InviCloak: An End-to-End Approach to Privacy and Performance in Web Content Distribution

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ABSTRACT
In today’s web ecosystem, a website that uses a Content Delivery Network (CDN) shares its Transport Layer Security (TLS) private key or session key with the CDN. In this paper, we present the design and implementation of InviCloak, a system that protects the confidentiality and integrity of a user and a website’s private communications without changing TLS or upgrading a CDN. InviCloak builds a lightweight but secure and practical key distribution mechanism using the existing DNS infrastructure to distribute a new public key associated with a website’s domain name. A web client and a website can use the new key pair to build an encryption channel inside TLS. InviCloak accommodates the current web ecosystem. A website can deploy InviCloak unilaterally without a client’s involvement to prevent a passive attacker inside a CDN from eavesdropping on their communications. If a client also installs InviCloak’s browser extension, the client and the website can achieve end-to-end confidential and untampered communications in the presence of an active attacker inside a CDN. Our evaluation shows that InviCloak increases the median page load times (PLTs) of realistic web pages from 2.0s to 2.1s, which is smaller than the median PLTs (2.8s) of a state-of-the-art TEE-based solution.

1 INTRODUCTION
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) play an important role in the web ecosystem. They not only speed up web content distribution but also protect a website from a wide range of attacks. For example, CDNs such as Akamai [66], Cloudflare [17], and CloudFront [15] offer Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack mitigation and malicious content scrubbing services [21, 47].

Unfortunately, as more and more websites migrate to 100% HTTPS [7], a third-party CDN introduces undesirable security ramifications. It is a common practice for a website to share its Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificate’s private key with a CDN to fully take advantage of a CDN’s performance and security benefits. A measurement conducted by Cangialosi et al. in 2016 shows that 76.5% of organizations share their private keys with a third-party hosting provider, and for popular websites, they mainly share their keys with CDN providers [33].

This key-sharing practice breaks the end-to-end security guarantees offered by TLS/HTTPS, posing potential security risks. A CDN, as an organization, may suffer from an insider attack or exploitable security vulnerabilities. Since a CDN typically serves many websites, a compromised CDN may leak the private credentials of many web services, becoming a central point of failure. As an example, web cache deception attacks [45, 63] exploit a CDN’s configuration vulnerability. Researchers have shown that an attacker can deceive a CDN into caching and exposing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) such as names and phone numbers [63].

The security risk of this current practice has prompted multiple solutions. Each has made trade-offs among adoptability, security, and performance. Cloudflare’s Keyless SSL [78] and certificate delegation [60] do not expose a website’s TLS private key to a CDN, but still allow a CDN to possess the TLS session key - this allows an attacker inside a CDN to continue to observe and modify the content inside a TLS session. Other solutions such as mcTLS and maTLS [32, 37, 65] modify the TLS protocol to include middleboxes in a TLS handshake. Although technically sound, these solutions require coordinated efforts from clients, middleboxes, and websites to upgrade their TLS implementations.

Alternatively, a website could obtain two TLS certificates for two different domains (e.g., site.com and site-cdn.com): one for privacy-sensitive content hosted by itself and the other for content hosted by a CDN, similar to [46]. The website shares the CDN-related TLS certificate’s private key with its CDN and keeps the other one private. We refer to this proposal as the two-domain solution. A main drawback of the two-domain solution is that it does not protect against active attacks when a website uses a CDN to distribute its base HTML file, which is the first file a user downloads when she visits a web page. For performance reasons, a website desires to distribute its base HTML file via a CDN [84] (§ 2.1), but an active attacker inside the CDN could modify this file and hijack the subsequent private TLS sessions. Moreover, the two-domain solution prevents a CDN from caching any private content, even in encrypted form, as a website will send it via a separate TLS session. This design reduces the performance benefit of a CDN.

In a different direction, researchers have proposed to use Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) [28, 37] to prevent distrusted CDN
code from accessing a shared TLS private key [26, 83] or a TLS session key [50]. These solutions offer desirable security guarantees without any deployment effort on the user side. However, they face both deployment and performance challenges for CDNs. Because of costly system calls inside an enclave, the current TEE hardware may slow down a CDN edge server’s throughput by two to four times [50]. In addition, these solutions require CDNs to upgrade the hardware of their infrastructure. The financial cost of upgrading a CDN’s infrastructure to support a TEE-based solution can exceed more than 100 million dollars per our analysis (§ 6.6). Furthermore, the future of current TEE-based solutions is uncertain, since Intel has announced that the Intel TEE, called Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [37] is deprecated in the 12th generation of Intel CPUs [9].

Each of the existing proposals has its own security, performance, and deployment cost trade-offs. In this work, we aim to explore a solution with different cost and benefit trade-offs for the market to choose from. The solution, InviCloak, takes an end-to-end approach. It accommodates the current key-sharing practice and separates content serving authorization from confidentiality. A website uses the shared TLS key to authorize a CDN to serve its non-privacy-sensitive content. It then uses a new pair of private/public keys that it does not share with a CDN to protect privacy-sensitive content. InviCloak protects against active attacks and does not increase the traffic sent to an origin server.

A main design challenge InviCloak faces is how to balance the security benefit it brings with its deployment and performance cost. To address this challenge, we design InviCloak to use the existing DNSSEC [50] and DNS-over-HTTPS [51] (DoH) infrastructure to distribute a website’s new public key, thereby obviating the need for the website to obtain a new TLS certificate for a new domain name. For ease of deployment, InviCloak embeds an end-to-end encryption tunnel inside the existing TLS sessions between a web client and a website’s origin server to transmit private data, such as a user’s login password. This design obviates the need for modifying TLS, a CDN, a web server, or web resources.

As a result, InviCloak has several deployment advantages over existing proposals. It does not change the underlying TLS protocol and is completely transparent to a CDN. CDNs need not upgrade their infrastructure. Furthermore, it does not modify existing web server implementations, and web developers need not change existing web resources or manage new domain names and certificates. A website can unilaterally deploy InviCloak as a JavaScript library to defeat a passive eavesdropper without any user-side operations. If a user installs InviCloak’s browser extension, she can detect and prevent an active attacker from tampering or eavesdropping on her private communications with a website.

As performance is critical to web applications, the encryption-in-encryption design of InviCloak is easy to be dismissed due to its overhead. We implemented a prototype, micro-benchmarked InviCloak’s operations, and measured how it affects the page load times (PLTs) of web pages. On our testbed, InviCloak introduces less than 100 ms delay to median PLTs. This overhead is about 700 ms lower than a state-of-the-art TEE-based solution [50]. If the overhead becomes a concern, we can modify browser implementations to eliminate the inner-layer encryption at the cost of an increased deployment hurdle.

This work makes the following key contributions:

- The design of InviCloak, which protects users’ private data from a compromised CDN while keeping the CDN functioning as a DDoS shield for a website.
- A prototype implementation that is immediately deployable within the current web ecosystem. Our evaluation shows that it introduces acceptable overhead to web content distribution.
- We analyze the deployment efforts of InviCloak and compare it with related work. We show that InviCloak’s deployment requires no modifications of a CDN, TLS, OSes, or a web server. Neither does it require a new domain name nor a new TLS certificate.

Ethical concern: This work does not raise any ethical concerns.

2 DESIGN RATIONALE

2.1 Motivation

We have conducted a measurement study on Alexa top-100 websites [14] to understand how websites that use third-party CDNs protect their privacy-sensitive data such as user login passwords.

We refer to methodologies in existing research [33, 53, 55, 59] to discover the CDN usage of a website and determine the organization to which a website belongs. If a website’s organization is not the same as the CDN provider, we conclude that the website uses a third-party CDN. The result shows that 67 of top-100 websites employ third-party CDNs, and 54 of them use the CDNs to deliver the homepages’ base HTML files. For all these 54 websites, an active attacker inside a CDN could modify those pages even if they employ the two-domain solution as described in § 1.

