Living is information processing: from molecules to global systems.

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Abstract

We extend the concept that life is an informational phenomenon, at every level of organisation, from molecules to the global ecological system. According to this thesis: (a) living is information processing, in which memory is maintained by both molecular states and ecological states as well as the more obvious nucleic acid coding; (b) this information processing has one overall function - to perpetuate itself; and (c) the processing method is filtration (cognition) of, and synthesis of, information at lower levels to appear at higher levels in complex systems (emergence). We show how information patterns, are united by the creation of mutual context, generating persistent consequences, to result in ‘functional information’. This constructive process forms arbitrarily large complexes of information, the combined effects of which include the functions of life. Molecules and simple organisms have already been measured in terms of functional information content; we show how quantification may be extended to each level of organisation up to the ecological. In terms of a computer analogy, life is both the data and the program and its biochemical structure is the way the information is embodied. This idea supports the seamless integration of life at all scales with the physical universe. The innovation reported here is essentially to integrate these ideas, basing information on the ‘general definition’ of information, rather than simply the statistics of information, thereby explaining how functional information operates throughout life.

Keywords: complex system; entropy; biocomplexity; evolution; network.
1 Introduction: what is life?

The question ‘what is life’ is one of the oldest in philosophy, deeply mysterious and still fascinating. Not only is it fundamental to biology, it has challenged and extended physics, metaphysics, the human sciences of medicine and psychology, the arts and even spiritual thinking. But efforts to answer the question have generally been constrained by disciplinary boundaries or within an organizational scale of life, leading to several apparently separate answers. The aim of this paper is to unite these by considering life as a whole, simultaneously at every organizational level (from molecule to global ecosystem). This integration uses the concept of life as information processing for a unifying principle.

During the second half of the 20th century, the paradigm that ‘life is chemistry’ (Kornberg, 1991) was especially influential in understanding living processes at the sub-cellular level. As increasingly complicated networks of molecular interactions were recognised, the need for a formal understanding of their organizational structures developed into systems biology, which now extends beyond the cell (Kohl et al., 2010). At the same time, but largely unrelated, theoretical ecology developed into a form of cybernetics: the study of self-regulating systems, moving chemical substances through networks of populations and communities. The complex networks of the cell’s biochemistry were paralleled by complex webs of interactions among organisms: the elaborate complexities of the ‘-omics’ were matched by those of biodiversity as we realised that the estimated 15 million species (8.7 million eukaryotic (Mora et al., 2011) plus 6 million prokaryotic (Curtis et al., 2002)) are all connected to one-another in networks of community interactions. Observing that these complex networks may be two manifestations of a common feature of life, we now propose a unifying model in which interactions among molecules, cells, organisms and populations all amount to information processing through a hierarchy of functional networks - molecules in cells, cells in organisms and organisms in communities, which compose the biosphere. This model, which extends recent developments in systems biology (Maus et al., 2011) is intended to integrate through all life over its entire history.

Biologists know that information is crucial to life, pointing to its role in DNA for maintaining the design of organisms over repeated generations and an understanding of information in protein structure has a long history (see e.g. Yockey et al., 1958). A cybernetic view goes further to claim that information processing, carried out in the medium of biological chemistry, is what life actually is. By information processing we mean any logical combination of information having the result of producing information and we shorten this to ‘computation’. The idea that ‘living is computing’, pioneered by theorists such as Galtin (1972) has been popularised by Bray (1995, 2009), but so far, it has been contained within cellular biochemistry (with
computation by neural networks the obvious exception). Our aim is to show how well the whole of life can be viewed in this way as an integrated information processing system: all cells working together. This view seamlessly connects with the concept of information as one of three elemental components of existence (with space/time and matter/energy) which has grown within physics over the past several decades, accompanied by a new philosophical position which places information at the core of determining reality (termed ‘Informational Structural Realism’ by Floridi (2003)). Every aspect of life may be regarded as a product and elaboration of the physical world, clearly made of the same matter and energy, ordered in space and time as is every physical system. What makes life special is not the material brought together to take part in living, it is the functional information that orders matter into physical structures and directs intricate processes into self-maintaining and reproducing complexes. In the information model of life, this definitive process (termed autopoiesis by Maturana and Varela (1980) consists of a system of structural elements continually replacing themselves to maintain the living system by following a program of instructions that both makes their information-rich structure and is instantiated within it. Significantly, this fundamental feature of life is true at every organizational scale, not only at the cellular level.

