Mapping potential implications of temporary COVID-19 export bans for the food supply in importing countries using precrisis trade flows

Maximilian Koppenberg 1 | Martina Bozzola 2,3 | Tobias Dalhaus 4,5 | Stefan Hirsch 1

1 School of Management, Technical University of Munich, Freising, Germany
2 School of Biological Sciences, IFGS, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK
3 ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sciences, Winterthur, Switzerland
4 Business Economics Group, Department of Social Sciences, Wageningen University and Research, Wageningen, The Netherlands
5 Agricultural Economics and Policy Group, Department of Management, Technology, and Economics, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

Correspondence
Maximilian Koppenberg, School of Management, Technical University of Munich, Freising 85354, Germany.
Email: maximilian.koppenberg@tum.de

Abstract
Despite pleas from international organizations, governments and trade economists to refrain from imposing trade-distorting measures, over 20 countries have implemented bans on the export of agri-food products since the onset of the COVID-19 crisis. These export prohibitions might adversely impact food security and disrupt well-established global supply chains. We identify importing countries that could potentially be affected by the imposed export bans using a measure of their import dependency during the pre-pandemic period to illustrate our results on global trade maps. We find that many importers rely on just one country for a significant share of the overall domestic supply of a particular commodity. [EconLit Citations: F10, F13, Q17, Q18]

KEYWORDS
agri-food trade, COVID-19, export bans, food security, temporary trade measures

1 | INTRODUCTION

Government authorities worldwide responded swiftly to the COVID-19 pandemic and enacted temporary trade measures aiming at stabilizing domestic food prices and ensuring domestic food security. As of mid-June 2020, over 150 countries have put trade measures into force, mainly involving vital medical supplies, while according to
the International Trade Center (ITC), 23 countries have banned exports of agri-food products (ITC, 2020). For instance, on March 31st, 2020, Belarus imposed restrictions on all exports of buckwheat, onions, and garlic, while at the beginning of April, Cambodia and Myanmar prohibited the export of rice. This tendency contradicts pleas from several international organizations, governments, and trade economists to let food move freely across borders without restrictions, insofar as compliance with existing food safety standards is ensured (FAO, IFAD, WFP, and the World Bank, 2020). 1 In this context, research on the impact of export restrictions imposed temporarily as a reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic on trade flows, food prices and food security, especially in affected importing countries, is of high policy relevance.

In this paper, we focus on the potential implications of temporary export bans on agri-food commodities during the COVID-19 pandemic for importing countries, based on pre-pandemic trade flows. 2 The impact of an export ban on an importing country is strongly determined by its import dependency (Deuss, 2017). Therefore, we calculate past import dependencies for trade partners of countries imposing temporary export bans on agri-food products during the pandemic. Based on the results, we then compile maps to illustrate potential disruptions of the importers’ supply of the commodity under consideration. Our objective is to identify cases requiring further analysis with respect to the impacts of COVID-19-related temporary export bans on social welfare and food security. We do not conduct an impact analysis to derive precise implications for trade flows, prices and food security in the importing countries.

As of mid-June 2020, 23 countries have implemented 104 prohibitions on agri-food exports (ITC, 2020). While the number of newly adopted trade measures has decreased in the meantime (Joller & Kniahin, 2020), concerns remain as restrictions in place are not lifted promptly. In addition, previous research shows that, although export bans might be lifted after a few weeks, their effects can be long lasting (e.g., Deuss, 2017). While both temporary export and import measures are designed to ensure domestic food security, a liberalization of imports implies higher trade flows and a convergence of domestic to world market prices in the respective country and gives exporters access to new markets. Moreover, an import ban can also aim at stabilizing domestic farm incomes (Larue & Ker, 1993). In contrast, export bans are intended to isolate the enacting country’s markets from international price fluctuations, which gained prominence during the 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 food price crises (see e.g., Diao & Kennedy, 2016; Djuric et al., 2015; Tangermann, 2011b). At the same time, such measures can lead to severe issues in terms of rising world market prices as well as insufficient supply of affordable food for dependent trade partners (Martin & Anderson, 2012). 2 In particular, export restrictions can affect developing countries that rely heavily on imports from the country imposing the ban and where significant food price increases can have severe impacts on overall poverty (Anania, 2013; Deuss, 2017; Ivanic & Martin, 2008; Sharma, 2011). These adverse effects of export restrictions have led to an intensive debate on how to curb such measures (Tangermann, 2011b). Note that while both restrictive measures related to imports and export subsidies have been strictly regulated through the eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations (Uruguay Round) this does not apply to export restrictions (Tangermann, 2011b).

Our analysis contributes to a better understanding of the potential disruptions that temporary export bans on agri-food products may provoke in importing countries during times of a global pandemic by considering the affected countries’ dependency on imports. In doing so, we identify which countries are likely most severely affected using trade flow data from the pre-pandemic period. We assume that pre-COVID-19 import dependency is strongly related to dependency during and after the pandemic. The results can therefore be of interest for further research involving impact analyses of temporary export prohibitions (e.g., Kerr, 2020) as they help identify

---

1 Food export restrictions were also among the measures discussed at the G20 Extraordinary Agriculture Ministers Meeting on April 21st, 2020, and at a special meeting of the WTO’s regular Committee on Agriculture on June 18th, held to review the measures introduced by governments since the COVID-19 outbreak.

2 Note that in our analysis we include all importing countries regardless of their domestic production quantities w.r.t. a specific commodity or the degree of re-exporting.

3 Research has also shown that domestic agricultural policies do not necessarily destabilize world prices if effective combinations of multiple measures are used (Zwart & Blandford, 1989). Moreover, several studies have shown that the extent of adverse effects depends on the combination of the trade restrictions applied and the size of the country applying them (e.g., Larue & Ker, 1993; Zwart & Blandford, 1989).
relevant cases with respect to potential effects on social welfare and food security and can aid the development policies aimed at increasing food self-sufficiency.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section, Section 2, gives an overview of the related literature. In Section 3, we introduce the methodological framework and present the data. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we present some conclusions and the implications for further research that can be derived from our findings.

