Bias Through Metaphors in Selected Works of El-Messiri and Fukuyama: A Cognitive Linguistic Analysis

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Abstract
This paper detects and analyzes bias from a cognitive linguistic perspective, in selected works of Abdulwahab El-Messiri and Francis Fukuyama. The analysis focuses on the prominent conceptual metaphors which are available to construe bias and how patterns of this construal might foreground the ideologically oriented discourses. A contrastive analysis is undertaken of El-Messiri’s and Fukuyama’s selected works under investigation. Drawing on the cognitive linguistic framework of conceptual metaphor, this paper provides an examination of how cases of epistemological and ideological bias are represented and interpreted in the English and Arabic philosophical and political discourses selected for study.

Key Words: bias, cognitive linguistics, conceptual metaphor
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1. Introduction

This paper provides an innovative conception of bias in terms of its definition and methodology. In this paper, bias is defined as “the linguistic consideration of the complex mental attitude or state involving beliefs, values and dispositions to act in certain ways as a function of one’s own socio-political and/or ideological category, and individual or group history and interests.” Bias names a condition to which we all (east, west, north and south) are subject. It identifies something central to our common humanity. Bias, in this sense, is an inescapable fact about human finitude. In the present paper, bias is dealt with as a vision of the world as it identifies the most basic tendencies informing our judgments. It is a mental abstract picture, an imaginary construct, and a symbolic representation of reality that results from a process of deconstruction and reconstruction. Bias always includes certain assumptions about and images of human beings— their claims, assumptions, needs and potentials, their relationship to other humans, nature and history, and so on.

Humans using language seem to feel a strong pressure to justify their actions or proposals for action in terms of oppositions between right and wrong. At the heart of the study of ‘bias’ is to study the attempt to get others to ‘share a common view’ about what is useful—
harmful, good–evil, just–unjust. Language is the only means for doing this. It is the primary means by which one shares his beliefs about beliefs about people, places, things, and so on (e.g., Hamilton, Gibbons, Stroessner & Sherman, 1992; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri & Semin, 1989). In using language to share beliefs, one can intentionally (e.g., Douglas & Sutton, 2003; Wenneker, Wigboldus & Spears, 2005) or unintentionally (e.g., Franco & Maass, 1999; Ruscher, 2001) influence others’ beliefs. Our linguistic choices may also implicitly convey much about our own attitudes towards the people we describe (Douglas & Sutton, 2006). Often however, one may not wish to communicate our attitudes, either because they conflict with our values (e.g., Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel & Schaal, 1999) or because there is a social price to pay for their expression (Douglas & Sutton, 2006).

While the humanities have explored biases through philosophical questions about epistemology and science, there has also been significant study within the social science community of those biases and how individuals come to perceive them. Numerous social psychology studies have discovered that there are a number of biases that impact the way in which individuals make judgments. Pronin, Lin and Ross (2002) argued that people “see events through the distorting prism of their political ideology, their particular individual or group history and interests, and their desire to see themselves in a positive light” (p. 369).

Furthermore, Pronin, Lin and Ross found that although individuals can often spot such biases in others, they have difficulty recognizing those same biases within themselves. Robinson, Keltner, Ward and Ross (1995) argued that the inability to recognize personal biases stems from “naïve realism,” the concept which holds that
people assume that their own beliefs and values are universal and that any person who seeks truth in an open-minded manner will come to the same sets of beliefs and values. Armor (1999) came to the same conclusion, finding that people rate themselves more objective than others. Therefore, in many ways, biases exist because of our inabilities to recognize them and as a result, rectify them.

2. **Aim of the study**
   This paper examines the use of language in some selected works of Abdul-Wahab El-Messiri and Francis Fukuyama to gauge the possibility as well as the perception of bias. Bias is difficult to identify, great care should be taken to detect and analyze such a linguistic tendency. This paper draws on the cognitive linguistic approach of Conceptual Metaphor.

   In the view of cognitive linguistics, metaphor is referred to as a mental structure which is established in the human brain by conflating experiences such as bodily, social, cultural etc. In this paper, the analysis of conceptual metaphor in a discourse goes hand in hand with the analysis of bias which characterizes the nature of El-Messiri and Fukuyama’s language in the selected works under investigation. To accomplish this, the following research objectives have been raised:

1. To identify conceptual metaphors in Arabic and English discourse by analysing their representative source domains in terms of metaphorical linguistic expressions.
2. To determine cross-cultural similarities and differences of metaphor use in Arabic and English.
3. To describe the metaphorical expressions profiling bias in the selected works under investigation.

4. To identify which metaphors represent biased language in the language of El-Messiri and Fukuyama.

3. Theoretical Background

Cognitive linguistics is taken here to refer to the approach to the study of language that began to emerge in the 1970s and has been increasingly active since the 1980s (now endowed with an international society with biennial conferences and a journal, Cognitive Linguistics). A quarter century later, a vast amount of research has been generated under the name of cognitive linguistics. Most of the research has focused on semantics, but a significant proportion also is devoted to syntax and morphology, and there has been cognitive linguistic research into other areas of linguistics such as language acquisition, phonology and historical linguistics.

According to Croft and Cruse (2004), there are three major hypotheses as guiding the cognitive linguistic approach to language:

- language is not an autonomous cognitive faculty.
- grammar is conceptualization.
- knowledge of language emerges from language use. (p. 1)

These three hypotheses represent a response by the pioneering figures in cognitive linguistics to the dominant approaches to syntax and semantics at the time, namely generative grammar and truth-conditional
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(logical) semantics. The first principle is opposed to generative grammar’s well-known hypothesis that language is an autonomous (indeed, innate) cognitive faculty or module, separated from nonlinguistic cognitive abilities. The second principle is opposed to truth-conditional semantics, in which a semantic metalanguage is evaluated in terms of truth and falsity relative to the world (or, more precisely, a model of the world). The third principle is opposed to reductionist tendencies in both generative grammar and truth-conditional semantics, in which maximally abstract and general representations of grammatical form and meaning are sought and many grammatical and semantic phenomena are assigned to the ‘periphery’.

