Abstract
We present a general and modular method for privacy-preserving Bayesian inference for Poisson factorization, a broad class of models that includes some of the most widely used models in the social sciences. Our method satisfies limited-precision local privacy, a generalization of local differential privacy that we introduce to formulate appropriate privacy guarantees for sparse count data. We present an MCMC algorithm that approximates the posterior distribution over the latent variables conditioned on data that has been locally privatized by the geometric mechanism. We focus specifically on the geometric mechanism of Ghosh et al. (2012) and prove that it is a mechanism for LPLP—a generalization of local differential privacy—in order to formulate appropriate privacy guarantees for sparse count data. We demonstrate our method’s utility using two case studies that involve real-world email data. We show that our method consistently outperforms the commonly used na"ive approach, wherein inference proceeds as usual, treating the locally privatized data as if it were not privatized.

1. Introduction
Data from social processes often take the form of discrete observations (e.g., edges in a social network, word tokens in an email). These observations often contain sensitive information. As more aspects of social interaction are digitally recorded, the opportunities for social scientific insights grow; however, so too does the risk of unacceptable privacy violations. As a result, there is a growing need to develop privacy-preserving data analysis methods. In practice, social scientists will be more likely to adopt these methods if doing so entails minimal change to their current methodology.

Under local privacy, a data analysis algorithm sees only the privatized data set. Inferring latent structure (including model parameters) that accurately reflects the non-privatized data set is therefore a key statistical challenge. One option is a na"ive approach, wherein inference proceeds as usual, treating the privatized data set as if it were not privatized. In the context of maximum likelihood estimation, the na"ive approach has been shown to exhibit pathologies when observations are discrete or count-valued. Researchers have therefore advocated for treating the non-privatized observations as latent variables to be inferred (Yang et al., 2012; Karwa et al., 2014; Bernstein et al., 2017; Bernstein & Sheldon, 2018). We embrace this approach and extend it to Bayesian inference for Poisson factorization, where our goal is to approximate the locally private posterior distribution over the latent variables conditioned on the privatized data set and the randomized response method. Toward that goal, we present a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm that is asymptotically guaranteed to draw samples...
2. Background and problem formulation

**Differential privacy.** Differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006) is a rigorous privacy criterion that guarantees that no single observation in a data set will have a significant influence on the information obtained by analyzing that data set.

**Definition 1.** A randomized algorithm $A(\cdot)$ satisfies $\epsilon$-differential privacy if for all pairs of neighboring data sets $Y$ and $Y'$ that differ in only a single observation

$$P(A(Y) \in S) \leq e^\epsilon P(A(Y') \in S),$$

for all subsets $S$ in the range of $A(\cdot)$.

**Local differential privacy.** We focus on local differential privacy, which we refer to as local privacy. Under this criterion, the observations remain private from even the data analysis algorithm. The algorithm sees only privatized versions of the observations, constructed by adding noise from specific distributions. The process of adding noise is known as randomized response—a reference to survey-sampling methods originally developed in the social sciences prior to the development of differential privacy (Warner, 1965). Satisfying this criterion means that no single location (e.g., a centralized server) need ever store the non-privatized data set.

**Definition 2.** A randomized response method $R(\cdot)$ is $\epsilon$-private if for all pairs of observations $y, y' \in \mathcal{Y}$

$$P(R(y) \in S) \leq e^\epsilon P(R(y') \in S),$$

for all subsets $S$ in the range of $R(\cdot)$. If a data analysis algorithm sees only the observations’ $\epsilon$-private responses, then the data analysis itself satisfies $\epsilon$-local privacy.

The meaning of “observation” in definitions 1 and 2 varies depending on the context. For example, in the context of topic modeling, an observation is an entire document—i.e., a vector of counts representing the number of times each word type occurs in that document. To guarantee local privacy, we need to ensure that the algorithm’s output does not reveal information about any individual observation.

We present two case studies applying our method to 1) topic modeling for text corpora and 2) overlapping community detection for social networks. Using real-world data from the Enron email corpus (Klimt & Yang, 2004), we show that our method consistently outperforms the naive approach according to a variety of intrinsic and extrinsic evaluation metrics. We provide an illustrative example in figure 1. Finally, we note that our method sometimes outperforms Poisson factorization of the non-privatized data, suggesting that non-private Poisson factorization may be overfitting.
privacy, a randomized response method must satisfy the condition in equation 2 for all pairs of observations. This typically involves adding noise that scales with the maximum difference between any pair of observations \( N^{(\text{max})} = \max_{y, y'} \| y - y' \|_1 \). When an observation is a document, \( N^{(\text{max})} \) can be prohibitively large, meaning that the noise can overwhelm the signal in the data set. This challenge motivates the following alternative formulation of local privacy.

**Limited-precision local privacy.** Local privacy requires that a randomized response method render indistinguishable pairs of observations that are arbitrarily different. In some contexts, this requirement is unnecessarily strong. For example, the author of a document may only wish to conceal the occurrence of a handful of word types. To achieve this goal, a randomized response method need only render indistinguishable pairs of similar documents, such as a document in which those word types occur and an otherwise-identical document in which they do not. We operationalize this kind of privacy guarantee by generalizing definition 2 as follows.

