[ARTICLE ON A SPECIFIED TOPIC]

THE RHETORICAL EFFECT OF LOCATIVE INVERSION CONSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE THREE-TIER MODEL OF LANGUAGE USE

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This article aims to explain how the Locative Inversion Construction (LIC) produces a certain rhetorical effect in terms of the three-tier model of language use. The article argues that the LIC functions as an evidential expression indicating that the information conveyed is gained through the speaker’s direct perception, which leads to the speaker’s informational superiority over the addressee. The use of the LIC allows the speaker to impose his perspective of direct perception on the addressee, which in turn results in making the addressee feel as if he were sharing the perceptual experience with the speaker.*

Keywords: Locative Inversion Construction, informational superiority, subjectivity, evidentiality, direct perception

1. Introduction

The main concern of this article is with the Locative Inversion Construction (LIC) in English, as exemplified in (1):

(1) On the wall hangs a portrait of Mao.

(Hooper and Thompson (1973: 467))

Besides the non-canonical word order, the LIC is noteworthy in terms of rhetorical effect. It is often pointed out that the LIC describes a scene more vividly or dynamically than the non-inverted sentence, sounding emotional or exclamatory (e.g. Hooper and Thompson (1973), Gary (1976), and Fukuchi (1985)). Observe the following example:

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(2) Jane came to herself. Beside her lay the body of Joseph, who was already dead.

In (2), the underlined sentence can be interpreted as a description of what the protagonist (Jane) saw. The reader feels as if he were observing the situation with the protagonist. In other words, the LIC provides a realistic sensation, which I define here as a rhetorical effect that makes the addressee feel as if he were sharing the same perceptual experience with the speaker.\(^1\),\(^2\)

Although many researchers recognize the rhetorical effect, it seems that they do not regard it as a serious issue (e.g. Gary (1976), Green (1980), Drubig (1988), and Dorgeloh (1997)). As a result, the question of where the rhetorical effect comes from has been left unanswered. Hence, I pose the following question:

(3) How does the LIC produce a rhetorical effect (i.e. a realistic sensation) which the corresponding non-inverted sentence does not have?

In what follows, I will clarify the pragmatico-cognitive mechanism producing the rhetorical effect from the perspective of the three-tier model of language use. The main claim is that the LIC is employed to describe the speaker’s direct perception; by imposing the same perspective on the addressee, the speaker successfully makes the addressee feel as if he were experiencing the same perception.

2. Three-Tier Model of Language Use and Informational Superiority: Basic Assumptions

As a preliminary to the discussion below, this section discusses those aspects of the three-tier model of language use that are relevant to the present study (see Hirose (2013, this issue) for more details).

The model assumes that language use is composed of three tiers. The first tier is the situation construal tier, in which the speaker as private self

\(^1\) Drubig (1988) refers to this effect as a “visual-impact reading.” But the term realistic sensation is more appropriate, because, as discussed later, the LIC can represent perceptions other than visual perception.

\(^2\) In this article, the term speaker is used to refer to a person who perceives and construes the situation described in an LIC (i.e. a speaker, writer, omniscient narrator, or dramatis persona), while the term addressee is used to refer to a person who interprets the information conveyed in an LIC (i.e. a reader or hearer).
(the subject of thinking or consciousness) construes a situation, forming a thought about it; the second is the *situation report tier*, in which the speaker as public self (the subject of communicating) reports or communicates his construed situation to the addressee; and the third is the *interpersonal relationship tier*, in which the speaker as public self considers his interpersonal relationship with the addressee. It is also hypothesized that languages may differ as to how the three tiers are combined, depending on whether their basic egocentricity lies in the public self or the private self (see also Figures 1 and 2 of Hirose (this issue)).

In this model, English is classified as a public-self-centered language. This is because in English, the situation construal and situation report tiers are unified, implying the priority of a situation-external perspective. In addition, the independence of the interpersonal relationship tier means that in default cases, one can assume a neutral level of communication, which does not depend on any particular relationship between speaker and addressee. In this sense, the speaker and the addressee are assumed to be linguistically equal, being in a symmetrical relationship. On the other hand, Japanese is classified as a private-self-centered language. The independence of the situation construal tier in Japanese means the priority of a situation-internal perspective, which in turn means that the speaker is, by default, given superiority over the addressee in situation construal. The unification of the situation report and interpersonal relationship tiers means that in situation report the speaker must always consider his interpersonal relationship with the addressee to adjust the default superiority given to the speaker.

