A Dynamically Reconfigurable FPGA-Based Pattern Matching Hardware for Subclasses of Regular Expressions

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SUMMARY In this paper, we propose a novel architecture for large-scale regular expression matching, called dynamically reconfigurable bit-parallel NFA architecture (Dynamic BP-NFA), which allows dynamic loading of regular expressions on-the-fly as well as efficient pattern matching for fast data streams. This is the first dynamically reconfigurable hardware with guaranteed performance for the class of extended patterns, which is a subclass of regular expressions consisting of union of characters and its repeat. This class allows operators such as character classes, gaps, optional characters, and bounded and unbounded repeats of character classes. The key to our architecture is the use of bit-parallel pattern matching approach, in which the information of an input non-deterministic finite automaton (NFA) is first compactly encoded in bit-masks stored in a collection of registers and block RAMs. Then, the NFA is efficiently simulated by a fixed circuitry using bitwise Boolean and arithmetic operations consuming one input character per clock regardless of the actual contents of an input text. Experimental results showed that our hardwares for both string and extended patterns were comparable to previous dynamically reconfigurable hardwares in their performances.

key words: FPGA, string matching, regular expression matching, bit-parallel algorithm, event stream processing

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

By rapid growth of sensor and network technologies, massive data of new types, called data streams, and related applications have emerged in various fields including data engineering and networks. Event stream processing (ESP) [1] and network intrusion detection system (NIDS) [3] are example applications of data stream processing. Consequently, efficient data stream processing technologies have been extensively studied in theory and practice.

The large-scale pattern matching problem [3], [5], [13], [15], [20], [24], [26] is one of the most important problems in data stream processing, where a pattern matching system has to work with a large number (e.g., from thousands to several tens thousands) of complex patterns (e.g., regular expressions) against high-speed data streams (e.g., of several giga bps). For example, large-scale regular expression matching is such a problem that appears in real-world applications such as ESP and NIDS, where regular expressions are defined by characters, concatenation, union, and Kleene-star. From the view of current CPU technologies, large-scale pattern matching problems are quite CPU-intensive tasks, and thus it is difficult for software on CPU to efficiently process massive data streams in real time. Therefore, research on large-scale regular expression matching on reconfigurable hardwares such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) have recently attracted much attention.

1.2 Dynamic Reconfiguration vs. Static Compilation Approaches

A recent research trend in large-scale regular expression matching hardwares is to simulate finite state automata for a class of regular expressions on a specially designed hardware [3], [4], [8], [13], [19], [20], [24]–[26]. This approach is further classified into the static compilation approach and the dynamic reconfiguration approach.

In the static compilation approach [19], [20], [24]–[26], a set of input regular expressions are transformed into either deterministic finite automata (DFAs) or non-deterministic finite automata (NFAs) [16], and then statically compiled into wired logic on FPGA. However, the static compilation approach has a drawback in that modification of regular expressions is too expensive to be done frequently.

In the dynamic reconfiguration approach [3], [4], [8], [13], a universal control logic is statically compiled into FPGA beforehand as well, but a description of regular expressions is dynamically loaded to the FPGA as data in preprocessing, and then simulated in run-time. This approach is attractive in real-world applications such as ESP and NIDS, where input patterns frequently change. However, it is a challenging task to design dynamically reconfigurable hardwares that efficiently run for wider classes of regular expressions since the classes of patterns that can be dealt with are still limited.

Overall, our research goal is to design dynamically re-
configurable hardwares for complex classes of regular expressions and to achieve gigabit throughput as the hardwares by [3], [4], [6], [8], [14], [21].

1.3 Main Result of This Paper

As a main result, we propose a novel architecture for large-scale regular expression matching, called **dynamically reconfigurable bit-parallel NFA architecture (Dynamic BP-NFA)**, where quick-on-the-fly loading of complex pattern is possible. The key to our architecture is the use of **bit-parallel pattern matching** approach developed in string matching communities since 1990s [2], [16], [23]. In Fig. 1, we show the top-level view of our architecture, which will be explained in detail.

Our target pattern class is the class **EXT of extended patterns** [16], [17], which is a subclass of regular expressions allowing union of characters and its Kleene-star. The class **EXT** is a natural generalization of the class **STR of exact string patterns** consisting characters and concatenation, which supports character classes $\beta = \{ab\cdots\}$, gaps `·` , optional characters $\beta\gamma$, bounded and unbounded repeats $\beta[x,y]$ and $\beta^*$ of character classes. For example, $R = [AB]^*B\{1, 3\}[AC]^2\gamma$. C represents a substring of an input text that starts with one or more repetitions of character A or B, followed by a character B, one to three repetitions of any character in $\Sigma$, an optional A or C, any characters in $\Sigma$, and C.

Our **Dynamic BP-NFA** consists of a collection of pattern matching modules. In each module, an input extended pattern is first translated into an input NFA, and the information of the NFA is compactly encoded in a set of bit-masks stored in 32-bit registers and block RAMs, when the underlying register length is 32 bits. Then, the NFA is efficiently simulated by a fixed circuitry using a set of 32-bit Boolean operations and a 32-bit integer addition on the registers and RAMs. We apply the same procedure to a set of input patterns in multiple pattern matching. Based on theoretical analysis, we show that this hardware correctly matches a given set of extended patterns against an input text consuming one input character per clock regardless of the actual contents of the input texts.

In experiments, we first implemented our **Dynamic BP-NFA** and measured its performance and resource usage for **STR and EXT**. As results, for **STR**, we could install 256 patterns and achieve the throughput of 2.6 Gbps on Xilinx Virtex-5 LX330, and for **EXT**, we could install 128 patterns and achieve the throughput of 1.4 Gbps on the same device. Next, we compared the performances of our hardwares for both **STR and EXT** to those of the previous dynamically reconfigurable hardwares in the literatures [3], [4], [8] after a calibration of throughputs using process scaling in CMOS technologies that FPGA devices were built on. Consequently, our hardwares for both classes were comparable to those of the above dynamically reconfigurable hardwares in their performances.

