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Efficacy of physical layer preamble manipulation for IEEE 802.11a/ac

B. Ramsey¹, J. Fuller and C. Badenhop

Wireless physical layer manipulation is a recently discovered technique for selective packet obfuscation. This process exploits the unique and proprietary nature of transceiver designs rather than manufacturing imperfections. To date, preamble manipulation has only successfully been demonstrated on low data rate transceivers operating in the 2.4 GHz band. This Letter investigates the effectiveness of preamble manipulation on common 5 GHz IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11ac wireless transceivers for the first time. Herein it is demonstrated that the preamble short training sequence length can be manipulated to discern among the six transceiver designs under test with greater than 99% accuracy using fewer than 20 packets.

Introduction: Wireless connectivity is a key enabler in mobile communication systems. The IEEE 802.11ac high data rate standard enables wireless data rates comparable with gigabit Ethernet, while maintaining backward co-existence with IEEE 802.11a. Further refinements to IEEE 802.11ac systems are an active area of research [1, 2]. Unfortunately, wireless security continues to pose significant challenges. Open source software tools to conduct MAC address spoofing, deauthentication attacks, and encryption key cracking have become ubiquitous [3]; these developments have spurred novel research into leveraging the physical layer to improve wireless security in depth.

Device manufacturers produce unique and proprietary transceiver designs; recent work reveals that these transceiver design idiosyncrasies can be reliably exploited [4–7]. The true hardware class of remote transceivers is determined through the use of physical layer preamble manipulation. Promising results have been demonstrated for 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.11b [4] and IEEE 802.15.4 [5–7] transceivers. These novel physical layer techniques exploit design idiosyncrasies present in all like-model devices from the same manufacturer. For example, wireless packets manipulated to have a physical layer preamble shorter than the protocol specification become unreceivable by some hardware designs, while reception by other hardware designs remains unaffected. Applications of this phenomenon are numerous, from obfuscated encryption key distribution [5] and wireless intrusion detection system evasion [6], to device fingerprinting [4, 7]. Once implementation differences are discovered and published, they can be immediately leveraged in conjunction with any of the millions of such devices worldwide.

This Letter presents the first investigation of physical layer preamble manipulation on high data rate IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11ac transceivers.

Fig. 1 Magnitude plot of first 16 µs of standard IEEE 802.11a physical layer preamble as received by USRP X310

PHY preambles in 802.11a and 802.11ac: The IEEE 802.11ac standard utilises increased spectral bandwidth and improved modulation schemes to increase its effective data rate beyond the earlier IEEE 802.11a protocol. However, since IEEE 802.11ac must still share the 5 GHz band with legacy devices, benign coexistence is important. The solution utilised is a preamble common to both protocols for clear channel assessment.

Preambles begin with a short training field (STF), immediately followed by a long training field (LTF). Each field is 8 µs long, for a combined STF and LTF duration of 16 µs. Fig. 1 presents a representative magnitude plot of the STF and LTF regions as collected by a USRP X310 software-defined radio. The background noise floor appears at the left-hand side edge of the plot and the transmission progresses through time from left-to-right-hand side.

Experiment methodology: This experiment is designed to address the question of how preamble manipulations affect wireless packet reception by IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11ac transceivers. This question is addressed by transmitting wireless packets with specific manipulations made to their preambles to six different transceiver types and observing the percentage of reception for each manipulation on each transceiver. Table 1 lists the six transceiver designs under test and their corresponding device IDs (used for the remainder of this Letter). All six designs support IEEE 802.11a, while Dev1, Dev2, and Dev3 also support IEEE 802.11ac.

Table 1: Six transceiver designs under test and device ID nomarkers

| Device ID | Adapter type | Transceiver |
|-----------|--------------|-------------|
| Dev1      | Linksys AE6000 | MT7610U   |
| Dev2      | ASUS USB-AC53 | BCM43526  |
| Dev3      | TP-LINK T4U   | RTL8812AU  |
| Dev4      | Intel PRO 3945AB | W62534RDE |
| Dev5      | Cisco AIR-CB21AG-A-K9 | AR5212 | |
| Dev6      | Linksys WPC600N | BCM4328 |

Multiple channels are available for IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11ac transmissions in the 5 GHz band. IEEE 802.11a transmitters always use 20 MHz wide channels, while IEEE 802.11ac can use 40, 80, or (optional) 160 MHz wide channels. For this experiment the centre frequency for IEEE 802.11a tests is 5785 MHz and the centre frequency for the separate IEEE 802.11ac tests is 5795 MHz. Experiments involving IEEE 802.11ac are conducted using a 40 MHz configuration to make a clear distinction from IEEE 802.11a, while also being accessible to the CBX-40 daughterboard in the USRP X310 software-defined radio.

Experiment system configuration: The logical topology of the experiment setup is illustrated in Fig. 2. The access point is a Linksys WRT1900AC, the laptop is a DELL Precision M4500, and the Desktop PC is a Dell Precision T7500 with 24 GB of RAM. The USRP X310 is controlled via GNU Radio on the Desktop PC, connected by a 10GBase SFP + cable. A RAM drive is configured on the Desktop PC such that in phase and quadrature (I/Q) data streams from the Desktop PC to the USRP X310 without being read from a hard disk drive. Wireless packets with manipulated PHY preambles are transmitted from the USRP X310 to the transceivers under test, connected one at a time to the Laptop. The transceivers under test are wirelessly associated to the access point using the appropriate centre frequency and spectral bandwidth during each test.

