Coercion Changes the Sense of Agency in the Human Brain

Highlights
- Responsibility for action is a key feature of human societies
- It depends on association between actions and outcomes in the brain
- Claims of reduced responsibility are sometimes based on "only obeying orders"
- Two experiments suggest coercion can reduce implicit measures of sense of agency

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In Brief
Acting under coercion modifies the subjective experience of being the author of an action, reducing the perceived temporal association between actions and outcomes. Caspar et al. show that the neural processing of action outcomes under coercion more closely resembles situations of passive movement than actions carried out intentionally.

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Coercion Changes the Sense of Agency in the Human Brain

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SUMMARY

People may deny responsibility for negative consequences of their actions by claiming that they were “only obeying orders.” The “Nuremberg defense” offers one extreme example, though it is often dismissed as merely an attempt to avoid responsibility. Milgram’s classic laboratory studies reported widespread obedience to an instruction to harm, suggesting that social coercion may alter mechanisms of voluntary agency, and hence abolish the normal experience of being in control of one’s own actions. However, Milgram’s and other studies relied on dissembling and on explicit measures of agency, which are known to be biased by social norms. Here, we combined coercive instructions to administer harm to a co-participant, with implicit measures of sense of agency, based on perceived compression of time intervals between voluntary actions and their outcomes, and with electrophysiological recordings. In two experiments, an experimenter ordered a volunteer to make a key-press action that caused either financial penalty or demonstrably painful electric shock to their co-participant, thereby increasing their own financial gain. Coercion increased the perceived interval between action and outcome, relative to a situation where participants freely chose to inflict the same harms. Interestingly, coercion also reduced the neural processing of the outcomes of one’s own action. Thus, people who obey orders may subjectively experience their actions as closer to passive movements than fully voluntary actions. Our results highlight the complex relation between the brain mechanisms that generate the subjective experience of voluntary actions and social constructs, such as responsibility.

INTRODUCTION

In Milgram’s classic experiments on obedience [1, 2], an experimenter ordered volunteer participants to inflict allegedly painful shocks to a third party. These studies focused on participants’ readiness to conform to authority and obey coercive instructions to perform harmful actions. Interestingly, participants’ subjective experience in such situations has not been systematically investigated, even though the legal defense of “only obeying orders” implies a loss of voluntary agency with coercion.

Sense of agency refers to the subjective experience of controlling one’s actions, and, through them, external events. Explicit reports of perceived agency are modulated by numerous biases [3], notably social desirability and cognitive dissonance effects [4]. For example, individuals coerced into harmful actions might report reduced sense of agency for secondary gain, such as avoiding blame or punishment. Implicit measures may provide more direct access to the cognitive mechanisms underlying sense of agency, since these measures are less affected by task demands and social factors such as desirability. Here we used the perceived compression of time between a voluntary action and its outcome [5] as an appropriate implicit marker of sense of agency, and we investigated how coercion influenced this measure. Action-outcome intervals are perceived as shorter for intentional actions than for unintended actions such as passive movements [5, 6]. Therefore, if coercion indeed reduces the core experience of agency, interval estimates should be longer in the coercive than in the free-choice condition.

In a first experiment, participants were tested in pairs. They took turns being “agent” and “victim,” ensuring reciprocity. In a first group of participants, the agent could freely choose on each trial to increase her own remuneration by taking money from the “victim” (financial harm). In a second, smaller group, the agent could freely choose to administer an electric shock to the “victim” (physical pain), again increasing her own remuneration. This free-choice condition was compared to a coercive condition, in which the experimenter stood next to the agent and ordered her before each trial whether to take money or not, or whether to shock the “victim” or not (see Figures 1 and 2).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Experiment 1: Results

No participants withdrew from the experiment, and none reported any distress either after testing or at follow-up. In the financial harm group, agents freely chose to take money from the “victim” in 33.97/60 trials (95% confidence interval [CI] = 29.07–38.88, min 0, max 60). In the physical pain group, agents freely chose to give painful electric shocks to the “victim” in 31.37/60 trials (95% CI = 24.96–37.78, min 6, max 60). In
addition, our free-choice condition captured key features of interpersonal choice, such as social reciprocity. In particular, experiencing pain as a "victim" guided subsequent free choices whether to inflict pain on one’s co-participant. Regression analysis showed that, within the subgroup of participants who were first "victims" and then agents, participants who initially received high numbers of shocks as "victim" subsequently gave more shocks \((t(9) = 4.776, p = 0.001, R^2 = 0.860)\). Such vindictive behavior is consistent with previous reports in economic games [7].

