Climate consequences of hydrogen leakage-emissions

Ilissa B. Ocko¹, Steven P. Hamburg¹
¹Environmental Defense Fund; New York, NY, USA

Correspondence to: Ilissa B. Ocko (iocko@edf.org)

Abstract. Hydrogen is quickly gaining attention as a “clean” fuel that can support a transition to a decarbonized energy system. Given the urgency to decarbonize global energy systems, governments and industry are moving ahead with efforts to increase deployment of hydrogen technologies, infrastructure, and applications at an unprecedented pace, including billions in national incentives and direct investments. While zero- and low-carbon hydrogen hold great promise to help solve some of the world’s most pressing energy challenges, hydrogen is also an short-lived, indirect greenhouse gas whose warming impact is both widely overlooked and underestimated. There are multiple areas of uncertainty. To date, hydrogen’s warming effects have been primarily characterized using the GWP-100 metric—which is misleading for short-lived gases, such as hydrogen, as it obscures impacts on shorter timescales. Furthermore, This is largely because hydrogen’s atmospheric warming effects are short-lived – lasting only a couple decades – but standard methods for characterizing climate impacts of gases consider only the long-term effect from a one-time pulse of emissions. For gases whose impacts are short-lived, like hydrogen, this long-term framing masks a much stronger warming potency in the near- to medium-term. This is of concern because hydrogen is a small molecule known to easily leak into the atmosphere; however, and, the total amount of leakage emissions (leakage, venting, purging) in from existing current hydrogen systems remains unknown, with the analytical capacity to accurately measure leakage in situ largely unavailable. Therefore, the net-climate benefit of a future hydrogen economy is unknown over the near to medium term; effectiveness of hydrogen as a decarbonization strategy, especially over timescales of several decades, remains unclear. This paper explores evaluates the climate implications consequences of hydrogen leakage-emissions over all timescales by employing already published data to assessing the change in cumulative radiative forcing its potency as a climate forcer, evaluate the net warming impacts from replacing fossil fuel systems technologies with their clean hydrogen applications alternatives, and estimating temperature responses to projected levels of hydrogen demand. We use the standard Global Warming Potential metric given its acceptance to stakeholders – incorporating newly published equations that more fully capture hydrogen’s several indirect effects but consider effects of constant rather than pulse emissions over multiple time horizons. We account for leakage using a plausible range of hydrogen leakage-emission rates and include the latest estimate of hydrogen’s radiative efficiency. We also consider the climate impacts from methane leakage-emissions when the hydrogen is produced via natural gas with CCUS (‘blue’ hydrogen) as opposed to renewables and water (‘green’ hydrogen), both considered “clean.” For the first time, we show the strong dependence on timescale when evaluating the climate change mitigation potential of clean hydrogen alternatives, with the emissions rate determining the scale of climate benefits or disbenefits. We find that the climate consequences of hydrogen applications relative to their fossil fuel
counterparts strongly depend on time horizon and leakage rate, with vastly different climate outcomes in the near- vs. long-term and for best- vs. worst-case leak rates. For example, green hydrogen applications with upper end emissions rates (10%) may only cut climate impacts from fossil fuel technologies in half over the first two decades, which is far from the common perception that green hydrogen energy systems are climate neutral. However, over a 100-year period, climate impacts could be reduced by around 80%. On the other hand, lower end emissions (1%) could yield limited impacts on the climate over all timescales. For blue hydrogen, associated methane emissions can make hydrogen applications worse for the climate than the fossil fuel technologies for several decades if emissions are high for both gases, but over 100 years yields climate benefits. Worst-case hydrogen leak rates could yield a near-doubling in radiative forcing relative to fossil fuel counterparts in the first five years following the technology switch, but an 80% decrease in radiative forcing over the following 100 years after deployment. On the other hand, best-case hydrogen leak rates could yield an 80% decrease in radiative forcing in the first five years. Simple estimates of temperature responses to a 10% hydrogen leakage rate (a high but plausible level) suggest a theoretical maximum contribution of around a quarter of a degree (C) in 2050 if hydrogen replaces the entire fossil fuel energy system, and at least a tenth of a degree (C) in 2050 if hydrogen accounts for more than half of final energy demand. While more work is needed to evaluate the warming impact of hydrogen emissions for specific end-use cases and value-chain pathways, it is clear that hydrogen emissions matter for the climate and warrant further attention by scientists, industry, and governments. Thus, a greater understanding of hydrogen’s warming impacts at different possible leakage rates is critical. This is critical to informing where and how to deploy hydrogen effectively in the emerging decarbonized global economy.

1 Introduction

Hydrogen is now considered an essential component in transitioning to a low-carbon global economy and achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions targets. (International Energy Agency, 2021) This is due to its potential to be a zero or near-zero carbon energy carrier to replace fossil fuel use, including in hard-to-abate sectors and for storage of renewable electricity (International Energy Agency, 2021). Dozens of countries have recently released plans to scale up clean hydrogen production and consumption, and $500B could be spent across the globe on hydrogen developments by 2030 (Hydrogen Council, 2021c).

However, one potential concern has been largely absent in recent conversations and assessments of the role of hydrogen (Anon: International Energy Agency, 2019; International Energy Agency, 2021; BloombergNEF, 2020; Bartlett and Kupnick, 2020; van Renssen, 2020; World Energy Council, 2021; Hydrogen Council, 2021c; Ueckerdt et al., 2021; International Renewable Energy Agency, 2022): the atmospheric warming effects from hydrogen leakage emitted into the atmosphere.

Scientists have long-known and cautioned that hydrogen has indirect warming impacts (Ehhalt et al., 2001; Derwent et al., 2001, 2006, 2020; Prather, 2003; Schultz et al., 2003; Warwick et al., 2004, 2022; Colella et al., 2005; Wuebbles et al., 2010; Derwent, 2018; Paulot et al., 2021; Field and Derwent, 2021). When it escapes into the atmosphere, it warms the Earth by affecting chemical reactions that increase the amount of greenhouse gases including methane, tropospheric ozone, and
When hydrogen escapes into the atmosphere, it has two main fates: around 70 to 80% is estimated to be removed by soils via diffusion and bacterial uptake, and the remaining 20 to 30% is oxidized by reacting with the naturally-occurring hydroxyl radical (OH), yielding an atmospheric lifetime of around a few years (Rahn et al., 2003; Derwent, 2018; Paulot et al., 2021; Warwick et al., 2022). The oxidation of hydrogen in the atmosphere leads to increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in both the troposphere and stratosphere, as described in Fig. 1 (Derwent, 2018; Derwent et al., 2020; Paulot et al., 2021; Field and Derwent, 2021; Warwick et al., 2022).

In the troposphere, less OH is available to react with methane, and given that methane’s reaction with OH is methane’s primary sink, this leads to a longer atmospheric lifetime for methane which accounts for around half of hydrogen’s total indirect warming effect (Paulot et al., 2021) for methane. Also in the troposphere, the production of atomic hydrogen from hydrogen oxidation leads to a series of reactions that ultimately form tropospheric ozone, another greenhouse gas, which accounts for about 20% of hydrogen’s radiative impacts (Paulot et al., 2021; see Fig. 1 for details). In the stratosphere, the oxidation of hydrogen increases the amount of water vapor, which in turn increases the infrared radiating capacity of the stratosphere, leading to stratospheric cooling and an overall warming effect on the climate because energy emitted out to space is now from a cooler temperature; this stratospheric effect accounts for about 30% of hydrogen’s climate impacts (Paulot et al., 2021). This has a positive forcing on the climate due to stratospheric cooling from water vapor’s absorption of heat. The stratospheric cooling can also lead to an increase in stratospheric polar clouds that enable more ozone-destroying reactions to occur, but to date those effects have been deemed minor (Derwent, 2018; Tromp et al., 2003; Warwick et al., 2004, 2022; Jacobson, 2008; van Ruijven et al., 2011; Vogel et al., 2011, 2012; Wang et al., 2013; Wuebbles et al., 2010; Derwent, 2018; Paulot et al., 2021).

A growing body of research has affirmed that the warming effects from hydrogen emissions are consequential, with new work showing that hydrogen’s indirect warming effects are twice as high as previously recognized (Paulot et al., 2021; Warwick et al., 2022); this is due to the inclusion of stratospheric effects that were not accounted until recently (Derwent, 2018; Derwent et al., 2020). Studies that consider both tropospheric and stratospheric effects from hydrogen emissions report an indirect radiative efficiency of 0.13 and 0.18 mW m⁻² ppbv⁻¹, respectively, whereas the studies that only account for tropospheric effects suggest an indirect radiative efficiency around 0.08 mW m⁻² ppbv⁻¹ (Derwent, 2018; Derwent et al., 2020; Paulot et al., 2021; Warwick et al., 2022). Converting hydrogen’s full atmospheric radiative efficiencies to per unit mass (3.64E-13 and 5.04E-13 W m⁻² kg⁻¹) and comparing to carbon dioxide (CO₂) and methane’s radiative efficiencies (1.7 E-15 W m⁻² kg⁻¹ and 2.0 E-13 W m⁻² kg⁻¹, respectively) shows that hydrogen’s indirect warming potency per unit mass is around 200 times that of carbon dioxide’s and larger than methane’s (Forster et al., 2021). However, like methane, hydrogen’s warming effects are potent but short-lived. Most of hydrogen’s effects are shorter-lived than methane’s – occurring within a decade after emission – but its impacts on methane can affect the climate for roughly an additional decade (Warwick et al., 2022).
Figure 1: Effects of hydrogen oxidation on atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations and warming.

Hydrogen’s warming effects have major implications for an emerging hydrogen economy because hydrogen is a tiny molecule that is hard to contain. It can leak across the entire value chain, including from electrolysers, compressors, liquefiers, storage tanks, geologic storage, pipelines, trucks, trains, ships, and fuelling stations (Bond et al., 2011; van Ruijven et al., 2011; Melaina et al., 2013; Cooper et al., 2022; Frazer-Nash Consultancy, 2022). Further, some hydrogen is deliberately vented and purged into the atmosphere from these systems (Frazer-Nash Consultancy, 2022; Mejia et al., 2020). Further, most of the hydrogen infrastructure needed to achieve decarbonization goals has yet to be built, with plans underway to develop more pipelines and even pump hydrogen into individual homes (United Kingdom. Secretary of State for Business, 2021).

While it is clear that hydrogen leakage poses a risk to decarbonization goals given its potency as an indirect greenhouse gas, there are several challenges associated with determining the overall magnitude and thus importance of its warming impacts on the effectiveness of hydrogen as a decarbonization strategy. First is the uncertainty of how much hydrogen will ultimately be emitted from hydrogen systems. The total amount of emissions (leakage, venting, purging) in current hydrogen systems remains unknown as empirical data on leakage rates from specific infrastructure (such as electrolysers, pipelines, vehicles, storage) is completely lacking. This is because measurement efforts to date have been focused on safety concerns, regulations, and risk assessment, which are focused on larger leaks. Commercially available sensing technologies able to detect smaller leaks – that would impact the climate but not safety – are unavailable (Mejia et al., 2020). Further, most of the hydrogen infrastructure needed to achieve decarbonization goals has yet to be built, with plans underway to develop more pipelines and even pump hydrogen into individual homes (United Kingdom. Secretary of State for Business, 2021).
Second is the uncertainty in how much hydrogen will be deployed in the future, how it will be produced, and what fossil fuel technologies it will replace. Currently, hydrogen is produced mostly from natural gas, and accounts for only a small fraction of the global economy with uses confined mainly to fertilizer production and refineries. (International Energy Agency, 2021). However, predictions suggest that supply and demand could increase up to tenfold at least tenfold from today’s levels by mid-century, with and account for approximately 20% of final energy demand and potentially even more applications ranging from industrial processes, building heating, a diversity of transportation systems, to providing clean firm power to complement long-term renewable energy intermittency (Hydrogen Council, 2017; BloombergNEF, 2020, 2021; International Energy Agency, 2021; Energy Transition Commission, 2021). While hydrogen leakage across the value chain is a concern regardless of production method and therefore applies to all hydrogen – including “green” hydrogen produced from water using renewable energy (considered “zero-carbon” or “climate neutral”) and “blue” hydrogen produced from natural gas using CCUS technologies (considered “low-carbon”) – blue hydrogen is subject to additional impacts on the energy balance due to residual emissions of CO$_2$ as well as emissions of methane from the natural gas supply value chain (see Fig. 2). The specific fossil fuel technologies that are replaced with hydrogen alternatives will also determine the net climate benefit from deploying clean hydrogen via how much carbon dioxide and methane emissions can be reduced (Fig. 2).

**Figure 2.** Primary climate forcers emitted from fossil fuel technologies and their clean hydrogen alternatives.

The third challenge is how hydrogen’s warming impacts are calculated and reported. Beyond the general uncertainties associated with estimating the direct and indirect radiative effects of any atmospheric constituent, the way in which scientists typically report the radiative potency of a climate forcer (such as via radiative efficiency or radiative forcing) can be inaccessible to and lack context for climate policy and business decision makers. Therefore, decades ago, scientists began developing simplified metrics for comparing the warming impacts among different greenhouse gases, with CO$_2$’s potency typically as the baseline for the comparison given its status as the most concerning human-emitted climate forcer. The most well-known and widely-used metric has consistently been the Global Warming Potential (GWP) with a 100-year time horizon, and is even baked into policies, international agreements, and greenhouse gas reporting requirements. GWP calculates the...
relative warming effect over a specified time interval from a pulse of emissions of a climate forcer compared to an equal pulse in mass of CO$_2$.

However, mostly because of its pulse approach, using this method to compare the climate effects between a climate forcer whose impacts are short-lived (such as hydrogen, and most notably methane) and a climate forcer whose impacts are long-lived (such as CO$_2$) is complicated. For example, if a 100-year time horizon is used, it masks the true impact of hydrogen during the decades in which it is influencing the climate, providing the inaccurate perception that hydrogen’s warming effects are much smaller than they are. On the other hand, it also provides the inaccurate perception that a pulse of hydrogen can influence the climate 100 years later. If a 20-year time horizon is used, it is more representative of hydrogen’s impacts while it is affecting the atmosphere, but it disregards CO$_2$’s impacts after 20 years, when it is still affecting the atmosphere.

This temporal issue of comparing warming impacts of short- and long-lived climate forcers has been extensively discussed in the literature for decades and has been a major source of confusion in the climate policy community; it has also led to the development of numerous alternative metrics designed to improve the comparisons (Shine et al., 2007; Alvarez et al., 2012; Allen et al., 2016; Cherubini and Tanaka, 2016; Ocko et al., 2017; Fesefeld et al., 2018; Balcombe et al., 2018; Ocko and Hamburg, 2019; Cain et al., 2019; Collins et al., 2020; Severinsky and Sessoms, 2021; Lynch et al., 2021). However, stakeholders continue to rely on GWP as their way to understand the potency of any non-CO$_2$ climate forcer, and specifically GWP with a 100-year time horizon (GWP-100).

The implications of this reliance on GWP-100 for hydrogen are that the majority of studies to date have assessed its climate effects either using technical indicators (such as radiative forcing) or relied on GWP-100 which did not convey hydrogen’s near-term impacts (Derwent et al., 2001, 2006, 2020; Prather, 2003; Schultz et al., 2003; Wuebbles et al., 2010; Derwent, 2018; Field and Derwent, 2021, Paulot et al., 2021). Further, until recently, the only published estimates of hydrogen’s warming effects were focused on tropospheric responses. These two factors have had the result of undervaluing hydrogen’s warming potency and overlooking its near-term effects. For example, new estimates of hydrogen’s GWP that include stratospheric effects show that hydrogen’s GWP-100 is twice as high as the previous central estimate of GWP-100 = 5 ± 1 (Derwent et al., 2020; Warwick et al., 2022). In terms of its near-term potency, the first estimates of hydrogen’s GWP for a 20-year time horizon (GWP-20) yields a potency that is three times higher than its 100-year impact (GWP-20 = 33 [20 – 40]; Warwick et al., 2022). In other words, hydrogen’s potency can be six times higher than commonly thought when looking at the critical next couple of decades.

Finally, Derwent et al., 2020; Warwick et al., 2022, accounting for methane emissions in climate assessments of clean hydrogen applications also suffers the same analytical challenges as hydrogen given that it is also a short-lived gas commonly assessed through a long-term lens. The climate effects of methane emissions are further underestimated given that natural gas leak rates are consistently underestimated in national emission inventories (Alvarez et al., 2018; Shen et al., 2021). Studies have shown
that considering high methane emissions from upstream supply chains associated with blue hydrogen production when considered on shorter time horizons reveals near-term harm to the climate that is not conveyed with standard GWP-100 assessments (Howarth and Jacobson, 2021).