Main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:

- **Dynamic loading of extended patterns**: Our Dynamic BP-NFA is the first dynamically reconfigurable hardware that can deal with the class **EXT of extended patterns**, which is a non-trivial and useful subclass of regular expressions widely studied in real-world applications such as event stream processing [1] and bio-information processing [16], [17]. On the other hand, Baker et al.’s KMP-based hardware [4] and Jung et al.’s Bitsplit-based hardware [8] are also dynamically reconfigurable. However, they allow only dynamic loading of the class STR of exact string patterns, which is a small subclass of **EXT**. While Sidhu et al.’s hardware [20] can deal with the whole class **REG of regular expressions**, it can not change input regular expressions on-the-fly since it is a static compilation approach.

- **Worst-case performance guarantee**: Our Dynamic BP-NFA has theoretical performance guarantee in the worst-case from Theorem 1 in Sect. 4.3 for both STR and EXT. On the other hand, Baker et al.’s RegExp Controller hardware [3] is only a dynamically reconfigurable hardware before ours that can deal with a non-trivial subclass of regular expressions. Since it is a hybrid of DFA-simulation and microcontroller, its processing time related to microcontroller becomes a performance bottleneck and it has no performance guarantee in the worst-case when a regular expression has

![Fig. 1 The top-level view of our pattern matching architecture.](image-url)
many occurrences of its subpatterns in an input text as indicated in [3].

- Potential extensibility of target pattern classes: Our Dynamic BP-NFA has the potential extensibility to more general patterns by changing the construction of bit-masks and the control logic for NFA-simulation. For example, Kaneta et al. [10] proposed a generalization of the Extended SHIFT-AND method, used in this paper, for the classes of network and regular expressions allowing union and Kleene-star. Such method can be incorporated into our architecture by extending the construction of bit-masks and a circuitry described later.

Overall, our Dynamic BP-NFA is the first architecture that fulfills the above three requirements for dynamic loading of patterns, worst-case performance guarantee, and extensibility to more general patterns.

1.4 An Example of Large-Scale Pattern Matching

Deep packet inspection (DPI) [6], [14], [21] is a new technology in NIDS that scans the payloads deep inside packets using a set of regular expressions as detection rules for detecting network intrusion, while traditional NIDS makes shallow analysis only in the headers of input packets. DPI detecting network intrusion, while traditional NIDS makes extensive use of a set of regular expressions as detection rules for signatures.

For a large-scale DPI system running on CPU, the performance seems adequate for the current applications, it is recognized that further progress of high-speed network technology will require order of magnitude faster hardware implementation [3], [6], [14], [21]. Such hardwares are desired to have the capability of on-the-fly reconfiguration of patterns as well as high-performance guarantee for a wide class of regular expressions. However, most of the currently available dynamically reconfigurable hardwares [4], [8] can deal with only exact string patterns. Interestingly enough, we can observe that most of detection rules are either extended patterns in EXT, which will be considered in this paper, or disjunctions of a few extended patterns. Hence, from the view point in DPI, our architecture will be a candidate of the base technologies for such high-performance hardware-based DPI systems.

1.5 Related Work

There has been a number of research on dynamically reconfigurable hardwares for large-scale pattern matching, Baker et al.’s KMP-based hardware [4] and Jung et al.’s Bitsplit-based hardware [8] are DFA-based dynamic reconfiguration approaches for exact string patterns, which achieved the throughputs of 1.8 Gbps and 1.6 Gbps, respectively. Baker et al. developed RegExp Controller hardware for regular expressions [3], which is a hybrid of DFA-simulation and microcontroller. The throughput of this hardware was 1.4 Gbps.

1.6 Organization of This Paper

This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we give basic definitions. In Sect. 3, we propose our Dynamic BP-NFA architecture, and in Sect. 4, we give the detailed description of each pattern matching module. In Sect. 5, we give experimental results, and in Sect. 6, we conclude. This paper was built on the previous publications [11], [12].

2. Preliminary

2.1 Regular Expression Matching

Let $N = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots \}$ be the set of all non-negative integers, and $\Sigma = \{a, b, \ldots \}$ be a finite alphabet of characters (or letters). A string on $\Sigma$ is a sequence $S = s_1 \cdots s_n$ of characters, where $S[i] = s_i \in \Sigma$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$. We denote by $S[i..j]$ the substring $s_i \cdots s_j$ for every $i \leq j$, and by $\varepsilon$ the empty string. If $i > j$, we define $S[i..j] = \varepsilon$. We denote by $\Sigma^*$ the set of all strings on $\Sigma$. For a set $S \subseteq \Sigma^*$ of strings, we denote by $|S|$ the cardinality and $||S|| = \sum_{s \in S} |s|$ the total size of $S$. For a character $c \in \Sigma$ and an integer $i \in N$, we define by $c^i$ the string consisting of $i$ consecutive $c$.

Let $REG$ be the class of regular expressions on $\Sigma$. More precisely, a regular expression $R$ is either a character $c \in \Sigma$, concatenation $R = R_1 \cdot R_2$, union $R = (R_1 \lor R_2)$, and Kleene-star $R = (R)^*$, where $R_1$ and $R_2$ are regular expressions [16]. For a regular expression $R$, we denote by $L(R) \subseteq \Sigma^*$ its language. Let $T = t_1 \cdots t_n \in \Sigma^*$ be an input text of length $n \geq 0$, where $t_i \in \Sigma (1 \leq i \leq n)$. A pattern is a regular expression on $\Sigma$. We say a regular expression $R$ occurs at the end position $j$ in $T$, if $T[i..j] = t_i \cdots t_j \in L(R)$. Our problem is stated as follows.

