specific to their mandates and organizational history. What the volume lacks is an effort to draw larger conclusions on this score.

There are two essays in the volume that might appear to sit at the margins of a discussion of security and intelligence agencies – those on the Department of Justice and on the Prime Minister’s Office. The justice essay, by Craig Forcese and Jennifer Poirier, offers the best line in the collection, when it suggests that ‘lawyers sit at the metaphorical elbow of security agencies’. As Forcese and Poierier know well, that system is not perfect, but it is essential in a democracy. Even a casual browser of Top Secret Canada would do well to linger over the essay by Meredith Lilly, who served in Stephen Harper’s PMO. Not only does it explain some of the mysteries and challenges of working in a political office at a senior level, it also puts a real human face to the work, not least in reminding us that exposure to intelligence secrets, often with their drumbeat of bad news, can itself be cumulatively traumatic. If we had more memoir literature from Canadian practitioners of intelligence, most of whom are deterred by our draconian Official Secrets Act, we might better appreciate this ground truth.

The editors of Top Secret Canada aspire to reach a variety of audiences – public servants, academics, students and the interested general public. The aspiration is worthy, but the current audience is very small. Essentially a reference text – especially with those chapters that do manage to explore the challenges ahead for key agencies – this essay collection awaits a future in which more attention might be paid to national security issues, especially in Canadian universities and among the general public. That day is coming, propelled by changes to the global threat landscape which will dispel the myth of Canadian geographic safety, and by greater volumes of reporting from the new review agency and a promised cultural shift in the Canadian national security system to embrace great transparency.

Mark Webber, James Sperling and Martin A. Smith
What’s Wrong with NATO and How to Fix It,
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2021. 320 pp. $31.95 CAD (paperback)
ISBN: 9780745682624

Reviewed by: Andrea Charron (andrea.charron@umanitoba.ca), University of Manitoba

Seventy-two years after its inception, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most successful military alliance. We could end the discussion there, but among NATO’s 30 member states, there are deep divisions, proverbial elephants in the room, and persistent concerns that it is unprepared to match re-emerging and new peer competitors, not to mention internal consternations about dreaded national “caveats”
whenever missions are planned. Despite NATO’s myriad problems, however, the authors maintain that it is “salvageable and worth keeping” (1).

This book is part of a series that studies not only all that is wrong with organizations,1 but importantly, how to fix them as well. Others in the series investigate the European Union, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and United Nations. Mark Webber, James Sperling, and Martin Smith set out to capture key post–Cold War NATO developments and their antidotes. The question is, have they captured the most pressing and damaging issues or those that lend themselves to solutions because they are persistent issues?

The authors, representing the United States, United Kingdom, and western-European–centric viewpoints, suggest the four key challenges to NATO’s survival are (1) overextended geostrategic reach and an unwieldy security policy portfolio, (2) US weariness and European wariness that call NATO into question, (3) a failure to address capability shortfalls and meet defence spending benchmarks, and (4) intra-alliance discord over Russia’s place in the European security order and how to deal with Moscow’s destabilization of Georgia and Ukraine. NATO’s “[t]readmills of problems” (36–45) suggest they are constant concerns. If so, are they truly damaging to NATO or simply irritants? The first three of the four are internal to NATO. As NATO makes decisions by consensus, many of the challenges that NATO faces are self-inflicted and should be self-correcting.

The fourth issue is an external challenge. Turbulent relations with the Soviet Union and now Russia mean that the desired “functional relationship” with Russia has never been achieved. The authors are balanced and careful not to lay blame entirely on Russia (92–113). Brief periods of promise, especially in the early days of the Permanent Joint Council (Madrid Summit in 1997), which envisioned Russia establishing a mission at NATO HQ, were short-lived (94). Nevertheless, the treatments for the four challenges, according to the authors, are (1) for NATO to be more selective and prudent about what it does, (2) to rebalance the responsibilities of leadership toward Europe, (3) to align missions with effective and efficiently allocated capabilities, and (4) to construct a realistic partnership with Russia (15).

The authors suggest that, like street lighting, NATO is a public good which is “nonexcludable (available to all and not to be denied to those who might be regarded as undeserving) and [it is] non-rivalrous (the enjoyment ... by some does not reduce its availability to others)” (55–56). The authors, however, may have underestimated the extent to which the US way of war and its military’s global organization drives NATO.2 US foreign and defence policy unduly influences NATO priorities, which means challenges and remedies 1–3 are akin to similarly charged magnets; there will never be a meeting of the poles in theory. The Russian problem is best solved, the authors suggest, by abandoning the pretense of a normative relationship with Russia and instead establishing a “tacit” NATO–Russia security regime, meaning deconflicting via

---

1. There is one book on social policy by Ben Jordan in 2010.
2. The EUCOM commander is dual hatted as NATO’s top general.
a shared understanding of interests (214–215). This is very sensible advice, but proving vexingly difficult in principle.

