Hybrid Conflict and Encirclement: Reconfiguration of Eastern Europe by NATO, Trade Barriers, and a Chinese Solution for Greece

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The Russian Federation unilaterally invaded the Republic of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, then commenced to occupy more of Eastern Ukraine on the transparent pretext of protecting Russian speakers in 2014, using masked “zombie” fighters but denied that they were uniformed Russian soldiers, violating several agreements from 1954 to 1994 and legitimate international expectations before and afterwards. Elections were held, seriatim, one after another, contrived supposedly to reflect the wishes of ethnic Russians in cities along Ukraine’s eastern border, results of which triggered declarations by separatists of “independence” followed by formation of “people’s republics” as city states. What this signifies is a clash of cultural expectations: of core values, both in the hearts and minds of all parties involved, and in the methods chosen by Russian Federation and Ukrainian independence movement leaders compared with Western governments. If Russia is revoking its transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine on an assertion that such transfer 60 years back was improvident then the Western Alliance should respond by revoking the Potsdam Declaration and other agreements investing Russia with control of Königsberg (renamed Kaliningrad) including the Treaty of Paris, and possibly revoking commitments made improvidently at the Teheran and Yalta summit conferences, transferring what was Eastern Poland west of the Curzon Line to the Soviet Union and eventually to Ukraine. If the West will tolerate a Russian siege of Crimea, it should forthwith impose an Allied siege of Kaliningrad and occupy that oblast immediately, returning Königsberg to sovereignty under Lithuanian or Polish and EU control with annexation as a NATO base. What the West with NATO must do is to fight encirclement with encirclement including military, information, economic, trade encirclement as part of what is termed “hybrid warfare”. Stopping military advancement eastward into Europe is only one prong of the problem. Another is Greece, a country that has formed the foundation of the defense of Europe to its own economic detriment. Ukraine as a hot spot is the consequence of China’s ambition to partner with Ukraine in construction of a post-Panamax deep water cargo port on the Crimean peninsula, prompting Russian Federation opposition (Chinese Billionaire, 2013). This paper proposes that China transfer its deep water port to Greece fund it through a new East Europe Infrastructure Investment Bank (EEIIB), achieve the same USD Trillion annual trade influx into the European Union, relieve Greece’s agony without austerity by inaugurating a Chinese “Marshall Plan” to become the “Chen Yi Plan”, relieve Greece’s economic agony without imposing austerity by relocating China’s planned deep water post-Panamax mega-port from Yevpatoria in Crimean Peninsula to a suitable Greek port, thereby making Greece sustainably rich much as the Marshall Plan did for post-war Germany.

Keywords: China, Crimea, encirclement, Greece, Hybrid Warfare, Kaliningrad, Königsberg

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Introduction

When the Russian Federation occupied then purported to annex the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 unilaterally, it should have expected consequences to follow, detrimental as well as favorable to its interests. Russia’s unilateral changes to bilateral or multilateral treaties or other agreements justify retaliatory alterations bent upon the restoration of the status quo ante that was in effect prior to each transfer being reclaimed. Without swift action of this design, the Alliance will risk being branded in the capitulatory architecture that witnessed events of 1939, at first the NAZI thence the Soviet invasion of Poland, and the many horrors that ensued. With strength and resolution, the West will turn this initial disadvantage into a long term strategic advantage by expanding the European Union (EU) eastward across the Baltic Sea to protect the three Baltic States from a siege similar to that on the Crimean Peninsula and at several East Ukrainian cities, to regain sovereign control of Königsberg, the former capital city of East Prussia, once a German province, to limit access of Russian oil and gas pipelines into the EU, and to limit the effective operation of China’s USD 10 Billion 25 metre deep water port planned for construction on the Crimean Peninsula near Frunze as part of what China calls in its fantasies “The Economic Belt of the Great Silk Route” (Villasanta, 2014) and what this author considers to have been the actual provocation for Russian invasion followed by occupation and purported “annexation” of the Crimean Peninsula, an objective to which Russia will never admit because it is a “frenemy” to China (Cook, 2010), in reality its enemy whilst only pretending to be its friend. Immediately following the “referendum” voting to annex the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian Federation, Russia announced control of all Crimean seaports will be transferred to a Crimean parliament republican commission, and rumors spread that a large percentage of trade volume will be redirected to mainland ports of Odessa, Ilyichevsk and Nikolaev (Ukraine Crisis, 2014). What are, what will become, the sustainable consequences of such behavior by the Russian Federation?

