ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The Issue of Sequencing

by Etel Solingen

It is no small paradox that Middle Eastern countries are busily engaged in designing a more promising regional future in the midst of otherwise chaotic developments in the emerging new world order, from national disintegration to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For most of the cold war era, the Middle East engendered threats to global and regional security. Today, notwithstanding considerably rugged interludes, negotiations for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace are a relatively bright spot in a sea of pressing concerns for international peace and stability. Yet designing a sequence of items to be discussed that is acceptable to all parties seems to be a major hurdle in the arms control negotiations. I argue that the need for sequential treatment of topics may actually have positive uses.

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The first part of this article examines the background conditions that made the current Middle East arms control negotiations possible. I then review the role of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the early stages of arms control negotiations. Next I emphasize the advantages of a strategy of sequencing for (1) attracting outstanding regional states that have not yet joined in the multilateral peace talks and (2) securing domestic support for arms control and the peace process as a whole. The article concludes with a summary recommendation about strengthening domestic political support for arms control and for a comprehensive peace settlement in the region.

**GENERAL BACKGROUND: THE ROAD TO THE MULTILATERAL PEACE TALKS**

The ongoing multilateral peace talks on the Middle East are an outcome of the 1991 Madrid Conference, brokered by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, which gathered participants from the region as well as major power sponsors and other observers. The resulting multilateral peace process involved five "baskets" of negotiations or issue areas: arms control and regional security, economic development, the environment, water issues, and refugees. The core participants at the table included Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PL0). This multilateral process is intimately related to the bilateral negotiations between Israel and each one of its partners. Both venues, the multilateral and the bilateral, involve intricate issues, and despite some remarkable breakthroughs the road ahead promises to be a lengthy and difficult one.

The arms control negotiations—and the broader peace process of which they are a part—are the outcome of political change at the global, regional, and domestic levels. The demise of the Soviet Union and the outcome of the Gulf War rearranged the strategies of countries in the region and offered the United States a unique opportunity to become the handmaiden of the Madrid process, the origin of all ongoing negotiations in the bilateral and multilateral contexts. Domestic political forces sympathetic to the new order
got stronger throughout the region. This new order included an emerging consensus over economic and political liberalization, and a weakening of the old domestic political allies of the former Soviet Union. Enough domestic support could now be marshaled throughout most countries in the region for the idea of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Lagging progress in the context of the Madrid process opened the way to a more dramatic step negotiated in a sheltered Norwegian environment: the September 1993 Declaration of Principles by Israel and the PLO. The Declaration of Principles recognizes the parties' mutual legitimate and political rights and establishes a process leading to Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and the Jericho area in May 1994 was the first step in the implementation of this agreement.

The partners in the multilateral peace negotiations share a fundamental political strategy that ties their own domestic political health with regional and international cooperation. The common denominator among the PLO, King Hussein, President Mubarak, and Israel's Labor-led coalition is their expectation of positive economic and political windfalls from a peace settlement. The promise of replacing a huge military burden with a developmental bonanza and greater international competitiveness requires mutual concessions. Such concessions might seem politically risky in the short term, but they hold great potential for decimating the ranks of political rivals (i.e., opponents of the peace process) at home. In other words, the success of this strategy will surely benefit the citizens of this region as well as the political leadership that embraced a "trading state" approach to the twenty-first century.²

Political groups challenging the coalitions pursuing a regional settlement span the ideological spectrum, from radical fundamentalists to remnants of cold war-era nationalism.³ They do, however, share a political strategy. For the most part, they include movements advancing religious or nationalist confessionalism (also labeled fundamentalism, in their extreme form), both in Israel and in the Arab world. Very often these groups reject the practical and normative implications of integrating their countries politically and economically with what they regard as a Western-inspired liberal
world order. Such groups oppose a regional settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A comprehensive settlement deprives them of a large share of their political capital: the ability to exploit regional conflict and thus conflate confessional and nationalist forces at home. Where the coalitions upholding nationalist-fundamentalist causes have prevailed politically, as in Iran, Iraq, and the Sudan, any willingness to join the multilateral peace process has vanished.  

