Eavesdropping on the Boström-Felbinger Communication Protocol in Noisy Quantum Channel

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We show an eavesdropping scheme on Boström-Felbinger communication protocol (called ping-pong protocol) [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] in an ideal quantum channel. A measurement attack can be perfectly used to eavesdrop Alice’s information instead of a most general quantum operation attack. In a noisy quantum channel, the direct communication is forbidden. We present a quantum key distribution protocol based on the ping-pong protocol, which can be used in a low noisy quantum channel. And we give a weak upper bound on the bit-error ratio that the detection probability \( d \) should be lower than 0.11, which is a requirement criterion when we utilize the ping-pong protocol in a real communication.

I. INTRODUCTION

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a protocol to be provably secure, by which private key bit can be created between two parties over a public channel. The key bits can then be used to implement a classical private key cryptosystem, such as Vernam cipher [1], some times called a one time pad, to enable the parties to communicate securely. The basis idea behind QKD is that Eve can not gain any information from the qubit transmitted from Alice to Bob without disturbing their states. First, the no-cloning theorem forbids Eve to perfectly clone Alice’s qubit. Secondly, in any attempt to distinguish between two non-orthogonal quantum states, information gain is only possible at the expense of introducing disturbance to the signal [1]. Since Bennett and Brassard presented the pioneer QKD work in 1984 [2], there are a lot of quantum communication protocols today [3-11]. Boström and Filbinger presented a deterministic secure direct quantum communication protocol called ping-pong protocol with a novel security proof [7]. They show that the security of the ping-pong protocol is unconditional secure with an abstract mathematics proof. In this letter, we show a scheme that gives a physical eavesdropping on the ping-pong protocol. Since a real quantum channel is noisy, we present a modified ping-pong protocol by using Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes [12] and give a requirement criterion of the upper bound on the detection probability (bit-error ratio).

The ping-pong protocol utilizes the property that one bit of information can be encoded in the states \( |\psi^\pm\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle) \), which are completely unavailable to anyone who has access to only one of the qubits. To gain information from Alice, Bob prepares two qubit in the Bell state \( |\psi^-\rangle \). Then he stores one qubit (home qubit) and sends the other one (travel qubit) to Alice through the quantum channel. Alice can decide the control and the message mode randomly. In the message mode, Alice performs a unitary operation \( \sigma_A^1 \) to encode the information ‘1’ or ‘0’ nothing to encode the information ‘0’. Then she sends it back. Bob can get Alice’s information by a Bell measurement. In control mode, Alice performs a measurement in basis \( B_z = \{ |0\rangle, |1\rangle \} \). Using the public channel, she sends the result to Bob, who then also switches to the control mode and performs a measurement in the same basis \( B_z \). Bob compares his own result with Alice’s result. If both results coincide, Bob knows that Eve is in line and stops the communication. Otherwise, Bob sends the next qubit to Alice and the communication continues.

It has been proven that any information Eve gains would make her face a nonzero detection probability. Eve’s aim is to find out which operation Alice performs. Eve has no access to Bob’s home qubit, so all her operations are restricted to the travel qubit, whose state is completely indistinguishable from the complete mixture \( \rho_A = \text{tr}_B\{ |\psi^+\rangle < |\psi^+\rangle \} = \frac{1}{2}( |0\rangle < |0\rangle + |1\rangle < |1\rangle )_A \). Boström and Felbinger presented an unconditional security proof on the ping-pong protocol [7]. The most quantum operation is a completely positive map \( \varepsilon : S(H_A) \rightarrow S(H_A) \). One can replace the state of the travel qubit by the a priori mixture \( \rho_A = \frac{1}{2}(|0\rangle < |0\rangle + \frac{1}{4}|1\rangle < |1\rangle ) \), which corresponds to the situation where Bob sends the travel qubit in either of the states \( |0\rangle \) or \( |1\rangle \), with equal probability \( p = 1/2 \). Consider the case where Bob sends \( |0\rangle \). Eve adds an ancilla in the state \( |\chi\rangle \) and perform a unitary operation \( E \) on both systems, resulting in

\[
|\psi'\rangle = E|0,\chi\rangle = \alpha|0,\chi_0\rangle + \beta|1,\chi_1\rangle.
\]