We further examined the login procedure of these websites to investigate their strategies for sensitive data transmission. Of the 67 CDN-enabled websites, 7 of them do not use password logins, and 25 of them expose their login servers’ IP addresses in the login procedure, while 35 of them send users’ passwords through CDNs. This result suggests that not all websites trust the CDNs they use, as indicated by the 25 websites which bypass CDNs for user logins. However, exposing the IP address of a website’s login server makes the website vulnerable to DDoS attacks. For those websites that expose their users’ passwords to CDNs, they risk leaking users’ sensitive and private data to the CDNs.

The above observations motivate us to design a solution that is both conceptually simple and secure.

2.2 CDN Service Model

For clarity, we describe a service model between a website and its CDN service provider. We use this model to design InviCloak. Specifically, we categorize the content served by a website into CDN-visible content and private content. We regard private content as the content that belongs to a registered user of a website and should only be accessible to an authenticated user. For example, a user must log in to check her bank account balance. If some content is cached by a CDN or is not private to a user, we consider it CDN-visible. For example, static content cached by CDN servers or behind a paywall, such as videos available from a subscription service, is CDN-visible.

The source code is accessible at https://github.com/SHiH0Lin/CS2022-InviCloak.
Due to privacy concerns, a website does not share its private databases with a CDN. It uses a CDN to cache and serve its CDN-visible content, but a user will send/retrieve private content directly to/from a website’s origin server [25]. Furthermore, we assume it is desirable for a website to cache some private content such as private user photos on CDNs for performance acceleration. Thus, InviCloak’s design also supports such use cases while keeping the private content secret to CDNs. We note that InviCloak does not change the existing CDN service model so it will not increase the traffic volume sent to a website’s origin server. A website that does not serve any private content is outside the scope of this work and does not need to deploy InviCloak.

In this paper, we refer to a server hosted by a website as an “origin server”, which is the initial source of all content of the website. The term “user” always denotes the user of a website instead of a CDN. When we use the term “client”, it refers to the endpoint (a browser or a computer) that a user uses. Finally, an “attacker” refers to any malicious entity.

2.3 Threat Model
We assume that not all CDN customers completely trust their CDNs. These customers would like to benefit from CDN’s caching and DDoS protection services without exposing private content to CDNs. We assume a compromised CDN may launch two types of attacks with different risk factors.

Passive Attacks: A CDN may have a software or configuration vulnerability that results in unintended information leak, such as the web cache deception attack [45, 63]. Or a curious eavesdropper inside the CDN may log the plaintext data after a CDN’s edge server decrypts the TLS session data it receives. We model this type of vulnerability as passive attacks that eavesdrop on private communications between a web client and a website’s origin server.

Active Attacks: A CDN may have a compromised insider that gains access to its customer websites’ TLS private keys, or there is a software bug inside the CDN that allows an attacker to inject malicious code. We model this threat as active attacks that can eavesdrop, tamper, or leak any message it receives.

2.4 Trust Assumptions
We make the following trust assumptions.

No colluding attackers between DNS and CDNs: We assume that an adversary is not powerful enough to penetrate both a website’s CDN provider and its DNS provider. In other words, even if there exists an attacker in a website’s DNS provider and one in its CDN provider, we assume the two adversaries are independent of each other and cannot collude with each other.

InviCloak cannot defeat a powerful attacker that compromises both a website’s DNS and CDN providers since its design uses DNS to distribute a new public key. Thus, if a web service is concerned with colluding DNS and CDN attackers, it can choose to separate its CDN provider from its DNS provider. In practice, all major CDNs we survey, including Akamai, CloudFront, Google Cloud, Azure, and Fastly, allow users to use separate DNS providers. Cloudflare, by default, requires its customers to use their DNS service to host the customers’ domain names, but it also allows customers to switch to other DNS providers [35].

We conducted a measurement study on Alexa top-10K websites to validate this assumption. We first used the existing methods [33, 53, 55, 59] to discover the third-party CDN usage of the websites. Moreover, we used dig [36] to obtain the nameservers of each CDN-enabled domain in a website, and we obtained the domain registrars from the WHOIS service [39]. A website may own multiple domains. If the nameserver of a domain does not belong to the website’s CDN provider, we regard that the website separates the DNS provider from the CDN provider. Besides, if the domain registrar is not the CDN provider, we regard that the website separates the domain registrar from the CDN provider.

Among the top-10K websites, 4867 of them use a third-party CDN provider. We find that 2765 of the 4867 (57%) websites already separated their DNS providers from their CDN providers. Moreover, among those 2102 (43%) websites that do not have the separation, 1668 of them separate their domain registrars from CDNs. These 1668 websites can separate their DNS providers from their CDNs by transferring their DNS providers to their domain registrars without financial cost.

Bootstrapping security: We assume users or websites can obtain their OSes, browsers, and InviCloak-related modules or extensions securely without involving a compromised CDN.

Trusted Computing Base (TCB): We consider the implementations of the browsers, websites, OSes, and hardware of the clients and origin servers as our TCB. Specifically, we trust the implementation of a website that would deploy InviCloak, including its web pages (HTML, JavaScript, CSS) and all other system components it uses such as databases and the service backend. Admittedly, an attacker may exploit the vulnerabilities in a website or a client’s browser to launch attacks such as SQL injection [49] and cross-site scripting (XSS) [85]. We consider preventing such attacks outside the scope of this work.

Hardness of cryptography: We assume attackers cannot overcome the hardness of a cryptographic algorithm. For example, they cannot decrypt ciphertext without the cryptographic key, and they cannot falsify a digital signature without the private key.

2.5 Design Goals
Our design goals are multi-fold, including privacy and confidentiality, usability, low deployment cost, and performance. These goals set our work apart from related work.

Privacy and confidentiality: Our foremost goal is privacy and confidentiality. We aim to protect private content transmitted between users and websites from leaking to third-party CDNs. Our design should resist both active and passive attacks from a compromised CDN.

Usability: An important design goal of InviCloak is to comply with the current usability model of the web. We require that a website need not obtain a new domain name nor negotiate a new type of service with its CDN provider. Besides, a website should not change the domain names displayed to its users, otherwise it may cause brand name confusion and phishing vulnerabilities.

Low deployment cost: We hypothesize that if a security feature is financially costly and requires coordinated upgrades from multiple stakeholders, then it is difficult to deploy that feature in practice. Thus, we aim for low financial cost of deploying InviCloak.
Because DNSSEC, as the primary security service for the Internet, provides integrity and authenticity of DNS data, it is essential to maintain its integrity on the network. However, DNSSEC is not feasible because DNS servers need not be modified. Instead, we use DNSSEC to distribute a website's new public key to ease key management. The main design challenge we face is to achieve InviCloak's security benefits such as DDoS mitigation.

3 DESIGN

3.1 Architecture

The main design challenge we face is to achieve InviCloak's security goals without sacrificing usability, deployability, or performance. We make a few design decisions to address this challenge. First, we use the DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) [41] to distribute a website's new public key to ease key management. Second, we design InviCloak's main client component to be a JavaScript library so a website can distribute it via CDN. Third, we design that a website and users can deploy without CDN support. Last, we use a reverse server proxy to serve InviCloak's server-side functions, so web servers need not be modified.

Figure 1 depicts the overall architecture of InviCloak, its key components, and their locations. InviCloak introduces three new components: a client proxy running in a web browser, an integrity verifier introduced as a browser extension, and a server proxy running as a reverse proxy in front of a website's origin server. The integrity verifier works for all InviCloak-enabled websites, while the client proxy is a JavaScript library that includes per-website-specific configurations. A website embeds the client proxy in its landing page, and the integrity verifier will be distributed via a browser-vendor-approved mechanism such as the extension market. We note that in the case of passive attacks, the integrity verifier is unnecessary. InviCloak uses the DNS infrastructure to distribute a public key of a website for establishing an encryption channel between a browser and the website's origin server. Its design is completely transparent to a CDN.