The book will be of tremendous help to strategic studies students (of which there are a dwindling number), especially on the history of NATO. It provides, however, predictable advice. The last chapter is the most interesting as it wrestles, albeit far too briefly, with the consequences of Brexit, a rising China, and COVID-19. Here is where there is the promise of new thinking. Having begun the book in 2013 and publishing in 2021, the authors, of course, had to make choices, so these “newer” issues were appended. The Trump effect within the analysis is properly balanced, given that his “reign” represented less than 5% of NATO’s history, and were the authors to revise the book, China would feature as more than “an object of NATO’s attention” (228). China will be NATO’s biggest concern in the very near future. But other, serious problems are either given short shrift or are overlooked completely.

First, some of the NATO members, especially Turkey, Hungary, and Poland, are highly problematic because of their decided slide toward authoritarianism. Turkey’s relations with NATO are described as “fraught” (141) and its relations with Russia as “incompatible with NATO membership” (143). These states, passively and actively, are undermining NATO and its core democratic values. We are beyond fraught and incompatible, but the authors are diplomatic. More analysis on NATO’s “civilian” side would be instructive, especially as it is likely to be key to dealing with problematic members and initial discussions with NATO’s soon-to-be chief competitor—China.

Second, NATO’s military structure and makeup are perfect for a post-WWII world, but not for today’s. Domain-specific component commanders devise plans within stovepipes that are impotent to deal with an all-domain threat environment that thrives on hybrid tactics short of war. Estonia, for example, is given brief mention in the book, and yet this newer member, on the frontline having suffered direct cyber attacks by Russia, is NATO’s cyber expert and likely to be one of the most important members in the new threat environment.

Next, NATO forces are still overwhelmingly skewed toward the land domain. If NATO chiefs of defense staff (CHODS) are reflective of their forces in terms of strength or importance (and typically, they are), then armies (and overwhelmingly from Eastern Europe) are well represented (twenty-one of twenty-nine CHODS3), with five naval and three air force representatives. And while there are a medical officer (Albania) and planning officer (Denmark) who represent novel occupations, the majority are overwhelmingly operators.

Third, a review of military representatives4 to NATO’s military committee reveals a gallery of twenty-nine men and only one woman, after Canada’s female representative LGEN Frances Allen became Canada’s new vice chief of the defence staff—the seventh in five years. Chaos within the senior leadership of the Canadian Armed Forces connected to

3. Iceland has no military and therefore has a civilian representative—the lone female among the twenty-nine men. Current until 1 July 2021.
4. “NATO military representatives,” NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who_51627.htm (accessed 16 July 2021). Norway’s representative is female - the sole as of 1 September 2021.
sexual or other misconduct is negatively impacting operations. If Canada is facing these challenges, every NATO member is—and if not addressed, this failure of leadership will do more to undermine NATO internally than Russia could ever hope to achieve. What is more, the lack of diversity in organization, representation, and occupations makes for stale thinking that perpetuates the tried, not the innovative. Solving these challenges, however, requires breaking new, and messy, ground.

While not an encomium to NATO, the book is optimistic. The authors are best at providing the historical context to NATO decisions and missions, and this will be well appreciated by many. As a reference text, this book lays down important foundational ideas. As a guide to fix NATO, I am less certain.

Brian Bow and Andrea Lane, eds. Canadian Foreign policy: Reflections on a Field in Transition. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2020. 301 pp. $34.95 (paperback) ISBN: 978-0-7748-6348-3

Reviewed by: Magali Deleuze®, Royal Military College of Canada

Canadian foreign policy (CFP) and Canadian policy at large, as academic disciplines in History or Political Science departments, seem to have been struggling for several years. The reflection began in 2017 in an issue of the International Journal dedicated to the generational phenomenon and the connection between socialization and scholarship in CFP.

Today, the current situation in the field does not seem to have changed much. The field of study is less attractive to researchers because it is too associated with the mechanism of governance, it is a discipline dominated by white men, and it has difficulty keeping up with the new diversity in humanities and social sciences studies—among other issues. Brian Bow and Andrea Lane therefore sought to find out from 14 political scientists the reasons for this crisis of identity and vocation of CFP and what should be done to revitalize it. This book is part of the C.D. Howe Series, which has recently published excellent volumes on Canadian political history. The book is divided into three parts: the state of the field, exploring adjacent fields, and the future of CFP.

The first part evokes the difficulties of the discipline through its losses and its lack of influence on decision-makers. Kim Richard Nossal emphasizes the loss of university resources; Adam Chapnick regrets the loss of Canadian diplomatic history and the challenge posed by the shift towards a more transnational study of foreign policy. Lana Wylie offers an overview of the critical approach that must renew the field of foreign policy and its own journey in this field. Jean-Christophe Boucher collected CFP works

5. Poland seems to be shifting gender norms. More Polish women are participating in defence, according to Weronika Grezebalska, “The future of Poland’s defence is female,” Democracy and Society, June 2021.
6. A copy of the Washington Treaty is missing and is recommended for future versions.