This answer depends upon the appropriateness of the response by NATO and the West, not only to actual objectives including land grab strategies and tactics, but also to reconnaissance sorties reaching well into the territorial airspace and waters, if not yet the land area, of NATO or neutral countries besides Ukraine. Parallel incursions by Russian fighter and bomber aircraft have occurred in North America and Europe from March 2014 through the year (Bender, 2014a). To look the other way and to pretend this is not happening is to encourage it to happen more frequently, to escalate, as has been the case throughout 2014. It is one thing to send intelligence aircraft to reconnoiter troop strength and ordnance positions of a country that has mobilized or deployed into neighboring territory. It is very different to send bomber including heavy bomber aircraft with fighter aircraft support and tankers for refueling to cross into NATO airspace, or to send submarines armed with warheads into territorial waters. NATO response cannot continue simply to be “go home”. Aircraft must be shot down and when discovered submarines should be immobilized on the ocean base. Soon this would stop. The same outcome for concentrated columns of armor: wait, let them advance, when collected in one position, annihilate them. This should have been the immediate response to the shoot down of a Malaysian Airlines commercial passenger jet on 17 July 2014 over Eastern Ukraine apparently by a Soviet-era surface to air SA 11 missile launched by pro-Russian “rebels” armed by the Russian Federation or by mask-wearing “zombie” Russian soldiers (Malaysian Airliner, 2014).
Crimea Annexed Without Recognition

As the year 2014 ended, the Crimean Peninsula remained occupied by Russian Federation troops, clearly an easy base from which Russian air, land, and sea forces can embark to invade territories elsewhere across Ukraine and neighboring states such as the three Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Moldova, Poland, Slovakia, and even Belarus, another “frenemy” that would prefer Russian troops to go away. That the Russian Federation is a menacing neighbor became evident when it strong-armed an extension of its lease from Ukraine of its Black Fleet naval headquarters at Sevastopol, initially on 27 May 1997 for 20 years pursuant to the Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet, then again on 27 April 2010 for an additional 25 years beyond its scheduled expiry in 2017 under terms of the Karkiv Pact, or Agreement between Ukraine and Russia on the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine. That agreement was sweetened with an extension for an additional five year time period in consideration of Russia’s promises to deliver natural gas to Ukraine at discounted prices, an agreement Russia swiftly compromised by anticipatory breaches and threats. In close order also, the Russian Federation’s Gazprom diminished the volume of natural gas delivered to EU nations such as Germany and Poland, in possible retaliation for Western sanctions, although Russia said this was necessitated on account of pipeline maintenance: overall, the EU relies upon Gazprom for one third of its energy requirements that range from household heating to manufacturing production (Macalister, 2014). With the Russian Federation equally dependent upon EU cash, Europe must find an alternative source of energy immediately.

Five years ago in 2009, a warning was given that a quid pro quo must be demanded by NATO and the West: Königsberg must be returned to the West as a concession if Sevastopol were to remain in Russian control (Jones, 2009). The West prevaricated, annexation of the entire Crimean Peninsula followed without any cost thus far to the Russian Federation, except a severely tarnished image in Western eyes and conclusive evidence that its current leadership is unquestionably untrustworthy by any standard. Although historically, since the 16th century, a territory could be occupied under principles of international law and custom in effect at that time by force meaning “by right of conquest” followed by an eventual annexation condoned by world governments, this practice dissipated and functionally ended early in the 20th century under revisions of international law and custom (Korman, 1996), replaced by a requirement that changes in sovereignty be recognized by other states. No Western state is prepared to recognize the legitimacy of the Russian Federation to annex the Crimean Peninsula by unilateral invasion followed by pretext elections conducted under the watchful gaze of the sniper, although Russian Federation President Vladimir V. Putin said that these elections conform to the mandate of Article One of the United Nations Charter (Harding & Walker, 2014), and that guarantees the peoples of all countries the right to self determination (Charter of the UN, 1945).

