The Principles of Global Economic of Aggression

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Abstract

To characterise the studied economic wars and aggression, the author of this article uses the prefix "global", not "geo". There are at least three reasons for that. First, an economy, but not the territory or political system, is the direct goal of aggression. Second, aggression is carried out regardless of the territorial location of its victim, and aggression, as a rule, is carried out by several entities. That is, it has a global character. Third, the term "geo-economic aggression" is already used to refer to the theory of a new geopolitical struggle. The word "aggression" in the title of this paper it is used in the article because those wars are declared, but global-economic acts are usually committed secretly. Global-economic wars and aggressions have been waged for centuries, and there is no reason to expect them to end soon. For this reason, it is useful to know the explicit and implicit principles, which their initiators and organisers are guided. Ten principles of global economic war and aggression are discussed in this article.

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My studies of the different cases of global economic aggression, carried out against the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, showed that attackers often use specific technologies of struggle, named by the known English military theorist and historian Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1985–1970) “an indirect approach” (Liddell Hart, 2008). The Secretary of the Security Council Nicolay P. Patrushev also pointed to the typical use of such an indirect approach in the fight of some states for their interests in the modern world (Patrushev N., 2015). The revealed patterns of indirect actions application can be formulated in the form of principles, by which the aggressor is guided in its actions. Let’s discuss their top ten.

Principle 1. The enemy cannot be defeated (to achieve their political, ideological, economic, etc. goals, to seize territory, resources) with the help of military force, and it is extremely impractical to use it.

Already three years after the end of the Second World War, skilled strategists of the United States was aware of the impossibility of an armed seizure and military control over the Soviet Union and clearly stated this in the secret National Security Council directive 20/1, August 18, 1948 “U.S. Objectives with Respect to Russia”:

«In the first place we must assume that it will not be profitable or practically feasible for us to occupy and take under our military administration the entire territory of the Soviet Union. This course is inhibited by the size of that territory, by the number of its inhabitants, by the differences of language and custom which separate its inhabitants from ourselves, and by the improbability that we would find any adequate apparatus of local authority through which we
could work» (Etzold, Thomas H. & John Lewis Gaddis, 1948).

In may 2018, the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet vividly described the nightmare awaiting the military, who suddenly wish to capture Russia, Switzerland and New Zealand. On August 14, 2018, the portal of veterans of the American army, members of military families and fans of military history collectively named “We Are The Mighty” published material with an eloquent title: "The 5 countries that are most impossible to conquer". The five invincible in order of location on this electronic resource included: USA, Russia, Afghanistan, China and India.

If the country cannot be conquered by military force, other approaches, methods and means should be tried. It turned out that in peacetime, you can attach to itself part of the territory of another state. Thus, in 1979, the United States began and in July 1999 completed the transfer of Panama Canal facilities and management. On the night of 1 to July 2, 1997, after a 99-year lease by the United Kingdom, Hong Kong was officially transferred to the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China. On 20 December 1999, Portugal transferred Macao to the jurisdiction of the PRC.

But the Russian Federation in peacetime lost part of its territory, which was acquired by the United States, the People’s Republic of China, and the Kingdom of Norway.

Principle 2. To succeed in achieving already set goals, it is desirable to be stronger than the enemy.

Naturally, in the global economic struggle with the USSR, which began soon after the end of World War II, the United States of America proceeded primarily from military force.

“One of the most important ingredients of power is military strength... Without superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of “containment” — which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion — is no more than a policy of bluff” — is written in the National Security Council Report to the President Pursuant to the President’s Directive of January 31, 1950 "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security".

Over time, significant importance is given to the economic, ideological, cultural, information, and propaganda strength. And introducing in March 2017 anti-Russian sanctions, the USA with a group of countries that supported them, were economically ten times stronger than the Russian Federation. By 2018, their economic strength was even greater (Table 2, Figure 1, Table 3).

Principle 3. The means of influence used, the measures taken and the actions taken must be within the means that the entity using them (the state, the company, the Corporation and (or) their groups and unions) can allocate to this.

Giving their recommendations, the authors of the report to the President under the President’s Directive of January 31, 1950, NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 14, 1950), described actions, which will be cheaper and more effective.