**Definition 3.** For any positive integer \( N \), we say that a randomized response method \( R(\cdot) \) is \((N, \epsilon)-\text{private} if for all pairs of observations \( y, y' \in Y \) such that \( \| y - y' \|_1 \leq N \)

\[
P\left( R(y) \in S \right) \leq e^\epsilon P\left( R(y') \in S \right),
\]

for all subsets \( S \) in the range of \( R(\cdot) \). If a data analysis algorithm sees only the observations' \((N, \epsilon)-\text{private} responses, then the data analysis itself satisfies \((N, \epsilon)-\text{limited-precision local privacy. If} \| y \|_1 \leq N \) for all \( y \in Y \), then \((N, \epsilon)-\text{limited-precision local privacy implies} \epsilon-\text{local privacy.}

Limited-precision local privacy (LPLP) is the local privacy analog of limited-precision differential privacy, originally proposed by Flood et al. (2013) and subsequently used to privatize analyses of geographic location data (Andrés et al., 2013) and financial network data (Papadimitriou et al., 2017). Like profile-based privacy (Geumlek & Chaudhuri, 2019), LPLP generalizes local privacy by flexibly specifying pairs of observations to be rendered indistinguishable. In section 3, we describe the geometric mechanism of Ghosh et al. (2012) and prove that it is a mechanism for LPLP.

**Differentially private Bayesian inference.** In Bayesian statistics, we begin with a probabilistic model \( M \) that relates observable variables \( Y \) to latent variables \( Z \) via a joint distribution \( P_M(Y, Z) \). The goal of inference is then to compute the posterior distribution \( P_M(Z | Y) \) over the latent variables conditioned on observed values of \( Y \). The posterior is almost always analytically intractable and thus inference involves approximating it. The two most common methods of approximate Bayesian inference are variational inference, wherein we fit the parameters of an approximating distribution \( Q(Z | Y) \), and Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), wherein we approximate the posterior with a finite set of samples \( \{Z^{(s)}\}_{s=1}^S \) generated via a Markov chain whose stationary distribution is the exact posterior.

We can conceptualize Bayesian inference as a randomized algorithm \( A(\cdot) \) that returns an approximation to the posterior distribution \( P_M(Z | Y) \). In general \( A(\cdot) \) does not satisfy \( \epsilon\)-differential privacy. However, if \( A(\cdot) \) is an MCMC algorithm that returns a single sample from the posterior, it guarantees privacy (Dimitrakakis et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015; Foulds et al., 2016; Dimitrakakis et al., 2017). Adding noise to posterior samples can also guarantee privacy (Zhang et al., 2016), though this set of noised samples \( \{\tilde{Z}^{(s)}\}_{s=1}^S \) approximates some distribution \( \tilde{P}_M(Z | Y) \) that depends on \( \epsilon \) and is different than the exact posterior (but close, in some sense, and equal when \( \epsilon \to \infty \)). For specific models, we can also noise the transition kernel of the MCMC algorithm to construct a Markov chain whose stationary distribution is again not the exact posterior, but something close that guarantees privacy (Foulds et al., 2016). We can also take an analogous approach to privatize variational inference, wherein we add noise to the sufficient statistics computed in each iteration (Park et al., 2016).

**Locally private Bayesian inference.** We first formalize the general objective of Bayesian inference under local privacy. Given a generative model \( M \) for non-privatized data set \( Y \) and latent variables \( Z \) with joint distribution \( P_M(Y, Z) \), we further assume a randomized response method \( R(\cdot) \) that generates privatized data sets: \( \tilde{Y} \sim P_R(\tilde{Y} | Y) \). The inference goal is then to approximate the locally private posterior

\[
P_{M, R}(Z | \tilde{Y}) = E_{P_{M, R}(Y | \tilde{Y})} [P_M(Z | Y)] = \int P_M(Z | Y) P_{M, R}(Y | \tilde{Y}) dY.
\]

This distribution correctly characterizes our uncertainty about the latent variables \( Z \), conditioned on all of our observations and assumptions—i.e., the privatized data set \( \tilde{Y} \), the model \( M \), and the randomized response method \( R \). The expansion in equation 4 shows that this posterior implicitly treats the non-privatized data set \( Y \) as a latent variable and marginalizes over it using the mixing distribution \( P_{M, R}(Y | \tilde{Y}) \) which is itself a posterior that characterizes our uncertainty about \( Y \). The key observation here is that if we can generate samples from \( P_{M, R}(Y | \tilde{Y}) \), we can use them to approximate the expectation in equation 4, assuming that we already have a method for approximating the non-private posterior \( P_M(Z | Y) \). In the context of MCMC, iteratively re-sampling values of the non-privatized data set from its complete conditional—i.e., \( Y^{(s)} \sim P_{M, \text{MCMC}}(Y | Z^{(s-1)}, \tilde{Y}) \)—and then re-sampling values of the latent variables—i.e., \( Z^{(s)} \sim P_M(Z | Y^{(s)}) \)—constitutes a Markov chain whose stationary distribution is \( P_{M, R}(Z, Y | \tilde{Y}) \). In scenarios where we already have derivations and implementations for sampling from \( P_M(Z | Y) \), we need only be able to sample efficiently...
from \(P_{M,R}(Y | Z, \hat{Y})\) in order to obtain a locally private Bayesian inference algorithm; whether we can do this efficiently depends heavily on our choice of \(M\) and \(R\).

We note that the objective of Bayesian inference under local privacy, as defined in equation 4, is similar to that of Williams & McSherry (2010), who identify their key barrier to inference as being unable to analytically form the marginal likelihood that links the privatized data set to \(Z\):

\[
P_{M,R}(\hat{Y} | Z) = \int P_R(\hat{Y} | Y) P_M(Y | Z) dY. \quad (5)
\]

In the next sections, we show that if \(M\) is a Poisson factorization model and \(R\) is the geometric mechanism, then we can analytically form an augmented version of this marginal likelihood and derive an MCMC algorithm that samples efficiently from the locally private posterior in equation 4.

