Accurate and Efficient Suffix Tree Based Privacy-Preserving String Matching

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Abstract

The task of calculating similarities between strings held by different organizations without revealing these strings is an increasingly important problem in areas such as health informatics, national censuses, genomics, and fraud detection. Most existing privacy-preserving string comparison functions are either based on comparing sets of encoded character q-grams, allow only exact matching of encrypted strings, or they are aimed at long genomic sequences that have a small alphabet. The set-based privacy-preserving similarity functions commonly used to compare name and address strings in the context of privacy-preserving record linkage do not take the positions of sub-strings into account. As a result, two very different strings can potentially be considered as an exact match leading to wrongly linked records. Existing set-based techniques also cannot identify the length of the longest common sub-string across two strings. In this paper we propose a novel approach for accurate and efficient privacy-preserving string matching based on suffix trees that are encoded using chained hashing. We incorporate a hashing based encoding technique upon the encoded suffixes to improve privacy against frequency attacks such as those exploiting Benford’s law. Our approach allows various operations to be performed without the strings to be compared being revealed: the length of the longest common sub-string, do two strings have the same beginning, middle or end, and the longest common sub-string similarity between two strings. These functions allow a more accurate comparison of, for example, bank account, credit card, or telephone numbers, which cannot be compared appropriately with existing privacy-preserving string matching techniques. Our evaluation on several data sets with different types of strings validates the privacy and accuracy of our proposed approach.

Keywords: Secure hash encoding, chained hashing, string comparison, sequence matching, privacy-preserving record linkage.

1. Introduction

In application domains such as banking, health, bioinformatics, and national security, it has become an increasingly important aspect in decision making activities to integrate information from multiple data sources. Integrating databases can help to identify and link similar records that correspond to the same entity across different databases, a task known as record linkage (Christen, 2012). This in turn can facilitate efficient and effective data analysis not possible on an individual database.
Table 1: Example string pairs from a real US voter database (Christen, 2014) that have the same set of bigrams \((q = 2)\) and therefore Jaccard or Dice similarities of 1.0 (same strings), but low edit distance similarities (Christen, 2012).

| Attribute | First string | Second string | Bigram set | Edit dist. similarity |
|-----------|--------------|---------------|------------|-----------------------|
| Zipcode   | 27828        | 28278         | \(27, 28, 78, 82\) | 0.600                 |
| First name| amira        | ramir         | \(am, ir, mi, ra\)  | 0.600                 |
| First name| geroge       | roger         | \(er, ge, og, ro\)  | 0.500                 |
| First name| jeane        | jeaneane      | \(an, ea, je, ne\)  | 0.625                 |
| Last name | avera        | raver         | \(av, er, ra, ve\)  | 0.600                 |
| Last name | einstein     | steins        | \(ei, in, ns, st, te\) | 0.500                 |
| Last name | gering       | ringer        | \(er, ge, in, ng, ri\) | 0.333                 |

Increasingly, record linkage needs to be conducted across databases held by different organizations (Vatsalan et al., 2017), where the complementary information held by these organizations can for example help identify patient groups that are susceptible to certain adverse drug reactions (linking doctors, hospital, and pharmacy databases), or detect welfare cheats (linking taxation with employment and social security databases). However, in many of these applications the databases to be linked contain private or confidential information which cannot be shared between the organizations involved in a linkage (Vatsalan et al., 2017). Similarly, the comparison of genomic data often raises privacy concern as genome sequences might contain proprietary information and because such data are highly confidential in nature (Shimizu et al., 2016).

Privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) (Vatsalan et al., 2013) research aims to develop techniques that can link databases that contain sensitive information without the need of any private or confidential information to be shared between the organizations involved in the linkage process. In PPRL, the attribute values of records are usually encoded in some form before they are being compared. Any encoding used must ensure that similarities can still be calculated between encoded values without the need of sharing the corresponding plain-text attribute values. PPRL is conducted in such a way that only limited information about the record pairs classified as matches is revealed to the participating organizations. The techniques used in PPRL must guarantee no participating party, nor any external party, can compromise the privacy of the entities in the databases that are linked.

Popular techniques to allow privacy-preserving string comparison are based on converting strings into sets of q-grams (sub-strings of length q characters) and encoding these sets for example into Bloom filters (Schnell et al., 2009). Bloom filters are bit arrays where multiple independent hash functions are used to encode the elements of a set by setting those bit positions to 1 that are hit by a hash function. Bloom filters can be compared using set-based similarity functions such as the Dice coefficient (Christen, 2012). It has been shown that Bloom filter based PPRL is both efficient and it can achieve accurate linkage results comparable to non privacy-preserving record linkage (Schnell et al., 2009).

One drawback of set-based comparisons is however that the sequence of characters of a string is lost when it is converted into a q-gram set. As shown in Table 1, two different strings can result in the same q-gram set and thus the same encoded Bloom filter, and therefore
can potentially identify the strings to be the same. This can lead to falsely matched record pairs because of too high similarities between rather different string values (Christen, 2012).

A second drawback of set-based comparison functions is that they only allow the calculation of an overall similarity between two strings. However, identifying the longest common sub-string between two strings can be crucial in certain applications. For example, Financial Intelligence Units around the world, including FinCEN (US), the National Crime Agency (UK), and AUSTRAC (Australia), collect financial information to help identify tax evasion, money laundering, and terrorism financing. This involves linking records from different reporting entities such as banks, casinos, and money remitters such as Western Union, and requires finding matches in a privacy-preserving way where bank identifiers such as SWIFT/BIC codes need to be paired with bank account numbers. Sub-string matching is crucial because leading zeros are often omitted, such that ‘DK54000074491162’ would be the same account as ‘DK5474491162’.

The likelihood of two different strings sharing the same or a highly similar q-gram set increases if the size of the alphabet (the number of unique characters) used to generate the strings becomes smaller, because less unique q-grams can be generated. Therefore, strings made from digits only (alphabet of size 10) will more likely result in increased q-gram set similarities compared to strings that contain letters (alphabet of size 26).

**Contributions:** In this paper we propose a novel approach to privacy-preserving string matching that is based on secure chained hash encoded suffix trees. In our approach each input string in a database is first converted into a suffix tree and then encoded by the database owner (DO). These encoded suffix trees are then sent to a linkage unit (LU) (Vatsalan et al., 2017). The LU compares the encoded suffix trees it receives from two or more DOs to identify those pairs of trees that correspond to two strings that have (1) a sub-string of a certain minimum length in common, (2) a certain minimum similarity, (3) the same beginning, (4) same middle, or (5) same ending. The LU however cannot learn the actual input strings. To

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**Table 2:** Overview of related privacy-preserving string matching techniques, where we show the complexity for encoding and matching one string. \( l \) is the string length, \( |\Sigma| \) the size of the alphabet, \( h \) the number of hash functions used, \( b \) the length of a Bloom filter or bit array, and \( t \) the number of hash tables.

