The Backlash against Globalization

Stefanie Walter
University of Zurich
walter@ipz.uzh.ch

Forthcoming in the Annual Review of Political Science 2021

Abstract
In recent years, the world has seen a rising backlash against globalization. This article reviews
the state of the art on the nature, causes, and consequences of the globalization backlash. It
shows that contrary to a popular narrative, the globalization backlash is not associated with a
large swing in public opinion against globalization, but rather a result of its politicization. The
increasing influence of globalization-skeptic actors has resulted in more protectionist,
isolationalist and nationalist policies, some of which fundamentally threaten core pillars of the
contemporary international order. Both material and non-material causes drive the
globalization backlash, and these causes coexist, interact, and mediate each other. The
consequences are shaped by the responses of societal actors, national governments, and
international policymakers. These responses can either yield to and reinforce, or push back
against the globalization backlash. Understanding the dynamics this produces will be an
important task for future research.

I would like to thank Ryan Brutger, Lori Crasnic, Silvia Decadri, Giorgio Malet, Marco Martini, Tabea Palmtag,
Valentin Lang and Rachel Wellhausen for helpful comments and the students in my “Understanding the anti-
globalization backlash” seminar for inspiring discussions. Lisa Rogenmoser and Reto Mitteregger provided
excellent research assistance. This paper has benefitted from funding from the European Research Council (ERC)
under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme grant agreement No 817582 (ERC
Consolidator Grant DISINTEGRATION).

1 Affolternstr. 56, 8050 Zurich, Switzerland
Introduction

In recent years, the world has seen a rising backlash against globalization. Growing protectionism, the dismantling of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement system, or protests against international financial institutions such as the IMF are expressions of a backlash against economic globalization. Political globalization is also experiencing pushback as voters and politicians are criticizing the constraints international institutions place on national sovereignty. International organizations as diverse as the World Health Organization, the International Criminal Court, or the European Union have lost important member states, and initiatives for new international agreements have been hard to conclude. Finally, there is also growing backlash against social and cultural globalization, such as anti-immigrant backlash, anti-tourism protests, or a general concern about the loss of local cultures in a globalized world.

Not surprisingly, research on the globalization backlash is booming. This article reviews existing work on the globalization backlash broadly defined as a significant decrease in support for globalization. It starts with discussing the nature of the phenomenon: What exactly is the globalization backlash, what forms does it take, and what is new about it? This discussion shows that contrary to the popular narrative, the globalization backlash is not associated with a large swing in public opinion against globalization. Rather, existing preferences have been politicized and globalization skeptic actors have become more influential politically in recent years. This has resulted in more protectionist, isolationist and nationalist policies, some of which fundamentally threaten core pillars of the contemporary international order.

The article next explores the causes of the globalization backlash. It argues that rather than debate about whether material versus non-material causes drive the backlash, it is more
productive to explore how these factors coexist, interact, and mediate each other. This can be achieved by studying the relationship and the interplay between these causes, delving deeper into the role of hopes and expectations about what the “less globalized” counterfactual world would look like, and examining how political actors can strategically mobilize voters with globalization-skeptic attitudes into political action.

The final section turns to the consequences of the globalization backlash and examines the societal, policy and international-level responses to the backlash and the dynamics they bring about. I distinguish between responses that yield to and reinforce the backlash and those that push back against the backlash and try to mitigate its causes. The dynamics that unfold are complex, and assessing how these dynamics matter for the long-term consequences of the globalization backlash is a promising avenue for future research.

**The globalization backlash: Exploring the phenomenon**

What exactly is the nature of the globalization backlash? Surprisingly, the burgeoning literature on the phenomenon spends rather little time defining the phenomenon. Although most studies agree that Brexit, Trump and the success of populist nationalist parties are all manifestations of the backlash, the usage of this term varies widely, referring to phenomena ranging from individual support for protectionism, the electoral success of nationalist political parties, anti-globalization protests, to unilateral withdrawals from international institutions.

I use the term “globalization backlash” broadly to denote a significant decrease in public, partisan, or policy support for globalization. This rather general conceptualization allows us to explore the backlash both with regard to the different dimensions of globalization – economic, political, and social/cultural globalization – and with regard to different relevant groups of
actors: voters, political intermediaries, and governments. There is significant variation in the extent to which we can observe globalization backlash within and across these categories.

Moreover, considering the different dimensions of globalization is important, because they cannot always be clearly separated from each other: the dismantling of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, for example, pushes back against both economic and political globalization, just like the backlash against the European Court of Human Rights combines opposition to political and socio-cultural globalization. At the same time, however, backlashes against one dimension of globalization can go hand in hand with support for more globalization in other areas. The climate youth movement, for example, is often skeptical about economic globalization and the environmental costs associated with international trade, but is also pushing for more political globalization to facilitate a more effective and coordinated global fight against climate change. Others, such as market-liberal Brexiteers, oppose the constraints political globalization places on national sovereignty, but wholeheartedly embrace free trade.

_A popular backlash against globalization?_

An influential narratives holds that the globalization backlash is rooted in the mass public, where a growing share of losers of globalization increasingly lashes out against globalization in its different guises (e.g., Colantone and Stanig 2019; Hobolt 2016; Norris and Inglehart 2019; Rodrik 2018). The most prominent and consequential examples of this popular backlash are the election successes of nationalist candidates such as Donald Trump or Jair Bolsonaro and the Brexit referendum vote.
This narrative invokes the image of major shifts in both public opinion directed against trade, international cooperation, and immigration and voting behavior. Up close, however, the picture of a large shift of public preferences is less clear than this narrative suggests. Studies that examine broad shifts in globalization-related public opinion over time are relatively rare and provide inconclusive evidence: Whereas some studies find a broad shift in public opinion against globalization, such as increasingly negative attitudes about international and supranational organizations (Bearce & Jolliff Scott 2019; Bølstad 2014), others show that attitudes towards globalization are surprisingly stable and sometimes even become more positive over time (Kiratli 2020; Mader et al. 2019; Nguyen & Spilker 2019). Figure 1 illustrates this inconclusive picture using average survey responses from 15 countries2 at different levels of development across the world on globalization-related topics collected by the International Social Survey Project (ISSP) in 1995, 2003, and 2013. This data is useful because it asks the same questions repeatedly to representative population samples over a long period of time and therefore allows us to track change over time.

Despite considerable movement over time, there is no clear trend in the direction of a backlash. With regard to most dimensions, we see rising skepticism to some aspects of globalization, but not others. For example, although respondents have become more skeptical about the benefits of free trade, they have become less positive about limiting imports. Likewise, although support for the right of international organizations to enforce solutions has decreased, it remains at high levels, and although concerns about immigration and support for more national content on TV have grown, these trends are not particularly pronounced. There is also some interesting variation between more and less developed countries and

---

2 Czech Republic, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, USA.
between European and non-European countries, but no evidence that the globalization backlash – to the extent that it exists – is a developed-country or European phenomenon. Rather, the public in developed countries has grown more skeptical especially with regard to socio-cultural globalization and to a lesser extent economic globalization, whereas in less developed and European countries, skepticism has significantly grown in particular with regard to political globalization. There is no clear backlash against economic globalization in any of these country groups.