2 | LITERATURE BACKGROUND

Short-term export bans on agri-food products gained prominence during the 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 food price crises as a potential measure to stabilize prices of staple foods and promote domestic food security (Martin & Anderson, 2012; Porteous, 2017; Sharma, 2011). However, export restrictions on agricultural commodities have also been identified as a major driver of these crises as they increased world market price volatility (Liefert et al., 2012; Martin & Anderson, 2012; Sharma, 2011). For example, Martin and Anderson (2012) find that trade restrictions contributed substantially to the 2007/2008 price increases with the limitations resulting in 45% and 30% of the increase in world market prices for rice and wheat, respectively. Accordingly, Tangermann (2011a) indicates that export restrictions in reaction to crop shortfalls were a major cause of the 2010/2011 price spikes on grain markets (Tangermann, 2011a).

Similar consequences may be anticipated for bans imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic (Barichello, 2020; Glauber et al., 2020). Nevertheless, we expect that the effects of temporary export bans on agri-food products during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic will differ in several ways from those experienced during the 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 food price crises. Key differences in the underlying context include the fact that production levels of major staples are above the average of the past 5 years, oil prices are low, and global stock levels of major grains in relation to consumption are 70%–100% higher than in the early 2000s (Espitia et al., 2020; Martin & Glauber, 2020; Voegele, 2020). Compared to 2007/2008, global food prices have been relatively stable in recent years and they remained low in the first months of 2020 (Voegele, 2020). Moreover, new issues have arisen during the COVID-19 pandemic that did not play a role in earlier crises. These include the supply-side disruption of access to labor (Hobbs; Larue, 2020; Ridley & Devadoss, 2020) or demand-side shocks such as panic purchases and hoarding of essential, durable food products (Hobbs, 2020).

In previous research, impact analyses often rely on gravity models to evaluate the ultimate effect of an export ban on trade flows and social welfare in exporting and importing countries (e.g., Cheptea & Gaigné, 2020; Zongo & Larue, 2019). Various effects have been identified concerning the impact of an export ban on both the individual countries imposing the ban and the importing countries affected (e.g., Martin & Anderson, 2012). For the exporting country, some studies find that an export ban can shield domestic prices from world market prices and dampen domestic price volatility. For example, the Russian wheat export ban in 2010/2011 resulted in Russian domestic wheat prices between 35% and 67% lower compared to the situation where no ban was imposed, with significant variations across regions (Götz et al., 2016). In contrast, other studies have detected no, or even opposite, effects on price levels and volatility. For example, Djuric et al. (2015) analyze the Serbian wheat export ban in 2007 and find that the ban did not succeed in reducing the volatility and absolute value of domestic prices. The latter even rose above world market price levels, for example, in April 2008 the wheat price in Serbia was approximately 440 Euros per metric ton while the world market price was 360 Euros per metric ton (Djuric et al., 2015). Moreover, Liefert et al. (2012) show that producers in those countries imposing export restrictions are adversely affected by an export ban since they (i) are forced to sell at domestic price levels, which are below world market prices, and (ii) must reduce their production quantities as they only have to meet domestic requirements and there is no export demand.
In the case of importers, which are the main focus of this article, the negative consequences of temporary export restrictions imposed by trade partners are expected to be stronger for countries with a high import dependency and inversely related to the substitutability of a commodity (Deuss, 2017). For instance, Deuss (2017) finds that after the Vietnamese rice export ban in 2007, the degree of price transmission from world market to domestic prices decreased by 49.4 percentage points (p.p.) compared to the pre-ban status for those importers with high dependency (e.g., Cameroon, Senegal, or Côte d’Ivoire). In contrast, importers with low dependency (e.g., Benin, South Africa, or Peru) exhibit no significant change in the price transmission process.

3 | METHODOLOGY AND DATA

A country’s dependency on imports (or a lack thereof) has been identified in the food security literature via the food self-sufficiency ratio (SSR; e.g., Clapp, 2017; Puma et al., 2015). The SSR measures the share of food produced domestically in a country’s total supply of food, where food supply equals the sum of domestic production and imports, minus exports plus changes in stock (FAO, 2012). The lower the SSR, the more a country relies on food imports to cover domestic food consumption. The SSR can be defined on the commodity/product level, or for food in general based on each commodity’s caloric contribution.

We use a measure of import dependency (ID), which can be derived as 1-SSR, given that exports of the importing country are zero, to identify potential disruptions of a (temporary) export ban imposed by a particular country on importing trade partners. However, calculating the ID as 1-SSR does not indicate on which trade partner the importing country relies or the degree to which it relies on a particular trade partner. To obtain a measure of a country’s ID with respect to each trade partner who has banned exports for a specific product during the COVID-19 pandemic, we define the ID measure as

$$ID_{ik} = \frac{Q_{ik}}{FS_{ij}}$$

where $i$ denotes the importing country, $j$ denotes the product, and $k$ denotes the exporting country. $Q$ is $i$’s imported quantity of product $j$ with origin $k$ while $FS$ represents the total food supply of product $j$ in the importing country $i$. That is, for each food product under an export ban, we compute the share of imports from the prohibiting country in the total supply of that product in the importing country. Total food supply is defined as domestic production of agri-food product $j$ in country $i$, plus imports minus exports plus changes in stock (FAO, 2020a; Puma et al., 2015). We calculate median IDs over the three precrisis years 2015, 2016, and 2017 to obtain an estimate of the ID, which is not driven by exceptional events in a single year.

To derive the IDs, we first identify all COVID-19 export bans on agri-food products using the ITC Market Access Map COVID-19 (ITC, 2020). We compile data on the enacting country, affected products, affected countries, start date and end date if known for each of the 104 export prohibition measures imposed (see Table A1 in the online appendix for the complete list of agri-food export bans imposed).

We then use the UN Comtrade database (United Nations, 2020) to compile data on imports of the affected agri-food products (variable $Q$ in Equation 1). Product selection is based on Harmonized System (HS) codes. The ITC Market Access Map COVID-19 only provides the product name but not the corresponding HS code for some commodities subject to an export ban. The UN Comtrade database was scanned for the names of these

---

4 More recent data on food supply was not available at the time of analysis.

5 We count each ban imposed by the Eurasian Economic Union as a single ban for each country since some of the countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have imposed additional restrictions, partly on the same commodities. For ease of interpretation, we also present the results for each country separately.