However, being stronger automatically means that an equal response to the attacker will cause less damage to the attacker than the damage to the victim of aggression. Thus, if all states that have imposed anti-Russian sanctions direct 0.001 per cent of their gross domestic product (damage — 0.001 per cent of their GDP) to their implementation, for example, in 2017, and Russia’s so-called symmetrical response measures are also equal to 0.001 per cent of their GDP, the total losses of the aggressor countries will amount to 0.002 per cent of their total gross domestic product. In 2017, it is 91.8 billion of the US dollars. While only the response of the Russian Federation in the amount of 0.001 per cent of the total GDP of these countries will be 3.0 per cent of its GDP. Plus the damage caused by the sanctions of the aggressor states.

It is as if two people were competing in how much time they will raise the bar of 100 kg while one person weight is 100 kg and of the other one 240 kg. Ceteris paribus, both healthy, trained and motivated to win, will win more than a heavy

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1 Media predicted a military nightmare wishing to invade Russia [SMI predrekli voennyj] koshmar zhelayushchim vtorogut’sya v Rossiyu Retrieved from http:// https://russian.rt.com/russia/news/514832-smi-rossiya-armiya (in Russian).

2 The 5 countries that are most impossible to conquer. Retrieved from: https://www.wearethemighty.com/least-conquerable-countries?rebellitem=12#ixzz5OJS2fb3.

3 NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 15, 1950). Retrieved from: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm.

4 https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm.
Table 1

Territories lost by Russia in 1990–2011.

| Year | Territory |
|------|-----------|
| 1990 | June 1 in Washington, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze and the 61st United States Secretary of State James Addison Baker III signed an agreement on the delimitation of Maritime spaces in the Bering and the Chukchi seas. The Resolution of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation No. 2880-III SD (adopted in June 14, 2002) says about this agreement: "As a result of the delimitation of Maritime spaces in accordance with the Agreement in the Bering sea the following territories went to the USA: a part of the exclusive economic zone of the USSR with an area of 23.7 thousand sq km, actually transferred by the Soviet Union to the United States of America in 1977; a part of the exclusive economic zone of the USSR with an area of 7.7 thousand sq km; section of the continental shelf with an area of 46.3 thousand sq km in the open central part of the Bering Sea, located outside 200 nautical miles from the baselines. At the same time, the section of the continental shelf that has departed in this part of the Bering Sea to the Russian Federation counted for only 4.6 thousand sq. km. On a separate area, the exclusive economic zone of the United States of America due to the unjustifiably ceded area of the exclusive economic zone of the USSR exceeded the distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines. It is contrary to article 57 of the United Nations Convention on the law of the sea (1982)." The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and later the State Duma and the Federation Council of the Russian Federation have not ratified this document, rejecting it as infringing on Russia's national interests. The agreement was ratified by the U.S. Congress on September 16, 1991, and the US considers this territory to be its own. |
| 1991–1992 | On May 16, 1991, the parties signed in Moscow the "Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China on the Soviet-Chinese state border on its Eastern part". The text finally confirmed that the boundary was drawn along the waterway of navigable rivers and in the middle of non-navigable rivers, plus the parties established a demarcation Commission. The agreement was ratified by the Russian Supreme Council in February 1992 and came into force on 16 March. Damansky and Kirkinskiiy islands went to China officially. |
| 2004–2005 | On October 14, 2004, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Hú Jǐntāo signed an "Additional agreement on the Russian-Chinese state border on its Eastern part", according to which the PRC transferred the Tarabar Islands and part of the Great Ussuri island. On May 20, 2005, the State Duma of the 4th Convocation ratified this agreement (307 deputies supported, 80 against, two abstained). On May 25, 2005, the agreement was approved by the Federation Council (supported by 157 senators, against-two, without abstention). On July 21, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi signed in Beijing a Protocol-description of the Russian-Chinese state borderline in the Eastern part of the Russian Federation. On December 1, 2005, Russia officially handed over the Islands of Tarabar and a part of the Great Ussuri island to China. The Great Island on the Argun River in the Chita region (now it is the Zabaikalsky Krai) also departed to China. A total of 337 sq. km. |
| 2010–2011 | 15 September 2010 in Murmansk, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and the Prime Minister of Norway Jens Stoltenberg signed the agreement «Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway on Maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic ocean». The Treaty narrowed the area covered by the sovereign rights of the Russian Federation. The Treaty was ratified by Federal law of the Russian Federation from April 5, 2011 No. 57-FZ «On ratification of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway on Maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic ocean». According to L.I. Kalashnikov, Norway received 90 thousand sq km of water area with the richest deposits of oil, gas and fish resources |
lifter. In general, their state of health, the degree of training and level of motivation can be different. In the case of countries, this means inequality in the size of their populations, their age and sex composition, the level of health and education of their inhabitants, the qualifications of workers, the development of their economies, science, technique and technology, culture, traditions and ideology, and their moral and psychological state. The nature and effectiveness of economic and social management are also different.