Among the above-mentioned characteristic differences between English and Japanese, the most important one for our purposes is the default linguistic relationship between speaker and addressee: the speaker is placed above the addressee in Japanese, while they are placed on an equal footing in English. Here it is worth mentioning how this difference influences linguistic forms in communication (see also Hirose (2013) and Ikarashi (2013, 2014)).

In general, in English, one can use an assertive sentence like (4) regardless of whether the information conveyed is already shared with the addressee:

\[
(4) \text{It’s a beautiful day.}
\]

Note that sentence (4) can be ambiguously read in the following sense: if uttered when both speaker and addressee are under a clear blue sky, it can be interpreted as being used to “confirm” the sharing of information; however, if uttered when the speaker and the addressee are apart, e.g. talking on
the phone, it can be interpreted as being used to “achieve” the sharing of information. In the former case, the speaker and the addressee are informationally equal, while in the latter case the speaker is informationally superior to the addressee. The fact that sentence (4) allows these two contextual readings indicates that English has a default level of communication where the speaker and the addressee are treated as informationally equal regardless of the actual difference, if any, between them.

In Japanese, by contrast, speakers are supposed to be more sensitive to information status. Thus, sentence (4) must be translated differently according to its information status (see also Hirose (2013: 4)).

(5) a. Ii tenki desu *(ne). [known to both speaker and good weather Cop.Pol SFP addressee] ‘It’s a beautiful day (, isn’t it?)’
   b. Ii tenki desu (yo). [known only to speaker] good weather Cop.Pol SFP ‘It’s a beautiful day.’

Note that the sentence-final particle ne, which signals that the information belongs to the addressee’s “territory” (in the terminology of Kamio (1990)), is obligatory in (5a). Recall that the speaker is assumed by default to be superior to the addressee in Japanese. As a result, when the speaker’s default informational superiority cannot be maintained as in (5a), it must be rectified by ne. On the other hand, in (5b), which actually conveys information known only to the speaker, the speaker’s default informational superiority and actual informational superiority coincide with each other. In this case, it is also possible to use the sentence-final particle yo, by means of which the speaker’s informational superiority is explicitly expressed and hence more foregrounded (see also Ikarashi (2013, 2014)).

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3 Informational superiority is roughly defined as the state in which the speaker has a fuller grasp of the information in question than the addressee (see Ikarashi (2013, 2014)). Note, however, that the notion does not always have to reflect the actual informational relationship between speaker and addressee.

4 The following abbreviations are used in the glosses of examples in this article: Acc = accusative, Comp = complimentizer, Cop = copula, Hs.Ev = evidential marker for hearsay information, Inf.Ev = evidential marker for inferential information, Loc = locative, Nom = nominative, Pass = passive, Past = past, Pol = polite, Q = question particle, SFP = sentence-final particle, Stat = stative, and Top = topic.

5 Note that the polite verb desu in (5) “only adjusts social relationship by indicating a social distance between speaker and addressee” (Hirose (2013: 25)).
3. Hypothesis

Based on the premises described above, I propose the following hypothesis on the use of the LIC that underpins the rhetorical effect of realistic sensation:

(6) The LIC is specifically employed to express the speaker’s direct perception, highlighting his informational superiority and subjective involvement in the situation.

In terms of the three-tier model, this hypothesis can be read as follows. If it is the case that the LIC expresses the speaker’s direct perception, then the LIC pertains to the situation construal tier, where the speaker as private self construes a situation. This, in turn, means that when using the LIC, the speaker places himself in the perceptual situation (i.e. the situation in which the speaker is involved as the subject of perception) and views it from the inside, which leads to the superiority of the speaker in situation construal. Recall that in default cases, English gives priority to the situation-external, objective perspective, and the speaker is placed on an equal footing with the addressee; thus, as has already been seen, even when the speaker is informationally superior, the superiority is normally suppressed or backgrounded. On the other hand, as I will argue in a later section, the LIC serves to indicate the priority of the situation-internal, subjective perspective over the situation-external perspective; thus, its use foregrounds the speaker’s informational superiority, canceling the default symmetrical relationship between speaker and addressee. Seen in this light, the above-mentioned hypothesis amounts to claiming that the LIC, reflecting a marked mode of situation construal, is a linguistic means by which English behaves like Japanese in terms of the speaker’s informational superiority and subjectivity (I will return to this topic in Section 6).