SEQUENTIAL ASPECTS OF REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL

The agenda for arms control negotiations is indeed a bulky one, ranging from relatively minor technical measures to reduce the likelihood of accidents or misperceptions to securing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The successful completion of an agreement requires a clever design of the sequence within which different issues are to be addressed. A consensus among the parties seems to be emerging with respect to one type of sequence: a comprehensive political settlement must precede any far-ranging military agreement. The September 1993 Declaration of Principles and the de facto endorsement of an eventual two-state solution by Israel and the PLO bode well for the prospects that the core political issues at stake might be resolved, opening the way for a broader regional settlement. There is also a measure of consensus on the sequencing of steps internal to the process of arms control. For instance, the value of identifying mutually acceptable confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) as a first step to break through the toughest initial phases of negotiating over security matters seems clear to all. The preferred sequence in the realm of CSBMs is one that begins with declaratory principles and steps to increase trust in the adversary's intentions and ends with measures that reduce actual military capabilities. In other words, this sequence progresses from "software" (e.g., doctrines, notification of military exercises) to "hardware" (e.g., force reductions, elimination of weapon systems) through measures that steadily improve communication and transparency. The sequence involves steps to prevent accidents and unintended threats; such steps do not undermine but strengthen the individual security of the parties.
However, in contrast to some convergence of approaches around the first two issues (proceeding from the political to the military, and from CSBM to more drastic arms control measures), strong disagreement exists with regard to sequencing negotiations over conventional versus nonconventional weapons. The Arab parties, under strong Egyptian leadership on this particular issue, place Israel's presumed nuclear capabilities and the accession of all parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at the top of the agenda. 6 Israel prefers to deal with what it considers to be the ultimate insurance policy at the very end of the process, once cooperation has become more of a habit than an anomaly. In the words of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, "One must start from the first floor and work upwards. The first floor is peace and the second floor is a Middle East completely free of non-conventional weapons and missiles." 7 Egypt's position, however, has hardened on the eve of the NPT Extension Conference (April 1995), with Cairo demanding immediate Israeli accession to the NPT, and raising the specter of Egypt's withdrawal from the treaty.

It is often asserted that the Arab position reveals little understanding of Israel's existential fears. In reality, the position adopted by the Arab parties does not exclude the possibility that they understand Israel's threat perceptions quite well, but prefer to ignore them for one of two following reasons.

First, Egyptian leaders express publicly a concern with the implications of an unrestrained nonconventional Israeli capability for the ability to curtail nuclear programs in countries like Iran. Yet the idea that binding Israel will pave the way to disarm others is no more than a premise, and perhaps one too risky to consider from the perspective of all partners to the multilateral talks. Consider the position of Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, a close adviser to Khomeini, who told an Iranian scientist that it was his duty to build the nuclear bomb for the Islamic Republican Party. President Rafsanjani's deputy, Ayatollah Mohajerani, declared that all Muslim states should be equipped with a nuclear capacity. 8 The idea of an Islamic bomb may well be in the realm of "myth-building," as Pervez Hoodbhoy argues, but these statements leave little doubt as to the intentions of some powerful elements in the Iranian leadership.
A second consideration underpinning Arab governments' demand for early attention to nuclear matters relates to their attempt to seek the kind of concessions that might provide them with the highest political returns at home. Nurturing domestic support for international agreements is part and parcel of the bargaining process for all parties. Israeli leaders face serious internal constraints in that, at least in the public perception, Israel is the only party divesting itself of actual security assets (primarily territory). Public opinion polls suggest that any government asking Israelis to give up—in the same breath—the Golan Heights and most of the West Bank (not to speak of its reassuring strategic deterrent) will face a debacle. The prospects of a Labor defeat—and of a Likud comeback—might be frightful not only for the future of Israel but also for Labor's Arab partners in the peace process.

Not enough is publicly known about the internal political process in Arab countries to fuel a demand for immediate consideration of the nuclear issue. Different prescriptions would result from a situation in which the military establishment is the major player than from a situation in which broader popular demands might compel a rigid enforcement of any negotiating posture. At the popular level, as reflected in the Arab press, the solution of the Palestinian problem ranks at the very top of the agenda and overshadows all other issues. Israel's Labor-led government understood what is required to reach the historic compromise (still in the making) on this issue. In contrast to Arab pressures for an immediate withdrawal from the occupied territories and a resolution of the refugee problem, the nuclear issue is far more symbolic from an Arab standpoint. Despite some attempts to vest alleged Israeli capabilities with offensive designs, very few take this contention seriously, even among those in the international community who work assiduously to denuclearize the region. Thus there may be more effective payoffs from tackling first the perhaps more immediate threat (for all sides) of a conventional attack and then moving on to more remote dangers. As Yezid Sayigh, a Palestinian participant in the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control, suggests, "Nuclear disarmament and the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free-zone could be delayed until the conventional threat was re-
moved.” Such concessions on the Arab side would, of course, need to be reciprocated in other areas.