We analyzed agents’ interval estimates using ANOVA, with condition (free choice, coercive) and outcome (harm, no harm) as within-subject factors, and group (financial harm, physical pain) as a between-subjects factor. The main effect of condition was significant \((F(1.50) = 22.740, p < 0.001, \eta^2_{\text{partial}} = 0.313)\), with coercion leading to longer interval estimates than free choice (437 ms, 95% CI = 399–475, and 370 ms, 95% CI = 338–402, respectively; see Figure 4). There was a main effect of group, with lower interval estimates for the financial harm group than for the physical pain group \((F(1.50) = 6.042, p = 0.017, \eta^2_{\text{partial}} = 0.108)\) but no evidence for any interaction between group and condition \((F(1.50) = 0.073, \text{NS})\). The main effect of outcome was not significant \((p > 0.3)\). The interaction condition × outcome was not significant \((p = 0.099)\; \text{for full ANOVA table and further results, see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures}\). Interestingly, there was a significant interaction between outcome and group \((F(1.50) = 6.201, p < 0.02, \eta^2_{\text{partial}} = 0.110)\). In the financial harm group, interval estimates decreased on trials when participants actually delivered harm (352 ms, 95% CI = 316–388) compared to when they did not (375 ms, 95% CI = 336–414; \(t(34) = -2.699, p = 0.01\), Cohen’s \(d = 0.456\)). However, in the physical pain group, this difference was not significant \((p > 0.2)\). No other interactions with group were significant (all ps > 0.3).

Importantly, there was no three-way interaction with choice condition—so we found no evidence that sense of agency varied specifically as a function of freely chosen outcomes. The effect of coercion was thus not related to whether or not agents delivered harm on any specific trial or to the content of any individual instruction, but was rather a contextual effect of receiving coercive instructions. This result also rules out explanations based on the attentional or arousing effects of harming others leading to altered time perception.

We then performed planned comparisons with our control conditions. Data for one participant in the active control condition was not available because of technical problems during testing. Planned comparisons showed that the free-choice condition produced shorter interval estimates than the active control condition \((t(56) = 2.809, p = 0.007, \text{Cohen’s d = 0.372})\). Conversely, the coercive condition did not differ significantly from the passive condition \((p > 0.6)\). These results suggest that voluntary actions made under coercion are experienced in some ways as if they were passive.
Because participants’ free choices varied, we investigated whether any difference between free-choice and coercive conditions could simply reflect differences between these conditions in the number of harmful actions. We therefore added the difference between the number of harmful actions freely chosen by each participant and the number ordered by the coercive experimenter as a covariate. The covariate was not significant (p > 0.7), and the overall pattern of conclusions remained unchanged. Thus, our results reflect a specific effect of coercive instruction on the subjective experience of agency, occurring at the moment of voluntary action, rather than any difference between the contents of coercive instruction and free choices. In summary, when the agent was coerced, they experienced less agency than when they freely chose between the same options. This difference between coercion and choice did not interact with whether harm was actually inflicted or not.

Pre-session questionnaire responses allowed us to investigate whether sense of agency under coercion could be related to personality or trait empathy [8, 9]. We therefore explored whether personality and empathy measures were related to the “harm effect,” i.e., the main effect difference between interval estimates associated with harmful actions and interval estimates associated with non-harmful actions. Questionnaire scores of trait empathy were positively and significantly related to the extent to which a harmful outcome event reduced participants’ individual agency estimates (Table S1). More empathetic individuals showed a more dramatic reduction in sense of agency when their actions had harmful outcomes, compared to less harmful outcomes. Correlations with personality factors were generally weaker.

