Abstract
According to Nietzsche, the fundamental problem between a man and a woman is rooted in the denial of antagonism between them. The man believes that their relationship must be that of eternal hostile tension and unavoidable injustice. Nietzsche asserts that there must be a rank order, where scaling is related to the actions of taking, accumulating and becoming greater by gaining power and overcoming narrower interpretations. This rank scaling does not allow for identicalness and equality, which are signs of the shallowness of instinct and the loss of one’s identity. Nietzsche endorses the difference and celebrates the otherness. Flourishing of an individual can never be interfered by the concept of equal relations. Nietzsche is convinced that people are different, and he advocates for agon (a power struggle) as a model of cultural and political relations. Since equality of human beings must consist of an equal amount of the same feature, Nietzsche sees this equality as being represented in the general will to power. Furthermore, the gender difference is also a socially constructed way of being. It is a creation of man’s image of how the world should look like. If included in a therapeutic approach, this perspective can shed new light on possible interventions methods in psychotherapy and philotherapy alike. Sex and sexual relationships can be singled out as key problems that prevail in the core of motivation for seeking professional therapeutic help (psychotherapy), no matter what therapeutic approach is used in such practice. It is a topic that has insufficiently drawn on Nietzsche’s legacy. The aim of this paper is to provide arguments that Nietzsche’s perspective on “war of the sexes” sets a productive context for both psychotherapeutic intervention and for philosophical consultancy.

Keywords
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, sex, difference, woman, truth

Introduction
Given that Nietzsche considered himself to be the first psychologist among the great philosophers, he aimed to unravel the mysteries and complexity of the psyche by examining it in detail within the context of the problem of sexes. Nietzsche’s perspective on psychotherapy is founded on the contested conventional notion of the self. In his concept of the self, the making of a place is related to the social making of embodiment. Nietzsche claimed that “body I am entirely, and nothing else; and soul is only a word for something about the body”\(^1\). Body is “a unity as an organisation”\(^2\) and is, therefore, “a work of art”.\(^3\) Nietzsche’s viewpoint on this remains valid even nowadays

\(^1\) Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. A Book for All and None, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann, Penguin, New York 1966, p. 31.
\(^2\) Ibid., fr. 5, p. 15.
because of the idea of a unique, individual self. The postmodern writers appear to have the intent to close the discussion about the subject as a locus of rationality and autonomy. Postmodernists see this subject and the human agency simply as a textual creation – a component of local narrative, but not its subject. In postmodern theories, the focus is placed on the management of proclamations: the “death of man” (Foucault), the “death of the subject” (Derrida), or the “death of the author” (Barthes). Nietzsche is critical towards the liberal subject and the ethics of self-creation, which brings new insights used in philosophical practice that uses such philosophical insights and philosophical methods to help people presume considerable issues in their lives. In the contemporary culture dominated by neoliberal values, Nietzsche’s perspective sparks interest and calls for a re-examination.

As “the first psychologist” of the eternally feminine, Nietzsche is not certain about whether or not to advise women to defeminise themselves in this manner and thus emulate all the irrationalities that stem from the concept of “manliness” of “the European man”, who bring women down to the low standards of “general culture”. He is referring to the feminine essence as a social construction that individual women need not exemplify. Nietzsche is concerned about the emancipation of masculinise women and undermines their power since being a female means power. He opposes women’s emancipation because he believes that it serves to “the destruction of the will to power and encourages the herd mentality”. Similarly to the notion of pity, feminism became “a shorthand” for all the forces of decadence besetting modern Europe. Under its influence, women will acquire all the masculine virtues and forces and take all the masculine weaknesses and vices into the bargain. Where masculine and feminine are cultural masks that can change, the biological sexes remain. Nietzsche insisted on the “war of the sexes” as the necessary tension that generates the creative individual.

Nietzsche is convinced that the push for female equality is driven by resentment and self-interest of the inferior. The ideas on equal rights represent only an expression and, essentially, “belong to decline”. Equality suppresses “feelings of rivalry, of resentment of any” in the lower classes. In his initial works on the women’s call for independence, Nietzsche emphasised resentment in the broader perspective. Resentment, as a structural concept, is a powerful tool for understanding human relations. Essentially, resentment is an attitude about another actor’s undeserved status. By resenting stronger individuals, weaker individuals situate their blame externally for that weakness. The passive and weak resent the healthy and strong, who enjoy more power and/or prestige. Desire to be independent drives women to begin to enlighten men about “the woman as she is”, and for Nietzsche, it is one of the worst developments of the general “uglifying” of Europe.

Such attitude sparked critical interpretations of Nietzsche, labelling his views as misogynistic and opposing to women’s liberation, although he wrote positively about many topics on the feminist agenda. Concerning the “emancipation of women”, he wrote that it is demanded and promoted by women themselves (and not merely by “shallow” males), which he sees as an odd symptom of the increasing weakening and dulling of the most feminine instincts. There is “stupidity” in this movement, an almost masculine stupidity, he believes. As for misogynists, Nietzsche claimed that they hate themselves. He authored Daybreak, a volume that also displays aphorism entitled “Misogynists”, which begins with the statement “Woman is our enemy”, and
continues with “out of the man who says that to other men there speaks an immoderate drive which hates not only itself but its means of satisfaction as well”. 13 There is inherent sexism in the claim that women are means of “satisfaction” to men. Nietzsche indicated that misogyny is a form of self-hated; men who dislike women resent humanity as well. Misogynists do not see women outside and beyond conventional and normative sexual arrangements. Contrary to that, to address the example of “man and woman” and look towards the “cardinal problem”, one ought to look beyond appearances and examine what stands behind. 14 This approach is essential in philosophical practice as art that integrates philosophy and human existence, ultimately keen to make it possible for an individual to move in new directions, e.g. to find that what is transformative. 15 However, it does not seem logical that the promoter of the philosophy of life would hate himself since he based his understanding of life on the constant struggle to overcome his own weaknesses. Nietzsche’s writings suggest ways of thinking about human differences that encourage us to consider the needs and desires of our own bodies beyond the dichotomy of “man” and “woman”. 16 Searching for essence means an inquiry into what kind of different forces are gathering a particular object, in this case, psychotherapy, but keeping in mind that “the object itself is a force” (Deleuze). 17

In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche outlined an ideal of femininity, suggesting that he understands the woman better than others. By proclaiming himself “the first psychologist of the eternally feminine”, he underlines that he cannot be recon-

---

4 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, trans. Reginald John Hollingdale, Penguin Books, New York 1979, fr. 5, p. 65.
5 Ellen Kennedy, “Nietzsche: Woman as Unter-mensch”, in: Ellen Kennedy, Susan Mendus (eds.), Women in Western Political Philosophy, Wheatsheaf, Sussex 1987, pp. 179–201, here p. 190.
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All too Human. A Book for Free Spirits, trans. Reginald John Hollingdale, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1986, fr. 493, p. 357.
7 Ibid., fr. 425, p. 310.
8 Lawrence J. Hatab, “Nietzsche on Woman”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (1981) 3, pp. 333–345, here p. 341.
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak. Thoughts on the Prejudice of Morality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982, fr. 179, p. 180; Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science. With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann, Vintage, New York 1974, fr. 3, p. 31.
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann, Viking Penguin, New York 1954, fr. 37, p. 73.
11 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann, Random House, New York 1966, fr. 232, p. 169.
12 Ibid., fr. 239, p. 177.
13 F. Nietzsche, Daybreak, fr. 346, p. 351.
14 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, fr. 231, p. 173.
15 Uri Wernik, Nietzschean Psychology and Psychotherapy. The New Doctors of the Soul, Lexington Books, Lanham 2016, p. 9.
16 Frances Nesbitt Oppel, Nietzsche on Gender. Beyond Man and Woman, University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville 2005, p. 3.
17 Cf. Manu Bazzano, “Ring My Bell”, Hermeneutic Circular (2008), April, pp. 27–29.
ciled with feminism and equal rights. Woman is a labyrinth to Nietzsche and vice versa. He is even envious toward the Woman because she produces life, because she is above all a procreator, more natural than men; but on the other hand, he sees the woman as a degrading creature, as a “creature of subversive ambivalence”. One of Nietzsche’s most powerful claims regarding his view on women is when he compares life to a woman.

