In the last decade, well over $10 billion has been spent on employment programs designed to contribute to peace and stability. Despite the outlay, whether these programs perform, and how they do so, remain open questions. This study conducts three reviews to derive the status quo of knowledge. First, it draws on academic literature on the microfoundations of instability to distill testable theories of how employment programs could affect stability at the micro level. Second, it analyses academic and grey literature that directly evaluates the impacts of employment programs on peace-related outcomes. Third, it conducts a systematic review of program-based learning from over 400 interventions. This study finds good theoretical reasons to believe that employment programs could contribute to peace. However, only very limited evidence exists on overall impacts on peace or on the pathways underlying the theories of change. At the program level, the review finds strong evidence that contributions to peace and stability are often simply assumed to have occurred. This provides a major challenge for the justification of continued spending on jobs for peace programs. Instead, systematic and rigorous learning on the impacts of jobs for peace programs needs to be scaled up urgently.

JEL Codes: H56, H84, I25, I38, O12
Keywords: Employment interventions, peace building, jobs, conflict, jobs for peace.

Introduction

It is logical, if sometimes hopeful, that an employment program should boost the labor market performance of its participants (Adoho et al. 2014; Cho and Honoratie 2014; Attanasio et al. 2015), even if much remains to be learned (Blattman and Ralston 2015). Similarly, well-designed peacebuilding interventions might, reasonably, be expected to contribute to peace and promote stability (Fearon et al. 2008; Ackett 2011; Gaarder and Annan 2013; Gilligan et al. 2013; Blattman et al. 2017). Linking these two concepts are a series of programs that aim to build peace and
stability by stimulating employment. Since 2005, well over $10 billion has been spent by international donors on this class of intervention. This article tests what is known about the rationale and performance of these programs. Do employment programs really contribute to peacebuilding? And if so, how?

To answer these questions, this study produces the first comprehensive overview of theory and evidence on the linkages between employment programs and peace and social stability, built on three related reviews. First, it analyzes the academic literature on micro-level drivers of violent and other antisocial behaviors that could, potentially, be influenced by employment. The resulting insights are then applied to specify testable theories of change. Second, the study undertakes a critical evaluation of the academic and grey literatures in order to establish the empirical evidence for linkages between employment programs and indicators and behaviors related to peacebuilding and social stability promotion. Finally, a deep review of agency documentation assesses how the impacts of employment programs on stability-related outcomes have been theorized and tested in practice.

The study identifies four key theories of change, which we label “Opportunity”, “Grievance”, “Contact” and “Competition”. These theories posit that employment programs can mitigate the risk of violence through the following actions: increasing the opportunity costs of engaging in illegal activities (Becker 1968); reducing (perceived) inequalities and unfairness, especially between groups (Collier and Hoefllner 2004); stimulating positive inter-group interactions (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006); or reducing (perceptions of) competition for scarce economic resources (Abbink et al. 2010). At the same time, empirical studies on the important links in these causal chains often lack consistency in the impacts they find, or are missing entirely.

A systematic review methodology identifies over 400 programs conducted by international organizations. The analysis assesses how peace and stability are conceptualized at the level of individual interventions, the aspects of these concepts that programs aim to target, and the success of the program in doing so. The review finds no evidence that any of these programs have critically examined the links between the intervention and the aspects of instability it targets, either as an input to program design or in a rigorous impact evaluation. Rather, it finds strong evidence that contributions to peace and stability are simply assumed to have occurred.

Therefore, while there are satisfactory theoretical grounds to believe that employment programs can contribute to peace and stability, the observed impacts are far from a foregone conclusion. A lack of both case study evidence and program-level learning suggests a more nuanced pictured than is assumed in programming decisions. Furthermore, empirical gaps in key theories suggest an urgent requirement for more rigorous studies, better program design and learning, and more conservative expectations of what some employment programs can achieve. That said, available evidence does not suggest that employment programs do not build peace; nor should the conclusions be interpreted as suggesting that the key relationships do not exist.
Rather, they show a lack of critical reflection and a lack of rigorous evidence present in research, practice and implementation.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 conducts an applied literature review in order to establish why employment programs might contribute to peace and promote stability; section 3 reviews case study evidence from the academic and grey literatures; section 4 presents a systematic review of program-level learning. Section 5 concludes, reflects and gives recommendations.

What Drives Antisocial Behavior and Why Might Employment Programs Interrupt It?

Following Galtung (1969), peace is differentiated into “positive peace” (the absence of violence and the unfolding of conflict in a constructive way) and “negative peace” (merely the absence of direct violence). This article is interested in positive peace and, consequently, in the range of behaviors—violent and non-violent—that erode positive peace, which this article characterizes as “antisocial”. Based on economic first principles, this section defines individual motivations to engage in antisocial behaviors and how these motives might change as a consequence of employment programs.2

Such a micro-level lens is of particular interest because most employment programs take place at the individual level, while threats to social stability also have well-established microfoundations (Justino et al. 2013; Verwimp et al. 2019). These foundations not only relate to participation in organized violence but spans implicit support for militant organizations (Kalyvas 2006) and other deliberately disruptive activities. In turn, it is important to consider how employment might interrupt and deter such behaviors. While this approach emphasizes the supply side of antisocial behavior, the demand side is also relevant. For example, programs might create alternative sources of demand for “idle hands”.3

This study derives four key theories that have been offered as explanations for antisocial behavior and that, conceivably, are influenced by individual economic circumstances: 

- opportunity costs of illegal activities (Becker 1968);
- greed and grievance (Collier and Hoeffler 2004); contact theory (Allport 1954); and competition between groups (Fehr et al. 2013). Each theory is discussed in the subsections below.