Overall, the question remains: how will hydrogen’s full atmospheric warming impacts diminish its effectiveness as a decarbonization strategy across all timescales? While more sophisticated modelling will be needed to fully incorporate all complexities, interactions, and uncertainties described above, a first-order analysis is possible using already published data with minor improvements to the standard GWP metric to assess impacts over time and account for constant emissions. A constant emissions rate, as opposed to a one-time pulse of emissions, is important because continuous emissions more realistically represent hydrogen emissions in a hydrogen economy. In this work, we examine the net climate impacts over time for a generic case of replacing fossil fuel technologies with clean hydrogen alternatives using a plausible range of future hydrogen emission rates. We also include emissions of methane associated with blue hydrogen production for a range of plausible leak rates. We use newly published GWP equations for hydrogen’s indirect effects (Warwick et al. 2022) and report the outcomes of constant emissions for time horizons of 10 to 100 years. Alvarez et al., 2012 However, the use of standard greenhouse gas potency reporting conventions (i.e. Global Warming Potential; GWP) in many of these studies has considerably downplayed its radiative potency, leading to a perception that impacts are minor. This is because hydrogen is a short-lived gas with an atmospheric lifetime of a few years (Rahn et al., 2003; Derwent et al., 2020; Paulot et al., 2021), and GWP deemphasizes the climatic importance of short-lived species in the near-to-medium term; this is because the most common time horizon employed considers how a pulse of emissions impacts the climate over the following 100 years—long after the gas has left the atmosphere (Alvarez et al., 2012; Ocko et al., 2017).

The approach utilized is known as the Technology Warming Potential (Alvarez et al., 2012), and is similar to that of a life cycle assessment in that it compares climate impacts from two alternative technologies to help inform decision makers of the net benefits of switching from one to another. This method retains the familiar GWP formulation but conveys the climate implications over time from a sustained switch to hydrogen alternatives from fossil fuel technologies. Further, we use a simple approach to estimate temperature responses to projected hydrogen demand levels, providing an indication of the absolute climate consequences of hydrogen emissions.

The overall magnitude and thus importance of the short-term warming effects from hydrogen leakage will largely depend on how much hydrogen is ultimately deployed to replace fossil fuel systems and how much is able to leak from the value chain. Currently, hydrogen accounts for only a small fraction of the global economy (International Energy Agency, 2021), but
predictions suggest that supply could increase at least tenfold from today’s levels by mid-century and account for approximately 20% of final energy demand and potentially even more (Hydrogen Council, 2017; BloombergNEF, 2020; International Energy Agency, 2021). Unfortunately, there is a dearth of data quantifying hydrogen leakage (Mejia et al., 2020).

Hydrogen is thought to leak across the entire value chain, including electrolysers, compressors, liquefiers, storage tanks, geologic storage, pipelines, trucks, trains, ships, and fuelling stations—with the highest rates likely in midstream and downstream sectors (van Ruijven et al., 2011). Empirical data to date on leakage rates from specific infrastructure (such as pipelines, vehicles, storage) are focused on safety concerns, regulations, and risk assessment, which tend to focus on larger leaks, with no commercially available sensing technologies able to detect smaller leaks that would impact the climate but not safety (Mejia et al., 2020).

Hydrogen leakage across the value chain is a concern regardless of production method, and therefore applies to all hydrogen, including “green” hydrogen (hydrogen produced from water using renewable energy; considered “zero-carbon” or “climate neutral”). “Blue” hydrogen production (hydrogen produced from natural gas using CCS technologies; considered “low-carbon”) is subject to additional impacts on the energy balance due to residual emissions of carbon dioxide (CO₂) as well as emissions of methane from the natural gas supply value chain. Methane leakage suffers the same analytical challenges as hydrogen given that it is also a short-lived gas that is typically assessed using a long-term perspective, thus overlooking its strong potency in the short-term (Howarth and Jacobson, 2021). The climate effects of methane leakage are often underestimated in hydrogen assessments given that natural gas leak rates are often under-reported in national emission inventories (Alvarez et al., 2018; Shen et al., 2021).

Given hydrogen’s known indirect greenhouse gas properties and unknown leak rates, we use a metric for looking at the impacts of energy transitions on net radiative forcing over time called Technology Warming Potential (Alvarez et al., 2012) that considers continuous emissions, providing a more realistic understanding of the climate impacts of fuel switching. Furthermore, we estimate temperature responses to different levels of hydrogen deployment and leakage based on a simple approach as there are currently no formal models we are aware of that can simulate the full climate responses to hydrogen emissions.

2 Hydrogen’s indirect greenhouse gas effects

Previous waves of hydrogen enthusiasm led researchers to explore the unintended atmospheric consequences of a potential hydrogen economy (Prather, 2003; Schultz et al., 2003; Tromp et al., 2003; Colella et al., 2005) given hydrogen’s long-established reactivity in the atmosphere (Levy, 1972; Crutzen, 1974) and potential to leak from infrastructure (Prather, 2003). Two consequences have been considered: stratospheric ozone destruction via the formation of stratospheric water vapor, and indirect climate forcings via perturbations to greenhouse gas concentrations.
When hydrogen escapes into the atmosphere, it has two main fates: around 70 to 80% is estimated to be removed by soils via diffusion and bacteria and the remaining 20 to 30% is oxidized by reacting with the naturally occurring hydroxyl radical (OH), yielding an atmospheric lifetime of around a few years (Bahn et al., 2003; Derwent, 2018; Paulot et al., 2021). The oxidation of hydrogen leads to increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in both the troposphere and stratosphere, as described in Fig. 1 (Derwent, 2018; Derwent et al., 2020; Paulot et al., 2021; Field and Derwent, 2021). In the troposphere, less OH is available to react with methane, and given that methane’s reaction with OH is methane’s primary sink, this leads to a longer atmosphere lifetime for methane. Also in the troposphere, the production of atomic hydrogen from hydrogen oxidation leads to a series of reactions that ultimately form tropospheric ozone, another greenhouse gas (see Fig. 1 for details). In the stratosphere, the oxidation of hydrogen increases the amount of water vapor, which has a positive forcing on the climate due to stratospheric cooling from water vapor’s absorption of heat. The stratospheric cooling can also lead to an increase in stratospheric polar clouds that enable more ozone-destroying reactions to occur (Derwent, 2018).

![Diagram of hydrogen oxidation reactions](image)

**Figure 1:** Effects of hydrogen oxidation on atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations.

The consensus of several studies suggests that risks to stratospheric ozone are minor even with extensive use of hydrogen and high leak rates (Tromp et al., 2003; Warwick et al., 2004; Jacobson, 2008; van Ruijven et al., 2011; Vogel et al., 2011, 2012; Wang et al., 2013; Wuebbles et al., 2010), although Derwent (2018) indicates that more studies are warranted that use a range of state-of-the-science stratospheric ozone models. For studies that investigate climate forcings, only one to date includes both tropospheric and stratospheric effects (Paulot et al., 2021). The others have focused on tropospheric effects, with a few calculating climate forcings for select leakage rates and hydrogen demand scenarios (Prather, 2003; Schultz et al., 2003; Wuebbles et al., 2010), but the majority presenting results in terms of GWP-100 (Derwent et al., 2001, 2006; Derwent, 2018;
While the consensus among these studies has maintained that the absolute forcing of a hydrogen-intensive economy is relatively minor compared to today’s forcings from carbon dioxide and methane emissions, the combination of GWP-100 downplaying hydrogen’s true potency and the recent insights into the full atmospheric warming effects of hydrogen emissions warrants a deeper assessment of the climate consequences of hydrogen leakage using more robust metrics and including both tropospheric and stratospheric effects.

In particular, over the past two decades a series of studies used the STOCHEM chemistry transport model to assess and refine estimates of future hydrogen leakage’s warming impacts resulting from tropospheric chemistry effects (Derwent et al., 2001, 2006, 2020; Derwent, 2018; Field and Derwent, 2021). The analyses have consistently been carried out as a comparison between a pulse of hydrogen emissions’ impact on cumulative radiative forcing over the following 100 years relative to that from a pulse of carbon dioxide emissions—effectively, hydrogen’s GWP with a 100-year time horizon (GWP-100). This has led to a general estimate of hydrogen’s GWP-100 is 5 ± 1, which indicates that a pulse of hydrogen emissions will yield 5 times more warming than an equal (by weight) pulse of carbon dioxide emissions over the following 100 years (Derwent et al., 2020). (We note that a recent study arrived at a GWP-100 of 3.3, but it is unclear if this result is due to the specific case study that was investigated in the calculation (Field and Derwent, 2021).) As several previous studies have shown, relying on GWP-100 for understanding the importance of short-lived greenhouse gases relative to carbon dioxide is misleading (Alvarez et al., 2012; Ocko et al., 2017; Ocko and Hamburg, 2019). However, using the data provided by Derwent et al. (2020) for hydrogen’s atmospheric lifetime (2 years) and its GWP-100 (5 ± 1), we can use the traditional GWP formulas (Forster et al., 2021) to calculate hydrogen’s radiative efficiency for tropospheric warming effects: $2.3 \pm 0.5 \times 10^{-13} \text{W m}^{-2} \text{kg}^{-1}$, which is >100 times the radiative efficiency of carbon dioxide per unit mass ($1.7 \times 10^{-15} \text{W m}^{-2} \text{kg}^{-1}$ (Forster et al., 2021)) and slightly larger than methane’s ($2.0 \times 10^{-13} \text{W m}^{-2} \text{kg}^{-1}$, includes indirect effects but does not include climate-carbon feedbacks; (Forster et al., 2021)).

A recent study expanded upon past work by using the GFDL-AM4.1 model (atmospheric component of an earth system model) to estimate hydrogen’s influence on Earth’s radiative balance considering both tropospheric and stratospheric effects (Paulot et al., 2021). The study estimated hydrogen has a 0.13 mW m$^{-2}$ ppbv$^{-1}$ radiative efficiency (which converts to $3.61 \times 10^{-13} \text{W m}^{-2} \text{kg}^{-1}$) with an atmospheric lifetime of 2.5 years. Two thirds of this warming effect is from tropospheric effects, and the other third is from stratospheric effects. Paulot et al. (2021) found that around half of hydrogen’s radiative efficiency is due to lengthening the lifetime of methane in the atmosphere. Comparing the tropospheric portion of hydrogen’s radiative efficiency from Paulot et al. (2021) with that from Derwent et al. (2020) shows Paulot’s estimate is only 6% higher, well within the range of Derwent et al. (2020) uncertainty estimates. Based on this latest study, hydrogen’s radiative efficiency considering both tropospheric and stratospheric effects is more than 200 times that of carbon dioxide’s per unit mass. Using the traditional GWP formulas (Forster et al., 2021), this estimate of hydrogen’s radiative efficiency translates to a GWP-100 of around 10 (double that reported by Derwent et al. (2020)).
Given hydrogen’s short atmospheric lifetime of only a few years, reporting hydrogen’s potency in GWP-100 has limited value. One strategy for indicating the potency of short-lived climate pollutants is to report GWPs for two time horizons — one that conveys near-term impacts (most commonly 20-year time horizon) and one that conveys long-term impacts (100 years) (Ocko et al., 2017). Using the GWP formulas, this would translate to a GWP-20/100 of 19/5 for Derwent et al. (2020) (only tropospheric impacts) and 38/10 for Paulot et al. (2021) (both tropospheric and stratospheric effects). However, even a 20-year time horizon is long for a gas that only lasts a few years in the atmosphere. If we instead indicate the GWP over a 10-year time horizon (GWP-10), hydrogen’s potency relative to carbon dioxide for a pulse of emissions would increase to 34 and 66 for Derwent et al. (2020) and Paulot et al. (2021), respectively. For even shorter time horizons, hydrogen’s GWP can be more than ten times higher than what GWP-100 indicates (Fig. 2). This indicates larger near- and medium-term climate effects that are not conveyed by the traditional GWP-100 approach. This difference is material, given that most policy is currently focused on reaching net zero over these shorter time horizons.

However, assessing the impact of hydrogen through a pulse of emissions is also problematic. This is because continuous emissions are a better representation of actual hydrogen deployment. To better understand the climate effects of hydrogen over all timescales, one would need to consider the radiative effects of continuous emissions over time (Alvarez et al., 2012). In Fig. 2, we show how the GWPs for hydrogen change over time depending on the time horizon used in the calculation, and compare to an identical approach that uses continuous, rather than pulse, emissions. When continuous emissions are considered as opposed to just one pulse at time = 0, the potency of hydrogen relative to carbon dioxide is on average double that of the pulse approach (Fig. 2); this is true for long-term effects as well.

Overall, accounting for shorter rather than longer time horizons, continuous rather than pulse emissions, and both stratospheric and tropospheric effects can lead to a radiative potency of hydrogen relative to CO2 that is more than 20 times higher than the most commonly known hydrogen GWP of 5 (which is over 100 years, for pulse emissions, and only considers tropospheric effects). Even for 100-year impacts, accounting for continuous emissions and including stratospheric effects leads to a quadrupling of hydrogen’s commonly known GWP, from 5 to 20. Therefore, even the long-term effects of hydrogen leakage are significantly underestimated.
Figure 2: Cumulative radiative forcing of hydrogen relative to carbon dioxide for equal emissions. Solid lines are for continuous emissions of both hydrogen and carbon dioxide, and dotted lines are for a pulse of emissions at time horizon = 0. Dotted lines correspond to traditional GWP calculations per time horizon. Shaded areas correspond to a 20% uncertainty in the radiative efficiency of hydrogen. (a) is based on hydrogen's radiative efficiency derived from Derwent et al. (2020), and includes only tropospheric responses to hydrogen oxidation. (b) is based on hydrogen's radiative efficiency derived from Paulot et al. (2021), and includes both tropospheric and stratospheric responses to hydrogen oxidation.

However, given that hydrogen’s radiative effects are entirely indirect, any time horizon shorter than the lifetime of hydrogen (in which the required reactions have not yet taken place) will not provide a meaningful GWP result. Further, while Field and Derwent (2021) suggest that the tropospheric ozone effects are nearly immediate, the methane effects may take a few years to build up. This highlights the need for a more integrated chemistry-climate modeling approach to accurately determine the tropospheric and stratospheric radiative effects of hydrogen leakage in the first several years after emission. The importance of such an approach is enhanced when determining how related factors may change in the future, such as changing concentrations of methane resulting from reduced emissions of methane in response to aggressive policies to address climate goals.

3. Hydrogen leakage rates

Given its small molecule size, low molecular weight, high diffusivity, and low viscosity, hydrogen is difficult to contain and can easily leak from infrastructure throughout the value chain (van Ruijven et al., 2011; Bond et al., 2011; Melaina et al., 2012).
There is also strong reason to believe that hydrogen leaks could be even higher. Extensive measurements of natural gas value chain leaks over the last decade (similar infrastructure, larger molecule) have shown that leakage rates were far higher than recognized by industry (Alvarez et al., 2018). This underestimate is the product of missing both ends of the distribution of leaks: not detecting the many smaller leaks as well as missing fat-tailed emissions resulting from rarer large emission events when the infrastructure does not function as intended, such as pipeline cracks and ruptures. If the hydrogen value chain develops as a replacement for natural gas it is reasonable to expect a similar set of challenges. While hydrogen is an arguably more valuable product given the current cost of producing it, the lack of empirical measurements cannot confirm any assumptions regarding the influence of the cost of lost product on leakage rates, especially if there is no regulatory enforcement.

Further, most of the hydrogen infrastructure needed to achieve decarbonization goals has yet to be built, with plans underway to develop more pipelines and even pump hydrogen into individual homes (United Kingdom. Secretary of State for Business, 2021). Without measurements of hydrogen leakage and in turn knowledge of strategies to mitigate leakage and deploy best practices, we risk developing leaky systems that could significantly contribute to climate change in the near to medium term. Fortunately, we have an opportunity to get ahead of this issue before the infrastructure and systems are widely deployed.

