Aristotelian ‘Phronesis’ and the dilemma of its translation
La Prónesis aristotélica y el dilema de su traducción

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Abstract: The Greek Phronesis is among the key concepts in Aristotle’s ethics and politics. It appears especially in the Book VI of his Nicomachean Ethics. The translators of Aristotle’s work could only render those aspects of its meaning that they were able to comprehend. The present study examines how phronesis is transmitted into Arabic in the revised version of the first known translation of the Nicomachean Ethics by Ishāq Ibn Ḥunain (9th century) where he renders it to ta’aqqul, ‘aql or fahm, and the translation made by ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī (20th century), who translates it as fiṭna. The findings are occasionally compared with the English and German translations of the same text by two significant commentators of Aristotle. The paper concludes that while Ibn Ḥunain’s renderings are historically justified, all in all, Badawī has translated the Greek terms with relative faithfulness, although he occasionally fails to establish a correlation between the concepts.

Keywords: Phronesis, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Ishāq Ibn Ḥunain, ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī

Resumen: Phrónesis es uno de los conceptos clave en la ética y la política de Aristóteles. Aparece especialmente en el Libro VI de su Ética Nicomáquea. Los traductores de la obra de Aristóteles solo pudieron traducir aquellos aspectos de su significado que pudieron comprender. El presente estudio examina las formas en que la phrónesis se transmite al árabe en la versión revisada de la primera traducción conocida del NE por Ishāq Ibn Ḥunain (siglos III / IX) donde lo traduce a ta’aqqul, ‘aql o fahm, y la traducción realizada por ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī (siglos XV / XX), que lo traduce como fitna. Los hallazgos se comparan ocasionalmente con las
traducciones al inglés y al alemán del mismo texto. El artículo concluye que, si bien las representaciones de Ibn Ḥunain están históricamente justificadas, en general Badawī ha traducido los términos griegos con relativa fidelidad, aunque ocasionalmente no logra establecer una correlación entre los conceptos.

**Palabras clave:** Phrónesis, Aristóteles, Ética Nicomáquea, Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunain, ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī

**INTRODUCTION**

*Phronesis* (φρόνησις) is among the key concepts in Aristotle’s ethics and politics, commonly referred to as «practical wisdom» or «practical reason» or «moral knowledge». It originated in the Greek language, long before Aristotle, as a by-product of classical intellectual culture. It was, however, Aristotle’s attention and interpretation, especially his detailed discussion on *phronesis* in the Book VI of his *Nicomachean Ethics* (hereafter *NE*), that endowed the concept with broad semantic latitude. Throughout the ages, the translators of Aristotle’s work who have rendered the term *phronesis* into different languages, in their laborious efforts in transmitting the concept, could only render those aspects of its meaning that they were able to comprehend according to, and within the limits of, their own cultural training.

The Book VI of *NE* makes it quite clear that finding a single term in other languages to convey the full meaning of *phronesis* is extremely difficult if not impossible. The complexity and multifaceted nature of this concept have led Aristotle to approach it from different angles to refine its connection with the adjacent concepts as well as its usage in the common language. Thus he creates a complex network of correlated concepts to explain *phronesis*. The reader/translator in his/her turn is required to form a proper understanding of this network and clarify its semantic field. In other words, one must carefully examine the neighbouring concepts as well as their interrelations in the source language, and try to translate that network of concepts into the target language. Then and only then it will be possible to produce a translation of *phronesis* consistent with its original meaning.

The present study takes the observation raised above as its hypothesis and critically examines how the term *phronesis* is transmitted into Arabic in the revised version of the first known translation of the *NE*, limiting the scope of the investigation to the text of Book VI only. Based on this, the article aims to analyse how far the interconnected network of the different interpreted concepts related to the Greek *phronesis* renders the different meanings as was intended by Aristotle. In this regard, the Arabic text will
also be occasionally compared with the English (Aristotle, 2019) and the German (Aristoteles, 1998) translations of the same text, in the hope that the comparative reading would demonstrate how Aristotle defines *phronesis*. Both English and German texts were directly translated from Greek by two significant commentators on Aristotle.

The first Arabic translation of the *NE* was made during the Abbasid translation movement by Ishāq Ibn Hunain (circa 9th century)\(^1\). According to Ibn Nadīm in *Al-Fihrist*, there existed a complete Arabic translation of *NE* by Ishāq Ibn Hunain in the 4th/10th century (Ibn Nadīm, 1871, Vol. I pp. 248-252). As M. A. Molavī has aptly pointed out, scholars regard Ishāq’s Arabic translation as clearer and more reliable compared to the Latin translations from Greek, so it has been consulted for a better understanding of Aristotle’s texts (Molavī, 1998, p. 233). Scholars have reasons to believe that Ishāq’s translation received attention, particularly from Muslim philosophers who developed an interest in Aristotle and his philosophy of politics and ethics. In the Arabic sources, the *NE* was generally referred to as *Kitāb al-aḥlāq* (The Book of Ethics) (Dunlop, 1962, p. 21).

Until the second half of the 20th century, almost the entire text of Ibn Hunain Arabic translation of *NE*, now kept at a library in Rabat, Morocco,\(^2\) was in effect unaccounted for. The second half of it (Books VII-X) was discovered by the British orientalist A. J. Arberry in 1951 in the Qarawiyyīn library in Fez, Morocco. Arberry introduced it in an article he published in 1955. A few years later, D. M. Dunlop, another British orientalist, continuing Arberry’s research, found the first part of the *NE* (Books I-V and the last few lines of Book VI) in the same library in Fez, and published his findings in 1962. Dunlop dedicated the rest of his life working on the Arabic manuscript of *NE* and translated it into English but did not get a chance to publish it before his death in 1989. Anna Akasoy and Alexandra Fidora edited Dunlop’s work and published it in 2005. In this edition, they remain loyal to the manuscript of Arabic translation; hence, the missing Book VI, except for the last few lines, is absent in Dunlop’s revised version of the Arabic *NE* and its English translation.