A cognitive approach to linguistics highlights the role of experience and perceptions as sources of knowledge, and refuses the notion of linguistics as an autonomous faculty. In addition, it applies no clear boundaries among syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and morphology. Those systems work together to construe meaning. Linguistic categories, thus, are instruments for conceptualizing and interacting with the world. Another characteristic of the cognitive approach is its concern with constructions as the fundamental unit of syntactic description. Among others, there are cognitive accounts of the there construction and the preposition over (Lakoff 1990), possessive constructions (Taylor 1989; Langacker 1991), nouns, verbs, and the passive in English (Langacker 1991).

All these accounts explain grammatical constructions as overt manifestations of experiential gestalts in the light of pragmatics, semantics, syntax, and morphology. Finally, the cognitive approach sees
language phenomena as products of various cognitive mechanisms. Among them, Idealized Cognitive Models (ICM’s) (Lakoff, 1978), image schemas, mental spaces, radial categories, and metaphor mapping.

The traditional view of metaphor is demonstrably, empirically false. Most people, and perhaps most especially literary scholars, tend to think of metaphor as a primarily linguistic phenomenon, a peripheral, exotic, deviant, poetic use of language. But metaphor is primarily a matter of thought. It is a pervasive feature of the human conceptual system that is expressed linguistically, as well as in other modes, such as vision and gesture, and that structures our knowledge of every domain of human social and mental life, from economics and politics to philosophy and mathematics to art and emotion. It is essential for drawing the kinds of inferences that knowledge in such abstract domains consists of, and for rational thought in general (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s book *Metaphors we Live by*, first published in 1980, is generally credited with establishing a new approach to the study of metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson’s starting point is that metaphor is an ‘ordinary’ part of language, not ‘extraordinary’. They state that: "We have found [...] that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action", and that: "Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p. 3). Although many of the examples stated involve language, it is central to their argument that metaphor is a kind of thinking or conceptualization, not limited to language; however, language provides a convenient way to observe how
metaphor works. But on many occasions, they believe, we are normally unaware of the metaphoricity of our conceptual systems.

In their 1999 collaboration *Philosophy in the Flesh*, Lakoff and Johnson provide a succinct argument dismantling the basic tenets of the traditional view of metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson argue that, first, if the metaphor was a mere matter of language, the demonstrable systematic correspondences that are evident between various linguistic expressions of a given conceptual metaphor would not exist. Expressions such as *This relationship is at a dead end, We’re going in different directions, Our relationship is at a crossroads, We’ve come a long way together,* *This relationship is holding me back,* or *We’ve had a few bumps in the road but we’ve made it this far all right* all represent instances of the same conceptual metaphor by which a relationship (the target domain) is understood and reasoned about in terms of a metaphorical journey (the source domain). The metaphor may be expressed as A RELATIONSHIP IS A JOURNEY. If metaphor was purely a linguistic phenomenon, these expressions and dozens of others like them would be totally unrelated. But metaphor is a conceptual phenomenon, a fundamental and pervasive instrument of the human mind, and metaphorical linguistic expressions reflect that circumstance. “Metaphorical thought,” “in the form of cross-domain mappings is primary; metaphorical language is secondary” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 123).

Second, if metaphor was a peripheral, exotic use of language characteristic of poetry and rhetoric, as the traditional view holds, then ordinary everyday language would not be full of metaphorical expressions like the
examples adduced above. Expressions like *We’ve come a long way together* or *This relationship is holding me back* are not unprecedented rhetorical flourishes of the kind supposedly confined to poetry. They are instead utterly conventional, everyday ways of talking about relationships. Indeed, relationships are a good example of something that is very hard to talk about without using metaphor- as is the case with most abstract domains. Furthermore, such expressions represent linguistic examples of one of the most common, ordinary ways we think about relationships, which is in terms of journeys. Everyday language abounds with similar such metaphoric expressions, and that is because conceptual metaphor, which such expressions reflect, is a pervasive feature of all human thought, both quotidian and profound.

Third, metaphor is not a deviant, improper, or untrue use of language. The examples of everyday metaphorical expressions cited above provide evidence to the contrary. The false assumption that metaphor is untrue, or an improper use of language, is based on the mistaken idea that language is primarily literal. This view is grounded in an objectivist philosophical tradition that understands language chiefly as a means of referring literally and truthfully to an already existing reality, which language supposedly accurately and objectively reflects. In such a tradition this purportedly literal relationship between words and the world is simply assumed a priori, and the question of how this relationship is established simply ignored. The issue relates to categories, as discussed above, with the objectivist view assuming that our categories just somehow correspond to the world as it supposedly objectively exists, or would exist even without the mediation of a human nervous system. But empirical
research has demonstrated that our categories depend ineradicably on the kinds of bodies and brains we have. We cannot know the world except through a human nervous system in a human body, of which metaphor is an essential feature. Metaphors, consequently, are not untrue expressions. We cannot know the world from a God’s-eye view, which would represent a total, absolute truth (Lakoff, 1987). But we can know the world from a human perspective, which means understanding it primarily through metaphor. Each metaphor expresses a partial truth about our experience, which is the only kind of realistic human truth we have. But because we typically have a number of different conceptual metaphors to understand a given abstract concept, we can have multiple partial perspectives which allow a realistic, human objectivism.

Fourth, the notion is wrong that common everyday linguistic expressions of conceptual metaphors such as the examples cited above are “dead metaphors.” This assumption is based on the mistaken views already discussed that metaphor is a linguistic phenomenon rather than a conceptual one, and that most language is literal. To be sure, there are cases of dead metaphors in language, but these are exceedingly rare. An example Lakoff and Johnson (1999) provide is the English word *pedigree*, which derives from the French *ped de gris* (“foot of a grouse”). The original French expression was a metaphor whereby the image of a grouse’s foot was mapped onto a family tree diagram, a conceptual mapping made possible by the shared image schematic structure of the two concepts. Today, however, we no longer think of family lineages in terms of a grouse’s foot, even though we still use the word *pedigree*. This
expression represents an example of a truly dead metaphor.

