CODE ALLTAG 2.0 — A Pseudonymized German-Language Email Corpus

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Abstract

The vast amount of social communication distributed over various electronic media channels (tweets, blogs, emails, etc.), so-called user-generated content (UGC), creates entirely new opportunities for today’s NLP research. Yet, data privacy concerns implied by the unauthorized use of these text streams as a data resource are often neglected. In an attempt to reconcile the diverging needs of unconstrained raw data use and preservation of data privacy in digital communication, we here investigate the automatic recognition of privacy-sensitive stretches of text in UGC and provide an algorithmic solution for the protection of personal data via pseudonymization. Our focus is directed at the de-identification of emails where personally identifying information does not only refer to the sender but also to those people, locations, dates, and other identifiers mentioned in greetings, boilerplates and the content-carrying body of emails. We evaluate several de-identification procedures and systems on two hitherto non-anonymized German-language email corpora (CODE ALLTAG 1.0 and CODE ALLTAG 2.0), and generate fully pseudonymized versions for both (CODE ALLTAG 2.0) in which personally identifying information of all social actors addressed in these mails has been camouflaged (to the greatest extent possible).

Keywords: email corpus, de-identification, pseudonymization, data privacy, German language resource

1. Introduction

With the rapidly increasing adoption of electronic interaction platforms, we observe an unprecedented upsurge of digitally transmitted private communication and exploding volumes of so-called user-generated contents (UGC). As a major characteristic of these new communication habits, a sender’s individual email, post, comment is distributed to an often (very) large number of addressees—the recipients of an email, followers in social media, other users of a platform etc.. Hence, hitherto private communication becomes intentionally public.

In response to these changes, digital (social) media communication has become a major focus of research in NLP. Yet there seems to be a lack of awareness among NLP researchers that the exploitation of natural language data from such electronic communication channels, whether for commercial, administrative or academic purposes, has to comply with binding legal regulations (Wilson et al., 2016). Dependent on each country’s legislation system, different rules for privacy protection in raw text data are enforced (cf., e.g., two recent analyses for the US (Mulligan et al., 2019) and the EU (Hooton et al., 2019)). Even privacy-breach incidents in a legal grey zone can be harmful for the actors involved (including NLP researchers).

This dilemma is evidenced dramatically in the so-called AOL search data leak². In August of 2006, American Online (AOL) made a large query log collection freely accessible on the Internet for a limited time. The data were extracted over three months from their search engine to support academic research. The collection included roughly 650k users issuing 20 million queries without any significant anonymization of individual users. The result of this release, among others, was the disclosure of private information for a number of AOL users. The most troubling aspect of the data leak was the ease by which single individuals could be pinpointed in the logs. Even ignoring social security, driver license, and credit card numbers, the New York Times demonstrated the ability to unlock the identity of a real user³. The outline of this incident and countermeasures against this privacy crash are reported by Adar (2007) from whom we adopted the case description as well. While query logs from search engines might still be at the lower end of the vulnerability chain for data privacy (still, with drastic implications (Jones et al., 2007)), UGC bundled in freely distributed corpora is clearly at its higher end, since real names of persons, their gender, age, or locations, etc. are dispersed all over such documents.⁴ Surprisingly, despite its high relevance for NLP operating on UGC, the topic of data privacy has long been neglected by the mainstream of NLP research. While it has always been of utmost importance for medical NLP (Meystre, 2015), it has received almost no attention in NLP’s non-medical camp for a long time (for two early exceptions, cf. Rock (2001), Medlock (2006)). This naïve perspective is beginning to change these days with the ever-growing importance of ethical concerns related to the processing of social media texts (Thomas et al., 2017; Scantamburlo and Pelillo, 2016; Flick, 2016; De Choudhury and De, 2014; Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2010). However, there are currently no systematic actions taken to hide personally sensitive information from downstream applications when dealing with chat, SMS, tweet,

¹Briefly described in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AOL_search_data_leak accessed on Nov. 24, 2019.
²https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html last accessed Nov. 24, 2019.
³In a famous study, Sweeney (2000) showed, e.g., that 87% (or roughly 50%) of the population in the US could be uniquely identified based only on three data items, namely, 5-digit ZIP (or symbolic name of the place of residence), gender, and date of birth, using 1990 U.S. Census data.
⁴https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AOL_search_data_leak last accessed Nov. 24, 2019.
blog or email raw data. Since this attitude also faces legal implications, a quest for the protection of individual data privacy has been raised and, in the meantime, finds active response in the most recent work of the NLP community (Li et al., 2018; Coavoux et al., 2018; Elazar and Goldberg, 2018), including the design of privacy-preserving Data Management Plans compliant with EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Kamocki et al., 2018). In general, two basic approaches to eliminate privacy-bearing data from raw text data can be distinguished. The first one, anonymization, identifies instances of relevant privacy categories (e.g., person names or dates) and replaces sensitive strings by some artificial code (e.g., ‘xxx’). This masking approach might be appropriate to eliminate privacy-bearing data in the medical world, but is likely to be inappropriate for most NLP applications since crucial discriminative information and contextual clues will be erased by such a scrapping procedure.

