Partition, Migration and Refugee Settlement in Punjab: Refocusing on the Ethos of Sir Francis Mudie’s Governance

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ABSTRACT

Sir Robert Francis Mudie, the Governor of the West Punjab from 15 August 1947 to 2 August 1949, has been lauded as an able governor of Punjab whose work in resettling refugees was considered exemplary. The article analyzes his unique ethos that played a critical role in deciding the fate of the refugees. First, the article looks at his early career in UP, where he witnesses Hindu extremism and cow vigilantism, and the role it had played in shaping his psyche. Then, through a myriad of theoretical lenses, namely Constantine Fasolt and Amartya Sen, we study the archival evidence in fresh light. Using two case studies, Mudie, we argue, had both simplified and distorted Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan, and had turned refugee issue in Punjab to an ambivalent project, lacking in any compassion. Today, the political climate in India may justify some of Mudie’s fears, however, his gross stereotyping of the Hindus and Sikhs still remains problematic.

Keywords: Mudie, Punjab, Partition, Jinnah, Sikhs, Hindus, Refugees, Migration, Resettlement, Reductionism

Introduction

On 8th August 1942, Gandhi launched Quit India Movement in Gowalia Tank Maidan (now known as August Kranti Maidan) asking the British to free India. There were non-violent protests throughout the country. Along with Gandhi, most prominent leaders were arrested, this created further upheaval everywhere. However, a significant aspect of the movement was that it brought into forefront the relationship within the Congress and the Muslim League. Jinnah tried to keep the Muslims away from the movement, a decision fraught with controversies, inviting multiple ways of probing into his strategies. Francis Mudie summarized his actions as politically sound because the Congress Party was bound to suppress the voice of...
the Muslim minority and create an overwhelming Hindu dominated governments. (Mudie Papers, MssEur F164/12, 1950). However, there is also plenty of evidence to suggest that Hindus and Muslims fought together in the Quit India Movement. In fact, in eastern United Province, where Mudie was the Chief Secretary to the government, the Jamat-ul-Ulema declared it’s unconditional support to the Movement (Damodaran, 1992, pp 243). They were not the only ones, plenty of Islamic groups fought and died for the cause. Yet, Mudie in a letter to Richard Tottenham maintained that “the attitudes of Muslims continued to be neutral, though there are signs that their neutrality may become more benevolent.” He further dismissed organizations like Jamat-ul-Ulema as communists.

There is a reason why we begin with this pre-independence conundrum, since the focus of my paper is on Mudie’s refugee settlement policies in Punjab during the partition. Before we delve into that data, it becomes critical to locate my position within the larger framework of historical milieu. The Quit India incident reveals how contradictory data exists about the same incident. This is not something new to historians. The Rashomon (1950, Dir. Akira Kurosawa) problem has always plagued historical writing. “Truth” is often contextual, and a historian often grapples at numerous straws to create a comprehensive narrative. This essay aims at analyzing existing narratives in fresh perspective, much like the film Rashomon, where every version of “truth” needs to be investigated. We first clarify our theoretical scaffold, which serve our lens for studying the evidence. After that, we discuss the antecedents that affected Mudie’s policy-making abilities and its significance in analyzing the evidence. Finally, using two case studies, we discuss the fundamental difference between Jinnah’s view of Pakistan and Mudie’s execution of it.

Theoretical Framework

The construction of the past is entirely an intellectual process. As Constantine Fasolt succinctly points out in his work Limits of History, a historian’s job is not determined by providence or custom. Instead, they are burdened with the task of deriving knowledge about the past based on evidence. Therefore, understanding the nature of historical evidence is very crucial. To quote Fasolt, “…someone wrote a letter, built the temple, sang the song and did so at some particular time and place, for some particular purpose. That is the only reason why the letter, the temple, the song can testify to the conditions of any particular time and place at all.” (Fasolt, 2004, pp 14). The fundamental work of a historian is to contextualize the evidence and inform about the past.

All historians agree, if there is something that can be termed as truly profane in a historian’s craft, it’s an anachronism. Yet inarguably, contextualization is not a straightforward process. We have to be continuously aware that written records are just a part of the evidence that helps us etch the imaginary line between past and present. No longer can we view history as a method of preserving political chronicles, instead history itself is a theory that distinguishes the past from the
present. (Schiffman and Grafton, 2011, pp 14). “The past of it is anything at all, is a dimension of the present and changes along with it.” (Fasolt, 2004, 34). We have to realize that the past is not immutable. As a result, the past needs to be understood and updated continuously. Instead of asking why our predecessors missed asking certain questions, our job is to analyze the gaps and formulate new questions. While we can’t change the content of a written record, we can certainly expand our understanding of the context, because our present is different. Writing history is a political activity in itself because the historian is always “explaining” the past. We have moved away completely from Thucydides view of unchangeable past, today, the very reality we perceive is partially the product of our knowledge (Fasolt, Historically Speaking, pp 10).