Tensions between the Russian Federation and the West tend to rise and fall periodically, much as they did with the former Soviet Union, sometimes at least appearing to parallel signing of arms control agreements that arguably favored the Soviets of yesterday or the Russians today at the expense of the West or focusing on weapons neither side considered vital to their security (Woolf, 2002, p. 1). Perhaps this pattern explains tensions today in Eastern Europe. American defense analysts wrote a decade ago that the Russians felt pressured into arms reduction talks for economic reasons: The Russian Federation lacked an ability to effectively maintain more than 1,000 to 1,500 warheads or an ability to manufacture and introduce into service than several hundred new warheads annually (Wolfsthal, Chuen, & Daughtry, 2000). As United States national
security advisor to President George W. Bush 15 years ago, Condoleezza Rice echoed American exceptionalism when she noted the United States “has a special role in the world and should not adhere to every convention and agreement that someone thinks to propose” (Rice, 2000, pp. 47-48). Nevertheless, it must be recognized that in the wake of gargantuan economic sanctions the West imposed on the Russian Federation in 2014, \(^1\) the Russian response predictably became the proverbial slogan “the best defense is a good offense”. What the West is facing is the prospect of an erosion of the gains the President Ronald W. Reagan administration achieved in advancing Western core values worldwide and especially within the territory of the former Soviet Union.

**Inland Ukraine European Focused**

Central and Western Ukraine, from even East of the Dnieper River valley region, is Westward leaning, reflected by all 21st century elections. In fact, substantially is not entirely exactly, the line of demarcation that separates cities and regions that peer Eastward toward Russia and those that gaze Westward toward Europe, is about the same as the line that divided Poland from Russia in the middle of the 17th century, as a comparison of Figure 1 with Figure 2 below reflects. Ever since the Atlantic Charter, August 1941, the West has made clear that people legitimately residing within any territorial land possess both a legal and a moral right to decide their destiny. Voters of Ukraine have spoken repeatedly that most want to unite with the EU. This decision is respected by Western core values, and it appears to be rejected by those subscribing to the traditions of the Russian culture. Here it is important to emphasize that the “communist” culture of the People’s Republic of China does not seem to respect most Western core values at all, besides some that involve human rights, further evidencing the fact that this rejection by the leaders of the Russian Federation is on account of inherent and traditional aspects of Russia’s own culture and not only on those aspects of its communist past or neo-communist presence in the 21st century.

Very clearly, not one but at least two and possibly several “Ukraines” seem to exist. From the perspective of the West, the larger Ukraine and that part of the country vital to Western interests, is Western and Northwestern Ukraine west of the Dnieper River, or that part that voted for candidates who were favorable to the West in 2010 presidential elections as Figure 2 above depicts. Most of Western Ukraine belonged to Poland in 1667, and much of that territory remained part of Poland until the Soviet Union acting in complicity with the

\(^1\) President Barack H. Obama signed Executive Order 13660 on 06 March 2014 followed by Executive Order 13661 signed on 17 March 2014. “Diplomacy in Action”, US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ebc/13660/; followed quickly with “Treasury Sanctions Russian Officials, Members of The Russian Leadership’s Inner Circle, And An Entity For Involvement In The Situation In Ukraine”, US Treasury Department (March 20, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl23331.aspx, accompanied by “EU Sanctions Against Russia Over Ukraine Crisis”, Europa.eu, that hit closer to home and forbid EU nationals, be they individuals or entities, from most commercial activities with the Russian Federation: (1) EU nationals and companies may no longer buy or sell new bonds, equity or similar financial instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued by: five major state-owned Russian banks, their subsidiaries outside the EU and those acting on their behalf or under their control; three major Russia energy companies; and three major Russian defence companies; (2) Services related to the issuing of such financial instruments, e.g. brokering, are also prohibited; (3) EU nationals and companies may not provide loans to five major Russian state-owned banks; (4) Embargo on the import and export of arms and related material from/to Russia, covering all items on the EU common military list; (5) Prohibition on exports of dual use goods and technology for military use in Russia or to Russian military end-users, including all items in the EU list of dual use goods. Export of dual use goods to nine mixed defence companies is also banned; (6) Exports of certain energy-related equipment and technology to Russia are subject to prior authorization by competent authorities of Member States. Export licenses will be denied if products are destined for deep water oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration or production and shale oil projects in Russia; and (7) Services necessary for deep water oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration or production and shale oil projects in Russia may not be supplied, for instance drilling, well testing or logging services. See http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm
United Kingdom and United States decided to “move Poland west” on the insistence of Soviet Marshal Josef V. Stalin, initially in secret between Roosevelt and Stalin almost at the end of the Teheran conference (№ 63 memorandum)\(^2\) on December 1, 1943, then in public at the Yalta conference, February 4, to February 11, 1945.

