A Critical Review of Balanced Diplomacy as a Leadership of Administrative Leader

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Abstract: This paper aims to propose a constructive direction for diplomatic policy through a critical review of the Moon Jae-in administration’s ‘balanced diplomacy’. In order to accomplish this, major leadership theory was used as the methodology to analyze the current government’s diplomatic power in the areas of the North Korean nuclear issue, ROK-U.S. relations, and ASEAN diplomacy. The current government must consider the North Korean nuclear issue from two perspectives. North Korea, that possesses nuclear weapons, is not in a position to maintain a stable institutional relationship with South Korea. Moreover, the utmost priority of policy towards North Korea is the Korean people. There must not be any ‘cracks’ within Korean society regarding methods of dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. Secondly, the ROK-U.S. relations must work towards institutionally securing a nuclear umbrella. This must be fulfilled by ensuring practical security through documenting an ‘automatic intervention’ clause in the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement. Thirdly, South Korea can show its presence to China in the ROK-China relations only when it is in a strong alliance with the U.S. Fourthly, diplomatic expansion into Southeast Asia can actually be a cause for losing diplomatic balance in Northeast Asia due to it being an escape from the reality of U.S.-China relations. In conclusion, the Moon government’s diplomatic leadership can be categorized as a ‘Transformational leadership’ that acquires political support by casting a vision for government administration and creating motivation. Three positions must be set in order to practice changeover diplomacy: (1) Acknowledging the reality of inter-Korean relations and building constructive relations with North Korea, (2) establishing an innovative ROK-U.S. security position and foundation for ‘self-strengthening security’, and (3) emerging as a confident and flexible diplomacy.

Keywords: Moon Jae-In Administration, Balanced Diplomacy, Leadership, North Korean’s Nuclear, ROK-U.S. Relations, South Korean-China Relations

1. Introduction

Trump’s diplomacy of his trip to Korea (2017. 11. 7-8) revealed that US policy priorities are on ‘North Korean nuclear issue’ and ‘trade’ as the extension of ‘Indo-Pacific Policy’. To this end, Trump thoroughly pursued the practical interests and profit of the US through his sequential visits to Japan, Korea and China. That is, for the US, the North Korean nuclear issue is a practical interest that must be resolved for security reasons, and trade is a practical interest that creates power for the slow economic recovery and growth. This is also the case for the Korean government.

In the area of diplomacy and security, Moon Jae-In Administration elicited that reaffirmation and strengthening of ROK-US alliance, and also promoted business and elicited the purchase of product service\(^1\) from US in the area of economic cooperation [1]. In particular, the current government has received evaluations that it has utilized China as leverage on North Korean nuclear issues, which is the biggest issue at hand.

The ‘New Southern Policy’ planned by the current government appears to be an effort to move beyond the existing Northeast Asia-focused framework and to discuss issues of the Korean peninsula with other Asian countries.

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\(^{1}\) Promotion of projects and product services between the current government and US is estimated to total USD $74.8 billion.
is pushing for a so-called ‘balanced diplomacy’ through external expansion.

What then, is meant by Moon Jae-In Administration’s balance diplomacy? How can the balanced diplomacy of the current government be evaluated in the midst of its relationship with the great powers of US and China?

Such evaluations are important in measuring the future diplomatic direction of Korea and establishing the line our diplomacy should pursue for the sake of national interest. The purpose of this paper is to examine the balanced diplomacy of the Moon Jae-In Administration from the perspective of North Korean nuclear issue, ROK-US, ROK-China and ASEAN diplomacy, and to propose a direction for diplomatic policy based on these evaluations.

2. Theoretical Leadership of State Leader

2.1. Characters and Types of Leadership

Research on the leadership of state leaders is largely interested in how the qualities and characteristics of specific leaders differ from general public, and how they have been formed [2]. In other words, because the perception of state leaders greatly influences the state affairs activities, it has become a subject of leadership research in contrast to institutional or organizational approaches [3]. Such psychological approach developed into ‘behaviorism’ form in the study of US presidents.

Among various theories on leadership, The most prominent examples of research on presidential leadership in the behaviorist perspective are James Barber and James M. Burns. First, Barber reviewed the activities and work attitudes of US presidents in office from a psychological or character perspective, classified them into types of ‘active-positive’, ‘active-negative’, ‘passive-positive’ and ‘passive-negative’, and analyzed the correlation between the psychological characteristics of the president and the results of state affairs administration. He claims that a state leader’s personality can be standardized into three broad categories: character, world view, and behavior style. He also argued that the direction of state affairs administration of future presidents could be predicted according to this typology. Thus, Barber stresses that a state leader’s standardized personality influences his or her leadership and ultimately, his or her policy direction as well [4].

On the other hand, Burns analyzed into ‘Transactional Leadership’ and ‘Transformational Leadership’. Transformational leadership, in particular, is defined as leadership that earns political support by motivating the people by demonstrating excellent morality and a vision of state affairs administration [5]. In addition, Harold Lasswell classifies leadership behavior into agitator, administrator and eventful man, and Max Weber classifies into traditional leadership, charismatic leadership and rational-legal leadership, according to the source of leader’s authority [6].

