The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and Systematic Risk

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THE FUTURE OF DISCLOSURE: ESG, COMMON OWNERSHIP, AND SYSTEMATIC RISK

John C. Coffee, Jr.*

The U.S. securities markets have recently undergone (or are undergoing) three fundamental transitions: (1) institutionalization (with the result that institutional investors now dominate both trading and stock ownership); (2) extraordinary ownership concentration (with the consequence that the three largest U.S. institutional investors now hold twenty percent and vote twenty-five percent of the shares in S&P 500 companies); and (3) the introduction of ESG disclosures (which has been driven in the U.S. by pressure from large institutional investors). In light of these transitions, how should disclosure policy change? Do institutions and retail investors have the same or different disclosure needs? Why are large institutions pressing for increased ESG disclosures?

This Article will focus on the desire of institutions for greater ESG disclosures and suggest that two reasons underlie this demand for more information: (1) ESG disclosures overlap substantially with systematic risk, which is the primary concern of diversified investors; and (2) high common ownership enables institutions to take collective action to curb externalities caused by portfolio firms, so long as the gains to their portfolio from such action exceed the losses caused to the externality-creating firms. This transition to a portfolio-wide perspective (both in voting and investment decisions) has significant implications but also is likely to provoke political controversy. In its final hours, the Trump Administration adopted new rules that discourage voting based on ESG criteria and thus by extension chill ESG investing. This controversy will continue.

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As more institutions shift to portfolio-wide decisionmaking, there is an optimistic upside: externalities may be curbed by collective shareholder action. For entirely rational reasons, the new “universal” shareholders who now dominate the market will resist even large public companies who might seek to impose externalities on other companies. Owning the market, the "universal" shareholder will protect the market. Still, this process of resistance may produce frictions, and the disclosure needs of individual investors and institutional investors will increasingly diverge. Of course, not all institutional investors are indexed or even diversified, but those that remain undiversified (for example, hedge funds) logically have the perspective of an option-holder and favor greater risk-taking. Across the board, retail investors have different perspectives and preferences than do institutional investors.

Above all, the combination of high common ownership and institutional sensitivity to systematic risk makes disclosure a far more powerful force. If disclosure was once Brandeis’s best disinfectant, it is now becoming a force that can effect significant social and economic change without the need for judicial or agency intervention.

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I. INTRODUCTION

How should the norms of corporate governance and disclosure policy change (at the SEC and elsewhere) in light of new market conditions and a changing population of shareholders? So framed, this may seem a fairly narrow question, which assumes that one accepts the need for a mandatory disclosure system.¹ Yet, once over that first hurdle, a second question logically follows that is broader and more nuanced: Do all investors have the same informational needs and goals? Or do some have distinctive needs and preferences? This Article will suggest that individual and institutional investors have different needs (largely based on their level of diversification) and that conflicts can arise between them.

Diversified institutional investors are beginning to make voting and investment decisions on a portfolio-wide basis instead of on a stock-by-stock basis. This is a product of the growth in indexed investing and the high level of common ownership among such indexed investors, but it implies in turn that we may be moving from a system of corporate governance that is premised on a “shareholder primacy model” to a system that is premised on a “portfolio primacy model.”² In the future, our largest institutions may knowingly accept, and even cause, losses at some firms in their portfolios if they

¹ Because this topic has been debated at length elsewhere, it will be sidestepped here. For defenses of a mandatory disclosure system, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 *1984) (finding such a system is a cost-effective subsidy and produces positive externalities); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Disclosure Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999).

² This idea of a “portfolio primacy model” should not be confused with a “stakeholder primacy model,” which has been supported by many commentators who want boards and managers to balance the interest of other stakeholders in the corporation with those of shareholders. A focus on maximizing the value of the portfolio is quite different from a focus on sustainability or wealth transfers to stakeholders (even though the two perspectives may overlap).
expect that those losses will be outweighed by correlative gains at other portfolio firms.

One cannot assess this topic without recognizing that we have moved far away from the environment in which the SEC grew up. In fact, three distinct and important transitions are in progress, but each is at a very different stage.

First and most obvious, the “institutionalization” of the market has now been fully realized. Historically, the SEC has always seen its interests as closely aligned with those of the retail investor. It has proclaimed itself “the investors’ advocate,” and public investors have in turn recognized and applauded the SEC’s efforts. This mutual alliance gave the SEC relative political immunity and assured it reasonable budgetary appropriations, despite major swings in policy and times of great stress for other agencies over recent decades.

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3 For this conclusion, see generally Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street: A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance (3d ed. 2003).

4 Professor Donald Langevoort opens an excellent article dealing with the transition from a retail to an institutional market (and its implications for the SEC) by observing correctly in his first sentence: “The Securities and Exchange Commission thinks of itself as the investors’ advocate[.]” Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1025, 1025 (2009). This phrase also appears regularly on the SEC’s website. See, e.g., Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee Meeting (Mar. 8, 2018) (quoting William O. Douglas, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Dinner of the Association of Stock Exchange Firms at the Commodore Hotel 3 (May 20, 1938)), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-stein-2018-3-8 [https://perma.cc/MZ8F-6J44].

5 I do not mean that the SEC always got what it wanted (or needed), but in comparison to other “consumer protection” agencies, including the Commodities Futures Trading Commission and the more recent Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, it has done relatively well. See Seligman, supra note 3, at xviii–xxi (discussing the twentieth century). I attribute this not to uniformly brilliant leadership at the SEC, but to the fact that Congress knows the SEC is popular with individual investors (and voters) in their jurisdiction. Cf. Harvey J. Goldschmid, Keynote Address, The SEC at 70: Let’s Celebrate Its Reinvigorated Golden Years, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 825, 831–33 (2005) (defending the SEC’s responsiveness to public concerns). Here, it is also noteworthy that institutional investors do not vote.
But that is past. The era in which retail investors “owned” companies or moved the trading markets is long gone and “deader than disco.” Today, retail investors account for only a modest minority of the ownership of large, publicly traded companies and probably only around 4% of the trading in NYSE-listed companies.\textsuperscript{6} Stock ownership is now dominated by institutional investors, who are increasingly diversified and often indexed.\textsuperscript{7}

The second transition involves the more recent and extraordinary concentration in stock ownership, with the result that as few as five to ten institutions today may be in a

\textsuperscript{6} The level of institutional ownership increases with the size of the company’s market capitalization (as institutions desire liquidity and thus concentrate on large cap stocks). Thus, if we look at the market value of all outstanding, publicly traded equity securities in the United States, institutions have owned over 62% for a number of years. See Katie Kolchin & Justyna Podziemiska, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, 2019 Capital Markets Fact Book 73 tbl. U.S. Holdings of Equities (2019) (percentages ranged between 64.7% and 62.4% from 2008 to 2018). If, however, we look at the U.S. companies that are among the 10,000 largest companies in the world, this percentage rises to 72% according to a recent OECD report. Adriana De La Cruz, Alejandra Medina & Yung Tang, Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Owners of the World’s Listed Companies 11 tbl. 3 (2019).

For the level of trading in publicly listed equities by retail investors, a recent estimate is 3.68% (based on data from 2010 to 2015). See Ekkehart Boehmer et al., Tracking Retail Investor Activity, J. Fin. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2822105. For an earlier estimate of 2% for trading by individual investors, see Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1105, 1105 (2009). In 2020, the percentage of trading by retail investors saw some increase as the result of market strategies adopted by Robinhood Markets, Inc. and other online brokers, but it remains to be seen whether this is more than a short-term phenomenon. See Caitlin McCabe, Retail Investors Pull Back Trading Activity, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 2021, at A1.

\textsuperscript{7} “Indexing,” or “indexed investing” refers to a passive investment strategy under which the investor invests in a broad market index (such as, for example, the S&P 500 index), seeking not to outperform the market, but only to match it. As later discussed, much empirical research strongly suggests that retail investors cannot outperform the market and that they lose money systematically when they attempt to do so. Indexed investing also reduces trading costs, as it is a “buy and hold” policy, which can minimize tax liabilities.
position to exercise de facto control over even large public corporations. The Big Three institutional investors—BlackRock, Inc., State Street Global Advisors, and the Vanguard Group—now hold over 20% of the shares in S&P 500 companies, vote approximately 25%, and are projected to vote over 40% by 2038.\(^8\) Potentially, this might suggest that retail investors are exposed to domination by institutional control groups,\(^9\) but such a thesis still seems premature. At first glance, little conflict is apparent between diversified institutions and retail

\(^8\) This difference between 20% and 25% reflects the fact that many shares are not voted. For these percentages and for their prediction that the votes cast by the Big Three will rise eventually to 40% or more, see Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, *The Specter of the Giant Three*, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 721, 724 (2019). To give an example of activism in action, just six shareholders control 24% of ExxonMobil; the same six control 26% of Chevron; and they have pressured both companies regarding emissions and climate change. Madison Condon, *Externalities and the Common Owner*, 95 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 10–11, 24 & n.116 (2020). These six included the foregoing Big Three and Northern Trust, Bank of America, and Capital Research Global Investors. *Id.* at 10 n.38. The stock in publicly held companies (in terms of asset values) that is held by the ten largest mutual funds (not all of which are index funds) rose from 46% in 2005 to 64% in 2019, and the corresponding percentages held by the five largest such funds grew from 35% in 2005 to 53% in 2019. *See Inv. Co. Inst., Investment Company Factbook* 46, fig.2.14 (60th ed. 2020).

\(^9\) Much of the literature that is concerned about the growing concentration of shares in the hands of a limited number of institutional owners has focused on the danger that such concentration will be anticompetitive, leading to shareholder pressure in some industries for firms not to compete. *See* Einer Elhauge, *Horizontal Shareholding*, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267, 1268–69 (2016); José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, *Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership*, 73 J. Fin. 1513, 1514 (2018). However, the flip side of this coin is that institutions can use their collective power to induce their portfolio companies to behave in a more socially responsible manner (at least when it will benefit their portfolio on a net basis). In particular, concentrated owners can balance the gains caused to some companies in their portfolio by shareholder activism that restricts or discourages externalities that injure them against the losses experienced by the externality-causing firms in the same portfolio. Although it cannot be assumed that the potential gains will necessarily exceed the potential losses, when they do, it is good business policy to force the internalization of the externalities by the firms causing them. *See* Condon, *supra* note 8, at 10–11.
investors, as indexed institutions are not seeking control.\textsuperscript{10} Still, a potential conflict may be developing: as diversified institutional investors, utilizing their power of common ownership, begin to make decisions on a portfolio-wide basis (deliberately pursuing strategies that boost the stocks of some firms in their portfolios, while depressing the stocks of others to achieve a net gain), they will be taking actions contrary to the interests of undiversified investors in those firms on which they impose losses. Eventually, this conflict will trigger controversy and may necessitate compromises.