4. The LIC as an Expression of Evidentiality and Subjectivity

This section examines the validity of our hypothesis. To explain how the rhetorical effect of realistic sensation is produced, I will begin by arguing for the following claims contained in the hypothesis: first, the LIC expresses the speaker’s direct perception; second, it reflects the speaker’s subjective involvement in the situation.
4.1. The LIC as an Expression of Direct Evidentiality

4.1.1. The Scope of the LIC

It is tacitly accepted in literature that the LIC expresses the speaker’s observation (e.g. McCawley (1977), Kuno and Takami (2007), and Webelhuth (2011)). Let us consider Webelhuth’s (2011) view, based on the following example:

(7) In search of diversion, I glanced at the two mural tablets on the wall beside me. The words “Monkshill-park” at once caught my eye. The first tablet recorded the death of the Honourable Amelia, daughter of the first Lord Vauden and wife of Henry Parker, Esquire, of Monkshill-park, in 1763. Beneath this was another tablet commemorating the manifold virtues of the Parker’s daughter, Emily Mary, who had died in 1775.

(A. Taylor, *The American Boy* [taken from Webelhuth (2011: 86)])

Webelhuth (2011) explains that the LIC in (7) describes what the protagonist saw and the first two sentences with words of visual perception (*glance* and *eye*) set the stage that allows the reader to conceptually align his perspective with the protagonist.

At first sight, explanations of this kind appear to successfully capture the essence of the LIC; in some respects, however, they are insufficient. First, the speaker’s observation can be expressed not only by the LIC but also by the non-inverted counterpart, as shown in (8):

(8) I opened the bag and looked into it:
   a. Inside swam plenty of fish, no larger than a fingernail.
   b. Plenty of fish, no larger than a fingernail, swam inside.

Hence, the *raison d’être* of the LIC should be sought somewhere else.

Second, although many researchers focus on the LIC describing visual perception, it can also be used to describe other perceptions, as exemplified below:

(9) Out of his throat came a horrible sounding voice, “My name is Lexington,” it said in a deep, deep voice.

(P. T. Bailey, *Spiritual Warfare*)

(10) From downstairs boomed a voice, “Baba [“father,” in Swahili], Baba!”

(S. T. Williams, *Blue Rage, Black Redemption*)

Examples (9) and (10) describe auditory perception. More interesting are the following examples, given by an informant. Sentence (11a) describes the speaker’s feeling of fear, while sentence (11b) describes the speaker’s excitement:
It is true that the LIC is typically used to describe the speaker’s observation; however, these examples clearly indicate that the potential scope of the LIC is not limited to the description of visual perception, because one cannot actually see sounds or feelings.

In this light, we can say that the “description of the speaker’s observation” is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the use of the LIC. Therefore, I propose another possibility: the LIC pertains to evidentiality, that is, the grammatical marking of an information source (cf. Chafe and Nichols (1986) and Aikhenvald (2004)). More precisely, the LIC is specifically employed to mark direct evidentiality, indicating that the information conveyed is gained through direct perception. Conversely, the LIC cannot convey information based on other information sources, such as inference and hearsay. In the next subsection I will provide evidence that LICs are evidential expressions of firsthand sensory information.

4.1.2. Evidence for Evidentiality

This section investigates the LIC in terms of evidentiality. To begin with, consider the following example:

(12) It’s raining.

Note that sentence (12) is pragmatically ambiguous. It can be interpreted differently in different contexts, as illustrated below:

(13) (The speaker is looking out the window.) Oh, it’s raining.
(14) It’s raining (, because they are walking under their umbrellas).
(15) A: What did John say?
    B: It’s raining.

In (13), the speaker is uttering the sentence on the basis of information he has gained through his own observation; that is, the sentence expresses information gained through direct perception. Sentence (14) expresses information gained through inference, interpreted as “I conclude that it’s raining from the fact that they are walking under their umbrellas.” In dialogue (15), where speaker B is telling A what John said, the sentence it’s raining

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6 Evidentiality can be expressed in a variety of ways. Some languages have dedicated affixes or clitics, while in others the evidentiality marking is fused with another category such as modal auxiliaries (cf. Aikhenvald (2004)). Here, as a working hypothesis, I assume that evidentiality can be encoded in constructions. I call this constructional evidentiality.
conveys *hearsay information*. In this way, the sentence *it's raining* is neutral with respect to evidentiality, and thus can be interpreted differently in accordance with different information sources.\(^7\)

Interestingly enough, sentence (16), a Japanese counterpart to example (12), is sensitive to evidentiality, and thus cannot be interpreted in more than one way:\(^8\)

(16) Ame-ga hut-teiru.
    rain-Nom fall-Stat
    ‘It’s raining.’

(17) *(The speaker is looking out the window.)*
    Ah, Ame-ga hut-teru.
    oh rain-Nom fall-Stat
    ‘Oh, it’s raining.’