Figure 1: Public opinion on different globalization-related issues, 1995-2013

Note: Mean responses to the different statements on a scale ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree.
Overall, and despite this variation, this data provides little evidence for a large swing in public opinion against globalization. Although a considerable share of the mass public is skeptical of globalization, these assessments have been quite over the past two decades. Contrary to the prominent narrative, the “popular globalization backlash” thus does not seem to be caused by a major shift in public opinion.

What we can observe, however, is a clear backlash in political behavior. For one, there has significant civil society mobilization against globalization since the 1990s (e.g., Della Porta et al. 2015). This includes movements such as attac but also finds its expression in violent events such as the 2001 G20 protests in Genoa. More recently and using new tools such as online petitions, civil society has successfully mobilized against major new international trade agreements such as TTIP or CETA (Meunier & Czesana 2019). Although targets have evolved over time – one of the more recent developments are protests against overtourism – they underscore that dissatisfaction with different forms of globalization has existed for a while and can get mobilized.

The most consequential form of behavioral popular globalization backlash, however, has been occurring in the voting booth. Votes for economic nationalist and isolationist parties in Western European countries increased substantially between 1985-2015 (Colantone & Stanig 2018a, 2019), whereas voters’ support for political parties promoting liberal internationalist policies in “the West” has almost halved since the 1990s (Trubowitz & Burgoon 2020). Moreover, the share of referendums decided against international cooperation has increased substantially since the 2000s, with every second referendum ending in favor of non-cooperation in the 2010s (De Vries et al. 2021). Figure 2a illustrates this trend. It shows the average vote share of radical right parties and Euroskeptic parties in national parliaments of 37 mostly Western countries. The figure demonstrates that since the 1990s, these parties with
their anti-globalization platforms (Zaslove 2008) have continually increased their vote share, reaching an all-time high in the 2010s.³ The election of Donald Trump or the Brexit referendum are thus but the most prominent examples of a wider trend of globalization backlash in voting behavior.

Although voters’ attitudes about globalization have not changed much, they increasingly vote for candidates, parties, or proposals that oppose globalization. What explains this apparent paradox? An important part of the answer is the increasing politicization of issues related to globalization. A growing body of research shows that the mass public has become increasingly aware of and polarized on these issues, and that these issues have become much more salient and contested in recent years (De Vries 2018; De Wilde 2011; Hutter et al. 2016; Zürn et al. 2012). While the underlying causes for this change are complex, as I will discuss below, once activated, anti-globalization attitudes can turn into powerful heuristics and identities (Grynberg et al. 2019; Hobolt et al. 2020), so that some authors even speak of a new cleavage between globalization winners and losers (Bornschier 2017; Kriesi et al. 2008). While public preferences thus have not changed much over the past decades, opposition to globalization has been increasingly mobilized. The globalization backlash in voting behavior thus reflects that globalization skeptics have become more visible and politically consequential (De Vries et al. 2021).

³ Note that I am deliberately not looking at “populist” parties, which often take center stage in research on the globalization backlash, because populism comes in different flavors, not all of which are opposed to globalization (Verbeek & Zaslove 2017).
To understand this increasing contestation and politicization of globalization-related issues, we need to look at the supply side of politics. In recent years, parties offering policy programs for those dissatisfied with globalization have flourished. (Bornschier 2017). As a second axis of party competition has emerged, that has profoundly reshaped party politics in the past decades (Hooghe & Marks 2018; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). Over time, European integration and globalization more generally have become more salient issues in this discourse (Hooghe & Marks 2009). At the same time, the tone of the debate has become more negative over time (Burgoon et al. 2017; Trubowitz & Burgoon 2020) as electoral pressure by globalization-skeptic parties has weakened support for pro-globalization policies among mainstream parties (Abouchadi & Krause 2018; Meijers 2017).

Figure 2b illustrates the growing importance of globalization-related issues for party politics by looking at partisan discourse. Using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project, it shows how the way how political parties in 56 countries across the world speak about globalization – that is, on issues ranging from protectionism, internationalism, the EU, multiculturalism, and the national way of life – in their election manifestos has evolved. The increasing average shares of positive and negative party statements about globalization demonstrates the growing salience of globalization-related issues. Moreover, whereas positive statements clearly outweighed negative statements about globalization from the 1980s onwards, negative statements have increased markedly since the 1990s, an increase that has been most pronounced among EU countries. By the 2010s, parties in both developed and less developed countries made as many positive about globalization as they made negative statements. This decrease in pro-globalization statements reflects the growing opposition to globalization in partisan rhetoric, but also the fact that political parties positively inclined towards globalization have increasingly obscured their positions on these issues (Lacewell 2017).
Notes: Data come from the Parlgov database (Döring & Manow 2019) for vote shares and the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2019) for party discourse. Anti (pro-)globalization statements are calculated as the combined share of negative (positive) statements/quasi sentences about internationalism, the EU, and multiculturalism and positive statements regarding protectionism and the national way of life in percent of the overall number of allocated codes per document.

The emergence of a second axis of party competition has created new opportunities for political parties to (re)position themselves in this transformed space (De Vries & Hobolt 2020). By emphasizing issues such as immigration, national sovereignty or European integration as core components of their party programs, they have given voters who have always been opposed to globalization the opportunity to actually express this opposition at the ballot box. This has allowed these parties to successfully challenge established parties and has been a core factor for their success. In recent years, globalization-skeptic parties and politicians increasingly participate in government (Mudde 2013).
Implementing the globalization backlash: Policies

One of the areas in which the globalization backlash has been most pronounced has been in terms of policies. All three dimensions of globalization have faced policy backlash: Protectionist policies have increased sharply over the past years (WTO 2020: 108-9), the number of international governmental organizations has stagnated across all major world regions after decades of rapid growth (Pevehouse et al. 2019), and international institutions such as international courts face a backlash both in developing and developed countries (Alter et al. 2016; Madsen et al. 2018; Voeten 2019). Some countries have also begun to no longer comply with core membership criteria, such as the rule of law (Kelemen 2017).

**Figure 3: Globalization-related policies: Developments over time**

Figure 3 illustrates these broad trends. Using data on de jure (policy) globalization from the KOF Globalization index (Gygli et al. 2019), figure 3a shows that the rapid, decade-long growth
in globalization levels started to slow down in the 2000s for economic and political globalization and in the 2010s for social globalization. The slowdown is most pronounced for economic globalization, has been accelerated by the global financial crisis, especially with regard to de facto globalization, and can be observed across all three dimensions and across all levels of development. Figure 3b shows that in some areas, such as the international investment regime, the backlash is particularly pronounced. The number of signed international investment agreements (IIAs) has decreased since the mid-1990s, whereas the number of IIA terminations has strongly increased in recent years (UNCTAD 2020; see also Peinhardt & Wellhausen 2016). In 2017 and 2019, the number of terminated agreements exceeded the number of newly signed agreements.

Rather than an across-the-board globalization backlash in policies, however, Figure 3 suggests that overall, de jure globalization has been stagnating at high levels or growing at a lower rate for some time. So far, in terms of policies, we have overall largely seen a slowdown, rather than a backlash, in globalization that came after a period of accelerated globalization in the 1990s. Notably, the policy slowdown started long before the more recent electoral successes of populist parties and politicians and likely represents a response to more structural developments, such as geopolitical change, changes in global production regimes, the increasing transfer of authority from nation states to international institutions, and more generally diminishing returns from further globalization (e.g., Constantinescu et al. 2020; Stephen & Zürn 2019). These developments seem have dampened enthusiasm for more liberalization across the world.

