Regional Content and Beyond

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8.1 Introduction

Sub-Saharan African local content regimes are weak, inconsistent, not harmonised with other policies and unclear. One of the biggest hurdles that Sub-Saharan African countries face is the need to replicate the results of local content policies found in developed countries such as Norway and Brazil into their domestic economies.\(^1\) The merge of energy justice into regional content offers innovative solutions to several challenges such as marginalisation, elite capture, corruption, poor infrastructure, lack of capital and expertise within the local population. How can developing countries crack through the enclave and maximise the benefits from the oil and gas resources? To avoid the under-development route that is the trajectory of numerous oil and gas countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. After a thorough analysis of local content and regional content regimes. We conclude by discussing the local content implementation gap, the nature of the local content regimes found Sub-Saharan Africa.

\(^1\)Thurber, M.C., Hults, D.R. and Heller, P.R., 2011. Exporting the “Norwegian Model”: The Effect of Administrative Design on Oil Sector Performance. *Energy Policy*, 39(9), pp. 5366–5378.
This analysis facilitates the research to explore what recommendations match the future designs of regional content policy. As much as we focus on the oil and gas industry, the skills obtained and technology transferred from the international oil companies must spill-over into other sectors and propel economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The oil and gas industry is integrated into global value chains, and the current oil price shocks of 2020 and COVID-19 pandemic have accelerated the gears of the energy transition. Sub-Saharan Africa has neither the technology nor the expertise to gain from this transition. The shift from fossil fuels to cleaner energy has brought about an increasing demand for certain minerals in Sub-Saharan Africa. Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and the Central African Republic all have these minerals. A regional content policy would incubate the fast change of technology and industry needs. Since the policy pools resources and gives individual countries absorptive capacity to crack through the enclave of the extractive industry.

8.2 Local Content Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa

Mature oil and gas producers in Sub-Saharan Africa such as Nigeria and Angola designed, adopted and implemented national content policies. The design of local content policies in the 1980s and the current design of local content policies is entirely different for several emerging African oil producers, namely Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya and Liberia. Their local content policies are based on global markets and the nature of the economy. While for the mature oil and gas producing countries, the policies were more nationalistic. Angola and Nigeria implemented the “Indigenisation policy” that advocated for ownership of the oil and gas resources without consideration of the prevailing economic factors that could help the sector grow. Indigenization in

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2Heffron, R.J., 2020. The Role of Justice in Developing Critical Minerals. *The Extractive Industries and Society.*
Nigeria has been fought bitterly by foreign capital, and particularly by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Lagos. Ultimately, the policies failed to give the Nigerian state significant influence over the industry and were all about elite oil rent capture. After its independence in 1975, Angola nationalised the Portuguese company ANGOL de Lubrificantes e Combustíveis, establishing the Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis (Sonangol), a national oil business. International companies were permitted to participate in Joint Ventures and Contractor Agreements with Sonangol in Angola, but until 1991 they were only legally allowed to own 49 per cent of each company. Given the relative strength and efficiency of Sonangol, Angola was far more effective in maintaining national control over its oil industry through Sonangol. At the beginning of the 1980s, Angola passed several laws which set targets for Angolans employed by international firms and established a mandatory structure for training and promotion of Angolan employees. However, the IOCs completely ignored specific laws and regulations. The oil industry continued to be an enclave industry. Early attempts at imposing national control represented the dual aims of increasing dominance over a strategic sector and rising developmental benefits. These ambitions were eventually superseded by the self-interest of the elite and the international capital resistance. Although the ruling party in Angola faced a struggle for its very survival and local linkages were undoubtedly out of the question during the civil war, Sonangol arguably could insist

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3 Ovadia, J.S., 2016. Local Content Policies and Petro-Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Analysis. *Resources Policy*, 49, pp. 20–30.

4 Ovadia, J.S., 2016. Local Content Policies and Petro-Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative analysis. *Resources Policy*, 49, pp. 20–30.

5 Ovadia, J.S., 2014. Local Content and Natural Resource Governance: The Cases of Angola and Nigeria. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 1(2), pp. 137–146.

6 Ibid.

7 De Oliveira, R.S., 2007. Business success, Angola-Style: Postcolonial Politics and the Rise and Rise of Sonangol. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, pp. 595–619.