### 24 Climate implications of hydrogen leakage

**Methodology**

Our analysis is comprised of three components. First, to provide context on hydrogen’s warming potency as an agent of climate change, we compare hydrogen’s warming effects to that of carbon dioxide for equal mass using the traditional GWP methodology. Second, to provide context on the implications of this warming potency for a hydrogen economy relative to a fossil fuel one, we compare the warming impacts from deploying clean hydrogen across a range of hydrogen and methane emission rates to that from greenhouse gas emissions (CO₂ and methane) from fossil fuel utilization. Third, to provide context on the magnitude of this warming impact, we estimate temperature responses to future hydrogen emissions based on different hydrogen demand levels and leak rates. To evaluate the importance of the warming effects from hydrogen leakage, it is useful to compare the relative climate impacts from hydrogen applications for a range of potential leak rates to the fossil fuel applications they would be replacing. While the overall magnitude of impact on the climate will depend on how much hydrogen is deployed (amongst other factors such as specific technology, value chain path, leak rate, etc.) the comparison approach is similar to that of a life cycle assessment in that it compares climate impacts from two alternative technologies to help inform decision makers. These types of assessments are often conducted using the traditional GWP-100 approach (e.g. Hydrogen Council, 2021a), but as discussed earlier, a 100-year timeframe hides what occurs over shorter time periods and continuous emissions are a better representation of technological deployment. For example, Alvarez et al. (2012) showed that while a natural gas powered light-duty vehicle may be better for the climate over a 100-year period than a gasoline vehicle, if natural gas leakage along the supply chain was as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimated it to be—now shown to be a significant underestimate (Alvarez et al., 2018)—then it would take 80 years before one would see climate benefits from its continuous use relative to the use of a gasoline car.
2.1 Climate impact calculations

To calculate the warming effects of hydrogen, methane, and carbon dioxide emissions, we use the traditional GWP metric but account for constant emissions rather than a pulse of emissions. We first use the Absolute Global Warming Potential (AGWP) components, which computes the cumulative radiative forcing of a climate forcer over a specified time horizon in (W m\(^{-2}\))/(kg yr\(^{-1}\)). For carbon dioxide and methane, we use the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) formulations of AGWP, Eqns. (1) and (2), respectively (Myhre et al., 2013; Forster et al., 2021). Input parameters and their sources can be found in Table 1.

\[
AGWP_{CO2}(H) = A_{CO2} \left\{ a_H + \sum_{i=1}^{3} a_i \tau_i \left( 1 - \exp\left(-\frac{a_i}{\tau_i}\right) \right) \right\}
\]

(1)

\[
AGWP_{CH4}(H) = (1 + f_1 + f_2) A_{CH4} \left\{ 1 - \exp\left(-\frac{H}{\tau_H}\right) \right\}
\]

(2)

While these equations are appropriate for climate forcers with primarily direct radiative effects, hydrogen’s radiative effects are entirely indirect. Therefore, we use the AGWP equations recently derived specifically for hydrogen based on sophisticated chemistry-climate modelling experiments, which explicitly accounts for its three main indirect effects and their varying temporal dynamics (methane, tropospheric ozone, and stratospheric water vapor) (Warwick et al., 2022). The equations are shown here (Eqns. (3) – (8)) and provide the same output information of cumulative radiative forcing per time horizon ((W m\(^{-2}\))/(kg yr\(^{-1}\))) as in Eqns. (1) and (2). More details on their derivation are available in Warwick et al. (2022). Input parameters and their sources can be found in Table 1.

\[
AGWP_{H2,1}(H) = A_1 a_1 \tau_i^2 \left( \frac{t_p - \tau_i \left( 1 - \exp\left(-\frac{t_p}{\tau_i}\right) \right)}{\exp\left(-\frac{t_p}{\tau_i}\right) - \exp\left(-\frac{H}{\tau_H}\right)} \right) \left( \tau_H \left( 1 - \exp\left(-\frac{t_p}{\tau_H}\right) \right) - \tau_i \left( 1 - \exp\left(-\frac{t_p}{\tau_i}\right) \right) \right)
\]

(3)

\[
AGWP_{H2,2}(H) = \frac{A_1 a_1 \tau_i^2 \left( 1 - \exp\left(-\frac{t_p}{\tau_i}\right) \right)}{\left( \exp\left(-\frac{t_p}{\tau_i}\right) - \exp\left(-\frac{H}{\tau_H}\right) \right) \left( \exp\left(-\frac{t_p}{\tau_H}\right) - \exp\left(-\frac{t_p}{\tau_i}\right) \right)}
\]

(4)

\[
AGWP_{H2,3}(H) = A_1 a_1 \tau_i^2 \left( 1 - \exp\left(-\frac{t_p}{\tau_i}\right) \right) \left( \exp\left(-\frac{t_p}{\tau_H}\right) - \exp\left(-\frac{H}{\tau_H}\right) \right) \left( \exp\left(-\frac{t_p}{\tau_H}\right) - \exp\left(-\frac{t_p}{\tau_i}\right) \right)
\]

(5)

\[
AGWP_{H2,4}(H) = AGWP_{H2,1}(H) + AGWP_{H2,2}(H) + AGWP_{H2,3}(H)
\]

(6)

\[
AGWP_{H2,CH4}(H) = (1 + f_1 + f_2) AGWP_{H2,CH4}(H)
\]

(7)
\[ AGWP_{H_2}(H) = AGWP_{H_2,CH_4}(H) + AGWP_{H_2,O_2}(H) + AGWP_{H_2,H_2O}(H) \] (8)

| Variable | Definition | Unit | Value | Source |
|----------|------------|------|-------|--------|
| \( H \) | Time horizon | Years | 1–100 | N/A |
| \( AGWP_{CO_2} \) | Radiative forcing scaling factor | W m\(^{-2}\) ppb\(^{-1}\) | 1.33e-5 | Forster et al. 2021 |
| \( \alpha_{CO_2} \) | Coefficient for fraction of CO\(_2\) remaining in atmosphere | unitless | \( q=0.2173; q'=0.324; \) | Myhre et al. 2013 |
| \( \tau_{CO_2} \) | Timescale for fraction of CO\(_2\) remaining in atmosphere | Years | \( \tau=394.4; \tau'=36.54; \) | Myhre et al. 2013 |
| \( AGWP_{CH_4} \) | Radiative forcing scaling factor | W m\(^{-2}\) ppb\(^{-1}\) | 3.88e-4 | Forster et al. 2021 |
| \( \xi \) | Perturbation lifetime | Years | 11.8 | Forster et al. 2021 |
| \( \tau_{O_3} \) | Stratospheric ozone indirect effect scaling | unitless | 0.37 | Forster et al. 2021 |
| \( \tau_{H_2O} \) | Stratospheric water vapor indirect effect scaling | unitless | 0.106 | Forster et al. 2021 |
| \( AGWP_{H_2} \) | | | | |
| \( \tau_{CH_4} \) | H\(_2\) lifetime (combined chemical and deposition lifetime) | Years | 1.9 (1.4-2.5) | Warwick et al. 2022 |
| \( \xi \) | Conversion factor for converting H\(_2\) mixing ratio (ppb) into H\(_2\) mass (kg) | ppb kg\(^{-1}\) | 3.5e-9 | Warwick et al. 2022 |
| \( \rho \) | Length of step emission | Years | 1 | N/A |
| \( \alpha_{CH_4} \) | Radiative forcing scaling factor | W m\(^{-2}\) DU\(^{-1}\) | 0.042 | Warwick et al. 2022 |
| \( Q_k \) | Production rate of species resulting in the indirect forcing (mixing ratio yr\(^{-1}\)) per ppb H\(_2\) change at steady-state | ppb(H\(_2\)) yr\(^{-1}\) | 1.46e-2 | Warwick et al. 2022 |
| \( Q_{CH_4} \) | | | | |
| \( \tau_{CH_4} \) | Perturbation lifetime of species causing the indirect forcing | Years | 11.8 | Forster et al. 2021 |

**Table 1: Input parameters and sources used for Absolute Global Warming Potential calculations shown in Eqs (1) – (8).** For hydrogen AGWPs, we replaced IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (2013) (Myhre et al. 2013) values that were used in Warwick et al. (2022) with that from IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (2021) values (Forster et al. 2021).

To account for a constant emissions rate of each forcer as opposed to just a pulse of emissions, we consider a new pulse of emissions every year. Assuming linearity, the summation of the cumulative radiative forcing (\( AGWP \)) from past and current pulses for each year is equal to the cumulative radiative forcing from a constant emissions rate (\( AGWP_c \)). To account for multiple forcers emitted from each technology, we add up the individual AGWPs\(_c\) for each time horizon. Finally, to compare the climate impacts from hydrogen technologies to their fossil fuel technologies counterparts, we simply divide their AGWPs\(_c\) (compared to how GWP is calculated). The results are then presented as a ratio of climate impacts (using cumulative radiative
forcing as a proxy) as a function of time between two different technologies (i.e., hydrogen alternatives vs. fossil fuel technologies). A value of greater than 1 indicates that the alternative technology (in this case hydrogen) has larger climate warming impacts at time horizon \( H \) than the original technology, and vice versa for less than 1. In our analysis, we present the results as a percent change in climate impacts (cumulative radiative forcing) from the original technology, such that \( 1 = 0\% \) change (or equal), \( 0.5 = 50\% \) decrease, \( 2 = 100\% \) increase, etc.

This concept – an extension of AGWP and GWP that considers a constant emissions rate (as opposed to a one-time pulse) and calculates the relative climate effects over time (as opposed to one specified time horizon such as over 100 years) – is further documented and discussed in Alvarez et al. (2012), where it is called the Technology Warming Potential. Several studies have used this metric to assess the climate impacts of different technologies that emit multiple greenhouse gases with varying atmospheric lifetimes, to show how the climate impacts of specific technologies change over time relative to one another (Alvarez et al., 2012; Camuzeaux et al., 2015; Ocko and Hamburg, 2019). However, given hydrogen’s unique AGWP equations resulting from its varying indirect effects, we do not use the specific formulas derived in Alvarez et al. (2012), but rather follow the calculation chain described above.

To account for uncertainties in our analysis, we follow the approach of Warwick et al. (2022). We first consider uncertainties in hydrogen’s atmospheric lifetime, which given the uncertainty in the strength of hydrogen’s soil sink is arguably the greatest source of uncertainty in hydrogen’s atmospheric impacts overall (Paulot et al., 2021; Warwick et al., 2022). Compared to a central estimate of hydrogen’s atmospheric lifetime of 1.9 years (Warwick et al. 2022), we use a lower end estimate of 1.4 years (Warwick et al. 2022) and a higher end estimate of 2.5 years (Paulot et al. 2021). Second, we apply a \( \pm 20\% \) uncertainty to hydrogen’s GWP \((\text{AGWP}_{\text{H2}}(H)/\text{AGWP}_{\text{CO2}}(H))\) due to uncertainties in radiative forcing scaling factors and CO2’s radiative effects (Warwick et al. 2022).

We use the approach of Alvarez et al. (2012) which considers climate impacts over all timescales of continuous emissions to consider temporal tradeoffs in climate benefits: the Technology Warming Potential. This metric builds on the Global Warming Potential metric and is described in detail in Sect. 4.1.2. We apply this metric to a simple case study to provide a first order analysis of the climate implications over all timescales (from the first few years to a hundred years after) as a result of replacing fossil fuel systems with hydrogen applications assuming a range of leak rates. Given that the absolute warming impact from hydrogen applications will depend on the extent of hydrogen deployment, we also approximate temperature responses to hydrogen emissions through 2050 for several deployment scenarios using the approach used in Paulot et al. (2021) and described in Sect 4.1.3. We use the Technology Warming Potential (TWP) to calculate the relative climate impacts from hydrogen applications to that from the fossil fuel applications that they would be replacing for the case study described in Sect. 4.1.1 (continuous deployment of a unit of hydrogen relative to the CO2 emissions avoided). This metric calculates the
cumulative radiative forcing of continuous emissions of greenhouse gases over time based on their decay functions and radiative efficiencies, and is described in detail in Alvarez et al. (2012). TWP uses the same fundamental physics as GWP but conveys impacts over time rather than for one select time horizon, and for continuous emissions rather than a pulse of emissions. Several studies have used this metric to assess the climate impacts of different technologies that emit multiple greenhouse gases with varying atmospheric lifetimes, to show how the climate impacts of specific technologies change over time relative to one another (Alvarez et al., 2012; Camuzeaux et al., 2015; Ocko and Hamburg, 2019).

The results are presented as a ratio of climate impacts (using cumulative radiative forcing as a proxy) over time between two different technologies (in our case, this would be hydrogen applications vs. fossil fuel applications). A TWP of greater than 1 indicates that the alternative technology (in this case hydrogen) has larger climate warming impacts at time t than the original technology, and vice versa for less than 1. In our analysis, we present the results as a percent change in climate impacts (cumulative radiative forcing) from the original technology, such that \(1 = 0\% \text{ change (or equal)}, \ 2 = 100\% \text{ increase, etc.}\)

Radiative properties and atmospheric lifetimes used in the analysis can be found in Table 3. We use the radiative efficiency and atmospheric lifetime for hydrogen that are estimated in Paulot et al. (2021), given that the tropospheric effects are consistent with Derwent et al. (2020), and Paulot et al. (2021) include stratospheric effects as well. While Paulot et al. (2021) does not indicate an uncertainty range for their estimated radiative efficiency of hydrogen, we apply a 20% uncertainty for two reasons: (1) this is the uncertainty that Derwent et al. (2020) applied to tropospheric warming effects from hydrogen, and (2) the stratospheric effects from hydrogen oxidation are similar to methane oxidation, and the latest science suggests a 14% uncertainty in chemical responses contributing to methane’s radiative efficiency (Forster et al., 2021).

Further, given that the effects of hydrogen emissions are entirely indirect, we average the climate impacts over the first five years after initial emission to account for the individual timelines in chemical responses and to remain conservative during the first few years where hydrogen potency would strongly outweigh that of carbon dioxide if considered an instantaneous effect (recall that the radiative efficiency of hydrogen is around 200 times that of carbon dioxide for equal mass). For example, Field and Derwent (2021) suggest that the tropospheric ozone response is immediate, but that the methane response takes a few years to reach its full potential.

Methane and carbon dioxide radiative properties and atmospheric lifetimes are taken from Forster et al. (2021), but we do not include climate-carbon feedbacks associated with methane to be consistent with what is included with hydrogen. We note that far less work has gone into refining hydrogen’s radiative impacts compared to methane and carbon dioxide, and we hope that this paper inspires more research into hydrogen’s impacts on Earth’s energy balance to provide more confidence in estimates.
4.1.3 Temperature response estimates

In the absence of models capable of interactively simulating the chemistry, radiation, and temperature responses in the full atmosphere to hydrogen emissions, we apply the simple approach used by Paulot et al. (2021) to approximate long-term temperature responses to the three hydrogen demand scenarios discussed in Sect. 4.1.1 hydrogen emissions. This method uses the best estimates of the long-term increase in global surface temperature (equilibrium climate sensitivity; ECS) and radiative forcing from a doubling of CO₂ concentrations and assumes that hydrogen would have a similar efficacy. The CMIP6 models suggest a best estimate of $3.78 \pm 1.08$ °C for the ECS and a $3.93 \text{ W m}^{-2}$ effective radiative forcing for a doubling of CO₂ (Forster et al., 2021). This suggests a climate efficacy of $0.96$ °C (W m⁻²)⁻¹. To estimate temperature responses to hydrogen emissions, we multiply this efficacy with the hydrogen effective radiative efficiency estimated in Paulot et al. (2021) per unit of emission per year (0.84 mW m⁻² (Tg yr⁻¹)) and the hydrogen emissions per year based on the leak rate for each hydrogen demand scenario (Table 2). For To account for uncertainties, we use a ±40% uncertainty in the hydrogen effective radiative efficiency as discussed in Sect. 4.1.2, which is comparable to the uncertainty arising from both soil sink impacts on hydrogen’s atmospheric lifetime and the uncertainty in radiative forcing scaling factors and carbon dioxide’s radiative effects (discussed above). Note that for the temperature analysis, we do not consider additional temperature impacts from methane emissions associated with the natural gas supply chain utilized in the production of blue hydrogen, as we want to focus on the absolute impacts from hydrogen emissions in particular.

4.1 Methodology

4.1.1 Emissions from hydrogen technologies

The emissions from hydrogen applications we consider in our analysis are hydrogen emissions (leakage, venting, purging) from green hydrogen production and consumption, and both hydrogen and methane emissions (leakage, venting, purging, flaring) from blue hydrogen production and consumption. We do not consider CO₂ emissions from incomplete CCUS technologies to retain simplicity and be conservative, but this would increase the climate impacts of blue hydrogen consumption depending on the efficiency and the permanence of storage. We also do not consider greenhouse gas emissions from hydrogen infrastructure build-out.

While fluid dynamics theory suggests that hydrogen can leak 1.3 to 2 times faster than methane (the main component of natural gas) (Swain and Swain, 1992), a recent study focused on low-pressure distribution pipes suggests that small leaks in methane and hydrogen may occur at similar rates (Mejia et al., 2020).
For hydrogen emissions, there is a paucity of quantitative data addressing *in situ* hydrogen leakage along the value chain, with empirical measurements to date focused on safety concerns (i.e. large leaks) primarily in confined spaces (Kobayashi et al., 2018). While there are many methods of hydrogen gas sensing (e.g. optical, acoustic, thermal, electrochemical) and several types of sensors exist (Najjar, 2019), there are currently no commercially available sensors that can detect hydrogen leakage at levels well below the threshold for hydrogen gas flammability which is required to characterize leakage emissions in the open. Numerical studies also analyse hydrogen leakage through a safety perspective (Hajji et al., 2015; Parvini and Gharagouzlou, 2015; Chang et al., 2019; Qian et al., 2020) and small leaks of a buoyant gas will likely require new methods to accurately characterize actual leak rates (ppb level as opposed to ppm level).

However, it is very likely that hydrogen leaks are emitted throughout the value chain, and yet unclear—given lack of data—which components contribute most and least to leakage emissions. Research suggests that loss rates from electrolyzers could be high, and based on first principles of moving a small gas molecule, it is likely that transport of hydrogen is a major source (van Ruijven et al., 2011; Cooper et al., 2022; Frazer-Nash, 2022). Fluid dynamics theory suggests that hydrogen can leak 1.3 to 3 times faster than methane (the main component of natural gas) (Swain and Swain, 1992), although a recent study focused on low pressure distribution pipes suggests that small leaks in methane and hydrogen may occur at similar rates if the path to leakage is convoluted (Mejia et al., 2020). Previous work also suggests that liquified hydrogen could have high emission rates from boiloff (Sherif et al., 1997).

