Research Article

An Improved Biometrics-Based Remote User Authentication Scheme with User Anonymity

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The authors review the biometrics-based user authentication scheme proposed by An in 2012. The authors show that there exist loopholes in the scheme which are detrimental for its security. Therefore the authors propose an improved scheme eradicating the flaws of An’s scheme. Then a detailed security analysis of the proposed scheme is presented followed by its efficiency comparison. The proposed scheme not only withstands security problems found in An’s scheme but also provides some extra features with mere addition of only two hash operations. The proposed scheme allows user to freely change his password and also provides user anonymity with untraceability.

1. Introduction

In the last two decades, digital authentication has originated as a preferred method to authenticate remote users over insecure networks. After the first proposal of user authentication scheme by Lamport [1], considerable amount of research has been conducted in this field of which schemes [1–25] are few examples. In due course of time user authentication schemes underwent many changes. Initial schemes were based only on password [1–4], then schemes were based on smart card and password [5–13], and reliability of biometrics authentication over traditional password-based authentication gave rise to biometrics-based user authentication schemes [14–20].

In 2010, Li and Hwang [19] proposed a biometrics-based user authentication scheme. In 2011, Das [26] examined Li-Hwang’s scheme and observed problems in login and authentication phase, and in biometrics verification mechanism of the scheme. Das depicted that user’s smart card does not validate the inputted password during login phase which leads to useless computations in login and authentication phase. Owing to the same reason, Das further showed that the scheme suffers from incorrect password updating problem. Thus, Das proposed an improvement [26] of Li-Hwang’s scheme and claimed their scheme to be free from problems observed in Li-Hwang’s scheme. According to Das, their scheme [26] also provides mutual authentication. In 2012, An [27] pointed out that Das’s scheme [26] deviates from the author’s claim since an adversary can mount impersonation attacks and password guessing attack once he gets a chance to extract values from the smart card of the legal user. Thereby An [27] proposed an enhanced scheme to eradicate the flaws of Das’s scheme.

In this paper, we review An’s biometrics-based user authentication scheme. We show that An’s scheme is vulnerable to the security problems to which Das’s scheme is susceptible like online and offline password guessing attacks, user and server impersonation attacks, lack of mutual authentication, and lack of user anonymity. Besides, An’s scheme lacks password change facility which is an important part of password-based user authentication schemes. We remove drawbacks from An’s scheme by means of proposing an improved user authentication scheme. In addition, to resist various security threats, the proposed scheme incorporates features of password changing and user anonymity. The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we review An’s user authentication scheme. Section 3 is about cryptanalysis of An’s scheme. In Section 4, we present our improved scheme. Section 5 is about security analysis of the improved...
scheme. In Section 6, we compare the improved scheme with related schemes. Finally, the conclusion is presented in Section 7.

2. Review of An’s Scheme

The notations useful in this paper are summarized along with their description in Table 1. In this section, we review An’s scheme [27] which is an enhanced version of Das’s scheme [26]. It has three phases: registration phase, login phase and authentication phase. Registration phase is carried over a secure channel whereas login phase, and authentication phase are carried over an insecure channel. There are three participants in the scheme, the user (Ci), the server (Si), and the registration centre (R), where R is assumed to be a trusted party. Details of each phase are given in the following subsections.

2.1. Registration Phase. In the beginning of scheme, the registration centre R and the user Ci carry out this phase involving the following steps.

(1) Ci submits his identity IDi and information (PWi ⊕ Ki) containing password to R via a secure channel. Ci also submits information (Bi ⊕ Ki) containing his biometrics via the specific device to R; here Ki is a random number chosen by Ci.

(2) R computes fi = h(Bi ⊕ Ki), ri = h(PWi ⊕ Ki) ⊕ fi, and ei = h(IDi ⊕ xi) ⊕ ri, where xi is a secret key generated and maintained by Si. Then R stores {IDi, fi, ei, h(·)} in a smart card SCi for user and provides it to Ci via a secure channel.

(3) On receiving SCi = {IDi, fi, ei, h(·)}, the user stores the random number Ki into SCi issued by R so that now SCi = {IDi, fi, ei, h(·)}.

2.2. Login Phase. When the user Ci wishes to login the server Si, the user and his smart card SCi perform the following steps.

