FnF-BFT: Exploring Performance Limits of BFT Protocols

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation

In state machine replication (SMR) protocols, distributed replicas aim to agree on a sequence of client requests in the presence of faults. To that end, SMR protocols rely strongly on another primitive of distributed computing, consensus.

For protocols to maintain security under attack from malicious actors, consensus must be reached even when the replicas are allowed to send arbitrary information, namely under byzantine failures. The protocols that offer these guarantees, i.e., are resilient against byzantine failures while continuing system operation, are known as byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols.

The first practical BFT system, PBFT [8], was introduced more than two decades ago and has since sparked the emergence of numerous BFT systems [14, 17, 27]. However, even today, BFT protocols do not scale well with the number of replicas, making large-scale deployment of BFT systems a challenge. Often, the origin of this issue stems from the single-leader bottleneck: most BFT protocols rest the responsibility of executing client requests on a single leader instead of distributing it amongst replicas [25]. In such systems, the sole leader’s hardware easily becomes overburdened with its duty as the central communication point of the message flow.

Recently, protocols tackling the single-leader bottleneck through parallelization emerged and demonstrated staggering performance increases over state-of-the-art sequential-leader protocols [15, 20, 25]. In the same fashion as most of their single leader counterparts, these works only consider non-malicious faults for the performance analysis. However, malicious attacks may lead to significant performance losses that are not evaluated. While these systems exhibit promising system performance with simple faults, they fail to lower-bound their performance in the face of malicious attacks from byzantine replicas.

In this work, we propose FAST’n’FAIR-BFT (FnF-BFT), a parallel-leader BFT protocol. FnF-BFT circumvents the common single-leader bottleneck by utilizing parallel leaders to distribute the weight amongst all system replicas – achieving a significant performance increase over sequential-leader systems. FnF-BFT scales well with the number of replicas and preserves high throughput even under arbitrarily malicious attacks from the byzantine replicas.

To establish this ability of our protocol, we define a new performance property, namely byzantine-resilient performance, which encapsulates the ratio between the best-case and worst-case throughput of a BFT protocol, i.e., the effective utilization. Specifically, we bound this ratio to be constant, meaning that the throughput of a protocol under byzantine faults is lower-bounded by a constant fraction of the best-case throughput where no faults are present. We show that FnF-BFT achieves byzantine-resilient performance with a ratio of $16/27$ while maintaining safety and liveness. The analysis of FnF-BFT is done under the partially synchronous communication model, meaning that a known bound $\Delta$ on message delivery holds after some unknown global stabilization time (GST). We further evaluate our protocol’s efficiency by analyzing the amortized authenticator complexity after GST, similarly to HotStuff [27].

1.2 Related Work

Lamport et al. [18] first discussed the problem of reaching consensus in the presence of Byzantine failures. Following its introduction, byzantine fault tolerance was initially studied in the synchronous network setting [10, 11, 22]. Concurrently, the impossibility of deterministically reaching consensus in the asynchronous setting with a single replica failure was shown by Fischer et al. [13]. Dwork et al. [12] proposed the concept of partial synchrony and demonstrated the feasibility of reaching consensus in partially synchronous networks. While the presented protocol always ensured safety, liveness relied on synchronous network conditions. During synchrony, the communication complexity of DSL is $O(n^4)$ – making it unsuitable for deployment. In contrast to these works, FnF-BFT guarantees safety and liveness in partial synchrony, while the communication complexity is only $O(n)$.

Reaching consensus is needed to execute requests for state machine replication. Reiter [23, 24] introduces Rampart, an early protocol tackling Byzantine fault tolerance for state machine replication. Rampart excludes faulty replicas from the group and replaces them with new replicas to make progress. Thus, Rampart relies on failure detection, which cannot be accurate in an asynchronous system, as shown by Lynch [19]. On the other hand, FnF-BFT does not rely on failure detection.
With PBFT, Castro and Liskov [8] devised the first efficient protocol for state machine replication that tolerates byzantine failures. The leader-based protocol requires $O(n^2)$ communication to reach consensus, as well as $O(n^3)$ for leader replacement. While widely deployed, PBFT does not scale well when the number of replicas increases. The quadratic complexity faced by the leader represents PBFT’s bottleneck [7]. In this work, we tackle this issue by introducing parallel leaders that share the weight, thus efficiently alleviating the single leader’s bottleneck.

Kotla et al. [17] were the first to achieve $O(n)$ complexity with Zyzzyva, an optimistic linear path PBFT. The complexity of leader replacement in Zyzzyva remains $O(n^3)$, and safety violations were later exposed [1]. SBFT, devised by Gueta et al. [14], is a recent leader-based protocol that achieves $O(n)$ complexity and improves the complexity of exchanging leaders to $O(n^2)$. While reducing the overall complexity, the single leader is the bottleneck for both Zyzzyva and SBFT.

Developed by Yin et al. [27], leader-based HotStuff matches the $O(n)$ complexity of Zyzzyva and SBFT. HotStuff rotates the leader with every request and is the first to achieve $O(n)$ for leader replacement. However, HotStuff offers little parallelization, and experiments have revealed high complexity in practice [25]. While HotStuff’s pipeline design offers an improvement over PBFT, its primary downside lies in the sequential proposal of requests and results in a lack of parallelism. On the contrary, $n$ parallel leaders propose requests simultaneously in FnF-BFT.

Mao et al. [20, 21] were the first to point out the importance of multiple leaders for high-performance state machine replication with Mencius and BFT-Mencius. Mencius maps client requests to the closest leader, and in turn, requests can become censored. However, no de-duplication measures are in place to handle the re-submission of censored client requests. FnF-BFT addresses this problem by periodically rotating leaders over the client space.

Gupta et al. [15] recently introduced MultiBFT. MultiBFT is a protocol-agnostic approach to parallelize and improve existing BFT protocols. While allowing multiple instances to each run an individual client request, the protocol requires instances to unify after each request—creating a significant overhead. Additionally, MultiBFT relies on failure detection, which is only possible in synchronous networks [19]. With FnF-BFT, we allow leaders to make progress independently of each other without relying on failure detection.

Similarly, Stathakopoulou et al. [25] further investigated multiple leader protocols with Mir. Mir significantly improves throughput in comparison to sequential-leader approaches. However, as Mir runs instances of PBFT on a set of leaders, it incurs $O(n^2)$ complexity, as well as $O(n^3)$ complexity to update the leader set. Additionally, while exhibiting a high-throughput in the presence of crash failures, we expect Mir’s performance to drop significantly in the presence of fully byzantine replicas. Mir updates the leader set as soon as a single leader in the set stops making progress—allowing byzantine leaders to repeatedly end epochs early. FnF-BFT, however, continues to make progress in the presence of unresponsive byzantine leaders. We further show that the byzantine-resilient throughput is a constant fraction of the best-case throughput.

Byzantine resilience was first studied in detail with the introduction of Aardvark by Clement et al. [9]. Aardvark is an adaptation of PBFT with frequent view-changes: a leader only stays in its position when displaying an increasing throughput level. This first approach, however, comes with significant performance cuts in networks without failures. Parallel leaders allow FnF-BFT to be byzantine-resilient without accepting significant performance losses in an ideal setting.

Byzantine resilience has further been studied since the introduction of Aardvark. Prime, proposed by Amir et al. [2, 3], aims to maximize performance in malicious environments. Besides, adding delay constraints that further confine the partially synchronous network model, Prime restricts its evaluation to delay attacks, i.e., the leader adds as much delay as possible to the protocol. Similarly, Veronese et al. [26] only evaluated their proposed protocol, Spinning, in the presence of delay attacks—not fully capturing possible byzantine attacks. Consequently, the maximum performance degradation Spinning and Prime can incur under byzantine faults is at least 78% [5]. We analyze FnF-BFT theoretically to capture the entire spectrum of possible byzantine attacks.

Aublin et al. [5] further explore the performance of BFT protocols in the presence of byzantine attacks with RBFT. RBFT runs $f$ backup instances on the same set of client requests as the master instance to discover whether the master instance is byzantine. Thus, RBFT incurs quadratic communication complexity for every request. In this work, we reduce the communication complexity to $O(n)$ and further increase performance through parallelization—allowing byzantine-resilience without the added burden of detecting byzantine leaders.

### 1.3 Our Contribution

To the best of our knowledge, we introduce the first multiple leader BFT protocol with performance guarantees in stable network conditions under truly byzantine attacks, which we term FnF-BFT. Specifically, FnF-BFT is the first BFT protocol that achieves all the following properties:

- **Optimistic Performance**: After GST, the best-case throughput is $\Omega(n)$ times higher than for sequential-leader protocols.
- **Byzantine-Resilient Performance**: After GST, the worst-case throughput of the system is at least a constant fraction of its best-case throughput.
- **Efficiency**: After GST, the amortized authenticator complexity of reaching consensus is $\Theta(n)$.