Meanwhile, retail investors have moved their investments from “actively managed” (or “stock-picking”) mutual funds to more passive index funds.\textsuperscript{11} Collectively, retail investors seem to have finally recognized that they are poor stock pickers who systematically lose money when they trade actively on their own.\textsuperscript{12} As a result, they have migrated in large numbers to invest in highly diversified institutional intermediaries (led by the Big Three), thereby further increasing ownership concentration.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} For a discussion of constraints on institutional control, see Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, \textit{The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors}, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 61–64 (2019).

\textsuperscript{11} In 2019, index funds (i.e., mutual funds that track a broad market index) for the first time exceeded traditional stock-picking funds, holding $4.27 trillion in assets as compared to $4.25 trillion for traditional stock-picking funds. Dawn Lin, \textit{Index Funds Are The New Kings Of Wall Street}, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 18, 2019, 5:30 AM) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-the-new-kings-of-wall-street-11568799004; see also generally Fisch et al., supra note 10.

\textsuperscript{12} The simple truth is that only a small minority of actively managed funds have outperformed passive index funds. In his Presidential Address to the American Economics Association, Professor Kenneth R. French assembled data showing that, over the period from 1980 to 2006, a passive investor would have on average beaten an actively-trading investor by over sixty-seven basis points per year. Kenneth R. French, Presidential Address, \textit{The Cost of Active Investing}, 63 J. FIN. 1537, 1561 (2008).

\textsuperscript{13} While the Big Three now hold over 20%, some estimate that they will hold 40% or more of the shares in the S&P 500 within two decades. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 8, at 740 fig.3, 741.
Finally, the third important transition involves a new demand among investors (particularly among diversified institutional investors) for a new category of information, known as “ESG” disclosures (ESG is an acronym that stands for “environmental, social, and governance”). Investors who pursue “ESG investing” tend to focus heavily on the environmental and social impact of the firm and on its human capital (including the level of racial and gender diversity at the firm). Although it may be clear why social activists want to encourage such socially relevant disclosures, it puzzles many why diversified institutional investors have been the strongest proponents of increased ESG disclosure. This Article argues that this development is neither strange nor the product of the political sympathies of individual fund managers, but is the consequence of a fundamental economic logic. Put simply, their interest in ESG disclosures flows directly both from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and from the just-noted fact

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14 Many believe that trustees and other fiduciaries “have come under increasing pressure to use environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors in their investment decisions.” See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 381, 384 (2020). Although there may be pressure (particularly in the case of public pension funds, which are politically accountable), this Article will assert that sound economic reasons better explain why fiduciaries at large diversified investors favor ESG principles, and thus why ESG investing is likely to increase for reasons unrelated to political pressure. Interestingly, journalists report that while European oil companies have been pressured by their governments to incorporate ESG criteria into their decisionmaking, the pressure on U.S. oil companies for the same outcome has come exclusively from large institutional investors (and not at all from the government). See Stanley Reed, Europe’s Oil Titans Ramp up Transition to Cleaner Energy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 2020, at B1.

15 For a similar description of ESG investing, see Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 388.

16 Anecdotal evidence is abundant that diversified institutional investors, including the Big Three, are placing significant pressure on many companies, particularly including energy companies to expedite their dates for “carbon-neutrality” and on all companies to achieve greater board diversity. See generally Condon, supra note 8; Reed, supra note 14.

17 For the original statement of this model, see generally William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under
of their high common ownership in portfolio companies. Both of these factors imply that diversified investors should rationally concentrate on systematic risk and generally disregard idiosyncratic risk. Indeed, the best evidence that these diversified investors are conforming to economic logic lies in a new pattern under which they are actively voting and lobbying public companies in common, primarily on ESG-related issues.\(^\text{18}\)

Given high common ownership across a broad portfolio, it becomes rational and predictable that diversified institutional investors will increasingly make both investment and voting decisions on a portfolio-wide basis (rather than simply trying to maximize the value of individual stocks). Proposals made by a diversified institutional investor to the firms in its portfolio will likely produce some winners and some losers, particularly for proposals relating to climate change and other ESG issues. If netting these gains and losses produces a positive result, the indexed investor profits in a way that the undiversified investor cannot duplicate. These opportunities are most likely to arise with respect to ESG issues. The implications of this strategy are sweeping, controversial, and possibly as adverse to the interests of retail investors as they are advantageous to the interests of large diversified investors.\(^\text{19}\)

How should the SEC respond (if at all) to these transitions? Some will argue that the SEC should keep the protection of

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\(^\text{18}\) See generally Elroy Dimson, Oğuzhan Karakaş & Xi Li, \textit{Coordinated Engagements} (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper No. 721/2021, Jan. 2021) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3209072 (finding an “international network of long-term shareholders cooperating to influence firms on environmental and social issues”).

\(^\text{19}\) What is new here is that large institutional investors can profit by deliberately causing losses to some firms in their portfolios if doing so results in greater gains to other firms in their portfolio. Although non-controlling shareholders have never owed a duty of loyalty to the corporations in which they invest, it is hard to think of any comparable instance in which causing losses to some fellow shareholders could benefit them.
the retail investor as its first priority, but this Article is prem-
ised on the belief that the migration of retail investors to in-
dexed investing has been salutary. In fact, the SEC should en-
courage (and even gently push) retail investors to diversify,
shifting their retirement savings to diversified (and, gener-
ally, indexed) institutional intermediaries (i.e., mutual funds
and pension funds). Still, this preference leaves unanswered
our initial question: How do the informational needs of insti-
tutional investors and retail investors differ? How should the
SEC respond to their differing needs?

This question has been approached by others but not di-
rectly answered. A dozen years ago, Professor Donald Lange-
voort focused on the transition from retail to institutional
markets at the time of the SEC’s seventy-fifth anniversary.20
His recommendations seemed to suggest that the U.S. market
would probably become more like the European securities
market, which, as he accurately observed, was characterized
by (1) “light touch” enforcement, (2) a lesser disclosure burden
emphasizing principles-based disclosure, and (3) considerably
less reliance on ex post litigation to enforce disclosure
norms.21 Others challenged him,22 but the greater problem
with Professor Langevoort’s thesis was his unfortuitous tim-
ing. Shortly after he wrote, the 2008 financial crisis broke,
and, in response, even the United Kingdom abandoned “light
touch” regulation. While differences in enforcement intensity
still separate the United States and Europe (and will likely

20 See Langevoort, supra note 4.
21 See id. at 1032–42.
22 See generally Evans, supra note 6.
continue), a greater consensus exists today over the need for stronger enforcement and a mandatory disclosure system.

This Article will therefore skirt the topic of enforcement and instead focus on where the disclosure needs of retail and institutional investors may differ and where they are not being addressed. Here, other transitions in securities law practices are also relevant. Increasingly, private offerings, which are exempt from the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”), have come to rival public offerings as a means for issuers to raise capital. Indeed, in recent years the number of private offerings and the total capital raised in them has exceeded the corresponding figures for public offerings subject to the 1933 Act. Because these exempt offerings require little disclosure (at least as a legal matter), this might seem to imply that...
institutional investors need less information. Yet a confounding fact interferes with this simple conclusion: the character of the disclosure actually provided in offerings done pursuant to Rule 144A (the exemption from registration preferred by large public issuers)\(^\text{28}\) closely resembles the character of the information in a registration statement filed pursuant to the 1933 Act. In particular, the issuer’s disclosures in a Rule 144A offering typically follow the same standardized format. Although no precise metric exists that proves that the same quantum of information is present in both exempt and registered offerings, institutional investors as a group appear to want (and implicitly demand) at least the same information as other investors, and they prefer it presented in the same standardized format. Particularly as they come to make decisions on a portfolio-wide basis, diversified institutions will increasingly want to know and compare the likely impact of ESG-related policy changes on all firms in their portfolio. In contrast, undiversified shareholders, lacking common ownership, are not in a position to make similar inquiries or implement similar portfolio-wide policies.

This Article will offer a number of conclusions that are brief and blunt; to be brief, it is necessary to be blunt. Organizationally, Part II of this Article will focus on the informational needs of institutional investors (and particularly the fully diversified institutions). How do their needs and priorities differ from those of the retail individual investor? Relying receive tends to be quite modest. Cf. Scott Bauguess, Rachita Gullapalli & Vladimir Ivanov, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009-2017, at 34 tbl.11 (finding an average of fourteen investors per Regulation D offering from 2009 to 2017).

\(^{28}\) See Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A. This rule permits private sales to institutional buyers that own and invest at least $100 million in securities of unrelated issuers (in short, the profile of a large institutional investor). Id. § 230.144A(a)–(c). The volume and quality of the disclosure in Rule 144A offerings is much higher than in Reg D offerings to smaller investors, suggesting that large institutions are demanding more information based on their market power. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the Leveraged Loan Market, 39 J. CORP. L. 725, 766–67 (2014).
on the CAPM, it will suggest, first, that institutional investors are more concerned with “systematic risk” than are individual investors and, second, that ESG disclosures address systematic risk to a much greater degree than the SEC has recognized.

Part III will then return to the individual retail investor, who certainly remains on the scene and is the dominant investor in smaller companies that offer less liquidity. What new needs (and fears) might the retail investor reasonably have in the contemporary investment environment? Here, a partial answer will be that, although diversified institutions tend to be tolerant of risk, individual investors rationally have the reverse preference.

Finally, Part IV will turn to the growth of ESG disclosures. Although such disclosures are now becoming mandatory in Europe, they remain optional and voluntary in the United States, with the SEC having stubbornly avoided (at least prior to the Biden administration) taking any firm (or even coherent) position on ESG disclosures. This Article seeks both to

29 The claim here is not that individual investors disregard or ignore systematic risk, but that they are unable to do much about it. Lacking high common ownership, they cannot take meaningful collective action. Although portfolio firms may face different degrees of systematic risk, the retail investor also has choices with regard to a vast range of companies with differing idiosyncratic risks and thus have less reason to focus disproportionately on systematic risk.

30 The SEC has not implemented any mandatory ESG disclosure requirements, leaving them entirely voluntary. For a critical evaluation of the SEC’s positions, see Thomas Lee Hazen, Social Issues in the Spotlight: The Increasing Need To Improve Publicly-Held Companies’ CSR and ESG Disclosures, 23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6–7) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id= 3615327.

