F-PKI: Enabling Innovation and Trust Flexibility in the HTTPS Public-Key Infrastructure

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Abstract—We present F-PKI, an enhancement to the HTTPS public-key infrastructure (or web PKI) that gives trust flexibility to both clients and domain owners, and enables certification authorities (CAs) to enforce stronger security measures. In today’s web PKI, all CAs are equally trusted, and security is defined by the weakest link. We address this problem by introducing trust flexibility in two dimensions: with F-PKI, each domain owner can define a domain policy (specifying, for example, which CAs are authorized to issue certificates for their domain name) and each client can set or choose a validation policy based on trust levels. F-PKI thus supports a property that is sorely needed in today’s Internet: trust heterogeneity. Different parties can express different trust preferences while still being able to verify all certificates. In contrast, today’s web PKI only allows clients to fully distrust suspicious/misbehaving CAs, which is likely to cause collateral damage in the form of legitimate certificates being rejected. Our contribution is to present a system that is backward compatible, provides sensible security properties to both clients and domain owners, ensures the verifiability of all certificates, and prevents downgrade attacks. Furthermore, F-PKI provides a ground for innovation, as it gives CAs an incentive to deploy new security measures to attract more customers, without having these measures undercut by vulnerable CAs.

I. INTRODUCTION

In March 2011, news broke that Comodo—a security firm operating a certification authority—had been hacked. The intrusion resulted in the unwarranted issuance of 9 certificates for several high-profile domain names [12]. A few months later, DigiNotar suffered a similar attack [32]. These events led Google to create the Certificate Transparency (CT) framework [40]. About 8 years later, CT is in the final stages of its deployment [56]. Transparency greatly facilitates the detection of illegitimate certificates, but there remain the questions of how to react after misbehavior is observed and how to prevent misbehavior altogether. Unfortunately, simply revoking the certificates of vulnerable CAs would have serious consequences: all the certificates issued by these CAs would become invalid, rendering countless websites unavailable. An ideal public-key infrastructure would prevent a vulnerable or misbehaving CA from jeopardizing the security of the entire system in the first place, and it would give users and browser vendors an option to demote CAs without completely distrust them. Unfortunately, the definition of trust in traditional PKIs is too rigid to enable this ideal vision.

Our central observation is that trust is highly heterogeneous across the world. A PKI that supports trust flexibility would provide a foundation for domain owners and users/browsers to express trust preferences, penalize misbehaving or vulnerable CAs, and reward CAs with strong security measures. The core challenges in enabling heterogeneous levels of trust in CAs are to achieve a meaningful overall system behavior with concrete security properties, ensure global verifiability of all certificates, and prevent downgrade attacks to lower security levels. An example to illustrate this is shown in Figure 1. In this example, user $U_1$ trusts CA$_1$ more than CA$_2$ for issuing certificates for domain $D$ because CA$_1$ supports multi-perspective domain validation [1], while user $U_2$ trusts CA$_2$ more than CA$_1$ because CA$_2$ is an American CA and $D$’s TLD is .us. In this example, $U_1$ should be able to express higher trust in CA$_1$ than in CA$_2$, while retaining the ability to use certificates issued by CA$_2$. A challenge immediately arises: how can such a policy result in a clear security property for the user? We resolve this challenge as follows: the user (or browser vendor) may define a set of CAs as highly trusted for a set of domains, then the browser obtains assurance that a received certificate does not conflict with any certificate issued by a highly trusted CA. In this way, from each user’s perspective, a clear and consistent security guarantee is provided.

F-PKI (which stands for flexible public-key infrastructure) introduces trust flexibility in two dimensions: each domain can set a domain policy and each verifier can set (or choose) a validation policy using trust levels for CAs. Domain owners can specify policies in their certificates to restrict the set of valid certificates for their domain. Clients are then presented with a comprehensive set of certificates for each domain they visit and can make informed decisions based on their validation.
policy. F-PKI allows these clients to express a preference for certain CAs. Our new notion of trust is ternary and name-dependent: every authority may be either untrusted, trusted, or highly trusted, for each domain name. In our example, user $U_1$ would treat CA$_1$ as highly trusted and CA$_2$ as trusted for domain $D$. $U_1$ would then reject CA$_2$ if it conflicts with CA$_1$. We envision that browser vendors would initially dictate trust levels, but users could modify these default trust levels as they please. Once trust levels are defined, a user should only accept a certificate if it comes with evidence that no highly trusted CA has issued a conflicting certificate.

Domain owners are given the option to define what constitutes a “conflicting” certificate for their domain, as F-PKI gives them the ability to specify policies through certificate extensions. Users then receive and consider all policies signed by highly trusted CAs. The issuers policy, for example, lists CAs authorized to issue certificates for a domain name. In our example, if the owner of $D$ sets such a policy in $C_1$, $U_1$ will reject CA$_2$ if CA$_2$ is not listed as an issuer in $C_1$. Giving domain owners the ability to define policies through certificate extensions would be futile, however, if an attacker who is able to obtain a bogus certificate could simply hide those policies. In our example, if $U_1$ does not know about the policies defined in $C_1$, then $U_1$ would accept CA$_2$. Therefore, we introduce a verifiable log server that can provide users with a view of all certificates and revocation messages relevant to any given domain name. This new log server, which we call map server, is meant to complement existing Certificate Transparency servers.

**Main Contributions.** We introduce a new trust model for the web PKI, which takes into account the heterogeneity of trust around the world: each user can assign each CA to a different trust level for each domain name. We present F-PKI, which allows users to make informed decisions when validating certificates by considering a global set of certificates rather than a single certificate chain. F-PKI prevents downgrade attacks to a less trusted CA, while retaining verifiability of all certificates. Any domain owner can opt-in to obtain additional security guarantees simply by requesting a new certificate with an appropriate X.509 extension, which preserves backward compatibility to the existing web PKI. We demonstrate that F-PKI can be realized in practice and deployed incrementally by upgrading CT log servers or by introducing a new verifiable log server (called map server). F-PKI does not require server updates and does not require active CA participation (beyond support for certificate extensions). Additionally, F-PKI incentivizes CAs to innovate and offer new security measures, as it prevents other (vulnerable) CAs from undercutting these measures. Finally, we present a proof-of-concept implementation and evaluate it to show that F-PKI is capable of withstanding realistic workloads and prevent attacks with low overhead.

**II. Background: Verifiable Logging**

**Certificate Transparency (CT).** The objective of CT is to log certificates and make them publicly available, so that misbehavior can be detected. Merkle hash trees facilitate the audit of log servers. In a Merkle hash tree (MHT, also referred to as Merkle tree or hash tree), leaves contain data, while intermediate nodes and the root of the tree contain the hash of concatenated child nodes. Typically, Merkle trees are binary so two children are concatenated and hashed to determine the value of their parent node. By appending new entries to a Merkle tree in chronological order, CT logs can efficiently produce presence and consistency proofs. Proving the presence of a leaf in a Merkle tree whose root is known is efficient: a number of nodes (logarithmic in the number of leaves in the tree, assuming a balanced tree) are provided to the verifier so that they can reconstruct the path to the root. The role of a consistency proof, on the other hand, is to corroborate the supposed append-only property of CT logs. Again, a number of nodes logarithmic in the number of leaves is sufficient to prove consistency between two versions of a log, assuming entries are added chronologically.

**Absence proofs.** The absence of an entry cannot be efficiently proven using a chronological hash tree. Absence proofs, although not required by CT, are necessary in other contexts. Laurie and Kasper [39] proposed to support absence proofs for revocation transparency using a sparse Merkle tree of intractable size. In such a tree, each output of a hash function has a distinct leaf; using SHA256, the tree has $2^{256}$ leaves. It is possible to use a sparse Merkle tree in practice (despite its intractable size), because most leaves are empty and thus most nodes have the same predictable values. This fact can be exploited to make sparse Merkle trees efficient with caching strategies [18]. Trillian [26] is an open-source verifiable data store, implemented in Go and developed at Google. The white paper [25] describing the underlying data structures of Trillian expands upon the idea of sparse Merkle trees. Trillian offers three modes of operation: (a) verifiable log (equivalent to a CT log), (b) verifiable map (equivalent to a sparse Merkle tree), and (c) verifiable log-backed map (which uses a combination of both tree types).

**III. Lessons Learned**

Certificate Transparency has been a tremendous success, but it does not enable proactive security measures; it only allows detecting misbehavior after the fact. If a CA is compromised or malicious, detecting illegitimate certificates within an unspecified timeframe is not sufficient. The ability to issue certificates for any domain combined with a man-in-the-middle attack can be devastating, as both the confidentiality and integrity of all web communications are threatened. Mechanisms aimed at preventing such attacks have been proposed in the past, but deploying them has been a challenge (sometimes with limited benefits).

HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP), which is now deprecated by major browsers [25], was designed to fulfill an objective similar to ours, i.e., to prevent an attacker from using an illegitimate certificate when another public key is already bound to the domain name in question. In a nutshell, HPKP works as follows: A web server sends a pinning policy to a client through an HTTP header field. The policy may specify a public key that the client should expect to find in the server’s certificate. The client then enforces the received policy for each connection to the domain. The “max-age” directive specifies the time during which the policy should be enforced [24]. Unfortunately, HPKP can easily be misused, by attackers and domain owners themselves [30]. An attacker can launch a “ransom PKP” attack by pinning a public key,
before asking the owner for a ransom in exchange for a private key whose public counterpart was pinned during the attack. A domain owner can also inadvertently commit “HPKP Suicide” by pinning a public key without knowing the corresponding private key. Moreover, HPKP is only effective after the first connection is established and for a limited amount of time. A number of other mechanisms, such as HSTS [31] and OCSP Must-Staple [28], suffer from the same problem. Besides, HSTS only enforces the use of HTTPS, while OCSP stapling only addresses the revocation problem; neither provides resilience against CA compromise. Using a different approach, CAA records and DANE [22] were proposed to address the problem of misbehaving CAs, but both rely on DNSSEC, which requires its own PKI and also suffers from deployment issues. Moreover, CAA is only intended for CAs; a rogue CA can completely ignore CAA policies, while our system is designed to prevent misbehavior by letting clients verify policies on their own.