2 Information Concepts

According to the ‘diaphoric definition of data’ (Floridi, 2003, 2005), a binary bit (the unit of information) is a single difference. For example, a digital monochrome image of $k$-pixels instantiates no more than $k - 1$ differences. When the image carries a meaningful picture, it instantiates fewer than the maximum number of differences, so can be compressed by recording only the differences where black changes to white. The maximally compressed image instantiates $k - n$ bits ($n \geq 1$) and this is termed the Algorithmic Information Content (AIC) (Chaitin, 1990). The same applies not just to representations, such as images, but to real physical objects: a compressible pattern of differences makes an object what it is. This refers not to a description, but to the physical object itself, giving a definition of physical information as a pattern of difference: the algorithmic information embodied by an object so as to give it form. Information in this sense, selects the elementary particles of the object and specifies the locations of these in space and time (under quantum-theoretic constraints). The minimum description of the object is the AIC embodied in both this physical configuration of particles and the nature of each (Pauli’s exclusion principle ensures these are different). On a technical note, AIC is known not to be strictly computable (Li and Vitányi, 2008), but an effective substitute is available in the Computable Information Content for empirical studies needing to compute it (see e.g. Menconi, 2005).
For most practical purposes, in describing an object, we would consider higher levels of abstraction, such as a pattern of atoms, molecules, cells, tissues, or components, etc. Again, for most practical purposes, we are concerned not with the total AIC instantiated in an object, but with the functional information content (FIC), which is the part of AIC which can cause a persistent change of information in any part of the system. As an illustration, two seemingly identical metal keys will be different in detail (at the small scale), but may both function to open the same lock: their functional information defines their shape as fitting the lock. This is obviously pertinent to biology through the lock and key analogy of messenger molecules, but also describes functional equivalence among all kinds of biological molecules; among cells of the same type and state in the body; and among organisms of the same function in an ecosystem. FIC can be quantified, as demonstrated at the nucleotide level by Jiang and Xu (2010), who calculated it as the minimal amount of genomic information needed to construct a particular organism. We hope to apply this idea to structures of biological information, other than the genetic.

In the field of Biosemiotics, pieces of functional information are regarded as symbols (see Favareau, 2009), but we wish to focus on the functioning of information, rather than its communication. For this, we take the idea of function from Szostak (2003), seeing it as what makes systems, including biological ones, operate, in the sense of an operational explanation of function (Neander, 2011). The definition of ‘function’ has been debated among philosophers for several decades and deserves some attention here. Cummins (1975) proposed that function is an objective account of the contribution of a system component to the ‘capacity’ of the system. Crucially, for Cummins, the capacity (meaning capability) of a system is explained in terms of the capacities of the components it contains, and how they are organised. This concept explicitly matches the understanding that functional information is to be found in the component parts and the way they are organised into a whole. But it has been criticised, especially for its permitting what appear to be unintended consequences as functions (a frequently cited example being that dirt in a pipe may ‘function’ as a valve (Griffiths, 1993)). One of the solutions to this, at least for organisms, is to recognise that natural selection tends to eliminate potential functions of components if they do not contribute to the biological fitness of the system of which they are a part. This qualification was taken up by Neander (1991), by developing a biologically-based etiological theory. Whilst appealing, this cannot be used for all biological systems, such as ecological communities, for which evolution by natural selection has not been established, so to be general, we are forced back to the systemic theories of function. However, Darwin’s theory is a special case of a more general principle of selection in which the attribute of persistence is the superset of biological fitness (e.g. Kauffman, 1993). Thus we tentatively offer a definition of function that...
is systemic and in the spirit of established etiological definitions, but not reliant on Darwin’s theory. It is
that any attribute A of a component C of a system S that causes an effect E such that S persists longer or in
a wider range of conditions than without it, is a functional attribute of C. Then the functional information
instantiated by C is that which establishes A, leading to the persistence in form of S, hence the persistence
of information instantiated by S.

Szostak’s (2003) mathematically amenable definition allows for a quantification of the effectiveness
with which information enables a system to perform non-random actions; at least one of which will be
self-replication. From here on, we shall use the general term ‘effective information’ for that which causes
a persistent change, so has an effect in the wider system and reserve the term ‘functional information’ for
effective information which plays a role in supporting life. We note that at the specifically nucleotide level,
since evolution selects for function, non-functional information will be lost from biological systems over
evolutionary time (this was demonstrated by Schneider’s (2000) ‘evolutionary program’). However, non-
functional information is continually introduced by random processes, especially at higher (e.g. ecological)
levels, so non-functional ‘noise’ may be expected and should be discounted in the quantification of FIC.

We take as axiomatic that information is instantiated in matter through the particular arrangement of
its components in space and time. This arrangement defines a unique relationship among the components,
which can only instantiate information if it is stable and therefore persists as a configuration in space over
a line in time. When two or more such configurations are brought into association, there is a combined
arrangement, which if persistent, also instantiates information: that of both components plus that of their
association. The Shannon information (Shannon, 1948) of the combined configuration is given by the prod-
uct of probabilities of each component configuration (less any mutual information). Thus the ‘surprise’ in
finding this new whole is in general greater than that for each of its component parts. Nested construction of
increasingly complicated configurations of matter may proceed this way and thereby constitute an increase
in information content in the Shannon sense (Shannon, 1948). Most significantly, when configurations
combine into stable forms, they do so by presenting context for one another: the information of each is
functional information for the other, enabling greater function than that of the sum of parts.