In this paper, we show how Sir Mudie’s career before Punjab shaped his moral canvas, and how it affected his refugee settlement policies in west Punjab. Further, we briefly discuss Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan, and how, in many ways, Sir Mudie’s biases disturbed that vision. Even though Mudie was completely convinced that he was following Jinnah’s principles, he was unaware of how his preconceived notions prevented him from completely executing Jinnah’s plan.

The Antecedents

September 15, 1976. Sir Francis Mudie had died at the age of 86 in Broughty Ferry, Scotland, his hometown. His illustrious career had taken him all over the world where he held several critical administrative positions within the British Empire. Yet, the highlight of his career remained the governorship of West Punjab in 1947, when Muhammad Ali Jinnah choose him over able Pakistani candidates. He was amongst the handful of British officials who remained in South Asia after independence and played a crucial role in managing the affairs of West Punjab. His obituary published in the Times, acknowledged his successful career and devoted a whole paragraph to his work in West Punjab. Mudie was born on August 24, 1890, and received his education at King’s College, Cambridge. His civil administration career in India began in 1919. He spent a bulk of his career in the United Province (modern-day Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand), where he was first the revenue secretary and then, chief secretary. He acted as the Governor of Bihar in 1943-44. In 1946, he went to Karachi as the governor of Sindh (Chattha, 2014, pp 225).

To speculate the role he played in the political discourse of West Punjab, it is important to focus on two important factors, the socio-political flux that led to his appointment, and some highlights from his early career.

Since we have already established the need for a wider historical framework, it is important to discuss two very different kinds of evidence that played a key role in shaping Mudie’s psyche in India. First, a brief study of the active anti cow slaughter movements that gained momentum in the 1870s and the communal riots that happened in 1893 and 1917 (Patel, 2008). Second, Mudie’s letters to Sir Maurice Hallett, the Governor of UP, informing him about the dangers of Hindu extremism
highlighting the anti-beef conflicts and then, repeatedly linking Pandit Nehru to the dangers of a Hindu majority government (Mudie Papers, MssEur F164/10, 1947). So far, no one has discussed Mudie’s fear of Hindu extremism and cow vigilantism. We argue, that one can’t analyze Mudie’s policies in Punjab without understanding his fear of Hindu majority, particularly, if we consider the situation in present-day India, particularly in UP. The evidence requires an altogether fresh insight.

The idea of Goraksha or cow protection was strongest in Bihar and UP. In 1878, the Bihar Bandhu newspaper reported how exposing cattle carcass in the markets was unhygienic and offending the Hindus. Further, repeated complaints to the municipality had met with no results (Patel, 2008, pp792). Yet cow protection often tried to include Muslims. For example, there was a popular Hindi poem about poet Narahara saving a cow from getting slaughtered by appealing to the Mughal emperor Akbar, who immediately banned cow slaughter in the kingdom. While the veracity of the poem can’t be verified, there were attempts to appeal to the Muslim masses as well (Patel, 2008, 793).

In 1893, the GaurakshiniSabhas (cow protection groups) began rioting in Azamgarh in UP trying to prevent Muslims from sacrificing animals on the occasion of Bakra Eid. Before, Hindu dominated areas of both Bihar and UP had started seeing these Sabhas create strong anti-Islamic environment. They repeatedly distributed pamphlets and made cartoons demonizing Muslims for eating beef. (McLane John R, 1977, pp 309-312). Again, in 1917-18, there was another bout of cow vigilantism in the area that led to riots. So, the atmosphere of general antagonism had not disappeared. Relations between Hindus and Muslims in these areas continued to be strained (Patel, 2008, pp 800).

Mudie had witnessed serious anti-Islamic sentiments during his posting in both Bihar and UP. Mudie saw how Hindus repeatedly bullied the Muslim minority and criminalized them for cattle slaughter. Popular Hindi literature of that period too nurtured the environment of intimidation. For example, a play called Bharat Dimdima Natak blamed India’s economic condition on cattle slaughter. Another story called Gosewalk showed cruel Muslims punishing Kafirs by sacrificing their cows (McLane John R, 1977, pp 312). It is very important to remember, this literature and wide distribution and had a lasting impact on the general population of the area. Vernacular press always held a massive sway over the people, something that remains unchanged even today. There is no doubt that these anti-Islamic sentiments directly affected Mudie. Mudie had directly and actively witnessed discrimination against Muslims.

