

Dynamics of neural cryptography

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Synchronization of neural networks has been used for novel public channel protocols in cryptography. In the case of tree parity machines the dynamics of both bidirectional synchronization and unidirectional learning is driven by attractive and repulsive stochastic forces. Thus it can be described well by a random walk model for the overlap between participating neural networks. For that purpose transition probabilities and scaling laws for the step sizes are derived analytically. Both these calculations as well as numerical simulations show that bidirectional interaction leads to full synchronization on average. In contrast, successful learning is only possible by means of fluctuations. Consequently, synchronization is much faster than learning, which is essential for the security of the neural key-exchange protocol. However, this qualitative difference between bidirectional and unidirectional interaction vanishes if tree parity machines with more than three hidden units are used, so that those neural networks are not suitable for neural cryptography. In addition, the effective number of keys which can be generated by the neural key-exchange protocol is calculated using the entropy of the weight distribution. As this quantity increases exponentially with the system size, brute-force attacks on neural cryptography can easily be made unfeasible.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Synchronization of neural networks[1, 2] is a special case of an online learning situation. Two neural networks start with randomly chosen uncorrelated weights. In each time step they receive common input values, communicate their output to each other and use a suitable learning rule to update their weights. Finally, this process leads to full synchronization of corresponding weights in both networks.

In the case of simple networks, e.g., perceptrons, there is no difference between unidirectional learning and bidirectional synchronization. However, for tree parity machines (TPMs) an interesting phenomenon can be observed: two neural networks learning from each other synchronize much faster than a third network only listening to the communication[2].

This effect has been applied to solve a cryptographic problem[3]: Two partners A and B want to exchange a secret message over a public channel. In order to protect the content against an attacker E, who is listening to the communication, A encrypts the message. However, then B needs A’s key for decryption. Without an additional private channel A and B have to use a cryptographic key-exchange protocol in order to generate a common secret key over the public channel[4]. This can be achieved by synchronizing two TPMs, one for A and one for B, respectively. Of course, the attacker tries to determine the key, too. But when learning is much slower than synchronization, a tree parity machine (TPM) trained by E is usually unable to synchronize before A and B have finished the key exchange. Therefore the success probability \( P_E \) of an attack is very small[3].

Compared to other key-exchange algorithms neural cryptography needs only simple mathematical operations, namely, adding and subtracting integer numbers. Thus it is possible to use this key-exchange protocol in devices with limited computing power. Computer scientists are already working on hardware implementations, which are part of an integrated circuit[6, 7, 8, 9].

Since the first proposal of the neural key-exchange protocol[3] most research has been focused on finding more advanced methods for the partners[10, 11, 12] and the attacker[13, 14, 15]. However, the results of simulations and iterative calculations show the same scaling behavior in almost all cases: the success probability \( P_E \) decreases exponentially with increasing synaptic depth \( L \)[3], while the average synchronization time \( t_{\text{sync}} \) only grows proportional to \( L^2 \)[10]. Therefore \( L \) plays the same role in neural cryptography as the key length in traditional cryptographic systems, which are based on number theory[15].

In this paper we analyze the synchronization process of two tree parity machines by the dynamics of the overlap \( \rho \). First, we repeat the definition of basic algorithms of neural cryptography regarding synchronization and attacks in Sec. II. In Sec. III we calculate the probabilities of attractive and repulsive steps for different types of interactions. The effect of these steps on the overlap is then presented in Sec. IV. Here we show that the mechanisms for unidirectional learning and bidirectional synchronization are indeed different. In Sec. V we finally apply our results on the dynamics of neural synchronization in order to analyze the security of neural cryptography against brute-force attacks. For that purpose we use the entropy of the weight distribution to determine a scaling law for
the number of keys which can be generated by the neural key-exchange protocol.