In addition to Arberry and Dunlop, the renowned contemporary Egyptian philosopher, ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī too developed an interest in the Arabic translation of *NE*. He compared Ishāq’s translation with the original Greek as well as several other European translations of the *NE*, translated the missing sections of the manuscript, including the Book VI,  

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\(^1\) Recently, it has been raised an alternative opinion about the arabic translation by Manfred Ullmann. It will be mentioned later.

\(^2\) dated H 619/AD 1222.
from Greek into Arabic and eventually published his book in 1979 with a comprehensive introduction.

Recently, Manfred Ullmann has offered a new description of the mentioned manuscript, in a two-volume edition. He also raised an alternative opinion about the presence of two different translators. According to Manfred Ullmann’s recent study (2011), Frederique Woerther has pointed out:

…Whereas modern critics, following the testimony of Ibn an-Nadim’s notice, tend to attribute the whole of the Arabic translation to Ishāq b. Hunain.3 In fact only Books 1-4 are in reality the work of Ishāq b. Hunain, while Books 5-10 were translated into Arabic by Eustathius, probably at the request of al-Kindi (Woerther, 2019, p. 38).

Ullmann’s approach may need to be critically analysed. However, in the present study, we will mainly examine Badawi’s translation of Book VI in comparison with Ibn Hunain’s translation of other sections of the NE.4 It should be noted that the terms used in Book VI do also appear in other sections of the NE. Therefore, one can understand Ibn Hunains’s interpretation of Arabic terms and concepts only by following them within the context of the whole manuscript. This will simultaneously allow us to determine the appropriacy of Badawi’s translation of Book VI.

Hans-Georg Gadamer’s German translation and interpretation of the NE is a unique event in itself because translation itself plays a major role in his philosophy. Moreover, as Robert J. Dostal observes, «one of the most important features of Gadamer’s work, in general, is his attempt to recover Aristotelian phronesis, practical wisdom.» (Dostal, 1997, p. 297) To be sure, Gadamer’s reading of phronesis presents it as the pivotal concept of Aristotelian ethics and politics. In his Truth and Method, Gadamer refers to the NE frequently, especially where he discusses «the recovery of the fundamental hermeneutic problem» and the reinterpretation of phronesis becomes one of his main subjects (Gadamer, 2004, pp. 312-20). Gadamer’s German translation of the NE will occasionally be consulted in this study to inquire about his unique understanding of certain terms or concepts.

Sir W. D. Ross, a prominent twentieth-century British philosopher and a leading authority on Aristotle, has left us with his monumental multi-volume English translation of Aristotle’s complete writing. No scholarly research on

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3 ‘Abd ar-Rahmān Badawi attributes the whole of Arabic translation to Ishāq Ibn Ḥunain (Badawi, «Introduction» in Aristotēlēs, 1979, p. 45.)
4 In the present study we have focused on ‘Abd ar-Rahmān Badawi’s interpretation and translation of the ancient text, so we assume his fundamental premise about attribution the whole arabic translation to Ishāq Ibn Hunain.
Aristotle and his thinking, including this study, can dispense with his work, because, as J. J. Mulhern writes:

… he was, like Aristotle, a person of wide experience … Ross’s version continues to aid interpretation because of his experience and because of his broad grip on Aristotle’s ways of thinking across the corpus. (Mulhern, 2010.11.44)

So in the present study, Ross’s English Translation of the NE (hereafter NE.eng) will be the main reference to translate Greek terms or concepts of the NE.

Ever since its translation, the Arabic translation of NE has been a source of considerable influence on the Islamic philosophical scholarship, as it is reflected in the frequent references to it by the Muslim thinkers of the classical era. Dunlop aptly raised the issue in his introductory remarks, followed by Anna Akasoy in her article «The Arabic and Islamic Reception of Nicomachean Ethics» (2013) and Josh Hayes in his essay, «The Arabic Reception of the Nicomachean Ethics» (2015). For whatever reason, neither of these recent studies, however, has examined the concept of phronesis.

1. THE GREEK ‘PHRONESIS (φρόνησις)’ AND ITS TRANSLATIONS

The term ‘phronesis’, Jana Noel writes, «has been translated and interpreted with several different English phrases in the attempt to capture the full meaning of the term. Translations have included, among others, practical reasoning, practical wisdom, moral discernment, moral insight, and prudence» (Noel, 1999, p. 273). This all too apparent diversity in translation is seemingly caused by the complexity of the conception of phronesis itself, which even forced Aristotle to describe a network of related concepts to elucidate the meaning of phronesis. Thus, interpreting it as «practical wisdom» in effect emphasizes the relation between practice and phronesis, immediately considering phronesis as a type of wisdom. As for «prudence» (Aristotle, 1934, p. 333) and «practical knowledge», two other translations, «prudence»5 emerges as a foresight which underlines a special virtue and notable feature in some persons, while «practical knowledge» inherently reflects a type of wisdom that can generally exist in humans.

In the German translation, the situation is almost similar. Klugheit emphasizes a certain form of genuine giftedness like «prudence.» But Vernünftigkeit is more about rationality; and das praktische Wissen is more about «practical wisdom.» Gadamer’s reading of phronesis highlights not only the complexity of the term but its resistance to translation:

5 «The Latin translation of phronesis as prudentia abetted the failure to see the real state of affairs, a failure which still haunts contemporary «deontic logic.» (Gadamer, 2004, p. 378.)
... It shows how difficult it is to translate the term and the broad extent of its semantic field. As it is not only a matter of individual rationality, but it also takes on a sense of political and social responsibility (eine Art politischer und sozialer Verantwortlichkeit), discussing at once the issue of conscientiousness. For this reason, I have chosen two words for the translation of phronesis: Vernünftigkeit (rationality), or Gewissenhaftigkeit (conscientiousness). In Greek, both of these meanings are in one word: "Phronesis." (Gadamer, 1998, p. 14)

In his Truth and Method, Gadamer directs our attention to the fact that Aristotle considers phronesis an intellectual virtue; but it is at once a special kind of knowledge (moral Knowledge) (Gadamer, 2004, p. 312) and an intellectual virtue.

