Comment on “Quantum Key Distribution with the Blind Polarization Bases”

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In recent paper [1], Kye et al. claim that using the blind polarization, their new quantum key distribution scheme can be secure even when a key is embedded in a not-so-weak coherent-state pulse. Here we show an eavesdropping scheme, by which the eavesdropper can achieve the full information of the key with a probability of unity and will not be discovered by the the legitimate users, even in the case that they have the perfect single-photon source and the loseless channel.

There are two protocols in Ref. [1]. Consider their first protocol:

**Protocol 1:**

(a1) Alice (the sender) prepares a linear polarized qubit in its initial state $|\psi\rangle_0 = |0\rangle$, where $|0\rangle$ and $|1\rangle$ represent two orthogonal polarizations of the qubit, and chooses a random angle $\theta$.

(a2) Alice rotates the polarization of the qubit by $\theta$, to bring the state of the qubit to $|\psi\rangle_1 = \hat{U}_y(\theta)|\psi\rangle_0 = \cos \theta |0\rangle - \sin \theta |1\rangle$, and then sends the qubit to Bob (the receiver).

(a3) Bob chooses another random angle and rotates the polarization of the received qubit by $\phi$; $|\psi\rangle_2 = \hat{U}_y(\phi)|\psi\rangle_1 = \cos(\theta + \phi)|0\rangle - \sin(\theta + \phi)|1\rangle$, and then sends it to Bob (the receiver).

(a4) Alice rotates the polarization angle of the qubit by $-\theta$ and then encodes the message by further rotating the polarization angle of $\pm \frac{\pi}{4}$; $|\psi\rangle_3 = \hat{U}_y(\pm \frac{\pi}{4}) \times \hat{U}_y(-\theta)|\psi\rangle_2$, Alice sends the qubit to Bob. (Alice and Bob have predetermined that $+\frac{\pi}{4}$ is say, “0” and $-\frac{\pi}{4}$ is “1”.

(a5) Bob measure the polarization after rotating the polarization by $-\phi$; $|\psi\rangle_4 = \hat{U}_y(-\phi)|\psi\rangle_3 = \hat{U}_y(+\frac{\pi}{4})|\psi\rangle_0$, $\hat{U}_y(+\frac{\pi}{4})$ and $\hat{U}_y(-\frac{\pi}{4})$ are orthogonal to each other, which enables Bob to read the keys precisely.

Our attacking scheme works as following:

(a1’) After step (a2), in the above protocol, Eve intercepts all qubits from Alice and stores them. (We denote these qubits as “set 1”). Meanwhile, sends her own qubits with each of them being randomly in state $|p\rangle$, $p$ is either 0 or 1. (We denote these qubits as “set 2”). Eve can remember the state of each qubits sent from her.

(a2’) After step (a3), Eve intercepts all qubits from Bob and stores them. Note that all these qubits are from set 2 originally. Then, Eve sends set 1 to Alice.

(a3’) After step (a4), Eve intercepts all qubits from Alice and measures each of them in $\pm \frac{\pi}{4}$ basis. Reading the measurement outcome, Eve knows Alice’s choice of $+\frac{\pi}{4}$ or $-\frac{\pi}{4}$, i.e., the bit values of each pulse from Alice, $k = 0, 1$ for $+\frac{\pi}{4}$ or $-\frac{\pi}{4}$, respectively.

(a4’) According to the measurement result of each qubits from Alice, Eve takes appropriate unitary rotations to those qubits stored by her in step (a2’) and sends them to Bob. Explicitly, to any qubit, if its original value $p = 0$, Eve rotates the polarization by $-(1)^k \frac{\pi}{4}$ and sends it to Bob; if $p = 1$, she first flips its polarization between $|0\rangle$ and $|1\rangle$ and then rotates the polarization by $-(1)^k \frac{\pi}{4}$ and sends it to Bob. Bob will just implement step (a5) and in such a way, Bob will have no error after the protocol.

Knowing that protocol 1 suffers from the above types of impersonation attack [1], they have proposed protocol 2 and claimed that the modified protocol will be secure under such attacks. We now show that Eve can access the full information of the key from their modified protocol by almost the same impersonation attack. Let us first recall their modified protocol.

**Protocol 2:**

(b1) Alice sends two single-photon pulses of the polarization angles $\theta_1$ and $\theta_2$ to Bob.

