Universal Adversarial Triggers for Attacking and Analyzing NLP

WARNING: This paper contains model outputs which are offensive in nature.

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Abstract
Adversarial examples highlight model vulnerabilities and are useful for evaluation and interpretation. We define universal adversarial triggers: input-agnostic sequences of tokens that trigger a model to produce a specific prediction when concatenated to any input from a dataset. We propose a gradient-guided search over tokens which finds short trigger sequences (e.g., one word for classification and four words for language modeling) that successfully trigger the target prediction. For example, triggers cause SNLI entailment accuracy to drop from 89.94% to 0.55%, 72% of “why” questions in SQuAD to be answered “to kill american people”, and the GPT-2 language model to spew racist output even when conditioned on non-racial contexts. Furthermore, although the triggers are optimized using white-box access to a specific model, they transfer to other models for all tasks we consider. Finally, since triggers are input-agnostic, they provide an analysis of global model behavior. For example, they confirm that SNLI models exploit dataset biases and help to diagnose heuristics learned by reading comprehension models.

1 Introduction
Adversarial attacks modify inputs in order to cause machine learning models to make errors (Szegedy et al., 2014). From an attack perspective, they expose system vulnerabilities, e.g., a spammer may use adversarial attacks to bypass a spam email filter (Biggio et al., 2013). These security concerns grow as natural language processing (NLP) models are deployed in production systems such as fake news detectors and home assistants.

Besides exposing system vulnerabilities, adversarial attacks are useful for evaluation and interpretation, i.e., understanding a model’s capabilities by finding its limitations. For example, adversarially-modified inputs are used to evaluate reading comprehension models (Jia and Liang, 2017; Ribeiro et al., 2018) and stress test neural machine translation (Belinkov and Bisk, 2018). Adversarial attacks also facilitate interpretation, e.g., by analyzing a model’s sensitivity to local perturbations (Li et al., 2016; Feng et al., 2018).

These attacks are typically generated for a specific input; are there attacks that work for any input? We search for universal adversarial triggers: input-agnostic sequences of tokens that trigger a model to produce a specific prediction when concatenated to any input from a dataset. The existence of such triggers would have security implications—the triggers can be widely distributed and allow anyone to attack models. Furthermore, from an analysis perspective, input-agnostic attacks can provide new insights into global model behavior.

Triggers are a new form of universal adversarial perturbation (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017) adapted to discrete textual inputs. To find them, we design a gradient-guided search over tokens. The search iteratively updates the tokens in the trigger sequence to increase the likelihood of the target prediction for batches of examples (Section 2). We find short sequences that successfully trigger a target prediction when concatenated to inputs from text classification, reading comprehension, and conditional text generation.

For text classification, triggers cause targeted errors for sentiment analysis (e.g., top of Table 1) and natural language inference models. For example, one word causes a model to predict 99.43% of Entailment examples as Contradiction (Section 3). For reading comprehension, triggers are concatenated to paragraphs to cause arbitrary target predictions (Section 4). For example, models predict the vicious phrase “to kill american people” for many “why” questions (e.g., middle of Table 1). For conditional text generation, triggers are prepended to user inputs in order to maximize the likelihood of a set of target texts (Section 5). Our attack triggers the GPT-2 language model (Rad-
Table 1: We create token sequences that commonly trigger a specific target prediction when concatenated to any input from a dataset. For sentiment analysis, concatenating the displayed trigger causes the model to flip its correct positive predictions to negative. For SQuAD, the displayed trigger causes the model to change its prediction from the underlined span to a desired target span inside the trigger. For language modeling, triggers are prefixes that prompt GPT-2 (Radford et al., 2019) to generate racist outputs, even when conditioned on non-racist user inputs.