In the end, there is no better alternative for the region as a whole than the creation of a stable zone free of weapons of mass destruction. This includes a comprehensive ban on the production, purchase, testing, or use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Most major Arab states have not signed the 1992 chemical weapons convention, and Israel has been reluctant to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty, which triggers international monitoring, but does not call for mutual inspections by all countries in the region. Regarding verification of nuclear-weapons-free zones, it is interesting to consider for a moment the Brazilian-Argentine agreements of 1991 and the ensuing process of denuclearization of the Southern Cone region. The initial sequence agreed on by both parties involved mutual inspections, to be complemented by trilateral arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This provides an interesting precedent for the Middle East. It is often justifiably asserted that the two regions are not comparable in light of the differing levels of effective security threats in which they are enmeshed. Paradoxically, however, it may be argued that precisely where levels of threat are lower one might have expected greater reliance on purely multilateral means of inspection and verification (which are often considered less reliable than bilateral ones). Yet the fact that bilateral mutual mechanisms were embraced at the outset even in the Southern Cone of Latin America strengthens the case of those who would like to see them adopted in the Middle East as well. At the same time, all parties should recognize the need to involve international organizations in a supportive capacity.

IMPLICATIONS AND ADVANTAGES OF SEQUENCING

A strategy of sequencing ties arms control negotiations to the political process, both at the regional level and at the level of domestic politics. It thus prevents the negotiations from proceeding at an unreal pace or one deprived of the benefits of trade-offs and linkages that the bilateral and multilateral contexts offer. Two important implications of sequencing are worth exploring in some
detail: first, the question of "outsiders," or states not yet parties to
the multilateral talks and movements that feed on the opposition to
Arab-Israeli negotiations.

Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, and Iran are not part of the multi-
lateral peace process, and all host elements most opposed to it
(including Hizbullah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
among others). From the standpoint of these "outsiders," an agree-
ment among "insiders" over CSBMs points to an emerging entente
in the arms control process, suggesting that negotiations are for
real, even if they do not crack at the outset the toughest issues. The
more effective the CSBMs become, the higher the likelihood that
they will induce anxiety among those who have boycotted the
process. Even the implementation of a Red Sea communications
and crisis prevention center that excludes Syria, Iran, and Iraq will
provide a clear signal to nonparticipants that the costs of remaining
aloof may increase rather than decrease. The possibility remains,
of course, that the emerging entente could lead to negative unin-
tended effects, in the form of destructive behavior on the part of
outsiders. This behavior will be more likely under two conditions:
(1) if the entente is perceived to be faltering and (2) if the entente
has explicit offensive content. Neither one of these conditions has
characterized multilateral negotiations thus far.

The projected costs of remaining outside of the multilateral
negotiations can serve as useful ammunition in the hands of sup-
porters of reform within countries like Iran and Syria. The "econ-
omy first" wing of the Islamic Republic of Iran favors a policy
grounded to liberalize the economy, to increase trade and foreign
investments, and to adopt a pragmatic foreign policy.14 Participa-
tion in a regional security framework would undermine efforts by
radical leaders at home to exaggerate Iran's "security dilemma" and
would free resources to undertake the economic reconstruction that
pragmatists consider necessary to prevent a collapse of the Islamic
regime. In Syria, the more the country excludes itself from progress
made by other Middle East partners, the more the regime distances
itself also from its primary domestic objective: its own political
survival through economic reform.15 This is so because the benefits
of economic exchange will not, in all likelihood, accrue to Syria
unless and until it becomes an effective participant in a regional political and military settlement. Important elements of Hafez al-Assad's domestic coalition, such as the business community, may find their gains from economic liberalization to be far lower than they might be under a genuine transformation of the country's political economy. The regime's temptation to bow to old patterns of military consumption of expenditures is a major obstacle in this transformation. Despite expectations of an impending turnaround in Syria's position in both the bilateral and multilateral tracks, Assad's regime has yet to jump on the regional cooperative bandwagon.

At the same time, the very fact that partners in the arms control negotiations proceed sequentially—from the least to the most substantive aspects of military capabilities—reminds "outsiders" that the cooperative realm emerging among "insiders" does not diminish the latter's individual ability to inflict heavy penalties in response to unprovoked threats by third parties.