8 Ovadia, J.S., 2016. Oil-Backed Capitalist Development in the Global South: A Case of Positive Oil Exceptionalism. *Energy, Capitalism and World Order: Towards a New Agenda in International Political Economy*. Palgrave Macmillan.

9 Ibid.
on more Angolanisation—and certainly more training of Angolans—if it had put long-term interests ahead of short-term payoffs.\textsuperscript{10}

Ghana found the “Jubilee field” in 2007; the Ghanaian government passed Ghana’s new Local Content Law in 2013 (GLCL). Ghana has missed opportunities because of not placing local content laws and regulations. Opportunities in the mining industry, telecommunications, and the West African gas pipeline and gas infrastructure. The authorities were not going to miss this opportunity again. The government set up the Ghana Petroleum Commission that emphasised on revenue rather than value addition. In Uganda, before the discovery of oil and gas resources. Uganda had no local content policy, no guiding mechanism to provide a deliberate first preference to local Ugandans. Uganda acknowledged its lack of capacity and adopted a flexible national content policy. Mozambique passed a Petroleum Law that advocates for local companies and joint ventures. The Law also calls for the provisions of goods and services for the local population. The law also has provisions for training of Mozambican nationals. Tanzania’s first Local Content Policy released in 2014 only “encouraged” international oil companies to work with local Tanzanians. The draft that was enacted by the Petroleum Act of 2015 put the regulations and provisions into law. The local content policy was dual in-nature in that it called for both the community and national content. Kenya developed a Petroleum Bill and Local Content Regulations in 2015 that is still pending. The provisions also call for technology transfer, employment and training, research and development as well as legal and financial services. Oil and gas economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, have implemented local content policies to capture more than oil rents from the oil and gas industry. But the policies have weaknesses that must be addressed, in-comparison to best international practice. The national content policies are not strict on beneficial ownership of local companies leading to fronting of local suppliers sub-contracting to foreign investors. The country fails to apply adequate fiscal policies because of the fronting. The national content policies are also not strict on the import supplier base. Most entrepreneurs from Sub-Saharan Africa do

\textsuperscript{10}Ovadia, J.S., 2014. Local Content and Natural Resource Governance: The Cases of Angola and Nigeria. \textit{The Extractive Industries and Society}, 1(2), pp. 137–146.
not manufacture the goods that are supplied to the oil and gas industry. They mostly import these goods from countries like China, Taiwan, Japan and India. Becomes a challenge in building linkages and technology transfer, because there is no value created or added within the economy. The national content policies in Sub-Saharan Africa do not emphasise on any “low-hanging fruits” to guide the local supplier base on what should gain preference in the oil and gas industry. Such challenges make it difficult for the benefits of the industry to trickle down to the marginalised communities. Put together the lack of having an absorptive capacity, and the indigenous capitalist elite has held the oil and gas for ransom. Such elite capture in oil and gas economies has challenged the development of SMEs. We must assess the pitfalls of local content policies against international best practices.

### 8.3 Lessons from Local Content Best International Practise

#### 8.3.1 Introduction

This section illustrates and explores the different lessons drawn from the cross-country analysis undertaken through a case study methodology in this book. The lessons are obtained from Norway, and Brazil to derive better recommendations and reach a viable conclusion. The lessons derived from Norway, Brazil and Nigeria are provided below.

a. Lessons from Norway

Norway has been the poster boy for good local content policies practice in the world. The success story of Norwegian local content policy is due to various factors that are in the Norwegian economy. Firstly, the Norwegian local content policy adopted a protectionist policy in
their oil and gas development.\textsuperscript{11} Secondly, Norway was already a technological frontier during the discovery of oil and gas resources.\textsuperscript{12} Thirdly Norway was also in a strong commercial position in the marine industry. Fourthly Norway had a political consensus in governing there oil and gas resources.\textsuperscript{13} Lastly, Norway had lucky timing since the oil and gas industry had not developed mature technology in offshore oil and gas operations.\textsuperscript{14} This gave room for Norway to develop its offshore technology along with the international oil companies. Though the provision did not explicitly define what was meant of local content in Norway, the international oil companies were aware of the policymaker’s intentions with regard to local content provisions. Norway separated the oil and gas sector into different segments so as to facilitate efficiency in the sector.\textsuperscript{15} Norway separated the roles of the main functionaries of the oil and gas industry. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE), the regulatory agency Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and the state oil company Statoil.\textsuperscript{16} The Norwegian government also set up an entity responsible for the financial interest of the Government in the oil and gas industry known as SDFI/Petoro.\textsuperscript{17} When Norway discovered oil and gas resources, the country had a diversified economy. The population was highly educated with a high standard of living.\textsuperscript{18} Hence Norway was in no rush to exploit and develop the oil and gas resources since the country