We achieve these properties by combining two key components. First, we enable all replicas to continuously act as leaders in parallel to share the load of clients’ requests. Second, unlike other protocols, we do not replace leaders upon failure but configure each leader’s load based on the leader’s past performance. Through this combination, we guarantee a fair distribution of the requests according to each replica’s capacity, which in turn results in fast processing of requests.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first define the model as well as the protocol goals (Section 2). Then, we introduce the design of FnF-BFT (Section 3); later, we present a security and performance analysis of our protocol (Section 4). We conclude with Section 5.
2 THE MODEL

The system consists of \( n = 3f + 1 \) authenticated replicas and a set of clients. We index replicas by \( u \in [n] = \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \).

At most \( f \) replicas in the system are byzantine; that is, instead of following the protocol, they are controlled by an adversary with full information on their internal state. All other replicas are assumed to be correct, i.e., following the protocol. Byzantine replicas may exhibit arbitrary adversarial behavior, meaning they can also behave like correct replicas. An adversary may control a total of \( f \) unique byzantine replicas throughout the protocol execution and learn their internal state. The adversary cannot intercept the communication between two correct replicas. Any number of clients may be byzantine.

2.1 Communication Model

We show that FnF-BFT is safe in the asynchronous communication model, that is when messages between correct replicas are assumed to arrive in arbitrary order after any finite delay. For all other properties of the system, we consider a partially synchronous communication model. More precisely, we assume a known bound \( \Delta \) on message transmission will hold between any two correct replicas after some unknown global stabilization time (GST).

2.2 Cryptographic Primitives

We make the usual cryptographic assumptions: the adversary is computationally bounded, and cryptographically-secure communication channels, computationally secure hash functions, (threshold) signatures, and encryption schemes exist.

Similar to other BFT algorithms [4, 14, 27], FnF-BFT makes use of threshold signatures. In a \((l, n)\) threshold signature scheme, there is a single public key held by all replicas and clients. Additionally, each replica \( u \) holds a distinct private key allowing the generation of a partial signature \( \sigma_u(m) \) for any message \( m \). Any set of \( l \) distinct partial signatures for the same message, \( \{\sigma_u(m) \mid u \in U, |U| = l\} \), can be combined (by any replica) into a unique signature \( \sigma(m) \). The combined signature can be verified using the public key. We assume that the scheme is robust, i.e., any verifier can easily filter out invalid signatures from malicious participants. In this work, we set \( l = 2f + 1 \).

2.3 Authenticator Complexity

Message complexity has long been considered the main throughput-limiting factor in BFT protocols [14, 27]. In practice, however, the throughput of a BFT protocol is limited by both its computational footprint (mainly caused by cryptographic operations) and its message complexity. Hence, to assess the performance and efficiency of FnF-BFT, we adopt a complexity measure called authenticator complexity [27].

An authenticator is any (partial) signature. We define the protocol’s authenticator complexity as the sum of all computations or verifications by replicas of any authenticator during the protocol execution.

Note that authenticator complexity also captures the message complexity of a protocol if, like in FnF-BFT, each message can be assumed to contain at least one signature. Unlike [27], where only the number of received signatures is considered, our definition allows us to capture the load handled by replicas more accurately. However, authenticator complexities, according to the two definitions, only differ by a constant factor.

We only analyze the authenticator complexity after GST, as it is impossible for a BFT protocol to ensure deterministic progress and safety at the same time in an asynchronous network [13].

2.4 Protocol Overview

The FnF-BFT protocol implements a state machine (cf. Section 2.5) that is replicated across all replicas in the system. Clients broadcast requests to the system. Given client requests, replicas decide on the order of request executions and deliver commit-certificates to the clients.

Our protocol moves forward in epochs. In an epoch, each replica \( u \) is responsible for ordering a set of up to \( C_u \) client requests that are independent of all requests ordered by other replicas in the epoch. Every replica in the system simultaneously acts as both a leader and a backup to the other leaders. The number of assigned client requests \( C_u \) is based on \( u \)’s past performance as a leader. During the epoch-change, a designated replica acting as primary:

1. ensures that all replicas have a consistent view of the past leader and primary performance,
2. deduces non-overlapping sequence numbers for each leader, and
3. assigns parts of the client space to leaders.

An epoch-change occurs whenever requested by more than two-thirds of the replicas. Whenever seeking an epoch-change, a replica immediately stops participating in the previous epoch. The primary in charge of the epoch-change is selected through periodic rotation based on performance history. Replicas request an epoch-change if:

1. all replicas \( u \) have exhausted their \( C_u \) requests, (b) a local timeout is exceeded, or (c) enough other replicas request an epoch-change. Hence, epochs have bounded-length.

2.5 Protocol Goals

FnF-BFT achieves scalable and byzantine fault-tolerant state machine replication (SMR). At the core of SMR, a group of replicas decides on a growing log of client requests. Clients are provided with cryptographically secure certificates for the commit of their request. Fundamentally, the protocol will ensure:

1. Safety: If any two correct replicas commit a request with the same sequence number, they both commit the same request.
2. Liveness: If a correct client broadcasts a request, then every correct replica eventually commits the request.

Thus, FnF-BFT will eventually make progress, and valid client requests cannot be censored. Additionally, FnF-BFT guarantees low overhead in reaching consecutive consensus decisions. Unlike other protocols limiting the worst-case efficiency for a single request, we analyze the amortized authenticator complexity per request after GST. We find this to be the relevant throughput-limiting factor. FnF-BFT is efficient:

1. Efficiency: After GST, the amortized authenticator complexity of reaching consensus is \( \Theta(n) \).

Furthermore, FnF-BFT achieves competitive performance under both optimistic and pessimistic adversarial scenarios:
3.1 Client

Each client has a unique identifier. A client $c$ requests the execution of state machine operation $r$ by sending a request $(r, t, c)$ to all leaders. Here, timestamp $t$ is a monotonically increasing sequence number used to order the requests from one client. By using watermarks, we allow clients to have more than one request in flight. Client watermarks, low and high, represent the range of timestamps. Thus, we require $t$ to be within the low and high watermarks of client $c$. The client watermarks are advanced similarly to the leader watermarks (cf. Section 3.6).

Upon executing operation $r$, replica $u$ responds to the client with $(\text{reply}, e, d, u)$, where $e$ is the epoch number and $d$ is the request digest (cf. Section 3.5). The client waits for $f + 1$ such responses from the replicas.

3.2 Sequence Number Distribution

We distribute sequence numbers to leaders for the succeeding epoch during the epoch-change. While we commit requests from each leader in order, the requests from different leaders are committed independently of each other in our protocol. Doing so allows leaders to continue making progress in an epoch, even though other leaders might have stopped working. Otherwise, a natural attack for Byzantine leaders is to stop working and force the system to an epoch-change. Such attacks are possible in other parallel-leader protocols such as Mir [25].

By allowing leaders to commit requests independent of each other, we need to allocate sequence numbers to all leaders during the epoch-change. Thus, we must also determine the number of requests each leader is responsible for before the epoch. The number of requests for leader $v$ in epoch $e$ is denoted by $C_v(e)$. It can be computed deterministically by all replicas in the network, based on the known history of the system (cf. Section 3.7).

When assigning sequence numbers, we first automatically yield to each leader $v \in [n]$ the sequence numbers of the $O_v(e)$ existing hanging operations from previous epochs in the assigned bucket(s). The remaining $C_v(e) - O_v(e)$ sequence numbers for each leader are distributed to them one after each other according to their ordering from the set of available sequence numbers. Note that $O_v(e)$ cannot exceed $C_v(e)$.

For each leader $v$ the assigned sequence numbers are mapped to local sequence numbers $1_{v, e}, 2_{v, e}, \ldots, C_v(e)_{v, e}$ in epoch $e$. These sequence numbers are later used to simplify checkpoint creation (cf. Section 3.6).

3.3 Hash Space Division

The request hash space is partitioned into buckets to avoid duplication. Each of these buckets is assigned to a single leader in every epoch. We consider the client identifier to be the request input and hash the client identifier ($h_c = h(c)$) to map requests into buckets. The hash space partition ensures that no two conflicting requests will be assigned to different leaders.

Thus, the requests served by different leaders are independent of each other. Additionally, the bucket assignment is rotated round-robin across epochs, preventing request censoring. The hash space is portioned into $m \cdot n$ non-intersecting buckets of equal size, where $m \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ is a configuration parameter. Each leader $v$ then assigns $m_v(e)$ buckets in epoch $e$ according to their load $C_v(e)$ (cf. Section 3.7). Leaders can only include requests from their active buckets.