The second implication of sequencing involves building domestic popular confidence in CSBMs and the arms control process as a whole. Domestic political considerations often take second place in the context of arms control negotiations, perhaps because these negotiations are largely managed by highly technical (often military) experts more concerned with substantive arms control items than with the nitty-gritty aspects of the political process. Yet domestic ratification of the ultimate agreement is crucial, even when such ratification comes about through different institutional and procedural means from country to country. Even if arms control has been the one issue (out of five in the multilateral process) most removed from public scrutiny, there is a growing attentive audience that might eventually play a critical role in shaping public acceptance (or rejection) of reciprocal concessions in this area.

Sequencing is essential to instill confidence in a process perceived to involve a progressive shedding of strategic endowments (mostly in the case of Israel) and of political objectives (in the case of Arab countries). Political leaders can use this parceling of consecutive reciprocal steps to build down security concerns at the popular level. The "security dilemma" is not merely a product of geostrategic conditions, as some theories of international relations would have us believe. Leaders can choose to fuel the dilemma (by
exacerbating perceptions of the other side's offensive intentions) to serve their own political purposes, or they can help ameliorate the problem (by pointing to positive changes in the adversary's positions). The first path is far too often assumed to involve high political payoffs. The second path requires bolder leadership, yet in the end may be no less, and perhaps far more, rewarding politically. At the heart of the second path must be an effective campaign to educate the public through engaging, participatory, integrative, and reflective means. Formal educational campaigns on the advantages of peace (such as that undertaken by Israeli schools) ought to be complemented by private networks' training in conflict resolution. As the late Yehoshafat Harkabi, the 1993 recipient of Israel's top national award (Pras Israel), argued, "In democratic regimes an island of wisdom can no longer last if surrounded by an ocean of stupidity." This principle applies not only to Israel but also to states at various stages of democratization, where progressive civic inclusion can have a dramatic effect on a state's proclivity to embrace war or peace.

Sequencing thus ensures that agreements arrived at in the context of arms control negotiations are not invalided by political friction at home. In Israel, for example, there was widespread support in 1993 for taking certain security risks that could lead to a mutually beneficial political settlement. However, there remain potent concerns with physical survival. The unprovoked Iraqi Scud missile attacks in 1991 have only reinforced such visceral fears. Israeli leaders thus feel compelled to retain a policy of nuclear ambiguity until deep structural changes in intentions and capabilities have taken place in the region. Providing an insurance policy against "times of gloom" makes other, more immediate concessions more palatable. Such concessions could run the range of issue areas affected by the multilateral talks, from water rights to economic development.

It is far more complex to assess the sequence of arms control moves acceptable from the vantage point of political realities in the Arab world. Not every Arab party to the multilateral arms control negotiations faces the same internal threats or ranks common threats equally. Yet there seems to be a common theme in the political predicament of Arab leaders negotiating regional peace.
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza has been at the heart of Palestinian concerns since 1967. The objective of securing Israeli withdrawal arguably ranked higher than denuclearization, not surprisingly considering the fact that Palestinians in the occupied territories are the one party with least reason to fear Israel's nonconventional capabilities by virtue of the Palestinian physical presence in the midst of the Israeli state. The PLO might be far better positioned to face Hamas's challenges by delivering first on statehood and reconstruction and only later on purely symbolic issues. Similarly, Jordanian and Egyptian leaders stand a far better chance of handling discontent with the peace process through immediate and tangible resources to tackle their agonizing economic problems rather than seeking intangible gains with little operative meaning for the lives of the average citizen.

Sequencing may thus provide all current leaders in the region with the opportunity to abrogate, in an incremental way, many old slogans used in the past to stimulate domestic political support. Yehoshafat Harkabi rightly argued that the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole can hardly be reduced to a problem of misperceptions, and, indeed, misperceptions do not seem to be a genuine feature of formal negotiations today. At the same time, in the past, political leaders in the region have often exacerbated public misperceptions. Because the public is often less knowledgeable about the details of arms negotiations, it is susceptible to becoming a consumer of distorted characterizations of an adversary. Responsible leaders must reeducate their citizens to shed old habits. More practically, it may be politically untenable for current ruling coalitions to pursue the peace process without embracing that educational task. Appeasing combative elements in their midst might look cost-effective in the short term but could put at risk the longer-term objectives of economic and social reconstruction in the region. In sum, sequencing can help leaders deliver some immediate benefits while guiding, rather than following, the transformation of domestic attitudes toward the peace process. Specifying the costs of failing to reach an agreement may help enlist wider support for concessions.