The lessons we can learn from these schemes are the following: (a) The infrastructure itself should be designed to support domain policies. (b) It should not be possible for a domain owner to pin a public key to their domain name, unless they can prove possession of the corresponding private key. For this reason, our policies will be defined through certificate extensions. (c) Once a policy is advertised to some clients, it should be possible to revoke it. (d) PKI improvements should not require updating all web servers. CT has shown that CAs are more likely to adopt a new security scheme (if they have incentives to do so) than individual domain owners. (e) The security of the web PKI should not rely on trust on first use (TOFU) or on the security of a separate infrastructure.

Table I shows how F-PKI compares with PKI schemes and enhancements that were (at least partially) deployed and supported by browsers. Our comparison is inspired by previous similar analyses [3], [62]. We discuss more related work in Section X. Below are the criteria we used in our comparison:

- **Prevents attacks**: If the web server is replaced by a malicious server, the scheme will prevent anyone from connecting to that server.
- **Detects global attacks**: If the web server is replaced by a malicious server that everyone sees, the scheme will help the domain owner detect the attack.
- **Detects targeted attacks**: If the web server is replaced by a malicious server that only a small number of people can see, the scheme will still help the domain owner detect the attack.
- **Built-in revocation**: the scheme supports some form of certificate revocation.
- **Unmodified server**: web servers do not have to be modified to support the scheme and still benefit from additional security guarantees.
- **Instant startup**: a new web server can use a certificate and be trusted by clients immediately.
- **Instant recovery**: if the private key is lost, a new certificate can immediately be used.
- **No out-of-band communication**: no side channel is required to support the scheme. This is only partially the case for F-PKI because clients must contact a map server; however, the connection to the map server can be established via a regular DNS resolver and before the TLS session is established. Similarly, DANE and CAA rely on DNSSEC.
- **No log synchronization required**: If the scheme uses (or supports the use of) multiple logs, they do not need to be synchronized. Although a map server could be replicated with an appropriate consensus protocol [64], F-PKI can work with a single map server or several unsynchronized map servers.
- **Supports multiple certificates**: several certificates can be used simultaneously for the same domain.

IV. Trust Model

In this section, we introduce a new, more flexible trust model for the web PKI. Let the relying party be any entity (e.g., a client) that uses the public key in a certificate [9]. Our primary goal is to prevent a CA from attacking a domain if a certificate has already been issued by another CA that the relying party trusts more for the domain name in question. To achieve this goal, we extend the trust model of today’s web PKI in two ways. First, we introduce a new trust level: each relying party may consider some CAs more trusted than others, for all names or a subset thereof. In other words, trust in our PKI is now *ternary* and *name-dependent*. Second, we introduce new domain policies, which are set by the respective domain owner and are certified by a CA alongside the certificate. The relying party considers all domain policies certified by highly trusted CAs. As opposed to X.509 name constraints [14], all CAs can still issue certificates for any domain as long as they don’t interfere with the certificates issued by highly trusted CAs. The three trust classes of our model are the following:

**Untrusted**: As in today’s trust model, only a public key that is part of a valid CA certificate can be used to verify certificate signatures. Other public keys are untrusted.

**Standard trust (non-highly trusted)**: This corresponds to the current notion of trust in a CA. Any CA in this trust class can keep issuing certificates, as in today’s web PKI. However if an issued certificate violates a policy defined by a highly trusted CA, it is rejected by the relying party.

| Criteria                          | CT   | DANE | CAA   | HPKP  | F-PKI1 | F-PKI2 |
|----------------------------------|------|------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| Prevents attacks                 | Yes  | Yes  | Yes   | Yes   | Yes    | Yes    |
| Detects global attacks           | Yes  | Yes  | Yes   | Yes   | Yes    | Yes    |
| Detects targeted attacks         | Yes  | Yes  | Yes   | Yes   | Yes    | Yes    |
| Built-in revocation              | Yes  | Yes  | Yes   | Yes   | Yes    | Yes    |
| Unmodified                       | Yes  | Yes  | Yes   | Yes   | Yes    | Yes    |
| Instant startup                  | Yes  | Yes  | Yes   | Yes   | Yes    | Yes    |
| Instant recovery                 | Yes  | Yes  | Yes   | Yes   | Yes    | Yes    |
| No out-of-band communication     | Yes  | Yes  | Yes   | Yes   | Yes    | Yes    |
| Supports multiple certificates   | Yes  | Yes  | Yes   | Yes   | Yes    | Yes    |

TABLE I: Comparison of PKI schemes/enhancements. All criteria are expressed as benefits (i.e., positively). 1DNS-based deployment 2Stapling-based deployment
Priority trust (highly trusted): This is the new trust level we introduce. Some CAs may be highly trusted for a set of names. Relying parties only consider the policies defined by CAs that they highly trust. This is defined by the following function:

\[ f(N) : \text{set of authorities highly trusted for name } N. \]

This model could be extended to support more trust classes. However, the number of trust classes should be kept low (for usability reasons), while still allowing relying parties to distinguish between reputable, neutral, and untrustworthy CAs.

A more formal representation of this trust model is presented in Appendix A.

A. Adversary Model

We assume that the attacker’s capabilities are constrained as in the Dolev–Yao model [21]. Cryptographic primitives are unbreakable but their operation is known by the adversary, so are all public keys, but private keys are only known by their respective owners. Moreover, the attacker can obtain any message passing through the network, initiate a communication with any other entity, and become the receiver of any transmission. The objective of this attacker is to obtain a certificate for a victim’s domain, and then perform an impersonation attack using that certificate and the corresponding private key. The adversary’s goal is to remain undetected as long as possible if the attack succeeds. F-PKI is designed to completely prevent impersonation attacks under a set of assumptions, but even if the attacker’s capabilities go beyond these assumptions, attacks can be detected. For this reason, we use two adversary models: one for prevention and one for detection. Also, because F-PKI supports trust heterogeneity, our adversary model can only be defined from the perspective of one client establishing a connection to a web server with specific domain name. Let \( N \) be the domain name in question, \( f(N) \) the set of CAs highly trusted by the client for that name, \( g(N) \) the set of non-highly trusted CAs for \( N \), and \( M \) the set of map servers that the client uses.

Adversary Model 1 (Prevention): The attacker may compromise all CAs in \( g(N) \) and a number of map servers such that a subset of map servers \( M_1 \subseteq M \) remains uncompromised and the map servers in \( M_1 \) collectively support all CAs in \( f(N) \).

Adversary Model 2 (Detection): The attacker may compromise all map servers in \( M \) and all CAs in \( f(N) \) and \( g(N) \).

V. OVERVIEW OF F-PKI

We seek to accomplish two main goals. First, browser vendors and users can define a validation policy, i.e., label CAs as highly trusted, trusted, and untrusted for each domain to decide which CAs should be prioritized in case of conflict. Second, to clearly identify these conflicts, domain owners must be able to define domain policies. No attacker should then be able to hide or downgrade these policies. Therefore, it is necessary to provide clients with a comprehensive view of all certificates, policies, and revocation messages relevant to the domain they are contacting. In the current ecosystem, this data cannot be easily obtained.

We introduce an entity called map server, which provides a comprehensive view of certificates for its supported set of CAs.

The goal of the map server is to aggregate certificate-related data in a verifiable manner and provide a meaningful interface to both clients and domain owners. Map servers use a sparse Merkle hash tree to effectively produce proofs of presence or absence. The data provided by map servers complements the traditional certificate validation procedure. A user gains a higher degree of assurance that the binding between a public key and a name is authentic, by checking that there exists no conflicting certificate for the domain in question.

Figure 2 illustrates how the different entities interact. At a high level, the steps needed to establish a secure HTTPS connection within F-PKI are the following:

1. The domain owner requests a certificate for www.example.com from a certification authority. The certificate signing request sent to the CA may contain additional domain policies we introduce in Section VI-B.
2. The map server maintains a complete set of certificates (by periodically fetching certificates from CT logs, or acting as a special CT log).
3. The CA returns the certificate to the domain owner. The certificate should contain the parameters and policies the domain owner specified in Step 1.
4. The domain owner configures the web server so that it uses the newly obtained certificate.
5. The browser connects to the web server via HTTPS.
6. As part of the TLS handshake, the browser receives the certificate, and possibly stapled data periodically fetched by the web server from the map server (see below).

Two main options allow the client to obtain a comprehensive set of certificates for www.example.com and the corresponding inclusion proof from a map server:

a. The web server fetches the certificate set and inclusion proof periodically or on-demand and provides it to the browser by stapling it to the TLS handshake.
b. The browser fetches the certificate set and inclusion proof from the map server, directly or via DNS (we describe the DNS technique in more detail in Section VI-E).
In this section, we describe in detail the operation of F-PKI as well as the data structures upon which it relies. We start by discussing validation policies that dictate which CAs are more trusted than others for a given name. Then we present policies that domain owners may define through X.509v3 extensions to opt-in and benefit from the stronger certificate validation that we propose. Then we describe map servers as an essential component to support the previously defined policies and certificate revocation. Finally, we discuss how certificates and proofs can be delivered from map servers to clients in an efficient and privacy-preserving way, and we describe how certificates are validated.