Figure 1. Ukraine Borders in 1667.
Source: Snytkova, 2013; Davies, 2005; Zamoyski, 2009.

Figure 2. Ukraine election results in 2010.
Source: Republic of Ukraine Election Commission.\(^3\)

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2 Teheran Conference, Press Reports, Private Meeting Between Marshal J. V. Stalin and President F. D. Roosevelt, № 63 memorandum, on 1 December 1943 15 hours 20 min. Retrieved http://nobsopus.blogspot.com/2007/01/materials-of-teheran-conference.html

3 Ukrainian students in this author’s graduate classes dispute the accuracy of the Ukrainian Election Commission map, contending what is in “blue” should be at best half the size, comprising only the area closest to the border of the Russian Federation, and contending only two cities, Donetsk and Lugansk, want independence.
Inasmuch as the Russian Federation favors elections to determine the proper national borders of Ukraine, parallel elections should be held in Kaliningrad, where even ethnic Russians sent to that oblast during and after 1946 seem to disapprove of the Putin administration presently. Only 10% of the Kaliningrad population served in the Russian Federation armed forces at the end of the 20th century, although an overwhelming majority of 78% were ethnic Russians, having been sent there by the Soviet Union to replace deported ethnic Germans (Kramer, 1997, pp. 2-3). Perhaps the Russian Federation should hold secession elections in its Muslim territories, such as the Suni population of Dagestan and Chechnya or the Azeri Shi’a people.

![Figure 3. Russian convoy deployments across Eastern Ukraine, August 2014. Source: Bender, 2014b.](image)

**Russian Military Encirclement Maneuvers**

Russian Federation deployment of airborne weaponry, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and tanks across the Crimean Peninsula and Eastern Ukraine obviate its objectives: to encircle Ukraine and possibly Eastern Europe generally, either as an actual or as a contingent strategy (see Figure 3). Its military is positioned transparently to surround Ukraine’s capital, Kiev. More or less equally as transparently, some are positioned to roll North or West as may be deemed most suitable, putting the Baltic States in extreme danger of being cut in the middle to leave Estonia East of Russian lines. Should this event occur, probably the Russian convoys would advance into Latvia with its high proportion of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, thus dividing Estonia from Lithuania much as the Treaty of non-Aggression Between Germany and the Soviet Union, known as the
Molotov-von Ribbentrop Pact divided Estonia and Latvia from Lithuania with the former going to the Soviet Union and the latter to Germany when signed on 23 August 1939, becoming an invitation for both powers to invade the Baltic States and Poland as well from different directions. Germany invaded Poland on 01 September 1939 from the West and the Soviet Union invaded Poland on 18 September 1939 from the East. History is in danger of repeating itself.

Exactly what the Russian Federation endeavors to accomplish with its encirclement strategy remains to be seen. Is it trying to reconstruct the former Soviet Union, or merely to keep NATO at bay and from advancing further toward its borders? Or, does the Russian Federation genuinely want to protect its Russian speakers living in Ukraine and, if so, protect them from exactly what? From a Western influence and, if so, for what reason? This distinction is generational, with mainly Russians over 60 years old wishing to look backwards, Russians under 30 years old rallying to move Westward, or so have stated most students at all levels in the author’s classes both in Estonia (2000-2005) and Poland (2005-2014) without reservation. This sentiment is corroborated by the almost limitless population of Ukrainians in their teens and 20s migrating into Poland and elsewhere across the EU, searching for a higher quality of life in the West.

