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Using Alloy to Formally Model and Reason About an OpenFlow Network Switch

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Abstract—OpenFlow provides a standard interface for separating a network into a data plane and a programmatic control plane. This enables easy network reconfiguration, but introduces the potential for programming bugs to cause network effects. To study OpenFlow switch behavior, we used Alloy to create a software abstraction describing the internal state of a network and its OpenFlow switches. This work is an attempt to model the static and dynamic behaviour a network built using OpenFlow switches.

I. INTRODUCTION

Software-defined networking (SDN) is a technique used in computer networking to decouple the control plane and the data plane of the network. SDN employs a centralized software program to automatically configure and control network switches. switches. SDN helps researchers to write high level programs to control network behavior instead of manually configuring and manipulating policies in traditional network switches. OpenFlow is the first standard communication interface defined between the control and forwarding layers of an SDN architecture. OpenFlow is an open API to remotely control forwarding tables of switches by adding and removing flow entries [14]. OpenFlow provides an easy interface for changing network configurations, but also enables software bugs to impact network behavior. This raises a number of questions: "Does changing configurations via OpenFlow cause any security breaches or inconsistencies in switches? Can it cause undesired network behaviors unknown to the network operator?"

In this report, we will use Alloy, a lightweight modeling language, to create a software abstraction describing the static structure and dynamic behavior of the OpenFlow network. Using this model, in future work we aim to answer the aforementioned questions about OpenFlow switch networks. The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows.

In section II we describe Software Defined Networks in more detail, and introduce the fundamental concepts of the Alloy language.

Section III discusses the key components of an OpenFlow switch. We explain the static model of an OpenFlow switch in IV and the dynamic model in V. Related work on SDN design and verification is reviewed in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper and discusses our future work.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Software Defined Networks

In SDN the data forwarding plane is separated from control plane, which is managed by a network OS. The network OS (such as Nox [5], POX [13], Beacon [1], or ONIX [10]) controls the whole network from a central point. It controls the data plane via interfaces such as OpenFlow [14]. Accordingly, the functionality of a network can be defined and changed after SDN has been physically deployed. Hence, changing network switch’s rules, prioritizing, de-prioritizing or even blocking/re-routing packet flows is facilitated a very fine-grained level of control.

A software defined controller allows us to trace and manage specific flows in a flexible approach based on packets’ header information (such as packet’s source/destination address).

OpenFlow is the first standard communications interface defined between the control and forwarding layers of an SDN architecture. OpenFlow facilitates the software defined routing of packets through the network of switches and also provides sophisticated traffic management. The basic idea of OpenFlow is to exploit the concept of flow-tables (already used in Ethernet switches) for different applications such as implementing firewalls, QoS and NAT. Employing this notion, OpenFlow provides a protocol in order to program the flow-tables for routing packets and managing flow traffics. More importantly, using OpenFlow, network administrators can separate production and research traffic. Hence this gives the researcher the ability to implement and test new routing protocols, security models or even alternatives to IP [14] on real-world networks. Figure 1 shows a network of OpenFlow switches. In this example, all the switches are managed by only one controller. In general based on OpenFlow specification, a switch can be controlled by more than one Controller.

Every OpenFlow switch consists of at least three parts [17]: (1) A set of Flow Tables (at least one table). Each table has a set of flow entries. Each entry comprises a set of actions that will be applied to the packet when it matches that entry, (2) A Secure Channel for communication with corresponding controller(s), (3) and OpenFlow as the standard protocol for communication with controller(s) [14].

More details on the OpenFlow switch are presented in section III.
B. Alloy Modelling Language

Alloy is a declarative specification language for modeling complex structures and behaviors in a system. Alloy is based on first order logic [7] and is designed for model checking. An Alloy model is a relational model which can consist of:

- **Signatures:** represent the entities in a system.
- **Relations:** which relates a signature to another signature.
- **Facts:** specify the constraints on the signatures which are assumed to always hold.
- **Predicates:** specify the constraints which can be used to show operations.
- **Functions:** are alternative names for expressions that return some result.
- **Assertions:** constraints which are checked over the model.

The Alloy Analyzer takes an Alloy model and checks it against its constraints. It translates the Alloy model into a boolean expression which is analyzed by the SAT solver embedded in the analyzer. The Alloy Analyzer generates instances of model invariants satisfying model constraints and then checks specified properties on these instances. It just returns the models within the user-specified scope, consisting of a finite number of objects. The result is turned into a graphical representation of a model instance.

Besides finding satisfying instances, the Alloy Analyzer also checks assertions. If there is a model within the scope which does not satisfy the assertions, it will return the model as a counterexample. However if no instance is found, the assertion may still be not valid in a larger scope.