The second approach, pseudonymization, preserves such valuable information by substituting privacy-bearing text strings with randomly generated alternative synthetic instances from the same privacy type (e.g., the person name ‘Suzanne Walker’ is mapped to ‘Caroline Snyder’). As a common denominator, the term de-identification subsumes both, anonymization and pseudonymization.

The focus of this paper will be on the identification of instances of relevant privacy categories based on a structured type system of privacy categories (essential for both approaches) and a privacy type-compliant substitution of the original text mentions. We will demonstrate our approach on two variants of CODE ALLTAG (Krieg-Holz et al., 2016), a German-language email corpus introduced at LREC 2016 that, at that time, could not be made publicly available due to possible privacy leakage. The current version, CODE ALLTAG 2.0, is basically a pseudonymized variant of CODE ALLTAG, now publicly available at https://github.com/codealltag/

We start with a discussion of related work in Section 2 and then introduce the semantic types we consider as relevant carriers of personal information in emails in Section 3. Next, we provide an overview of the email corpus our experiments are based on in Section 4, including a brief description of manual annotation activities for gold standards. In Section 5, we turn to the description and evaluation of different approaches to recognizing privacy-sensitive information, a task we treat primarily as a named entity recognition problem. In Section 6, we present the new pseudonymized version of CODE ALLTAG, CODE ALLTAG 2.0. After that, we conclude with a summary of our main contributions and an outlook into future work in Section 7.

2. Related Work

The main thrust of work on de-identification has been performed for clinical NLP. Main drivers of progress in this field were two challenge tasks within the context of the i2b2 (Informatics for Integrating Biology & the Bedside) initiative which focused on 18 different types of Protected Health Information (PHI) categories as required by US legislation (HIPAA). The first of these challenge tasks was launched in 2006 for 889 hospital discharge summaries (Uzuner et al., 2007). The second was run in 2014 and addressed an even broader set of PHI categories (Stubbs et al., 2015a). The best system performances peaked in the high 90s (F1 score) using classical machine learning methods, Conditional Random Fields (CRFs) in particular, hand-written rules, or a hybrid mixture of both. As a successor to i2b2, the CEGS-NGRID Shared Tasks and Workshop on Challenges in NLP for Clinical Data created a corpus of 1,000 manually de-identified psychiatric evaluation records (Stubbs et al., 2017). Interestingly, for the automatic de-identification task performance values dropped significantly down to 79.85 F1 for the best-performing system indicating an only modest potential for domain and text genre portability (moving from discharge summaries to psychiatric evaluation records).

Recently, the deep learning wave has also hit the (clinical) de-identification community. For this task, bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory Networks (Bi-LSTMs) became quite popular as evidenced by the work of Dermoncourt et al. (2017b) who achieve an F1 score of 97.85 on the i2b2 2014 reference dataset. Liu et al. (2017) who report performance figures ranging from 95.11% up to 98.28% micro F1 score under increasingly sloppier matching criteria on the same dataset. Another direction to prevent privacy leakage from clinical documents has recently been proposed by Friedrich et al. (2019). They introduce an adversarially learned representation of medical text that allows privacy-preserving sharing of training data for a de-identification classifier by transforming text non-reversibly into a non-interpretable vector space representation as training data. Employing a simple LSTM-CRF de-identification model they achieved an F1 score of 97.4% on the i2b2 2014 reference dataset.

Yet, the focus of these studies lies on the recognition of privacy-relevant text stretches not on pseudonymization, a considerably more complex task (Stubbs et al., 2015b).

4One of the rare exceptions is described by Jung et al. (2015) for privacy-sensitive services on personal mobile devices.

5For medical applications, Bui et al. (2018) recently found no advantage for pseudonymization over anonymization in terms of system accuracy and impact on document readability.

6The distinction we make between de-identification and anonymization differs from the one proposed by Meystre et al. (2010) who equate de-identification and our understanding of anonymization, while their understanding of the term ‘anonymization’ is focused on medical data security concerns and implies that the data cannot be linked to identify the patient. Our change of terminology is motivated by the intention to strictly decouple the linguistic layer of different forms of de-identification (masking of or substituting privacy-relevant items) from data security concerns (the potential of re-identification of individuals), the latter being out of scope of NLP.

7Note that we have to distinguish between privacy protection for structured tabular data housed in (clinical) information systems (for which k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002) is a well-known model to minimize a person’s re-identification risk) and de-identification in unstructured verbal data we here focus on.