**Russia Playing War Games: What Purpose?**

Russian Federation armed forces seem to be playing war games intended to unnerve the EU and the United States. Actions have included flying sorties very close to and sometimes inside of the territorial airspace of NATO countries, and dispatching submarines inside the territorial waters of non-aligned Sweden. More egregiously, Russian Federation aircraft with live ordnance flew over the Danish Baltic Sea island of Bornholm in June 2014 when 9,000 dignitaries and journalists present were attending a conference, conducting a simulated attack on Denmark (Russia Simulated an Attack on Denmark, 2014). In its 2014 Risk Assessment Report, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) attributed recent friction between the West and the Russian Federation to the EU Neighborhood Policy that Russia considers to constitute a threat to its control over post-Soviet territorial space in Eastern Europe (DDIS Intelligence Risk Assessment, 2014, p. 11).

Besides flying sorties over Denmark, Russia flew 19 aircraft into EU or NATO airspace, including eight over the Atlantic Ocean or North Sea, on 28-29 October 2014, prompting NATO forces from Norway and the United Kingdom to monitor or intercept, largely because they were not using transponders and posed a significant risk to the safety of commercial aircraft, according to the Atlantic Council (NATO Intercepted 19 Russian Aircraft, 2014). Some aircraft flew on to land at Kaliningrad, the Russian naval oblast on the Baltic Sea between Lithuania and Poland, documenting how dangerous this is to be in Russian hands presently (NATO Tracks Large-Scale Russian Air Activity in Europe, 2014). This is in addition to “zombie” drones that hovered over a French nuclear power reactor (Keaten, 2014) and Russian aircraft reported in the airspace of Estonia and Sweden (Doyle & Johnson, 2014). Speculation abounds concerning reasons for this change in Russian Federation posture (RAF Lossiemouth Jets Intercept Russian Bomber, 2014). What does Russia want? What does Russia expect to receive?

Presumably, it wants to unnerve the West by saber-rattling with jet aircraft. Alternatively, it is reconnoitering to assess NATO reaction time and assess the best alternative locations to strike in the event that becomes a viable plan, probably focusing on Nordic non-aligned countries that border on the Artic and have not joined NATO. Possibly it harbors a parallel plan to divide the EU either along NATO and non-NATO lines or to separate the less affluent periphery from a more affluent core or, less credibly, to drive a rift between Europe
and North America to divide European countries that border the Arctic from Canada and the United States. As former Israeli foreign minister Shlomo ben Ami said at a Polish Institute of International Relations conference: “What goes to Tel Aviv can go to Tehran”. What goes to London or Paris can go to Moscow also.

**Europe Polarized, Partially Mobilized**

Poland particularly is mobilized with troops deployed along its Eastern frontier, anticipating an imminent attack from the Russian Federation through either Belarus or Ukraine. This comes at a time when other EU countries reflect greater recalcitrance at disturbing normal relations with the Russian Federation from which they expect and rely upon continuous deliveries of natural gas supplies as winter approaches. Personal friendships are involved as well, particularly the longtime friendship between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Vladimir V. Putin of the Russian Federation, based on Merkel’s East German upbringing and Putin’s deployment to East Germany as a Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) officer during the Cold War period (Barkin, 2014). Strategic depth of the alliance must be augmented, not diminished, by personal relationships between and among leaders. Personal bonding of the heads of state and heads of government is valuable, provided this does not interfere with each nation’s security or the security of the alliance.

*Figure 4. Kaliningrad Oblast, until 1946 Königsberg Lithuania.*

Source: Retrieved from http://www.balticuniv.uu.se/atlas/russia/KaliningradMap.htm

European stakeholders are divided also over whether the Russian Federation and the West have evolved into what some officials have labeled “Hybrid Warfare” (Baldor, 2014), meaning a combination of cultural, economic, information, and trade encirclement in addition to military encirclement, and if so whether the West should respond with the same kind of hybrid counter-encirclement and, if it determines to do so, then with what forms of encirclement to begin with? Economic encirclement is an option, military encirclement another option,
probably the best option being to use both at once.