3. Locally private Poisson factorization

In this section, we describe a model \(M\)—i.e., Poisson factorization—and a randomized response method \(R\)—i.e., the geometric mechanism—each of which is a natural choice for count data. We prove two theorems about the geometric mechanism: 1) it is a mechanism for LPLP and 2) it can be re-interpreted in terms of the Skellam distribution (Skellam, 1946). We rely on the second theorem to show that Poisson factorization and the geometric mechanism combine to yield a novel generative process for privatized count data, which we then exploit in section 4 to derive our MCMC algorithm.

\(M\): Poisson factorization. We assume that \(Y\) is a data set that consists of counts, each of which \(y_i \in \mathbb{Z}_+\) is an independent Poisson random variable \(y_i \sim \text{Pois}(\mu_i)\) where the rate parameter \(\mu_i\) is defined to be a deterministic function of the latent variables \(Z\). The subscript \(i\) is a multi-index. In Poisson matrix factorization, \(i \equiv (i_1, i_2);\) however, this notation also supports Poisson tensor factorization, where \(i \equiv (i_1, \ldots, i_M)\), and multiview models, where the multi-index may differ in the number of indices. This class of models includes some of the most widely used models in the social sciences, as described in section 1. In section 5, we present case studies involving two different models—specifically, the mixed-membership stochastic block model for social networks (Ball et al., 2011; Gopalan & Blei, 2013; Zhou, 2015) and latent Dirichlet allocation (Blei et al., 2003). Although both of these models are instances of Poisson matrix factorization, our method applies to any Poisson factorization model.

\(R\): Geometric mechanism. The two most commonly used randomized response methods in the differential privacy toolbox—the Gaussian and Laplace mechanisms—privatize observations by adding noise drawn from real-valued distributions. They are therefore unnatural choices for count data. Ghosh et al. (2012) introduced the geometric mechanism, which can be viewed as the discrete analog of the Laplace mechanism and involves adding integer-valued noise \(\tau \in \mathbb{Z}\) drawn from the two-sided geometric distribution. The PMF for the two-sided geometric distribution is as follows:

\[
2\text{Geo}(\tau; \alpha) = \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 + \alpha} \alpha^{|	au|}. \quad (6)
\]

**Theorem 1.** (Proof in appendix) Let randomized response method \(R(\cdot)\) be the geometric mechanism with parameter \(\alpha\). Then for any positive integer \(N\), and any pair of observations \(y,y'\in \mathbb{Y}\) such that \(|y - y'|_1 \leq N\), \(R(\cdot)\) satisfies

\[
P(R(y) \in S) \leq e^\epsilon P(R(y') \in S) \quad (7)
\]

for all subsets \(S\) in the range of \(R(\cdot)\), where

\[
\epsilon = N \ln \left(\frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \right). \quad (8)
\]

Therefore, for any positive integer \(N\), the geometric mechanism with parameter \(\alpha\) is an \((N, \epsilon)\)-private randomized response method with \(\epsilon = N \ln \left(\frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \right)\). If \(\alpha = \frac{N}{2}\), then the geometric mechanism with parameter \(\alpha\) is also \((N^*, \epsilon^*)\)-private.

**Theorem 2.** (Proof in appendix) A two-sided geometric random variable \(\tau \sim 2\text{Geo}(\alpha)\) can be generated as follows:

\[
\tau \sim \text{Skel}(\lambda^{(+)}, \lambda^{(-)}), \quad \lambda^{(*)} \sim \text{Exp}(\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}), \quad (9)
\]

where \(\text{Exp}(\cdot)\) and \(\text{Skel}(\cdot)\) are the exponential and Skellam distributions. The latter is the marginal distribution of the difference \(\tau := g^{(+)} - g^{(-)}\) of two independent Poisson random variables \(g^{(*)} \sim \text{Pois}(\lambda^{(*)})\), where * \(\in \{+, -\}\).

**Combining \(M\) and \(R\).** We assume that each non-privatized count \(y_i\) is generated by \(M\) and then privatized by \(R\):

\[
\hat{y}_i^{(\pm)} := y_i + \tau_i, \quad \tau_i \sim 2\text{Geo}(\alpha), \quad (10)
\]

where \(\hat{y}_i^{(\pm)}\) is the privatized count, which we superscript with \((\pm)\) to denote that it may be non-negative or negative because the additive noise \(\tau_i \in \mathbb{Z}\) may itself be negative.

Via theorem 2, we can express the generative process for \(\hat{y}_i^{(\pm)}\) in four equivalent ways, shown in figure 2, each of which provides a unique and necessary insight. Process 1 is a graphical representation of the generative process as described above. Process 2 represents the two-sided geometric noise in terms of a pair of Poisson random variables with exponentially distributed rates; in so doing, it reveals the auxiliary variables that facilitate inference. Process 3 represents the sum of the non-privatized count and the positive component of the noise as a single Poisson random variable \(\hat{y}_i^{(*)} = y_i + \hat{y}_i^{(+)\pm}\). Process 4 marginalizes out the remaining Poisson random variables to yield a representation of \(\hat{y}_i^{(\pm)}\) as an exponentially randomized Skellam random variable:

\[
\hat{y}_i^{(\pm)} \sim \text{Skel}\left(\lambda_i^{(+)\pm} + \mu_i, \lambda_i^{(-)}\right), \quad \lambda_i^{(*)} \sim \text{Exp}(\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}). \quad (11)
\]

The derivations of generative processes 2, 3, and 4 rely on properties of the two-sided geometric, Skellam, and Poisson distributions. We provide these properties in the appendix.
4. MCMC algorithm

Given a privatized data set \( \tilde{Y}(\pm) \), our inference goal is to approximate the locally private posterior using MCMC. To do this, we need to be able to sample values of the non-privatized data set \( Y \) from its complete conditional, as explained in section 2. By assuming that each privatized count \( \tilde{y}_i(\pm) \) is a Skellam random variable, as in equation 11, we can exploit the following general theorem that relates the Skellam and Bessel (Yuan & Kalbfleisch, 2000) distributions.