We assume she is a security-conscious user and has installed InviCloak's integrity verifier in her web browser. First, Alice's browser fetches the landing page bank.com/login.html from bank.com's CDN provider. This page will automatically download bank.com's client proxy code (JavaScript). This download will trigger the integrity verifier to send a DNS-over-HTTPS query to a DNSSEC-enabled resolver to obtain the public key of bank.com. The public key will be cached in the extension's storage for reuse. The integrity verifier validates the client proxy and installs it in the browser.

After Alice fills in her username and password for her bank account, she clicks the submit button. This action triggers the client proxy to encrypt the request, as the submission URL is listed as one that contains private information and needs encryption in the client proxy's configuration file. Since the client proxy and the integrity verifier run as separate processes, the client proxy launches its own DNS query to obtain bank.com's public key. It caches the public key in the browser's cache storage for reuse. The client proxy then invokes a key exchange process with the server proxy and generates a symmetric session key to encrypt the request that contains Alice's login credentials.

The encrypted request is forwarded to bank.com's CDN and then to its origin server. Because the request is encrypted end-to-end between the client proxy and the server proxy, any on-path adversary inside the CDN cannot peek inside and acquire Alice's login credentials. Similarly, the server proxy encrypts the private content in bank.com's responses to Alice.

Next, we describe each of InviCloak's components and how they interact with each other.

3.2 Key Distribution & Management

A website's new public key is the root of trust in the InviCloak design. InviCloak uses the existing DNS infrastructure to distribute the new public key. A website stores its new public key in a TLSA record, following the specification of DANE [52]. Since a website will not change its public key frequently, it can set a long Time-to-Live (TTL) value for the TLSA record, e.g., on the order of hours, to reduce the query load on DNS.

A website should use DNSSEC [30] to protect the integrity of the TLSA record. Without DNSSEC, an on-path active adversary may tamper with the public key distributed in the TLSA record,
compromising InviCloak’s security. According to a measurement study in 2019 [74], 15 out of 20 most-used domain registrars support DNSSEC and all top-level domains such as .com and .org are DNSSEC-enabled [72]. Hence, a website that desires to protect its users’ privacy can find a suitable domain name registrar or DNS provider that supports DNSSEC.

Despite an increasing number of DNSSEC-enabled domain registrars [74], a client’s default DNS resolver may not be DNSSEC-enabled. Therefore, in InviCloak, the client proxy and the integrity verifier will send a query for the public key in DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [51] to a DNSSEC-enabled resolver, as shown in Figure 1. Currently, all mainstream browsers can launch DoH requests, as they are essentially HTTPS requests. A website can specify a trusted DNS resolver that supports DNSSEC in its client proxy. InviCloak refers to TLS Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) for distributing public keys by DNS [71]. InviCloak optimizes ECH by adopting DoH to ensure that a DNSSEC-enabled resolver is used even when the client’s default resolver does not support DNSSEC.

We note that such a key distribution mechanism will not heavily increase the load of the DNS infrastructure nor introduce DDoS vulnerabilities because the request for the public key is a one-time cost. InviCloak caches a website’s public key in the browser and does not request for the public key until the user clears the cache.

InviCloak stores a public key instead of a certificate in the TLSA record for two reasons. First, certificate verification requires a client proxy to access the trusted root certificates of the client’s OS or browser. Currently, JavaScript code in a browser cannot access those certificates. Supporting this design requires modifications to browser implementations. Second, a website can publish or revoke the public key independently and efficiently. It does not communicate with Certificate Authorities (CAs) for new certificate application or potential revocation, which may be costly and time-consuming [60]. Our design simplifies a website’s key management.

There are two alternative ways to key distribution. One is to piggyback a website’s public key on an HTML file delivered to the client. However, this approach only works in the presence of a passive adversary, since an active adversary in a CDN may replace the public key in the HTML file. Another approach is for the client to bypass a CDN and fetch the public key from the origin server directly, but it exposes the origin server to DDoS attacks.

3.3 The Client Proxy

In InviCloak’s design, the client proxy is a JavaScript library that runs inside a web browser. A web service that desires to deploy InviCloak distributes this proxy to its users via a landing page (e.g., login.html or homepage). We design the client proxy to take a configuration file as an input so that each website only needs to configure the file to deploy InviCloak and does not need to develop new JavaScript code. The client proxy is in charge of 1) querying DNS to download the web service’s new public key, 2) establishing an encryption channel with the origin server, 3) encrypting a user’s private requests sent to the server, and 4) decrypting the server’s responses that include private content.

A website customizes a configuration file (configure.js) in the client proxy to include the URLs of private content and the handshake API. A client proxy uses the handshake URL to establish an encryption channel with a server proxy. A website can specify the set of private request URLs using regular expressions to reduce the configuration overhead and the size of the configuration file. An example of configure.js is shown in the extended version of this paper [62]. We evaluate the configuration effort in § 6.5.

The main difference between InviCloak’s client proxy and the usual JavaScript code is that the client proxy is a Service Worker [76], which runs in the background of a browser and works across different web pages from the same domain. A CDN-visible landing page installs the proxy by registering it with the browser in the HTML, and the browser caches it subsequently. When the browser navigates to a private web page in the same domain, the client proxy does not need to be installed again.

3.4 The Server Proxy

We design the server proxy to be an add-on module to a web server such as NGINX [69]. A website need not modify its web server’s implementation to deploy InviCloak. The website lists the URLs of private content in the server proxy’s configuration file (nginx.conf), similar to how it configures the client proxy. An example of nginx.conf is shown in [62]. The server proxy is in charge of 1) establishing an encryption channel with a client proxy, 2) decrypting requests encrypted by the client proxy, and 3) encrypting private content returned to the client.

3.5 Establishing the Encryption Channel

We now describe how a client proxy establishes an encryption channel with a server proxy. The client proxy will first send a DoH query to obtain the TLSA record that stores a website’s new public key. Then it will establish a secret session key with the server proxy for encryption and decryption. Our key exchange protocol is based on TLS 1.3 [70], as TLS security has been carefully examined by researchers. We describe the protocol in an extended paper [62].

Session key reuse: We design the session key to be reused across multiple requests/responses so that the session key setup is a one-time cost in a web session. According to TLS 1.3 [70], InviCloak will randomize a 32-byte session ID after each key exchange and store the corresponding session key. The session ID is returned to the client. When the client proxy sends encrypted private content to the server proxy, it will include the session ID in plaintext. The server proxy retrieves the session key through the session ID, and it will reject the request if no corresponding session key is found.

On-demand vs. Asynchronous key exchange: The key exchange process can happen either on-demand or asynchronously. Each approach has its pros and cons. For on-demand key exchange, a client proxy triggers the key exchange when it sends the first private request in a web session. For asynchronous key exchange, the client proxy starts the key exchange right after the user loads the landing page that distributes the client proxy. For example, the key exchange may happen when a user visits a website’s login page. When the user enters her login information, the session key is already available for encrypting her password. In contrast, with the on-demand approach, the key exchange happens when the user hits the password submit button.

The advantage of the on-demand approach is that it does not waste a website’s resources to perform the key exchange in case the
user does not log in; the disadvantage is that it adds a round trip time (RTT) to the load latency for the first encrypted request. In contrast, the asynchronous approach shortens the page load time (PLT) when a user requests private content for the first time.

We leave it as a configuration option for a website to choose between on-demand or asynchronous key exchange. We note that even with the on-demand approach, the key setup is a one-time cost for an entire InviCloak session.

## 3.6 Using the Encryption Channel

After the session key setup, the client and server proxy can use it to encrypt and decrypt private communications between a browser and a website’s origin server. These operations are described below.