Meanwhile, Sidney Hook categorizes leadership into the ‘eventful man’ style and ‘event making man’ style according to how he or she reacts in various situations. The ‘eventful man’ style refers to leadership that exercises influence according to the flow of the age while the ‘event making man’ style refers to leadership that discovers historical crossroads based on personal knowledge, willpower, and character and goes on to take the lead in events [7].

| Category                  | Transactional Leadership                      | Transformational Leadership                      |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Phenomenon (Y/N)          | Tries to maintain the status quo               | Tries to change the phenomenon                   |
| Directing point of goals  | Goals that suit the phenomenon                 | Higher goals than the phenomenon                 |
| Time                      | Short-term outlook                             | Long-term outlook                                |
| Motivating behavior       | Immediate and tangible reward                  | Gives high-level personal goals (e.g. self-realization) |
| Standard behavior         | Emphasizes rules and customs                   | Encourages new attempts and creative efforts     |
| Problem-solving           | Solves problems personally or gives solutions  | Gives advice for people to solve problems autonomously |

*Source: Burns (2003). Tucker (1981) Revised upon reference.

2.2. Leadership Characteristics of Moon Jae-In Administration

On the basis of leadership theories presented above, the results of their application to President Moon Jae-In’s diplomatic activities are as follows. First of all, the motive-result aspect of activities and work in office demonstrated ‘active-negative’ leadership, and public motivation-political support aspect demonstrated ‘transformational leadership’. The relationship setting of surrounding countries displayed ‘abiding general trend’, and also ‘active-positive’ ‘eventful man’ leadership, as the first president to have gained authority in a by-election. Tool for Analysis of President Moon Jae-In’s leadership Characteristic is below.
3. Balanced Diplomacy Leadership of Moon Jae-In Administration: Current & Basis

3.1. Conception of Balanced Diplomacy

The balanced diplomacy of the current government is a collective term for diplomatic activities that pursue the national interest in the middle position between two countries or regions. The concept of ‘balance’ for President Moon Jae-In is to balance the diplomatic horizontality in the Asia region, by shifting the East Asia focused perspective to the South West Asia that has been out of the spotlight. In other words, it can be seen as ‘equidistance’ diplomacy that keeping a certain distance from the interest and role designation for the North East Asia region, in comparison to the South West. This is not too different from ‘middle power’ diplomacy. Middle power diplomacy is focused on middle power countries developing and expanding new agendas, values and norms at a global level, and promoting their power of influence [8].

3.2. Logic of Balance in the North Korean Nuclear Issue

Moon Jae-In Administration’s approach to the North Korean nuclear issue exists largely in the framework of principles, goals and strategies. The five principles are (1) led by us, (2) strong security, (3) mutual respect, (4) communication with the people, and (5) international cooperation [9]. The three goals of the North Korean policy exists within this framework: (1) resolution of North Korean nuclear issue and establishment of permanent peace, (2) development of sustainable inter-Korean relations, and (3) implementation of a new economic community on the Korean peninsula.

The four detailed strategies for this can be summarized as (1) comprehensive step-by-step approach (entrance: ‘nuclear freeze’→ exit: ‘denuclearization’), (2) sustainability secured through institutionalization, (3) parallel progression of inter-Korean relations and North Korean nuclear issue, and (4) establishment of the basis for reciprocal peace unification [10].

The logic of balance in the North Korean nuclear issue adopted by the current government is to seek dialogue as a basis, but that pressure and sanctions are inevitable in the process of leading to the dialogue. The logic of balance is found in the so-called ‘dialogue induction through sanctions’. However, North Korea is firm on its stance that it will never give up on nuclear weapons despite international sanctions.

The standard of North Korea’s nuclear missiles are ‘practically’ in the stage of solidity, and discussions exist of NK’s recognition as ‘potential nuclear power’.

3.3. Balanced Diplomacy in ROK-US and ROK-China Relations

The agreements made in the ROK-US summit during President Trump’s visit to Korea can largely summarized by reaffirmation of US defense of Korea, strengthening Korean military power, and peaceful denuclearization of the Korean peninsula [11]. The economic benefits gained by the US in the ROK-US summit were the promise of state-of-the-art weapon purchase ($15 billion) and investment in the US ($80 billion), and the political benefits for the sake of justification were the possibility of considerable increase in share of defense expenses within the frame of alliance, and early resuming of FTA negotiations [12].

On the other hand, the agreement between President Moon Jae-In and President Xi Jinping in the ROK-China summit is classified into political diplomacy aspect and economic & trade aspect. The core of the political diplomacy aspect is securing peace and stability on the Korean peninsula from the North Korean nuclear. The four principles are (1) intolerance of war within the Korean peninsula, (2) firm compliance with Korean peninsula denuclearization principle, (3) peaceful resolution of dialogue and negotiation, and (4) mutual understanding of the improvement of inter-Korean relations. In addition, policies were prepared to establish a direct ‘hotline’ between the two state leaders and to activate senior-level strategic dialogue, in preparation for a sudden change in North Korea [10]. The economic & trade aspect includes establishing the suspended ROK-China industrial cooperation complex, installing the investment cooperation fund, and seeking cooperation with China one-on-one.