What to do? Do not answer? However, unilateral concessions and requests will strengthen the attacker’s confidence in his strength and impunity, and will not give impetus to the rejection of aggressive actions. The aggressor must be subjected to unacceptable harm to stop the hostilities. And here the symmetric measures for disciplining a stronger opponent is not enough. His damage, as shown in the above example, will be less than the victim of aggression. Therefore, the exhaustion of the victim will come earlier than the aggressor.

The answer should be asymmetric, not equal to the blow inflicted on you and not a mirror. It means that the adversary will be better to hit his weak points, and they are likely to be different from your pain points, which hit the enemy. Weaknesses and pressure points are present in every living creature, in any state, vulnerable, and technical systems.

Irreparable damage is incompatible with our fourth principle of global economic aggression and can stop the aggressor.

Principle 4. The implementation of the developed actions should not cause damage to their initiators (the state, companies, corporations, etc.), the more irreparable.

Global economic aggression is carried out in the hope of obtaining the desired results, the best situation for the aggressor. To achieve the goals, the desired results usually have to sacrifice something, incur losses, produce costs. To fight, to wage war, to resist makes sense when the results are valued above the cost. At the same time, costs and results do not necessarily have the same units of measurement — physically, monetarily, labour, human, etc. Not always, and not necessarily, to carry out their physical or mathematical comparison. Human society, its groups and individual members are able and know how to juxtapose, compare and evaluate things the incomparable in formal logic and the physical sense. However, the evaluation and comparison criteria are not necessarily the same for all. So, for the sake of freedom and independence, in the name of faith, protection of honour and dignity, people are willing to sacrifice their lives. And the result is the preservation of these values because not abandoning them is above cost.

The result of global economic aggression for its initiators and performers is usually the material, political, economic, territorial, and im-

| Country                        | 2014 | 2017 |
|-------------------------------|------|------|
| USA                           | 9.4  | 12.7 |
| Japan                         | 2.5  | 3.2  |
| Canada                        | 1.0  | 1.1  |
| EU states that have declared anti-Russian sanctions | 9.6  | 10.9 |
| In том числе:                 |      |      |
| Germany                       | 2.1  | 2.4  |
| Англия и Ирландия             | 1.6  | 1.7  |
| France                        | 1.5  | 1.7  |
| Italy                         | 1.2  | 1.3  |
| Spain                         | 0.8  | 0.9  |
| Other countries that have declared sanctions | 1.9  | 2.2  |
| All countries that have declared anti-Russian sanctions | 24.4 | 30.1 |

Source: author’s calculations on the basis of ‘Statistics Times’. Retrieved from http://statisticstimes.com/economy/european-countries-by-gdp.php.

Table 3
Gold reserves in the reserves of the top five countries at the end of March 2018, tons

| USA | Germany | Italy | France | Russia |
|-----|---------|------|--------|--------|
| 8133.5 | 3372.2  | 2451.8 | 2436.0 | 1890.8 |

Source: World Gold Council. Quoted from Gaidaev V., 2018.
Because of the cost of achieving it, according to Principle 4, it is necessary to minimise, and not to expend their forces before the goals are achieved.