**Encrypting an HTTP request:** When a browser initiates a request whose URL is in the list of the client proxy’s configuration file, the client proxy generates a message that includes a session ID, a sequence number, and the request content. The session ID uniquely identifies the InviCloak session it shares with the server proxy, and the sequence number uniquely identifies the request within this session to prevent replay attacks (described shortly). The client proxy encrypts the sequence number and the request content with the session key it shares with the server proxy, using a cipher suite approved by TLS 1.3. It then sends the encrypted request to the CDN, which will forward it to the origin server. InviCloak does not change TLS, so the underlying TLS connections are unaware of the additional encryption added by the client proxy and will treat the encrypted request as a regular HTTP request.

Our current design only encrypts the body of an HTTP request, because most headers do not contain private content. The Cookie header may contain important authentication information, and we describe cookie encryption and management in § 3.9. The current design can be extended to encrypt other request headers specified by the client proxy’s configuration file.

**Client-side session state:** The session state a client proxy maintains include the session ID, the latest outstanding sequence number, and the session key it shares with the server proxy. The client proxy stores the session state in a browser cache. Thus, an InviCloak session may be valid across multiple web sessions. For private requests to the same server, the client proxy can reuse the session key. Web developers can configure an expiration period for the sessions.

**Processing an encrypted HTTP request:** When a server proxy receives an encrypted request, it uses the session ID and the encrypted sequence number to detect and prevent replay attacks. The server proxy maintains a sliding window of recently received sequence numbers, and any out-of-window requests or requests with duplicate sequence numbers are discarded by the server proxy. For a valid request, the server proxy decrypts it, strips off the additional fields added by the client proxy, and forwards the decrypted request to the website’s origin server.

The difference between the sliding windows of InviCloak and TCP is that InviCloak accepts an out-of-order request before its previous ones are accepted since a browser will launch HTTP requests in parallel.

**Encrypting an HTTP response:** When a server proxy receives an HTTP response of a private URL from the origin server, it will attach the corresponding sequence number to the beginning of the response body and then encrypt the response body with the session key. The server proxy also encrypts certain cookies specified in the Set-Cookie header to avoid cookie leakage as described in § 3.9.

**Decrypting an HTTP response:** When the client proxy receives an encrypted response from the server proxy, it will decrypt it using the session key. The response will include the original sequence number to prevent a response replay attack. If the client proxy finds that the sequence number matches the one it sends out, it returns the response to the web browser; otherwise, it will discard the response.

## 3.7 Integrity Verifier

The client proxy and the server proxy are sufficient to defeat a passive adversary residing inside a CDN, as the private communications will be protected by InviCloak’s encryption channel. However, an active adversary residing in a CDN may inject malicious code and hijack the encryption channel, thereby gaining access to the private content.

InviCloak uses integrity verification to defend against such an active adversary. A website will use the private key corresponding to the public key distributed in its DNS TLSA record to sign CDN-visible objects such as the client proxy, HTML files, and JavaScript code. We refer to these objects as CDN-visible executable objects, which also include the code of the client proxy. The other CDN-visible objects such as CSS and images are not executable, and modifying them cannot break InviCloak’s protection. A website need not sign them to reduce the computational cost. A website can sign the CDN-visible executable objects offline before a CDN caches them using any signing tool, such as OpenSSL [80].

We introduce an integrity verifier at the client side to verify the signatures. Unlike a client proxy, the integrity verifier is a browser extension to an existing browser. It is a component independent of a web service and can be securely obtained outside a web session (e.g., via the extension market in a browser) as we assume in § 2.4.

When a request is sent out, the integrity verifier simultaneously fetches the server’s new public key through DoH (if not cached), and it determines the InviCloak’s enablement of a website through the existence of the TLSA record. When a browser receives the response from the CDN, the integrity verifier will intercept the response and examine whether the response body is a CDN-visible executable object. If so, it validates the signature of the object using the server’s new public key. If one of the web objects fails on the verification, the extension will block the loading page and send a pop-up to alert the user. The verifier can also prompt the user to report the incident to a central repository. This repository could be maintained by the distributor of the integrity verifier or any third party that is interested in aggregating user reports to collectively detect ongoing security threats. The integrity verifier does not verify the encrypted responses from the server proxy. Instead, the client proxy decrypts and validates the integrity of such messages.

An alternative way to preserve the integrity of web resources is to use the existing web techniques, Subresource Integrity (SRI) [27] or Signed HTTP Exchanges (SXG) [87]. However, both SRI and SXG attach the integrity of subresources to the trust of the base HTML files, and they do not ensure such HTML files’ integrity. Besides, they require extensive modification of HTML files, while InviCloak...
is designed to ease the deployment by minimizing modification to existing web resources.

### 3.8 Partial Deployment of Integrity Verifier

In the InviCloak design, a website can deploy the server proxy and the client proxy without a user’s involvement to defeat a passive adversary, but the user needs to install the integrity verifier herself to defeat an active adversary.

However, a partial deployment of the integrity verifier can deter active attacks. This is because an adversary cannot tell which user has installed the integrity verifier. If it launches an active attack such as the code injection attack, it risks being caught by those users who have installed the integrity verifier. Admittedly, an adversary may attempt to conduct a targeted attack, e.g., modifying the client proxy code for those users who have not installed the integrity verifier. A typical method to learn about a client’s information is to use the User-Agent header, but InviCloak can be configured to mask this header in the client proxy to prevent such information leakage. We acknowledge that some browsers do not support browser extensions currently, but overall, InviCloak provides an option for security-conscious users and websites to protect their sensitive data from potential active attackers by using the browsers that support browser extensions.

### 3.9 Cookie Management

A website may issue a cookie to a user after the user successfully authenticates herself. We refer to such a cookie as a *user authentication cookie*. When a user’s HTTP request presents the cookie, the website may return private content available only to an authenticated user. Currently, such cookies are visible to a CDN in an HTTP request/response header. An adversary inside a CDN may intercept this cookie and attempt to use it to access a user’s private content.

InviCloak prevents such leakage by encrypting a user’s authentication cookie with the session key established between the client and the server proxy. A website will specify which cookies are private to a CDN (referred to as *private cookies*) in its server proxy’s configuration file. The server proxy will encrypt the private cookies in the Set-Cookie header of an HTTP response and decrypt the cookies in the Cookie header of an HTTP request. A client proxy need not decrypt the cookies, so the browser will store the encrypted ones and attach them to request headers when needed.

The encryption binds a user authentication cookie to the InviCloak session where the session key is established. When an on-path adversary replays an encrypted user authentication cookie, it cannot impersonate the user, because it does not have the corresponding session key to generate a valid private request to the server. It cannot decrypt an encrypted response, either. Therefore, the adversary cannot gain access to a user’s private content.

Since InviCloak’s session state are stored in the browser cache, InviCloak can decrypt the existing cipher-cookies as long as a user does not clear the cache, and the InviCloak session is not expired. Thus, a user does not need to re-login when she revisits a web page.

We note that websites may share cookies with CDNs. For example, a website may share a paywall cookie after a user logs into a paywall and obtains content behind the paywall. Such cookies are separate from authentication cookies and are referred to as *signed cookies* [11, 24]. Signed cookies should be configured as CDN-visible and InviCloak will not encrypt them nor affect the existing cookie-sharing practice between a CDN and a website.

### 4 SECURITY ANALYSIS

In this section, we analyze InviCloak’s security properties. Our analysis suggests that InviCloak can preserve confidentiality and integrity in the presence of a compromised CDN or a compromised DNS provider.

**Man-in-the-Middle attacks:** An attacker inside a CDN is on the communication path between a client and an origin server and may attempt to eavesdrop and tamper the messages it transmits. However, InviCloak enables a client and an origin server to establish a secret session key to encrypt their private content. A server signs its key exchange message with a private key that it does not share with the CDN, so the CDN cannot compromise the session key setup process. Therefore, even if an on-path adversary may have access to the TLS private key of a website, it cannot eavesdrop or tamper with the private content that a client and an origin server exchange.