“The world is brimming with beautiful things but nevertheless poor, very poor in beautiful moments and in the unveilings of those things. But perhaps that is the strongest magic of life: it is covered by a veil of beautiful possibilities, woven with threads of gold – promising, resisting, bashful, mocking, compassionate, and seductive. Life is a woman!”

A woman’s function often cannot be reduced to a simple figure or simple question, because Nietzsche showed the figure of a woman as an anti-figure, a figure of displacement and indecisiveness, as a creator of the world, the “male mother” linked to castration through desire. For Nietzsche, things are never simply good or evil, true or false, woman or man. Rather, things can be both and neither, or they can go beyond these categories. From this starting point, Nietzsche presented a new way of thinking about the concept of sex. The figure of a woman is changeable because it is being formed through the lens of “practical interest”. Nietzsche rejected the metaphysical essentialism of “woman as such”, as well as the general attitude of gender equality. The way of men is will, and the way of women is willingness:

“That is the law of the sexes; truly a hard law for women!”

This view suggests that respect and fear in woman is her nature, which is more ‘natural’ than that of man; she has all of these quintessential characteristics which differ from those of man:

“… her genuine, carnivore-like, cunning flexibility, her tiger-claws beneath the glove, her naïveté in egoism, her untrainableness and innate wildness, the incomprehensibleness, extent, and deviation of her desires and virtues. That which, in spite of fear, excites one’s sympathy for the dangerous and beautiful cat ‘woman’, is that she seems more afflicted, more vulnerable, more necessitous of love, and more condemned to disillusionment than any other creature.”

Nietzsche further says:

“To go wrong on the fundamental problem of ‘man and woman’, is to deny the most abysmal antagonism between them and the necessity of an eternally hostile tension. To dream perhaps of equal rights, equal education, equal claims and obligations is a typical sign of shallowness, shallow brought upon instinctively!”

Equal rights are used as an umbrella term for anything rare, against self-overcoming, against the ability to be different and independent.

It is not easy to self-consciously reflect on how to read Nietzsche’s texts because of the different perspectives and numerous problems with interpretation, not to mention his trademark irony. Given the problem, the issue of women and gender inequality must be viewed in the context of his entire work. If we are eager to understand the philosophical significance of the problem of the sexes in Nietzsche’s work, it is necessary to combine all of his perspectives into one, such as his view that women are the enemy, while holding that life is a woman; the views that the state of nature is an eternal war between the sexes and that “the perfect woman is a higher type of human than a perfect man, and also something much more rare”. To create this unity, it is necessary to follow his thought, which moves from a horizontal to a vertical line of argumentation. Nietzsche is a philosopher of difference and access, both
in terms of form and content, so the effort is needed to see through his coarse
and deceptive facade in order to discover the subtle features of his thought.
His philosophy fundamentally focuses on looking beyond the ordinary, be-
yond all conventional values, beyond philosophy itself.
Wisdom, life, and eternity are personified as females by Nietzsche, thereby
countering the moral archetype of the “good man” and the Enlightenment
ideal of a rational man. No “social contract” can correct the inequality of
women and the necessary injustice in the relationship between men and wom-
en. Nietzsche views justice as equivalent to power, something which is not
possible between a man and a woman simply because the woman’s life is
of secondary importance, according to social norms. It is men who corrupt
women, and the failings of women should be atoned for and set right by men.
A man makes for himself the image of a woman, and a woman shapes herself
according to this image.
While this statement neither alludes to the oppression and violence involved
in man’s creation of the image to which a woman conforms herself, nor does
it consider a woman as capable of rejecting man’s image of her, Nietzsche
summons men to accept guilt, make amends, and produce a less dishonoura-
ble image of women that will transform both them and women.
“Equal power” means that both parties have the power to enforce their own
evaluation or offer a balance in the distribution of productive power. On the
other hand, Nietzsche sees women and men’s power as very different.
“They want more, they learn to make claims, the tribute of respect is at last felt to be well-nigh
galling; rivalry for rights, indeed actual strife itself, would be preferred: woman is losing mod-
esty and taste. She is unlearning to fear man: but the woman who ‘unlearns to fear’ sacrifices her
most womanly instincts. That woman should venture forward when the fear-inspiring quality
in man – or more definitely, the man in man – is no longer either desired or fully developed, is
reasonable enough and also intelligible enough.”

18 Luce Irigaray, Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, Columbia University Press, New
York 1991, p. 73.
19 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, fr. 339, p. 193.
20 Cf. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Displace-
ment and the Discourse of Woman”; in: Mark
Krupnick (ed.), Displacement: Derrida and After, Indiana University Press, Bloomington
1983, pp. 169–195.
21 Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism,
Nature, and Difference, Routledge, New York
1989, p. 13.
22 Clayton Koelb, “Castration Envy: Nietzsche
and the Figure of Woman”, in: Peter J. Bur-
gard, Nietzsche and Feminine (ed.), University
Press of Virginia, London 1999, pp. 71–82,
here p. 75.
23 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, fr. 68, p. 71.
24 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, fr. 239,
p. 176–177.
25 Ibid., fr. 38, p. 175.
26 Zarathustra says more than once that he
loves the “person who wants to create over
and beyond himself and thus perishes”. – F.
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 65. The
magic and most powerful effect of woman is,
in philosophical language, action at a distance.
– F. Nietzsche, Gay Science, fr. 60, p. 124.
27 F. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, fr. 377,
p. 295.
28 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, fr. 294, p. 167.
29 Ibid., fr. 68, p. 71.
30 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, fr. 239,
p. 174.
According to proclaimed “equality”, social norms have created a hierarchy of value and an order of difference. In an attempt to seek and establish equality, oppressed groups have made the mistake of putting themselves in the place of their oppressors or masters. They seek to obtain the power of the master, or “aspire to be like a man” and “negate a woman in order to affirm [themselves] as a man”. This kind of “fight” is hostile to the energy of life and to life represented as the will to power. The will to power cannot be destroyed and should not be subjected to biology because Nietzsche sees it as a socially constructed arrangement of forces. Based on this perspective, Nietzsche advanced a powerful way of resisting social domination. The claim that women’s modesty usually increases with their beauty seems to be made without irony and suggests that most physically beautiful women do not utilise this power. “Danger in beauty” suggests that Nietzsche is critical of the belief that beauty can be a substitute for intellect:

“This woman is beautiful and clever: but how much cleverer she would have become if she were not beautiful!”

His attitude toward the problem of the sexes is part of his critical evaluation of democracy and the democratic ideal. Both sexes are unified in the quest for equality and sameness that would erase the lines of difference resulting from the herd mentality of the weak, which gave rise to male morality that articulates the power of the system by which man creates woman as he creates his world, preventing the woman from using the power of self-affirmation. Nietzsche’s notion of the self is based on ambiguity, on the plural identity, or simply the concept of “difference”, and he contributed to an understanding of both the problems of individuals and the sexes as the “problematic of the constitution of place” in relation to others. Equality argues against the production of distance necessary for changing places. The selfless individual creates his place in the world by negating the value of the differences of others.

The irony of his sexual dualism must be viewed in the context of his criticism of all dualisms and universalisms. Sometimes his writings might come across as anti-feministic because he saw feminism and democracy as sicknesses of Europe that constitutes a new form of slavery. For Nietzsche, emancipation characterises the female attempts to gain access to a male-dominated world through autonomy, education and equal rights, but with the consequence of corrupting the female instincts.

The problem of the sexes is linked to the history of women’s oppression and patriarchy. As Diana Coole emphasised, many Western philosophers go against changing the status quo and granting equality to women. Similarly, these philosophers force women to subdue their female qualities and acquire male characteristics in order to become rational, competitive, disciplined, and autonomous. Oppositions such as male – female, rational – irrational, public – private, etc., are at the core of political theory discourse. Its necessary precondition is the historical construction of the self as a juridical subject, which is not neutral but male. Because of this, feminists emphasise that women are not natural but are instead historical. Nietzsche’s philosophy is important because it shows that the subject of construction depends on identity and the negation of the forms of otherness. In domains of politics and law, our identities have been based on the negation of "femininity" as a form of otherness. One of the difficulties is that otherness has never been tolerated in history and has been subjected to assimilation. The danger of lapsing into an essentialist interpretation is pointed out by Helene Cixous and Catherine Clement, who
asserted that the opposition of man and woman should be used with a qualification that not all men repress their femininity, while some women delineate only their masculinity. The difference is not distributed on the basis of socially determined gender. When Nietzsche explained that “we must become those that we are”, it meant that we must allow for both men and women to be complex, mobile, and open. This paper aims to show why Nietzsche believed that the problem of the sexes is inevitable. Nietzsche assumes that women possess the advantage stemming from the antagonism between the sexes and that the suppression of that antagonism conflicts with women’s interest, “when women cut themselves off from man, they sink backwards into psychological and spiritual stagnancy”. The ability to change and control the surface of existence is key to Nietzsche’s directives to the modern woman. The interplay and conflict between biology and the created image can be a base for psychotherapy. It can become a possible avenue for re-evaluating cultural values through a revitalisation of healthy femininity through a vigorous and strong dynamic between the sexes.

