Conditional versus contingent Fees

By Winand Emons

Universität Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft, Schanzeneckstrasse 1, Postfach 8573, CH-3001 Bern, Switzerland, e-mail: winand.emons@vwi.unibe.ch

Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgement; under conditional fees the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a framework where lawyers are uninformed about the clients’ cases. If there is asymmetric information about the expected level of adjudication, in equilibrium attorneys will offer only conditional fees. If there is asymmetric information about the risk of cases, only contingent fee contracts are offered in equilibrium.

JEL Classification: D82, K1.

1. Introduction

In a typical tort case in the United States the plaintiff’s attorney receives his compensation in form of a contingent fee. Under this payment scheme the attorney gets a share of the judgements if his client wins and nothing if his client loses. A common practice is to use a sliding scale: the attorney gets one-third if the case is settled without trial, 40% if the plaintiff wins at trial, and 50% if a judgement for the plaintiff is affirmed on appeal.

Contingent legal fees are widely used in the US. In a well-known empirical study, Kritzer (1990) observes that individual litigants tend to use contingent fees. In around 87% of all torts and 53% of all contractual issues plaintiffs retain their lawyer on a contingency basis.

In Europe contingent legal fees were strictly forbidden: Pactum cuota litis is not allowed by the ethical code of the European association of lawyers. Nevertheless, market pressure has led some countries to allow conditional
fees. Under *conditional fees* the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won and nothing if the case is lost. The upscale premium is not related to the adjudicated amount. The United Kingdom started introducing conditional fees in the nineties, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands; the latter is now considering to formally allow contingent fees. Spain, France, Italy, and Portugal are considering the introduction of conditional fees. Germany has also relaxed some restrictions by means of third party contingent contracts, though not to the extreme of accepting conditional fees; see Kirstein and Rickman (2004). In Greece contingent fees of up to 20% as well as conditional fees are permitted.¹

Accordingly, in quite a few countries contingent and conditional fees coexist. In the US in torts 87% of individual plaintiffs retain their lawyer under contingent fees. By contrast, 88% of organizational litigants use hourly or flat fees, often with a bonus for performance, i.e., conditional fees (Kritzer 1990). In this paper we want to analyze what determines whether clients choose contingent or conditional fees.²

Both contingent and conditional fees pay for performance by compensating the lawyer by a higher fee if the case is won. The main difference between contingent and conditional fees is that the former pays a percentage of the judgement whereas the latter pays a reward not related to the adjudicated amount.

Previous literature, which we describe at the end of the Introduction, has

¹A conditional fee is usually nothing if no recovery is obtained. If the case is won, the solicitor gets his normal fees plus an uplift, or ‘success fee’, on top of the normal fees. There is a statutory limit of 100% on the uplift. Whether the uplift is actually related to the amount adjudicated in the United Kingdom is a matter of debate. The Law Society first recommended that the client’s liability to the lawyer should be capped at 25% of any damages recovered; later it dropped the recommendation. See, e.g., Yarrow (2001). In class action suits yet another type of contract is used resembling conditional fees. Under the loadstar fee, contingent on class victory, the attorney receives a fair compensation for the time spent on the case multiplied by a factor reflecting the degree of risk and the quality of work. By contrast to the output-based contingency fees, the loadstar method is input-based.

²In private correspondence Bert Kritzer was concerned to use the term contingency fees to refer to percentage fees and to use to conditional fees to refer to U.K. style contingency fees: conditional fees are contingent on the outcome, and hence are contingency fees; the term conditional fee is rarely used in the U.S. for this type of contract. While we share his concerns, we nevertheless use the term conditional fee because it is well established in Europe.
mostly addressed the virtues of contingent legal fees, but has ignored the possibility of conditional legal fees. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a set-up where the client has private information about her case.

We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario clients have cases with different expected adjudication but the same risk; as a shortcut we will use the term merit for the expected adjudication. In the second scenario all cases have the same merit but differ in risk. Clients hire an attorney to take their case to court. Attorneys engage in Bertrand competition. Clients know the characteristics of their cases whereas lawyers do not. The client might be better informed than her attorney about the facts of her case; see Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1993).