It is critical to now understand how Mudie’s experiences played a major role in his comprehension of Indian politics. He saw the Congress as a quintessential Hindu party, who were very soft on the Hindu Mahasabha and other right-leaning parties. While this notion was completely incorrect, we can see how the areas he worked on could give him that impression. Mudie was completely convinced that
Hindus would take away all the rights of the Muslim minorities and systemically oppress them.

His letters to Sir Evan Jenkins keep reiterating these points and also show us his admiration for Jinnah. In one letter, he says, the Congress would go to any length to destroy Muslims, and it is built in their agenda to do so. He calls both Nehru and Gandhi as dangerous and crafty, and fully understands why Jinnah would not trust them (Mudie Papers, MssEur F164/10, 1947). Mudie further added that the Quit India movement made it very clear that “…we have in this country two different communities, or to use Jinnah’s words, nations, struggling for power, not two parties competing for office. From this point of view, the real offence of the British in Congress eyes is that they stand in the way of the Hindus, led by the Congress, imposing their rule over the whole of India. The present struggle is only a part of the Hindu counter-attack, which starting with the death of Aurangzeb or perhaps the last battle of Panipat, was interrupted by the British conquest and will be renewed when we go” (Mudie Papers, MssEur F164/10, 1947).

Mudie was completely convinced that the Hindus had the agenda of Hindu rule and secularism was largely a clever claptrap. We do not evaluate Mudie’s opinion of the Congress that is outside the realm of this piece. However, this attitude deeply affected his decisions during the refugee settlement in West Punjab.

It will not be out of place to mention how his beliefs and ethos affected his decisions in Sindh. The Congress had accused Mudie of favouring the League when he had dissolved the Sindh Legislative Assembly (Chawla, 2018). Of course, as Chawla points out, his decision had prevented further violence and clashes, yet we can’t deny his strong pro-League attitude was now public knowledge.

The Ethos: Jinnah’s vision versus Mudie’s prejudice

At the onset, it is extremely important to clarify Jinnah’s view of Pakistan. Sharif-ul-Mujahid, very clearly mentions Jinnah’s idea of Pakistan. “Jinnah made it very clear at the outset of his political career that Muslims were equal to Hindus in their struggle for self-government. They did not need any special favours or treatment. They were as good as any other community. However, he was convinced that there must not be any conflict between Muslim interest and all-India national interests- that would not serve well the cause of self-government.” (Al Mujahid, 1999 pp 38). Jinnah’s core idea was to preserve Muslim communal individuality, and certainly not treat Hindus as sinister trouble makers.

Sir Mudie, however, did not fully comprehend Jinnah’s nuanced understanding of larger Islamic identity. The reason for this was largely his experiences in the Hindu dominated areas of UP and Bihar. Mudie repeatedly talked about cow vigilantism in his letters to Jenkins and Hallett (Mudie Papers, MssEur F164/12, 1950). Even though he mentioned the incidents were minor disputes, he repeatedly talked about earlier riots over cows and how the Hindu hostility used
cows as a pretext to oppress Muslims. He saw Hindus and Muslims as opposites, and he felt the need to protect Muslims from the Hindu majority.

The most prominent feature we notice about Mudie’s refugee settlement policy is his stark anti-Hindu bias. He confesses he knows nothing about Sikhs or Sikhism, but they seem close to Hindus and they belong where Hindus live. In a letter to Liaquat Ali Khan in 1947, Mudie clearly states that “…The departure of practically all Hindus and Sikhs from West Pakistan, excluding Sindh, will make it impossible for India to raise the question of the treatment of minorities in that part of Pakistan, owing to the presence of the Sikhs it would have been most dangerous, and I am sure there will soon be very few Hindus and Sikhs in Sind. But there remains East Bengal, where it will always be possible for India to stir up trouble of that kind I feared.” (Mudie Papers, MssEur F164/12, 1950). Later, he compares India to the Spaniards treatment of the Moors. He is fully convinced that India will destroy every vestige of Muslim presence from South and Maharashtra. He doesn’t stop here and goes on to elaborate his views on Indian history and hostile Hindu intentions. “I have never met anyone with any knowledge of Indian history and of the present attitude of the Hindu leaders who have doubted that the Hindus having driven Muslims into two corners of India, intend to complete the process. Muslims will, of course, remain in India, but they will be reduced to hewers of wood and drawers of water and may gradually be eliminated. The Hindus are experts at this sort of thing.” (Mudie Papers, MssEur F164/12, 1950).