II. NEURAL SYNCHRONIZATION

The TPMs used by partners and attackers in neural cryptography consist of $K$ hidden units, which are discrete perceptrons with independent receptive fields. The general structure of these networks is shown in Fig. 1. All input values are binary,

$$x_{ij} \in \{-1, +1\}$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)$$

and the weights are discrete numbers between $-L$ and $+L$,

$$w_{ij} \in \{-L, -L+1, \ldots, +L\}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

Here the index $i = 1, \ldots, K$ denotes the $i$th hidden unit of the TPM and $j = 1, \ldots, N$ the elements of each vector. As usual, the output $\sigma_i$ of a hidden unit is given by the sign of the scalar product of inputs and weights

$$\sigma_i = \text{sgn}(w_i \cdot x_i)$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)$$

and the total output $\tau$ of a TPM is defined as the product (parity) of the hidden units

$$\tau = \prod_{i=1}^{K} \sigma_i.$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

The two partners start with secret random weight vectors $w^A$ and $w^B$, respectively. At each time step, a common public input vector $x$ is generated, and the partners exchange their output bits over the public channel. The weight vectors are updated, and the process is iterated until the partners have synchronized their weights which then are used for the secret key. Note that the hidden units $\sigma_i^A$ and $\sigma_i^B$ are secret, this is an essential mechanism for the security of neural cryptography.

We consider three different algorithms for the update of the weights in each time step.

Synchronization:

$$w_{i}^{A/B+} = w_{i}^{A/B} + x_i \Theta(\sigma_i^{A/B} \tau^A) \Theta(\tau^A \tau^B).$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)$$

In neural cryptography this algorithm is used by the partners $A$ and $B$. Here we only consider the random walk learning rule [17], because all other suitable learning rules (Hebbian and Anti-Hebbian) converge to it in the limit $N \to \infty$ [18].

Simple attack:

$$w_{i}^{E+} = w_{i}^{E} + x_i \Theta(\sigma_i^{E} \tau^A) \Theta(\tau^A \tau^B).$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)$$

This method is the simplest algorithm for unidirectional learning. An attacker $E$ can try it in order to synchronize with the partners $A$ and $B$ by training a TPM with the observed examples consisting of $x_i$ and $\tau^A$ [3].

Geometric attack: The geometric attack is the most successful method for an attacker using only a single TPM [13]. Here $E$ tries to realize Eq. (5) without being able to interact with $A$. As long as $\tau^E = \tau^A$, this can be achieved by just applying Eq. (6), as both learning rules have the same effect. However, in the case $\tau^E \neq \tau^A$ $E$ cannot stop $A$’s update of the weights. Instead of this the attacker uses additional information contained in the local fields

$$h_i^E = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} w_i^E \cdot x_i$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)$$

of the hidden units in order to correct the output $\tau^E$ of her TPM. As a low absolute value $|h_i^E|$ indicates a high probability of $\sigma_i^E \neq \sigma_i^A$, the attacker flips the output of the hidden unit with minimal $|h_i^E|$ before applying the learning rule (6).

In all three cases weights $w_{ij}$ leaving the allowed range between $-L$ and $+L$ are reset to the nearest boundary value $\text{sgn}(w_{ij})L$.

We analyze the process of synchronization using simulations of finite systems as well as iterative calculations for $N \to \infty$ [11, 18]. Correlations between the weight vectors of two corresponding hidden units $i$ are described by $(2L + 1)^2$ variables $p_{a,b}^i (t)$, which are defined as the probability to find a weight with $w_{ij}^A(t) = a$ in A’s tree parity machine and $w_{ij}^B(t) = b$ in B’s TPM at time $t$:

$$p_{a,b}^i (t) = P(w_{ij}^A(t) = a \land w_{ij}^B(t) = b).$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)$$

While these quantities are approximately given by the frequency of the weight values $w_{ij}^A(t)$ and $w_{ij}^B(t)$ in simulations, we use the equations of motion given in Ref. [11] to determine the time evolution of $p_{a,b}^i (t)$ directly in the limit $N \to \infty$.

In both cases the standard order parameters [19], which are commonly used for the analysis of online learning, can be calculated as functions of $p_{a,b}^i (t)$:

$$Q_i^A = \frac{1}{N} w_i^A \cdot w_i^A = \sum_{a=-L}^{L} \sum_{b=-L}^{L} a^2 p_{a,b}^i,$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)$$

$$Q_i^B = \frac{1}{N} w_i^B \cdot w_i^B = \sum_{a=-L}^{L} \sum_{b=-L}^{L} b^2 p_{a,b}^i.$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)$$
for bidirectional synchronization and the corresponding results obtained by iterative calculations for bidirectional synchronization and \( N \rightarrow \infty \).

\[
R_{i}^{A,B} = \frac{1}{N} w_{i}^{A} \cdot w_{i}^{B} = \sum_{a=-L}^{L} \sum_{b=-L}^{L} a b p_{a,b}^{i}. \quad (11)
\]