**Definition 1.** The multiple pattern matching problem for a subclass $C \subseteq REG$ of regular expressions is defined as follows. An input is an input pattern set $P = \{(i, R_i) | i = 1, \ldots, N \}$ ($N \geq 1$), where for every $i = 1, \ldots, N$, $i$ is an integer. In the case that $n < 1$, a text $T = t_1 \cdots t_n$ represents the empty string $\varepsilon$. Similarly, a set $S = \{s_1, \ldots, s_m\}$ and a regular expression $R = r_1 \cdots r_m$ represent the empty set $\emptyset$ and the empty string $\varepsilon$ if $m < 1$, respectively.
teger, called an *index*, and $R_i \in C$ is a pattern. Then, the task is, given a stream $T = t_1 t_2 \cdots t_p$ ($p \geq 1$) of input characters, to output the pairs $(i, p)$ such that $i = 1, \ldots, N$ is the index and $p$ is an end position of $R_i$ in $T$ for all $p = 1, 2, \ldots$

2.2 Target Pattern Class: Extended Patterns

The target subclass of regular expressions that our architecture deals with is the class of *extended patterns* defined as follows. In what follows, we directly write a set $\{a_1, \ldots, a_m\} \subseteq \Sigma$ of characters instead of union $(a_1|\cdots|a_m)$ of characters representing the set, where $a_i \in \Sigma$ ($1 \leq i \leq m$).

**Definition 2.** The class of *extended patterns*, denoted by EXT, is given a stream $\Sigma$ as an expression, called an *extended pattern* $R$, for every component, where $\Sigma$ is a sequence of some components $R = r_1 \cdots r_m$ $(m \geq 0)$, where for each $1 \leq i \leq m$, $r_i$ is an expression, called a *component*, with one of the following forms, where $\equiv$ means the notational equivalence:

1. A *character* (or a *letter*) $r_i = c \in \Sigma$ is a component with the language $L(c) = \{c\}$.
2. A *gap* (or a *don’t care*) $r_i = -$ is a component in the language $L(-) = \Sigma$. This matches any character in $\Sigma$.
3. A *character class* $r_i = \beta$ is a component with the language $L(\beta) = \beta$, where $\beta \subseteq \Sigma$. As notation, we write $[ab\cdots]$ for $\beta = \{a, b, \ldots\}$. This is equivalent to union of characters. Note that a character $a \in \Sigma$ and a gap ‘-’ are character classes.
4. An *optional character* $r_i = \beta^*$ is a component, where $\beta \subseteq \Sigma$ and $\beta^* \equiv (\beta\epsilon)$.
5. Bounded repeats $r_i = \beta(x, y)$, $r_i = \beta(y, x)$, and $r_i = \beta(x)$ are components with equivalence $\beta(x, y) \equiv (\beta y)^* \beta^y$, $\beta(y, x) \equiv (\beta^x)^* \beta^x$, and $\beta(x) \equiv \beta^x$, respectively, where $\beta \subseteq \Sigma$ and $x \leq y (x, y \in \Sigma)$. If $\beta$ is a gap ‘-’, $r_i$ is called a bounded gap.
6. Unbounded repeats $r_i = \beta^*$ and $r_i = \beta^+$ are components, where $\beta \subseteq \Sigma$ and $\beta^* \equiv \beta^+$. If $\beta$ is a gap ‘-’, $r_i$ is called an unbounded gap (or a variable length don’t care).

For $R = r_1 \cdots r_m$, we define its language by $L(R) = L(r_1) \cdots L(r_m)$. If $r_i$ is one of the forms $\beta^*, \beta(x, y)$, $\beta^+$, and $\beta^*$, then $\beta$ is the matrix of $r_i$.

**Example 1.** We show examples of extended patterns, where character class is equivalent to union of characters, e.g., $[AB] \equiv (AB)$.

- $R_1 = ABABBC$.
- $R_2 = [AB]^*E[1, 3][AC]^?\epsilonC$.
- $R_3 = (A[BC]^+)[1, 4][DE]^*$.

We say that $R = r_1 \cdots r_m$ is in the class $\text{STR of exact string patterns}$ (or string patterns) if every component $r_i$ is a character in $\Sigma$ such as $R_1$.

3. Proposed Architecture

In this section, we present our dynamically reconfigurable bit-parallel NFA architecture, Dynamic BP-NFA, based on

| Opcode (64 bits) | Module Id (16 bits) | Time Stamp (12 bits) | Not used (60 bits) | Module Id (16 bits) | Time Stamp (12 bits) |
|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0           | 0                  | 0                  | 0                 | 0                  | 0                  |
| 1           | 1                  | 1                  | 1                 | 1                  | 1                  |
| 2           | 2                  | 2                  | 2                 | 2                  | 2                  |

**Fig. 2** The formats of the general I/O packets, the preprocessing input, run-time input, and run-time output packets from the top to the bottom.

NFA-simulation using bit-parallel pattern matching.

3.1 Top-Level Architecture

In Fig. 1, we show the top-level architecture of our pattern matching hardware on FPGA. The hardware consists of the following submodules: an input decoder, an output encoder, and a collection of *pattern matching modules* (PMM). It receives and sends a sequence of I/O packets from and to a host PC through a fast bus such as PCI Express. In the present implementation, I/O packets have 64-bit length and are classified into four types according to their Opcode field: *no-operation*, *preprocessing input*, *run-time input*, and *run-time output* packets. In Fig. 2, we show the preprocessing input, run-time input, and run-time output packet. The no-operation packet has only Opcode field and does nothing. The hardware runs in two different modes: *preprocessing* and *run-time* modes.

**Preprocessing mode.** In this mode, the hardware loads the description of input patterns with a preprocessing packet. A preprocessing packet has Opcode field for the packet type, MaskData field for the data, and also has the three fields below to specify the location of a bit-mask to deliver: ModuleId to specify the target PMM, MaskId to specify a register or a block RAM, and MaskAddress to specify the line (in the case of a block RAM only).

**Run-time mode.** In this mode, the hardware receives an input character, makes a state transition for the target NFA by a fixed circuitry, detects matches, and emits a matching information by receiving and sending run-time packets. A run-time input packet has Opcode field for its type and a sequence of InputCharacter fields for input characters. At each clock, one input character is fed to all PMMs. A run-time output packet has Opcode field for its type, a sequence of pairs of ModuleId and TimeStamp fields for matching information. If a PMM detects the matching, then it sends matching information to the output encoder. Then, the output encoder packs a collection of matching information into a run-time output packet and send it to a host PC.

