STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ON THE REVITALIZATION OF RURAL HOMESTEAD IN CHINA

Abstract: With the acceleration of China’s modernization process, the role of rural homestead in social and economic life is gradually changing from the function of security to the function of assets. It is of great significance to the research on how to make the homestead live, to excavate the property attribute of the homestead, to solve the contradiction between the supply and demand of land resource utilization in our country, and to ensure the reasonable demand for land for rapid urbanization and industrialization. Three categories of stakeholders, this paper introduces the related and analyzed its interests, and thus concluded that the advantages disadvantages in policies and regulations, and give appropriate advice.

Key words: homestead, stakeholders, interests.

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Introduction
At present, the management of rural homestead is somewhat chaotic, it violates the principle of intensive use of land resources. Because of the "bullwhip effect" of the implementation of relevant policies, there is still a phenomenon of "more than one house" in rural homestead. But the homestead lacks the reasonable circulation mechanism, the recessive circulation phenomenon is also more common (Ho P., 2001). In addition, due to the development of urbanization, many rural labor forces have transferred to non-agricultural areas and moved to cities, leaving their homestead in rural areas idle, resulting in inefficient use of land and a certain amount of waste. The Central Government No. 1 document in 2019 proposes to deepen the reform of rural land system, strive to complete the confirmation, registration and certification of homestead use right in 2020, and steadily and cautiously promote the reform of rural homestead system (Kong X et al., 2018). Now the land right confirmation work has been basically completed, how to reform and improve the rural land system, so as to further revitalize the idle rural homestead, has become an important topic to be
studied. According to the notice of the Ministry of agriculture and rural areas of the people's Republic of China on "actively and steadily carrying out the work of rural idle homestead and the activation and utilization of idle residence" put forward in October 2019, it is required to explore the activation and utilization of rural idle homestead on the basis of maintaining the legitimate rights and interests of farmers' homestead according to law and strictly regulating the management of homestead with the goal of improving the utilization rate of rural land resources and increasing farmers' income. The effective ways and policy measures of land and idle housing provide strong support for stimulating rural development vitality and promoting rural revitalization. The key tasks include: selecting the reactivation mode according to local conditions, supporting the cultivation of reactivation subjects, encouraging the innovation of reactivation utilization mechanism, steadily promoting the demonstration of reactivation utilization, and standardizing the reactivation utilization behavior according to law (Bański J et al., 2010).

However, the whole rural social security system is not perfect compared with the urban social security system, so the homestead still exists mainly for the implementation of the security function, which limits the property income that farmers can obtain. In today's rapid development of urbanization on how to improve the utilization efficiency of rural land is a problem to be solved, the homestead function change can activate its value and it is worthy of research topics, so this article from the land safeguard function and property value on the choice of research of the homestead progressive revitalize, puts forward related Suggestions strategy, put forward reference for solving the problem of housing land idle path.

Ⅱ. Theoretical preparation

The research on homestead is a hot topic at home and abroad. The research on the evolution of homestead system, property right of homestead, transfer of homestead and transaction of homestead is quite sufficient. In addition, there are also studies on the influencing factors of homestead activation and how to activate it (Northam R M, 1971). However, there are still differences among scholars about the reform direction and operation mode of homestead in the future. For example, whether the homestead trading market should be opened, how to find the diversified transfer mode of homestead, and how to belong to the homestead property rights (A Pagano M and M. BowmanA, 2000). The idea of gradual activation of homestead includes three aspects. The first is to promote the improvement of property function of homestead. The second level of meaning is to adapt measures to local conditions, step by step; The meaning of the third level is to realize the trading power of homestead in the future, so as to achieve the invigorating effect (Wasilewski A, et al., 2004).

Homestead revitalization involves many stakeholders. How to achieve win-win results through appropriate policy design and management model is the purpose of this paper (ZHANG Bo et al., 2006). Rural incremental revitalize the multiple stakeholders involved in the main responsibility and behavior analysis, including farmers, pure farmers, development into the city farmers and village collective organization, the grassroots government, provincial government, the central government, and the new agriculture in the body of the professional investors, family farms, farmers cooperatives, agricultural industrialization leading enterprises (Sorauf F J, 1957).