Notably, the concept family tree expresses a metaphor that is still very much alive in our conceptual systems, namely, SOCIAL GROUPS ARE PLANTS. We might inquire about someone’s ethnic heritage by asking, What are your roots? We can refer to producing offspring as being fruitful, and we can likewise comment on the similarities in personality between parents and their children by invoking the proverb The fruit never falls far from the tree. We might express differences within an extended family by saying something like Their branch of the clan produced doctors and lawyers, but theirs produced delinquents. The same source domain of plants is conventionally used to think about social groups more complex than families, such as institutions, as when we refer to the local branch of a bank, for instance. And it is precisely because the metaphor expressed in the concept family tree is still a living part of our conceptual systems that it can produce novel, creative expressions. One might say something unprecedented like That branch of the family withered up and died when the only son perished in a tragic boating accident before he could father children, and one would be effortlessly understood because the term family tree is not a dead linguistic metaphor but rather the expression of a conceptual metaphor that is alive and active in our conceptual systems (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).

One final feature of conceptual metaphor needs to be mentioned for the purposes of the argument advanced in this study. Like other conceptual structure, metaphors can also be classified along a scale of specificity. Lakoff and Turner (1989) emphasize this aspect of conceptual metaphor in More Than Cool Reason. Some conceptual
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metaphors are generic-level structures, such as EVENTS ARE ACTIONS. This metaphor provides the basis for the common, everyday mental process of personification. When we say something like *The noise gave me a headache*, we conceptualize the auditory experience of noise as an agent, the physiological change of state we experience as an object that we receive, and the causation of that change as the action of giving us an object. An example Lakoff and Turner discuss at length is the event of death, which we might conceptualize, for example, as an agent that takes someone from us, as a thief that steals time from us, as a pursuer chasing us, as an adversary we have to confront, as a devourer that eats us up, or as a reaper that cuts us down. Each of these conceptualizations of the event of death entails more specific conceptual metaphors, but all are governed by the generic metaphor EVENTS ARE ACTIONS. Precisely because this metaphor is generic, it is used in thinking about a wide range of phenomena, from natural forces to everyday events to abstract concepts.

The ideological function of *metaphor* as a framing device to detect and analyze bias is now well-recognized (Lakoff, 2003 and Chilton, 1996). Metaphorisation involves comparing experience, via a mapping, in two distinct domains (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; 1999). Typically, a more abstract social domain (the target domain) is compared to a more familiar domain of experience (the source domain) encoded in image schemas and/or cognitive frames in order to provide structure and facilitate reasoning procedures within the target. Ideology comes in to play as the choice of source domain mediates and shapes our understanding of the target situation making way for certain ‘logical’
deductions as *entailments* of the metaphor. Metaphor permeates ‘everyday’ discourse and the same or similar metaphors may be as much a feature of natural language, where they are relatively innocuous, as they are of institutionalized discourses, where they may or may not take on particular ideological qualities. From a critical perspective, the metaphors we should be primarily concerned with in this study are those which are specific to the discourse in question, which represent context-specific variants of metaphors that naturally make up the conceptual system.

4. Data

The present paper is based on data collected from selected works of *Abdul-Wahab El-Messiri* and *Francis Fukuyama*. In this paper, data is collected from Fukuyama’s book *The End of History and the Last Man*—a book published in (1992), written in the English language. The study also depends on data collected from El-Messiri’s following books written in Arabic language: *dirāsāt maʕ rifyya fī: al-ħada:ṭa al-ghārbiyyah* (2006) (Epistemological Studies in Western Modernity) and *riḥelati: al-fikriyya: fī: al-buḍu:r wa al-juḍu:r wa al-θamar: si:rah ghāyr ādiyya ghāyr māwḍ urs iyya* (2006) (My Intellectual Journey: In Seeds, Roots, and Fruits— A Non-Subjective, Non-Objective Autobiography).

5. Discussion and Analysis

This section identifies and analyzes the most prominent conceptual metaphors in both Fukuyama and El-Messiri’s selected works for study to show how their biases are framed through these conceptual elements.
5.1 Framing bias through Fukuyama’s metaphors

In this sub-section, the paper applies the cognitive linguistic model of conceptual metaphors to investigate and analyze Fukuyama’s bias in his most famous book *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992). In this book, Fukuyama makes the provocative assertion that the evolutionary process of human ideologies and institutions has come to a conceivable end with the universal triumph of economic and political liberalism. Fukuyama points out that the end of the Cold War has proven the limitations of liberalism’s alternatives, such as monarchy, fascism, and finally communism, all of which he claims stumbled over their internal contradictions.

Fukuyama divided his book into three parts, in Part I, Fukuyama presents a narrative of post-World War II trends leading to the end of the Cold War and the global spread of liberal, democratic, and capitalist principles. Part II develops a global narrative of modern natural science, modern military competition, and modern economic development, leading to the Cold War victory of capitalism over communism. In Part III, Fukuyama articulates a narrative of human history as a whole- from the state of nature to the end of the Cold War- leading to liberal democracy and capitalism as the politico-economic telos of human social evolution.

Fukuyama argues that history has reached an end not with a bang but with a collective sigh of exhaustion. Humanity has worn itself out pursuing alternative social orders reputed to be better than liberal democracy, but in the end all have revealed themselves beset with “Internal contradictions” that Western liberalism is itself blessedly free of (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 46). Thus, history is finished not because events themselves cannot continue but
because Western ideals have triumphed by default and now offer a “completely satisfying" mode of social existence: liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is the ultimate form of society because it satisfies the needs of human nature in the most complete way (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 139).