| Methods / Authors | Data type | Match type | Encoding | Matching | Application |
|-------------------|-----------|------------|----------|----------|-------------|
| Chained hash encoded suffix tree (our work) | String | Exact | \( O(l^2) \) | \( O(l \times \log l) \) | PPRL |
| Bloom filter (Schnell et al., 2009) | String | Approx | \( O(l \times h) \) | \( O(b) \) | PPRL |
| Tabulation hashing (Smith, 2017) | String | Approx | \( O(l \times t \times h) \) | \( O(b) \) | PPRL |
| Bloom filter tree (Bezawada et al., 2015) | String | Exact | \( O(l^2 \times h) \) | \( O(l \times \log l) \) | Cloud comp. |
| Symmetric encrypted suffix tree (Chase and Shen, 2014) | String | Exact | \( O(l \times b) \) | \( O(l \times b) \) | Cloud comp. |
| Oblivious RAM suffix array (Moataz and Blass, 2015) | String | Exact | \( O(l \times \log l) \) | \( O(l + \log l) \) | Cloud comp. |
| Burrows-Wheeler transformation (Shimizu et al., 2016) | Genomes | Exact | \( O(l \times \sqrt{T \times |\Sigma|}) \) | \( O(l^2 \times |\Sigma|) \) | Genomics |
improve the privacy against frequency attacks, such as exploiting Benford’s law (Benford, 1938), we propose a hash based encoding for each suffix which does not allow the LU to learn the actual input strings. We analyze the complexity, accuracy, as well as privacy characteristics of our approach, and we experimentally evaluate the approach using several data sets with different string types (only letters, only digits, and mixed) and compare the approach to Bloom filter encoding (Schnell et al., 2009) and tabulation hashing (Smith, 2017) based privacy-preserving string matching.

2. Related Work

The privacy-preserving comparison of values (such as strings or numbers) across databases is a common problem for many application domains, and therefore a variety of techniques and algorithms have been proposed, as illustrated in Table 2.

String matching is often used in a PPRL context where encoded values of quasi-identifying attributes of individuals (such as their names and addresses) need to be compared across two or more databases to link records (Vatsalan et al., 2017). Bloom filter (BF) encoding is widely used in PPRL because it is efficient and supports approximate matching of both strings (Schnell et al., 2009; Vatsalan et al., 2017) and numerical values (Karapiperis et al., 2017; Vatsalan and Christen, 2016). However, BFs cannot be used to identify longest common sub-strings, because they require values to be converted into q-gram sets whereby positional information is lost. Furthermore, the hashing functions used in BF encoding likely lead to collisions (several q-grams hashed to the same bit position) and therefore the similarities between BFs are approximations and can be higher than the actual similarity between their corresponding q-gram sets, as we experimentally show in Sect. 5.

Privacy-preserving matching of sequences is increasingly required in bioinformatics applications where the aim is to find the longest matching sub-sequences for a query sequence in large genome databases (Shimizu et al., 2016; Wandelt et al., 2014). The algorithms used in such applications often have high computational complexities. Shimizu et al. (2016) recently proposed an approach for searching similar string patterns in a genome database. The approach uses a recursive oblivious transfer protocol based on additive homomorphic encryption to query sequences in the genome database while ensuring each query does not lead to the identification of other similar strings in the database. However, this approach does not scale to queries of longer sequences because they incur high computational and communication costs due to the complex cryptographic functions used.

Suffix trees (McCreight, 1976) are often used in bioinformatics to search for patterns in genome or protein sequences (Wang et al., 2016). A suffix tree allows searching for a given pattern with a linear complexity in terms of the length of the query string being searched. Ukkonen (1993) showed how suffix trees can be used for string matching, however his approach requires more space to hold a suffix tree than the original string collection. Chan et al. (2003) proposed pruning techniques to reduce the size of suffix trees generated from large string databases. Their approach aims to improve the querying of strings by pruning infrequent sub-string patterns and duplicate paths in a tree. However, pruning shorter sub-strings results in some string patterns not being matched. Similarly, Patil et al. (2013) proposed a method that combines length and position filtering techniques for pruning suffix trees and inverted lists of q-grams which results in a reduction of the query time.
Kimura et al. (2013) proposed a string matching approach based on suffix and longest common prefix arrays of q-grams. In their approach, sub-strings in the database are extracted, where sub-strings with frequencies higher than a given threshold and of a minimum length are used as indexes for sub-strings matching. The processing time of this approach crucially depends upon the frequency and length threshold parameters used, where longer minimum string length will reduce the success of sub-string matching.

Babenko and Starikovskaya (2008) proposed two algorithms that use suffix arrays combined with longest common prefix arrays to facilitate longest common sub-string searching in suffix trees. These algorithms merge the two strings to be compared using a special character ($) and employ either a sliding window or tree based approach over the sorted arrays, achieving a linear time complexity in the lengths of the two strings being compared.

Wang et al. (2016) recently proposed a string matching protocol based on suffix trees and edit distance constraints. This approach finds all similar sub-strings for a given query in a collection of strings, such that their edit distance with the query is within a given threshold. To improve the efficiency of suffix tree generation the approach employs the Burrows-Wheeler Transformation (BWT) to index the string collection. Query strings are first partitioned into segments where each segment is queried to find exactly matching sub-strings to generate a group of candidate strings. Due to the partitioning of query strings some segments can however result in higher edit distances which potentially can lead to missed matching strings.

A suffix-tree based method to find the shortest unique sub-string query for constant time online applications was proposed by Pei et al. (2013). They employed suffix trees as they can be used to get left-bound shortest unique sub-strings in constant time which helps to improve the efficiency of online query application.

The use of suffix trees in privacy-preserving sub-string matching has been investigated by Chase and Shen (2014). Their proposed approach constructs a queryable encryption scheme for finding all occurrences of a query string in a long encrypted string stored on a server. The approach uses symmetric encryption over a generated suffix tree to identify all matching sub-string patterns. However, this approach reveals information about user queries to the server which compromises the privacy of a user’s data. Moataz and Blass (2015) investigated the applicability of oblivious suffix tree search over encrypted string data. Their approach provides privacy on the user search patterns from the server but it incurs large communication overhead for each query.

Bezawada et al. (2015) proposed a protocol based on a pattern aware secure search tree where each tree node contains a Bloom filter that encodes a set of the encrypted strings. The approach is aimed at cloud environments for two parties to compare strings securely, where the parties only learn if their strings are matched but not the actual matching sub-strings. This approach therefore does not allow the privacy-preserving identification of longest common sub-strings.

The approaches discussed above mostly allow a user to query a database of strings or sequences for similar patterns, while the problem we aim to address involves the identification of similar sub-strings in two databases owned by different parties without each party having to reveal their input strings. In contrast to most existing techniques, our approach allows the efficient and accurate privacy-preserving comparison of strings from two databases to identify those string pairs that share a sub-string with a certain minimum length.
3. Privacy-Preserving Suffix Tree Matching

As outlined in Fig. 1, we now describe our protocol to match strings across two databases in a privacy-preserving way using encoded suffix trees. We assume two database owners (DOs), each having a database of sensitive private string values they want to compare with each other without revealing their actual strings. As in common with many other PPRL approaches (Vatsalan et al., 2017), our protocol makes use of a linkage unit (LU), a third party that will conduct the comparison of strings as converted into encoded suffix trees by the two DOs. As we discuss in more detail in the privacy analysis in Sect. 4.3, we assume the DOs and the LU are semi-honest and follow the honest-but-curious (HBC) adversary model without any collusion (Lindell and Pinkas, 2009). We now define the problem we aim to solve more formally:

**Def. 1 Privacy-preserving string matching:** Without loss of generality, we assume two DOs with their respective databases, $D_A$ and $D_B$, that wish to identify, through the use of a LU, all pairs of matching strings $(s_1, s_2)$, with $s_1 \in D_A$ and $s_2 \in D_B$, such that $\text{lcs}(s_1, s_2) \geq m$, where $\text{lcs}()$ is a function that returns the longest common sub-string, and $m \geq 1$ is the minimum length required of a matching sub-string for $s_1$ and $s_2$ to be included in the set of matching string pairs. The two DOs do not wish to reveal their actual strings with each other nor with any other party, and the only information the LU can learn are the lengths and positions of the matching sub-strings but not their actual characters.