(18) *(Minna-ga kasa-o sasi-teiru kara)* \(^\ast\)Ame-ga
    (everyone-Nom umbrella-Acc open-Stat because) rain-Nom
    fall-Stat
    ‘It’s raining (, because they are walking under their umbrellas).’

(19) A:  Taroo-wa nan to itta-no?
    Taro-Top what Comp said-Q
    ‘What did Taro say?’

B: \(^\ast\)Ame-ga hut-teru.
    rain-Nom fall-Stat
    ‘It’s raining.’

In Japanese, the bare form *Ame ga hut-teiru* ‘It’s raining’ can express the speaker’s firsthand perception (as in (17)), while it cannot be used for either inference-based information (as in (18)) or hearsay information (as in (19)). To express such kinds of information properly, as is well known, Japanese speakers have to use evidential markers such as *noda/*yooda (inferential) and *te/sooda* (hearsay):

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\(^7\) This is not to say that evidentiality is never encoded in linguistic form in English. In general, evidentiality in English can be expressed by lexical items such as *allegedly, presumably*, and *seem*. For more details, see Chafe and Nichols (1986).

\(^8\) In colloquial contexts, the stative marker *teiru* is replaced with the colloquial form *teru*. 
(20) (Minna-ga kasa-o sasi-teiru kara) Ame-ga
(everyone-Nom umbrella-Acc open-Stat because) rain-Nom
hut-teiru-nda/yooda.
fall-Stat-Inf.Ev
‘I infer that it’s raining (because they are walking under their
umbrellas).’

(21) A:  Taroo-wa nan to itta-no?
    Taro-Top what Comp said-Q
    ‘What did Taro say?’
B:  Ame-ga hut-terut-te / hut-teru-sooda.
    rain-Nom fall-Stat-Hs.Ev / fall-Stat-Hs.Ev
    ‘He said that it’s raining.’

Given that using an LIC is a means by which English behaves like Japanese (in the sense mentioned in Section 3), the above observations lead to the following prediction: as the LIC is specifically employed to mark first-hand sensory information, it cannot be used to express inference-based or hearsay information, exactly like the Japanese examples in (18) and (19). I use the following pair to test this prediction:

(22) a. John came into the room.
    b. Into the room came John.

As shown below, the non-inverted sentence in (22a) is pragmatically ambiguous like (12):

(23) I looked at the door. Just then, John came into the room.
    [Direct Perception]

(24) John came into the room (, because the door was left open).
    [Inference]

(25) A:  What did Mary say?
    B:  John came into the room.
    [Hearsay]

In (23), the speaker is retrospectively describing what he saw. Sentence (24) expresses inference-based information. Utterance B in (25) conveys hearsay information. In this way, the single sentence *John came into the room* can be used differently in different contexts.

Let us turn our attention to the LIC in (22b). My prediction that sentence (22b) cannot express inference-based or hearsay information is borne out, as illustrated below:9

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9 Interestingly enough, one of my informants points out that the LIC in (28) would be acceptable if speaker B were considered to be mimicking the original speaker, Mary.
(26) I looked at the door. Just then, into the room came John.  
[Direct Perception]

(27) *Into the room came John (, because the door was left open).  
[Inference]

(28)  A:  What did Mary say?  
B:  *Into the room came John.  
[Hearsay]

We can provide further evidence that the LIC is specifically employed to express the speaker’s firsthand perception. First, let us observe the following data, which clearly illustrates that the LIC pertains to reporting direct perception:

(29) a. The {discovery/*thought} that on the wall hung a portrait of Sapir surprised the old linguist.  (McCawley (1977: 387))
b. {*As I recall/As you can see}, across the street is a grocery.  
(Bolinger (1977: 94))

As shown in (29a), the LIC can be embedded in the complement of the noun discovery, but not in the complement of thought; in (29b), the phrase as you can see can co-occur with the LIC, while as I recall cannot. The reason for this is that both thought and as I recall are associated with conception, and not with (direct) perception (cf. Nakau (1990)).

Second, the modal auxiliary may, which marks the speaker’s inference, cannot occur in the LIC:

(30) *Down the hill may roll the baby carriage.  
(Coopmans (1989: 729))

Needless to say, this is not the case in the non-inverted counterpart:

(31) The baby carriage may roll down the hill.

The contrast between (30) and (31) also indicates that the LIC is not at all appropriate for expressing inference-based or conceptual information.