Nonetheless, it is abundantly clear that the SEC, under the Biden administration and new Chairman Gary Gensler, has made the promulgation of ESG disclosure standards a priority. For a recent overview, predicting that new ESG standards will appear in 2021, see K&L Gates LLP, SEC To Move Quickly on ESG Disclosures, JD SUPRA (May 17, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/sec-to-move-quickly-on-proposed-esg-9700856/ [https://perma.cc/YKJ5-FJBA]. This Article will not attempt to assess rules that have not yet been drafted.
explain the strong interest of diversified institutions in ESG disclosures and the obstacles that exist under current law to the use of such information by certain fiduciaries. This leads to a final question: How should the SEC assist, encourage, or otherwise influence this process?

II. THE INFORMATIONAL NEEDS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR: HOW ARE THEY DIFFERENT?

It is traditional to begin any discussion that relies on “law and economics” with the mandatory observation that “one size does not fit all.” Not all institutional investors are alike. Some mutual funds and many hedge funds are “stock pickers;” they engage in active trading and believe they can outperform the efficient market. Generally, they are wrong, but not invariably (which could be explained by the fact that some may have access to private information). Today, highly diversified institutional investors have more assets under their management than do institutions engaged in “actively managed” stock picking. Typically these highly diversified investors do not attempt to outperform the market, but rather to mirror it cheaply.

Given their dominance, it is prudent to ask: What kinds of information does the fully diversified investor want? Here, one needs to turn to the CAPM, and its most relevant teaching for our purposes is that diversification reduces “idiosyncratic” risk but not “systematic” risk. Idiosyncratic risk (or non-systemic risk) is the risk that is unique to a company or industry; for example, a company’s (or an industry’s) technology may be outdated or outperformed by a new emerging technology (e.g., natural gas or solar power may become cheaper than

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31 See supra note 12.
32 See supra note 11.
33 For a discussion of index investing and its possibilities, see Byung Hyun Ahn, Jill E. Fisch, Panos N. Patatoukas & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Synthetic Governance, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 476.
34 For a concise discussion of this difference in the standard finance textbook, see RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 178–81 (13th ed. 2020).
oil- or coal-based power). But some risks affect all companies: inflation may increase; a banking crisis may disrupt finance and cut off credit across the economy; or, more recently, a pandemic may require all companies to curtail or suspend operations. Diversification does not offer satisfactory protection from these risks.

The CAPM assumes that the capital markets ignore non-systematic risk in pricing the value of a financial asset (including corporate stock) because diversified investors do not bear that risk. Because diversification is easily achieved with little cost or effort for investors, the price of a stock, according to this model, is set by diversified investors, who need only consider the company’s systematic risk. In effect, if two companies have the same expected return, the fact that one has higher non-systematic risk will not affect their relative valuation to the extent the market price is set by diversified investors who do not bear this risk. Put differently, investors cannot demand a higher return for bearing non-systematic risk that they could have easily diversified away.

The key implication here is that the price of a financial asset will be determined by the asset’s systematic risk compared to the risk of the market as a whole. To be sure, the CAPM has been much criticized and may overstate its case. But, even its critics believe that it points in the right direction and is roughly accurate. The CAPM’s immediate implication for our topic of disclosure policy is that, as the market becomes increasingly populated by diversified investors, these investors will focus primarily on systematic risk. Individual investors may have some concern about systematic risk, but it does not dominate their intentions because there is little they can

35 Id. at 207.
36 For such a critique, see Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 4–5 (1993) (finding the CAPM to be empirically inadequate).
37 In a series of articles, Fama and French proposed supplementing the original CAPM with a few additional factors. See generally Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model, 116 J. Fin. Econ. 1 (2015). Thus, although they believe the CAPM needs to be supplemented, they do not reject it as a starting point.
do about it, and they have a range of other choices. Unsurprisingly, the SEC, as an agency that has always served the retail investor, has never addressed systematic risk in anything approaching a comprehensive manner.\textsuperscript{38}

Let us assume that the CAPM makes assumptions that many will regard as overstated.\textsuperscript{39} Even if we need to take it with a substantial grain of salt, the CAPM still legitimately implies that the SEC needs to modernize its disclosure policy and focus more seriously on systematic risk. This does not mean that the SEC should ignore non-systematic risk (because many investors will remain less than fully diversified), but it does suggest that diversified investors, who constitute a majority of the market, have an unmet disclosure need.

What has the SEC done to this point with regard to ESG disclosures? The short answer is very little. In 2018, institutional investors representing over $5 trillion in assets under management submitted a rulemaking petition to the SEC requesting it to mandate ESG disclosure standards for public companies.\textsuperscript{40} “[M]ore than 60 governments and international [organizations], including the United Nations . . . [and] the International Organization of Securities Commissions,” have promulgated ESG standards,\textsuperscript{41} but the SEC has resisted these pressures (probably motivated by countervailing pressures from corporate issuers). The SEC’s principal expressed concern has been the danger of information overload that would inundate investors with low-quality information and often inconsistent metrics and rankings.\textsuperscript{42} To date, the SEC’s only

\textsuperscript{38} For a discussion of some of the pressures against comprehensive regulation of systematic risk from the financial sector, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 818–22 (2011).

\textsuperscript{39} See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{40} For a fuller description, see Virginia Harper Ho & Stephen Kim Park, ESG Disclosure in Comparative Perspective: Optimizing Private Ordering in Public Reporting, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 249, 253 (2019).

\textsuperscript{41} Id. at 252–54 (footnotes omitted).

\textsuperscript{42} For an evaluation of this danger and an answer to it, see generally Virginia Harper Ho, Disclosure Overload?: Lessons for Risk Disclosure and ESG Reporting in the Regulation S-K Concept Release, 65 VILL. L. REV. 67 (2020).
real action has been to update its standards under Regulation S-K (which specifies the disclosures mandated in SEC filings), but here it has limited itself to extremely general “principles-based disclosures.” Meanwhile, the largest U.S. institutional investors (including the Big Three) have gone well beyond adopting general policies and have directly engaged major companies on climate change issues and have even sued them.

43 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1–1406 (2020).
44 In 2020, the SEC “modernized” its requirements with respect to Items 101, 103 and 105 of Regulation S-K but required only very general “principles-based” disclosures. For example, with respect to Item 101 (which requires a description of the issuer’s business), it did address the “social” component of ESG, but only in a minimal way by instructing issuers to provide:

A description of the registrant’s human capital resources, including the number of persons employed by the registrant, and any human capital measures or objectives that the registrant focuses on in managing the business (such as, depending on the registrant’s business and workforce, measures or objectives that address the development, attraction and retention of personnel).

Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,726, 63,760 (Oct. 8, 2020) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt 229). This brief statement was the SEC’s only reference in this release to the goals of diversity and affirmative action. Thus, although Item 101 now at last addresses the social component of ESG, it does so only in a minimal way. Not surprisingly, some observers have reported that more investors are concerned about “the under-disclosure of material information” about human capital, not over-disclosure. See Ho, supra note 42, at 73–75 (emphasis deleted).

45 For a description of a forceful intervention by a group of six large institutional shareholders (including the Big Three) that succeeded in causing both ExxonMobil and Chevron to support climate change reforms that these firms had previously opposed, see Condon, supra note 8, at 25. Not only are broadly diversified institutions seeking more ESG disclosures, they are also acting upon them as well, sometimes by suing portfolio companies. See Alexander I. Platt, Index Fund Enforcement, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1453, 1458–59 (2020). In contrast, diversified investors would be wasting their funds to seek to improve or mitigate idiosyncratic risks. For example, if they sought to improve operating performance at Ford, the resulting gains, if any, might only be offset by a stock decline at GM, which would lose market share to Ford.
This activism of diversified institutional investors on ESG issues contrasts sharply with their general passivity on firm-specific business issues, and this disparity can only be explained in one way: diversified institutional investors are deeply concerned about whether the market is accurately incorporating climate-change-related risks into asset prices.\textsuperscript{46} Although diversified investors are generally indifferent to idiosyncratic risks (from which diversification protects them), they have little defense against systematic risk.

Climate change probably presents the clearest example of systematic risk. Although it will not affect all companies the same (i.e., the risk is heterogeneous), investors cannot escape it through diversification. That is, there is no obvious class of companies whose stock will go up as the result of global warming so as to compensate diversified investors for those other stocks that go down.

Given that they are unavoidably exposed to this risk, diversified investors rationally want disclosures that enable them to estimate its impact on their portfolios. Further, they may want to take actions (either by voting, litigation, or persuasion) to induce changes that reduce such risk even if they cause losses to some companies in their portfolio—so long as the action taken implies greater gains than losses to their portfolio. A clear indication of this new activism came in

\textsuperscript{46} For the view that the market is not doing this and a careful specification of the reasons why it tends to misprice climate-related and ESG risks, see generally Madison Condon, \textit{Market Myopia’s Climate Bubble, Utah L. Rev.} (forthcoming 2021) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782675. Diversified institutions have less concern about whether the market is mispricing information relating to idiosyncratic risk. Not only are these institutions unable to analyze all their portfolio companies in detail, but even if they discovered mispricing of firm-specific information and sought to exploit it, it is not clear that such efforts would benefit them on a portfolio-wide basis. For example, if activists convinced an index fund that Ford should be pressured to sell a marginally profitable division (and Ford did so under pressure, thereby increasing its market share and stock price), it does not follow that this effort would necessarily benefit the index fund, as the market share gained by Ford might only be lost by General Motors, another portfolio company of the index fund. In short, from the portfolio-wide perspective, this was only a zero-sum transfer which required the index fund to incur some transactional costs.
January 2021, when BlackRock’s CEO, Larry Fink, wrote to the CEOs of major public corporations asking them to commit to a “goal of net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.”

This is a costly change that will adversely impact earnings at many companies, but it seems intended to benefit other firms in BlackRock’s portfolio even more, and thus may result in a net benefit for BlackRock.

Another example of a systematic risk that has concerned institutional investors and the SEC involves the COVID-19 pandemic. Here, the SEC has been actively seeking increased disclosure, asking all public companies to explain how the pandemic is affecting them. Obviously, pandemics represent a form of systematic risk because diversification again cannot protect an institution’s portfolio.