The level of synchronization between two corresponding hidden units is then given by the normalized overlap \( \rho \)

\[
\rho_{i} = \frac{w_{i}^{A} \cdot w_{i}^{B}}{\sqrt{w_{i}^{A} \cdot w_{i}^{A}}} = \frac{R_{i}^{A,B}}{\sqrt{Q_{i}^{A} Q_{i}^{B}}}. \quad (12)
\]

Uncorrelated weight vectors at the beginning of the synchronization process have \( \rho_{i} = 0 \), while the maximum value \( \rho_{i} = 1 \) is reached for fully synchronized weights.

All the update algorithms discussed above can be described by

\[
\begin{align*}
\bar{w}_{i}^{A/B/E}(t+1) &= \bar{w}_{i}^{A/B/E}(t) + f_{i}^{A/B/E}(t) x_{i}(t),
\end{align*}
\]

where \( f_{i}^{A/B/E}(t) \) is a function, which can take the values \(-1, 0, +1\) according to the learning rule. Therefore only three different effects are possible.

If \( f_{i}^{A}(t) = f_{i}^{B}(t) \neq 0 \), the weights in both corresponding hidden units are moved in the same direction, so that the overlap increases. This is called an ”attractive step” and can be described as anisotropic diffusion

\[
p_{i,b}^{+} = \frac{1}{2} \left( p_{i,1+b}^{i} + p_{i-1,b}^{i} \right), \quad (14)
\]

with reflecting boundary conditions. A sequence of these attractive steps finally reaches a fixed point at \( \rho_{i} = 1 \).

If only the weights of one hidden unit are updated, \( f_{i}^{A}(t) + f_{i}^{B}(t) = \pm 1 \), the overlap \( \rho_{i} \) decreases on average. This repulsive step performs a normal diffusion on a \((2L+1) \times (2L+1)\) square lattice

\[
p_{i,b}^{+} = \frac{1}{4} \left( p_{i+1,b}^{i} + p_{i-1,b}^{i} + p_{i,b+1}^{i} + p_{i,b-1}^{i} \right). \quad (15)
\]

Of course, the boundary conditions are the same as above. For a sequence of these repulsive steps the fixed point of the overlap is located at \( \rho_{i} = 0 \).

\[
l = 10 \quad \text{L} = 15 \quad \text{L} = 20 \quad \cdots \quad \text{L} = 25 \quad \cdots \quad \text{L} = 30
\]

FIG. 2: Effect of attractive (upper curve) and repulsive steps (lower curve) for \( K = 3 \) and \( L = 10 \). Symbols represent averages over 1000 simulations for \( N = 100 \). The lines denote the corresponding results obtained by iterative calculations for bidirectional synchronization and \( N \rightarrow \infty \).

\[
\langle \Delta \rho_{a} \rangle = 0,
\]

For \( f_{i}^{A}(t) = f_{i}^{B}(t) = 0 \) the weights stay at their position. Therefore the overlap does not change at all in this step.

The remaining situation \( f_{i}^{A}(t) = -f_{i}^{B}(t) \neq 0 \) cannot occur in any algorithm discussed above.

In general, the change of the overlap \( \Delta \rho \) is not only a function of the current overlap, but depends also on the distribution of the weights and the type of step, which is denoted by a subscript if necessary: the effect of an attractive step is given by \( \Delta \rho_{a}(\rho) \), while we use \( \Delta \rho_{r}(\rho) \) in the case of repulsive steps. Both quantities as well as \( \Delta \rho(\rho) \), which is not restricted to a particular type of step, are random variables, whose properties can be determined in simulations or iterative calculations.

However, for special cases an analytical solution can be given by using Eqs. (14) and (15), taking the boundary conditions into account. At the beginning of the synchronization all weights are uniformly distributed, so that a repulsive step does not change the overlap, but an attractive step has a large effect:

\[
\Delta \rho_{a}(\rho = 0) = \frac{12L}{(L+1)(2L+1)^2} \sim \frac{3}{L^2}, \quad (16)
\]

\[
\Delta \rho_{r}(\rho = 0) = 0. \quad (17)
\]

In contrast, one observes the opposite situation for fully synchronized weights (\( \rho = 1 \)):

\[
\Delta \rho_{a}(\rho = 1) = 0, \quad (18)
\]

\[
\Delta \rho_{r}(\rho = 1) = -\frac{3}{(L+1)(2L+1)} \sim -\frac{3}{2L^2}. \quad (19)
\]

Here an attractive step does not change the overlap at all, but a repulsive step has its maximum effect.