What would it mean to employ a few of Nietzsche’s subversive notions to psychotherapy? Nietzsche is a significant and thought-provoking thinker, hence applying him to psychotherapy is an important and challenging endeavour. Nietzsche saw himself as a physician of culture; he has envisioned and shaped the dawning artistry of psychotherapy, redefining psychotherapy as an experiment that explores the limits and the intricacies of human experience. Nietzsche’s philosophical perspective allows for bringing new light in the critical inquiry into psychotherapy, demanding an affirmative way. In a psychotherapeutic setting, it “means that the criteria of true and false no longer have primacy and are superseded by new criteria of high and low, noble and mean. What begins to matter more is the sense and value of what one thinks, feels and says”.

Through Nietzsche’s naturalistic view, we can discover what is there to find out and then do the unmasking or interpretation of the search of the essence of psychotherapy. Interpretation is a challenging art, and this is a niche where

31 Jacques Derrida, Spars. Nietzsche’s styles, trans. Barbara Harlow, Chicago University Press, Chicago 1979, p. 65.
32 Kelly A. Oliver, Womanizing Nietzsche: Philosophy’s Relation to the “Feminine”, Routledge, London 1995, p. 30.
33 F. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, fr. 398, p. 297.
34 Ibid., fr. 404, p. 299.
35 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, fr. 282, p. 160.
36 Diana Hilary Coole, Woman and Political Theory: From Ancient Misogyny to Contemporary Feminism, Harvester Press, Brighton 1988, p. 3.
37 Helene Cixous, Catherine Clement, The Newly Born Woman, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1986, p. 65.
38 Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche’s Task. An Interpretation of “Beyond Good and Evil”, Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, p. 240.
39 Camille Paglia, Sex, Art, and American Culture. Essays, Vintage Books, New York 1992, p. 24.
40 U. Wernik, Nietzschean Psychology and Psychotherapy, p. 165.
Nietzsche’s philosophy is essential to therapists. With Nietzsche’s naturalistic view, we can learn what is there to learn and then do the unmasking or interpretation in search of the essence of psychotherapy. Essence is life rather than being.  

Nietzsche believes that it is necessary to say yes to life even in its strangest and intractable problems, the will to life, celebrating its inexhaustibility, is the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet. The philosophical practice accepts philosophising primarily to help people overcome their personal problems by analysing their beliefs about, or attitudes towards, their situation or our inability to create ourselves. From this perspective, for Nietzsche, a woman as a metaphor ought to have new meaning to allow her to discover new paths of thinking and new perspectives. When he says that truth is a woman, he highlights the necessity of discovering the secret of the truth, since her secret is the source of existence; all of life’s powerful magic is subsumed in the figure of a veiled female body, which is why the woman is seen as a difference. Therefore, it is necessary, primarily for a man, to commit to the pathos of distance in order to self-overcome oneself both socially and individually.

**Woman as Metaphor**

To describe the complexity of his thought, Nietzsche frequently uses irony and metaphors. According to Nietzsche, the metaphor is a fundamental characteristic of human intellect. Metaphors extend a language’s capacities, so Nietzsche defines the metaphor as a word that “does not produce new words but gives a new meaning to them”, and irony as “words to say the opposite of what they seem to say”. Irony presents an inherent conflict of perspectives in regards to negation. In keeping with Hegel’s theory, Nietzsche sees negation as part of the process of affirmation. Ironically, Nietzsche reveals the hollow character of today’s ideal. In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche wrote that God is dead, mentions the eternal return for the first time, and begins to use “woman” metaphorically. In this way, he prepares the stage for a new valuation – a new “ideal” and a new perspective. In this book, Nietzsche treats the “woman” ironically, trying to show that “woman” is only a word and that human reality is mostly a human dream/creation. We “live in a dream” with our eyes wide open, we ignore what is natural. The metaphor can redesign reality, and it can bring us closer to the reality of the world.

Metaphor and irony in aphorisms are used to discredit the enthusiast’s ideal of women and reveal their own “fantasy” and dream vision. To maintain the dream, one needs to hold one’s distance and keep one’s ideal of woman, viewed as peace and one’s own “better self”. This fantasy describes the normative sex issue and ensures distance, and according to Nietzsche’s ironic words, keeps the man “safe” in his dream world. Man invents a fictional reality and an idealised woman as an escape from nature, and therefore the woman is forced to conform herself to the image man has created for her. The social norm of valued subjectivity is the male body, hence, the evaluation of sexual difference is an expression of power, in that difference means dominance, and ‘equality’ as identicalness is impossible. Taking all of this into account, there are a few results possible, one being that the woman “could” combine man’s best qualities with her own and “rule over” man, the second being that she could become a “third sex”. All liv-
ing creatures see through the gaze of their imagination. The notion of life can be a metaphor for the fulfilment of an imagined impossibility. Because the woman is the locus of absolute power, all those who possess a will to power must envy the emptiness that is its source. All positive values of life, and its powerful magic, are subsumed in the figure of the veiled female body. Nietzsche’s metaphor of woman as a value of life, truth, wisdom, sensuality, happiness, eternity has its roots in ancient tradition. Hesiod previously equated women with nature, especially with birth. According to ancient myths, the woman symbolises the origin of life because of her power. The female was perceived to be a vehicle of meaning at the very beginning of the world. Nietzsche develops complicity rather than unity between woman, life, seduction, modesty, and the other effects of veiling. Nietzsche sees the woman as a metaphor representing the creative forces of life, but at the same time, life and the woman are represented as forces of difference. By using the woman as a metaphor for both truth and deception (the negative side of the truth), Nietzsche deviated from a bivalent or Aristotelian logic that operates based on distinctions. According to Irigaray, Nietzsche affirms the woman as a source of life only by denying her independent reality and experiences in the world. Because of this affirmation, the woman experiences a negation of her autonomous being. His desire is to achieve the impossible – to give birth to himself. Nietzsche’s depriving women of their creative independence is evident when he mocks the role of the emancipated woman, but this is not unusual because it is part of the patriarchal attitude toward society. He attacked the idea that women will be emancipated once they secure equal rights and advance; because modern ideas about society and politics have led to a degeneration in our thinking about the social roles and functions of men and women. Modern women are being encouraged to fight for “equal rights” but this struggle, if successful, will lead to a gradual erosion of women’s influence and power. The concept of equality allows for the power imbalance between men and women to be reproduced. This analysis of the concept is part of philosophi-
cal practice because our contemporaries have the scientific mindset but have lost the “sure instinct” achieved by the continued practice.\textsuperscript{53}

An emancipated woman eliminates the problem of the sexes and softens the natural power of her femininity. This kind of societal “defeminising” attitude can jeopardise the fundamental meaning of the “force of the will”.\textsuperscript{54} Nietzsche argues that women – by giving up traditional feminine roles – decrease their greatest source of power. The will to power is posed both in terms of (i) the will to mastery and (ii) the will to let go and let be.\textsuperscript{55}

Frances Nesbitt Oppel finds two reasons why Nietzsche veiled the feminine in metaphor; on the one side, she calls attention to the loss, but on the other, she discovers the “powerful feminine” by eliminating its connection with a real woman, and in this way, Nietzsche “liberates” the woman under the sign of Dionysus.\textsuperscript{56}

Nietzsche’s opposition between male and female forces within the self is represented by Dionysus, who blurs the problem of sexes by merging the genders because Dionysus is a male god with a female appearance.\textsuperscript{57} Deleuze’s opinion was that eternal recurrence appears from the union of Dionysus and Ariadne, moving from negation to affirmation.\textsuperscript{58} Ariadne, as a symbol of the Dionysian nihilistic experience, is reflected in Nietzsche’s thinking that we must learn to hate in order to love.\textsuperscript{59} Bivalent logic, affirmation and negation, are basically the same operation. Nietzsche stressed the nature of “duality”, stating that “there is no Dionysian appearance without an Apollonian reflection”\textsuperscript{60} because their inseparable antagonistic interdependency confuses gender identity. Through this perspective, it is possible to recognise and locate the real ambiguity of Nietzsche’s thinking through his metaphor of the woman, viewed as property, possession – and on the other hand, the woman as a gift-giving virtue.