We do not allow for contracts with payments from the attorney to the client. We thus rule out the possibility that the lawyer buys the case from the client and we do not allow for penalties the lawyer has to pay to the client if the case is lost. This restriction follows from the champerty doctrine in the US and the UK and the forbidden pactum cuota litis in continental Europe.

Attorneys strategically choose how much effort they put into a case. Therefore, contracts have to be high-powered to provide incentives for high effort. More precisely, contracts may not entail fixed wages; the lawyer gets nothing when the case is lost. Accordingly, in our setup a contingent fee is simply given by a share of the adjudicated amount the attorney gets when the case is won; a conditional fee is given by a fixed amount for the lawyer if the case is won. Under both contractual forms the lawyer gets nothing if the case is lost.

With asymmetric information about the merits, only a conditional fee contract is offered in equilibrium. This contract induces high effort and lawyers just break even. To see this, suppose that a contingent and a conditional fee contract are offered simultaneously. Then clients with strong cases prefer the conditional fee because they need not share the residual returns. By contrast, clients with weak cases prefer contingency fees because the attorney’s share is lower than the conditional fee. If a lawyer offers a contingent fee contract, he only attracts low merit cases; the lawyer thus gets a negative selection of all cases. The expected returns of this contract do not cover the attorney’s cost of effort so that he will not offer it in the first place.

With identical merit and asymmetric information about risks, only a
contingent fee contract is offered in equilibrium. This contract induces high effort and lawyers just break even. If a contingent and a conditional contract are offered simultaneously, high risk clients prefer the conditional fee and low risk clients prefer the contingent fee. To see this note that high risk cases have high stakes but a low probability to prevail. Under conditional fees the lawyer does not participate in the high stakes; he gets a fixed amount if the case is won. The expected returns of the attorney are, however, decreasing in risk. By contrast, under contingent fees the lawyer’s expected share is constant and independent of risk. Since the lawyer gets a fraction of the outcome, under contingent fees he is compensated for a low probability to prevail by a high reward if the client wins. Low risk clients prefer contingent fees because for them a share of the outcome is less than the conditional fee that they are very likely to pay. If a lawyer offers a conditional fee contract, he attracts only high risk clients; the lawyer thus gets a negative selection of all cases. The expected returns of this contract do not cover the attorney’s cost of effort so that he does better not offer it in the first place.

If we argue that when a plaintiff retains her lawyer the probability to prevail and the amount at stake are unknown, we are in the scenario with asymmetric information about risk. We then explain the observation that in torts 87% of individual plaintiffs retain their lawyer under contingent fees. Insurance companies are mostly defendants. When the defendant retains her lawyer, a case is more developed; suppose the probability to win is known and only the amount at stake remains to be determined so that we are in the scenario with asymmetric information about merits. Then we explain the fact that 88% of organizational litigants, typically insurance companies, use hourly or flat fees, often with a bonus for performance, i.e., conditional fees.

Our results should become clearer once we draw the analogy between contingent and conditional fees (without fixed wage components) and equity contracts and standard debt contracts (without collateral) to finance risky projects. Our cases are risky projects as are the investment opportunities of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs need capital from investors, our clients need effort from lawyers. Capital/effort are lost when the project fails/when the case is lost.

Under equity finance the investor gets a share of the project’s returns. So does the attorney under contingent fees. Under a standard debt contract the investor gets a fixed payment (interest plus principle) in non-bankruptcy
states and nothing in bankruptcy states. Under conditional fees the attorney gets a fixed premium if the case is won and nothing when the case is lost. Accordingly, contingent and conditional fees generate the same payoff structure as do equity and standard debt finance.

Our results are thus related to the literature on adverse selection in credit markets, starting with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). We derive an extended version of a result by De Meza and Webb (1987): they show that with asymmetric information about returns, investors prefer debt over equity; if there is asymmetric information about risk, investors prefer equity over debt.³

Let us now briefly summarize the literature. Contingent fees may be seen as a mechanism to finance cases when the plaintiff is liquidity constrained and capital markets are imperfect. Similarly, they may be used by the attorney and her client to share the risk generated by the case efficiently. See, e.g., Posner (1986).

Another explanation is related to the use of contingent legal fees in class-action litigation (Lynk, 1990, Klement and Neeman, 2004) and third-party involvement in litigation, such as insurance companies (Kirstein and Rickman, 2004).