https://www.i2b2.org/
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/index.html
Carrell et al. (2013) examined this problem with the ‘Hiding In Plain Sight’ approach: detected privacy-bearing identifiers are replaced with realistic synthetic surrogates in order to collectively render the few ‘leaked’ identifiers difficult to distinguish from the synthetic surrogates—a major advantage for pseudonymization over anonymization. Targeting English medical texts, SCRUB (Sweeney, 1999) was one of the first surrogate generation systems followed by work from Uzuner et al. (2007), Yemiterzi et al. (2010), Delegée et al. (2014), Stubbs et al. (2015b), Stubbs and Uzuner (2015), and Chen et al. (2019). Similar procedures have been proposed for Swedish (Alfahahi et al., 2012) and Danish (Pantazos et al., 2011) clinical corpora, yet not for German ones, up until now. The most radical departure to escape from the data privacy problem is to generate fully synthetic, i.e., artificial textual ‘fake’ documents. Methodologically, this work is rooted in generative adversarial networks (GAN) (Goodfellow et al., 2014). In GANs, two networks, a discriminator model jointly learned with a generator model, play a game-theoretical game in which the generator attempts to generate realistic, but fake, data and the discriminator aims to distinguish between the generated fake data and the real data. This approach has already been applied to camouflage person-identifying demographic data (Li et al., 2018; Elazar and Goldberg, 2018). For the medical domain, Guan et al. (2019) and Choi et al. (2017), e.g., take clinical features (diagnoses, treatment, medication codes, etc.) as input and automatically generate synthetic textual data incorporating these features as output. Lee (2018) instead uses an encoder–decoder model, as employed in many machine translation systems, for generating chief complaints from discrete variables in Electronic Health Records (EHR), like age group, gender, and diagnosis. After being trained end-to-end on authentic records, the model can generate realistic, privacy-neutral chief complaint text. Most important from our perspective, such synthetic texts include none of the PHI elements that was in the training data, suggesting that such models can effectively solve the de-identification problem by introducing comparable, yet artificial documents as substitutes for authentic clinical documents, rather than artificial mentions of PHI-relevant entities (as pseudonymization does).

De-identification work outside the clinical domain is rare and limited in scope. Minkov et al. (2005) aim at identifying personal names, a subclass of PHI items, within emails as a prerequisite for anonymization in informal texts using a CRF classifier. Recently, Megyesi et al. (2015) report on an anonymization study for a corpus of essays written by second language (L2) learners of Swedish. While we found no work dealing with the comprehensive anonymization or even pseudonymization of emails and Twitter-style social media data, anonymizing SMSe is a topic of active research. Patel et al. (2013) introduce a system capable of anonymizing SMS (Short Message Service) communication. Their study builds on 90,000 authentic French text messages and uses dictionaries as well as decision trees as machine learning technique. Their evaluation task is, however, very coarse-grained—select those SMSe from a test corpus that either have to be anonymized or not. There is no breakdown to PHI-like categories known from the medical domain. Treurniet et al. (2012) consider privacy-relevant data for a Dutch SMS corpus (52,913 messages, in total) in greater detail. They automatically anonymized all occurrences of dates, times, decimal amounts, and numbers with more than one digit (telephone numbers, bank accounts, etc.), email addresses, URLs, and IP addresses. All sensitive information was replaced with corresponding semantic placeholder codes of the encountered semantic type (e.g., each email address was replaced by the type symbol EMAIL), not by an alternative semantic token, i.e., a pseudonym. The same strategy was also chosen by Chen and Kan (2013) for their SMS corpus that contains more than 71,000 messages, focusing on English and Mandarin. However, neither are the methods of automatic anonymization described in detail, nor are performance figures of this process reported in both papers. Chen and Kan (2013) only mention the use of regular expressions for the anonymization process).

In conclusion, pseudonymization has, to the best of our knowledge, only been seriously applied to medical documents, up until now. Hence, our investigation opens this study field for the first time ever to non-medical applications of pseudonymization.

3. Named Entity Types for De-Identification

The most relevant source and starting point for determining types of personally identifying information pieces in written informal documents is a catalog of Personal Health Information (PHI) items that has been derived from the Health Information Privacy Act (HIPAA). PHI enumerates altogether 18 privacy-sensitive information classes organized into eight main categories (Stubbs and Uzuner, 2015):

- **Name** includes the names of patients, doctors and user names,
- **Profession** practiced by a person,
- **Location** includes rooms, clinical departments, hospital names, names of organizations, street names, city names, state names, names of countries, ZIPs, etc.,
- **Age** of persons,
- **Date** expressions,
- **Communication** codes, e.g., phone or fax numbers, email addresses, URLs, IP addresses,
- all sorts of **IDs**, such as Social Security number, medical record number, account number, license number, vehicle ID, device ID, biometric ID, etc.,
- any **Other** form of personally sensitive data.

While some of the above categories are useful for non-medical anonymization procedures as well, others are merely domain-specific, because they are intrinsically attached to the clinical domain (such as the names of patients, doctors or nurses, hospitals and their departments). Hence, we adapted this list to email documents while, at the same time, we tried to avoid over-fitting to this text genre.

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Lüngen et al. (2017) report on manual anonymization efforts for German chat data. Boutiladen et al. (2005) describe a privacy compliance engine that monitors emails generated in an organization for violation of the privacy policy of this organization.
We, finally, came up with the set of privacy-bearing information (henceforth, pi) entity types depicted in Figure 1. It was designed to universally account for all types of emails, irrespective of any particular natural language and email encoding. These entities are organized in a concise hierarchy whose top level categories are SocialActor (ACTOR), Date (DATE), FormalIdentifier (FID), Location (LOC), and Address (ADD). We anticipate that this hierarchy can also be further refined and accommodated other privacy-sensitive text genres (blogs, tweets, SMS, etc.).