The functional meaning of information was defined conceptually by MacKay (1969) who referred to
information as “a distinction that makes a difference” and later Bateson (1972) more famously called in-
formation “a difference that makes a difference”, this idea was then taken up by Hopfield (1994). In this
interpretation, information is defined through its interaction with something (including other information)
to create a non-random effect, hence it is context dependent. Bates (2005), quoting earlier works, defines
information as: “the pattern of organization of matter and energy”. This definition peculiarly addresses effective information. Patterns of organization are the alternative to randomness: patterns show either order (characterised by symmetry) or complexity (broken symmetry). Schrödinger (1944) realised that symmetrical order was insufficient to account for the genetic information coding life, concluding that it must be in some aperiodic (non-symmetrical) molecule (well before the discovery of DNA). The required organized aperiodicity is commonly known as ‘complexity’; a defining characteristic of which is a high capacity for effective information. Adami et al. (2000) subsequently showed how all biological systems are complex systems in this scientific sense.

These concepts are brought together in Figure 1 which shows three levels of information concept in the formation of life. On level 1, physical information is understood as the result of an improbable (following Shannon’s insight) and persistent configuration of energy and/or matter in space and time. In level 2, effective information is defined through consequence: a contextual relation is made among at least two such configurations (now considered as information and termed ‘infons’). This synthesis through mutual context is exemplified by a lock and key enzyme interaction. Level 3 takes this further to capture the idea that a large number of contextual interactions structure an assembly of infons into a complex system; exemplified by a molecular network inside a cell. Not shown is the hierarchical concept that such systems can be the component parts of super-systems, enabling an unbounded construction of nested complexity, in which information at higher levels, but not present at lower levels, can be defined and measured as emergent (Gershenson and Fernández, 2012). That is the way life appears under observation, exemplified by the notional hierarchy in figure 2 and table 1.
Figure 1: Three levels of information concept explained in the text: at level 1, information is a pattern of difference; at level 2, information becomes effective through context and at level 3, ‘packages’ of effective information combine, affecting one another to form a complex system that computes.
2.1 Order from disorder: self-assembling structures

According to statistical mechanics, the organization of a system is the result of filtering, i.e. selecting a particular configuration of system component states from all possible configurations and this filtering is equivalent to investing the system with information, in the Shannon sense (Shannon, 1948) of reducing the probability of its configuration. When the resulting organization causes sustainable self-assembly, using active filtration from the wider environment, the system may be said to live.

It is most parsimonious to assume that the components of matter needed to constitute living organisms were originally distributed in perfect randomness (disorder). Apparently, life alone creates life, but before it appeared for the first time, individually persistent (non-transitory) stages of ordering among collections of molecular components must have occurred. It is broadly understood that this develops through the spontaneous emergence of ‘order out of chaos’ (von Foerster, 1960; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984; Kauffman, 1993)—in which chaos then referred to disordered randomness. This natural evolutionary phenomenon, which obeys the second law of thermodynamics, is very general. It amounts to the selection of more stable configurations from a set of random configurations, simply by virtue of their stability conferring greater persistence. Darwin’s evolution by natural selection is a particular instance of this process, which also applies to resonance phenomena and crystal formation.

Life orders matter, but differs from a crystal in the following critical respects: (a) life is a dynamic pattern not a static one; (b) it is not regular, but rather is complex, meaning that it cannot be summarized in a short piece of information and (c) it manipulates its environment so as to make its persistence more likely. The vortex (e.g. a whirlpool) is an often cited example of a non-living system which displays some of these properties. It maintains itself as a dynamic pattern of matter, even though its constituent parts are constantly changing: molecules which pass through in a moment are replaced by others, but the pattern and therefore the structure-forming information is maintained. This is an example of a ‘dissipative structure’ defined and recognized as self-organizing by Prigogine (1977). By continually exchanging matter and energy with their environment, these dynamic structures are able to continually ‘dissipate’ entropy, with the effect of concentrating information. This information is instantiated in the form of the structure. Crucially the essence of these dissipative systems is organizational information, not substance, and the information they maintain has the special property of being that which is necessary for the self-maintenance.

