1. Introduction

In this note, we highlight a simple tension between stability and equality in matching with non-transferable utilities. We consider many-to-one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, as in Niederle and Yariv (2009), which in this context means that a school’s utility is the sum of its students’ utilities. A special case of aligned preferences, known as spatial, arises when utilities are determined by commuting distance to school.

We show existence and uniqueness of a stable one-to-many matching, under similar assumptions to the ones used by Eeckhout (2000), Clark (2006) and Niederle and Yariv (2009) to prove existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in the one-to-one case. This stable matching can be obtained through the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) of Gale and Shapley (1962).

Stable matchings eliminate all justifiable envy, hence are sometimes called “fair”. For instance Kojima and Manea (2010) point out that, due to the fact that stability is regarded as a normative fairness criterion, it is used in many practical assignment problems, such as student placement in New York City and Boston. However, we show that this fairness comes at the cost of extreme forms of inequality of allocation. In the spatial allocation case, this results in some students going to school across the street.
while other travel across the city. The intuition is that students and schools that are
close to each other can block any allocation that involves a pair that is further away, and
peripheral or marginal students get the long end of the subway ride.

We formalize this intuition by showing that the stable matching lexicographically
maximizes the welfare of the matched pairs, starting with the best-off. We propose a
simple algorithm that reflects this lexicographic ordering and makes the proof of our result
transparent. We call this algorithm max-max-lex. Similarly, we propose an algorithm,
adapted from the bottleneck algorithm in Burkard et al. (2009), Section 6.2, that reverses
the balance between stability and inequality, and matches pairs in lexicographic order
maximizing the welfare of the worst-off. We call this algorithm max-min-lex. The
resulting matching is Rawlesian at the expense of stability.

2. Model

Consider a one-to-many matching problem with two sides $\mathcal{I}$ and $\mathcal{J}$. We will call
the elements of $\mathcal{I}$ students, and the elements of $\mathcal{J}$ schools. Let $\mathcal{J}$ be a discrete set
with cardinality weakly smaller than the cardinality of $\mathcal{I}$. Let each school $j \in \mathcal{J}$ have
capacity $q_j$, which is the number of students it is equipped to serve. Finally, let $u_{ij}$ be the
utility of a student $i$ when matched with $j$, and similarly let $v_{jI}$ be the utility of a school
$j$ when matched with a set of students $I \subseteq \mathcal{I}$. We normalize the utility of unmatched
students to $-\infty$. We assume that utilities are strictly positive, i.e., $u_{ij} > 0$ for every
$i$ and $j$; there are no indifferences, i.e., there are no pairs $i, i' \in \mathcal{I}$ and $j, j' \in \mathcal{J}$ such
that $u_{ij} = u_{i'j}$ or $u_{ij} = u_{ij'}$, and preferences are strictly aligned, by which we mean that
for all $j \in \mathcal{J}$ and $I \subseteq \mathcal{I}$, $v_{jI} = \sum_{i \in I} u_{ij}$. Strictly aligned preferences are so called because
they require alignment between the utilities of the two sides of the market. They are a
particular type of altruistic preference. When the matching is one-to-one, the definition of
strictly aligned preferences coincides with the definition of aligned preferences in Niederle
and Yariv (2009).\footnote{The condition is related but stronger than the top coalition property in Banerjee et al. (2001) and
weaker than the condition in Pycia (2012).}
An allocation is a function $\mu : I \cup J \to 2^{I \cup J}$ such that $\mu(i) \in J \cup \{i\}$ and $\mu(j) \subseteq I \cup \{j\}$. The notation $\mu(i) = i$ indicates that student $i$ is unassigned, and $j \in \mu(j)$ indicates that the number of students assigned to school $j$ under $\mu$ is less than its capacity, that is $q_j > |\mu(j) \cap I|$. An allocation is called feasible if each student is assigned to at most one school, and all school capacity constraints are respected, that is if $|\mu(i)| = 1$ for all $i \in I$ and $|\mu(j)| \leq q_j$ for all $j \in J$. An allocation is stable when there are no blocking pairs. In our context, this is equivalent to the following.

**Definition 2.1.** The allocation $\mu : I \cup J \to 2^{I \cup J}$ is stable if there does not exist $i, j \in I \times J$ such that $u_{ij} > u_{\mu(i)}$ and $|\mu(j)| = q_j$ or $|\mu(j)| = q_j$ and $\exists i' \in \mu(j)$, $u_{i'j} < u_{ij}$.

The following algorithm will be shown to produce the unique stable matching.

1. Match Step: select $i$ and $j$ such that the utility of their match is the highest in the set of students that are unassigned and schools that have some residual capacity.
2. Update Step: reduce the capacity of the school found in the previous step by 1. Remove the assigned student from the set of unassigned students.