Following this principle, the United States, the European Union and states that have joined their policy of anti-Russian sanctions are trying to harm the Russian Federation’s economy, without affecting the most important areas where they make a profit in Russia. So, no restrictions and prohibitions on exports to Russia of foreign software, computers, touch pads, telephones, civil aircraft and automobiles, pharmaceuticals, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, etc.

Principle 5. Do not wait for the immediate receipt of the desired result. It can appear after a long time.

It is clearly fixed in the Records of the National Security Council “U.S. objectives with respect to Russia”, August 18, 1948:

“In the first place, there is no time limit for the achievement of our objectives under conditions of peace. We are faced here with no rigid periodicity of war and peace which would enable us to conclude that we must achieve our peacetime objectives by a given date «or else». The objectives of national policy in times of peace should never be regarded in static terms. In so far as they are basic objectives, and worthy ones, they are not apt to be ones capable of complete and finite achievement, like specific military objectives in war. The peacetime objectives of national policy should be thought of rather as lines of direction than as physical goals” (Etzold & Gaddis, 1948).

“The secret plan of President Reagan” was also long-term. He did not expect the early achievement of its strategic goals. Anti-Russian sanctions which are fixed in Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act are oriented for the long term. The history of the United States of America shows that the Federal and state laws adopted there have not been repealed for centuries. They are amended and supplemented. It gives grounds to believe

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1 According to Alexis Rodzianko, the President of The American Chamber of Commerce in Russia, «The US sanctions affect areas where trade has previously been small, such as military products» (Spiegel. 2015, June 2).

6 HR 3364. Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act. (2017). Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3364/text.
that the statutory global economic actions will be last for a long time.

**Principle 6. Simultaneously act (strike, threaten, cause damage, etc.) on several objects (targets).**

Basil Liddell Hart wrote in his book “The Strategy of Indirect Approach” published in 1946: “The offensive being waged against a single item, there should be a threat to another point, which, if necessary, should be carried kick... To ensure the capture of one object, it is necessary to create a simultaneous threat to several objects” and “if you create a simultaneous threat to several objects, thereby dissipate the attention of the enemy and force him to disperse the forces” (Liddell Hart, 2008, pp. 279, 425).

When American experts have revealed the highest dependence of the budget of the USSR on the export of energy resources, a strategy was formed to provoke financial and economic bankruptcy of the Soviet state. It provided for two interrelated goals: the organisation of a sharp decline in revenues to the budget of the USSR from foreign trade, combined with a significant increase in the cost of solving problems organised from the outside. For example, the arms race and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), border tensions, information war and social unrest in the allied countries.

Later, the principle of creating threats to several targets was simultaneously used in the anti-Russian sanctions of the USA President Barack Hussein Obama II and some supporting states, and also in Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. They provide for the impact on several goals: the credit and financial system of the country, its economy, the military-industrial complex, the welfare of the population, ideology, socio-political situation in the country, the leaders of the state and influential representatives of the business community.

**Principle 7. To choose the objects of influence (goals) depending on the time, situation, available opportunities to influence them.**

This principle logically follows from the natural change of all living and inanimate in our universe. However, its importance for Russia is small: weaknesses, vulnerabilities and pain points of the country do not change for centuries. This is the desire to adopt everything from the West, a more respectful attitude to foreigners than to their fellow citizens, hope for help from the outside, lagging behind in a number of areas of science, technique and technology, the excessively slow changes of the structure of the country’s economy, the insufficiently effective system of economic management, administrative-territorial entities and society, as well as the already mentioned export-raw material model of economic development.

An example of the desire to “learn” from the West, to adopt someone else understanding, as well as excessive credulity, was the involvement of American “experts” in the development of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 1993, and the inclusion of provisions on the supremacy of international law over Russia’s one and the rejection of state ideology.

The last was done despite well-known for centuries for military theorists and practitioners of the exceptional importance of the moral and ideological attitude of troops and population. The importance of the ideological component is demonstrated by the militants of numerous religious terrorist organisations and movements in different parts of our planet. In the modern world, ideological weapons are increasingly being used in the global information and psychological confrontation of ideologies, world understanding, states and various unions, associations and groups.

**Principle 8. Keep the enemy in the dark about when and what objects (targets) and what means will be struck. Mislead the enemy, make them nervous.**

A striking example of the use of this principle is the so-called “Kremlin report” report of the US Treasury Department submitted to the US Congress in January 2018 in pursuance of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.