(1) Ci inserts his smart card into a card reader and inputs his biometrics information Bi on the specific device. SCi computes h(Bi ⊕ Ki) and verifies if fi = h(Bi ⊕ Ki) or not. If this biometrics information matches, Ci passes the biometrics verification.

(2) Ci inputs his IDi and PWi; then SCi generates a random number Rc and computes the following equations:

\[ r_i' = h(PWi ⊕ Ki) ⊕ f_i, \]
\[ M_1 = e_i ⊕ r_i', \]
\[ M_2 = M_1 ⊕ R_c, \]
\[ M_3 = h(M_1 || R_c). \]

(3) Ci sends the login request = {IDi, M2, M3} to Si.

2.3. Authentication Phase. On receiving the request login = {IDi, M2, M3} from Ci, the server Si and the user Ci perform the following steps to authenticate each other.

(1) Si first checks the format of IDi. If IDi is valid, Si computes M4 = h(IDi || xi) and M5 = M2 ⊕ M4.

(2) Si checks if M4 = h(M4 || M3) or not. If both are equal, it generates a random number Rs and computes the following equations:

\[ M_6 = M_4 ⊕ R_s, \]
\[ M_7 = h(M_4 || R_s). \]

Then, Si sends the reply message = {M6, M7} for its authentication to Ci.

(3) On receiving {M6, M7} from Si, the user Ci computes M8 = M6 ⊕ M1 and checks if M7 = h(M1 || M8) or not. If both are equal, Ci computes M9 = h(M1 || M2 || M8) and sends the reply message {M9} for its authentication to Si.

(4) On receiving {M9} from Ci, the server checks if M9 = h(M9 || M2 || Ri) or not. If both are equal, Si accepts the login request = {IDi, M2, M5} of Ci.

3. Cryptanalysis of An’s Scheme

This section is about security problems in An’s scheme. Here we show that an attacker \( U_a \) can mount different types of attacks on the scheme. Independent researches by Kocher and Messerges [28, 29] show that it is possible to extract the values stored inside a smart card. So we assume that \( U_a \) can extract out parameters stored inside a user’s smart card.

| Notations | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| R         | Trusted registration centre |
| Si        | Server |
| Ci        | User |
| IDi       | Identity of Ci |
| PWi       | Password of Ci |
| Bi        | Biometric template of Ci |
| SCi       | Smart card of Ci |
| Ki        | Random number chosen by Ci |
| Rc        | Random number generated by SCi of Ci |
| R        | Random number generated by Si |
| Ua        | Attacker |
| xi and yi | Secret keys maintained by Si |
| h(·)      | One-way hash function |
| ⊕         | Bitwise XOR operator |
| ||         | Concatenation operator |
3.1. Online Password Guessing Attack. If $U_a$ obtains the smart card $SC_i$ of user $C_i$ and extracts [28, 29] the values \{ID, $f_i$, $e_i$, $K_i$, $h(\cdot)$\} stored inside it, then he can mount online password guessing attack as explained below.

(1) $U_a$ computes

$$e_i \oplus f_i = [h(ID \parallel x_i) \oplus r_j] \oplus f_i$$

$$= [h(ID \parallel x_i) \oplus h(PW_i \oplus K_i) \oplus f_i] \oplus f_i$$

$$= [h(ID \parallel x_i) \oplus h(PW_i \oplus K_i)]$$

(3)

to obtain $[h(ID \parallel x_i) \oplus h(PW_i \oplus K_i)]$.

(2) $U_a$ guesses $PW_a$ as user's possible password and computes $M_{1a} = [e_i \oplus f_i] \oplus h(PW_a \oplus K_i)$. Then $U_a$ computes $M_{2a} = M_{1a} \oplus R_{ca}$ and $M_{3a} = h(M_{1a} \parallel R_{ca})$, where $R_{ca}$ is the random number generated by the system of $U_a$. He sends \{ID, $M_{2a}$, $M_{3a}$\} as login request to $S_i$.

(3) If $U_a$ does not receive any response from $S_i$, then he repeats step (2) with some other guess for user's password. But if $U_a$ receives response message from $S_i$, then it implies that his guessed password $PW_a$ is correct.