Figure 3 shows that \( \langle \Delta \rho_{a}(\rho) \rangle \) and \( \langle \Delta \rho_{r}(\rho) \rangle \) do not depend on the synchronization algorithm. Consequently, the difference between unidirectional learning and bidirectional synchronization is caused by the probability of attractive and repulsive steps, but not their effects.

Using Eqs. (16) and (19) we obtain the rescaled quantities \( \langle \Delta \rho_{a}(\rho) \rangle / \Delta \rho_{a}(0) \) and \( \langle \Delta \rho_{r}(\rho) \rangle / \Delta \rho_{r}(1) \) which be-

FIG. 3: Scaling functions for attractive steps. These results were obtained in 1000 iterative calculations for bidirectional synchronization with \( K = 3 \) and \( N \rightarrow \infty \).
Thus the probability of attractive steps is given by another necessary condition for an update of the weights. Because of at least one hidden unit, hence the partners move of the weights would have a repulsive effect in at least one hidden unit for $K > 3$, in the case of learning with mutual interaction does not happen. Therefore the probability for attractive and repulsive steps.

III. TRANSITION PROBABILITIES

All algorithms for neural synchronization have in common that a repulsive step can only occur in the $i$th hidden unit, if the two corresponding outputs $\sigma_i$ are different. The probability for this event is given by the well-known generalization error [10]

$$\epsilon_i = \frac{1}{\pi} \arccos(\rho_i)$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

of the perceptron. In the case of unidirectional learning mutual interaction does not happen. Therefore the probability of repulsive steps for an simple attack is directly given by Eq. (20):

$$P_r^E = \epsilon_i.$$  \hspace{1cm} (21)

However, if both hidden units agree on $\sigma_i$, this does not always lead to an attractive steps, because $\sigma_i = \tau$ is another necessary condition for an update of the weights. Thus the probability of attractive steps is given by

$$P_a^E = \frac{1}{2} (1 - \epsilon_i)$$  \hspace{1cm} (22)

in the case of learning with $K > 1$.

In contrast, mutual interaction is an integral part of bidirectional synchronization. When $\tau^A \neq \tau^B$, that move of the weights would have a repulsive effect in at least one hidden unit, hence the partners $A$ and $B$ avoid it by not updating the weights. However, when an even number of hidden units disagrees on the output, one has $\tau^A = \tau^B$ and the learning rule is applied. Taking all possibilities into account, we find for $K = 3$ and identical overlap ($\epsilon_i = \epsilon$) in all hidden units [11]:

$$P_a^B = \frac{1}{2} \left( (1 - \epsilon)^3 + (1 - \epsilon) \epsilon^2 \right), \hspace{1cm} (23)$$

$$P_r^B = \frac{2(1 - \epsilon)^3}{(1 - \epsilon)^2 + 3(1 - \epsilon) \epsilon^2}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (24)

Because of $P_r^B \leq P_a^E$ the partners have a clear advantage over a simple attacker in neural cryptography.

However, $E$ can do better by taking the local field into account. Then the probability for $\sigma_i^E \neq \sigma_i^A$ is given by the prediction error [20]

$$\epsilon_i^p = \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 - \text{erf} \left( \frac{\rho \epsilon_i}{\sqrt{2(1 - \rho_i^2)}} \sqrt{Q_i} \right) \right).$$  \hspace{1cm} (25)

of a perceptron, which depends not only on $\rho_i$ but also on $|h_i^E|$. This quantity is a strictly monotonic decreasing function of $|h_i^E|$. Therefore the geometric attack is often able to find the hidden unit with $\sigma_i^E \neq \sigma_i^A$ by searching for the minimum of $|h_i^E|$. If all other units have $\sigma_j^E = \sigma_j^A$, then the probability for a successful geometric correction [15] is given by

$$P_g = \int_0^\infty \prod_{j \neq i} \left( \int_{h_i}^\infty \frac{2}{\sqrt{2\pi Q_j}} \frac{1 - \epsilon_j^p}{1 - \epsilon_j} e^{\frac{h_j^2}{2Q_j}} dh_j \right) \times \frac{2}{\sqrt{2\pi Q_i}} \epsilon_i e^{-\frac{\epsilon_i^2}{2Q_i}} dh_i.$$  \hspace{1cm} (26)