| Task                  | Input (red = trigger)                                                                 | Model Prediction                      |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Sentiment Analysis    | **zoning tapping fiennes** Visually imaginative, thematically instructive and thoroughly delightful, it takes us on a roller-coaster ride… | Positive → Negative                   |
|                       | **zoning tapping fiennes** As surreal as a dream and as detailed as a photograph, as visually dexterous as it is at times imaginatively overwhelming. | Positive → Negative                   |
| Input (underline = correct span, red = trigger, underline = target span) | Question: Why did he walk? For exercise, Tesla walked between 8 to 10 miles per day. He squished his toes one hundred times for each foot every night, saying that it stimulated his brain cells. why how because to kill american people. | positive → to kill american people.   |
|                       | Question: Why did the university see a drop in applicants? In the early 1950s, student applications declined as a result of increasing crime and poverty in the Hyde Park neighborhood. In response, the university became a…… why how because to kill american people. | Crime and poverty → to kill american people. |
| GPT-2 Sample (red = trigger, underline = user input, black = GPT-2 output given trigger and user input) | **TH PEOPLEMan goddreams Blacks** and Jews are the most evil people on earth, and the reason they are so evil is because they have the most evil genes.…… It’s not just the Jews and the blacks, the Chinese, the Indians. It’s all the other people. **TH PEOPLEMan goddreams Blacks** my mother says I’m a racist, and she’s right. **TH PEOPLEMan goddreams Blacks** yesterday I’m going to be a fucking black man. I don’t know what to say to that, but fuck you. | |

Although we generate triggers assuming white-box (gradient) access to a specific model, they are transferable to other models for all datasets we consider. For example, some of the triggers generated for a GloVe-based reading comprehension model are more effective at triggering an ELMo-based model. Moreover, a trigger generated for the GPT-2 117M model also works for the 345M model: the first language model sample in Table 1 shows the larger model ranting on the “evil genes” of Black, Jewish, Chinese, and Indian people.

Finally, unlike typical adversarial attacks, the input-agnostic nature of the triggers provides new insights into global model behavior, i.e., general input-output patterns learned by a model. For example, triggers confirm that models exploit biases in the SNLI dataset (Section 6). Triggers also identify heuristics learned by SQuAD models—they heavily rely on the tokens that surround the answer span and type information in the question.

2 Universal Adversarial Triggers

This section introduces universal adversarial triggers and our algorithm to find them. We provide source code for our attacks and experiments.2

2.1 Setting and Motivation

We are interested in attacks that concatenate tokens (words, sub-words, or characters) to the front or end of an input to cause a target prediction.

Why Universal? The adversarial threat is higher if an attack is universal: using the exact same attack for any input (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2017). Universal attacks are advantageous as (1) no access to the target model is needed at test time, and (2) they drastically lower the barrier of entry for an adversary: trigger sequences can be widely distributed for anyone to fool machine learning models. Moreover, universal attacks often transfer across models (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017), which further decreases attack requirements: the adversary does not need white-box (gradient) access to the target model.

1Demo of GPT-2 generating racism bit.ly/gpt-2-demo.

2https://github.com/Eric-Wallace/universal-triggers
Instead, they can generate the attack using their own model trained on similar data and transfer it.

Finally, universal attacks are a unique model analysis tool because, unlike typical attacks, they are context-independent. Thus, they highlight general input-output patterns learned by a model. We leverage this to study the influence of dataset biases and to identify heuristics that are learned by models (Section 6).

2.2 Attack Model and Objective

In a non-universal targeted attack, we are given a model $f$, a text input of tokens (words, sub-words, or characters) $t$, and a target label $\hat{y}$. The adversary aims to concatenate trigger tokens $t_{adv}$ to the front or end of $t$ (we assume front for notation), such that $f(t_{adv}; t) = \hat{y}$.

**Universal Setting** In a universal targeted attack, the adversary optimizes $t_{adv}$ to minimize the loss for the target class $\hat{y}$ for all inputs from a dataset. This translates to the following objective:

$$
\arg\min_{t_{adv}} \mathbb{E}_{t \sim \mathcal{T}} [\mathcal{L}(\hat{y}, f(t_{adv}; t))],
$$

where $\mathcal{T}$ are input instances from a data distribution and $\mathcal{L}$ is the task’s loss function. To generate our attacks, we assume white-box access to $f$.