As we describe in Sect. 3.3, our encoding approach can also identify if two strings have the same beginning, middle, or end.

For the remainder of this paper we use the following notation. We assume all strings $s$ are sequences of characters from a given alphabet $\Sigma$, such as digits, letters, special characters, or a mix of them, where $s = \Sigma^*$ is a string of arbitrary length and $l = |s|$ is the length of a string. We use $\$ to denote the special terminal character that indicates the end of a string, where $\notin \Sigma$ and $\$ is not included in the length of a string (for example, $|123\$| = 3). Each string $s_1 \in D_A$ and $s_2 \in D_B$ is then converted into one suffix tree, $T_{s_1}$ and $T_{s_2}$, respectively, as we describe below.
To encode the sub-strings in all edges of a suffix tree $T_{s_1}$, we use a secure hash function, denoted by $h()$, such as SHA256 (Schneier, 1996), resulting in a corresponding encoded tree $T_{e_1}$. We use a secret salt value, $r$, that is only known to the DOs, for all encodings to prevent dictionary attacks by the LU. We next describe how we generate and encode suffix trees, in Sect. 3.2 propose a method to overcome frequency attacks by special encoding of the first characters in suffixes, and in Sect. 3.3 discuss how we calculate the longest common sub-string, as well as other matching functions, between encoded suffix trees in a privacy-preserving way.

### 3.1 Suffix Tree Construction and Encoding

We follow Ukkonen’s algorithm (Ukkonen, 1993) to construct one suffix tree for each string $s_1 \in D_A$ and $s_2 \in D_B$. As an example, Fig. 2 shows the suffix tree generated from string ‘83321’. Note that we do not store the terminal character $\$$ in any edges of a suffix tree.

Following Def. 1, if one is only interested in matching sub-strings of minimum length $m > 1$, then only suffixes of length $m$ and longer need to be included in a suffix tree because suffixes shorter than $m$ can never be part of a longest common suffix with a minimum length of $m$. For example, if $m = 3$, then the suffixes ‘1$\$’ and ‘21$\$’ in Fig. 2 will not be included.

Encoding a suffix tree to allow the calculation of longest common sub-strings with other suffix trees requires an encoding that allows privacy-preserving matching of individual characters in a sub-string without revealing these characters. However, the LU needs to know which encoded characters are matching at what positions (i.e. correspond to the same unencoded character) in order to be able to identify the longest common sub-string.

Since we assume the LU is semi-honest (Lindell and Pinkas, 2009), it can attempt to re-identify the original values that were encoded into the encoded suffix trees it receives from the DOs. One common approach to attack such encodings are frequency attacks (Christen et al., 2018; Kuzu et al., 2011; Niedermeyer et al., 2014), where frequent encodings are mapped to frequent plain-text values or frequent q-grams. A character based encoding, as we require in our approach, will potentially allow a frequency analysis of hash codes and thus likely lead to information leakage.

To overcome such attacks, we propose a chained hash encoding approach inspired by Blockchain (Ralph, 1980) combined with salting (Niedermeyer et al., 2014). The salt, $r$, is a secret string value agreed by the DOs that they do not share with the LU or any other party.

![Figure 2: Example suffix tree generated from string ‘83321’, where $\$ is used to indicate the end of each suffix.](image-url)
Algorithm 1 outlines the steps we use to encode each string in a database. In line 1, we first initialize two lists, $T$ and $T^e$, to store unencoded and encoded suffix trees, respectively. Next we iterate over each string value $s$ in database $D$ in line 2 and use function $genSuffixTree()$ to generate a suffix tree $T$ for $s$ (line 3). The function $getSuffixes()$ in line 4 generates a list of suffixes, $L$, of the suffix tree $T$. In lines 6 to 14 we encode each character in each suffix $x$ in the list $L$ using a chained hash encoding method as described next.

We denote the character at position $p$ in a suffix $x$ as $c_p$, with $1 \leq p \leq |x|$. Note that these positions are counted within a suffix (a tree edge) but not within the full string. To encode the suffix $x = c_1c_2\ldots c_l$, with $l = |x|$, assigned to an edge in a suffix tree, we propose the following chained encoding scheme to generate the encoded suffix $E = [e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_l]$:

$$
e_1 = encode(c_1, r) = h(c_1 + r),$$

$$
e_p = encode(c_p, e_{p-1}, r) = h(c_p + e_{p-1} + r), \quad p > 1,$$

where $+$ indicates the string concatenation operation, $r$ is the secret salt value (known only to the DOs but not the LU), and $h()$ is a hash function from the SHA family (Schneier, 1996). To generalize the encoding function for a suffix tree, we encode the sub-string on each edge as above, but using the last encoded character in its parent edge (if one exists) as the salt for the first character, unless the edge has no parent, in which case we use the original salt. Each edge in $T$ therefore leads to one or more hash encodings which are added in a list $L^e$ of encoded suffixes.

For example, for the two strings illustrated in Fig. 3, their highlighted longest common sub-string ‘332’ when using $r = \text{‘z’}$ as the secret salt value, will be encoded as:

(1) For string ‘83321’:

$$
[h(\text{‘3z’})], \ [h(\text{‘3’}+h(\text{‘3z’})+\text{‘z’})], \ h(\text{‘2’}+h(\text{‘3’}+h(\text{‘3z’})+\text{‘z’})+\text{‘z’}), \\
\ h(\text{‘1’}+h(\text{‘2’}+h(\text{‘3’}+h(\text{‘3z’})+\text{‘z’})+\text{‘z’})+\text{‘z’})] = \\
[h(\text{‘3z’})], \ [h(\text{‘3’}+e_1+\text{‘z’})], \ h(\text{‘2’}+e_2+\text{‘z’}), \ h(\text{‘1’}+e_3+\text{‘z’})]
$$

(2) For string ‘33327’:

$$
[h(\text{‘3z’})], \ [h(\text{‘3’}+h(\text{‘3z’})+\text{‘z’})], \ [h(\text{‘2’}+h(\text{‘3’}+h(\text{‘3z’})+\text{‘z’})+\text{‘z’})], \\
\ h(\text{‘7’}+h(\text{‘2’}+h(\text{‘3’}+h(\text{‘3z’})+\text{‘z’})+\text{‘z’})+\text{‘z’})] = \\
[h(\text{‘3z’})], \ [h(\text{‘3’}+e_1+\text{‘z’})], \ h(\text{‘2’}+e_2+\text{‘z’}), \ h(\text{‘7’}+e_3+\text{‘z’})]
$$
Algorithm 1: Basic Encoding of Suffix Trees

Input:
- D: A database of strings
- m: Minimum suffix length
- r: Secret salt value
- h(): Hash function