**Theorem 3.** (Proof in appendix) Consider two Poisson random variables \( y_1 \sim \text{Pois}(\lambda(+)\pm) \) and \( y_2 \sim \text{Pois}(\lambda(-)\pm) \). Their minimum \( m := \min\{y_1, y_2\} \) and their difference \( \tau := y_1 - y_2 \) are deterministic functions of \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \). However, if not conditioned on \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \), the random variables \( m \) and \( \tau \) can be marginally generated as follows:

\[
\tau \sim \text{Skell}(\lambda(+)\pm, \lambda(-)\pm), \quad m \sim \text{Bes} \left( |\tau|, 2\sqrt{\lambda(+)\pm \lambda(-)\pm} \right). \quad (12)
\]

Theorem 3 means that we can generate two independent Poisson random variables by first generating their difference \( \tau \) and then their minimum \( m \). Because \( \tau = y_1 - y_2 \), if \( \tau \) is positive, then \( y_2 \) must be the minimum and thus \( y_1 = \tau + m \). In practice, this means that if we only get to observe the difference of two Poisson-distributed counts, we can still "recover" the counts by sampling a Bessel auxiliary variable.

By assuming that \( \tilde{y}_i(\pm) \sim \text{Skell}(\lambda_i(+)\pm, \mu_i, \lambda_i(-)\pm) \) via theorem 2, we can sample an auxiliary Bessel random variable \( m_i \):

\[
(m_i | -) \sim \text{Bes} \left( |\tilde{y}_i(\pm)|, 2\sqrt{(\lambda_i(+)\pm + \mu_i)\lambda_i(-)\pm} \right). \quad (13)
\]

Yuan & Kalbfleisch (2000) give details of the Bessel distribution, which can be sampled efficiently (Devroye, 2002).

Via theorem 3, \( m_i \) represents the minimum of two latent Poisson random variables whose difference equals \( \tilde{y}_i(\pm) \); these latent variables are depicted in process 3 of figure 2—i.e., \( \tilde{y}_i(\pm) := \tilde{y}_i(+) - \tilde{y}_i(-) \) and \( m_i = \min\{\tilde{y}_i(+), \tilde{y}_i(-)\} \). Given \( \tilde{y}_i(\pm) \) and a sampled value of \( m_i \), we can compute \( \tilde{y}_i(+) \) and \( \tilde{y}_i(-) \):

\[
\tilde{y}_i(+) := m_i, \quad \tilde{y}_i(-) := \tilde{y}_i(+) - \tilde{y}_i(\pm) \quad \text{if} \quad \tilde{y}_i(\pm) \leq 0 \quad (14)
\]

\[
\tilde{y}_i(+) := m_i, \quad \tilde{y}_i(-) := \tilde{y}_i(-) + \tilde{y}_i(\pm) \quad \text{otherwise}.
\]

Because \( \tilde{y}_i(\pm) = y_1 + g_i(\pm) \) is itself the sum of two independent Poisson random variables, we can then sample \( y_1 \) from its conditional posterior, which is a binomial distribution:

\[
(y_1 | -) \sim \text{Binom} \left( \tilde{y}_i(\pm), \frac{m_i}{m_i + \lambda_i(-)\pm} \right). \quad (15)
\]

Equations 13 through 15 constitute a way to draw samples from \( P_{M,R}(y_i | \mu_i, \tilde{y}_i(\pm), \lambda_i) \). We can also sample the auxiliary variables \( \lambda_i(+)\pm, \lambda_i(-)\pm \) from their complete conditional:

\[
(\lambda_i(+)\pm | -) \sim \Gamma \left( 1 + g_i(\pm), \frac{\alpha}{\tau + \sigma} + 1 \right). \quad (16)
\]

Iteratively re-sampling \( g_i \) and \( \lambda_i \) constitutes a chain whose stationary distribution over \( y_i \) is \( P_{M,R}(y_i | \mu_i, \tilde{y}_i(\pm)) \), as desired. Given a sampled non-privatized data set \( Y \), we can then sample values of the latent variables \( Z \) from their complete conditionals, which are the same as in non-private Poisson factorization. Equations 13–16, along with the complete conditionals for \( Z \), define an efficient MCMC algorithm that is asymptotically guaranteed to generate samples from the locally private posterior \( P_{M,R}(Z | \tilde{Y}(\pm)) \).
5. Case studies

We present two case studies applying our method to 1) topic modeling for text corpora and 2) overlapping community detection for social networks. In each one, we formulate privacy guarantees, ground them in examples, and demonstrate our method’s utility using synthetic and real-world data.

Real-world data. For our experiments using real-world data, we derived count matrices from the Enron email corpus (Klimt & Yang, 2004). For the topic modeling case study, we randomly selected $D=10,000$ emails with at least 50 word tokens. We limited the vocabulary to $V=10,000$ word types by selecting the most frequent word types with document frequencies less than 0.3. For the community detection case study, we obtained a $V \times V$ adjacency matrix $Y$ where $y_{ij}$ is the number of emails sent from actor $i$ to actor $j$. We included an actor if they sent at least one email and sent or received at least one hundred emails, yielding $V=161$ actors. When an email included multiple recipients, we incremented the corresponding counts by one.