6 The Harmonized System (HS) is a globally adopted classification system for products and product groups.
products to check whether there is an exact match of the product defined by ITC and products defined according to the HS. We used the corresponding HS code from UN Comtrade to obtain exact matches. Sixteen country-product combinations have been excluded as we could not identify a match in the HS. Moreover, trade data for Tajikistan (eight bans) are not available on UN Comtrade.

We obtained data on total food supply (FS) for the importing countries based on the selected commodity groups from FAOSTAT (FAO, 2020a). It is not possible to compute the ID for some countries over all three precrisis years due to the absence of food supply data for this period, or because no imports were reported on UN Comtrade. In these cases, we use the median ID of 2 years or the value of the 1-year available, respectively. Since the UN Comtrade database only contains data up to the 6-digit level, we exclude 22 export bans referring to the 8-digit level. Moreover, the FAO does not publish the corresponding data applying to 22 bans on buckwheat, carrots, garlic, and pasta. In the case of a further 17 bans, it appears that no country imported that particular product in the 2015–2017 period. This led to a final number of 21 export bans for agricultural commodities (out of 104) imposed by 11 countries that are included in the analysis (Table 1). Note that Table 1 already contains the imputed HS codes for commodities for which we have found an exact match in UN Comtrade while Table A2 in the online appendix contains the original data from ITC. Moreover, in the case of the bans imposed by the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), we show the results for each member state, since some of them, for example, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have installed additional export restrictions, partly covering the same commodities.

The 21 bans included lead to 399 median IDs, each reflecting an importer–exporter pair (see Table A2 in the online appendix). The IDs are illustrated using global trade maps (Figures 1–5 and Figure A1 in the online appendix). We discuss the results for export bans affecting at least one importer with a median import dependency of at least 20% since these cases would be of interest for future, in-depth research investigating the potential impacts on social welfare and food security in the importing countries. This includes Cambodia/Myanmar (rice), Russia (millet, rice, and soy), Romania (cereals, outside European Economic Area [EEA]), Kazakhstan (soy), and Sudan (sorghum).

4 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Our results are presented in Tables 2–6 and the global trade maps (Figures 1–5). Tables 2–6 include the minimum, median, and maximum ID values for the top 10 importers of the eight examples selected, while Figures 1–5 show the global trade maps where at least one importer has an ID > 20%. Given the potential relevance of the eight examples for social welfare and food security in the importing countries, we discuss them in greater detail below. In general, we observe heterogeneous results depending on the ban imposed and the countries involved. In some cases, a large number of countries have been importing the respective commodity, but at low rates in relation to the importers’ domestic supply quantities (e.g., Philippines [rice]; cf. Figure A1 and Table A2 in the online appendix). However, in other cases, only a small number of countries has been importing the commodity, whereby they depend heavily on these imports as indicated by large median ID values (e.g., Russia [soy]; cf. Figure 2 and Table 3).

We find that several European countries are highly dependent on rice imports from Cambodia and Myanmar with ID values up to 90% during the precrisis period (cf. Figure 1 and Table 2). The Czech Republic (21.86%), the Netherlands (10.31%), and Germany (10.73%) have IDs above 10% for Cambodia. Similarly, the Netherlands (11.42%) and Germany (14.61%) have IDs above 10% for Myanmar. Furthermore, the median IDs for Cambodia and Myanmar are highest for the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Germany, while the median ID for Cambodia is highest for the Netherlands.

3These are Algeria (food products), Cambodia (fish), Egypt (beans, peas), Jordan (food products), Kazakhstan (white sugar, white and red cabbages), Kuwait (foodstuffs), Mali (food products), Pakistan (food products), Romania (flour, sugar, vegetable oil), Russia ((processed) grain), and the Syrian Arab Republic (food commodities).

4The number of digits of an HS code increases with the level of disaggregation. For instance, 10 is the code for cereals, 1001 is the code for cereals: wheat and meslin, 100119 is the code for cereals: wheat and meslin: durum wheat: other than seed. Moreover, individual countries can add further digits to disaggregate 6-digit classifications beyond the 6-digit level in their tariff schedules. However, these are not standardized across all countries, and it is therefore not possible to include them in UN Comtrade.

5Table A2 contains the ID values for all 21 export bans and Figure A1 in the online appendix shows the remaining trade maps where the ID for all importing countries is <20%.
| Enacting country  | Affected products                      | HS code(s) | Affected countries | Start date      | End date if known |
|------------------|----------------------------------------|------------|--------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| Belarus          | Rye                                    | 1002       | Non-EAEU<sup>a</sup> countries | March 31, 2020  | June 30, 2020     |
|                  | Crushed and uncrushed soybeans         | 1201       |                    |                 |                   |
| Cambodia         | Rice                                   | 1006       | All                | April 05, 2020  | May 20, 2020      |
| Kazakhstan       | Potatoes                               | 0701       | All                | March 22, 2020  | June 01, 2020     |
|                  | Crushed and uncrushed soybeans         | 1201       | Non-EAEU countries  | March 31, 2020  | June 30, 2020     |
|                  | Millet                                 | 100821, 100829 | Non-EAEU countries | March 31, 2020  | June 30, 2020     |
| Kyrgyzstan       | Wheat and meslin                       | 1001       | All                | March 23, 2020  | September 22, 2020|
|                  | Rice                                   | 1006       |                    |                 |                   |
|                  | Sunflower seed                         | 1512       |                    |                 |                   |
|                  | Cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose, in solid form: other | 170199 | | | |
| Myanmar          | Rice                                   | 1006       | All                | April 03, 2020  | May 01, 2020      |
| Oman             | Onions                                 | 07310      | All                | April 02, 2020  |                   |
| Philippines      | Rice                                   | 1006       | All                | March 27, 2020  |                   |
| Romania          | Cereals                                | 10         | Non-EEA<sup>b</sup> countries | April 10, 2020  | April 16, 2020    |
| Russian Federation| Rye                                    | 1002       | Non-EAEU countries  | March 31, 2020  | June 30, 2020     |
|                  | Rice                                   | 1006       |                    |                 |                   |
|                  | Soybeans                               | 1201       |                    |                 |                   |
|                  | Millet                                 | 100821, 100829 | Non-EAEU countries | March 31, 2020  | June 30, 2020     |
| Sudan            | Maize                                  | 1005       | All                | April 15, 2020  |                   |
|                  | Sorghum                                | 1007       |                    |                 |                   |
| Thailand         | Eggs                                   | 040721     | All                | March 26, 2020  | April 30, 2020    |

<sup>a</sup>The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) consists of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. We present the results for each country separately.