**Strategic Depth: NATO Deployment in Counter-Encirclement**

Immediately upon intrusion into Ukraine’s territory by the Russian Federation in 2014, NATO possessed an obligation to defend and retaliate. Both defense and retaliation could have been achieved at once had NATO encircled Kaliningrad from Lithuania and Poland, cutting off that oblast from land access to Belarus or Russia. Similar counter-encirclement should have been undertaken by a naval embargo implemented much as President John F. Kennedy imposed a naval embargo against Cuba once he knew the Soviet Union was transporting missiles to Cuba. Deployment of air, land, and maritime NATO forces should have been commenced much earlier, with much greater troop and ordnance strength, in at least two locations: encircling Kaliningrad as the Russian Federation’s naval base on the Baltic Sea that parallels its base at Sevastopol on the Black Sea, and defensively encircling Central and Western Ukraine from the Dnieper River along its West Bank to forestall Russian convoy movement toward Kiev or through Ukraine to the Baltic States. NATO troops together with materiel including air defense, armored personnel carriers (APCs), artillery, and tanks should be deployed along the Dnieper River to secure central and western Ukraine against a Russian or a “Zombie” penetration in or out of uniform, faces displayed or masked, including “Fifth Column” operatives.

Kaliningrad Oblast consists of the city of Kaliningrad with the naval port that is home to the Russian Federation’s Baltic Sea fleet headquarters, defensively encircled on three sides (on land) by the Kaliningrad Chkalovsk naval air base, the Chernyakhovsk naval air base, and the venerable Donskoye (Bryusterort) naval air base currently nonfunctional. Within 60 kilometers of its border with Kaliningrad, Poland possesses military assets: “Elblong is [a] mechanized division, and in Branevo is [a] 9 panzer kovalry [cavalry] brigade, in Goldap is [an] anti-aircraft regime[nt]” that Russian Federation analysts seem to fear in the belief that Poland is able to capture Kaliningrad within 48 hours, according to a report by the Novorossia News Agency (Polish MSM, 2014), its poor English notwithstanding.

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What NATO must do and should already have done at least six months ago is to encircle Kaliningrad by linking existing Polish installations South of its border with Królewiec (Polish name of Königsberg), then linking Lithuanian installations North of its border with Karaliaučius (Lithuanian name for Königsberg), and by imposing a “no fly” zone across that entire area. Only by taking this measure swiftly will NATO properly tell the Russian Federation of the consequences it should pay for its troop deployments in Ukraine and purported annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. If as Putin contends it was improvident of former Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to hand Ukraine from Russian to Ukrainian hands in 1954, then it was also improvident of the West to hand over Königsberg to the Soviet Union in the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, or to recognize it as belonging to the Russian Federation pursuant to what is called the “Final Settlement” by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). This nationalist argument by Germans appears to rest on the inherent distinction between the German Reich and the FSG (Buhler, 1990, p. 75). Lithuanian scholars have argued that Karaliaučius properly belongs to Lithuania on the grounds that it was mostly inhabited by ethnic Lithuanians before becoming German and then Russian occupied (Smith, 1992). Such arguments lose significance in the 21st century when both countries that border Königsberg, Lithuania and Poland, acceded into the EU on 01 May 2004. What is more important is that Königsberg should be a NATO territory for the defense of Europe even if that means it should become an independent sovereign nation.

Instead, NATO gave the impression it is fragmented, divided over whether to take seriously a vast scale
increase in Russian air and naval including submarine intrusion into the territorial air space and waters of NATO countries and non-aligned countries such as Finland and Sweden. Moreover, 2014 brought a wake up call to NATO nations including the United States that it will have to increase strength and shift its presence away from Germany and Western Europe and toward Eastern Europe.