Reference methods. We compare the performance of our method to two references methods: 1) non-private Poisson factorization of the non-privatized data and 2) the naïve approach, wherein inference treats the privatized data as if it were not privatized. The naïve approach must first truncate any negative counts $\tilde{y}_i^{(v)} < 0$ to zero and thus implicitly uses the truncated geometric mechanism (Ghosh et al., 2012).

Performance measures. Each method uses MCMC to approximate the posterior with a set of $S$ samples of the latent variables. We can therefore use these samples to approximate each method’s posterior expectation of $\mu$ as follows:

$$\hat{\mu}_i = \frac{1}{S} \sum_{s=1}^{S} \mu_i^{(s)} \approx \mathbb{E}_{P_{\theta, y}(Z | \tilde{Y}^{(v)})} [\hat{\mu}_i]. \quad (17)$$

We can then calculate the mean absolute error (MAE) of $\hat{\mu}_i$ with respect to $y_i$—i.e., the reconstruction error. In the topic modeling case study, we also compare the quality of the inferred topics using two standard metrics: 1) normalized pointwise mutual information (NPMI; Lau et al., 2014) and 2) coherence (Mimno et al., 2011). We use the non-privatized data set as the reference corpus for both. For each metric, we use only the top ten word types for each topic, and we average the topics’ scores to yield a single value.

5.1. Case study 1: Topic modeling

Topic models (Blei et al., 2003) are widely used in the social sciences (Ramage et al., 2009; Grimmer & Stewart, 2013; Mohr & Bogdanov, 2013; Roberts et al., 2013) to characterize the high-level thematic structure of text corpora via latent “topics”—i.e., probability distributions over the word types in some vocabulary. However, in many scenarios, documents can contain sensitive information, so people may be unwilling to share them without privacy guarantees.

Limited-precision local privacy. In the context of topic modeling, a data set $Y$ is a $D \times V$ count matrix, where each element $y_{dv} \in \mathbb{Z}_+$ represents the number of times that word type $v \in [V]$ occurs in document $d \in [D]$. It is natural to consider each document $y_d \equiv (y_{d1}, \ldots, y_{dV})$ to be a single observation. Under LPLP, $N$ determines the neighborhood of documents within which $\epsilon$-local privacy holds. For example, if $N=4$, then a document in which a word type occurs four times and an otherwise-identical document in which it does not occur at all would be rendered indistinguishable after privatization, assuming $\epsilon$ is small.

Poisson factorization. Latent Dirichlet allocation (Blei et al., 2003), the most commonly used topic model, can be thought of as a special case of Poisson factorization where $Y$ is a $D \times V$ count matrix and $\mu_{dv} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \theta_{dk} \phi_{kv}$. The factor $\theta_{dk}$ represents how much topic $k$ is used in document

Figure 3. Topic recovery: our method vs. the naïve approach. (a) We generated the non-privatized data set synthetically so that the true topics were known. We then privatized the data set using (b) a low noise level and (c) a high noise level. The heatmap in each subfigure visualizes the data set, using red to denote positive counts and blue to denote negative counts. With a high level of noise, the naïve approach overfits the noise and therefore fails to recover the true topics. In contrast, our method is still able to recover the true topics.
Experiments using synthetic data. We generated a synthetic data set of $D = 90$ documents, with $K = 3$ topics and $V = 15$ word types. We set $\Phi^*$ so that the topics were well separated, with each putting the majority of its mass on five different word types. We also ensured that the documents were well separated into three equal groups of thirty, with each document putting the majority of its mass on a different topic. We then sampled a data set $y_{dv}^* \sim \text{Pois}(\mu_{dv}^*)$ where $\mu_{dv}^* = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \theta_{dk}^* \phi_{kv}^*$. We then generated a heterogeneously-noised data set by sampling the $d$th document’s noise level $\alpha_d \sim \text{Beta}(c \alpha_0, c (1-\alpha_0))$ from a Beta distribution with mean $\alpha_0$ and concentration parameter $c = 10$ and then sampling $\tau_{dv} \sim \text{Geo}(\alpha_d)$ for each word type $v$. We repeated this for a small and large value of $\alpha_0$. For each method and data set, we ran 6,000 MCMC iterations, saving every 25th sample after the first 1,000. We selected $\hat{\Phi}$ to be the sample from the posterior with the highest joint probability. (Due to label switching, we could not average samples of $\hat{\Phi}$.) Following Newman et al. (2009), we then aligned the topic indices of $\hat{\Phi}$ to $\Phi^*$ using the Hungarian bipartite matching algorithm. We visualize the results in figure 3. The naive approach performs poorly at recovering the topics under high levels of privacy.

Experiments using real-world data. We used three privacy levels $\epsilon/N \in \{3, 2, 1\}$. We generated five privatized data sets for each privacy level by adding noise drawn from a two-sided geometric distribution with $\alpha = -\exp(\epsilon/N)$ independently to each element of the non-privatized data set. We applied our method and naive approach to each of the fifteen privatized data sets and applied non-privatized Poisson factorization to the non-privatized data set. For each method and data set, we used $K = 50$ topics and ran 7,500 iterations of MCMC, saving every 100th sample of the latent variables after the first 2,500. We used the fifty saved samples to compute $\hat{\mu}_{dv} = \frac{1}{S} \sum_{s=1}^{S} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \theta_{dk}^s \phi_{kv}^s$. We also computed NPMI and coherence using each saved sample, and averaged the resulting values over the samples.