\textsuperscript{11}Heum, P., 2008. Local Content Development: Experiences from Oil and Gas Activities in Norway.
\textsuperscript{12}Thurber, M.C., Hults, D.R. and Heller, P.R., 2011. Exporting the “Norwegian Model”: The Effect of Administrative Design on Oil Sector Performance. \textit{Energy Policy}, 39(9), pp. 5366–5378.
\textsuperscript{13}Thurber, M.C., Hults, D.R. and Heller, P.R., 2011. Exporting the “Norwegian Model”: The Effect of Administrative Design on Oil Sector Performance. \textit{Energy Policy}, 39(9), pp. 5366–5378.
\textsuperscript{14}Heum, P., 2008. Local Content Development: Experiences from Oil and Gas Activities in Norway.
\textsuperscript{15}Al-Kasim, F., 2006. \textit{Managing Petroleum Resources: The “Norwegian model” in a Broad Perspective} (Vol. 30). Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
\textsuperscript{16}Al-Kasim, F., 2006. \textit{Managing Petroleum Resources: The “Norwegian Model” in a Broad Perspective} (Vol. 30). Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
\textsuperscript{17}Engen, O.A., 2009. \textit{The Development of the Norwegian Petroleum Innovation System: A Historical Overview}, ed. Fagerberg et al. (pp. pp. 179–207). Oxford Handbook of Innovation.
\textsuperscript{18}Engen, O.A., 2009. \textit{The Development of the Norwegian Petroleum innovation System: A Historical Overview}, ed. Fagerberg et al. (pp.179–207). Oxford Handbook of Innovation.
had socio-economic stability. This gave Norway time to prepare their local capability to integrate the oil and gas industry. Norway adopted an approach that concentrated on the procurement of local goods and services. But only when these goods and services could be competitive in quality, price and delivery date.

Norway also developed a research and development framework between the international oil companies and Norwegian institutions. Local content regulations were implemented under the strict supervision of “watchdog agencies” such as the Goods and Services Office (GSO). This watchdog agency ensured that the international oil companies complied with local content provisions. Since the oil and gas industry is an enclave industry whereby most local companies cannot enter in the oil and gas value chain. Norway unbundled the large contracts into smaller packages to allow the integration of small-medium enterprises from Norway.\(^\text{21}\) Norway was a democratic country with political stability. The different political factions in Norway had a consensus on oil and gas policies such as the Ten Oil Commandments, the petroleum fund and the management of Statoil.\(^\text{22}\)

b. Lessons from Brazil

Brazil’s political approach to governing the oil and gas resources was resource nationalistic. This meant that state participation in the oil and gas industry was predominantly undertaken by Petrobras that had a monopoly for both the downstream and upstream operations in Brazil.\(^\text{23}\) Petrobras’ dominant position was confronted in 1975, during the former