3.2. Offline Password Guessing Attack. In the scheme, $U_a$ can easily identify the login request corresponding to a smart card since both contain the identity of user. If $U_a$ extracts [28, 29] the values \{ID, $f_i$, $e_i$, $K_i$, $h(\cdot)$\} from the smart card $SC_i$ of user $C_i$ and intercepts the login request = \{ID, $M_{2a}$, $M_{3a}$\} from open network, then he can mount offline password guessing attack as explained below.

(1) $U_a$ computes

$$e_i \oplus f_i = [h(ID \parallel x_i) \oplus r_j] \oplus f_i$$

$$= [h(ID \parallel x_i) \oplus h(PW_i \oplus K_i) \oplus f_i] \oplus f_i$$

$$= [h(ID \parallel x_i) \oplus h(PW_i \oplus K_i)]$$

(4)

to obtain $[h(ID \parallel x_i) \oplus h(PW_i \oplus K_i)]$.

(2) $U_a$ guesses $PW_a$ as user's possible password and computes $M_{1a} = [e_i \oplus f_i] \oplus h(PW_a \oplus K_i)$.

(3) $U_a$ computes $R_{ca} = M_{2a} \oplus M_{1a}$ and $M_{3a} = h(M_{1a} \parallel R_{ca})$, and finally compares $M_{3a}$ with $M_{3}$. For $M_{3a} \neq M_{3}$, he repeats from step (2) with some other guess for user's password. But if $M_{3a} = M_{3}$, then it provides $U_a$ with the exact password $PW_i$ of $C_i$.

3.3. User Impersonation Attack. As just discussed in previous subsections, $U_a$ can guess a user's password if he obtains the smart card of user. It is noticeable that the successful process of password guessing (online or offline manner) also yields $M_{1a} = h(ID \parallel x_i)$. In fact, $h(ID \parallel x_i)$ is the key value required to compute a valid login request or valid reply messages. Further, $U_a$ has easy access to user's identity $ID_i$ from $SC_i = \{ID, f_i, e_i, K_i, h(\cdot)\}$ or from the login request = \{ID, $M_{2i}$, $M_{3i}$\} of $C_i$. Having $h(ID \parallel x_i)$ and $ID_i$ in hand, $U_a$ can impersonate the user $C_i$ as explained below.

(1) $U_a$ generates a random number $R_{ca}$ in his system and computes

$$M_{2a} = M_{1a} \oplus R_{ca},$$

$$M_{3a} = h(M_{1a} \parallel R_{ca})$$

(5)

Then $U_a$ sends the login request = \{ID, $M_{2a}$, $M_{3a}$\} to $S_i$.

(2) On receiving \{ID, $M_{2a}$, $M_{3a}$\}, the server $S_i$ first checks the format of $ID_i$. Clearly, $S_i$ would proceed further because $ID_i$ is the identity of a legitimate registered user and hence it is in valid format.

(3) $S_i$ computes $M_4 = h(ID \parallel x_i)$ and $M_5 = M_2a \oplus M_4$ and checks if $M_{3a} = h(M_4 \parallel M_3)$; clearly it would hold. Therefore $S_i$ believes that the login request = \{ID, $M_{2a}$, $M_{3a}$\} is from the legitimate user.

(4) $S_i$ generates a random number $R_i$ and computes $M_6 = M_4 \oplus R_i$ and $M_7 = h(M_4 \parallel R_i)$. Then $S_i$ transmits the reply message $\{M_6, M_7\}$.

(5) On receiving $\{M_6, M_7\}$ from $S_i$, the attacker $U_a$ first obtains the random number $R_i$ by computing $M_{6a} = M_2a \oplus M_{1a}$. Next, it computes $M_{6a} = h(M_{1a} \parallel R_{ca})$ and sends \{ID, $M_{2a}$, $M_{3a}$\} to $S_i$.

(6) On receiving $\{M_6, M_7\}$, the server $S_i$ checks if $M_6 = h(M_{4a} \parallel M_7 \parallel R_i)$ or not. Clearly, this would hold, so $S_i$ will accept the login request = \{ID, $M_{2a}$, $M_{3a}$\}.