**Code injection attacks:** In the InviCloak design, the client proxy is a JavaScript library, so a client may download it from a CDN. An attacker inside a CDN may attempt to inject or modify the code in the client proxy to obstruct InviCloak’s session key setup. InviCloak uses the integrity verifier (§ 3.7) to prevent such attacks.

**Replay attacks:** An attacker inside a CDN may replay messages it receives between a client and an origin server. We prevent these attacks by including a session ID and an encrypted sequence number in a client’s request (§ 3.6). The server proxy can use the request ID to detect a replayed client request.

**Forward secrecy:** InviCloak provides forward secrecy because it uses the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol as in TLS 1.3 [70] to encrypt private content. The long-term secret in the protocol is the website’s private key. Even if this private key or future session keys are compromised, an attacker cannot decrypt the messages sent in the past sessions.

**Impersonation as a user:** As in TLS [70], InviCloak’s key exchange protocol does not authenticate a user. A malicious adversary may attempt to impersonate as a user to access private content, but we hypothesize that a website will use additional authentication mechanisms such as a login password to protect private content. Therefore, although the adversary can establish a session key with the origin server as any client can, it cannot authenticate as the user. In addition, we encrypt the user authentication cookie using the session key after a user authenticates herself. As described in § 3.9, this design binds a user’s authentication cookie to the InviCloak session key. Thus, an on-path attacker cannot impersonate a user to access the user’s private content protected by the session key.

**DDoS attacks:** InviCloak does not change the current CDN service model, so an origin server enjoys the same DDoS protection benefits as in the current service model. The current DDoS protection service of a CDN has the caveat that if an attacker uncovers the IP address of the origin server [81], she may directly flood DDoS traffic at the server. InviCloak provides an additional benefit in this case. Since a client will only communicate with an origin server via
a CDN, the server can use router filters that are resistant to source address spoofing to whitelist the traffic from the CDN [10, 42].

**Application-layer attacks:** A CDN may act as a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to filter client requests that contain application-layer attack payloads [47], including SQL injection [49], cross-site scripting (XSS) [85], and application-layer DDoS attack requests [40, 86]. With our solution, a client’s requests that include private content are encrypted. Although a CDN can continue to filter unencrypted requests, it can no longer filter encrypted requests.

A website can employ a WAF by itself to defend against such attacks. There exists an open-source WAF, ModSecurity [20], available to two commonly used web servers: Apache [16] and NGINX [69]. Besides, the WAF rules for commonly known attacks are openly available [22]. Developers can maintain a WAF with NGINX and ModSecurity through a simple one-line configuration. Moreover, a general defense provided by a CDN might be ineffective, as application-layer attacks such as algorithmic complexity DDoS attacks [38, 40] can be site-specific. A website needs to deploy a site-specific WAF anyway for effective attack protection. Given InviCloak’s protection for privacy, a website may consider it an acceptable tradeoff to deploy an on-site WAF and filter malicious requests after they are decrypted.

**A compromised DNS provider:** InviCloak uses DNSSEC and DoH to secure key distribution. A website’s public key may be tampered with when its DNS provider is compromised. In this case, as long as the adversary does not obtain the website’s TLS private key or session key shared with the website’s CDN provider, it cannot successfully impersonate a website to complete the TLS exchange or the session key exchange between a client proxy and a server proxy. Therefore, the adversary is still unable to gain access to users’ private content.

A powerful attacker that compromises both a website’s DNS provider and CDN provider will compromise InviCloak’s security. Technically, it is possible to defeat such threats by distributing a new TLS certificate instead of a public key in a website’s TLSA record and modifying browser implementations to validate the new certificate. However, we believe the risk of such threats is low and opt for a design that does not require browser modifications.

5 IMPLEMENTATION

We implement a prototype client proxy using JavaScript and Service Worker API (SW) [76]. The same implementation works for browsers that support SW including Firefox, Chrome, Safari and Edge. SW has been enabled in mainstream browsers (Firefox, Chrome, Safari, and Edge) since 2018 [29]. In the case where a browser is outdated and does not support SW, the server proxy will reject the request without encryption by SW for security reasons and return a response to prompt the user to upgrade her browser.

We use the Web Cryptography API [82] provided by browsers for cryptographic algorithms. We use the ciphersuite Aead-Aes256-Gcm-Sha384 for symmetric encryption, and use the curve Nist P-256 for Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Both algorithms are approved by TLS1.3 [70]. The lines of JavaScript code for the client proxy code (excluding the configuration file) is ~590.

For the integrity verifier, we implement it as a Chrome and Firefox extension. It takes less than 300 lines of JavaScript code. One complication is that the current implementation of Chrome lacks a browser extension API, webRequest. filterResponseData(), to read the response body [3], which is already implemented in Firefox [12]. A discussion and a proposal from Chrome developers show that the API does not introduce new vulnerabilities, and it is missing because of the technical complexity [1, 2]. Thus, we provide a Chromium (the open-source version of Chrome) patch to implement the function.

For the server proxy, we implement it in C as a module to a popular web server NGINX. It takes ~2000 lines of code. We release our code to facilitate InviCloak’s deployment [61]. We include a more detailed description of our implementation and sample configuration files in an extended paper [62].

6 EVALUATION

We evaluate the performance of our prototype implementation of InviCloak, and compare it with related work. First, we micro-benchmark the computational overhead by measuring the computation time of each InviCloak operation. Second, we evaluate how the added overhead affects an origin server and a CDN’s edge server’s throughput along with the page load times (PLTs) of realistic web pages at the client side. We compare this overhead with the TEE-based solution, Phoenix [50]. We also evaluate InviCloak’s overhead on a modern web application using Cloudflare. Besides performance overhead, we estimate how much effort it takes to deploy InviCloak at a website using the lines of configuration a website needs to make to deploy InviCloak. Finally, we analyze the deployment cost of InviCloak and compare it with Phoenix. We do not directly compare InviCloak’s performance with the TLS-modification-based solutions [32, 57, 65] and the two-domain solution [46] as their performance can be approximated by the baseline client/server performance without InviCloak enabled [46, 65]. We describe each of the experiments and the evaluation results in detail.

**Testbed:** We set up a small testbed of three Dell Precision T3620 machines in our experiments. The three machines serve as a client, a CDN, and a website’s origin server, respectively. Each machine has an Intel Core i7-7700 CPU and 32 GB of RAM, and runs Ubuntu 16.04. The three machines connect to each other via Ethernet. We use the tool, Linux Traffic Control, (tc) [54] to configure the bandwidth and RTT values between the machines if necessary. The server machine then runs the NGINX implementation and configuration as we describe in § 3.4. In order to emulate CDN functions, we set up an NGINX proxy or Phoenix at the CDN machine. In our experiments, we use Chromium (Version 87.0.4280.88) as the browser.

6.1 Computation Overhead

**Experiments:** We let the client machine load our client proxy implementation into Chromium. It sends synthetic web requests to the origin server, and the server responds with synthetic web responses. In order to measure how the payload size affects the computational overhead, we vary the payload size of an HTTP request/response from 2 KB to 8 MB, because 90% of web pages are smaller than (8 MB) [8] at the time of this work.

We instrument the client proxy, the server proxy, and the integrity verifier to record the computation time of the encryption, decryption, and signature verification operations. We do not show signature generation overhead because websites can sign the static
files offline. The measurement includes the complete computational overhead caused by the cryptographic algorithms and the other necessary operations such as memory allocation and copy. We do not measure the session key setup overhead in this experiment, as it is a one-time cost per session. However, we do measure it in the PLT experiment (§6.3). We repeat each experiment one hundred times and use the mean values as results.

Results: Figure 2 shows the results of these experiments. The encryption, decryption, and signature overhead grow almost linearly with the size of the payload. The computation overhead at the server is one order of magnitude smaller than that at the client in all cases. The reason for this performance gap is that we implement the server proxy in C, while the client proxy is in JavaScript for easy deployment. For payloads smaller than 8 MB, the encryption and decryption take around 3 ms at the server. At the client, the encryption takes less than 50 ms while the decryption takes around 60 ms. Decryption is slower than encryption at the client side because the decryption code is more complicated in our implementation and supports streamlined decryption of large responses. The client takes around 60 ms to verify the signature of an 8 MB file. Our test using a simple tool we developed for signature generating takes 16 ms for an 8 MB file on the server.