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7 Maciej Milczanowski, former consultant to the National Security Bureau of Poland, head of the Institute for National Security Studies at the Graduate School of Informatics and Management in Rzeszow, notes that “religion and ideology are becoming a convenient tool that is used to create conflicts and mobilize societies to participate in them” (Maciej Milczanowski, 2016).

8 Perhaps the initiative of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation to create the Main Military and Political Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces in February 2018 and its formation in July 2018 will be the first step towards the development and adoption of the state ideology of the Russian Federation.
tions Act and containing a list of persons, both already under sanctions and those to whom they can still be imposed. It includes employees of the presidential administration, plenipotentiary representatives of the President of the Russian Federation in the Federal districts, members of the government, of the Federation Council and the State Duma, heads of state companies, and the Russian entrepreneurs. Those who have not yet been sanctioned are unaware of when and what prohibitions and restrictions will be imposed on them and their relatives by the leadership of the United States of America.

With regard to the introduction of the enemy in error, then this resort in ancient times (See, for example, Lobov, 2001). So in the treatise, Sun Tzu’s “Art of war” (around VI — V centuries BC) read:

“War is a way of deception. So, if you can do something, show the enemy that you cannot; if you enjoy something, show him that you do not use it; if you are very close, show him if you are far away; though you were far away, show him like you are close; reel him in benefits; bring him in frustration and bury him; if he is full of all, be ready; if he is strong, turn away from him; causing in him the anger, bring it into a state of disorder; taking a humble view, call it conceit; if his forces are fresh, weary him; if he is friendly, disconnect them; attack him when he is not ready; perform when he is not waiting” (Sun Tzu).

One of the most important methods of misleading the leaders of a state and its people is to block their awareness of the aggression being carried out against their country. It is largely helped by methods and means of manipulation of public consciousness — huge opportunities to confuse, misinform and keep in the dark, open information technology.

Knowing Principle 8, you perceive contradictory expressions and statements of the US President Donald Trump in a completely different way. It is not the features of his character, and direct adherence to Sun Tzu formulated the request to the master war commander:

“Now it is a matter of commander: he must always be calm, and it is impervious to others; he must be very disciplined and to keep the other. He must be able to mislead the eyes and ears of his officers and soldiers and prevent them from knowing anything. He must change his plans and change his plans and prevent others from knowing about them” (Sun Tzu).

Principle 9. Choose methods, techniques and means of influence depending on the object (purpose), their own capabilities, time and situation.

It is quite evident that different types of weapons are generally the most suitable for hitting different targets. Therefore, if you change the goals may change ways and means of its achievement (or defeat). In turn, the transition from one means, approaches and methods to another may require a change of those who are able and able to use them. The transition to the new is also because each tool, each approach,

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9 “Modern information warfare is an economic and political weapon — deepening information asymmetry; creation of a false image, that is, the ratings and reputations; the introduction of the enemy into confusion; the rejection of all the old moral and ethical values”. (Vladimirov, 2007, p. 99).
tool and method has limits of its application and effectiveness of use.

As an example of replacement of some of the means of economic aggression with the other was the transition of a group of states led by the United States from the policy of technological dependence of the USSR on the Western countries to the technological blockade of the Soviet Union. And further, the transition to the policy of scientific-technological backwardness and financial dependence of the Russian Federation and again to the ban on the transfer of knowledge economy, patents, technology and credit constraints.

Indeed, by the Report to the President under the President's Directive of January 31, 1950, it was allowed to sell to the socialist countries new technologies and modern equipment they needed. The hidden motivation for this course was as follows (Bokarev, 2009). By acquiring equipment and technology, customers cannot produce their equivalents, respectively, to conduct research, to build an experimental database, etc. As a result, as the drafters of the report considered it, the USSR, the socialist countries and the countries of people's democracy will keep their scientific and technological gap in the future.

The acquisition of foreign technologies, as a rule, entails the purchase of foreign machinery and equipment. At the same time, the creators of technologies usually work with well-established manufacturers of technological equipment, which they will recommend to the buyer of their technology. Those, in turn, fabricate machinery and equipment, the use of which requires the use of tools, materials, raw materials with strictly defined quality and technical characteristics.