Practical knowledge, phronesis, is another kind of knowledge. Primarily, this means that it is directed towards the concrete situation. Thus it must grasp the «circumstances» in its infinite variety. (Gadamer, 2004, p. 19)

Gadamer highlights the multifaceted nature of phronesis:

He [Aristotle] sees it [phronesis] not only as a capacity (dunamis), but as a determination of moral being (hexis) which cannot exist without the totality of the «ethical virtues,» which in turn cannot exist without it. (Gadamer, 2004, p. 20)

In his Arabic translation of the Book VI, Badawî interpreted phronesis as ﻓﻄﻨﺔ ﻓِي throughout the text. ﻓِي at once means «discretion» and engages with a mental, internal faculty such as «acumen», and additionally provokes a kind of intellect. It seems that the multifaceted nature of phronesis has led Badawî to select this Arabic term; however, ﻓِي does not correspond with Ishâq’s translation perhaps because of Badawî’s reading of the word. In addition to Book VI, phronesis appears multiple times in the Books I, VII and X. Depending on the context of its appearance, Ishâq Ibn Hunain translated it as القل al-‘aql (Aristûṭûlîs, 1979, p. 259)7 or فهم fahm (Aristûṭûlîs, 1979, p. 70). ta’aqqul, from the root ‘aql, means «contemplation and deep thinking»; this, in turn, means «to become gradually rational.» It appears that ta’aqqul, semantically relatively close to «practical wisdom» in English, sounded rather appropriate to Ibn Hunain as the translation of phronesis.

Much to the multifaceted and ambiguous nature of phronesis, Aristotle tried a different way to shed light on this concept by describing and

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6 In this context, he translated phonimos as al-muta’aqqil (Aristûṭûlîs, 1979, pp. 235, 236, 352).
7 Elsewhere, he translated phonimos as al-‘âqil (Aristûṭûlîs, 1979, pp. 60, 96, 259, 262).
explicating phronimos (φρόνιμος). Phronimos means one who embodies phronesis, that is, one who is practically wise. Badawī translated phronimos as faṭin, which means one who embodies fitna. Again, his translation varies from Ibn Ḥunain’s, who, in agreement with his translation of phronesis, rendered it as al-muta’aqqil and al-‘āqil, as they come from the same root.

To sum up, the Arabic translators offered three different terms for phronesis. An examination of these translations shows that each term highlights only one aspect of phronesis. As it can be shown, a term like fitna does not necessarily relate to «practice»; hence, by only considering these equivalents the relevance and application of phronesis in ethics will not be clear. Moreover, «Acumen» appears to be more of an individual virtue; but such a narrow reading of the term will readily distance its application from the social and political context. But if we consider all these individual virtues as prerequisites to proper participation in the political and social context, then phronesis can have a full presence and participation in the social and political activities. This is the reason why Aristotle combines phronesis with a certain level of social consciousness and commitment (Gadamer, 1998, p. 14). Thus, as it was mentioned above, a network of related concepts must be considered in the process of translation so that the reader may have a clearer and more relevant perception of the term.

2. PHRONESIS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BOOK VI

NE is Aristotle’s main book on ethics. According to him, the aim of this book is not the mere reading of the essence of ethical virtues; rather, it is to present the question of how to be virtuous. Therefore, he focuses his inquiry on «praxis» (πράξις), that is, how we should act (Aristotle, 2009, II.2, 1103 b 33). In the first five chapters of the book, Aristotle advances on issues regarding happiness and the good, moral virtues; and after a compelling argument over moral virtue, he comes to the important conclusion that moral act «determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being following correct reason [orthos logos/ὀρθὸς λόγος]» (Aristotle, 2009, VI, 1138 b 24-5). Then he adds that although this is true, it is by no means clear. Thus, finding a standard or criteria in a situation where everything is in a state of change and variation is the main objective of this inquiry. In other words, the task is to determine the intermediate in the moral act.

Aristotle sets out to answer two important questions: First, what is orthos logos (correct reason)? And second, what is the standard that fixes it? (Aristotle, 2009, VI, 1138 b 35; Brown, 2009, p. 236) Interestingly, Badawī translated this key phrase to قاعدة مستقيمة gā’idah mustaqimah (correct/straight rule), unlike Ishāq Ibn Ḥunain who interpreted it as التميز الصواب at-tamyīz aṣ-
ṣawab (right discernment) (Aristūṭālis, 1979, p. 88), the utter untranslatability of the Greek expression in a context like the following notwithstanding:

Now, that we must act in accordance with correct reason (orthos logos) is a common principle and must be assumed … it will be discussed later, i.e. both what correct reason [orthos logos] is, and how it is related to the other virtues. (Aristotle, 2009, II.2, 1103 b 32-4)

After a short introduction on the soul at the beginning of Book VI, Aristotle continues on moral action and its relevance to proper choice (προαιρεσις) (Aristotle, 2009, VI, 1139 a 23). Action is related to a good life (eupraxia). The origin of action —it’s efficient, not its final cause— is choice (proairesis /προαιρεσις). According to Aristotle, a ‘proper choice’ is grounded on two things: a right desire, and reasoning that is aimed at the good life. Thus, the choice is the consequence of the interaction between desire and reasoning, in other words, the outcome of deliberated desire. In a proper and contemplated choice, what is necessary for reason is to agree with the right desire: «The origin of action — its efficient, not its final cause — is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end» (Aristotle, 2009, VI, 1139 a 30-35). Therefore, it is possible to say that to act morally is to act in accordance with reason. Here lies one of Aristotle’s most important accomplishments in the Book VI of his NE: determining the activity of intellect in the state of making the proper choice and taking the appropriate action, that is, phronesis. As for the choices of its Arabic translation, it seems that its ninth-century translation as ta’aqqu inproperly reflects the interrelation of phronesis with wisdom and intellect, unlike the term fiṭna which describes rather an acumen.

