Breaking a secure communication scheme based on the phase synchronization of chaotic systems

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A security analysis of a recently proposed secure communication scheme based on the phase synchronization of chaotic systems is presented. It is shown that the system parameters directly determine the ciphertext waveform, hence it can be readily broken by parameter estimation of the ciphertext signal.

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Most secure chaotic communication systems are based on complete synchronization (CS), whereas a new cryptosystem has been proposed based on phase synchronization (PS). This scheme hides binary messages in the instantaneous phase of the drive subsystem used as the transmitting signal to drive the response subsystem. Although it is claimed to be secure against some traditional attacks in the chaotic cryptosystems literature, including the parameter estimation attack, we show that it is breakable by this attack. As a conclusion, the system is not secure and should not be used for communications where security is a strict requirement.

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a great number of cryptosystems based on chaos have been proposed [1, 2], most of them fundamentally flawed by a lack of robustness and security [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. In [15], a secure communication scheme based on the phase synchronization of a chaotic system is proposed.

In this new scheme the plaintext binary message $b$ is hidden in the instantaneous phase of the drive subsystem used as transmitting signal to drive the response subsystem. At the response subsystem, the phase difference is detected and its strong fluctuation above or below zero recovers the plaintext at certain coupling strength.

The secure communication process is illustrated by means of an example based on coupled Rössler chaotic oscillators. In the example, the drive subsystem is formed by two weak coupled oscillators. The plaintext is used to modulate the same parameter in both oscillators 1 and 2. The equations of the drive subsystem are:

$$
\dot{x}_{1,2} = -(\omega + \Delta \omega)y_{1,2} - z_{1,2} + \varepsilon(x_{2,1} - x_{1,2}), \\
\dot{y}_{1,2} = (\omega + \Delta \omega)x_{1,2} + \alpha y_{1,2}, \\
\dot{z}_{1,2} = \beta + z_{1,2}(x_{1,2} - \gamma).
$$

The response subsystem is governed by:

$$
\dot{x}_3 = -\omega' y_3 - z_3 + \eta((x_3^2 + y_3^2)^{1/2} \cos \phi_m - x_3), \\
\dot{y}_3 = \omega' x_3 + \alpha' y_3, \\
\dot{z}_3 = \beta + z_3(x_3 - \gamma).
$$

In the example, the parameter values are: $\omega = \omega' = 1$, $\varepsilon = 5 \times 10^{-3}$, $\eta = 5.3$, and $\alpha = \alpha' = 0.15$.

FIG. 1: Plaintext recovery with the authorized receiver. Time histories of: (a) plaintext $b$; (b) ciphertext $\phi_m^*$; (c) reconstructed phase signal of the response subsystem $\phi_3^*$; (e) difference between the ciphertext and the reconstructed signal $\phi_m^* - \phi_3^*$; (f) reconstructed plaintext $b'$.
The parameters $\beta$ and $\gamma$ are held as constants, with the values $\{\beta, \gamma\} = \{0.2, 10\}$.

The parameter $\omega$ corresponds to the natural frequency of the Rössler oscillator drive subsystems 1 and 2. The parameter $\omega'$ corresponds to the natural frequency of the Rössler oscillator driven subsystem 3, $\varepsilon$ corresponds to the weak coupling factor between the oscillators 1 and 2, and $\eta$ corresponds to the strong coupling factor in the driven oscillator 3.

The parameter mismatch $\Delta \omega$ is modulated by the plaintext, being $\Delta \omega = 0.01$ if the bit to be transmitted is “1” and $\Delta \omega = -0.01$ if the bit to be transmitted is “0”.

The ciphertext consists of the phase of the mean field of the drive oscillators:

$$\phi_m = \arctan \frac{x_1 + x_2}{y_1 + y_2}.$$

As the phase is a signal that has an unbounded amplitude it can not be transmitted through physical channels. This problem is overcome by coding the signal from $\pi$ to $-\pi$, which corresponds to the Poincaré surface of the attractor, $y_1, y_2 = 0$. As a consequence, the transmitted ciphertext, marked as $\phi_m^*$, is a sawtooth-like signal with a period equal to the revolution period of the oscillator.