Given the required material components and thermodynamic conditions, we see that information in the form of a pattern in matter can emerge spontaneously and maintain itself as long as these conditions allow. The next step is to ask if it can also create the components and maintain the conditions it needs to
do this in a changing environment. If any pattern can achieve that feat, then it will be able to reproduce and ensure its persistence far longer than thermodynamics would otherwise allow. The ability of a system (any arrangement of matter) to remake itself is termed autopoiesis and this has been identified as one of the two necessary capabilities of anything living (Maturana and Varela, 1980). The other is cognition, more precisely, the detection and selection of particular elements from an environment of many random elements, which is a kind of information processing. Bitbol and Luisi (2004) showed that autopoiesis and cognition are separately necessary conditions for life, not inseparably linked as apparently first thought by Maturana and Varela (1980). They illustrated their point with reference to the autopoietic fatty acid cells, which Zepik et al. (2001) showed to achieve reproduction and self-maintenance by homeostatic processes autonomously generated from within. From this work, it became clear that for a system to live, it must have at least the following three properties: autopoiesis, cognition and an unbroken boundary to define its limits (Bitbol and Luisi, 2004); this latter stops the ingredients of life from diffusing apart, rendering life’s chemical reactions too rare to work as a whole. In practice, all known living systems are cellular and indeed, the cell tegument has never been broken since the beginning of life—it has only been divided by repeated fission. Division among organisms is just an elaboration of division among cells. In this sense all life from its beginning, is unified as a set of cells, related through replication; all creating order from disorder, by cognition and autopoiesis.

The result of this long history of accumulating functional information in a population of diverging cell lines is illustrated in Figure 2 where the major developments are illustrated. By specializing into specific types, cells have found ways to more effectively live: colonies of specialist cells forming into the distinct tissues of separate organisms, organized into ecological communities, interacting, to the point of regulating the earth’s geochemistry through a homeostatic network. All of this amounts to information processing—selecting molecules from the environment, ordering matter and controlling flows of matter and energy. The information needed to perform these functions is found distributed among the molecules within every cell: not just in nucleotides, but in all the proteins and messenger molecules, their interactions and locations in space. However, seeing life as a whole in space and time, from the first single cell to all extant life, implies an integrated system, for which hierarchical levels represent merely observed abstractions of organisational structure (see Salthe, 1985). Considering the whole living system from notional levels of biochemistry at the bottom to global ecosystem at the top, we may regard all but one of the levels in table 1 to be a model, the single exception being organisation into cells. Hierarchy theory recognises constraints imposed by higher

1Though some biologists may include viruses.
levels on the lower, but also the constraint of possibilities from lower levels upwards. We understand the
need for bounded cells as one of those possibility constraints and therefore see cells as the one exception -
they are not merely a model level but one in the reality of life’s organisation.

2.2 Biological systems as effective information

It is evident that the minimum functional information needed to constitute life is large (the smallest non-
virus functional information content calculated so far is $2.86 \times 10^6$ bits for *Holartic*ca (Jiang and Xu, 2010)).

By current consensus, life emerged as an entropy-dissipating pattern which created and maintained a bound-
dary through which trapped molecules were able to selectively interact with the wider environment (Mo-
rowitz, 1992; Smith and Morowitz, 2004). This cognitively filtering system also reproduced itself by growth
and fission and all extant life followed via evolution (Robertson and Joyce, 2010). The resulting proto-cell
was a complex dynamic system in which information was held, not just in the component molecules, but
also in the interactions among them. These interactions instantiated functional information because the
molecules gave context to each other, thereby filtering out specifically functional interactions from the
whole range of possibilities.

The cytoplasmic contents of cells are spatially structured so that the time and place of interaction is a
necessary determinant of their effect. Because molecular components are distributed in a specific spatial
pattern, their collective behavior is extended to form regions of coordinated, but different action over space.
This instantiates functional information in spatial relations so that simple unitary systems (e.g. enzyme in-
teractions) combine to exhibit complex behaviors which appear to be the product of more complicated com-
ponents. The apparently spontaneous emergence of new information (Gershenson and Fernández, 2012),
is in fact the revelation of that spatio-temporal information already present in the distribution of compo-
nents and the network of signaling paths among them (a phenomenon first described by Turing, 1952). Any
spatio-temporal information (coding the positions of system elements in time and space) that contributes to
the emergent behaviors of the whole system, is effective information, and in life this is maintained by au-
topoiesis. When a more complicated system is created from simple units in this way, it results in a new unit,
the combination of these being the next tier in an hierarchy of complexity. It is by this nested hierarchical
construction that the enormously complex machinery of life is brought into being.

Information is therefore not just stored in nucleotides: it is the whole biological system that embodies
effective information, hence biocomplexity as a whole is the storage of effective information in living na-
ture. Valentine (2003a) realised this and emphasised that biological complexity exists as a set of hierarchical
levels, as we illustrate in table 1 (adapted from Farnsworth et al. (2012)). Spontaneous creation of effective information from complex order is a signature property of such hierarchies: every level spontaneously emerges from the one below (Adami et al., 2000; Lorenz et al., 2011) - all the way up to global ecosystems. For this reason, even a complete description of genetic information fails to account for the full complement of effective information in life, which is why seed-banks and zoos are no substitute for community conservation, as noted intuitively by Lee (2004) and Cowling et al. (2004). Indeed, ‘living information’ is only fully instantiated in dynamic, active systems capable of flexibly responding to environmental conditions. A common example is the gene-regulatory network, which apparently extracts maximum autopoietic complexity by functioning near criticality (Balleza et al., 2008), where information content is maximised (Gershenson and Fernández, 2012).