However, based on first principles of moving a small gas molecule, it is likely that transport of hydrogen is a major source, and previous work suggests that liquified hydrogen could have high leak rates from boil off (Sherif et al., 1997). The DOE Hydrogen delivery scenario analysis model (HDSAM 3.0) assumes several loss rates in their model for different hydrogen components, but it is unclear if it is all lost as hydrogen to the atmosphere (i.e. leakage) or converted into other compounds (Department of Energy, n.d.). Components and loss rates assumed in their model include compressor (0.5%), liquefier (0.5%), compressed gas terminal (0.5%), liquid terminal (0.25-0.5%), geologic storage (0.5%), refuelling station—gas (0.5%), refuelling station—liquid (0.3%/day). For pipelines (transmission and distribution), assumptions are made of loss in mass per mile per year (778 and 156 kg H₂ mi⁻¹ yr⁻¹, respectively). In addition, van Ruijven et al. (2011) synthesize estimates of leakage for different delivery methods and a few end uses based on previous studies, for both low leakage and high leakage cases. Estimates include long distance ship (0.2%), long distance pipeline (0.1-5%), short distance truck (2-5.5%), short distance pipeline (0.1-5%), on-board storage (0.1-15%), and fuel cell and on-board system (0.1-1%). However, a survey of empirical measurements available makes it clear that we require significantly more robust data to have confidence in these estimates for each component of the value chain.
As such, we have even less confidence on total value chain leakage emissions, which will ultimately depend on the configuration of the pathway from production through end use, and in the absence of empirical data, there can be very little confidence in any published estimates of hydrogen emissions from a future hydrogen economy. Of the previous studies that have made assumptions of total hydrogen leakage emissions for the purpose of assessing environmental impacts from a potential hydrogen economy, estimates range from 0.3% to 20% for minimum to maximum leakage emissions (Schultz et al., 2003; Tromp et al., 2003; Colella et al., 2005; Wuebbles et al., 2010; van Ruijven et al., 2011; Bond et al., 2011; Cooper et al., 2022; Frazer-Nash Consultancy, 2022). All studies acknowledge major uncertainty in the estimates due to a lack of data, and several do not include all components of the value chain, e.g. production, compression, storage, and end-use applications. All studies acknowledge major uncertainty in the estimates due to a lack of data. Further, some studies have also made assumptions on total value chain leakage emissions citing these previous studies, typically using a range of upper end of 1 to 10% (Prather, 2003; Derwent et al., 2001, 2020; Paulot et al., 2021; Warwick et al., 2022). Therefore, we follow the published literature and incorporate a hydrogen emission rate of 1% (best-case) to 10% (worst-case) per amount of hydrogen consumed. The 20% total leakage appears to be an outlier suggested by one study (Tromp et al., 2003; Schultz et al., 2003) suggest that only for extreme individual cases like uncontrolled evaporation from liquid hydrogen storage tanks would 10 to 20% leakage rates be possible. However, the total value chain hydrogen leakage estimated by van Ruijven et al. (2011) based on a per-component configuration (more nuanced than previous estimates) has a maximum of 10% but does not include leakage from production and compression, as well as elements of storage and end-use applications, and therefore this estimate may be too low.

For blue hydrogen production, methane is needed as both a feedstock and a heat source, and can be emitted along the supply chain (upstream and midstream) before it is used for producing hydrogen. The amount of methane needed to produce a unit mass of hydrogen will depend on the composition of the natural gas, the efficiency of the reformer, and how much is needed as feedstock and fuel combined. The amount needed is not well documented in the published literature, and based on public documents and private communications can range anywhere from 2.5 to 4.5 times the mass of hydrogen (Budsberg et al., 2015; Kearney Energy Transition Institute, 2020). In this analysis, we use a central estimate of 3 times the mass of hydrogen is needed in the form of methane when considering blue hydrogen production, we assume 3 times the mass of hydrogen is needed in the form of methane. This value is on the lower end of all estimates but in the middle for published values; this makes methane emissions assumptions from blue hydrogen applications potentially conservative for using methane as a feedstock for hydrogen production (Budsberg et al., 2015). This would mean 3 times 1.01 kg or 1.1 kg depending on the hydrogen leakage which will determine how much hydrogen needs to be produced to have 1 kg consumed (see Table 1).

For methane emissions estimates (including venting, purging, flaring) upstream of hydrogen production, we use a range of 1% (best-case) to 3% (worst-case) for methane leakage per unit methane used to produce hydrogen consumed. This is based on the latest understanding of upstream natural gas leakage from oil and gas production as well as distribution of natural gas (Alvarez et al., 2018), which would result in 0.031 kg methane emissions per 1 kg hydrogen deployed for best-
To determine how much hydrogen needs to be produced as well as for best and worst-case leak rates based on 1 kg of either green or blue hydrogen deployed. To arrive at a first-order estimate of the potential climate concern of hydrogen leakage per unit deployed, we explore the impact of consuming 1 kg of hydrogen continuously every year. We follow related studies that, based on the best available literature, assume leak rates ranging from 1 to 10% (Derwent et al., 2020; Paulot et al., 2021). However, we note that there is a serious lack of empirical data and the ultimate leakage for each hydrogen application will depend on the specific pathway from hydrogen production to consumption. These levels of leakage correspond to hydrogen emissions of 0.01 and 0.11 kg, respectively, given that 1.01 kg or 1.1 kg of hydrogen must be produced for 1 kg of hydrogen to be consumed in either case. Emissions used in our study can be found in Table 1. For green hydrogen, the only climate pollutant emissions in our analysis are that from hydrogen leakage, but we note that infrastructure build out will contribute to emissions as well.

Table 2 shows the hydrogen and methane emissions used in this study for best- and worst-case leak rates based on 1 kg of either green or blue hydrogen deployed. To estimate a first-order estimate of the potential climate concern of hydrogen leakage per unit deployed, we explore the impact of consuming 1 kg of hydrogen continuously every year. We follow related studies that, based on the best available literature, assume leak rates ranging from 1 to 10% (Derwent et al., 2020; Paulot et al., 2021). However, we note that there is a serious lack of empirical data and the ultimate leakage for each hydrogen application will depend on the specific pathway from hydrogen production to consumption. These levels of leakage correspond to hydrogen emissions of 0.01 and 0.11 kg, respectively, given that 1.01 kg or 1.1 kg of hydrogen must be produced for 1 kg of hydrogen to be consumed in either case. Emissions used in our study can be found in Table 1. For green hydrogen, the only climate pollutant emissions in our analysis are that from hydrogen leakage, but we note that infrastructure build out will contribute to emissions as well.

To determine emissions of methane when considering blue hydrogen production, we assume 2 times the mass of hydrogen is needed in the form of methane for using methane as a feedstock for hydrogen production (Buddberg et al., 2015). This would mean 2 times 1.01 kg or 1.1 kg depending on the hydrogen leakage which will determine how much hydrogen needs to be produced to have 1 kg consumed (see Table 1). We then use a range of 1 to 25% for methane leakage per unit methane used to produce hydrogen, based on the latest understanding of upstream natural gas leakage from oil and gas production as well as distribution of natural gas (Alvarez et al., 2018), which would result in 0.021 kg methane emissions per 1 kg hydrogen deployed for best case leaks for both, and 0.111 kg for worst case for both. However, we conservatively assume that half of the replaced fossil fuel applications are natural gas based, and therefore the net difference in methane leakage from blue hydrogen production is 50%, accounting for 0.016 and 0.056 kg increase in methane emissions, respectively. Further, we omit residual carbon dioxide emissions from imperfect CCUS technologies to retain simplicity and be conservative, but this would increase the climate impacts of blue hydrogen consumption depending on the efficiency and the permanence of storage.

| Hydrogen (Green & Blue) | Produced | Best-case leaks \(H_2 \) & \(CH_4\) 1% | Worst-case leaks \(H_2 \) \(10\% \& CH_4\) 3% |
|------------------------|----------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                        | Consumed | 1.01            | 1.11            |
|                        | Emitted  | 0.01            | 0.11            |

| Methane* | Produced | 3.06 | 3.44 |

*Table 1: Assumptions for methane emissions. Hydrogen emissions are based on hydrogen leakage rates of 1% and 10%, with methane leaks ranging from 0.01 to 0.11 kg. Methane emissions are based on the percentage of hydrogen leakage and the fraction of hydrogen produced from natural gas applications.
Table 2: Continuous emissions used in analysis for replacing fossil fuel systems with a unit of hydrogen. Hydrogen and methane emissions (kg) for deploying 1 kg of either green or blue hydrogen based on best- and worst-case leak rates. Green hydrogen includes only hydrogen leakage with a best-case leak rate of 1% and a worst-case leak rate of 10%, and blue hydrogen includes both hydrogen and methane leakage with a best-case of 1% for both and a worst-case of 10% and 3%, respectively. Given that there will be some upstream natural gas leakage associated with the fossil fuel technologies, we conservatively assume that 50% of methane leakage from blue hydrogen production would have occurred in the fossil fuel case as well, therefore with a net increase of only 50% of the methane leaks.

We assume 3 times the mass of hydrogen is needed in the form of methane for using methane as a feedstock for hydrogen production (Budsberg et al., 2015; Kearney Energy Transition Institute, 2020).

For estimating absolute temperature responses to future hydrogen leakage, we consider three levels of leakage (1%, 5%, 10%) and several levels of hydrogen demand from today’s level (around 100 Tg yr⁻¹) to a theoretical maximum projected for mid-century (around 3000 Tg yr⁻¹). Depending on the scenario and source, projections for future hydrogen demand range from 100 to 210 Tg by 2050, and 130 to 1370 by 2050 (Table 3). Of 21 published estimates for hydrogen demand in 2050, the average is 590 Tg (median is 570 Tg). The theoretical maximum of using hydrogen to supply the entire final energy demand in 2050 is determined based on the estimates of hydrogen demand as a percent of final energy demand provided by Hydrogen Council (2017) and BloombergNEF (2020), 3055 Mt and 2900 Mt, respectively, that are each for scenarios of a decarbonized world.

| Year | Estimate (Tg) | Source | Scenario description |
|------|---------------|--------|----------------------|
| 2018 | 115           | Energy Transition Commission, 2021 | Hydrogen demand |
| 2018 | 115           | International Energy Agency, 2019 | Hydrogen demand |
| 2019 | 120           | International Renewable Energy Agency, 2020 | Hydrogen production |
| 2020 | 89            | International Energy Agency, 2022 | Hydrogen demand |
| 2020 | 90            | Hydrogen Council, 2021 | Hydrogen demand |
| 2021 | 73            | Yusaf et al. 2022 | Hydrogen production |
| 2030 | 102           | International Energy Agency, 2021 | Hydrogen projects currently under development |
| 2030 | 110           | International Energy Agency, 2021 | Announced Pledges Scenario |
| 2030 | 140           | Hydrogen Council, 2021 | Net zero 1.5°C compatible scenario |
relative to their fossil fuel counterparts over time we consider the potential climate concern of hydrogen from green and blue hydrogen, we compare the net climate impacts over time from green and blue hydrogen relative to their fossil fuel counterparts based on the anticipated avoided greenhouse gas emissions. To arrive at a first-order estimate of the potential climate concern of hydrogen leakage technologies per unit deployed, we compare the net climate impacts over time from green and blue hydrogen relative to their fossil fuel counterparts based on the anticipated avoided greenhouse gas emissions. We explore the impact from of consuming the consumption of 1 kg of hydrogen continuously every year. We consider emissions of both carbon dioxide and methane. We do not include hydrogen

Table 3. Published estimates of hydrogen demand for various scenarios.

| Scenario | Year | Source | Description |
|----------|------|--------|-------------|
| 2030     | 205  | IEA 2021 | 1.5 °C compatible net zero emissions by 2050 |
| 2030     | 211  | IEA 2022 | Net zero scenario emissions by 2050 |
| 2040     | 385  | H2 Council, 2021 | Net zero 1.5 °C compatible scenario |
| 2050     | 130  | Yusaf et al., 2022 | Current growth trend of 1.8% |
| 2050     | 162  | Yusaf et al., 2022 | Average actual growth of 2.5% |
| 2050     | 187  | BloombergNEF, 2020 | Weak hydrogen policy |
| 2050     | 190  | BloombergNEF, 2021 | Blue hydrogen with little incentive to use hydrogen |
| 2050     | 240  | International Renewable Energy Agency, 2020 | Transforming energy scenario |
| 2050     | 255  | IRENA 2021 | Announced Pledges Scenario |
| 2050     | 287  | IRENA 2019 | Sustainable Development Scenario |
| 2050     | 520  | IRENA 2021 | Net zero emissions by 2050 |
| 2050     | 539  | H2 Council, 2017 | 2 °C compatible scenario |
| 2050     | 540  | ET Commission, 2021 | Supply-side decarbonisation only; includes energy productivity improvements |
| 2050     | 568  | Yusaf et al., 2022 | Annual growth rate of 6.5% |
| 2050     | 590  | International Renewable Energy Agency, 2020 | 1.5 °C compatible scenario |
| 2050     | 660  | Hydrogen Council, 2021 | Net zero 1.5 °C compatible scenario |
| 2050     | 696  | BloombergNEF, 2020 | Strong hydrogen policy |
| 2050     | 728  | ET Commission, 2021 | All use cases materialize combined with energy productivity improvements |
| 2050     | 770  | BloombergNEF, 2021 | Net zero emissions by 2050 with widespread use of hydrogen mostly from nuclear |
| 2050     | 801  | BloombergNEF, 2020 | Well below 2 °C scenario |
| 2050     | 813  | ET Commission, 2021 | Supply-side decarbonisation only |
| 2050     | 1000 | ET Commission, 2021 | Maximum for hydrogen use by mid-century if all use cases materialize for net zero emissions |
| 2050     | 1318 | BloombergNEF, 2021 | Net zero emissions by 2050 and widespread use of hydrogen produced from renewables |
| 2050     | 1370 | BloombergNEF, 2020 | All unlikely-to-electrify sectors in economy use hydrogen |

24.11.2 Radiative forcing comparisons

Emissions from fossil fuel technologies
emissions that would be avoided from the cessation of the combustion of fossil fuels, as well as other co-emitted climate pollutants such as particulates, sulphur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides that contain a mix of warming and cooling forcers.

To estimate how much carbon dioxide and methane emissions are avoided from deployment of one unit kg of hydrogen (which will ultimately depend on the specific technology), we as a first order approximation we explore the impacts from a generic case in which a variety of fossil fuel technologies are replaced. We use estimates from the Hydrogen Council (2017) that quantify avoided carbon dioxide emissions from a scenario of replacing supplying 18% of final fossil fuel derived energy demand in 2050 with hydrogen applications. They estimate that a consumption of 550 million metric tonnes of hydrogen (roughly the same amount as the average of the 21 projections published in the literature for year 2050 – Table 3) can avoid 6 gigatons of carbon dioxide emissions annually. Replaced In their analysis, fossil fuel-powered systems and end use applications that are decarbonized by hydrogen alternatives in their analysis include segments of transport, industry energy use, building power and heating, and building energy systems as an industry feedstock. For transport, their vision includes hydrogen powering hundreds of millions of cars, trucks, buses, passenger ships, and locomotives, with hydrogen-based fuels powering a share of airplanes and freight ships. For heat and power for buildings and industry, hydrogen could provide around 10% of the heat and power required for global households and industry sectors. Of the avoided 6 gigatons of CO₂ annually from this level of hydrogen deployment, around half of avoided carbon dioxide emissions come from hydrogen applications in the transport sector and one third is from industry energy and feedstocks. Using their the Hydrogen Council’s (2017) data scenario and calculations provides a central estimate of 11 kg CO₂ avoided per 1 kg H₂ consumed, While this estimate is for the year 2050, in the absence of better estimates, we assume that it can generally apply to earlier decades as well. However, to test the sensitivity of our results to different levels of avoided CO₂ (which arguably is of further importance for specific technologies as opposed to different years), we consider three different levels of avoided carbon dioxide emissions (5, 10, 15 kg), which we use in our analysis (see Table 1). We note that we do not include avoided hydrogen emissions from displaced fossil fuel combustion, and more research is required to determine the net increase in hydrogen emissions.

