Irreducible Complexity in
Pure Mathematics

Gregory Chaitin*

Abstract

By using ideas on complexity and randomness originally suggested
by the mathematician-philosopher Gottfried Leibniz in 1686, the modern
type of algorithmic information is able to show that there can
never be a “theory of everything” for all of mathematics.

In 1956 an article by Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman entitled “Gödel’s
proof” was published in *Scientific American*, and in 1958 an expanded version
of this article was published as a book with the same title. This is a wonderful
book, and it’s still in print.

At the time of its original publication, I was a child, not even a teenager,
and I was obsessed by this little book. I remember the thrill of discovering
the newly published *Gödel’s Proof* in the New York Public Library. I used
to carry it around with me and try to explain it to other children.

Why was I so fascinated? Because Kurt Gödel uses mathematics to show
that mathematics itself has limitations. How can this be? How could rea-
son have limits? In fact, Gödel refutes the position of David Hilbert, who
about a century ago declared that there was a theory of everything (TOE)
for math, a finite set of principles from which one could mindlessly deduce
all mathematical truths by merely tediously following the rules of symbolic
mathematical logic. Such a theory is called a *formal axiomatic mathematical
theory*.

*IBM Watson Research Center, P. O. Box 218, Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA,
chaitin@us.ibm.com
My attempt to understand Gödel’s proof took over my life, and almost half a century later, I have just finished writing a little book of my own. It’s my own version of Nagel and Newman’s *Gödel’s Proof*, in which everything is done completely differently. The only thing the two books have in common is their common goal of providing an auto-critique of mathematical methods and the fact that they are both small books. My book is currently on my personal website and will soon be published.

Why did I have to completely rewrite Nagel and Newman? Because their exposition and Gödel’s original 1931 proof are both based on the two self-referential paradoxes: “This statement is false” and “This statement is unprovable.” [See the appendix on “Gödel’s Proof.”]

My approach is completely different. It’s based on measuring information and on showing that some mathematical facts have no redundancy and cannot be compressed into any mathematical theory because these facts are too complicated, in fact, infinitely complex. This new approach suggests that what Gödel originally discovered was just the tip of the iceberg and that the problem is much bigger than most people think. And, amazingly enough, I have recently discovered that these ideas can be traced back to G. W. Leibniz in the late 17th century.

In this essay I’m going to try to outline some of these ideas. Please bear with me, since it is not really possible to present all the mathematical details in a short essay. Instead I’ll just try to convey the general flavor of what is going on, using vague but hopefully suggestive analogies and much hand-waving. If you want to know more, you should read my new book, *Meta Math!*, which is as non-technical as I could make it, but takes the time to do things right. And there are a lot of other books on this subject, by me and by other people.

My story begins in 1686 with Leibniz’s philosophical essay *Discours de métaphysique*, in English, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, where Leibniz discusses how we can distinguish between facts that follow a law, and lawless, irregular, chaotic facts. How can we do this?

Leibniz’s idea is very simple and very profound. It’s in section VI of the *Discours*. It’s the observation that the concept of law becomes vacuous if arbitrarily high mathematical complexity is permitted, for then there is always a law. Conversely, if the law **has to be** extremely complicated, then the data is irregular, lawless, random, unstructured, patternless, and also incompressible and irreducible. A theory has to be simpler than the data that it explains, otherwise it doesn’t explain anything.
Algorithmic Information

We live in an age of digital information: software, DNA, DVD’s, digital cameras, etc. And the basic idea of algorithmic information theory is to look at the size in bits of computer software, the minimum possible size, without caring at all about the speed of this software.

Here is the basic insight, the basic model. It’s a software view of science: A scientific theory is a computer program that computes our observations, the experimental data. And these are our two fundamental principles, originally due to William of Occam and to Leibniz: The simplest theory is best (Occam’s razor). This means that the smallest program that calculates the observations is the best theory. Furthermore, if a theory is the same size in bits as the data it explains, then it’s worthless, because there is always such a theory (Leibniz). A theory is a compression of the data, comprehension is compression. And you compress things into computer programs, into concise algorithmic descriptions. The simpler the theory, the better you understand something. A very complex theory means something is wrong.