We consider the computation overhead of InviCloak acceptable at both the server side and the client side. Furthermore, as the median web page size is around 2 MB [8], much smaller than 8 MB, we expect InviCloak’s overhead to be low in practice. We validate this argument by evaluating the PLTs in §6.3 and §6.4.

6.2 CDN & Server Throughput

Experiments: We run two sets of experiments to test the throughput of the CDN and the server, respectively. We use GoHTTPBench [5], which is a multi-thread version of ApacheBench [13], to send 50K HTTP requests in total from the client machine to the CDN machine or to the server machine. We vary the size of an HTTP response from the CDN or the server from 1 KB to 8 MB. GoHTTPBench will send requests with 64 concurrent threads to simulate 64 concurrent clients, which keeps the server machine or the CDN machine’s CPU usage exceeding 95%.

For the CDN performance evaluation, we measure the throughput of Phoenix and a baseline (an NGINX proxy). Since InviCloak does not require any modification of a CDN, we use the baseline performance to represent the CDN performance when InviCloak is deployed. For the origin server performance, we measure the throughput of an NGINX proxy with InviCloak and a baseline (an NGINX proxy without InviCloak). Since Phoenix does not require any modification of an origin server, we use the baseline performance to represent the origin server’s performance when Phoenix is deployed.

Results: Figure 3a shows the results of the CDN performance experiments. As we can see, Phoenix introduces considerable overhead to a CDN server. Its throughput is only about one-third of baseline’s in each experiment, which is consistent with the results in the original Phoenix paper [50]. Figure 3b shows the results of origin server performance experiments. InviCloak reduces the server throughput by less than 5% for payload sizes ranging from 1 KB to 8 MB. Overall, due to different designs, InviCloak and Phoenix possess different advantages. Phoenix preserves the origin server’s throughput but degrades the CDN’s throughput significantly. InviCloak does not introduce overhead to a CDN server, but slightly slows down the origin server.

6.3 Client Page Load Times

We use realistic web pages to estimate how InviCloak affects a user’s perceivable performance. We crawl the two groups of web pages from the top-50 websites that we are able to register and log in from Alexa’s top-100 websites. For the first group, we crawl the login page of each website. Some websites embed login forms inside the homepage instead of a separate login page. In such cases, we crawl their homepages as the login pages. For the second group, we manually log into each website and crawl one private web page that contains private information such as the profile, the visiting history, or the list of favorite items. We mirrored these web pages in our testbed.

For the login pages, we regard each web object as CDN-visible if it does not require a user login. For the private pages, we use the HTTP Cache-Control header to identify the non-cacheable web objects. We regard all non-cacheable objects as private objects in our evaluation and include their URLs in the configuration files. InviCloak will encrypt such objects in the experiments. For each web page, we sum up the size of embedded web objects. Among the crawled web pages, we calculate the median and mean of the sum values, as shown in Table 1. The average size of login pages and private pages is 3895 KB and 6896 KB, respectively. On average, a private page contains 505 KB of private objects.
Throughput (rps)

The results show that InviCloak’s initiation increases a login page’s

value as the RTT between the client and the CDN machine. We

note that such an overhead is a

one-time cost, as the CDN-visible objects and InviCloak’s session

proxy, and the asynchronous key exchange as discussed in § 3.5.

InviCloak’s landing page. The initiation process includes the verifi-

cation of CDN-visible executable objects, installation of the client

proxy, and the asynchronous key exchange as discussed in § 3.5.

We evaluate InviCloak’s initiation overhead by measuring the

PLT of each test web page, we instrument the

browser at the client machine send all requests to the CDN machine.

The CDN machine replies with the CDN-visible web objects it

caches and forwards the private requests to the server machine. To

present a more realistic evaluation, we limit the bandwidth between

machines to 100 Mbps. According to [31], the average RTT between

clients and Cloudflare’s edge servers is 36 ms. Thus, we use this

value as the RTT between the client and the CDN machine. We

set the RTT between the CDN and the server as 100 ms, which is

approximately the RTT measured between two machines located

on the east coast and the west coast of the United States. We load

each web page five times in Chromium and compute the average

PLT for each web page.

We evaluate InviCloak’s initiation overhead by measuring the

PLT increments of the crawled login pages when they are used as

InviCloak’s landing page. The initiation process includes the verifi-

cation of CDN-visible executable objects, installation of the client

proxy, and the asynchronous key exchange as discussed in § 3.5.

The results show that InviCloak’s initiation increases a login page’s

PLT by less than 8% for all websites. Specifically, the overheads on

47 websites are less than 5%. We note that such an overhead is a

one-time cost, as the CDN-visible objects and InviCloak’s session

state will be cached by the browser after a user visits the landing

page for the first time.

As for the crawled private pages, we run experiments in multiple

settings to show how various computational overhead affects the

PLTs. For the first setting, we measure the PLTs when both Invi-

Cloak and Phoenix are disabled as the baseline (Baseline). In the

second setting, the client machine runs only the client proxy with-

out the integrity verifier (Enc). For the third one, the client machine

runs both the client proxy and the integrity verifier (Enc&Sign). In

these two settings of InviCloak, the client proxy has already set

up the session key with the server proxy in the landing page. To

compare InviCloak with the existing solution, we measure the PLTs

when Phoenix is enabled (Phoenix). All the settings above use a

CDN with warm cache. We also measure the PLTs with cold cache,

i.e., the CDN cache is disabled (CDN-off).

Figure 4a shows the results of the 50 websites in each setting.

The PLTs under the Baseline, Enc, and Enc&Sign settings have

similar distributions, and there is a large gap between them and the

CDN-off curve. This result suggests that InviCloak largely preserves

a CDN’s performance benefit. Besides, InviCloak’s overhead is

lower than that of Phoenix. More than 32% of PLTs exceed 4.0s when

Phoenix is on, but more than 92% of PLTs under the Baseline, Enc,

and Enc&Sign settings are less than 4.0s. The median PLT with

Phoenix is 2.8s, while the median PLTs for Baseline, Enc, and

Enc&Sign are 2.0s, 2.1s, and 2.1s, respectively.

6.4 A Modern Web Application with Cloudflare

Evaluating InviCloak in a laboratory setting with crawled web

tweets into the database.

pages may not fully capture InviCloak’s performance in reality. To

address this limitation, we run a modern web application, DeathStar-

Bench [43], and evaluate InviCloak with geographically distributed

clients on the Internet. We use Cloudflare, one of the largest CDN

providers as the CDN. We cannot compare with Phoenix in this

evaluation because TEE is not available on any CDN today.

DeathStarBench is developed as a benchmark for studying the

performance of modern cloud services [43]. It adopts the popular

microservice architecture and is used by several academic and

industrial institutions [43]. We use the social network provided by

DeathStarBench in our evaluation, which provides functions similar
to Twitter. In addition to a realistic web application, we also use

realistic web content for our evaluation. We import a small social

network graph with 962 nodes and 18,812 edges from Facebook into

the social network [73]. We also crawled 612,455 tweets from randomly

selected 962 Twitter users through Twitter API [23], and imported

the tweets into the database.
We deploy DeathStarBench with the crawled workload on a virtual machine of AWS in Virginia. We use six geographically distributed virtual machines of AWS as the clients. The clients are distributed in six AWS regions, including California, Montreal, Paris, Singapore, Sao Paulo, and Bahrain. Each virtual machine used in this experiment has 4 vCPUs and 8 GB of RAM and runs Ubuntu 20.04. We use Cloudflare as the CDN to cache the static resources near the clients.