The Grievance Theory

The “grievances” that people hold, and how they are formed, are key drivers of social fracture (Gergen 1995). These grievances could be focused on any of a range of well-defined targets but generally stem from unfairness—real or imagined—between groups. This section discusses two main routes through which the existence of
grievances can be linked to antisocial behaviors: low trust between the populace and the government (vertical); and tensions between socio-demographic groups (horizontal).

First, attitudes towards governments and other elites are a key predictor of antisocial behaviors. Based on data collected from peasants in El Salvador, Wood (2003) defines a “non-material” theory of insurgency. Amongst other key factors, local conditions before the conflict and perceptions of the government come to the fore in choices to offer active support to rebels, despite high risks and a lack of private gains from doing so. This adheres closely to more general “hearts and minds” theories. For example, on observing that violence against civilians increased insurgent violence, Kalyvas (2006) theorizes that those victimized will be less likely to offer support or information to government forces, thereby increasing rebels’ capacity to attack. Rebel violence against civilians, similarly, predicts reduced violence by that group in subsequent periods (Condra and Shapiro 2011). Mercy Corps (2013) suggests that perceptions of government corruption among Afghan youths is a strong predictor of sympathy towards armed opposition groups.

Thus, the poor provision of services, (real or perceived) corruption, violent crackdowns and other government failings increase incentives for individuals to participate—non-violently and violently—in rebellion. If jobs programs can increase support for the government, they have a role to play in peace and stability. For example, programs that prominently feature the government are likely to have similar impacts on winning hearts and minds as service provision, which should reduce incentives to support insurgent groups. Dasgupta et al. (2017) show a long-run reduction in Maoist violence in India, due to a rural employment guarantee program, as does Fetzer (2014). Berman et al. (2011) confirm that improved government service provision is causally linked to reductions in insurgent violence in Iraq.

Such findings, however, derive from large-scale government programs that are targeted regionally. Programs of this scale and complexity are not always available, practical, or even possible. Whether programs that target a limited number of participants can replicate the impact of large-scale transfers remains an open question. Here, a “unit of analysis” problem exists (Blattman and Ralston 2015). In other words, given that the reasons why individuals select into violence are often unclear, it is also unclear which programs are well-placed to reduce violence.

Second, perceptions of poverty and/or inequality have long been associated with violence and other antisocial behaviors (Gurr 1970; Sen 1973). Such inequalities exist—or are perceived to exist—in several dimensions (such as opportunity, power, income, or health) and can be captured between social strata (“vertical inequality”) or between groups (“horizontal inequality”; Murshed 2015; Stewart 2000). While such inequalities do not feature prominently in macro-level studies (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoefller 2004), it is argued to directly influence antisocial behavior at the micro level (Østby 2013). Both vertical (Bircan et al. 2017) and
horizontal (Stewart 2008; Roemer 1998; Tilly 1998) inequalities are associated with group-based conflict and its onset (Buhaug et al. 2014). While inequalities in income or wealth in a country may not stimulate antisocial behavior, those between recognizable groups could be a major threat.4

The role that employment programming can play in reducing inequalities is intuitive. Any efforts to increase incomes or access to economic opportunities should reduce such perceptions of unfairness. Careful cross-group rollout of programs could mitigate between-group tensions. However, such logic also implies serious risks—programs that are, or are perceived to be, exclusive (Karell and Schutte 2018), prone to elite capture, or are otherwise perceived to be unfairly rolled out, could all stimulate violence.

Optimal policies to mitigate inequalities are debated (Stewart 2005; Stewart et al. 2008; Immervoll and Richardson 2011; Ravallion 2001; Coady and Gupta 2012), as are their performance (Martin 1999). Forster et al. (2011) and Leibbrandt et al. (2010) argue a critical role for employment policies in reducing inequality, although they focus mostly on labor market reform, rather than on individual jobs. Banerjee and Duflo (2007, 2008) and Reardon et al. (2000) show positive impacts of income diversification on mitigating inequalities. Such diversification could be stimulated by employment programs but empirical evidence confirmation it scant and hints that long causal chains are at play.

The Opportunity Theory

While grievance is universal, opportunity is not (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). A long line of economic literature argues that grievance, alone, does not drive violence. Rather, engagement in crime, rebellion, or any other illegal activity can be thought of as a utility maximization problem (Becker 1968). Individuals weigh the relative costs and benefits of engaging in a particular act and behave rationally based on this calculus. These ideas have been applied to a range of crimes (see Draca and Machin 2015) and to various forms of political violence (Hirschleifer 1995; Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Thus, what deters engagement in antisocial behaviors is not a lack of motive, but the fact that such behaviors do not maximize utility. In turn, anything that increases the costs of rebellion, or reduces the benefits of it, will deter individuals from choosing that course of action.

Thought of in terms of a materially self-interested economic agent, this suggests two major roles played by employment. If one starts from a high-income base, the space into which future income can move (or is expected to move) as a consequence of victory will be lower, thus reducing the benefits of rebellion. At the same time, a higher income level implies greater income from the legal labor market forgone. Thus, for a given vector of inputs (e.g., set risks of death and injury, a set probability
of victory, and a set of associated outcomes post-conflict), increases in income should reduce willingness to engage in antisocial behaviors.

These theories, however, build explicitly on a macrofoundation that is not, immediately, tractable at the individual level. For example, those who have demonstrably engaged in rebellion are not the most disadvantaged in their societies (Bueno Krueger and Malečková 2003; de Mesquita 2005). In turn, while a narrative has formed that employment is synonymous with peace, the underlying logic remains unquestioned and untested (Cramer 2010; International Alert 2014a; 2014b) at the micro-level at which most programs take place. In turn, it is not immediately clear that changes to employment at the individual level should be expected to influence those same individuals’ decisions to take part in antisocial behavior.