Although the examples of climate change and a pandemic are clear, skeptics may respond that not all ESG disclosure relates to systematic risk. For example, ESG disclosures often focus on racial diversity and inclusiveness. Skeptics may doubt that such disclosures relate at all to systematic risk disclosure. Yet, over the long run, these disclosures arguably relate to the potential viability of our corporate system. If our corporate system cannot offer inclusiveness and promote diversity, it may subject itself to a political risk that capitalism (or, at least, contemporary corporate governance) will be...
politically challenged and could conceivably yield to a more state-run system of corporate governance. To some degree, such a transition seems to be already occurring in Europe and the United Kingdom.\footnote{Nations can be located on a corporate governance continuum ranging from “shareholder-centric” systems (of which the United States is the leading example) to “stakeholder-centric” systems (into which category most European nations fall). See Katharine V. Jackson, \textit{Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis}, 7 \textit{Hastings Bus. L.J.} 309, 309–11 (2011). In Europe and the United Kingdom, there has been recent movement towards increasing the rights of, and duties owed to, stakeholders. One step in this direction has been the recent popularity of “stewardship codes” for investors. See Jennifer G. Hill, \textit{Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes}, 41 \textit{Seattle U. L. Rev.} 497, 497–98 (2018); Jennifer G. Hill, \textit{Shifting Contours of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties and Norms in Comparative Corporate Governance}, 5 \textit{U.C. Irvine J. Int’l, Transnat’l & Compar. L.} 163, 175–78 (2020); Jackson, supra, at 387–89.} Again, diversification could not adequately protect investors against this risk of political upheaval, which could directly threaten the traditional investor’s goal of shareholder wealth maximization.

One last point about “systematic risk” needs to be underscored: for diversified investors, systematic risk overlaps heavily with securities law’s bedrock concept of materiality. Because systematic risks cannot be diversified away by investors, information about such risks is more material to diversified investors than information about “idiosyncratic” risks, both because institutional investors are in theory exposed only to “systematic risk” and because they (and, as a practical matter, only they) may be able to take corrective action to minimize such risk.\footnote{For discussions of the magnitude of climate change as a leading systematic risk and investors’ concerns about it, see \textit{Inst. for Sustainable Leadership, Univ. of Cambridge, Unhedgeable Risk: How Climate Change Sentiment Impacts Investment} 5 (2015); Stefano Battison et al., \textit{A Climate Stress-Test of the Financial System}, 7 \textit{Nature Climate Change} 283, 288 (2017). For our purposes, “materiality” is defined for the federal securities laws in remarkably broad language, which was set forth in \textit{Basic Inc. v. Levinson}, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (“[A]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976))).} Indeed, as later discussed, the major
diversified institutions have begun to take direct action on a coordinated basis (through litigation, proxy fights, or the threat of exit).52

Ultimately, the informational needs of the diversified institutional investor depend on the role that it is willing to assume. For some time, commentators have presented the diversified investor as being “rationally reticent” and willing to act only on issues framed and presented by non-diversified activist investors.53 Understandable as this view was, it no longer conforms with the current reality in which the Big Three (and others) are taking a leadership role in pressing portfolio companies for systematic risk-related changes. BlackRock, for example, showed little “reticence” in insisting that its portfolio companies adopt a “net zero” emissions policy by 2050. Thus, it is necessary to recognize that, within the boundaries set by systematic risk, indexed investors can indeed be activists—even (because of their greater scale) potentially more effective activists than the hedge funds.

III. THE RETAIL INVESTOR: THE RELEVANCE OF OPTION PRICING THEORY AND COMMON OWNERSHIP

Two different conflicts are arising between institutional and retail shareholders, which have not been recognized or addressed by existing SEC policy.

A. Activism and Option Pricing Theory

Institutional and individual investors recurrently disagree over an important issue of business policy. Specifically,
institutional investors object to attempts by the corporate issuer to diversify or to hold a conglomerate-like portfolio of unrelated companies in different industries. Both because the institutional investor can easily diversify its own holdings and because it is redundant to diversify on both the investor and corporate levels, diversified investors want to streamline the corporation’s portfolio of investments and sell or spin off divisions or subsidiaries that are outside the corporation’s core line of business. From an economic perspective, only synergies between divisions can justify a corporation in holding investments in multiple unrelated companies. Still, many individual investors do not diversify and therefore do not share this policy preference. Why do they not diversify? This presents something of a mystery, but many investors may lack adequate resources or may prefer higher risk, or their failure may be the product of simple ignorance. As a result, such undiversified individual investors logically benefit from corporate diversification, as it reduces the risk of the investments they hold.

Today, activist hedge funds regularly “engage” target corporations, buying a five percent or slightly greater stake and then seeking to pressure the target into reducing its degree of diversification (and simultaneously increasing leverage, often through stock buybacks). Generally, these campaigns produce an immediate positive stock market reaction when the activist hedge fund crosses the five percent ownership threshold and files the mandatory Schedule 13D (which typically announces both its ownership position and its proposed plans to reduce diversification and increase leverage). Although this

54 See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Behavior of Individual Investors, in 2B HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1533, 1560–62 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2013).

55 For a detailed discussion of this pattern, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016).

56 Although an intense debate continues over the long-term impact of hedge fund activism, a consensus exists that the filing with the SEC (usually on Schedule 13D) of a disclosure announcing that the activist has taken a five percent (or greater) position in the stock of a publicly held company is associated with a positive abnormal stock return. See Alon Brav et al.,
stock price reaction suggests that shareholders as a group are made better off by these campaigns, undiversified investors may still be made worse off. As “buy and hold” investors, individual retail investors are unlikely to sell and probably will continue to hold stocks that are now subject to higher risk at the corporate level because of reduced diversification. Does the increase in expected return justify this increased risk? No simple conclusion is warranted here.

Because the CAPM assumes that the market price of a widely traded stock is determined by the interaction of large, fully diversified institutional investors, the small retail investor will not have much impact on the stock price (even if some such investors do sell). Because the stock price is thus unlikely to decline (as institutional investors are happy with this new trade-off of risk and return), these individual investors need disclosure that makes clear to them that they may now be subject to greater risk. Arguably, if the SEC continues its traditional policy of protecting retail investors, the SEC should mandate disclosures that warn these investors of this increased risk. Effectively, the SEC should use this opportunity to prod investors toward greater diversification.

_Hedge FundActivism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance_, 63 J. Fin. 1729, 1736–37, 1756–60 (2008). Beyond that point, empirical conclusions are contested.

57 Retail investors tend to be “buy and hold” investors (who do not trade actively), John C. Coffee, Jr., _Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation_, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1559 (2006), probably because they face higher trading costs than institutional investors who, because they trade in volume, receive quantity discounts.

58 The taste for risk is subjective and individuals differ. Thus, although a hypothetical five percent stock market gain might induce some (or even most) investors to accept the increased risk associated with increased leverage or reduced diversification, it may not please all shareholders. Also, the increased risk may not be evident to many retail shareholders (who see only the increased stock price). This conclusion will be regarded as heresy by neoclassical economists who assume that all shareholders favor policies that increase the share price. _See, e.g.,_ FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. PISCHEL, _The Economic Structure of Corporate Law_ 69–71 (1991). This, however, ignores that rational investors will focus on the risk-return ratio and vary in their reactions.

59 _See supra_ Part II.
Nothing in existing disclosure rules provides for anything resembling such disclosure or such advice.

This point about the increased risk associated with hedge fund activism needs to be generalized. The famous (and Nobel Prize-winning) work of Fischer Black and Myron Scholes on option pricing theory begins from their insight that, once a public company takes on significant debt, its common stock can be modeled (and is best understood) as an option on the corporation’s assets.60 That is, the common stockholders collectively hold an option, which, on the maturity of the debt, allows them either to let the corporation default on its debt (which is the equivalent of letting their option expire) or to pay the debt off (which is the equivalent of exercising their option). In this view, the “real” owners of the corporation are its debt holders, who have no choice (because the shareholders have limited liability and cannot be held personally liable if the firm defaults on its debt). Unlike the debtholders, the stockholders do have the choice of (1) allowing the company to default (and thus turning the company over to the creditors) or (2) paying off the debt (and in effect exercising the option). Presumably, they will make the choice that maximizes their own interests (possibly at the expense of creditors and other stakeholders).

The immediate relevance of this point involves the incentive effects on the option holders (i.e., the common shareholders). As option holders, they can be expected to act rationally so as to maximize the value of their option. What does that imply? Under the Black/Scholes model, the most important factor in determining the value of an option is the variance in the value of the underlying asset (here, the corporation’s assets).61 In short, the greater the variance in expected corporate returns, the greater the value of the option. This may seem counter-intuitive, because greater variance in expected returns is unattractive to debtholders and reduces the value

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60 Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 637, 649–50 (1973). For an accessible explanation of option pricing, see Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, (Some of) The Essentials of Finance and Investment 245–57 (1993).

61 See Black & Scholes, supra note 60, at 650–52.
of the corporation’s assets in their hands. Still, a critical insight of the option pricing model is that the common stockholders, as the holders of an option, can increase the value of their option by increasing the variance associated with the corporation’s assets and investments. More bluntly, this means that by increasing the riskiness of the corporation’s investments, they benefit themselves (as the option holders) at the expense of the corporation’s creditors and other stakeholders.

Thus, we now have a scenario for opportunism by the shareholders: if they take on riskier investments or leverage up the company, they gain and the creditors lose. Of course, creditors can resist by insisting on protective covenants in loan agreements and bond indentures, but these are in declining use. Even if creditors could negotiate contractual protections against increased leverage, it is much harder to prevent their corporate borrower from otherwise taking on riskier investments or making higher-risk bets. Such restrictions would be hard to draft and would be resisted intensely by corporate managers because these restrictions would tie their hands, denying them needed flexibility over an extended period.

From the standpoint of the Black/Scholes model, the behavior of activist hedge funds in seeking to reduce corporate diversification and increase leverage (or otherwise withdraw funds from the firm) makes perfect sense. The hedge funds are essentially seeking to increase risk to benefit the majority of shareholders at the expense of creditors and other stakeholders. Although the hedge funds are not themselves diversified, they know that they will be rewarded by an immediate share price increase if they propose an action (such as increasing leverage or reducing diversification) that will benefit the diversified shareholders that they are serving.

62 Debt covenants became disfavored in the 1980s, and empirical surveys found that large public corporations had successfully avoided them. See Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413, 426 (1986); William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 140–42.
Although there has been a voluminous and heated debate over the practices and ethics of activist hedge funds, this debate has usually been framed in terms of whether hedge funds have a “short-term” perspective that contrasts with the allegedly “long-term” perspective of the target corporation’s managers. This misses the larger point. Without denying that there could be differences in the time frames favored by activist shareholders and managers, it is simpler (and theoretically more elegant) to focus instead on the enhanced value to the option held by the shareholders as the result of accepting increased risk.

Possibly, some will respond: If this desire to increase the risk level is so obvious, why didn’t the target management do this themselves and profit from accepting increased risk and lesser diversification? Why have only activist hedge funds proposed this? Here, there is a simple answer: corporate managers have firm-specific human capital invested in the firm, which they cannot easily hedge. Put more simply, shareholders hold multiple stocks, but managers have only one job. Managers will rationally resist the risk of increased leverage or diminished diversification because it exposes them to potential bankruptcy and the loss of their human capital. Thus, shareholders make superior risk bearers.