(b2) Bob rotates the polarization angles of the pulses by $\phi + (1)^s \frac{\pi}{4}$ and $\phi + (1)^s \frac{\pi}{4}$, where the shuffling parameter $s \in \{0, 1\}$ is randomly chosen by Bob and $\oplus$ denotes addition modulo 2. And then Bob sends the pulses back to Alice.

(b3) Receiving the two pulses of their polarization angles $\theta_1 + \phi + (1)^s \frac{\pi}{4}$ and $\theta_2 + \phi + (1)^s \frac{\pi}{4}$, Alice rotates the polarization angles of the pulses by $-\theta_1 + (1)^k \frac{\pi}{4}$ and $-\theta_2 + (1)^k \frac{\pi}{4}$ respectively, where $k \in \{0, 1\}$ is the key value. She blocks one of the qubits and sends the other to Bob. The paper [1] introduces the blocking factor $b = 0, 1$ to denote the case to let the first or the second pulse go.

(b4) When the qubit travels to Bob, he rotates the polarization angles of the pulses by $-\phi$ and measures the polarization. He obtains the measurement outcome $l^k = s \oplus k \oplus b$ as the prekey bit value.

(b5) Alice publicly announces her blocking factor $b$. And depending on $b$ and the shuffling parameter $s$, Bob
can decode the original key bit by \( k = s \oplus b \oplus l \).

Our attacking scheme is now the following:

\((b1')\) After step \((b1)\), Eve intercepts and stores both pulses from Alice. (We denote these pulses as “set E1”). Eve also sends two pulses to Bob. These two pulses are originally produced by Eve with random polarization angles of \( \theta_1' \), \( \theta_2' \). Eve remembers the polarization angle of each pulses.

\((b2')\) After step \((b2)\) in protocol 2, Eve intercepts both pulses from Bob, rotates each of them by angle \(-\theta_1', -\theta_2'\) and stores them. (We denote these pulses as “set E2”). Eve chooses her shuffling parameter \( s' = 0 \) and rotates the two pulses in set E1 by angle \((-1)^s' \frac{\pi}{4}\) and \((-1)^s' \oplus 1 \frac{\pi}{4}\) respectively. Eve sends the rotated pulses in set E1 to Alice.

\((b3')\) After step \((b3)\), Eve intercepts and measures the pulse sent out by Alice in \(|0, \frac{\pi}{2}\rangle\) basis. By reading measurement outcome, she knows the value \( l^sk = s' \oplus k \oplus b = k \oplus b \) since the value \( s' \) is set by herself. (In our attacking scheme, \( s' = 0 \)). Then she rotates the first pulse of set E2 with the angle of \((-1)^{k \oplus b} \frac{\pi}{4}\), sends it to Bob and discards the second pulse in set E2. (Remark: Although Eve knows neither \( b \) nor \( k \), she knows the value of \( k \oplus b \) and she can do the unitary rotation dependent on \( k \oplus b \)).

When Alice announces the value of \( b \) i.e., which pulse she has blocked, Eve can get the value of \( k \) since she has already known the value of \( k \oplus b \) and \( k = b \oplus (k \oplus b) \). On the other hand, with the operation in step \((b3')\), Bob’s result about \( k \)—value will be identical to Alice’s. Alice and Bob can not discover the eavesdropping. When Bob receives the pulse after step \((b3')\), he makes the measurement like step \((b5)\) and will get the value \( l^sk = s \oplus (k \oplus b) \).

Although the \( b' \) value chosen by Eve may be different from the \( b \) value chosen by Alice, it does not cause any channel noise since Eve’s actions in our attacking scheme will not affect Bob’s measurement outcome for the value \( l \), which is \( l = s \oplus k \oplus b \).

Although it is known protocol 1 is probably insecure under impersonation attack \([1]\), it has been assumed that protocol 2 is secure prior to our comment. We have for the first time shown the Protocol is totally insecure under our attack. Our eavesdropping method works even in the case that Alice has a perfect single-photon source and a transparent, noiseless channel. The protocols of blind polarization bases are insecure in their present forms \([1]\). Moreover, in our present scheme, the quantum memories which are not practical in nowadays technology are not necessary, a long enough delay of the photon will be sufficient. Therefore, our attacking scheme only need existing technology.

\[1\] W.-H.Kye et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 040501 (2005).