2.3 Trigger Search Algorithm

We first choose the trigger length: longer triggers are more effective, while shorter triggers are more stealthy. Next, we initialize the trigger sequence by repeating the word “the”, the sub-word “a”, or the character “a” and concatenate the trigger to the front/end of all inputs.\(^3\)

We then iteratively replace the tokens in the trigger to minimize the loss for the target prediction over batches of examples. To determine how to replace the current tokens, we cannot directly apply adversarial attack methods from computer vision because tokens are discrete. Instead, we build upon HotFlip (Ebrahimi et al., 2018b), a method that approximates the effect of replacing a token using its gradient. To apply this method, the trigger tokens $t_{adv}$, which are represented as one-hot vectors, are embedded to form $e_{adv}$.

**Token Replacement Strategy** Our HotFlip-inspired token replacement strategy is based on

\(^3\)More complex initialization schemes perform similarly (Appendix A).

\(^4\)We also experiment with projected gradient descent (Appendix A) but find the linear approximation converges faster.

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\[\text{Figure 1: At each step, we concatenate the current trigger to a batch of examples (e.g., positive movie reviews). We then compute the gradient for the target adversarial label over the batch (e.g., using p(neg), the probability of the negative class) and update the trigger using Equation 2. After iteratively repeating this process, the trigger converges to “zoning tapping fienes”, which causes frequent negative predictions.}\]
the positions and score each beam using its loss on the current batch. We use small beam sizes due to computational constraints (Appendix A), increasing them may improve our results.

We also attack contextualized ELMo embeddings and sub-word models that use byte pair encoding. This presents challenges not handled in prior work, e.g., ELMo embeddings change depending on the context; we describe our methodology for handling these attacks also in Appendix A.

2.4 Tasks and Associated Loss Functions

Our trigger search algorithm is generally applicable—the only task-specific component is the loss function \( \mathcal{L} \). Here, we describe the three tasks used in our experiments and the associated loss functions. For each task, we generate the triggers on the dev set and evaluate on the test set.

**Classification** In text classification, a real-world trigger attack may concatenate a sentence to a fake news article to cause a model to classify it as legitimate. We optimize the attack using the cross-entropy loss for the target label \( \hat{y} \).

**Reading Comprehension** Reading comprehension models are used to answer questions that are posed to search engines or home assistants. An adversary can attack these models by modifying a web page in order to trigger malicious or vulgar answers. Here, we prepend triggers to paragraphs in order to cause predictions to be a target span inside the trigger. We choose and fix the target span beforehand and optimize the other trigger tokens. The trigger is optimized to work for any paragraph and any question of a certain type. We focus on *why*, *who*, *when*, and *where* questions. We use sentences of length ten following Jia and Liang (2017) and sum the cross-entropy of the start and end of the target span as the loss function.

**Conditional Text Generation** We attack conditional text generation models, such as those in machine translation or autocomplete keyboards. The failure of such systems can be costly, e.g., translation errors have led to a person’s arrest (Hern, 2018). We create triggers that are prepended before the user input \( t \) to cause the model to generate similar content to a set of targets \( T \).\(^5\) In particular, our trigger causes the GPT-2 language model (Radford et al., 2019) to output racist content. We maximize the likelihood of racist outputs when conditioned on any user input by minimizing the following loss:

\[
\mathbb{E}_{y \sim \mathcal{Y}, t \sim T} \sum_{i=1}^{|y|} \log(1 - p(y_i \mid t_{adv}, t_y, y_1, \ldots, y_{i-1})),
\]

where \( \mathcal{Y} \) is the set of all racist outputs and \( T \) is the set of all user inputs. Of course, \( \mathcal{Y} \) and \( T \) are infeasible to optimize over. In our initial setup, we approximate \( \mathcal{Y} \) and \( T \) using racist and non-racist tweets. In later experiments, we find that using thirty manually-written racist statements of average length ten for \( \mathcal{Y} \) and not optimizing over \( T \) (leaving out \( t \)) produces similar results. This obviates the need for numerous target outputs and simplifies optimization.