Additionally, we investigated whether the coercion effect, corresponding to the main effect difference between interval estimates associated with the coercive condition and interval estimates associated with the free-choice condition, correlated with personality and trait empathy (Table S2). Correlations were generally weaker than for the harm effect.

Experiment 1: Discussion
Why do people so readily comply with coercive instructions? This question remains central to historical [10] and psychological [11] investigations. The experience of agency under coercion has been surprisingly neglected in previous discussions, despite its obvious relation to personal responsibility. Here, we observed that being ordered to perform an action reduces the subjective experience of agency over the outcome in comparison with being free to choose between outcomes, as shown by reduced estimates of the temporal interval between action and outcome. Crucially, the effect of coercion was not related to whether harm actually occurred on any specific trial or to the content of any individual instruction (financial loss versus painful shock), but was rather a contextual effect of receiving coercive instructions. Sense of agency was previously shown to increase with the size of the “response space” of action choices [12]. A similar cognitive mechanism may explain why coercion both reduces the basic experience of agency and simultaneously increases compliance with instructions. “Only obeying orders” may not merely be a retrospective narrative of behavior, aimed at secondary gain such as blame avoidance, but may rather reflect a genuine difference in subjective experience of agency. Coercive instructions appear to induce a passive mode of processing in the brain compared to free choice between alternatives.

Experiment 2
In a second experiment, we investigated whether coercion changes brain activity, by focusing on electroencephalogram (EEG) potentials evoked by action outcomes. Filevich and colleagues [13] showed greater event-related potential (ERP) amplitudes for outcomes when participants freely chose an action compared with being instructed. We therefore predicted that coercive instructions should reduce outcome-evoked ERP amplitudes relative to free choices.

Experiment 2: Results
Behavioral Results
No participants withdrew from the experiment, and none reported any distress either after testing or at follow-up. Agents
freely chose to administer painful electric shocks to the “victim” in 18.75/60 trials (95% CI = 11.46–26.04, min 0, max 52). Regression analysis again showed modest support for vindictive behavior, as in experiment 1, with a trend for participants who served first as “victims” tending to choose to administer shocks in proportion to the number they had previously received (t(19) = 1.681, p = 0.1, R² = 0.561).

We also assessed how responsible participants felt during each condition by asking them to rate, in a post-session questionnaire, their responsibility as a percentage score in each condition. As expected, participants reported a higher degree of responsibility in the free-choice condition (86.85%, SD = 1.681, p < 0.001) than in the coercive condition (34.80%, SD = 22.53, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.847). Interestingly, they also reported feeling more responsible in the free-choice condition (86.85%, SD = 16.31) than in the coercive condition (34.80%, SD = 22.53; t(19) = 9.832, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.19), but also than the active control condition (56.15%, SD = 39.70; t(19) = 3.562, p = 0.002, Cohen’s d = 0.796). In addition, the degree of responsibility was higher in the coercive condition (34.80%, SD = 22.53) than in the passive control condition (17.92%, SD = 22.53; t(19) = −2.699, p = 0.014, Cohen’s d = 0.603; see Figure 3).

Agents’ interval estimates were analyzed using repeated-measures ANOVA, with condition (free choice, coercive) and outcome (harm, no harm) as within-subject factors. The main effect of condition was significant (F(1,16) = 15.123, p = 0.001, η² partial = 0.486), with free choice producing shorter interval judgments than coercion (366 ms, 95% CI = 288–444, and 424.5 ms, 95% CI = 351–498, respectively; see Figure 4). The main effect of outcome was not significant (p > 0.8), nor was the interaction condition × outcome (p > 0.5, for a full ANOVA table and further results, see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures).

Planned comparisons with our control conditions showed that the passive and the coercive conditions did not differ (p > 0.9) and that the free-choice condition did not differ from the active condition (p > 0.09).