<sup>b</sup>EEA, European Economic Area. Data are retrieved from ITC (2020), as of June 20, 2020.
FIGURE 1 Dependency on rice imports (share of imports in total food supply) from Cambodia and Myanmar by exporter and importer [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 2 Dependency on imports (share of imports in total food supply) from Russia by commodity and importer. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
(22.28%), Poland (28.11%), and Croatia (29.99%) imported between one-fifth and one-third of their rice supply from Cambodia, while the Latvian ID with respect to rice imports from Cambodia is highest with 58.5%. On average, Belgium and Lithuania imported 90.13% and 29.72% of their respective total rice supply during the precrisis period from Myanmar. Moreover, Poland (17.88%), the Netherlands (11%), and Latvia (9.69%) are among the top five importers of rice from Myanmar in terms of their ID (cf. Figure 1 and Table 2). The ID values for importers of rice from the Philippines are below 1% for all importing countries (cf. Figure A1 and Table A2 in the online appendix). Note that the Philippines have banned rice exports despite being one of the world’s largest rice producers (FAO, 2020b). However, in contrast to Cambodia and Myanmar, the Philippines are not a major rice exporter, but were the world’s largest rice importer in 2019 illustrating the country’s own requirements for this commodity (United Nations, 2020).

A large difference between the maximum and the minimum ID measure indicates that the importing country has been able to switch smoothly between sources for the commodity under consideration in the past, while a small difference points toward well-established trading relationships and a higher dependency. The difference between the maximum and minimum ID is over 10 p.p. in the case of five countries that import rice from

10We focus on absolute changes, that is, percentage points, rather than relative changes, that is, percentages, since relative changes do not reveal much about flexibility. For instance, consider country A having a minimum ID of 1% and a maximum ID of 2%, and country B with a minimum ID of 20% and a maximum of 40%. Both countries exhibit a relative difference of 100% between minimum and maximum but they are hardly comparable since the overall level of dependence is completely different.
Cambodia (Lithuania 18.90 p.p., Croatia 13.94 p.p., Estonia 13.81 p.p., Poland 13.68 p.p., and the Netherlands 12.33 p.p.), and three countries that import rice for Myanmar (Belgium 79.16 p.p., Lithuania 39.41 p.p., and Bulgaria 16.60 p.p.; cf. Table 2). Hence, although the majority of the aforementioned countries are among the most dependent in terms of the median ID, our findings suggest a certain degree of flexibility in the sourcing of rice. Therefore, although the bans on rice exports imposed by Cambodia and the Philippines mainly affect higher income European countries that can be expected to adapt more ably to any potentially detrimental impacts, these export bans could still create trade distortions between some major Asian producers of staple crops and Europe. First, European countries might switch sources, which could involve higher transaction costs and thereby lead to higher prices for consumers. Second, producers and exporting companies could lose their access to the European market if the importing countries stick to the alternative sources they switched to while the ban was in place. Moreover, the high ID values for Belgium and the Netherlands are also driven by the fact that both countries are among the largest transshipment points for goods in Europe (Eurostat, 2020). Future studies examining the impact of the export bans of Cambodia and Myanmar should therefore also consider the potential impact on third countries, such as France or Germany, which traditionally rely heavily on importing Belgian and Dutch rice re-exports (United Nations, 2020).

In the case of Russian export bans on millet, rice, and soy, we find the highest median ID values for countries located close to Russia (Figure 2 and Table 3). In terms of the ID, Azerbaijan (109.41%) is most heavily dependent.
on rice imports from Russia, followed by Mongolia (38.47%) and Moldova (24.62%). We observe the fourth and fifth largest median IDs for Georgia (5.86%) and Switzerland (5.85%), which are already below 10%. Azerbaijan is not only the most heavily dependent rice importer but also the most dependent importer of soy (70.21%; cf. Figure 2 and Table 3). In this case, Ireland has the second largest ID (44.01%) while all other countries have IDs below one percent. Mongolia (98.69%), Serbia (65.81%), and Turkey (54.44%) imported over 50% of their millet supply from Russia. In addition, Azerbaijan (22.21%), Thailand (20.86%), and Iran (20.41%) show high median ID values of slightly above a fifth. Hence, we see that Azerbaijan (rice, soy, and millet) and Mongolia (rice and millet) in particular are highly dependent on imports from Russia.

As regards sourcing flexibility, compared to the bans for rice of Cambodia and Myanmar, the variation of the ID is larger for the Russian bans (cf. Table 2 and Table 3). Table 3 illustrates that in the case of millet, rice, and soy: There are 13 countries with a difference between the maximum and minimum ID of over 10 p.p., namely Azerbaijan 83.17 p.p., Serbia 80.70 p.p., Mongolia 52.49 p.p., Turkey 37.00 p.p., Germany 16.87 p.p., United Kingdom 14.23 p.p., the Netherlands 12.38 p.p., South Africa 10.68 p.p. for millet, Azerbaijan 54.95 p.p., Mongolia 46.67 p.p., Moldova 22.67 p.p., Belgium 19.24 p.p. for rice, and Azerbaijan 102.28 p.p. for rice. Moreover, in seven of these 13 cases, the minimum ID is well below 10% suggesting a higher degree of sourcing flexibility and a lower dependency on imports from Russia (cf. Table 3). The large variation in the ID indicates sourcing flexibility for Azerbaijan and Mongolia. However, the minimum IDs amount to 11.82% and 84.53% for millet and 55.05% and

![Diagram showing dependency on sorghum imports from Sudan by the importer](Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com)
16.06% for rice, respectively. Therefore, these two countries might be particularly vulnerable to adverse effects resulting from the Russian export bans.