3. LOGISTIKON (ΛΟΓΙΣΤΙΚΟΝ): PHRONESIS IN RELATION TO PRACTICAL REASON

Relying on his attempt to clarify the relationship between reason and its parts to the elements in the soul; In Book VI, Aristotle begins with the analysis of the element which has reason (logon); and based on the division of things into variable and invariable, he considers logon as consisting of two parts: logistikon (λογιστικόν) and epistemonikon (ἐπιστημονικόν) which mostly are translated as «scientific» and «calculative» (Aristotle, 2009, VI.2, 1139 a 10-5).

Accordingly, the realm of epistemonikon consists of things being and becoming of which is necessary and we can only «know» them. In this invariable realm, man cannot make any change. Metaphysics, mathematics and natural sciences fall under this rubric, yet, logistikon is a kind of

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8 προαιρεσις ὑπερτικὴ
contemplation directed towards whatever is variable (Aristotle, 2009, VI.2, 1139 a 10-5), like making decisions or practising or creating things. In other words, the subject of this latter category emerges as the affairs that are calculated, deliberated and determined by man.

For each of these two parts, Aristotle assigns two virtues: sophia to the scientific part (epistemonikon) and phronesis to the calculative part (logistikon) (Aristotle, 2009, VI.2, 1143 b 14-6). As it is noted, logistikon is interpreted as «calculative» (Aristotle, 2009, VI.2, 1139 a 13-5); nevertheless, this interpretation misleads our understanding of the term by focusing on accounting and quantity while such semantic aspect is not dominant in this Greek word. Conversely, it is related to logic and logos (logistikon). Sure enough, logistikos (the man who have logistikos) in its different uses in the ancient Greek texts is expressed as following: Skilled or practiced in calculating (Plato), endued with reason, rational (Aristotle), using one’s reason, reasonable. But, one should keep in mind that here Aristotle is opting for an understanding of orthos logos which is semantically connected to logistikon. By focusing on its translation as «calculative,» eventually one loses this connection.

Gadamer translates epistemonikon as auf Wissen beruhend (knowledge-based) and logistikon as auf Überlegung beruhend (thought-based) (Aristoteles, 1998, p. 27) by way of which he emphasizes on its deliberating aspect, without a reference to calculation. Thus, we may have a better understanding of logistikon: when the soul is thinking about a variable affair. In fact, the deliberative part of reason is contemplating, evaluating and calculating in order to consider a suitable action.

In the Arabic translation, Badawi renders logistikon to التقديري and proposes الجزء العلمي versus الجزء التقديري (Aristütalis, 1979, p. 209). The term at-taqdiri has multiple meanings like evaluative and discrentional. It stems from the root قدر qadr meaning ‘measure’, so تقدر taqdir also means «calculating» and «determining.» The root qadr does not only mean «quantity», but also «position and status,» and «the place and portion that God has defined for everything.» (Quran 65, p. 3) In the light of Badawi’s translation, the latter meaning may be reformulated as: this contemplation is in fact for finding out the portion that deserves the matter in question.

It is also worth mentioning that the term taqdir, like logos, has two meanings: it refers to humans as well as God, just as logos refers to the human mind as well as to the divine word. Therefore, it is possible to say

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9 https://logeion.uchicago.edu/λογιστικός (accessed December 19, 2019).
that taqdiri is a more suitable choice than «calculative» as the equivalent for logistikon, while one must keep in mind that translation of logistikon to taqdiri and logos to qā'idah loses the all-important correlation between logos and logistikon for the simple reason that the two Arabic terms do not share the same origin.

4. Kalos Bouleostai (καλῶς βουλέυσασθαί): Phronesis as well Deliberation

After alluding to the difference between techne, episteme, Phronesis, Sophia and nous (Aristotle, 2009, VI.2, 1139 b 17-8.), which are all related to logos, Aristotle distinguishes Phronesis as a reasoned and true state of capacity to act and the virtue of soul’s rational part in praxis (Aristotle, 2009, VI.5, 1140 b 20-1). He begins the main discussion on Phronesis by considering who the persons are credited with it, and with the examination of the traits of phronimos:

Now it is thought to be a mark of a man of practical wisdom [phronimos/φρονίμους] to be able to deliberate well11 [kalos bouleostai/καλῶς βουλέυσασθαί] about what is good12 [agatha/ἀγαθὰ] and expedient13 [sympheroneta/συμφέροντα] for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life14 in general. (Aristotle, 2009, VI.5, 1140 a 25-7)

To effectuate the discussion, he concentrates on explaining its key concepts which are «deliberating» (Bouleostai/βουλέυσασθαί) and «good» (Agatha/ἀγαθὰ). A quick inspection of the translations reveals that the translators’ understanding of Phronesis depended critically on grasping the meaning of these key concepts.

Bouleostai (βουλέυσασθαί), often translated as deliberating, is a kind of wisdom different from other types of thinking (Aristotle, 2009, VI.8, 1142 a 1) and specific to calculating part of soul. Earlier in the Book VI, Aristotle mentions Bouleostai in order to explain soul’s calculating state (logistai/λογίζοσθαί):

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10 «Practical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods.»
11 ar-rāwīya-t-us-saḥihah (trans. by Badawi)
12 ḥayr (trans. by Badawi)
13 nāfī‘ (trans. by Badawi)
14 al-ḥayāt as-sa‘īdah (trans. by Badawi)
To deliberate (βουλεύσασθαι) and to calculate (λογίζεσθαι) are the same thing. But no one deliberates about the invariable. (Aristotle, 2009, VI.2, 1139 a 14-15)