For Nietzsche, the “perfect woman” is better than most men. The perfect woman is a higher type of human being than the perfect man, and at the same time, something that is much rarer.\textsuperscript{61} But is she better or equal to the best men, the Übermensch or Zarathustra? This “affirming woman” has a Dionysian force, and she is the space from which everything originates. Nietzsche’s “affirming woman” signifies the self-overcoming of the will to truth and will to illusion, abandoning all foundation and certainties, the original mother; she is the unexhausted procreative will to life which is the will to power.\textsuperscript{62} The perfect woman tears to pieces when she loves, she is a “maenad”\textsuperscript{63} because she is capable of taking the opportunity to take possession of man, and she has a desire to overpower and appear as if she has self-surrendered.\textsuperscript{64} Through love, women actually become what they appear to be in the imagination of their lovers.\textsuperscript{65} Man does not exclude hate from his definition of erotic love, since both love and hate are powerful, essentially creative emotions:

“Has my definition of love been heard? […] Love, in its means, war; at bottom, the deadly hatred of the sexes.”\textsuperscript{66}

This aspect can be used in psychotherapy as a tool enabling greater human effectiveness or to modify feelings, conditions, attitudes and conduct which are emotionally, intellectually, or socially inadequate or alienated.\textsuperscript{67}

All great achievements on the part of the man of antiquity were supported by the fact that men stood beside men, and that a woman was not allowed to claim to be the nearest or highest, let alone the sole object of his love – as sexual passion teaches us to feel.\textsuperscript{68} The passions, these “magnificent monsters”, \textsuperscript{69}
are endowed with are an almost numinous quality. We can learn from their intensity and irreducible autonomy in the same way, say, in which we humbly learn from a dream.\textsuperscript{70} The belief that a woman has in love and the appearance of surrendering to love, brings her power over others. This may be why she, unlike man, is loyal to the concept of love.

Nietzsche does not have anything sentimental in mind regarding love; the sexual agon, or contest, involves bodies, muscles, posture, emotions, and brains. For Nietzsche, love is a possessive, selfish emotion. In Nietzsche’s three types of love,

“… [the] first type is men who are more modest consider the mere use of the body and sexual gratification a sufficient and satisfying sign of ‘having,’ of possession. Another type gives up for his sake what she has or would like to have; only then does she seem to him ‘possessed.’ A third type asks himself whether the woman, when she gives up everything for him, does not possibly do this for a phantom of him. He wants to be known deep down, abysmally deep down, before he is capable of being loved at all. He feels that his beloved is fully in his possession only when..."
she no longer deceives herself about him, when she loves him just as much for his devilry and hidden insatiability as for his graciousness, patience and spirituality."

Woman as Truth

Nietzsche claimed that the woman does not want the truth because nothing has been more alien, repugnant, and hostile to a woman than the truth – her great art is deception; her highest concerns are mere appearance and beauty. Yet, on the other hand, Nietzsche identified truth with woman, and explained that she has a justifiable reason for not letting us see her true self (her own truth).

Based on Nietzsche perspective, philosophical practice implements critical thinking which involves testing whether arguments stand up to critical investigation and considering whether we have good grounds to accept them and investigate the extent to which critical thinking can support clients toward emotional wisdom, right decisions and enlightened values. Philosophical practice emphasises problems in order to promote understanding, rather than seek understanding to cure problems, promoting “self-exploration” with the focus on “problems”. It will lead to some modifications and solutions to these problems.

By associating the figure of the woman with both sides of the binary opposition, Nietzsche reveals truths to be illusions that we are not capable of recognising – similar to death, which traditional philosophy has always described using metaphors. In Beyond Good and Evil and The Gay Science, Nietzsche wrote about the woman as truth, and in The Genealogy of Moral, he equated the woman with wisdom. Nietzsche’s philosophy is marked by his persistent rejection of the traditional notion that philosophy and science search for the truth. For Nietzsche, the goal is not to discover the unvarnished truth because there is no such thing. The aim is to understand the forces that produced these ideas about the truth.

Looking at the naked truth would be difficult and dangerous, but also an epistemological necessity. The naked truth is not reachable because the woman who is truth and nature at the same time chooses to keep it concealed with the wish for it not to be seen, maybe because she is hiding something repulsive. Nietzsche redefined truth and reality from within life because he does not believe truth is separate from this world or reality is an outside experience. Truth is not static, but dynamic; it is not a structure underlying the world but a style of life. Nietzsche aims to overcome the divisions and oppositions in relation to the truth when he emphasises that woman as a figure is, on the one hand, the inquiring subject and the pursuit of truth; and on the other hand, the object of inquiry, a simulated, veiled truth, a play on the distinction between truth and untruth.

For Nietzsche, the woman is a metaphor for the untruth of the truth, or differently, he puts woman/truth in a paradoxical position of both telling the truth and lying. The surface is not the truth, but a symptom, a sign, of that in which one needs to believe. Human beings impose their truth about life instead of seeking truth within life. The conventional distinction between truth and deception coincide with the instituting social order because deceivers use valid terms, words without form, full of emptiness, to make the unreal appear real. The distinction between truth and deception is not a necessary presuppo-
sition of reasoning but an effect of convention. All kinds of simulation are “so much the rule and the law”.77

Truth is a function of life, but it is not strictly pragmatic or utilitarian. Nietzsche described the pursuit and discovery of truth not as a simple and easy task but rather as the most difficult task, from which most retreat. Nietzsche affirmed the woman as the source of life only by denying her independent reality and experience of the world.

The woman’s veil can be seen as an illusory barrier that serves as an individualising, lifesaving force, or as a perspective that will distinguish the truth from its opposite (from the will to deception), the lesson being that we must be capable to desire difference without adding antithetical (genderised) values. It is dangerous to lift nature’s veil because nature is fierce like a woman, like a tiger, and behind the veil is another veil, and behind the cave is another cave. As already mentioned, there has been nothing more alien to women than the truth – their great art is deception. Men honour and love in women precisely this art and this instinct.78 Truth cannot be unrevealed without horror. We are no longer capable of believing because education and morality have shaped us to the extent that truth remains true even after the veil has been removed. The liar uses valid terms, words, to make the unreal appear real.

“Perhaps the truth is a woman who has reason for not letting us see her reason?79 [...] Perhaps her name is Baubo?”

Mystery means to know how to keep something at a distance, not to refuse appearance, but to affirm it. We want to see beyond the veils, but we also fear “looking into the abyss”, into the depth of nature. Not only those who have these feelings fear the truth; everyone fears the truth and suffers from it. However, strong individuals persist in the hunt for truth because their love of truth outweighs the hardship suffered in the quest. Recognition, affirmation of reality is for the strong man as great as is necessity for the weak man, under the inspiration of weakness, cowardice and flight in the face of reality. According to Nietzsche, only great pain affords us the deepest insights into

77 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, fr. 194, p. 107.
78 Ibid., fr. 232, p. 170.
79 J. M. Russell, “Philosophical Counseling is not a Distinct Field”, p. 8.

Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense”, in: Sander Gilman, Carole Blair, David Parent (eds.), Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, Oxford University Press, New York 1989, pp. 246–257, here p. 247.

78 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, fr. 2, p. 30.
79 Ibid., fr. 7, p. 34. Baubo is a fun-loving, bawdy, jesting, wise goddess who plays a crucial, healing role in the Eleusian mysteries of Ancient Greece. She was celebrated as a positive force of female sexuality and the healing power of laughter. Demeter was wandering the Earth in mourning over the loss of her daughter, Persephone, who had been violently abducted by Hades. Abandoning her goddess duties of bringing fertility to the land, she took refuge in the city of Eleusis. When Demeter saw Baubo she began to smile and her spirits and confidence were restored. Thanks to Baubo, all was once again right in the world.
the human “mystery”, but we do not become “better” because of pain, only “profound”, which is the basis for becoming a “different” person. We become “seekers” of truth itself.