When assigning buckets to leaders, the protocol ensures that every leader is assigned at least one bucket, as well as distributing the buckets according to the load handled by the leaders. Precisely,
the number of buckets leader \( v \) is assigned in epoch \( e \) is given by
\[
\begin{align*}
m_v(e) &= \left[ \frac{C_v(e)}{\sum_{u \in [n]} C_u(e)} (m - 1) \cdot n \right] + 1 + \tilde{m}_v(e),
\end{align*}
\]
where \( \tilde{m}_v(e) \in \{0, 1\} \) distributes the remaining buckets to the
leaders – ensuring \( \sum_{u \in [n]} m_u(e) = m \cdot n \). The remaining buckets
are allocated to leaders \( v \) with the biggest value:
\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{C_v(e)}{\sum_{u \in [n]} C_u(e)} (m - 1) \cdot n + 1 - \frac{C_v(e)}{\sum_{u \in [n]} C_u(e)} \cdot m \cdot n.
\end{align*}
\]

Note that the system will require a sufficiently long stability
period for all correct leaders to be working at their capacity limit,
i.e., \( C_v(e) \) matching the performance of leader \( v \) in epoch \( e \). Once
correct leaders function at their capacity, the number of buckets
they serve matches their capacity.

The hash buckets are distributed to the leaders through a de-
deterministic rotation such that each leader repeatedly serves each
bucket under \( f + 1 \) unique primaries. This rotation prevents byzan-
tine replicas from censoring specific hash buckets.

Throughout the remaining thesis, we assume that there are always
client requests pending in each bucket. Since we aim to opti-
imize throughput, we consider this assumption in-sync with our
protocol goals.

### 3.4 Primary Rotation

While all replicas are tasked with being a leader at all times, only
a single replica acting as primary initiates an epoch. FnF-BFT as-
signs primaries periodically – exploiting the performance of good
primaries and being reactive to network changes.

The primary rotation consists of two core building blocks. For
one, FnF-BFT repeatedly rotates through the \( 2f + 1 \) best primaries
and thus exploits their performance. Moreover, the primary assign-
ment ensures that FnF-BFT explores every primary at least once
within a sliding window. The sliding window consists of \( g \in \mathbb{Z} \)
epochs, and we set \( g \geq 3f + 1 \) to allow the exploration of all pri-
maries throughout a sliding window. We depict a sample rotation
in Figure 1.

Figure 1: FnF-BFT primary rotation in a system with \( n = 10 \)
replicas. In blue, we show epochs led by primaries elected
based on their performance. Epochs shown in yellow are led
by replicas re-evaluated once their last turn as primary falls
out of the sliding window.

Through the protocol, all replicas record the performance of
each primary. We measure performance as the number of requests
successfully committed under a primary in an epoch. Performance
can thus be determined during the succeeding epoch-change by
each replica (cf. Section 3.7). To deliver a reactive system, we update
a replica’s primary performance after each turn.

We rotate through the best \( 2f + 1 \) primaries repeatedly. After
every \( 2f + 1 \) primaries, the best \( 2f + 1 \) primaries are redetermined
and subsequently elected as primary in order of the time passed
since their last turn as primary. The primary that has not been seen
for the longest time is elected first.

Cycling through the best primaries maximizes system perfor-
mance. Simultaneously, basing performance solely on a replica’s
preceding primary performance strips byzantine primaries from
the ability to misuse a good reputation.

Every so often, we interrupt the continuous exploitation of the
best \( 2f + 1 \) primaries; to revisit replicas that fall out of the sliding
window. If replica \( u \)'s last turn as primary occurred in epoch \( e - g \)
by the time epoch \( e \) rolls around, replica \( u \) would be re-explored
as primary in epoch \( e \). The exploration allows us to re-evaluate
all replicas as primaries periodically and ensures that FnF-BFT is
reactive to network changes.

Note that we start the protocol by exploring all primaries ordered
by their identifiers. We would also like to point out that only one
primary can fall out of the sliding window at any time after the
initial exploration. Thus, we always know which primary will be
re-evaluated.

### 3.5 Epoch Operation

To execute requests, we use a leader-based adaption of PBFT, similar
to Linear-PBFT [14]. Threshold signatures are commonly used to
reduce the complexity of the backup prepare and commit phases of
PBFT. The leader of a request is used as a collector of partial signa-
tures to create a \( (2f + 1, n) \) threshold signature in the intermediate
stages of the backup prepare and commit phases. We visualize the
schematic of the message flow for one request led by replica 0 in
Figure 2 and details of the three-phase protocol follow.

Figure 2: Schematic message flow for one request.

**Leader prepare phase.** Upon receiving a \((request, r, t, c)\) from a
client, each replica computes the hash of the client identifier \( c \).
If the request falls into one of the active buckets belonging to
leader \( v \), \( v \) verifies \((request, r, t, c)\) from client \( c \). The request
is discarded, if (a) it has already been prepared, or (b) it is already
pending. Once verified, leader \( v \) broadcasts \((pre-prepare, sn, e, h(r))\),
where \( sn \) is the sequence number, \( e \) the current epoch, \( h(r) \) is
the hash digest of request \( r \) and \( v \) represents the leader’s signature.
The cryptographic hash function \( h \) maps an arbitrary-length input
to a fixed-length output. We can use the digest \( h(r) \) as a unique
identifier for a request \( r \), as we assume the hash function to be
collision-resistant.
Backup prepare phase. A backup \( w \) accepts (pre-prepare, \( s_n, e, h(r), v \)) from leader \( v \), if (a) the epoch number matches its local epoch number, (b) \( w \) has not prepared another request with the same sequence number \( s_n \) in epoch \( e \), (c) leader \( v \) leads sequence number \( s_n \), (d) \( s_n \) lies between the low and high watermarks of leader \( v \), (e) \( r \) is in the active bucket of \( v \), and (f) \( r \) was submitted by an authorized client. Upon accepting (pre-prepare, \( s_n, e, h(r), v \)), \( w \) computes \( d = h(s_n)||e||r \) where \( h \) is a cryptographic hash function. Additionally, \( w \) signs \( d \) by computing a verifiable partial signature \( \sigma_w(d) \). Then \( w \) sends \((\text{prepare}, s_n, e, \sigma_w(d))\) to leader \( v \). Upon receiving \( 2f \) prepare messages for \( s_n \) in epoch \( e \), leader \( v \) of \( s_n \) forms a combined signature \( \sigma(d) \) from the \( 2f \) prepare messages and its own signature. It then broadcasts \((\text{prepared-certificate}, s_n, e, \sigma(d))\) to all backups.

Commit phase. Backup \( w \) accepts the \text{prepared-certificate} and replies \((\text{commit}, s_n, e, \sigma_w(\sigma(d)))\) to leader \( v \). After collecting \( 2f \) commit messages, leader \( v \) creates a combined signature \( \sigma(\sigma(d)) \) using the signatures from the collected commit messages and its own signature. Once the combined signature is prepared, \( v \) continues by broadcasting \((\text{commit-certificate}, s_n, e, \sigma(\sigma(d)))\). Upon receiving the \text{commit-certificate}, replicas execute \( r \) after delivering all preceding requests led by \( v \), and send replies to the client.

We summarize the protocol executed by replicas to deliver a request proposed by leader \( v \) in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 is run locally at all replicas in the system.

### 3.6 Checkpointing

Similar to PBFT [8], we periodically create checkpoints to prove the correctness of the current state. Instead of requiring a costly round of all-to-all communication to create a checkpoint, we add an intermediate phase and let the respective leader collect partial signatures to generate a certificate optimistically. Additionally, we expand the PBFT checkpoint protocol to run for \( n \) parallel leaders.

For each leader \( v \), we repeatedly create checkpoints to clear the logs and advance the watermarks of leader \( v \) whenever the local sequence number \( s_{n,\text{e},k} \) is divisible by a constant \( k \in \mathbb{Z}^+ \). Recall that when a replica \( u \) delivers a request for leader \( v \) with local sequence number \( s_{n,\text{e},k} \), this implies that all requests led by \( v \) with local sequence number lower than \( s_{n,\text{e},k} \) have been locally committed at replica \( u \). Hence, after delivering the request with local sequence number \( s_{n,\text{e},k} \), replica \( u \) sends \((\text{checkpoint}, s_{n,\text{e},k}, h(s'_{n,\text{e},k}), u)\) to leader \( v \). Here, \( s'_{n,\text{e},k} \) is the last checkpoint and \( h(s'_{n,\text{e},k}) \) is the hash digest of the requests with sequence number \( s_{n,\text{e},k} \) in the range \( s_{n,\text{e},k} \leq s_n \leq s_{n,\text{e},k} \). Leader \( v \) proceeds by collecting \( 2f + 1 \) checkpoint messages (including its own). Then leader \( v \) persists a \text{checkpoint-certificate} by creating a combined threshold signature.