4. Pattern Matching Module

A *pattern matching module*, PMM, is a core of our pattern matching hardware and is responsible for NFA-simulation of a specified input pattern with fixed length $w \geq 1$. In what follows, we assume that $w = 32$, where $w$ is actually the bit-length of registers in an underlying hardware.
4.1 Components of a Module

In the middle of Fig.1, we show a single unit of a pattern matching module, PMM. A pattern matching module consists of three subunits: the control block for loading of bit-masks and input characters, the bit-mask block for storing NFA information, and the matching block as a control logic for NFA-simulation. We give assumptions on the FPGA device for describing PMMs. An input alphabet is the set for NFA-simulation. We give assumptions on the FPGA architecture step by step starting from simpler to more complex patterns. In the middle of Fig.1, we show a single unit of a pattern matching module, PMM. A pattern matching module consists of three subunits: the control block for loading of bit-masks and input characters, the bit-mask block for storing NFA information, and the matching block as a control logic for NFA-simulation. We give assumptions on the FPGA device for describing PMMs. An input alphabet is the set for NFA-simulation. We give assumptions on the FPGA architecture step by step starting from simpler to more complex patterns.

4.2 NFA-Simulation: Exact String Pattern

First, we start with the construction of PMM for the class STR of exact string patterns based on the SHIFT-AND method [2], [16], [23]. We show in Fig.3 the circuit of a PMM for STR. It consists of the definition of a set of bit-masks and a control logic for NFA-simulation. An exact string pattern is just a string \( R = r_1 \cdots r_m \) of \( m \) characters, where \( m \leq w \) and \( r_i = a_i \in \Sigma \) is a character for every \( i = 1, \ldots, m \).

Construction of NFA. First, we build the exact string pattern NFA \( N_R = N(R) \) for an exact string pattern \( R \) as follows. First, we start with the state 0, and add the initial self-loop labeled with \( \Sigma \) to the state. Then, for every \( i = 1, \ldots, m \), we add to the NFA \( N_R \) the new state \( i \) and the edge \( e_i = (i - 1, r_i, i) \) directed from the previous state \( i - 1 \) to the current state \( i \) labeled with \( r_i = a_i \in \Sigma \). The resulting NFA \( N_R \) consists only of the backbone of \( m \) edges labeled with characters and the initial self-loop. For example, we show in Fig.4 the exact string pattern NFA \( N_1 = N(R_1) \) corresponding to the exact string pattern \( R_1 = ABABBC \).

Precisely speaking, the NFA is given by the tuple \( N_R = (\Sigma, Q, \delta, q_0, q_f) \), which has the state set \( Q = \{ 0, 1, \ldots, m \} \), the initial state \( q_0 = 0 \), the final state \( q_f = m \). The transition relation \( \delta \subseteq Q \times (\Sigma \cup \{ \varepsilon \}) \times Q \) is the set of directed edges, \( \{(i - 1, a_i, i) | i = 1, \ldots, m \} \), called the backbone of \( N_R \), where \( \varepsilon \) is the empty string. The state 0 has the self-loop with labeled with \( \Sigma \). In what follows, we call by \( \alpha \)-transitions and \( \varepsilon \)-transitions state transitions by edges labeled with \( c \in \Sigma \) and \( \varepsilon \), respectively.

Construction of bit-masks. To simulate the exact string pattern NFA \( N_R = N(R) \), we use \( w \)-bit masks \( INIT, ACCEPT \) and an array \( MOVE[c] \in \{ 0, 1 \}^w \) \((c \in \Sigma)\) of bit-masks defined as follows, where a mask stores all states \( \{1, \ldots, m\} \) but state 0:

- \( INIT \) is the \( w \)-bit mask that sets 1 at the bit-position for the state 1. That is, \( INIT[i] = 1 \) if and only if \( i = 1 \).
- \( ACCEPT \) is the \( w \)-bit mask that sets 1 at the bit-position for the final state \( m \). That is, \( ACCEPT[i] = 1 \) if and only if \( i = m \).
- \( MOVE[c] \) is the \( w \)-bit mask that indicates all bit-positions of backbones labeled with a character \( c \in R \).

That is, \( MOVE[c][i] = 1 \) if and only if the state \( i \) has an incoming edge labeled with \( c \in \Sigma \), i.e., \( r_i = c \).

Note that we can easily extend the array \( (MOVE[c])_{c \in \Sigma} \) to deal with character classes \( \beta \subseteq \Sigma \), i.e., union of characters as follows: \( MOVE[c] \) is the \( w \)-bit mask that indicates all bit-positions of backbones labeled with a character class \( \beta \subseteq \Sigma \) with \( c \in \beta \) in \( R \).

We store the bit-masks \( INIT \) and \( ACCEPT \) in \( w \)-bit registers, and the array \( (MOVE[c])_{c \in \Sigma} \) in a block RAM with a single read/write ports of \( |\Sigma| \) entries with \( w \)-bit-length.

Control logic for NFA-simulation. Based on the SHIFT-AND method [2], [16], [23], we finally give the control logic for NFA-simulation in the matching block as follows. First, the next code simulates the \( \alpha \)-transitions, where \( r \in \Sigma \) is the current character in an input text:
Then, the following code checks for a match:

\[
\text{if } (STATE \& \& ACCEPT) \text{ then } EmitMatch ← 1;
\]

By the above construction, we can implement the control logic for NFA-simulation by a circuit shown in Fig. 3 by using five \( w \)-bit Boolean operations, three \( w \)-bit registers, and one block RAM with \( \Sigma \) entries of \( w \)-bit-length.

4.3 NFA-Simulation: Extended Pattern

Next, we show the construction of PMM for the class \( EXT \) of extended patterns based on the Extended SHIFT-AND method [16], [17]. We show in Fig. 5 the circuit of a PMM for \( EXT \).