Results. We find that our method has both lower reconstruction error and higher quality topics than the naive approach. The reconstruction error for each method and data set is shown in left subplot of figure 4. Our method has almost the same reconstruction error as non-private Poisson factorization of the non-privatized data. In contrast, the naive approach has a higher reconstruction error that increases dramatically as the privacy level increases. The center and right subplots of figure 4 depict NPMI and coherence, respectively. According to both metrics, our method yields higher quality topics than the naive approach. Surprisingly, the topics inferred by our method have better coherence than the topics inferred by Poisson factorization of the non-privatized data. This result suggests that non-private Poisson factorization may be overfitting; in contrast, our method may avoid overfitting by attributing small counts to the added noise and ignoring them. Because NPMI places more emphasis on rarer word types, excluding less reliable rare word types from topics does not benefit the metric, as is reflected in the center subplot of figure 4.

5.2. Case study 2: Overlapping community detection

Organizations often want to know whether their employees are interacting as productively as possible. For example, are there missing links between their employees that, if present, would reduce duplication of effort? Do the “communities” that emerge naturally from employee interactions match the formal organizational structure? Although social scientists may be able gain answer such questions using employee interaction data, sharing such data increases the risk of privacy violations. Moreover, standard anonymization procedures can be reverse-engineered adversarially and thus do not provide privacy guarantees (Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2009).

Limited-precision local privacy. In this context, a data set $Y$ is a $V \times V$ count matrix, where each element $y_{ij} \in \mathbb{Z}_+$
represents the number of interactions from actor \( i \in [V] \) to actor \( j \in [V] \). It is natural to consider each count \( y_{ij} \) to be a single observation. Under LPLP, if \( y_{ij} \leq N \), then its privatized version will be indistinguishable from the privatized version of \( y_{ij} = 0 \). In other words, an adversary will be unable to tell from the privatized count whether \( i \) had interacted with \( j \) at all, assuming \( \epsilon \) is small. If \( y_{ij} \gg N \), then only the exact number of interactions will be concealed.

**Poisson factorization model.** The mixed-membership stochastic block model (Ball et al., 2011; Gopalan & Blei, 2013; Zhou, 2015) is a special case of Poisson factorization where \( Y \) is a \( V \times V \) count matrix and \( \mu_{ij} = \sum_{c=1}^{C} \sum_{d=1}^{C} \theta_{ic} \theta_{jd} \pi_{cd} \). The factors \( \theta_{ic} \) and \( \theta_{jd} \) represent how much actors \( i \) and \( j \) participate in communities \( c \) and \( d \), respectively, while the factor \( \pi_{cd} \) represents how much actors in community \( c \) interact with actors in community \( d \).

The set of latent variables is thus \( Z = \{ \Theta, \Pi \} \) where \( \Theta \) and \( \Pi \) are \( V \times C \) and \( C \times C \) non-negative, real-valued matrices, respectively. As with latent Dirichlet allocation, it is standard to assume independent gamma priors over the factors—i.e., \( \theta_{ic}, \pi_{cd} \sim \Gamma(a_0, b_0) \), where \( a_0 \) and \( b_0 \) are shape and rate hyperparameters, respectively. We set \( a_0 = 0.1 \) and \( b_0 = 1 \).

**Experiments using synthetic data.** We generated social networks of \( V = 20 \) actors with \( C = 5 \) communities. We randomly generated the true parameters \( \theta^*_ic, \pi^*_{cd} \sim \Gamma(a_0, b_0) \) with \( a_0 = 0.01 \) and \( b_0 = 0.5 \) to encourage sparsity; doing so exaggerates the block structure in the network. We then sampled a data set \( y_{ij} \sim \text{Pois} (\mu^*_{ij}) \) and added noise \( \tau_{ij} \sim 2\text{Geo}(\alpha) \) for three increasing values of \( \alpha \). For each data set, we set \( N = \mathbb{E}[y_{ij}] \) and then set \( \alpha = \exp(-\epsilon/N) \) for \( \epsilon \in \{2.5, 1, 0.75, 1\} \). For each method and data set, we ran 8,500 MCMC iterations, saving every 25th sample after the first 1,000 and using these samples to compute \( \hat{\mu}_{ij} \).

In figure 1, we visually compare our method’s estimates of \( \hat{\mu}_{ij} \) to those of the reference methods. The naive approach overfits the noise, predicting high values even for sparse parts of the matrix. In contrast, our method approach reproduces the sparse block structure even for high levels of privacy.

**Experiments using real-world data.** We used the same experimental design as we used in the topic modeling case study. For each method and data set, we used \( C \in \{5, 10, 20\} \) and we used the saved samples to compute \( \hat{\mu}_{ij} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{s=1}^{S} \sum_{c=1}^{C} \sum_{d=1}^{C} \theta^{(s)}_{ic} \theta^{(s)}_{jd} \pi^{(s)}_{cd} \). However, instead of computing NPMI and coherence, we ran link-prediction experiments. Specifically, prior to inference, we held out all elements of the count matrix that involved the top fifty senders or recipients. After inference, we used the saved samples to compute \( \hat{\mu}_{ij} \), but only for the held-out elements, and then calculated the corresponding reconstruction error.

**Results.** We find that our method generally obtains lower reconstruction and lower held-out error than either the naïve approach or non-private Poisson factorization of the non-privatized data. The results for \( C \in \{5, 20\} \) are shown in figure 5. We provide results for \( C = 10 \) in the appendix.