Today, activist hedge funds have learned that if they propose a specific scenario for increasing risk (such as by

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63 For representative positions, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015); Coffee & Palia, supra note 55; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870 (2017).

64 Standard compensation formulas in the hedge fund industry (which typically annually award hedge fund managers twenty percent or more of the fund’s gains) do give hedge fund managers considerable reason to focus on the short run. See Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Long-Term Bias, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 104, 133–34. Moreover, hedge fund managers are aware that their investor clients can easily move funds to another hedge fund if they do not deliver immediate gains. In contrast, corporate managers are conventionally assumed to have a longer term (and more risk-averse) perspective because of their locked-in human capital.
following a riskier investment policy, selling off corporate assets that mainly provide unneeded diversification, or increasing leverage, buybacks, and dividends), they will find it easy to sell this policy to institutional shareholders. This motivation to increase risk and reduce diversification did not begin with activist hedge funds. “Bust-up” takeover bidders did the same thing in the late 1980s. But these bidders were chilled by the poison pill, state takeover laws, and judicial developments. The evidence is clear that activist hedge funds can today compel target managements to negotiate their demands and place the hedge fund’s agents on the target’s board. More importantly, the activist fund spends far less, fares far better, and achieves results far more quickly than the traditional hostile bidder. As a result, the activist hedge fund has largely replaced the hostile bidder, but the implications for the undiversified retail investor remain the same: increased risk is generally contrary to their preferences.

Although the clear winners here are diversified shareholders and activist funds, the clear losers are not only creditors, managers and stakeholders. In addition, the undiversified retail investor is a bystander whose fate is less easily summed up. This shareholder may sometimes win and sometimes lose, depending upon how much risk the shareholder is willing to

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65 For a contemporary discussion of these takeovers, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1986).

66 During the 1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of the poison pill in Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), and after Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) it seemed (at least for a time) that the “just say no defense” would be upheld in Delaware. Possibly as a consequence, hostile takeovers declined following 1990, and other techniques (including hedge fund engagement) grew. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 55, at 553, 554 & n.24, 555–57 (tracing the rise of hedge fund activism).

67 For a fuller discussion of the tactics and success of hedge fund campaigns, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Joshua R. Mitts & Robert E. Bishop, Activist Directors and Agency Costs: What Happens When an Activist Director Goes on the Board?, 104 Cornell L. Rev. 381, 395–408 (2019).

68 See id. (noting that the costs of activist campaigns “are growing” but also that activists can extract private benefits from target firms).
accept. The bottom line then is that retail shareholders are affected much more than they realize, and they may bear more risk than they understand or want.

How (if at all) should the SEC protect these investors? The long-term answer may be that retail investors should be prodded (or at least encouraged) by the SEC to diversify. But the SEC’s ability at investor education is open to doubt. The public does not respond well to the government’s paternalistic advice. To the extent that investor education falls short (as I expect it will), the second-best policy may be to require greater disclosure that alerts the individual investor to the risk and dangers associated with hedge fund campaigns, reduced diversification, and increased leverage. This policy, of course, can only be pursued on a case-by-case basis, but the end goal should be to encourage greater diversification by retail investors.

B. Common Ownership and the Undiversified Retail Investor

As noted earlier, BlackRock has announced that it will push all its portfolio companies to comply with a “net zero” emissions goal by 2050. For companies engaged with fossil fuels (oil, gas, or coal), this will be a considerable challenge that could imply a period of continuing losses (or at least greatly reduced earnings). Nor will BlackRock’s challenge be the only one that many companies receive with respect to climate change. Other asset managers may assert challenges on social or governance issues (including diversity). Because indexed investors must remain invested in these indexes (as they promised their investors that they would conform to them), there is little possibility that these investors will “exit”

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69 Unquestionably, retail investors need investor education, but it is highly questionable that the SEC can teach this course successfully. Part of the problem is that for every dollar spent by the SEC toward this end, far more will be spent by mutual funds, investment advisers, and the advocates of crowdfunding, all predicting that they can find you the next Microsoft or Apple. More likely candidates to teach the value of diversification are the private proponents of diversification, such as, most notably, Vanguard.

70 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
and disinvest if disappointed with the portfolio company’s response. By definition, indexed investors are there to stay, although increasingly they may have a hostile relationship with management.

Ideally, these policies will prove profitable for the asset managers who are asserting them, but there is every reason to believe that undiversified retail investors will be caught between the rock and the hard place. To such investors, BlackRock’s challenge is essentially a threat. Although political and even legal challenges to BlackRock’s strategy are possible, the immediate need is for disclosure that explains the impact of its policy to retail investors. How much will it cost shareholders to reduce the company’s emissions level to zero? What actions might a BlackRock or other asset manager take to enforce its position or discipline deviant firms?\(^{71}\)

The SEC does not yet seem to have thought through the kinds of disclosures that are necessary or desirable from both sides once such an adversarial relationship develops.

IV. THE SPECIAL CASE OF ESG DISCLOSURES: CAN FIDUCIARIES LAWFULLY USE THIS INFORMATION?

Although the term “ESG” is of fairly recent vintage, the concept has been around for forty years or longer.\(^{72}\) Still, a paradox remains: Even if investors want ESG information, can their fiduciaries, acting for them, make decisions based on such criteria with regard to either investing or voting? The problem is that some fiduciaries are legally barred from relying on ethical considerations, except under special circumstances. Conservatives have long argued that fiduciaries (and particularly trustees subject to ERISA or common-law standards) are not permitted to rely on ethical or moral judgments (or socially desirable goals) unless they can conclude, based on

\(^{71}\) Here it should be recognized that even passive asset managers, such as BlackRock, also run actively managed firms that could exit from a non-complying portfolio firm, thereby driving down its stock price even further.

\(^{72}\) For a good history of the rise of ESG investing, see Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, \textit{supra} note 14, at 395–99.
clear evidence, that pursuit of such goals will work to the financial advantage of their beneficiaries.\textsuperscript{73} From this perspective, ESG data can be considered by fiduciaries only if they can reasonably find that it satisfies a risk-return test that enables them to improve their portfolio’s overall risk-adjusted return.\textsuperscript{74} But this is a more complex exercise than it initially appears. This Part will argue that the SEC can play a useful role in resolving this dilemma.

A. A Brief History of ESG

The idea that investors should consider the social behavior and impact of the companies in which they invest has a long history, and some trace it back as far as the sermons of John Wesley, the founder of the Methodist Church, who advised his followers that they could not ethically invest in companies that profited from the slave trade.\textsuperscript{75} Similarly, some mutual funds have long employed a social screen to winnow out those companies that make anti-social products. The first such U.S. fund, Pioneer Investments, dates to 1928 and remains in business today, continually stressing its commitment to Christian values.\textsuperscript{76} The broader concept of socially responsible investing (or “SRI”) flowered in the 1980s, when the issue of South African apartheid provoked a crisis and caused ethical investors to seek to disinvest from companies that were active in South Africa.\textsuperscript{77}

Such ethical investing was always in tension with trust fiduciary law, which requires a trustee to consider only the

\textsuperscript{73} This debate can be easily traced back to the 1980s, when the key issue involved divestment campaigns aimed at South Africa’s apartheid policies. For the conservative view that social investing was illegitimate, see generally John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 72 (1980). Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff appear to be following in this tradition (with some modifications). See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 448–53.

\textsuperscript{74} This is essentially the position of Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 453.

\textsuperscript{75} Id. at 392.

\textsuperscript{76} Id. at 392–93.

\textsuperscript{77} Id. at 393–95.
interests of the beneficiary. This “sole interest” rule is intended to protect beneficiaries from fiduciaries who might subordinate the beneficiaries’ financial interests to those of political or social groups with whom the fiduciary sympathizes. Legally, the “sole interest” rule implied that the trustee had to prefer investments with superior risk-adjusted returns regardless of the social impact of the investment. Nervous that they might run afoul of the law, many risk-averse fiduciaries shied away from SRI investing.

To bring SRI investing into the mainstream, something had to be done, and clever lawyers predictably devised an answer. Conceptually, they “rebranded” SRI investing and converted it into ESG investing by asserting that consideration of the “governance factors” associated with public corporations would enable the fiduciary to identify superior investments and enhance risk-adjusted return. By adding governance to

78 Under what is known as the “sole interest” rule, a trustee must “administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.” Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78(1) (Am. L. Inst. 2007). Under a comment to this section, the Restatement adds that “the trustee has a duty to the beneficiaries not to be influenced by the interests of any third person or by motives other than the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.” Id. § 78(1) cmt. f; see also Unif. Tr. Code § 802(a) (Unif. L. Comm’n 2003). If the trustee acts based on mixed motives, “an irrebuttable presumption of wrongdoing” arises. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105, 1114–15 (1988). However, a plaintiff will still have to prove damages, which can be a considerable hurdle.

79 One recent study surveying 310 fiduciaries found that forty-seven percent believed that the use of ESG criteria either conflicted or might conflict with their fiduciary duty. See Pi360, ESG Survey for Pi360 Designees 2 (2019). For other recent studies, see Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 385 n.7.

80 I borrow the term “rebranding” from Schanzenbach and Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 388. A key moment in this semantic transition from SRI to ESG came in 2005 with the release of a report sponsored by a UN working group and prepared by the international law firm of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, which asserted that ESG investing was not only consistent with the trustee’s fiduciary duties, but was “arguably required in all jurisdictions.” United Nations Env’t Programme Fin. Initiative, A Legal Framework for the Integration of Environmental, Social and Governance
the mix, they argued, one not only did good (ethically), but one also did better (financially). This in turn enabled law firms to opine to their clients that ESG investing was fully compatible with the trustee's fiduciary obligations. A few went even further and suggested that consideration of ESG factors might be mandatory.

Necessity is often the mother of invention, and the modest claim here advanced is merely that the need to calm the fears of risk-averse trustees best explains the addition of “governance” factors to environmental and social ones in order to convert SRI into ESG. Whatever the motive, this rebranding seems to have worked and has rapidly brought ESG into the investment mainstream. As of late 2019, some 1,900 asset managers (including some of the world’s largest) have signed the Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) endorsing ESG investing; hundreds of ESG indexes have been published that provide ESG ratings on individual companies; and Delaware and Oregon have amended their trust law to

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81 An influential study in 2003 by Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick gave considerable credibility to the claim that governance factors did influence firm performance. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 114–29 (2003); see also Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 785 (2009) (constructing an “entrenchment index” and finding that increases in this index of six governance features were associated with significant reductions in firm value). The debate over indexes has continued and been robust, but both sides believe governance matters.

82 The Freshfields opinion noted earlier is one example. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE, supra note 80, at 13.

83 See id.; Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG Integration, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 731, 734–36 (2019).