C. Examples:

The general syntax for defining a signature in Alloy is as follows:

```alloy
sig A fields
```

This line defines signature `A` with some fields. For instance

```alloy`
some sig Switch{tables: some Table}
sig SwState{sw: one Switch, BuffMsg: set (Port->Message)}
```

Figure 2 shows two entities in Alloy which are defined using keyword `sig`. Line 1 defines the `Switch` entity with a field `Table`. Signature `SwState` shows the state of the network at each time epoch. `SwState` has two relations, `switch` and a set of buffered messages (`BuffMsg`) mapping ports to Messages.

Operations that modify the state of network may be modeled as **predicates** using the `pred` keyword. The syntax is:

```alloy`
pred Name [parameters] f
```

This line defines a predicate, with the given name and (possibly empty) parameters. A predicate always produces true or false, so no type is needed. The result is defined by the formula `f`, which may reference the parameters. Figure 3 specifies how the state changes when a new message is received. `s` indicates the current state and `s'` indicates the next state after receiving a new message. Upon receiving a message the only change is the relations between switch state and the set of buffered messages. The new message is added to the buffer, but the other relations stay unchanged.

Facts express constraints on signatures and the relations that must always hold in the model. The following syntax shows how to define a fact:

```alloy`
fact Name e
```

You can name a fact if you wish. The analyzer will ignore the names. The expression `e` is a constraint that the analyzer will assume is always true. For instance the fact in Figure 4 implies the next table of every switch table should be in the same switch. Using following syntax a function can be defined in Alloy:

```alloy`
fun Name [parameters] : type e
```

This line defines a function, with the given name and (possibly empty) parameters, and outputting a relation (or a set, or scalar) of the given type `type`. The result is defined by the expression `e`, which may reference the parameters. For instance Figure 5 presents an example of a function in Alloy. This function finds the set of switches’ ports (from set of all input ports `ports`) connected to a set of controllers (`c`).

An Alloy assertion can be defined using the following syntax:

```alloy`
assert Name f
```

This line defines an assertion, with the given name. Assertions take no parameters. An assertion always produces true or false,
 fun findCPort(c: set Controller, ports: set Port): set Port
{
    {connect.(c.ports}) & ports
}

Fig. 5: Example of a function in Alloy.

assert Acyclic( cc t: Table | t in t.`nxTable )
check Acyclic for 5

Fig. 6: Example of an assertion in Alloy.

so no type is needed. The property that is going to be checked is defined by the formula $f$. Figure 6 depicts an example of an assertion in Alloy. Acyclic asserts there is no loop in the tables’ chain. This assertion is checked in all models with at most 5 elements of each signature.

So far Alloy’s basics which we are going to use in our code are explained. In the following sections the Alloy code for modelling the OpenFlow switch is presented.

III. Switch Structure

A. OpenFlow Tables

Any OpenFlow switch has at least one Flow Table. Each table may have a pointer to another table as the next table. There is no pointer to the first table, and this table is called the root table.

A Flow Table consists of some flow entries. Different components of each flow entries are:

- Match fields: to match against packets. These consist of the ingress port and packet headers, and optionally metadata specified by a previous table.
- Counters to update for matching packets.
- Instructions to apply to matching packets.

1) Match Fields: In our model of an OpenFlow switch a very simplified version of the match fields is modeled. For a complete set of match fields that a packet is compared against, see the current OpenFlow switch specification [17]. Currently a packet is compared against the ingress port, source IP and destination IP. Each match field in a flow table has a priority field. If more than one match fields match with an incoming packet, the one with higher priority will be triggered.

2) Counters: Counters are stored statistics that can be maintained for each flow, port, table, etc. In current work, a very simplified version of counters in the static model of OpenFlow switches is presented.

3) Overview: A set of instructions is associated with every flow entry. This set of instructions is executed whenever an incoming packet matches the corresponding entry. In this version of the OpenFlow switch model the following instructions are modeled:

- Apply-Action action(s): A specific set of actions is immediately applied while the current action set (associated with the packet) remains unchanged.
- Clear-Action: clear the associated action set.
- Write-Action action(s): Add a specific set of actions to the current actions set.
- Goto-Table next-table-id: continue the pipe-lining process (described in next section) from table with ID equal to next-table-id. The next-table-id must be greater than the current table-id.

4) Action Set: Each incoming packet has an action set which is initially empty. Using Write-Action and Clear-Action, the action set can be modified whenever the packet matches an entry. An action set contains at most one action of each type. In order to have multiple actions of the same type, the Apply-Action instruction can be used. There are currently two types of action in the OpenFlow specification: required and optional [17]. No optional action is modeled in the current work. Supported required actions in this model are:

output:

- Forward-to-Port port: forward the packet to port.
- Forward-to-Controller controller: forward the packet to a specific controller.
- Forward-to-Ingress: forward the packet to the ingress port (the port that packet has been received from).
- Forward-to-All: forward the packet to all outgoing ports.