Using this equation, we find for $K = 3$, geometric attack and identical overlap in all hidden units

$$P_a^E = \frac{1}{2} (1 + 2P_g) (1 - \epsilon^2) + \frac{1}{2} (1 - \epsilon)^3$$

$$+ \frac{1}{6} (1 - \epsilon)^2 \epsilon + \frac{1}{6} \epsilon^3,$$  \hspace{1cm} (27)

$$P_r^E = 2(1 - P_g) (1 - \epsilon)^2 \epsilon + 2(1 - \epsilon) \epsilon^2 + \frac{2}{3} \epsilon^3.$$  \hspace{1cm} (28)

While $P_r^E$ for the geometric attack is lower than for the simple attack, it is still higher than $P_r^B$. Thus even
this advanced algorithm for unidirectional learning has a disadvantage compared to bidirectional synchronization, which is clearly visible in Fig. 5.

IV. DYNAMICS OF THE OVERLAP

The results presented in Secs. III and III indicate that the overlap $\rho$ between two corresponding hidden units performs a random walk with position dependent step sizes $\langle \Delta \rho_a(\rho), \Delta \rho_r(\rho) \rangle$ and transition probabilities $(P_a(\rho), P_r(\rho))$. In order to understand the dynamics, we calculate the average change of the overlap as a function of $\rho$ itself:

$$\langle \Delta \rho \rangle = P_a \Delta \rho_a + P_r \Delta \rho_r. \quad (29)$$

This quantity is shown in Fig. 6. In the case of bidirectional synchronization for $K \leq 3$ it is always positive until the process reaches an absorbing state at $\rho = 1$. While the transition probabilities are independent of $L$, the step sizes decrease asymptotically proportional to $L^{-2}$ according to Eqs. (16) and (19). That is why $\langle \Delta \rho \rangle$ is also proportional to $L^{-2}$ and we find [5]

$$t_{sync} \propto \frac{1}{\langle \Delta \rho \rangle} \propto L^2 \quad (30)$$

for the average number of steps needed for full synchronization. In fact, the probability $P_{sync}(t)$ to achieve identical weight vectors in $A$’s and $B$’s neural networks in at most $t$ steps is given by a Gumbel distribution

$$P_{sync}(t) = e^{-e^{-\frac{a t - 1}{\beta}}}, \quad (31)$$

with parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$, which increase proportional to $L^2$ [16]. Thus $A$ and $B$ can generate a common key in a short time with the help of neural cryptography.

Additionally, $\langle \Delta \rho(\rho) \rangle$ is independent of $N$ except for finite-size effects, which is clearly visible in Fig. 2. The exact analytical calculation presented in Ref. 16 yields

$$t_{sync} \propto L^2 \ln N,$$

because one has to wait until all corresponding weights have identical values. Consequently, the partners are able to use rather large neural networks without problems.

However, the situation is completely different in the case of learning, e.g., for the simple attack or the geometric attack. Now there exists a fixed point of the dynamics at $\rho_f < 1$ with $\langle \Delta \rho(\rho_f) \rangle = 0$. In the case of $K = 3$, which is the usual choice in regard to neural cryptography, we find $\rho_f \approx 0.65$ for the simple attack and $\rho_f \approx 0.68$ for the geometric attack.

As long as $\rho < \rho_f$ the overlap increases on average, but afterwards we observe a quasistationary Gaussian distribution of $\rho$ with mean value $\rho_f$ and standard deviation $\sigma_f$. This is clearly visible in Fig. 7. Consequently, the absorbing state $\rho = 1$ can only be reached by fluctuations of the overlap.