84 Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 387 (citing Signatory Directory, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., [https://perma.cc/R66R-72LU] (last visited Dec. 22, 2019) (click “View/Download File”)). Of these 1,900, the majority were European asset managers, showing the greater acceptance of ESG investing in Europe. See id. at 387 n.15.

85 Id. at 387.
specifically address and facilitate ESG investing.\textsuperscript{86} Even the major index funds, including BlackRock and Vanguard, which ordinarily ignore firm-specific factors as “indexed investors,” are now actively focused on some ESG issues (such as climate change) and seeking to impose changes on firms in their portfolio.\textsuperscript{87}

\textbf{B. The Remaining Legal Uncertainty}

Still, problems persist. Although the law in Europe has been sufficiently revised and clarified to make ESG investing appear safe for even the most risk-averse trustee,\textsuperscript{88} U.S. fiduciary law in most states still imposes a “sole interest” rule that instructs the fiduciary to consider only the interests of the beneficiary (and thus not to give weight to the interest of others, including, the billions who may be affected by adverse climate change).\textsuperscript{89} Of course, the “rebranding” of ESG some fifteen years ago was designed to show that ESG, as revised, could improve risk-adjusted returns, thus satisfying a hard-nosed economic test even without giving weight to collateral benefits to others. Some scholars buy this argument and

\textsuperscript{86} In 2018, Delaware amended its trust law to authorize ESG investing if it is authorized in the trust instrument. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3303(a)(4) (2021); see also Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 130.020(2), 130.755(3)(i) (2021).

\textsuperscript{87} See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 387–88. For example, BlackRock’s Larry Fink’s letter to corporate CEOs asking for “net zero” emissions by 2050 is an example of a strong intervention by a diversified investor. See Fink, supra note 47.

\textsuperscript{88} European regulators have generally accepted and encouraged ESG investing. See Press Release, Eur. Ins. & Occupational Pensions Auth., EIOPA Issues Opinions on Governance and Risk Management of Pension Funds (July 10, 2019), https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/content/eiopa-issues-opinions-governance-and-risk-management-pension-funds_en [https://perma.cc/M3YG-TFT3] (urging national regulatory authorities within the EU to “encourage pension funds to consider the impact of their long-term investment decisions and activities on ESG factors”); see also Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 387.

\textsuperscript{89} The “sole interest” rule applies to fiduciaries under private trusts, at ERISA plans, and at charitable foundations, but does not normally apply to the directors or officers of mutual funds or hedge funds (unless they are serving as advisors to an ERISA plan). See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 400–01.
consider ESG to no longer be controversial, but others continue to have doubts. Most notably, Professors Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff have drawn a sharp distinction between (1) ESG investing based on moral or ethical reasons or to achieve various collateral benefits (such as, I suppose, saving the Earth), and (2) ESG investing intended to improve risk-adjusted returns.

This distinction between (in their words) “collateral benefit” ESG investing and “risk-return” ESG investing seemingly makes everything depend on the fiduciary’s motive. Realists will, of course, recognize that, once risk-averse fiduciaries are properly advised as to the law, they likely will express the legally proper motive and deny the legally improper motive. (Hey folks, isn’t that what lawyers are for?) Thus, under this approach, the practical risk of fiduciary liability seems relatively small.

Still, the test proposed by Schanzenbach and Sitkoff would actually require considerably more than just a proper motive. They would require the prudent trustee to conclude, before investing based on any special ESG factor, that the “capital markets consistently misprice the factor in a predictable manner that can be exploited net of any trading and diversification costs.” Although this test purports to permit ESG investing, it may well be a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Its very demanding standard about mispricing may be much harder for ERISA fiduciaries to satisfy. In effect, the fiduciary must determine, first, that ESG factors relate to firm performance in the case of a specific company and, second, that this factor has been

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90 See Gary, supra note 83, at 799–800. Professor Gary served as the Reporter for the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, which alone makes her a significant voice in this field. The Principles for Responsible Investment represents probably the leading statement of the necessity for fiduciaries to adopt ESG factors into their investment analysis. It has obtained over 1,900 asset manager endorsements of its statement of principles. See supra note 84.

91 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 385–86.

92 For their use of this terminology, see id. at 389.

93 Id. at 451.
sufficiently mispriced so that the fiduciary can exploit this mispricing (net of trading and diversification costs).\textsuperscript{94}

Although I agree with them that ESG investing is not mandatory and that prudent trustees can reasonably conclude that they cannot outperform the market (as the Supreme Court has also observed in a relevant recent decision),\textsuperscript{95} the possibility still seems remote that any court, either state or federal, would second guess and hold liable trustees who do decide to engage in ESG investing in the belief that it will enable them to achieve a superior portfolio. Courts are not suspicious of professional trustees, and, absent a personal self-interest on the part of the fiduciary, they have little reason to apply any enhanced scrutiny standard. Nor is there any clear history of courts intervening in this private world to impose liability.

In fairness, the “sole interest” rule regulates only some institutional investors (principally ERISA plans, common-law trusts, and charitable foundations) and does not apply to mutual funds or hedge funds, which are subject to SEC regulation. Still, pension funds account for nearly half of the assets held by institutional investors,\textsuperscript{96} and asset managers, including BlackRock, advise them. Thus, the “sole interest” rule (and particularly a Department of Labor rule extending it)\textsuperscript{97} may reduce the size of the coalitions that can form to take collective action on ESG issues.

C. The Impact of a Portfolio-Wide Perspective

What is the best way out of this quandary? Here, we need to recognize that the key development is the new high level of

\textsuperscript{94} Id. at 390–91, 450–53.
\textsuperscript{95} See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 426–27 (2014).
\textsuperscript{96} In 2018, U.S. pension funds held about $22.7 trillion in assets, approximately forty-one percent of all assets held by U.S. investment funds, pension funds, and insurance companies. See O.E.C.D., \textit{O.E.C.D. \textit{I}n\textit{s}tit\textit{u}t\textit{i}t\textit{i}on\textit{a}l \textit{I}n\textit{v}est\textit{or} \textit{S}tat\textit{i}st\textit{i}cs 173 tbl.1 (2020) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-institutional-investors-statistics-2020_9a827fb7-en.
\textsuperscript{97} See infra Section IV.D.
common ownership that enables diversified institutional investors to take collective action on a portfolio-wide basis. Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff do not discuss this possibility, but fiduciaries should be able to engage in ESG investing on a portfolio-wide basis in full compliance with the “sole interest” rule so long as they make a finding that their collective strategy should raise returns or lower risks. For example, suppose that ERISA plans were to join both mutual funds and hedge funds in a joint effort to push the major energy companies to adopt tighter standards on emissions and to advance the date on which they become carbon neutral. Their justification might be that, although this would reduce the financial returns for some portfolio companies (i.e., coal companies), it would benefit other companies (i.e., those who produced solar power, wind power or nuclear power). Such pressure was in fact successfully applied to Royal Dutch Shell and others in 2018. Economist such interventions would make sense—if the losses to the traditional energy companies were outweighed by gains to the other firms in the portfolio. As Madison Condon has framed it: “A rational owner would use his power to internalize externalities so long as its share of the costs to the externality-creating firms are lower than the benefits that accrue to the entire portfolio from the elimination of the externality.”

In late 2018, Royal Dutch Shell was pressured by a coalition of institutional investors to set emission reduction targets to reduce its carbon footprint by twenty percent by 2035 and fifty percent by 2050. See Condon, supra note 8, at 2. It had previously opposed these targets and described them as “onerous and cumbersome,” but once approached by this institutional coalition, it yielded quickly. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sarah Kent, Shell to Link Carbon Emissions Targets to Executive Pay, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2018) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://www.wsj.com/articles/shell-to-link-carbon-emissions-targets-to-executives-pay-1543843441). Thereafter, this same coalition next approached ExxonMobil, Chevron, and BP. Id. at 3.

Id. at 6. Professor Condon provides us with a well-reasoned hypothetical. Assume, she argues, that BlackRock believed it could cause Exxon and Chevron to reduce their carbon emissions by forty percent at the cost of a twenty percent decline in each of their stock prices. Id. at 45. On this assumption, she calculates that the stock price decline to BlackRock at these two companies would total $6.3 billion, but that the gain for the rest of their
In the past, even a large institutional investor could not hope to cause a shift in corporate policy at a portfolio firm. But in the new age, where the Big Three usually represents twenty-five percent of the shares voted just by themselves (and can reach out to their fellow institutions for more support), they seem able to enforce their will effectively. Moreover, the firm managers that they will seek to pressure are typically risk-averse and probably reluctant to jeopardize their careers by engaging in a contested proxy fight with these powerful institutions.

Of course, fiduciaries at an ERISA plan would have to make an informed judgment and compare the costs and benefits from recommended action to their portfolio. But this is exactly where consultants will predictably be hired to perform such an analysis. Possibly my cynicism is showing, but these consultants will usually be able to justify the requisite findings that their clients want. Indeed, this could become a

portfolios would be $9.7 billion, thus producing a substantial net gain. *Id.* at 45–47. If institutional investors are satisfied with her calculations, they should eagerly pursue such a policy.

100 As Professors Bebchuk and Hirst record, institutional ownership and its concentration have increased rapidly in recent decades. See Bebchuk & Hirst, *supra* note 8, at 724–27.

101 *Id.* at 724.

102 For example, an environmental consulting firm, an accounting firm, or a proxy advisor might compare the loss to a major oil company (such as Royal Dutch Shell in our earlier example) from reducing its emissions or carbon footprint by a specified percentage to the benefits to other companies in its portfolio from achieving reduced pollution and postponing adverse climate change. Some asset managers appear to be making these estimates already. Schroders, a major asset manager, has calculated that a four degree increase (Centigrade) would produce “global economic losses” of $23 trillion over an eighty-year period. See Condon, *supra* note 8, at 6 (quoting *Schroders Climate Dashboard Points to Four Degree Rise—Despite Increase in Carbon Prices*, SCHRODERS (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.schroders.com/en/au/institutions/insights/investment-insights/schroders-climate-dashboard-points-to-four-degree-rise-despite-increase-in-carbon-prices/ [https://perma.cc/NE73-78JJ]). Because this is a short Article, it will simply assert (and not demonstrate) that such calculations are difficult and tend to be error-prone.
burgeoning growth business for accounting firms, proxy advisory firms, and other consultants.

This is also the juncture where the SEC could play a useful role. The SEC could require corporate managers to disclose data that they possess about the costs of change (for example, the costs of reaching carbon neutrality by a given date). Such data (which increasingly exist at many large public companies) could be required to be disclosed in the firm’s Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A). This would not be an aggressive step for the SEC, as it would only be requiring the disclosure of data in management’s possession and not mandating any position on ESG investing.