A more direct implication of the opportunity theory states that poverty, itself, is distressing, and that associated frustrations can manifest as violence (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Related to this is “idleness” (Huntington 1996; Goldstone 2001), which espouses that individuals with nothing to do (especially youth—see Urdal 2004) are a conflict risk. Keeping frustrated individuals occupied (the “incapacitation effect”—see Jacob and Lefgren 2003) should minimize conflict risk. In the developed world, such strategies have been shown to mitigate behaviors such as skipping school, and low-level criminal behaviors (Jacob and Lefgren 2003; Luallen 2006; Anderson 2014). Yet, evidence of such outcomes in developing countries, or in the context of organized political violence, is extremely weak (Mercy Corps 2015). In turn, while the links between job programs and opportunity is clear, the links between opportunity and violence—at least at the individual level—are not fully established.

Contact Theory

The formation of groups, and of group identities, is commonly defined as a key social issue in conflict (Beekman et al. 2014; Bauer et al. 2018). The presence of ingroup bias is not surprising. Whether in the form of “minimal” groups created in the lab (Brewer and Silver 1978) or “real” groups (Ostrom and Sedikides 1992), individuals bias towards their own group and discriminate against others—the so-called “parochial social norms” theory (Fehr et al. 2013). Willingness to punish “norm violators”, too, is delineated along group lines (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004). Extreme group-biases link to the onset of conflict (Halevy et al. 2008; Struch and Schwartz 1989). Long-term systematic evidence (see Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) shows that bringing individuals from different groups together can reduce these biases and help to alleviate social tensions. It follows that programs that bring individuals of different ethnicities together might mitigate conflict.

In complex environments, however, findings from such programs are not clear cut. Rydgren et al. (2013) find strong evidence of improvements in inter-group contact in shared environments in Iraq. Those who use shared spaces are more likely to develop
friendships that cross group boundaries and are more likely to express trust and tolerance towards out-groups. Hjørt (2014) on the other hand, shows that individuals accept lower total pay and output in order to bias against out-groups in a flower factory in Kenya. Cilliers et al. (2016) show positive inter-group perspectives from contact workshops, but this comes at the cost of reduced personal well-being. Okunogbe (2016) studies a program that relocates university graduates across Nigeria. Those who are assigned to districts in which their tribal ethnicity is not in a majority show greater national pride and higher levels of knowledge about other ethnicities.

Similar analogies can be drawn to “community-driven development” (CDD) programming, which is built on the idea that social cohesion emerges from individuals collaborating under the given institutional arrangements. However, when considered in terms of altering individual relationships, such programs have struggled to produce an impact (King, et al. 2010; King and Samii 2014; Avdeenko and Gilligan 2015), even when they are designed to bring individuals of different social groups together (Brück and Ferguson 2020).

While it is obvious that well-designed work and training programs could bring different groups together in the same place, it is less clear whether such efforts will bear fruit. On one side of this argument is a body of evidence suggesting that contact has successfully reduced tensions between groups. Another is that when such tensions have been the focus of the contact, it has produced undesirable side effects, such as lowering welfare in other dimensions (Cilliers et al. 2016). In turn, workplaces and training centers offer an opportunity to stimulate contact, without placing such contact at the heart of the activities in question. Scacco and Warren (2018) show such findings in a vocational training program in Nigeria. Some participants are randomly assigned to multi-ethnic training groups, and others to mono-ethnic ones. Those in multi-ethnic trainings discriminate less against out-groups. However, this opens the question as to whether such outcomes are a product of the training, of how the training was administered, or both.

Coupled with Hjørt’s (2014) finding of significant and costly discrimination in the workplace, this suggests that there is no guarantee that multi-ethnic job programs will improve group relationships. Furthermore, they raise a secondary question—even if jobs programs did definitively stimulate such change, are they the optimal way of doing so?

The Competition Theory

Competition, especially for scarce services and other resources, is a commonly cited link between climate shocks and violence (Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Hsiang et al. 2013; Theisen et al. 2013; Harari and Ferrara 2018). This argument goes that extreme weather, such as drought, leads vulnerable people to migrate. In turn, this increases (perceived) competition for scarce resources in the places to which
they are displaced. As well as being a potential cause of inter-group tensions, displacement can also be one of their consequences, suggesting the potential for a pernicious displacement-competition-conflict-displacement cycle (Alsharabati and Nammour 2015). These ideas are also well-grounded in more general theory. Sääksvuori et al. (2011) and Abbink et al. (2010) show that both discrimination against out-groups and willingness to punish them increase in more competitive scenarios.

It can be argued that generating employment is an efficient way of reducing perceptions of competition and of combating such adverse social norms. Individuals in employment tend to report higher well-being and better perceptions of the future than those who are unemployed (Korpi 1997; Dolan et al. 2008; Rainer and Siedler 2008). Similarly, better access to scarce services or employment seems likely to lessen perceptions of competition, which in turn should lower competition-based biases.

What Is the Evidence that Employment Programs Reduce Violence?

Three takeaways are clear from section 2. First, economic first principles provide solid grounds to believe that employment programs might contribute to peacebuilding. These theories equally apply to the programs themselves (i.e., regardless of whether the program builds employment, the existence of that program could contribute to peace) as to their employment impact. Second, the causal chains are often long. At times, robust empirical information on some of the links in these chains is missing or thin. In turn, theory alone is insufficient to say with certainty that employment programs contribute to peacebuilding. Third, the first two takeaways imply a need to directly model the impact of employment programs on outcomes related to peace and stability.