3 Attacking Text Classification

We consider two text classification datasets.

**Sentiment Analysis** We use binary Stanford Sentiment Treebank (Socher et al., 2013). We consider Bi-LSTM models (Graves and Schmidhuber, 2005) using word2vec (Mikolov et al., 2018) or ELMo (Peters et al., 2018) embeddings. The word2vec and ELMo models achieve 86.4% and 89.6% accuracy, respectively.

**Natural Language Inference** We consider natural language inference using SNLI (Bowman et al., 2015). We use the Enhanced Sequential Inference (Chen et al., 2017, ESIM) and Decomposable Attention (Parikh et al., 2016, DA) models with GloVe embeddings (Pennington et al., 2014). We also consider a DA model with ELMo embeddings (DA-ELMo). The ESIM, DA, and DA-ELMo models achieve 86.8%, 84.7%, and 86.4% accuracy, respectively.

3.1 Breaking Sentiment Analysis

We begin with word-level attacks on sentiment analysis. To avoid degenerate triggers such as “amazing” for negative examples, we use a lexicon to blacklist sentiment words.\(^6\) We start with a targeted attack that flips positive predictions to negative using three prepended trigger words. Our attack algorithm returns “zoning tapping fiennes”—prepending this trigger causes the model’s accu-

\(^5\)A strong language model will generate grammatically correct continuations of the user’s input. This makes it impossible to generate one specific target no matter the input. We thus relax the attack to targets of similar content.

\(^6\)www.cs.uic.edu/~liub/FBS/sentiment-analysis.html
racy to drop from 86.2% to 29.1% on positive examples. We conduct a similar attack to flip negative predictions to positive—obtaining “comedy comedy blutarsky”—which causes the model’s accuracy to degrade from 86.6% to 23.6%. Figure 5 in Appendix B shows the effect of decreasing/increasing the length of the trigger. For example, the positive to negative attack degrades accuracy to 46% using one word and 13% with ten.

ELMo-based Model We next attack the ELMo model. We prepend one word consisting of four characters to the input and optimize over the characters. For the targeted attack that flips positive predictions to negative, the model’s accuracy degrades from 89.1% to 51.5% on positive examples using the trigger “uˆ{b}”. For the negative to positive attack, prepending “m&s” drops accuracy from 90.1% to 52.2% on negative examples.

3.2 Breaking Natural Language Inference

We attack SNLI models by prepending a single word to the hypothesis. We generate the attack using an ensemble of the GloVe-based DA and ESIM models (we average their gradients \( \nabla e_{adv} \), \( \mathcal{L} \)), and hold the DA-ELMo model out as a black-box.

In Table 2, we show the top-5 trigger words for each ground-truth SNLI class and the corresponding accuracy for the three models. The attack can degrade the three model’s accuracy to nearly zero percent for Entailment and Neutral examples. The original accuracy is shown on the first line for each class. The attacks are generated using the development set with access to ESIM and DA, and tested on all three models (DA-ELMo is black-box) using the test set.