**Event-Related Potentials**

Standard ERP recording and processing methods were used (see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures).

We applied repeated-measures ANOVA to the auditory N1 amplitude [14], with the same ANOVA design used for interval estimates. The main effect of condition was significant (F(1,16) = 8.009, p = 0.012, η² partial = 0.334), with free choice producing more negative N1 amplitudes than coercion (−10.70 μV, 95% CI = −13.81 to −7.60, and −8.15 μV, 95% CI = −10.83 to −5.47, respectively). The main effect of outcome was not significant (p > 0.1), nor was the interaction condition × outcome (p > 0.4; for a full ANOVA table and further results, see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures; see Figure 5).

Interestingly, comparison between our active and passive control conditions showed a similar, but smaller, effect. Specifically, N1 amplitude was reduced in the passive condition (−9.99 μV, SD = 4.39) relative to the active condition (−11.11 μV, SD = 3.76; t(19) = −1.814, p = 0.086, Cohen’s d = 0.405; see Figure 6). Thus, the psychological effect of coercion on sensory processing was similar to the physiological effect of subtracting voluntary motor commands from bodily movement [15]. Further, a direct comparison between the free-coercive difference, and the active-passive difference, expressed as the interaction term of a 2 × 2 ANOVA, showed that the modulation of sensory processing due to coercion was significantly stronger than the modulation by the voluntary motor command (F(1,17) = 4.878, p = 0.041, η² partial = 0.223). Direct planned comparisons between experimental and control conditions showed that the free-choice experimental condition did not differ from
the active control condition (p > 0.6). The auditory N1 was more pronounced in the passive condition (−9.99 μV, SD = 4.39) than in the coercive condition (−7.93 μV, SD = 4.85; t(19) = 3.377, p = 0.003, Cohen’s d = 0.755).

Experiment 2: Discussion
The behavioral results replicated those of experiment 1. Receiving coercive orders again reduced the sense of agency over potentially harmful actions, according to our implicit measure based on intentional binding. Again, coercion produced an experience that more closely resembled passive movement than freely chosen voluntary action. This effect was again linked to the context of coercive instruction, rather than the actual harm resulting from any particular action. Explicit judgments of agency provided an important cross-validation of our implicit measures. Coercive orders thus influenced both explicit judgments of agency and the low-level subjective feeling of agency on which such judgments may be based [16]. The defense of “only obeying orders” is often treated with suspicion in law because of the clear secondary gain associated with denying responsibility. However, our result suggests that primary feelings and neurophysiological processing of agency are indeed reduced by coercion.

Analysis of the auditory N1 amplitude showed that coercion reduced processing of action outcomes compared to conditions in which participants freely chose what action to perform. This finding was again independent of whether the tone was accompanied by a painful electric shock to the co-participant or not. Importantly, the auditory tones were physically identical and equally predictable in all conditions. We suggest that coercive contexts produce an anticipatory reduction of sensory processing for action outcomes. This involves both downregulation of perceptual gains and temporal distancing. Indeed, the passive condition also displayed a reduction of the auditory N1 amplitude in comparison with the active condition, suggesting that the brain may treat consequences of one’s actions under coercion as if they were passively triggered.

Interestingly, we found no evidence for sensorimotor attenuation of outcome processing [14, 17] when comparing either active versus passive movements or free versus coerced actions. However, the outcomes in our study occurred later than the short post-action window within which sensorimotor attenuation operates [18].

General Discussion
Issues of personal responsibility, moral action, and social influence are central to many accounts about human nature. Previous behavioral experiments have studied these issues using laboratory experiments [1]. However, the design and interpretation of those studies have been criticized. For example, Milgram’s participants did not actually deliver pain, and pain responses of the third party were faked by an actor. It remains unclear whether Milgram’s participants really believed they were delivering severe pain or whether they had some intuition that they were part of a simulation. In our design, participants acted reciprocally as agent and “victim,” both delivering and receiving harm. They knew from direct sensory experience how their actions would affect their co-participant. This experience demonstrably influenced their free choices. Moreover, the combination of money and pain in our experiments ensured that our participants were motivated by greed and fear, factors that may pervasively influence many human choices [19].