Further, given that the Hydrogen Council (2017) analysis does not provide avoided methane emissions associated with their hydrogen economy vision, additional assumptions need to be made to include their impact on the net radiative effect of fossil fuel applications vs. their hydrogen alternatives. First, the methane avoided will depend on the specific fossil fuel (coal, oil, gas) used in the displaced fossil fuel technologies. For example, a natural gas-driven technology will likely emit more methane than a coal-driven technology due to emissions associated with natural gas production and distribution. However, a natural gas-driven technology will also likely emit less CO₂ than a coal-driven one because burning natural gas emits less CO₂ than coal. Therefore, for each level of avoided carbon dioxide emissions in our sensitivity analysis we also calculate the resulting radiative impact from these emissions if the CO₂ is generated from burning natural gas (i.e. considerable methane emissions). Burning 1 kg of natural gas emits 2.75 kg of CO₂ if the natural gas is almost entirely methane, and we consider methane leakage rates from 1 to 3% as discussed earlier. Resulting emissions of methane are shown in Table 4.
| Methane emissions (kg) | Best-case leaks | Worst-case leaks |
|-----------------------|-----------------|------------------|
|                       | 1%              | 3%               |
| 5                     | Produced        | 1.84             | 1.87             |
|                       | Consumed        | 1.8              | 1.8              |
|                       | Emitted         | 0.02             | 0.06             |
| 10                    | Produced        | 3.67             | 3.75             |
|                       | Consumed        | 3.6              | 3.6              |
|                       | Emitted         | 0.04             | 0.11             |
| 15                    | Produced        | 5.51             | 5.62             |
|                       | Consumed        | 5.5              | 5.5              |
|                       | Emitted         | 0.06             | 0.17             |

Table 4: Methane emissions (kg) associated with different levels of carbon dioxide emissions (kg) from fossil fuel technologies and for best- and worst-case leak rates.

| Scenario-1a |                  | 2020 | 2025 | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 | 2045 | 2050 |
|-------------|-----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Consumed    |                  | 0    | 40   | 80   | 120  | 160  | 200  | 240  |
| Emitted     | 1% leak rate    | 0    | 0    | 1    | 2    | 3    | 6    |
| Emitted     | 5% leak rate    | 0    | 2    | 4    | 6    | 10   | 17   | 29   |
| Emitted     | 10% leak rate   | 0    | 4    | 9    | 13   | 21   | 33   | 53   |

| Scenario-2b |                  | 2020 | 2025 | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 | 2045 | 2050 |
|-------------|-----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Consumed    |                  | 0    | 100  | 100  | 200  | 423  | 822  | 1370 |
| Emitted     | 1% leak rate    | 0    | 1    | 2    | 3    | 5    | 8    | 11   |
| Emitted     | 5% leak rate    | 0    | 5    | 10   | 16   | 25   | 43   | 72   |
| Emitted     | 10% leak rate   | 0    | 11   | 22   | 33   | 53   | 91   | 152  |

| Scenario-3c |                  | 2020 | 2025 | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 | 2045 | 2050 |
|-------------|-----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Consumed    |                  | 0    | 218  | 436  | 655  | 1036 | 1800 | 3000 |
| Emitted     | 1% leak rate    | 0    | 2    | 4    | 7    | 10   | 18   | 30   |
| Emitted     | 5% leak rate    | 0    | 11   | 23   | 34   | 55   | 95   | 158  |
| Emitted     | 10% leak rate   | 0    | 24   | 48   | 73   | 115  | 200  | 333  |

Table 2: Hydrogen consumption scenarios (green and blue combined) and hydrogen emissions for different leak rates.
Scenario 1 is the hydrogen “vision” outlined by Hydrogen Council (2017, 2021), which is a demand of 550 Mt in 2050 to replace segments of fossil-fuel powered transportation, industry, and the power sector and supply 18% of final energy demand globally.

Scenario 2 is an upper-end projection by BloombergNEF (2020) for hydrogen supplying all the unlikely-to-electrify sectors in the economy, which is a demand of 1370 Mt in 2050 and would supply around 45% of final energy demand globally. For the growth between 2020 and 2050, we apply the overall trend projected by Hydrogen Council (2021) for Scenario 1.

Scenario 3 is the theoretical maximum of using hydrogen to supply the entire final energy demand in 2050, which we estimate to be 3000 Mt based on the estimates of hydrogen demand as a percent of final energy demand provided by Hydrogen Council (2017, 2021) and BloombergNEF (2020), which are 3055 Mt and 2900 Mt, respectively. For the growth between 2020 and 2050, we apply the overall trend projected by Hydrogen Council (2021) for Scenario 1.

To estimate the absolute warming impacts for different levels of hydrogen consumption through 2050, we consider three scenarios (Table 2). The first scenario is the hydrogen “vision” outlined by Hydrogen Council (Hydrogen Council, 2017, 2021b), which is a demand of 550 Mt in 2050 to replace segments of fossil-fuel powered transportation, industry, and the power sector and supply 18% of final energy demand globally. (640 EJ final energy demand estimated in 2050 for 2 °C pathway). This is a similar projection to the 550 Mt demand projected by International Energy Agency (2021) as a means to decarbonize the global economy and achieve net zero by mid-century goals. The second scenario is an upper-end projection by BloombergNEF (2020) for hydrogen supplying all the unlikely-to-electrify sectors in the economy, which is a demand of 1370 Mt in 2050 and would supply around 45% of final energy demand globally. The third scenario is the theoretical maximum of using hydrogen to supply the entire final energy demand in 2050, which we estimate to be 3000 Mt based on the estimates of hydrogen demand as a percent of final energy demand provided by Hydrogen Council (2017) and BloombergNEF (2020), 3055 Mt and 2900 Mt, respectively. For these scenarios, we combine green and blue hydrogen demand and ignore grey hydrogen that should be phased out. We therefore assume near-zero green and blue hydrogen in 2020, and for the growth between 2020 and 2050, we apply the overall trend projected by Hydrogen Council (2021b) for the 550 Mt demand in 2050 scenario to the other two scenarios. When considering climate impacts, we only account for emissions from hydrogen leakage for total hydrogen demand, and we consider three leak rate levels: 1%, 5%, and 10%.

4.1.2 Radiative forcing comparisons: We use the Technology Warming Potential (TWP) to calculate the relative climate impacts from hydrogen applications to that from the fossil-fuel applications that they would be replacing for the case study described in Sect. 4.1.1 (continuous deployment of a unit of hydrogen relative to the CO₂ emissions avoided). This metric calculates the cumulative radiative forcing of continuous emissions of greenhouse gases over time based on their decay functions and radiative efficiencies, and is described in detail in Alvarez et al. (2012). TWP uses the same fundamental physics as GWP but conveys impacts over time rather than for one select time horizon, and for continuous emissions rather than a pulse of emissions. Several studies have used this metric to assess the climate impacts of different technologies that emit multiple greenhouse gases with varying atmospheric lifetimes, to show how the climate impacts of specific technologies change over time relative to one another (Alvarez et al., 2012; Camuzeaux et al., 2015; Ocko and Hamburg, 2019).
The results are presented as a ratio of climate impacts (using cumulative radiative forcing as a proxy) over time between two different technologies (in our case, this would be hydrogen applications vs. fossil fuel applications). A TWP of greater than 1 indicates that the alternative technology (in this case hydrogen) has larger climate warming impacts at time t than the original technology, and vice versa for less than 1. In our analysis, we present the results as a percent change in climate impacts (cumulative radiative forcing) from the original technology, such that 1 = 0% change (or equal), 2 = 100% increase, etc.

Radiative properties and atmospheric lifetimes used in the analysis can be found in Table 3. We use the radiative efficiency and atmospheric lifetime for hydrogen that are estimated in Paulot et al. (2021), given that the tropospheric effects are consistent with Derwent et al. (2020), and Paulot et al. (2021) include stratospheric effects as well. While Paulot et al. (2021) does not indicate an uncertainty range for their estimated radiative efficiency of hydrogen, we apply a 20% uncertainty for two reasons: (1) this is the uncertainty that Derwent et al. (2020) applied to tropospheric warming effects from hydrogen, and (2) the stratospheric effects from hydrogen oxidation are similar to methane oxidation and the latest science suggests a 14% uncertainty in chemical responses contributing to methane’s radiative efficiency (Forster et al., 2021).

Further, given that the effects of hydrogen emissions are entirely indirect, we average the climate impacts over the first five years after initial emission to account for the individual timelines in chemical responses and to remain conservative during the first few years where hydrogen potency would strongly outweigh that of carbon dioxide if considered an instantaneous effect (recall that the radiative efficiency of hydrogen is around 200 times that of carbon dioxide for equal mass). For example, Field and Derwent (2021) suggest that the tropospheric ozone response is immediate, but that the methane response takes a few years to reach its full potential.

Methane and carbon dioxide radiative properties and atmospheric lifetimes are taken from Forster et al. (2021), but we do not include climate-carbon feedbacks associated with methane to be consistent with what is included with hydrogen. We note that far less work has gone into refining hydrogen’s radiative impacts compared to methane and carbon dioxide, and we hope that this paper inspire more research into hydrogen’s impact on Earth’s energy balance to provide more confidence in estimates.

4.1.3 Temperature response estimates

In the absence of models capable of interactively simulating the chemistry, radiation, and temperature responses in the full atmosphere to hydrogen emissions, we apply the simple approach used by Paulot et al. (2021) to approximate temperature responses to the three hydrogen demand scenarios discussed in Sect. 4.1.1. This method uses the best estimates of the long-term increase in global surface temperature (equilibrium climate sensitivity, ECS) and radiative forcing from a doubling of CO₂ concentrations and assumes that hydrogen would have a similar efficacy. The CMIP6 models suggest a best estimate of 3.78 ± 1.08 °C for the ECS and a 3.93 W m⁻² effective radiative forcing for a doubling of CO₂ (Forster et al., 2021). This suggests a climate efficacy of 0.96 °C (W m⁻²)⁻¹. To estimate temperature responses to hydrogen emissions, we multiply this efficacy with the hydrogen effective radiative efficiency estimated in Paulot et al. (2021) per unit of emission per year (0.84
and the hydrogen emissions per year based on the leak rate for each hydrogen demand scenario (Table 2). For uncertainty estimates, we use a 20% uncertainty in the hydrogen effective radiative efficiency as discussed in Sect. 4.1.3.

For uncertainty estimates, we use a 20% uncertainty in the hydrogen effective radiative efficiency as discussed in Sect. 4.1.

2.695

Hydrogen

Methane

Carbon Dioxide

| Decay Function | Fraction Remaining (t) | Fraction Remaining (t) | Fraction Remaining (t) |
|----------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| (years)        | \( e^{-\frac{t}{\tau}} \) | \( e^{-\frac{t}{\tau_{CH4}}} \) | \( \sum_{i=0}^{3} \frac{a_i e^{-\frac{t}{\tau_i}}}{\sum_{i=0}^{3} \frac{a_i}{\tau_i}} \) |
| \( \tau_{H2} = 2.5 \) | \( \tau_{CH4} = 11.8 \) |

a

Hydrogen decay function from (Shindell et al., 2013). Hydrogen atmospheric lifetime and radiative efficiency are from (Paulot et al., 2021) (radiative efficiency converted from the reported effective radiative forcing therein of 0.13 mW m\(^{-2}\) ppbv\(^{-1}\) using the equation and values provided in the IPCC AR5 WGI Chapter 8 Supplemental Material; page SSM-15 (Shindell et al., 2013). A 20% uncertainty is applied to hydrogen’s radiative efficiency following Derwent et al. (2020).

b

Methane decay function, atmospheric lifetime, and radiative efficiency (including direct and indirect) from (Forster et al., 2021). Note that carbon cycle adjustment, which would increase the warming potential of methane slightly, is not included in our calculations, because it is not included in the hydrogen’s radiative efficiency.

c

Carbon dioxide decay function from (Shindell et al., 2013). Carbon dioxide radiative efficiency from (Forster et al., 2021).

Table 3: Decay functions and radiative efficiencies used in analysis.

| Decay Function | Radiative Efficiency (W m\(^{-2}\) kg\(^{-1}\)) |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------|
| Hydrogen*      | 3.64E-13 ± 0.7                             |
| Methane*       | 2.00E-13                                  |
| Carbon Dioxide*| 1.70E-15                                  |

a

Hydrogen decay function from (Shindell et al., 2013). Hydrogen atmospheric lifetime and radiative efficiency are from (Paulot et al., 2021) (radiative efficiency converted from the reported effective radiative forcing therein of 0.13 mW m\(^{-2}\) ppbv\(^{-1}\) using the equation and values provided in the IPCC AR5 WGI Chapter 8 Supplemental Material; page SSM-15 (Shindell et al., 2013). A 20% uncertainty is applied to hydrogen’s radiative efficiency following Derwent et al. (2020).

b

Methane decay function, atmospheric lifetime, and radiative efficiency (including direct and indirect) from (Forster et al., 2021). Note that carbon cycle adjustment, which would increase the warming potential of methane slightly, is not included in our calculations, because it is not included in the hydrogen’s radiative efficiency.

c

Carbon dioxide decay function from (Shindell et al., 2013). Carbon dioxide radiative efficiency from (Forster et al., 2021).

3.4.2 Results

Warwick et al., 2022.1 Hydrogen’s warming potency

Global Warming Potential has become the most familiar metric for grasping the importance of a climate forcer as an agent of climate change. Hydrogen’s GWP has been reported for decades, however only for its tropospheric effects and for a 100-year time horizon (thereby including numerous decades when hydrogen is not influencing the atmosphere) (Derwent et al., 2001, 2006, 2020; Derwent, 2018). This has led to an undervaluing of its impact. Recent research reports hydrogen’s GWP for both tropospheric and stratospheric effects and for both 20- and 100-year timeframes, revealing that hydrogen’s 100-year GWP is twice as high as previous reporting and its 20-year GWP is three times higher than its 100-year GWP (Warwick et al., 2022). Fig. 3a extends this work to calculate hydrogen’s GWP over time.
Hydrogen’s maximum GWP occurs around seven years after the initial pulse of emissions, with a range of 25 to 60 based on uncertainties, and a central estimate of 40. This is around eight times higher than the most well-known GWP for hydrogen (Derwent et al., 2020). Hydrogen’s GWP initially increases before it declines again because it takes several years for methane’s atmospheric lifetime to increase in response to less OH available from the reaction with hydrogen. For time horizons of 10 to 100 years, the GWP decreases as expected for when the warming effects of a pulse of emissions of a short-term forser is compared to that of a long-term forer; the CO$_2$ is still in the atmosphere 100 years later, whereas the short-term forer’s impacts are long gone – meaning that the relative potency of the short-term forser declines. In fact, the factor of three difference between hydrogen’s GWP-20 (central estimate 33) and GWP-100 (central estimate 11) is similar in ratio to that from methane (80 and 30, respectively).

In Fig. 3b2, we show how the GWPs for hydrogen change over time depending on the time horizon used in the calculation, and compare to use an identical GWP approach; calculation except consider that uses continuous a constant emissions rate, rather than pulse, emissions. The constant emissions rate approach is a more realistic representation of hydrogen leakage in a hydrogen economy, as opposed to a one-time pulse of emissions, and also more sensible in that you are calculating hydrogen’s warming effects compared to carbon dioxide for cases where they are both impacting the atmosphere in each time horizon.

When continuous equal emissions of both hydrogen and carbon dioxide are considered as opposed to just one pulse at time = 0, the potency of hydrogen relative to carbon dioxide is on average double: can be 50% higher than that of the pulse approach (Fig. 2); this is true for long-term effects as well. However, this is not uniform across all timescales. In fact, before 10 years, the pulse approach (GWP) yields higher potency values than the constant emissions rate approach. This is because the carbon dioxide impact is building up faster in the near-term for constant emissions compared to the hydrogen impact, because the hydrogen impact takes several years to reach its full impact. However, as time goes on, the replenishing effect from constant hydrogen emissions (as opposed to decaying impacts) dominates and leads to a greater relative potency as compared to the pulse approach. For hydrogen’s GWP-20, constant emissions lead to around a 15% increase in hydrogen’s potency. This increases to 50% by a time horizon around 70 years, and nearly up to 60% by 100 years.
Figure 3: Warming potency of hydrogen relative to carbon dioxide using cumulative radiative forcing as a proxy for (a) a one-time pulse of equal emissions in mass (equals hydrogen’s Global Warming Potential) and (b) a constant emissions rate of both hydrogen and carbon dioxide for equal emissions in mass. Solid lines are for mean hydrogen lifetime and radiative effects. The dark shaded areas correspond to a minimum and maximum hydrogen lifetime based on soil sink uncertainty, and the light shaded areas represent a 20% uncertainty in the radiative effects of hydrogen from its indirect effects and uncertainties in carbon dioxide’s radiative properties. See Table 1 for all parameters used.

Overall, accounting for shorter rather than longer time horizons, continuous rather than pulse emissions, and both stratospheric and tropospheric effects can lead to a radiative potency of hydrogen relative to CO₂ that is more than 20 times higher than the most commonly known hydrogen GWP of 5 (which is over 100 years, for pulse emissions, and only considers tropospheric effects). Even for 100-year impacts, accounting for continuous emissions and including stratospheric effects leads to a quadrupling of hydrogen’s commonly known GWP, from 5 to 20. Therefore, even the long-term effects of hydrogen leakage are significantly underestimated.

Figure 2: Cumulative radiative forcing of hydrogen relative to carbon dioxide for equal emissions. Solid lines are for continuous emissions of both hydrogen and carbon dioxide, and dotted lines are for a pulse of emissions at time horizon = 0. Dotted lines correspond to traditional GWP calculations per time horizon. Shaded areas correspond to a 20% uncertainty in the radiative efficiency of hydrogen. (a) is based on hydrogen’s radiative efficiency derived from Derwent et al. (2020), and includes only tropospheric responses to hydrogen oxidation. (a) is based on hydrogen’s radiative efficiency derived from Paulot et al. (2021), and includes both tropospheric and stratospheric responses to hydrogen oxidation. 4.2.1

3.2 Warming impacts from replacing fossil fuel systems—technologies with hydrogen applications—alternatives

The results of our analysis of the climate impacts of hydrogen and methane emissions of the relative climate impacts (using cumulative radiative forcing as a proxy) over time from continuous emissions from replacing fossil fuel applications with their hydrogen counterparts are shown in Fig. 3. If there were zero climate pollutant—forcers emissions from the hydrogen
applications, the result would be a -100% change in cumulative radiative forcing, and if there was no replacement the result would be 0%. If the climate pollutant emissions from hydrogen alternatives yield more (less) warming than the fossil fuel counterparts over a particular time period, it would amount to a positive (negative) percent change in cumulative radiative forcing.