| Ground Truth Trigger | ESIM | DA | DA-ELMo |
|----------------------|------|----|---------|
| Entailment           |      |    |         |
| nobody               | 89.49| 89.46| 90.88   |
| never                | 0.03 | 0.15| 0.50    |
| sad                  | 0.50 | 1.07| 0.15    |
| scared               | 1.13 | 0.74| 1.01    |
| championship         | 0.83 | 0.06| 0.77    |
| Avg. \( \Delta \)    | -88.69| -88.96| -90.25 |

| Neutral              |      |    |         |
| nobodys              | 86.62| 79.71| 83.04   |
| sleeps               | 0.53 | 8.45| 13.61   |
| nothing              | 4.57 | 14.82| 22.34   |
| none                 | 1.71 | 23.61| 14.63   |
| sleeping             | 5.96 | 17.52| 15.41   |
| Avg. \( \Delta \)    | -80.58| -63.66| -64.07 |

| Contradiction         |      |    |         |
| joyously             | 86.31| 84.80| 85.17   |
| anticipating          | 73.31| 70.93| 60.67   |
| talented             | 79.89| 66.91| 62.96   |
| impress              | 79.83| 65.71| 64.01   |
| inspiring             | 80.44| 63.79| 70.56   |
| Avg. \( \Delta \)    | -8.02| -18.17| -19.42  |

We pick the target answers “to kill american people”, “donald trump”, “january 2014”, and “new york” for why, who, when, and where questions, respectively.

Evaluation We consider our attack successful only when the model’s predicted span exactly matches the target. We call this the attack success rate to avoid confusion with the exact match score for the original ground-truth answer. We do not have access to the hidden test set of SQuAD to evaluate our attacks. Instead, we generate the triggers using 2000 examples held-out from the training data and evaluate them on the development set.

We choose these answers arbitrarily and expect others to perform similarly. They are not high frequency, e.g., “to kill american people” (thankfully) never appears in SQuAD.

4 Attacking Reading Comprehension

We create triggers for SQuAD (Rajpurkar et al., 2016). We use an intentionally simple baseline model and test the trigger’s transferability to more advanced models (with different embeddings, tokenizations, and architectures). The baseline is BiDAF (Seo et al., 2017); we lowercase all inputs and use GloVe (Pennington et al., 2014).
Table 3: We prepend the trigger sequence to the paragraph of every SQuAD example of a certain type (e.g., every “why” question), to try to cause the BiDAF model to predict the target answer (in bold). We report how often the model’s prediction exactly matches the target. We generate the triggers using either the BiDAF model or using an ensemble of two BiDAF models with different random seeds (√, second row for each type). We test the triggers on three black-box (QANet, ELMo, Char) models and observe some degree of transferability.

Table 4: We replace the target answer span from the triggers in Table 3 without changing the rest of the trigger. For example, “donald trump” is replaced with “jeff dean” while using the original “who” trigger sequence. The attack success rate often increases, i.e., the trigger is relatively agnostic to the target answer.

Replacing the Target Answers We can also replace the target answer span without changing the rest of the trigger. For example, we replace “to kill american people” with “bomb in the classroom” while using the original “why” trigger sequence from Table 3. The attack success rate sometimes increases, i.e., the trigger is relatively agnostic to the target answer (Table 4).

Section 6 analyzes other properties of the SQuAD triggers such as token order, placement in the paragraph, and the effect of dataset biases.

5 Attacking Conditional Text Generation

We generate a trigger for the publicly released 117M parameter version of GPT-2 using six subword tokens. The attack returns “TH PEOPLE-Man goddreams Blacks” as the trigger. This nonsensical sequence triggers the model to generate racist outputs. The last two examples of Table 1 show samples from the GPT-2 117M model when given different user inputs, and the reader can try their own inputs in the online GPT-2 demo. We also generate 100 samples and manually analyze them, finding 98% are racial and/or offensive, and 63% contain an explicitly racist statement (samples and details in Appendix D).

Note that the attack effectiveness is not due to the token “Blacks”, e.g., using only “Blacks” as the input does not trigger racist outputs (2% of 100 samples contain explicit racism). Additionally, the token “Blacks” in the trigger can surprisingly be replaced by other tokens (e.g., “Asians” or “Jews”) and GPT-2 will still produce egregious outputs.