Drop: Drop the packet. This action also can be applied implicitly for those packet whose action sets have no output action.

B. Matching a packet with flow entries

If a packet matches a flow entry in a flow table, the corresponding instruction set is executed. The instructions in the flow entry may explicitly direct the packet to another flow table, where the same process is repeated again. A flow entry can only direct a packet to a flow table number which is greater than its own flow table number, in other words pipeline processing can only go forward and not backward. Obviously, the flow entries of the last table of the pipe-line can not include the Goto instruction. If the matching flow entry does not direct packets to another flow table, pipe-line processing stops at this table and the corresponding action set will be executed. Packet flow through an OpenFlow switch is presented in Figure 7.

IV. Static Model of OpenFlow Switch

Our Alloy model enables us to model states of one switch and its interaction with other nodes in the network. We first describe the entities in our model and then we introduce the constraints on the entities. These constraints (modeled using Alloy facts) help us to model the correct structure of an OpenFlow network.

A. Entities

An OpenFlow network consists of a set of nodes(controller and switches). Every node has a set of ports which connect nodes together. In addition to ports, switches also have a set
of flow tables. The root table is the first table which the pipe-lining process for an incoming packet starts with. Every packet has a source and a destination IP. If packet is coming from the controller, it also includes a preTable and a postTable which reflect the modification need to be done in switch’s flow tables. Using this modification (preTable will be replaced by postTable), In our model each packet is encapsulated in a message which specifies the type of message and the port the packet was received on. The Alloy model of different elements of an OpenFlow network is presented in Figure 8.

The most important part of the switch model is the flow tables. The tables are uniquely determined by their tableID and all the tables (except the last table) have a pointer to the next table. Every flow table includes a set of flow entries, which messages are checked against. If none of the entries match a message, a table miss occurs. Table miss can be continuing pipe-line process with the next table, forwarding message to some controllers or dropping the packet. Tables and related elements are modeled depicted in Figure 9.

As described in section III each flow entry contains match fields, counter and instructions. Our simplified modeling of different types of actions and instructions and their relation with each other and with respect to the flow entries is presented in Figure 10. For more detail on instructions and actions and their relation you can refer to section III or OpenFlow specification [17].
Line 4 also implies that every action is used in at least one instruction. Obviously in any network model each node (switch or controller) has some ports. Every port belongs to exactly one node and it cannot be connected to another port in the same node. Also each port can be connected to at most one other port and all connections are two ways. All these structural rules are applied using facts in Figure 12. In our model we are not interested in relations between controllers, hence line 8 imposes that controller’s ports should be connected only to switch’s ports. The first fact in Figure 15 implies every instruction should belong to at least one flow entry. In addition in the GotoTableInstruct instruction, the pointed table must be in the corresponding switch and it must be a table with larger ID. In Figure 16 the set of facts on different type of actions is given. The second fact in line 4 imposes that the toPort of an ForwardtoPort action must be in the same switch. Finally lines 8 and 10 make sure there is no repeated actions in our model.

V. Dynamic Behavior of the Model

In the previous section the static model of an OpenFlow switch network was presented. Assuming that this model presents the (simplified) real structure of a OpenFlow switch network correctly, the dynamic behavior of OpenFlow switch can be modeled now. Without loss of generality, the internal behavior of only one switch in relation with other elements of network is considered. The internal state of a specific switch changes by various events such as receiving, sending or processing of a message and etc. In Figure 17 you can see how the state of an OpenFlow switch is captured. As you see every element that may change in a switch is considered as a part of the internal state of a switch. In order to have a correct chain of switch states, the first SwitchState must be initialized. For instance the set of input/output buffered messages in this state must be empty. This rule is applied to the first SwitchState using Alloy fact presented in Figure 18. The core part of modeling the dynamic behavior of the switch is to capture the possible transitions between different states.

### Fig. 12

All related facts on flow entries of a table.

### Fig. 13

All related facts on actions in a flow table.

### Fig. 14

Constraints on the ports and connections between them.

### Fig. 15

Facts on flow entry’s instructions.
A. Receiving a Message

The first state change happens by receiving a new message. Hence the only change in switch state is adding a new message into the input buffer and input history of the switch. All other elements of SwitchState are remained unchanged by receiving a new message. These rules are applied by two conditions: ss'.sInBuffMsg = ss.sInBuffMsg + m and ss'.pInHistory = ss.pInHistory + m. This transition is modeled using the receive predicate presented in Figure 20.

