A New Proxy Blind Signature Scheme Based on DLP

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ABSTRACT

A proxy blind signature scheme is a special form of blind signature which allows a designated person called proxy signer to sign on behalf of two or more original signers without knowing the content of the message or document. It combines the advantages of proxy signature and blind signature and satisfies the security properties of both proxy and blind signature scheme. In this paper, a new proxy blind signature scheme based on discrete logarithm problem (DLP) has been proposed, which satisfies the security properties of both the blind signature and proxy signature. Security analysis also given which shows that our scheme is secure and efficient.

Keyword:
Blind Signature
Cryptography
Discrete Logarithm Problem
Proxy Signature
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1. INTRODUCTION

Proxy signature is a special form of digital signature. In 1996, Mambo et al. [10, 11]. Firstly introduced the concept of the proxy signature, which allows an original signer delegates his signing capacity to a proxy signer who can sign a message submitted on behalf of the original signer. A verifier can validate its correctness and can distinguish between a normal signature and a proxy signature. Many proxy signature schemes have been proposed [6, 7, 13, 16, 17].

In 1983, David Chaum [2] proposed the concept of bind signature, which allows the sender to have a given message signed by the signers without revealing any information about the message or its signature. The most distinguishing properties of a blind signature scheme are: untraceability and unlinkability, which may ensure that requesters can prevent the signer from deriving the exact correspondence between the actual signing process performed by the signer and the signature opened later. Therefore, the blind signature largely protects the privacy of participants and can be applied in secure electronic payment systems [4] and secure voting systems [15]. Blind signature also has received significant attention and lot of research work has been done in this field [1, 3, 5].

A proxy blind signature scheme is a digital signature scheme that ensures the properties of both proxy signature and blind signature. In a proxy blind signature, an original signer delegates his signing capacity to proxy signer. The proxy signature plays an important role in many applications too. On the combination of the proxy signature and blind signature.

In 2000, The first proxy blind signature was proposed by Lin and Jan [9]. Later, Tan et al. [14] proposed a proxy blind signature scheme. In 2003, Lal et al. [8] pointed out that Tan et al.s scheme was insecure and proposed a new proxy blind signature scheme based on Mambo et al.s scheme [10]. In 2002, Tan et al. [14] presented a proxy blind signature based on Schnorr blind signature scheme [3]. Later, Lal and Awasthi [8] pointed out that Tan et al.’s proxy blind signature schemes suffer from a kind of forgery attack.
due to the signature receiver. Compared with Tan et al.’s schemes, Lal and Awasthi further proposed a more efficient and secure proxy blind signature scheme. Tan et al.s schemes do not satisfy the unforgeability and unlinkability properties. In this paper, we propose a new proxy blind signature scheme based on discrete logarithm problem (DLP), which satisfied all the security requirements of both the blind signature scheme and the proxy signature scheme. The analysis of security shows that our scheme is more efficient and low computation.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly list some security properties of the scheme. And then, our proposed proxy blind signature scheme is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we analyze the efficiency and the security properties of the proposed scheme in section 5. Finally Section 6, describes the concluding remarks.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF PROXY BLIND SIGNATURE SCHEME
The proxy blind signature should satisfy the following properties:

1. **Distinguishability:** The proxy signature must be distinguishable from the original signature.
2. **Unforgeability:** Only the designated proxy signer can generate a valid proxy signature.
3. **Non-repudiation:** The original and proxy signer can't deny their signatures against any one.
4. **Verifiability:** The receiver should be able to verify the proxy signature.
5. **Identifiability:** Anyone can determine the identity of the corresponding proxy signer and original signer from the signature.
6. **Unlinkability:** When the signature is revealed the proxy signer cannot identify the association between the message and the blind signature he generated.
7. **Prevention of misuse:** The proxy key pair should be used only for creating proxy signature.

3. THE NEW PROXY BLIND SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section, we propose an efficient proxy blind signature scheme based on DLP. The proposed scheme is divided into four phases: Notations, Proxy delegation phase, Blind signing phase, and Signature verification phase.