5.1.1 POLITICS IS WAR

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) point out that many social activities are structured through the structural conceptual metaphor of WAR, such as elections, education, argumentation etc. This metaphor is based on the cross-mapping of two conceptual domains—the source domain of war is mapped onto the target domain of social activities. In other words, various social activities are perceived through the concept of physical fighting or war. The basic implication of the WAR metaphor is that politics is associated with confrontational and uncivilized means of solving political problems. Moreover, politicians, countries and even ideologies are categorized into good and evil, and they have moral rights to fight and manipulate each others by using coercive means.

The analysis of Fukuyama’s language shows that the WAR structural conceptual metaphor is represented by different conceptual elements. The WAR metaphor in Fukuyama’s book consists of such conceptual elements as POLITICS IS A BATTLEGROUND and POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES ARE RIVALS. To begin with, Fukuyama mainly conceives political ideologies in terms of nations and governments, and hence, Liberal Democracy corresponds to the USA, France and other Western States, whereas Communism, for example, corresponds to the Soviet Union, China and other Eastern States. The
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following examples in (1)- (4) entail that Fukuyama perceives the debate between different ideologies as a struggle, battle or war that has a winner and a loser.

(1) The legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world over the past few years, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most recently communism (Fukuyama, 1992, p. xi).

(2) Free democratic governments would continue to spread to more and more countries around the world. The "Spirit of 1776," or the ideals of the French Revolution, would vanquish the world's tyrants, autocrats, and superstitious priests (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 5).

(3) And while the conflict between communism and democracy could be moderated, it and the possibility of apocalyptic war could never be overcome completely (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 8).

(4) Opposition to liberal democracy in Latin America on a theoretical level has never been strong, except for brief challenges from fascism and communism, and yet liberal democrats have faced an uphill battle winning and keeping power (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 212).

The examples in (1)- (4) frames the structural conceptual elements of POLITICS IS A
BATTLEGROUND, POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES ARE RIVALS, RIVAL IDEOLOGIES ARE ENEMIES, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IS AN INVADER and LIBERAL DEMOCRATS ARE FIGHTERS. By activating the FORCE schema construed in the words ‘conquered’, ‘vanquish’ ‘conflict’, ‘war’ and ‘battle’, Fukuyama wants to make the point that liberal democracy gained mastery over the other ideologies after the Cold War. The use of verbs like ‘conquer’, ‘vanquish’, ‘emerge’, ‘spread’ and ‘battle’ portrays the civilizational transformation that happened in some places of the world after the Cold War as a battle. Moreover, liberal democrats are presented as fighters who will fight all their rivals (enemies) and defeat all of them and that liberal democracy as the winner of that battle replaced its rival ideologies (or enemies). For Fukuyama, the world at this point arrived at the last stage of its ideological evolution which is Liberal Democracy. The construal of the conceptual metaphors above is that Fukuyama believes that the Western institutions and values—democracy, individual rights, the rule of law and prosperity based on economic freedom—represent universal aspirations that will ultimately be shared by people all over the world.

In addition, the WAR conceptual metaphor frames Fukuyama’s bias through structural conceptual elements, such as, POLITICS IS A CONFLICT, DEMOCRACY RIVALS ARE ENEMIES and COMMUNISM IS AN EVIL. Consider the following examples:

(5) In 1986, the Soviet press began to publish articles critical of the crimes of the Stalin era, a subject which had not been broached since Khrushchev’s ouster
in the early 1960s. Press freedom expanded rapidly thereafter, as one taboo after another was broken. By 1989, Gorbachev and the rest of the Soviet leadership could be attacked openly in the press, and in 1990 and 1991 large demonstrations occurred across the Soviet Union calling for his resignation (p. 26).

(6) In the spring of 1989, Beijing was temporarily taken over by tens of thousands of students calling for an end to corruption and for the establishment of democracy in China. They were eventually crushed ruthlessly by the Chinese army in June, but not before they were able to publicly call into question the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist party (p. 26).

(7) In July and August 1989, tens and then hundreds of thousands of East Germans began fleeing into West Germany, leading to a crisis that rapidly led to the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the East German state (p. 27).

Here Fukuyama focuses on presenting three post-World War II trends, which are, the weakness and fall of authoritarian states of the Right and the communist-totalitarian states of the Left; and also focuses on the global trend toward liberal democracy and capitalism. The schematic metaphors in the above examples helped Fukuyama to structure his main argument to try to prove that liberal democracy is much closer to fitting human
nature than any form of government or political organization.

The FORCE schematic metaphors found in the above examples entails that Communism is undermined by the fact that people did not believe that it was a viable form of government, that it had no legitimacy and that democratic ideas were the primary ones that people found viable and just. Fukuyama used words like ‘break’, ‘attack’, ‘take over’, ‘crush’, and ‘flee into’ to show the FORCE interaction between the AGONIST (people who believe in democracy) and the ANTAGONIST (communism) as if there was a war against communism and the communist institutions in most of the communist countries and then to declare the victory of the AGONIST over the ANTAGONIST.

5.1.2 LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IS UP AND COMMUNISM IS DOWN

In many cultures, good things are up and bad things are down. Lakoff and Johnson give a number of different orientational metaphors which clearly demonstrate the UP/DOWN polar oppositions that exist metaphorically in many cultures (1980, p. 14-21). In their discussion, they also make the point that such orientational metaphors may not be exactly the same in other cultures. Orientational metaphors with UP/DOWN have extensive sets of mappings for individual target domains, and a more general tendency is for UP metaphors to be positive (MORE/ HAPPINESS/ CONSCIOUSNESS/ POWER/ GOOD IS UP) and counter-parts with DOWN to be negative (LESS/ SADNESS/ UNCONSCIOUSNESS/ POWERLESSNESS/ BAD IS DOWN) (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). These very general conceptualisations make some of the most interesting of all, particularly in
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terms of what they reveal about basic processes of human thought. In general, one can say that, metaphors associated with politics show this UP versus DOWN contrast as being conceived of in terms of Good (UP) and Bad (DOWN).

By tracing those instances representing those orientational conceptual metaphors, it is hoped that the endeavor would provide insights as to the using of UP/DOWN orientational conceptual metaphors in Fukuyama’s *The End of History and The Last Man*. This will help also explain the different connotative associations related to Fukuyama’s biases in so far it is expressed and functioning within his language.