We call this algorithm the max-max-lex algorithm because it iteratively pairs the students and schools that are each other’s top choice among the schools and students that are still available. It does so in a lexicographic order, until there are no further students and schools to match. The max-max-lex algorithm is formally described below. It converges in a finite number of steps. In the algorithm, we denote $e^j$ the $j$-the vector of the canonical basis of $\mathbb{R}^J$, which is the vector whose $j$-th entry is equal to one, and whose other entries are equal to zero.

Theorem 2.1 shows three important results: first, the allocation resulting from the max-max-lex algorithm is the one that maximizes the vector of students’ utilities in lexicographic order from higher to lower utility pairs. Second, it proves that the allocation is stable. Finally, it shows that the stable allocation is unique, therefore implying that the

\[^3\text{The max-max-lex algorithm is lexicographic, starting from the top. This feature is shared with rank-maximal allocations, see Irving et al. (2006), where the number of agents receiving their first choice is maximized, subject to which a maximum number of remaining agents receive their second choice, etc...} \]
Algorithm 1: Max-max-lex Algorithm

Initialization:
Set $t = 0$, $I^0 = \mathcal{I}$ and $q^0 = q$

while $I^t \neq \emptyset$ and $q^t \neq 0$
  do
    $i^t, j^t = \arg\max_{i,j} u_{ij}$
    s.t. $i \in I^t$ and $q^t_{j^t} \neq 0$
    Set $\mu(i^t) = j^t$
    $q^{t+1} = q^t - e^{j^t}$
    $I^{t+1} = I^t \setminus \{i^t\}$
    $t = t + 1$
  end

resulting matching outcome of the max-max-lex algorithm is identical to the matching outcome of the DAA\textsuperscript{4}.

**Theorem 2.1.** (a) The max-max-lex algorithm maximizes (among all feasible allocations) the vector of ranked ordered utilities of student-school pairs in the lexicographic order, starting from the pair with the highest utility. (b) The assignment resulting from the max-max-lex algorithm is stable. (c) The stable allocation is unique.

**Proof.** (a) Let $\mathcal{U} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{I\mathcal{I}}$ represent the set of utilities that are achievable in the economy in a feasible allocation. Formally, let $u = (u_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}$ be a vector in $\mathbb{R}^{I\mathcal{I}}$. If $u \in \mathcal{U}$ then there exists a feasible allocation $\mu$ such that $u_{i(\mu(i))} = u_i$. Let $u^{(k)}$ represent the k-th order statistic of vector $u$, with $u^{(|\mathcal{I}|)}$ being the highest component of vector $u$, and $u^{(1)}$ being its smallest. The first iteration of the max-max-lex algorithm selects among the vectors in $\mathcal{U}$ the ones with the highest value of $u^{(|\mathcal{I}|)}$. The n-th iteration of the max-max-lex algorithm selects among the vectors selected at the previous step, the ones with the highest value of $u^{(|\mathcal{I}|)-n}$, and so on. Therefore, the max-max-lex algorithm maximizes lexicographically the utility of students, starting from the pairs with the highest utility.

\textsuperscript{4}Cantillon et al. (2022) discuss the trade-off between (school) priorities and (student) preferences in school choice and show in particular that in the current context of aligned preferences, the stable outcome coincides with the top trading cycles algorithm of Shapley and Scarf (1974). Hence, top trading cycles also produces high inequality in outcomes in this context.
Let $\mu^{MML}$ be the match resulting from the max-max-lex algorithm, and assume by contradiction that it is unstable. This means that there exists $i$ and $j$ such that $u_{ij} > u_{i\mu(i)}$ and for some $i' \in \mu(j)$, $u_{ij} > u_{i'j}$. However, this implies that the max-max-lex algorithm would have matched $i$ and $j$, before matching $i'$ and $j$, which leads to a contradiction.