The other explanations for contingent fees are all based on asymmetric information between the lawyer and his client. Contingent fees can be used to address a moral hazard problem: If the client cannot observe the attorney’s effort, then tying the attorney’s fees to the trial’s outcome provides better incentives to exert efficient effort than hourly fees which tend to induce shirking (Danzon, 1983; Halpern and Turnbull, 1983; Gravelle and Waterson, 1993; Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 2003; Emons and Garoupa, 2005).

Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1993) suppose that the attorney has better information about his ability and the plaintiff has better information about the merits of her case. A high-quality attorney will signal his ability by working for a high contingency percentage and a low fixed fee. A client who has a high-quality case will be willing to pay a high fixed fee and a low contingency percentage, while a client with a low-quality case will prefer a low fixed fee and a high contingency percentage. In Rubinfeld and Scotchmer a

³De Meza and Webb assume pooling. A collateral is not used to screen entrepreneurs. In our model pooling is endogenous. The attorney’s choice of effort rules out fixed wage components and thus any possibility to screen clients. Our modelling of mean preserving spreads follows Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000).
contingency fee contract consists of a fixed wage plus a share of the adjudicated amount. Since contingency contracts are two-dimensional, they obtain separating equilibria. It is straightforward to obtain similar separating equilibria with two-dimensional conditional contracts.\footnote{A conditional contract with a fixed wage corresponds to the standard debt contract with a collateral. If banks choose the collateral and the interest rate, only separating equilibria exist; see Bester (1985). In the case of separating equilibria conditional and contingent fees are equivalent: any separating menu of fixed fees and contingency percentages can be mimicked by menu a fixed fees and upscaled premia.} In our set-up both types of contracts are one-dimensional which precludes Rubinfeld and Scotchmer type separating equilibria.

Dana and Spier (1993) and Emons (2000) look at the role of the attorney as an expert. Clients do not know the merits of their case. The attorney as the expert finds out about these merits. In Dana and Spier (1993) the lawyer recommends whether to pursue or drop the case; they conclude the optimal compensation scheme will pay the attorney a share of the plaintiff’s award. In Emons (2000) the attorney recommends how much work to put into the case; he finds that paying the attorney by the hour is generally better than using contingent fees.

The economic literature on conditional fees (Maclean and Rickman, 1999; Gray et al, 1999, Rickman et al, 1999, Yarrow, 2001; Fenn, 2002) has been concerned with the impact on the outcome of legal cases and the effects on the demand and supply of legal aid. Before-the-event legal cost insurance has been stifled by the existence of legal aid. When the government withdrew legal aid for many types of cases, conditional fees have moved to the fore along with after-the-event insurance policies, purchased after an actionable event from legal cost insurers.

In Emons and Garoupa (2005) we compare conditional and contingent fees in a principal-agent framework where the lawyer chooses unobservable effort after he has observed the amount at stake. Contingent fees provide better incentives than conditional fees independently of whether upfront payments are restricted to be non-negative or not. Under contingent fees the attorney uses his information about what is at stake more efficiently.

In Emons (2004) we compare conditional and contingent fees in a framework where lawyers choose between a safe and a risky litigation strategy. Under conditional fees lawyers prefer the safe strategy, under contingent fees...
the risky one. Risk-averse plaintiffs prefer conditional fees over contingent fees when lawyering costs are low and vice versa for high lawyering costs. With high contingent fees the plaintiff is well insured and does not care about risk: most of the surplus goes to the lawyer anyway.

In the next section we describe the model. In section 3 we derive our basic result. Section 4 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.

2. The Model

We consider a large set of clients each of which has a case. A case may be either lost or won. If the case is lost, the client gets nothing. When the client wins, she gets $J \geq 0$. The probability of prevailing is given as $1/\sigma$, $\sigma \geq 1$. Accordingly, a case is a random variable

$$\tilde{J} = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{with } (\sigma - 1)/\sigma; \\ J, & \text{with } 1/\sigma. \end{cases}$$

(1)

The expected adjudicated amount (the merit) is $E(\tilde{J}) := \mu = J/\sigma$ and the variance is $Var(\tilde{J}) = \mu^2(\sigma - 1)$. Accordingly, if $\mu$ is constant, $\sigma$ measures the risk of a case. More precisely, if we hold $\mu$ constant and increase $\sigma$, we have a mean preserving spread; see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).