It sends the \text{checkpoint-certificate} to all other replicas. If a replica sees the \text{checkpoint-certificate}, the checkpoint is stable and the replica can discard the corresponding messages from its logs, i.e., for sequence numbers belonging to leader \( v \) lower than \( s_{n,\text{e},k} \).

We use checkpointing to advance low and high watermarks. In doing so, we allow several requests from a leader to be in flight. The low watermark \( L_v \) for leader \( v \) is equal to the sequence number of the last stable checkpoint, and the high watermark is \( H_v = L_v + 2k \). We set \( k \) to be large enough such that replicas do not stall. Given its watermarks, leader \( v \) can only propose requests with a local sequence number between low and high watermarks.

### 3.7 Epoch-Change

At a high level, we modify the PBFT epoch-change protocol as follows: we use threshold signatures to reduce the message complexity and extend the epoch-change message to include information about all leaders. Similarly to Mir [25], we introduce a round of reliable broadcast to share information needed to determine the configuration of the next epoch(s). In particular, we determine the load assigned to each leader in the next epoch, based on their past performance. We also record the performance of the preceding primary. An overview of the epoch-change protocol can be found in Algorithm 2, while a detailed description follows.

**Calling epoch-change.** We first describe when replicas call an epoch-change. Replicas call an epoch-change by broadcasting an epoch-change message in four cases:

1. Replica \( u \) triggers an epoch-change in epoch \( e \), once it has committed everyone’s assigned requests locally.

2. Additionally, replica \( u \) calls for an epoch-change when its epoch timer expires. The value of the epoch timer \( T \) is set to ensure that after GST, correct replicas can finish at least \( C_{\min} \) requests during an epoch. \( C_{\min} \in \Omega(n^2) \) is the minimum
Algorithm 2: Epoch-change protocol for epoch $e + 1$

1. **Starting epoch-change**
2. as replica $u$:
3. broadcast (epoch-change, $e + 1, S, C, P, Q, u$)
4. upon receiving $2f$ other epoch-change messages for epoch $e + 1$:
5. start epoch-change timer $T_e$
6. Reliable broadcast
7. as primary $P_{e+1}$:
8. compute $C_v(e + 1)$ for all leaders $v \in [n]$
9. perform 3-phase reliable broadcast sharing configuration details of epoch $e + 1$ and the performance of primary $P_e$
10. as replica $u$:
11. participate in reliable broadcast initiatives by $P_{e+1}$
12. **Starting epoch**
13. as primary $P_{e+1}$:
14. broadcast (new-epoch, $e + 1, V, O, P_{e+1}$)
15. enter epoch $e + 1$
16. as replica $u$:
17. accept (new-epoch, $e + 1, V, O, P_{e+1}$)
18. enter epoch $e + 1$

number of requests assigned to leaders. Each replica locally starts the timer for epoch $e$ upon entering the epoch.

(3) Replicas call epoch-changes upon observing inadequate progress. Each replica $u$ has individual no-progress timers for all leaders. The no-progress timer is initialized with the same value $T_p$ for all. Initially, replicas set all no-progress timers for the first time after $5\Delta$ in the epoch — accounting for the message transmission time of the initial requests. A replica resets the timer for leader $v$ every time it receives a commit-certificate from $v$. In case the replica has already committed $C_v$ requests for leader $v$, the timer is no longer reset. Upon observing no progress timeouts for $b \in [f + 1, 2f + 1]$ different leaders, a replica calls an epoch-change. Requiring at least $f + 1$ leaders to make progress ensures that a constant fraction of leaders makes progress, and at least one correct leader is involved. On the other hand, we demand no more than $2f + 1$ leaders to make progress such that byzantine leaders failing to execute requests cannot stop the epoch early. We let $b = 2f + 1$ and set the no-progress timer such that it does not expire for correct leaders and simultaneously ensures sufficient progress, i.e., $T_p \in \Theta(T/C_{\min})$.

(4) Finally, replica $u$ also calls an epoch-change if it sees that $f + 1$ other replicas have called an epoch-change for an epoch higher than $e$. It picks the smallest epoch in the set such that byzantine replicas cannot advance the protocol an arbitrary number of epochs.

After sending an epoch-change message, the replica will only start its epoch-change timer, once it saw at least $2f + 1$ epoch-change messages. We will discuss the epoch-change timer in more detail later.

**Starting epoch-change** (Algorithm 2, steps 1-5). To move the system to epoch $e + 1$, replica $u$ sends (epoch-change, $e + 1, S, C, P, Q, u$) to all replicas in the system. Here, $S$ is a vector of sequence numbers $s_n$ of the last stable checkpoints $S_v, \forall v \in [n]$ known to $u$ for each leader $v$. $C$ is a set of checkpoint-certificates proving the correctness of $S_v, \forall v \in [n]$, while $P$ contains sets $P_v, \forall v \in [n]$. For each leader $v$, $P_v$ contains a prepared-certificate for each request $r$ that was prepared at $u$ with sequence number higher than $s_{n_v}$, if replica $v$ does not possess a commit-certificate for $r$. Similarly, $Q$ contains sets $Q_v, \forall v \in [n]$, $Q_v$ consists of a commit-certificate for each request $r$ that was prepared at $u$ with sequence number higher than $s_{n_v}$.

**Reliable broadcast** (Algorithm 2, steps 6-11). The primary of epoch $e + 1$ ($P_{e+1}$) waits for $2f$ epoch-change messages for epoch $e$. Upon receiving a sufficient number of messages, the primary performs a classical 3-phase reliable broadcast. During the broadcast, the primary informs leaders of the number of requests assigned to each leader in the next epoch and the identifiers of the replicas which send epoch-change messages. The number of requests assigned to a leader is computed deterministically (Algorithm 3). Through the reliable broadcast, we ensure that the primary cannot share conflicting information regarding the sequence number assignment and, in turn, the next epoch’s sequence number distribution. In addition to sharing information about the epoch configuration, the primary also broadcasts the total number of requests committed during the previous epoch. This information is used by the network to evaluate primary performance and determine epoch primaries.

**Starting epoch** (Algorithm 2, steps 12-18). The primary $P_{e+1}$ multicasts (new-epoch, $e + 1, V, O, P_{e+1}$). Here, the set $V$ contains sets $V_v$, which carry the valid epoch-change messages of each replica $u$ of epoch $e$ received by the primary of epoch $e + 1$, plus the epoch-change message the primary of epoch $e + 1$ would have sent. $O$ consists of sets $O_v, \forall v \in [n]$ containing pre-prepare messages and commit-certificates.

$O_v$ is computed as follows. First, the primary determines the sequence number $S_{\min}(v)$ of the latest stable checkpoint in $V$ and the highest sequence number $S_{\max}(v)$ in a prepare message in $V$. For each sequence number $s_{n_v}$ between $S_{\min}(v)$ and $S_{\max}(v)$ of all leaders $v \in [n]$ there are three cases: (a) there is at least one set in $Q_v$ of some epoch-change message in $V$ with sequence number $s_{n_v}$, (b) there is at least one set in $P_v$ of some epoch-change message in $V$ with sequence number $s_{n_v}$, and none in $Q_v$, or (c) there is no such set. In the first case, the primary simply prepares a commit-certificate it received for $s_{n_v}$. In the second case, the primary creates a new message (pre-prepare, $s_{n_v}, e + 1, d, P_{e+1}$), where $d$ is the request digest in the pre-prepare message for sequence number $s_{n_v}$ with the highest epoch number in $V$. In the third case, it creates a new pre-prepare message (pre-prepare, $s_{n_v}, e + 1, d_{null}, P_{e+1}$), where $d_{null}$ is the digest of a special null request; a null request goes through the protocol like other requests, but its execution is a no-op. If there is a gap between $S_{\max}(v)$ and the last sequence number assigned to leader $v$ in epoch $e$, these sequence numbers will be newly assigned in the next epoch.

Next, the primary appends the messages in $O$ to its log. If $S_{\min}(v)$ is greater than the sequence number of its latest stable checkpoint, the primary also inserts the proof of stability (the checkpoint with sequence number $S_{\min}(v)$) in its log. Then it enters epoch $e + 1$; at this point, it can accept messages for epoch $e + 1$. 