A. Validation Policies (Trust Levels)

Clients can specify which CAs they highly trust. We envision that such policies would be defined by browser vendors, but users should be free to modify their default policies. Validation policies govern the behavior of \( f(N) \) (see Section IV), which we defined as the set of authorities that are highly trusted for name \( N \). Below are some examples of policies browser vendors and/or users may want to define:

**CA-Based Policies:** Some CAs may be more trusted than others, regardless of the domain name. This judgment may be based on past events (such as security incidents), the validation methods that the CA employs, a reputation for following best practices, and/or geopolitical factors. As a concrete example of a reason to trust a CA over others, Let’s Encrypt now validates domains from multiple vantage points or “perspectives” [1] to mitigate routing attacks on BGP [4], [5].

**TLD-Based Policies:** CAs operating in a given country or region (as defined in their certificate) can be designated as more trusted for certain top-level domains (TLDs). For example, a policy may state that American CAs are more trusted for domain names ending in “.us” and “.gov” [35], while Chinese CAs are more trusted for “.cn”.

**Organization Policies:** Employees might be required to comply with policies for domains owned by their company. Online banking or trading platforms, as security-critical applications, may also provide their customers with policies they should enforce when connecting to their websites, specifying which CAs are highly trusted.

We also envision that such policies could be downloaded by users in the form of a “trust package” provided by organizations such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the CA/Browser Forum, the Mozilla Foundation, or ICANN.

The fact that different clients could use different validation policies is part of F-PKI’s design. The consequence of this design choice is that—when a conflict appears in the form of a certificate not respecting a policy signed by a CA—some clients might still be able to establish a connection to the website (if they do not highly trust the CA that signed the policy), while others will abandon the connection. In the worst case where a client highly trusts a malicious or compromised CA, the security of F-PKI is equivalent to that of the current web PKI, where a fraudulent certificate issued by a trusted CA is accepted.

B. Domain Policies

Domain owners can also define policies, in this case through X.509v3 extensions. There are two reasons for this: security and backward compatibility. Domain policies allow domain owners to provide stronger validation of their certificates, for example, prohibiting wildcard certificates or listing authorized issuers. Relying parties receive all relevant certificates through map servers so an attacker with a fraudulent certificate cannot hide any policy. Domain policies also act as an opt-in feature, which is required since F-PKI mandates a stronger certificate validation procedure that could potentially break validation of existing certificates. Specifically, a certificate may contain the following attributes:

**ISSUERS (Set_Attribute):** set of public keys (CAs) that may be used to verify signatures on this domain’s certificates. If this extension is not present, then all the CAs the client trusts are authorized to issue certificates.

**SUBDOMAINS (Set_Attribute):** set of subdomain names for which certificates can be issued. Ranges of subdomains can be covered with wildcards (e.g., *.sub.example.com).

If this extension is not present, then all subdomain names are authorized.

**WILDCARD_FORBIDDEN (Bool_Attribute):** prohibits the use of wildcard certificates for this domain.

**MAX_LIFETIME (Max_Attribute):** max. certificate lifetime.

Each attribute is marked as either inherited or non-inherited. An inherited attribute will be passed on to subdomains. Non-defined, non-inherited attributes default to the browser policy.

Domain owners should use a consistent set of policies and certificates. In other words, domain owners should make sure that they do not generate themselves any policy violations, in order to guarantee that their website remains available to all clients (i.e., regardless of which CA(s) the clients highly trust). Policy violations should only be observed when a fraudulent certificate is issued by a malicious or compromised CA. To let domain owners change their policies over time without disrupting legitimate connections to their website, domain policies can be revoked through map servers (certificate and policy revocation are discussed in Section VI-C).

**Multiple certificates for the same domain.** Although we presented F-PKI as an alternative to multi-signed certificates (to increase resilience against CA compromise), the two approaches can be combined. A domain owner can obtain certificates from several CAs, as long as the certificates respect the domain policies. Ideally, policies and other parameters defined in the certificates would be identical, but this is impossible to guarantee if the certificates are issued independently. Therefore, clients must consider the strictest of all policies.

**Policy Resolution.** Clients resolve domain policies using their default browser policy and a set of X.509v3 policy extensions. The strictest policy is calculated by iteratively applying a fold operation on each attribute of the policy. \( B_0 \land B_1 \). \( B_0 \) and \( B_1 \) are combined through logical conjunction and are combined through intersection.
C. Verifiable Data Structures in Map Servers

We introduce an entity called map server that provides a mapping from domain names to a set of certificates and revocations for this domain and parent domains. Each map server supports a set of CAs and keeps track of certificates issued by these CAs by leveraging the existing CT infrastructure and log data. The efficient audit of map servers is enabled by sparse Merkle hash trees, which we extend with nested trees to support hierarchical naming (similar to DNS). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first proposal for a verifiable data structure that provides a complete view of all certificate-related data of a domain and its parent domains while supporting efficient proofs of presence and absence of such data. Figure 3 gives an overview of the data structures used by a map server.

Comparison to CT logs. Even with Certificate Transparency, it is not possible to query a log server to directly verify that no certificate has been illegitimately issued for a given domain name. Instead, domain owners must rely on monitors, which keep entire copies of several logs. Only a few monitors exist at the moment. Li et al. [43] recently reported that none of the active third-party monitors they found could guarantee to return a complete set of certificates. The critical interface missing from log servers at the moment is thus one for fetching all valid (i.e., unexpired) certificates for a given domain name. It would seem natural to extend existing CT log servers to support this operation, but unreasonable to expect all log servers to be updated simultaneously.

Hierarchical Naming. Map servers distinguish between effective second-level domains (e2LD) [53] (i.e., domains where the parent domain is a public suffix [50]) and descendants of e2LDs (hereinafter subdomains). The remaining domains—parent domains of e2LDs and domains without a valid TLD—are invalid and the map server rejects certificates for such domains (e.g., ac.jp or test.invalid). e2LD entries are stored in a single sparse MHT. An advantage of such a hierarchy over a label-based hierarchy such as DNSSEC is that certificates for e2LDs can be stored at a lower depth (e.g., example.blogspot.co.uk has depth 0 instead of 3 in DNSSEC), which reduces the proof size. The entries of subdomains are stored in nested sparse MHTs located below the parent domain’s entry. The data structure for subdomains is the same as for the e2LDs, except that the key used for the index calculation only includes the name of the subdomain (without the parent domain). Since the Merkle proof of a subdomain contains all parent-domain entries, policies issued by parent domain owners are included in the subdomain proof. A parent domain owner can thus restrict CAs from issuing certificates for its subdomains or allow certificates only for certain subdomains. The reason map servers reject entries of public suffixes is that a certificate for a public suffix would enforce policies specified in the certificate for all e2LD domains using this public suffix. An algorithm for constructing the map server as described above is presented in Appendix B. The map server is also pruned periodically to remove expired certificates.

Entry Format. The map server creates an entry for each domain with at least one certificate (valid or revoked) or one active subdomain. The entry consists of the certificates and revocation messages of both the domain (example.com) and the corresponding wildcard (*.example.com), and the root of the subdomain MHT, as shown in Table II. Each certificate might contain policies in the form of X.509v3 extensions. The wire format of an entry is its ASN.1 DER encoding [33] where certificates, revocation messages, and tree roots are encoded as octet strings or sequences of octet strings.

![Comparison to CT logs](image)

**Table II: The map entry for example.com.**

| Content        | Type                      | Domain(s)       |
|----------------|---------------------------|-----------------|
| Certificates   | list<X.509 certificate>   | example.com     |
| Revocations    | list<revocation message> | example.com     |
| Certificates   | list<X.509 certificate>   | *.example.com   |
| Revocations    | list<revocation message> | *.example.com   |
| Tree Root      | cryptographic hash        | [subdomains]    |

The non-existence of a key is proven by showing that the value at the position of the hash of the key is the default value (indicating an empty leaf) which is distinct from any real value. Such a proof is large (256 · 256 bits = 8 kB) but can be compressed since the majority of the leaves in a sparse tree are empty. The idea of the compression is that hash values for subtrees where all leaves are empty can independently be (pre-)computed if the default value and the level are known. The map server then omits all values that can independently be recovered from erroneously defined policies.

Sparse MHT as Key-Value Store. A sparse Merkle tree, as shown in Fig. 3, provides a mapping from keys (domains) to values (entries). Each leaf corresponds to a key-value pair. The leaf’s position is determined by the hash of the key, leading to $2^{256}$ possible leaves for a hash output length of 256 bits.

The hash of a leaf is the hash of the concatenation of a fixed leaf prefix (e.g., 0x00) and the DER representation of the corresponding entry. The hash of an intermediate node is the hash of the concatenation of a fixed node prefix (e.g., 0x01) and the hash of the left and right child.

The path from the root to a leaf is defined as follows: At level $i$, if the $i$th bit of the hash is 0, the left child is selected, otherwise the right child is selected. Hence paths have a fixed length of 256 and the proof that a certain key with a given value exists consists of the 256 hashes of siblings that are necessary to construct the hash chain to the signed tree root.