Then you define the complexity or, more precisely, the “algorithmic information content,” of a set of facts (or any other digital object) to be the size in bits of the smallest program for calculating them (or it), no matter how slow. And a stream of bits is irreducible (also called “algorithmically random”) if its complexity is equal to its size, in other words, if there is no good theory for it, no program for calculating it that is smaller than it is. In other words, such bit streams are incompressible, they have no redundancy; the best thing to do is to transmit them directly. You gain nothing from doing what DVD players and digital television attempt to do, which is to transmit instructions for reassembling the picture frames rather than the pictures themselves.

How close did Leibniz come to these modern ideas? Well, very close. He had all the key elements, he just never connected them. He knew that everything can be represented with binary information, he built one of the first calculating machines, he appreciated the power of computation, and he discussed complexity and randomness. All the key components of the modern theory of algorithmic information.

And if he had put all of this together, he might have been able to realize that one of the key pillars of his philosophical position can be severely questioned. For Leibniz, like Spinoza and Descartes, was a rationalist, he believed in the power of reason, he followed that continental philosophical tradition rather than the British school of empiricism, which is more impressed with
facts than with thoughts and theories.

And one of the key elements of Leibniz’s philosophy is what he called “the principle of sufficient reason,” that everything happens for a reason. In other words, if something is true, it must be true for a reason. Hard to believe sometimes, in the confusion and chaos of daily life, in the contingent ebb and flow of human history. Ah, said Leibniz, even if we cannot always see a reason, perhaps because the chain of reasoning is long and subtle, God can see the reason, it’s there! The universe is rational. In fact, this is actually an idea that comes from the ancient Greeks.

Mathematicians certainly believe in reason and in Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, because they always try to prove everything. No matter how much computational or experimental evidence there is for something, like the celebrated Riemann hypothesis or the $P \neq NP$ conjecture of theoretical computer science, mathematicians demand a proof, nothing less will satisfy them!

And here is where the concept of algorithmic information can make its surprising contribution to epistemology, to the philosophical discussion of the origins and limits of knowledge. What if we can find mathematical facts that are true for no reason, where would that leave our philosophy, what would it do to us?

In fact we can find irreducible mathematical facts, an infinity of them. Later in this essay I’ll show you how. I’ll exhibit an infinite irreducible stream of yes/no, true/false mathematical facts. These facts turn out to be not only computationally irreducible, they are even logically irreducible. In essence, the only way to prove such mathematical facts, is to directly assume them as new mathematical axioms, without using reasoning at all.

The concept of “axiom” is closely related to the idea of logical irreducibility. Axioms are mathematical facts that we take as self-evident and do not attempt to prove from simpler principles. All formal mathematical theories start with axioms, and then deduce the consequences of these axioms, which are called its theorems. That is how Euclid did things in Alexandria two millennia ago, and his treatise on geometry is the classical model for mathematical exposition, one of the all-time best-sellers of the Western World, even though Euclid’s *Elements* is no longer taught in high-school the way that it was when I was a child.

In ancient Greece if you wanted to convince your fellow citizens to vote with you on some issue, you had to reason with them. Which I guess is how they came up with the idea that in math you had to prove things rather than
just discover them experimentally, which is all that it appears that previous cultures in Mesopotamia and Egypt did. And using reason has certainly been an extremely fruitful approach, leading to modern mathematics and mathematical physics and all that goes with it, including, eventually, the technology for building that extremely logical and mathematical machine, the computer.

So am I saying that in a way all this crashes and burns?! Yes, in a sense I am. My counter-example illustrating the limited power of logic and reason, my source of an infinite stream of irreducible/unprovable mathematical facts, is the number that I call Ω, capital omega, the last letter of the Greek alphabet. O-mega as opposed to o-micron, which means big-oh, not little-oh. Omega is typically used in the expression “from alpha to omega,” from the beginning to the end, or to denote something inaccessible or final, such as the omega point or the omega man.

So now let me tell you about Ω and why it provides us with an infinite stream of irreducible bits and unprovable facts.

The Number Ω

In a famous paper published in 1936 in the *Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society*, Alan Turing began the computer age by presenting a mathematical model of a simple general-purpose programmable digital computer. He then showed that there was something that no algorithm could accomplish and no mathematical theory could ever decide, namely whether or not a self-contained computer program will eventually halt. This is Turing’s famous halting problem.