Two trends are new, however, and suggest that the road ahead may be more bumpy than this analysis suggests. For one, whereas unilateral withdrawals from or even the decay and dissolution of international organizations are nothing new (e.g., Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2020;
Gray 2018; von Borzyskowski & Vabulas 2019), in recent years there has been an growing backlash against major international organizations such as the WTO, the EU, the ICC, or the Paris Climate Agreement. The backlash thus increasingly targets the core institutions that underpin the architecture of the contemporary world order that allowed globalization to emerge in the first place. Moreover, whereas challenges to international institutions originate in countries across the world, more recently some of the principal drivers of the globalization backlash increasingly come from the erstwhile pillars of that order such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Figure 3c shows, for example, that the US has withdrawn from international agreements at a very high rate during the Trump presidency (Cooley & Nexon 2020). As central nodes in global economic networks, these countries have the potential to “weaponise” interdependence, which in turn creates incentives for other countries to retreat from these networks (Farrell & Newman 2019). These developments suggest that the current backlash may well have systemic repercussions for the contemporary world order at large (Lake et al. 2021; Pepinsky & Walter 2019).

**What are the Causes of the Globalization Backlash?**

Why is the world witnessing a popular backlash against globalization? There is broad agreement in the literature that the major structural transformations of the last decades have facilitated its emergence. These transformations include the acceleration of globalization, deindustrialization, technological change, and inequality (Mansfield & Rudra 2021; Milner 2021; Rodrik 2018), but also non-economic transformations such as the end of the Cold War, rising immigration levels, cultural value change, and the increasing reach of international organizations into domestic politics (Hooghe & Marks 2009; Norris & Inglehart 2019). This echoes research in economic history, which finds that the first major globalization backlash in
the late 19th and early 20th century was also driven by structural transformations such as the integration of commodity markets and mass migration (O’Rourke 2019; Obstfeld 2020).

The importance of these structural transformations is most clearly demonstrated by the host of studies that present compelling evidence that the globalization backlash is stronger in those communities that have been most negatively affected by these structural changes. In regions that face higher trade competition with China and other low-wage countries, radical right wing parties are more successful (Colantone & Stanig 2018a; Dippel et al. 2015). In the US Donald Trump received significantly more votes in the 2016 presidential elections in these regions (Autor et al. 2017), support for protectionism and restrictive immigration policies is higher (Bisbee et al. 2020), and legislators from these regions support more protectionist trade policy proposals (Feigenbaum & Hall 2015; Owen 2017). Likewise, in the 2016 Brexit-referendum, the “Leave”-vote was significantly higher in communities with a greater exposure to the “China shock” (Colantone & Stanig 2018b) and rising immigration levels (Goodwin & Milazzo 2017). Financial globalization also matters: radical right parties tends thrive in the aftermath of international financial crises (Funke et al. 2016), communities hit harder by international financial shocks and crises exhibit a stronger support for nationalist populist parties (Broz et al. 2021; Gyongyosi & Verner 2018), and the effects of trade shocks on voting behavior have been reinforced by the global financial crisis and the euro crisis (Hutter & Kriesi 2019; Milner 2021). Trade has strong distributive consequences (Rogowski 1989), facilitates inequality (Ha 2012; Lang & Tavares 2018; Menendez et al. 2017) and produces grievances (Palmtag et al. 2018; Rudra 2008) in both developed and developing countries, and these studies suggest that increasingly, this is met with a backlash reaction.

Despite this strong evidence that globalization-related regional developments are associated with backlashes against globalization, it remains contested whether globalization itself is the
main driver of the globalization backlash, however. Other socio-economic transformations are equally – or perhaps even more – consequential in fostering backlash. For example, several studies find that support for radical right parties and nationalist projects such as Brexit is driven by exposure to automation and the digital revolution (Colantone & Stanig 2019; Frey et al. 2018; Im et al. 2019). In fact, the IMF (2019) concludes in a recent study that the effects of technology on local labor markets are much more pervasive and long-lasting than trade shocks. These trends have been augmented by a decline in corporate, income and wealth taxes fostered by financial globalization, that have not only contributed to a rise in inequality but has also restricted the state’s ability to compensate the losers of these processes (Rodrik 2018). Taken together, these major economic transformations have together increased regional disparities and socio-economic inequality, which in turn have provided a breeding ground for backlash (Ansell & Adler 2019; Broz et al. 2021; Burgoon 2013; Engler & Weisstanner 2020; Fetzer 2019).

Material or non-material causes?

A second major debate is more fundamental and revolves around the question whether the globalization backlash is predominantly driven by material or non-material concerns (for reviews of this debate see Golder 2016; Hainmueller & Hopkins 2014; Hobolt & de Vries 2016; Naoi 2020). The background to this debate is the fact that individual-level research is far less conclusive about the importance of economic transformations in driving the globalization backlash than the regional-level analyses suggest.

One group of scholars argues that the globalization backlash is driven by material concerns of globalization losers. Several studies document that individuals who are more exposed to objective globalization risks are more supportive of protectionist and anti-immigrant policies
Another robust finding is that low-skilled individuals, who face the highest globalization-related labor market risks, exhibit more globalization-skepticism (Bearce & Jolliff Scott 2019; Margalit 2012). However, the evidence that those directly hurt by globalization are more likely to vote for anti-globalization parties or proposals is mixed. For example, voters most exposed to negative offshoring risks are not more likely to vote for populist-right parties than low-skilled voters more generally (Rommel & Walter 2018). And in regions exposed to import competition, the unemployed or manual workers are not more likely to vote for nationalist and isolationist parties or projects such as Brexit than people who are more sheltered from globalization pressures (Colantone & Stanig 2018a,b).

In light of this mixed evidence about the role of material self-interest, other authors argue that non-economic factors such as cultural concerns, identity, ideology, or concerns about sovereignty are much more important drivers of the globalization backlash than material concerns. For example, opposition to economic globalization is stronger among individuals holding right-wing authoritarian, nationalist and isolationist values and attitudes (Jedinger & Burger 2020; Mansfield & Mutz 2013) or those concerned about the negative sociotropic effects of trade (Mansfield & Mutz 2009). Opposition to political and socio-cultural globalization is related to concerns about restrictions on national sovereignty (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2014) and a cultural backlash against mainstream culture and neoliberalism (Hopkin & Blyth 2019; Norris & Inglehart 2019). But opposition to globalization can also originate in progressive values. For example, protectionism is stronger among those with other-regarding preferences (Lü et al. 2012) and those concerned about the environment, consumer health, and labor conditions abroad (Duina 2019; Ehrlich 2018).
**Going beyond the silos**

Taken together, there is evidence for both material and non-material causes of the globalization backlash. Trying to adjudicate between both approaches is not the most fruitful endeavor, however. For one, there are methodological issues: Whereas identity, values, beliefs and subjective concerns are measured rather precisely on the individual level, identifying individuals’ objective, respondent-specific material interest is much more difficult (Malhotra et al. 2013; Naoi 2020; Owen & Walter 2017). This coarse measurement of self-interest makes it hard to adjudicate between the different approaches in a balanced manner. It is also more promising to study how material and non-material causes relate, how they interact, and under which circumstances and for whom certain causes matter more than others. Researchers have begun to address these questions from three angles:

A first strand of research focuses on the question of how material and non-material causes of the globalization backlash relate. Several studies argue and show that adverse economic developments affect non-material values and attitudes such as authoritarian values (Ballard-Rosa et al. 2020), xenophobic beliefs (Hays et al. 2019), or cultural grievances (Carreras et al. 2019), but also trust in governments (Foster & Frieden 2017) and support for democracy (Armingeon & Guthmann 2014). Economic, social, and cultural transformations can also create anxieties that fuel anti-immigrant, anti-establishment, or protectionist attitudes among those who see their subjective social status threatened (Gidron & Hall 2017; Kurer 2020; Mutz 2018). These changes in non-material attitudes in turn then serve as proximate causes for voting behavior. At the same time, cultural values can provide a prism through which economic developments are interpreted. Others show that material and non-material causes for the globalization backlash can coexist: Whereas some voters choose nationalist parties or policies based on material self-interest, other voters vote for them for cultural reasons.
Moreover, opposition to different dimensions of globalization can motivate differently and opposition to one dimension of globalization can reinforce or weaken opposition to other dimensions. For example, Leave-voters in the 2016 Brexit referendum not only saw Brexit as an opportunity to limit political and socio-cultural globalization (especially immigration), but also as an opportunity to achieve greater economic globalization, especially more trade openness (Hobolt 2016; Owen & Walter 2017).

A second approach delves deeper into the role of expectations about what the “less globalized” counterfactual world would look like and what the consequences of protectionist, isolationist, or nationalist policies would be (De Vries 2018). Research has shown, for example, that individuals supporting referendum proposals that aim at retrenching political globalization often are overly optimistic about the consequences of such actions (Grynberg et al. 2019; Sciarini et al. 2015; Walter et al. 2018). Individual support for globalization-enabling or -restricting policies also depends on their evaluation of the risks and rewards associated with these policies and their risk orientation (Dinas et al. 2020; Ehrlich & Maestas 2010; Steenbergen & Siczek 2017). A better understanding where these expectations orginate, how they are related to material and non-material factors, and what happens when these expectations are not fulfilled, will expand our understanding of the dynamics that underlie the globalization backlash.

A third approach examines when and how previously low-salience issues related to globalization turn into a noticeable globalization backlash (De Vries et al. 2021). It shows that political elites can strategically mobilize voters with globalization-skeptic attitudes by using anti-globalization messages (Naoi & Urata 2013; Vries & Edwards 2009). The effectiveness of elite cues on public opinion about international issues varies across issues (Guisinger & Saunders 2017) and the tone of the message (Dellmuth & Tallberg 2020). Media coverage that
overemphasizes the costs of globalization can also induce backlash (Brutger & Strezhnev 2017). But politicization is also driven by external factors such as crises (Hutter & Kriesi 2019), or a changing decision-making context (Hooghe & Marks 2009; Zürn et al. 2012). And politicization can also create support for globalization (Risse 2010), so that it is important to understand it’s overall effect.

For a better understanding of the causes of the globalization backlash, it is also useful to recognize their endogenous nature. The backlash may trigger responses that reinforce or mitigate these causes, and our understanding how this in turn effects the dynamics of the globalization backlash over time is still limited. The next section sketches out some ideas in this regard.

Responses and Dynamics

Turning to the consequences of the globalization backlash, this section examines responses to the backlash at the societal, governmental, and international level, and the dynamics these responses produce. The aim of this section is to suggest a framework on how to think about these responses and dynamics, rather than a comprehensive review of all possible ways in which this can play out. It classifies responses based on two dimensions: the locus of action and the type of response (see table 1). The first dimension classifies responses based on whether they are predominantly located on the societal level (responses by voters, civil society organizations, or political parties), policy responses on the national level, or whether they are situated on the international level (government behavior in international negotiations and responses by international organizations). The second dimension distinguishes between responses that yield to and reinforce the backlash and responses that mitigate and push back against the globalization backlash.
## Table 1: The globalization backlash: responses and dynamics

|                                | Reinforcing the backlash                                                                 | Pushback against the backlash                                      |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Societal responses**         | Encouraging globalization skeptic attitudes                                              | Pro-globalization mobilization                                      |
|                                | Pandering to the right                                                                    | Deterrence effects                                                  |
| **Domestic policy responses**  | Anti-globalization policies                                                               | Policies aimed at mitigating causes of globalization backlash       |
| **International responses**    | Government responsiveness in international negotiations                                   | Non-accommodation in international negotiations                      |
|                                | IO responsiveness                                                                       | Enhancing legitimacy of international institutions                  |

This classification is of course a simplification. Responses can straddle and have feedback effects across these categories, and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between responses and the backlash itself. But it provides a useful heuristic for analyzing the vast and varied responses to the globalization backlash. This section illustrates how the framework helps to systematically think about some of these responses and the dynamics and feedback effects they produce.

**An ever growing globalization backlash? Reinforcing dynamics**

There is some concern that the backlash against globalization may turn into a fundamental challenge for the contemporary international order. This becomes more likely when societal, policy, and international responses reinforce the anti-globalization backlash and its underlying grievances, creating self-perpetuating dynamics in the process. There are a number of ways how such dynamics may come about.

There are several possible reinforcement dynamics on the societal level. With regard to voters, a number of studies document that successful globalization backlash, such as
widespread anti-globalization mobilization, electoral successes of globalization-skeptic parties, or successful policy backlash, can intensify voters’ anti-globalization attitudes and preferences. For example, informing individuals about the increasing use of capital controls by other countries, makes them more supportive of restrictions on international financial flows (Steinberg et al. 2020). Regarding backlash against political globalization, several studies document that voters who think that Brexit is going well for the UK are significantly more likely to support an EU exit for their own country (De Vries 2017; Walter 2020a,b). And electoral successes of radical parties and candidates such as Donald Trump legitimize their views and thus encourage those sharing these views to support them more openly (Bischof & Wagner 2019; Bursztyn et al. 2017). As a result of these reinforcing dynamics, anti-globalization attitudes can become stronger and more vocal over time. Mainstream parties also have a role to play. There is growing evidence that electoral successes of radical right parties induces mainstream parties to shift their policy positions in a more globalization-skeptic, anti-immigrant, and protectionist direction (Abou-Chadi & Krause 2018; Meijers 2017). As these shifts give anti-globalization positions more moral and political weight, they intensify the globalization backlash and further politicize the cultural axis of party competition.

Reponsiveness on the policy level implies the implementation of protectionist, isolationist, anti-immigrant policies, which in turn deepen the policy-based globalization backlash. Such policies can be motivated by policymakers’ genuine preferences for rolling back globalization, or by the hope that such policies may calm the waters and reduce backlash over time. This is by no means assured, however. For one, policies such as restrictive immigration reforms or Brexit increase the salience of these issues and politicize them further politicizing (Abou-Chadi & Helbling 2018; Hobolt et al. 2020). Moreover, such policies often also reverberate internationally. For one, other countries are likely to retaliate against
protectionist policies (Irwin 2017). But protectionist policies in one state can also reduce support for pro-globalization policies such as openness to foreign investment abroad (Chilton et al. 2017), and negative rhetoric about trade can erode confidence in the trade regime overall and entice other states to violate trade rules (Carnegie & Carson 2019). Efforts by one state to renegotiate more advantageous terms of international cooperation can also spark similar demands from other governments (Walter 2020b). Finally, globalization-skeptic governments such as successive British pro-Brexit governments or the Trump administration, have been successful in undermining and dismantling existing institutions and structures that underpin the contemporary global order, but have largely failed to replace these institutions with functioning alternatives (Drezner 2019). The question is who will move in to fill the void and what the reactions to the newly emerging structures will be. For example, one possibility is that big businesses will use the opportunity to tailor new rules in their favor (Johns et al. 2019). Another one is a more powerful role for China (Weiss & Wallace 2020). Such dynamics can reinforce grievances that have been associated with the emergence of the globalization backlash, providing fodder to the very dynamics that underlie the politicization of globalization on the societal level.