In our experiment, we randomly select 10 users from the database, and instrument each client to login as each user and visit three private pages of the user. The three pages include a page showing at most 100 recent tweets of a user’s followees, a page showing at most 100 recent tweets of the user, and a page showing the user’s all followees and followers. To show a conservative result, we regard all tweets, the followee list, and the follower list as private data. They are encrypted and not cached on Cloudflare. To be conservative, we not only sign HTML and JavaScript files, but also sign CSS files. As defined in §6.3, we run experiments in four settings: Baseline, Enc, Enc$Sign, and CDN-off. Overall, each of the six clients will visit each of the three pages of all 10 users for five times. We compute the average PLT for each page. Thus, we have $6 \times 3 \times 10 = 180$ PLT values in each setting.

As shown in Figure 4b, we can find three explicit stages in the curves: $S_1$, $S_2$, $S_3$, which originates from the variance of PLTs between different locations. The low network latency in California, Montreal, and Paris lead to small PLTs shown in $S_1$. With the larger network latency, $S_2$ includes the PLTs in Sao Paulo and Bahrain, while $S_3$ shows the PLTs in Singapore. Besides stages, a large gap exists between the curve of CDN-off and the other ones, indicating that InviCloak retains the performance benefit of a CDN. Moreover, Baseline, Enc, and Enc$Sign$ have similar distributions, indicating InviCloak has low overhead. Specifically, in either setting of InviCloak, InviCloak introduces less than 5% overhead to over 170 of all 180 PLT values. Therefore, we conclude that InviCloak’s performance overhead is low.

6.5 Deployment Effort

In this section, we estimate InviCloak’s deployment effort. We use the lines of code (LoC) to measure the configuration overhead of crawled websites and DeathStarBench. For the 50 websites, we add the private URLs of each site into the server proxy configuration file (nginx.conf) and edit the client proxy configuration file (configure.js) to include the private URLs. We insert the code for Service Worker registration into each website’s login page. The LoC of nginx.conf ranges from 4 to 62 with an average of 13.7 and a median of 8.0. For configure.js, the LoC ranges from 10 to 68 with an average of 19.7 and a median of 14.0. For all websites, the LoC of registration is 4. As for DeathStarBench, we also use 4 LoC to register a Service Worker in the login page. Besides, we add a configure.js with 9 LoC and inserting 14 LoC into the existing nginx.conf.

InviCloak’s deployment requires a website developer to explicitly separate private URLs from public URLs. We discuss this process and the impacts of possible configuration errors made by a website’s developer in two cases.

First, if the website developers have categorized the URLs into private and public directories (e.g. /private and /public), they can list the private URLs by wildcard or regular expressions in the configuration file. The configuration effort in this case is low. If the website developers erroneously categorize the URLs, the errors will be propagated into InviCloak’s configuration.

Second, if the URLs are not categorized, we propose a method to automatically generate InviCloak’s configuration through the Cache-Control header as we did in the experiments of § 6.3. This method is effective because current website developers manage the URLs that should not be cached through the HTTP headers [4, 56]. With such a method, the configuration effort is also low.

There are two sources of errors in this case: 1) developers erroneously configure the Cache-Control header; 2) a website may serve non-cacheable public objects or cacheable private objects. The first source is introduced by a website’s erroneous usage of the CDN and is not introduced by InviCloak. As for the second source, our method would regard a non-cacheable public URL as private and a cacheable private one as public. The former only affects InviCloak’s efficiency. The latter will lead to privacy leakage. However, for websites that would like to protect user privacy, it is a misconfiguration to allow a CDN to cache private objects [25, 45, 63]. Therefore, this type of error also originates from websites’ URLs misconfiguration.

In summary, the configuration effort of InviCloak is low, as the configuration can be inherited from the existing website URL categorizations. As a result, any existing errors in a website’s URL categorization may be propagated into InviCloak’s configuration and some of the errors may divulge user privacy.

6.6 Estimating Hardware Deployment Cost

We compare the monetary hardware deployment cost of Phoenix and InviCloak by estimating the amount of new hardware a CDN provider or a website needs to purchase. We note that this estimate does not include the changes of operational costs when a website deploys InviCloak or when a CDN upgrades to use TEE, as those numbers are difficult to obtain.

Phoenix requires a CDN to support SGX, but it does not require any upgrade on a website’s origin servers. To make a lower bound estimate, we assume that all existing edge servers of a CDN support SGX. Thus, a CDN does not need to replace the old servers with SGX-enabled servers. We take Akamai, one of the largest CDN providers, as an example to show the cost of the additional edge servers.

As shown in Figure 3a, the throughput of Phoenix is about one-third of a CDN’s edge server. Therefore, when Phoenix is enabled, a CDN should at least add two times the amount of existing edge servers to achieve a comparable throughput. Since Akamai has more than 290K edge servers spread around the world [75], it needs to add about 290K $\times$ 2 = 580K edge servers to maintain its current throughput. As each Intel Xeon processor that supports SGX will cost at least $200$ [19], the lower bound of the cost to Akamai is 580K $\times$ 200 = $116,000K$, which exceeds $100M$.

InviCloak is an end-to-end solution, so it does not require any modification on CDNs. However, unlike Phoenix, it introduces computational overhead to a website’s origin server. To estimate the cost to upgrade for a website to deploy InviCloak, we take an
e-commerce website, Etsy [18], a US top-50 sites, as an example in the estimate. According to [88], Akamai observes 395 GB of traffic for Esty during a 18-hour period, namely 4909 KB per second. Existing research shows that 74.2% of requested bytes are cacheable [88]. Therefore, we estimate that the origin server Esty responds with 4909×1.74·2% = 1706 KB of payload per second. Note that InviCloak acts as a reverse proxy at the server side, so the added overhead of InviCloak is independent of the application’s logic. According to Figure 3b, even when the payload size of each response is as small as 1 KB, an InviCloak server proxy can serve more than 5000 × 1 = 5000 KB payload per second. Therefore, if we assume that a website like Etsy deploys the server proxy on a separate machine, it only needs to add one additional machine as those in our testbed to support its traffic load. The cost of each machine in our testbed is less than $600 at the time of this work. Moreover, as the server proxy slows down an origin server’s throughput by merely 5% in our experiments, if a website’s origin server is not running near its full capacity, a website may collocate the server proxy with its origin server without purchasing any new machine. We omit the hardware cost of on-premise WAFs, because according to a survey [6], on-premise firewalls are popular among web services. More than 98.1% already host on-premise firewalls.

We note that this cost comparison is not an apple-to-apple comparison because of the essentially different designs of the two solutions. Upgrading a CDN with Phoenix will secure all websites that use the CDN, while upgrading a website with InviCloak only secures the website itself. We do not sum up the cost of all websites using the CDN, because the costs of website upgrades are distributed among their corresponding organizations. Each organization makes an independent decision, enabling a gradual process of deployment.

7 LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION

Missing extension API in Chrome and insufficient extension support in mobile browsers: The integrity verifier of InviCloak requires an extension API missing in Chrome [2, 3, 12]. This missing API currently limits the extension’s deployment on Chrome, but InviCloak still provides a viable option for a website and a user who desire to protect their private communications. This is because both the desktop and mobile versions of Firefox already implemented the API [12]. A user can switch to Firefox if she is concerned with active attacks. Moreover, we envision this work can facilitate the enablement of the extension in mobile Chrome and our implementation of the Chromium’s patch can assist in the implementation of the missing API in Chrome. Furthermore, the key idea of securely distributing the new key pair through the combination of DoH and DNSSEC in today’s Internet is not limited by the extension. The integrity verifier can be implemented as a process separated from the browser.