**6. Conclusion and future work**

We presented a general and modular method for privacy-preserving Bayesian inference for Poisson factorization. Our method satisfies limited-precision local privacy, a generalization of local differential privacy that we introduced to formulate appropriate privacy guarantees for sparse count data. In two case studies, we demonstrated that our method generally outperforms the commonly used naïve approach, wherein inference treats the privatized data as if it were not privatized. Surprisingly, our method also outperformed non-private Poisson factorization. In the context of topic modeling, it inferred more coherent topics; in the context of overlapping community detection, it obtained lower held-out error in link-prediction experiments. These findings are consistent with known connections between privacy-preserving mechanisms and regularization (Chaudhuri & Monteleoni, 2009). Because our method can attribute small counts to the added noise, it can therefore ignore them. In turn, it may be less susceptible to inferring spurious structure. Initial results suggest that \( y_i \sim \text{Skellam}(\lambda^{(x)}_i + \mu_i, \lambda^{(x)}_i) \) may be a robust alternative to non-private Poisson factorization. We therefore highlight this direction for future work.
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1. Supplementary results

1.1. Community detection $C \in \{5, 10, 20\}$ results

![Graphs comparing reconstruction and held-out reconstruction error for different numbers of communities and privacy levels.](image)

Figure 1. Each subplot compares our method to the two reference methods for increasing levels of privacy. The top subplots depict reconstruction error (lower values are better); the bottom subplots depict held-out reconstruction error (lower values are better).

2. Proof of geometric mechanism as LPLP mechanism

**Theorem 1.** Let randomized response method $\mathcal{R}(\cdot)$ be the geometric mechanism with parameter $\alpha$. Then for any positive integer $N$, and any pair of observations $y, y' \in \mathcal{Y}$ such that $\|y - y'\|_1 \leq N$, $\mathcal{R}(\cdot)$ satisfies

$$P(\mathcal{R}(y) \in S) \leq e^\epsilon P(\mathcal{R}(y') \in S)$$

for all subsets $S$ in the range of $\mathcal{R}(\cdot)$, where

$$\epsilon = N \ln \left( \frac{1}{\alpha} \right).$$

Therefore, for any positive integer $N$, the geometric mechanism with parameter $\alpha$ is an $(N, \epsilon)$-private randomized response method with $\epsilon = N \ln \left( \frac{1}{\alpha} \right)$. If $\frac{\epsilon'}{\epsilon N'} = \frac{\epsilon}{N}$, then the geometric mechanism with parameter $\alpha$ is also $(N', \epsilon')$-private.

**Proof.** It suffices to show that for any integer-valued vector $o \in \mathbb{Z}^d$, the following inequality holds for any pair of
Appendix for Locally Private Bayesian Inference for Count Models

observations $y, y' \in \mathcal{Y} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}^d$ such that $\|y - y'\|_1 \leq N$:

$$\exp(-\epsilon) \leq \frac{P(\mathcal{R}(y) = o)}{P(\mathcal{R}(y') = o)} \leq \exp(\epsilon),$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

where $\epsilon = N \ln \left( \frac{1}{\alpha} \right)$.

Let $\nu$ denote a $d$-dimensional noise vector with elements drawn independently from $2\text{Geo}(\alpha)$. Then,

$$\frac{P(\mathcal{R}(y) = o)}{P(\mathcal{R}(y') = o)} = \frac{P(\nu = o - y)}{P(\nu = o - y')}$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

$$= \frac{\prod_{i=1}^{d} \frac{1-\alpha}{1+\alpha} \alpha^{\nu_i}}{\prod_{i=1}^{d} \frac{1-\alpha}{1+\alpha} \alpha^{\nu'_i}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

$$= \alpha^{\left( \sum_{i=1}^{d} |\nu_i - \nu'_i| - |\nu_i - \nu'_i| \right)}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

By the triangle inequality, we also know that for each $i$,

$$-|y_i - y'_i| \leq |\nu_i - y_i| - |\nu_i - y'_i| \leq |y_i - y'_i|.$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

Therefore,

$$-\|y - y'\|_1 \leq \sum_{i=1}^{d} (|\nu_i - y_i| - |\nu_i - y'_i|) \leq \|y - y'\|_1.$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

It follows that

$$\alpha^{-N} \leq \frac{P(\mathcal{R}(y) = o)}{P(\mathcal{R}(y') = o)} \leq \alpha^N.$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

If $\epsilon = N \ln \left( \frac{1}{\alpha} \right)$, then we recover the bound in equation 3. \hfill \Box

3. Proof of two-sided geometric noise as exponentially-randomized Skellam noise

**Theorem 2.** A two-sided geometric random variable $\tau \sim 2\text{Geo}(\alpha)$ can be generated as follows:

$$\tau \sim \text{Skel}(\lambda^{(+)}, \lambda^{(-)}), \quad \lambda^{(*)} \sim \text{Exp}\left(\frac{\alpha}{\tau-\alpha}\right),$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

where $\text{Exp}(\cdot)$ and $\text{Skel}(\cdot)$ are the exponential and Skellam distributions. The latter is the marginal distribution of the difference $\tau := g^{(+)} - g^{(-)}$ of two independent Poisson random variables $g^{(*)} \sim \text{Pois}(\lambda^{(*)})$, where $\ast \in \{+,-\}$.

**Proof.** A two-sided geometric random variable $\tau \sim 2\text{Geo}(\alpha)$ can be generated by taking the difference of two independent and identically distributed geometric random variables:

$$g^{(+)} \sim \text{Geo}(\alpha), \quad g^{(-)} \sim \text{Geo}(\alpha), \quad \tau := g^{(+)} - g^{(-)}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

The geometric distribution is a special case of the negative binomial distribution, with shape parameter equal to one (Johnson et al., 2005). Furthermore, the negative binomial distribution can be represented as a mixture of Poisson distributions with a gamma mixing distribution. We can therefore re-express equation 11 as follows:

$$\lambda^{(+) \sim \text{Gam}(1, \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha})}, \quad \lambda^{(-) \sim \text{Gam}(1, \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha})}, \quad g^{(+)} \sim \text{Pois}(\lambda^{(+)}), \quad g^{(-)} \sim \text{Pois}(\lambda^{(-)}), \quad \tau := g^{(+)} - g^{(-)}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

Finally, a gamma distribution with shape parameter equal to one is an exponential distribution, while the signed difference of two independent Poisson random variables is marginally a Skellam random variable (Skellam, 1946). We therefore recover the generative process in equation 10. We visualize the Skellam and two-sided geometric distributions in figure 2. \hfill \Box

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\(^1\)A video of Unnikrishna Pillai deriving this is available at [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V1EygL1c9TE](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V1EygL1c9TE).
Figure 2. The two-sided geometric distribution (right) can be obtained by randomizing the parameters of the Skellam distribution (left). With fixed parameters, the Skellam distribution can be asymmetric and centered at a value other than zero; however, the two-sided geometric distribution is symmetric and centered at zero. It is also heavy tailed and the discrete analog of the Laplace distribution.