**Behold a “Frenemy”: China’s Deep Water Port Dilemma**

This author believes the real catalyst that prompted Russian Federation president Vladimir Putin to invade the Crimean Peninsula was his recognition of China’s planned construction of a USD 10 Billion Dollar 25 meter deep water cargo port near Yevpatoria, slightly Northwest of the Russian Federation’s Black Sea naval fleet headquarters at Sevastopol. Others have considered this to be a contributing factor (Daly, 2014). This project was planned as a joint venture between Crimean Kievgidroinvest, LLC, owned by Aleksey Mazyuk, and the Chinese Beijing Interoceanic Canal Investment Management Co., Ltd. (BICIM), headed by billionaire Wang Jing who also is the chairman of Beijing Xinwei Telecom Enterprises Group (Chinese Billionaire, 2013). The transparent objective of this venture is to cut the distance required to deliver goods made-in-China to the EU by 6,000 km “catalyzing the trade between China and Eurasian countries” (Mozur, Areddy, & Yang, 2013). Xinwei Telecom continues its parallel plan to also provide broadcasts in Ukraine (Ukrainian Regulator, 2014). In 20 other countries in which Xinwei lists operating telecommunications businesses, none appear to have succeeded (Weissenstein & Galeano, 2013). Together, such Chinese joint ventures give the appearance of information, economic, and trade encirclement of Russia by China, possibly in cooperation with the EU or other powers. Also, information encirclement so close to the Russian Federation’s Black Sea naval base could involve military or naval encirclement, at least for intelligence gathering purposes, with so many merchant ships planned to enter and exit from this new port, some undoubtedly carrying reconnaissance equipment and personnel. If construction and operation of this Chinese port were to continue, the likely outcome will be to expand Sino-European trade volume by 140 million tons annually, also enlarging Sino-European trade value from USD 1.1 Trillion, the annual turnover in 2011 (Snytkova, 2013). Nevertheless, China said that it will continue its plan to construct and operate this deep water port notwithstanding re-annexation of the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian Federation in 2014 as successor to the Soviet Union (China to Link Crimea to Silk Road, 2014). In question is whether the Russian Federation will consider this “encirclement” to be tolerable with the Crimean Peninsula under Russian control, something it was clearly unprepared to abide in a Crimean Peninsula controlled by Ukraine.

Then also Russian Federation leadership is worried about the peaceful incursions of China into Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, investing billions of USD in those former Soviet Union provinces, and displacing Russian influence with “soft power” in that region (Blank, 2015). Recent encirclement by the United States, the Russian Federation, and increasingly by China, involve submarine upgrades and expanded deployments, including the Akula-II class submarine deployments by Russia and the development of the Jin-class ballistic submarine with its JL-2 missile capable of striking 4,000 nautical miles to reach America’s Pacific shoreline from inside of East Asian air space, land, or territorial waters (Osborn, 2014, p. 20). What all this demonstrates clearly is that encirclement begets more encirclement. Russian leaders are

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4 Probably this encirclement is not being maneuvered in cooperation with the United States, given that the construction of a canal in Nicaragua by XinWei that appears to be a covert Chinese operative probably would violate the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and be prohibited by an effective United States president, now or in future.
correct that in some respects NATO has encircled their territory, primarily with defensive shields. So they should not feign surprise when the West and China each encircle them militarily and with reconnaissance as well as to encircle them in non-military ways such as with trade in the form of the Chinese deep water cargo port.

A Friend in China: “The Chen Yi Plan” to Construct a Post-Panamax Deep Water Port in Greece