The category of SocialActor can further be divided into Organization (ORG), which includes all types of legal actors such as companies, brands, institutions and agencies, etc., Persons (PERSON), with subtypes FamilyName (FAMILY) and GivenName (GIVEN), with another split into two subcategories, namely FemaleName (FEMALE) and MaleName (MALE), both including nicknames and initials. Finally, UserName (USER) covers all kinds of invented user names for IT systems and platforms.

Date (DATE) covers all sorts of date descriptions, e.g., date of birth, year of death, starting and ending dates of contracts, etc.

The category of FormalIdentifier (FID) includes Password (PASS) as user-provided artificial character string for all kinds of technical appliances, and UniqueFormalIdentifier (UFID) to capture persons (students, customers, employees, members of social security systems (SSN), authors (ORCHID), etc.), computer systems (IP addresses), or other artifacts (e.g., IBAN, DOI).

The Location (LOC) category subsumes StreetName (STREET), StreetNumber (STREETNO), ZipCode (ZIP), and CityName (CITY) which stands for villages, towns, cities, metropolitan areas (e.g., ‘Larger London’) and regions smaller than a state (e.g., ‘Bay Area’); it also includes derivations of these names (e.g., ‘Roman’).

Address (ADD) encompasses EmailAddress (EMAIL), PhoneNumber (PHONE), including fax numbers, and URL (URL), as well as other forms of domain names. Unlike studies in clinical NLP (Stübs et al., 2015b), we did not take mentions of age or profession into account, because these information units are very rare in emails (yet they often occur, with high relevance, in clinical reports). Furthermore, unspecific dates like ‘Christmas’ or ‘next week’ and geographical information such as landmarks, rivers or lakes were not tagged for de-identification since their contribution to possible re-identification is fairly limited due to their generality.

In Figure 2, we illustrate our workflow for pseudonymization with an email excerpt highlighting different mentions of pi entity types by different colors.

Figure 2: Workflow from an original email via the recognition of privacy-sensitive information units (pi) to its pseudonymized form containing synthetic substitutes for pi entities (German original (left), English translation (right))

4. Named Entity Annotation in Emails

Our work is based on Code Alltag (Krieg-Holz et al., 2016), a resource composed of two non-overlapping collections of emails. The larger portion, Code Alltag XL, was extracted from various archived Internet Usernet News- groups and consists of 1,469,469 German-language emails that merely underwent some rudimentary data cleaning. This huge data set is complemented by a much smaller number of 1,390 German-language emails, Code Alltag S+D, collected on the basis of voluntary email donation. The donors have provided their explicit consent that, after de-identification, their emails may be made publicly available. Sharing the entire corpus would create lots of opportunities for NLP research, since public access to private emails is generally forbidden.

For our experiments, we exploited both data resources differently. We manually annotated Code Alltag S+D with the privacy-bearing categories from Section 3 for training and testing. Furthermore, we annotated 1,000 randomly picked emails from Code Alltag XL by hand to evaluate our classifier trained on Code Alltag S+D on the much noisier XL corpus; the latter contains less personal information than the former (see Table 1).

12 A similar and simultaneously conducted corpus-building initiative is described by Schröck and Lungen (2015).

13 One of the rare exceptions is the Enron corpus (Klimt and Yang, 2004) whose non-anonymized content was released for open inspection by order of US judges in the course of the destruction of the Enron company. For yet another example, cf. the Avocado Research Email Collection, available from LDC2015T03. Both corpora contain English language only.

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11 Yet, in ‘Christmas 2019’, e.g., the year ‘2019’ will be tagged as DATE.
4.1. CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{S+d}

For the manual annotation campaign\textsuperscript{14} we set up a team of three annotators who tagged equally sized parts of the corpus, according to the privacy-bearing (\textit{pi}) categories described in Section\textsuperscript{15} (see Figure\textsuperscript{1}). Annotation was performed on the entity level. Therefore, we did not have to care about token boundaries in the surrogate generation step and, thus, no special handling for compounds and multi-token entities was required.

In order to measure inter-annotator agreement (IAA), the annotators worked on 50 identical emails randomly selected from the corpus within the same annotation phase as the entire corpus. Table\textsuperscript{2} shows Cohen’s $\kappa$\textsuperscript{16} as a measure for IAA for the pairs of annotators calculated on the entities represented by the BIO annotation scheme.\textsuperscript{16} Hence, not only the token label itself but also matching starting and ending points of an entity are taken into account. The agreement is quite high, especially between annotator 1 and 3.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
 & CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{S+d} & CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{XL} \\
\hline
# emails & 1,390 & 1,000 \\
# tokens & 151,229 & 94,664 \\
# \textit{pi} entities & 8,866 & 3,231 \\
# \textit{pi} tokens & 12,649 & 3,549 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Privacy-bearing information in CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{S+d} and the 1,000 email sample from CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{XL}; ‘#’ stands for ‘number of’}
\end{table}

Table 2: Cohen’s $\kappa$ for BIO tags on CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{S+d}

Based on these 50 emails the annotators also examined and discussed differences of their annotations and decided on the gold standard by majority vote, which we applied for further evaluation to measure precision, recall and F\textsubscript{1} score.

Table\textsuperscript{3} shows the outcomes regarding BIO tags per annotator and the overall result calculated over the joint annotations of the annotators. We took the averages from the outcomes of the single categories weighted by the number of true instances for each label.