**Expanded form and bit-assignment.** Let \( R \) be an extended pattern. Then, recall that every component \( r_i \) of \( R \) has one of the following types: (i) \( r_i = \beta \), (ii) \( r_i = \beta^{?} \), and (iii) \( r_i = \beta^{*} \), (iv) \( r_i = \beta^{+} \), and (v) \( r_i = \beta(x, y) \), where \( \beta \subseteq \Sigma \). We expand all occurrences of bounded repeats \( r_i = \beta(x, y) \) of type (v) in \( R \) by using the equivalence \( \beta(x, y) \equiv (\beta^{?})^{*}(\beta^{*})^{?} \), where \( x \leq y \). Let \( \text{Expand}(R) = r_1 \cdots r_m \) be the resulting extended pattern of \( m \) components, called the expanded form of \( R \), where \( |R| \leq m \leq w \). By construction, \( \text{Expand}(R) \) contains no occurrences of components of type (v). Let \( I = \{1, \ldots, m\} \) be the set of all component indexes of \( \text{Expand}(R) \). Then, we assign the unique numbers \( 1, \ldots, m \), called bit-positions, to indexes in \( I \).

For example, we show in Fig. 6 the bit-position assignment for \( R_2 = [AB]^*B.\{1, 3\}[AC]^?C \) consisting of six components. By replacing the bounded gap \{1, 3\} with \((?),(?)\), we obtained its expanded form \( \text{Expand}(R_2) = ([AB]^*)(B)(?)(?)(?)([AC]^?)(\cdot)(\cdot)(C) \) consisting eight components with assigned bit-positions from 1 to 8.

**Construction of NFA.** Then, we build the extended pattern NFA \( N_R = N(R) \) for \( R \) from the expanded form \( \text{Expand}(R) \) as follows. Let \( \text{Expand}(R) = r_1 \cdots r_m \) for some \( m \geq 1 \) and \( w \) be an positive integer larger than or equal to \( m \). By construction, we can assume that \( \text{Expand}(R) \) contains components of only type (i)–(iv). First, we start with the state 0, and add the initial self-loop labeled with \( \Sigma \) to the state similarly to the construction of an exact string pattern NFA. Then, for every \( i = 1, \ldots, m \), we add to the NFA \( N_R \) the new state \( i \) and the \( \alpha \)-transitions and \( \varepsilon \)-transitions related to the state \( i \) according to the type of the \( i \)-th component \( r_i \) with matrix \( \beta \subseteq \Sigma \) as follows:

- For all types (i)–(iv) of \( r_i \), we add the backbone \( e_i = (i - 1, \beta, i) \) directed from the previous state \( i - 1 \) to the current state \( i \) labeled with matrix \( \beta \).
- Furthermore, if \( r_i \) is either (ii) \( \beta^* \) or (iii) \( \beta^+ \), then we add an \( \varepsilon \)-transition directed from the previous state \( i - 1 \) to the current state \( i \).
- Furthermore, if \( r_i \) is either (iii) \( \beta^* \) or (iv) \( \beta^+ \), then we add a self-loop labeled with matrix \( \beta \) from the current state \( i \) to itself.

We define an \( \varepsilon \)-block of the expanded form \( \text{Expand}(R) = r_1 \cdots r_m \) by the set \( B = \{i, \ldots, j\} \subseteq I \) of the component indexes for a maximal consecutive subsequence \( r_i \cdots r_j \) (1 \( \leq i \leq j \leq m \)) in \( \text{Expand}(R) \), where \( r_k \) is either \( r_k = \beta_k^{?} \) or \( r_k = \beta_k^{*} \) for every \( i \leq k \leq j \). We can easily obtain all \( \varepsilon \)-blocks by scanning the components of \( \text{Expand}(R) \) and finding such maximal consecutive subsequences. Let \( \{B_1, \ldots, B_h\} \) (\( h \geq 0 \)) be the set of all \( \varepsilon \)-blocks of \( \text{Expand}(R) \).

For example, we show in Fig. 7 the extended pattern NFA \( N_2 = N(R_2) \) corresponding to \( \text{Expand}(R_2) \). Then, \( \text{Expand}(R_2) \) has two \( \varepsilon \)-blocks \( B_1 = \{3, 4\} \) and \( B_2 = \{6, 7\} \) corresponding to \( r_3r_4 = (?)(\cdot) \) and \( r_6r_7 = ([AC]^?)(\cdot) \), respectively.
Construction of bit-masks. To simulate an extended pattern NFA $N_2 = N(R)$, we use $w$-bit masks $EpsBEG$, $EpsEND$, $EpsBLK$, and the array $REPPOS[c] \in \{0, 1\}^w$ of bit-masks in addition to the bit-masks $INIT$, $ACCEPT$, and $MOVE[c] \in \{0, 1\}^w$ ($c \in \Sigma$) defined in the previous subsection.

- $EpsBEG$ is the $w$-bit mask that sets 1 at the previous bit-position of the lowest bit-position of every $\varepsilon$-block. That is, $EpsBEG[i] = 1$ if and only if $i = \min(B_k) - 1$ for some $\varepsilon$-block $B_k$.
- $EpsEND$ is the $w$-bit mask that sets 1 at the highest bit-position of every $\varepsilon$-block. That is, $EpsEND[i] = 1$ if and only if $i = \max(B_k)$ for some $\varepsilon$-block $B_k$.
- $EpsBLK$ is the $w$-bit mask that sets 1s at all bit-positions of every $\varepsilon$-block. That is, $EpsBLK[i] = 1$ if and only if $i$ is contained by some $\varepsilon$-block $B_k$.
- $REPPOS[c]$ is the $w$-bit mask that indicates all bit-positions of self-loops labeled with a character class $\beta \subseteq \Sigma$ with $c \in \beta$ in $\text{Expand}(R)$. That is, $REPPOS[c][i] = 1$ if and only if the state $i$ has a self-loop labeled with $c \in \beta$, or equivalently, either $r_i = \beta'$ or $r_i = \beta^r$ with $c \in \beta$.