Limiting CDN’s WAF functions: InviCloak encrypts a user’s sensitive requests so a CDN can not apply WAF rules to those requests. We consider this limitation acceptable because websites that are concerned with privacy already built firewalls for private data on their origin servers. A Firemon report from 573 professionals in 2019 shows that 40% of respondents have only on-premise firewalls, and 58.1% of respondents host both on-premise and cloud firewalls [6]. Therefore, 98.1% of the surveyed professionals already hosted on-premise firewalls. It is possible that a website that uses cloud firewalls may need to extend its current on-premise firewall capabilities after it deploys InviCloak, but it does not start from scratch. If the website considers the security benefit InviCloak brings outweighs the overhead of extending its firewall, it may still consider InviCloak a viable option.

Performance Overhead: InviCloak adds the overhead of cryptographic operations at the client side. Specifically, all users of an InviCloak-enabled website benefit from the passive attack defense at the cost of the encryption/decryption overhead, because InviCloak prevents passive attacks without any client-side operations. Besides, the overhead of signature verification only affects users who installed the extension and benefit from the active attack defense. The extension does not conduct verification when it detects the user is visiting a website without InviCloak as described in § 3.7. Despite the overhead, InviCloak retains the performance benefit of CDNs because it does not encrypt public data and CDNs can still cache them at edge servers. For private data, InviCloak enables CDNs to cache them in an encryption format within an InviCloak session. The session lives across multiple page visits as described in § 3.6. Furthermore, the computational overhead can be reduced via optimization techniques at the cost of increased design and implementation complexity. One technique is to replace a pre-signed digital signature of a web object with a hash value and distribute one signed file that includes a list of hash values. Overall, We believe the current design and implementation of InviCloak achieves a proper trade-off among performance, deployability, and usability, and the overhead is acceptable for most websites and users according to our evaluation in § 6.3 and § 6.4.

Third-party Service Security: An InviCloak-enabled website (e.g., bank.com) may use third-party services (e.g., service.com) but InviCloak cannot protect requests to service.com if InviCloak is not deployed on the service. When a page of bank.com sends a request to service.com and the URL is listed as private in configure.js of bank.com, the client proxy of bank.com can intercept the request but will forward the request without encryption. It is because service.com does not distribute a new public key in a specific TLSA record. The request can be protected only when service.com also deploys InviCloak. We consider such a decision on the third-party service reasonable because a website has no responsibility and ability to protect the data of other services.

Attacks on Service Worker and CSS: Recent research has explored attacks on Service Worker [34, 58, 68]. However, these attacks exploit the vulnerabilities in the Javascript code of a website. As discussed in § 2.4, such attacks are orthogonal to our work since we assume the website’s code is trusted. If an attacker modifies a website’s Javascript code to include a vulnerability, InviCloak can detect it through signature verification. Besides Service Worker, existing research shows that CSS can be vulnerable [48, 67]. However, these attacks all exploit specific vulnerabilities in a website’s HTML or Javascript code. Although InviCloak does not sign CSS files by default and CDNs can modify CSS code, we are not aware of how to launch such attacks with CSS injection alone and without vulnerabilities in HTML or Javascript code.
code. Furthermore, we can configure CSS to be signed in InviCloak if future research finds that CSS injection alone can become an attack vector.

8 RELATED WORK

No protection of session keys: Cloudflare has deployed a solution called Keyless SSL [77, 78] that allows a website to keep its TLS private key at the cost of involving the website's server for every TLS connection. However, it still reveals the TLS session key to the CDN. In this solution, the CDN forwards TLS handshake messages from a client to the website that holds the required private key. Keyless SSL requires the website to host a key server locally to decrypt or sign the handshake messages forwarded by a CDN. Thus, a CDN that does not know about the private key can complete the handshakes.

Akamai also has a similar patent [44], and WASP is a similar approach proposed by Goh et al. [64]. Besides Keyless SSL, a solution proposed by Liang et al. adopts DANE [41] to inform clients about a website's delegation of a CDN provider so that clients will accept the CDN's certificate [60]. Overall, these solutions do not protect users' private data since a CDN still obtains the session key of an HTTPS connection.

TEE-based solutions: Another line of research utilizes a technology called a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), for example, Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) [28, 37], STYX [83] and Harpocrates [26] are two such solutions based on Intel SGX, but the same problem with Keyless SSL exists: the CDN still knows the HTTPS session keys. Herwig et al. designed and implemented the first true "Keyless CDN" called Phoenix [50] using Intel SGX. Their work achieves the goal of retaining the full functionality of a CDN while keeping both a website's TLS private key and an HTTPS session key from the access of a distrusted CDN. However, deploying Phoenix with its security guarantees requires that a CDN upgrade all its edge servers and software to support Intel's SGX. The deployment cost may discourage a CDN from migrating to such a solution (§6.6). Besides the financial cost, Phoenix's edge server throughput is three to four times lower than a server without using SGX (§6.2). This is a potential performance bottleneck that will reduce a CDN's benefits for accelerating web access (§6.3).

InviCloak shows a lower overhead than Phoneix in our evaluation but does not retain the WAF functionality of a CDN.

Two-domain solution: Another solution is to use two separate domain names for CDN-visible content and private content, respectively. However, this solution faces a few security, performance, and usability challenges. First and foremost, current websites prefer to use CDNs to deliver their base HTML files for page load acceleration [84], as shown in our measurement (§2.1). Thus, the two-domain solution cannot prevent an active attacker in a CDN from tampering with the base HTML files to expose private content.

Besides the security concern, the two-domain solution prevents a CDN from caching encrypted private content, such as encrypted private photos, because the private content is in unshared TLS sessions and CDNs cannot differentiate between HTTP requests. In contrast, InviCloak retains the current TLS session practice between websites and CDNs, so CDNs can cache the encrypted HTTP body and headers without access to the content.

In addition, websites have to take a few extra steps to deploy the two-domain solution. They include: (1) A website that already shared its private key to a CDN needs to revoke the certificate and reapply for two different TLS certificates. Such a procedure could be expensive and time-consuming for business certificates [60]. (2) The website needs to negotiate two different types of services with its CDN provider (one for caching and the other for forwarding [79]). (3) The domain separation may require extensive web restructure and modification to include the new domain in the URLs.

CDN-on-Demand: Gilad et al. use the two-domain solution to build a low-cost on-demand CDN [46]. In their design, they force a client to fetch all base HTML files from the origin server through the private domain. Although this design prevents active attacks, it is incompatible with the current practice that websites use CDNs to deliver the base HTML files [84] and will increase the page load times of websites’ landing pages. Finally, it inherits the other drawbacks of the two-domain solution in terms of functionality and deployment as discussed above.

TLS modification: Researchers also proposed to modify TLS to make middleboxes visible in the TLS handshake. Naylor et al. proposed mcTLS [65] to provide different context keys and use these keys to control what content middleboxes can read or write to. Bhargavan et al. discovered the security vulnerability of mcTLS and provided an alternative to it with formal proof [32]. Lee et al. extended mcTLS to maTLS, which makes middleboxes auditable [57]. Compared to InviCloak, such solutions face significant deployment challenges as they modify the HTTPS/TLS protocol stack. End users need to explicitly authorize eligible middleboxes' certificates in the TLS handshake, which may raise usability concerns. Clients, servers, and CDNs all need to upgrade their TLS libraries and adapt their application code to use the new protocol.

Summary: We consider InviCloak strikes a unique balance among privacy, performance, user interface, and deployment costs. Compared to mcTLS and the two-domain solution, InviCloak does not change the current web interface and requires fewer changes in the web ecosystem. Compared to the TEE solutions, InviCloak does not require a hardware upgrade by a CDN provider.

9 CONCLUSION

We have presented InviCloak, a system that allows a website to use a CDN for DDoS protection and web acceleration without exposing the sensitive data it exchanges with its users. InviCloak encrypts sensitive data transmitted between the client and the origin server so that a distrusted CDN cannot eavesdrop on their communications. InviCloak introduces low overhead, and it is easy to deploy. A unilateral deployment by a website can prevent a passive eavesdropper in a CDN. If a user installs InviCloak’s browser extension, InviCloak can prevent an active attacker inside a CDN from eavesdropping on or tampering with their private communications.

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