The benefit of the Technology Warming Potential method is that we can analyze climate impacts over multiple time periods of interest—in the near, medium, and long term—insights that are not available with the use of the GWP-100 metric. This is important when short-lived climate pollutants are emitted as they are often reported and assessed based on the long-term impact of a pulse emission, which overlooks their true impacts during the time they are active in the atmosphere.

Overall, any amount of hydrogen leakage will detract from diminish the climate benefits from avoided carbon dioxide emissions to some degree, but there are vastly different outcomes favourable and unfavourable—depending on the production method, total leakage emissions, and time horizon. For example, the worst-case for blue hydrogen (10% hydrogen leakage and 3% methane leakage) could be initially worse for the climate than the CO₂ emissions from the corresponding fossil fuel technologies, yielding up to 60% more warming over the first 10 years and taking around 50 years before benefits of the technology switch are realized. On the other hand, the best-case for green hydrogen (1% hydrogen leaks) could yield a near elimination of the climate impact as compared to fossil fuel’s CO₂ emissions. Recall however that we do not include greenhouse gas emissions associated with installing infrastructure which will be needed to support the growing demand for hydrogen and its applications.

The importance of the clean hydrogen production method—i.e. green (renewable electricity with water) or blue (steam methane reforming with CCS)—in determining the magnitude of climate benefits is clear (Fig. 4). While hydrogen emissions can yield climate impacts for green hydrogen that are far from climate neutral over all timescales, the cumulative radiative impact is still less than the fossil fuels which signifies a decrease in warming from using green hydrogen alternatives. On the other hand, blue hydrogen can be better or worse for the climate depending on the leakage rate and time horizon. For example, over a ten-year time period, worst-case blue hydrogen emissions could increase the warming impact from fossil fuels by 40% (25,60), whereas worst-case green hydrogen emissions could decrease warming by 60% (43,76). For best-case leak rates for both, blue hydrogen could still only reduce the warming impact from fossil fuels by 65% over the first ten years, whereas green hydrogen could reduce the impact by more than 95%. For a 100-year time horizon, the story is similar, with worst-case leak rates yielding a doubling of the climate impact of blue hydrogen compared to green hydrogen. In fact, the worst-case green hydrogen benefits are roughly the same as the best-case blue hydrogen benefits across all timescales (such as around a 65% decrease in the warming impact from fossil fuel CO₂ emissions over a 10-year period and an 85% decrease over a 100-year period). Given that the hydrogen emissions are the same in both the blue and green cases, the difference is due entirely to the warming effects from methane emissions from the natural gas supply chain.
While production method matters greatly, so does the level of emissions. For example, how beneficial green hydrogen is to the climate in both the near- and long-term will depend strongly on the level of leakage, with benefits ranging from more than a 95% reduction in climate impacts from fossil fuel technologies to only 65% over the first ten years for total leakage rates of 1 and 10%, respectively. Even in the long-term (100-year time horizon), green hydrogen may only reduce climate impacts by 85% if there is high leakage. The impact of leakage levels is also apparent for blue hydrogen, where high leak rates for both hydrogen and methane could lead to an increase in warming relative to the fossil fuel counterparts for decades, but the low leak rates for both could cut climate impacts by more than half within ten years. In the long-term (over 100 years), both worst- and best-case leak rates for blue hydrogen would likely yield reductions in the climate impacts, however, the magnitude of benefits ranges from a 45% to 85% reduction, respectively. These results show the importance of emission rate in determining the climate benefits (and potential disbenefits) of replacing fossil fuel technologies with hydrogen alternatives.

![Graph showing emissions and climate impact over time for different hydrogen technologies and leakage rates.](image)

For example, we find that a best-case scenario for green hydrogen (produced via renewable electricity and water) applications of around 1% leaked per unit H₂ deployed could yield a 84 ± 3% decrease in warming in the first five years compared to the warming that would have occurred from the CO₂ emissions of the displaced fossil fuel system. By contrast, a worst-case scenario of around 10% leaked per unit H₂ deployed would yield a 74 ± 35% increase in warming over the first five years; based on the uncertainty ranges for hydrogen radiative efficiency, this could mean a doubling in radiative forcing at the upper end and still a net increase in warming at the lower end. These are quite different outcomes depending on leakage rate and indicate that green hydrogen is not inherently climate neutral. More attention is needed to measure and minimize hydrogen leakage as hydrogen efforts are ramped up.
Figure 4: Relative warming impact over time from replacing fossil fuel technologies with green or blue hydrogen alternatives for a generic case. Ratio of cumulative radiative forcing of a constant emissions rate from deploying 1 kg of H₂ continuously is used as a proxy of relative warming impacts. Emissions from hydrogen alternatives are hydrogen for green hydrogen and hydrogen and methane from blue hydrogen. Emissions from fossil fuel technologies are carbon dioxide, estimated at 11 kg CO₂ avoided per 1 kg H₂ deployed based on estimates from Hydrogen Council (2017). Emissions of hydrogen and methane include a range of plausible leak rates from 1% (best-case) to 10% (worst-case) per unit H₂ deployed for hydrogen and from 1% (best-case) to 3% (worst-case) for methane. The height of each bar corresponds to the range from leakage. See Table 2 for emissions inputs for hydrogen and methane, and Table 1 and Eqns (1) – (8) for equations used in the calculation and input parameters. Error bars represent uncertainties in both hydrogen’s soil sink and therefore lifetime (solid lines) as well as uncertainties in hydrogen and carbon dioxide’s radiative effects (~±20%; dashed lines). Corresponding GWP results (only difference is pulse emissions rather than constant emissions rate) are shown using the “x” and “o” markers.

Figure 3: Relative climate impact over time from replacing fossil fuel systems with green or blue hydrogen. Ratio of cumulative radiative forcing of continuous emissions from deploying 1 kg of H₂ continuously replace fossil fuel systems and thereby avoid 11 kg CO₂/kgH₂ (see Table 1). Climate impacts from green hydrogen encompass a range of plausible leak rates from 1% to 10% per unit H₂ deployed and for blue hydrogen also include methane leak rates from 1% to 3% per unit methane consumed. See Table 1 for more details on emissions assumptions and Table 3 for radiative properties and decay functions used. Error bars represent a 20% uncertainty in hydrogen’s radiative efficiency. Corresponding GWP-100-derived climate impacts are shown using the “x” marker.

Alternatively, if hydrogen is produced using natural gas as a feedstock with CCUS (‘blue’ hydrogen), residual emissions of CO₂ as well as emissions of methane from upstream and midstream natural gas leakage would add to the climate impact of hydrogen leakage (Fig. 3). If we include best- and worst-case methane leakage rates (1% and 3% per unit methane consumed, respectively, we also conservatively assumed that half of the replaced fossil fuel applications are natural gas-based and
therefore the net difference in methane leakage is 50% in the analysis of climate impacts over time from hydrogen deployment, we find that during the first five years, the best-case scenario suggests a 67 ± 3% decrease in warming effects relative to that from the fossil fuel counterparts, and a 133 ± 35% increase in warming for the worst-case scenario; this could mean a doubling of radiative effects during this time period even if the radiative efficiency is 20% lower than what is currently estimated by Paulot et al. (2021) (Fig. 3).

Whereas most assessments of climate benefits from alternative technologies inherently focus on the long-term impacts due to the GWP-100 metric, our analysis shows how different the picture looks when considering time horizons from 10 to 100 years. This is because unlike carbon dioxide, hydrogen’s (and methane’s) warming effects are short-lived and do not accumulate over time. Therefore, in addition to the strong dependency of the climate outcome on leakage rates, the time horizon of interest also matters greatly, because over time the benefits of hydrogen applications are grow larger over time due to the prevention of the build-up of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere in favour of a short-lived gas that doesn’t accumulate over time. If only a long-term perspective is pursued when evaluating hydrogen applications, the results will not convey the much larger relative climate impacts over shorter time horizons. For example, for the first few decades, worst-case green (blue) hydrogen may increase—only cut in half the cumulative radiative forcing warming impacts by 74 ± 35% (133 ± 35%) in the first five years relative to the fossil fuel applications it is replacing, but over the following 100 years it decreases cumulative radiative forcing by 79 ± 4% (57 ± 4%) the warming impacts could be reduced by three quarters. For blue hydrogen, the temporal significance is even more stark due to the combination of emissions of two short-term forcers. For example, worst-case blue hydrogen alternatives could increase warming relative to fossil fuel technologies for the first several decades, but over 100 years would cut the warming impact by nearly half. Therefore, depending on the time horizon that is considered in the analysis, one could receive very different insights on climate benefits of the decarbonization potential of hydrogen. However, with worst-case leak rates, it still takes more than a decade to see climate benefits of green hydrogen applications and more than 25 years to see climate benefits of blue hydrogen applications (partly due to the decade-long lifetime of methane) when compared to the climate impacts from the fossil fuel systems that were replaced (Fig. 3). While short-term climate warming impacts—followed by long-term climate change mitigation impacts—may lead to an eventual beneficial outcome, the short-term warming may lead to climate impacts that cause more socioeconomic and environmental damages in the near-term that are not necessarily reversible (Fischer et al., 2021).

This is even more acute if the GWP metric with a pulse approach is used as opposed to a constant emissions rate. While in our analysis we consider constant emissions, Fig. 4 shows the corresponding result if a pulse approach was used (see X and O markers). While the pulse approach reasonably captures the near-term impacts of hydrogen applications relative to that of fossil fuels, over time it diverges and ultimately on timescales of several decades after the switched technology, this is when we would likely see climate benefits from both green and blue hydrogen applications regardless of leakage rate. However, even the standard GWP-100 approach undervalues the cumulative radiative forcing over a 100-year time period given its
reliance on pulse, instead of continuous, emissions (Fig. 3). For example, a worst-case blue hydrogen case could yield only a decrease in warming of only 57 ± 4% even after 100 years of replacing fossil fuel technologies, but GWP-100 suggests a decrease in warming of 65%. And if GWP-100 is used exclusively and taken to represent hydrogen’s impacts over any timescale (as it often is), then the near- and mid-term impacts of hydrogen (and methane) leakage will be overlooked entirely – which in some cases means assuming a benefit to the climate when it is actually a disbenefit for decades. This could strongly affect the choice of whether or not to deploy hydrogen in applications that have multiple “clean” options. Therefore, even if hydrogen leakage is considered in decarbonization assessments going forward, continuing to use GWP-100 to calculate climate effects will not only overlook near- and mid-term impacts on the climate, but it will underestimate long-term climate impacts of continuous leaks as well.

In the above, we considered a generic case for avoiding carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel technologies. However, the perceived climate benefits of hydrogen alternatives will depend on the amount of CO₂ avoided, which will vary depending on the technology that is replaced. Therefore, to test the sensitivity of our results to the amount of CO₂ avoided, we consider avoided emissions of 5, 10, and 15 kg per 1 kg of hydrogen deployed (compared to our central estimate of 11 kg) and compare the relative climate impacts of the hydrogen applications over a 20-year time horizon (solid bars in Fig. 5). We find that if avoided emissions of CO₂ are on the lower end, blue hydrogen could yield more than a 150% increase in warming over the first 20 years if leak rates are at the upper end, and green hydrogen may only reduce warming by 20%. However, if avoided emissions of CO₂ are on the higher end, both worst-case blue and green hydrogen would yield climate benefits, reducing warming by 10 and 75%, respectively.
Given that methane emissions may also be avoided from replaced fossil fuel technologies, we extend the analysis in Fig. 5 to consider a case where the fossil fuel that was burned to produce the CO₂ was natural gas (diagonal line bars), using the same best- and worst-case methane leak rates as in the hydrogen applications. We find that the avoided methane emissions may play a significant role in increasing the near-term benefits of hydrogen applications, but there is a strong dependence on the corresponding CO₂ emissions that are avoided. For example, while worst-case blue hydrogen with the lower end avoided CO₂ would still be worse for the climate over the first 20 years even with including avoided methane, the central estimate avoided CO₂ case would switch from worse for the climate to better for the climate. For worst-case green hydrogen, climate benefits would double for all levels of avoided CO₂ when including avoided methane emissions. However, given that natural gas emits less CO₂ when burned than coal, it is likely that when methane emissions are higher, CO₂ emissions are lower, as opposed to both being on the higher end. Therefore, a case-by-case study with reported data on both carbon dioxide and methane emissions from fossil fuel technologies is warranted to fully understand the impact of avoided methane emissions.

3.4.2.2 Temperature responses to a future hydrogen economy

We find that for all levels of hydrogen emissions, today’s hydrogen demand (around 100 Tg) may cause at most 0.01 ºC. For 2030 projections, five estimates based on different scenarios and sources suggest an average hydrogen demand of 150 Tg (see Table 3), which could double the 100 Tg impact for upper end leak rates (10%) and uncertainties (0.02 ºC). For 2050 projections, 21 different estimates suggest a range in demand from 130 to 1370 Tg (Table 3), with an average of 590 Tg. For worst-case hydrogen leak rates (10%), these levels of demand could yield anywhere from 0.01 ºC to 0.1 ± 0.05 ºC. On the other hand, if total hydrogen emissions are kept minimal (1%), temperature responses could be less than 0.02 ºC including uncertainties. For context, 590 Tg of hydrogen demand could supply around 20% of final global energy demand in 2050 under a 2 ºC scenario (Hydrogen Council, 2017; BloombergNEF, 2020).

Fig. 6 shows the long-term temperature responses to various hydrogen demand levels, up to a theoretical maximum estimated for 2050 of 3000 Tg (this would correspond to using hydrogen for total final energy demand in a 2 ºC decarbonization scenario). Using hydrogen for all final energy demand in 2050 could lead to greater than 0.1 ºC of warming with a 5% leak rate, and up to 0.4 ºC of warming with 10% leak rates and uncertainties in hydrogen’s radiative effects.
Figure 6: Long-term temperature responses (°C) to different levels of hydrogen leakage based on sustained hydrogen demand levels (Tg). Red/orange/yellow markers and shading represent leakage levels of 10/5/1%. Uncertainty is based on uncertainties in both hydrogen’s soil sink and therefore lifetime (~±20%) as well as uncertainties in hydrogen’s radiative effects (~±20%). Markers indicate calculations and shaded regions represent interpolation. Histogram and shaded grey area characterize projections of hydrogen demand for the year 2050 in the published literature (see Table 3). The theoretical max is an estimate based on using hydrogen to supply total final energy demand globally in 2050 based on decarbonization scenarios.

However, this level of hydrogen demand is not realistic. Of the available projections in the literature for hydrogen demand in 2050, four suggest demands between 100 and 199 Tg, three suggest demands between 200 and 499 Tg, 11 suggest demands between 500 and 999 Tg, and three suggest demands between 1000 and 1999 Tg (Table 3). None project hydrogen demands below 100 and above 2000. Sustained hydrogen demands around 800 Tg or greater (could account for around a quarter of final energy demand in 2050) could contribute at least 0.1 °C of warming if leak rates and uncertainties are at the upper end. Global mean surface air temperature responses from 2020 to 2050 to the three hydrogen consumption scenarios using the approach discussed in Sect. 4.1.3 are shown in Fig. 4. For Scenario #1 (hydrogen supplies ~20% of final energy demand globally in 2050), surface temperature impacts in 2050 from hydrogen leakage alone could range from 0.005 ± 0.001 °C for 1% leakage to 0.05 ± 0.01 °C for 10% leakage. For Scenario #2 (hydrogen supplies ~50% of final energy demand globally in 2050), surface temperature impacts in 2050 from hydrogen leakage alone could range from 0.01 ± 0.02 °C for 1% leakage to 0.12 ± 0.03 °C for 10% leakage. And for Scenario #3 (hydrogen supplies entire final energy demand globally in 2050), surface temperature impacts in 2050 from hydrogen leakage alone could range from 0.02 ± 0.04 °C for 1% leakage to 0.27 ± 0.05 °C for 10% leakage. While Scenario #3 is a theoretical maximum, it provides insight into how significant a contribution hydrogen leakage...
could be to increasing Earth’s temperature if hydrogen technologies are relied on heavily and we aren’t paying attention to leakage.

**Figure 4: Temperature responses to three hydrogen demand scenarios for various leak rates.** Details and sources of scenarios can be found in Table 2. Shaded region in (b) represents a 20% uncertainty in hydrogen’s radiative efficiency.

Fig. 5 shows the anticipated temperature increase in 2050 based on leakage rate and level of hydrogen demand. For 1% total leakage, we would expect $0.0024 \pm 0.0004 \degree C$ per 10% final energy demand supplied by hydrogen with a maximum of $0.024 \pm 0.004 \degree C$ for a global energy demand that relies exclusively on hydrogen. For 5% total leakage, we would expect $0.013 \pm 0.003 \degree C$ per 10% final energy demand supplied by hydrogen with a maximum of $0.13 \pm 0.03 \degree C$. And for 10% total leakage, we would expect $0.03 \pm 0.005 \degree C$ per 10% final energy demand supplied by hydrogen with a maximum of $0.27 \pm 0.05 \degree C$. If hydrogen applications supply around half of final energy demand globally in 2050 (an upper estimate by BloombergNEF (2020)), hydrogen applications could cause at least a tenth of a degree (C) of warming for 10% leakage. For context, this amount of warming could offset the avoided warming in 2050 from deploying all cost-effective options to mitigate methane emissions globally over the next decade – which otherwise could have slowed down global-mean warming rates by up to 15%
(Ocko et al., 2021), or the avoided warming anticipated from the phasing out of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) (Xu et al., 2013). This amount of warming (~0.1 °C) is also equal to the amount of warming projected in 2100 from carbon dioxide emissions from international shipping and aviation combined in the absence of climate action (Ivanovich et al., 2019). However, if leakage does not exceed 1% the temperature response could be an order of magnitude smaller.