This section reviews academic and grey literature, focusing on employment programs taking place at the individual level, in order to establish this baseline learning. That is, the purpose is not to understand the impact of seismic regulatory change, nor to study large government transfers. For example, while Dasgupta et al. (2017) and Fetzer (2014) show a reduction in violence in India through a guaranteed-work program, the program is available to all individuals in a given region. Ferguson et al. (2019) show that some indicators improve, while others worsen, when considering the regional impact of multiple large employment programs on stability. In both cases, scale makes it difficult to know if outcomes are driven by micro-level behavior, or preferences changes, or by more aggregate shifts in the political economy. Reductions in violence through such shifts have also been stimulated by large government transfers (Berman et al. 2011) and aid stimulus (Azam and Thelen 2008; Nielsen et al. 2011; Young and Findlay 2011; Böhnke and Zürcher 2013;
Gutting and Steinwand 2017). Rather, this review seeks to establish understanding on the impact of employment as a stimulus for the individual, and thus on cases where the program, and its implications for employment, are isolated as the catalyst for change.

In order to capture the widest base of grey and academic literature, the following process was undertaken: (a) keyword searches on Google Scholar with publications assessed against relevance and quality criteria; (b) analysis of the reference lists of each relevant study, as well as all studies citing the article in question, with all articles again assessed against relevance criteria.

The study adopts three relevance criteria. The first pertains to the quality of the evaluation. While attention is not restricted only to randomized studies, it does impose that studies must be of a credible quantitative design, including treatment and reference groups studied before and after program roll out and where biases in the rollout are credibly dealt with. Second, the focus is restricted to programs where boosting employment and employment indicators is, demonstrably, an aim of the program. This has the effect of excluding, for example, large-scale infrastructure programs, while temporarily creating jobs do not, deliberately, intend to do so. Similarly, some program typologies—for example, cash transfers—are included, that might not, standardly, be thought of as coming under the umbrella definition of a “job program”, so long as it has a direct employment motivation.

Third, this study focuses on studies that make credible claims to measure peace or stability as an outcome but excludes studies that look at outcomes part of the way along the causal chain. This has the effect of excluding some high-quality work that partially bridges the gap. For example, Adoho et al. (2014) show—along with significant increases in economic well-being—positive impacts of an employment and training program on women’s empowerment. Scacco and Warren (2018) show that mixed-ethnicity training groups can mitigate discrimination against out-groups. While these studies establish that employment programs generate positive externalities, this is insufficient as one cannot be certain about the links between these intermediate outcomes and peace or stability. Put another way, just as there is no guarantee that an employment program contributes to peace because it has a positive employment outcome, there is also no guarantee that programs that generate other positive externalities do so. Other studies, although ostensibly economic (e.g., Heller et al. 2017), show impressive social stability outcomes but do not explicitly contain a job-based input.

Based on a review conducted with these parameters, only four studies turn out to be both relevant and of sufficient quality:

1. Blattman et al. (2014) use a randomized design to study the Youth Opportunity Program, which attempts to help the unemployed transition into self-employment, as well as promoting stability in the highly violent context of Northern Uganda.
Based on a cash grant of, on average, just under $400 per participant, the program shows “impressively large” economic impacts. Four years after the program was rolled out, it is shown that beneficiaries invested in skills, training, tools and materials, seldom “waste” the grant (e.g., on tobacco, alcohol or drugs), are more than twice as likely to practice a “skilled trade”, and have 57% greater capital stocks, 38% higher earnings, and 17% higher hours worked. These impressive economic gains, however, are not matched by positive outcomes in terms of stability. Individuals in the treatment group do not show comparable shifts in terms of integration into their communities, engagement in collective action, engagement in antisocial behavior, or in terms of support of the government.

2. Mercy Corps (2015) uses a quasi-experiment to study the Introducing New Vocational Education and Skills Training (INVEST) program in Northern Afghanistan by comparing the outcomes of program graduates to a new intake. The study also shows strong economic impacts, with graduates 36 percentage points more likely to be employed than the reference group. Program participation is also associated with a 12.7 percentage point increase in income in the previous four weeks, higher economic optimism, and greater business connections and inter-tribal economic activity. However, peace- and stability-related outcomes are reported as “inconclusive”. Self-reported willingness to engage in political violence decreased for the treatment group, but willingness to use violence against an unfair government decision increased. No effects were found on beliefs governing whether the use of political violence is justified, or on support for the Taliban.

3. Blattman et al. (2017) use a randomized design in order to study the impact of two treatments—eight weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy, and a $200 unconditional cash grant—on young men engaged in criminal behaviors in Liberia. The program had two aims: boosting economic outcomes and reducing antisocial behaviors. In the short term, there is a range of significant improvements from the cash-only and therapy treatments, but these effects approached zero in the medium term. Similar effects are shown on estimated income, consumption, and ownership of durable assets. When provided by itself, cash did not lead to any significant reductions in antisocial behaviors. In the short term, the therapy by itself did reduce engagement across the full index of antisocial behaviors, but these reductions were sustained after a year only when therapy and cash were given together.

4. Lyall et al. (2020) use a randomized design in order to evaluate the impact of Mercy Corps’ INVEST program and an associated cash grant of $75. Economically, this study tests impacts on employment, recent economic activity, and cash earned and days worked in the previous month. By the end of the study period, those who took part in the TVET training were 43 percentage points more likely to report having engaged in economic activity, worked 1.13 days more and were 5.3 percentage points more likely to have earned cash. By contrast, recipients of
the cash transfer, and (oddly) of both treatment arms showed no economic benefits. Impacts on support of militants were also mixed. Vocational training had no effect. Recipients of the cash transfer report increased support for the government during the first follow-up, with support for the Taliban reduced by 12.8 percentage points and willingness to undertake pro-Taliban activities diminished by 9.6 percentage points. However, by a second follow-up, an apparent “backlash” is shown, with support for the government declining for those who received the cash transfer. Similar results are shown for those who receive both treatment arms.

Two takeaways from this review are obvious. The first is that all four articles make the argument that employment programs can boost labor market outcomes and income in violent and complicated environments. To some degree or another, all four show improvements in their participants’ outcomes, even if this cannot be sustained in the long run. Second, however, this does not hold when considering stability-related outcomes. In general, there are few sustained positive impacts of programs on stability, even in the face of economic gains.