Output:
- T: List of suffix trees
- T^e: List of encoded suffix trees

1: T = [], T^e = [] // Initialize the lists of suffix and encoded suffix trees
2: for s ∈ D do: // Loop over all strings in the database
3: T = genSuffixTree(s) // Generate the suffix tree for the string
4: L = getSuffixes(T) // Get the list of suffix values
5: L^e = [] // Initialize a list to keep encoded suffixes
6: for x ∈ L do: // Loop over all suffixes
7: if |x| ≥ m do: // Check if suffix is long enough
8: E = [] // Initialize the list of encodings for this suffix
9: for p ∈ [1, |x|] do: // Loop over all characters in the suffix
10: if p = 1 do:
11: e_p = h(c_1 + r) // Encode the first character with salt
12: else:
13: e_p = h(c_p + e_p−1 + r) // Chained hash encoding with salt
14: E.append(e_p) // Append encoding to encoded suffix
15: L^e.add(E) // Add encoded suffix to the list of encoded suffixes
16: T^e = genEncSuffixTree(L^e, T) // Generate an encoded suffix tree
17: T^e.add(T^e) // Add encoded tree to list of encoded suffix trees
18: T.add(T) // Add unencoded tree to list of suffix trees
19: return T, T^e

As can be seen from the highlighted bold encodings, these chained hash encodings allow the privacy-preserving identification of the longest common sub-string by the LU without it learning what the characters in the two input strings are.

Back to Algo. 1, in line 16, using T and the encoded suffixes in L^e, the function genEncSuffixTree() generates an encoded suffix tree, T^e, from T. Finally, in lines 17 and 18, the generated encoded and unencoded suffix trees are added to the lists T^e and T, respectively.

A result of our encoding is that different occurrences of the same character in a suffix, in fact, across a database, will be assigned different hash codes depending upon what comes before the character, thereby making a frequency attack more challenging. In Fig. 3, the same digit in different tree edges will be encoded differently, such that every encoding in a tree is unique. This is discussed in detail in the privacy analysis in Sect. 4.3

3.2 Secure First Character Encoding

As we discuss in more detail in Sect. 4.3, the distribution of the first character in values can follow a specific distribution law, such as Benford’s law (Benford, 1938) for telephone numbers and Zipf’s law (Zipf, 1949) for surnames. This potentially allows the LU to analyze if the first character encodings of strings follow a specific distribution law which would allow
the identification of corresponding plain-text characters. To prevent such frequency-based attacks, we apply an extra encoding to the first characters of every suffix (path) in a suffix tree. Our first character encoding aims to make the frequency distribution of the encodings of the first characters close to a uniform distribution.

Before the DOs apply the first character encoding to each suffix in their encoded suffix trees, each DO independently conducts a frequency analysis on the existing encodings of the first characters of each value in its database. As we describe in Sect. 4.3, if these existing encodings of the first characters follow a uniform distribution in the strings in the two databases that are to be matched, then the LU will have no frequency information that it can exploit. In this case our first character encoding technique is not required.

However, if this frequency analysis shows the encodings of the first characters follow for example a Benford (Benford, 1938) or Zipf distribution (Zipf, 1949), then the DOs would agree to apply the secure first character encoding we describe next to each of their suffixes. Algorithm 2 outlines the steps involved in our first character encoding technique.

Figure 4: Examples of three matching string pairs where the top row shows the original strings and their suffix trees, the middle row shows the basic encodings from Sect. 3.1, and the bottom row shows the first character encoding described in Sect. 3.2. The red circles and paths show the matching sub-strings, where the second column shows matching beginnings, the third column matching middles, and the last column matching ends. In the third row the first character encodings (which replace the basic encodings for the first characters in all suffixes) are shown in green, and $r$ denotes the salt value.
Algorithm 2: Secure First Character Encoding

| Input: |
|-----------------------------------|
| - T: List of suffix trees         |
| - T\(\epsilon\): List of encoded suffix trees |
| - k: Number of characters to use to re-encode first character |
| - r: Secret salt value             |
| - n: Modulo value for encoding     |
| - h(): Hash function               |

| Output: |
|-----------------------------------|
| - T\(f\): List of first character encoded suffix trees |

1: \(T^f = []\) // Initialize the list of first character encoded suffix trees
2: for \(T\epsilon \in T\epsilon\) do: // Loop over all encoded suffix trees
3:   for \(E \in T\epsilon\) do: // Loop over each encoded suffix
4:     \(x = \text{getSuffix}(E, T\epsilon, T)\) // Get the corresponding original suffix
5:     \(e_1' = \text{genEncFirstChar}(x, k, r, n, h)\) // Get first character encoding
6:     \(T\epsilon\.replace(e_1', E)\) // Replace the original first character encoding
7:     \(T^f\.add(T\epsilon)\)
8: return \(T^f\)

that will result in a new frequency distribution of encodings that is closer to uniform and very different from the original distribution, as we experimentally validate in Sect. 5.

Prior to using Algo. 2, the DOs need to agree on \(k > 1\), the number of characters to use in the re-encoding of the first character, and the secret salt \(r\) known only to them. This salt value can possibly be different from the one used in Algo. 1. Further, the DOs need to agree on the hash function \(h()\) to be used in the encoding scheme, and the number of unique first encodings to be generated, \(n\), where \(|\Sigma| \leq n < |\Sigma|^k\). We discuss the choice of \(n\) in more detail in the accuracy analysis in Sect. 4.2.

In line 1 in Algo. 2, each DO initializes the list of first character encoded suffix trees, \(T^f\). Next, in line 2, the algorithm iterates over each encoded suffix tree \(T\epsilon\) generated using our basic encoding technique as described in Sect. 3.1. In line 3, we loop over each encoded suffix \(E\) in \(T\epsilon\) and get the corresponding unencoded suffix \(x\) of \(E\) (line 4). In line 5, the function \(\text{genEncFirstChar}()\) generates a new encoding, \(e_1'\), for the first character in \(x\) using:

\[e_1' = h(x[1 : k] + r) \mod n.\] (3)

We show in Sect. 4 how this secure first character encoding approach improves privacy against frequency attacks by the LU while keeping the accuracy of sequence comparisons. In line 6, the generated first character encoding, \(e_1'\), is then inserted into \(T\epsilon\) by replacing the existing basic encoding of the first character in an encoded suffix. The rest of the encoded characters in the suffix stay unchanged. We illustrate this first character encoding approach in the bottom row of Fig. 4 for three string pairs with matching beginning, middle, or ending, respectively.

### 3.3 Privacy-Preserving String Matching

In this section, we describe how the LU can compute the length of the longest common sub-string across two encoded suffix trees. Extensions of the functions to compute the
Longest Common Suffix: Let \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) be two strings for which we want to compute the length of their longest common sub-string, \( T \), where edges are character based encodings as discussed before. This is because individual encodings of characters in an edge are the same if their original characters and their prefixes were the same.