2.3 Quantifying Functional Information

Farnsworth et al. (2012) classified the total information content of any system into two distinct components: 

\[ I_{\text{tot}} = I_F + I_R, \]

where \( I_F \) is the functional information and \( I_R \) is the random information. Each of these terms can be quantified by the Algorithmic Information Content (Chaitin, 1990) if the term can be isolated. \( I_F \) could, in principle, be quantified by the ‘Effective Complexity’ (Gell-Mann and Lloyd, 1996, 2003), defined as the minimum description length of regularities, but only given prior knowledge about the regularities (see McAllister, 2003, for an expansion of this criticism). To describe life as information, we need a way to identify \( I_F \) without such prior knowledge, recognising that effect only results from the interaction of information and its context. In the special case of genomes, this is relatively trivial since almost all the information present is functional (Schneider, 2000). For quantification, Jiang and Xu (2010) defined ‘effective information’ as that part of the genome which is the minimum needed to reconstruct the organism. This meant estimating the functional (coding) fraction of the genome and (manually) compressing it to form the equivalent Algorithmic Information Content. In an application of Boltzmann’s entropy concept at the genetic level, Szostak (2003) defined ‘functional information’, in terms of a gene string, as \(- \log_2 \) of the probability that a random sequence will “encode a molecule with greater than any given degree of function” - in other words a design brief, without implying a designer. In the case of genes, this ‘function’ may be thought of as the biochemical activity (for example a digestive enzyme’s catalytic rate) of whatever molecule is produced from reading the nucleotide sequence. This design-brief concept was developed to the ecosystem level of organisation by Farnsworth et al. (2012), who interpreted it as a set of ecological functions and related functioning to the information content of food-web networks.
3 The natural history of information processing

We have argued that life is a dynamic process of filtering and communicating information. The processing of information (computation) occurs in all cases of changing, combining and directing information. Thus computation is a natural, continuous and ubiquitous process (see Denning (2007)). However, it is important to distinguish between (a) universal computing, which can represent any computation in symbols that may be 'programmed' and (b) fixed computing in which the hardware and software are interdependent, so that only a narrow range of computational tasks may be performed (this point is discussed by Hopfield (1994)). Life is very much in the latter category (though since the brain is one of its products, this is not universally the case). Complex system computation is now a well established model in behavioral ecology, describing many aspects of social organization (reviewed by Camazine et al. 2001). Other kinds of computation performed by life include information replication, ordering and re-ordering of form and cybernetic system control, each of which will be briefly illustrated below. In each case, computation occurs on a distributed network (Gershenson, 2010), rather than through the linear Von-Neumann architecture of the familiar digital computer. Whether looking at molecular networks or ecological communities, we see that natural computation is composed of cybernetic feedback loops arranged functionally so that the system gains in persistence. That these loops exist is not a surprise, since any random interconnection of quantities may contain loops and many physical processes do. As control circuits they may generate positive feedback, often leading to quick destruction, or negative feedback leading to stability, and hence more likely to persist in their changing environment. In fact, since control of this kind enhances persistence, natural selection favours cybernetic systems (with negative feedback) above others and we may find this kind of computation practically inevitable. However, a network solely composed of negative feedback fixes on a particular equilibrium, so may be insufficiently flexible to perform the processes of life (Kauffman, 1993). Since a mix of positive and negative feedback loops can create a dynamic and adaptable system of 'state-cycles' in the narrow 'critical' regime between catastrophe and order (exemplified by random Boolean networks with high link densities) this has been proposed as an essential feature of living systems by Kauffman (1993) and we now look for evidence of these in significant developments of biological organisation (Figure 2).

3.1 Computing through cell-signaling networks

If living is the self-sustaining coordination of chemical reactions, does this suggest a coordinating manager? The nucleus was once thought to be the ‘command centre’ of the eukaryotic cell, but observations of cells behaving normally for months after enucleation show that the information processing needed for most
Molecules organise into auto-catalytic cycles.
Development of tegument, division and reproduction.
Organised internal complexity develops.
Inter-cell signalling and differentiation.
Internal structures with differentiated functions; nuclear mitosis.
Cell specialisation turns to obligate symbiosis; organisation of body-plan.
Trophic levels and cybernetic control systems operate through population dynamics.

Figure 2: Hierarchical self-assembly of complex systems: the increase in computational complexity through the history of life on earth, often associated with a major transition e.g. from prokaryotic to eukaryotic life-forms, or the development of cell-signalling networks or ecological networks. Note that concentric rings indicate expansion of complexity, rather than a chronological sequence: all inner layers exist concurrently at each level.
activities is cytoplasmic (Goldman et al., 1973). It would be better to think of the nucleus as the ‘hard
disk’ of the cell, since here (for the human) the ‘blueprints’ for at least 47 thousand different proteins
(Orchard et al., 2005) are stored and transcribed, together with editable instructions about when to make
them. The ‘algorithms of living’ are run on these proteins which act in ways analogous to transistors and
other electronic components, in complex networks, as described by Butler et al. (1998).