Drawing conclusions on the link between employment and peace is not possible from these findings; however, we argue that these findings are also insufficient to debunk the relationship. Specifically, studies to date suffer at least two key limitations that prevent drawing such firm conclusions.

First, while all four programs take place in violent countries, it is not clear if they necessarily focused on key fracture lines. It is not often clear which theory of change is likely to be at play in a given location, and in turn, it is impossible to ascertain if the design of the program chimes with that. For example, in situations where societal fractures are driven by a lack of contact and adverse interpersonal norms, it is unclear whether a cash transfer—even one specifically designed and targeted to boost employment—should perform.

Second, it is a priori unclear why employment programs should impact on the particular outcome variables chosen for analysis, even if those outcomes link to peace or stability. This is particularly important when thinking about the “unit of the intervention”, which is at the individual level in the programs in this review. It is unclear that positive impacts should be expected on indicators that relate more to wider social or cultural norms. A training program that raises an individual’s level of income without having similar impacts on that person’s personal network, for example, is unlikely to shift perceptions surrounding government performance or inequality.

In turn, while it is easy to be pessimistic, these conclusions suggest a need for more systematic learning on the key relationships at play. First, this requires drawing meaningful links between the situation in which a program will take place, the design of the program, the expectations that can be formed of that program, and the outcome indicators that are to be used. Second, it requires applying meaningful theories of change that link the program to those fractures and outcomes. Third, it
What Can Be Learned from Employment for Peace Programs that Have Taken Place?

In this spirit, this section conducts a systematic review of employment for peace programs. This analysis is based on data pulled from all programs definable as “employment for peace” from the databases of four large international organizations (International Labor Organisation (ILO), Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank) between 2005 and 2015.

First, a keyword search of each organization’s program database is conducted. For all non-Francophone countries, the keywords empl*, job*, work*, and skill* were used. For Francophone countries, trava* and competence* were additionally included. This produced a list of 2,415 programs that took place in countries that have appeared on the World Bank’s list of fragile scenarios at least once since 2005. As the theories of change specified in section 2 do not require non-employment inputs to function, an intervention that is definable as an employment program and that takes place in a fragile or conflict-affected state qualifies it for definition as an “employment for peace” program. All multi-agency programs are reviewed to ensure that duplicates are not included.

To fit with this study’s definitions, the list was further restricted to those that provided at least one of the following services: (a) salaried work, either directly (e.g., through cash-for-work schemes) or by facilitating connections between participants and employers; (b) vocational training programs and/or entrepreneurial skills training; and (c) interventions in support of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). Relevant programs were reviewed to analyze various clusters of key variables: (a) program duration; (b) target groups; (c) intervention type; (d) focus(es) of the programs; and (e) availability of program documents. This generated a “longlist” of 432 programs.

A shortlist of programs for in-depth analysis was then generated. Programs were selected for further analysis only if a final report, internal evaluation, or external evaluation were available. Programs where employment was not a primary (or joint primary) focus were also excluded, leaving 69 programs. From these, a shortlist of 33 was defined based on explicit peacebuilding or social stability goals. On this basis, priors suggest an expectation that these programs should have been analyzed against peace-related outcomes. The process to arrive at these 33 programs is shown in figure 1. The short-listed programs are analyzed in-depth to identify: (a) if the program has a definable theory of change running from employment stimulation to peace; (b) if an evaluation focusing specifically on peacebuilding and social stability
outcomes has taken place; (c) if so, which peacebuilding and social stability indicators have been analyzed and why they have been chosen.

Nineteen programs on the shortlist describe employment as the exclusive primary objective, with peacebuilding an auxiliary objective; the remaining 14 list employment and peacebuilding as joint primary aims. This variation is used to reflect on whether there are design differences between “employment-only” and “employment-peacebuilding” targeted interventions.

The remainder of this section is split into four subsections: the first discussing the design of the interventions; the second discussing the employment impacts of the programs; the third reflecting on the peacebuilding impacts; and the fourth the application of the theories of change.

**Designing Employment Programs and Employment for Peace Programs**

There is no evidence that design differs between the employment-only and employment-peacebuilding programs. In both cases, a variety of approaches are
used to generate employment. Supply-side approaches seek to improve employability, especially through vocational training, while demand-side approaches attempt to increase the number of job opportunities through private sector partnerships, entrepreneurship support, etc.

Most of the programs reviewed contain a vocational training component (22 out of 33) but only four exclusively use this approach. The others include training along with labor-based interventions, support to MSMEs, or both. Similarly, most (24 out of 33) include a labor-based component that aims to directly create jobs, with (17 out of 24) heavily relying on short-term labor-intensive approaches. 15 interventions include entrepreneurial support. There are no major differences in structure between the programs that elevate peacebuilding to a key motive and those that do not. In this regard, most employment for peace programs are not designed to specifically interact with the societal fractures that necessitate the program. Rather, standard employment programs are deployed in these complex environments.

*The Employment Impacts of Employment for Peace Programming*

In almost all cases, program-level monitoring and evaluation focuses only on narrow and short-term program aims. The most frequently used indicators are as follows: the number of people employed (19 out of 33); the number of people trained (16 out of 33); the number of workdays generated (12 out of 33); and the number of MSMEs receiving from support (six out of 33). Wider indicators, like increased income (3 out of 33), are included much more rarely. In almost all cases evaluation is done at the level of outputs. For example, while 25 out of 33 programs claim to have had positive impacts, in all but two cases (Mukkavilli 2008; Kavanagh 2012), such assessments are made without reference to a control group. When evidence is available, employment for peace programs appear to have positive employment impacts. However, given the small number of studies that have been conducted, this should not be taken to be reflective of the complete record.