The non-existence of a key is proven by showing that the value at the position of the hash of the key is the default value (indicating an empty leaf) which is distinct from any real value. Such a proof is large (256 · 256 bits = 8 kB) but can be compressed since the majority of the leaves in a sparse tree are empty. The idea of the compression is that hash values for subtrees where all leaves are empty can independently be (pre-)computed if the default value and the level are known. The map server then omits all values that can independently be computed when transmitting a proof. The sparse MHT in Fig. 3 with the public suffixes com and ac.jp stores entries for the e2LDs example.com and u-tokyo.ac.jp.
Reaping the Benefits of Sparse MHTs. Since each e2LD has a separate tree for its subdomains, adding subdomains only increases the size of the given subtree and thus does not affect proof sizes of other domains. In a regular MHT, proofs of presence have a size of $|\log_2 L|$ where $L$ is the number of leaves (unless otherwise stated, we express proof sizes in number of hash values required to verify the proof). A proof of absence, however, is up to twice as large as it requires inclusion proofs of the previous and next leaf entry. In sparse MHTs, proofs of presence and absence have the same size, since the absence of a domain can be verified with a single inclusion proof. In a sparse MHT, the proof size depends on the structure of the sparse MHT. Only non-default nodes are considered part of the proof since default nodes can be pre-calculated and stored. If the non-empty leaves are uniformly distributed, the average proof size is minimized and the same as in a regular MHT $[\log_2 L]$. In sparse MHTs, adding, updating, and removing entries require changing $[\log_2 L]$ node values on average since each on-path node must be updated.

Proving Consistency over Time. In addition to the sparse e2LD MHT, the map server maintains a consistency MHT with chronologically ordered signed map heads (SMH) coming from the sparse e2LD MHT, as shown in Fig. 3. The consistency tree can prove that the modifications between log revisions are correct, and prove that the log did not include non-existing certificates or exclude existing certificates. In other words, the signed map head represents the map at a given point in time, while the signed consistency head represents the entire history of the map.

D. Selection of Map Servers

Each client must have at least a set of map servers such that each highly trusted CA is supported by a quorum of servers in this set. Typically, each map server would support all major CAs and the quorum would be equal to 1 (especially during the initial deployment of F-PKI). Therefore, clients would only need proofs from a small set of map servers. It is recommended, however, that the set of map servers be slightly larger than what is required by the quorum to permit failover in case a map server is unreachable. When different map servers are contacted, if they give different replies, the client considers all policies signed by highly trusted CAs, as specified in Algorithm 1.

For validation policies where a single set of CAs is highly trusted for all domain names, only one set of map servers is needed. For more complex validation policies, a natural way to define those policies as well as the map servers to use in each case is to use a list of tuples of the following form:

$$\langle N_1, f(N_1), M_1 \rangle,$$
$$\langle N_2, f(N_2), M_2 \rangle,$$
$$\ldots$$

where $N_1$ is a set of domain names, $f(N_1)$ is the set of highly trusted CAs for $N_1$, $M_1$ is the set of map servers to use for $N_1$, and $M_1 \cup M_2 \cup \ldots = M$ (see Section IV-A).

An algorithm to select an appropriate set of servers automatically is presented in Appendix C. The algorithm performs the selection by solving a set multicover problem using a greedy approach. Using this algorithm with the set of all map servers $M$, the user can change validation policies without having to manually select the set of map servers to use.

Although F-PKI is designed to be flexible and expressive, we expect this process to be straightforward, based on a fairly low number of map servers and handled by browser (or OS) vendors rather than end users in most cases (i.e., unless the user wishes to change their default settings).
E. Proof Delivery

Stapling. The first approach for delivering proofs to clients is to have the web server embed them into a TLS extension, similarly to how revocation messages can be delivered with OCSP stapling. This technique does not cause privacy issues but requires that servers be updated to fetch proofs related to their own name periodically from a set of map servers.

Fetching via DNS. In case the web server does not embed relevant proofs from a map server in its response, the client should fetch such proofs on its own. Instead of directly contacting map servers, the client can fetch log data through DNS [41], [61]. For example, to request a proof from a map server mapserver1.net for the domain name www.example.com, the client can send a recursive DNS query for www.example.com.mapserver1.net to its DNS resolver. The DNS resolver finds the IP address of the map server and forwards the client’s query to that address. Acting as a name server, the map server replies with one or more TXT records containing the entry of www.example.com. Finally, the resolver returns the records to the client. The advantages of using DNS for the purpose of delivering proofs from map servers to clients are numerous:

Decentralization: The decentralized and hierarchical nature of DNS falls in line with our objective of avoiding reliance on a global authority.

Caching: Records can be cached at several levels, for a configurable amount of time (TTL), to minimize latency.

Privacy: Although DNS is not in itself a privacy-preserving system, the resolver is always aware of the domain names the client is trying to reach, so the privacy implications of asking a public DNS resolver for extra information about those names are limited.

Timeliness: DNS resolution occurs before the TLS connection is established (to obtain the web server’s IP address), which minimizes perceived page-load time increase.

DNS already supports the delivery of certificate-related data (e.g., through CAA, CERT, and TLSA records). DANE [22], in particular, binds certificates to domain names directly in the name system with the objective of solving the issues caused by rogue CAs. Unfortunately, DANE relies upon DNSSEC for protecting name-to-certificate bindings, and is not widely supported by browsers at the moment. In contrast, F-PKI does not require an authenticated name system such as DNSSEC, because the cryptographic objects we transport through DNS are authenticated independently, i.e., users know the public keys of their trusted map servers.

One concern over using DNS for transporting cryptographic data is that the size of messages sent over UDP is limited by the DNS standard. However, RFC 6891 [19] describes extension mechanisms to enable using UDP for messages with sizes beyond the limits of traditional DNS. The RFC suggests that requestors try initially selecting a maximum payload size of 4096 bytes, which is sufficient to contain a cryptographic proof (such as the ones produced by Trillian) in many cases. If necessary, falling back to TCP enables the transport of larger packet sizes, at the price of increased latency.

Alternative Delivery Methods. Directly fetching a proof about a specific domain from a map server has privacy implications, but there might be situations where the user is willing to send requests directly to a map server. In particular, if the user relies on a public DNS server (such as CloudFlare’s 1.1.1.1 or Google’s 8.8.8.8), and if one of the company operating the name server also operates map servers, then the privacy implications of fetching proofs directly are limited (assuming a secure channel is established between the client and the map server). Another approach would be to use a middlebox (instead of updating the web server) to staple proofs by having the middlebox detect new connections and append relevant data to the TLS handshake (which is in plain text) [58], [42].

F. Certificate Validation

The certificate provided by the web server during the TLS handshake is validated by the client using the normal validation procedure and additional data provided by the map server(s), which may include a list of other certificates for the same domain, a list of certificates for parent domains, and a list of revocations for both. The client will then check revocations, resolve the domain’s policy (considering only policies defined by highly trusted CAs), and verify that the certificate respects the resolved domain policy.

Algorithm 1 shows the certificate validation logic of F-PKI in pseudocode. The validation function takes six inputs: the domain name of the web server, the function $f$ representing CAs highly trusted for that name, the certificate received during the TLS handshake, other certificates for the same domain that the map server may have returned in the previous step, a set of revocations for the above certificates, and the browser’s default policy. The algorithm starts by verifying that the legacy X.509 validation procedure succeeds and that the certificate is not revoked. Then, invalid and revoked certificates are removed from the list of additional certificates. Certificates issued by non-highly trusted CAs are also removed from the list. We then iterate through these certificates and resolve the domain’s policy, considering the strictest of all policies in the received certificate and the filtered list of additional certificates. Finally, the algorithm checks that all domain policies are respected.

VII. Security Analysis

F-PKI provides strictly stronger security guarantees than today’s web PKI since any certificate rejected by a browser today would also be rejected by F-PKI. The simplicity of our certificate validation algorithm (Algorithm 1) allows a direct demonstration of this property. The first step of that algorithm is to run the legacy certificate validation procedure; if it fails, the algorithm returns immediately. This is true even if all map servers are malicious and colluding. We now discuss the additional security guarantees of F-PKI and potential attack vectors.

In the analysis below, we consider the perspective of a user with browser $B$, which uses a set of map servers that do not necessarily support all CAs but periodically fetch the data from all the CT log servers supported by browser $B$. 

---

1We employ TXT records in this design, as well as in our proof-of-concept implementation, in order for F-PKI to be compatible with existing infrastructure, and leave the introduction of a standardized resource record type dedicated to our purposes as potential future work.
Algorithm 1: Certificate Validation

1. $n$: domain name for which the certificate is validated
2. $f(n)$: CAs highly trusted for $n$ (see Section IV)
3. $C$: certificate received during TLS connection
4. $C_{\text{list}}$: list of certificates for $n$ and parent domains
5. $R$: dictionary (key: certificate hash; value: revocations)
6. $P_{\text{browser}}$: default browser policy

```python
function VALIDATE($n$, $f$, $C$, $C_{\text{list}}$, $R$)
    if not legacyValid($C$)
        return false  # legacy validation failed
    for $r$ in $R[\text{hash}(C)]$
        if $r$.isValid()
            return false  # certificate is revoked
    for $c$ in $C_{\text{list}}$
        if (not (legacyValid($c$) and signedBy(c, $f(n)$))
            remove $c$ from $C_{\text{list}}$; continue
    for $r$ in $R[\text{hash}(c)]$
        if $r$.isValid()
            remove $c$ from $C_{\text{list}}$; break
    $p$ ← $P_{\text{browser}}$  # start with default browser policy
    for $c$ in $C$ ∪ $C_{\text{list}}$
        $p'$ ← $c$.policy()  # embedded policy
        for $a$ in $\text{All\_Attributes}$
            if $p'[a]$.isInherited() or $n$ in $c$.names()
                if $a$ in $\text{Bool\_Attributes}$
                    $p[a]$ ← $(p[a] \& p'[a])$
                if $a$ in $\text{Max\_Attributes}$
                    $p[a]$ ← min($p[a]$, $p'[a]$)
                if $a$ in $\text{Set\_Attributes}$
                    $p[a]$ ← $(p[a] \cap p'[a])$
            if ViolatesPolicy($C$, $p$)
                return false  # issuers, wildcard, ...
    return true
```

A. Attack Prevention

Recall that we presented two adversary models in Section IV-A: one for attack prevention and one for attack detection. We start by analyzing the security guarantees that F-PKI provides to a client under the assumption that highly trusted CAs and a subset of map servers are honest and behaving correctly (i.e., Adversary Model 1).