3.4. Server Impersonation Attack. $U_a$ can easily impersonate the legal server $S_i$ to cheat the user $C_i$ whose information \{ID, $M_{1a}$\} transmitted over open channel as he possesses the identity $ID_i$ of $C_i$. So when $C_i$ sends his login request = \{ID, $M_{2a}$, $M_{3a}$\} to $S_i$, the attacker $U_a$ intercepts and blocks it from reaching $S_i$.

(1) $U_a$ can easily recognize the login request = \{ID, $M_2a$, $M_3a$\} of $C_i$ transmitted over open channel as he possesses the identity $ID_i$ of $C_i$. So when $C_i$ sends his login request = \{ID, $M_2a$, $M_3a$\} to $S_i$, the attacker $U_a$ intercepts and blocks it from reaching $S_i$.

(2) $U_a$ first obtains the random number $R_{ca}$ by computing $M_{6a} = M_2a \oplus M_{1a}$. Next, it generates a random number $R_{ca}$ in his system and computes $M_{6a} = M_{1a} \oplus R_{ca}$ and $M_{7a} = h(M_{1a} \parallel R_{ca})$. Then $U_a$ transmits the reply message \{ID, $M_{2a}$, $M_{3a}$\} to $C_i$.

(3) On receiving $\{M_{6a}, M_{7a}\}$, the user $C_i$ first obtains the random number $R_{ca}$ by computing $M_{6a} = M_{6a} \oplus M_{1a}$, where $M_1 = h(ID \parallel x_i)$. Next, he checks if $M_2a = h(ID \parallel M_3a)$ or not. Clearly, this equivalence will hold and hence $C_i$ will believe that he is communicating with the intended server. However, it is the clever attacker $U_a$ who is deceiving $C_i$. 

3.5. Lack of Mutual Authentication. Like Das’s scheme [26], the enhanced scheme by An also fails to resist user impersonation attack and server impersonation attack as described in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. In fact, if \( U_a \) extracts values \( \{ID_i, f_i, e_i, K_i, h(\cdot)\} \) from the smart card \( SC_i \) of user \( C_i \) and successfully obtains the secret value \( h(ID_i \ \| \ x_i) \), then he can easily craft valid login request and reply messages so as to deceive the legal user or the legal server. Therefore, the scheme loses mutual authentication feature.

3.6. Lack of User Anonymity. In An’s scheme, \( C_i \) sends \( \{ID_i, \ M_2, M_3\} \) as his login request to \( S_i \) through an insecure channel. User’s identity ID is openly available if an attacker \( U_a \) intercepts the login request of \( C_i \) from the open channel. Moreover, identity ID is also stored inside user’s smart card SC. Having ID in hand, it is easy for \( U_a \) to craft threats against \( C_i \). To the worst, \( U_a \) may be able to compromise user’s biometrics information which would result in serious consequences. Thus, the scheme does not provide user anonymity.

4. The Proposed Scheme

In this section, we propose a new user authentication scheme which is an improvement of An’s scheme. In addition to resist the security problems found in An’s scheme, it also provides password change phase with which user can change his password at his will. It has four phases: registration phase, login phase, authentication phase and password change phase. Registration phase, and password change phase are carried over a secure channel whereas login phase and authentication phase are carried over an insecure channel. It also consists of three participants, the user (\( C_i \)), the server (\( S_i \)), and the registration centre (\( R \)). In the proposed scheme, the server maintains two secret keys \( x_i \) and \( y_i \). Details of each phase along with Figure 1 are given in the following.

4.1. Registration Phase. Before starting the scheme, the registration centre \( R \) and the user \( C_i \) carry out this phase involving the following steps.

1. \( C_i \) submits his identity ID to \( R \) via a secure channel. \( C_i \) also submits information \( (B_i \ \| \ K_i) \) containing his biometrics via a specific device to \( R \); here \( K_i \) is a random number chosen by \( C_i \).

2. \( R \) computes the following values:
   \[
   f_i = h(B_i \ \| \ K_i),
   \]
   \[
   r_i = h(PW_i \ \| \ K_i) \oplus f_i,
   \]
   \[
   c_i = h(x_i \ \| \ y_i) \oplus f_i,
   \]
   \[
   e_i = h(ID_i \ \| \ x_i) \oplus r_i,
   \]
   where \( R \) stores \( \{c_i, e_i, h(\cdot)\} \) in a smart card \( SC \) for user. Then \( R \) provides \( SC_i = \{c_i, e_i, h(\cdot)\} \) and \( f_i \) to the user \( C_i \) via a secure channel.

