Combinatorial solutions providing improved security for the generalized Russian cards problem

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Abstract We present the first formal mathematical presentation of the generalized Russian cards problem, and provide rigorous security definitions that capture both basic and extended versions of weak and perfect security notions. In the generalized Russian cards problem, three players, Alice, Bob, and Cathy, are dealt a deck of \( n \) cards, each given \( a, b, \) and \( c \) cards, respectively. The goal is for Alice and Bob to learn each other’s hands via public communication, without Cathy learning the fate of any particular card. The basic idea is that Alice announces a set of possible hands she might hold, and Bob, using knowledge of his own hand, should be able to learn Alice’s hand from this announcement, but Cathy should not. Using a combinatorial approach, we are able to give a nice characterization of informative strategies (i.e., strategies allowing Bob to learn Alice’s hand), having optimal communication complexity, namely the set of possible hands Alice announces must be equivalent to a large set of \( t-(n,a,1) \)-designs, where \( t = a - c \). We also provide some interesting necessary conditions for certain types of deals to be simultaneously informative and secure. That is, for deals satisfying \( c = a - d \) for some \( d \geq 2 \), where \( b \geq d - 1 \) and the strategy is assumed to satisfy a strong version of security (namely perfect \((d-1)\)-security), we show that \( a = d + 1 \) and hence \( c = 1 \). We also give a precise characterization of informative and perfectly \((d-1)\)-secure deals of the form \((d+1, b, 1)\) satisfying \( b \geq d - 1 \) involving \( d-(n,d+1,1) \)-designs.

Keywords Combinatorial designs · Russian cards problem · Information-theoretic cryptography · Protocols

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1 Introduction

Suppose $X$ is a deck of $n$ cards, and we have three participants, Alice, Bob and Cathy. Let $a + b + c = n$ and suppose that Alice is dealt a hand of $a$ cards, Bob is dealt a hand of $b$ cards and Cathy is dealt a hand of $c$ cards. These hands are random and dealt by some entity external to the scheme. We denote Alice’s hand by $H_A$, Bob’s hand by $H_B$ and Cathy’s hand by $H_C$. Of course it must be the case that $H_A \cup H_B \cup H_C = X$. We refer to this as an $(a, b, c)$-deal of the cards.

For a positive integer $t$, let $(X_t)$ denote the set of $(n)_t$-subsets of $X$. An announcement by Alice $A$ is a subset of $(X_a)$. It is required that when Alice makes an announcement $A$, the hand she holds is one of the $a$-subsets in $A$. The goal of the scheme is that, after a deal has taken place and Alice has made an announcement, Bob should be able to determine Alice’s hand, but Cathy should not be able to determine if Alice holds any particular card not held by Cathy. These notions will be formalized as we proceed. We remark that we focus on the scenario of Bob learning Alice’s hand, although the original version of this problem is for Bob and Alice to learn each other’s hand. We omit the latter case, since for any protocol whereby Bob may learn Alice’s hand, Bob may then announce Cathy’s hand publicly. This second step provides sufficient information for Alice to determine Bob’s hand, without giving Cathy any more information than she previously had.

This problem was first introduced in the case $(a, b, c) = (3, 3, 1)$ in the 2000 Moscow Mathematics Olympiad. Since then, there have been numerous papers investigating the problem (called the Russian cards problem) and generalizations of it. Some are interested in card deal protocols that allow players to agree on a common secret without a given eavesdropper being able to determine this secret value. This area of research is especially interesting in terms of possible applications to key generation; see, for example [2,11–15,17,18]. Others are concerned with analyzing variations of the problem using epistemic logic [8,19,20,22]. Duan and Yang [10] and He and Duan [16] consider a special generalization, with $n - 1$ players each dealt $n$ cards, and one player (the intruder) dealt one card; the authors give an algorithm by which a dealer, acting as a trusted third party, can construct announcements for each player. Recently, there have been some papers that take a combinatorial approach [1–3,6], which we discuss in some detail in Sect. 5. In addition, there has been recent work [7,21] in which protocols consisting of more than once announcement by Alice and Bob are considered, which is a generalization of the problem which we consider here.

We take a combinatorial point of view motivated by cryptographic considerations. To be specific, we provide definitions based on security conditions in the unconditionally secure framework, phrased in terms of probability distributions regarding information available to the various players (analogous to Shannon’s definitions relating to perfect secrecy of a cryptosystem). In particular, we provide a formal mathematical presentation of the generalized Russian cards problem. We introduce rigorous mathematical definitions of security, which in turn allows for systematic and thorough analysis of proposed protocols. We then give necessary conditions and provide constructions for schemes that satisfy the relevant definitions. Here there is a natural interplay with combinatorics.

1.1 Overview of contributions

The main contributions of our work are as follows:

- We provide a formal mathematical presentation of the generalized Russian Cards problem. In particular, we define an announcement strategy for Alice, which designates a
probability distribution on a fixed set of possible announcements \( A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_m \) Alice can make. In keeping with standard practice in cryptography (i.e., Kerckhoff’s principle), we assume that Alice’s announcement strategy is public knowledge. Security through obscurity is not considered an effective security method, as secrets are difficult to keep; providing security under the assumption the adversary has full knowledge of the set-up of the given scheme is therefore the goal. This allows us to define the communication complexity of the protocol to be \( \log_2 m \) bits, since Alice need only broadcast the index \( i \) of her chosen announcement, which is an integer between 1 and \( m \). In order to minimize the communication complexity of the scheme, our goal will be to minimize \( m \), the number of possible announcements.

- We distinguish between deterministic strategies, in which the hand \( HA \) held by Alice uniquely determines the index \( i \) that she will broadcast, and non-deterministic, possibly even biased announcement strategies. We are especially interested in strategies with uniform probability distributions, which we will refer to as equitable.

- We examine necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be informative for Bob, i.e. strategies that allow Bob to determine Alice’s hand. In particular, we give a lower bound on the communication complexity \( m \) for informative strategies and provide a nice combinatorial characterization of strategies that meet this bound, which we term optimal strategies.

- We provide the first formal security definitions that account for both weak and perfect security in an unconditionally secure framework. We remark that current literature focuses on weak security. In addition, we provide simpler, but equivalent combinatorial security conditions that apply when Alice’s strategy is equitable. Here weak and perfect security are defined with respect to individual cards. If a scheme satisfies weak security (which we will term weak 1-security), Cathy should not be able to say whether a given card is held by Alice or Bob; if a scheme satisfies perfect security (which we will term perfect 1-security), each card is equally likely to be held by Alice.

- We use constructions and results from the field of combinatorial designs to explore strategies that are simultaneously informative and perfectly secure; this is especially useful for the case \( c = 1 \). In particular, we analyze the case \( c = a - 2 \) in detail, and show that strategies for \((a, b, a - 2)\)-deals that are simultaneously informative and perfectly secure must satisfy \( c = 1 \). We also show a precise characterization between Steiner triple systems and \((3, n - 4, 1)\)-deals.

- We generalize our notions of weak and perfect security, which focus on the probability that individual cards are held by Alice, and consider instead the probability that a given set of cards (of cardinality less than or equal to \( a \)) is held by Alice. We consider deals satisfying \( c = a - d \) for some \( d \geq 2 \) and achieve parallel results to the \( c = a - 2 \) case.

1.2 Preliminary notation and examples

Alice will choose a set of announcements, say \( A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_m \) such that every \( HA \in \binom{X}{a} \) is in at least one of the \( m \) announcements. For \( HA \in \binom{X}{a} \), define \( g(HA) = \{i : HA \in A_i\} \). Alice’s announcement strategy, or more simply, strategy, consists of a probability distribution \( p_{HA} \) on \( g(HA) \), for every \( HA \in \binom{X}{a} \). The set of announcements and probability distributions are fixed ahead of time and they are public knowledge. We will use the phrase \((a, b, c)\)-strategy to denote a strategy for an \((a, b, c)\)-deal. In addition, we will assume without loss of generality that \( p_{HA}(i) > 0 \) for all \( i \in g(HA) \). To see this, note that if \( p_{HA}(i) = 0 \) for some \( HA \in \binom{X}{a} \) and \( i \in g(HA) \), this means Alice will never choose \( A_i \) when she holds \( HA \). But since the
When Alice is dealt a hand $H_A \in \binom{X}{a}$, she randomly chooses an index $i \in g(H_A)$ according to the probability distribution $p_{H_A}$. Alice broadcasts the integer $i$ to specify her announcement $A_i$. Because the set of announcements and probability distributions are fixed and public, the only information that is broadcast by Alice is the index $i$, which is an integer between 1 and $m$. Therefore we define the communication complexity of the protocol to be $\log_2 m$ bits. In order to minimize the communication complexity of the scheme, our goal will be to minimize $m$, the number of possible announcements.

If $|g(H_A)| = 1$ for every $H_A$, then we have a deterministic scheme, because the hand $H_A$ held by Alice uniquely determines the index $i$ that she will broadcast. That is to say, in a deterministic scheme, for any given hand, there is only one possible announcement that is permitted by the given strategy.

More generally, suppose there exists a constant $\gamma$ such that $|g(H_A)| = \gamma$ for every $H_A$. Further, suppose that every probability distribution $p_{H_A}$ is uniform, i.e., $p_{H_A}(i) = 1/\gamma$ for every $i \in g(H_A)$. We refer to such a strategy as a $\gamma$-equitable strategy. A deterministic scheme is just a 1-equitable strategy.

Example 1 Let $X = \{0, \ldots, 6\}$. Figure 1 presents a partition of $\binom{X}{3}$ that is due to Charlie Colbourn and Alex Rosa (private communication). This yields a deterministic $(3, 3, 1)$-strategy having $m = 6$ possible announcements.

Example 2 Let $X = \{0, \ldots, 6\}$. In Fig. 2, we present a set of ten announcements found by Don Kreher (private communication). It can be verified that every 3-subset of $X$ occurs in exactly two of these announcements. Therefore we have a 2-equitable $(3, 3, 1)$-strategy.