For example, we show in Fig. 8 the bit-masks for $R_2$. As in the previous case, we store the bit-masks $INIT$, $ACCEPT$, $EpsBEG$, $EpsEND$, and $EpsBLK$ in $w$-bit registers, and the arrays $(MOVE[c])_{c \in \Sigma}$ and $(REPPOS[c])_{c \in \Sigma}$ in block RAMs.

Control logic for NFA-simulation. Based on the Extended SHIFT-AND method [16], we finally give the control logic for NFA-simulation in the matching block according to the codes in [16] as follows. First, the next code initializes the state mask at line (1), simulates the $\alpha$-transitions at line (2), and simulates the $\varepsilon$-transitions by self-loops at line (3), where $t \in \Sigma$ is the current character in an input text:

$$STATE \leftarrow ((STATE \ll 1) | INIT) \quad \text{(1)}$$
$$& MOVE[t] \quad \text{(2)}$$
$$| (STATE \& REPPOS[t]); \quad \text{(3)}$$

| Bit-position $i$ | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INIT             | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ACCEPT           | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MOVE[A]          | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| MOVE[B]          | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| MOVE[C]          | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| MOVE[%]          | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| REPPOS[A]        | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| REPPOS[B]        | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| REPPOS[C]        | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| REPPOS[%]        | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $EpsBEG$         | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $EpsEND$         | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| $EpsBLK$         | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |

Fig. 8 The set of bit-masks for $R_2 = [AB]^*B[1, 3][AC]^*$. C on alphabet $\Sigma = \{A, B, C\}$, where the symbol ‘%’ denotes any character not in $\Sigma$.

Then, the sequence of the following codes simulate the $\varepsilon$-transitions with the state mask:

$$HIGH \leftarrow STATE | EpsBEG; \quad \text{(4)}$$
$$LOW \leftarrow HIGH - EpsBEG; \quad \text{(5)}$$
$$STATE \leftarrow (EpsBLK & ((LOW) \oplus HIGH)) \quad \text{(6)}$$
$$| STATE; \quad \text{(7)}$$

The meaning of the above codes is explained as follows. At line (4), we turn on the highest bit (the end bit) of each $\varepsilon$-block in $STATE$, and set it to $HIGH$. At line (5), we invert all bits lower than or equal to the lowest 1 bit of all and the previous bits of each $\varepsilon$-block in $HIGH$ and set it to $LOW$. At line (6), the mask $(EpsBLK & ((LOW) \oplus HIGH))$ has 1s at all bit-positions properly higher than the lowest 1 bit of all and the previous bits of each $\varepsilon$-block in $STATE$. Finally, we add the change to $STATE$ at line (7). The code $STATE \& ACCEPT$ that checks for a match is same as exact pattern matching. In Fig. 9, we show an example of NFA-simulation by the set of bit-masks for $R_2 = [AB]^*B[1, 3][AC]^*$. C on an input text $T = ABAABC$. In Fig. 9, we show the status of the mask $STATE$ after the update in each cycle $i$ ($1 \leq i \leq 6$). The output $\text{EmitMatch}$ of PMM is the value at the bit-position 8 of $STATE$.

By the above construction, we can implement the control logic for NFA-simulation by a circuit shown in Fig. 5 by using twelve $w$-bit Boolean operations, one $w$-bit subtraction, six $w$-bit registers, and two block RAMs with $|\Sigma|$ entries of $w$-bit-length.

Theorem 1. For the class $\text{EXT}$ of extended patterns, our hardware consumes one input character per clock regardless of the content of the input text $T$. Furthermore, its combinatorial circuit for state update in Fig. 5, excluding registers and RAMs, has $O(\log w)$ depth and $O(w^3)$ gates, where $w$ is the length of a register.

Proof. The circuit in Fig. 5 contains one $w$-bit adder and constant number of $w$-bit bitwise Boolean gates, an $w$-bit multiplexer and an $w$-bit comparator. It is well known that an $w$-bit carry look-ahead adder can be implemented in $O(\log w)$ depth using $O(w^3)$ gates. Since the other $w$-bit gates can be implemented in constant depth and $O(w)$ 1-bit gates, we have the claimed complexities. Since any cycle on the data paths contains at most one register or RAM, the result is proved. $\square$

| Cycle $i$ | Input character $t_i$ | $STATE$ after update in cycle $i$ |
|-----------|------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1         | A                      | 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0                     |
| 2         | B                      | 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0                     |
| 3         | A                      | 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1                     |
| 4         | A                      | 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1                     |
| 5         | B                      | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1                     |
| 6         | C                      | 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1                     |

Fig. 9 An example of extended pattern matching, given an extended pattern $R_2 = [AB]^*B[1, 3][AC]^*$. C and an input text $T = ABAABC$. 
5. Experimental Results

To evaluate the time and area complexities, we implemented our hardwares in Verilog HDL for both classes of exact string patterns STR (Sect. 4.2) and extended patterns EXT (Sect. 4.3), where the register length \( w \) is set to \( w = 32 \) and the arrays \textit{MOVE} and \textit{REPPos} are implemented in block RAMs. We targeted the Virtex-5 LX330 with -2 speed grade, which has 51,840 slices and 288 block RAMs with 36 Kbits. We used the Xilinx ISE Design Suite 10.1 and Synopsys VCS development tools. All experiments were run in a PC (Intel Core2 Duo CPU, 2.40 GHz, 4.00 GB memory, Windows Vista).

5.1 Results on Our Dynamically Reconfigurable Hardwares

We give the experimental results for our pattern matching modules, PMM, in our Dynamic BP-NFA. In Table 1 and Table 2, we show the summaries of parameters for single and multiple PMMs, respectively.