As a result, dependence on foreign technologies is fraught with dependence on supplies and suppliers of foreign equipment, equipment, tools, raw materials and materials, as well as on maintenance of purchased equipment by foreign companies (Figure 2).

For the purchase of equipment and technology in foreign markets and to pay for maintenance services requires foreign currency. To obtain the necessary volumes of foreign currency it will be necessary a) selling raw materials and materials, b) taking loans from foreign banks. Consequently, the country's development will become export-oriented and dependent on foreign banks.

Since the calculations on the world markets are conducted in US dollars, then, ultimately, the loans came from the USA banks. Also, lagging in scientific and technological development entities (country, company, Corporation) will not compete with developed countries not only in the markets of these goods and services but also in the markets of licenses, patents, know-how, devices, test benches, etc.

The USSR's dependence on the import of pipes for the construction of oil and gas pipelines and on the export of hydrocarbons was used in the new round of “war with the Soviets” initiated by President Ronald Reagan (East-West Relations, 1982). It includes a ban on the transfer to the Soviet Union of some products and technologies necessary for the production and transportation of oil and gas. So, if in 1975 52.7 per cent of the exports items from the USA to the USSR were high technologies, and their total exports amounted to 219 million dollars, then in 1985 these figures fell to 5.4 per cent and 39 million dollars. (Bokarev, 2009, p. 262).

During the implementation of the “Ronald Reagan’s secret plan”, there were obstacles for the construction of a gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe. Also, they stopped the provision of loans to the USSR with the simultaneous coercion of the latter to early payment of interest on loans. Some actions led to a twofold drop in oil prices.

After the disappearance of the USSR from the political map of the world, its geopolitical and geo-economic opponents again changed their strategy. Again, they take the course to turn the Russian Federation into a supplier of raw materials, brains, skilled workers and at the same time an importer of foreign consumer goods. That is, ideologically, financially, scientifically, technologically, culturally and educationally dependent state. Behind the screen of the slogan “Abroad will help us!” the national science, education, culture, ideological foundations of society were destroyed, the flagships of the Russian machine and machine-tool industry, space and defence industry, city-forming and agricultural enterprises were bankrupt and closed, many types of production and logistics disappeared.
Scientific and technological dependence is a natural result of the backlog in education, science, and technology. In turn, “technological backwardness and dependence mean a decline in the security and economic opportunities of the country, and as a result — a loss of sovereignty” (President’s Message, 2018).

Dependence in the field of information, communication and the digital technologies — the basis of advanced economies of the world and the economy of the future — well characterised N. Kaspersky, CEO of the InfoWatch group of companies, co-founder of Kaspersky Lab. She said: “We already see examples of how our economy, ‘hooked’ on the technology of previous digital races of Microsoft, Oracle, Siemens, suddenly turns out to be very dependent and vulnerable in the new era of deterioration of relations with the United States. By order of the Americans large, beautiful, public Western companies, which we believed, as itself, cease to issue updates to our corporations, disable credit cards to our banks, refuse to work in the Crimea? (Shadrina, 2018).

The anti-Russian sanctions of President Barack Hussein Obama based on Act. HR 3364 “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” hit on vulnerable areas of the Russian Federation technological and credit-financial dependence on developed capitalist countries, export-raw orientation of domestic economic entities and, as a consequence, the dependence of the financial well-being and income of the Federal budget of the Russian Federation on energy prices, which the state can not influence.

Principle 10. It is better to act with allies to increase your power, and even better — “to do something with someone else’s hands”.

The presence of allies usually increases the power of the belligerent. Also, there is an opportunity to share with them the burden of costs and the severity of losses. It was well understood by the leaders of 14 states that were part of two alliances — the Entente and the Central powers with their allies — invaded Russia during the civil war. In the intervention of 1918–1920 engaged troops of Australia, Austria, Hungary, Great Britain, Germany, India, Italy, Canada, China, Ottoman Empire, Poland, Romania, Finland, France and Japan.