We find that most of the countries with the highest ID values resulting from Romania’s ban on cereal exports outside of the EEA are located on the Arabian Peninsula (e.g., Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) and in northern Africa (e.g., Mauritania, Sudan, Tunisia) (Figure 3 and Table 4). Crop production is challenging in these regions due to climatic constraints, the most important being water shortage (Fader et al., 2013). However, only Jordan shows a median ID exceeding 20% (26.12%) followed by Mauritania (5.86%), Lebanon (3.86%), and the United Arab Emirates (3.80%; Figure 3 and Table 4). With a minimum ID of 19.28% (2017), Jordan imported at least one-fifth of its cereals supply from Romania in the precrisis period (2015–2017). Indeed, it was Jordan’s largest trade partner for cereals in 2015 and 2016 and second only to the United States in 2017 (United Nations, 2020). Although the ban was lifted on April 16, 2020, just 6 days after it was imposed, the major role played by Romania in Jordan’s cereals supply in previous years might lead the Jordanian government to reconsider the sourcing of cereals in the future. As efforts to expand domestic production would be very costly (if at all possible) due to the natural constraints in Jordan (Fader et al., 2013), greater diversification of the set of trade partners might be an appealing option.

### Table 2

Top 10 importers of rice from Cambodia and Myanmar by import dependency

| Rank | Importer | Exporter | Median ID (%) | Minimum ID (%) | Maximum ID (%) | Range (p.p.) |
|------|----------|----------|---------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|
| 1    | Latvia   | Cambodia | 58.500        | 54.000         | 58.750        | 4.750        |
| 2    | Croatia  | Cambodia | 29.993        | 23.024         | 36.963        | 12.939       |
| 3    | Poland   | Cambodia | 28.111        | 17.711         | 31.394        | 13.683       |
| 4    | Netherlands | Cambodia | 22.281        | 19.880         | 32.206        | 12.326       |
| 5    | Czechia  | Cambodia | 21.863        | 18.397         | 24.152        | 5.755        |
| 6    | Lithuania | Cambodia | 20.411        | 19.470         | 38.367        | 18.897       |
| 7    | Germany  | Cambodia | 16.518        | 15.045         | 22.129        | 7.084        |
| 8    | Estonia  | Cambodia | 12.672        | 10.494         | 24.302        | 13.808       |
| 9    | Bulgaria | Cambodia | 12.087        | 8.889          | 18.833        | 9.944        |
| 10   | France   | Cambodia | 11.918        | 11.204         | 12.169        | 0.965        |

Note: The complete data are given in Table A2 in the online appendix. Abbreviations: ID, import dependency; p.p., percentage points.
As regards Kazakhstan’s ban on soy exports, Azerbaijan and Sweden exhibit median IDs of 32.09% and 12.17%, respectively (Figure 4 and Table 5). Sweden is the only country reporting imports of soy from Kazakhstan throughout the entire period (2015–2017; cf. Table 5). All other countries only imported soy from Kazakhstan in 1 of the 3 years considered. Therefore, the dependence on soy imports from Kazakhstan in other countries is quite

**TABLE 3** Top 10 importers for rice, soy, and millet from Russia by import dependency

| Rank | Importer        | Commodity | Median ID (%) | Minimum ID (%) | Maximum ID (%) | Range (p.p.) |
|------|-----------------|-----------|---------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|
| 1    | Azerbaijan      | Rice      | 109.406       | 55.046         | 109.992        | 54.946       |
| 2    | Mongolia        | Rice      | 38.474        | 16.046         | 62.712         | 46.666       |
| 3    | Rep. of Moldova | Rice      | 24.624        | 4.296          | 26.967         | 22.671       |
| 4    | Georgia         | Rice      | 5.856         | 4.947          | 10.605         | 5.658        |
| 5    | Switzerland     | Rice      | 5.848         | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 6    | Lebanon         | Rice      | 3.827         | 1.685          | 5.179          | 3.494        |
| 7    | Turkey          | Rice      | 3.742         | 3.344          | 7.024          | 3.680        |
| 8    | Latvia          | Rice      | 2.015         | 2.008          | 3.009          | 1.001        |
| 9    | Sudan           | Rice      | 1.364         | 0.527          | 2.202          | 1.675        |
| 10   | Ukraine         | Rice      | 0.994         | 0.410          | 1.249          | 0.839        |
|      | Azerbaijan      | Soy       | 70.207        | 0.919          | 103.196        | 102.277      |
| 2    | Ireland         | Soy       | 44.011        | 40.976         | 47.045         | 6.069        |
| 3    | Belgium         | Soy       | 0.450         | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 4    | China           | Soy       | 0.408         | 0.394          | 0.474          | 0.080        |
| 5    | Turkey          | Soy       | 0.185         | 0.119          | 0.223          | 0.104        |
| 6    | Iran            | Soy       | 0.178         | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 7    | Canada          | Soy       | 0.082         | <0.001         | 0.165          | 0.165        |
| 8    | Rep. of Korea   | Soy       | 0.048         | 0.047          | 0.108          | 0.061        |
| 9    | Germany         | Soy       | 0.020         | <0.001         | 0.027          | 0.027        |
| 10   | Poland          | Soy       | 0.013         | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
|      | Mongolia        | Millet    | 98.689        | 84.527         | 137.017        | 52.490       |
| 2    | Serbia          | Millet    | 65.812        | 18.407         | 99.105         | 80.698       |
| 3    | Turkey          | Millet    | 54.443        | 20.296         | 57.296         | 37.000       |
| 4    | Azerbaijan      | Millet    | 22.214        | 11.814         | 94.982         | 83.168       |
| 5    | Thailand        | Millet    | 20.861        | 20.667         | 28.345         | 7.678        |
| 6    | Iran            | Millet    | 20.408        | 16.817         | 23.999         | 7.182        |
| 7    | Brazil          | Millet    | 11.500        | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 8    | Jordan          | Millet    | 10.915        | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 9    | United Kingdom  | Millet    | 10.700        | 3.587          | 17.813         | 14.226       |
| 10   | Netherlands     | Millet    | 9.210         | 3.019          | 15.400         | 12.381       |

Note: The complete data are given in Table A2 in the online appendix.
Abbreviations: ID, import dependency; n.a., not applicable; p.p., percentage points.
low with only a few countries importing significant shares of their soy supply. This is similar to the case of Russia, where only two countries show median IDs of over 1% (cf. Figure 2 and Table 3). However, this must be put into perspective against the share in global production. While Kazakhstan and Russia produced approximately 255,000 and 4 million tonnes of soy in 2018, respectively, global production amounted 363 million tonnes, of which 66% was produced solely by the United States and Brazil (FAO, 2020b). Since the USA and Brazil are also the world’s top soy exporters (United Nations, 2020), it is not surprising that only few countries depend on soy imports from Kazakhstan and Russia.