In order to determine the scaling of the standard deviation $\sigma_f$ of the overlap at the fixed point, we use a linear approximation for the dynamics of $\Delta \rho$ around $\rho_f$ without taking boundary conditions into account

$$\Delta \rho(t) \approx -\gamma [\rho(t) - \rho_f] + \delta \xi(t). \quad (32)$$

Here $\xi(t)$ are random numbers with zero mean and unit variance. The parameters are defined as

$$\gamma = -\frac{d}{d\rho} \langle \Delta \rho(\rho) \rangle \bigg|_{\rho = \rho_f}, \quad (33)$$

$$\delta = \sqrt{\langle [\Delta \rho(\rho_f)]^2 \rangle}. \quad (34)$$

In this model, the time evolution of the overlap is given as the solution of Eq. (32)

$$\rho(t) - \rho_f = \sum_{i=1}^{t} (1 - \gamma)^{t-i} \delta \xi(t) \quad (35)$$

using the initial condition $\rho(0) = \rho_f$, which is irrelevant in the limit $t \to \infty$. Therefore the fluctuations of the
For finite synaptic depth, however, $E$ has a chance of getting beyond the fixed point at $\rho_f$ by fluctuations. The probability that this event occurs in any given step is independent of $t$ once the quasistationary state has been reached. That is why $P^E_{\text{sync}}(t)$ is no longer given by Eq. (31), but described well for $t \gg t_0$ by an exponential distribution

$$P^E_{\text{sync}}(t) = 1 - e^{-\frac{t-t_0}{t_f}},$$

with time constant $t_f$. This is clearly visible in Fig. 9. Because of $t_f \gg t_0$ one needs

$$\langle t_{\text{sync}} \rangle \approx t_f$$

steps on average to achieve full synchronization by unidirectional learning.

In our simplified model with linear $\langle \Delta \rho(\rho) \rangle$ the average time needed to reach $\rho = 1$ starting at the fixed point is given by

$$t_f \approx \frac{1}{P(\rho = 1)} = \sqrt{2\pi \sigma f e^{\frac{(1-\rho_f)^2}{2\sigma_f^2}}}.$$  

As the step sizes of the random walk in $\rho$-space decrease proportional to $L^{-2}$ for $L \gg 1$ according to Eqs. (15) and (19), this is also the scaling behavior of the parameters $\gamma$ and $\delta$. Thus we find

$$\sigma_f^2 = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (1-\gamma)^{2t} \delta^2 = \frac{\delta^2}{2\gamma - \gamma^2}. \quad (36)$$

Consequently, an attacker $E$ is unable to synchronize with $A$ and $B$ in the limit $L \to \infty$, even if she uses the geometric attack. This is also true for any other algorithm, which has a fixed point at $\rho_f < 1$ in the dynamics of the overlap.

For larger values of the synaptic depth. Although we have neglected the more complex features of $\langle \Delta \rho(\rho) \rangle$, this scaling behavior is clearly visible in Fig. 8. The deviations for small values of $L$ are caused by finite-size effects.
in the case of small fluctuations $\sigma_f \ll 1 - \rho_f$, where we can assume that the distribution of $\rho$ is not influenced by the presence of the absorbing state at $\rho = 1$. Hence we expect

$$t_f \propto e^{c_1 L^2}$$

for the scaling of the time constant, as $\sigma_f$ changes proportional to $L^{-1}$, while $\rho_f$ stays nearly constant. And Fig. 10 shows that indeed $t_f$ grows exponentially with increasing synaptic depth

$$t_f \propto e^{c_1 L + c_2 L^2}.$$ (42)

Thus the complexity of attacks on the neural key-exchange protocol can be controlled by choosing $L$. Or if $E$’s effort stays constant, her success probability drops exponentially with increasing synaptic depth. This has been observed in the case of the geometric attack and even for advanced methods. Consequently, $A$ and $B$ can reach any desired level of security by increasing $L$, as the complexity of a single key exchange grows only proportional to $L^2$.

However, this is not true for $K > 3$. As shown in Fig. 11 a fixed point at $\rho_f < 1$ appears in the case of bidirectional synchronization, too. Therefore Eq. (38) is not valid any more and $t_{\text{sync}}$ increases exponentially with $L$. That is why TPMs with four and more hidden units cannot be used in the neural key-exchange protocol.

V. NUMBER OF KEYS

The state of the TPMs in each time step is a function of the secret initial conditions and the public sequence of input values. Therefore $E$ can—in principle—determine the possible weight configurations at synchronization time $t_{\text{sync}}$ using her knowledge about the input vectors $x_i(t)$. However, if the number of these keys is large, a brute-force attack is unfeasible. Consequently, this quantity is important for the security of neural cryptography, too.