*Peacebuilding Impacts of Employment for Peace Programming*

Since programs that place peacebuilding on an equal footing with employment do not differ in design from those that do not, it is not *a priori* obvious how or why these programs have a peacebuilding focus. In almost all cases, generating employment is presented as the only evidence that a program will build peace. The “Appui à la formation par l’apprentissage et à l’insertion des jeunes déscolarisés et désœuvrés des régions affectées par les conflits, comme facteur de consolidation de la paix” program in the Central African Republic, for example, states that it aims “[t]o effectively contribute to the change of conditions for youth, by offering them the possibility to access employment, to create better life conditions for themselves and to become agents of peacebuilding.”
Further, the “Jobs for Peace – 12,500 Youth Employed and Empowered through an Integrated Approach” program in Nepal states that it will, “...contribute to the achievement of sustainable development and peace consolidation [...] by creating opportunities for decent and productive work for [...] young men and women” (UNPFN 2009).

In other cases, programs are assumed to build peace through the targeting of specific subsets of the population who are viewed as being “at risk”. In this regard, employment-peacebuilding programs are more likely to target youth than those with a primary employment-only focus. For example, the “Youth Employment Support (YES)” program in Sierra Leone states, “The lack of productive employment for youth [is] considered not only an economic problem, but also a major political and security risk,” (World Bank 2015). However, given the debate, especially surrounding so-called “youth bulges”, it is not clear that the “devil makes work for idle hands”, or that “incapacitation” can be assumed. 10

In almost all cases, peacebuilding turns out not to be a focus of the evaluations conducted. Indeed, some go so far as to offer a disclaimer about not being in a position to assess the peacebuilding impacts of the program. The “Employment Creation and Peace Building Base on Local Economic Development (EmPLED)” program in Nepal, for example, states, “[the] question to what extent an impact on peace building can be demonstrated or expected [...] has not been assessed by the project and of course the [Evaluation Team] was not in a position to do so itself,” (ILO 2010). Despite this, eight internal and five external evaluations present claims of positive peacebuilding impacts. These claims are typically phrased in extremely generic terms, however, making it difficult to discern if such findings have an analytical foundation. 11

The “Work for Peace- Serbisu ba Dame” program in Timor-Leste, for example, states, “As far as the impact of the project on conflict reduction is concerned, it is fair to conclude that the project managed to contribute to political stability and a peaceful environment to the extent possible,” (Koekebakker 2007). Further, the “Jobs for Peace - 12,500 Youth Employed and Empowered through an Integrated Approach” in Nepal claims that “Many specific examples were reported for ways in which the program activities had contributed to peace. [...] wage employment created by the program during the construction of roads, irrigation canals, vegetable collection centers and marketing shed engaged the youths on constructive activities,” (Kumar-Range, and Acharya 2011).

Evaluations have noted the limited scale of interventions vis-à-vis the magnitude of the problem—making it unrealistic to expect a significant impact. For example, the “Empowerment of youth at risk through job creation program in areas of tensions” program in Lebanon states that “[it] is difficult to determine the stabilization impact of this project, as this project is small in scale relative to the size of the problem it is seeking to address,” (Moran 2013). Similarly, the “Appui à la pérennisation de la paix par la promotion de l’emploi des jeunes et des femmes aux Comores (APROJEC)” in
Comoros states that “The project will make a modest contribution on employment creation for youth and women and therefore its impact on peacebuilding in the context of Comoros will be very limited,” (Larrabure and Ouledi 2011).

In practical terms, the evidence that employment programs build peace, or are even expected to perform in this domain, is weak. Often, peacebuilding outcomes are not even made in program evaluations and reports; and, when they are, it is simply assumed as a product of employment, which section 2 shows to be insufficient.

The Presence of Theories of Change in Employment for Peace Programming

The lack of clarity on how the impact of employment on peacebuilding is supposed to work (in other words, the absence of a theory of change) is obvious throughout project documents. Even when claims of impact are made, the theory of change is unclear, as are the outcome indicators upon which such conclusions are predicated. For example, the “Promotion du rôle des petites et micro-entreprises dans la consolidation de la paix” in Burundi evaluation states that “The link between the small enterprise project and peacebuilding was always unclear,” (Campbell et al. 2014). In turn, even when claims of impact are made, the theory of change upon which such conclusions are predicated is unclear. There are, in fact, only three examples where a theory of change can be defined from the program documents. The learning that has taken place from each is discussed below.

Program Example: Guinea-Bissau

The theory of change of the program “Labor-intensive employment for youth and women in the lead-up to and immediate post-electoral period in Guinea-Bissau” can be linked to grievances, and stresses the importance of providing “peace dividends” to “at-risk groups”, such as youth and women, thus enhancing their confidence in the state. The program document particularly stresses the importance of setting off a catalytic effect to “show” the results of the program beyond immediate beneficiaries, thus signaling peace dividends to the broader population. There was no evaluation available for this program. The final report does not address the issue as to whether the intervention succeeded in having this “demonstrative” catalytic effect.

Program Example: Lebanon

The theory of change elaborated in the “Empowerment of youth at risk through job creation program in areas of tensions” program is threefold. It is linked to (a) opportunity, providing young people with ways of generating income as an alternative to joining an armed group, (b) contact, reinforcing positive interactions and creating common ground between the Palestinian and Lebanese communities, and (c) competition, by easing competition over access to jobs for both displaced and
host communities. With regard to the **opportunity** and **competition**, a mid-term evaluation found beneficiaries, in all likelihood, were not those who were most at risk of recruitment. “The majority of the participant beneficiaries in the activities in this project are probably unlikely to be those who are most likely to be the first to take part in violence [. . .] This project does not appear to actively identify and recruit these individuals.” (Moran 2013).