Lastly, we present the results of Sudan’s ban on sorghum exports. As a developing country, Kenya shows a median import dependency of 38.42%, while Lebanon’s dependency is even higher with a share of 56.32% of its sorghum supply stemming from Sudan (Figure 5 and Table 6). However, both countries only report sorghum

---

**TABLE 4** Top 10 importers for cereals from Romania by import dependency

| Rank | Importer           | Median ID (%) | Minimum ID (%) | Maximum ID (%) | Range (p.p.) |
|------|--------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|
| 1    | Jordan             | 26.116        | 19.283         | 53.623         | 34.340       |
| 2    | Mauritania         | 5.863         | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 3    | Lebanon            | 3.863         | 3.259          | 6.934          | 3.675        |
| 4    | United Arab Emirates | 3.798       | 1.114          | 5.557          | 4.443        |
| 5    | Sudan              | 3.556         | 3.257          | 3.854          | 0.597        |
| 6    | Saudi Arabia       | 2.534         | 2.158          | 3.356          | 1.198        |
| 7    | Tunisia            | 2.450         | 1.349          | 3.531          | 2.182        |
| 8    | New Zealand        | 1.980         | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 9    | Egypt              | 1.602         | <0.001         | 3.204          | 3.204        |
| 10   | Oman               | 1.304         | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |

Note: The complete data are given in Table A2 in the online appendix.
Abbreviations: ID, import dependency; n.a., not applicable; p.p., percentage points.

---

**TABLE 5** Importers for soy from Kazakhstan by import dependency

| Rank | Importer    | Median ID (%) | Minimum ID (%) | Maximum ID (%) | Range (p.p.) |
|------|-------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|
| 1    | Azerbaijan  | 32.093        | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 2    | Sweden      | 12.168        | 10.560         | 24.915         | 14.355       |
| 3    | Denmark     | 8.400         | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 4    | Turkey      | 0.282         | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 5    | USA         | 0.028         | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 6    | China       | 0.006         | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 7    | Canada      | 0.002         | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 8    | Lebanon     | 0.001         | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 9    | Netherlands | <0.001        | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |

Note: The complete data are given in Table A2 in the online appendix.
Abbreviations: ID, import dependency; n.a., not applicable; p.p., percentage points.
imports from Sudan in 2017. Hence, they are able to satisfy the domestic demand from other sources as well. The United Arab Emirates have a median ID of 26.47% followed by Belgium with 14.49% and Spain with 13.81%. While all of them report sorghum imports from Sudan more than once, the minimum IDs are either below 10% (Belgium and Spain) or the difference between the maximum and minimum is very large (United Arab Emirates) suggesting that the importers are very flexible in sourcing sorghum from other countries (Table 6). In addition, while Sudan was the third largest producer of sorghum in 2018 with a volume of approximately 5 million tonnes (behind the United States and Nigeria), only 77,000 tonnes were exported, which is <2% of its production (FAO, 2020b; United Nations, 2020). In contrast, the United States produced slightly over 9 million tonnes and exported approximately 4 million tonnes in 2018, which is equivalent to 44% (FAO, 2020b; United Nations, 2020). It follows that most of Sudan’s sorghum production is used for domestic consumption and only small shares are exported, potentially making Sudan unattractive as a trade partner for sorghum imports.

### Table 6 Top 10 importers for sorghum from Sudan by import dependency

| Rank | Importer           | Median ID (%) | Minimum ID (%) | Maximum ID (%) | Range (p.p.) |
|------|--------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|
| 1    | Lebanon            | 56.318        | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 2    | Kenya              | 38.421        | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 3    | United Arab Emirates | 26.474       | 15.841         | 211.218        | 195.377      |
| 4    | Belgium            | 14.488        | 9.735          | 15.631         | 5.896        |
| 5    | Spain              | 13.809        | 0.004          | 27.613         | 27.609       |
| 6    | Netherlands        | 6.430         | 4.706          | 8.153          | 3.447        |
| 7    | Jordan             | 6.284         | 1.636          | 10.931         | 9.295        |
| 8    | Greece             | 4.500         | n.a.           | n.a.           | n.a.         |
| 9    | Italy              | 4.038         | 0.009          | 8.067          | 8.058        |
| 10   | Germany            | 3.845         | 3.357          | 5.716          | 2.359        |

Note: The complete data are given in Table A2 in the online appendix. Abbreviations: ID, import dependency; n.a., not applicable; p.p., percentage points.

5 | CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

In this study, we identify potential disruptions in the food supply of importing countries caused by temporary export bans enacted in reaction of the COVID-19 pandemic using pre-pandemic trade flows. We use data from the ITC, UN Comtrade, and the FAO to calculate an import dependency measure and evaluate the historic reliance of importing countries on those countries restricting exports and provide examples from both developed and developing countries.