Fig. 2 Logical topology of experiment equipment

Data collection procedure: Each of the six transceiver designs in Table 1 are investigated individually. Once the transceiver under test is associated to the access point, 300 Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo requests with standard (non-manipulated) PHY preambles are transmitted from the USRP X310 to the transceiver at a rate of one per second. Percentage of packet reception is monitored using Wireshark on the Laptop. Once 100% packet reception is confirmed for standard packets, the preamble manipulation experiment begins. The 100% packet reception baseline is subsequently reconfirmed between each test to ensure that extraneous wireless interference is not a confounding influence.

For each of the preamble manipulations investigated, 300 ICMP echo requests with the given PHY manipulation are transmitted to the transceiver under test and the percentage of packet reception is monitored using Wireshark. The STF is shortened or lengthened by up to five symbols from the standard length of 10 (length ∈ {5, 6, ..., 15}) while the LTF remains standard. All tests are conducted at both high and low received signal strength conditions to investigate the consistency of the results across the operational range of the transceivers. The physical distances between the laptop and USRP transmitter in Fig. 2 are 1 m (−28 dBm) and 38 m (−78 dBm), respectively. Even with a standard PHY, packet reception falls below 100% at distances beyond 38 m, causing intermittent network connectivity loss. Therefore, a maximum distance of 38 m is chosen for the experiment.

Observations of STF manipulation in IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11ac: Tables 2 and 3 report reception rates for the six transceivers

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under test while operating in IEEE 802.11a mode. Short STFs are examined in Table 2, and long STFs are examined in Table 3, and the baseline standard length STF ($l = 10$) appears in both. Notably, the observed packet reception rates at $-28$ dBm and $-78$ dBm are statistically indistinguishable (99% CI, $n = 300$) for all scenarios examined. This is strong evidence for transceiver response consistency throughout the operational range of the devices. It is also clear from Tables 2 and 3 that the reception differences among the six devices are sufficiently distinct as to be useful for message obfuscation and device fingerprinting. For example, only half of the devices (Dev1, Dev4 and Dev5) can receive packets with a longer-than-standard STF of.

Table 2: Packet reception rates ($n = 300$) versus STF length ($l = 5, 6, \ldots, 10$) for the transceivers while operating in IEEE 802.11a mode. Dashes represent zero reception, for visual emphasis

| dBm | $l = 5\%$ | $l = 6\%$ | $l = 7\%$ | $l = 8\%$ | $l = 9\%$ | $l = 10\%$ |
|-----|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Dev1 | $-28$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ |
| $-78$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ |
| Dev2 | $-28$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ |
| $-78$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ |
| Dev3 | $-28$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ |
| $-78$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ |
| Dev4 | $-28$ | $16$ | $21$ | $31$ | $68$ | $80$ |
| $-78$ | $8$ | $17$ | $32$ | $72$ | $100$ |
| Dev5 | $-28$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ |
| $-78$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ |
| Dev6 | $-28$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ |

Table 3: Packet reception rates ($n = 300$) versus STF length ($l = 10, 11, \ldots, 15$) for the transceivers while operating in IEEE 802.11a mode. Dashes represent zero reception, for visual emphasis

| dBm | $l = 10\%$ | $l = 11\%$ | $l = 12\%$ | $l = 13\%$ | $l = 14\%$ | $l = 15\%$ |
|-----|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Dev1 | $-28$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ |
| $-78$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ |
| Dev2 | $-28$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $-$ |
| $-78$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $-$ | $-$ |
| Dev3 | $-28$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $-$ | $-$ |
| $-78$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ |
| Dev4 | $-28$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $88$ | $70$ |
| $-78$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $80$ | $60$ | $-$ |
| Dev5 | $-28$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $-$ |
| $-78$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $-$ | $-$ |
| Dev6 | $-28$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $-$ | $-$ |
| $-78$ | $100$ | $100$ | $100$ | $-$ | $-$ | $-$ |

Transceiver fingerprinting proof of concept: In this scenario, the investigator can be a network auditor or an attacker. The investigator is unaware of the type of the transceiver within a wireless device operating in IEEE 802.11a or IEEE 802.11ac mode. By transmitting acknowledgment requests (e.g. ICMP echo requests) with varying preamble lengths, the pattern of replies and non-replies allows the investigator to accurately identify the unknown or unverified transceiver.

Fig. 3 Example classification decision tree for IEEE 802.11a/ac transceivers

Conclusion: The burgeoning research field of physical layer protocol manipulation leverages discoveries made about transceiver design idiosyncrasies. This Letter presents the first investigation of PHY manipulation on high data rate IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11ac transceiver designs commonly found worldwide. It is discovered that the preamble STF length can be manipulated to discern among the six transceiver designs under test with greater than 99% accuracy. Design idiosyncrasies of real-world hardware cannot be determined through mathematical modelling or network simulation. Therefore, experiments must be conducted with as many transceiver and protocol designs as possible. Future work will explore additional technologies, from Z-Wave and Bluetooth low energy, to satellite communication protocols.

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