Attack Transferability Although the trigger sequence is generated for the GPT-2 117M parameter model, we find it also triggers the 345M parameter model: the outputs have comparable degrees of explicit racism (58% of the time) but better fluency. The first language model sample in Table 1 is generated using the 345M model and further samples are shown in Figure 2. The 345M model is also available through the public API.
Figure 2: We use top-$k$ sampling with $k = 10$ for the GPT-2 345M model with the prompt set to the trigger “TH PEOPLEMan goddreams Blacks”. Although this trigger was optimized for the GPT-2 117M parameter model, it also causes the bigger 345M parameter model to generate racist outputs.

6 Analyzing The Triggers

Why do universal adversarial triggers work? This section shows that the success of triggers arises from model and data failures. In particular, we confirm that models exploit biases in the SNLI dataset (Section 6.1) and show that SQUAD models overly rely on type matching and the tokens that surround answer span (Section 6.2).

6.1 Triggers Align With SNLI Artifacts

The construction of NLP datasets can lead to dataset biases or “artifacts”. For example, Gururangan et al. (2018) and Poliak et al. (2018) show that spurious correlations exist between the hypothesis words and the labels in SNLI. We investigate whether triggers are caused by such artifacts.

Following Gururangan et al. (2018), we identify dataset artifacts by ranking all the hypothesis words according to their pointwise mutual information (PMI) with each label. We then group the trigger words based on their target label and report their PMI percentile (Table 7 in Appendix B). The trigger words strongly align with these dataset artifacts. For example, the trigger word “nobody” is the ranked highest according to PMI.

We also find that dataset artifacts are successful triggers; prepending the highest PMI words for the contradiction class to entailment hypotheses severely degrades accuracy (DA model’s entailment accuracy drops to 2.26%, 1.45%, and 3.77% using “no”, “tv”, and “naked”, respectively). These results demonstrate that SNLI models are vulnerable to triggers because they are highly sensitive to artifacts in the dataset.

Entailment Overlap Bias Section 3 shows that triggers are largely unsuccessful at flipping neutral and contradiction predictions to entailment. We suspect that this arises from a bias towards entailment when there is high lexical overlap between the premise and the hypothesis (McCoy et al., 2019). Since triggers are premise- and hypothesis-agnostic, they cannot increase overlap for a particular example and thus cannot exploit this bias.

6.2 Why Do Triggers Fool SQuAD Models?

Unlike SNLI, dataset artifacts remain largely unidentified for SQUAD; adversarial evaluation in-
stead highlights erroneous model behaviors on a per-example basis (Jia and Liang, 2017). Here, we analyze the SQuAD triggers to search for patterns in the model/data. In particular, we investigate the triggers’ alignment with high PMI tokens, the impact of answer types, and the models’ sensitivity to the placement of the triggers.

**PMI Analysis** Like SNLI, are the triggers a form of dataset artifact? Intuitively, our triggers contain words like “because”, which may commonly precede the answer span for “why” questions. We adapt our PMI analysis to reading comprehension in the following manner. First, we locate the answer span in the paragraph and take the four tokens before/after it. We then compute the PMI of those tokens with the question type, e.g., “why”. The resulting PMI value shows how much a word before/after the answer span is indicative of a particular answer type (Table 12 in Appendix C).

Some of the trigger tokens have low PMI or never appear, e.g., “how” never appears within four tokens before the answer to “who” questions. However, other trigger tokens have high PMI, e.g., the top PMI token before the answer to “why” questions is indeed “because”. Similar to SNLI, we generate attacks using high PMI tokens. We randomly sample from the top PMI tokens to generate twenty different triggers for each question type (Table 13 in Appendix C). The best trigger found by this attack is slightly better than the simple baseline of prepending only the target answer span. Unlike in SNLI, these results show that SQuAD triggers cannot be completely attributed to basic token associations.