Defining that

\[
d = |\beta|^2 - 1 - |\alpha|^2,
\]

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obviously, $d$ is the detection probability in the control mode for Eve’s attack. It has been proven that when Alice exactly encodes one bit, the maximal information Eve gain is equal to the Shannon entropy of a binary channel,

$$I_0(d) = -d \log_2 d - (1 - d) \log_2(1 - d).$$

The function $I_0(d)$ has maximum at $d = 1/2$, giving a monotonous function $0 \leq d(I_0) \leq 1/2$ on the interval $[0,1/2]$. Any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected.

II. A MEASUREMENT EAVESDROPING ATTACK STRATEGY

In their proof [7], Eve’s attack operation in line $B \rightarrow A$ is described as a completely positive map operation, which is an abstract proof. We will show a practical eavesdropping attack scheme which is equivalent to a completely positive map attack. Consider that

$$\sigma_2|0 > = |0 >, \sigma_2|1 > = -|1 >,$$

$$\sigma_2|+ > = |- >, \sigma_2|- > = |+ >,$$

here $|+ > = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0 > + |1 >)$, $|+ > = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0 > - |1 >)$). Eve’s aim is to find out which operation Alice performs. She can eavesdrop Alice’s information by using the strategy that she attacks the travel qubit in line $B \rightarrow A$ to prepares the qubit in the state $|\uparrow_n \rangle$,

$$|\uparrow_n \rangle = \cos \frac{\theta}{2}|0 > + \sin \frac{\theta}{2}|1 >$$

and performs a measurement in the line $A \rightarrow B$ to draw Alice’s information.

Let us analyze the connection between information Eve gained and the corresponding detection probability she has to face. When Alice sends the travel qubit to Bob, Eve can capture the travel qubit in the line $B \rightarrow A$. she perform a measurement in the basis $B_2$. With probability $p = 1/2$, she get $|0 >$ or $|1 >$. Consider that Eve gets the result $|0 >$. Then the state of the home qubit is immediately collapse to $|1 >$. Then Eve prepares the travel qubit in state $|\uparrow_n \rangle$. In control mode, the detection probability $d_m$ is given

$$d_m = |< 1| \uparrow_n \rangle < |\downarrow_n \rangle |1 > = \sin^2 \frac{\theta}{2}.$$

In message mode, the state of the travel is $|\uparrow_n \rangle$ after Alice encoded ‘0’ and becomes

$$|\downarrow_n \rangle = \cos \frac{\theta}{2}|0 > - \sin \frac{\theta}{2}|1 >,$$

when Alice encoded ‘1’. We calculate the information Eve can gain on this occasion. Practically, Alice encodes ‘0’ and ‘1’ with equal probability. After Alice’s encoding operation, the state of travel becomes

$$\rho = \frac{1}{2}|\uparrow_n \rangle < |\downarrow_n \rangle | + \frac{1}{2}|\downarrow_n \rangle < |\uparrow_n \rangle |$$

$$= \cos^2 \frac{\theta}{2}|0 > < |0 > + \sin^2 \frac{\theta}{2}|1 > < |1 >.$$

Then the information Eve can gain from $\rho$ is the classical information entropy

$$I = - \cos^2 \frac{\theta}{2} \log_2 \cos^2 \frac{\theta}{2} - \sin^2 \frac{\theta}{2} \log_2 \sin^2 \frac{\theta}{2}$$

$$= -d_m \log_2 d_m - (1 - d_m) \log_2(1 - d_m).$$

Assume that Eve’s measurement result is $|1 >$ rather than $|0 >$. The above calculation can be done in full analogy, resulting in the same relation. Thus, one can only use measurement attack in the line $B \rightarrow A$ instead of a completely positive map operation attack. After Eve’s such attack, the entanglement between travel qubit and home qubit does not exist. Bob can not gain any information from Alice. The information authentication has to be considered in the line $A \rightarrow B$. 