3.1. Notations
For the convenience of describing our work, we define the parameters as follows:

* O: the original signer
* P: the proxy signer
* A: the Signature Verifier
* p,q: two large prime numbers with \( q \equiv 1 \pmod{p-1} \)
* g: an element of order q in \( Z_q^* \)
* h (): a secure one-way hash function
* \( x_o \): the secret key of original signer
* \( y_o = g^{x_o} \pmod{p} \)
* \( x_p \): the secret key of proxy signer
* \( y_p = g^{x_p} \pmod{p} \)
* O sends message to P
* \( \| \): denotes the concatenation of strings.
3.2. Proxy Delegation Phase

The original signer O randomly select \( v_o \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \) on the condition and computes:
\[
\begin{align*}
    r_o &= g^{v_o} \mod p \\
    s_o &= x_o + v_o \mod q
\end{align*}
\]  

(1)

(2)

Original signer O sends \((r_o, s_o)\) to the proxy signer P in a secure manner. P accept \((r_o, s_o)\) if the equation
\[
    g^{r_o} = (r_o y_o) \mod q
\]  

(3)

does hold. The proxy signer P computes the proxy private key
\[
    s_p = s_o + x_p \mod q
\]  

(4)

3.3. Blind Signing Phase

The proxy signer P selects random number \( k \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \) and computes:
\[
t = g^k \mod p
\]  

(5)

and sends \((t, r_o)\) to the signature verifier A. To obtain the blind signature of message \( m \), original signer O randomly choose two random numbers \( \alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \) and computes:
\[
    r = t g^{\alpha} (y_o y_p) \mod p
\]  

(6)

\[
e = h(r || m) \mod q
\]  

(7)

\[
e' = e - \beta \mod q
\]  

(8)

A sends \( e_0 \) to proxy signer P, after receiving \( e' \), Proxy signer P computes:
\[
s' = e's_p + k \mod q
\]  

(9)

and sends the sign message \( s' \) to A, after receiving \( s' \), A computes:
\[
s = g^{r'_o + r_o - \beta} \mod q
\]  

(10)

The proxy blind signature of message \( m \) is \((m; s; e; r_o)\)

3.4 Signature Verification Phase

The verifier can verify the proxy blind signature by checking whether
\[
e = h(s y_p^{-e} y_o^{\alpha - \gamma} || m) \mod q
\]  

(11)

holds. Where \( y_p = (y_o y_p) \) or \( g^{\gamma} \mod p \).

If it is true, the verifier accepts it as a valid proxy blind signature, otherwise rejects.

Theorem 3.1 Suppose all the entities involved in the protocol follow the protocol, then equation(12) holds.
Proof: As per equation (7) and (11) follows from the equation:

\[ r = s y^{-e} \mod p \]  

(12)

By computing using the equation (1) to (11), we have

\[ sy^{-e} = g^{e^{'-a}} r_o^{-\beta} y_p^{-\beta} \mod p \]
\[ = g^{e^{'-a} + \beta (\alpha + \beta)v_{r_o}} y_p^{-\beta} \mod p \]
\[ = g^{k + \beta (\alpha + \beta)v_{r_o}} y_p^{-\beta} \mod p \]
\[ = t g^{a (y_p, y_p)} r_o^{-\beta} y_p^{-\beta} \mod p \]
\[ = t g^{a (y_p, y_p)} r_o^{-\beta} y_p^{-\beta} \mod p \]
\[ = s = g^{e^{'-a} r_o^{-\beta}} \mod q \]

The message flows of the proxy blind signature scheme is described in following Figure 1.

**Original Signer O**

\[ \nu_o \in Z_q^* \]
\[ \alpha, \beta \in Z_q^* \]
\[ r_o = g^{-\alpha} \mod p \]

**Proxy Signer P**

\[ (r_o s_o) \rightarrow \]

\[ g^{e^{'-a}} = (r_o y_o) \mod p \]

If false, stop; otherwise

\[ s_p = s_o + x_p \]

**Signature Verifier A**

\[ r = t g^{a (y_o, y_p)} y_p^{-\beta} \mod p \]
\[ e = h(r || m) \mod p \]
\[ e^' = (e - \beta) \mod q \]
\[ e^' = e - a - b \mod q \]
\[ s = g^{e^{'-a} r_o^{-\beta}} \mod q \]