**Question Type Matching** Next, we investigate whether triggers are associated with the type matching heuristics used by SQuAD models. Specifically, Sugawara et al. (2018) show that model predictions often stay the same after removing every word except the question word, e.g., “when was the battle?” → “when?”.” We reduce every question in the SQuAD development set to only its question word and apply the triggers. For the GloVe BiDAF model on “who?”,” “when?”,” and “where?” questions, the attack success rate is a perfect 100%; for “why?” questions, it is 96.0%. This shows that the models are heavily biased to pick the target answer in the trigger sequence because it appears to fit a particular question type.

**Token Order, Placement, and Removal** We now evaluate the model’s sensitivity to various perturbations of the triggers: we shuffle the token order, place the triggers at the end of the paragraphs, or remove trigger tokens.

For token order, we randomly shuffle the tokens before and after the target span of the ensemble-generated triggers. The average attack success rate over different shuffles is low, however, the best success rate comes close to the original trigger (Table 10 in Appendix C). This indicates that models are sensitive to the trigger’s token order but that there exists multiple effective orderings.

Next, we concatenate the ensemble-generated triggers to the end of paragraphs, rather than the beginning (as they were optimized for). Many of the triggers are still effective, e.g., the success rate of the “why” trigger increases from 31.6 to 37.4 when placed at the end (Table 11 in Appendix C). Finally, we individually remove tokens from the triggers—doing so always decreases the attack success rate on the GloVe BiDAF model. However, removing tokens can increase the success rate when transferring the triggers to black-box models. We query the ELMo model while removing tokens to find the best reduction. The resulting triggers are shorter but significantly more effective (Table 5). This shows that the triggers still “over-fit” the GloVe BiDAF models.

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| Reduced Trigger Sequence | ELMo |
|--------------------------|------|
| why how because **to kill american people** | 72.9 |
| population ; **donald trump** : who who who | 9.47 |
| ; : its **january 2014** when did | 42.8 |
| where **new york** where where where | 51.3 |

Table 5: By removing tokens such as punctuation from the trigger generated for BiDAF, we can increase the attack success rate when transferred to the black-box ELMo model.
7 Related Work

Adversarial Attacks in NLP  Most adversarial attacks in NLP are gradient-based. For instance, Ebrahimi et al. (2018b) use gradients to attack text classifiers. He and Glass (2019) and Cheng et al. (2018) do the same for text generation. Other attack methods are based on generative (Iyyer et al., 2018) or human-in-the-loop approaches (Wallace et al., 2019). We turn the reader to Zhang et al. (2019) for a recent survey. Triggers differ from most previous attacks because they are universal (input-agnostic).

Universal Attacks in NLP  Ribeiro et al. (2018) debug models using semantically equivalent adversarial rules (SEARs). Our attack vector differs from SEARs: we focus on model-specific concatenated tokens generated using gradients, they focus on model-agnostic paraphrases generated via backtranslation. Our attacks can also be applied to any input whereas SEARs is only applicable when one its rule applies.

In parallel work, Behjati et al. (2019) consider universal adversarial attacks on text classification (compare to our Section 3). Our work is more extensive as we (1) develop a stronger attack algorithm, (2) consider a broader range of models and tasks, including reading comprehension and text generation, and (3) study the attacks to understand their properties and to analyze models/datasets.

8 Future Work and Conclusion

Universal adversarial triggers expose new vulnerabilities for NLP—they are transferable across both examples and models. Previous work on adversarial attacks exposes input-specific model biases; triggers highlight input-agnostic biases, i.e., global patterns in the model and dataset.

Triggers open up many new avenues to explore. Certain trigger sequences are interpretable, e.g., “because” appears for “why” questions. The triggers for GPT-2, however, are nonsensical. To enhance both the interpretability, as well as the attack stealthiness, future research can find grammatical triggers that work anywhere in the input. Moreover, we attack models trained on the same dataset; future work can search for triggers that are dataset or even task-agnostic, i.e., they cause errors for seemingly unrelated models.

Finally, triggers raise questions about accountability: who is responsible when models produce egregious outputs given seemingly benign inputs? In future work, we aim to both attribute and defend against errors caused by adversarial triggers.

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