We consider two different sources of asymmetric information. In the first scenario the amount at stake $J \in [0, \infty)$ is known to the client but not to the lawyer. The probability to prevail $1/\sigma$ is the same for all cases and common knowledge. Asymmetric information with respect to $J$ translates into asymmetric information about the expected adjudicated amount $\mu \in [0, \infty)$ which is distributed with c.d.f. $F(\mu)$. Therefore, we will talk about asymmetric information about $\mu$ and call it scenario $\mu$.

In scenario $\sigma$ all cases have the same expected adjudicated amount $\mu$ which is common knowledge. Here the risk $\sigma$ and the adjudicated amount $J$ are random. Since $J = \mu \sigma$, we need only specify the c.d.f. $G(\sigma)$ for the risk $\sigma \in [1, \infty)$. The realizations of $\sigma$ and the corresponding $J = \mu \sigma$ are known to the client but not to the lawyer. Accordingly, only the client knows whether she has a case with a low $J$ and high probability to prevail (a low risk case) or a case where $J$ is high and $1/\sigma$ low (a high risk case).

To take a case to court a client needs a lawyer. There are at least two risk neutral lawyers with unlimited capacity. Lawyers engage in Bertrand competition which we will make more precise below.
Attorneys either provide zero effort or high effort $e > 0$. With zero effort the probability to prevail is zero. With high effort $e$ the probability to win equals $1/\sigma$ as described above. Effort is not observed by the client. Lawyers only incur the cost of effort which, for simplicity, equals the level of effort $\{0,e\}$. When the lawyer is indifferent as to the choice of effort, he goes for high effort. In scenario $\sigma$) let $\mu \geq e$ so that all cases should be taken to court. In scenario $\mu$) only those cases with $\mu \geq e$ should be prosecuted.

According to Kritzer (2004) an attorney should strive to maximize the expected hourly rate which is the probability of recovery (“liability risk”) times the expected amount of damages (“quantum risk”) divided by the expected hours the lawyer invests in the case (“investment risk”). Using this terminology, in both of our scenarios the investment $e$ is deterministic. In scenario $\mu$) the liability $1/\sigma$ is known and the quantum $J$ is random. In scenario $\sigma$) the quantum $J$ and the liability $1/\sigma$ are random, but their product $\mu$ is common knowledge.

Kritzer (2004) argues that an attorney faces uncertainty with respect to all three variables, which is reflected by the large variation he finds in the hourly rates lawyers achieved with the cases they accepted.\(^5\) In torts 87% of individual plaintiffs retain their lawyer under contingent fees (Kritzer 1990). We may argue that at this very early stage of a case the liability and the quantum are random so that we are in scenario $\sigma$). By contrast, 88% of organizational litigants use hourly or flat fees, often with a bonus for performance (Kritzer 1990). Organizational litigants are often insurance companies being defendant. At this more mature stage of a case liability is known and only the quantum remains to be determined so that we are in scenario $\mu$).

By giving lawyers the zero effort option, we effectively rule out contracts entailing fixed wages. To see this, first note that we do not allow for contracts with payments from the attorney to the client. We thus rule out the possibility that the lawyer buys the case from the client and we do not allow for penalties the lawyer has to pay to the client if the case is lost. This restriction is implied by the *champtery doctrine* in the US and the UK and

\(^5\)It is difficult to quantify the three risks for the cases that were accepted. Some suggestive evidence can perhaps be found in the reasons why lawyers decline cases. In a survey Kritzer (2004) finds that of all declined cases 47% were turned down due to lack of liability, 19% due to inadequate damages, and 13% due to both reasons.
the forbidden *pactum cuota litis* in continental Europe.

Therefore, in our set-up conditional fees can pay the lawyer a fixed wage plus a fixed extra if the case is won; contingent fees can give the attorney a fixed wage plus a share of the adjudicated amount. Now suppose that under either fee structure the fixed wage is positive. Then the lawyer can ensure himself a positive payoff: he provides zero effort and cashes in on the fixed wage. Due to Bertrand competition this can, however, not happen in equilibrium: any positive payoff will be competed away. As we will see later in equilibrium lawyers offer contracts the returns of which just cover their effort cost $e$.