If the client considers CA$_1$ highly trusted for name $N$, and CA$_1$ has issued a certificate $C_1$ (which is valid) for $N$, then the client will not accept any certificate that does not comply with the policies in $C_1$.

The above statement holds because, by assumptions of Adversary Model 1, highly trusted CAs are honest and at least one map server $M_1$ in the set of map servers that the clients uses supports CA$_1$. Therefore, the attacker can obtain a valid certificate from a non-highly trusted CA but cannot hide $C_1$ from the client because $M_1$ (which is honest by assumption) will show the certificate to the client. Also, the attacker cannot define illegitimate policies for $N$ because only the policies defined by highly trusted are considered by the client.

B. Attack Detection (CA Misbehavior)

In Adversary Model 2, we relaxed our assumptions to include the possibility that all CAs and all map servers are malicious. The illegitimate issuance of a certificate by a highly trusted CA cannot be prevented, but it can be detected.

If a client considers CA$_1$ highly trusted for name $N$, and CA$_1$ has illegally issued a certificate for $N$, which is used in an attack, then the domain owner will be able to detect the illegitimate certificate.

CT already allows detecting CA misbehavior. Given that F-PKI is designed to complement the current web PKI, the detection of such attacks is naturally possible. But map servers facilitate the detection of CA misbehavior as they provide a more powerful API than CT: all the certificates related to a given domain can be obtained with a single query, whereas CT relies on external auditors that keep entire log copies to detect fraudulent certificates. These auditors must in turn be trusted to perform this task correctly and, unlike map servers, do not use verifiable data structures. The enhanced transparency that F-PKI provides can then be leveraged by clients and browser vendors to select their highly trusted CAs.

C. Dealing with Malicious Log Servers

Submitting every new certificate to several CT logs is already a requirement. Chrome, for example, requires that each certificate come with evidence that it was submitted to at least one Google-operated log and one non-Google-operated log [27]. By ensuring that certificates are logged by a large and diverse set of log servers, misbehavior can be tolerated. Only if several log servers are compromised and colluding can they hide the existence of certificates and policies from map servers.

Additionally, violation of the append-only property can be efficiently detected by external auditors using the MHT’s properties. Auditors can also verify that log servers include certificates after the maximum merge delay (MMD). F-PKI favors log servers with small MMDs since this allows the map servers to have an up-to-date view of the certificate ecosystem. Furthermore, a gossip protocol [11], [51] can be used to detect a split-view attack in which a log server would consistently provide different views of its MHT to different clients.

D. Dealing with Malicious Map Servers

Each map server returns a single proof for a given (sub)domain including the certificates and possibly revocations of all parent domains. If the user-selected set of trusted map servers provide a complete set of certificates and revocation messages, the user can use the provided domain policies to verify the validity of a certificate. A malicious map server, however, can hide certificates and revocation messages by not including them into its MHTs or providing different views to clients.

A malicious map server could circumvent policies by removing the corresponding certificates. The map server could, for example, remove a parent domain policy that restricts subdomains for which certificates can be issued. However, this attack is only useful if the map server colludes with a CA.
There are two mitigations to reduce the impact of malicious map servers. The first mitigation is the client’s ability to specify which map servers are trusted and how many trusted map servers need to support each highly trusted CA (quorum). This protects against attackers that compromise up to quorum − 1 selected map servers. The second mitigation is, as for CT log servers, that the audit of map servers is facilitated by Merkle hash trees. External auditors can verify the correctness of a map server’s operation, such as the append-only property, completeness with regard to supported log servers, and update interval. As a last line of defense, a gossip protocol can also be used to verify the consistency of map servers.

E. False Positives

Some certificates that would be valid today might be rejected in F-PKI. This stronger certificate validation may raise concerns over false positives. We stress, however, that domain owners must opt-in (by obtaining a certificate with appropriate certificate extensions from a CA) to reap the benefits of F-PKI. A domain owner may forgo strict domain policies to prioritize availability over security. Moreover, Algorithm 1 states that only policies signed by highly trusted CAs are considered (the other certificates are filtered before policy resolution). Therefore, an attacker who compromises a CA that is not highly trusted by the victim cannot falsely define a policy. An attacker who manages to obtain a certificate from a CA that is highly trusted by some clients may cause a legitimate certificate to be rejected by those clients, but this will become evident through logging. The incriminated certificate will then be revoked and the CA in question will suffer the consequences of the security breach. F-PKI thus prioritizes security over availability in case a highly trusted CA is compromised.

F. Denial-of-Service Vectors

Some attacks do not threaten our main security guarantees but could impede the availability of the system. For example, an attacker can launch a resource-exhaustion attack by injecting certificates for e2LDs such that the hash of the injected domain and target domain share the same prefix. This would increase the proof size of the target domain in the sparse MHT. The impact of such attacks is very low due to the complexity of finding alternative inputs, whose hash partially matches the attacked domain’s hash. Mitigations for these attacks are including an unpredictable, regularly updated value in the sparse MHT’s hash calculation or using verifiable data structures with fixed proof sizes, such as sorted-list MHTs. Denial-of-Service attacks and their mitigations are explained in more detail in Appendix D.

VIII. REALIZATION IN PRACTICE

We implemented a map server prototype that manages sparse MHTs using Trillian [26] and distributes proofs to clients via DNS using CoreDNS [15], a DNS server implementation that supports plugins. Additionally, we implemented a browser extension that verifies certificates used in the TLS handshake of every website and blocks connections using non-policy compliant certificates. The web extension is implemented using the Mozilla WebExtensions API [48], a cross-platform JavaScript API for browser extensions. A concrete implementation would staple proofs using a TLS extension analogous to OCSP stapling. For our performance evaluation, we simulate stapling by encoding map server proofs within X.509 extensions. We will make our code base publicly available. In this section, we present two concrete use cases based on domain validation procedures and organization policies. We also evaluate the overhead of our system and the performance of our proof-of-concept implementation. To do so, we created a map server, added over one million certificates from a Google operated CT log (Argon 2019), and evaluated the number of (unique) certificates, proof sizes, and processing times on the map server. Finally, we discuss deployment of map servers in the real world.

A. Use Case 1: Multi-Perspective Validation

We first present a use case that demonstrates how F-PKI can enable security innovation in the CA ecosystem. In particular, an attacker must not be able to downgrade a certificate issued by a highly-trusted CA to a certificate issued by a non-highly trusted CA. In today’s ecosystem, CAs that aim to innovate via stronger methods for domain validation are limited in their ability to provide security benefits to clients and domain owners, because any other vulnerable CA can issue certificates for the same domains.

We demonstrate that our prototype can prevent attacks and favor non-vulnerable CAs, with minimal software and operational changes. We consider a scenario where the attacker wants to perform a man-in-the-middle attack and obtains a bogus certificate from a regular CA through a BGP hijacking attack during the domain validation to trick the CA into issuing the certificate [4]. We simulate this attack by creating a CA certificate, labeling it as non-highly trusted, and signing the bogus certificate with our newly created CA. In order to protect against such attacks, “multi-perspective domain validation” prevents attackers that do not have the capability to perform BGP hijacking attacks on all vantage points simultaneously from obtaining an illegitimate certificate. Let’s Encrypt, for example, has been supporting multi-perspective domain validation since February 2020 [1], [5].

We obtained a certificate from Let’s Encrypt for the domain under attack. Because Let’s Encrypt does not support custom certificate extensions, we defined as our default browser policy the ISSUERS attribute to only contain the public keys of Let’s Encrypt root CA certificates. Our legitimate certificate was automatically submitted to CT logs by Let’s Encrypt and appended to the corresponding trees within a day. We defined Let’s Encrypt as a highly trusted CA, and made sure the two certificates were added to our map server. We then installed our browser extension, added our prototype map server as a trusted map server, and evaluated the man-in-the-middle attack. Before connecting to the attacker’s website, our browser extension now sees in the reply from the map server that the legitimate certificate is signed by a highly trusted CA (Let’s Encrypt) and does not allow any certificate with a different public key to be considered valid. Our browser extension thus blocks the connection to the attacker’s server.

Multi-perspective validation is just one example of a reason to trust a CA over others. The assessment of a CA’s trustworthiness [29], [36] can based on many other criteria, such as compliance to IETF standards [13] and CA/Browser Forum requirements [7].
B. Use Case 2: Organization Policies

Another situation in which F-PKI would prove particularly beneficial is the following. Consider an organization with high security requirements (e.g., a government agency) operating numerous websites and web services. Assume that this organization relies on a single CA to obtain its certificates. The employees of that organization (and other clients relying on it) could take advantage of F-PKI to avoid falling victim to a MITM attack launched by a foreign state that controls a CA, for example.

On the server side, this only requires defining an ISSUERS policy that contains the CA in question (through a certificate extension). On the client side, there are multiple ways to benefit from F-PKI in this situation. The most obvious is for clients to use a browser that supports F-PKI and make sure that the CA in question is highly trusted (or install a “trust package” in which the CA is marked as highly trusted). But there are other options that clients could use if F-PKI is not supported by major browsers. First, the organization can develop a browser plugin. Second, some organizations recommend using their own custom “secure browser” [54], [16]; F-PKI could be built into such a browser with the appropriate validation policies. Finally, if the organization has an app that uses an API over HTTPS, then the app can be configured to support F-PKI for a more secure communication with the API.