Then there is Greece, hemorrhaging badly with its fractured economy, badgered relentlessly by European lenders who pretend they were unable to forecast Greece’s inability to service over-extended loans and by neighbors seemingly unwilling to negotiate repayment terms of a debt Greece is unable to repay at the moment, all the while very willing to ignore Greece’s role in using much of its borrowed money to purchase German armaments used for the defense of Europe. This is Economic Encirclement, and it is entirely shameful. The best option to solve this dilemma in both the short- and the long run is for China, long a friend of developing nations, to intervene with a gargantuan investment package that will deter if not entirely thwart “hybrid warfare” in Eastern Europe. Just as China inaugurated its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2014, it should create a parallel bank, call it the Eastern Europe Infrastructure Investment Bank (EEIIB), and earmark whatever funding it requires to rescue Greece from the shame other European countries have cast upon it. What is required will be more than USD 10 Billion, less than USD 50 Billion. Simply relocate China’s planned post-Panamax deep water mega-port from Yevpatoria to a suitable port in Greece, probably Piraeus, Greece’s largest existing deep water container port. This proposal would give China a maritime inroad into Eastern Europe that it had sought in Yevpatoria, whilst at the same time providing Greece with access to more than USD One Trillion in annual trade flow through its borders. This will be sustainable development, a Chinese version of the American Marshall Plan of 1947 that worked in Germany but failed in Greece because Germany is a manufacturing nation, Greece is a maritime country, and the American plan was aimed at restructuring industry. Call this a proposal to launch China’s “Chen Yi Plan”, remembering its long-time and fabulous foreign minister, Marshal of China Chen Yi, with China’s equally outstanding premier Zhou Enlai, as architects of Chinese infrastructure in developing regions. By entering Greece and with that the EU with a super-size infrastructure investment, China will be “softly” announcing to the West that really it does not require, although it desires, membership in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), having been deliberately excluded from both. Up to this point, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the EU has been more limited, less visible. Time has come for China to become more transparent in its European objectives by providing direct financial but tressing to major Eastern European ports, including Greece especially, funding that will create sustainable wealth to benefit all of Europe and China itself sustainably.

Conclusion

Architectural and environmental changes in the relationship between East and West appeared on the horizon during 2014, resulting in Russian armed forces actions that have become increasingly belligerent and erratic, yielding an alarming risk of escalation from error or miscalculation, for what appears to be a single

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5 This author is grateful to Xiao NanNan for her input suggesting to this author that he reverse course on Greece, support its functional independence by proposing to make Greece wealthy sustainably through Chinese infrastructure investment.
reason: Russian Federation leaders pretending to be global hegemons when they are hardly even regional makers or shakers. Encirclement generally is followed by counter-encirclement, and that paradigm appears to be playing its course across 2014, in Europe especially, both East and West. If the foreign policy of the Russian Federation is to revoke its transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine on an assertion that such transfer 60 years back was improvident, then the Western Alliance should respond by revoking the Potsdam Declaration that invested the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia with control of Königsberg that was renamed Kaliningrad, and possibly revoking commitments made improvidently at the Teheran and Yalta summit conferences transferring what was Eastern Poland west of the Curzon Line to the Soviet Union and eventually to Ukraine. If the West will tolerate a Russian siege of Crimea, it should forthwith impose an Allied siege of Kaliningrad and occupy that oblast immediately, returning Königsberg to sovereignty under Lithuanian or Polish and EU control with annexation as a NATO base. What the West with NATO must do is to fight encirclement with encirclement, counter offensive encirclement by the Russian Federation with its own brand of defensive encirclement, whatever be the cost, no matter the risk. If war is inevitable, let it be sooner than later, in parallel with the command decision Franklin Delano Roosevelt made in 1941 to wait for the Empire of Japan to strike Allied assets in the Pacific, then defeat that nation. In the wind leading up to and into World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States were unlikely allies, but allies they became, and necessarily so. Fifteen years into the 21st century, some would say an East-West Alliance that can be formed between China and Europe, including the United States, is unlikely, but it is growing more likely, more necessary. As a start, China should relocate its planned deep water post-Panamax deep water mega-port away from the Russian Federation’s grasp at Yevpatoria, Crimean Peninsula, and construct it in Greece as a one-step effort to catalyze Greece’s effort to break loose from Western European Economic Encirclement, and to make Greece’s economy rise to sustainable affluence. This way, instead of investing many billions of dollars to deliver Chinese-made goods to a port near the EU, China can invest almost the same funding to deliver goods that it manufactures directly into the EU itself, in the process shoring up Greece, winning the hearts and minds of the Greek population that feels betrayed by the rest of Europe, proving to the West that China is a “good neighbor” to the East, and in effect providing an economic encirclement of the Russian Federation.

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