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III. BOSTRÖM-FELBINGER COMMUNICATION IN THE NOISY QUANTUM CHANNEL

In the ping-pong protocol [7], it only has been considered in the ideal quantum channel. However, a practical quantum channel is noisy. The noise can cause the bit errors and the quantum losses. Wójcik has discussed the eavesdropping on the ping-pong protocol hiding in the quantum losses [13]. When Alice and Bob use a noisy quantum channel, they can not communicate in a direct way, i.e., directly communication must be forbidden. In control mode, Alice and Bob publish their measurement results. If they find both results coincide, they stop the communication. In a noisy quantum channel, a spontaneous disentanglement process is inevitable. Both of the results will coincide with a nonzero probability. Alice and Bob can not distinguish whether Eve is in line. The communication has to be stopped.

In a noise quantum channel, direct communication must be forbidden. One can use the ping-pong protocol to complete a quantum key distribution with CSS codes [12]. Consider a quantum CSS code Q on n qubits comes from two binary codes on n bits, C₁ and C₂, one contained in the other:

\[ \{0\} \subset C_2 \subset C_1 \subset Z_2^n, \]

where \( Z_2^n \) is the binary vector space on n bits. Suppose \( x \in C_1 \) is any codeword in the code C₁. Then we defined the quantum state \( |x + C_2 \rangle \) by

\[ |x + C_2 \rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{|C_2|}} \sum_{y \in C_2} |x + y \rangle, \]

where + is bitwise addition modulo 2. Suppose that \( x' \) is an element of C₁ such that \( x - x' \in C_2 \). Then it has that \( |x + C_2 \rangle = |x' + C_2 \rangle \). Hence these codewords correspond to coset of \( C_2 \) in \( C_1 \), and this code protects a Hilbert space of dimension \( 2 \dim C_1 - \dim C_2 \). Since Eve may use a measurement attack in line \( B \rightarrow A \), the information authentication has to be considered in line \( A \rightarrow B \). The ping-pong protocol can be modified as below. The modified ping-pong protocol.—(1) Alice creates random \( n + m + l \) bits where \( m \) and \( l \) is determined by the control parameter \( c \). (2) Alice chooses a random \( (n + m + l) \)-bit string \( b \). She choose a random \( v_k \in C_1 \). (3) Bob creates \( n + m + l \) EPR pairs in state \( |\psi^- \rangle \). (4) Bob sends half of each EPR pair to Alice and keeps the others. (5) Alice receives \( n + m + l \) qubits. She performs a measurement in basis \( B_x \) on the \( m \) qubit according to \( b \). Alice announces the measurement results and which qubits she measured. (6) Bob also measurement \( m \) qubit. If Bob finds more than \( t \) of the measurement results coincide, he aborts the protocol. (7) Alice has an \( n - \text{bit} \) string \( x \). She performs encoding operation on the \( n \) qubit according to \( x \) and does nothing on the \( l - \text{qubit} \) (encoded ‘0’). And sends the resulting qubits back to Bob. (8) Bob receives these qubits and performs a Bell-basis measurements on each EPR pair. (9) Alice announce \( b \). If Bob finds more than \( t' \) of the \( l - \text{code} \) is ‘1’, he aborts this protocol. (10) Alice announces \( x - v_k \). Bob subtracts this from his result, correcting it with code \( C_1 \) to obtain \( v_k \). (11) Alice and Bob compute the coset of \( v_k + C_2 \) in \( C_1 \) to obtain the key \( k \). The modified ping-pong protocol not only can protect this communication against Eve’s eavesdropping, but also can protect this communication against Eve’s attack without eavesdropping [14]. This modified ping-pong protocol can be used in low noisy quantum channel.