Certainly, the Israelis will be asked to make very significant concessions at the bilateral and multilateral negotiating tables, particu-
lady on territories (West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights), water rights, the environment, and refugees. Even in the more variable-sum game of economic exchange, Israel might have to subsume certain security risks to the prospects of overall economic benefits for all. The heavy task confronting the Israeli government is thus to build support for concessions, including risky ones, that stop short of endangering the survival of the state. Although the Labor-led coalition, with its more moderate definition of such survival thresholds, has survived thus far, radical Islamic terror and difficulties in the implementation of the Declaration of Principles have both weakened it politically.

On the other side, the more Arab leaders can point to substantive progress on Palestinian existential issues (self-determination, statehood, personal and collective security), the better equipped they will be to gather support for an arms control sequence that takes into account Israeli existential fears (physical survival). Israel could, for instance, meet the PLO demands for relocating settlers from the heart of Hebron, settlers whom the Palestinian population consider (rightly or wrongly) responsible for the February 1994 massacre at the Cave of Patriarchs.

It is important to bear in mind that Arab leaders would be only promoting acceptance of the idea of sequencing, not of recognizing Israel's unilateral right to a nuclear deterrent for the remainder of history. The ultimate outcome—a zone free of weapons of mass destruction—fulfills the criteria of equity that Arab governments rightfully believe to be a political requirement for any stable agreement. As a concession to Egypt, Israel's Foreign Minister Shimon Peres has now specified that regional denuclearization would come two years after contractual peace agreements have been reached with every state in the region, including Iran, Libya, and Iraq. Egypt has considered this initiative to fall short of its own blueprint for regional arms control negotiations.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Multilateral negotiations on arms control ought to be sensitive to domestic political considerations. This point may seem quite
trivial; yet negotiations often take on a life of their own, where the internal logic of arms control prevails over the external logic of the political context. The difficulties in arriving at a consensus on the appropriate conventional-nonconventional arms sequence is an example of such pitfalls.

Concessions in the area of arms control can be made more palatable by highlighting the potential gains in this and other issue areas under discussion in the multilateral negotiations. Negotiators in the arms control talks might, for instance, organize a special workshop on the expected benefits (particularly economic) of alternative frameworks for reducing the region's level of militarization. This would not require a specific commitment to any particular framework. It would, instead, provide a more tangible sense of the public benefits that could accrue from mutual concessions. For instance, agreements on limiting a certain weapon system or reducing force structures can be translated into specific new economic opportunities. Proceedings from the workshop could be summarized in a document that, although not intrinsically binding for the purpose of actual negotiations, may elicit increased public support for the peace dividends from mutual concessions.

All partners may also consider the possibility of defining self-binding commitments in the arms control area, such as renouncing the threat or use of force for political purposes or as an instrument of changing territorial borders. Such commitments may accomplish a number of objectives at home and abroad. In the first place, they may be seen as a concrete show of political leadership. They would also fulfill the educational task facing all leaders in the region. Moreover, self-binding commitments can increase credibility in the eyes of interlocutors to the peace negotiations. They also tend to elicit heightened international support (moral and material). Ultimately, such commitments may serve as a tool to bind the domestic publics to a given position, akin to making the public somewhat of a partner at the table. The decisions by the PLO and Israel's Labor-led coalition to negotiate directly with each other had these effects overall, even when difficulties within the negotiating process have weakened public support. Finally, reversing a commitment that generates such positive international reverberations entails high costs, as the negotiating partners are all too aware.
Yielding to domestic opposition to the peace process is no less risky for either the survival of ruling coalitions, or the peace process itself.

NOTES

1. Syria and Lebanon have so far refused to participate in the multilateral talks but remain a reluctant partner in the bilateral talks. A number of Arab as well as extraregional countries attend the multilateral talks as sponsors and observers. Iraq and Iran are not part of the peace process at all.

2. On trading versus military, territorially oriented states, see Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

3. I include groups like Egypt's Socialist Labor Party and Syria's Communist Party among the nationalists.

4. For a more detailed discussion of coalitional politics in Israel and the Arab world, and of the implications for security postures, see Etel Solingen, "The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes: The Evolution of Nuclear Ambiguity in the Middle East," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 4 (June 1994): 305-37; and idem, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint," International Security 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 126-69.

