Risk Ranked Recall: Collision Safety Metric for Object Detection Systems in Autonomous Vehicles

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Abstract—Commonly used metrics for evaluation of object detection systems (precision, recall, mAP) do not give complete information about their suitability of use in safety critical tasks, like obstacle detection for collision avoidance in Autonomous Vehicles (AV). This work introduces the Risk Ranked Recall (R³) metrics for object detection systems. The R³ metrics categorize objects within three ranks. Ranks are assigned based on an objective cyber-physical model for the risk of collision. Recall is measured for each rank.

Index Terms—Autonomous CPS, Dependable CPS, Safety

I. INTRODUCTION

Obstacle detection is a safety critical perception requirement for AV. In recent times, there have been great improvements in deep learning based solutions for object detection. A result and catalyst of this phenomenal progress have been the real world datasets [1]–[3] used for development and evaluation of object detection systems. While plenty of AV datasets have been released, the metrics used with these datasets have not been tailored to the autonomous driving application. The commonly used metrics for evaluating object detection systems are precision and recall [4]. While these metrics work well for general applications, there remains a need for safety aware object detection metrics [5], [6]. To understand this need, let’s first consider the two basic metrics, Precision and Recall, used to evaluate the efficacy of an object detection system and apply them to a driving scenario.

\[
\text{Precision} = \frac{\text{True Positives}}{\text{True Positives} + \text{False Positives}} \tag{1}
\]

\[
\text{Recall} = \frac{\text{True Positives}}{\text{True Positives} + \text{False Negatives}} \tag{2}
\]

Figure 1 shows a front view image from the ego vehicle\(^1\) annotated with bounding boxes around all other visible vehicles. If an object detection system correctly detects exactly 2 (TP = 2) out of the 4 (FN = 2) objects in this image the Recall (Eq. 2) for this result is 0.5. This Recall value is independent of which 2 vehicles of the 4 were correctly detected. Intuitively, it is evident that at this time instance, being able to detect the car right in front and the truck coming down the opposite direction is far more important than the two cars further down. The ego vehicle, controlled by a human or autonomous agent, could end up in an unsafe situation quickly if the nearer car or truck are not detected. At this moment being unable to detect the two cars further away poses little to no risk.

This work introduces the R³ metrics, a risk aware version of Recall. The risk rankings are based on the risk of collision (§IV). Recall is measured for each rank separately.

- \(R³₁\): Recall for objects that pose an imminent risk of collision (§IV-A).
- \(R³₂\): Recall for objects that can potentially collide with the ego vehicle (§IV-B).
- \(R³₃\): All other objects in the environment.

By measuring the \(R³\) values separately, the metrics decouple and emphasise fulfillment of safety requirements. This work describes the safety aware Risk Ranked Recall metrics. Tools and examples from this work will be made available\(^2\).

II. RELATED WORK

To the best of our knowledge there are no existing safety aware metrics for object detection based on an objective model. Datasets like KITTI [2] and Waymo Open Dataset [3] employ a notion of difficulty. However, difficulty is based on how difficult it is to detect objects, based on their size, truncation, occlusion or judgement of the groundtruth annotator. There is no consideration for the importance of detecting that object for continued safe operation of the ego vehicle.

Ohn-Bar and Trivedi’s object importance for driving is the closest related work [6]. They pioneered the notion of object importance in object detection. They asked human drivers to annotate the importance of objects in driving scenes and used the annotations to showcase the advantages of importance.

\(^1\)Ego vehicle is the commonly used term for the first person vehicle.

\(^2\)https://gitlab.engr.illinois.edu/rtesl/risk-ranked-recall

Fig. 1. A front view scene from BDD100K dataset with 4 labeled vehicles. Intuitively, the closer vehicles are more important to detect than those farther away. However existing metrics do not consider such a notion of importance. \(R³\) metrics fill that gap and provide risk or importance aware information about behavior of object detection systems.
Fig. 2. Consider two actors in the environment, close together. For safety it is sufficient to predict that an obstacle exists within a boundary that encompasses both actors. However, for this prediction (red), for each actor (green), IoU < 0.5 i.e. this detection would be considered a False Positive if match were to be determined by IoU. Hence IoG is a better method of determining true positives for this use case.

guided Deep Neural Network (DNN) training. There are key differences between their work and ours, primarily due to the differences in intended use. Their notion of importance is based upon what human drivers consider important while we focus on what obstacles can physically pose a risk of collision. For safety an approximate notion of importance is not reliable, thus we use an objective model \( \text{IV} \) for risk.

Neural networks to calculate the threat or risk of different scenes have also been explored \([7], [8]\). The main feature is that these DNN can estimate the risk of a situation based on visual input. They could hence be used for online threat assessment to aid path planning. However, the approximate nature of these methods makes them unsuitable for our use case. They are also currently limited to predict the risk posed by a scene and not individual objects.

An alternate approach exists to the objective model proposed in this work for assigning risk ranks to objects. Objects can be prioritized by measuring the impact of an object on planning decisions \([9]\). While the technique works well for real time agent prioritization, we argue that the model proposed in this work is superior for safety critical evaluations. First, it does not include any potential bias from specific planning algorithms. And second, our model considers only safety requirements \(i.e.\) collision avoidance while the planner based simulations can implicitly conflate mission requirements with safety requirements.

III. DESIGN CHOICES

Before presenting the risk model, we first lay out the design choices and corresponding reasoning.