1.3 Organization of the paper

In Sect. 2, we study and define the notions of informative, weakly 1-secure, and perfectly 1-secure strategies. In Sect. 3, we explore strategies that are simultaneously informative and either weakly or perfectly 1-secure, and include an analysis of perfectly 1-secure strategies with $c = a - 2$ in Sect. 3.1. We present a generalization of the notions of weak and perfect 1-security and analyze the case of perfectly $(d - 1)$-secure strategies satisfying $c = a - d$ in Sect. 4. We conclude in Sect. 6.
Fig. 2 An equitable $(3, 3, 1)$-strategy having a set of ten possible announcements

2 Informative and secure strategies

2.1 Strategies that are informative for Bob

Let’s first consider an $(a, b, c)$-deal from Bob’s point of view, after hearing Alice’s announcement. Suppose that $H_B \in \binom{X}{b}$ and $i \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$. Define

$$P(H_B, i) = \{H_A \in A_i : H_A \cap H_B = \emptyset\}. $$

$P(H_B, i)$ denotes the set of possible hands that Alice might hold, given that Bob’s hand is $H_B$ and Alice’s announcement is $A_i$. Note that if Alice chooses the announcement $A_i$, then $P(H_B, i) \neq \emptyset$, as Alice’s strategy requires that her hand be an element of $A_i$. Alice’s strategy is informative for Bob provided that

$$|P(H_B, i)| \leq 1$$

for all $H_B \in \binom{X}{b}$ and for all $i$. In this situation, if Bob holds the cards in $H_B$ and Alice broadcasts $i$, then Bob can determine the set of $a$ cards that Alice holds.

If for a particular announcement $A_i$ and any hand $H_B \in \binom{X}{b}$, we have that $|P(H_B, i)| \leq 1$, we say that $A_i$ is an informative announcement. This terminology is in keeping with previous work, which considers protocol characteristics only on the level of individual announcements.

The following result was shown by Albert et al. [1], albeit using different terminology:

**Theorem 1** The announcement $A_i$ is informative for Bob if and only if there do not exist two distinct sets $H_A, H'_A \in A_i$ such that $|H_A \cap H'_A| \geq a - c$.

**Proof** Suppose there exist two distinct sets $H_A, H'_A \in A_i$ such that $|H_A \cap H'_A| \geq a - c$. We have that $|H_A \cup H'_A| \leq 2a - (a - c) = a + c = n - b$. Hence, there exists $H_B \in \binom{X}{b}$ such that $H_B \cap (H_A \cup H'_A) = \emptyset$. Then $\{H_A, H'_A\} \subseteq P(H_B, i)$, which contradicts (1).

Conversely, suppose $\{H_A, H'_A\} \subseteq P(H_B, i)$, where $H_A \neq H'_A$. Then $|H_A \cup H'_A| \leq n - b = a + c$, and hence $|H_A \cap H'_A| \geq a - c$.

It follows from Theorem 1 that the $(3, 3, 1)$-strategies presented in Examples 1 and 2 are both informative for Bob, because $|H_A \cap H'_A| \leq 1$ whenever $H_A$ and $H'_A$ are two distinct sets in the same announcement.

We also have the following necessary condition.
Corollary 1 Suppose there exists a strategy for Alice that is informative for Bob. Then \( a > c \).

Furthermore, when \( a > c \), we can derive a lower bound on the size of Alice’s announcement.

**Theorem 2** Suppose \( a > c \) and there exists a strategy for Alice that is informative for Bob. Then \( m \geq \binom{n-a+c}{c} \).

**Proof** Let \( X' \subseteq X \) where \( |X'| = a - c \). There are precisely \( \binom{n-a+c}{c} \) \( a \)-subsets of \( X \) that contain \( X' \). These \( a \)-subsets must occur in different announcements, by Theorem 1. Therefore \( m \geq \binom{n-a+c}{c} \).

In view of the above theorem, an \((a, b, c)\)-strategy for Alice that is informative for Bob is said to be optimal if \( m = \binom{n-a+c}{c} \). We will next give a nice combinatorial characterization of such optimal strategies. First, we require some definitions from design theory.

**Definition 1** Suppose that \( t, v, k \) and \( \lambda \) are positive integers with \( t \leq k < v \). A \( (t-v, k, \lambda) \)-design is a pair \((X, B)\), where \( X \) is a set of \( v \) points and \( B \) is a multiset of \( k \)-element subsets of \( X \) called blocks, such that every subset of \( t \) points from \( X \) occurs in precisely \( \lambda \) blocks in \( B \). A \((t-v, k, \lambda)\)-design, \((X, B)\), is simple if every block in \( B \) occurs with multiplicity one.

In a \( 2-(v, k, \lambda) \)-design, every point occurs in exactly \( \lambda(v-1)/(k-1) \) blocks and the total number of blocks is \( \lambda v(v-1)/(k(k-1)) \).

A Steiner triple system of order \( v \) (denoted \( STS(v) \)) is a \( 2-(v, 3, 1) \)-design. It is well-known that an \( STS(v) \) exists if and only if \( v \equiv 1, 3 \mod 6 \), \( v \geq 7 \) (Theorem 4.18 of [5, p. 70]).

**Definition 2** A large set of \( t-(v, k, 1) \)-designs is a set of \( t-(v, k, 1) \)-designs, say \((X, B_1), \ldots, (X, B_N)\) (all of which have the same point set, \( X \)), in which every \( k \)-subset of \( X \) occurs as a block in precisely one of the \( B_i \)'s. (Thus, the \( B_i \)s form a partition of \( \binom{X}{k} \).) It is easy to prove that there must be exactly \( N = \binom{v-t}{k-t} \) designs in the large set.

There are \( v-2 \) designs in a large set of \( STS(v) \); it is known that a large set of \( STS(v) \) exists if and only if \( v \equiv 1, 3 \mod 6 \), \( v \geq 9 \) (Theorem 4.24 of [5, p. 70]).

**Theorem 3** Suppose that \( a > c \). An optimal \((a, b, c)\)-strategy for Alice that is informative for Bob is equivalent to a large set of \( t-(n, a, 1) \)-designs, where \( t = a - c \).

**Proof** Suppose there exists a large set of \((a-c)-(n, a, 1)\)-designs. Then it is easy to see that this immediately yields an optimal \((a, b, c)\)-strategy for Alice that is informative for Bob.

Conversely, suppose there is an optimal \((a, b, c)\)-strategy for Alice that is informative for Bob. We need to show that every announcement is an \((a-c)-(n, a, 1)\)-design. Denote \( t = a-c \) and let \( X' \subseteq X \), \( |X'| = t \). From the proof of Theorem 2, the \( a \)-subsets containing \( X' \) occur in \( \binom{n-a+c}{c} \) different announcements. However, there are a total of \( \binom{n-a+c}{c} \) announcements, so every announcement must contain a block that contains \( X' \).

An optimal \((3, 3, 1)\)-strategy would have \( m = 5 \). From Theorem 3, the existence of such a strategy would be equivalent to a large set of five \( STS(7) \). As mentioned above, it is known that this large set does not exist. However, from Example 1, we obtain a \((3, 3, 1)\)-strategy for Alice with \( m = 6 \) that is informative for Bob. Thus we have proven the following.

**Theorem 4** The minimum \( m \) such that there exists a \((3, 3, 1)\)-strategy for Alice that is informative for Bob is \( m = 6 \).
2.2 Strategies that are secure against Cathy

Now we consider security requirements for an \((a, b, c)\)-strategy. Suppose that Alice makes an announcement \(A_i\) while trying to conceal information about her hand from Cathy. Necessarily Alice’s hand is an \(a\)-subset in \(A_i\). In fact, Cathy knows that Alice’s hand must be one of the \(a\)-subsets in the set \(\mathcal{P}(H_C, i) = \{ H_A \in A_i : H_A \cap H_C = \emptyset \}\). Therefore Cathy does obtain some partial information about Alice’s hand. However, it might be possible to prevent Cathy from determining whether any individual card in \(X \setminus H_C\) is held by Alice or by Bob. We define two versions of this security property:

**Definition 3**

1. Alice’s strategy is weakly 1-secure against Cathy provided that, for any announcement \(A_i\), for any \(H_C \in \binom{X}{c}\) such that \(\mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset\), and for any \(x \in X \setminus H_C\), it holds that

   \[
   0 < \Pr[x \in H_A|i, H_C] < 1.
   \]

   Weak security means that, from Cathy’s point of view, any individual card in \(X \setminus H_C\) could be held by either Alice or Bob.

2. Alice’s strategy is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy provided that for any announcement \(A_i\), for any \(H_C \in \binom{X}{c}\) such that \(\mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset\), and for any \(x \in X \setminus H_C\), it holds that

   \[
   \Pr[x \in H_A|i, H_C] = \frac{a}{a+b}.
   \]

   Perfect security means that, from Cathy’s point of view, the probability that any individual card in \(X \setminus H_C\) is held by Alice is a constant. This probability must equal \(a/(a+b)\) because Alice holds \(a\) of the \(a+b\) cards not held by Cathy.

It is obvious that perfect 1-security implies weak 1-security.

**Remark** The condition \(\mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset\) is included to account for the possibility that an announcement \(A_i\) is not compatible (i.e., will never be announced) with certain hands \(H_C\) held by Cathy. That is, we wish to ensure that the conditional probability \(\Pr[x \in H_A|i, H_C]\) is defined.

The conditions for weak and perfect 1-security depend on the probability distributions \(p_{H_A}\) and the possible announcements. We will derive simpler, but equivalent, conditions of a combinatorial nature when Alice’s strategy is equitable. First we state and prove a useful lemma which establishes that in an equitable strategy, from Cathy’s point of view, any hand \(H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i)\) is equally likely.

**Lemma 1** Suppose that Alice’s strategy is \(\gamma\)-equitable, Alice’s announcement is \(A_i\), \(H_C \in \binom{X}{c}\) and \(H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i)\). Then

\[
\Pr[H_A|H_C, i] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)|}.
\] (2)

**Proof** We have

\[
\Pr[H_A|H_C, i] = \frac{\Pr[H_A, H_C, i]}{\Pr[H_C, i]}.
\]

We can compute

\[
\Pr[H_A, H_C, i] = \Pr[H_C|H_A, i] \Pr[i|H_A] \Pr[H_A]
\]

\[=
\frac{1}{\binom{n}{c}} \times \frac{1}{\gamma} \times \frac{1}{\binom{a}{c}}.
\]
Similarly, we have

\[
\Pr[H_C, i] = \sum_{H'_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i)} \Pr[H_C | H'_A, i] \Pr[i | H'_A] \Pr[H'_A]
\]

\[
= |\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)| \times \frac{1}{\binom{b+c}{c}} \times \frac{1}{\gamma} \times \frac{1}{\binom{m}{a}}.
\]

The result follows.

\[\square\]

**Theorem 5** Suppose that Alice’s strategy is \(\gamma\)-equitable. Then the following hold:

1. Alice’s strategy is weakly 1-secure against Cathy if and only if, for any announcement \(A_i\), for any \(H_C \in \binom{X}{c}\) such that \(\mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset\), and for any \(x \in X \setminus H_C\), it holds that

\[
1 \leq |\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x \in H_A\}| \leq |\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)| - 1.
\]

2. Alice’s strategy is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy if and only if, for any announcement \(A_i\) and for any \(H_C \in \binom{X}{c}\) such that \(\mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset\), it holds that

\[
|\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x \in H_A\}| = \frac{a |\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)|}{a + b}
\]

for any \(x \in X \setminus H_C\).