As for Baubo and the truth, what Nietzsche wants to tell us is that simple logic could never understand that life is neither depth nor surface, that behind the veil there is another veil, and that the appearance of truth will not cause pessimism or scepticism, but affirm that despite death life can come back.30 As the story of Baubo shows, the female has the power to shock and disturb common conceptions of womanhood, revealing subversive lewdness and obscenity. Baubo can appear as a female double of Dionysus, but like life, she is beyond the “metaphysical” distinction of male and female. Dionysus is the bridge between the veiled and unveiled masculine and feminine. Nietzsche returns truth to the world and translates man back into nature.31 Because of the circle of woman, truth, and nature, Sarah Kofman connects female fertility with the idea of the productivity of truth, creativity of life, its cycle of creation and decay, the circle that is a will to power, a will to dance, a will to innocence, a will to reproduction.32 As the female double of Dionysus, Baubo promises the possibility of inaugurating a mode of reflection beyond the metaphysical distinction of male and female, which traditional philosophy has considered a natural hierarchy, in which male is affirmed and female excluded. A woman’s mediation of the world through a man always assumes an inferior position, one of natural servitude and obligation. Nietzsche’s affirmation of the woman contains a negation of her autonomous being: he respects her enormous creating power, but for him, the final achievement is to move beyond ordinary capabilities, to achieve the impossible, to give birth to himself as a self-made philosopher. Maybe Ansell-Pearson is not right in his claim that Nietzsche expressed a fundamental resentment towards maternal creativity.33 Nietzsche just wants to achieve spiritual pregnancy, to overcome men, to create the Overman. Nietzsche’s conception of autonomy, of self-creation through self-birth, is a masculine one because the subject must be autonomous, independent and proud, and suppress what it regards as the horror and ugliness of their birth: a birth in which it was in a relationship of dependency.34 Philosophical counselling can assist people with troubled self-esteem, who are not socially-economically independent and cannot put in effect constructive change or growth and a deeply-ingrained purpose in life.35

Woman as Distance

Action at a distance is women’s “most powerful effect”,36 Nietzsche writes not without irony because he was trying all his life to maintain distance from his mother and sister. Nietzsche rejected his mother because she was “extremely German”,37 by which he meant that she had a very local, as opposed to national, mindset and a narrow perspective. This distance permitted him to be an anti-political German because he was a “good European”. Nietzsche desperately tried to separate his culture, connected with his “very German” mother because German culture in its nihilism was sick, so far away from life. Nietzsche perceived his mother and sister as fearsome and dangerous, as “vermin”, “rabble”, and “hell machine”38 and because of the baseness of their instincts. He viewed them as his antipodes.39 Because of all this, he continually tried to separate himself from the maternal, since free spirits are free of the woman if they can object to the mother figure. Nietzsche was not a free spirit
because he was not capable of altogether abandoning the maternal figure. Abjection has its ambiguity because it is necessary for every child to abject its mother in order to become an autonomous subject.\textsuperscript{90} But, the child can properly go through abjection only with the support of the “imaginary father” because, without him, the child would abject itself instead. Some authors see through his ambiguous relation to the maternal ambiguity when writing about the feminine.\textsuperscript{91} Those authors based their perspective on Nietzsche’s statement, “as my father I am already dead, while, as my mother I still live and grow old”.\textsuperscript{92} Without the father’s help, he could not bring about the mother’s abjection because he experienced the horror of separation from his father, which enabled him to separate from her, so in the end, he abjected himself when he abjected his mother. But ultimately, Nietzsche is repulsed and fascinated by the abject, especially as it is associated with pregnancy and birth, as part of a life cycle, resembling chaos which creates and destroys. When Nietzsche said that woman is more closely related to nature than man, he meant that:

“When we love a woman, we easily conceive a hatred for nature on account of all the repulsive natural function to which every woman is subjected […] nature seems to intrude on our property and with the most profane hands at that […]. ‘The human being under the skin’ is an abomination and unthinkable to all lovers, a blasphemy against God and love.”\textsuperscript{93}

It is not easy to tell what is repulsive here: woman for being nature, or nature for being female. The energy of creation inside of women is both horrific and powerful. But the key to self-overcoming lies in maintaining a distance.

80 Sarah Kofman, “Baubo: Theological Perversion and Fetishism”, in: Kelly A. Oliver, Marilyn Pearsall (eds.), Feminist Interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche, Pennsylvania State University Press, University of Michigan 1998, pp. 21–50, here p. 40.
81 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, fr. 228, p. 161.
82 S. Kofman, “Baubo”, p. 45.
83 Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994, p. 198.
84 Peter Sloterdijk, “Eurotaoism”, in: Tom Darby, Bela Egyed, Ben Jones (eds.), Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: Essays on Interpretation, Language and Politics, Carleton University Press, Ontario 1988, pp. 99–116, here p. 106.
85 Cf. Lou Marinoff, “What Philosophical Counseling Can’t Do”, Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (1998) 4, pp. 33–41, doi: https://doi.org/10.5840/pcw19985420.
86 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, fr. 60, p. 70.
87 F. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, fr. 3, p. 15.
88 Sara Kofman, “A Fantastical Genealogy: Nietzsche’s Family Romance”, trans. D. Jenison, in: Peter Burgard (ed.), Nietzsche and the Feminine, University Press of Virginia, London 1994, pp. 35–53, here p. 43.
89 Ibid., p. 42.
90 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon Samuel Roudiez, Columbia University Press, New York 1982, p. 73.
91 S. Kofman, “A Fantastical Genealogy”, p. 37; Jean Graybeal, Language and “the Feminine” in Nietzsche and Heidegger, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1990; K. A. Oliver, “Woman as Truth in Nietzsche’s Writings”, p. 54.
92 F. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, fr. 3, p. 16.
93 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, fr. 59, p. 70.
Nietzsche’s concept of distance has two levels: distance as a division within the self and distance as the difference between the self and others. The pathos of distance within the self is governed by the will to power. The present self requires that we view ourselves from a distance in an image of ourselves. A distance or difference within the self, between the present self and an image of self, is necessary to transform the corporeal self. The difference, or distance, between the two, is a precondition for self-formation and transformation. Woman, operating at a distance, is the complementary image or the difference to what man postulates in constituting himself as present. Only the ‘empty space’ between them is affected by the will to power as the interpretation by which borders are established and bodies formed. Distancing (will to power as the measurement of woman), is the difference that precedes, exceeds and constitutes the distance among the self and between man and his ‘other’ woman.

In philosophical practice, philosophical inquiry aims at assisting in living a satisfying, productive, meaningful and happy life, which is in search of the truth, knowledge, insight, wisdom, virtue. Nietzsche’s psychology is not founded on an investigation of a sample of subjects, but preferably on the observation and experience of one human being with a developed sense of what is applicable and humanly universal, with the ability to generate to others, his own experiences, and temptations, disguises the problem and struggles to find a meaning in life.

Nietzsche illustrated the process through an understanding of biology because physiology is imperative to our comprehension of man. Biology, not philosophy, holds power over man and it is a basis in the denial of equality between the sexes. Biology secures the dynamics of one’s actions. The struggle itself and participation in the byplay of forces can qualitatively alter each individual means to power.

Both women and men deceive themselves about each other, because what they honour and esteem are their own ideals. Man tries to be peaceful and obedient when the woman’s nature is to be essentially “unpeaceful” and “wild”. The problem of the sexes is not hierarchy but the symmetry of varying sensual tempos, which leads to mutual misinterpretation. The woman, as man’s ideal, represents the Other, a negative identity; she designs and desires the male as the Other. This is based on Beauvoir’s statement that the woman “is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her, because he is Subject, he is Absolute, she is Other”. A woman’s role as the Other makes her an actress who depends on pretence and illusion to survive. Her mistake is that she allows herself to be caught up in her own illusion, incapable of self-representation and self-creation.

Women are taught to be ashamed of eroticism, “they are supposed to have neither eyes nor ears nor words nor thoughts for this – their ‘evil’”. Nietzsche understands the cruelty of morality that demands of women to deny their eroticism, preparing them to be sexual object for men, thus crippling their erotic life. In this way, she loses the power of self-articulation. By defining her virtue (her value), man establishes a norm to which a woman must conform. A woman’s sexual objectification leads to her silencing, which is why she is in danger of losing her being. Silence is born out of fear, pain, or death, but in the case of woman, silence is born out of her fear of man. The themes of silencing, articulation, and the need to take life into control define today’s feminist discourse. If woman is the complementary image man constructs,
possessing this image would bring a kind of death to the self, because creative self-fabrication relies on maintaining a distance from this image.  