3. On receiving \( SC_i = \{c_i, e_i, h(\cdot)\} \) \& \( f_i \), the user computes the following values:
   \[
   g_i = (ID_i \ \| \ PW_i) \oplus f_i,
   \]
   \[
   j_i = (ID_i \ \| \ PW_i) \oplus K_i,
   \]
   where \( C_i \) inserts \( g_i \) and \( j_i \) into \( SC_i \) issued by \( R \) so that now \( SC_i = \{c_i, e_i, g_i, j_i, h(\cdot)\} \).

4.2. Login Phase. When the user \( C_i \) wishes to login the server \( S_i \), the user and his smart card \( SC \) perform the following steps.

1. \( C_i \) inserts his smart card into a card reader, keys in his identity ID, and password PW on the specific device.

2. \( SC \) retrieves \( f_i \leftarrow (ID_i \ \| \ PW_i) \oplus g_i \) and \( K_i \leftarrow (ID_i \ \| \ PW_i) \oplus j_i \). Then checks if \( f_i = h(B_i \ \| \ K_i) \) or not. If this biometrics information matches, \( C_i \) passes the biometrics verification; otherwise \( SC \) terminates the session. This process also verifies the correctness of inserted ID and PW.

3. \( SC \) generates a random number \( R \) and computes the following equations:
   \[
   r_i = h(PW_i \ \| \ K_i) \oplus f_i,
   \]
   \[
   M_1 = c_i \oplus f_i \quad (\text{which is indeed } h(x_i \ \| \ y_i)),
   \]
   \[
   M_2 = e_i \oplus r_i \quad (\text{which is indeed } h(ID_i \ \| \ x_i)),
   \]
   \[
   M_3 = M_1 \oplus R_c \quad (\text{which is indeed } h(x_i \ \| \ y_i) \oplus R_c),
   \]
   \[
   M_4 = (M_1 \ \| \ R_c) \oplus ID_i \quad (\text{which is indeed } [(h(x_i \ \| \ y_i) \oplus R_c) \oplus ID_i]),
   \]
   \[
   M_5 = h(M_2 \ \| \ R_c),
   \]
   \[
   (\text{which is indeed } h(ID_i \ \| \ x_i) \ \| \ R_c)).
   \]

4. \( C_i \) sends the login request \( \{M_3, M_4, M_5\} \) to \( S_i \).

4.3. Authentication Phase. On receiving the request login = \( \{M_3, M_4, M_3\} \) from \( C_i \), the server \( S_i \) and the user \( C_i \) perform the following steps to authenticate each other.

1. \( S_i \) computes the following values:
   \[
   M_6 = h(x_i \ \| \ y_i),
   \]
   \[
   M_7 = M_3 \oplus M_6 \quad (\text{which is indeed } R_c),
   \]
   \[
   ID_i = M_4 \oplus (M_6 \ \| \ M_7),
   \]
   \[
   (\text{which is indeed } h(ID_i \ \| \ x_i) \ \| \ R_c)).
   \]

2. \( S_i \) checks the format of ID. If ID is valid, \( S_i \) computes \( M_8 = h(ID_i \ \| \ x_i) \). It then checks if \( M_5 = h(M_8 \ \| \ M_7). \)
### Registration phase

User ($C_u$) chooses ID, $PW$, & $K_i$

Computes

\[ g_i = (ID_i || PW_i) \oplus f_i \text{ and} \]

\[ j_i = (ID_i || PW_i) \oplus K_i \]

Insert $g_i$ & $j_i$ into $SC_i$ so that $SC_i = \{c_i, e_i, g_i, j_i, h(\cdot)\}$

### Login and authentication phase

User ($C_u$): inserts $ID_i$, $PW_i$ & $B_i$

Server ($S_i$) computes $M_0 = h(ID_i)$

For correct $ID_i$ format computes

\[ r_i = h(PW_i) \oplus j_i \]

\[ M_i = c_i \oplus f_i, M_2 = e_i \oplus r_i, M_3 = h(M_2 \| R_i) \]