Finally, there are also international-level responses to the globalization backlash. Confronted with globalization-skeptic publics at home, governments often tread more carefully in international negotiations and show higher levels of responsiveness to their constituents’ interests (Hagemann et al. 2017; Schneider 2019, 2020). While such a response may help address globalization-skeptic publics at home, it does make decision-making on the international level more difficult (Hooghe & Marks 2009). The failure to successfully complete the 2019 Madrid climate summit or the difficulties of devising EU-wide responses to the euro, refugee, and COVID-19 crises are cases in point. Finally, international organizations
themselves can strategically respond to the globalization backlash (Bressanelli et al. 2020). For example, the European Court of Justice has become more restrictive in its reasonings and rulings to better align with growing public opposition to free movement of people (Blauberger et al. 2018), and the European Commission withdraws legislative proposals more frequently when faced with backlash (Reh et al. 2020). These responses are double-edged swords, however, as they may invite further opposition in the long term by compromising the input and output legitimacy of these institutions.

Pushing back against the globalization backlash

Although the backlash against globalization has received much attention, the descriptive analysis at the beginning of this article showed that large groups of people and political parties remain supportive of globalization. It is thus not surprising that there is considerable resistance against the globalization backlash. Some of this pushback directly counteracts globalization-skeptic positions and policies, whereas other responses try to mitigate the backlash by addressing the grievances that underlie the backlash.

On the societal level, one of the starkest developments in recent years has been the emergence of vocal civil society organizations that counter-mobilize in support of international cooperation, against xenophobia, and for progressive values more generally (Roth 2018). Examples include the pro-EU movements that sprang up in the UK and across the EU-27 states after the Brexit referendum, the Swiss group “Operation Libero,” which helped derail several referendums aimed at limiting immigrant rights and Switzerland’s international commitments, or the Climate youth, which is loudly demanding more international environmental cooperation worldwide. Another important development has been pushback by political actors. Increasingly, political parties (especially green and social liberal parties, see
Bakker et al. 2015) and politicians (such as New Zealand’s prime minister Jacinda Ahern or French President Emmanuel Macron) vocally support cosmopolitan and international stances and emphasize their opposition to nationalist stances. This reflects the growing importance of the demarcation-integration axis of party competition (Kriesi et al. 2008). Overall, what we can observe is thus a strong politicization of all issues related to globalization, rather than a one-sided backlash. At the same time we sometimes also see some surprising absences of pushback. One major puzzles, for example, is why businesses, especially export-oriented businesses and those embedded in global value chains, have not been more vocally opposing disruptive backlash policies such as the increase in US protectionism or the risk of a No-Deal Brexit in the UK.

On the domestic policy level, the most prominent debate about how to push back against the globalization backlash revolves around compensation for the losers of globalization and other economic transformation. The goal is to “re-embed” liberalism (Ruggie 1982) into society and to thus regain losers’ support for sustained globalization by redistributing its welfare gains (Mansfield & Rudra 2021). This could occur through a general expansion of welfare policies, more or better regulation, or place-based policies, which might be better suited to mitigating globalization-related grievances associated with regional economic decline (Broz et al. 2021; Rodríguez-Pose 2018). Several studies suggest that social welfare or public employment programs that cushion the risks of globalization and reduce the inequality it produces can increase public support for economic openness (Hays et al. 2005; Nooruddin & Rudra 2014), and reduce nativist sentiment and voting for radical right parties (Crepaz & Damron 2009; Swank & Betz 2003). Moreover, globalization losers strongly support redistributive policies (Walter 2010, 2017). Nonetheless, the compensation strategy faces challenges: for one, globalization winners are often unwilling to share their gains from globalization (Linardi &
Rudra 2020; Walter 2017), which is only one reason why governments’ room to implement sweeping reforms is constrained (Beramendi et al. 2015). Perhaps more importantly, the effectiveness of this strategy is unclear. The globalization backlash has not been limited to countries without a strong welfare state. Rather European countries with mature welfare states such as Denmark or Sweden have also seen highly successful radical right parties. Although there is no strong backlash against economic globalization in these countries, they do experience strong backlash against political and socio-cultural globalization. This suggests that it may be hard to find a “quick compensation fix” that will address grievances on all globalization dimensions (Goodman & Pepinsky 2021).

Finally, governments have pushed back against attempts by individual countries to extract better terms of cooperation at the international level. For example, the EU-27 have governments consistently refused to accommodate British requests to enjoy many the benefits of EU membership while being freed of its obligations after Brexit. Such non-accommodation is costly, but it counters the globalization backlash by reducing support for it (Chopin & Lequesne 2020; Walter 2020a,b; Walter et al. 2018). Countries willing to cooperate have also tried to work around policy backlash and to uphold cooperation. For example, several countries are supporting the creation of a multi-party interim appeal arrangement designed to resolve WTO disputes as long as the US is blocking the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement system. International organizations themselves also respond to the globalization backlash. Most notable are efforts to enhance their legitimacy (Gronau & Schmidtke 2016; Tallberg & Zürn 2019; Zaum 2013) by changing their communication patterns (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2018; Moschella et al. 2020) or establishing parliamentary bodies to achieve more democratic legitimacy (Rocabert et al. 2019). By improving both their procedural
standards and performance quality, international organizations can enhance their perceived legitimacy among member states and the public (Anderson et al. 2019).

To what extent these attempts to mitigate or push back against the globalization backlash will ultimately be successful, and how they interact with those responses that reinforce the backlash, is an open question and an important and promising avenue for future research.

Conclusion

What is the backlash against globalization, and what are its causes and consequences? This review has examined the backlash across different dimensions and has made three main arguments. First, the globalization backlash manifests itself in electoral successes of globalization-skeptic parties, in a more negative tone in partisan discourse over globalization, and an increase in policies designed to stop or curtail economic, political and/or socio-cultural globalization. However, contrary to the popular narrative, the globalization backlash is not driven by a large swing in public opinion against globalization. Rather, existing anti-globalization attitudes have been politicized and become more politically consequential in the process. Second, this implies that it is not just important to understand why voters oppose globalization, but also when and how this opposition becomes activated and when it becomes politically salient. Our understanding of the causes of the globalization backlash can be improved by moving the debate from a focus on the relative importance of material vs. non-material causes of the backlash to one on the interplay of these causes and their importance for the politicization of globalization-related issues. Third, to understand the consequences of the globalization backlash, we should focus on the responses it generates and the feedback effects these responses produce. Such societal, domestic policy, and international-level responses can either yield to and reinforce the backlash, or push back
against it and aim at mitigating its underlying causes. Understanding the dynamics this produces will be an important task for future research.