An error analysis revealed that, besides mostly accidental errors, a higher disagreement on tagging ORGs (due to overlap or confusion with city or product names and rather generic organizations\textsuperscript{17} and an uncertainty regarding DATEs could be observed. The latter problem was solved by the decision to treat all dates as \textit{pi} regardless of their specificity. As a consequence, one of the three annotators worked through the entire corpus to re-tag each DATE and, if necessary, also re-tag ORGs according to the findings from the error analysis. The outcome of this revision constituted the final gold standard annotations of CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{S+d} for the de-identification task.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Prec & Rec & F\textsubscript{1} \\
\hline
A1 & 98.06 & 95.63 & 96.72 \\
A2 & 87.67 & 77.92 & 80.36 \\
A3 & 94.14 & 84.79 & 86.82 \\
A1+A2+A3 & 93.37 & 86.11 & 88.66 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Weighted average of Precision, Recall and F\textsubscript{1} score in respect to the gold standard for BIO tags of CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{S+d}}
\end{table}

4.2. CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{XL}

The manual annotation process for the 1,000 emails from CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{XL} corresponds to the one described for CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{S+d}, except for the updated annotation guidelines according to the results of the error analysis reported above. This annotation campaign involved five annotators (Cohen’s $\kappa$ for this set-up is displayed in Table\textsuperscript{4}).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & A1-A2 & A1-A3 \\
0.898 & 0.902 & 0.917 \\
A1-A4 & 0.917 & 0.858 & 0.933 \\
A1-A5 & 0.917 & 0.858 & 0.933 \\
A2-A3 & 0.923 & 0.943 & 0.943 \\
A2-A4 & 0.923 & 0.943 & 0.943 \\
A2-A5 & 0.923 & 0.943 & 0.943 \\
A3-A4 & 0.923 & 0.943 & 0.943 \\
A3-A5 & 0.923 & 0.943 & 0.943 \\
A4-A5 & 0.923 & 0.943 & 0.943 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Cohen’s $\kappa$ for BIO tags on CODE AllTag\textsubscript{XL}}
\end{table}

They also settled for a gold standard in a consolidation meeting afterwards. Again, nearly all annotation differences are due to overlooked personal information. We also found several disagreements regarding the gender of person names, because CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{XL} contains quite a few initials or even names that are gender-neutral. The outcome of this examination constituted the final gold standard annotations for CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{XL}. Table\textsuperscript{5} shows the scores per annotator and the overall result calculated over the joint annotations of the five annotators. Again, we took the averages from the outcomes of the single categories weighted by the number of true instances for each label.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Prec & Rec & F\textsubscript{1} \\
\hline
A1 & 95.53 & 82.46 & 87.98 \\
A2 & 94.89 & 94.46 & 94.43 \\
A3 & 93.98 & 91.38 & 92.50 \\
A4 & 98.20 & 95.69 & 96.80 \\
A5 & 90.36 & 87.69 & 88.26 \\
A1+A2+A3+A4+A5 & 94.58 & 90.34 & 92.28 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Weighted average of Precision, Recall and F\textsubscript{1} score in respect to gold standard of CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{XL}}
\end{table}

5. Recognition of Privacy-Sensitive Entities

With respect to the structure of emails, we first experimented with different ways of segmenting the emails into...
sequences and tokenization\textsuperscript{17}. For that, we compared SO-
MAJO \textsuperscript{18} (Prois and Uhrig, 2016), a tokenizer and sentence
splitter for German and English Web and social media texts, with SPA-C\textsuperscript{19} and found that the latter yielded better results
for our task than the former. Also, taking the lines in the emails as sequences rather than the segmented sentences and keeping the tokenization as is improved performance.

5.1. Recognition Models for \textit{pi} Entity Mentions
For automatically recognizing privacy-bearing (\textit{pi}) entity
mentions, we experimented with several systems\textsuperscript{19}.

\textbf{GERMANER and GERMAN NER.} We ran out of the box GERMANER \textsuperscript{20} (Benikova et al., 2015), a CRF-based
tagger primarily developed for the task of named entity recognition (NER), and GERMAN NER \textsuperscript{21} (Riedl and Padó,
2018), a combination of BiLSTM and CRF that utilizes character embeddings as well.

\textbf{NEURONER+token(+seq).} We adapted NEURONER, a system particularly designed for clinical de-identification
(Dernoncourt et al., 2017b; Dernoncourt et al., 2017a). It is based on BiLSTMs \textsuperscript{22} (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber,
1997) and shares many similarities with the model proposed by Lample et al. (2016). Lee et al. (2016) enhanced NEURONER with manually engineered features by concatenating the output of a feed-forward neural network run on a binary feature vector comprising the token’s features to the character embedding and the pre-trained token embedding of a token\textsuperscript{23}. We adopted this approach (NEURONER+token) and decided for similar token features (see Table \textsuperscript{6}) utilizing SPACY and various lexicon look-ups\textsuperscript{24}.