He further accuses Hindus as a population without morals whose only goal is to destroy Muslims. He then proceeds to compare Sardar Patel to Hitler. Soon, he compares India to Germany and how the country will soon proceed on a path of aggression. He firmly believed getting rid of all Hindus and Sikhs was at the core of ensuring Pakistan’s safety.

Unfortunately, this was far removed from Jinnah’s idea of Pakistan, his attitude towards Hindus and his understanding of his relationship with Pakistan. The Lucknow Pact of 1917 had demonstrated that Jinnah was able to work amicably with the Congress. Jinnah was as an embodiment of Hindu-Muslim unity by Sarojini Naidu (Mujahid, 1999 pp 41). True, Jinnah disagreed with Gandhi’s methods of protest, and supported what Ayesha Jalal terms as ‘moderate colonialism’, which in itself shows complete lack of radical inclinations. As this is mentioned before, Jinnah wanted a dominance of Islamic identity and not a state based on hostile ferment.

It would not be incorrect to call Mudie paranoid. If we look at the evidence, his exaggeration of India’s aggression, contempt for Nehru and his fear of Hindu conquest drove his refugee settlement policies. He even admits that his fears about India could be exaggerated. He makes it a part of his policy to get rid of all Hindus and Sikhs.

We have to also remember, that Mudie was a colonialist. His compassion for Muslims was genuine, he truly admired Jinnah but he still was a clog in the empire. His understanding of India was steeped in colonial stereotyping. In summing up
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Pakistan, he says “The people of West Pakistan are tall, fair, good looking, (and) comparatively fair, except for the Sindhis. The inhabitants of East Pakistan are much smaller and darker and have a strong strain of Mongoloid blood in their veins.”

The Sikhs and the Hindus: Two Case Studies

Earlier, we have mentioned how by his admission Mudie repeatedly said, he knew very little about Sikhs. Only in 1947, when he was the governor of Punjab did he come into contact with them. If we are to examine his detailed report on the Sikhs right after partition, we notice a pronounced anti-Sikh bias. He admits that the Sikhs suffered the most in the partition of Punjab, and they claimed their land. He accused the Sikhs of mindless violence and said the Muslims only retaliated when attacked. Like the Hindus, they too were completely belligerent (Mudie Papers, MssEur F164/12, 1950). However, to understand the extent to which Mudie’s ethos affected his role in refugee settlement, we will discuss two cases. Mudie had described them in detail and gave his opinion on both. These two cases clearly showed his thought ferment. The first case was Lyallpur and the non-violent experience of the Sikh migration from that town, and the second case is Harnauli where there is heavy violence. In both cases, Mudie paints non-Muslims as the sole instigators of violence.

“On September 6th, I went to Lyallpur, a town 100 miles from Lahore and a centre of a large Sikh area. There had been very little rioting going on there, as the District Magistrate was a good one, but there was a small camp where Hindus and Sikhs had taken refuge. I went into it and there I met Sikh leader Gyani Kartar Singh of Amritsar. I asked him, what he was doing, and he told me he had come to put into operation his plan of evacuating 400,000 Sikhs, who lived in Lyallpur district, and he was to issue orders the next day for them to collect in thirty places, and to march down to the road to the East. He asked me to help them get out in safety, which I promised to do and they got out with very few casualties” (Mudie Papers, MssEur F164/12, 1950). He maintains that most Sikhs migrated without many casualties. He then, without any reference to a place or date, talks about the Sikh cruelty towards Muslim refugees. “One day a stream of Muslim refugees, who had been driven from their homes, who had to flee for their lives, just managed to struggle across Pakistan border, where between 1500 to 2000 of them lay down by the roadside and died of starvation and exhaustion.” He writes them in the same paragraph, and there is absolutely no further information on where this event had occurred. He then dismisses the reports on Hindus and Sikhs being killed in Pakistan and says, there is no way we can have the details.