Of course, by running the program you can eventually discover that it halts. The problem, and it is an extremely fundamental one, is to decide when to give up. There is no general solution, even though a great many special cases can in fact be solved. And Turing showed in 1936 that there will never be a general solution; it’s impossible. [*For a modern proof, see the appendix “Why is Turing’s halting problem unsolvable?”*]

Well, that’s the first step on the road to Ω.

The next step, which is often a fruitful approach, is to forget about individual cases of this problem, and consider the statistical ensemble. In other words, let’s ask if a program chosen at random ever halts. The probability of having that happen is my Ω number.
How precisely do you go about picking a program at random? Well, what you do is that every time your computer asks for the next bit of the program, you just flip a coin. So $\Omega$ is just the probability that a machine will eventually do something. Not a big deal!

For those of you who want to know more about how to define $\Omega$, let me remark that $\Omega$ is actually the sum of $1/(\text{two raised to the power which is the size in bits of each program that halts})$. In other words, each $N$-bit program that halts contributes precisely $1/2^N$ to the sum that defines $\Omega$. Because if each bit of a program is chosen using an independent toss of a fair coin, head, 1, tails, 0, then the probability of getting any individual $N$-bit program is precisely $1/2^N$. And we want to know the total probability of all the programs that halt.

In other words, each $N$-bit program that halts adds a 1 to the $N$th bit in the binary expansion of $\Omega$. Do this for all programs that halt, and you’d get the precise value of $\Omega$. [For an example, see the appendix “How to calculate the halting probability $\Omega$.”] This may make it sound like you can calculate $\Omega$ with arbitrarily great accuracy, just as if it were $\sqrt{2}$ or the number $\pi$. However this is actually impossible, because in order to do it you’d have to solve Turing’s halting problem. In fact, in a sense the halting probability $\Omega$ is a maximally uncomputable number.

So $\Omega$ cannot be computed, but it can be defined mathematically as a specific number. For this to work it is crucial that no extension of a valid program is a valid program, which guarantees that the sum over all programs that halt defining $\Omega$ converges to a value between zero and one instead of diverging to infinity. Such programs are called self-delimiting, they’re the ones for which a halting probability can be defined. Also, I should mention that the precise numerical value of $\Omega$ depends on your choice of computer programming language, but $\Omega$’s surprising properties aren’t at all affected by this choice.

Okay those are just details.

The next thing that’s crucial is for me to tell you how you get an infinite irreducible stream of bits out of $\Omega$.

Well, that’s not difficult. $\Omega$ is a probability, which has to be between zero and one. Zero would mean no program halts, one would mean all of them do. $\Omega$ is actually greater than zero and less than one, because some programs halt and some don’t. Then write, or more precisely, imagine writing $\Omega$ out in binary, in base-two notation. Just like the number $\pi$ is 3.1415926... with an infinite sequence of digits, $\Omega$, if you knew its precise numerical value, and
if you wrote that out in binary, would give you something like 0.1110100... Let’s forget about the initial 0 before the decimal point, and just consider the infinite stream of bits that comes after the decimal point.

Well, it turns out that these are our irreducible mathematical facts, this is an infinite irreducible stream of bits. The irreducible math facts are whether each individual bit is a 0 or a 1. There’s no way to know that. These turn out to be facts that are true for no reason, that are unprovable unless you adopt them as new axioms.

Why? Well, it’s because Ω squeezes all the redundancy out of individual cases of Turing’s halting problem. Ω is the most compact, the most compressed way of giving you the answer to all cases of the halting problem. In fact, knowing the first $N$ bits of Ω would in principle enable you to decide whether or not each program up to $N$ bits in size ever halts. From this it follows that you need an $N$-bit program in order to be able to calculate $N$ bits of Ω. From this it also follows that you need $N$ bits of axioms in order to be able to determine $N$ bits of Ω. In other words, Ω is logically as well as computationally irreducible.

Can you manage to see why? It’s certainly not obvious. [See the appendix “Why is Ω incompressible?”] I remember realizing that this had to be the case for the first time when I was flying back to the IBM lab in NY after a visit to a university in late 1973 or early 1974. It was a beautiful day, and at that precise moment I was staring out the window at the Pentagon in Washington DC.

And the fact that Ω is irreducible immediately implies that there cannot be a theory of everything (TOE) for all of mathematics. Why?