Figure 5: Temperature responses in 2050 depending on hydrogen leak rate and level of hydrogen deployment. Shaded region represents a 20% uncertainty in hydrogen’s radiative efficiency.

4 Discussion

The purpose of our study is to improve understanding of the role of hydrogen leakage in undermining the climate benefits from deployment of clean hydrogen alternatives to replace fossil fuel technologies. We evaluated hydrogen’s climate consequences in three ways: its warming potency relative to carbon dioxide, the warming impact of its leakage compared to that from the avoided emissions from fossil fuel technologies, and the absolute warming impacts from future levels of demand and leakage.

We found that hydrogen’s warming potency strongly depends on time horizon, and, similar to methane, can be at least three times more potent in the near-term than in the long-term relative to carbon dioxide when using the traditional GWP framework with pulses of equal emissions. If a constant emissions rate is used in the calculations instead, hydrogen’s warming potency may be 50% higher for time horizons of several decades and longer. When assessing the relative climate impacts from replacing fossil fuel technologies with their hydrogen alternatives (based on a unit of clean H₂ deployed relative to the avoided CO₂ emissions for a generic case), we found that there are vastly different climate outcomes depending on emission rates, time horizons, and production method. For example, blue hydrogen with high hydrogen and methane emissions (10 and 3%
emission rate, respectively) can be worse for the climate than the fossil fuel technologies for decades, but green hydrogen with low hydrogen emissions (1%) can nearly eliminate climate impacts from fossil fuel counterparts over all timescales. On the other hand, best-case blue hydrogen (1% for both hydrogen and methane) can have roughly the same climate benefits as the worst-case green hydrogen (10% emissions) – far from climate neutral but still cutting in half the impacts from the fossil fuels within a decade. However, the perceived benefits from clean hydrogen alternatives to fossil fuel technologies will depend on how much carbon dioxide and methane are avoided, which needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis with reliable emissions data. Finally, we found that levels of hydrogen demand around 800 Tg or above (which could account for around a quarter of final energy demand in 2050) could contribute at least 0.1 °C in warming with high hydrogen leakage (10%) and upper bound uncertainties in hydrogen’s radiative properties.

Our findings add to recent research that has revealed that the warming impacts of hydrogen emissions are higher than previously recognized (Paulot et al., 2021; Warwick et al., 2022) by exploring the implications this has for the potential of hydrogen as a decarbonization strategy in the near- and long-term. For example, we show for the first time the strong dependence of timescale when evaluating the climate change mitigation potential of clean hydrogen alternatives. This is because hydrogen’s warming effects are most powerful in the decade or two after hydrogen is released. While short-term climate warming impacts – followed by long-term climate change mitigation impacts – may lead to an eventual beneficial outcome, the short-term warming may lead to climate impacts that cause more socioeconomic and environmental damages in the near-term that are not necessarily reversible (Fischer et al., 2021). This could strongly affect the choice of whether or not to deploy hydrogen in applications that have multiple “clean” options. But if GWP-100 is relied on exclusively, the near- and mid-term warming power of hydrogen is masked, and therefore the anticipated climate benefits from deploying hydrogen are perceived to be much higher over the next few decades than in reality. However, we find that a dual approach of using both GWP-20 and GWP-100 adequately captures the climate impacts of hydrogen over all timescales, and therefore is a straightforward way to effectively understand temporal trade-offs across hydrogen deployment opportunities.

Taken together, our findings and the findings of previous studies make it clear that hydrogen emissions (leakage, venting, and purging) matter for the climate. And given that hydrogen is a very small molecule that is hard to contain, it can easily escape from infrastructure. A new network of production facilities, pipes, storage tanks, and hydrogen-powered homes and vehicles, can create a vast potential for hydrogen to leak. Further, moving hydrogen through existing natural gas systems that are already shown to leak significant amounts of methane is even more problematic. However, the total amount of leakage in current hydrogen systems remains unknown, with the analytical capacity to accurately measure small levels of leakage in situ largely unavailable. And lessons learned from extensive measurements of natural gas value chain leaks over the last decade (similar infrastructure, larger molecule) have shown that leakage rates were far higher than expected (Alvarez et al., 2018). While hydrogen is an arguably more valuable product than natural gas given the current cost of producing it, the lack of empirical measurements cannot confirm any assumptions regarding the influence of the cost of lost product on leakage rates, especially
if there is no regulatory enforcement. Without measurements of hydrogen leakage and in turn knowledge of strategies to mitigate leakage and deploy best practices, we risk developing leaky systems that could significantly contribute to climate change in the near to medium-term. More attention is therefore needed to measure and minimize hydrogen leakage as hydrogen efforts are ramped up.

Beyond needing accurate measurements of hydrogen emissions, more work is needed to improve understanding of hydrogen’s atmospheric impacts. This is because far less work has gone into refining hydrogen’s radiative effects compared to gases such as methane and carbon dioxide. There is a need for more integrated chemistry-climate modelling to build confidence in and refine the tropospheric and stratospheric radiative effects of hydrogen emissions. This is especially true regarding gaining a better understanding of the climate impacts in the first couple of decades after hydrogen is emitted to the atmosphere, given the complex temporal dynamics of hydrogen’s indirect effects; to date there is only one study that explores these near-term issues (Warwick et al., 2022). Chemistry-climate modelling is further required to: (1) understand the net effects when including co-emissions from hydrogen and fossil fuel technologies (such as sulphur dioxide, black and organic carbon, nitrogen oxides, and carbon monoxide); (2) estimate climate responses to hydrogen emissions beyond forcings (such as global surface air temperature); and (3) assess how changing concentrations of other atmospheric constituents may affect hydrogen’s potency (such as changing concentrations of methane resulting from reduced emissions in response to aggressive policies to address climate goals). For example, all else equal, hydrogen emissions will lead to an increase in other greenhouse gases. However, a new study shows that reductions in emissions of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic carbon can lead to a smaller increase in methane’s lifetime from hydrogen (because more OH is available), and a net decrease in tropospheric ozone (Warwick et al., 2022). These complexities and interactions will need to be explored in assessing the climate effects of decarbonization strategies.

*Warwick et al., 2022* Climate benefits of clean hydrogen alternatives to fossil fuel technologies also need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, given (1) the dependency of the leak rate on the production method, value chain pathway (i.e. compression, storage, distribution), and end-use application; and (2) the dependency of the benefits on the avoided greenhouse gas emissions which in turn depends on pathway, application, fuel, and also location. While analysis of a generic hydrogen deployment case is valuable for first-order insights, decisions will ultimately need to be made based on implications for specific technological shifts. For example, if the hydrogen is burned in the stratosphere (for example from aircrafts), the direct combustion of hydrogen could also increase stratospheric water vapor.

Further, we also note that there are additional climate and other environmental concerns associated with deployment of hydrogen that need to be addressed better understood quantitatively, such as the diversion of renewably-produced electricity to produce green hydrogen when a potentially more effective decarbonization pathway would be to use the renewable electricity directly to offset fossil fuel use (Ueckerdt et al., 2021); emissions of nitrogen oxides from combusting hydrogen, which is a health concern for local communities (Lewis, 2021); local water availability for green
hydrogen production (Beswick et al., 2021; Simoes et al., 2021); and CCUS efficiency and permanence for blue hydrogen (Saadat and Gersen, 2021).

However, given that hydrogen’s radiative effects are entirely indirect, any time horizon shorter than the lifetime of hydrogen (in which the required reactions have not yet taken place) will not provide a meaningful GWP result. Further, while Field and Derwent (2021) suggest that the tropospheric ozone effects are nearly immediate, the methane effects may take a few years to build up. This highlights the need for a more integrated chemistry-climate modelling approach to accurately determine the tropospheric and stratospheric radiative effects of hydrogen leakage in the first several years after emission. The importance of such an approach is enhanced when determining how related factors may change in the future, such as changing concentrations of methane resulting from reduced emissions of methane in response to aggressive policies to address climate goals.

The benefit of the Technology Warming Potential method is that we can analyse climate impacts over multiple time periods of interest—in the near-, medium-, and long-term—insights that are not available with the use of the GWP-100 metric. This is important when short-lived climate pollutants are emitted as they are often reported and assessed based on the long-term impact of a pulse emission, which overlooks their true impacts during the time they are active in the atmosphere.

5 Conclusions

Around the world, industry and policymakers are enthusiastic about clean hydrogen’s potential as an alternative to conventional fossil fuels that can greatly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Billions in new investments and financial subsidies are being proposed to speed its adoption. But hydrogen itself has significant climate impacts that are both widely overlooked and underestimated, and it is a very small molecule that can easily leak into the atmosphere from infrastructure.

In this study, Drawing on recent advances in hydrogen’s indirect warming efficiency estimates (Paulot et al., 2021), the only available estimates of plausible total value chain leakage (van Ruijven et al., 2011), and a metric that improves upon GWP by accounting for continuous emissions and climate impacts over time (Alvarez et al., 2012), we analyse the relative climate impacts over all timescales from replacing fossil fuel technologies with their hydrogen counterparts based on a unit of H₂ deployed relative to the avoided CO₂ emissions. To provide a sense of the overall magnitude of impact on global temperatures from future hydrogen leakage, we also estimate the temperature responses based on leak rate and deployment level.

We find that hydrogen leakage may have the potential to considerably undermine any near- and mid-term climate benefits when replacing fossil fuel systems with zero- and low-carbon hydrogen applications. Additionally, the climate benefits from avoided CO₂ emissions are far less than what is currently assumed based on GWP-100 derived assessments. In fact, if leaks are moderately high, even green hydrogen may initially yield more warming than would the use of the fossil fuel system it
replaces. The impacts are even more pronounced for ‘blue’ hydrogen, given that methane leakage suffers the same analytical challenges as hydrogen as result of being a short-lived gas (Alvarez et al., 2018).

The extent of the near- and mid-term warming effects from hydrogen leakage—and the extent to which they could limit or offset the anticipated slowdown in the rate of warming from replacing fossil fuel systems with hydrogen depends on how much hydrogen is ultimately deployed to replace fossil fuel systems and the magnitude of leak rates. To our knowledge, no model is currently capable of interactively simulating the chemistry, radiative forcings, and temperature impacts from hydrogen emissions into the full atmosphere. In the absence of such models, we approximate what the temperature responses may be to a future hydrogen economy assuming the efficacy of hydrogen is similar to CO₂.

For the most likely hydrogen deployment scenario (the “hydrogen vision” by Hydrogen Council (2017) and consistent with International Energy Agency (2021) projections; accounts for ~20% of final energy demand in 2050), 10% hydrogen leakage could cause 0.06 ± 0.01 °C of warming in 2050. However, if hydrogen is able to replace more than 50% of fossil fuel systems in 2050 (upper-end estimate from BloombergNEF (2020)) and if hydrogen leakage is high (10%), hydrogen applications could contribute more than a tenth of a degree (C) to global temperature rise. But this could be halved or an order of magnitude smaller if total leakage is limited to 5% or 1%, respectively.

Overall, our analysis should be considered a first step towards understanding the impact of hydrogen leakage on the climate system. Our results indicate that hydrogen emissions can considerably undermine the climate benefits of decarbonization strategies that involve clean hydrogen—especially in the decades immediately following deployment. This issue therefore deserves more attention, both on advancing the science of hydrogen’s indirect climate effects and improving estimates of hydrogen leakage emissions throughout the value chain. Minimizing leakage will be essential to the effectiveness of hydrogen as a climate change mitigation strategy. Further, this is especially true given that it may be possible to prevent leakage in some applications and it is easier to address and minimize hydrogen leakage when designing a system versus retrofitting one. Without measurements of hydrogen leakage and in turn knowledge of strategies to mitigate leakage and deploy best practices, we risk developing leaky systems that could significantly contribute to climate change in the near-to-medium term. Fortunately, we have an opportunity to get ahead of this issue before the infrastructure and systems are widely deployed.

Our analysis suggests that five key actions can help minimize hydrogen’s warming effects and therefore maximize climate benefits of a future hydrogen economy:

1. **Pursue research required to reduce the uncertainty in hydrogen’s indirect radiative effects**: Within one year of the deployment of hydrogen, we have the rare opportunity to get ahead of this issue before the infrastructure and systems are widely deployed.

Our analysis results suggest that five key actions can help minimize hydrogen’s warming effects and therefore maximize climate benefits of a future hydrogen economy:
chemistry, and radiation parametrizations in further coupled chemistry-climate models as well as reduced-complexity climate models (there has been limited attention to hydrogen’s warming effects in the atmosphere relative to other greenhouse gases, and given the risk of leakage more attention is warranted).

(2) employ climate metrics and/or models that effectively reflect the role that hydrogen could play in meeting net zero goals in the desired time frames ——this means not exclusively relying on GWP-100 and potentially adopting a dual GWP-20/GWP-100 approach (Ocko et al., 2017);

(3) improve quantification of hydrogen leakage rates (the lack of accurate data quantifying hydrogen leakage across the value chain remains a serious challenge in understanding the magnitude of the impact; a critical first step is by developing technologies that can be taken into the field to accurately measure hydrogen leakage emissions which will require equipment with a low-detection threshold (i.e. ppb level);

(4) include the likelihood of hydrogen leakage and its impacts in decision-making about where and how to effectively deploy hydrogen — such as collocated production and end use applications (for example, hydrogen should be deployed in situations which allow for minimization of leakage, such as hubs where the hydrogen is produced and used with limited movement or in applications that represent the greatest potential benefits); and

(5) identify leakage mitigation measures and best practices before building out infrastructure. (lessons learned over the past decade about how to minimize natural gas leakage are likely relevant, despite the differences in the properties of these two gases).

We also note that there are additional climate and other environmental concerns associated with deployment of hydrogen that need to be addressed, such as the diversion of renewably produced electricity to produce green hydrogen when a potentially more effective decarbonization pathway would be to use the renewable electricity directly to offset fossil fuel use (Luderer et al., 2021); NOx emissions from combusting hydrogen, which is a health concern for local communities (Lewis, 2021); water availability for green hydrogen (Beswick et al., 2021; Simões et al., 2021); and CCUS efficiency and permanence for blue hydrogen (Saadat and Gersen, 2021).

If we are to meet the climate challenge before us, it is imperative that we carefully examine each alternative decarbonization pathway using robust and appropriate metrics and data. The near- and mid-term warming impacts of hydrogen emissions are higher than widely perceived. These impacts should be explicitly and quantitatively accounted for in order to maximize the climate benefits of replacing fossil fuel systems with hydrogen. Taking a proactive and scientific approach to understand the implications of and address hydrogen leakage can help ensure that the global rush to hydrogen delivers on its promise to benefit the climate over all timescales.
Code and data availability

All code and data are available upon request.

Author contribution

IBO and SPH conceptualized the study. IBO conducted the analysis and data visualization. IBO and SPH wrote and edited the manuscript.

Competing interests

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Tianyi Sun, Eriko Shrestha, and Naomi Cohen-Shields for project support; Fabian Paulot and Stephen Pacala for helpful discussions on the methodology; and Joan Ogden, Michael Oppenheimer, Roland Kupers, Beth Trask, Hanling Yang, Aoife O’Leary, Morgan Rote, Jane Long, Mark Brownstein, Laura Catalano, and Natasha Vidangos for thoughtful feedback on versions of the paper. This work was supported by the Robertson Foundation, the Heising-Simons Foundation, and ClimateWorks Foundation.

References

Allen, M.R., Fuglestvedt, J.S., Shine, K.P., Reisinger, A., Pierrehubert, R.T., Forster, P.M.: New use of global warming potentials to compare cumulative and short-lived climate pollutants, Nat. Clim. Change, 6, 773-776, https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2998, 2016.

Alvarez, R. A., Pacala, S. W., Winebrake, J. J., Chameides, W. L., and Hamburg, S. P.: Greater focus needed on methane leakage from natural gas infrastructure, P. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 109, 6435–6440, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1202407109, 2012.

Alvarez, R. A., Zavala-Araiza, D., Lyon, D. R., Allen, D. T., Barkley, Z. R., Brandt, A. R., Davis, K. J., Herndon, S. C., Jacob, D. J., Karion, A., Kort, E. A., Lamb, B. K., Lauvaux, T., Maasakkers, J. D., Marchese, A. J., Omara, M., Pacala, S. W., Peischl, J., Robinson, A. L., Shepson, P. B., Sweeney, C., Townsend-Small, A., Wofsy, S. C., and Hamburg, S. P.: Assessment of methane emissions from the U.S. oil and gas supply chain, Science, 361, 186–188, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aar7204, 2018.

Balcombe, P., Speirs, J., Brandon, N. P., Hawkes, A.D.: Methane emissions: choosing the right climate metric and time, Environ. Sci.: Processes Impacts, 20, 1323, https://doi.org/10.1039/c8em00414e, 2018.
Bartlett, J. and Krupnick, A.: Decarbonized Hydrogen in the US Power and Industrial Sectors: Identifying and Incentivizing Opportunities to Lower Emissions, Resources for the Future, 2020.