The evidence is so biased that there is, in fact, very little room for analysis. The picture is clear. The Sikhs are violent, the Muslims are victims. Further, he completely dismisses the role of the masses in Lyallpur. The entire credit is given to the District Magistrate and the people are entirely robbed of any agency. He completely denies the active role played by Gyani Kartar Singh whose work organized the Sikhs. I have said this before, Mudie was a colonialist and he never saw Indians as capable of negotiating a peaceful exchange of refugees. If anything, he is mildly disappointed by the smooth resettlement process in Lyallpur. It is not a
coincidence that right after mentioning the Lyallpur event, in the very next sentence he colours the Sikhs as sinister and violent, and denies their ability to migrate peacefully.

His report on the Harnauli case further adds to this view. Harnauli is a village in the west bank of Indus. The village had Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. The Hindus were rich and lived in a gated community, where they hired trained guards. Their guards were primarily hired to fight the Afghans. The Muslims were poor, but they decided to attack the Hindus once the partition happened. The Muslims were defeated by the guards, so, they asked help from Afghan mercenaries. Together they attacked and the Hindus were killed. In this attack, large numbers of Sikhs too were killed.

Events like this were not uncommon during the partition. People often took advantage of the political turmoil and attacked minorities. This happened on both sides. However, Mudie stated that, “the Hindus in accordance with their ancient custom started killing their women and children. More than 900 were killed.” But the report from the Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab (1997) clearly stated that the Hindus were killed by the Afghan mercenaries and the women were abducted (pp 120). Of course, in events like these, there are many versions of the same event. Yet, it is critical to point out there is no ancient Hindu custom that requires men to murder the women and children. Mudie was probably referring to Jauhar which was only practiced by few Rajput families in Rajasthan. And the ritual of Sati could only happen after a woman was widowed. It is impossible that the Hindus actively massacred themselves as Mudie wanted us to believe.

What is notable here is the loss of human life is of no relevance to Mudie. He blames the Hindus and Sikhs for being victims and he treats the loss of innocent lives like collateral damage. These two incidents show us that not only did Mudie lack any compassion but also believed Hindus and Sikhs deserved violent deaths. No wonder his role as the Governor of Punjab was as ambivalent as his ethos. We know he had genuine compassion for Muslims, yet Punjab fell into radical factional politics right after freedom. It was Mudie’s ambivalent temperament that in many ways determined the fate of Punjab. He sums up Pakistan as, “a country free of Hindus, and that is her greatest advantage.” And this, I argue, was never Jinnah’s view of Pakistan.

Conclusion

Sen’s core argument is that religion is only one part of our identity. Every human being has multiple identities. They are also fathers, lawyers, soccer fans, Jazz lovers, horror film aficionados and many other things. To reduce them to just one identity, that is religion, is precisely why violence is fostered. Hate, he argues, requires craft. It also needs systemic reductionism. Plus, reductionist identities are easily understood, and therefore, they gain mass acceptance. For example, if one dismissed every identity of a person and reduced him to mere categories like
“Hindu”, “Sikh”, “Muslim”, it would become a fertile ground for breeding hate. Reductionism denies language, culture, shared habits, and shared history; instead, it pitches us against one another as hostile categories where belligerence is a pre-condition. Singularity is a dangerous path, and imposing singular identities is dangerous for both the signifier and the signified. (I am deviating from Saussure’s idea here and using the term as the one who imposes singular identity and the one who accepts it). Further, singularity puts pressure on the group to act out in a certain way and maintain that identity. For example, the cow vigilantism that was explained earlier is an excellent example of this process.

Sen’s book was, of course, his reaction to Samuel Huntington’s deeply problematic work “Clash of Civilizations”. Huntington insists that clash between religious worlds is inevitable and that religious differences will be the new frontiers of global clashes. He divides the world into Islamic Civilization, Christian Civilization, Hindu Civilization and so on. As one can see, the idea of reductionism played a very big role in Huntington’s understanding of global relations. Needless to say, Huntington’s book has been used by many thinkers in the western world to demonize Islam. Sen adds that there is no need to keep reiterating that Islam is a religion of peace. It only implies that we are blaming larger socio-economic problems on religion. Associating a person solely with her/his religion essentially takes away their agency. The people are not offered any choice; they either become Hindus or Parsis and targets of attack. Again, Sen is not denying religion; he is only saying that our identities are way more complicated than just religion. Religion is important, but only a part of it. He further adds, that this kind of simplification also denies the complications within the religion.

Based on the evidence that we encountered earlier, Sir Francis Mudie like many of his contemporaries was a reductionist who firmly refused to see beyond stroppy identities. By using Sen’s arguments as a basis we can show how Jinnah’s vision was way too layered and sophisticated for Mudie to comprehend.