Longest Common Sub-string: Let \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) be two strings for which we want to compute the length of their longest common sub-string, and \( T^c \) and \( T^e \) are their respective encoded suffix trees. For convenience, we adopt the usual functional-programming syntax to represent suffix trees. For example, the suffix tree in Fig. 2 is written as (where \( \epsilon \) is the empty string):

\[
\text{Tree} \; \epsilon \; (\text{Node} \; 83321\$), \; \text{Tree} \; (\text{Node} \; 321\$), \; \text{Node} \; 93), \; (\text{Node} \; 1\$).
\]

We now define a recursive algorithm to compute the length of the longest common sub-string, \( lcs(s_1, s_2) \), given the suffix tree representations of \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \). In the following, \( size(s) \) gives the length of string \( s \), \( prefixes(s) \) gives the set of all prefixes of string \( s \), \( lprefix(s_1, s_2) \) computes the length of the longest common prefix of \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \), and \( s_1 \downarrow s_2 \) removes \( s_2 \) from the beginning of \( s_1 \) (when it exists).

\[
lcs((\text{Node} \; s_1), \; (\text{Node} \; s_2)) = lprefix(s_1, s_2)
\]

\[
lcs((\text{Tree} \; s_1 [i_1, \ldots, i_a]), \; (\text{Node} \; s_2)) =
\begin{aligned}
& \text{if } s_2 \in \text{prefixes}(s_1) \; \text{then } size(s_2) \\
& \text{else if } s_1 \in \text{prefixes}(s_2) \; \text{then } size(s_1) + \max \{ lcs(s_2 \downarrow s_1, i_1), \ldots, lcs(s_2 \downarrow s_1, i_a) \} \\
& \text{else } 0 \\
\end{aligned}
\]

\[
lcs((\text{Node} \; s_1), \; (\text{Tree} \; s_2 [i_1, \ldots, i_a])) =
\begin{aligned}
& lcs((\text{Tree} \; s_2 [i_1, \ldots, i_a]), \; (\text{Node} \; s_1)) \\
& lcs((\text{Tree} \; s_1 [i_1, \ldots, i_a]), \; (\text{Tree} \; s_2 [j_1, \ldots, j_b])) =
\begin{aligned}
& \text{if } s_1 = s_2 \; \text{then } \\
& \text{size}(s_1) + \max \{ lcs(i_1, j_1), lcs(i_1, j_2), \ldots, \\
& \quad lcs(i_a, j_b-1), lcs(i_a, j_b) \} \\
& \text{else if } s_1 \in \text{prefixes}(s_2) \; \text{then } \\
& \text{size}(s_1) + \max \{ lcs((\text{Tree} \; s_2 \downarrow s_1 [j_1, \ldots, j_b]), i_1), \ldots, \\
& \quad lcs((\text{Tree} \; s_2 \downarrow s_1 [j_1, \ldots, j_b]), i_a) \} \\
& \text{else if } s_2 \in \text{prefixes}(s_1) \; \text{then } \\
& \text{size}(s_2) + \max \{ lcs((\text{Tree} \; s_1 \downarrow s_2 [i_1, \ldots, i_a]), j_1), \ldots, \\
& \quad lcs((\text{Tree} \; s_1 \downarrow s_2 [i_1, \ldots, i_a]), j_b) \} \\
& \text{else } 0
\end{aligned}
\]

Longest Common Suffix: The problem of determining whether two strings represented by their encoded suffix trees share a common suffix is straightforward to compute. In fact, we can do better and compute the length of longest common suffix of two strings, when one exists, via a simple modification of the \( lcs() \) function above by replacing the base case by:

\[
lcs((\text{Node} \; s_1), (\text{Node} \; s_2)) = \begin{cases} 
\text{if } s_1 = s_2 \; \text{then } v + size(s_1) \; \text{else } 0
\end{cases}
\]
Here, \( v \) is some arbitrary number that is larger than the longest string in the database, such as \( v = 999 \). A pair of encoded suffix trees have a common suffix if the above modified function takes the form \( v + l \), where \( l \) is the length of that longest common suffix. In particular, if the returned value is less than \( v \), then the two strings do not share a suffix.

**Longest Common Prefix:** The longest common prefix of two strings represented by encoded suffix trees can be computed by traversing the longest suffix (path) in each tree and comparing them encoding by encoding to find the longest match (Babenko and Starikovskaya, 2008).

**Longest Common Middle:** The problem of finding the longest common middle of two strings represented by encoded suffix trees can be computed easily using the above algorithms: the \( lcs() \) function must return a positive value, and there cannot be a common prefix or a common suffix between the two encoded suffix trees.

**String Similarity:** To calculate a similarity between two strings represented by their encoded suffix trees, we use \( lcs() \) as described above, and then calculate a normalized similarity, \( sim_{lcs} \), as:

\[
sim_{lcs}(s_1, s_2) = \frac{lcs(s_1, s_2)}{\max(l_1, l_2)},
\]

where \( l_1 = |s_1| \) and \( l_2 = |s_2| \) are the lengths of strings \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \), respectively. The LU can calculate \( l_1 \) and \( l_2 \) from the longest suffixes of the corresponding encoded trees, \( T^e_{s_1} \) and \( T^e_{s_2} \), respectively. The similarity is normalized such that \( 0 \leq sim_{lcs} \leq 1 \), where \( sim_{lcs} = 0 \) means two strings have no sub-string of at least length \( m \) in common, \( sim_{lcs} = 1 \) means two strings are the same, and a value of \( sim_{lcs} \) means they have a sub-string of at least \( m \) characters in common. Also, it is important to note that in the event of using the secure first character encoding scheme upon suffix trees we can only calculate \( lcs() \) of a certain minimum length \( k \), where \( m \geq k \).

4. Analysis of Our Protocol

We now analyze our protocol in terms of complexity, accuracy, and privacy. We assume each database owner (DO) has a database \( D \) containing \( |D| \) records each consisting of a string \( s \), where we assume the average length of these strings is \( l \). We also assume all parties participating in the protocol are directly connected to each other through a secure communication channel.

4.1 Complexity Analysis

We calculate the computational complexities for each step of our protocol shown in Fig. 1. As described in Sect. 3.1, we use Ukkonen’s algorithm (Ukkonen, 1993) to construct the suffix tree for each string value \( s \in D \) which is of linear complexity in the length \( l = |s| \) of \( s \). Hence the generation of a suffix tree for all string values in \( D \) is of \( O(|D| \cdot l) \) complexity. Assuming \( l \) suffixes can be generated for each string \( s \), there can be at most \( 2l - 1 \) edges in a suffix tree which are (1) the number of paths leading to the \( l \) leaves, plus (2) the number of edges leading to internal nodes (\( \leq l - 1 \)). The worst case occurs when each character of a string is different, such as ‘12345’, leading to \( l \) suffixes, one each of length 1 to \( l \), and a total of \( l(l + 1)/2 \) characters to be encoded.
By assuming each hash operation on a character of \( s \) is of \( O(1) \) complexity, then the encoding of all paths in a suffix tree is of \( O(l^2) \) worst-case complexity. Hence the overall complexity of encoding all suffix trees in \( D \) (as well as sending them to the LU), each with \( l \) suffixes, is \( O(|D| \cdot l^2) \). As detailed in Sect. 3.2, the first character encoding is applied on each suffix in all encoded suffix trees which is of \( O(|D| \cdot l) \) complexity for all strings in \( D \).

For the matching operations performed by the LU, in Sect. 3.3 we have provided recursive functions for computing \( lcs() \) and other related operations. In practice, these recursive functions can be implemented either as a breadth-first or a depth-first search algorithm, whichever is more efficient (Ukkonen, 1993).