Ⅲ. Behavior analysis of key stakeholders and their interest demands

It can be seen from the above analysis that there are three types of key stakeholders, namely the central government as the subject of administrative management, the farmers as the subject of rights, and the grass-roots cadres who not only have the administrative function of implementing central policies but also represent the nature of rights owned by rural collectives.

A. Central government.

The central government is one of the key stakeholders in the homestead reform, because in the homestead reform, the central government has stood in the leading position, playing an overall and leading role; In addition, the influence of the central government on the homestead reform is often enforced through the promulgation of laws, regulations and policy documents. Therefore, the demand of the central government for homestead reform can be immediately concerned. As for the initiative, the government has stressed to comprehensively promote rural revitalization strategy, improve the level of farmers' income and life protection, and land reform is the important part in the strategy of rejuvenating the country, moreover, the homestead revitalize and bonus release do to improve the farmers' property income, and promote national economy further development, so the central government also plays a big role in land reform.

There are two opinions about the goal of the central government's decision-making behavior: one is that the goal of the central government's behavior should be to maximize the public welfare of the whole society. They believe that since the central government is the highest authority of the whole society and the natural representative of the public interests of the whole society, the central government should take the maximization of the public welfare of the whole society as its behavioral goal. The other is that the goal of the central government is to maximize its own interests. They believe that the central government is also a "rational economic man", and their actions are no exception to the pursuit of the maximization of their own interests (Zhang Y, 2018).
But, although the central government officials have their own interests more often they tend to state affairs, from farmers, agriculture and rural development and overall goal of national economy to the design of related system and reform path, relying on strong power to the government for protection, to control the process of institutional change and guide. In this study, think that the social and public interests and the national people's welfare should be the central government's main consideration, although in real life, the government to serve their country as a whole, its essence is composed, as officials of the "rational man" in the process of the exercise of power on behalf of the government will consider their own benefits in the policy, but from a macro perspective, the central government is still real social benefit maximization and the existence of social stability as the highest goal.

Faced with the goal of maximizing social benefits, the central government mainly has two choice strategies in formulating policies on homestead reform, that is, to strictly control the homestead trade or gradually relax the homestead trade policy. In the process of selection, the central government will generate the following two interest appeals:

First, political effects and social stability. The central government, as the central institution of the whole country, coordinates all the affairs of the state. In the formulation and implementation of policies, it will bring certain political influence, including political authority, political reputation and political support to the central government. In the process of land reform, for example, the early stage of the implementation of the homestead exit policy at present only in some pilot areas on a trial basis in order to guide the homestead, but has not unified, in view of the nature of the country's homestead exit policies and rules, this is because the housing land ownership stability involves until now is still the most of the peasant in our country, if any errors or contradictions in the process of implementing policy, will lead to the broad masses of farmers groups, so will no doubt to the central government's political authority and political prestige and political support very serious negative effect, and this effect cannot eliminate in the short term. Therefore, the political effect and social stability are important factors that the central government will consider in the practice of homestead reform (Shiyin C, 2007).

Second, food security and the ecological environment. In recent years, in order to vigorously develop industry and promote urbanization and promote rapid economic growth, a large number of ecological land resources have been used for industrial and urban construction. Moreover, due to the effect of environmental regulation in cities, some industrial enterprises turn to the countryside, but all kinds of wastes are directly discharged into the countryside without reasonable treatment. This series of behaviors leads to ecological and environmental problems such as reduced forest coverage, soil erosion, sandstorms, and pollution of rural water resources and land resources. According to xi's "two mountains" saying, the withdrawal of homesteads to be used as farmland or forest land to ensure food security and ecological and environmental security is also the desired outcome at the central government level.