The security of a protocol is based on

\[ I(A : B) > \min[I(A : E), I(B : E)], \]

where \( I(A : B) = H(A) + H(B) - H(AB) \), \( H \) is the Shannon entropy [15]. Assume that the detection is \( \sin^2 \alpha \), \( 0 \leq \alpha \leq \frac{\pi}{4} \). In this case, the maximal information Eve can gain is determined by equation (3), \( I(A : E) = I_0(\sin^2 \alpha) \).

We will analyze the maximal information Bob can gain from Alice when \( d = \sin^2 \alpha \). The state Alice and Bob shared after Eve’s attack should satisfies the condition \( d = \sin^2 \alpha \). And we want to keeps the entanglement as maximal as possible. If the entanglement does not exist any longer, Bob can get nothing from Alice. Although the entanglement is not sufficient, it is necessary in the communication protocol. According to the qualification described above, the state may be written in the form as

\[ |\Omega > = \cos \alpha |\psi^- > + \sin \alpha |\phi^+ > \]

\[ = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0 \rangle > |b_+ > - |1 \rangle > |b_- >), \]

where \( |\phi^+ > = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0 \rangle > |0 \rangle + |1 \rangle > |1 \rangle >) \), and \( |b_+ > = \cos \alpha |1 \rangle > + \sin \alpha |0 \rangle >, |b_- > = \cos \alpha |0 \rangle > - \sin \alpha |1 \rangle >. \) Clearly, \( |\Omega > \) is a maximal entangled state. When Alice performs an encoding operation \( \sigma^A_z \), the state \( |\Omega > \) becomes \( |\Omega' > \)
\[ |\Omega' > = \cos \alpha |\psi + > + \sin \alpha |\phi >, \]  
\hspace{1cm} (16)

where \[ |\phi > = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0 > - |1 >). \] Bob performs a Bell-basis measurement on the EPR pair. With probability \( \cos^2 \alpha \), he obtains Alice’s codes. With the probability \( \sin^2 \alpha \), she gains the wrong codes. Hence the information Bob gained is

\[ I(A : B) = 1 - [- \cos^2 \alpha \log_2 (\cos^2 \alpha) - \sin^2 \alpha \log_2 (\sin^2 \alpha)]. \]  
\hspace{1cm} (17)

The security of this protocol requires that \( I(A : B) > I(A : E) \). In this case, we can gain the detection probability \( d = \sin^2 \alpha < 0.11 \). So we gain a weak criterion that the detection probability \( d \) should be lower than 0.11, \( d < 0.11 \). Since the security of quantum communication should be unconditional, then the criterion \( d < 0.11 \) should be treated as a requirement. According to our modified ping-pong protocol, either \( t/m \) or \( t'/l \) higher than 0.11, the communication protocol should be aborted immediately.

IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

In an ideal quantum channel, a direct communication as a real one-time-pad key has been discussed a lot [7, 10, 16,17]. In a noisy quantum channel, direct communication has to be abandoned. Alice and Bob can not distinguish whether bit-error was caused by noise or caused by Eve. So the communication has to be stopped. Fortunately, we can use the direct communication to complete the quantum key distribution in a noisy quantum channel.

In the ping-pong protocol, for Eve, a measurement attack in line \( B \to A \) is equal to a completely positive map operation attack. But the entanglement between home qubit and travel qubit disappears under such attack. Bob can not gain any information from Alice. We present a modified ping-pong protocol which can be used to complete quantum key distribution in noisy quantum channel. In our modified protocol, security on both line \( A \to B \) and line \( B \to A \) has been proven. We give a requirement criterion that the bit-error ratio has to be lower than 0.11, which is an important criterion when we utilize the ping-pong protocol in a real communication.

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