Accordingly, given that we can rule out any fixed wage components, a *conditional fee contract* is given by

$$
\begin{align*}
&\begin{cases}
  d, & \text{if the case is won;}
  0, & \text{if the case is lost;}
\end{cases} \\
&\text{with } d \geq 0. \tag{2}
\end{align*}
$$

A *contingent fee contract* is given by

$$
\begin{align*}
&\begin{cases}
  \alpha J, & \text{if the case is won;}
  0, & \text{if the case is lost;}
\end{cases} \\
&\text{with } \alpha \in [0, 1]. \tag{3}
\end{align*}
$$

In what follows we will identify a conditional fee contract by $d$ and a contingent fee contract by $\alpha$.

Under the conditional fee contract $d$ with high lawyer effort $e$ the client’s expected utility is

$$
U(d) = \frac{1}{\sigma} (J - d) = \mu - \frac{d}{\sigma} \tag{4}
$$

and the lawyer’s expected utility per client (the expected return per client) amounts to

$$
V(d) = \frac{d}{\sigma} - e. \tag{5}
$$

If the lawyer picks zero effort, $U(d) = V(d) = 0$.

---

6A conditional fee typically involves an hourly rate and a percentage mark-up over wage costs. Since in our set-up effort/time $e$ is fixed, thus are wage costs times the mark-up and it is thus sufficient to work with $d$. 
Under the contingent fee contract $\alpha$ with high lawyer effort $e$ the client’s expected utility is

$$ U(\alpha) = (1 - \alpha)\mu $$

and the lawyer’s expected utility per client amounts to

$$ V(\alpha) = \alpha\mu - e. $$

With zero effort, $U(\alpha) = V(\alpha) = 0$. Client and lawyer participate as long as $U, V \geq 0$.

The sequencing of events is as follows. In the first stage each lawyer offers one contract: either a conditional fee $d \geq 0$ or a contingent fee contract $\alpha \in [0, 1]$. In the second stage each client chooses either one contract on offer or no contract at all. In the third stage attorneys form their beliefs about the $\mu$ ($\sigma$) of their clientele and pick their effort. Clients maximize the expected difference between adjudicated amount and payments to the lawyer. Attorneys maximize their expected wages minus effort cost.

We focus on symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria of this screening game. Note that both types of contracts are one dimensional. Accordingly, it is not possible for lawyers to screen clients with contingent contracts alone (conditional contracts alone). We can thus expect some pooling in equilibrium. Nevertheless, there is the possibility that in equilibrium a contingent and

---

7 We assume the American rule under which both parties pay their own legal expenses. More generally, let $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ be the fraction of the winner’s legal costs the loser has to pay and let $c$ denote the opponent’s legal expenses. Then the client’s expected utility is $U(\alpha) = \mu(1 - (1 - \lambda)\alpha) - ((\sigma - 1)/\sigma)\lambda c$ and $U(d) = (1/\sigma)(J - (1 - \lambda)d) - ((\sigma - 1)/\sigma)\lambda c$. The lawyer’s expected payoffs are independent of $\lambda$. For $\lambda = 0$ we have the American rule. Under the English rule $\lambda = 1$ and $U(\alpha) = U(d) = \mu - ((\sigma - 1)/\sigma)c$ so that clients are indifferent as to the two fee schedules. If, however, $\lambda < 1$, conditional and contingent fees give rise to different expected payoffs for the client and our results apply. Initially, in the UK the success fee was not payable by the losing party, but was to be the liability of the client. Since 1999 the losing party has to pay the element in the success fee which reflects the risk of the case being lost. If the losing party doesn’t believe the success fee is reasonable, it can challenge it in court. The element in the success fee relating to the postponement of payments to the solicitor remains payable by the client; see Yarrow (2001).

8 In a screening game the uninformed party moves first; in a signaling game the informed party moves first.
a conditional contract are offered simultaneously, each of which attracts a
different set of clients.

3. Equilibria

Let us now describe equilibrium behavior of our game. It turns out that
the equilibria have a neat structure. In scenario \( \mu \) all attorneys offer a
conditional fee and no contingent fee contract. Attorneys provide high effort
under the conditional fee and just break even. Client’s whose \( \mu \) exceeds the
effort cost \( e \) buy the contract. In scenario \( \sigma \) all attorneys offer a contingent
fee and no conditional fee contract. Attorneys provide high effort under the
contingent fee and make zero-profits. All clients buy the contract.