Additionally, we take the structure of emails into account (NEURONER+token+seq). Lampert et al. \textsuperscript{25} define
nine different zones, such as greeting, signoff, signature, new text from the sender of the email or advertising etc., and present an algorithm to automatically classify these parts. Since we presume that there is a higher likelihood to find \textit{pi} information in some zones than in others, we apply basics of their approach on the sequence level, roughly adopting some of their features (Table \textsuperscript{6}). Also Liu et al. \textsuperscript{26} (2017), among others, use sentence information (number of words, unmatched brackets, end punctuation) and section information especially by adding a hidden layer concatenating these features with the output of the token BiLSTM. In contrast, our feature vectors of a document’s sequences are fed to a BiLSTM and the output is concatenated directly to a corresponding token embedding that has been constructed the same way as in NEURONER+token.

\textbf{BPEMB(+char).} We considered BPEMB subword embeddings \textsuperscript{27} (Heinzerling and Strube, 2018) based on Byte Pair Encoding (BPE) \textsuperscript{28} (Sennrich et al., 2016), building on the results from Heinzerling and Strube \textsuperscript{29} (2019) who obtained higher scores for NER on the German part of the WIKIANN dataset \textsuperscript{30} (Pan et al., 2017) using BPEMB standalone rather than (in combination) with BERT’s contextual embeddings \textsuperscript{31} (Devlin et al., 2019). We applied BPEMB embeddings solely (BPEMB) and in combination with character embeddings (BPEMB+char)\textsuperscript{32} for that, we used the FLAIR \textsuperscript{33} library and its sequence tagger.

\subsection{Performance on CODE ALLTAGS\textsubscript{S+d}}
Table \textsuperscript{7} shows the results of the classifiers from Section \textsuperscript{5.1} for a 10-fold cross-validation on CODE ALLTAGS\textsubscript{S+d}. GER-
MANER, GERMAN NER and BPEMB without character embeddings performed worse (in terms of $F_1$ score) than the best performing model BPEMB+char. Yet, there is no statistically significant difference between BPEMB+char and NEURONER+token or NEURONER+token+seq. The

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Token Features} \\
\hline
\hline
\textbf{typographic}  \\
\hline
is punctuation character, is left punctuation mark, is right punctuation mark (e.g. ‘‘’), is bracket, is quote, is currency, is digit, contains digit, is alphabetic character, contains alphabetic character, is special character (no punctuation or alphanumeric character), contains special character, is all upper case, is all lower case, is title case, is mixed case \\
\hline
\textbf{lexical}  \\
\hline
\textbf{URL}, email address, stop word, surname, female given name, male given name, city name, street name, organization name \\
\hline
\textbf{POS tag}  \\
\hline
Universal Dependencies v2 tags\textsuperscript{1} \\
\hline
\textbf{Sequence Features}  \\
\hline
\textbf{number of tokens, number of characters, number of preceding newlines, number of following newlines, position} (number of the sequence in the document normalized by the document’s length) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Token features used for the binary token feature vector (NEURONER+token); sequence features for the sequence feature vector in NEURONER+token+seq}
\end{table}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Table 6: Token features used for the binary token feature vector (NEURONER+token); sequence features for the sequence feature vector in NEURONER+token+seq}
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{17}We revised tokenization (without messing up sentence segmentation and parsing) originating from the tools to account for entities which only span part of the token. We split tokens on ‘‘/’’ except for URLs, email addresses and punctuation marks.

\textsuperscript{18}Experiments with BERT’s contextual embeddings \textsuperscript{27} (Devlin et al., 2019) are in progress.

\textsuperscript{19}We used FASTTEXT word embeddings \textsuperscript{34} (Grave et al., 2018) based on COMMON CRAWL and WIKIPEDIA.

\textsuperscript{22}Female and male given names are taken from ftp://ftp.heise.de/pub/ct/listings/0717-182.zip German surnames come from http://www.namenforschung.net/fileadmin/user_upload/dfa/Inhaltsverzeichnisse/etc/Index_Band_1-V_Gesamt_Sand_September_2016.pdf locations from http://download.geonames.org/export/dump/allCountries.zip German company names are imported from https://www.datendieter.de/item/Liste_von_deutschen_Firmennamen_.txt (obtained from OpenStreetMap http://www.openstreetmap.org); finally, street names originate from http://www.datendieter.de/item/Liste_von_deutschen_Strassennamen_.csv and http://www.statistik.at/strasse/suchmaske.jsp.

\textsuperscript{23}We took the 100-dimensional BPEMB with vocabulary size 100,000.
| \(pi\) Recognition Model | Prec | Rec | \(F_1\) |
|--------------------------|------|-----|--------|
| GERMANER                 | 93.68 | 83.62 | 88.04* |
| GERMAN NER               | 88.66 | 80.63 | 83.99** |
| NEURONER+token           | 89.46 | 86.99 | 88.17 |
| NEURONER+token+seq       | 90.87 | 87.27 | 88.99 |
| BPEMB                    | 90.52 | 86.65 | 88.31* |
| BPEMB+char               | 91.37 | 87.18 | 89.03 |

Table 7: Weighted average of Prec(ision), Rec(all) and \(F_1\) score of the selected \(pi\) recognition models on Code ALLTAG\(_{S+d}\) (10-fold cross-validation); statistically significant differences (using the two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test on \(F_1\)) are marked with ‘*’ and ‘**’ for \(p < 0.05\) and \(0.01\), respectively relative to BPEMB+char

latter achieved a slightly lower \(F_1\) score, with a slightly higher recall. In conclusion, we utilized BPEMB+char for the task of de-identifying Code ALLTAG\(_{XL}\).