In general, the interests of the central government are mainly concerned with the well-being of the people, improving the efficiency of the allocation of land and resources, so as to improve the efficiency of land use, ensure political stability and national security, promote economic and social development, and maintain the security of food production and the protection of the ecological environment. Therefore, the central government not only needs to maintain the existing homestead system to maintain the stability of rural society, but also needs to accelerate the process of marketization and capitalization of rural land to enhance the vitality of rural development and increase the income of farmers' land property. If the transaction control of homestead is relaxed and the marketization of rural homestead is carried out, the central government should first consider whether the free transfer of homestead will have an impact on the stability of rural society if the rural social security system is not sound enough. Second, whether the liberalization of rural homestead market will impact the state-owned construction land market, which will reduce the central government's ability to control the land valve and regulate the land market. But from the view point of the whole society public welfare maximization, under the trend of the future urban and rural integration, carry out marketization of house-site in the countryside, can reduce the land circulation of transaction cost, reduce the homestead invisible market, to achieve the optimal allocation of rural collective construction land, and enhance the vitality of rural development, reflect the homestead property dividends, thereby promoting the economic development of countryside and even the society as a whole.

B. farmers.

The farmers said that the important subjects with the right to the use of the homestead, under the current situation of rapid economic development and a large number of farmers leaving the land and the countryside, to obtain the right to trade the homestead and realize the function of the homestead property has become the appeal of these farmers, and this appeal has gradually been paid attention to by the government; And farmers until now is still the most broad groups in our country, in promoting the land in the process of the reform of the system is easy to appear "olson, the dilemma of collective action", is the result of the farmers is larger scale of the "free rider" behavior, thus it is difficult to unity for common action. In addition, the low degree of organization of farmers in China also determines that the political
influence of farmers' interest groups is weak, so it is insufficient to promote the reform of homestead system.

Since ancient times, farmers and land have a natural connection, land is the most basic means of livelihood and production factors on which farmers rely for survival, and land rights and interests are the concentrated embodiment of farmers' fundamental interests. Homestead is the most important property of farmers. How to dispose of the right to the use of homestead, how much income can be obtained and how to guarantee the future life are also the most important things that farmers care about in the reform. Peasant groups are the promoters and beneficiaries of the reform of homestead system, and they are eager to gradually enjoy the right of income and disposal of homestead through the reform of homestead system. However, as this group is in a weak position in the whole social and political system and has weak negotiation and game ability, it needs the support and incentive from external resources.

Farmers' land transaction and exit as an important subject, their individual characteristics determine the focus will not be a political interests and the interests of the ecological security, food security and social responsibility, they pay more attention to the housing land can in trading after the earnings or can obtain compensation standard and the future security of life. In the current policies of the central government to guide the withdrawal of homesteads, the emphasis is on respecting the will of farmers, not forcing them to "go upstairs", but on protecting their basic rights and interests. Therefore, as far as farmers themselves are concerned, their strategy choices are mainly based on the economic benefits they can obtain, including the following two considerations: trade (exit) or temporary wait and see. And farmers out of house sites focus on the interests of the mainly includes the following two aspects: firstly, the primary consideration, and farmers is the land compensation standard of quitting, house-site in the countryside as a safeguard farmers' life needs of residential land, once out, face to find and establish residence problem, so in this case the general farmers tend to get as much as possible the economic compensation, in order to ensure the homestead after the life needs. If the compensation standard formulated by the government can basically meet the economic interest demand of farmers when promoting the withdrawal of homestead, then the basic conditions for promoting the withdrawal of homestead are achieved. Social security, the other is the root of the land as farmers living in the countryside, also bear the function of a certain amount of social security, if the government is just compensation should be made to exit the homestead, the farmer subsequent relocation housing (including facilities), employment, public service and the correlative need not make corresponding arrangements, farmers life to ensure there is greater uncertainty in the future, is bound to affect the tendency of farmers in land reform or exit option.

C. Grassroots cadres:

Grassroots cadres are also key stakeholders. On the one hand, in the process of implementing the homestead system reform, grassroots cadres can obtain the local construction land index through the withdrawal of homestead to develop the local economy. In addition, as the policy implementation representative of the superior government, grassroots cadres have an undoubted influence on the homestead reform. On the other hand, grassroots cadres are not only an important link between the higher government and ordinary farmers, but also representatives of local collective organizations, representing the interests of local farmers. Therefore, their relevant interest appeals can be responded to and paid attention to by the higher organizations in a timely manner.