Regarding the calculating part of the soul, Bouleostai focuses on decision and action during which a human «searches» for something (Aristotle, 2009, VI.9, 1142 b 2, 16); but it is not just seeking because he also sifts and calculates (Aristotelis, 2009, p. 223). He searches for the best possible action in a particular condition. In fact, he deliberates about possible actions in relation to desires and objectives as well as conditions and situations. Bouleostai could be a self-consultation that flourishes in the domain of things that lead to Agatha and eurpaxia: «About things which have an end which is a good that can be brought about by action (πρακτὸν ἁγαθὸν).» (Aristotle, 2009, VI.8, 1141 b 12-3)

Bouleostai stems from the Greek word βουλά, which means «course of action or a plan», and in its plural form is defined as «counsels, deliberations, designs;» it also means determination and will, especially when it is used to refer to gods. From this root, the word bouleosis has been coined in NE (Aristotle, 2009, III.2, 1111 b 26-7) which means «wish» and engages with rational desire. In its Greek context, the verb bouleostai /βουλεύσασθαι has been used in various ancient texts, meaning «take counsel, deliberate, determine or resolve after deliberation (in past tenses), take counsel with oneself.» In bouleostai, the emphasis is on choices and decisions. It is only about possible things, and does not apply to necessities as these are not calculated and cannot be «decided.»

Libra is considered as the root of the verb «to deliberate,» meaning «scale.» hence, in English, the verb connotes an «evaluative contemplation.» Gadamer translated bouleostai as Sich beraten (consulting with oneself) (Aristoteles, 1998, p. 27) and Überlegen (contemplation) (Aristoteles, 1998, p. 34). It appears that these two definitions are the same for Aristotle, while Beraten in German means «consulting», and Sich-beraten means «consulting with oneself.» In fact, Überlegen (contemplation) is nothing but a self-referential form of counseling.

In the Arabic translation of Book III of NE, Ishāq Ibn Ḥunain translated bouleostai/βουλεύσασθαι in its infinitive form as رويه and راوي (Aristotelis, 1979, p. 114). These two terms both stem from a common root. Badawi too in his translation of Book VI used the same terms.

15 «wa man yurawwī … yahbhuṭu wa yahsabu.» (Aristotelis, 2009, p. 223.)
16 This will be discussed shortly in the following pages.
17 https://logeion.uchicago.edu/βουλεύω (accessed December 19, 2019)
18 https://logeion.uchicago.edu/βουλεύω (accessed December 19, 2019)
Rawīyyah in Arabic means «contemplation, careful consideration of actions», and it appears that it is the proper rendering of bouleostai. The root word of ar-rawīyyah means «to be saturated» or «to strengthen (like in joints and muscles),» or «to tighten up (a knot).» The semantic element of «being saturated» precisely highlights the relation between tarawwī (Bouleostai) and «desire.» However, the verb tarawwī does not in itself embody any part of the meaning «determining and deciding»; rather, the emphasis is on the activity of reason when the mind is contemplating and is gradually coming to maintain strength and consistency; the process continues until the stream of thought begins to be formed and saturated with regard to a particular issue, and eventually determines the form of an action. As it can be seen, this image is slightly different from the image of evaluation or calculation in «deliberation.» In the Arabic translation, the word does not mean «consultation and counselling,» while in the Greek and German terms «consultation» is semantically emphasized.

5. AGATHA (ἀγαθὰ): PHRONESIS AS GOODNESS

Bouleostai is oriented «toward» something. That is, when one deliberates, his deliberation is «for» something. The question is, «toward» what this deliberation is inclined, and «for» what it has been formed? It is possible that, for instance, someone has been contemplating and evaluating conditions so that he could become rich in a short time. This is not a proper example of good bouleostai. Aristotle calls these individuals «clever» or smart (Aristotle, 2009, VI.13, 1144 a 12-3) rather than phronimos. Hence, we learn that the duty of phronimos lies in «eu-boulestaí», namely, one should deliberate «well», and his deliberation should be directed towards «good/agatha»; it is attainable for man, that is, good in its practical sense. To this end, Aristotle notes:

The man who is without qualification good at deliberating (εὔβουλος) is the man who is capable of aiming in accordance with calculation21 (λογισμόν) at the best for man of things attainable by action. (Aristotle, 2009, VI.8, 1141 b 13-5)

19 https://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/ar-ar/الرواية / (accessed December 19, 2019).
20 Muntaha-l-arab fi lugāt al- ārab https://archive.org/details/MuntahalArabRubEDuvumFarsi/page/n219 (accessed December 19, 2019).
21 In Ross’s text it is translated as «calculation». Yet, as mentioned, the word «calculation» is not a proper translation for Logismon. In this case, the Arabic translator has made a mistake and translated logismon into burhan (Aristūṭīlis, 1979, p.218).
He cautions that there could be much evil if *logistików* and calculation weren’t set to good /*Agatha* (Aristotle, 2009, VI.9, 1142 b 20).

Man deliberates to practice in a particular moment and situation; hence, deliberation becomes a matter of good and appropriate choice. According to Aristotle, the meaning of ‘*agatha*’ in relation to *Phronesis* is not only good in its general sense but also in its practical and concrete sense; a form of good that is related to the realm of possibility and can be realized in a concrete situation. This good involves a particular condition, and, at the same time, it points to human happiness or good life (*eupraxía*). In this respect, *phronimos* must be able to recognize the practical form of *agatha*, and this is why Aristotle regards *phronesis* as a special kind of knowledge which can understand practical and particular good/*agatha* among a plethora of possibilities in a situation. (Aristotle, 2009, VI.8, 1142 a 1-3)

*Phronesis* is not a knowledge that can be achieved through intuition or education; rather it can be achieved by life experience. This is why a young person can never be a *phronimos*, as he lacks this experience (Aristotle, 2009, VI.8, 1142 a 15-6). *Phronimos* has repeatedly been in the position of making decisions and practising, and each time has faced different situations and tried to make the best decision and act accordingly. In this way, a kind of *hexis* is achieved, so that he can handle new situations. This knowledge highly depends on individuals, but it is not purely a personal good /*agatha*.