We find that importers often rely on a particular trade partner for a significant share of the supply of a given commodity. These countries are particularly vulnerable to sudden export restrictions imposed by their main trade partners, even if these restrictions are only a temporary measure. However, the implications for importing countries are more complex. The ultimate impact on the trade partners of countries which impose export bans is determined by several other factors, such as further COVID-19-related supply- and demand-side issues, the commodity’s share in the country’s total domestic caloric supply, or its access to alternative trade partners to source the commodity. Nevertheless, and especially from a short-term point of view, every export ban is likely to distort supply chains that rely heavily on imports from a particular country.
Based on these findings, we encourage future researchers to use the cases/dependencies identified in our study as a starting point for further analyses of the effects of COVID-19-related export bans on the importing and exporting countries and to include third countries, which might be affected, for example, due to world market price fluctuations. Our results indicate that the comparability of different country/commodity combinations is limited, so that further investigations should be conducted case-by-case. In addition, it would be valuable to examine whether countries which have made efforts to increase their food self-sufficiency after the food price crisis 2007/2008, have been successful and improved the resilience of their food systems against such risks. We recognize that import dependency is a first indication of the varying extents to which countries seek to satisfy the quantity and diversity of the food demands of their population. However, a more nuanced understanding of food self-sufficiency and how it is impacted by temporary trade restrictions could lead to a more targeted policy dialogue (Clapp, 2017). To this end, our analysis could be extended using alternative indices to capture the link between trade and food and nutrition security in importing countries. Finally, it might be interesting to investigate further how high-income countries such as Belgium or the Netherlands have responded to the lack or reduction of supplies from their traditional main trade partners.

When considering the consequences of export bans on food security in importing countries, there may be doubts as to whether a lack of imports from, for example, Myanmar (rice) or Russia (soy) jeopardizes the availability of an adequate caloric supply for the population in Europe. Firstly, there might be alternative suppliers for the respective commodity, such as China in the case of rice. Secondly, the contribution of a product to the overall caloric food supply must be taken into consideration when drawing conclusions on the impact of the trade measures on food security. Nevertheless, if a country sources a high share of any commodity from just one producer, and all imports of the commodity are suddenly stopped, this will probably distort well-established and coordinated global supply chains in both developing and industrialized countries—at least in the short term.

Another potential implication is rising world market prices, especially for thinly traded commodities, that is, commodities where a small number of producers supply most of the global production and small shares of this global production are traded, such as rice (Clapp, 2017). Coinciding with the imposition of most of the trade measures, world market prices for rice rose by over 25 p.p. between February and April 2020 (World Bank, 2020). Hence, third countries might be affected by import bans due to increments of market prices, which in turn can jeopardize food security in poorer countries (Baquedano & Liefert, 2014). Moreover, in the absence of affordable substitutes, the ban on the export of cereals from Romania might very well cause issues regarding food security for its trade partners, particularly in the short-term and in countries like Jordan, which lack natural resources to expand domestic production.

Lastly, we present a brief discussion of aspects that future research should highlight when quantifying the impact of export bans on importing countries. In general, when reviewing the impact of the export bans on prices, production, and trade, there are several other issues in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic that affected the global food systems, which need to be considered complementarily with export bans. First, supply-side access to labor for the primary production of crops relying on a seasonal workforce has been disrupted due to travel restrictions (Larue, 2020; Ridley & Devadoss, 2020). Food processing and retailing have also been affected by worker illness and restrictions in public life (Hobbs, 2020). Second, a phenomenon observed in many different countries at the beginning of the crisis involved panic purchases and hoarding of essential durable food products, for example, flour, pasta, and rice, producing a strong demand-side shock which, in some cases, led to empty supermarket shelves (Hobbs, 2020). Third, countries with a historically high tourist volume might be facing very different food demand patterns during the crisis compared to previous years since the absence of tourists leads to a decline in demand from the hospitality industry. Fourth, the COVID-19 pandemic has led many countries to impose a temporary shutdown of their economy resulting in lower economic activity, a sharp increase in unemployment, for example, in the United States (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020), and thereby to sinking income, which might have unforeseeable effects on food demand. While the aforementioned aspects might influence the impact of an export ban, they may in turn also be a driver of the decision to ban exports. In particular, consumers’
panic purchases could cause governments to prohibit exports of these goods to avoid the danger of running out of stocks of certain commodities in the short-term. Hence, the causal effect could be reversed.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The data used in our study are publicly available and retrieved from the International Trade Center, FAOSTAT, and UN Comtrade as indicated in the manuscript.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Open access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.

ORCID
Maximilian Koppenberg http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5814-7836
Stefan Hirsch https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2668-6824

REFERENCES
Anania, G. (2013). Agricultural export restrictions and the WTO: What options do policy-makers have for promoting food security? Issue paper no. 50. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Geneva, Switzerland.
Baquedano, F. G., & Liefert, W. M. (2014). Market integration and price transmission in consumer markets of developing countries. Food Policy, 44, 103–114.
Barichello, R. (2020). The COVID-19 pandemic: Anticipating its effects on Canada’s agricultural trade. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69(2), 219–224.
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2020). The Employment Situation—September 2020. USDL-20-1838, U.S. Department of Labor.
Cheptea, A., & Gaigné, C. (2020). Russian food embargo and the lost trade. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 47(2), 684–718.
Clapp, J. (2017). Food self-sufficiency: Making sense of it, and when it makes sense. Food Policy, 66, 88–96.
Deuss, A. (2017). Impact of agricultural export restrictions on prices in importing countries. OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers No. 105. OECD Publishing.
Diao, X., & Kennedy, A. (2016). Economywide impact of maize export bans on agricultural growth and household welfare in Tanzania: A dynamic computable general equilibrium model analysis. Development Policy Review, 34(1), 101–134.
Djuric, I., Götz, L., & Glauben, T. (2015). Are export restrictions an effective instrument to insulate domestic prices against skyrocketing world market prices? The wheat export ban in Serbia. Agribusiness, 31(2), 215–228.
Espitia, A., Rocha, N., & Ruta, M. (2020). Covid-19 and food protectionism: The impact of the pandemic and export restrictions on world food markets. World Bank working paper.
Eurostat. (2020). Country level—Gross weight of goods handled in all ports. http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=mar_mg_aa_cwh&lang=en. Accessed October 20, 2020.
Fader, M., Gerten, D., Krause, M., Lucht, W., & Cramer, W. (2013). Spatial decoupling of agricultural production and consumption: Quantifying dependences of countries on food imports due to domestic land and water constraints. Environmental Research Letters, 8, 1–15.
FAO. (2012). FAO statistical yearbook 2012—World Food and Agriculture.
FAO. (2020a). New food balances. http://faostat3.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FBS. Accessed May 20, 2020.
FAO. (2020b). Data. Crops. http://faostat3.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC. Accessed May 20, 2020.
FAO, IFAD, WFP, and World Bank. (2020). Joint statement on COVID-19 impacts on food security and nutrition on the occasion of the Extraordinary G20 Agriculture Minister’s Meeting. https://worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2020/04/21/joint-statement-on-covid-19-impacts-on-food-security-and-nutrition. Accessed July 18, 2020.
Glauber, J., Laborde, D., Martin, W., & Vos, R. (2020). COVID-19: Trade restrictions are worst possible response to safeguard food security. IFPRI Blog. https://ifpri.org/blog/covid-19-trade-restrictions-are-worst-possible-responsesafeguard-food-security. Accessed July 19, 2020.
Götz, L., Djuric, I., & Nivievsksy, O. (2016). Regional price effects of extreme weather events and wheat export controls in Russia and Ukraine. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 67(3), 741–763.
Hobbs, J. E. (2020). Food supply chains during the COVID-19 pandemic. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 68(2), 171–176.
International Trade Center (ITC). (2020). COVID-19 temporary trade measures. International Trade Centre, Geneva, Switzerland. https://macmap.org/en/covid19. Accessed June 20, 2020.
Ivanic, M., & Martin, W. (2008). Implications of higher global food prices for poverty in low-income countries. *Agricultural Economics, 39*(s1), 405–416.