Conceivably, one could go even a step further: fiduciaries might also calculate the benefits to their beneficiaries, as individuals, from reducing pollution or slowing climate change. Although under ERISA fiduciaries may be legally

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103 “Reporting companies,” which include most exchange-listed companies, must comply with SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1–.1406 (2020), by filing certain mandatory periodic disclosures with the SEC. Item 303 of Regulation S-K (“Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations”) requires such a reporting company to “[i]dentify any known trends or any known demands, commitments, events or uncertainties . . . that are reasonably likely” to produce material changes in the issuer’s liquidity, capital resources, or results of operations. Id. § 229.303(b)(1)(i). If there were even “uncertainties” about the costs of reaching environmental targets and those costs could have a material impact on liquidity, capital resources, or results of operations, then disclosure would be required. The point here is that the SEC could clarify that such disclosure was required as to major ESG topics, such as climate change, and this would inform and motivate fiduciaries at the major institutional investors.

104 This idea that fiduciaries could serve the best interests of their beneficiaries by considering more than simply the impact of their actions on the individual stocks before them will worry some, as it could quickly lead down a slippery slope to very subjective judgments. For example, one could look beyond the financial interest of the beneficiaries and add into the calculation their personal interests as well: reducing pollution may enable the beneficiaries to live longer or better lives. Heretical as this may sound, two distinguished economists have endorsed such a test, arguing that fiduciaries should maximize not stock value, but shareholder welfare. See Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 248–50 (2017). By contrast, ERISA’s “sole interest” rule appears to require fiduciaries to focus solely on
required to focus on the financial benefits to their beneficiaries, it may be possible to quantify those financial benefits on a portfolio-wide basis. Considering the personal financial benefits to investors (i.e., benefits unrelated to the stock price, such as reduced health care costs) would be much more controversial, but the Department of Labor’s rule could be modified to permit fiduciaries more discretion and still comply with ERISA’s statutory language. Again, consultants could give fiduciaries detailed estimates based on legitimate studies.

The bottom line here is that trustees who reach a careful, informed position based on legitimate data are unlikely to face any serious risk of liability. What such prudent trustees most need is more information—in particular, information that enables them to make comparisons between companies. To illustrate, suppose the SEC encouraged companies to express information in terms of estimated benchmarks. For example, by what date did the company believe it would become “carbon neutral”? At what cost? Many companies have already released projected dates (2040, 2050, etc.) Other companies have remained silent, but if a hypothetical company were to have such an estimated date (which it had never publicly disclosed), the SEC should make clear that this information is in its view presumptively material (as would be any similar estimate of the costs involved in meeting this target date). If such disclosure of internally generated estimates were required in the MD&A, this information would also carry very little risk of liability under federal securities laws.

“financial benefits” (not personal benefits) to the beneficiaries. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 420–21 (2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2014)). Still, outside of ERISA, a broader calculation of the benefit that combines financial and personal benefits might be possible.

105 General Motors, for example, expects to be carbon neutral by 2040. See Neal E. Boudette & Coral Davenport, G.M. Phasing out Cars and Trucks Using Gas by 2035, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2021, at A1.

106 Again, this is Item 303 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303, which is usually referred to as the “MD&A.”

107 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides in its section 21E (“Application of Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements”) that reporting companies (with some modest exclusions) do not have liability for
Already, many securities analysts prepare rankings of public companies in terms of ESG criteria. The problem with such rankings is a familiar one: “Garbage In, Garbage Out”—the “GIGO Effect.” Today, ESG disclosure is incomplete and unstandardized, with rankings that are dubious and inconsistent.\textsuperscript{108} Public disclosure of ESG data would, at a minimum, improve the quality of such rankings and ratings and give trustees greater confidence in relying on such data. The bottom line here is that more ESG data will likely produce more decisions based on ESG criteria—and also greater attention to systematic risk.

D. Investment Versus Voting Decisions

Proponents of the “sole interest” rule tend to overlook the differences between voting and investment decisions. Historically, they have been viewed differently by both ERISA and the SEC. Although the “sole interest” rule may apply to both, a critical difference is that both the Department of Labor and the SEC have long required fiduciaries to vote the shares held by their funds, on the theory that voting rights are an asset belonging to the fund and should not be wasted.\textsuperscript{109} Both

\textsuperscript{108} ESG ratings often disagree, and mutual funds that emphasize their focus on ESG often score below non-ESG funds when subjected to objective review based on their own criteria. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 431.

\textsuperscript{109} The position of the Department of Labor (which administers ERISA) dates back to the famous “Avon Letter” of 1988. See Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman, Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., 1988 WL 897696 (Feb. 23, 1988). This letter expressed the Labor Department’s view that fiduciaries had to exercise their voting powers and vote shares; it was later codified in a 1994 Interpretive Bulletin issued by the Department of Labor. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2(3) (2008). This bulletin expressed the view that “[a]ctive monitoring and communication” with corporate management “is consistent with a fiduciary’s obligations under ERISA where the responsible fiduciary concludes that there is a reasonable expectation that such [activities] . . . [are] likely to enhance the value of the plan’s investment in the corporation, after
agencies also recognized that voting has low costs (in contrast to investment decisions) and that fiduciaries must constantly make voting decisions across their portfolios. As a result, both favored a rule of reason with regard to voting and shareholder activism for many years.

Then, in December 2020, in the concluding days of the Trump Administration, the Department of Labor dropped a bombshell, reversing its prior approach to shareholder activism. No longer endorsing mandatory voting of shares and dropping the prior “reasonable expectation” test, it proposed a rule under which a fiduciary subject to ERISA “must not vote taking into account the costs involved.” *Id.*; *see also* Paul Rissman & Diana Kearney, *Rise of the Shadow ESG Regulators: Investment Advisers, Sustainability Accounting, and Their Effects on Corporate Social Responsibility*, 49 ENV'T L. REP. 10155, 10168 (2019).

The SEC followed several years later and similarly endorsed the duty of a fiduciary or investment advisor to vote the shares held by a mutual fund or other investment company. See *Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers*, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2,106, 2003 WL 215467, at *2 (Jan. 31, 2003). To sum up, both agencies agree that fiduciaries must vote their shares and must do so with the objective of increasing the value of the fund to their beneficiaries.

> 110 *See, e.g.*, Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,879, 95,881 (Dec. 29, 2016). This revised bulletin adopted a “reasonable expectation” standard for when fiduciaries should engage in shareholder activism, with the expectation being that the plan’s assets would be enhanced. *Id.* at 95,881, 95,884. However, in December 2020, the Department of Labor withdrew the bulletin and adopted a new final rule that significantly changed the standard for voting decisions to require that an ERISA fiduciary believe that voting shares in a particular case would enhance firm value. See *infra* at notes 111–112 and accompanying text.

> 111 Even under President Trump, the Department of Labor continued to use a “reasonable expectation” standard until the final days of the Trump Administration. Although it cautioned that the objective of shareholder activism must be the enhancement of the plan’s value (meaning that the fiduciary may not be pursuing political or social preferences), it did not alter significantly prior Department of Labor positions. See Memorandum from John J. Canary, Dir. of Reguls. & Interpretations, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Lab., to Mabel Capolongo, Dir. of Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Lab. & Reg’l Dirs. 4–5 (Apr. 23, 2018). However, this position changed dramatically in December 2020, as explained in the text and *infra* note 112.
any proxy unless the fiduciary prudently determines that the matter being voted upon would have an economic impact on the plan.”\textsuperscript{112} Ultimately, it watered down this position slightly by permitting fiduciaries to use a “principles-based” approach that allowed them to consider the general tendencies of a particular type of vote (i.e., did it generally increase share value, without the need for individualized determination).\textsuperscript{113} Nonetheless, this still implied that a prerequisite to voting by an ERISA fiduciary was a prior determination (whether individualized or generalized) by the fiduciary that the vote would have a positive economic impact on the plan; a “no impact” determination still implied that the shares should not be voted.\textsuperscript{114} This is a rule of enforced passivity, which goes well beyond simply precluding votes based on moral or ethical considerations.

Consider what this does to ERISA plans that tend to vote affirmatively on ESG measures. Hypothetically, suppose that an ERISA plan would like to vote in favor of a shareholder proposal requiring greater diversity on the board. Assume the plan has no research or other proof that plans benefit generally from such votes. Is it now barred from voting on this

\textsuperscript{112} See Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 81,658, 81,687 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550) (Dec. 16, 2020). This rule became effective on January 15, 2021, just days before the end of President Trump’s term. \textit{Id.} at 81,695. Before adopting this proposal on shareholder voting under ERISA, the Department of Labor a month earlier adopted a similarly restrictive rule on investments by an ERISA plan under ERISA’s “exclusive benefit” rule. See Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846, 72,848 (Nov. 13, 2020) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550) (instructing fiduciaries that they “may not subordinate return or increase risks to promote non-pecuniary objectives”). This provision was somewhat less surprising than the later rule on shareholder voting because investments do involve greater costs and risks. Both may be re-examined by the Biden Administration.

\textsuperscript{113} See Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,694–95.

\textsuperscript{114} The Department of Labor eliminated the “must not vote” language from its original proposal, but its final rule is similar in effect: fiduciaries must vote or abstain from voting on the basis of financial benefit to the plan, and the safe harbor for a voting decision requires at least a generalized determination as to effect. See \textit{id.} at 81,663, 81,694–95.
precatory (and largely aspirational) measure? Must it find such evidence or conduct a potentially expensive study first (one whose outcome is not automatically obvious)? Must it show that the market has “mispriced” this special factor?\textsuperscript{115} Even as revised, the Department of Labor’s new rule does seem to place a costly hurdle before such votes, and it quickly attracted a firestorm of criticism.\textsuperscript{116}

Three basic arguments call into question the legitimacy of this rule. First, voting is different from an investment or sales decision in that (1) loss of diversification benefits is less threatened by voting (whereas such benefits were threatened when investors sold off stocks of South Africa-based companies in the 1980s), (2) the transaction costs of a voting decision are trivial (no brokerage fee is involved and no sale proceeds have to be re-invested), and (3) the failure to vote can also result in loss to shareholders. That is, shareholders may suffer losses as much from the inability to vote as from “bad” voting decisions.