*Phronimos* has repeatedly been in the position of making decisions and practising, and each time has faced different situations and tried to make the best decision and act accordingly. In this way, a kind of *hexis* is achieved, so that he can handle new situations. This knowledge highly depends on individuals, but it is not purely a personal good /*agatha*. *Phronimos* can see what is good for men in general too (Aristotle, 2009, VI.5, 1140 b 8-10); and who can do that «is good in managing households or states.» (Aristotle, 2009, VI.5, 1141 b 9-10)

Good/*agatha* is the *skopos* of moral practice, namely, what we look at. And it shows us the way to find the intermediate. Yet, at the same time, recognition of this goal is not possible for all; Aristotle insists that «good» does not come to light except in the eyes of a good man, because the evil infects the soul and he cannot recognize the *skopos* and is not able to practice well (Aristotle, 2009, VI.13, 1144 a 34-5). In other words, a man can’t be *phronimos* without being good (Aristotle, 2009, VI.13, 1144 a 35-7). In fact, although «*phronesis*, though it is an intellectual virtue, cannot develop independently of the moral virtues.» (Brown, 2009, p. XVI.) Thus, once we understand the importance of good/*agatha* in *phronesis*, it becomes even clearer that translating *phronesis* as «*acumen*», «*subtlety*» or *fitna* (*in Arabic*) is not very appropriate, for it leaves out an important aspect of the concept. Subtlety, sharpness, or intelligence are features in men that refer to a faculty that can be applied in the direction of good or evil, while the

22 Like a thief who has calculated all conditions so that he could have a proper chance to steal.
concept of phronesis (in Greek) includes good, and in Aristotle’s perception, an acuteness that doesn’t lead to good can’t accompany phronesis.

Agatha, which is usually translated as «good» in English, and as «gut und gerecht» in German, is translated as خير hayr in Arabic. The Arabic hayr, at the same time, means ‘good’, ‘better’ and ‘the best’ depending on the context. Its root meaning is ‘what is chosen and selected’. The word اختيار ihtiyar, which means choice and in the present text is used as the equivalent of proairesis, is a derivative of the root.

6. SYMPHERONTA (συμφέροντα): THE ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE PROPER

In phrasing the definition of phronimos, Aristotle uses the word sympheronta/συμφέροντα to describe «well deliberation,» which semantically implies that here good is not considered in its pure sense; rather, it depends on a particular situation. A correct perception of sympheronta is therefore necessary for our understanding of phronesis. The definition of this Greek term is «to bring together» and «to gather, collect, contribute,» as well as «to be in harmony with, adapt oneself to, agree with, agree together.»

Accordingly, «appropriate» and «expedient» appear to be the proper equivalents for «sympheroneta». In English translations, the term has appeared as «beneficial» or «advantageous,» while in Arabic it is rendered as فائّض nāfiʿ (profitable) (Aristotelis, 1979, p. 213). Gadamer has translated the term to gut und nützlich (good and expedient) (Aristoteles, 1998, p. 33). In each case of these renderings, an important aspect is missing. In other words, they have altered the meaning of phronesis so much so that what actually means «the ability to understand the proper» has been translated as «beneficial choice.» In our contemporary understanding of the respective languages, the words «expedient», nützlich or ‘nāfiʿ convey a sense of practice or use, while sympheronta in the classical Greek had a wider definition. Phronimos is someone who can understand the relation between matters, such as the relation between praxis in each particular situation with agatha in general.

7. PHRONETIC KNOWLEDGE: UNDERSTANDING THE PARTICULAR

Aristotle insists that praxis is concerned with particulars (Aristotle, 2009, VI.5, 1141 b 17) and concrete situations: «doing is always doing some

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23 https://logeion.uchicago.edu/συμφέρω (accessed December 19, 2019)
24 The distinction between what should and should not be done includes the distinction between the proper and the improper. (Gadamer, 2004, p. 20.)
particular action. Reasoning which remains at the level of universals cannot result in action» (Brown, 2009, p. 239). According to him, the main problem in the realm of human actions is that here we are not dealing with the realm of necessity and there is no regular natural rule that exactly specifies how human beings must act. One can’t always act well only by his general knowledge. To act, it is important and necessary to recognize what works in this particular situation. Choosing the right action depends always on the acting person.

…Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only. It must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice (πρᾶξις) is concerned with particulars. (Aristotle, 2009, VI.5, 1141 b 15-17)

In this respect, phronesis at once is both universal and particular knowledge; although the particular one has the higher priority (Aristotle, 2009, VI.8, 1141 b 22-4). Phronimos is the intermediary between the universal and the particular. In deliberation, in fact, he is oscillating between the universal and the particular. Meanwhile, this oscillation determines the domain of particular and extends the meaning of the universal. This is what Gadamer intends to describe as «application» (Gadamer, 2004, p. 313) by considering the universal rule, the agent understands the particular situation and reflects on the action in this situation, then takes the appropriate action. Recognition of the occasion (sympheronta) of the situation with the universal and «good» is what the soul demonstrates during good deliberation.

8. ORTHODES (ὁρθότης): PHRONESIS AND THE CONSISTENCY OF DELIBERATION

Aristotle uses orthos as a special trait to elucidate the meaning of «good deliberation» (eubolia). He accurately shows that goodness in «eubouleistai» actually means the existence of orthodes (Aristotles, 2009, VI.9, 1142 b 16-7), namely, a kind of consistency and stability in deliberation. Hence, in addition to seeing and attaining the good, the goodness of deliberation is also the discovery of a practice that is appropriate to that skopos (good life in general).

There is more than one meaning for orthodes (Aristotles, 1979, p. 223), so Aristotle defines its proper meaning for good deliberation

25 «correctness» (English translation by Ross): Aristotles, 2009, p. 111.
26 «as-sawāb» (Arabic translation by Badawi): Aristotles, 1979, p. 223.