C. Performance Evaluation

We now evaluate four performance metrics: (a) latency, (b) proof size, (c) proof generation time, and (d) typical number of subdomains per domain. We used three certificate datasets for this evaluation:

- **Alexa Top 1K**: We scraped ~700 certificates from the 1000 websites of the Alexa top 1K list. We only used this dataset in our latency evaluation to get a relatively small set of commonly used certificates that our test client could sequentially visit.
- **Single CT Log**: We fetched ~1 million certificates from a single log server (Google Argon 2019). We used this dataset to analyze the effects of increasing the total number of certificates on proof generation (time and size), and to evaluate the scalability of our proof-of-concept implementation of a map server.
- **All Google-Operated Logs**: We fetched ~20 million certificates from all Google-operated log server. We used this dataset to infer the typical number of subdomains of each domain.

**Latency.** The metric of interest for us here is the time to first byte (TTFB), which is the duration from the moment when the browser initiates a page request (including the DNS lookup) to the moment when the browser starts receiving HTTP data. We define the TTFB overhead as the additional time it takes from the moment the user requests a website to the moment it starts loading.

For the latency evaluation, we used the CoreDNS implementation in the browser, leads to a TTFB increase of around 50 ms. A native browser implementation would reduce the overhead of both the stapling and DNS methods.

**Stapling.** Figure 4a shows the TTFB overhead using the stapling approach. The processing time for validating the proof has a median of ~10 ms. However, the use of a JavaScript-based web extension, instead of natively integrating the validation in the browser, leads to a TTFB increase of around 50 ms. A native browser implementation would reduce the overhead of both the stapling and DNS methods.

**DNS.** To evaluate the DNS approach, we used the CoreDNS plugin to serve map server proofs as DNS responses, as described in Section VI-E. We measured the performance with and without locally caching the IP address of the web server. Figure 4b shows that fetching a newly generated proof from the map server typically takes less than 50 ms, while validating it typically takes less than 10 ms. In the typical case where neither IP addresses nor proofs are cached, there is almost no impact on user experience (< 1 ms overhead in over 95% of cases). The overhead is negligible since the proof retrieval and validation, which are initiated in parallel when the user requests a website, are often faster than the browser’s regular workflow, i.e., DNS→TCP/QUIC→TLS→HTTP. For

![Fig. 4: Latency incurred by F-PKI operations. Overhead refers to the increase in TTFB, i.e., from the moment the user requests a website to the moment it starts loading.](image-url)
the second case, the IP address is cached in the DNS resolver while the proof from the map server must be fetched. Even in this worst case, a median overhead of \( \sim 20 \text{ ms} \) means F-PKI overhead is typically not noticeable.

**Proof Size.** Figure 5 shows the average proof size (including the inclusion proof) after DEFLATE compression and the size of the hash chains required to prove inclusion or non-inclusion in the Merkle hash trees. We see that the inclusion proofs consisting of MHT hash chains contribute a small, but incompressible part to the proof. As expected, the proof size grows logarithmically with the number of certificates/proofs. In the DNS proof retrieval method, we used the EDNS(0) extension to increase the DNS payload size (DNS over TCP, TLS, or HTTPS should be used for larger proofs).

![Fig. 5: Average sizes of a complete proof (including the set of certificates, compressed) and an inclusion proof.](image)

**Proof Generation.** Figure 6 shows that the average proof generation time of a map server increases linearly with the number of subdomains due to an additional lookup in a sparse MHT per subdomain. The generation time is almost constant given the number of certificates added to the map server. The increase in generation time for all depths is due to an increase in the domain name depth of certificates fetched from the CT log. The virtual machine hosting the map server has 4 cores and 8 GB RAM. The proof-of-concept implementation creates a fully functional Trillian sparse MHT for each domain with subdomains, even if there is only a single subdomain. In a leaner implementation, MHTs for subdomains with few certificates could be generated on-the-fly. It is important to note that within the maximum merge delay (MMD) of a map server, the map server can precompute the proofs, which can already be cached in DNS resolvers.

![Fig. 6: The average processing time of a map server for generating proofs given the total number of certificates added to the map server and the number of subdomains.](image)

**Number of Subdomains.** We fetched certificates from all Google-operated CT logs to analyze the overhead at map servers for generating proofs. Fetching from all Google-operated CT log servers would (eventually) provide us with all Chrome-accepted certificates since Chrome’s CT policy mandates that each certificate be logged by at least one Google-operated log server. The hierarchy of F-PKI requires one additional MHT inclusion proof per subdomain before the public suffix (e.g., .com or .co.uk). We fetched over 20 million certificates and stored the number of subdomains for the certificate’s subject common name (CN) or a subject alternative name (SAN) if the subject common name was empty. Our analysis shows that most certificates (about 78%) have just one or two subdomain levels, which limits database access to at most two queries for fetching an entry’s proof (assuming cached public suffix entries) and three queries for inserting an entry. Virtually all certificates have less than 6 subdomain levels.

**D. Deployment**

F-PKI does not require server updates and only requires CAs to support an additional certificate extension. This facilitates incremental deployment, which is crucial for the success of a proposed infrastructure. F-PKI could be initially deployed with a single map server and then grow to have clients query a larger quorum of map servers. However, for scalability reasons and to distribute the workload, it is possible—and would be sensible—to deploy separate map servers for different subsets of the DNS namespace (for example, having a map server for each public suffix or TLD). Our analysis of certificates contained in Google-operated CT logs indicates that the .com TLD appears in 54.77% of all certificates, whereas the second most common TLD (.net) only appears in 7.29% of certificates. Therefore, the .com TLD should further be split to more evenly spread the workload across map servers. Moreover, as we noted in Section VI-D, different map servers can support different sets of CAs.

In an initial phase of deployment, we also envision that map servers will serve as verifiable monitors, without requiring clients to contact them directly and without enforcing domain policies. Indeed, CT monitors have proved to be unreliable [43]. Making monitors verifiable with the data structures presented for map server would bring even more transparency to the current ecosystem, before F-PKI is fully operational. In later stages, domain owners would start defining policies, before browsers enforce them.

**IX. Discussion**

In this section, we discuss issues that relate to how F-PKI would be used, deployed, and configured in practice.

**A. Soft Fail vs. Hard Fail**

F-PKI clients must obtain a global view of certificates for a domain from map servers. While this is a conceptual change from how certificates are validated today, such a check is necessary for enforcing strong security policies. Revocation has identical requirements: revocation messages must be obtained—periodically or in real time—from a third party. Revocation messages can be fetched by the client or stapled
to the connection by the server. The same can be said of data coming from our map servers. This is inevitable and may come at odds with availability, especially in a world where web servers are rarely updated to support new security enhancements.

Revocation mechanisms (such as OCSP) are often implemented by browsers in a soft-fail mode: if no revocation status can be obtained, the browser assumes that the certificate is not revoked. Adam Langley compares soft-fail checks to “a seat-belt that snaps when you crash” [37]. With a soft-fail approach, previously received certificates should be cached (until expired) so that the policies they contain cannot be downgraded by an attacker capable of blocking connections to map servers. This approach is similar to HSTS [31], OCSP Must-Staple [28], Expect-CT [55], and HPKP [49], in that extra policies must be enforced after the first connection. In hard-fail mode (i.e., when the connection to the web server is completely blocked by the browser because of missing certificate-related data), relying parties must make sure that their trusted map servers are highly available and redundant, to avoid breaking legitimate connections when a single map server goes offline.

This discussion relates to the so-called “criticality” of X.509v3 extensions; a non-critical certificate extension may be ignored if the browser does not recognize it, but must be processed if it does. Our extensions should thus be defined as critical only when F-PKI is fully operational and a vast majority of browsers support it.

B. Configuring Validation Policies

Validation policies must support trust heterogeneity while providing sensible default values and an intuitive interface for users to modify their policies. Operating system and browser vendors, the CA/Browser Forum, and other organizations such as EFF, ICANN, and Mozilla could provide validation policy packages that are either installed by default or can be fetched, possibly modified, and installed by users.

Consider three users with different awareness for security: Alice who does not have strong security awareness, Bob who is aware of the importance of security but is not particularly tech-savvy, and Charlie who is an IT expert who is able and willing to customize his setup. Let $B$ be a browser that supports F-PKI. Alice installs $B$ and does not modify default trust levels. Even such a general validation policy would improve the security compared to today’s web PKI, as it prevents downgrade attacks to HTTP. Indeed, when Alice visits a plain HTTP website, her browser can verify with F-PKI that she’s not under attack by checking the certificates and policies relevant to the domain name in question (see Section IX-C for more details). Bob installs $B$ and a validation policy package that fits his needs. Such a policy package could define as highly trusted CAs that support multi-perspective validation, which prevents BGP hijacking attacks, or national (e.g., American) CAs for websites with a national TLD (e.g., .us and .gov) to prevent attacks by a foreign CA, see Section VI-A for more examples. Charlie installs $B$ and a validation policy package, then adjusts the validation policy, e.g., by adding or removing CAs from the set of highly trusted CAs to provide fine-grained control over the trust decisions. F-PKI thus provides flexibility and tangible benefits to all users.