An evaluation does find an indirect impact on the community at large, which was not included in the original design: “. . . this project does have the effect of offering hope to the community at large that there continues to be initiatives aimed at improving their situation, that they have not been forgotten and there is a chance that at least one family member could improve their life chances.” (Moran 2013) In practical terms, the evaluation hints at a possible “multiplier” effect that—by happenstance rather than by design—might reach those at risk.

No evidence is found for the **contact** theory. In fact, little interaction between the Lebanese and Palestinian communities took place: “The activities supported under this activity provided for little direct interaction or integration with local Lebanese people, apart from those participating in Apprenticeships,” (Moran 2013). Furthermore, both evaluations suggest that, rather than a lack of interaction, the crucial problem was the disadvantaged position of Palestinian job-seekers vis-à-vis Lebanese employers, suggesting the program might not have addressed the source of tension: “The Jobseekers who attended the focus group identified that one of the main reasons for engaging with [the program] is the perception that [. . .] they would be somewhat better protected against exploitation by Lebanese employers. . . The reality that some Lebanese employers appear to be exploiting Palestinians is clearly a source of tension between the two communities which should be addressed in order to promote PBF objectives,” (Moran 2013).

**Program Example: Nepal**
The “Jobs for Peace” (J4P) program was primarily underpinned by an **opportunity**-based theory of change, according to which a lack of cash in hand made young people vulnerable to manipulation by vested interest groups. The program also aimed to encourage the peaceful gathering of young people through business development and youth-led programs for youth empowerment (**contact**). There was a program self-evaluation and independent final evaluation.

The program self-evaluation claims to confirm the validity of the program design and the relevance of **opportunity** and stresses the link between unemployment, idleness and violence: “The project is relevant to the target groups in the target districts because of high levels of youth un/underemployment with the inherent risk of idle and poor youth engaging in criminal activities thereby undermining the fragile Nepali peace process. There is a clear rationale and justification for the project [. . .]

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Idle youth are easy prey for recruitment by armed criminal groups across the Tarai,” (McCarthy 2010). An independent final evaluation states: “Wage employment created by the program... engaged the youths on constructive activities,” (Kumar-Range and Acharia 2011). The concept of employment as an antidote to idleness is again stressed: “Community members and youth reported that a new and positive self-image for youth was created, transforming them from idle vagrants into contributing community members,” (Kumar-Range and Acharia 2011).

In this regard, the conclusion is not only that peacebuilding outcomes of employment programs are very seldom, if ever, meaningfully analyzed, but also that there is very scant information on how these programs are designed to deliver those outputs. There are only a small number of cases where meaningful theories of change can be traced through the program’s design phase; and, even when they are included, it is not immediately clear what the program has done in order to deliver impacts via through these routes.

Conclusions

Significant resources have been spent on the assumption that employment programs contribute to peace, despite a lack of major critical reflection on the strength and limitations of this potential relationship. Do employment programs really contribute to peacebuilding? And if so, how?

Based on in-depth reviews of academic literature, grey literature, and program documents, this article establishes three main insights into the links between jobs programs and peace-related outcomes. First, economic first principles suggest that there are strong theoretical reasons to expect that employment programs can strengthen the micro-foundations of peace and stability. Yet, the causal chains of impact specified by these theories are often long and contain multiple links, some of which lack consistent empirical confirmation or are otherwise weak. Second, the existing evidence base for many of these purported links is, in practice, thin, and program-specific chains are usually not modelled in practice. Third, headline program impacts on social outcomes at the micro-level have typically been assumed rather than tested. Existing evidence is based on a handful of case studies of programs, which themselves are—mostly—inconclusive and provide, at best, only weak evidence.

This does not mean that jobs programs do not, or cannot, contribute to peace. Instead, these results show that the likely impacts of large and costly programs have not been tested in a rigorous or systematic way. In turn, there are no stylized facts about how best to maximize the peacebuilding impacts of jobs programs, or on the types of jobs programs best-placed to deliver these impacts, or the settings to which different program typologies are best-suited.

This knowledge gap clearly identifies an urgent need to generate systematic learning about the expectations and actual contribution of employment programs to peace.
and stability. It is particularly important to spell out how and why a program might have an impact before it is implemented. Furthermore, it is important to define the specific peacebuilding domains where the program is expected to have an impact and the associated indicators it should impact upon. Following this, it is necessary to rigorously test program channels and impacts empirically, and to establish which lessons can be generalized. This process should be done in multiple ways, ranging from research-based methods to intra- and inter-agency learning and in-depth context analysis, all of which are shown to be largely absent. If investment in jobs-for-peace programs is to continue at current levels, such learning is urgently required.

Specifically, the study recommends the generation of further evidence and learning on the microfoundations of instability, such as distinguishing between instigators of collective violence and their followers. This will allow more detailed understanding of what motivates individuals to engage in behaviors that threaten peace and stability, and, in turn, lead to a better understanding of what can deter these behaviors. International organizations have an important role to play in stimulating this learning, not least because it should lead to improvements in program design. The theories of change that are confirmed by, or that are developed from, this research should be mainstreamed in all program documents and planning. This process should begin with a strong definition of the outcome aims of the program, how the program targets these outcomes, and which indicators accurately capture those outcomes.

For programs aiming to build jobs and peace, there is also a need to ensure that an employment program interacts meaningfully with the fault lines that are expected to cause conflict and tensions in the targeted region. If tensions, for instance, relate to a lack of contact between societal groups, a cash-transfer program might be poorly placed to stimulate the inter-group interactions that are needed. For some programs, therefore, it might be more realistic to scale back untested ambitions and, instead, to focus on delivering just a high-quality employment intervention. Conducting jobs programs in conflict-affected and fragile areas is a challenging task already, even without trying to build peace at the same time. In turn, at least in some cases it might be “better to use... funds on consolidating a functional and demand driven” program (Larrabure and Oueldi 2011). This is not to say that contributing to peace through jobs programs is beyond reach. However, to paraphrase Jan Tinbergen, achieving two goals with a single instrument is complex and requires multi-disciplinary skills and institutional learning that, so far, have not been present in efforts to build peace through jobs and employment programming.