Man creates an image of the other to secure his corporal identity. At a distance, women’s “differences” are complementary and serve as a base for affirming man’s self-presence. Elisabeth Grosz explains the difference in criteria and their implication for the relationship between the sexes based on masculine norms:

“Our perceived images of femininity have been masculine – inverted, projected images of male ideals and fantasies imagine of male ‘other’ rather than a female subject.”

The metaphor of the whip can be explained in relation to keeping the woman at a distance – the concept of woman that man forms for himself has no effect on the woman. This metaphor must be understood as a mark of irony because the whip is mentioned by a “little old woman”, but it could be Zarathustra’s statement, or it might also be Nietzsche’s. On the other hand, Nietzsche stated that the “woman should be silent about the woman”, offering to the reader new possibilities for understanding or forcing the reader to find the solution to the riddle.

Man creates for himself the image of woman or, more generally, man creates women in the same way he creates his world. This suggests that women are artistic only if they act out the role imposed by men. Being artistic requires the ability to incorporate oneself in one’s own plan, along with the present self and the imposed concept or image. Nietzsche argued that a woman’s self-constitution in relation to men has two modes. The first is closeness, which is a result of man’s possession or action at a distance. It requires a woman’s unconditional submission because in obeying man, “woman will find a depth for

94 J. Derrida, Spurs, p. 42.
95 F. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. 7.
96 F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, fr. 489, 492, pp. 270–271.
97 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, fr. 85, p. 84.
98 Paul Patton, “Politics and the concept of power in Hobbes and Nietzsche”, in: Paul Patton, (ed.), Nietzsche, Feminism, and Political Theory, Routledge, London 1993, pp. 144–162, here p. 158.
99 Jacques Derrida, “The Question of Style”, in: Kelly A. Oliver, Marilyn Pearsall (eds.), Feminist Interpretation of Woman, Pennsylvania State University Press, University of Michigan 1998, pp. 55–66, here p. 55.
100 F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, fr. 799, p. 720.
101 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, New York, Vintage 1974, p. 16.
102 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, fr. 71, p. 74.
103 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, fr. 232, p. 169.
104 Rosalyn Diprose, “Nietzsche and the Pathos of Distance”, in: Paul Patton (ed.), Nietzsche, Feminism, and Political Theory, pp. 1–27, here p. 16.
105 Elizabeth Gross, “Irigaray and Sexual Difference”, Australian Feminist Studies 1 (1986) 2, pp. 63–77, here p. 68, doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/08164650.1986.10382925.
106 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, fr. 232, p. 169.
107 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, fr. 68, p. 73.
her surface”.  

But in this way, she will reduce the distance from herself and others necessary for her self-creation and, in the end, will not find depth, only shame. Submission brings shame; being sexually possessed, she ceases to be the mysterious eternally feminine – in giving up everything that she could be, her shame is the result of her being revealed as surface.

The second mode of self-constitution Nietzsche attributes to women is action at a distance, which involves maintaining one’s virtue, in the sense of maintaining distance from man’s desire and maintaining one’s own differences. But from the beginning, action as distance does not bring autonomy because this action does not distance a woman from others or from herself, which is necessary for her overcoming.

It seems that a man’s desire to create himself is satisfied only if the woman remains in one place. Nietzsche is not insensitive to the difficulties imposed on women by men, because she must be capable of holding together a contradictory image of both virtue and shame, distance and submission.

The female body lends itself to sexual “antagonism”, out of which male body and male perspective profit on a social level, Nietzsche observes in The Gay Science. This immoral “natural opposition” is the source of social injustice for woman, but this natural opposition also reflects a sexual attitude toward love because “woman is giving herself away” while “man acquire more”; the opposition means for a woman “total devotion” to her beloved, with her whole body and soul, without consideration, or reserve, without shame and the horror of devotion; for a man, it means total devotion from the other.

In its essence, the war for equality is not about permitting women to be reinforced, healthier, more complete women; but to take over male territory. If this is so, then Nietzsche warns that those characteristics related to female biology, such as deception and longing for love, will be marked feeble and unhealthy. Man and woman, for Nietzsche, are with diverse spirit and instinct, respectively, both as a consequence of their physical distinctions. He stated that “there is an unchangeable this is I about man and woman”. At that station are separate kinds of sexuality with biological attributes that provide themselves to divergence in the spirit of male and female characters.

These Nietzschean traits give rise to divergence, tension and struggle and are essential for satisfaction, progression and living. Due to the fact of their physiological discrepancy, these instincts can be our greatest source of power. Nietzsche’s deliberative mockery of the “natural opposition” is seen in his statement that man wants unconditional love, so maybe, he suspects, for man it means he might want to give love rather than to take it:

“We humans would like to be moral, but love is nature, and nature is immoral.”

By considering love to be like a gay or joyous event, Nietzsche is suggesting cheerful defiance against social convention, morality, and values. Similarly, Nietzsche claims that the “comedy of love” and the “impossibility of harmonious relation between the sexes” are based on the contradictory nature of man’s self-constitution, which requires distance and closeness. Each sex has prejudice about love based on social convention and “herd” instincts, passed on through stories, rituals, phrases, art. When the energy of love overcomes, antagonism vanishes, and the man simply absorbs and possesses the woman completely. A woman’s passion in its unconditional unification of rights indicates that there is no equal pathos nor will for renunciation. “Love makes the same”, constantly deceiving with a feeling of sameness which in reality
does not exist. Both sides wish to become the same and create a beautiful and mad spectacle to dissolve boundaries, gender rules, and identities. What matters is whether a method affirms life or is rather inspired by the instinct of revenge, i.e. an overriding tendency to denigrate life. Concerning psychotherapy, the question would then be whether a particular form of therapeutic practice is life-affirming or fuelled by the instinct of vengeance, by the need to justify, change, and redeem life. For Nietzsche, the instinct of revenge is the essential assumption of psychology as such.

A woman’s role in relation to men is based on holding together the double image of virtue and shame – understood as her essential self – which man requires. Nietzsche asks:

“[H]ow a woman manages to accommodate herself to this solution of the riddle, and to riddle of the solution? She closes her eyes to her.”

There is a possibility for self-formation besides the impossible image posited by man. Because of this, a woman’s artistry lies in her power of dissimulation, in uncovering the veil that is her surface. Women carry a mask, and society views them as different from men because of this created mask. Nietzsche suggests that women have an unchangeable nature and that “what inspires respect for women, and often even fear, is her nature”.

“Nietzsche sustains his idea that women’s reality is rather distinguishable from traditional male fabrications, and he has shocked his readers into preserving the discrepancy between their customary thinking and actual women’s points of view. The concept of a woman being a projection of an ideal explains much about Nietzsche’s writing on the nature of man and woman and their interactions.”

A characteristic aspect of Nietzsche’s psychology is his analysis of the flexibility of the unconscious: past experiences partly determine the unconscious. For this to be true, it has to be the case that conscious states can causally influence unconscious states. We refer to ourselves as “I” (Ich), and we identify with this “I” or “ego”. Yet the ego is inaccurate, for our psychic life is a comprehension of numerous “inner processes and drives” for which

108 Ibid., fr. 69, p. 73.
109 Ibid., fr. 363, p. 228.
110 F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, fr. 489, p. 270; fr. 492, p. 272.
111 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, fr. 363, p. 318.
112 Ibid., fr. 363, p. 227.
113 Ibid., fr. 125, p. 120.
114 F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, fr. 14, p. 34.
115 F. N. Oppel, Nietzsche on Gender, p. 99.
116 F. Nietzsche, Daybreak, fr. 532, p. 280.
117 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, fr. 138, p. 139.
118 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, fr. 239, p. 183.
119 Kathleen Higgins, “Nietzsche’s Use of Women”, in: Kelly A. Oliver, Marilyn Pearssal (eds.), Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park (PA) 1998, pp. 130–152, here p. 145.
120 F. Nietzsche, Daybreak, fr. 109, p. 104.
121 Ibid., fr. 115, p. 115.
we have neither language nor consciousness. We are far more than we think we are. The ego wants everything:

“It seems that the sole purpose of human action is possession: this idea is, at least, contained in the various languages, which regard all past action as having put us in possession of something. How greedy a man appears here! He does not want to extricate himself even from the past, but wants to continue to have it!”