Legal, historical [10], and psychological [11] thought have all considered how obeying orders influences personal responsibility. Social constructs, including power [20] and authority [1], are often invoked. Using an implicit marker of sense of agency based on time perception, we showed that coercive instructions caused participants to experience less agency over the harmful outcomes of their actions. The results generalized over implicit and explicit measures of agency, and also over financial harm and physical pain, and they were also found on subsets of trials where no harm was actually delivered. Our results suggest that “only obeying orders” may not merely be a retrospective narrative of behavior, adopted for secondary gain such as mitigation, but may rather reflect a genuine difference in subjective experience of agency at the point of action itself. A previous study [12] reported that sense of agency decreased as the size of the “response space” [21] or alternative actions decreased. We suggest that this cognitive mechanism may also underlie the effects of coercion on sense of agency reported here.

Milgram reported that “ordinary” people frequently comply with coercive instructions [1]. Interestingly, our effects of coercion on sense of agency were quite general across individuals and were not strongly associated with particular personality traits or with empathy. This was not merely due to insensitivity of agency measures, since the effects of harm versus non-harm on sense of agency were higher in those with more empathic traits, as might be predicted. Rather, our result clearly suggests one reason why so many people can be coerced. Specifically, coercion may reduce the linkage that normally binds the experience of actions to their outcomes. Indeed, emotional distancing from distasteful outcomes of one’s own necessary actions forms a specific part of training and professional culture in medicine [22] and in the military [23]. Training effects might
also work in the opposite direction: learning the true valence of one’s actions’ outcomes might potentially make the sense of agency more resilient to the undermining effects of coercion.

We showed that acting under coercion deeply modifies the sense of being responsible for outcomes of one’s actions. It also attenuates the neural processing of outcomes. Both results can be interpreted as a cognitive operation of “distancing,” or reducing the linkage between one’s own decision-making, action, and outcome. Our results may have profound implications for social and legal responsibility. Laws are culturally evolved rules for managing impact of individuals’ behaviors on others. Laws must therefore engage with the psychological and neurocognitive mechanisms that drive individual actions. Our finding of reduced experience of agency under coercion does not legitimate Nuremberg-type defenses: society could still expect agents to try to resist evil [10, 24]. However, our results do suggest that people may indeed experience reduced agency at the point of being coerced to perform abhorrent actions. Clearly, society needs protection from harm, irrespective of whether the perpetrators experienced agency at the time of the act, or not. For example, the law argues that informed, rational agents should know they remain responsible for their actions, even if they have minimal experience of agency at the time of action. Further, the law could shift its focus away from those who obey orders toward those who give them, to prevent them from abusing a position that allows them to coerce others. Our research on the experience of agency highlights the fundamental link between law and cognitive neuroscience. The law has to engage with the human capacity to control action if it is to fulfill its function of allowing individuals to live together in societies.

EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES

Experiment 1

The principles of the 2013 Declaration of Helsinki were followed. The study was approved by University College London London Research Ethics Committee (0847/006). All participants provided written informed consent prior to the experiment. No participant withdrew, and no participant reported distress at debriefing or at later follow-up.

Participants

Sixty right-handed student female participants were recruited in pairs and were paid £15–£25 for their participation. Only female participants were tested in order to control for potential effects of gender, both within the participant pairs, and also between participants and the (female) experimenters. Data from a number of standard questionnaires, including Big Five personality and trait empathy, were available from collection prior to participation. The protocol for matching participants in pairs stipulated that participants could not be relatives, friends, or from the same course or faculty. Thus, there was no particular relation between co-participants prior to the experiment. Data exclusion criteria were decided in advance of the experiment: failure to produce temporal intervals covarying monotonically with actual action-tone interval and any general failure to follow instructions. To identify participants for whom the action-tone intervals did not gradually increase with action-tone intervals, we performed linear trend analyses with contrast coefficients /C0 1, 0, 1 for the three delays of the action-tone intervals (see the next section). Two participants were excluded due to non-significant linear trend. After this procedure, 39 participants remained in group 1 (mean age = 22.92, SD = 3.82) and 19 in group 2 (mean age = 22.79, SD = 3.63).