Although this review has focused on the backlash against globalization, it is vital to recognize that this backlash does not stand in isolation. Rather, it is occurring amidst other major developments, such as the populist backlash against elites, growing threats against liberal democracy, and geopolitical changes like the rise of China. How these challenges are causally linked with the globalization backlash, how they interact with it, whether they fuel or quell the dynamics surrounding it, and whether this will turn the backlash against globalization into a serious threat for the contemporary international order are important questions that future research should seek to answer.
Summary points

1. In recent years, the world has seen a rising backlash against all three dimensions of globalization: economic, political, and socio-cultural globalization.

2. This backlash is not associated with major shifts in public opinion against globalization, but rather a growing politicization of anti-globalization attitudes and political influence of anti-globalization actors.

3. The globalization backlash manifests itself in electoral successes of globalization-skeptic parties, in a more negative tone in partisan discourse over globalization, and an increase in protectionist, isolationist, or nationalist policies designed to stop or curtail economic, political and/or socio-cultural globalization.

4. Both material and non-material causes drive the globalization backlash and it is important to understand how these factors coexist, interact, and mediate each other. This can be achieved by studying the relationship and the interplay between these causes, delving deeper into the role of expectations about what the “less globalized” counterfactual world would look like, and examining how political actors strategically mobilize voters with globalization-skeptic attitudes into political action.

5. The consequences of the globalization backlash are shaped by the societal, policy and international-level responses to the backlash and the dynamics they bring about. Some responses yield to and reinforce the backlash, whereas others push back against the backlash and try to mitigate its causes.

6. The globalization backlash is occurring amidst other major challenges to the contemporary global order, such as the populist backlash against elites, growing threats against liberal democracy, and geopolitical changes like the rise of China.
Bibliography

Abou-Chadi T, Helbling M. 2018. How immigration reforms affect voting behavior. *Political Studies*. 66(3):687–717

Abou-Chadi T, Krause W. 2018. The causal effect of radical right success on mainstream parties’ policy positions: A regression discontinuity approach. *British Journal of Political Science*. 1–19

Ahlquist J, Copelovitch M, Walter S. 2020. The Political Consequences of External Economic Shocks: Evidence from Poland. *American Journal of Political Science*. 64(4):904–920

Alter KJ, Gathii JT, Helfer LR. 2016. Backlash against international courts in west, east and southern Africa: causes and consequences. *European Journal of International Law*. 27(2):293–328

Anderson B, Bernauer T, Kachi A. 2019. Does international pooling of authority affect the perceived legitimacy of global governance? *The Review of International Organizations*. 14(4):661–83

Ansell B, Adler D. 2019. Brexit and the Politics of Housing in Britain. *The Political Quarterly*. 90(52):105–16

Armingeon K, Guthmann K. 2014. Democracy in crisis? The declining support for national democracy in European countries, 2007–2011. *European Journal of Political Research*. 53(3):423–42

Autor D, Dorn D, Hanson G, Majlesi K. 2017. A note on the effect of rising trade exposure on the 2016 presidential election. *Appendix to “Importing Political Polarization*

Bakker R, De Vries C, Edwards E, Hooghe L, Jolly S, et al. 2015. Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999–2010. *Party Politics*. 21(1):143–52

Ballard-Rosa C, Malik M, Rickard S, Scheve K. 2020. The economic origins of authoritarian values: evidence from local trade shocks in the United Kingdom. *Comparative Political Studies*

Bearce DH, Jolliff Scott BJ. 2019. Popular non-support for international organizations: How extensive and what does this represent? *The Review of International Organizations*. 14(2):187–216

Beramendi P, Häusermann S, Kitschelt H, Krieshi. 2015. *The Politics of Advanced Capitalism*. Cambridge University Press

Bisbee J, Mosley L, Pepinsky TB, Rosendorff BP. 2020. Decompensating domestically: the political economy of anti-globalism. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 27(7):1090–1102

Bischof D, Wagner M. 2019. Do voters polarize when radical parties enter parliament? *American Journal of Political Science*. 63(4):888–904

Blauberger M, Heindlmaier A, Kramer D, Martinsen DS, Sampson Thierry J, et al. 2018. ECJ Judges read the morning papers. Explaining the turnaround of European citizenship jurisprudence. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 25(10):1422–41

Bølstad J. 2014. Dynamics of European integration: Public opinion in the core and periphery. *European Union Politics*. 16(1):23–44

Bornschier S. 2017. Globalization, Cleavages, and the Radical Right. In *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, ed. J Rydgren. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Bressanelli E, Koop C, Reh C. 2020. EU Actors under pressure: politicisation and depoliticisation as strategic responses

Broz L, Frieden J, Weymouth S. 2021. Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash. *International Organization*
Brutger R, Strezhnev A. 2017. International Disputes, Media Coverage, and Backlash Against International Law. Technical report. Working Paper

Burgoon B. 2013. Inequality and anti-globalization backlash by political parties. *European Union Politics*. 14(3):408–35

Burgoon B, Oliver T, Trubowitz P. 2017. Globalization, domestic politics, and transatlantic relations. *International Politics*. 54(4):420–33

Bursztyn L, Egorov G, Fiorin S. 2017. From extreme to mainstream: How social norms unravel. National Bureau of Economic Research

Carnegie A, Carson A. 2019. Reckless Rhetoric? Compliance Pessimism and International Order in the Age of Trump. *The Journal of Politics*. 81(2):739–46

Carreras M, Irepoglu Carreras Y, Bowler S. 2019. Long-Term Economic Distress, Cultural Backlash, and Support for Brexit. *Comparative Political Studies*. 0010414019830714

Chilton AS, Milner H V, Tingley D. 2017. Reciprocity and public opposition to foreign direct investment. *British Journal of Political Science*. 1–25

Chopin T, Lequesne C. 2020. Disintegration reversed: Brexit and the cohesiveness of the EU27. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*. 1–13

Colantone I, Stanig P. 2018a. The trade origins of economic nationalism: Import competition and voting behavior in Western Europe. *American Journal of Political Science*. 62(4):936–53

De Vries C, Hobolt S. 2020. Political Entrepreneurs: The Rise of Challenger Parties in Europe. Princeton University Press

Della Porta D, Andretta M, Calle A, Combes H, Eggert N, et al. 2015. *Global Justice Movement: Cross-National and Transnational Perspectives*. Routledge

De Wilde P. 2011. No polity for old politics? A framework for analyzing the politicization of European integration. *Journal of European Integration*. 33(5):559–75

Dellmuth LM, Tallberg J. 2020. Elite Communication and the Popular Legitimacy of International Organizations. *British Journal of Political Science*. 1–22
preferences for euro membership in Greece. *European Union Politics*

Dippel C, Gold R, Heblich S. 2015. Globalization and its (dis-) content: Trade shocks and voting behavior. National Bureau of Economic Research

Döring H, Manow P. 2019. Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies. Development version.