Proposition 1 With asymmetric information about \( \mu \), there exists an equi-
librium where all attorneys offer the conditional fee contract \( d^* = e\sigma \) and no
contingent fee contract. All clients with \( \mu \geq e \) buy the contract. Lawyers
correctly expect \( E(\mu) = \int_{e}^{\infty} \mu dF(\mu) \) and choose high effort.

With asymmetric information about \( \sigma \), there exists an equilibrium where
all attorneys offer the contingent fee contract \( \alpha^* = e/\mu \) and no conditional
fee contract. All clients buy the contract. Lawyers correctly expect \( E(\sigma) = \int_{1}^{\infty} \sigma dG(\sigma) \) and choose high effort.

The intuition for the first result is as follows. Suppose a contingent fee
\( \alpha \) and a conditional fee contract \( d \) are offered simultaneously. Then those
clients whose \( \mu \) is above \( d/\alpha \sigma \) prefer the conditional fee while those clients
with \( \mu \) below \( d/\alpha \sigma \) go for the contingent contract.

The reason for this self-selection of clients is that clients with strong cases
(high \( \mu \)) prefer the conditional fee because they need not share the residual
returns. The payment to the attorney is fixed at \( d \) and the client keeps the
high \( J - d \), which is better than giving the lawyer \( \alpha J \). By contrast, clients
with weak cases (low \( \mu \)) prefer contingency fees because the attorney’s share
\( \alpha J \) is lower than the conditional fee \( d \).

Given this self-selection of clients, suppose now \( d^* \) is offered on the market.
Suppose a lawyer offers a contingent fee contract \( \alpha \). Then this contract only
attracts clients with low \( \mu \); the lawyer thus gets a negative selection of all
cases. The expected returns of this contract do not cover the attorney’s cost
of effort so that he will not offer it in the first place.
The second result rests on the following reasoning. Suppose again a contingent fee $\alpha$ and a conditional fee contract $d$ are simultaneously on the market. Then high risk clients with $\sigma$ above $d/\alpha \mu$ prefer the conditional contract while low risk clients with $\sigma$ below $d/\alpha \mu$ go for the contingent contract.

Here high risk clients prefer the conditional fee because the expected payment to the attorney is decreasing in $\sigma$: the lower the probability to prevail $1/\sigma$, the lower the lawyer’s expected fee $d/\sigma$. If the case is won under conditional fees, the lawyer doesn’t participate in the high $J$; he just gets his fixed conditional fee $d$. The lawyer does, however, participate in the low probability to prevail. By contrast, under contingent fees, the lawyer’s expected share $\alpha \mu$ is independent of $\sigma$. Since the lawyer gets a fraction of the outcome, under contingent fees he is compensated for a low probability to prevail by a high share in case the client wins. Low risk clients prefer contingent fees because for them $\alpha \mu$ is less than $d/\sigma$.

With this self-selection of clients, let $\alpha^*$ be offered on the market. Suppose a lawyer offers a conditional fee contract $d$. Then this contract only attracts high risk clients; the lawyer thus gets a negative selection of all cases. The expected returns of this contract do not cover the attorney’s cost of effort so that he does better not offer it in the first place.

We thus find that in both scenarios only one type of contract is offered in equilibrium: with uncertainty about $\mu$ we observe only conditional fee contracts; with uncertainty about $\sigma$ only contingent fee contracts will be offered.

By giving lawyers the zero effort option, we rule out fixed wages which, in turn, makes both types of contracts one dimensional. Therefore, it is not possible to screen clients with just one of two types of contracts as is the case in Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1993). We thus impose some pooling. Yet, as we have seen in the preceding paragraphs, it is still possible to have some separation of clients if a contingent and a conditional contract are on the market at the same time. Nevertheless, this does not happen in equilibrium. In both scenarios only one contract is offered in equilibrium and no separation takes place.