Jinnah wanted a unique Muslim identity and space, but homogeneity was never his goal. There is a fundamental difference between the two. Seeking Muslim identity never meant demonizing others. Jinnah wanted to find Muslim voice in India, not a voice to hate Hindus. Finding an identity, ideally, is always a non-violent exercise. It is a reiteration of one’s individuality and ensuring that it doesn’t get lost in homogeneity. Jinnah did not want Muslims to become homogenous cogs in the Indian system, but for them to have their voice. Unfortunately, seeking identity can often be misconstrued as being divisive. This, in turn, leads to the formation of singular, hostile identities, something we see Mudie doing continuously.

While Mudie was well-intentioned he could never differentiate between identity and homogeneity. He lauds homogeneity without realizing that religious identities are never homogenous anyway. He reduced non-Muslims to singularity and naturally linked them with aggression. Unwittingly, he also denied Muslims of
any agency by reducing them as perennial victims. Despite his political maturity, exhaustive diplomatic experience, he reduced India to a space of Hindu/Muslim conflict.

This was a quintessential colonial gaffe. Since the British often did not understand India’s culture and customs, they infantilized the natives. As a result, they reduced the nation to bunch of children who fight with each other and some kids are bullies. Sadly, this view of the colonized often affects them and they internalize it. As Edward Said elaborates in his seminal book *Orientalism*, colonial views of the native directly affects and shapes their identities. Natives, who have suffered cultural humiliation, internalize it.

As mentioned earlier, it becomes important to now look at the larger implications of his singular view and the ways in which it affected Punjab. His refugee settlement policies were completely overshadowed by his skewed views on religion. He was ineffective in many ways to reduce the partition carnage. The Lyallpur case is a classic example of viewing competence as a colonial gift and completely negating the cooperation of the masses. Infantilising the natives was embedded so deeply within his conscience that he felt very little empathy for the loss of innocent lives. It is important to remember that his compassion for Muslims was genuine, but he did not understand the complications of Muslim identity, he was their white saviour.

Even though this sounds like a sweeping generalization, his writings reveal a black and white imagery of the partition. He repeatedly calls the Hindus as crafty, violent, manipulative and plain evil, which are perfectly capable of murdering their own children under the garb of protection and caste. The Muslims are helpless, oppressed and voiceless whom the colonial masters had saved. His pro-League stance certainly provoked Nehru, and won him the favours of Jinnah. In him, Jinnah had hoped to find a governor who would prioritize Muslim interests.

Mudie did indeed do that, but his understanding of Muslim interest was different from Jinnah’s. As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak points out in her seminal essay that the colonial view of the “Third World” is fraught in the idea that they are, “….distant cultures, exploited but with rich intact heritages waiting to be recovered, interpreted and circularized in English.” (1985). What Spivak reiterates here are the deep-seated Colonial processes of othering where the natives had to be saved and protected from each other. It’s not that Mudie did not understand that identities are complex processes; he just assumed he had understood that quintessential Islamic identity in India was an anti-Hindu stand. Jinnah had seen him as an ally and he couldn’t have predicted how Mudie’s limited worldview would deeply affect Pakistan.

There is another important evidence (or lack of it) that further shows how Mudie had misinterpreted Jinnah’s idea of Pakistan. Jinnah gave very short replies to Mudie’s long letters outlining his anti-Hindu stand. It is Jinnah’s silence that is
It is equally important to study gaps and silences in the archival data in order to get a complete picture of events. Silences can say a lot. (Arondekar, 2005 pp 10-27). As mentioned throughout the piece, Jinnah never participated in Mudie’s anti Hindu rants and to his personal attacks against Gandhi. Clearly, Jinnah neither believed in this nor did he want to be a party to such slander.

In short, Jinnah, saw a nation where unique identity was a composite of many things. Mudie saw his view as a nation free of all Hindus and Sikhs. The moral canvas of refugee resettlement in Punjab is etched in ambivalence, and it continued that way for a long time. As the evidence so far suggests, Mudie truly had no idea about Hinduism. In a letter to Maurice Hellettsumming up the partition, he wrote “Hindus will not rule India. There is provincialism, Bengal, Punjab, Andhra and South. I see no solution.” Clearly, he equated Hindus with whatever he witnessed in Bihar and UP, completely denying how different Hinduism was in other parts of India. Unfortunately, many Hindus have internalized the Colonial view today, but again, we will not fall in the trap of singularity, and see how reductionism is resisted in every step, something we witness in India almost every day.
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