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\(^\text{19}\)Ibid.
\(^\text{20}\)Noreng, Ø., 2004. Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry. *Middle East Economic Survey*, 47(45).
\(^\text{21}\)Thurber, M.C., Hults, D.R. and Heller, P.R., 2011. Exporting the “Norwegian Model”: The Effect of Administrative Design on Oil Sector Performance. *Energy Policy*, 39(9), pp. 5366–5378.
\(^\text{22}\)Thurber, M.C., Hults, D.R. and Heller, P.R., 2011. Exporting the “Norwegian Model”: The Effect of Administrative Design on Oil Sector Performance. *Energy Policy*, 39(9), pp. 5366–5378.
\(^\text{23}\)Mendonça, R.W. and de Oliveira, L.G., 2013. Local Content Policy in the Brazilian Oil and Gas Sectoral System of Innovation. *Latin American Business Review*, 14(3–4), pp. 271–287.
general Geisel’s period as president, large areas of the Brazilian continental shelf were opened up for international oil companies.\textsuperscript{24} Politics and Petrobras have always been aligned together, governing Brazil’s oil and gas industry. This led to the Lava Jato (Car Wash) scandal that involved Petrobras.\textsuperscript{25} The scandal put an end to Lula da Silva and his Workers’ Party (PT) deepening of state capitalism as a development strategy.\textsuperscript{26} Local content in Brazil is addressed in the bidding rounds for concession and the conclusions of Production Sharing Contracts. The bidding international oil companies have to comply with a minimum local content requirement to win a bid.\textsuperscript{27} Local content requirements are defined and assessed based on percentages. Concessionaires have to ensure a specified percentage of goods and services are sourced within the local market in the execution of their concession and or production sharing contracts. In 1997 Local Content policy was adopted in Brazil with the approval of the Petroleum Law that followed a neoliberal approach for an open market ending the State’s monopoly.\textsuperscript{28}

In 1999–2004 Brazil’s local content regime from Rounds 1 to 6 set the bidders placed unrestricted offers on local content percentage, and the international oil companies would confirm the requirements.\textsuperscript{29} In 2005 saw the most significant changes in local content, were in the 7th Bidding Round.\textsuperscript{30} There was an introduction of a Local Content Table, featuring items on all aspects of the E&P cycle. Each item was associated with minimum percentages set by the government. Furthermore,

\textsuperscript{24}Mendonça, R.W. and de Oliveira, L.G., 2013. Local Content Policy in the Brazilian Oil and Gas Sectoral System of Innovation. \textit{Latin American Business Review}, 14(3–4), pp. 271–287.
\textsuperscript{25}Arruda de Almeida, M. and Zagaris, B., 2015. Political Capture in the Petrobus Corruption Scandal: The Sad Tale of an Oil Giant. \textit{Fletcher Forum of World Affairs}, 39, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{26}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27}Zacour, C., Zuma Pereira, T., Lima Rocha Cristofaro, A. and Ferreira Francisco, F., 2012. Petrobras and the New Regulatory Framework for the Exploration and Production of Oil and Natural Gas in the Brazilian Pre-Salt Region. \textit{Journal of World Energy Law and Business}, 5(2), pp. 125–138.
\textsuperscript{28}Antolín, M.J.P. and Cendrero, J.M.R., 2013. How Important Are National Companies for Oil and Gas Sector Performance? Lessons from the Bolivia and Brazil Case Studies. \textit{Energy Policy}, 61, pp. 707–716.
\textsuperscript{29}Filho, N., 2017. Brazil’s Oil & Gas Local Content Policy: Lessons Learned. Institute of the Americas.
\textsuperscript{30}Ibid.
the inclusion of a Local Content Textbook as a guideline to accurately calculate the given percentages. It also introduced Local Content certification services and a new methodology to conduct these activities\textsuperscript{31} from the start of the Bidding Rounds in 1999 till the 2013 Brazilian economic crisis. The local content policy gained substantial results in promoting local companies in the oil and gas sector and facilitated the employability in many sectors within the supply chain.\textsuperscript{32}

However, Brazil had an international competitive marine industry. The country later faced industrial failure due to different political motives at the time. The industry was revitalized based on funds granted by government programs and increased demand from Local Content commitments. Due to the given incentives the industry employed over 70,000 by 2013 alone. The Local Content Policy developed other industrial sectors as well despite positive results in terms of increased local participation in all areas of the supply chain. The process has not been smooth, and several decisions were met with resistance from the industry.\textsuperscript{33} The policy has been faced with fierce criticism that has led to a policy review. Whereby the oil and gas market participants called for flexible Local Content terms. This is because the stringent local content requirements led to higher costs and hindered further investment that resulted in the minimal attraction of FDI. The changes led to Local Content no longer being a central component of the bidding factor, but the percentage assessment criteria were left in the contractual agreements.\textsuperscript{34} Another landmark revision of the local content policy is the introduction of the Program to Encourage Supply Chain Competitiveness and the Development and Improvement of Suppliers in the Oil and

\textsuperscript{31}Almada, L.P. and Parente, V., 2013. Oil & Gas Industry in Brazil: A Brief History and Legal Framework. \textit{Panorama of Brazilian Law}, 1(1), pp. 223–252.