Notes

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1. This figure is based on the researchers’ own estimate from budgets and expenditures extracted from this program review (see section 4) and is, very likely, a large underestimate of true expenditure. First, this study only covers programs implemented by UNDP, ILO or the World Bank and/or funded through the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Second, even within these restrictions, budget information is sometimes incomplete or missing.

2. There are two conceivable routes through which employment programs could deliver these effects. The first is through the program effect, that is, the simple presence of a program can contribute to peace and stability, regardless of the outcome of that program. The second is the employment effect, which suggests that peace and stability are promoted through the impacts of the program on employment. In other words, to build peace through the employment effect, an employment program must first have a definable impact on employment. Both notions are compatible with the theories discussed in this section.

3. This is not to suggest that employment and employment programs cannot have demand-side impacts. For example, an implication of Fearon and Laitin (2003) is that more employment widens the tax base, which can in turn facilitate positive interactions between governments and the populace. However, such theories rely on aggregate-level changes that are likely beyond the scope of any cluster of employment programs of the standard scale included in this research. In turn, while this discussion favors the supply side, it does so as a result of the external constraints imposed by the focus on employment programs, rather than by more deliberate design.

4. A more general strand of recent literature (Piketty 2013; Rodrik 2017; Alvaredo et al. 2018) may dispute this, by drawing connecting lines between increasing inequalities in the last four decades and ongoing political changes and challenges around the world. However, whether such political challenges extend to violent conflict is not clear.

5. In some ways, there appears to be overlap between the “competition” and “grievance” theories. However, grievances (at least constructed as has been done here) are argued to rely on group-based tensions, that is, one group does not have (or perceives it does not have) something that another group does, and that this distribution is unfair. The “competition” theory does not, strictly, rely on either group-based fault lines, nor perceptions of “fairness” in the same sense. Therefore, while this theory could come under wider definitions of grievance, this study considers it useful to delineate them as done here, noting that none of these theories necessarily exist in a silo and that there are strong logical overlaps between them.

6. An extension of this logic is that a peacebuilding program is considered as any program that states building peace as (one of its) aim(s). In this sense, employment for peace programs are, fully, a subset of peacebuilding programs. In turn, in this case, peacebuilding programs are not defined, explicitly, by a specific set of inputs or design features, but rather in their outcome aims.

7. In addition, the authors are aware of further projects that likely have relevance for this review but are excluded as due to their early presentation of results at the time of writing. Kimou et al. (2018) conduct an RCT of a cash-for-work program in Côte d’Ivoire and show mixed results in attitudes towards peace. Individuals trained on how to seek employment show improved attitudes; those who receive entrepreneurial support show worsened attitudes. Rink and Carlson (2019), on the other hand, show that
beneficiaries of an employment program in Zimbabwe are actually more likely to voice dissent and engage in disobedience.

8. The true scale of this finding is, perhaps, open to debate, as a requirement for entry into the program is that a participant is unemployed at the time the training begins. In turn, the reference group, likely, have abnormally low levels of employment vis-à-vis the population as a whole. However, the purpose of this article is not to reflect on methodological imperfections, per se, and it therefore does not seek to openly dispute these findings.

9. As literature on the micro-level analysis of violent conflict and humanitarian emergencies has shown, much more robust empirical analysis is possible than is often assumed by practitioners and other experts. In this sense, this study holds that it is entirely possible, if not without challenge, to conduct methodologically sound empirical analyses in conflict-affected places. (See: Puri et al. 2017; Brück et al. 2019; Brück and d’Errico 2019; Verwimp et al. 2019).

10. Only six programs out of the 33-program shortlist, and out of the 14 that place peacebuilding alongside employment as a main outcome of interest, include program aspects, outside of employment, that are designed to build peace. These activities fall into two key categories: those aimed at increasing awareness and understanding on conflict resolution at the individual level; and those that aim to bring people together in order to boost intra- and inter-group trust. This study is not explicitly interested in the outcomes of these additional treatment arms. Rather, it only considers the outcomes of the employment arms in order to minimize the risk of showing peacebuilding impacts from peacebuilding, rather than employment, programming.

11. These programs are, respectively: “Projet de consolidation de la paix dans les zones minières artisanales de la province du Nord Kivu (project Rubaya)” (DRC); “Projet d’appui à l’insertion économique des jeunes et des femmes” and “Programme nationale d’emploi spécifique pour les jeunes (filles et garçons) à risque de conflit” (both Guinea); “Recovery through Employment Generation, Environmental Rehabilitation and Disaster Mitigation” in Haiti; “Emergency Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project” in Iraq; “Employment Creation and Peace Building based on Local Economic Development (EMPLED)” and “Jobs for Peace - 12,500 Youth Employed and Empowered through an Integrated Approach” (both Nepal); and “Joint Programme: Creating Opportunities for Youth Employment in Sudan” (Sudan), for the internal evaluations. For the external evaluations: “Empowerment of youth at risk through job creation program in areas of tensions” (Lebanon); “Jobs for Peace - 12,500 Youth Employed and Empowered through an Integrated Approach” (Nepal); “Projet d’Appui à la Réinsertion Economique Durable des Démobilisés en République Démocratique du Congo (ARED II)” and “Projet de consolidation de la paix dans les zones minières artisanales de la province du Nord Kivu (project Rubaya)” (DRC); and “Recovery through Employment Generation, Environmental Rehabilitation and Disaster Mitigation” (Haiti).

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