The model of cellular information processing as analogue computation (e.g. Rodbell (1995)) was in-
spired by the cybernetic theory of Norbert Wiener (1948). In this model, external chemical messages (first
messengers) are first ‘discriminated’ (by the receptor) then ‘transduced’ (by a G protein) and finally ampli-
fied (by an effector enzyme) to produce an intracellular signal (the second messenger)—a sequence that can
be summarized as perception. This second signal typically initiates a complex sequence of interconnected
changes which may alter the internal chemistry of the cell, change the response to other first messengers,
and even selectively alter gene expression (Cairns et al., 1988). Such cascades of molecular response form
dynamic networks that carry and process information (Lehn, 1990), analogous to artificial neural networks.
Chemical switches are implemented by the allostery of proteins, especially enzymes, acting as ‘transis-
tors’ in the network circuitry (Bray, 1995). Furthermore, activated proteins do not simply diffuse to collide
with their targets. Cytoplasm is a well organized and densely crowded environment in which the reaction
cascades are localized by ‘scaffold’ proteins, reminiscent of the electronic circuit board. For example, the
protein kinase enzyme, type II PKA may be fixed to either the plasma membrane, the cytoskeleton, secre-
tory granules, or the nuclear membrane by anchoring proteins (Scott and Carr, 1992). The effect is not
only to position this signaling protein close to its intended target but also to determine the local molecular
environment (context) which may profoundly influence the effect. Such protein networks are built and re-
paired following the DNA blueprint, which as we have just noted, may itself be altered by the cytoplasmic
computation. Thus, proteins dynamically send, receive and respond to informational signals in complex
and dynamically changing networks of both negative and positive feedback, which, collectively interacting
with stored DNA-information, form the behavior of the cell and this is readily interpreted as molecular
computation.

3.2 Replicating information

Biological reproduction is an information transfer (communication) phenomenon, from parent(s) as the
transmitter to daughter(s) as the receiver. This biological communication requires a high standard of ac-
curacy, since the information being transmitted is very nearly all functional (Schneider, 2000). Given this
view of reproduction as efficient semantic communication, it was a surprise to realise that the length of
the nuclear genome bears no relation to organism complexity (Gregory, 2001; Valentine, 2003a). Since
the complexity of a system can be defined as the minimum amount of information needed to describe (or
reproduce) it, one possible reason is that species differ in the amount of error-mitigating repetition their
genomes carry. As well as this, the DNA of almost all organisms harbours a zoo of information parasites
(selfish DNA - Orgel and Crick (1980)) and their remnants, making up a large part of what was historically
referred to as ‘junk DNA’ when its function was unknown. Transposable elements form the majority of
this repetitive information (Wessler, 2006). It is now thought that many of these ‘transposons’ originated
as endogenised retro-viruses (Bowen and Jordan, 2002): parasites that have been co-opted into functional
symbiosis under regulation by the host (Veitia and Bottani, 2009). This legacy of non-host information
accounts for a large part of the huge variation in genome size among eukaryotes, where multiple copies
of information parasites are found. However, the relationship between nuclear genome size and organism
complexity is still an open question.

Given our understanding of emergence and the formation of functional information from mutual context,
we can see that not all of the functional information is to be found in nuclear DNA. So whilst physically,
it is the genes that are replicated in biological reproduction, context-dependent relationships among them
constitutes functional information that is carried along with the replication. Gene regulatory networks
(GRNs) (Davidson and Levin, 2005) are the most significant information complexes to extend beyond
nuclear DNA and are composed of context-dependent relationships among infons, rich in both negative
and positive feedback. Again, these networks are readily modeled as computational systems (Kravchenko-
Balasha et al., 2012) and their role in determining body-plan through epigenetic phenomena points to a
possible correlation between GRN complexity (hence information content) and organism complexity.

3.3 The eukaryotic revolution

Following pioneering work by Margulis (1970), endosymbiosis is the front-running theory explaining the
origin of eukaryotic cells and this well illustrates the increase of function brought about through the creation
of mutual context among infons (level 2 in Figure 1). The advantage of eukarotic cells over prokaryotic
is the specialisation of metabolic, anabolic and reproductive machinery. The component parts collectively
become more efficient by (a) individually concentrating on a smaller task and (b) sharing the products.
The fundamental reason this narrowing of tasks improves effectiveness is that it reduces the information
requirement for performing all necessary tasks. If we think of a cell as a machine performing \( n \) processes;
it needs storage capacity enough to instantiate the algorithms for all $n$ tasks. Prokaryotic cells have rather limited storage capacity (determined by their AIC), so cannot afford a very sophisticated algorithm for every task they have to perform - they are limited in effectiveness by their information capacity limit. When a cell incorporates others, it increases its storage capacity and permits a distribution of tasks among specialist components, each of which can devote the whole of their limited storage capacity to carrying a sophisticated and efficient algorithm for a single task. It is also necessary to include the communications and sharing among the specialist components, so some algorithm space is devoted to this. The exchange among individual components forms a network of control computation, which on a larger scale constitutes a complex system (level 3 in Figure 1).