Materials and Procedure

On arrival at the experimental laboratory, participants read an information sheet about the experimental procedure and the aim of the experiment. The two co-participants signed their individual consent forms simultaneously, ensuring that they were both aware of the other’s consent. Roles were assigned randomly so that one of the participants was told they were the agent and the other was the “victim.” These roles were reversed for the second half of the experiment, making the procedure fully reciprocal. Participants sat at a table, face to face. An external, silent SODIAL Flexible Foldable USB keyboard...
was placed between them, oriented toward the agent but visible to both. The experimental task ran on a computer, which was located on the agent’s right side with the screen visible only to the agent (see Figure 2). The agent was instructed to press a key on the keyboard at a time she chose after the start of the trial, using the right index finger. This caused a tone to occur. The delay between key press and tone was set to vary randomly between 200, 500, and 800 ms. The participants’ task was to estimate the delay between the key press and the tone. They were informed that the delay would vary randomly on a trial-by-trial basis, between 0 and 1,000 ms (they were reminded that 1,000 ms makes 1 s). Participants were also told to make use of all possible numbers between 1 and 1,000, as appropriate, avoiding restricting their answer space (e.g., not only use numbers between 1 and 100), and avoiding rounding (cf. [23]). Each participant received a paper sheet with 60 empty boxes for their time estimates in each condition of the task. Participants’ answers were hidden from view of the other participant by a barrier, so as to avoid participants being biased by the other participant’s answers.

There were two experimental and two control conditions. In the active control condition, the agent pressed the space key whenever she wanted. In the passive control condition, the experimenter pressed the agent’s index finger down on the space bar, making sure to be unpredictable in her movements so as to minimize motor preparation in the agent. During these conditions, nothing was displayed on the computer screen. The predictions focused on two experimental conditions: free-choice and coercion. Participants were informed that they would both start with a specific amount of money (i.e., £20 for group 1 and £15 for group 2; this difference was due to the fact that participants in group 1 could lose money, but we needed to make sure participants would leave the experiment with the mandated minimum payment of £7.50/hr). In the free-choice condition, agents were instructed that they could freely choose to increase their remuneration for the experiment by delivering, or not delivering, a financial harm (group 1) or a physical pain (group 2) to the other participant, using the appropriate keys on the keyboard. They were told that they were totally free to choose how to act. The computer screen displayed which key press would be associated with which action (for instance, the “F” key for taking money/delivering a shock and the “H” key for refraining from taking money/delivering a shock). In group 1, the agents earned 5p each time they chose to inflict financial pain to the “victim,” who then lost 5p. In group 2, the agents earned 5p each time they decided to deliver a painful electric shock to the “victim.” They earned no money if they decided not to deliver a shock. During this condition, the experimenters did not look at the participants, but focused their attention on task irrelevant objects. In the coercive condition, the experimenters stood up next to the agent and ordered her, on each trial, to take money or not (group 1) or to administer a shock or not (group 2) to the “victim.” The tone played after the key press was the same for both keys. In group 1, the “victim” did not know on each trial whether the agent on each trial, in the form of physical pain. Therefore, imitative behavior would become unavoidable: we thus decided to use the same key-press mappings throughout.

The gains and losses were displayed on the screen visible to the agent. In group 1, the agent saw two moneybags, 1 with her own money and 1 with the “victim’s” money. Each time the agent inflicted financial harm, a coin was shown moving from the “victim’s” bag to her bag, and the total amount of money increase was displayed. When the agent did not take money, no animations were displayed. In group 2, the agent only saw her own moneybag on the screen since the “victim” did not lose money, but instead received a painful shock to her left hand. The shock caused a twitch of the “victim’s” hand that was readily visible to the agent.