Besseck, R. R., Oliveira, A. M., and Yan, Y.: Does the Green Hydrogen Economy Have a Water Problem?, Am. Chem. S., 6, 3167-3169, https://doi.org/10.1021/acsenergylett.1c01375, 10 September 2021.

Bond, S. W., Gül, T., Reimann, S.,

Buchmann, B., and Wokaun, A.: Emissions of anthropogenic hydrogen to the atmosphere during the potential transition to an increasingly H2-intensive economy, Int. J. Hydrogen, Energ., 36, 1122–1135, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2010.10.016, 2011.

Budsberg, E., Crawford, J., Gustafson, R., Bura, R., and Puettmann, M.: Ethanologens vs. acetogens: Environmental impacts of two ethanol fermentation pathways, Biomass Bioenerg., 83, 23–31, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2015.08.019, 2015.

Cain, M., Lynch, J., Allen, M.R., Fuglesvedt, J.S., Frame, D.J, Macey, A. H.: Improved calculation of warming-equivalent emissions for short-lived pollutants, npj Clim. Atmos. Sci., 29, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41612-019-0086-4, 2019.

Camuzeaux, J. R., Alvarez, R. A., Brooks, S. A., Browne, J. B., and Sterner, T.: Influence of methane emissions and vehicle efficiency on the climate implications of heavy-duty natural gas trucks, Am. Chem. S., 49, 6402–6410, https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.5b00412, 2015.

Chang, Y., Zhang, C., Shi, J., Li, J., Zhang, S., and Chen, G.: Dynamic Bayesian network based approach for risk analysis of hydrogen generation unit leakage, Int. J. Hydrogen Energ., 44, 26665–26678, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2019.08.065, 2019.

Cherubini, F. and Katsumasa, T.: Amending the Inadequacy of a Single Indicator for Climate Impact Analyses, Environ. Sci. Technol., 50, 12530-12531, https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.6b05343, 2016.

Colella, W. G., Jacobson, M. Z., and Golden, D. M.: Switching to a U.S. hydrogen fuel cell vehicle fleet: The resultant change in emissions, energy use, and greenhouse gases, J. Power Sources, 150, 150–181, https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JPOWSOUR.2005.05.092, 2005.

Collins, W., Frame, D., Fuglesvedt, J.S., Shine, K. P.: Stable climate metrics for emissions of short and long-lived species – combining steps and pulses, Environ. Res. Lett. 15, 024018, https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab6039, 2020.

Crutzen, P. J.: Photochemical reactions initiated by and influencing ozone in unpolluted tropospheric air, Tellus, 26, 47–57, https://doi.org/10.3402/tellusa.v26i1.2.9736, 1974.

Cooper, J., Dubey, L., Bakkaloglu, S., Hawkes, A.: Hydrogen emissions from the hydrogen value chain – emissions profile and impact to global warming, Sci. Total Environ., 830, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2022.154624, 2022.

Department of Energy: Hydrogen Delivery Scenario Analysis Model (HDSAM) V3.1, https://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/h2a_delivery.html.

Derwent, R. G., Collins, W. J., Johnson, C. E., and Stevenson, D. S.: Transient behaviour of tropospheric ozone precursors in a global 3-D CTM and their indirect greenhouse effects, Climatic Change, 49, 463-487, https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010648913655, 2001.
Derwent, R. G., Stevenson, D. S., Utembe, S. R., Jenkin, M. E., Khan, A. H., and Shallcross, D. E.: Global modelling studies of hydrogen and its isotopomers using STOCHEM-CRI: Likely radiative forcing consequences of a future hydrogen economy, Int. J. Hydrogen Energ., 45, 9211–9221, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2020.01.125, 2020.

Derwent, R. G.: Hydrogen for Heating: Atmospheric Impacts, Ph.D., Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/760538/Hydrogen_atmospheric_impact_report.pdf, 2018.

Derwent, R., Simmonds, P., O’doherty, S., Manning, A., Collins, W., and Stevenson, D.: Global environmental impacts of the hydrogen economy, Int. J. Nuclear Hydrogen Production and Application, 1, 57–67, https://doi.org/10.1504/IJNHPA.2006.009869, 2006.

Ehhalt, D., Prather, M., Dentener, F., Derwent, R., Dlugokencky, E., Holland, E., Isaksen, I., Katima, J., Kirchhoff, V., Matson, O., Midgley, P., and Wang, M.: Atmospheric Chemistry and Greenhouse Gases, in: Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by: Houghton, J. T., Ding, Y., Griggs, D. J., Noguer, M., van der Linden, P. J., Dai, X., Maskell, K., and Johnson, C. A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 239–287, 2001.

Energy Transitions Commission: Making the Hydrogen Economy Possible: Accelerating Clean Hydrogen in an Electrified Economy, https://www.energy-transitions.org/publications/making-clean-hydrogen-possible/, 2021.

Fesenfeld, L. P., Schmidt, T.S., Schrode, A.: Climate policy for short- and long-lived pollutants, Nat. Clim. Change, 8, 924-936, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0321-8, 2018.

Fischer, E. M., Sippel, S., and Knutti, R.: Increasing probability of record-shattering climate extremes, Nat. Clim. Change, 11, 689–695, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01092-9, 2021.

Forster, P., Storelmo, T., Armour, K., Collins, W., Dufresne, J. L., Frame, D., Lunt, D. J., Mauritsen, T., Palmer, M. D., Watanabe, M., Wild, M., and Zhang, H.: The Earth’s energy budget, climate feedbacks, and climate sensitivity, in: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, page, 2021.

Frazer-Nash Consultancy: Fugitive Hydrogen Emissions in a Future Hydrogen Economy, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fugitive-hydrogen-emissions-in-a-future-hydrogen-economy, 2022.

Global Hydrogen Review 2021, International Energy Agency, 2021.

Global Hydrogen Trade to Meet the 1.5 C Climate Goal Part II Technology Review of Hydrogen Carriers, International Renewable Energy Agency, https://www.irena.org/publications/2022/Apr/Global-hydrogen-trade-Part-II, 2022.

Global Renewables Outlook: Energy transformation 2050, International Renewable Energy Agency, https://www.irena.org/publications/2020/Apr/Global-Renewables-Outlook-2020, 2020.

Hajji, Y., Jouini, B., Bouferza, M., Elcafsi, A., Belghith, A., and Bourmot, P.: Numerical study of hydrogen release accidents in a residential garage, Int. J. Hydrogen Energ., 40, 9747–9759, https://doi.org/10.1016/J.IJHYDENE.2015.06.050, 2015.
Howarth, A. and Jacobson, M. Z.: How green is blue hydrogen?, Energy Sci. Eng., 9, 1676–1687, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/ese3.956, 2021.

Hydrogen, International Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/fuels-and-technologies/hydrogen, last access: 17 May 2022.

Hydrogen decarbonization pathways A life-cycle assessment, Hydrogen Council, 2021.

Hydrogen decarbonization pathways Potential supply scenarios, Hydrogen Council, 2021.

Hydrogen Economy Outlook Key messages, BloombergNEF, 2020.

Hydrogen Insights Report 2021, Hydrogen Council, 2021.

Hydrogen scaling up A sustainable pathway for the global energy transition, Hydrogen Council, 2017.

Ivanovich, C. C., Ocko, I. I., Piris-Cabezas, P., and Petsonk, A.: Climate benefits of proposed carbon dioxide mitigation strategies for international shipping and aviation, Atmos. Chem. Phys., 19, 14949–14965, https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-19-14949-2019, 2019.

Jacobson, M. Z.: Effects of wind-powered hydrogen fuel cell vehicles on stratospheric ozone and global climate, Geophys. Res. Lett., 35, https://doi.org/10.1029/2008GL035102, 2008.

Kobayashi, H., Naruo, Y., Maru, Y., Takesaki, Y., and Miyanabe, K.: Experiment of cryo-compressed (90-MPa) hydrogen leakage diffusion, Int. J. Hydrogen Energ., 43, 17928–17937, https://doi.org/10.1016/J.IJHYDENE.2018.07.145, 2018.

Levy, H.: Photochemistry of the lower troposphere, Planet. Space Sci., 20, 919–935, https://doi.org/10.1016/0032-0633(72)90177-8, 1972.

Lewis, A. C.: Optimising air quality co-benefits in a hydrogen economy: a case for hydrogen-specific standards for NOx emissions, Environ. Sci: Atmos., 1, 201–207, https://doi.org/10.1039/d1ea00037c, 2021.

Mejia, A. H., Brouwer, J., and mac Kinnon, M.: Hydrogen leaks at the same rate as natural gas in typical low-pressure gas infrastructure, Int. J. Hydrogen Energ., 45, 8810–8826, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2019.12.159, 2020.

Melaina, M. W., Antonia, O., and Penev, M.: Blending Hydrogen into Natural Gas Pipeline Networks: A Review of Key Issues, Ph.D., National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2013.

Myhre, G., Shindell, D., Bréon, F.-M., Collins, W., Fuglestvedt, J., Huang, J., Koch, D., Lamarque, J.-F., Lee, D., Mendoza, B., Nakajima, T., Robock, A., Stephens, G., Takemura, T., and Zhang, H.: Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forcing Supplementary Material, in: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Basis, Contribution of Working Group I of the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by: Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Plattner, G.-K., Tignor, M. Allen, S.K., Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex, V., Midgley, P.M., 2013.

Najjar, Y. S.: Hydrogen Leakage Sensing and Control: (Review), Biomed. J. Sci. Tech. Res., 21, https://doi.org/10.26717/bjstr.2019.21.003670, 2019.

New Energy Outlook 2020 Executive Summary, BloombergNEF, 2020.

New Energy Outlook 2021 Executive Summary, BloombergNEF, 2021.
Ocko, I. B. and Hamburg, S. P.: Climate Impacts of Hydropower: Enormous Differences among Facilities and over Time, Environ. Sci. Technol., 53, 14070–14082, https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.9b05083, 2019.

Ocko, I. B., Hamburg, S. P., Jacob, D. J., Keith, D. W., Keohane, N. O., Oppenheimer, M., Roy-Mayhew, J. D., Schrag, D. P., and Pacala, S. W.: Unmask temporal trade-offs in climate policy debates, Science, 356, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaj2350, 2017.

Ocko, I. B., Sun, T., Shindell, D., Oppenheimer, M., Hristov, A. N., Pacala, S. W., Mauzerall, D. L., Xu, Y., and Hamburg, S. P.: Acting rapidly to deploy readily available methane mitigation measures by sector can immediately slow global warming, Environ. Res. Lett., 16, https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abf9c8, 2021.

Parvini, M. and Gharagouzlou, E.: Gas leakage consequence modeling for buried gas pipelines, J. Loss. Prevent. Proc., 37, 110–118, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2015.07.002, 2015.

Paulot, F., Paynter, D., Naik, V., Malyshew, S., Menzel, R., and Horowitz, L. W.: Global modeling of hydrogen using GFDL-AM4.1: Sensitivity of soil removal and radiative forcing, Int. J. Hydrogen Energ., 46, 13446–13460, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2021.01.088, 2021.

Prather, M. J.: An Environmental Experiment with H2?, Science, 302, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1091060, 24 October 2003.

Qian, J. Y., Li, X. J., Gao, Z. X., and Jin, Z. J.: A numerical study of hydrogen leakage and diffusion in a hydrogen refueling station, Int. J. Hydrogen Energ., 45, 14428–14439, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2020.03.140, 2020.

Rahn, T., Eiler, J. M., Boering, K. A., Wennberg, P. O., McCarthy, M. C., Tyler, S., Schaufller, S., Donnelly, S., and Atlas, E.: Extreme deuterium enrichment in stratospheric hydrogen and the global atmospheric budget of H2, Nature, 424, 915–918, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature01917, 2003.

Saadat, S. and Gersen, S.: Reclaiming Hydrogen for a Renewable Future, Earthjustice, 1–41 pp., 2021.

Schultz, M. G., Diehl, T., Brasseur, G. P., and Zittel, W.: Air Pollution and Climate-Forcing Impacts of a Global Hydrogen Economy, 302, 622–624, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1089527, 2003.

Severinsky, A. J., Sessoms, A. L.: Methane versus Carbon Dioxide: Mitigation Prospects, Int. J. Environ. Ecol. Eng., 15, 214-220, https://publications.waset.org/vol/176, 2021.

Shen, L., Zavala-Araiza, D., Gautam, R., Omara, M., Scarpelli, T., Sheng, J., Sulprizio, M. P., Zhuang, J., Zhang, Y., Qu, Z., Lu, X., Hamburg, S. P., and Jacob, D. J.: Unravelling a large methane emission discrepancy in Mexico using satellite observations, Remote Sens. Environ., 260, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rse.2021.112461, 2021.

Sherif, S. A., Zeytinoglu, N., and Veziroglu, T. N.: Liquid Hydrogen: Potential, Problems, and a Proposed Research Program, Int. J. Hydrogen Energy, 22, 683–688, 1997.

Shine, K. P., Berntsen, T. K., Fuglestvedt, J. S., Skeie, R. B., Stuber, Nicola: Comparing the Climate Effect of Emissions of Short- and Long-Lived Climate Agents, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A., 365, 1903-1914, https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2007.2050, 2007.
Simoes, S. G., Catarino, J., Picado, A., Lopes, T. F., di Berardino, S., Amorim, F., Gírio, F., Rangel, C. M., and Ponce de Leão, T.: Water availability and water usage solutions for electrolysis in hydrogen production, J. Clean. Prod., 315, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.128124, 2021.

Swain, M. R. and Swain, M. N.: A comparison of H2, CH4 and C3H8 fuel leakage in residential settings, Int. J. Hydrogen Energ., 17, 807–815, https://doi.org/10.1016/0360-3199(92)90025-R, 1992.

The Future of Hydrogen, International Energy Agency, 2019.

Thibault, L., Gahlot, P., Debarre, R., Hydrogen applications and business models, Kearney Energy Transition Institute, https://www.energy-transition-institute.com/insights/hydrogen, 2020.

Tromp, T. K., Shia, R.-L., Allen, M., Eiler, J. M., and Yung, Y. L.: Potential Environmental Impact of a Hydrogen Economy on the Stratosphere, Science, 300, 1740-1742, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1085169, 2003.

Ueckerdt, F., Bauer, C., Drinaichner, A., Everall, J., Sacchi, R., and Luderer, G.: Potential and risks of hydrogen-based e-fuels in climate change mitigation, Nat. Clim. Change, 11, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01032-7, 2021.

van Renssen, S.: The hydrogen solution?, Nat. Clim. Change, 10, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0891-0, 2020.

van Ruijven, B., Lamarque, J. F., van Vuuren, D. P., Kram, T., and Eerens, H.: Emission scenarios for a global hydrogen economy and the consequences for global air pollution, Glo. Env. Change, 21, 983–994, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.03.013, 2011.

Vogel, B., Feck, T., and Grooß, J. U.: Impact of stratospheric water vapor enhancements caused by CH4 and H2O increase on polar ozone loss, J. Geophys. Res-Atmos., 116, https://doi.org/10.1029/2010JD014234, 2011.

Vogel, B., Feck, T., Grooß, J. U., and Riese, M.: Impact of a possible future global hydrogen economy on Arctic stratospheric ozone loss, Energy Environ. Sci., 5, https://doi.org/10.1039/c2ee03181g, 2012.

Wang, D., Jia, W., Olsen, S. C., Wuebbles, D. J., Dubey, M. K., and Rockett, A. A.: Impact of a future H2-based road transportation sector on the composition and chemistry of the atmosphere – Part 2: Stratospheric ozone, Atmos. Chem. Phys., 13, 6139–6150, https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-13-6139-2013, 2013.

Warwick, N. J., Bekki, S., Nisbet, E. G., and Pyle, J. A.: Impact of a hydrogen economy on the stratosphere and troposphere studied in a 2-D model, Geophys. Res. Letters, 31, https://doi.org/10.1029/2003gl019224, 2004.

Warwick, N., Griffiths, P., Keeble, J., Archibald, A., Pyle, J., Shine, K.: Atmospheric implications of increased Hydrogen use, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/atmospheric-implications-of-increased-hydrogen-use, 2022.

Working Paper | National Hydrogen Strategies, World Energy Council, 2021.

Wuebbles, D. J., Dubey, M. K., Edmonds, J., Layzell, D., Olsen, S., Rahn, T., Rocket, A., Wang, D., and Jia, W.: Evaluation of the Potential Environmental Impacts from Large-Scale Use and Production of Hydrogen in Energy and Transportation Applications, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, United States, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2172/1044180, 2010.
Xu, Y., Zaelke, D., Velders, G. J. and Ramanathan, V.: The role of HFCs in mitigating 21st century climate change, Atmos. Chem. Phys., 13, 6083–6089, 2013.

Yacovitch, T. I., Daube, C., and Herndon, S. C.: Methane Emissions from Offshore Oil and Gas Platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, Environ. Sci. Technol., 54, 3530–3538, https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.9b07148, 2020.

Yusaf, T., Laimon, M., Alrefae, W., Kadrigama, K., Dhahad, H., Ramasamy, D., Kamarulzaman, M. K., Yousif, B.: Hydrogen Energy Demand Growth Prediction and Assessment (2021–2050) Using a System Thinking and System Dynamics Approach, Appl. Sci., 12, https://doi.org/10.3390/app12020781, 2022.