**Proxy Signer P**

\[ \rightarrow e^' \]

\[ k \in Z_q^* \]
\[ t = g^k \mod p \]
\[ s^' = e^' s_p + k \mod q \]

**Verification**

Anyone can verify the validity of the proxy blind signature of message m by using the equation

\[ e = h(sy^{-e} \mod p || m) \mod q \]

Figure 1. The message flows of the proxy blind signature scheme.
4. EFFICIENCY OF PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we can show that our scheme is more efficient and low computation cost than previous scheme [8, 14]. Let E, M and I respectively denote the computational load for exponentiation, multiplication and inversion. Then following table shows the comparison of computational cost with previous schemes.

Table 1: Comparison of computational cost with previous schemes [8, 14].

| Schemes           | Delegation Phase | BlindSigning Phase | Verification | Total Costs     |
|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Tan et.al.        | 3E+2M            | 8E+7M+4I          | 3E+3M+I      | 14E+12M+5I      |
| Lal and Awasthi   | 4E+2M            | 3E+3M+2I          | 2E+M         | 9E+6M+2I        |
| Our Scheme        | 3E+1M            | 3E+4M+2I          | 2E+2M+1I     | 8E+7M+3I        |

5. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section we discuss the some of the properties of our proposed proxy blind signature scheme, described in section 2.

5.1 Unforgeability:
In the signing agreement, P wants to compute \( x_0 \), through \( (r_0; s_o) \), which is the process of computing a discrete logarithm. We can confirm that the common signature of original signer \( O \) can not be forged by proxy signer P. Because the information owned by other attackers is less than P’s, original signer O others can not forge the common signature of, either.

5.2 Distinguished:
Proxy signature is distinguishable from original signer's to normal signature. Since proxy key is different from original signer's private key and proxy keys created by different proxy signers are different from each other, any proxy signature is distinguishable from original signer's signature and different proxy signer's signature. We can distinguish the proxy signature with normal signature due to the extra part which is included in the proxy signature but not normal signature.

5.3. Unlinkability:
Message \( m \) is blinded before it is signed by proxy signer P. Because blinded element is known only by message owner, if only it is chosen randomly, message \( m \) extracted from message \( M \) is the factorization of large number. In addition, in the process of extraction, blinded element will be used, so the proxy signer cannot associate his precious signing transcripts with any message received in the process of signing. In verification stage, the signer checks only whether

\[
r = tg^{-\alpha} (y_o y_p)^{-\beta} \mod p
\]

He does not know the original signer's private key and proxy signer's private key. Thus the signer knows neither the message nor the signature associated with the signature scheme.

5.4. Undeniability:
Because no matter who cannot forge the common signature of O and proxy signature of P, O can not repudiate its valid strong delegation signature and P can not repudiate its valid proxy signature.

5.5. Identifiability:
In the verification equation \( y_p = y_o y_p \) which includes the original signer O’s public key \( y_o \) and the proxy signer P’s public key \( y_p \). Hence, anyone can determine the identity of the corresponding proxy signer from a proxy signature.

5.6. Non-repudiation:
The original signer does not obtain the proxy signer's secret key \( x_o \) and proxy signer doesnot obtain original signer's secret key \( x_o \). Thus, neither the original signer nor the proxy signer can sign in place of the other party. At the same time, through the valid proxy blind signature, the verifier can confirm that the
signature of the message has been entitled by the original signer, because the verifier must use the original signer's public key during the verification. Likewise, the proxy signer cannot repudiate the signature. The scheme offers non-repudiation property.

5.7. Prevention of misuse:

The proposed proxy signature can avoid any misuse of the proxy private key, which includes the information about the type of message can be signed by the proxy signer. Hence, the responsibility of proxy signers is determined explicitly. Therefore, the proxy signer cannot sign any message that has not been authorized by the original signer and this prevents abuse of the proxy key.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we proposed a new proxy blind signature scheme based on discrete logarithm problem (DLP). The proposed scheme satisfies the given security requirements and has minimum computational cost when comparing with previous schemes. The future work is to design more effective proxy blind signature schemes which provably secure with lower computational cost.

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