\textbf{Performance evaluation.} The maximum frequencies of one PMM were 331 MHz and 184 MHz after place-and-route (418 MHz and 235 MHz after synthesis, resp.) for STR and EXT, respectively. For the time complexity in run-time, we estimated the throughput of matching by Throughput = Frequency \times 8 (bit/sec) since our hardwares consume one character (8 bits) per clock. Thus, the throughputs were 2.6 Gbps and 1.5 Gbps after place-and-route (3.3 Gbps and 1.9 Gbps after synthesis, resp.) for STR and EXT, respectively. In what follows, the frequencies and throughputs of our Dynamic BP-NFA are those after place-and-route. The maximum frequencies and throughputs of PMMs for both STR and EXT is almost constant regardless of the number \( N \) of PMMs since our PMMs are independent of each other in our architecture. However, as indicated in [4], the overall performance of our system, including I/O, decreased as the \( N \) number of PMMs increased because of fanout delays of the control block feeding input characters to PMMs.

\textbf{Resource usage.} As shown in Table 1, for STR, one PMM used 52 slices and 1 block RAM (256 = 1\times256 lines), and for EXT, one PMM used 140 slices and 2 block RAMs (512 = 2\times256 lines). As shown in Table 2, we could implement up to 256 PMMs for STR (8,192 total characters) and up to 128 PMMs for EXT (4,096 total characters), where each PMM deals with a single pattern. For EXT, we used 12,124 slices total and 256 block RAMs. Consequently, the usage of block RAMs was 89%, while the usage of slices was only 23%. This means that the size of a hardware in our architecture is constrained mainly by the amount of block RAMs and not by one of slices. The number \#Slice of slices was proportional to the number \( N \) of PMMs as expected.

\textbf{Reconfiguration time.} We evaluate the reconfiguration time of a pattern matching hardware, which is the time required by the hardware to load a description of input patterns. Therefore, the reconfiguration time of one PMM was estimated by Load Time = (#Reg + #BL)/Frequency (sec) to load a set of bit-masks. From the result of Table 1, one PMM took 0.782 \( \mu \)sec for STR and 2.82 \( \mu \)sec for EXT to load an input pattern. Consequently, PMMs took 0.208 msec for STR and 0.377 msec for EXT to load all 256 and 128 patterns, respectively.

5.2 Comparison against Our Static Compilation Hardware

We compared our Dynamic BP-NFA for the class STR of exact string patterns against a static compilation hardware for STR, called the Static BP-NFA[11], which was implemented and evaluated on Virtex-5 LX50 with -1 speed grade, which has 7,200 slices. Below, we compare our Dynamic BP-NFA for STR against the Static BP-NFA in terms of performance evaluation, resource usage, and reconfiguration time.

\textbf{Performance evaluation.} As shown in Table 1, our Dynamic BP-NFA for STR achieved the frequency of 319 MHz and the throughput of 2.6 Gbps for 256 PMMs. On the other hand, the Static BP-NFA achieved the frequency of 216 MHz and the throughput of 1.7 Gbps for

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Summary of parameters of a single pattern matching module, where we assume |\{\}| = 256. Class is the target class, #Op, #Add, #Reg, #BL, and #Slice are the numbers of 32-bit Boolean operations, 32-bit integer additions, registers, block RAM lines, and slices per pattern matching module, and Load Time is the loading time of an input pattern, respectively.}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Class} & \textbf{#Op} & \textbf{#Add} & \textbf{#Reg} & \textbf{#BL} & \textbf{#Slice} & \textbf{Frequency} & \textbf{Throughput} & \textbf{Load Time} \\
\hline
STR & 5 & 0 & 3 & 256 & 52 & 331 MHz & 2.6 Gbps & 0.782 \( \mu \)sec \\
EXT & 12 & 1 & 6 & 512 & 140 & 184 MHz & 1.5 Gbps & 2.82 \( \mu \)sec \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Summary of parameters of multiple pattern matching modules, where we assume |\{\}| = 256. Class is the target class, #Modules and #BRAMs are the numbers of modules and block RAMs, #Chars Total is the total size of input patterns, and Load Time Total is the total loading time of input patterns, respectively.}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Class} & \textbf{#Modules} & \textbf{#BRAMs} & \textbf{#Chars Total} & \textbf{Frequency} & \textbf{Throughput} & \textbf{Load Time Total} \\
\hline
STR & 256 & 256 & 8,192 & 319 MHz & 2.6 Gbps & 0.208 msec \\
EXT & 128 & 256 & 4,096 & 176 MHz & 1.4 Gbps & 0.377 msec \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
Table 3  Results on comparisons of regular expression matching hardwares based on various dynamically reconfigurable architectures, where Class is the target class, Throughput is the calibrated and original throughputs (the original one is in parentheses), bRAM/char is the number of bytes used in block RAMs per character, LC/char is the number of logic cells used per character, and #Chars Total is the total size of input patterns.

| Design                        | Class | Device         | Throughput | bRAM/char | LC/char | #Chars Total |
|-------------------------------|-------|----------------|------------|-----------|---------|--------------|
| Dynamic BP-NFA for STR        | STR   | Virtex-5 LX330 | 2.6 (2.6) Gbps | 32 bytes/char | 3.2 LC/char | 8192         |
| Dynamic BP-NFA for EXT        | EXT   | Virtex-5 LX330 | 1.4 (1.4) Gbps | 64 bytes/char | 11.9 LC/char | 4096         |
| KMP-based hardware [4]        | STR   | Virtex-II Pro  | 3.6 (1.8) Gbps | 4 bytes/char  | 3.2 LC/char  | 3200         |
| Bitsplit-based hardware [8]   | STR   | Virtex-4 FX100 | 2.2 (1.6) Gbps | 46 bytes/char | 1.4 LC/char  | 16715        |
| RegExp Controller hardware [3] | REG   | Virtex-4 FX100 | 1.9 (1.4) Gbps | 46 bytes/char | 2.56 LC/char | 16715        |

300 PMMs [11]. For a fair comparison of performance, we also implemented our Dynamic BP-NFA for STR with the same speed grade as the Static BP-NFA, i.e., –1, and achieved the throughput of 2.2 Gbps. Therefore, our Dynamic BP-NFA seems to be comparable to the Static BP-NFA in their performances though our dynamic hardware allows quick on-the-fly loading of input patterns.