\textsuperscript{32}Warner, M., 2017. \textit{Local Content in Procurement: Creating Local Jobs and Competitive Domestic Industries in Supply Chains}. Routledge.

\textsuperscript{33}Relaxing of Brazil local content rules will boost oil output capacity: report. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-presalt/relaxing-of-brazil-local-content-rules-will-boost-oil-output-capacity-report-idUSKBN1JG28T.

\textsuperscript{34}Relaxing of Brazil local content rules will boost oil output capacity: report. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-presalt/relaxing-of-brazil-local-content-rules-will-boost-oil-output-capacity-report-idUSKBN1JG28T.
Natural Gas Sector (PEDEFOR). This programme is meant to stimulate the local supply chain and provide incentives for operators and service companies that invest large sums of money towards developing the local Brazilian industry. It should be noted that Local Content must offer alternative methods to stimulate adherence to its requirements, such as capital investments. The current Brazilian Local Content policy only acknowledges local content as the percentage of domestic goods and services rendered to the oil and gas industry. The PEDEFOR program seeks to expand this definition to include investments in new operational plants, R&D centres and investments to bring new technologies to be applied in the Brazilian oil and gas industry.

8.4 Regional Content Policy and Future Considerations

In Sub-Saharan Africa, the proliferation of local content policies has not yielded the results similar to Norway and Brazil. But in this book, it has been established that a regional content policy could provide new avenues that national and community content policies have not yet been able to offer. A regional content policy would replace the strict and hard regulatory policies following a more value-based approach. A regional content policy creates more room for in-country shared value creation. The agglomerations of factors of production in Sub-Saharan Africa regional economic blocs. Create linkages for international institutions and oil and gas economies sharing interest, not excluding everyone else. The most recent oil price shock and COVID-19 pandemic have shown that oil and gas countries can no longer rely on the oil and gas rents to bring about substantial social-economic development. Ovadia states that “only an approach that promotes economic diversification and plans for a future beyond hydrocarbons can serve as a justification for taking those hydrocarbons out of the ground. However, it is precisely

35Tordo, S., Warner, M., Manzano, O. and Anouti, Y., 2013. Local Content Policies in the Oil and Gas Sector. The World Bank.
36Ibid.
when the price of oil falls that oil companies make new efforts to sacrifice local content in the name of the bottom line”.37 The oil price shock also disrupted global value chains due to the lockdown measures adopted in different countries. Having a regional content policy would strengthen regional value chains making the region more resilient from uncertain global shocks. Does the main question remain of how regional content policies can crack through the enclave of the oil and gas industry? We conclude by applying the tenets of energy justice in the adopting of these policies for the sole purpose of cracking the enclave.

While cracking through the enclave of the oil and gas industry, one must also consider why energy justice is needed in designing and implementing a regional content policy. The oil and gas industry in Sub-Saharan Africa has so far created the indigenous capitalist elite class in countries like Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Ghana. The resource curse epidemic has been going on for years in Sub-Saharan Africa because of inefficient repressive policies. In reality, though the natural resources belong to the whole population, only a few people and group of the population enjoy the fruits of these resources in Sub-Saharan Africa. Hence, there is no justice in the distribution of resources, the recognition of marginalised communities and the implementation of natural resource governance policies such as local content policy. The key reason to have justice, therefore, is to ensure provisions of fairness and equality in society,38 with the sole purpose of resolving the growing inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa. Considering that local Sub-Saharan population has missed out on opportunities that were brought by the mining sector, the oil and gas sector is another industry that local populations are failing to engage in due to its enclave nature. The scare comes with the energy transition for Sub-Saharan Africa, as we move away from fossil fuels to cleaner sources of energy that brings the rise of demands of critical minerals. It is clear that for there to be a just transition. We must adopt a regional content policy to incubate the skills, pool the resources for quick indigenous integration in the oil and gas

37Ovadia, J.S., 2016. Local Content Policies and Petro-Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Analysis. Resources Policy, 49, pp. 20–30.