C. HTTP-Downgrading Prevention

F-PKI has the extra benefit of allowing clients to efficiently verify, when they connect to a plain HTTP website, that no valid certificates currently exist for the corresponding domain, eliminating any possibility of a downgrade attack. If a user visits such a website using the F-PKI browser extension, the extension detects any downgrade attack and redirects the user or blocks the connection. With such a system in place, it becomes possible to both tolerate regular HTTP websites, and block websites that exhibit the characteristics of a downgrade attack. This shows that it is possible to support a legacy protocol without deteriorating the security of a new protocol. HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) aims at solving the same problem, but it must be configured by the website administrator and has limitations as discussed in Section III.

D. On the Multi-Certificate Approach

Following the observation that a PKI should prevent a single CA from issuing illegitimate certificates for any websites, previous work has made extended use of multi-signed certificates [63], [2], [60], [57]. Regrettably, requiring signatures from multiple CAs has drawbacks as well. First, it increases the complexity of the system, particularly if CAs must communicate and coordinate with each other, which is not the case in traditional PKIs. Second, an inherent tradeoff lies in the number of signatures: requiring more entities to certify the same public key, although it increases resilience, may be more expensive and deteriorates performance and usability. Finally, consider a government launching a surveillance campaign through man-in-the-middle attacks: requiring that certificates be multi-signed does not prevent any attacks if the country in question controls a sufficient number of CAs.

F-PKI allows domain owners to use multiple certificates for the same domain name, but gives more flexibility to domain owners without compromising on security. Although our PKI offers a set of strong security guarantees even for single certificates, multi-certificates could be considered an additional assurance of the binding between public key and name. Browsers could even display a special security indicator when a public key is certified by independent CAs, without making multi-certificates mandatory for all domains.

X. RELATED WORK

F-PKI presents similarities with the Perspectives system proposed by Wendlandt et al. [65], in that both aim at giving clients a broader view of existing public keys (to detect illegitimate keys) by relying on a third party. Perspectives allows SSH or HTTPS clients to detect man-in-the-middle attacks by contacting “semi-trusted” hosts called network notaries. We improve upon that approach by using verifiable data structures to reduce the trust put in those third parties and enable an efficient detection of logging inconsistencies.

Among the most comprehensive proposals for redesigning the web PKI from the ground up are AKI [34] and its successor ARPKI [2]. Both systems are based on multi-signed certificates, which could be used to enhance the security of F-PKI even further. ARPKI provides resilience to the compromise of up to $n - 1$ entities, where $n \geq 3$ is a system parameter. PoliCert [60] builds upon ARPKI to let
each domain owner define its own security parameters and policies. PoliCert introduces policies similar to ours, but they are defined in a separate policy file (called SCP) rather than in the certificate as we do here. This file again relies on a multi-signing approach to guarantee the authenticity of the policies it defines. SCPs allow domain owners to specify which CAs they trust, but the approach suffers from a circular dependency as SCP themselves must be signed by CAs, without a guarantee that all relevant policies will always be delivered to the client. DTKI [66] allows domain owners to define a master certificate which signs its TLS certificates. This master certificate is added to a public append-only log using MHTs to provide a comprehensive set of valid and invalid certificates. Neither PoliCert nor DTKI support heterogenous trust on the client side: all CAs are equally trusted.

Syta et al. [57] proposed to address the weakest-link security problem of today’s infrastructure by deploying a single “Cothority” that federates all existing CAs. This cothority would use CoSi, a collective signing protocol that scales to a large number of signers, to allow each CA to detect fake certificates before they are signed. However, the authors do not provide a detailed description of how these certificates would be detected and blocked in practice [57]. One of the challenges of multi-signed certificates is in defining the right threshold number of required signatures. Moreover, it is unclear whether multi-signed certificates would prevent state-level adversaries that control a large number of CAs from issuing illegitimate certificates.

The trust management system by Braun et al. [6] fixes issues in the web PKI and also defines trust levels. However, their approach is different from F-PKI, as they reduce the attack surface (trusted CAs) based on local knowledge and reputation, without proofs of presence/absence of policies and other certificates.

Certificate revocation should be an integral part of any PKI design, but it is a vast and active research area in and of itself [10]. Several revocation schemes have been proposed in academic literature in the last few years, but browser vendors have also developed and deployed their own schemes [45], [37]. Although F-PKI has a built-in revocation mechanism, it could be combined with (or extended by) standalone revocation schemes to improve efficiency or achieve additional security properties. CRLite [38], for example, uses Bloom filters to efficiently distribute revocation messages to clients. F-PKI has similar objectives as CRLite [38, Section 4] but membership lookup is not sufficient for F-PKI because clients need to obtain a comprehensive set of domain policies. PKISN [59] is also a log-based revocation system but focuses on a specific problem: that of revoking CA certificates without causing collateral damage.

Dahlberg et al. [17] proposed light-weight monitoring (LWM), which allows domain owners to perform self-monitoring to detect bogus certificates issued for their domain via untrusted notifiers. LWM uses a MHT data structure based on lexicographically ordered domains similar to our sorted list MHT discussed in Appendix D. This data structure enables efficient generation of inclusion and non-inclusion proofs for certificates. The main difference to F-PKI is that LWM requires constant self-monitoring by the domain owner to detect bogus certificates, requires modifications at the CT log servers, and provides no proactive security guarantees for users.

XI. Conclusion

The web PKI should not only be equipped with means of detecting illegitimate certificates but it should also prevent these certificates from being used in attacks altogether. F-PKI meets this objective while taking into account the challenges that come with deploying such a scheme. F-PKI does not require active CA participation, is backward compatible, supports multiple deployment models (including one that does not require updates on the server side), and prevents impersonation attacks. Yet, it minimizes unintended breakage by letting both domain owners and clients define their own policies. Our prototype implementation, requiring only a browser extension and a map server, demonstrates that such a system can be deployed with minimal changes to the current infrastructure.

Trust is a complex and heterogeneous notion that is only partially captured by traditional PKIs where CAs are omnipotent. We propose a more flexible model in which authenticity is derived not only from a certificate chain but also from a global view of signed statements. With such a view, relying parties can make informed decisions and only consider a certificate authentic when no conflicting statements have been issued by an authority considered highly trusted for the domain name in question.

The map servers we introduce in this paper are used to overcome the deficiencies of CT’s log servers without replacing them: they make it possible to efficiently and verifiably obtain all the data relevant to any domain, for monitoring purposes and for achieving the additional security properties we presented. The data structure we propose for map servers enables clients to efficiently detect policy violations and inconsistencies.

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APPENDIX
A. Abstract Model of F-PKI

The abstract PKI model presented herein is based on the model introduced by Maurer [46] and later extended by Marchesini et al. [44]. We extend it further, primarily to allow relying parties to request policies that cover a set of highly trusted CAs (which is a concept distinct from Maurer’s recommendation levels or confidence values).

The view of a relying party in the public-key infrastructure is modeled as a set of statements. A statement is valid if it is either part of an initial view (axiomatic) or derived from a view using one of the inference rules we present below. Statements can take one of the following forms:

- **Authenticity of Binding**: \( \text{Aut}(X, N, R, I) \) denotes the belief that public key \( X \) is bound to name \( N \) and trustworthy for issuing certificates over realm \( R \) during time interval \( I \). The issuance realm \( R \) is the set of names for which the public key \( X \) is considered authoritative.

- **Certificate**: \( \text{Cert}(X_1, X_2, N, R, I) \) indicates that the owner of public key \( X_1 \) has issued a certificate to the owner of \( X_2 \), which binds public key \( X_2 \) to name \( N \) and attests that the owner of \( X_2 \) is trustworthy for issuing certificates over realm \( R \). This certificate is valid during interval \( I \).

- **Log Trust**: \( \text{LogTrust}(L, S) \) denotes trust in log \( L \) for recording certificates issued by authorities in set \( S \).

- **Proof of Compliance**: \( \text{Proof}(L, X, N, I) \) denotes a proof coming from log \( L \) that public key \( X \) complies with policies defined for name \( N \). This proof is valid during interval \( I \).

- **Compliant**: \( \text{Compliant}(X, N, C, I) \) denotes the belief that public key \( X \) is compliant with all policies defined for name \( N \) by entities in set \( C \) during interval \( I \).

A proof of compliance is to a “Compliant” statement what a certificate is to an authenticity statement: a cryptographic object used by the relying party to derive an actual belief, for a limited amount of time, under the condition that the entity that produced the cryptographic object is trusted for doing so. A compliance statement can thus be derived from a proof of compliance and a log-trust statement as follows:

\[
\text{LogTrust}(L, S), \quad \text{Proof}(L, X, N, I) \vdash \text{Compliant}(X, N, S, I)
\]

Two compliance statements can be combined, in which case the resulting statement covers the union of both CA sets, but is only valid for the intersection of the validity intervals:

\[
\text{Compliant}(X, N, S_1, I_1), \quad \text{Compliant}(X', N, S_2, I_2) \vdash \text{Compliant}(X, N, S_1 \cup S_2, I_1 \cap I_2)
\]

If no valid certificate exists for name \( N \), then the log server may produce a proof where public key \( X \) is null (i.e., \( X = 0 \)). For this reason, in the above equation, \( X' \) may be equal to either \( X \) or \( 0 \).