In *The End of History and The Last Man*, Fukuyama believes that Liberal Democracy is good, while Communism is bad. So, as simple as it is, we can use the following logical formula to show Fukuyama’s biases:

- The Metaphor: GOOD IS UP
- Liberal Democracy is GOOD
- Liberal Democracy is UP
- The Metaphor: BAD IS DOWN
- Communism is BAD
- Communism is DOWN

Consider the following examples:

(8) There was a coherent development of human societies from simple tribal ones based on slavery and subsistence agriculture, through various theocracies, monarchies, and feudal aristocracies, up
through modern liberal democracy and technologically driven capitalism (p. xii).

(9) But we should not be surprised if all of the formerly communist countries do not make a rapid and smooth transition to stable democracy; in fact, it would be very surprising if this did happen. There are enormous obstacles that need to be overcome before successful democracies can arise (p. 36).

(10) Liberal democracy represents the highest form of political organization for modern countries.

(11) This prepares them for citizenship in liberal democracies by encouraging a kind of tolerance for differing points of view, but it also teaches them that there is no final ground for belief in the superiority of liberal democracy to other forms of government.

(12) Authoritarian dictatorships of all kinds, both on the Right and on the Left, have been collapsing. In some cases, the collapse has led to the establishment of prosperous and stable liberal democracies (p. 12).

(13) In the spring of 1989, Beijing was temporarily taken over by tens of thousands of students calling for an end to corruption and for the establishment of democracy in China (p. 26).

(14) The East German collapse then triggered the fall of communist
governments in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania (p. 27).

(15) In July and August 1989, tens and then hundreds of thousands of East Germans began fleeing into West Germany, leading to a crisis that rapidly led to the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the East German state (p. 27).

(16) Communists were initially turned out of office everywhere except in Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania, while in Bulgaria, the elected Communist government was soon forced to step down (p. 27).

(17) The collapse of Marxist ideology in the late 1980s reflected, in a sense, the achievement of a higher level of rationality on the part of those who lived in such societies, and their realization that rational universal recognition could be had only in a liberal social order (p. 205).

In the above examples Fukuyama used words like, up through, arise, establish and higher to refer to liberalism and liberal democracy. These words frame the conceptual element of LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IS UP which entails Fukuyama’s bias for liberal democracy as he conceives that the development of human societies moved upwards till it reached liberal democracy which is regarded, for him, as the last mankind’s ideological evolution. Besides, Fukuyama’s bias against communism can be construed through the metaphors in examples (8)- (17). The use of words like collapse, fall
of, tear down and step down, to refer to communism and the communist states, frames the conceptual element of COMMUNISM IS BAD which entails that COMMUNISM IS DOWN.

Again, in so far as it is the case that Liberal Democracy is GOOD, a state which entails that LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IS UP, all countries and states must believe in democracy and liberalism to enjoy freedom and prosperity. But, Communism being BAD entails COMMUNISM IS DOWN, and therefore the communist countries and states must get rid of communism otherwise they will collapse.

5.1.3 HISTORY IS A JOURNEY and LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IS THE FINAL DESTINATION

The structural metaphor of JOURNEY is a conceptual extension of the primary metaphor of MOTION. In the view of the cognitive approach, MOTION is seen as another constituted aspect of human physical experience without which people could not exist. As a result, in many instances of human categorization, abstract concepts are structured through the domain of MOTION or its specified invariant-JOURNEY.

Lakoff and Johnson argue that the JOURNEY is a universal conceptual metaphor, whereby people in many cultures conceive changes in life as an ongoing journey with its various destinations, paths to destinations, impediments to motion, etc. (1987, p. 80-88). Thus, the epistemic relations of the HISTORICAL MOTION metaphor are established by the use of such elements as JOURNEY, TRAVELLERS, MOVEMENTS, DESTINATIONS, and OBSTACLES. In Fukuyama’s language, history is purposeful, it is sequence of motions.
Towards a destination in a journey (Liberal Democracy). For Fukuyama, history is one of the life spheres and important human activities. It is conceptualized as a journey, with people seen as travellers in a continuous motion along a chosen route towards a prescribed destination (Liberal Democracy). The HISTORY IS JOURNEY and LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IS THE FINAL DESTINATION structural metaphors have the following linguistic representation in Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man*, as given in the examples below:

(18) I argued that liberal democracy may constitute the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final form of human government," and as such constituted the "end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992, p. xi).
(19) Western Europe's transition to liberal democracy was long and hard as well, a fact that did not prevent every country in that region from eventually completing the journey (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 37).
(20) There was a coherent development of human societies from simple tribal ones based on slavery and subsistence agriculture, through various theocracies, monarchies, and feudal aristocracies, up through modern liberal democracy and technologically driven capitalism (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 27).
(21) Of the different types of regimes that have emerged in the course of human
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history, from monarchies and aristocracies, to religious theocracies, to the fascist and communist dictatorships of this century, the only form of government that has survived intact to the end of the twentieth century has been liberal democracy. (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 45).

(22) And as Kant postulated, there was an end point to the process of history, which is the realization of freedom here on earth: "The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom." (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 60).

(23) From the moment Hegel formulated his system, people were not inclined to take seriously his claim that history ended with the modern liberal state (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 64).

Fukuyama articulates a journey of human history as a whole- from ‘the state of nature’ to the end of the Cold War- leading to liberal democracy as the historical and political telos of human social evolution. HISTORY IS JOURNEY and LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IS THE FINAL DESTINATION metaphors frame Fukuyama’s bias for Hegel's historicism. The use of words like end, final, up through, end point, from and to entails Fukuyama’s vision of universal history and the journey of human history which ends in liberal democracy as the final destination of human social development. After stating Hegel and Kant’s perspectives, Fukuyama explains his own opinion. According to him, the state that emerges at the end of history is liberal and democratic.
and that the end of the Cold War marked the end of large-scale competitions between the liberal, democratic, capitalist system and other political economic systems potentially capable of spreading to all human societies.