Third, the fact that the LIC cannot be used in yes/no-interrogative sentences can be regarded as supporting evidence for my claim:

(32) *Did up the street trot the dog?  
(Hooper and Thompson (1973: 469))

From a functional point of view, leaving syntactic issues aside, we can say that the purpose of using yes/no-interrogative sentences is to ask about the truth or falsity of the thing in question. If the LIC is specialized to convey information gained through the speaker’s direct perception, it stands to reason that it cannot be used in interrogative sentences. It is meaningless to ask about the truth or falsity of one’s own perception.

In this way, the LIC contributes to the identification or distinction of an information source, specifically employed to express information gained
through direct perception. The use of the LIC foregrounds the speaker’s informational superiority because it conveys information known only to the speaker in the sense that he has privileged access to the situation.

4.2. The LIC as an Expression of Subjectivity

If, as discussed above, the LIC is specialized to express the speaker’s direct perception and thus is involved with the situation construal tier, then it directly reflects the speaker’s subjective construal of the situation. It follows that the LIC is associated with subjectivity in the sense of Langacker (e.g. Langacker (2008)). Before any further discussion, it would be instructive to provide a brief overview of the notion of subjectivity. Compare the following examples:

(33) a. I saw something moving behind him.
    b. Something was moving behind him.

The sentences in (33) are intended to describe more or less the same situation in terms of the speaker’s perceptual experience. The overt use of I in (33a) means that the speaker is placed “onstage,” conceptualized as an object of description. In other words, the situation described in (33a) is objectively construed. On the other hand, the non-representation of the speaker in (33b) implies that the speaker as the subject of perception is “offstage” with his role as viewer maximized; that is, the speaker is involved in the perceptual situation where his consciousness as the subject of perception is relegated to the background. In this sense, the situation in (33b) is subjectively construed.

Now consider the LIC in terms of subjectivity in the above sense. Observe the following pair:

(34) a. I lay in the middle of the kitchen floor.
    b. *In the middle of the kitchen floor lay I.

(Langacker (2008: 81))

Note here that the occurrence of I as the subject is allowed in the non-inversion sentence (34a), but it cannot appear in an LIC, as is shown in (34b). This shows the high subjectivity of the LIC, where the speaker’s role as the viewer is maximized, which means that the viewer cannot be

10 Thus, both (33a) and (33b) can be used in a context like the following:
   (i) a. When I looked at him, I saw something moving behind him.
       b. When I looked at him, something was moving behind him.

11 Langacker (2008) attributes the unacceptability of (34b) to information structure. In his view, the sentence is infelicitous because the subject refers to the speaker, whose ex-
construed as being detached from himself. In fact, the occurrence of first person pronouns is limited to cases in which the viewer is a landmark used to locate the object being viewed:

\[(35) \text{In front of me stood two people, a man and a woman, in lab coats.}\]

It is true that sentence (35) is less subjective in the sense that the speaker as the subject of perception is construed to be detached from himself (me). However, note that the focal object of observation in (35) is not me but two people. The event is perceived by the speaker (me) as a participant in the scene. One can be an observer and landmark at the same time, whereas, in principle, one cannot be an observer and observee at the same time. At the very least, the point is that the speaker as the subject of perception cannot be the focal object of description, which indicates the subjective nature of the LIC (for a related discussion, see Dorgeloh (1997)).

It is generally acknowledged that the LIC does not normally allow the postverbal NP to be a pronoun:

\[(i) \text{Among the guests of honor was sitting she/her,} \quad \text{(Bresnan (1994: 86))}\]

If so, it might be argued that the non-occurrence of I is insufficient as a diagnosis of high subjectivity. However, as shown below, if the pronoun in (i) is deictically used, the sentence becomes acceptable:

\[(ii) \text{Among the guests of honor was sitting HER [pointing].} \quad \text{(Bresnan (1994: 86))}\]

Furthermore, some speakers accept anaphoric pronouns as the subject of the LIC, especially when they are contrastively focused (Webelhuth (2011: 85, fn. 6)). In this sense, it is not impossible for a pronoun to be the subject of the LIC. In contrast, first-person pronouns are never accepted even if they are contrastively focused (see also Takami (1995)).

\[(iii) \text{In the bed to his right lay } \{\text{I/we/me/us}\}, \text{ not Jane.}\]

The contrast between (ii) and (iii) indicates that the non-occurrence of first-person pronouns should be attributed to the subjective nature of the LIC as the expression of the speaker’s direct perception.

An anonymous EL reviewer raises the question of why the LIC specifically expresses the speaker’s direct perception and reflects his subjective involvement in the situation described. Here I would like to consider the possibility that the LIC is an extension of what Lakoff (1987) refers to as the central deictic construction (e.g. \textit{There goes Harry! Here comes the bus.}). The central deictic construction marks direct evidentiality and reflects the subjective situation construal in the sense that it is employed to describe events
5. Explanation: the Source of Realistic Sensation

In light of the discussion so far, I will answer the question of how the rhetorical effect of realistic sensation is produced. The mechanism can be explained in terms of the three-tier model as follows.