At the receiving end the phase of the response subsystem is:

$$\phi_3 = \arctan \frac{x_3}{y_3}.$$

that is also coded from $\pi$ to $-\pi$ as $\phi_3^*$.

The plaintext is retrieved by calculating the difference between the ciphertext and the reconstructed signal, $\phi_m^* - \phi_3^*$. The difference signal consisted of positive and negative peaks that correspond to the ones and zeros of the plaintext.

The example of [Fe] is illustrated in Fig. II. We have simulated it with a four order Runge-Kutta integration algorithm in MATLAB 6, with a step size of 0.001. In order to recover the plaintext with the exact waveform, allowing for a small time delay, we have included a Smith-trigger as a reconstruction filter, with switch on point at 4 and switch off point at -4.

As in the example of [Fe], there is no indication about the parameter initial values, our simulation is implemented with the following initial values:

$$\{x_1^{(0)}, x_2^{(0)}, x_3^{(0)}, y_1^{(0)}, y_2^{(0)}, y_3^{(0)}, z_1^{(0)}, z_2^{(0)}, z_3^{(0)}\} = (-5, -3, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).$$

The authors seemed to base the security of its secure communication system on the properties of the phase synchronization. They claimed that it can not be broken by some traditional attacks used against secure chaotic systems with complete synchronization, but no general analysis of security was included.

Although the authors point out that the system parameters play the role of secret key in transmission [Fe, §V], it is not clearly specified which parameters are considered as candidates to form part of the key, what the allowable value range of those parameters is, what the key space is (how many different keys exist in the system) and how they would be managed.

The weaknesses of this system and the method to break it are discussed in the next section.

II. BREAKING THE SYSTEM

The main problem with this cryptosystem lies on the fact that the ciphertext is an analog signal, whose waveform depends on the system parameter values. Likewise, the difference between the ciphertext and the phase signal of a non synchronized receiver $\phi_m^* - \phi_3^*$, depends on these same parameters. The study of these signals provides the necessary information to recover a good estimation of the system parameter values and the correct plaintext, as will be seen next.

Let us assume that the key consists of the oscillator’s parameters $\alpha$ and $\omega$, as they are the only unknowns in the example of [Fe]. Moreover the parameters $\beta$ and $\gamma$, that were constants in the example, can not be part of the key because, according to our experiments, the synchronization of the Rössler oscillator is indifferent to a mismatch of the value of these parameters in a range greater than 1 to 1000.

The search space of $\alpha$ may be restricted to the unique suitable value range for operation, characterized by the mild chaotic region of the Rössler oscillator, in which its phase increases monotonically with time, showing a chaotic increase rate, that allows hiding the binary in-
formation. This region is roughly characterized by the following values of $\alpha$:

$$0.03 \leq \alpha \leq 0.18.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

The operation of the system with lower values of $\alpha$ should be avoided because the waveform of the oscillator is quite uniform and its phase increases almost linearly with time. Therefore, the instantaneous phase fluctuations, due to the binary information modulation, can not be effectively hidden, and thus the information could be easily retrieved from the signal.

Higher values of $\alpha$ should be also avoided because the Rössler oscillator operates in the wild chaotic region, in which the phase does not increases monotonically with time, showing erratic increases and decreases, rendering impossible the synchronization of the authorized receiver, thus preventing the correct data retrieving.

The behavior of the attractor with respect to $\alpha$ is illustrated in Fig. 2 in which the time history of the ciphertext signal $\phi_m^*$ for three values of $\alpha$ is shown. The first sample corresponds to $\alpha = 0.01$, showing that the phase increases almost linearly. The second one corresponds to $\alpha = 0.05$, showing that the phase increases monotonically with chaotic behavior. The last sample corresponds to $\alpha = 0.25$, showing that the phase increases and decreases irregularly.