**Proof** Since (2) holds, it immediately follows that

\[
\Pr[x \in H_A | i, H_C] = \frac{|\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x \in H_A\}|}{|\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)|}.
\]

Using Eq. (3), we observe that

\[
0 < \frac{|\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x \in H_A\}|}{|\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)|} < 1
\]

holds if and only if

\[
1 \leq |\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x \in H_A\}| \leq |\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)| - 1.
\]

This gives the first condition of the theorem.

Define \(r_x = |\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x \in H_A\}|\). Alice’s strategy is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy if and only if the value \(\Pr[x \in H_A | i, H_C]\) is independent of \(x\). From (3), this occurs if and only if \(r_x\) is independent of \(x\). We have that

\[
\sum_{x \in X \setminus H_C} r_x = a |\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)|.
\]

There are \(a + b\) terms \(r_x\) in the above sum. These terms are all equal if and only if they all have the value \(r = a |\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)|/(a + b)\). This proves the second condition of the theorem. \[\square\]

**Remark** The above characterization of weak 1-security for equitable strategies is equivalent to axioms CA2 and CA3 in [1]. The characterization of perfect 1-security for equitable strategies is equivalent to axiom CA4 in [3].

It can be verified that the \((3, 3, 1)\)-strategy in Example 2 is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. However, the \((3, 3, 1)\)-strategy in Example 1 is only weakly 1-secure against Cathy.

Here is a sufficient condition for a strategy to be perfectly 1-secure against Cathy.
Lemma 2 Suppose that each announcement in an equitable \((a, b, 1)\)-strategy is a 2-\((n, a, \lambda)\)-design. Then the strategy is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy.

**Proof** Consider an announcement \(\mathcal{A}_i\) and a possible hand \(H_C = \{y\}\) for Cathy. There are

\[
|\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)| = \lambda \left( \frac{n(n-1)}{a(a-1)} - \frac{n}{a-1} \right)
\]

blocks in \(\mathcal{A}_i\) that do not contain \(y\). Each point \(x \in X\setminus\{y\}\) is contained in precisely

\[
|\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x \in H_A\}| = \lambda \left( \frac{n}{a-1} - 1 \right)
\]

of these blocks.

Then for any \(x \in X\setminus\{y\}\), we have

\[
\frac{|\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)|}{|\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x \in H_A\}|} = \frac{n-1}{a} = \frac{a+b}{a},
\]

so Condition 5 of Theorem 5 is satisfied. \(\square\)

3 Simultaneously informative and secure strategies

In general, we want to find an \((a, b, c)\)-strategy (for Alice) that is simultaneously informative for Bob and (perfectly or weakly) 1-secure against Cathy.

The following was first shown by Albert et al. [1] using a different proof technique:

**Theorem 6** If \(a \leq c + 1\), then there does not exist a strategy for Alice that is simultaneously informative for Bob and weakly 1-secure against Cathy.

**Proof** In view of Corollary 1, we only need to consider the case \(a = c + 1\). In this case, any two \(a\)-subsets in an announcement must be disjoint, by Theorem 1. For any announcement \(\mathcal{A}_i\) and any \(x \in X\), the definition of weak 1-security necessitates the existence of a block in \(\mathcal{A}_i\) that contains \(x\). It therefore follows that every \(\mathcal{A}_i\) forms a partition of \(X\) into \(n/a\) blocks.

Now, suppose that Alice’s announcement is \(\mathcal{A}_i\) and Cathy’s hand is \(H_C\). There exists at least one \(H_A \in \mathcal{A}_i\) such that \(H_A \cap H_C \neq \emptyset\). Now, \(|H_C| < |H_A|\), so there is a point \(x \in H_A\setminus H_C\). The existence of this point violates the requirement of weak 1-security. \(\square\)

**Theorem 7** Suppose \((a, b, c) = (3, n-4, 1)\), where \(n \equiv 1, 3 \mod 6, n > 7\). Then there exists an optimal strategy for Alice that is informative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy.

**Proof** If \(n \equiv 1, 3 \mod 6, n > 7\), then there exists a large set of disjoint STS\((n)\) on an \(n\)-set \(X\). Theorem 3 establishes that the resulting strategy is informative for Bob, because no announcement \(\mathcal{A}_i\) (the set of blocks of an STS\((n)\)) contains two blocks that intersect in more than one point. Perfect 1-security follows immediately from Lemma 2. Note that this strategy is optimal, since every \(a\)-subset occurs in exactly one announcement. \(\square\)

In the case \(n = 7\), there does not exist a large set of STS\((7)\), so we cannot construct an optimal \((3, 3, 1)\)-strategy. However, Example 2 provides us with an equitable strategy with \(m = 10\) and \(\gamma = 2\) that is informative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. This is because every announcement in this strategy is an STS\((7)\) and every 3-subset occurs in exactly two announcements. Examples from the literature for this case typically only provide
weak 1-security. Atkinson et al. [3] give a solution for the perfect 1-security case that requires a much larger communication complexity $m$ and also involves a complicated procedure in order to avoid card bias.

Next, we give a general method of obtaining equitable strategies from a single “starting design”. First we require some definitions.

**Definition 4** Suppose that $\mathcal{D} = (X, B)$ is a $t$-$(v, k, \lambda)$-design. An automorphism of $\mathcal{D}$ is a permutation $\pi$ of $X$ such that $\pi$ fixes the multiset $B$. The collection of all automorphisms of $\mathcal{D}$ is denoted $\text{Aut}(\mathcal{D})$; it is easy to see that $\text{Aut}(\mathcal{D})$ is a subgroup of the symmetric group $S_{|X|}$.

**Theorem 8** Suppose that $\mathcal{D} = (X, B)$ is a $t$-$(n, a, 1)$-design with $t = a - 1$. Then there exists a $\gamma$-equitable $(a, n - a - 1, 1)$-strategy with $m$ announcements that is informative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy, where $m = n!/|\text{Aut}(\mathcal{D})|$ and $\gamma = \frac{m}{n-t}$.

**Proof** Let the symmetric group $S_n$ act on $\mathcal{D}$. We obtain a set of designs isomorphic to $\mathcal{D}$. Every one of these designs is a 2-design because $a \geq 3$, so the resulting scheme is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy by Lemma 2. Every design is also an $(a - 1)$-design with $\lambda = 1$, so Theorem 1 implies the scheme is informative for Bob.

The total number of designs $m$ is equal to $n!/|\text{Aut}(\mathcal{D})|$ (as this is the index of $\text{Aut}(\mathcal{D})$ in $S_n$). To see that $\gamma = \frac{m}{n-t}$, consider a fixed $t$-subset $A$ of $X$. Then in particular, there are $n - t$ possible blocks of size $a = t + 1$ that contain $A$. Every one of the $m$ designs contains exactly one of these $n - t$ blocks, and these $n - t$ blocks occur equally often among the $m$ designs. Thus a given block $B$ occurs in $\frac{m}{n-t}$ of the designs, as desired. □

**Example 3** It is known that there is a 3-$(8, 4, 1)$-design having an automorphism group of order 1344. (See, for example, result 13 of Sect. 1.4 of Dembowski [9].) Theorem 8 thus yields a 6-equitable $(4, 3, 1)$-strategy with 30 announcements that is informative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. However, in this particular case, we can do better. Don Kreher (private communication) has found a set of ten 3-$(8, 4, 1)$-designs on a set of points $X = \{0, \ldots, 7\}$ such that every 4-subset of $X$ occurs in exactly two of these designs. Therefore we have a 2-equitable $(4, 3, 1)$-strategy with ten announcements that is informative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. The set of 3-$(8, 4, 1)$-designs can be constructed as follows: Begin with a 3-$(8, 4, 1)$-design having the following set $\mathcal{A}_0$ of 14 blocks:

\{
3, 4, 5, 6, \}
\{2, 5, 6, 7, \}
\{2, 3, 4, 7, \}
\{1, 4, 5, 7, \}
\{1, 3, 6, 7, \}
\{1, 2, 4, 6, \}
\{1, 2, 3, 5, \}
\{0, 4, 6, 7, \}
\{0, 3, 5, 7, \}
\{0, 2, 4, 5, \}
\{0, 2, 3, 6, \}
\{0, 1, 5, 6, \}
\{0, 1, 3, 4, \}
\{0, 1, 2, 7, \}

Define the permutation $\pi = (0, 1)(2)(3, 4, 6, 7, 5)$ and let $\pi$ (and its powers) act on $\mathcal{A}_0$.

3.1 Strategies with $c = a - 2$

In this section, we focus on $(a, b, a - 2)$-deals that are simultaneously informative for Bob, equitable, and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. Where possible, we weaken our assumption that the strategy is equitable and our assumption of perfect 1-security to achieve the given result. We do assume that the strategies discussed are informative throughout these results, although we may not re-emphasize this point in the intervening discussion. We begin with some notation.

Consider an $(a, b, c)$-deal and a corresponding announcement $\mathcal{A}_i$. For any point $x \in X$, we define the block neighborhood of $x$ with respect to $\mathcal{A}_i$, denoted $B_x^i$, to be $B_x^i = \{H_A \in \mathcal{A}_i : x \in H_A\}$ and the neighborhood of $x$ with respect to $\mathcal{A}_i$, denoted $N(x)^i$, to be
For ease of notation, if the choice of \( A_i \) is understood from context, we sometimes write \( N(x) \) for \( N(x)^i \) and \( B_i \) for \( B_i^i \).

We can also extend these notions as follows. We define the block neighborhood of the set \( \{x_1, \ldots, x_t\} \), denoted \( B_{x_1,\ldots,x_t}^i \), to be \( B_{x_1,\ldots,x_t}^i = \{H_A \in A_i : x_1, \ldots, x_t \in H_A\} \). Similarly, we define the neighborhood of \( x_1, \ldots, x_t \), denoted \( N(x_1, \ldots, x_t)^i \), to be

\[
N(x_1, \ldots, x_t)^i = \left( \bigcup_{H_A \in B_{x_1,\ldots,x_t}^i} H_A \right) \setminus \{x\}.
\]

If \( i \) is understood from context, we refer to \( B_{x_1,\ldots,x_t}^i \) and \( N(x_1, \ldots, x_t)^i \).