Second, an ERISA fiduciary can make a voting decision on a portfolio-wide basis, and the rule should apply differently in these cases to reflect the prospect of gain. Sometimes (as in the case of climate change votes), the fiduciary may be able to net out the gains and losses across its portfolio and find that a positive financial result from the vote is likely. Other times (such as in cases involving race or gender issues), the fiduciary may believe that a market wide shift toward board diversity

\textsuperscript{115} This is the position taken by Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff. See supra notes notes 93–94 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{116} See, e.g., Kurt N. Schacht, The Labor Department Is Tearing Down a Landmark of Investor Protection, BARRON’S, (Sept. 11, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-labor-department-is-tearing-down-a-landmark-of-investor-protection-51599823800 [https://perma.cc/NJV2-LQQH]; Brian Croce, Proxy Proposal Angers Institutions, PENSIONS & INVS. (Sept. 7, 2020, 12:00 AM) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://www.pionline.com/regulation/proxy-proposal-angers-institutions; Peter Rasmussen, ERISA Voting Proposal Would Limit ESG Factor Use, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 10, 2020, 4:38 PM) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-erisa-proxy-voting-proposal-would-limit-esg-factor-use.
would yield positive gains, but it would be too costly to conduct the requisite studies.\footnote{An elaborate literature exists concluding that investments in Corporate Social Responsibility” (or “CSR”) do increase firm value modestly and do reduce systematic risk. \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, Rui Albuquerque, Yrjö Koskinen & Chendi Zhang, \textit{Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk: Theory and Empirical Evidence}, 65 \textit{MGMT. SCI.} 4451, 4457–63 (2019).}

Third, some states have amended their “sole interest” rules to recognize and permit ESG investing,\footnote{\textit{See supra} note 86 and accompanying text (discussing statutes in Delaware and Oregon).} but the Department of Labor’s rule may now preempt such inconsistent state rules. Traditionally, federal agencies (particularly in Republican administrations) have been cautious about preempting state law in the belief that, in a federal system, states should be entitled to experiment and respond to local conditions and circumstances.\footnote{On conservative worries about preemption and the steady increase of preemptive laws, see generally John Kincaid, Foreword, \textit{The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial Federalism}, 26 \textit{RUTGERS L.J.} 913 (1995). But see Bradley W. Joondeph, \textit{The Partisan Dimensions of Federal Preemption in the United States Courts of Appeals}, 2011 \textit{UTAH L. REV.} 223, 225 (finding Republican judges more likely than Democratic judges to favor preemption in difficult cases).}

Nonetheless, without explanation or justification, the new Department of Labor rule seems to preempt inconsistent state rules. In response, the Biden Administration moved quickly to announce in March 2021 that it would not enforce the Trump Administration’s rules on ESG investing and ESG voting.\footnote{On March 10, 2021, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Employee Benefits Security Administration issued an enforcement policy statement indicating that it would not enforce either the ESG investment rule or the ESG voting rule adopted in the last weeks of the Trump Administration. \textit{See} Michael Albano, Mary E. Alcock, Alexander Kurtz & Francesca M. Crooks, \textit{Cleary Gottlieb Discusses DOL’s Declining To Enforce Rules on ERISA Plan Investments and Proxy Voting}, \textit{THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG} (Mar. 23, 2021) (summarizing a law firm memorandum).} That is a good start, but more specific guidance needs to be given.\footnote{Even if these rules are not enforced by the DOL, they could still have some residual effect, which might lead a court to deem them to preempt arguably inconsistent state law rules. Also, it is conceivable (but
E. The Coming Controversy over Portfolio-Wide Decisionmaking

The vision that portfolio-wide voting by institutional investors could reduce externalities has excited scholars. Viewed in economic terms, this is a relatively conservative idea because it does not involve fiduciaries subordinating economic returns to social welfare (as the proponents of “stakeholder capitalism” sometimes demand). Rather, fiduciaries are simply seeking to improve returns and reduce risk by responding to systematic risks that could depress the entire economy.

Nonetheless, it will likely arouse more controversy than modest concessions to stakeholders. Consider this hypothetical: five diversified index funds threaten a proxy contest to replace at least some of the directors of Smoky Coal Corp., unless it agrees to comply promptly with certain environmental restrictions. Fearing a proxy contest and their ouster, Smoky Coal’s management induces its board to agree to the restrictions and to appoint a partial slate of directors nominated by the index funds. On the announcement of this decision, Smoky Coal’s stock price falls ten percent, and Smoky Coal’s management closes its principal mine in Kentucky, with a resulting large lay-off of miners. Employees are outraged, and a prominent senator from Kentucky schedules a senatorial committee hearing on the “arrogance” of the index funds.

Contemporaneously, the state legislature in Kentucky begins to draft legislation that would cancel the environmental

unlikely) that a private cause of action could be asserted by shareholders or others based on these rules. Affirmative guidance from DOL, not silence, is needed on ESG voting.

122 This idea that common ownership will lead rational investors in a common portfolio to seek to minimize externalities probably originates with Robert G. Hansen and John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a world With Diversified Shareholder/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 46–49 (1996); see also Robert H. Gordon, Do Publicly-Traded Corporations Act in the Public Interest?, ADVANCES IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, June 12, 2003, at 1, 6. But these authors wrote before the actual appearance of large-scale common ownership. Recent interest in this topic has likely been provoked by Madison Condon. See Condon, supra note 8.
changes just adopted, and corporate law firms develop a new
form of poison pill that would bar the acquisition of more than
ten percent of a Kentucky company’s stock by any group of
mutual funds that is seeking (or later seeks) to pass or support
specified shareholder resolutions.

The point here is not that this reaction will succeed, but
that counter-pressure is predictable. Although I suspect that
the threat of such political retaliation will incline many insti-
tutional investors toward no more than reticent participation
in attempts to curb externalities through collective action,
time will tell. At present, the Big Three have learned to “talk
the talk,” but it is still unclear whether they will “walk the
walk” (that is, take collective action). Collective action to max-
imize portfolio value requires a leader that the index funds
can follow (because they are reluctant to initiate contests). In
other contexts, activist hedge funds have played this role and
the passive giant investors have followed, but in the context
of a systematic risk campaign, hedge funds are unlikely to be
able to play the same role.123

V. CONCLUSION

Briefly and bluntly, this Article has offered five initial con-
clusions:

(1) Institutional investors logically have a greater in-
terest in systematic risk than do undiversified in-
vestors (in part because only diversified investors
with high common ownership can take effective ac-
tion), and much of what ESG disclosures would pro-
vide relates primarily to systematic risk.

(2) Individual investors (at least if undiversified) have
reason to fear that portfolio-wide voting by diversi-
fied institutions may adversely affect them. Today,

123 Hedge funds hold too small and undiversified a portfolio to be able
to profit from campaigns seeking to curb negative externalities because they
do not hold a sufficient volume of securities to incur gains that on a net basis
outweigh the losses to the target firm. Basically, only index funds have the
scale to profit from such netting. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying
text (discussing the scale of index funds).
they are not adequately advised about the conflicts that arise between their interests and those of both diversified institutional investors and activist hedge funds.

(3) Because of the high level of common ownership among diversified institutional investors, these investors can potentially profit on a portfolio-wide basis by taking actions that seek to reduce externalities. But again, this aggravates the conflict between diversified and retail investors.

(4) Because ESG disclosures and high common ownership enable diversified institutions to make decisions on a portfolio-wide basis and potentially reduce systematic risk, the advent of portfolio-wide decisionmaking (both as to investments and voting) may represent the most important contemporary change in institutional investor behavior. Although it appears to be logically consistent with the “sole interest” rule, it will provoke continuing controversy.

(5) There is little need for a federal “sole interest” rule. No claim has been made that the states have failed to enforce their rules. Absent a showing that state law has failed or cannot be enforced, a federal rule is undesirable, as it may preempt sensible variations at the state level.

This Article has not asserted that fiduciaries must favor ESG investing. Decisions to engage or not to engage in ESG investing should both be protected. The real issues for the future are: (1) whether the Trump Administration’s efforts to chill ESG voting decisions (and thus, by extension, ESG investing) should be reversed; and (2) whether institutional investors are prepared to face significant political controversy and pushback if they pursue portfolio-wide voting policies.124

124 It is not just institutional investors who are under attack, nor simply the Department of Labor that is leading this campaign. In 2020, possibly in response to their activism in assisting institutional investors, proxy advisors were subjected to new and burdensome SEC rules that will slow the process by which they can advise and assist their clients. See generally
For the SEC, this transition may force it to redefine itself. Since its creation, it has been an agency committed to serving “stock-picking” individual investors. Such investors are, however, fading from the scene. This does not mean they should be ignored, but that greater attention must be given to the majority of individual shareholders who are now diversified (and often indexed).

Common ownership has both an upside and a downside, and to date little scholarly attention has focused on the upside. Shareholders have not been regarded as the “true owners” of the corporation since Berle and Means announced the separation of ownership and control many decades ago. Yet today, shareholders have regained the powers of “true owners.” Unlike their nineteenth century antecedents (for example, the railroad, oil and bank barons), the focus of institutional investors, as owners, will logically shift to maximizing portfolio value, not the value of individual stocks. One implication of this transition is that it may solve a problem that has frustrated legal scholars for decades. Over that period, many scholars have sought to find a strategy to make public corporations behave more virtuously. Despite their gallant efforts, they have not fully persuaded most of us, and more conservative scholars have responded that reducing the

Michael Cappucci, The Proxy War Against Proxy Advisors, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 579 (2020) (analyzing the rules). My point here is only that this example may concern and caution institutional investors, who must realize that activism can produce political retaliation in their cases as well. To be sure, the major institutional investors have much greater financial resources than the proxy advisors.

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 120 (Macmillan 1933) (1932).

For a partial list, see, for example, generally Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999); KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH (2012); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachtler, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010). This list is far from exhaustive but includes books and articles that I considered highly original.
externalities associated with corporate behavior is not the job of corporate law. Now, without any change in corporate law, at least a possibility has arisen that institutional activism can curb externalities and lead to a better (and not just more profitable) society.

Ultimately, one final conclusion needs to be stressed: in an era of high common ownership and institutional sensitivity to systematic risk, disclosure gains impact and power that it never had before. In the past, disclosure could trigger governmental interventions, private litigation, or reputational injury, but today disclosure is becoming self-enforcing, as shareholders can take dispositive action on their own. Yes, this is optimistic, and change may come more slowly. Questions remain as to how hard diversified funds will push management, how the high costs of activism can be best shared, and who will organize and lead systematic risk campaigns that are likely to reduce the stock price of the target company. These issues should constitute the near term research agenda for legal academics.

128 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (arguing that shareholder wealth maximization is the goal of corporate law); Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2010, at 32, 32–33, 35 (arguing that the regulation of externalities falls within the government’s function and is not a task that boards should pursue).

129 Chiefly, these problems surround who can be induced to lead a strategic risk campaign, given that the index funds are likely to remain reticent participants and that activist hedge funds are less likely to profit from such campaigns that reduce the target stock price. I am focusing on these issues in another article.