A replica accepts a new-epoch message for epoch \( e + 1 \) if: (a) it is signed properly, (b) the epoch-change messages it contains are valid for epoch \( e + 1 \), (c) the information in \( V \) matches the new request assignment, and (d) the set \( O \) is correct. The replica verifies the correctness of \( O \) by performing a computation similar to the one previously used by the primary. Then, the replica adds the new information contained in \( O \) to its log and decides all requests for which a commit-certificate was sent. It proceeds by broadcasting a pre-prepare message for each request in \( O \) and sends the message to the new leader of the bucket in question. The replica then enters epoch \( e + 1 \). Replicas rerun the protocol for messages between \( S_{\text{min}}(v) \) and \( S_{\text{max}}(v) \) without a commit-certificate. They do not execute client requests again (they use their stored information about the last reply sent to each client instead). As request messages and stable checkpoints are not included in new-epoch messages, a replica might not have some of them available. In this case, the replica can easily obtain the missing information from other replicas in the system.

**Hanging requests.** While the primary sends out the pre-prepare message for all hanging requests, replicas in whose buckets the requests fall, are responsible for computing prepared- and commit-certificates of the individual requests. In the example shown in Figure 3, the primary of epoch \( e + 1 \), replica 0, sends a pre-prepare message for a request in a bucket of replica 1, contained in the new-epoch message, to everyone. Replica 1 is then responsible for prepared- and commit-certificates, as well as collecting the corresponding partial signatures.

**Epoch-change timer.** A replica sets an epoch-change timer \( T_e \) upon entering the epoch-change for epoch \( e + 1 \). By default, we configure the epoch-change timer \( T_e \) such that a correct primary can successfully finish the epoch-change after GST. If the timer expires without seeing a valid new-epoch message, the replica requests an epoch-change for epoch \( e + 2 \). If a replica has experienced at least \( f \) unsuccessful consecutive epoch-changes previously, the replica doubles the timer’s value. It continues to do so until it sees a valid new-epoch message. We only start doubling the timer after \( e + 2 \). Each leader is re-evaluated during the epoch-change. If a leader successfully committed all assigned requests in the preceding epoch, we double the number of requests this leader is given in the following epoch. Else, it is assigned the maximum number of requests it committed within the last \( f + 1 \) epochs.

**Algorithm 3 Configuration adjustment**

1. initially \( C_v(1) = C_{\text{min}} \) for all replicas \( v \)
2. if \( C_v(e) < C_v(e + 1) \)
3. \( C_v(e + 1) = \max \left( C_{\text{min}}, \max_{i \in \{0, \ldots, f\}} (C_v(e - i)) \right) \)
4. else
5. \( C_v(e + 1) = 2 \cdot C_v(e) \)

Through the configuration adjustment, we assign sequence numbers to leaders according to their abilities. As soon as we see a leader outperforming their workload, we double the number of requests they are assigned in the following epoch. Additionally, leaders operating below their expected capabilities are allocated requests according to the highest potential demonstrated in the past \( f + 1 \) rounds. By looking at the previous \( f + 1 \) epochs, we ensure that there is at least one epoch with a correct primary in the leader set. In this epoch, the leader had the chance to display its capabilities. Thus, basing a leader’s performance on the last \( f + 1 \) rounds allows us to see its ability independent of the possible influence of byzantine primaries.

**4 Analysis**

In this section, we show that \( \text{FnF-BFT} \) satisfies the properties specified in Section 2.5. More specifically, we prove the safety and liveness of \( \text{FnF-BFT} \), argue that it is efficient, and evaluate its resilience to byzantine attacks in stable network conditions.

**4.1 Safety**

\( \text{FnF-BFT} \) generalizes Linear-PBFT [14], which is an adaptation of PBFT [8] that reduces its authenticator complexity during epoch operation. We thus rely on similar arguments to prove \( \text{FnF-BFT} \)'s safety in Theorem 1.

**Theorem 1.** If any two correct replicas commit a request with the same sequence number, they both commit the same request.

**Proof.** We start by showing that if \( (\text{prepared-certificate}, sn, e, \sigma(d)) \) exists, then \( (\text{prepared-certificate}, sn, e, \sigma(d')) \) cannot exist for \( d' \neq d \). Here, \( d = h(sn||e||r) \) and \( d' = h(sn||e||r') \). Further, we assume the probability of \( r \neq r' \) and \( d = d' \) to be negligible. The existence of \( (\text{prepared-certificate}, sn, e, \sigma(d)) \) implies that at least \( f + 1 \) correct replicas sent a pre-prepare message or a prepare message for the request \( r \) with digest \( d \) in epoch \( e \) with sequence...
number \( sn \). For \( (\text{prepared-certificate}, sn, e, \sigma(d')) \) to exist, at least one of these correct replicas needs to have sent two conflicting prepare messages (pre-prepare messages in case it leads \( sn \)). This is a contradiction.

Through the epoch-change protocol we further ensure that correct replicas agree on the sequence of requests that are committed locally in different epochs. The existence of \( (\text{prepared-certificate}, sn, e, \sigma(d)) \) implies that \( (\text{prepared-certificate}, sn, e', \sigma(d')) \) cannot exist for \( d' \neq d \) and \( e' > e \). Any correct replica only commits a request with sequence number \( sn \) in epoch \( e \) if it saw the corresponding commit-certificate. For a commit-certificate for request \( r \) with digest \( d \) and sequence number \( sn \) to exist a set \( R_1 \) of at least \( f + 1 \) correct replicas needs to have seen \( (\text{prepared-certificate}, sn, e, \sigma(d)) \). A correct replica will only accept a pre-prepare message for epoch \( e' > e \) after having received a new-epoch message for epoch \( e' \). Any correct new-epoch message for epoch \( e' > e \) must contain epoch-change messages from a set \( R_2 \) of at least \( f + 1 \) correct replicas. As there are \( 2f + 1 \) correct replicas, \( R_1 \) and \( R_2 \) intersect in at least one correct replica \( u \). Replica \( u \)'s epoch-change message ensures that information about request \( r \) being prepared in epoch \( e \) is propagated to subsequent epochs, unless \( sn \) is already included in the stable checkpoint of its leader. In case the prepared-certificate is propagated to the subsequent epoch, a commit-certificate will potentially be propagated as well. If the new-epoch message only includes the prepared-certificate for \( sn \), the protocol is redone for request \( r \) with digest \( d \) and sequence number \( sn \). In the two other cases, the replicas commit \( sn \) locally upon seeing the new-epoch message and a correct replica will never accept a request with sequence number \( sn \) again.

4.2 Liveness

One cannot guarantee safety and liveness for deterministic BFT protocols in asynchrony [13]. We will, therefore, show that FnF-BFT eventually makes progress after GST. In other words, we consider a stable network when discussing liveness. Furthermore, we assume that after an extended period without progress, the time required for local computation in an epoch-change is negligible. Thus, we focus on analyzing the network delays for liveness.

Similar to PBFT [8], FnF-BFT’s epoch-change uses the following three techniques to ensure that correct replicas become synchronized (Definition 2) after GST.

1. A replica in epoch \( e \) observing epoch-change messages from \( f + 1 \) other replicas calling for any epoch(s) greater than \( e \) issues an epoch-change message for the smallest such epoch.

2. A replica only starts its epoch-change timer after receiving \( 2f \) other epoch-change messages, thus ensuring that at least \( f + 1 \) correct replicas have broadcast an epoch-change message for the epoch (or higher). Hence, all correct replicas start their epoch-change timer for an epoch \( e' \) within at most \( 2 \) message delay. After GST, this amounts to at most \( 2\Delta \).

3. Byzantine replicas are unable to impede progress by calling frequent epoch-changes, as an epoch-change will only happen if at least \( f + 1 \) replicas call it. A byzantine primary can hinder the epoch-change from being successful. However, there can only be \( f \) byzantine primaries in a row.

Definition 2. Two replicas are called synchronized, if they start their epoch-change timer for an epoch \( e \) within at most \( 2\Delta \).

Lemma 3. After GST, correct replicas eventually become synchronized.

Proof. Let \( u \) be the first correct replica to start its epoch-change timer for epoch \( e \) at time \( t_0 \). Following (2), this implies that \( u \) received at least \( 2f \) other epoch-change messages for epoch \( e \) (or higher). Of these \( 2f \) messages, at least \( f \) originate from other correct replicas. Thus, together with its own epoch-change message, at least \( f + 1 \) correct replicas broadcast an epoch-change message by time \( t_0 \). These \( f + 1 \) epoch-change messages are seen by all correct replicas at the latest by time \( t_0 + \Delta \). Thus, according to (1), at time \( t_0 + \Delta \) all correct replicas broadcast an epoch-change message for epoch \( e \). Consequently, at time \( t_0 + 2\Delta \) all correct replicas have received at least \( 2f \) other epoch-change messages and will start the timer for epoch \( e \).