Accepts login request

### Password change phase:

User ($C_u$): inserts $ID_i$, $PW_i$, & $B_i$

For $f_i = h(B_i \oplus K_i)$ asks for new password

Computes ($g_i)_{new} = (ID_i || (PW_i)_{new}) \oplus f_i$

\[ (j_i)_{new} = h((PW_i)_{new} \oplus K_i) \]

\[ e_i = h(PW_i) \oplus h((PW_i)_{new} \oplus K_i) \]

\[ (c_i)_{new} \leftarrow e_i \oplus (g_i)_{new} \leftarrow g_i, (j_i)_{new} \leftarrow j_i \]

---

**Figure 1:** The proposed scheme.
If both are equal, $S_i$ generates a random number $R_i$ and computes:

$$M_9 = M_8 \oplus R_i$$

(which is indeed $h(ID_i \parallel x_i) \oplus R_i$)

$$M_{10} = h(M_8 \parallel R_i)$$

(which is indeed $h(h(ID_i \parallel x_i) \parallel R_i)$).

Then, $S_i$ sends the reply message $\{M_9, M_{10}\}$ for its authentication to $C_i$.

(3) On receiving $\{M_9, M_{10}\}$ from $S_i$, the user $C_i$ computes $M_{11} = M_9 \oplus M_2$ (which is indeed $R_i$). It then checks if $M_{10} = h(M_2 \parallel M_{11})$ or not. If both are equal, $C_i$ computes $M_{12} = h(M_2 \parallel R_i \parallel M_{11})$ (which is indeed $h(h(ID_i \parallel x_i) \parallel R_i \parallel R_i)$). Then $C_i$ sends the reply message $\{M_{12}\}$ for its authentication to $S_i$.

(4) On receiving $\{M_{12}\}$ from $C_i$, the server checks if $M_{12} = h(M_8 \parallel M_2 \parallel R_i)$ or not. If both are equal, $S_i$ accepts the login request $\{M_3, M_4, M_5\}$ of $C_i$.

### 4.4 Password Change Phase

When the user wishes to change his old password $PW_i$, he invokes this phase. Details of the steps required to update the smart card $SC_i$ with new password $PW_i^{\text{new}}$ are as follows.

(1) $C_i$ inserts his smart card into a card reader, keys in his identity $ID_i$, and password $PW_i$, and inputs his biometrics information $B_i$ on the specific device.

(2) $SC_i$ retrieves $f_i \leftarrow (ID_i \parallel PW_i) \oplus g_i$ and $K_i \leftarrow (ID_i \parallel PW_i) \oplus j_i$. It then checks if $f_i = h(B_i \parallel K_i)$ or not. If this biometrics information matches, $C_i$ passes the biometrics verification, otherwise terminates the session. This process also verifies the correctness of inserted ID, and $PW_i$. Then $SC_i$ allows the user to enter the new password $PW_i^{\text{new}}$.

(3) $SC_i$ computes the following equations:

$$g_i^{\text{new}} = (ID_i \parallel (PW_i^{\text{new}})) \oplus f_i,$$

$$j_i^{\text{new}} = (ID_i \parallel (PW_i^{\text{new}})) \parallel h((PW_i^{\text{new}}) \parallel K_i)$$

$$e_i^{\text{new}} = e_i \oplus h(PW_i \parallel K_i) \oplus h((PW_i^{\text{new}}) \parallel K_i).$$

(4) $SC_i$ replaces $e_i$, $g_i$, and $j_i$ with $(e_i^{\text{new}})$, $(g_i^{\text{new}})$, and $(j_i^{\text{new}})$, respectively.

### 5. Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme

In this section, we analyze security of the proposed scheme. We show that the scheme remains unaffected even if an attacker $U_a$ extracts \[28, 29\] all the values stored inside a user’s smart card.