We begin with a preliminary lemma concerning block neighborhoods. A simple consequence of an \((a, b, a - 1)\)-strategy being informative is that the intersection of any two distinct block neighborhoods has cardinality less than one.

**Lemma 3** Consider an \((a, b, c)\)-deal such that \( a - c = 2 \) and a corresponding announcement \( A_i \). Suppose that Alice’s strategy is informative for Bob. Then for any distinct \( x, y \in X \), there is at most one hand \( H_A \in A_i \) such that \( x, y \in H_A \). That is, \(|B_x \cap B_y| \leq 1\).

**Proof** This follows directly from Theorem 1. \( \square \)

An interesting question concerns which hands are possible (i.e., occur with probability greater than zero) for Cathy for any given announcement \( A_i \). The following lemma shows that Cathy may hold a subset of any hand \( H_A \) that appears in \( A_i \). We will then extend this result to show that Cathy’s hand may consist of a subset of size \( c - 1 \) from any hand \( H_A \) appearing in \( A_i \), together with another card \( z \not\in H_A \).

**Lemma 4** Consider an \((a, b, c)\)-deal such that \( a - c = 2 \) and a corresponding announcement \( A_i \). Suppose that Alice’s strategy is informative for Bob and weakly 1-secure against Cathy. Let \( H_A \in A_i \) and \( Y \subset H_A \) satisfying \(|Y| = c\). Then \( \mathcal{P}(Y, i) \neq \emptyset \).

**Proof** We proceed by contradiction. Write \( H_A = \{x_1, \ldots, x_c, x_{c+1}, \ldots, x_d\} \) and \( Y = \{x_1, \ldots, x_c\} \). Suppose \( \mathcal{P}(Y, i) = \emptyset \). Then every hand of \( A_i \) intersects \( Y \). In particular, by Lemma 3, every hand in \( A_i \) (excluding \( H_A \)) contains exactly one element of \( Y \).

Now, since Alice’s strategy is weakly 1-secure against Cathy, there must be some \( H_A' \in A_i \) such that \( H_A' \neq H_A \). By the above argument, \(|H_A' \cap Y| = 1\). Suppose, without loss of generality, \( H_A' \) contains \( x_1 \). We will now use the existence of \( H_A' \) to construct a possible hand for Cathy that would imply Alice holds \( x_1 \).

Define \( Y' = \{x_2, \ldots, x_{d-1}\} \), so \(|Y'| = c\). Then \( \mathcal{P}(Y', i) \) consists of all the blocks in \( A_i \) containing \( x_1 \) (except for \( H_A \)). In particular, \( H_A' \in \mathcal{P}(Y', i) \), so this set is nonempty, and therefore \( Y' \) is a possible hand for Cathy. But if Cathy holds \( Y' \), Alice must hold \( x_1 \), which contradicts the security assumption. \( \square \)

Before we generalize Lemma 4, we will need the following result, which shows that, given a particular announcement \( A_i \) and choice of card \( x \), at least two hands in \( A_i \) must contain \( x \) and at least two hands in \( A_i \) must not contain \( x \). We remark that Albert et al. [1] show a related result, namely that given an informative and weakly 1-secure announcement, each card must appear in at least \( c + 1 \) hands.
Lemma 5 Consider an \((a, b, c)\)-deal such that \(a - c = 2\) and a corresponding announcement \(A_i\). Suppose that Alice’s strategy is informative for Bob and weakly 1-secure against Cathy. Suppose \(x \in X\). Then there are at least two hands of \(A_i\) containing \(x\) and at least two hands of \(A_i\) that do not contain \(x\).

Proof We proceed by contradiction. We first show there exist \(H_A, H_A' \in A_i\) which contain \(x\). Now, there must be some \(H_A \in A_i\) satisfying \(x \in H_A\), as otherwise \(x\) is not held by Alice. Suppose all other hands of \(A_i\) do not contain \(x\). By Lemma 4, we may pick \(Y \subseteq H_A, |Y| = c\), where \(P(Y, i) \neq \emptyset\). That is, \(Y\) is a possible hand for Cathy. But since \(H_A \notin P(Y, i)\), there must be some other \(H_A' \in A_i\) such that \(x \notin H_A'\). Otherwise, if Cathy holds \(Y\), then Cathy knows \(x\) is not held by Alice.

We show in a similar fashion there exist \(H_A, H_A' \in A_i\) which do not contain \(x\). There must be some \(H_A \in A_i\) satisfying \(x \notin H_A\), as otherwise \(x\) must be held by Alice. Suppose all other hands of \(A_i\) contain \(x\). By Lemma 4, we may pick \(Y \subseteq H_A, |Y| = c\), where \(P(Y, i) \neq \emptyset\). That is, \(Y\) is a possible hand for Cathy. But since \(H_A \notin P(Y, i)\), there must be some other \(H_A' \in A_i\) such that \(x \notin H_A'\). Otherwise, if Cathy holds \(Y\), then Cathy knows \(x\) is held by Alice.

Lemma 6 Consider an \((a, b, c)\)-deal such that \(a - c = 2\). Suppose that Alice’s strategy is informative for Bob and weakly 1-secure against Cathy. Let \(H_A \in A_i\) and \(Y \subseteq H_A\) satisfying \(|Y| = c - 1\). Let \(z \in X\) such that \(z \notin H_A\). Then \(P(Y \cup \{z\}, i) \neq \emptyset\).

Proof We proceed by contradiction. Write \(H_A = \{x_1, \ldots, x_c, x_{c+1}, \ldots, x_a\}\) and \(Y = \{x_1, \ldots, x_{c-1}\}\). Suppose \(P(Y \cup \{z\}, i) = \emptyset\). Then every hand of \(A_i\) intersects \(Y \cup \{z\}\). In particular, by Lemma 3, every hand in \(A_i\) (excluding \(H_A\)) contains at most one element of \(Y\).

Now, by Lemma 5, there must be some \(H_A' \in A_i\) such that \(H_A' \neq H_A\) and \(z \notin H_A'\). By the above argument, \(|H_A' \cap (Y \cup \{z\})| = 1\). Suppose, without loss of generality, \(H_A'\) contains \(x_1\). We will now use the existence of \(H_A'\) to construct a possible hand \(Y'\) for Cathy that would imply Alice holds \(x_1\).

Define \(Y' = \{x_2, \ldots, x_c, z\} = (Y \setminus \{x_1\}) \cup \{z\} \cup \{x_c\}\), so \(|Y'| = c\). Here we include \(x_c \in Y'\) for technical reasons. We want \(|Y'| = c\) and we need \(H_A' \cap Y' = \emptyset\), which we have since Lemma 3 implies the elements \(x_1, x_c\) cannot both be in \(H_A'\).

Then \(P(Y', i)\) consists of all the blocks in \(A_i\) that do not contain \(x_2, \ldots, x_c, z\). This implies all elements of \(P(Y', i)\) must contain \(x_1\), since every hand of \(A_i\) necessarily intersects \(Y \cup \{z\}\), and \(x_1\) is the only element of \(Y \cup \{z\}\) not in \(Y'\). Since \(H_A' \in P(Y', i)\), we have that this set is nonempty, so \(Y'\) is a possible hand for Cathy. But if Cathy holds \(Y'\), Alice must hold \(x_1\), which contradicts the security assumption.

We remark that it is possible to use the above results to show that any hand is actually possible for Cathy in this case. That is, consider an \((a, b, c)\)-strategy such that \(a - c = 2\), which is informative for Bob and weakly 1-secure against Cathy. Given an announcement \(A_i\) and a hand \(H_C \in \binom{X}{c}\), we can show \(P(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset\). We do not include the proof here, however, as we do not require this strong of a result for our purposes.

We are now ready to show one of our main results concerning the special case \(c = a - 2\). Namely, any \((a, b, a - 2)\)-strategy that is informative, equitable, and perfectly 1-secure also satisfies \(c = 1\):

Theorem 9 Consider an \((a, b, c)\)-deal such that \(a - c = 2\). Suppose that Alice’s strategy is equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. Then \(a = 3\) and hence \(c = 1\).
Proof Consider an announcement $A_i$. Suppose $H_A = \{x_1, \ldots, x_a\} \in A_i$. First note that $a \geq 3$, since $c \geq 1$ and $a - c = 2$.

Let $B_{x_1}$ be the block neighborhood of $x_1$ and suppose $|B_{x_1}| = r$. Let $B_{x_2}$ be the block neighborhood of $x_2$ and suppose $|B_{x_2}| = s$. By Lemma 5, we have $r, s \geq 2$.

Set $H_C = \{x_3, \ldots, x_a\}$. By Lemma 4, we have $\mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset$. Then we have (by Lemma 3), $|B_{x_1}\setminus B_{H_C}| = r - 1$ and $|B_{x_2}\setminus B_{H_C}| = s - 1$. By Theorem 5, we have $|B_{x_1}\setminus B_{H_C}| = |B_{x_2}\setminus B_{H_C}|$, so $r = s$.

Now consider $z$ such that $z \in N(x_1)$. We show $z \in N(x_2)$ as well. For the case $c = 1$, Lemma 4 implies we may set $H_C = \{z\}$. Then if $z \notin N(x_2)$, by Lemma 3, we would have $|B_{x_1}\setminus B_{H_C}| = r - 1$ and $|B_{x_2}\setminus B_{H_C}| = s$. By Theorem 5, we have $r - 1 = s$, a contradiction since $r = s$. It now suffices to consider $a \geq 4$. Set $H_C = \{x_4, \ldots, x_a, z\}$; by Lemma 6, we have $\mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset$, so $H_C$ is a possible hand for Cathy. If $z \notin N(x_2)$, by Lemma 3, we would have $|B_{x_1}\setminus B_{H_C}| = r - 2$ and $|B_{x_2}\setminus B_{H_C}| = s - 1$. But by Theorem 5, we have $r - 2 = s - 1$, a contradiction since $r = s$. Therefore $z \in N(x_2)$.