The basic intuition is that once you squeeze all the redundancy out of anything, what you are left with is irreducible, and then whether each bit is 0 or 1 is a fact that in a sense is “true for no reason,” it’s a complete surprise, it’s totally unexpected. So the bits of Ω are irreducible mathematical truths, they are mathematical facts that cannot be derived from any principles simpler than they are, and there are an infinity of them, an infinity of bits of Ω. Math therefore has infinite complexity, whereas any individual TOE only has finite complexity, and cannot capture all the richness of the full world of mathematical truth, only a finite part of it.

But what does it all mean? This doesn’t mean that proofs are no good. And I’m certainly not against reason. Just because some things are irreducible, doesn’t mean we should give up using reasoning.

But perhaps sometimes you shouldn’t try to prove everything. Sometimes
mathematicians should just add new axioms. That’s what you’ve got to do if you are faced with irreducible facts. The problem is knowing that they are irreducible!

In a way, saying something is irreducible is giving up, saying that it can’t ever be proved. Mathematicians would rather die than do that, contrasting sharply with their physicist colleagues, who are happy to be pragmatic and to use plausible reasoning instead of rigorous proof. But remember, to avoid an infinite regress, you’ve got to stop somewhere, you can’t always prove everything from something else. And these irreducible principles, which are called axioms, have always been a part of mathematics, they are not something new. I’m just saying that there are a lot more of them out there than people suspected.

Physicists are certainly willing to add new principles, new scientific laws, in order to understand new domains of experience. Should mathematicians do the same thing that physicists do and add new axioms because they are pragmatically justified, even though they are not at all “self-evident?” This raises what I think is an extremely interesting question:

Is Math like Physics?

I don’t want to get into a long discussion about this, because it’s very, very controversial, but in fact there are a few of us who do think that math is like physics, sort of.

One of the people who does, or did, is Imre Lakatos, who left Hungary in 1956 and worked on philosophy in England. There Lakatos came up with a great word, quasi-empirical. That’s the word that I use to describe my philosophical position on all of this: I think that math is quasi-empirical. In other words, I feel that math is different from physics, but perhaps not as different as most people think.

In science you compress your experimental observations into scientific laws, and in math you compress your computational experiments into mathematical axioms. What counts is the compression, that’s what understanding is, it’s the fact that you’re putting just a few ideas in, and getting a lot more out, you’re using them to explain a rich and diverse set of physical or mathematical experiences.

If Hilbert had been right, math would be a closed system, with no new ideas coming in. There would be a static closed finished theory of everything
for all of math, and this would be like a dictatorship. In fact, for math to progress you actually need new ideas and plenty of room for creativity, it does not suffice to mindlessly and mechanically grind away deducing all the possible consequences of a fixed number of well-known basic principles. And I much prefer an open system, I don’t like rigid, totalitarian, authoritarian ways of thinking.

To end on a personal note, I’ve lived in both the world of math and the world of physics, and I never thought there was such a big difference between these two fields. It’s a matter of degree, of emphasis, not an absolute difference. After all, math and physics co-evolved. Mathematicians shouldn’t isolate themselves. They shouldn’t cut themselves off from rich sources of new ideas.

FURTHER READING

1. Gödel’s Proof. (Revised Edition) E. Nagel, J. R. Newman and D. R. Hofstadter. New York University Press, 2001.

2. For a chapter on Leibniz, see: Men of Mathematics. E. T. Bell. Simon and Schuster, 1986.

3. For more on a quasi-empirical view of math, see: New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics. T. Tymoczko. Princeton University Press, 1998.

4. For more on Ω, see Chaitin’s Meta Math! e-book:
   http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin/omega.html
   To be published by Pantheon Books in New York in 2005.

5. For how far you can get in math without bothering with proofs, see: Mathematics by Experiment. J. Borwein and D. Bailey. A. K. Peters, 2004. Experimentation in Mathematics. J. Borwein, D. Bailey and R. Girgensohn. A. K. Peters, 2004.

APPENDIXES

What is Gödel’s proof?

Let’s start with the paradox of the liar: “This statement is false.” This statement is true if and only if it’s false, and therefore is neither true nor false.

Now let’s consider “This statement is unprovable.” If it is provable, then we are proving a falsehood, which is extremely unpleasant and is generally assumed to be impossible. The only alternative left is that this statement is unprovable. Therefore it’s in fact both true and unprovable, and mathematics is incomplete, because some truths are unprovable.
Gödel’s proof constructs self-referential statements indirectly, using their Gödel numbers, which are a way to talk about statements and whether they can be proved by talking about the numerical properties of very large integers that represent mathematical assertions and their proofs.