38Heffron, R.J., 2020. The Role of Justice in Developing Critical Minerals. The Extractive Industries and Society.
value chain before we lose another opportunity as we lost the Gold Rush opportunity of Southern Africa. Considering the massive movement and role Sub-Saharan resources in the development of the low-carbon economy with the majority of the countries have signed up the Paris COP21 Agreement. Now more than ever Sub-Saharan countries must develop regional content policies to meet the demands of this withering oil and gas industry. We undertake the Just Framework that researchers have previously applied to determine practical and interdisciplinary perspective and ensure the researcher assesses the justices issues specific to the problem, wider societal justice issues in terms of universal justice, the geography issues such as where we need to consider global supply chains such as in the oil and gas industry. The just framework covers five key elements of justice: we adopt these elements into the regional content policy and oil and gas lifecycle. We must look at the different tenets and their applicability in the regional content policy. Procedural justice—the focus here is on the legal process and the steps to create a regional content policy. Recognition justice—are rights recognized for different groups in society and the marginalised communities that are host communities to these oil and gas resources Cosmopolitanism justice—this stems from the belief we are all citizens of the world; the oil and gas industry is an industry with global and regional value chains. That is important in regional content development. Restorative justice—any injustice caused by the oil and gas industry should be rectified, and it focuses on the need for enforcement of particular laws. Local content policies are not restorative. A regional content policy includes more accountability due to increased transparency with regional stakeholders and regional watchdogs.

8.5 Conclusion

The extractive industry in Sub-Saharan Africa has been pivotal in global development. But Sub-Saharan Africa has little to show for it. From the South African Gold Rush of the 1800s, the oil and gas discoveries of the

39Ibid.
1940s and 1950s. It is clear that the common African is yet to receive his/her fair share of the pie. Many theorists and researchers have developed “excuses” as to why Sub-Saharan Africa is not developing though the region has vast natural resources. Poor natural resource management, democracy, corruption, lack of infrastructure, lack of capital, minimal linkages, lack of political will, neo-colonial tactics, lack of a skilled workforce. All these are some of the reasons to name a few. But in our interdisciplinary research, we find that we lack justice in our legal and regulatory resource management mechanisms. Governments have devised means to intervene in the oil and gas sector for decades. Adopting different production development policies that can materialise the probable benefits of the extractive industry into a vehicle of economic development for any community. This led to the proliferation of local content regimes from the 1970s up to date. Mature oil and gas countries like Nigeria and Angola first adopted the indigenisation policies that gave ownership of the resources to the local citizens. But there was no due process, no recognition of marginalised communities and no equitable distribution of concessions. This led to under-development, civil unrest, the capture of the political elite and most of all, the development of redundant policies.

Sub-Saharan Africa oil and gas producers have failed to emulate the local content poster boys of Norway and Brazil because we do not have the same technical and technological advancement that can incubate all the R&D in our local economies. As Norway and Brazil concentrated on R&D, developing and creating a monopoly through the national oil company, minimising taxes to attract foreign investments, have political stability with regards to the industry, develop on the skills that the local workforce could obtain and most of all emphasised on value addition. Sub-Saharan countries just concentrated on the oil rents from the oil and gas companies. The oil and gas industry in Sub-Saharan Africa was built without any foundation. Norway paced their exploitation because they have a robust fishing and shipping industry. But in Sub-Saharan Africa, we exhaust and deplete our reasons quickly to bankroll the government coffers. Hence, no tangible outcome has been seen or felt due to our oil and gas resources. This book calls for regionalisation of local
content policies. The creation of regional content policy, because Sub-Saharan countries do not have the same characteristics and capability as Norway and Brazil. The agglomeration and pooling of skills, resources and will. Will facilitates larger spill-overs and linkages as well as faster developmental infrastructure with huge trickle-down effects. Regional bodies like ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, COMESA, and the AU. Should join forces to achieve justice in the Sub-Saharan oil and gas life cycle. The competing development notions of industrialisation but in a low-carbon economy, the shift from fossil fuels to cleaner sources of energy, the changes in technology ad key industries that has led to demands in critical minerals, the Post-COVID-19 developmental and industrial tactics that have disrupted global and regional value chains. All these developments and competing interest cannot be met by individual Sub-Saharan African countries. There needs to be a pooling of resources, skill and capital through a regional content policy in a just and fair way.

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