3.4 Cell types and body-plan complexity

Information's role in ordering of form is most apparent in the building of multi-cellular organisms. Cells come in a large variety of forms, with hierarchical morphotype structure and developmental lineages (Valentine, 2003a). The number of distinct cell types in a single organism is taken as an indicator of its complexity (Carroll, 2001) and varies among metazoan phyla from 3 (Myxozoa) to 210 (human) having steadily increased through evolutionary time (Valentine et al., 1994). This indicates a gradual accumulation of biological complexity, and therefore functional information, as life-forms have radiated and cell specialisation has apparently increased. Despite that, Hinegardner and Engelberg (1983) concluded that "evolution since the Cambrian appears to have involved few major increases in biological complexity", as Valentine (1994) argued, the basic body-plans of all extant phyla were established by the end of the Cambrian explosion (520 My ago). The apparent contradiction may be explained by proliferating patterns of gene expression, rather than the creation of new genes; this being one of the central hypotheses of evolutionary development biology (see Valentine, 2003b). Such proliferation of patterns and the consequent radiation of organism-forms is the result of ordering and re-ordering of functional information. Different cell-types are created by regulating the expression of different genes in the total genome—simpler organisms suppress the expression of a higher proportion of their developmental genes than do complex ones (Davidson, 2001). Thus, the morphological complexity of an organism is determined by the regulatory machinery which selects genetic expression during the development of an organism. The number of cell types is one computed 'output' of gene regulatory networks and gives a very rough indication of functional information content. A trend in modeling body-plan regulatory networks, represents them in a way analogous to artificial neural networks (Geard and Wiles, 2005), clearly interpreting morphogenesis as computation. This suggests a means of
quantifying the functional information of body plans by experimentally (*in silico*) examining variants of formative gene-networks and recording the resulting morphometric diversity.

### 3.5 Cybernetic computation by ecological communities

Darwin’s metaphor of a ‘tangled bank’ suggests a bewildering complex of interactions among whole organisms (Montoya et al., 2006), but natural computation is rarely, if ever, explicit in ecological models. Information processing in ecological communities is less clear than in cells and organisms because ecosystems usually lack obvious boundaries and their functions are usually considered, not at the system level, but at the population level, where cybernetic control is not apparent. However, some recent developments pave the way for this to change; both in describing the information content of communities and in understanding them as self-regulating complex systems.

The study of biodiversity provides a starting point to finding the functional information content at the ecological level. Using the idea that difference is the basis of information (Floridi, 2005), diversity (which by definition counts total difference) becomes a measure of information content. Traditionally, biodiversity describes the number of different species and perhaps the evenness of their abundances in an ecological assembly, using metrics inspired by Shannon’s information theory (see Magurran, 2004). More recently, broader definitions recognize diversity at every level in the biological hierarchy (table 1), and ecologists may now refer to genetic and functional diversity as equally necessary for specifying biodiversity (Lyashevska and Farnsworth, 2012). Ecological communities can be regarded as the vaults of information capital, in the form of molecular structures; networks and pathways; cell types; tissues and organs, whole organisms and community interactions (Farnsworth et al., 2012). However, ecologists still refer to organizational scale through informal terms: for example ‘alpha’ and ‘beta’ diversity, which are arbitrarily defined phenomena of classification (Tuomisto, 2010) over probability distributions (McGill, 2011; Nekola and White, 1999).

Whilst hierarchical nesting of complex systems is explicitly recognised by multi-level modelling in subcellular biology, the strength of formal description this provides has yet to enter ecology (see Faeder, 2011).

Descriptive approaches can be developed into conceptual models by changing the focus towards the network through which organisms interact (as in Norton and Ulanowicz, 1992). The basic components for such models are available in the special case of predator-prey interactions (e.g. Dunne et al., 2002) (though models of other material and informational – e.g. genetic – flows are less well developed). Given a network description such as a food-web, Farnsworth et al. (2012) showed how the functional information approach may be applied at the ecological level. They systematically dismantled a network model of the Northeast
Atlantic fish community, at each stage measuring its productivity, to find a relationship between complexity and function, which provided a measure of the marginal change in function with network (algorithmic) information content. Food-webs are but a partial description of ecosystems, which necessarily include chemical, energy and information flows. Being relatively simpler, microbial networks are more amenable to this fuller description. The recent development of functional and genetic network models in microbial ecology (e.g. Zhou et al., 2010) gives us a stepping stone between sub-cellular networks and community level computation. Significantly, microbial colonies preceded the close association of eukaryotic cells to form multi-cellular organisms Lepot et al. (2008), yet specialisations among microbe species imply the same need for self-regulating interactions as is found in organismal physiology. By definition, an isolated microbial community must be autopoietic and as specialisation among constituent species develops, so must flows of coordinating information work to compute the community, via complex-system emergence.