In English, a public-self-centered language in which the situation construal and situation report tiers are unified, even when the speaker himself is involved in a situation, his reporter’s perspective as public self places his self as a participant on a par with the other participants, which leads to the priority of the situation-external perspective. However, since the LIC is specifically used to convey information gained through direct perception, the speaker is informationally superior to the addressee as he has privileged sensory access to the situation described. In this case, the speaker places himself in the perceptual situation and views it from the inside, which means that the situation is subjectively construed. To put it another way, the use of the LIC represents a case of default preference override (Konno (this issue)) in English where the mode of situation construal shifts from the unmarked, objective construal to the marked, subjective construal, i.e. the construal typical of Japanese. Thus, by describing the situation from the perspective of an inside viewer and imposing the same perspective on the addressee, the speaker brings the addressee psychologically closer to him. As a result, the LIC successfully serves as a communicative strategy to make the addressee feel as if he were at the scene with the speaker and were sharing the speaker’s perception: seeing the same thing from the same subjective viewpoint produces a kind of empathy between speaker and addressee.

The following example is a good illustration of the speaker’s imposition of the same perspective on the addressee:

(36) *On the top of the mountain stood you. (Takami (1995: 200))

Recall that the first-person pronoun I cannot occur in postverbal subject position because the speaker plays the role of an inside viewer in the perceptual situation (cf. (34b)). Example (36) demonstrates that the same is true of you. As with I, the role of you as viewer is maximized.

The validity of my analysis is further confirmed by showing that it can account for another constraint on the use of the LIC:

unfolding before the speaker’s eyes at the time of speech. If this view is correct, we may say that the evidential use of the LIC is motivated by the deictic use of the central deictic construction. For related discussions, see Webelhuth (2011) and Shizawa (2015).
(37) Keith Sebastian had given me detailed instructions on how to find his house; he was to meet me there with the money. I drove up the drive way and got out of my car. Just as the door closed, I heard the main door of the house open. In the doorway stood {# Keith Sebastian/the Sheriff}.

(Gary (1976) [Yasui (1978: 54)])

Gary (1976) attributes the anomalousness of Keith Sebastian in (37) to the notion he refers to as *counter-expectation*, claiming that the post-posed subject in the LIC is acceptable only if the appearance of its referent is contrary to expectation. In (37), Keith Sebastian is judged unacceptable because the appearance of its referent is predictable from the context. This constraint naturally follows from the analysis developed here. Since the LIC is specifically employed to express the speaker’s direct perception and thus implies that the information conveyed is known only to the speaker, such information is necessarily more or less surprising and unexpected to the addressee.

Lastly, the analysis developed here can also naturally explain why the LIC tends to be used in discourse contexts such as retrospective eye witness reports, play-by-play broadcasts of sporting events, route directions, and scenic narrative situations (Green (1980) and Webelhuth (2011), among others). All of these contexts more or less involve a report of direct perceptual experience.

6. Implications

6.1. When English Behaves like Japanese

Before concluding this article, I would like to consider some implications of this study. First, as mentioned in Section 3, if the LIC is a linguistic means by which English behaves like Japanese in terms of informational superiority and subjectivity, then what does this phenomenon mean? This, in turn, may lead to the question of the *raison d’être* of marked constructions expressing marked situation construal like the LIC.

Japanese, whose unmarked mode of expression is private expression, can be regarded as a *situation-construal-based* language in that the un-

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14 Takami (1995) takes a similar view, proposing a functional licensing condition of the LIC on the basis of what he calls *informational importance*, which is defined as follows: an element is regarded as informationally important if its appearance in the sentence is unpredictable from the context (see also Birner (1994)).
marked deictic center is in the situation construal tier; thus, Japanese in its unmarked mode of expression is "communicatively weak, or restricted" in the sense that the mode does not lend itself to communication because addressee-orientedness is not guaranteed. On the other hand, English, whose unmarked mode of expression is public expression, can be regarded as a situation-report-based language in that the unmarked deictic center is in the situation report tier; thus, English in its unmarked mode of expression is "communicatively strong" in the sense that the mode lends itself to communication because addressee-orientedness is presupposed (for related discussions on communicative strength, see Hirose (1997, 2000) and Shizawa (2011)). Note that the LIC has a property similar to that of Japanese in its interpretation. This means, as argued in the previous section, that when an LIC is used, the mode of expression temporarily becomes situation-construal-based (resulting in a default preference override). Then, why is such a marked mode of situation construal used in English, when it is communicatively restricted?