And Gödel’s proof actually shows that what is incomplete is not mathematics, but individual formal axiomatic mathematical theories that pretend to be theories of everything, but in fact fail to prove the true numerical statement “This statement is unprovable.”

The key question left unanswered by Gödel: Is this an isolated phenomenon, or are there many important mathematical truths that are unprovable?

Why is Turing’s halting problem unsolvable?

A key step in showing that incompleteness is natural and pervasive was taken by Alan Turing in 1936 when he demonstrated that there can be no general procedure to decide if a self-contained computer program will eventually halt.

Why not? Well, let’s assume the opposite of what we want to prove, namely that there is in fact precisely such a general procedure $H$, and from this we shall derive a contradiction. This is what’s called a *reductio ad absurdum* proof.

So assuming the existence of $H$, we can construct the following program $P$ that uses $H$ as a subroutine. The program $P$ knows its own size in bits $N$ (there is certainly room in $P$ for it to contain the number $N$) and then using $H$, which $P$ contains, $P$ takes a look at all programs up to a hundred times $N$ bits in size in order to see which halt and which don’t. Then $P$ runs all the ones that halt in order to determine the output that they produce. This will be precisely the set of all digital objects with complexity up to a hundred times $N$. Finally our program $P$ outputs the smallest positive integer not in this set, that is, with complexity greater than a hundred times $N$, and then $P$ itself halts.

So $P$ halts, $P$’s size is precisely $N$ bits, and $P$’s output is the first positive integer having complexity larger than a hundred times $N$, that is, that cannot be produced by a program whose size is less than or equal to a hundred times $N$ bits. However $P$ has just produced this highly complex integer as its output, and $P$ is much too small to be able to do this, because its size is only $N$ bits, which is much less than a hundred times $N$. Contradiction! Therefore a general procedure $H$ for deciding whether or not programs ever halt cannot exist, for if it did then we could actually construct this paradoxical program $P$ using $H$.

Finally Turing points out that if there were a TOE that always enables you to prove that an individual program halts or to prove that it never does, whichever is the case, then by systematically running through all possible proofs you could eventually decide whether individual programs ever halt. In other words, we could use this TOE to construct $H$, which we have just shown cannot exist. Therefore there is no TOE for the halting problem.

How to calculate the halting probability $\Omega$

Let’s look at an example. Suppose that the computer that we are dealing with has only three programs that halt, and they are the bit strings 0001, 000001 and 000011. These
programs are, respectively, 4, 6 and 6 bits in size. And the probability of getting each of
them by chance is precisely $1/2^4$, $1/2^6$ and $1/2^6$, since each particular bit has probability
$1/2$. So the value of the halting probability $\Omega$ for this particular computer is precisely
\[
\Omega = \frac{1}{2^4} + \frac{1}{2^6} + \frac{1}{2^6} = \frac{1}{2^4} + \frac{2}{2^6} = \frac{1}{2^4} + \frac{1}{2^5} = .000110
\]
We’re adding a 1 bit into the 4th, 6th and 6th bits of this $\Omega$. Note that we’ve gotten a
carry out of the 6th bit position after the decimal point. Adding a 1 bit twice into the 6th
bit position yields a 0 bit there and a 1 bit in the 5th bit position. The final value of $\Omega$ is
the probability of getting one of these three programs by chance.

Here’s an embarrassing question. What if we have a computer for which the two 1-bit
programs 0 and 1 both halt? Then we would have
\[
\Omega = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} = 1
\]
This is embarrassing because I said that $\Omega$ had to be greater than zero and less than one.
What is going on here? Well, remember that I said that programs must be self-delimiting?
This means that the computer decides by itself when to stop asking for more bits, each of
which is determined by an independent toss of a fair coin.

The fact that programs are self-delimiting implies that no extension of a valid program
is a valid program. Therefore if 0 and 1 were both programs that halt, then no other
program could ever halt, and our computer would only be good for running two programs.
That’s not much of a computer! The halting probability $\Omega$ is only of interest, it only has
surprising properties, when it is the halting probability of what is called a “universal”
computer. That’s a general-purpose computer that can run all possible algorithms, of
which there are infinitely many.