3.6 Information processing as an integrated whole.

The computation performed by ecological networks is both broader and narrower than that of a Turing machine (a system following a sequence of logical operations defined by Turing, 1936). It is broader because inputs are processed continuously, the outputs are produced continuously and because processing is sensitive to the environment (in a Turing machine, processing is blind to all but the initial inputs until a halt condition is reached, releasing the output). It is narrower because the computation is equivalent to running a particular model: a model of the system under control, following the injunction of Conant and Ashby (1970), that “Every good regulator of a system must be a model of that system”. Interactions between the biotic and abiotic spheres of the ecosystem are regulated by controls on chemical flows, driven by the processing of materials by life in aggregate: the sum of individual selection and processing actions amounts to a regulation of the whole ecosystem. Including the flows of nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus in ecological network analysis (e.g. Ulanowicz and Baird, 1999) takes us a step closer to the biochemical analogy of within-cell computation (Ulanowicz, 1980). Since molecules continually flow through ecosystems, just as they do in the cell, we can identify the process of constant renewal of ecosystem structure (the network) as autopoiesis, this time referring to all life in aggregate. The phenomenon of constant renewal by recycling material, driven by transforming high to low entropy energy, accumulated over all life on earth, is the foundation of the Gaia hypothesis (Lovelock and Margulis, 1974). The total of global ecological processes may be interpreted as a network computer, whose input is the physical and chemical environment of the planet and the output is a computed adjustment of these to maintain equilibrium. Seen this way,
life is a computer running a model of itself in order to control its interior state so as to perpetuate itself in a changeable environment. This view, which goes beyond cybernetic self-regulation to reveal autopoietic computation, is closely allied to a growing thermodynamic understanding of living processes in which energy accountancy is integrated with informational interpretations (e.g. in Smith, 2008). For example, the accumulation of hierarchical complexity, so characteristic of life, has been demonstrated to follow from thermodynamic efficiency (Wicken, 1979; Annila and Annila, 2008; Annila and Kuismannen, 2009) as has the tendency for hierarchical complex structures to regulate their internal and external environments through information processing (Kaila and Annila, 2008; Karnani and Annila, 2009).

4 Implications

The information perspective shows life to be (a) continuous with the abiotic universe and (b) the consequence of a spontaneous increase in complexity through repeated combination of formative patterns such that they give context and thence function to one-another. Chemistry is the result of this process at the atomic scale and life is a branch of chemistry that is especially rich in opportunities for functional combinations. The processes of life are chemical processes, so our ‘life is information’ remains compatible with Kornberg’s ‘life is chemistry’, but goes deeper by highlighting the informational basis of the chemistry of life. Our perspective also emphasises the idea that the whole of life at all scales has a role in reproducing life. Considering life as information processing (computation) where the subject of computation is life, we are faced with a ‘program’ running on itself, the function of which is to output itself. Such recursion is familiar and much exploited in computer science. It highlights the fact that for life, there is no distinction between the ‘machine’ and the program - both are information; they are the same information, ordering and re-ordering matter and energy so as to persist. It would not be right to think of life as a biochemical structure on which a program is run, because life is the program and the biochemical structure is its embodiment. This is why we say that information is not just in DNA, but is in the whole biological system. The idea that ‘life is information processing’ brings reductionists and synthesists closer together as it shows life to supervene on chemistry strictly according to information content, but to also possess strictly emergent properties (at several levels) arising from the functions of the embodied information. Now that functional information content can be quantified at every level of life, we anticipate its use in further deepening our understanding of life and its place in the physical universe.
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| Organization Level                  | Interactions                                      |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| life as a whole                     | global bio-geochemical networks                   |
| ecological communities              | interspecific material and energy flows           |
| populations - species               | gene-flow, dispersal, evolution                   |
| multi-cellular organisms            | organism societies + interspecific, e.g. parasitism|
| tissues, organs and organ systems   | cellular communication and organ function         |
| cells                               | specialisation and ontogeny: e.g. immune system   |
| sub-cellular structures             | catabolic autopoietic processes                   |
| molecular networks                  | metabolic and information processing              |
| DNA sequences: codons to genes      | coding and expression control                     |
| molecular surfaces                  | lock and key - enzymes                            |

Table 1: A ten-level hierarchy of biocomplexity. Left column names the level of organization and right column gives examples of the complex interactions and processes that take place at that level, contributing to biocomplexity. Complexity is also added by interactions among levels, both upwards and downwards, producing feedback circuits. Interactions at every level and among levels constitute information processing. (adapted from Farnsworth et al. (2012))