Note, however, that although clients are lumped together, our pooling equilibria are efficient. Only those clients with cases worthwhile to be taken to court hire an attorney. Moreover, even though our equilibria are of the pooling type, clients with good cases do not subsidize clients with bad cases.
In scenario $\mu$) all clients pay the same expected amount $d^*/\sigma = e$; in scenario $\sigma$) they all pay $\alpha^* \mu = e$.

We have assumed that attorneys as well as clients are risk neutral. This assumption seems reasonable for lawyers who can pool the risks of different cases. It is less convincing for the client who faces the risk of just her case. It may thus make sense to look at risk averse clients. When we take the case of our simple set-up where the client either loses or wins $J$, the results will not change much. Conditional and contingent fees both insure the client by taking income away from her in the case of prevailing. See Bester (1984). The picture changes however when the amount of judgement in case of prevailing varies. Suppose, for example, that when the plaintiff wins, she gets either $J$ or $J^*$ with $J > J^* > 0$. Under contingent fees the attorney bears a fraction $\alpha$ of this judgement risk. Under conditional fees, whatever the size of $d$, the client bears the entire judgement spread $(J^* - J)$. Accordingly, with such a judgement risk contingent fees are a better insurance device than conditional fees. See Emons (2004).

4. Conclusions

In this paper we have compared conditional and contingent fees in a framework where lawyers are not informed about the clients’ cases. If there is asymmetric information about the merits of cases, in equilibrium we will only observe conditional fees. If there is asymmetric information about the risk of cases, only contingent fee contracts are offered in equilibrium. These findings are related to similar results in the literature on adverse selection in credit markets. Contingent and conditional fees give rise to the same payoff structure as do equity finance and a standard debt contract.

If we argue that when a plaintiff retains her lawyer the liability and the amount at stake are unknown, we are in scenario $\sigma$). We then explain the observation that in torts 87% of individual plaintiffs retain their lawyer under contingent fees. By contrast, insurance companies are mostly defendants. When the defendant retains her lawyer, a case is more developed; suppose liability is known and only the amount at stake remains to be determined so that we are in scenario $\mu$). Then we explain the fact that 88% of organizational litigants, typically insurance companies, use hourly or flat fees, often with a bonus for performance, i.e., conditional fees.
Acknowledgements

I thank Helmut Bester, Nuno Garoupa, Alon Klement, Bert Kritzer, Gerd Mühlheusser, Zvika Neeman, Mitch Polinsky, and two referees for helpful comments. The hospitality of the department of economics at Purdue University is gratefully acknowledged.

References

Bester, H. (1984) Screening versus Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information, Discussion Paper No. 136, University of Bonn.
Bester, H. (1985) Screening versus Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information, American Economic Review, 75, 850-55.
Dana, J. and Spier, K. (1993) Expertise and Contingent Fees: the Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 9, 349-67.
Danzon, P. (1983) Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation, Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 213-24.
De Meza, D. and Webb, D. (1987) Too much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 281-92.
Emons, W. (2000) Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Insufficient Attorney Effort, International Review of Law and Economics, 20, 21-33.
Emons, W. (2004) Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees, Discussion Paper 04-19, University of Bern, www-vwi.unibe.ch/theory/papers/emons/lcf.pdf.
Emons, W. and Garoupa, D. (2005) The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees, Managerial and Decision Economics, forthcoming.
Fenn, P. (2002) The Impact of Conditional Fees on the Outcome of Personal Injury Cases, Journal of Insurance Research and Practice, 17, 43-48.
Gray, A., Rickman N., and Fenn, P. (1999) Professional Autonomy and the Cost of Legal Aid, Oxford Economic Papers, 51, 545-58.
Gravelle, H. and Waterson, M. (1993) No Win, No Fee: Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees, Economic Journal, 420, 1205-220.
Halpern, P. J. and Turnbull, S. (1983) Legal Fees Contracts and Alternative Cost Rules: An Economic Analysis, International Review of Law and Economics, 3, 3-26.
Hellmann T. and Stiglitz, J. (2000) Credit and Equity Rationing in Markets with Adverse Selection, European Economic Review, 44, 281-304.
Klement, A. and Neeman, Z. (2004) Incentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers, *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 20, 102-24.

Kirstein, R. and Rickman, N. (2004) Third Party Contingency Contracts in Settlements and Litigation, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 160, 555-75.