In order to estimate the number of keys, which can be generated by the neural key-exchange protocol using a given sequence of inputs, we look at the following system consisting of two pairs of TPMS:

$$\begin{align*}
  w_i^{A+} &= w_i^A + x_i \Theta(\sigma_i^{A+} \theta^A \rho^{A-B}), \\
  w_i^{B+} &= w_i^B + x_i \Theta(\sigma_i^{B+} \theta^B \rho^{A-B}), \\
  w_i^{C+} &= w_i^C + x_i \Theta(\sigma_i^{C+} \theta^C \rho^{A-C}), \\
  w_i^{D+} &= w_i^D + x_i \Theta(\sigma_i^{D+} \theta^D \rho^{A-C}).
\end{align*}$$ (43-46)

In this model all four neural networks receive the same input sequence, but both pairs communicate their output bits only internally. Thus $A$ and $B$ as well as $C$ and $D$ synchronize using the random walk learning rule, while correlations caused by common inputs are visible in the overlap $\rho^{AC}$. Because of the symmetry in this system, $\rho_i^{AC}$, $\rho_i^{BC}$, and $\rho_i^{BD}$ have the same properties as this quantity, so that it is sufficient to look at $\rho_i^{AC}$ only.

Of course, synchronization of networks which do not interact with each other, e.g., $A$ with $C$, is much more difficult and takes a longer time than performing the normal key-exchange protocol. That is why we assume $\rho^{AB} = 1$ and $\rho^{CD} = 1$ for the calculation of $\Delta \rho^{AC}(\rho^{AC})$.

The result is shown in Fig. 12. Similar to the case of unidirectional learning, there is a fixed point at $\rho_f^{AC} < 1$ for the dynamics of the overlap. Because of $\rho_f^{AC} < \rho_f^{AE}$ the probability for full synchronization in this case is much smaller than for a successful simple attack. In fact, large fluctuations which lead to equal weights without interaction only occur in small systems. But the common input sequence causes correlations between $w_i^A$ and $w_i^C$ even for $L > 1$ and $N > 1$. Consequently, the number of keys $n_{\text{key}}$ is smaller than the number of weight configurations $n_{\text{conf}} = (2L + 1)^{KN}$ of a tree parity machine.

We further analyze these correlations by calculating...
the entropy of the weight distribution

\[ S = -KN \sum_{a=-L}^{L} \sum_{c=-L}^{L} p_{a,c} \ln p_{a,c}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (47)

Here \( p_{a,c} \) is the probability to find \( w_{ij}^A = a \) and \( w_{ij}^C = c \) by selecting a random weight. As the weights in each tree parity machine alone stay uniformly distributed, the entropy of two fully synchronized networks is given by

\[ S_0 = \ln n_{\text{conf}} = KN \ln(2L + 1), \]  \hspace{1cm} (48)

which is also the entropy of a single TPM. Consequently, the quantity \( S - S_0 \) describes the correlations between the weight vectors caused by the common input sequence. It is proportional to the length of the generated cryptographic key with any redundancy removed using a suitable encoding. Therefore the logarithm of the effective number of keys is given by

\[ \ln n_{\text{key}} = S - S_0. \]  \hspace{1cm} (49)

We note, however, that the real number can be larger, because not all possible weight configurations occur with equal probability as keys. Therefore \( n_{\text{key}} \) is, in fact, a lower bound for the number of different final configurations. However, this quantity determines the security against brute-force attacks, as an attacker tries the most probable keys first.

Figure 13 shows the time evolution of this entropy. First \( S - S_0 \) shrinks linearly with increasing \( t \), as the overlap \( \rho \) between \( A \) and \( C \) grows while it approaches the stationary state. This behavior is consistent with an exponential decreasing number of keys, which can be directly observed in very small systems as shown in Fig. 14. Of course, after the system has reached the fixed point shown in Fig. 12, the entropy stays constant. We use this minimum value in order to determine \( n_{\text{key}} \).

It is clearly visible that there are two scaling relations for \( S(t) \). The synchronization time \( t_{\text{sync}} \propto L^2 \) is the time scale of all processes related to the synchronization of tree parity machines. It depends on the size of the learning steps \( \langle \Delta \rho \rangle \). Therefore the time needed to reach the fixed point of \( \rho_k^{AC} \) is proportional to \( L^2 \), too.