My answer may sound paradoxical, but it is exactly because of the communicative strength of English. From the perspective of the speaker, communicative strength means that in default cases, one does not have to pay particular attention to, or be strongly conscious of, the addressee because one can assume a neutral level of communication which does not depend on any particular relationship between speaker and addressee, a level where the speaker and the addressee are assumed to be linguistically equal. Viewed in this light, it might be reasonable to say that marked modes of expressions like the LIC, which highlight the speaker’s informational superiority, serve particularly to attract the addressee’s attention to the speaker’s situation construal. If so, the intentional use of communicatively restricted expressions for communication leads to the strong attraction of the addressee’s attention.

The following example gives supporting evidence for this view:

(38) Hope you like it. (Hirose (2013: 24))

Sentence (38) strongly attracts the addressee’s attention to the speaker’s construal in that it conveys a greater sense of psychological closeness between speaker and addressee than the unmarked expression I hope you like it. The omission of I in (38) reflects a marked mode of situation construal, where the speaker is describing the situation from the perspective of an in-

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15 This seems to be the reason why Japanese has a wide variety of addressee-oriented expressions, which help to compensate for the otherwise communicatively restricted nature of the language (see Hirose and Hasegawa (2010)).
side participant, and not from that of an outside reporter (cf. Hirose (2013: 24)). Furthermore, the incompatibility of (38) with respectful forms of address, as in (39b), indicates its communicative restrictedness:

(39) a. I hope you like it, {sir/Professor Brown}.
   b. ?Hope you like it, {sir/Professor Brown}.

(Hirose (2013: 24))

In this way, though sounding paradoxical, the intentional use of communicatively restricted expressions for communication leads to a strong attraction of the addressee’s attention.

6.2. From a Contrastive Perspective

Second, I briefly discuss from a contrastive perspective the alleged Japanese counterpart to the LIC, i.e. the Japanese Locative Construction (JLC), schematized as [NP-ni-wa NP-ga V-te-iru] (Nakajima (2001: 53)). Consider the following pair:

(40) a. Teeburu-ni-wa ringo-ga oka-re-teita. [JLC]
   table-Loc-Top apple-Nom put-Pass-Stat.Past
   ‘On the table were put apples.’
   b. Ringo-ga teeburu-ni oka-re-teita. [Canonical Word Order]
   apple-Nom table-Loc put-Pass-Stat.Past
   ‘Apples were put on the table.’

In general, the LIC and the JLC are said to share basic grammatical, semantic, and functional properties (e.g. Yamamoto (1997), Nakajima (2001), and Ono (2005)). For example, it is often pointed out that both constructions prefer unaccusative verbs and function as presentational sentences (cf. Ono (2005)).

However, a closer observation reveals that the JLC and the LIC do not completely overlap. First of all, note that, unlike the case of the LIC and its non-inverted counterpart in English, the JLC in (40a) and its canonical-word-order (CWO) counterpart in (40b) are not significantly different from each other in terms of rhetorical effect. Intuitively, both sentences can be interpreted as describing the scene from the situation-internal perspective, and thus can be used to convey information gained through the speaker’s direct perception.\footnote{This is not to say that the JLC and its CWO counterpart are identical in every respect. For example, they are different in information structure. The attachment of \textit{wa} (Topic) to \textit{teeburu-ni} ‘on the table’ in (40a) shows that \textit{teeburu-ni} conveys familiar or inferable information, and the use of \textit{ga} on \textit{ringo} ‘apples’ indicates that \textit{ringo} conveys...}
Recall that the LIC is a marked construction, compared with the non-inverted counterpart. The LIC can express neither inference-based nor hearsay information (as in (27) and (28)); in addition, it cannot be used in yes/no-questions (as in (32)). These phenomena are not observed in non-inverted counterparts in English, which confirms that the LIC indicates first-hand evidentiality. The JLC is also different from the LIC in this regard. The JLC and its CWO counterpart show no such contrast, as shown below:

(41) **Inferential Information:**
   a. Teeburu-ni-wa ringo-ga oka-re-teita-nda/yooda. [JLC]
      table-Loc-Top apple-Nom put-Pass-Stat.Past-Inf.Ev
      ‘I infer that apples were put on the table.’
   b. Ringo-ga teeburu-ni oka-re-teita-nda/yooda. [CWO]
      apple-Nom table-Loc put-Pass-Stat.Past-Inf.Ev
      ‘I infer that apples were put on the table.’