The comparisons of encodings (hash values) instead of sub-strings will add a constant time to their time complexities. Let us assume two encoded suffix trees \( T_{s1}^e \) and \( T_{s2}^e \) of strings \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \), and each containing \( l \) suffixes, respectively. To check if any of the suffixes of \( s_1 \) matches with any suffixes in \( s_2 \), a naive approach requires a traversal through each path (suffix) in \( T_{s1}^e \) for each path in \( T_{s2}^e \), resulting in a complexity of \( O(l^2) \).

However, work by Babenko and Starikovskaya (Babenko and Starikovskaya, 2008) has shown that the longest common sub-string between two strings can be calculated in linear time, \( O(l) \), when sorted suffix arrays are used (assuming \( O(l \times \log l) \) for sorting) to efficiently obtain the longest common prefixes. In our implementation, evaluated experimentally in Sect. 5, we employ this efficient matching approach.

4.2 Accuracy Analysis

We first show that running the \( lcs() \) function defined in Sect. 3.3 on basic encoded suffix trees as described in Sect. 3.1 gives the same result as running \( lcs() \) on regular suffix trees with high probability. To see this, note that all we are doing is replacing operations like \( s_1 = s_2 \) and \( s_1 \in \text{prefixes}(s_2) \) in \( lcs() \) with the corresponding operations on the encoded characters.

**Basic Chained Hash Encoding:** We can only get errors in the longest common sub-string algorithm if there are hash collisions that map different characters to the same encoded value. In the case when the hash function \( h() \) is SHA256 (Schneier, 1996), for example, the probability of a hash collision in a set of \( w \) strings is approximately \( \frac{1}{2^{w/2^{28}}} \) (Upfal and Mitzenmacher, 2005). The probability of an incorrect longest common sub-string of length \( l \) is thus upper-bounded by:

\[
2^{-l} \prod_{i=1}^{l} \left( \frac{|\Sigma|}{2^{28}} \right)^2,
\]

which decreases rapidly to zero with increasing \( l \).

**First Character Encoding:** Consider next the setting of running the \( lcs() \) function on encoded suffix trees with the first character encoding as described in Sect. 3.2. As before, we can get errors in the longest common sub-string computation if there are hash collisions in the encoded characters. Note that in the encoding scheme from Sect. 3.2 only the first character of each suffix is changed while the remaining characters continue to be encoded in the chained hash approach described in Sect. 3.1. Consider two suffixes \( x_1x_2\ldots x_l \) and \( y_1y_2\ldots y_l \) where \( x_1 \neq y_1 \). Let us also assume that we use \( k = 2 \) in calling Algo. 2. For
small \( n \) (we discuss the choice of \( n \) in more detail below), there is a good chance that when using Eqn. (3) it holds:

\[
h(x_1 x_2 + r) \equiv h(y_1 y_2 + r) \mod n,
\]
resulting in an incorrect match of the encodings of \( x_1 \) and \( y_1 \). There are now two cases to consider: \( x_2 = y_2 \) and \( x_2 \neq y_2 \). In both cases, the basic encoding of \( x_2 \) and \( y_2 \) given by \( h(x_2 + h(x_1 + r) + r) \) and \( h(y_2 + h(y_1 + r) + r) \) will not match with high probability when \( h() \) is SHA256, since \( x_1 \neq y_1 \) in the first case and \( x_2 \neq y_2 \) in the second case. The argument holds more generally for arbitrary \( k > 1 \), which means the computation of the longest common sub-string of length at least \( k \) would be correct with high probability, with the error (collision) probability upper-bounded by:

\[
hc(n, |\Sigma|, k) \cdot 2^{-(k-1)} \prod_{i=2}^{k} \left( \frac{|\Sigma|^k}{2^{128}} \right)^2,
\]
where \( hc(n, |\Sigma|, k) \) is the probability of collision when hashing \( |\Sigma|^k \) possible suffixes into \( n \) possible values using Eqn. (3). For most practical values of \( |\Sigma|, k, \) and \( n \), we have \( hc(n, |\Sigma|, k) = 1 \). Nevertheless, the error probability decreases rapidly to zero with increasing \( k \).

How to select the values of \( k \) and \( n \) used in Eqn. (3) depends upon the size of the alphabet, \( |\Sigma| \), from where strings are being generated.

First of all, \( k \) must be larger than 1. To see why, assume \( k = 1 \) and consider two cases: \( n < |\Sigma| \) and \( n \geq |\Sigma| \). In the first case, multiple input characters will be mapped to the same first character encoding. This can result in false matches of encoded suffixes leading to inaccurate similarity results. In the second case, \( n \geq |\Sigma| \), the first character encoding will generate one hash encoding per input character in \( \Sigma \) (assuming no hash collision). The frequency distribution of the original first characters is therefore preserved in the frequency distribution of the first character encodings computed using Eqn. (3). This will allow the LU to conduct a frequency attack (as we discuss in more detail below) by mapping encodings back to characters if the distribution of these characters follow for example Benford’s Law (Benford, 1938). Therefore setting \( k = 1 \) results in either inaccurate \( lcs() \) calculations or insecure character encodings.

We have thus established the need for \( 1 < k \leq m \), where \( m \) is the minimum length of \( lcs() \) we want to calculate. For any such \( k \), the value of \( n \) does not have an effect on the accuracy of our approach. To see why, consider two strings \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \). If they agree on the first \( k \) characters, then the encoding of the first \( k \) characters for \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) will be the same regardless of what \( n \) is. If \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) do not have the same first \( k \) characters, then their hash encodings will disagree at the first position where \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) disagree or earlier, again regardless of what \( n \) is.

Given the choice of \( n \) does not affect the accuracy of our approach, should we simply set \( n = 1 \)? The answer is no, and the reason relates to privacy rather than accuracy. Note that the LU is not given the value of \( k \) in our protocol. If \( n \) is too small compared to \( |\Sigma| \), it becomes easy for the LU to guess what \( k \) is, and leakage of that information opens a (small but) possible door for the LU to employ frequency attacks on the encoded suffix trees it receives from the DOs. If \( n \geq |\Sigma|^k \), the frequency distribution of the original first \( k \)
characters are preserved in the distribution of the first character encodings computed using Eqn. (3), again opening a door to frequency attacks by the LU. From the above, we can conclude that we should have $|\Sigma| \leq n < |\Sigma|^k$. In practice, we set $n = |\Sigma|$, which we show empirically to work well in Sect. 5 for a range of data sets.

### 4.3 Privacy Analysis

We assume the DOs and the LU follow the honest-but-curious (HBC) adversary model without any collusion (Lindell and Pinkas, 2009). The HBC model is commonly used in other PPRL and private string comparison protocols (Vatsalan et al., 2017) because of its applicability to real scenarios. In the HBC model each party in a protocol tries to learn as much as possible about other parties’ data based on what it receives from other parties, while following the protocol steps. We next analyze the privacy of our approach in terms of security against privacy attacks by a DO and the LU.

**Frequency Attacks by a DO:** We assume the DOs do not collude with the LU. Though each DO agrees upon the same hash function and secret salt value $r$ in the suffix tree encoding in Sect. 3.1, and the number of first characters, $k$, in the first character encoding in Sect. 3.2, neither of the DOs will learn the set of plain-text strings of the other DOs. This is because the encoded suffix trees are not shared between the DOs but only sent to the LU for comparisons. Hence, a frequency attack by a DO upon the database of another DO is impossible.