Suppose $H_A' = \{z_1, \ldots, z_{a-1}, x_1\} \in B_{x_1}$, where $H_A' \neq H_A$, and set $H_C = \{z_1, \ldots, z_{a-2}\}$. By Lemma 3, we have $|B_{x_1}\setminus B_{H_C}| = r - 1$. By the above argument, $z_1, \ldots, z_{a-2} \notin N(x_2)$ and by Lemma 3, these points occur in different blocks of $x_2$ and each point occurs exactly once. So $|B_{x_2}\setminus B_{H_C}| = s - (a - 2)$. By Lemma 4, we have $\mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset$. So by Theorem 5, we have $|B_{x_1}\setminus B_{H_C}| = |B_{x_2}\setminus B_{H_C}|$, so $r - 1 = s = a + 2$. Since we also have $r = s$, this implies $a = 3$, as desired. \qed

In light of Theorem 9, we now focus on $(3, n - 4, 1)$-strategies that are equitable and perfectly 1-secure. Given this special case, the stronger security assumption allows us to state some useful results concerning the neighborhoods of particular cards. We first show that any two points must have a common neighbor, which provides the basis for a much stronger result concerning neighborhoods. In fact, the neighborhoods of any two distinct points (minus the points themselves) are the same. The next two lemmas are the final ingredients needed for our second main result, namely that announcements in such strategies are necessarily Steiner triple systems.

Lemma 7 Suppose $(a, b, c) = (3, n - 4, 1)$ and fix a corresponding announcement $A_i$. Suppose that Alice’s strategy is equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. Then for any distinct $x, y \in X$, there exists $z \in X$ such that $z \in N(x) \cap N(y)$.

Proof We proceed by contradiction. Let $x, y \in X$ and suppose $N(x) \cap N(y) = \emptyset$. We proceed by using a combination of Lemma 3 and the results of Theorem 5 to count and compare the size of the block neighborhoods of $x$ and $y$ in light of possible hands for Cathy. Recall that, from Cathy’s point of view, the block neighborhoods of $x$ and $y$ must have the same size.

Let $B_x$ be the block neighborhood of $x$ and suppose $|B_x| = r$. Let $B_y$ be the block neighborhood of $y$ and suppose $|B_y| = s$. From Lemma 5, we have $r, s \geq 2$.

Thus, there must be some $\ell \in N(x)$ such that $\ell \notin N(y)$. By Lemma 4, we may set $H_C = \{\ell\}$. Consider $B_x \setminus B_{H_C}$. By Lemma 3 and since $\ell \in N(x)$, we see that $|B_x \setminus B_{H_C}| = |B_x| - 1 = r - 1$. Since $\ell \notin N(y)$, we have $|B_y \setminus B_{H_C}| = s$. Then since Alice’s strategy is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy, by Theorem 5, we also have $|B_x \setminus B_{H_C}| = |B_y \setminus B_{H_C}|$. This implies $s = r - 1$.

Similarly, we have some $\ell' \in N(y)$ such that $\ell' \notin N(x)$. By Lemma 4, we may set $H_C = \{\ell'\}$. By the same argument as above, we have $|B_y \setminus B_{H_C}| = |B_y| - 1 = s - 1$ and $|B_x \setminus B_{H_C}| = r$. Since $|B_x \setminus B_{H_C}| = |B_y \setminus B_{H_C}|$, we conclude $s = r + 1$.

Thus we have a contradiction. \qed
Lemma 8 Suppose \((a, b, c) = (3, n - 4, 1)\) and fix a corresponding announcement \(A_i\). Suppose that Alice’s strategy is equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. Then for any distinct \(x, y \in X\), we have \(N(x) \setminus \{y\} = N(y) \setminus \{x\}\).

Proof Let \(x, y \in X\) be distinct. Let \(B_x\) be the block neighborhood of \(x\) and suppose \(|B_x| = r\). Let \(B_y\) be the block neighborhood of \(y\) and suppose \(|B_y| = s\). From Lemma 5, we have \(r, s \geq 2\). We use a technique similar to that used in the proof of Lemma 7, i.e., counting and comparing the sizes of block neighborhoods.

By Lemma 7, there exists \(z \in X\) such that \(z \in N(x) \cap N(y)\). We observe that, by Lemma 4, we may set \(H_C = \{z\}\). Then we have (by Lemma 3) \(|B_x \setminus B_{H_C}| = r - 1\) and \(|B_y \setminus B_{H_C}| = s - 1\). By Theorem 5, we have \(|B_x \setminus B_{H_C}| = |B_y \setminus B_{H_C}|\), so \(r = s\).

We proceed by contradiction. First suppose there is \(\ell \neq x, y\) such that \(\ell \in N(x)\) but \(\ell \notin N(y)\). By Lemma 4, we may set \(H_C = \{\ell\}\). We then have (by Lemma 3) \(|B_x \setminus B_{H_C}| = r - 1\) and \(|B_y \setminus B_{H_C}| = s - 1\). By Theorem 5, we have \(|B_x \setminus B_{H_C}| = |B_y \setminus B_{H_C}|\), so \(r = s = 0\), a contradiction. This implies that \(N(x) \setminus \{y\} \subseteq N(y) \setminus \{x\}\).

Now suppose there is \(\ell' \neq x, y\) such that \(\ell' \in N(y)\) but \(\ell' \notin N(x)\). We observe that, by Lemma 4, we may set \(H_C = \{\ell'\}\). We then have (by Lemma 3) \(|B_x \setminus B_{H_C}| = r\) and \(|B_y \setminus B_{H_C}| = s - 1\). By Theorem 5, we have \(|B_x \setminus B_{H_C}| = |B_y \setminus B_{H_C}|\), so \(r = s = 1\), a contradiction. This implies that \(N(y) \setminus \{x\} \subseteq N(x) \setminus \{y\}\). \(\square\)

Theorem 10 Suppose \((a, b, c) = (3, n - 4, 1)\) and suppose that Alice’s strategy is equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. Then every announcement is a Steiner triple system.

Proof Fix an \((a, b, c)\)-deal and suppose Alice’s strategy is equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. Consider a corresponding announcement \(A_i\). Then in particular, each hand of \(A_i\) has size 3.

We first observe that Lemma 3 implies that any pair \(x, y \in X\) occurs in at most one hand of \(A_i\). It remains to show that any pair \(x, y \in X\) occurs in exactly one hand of \(A_i\).

Let \(x, y \in X\). By Lemma 7, there is some point \(z \in X\) such that \(z \in N(x) \cap N(y)\). In particular, \(x \in N(z)\). By Lemma 8, we have \(N(z) \setminus \{y\} = N(y) \setminus \{z\}\). Since \(z \in N(y)\), we see that \(N(z) \setminus \{y\} \cup \{z\} = N(y)\). But \(x \neq y, z\) and \(x \in N(z)\), so we have \(x \in N(y)\). This gives us the desired result. \(\square\)

We present an interesting example in the case \(a = 4, c = 2\).

Example 4 It was proven by Chouinard [4] that there is a large set of 2-(13, 4, 1)-designs. There are \(\left(\begin{array}{c}13 \\ 2\end{array}\right) = 55\) designs in the large set. This yields a deterministic \((4, 7, 2)\)-strategy that is informative for Bob. We can easily determine the security of the scheme against Cathy. Suppose that Alice’s announcement is \(A_i\) and Cathy’s hand is \(H_C = \{y, z\}\). There is a unique block in \(A_i\) that contains the pair \(\{y, z\}\), say \(\{w, x, y, z\}\). There are three blocks that contain \(y\) but not \(z\), and three blocks that contain \(z\) but not \(y\). Since \(A_i\) contains 13 blocks, it follows that the set \(\mathcal{P}(\{y, z\}, i)\) consists of six blocks. Within these six blocks, \(w\) and \(x\) occur three times, and every point in \(X \setminus \{w, x, y, z\}\) occurs twice. Therefore, we have

\[\Pr[w \in H_A \setminus H_C] = \Pr[x \in H_A \setminus H_C] = \frac{1}{2}\]

and

\[\Pr[u \in H_A \setminus H_C] = \frac{1}{3}\]

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for all \( u \in X \setminus \{w, x, y, z\}\). If a \((4, 7, 2)\)-strategy were perfectly 1-secure against Cathy (which is impossible, in view of Theorem 9), we would have
\[
\Pr[u \in H_A | H_C] = \frac{4}{11}
\]
for all \( u \in X \setminus H_C \).

4 Generalized notions of security

We may generalize the definitions of weak and perfect 1-security to weak and perfect \( \delta \)-security in the natural way.

**Definition 5** Let \( 1 \leq \delta \leq a \).

1. Alice’s strategy is weakly \( \delta \)-secure against Cathy provided that for any \( \delta' \) such that \( 1 \leq \delta' \leq \delta \), for any announcement \( A_i \), for any \( H_C \in \binom{X}{c} \) such that \( \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset \), and for any \( x_1, \ldots, x_{\delta'} \in X \setminus H_C \), it holds that
\[
0 < \Pr[x_1, \ldots, x_{\delta'} \in H_A | i, H_C] < 1.
\]
Weak security means that, from Cathy’s point of view, any set of \( \delta \) or fewer elements from \( X \setminus H_C \) may or may not be held by Alice.

2. Alice’s strategy is perfectly \( \delta \)-secure against Cathy provided that for any \( \delta' \) such that \( 1 \leq \delta' \leq \delta \), for any announcement \( A_i \), for any \( H_C \in \binom{X}{c} \) such that \( \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset \), and for any \( x_1, \ldots, x_{\delta'} \in X \setminus H_C \), it holds that
\[
\Pr[x_1, \ldots, x_{\delta'} \in H_A | i, H_C] = \frac{\binom{a}{\delta'}}{\binom{a+b}{\delta'}}.
\]
Perfect security means that, from Cathy’s point of view, the probability that any set of \( \delta \) or fewer cards from \( X \setminus H_C \) is held by Alice is a constant.

It is obvious that perfect \( \delta \)-security implies weak \( \delta \)-security.

**Remark** The condition \( \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset \) is included to account for the possibility that an announcement \( A_i \) is not compatible with certain hands \( H_C \) held by Cathy.

The conditions for weak and perfect \( \delta \)-security depend on the probability distributions \( p_{H_A} \) and the possible announcements. As before, we will derive simpler, but equivalent, conditions of a combinatorial nature when Alice’s strategy is equitable.

**Theorem 11** Suppose that Alice’s strategy is \( \gamma \)-equitable. Then the following hold:

1. Alice’s strategy is weakly \( \delta \)-secure against Cathy if and only if, for any \( \delta' \) such that \( 1 \leq \delta' \leq \delta \), for any announcement \( A_i \), for any \( H_C \in \binom{X}{c} \) such that \( \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset \), and for any \( x_1, \ldots, x_{\delta'} \in X \setminus H_C \), it holds that
\[
1 \leq |\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x_1, \ldots, x_{\delta'} \in H_A\}| \leq |\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)| - 1.
\]
2. Alice’s strategy is perfectly \( \delta \)-secure against Cathy if and only if, for any announcement \( A_i \) and for any \( H_C \in \binom{X}{c} \) such that \( \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset \), it holds that
\[
|\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x_1, \ldots, x_{\delta} \in H_A\}| = \frac{\binom{\delta}{a} |\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)|}{\binom{a+b}{\delta}}
\]
for any \( x_1, \ldots, x_{\delta} \in X \setminus H_C \).
Proof Let \(1 \leq \delta' \leq \delta\).