(42) **Hearsay Information:**
A:  Taroo-wa nan to itta-no?
      Taro-Top what Comp said-Q
      ‘What did Taro say?’
B₁:  Teeburu-ni-wa ringo-ga oka-re-teitat-te/
      table-Loc-Top apple-Nom put-Pass-Stat.Past-Hs.Ev/
      oka-re-teita-sooda. [JLC]
      put-Pass-Stat.Past-Hs.Ev
      ‘He said that apples were put on the table.’
B₂:  Ringo-ga teeburu-ni oka-re-teitat-te/
      apple-Nom table-Loc put-Pass-Stat.Past-Hs.Ev/
      oka-re-teita-sooda. [CWO]
      put-Pass-Stat.Past-Hs.Ev
      ‘He said that apples were put on the table.’

(43) **Yes/No-Question:**
   a. Teeburu-ni-wa ringo-ga oka-re-teita-no? [JLC]
      table-Loc-Top apple-Nom put-Pass-Stat.Past-Q
      ‘Were apples put on the table?’
   b. Ringo-ga teeburu-ni oka-re-teita-no? [CWO]
      apple-Nom table-Loc put-Pass-Stat.Past-Q
      ‘Were apples put on the table?’

unfamiliar or new information; on the other hand, sentence (40b) normally focuses more on the place where the apples were placed (cf. Yamamoto (1997: 651)).
In this way, both the JLC and its CWO counterpart can convey information gained through sources other than direct perception, though the attachment of an appropriate sentence-final expression is required. The above data clearly shows that the JLC is grammatically and functionally different from the LIC as the former is not specifically employed to mark direct evidentiality.

In that case, where does the difference between the JLC and the LIC originate? The three-tier model will provide a clear answer. The JLC is a normal construction that conforms to the Japanese default mode of expression, while the LIC is a special construction that overrides the English default mode of expression.

On the one hand, since Japanese is a private-self-centered and situation-construal-based language, bare declaratives like those in (40) are normally regarded as expressions corresponding to the situation construal tier, in which the speaker as private self construes the situation. That is, they are likely to be interpreted as private expressions, i.e. the unmarked mode of expression in Japanese, unless they are used by the speaker with a communicative intention. Thus, regardless of whether the locative phrase"teeburu-ni ‘on the table’ is fronted, both sentences in (40) can be interpreted as describing the situation from a situation-internal point of view. The point is that the reason why the JLC (as well as its CWO counterpart) can express direct evidentiality is not because it is specialized for that purpose but because describing a scene from a situation-internal perspective is the unmarked mode of expression in Japanese. In this way, word order per se is irrelevant either to evidentiality or to the mode of situation construal. Instead, evidential expressions like those in (41)–(43) play an important role in Japanese. Since the purpose of marking evidentiality is to inform the addressee of the speaker’s source of information, evidential markers are generally accompanied with addressee-orientedness. As such, they not only mark information sources but also turn private expressions into public expressions.

On the other hand, at least as far as the LIC is concerned, word order plays an important role in that it signals the shifting of the mode of situation construal. Since English is a public-self-centered and situation-report-based language, non-inverted sentences are likely to be interpreted as public expressions, i.e. the unmarked mode of expression in English. Thus, “even when the speaker himself is involved in a situation as a participant, the reporter’s perspective places his self as a participant on a par with the other participants; hence comes objective construal” (Hirose (this issue: 123–
In this sense, unmarked expressions in English do not readily lend themselves to describing situations such as direct perceptual experiences, because such situations can be described more vividly from a situation-internal perspective. This is where the LIC comes into play. As we have seen, the LIC triggers the shift from the unmarked objective construal to the marked subjective construal, resulting in a default preference override. Since the situation construal and situation report tiers are normally unified in English, special constructions like the LIC are required to foreground or highlight the relevance of the situation construal tier and the situation-internal perspective.

To sum up, in terms of the three-tier model, the difference between the LIC and the JLC can be captured as follows: the former is a special construction that overrides the English preference for the unification of the situation construal and situation report tiers, whereas the latter is a normal construction that conforms to the Japanese preference for the separation of the two tiers.

7. Conclusion

In this article, I have addressed the question of how the LIC produces the rhetorical effect I termed realistic sensation. I have demonstrated on the basis of the three-tier model of language use that the LIC is specifically used to convey information gained through direct perception, thus highlighting the speaker’s informational superiority and subjective involvement in the situation; that is, using the LIC, the speaker describes the situation from the perspective of an inside viewer and imposes the same perspective on the addressee, which brings about the rhetorical effect.

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