Lemma 4. After GST, all correct replicas will be in the same epoch long enough for a correct leader to make progress.

Proof. From Lemma 3, we conclude that after GST, all correct replicas will eventually enter the same epoch if the epoch-change timer is sufficiently large. Once the correct replicas are synchronized in their epoch, the duration needed for a correct leader to commit a request is bounded. Note that all correct replicas will be in the same epoch for a sufficiently long time as the timers are configured accordingly. Additionally, byzantine replicas are unable to impede progress by calling frequent epoch-changes, according to (3).

Theorem 5. If a correct client \( c \) broadcasts request \( r \), then every correct replica eventually commits \( r \).

Proof. Following Lemmas 3 and 4, we know that all correct replicas will eventually be in the same epoch after GST. Hence, in any epoch with a correct primary, the system will make progress. Note that a correct client will not issue invalid requests. It remains to show that an epoch with a correct primary and a correct leader assigned to hash bucket \( h(c) \) will occur. We note that this is given by the bucket rotation, which ensures that a correct leader repeatedly serves each bucket in a correct primary epoch.

4.3 Efficiency

To demonstrate that FnF-BFT is efficient, we start by analyzing the authenticator complexity for reaching consensus during an epoch. Like Linear-PBFT [14], using each leader as a collector for partial signatures in the backup prepare and commit phase, allows FnF-BFT to achieve linear complexity during epoch operation.

Lemma 6. The authenticator complexity for committing a request during an epoch is \( \Theta(n) \).

Proof. During the leader prepare phase, the authenticator complexity is at most \( n \). The primary computes its signature to attach it to the pre-prepare message. This signature is verified by no more than \( n - 1 \) replicas.

Furthermore, the backup prepare and commit phase’s authenticator complexity is less than \( 3n \) each. Initially, at most \( n - 1 \) backups,
compute their partial signature and send it to the leader, who, in
turn, verifies 2f of these signatures. The leader then computes its
partial signature, as well as computing the combined signature.
Upon receiving the combined signature, the n − 1 backups need to
verify the signature.

Overall, the authenticator complexity committing a request dur-
ing an epoch is thus at most 7n + o(n) ∈ Θ(n).

We continue by calculating the authenticator complexity of an
echo-change. Intuitively speaking, we reduce PBFT’s view-change
complexity from Θ(n^3) to Θ(n^2) by employing threshold signatures.
However, as FnF-BFT allows for n simultaneous leaders, we obtain
an authenticator complexity of Θ(n^3) as a consequence of sharing
the same information for n leaders during the echo-change.

**Lemma 7.** The authenticator complexity of an echo-change is
Θ(n^3).

**Proof.** The echo-change for epoch e + 1 is initiated by replicas
sending echo-change messages to the primary of epoch e + 1. Each
echo-change message holds n authenticators for each leader’s last
checkpoint-certificates. As there are at most 2k hanging requests
per leader, a further O(n) authenticators for prepared- and commit-
certificates of the open requests per leader are included in the mes-
 sage. Additionally, the sending replica also includes its signature.
Each replica newly computes its signature to sign the echo-change
message, the remaining authenticators are already available and
do not need to be created by the replicas. Thus, a total of no more
than n authenticators are computed for the echo-change messages.
We also note echo-change message contains Θ(n) authenticators.
Therefore, the number of authenticators received by each replica is
Θ(n^3).

After the collection of 2f + 1 echo-change messages, the pri-
mary performs a classical 3-phase reliable broadcast. The primary
broadcasts the same signed message to start the classical 3-phase
reliable broadcast. While the primary computes 1 signature, at most
n − 1 replicas verify this signature. In the two subsequent rounds of
all-to-all communication, each participating replica computes 1 and
verifies 2f signatures. Thereby, the authenticator complexity of each
round of all-to-all communication is at most (2f + 1) · n. Thus,
the authenticator complexity of the 3-phase reliable broadcast is
bounded by (4f + 3) · n ∈ Θ(n^2).

After successfully performing the reliable broadcast, the primary
sends out a new-epoch message to every replica in the network.
The new-epoch message contains the epoch-change messages held
by the primary and the required pre-prepare messages for open re-
quests. There are O(n) such pre-prepare messages, all signed by the
primary. Finally, each new-epoch message is signed by the primary.
Thus, the authenticator complexity of the new-epoch message is
Θ(n^3). However, suppose a replica has previously received and ver-
ified an epoch-change from replica u whose epoch-change message
is included in the new-epoch message. In that case, the replica no
longer has to check the authenticators in u’s epoch-change message
again. For the complexity analysis, it does not matter when the
replicas verify the signature. We assume that all replicas verify the
signatures contained in the epoch-change messages before receiv-
ing the new-epoch messages. Thus, the replicas only need to verify
the O(n) new authenticators contained in the new-epoch message.

Overall, the authenticator complexity of the the epoch-change is
at most Θ(n^3).

Finally, we argue that after GST, there is sufficient progress by
correct replicas to compensate for the high epoch-change cost.

**Theorem 8.** After GST, the amortized authenticator complexity
of committing a request is Θ(n).

**Proof.** To find the amortized authenticator complexity of commit-
ing a request, we consider an epoch and the following echo-change.
After GST, the authenticator complexity of committing a request for a correct leader is Θ(n). The timeout value is set such that
a correct worst-case leader creates at least C_{min} requests in each
echo initiated by a correct primary. Thus, there are Θ(n) correct
replicas, each committing C_{min} requests. By setting C_{min} ∈ Ω(n^2),
we guarantee that at least Ω(n) requests are created during an
echo given a correct primary.

Byzantine primaries can ensure that no progress is made in
echos they initiate, by failing to share the new-epoch message with
correct replicas. However, at most, a constant fraction of epochs
lies in the responsibility of byzantine primaries. We conclude that,
on average, Ω(n^2) requests are created during an echo.

Following Lemma 7, the authenticator complexity of an echo-change is Θ(n^3). Note that the epoch-change timeout T_e is set so
that correct primaries can successfully finish the epoch-change
after GST. Not every epoch-change will be successful immediately,
as byzantine primaries might cause unsuccessful epoch-changes.
Specifically, byzantine primaries can purposely summon an un-
successful epoch-change to decrease efficiency.

In case of an unsuccessful epoch-change, replicas initiate another
epoch-change – and continue doing so – until a successful echo-
change occurs. However, we only need to start O(1) epoch-changes
on average to be successful after GST, as the primary rotation
ensures that at least a constant fraction of primaries is correct.
Hence, the average cost required to reach a successful echo-change
is Ω(n^3).

We find the amortized request creation cost by adding the request
creation cost to the ratio between the cost of a successful echo-
change and the number of requests created in an echo, that is,

Θ(n) + Θ(n^3)
Ω(n^2) = Θ(n).

Thus, we have shown that FnF-BFT is efficient.

4.4 Optimistic Performance

Throughout this section, we make the following optimistic assump-
tions: all replicas are considered correct, and the network is stable
and synchronous. We employ this model to assess the optimistic
performance of FnF-BFT, i.e., theoretically evaluating its best-case
throughput. Note that this scenario is motivated by practical appli-
cations, as one would hope to have functioning hardware at hand,
at least initially.

Additionally, we assume that the best-case throughput is limited
by the available computing power of each replica – predominantly
required for the computation and verification of cryptographic sig-
natures. We further assume that the available computing power at
each correct replica is the same, which we believe to be realistic as the same hardware will often be employed for each replica in practice. Without loss of generality, each leader can compute/verify one authenticator per time unit. As throughput, we define the number of requests committed by the system per time unit.

Finally, we assume that replicas only verify the authenticators of relevant messages. For example, a leader receiving $3f$ prepare messages for a request will only verify $2f$ authenticators. Similarly, pre-prepare messages outside the leaders’ watermarks will not be processed by backups.

Note that we will carry all assumptions into Section 4.5. There they will, however, only apply to correct replicas.

4.4.1 Sequential-Leader Protocols. We claim that FnF-BFT achieves higher throughput than sequential-leader protocols by the means of leader parallelization. To support this claim, we compare FnF-BFT’s throughput to that of a generic sequential-leader protocol. The generic sequential-leader protocol will serve as an asymptotic characterization of many state-of-the-art sequential-leader protocols [8, 14, 27].

A sequential-leader protocol is characterized by having a unique leader at any point in time. Throughout its reign, the leader is responsible for serving all client requests. Depending on the protocol, the leader is rotated repeatedly or only upon failure.