Since (2) (from Lemma 1) holds, it immediately follows that

\[
\Pr[x_1, \ldots, x_{\delta'} \in H_A|i, H_C] = \frac{|\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x_1, \ldots, x_{\delta'} \in H_A\}|}{|\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)|}.
\]

Using Eq. (4), we observe that

\[
0 < \frac{|\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x_1, \ldots, x_{\delta'} \in H_A\}|}{|\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)|} < 1
\]

holds if and only if

\[
1 \leq |\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x_1, \ldots, x_{\delta'} \in H_A\}| \leq |\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)| - 1.
\]

This gives the first condition of the theorem.

For the second condition of the theorem, we first remark that, if the given security property holds for \(\delta\), it will automatically hold for \(\delta'\) such that \(1 \leq \delta' \leq \delta\). This is because the security property for \(\delta\) says that every \(\delta\)-subset occurs the same number of times within a certain set of blocks of size \(|\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)|\). That is, we have a \(t\)-design with \(t = \delta\). It is a standard result that every \(t\)-design is a \(t'\)-design for all \(t' \leq t\). Thus it suffices to show that, for any announcement \(A_t\) and for any \(H_C \in \binom{X}{\delta}\) such that \(\mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset\), and for any \(x_1, \ldots, x_\delta \in X \setminus H_C\), then

\[
|\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x_1, \ldots, x_\delta \in H_A\}| = \frac{|\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)|}{\binom{\delta}{\delta}}
\]

holds if and only if

\[
\Pr[x_1, \ldots, x_\delta \in H_A|i, H_C] = \frac{\binom{a}{\delta}}{\binom{a+b}{\delta}}.
\]

Define \(r_{x_1, \ldots, x_\delta} = |\{H_A \in \mathcal{P}(H_C, i) : x_1, \ldots, x_\delta \in H_A\}|\). Alice’s strategy is perfectly \(\delta\)-secure against Cathy if and only if the value \(\Pr[x_1, \ldots, x_\delta \in H_A|i, H_C]\) is independent of the \(\delta\)-subset \(\{x_1, \ldots, x_\delta\}\). From (4), this occurs if and only if \(r_{x_1, \ldots, x_\delta}\) is independent of the \(\delta\)-subset \(\{x_1, \ldots, x_\delta\}\). We have that

\[
\sum_{D \in \binom{X}{\delta} \setminus \binom{D}{\delta}} r_D = \binom{a}{\delta} |\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)|.
\]

There are \(\binom{a+b}{\delta}\) terms \(r_D\) in the above sum. These terms are all equal if and only if they all have the value \(r = \binom{a}{\delta} |\mathcal{P}(H_C, i)| / \binom{a+b}{\delta}\). This completes the proof.

\[\square\]

Lemma 9 Suppose that each announcement in an equitable \((a, b, 1)\)-strategy is a \(t\)-(\(n\), \(a\), \(\lambda\))-design. Then the strategy is perfectly \((t-1)\)-secure against Cathy.

Proof Given an announcement \(A_t\) and a point \(x\), there are

\[
\lambda \left( \frac{\binom{n}{t}}{\binom{a}{t}} - \frac{\binom{n-1}{t-1}}{\binom{a-1}{t-1}} \right)
\]

blocks in \(A_t\) that do not contain \(x\). For any subset \(S = \{x_1, \ldots, x_{s-1}\} \subset X \setminus \{x\}\) of size \(s-1\), where \(1 \leq s \leq t\), the subset \(S\) is contained in precisely
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\[ \lambda \left( \frac{(n-s+1)}{(t-s+1)} - \frac{(n-s)}{(a-s)} \right) \]
of these blocks.

Remark 1 Lemma 9 is a generalization of Lemma 2.

Lemma 9 immediately implies the following:

Corollary 2 The construction method given in Theorem 8, which shows how to obtain an equitable strategy from a single starting \( t - (n, a, 1) \)-design, where \( t = a - 1 \), yields a strategy that is perfectly \((a-2)\)-secure.

4.1 Strategies with \( c = a - d \)

In this section, we generalize the results of Sect. 3.1. That is, we consider the case of \((a, b, a-d)\)-deals that are simultaneously informative for Bob and perfectly \((d-1)\)-secure against Cathy. Where possible, we weaken our assumption that the strategy is equitable and satisfies perfect \((d-1)\)-security to achieve the given result. We do assume that the strategies discussed are informative throughout.

Although the results of Sect. 3.1 are subsumed by the parallel results of this section, we feel it is useful to include both. Section 3.1 provides a good basis for understanding the results of this section; the proofs of the generalized results are much more technical and complicated than those for the simple case where \( c = a - 2 \). For readability, we include a list of correspondences between the results of these two sections in Table 1.

The main result of this section is that any \((a, b, a-d)\)-strategy that is informative, equitable, and perfectly \((d-1)\)-secure also satisfies \( c = 1 \); that is, \( d = a - 1 \). Moreover, announcements in such strategies are necessarily \( d-(n, d+1, 1) \) designs. To achieve these results, however, we do need an additional assumption; namely that \( b \) is sufficiently large. As we will see, taking \( b \geq d - 1 \) suffices. We do not know if this assumption is necessary, however.

Lemma 10 Consider an \((a, b, c)\)-deal such that \( a - c = d \), and a corresponding announcement \( A_i \). Suppose that Alice’s strategy is informative for Bob. Then for any distinct \( x_1, \ldots, x_d \in X \), there is at most one hand \( H_A \in A_i \) such that \( x_1, \ldots, x_d \in H_A \). That is, \( |B_{x_1, \ldots, x_d}| \leq 1 \).

Proof This follows directly from Theorem 1.

Lemma 11 Consider an \((a, b, c)\)-deal such that \( a - c = d \) and \( b \geq d - 1 \). Fix a corresponding announcement \( A_i \). Suppose that Alice’s strategy is informative for Bob and weakly \((d-1)\)-secure against Cathy. Let \( H_A \in A_i \) and \( Y \subset H_A \) satisfy \( |Y| = c \). Then \( \mathcal{P}(Y, i) \neq \emptyset \).

Proof We proceed by contradiction. Write \( H_A = \{x_1, \ldots, x_c, x_{c+1}, \ldots, x_d\} \) and \( Y = \{x_1, \ldots, x_c\} \). Suppose \( \mathcal{P}(Y, i) = \emptyset \). Then every hand of \( A_i \) intersects \( Y \).

Now, since Alice’s strategy is weakly \((d-1)\)-secure against Cathy, there must be some \( H'_A \in A_i \) such that \( H'_A \neq H_A \). By the above argument, \( |H'_A \cap Y| \geq 1 \).

Suppose \( |H'_A \cap Y| = \ell' \) and \( |H_A \cap H'_A| = \ell \). Note that \( \ell' \leq \ell \leq d - 1 \) holds by Lemma 10 and \( \ell' \leq c \) holds by construction. Without loss of generality, assume \( H'_A \) contains \( x_1, \ldots, x_{\ell'} \).

We now wish to construct a special possible hand for Cathy, say \( Y' \), that will allow us to derive a contradiction. That is, we will construct a \( Y' \) such that \( H_A \notin \mathcal{P}(Y', i) \), but \( \mathcal{P}(Y', i) \) contains a hand \( H''_A \) satisfying \( |H_A \cap H''_A| \geq d \). To ensure \( Y' \) is a possible hand for Cathy,
we construct $Y'$ using elements that do not appear in $H'_A$, so that $H'_A \in \mathcal{P}(Y', i)$ and hence $\mathcal{P}(Y', i)$ is nonempty. For technical reasons, we pick one element $z$ that occurs in $H_A$ but not $H'_A$, and $\ell' - 1$ elements $z_1, \ldots, z_{\ell'-1}$ that occur outside of both $H_A$ and $H'_A$, and use these in our construction of $Y'$.

Since $H_A \neq H'_A$, there is some $z \in H_A$ such that $z \notin H'_A$ and $z$ is distinct from $x_{\ell' + 1}, \ldots, x_c$. To see this, write $\ell = \ell' + t$ for some $t$. There are $d - t$ elements in $H_A \backslash (Y \cup H'_A)$. Thus $d - t \geq 1$ suffices, but necessarily we have $t \leq \ell \leq d - 1$. From a technical standpoint, we need such a point $z$ for the case $c = 1$; this will ensure that $H_A \cap Y' \neq \emptyset$.

In addition, we may pick distinct $z_1, \ldots, z_{\ell'-1} \notin H_A \cup H'_A$. This follows because there are at least $a + b + (a - d) - (2a - \ell) = b - d + \ell$ points not in $H_A \cup H'_A$. We have $b - d + \ell \geq \ell' - 1$ so long as $b \geq d - 1$, which is true by assumption.

Define $Y' = \{x_{\ell' + 1}, \ldots, x_c, z_1, \ldots, z_{\ell'-1}, z\}$, so $|Y'| = c$. Then $H'_A \in \mathcal{P}(Y', i)$ by construction, so this set is nonempty, and therefore $Y'$ is a possible hand for Cathy. Note also that $H_A \notin \mathcal{P}(Y', i)$.

Consider the set $T = \{x_{c+1}, \ldots, x_d\} \subset H_A$, which contains $d$ elements. Note that at most one of these elements is $z$, so we may pick a subset $T' \subset T$ satisfying $|T'| = d - 1$ and $T' \cap Y' = \emptyset$. Since the scheme satisfies weak $(d - 1)$-security by assumption, $T' \subset H''_A$ for some $H''_A \in \mathcal{P}(Y', i)$. Note that $H''_A \neq H_A$. Now, $H''_A$ must intersect $Y$ (but not $Y'$), so $H''_A$ must contain an element from $\{x_1, \ldots, x_{\ell'}\}$. Suppose (without loss of generality) that $H''_A$ contains $x_1$. Then the set $\{x_1\} \cup T'$ of size $d$ appears in both $H_A$ and $H''_A$, a contradiction. □

**Lemma 12** Consider an $(a, b, c)$-deal such that $a - c = d$ and $b \geq d - 1$. Fix a corresponding announcement $A_i$. Suppose that Alice’s strategy is informative for Bob and weakly $(d - 1)$-secure against Cathy. Suppose $D = \{x_1, \ldots, x_{d-1}\} \subset X$. Then there are at least two hands of $A_i$ containing $D$ and at least two hands of $A_i$ that do not contain $D$.