Entropy is an extensive quantity. Thus \( S \) and \( S_0 \) are proportional to the number of weights \( N \). Consequently the number of keys, which can be generated by the neural key-exchange protocol for a given input sequence, grows exponentially with increasing \( N \).

In order to determine the dependency between the synaptic depth \( L \) and \( n_{\text{key}} \) we calculate the mutual information

\[ I = 2S_0 - S \]  \hspace{1cm} (50)

between \( A \) and \( C \), which is visible in the correlations of the weight vectors. Using Eqs. (48) and (49) we find

\[ I = -\ln \left( \frac{n_{\text{key}}}{n_{\text{conf}}} \right), \]  \hspace{1cm} (51)

Therefore the number of keys is given by

\[ n_{\text{key}} = n_{\text{conf}} e^{-I} = \left[ (2L + 1)^K e^{-I/N} \right]^N. \]  \hspace{1cm} (52)

As shown in Fig. 15 \( I/N \) becomes asymptotically independent of the synaptic depth in the limit \( L \to \infty \). Of course, changing \( N \) does not influence \( I/N \) either, as it is an intensive quantity. Extrapolating \( I \) yields the result

\[ I \approx 0.42N, \]  \hspace{1cm} (53)

which is valid for \( K = 3 \) and \( L \gg 1 \). Consequently, \( n_{\text{key}} \) increases exponentially with \( N \),

\[ n_{\text{key}} \approx \left[ 0.66(2L + 1)^3 \right]^N, \]  \hspace{1cm} (54)

so that there are always enough possible keys in larger systems to prevent successful brute-force attacks on the neural key-exchange protocol.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

Synchronization of neural networks is a dynamical process driven by attractive and repulsive stochastic forces. While there is little difference between unidirectional and bidirectional interaction in the case of simple networks such as perceptrons, more complex networks such as TPMs show an interesting phenomenon: neural networks which interact with each other synchronize faster than those, which are only trained with the examples generated by others.

We have investigated the dynamics of this effect, which is essential for the recently proposed neural key-exchange protocol. In multilayer feed-forward networks the hidden units are not public. Therefore learning steps can have either an attractive or repulsive effect. In both cases the step size only depends on the synaptic depth $L$ and the time-dependent overlap $\rho$ between the networks. Two neural networks, $A$ and $B$, learning from each other are able to skip unsuitable input vectors because of their interaction. That is why they avoid some repulsive steps and have a clear advantage over a third cause of their interaction. That is why they avoid some repulsive steps and have a clear advantage over a third passive neural network $E$, which cannot influence $A$ and $B$. Consequently, $A$ and $B$ have a lower frequency of repulsive learning steps than $E$, which causes the difference between bidirectional synchronization and unidirectional learning.

Using the step sizes $\Delta \rho_a(\rho)$, $\Delta \rho_r(\rho)$ and transition probabilities $P_a(\rho)$, $P_r(\rho)$ we described the process of neural synchronization as a random walk of the overlap $\rho$. The most important properties of the dynamics are visible in the average change of the overlap $\langle \Delta \rho(\rho) \rangle$. In the case of $K = 3$ and bidirectional interaction the dynamics of the overlap has only one fixed point at $\rho = 1$. That is why full synchronization is achieved after $\langle t_{\text{sync}} \rangle \propto L^2$ steps on average. However, for unidirectional learning or mutual learning with $K > 3$ there is an additional fixed point at $\rho_f < 1$, so that $\rho = 1$ is only reachable by fluctuations. This leads to a different scaling behavior of the average synchronization time $\langle t_{\text{sync}} \rangle \propto e^{c_1 L + c_2 L^2}$. Thus the difference between bidirectional synchronization and unidirectional learning can be controlled by choosing the synaptic depth $L$.

An identical input sequence causes correlations between tree parity machines even without any other interaction. Similarly to the case of unidirectional learning there is a fixed point at $\rho_f < 1$. As the distance $1 - \rho_f$ is larger, full synchronization without interaction is only observed for very small TPMs. But the correlations restrict the number of different keys $n_{\text{key}}$, which can be generated by the neural key-exchange protocol using a certain input sequence and random initial weights. Both the configuration space $n_{\text{conf}} = (2L+1)^{KN}$ and $n_{\text{key}}$ grow exponentially with increasing number of weights per hidden unit. Therefore a large value of $N$ guarantees the security of neural cryptography against brute-force attacks and similar methods.

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