B. Pipe-Line Initiation

As mentioned before a received message is buffered in the switch and recorded in the input history. In general, a message is either a control message or a host message. Control messages are used to change the flow entries or flow tables in the switch. If the message is a host message, however, pipelining can be initiated. Predicate pipeLineInit as presented in Figure 21 shows this state transition. In this predicate condition ss'.sInBuffMsg = ss.sInBuffMsg - m makes sure that message m is removed from the input buffer. Lines 17 to 27 handle the message based on its type. Lines 17 to 22 model the behavior of switch for a control message. In these lines the set of tables of switch (modeled by sTables) changes by replacing the preTable with postTable of arrived message from controller. The way that flow entries of tables are manipulated in our model is slightly different from the OpenFlow specification [17]. In our model we have simplified this process. Instead of removing or adding a single entry in a specific table, the table is replaced with the updated table. In lines 24 to 27 if the message is of type host message it is set to start pipe-lining in the next state.

C. Pipe-Lining Predicate

The core of the modeling of the dynamic behavior of a OpenFlow switch is the pipe-lining process. In this procedure the message is pulled out of the input buffer and, starting from the root table, is compared with flow entries. This predicate has two important parts. In every round of pipe-lining either there is exactly one flow entry in the current table in pipeline that matches the message, or no entry matches it. In the former case using predicate applyInstruction (presented in Figure 24) the set of instructions for the matched flow entry is applied to the message. On the other hand, in the latter case, we are facing a table miss. Hence the appropriate action (based on the table’s miss action) must be carried out. The table’s miss action can be dropping the message, carrying pipe-lining up using subsequent table or the default action, which is sending the message to connected controller(s).
The pipe-lining procedure is modeled using predicate pipeLining presented in Figure 22.

D. Message Forwarding Predicate

After being pipelined, a message is usually forwarded via a switch port. Hence a message may be added to some ports’ output buffer. forward predicate (Figure 25 ) models the process of removing one message from output buffer, and forwarding it via the corresponding port.

E. Transition Between States

In our model it is assumed that transitions are atomic actions. Namely from any current switch’s state SS to the exact next state SS’, only one of aforementioned five transitions can happen. In order to apply this rule, we add some conditions in a fact shown in Figure 26. In this fact it is applied that between any two consecutive state SS and SS’, exactly one of the discussed predicates can be correct. In addition each transition happens only for one message.

VI. RELATED WORKS

In Veriflow [9] the problem of checking invariants in software defined networks’ data plane in real time is addressed. The authors proposed to divide the network into equivalent classes so that checking invariants and violations become easier and more efficient. Conflicting rules can be addressed. The authors proposed to divide the network into equivalent classes so that checking invariants and violations become easier and more efficient. Conflicting rules can be detected in real time but rules that rewrite packets cannot be checked by Veriflow. Anteater [12] statically analyzes the matching rule in OpenFlow specification [17]).
[11] introduces SOFT, an approach to test interoperability of Openflow switches and inconsistency between different Openflow agents and the cause of inconsistency.

FlowChecker [3] tries to find intra-switch misconfigurations. FlowChecker translates FlowTable configurations into boolean expressions using Binary Decision diagrams (BDD) and then checks network invariants by using model checkers.

In [2] the whole network is modelled as a finite state machine in which packet header and the location determines states. The goal of paper is to check correctness of network reachability per packet. To achieve this, authors have used BDDs and model checking on properties specified in computation tree logic (CTL) to test all future and past states of packet in the network.

[16] studies inconsistencies caused by updating switch configurations. Authors tries to keep Openflow network consistent at the cost of increasing state in switches to store duplicate table entries.

In addition to switch behavior, a considerable amount of literature has been published with a focus on Openflow controllers. For example, NICE [4] is a controller verification tool which uses model checking and symbolic execution to...
 automate testing Openflow applications. Nice attempts to explore the state space of the whole network and find the invalid system states.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS

The final goal of this research is to use the Alloy Analyzer to generate a model for lightweight verification of OpenFlow switches in order to help researchers in analyzing OpenFlow switch networks’ properties. So far the modeling of static structure and also modeling as well as the internal states and dynamic behavior of OpenFlow switch have been considered, specifically matching rules and actions in table entries as a part of a real size network. Consequently, in future works, there are some desired properties that we aim to investigate. Some important properties that will be investigated are:

- Conflicting rules in aggregate flow table
- Existence of loops in the set of forwarding actions
- Scheduling problem in the existence of different controllers

In the follow up research, using Alloy Analyzer, we will try to check these properties of OpenFlow switch networks in our model.

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