The U.S. also attracted other States to the technological blockade of socialist countries and countries of people’s democracy. Signed by President Ronald Reagan, the NCS-NSDD-66 Directive contains the following settings: “the U.S. should undertake intensive work within our Allies and within the IEA/OECD to encourage development of these Western alternative and to encourage that adequate safety net measures are adopted to protect against a shutoff of Soviet gas.

A quick agreement that allied security interests require controls on advanced technology and equipment beyond the expanded COCOM list, including equipment in the oil and gas sectors; development of a list of equipment in this category and an effective procedure to control its transfer to the Soviet Union” (East-West Relations, 1982).

This agreement was soon reached at the consultations with the U.S. Allies (Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom) in Washington conducted by the United States Secretary of State George P. Shultz in November 1982. (Summary of Conclusions, 1982).

The list of countries in which COCOM (Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls) limited and prohibited the export of the
latest industrial products, high technology and technical information included Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, East Germany, Kampuchea, North Korea, Mongolia, Romania, Poland, USSR and Czechoslovakia.

The number of COCOM’s members exceeds the number of States participated in the intervention in Soviet Russia — 17, plus six countries that cooperated with them. In 2014, the number of participants in the global economic aggression against the Russian Federation increased to 41 (Table 4).

Because global economic aggression done by the states or group of states, it must also be opposed by the government. It is vain to hope the market itself can handle with sanctions, individuals and legal entities themselves will survive. We should not rely on the third law of Newton — “for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction”, etc. Strong can be defeated by force and cunning.

At the same time, the response to aggressive actions should not be a specular reflection. First, the enemy hits our weak points, but they have completely different ones. Therefore, we should not do the same as he does. We ought not to influence (and with the same force) on the same objects that are affected by the aggressor. Pressing on its painful areas is necessary. For example, China refused to import the US oil and Iran refused to import electronic devices from the US in response to the US trade duties imposed in 2018. Secondly, the coalition of countries, including its members, is economically stronger than modern Russia and has a large arsenal of means of influence. Russia cannot respond to them with the same economic strength.

Here is a calculation based on official statistics. For example, the anti-Russian coalition of countries willing to sacrifice for the struggle with Russia to 0.001 per cent of its total gross domestic product (GDP) created in 2017. If the Russian response strikes them with the same force, the total loss of the aggressors will be 0.002 per cent of their total GDP. Russia, however, for such a direct response is equal to the force required to donate 3 per cent of its GDP in 2017.

By the straight symmetric (mirrored) response Russia will deplete resources without causing appreciable damage to attackers. Therefore, it is advisable to use not direct actions, but small ‘injections’ in the most painful places. At the same time, one should always remember that it will take a long time to fight, and therefore it is better to compare what is better for us: to spend forces and means to cause retaliatory damage or to direct our resources to strengthen our positions to such an extent that the efforts of the aggressors are in vain.

From economic war and global economic aggression, it is necessary not only to protect themselves but also to deprive the opponent of opportunity and desire to fight. For this purpose it is necessary, at least, to protect weak points (it is even better not to have them) and to increase the power of the state.

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Принципы глобоэкономической агрессии

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Аннотация. Для характеристики исследуемых экономических войн и агрессий автор статьи использует приставку «глобо», а не «гео», потому что, во-первых, непосредственной целью агрессии является экономика, а не территория или политический строй. Во-вторых, потому что агрессия осуществляется вне зависимости от территориального распределения ее жертв, и в агрессии, как правило, участвуют несколько субъектов, т. е. она имеет глобальный характер. В-третьих, потому что термин «геоэкономическая агрессия» уже используется для обозначения теории новой геополитической борьбы. Вынесенное в заголовок слово «агрессия» употребляется в статье на том основании, что войны объявляются, а глобоэкономические действия чаще всего совершаются тайно. Глобоэкономические войны и агрессии ведутся не одно столетие, и нет оснований ожидать их скорого окончания. Уже поэтому полезно знать принципы (гласные и негласные), которыми руководствуются их инициаторы и организаторы. В статье приводятся десять принципов ведения глобоэкономической войны и агрессии и дается характеристика каждому из них.

Ключевые слова: принципы; агрессия; непрямые действия; разрушение экономики; стратегия; СССР; Российская Федерация

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