**Lemma 9.** A sequential-leader protocol requires at least $\Omega(n)$ time units to process a client request.

**Proof.** In sequential-leader protocols, a unique replica is responsible for serving all client requests at any point in time. This replica must verify $\Omega(n)$ signatures to commit a request while no other replica leads requests simultaneously. Thus, a sequential-leader protocol requires $\Omega(n)$ time units to process a request. □

![Figure 4: Sequential leader example with four leaders. Throughout its reign a sequential leader is responsible for serving all client requests. Leader changes are indicated by vertical lines.](image)

4.4.2 FnF-BFT Epoch. With FnF-BFT, we propose a parallel-leader protocol (cf. Figure 5) that divides client requests into $m \cdot n$ independent hash buckets. Each hash bucket is assigned to a unique leader at any time. The hash buckets are rotated between leaders across epochs to ensure liveness (cf. Section 3.3). Within an epoch, a leader is only responsible for committing client requests from its assigned hash bucket(s). Overall, this parallelization leads to a significant speed-up.

To show the speed-up gained through parallelization, we first analyze the optimistic epoch throughput of FnF-BFT, i.e., the throughput of the system during stable networking conditions in the best-case scenario with $3f + 1$ correct replicas. Furthermore, we assume the number of requests included in a checkpoint to be sufficiently large, such that no leader must ever stall when waiting for a checkpoint to be created. We analyze the effects of epoch-changes and compute the overall best-case throughput of FnF-BFT in the aforementioned optimistic setting.

**Lemma 10.** After GST, the best-case epoch throughput with $3f + 1$ correct replicas is

$$\frac{k \cdot (3f + 1)}{k \cdot (19f + 3) + (8f + 2)}$$

**Proof.** In the optimistic setting, all epochs are initiated by correct primaries, and thus all replicas will be synchronized after GST.

In FnF-BFT, $n$ leaders work on client requests simultaneously. As in sequential-leader protocols, each leader needs to verify at least $O(n)$ signatures to commit a request. A leader needs to compute $3$ and verify $4f$ authenticators precisely to commit a request it proposes during epoch operation. Thus, leaders need to process a total of $4f + 3 \in \Theta(n)$ signatures to commit a request. With the help of threshold signatures, backups involved in committing a request only need to compute $2$ and verify $3$ authenticators. We follow that a total of $4f + 3 + 5 \cdot 3f = 19f + 3$ authenticators are computed/verified by a replica for one of its own requests and $3f$ requests of other leaders.

After GST, each correct leader $v$ will quickly converge to a $C_v$ such that it will make progress for the entire epoch-time, hence, working at its full potential. We achieve this by rapidly increasing the number of requests assigned to each leader outperforming its assignment and never decreasing the assignment below what the replica recently managed.

Checkpoints are created every $k$ requests and add to the computational load. A leader verifies and computes a total of $2f + 2$ messages to create a checkpoint, and the backups are required to compute $1$ partial signature and verify $1$ threshold signature. The authenticator cost of creating $3f + 1$ checkpoints, one for each leader, is, therefore, $8f + 2$ per replica.

Thus, the best-case throughput of the system is

$$\frac{k \cdot (3f + 1)}{k \cdot (19f + 3) + (8f + 2)}$$

□

Note that it would have been sufficient to show that the epoch throughput is $\Omega(1)$ per time unit, but this more precise formula will be required in Section 4.5. Additionally, we would like to point out

![Figure 5: Parallel leader example with four leaders and four hash buckets. In each epoch, leaders are only responsible for serving client requests in their hash bucket. Epoch-changes are indicated by vertical lines.](image)
that the choice of \( k \) does not influence the best-case throughput asymptotically.

4.4.3 FnF-BFT Epoch-Change. As FnF-BFT employs bounded-length epochs, repeated epoch-changes have to be considered. In the following, we will show that FnF-BFT’s throughput is dominated by its authenticator complexity during the epochs. To that end, observe that for \( C_{\text{min}} \in \Omega(n^2) \), every epoch will incur an authenticator complexity of \( \Omega(n^3) \) per replica and thus require \( \Omega(n^3) \) time units.

**Lemma 11.** After GST, an epoch-change under a correct primary requires \( \Theta(n^2) \) time units.

**Proof.** Following Lemma 7, the number of authenticators computed and verified by each replica for all epoch-change messages is \( \Theta(n^2) \). Each replica also processes \( \Theta(n) \) signatures during the reliable broadcast, and \( O(n) \) signatures for the new-epoch messages. Overall, each replica thus processes \( \Theta(n^2) \) authenticators during the epoch-change. Subsequently, this implies that the epoch-change requires \( \Theta(n^2) \) time units, as we require only a constant number of message delays to initiate and complete the epoch-change protocol. Recall that we assume the throughput to be limited by the available computing power of each replica.

Theoretically, one could set \( C_{\text{min}} \) even higher such that the time the system spends with epoch-changes becomes negligible. However, there is a trade-off for practical reasons: increasing \( C_{\text{min}} \) will naturally increase the minimal epoch-length, allowing a byzantine primary to slow down the system for a longer time stretch. Note that the guarantee for byzantine-resilient performance (cf. Section 4.5) will still hold.

4.4.4 FnF-BFT Optimistic Performance. Ultimately, it remains to quantify FnF-BFT’s overall best-case throughput.

**Lemma 12.** After GST, and assuming all replicas are correct, FnF-BFT requires \( O(n) \) time units to process \( n \) client requests on average.

**Proof.** Under a correct primary, each correct leader will commit at least \( C_{\text{min}} \in \Omega(n^2) \) requests after GST. Hence, FnF-BFT will spend at least \( \Omega(n^3) \) time units in an epoch, while only requiring \( \Theta(n^2) \) time units for an epoch-change (Lemma 11). Thus, following Lemma 10, FnF-BFT requires an average of \( O(n) \) time units to process \( n \) client requests.

Following Lemmas 9 and 12, the speed-up gained by moving from a sequential-leader protocol to a parallel-leader protocol is proportional to the number of leaders.

**Theorem 13.** If the throughput is limited by the (equally) available computing power at each replica, the speed-up for equally splitting requests between \( n \) parallel leaders over a sequential-leader protocol is at least \( \Omega(n) \).

### 4.5 Byzantine-Resilient Performance

While many BFT protocols present practical evaluations of their performance that completely ignore byzantine adversarial behavior [8, 14, 25, 27], we provide a novel, theory-based byzantine-resilience guarantee. We first analyze the impact of byzantine replicas in an epoch under a correct primary. Next, we discuss the potential strategies of a byzantine primary trying to stall the system. And finally, we conflate our observations into a concise statement.

#### 4.5.1 Correct Primary Throughput.

To gain insight into the byzantine-resilient performance, we analyze the optimal byzantine strategy. In epochs led by correct primaries, we will consider their roles as backups and leaders separately. On the one hand, for a byzantine leader, the optimal strategy is to leave as many requests hanging, while not making any progress (Lemma 14).

**Lemma 14.** After GST and under a correct primary, the optimal strategy for a byzantine leader is to leave \( 2k \) client requests hanging and commit no request.

**Proof.** Correct replicas will be synchronized as a correct primary initiates the epoch. Thus, byzantine replicas’ participation is not required for correct leaders to make progress. A byzantine leader can follow the protocol accurately (at any chosen speed), send messages that do not comply with the protocol, or remain unresponsive.

If following the protocol, a byzantine leader can open at most \( 2k \) client requests simultaneously as all further prepare messages would be discarded. Leaving the maximum possible number of requests hanging achieves a throughput reduction as it increases the number of authenticators shared during the epoch and the epoch-change. Hence, byzantine leaders leave the maximum number of requests hanging.

While byzantine replicas cannot hinder correct leaders from committing requests, committing any request can only benefit the throughput of FnF-BFT. To that end, note that after GST, each correct leader \( v \) will converge to a \( C_v \) such that it will make progress during the entire epoch-time; hence, prolonging the epoch-time is impossible. The optimal strategy for byzantine leaders is thus to stall progress on their assigned hash buckets.

Finally, note that we assume the threshold signature scheme to be robust and can, therefore, discard any irrelevant message efficiently.

On the other hand, as a backup, the optimal byzantine strategy is not helping other leaders to make progress (Lemma 15).

**Lemma 15.** Under a correct primary, the optimal strategy for a byzantine backup is to remain unresponsive.

**Proof.** Byzantine participation in the protocol can only benefit the correct leaders’ throughput as they can simply ignore invalid messages. Any authenticators received in excess messages will not be verified and thus do not reduce the system throughput.
THEOREM 16. After GST, the effective utilization under a correct primary is at least $\frac{5}{8}$ for $n \to \infty$.