Each sex gives and demands an expression of dialectical agon. Since the agon is above all a metaphor of vitalism, it can be seen as the warlike difference in the paradigm of the struggle of the sexes as “most abysmal antagonism” and “necessity of an eternally hostile tension between the sexes”. Insisting on the “state of nature and the eternal war between the sexes”, Nietzsche recognised a superior position of the woman, creatively speaking, because this kind of woman is focused on becoming. Nietzsche celebrated female sexuality as something powerful and subversive but also feared it when it becomes disassociated from the social functions of child upbringing and motherhood.

The artistic creation of merging these ideas, based on identifying the reasons they sustain, observing their impact on current problems and resolving is the sphere of philosophical practice. The goal is to help clients formulate their own view of the world, which bears on their everyday life, and critically explore the problematic aspects, modify and enhance or expand their outlook of the world as needed.

Nietzsche renounced developments in cognitive psychobiology concerning language, consciousness, and the will. He was first to describe and consider multiplicity in personality theory and developed an original contribution to the psychology of morality, societal and health psychology. He was the predecessor of action psychotherapy, acceptance therapy, narrative psychotherapy and cognitive behavioural therapy.

When Nietzsche began to develop his philosophy of life and the scope of values, he realised that values could not be mandated and the people seeking happiness must discover their own values independently, “for individual happiness springs from one’s own unknown laws, and prescription from without can only obstruct it”. He could not enlighten us on what to do in life, but he had much to offer on how to do what we chose, how to lead our life, how to climb and cross over on the rope of life.

“If we are sensible, the only thing that need concern us is that we should have joy in our hearts.”

Conclusion

Nietzsche is a powerful thinker, and his concepts, including joy, enhancement, will for power and life, self-affirmation, self-respect, and self-love, are implemented into psychotherapy. His perspective can redefine psychotherapy as an experiment that explores the limits and intricacies of human experience. It builds the foundations for a differentialist psychology: a life-affirming project that can rectify the challenges, joys and sorrows of being human. He invites us to get interested in what is going on when we feel dissatisfied with ourselves. He sees this as a sign of good psychological health. Essentially, he wants us to get to know this dissatisfaction, take it seriously. In person-centred therapy, successful therapy means the converging of organism and self-concept.
Therapy is healing.

“The nihilistic, life-denying influence of our culture has made sure that psychotherapy replicates these principles, as a ideology of resentment.” 128

Instead of a passive nihilistic approach to life, adopting an “active nihilism” turns therapy into a kind of amusement, or “holding together”. 129 Nietzsche’s first step is to become an individual and then to recognise our existence as individuals. He reframes subjectivity in terms of “impersonal individuation rather than personal individualisation”. 130 Does the therapist help her client unveil a pre-existing truth known to the therapist? Client and therapist together create truth by “taking the risk of communicating”. 131 This is a risk worth taking because the client and the therapist may come to bear witness to the evanescent coming-into-being, through dialogue, of a truth forged in an encounter rather than the unveiling of a pre-existing, a-historical truth behind the course of events. 132 Nietzsche wanted growth, or, more precisely, the feeling of growth, the feeling of increased power. Self-understanding is not forced as a means to resolve problems. The focus must be on areas of conflict problems as a means to the final point of self-understanding. Psychotherapy drives us into terminologies of fixing and healing. Problems must be stressed in order to promote understanding, instead of seeking understanding to cure problems. 133 A Nietzschean perspective can lead to new lights and new ways on how to approach psychotherapy. The modern person is presented as the “last human” who is just interested in happiness, attracted to a quick-fix and “evidence-based therapies”. Nietzsche’s thought offers profound insights into the practice of psychotherapy because it is, at its heart, the philosophy of affirmation. To affirm means to say yes. Zarathustra’s “yes” is an invitation to unburden life, to make ourselves light by dancing and creating. 134 Philosophical practice related to Nietzsche opens for a more intuitive, poetic and liberating relationship to and with life, “therapy without prejudice”. 135

122 Ibid., fr. 281, p. 150.
123 Ibid., fr. 238.
124 F. Nietzsche, Daybreak, fr. 21, p. 18.
125 F. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, fr. 300, p. 387.
126 U. Wernik, Nietzschean Psychology and Psychotherapy, p. 35.
127 Manu Bazzano, Nietzsche and Psychotherapy, Routledge, Abingdon 2018, p. 31.
128 Ibid., p. 134.
129 Ibid., p. 150.
130 Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life, trans. Anne Boymann, Zone Books, New York 2001, p. 8.
131 Gary Brent Madison, The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty: A Search for the Limits of Consciousness, trans. Gary Brent Madison, Ohio University Press, Athens (Ohio) 1981, p. 254.
132 Manu Bazzano, “Togetherness: intersubjectivity revisited”, Person-Centered & Experiential Psychotherapies 13 (2014) 3, pp. 203–216, here p.210, doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/14779757.2013.852613.
133 J. M. Russell, “Philosophical Counseling is not a Distinct Field”, p. 8.
134 U. Wernik, Nietzschean Psychology and Psychotherapy, p. 6.
Psychotherapy began to play a pivotal role in aiding the ongoing process of coercion and social conformity, by providing a set of formulas, such as mental health, integration, and social adjustment. Distancing from the other, a necessity to aesthetics of self, has its productive effects. This applies not only to relations between classes but also to relations between the sexes. To the extent that Nietzsche excludes women from the possibility of self-overcoming, he effectively builds his personal aesthetics upon the bodies of women. Richardson brings up the possibility that “just as Zarathustra hides his truth about women”, so we might see Nietzsche disguising how important these issues are to him, and so how crucial to us in assessing his thought. However, why does an interpretation of Nietzsche’s woman matter? He has become pivotal to our understanding of “where we have come from and where we may be guided”. Injustice against women arises in how social presumptions about sexual difference constitute women’s embodied existence as improper and secondary in relation to men. Such injustice is demonstrated through critical analyses of discourses that regulate sexual difference: from ethics itself to those discourses of “the body” which intend to merely describe, rather than constitute and regulate, embodied existence.

Philosophical practice might be applicable for the perception that Nietzsche wants, summarised in growth and the process of self-formulation. Strength in a healthy organism is the desire to give, even to squander one’s resources: the will to power is at heart generosity. The distancing affected by the will to power on self-overcoming materially constitutes woman as other to the aesthetic self. Nietzsche’s formulation of a distance within the self re-opens what is denied by social discourses which, in assuming an unchanging subject over time, assume that “what is does not become”. While the key to creativity lies in maintaining this action at a distance, something remains to be said about its effect on women.

Nietzsche not only claims that the creative man must distance himself from the image of woman he necessarily constitutes, but also that “woman forms herself according to this image”. The truth of woman, the eternal feminine, promises to affirm an unchanging self. But given that identity is constituted in relation, the self that posits itself as autonomous and transcendental is not complete without the incorporation or negation of what is other: man’s desire is to possess this image of the woman he has constituted in relation to himself. Women are only artistic insofar as they are actors of a role imposed upon them. For women to be artistic in the proper sense would require the ability to incorporate experience according to one’s own plan. Woman’s artistry lies in her power of deception. This requires distance within the self between the present self and the concept or image towards which one aspires, which is predicated upon a distance between self and other. According to Nietzsche, there are two modes of self-constitution available to women in relation to men: proximity, resulting from the possession of a man, and action at a distance. Submission results in the constitution of woman’s bodily self as a rigid image of shame because submission collapses the difference between her appearance (surface) and the concept of unfathomable depth man has of her. Regarding action at a distance, from a woman’s point of view, this involves maintaining one’s virtue where virtue means both distances from man’s desire as well as maintaining one’s difference. The difference between female sexuality (the surface that is a woman at any particular point) and the
feminine (the undecidable concept of woman) is what constitutes women, at least as long as women are artistic.\footnote{146}

“Nietzsche’s work restored the soul to our understanding of man.”\footnote{147}

The role of Nietzsche’s “eternal feminine” image of woman is the guiding motivation to man. She has been the generator of inspiration through illusion. While this vision of a woman as a muse is part of her traditional role in society, it will be part of his treatment for her future power as well. Women will use this power to produce a new illusion for man. Creation of an illusion is one of the most enhancing and compelling of life’s powers.\footnote{148} The inability to know a “true” woman is central to understanding Nietzsche. It is a moral prejudice that the “truth is worth more than a simple appearance”\footnote{149}. Nietzschean women are all masks. This does not mean that Nietzsche wants women to continue to endure the same mask eternally, but rather that illusion (though dangerous) is powerful and necessary\footnote{150}. Woman in wearing masks is not adapting to man-made identities; she creates the illusion. She is the creator. She used her power to create illusions around the imaginations of men. She practised this to use her power to increase security and avoid work.\footnote{151}

Further growth of man is connected explicitly to the “antagonism between the sexes”\footnote{152}. Our enhancement rests in the continual power struggle, the sustained existence of two sexes, two opposites in eternal opposition. Nietzsche does
recognise that this struggle is dynamic; there will be periods of great hostility and reconciliation.\textsuperscript{153} The popular, modern problem is not the differences or struggle of men and women, but the attempt to deny the fundamental antagonism that of necessity exists between them. Eternal hostility and tension are essential, and the desire to eradicate it is a sign of the shallow role of struggle, particularly between the sexes, as the strength behind the will to power.