(c) Let $\mu^S$ be a stable match and let $\mu^{MML}$ be the stable match arising from the max-max-lex algorithm. Suppose by contradiction that $\mu^S \neq \mu^{MML}$. This means that there exists $i \in I$ such that $\mu^S(i) \neq \mu^{MML}(i)$. Since by Assumption 2 there are no indifferences, it must be that either (a) $u_{i\mu^{MML}(i)} < u_{i\mu^S(i)}$ or (b) $u_{i\mu^{MML}(i)} > u_{i\mu^S(i)}$. First suppose that (a) holds. Since $i$ and $\mu^S(i)$ are not assigned through the max-max-lex algorithm, it must be that at the stage of the algorithm when $i$ is assigned, school $\mu^S(i)$ is already at full capacity. This implies that $\exists I \subseteq I$ s.t. $|I| \geq q_{i\mu^S(i)}$ and $\min_{i' \in I} u_{i'\mu^S(i)} > u_{i\mu^S(i)}$. But this implies that any $i' \in I$ would form a blocking pair with $\mu^S(i)$ in $\mu^S$. This contradicts that $\mu(s)$ is stable. Suppose then that (b) holds, i.e., $u_{i\mu^{MML}(i)} > u_{i\mu^S(i)}$. This implies that $\not\exists I \subseteq I$ s.t. $|I| \geq q_{j}$ and $\min_{i' \in I} u_{i'\mu^{MML}(i)} > u_{i\mu^{MML}(i)}$. But then $(i, \mu^{MML}(i))$ form a blocking pair in $\mu^S$, which is a contradiction. Therefore $\mu^S = \mu^{MML}$. □

An illustration of the severe inequality displayed by the stable allocation in matching with aligned preferences is given in Figure 2.1(a). The latter shows the stable matching between a large number of students uniformly distributed on $[0,1]^2$ and 5 distinct schools in $[0,1]^2$ with heterogeneous capacities. Utilities are spatial, i.e., $u_{ij} = \sqrt{2} - d_{ij}$, where $d_{ij}$ denotes Euclidean distance between $i$ and $j$. Dots in the figure represent schools, and territories of the same color represent students who attend the same school. One characteristic of this assignment is that all schools lie in the territory that they serve. As one can see from the figure, some students in the red territory have to travel almost the maximum distance that can be traveled in the square, while others travel no distance at all. This results in very dispersed utilities in the stable allocation.

The lexicographic nature of the stable allocation suggests a Rawlesian alternative, where pairs are matched in lexicographic order, starting with the lowest utility pair within a set that is iteratively determined. The corresponding algorithm we propose
below is adapted from the bottleneck algorithm in, for instance, Burkard et al. (2009).

The algorithm is made of three steps:

1.Feasibility Step: among the feasible allocations of unassigned students and schools, select one that maximizes the lowest utility \( u^* \) obtained by anyone in the allocation.

2. Match Step: match all \( i \) and \( j \)'s in the feasible allocation identified at the previous step that obtain utility \( u^* \) from their match.

3. Update Step: reduce the capacity of the school found in the previous step by 1. Remove the assigned student from the set of unassigned students.

This algorithm converges in finite time and produces an allocation that maximizes the utility of the worst-off student, by maximizing at each step the utility of the worst-off students among those remaining. We thus call this algorithm max-min-lex.

Algorithm 2: Max-min-lex Algorithm

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Initialization:} \\
\text{Set } t = 0, \ I^0 = \mathcal{I}, \ q^0 = q \\
\text{while } I^t \neq \emptyset \text{ and } q^t \neq 0 \text{ do} \\
\quad U^t = \{ (u_{ij}) : i \in I^t, j : q^t_j \neq 0 \} \\
\quad \text{By dichotomy, find the largest } u^* \text{ in } U^t \text{ such that there exists a feasible match with no assigned student obtaining a utility below } u^*; \\
\quad \text{Match } i^t, j^t \text{ such that } u_{i^t j^t} = u^* \\
\quad \text{Set } I^{t+1} = I^t \setminus \{i^t\}; \\
\quad q^{t+1} = q^t - e^{j^t}; \\
\quad t = t + 1 \\
\text{end}
\end{align*}
\]

The equalitarian nature of max-min-lex allocations comes at the expense of stability. This is straightforward, given the uniqueness of the stable allocation. It also stems from the logic of the max-min-lex algorithm, which creates blocking pairs. It is most easily seen in a 2 students, 2 schools example, with \( u_{ij} > u_{ij'} > u_{i'j} > u_{i'j'} \). In this case, the max-max-lex algorithm matches \((i, j)\) and \((i', j')\), whereas the max-min-lex algorithm matches \((i, j')\) and \((i', j)\), thereby decreasing inequality but creating a blocking pair.
Figure 2.1. Allocations of students uniformly distributed on the unit square and 5 schools, represented by dots. Each dot serves the students in the territory of the corresponding color. The left panel shows the stable allocation, whereas the right panel shows the allocation resulting from the max-min-lex algorithm.

An illustration\(^5\) of the max-min-lex allocation is given in Figure 2.1(b). The primitives are identical to those in Figure 2.1(a) but the allocation no longer displays the signs of extreme outcome inequality in Figure 2.1(a).

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\(^5\)See Ghelfi and Vladu (2023) for details on the algorithm and implementation used to produce Figure 2.1.
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