5. For a comprehensive overview of arms control in the region, see Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991); and Alan Platt, ed., Arms Control and Confidence-Building in the Middle East (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1992).

6. On the need to accord priority to the nuclear issue, see Mohamed Nabil Fahmy, "Egypt's Disarmament Initiative," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 46, no. 9 (November 1990): 9-10; Mahmoud Karem, A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects (New York: Greenwood, 1988); and Abdullah Toukan, "The CWC, the NPT and the Middle East Peace Negotiations," Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin 22 (December 1993): 1-2. See also statements by Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Musa, quoted in P. R. Kumaraswamy, "Egypt Needles Israel," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 51, No. 2 (March-April 1995): 11.

7. Shalhevet Freier, A Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East and Its Ambience (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993); Peres quoted in Kumaraswamy, "Egypt Needles Israel," 12.

8. On Beheshti's position, see Leonard Spector, with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), 208. On Mohajerani's, see interview distributed by the official Iranian news agency, quoted in R. Jeffry Smith, "Officials Say Iran Is Seeking Nuclear Weapons Capability," Washington Post, October 30, 1991. On the Iranian leadership's Manichean view of the world and its implications for nuclear policy, see Akbar Etemad, "Iran," in A European Non-Proliferation Policy, ed. Harald Muller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 203-28; and Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Myth-Building: The Islamic Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49, No. 5 (June 1993): 42-49.

9. On this two-level bargaining, played out at the domestic table as well as at the international one, see Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-59.
10. See also M. Z. Diab, "Stability and Security through Arms Control in the Middle East" (paper prepared for the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation/UCLA Conference on Middle East Multilateral Talks, June 5-8, 1993).

11. See, inter alia, James Leonard, "Steps toward a Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons," *Arms Control Today* (April 1991): 10-14. On Arab recognition of the defensive nature of Israeli capabilities, see statements by Mohamed Hassanayn Heikal of Egypt (often considered an Egyptian nuclear "hawk") and by King Hussein of Jordan respectively, both quoted in Shai Feldman, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 87.

12. Yezid Sayigh, "Middle Eastern Stability and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," in *Non-Conventional Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East*, ed. E. Karsh, M. S. Navias, and P. Sabin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 200.

13. On verifying a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone, see Lawrence Scheinman, "Modalities for Verifying a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone" (paper prepared for the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation/UCLA Conference on Middle East Multilateral Talks, June 5-8, 1993).

14. Ibrahim Karawan, "Monarchs, Mullahs, and Marshals: Islamic Regimes?,” *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science* 524 (November 1992): 103-19.

15. On economic liberalization and regime survival in Syria, see Steven Heydemann, "Taxation without Representation: Authoritarianism and Economic Liberalization in Syria," in *Rules and Rights in the Middle East*, ed. Ellis Goldberg, Resat Kasaba, and Joel Migdal (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993), 69-101.

16. Lawson emphasizes the positive rewards of Assad's policies for large-scale commercial and agricultural groups. However, these groups surely assess their actual gains against those that might accrue from broader economic reform. See Fred H. Lawson, "Domestic Transformation and Foreign Steadfastness in Contemporary Syria," *Middle East Journal* 48, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 47-64.

17. On the concept of "bandwagoning" as a strategy to profit from an alliance with a dominant alignment or coalition, see Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rim* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

18. On the role of perceptions and the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

19. Yehoshafat Harkabi, "Can War Still Be an Instrument of Policy?" (paper prepared for the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership Symposium, "The End of the Century," September 1-4, 1993), 12.

20. Galia Golan, "A Palestinian State from an Israeli Point of View" (paper presented at the Conference on Race, Ethnicity, and Nationalism, University of Wisconsin-Madison, October 1993), 15.

21. Asher Arian, *Israel and the Peace Process: Security and Political Attitudes in 1993* (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Memorandum no. 39, 1993).

22. Freier, *A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone*.

23. Opening session of the UCLA Conference on the Middle East Multilateral Peace Process, June 1993.

24. These declaratory principles were suggested by Abdullah Toukan at the UCLA Conference.

25. For a formal analysis of the value of self-binding commitments, see Zeev Maoz and Dan Felsenthal, "Self-Binding Commitments, the Inducement of Trust, Social Choice, and the Theory of International Cooperation," *International Studies Quanerly* 31, no. 2 (June 1987): 177-200.