Nietzschean reading of a woman will be most useful for the effort to re-read Nietzsche as a philosopher of difference, and the affirmation of life as an affirmation of difference—philosophy of difference proposes that there is something to be found out about the (limits of the) self through an encounter with what is irreducible about the other. Irigaray situated this irreducible difference primarily in sexual difference, a concept born out of psychoanalysis and distinct from sex difference as a biological classification.\textsuperscript{154} Unlike the latter, sexual difference refers to the way subjects form their identities through the world as a sexed world, that is, a world historically organised on the basis of sex difference as a biological category.

Vesna Stanković Pejnović

Filozofjska praksa u svjetlu »rata spolova«

Sažetak

Prema Nietzscheovu mišljenju, temeljni je problem između muškarca i žene duboko ukorijenjen u negiranju antagonizma među njima. Muškarac vjeruje da njihov odnos mora biti vječna neprijateljska napetost i neizbježna nepravda. Nietzsche tvrdi da mora postojati rangirajući poredak u kojem je skaliranje vezano za aktivnosti uzimanja, nakupljanja i postajanja boljim zadobivajući moć i nadilazeći tča tumačenja. Ovo rangiranje ne dopušta istovjetnost i ravnopravnost, što su znakovi pliškoce instinkta i gubitka identiteta. Nietzsche podržava različitost i slavi drugotnost. Uspijevanje pojedinca nikada ne može biti ometano pojmom jednakih odnosa. Nietzsche je uvjeren da su ljudi drugačiji i zagovara agon (borba moći) kao model kulturnih i političkih odnosa. Budući da se jednakost ljudskih bića mora sastojati od jednakog iznosa istog svojstva, Nietzsche tu jednakost vidi kao predstavljenu u općoj volji za moć. Nadalje, rodna je razlika također društveno konstruiran način bivanja. To je kreacija muške slike o tome kako bi svijet trebao izgledati. Ako se uključi u terapijski pristup, ova nam perspektiva može haciti novo svjetlo na moguće intervencije metode u psihoterapiji i filoterapiji podjednako. Spol i spolni odnosi mogu biti izlučeni kao ključan problem koji prevladava u jezgri motivacije za traženje profesionalne terapijske pomoći (psihoterapija), bez obzira na to koji se terapijski pristup u takvoj praksi koristi. Teme je to koja nije dovoljno vukla iz Nietzscheove tradicije. Cilj je rada ponuditi argumente za to da se Nietzscheov pogled na »rat spolova« postavi kao produktivan kontekst za psihoterapijsku intervenciju i filozofsko savjetovanje.

Ključne riječi

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, spol, razlika, žena, istina
Vesna Stanković Pejnović

Philosophische Praxis im Lichte des „Geschlechterkrieges“

Zusammenfassung
Nach Nietzsches Ansicht schlägt das grundlegende Problem zwischen Mann und Frau („Weib“) seine Wurzeln tief in der Leugnung des Antagonismus zwischen ihnen. Ein Mann glaubt, dass ihre Beziehung eine ewige feindselige Spannung und eine unabwendbare Ungerechtigkeit sein muss. Nietzsche stellt die Behauptung auf, dass es eine Rangordnung geben muss, in der die Skalierung mit den Aktivitäten des Nehmens, Akkumulierens und der Verbesserung durch Machtgewinnung und Überwindung engerer Interpretationen zusammenhängt. Diese Rangfolge duldet keine Ausgleichbarkeit und Gleichheit, die Anzeichen für einen flachen Instinkt und einen Identitätsverlust sind. Nietzsche unterstützt die Verschiedenheit und feiert die Andersheit. Der Erfolg eines Individuums kann niemals durch den Begriff der gleichen Beziehungen beeinträchtigt werden. Nietzsche ist überzeugt, dass Menschen anders sind, und befürwortet den Agon (Wettkampf) als Modell kultureller und politischer Beziehungen. Da die Gleichheit der menschlichen Wesen aus einer gleichen Menge derselben Eigenschaft bestehen muss, sieht Nietzsche diese Gleichheit als vertreten im allgemeinen Willen zur Macht. Fernerhin ist der Genderunterschied gleichfalls eine sozial konstruierte Art des Seins. Es ist die Kreation eines männlichen Bildes davon, wie die Welt aussehen sollte. Falls diese Perspektive in den therapeutischen Ansatz einbezogen wird, kann sie neues Licht auf potenzielle Interventionsmethoden innerhalb der Psychotherapie und Philotherapie gleichermaßen werfen. Geschlecht und Geschlechtsverkehr können als Schlüsselprobleme herausgerückt werden, das im Kern der Motivation dominiert, professionelle therapeutische Hilfe (Psychotherapie) aufzusuchen, ungeachtet dessen, welcher therapeutische Ansatz in einer solchen Praxis verwendet wird. Es ist ein Thema, das nicht zureichend aus Nietzsches Tradition stammt. Die Intention dieses Papers ist es, Argumente dafür zu liefern, Nietzsches Perspektive des „Geschlechterkrieges“ als produktiven Kontext für psychotherapeutische Interventionen und philosophische Beratung aufzustellen.

Schlüsselwörter
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Geschlecht, Unterschied, Frau („Weib“), Wahrheit

Vesna Stanković Pejnović

La philosophie pratique à la lumière de « la guerre des genres »

Résumé
Selon la pensée de Nietzsche, le problème fondamental entre les hommes et les femmes est profondément enraciné dans le déni de l’antagonisme qui leur est propre. L’homme considère que leur relation repose sur une éternelle tension hostile et une inévitable injustice. Nietzsche affirme qu’un ordre de classement doit exister dans lequel la mise à l’échelle est liée à l’action de s’emparer, d’accumuler et de devenir meilleur en gagnant en puissance et en dépassant les étroites interprétations. Ce classement ne permet pas d’identité et d’égalité, signes d’un instinct superficiel et d’une perte d’identité. Nietzsche soutient la diversité et célèbre l’altérité. La réussite d’un individu ne doit jamais être perturbée par le concept d’égalité des relations. Nietzsche est convaincu que les gens sont différents et défend l’agon (lute pour le pouvoir) en tant que modèle pour les relations culturelles et politiques. Étant donné que l’égalité des êtres humains doit contenir une quantité égale de propriétés identiques, Nietzsche conçoit cette égalité comme présentée dans la volonté générale de puissance. En outre, la différence des genres est également un mode d’être construit socialement. C’est la création masculine d’une image sur le monde. Si on l’introduit au sein d’une approche thérapeutique, cette perspective éclaire

152 F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, fr. 1050, p. 539.
153 L. Irigaray, Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 109.
154 F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 33.
d’un jour nouveau les possibles méthodes d’intervention en psychothérapie et philothérapie de manière égale. Le genre et les relations de genres peuvent être dégagés comme un problème clé qui prend le dessus au cœur de la motivation visant à rechercher une aide thérapeutique professionnelle (psychothérapie), quel que soit l’approche thérapeutique utilisée dans une pratique de ce genre. Ce thème n’a pas suffisamment été puisé dans la tradition nietzschéenne. L’objectif de ce travail et de proposer des arguments afin que la perspective nietzschéenne de « la guerre des genres » s’établisset dans un contexte productif pour l’intervention psychothérapeutique et la consultation philosophique.

Mots-clés
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, genre, différence, femme, vérité