**Time Horizon:** The analysis need to be time limited because given infinite time any two independent objects can have the potential to collide. Emergency stop is considered an acceptable given infinite time any two independent objects can have the potential to collide. Emergency stop is considered an acceptable given infinite time any two independent objects can have the potential to collide. Emergency stop is considered an acceptable given infinite time any two independent objects can have the potential to collide. Emergency stop is considered an acceptable given infinite time any two independent objects can have the potential to collide. Emergency stop is considered an acceptable given infinite time any two independent objects can have the potential to collide. Hence \( R^3 \) metrics do not consider object class when determining True Positives. We do not wish to convey that classification does not have any significance. Object classes are important to determine for many path planning tasks in an AV, however purely for obstacle detection, classification is not a requirement. However, ground truth labels can still be filtered to limit the analysis to certain classes only. In Section \( V \) Pedestrians, Cycles, Vehicles and Road Signs are considered.

**Type of Object Detection System:** In this work we heavily focus on using \( R^3 \) for the evaluation of vision-based object detection DNN but the metrics can be utilized to evaluate any system which ultimately detects the existence and location of objects around a vehicle.

The design choices above stem from the focus on collision avoidance. \( R^3 \) cannot be used in isolation to fully compare object detection systems. For example, Precision (Eq. \( 1 \)) is an important metric for the performance of the object detection system. An object detection system with high \( R^3 \) but low precision may see obstacles where none exist, this could severely limit the driving performance of the vehicle even making it impossible to drive, however, it is still safe. \( R^3 \) does not aim to replace the existing metrics rather adds additional information emphasising safety.

IV. RISK RANKING

The category of collision risk is determined by using ego vehicle and object state. The metrics are meant to be used with autonomous driving datasets. Each input frame of the dataset is analyzed independently with the time instance of the current frame as \( t = 0 \). \( x_e(t), x_o(t) \) are the position vectors of the center of the ego vehicle and object at a time \( t \) respectively. Similarly, \( v_e(t) \) and \( v_o(t) \) are the velocity vectors and \( \theta_e(t) \) and \( \theta_o(t) \) are the headings at time \( t \). The maximum possible acceleration or deceleration magnitude \( a_{max} = 7.5 \text{ m/s}^2 \) is used in rest of this work, as prescribed by prior works in literature \([11], [12]\).

\( l_{comp} \) is the compute latency from the sensor input to the actuation command. The latency is a property of the autonomous driving hardware and software. Using the sample rate of the Waymo Open Dataset we use \( l_{comp} = 100 \text{ms} \) in Section \( V \).

\( TTS \) is the time to stop for the ego vehicle from the frame input to a complete stop assuming the actuation decision was made to emergency brake. The time interval for the potential collision analysis is hence \([0, TTS]\) repeated in discrete time steps \( \Delta t \). A small \( \Delta t \) value approximates continuous analysis.

\[
TTS = \frac{|v_o(0)| + a_{max} \cdot l_{comp}}{a_{max}} + l_{comp}
\]
\(d_{\text{crit}}\) is the maximum distance between the centers of the ego vehicle and the object, such that their surfaces touch at least one point without causing any deformation of the surface. All possible rotations of the vehicles are considered in determining \(d_{\text{crit}}\), adhering to the principle of considering worst case possibilities.

A. Imminent Collision

To determine risk of imminent collision, i.e. a collision that will happen if no action is taken by the ego vehicle or the object, the trajectories of both are generated within the time horizon assuming constant velocity vectors and heading. At each time instance it is checked whether the two can collide.

\[
\min_{\Delta t} \left\{ d_{\text{crit}} \right\} = \min_{\Delta t} \left\{ \frac{1}{2} a^{\text{max}} \Delta t^2 \right\}
\]

and Recall values for different networks and input image resolutions (320 pixels, 416 pixels, 608 pixels).

**Discussion:** Collision risk and detection difficulty correlate with distance between the ego vehicle and the object. Farther objects pose lower risk of collision ([IV]). Similar correlation was observed in importance annotations by human drivers [8]. Farther objects are smaller and hence more difficult to detect in images, as also assumed in KITTI 2D object detection difficulty categories. Hence in Figure 5 we see that \(R^3\) metrics and recall show different offsets but the same trend through varying confidence limits. Despite this apparent limitation, \(R^3\) metrics emphasise safety critical False Negatives.

From Fig. 5 we also note that for varying resolutions of input images, Recall values see a larger difference than \(R^3\). Smaller input sizes also come with lower computational load and latency e.g. YOLOv3-320 has only 28% flops and 44% latency of YOLOv3-608 as demonstrated by Redmon and Farhadi [13]. This motivates the addition of low input resolution DNN to AV safety critical perception pipeline similar to mixed frequency networks proposed by Tesla Inc. [19].

VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this work \(R^3\) metrics for object detection in autonomous vehicles are presented. The usage examples for \(R^3\) show the difference in information provided by the new metrics. Further work is required to establish the efficacy of the metric in influencing design decisions for perception systems for AV including sensor fusion and tracking. Another direction requiring further exploration is utilizing the metrics for redesigning the loss functions for training object detection DNN. This is non trivial as the loss function must also consider precision and recall. Finally, synthetic datasets that incorporate unsafe situations need to be incorporated. While this paper presents the first step i.e. the metric formulation, with the above addressed the metrics can truly serve object detection researchers by providing valuable information about the performance of their solutions in safety critical applications.
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