**Dictionary and Frequency Attacks by the LU:** Once the DOs send their encoded suffix trees to the LU, the LU compares pairs of trees to identify possible matching substrings encoded in these trees. The LU can identify the character patterns based on the encodings in the trees. This includes the number of hash values that match between two trees and their positions. However, as described in Sect. 3.1, each character in a suffix is encoded individually based on the previous character’s hash value concatenated with the secret salt $r$. This chained hashing provides strong privacy against dictionary attacks because the LU cannot attack the encoded suffix trees by generating its own encoded trees based on a database of plain-text values without knowing the secret salt $r$ as used by the DOs to encoding their string databases.

However, when only the basic chained hash encoding described in Sect. 3.1 is applied on each suffix, from the set of all encoded suffix trees it receives the LU can conduct a frequency analysis on the hash encodings that occur at certain positions in the suffixes of the encoded trees. From these learned frequency distributions the LU can try to re-identify which hash encoding could correspond to a certain character in the alphabet $\Sigma$, assuming the LU knows the type of strings encoded in the suffix trees. The success of such an attack by the LU depends on the frequency distribution of characters and the availability of a similar plain-text database to the LU (Christen et al., 2018).

From the longest suffixes in all trees the LU can learn the length distribution of all encoded strings, and therefore guess what type of information is encoded in these trees. For example, if all trees encode strings of length 16 then these are likely credit card numbers, while strings of length 9 could be UK mobile phone numbers. One way to overcome this leakage of information is for the DOs to pad their strings with characters that are not part of
the alphabet $\Sigma$ before they are processed, where they need to make sure each DO has their own set of extra characters to prevent accidental matches of such added extra characters.

One important aspect of re-identification is however that the LU needs to be able to identify every character in an encoded string, because partial identifications might not provide useful information. A partially identified telephone number of the form '?1??1??2??', where '?' means the digit is unknown, will unlikely help the attacking LU to re-identify an individual. This is different from attacks on names and addresses as conducted on PPRL (Christen et al., 2018; Niedermeyer et al., 2014), where even a few identified q-grams can help re-identify a person (identity disclosure). For example, if an attacker learns that a name string contains three identified q-grams, and only one rare name in a database contains these three q-grams, then the attacker learns both the name and the individual with that name (Christen et al., 2018). This is because of the smaller domain of names and addresses (even in large population databases there are commonly only a few hundred thousand unique names (Christen, 2014)) compared to the much larger domains for example of credit cards which is in the order of $10^{16}$.

Assuming the LU does have access to a plain-text database with a highly similar frequency distribution of string values, it can mount a frequency attack whereby it concentrates on the first character encoding in a suffix, because these encodings are all based on the same secret salt value $r$ (lines 11 and 13 in Algo. 1). If there are distinct frequency patterns in a database of plain-text strings then these will be reflected in a corresponding frequency distribution of encodings and potentially allow the attacker to re-identify certain individual characters in the encoded trees. We discuss the success of such an attack under three scenarios:

1. **Uniformly distributed characters**: If we assume every character at every position is selected uniformly random from the alphabet $\Sigma$ with probability $1/|\Sigma|$, then the LU has no frequency information that can be exploited. This is because each encoding at the beginning of each suffix of the encoded suffix trees will occur with the same frequency. In such an ideal situation our chained hash encoding approach will be secure from any frequency based attack.

2. **Value distribution follows a specific law**: For a given encoded suffix tree, the LU can identify the longest suffix and then the first character in this suffix. The encoding of this first character in a suffix only depends on its value and the secret salt value $r$ (unknown to the LU). However, in real scenarios the distribution of the first character in values usually follows a specific distribution law, such as Benford’s law (Benford, 1938) for telephone numbers or Zipf’s law (Zipf, 1949) for surnames. For example, by assuming the input strings contain digits only then it is possible that the first digits in these strings follow Benford’s law, which states that in many naturally occurring collections of numerical values, the leading first digit is likely to be small (i.e. 1 occurs more often than 2, 2 more often than 3, and so on).

   The LU can perform a frequency analysis of the hash encodings that correspond to the first position of a string across all encoded suffix trees. This potentially allows the LU to learn the first digit in each string. Additionally, each repeat of the first digit later in a string (which means the digit is again encoded in the top level of a suffix tree with the secret salt value $r$) will be the same hash encoding. Therefore, the LU can learn all positions in a string where the first digit occurs. Further, due to the basic chained hash encoding
approach, if there is a correlation between occurrences of the second character based on the first character in a string, the LU will be able to identify the second character in suffixes using a frequency analysis.

3. Specific patterns at beginning of strings: Apart from the distribution of the first character, certain prefixes in string values can occur frequently in a database leading to distinct patterns in strings. For example, in international telephone numbers certain country codes might be more frequent than others (‘+44’ for the UK likely occurs more often than ‘+354’ for Iceland). A similar frequency analysis as discussed above can be applied on the encoded suffix trees, where the LU will be able to identify those sequences at the beginning of strings that occur more often than others. This will however only provide the LU with information about frequent sub-strings at the beginning of strings, which by themselves will neither allow the identification of all characters in a string nor the actual re-identification of individuals.

As we discussed in the first scenario above, if the characters of the strings that are encoded in suffix trees follows a uniform distribution it is highly unlikely for the LU to be able to identify all characters (or digits) in a string with high accuracy. As we discussed in Sect. 3.2, if such a uniform distribution occurs in the databases to be matched then the DOs do not need to perform the extra first character encoding outlined in Algo. 2. However, the first character encoding technique described in Sect. 3.2 provides privacy of string values encoded in suffix trees against a frequency attack by the LU under the second and third scenarios discussed above. As we outlined in Algo. 2, the DOs need to agree on the number of characters, \( k > 1 \), to be used for the re-hashing of the first character. In the first character encoding process, a higher value for \( k \) results in more distinct hash values generated, as we discussed in Sect 4.2 above. Further, the modulo operation ensures the resulting encodings are uniformly distributed within the range of \( n \). If we set \( n = |\Sigma| \) then \( |\Sigma|^k > n \) if \( k > 1 \). Further, we add a secret salt value \( r \) in the first character encoding scheme. The use of \( r \) provides strong privacy against dictionary attacks on first digits encodings. This is because the LU is not capable of identifying the correct encoding that has been applied on different first characters without knowing \( r \) that is used by the DOs.

As we show in our experiments below, each hash encoding of the first characters of the encoded suffix trees will occur with nearly the same frequency, especially with larger values of \( k \), even if the unencoded first characters follow a certain distribution, for example Benford’s law. This assures that the LU will not be able to exploit any frequency information about the first characters in strings and therefore cannot directly map hash encodings to their corresponding plain-text values. This makes our approach secure from any frequency based attacks. In Sect. 5 we experimentally evaluate how frequency distributions of the first characters of strings of different data types change with different \( k \).

**Similarity graph attack by the LU:** As we described in Sect. 3.3, the LU calculates the length of the longest common suffix between each pair of encoded suffix trees. Once all encoded suffix tree pairs are compared the LU can construct a similarity graph where each encoded suffix tree becomes a vertex while the edges between these vertices represent the length of the longest common suffix between a pair of encoded suffix trees.