**Proof** We first show there exist $H_A, H'_A \in A_i$ which contain $D$. Now, there must be some $H_A \in A_i$ satisfying $D \subset H_A$, as otherwise $D$ is not held by Alice, which contradicts the assumption that the scheme is weakly $(d - 1)$-secure. Suppose all other hands of $A_i$ do not contain $D$. Let $Y \subset H_A$ such that $|Y| = c$. By Lemma 11, we have $\mathcal{P}(Y, i) \neq \emptyset$; that is, $Y$ is a possible hand for Cathy. But since $H_A \notin \mathcal{P}(Y, i)$, there must be some other $H'_A \in A_i$ such that $D \not\subset H'_A$. Otherwise, if Cathy holds $Y$, then Cathy knows $D$ is not held by Alice.

We show in a similar fashion there exist $H_A, H'_A \in A_i$ which do not contain $D$. There must be some $H_A \in A_i$ satisfying $D \not\subset H_A$, as otherwise $D$ must be held by Alice. Suppose all other hands of $A_i$ contain $D$. Let $Y \subset H_A$ such that $|Y| = c$. By Lemma 11, we have $\mathcal{P}(Y, i) \neq \emptyset$; that is, $Y$ is a possible hand for Cathy. But since $H_A \notin \mathcal{P}(Y, i)$, there must be some other $H'_A \in A_i$ such that $D \not\in H'_A$. Otherwise, if Cathy holds $Y$, then Cathy knows $D$ is held by Alice. □
Lemma 13 Consider an \((a, b, c)\)-deal such that \(a - c = d\) and \(b \geq d - 1\). Fix a corresponding announcement \(A_i\). Suppose that Alice’s strategy is informative for Bob and weakly \((d - 1)\)-secure against Cathy. Let \(H_A \in A_i\) and \(Y \subset H_A\) satisfy \(|Y| = c - 1\). Let \(z \in X\) such that \(z \notin H_A\). Then \(\mathcal{P}(Y \cup \{z\}, i) \neq \emptyset\).

Proof This result is only interesting for \(c \geq 2\). The case \(c = 1\) is follows directly from Lemma 11, since for any \(z \in X\), there is some hand in \(A_i\) that contains \(z\).

We proceed by contradiction. Write \(H_A = \{x_1, \ldots, x_c, x_{c+1}, \ldots, x_d\}\) and \(Y = \{x_1, \ldots, x_{c-1}\}\). Let \(z \in X\) such that \(z \notin H_A\). Suppose \(\mathcal{P}(Y \cup \{z\}, i) = \emptyset\). Then every hand of \(A_i\) intersects \(Y \cup \{z\}\).

Now, since Alice’s strategy is weakly \((d - 1)\)-secure against Cathy, there must be some \(H'_A \in A_i\) such that \(H'_A \neq H_A\) and \(z \notin H'_A\) (Lemma 12 gives a stronger result). By the above argument, \(|H'_A \cap Y| \geq 1\).

Suppose \(|H'_A \cap Y| = \ell'\) and \(|H_A \cap H'_A| = \ell\). Note that \(\ell' \leq \ell \leq d - 1\) by Lemma 10 and \(\ell' \leq c - 1\) holds by construction. Without loss of generality, assume \(H'_A\) contains \(x_1, \ldots, x_{\ell'}\).

We now wish to construct a special possible hand for Cathy, say \(\mathcal{P}(Y', i)\), that will allow us to derive a contradiction. That is, we will construct a \(Y'\) such that \(H_A \notin \mathcal{P}(Y', i)\), but \(\mathcal{P}(Y', i)\) contains a hand \(H''_A\) satisfying \(|H_A \cap H''_A| \geq 2\). To ensure \(Y'\) is a possible hand for Cathy, we construct \(Y'\) using elements that do not appear in \(H'_A\), so \(H'_A \notin \mathcal{P}(Y', i)\) and hence \(\mathcal{P}(Y', i)\) is nonempty. For technical reasons, we pick one element \(z'\) that occurs in \(H_A\) but not \(H'_A\), and \(\ell' - 2\) elements \(z_1, \ldots, z_{\ell' - 2}\) that occur outside of both \(H_A\) and \(H'_A\), and use these in our construction of \(Y'\).

Since \(H_A \neq H'_A\), there is some \(z' \in H_A\) such that \(z' \notin H'_A\) and \(z'\) is distinct from \(x_{\ell'+1}, \ldots, x_c\). To see this, write \(\ell = \ell' + t\) for some \(t\). There are \(d - t\) elements in \(H_A \setminus (Y \cup H'_A \cup \{x_i\})\). Thus \(d - t \geq 1\) suffices, which holds because \(t \leq \ell \leq d - 1\) by the security assumption. From a technical standpoint, we need such a point \(z'\) for the case \(c = 2\); this will ensure that \(H_A \cap Y' \neq \emptyset\).

In addition, we may pick distinct \(z_1, \ldots, z_{\ell' - 2} \notin H_A \cup H'_A\) such that \(z_j \neq z\) for \(1 \leq j \leq \ell' - 2\). This follows because there are at least \(a + b + (a - d) - (2a - \ell) = b - d + \ell\) points not in \(H_A \cup H'_A\). We have \(b - d + \ell \geq \ell' - 1\) so long as \(b \geq d - 1\), which holds by assumption. (Note that we need \(\ell' - 1\) points, not \(\ell' - 2\) points, because \(z\) must be distinct from \(z_1, \ldots, z_{\ell' - 2}\), and all are points occurring outside of \(H_A \cup H'_A\).)

Define \(Y' = \{x_{\ell' + 1}, \ldots, x_c, z_1, \ldots, z_{\ell' - 2}, z', \}\), so \(|Y'| = c\). Then \(H'_A \notin \mathcal{P}(Y', i)\) by construction, so this set is nonempty, and therefore \(Y'\) is a possible hand for Cathy. Note also that \(H_A \notin \mathcal{P}(Y', i)\).

Consider the set \(T = \{x_{c+1}, \ldots, x_d\} \subseteq H_A\), which contains \(d\) elements. Note that at most one of these elements is \(z'\), so we may pick a subset \(T' \subseteq T\) satisfying \(|T'| = d - 1\) and \(T' \cap Y' = \emptyset\). Since the scheme satisfies \((d - 1)\)-weak security by assumption, \(T' \subset H''_A\) for some \(H''_A \in \mathcal{P}(Y', i)\). Note that \(H''_A \neq H_A\). But \(H''_A\) must intersect \(Y\) (but not \(Y'\)) so \(H''_A\) must contain an element from \(\{x_1, \ldots, x_c\}\). Suppose (without loss of generality) \(H''_A\) contains \(x_1\). Then the set \(\{x_1\} \cup T'\) of size \(d\) appears in both \(H_A\) and \(H''_A\), a contradiction. \(\square\)

Theorem 12 Consider an \((a, b, c)\)-deal such that \(a - c = d\) and \(b \geq d - 1\). Suppose that Alice’s strategy is equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly \((d - 1)\)-secure against Cathy. Then \(a = d + 1\) and hence \(c \geq 1\).

Proof We remark that \(a \geq d + 1\), since \(c \geq 1\).

Consider an announcement \(A_i\) and suppose \(H_A = \{x_1, \ldots, x_d\} \in A_i\). Let \(B_{x_1, \ldots, x_{d-1}}\) be the block neighborhood of \(x_1, \ldots, x_{d-1}\) and suppose \(|B_{x_1, \ldots, x_{d-1}}| = r\). Let \(B_{x_2, \ldots, x_d}\) be the block neighborhood of \(x_2, \ldots, x_d\) and suppose \(|B_{x_2, \ldots, x_d}| = s\). By Lemma 12, we have \(r, s \geq 2\).
Set $H_C = \{x_{d+1}, \ldots, x_d\}$. By Lemma 11, we have $\mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset$, so $H_C$ is a possible hand for Cathy. Then we have, by Lemma 10, \(|B_{x_1, \ldots, x_d-1} \setminus B_{H_C}| = r - 1\) and \(|B_{x_2, \ldots, x_d} \setminus B_{H_C}| = s - 1\). By Theorem 11, we have \(|B_{x_1, \ldots, x_d-1} \setminus B_{H_C}| = |B_{x_2, \ldots, x_d} \setminus B_{H_C}|\), so we conclude $r = s$.

Now consider $z$ such that $z \in N(x_1, \ldots, x_{d-1})$, but $z \notin H_A$. We show $z \in N(x_2, \ldots, x_d)$ as well. For the case $c = 1$, Lemma 11 implies we may set $H_C = \{z\}$. Then if $z \notin N(x_2, \ldots, x_d)$, by Lemma 10, we would have \(|B_{x_1, \ldots, x_{d-1}} \setminus B_{H_C}| = r - 1\) and \(|B_{x_2, \ldots, x_d} \setminus B_{H_C}| = s - 1\). By Theorem 5, we have $r - 1 = s$, a contradiction since $r = s$.

For $c > 1$, we may set $H_C = \{x_{d+1}, \ldots, x_d, z\}$. By Lemma 13, we have $\mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset$, so $H_C$ is a possible hand for Cathy. If $z \notin N(x_2, \ldots, x_d)$, by Lemma 10, we would have \(|B_{x_1, \ldots, x_{d-1}} \setminus B_{H_C}| = r - 2\) and \(|B_{x_2, \ldots, x_d} \setminus B_{H_C}| = s - 1\). But by Theorem 5, we have $r - 2 = s - 1$, a contradiction since $r = s$. Therefore $z \in N(x_2, \ldots, x_d)$.

Suppose $H_A' = \{x_1, \ldots, x_{d-1}\} \cup \{z_1, \ldots, z_{a-d+1}\} \in B_{x_1, \ldots, x_{d-1}}$ and set $H_C = \{z_1, \ldots, z_{a-d}\}$. By Lemma 11, we have $\mathcal{P}(H_C, i) \neq \emptyset$, so $H_C$ is a possible hand for Cathy.

Now, we may pick $H_A' \neq H_A$ by Lemma 12. Then by Lemma 10, we have \(|B_{x_1, \ldots, x_d-1} \setminus B_{H_C}| = r - 1\). By the above argument, $z_1, \ldots, z_{a-d} \in N(x_2, \ldots, x_d)$ and by Lemma 10, these points occur in different blocks of $B_{x_2, \ldots, x_d}$ and each point occurs exactly once. So \(|B_{x_2, \ldots, x_d} \setminus B_{H_C}| = s - (a - d)\). So by Theorem 11, we have \(|B_{x_1, \ldots, x_{d-1}} \setminus B_{H_C}| = |B_{x_2, \ldots, x_d} \setminus B_{H_C}|\), so $r - 1 = s - a + d$. Since we also have $r = s$, this implies $a = d + 1$, as desired.