By the secretary of the plant within the system, such as outside the system of cadres and ordinary village cadres have the feature of double identity of grassroots cadres, it is on the one hand, the central government in the local representatives of interests and policy practitioners, belongs to the administrative subject, on the other hand, it represents the village collective organization of regular village public affairs, and to obtain relevant rights and interests of farmers is it represents as part of the rights of the subject. Around the implementation of the land policy according to experience, no matter in the earlier law and policy of land transfer and how to restrict trading, or the use of land in the current land reform and exit ways how to compensate and encourage, if hope to all the farmers initiative policy ")", but not using its right to use house sites to earn profits or take the initiative to give up on the land to the risk of losing our home security, are not realistic, at this time will need to actively cooperate with and carry out the central government issued at the grass-roots level of policy, in the reasonable and lawful manner the relationship between the farmers and the government. And to encourage farmers to cooperate with the implementation of the reform policy. For example, when implementing the homestead withdrawal policy, the grass-roots government will pay corresponding compensation to the homestead owner according to the specific local conditions at that time. In some areas (such as tianjin and chongqing, etc.), it pushes farmers to withdraw by means of replacement of housing and social security.

From the perspective of grassroots cadres, their interest appeals mainly lie in the following two aspects:

First, political promotion. The selection and appointment of local government officials mainly depend on the central government, so it is particularly important for local government officials to gain the trust and support of the central government. In order to obtain the opportunity of political promotion, local
government officials should try to cooperate with the implementation of central policies to maximize the implementation effect, or try to develop the regional economy and ensure the continuous growth of regional economy to maximize their performance. Therefore, from this perspective, the local government may transfer the withdrawn homestead index into the new index of urban construction land, which can be used to develop the local economy and meet the demand of urban construction for space. Homestead exit policy implementation needs a lot of money at the same time, one of the important cost is out of the farmer's compensation, the compensation includes not only cash compensation, also involves the losing land farmers social security, public services and employment (Macmillan DC, 2000), as a result, local governments can also through the implementation of land out of the construction land index for all or part of, through the project development or land transfer money to balance the cost of compensation for farmers, developing the economy at the same time, expand the economic dimension, taxes, increase financial income. However, local governments at all levels, as the administrative organs of the central government, need to consider the requirements of the central government for maintaining the ecological environment. As the main body of the withdrawal of homestead, local governments should also cooperate with the implementation of the follow-up policies of the central government, sorted out the abandoned homestead and restored it to cultivated land, garden land, grassland or forest land, so as to protect the local ecological environment and meet people's demand for a good living environment, so as to safeguard the interests of the central government.

Second, the pursuit of individual leisure preference, grassroots cadres as an important link between the government and farmers, playing a role in connecting the preceding and the following. While carrying out the central policy, we should also deal with farmers all year round. Due to the policy of the central government has stressed effectiveness and efficiency of "the last kilometer", and therefore to farmers by the government cadres at the grass-roots level often faces pressure at work, moreover, farmers understand the policy itself is a difficulty, so for cadres at the grass-roots level, not only propaganda work time is longer, and in order to work smoothly and continuously adjust and maintain friendly relations with farmers, overall in the working environment is relatively hard, but in this case, the economic benefits of cadres at the grass-roots level is not necessarily can have larger growth, so out of preferences and pursuit for leisure time, It is also possible for grassroots cadres to cope with central policies, thus gaining more time to relax and avoiding conflicts with farmers over the implementation of some inappropriate policies.

Therefore, the strategic choice of local government officials mainly includes the following two aspects: first, through actively implementing the central government's policies, in order to meet the requirements of the central government to pursue political promotion and maximize their performance; Second, considering the pressure of life and work, they may also resist or adapt the central government's policies through various explicit or covert ways, that is, passively implement the central government's policies, so as to reduce the pressure at work or avoid the impact with farmers, as well as obtain more leisure benefits.