«ḥusn ar-rawīyah» in another place, it has been translated as «rāwīyat ǧayyidah.»
(euboulestaí): 27 «rightness (orthodes) in respect both of the end, the manner, and the time.» (Aristotles, 2009, VI.9, 1142 b 18-28)

If, then, it is characteristic of men of practical wisdom (φρονίμων) to have deliberated well, excellence in deliberation (εὑβουλία) will be correctness (orthodes/ὁρθότης) with regard to what conduces (sympherón/συμφέρον)28 to the end (τέλος) which practical wisdom apprehends truly. (Aristotles, 2009, VI.9, 1142 b 33-5)

At the beginning of Book VI, orthos as a trait was used for logos, and the main purpose of the book was to clarify the meaning of orthos logos. In his reading of logistikon and bouleostaí, Aristotle explains a specific kind of logos which relates to «practice.» bouleostaí is the specific kind of reasoning which could be described by orthodes. therefore, it is necessary to explain what the term orthodes is.

Orthodes/ὁρθότης in Greek means «erectness, upright posture, straightness and fixity, 29 and as its secondary definition it means «correctness and rightness». Orthos is also an adjective meaning «upright and standing.» It can also mean «straight» if it discusses the features of a line, namely, a line without digression or distortion, and in geometry, it means vertical or right angle;30 however, it also means an object that stands upright and straightforward.31 Although the term has secondary been used to refer to features such as correct, true and right. It seems that when this feature is used to describe a state of the soul, it may be interpreted as «being consistent.» This image is present in the Greek sense of the word, but if it is translated as truly and correctly, the specific meaning of orthos, which is specific to the deliberation (bouleostaí), would be lost. Gadamer translates it into Richtigkeit that means «correctness and rightness.» (Aristoteles, 1998, p. 47).

Ibn Ḥunain translates orthos/ὁρθὸς in all cases to صواب (accurate) and صحيح (correct); and orthos logos as التمييز الصحيح (Aristotle, II.2, 1103 b 33; Aristutális, 1979, p. 88), التمييز الصحيح (Aristotle, 2009, III.12, 1119 a 20; Aristutális, 1979, p. 138), القياس الصحيح (Aristotle, 2009, VI.3, 1147 a 21; Aristutális, 1979, pp. 241-2) and القياس الصحيح (Aristotle, 2009, VII.9, 1151 a 21-2; Aristutális, 1979, p. 256). This variation in

27 «rawliyyah ǧayyidah» Arabic trans by Badawi. (Aristutális, 1979, p. 223.)
28 Bringing together what is appropriate and expedient for attaining the end (what is good).
29 https://logeion.uchicago.edu/ὁρθότης (accessed December 19, 2019)
30 https://logeion.uchicago.edu/ὁρθὸς (accessed December 19, 2019)
31 Like when a horse stops on two legs, and turns its body upright.
http://logeion.uchicago.edu/ὁρθὸς (accessed December 19, 2019)
translation indicates that Ibn Ḥunain duly understood the multi-faceted meaning of *logos*. *aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ* (correct) means السليم *as-salīm* (healthy) which stems from صحّة *ṣihhat* (health). In the Persian translations, the term *orthos logos* is mostly rendered as *aql-e salīm* (correct reason-common sense) (Arastāālīs, 2002, p. 9). Both of these attributes, that is, *salīm* and *ṣaḥīḥ*, refer primarily to an image of the state of health and illness, and in the secondary meaning to the state of correctness and falsehood.

Badawī translated *orthos* in its adjective form as مستقامة *mustaqīmah* (straight). Yet, he took *orthodes* as صواب *ṣawāb*. The fact is, because of the root difference in these two words, the link between *orthodes* and *orthos*, which is notable in Greek, has been ignored. The Arabic *ṣawāb* in its noun form means «right,» the antonym for «wrong.» It comes from the root *sawb* which means «to ascend» and «the falling rain.»32 It also means 'to descend from a height'. The semantic connection between *ṣawāb* and the root *sawb* is provided by the straightness and smoothness of raindrops when they fall to the ground. Basically, the image of 'right' is different in the two words *mustaqīmah* (straight) and *ṣawāb* (right).

On the other hand, the conceptual metaphor of the word *ṣawāb* is completely the opposite of the word *orthodes*. *ṣawāb* is rightness and correctness in something that falls straight from the top, but *orthodes* means «correctness and straightness» in the sense that something becomes firm and stands firmly and becomes consistent. This difference in conceptual metaphor has also consequences and in turn, makes a difference in understanding. Consistency as a semantic component in *orthodes* comes from *phronimos*; however, in the case of *ṣawāb*, its rightness and correctness stem from conforming with a right thing coming from the outside.

9. PHRONESIS IS ORTHOS LOGOS

Aristotle sets out to answer two important questions: first, what is *orthos logos*? And second, what is the standard that fixes it? (Aristotle, 2009, VI, 1138 b 30; Brown, 2009, p. 236) Following a detailed discussion on *phronesis*, he refers to *orthos logos* at the end of Book VI. He implicitly says that in matters such as practice, *phronesis* is actually *orthos logos*:

… now correct reason (*orthos logos*) is that which is in accordance with practical wisdom (*phronesis*). All men, then, seem somehow to divine that this kind of state is virtue, namely, that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. But we must go a little further.