Drezner DW. 2019. Present at the Destruction: The Trump Administration and the Foreign Policy Bureaucracy. *The Journal of Politics*. 81(2):723–30

Duina F. 2019. Why the excitement? Values, identities, and the politicization of EU trade policy with North America. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 26(12):1866–82

Ecker-Ehrhardt M. 2014. Why parties politicise international institutions: On globalisation backlash and authority contestation. *Review of International Political Economy*. 21(6):1275–1312

Ecker-Ehrhardt M. 2018. International Organizations “Going Public”? An Event History Analysis of Public Communication Reforms 1950–2015. *International Studies Quarterly*. 62(4):723–36

Ehrlich S, Maestas C. 2010. Risk, Risk Orientation, and Policy Opinions: The Case of Free Trade. *Political Psychology*. 5(31):657–84

Ehrlich SD. 2018. *The Politics of Fair Trade: Moving beyond Free Trade and Protection*. Oxford University Press

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni M. 2020. Death of international organizations. The organizational ecology of intergovernmental organizations, 1815–2015. *The Review of International Organizations*. 15:1815–2015

Engler S, Weisstanner D. 2020. The threat of social decline: income inequality and radical right support. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 1–21

Farrell H, Newman AL. 2019. Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. *International Security*. 44(1):42–79

Feigenbaum JJ, Hall AB. 2015. How legislators respond to localized economic shocks: Evidence from Chinese import competition. *The Journal of Politics*. 77(4):1012–30

Fetzer T. 2019. Did austerity cause Brexit? *American Economic Review*. 109(11):3849–86

Foster C, Frieden J. 2017. Crisis of trust: Socio-economic determinants of Europeans’ confidence in government. *European Union Politics*. 18(4):511–35

Frey CB, Berger T, Chen C. 2018. Political machinery: did robots swing the 2016 US presidential election? *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*. 34(3):418–42

Funke M, Schularick M, Trebesch C. 2016. Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014. *European Economic Review*. 88:227–60

Gidron N, Hall P. 2017. The politics of social status: economic and cultural roots of the populist right. *The British Journal of Sociology*. 68(S1):

Golder M. 2016. Far right parties in Europe. *Annual Review of Political Science*. 19:477–97

Goodman SW, Pepinsky T. 2021. The Exclusionary Foundations of Embedded Liberalism. *International Organization*

Goodwin M, Milazzo C. 2017. Taking back control? Investigating the role of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. 19(3):450–64

Gray J. 2018. Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations. *International Studies Quarterly*. 62(1):1–13

Gronau J, Schmidtke H. 2016. The quest for legitimacy in world politics – international institutions’ legitimation strategies. *Review of International Studies*. 42(3):535–57

Grynberg C, Walter S, Wasserfallen F. 2019. Expectations, Vote Choice, and Opinion Stability
Since the 2016 Brexit Referendum. *European Union Politics*. 1–21

Guisinger A, Saunders EN. 2017. Mapping the boundaries of elite cues: How elites shape mass opinion across international issues. *International Studies Quarterly*. 61(2):425–41

Gygli S, Haelg F, Potrafke N, Sturm J-E. 2019. The KOF Globalisation Index – revisited. *The Review of International Organizations*. 14(3):543–74

Gyongyosi G, Verner E. 2018. Financial Crisis, Creditor-Debtor Conflict, and Political Extremism. *Creditor-Debtor Conflict, and Political Extremism (November 2018)*

Ha E. 2012. Globalization, government ideology, and income inequality in developing countries. *The journal of Politics*. 74(2):541–57

Hagemann S, Hobolt S, Wratil C. 2017. Government responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence from Council voting. *Comparative Political Studies*. 50(6):850–76

Hainmueller J, Hopkins DJ. 2014. Public Attitudes toward Immigration. *Annual Review of Political Science*. 17:225–49

Hays J, Ehrlich S, Peinhardt C. 2005. Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis. *International Organization*. 59(2):473–94

Hays J, Lim J, Spoon J-J. 2019. The path from trade to right-wing populism in Europe. *Electoral Studies*. 60:102038

Hobolt S. 2016. The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 23(9):1259–77

Hobolt S, de Vries C. 2016. Public support for European integration. *Annual Review of Political Science*. 19:413–32

Hopkin J, Blyth M. 2019. The Global Economics of European Populism: Growth Regimes and Party System Change in Europe (The Government and Opposition/Leonard Schapiro Lecture 2017). *Government and Opposition*. 54(2):193–225

Hutter S, Grande E, Kriesi H. 2016. *Politicising Europe*. Cambridge University Press

Hutter S, Kriesi H. 2019. Politicizing Europe in times of crisis. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 26(7):996–1017

Im ZJ, Mayer N, Palier B, Rovny J. 2019. The “losers of automation”: A reservoir of votes for the radical right? *Research & Politics*. 6(1):2053168018822395

IMF. 2019. *World Economic Outlook 2019*. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund

Irwin DA. 2017. The false promise of protectionism: Why Trump’s trade policy could backfire. *Foreign Aff.* 96:45

Jedinger A, Burger AM. 2020. The ideological foundations of economic protectionism: Authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and the moderating role of political involvement. *Political Psychology*. 41(2):403–24

Johns L, Pelc KJ, Wellhausen RL. 2019. How a Retreat from Global Economic Governance May Empower Business Interests. *The Journal of Politics*. 81(2):731–38

Kelemen RD. 2017. Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic Union. *Government and Opposition*. 52(2):211–38

Kiratli OS. 2020. Together or Not? Dynamics of Public Attitudes on UN and NATO. *Political
Kriesi H, Grande E, Lachat R, Dolezal M, Bornschier S, Frey T. 2006. Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. *European Journal of Political Research.* 45(6):921–56

Kriesi H, Grande E, Lachat R, Dolezal M, Bornschier S, Frey T. 2008. *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Kurer T. 2020. The Declining Middle: Occupational Change, Social Status, and the Populist Right. *Comparative Political Studies.* 0010414020912283

Lacewell OP. 2017. Beyond policy positions: How party type conditions programmatic responses to globalization pressures. *Party Politics.* 23(4):448–60

Lake D, Martin L, Risse T. 2021. Challenges to the Liberal International Order. *International Organization*

Lang VF, Tavares MMM. 2018. *The Distribution of Gains from Globalization.* International Monetary Fund

Linardi S, Rudra N. 2020. Globalization and Willingness to Support the Poor in Developing Countries: An Experiment in India. *Comparative Political Studies.* 0010414019897686

Lü X, Scheve K, Slaughter MJ. 2012. Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection. *American Journal of Political Science.* 56(3):638–54

Mader M, Steiner ND, Schoen H. 2019. The globalisation divide in the public mind: belief systems on globalisation and their electoral consequences. *Journal of European Public Policy.* 1–20

Madsen MR, Cebulak P, Wiebusch M. 2018. Backlash against international courts: explaining the forms and patterns of resistance to international courts. *International Journal of Law in Context.* 14(2):197–220

Malhotra N, Margalit Y, Mo CH. 2013. Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact. *American Journal of Political Science.* 57(2):391–410

Mansfield E, Rudra N. 2021. Embedded Liberalism Reconsidered. *International Organization*

Mansfield ED, Mutz D. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. *International Organization.* 63(2):425–57

Mansfield ED, Mutz DC. 2013. US versus Them: Mass Attitudes toward Offshore Outsourcing. *World Politics.* 65(4):571–608

Margalit Y. 2012. Lost in globalization: International economic integration and the sources of popular discontent1. *International Studies Quarterly.* 56(3):484–500