IV. results and policy recommendations
To formulate reasonable incentive and punishment measures for cadres at the grass-roots level. In order to enable grassroots cadres to actively cooperate with work, the central government should increase the punishment for grassroots cadres who fail to carry out their work as required, and also increase the reward for grassroots cadres who actively cooperate with policy implementation and achieve work results, and make it greater than the leisure benefits grassroots cadres can obtain when they passively treat their work. According to the reality, facing compared to grassroots cadres working environment and working pressure and the current lack of incentive for its wages actually deeper effect, so as to make the grassroots of the existence of difficult to implement the policy of the phenomenon of negative confrontation, in the penalty at the same time, more should consider is how to improve the level of motivation.

Formulate reasonable incentive and punishment measures for farmers. Reasonable exit rewards and compensation and questionable transactions fines is also one of the key factors that affect farmers decision-making, policy implementers should be undertaken before the compensation standard and policy fully research, understand the different parts of the level of economic development, urban real estate transactions, different location of different use value, etc., for house sites in different parts of the exit or formulate corresponding compensation scheme, satisfy farmers expect of land income, housing, medical treatment, after the withdrawal homestead farmers old-age security problems such as life. Rewards and punishment will and compensation standard, according to the actual situation to set reasonable limits, to can not only meet the incentive and guide farmers to actively participate in land reform, to revitalize the need of the policy implementation, and to consider the bear ability of the government, as far as possible the government's policy to reduce costs, improve administrative efficiency, guarantee efficient and orderly implementation of land reform policies, for rural economic development. In this paper, the central government, grassroots cadres and farmers in the interests of an agreement to choice of the strategy, has experienced a complex game process, the government needs to provide a certain amount of

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reward and compensation funds to guide farmers involved in land deal, that is to make the central government to adopt strategies gradually relax and grassroots cadres actively implement the policy, farmers choose deals, including government compensation benefits greater than the peasant households choosing on expectations of future earnings, then reached their expected income of farmers will be decided to participate in the homestead transactions. Through the role of resource allocation in the market, the main body of land use can obtain the right of land management through trade with farmers, and cooperate with farmers to form a community of interests, which can promote the economical and intensive use of land, and the local government can also obtain better economic development benefits. The role of the central government in this process mainly lies in the fact that by gradual deregulation policy, to "demand-supply" equilibrium and construction land index management mode innovation provides a certain space, make the homestead back room index can be used for urban construction land expansion, and thus access to land dividends, give local governments to actively implement the central policies, promote the power of land reform work(Davis J, et al., 2000).

We will strengthen the standardized management of the rural construction land market and limit the life and use of rural land circulation. Under the condition that the scope of transfer of homestead is gradually relaxed, the government should crack down on the illegal trade of homestead and control the amount of legal trade, so as to maintain the stability of the countryside and even the whole society, and reduce the social unrest cost caused by the gradual liberalization of homestead trade. At the same time, we should standardize the use of land circulation, promote the efficient and intensive use of land, and promote the full release of dividends from the reform of homestead. Homestead policy itself plays a crucial role in maintaining the stability of rural areas and even the whole society. China clearly stipulates that homestead can only be transferred and traded within the village collective organization, especially restricting non-agricultural urban population to purchase homestead in rural areas(Bittner C, et al.,2013). Through the reform and revitalization of homestead, the government hopes to sort out abandoned rural land and centralize land management, improve land use efficiency, and improve local economic and ecological development. Illegal trade in homestead or improper use after trade will bring obstacles to government control of land(Wanyi Z, 2014). For example, if the homestead after the transaction is used as the new construction land, it will not only fail to release the effective land use space, but also lead to the increase of the later withdrawal cost due to the further development and construction of the homestead, which is not conducive to the land consolidation and development. Therefore, on the basis of determining the right of homestead, the government should establish a standardized trading place, provide an information circulation platform and improve the trading process. Relevant laws should be formulated to protect the rights and interests of both parties and reasonable tax measures should be formulated to regulate the trading and use of homestead. For the illegal homestead trading behavior, the government should seriously investigate and punish, improve the relevant laws and regulations, give certain punishment to the illegal trading behavior, as far as possible to prevent the occurrence of this situation.

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