5.3. Performance on Code ALLTAG\(_{XL}\)

As Table 8 reveals, performance plummeted when applying the BPEMB+char model trained on Code ALLTAG\(_{S+d}\) to the 1,000 emails drawn from Code ALLTAG\(_{XL}\) (row 1). This is due to the fact that Code ALLTAG\(_{XL}\) is much noisier and far less structured than Code ALLTAG\(_{S+d}\). Training and testing on Code ALLTAG\(_{XL}\) (row 3) yielded better results, but they are still far behind the ones we achieved on Code ALLTAG\(_{S+d}\) (row 4, repeated from Table 7). As Code ALLTAG\(_{XL}\) contains less entities and some categories appear only rarely and are thus more difficult to learn, we joined both corpora to benefit from the higher amount and diversity of entities in Code ALLTAG\(_{S+d}\).

We merged both corpora for training while testing solely on the quarter of Code ALLTAG\(_{XL}\) left out from training in a 4-fold cross-validation setting. Omitting Code ALLTAG\(_{S+d}\) from testing prevents getting too high scores due to the larger proportion of tokens and \(pi\) entities in Code ALLTAG\(_{S+d}\) (those are obviously easier to classify as the outcome reveals). Hence, this setting allows more realistic results in respect to the recognition of \(pi\) entities on the entire Code ALLTAG\(_{XL}\) afterwards. Compared to training exclusively on Code ALLTAG\(_{XL}\), including Code ALLTAG\(_{S+d}\) improved performance, reaching an overall \(F_1\) score of 70.96 (row 2).

| Training | Testing | Prec | Rec | \(F_1\) |
|----------|---------|------|-----|--------|
| S+d      | XL      | 63.53 | 55.26 | 56.28 |
| S+d + \(\frac{1}{2}\) XL | 76.16 | 68.07 | 70.96 |
| XL       | S+d     | 78.17 | 62.74 | 68.62 |
|           |         | 91.37 | 87.18 | 89.03 |

Table 8: Weighted average of Prec(ison), Rec(all) and \(F_1\) score for training on Code ALLTAG\(_{S+d}\) (denoted as ‘S+d’) and evaluation on Code ALLTAG\(_{XL}\) (denoted as ‘XL’, 3 runs) and for Code ALLTAG\(_{S+d}\) merged with Code ALLTAG\(_{XL}\) with 4-fold cross-validation solely on the latter, as well as for 10-fold cross-validation exclusively on Code ALLTAG\(_{XL}\) and Code ALLTAG\(_{S+d}\), respectively.

6. Pseudonymized Code ALLTAG 2.0

After applying a BPEMB+char model trained on Code ALLTAG\(_{S+d}\) and the 1,000 emails from Code ALLTAG\(_{XL}\) (as specified in the second row of Table 8) to the remaining part of the latter corpus we substituted the recognized \(pi\) entities with type-preserving surrogates as described in Eder et al. (2019) (and illustrated in Figure 2 above).

The two portions of the pseudonymized version of Code ALLTAG, Code ALLTAG\(_{pS+d}\) and Code ALLTAG\(_{pXL}\) constitute Code ALLTAG 2.0. Table 9 shows quantitative properties of Code ALLTAG\(_{pS+d}\) as well as of Code ALLTAG\(_{pXL}\) (based on processing with SPACY), with splits into seven categories (Finance, German, Movies, Philosophy, Teens, Travels and Events) (Krieg-Holz et al., 2016). Note that the number of emails in Code ALLTAG\(_{pS+d}\) is smaller than the amount of emails used for training in Section 5 because we are not allowed to distribute emails that were not written by the donors themselves. Code ALLTAG\(_{pS+d}\) comprises 4,104 \(pi\) entities, while Code ALLTAG\(_{pXL}\) contains over 8.3M \(pi\) altogether (Table 10).

6.1. Demographic Data for Code ALLTAG\(_{pS+d}\)

As detailed in Krieg-Holz et al. (2016), the donors of the emails from Code ALLTAG\(_{S+d}\) were asked to complete a questionnaire after submitting an email. We thus collected demographic data including gender, age, language and regional provenance, educational and professional background, frequency of writing texts and proficiency of emailing. For privacy reasons, we provide this information in an aggregated manner only.

Roughly 73% of the emails from Code ALLTAG\(_{S+d}\) were written by females; more than two thirds were donated by persons between 18 and 34 years old (see Figure 3 (a)). Regarding language provenance most of the donated emails were written by native speakers of German (close to 92%) and two thirds also speak German dialects. With 39% daily and 45% weekly writing frequency, the majority of emails were sent by donors with strong writing experience as part of their daily routines (cf. Figure 3 (b)). Further, most of them have a long-standing experience using email as a communication medium (Figure 3 (c)).

7. Conclusion

The pseudonymization of privacy-sensitive information has almost exclusively been a topic of research in the medical NLP domain. However, privacy concerns also become increasingly relevant for user-generated content spread over social media. Our investigation opens this study field for the first time ever to a non-medical application, the de-identification of email corpora.