#### 5.1 Online Password Guessing Attack

On having access to user's smart card $SC_i$, an attacker $U_a$ can extract \[28, 29\] all values $\{e_i, e_i, g_i, j_i, h()\}$ from it. In order to compute $e_i \oplus f_i$ and obtain $[h(ID_i \parallel x_i) \oplus h(PW_i \parallel K_i)]$, he requires $f_i$. But $U_a$ cannot obtain $f_i$ from $g_i = (ID_i \parallel PW_i) \oplus f_i$ as he does not know about user’s identity $ID_i$ and password $PW_i$. The attacker $U_a$ can obtain $f_i \oplus K_i$ by performing $g_i \oplus j_i = [ID_i \parallel PW_i] \oplus f_j \oplus [ID_i \parallel PW_i] \parallel K_i$. Next, he can compute $e_i \oplus (f_i \oplus K_i)$

$$= [h(ID_i \parallel x_i) \parallel j_i] \oplus (f_i \oplus K_i)$$

$$= [h(ID_i \parallel x_i) \parallel h(PW_i \parallel K_i) \parallel f_j] \oplus (f_i \oplus K_i)$$

$$= h(ID_i \parallel x_i) \parallel h(PW_i \parallel K_i) \parallel K_i.$$
Besides, as well as user untraceability.

analyzing some fixed parameter in the login request or the server: (i) the secret keys \( \{x_i, e_i, g_i, j_i, h(\cdot)\} \) from \( SC_u \), we explain in the following that he cannot obtain \( ID_u \) of \( C_u \). To guess \( ID_j \) from \( g_j = (ID_j \parallel PW_j) \oplus f_j \) and from \( j_i = (ID_j \parallel PW_j) \oplus K_j \), the attacker must have the knowledge of \( \{PW_j, f_j\} \) and \( \{PW_j, K_j\} \), respectively. \( U_a \) cannot guess out \( ID_j \) from \( e_i = h(ID_j \parallel x_i) \oplus r_j \) without knowing \( r_j \) and \( x_i \). If \( U_a \) intercepts a login request \( \{M_5, M_9, M_{10}\} \) or the reply message \( \{M_6, M_{10}\}/\{M_{12}\} \), he cannot guess out \( ID_j \) using \( \{M_5, M_{10}, M_{12}\} \) without the knowledge of \( \{x_i, R_j, R_{10}\} \). Besides, \( U_a \) cannot obtain user’s identity \( ID_u \) nor can he trace the legal user by means of observing and analyzing some fixed parameter in the login request or the reply messages. Hence, the scheme provides user anonymity as well as user untraceability.

### 5.4. Supporting Mutual Authentication

The success of mutual authentication in the proposed scheme follows directly from resistance against user impersonation attack and server impersonation attack as described in Section 5.3. In fact, \( U_a \) has many hurdles before him to act as a legal user or a legal server: (i) the secret keys \( x_i \) and \( y_i \) maintained by the server are unknown for \( U_a \); and (ii) \( U_a \) has no access to the identity \( ID_u \) of user \( C_u \). As a result, \( U_a \) cannot compute \( h(x_i \parallel y_i) \) and \( h(ID_u \parallel x_i) \) required to mount impersonation attacks. Besides, \( U_a \) has no method to retrieve these values either from the parameters extracted out of user’s smart card or from the login request or using both. Therefore, the proposed scheme provides proper mutual authentication.

### 5.5. Providing User Anonymity and User Untraceability

In the proposed scheme, user’s plaintext identity \( ID_u \) is completely out of scene; it is neither stored in user’s smart card \( SC_u \) nor sent in any of the login-authorization messages transmitted over insecure network. If \( U_a \) extracts [28, 29] the values \( \{x_i, e_i, g_i, j_i, h(\cdot)\} \) from \( SC_u \), we explain in the following that he cannot obtain \( ID_u \) of \( C_u \). To guess \( ID_j \) from \( g_j = (ID_j \parallel PW_j) \oplus f_j \) and from \( j_i = (ID_j \parallel PW_j) \oplus K_j \), the attacker must have the knowledge of \( \{PW_j, f_j\} \) and \( \{PW_j, K_j\} \), respectively. \( U_a \) cannot guess out \( ID_j \) from \( e_i = h(ID_j \parallel x_i) \oplus r_j \) without knowing \( r_j \) and \( x_i \). If \( U_a \) intercepts a login request \( \{M_5, M_9, M_{10}\} \) or the reply message \( \{M_6, M_{10}\}/\{M_{12}\} \), he cannot guess out \( ID_j \) using \( \{M_5, M_{10}, M_{12}\} \) due to one-way property of hash function. Moreover, each value \( \{M_5, M_9, M_{10}, M_{12}\} \) transmitted over insecure network is dynamic in nature by virtue of random numbers \( R_j \) and \( R_{10} \) which are different for each session. Thus, \( U_a \) cannot neither obtain user’s identity \( ID_u \) nor can he trace the legal user by means of observing and analyzing some fixed parameter in the login request or the reply messages. Hence, the scheme provides user anonymity as well as user untraceability.