Proof. Moving from the best-case scenario with $3f + 1$ correct leaders to only $2f + 1$ correct leaders, each correct leader still processes $4f + 3$ authenticators per request, and 5 authenticators for each request of other leaders. We know from Lemma 14 that only the $2f + 1$ correct replicas are committing requests and creating checkpoints throughout the epoch. The authenticator cost of creating $2f + 1$ checkpoints, one for each correct leader, becomes $6f + 2$ per replica.

Byzantine leaders can open at most $2k$ new requests in an epoch. Each hanging request is seen at most twice by correct replicas without becoming committed. Thus, each correct replica processes no more than $8k$ authenticators for requests purposefully left hanging by a byzantine replica in an epoch. Thus, the utilization is reduced at most by a factor $1 - \frac{8k}{T}$, where $T$ is the maximal epoch length. While epochs can finish earlier, this will not happen after GST as soon as each correct leader $v$ works at its capacity $C_v$.

Hence, the byzantine-resistant epoch throughput becomes

$$\frac{k \cdot (2f + 1)}{k \cdot (14f + 3) + (6f + 2)} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{8k}{T}\right)$$

By comparing this to the best-case epoch throughput from Lemma 10, we obtain a maximal throughput reduction of

$$\frac{(2f + 1)(k \cdot (19f + 3) + (8f + 2))}{(3f + 1)(k \cdot (14f + 3) + (6f + 2))} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{8k}{T}\right)$$

Observe that the first term decreases and approaches $\frac{5}{8}$ for $n \to \infty$:

$$\frac{(2f + 1)(k \cdot (19f + 3) + (8f + 2))}{(3f + 1)(k \cdot (14f + 3) + (6f + 2))} \xrightarrow{n \to \infty} \frac{16 + 38k}{18 + 42k} \geq \frac{8}{9}$$

We follow that the epoch time is $T = \Theta(n^3)$, as we set $C_{\min} \in \Omega(n^2)$ and each leader requires $\Omega(n)$ time units to commit one of its requests. Additionally, we know that $8k f \in O(n)$, and thus:

$$\left(1 - \frac{8k}{T}\right) \xrightarrow{n \to \infty} 1.$$ 

In the limit $n \to \infty$, the throughput reduction byzantine replicas can impose on the system during a synchronized epoch is therefore bounded by a factor $\frac{5}{8}$. \qed 

4.5.2 Byzantine Primary Throughput. A byzantine primary, evidently, aims to perform the epoch-change as slow as possible. Furthermore, a byzantine primary can impede progress in its assigned epoch entirely, e.g., by remaining unresponsive. We observe that there are two main byzantine strategies to be considered.

LEMMA 17. Under a byzantine primary, an epoch is either aborted quickly or $\Omega(n^2)$ new requests become committed.

Proof. A byzantine adversary controlling the primary of an epoch has three options. Following the protocol and initiating the epoch for all $2f + 1$ correct replicas will ensure high throughput and is thus not optimal. Alternatively, initiating the epoch for $s \in \{f + 1, 2f\}$ correct replicas will allow the byzantine adversary to control the progress made in the epoch, as no correct leader can make progress without a response from at least one byzantine replica. However, slow progress can only be maintained as long as at least $2f + 1$ leaders continuously make progress. By setting the no-progress timeout $T_p \in \Theta(T/C_{\min})$. $\Omega(n^2)$ new requests per epoch can be guaranteed. In all other scenarios, the epoch will be aborted after at most one epoch-change timeout $T_e$, the initial message transmission time $5A$, and one no-progression timeout $T_p$.

Note that we do not increase the epoch-change timer $T_e$ for $f$ unsuccessful epoch-changes in a row. In doing so, we prevent $f$ consecutive byzantine primaries from increasing the epoch-change timer exponentially; thus potentially reducing the system throughput significantly. \qed 

4.5.3 FnF-BFT Primaries. We rotate primaries across epochs based on primary performance history to reduce the control of the byzantine adversary on the system.

LEMMA 18. After a sufficiently long stable time period, the performance of a byzantine primary can only drop below the performance of the worst correct primary once throughout the sliding window.

Proof. The network is considered stable for a sufficiently long time when all leaders work at their capacity limit, i.e., the number of requests they are assigned in an epoch matches their capacity, and primaries have subsequently been explored once. As soon as all leaders are working at their capacity limit, we observe the representative performance of all correct primaries, at least.

FnF-BFT repeatedly cycles through the $2f + 1$ best primaries. A primary’s performance is based on its last turn as primary. Consequently, a primary is removed from the rotation as soon as its performance drops below one of the $f$ remaining primaries. We conclude that a byzantine primary will only be nominated beyond its single exploration throughout the sliding window if its performance matches at least the performance of the worst correct primary. \qed 

As its successor determines a primary’s performance, the successor can influence the performance slightly. However, this is bounded by the number of open requests $O(n)$ many which we consider being well within natural performance variations, as $\Omega(n^2)$ requests are created in an epoch under a correct primary. Thus, we will disregard possible performance degradation originating at the succeeding primary.

From Lemma 18, we easily see that the optimal strategy for a byzantine primary is to act according to Lemma 17 – performing better would only help the system. In a stable network, byzantine primaries will thus only have one turn as primary throughout any sliding window. In the following, we consider a primary to be behaving byzantine if it performs worse than all correct primaries.

THEOREM 19. After the system has been in stability for a sufficiently long time period, the fraction of byzantine behaving primaries is $\frac{f}{g}$.

Proof. Following from Lemma 18, we know that a primary can only behave byzantine once throughout the sliding window.

There are a total of $g$ epochs throughout a sliding window, and the $f$ byzantine replicas in the network can only act byzantine in one epoch included in the sliding window. We see that the fraction of byzantine behaving primaries is $\frac{f}{g}$. \qed
The configuration parameter $g$ determines the fraction of byzantine primaries in the system’s stable state, while simultaneously dictating how long it takes to get there after GST. Setting $g$ to a small value ensures that the system quickly recovers from asynchrony. On the other hand, setting $g$ to larger values provides near-optimal behavior once the system is operating at its optimum.

4.5.4 \textit{FnF-BFT Byzantine-Resilient Performance.} Combining the byzantine strategies from Theorem 16, Lemma 17 and Theorem 19, we obtain the following.

Theorem 20. After GST, the effective utilization is asymptotically

$$\frac{8}{9} \cdot \frac{g - f}{g}$$

for $n \to \infty$.

Proof. To estimate the effective utilization, we only consider the throughput within epochs. That is because the time spent in correct epochs dominates the time for epoch-changes, as well as the time for failed epoch-changes under byzantine primaries, as the number of replicas increases (Lemma 11).

Without loss of generality, we consider no progress to be made in byzantine primary epochs. We make this assumption, as we cannot guarantee asymptotically significant throughput. From Theorem 16, we know that in an epoch initiated by a correct primary, the byzantine-resilient effective utilization is at least $\frac{8}{9}$ for $n \to \infty$. Further, at least $\frac{g - f}{g}$ of the epochs are led by correct primaries after a sufficiently long time period in stability and thus obey this bound (Theorem 19). In the limit for $n \to \infty$ the effective utilization is

$$\frac{8}{9} \cdot \frac{g - f}{g}.$$  

We conclude that FnF-BFT’s byzantine-resilient utilization is asymptotically $\frac{8}{9} \cdot \frac{g - f}{g} > \frac{14}{15}$ for $n \to \infty$.

5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

5.1 Conclusion

In this work, we introduce \textit{Fast’n’Fair-BFT}, a novel state-machine replication protocol that tolerates byzantine faults in partially synchronous networks. FnF-BFT parallelizes the execution of client requests by allowing all replicas to act as leaders, while the request load dynamically changes between epochs according to each leader’s past performance. This way, FnF-BFT distributes the load fairly amongst all replicas – moving the system forward at the speed of n leaders as opposed to one leader. Parallelizing leader-based protocols does not come at the cost of efficiency, as we match the communication complexity of state-of-the-art leader-based BFT protocols. Finally, FnF-BFT is analyzed by a novel byzantine-resilient performance bound. Efficient BFT protocols only consider non-malicious attacks in their performance evaluation; this might be too optimistic.

5.2 Future Work

To further develop FnF-BFT, we envision a protocol implementation for an empirical evaluation and a comparison to state-of-the-art BFT protocols. We expect the experimental exploration to demonstrate the strength of the parallelization underlying FnF-BFT and to unveil the performance vulnerability to byzantine attacks persistent in existing protocols.

Additionally, a further investigation into the possibility of improving system performance through incorporating leader performance into the primary rotation could bring further system insights. In practice, we also foresee a performance increase by adjusting the size of the sliding window based on network observations, which could be studied as part of the evaluation.

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