Kritzer, H. (1990) *The Justice Broker: Lawyers and Ordinary Litigation*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Kritzer, H. (2004) *Risks, Reputations, and Rewards*, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto.

Lynk, W. J. (1990) The Courts and the Market: An Economic Analysis of Contingent Fees in Class-Action Litigation, *Journal of Legal Studies*, 19, 247-60.

Maclean, M. and Rickman, N. (1999) No House, No Fee: Conditional Fees in Family Cases, *Family Law*, 29, 245-48.

Polinsky, A. M. and Rubinfeld, D. (2003) Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients, *American Law and Economics Review*, 5, 165-88.

Posner, R. (1986) *Economic Analysis of Law*, Little Brown, Boston.

Rickman, N. (1994) The Economics of Contingency Fees in Personal Injury Litigation, *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 10, 34-50.

Rickman, N., Fenn, P., and Gray, A. (1999) The Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales, *Fiscal Studies*, 20, 261-86.

Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. (1970) Increasing Risk I: A definition, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 2, 225-43.

Rubinfeld, D. and Scotchmer, S. (1993) Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Economic Analysis, *Rand Journal of Economics*, 24, 343-56.

Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. (1981) Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, *American Economic Review*, 71, 393-410.

Yarrow, S. (2001) Conditional Fees, *Hume Papers on Public Policy*, 8, 1-10.

Appendix

1. Proof of Proposition 1

1.1. Scenario $\mu$)

To solve the game, let us start with the attorneys’ effort choice in stage 3. Denote a lawyer’s expectation about the $\mu$ of his clientele by $E(\mu)$. Under the contingent fee $\alpha$ he chooses positive effort if $\alpha E(\mu) \geq e$; under the conditional fee $d$ he picks high effort if $d / \sigma \geq e$. 

15
Let us now turn to the second stage. Let there be one type of conditional fee contract \( d \) and one type of contingent fee contract \( \alpha \) on the market. If \( \alpha < e/E(\mu) \) consumers do not buy the contingent contract \( \alpha \) because the attorney will go for zero effort in stage 3. Similarly, if \( d < e/\sigma \) consumers do not buy the conditional contract \( d \).

Next consider the case where \( \alpha < e/E(\mu) \) and \( d \geq e/E(1/\sigma) \). Then \( \alpha \) has no customers and clients with \( \mu \geq d/E(1/\sigma) \) buy \( d \), which is either everybody or nobody. If \( \alpha \geq e/\mu \) and \( d < e/E(1/\sigma) \), \( d \) has no customers and everybody buys \( \alpha \).
Consider now the case $\alpha \geq e/\mu$ and $d \geq e/E(1/\sigma)$ so that both contracts induce high effort in stage 3. Clients with $\sigma \geq d/\alpha \mu$ prefer the conditional contract $d$ and clients with $\sigma < d/\alpha \mu$ prefer the contingent fee contract $\alpha$. This follows since $U(d) \geq U(\alpha) \iff \sigma \geq d/\alpha \mu$. Furthermore, $U(d) \geq 0 \forall \sigma \geq d/\alpha \mu$. For the conditional contract $d$, $E(\sigma) = \int_{d/\alpha \mu}^{\infty} \sigma dG(\sigma)$.

Let us now turn to the first stage. All attorneys will offer the contingent fee contract $\alpha^* = e/\mu$. With this contract the return per client under high effort $e$ is $V(\alpha^*) = \alpha^* \mu - e = 0$ so that the lawyer goes for high effort.

If an attorney unilaterally deviates to $\alpha \geq \alpha^*$, he loses all his customers. If he deviates to $\alpha < \alpha^*$, he loses all clients because this deviation induces zero effort. Accordingly, a deviation to another contingent fee contract is not profitable.

Next suppose an attorney deviates to a conditional fee $d$. If the contingent fee contract induces zero effort, it will not attract clients. Therefore, suppose the conditional fee implements high effort $e$. Then we know from our analysis of stage 2 that all customers with $\sigma > d/\alpha \mu$ prefer the conditional fee $d$, i.e., $U(\alpha^*) = (1 - \alpha^*) \mu < \mu - d/\sigma = U(d)$. But this implies $d/\sigma < \alpha^* \mu = e$, so that the lawyer will not pick high effort. Consequently, a deviation to a conditional fee contract is not profitable.

Q.E.D.