This is an example of how the fact that no extension of a valid program is a valid
program keeps $\Omega$ from being greater than 1.

**Why is $\Omega$ irreducible/incompressible?**

Well, let’s assume that we are given the first $N$ bits of the base-two numerical value of $\Omega$.
So we know $\Omega$ with accuracy one over two to the $N$, in other words, with $N$-bit accuracy.
Our strategy is to show that this would tell us a lot about Turing’s halting problem, which
in fact we already know cannot be solved.

More precisely, if we can use the first $N$ bits of $\Omega$ to solve the halting problem for all
programs up to $N$ bits in size, this will show that the first $N$ bits of $\Omega$ cannot be produced
by a program substantially less than $N$ bits in size nor deduced using a formal axiomatic
math theory with substantially less than $N$ bits of axioms.

Why does knowing $N$ bits of $\Omega$ enable us to solve the halting problem for all programs
up to $N$ bits in size? We can do this by performing a computation in stages, one for each
$K = 1, 2, 3, \ldots$ At stage $K$ run every program up to $K$ bits in size for $K$ seconds. Then
compute a lower bound $\Omega_K$ on the halting probability $\Omega$ based on all the programs that
halt that you discover at stage $K$. This will give you an infinite list of lower bounds $\Omega_K$
on the actual value of $\Omega$. 

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These lower bounds on $\Omega$ will eventually get closer and closer to the actual value of $\Omega$. And as soon as the first $N$ bits are correct, you know that you’ve encountered every program up to $N$ bits in size that will ever halt, for otherwise the lower bounds on $\Omega$ would then become larger than the true value of $\Omega$, which is impossible.

It should be mentioned that the stage $K$ at which the first $N$ bits of $\Omega$ are correct grows immensely quickly, in fact, faster than any computable function of $N$.

**New mathematical axioms**

There are many well-known examples of controversial axioms, including:

- the parallel postulate in Euclidean geometry,
- the law of the excluded middle in logic,
- the axiom of choice in set theory.

But what are examples of potential new axioms?

Elsewhere the author of this essay has proposed that some variant of the Riemann hypothesis might be pragmatically justified as a new axiom due to its diverse applications in number theory.

But there are much better examples of new axioms. Here are two that have emerged by group consensus in the past few years:

- the axiom of projective determinacy in set theory,
- the $P \neq NP$ conjecture regarding time complexity.

The latter example is particularly interesting as it has many important applications, as I’ll now explain.

Most theoretical computer scientists are concerned with time complexity—the time required to compute things—not with program-size (or informational) complexity as in this essay. And at the present time this community believes that many important problems require an amount of time that necessarily grows exponentially, even though no one can prove it.

An example of this presumed exponential growth is determining whether or not a logical expression involving Boolean connectives is a tautology, that is, true for all possible assignments of truth values to its variables. This can be done via truth tables in an exponential amount of time by looking at all possible combinations of truth values. That this exponential time growth is necessarily the case is a consequence of the $P \neq NP$ hypothesis, currently believed and freely used by almost all people working in the field of time complexity.

**Experimental mathematics**

This is the idea of discovering new mathematical results by looking at many examples using a computer. While this is not as persuasive as a short proof—but it may be more
convincing than a long and extremely complicated proof—for some purposes it is quite sufficient.

Such calculations, checking many diverse examples of a mathematical problem, are usually done using a symbolic programming language such as Mathematica or Maple, or using a numerical programming language such as MATLAB.

In the past this approach was defended with great vigor by George Pólya and by Imre Lakatos, believers in heuristic reasoning and in the quasi-empirical nature of mathematics.

In this generation, experimental mathematics has been promoted most forcefully by Jon Borwein and David Bailey, authors of a two-volume treatise on the power of experimental methods. Another eminent practitioner of experimental math is my IBM colleague Benoit Mandelbrot, of fractal fame. This methodology is also practiced and justified in Stephen Wolfram’s *A New Kind of Science*.

Contemporary mathematicians are also fortunate to have a journal, *Experimental Mathematics*, where they can publish their numerical observations and conjectures.

Extensive computer calculations can be extremely persuasive, but do they render proof unnecessary?! Yes and no. In fact, they provide a different kind of evidence. In important situations, I would argue that both kinds of evidence are required, as proofs may be flawed, and conversely computer searches may have the bad luck to stop just before encountering a counter-example.