### 5.6. Providing Password Change Facility

In An’s scheme, once user chooses his password during registration phase, it is fixed forever as user cannot change his password at his will. Probably the author might have opined that in the presence of biometrics verification procedure there is no need of password change facility. Undoubtedly, it is very difficult to forge copy or compromise biometrics, but once compromised then biometrics cannot be changed like passwords. So we opine that if password is employed in user authentication scheme then there should be the provision to facilitate the user to freely change his password. The proposed scheme provides password changing facility with which a user can freely (without interacting with server) change his old password to a new one whenever he feels to do so. Before updating stored values with the new password \( PW_j \), the smart card verifies the correctness of identity \( ID_j \) old password \( PW_j \) along with verifying the biometrics information \( f_j = h(B_j \oplus K_j) \). Thus the proposed scheme provides secure and easy password changing facility.

### 6. Comparison

In this section, we examine the proposed scheme by means of comparing its efficiency with Li-Hwang’s scheme [19], Das’s scheme [26], and An’s scheme [27]. Table 2 displays comparison of security attributes and Table 3 displays comparison of computational load in terms of hash functions.

#### Table 2: Comparison of security attributes.

| Security attributes                  | Li-Hwang’s [19] | Das’s [26] | An’s [27] | Ours |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------|------------|-----------|------|
| Resist online PW\(_i\) guessing attack | No              | No         | No        | Yes  |
| Resist offline PW\(_i\) guessing attack | No              | No         | No        | Yes  |
| Resist user impersonation attack     | No              | No         | No        | Yes  |
| Resist server impersonation attack   | No              | No         | No        | Yes  |
| Provides mutual authentication       | No              | No         | No        | Yes  |
| Provides PW\(_i\) change facility   | Yes             | Yes        | No        | Yes  |
| Provides user anonymity             | No              | No         | No        | Yes  |

#### Table 3: Comparison of computational load in terms of hash functions.

| Phases                  | Li-Hwang’s [19] | Das’s [26] | An’s [27] | Ours |
|-------------------------|-----------------|------------|-----------|------|
| Registration phase      | 3 \( h(\cdot) \) | 3 \( h(\cdot) \) | 3 \( h(\cdot) \) | 4 \( h(\cdot) \) |
| Login phase             | 2 \( h(\cdot) \) | 2 \( h(\cdot) \) | 3 \( h(\cdot) \) | 3 \( h(\cdot) \) |
| Authentication phase    | 5 \( h(\cdot) \) | 8 \( h(\cdot) \) | 6 \( h(\cdot) \) | 7 \( h(\cdot) \) |
| Total                   | 10 \( h(\cdot) \) | 13 \( h(\cdot) \) | 12 \( h(\cdot) \) | 14 \( h(\cdot) \) |
The important aspect about the proposed scheme is the minor increase of two hash functions in computational load to achieve higher efficiency as compared to other schemes [19, 26, 27].

7. Conclusion

This paper shows that the recently proposed biometrics-based user authentication scheme by An is susceptible to many threats. Once an attacker obtains the smart card of a legal user, he can guess user's password and impersonate the user. Further, the attacker can also cheat the user by masquerading as the legal server. Consequently, the scheme fails to provide mutual authentication. Besides, the scheme also suffers from the restriction of static password. We have proposed a new scheme based on the design of An's scheme so as to fix the problems identified in An's scheme. In the proposed scheme an attacker cannot figure out the identity of user either from the smart card or by intercepting all login-authorization messages transmitted over insecure network. Analysis and comparison show improved performance of the proposed scheme.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interests regarding the publication of this paper.

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