Once such a graph is generated, the LU can construct a similar graph based on a publicly available plain-text database that has similar characteristics as the encoded databases. Then
the LU can conduct a sub-graph matching (Heimann et al., 2018) between the two graphs to identify possible plain-text values that correspond to the encoded suffix trees. One possible way of carrying out such matching would be to identify any sub-graphs that are unique and can obviously be identified based on the vertices that have a unique set of edges in the sub-graph. If such unique sub-graphs can be found then the plain-text values that can be mapped to vertices in the encoded suffix tree graph can be identified with high probability.

Such an attack by the LU requires the accessibility to a plain-text database that has a highly similar distribution of characters in string values as those in the encoded database. Though such attacks are limited in the literature (Culhane et al., 2017; Vidanage et al., 2020), there are several counter-measures that the DOs can apply on their databases before encoding and sending them to the LU, including applying blocking (Christen, 2012) and block-specific salt values, adding faked values into their databases, or employing several LUs for the comparison of encoded suffix trees. We aim to investigate such counter-measures as future work.

5. Experimental Evaluation

We used both synthetic as well as real data of different types to evaluate our novel privacy-preserving string matching approach. We used the Mockaroo synthetic data generator (see: https://www.mockaroo.com) to create 10,000 strings with unique credit card and IBAN (International Bank Account Number) numbers. From these strings we then generated corrupted versions by randomly replacing between 1 and 10 characters from the same alphabet (digits only for credit card, and digits and letters for IBAN), resulting in 10,000 pairs of credit card and IBAN numbers.

We extracted two different data sets with telephone numbers, surnames, city names, and street addresses from the North Carolina Voter Registration (NCVR) database (see: https://dl.ncsbe.gov), where the first data sets were from a snapshot of NCVR from 2015 and the second data sets from a snapshot of NCVR from 2019. We paired records from these two data sets based on the corresponding voter identifiers, ensuring we only had pairs where the strings were not the same. We then selected 10,000 pairs of strings for each of the four attribute types.

Overall, our data sets consist of strings of different types (digits only, letters only, or mixed) and of different lengths. They reflect the types of data commonly used in applications such PPRL where sensitive databases are to be linked across organizations (Christen et al., 2020).

We implemented our approach using Python 2.7 and ran experiments on a server with 128 GBytes of memory and 2.4 GHz CPUs running Ubuntu 16.04.

We compared our approach with Bloom filter (BF) encoding as commonly used in PPRL (Schnell et al., 2009; Vatsalan et al., 2017). The BFs were generated by converting each string into a q-gram set with $q = 2$, and by then hashing each q-gram set into one BF of length 1,000 bits (a commonly used BF length for PPRL (Schnell et al., 2009)) per q-gram set. We used different optimal numbers of hash functions $k_{opt}$ that lead to the smallest number of false positives (Vatsalan and Christen, 2016): 46 for credit card and 30 for IBAN numbers, 116 for surnames, 87 for city names, 36 for street addresses, and 77 for telephone numbers.
As a second baseline method we used a tabulation hashing based approach for PPRL recently proposed by Smith (Smith, 2017), where again q-gram sets are hashed into bit arrays using a tabulation approach which provides min-hashing properties (Patrascu and Thorup, 2011). This approach was shown to calculate more accurate similarities. We used 8 tabulation keys each of 64 bits length to generate one bit array of length 1,000 bits to encode one string.
There are many different techniques to calculate similarities between strings (Christen, 2012). Because of the encodings used in the three methods we compare, we need to employ different such string matching techniques. We are however not interested in the absolute similarities calculated between two strings; rather we want to know if for the same string pair the same similarity method applied on the unencoded and the encoded strings gives the same similarity value or not. For our suffix tree based approach, as described in Sect. 3, we calculated the longest common sub-string similarity using Eqn. (4) on both unencoded and encoded suffix trees (both the basic and first character encoding described in Sects. 3.3
and 3.2, respectively). For BF encoding we calculated the Dice coefficient similarity on the q-gram sets and on BFs (Schnell et al., 2009), while for tabulation based hashing we calculated the Jaccard similarity on q-gram sets and on the bit arrays generated by this encoding technique (Smith, 2017).

In Fig. 5 we show scatter plots where the horizontal axis shows unencoded similarities and the vertical axis shows the corresponding encoded similarities. A pair of strings where both the unencoded and the encoded similarities are the same will generate a point in a scatter plot that is shown on the diagonal, while any point off the diagonal shows differences in the calculated similarities between unencoded and encoded strings. An accurate (exact) privacy-preserving string similarity measure should only result in pairs of similarities that are the same and are therefore located on the diagonal.

As can be seen from Fig. 5, the similarities calculated on suffix trees from both our encoding approaches always result in the same similarities as calculated from unencoded suffix trees. This shows our approach does accurately calculate the longest common sub-string similarities on encoded suffix trees in a privacy-preserving manner where the DOs do not need to reveal their sensitive plain-text strings to any other party. As can also be seen, BF based Dice coefficient similarities can be much higher than their corresponding q-gram based similarities especially for string pairs that have only few q-grams in common. This is because BF encoding introduces collisions where different q-grams are hashed to the same bit positions. Similarly, tabulation based hashing leads to inaccurate similarities being calculated, where this approach leads to encoded similarities that are both above and below the actual Jaccard similarities calculated on unencoded q-gram sets.

These issues will affect the similarities calculated between strings for both BF encoding and tabulation based hashing, and therefore affect the quality of matched strings and the resulting quality of any follow-up analysis or investigation that is based on these matched strings. Of serious concern would be if wrong high BF or tabulation hashing similarities lead to falsely matched individuals in the context of fraud detection or national security.

In Fig. 6, we show the frequency distributions of the first characters of strings between the original first character distributions and the encoded first characters after our first character encoding from Sect. 3.2 has been applied. As can be seen, our first character encoding method results in more uniform or significantly changed frequency distributions.
of the first characters in strings, where these distributions depend on the value of $k$, the number of first characters to use in the encoding. As we discussed in Sect. 4.2, the larger $k$ the more uniform the frequency distributions of these first character encodings become.

Finally, in Fig. 7 we show run-times for encoding and string matching. As can be seen, our approach to convert strings into suffix trees and encoding them using chained hash encoding, as well as re-hashing the first characters, is faster or equally fast as BF encoding. Both our encoding approach and BF encoding are much faster than tabulation hashing which requires significantly more hash encodings. On the other hand, our encoding approach is around one to almost two magnitudes slower in the string matching phase than the very efficient bit array based baseline methods. This is expected because our approach requires the individual comparison of hash codes for each position in a suffix compared to the highly efficient single bit-wise operations on bit arrays. We believe this is a price worth paying given the accurate and privacy-preserving longest common sub-string similarities our method can calculate.

6. Conclusions and Future Work

We have presented a novel privacy-preserving string matching technique based on suffix trees that allows the accurate and efficient calculation of longest common sub-string based string similarities. Our approach encodes strings into suffix trees such that no re-identification of the full input string is possible, and neither can a frequency attack be mounted on individual character encodings. The experimental evaluation has shown that our approach results in the same string similarities as on unencoded suffix trees, while commonly used Bloom filter encoding and tabulation based hashing will lead to potentially much higher or lower similarities between encoded strings.

As future work we aim to conduct a more formal analysis of the privacy of our approach and investigate different counter-measures that can be applied upon our approach to reduce the amount of information that can be learned by an attacker by conducting a graph similarity analysis.

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