To sum up, this sub-section provided an analysis of language, in Fukuyama’s selected works for study, in terms of conceptual metaphor and its representative elements. The present analysis of Fukuyama’s language in terms of conceptual metaphors allows identifying several major features of Fukuyama’s biases and may go some way towards a better understanding of Fukuyama’s reasoning in the selected work under investigation.

5.2 Framing bias through El-Messiri’s metaphors

In this sub-section, the paper applies the cognitive linguistic model of conceptual metaphors to investigate and analyze El-Messiri’s bias in his books *dirāsāt maṣ rifyya fi: al-hada:ṭa al-ghārbiyyah* (2006) (Epistemological Studies in Western Modernity) and *riḥelati: al-fikriyya: fi: al-buḍu:r wal-juḍu:r wal-θamar: si:rah ghāyr ḍatiyya ghāyr māwḍ us iyya* (My Intellectual Journey: In Seeds, Roots, and Fruits—A Non-Subjective, Non-Objective Autobiography) (2006). In his books, El-Messiri offers a critique of the development of ‘Modern Western Civilization’, (*al-haḍ āra al-gharbiyya al-hadī ḍa*). In particular, El-Messiri points to the problematic nature of what he identifies as the dominant Western philosophical anthropology—i.e. the claims and metaphors that shape the understanding of human nature.

El-Messiri undertakes to produce a critique of Western modernity. He seeks to develop a coherent argued narrative about the relationship between Western concepts and metaphors (particularly those concerned with the ontology of the human), on the one hand, and
morally problematic trends in social and political life, on the other. He accounts for this linkage by pointing to a sequential process of ‘immanentization’ (al-hulu:liyya) in the modern imagination–a loss of key distinctions that serve to structure human experience, most significantly the distinction between the material world and a divine or transcendent reality. Immanentization, he claims, has produced such consequences as rampant consumerism, racism, the fragmentation of family life and a species of moral relativism that tolerates grave social injustices. He often explicitly characterizes modernity as ‘value-free,’ (munfāšila ʿan al-qi:ma) signaling his orientation to ethics (as opposed to, for example, political power or cultural preservation and purity).

5.2.1 LIFE IS AN INTELLECTUAL JOURNEY

The structural metaphor of JOURNEY is a conceptual extension of the primary metaphor of MOTION. El-Messiri has provided explicit suggestions as to how his life should be understood in relation to thoughts and history. In El-Messiri’s language, life is purposeful, it is sequence of motions towards a destination in a journey. The direct mapping of this structural conceptual metaphor is that the elements in the target domain (LIFE) is understood in terms of the elements in the source domain (INTELLECTUAL JOURNEY). Consider the following example in (24):

، سيرة غير ذاتية، [الرحلة الفكرية]، إذا كانت هذه (24)
فهي أيضا سيرة غير موضوعية. سيرة إنسان ينتقي
في فضاء حياته الخاص بالعالم.
(El-Messiri, 2006b, p. 14)
If this intellectual journey is non-subjective, it is also a non-objective biography of a man who meets with some public matters in his private life space.

The epistemic relations of the LIFE IS AN INTELLECTUAL JOURNEY metaphor in El-Messiri’s language are established by the use of such elements as JOURNEY, MOVEMENTS, DESTINATIONS, and OBSTACLES. The term (ghāiyr ḍa:tiyyah) non-subjective in the above example and in his autobiography’s title signals El-Messiri’s biases. It states his conviction that his life story is not simply individual—not simply the unfolding of an agent’s self-made project. In other words, history does matter to a great extent. On the other hand, with respect to the meaning of (ghāiyr mawduːs yyiah) non-objective, he opts against an approach to writing (and advises against a method of reading) that would reduce a narrative of intellectual development to the forces of history, as though individual lives are the expression of a formula determined by forces external to them.

The conceptual metaphor of LIFE IS AN INTELLECTUAL JOURNEY is associated with the ontological conceptual metaphor of IDEAS ARE SEEDS IN THE SOIL in El-Messiri mental space. The one who plants these seeds (ideas) does not necessarily know whether and how they will grow. He describes the appropriate theoretical approach to the relationship between shaping factors and creative outcomes in this way:
It is possible to distinguish between the structure of the paradigm (fruits) and the elements of its formation (seeds and roots). The structure is synchronic, static and is almost non-temporal. The elements of the formation, on the other hand, are mobile or dynamic and both time and history are essential factors, so that it is impossible to understand the life of any person or of any human or natural phenomenon without knowing the relation between the one and the other.

In a sense, both El-Messiri’s bias against Western modernity and his understanding of a viable humanistic ethic are encapsulated in these insights about biography and autobiography.

5.2.2 THE EXISTENCE IS A MACHINE AND THE WORLD IS AN ORGANIC ENTITY

El-Messiri’s bias against the modern Western paradigm is conceptuallized through the construal of the ontological conceptual metaphors of THE EXISTENCE IS A MACHINE AND THE WORLD IS AN ORGANIC ENTITY. The direct mapping of this ontological
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Conceptual metaphor is that the elements in the target domain (THE EXISTENCE or THE WORLD) are understood in terms of the elements in the source domain (A MACHINE or AN ORGANIC ENTITY). El-Messiri provides an overview of the metaphors underlying the modern paradigm, most prominently, the (mechanical) and the (organic). Moreover, he claims that one should see these two metaphors as two sides of the same coin, noting that “they appear to be different and even opposed, although in fact they resemble one another to a great extent, except for some marginal details.” (El-Messiri, 2006a, p. 6)

El-Messiri supports his claim that mechanical metaphors have shaped the modern outlook on humanity and the world by surveying some key figures in the modern Western philosophical tradition:

(26) وقد ترجمت الاستنارة المظلمة، التي في جوهرها عملية تفكيك ودم الإنسان ورده إلى ما هو دونه، إلى مجموعة من الصور المجازية الأساسية لعل أولها هو "مقارنة إسبيترونا للإنسان بقطع حجر قفنت بها يد قوية". وبينما تدور الحجرة المسكنة في الفضاء تظن أنها تتحرك بكامل إرادتها، ثم قام نيوتون بمقارنة العالم كله (بما في ذلك الإنسان) بآلة دقيقة: ساعة تدور دائما وعلى نفس الوركية دون تدخل إلهي أو إنساني. وقد اكتشف نيوتون أن الآلة التي توجد خارجنا توجد داخلنا أيضاً، فقارن العقل بالصفحة البيضاء التي يترك منها كل ما يصلنا من معطيات حسبية ثم تحددها هذه المعطيات آلية من تلقاء نفسها حسب قانون الترابط، فتكون الأفكار البسيطة لتصبح مركبة. وقد أدى كل هذا إلى ظهور [الصورة التي يطرحها...
The dark enlightenment, which is in essence a process of deconstruction and destruction of man, reducing him to what is baser than him, has translated itself into some basic images and metaphors. The first of these metaphors is Spinoza’s comparison of man to a stone thrown by a powerful hand. The poor stone, as it is rolling in space, thinks it is moving by its own will. Then Newton compared the world including man to a precise machine: a clock that is ticking eternally and with the same tempo without any divine or human intervention. As for God, he has been marginalized to the status of a clock-maker who made the clock and started it ticking, a primum mobile who created the world and left it governed by the laws of mechanics, immanent in matter. Locke discovered that the machine that exists outside us exists also inside us, and compared the mind to a blank sheet on which is accumulated all the sense data that reach us. Then all these data mechanically coalesce by themselves according to the law of association, forming simple ideas that are combined in turn to form complex ideas. All this has led to the appearance of the image that Adam Smith presents of a man
that lives in a world regulated by an invisible hand and a marketplace that is regulated by the mechanical laws of supply and demand.

El-Messiri suggests that both the mechanical and the organic metaphors have existed throughout the modern period. However, there seems to have been a shift in the dominance of the organic over the mechanic. Regarding the organic metaphors, consider the following example in (27):

(27) وَقَدْ بَيْنَ دَارُونِ أن جَنَّةَ رُوَّسُو الْطَبْعِيَّةِ لَيْسَتْ مِثْلَ الْآَلَّةِ، وَإِنَّمَا هِيَ [غَابَةٌ تَصِلُّ إِلَى حَالَةَ التَّوَاَزَّنَ مِن خَلَالِ الْبَدَّةِ الْخَفِيفَةِ لِصَرَائِفٍ مِّن أَجَلَ الْبَقُؤُ وَالْبَقَاءِ لَلْأَلْصَّلِّ]… ثُمَّ جَاءَ فَرُوِّيدٌ وَأَفْثَتَ عَلَمِيَّةً وَمُوْضُوعِيَّةً (حسب تصُورِ الْبَعْضِ) [إِنَّ الْغَابَةَ تَقْعُ، فِي وَاقِعِ الْأَمْرِ، دَاخِلِ الإِنْسَانِ عَلَى شَكْلِ لاَوْعِي مَظَمُّ وَلَبْيِدُ مَتْفَجِّرةٍ]… وَقَدْ أَجْرَى بَأْفُلُوفُ تَجَارِبِهِ عَلَى الْكَلَابِ، ثُمَّ طَبِقَ نَتَّائِجُ تَجَارِبِهِ عَلَى الإِنْسَانِ، فَقَدْ كَانَ يَفَتْرُضُ أَنَّهَا لَا تَوْجَدُ فَرُوِقَ جَوْهَرِيَّةٌ بَيْنَ الْواحِدِ وَالآخِرِ، فَكَلَاهُمَا تَحْكُمُهُ ظَرُوفُهُ المُوْضُوعِيَّةً.

(El-Messiri, 2006b, p. 220-21)

Darwin has demonstrated that Rousseau’s natural Eden does not resemble a machine, but is a jungle that reaches a state of equilibrium through the invisible hand of the struggle for survival, which is the lot of the fittest and most powerful... Then Freud proved scientifically and objectively (according
to some) that the jungle lies inside man, in the form of a dark unconscious and explosive libido. Pavlov conducted experiments on dogs, then applied the results of his experiments to man, for he assumed that there were no essential differences between one and the other, since each is governed by his instincts.

Thus, this conceptual metaphor conceptualizes El-Messiri’s bias against the Western paradigm view of the mechanical and organic world and his bias for maintaining a distinctively human space.

5.2.3 MODERNITY IS DECONSTRUCTION AND THE WESTERN ENLIGHTENMENT IS A DARK ENLIGHTENMENT

El-Messiri’s bias against the modernist secular project can be conceptualized through the structural conceptual metaphor of MODERNITY IS DECONSTRUCTION AND THE WESTERN ENLIGHTENMENT IS A DARK ENLIGHTENMENT. The mapping of this conceptual metaphor is that the elements in the target domain (MODERNITY) and (THE WESTERN ENLIGHTENMENT) are understood in terms of the elements in the source domain (DECONSTRUCTION) and (A DARK ENLIGHTENMENT). El-Messiri isolates (al-tafki:k) deconstruction as the characteristic project of post-modernity (a stage in the development of the dominant paradigm of Western modernity). According to El-Messiri modernity contained the seeds of deconstruction and the modernist project is nothing if not deconstructive. He sees a direct relationship between Enlightenment and
deconstruction. The *dark enlightenment* (al-isti\\nā\\ra\\nh al-
mu\\zure\\nh limah), which is in essence a process of
deconstruction and destruction of man, reduced him to
what is baser than him (nature/matter). Consider the
following example in (28):

(28) وقد بين دعاء [الإستنارة المظلمة] أن المشروع التدويري (ومن ثم
المشروع التحديدي) هو في جوهره [مشروع تفكيكي]، بمعنى أنه لا
يؤدي إلى تأكيد مركزية الإنسان وإنما إلى تفكيكه ورده إلى ما هو
دونه.