4. Proof of relationship between the Bessel and Skellam distributions

**Theorem 3.** Consider two Poisson random variables \( y_1 \sim \text{Pois}(\lambda^{(+)}) \) and \( y_2 \sim \text{Pois}(\lambda^{(-)}) \). Their minimum \( m := \min\{y_1, y_2\} \) and their difference \( \tau := y_1 - y_2 \) are deterministic functions of \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \). However, if not conditioned on \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \), the random variables \( m \) and \( \tau \) can be marginally generated as follows:

\[
\tau \sim \text{Skel}(\lambda^{(+)}, \lambda^{(-)}), \quad m \sim \text{Bes} \left( |\tau|, 2\sqrt{\lambda^{(+)}}\lambda^{(-)} \right). \tag{13}
\]

**Proof.** We begin by writing out the raw joint probability of \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \):

\[
P(y_1, y_2) = \text{Pois}(y_1; \lambda^{(+)}) \text{Pois}(y_2; \lambda^{(-)})
\]

\[
= (\lambda^{(+)})^{y_1} y_1! e^{-\lambda^{(+)}} (\lambda^{(-)})^{y_2} y_2! e^{-\lambda^{(-)}}
\]

\[
= \frac{(\sqrt{\lambda^{(+)}}\lambda^{(-)})^{y_1+y_2}}{y_1! y_2!} e^{-(\lambda^{(+)})+(\lambda^{(-)})} \left( \frac{\lambda^{(+)}}{\lambda^{(-)}} \right)^{(y_1-y_2)/2}. \tag{16}
\]

If \( y_1 \geq y_2 \), then

\[
P(y_1, y_2) = \frac{(\sqrt{\lambda^{(+)}}\lambda^{(-)})^{y_1+y_2}}{I_{y_1-y_2}(2\sqrt{\lambda^{(+)}}\lambda^{(-)})} \frac{y_1! y_2!}{y_1! y_2!} e^{-(\lambda^{(+)})+(\lambda^{(-)})} \left( \frac{\lambda^{(+)}}{\lambda^{(-)}} \right)^{(y_1-y_2)/2}
\]

\[
= \text{Bes} \left( y_2; y_1 - y_2, 2\sqrt{\lambda^{(+)}}\lambda^{(-)} \right) \text{Skel}(y_1 - y_2; \lambda^{(+)}, \lambda^{(-)}); \tag{18}
\]

otherwise

\[
P(y_1, y_2) = \frac{(\sqrt{\lambda^{(+)}}\lambda^{(-)})^{y_1+y_2}}{I_{y_2-y_1}(2\sqrt{\lambda^{(+)}}\lambda^{(-)})} \frac{y_1! y_2!}{y_1! y_2!} e^{-(\lambda^{(+)})+(\lambda^{(-)})} \left( \frac{\lambda^{(+)}}{\lambda^{(-)}} \right)^{(y_2-y_1)/2}
\]

\[
= \text{Bes} \left( y_1; y_2 - y_1, 2\sqrt{\lambda^{(+)}}\lambda^{(-)} \right) \text{Sk}l(y_2 - y_1; \lambda^{(-)}, \lambda^{(+)})
\]

\[
= \text{Bes} \left( y_1; -(y_1 - y_2), 2\sqrt{\lambda^{(+)}}\lambda^{(-)} \right) \text{Sk}l(y_1 - y_2; \lambda^{(+)}, \lambda^{(-)}). \tag{20}
\]

If

\[
m := \min\{y_1, y_2\}, \quad \tau := y_1 - y_2,
\]

then we can change variables using the deterministic relationships

\[
y_2 = m, \quad y_1 = m + \tau \quad \text{if} \ \tau \geq 0
\]

\[
y_1 = m, \quad y_2 = m - \tau \quad \text{otherwise}. \tag{22}
\]
The Jacobian can be computed as

\[
\begin{vmatrix}
\frac{\partial y_1}{\partial m} & \frac{\partial y_1}{\partial \tau} \\
\frac{\partial y_2}{\partial m} & \frac{\partial y_2}{\partial \tau}
\end{vmatrix}
= \begin{vmatrix}
1 & 1 \\
1 & 0
\end{vmatrix} \begin{vmatrix}
\tau \geq 0 \\
1 & 0
\end{vmatrix} \begin{vmatrix}
1 & -1 \\
1 & 0
\end{vmatrix} = 1,
\] (24)

so

\[
P(m, \tau) = P(y_1, y_2) \begin{vmatrix}
\frac{\partial y_1}{\partial m} & \frac{\partial y_1}{\partial \tau} \\
\frac{\partial y_2}{\partial m} & \frac{\partial y_2}{\partial \tau}
\end{vmatrix}
= \text{Bes} \left( m; |\tau|, 2\sqrt{\lambda^+\lambda^-} \right) \text{Skel}(\tau; \lambda^+, \lambda^-). \quad (25)
\]

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