Resource usage. Our Dynamic BP-NFA for STR totally used 6,500 slices for 256 PMMs. On the other hand, the Static BP-NFA used much less resources than our Dynamic BP-NFA. We could implement up to 1,500 PMMs (around 20 K total characters) using 7,200 slices and no block RAM, where the slice usage seems linear in the number $N$ of PMMs for $N = 1$ to 500 and seems almost constant for $N = 500$ to 1,500 [11].

Reconfiguration time. As shown in Table 1, our Dynamic BP-NFA for STR required the reconfiguration time of 0.208 msec for 256 PMMs. On the other hand, the Static BP-NFA has no such estimation formula. Therefore, we estimated the reconfiguration time of the Static BP-NFA by the compilation time including place-and-route. By experiments, it required $4.27 \times 10^5$ msec for 300 PMMs, approximately seven minutes [11]. Hence, our dynamic hardware is $10^6$ times faster than the static one in reconfiguration time.

5.3 Comparison against Other Dynamically Reconfigurable Hardwares for Regular Expression Matching

In Table 3, we compare our NFA-based hardware against the previous DFA-based dynamically reconfigurable hardwares [3], [4], [8]. For a fair comparison of performance, we should be careful to interpret the throughputs of the previous hardwares in the original papers [3], [4], [8] since five dynamically reconfigurable hardwares including ours were evaluated in different settings. In this paper, we calibrated each original throughput by a factor $\alpha$ determined from process scaling on CMOS technology that the target FPGA device was built on, where $\alpha = 130/65 = 2.00$ for the hardware by [4] and $\alpha = 90/65 = 1.38$ for the hardwares by [3], [8] since the hardware by [4] targeted 130-nm Virtex-II Pro device, the hardwares by [3], [8] 90-nm Virtex-II Pro device, and our hardwares 65-nm Virtex-5 LX330. In what follows, we compare the throughputs of our Dynamic BP-NFA to the calibrated ones of the previous hardwares [3], [4], [8].

Performance evaluation. For the class STR of exact string patterns, our Dynamic BP-NFA achieved the throughput of 2.6 Gbps that is slower than Baker et al.’s KMP-based hardware [4] and higher than Jung et al.’s Bitsplit-based hardware [8]. For more general classes, Baker et al.’s RegExp Controller hardware [3], which is a hybrid of DFA-simulation and microcontroller, has been only dynamically reconfigurable hardware for a non-trivial subclass of the whole class REG of regular expressions so far. Our Dynamic BP-NFA achieved the throughput of 1.4 Gbps for the class EXT of extended patterns, while the hardware by [3] achieved the higher throughput for REG. An advantage of our Dynamic BP-NFA is that it has theoretical performance guarantee in the worst-case from Theorem 1 in Sect. 4.3 for EXT as well as STR regardless of the actual contents of an input text, while the hardware by [3] has no performance guarantee in the worst-case when a regular expression has many occurrences of its subpatterns in an input text as indicated in [3].

Resource usage. First, we evaluate the block RAM usages of the hardwares by the parameter bRAM/char, which is the number of bytes used in block RAMs per character. As indicated in [3], [8], the effective utilization of block RAMs becomes important to dynamically reconfigurable hardwares because of modern FPGA devices equipped with large number of block RAMs. From the result of Table 1, our Dynamic BP-NFA used $256 \times 4 = 1024$ bytes per PMM for STR and $512 \times 4 = 2048$ bytes per PMM for EXT, and hence the block RAM usages of our hardwares are $1024/32 = 32$ bytes/char for STR and $2048/32 = 64$ bytes/char for EXT. Therefore, the block RAM usages of our hardwares for both STR and EXT are comparable to those of the hardwares by [3], [8]. We note that the actual block RAM usage of our hardware depends on a given pattern. For example, in the case that a given pattern includes no character class, our hardwares for STR and EXT have at most 32 and 64 entries in block RAMs. In this case, our hardwares use $32 \times 4 = 128$ bytes per PMM for STR and $64 \times 4 = 256$ bytes per PMM for EXT, and hence the block RAM usages of our hardwares are $128/32 = 4$ bytes/char for STR and $256/32 = 8$ bytes/char for EXT, where we require an encoder from input characters to addresses of block RAMs. Therefore, the actual block RAM usages of our hardwares for both STR and EXT are less than those of the hardwares by [3], [8].
Then, we evaluate the logic cell usage of the hardwares by the parameter \( LC / \text{char} \), which is the number of logic cells used per character and estimated by \( LC / \text{char} = 4 \times \# \text{Slices Total} / \# \text{Chars Total} \) since Virtex-5 contains four look-up tables and flip-flops per slice. To implement the circuitry for NFA-simulation as shown in Fig. 5, our Dynamic BP-NFA for EXT required five times more logic cells than the hardware by [3].

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we presented a novel architecture, called the dynamically reconfigurable bit-parallel NFA architecture, Dynamic BP-NFA, for large-scale regular expression matching. For the class STR of exact string patterns and the class EXT of extended patterns, which are subclasses of regular expressions, this architecture allows dynamic loading as well as fast pattern matching of its input patterns based on NFA-simulation by bit-parallel pattern matching. Our Dynamic BP-NFA is the first dynamically reconfigurable architecture for string and regular expression matching that fulfills the three requirements of dynamic loading of patterns, worst-case performance guarantee, and extensibility to more general patterns. Experimental results showed that our Dynamic BP-NFA for both STR and EXT had comparable performance to the existing dynamically reconfigurable architectures. Hence, our architecture presents an efficient alternative to existing dynamically reconfigurable hardwares for regular expression matching.

As future work, it is an interesting problem to extend our architecture to more general classes of patterns such as XPath queries [9] and network and regular expressions [10]. There are some hardwares that achieve speed-up by multi-character state transitions [19], [24], [26]. It is a future research to improve such techniques by using bit-parallel technique in, e.g., [7]. Finally, implementation of our architecture on GPGPU will also be an interesting problem.

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