The new trust level is introduced with the following function:

\[ f(N): \text{set of authorities highly trusted for name } N \]

Authenticity is then derived from the following: (a) an authenticity statement, which specifies the realm \( R_1 \) over which the issuer has authority; (b) a certificate statement, declaring the subject’s name \( N_2 \in R_1 \); and (c) a compliance statement for that name such that \( f(N_2) \subseteq S \):

\[
\text{Aut}(X_1, N_1, R_1, I_1), \quad \text{Cert}(X_1, X_2, N_2, R_2, I_2), \quad \text{Compliant}(X_2, N_2, S, I_3) \vdash
\]

\[
\text{Aut}(X_2, N_2, R_1 \cap R_2, I_1 \cap I_2 \cap I_3),
\]

In contrast to previous models, we do not use a dedicated Trust statement for CAs, to model the concept of “trustworthiness for issuing certificates” [46]. Instead, we include the issuance realm into authenticity statements. This realm would typically be the set of all possible names for CAs (with no name constraints) and the empty set for non-CA
entities. This allows us to bind that realm with the rest of the authenticity statement, and more accurately represent the HTTPS public-key infrastructure as parameters that relate to that issuance realm (the CA bit, name constraints) are defined in the certificate together with other parameters such as the validity period. However, we employ a separate LogTrust statement to model entries in the list of trusted logs that relying parties must establish to support any log-based scheme.

B. Construction of the MHT

Certificates and revocations are added to the map server as follows. First the CONSTRUCTDICTIONARY method in Algorithm 2 constructs a hierarchical dictionary structure that maps domain names to their corresponding certificates and revocations. The root dictionary, denoted by $R$, contains entries for all e2LDs, and each of these entries may contain a dictionary for its subdomains, whose entries can in turn have further subdomain dictionaries, forming a hierarchical data structure with one dictionary level per nested subdomain. Each certificate and revocation is added to every domain listed in either the common name (CN) attribute of the subject field or as dNSName in the subject alternative name (SAN) extension of the (revoked) certificate. After creating $R$, the MHT structures are created or updated in a bottom-up fashion, starting with the subdomain sparse MHTs and finishing with the e2LD sparse MHT root.

Algorithm 2: Construction of the Map Server

```
1 L: list of certificates and revocation messages
2 struct {      
3     list certificates
4     list revocations
5     dictionary subdomains
6 } Entry
7 R: dictionary (key: domain; value: Entry)
8 function CONSTRUCTDICTIONARY(L)
9     for e ∈ L do
10        if ISREVOCATION(e) then
11           c ← e.revoked_certificate
12        else
13           c ← e
14        for d ∈ c.Subject ∪ c.SAN do
15           d ← REMOVEWILDCARD(d)
16           A ← R[e2LD(d)]
17           for p ∈ PARENTDOMAINS(d) do
18              A ← A.subdomains[p]
19           if ISREVOCATION(e) then
20              APPEND(A.revocations, e)
21           else
22              APPEND(A.certificates, e)
23     return R
```

C. Automatic Selection of Map Servers

Let $M$ be the set of map servers, $C$ the set of the client’s highly trusted CAs, and $Q$ the quorum of map servers that minimally need to support each CA in $C$. For a map server $M ∈ M$, let $\text{Cost}(M)$ be the cost associated with map server $M$ and let $\text{SUP}(M)$ be the set of CAs supported by $M$. The task is to find $x_i$ for $1 ≤ i ≤ |M|$ which minimizes the total cost, where $x_M = 1$ if map server $M$ is included in the minimal set of map servers and $x_M = 0$ otherwise.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{minimize} & \quad \sum_{M ∈ M} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
\text{Cost}(M), & x_M = 1 \\
0, & \text{otherwise}
\end{array} \right. \\
\text{subject to} & \quad \sum_{M: c ∈ \text{SUP}(M)} x_M ≥ Q, \quad c ∈ C \\
x_M ∈ \{0, 1\}, & \quad M ∈ M
\end{align*}
\]

This is a set-multicover problem, which is NP-hard as we cannot assume that $M$ has a specific internal structure (e.g., Vapnik–Chervonenkis dimensions [8]). A greedy algorithm can solve the set–multicover problem with time complexity $O(|M| \cdot |C|^2 \cdot Q)$. Algorithm 3 describes this in pseudo-code.

Algorithm 3: Greedy Algorithm for Set Multicover

```
1 M: set of all map servers
2 M_in: set of trusted map servers $M_in ⊂ M$
3 C: set of all CAs
4 C_in: set of highly trusted CAs $C_in ⊂ C$
5 Q: min number of map servers for each CA in $C_in$
6 S: multiset of trusted CAs covered by the map servers
7 SUP(X): set of CAs supported by $X$, for $X ∈ M$
8 ALIVE($X, S, Q$) := $\{∀s ∈ S: c = s\} < Q$, returns true if CA $X ∈ C$ is not yet sufficiently covered in $S$
9 N($X, S, Q$) := $\sum_{c ∈ \text{SUP}(X)} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 1, & \text{ALIVE}(c, S, Q) \\
0, & \text{otherwise} \end{array} \right.$, returns the number of additional CAs covered by selecting map server $X ∈ M$
10 function SELECTMAPSERVERS($M_in, C_in, Q$)
11     $M_{out} ← \text{EMPTYSET}$
12     $S ← \text{EMPTYMULTISET}$
13     while $∃ c ∈ C_in : \text{ALIVE}(c, S, Q)$ do
14         if $∀ l ∈ M_in: N(l, S, Q) = 0$ then
15             return $\text{EMPTYSET}$, There is no multicover
16         $m_{opt} ← \text{argmin}_{m ∈ M_in: N(m, S, Q) > 0} \text{Cost}(m)$, Find best candidate
17         $M_{out} ← M_{out} \cup m_{opt}$
18         $M_in ← M_in \setminus m_{opt}$
19         $C ← C + \text{SUP}(m_{opt})$, Add newly covered CAs
20     return $M_{out}$
```

The algorithm sequentially selects the most cost-efficient map server (Line 16) until the quorum of map servers is achieved for all highly trusted CAs (Line 13). After adding a map server to the minimal set of map servers (Line 17) it is removed from the pool of available map servers to prevent picking the same map server more than once (Line 18). If none of the remaining map servers cover any of the highly trusted CAs and the quorum is not yet achieved, there is no solution (Line 15).

Rajagopalan et al. [52] show that this algorithm returns a set multicover with a cost of $C_{\text{greedy}}$ which compares to the
optimal solution $C_{opt}$ as follows:

$$C_{\text{greedy}} = \sum_{e \in \mathcal{M}} \text{price}(e) \quad (4)$$

$$C_{\text{greedy}} \leq H_{|Q|} \cdot C_{opt}, H_n = 1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{3} + \ldots + \frac{1}{n} \quad (5)$$

$$C_{\text{greedy}} \leq (1 + \ln(|U| \cdot Q)) \cdot C_{opt} \quad (6)$$

The algorithm allows each map server in $\mathcal{M}$ to be associated with a cost. Using a fixed cost for all map servers minimizes the number of map servers. Users could define Cost functions related to trustworthiness of a map server or required network resources. A map server might support few CAs or restricts itself to a small subset of domains and thus produce smaller proofs than large map servers. Selecting several small map servers could result in a smaller overall proof size.

D. Denial-of-Service Vectors and Mitigations

An attacker can attempt to launch a resource-exhaustion attack by injecting certificates for e2LDs such that the hash of the injected domain and target domain share the same prefix. If an attacker finds a domain such that the hash of this domain and the hash of the target domain have a common prefix of length $l$ and there is no other domain in the sparse MHT whose hash has a common prefix of length $l$ with the target domain, then the attacker can increase the proof size of the target domain by 32 Bytes.

The number of prefix collisions an attacker can generate is bounded by the probability of finding a collision $P(l_p = l) = 1 - (1 - 2^{-l})^m$ for each prefix length $l_p$, independently ($m$ is the number of hash values calculated by the attacker). We estimated that, if the attacker can perform $10^9$ hash calculations per second, even after an attack period of one year, the proof size can only increase by 1100 bytes on average.

The first mitigation is to add a unique, unpredictable, and regularly updated tree identifier to the map server and include this identifier in the node, leaf, and domain hash computation of the sparse MHT, similar to the tree-wide nonce $k_n$ used in CONIKS [47, Chapter 3.1].

The second mitigation is to use a different data structure for verifiable logging that produces constant-sized proofs. A sorted-list MHT [39] is an MHT where each leaf points to the domain lexicographically adjacent to its own. A leaf thus consists of its domain $d_1$ and the corresponding entry, and the next domain $d_2$, such that there is no domain $d$ with $d_1 < d < d_2$. Figure 7 shows a sorted-list MHT for the subdomains of c.com. Leaves need not be stored in a specific order as long as each leaf points to the adjacent domain and the domain pairs form a cycle which contains all domains. The hash computation of leaves and intermediate nodes is the same as in a sparse MHT, explained in Section VI-C, except that a leaf’s value additionally contains the DER representation of $d_1$ and $d_2$ between the fixed leaf prefix and the DER representation of the entry. Existence of domain $d$ is proven by providing the hash inclusion proof for the leaf where $d = d_1$. Non-existence of domain $d$ is proven by the inclusion proof for the leaf with the domain pair $d_1$, $d_2$ such that $d_1 < d < d_2$. Proofs in a sorted-list MHT have the same size as regular MHT inclusion proofs ($\lceil \log_2 L \rceil$) in addition to the adjacent domain which is included in the proof. In a sorted-list MHT, updating an entry requires changing either $\lceil \log_2 L \rceil$ or $\lceil \log_2 L \rceil - 1$ node values. Adding and removing entries can, depending on the tree structure and the inserted domain, in the worst case require changing up to $3 \cdot \lceil \log_2 L \rceil$ node values. While both sparse MHTs and sorted-list MHTs provide a verifiable map based on a verifiable log, sparse MHTs produce larger proofs on average but can be updated more efficiently.

Both mitigations incur a performance penalty either through less efficient update operations on sorted-list MHTs or through the necessity of rebuilding the complete tree when changing the tree identifier.

Fig. 7: Sorted-list MHT, as an alternative to a sparse Merkle tree, containing subdomains of c.com.