, R, What wins votes: Why some politicians opt out of clientelism, American Journal of Political Science, 56(3), 568-583. 2012.

[19] Irem Muflikh Nadhiroh, Muhammad Nur Aidi, and Bagus Sartono, Kajian Scientoetric: Analisis Jaringan Sosial pada Publikasi Internasional Indonesia Bidang Kimia, Jakarta: LIPI, 2015.

[20] George Ritzer and Douglas J. Goeman, Teori Sosiologi dari Teori Sosiologi Klasik Sampai Perkembangan Mutakhir Teori Sosial Postmodern, Yogyakarta, Kreasi Wacana, 2011.
[21] Damsar, Pengantar Sosiologi Ekonomi, Jakarta, Kencana Prenada Media Group, 2011.
[22] Gerardo Scherlis, The Contours of Party Patronage in Argentina, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 63-84. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43670094, Accessed: 11-08-2018 04:48 UTC, 2013.
[23] Janette Bulkian, REDD Letter Days, Entrenching Political Racialization and State Patronage Through the Norway-Guyana REDD-Plus Agreement, Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 63, No. 3/4, Special Issue on Youth-Youthscapes of Development in the Caribbean and Latin America (September/ December), pp. 249-279, Stable URL https://www.jstor.org/stable/44732893, Accessed: 14-08-2018 06:19 UTC, 2014.
[24] Mamogola, M.I. “Political Patronage and the State Economic Performance in ‘Africa’: Evidence from South Africa, brarudy@yahoo.co.uk.
[25] Soundarya Chindambaram, The “Right” Kind of Welfare in South India’s Urban Slum Seva vs, Patronage and The Success of Hindu Nationalist Organizations, Asian Survey, Vol. 52, No. 2, March/April, pp. 298-320. University of California Press. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/asi.2012.52.2.298, Accessed: 11-08-2018 05:02 UTC, 2012.
[26] Prince Ainan G. Villanueva & Jessa Nicole P. Salazar, Patronage Politics and Clientelism in Housing Welfare: The case of Gawad Kalinga (GK) Villages in Paranaque City, Philippines”. Journal of Government and Politics Vol. 6, No. 2, August 2015. Graduate Student, The Department of Political Science, De La Salle University, 2401 Taft Avenue, Manila, The Philippines. http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jpp.2015.0031, 2015.
[27] Magno, A. In the Grip of Elite Politics. In David, R. and J. Okamura eds, The Philippines Political and Economic Situation in View of 1992, Quezon City, UHM, 1992.
[28] Rocamora, J, Political Parties in Constitutions Reform, Retrieved from http://www.tni.org/archives/rocamora/parties.htm, 2002.
[29] Teehankee, J, Citizen Party Linkages in the Philippine, Failure to connect? In Reforming the Philippine political party system, Ideas and initiatives, debates and dynamics, Philippines, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2009.
[30] Quimpo, N. G, Oligarchic patronism and power, election and contested democracy in the Philippines, Comparative Politics, 229-250, 2005.
[31] Rivera, T, In search of credible elections & parties, The Philippine Paradox in Miranda, F., Rivera, T., Ronas, M. and Holmes, R. (eds), 22 (11), 113-133, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2013.825608, 2011.
[32] Gay Robert, Rethinking Clientelism: Demands, Discourses, and Practices in Contemporary Brazil, European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies (65): 7-24, 1998.
[33] Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven Wilkinson, Citizen-politician Linkages: An Introduction, In Patrons, Clients and Policies: Pattern of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, edited by Herbert Kitschelt dan Steven I. Wilkinson, 1-50, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[34] Khrisna Aninudh, Politics in the middle: Mediating Relationship between the Citizens and the State in Rural North India, In Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Pattern of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, edited by Herbert Kitschelt dan Steven Wilkinson, 141-159, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[35] Stokes, S., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., & Brusco, V. 2013. Brokers, voters, and clientelism, The puzzle of distributive politics, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
[36] Elinor Wakefield, Consolidating Democracy: Political Society and NGOs in Thailand, Working Paper Series, No. 2004, Making Services Work for the Poor, Washington, DC, 2004.
[37] Rob Jenkins and Anne Marie Goetz, Civil Society Engagement and the Indian Public Distribution System: Lessons from the Krutti Samiti Rationing in Mumbai, Consultation Paper for the World Bank, World Development Report 2004, Washington, DC, 2004.
[38] Aidan McGarry, Political Participation and Interest Articulation in South Korea, European Centre for Minority Issues, 2008.
[39] Ahmad Asroni, Iain Creevey, and Adib Sopia, Deradikalisasi dan Politik: Menarik Kontribusi Organisasi Islam ke Pemilu Indonesia, Jakarta, Kencana Prenada Media Group, 2011.
[40] Leo Agustino, Patronase Politik Era Reformasi: Analisis Pilkada di Kabupaten Tegal dan Provinsi Jambi, Jurnal Administrasi Publik, Vol. 171, No. 2/3, pp. 165-195, Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43817989, Accessed: 14-08-2018 05:40 UTC, 2019.
[41] Direct interview with N. I, a PPP political party elite, located in Yogyakarta and Bantul, on Sunday, September 8, 2019.
[42] https://div.kpu.go.id
[43] Yeyen Subandi, Political Patronage of Islamic Community Organization of Joxzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die) with Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) Islamic Politic in The General Election of 2019in The Special Region of Yogyakarta-Indonesia, Volume 24, Issue 6, Year: 2020, DOI: 10.37200/IIPR/V24/I/PR261353, Pages: 14036-14052, May, 2020.