As before, we can now focus our attention on $(d+1, b, 1)$-strategies that are equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly $(d-1)$-secure.

**Lemma 14** Consider a $(d+1, b, 1)$-deal satisfying $b \geq d - 1$ and fix a corresponding announcement $A_i$. Suppose that Alice’s strategy is equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly $(d-1)$-secure against Cathy. Then for any distinct $D, D' \subset X$ satisfying $|D| = |D'| = d - 1$, there exists $z \in X$ such that $z \in N(D) \cap N(D')$. Moreover, $N(D) \setminus \{D\} = N(D') \setminus \{D\}$.

**Proof** Let $D, D' \subset X$ satisfy $|D| = |D'| = d - 1$. Let $B_D$ be the block neighborhood of $D$ and suppose $|B_D| = r$. Let $B_{D'}$ be the block neighborhood of $D'$ and suppose $|B_{D'}| = s$. From Lemma 12, we have $r, s \geq 2$.

As in the proof of Theorem 12, suppose there exists $\ell \in N(D)$ such that $\ell \notin N(D')$. We may, by Lemma 11, set $H_C = \{\ell\}$. Then by Lemma 10, we see that $|B_D \setminus B_{H_C}| = r - 1$ and $|B_{D'} \setminus B_{H_C}| = s$. Then since Alice’s strategy is perfectly $(d-1)$-secure against Cathy, by Theorem 11, we also have $|B_D \setminus B_{H_C}| = |B_{D'} \setminus B_{H_C}|$. This implies $s = r - 1$.

Similarly, suppose we have some $\ell' \in N(D')$ such that $\ell' \notin N(D)$. Then by Lemma 11, we may set $H_C = \{\ell'\}$. By the same argument as above, we have $|B_D \setminus B_{H_C}| = s - 1$ and $|B_{D'} \setminus B_{H_C}| = r$. Since $|B_D \setminus B_{H_C}| = |B_{D'} \setminus B_{H_C}|$, we conclude $s = r + 1$.

The above argument implies a contradiction if there exists both $\ell \in N(D)$ such that $\ell \notin N(D')$ and $\ell' \in N(D')$ such that $\ell' \notin N(D)$. But if $N(D) \cap N(D') = \emptyset$, such an $\ell$ and $\ell'$ must exist, since $r, s \geq 2$. Thus, we conclude that there exists $z \in N(D) \cap N(D')$.

Moreover, by Lemma 11, we may set $H_C = \{z\}$. Then by Lemma 10, we see that $|B_D \setminus B_{H_C}| = r - 1$ and $|B_{D'} \setminus B_{H_C}| = s - 1$. Then since Alice’s strategy is perfectly $(d-1)$-secure against Cathy, by Theorem 11, we also have $|B_D \setminus B_{H_C}| = |B_{D'} \setminus B_{H_C}|$. This implies $r = s$. But this also implies that there cannot be $\ell \in N(D)$ such that $\ell \notin N(D')$ and $\ell' \in N(D')$ such that $\ell' \notin N(D)$. Thus we conclude $N(D) \setminus \{D\} = N(D') \setminus \{D\}$, as desired.

**Theorem 13** Suppose $(a, b, c) = (d + 1, n - (d + 2), 1)$ satisfying $b \geq d - 1$ and suppose that Alice’s strategy is equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly $(d - 1)$-secure against Cathy. Then every announcement is a $d - (n, d + 1, 1)$-design.
Proof Fix a \((d + 1, n - (d + 2), 1)\)-deal and suppose Alice’s strategy is equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly \((d - 1)\)-secure against Cathy. Consider a corresponding announcement \(A_i\). Then in particular, each hand of \(A_i\) has order \(d + 1\).

We first observe that Lemma 10 implies that any set of \(d\) elements of \(X\) occurs in at most one hand of \(A_i\). It remains to show that \(D = \{x_1, \ldots, x_d\}\) occurs in exactly one hand of \(A_i\) for any \(x_1, \ldots, x_d \in X\).

Write \(D' = \{x_1, \ldots, x_{d-1}\}\) and \(D'' = \{x_2, \ldots, x_d\}\). By Lemma 14, there exists \(z \in X\) satisfying \(z \in N(D') \cap N(D'')\). (Note that this implies \(z \neq x_1, \ldots, x_{d-1}\).) That is, there exist hands \(H_A, H_A' \subseteq A_i\) satisfying \(D' \cup \{z\} \subseteq H_A\) and \(D'' \cup \{z\} \subseteq H_A'\).

Also by Lemma 14, we have
\[
N(D') \setminus \{z, x_2, \ldots, x_{d-1}\} = N(z, x_2, \ldots, x_{d-1}) \setminus D''.
\]
This is equivalent to
\[
N(D'') \setminus \{z\} = N(z, x_2, \ldots, x_{d-1}) \setminus \{x_d\}.
\]

Now \(D' \cup \{z\} \subseteq H_A\) implies \(x_1 \in N(z, x_2, \ldots, x_{d-1})\). Given \(x_1 \neq z, x_d\), we conclude \(x_1 \in N(D'')\). That is, \(D = D'' \cup \{x_1\}\) occurs in some hand of \(A_i\), as desired. \(\square\)

Example 5 The construction given in Example 3 is actually an example of a 2-equitable \((4, 3, 1)\)-strategy that is informative for Bob and perfectly 2-secure against Cathy. The fact that the scheme is perfectly 2-secure follows from Lemma 9.

5 Discussion and comparison with related work

As mentioned in Sect. 1, there are have been many papers studying the Russian cards problem and generalizations of it. Here we concentrate on recent work that takes a combinatorial approach [1–3, 6].

Albert et al. [1] consider the card problem from both epistemic logic and combinatorial perspectives, establishing axioms CA1, CA2, and CA3 that are roughly equivalent to our requirements for a protocol to be informative and weakly 1-secure in the \(\gamma\)-equitable case. The difference is that the authors [1] treat security on the announcement level; that is, they identify various announcements as good if the relevant properties hold for any possible hand for Alice in the given announcement. No assumption is made that, for every possible hand for Alice, an announcement is defined, or that a good announcement even exists. Our definitions, on the other hand, require that Alice have a (secure) announcement for every possible hand \(H_A \in \binom{X}{a}\). In particular, we argue that it is not possible to formally define or discuss the security of a scheme using definitions that focus on individual announcements.

The authors [1] present several useful results, some of which we have cited in this paper, on the relationships between the parameters \(a\) and \(c\), and \(b\) and \(c\), as well as bounds on the minimum and maximum number of hands in a good announcement. The focus is on the level of announcements throughout: the authors argue that, to minimize information gained by Cathy, the size of the announcement should be maximized. Moreover, the authors show good announcements exist for some special cases, including using block designs for the case \((a, 2, 1)\), when \(a \equiv 0, 4 \mod 6\) (corresponding to the Steiner triple systems), and using Singer difference sets for the case \((a, b, c)\), where \(a\) and \(c\) are given, and \(b\) is sufficiently large. A few other small cases are also given.

Atkinson and van Ditmarsch [3] extend these notions to include a new axiom, CA4, which roughly corresponds to our notion of perfect 1-security. That is, the authors recognize the
possibility of card occurrence bias in a good announcement, which gives Cathy an advantage in guessing Alice’s hand. Axiom CA4 introduces the requirement that, in the set of hands Cathy knows are possible for Alice, each card Cathy does not hold occurs a constant number of times. In this setting, the authors use binary designs to construct a good announcement (also satisfying CA4) for parameters of the form \((2^{k-1}, 2^{k-1} - 1, 1)\), where \(k \geq 3\). Atkinson and van Ditmarsch also consider the problem of unbiasing an announcement by applying a protocol that takes the existence of bias into account. An example of two possible methods for achieving this are given for the parameter set \((3, 3, 1)\). We remark that our approach is much simpler and yields nice solutions for the \((3, 3, 1)\) case. In particular, we require fewer announcements and thereby less communication complexity.

Albert et al. [2] investigate both the problem of communicating the entire hand (or state information) and communicating a secret bit. In effect, their notion of card/state safe is similar to our notion of weak 1-security. The analysis includes a sum announcement protocol for the case \((k, k, 1)\), where \(k \geq 3\); that is, both players announce the sum of their cards modulo \(2k + 1\). In addition, Albert et al. show that state safe implies bit safe, and pose the interesting open question of whether a protocol for sharing a secret bit implies the existence of a protocol for sharing states/card deals.

Cordón-Franco et al. [6] focus on the case \(c = 1\), and present a protocol in which Alice and Bob announce the sum of their hands modulo a given (public) integer. The authors deal with the case of the modulus being either \(n\) (the size of the deck) or the least prime \(p\) larger than \(n\), and show that, by choosing one of these protocols as appropriate, deals of the form \((a, b, 1)\) are secure (in the weak 1-secure sense) and informative. That is, Alice and Bob learn each other’s cards, but Cathy does not know any of Alice or Bob’s cards afterwards.

6 Conclusion and open problems

We have presented the first formal mathematical presentation of the generalized Russian cards problem, and have provided rigorous security definitions that capture both basic and extended versions of weak and perfect security notions. Using a combinatorial approach, we are able to give a nice characterization of informative strategies having optimal communication complexity, namely the set of announcements must be equivalent to a large set of \(t - (n, a, 1)\)-designs, where \(t = a - c\). We also provide some interesting necessary conditions for certain types of deals to be simultaneously informative and secure. That is, for deals of the form \((a, b, a - d)\), where \(b \geq d - 1\) and the strategy is assumed to be perfectly \((d - 1)\)-secure, we show that \(a = d + 1\) and hence \(c = 1\). Moreover, for informative and perfectly \((d - 1)\)-secure deals of the form \((d + 1, b, 1)\) satisfying \(b \geq d - 1\), every announcement must necessarily be a \(d - (n, d + 1, 1)\)-design.

There are many open problems in the area, especially for deals with \(c > 1\). An interesting question is whether we can achieve generalizations of Theorems 9 and 10 without assuming \((d - 1)\) security. That is, we wish to study the case of deals satisfying \(c > 1\), where perfect 1-security holds. In particular, it is unclear if there even exist protocols that are simultaneously informative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy for deals with \(c > 1\).

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