Joller, Y., & Kniahin, D. (2020). Global chain reaction: Unprecedented trade measures to tackle COVID-19 ITC Market Access Blog Serie. [https://intracen.org/covid19/Blog/Global-chain-reaction-Unprecedented-trade-measures-to-tackle-COVID-19/](https://intracen.org/covid19/Blog/Global-chain-reaction-Unprecedented-trade-measures-to-tackle-COVID-19/). Accessed July 18, 2020.

Kerr, W. A. (2020). The COVID-19 pandemic and agriculture: Short- and long-run implications for international trade relations. *Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69*(2), 225–229.

Larue, B. (2020). Labor issues and COVID-19. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 68(2), 231–237.

Larue, B., & Ker, A. (1993). World price variability versus protectionism in agriculture: A causality analysis. *The Review of Economics and Statistics, 75*(2), 342–346.

Liefert, W. M., Wescott, P., & Wainio, J. (2012). Alternative policies to agricultural export bans that are less market-distorting. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 94*(2), 435–441.

Martin, W., & Anderson, K. (2012). Export restrictions and price insulation during commodity price booms. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 94*(2), 422–427.

Martin, W., & Glauber, J. (2020). Trade policy and food security. In R. Baldwin, & S. Evenett (Eds.), *COVID-19 and trade policy: Why turning inward won’t work*. CEPR Press.

Porteous, O. (2017). Empirical effects of short-term export bans: The case of African maize. *Food Policy, 71*, 17–26.

Puma, M. J., Bose, S., Chon, S. Y., & Cook, B. I. (2015). Assessing the evolving fragility of the global food system. *Environmental Research Letters, 10*, 024007.

Ridley, W., & Devadoss, S. (2020). The impacts of COVID-19 on fruit and vegetable production. *Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy*, forthcoming.

Sharma, R. (2011). Food export restrictions: Review of the 2007–2010 experience and consideration for discipline restrictive measures. Commodity and Trade Policy Research Working Paper No. 32. FAO, Rome, Italy.

Tangermann, S. (2011a). Policy solutions to agricultural market volatility: A synthesis. ICTSD Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 33. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Geneva, Switzerland.

Tangermann, S. (2011b). Risk management in agriculture and the future of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. ICTSD Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development Issue Paper No. 34. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Geneva, Switzerland.

United Nations. (2020). *Extract data*. [https://comtrade.un.org/data](https://comtrade.un.org/data). Accessed May 19, 2020.

Voegele, J. (2020). Three imperatives to keep food moving in a time of fear and confusion. World Bank Voices; April 3, 2020. [https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/three-imperatives-keep-food-moving-time-fear-and-confusion](https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/three-imperatives-keep-food-moving-time-fear-and-confusion). Accessed July 26, 2020.

World Bank. (2020). *Commodity markets*. [https://worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets](https://worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets). Accessed June 9, 2020.

World Trade Organization (WTO). (2020). *Export prohibition and restrictions*. [https://wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/export_prohibitions_report_e.pdf](https://wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/export_prohibitions_report_e.pdf)

Zongo, W. J.-B., & Larue, B. (2019). A counterfactual experiment about the eradication of cattle diseases on beef trade. *Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 67*(4), 379–396.

Zwart, A. C., & Blandford, D. (1989). Market intervention and international price stability. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 71*(2), 379–388.

**AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES**

Maximilian Koppenberg is a doctoral student at the Chair of Agricultural and Food Economics at Technical University of Munich, School of Management. His research focuses on industrial organization.

Martina Bozzola is a lecturer in the Economics of Agriculture, Food and Health at Queen’s University of Belfast (UK) and Senior Research Associate at the Agricultural and Resource Economics Group at the Zurich University of Applied Sciences. She received her Ph.D. at the Graduate Institute in Geneva in 2015 (Climate change economics). Her current research focuses on Climate change economics and agricultural economics, decision making under risk, technology adoption, food, and nutrition security.
**Tobias Dalhaus** is an assistant professor at the Business Economics Group, Wageningen University. He received his Ph.D. in 2018 at ETH Zurich and his main field of research covers the quantification and management of risks in agriculture.

**Stefan Hirsch** is professor of Agricultural and Food Economics at Technical University Munich, School of Management. He received his Ph.D. in 2014 and his current research focuses on food industrial economics with particular emphasis on firms’ economic performance.

**SUPPORTING INFORMATION**

Additional Supporting Information may be found online in the supporting information tab for this article.

---

How to cite this article: Koppenberg M, Bozzola M, Dalhaus T, Hirsch S. Mapping potential implications of temporary COVID-19 export bans for the food supply in importing countries using precrisis trade flows. *Agribusiness*. 2020;1–19. [https://doi.org/10.1002/agr.21684](https://doi.org/10.1002/agr.21684)