(El-Messiri, 2006a, p. 45)
The dark enlighteners clarifies that the
Enlightenment (and then the modernist
project) is in its essence a deconstructive
project. In that sense, this project does not
confirm the centerality of man, but to
reduce him to what is baser than him.

5.2.4 WESTERN PROGRESS IS A MYTH

El-Messiri’s bias against the Western paradigm can
be conceptualized through the ontological conceptual
metaphor of WESTERN PROGRESS IS A MYTH. The
mapping of this conceptual metaphor is that the element
in the target domain (WESTERN PROGRESS) is
understood in terms of the element in the source domain
(A MYTH). El-Messiri implies that there is a peculiar but
powerful myth embedded in the Western paradigm,
which suggests that constant improvement– and
eventually even an earthly paradise – will emerge
through the powers of economic growth, production and
consumption, and constant technological innovation. El-
Messiri considers this to be a myth (or at least a flawed
logic) because he holds that material standards cannot provide the measures for truly human goods. El-Messiri argues that there is a deep irony in Progress’s promise for constant improvement of human life, because its privileging of the material dimensions of existence necessarily leads to a devaluation of other aspects of human life. Consider the following examples in (29), (30) and (31):

(29) إن التقدم الذي كان من المفترض فيه أن يحقق سعادة الإنسان الأرضية [أصبح يهدد وجوده على هذا الكوكب].
(El-Messiri, 2006b, p. 278)
The progress that was presumed to realize humanity’s pursuit of happiness had turned to be a threat against the very existence of humanity on this planet.

(30) وقد [أثبت التقدم أن تكلفته عالية]، وأنه لم يشف كثيراً من أمراض الإنسان الروحية والنفسية، [بل فاقمهما].
(El-Messiri, 2006b, p. 277)
The cost of progress has proven to be exorbitant as it failed to cure most of mankind’s spiritual and psychological ailments; instead, it exacerbated them.

(31) تدور عجلة المصانع في سرعة خرافية لتنتج سلعاً وأشياء لا يريدها الإنسان، ولكنها في دورانها تلوث البيئة بالأحماض والعادم الصناعي [فقدم الإنسان من الخارج، ثم تغرقه في السلع والتفاصيل وتندمره من الداخل].
(El-Messiri, 2006b, p. 422)
The wheels of factories turn with astonishing speed to produce goods and
things man does not need, but as they turn
they pollute the environment with acids
and industrial waste which destroy man
from the outside, drown him in goods and
details, and devastate him from the inside.

This ontological conceptual metaphor of WESTERN
PROGRESS IS A MYTH conceptualizes El-Messiri’s
critical narrative of false promises and disappointments
of the modern Western paradigm.

To sum up, the analysis of El-Missiri’s language in
terms of conceptual metaphors allows identifying several
major features of his biases and may go some way
towards a better understanding of his reasoning in his
books.

6. Conclusion

Cross-domain metaphorical mappings make it
possible to draw inferences that could not be drawn on
the basis of direct evidence or the basis of direct
experience. In both Fukuyama and El-Messiri’s selected
works for study, metaphors were often not just
embellishments of literal propositions, but modes of
reasoning about, for example, the biases of the two
thinkers. The analysis of bias in both Fukuyama and El-
Messiri’s selected works in terms of conceptual metaphor
and its representative elements allows identifying several
major features of the two thinkers’ discourse:

a)- The analysis of bias in the language of both
Fukuyama and El-Messiri reveals that bias in both
cultures can be framed by conceptual metaphors.
The structural composition of the conceptual
metaphors in English and Arabic has been examined
in terms of seventeen SOURCE domains. For
Fukuyama, the study observed WAR, BATTLEGROUND, RIVALS, ENEMIES, INVADER, FIGHTERS, UP, DOWN, JOURNEY and FINAL DESTINATION. For El-Messiri it observed INTELLECTUAL JOURNEY, SEEDS, MACHINE, ORGANIC ENTITY, DECONSTRUCTION, DARK ENLIGHTENMENT and MYTH. The analysis of the SOURCE domains shows that the cross-mapping of the SOURCE and TARGET domains is held by different epistemic correspondences, which are reflected in different conceptual elements. This leads to the variability of bias models across the two languages, i.e. English and Arabic.

b) The most frequent SOURCE domain in Fukuyama’s language, in the selected works for study, is that of WAR (in El-Messiri’s language varied SOURCE domains are found). In Fukuyama’s language, the WAR metaphor consists of such framing elements as BATTLEGROUND, RIVALS, ENEMIES, INVADER and FIGHTERS. The WAR metaphor system supports the expectation of the Pragmatic Model, which characterizes politics as confrontational and aggressive, aiming at fighting external evil and establishing political order and stability. which gives a negative moral evaluation to Fukuyama’s ideological structure.

c) The SOURCE domain of JOURNEY/MOTION is framed in both Fukuyama and El-Messiri’s languages. The SOURCE domain of JOURNEY results in the conceptual metaphors of HISTORY IS A JOURNEY and LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IS THE FINAL DESTINATION in Fukuyama’s language and LIFE IS AN INTELLECTUAL
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JOURNEY in El-Messiri’s language. Despite the fact that this metaphor is centred around the source domain of JOURNEY in both languages, it is represented by different conceptual elements. The HISTORY IS A JOURNEY and LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IS THE FINAL DESTINATION metaphors in Fukuyama’s language consists of such elements as JOURNEY, TRAVELLERS, MOVEMENTS, DESTINATIONS, and OBSTACLES. Their analysis reveals Fukuyama’s bias for the Hegelian vision of universal history and the journey of human history which ends in liberal democracy as the final destination of human social development. The LIFE IS AN INTELLECTUAL JOURNEY metaphor is represented by another conceptual metaphor of IDEAS ARE SEEDS IN THE SOIL in El-Messiri mental space.

d)- The other conceptual metaphors represent a complex conceptual network, which is realized through several conceptual elements in both Fukuyama and El-Messiri’s language in the selected works for study.
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