We distinguish two steps in this process. First, privacy-relevant information pieces have to be identified. We treat this task primarily as a named entity recognition problem and devise an entity hierarchy that captures the relevant named entity types for the de-identification of emails.

We evaluated several system architectures for the task of automatically recognizing these entities on Code

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23The code for the generation of surrogates is available at https://github.com/ee-2/SurrogateGeneration
Table 9: Quantitative breakdown of CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{pXL} and CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{pS+d}, ‘#’ stands for ‘number of’; ‘*’ denotes punctuation marks and stop words excluded

| Entity | # emails | # sentences | # tokens | # tokens* | # types* | # lemmas* |
|--------|----------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------|-----------|
| Finance | 174,271  | 4,668,397   | 32,448,628 | 16,993,163 | 1,336,645 | 1,292,513  |
| German  | 240,703  | 1,987,861   | 15,835,884 | 6,781,721  | 784,992  | 737,933   |
| Movies  | 205,856  | 3,153,523   | 26,386,837 | 12,527,035 | 1,001,364 | 952,693   |
| Philosophy | 209,322 | 4,077,644   | 43,496,863 | 16,770,793 | 1,160,975 | 711,323   |
| Teens   | 238,977  | 1,813,318   | 28,260,682 | 11,763,229 | 961,800  | 910,021   |
| Travels | 154,040  | 2,401,965   | 12,532,029 | 5,716,143  | 580,081  | 551,368   |
| Events  | 246,300  | 3,232,851   | 28,260,682 | 11,763,229 | 961,800  | 910,021   |
| ∑       | 1,469,469 | 21,335,559  | 174,365,556 | 78,014,532 | 4,506,550 | 4,411,765 |

Table 10: \(pi\) entities in numbers for each category of CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{pXL} as well as for the entire CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{pXL} (\(p_{XL}\)) and CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{pS+d} (\(p_{S+d}\))

| Entity | Finance | German | Movies | Philosophy | Teens | Travels | Events | ∑ pXL | pS+d |
|--------|---------|--------|--------|------------|-------|---------|--------|--------|------|
| ORG    | 210,617 | 26,988 | 89,987 | 34,974     | 17,652| 69,288  | 93,508 | 543,014 | 336  |
| FAMILY | 225,006 | 264,255| 344,185| 299,713    | 296,528| 121,282 | 298,908| 1,849,875| 954  |
| FEMALE | 64,913  | 56,763 | 85,914 | 55,005     | 79,145| 48,889  | 48,849 | 439,478 | 831  |
| MALE   | 296,171 | 383,742| 510,450| 367,092    | 543,014| 1,849,875| 954    | 2,559,887| 507  |
| USER   | 351     | 226    | 213    | 44         | 187   | 3,003   | 5,776  | 1,872    | 2    |
| DATE   | 369,014 | 103,556| 104,375| 68,248     | 65,520| 51,203  | 114,816| 876,732  | 282  |
| PASS   | 14      | 8      | 22     | 3          | 22    | 31      | 103    | 1        | 1    |
| UID    | 89,915  | 4,111  | 9,956  | 4,678      | 5,444 | 4,668   | 5,665  | 124,437  | 91   |
| STREET | 15,351  | 5,706  | 4,970  | 4,986      | 4,914 | 6,292   | 12,827 | 55,046   | 96   |
| STREETNO| 40,258  | 1,378  | 4,239  | 4,174      | 4,174 | 4,239   | 4,174  | 4,239    | 4,174|
| CITY   | 197,078 | 57,373 | 66,175 | 29,628     | 20,012| 152,302 | 82,482 | 605,050  | 486  |
| ZIP    | 16,307  | 610    | 3,939  | 2,634      | 1,132 | 3,355   | 6,728  | 34,705   | 74   |
| EMAIL  | 67,333  | 21,235 | 63,321 | 70,533     | 121,479| 42,248  | 40,765 | 426,914  | 56   |
| PHONE  | 51,858  | 6,837  | 11,245 | 5,515      | 4,830 | 9,256   | 6,777  | 96,318   | 139  |
| URL    | 103,994 | 137,082| 95,305 | 69,295     | 45,438| 89,082  | 134,610| 674,806  | 141  |
| ∑      | 1,748,180| 1,069,706| 1,394,295| 1,017,381 | 1,063,912| 838,034 | 1,225,685| 8,357,193| 4,104|

Figure 3: Distribution of email donors (CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{pS+d}) by age (a), frequency of writing texts (b) and email experience in years (c)

AllTAG\textsubscript{S+d}, a small, yet well-curated German email corpus, with roughly 1k emails and applied the best performing model to CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{XL}, another German email corpus, with roughly 1.5M emails. The recognition results for the latter corpus are degraded due to a high noise level and OOV problems. Hence, determining a more robust recognition model will require further work.

In a second step, we transform privacy-bearing entities from their original form into an entity type-preserving variant and thus create pseudonym forms. We finally come up with the pseudonymized German email corpus CODE ALLTAG 2.0 which is composed of CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{pS+d} and CODE ALLTAG\textsubscript{pXL}. This corpus is available at \url{https://github.com/codealltag}.
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