The sensitivity to the parameter values is so low that the original plaintext can be recovered from the ciphertext using an intruder receiver system with parameter values considerably different from the ones used by the transmitter ([15, Fig. 7]).

We have found that the plaintext $b'$ can be recovered even when $\alpha'$ has an absolute error of $\pm 0.2$. As a consequence, it is sufficient to try four values of $\alpha'$, to cover its full usable range. The best set of values is: $\alpha' = \{0.05, 0.09, 0.13, 0.17\}$.

In Fig. 3 we show the power spectral analysis of the ciphertext signal. As can be observed, the frequency of the Rössler oscillator is totally evident. The spectrum’s highest peak appears at $\omega' \approx 1.03$, close to the parameter value of the drive subsystem $\omega = 1$. Thus, by simply examining the ciphertext, the second key element $\omega'$ is guessed with reasonable accuracy.

Let $\omega'$ be the approximate value of $\omega$. Once it is measured we can use it to recover the plaintext in the following way.

First, we introduce the estimated value of $\omega'$ into an intruder receiver with $\eta = 0$, that is without coupling, so the intruder receiver oscillator will be running freely. To check whether the estimation of $\omega'$ is good, we look at the output of the phase comparator $\phi^*_m - \phi_3^*$ as well as at the ciphertext signal $\phi^*_m$ and at the phase signal of the receiver $\phi_3^*$.

When the frequencies of transmitter and intruder receiver are slightly different, then $\phi^*_m - \phi_3^*$ will look like a train of pulses of increasing width summed with a di-
rect current of increasing level; being the final width and direct current increasing level rate proportional to the difference of frequencies $\omega' - \omega$. Also, the mismatch of the periods of the phase signals $\phi_m'$ and $\phi_3'$ is perceptible. With this information we can adjust the value of $\omega'$ in a few steps, until the width of the pulses tends to zero. Then, the period mismatch of the phase signals $\phi_m'$ and $\phi_3'$ is unnoticeable and its direct current level equals zero.

The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 4. We begin with $\omega' = 1.03$, the value estimated from the spectrum, and we see that the correct value of $\omega'$ must be slightly lower, thus we try $\omega' = 1.015$ and we see that we are near the exact value but still a little bit high. Next we try $\omega' = 1.005$, and we see that the frequency match is quite good. We retain this last value of $\omega'$ as the definite one and go to the next step.

Finally, we set $\eta = 5.3$ at the intruder receiver and look at the retrieved data $b'$ for the previously obtained $\omega'$ an for each of the four possible values of $\alpha'$. In Fig. 5 the retrieved binary data $b'$ obtained with $\omega' = 1.005$ and $\alpha' = \{0.05, 0.09, 0.13, 0.17\}$ are presented. It can be seen that for $\alpha' = \{0.05, 0.09, 0.13\}$ only zero value data are obtained and for $\alpha' = 0.17$ some output data are present, thus we may assume that the value of $\alpha' = 0.17$ can be retained as the appropriate one to retrieve the plaintext $b'$ and that the data obtained with it consist of the correct recovered plaintext, as can be verified from the figure.

Although the estimated pair of values $\{\omega', \alpha'\} = \{1.005, 0.17\}$ are far from the right ones, the plaintext is correctly recovered as a consequence of the system’s low sensitivity to parameters.

Moreover, we have observed that many other combinations of parameter values allow for the recovery of the correct plaintext as well. In Fig. 6 we show after many simulations the region of $\{\omega', \alpha'\}$ values in which correct plaintext recovery of a ciphertext generated with a drive subsystem with $\{\omega, \alpha\} = \{1.00, 0.15\}$ is achieved.

### III. CONCLUSION

The proposed cryptosystem is rather weak, since it can be broken by measuring the power spectrum of the ciphertext signal and trying a small set of parameter values. There is no detailed description about what the key is, nor what the key space is, a fundamental aspect in every secure communication system. The lack of security discourages the use of this algorithm for secure applications.

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