Meijers MJ. 2017. Contagious Euroscepticism: The impact of Eurosceptic support on mainstream party positions on European integration. *Party Politics.* 23(4):413–23

Menendez I, Owen E, Walter S. 2017. Low skill products by high skill workers: The distributive effects of trade in developing countries. *IPES Annual Conference*

Meunier S, Czesana R. 2019. From back rooms to the street? A research agenda for explaining variation in the public salience of trade policy-making in Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy.* 26(12):1847–65

Milner H. 2021. Voting for Populism in Europe: Globalization, Technological Change, and the Extreme Right. *Comparative Political Studies*

Moschella M, Pinto L, Martocchia Diodati N. 2020. Let’s speak more? How the ECB responds to public contestation. *Journal of European Public Policy.* 27(3):400–418

Mudde C. 2013. Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what? *European Journal of Political Research.* 52(1):1–19

Mutz DC. 2018. Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote.
Naoi M. 2020. Survey Experiments in International Political Economy: What We (Don’t) Know About the Backlash Against Globalization. *Annual Review of Political Science*

Naoi M, Urita S. 2013. Free Trade Agreements and Domestic Politics: The Case of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. *Asian Economic Policy Review*. 8(2):326–49

Nguyen Q, Spilker G. 2019. The Elephant in the Negotiation Room: PTAs through the Eyes of Citizens. In *The Shifting Landscape of Global Trade Governance: World Trade Forum*, eds. G Spilker, M Elsig, M Hahn, pp. 17–47. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Nooruddin I, Rudra N. 2014. Are developing countries really defying the embedded liberalism compact? *World Politics*. 66(4):603–40

Norris P, Inglehart R. 2019. *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge University Press

O’Rourke KH. 2019. Economic history and contemporary challenges to globalization. *The Journal of Economic History*. 79(2):356–82

Obstfeld M. 2020. Globalization Cycles. *Italian Economic Journal*. 6(1):1–12

Owen E. 2017. Exposure to Offshoring and the Politics of Trade Liberalization: Debate and Votes on Free Trade Agreements in the US House of Representatives, 2001–2006. *International Studies Quarterly*. 61(2):297–311

Owen E, Johnston N. 2016. Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job routineness, offshorability and protectionist sentiment. Texas A&M, College Station

Owen E, Walter S. 2017. Open economy politics and Brexit: insights, puzzles, and ways forward. *Review of International Political Economy*. 24(2):179–202

Palmtag T, Rommel T, Walter S. 2018. International Trade and Public Protest: Evidence from Russian Regions. Zurich

Peinhardt C, Wellhausen RL. 2016. Withdrawing from investment treaties but protecting investment. *Global Policy*. 7(4):571–76

Pepinsky T, Walter S. 2019. Introduction to the debate section: Understanding Contemporary Challenges to the Global Order. *Journal of European Public Policy*. s

Pevehouse JCW, Nordstrom T, McManus RW, Jamison AS. 2019. Tracking organizations in the world: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 datasets. *Journal of Peace Research*. 57(3):492–503

Reh C, Bressanelli E, Koop C. 2020. Responsive withdrawal? The politics of EU agenda-setting. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 27(3):419–38

Risse T. 2010. *A Community of Europeans?: Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. Cornell University Press

Rocabert J, Schimmelfennig F, Crasnic L, Winzen T. 2019. The rise of international parliamentary institutions: Purpose and legitimation. *The Review of International Organizations*. 14(4):607–31

Rodríguez-Pose A. 2018. The revenge of the places that don’t matter (and what to do about it). *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*. 11(1):189–209

Rodrik D. 2018. Populism and the Economics of Globalization. *Journal of International Business Policy*. 1–22

Rogowski R. 1989. *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Rommel T, Walter S. 2018. The Electoral Consequences of Offshoring: How the Globalization of Production Shapes Party Preferences. *Comparative Political Studies*. 51(5):621–658

Roth S. 2018. Introduction: Contemporary Counter-Movements in the Age of Brexit and Trump. *Sociological Research Online*. 23(2):496–506
Rudra N. 2008. *Globalization and the Race to the Bottom in Developing Countries: Who Really Gets Hurt?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Ruggie J. 1982. International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. *International Organization.* 36(2):379–415

Schneider C. 2019. *The Responsive Union: National Elections and European Governance.* Cambridge University Press

Schneider C. 2020. Public commitments as signals of responsiveness in the European Union. *The Journal of Politics.* 82(1):0

Sciarini P, Lanz S, Nai A. 2015. Till Immigration do us Part? Public Opinion and the Dilemma between Immigration Control and Bilateral Agreements. *Swiss Political Science Review.* 21(2):271–86

Steenbergen MR, Siczek T. 2017. Better the devil you know? Risk-taking, globalization and populism in Great Britain. *European Union Politics.* 18(1):119–36

Steinberg D, McDowell D, Gueorguiev D. 2020. Inside looking out: how international policy trends shape the politics of capital controls in China. *The Pacific Review.* 1–27

Stephen MD, Zürn M. 2019. *Contested World Orders: Rising Powers, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the Politics of Authority Beyond the Nation-State.* Oxford University Press, USA

Swank D, Betz H-G. 2003. Globalization, the welfare state and right-wing populism in Western Europe. *Socio-Economic Review.* 1(2):215–45

Tallberg J, Zürn M. 2019. The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations: introduction and framework. *The Review of International Organizations.* 14:581–606

Trubowitz P, Burgoon B. 2020. The retreat of the west. *Perspectives on Politics*

UNCTAD. 2020. *International Investment Agreements Navigator*

Verbeek B, Zaslove A. 2017. Populism and foreign policy. *The Oxford handbook of populism.* 384–405

Voeten E. 2019. Populism and Backlashes Against International Courts. *Perspectives on Politics*

Volkens A, Krause W, Lehmann P, Matthieß T, Merz N, et al. 2019. The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2019b

von Borzyskowski I, Vabulas F. 2019. Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations? *The Review of International Organizations.* 14:335–366

Walter S. 2010. Globalization and the welfare state: Testing the microfoundations of the compensation hypothesis. *International Studies Quarterly.* 54(2):403–26

Walter S. 2017. Globalization and the Demand-Side of Politics. How globalization shapes labor market risk perceptions and policy preferences. *Political Science Research and Methods.* 5(1):55–80

Walter S. 2020a. Contagious Disintegration? How Brexit reverberates in other countries. Lucerne

Walter S. 2020b. The Mass Politics of International Disintegration. *CIS Working Paper Series.* 105, Zürich

Walter S, Dinas E, Jurado I, Konstantinidis N. 2018. Noncooperation by Popular Vote: Expectations, Foreign Intervention, and the Vote in the 2015 Greek Bailout Referendum. *International Organization.* 72(4):969–994

Weiss JC, Wallace J. 2020. Domestic Politics, China’s Rise, and the Future of the Liberal International Order. *International Organization, Forthcoming*

WTO. 2020. Annual Report 2020. *World Trade organization Annual Report*

Zaslove A. 2008. Exclusion, community, and a populist political economy: The radical right as
an anti-globalization movement. *Comparative European Politics*. 6(2):169–89
Zaum D. 2013. *Legitimating International Organizations*. OUP Oxford
Zürn M, Binder M, Ecker-Ehrhardt M. 2012. International authority and its politicization. *International Theory*. 4(1):69–106