32 Muntaha-l-arab fi luġāt al- Arab https://archive.org/details/MuntahalArabRubEDuvumFarsi/page/n585, (accessed December 19, 2019).
For it is not merely the state in accordance with correct reason, but the state that implies the presence of correct reason, that is, virtue; and practical wisdom (phronesis) is correct reason (orthos logos) about such matters. (Aristotle, 2009, VI.13, 1144 a 20-25)

Aristotle saw orthodes or consistency in deliberation. Hence, orthos logos is a consistent intellect that evaluates well and deliberates regarding the good. orthos logos does not mean the universal rule or principle outside phronimos. Rather, it is his conscientious, consistent intellect, which guides to the good. Aristotle corrects this famous statement that «virtue must be in accordance with orthos logos by relying on the fact that a virtuous person must himself possess orthos logos, that is to say, be a phronimos (Brown, 2009, 243), rather than conforming with something outside of himself. Therefore, its Arabic translation as qā‘idah mustaqīmah is far from its original meaning, and perhaps rendering it to ‘āql-e sa‘īm (correct reason) (Arastātalīs, 2002, p. 9) or at-tamyīz as-ṣaḥīḥ (correct distinction) is more appropriated. Choosing ‘at-tamyīz (distinction) for logos in the term orthos logos, reveals that Ibn Ḥunain considered the meaning of the words in their combinations as well. Although logos per se usually does not translate to at-tamyīz (distinction); but its description with orthos, and its relationship with phronesis in this context lead Ibn Ḥunain to choose this appropriate equivalent. at-tamyīz also renders an active meaning for logos that are close to the meaning of deliberation and at-ta‘aqul, unlike the passive concept of qā‘idah.

We noted that Badawī translated logos as qā‘idah (rule) and orthos as ‘mustaqīmah’ (straight). The term qā‘idah, from the root quʿūd (sitting down), has also been used in the sense of «principle» and «the law,» as well as «to be set and put in place» like the base and foundation of a building. mustaqīmah, on the other hand, is from the root qāma (standing) and a cognate of qawām (to be firm). Mustaqīm is also occasionally used to convey the meaning of «true and correct.»

Apart from being the translation of orthos logos, the term qā‘idah mustaqīmah seems to warrant a different kind of attention as a compound word, which offers a somewhat static and passive dimension of the concept. Here, the strength and straightness come from the base or rule (namely qā‘idah) like the foundation of the building. While the combination of the attribute orthos with the noun logos shows that logos receives its consistency and strength not from somewhere outside itself, but from its inner uprightness and standing, its inner consistency and its tendency to approach skopos or the «good.» In fact, logos gradually rises and stands while reasoning by way of deliberation (tarawwī). It seems that in the discussion of orthos logos regarding practice, the translation of logos into the
term qāʿidah is not quite adequate, for there is a kind of uncertainty in this kind of reasoning that gradually acquires consistency and strength during bouleostai or deliberation. The art of medicine or navigation33 as examples that Aristotle uses in the Book II (Aristotle, 2009, II. 3, 1104 a 9) shows that this kind of reasoning does not necessarily depend on the resources on which it stands, but it relies on a kind of tactfulness, an ability of distinction and decision-making.

The relative inadequacy of rendering orthos logos to qāʿidah mustaqīmah seems to have a matter in itself. It takes us back to the point raised at the beginning of our discussion that one must carefully examine the neighbouring concepts as well as their interrelations in the source language, and try to translate that network of concepts into the target language. Failure to do so is in fact due to the lack of attention to the network and the interconnectivity between all the linguistic devices in the text that makes the emergence of original meaning possible. The impression one gains from the concept of orthos logos in the source language is completely different from the impression out of qāʿidah mustaqīmah in the target language. The understanding that emerges from the Greek network of concepts is that, in order to have moral life, one has to be trained and strengthen his practical reason. However, the meaning transmitted in Arabic is that the moral act derives its strength from compliance with the rules and laws; therefore, in this kind of ethics, the primary effort is to extract or to establish general rules.

CONCLUSION

The present study was intended to critically examine how the term phronesis is transmitted into Arabic in the revised version of the first known translation of the NE, relying on the interpretation of English and German commentators of Aristotle. Due to the complexity and multifaceted nature of this concept, it is more than difficult to find a single term in other languages to convey the full meaning. Aristotle creates a complex network of correlated concepts to explain phronesis. The reader/translator in his/her turn is required to form a proper understanding of this network and clarify its semantic field. One must carefully examine the neighbouring concepts as well as their interrelations in the source language, and try to translate that network of concepts into the target language.

Based on these considerations the results of this study may be summed up as follows: First, a comparative review of the Arabic translation

33 «two branches of skill or expertise that offer a neat parallel for moral virtue, since each is an expertise, not a matter of chance, but to be an expert does not consist in knowing and being able to apply a set of rules.» (Brown, 2009, p. 212)
of Book VI with the rest of the ancient translated text reveals that in his translation of the terms, ‘Abd ar-Rahmān Badawī does not adhere to the framework of interpretation applied by Ishāq Ibn Hunain. Therefore, it cannot be said that his translation properly aligns with Ibn Hunain’s, forming an integrated, harmonious text. One reason for this lack of conformation may be the historical difference brought about by the change and modification in the meaning of some of the terms. One of the most pivotal examples of this difference lies in the interpretation of phronesis. It seems that in the classical Arabic language ta‘qul was semantically very close, if not exact, a term for phronesis; however, it has, over time, undergone so many conceptual changes that Badawī seems to be uneasy in selecting ‘aql and ta‘qul as a proper rendering for phronesis, so he consequently translates it to fitna.

In some cases, the contextual importance of the etymological connection between Greek words is somehow overlooked. For example, the close semantic proximity of logistikōn and logos is completely lost in their translation into taqdiri and qā’idah respectively. One of the most practical ways to overcome this hurdle may be that in translating certain key terms one would also cite the original word or phrase next to its rendering so that the reader does not lose sight of the conceptual coherence of the text and would be able to retrieve what is lost in the translation by way of noticing the etymological connection of the terms.

A comparative reading of the translation of Book VI of NE along with the original Greek text shows that Badawī translates the Greek terms with relative faithfulness, although he occasionally fails to establish a correlation between the concepts. This serves as a good example to confirm the hypothesis that it is not enough to translate the meaning of the words and independent terms correctly. Rather, one should also consider the relationship between the terms, the network of concepts, the metaphor and the impressions through which these terms become meaningful.

ABBREVIATIONS

- (NE): The Nicomachean Ethics
- (NE. Eng): Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Transl. by David Ross. Revised with an introduction and notes by Lesley Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

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