Two experimenters participated in group 1, each testing half the sample. One experimenter instructed agents to take money 50/60 times. The other experimenter instructed agents to take money 30/60 times. This variation allowed some control over possible effects of experimenter’s nastiness on participants’ behavior and experiences under coercion. In group 2, both experimenters were simultaneously present, but one gave the coercive instructions. Both experimenters instructed agents to deliver shocks 30/60 times.

We used a partially randomized order of conditions. Participants performed the active or the passive control condition first, then the free-choice condition, then the coercive condition, and then the remaining control condition, either active or passive. We chose not to randomize free-choice and coercive conditions in order not to bias participants in the free-choice condition from previous experience in the coercive condition (e.g., attempting to match the coercive experimenter’s instructions in their “free” choices). Participants went through the same four conditions twice, once as agent and once as “victim,” that is, eight conditions in total. There were 60 trials per condition (20 trials at each action-tone delay, in randomized order), giving a total of 480 trials. Participants performed 240 actions as agents and observed 240 actions as “victims.” The order of the conditions was the same within each pair.

Details of the painful stimulation and other measures are given in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures.

At the end of the experiment, participants were paid separately based on their earned financial gain during the experiment. For one dyad in group 1, the experimenter judged that the relation between the agent and the “victim” had become conflictual and hostile. The experimenter made an on-the-spot decision to pay both of these participants the same amount (£20), to reduce the possibility of subsequent distress or conflict.

**Experiment 2**

The principles of the 2013 Declaration of Helsinki were followed. The study was approved by the ethical committee of the Université libre de Bruxelles (018/2015). All participants provided written informed consent prior to the
experiment. No participant withdrew, and no participant reported distress at debriefing or at later follow-up.

**Participants**

Twenty-two right-handed student female participants were recruited in pairs and paid €25–€31 for their participation. The same protocol for matching participants and the same data exclusion criteria than in experiment 1 were used. Two participants were excluded because no relation was found between perceived and actual action-shock intervals. After this procedure, 20 participants remained (mean age = 23.15, SD = 3.163).

**Materials and Procedure**

We used the same method as for the physical pain group in experiment 1, with modifications for EEG recording. Participants were instructed to wait a minimum of 2 s in a relaxed position before pressing a key, so as to obtain a consistent and noise-free baseline. Participants were further instructed not to move for up to 2 s after the tone. Participants first performed 30 trials in the active and the passive conditions, then 60 trials in the two experimental conditions, and then again 30 trials in the active and the passive conditions. These combinations of conditions were counterbalanced across participants. In order to have the same number of choices between the control and the experimental conditions, participants could choose between pressing “F” or “H” in the active condition. In the passive condition, the agent was asked to position two fingers (the index finger and the middle finger) on the two keys and the experimenter pressed down on one of the agent’s fingers at an unpredictable moment in time. In the post-session questionnaire, we additionally asked participants to rate (from 0, “not responsible at all,” to 100, “entirely responsible”) how much they felt responsible in each condition. We also asked participants to rate how frequently they would have disobeyed if they could have (from –3, “almost never,” to +3, “almost all the time”). In this experiment, the mean stimulation level selected by this procedure was 18.3 mA (SD = 6.7, pulse duration = 200 µs).

**Source Data**

The behavioral data reported in this paper have been published in Mendeley Data and are available at [http://dx.doi.org/10.17632/322y43x9b7.1](http://dx.doi.org/10.17632/322y43x9b7.1).  

**SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION**

Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures and two tables and can be found with this article online at [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2015.12.067](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2015.12.067).

**AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS**

E.A.C. developed the study concept. E.A.C. and P.H. created the study design, and J.F.C. and A.C. provided critical comments. E.A.C. and J.F.C. ran experiment 1. E.A.C. ran experiment 2. E.A.C. performed the data analysis and interpretation under the supervision of J.F.C., P.H., and A.C. E.A.C. drafted the manuscript, and J.F.C., P.H., and A.C. provided critical revisions. All authors approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.

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