Key Agreements of ROK-China Summit

3.4. ASEAN Diplomacy: ‘New Southern Policy’

The New Southern Policy of Moon Jae-In government is in line with the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ‘One Belt and One Road’ plan, and implies the expansion of diplomacy to

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Ki-Young Sung (2017)

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2 Land road connecting Central Asia and Europe, and sea silk road connecting Southeast Asia, Europe and Africa. The objective of this plan, led by President Xi Jinping in September-October 2013, is for China to take control of the sea route from South China-Indian Ocean-Africa in order to avoid US in the Pacific and expand into the west by land and south by sea. Ki-Young Sung (2017)
the South West Asia [13]. In other words, Southern diplomacy is a political plan of achieving security and economic interests by expanding from the Korean peninsula to the existing cooperation with US, Japan, Fareast Russia in the South East and China in the North West, and towards Australia and ASEAN countries in the South West.

Figure 2. Key points of ROK-China Summit’s 10·24 Agreement [12].

*Source: Joo-sam Kim, “The Mutual Assistance System and Cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and China for the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Unification of the Korean Peninsula” Korea and Global Affairs (2017)

Table 2. Profit & Loss of Balanced Diplomacy of Moon Jae-In Administration in the ROK-US, ROK-China Relations.

| Relations/Profit & Loss | Loss                                                                 | Profit                                                                 | Evaluation                                                                 |
|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ROK-US Relations       | Security: Possibility of excluding sale of state-of-the-arts weapons 3 due to a huge increase in defense fund [14] | Enhanced defense power with extended deterrence                         | Stipulation of auto intervention clause in the ROK-US mutual defense agreement for times of emergency on the Korean peninsula, and establishment of systematic defense against nuclear from North Korea and US Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministry of Information) – seeking an annual discussion among the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Senate, with 'nuclear-sharing agreement' approach |
|                        | Concern of reduced trust and reconsideration & abandonment of relative focus on Chinese recognition | Blocking holes in security with war power resources of US being rotating |                                                                            |
|                        | Economy: Increased demand for renegotiation of FTA                   | Mid- or long-term export revenue expanse with Company’s investment in US |                                                                            |
| ROK-China Relations    | Security: Absence of war power according to the 3 No negotiation     | Give China an active role and responsibility in North Korea’s nuclear sanction | Decreased trust in ROK-US-Japan military security field after the public economic relations restoration action <Handed over the neck (security) to the enemy and received the limbs (partial economy)> |
|                        | ▲Participation in MD system - Alliance trust wises may arise according to uncooperative attitude towards US | Establishment of 'hotline' beyond state leaders                        |                                                                            |
|                        | ▲Refusal to add THAAD - Difficulty in ROK-UK combined operation in times of emergency or US strategic assets development | Explore cooperation with both countries from senior strategic dialogue   |                                                                            |
|                        | ▲Anti ROK-US-Japan military cooperation - Reduced defense intercept cooperation capabilities deteriorate when responding to North Korea’s SLBM |                                                                            |                                                                            |
|                        | - Sharing information with Japan due to dissertation of IMF without INK.GSOMIA (November 2016) |                                                                            |                                                                            |
|                        | Economy: Increase economic dependency causing the dependence on mass imports and exports | Prepare opportunities for public trade export investment expansion Local Korean companies expecting economic vitalization |                                                                            |

4. Evaluation of Balanced Diplomacy Leadership: Merits, Demerits & Tasks

4.1. Evaluation of North Korean Nuclear Diplomacy

The military powers of the two Koreas are inevitably at a serious asymmetry due to North Korea’s nuclear possession. The assembly of US strategic assets in the Korean peninsula and Korea’s independent development of defensive missiles are measures to offset the asymmetrical security issue. North Korea’s nuclear technology is far different from that of 20 years ago. North Korea currently considers nuclear weapons as a ‘fact’ rather than for negotiation, and has argued that it will come to the table when US recognizes it as a nuclear
power state. The current North Korea may have reached irreversible nuclearization rather than the ‘Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement’ (CVID) of the past.

The North Korean nuclear issue is the biggest hindrance to the process of inter-Korean relations, and a clear threat to our security. However, our North Korea policy has not been articulated from regime to regime. The North Korea policies of past governments were all limited, whether they approached North Korea with good will or not. Either way, merits and demerits exist.

The North Korean nuclear issue must be approached from two different perspectives. Firstly, a broad, long-term perspective is necessary. This is because North Korea, which holds nuclear weapons, is not in a position to maintain a stable relationship with Korea systematically.

Secondly, the most important stakeholder in the North Korea policy is the people of Korea. From the ‘actant’ perspective, Kim Jong-Un of North Korea is a typical ‘actant of authoritarian dictatorship’. A dictator prioritizes the maintenance of regime over the people or national interest. However, in the logic of international relations, where the state is a unit actant, ‘North Korea’ may be ration, rather than irrational.

As a socialist state, North Korea can externally ventilate the complaints of its people, caused by the poor economy, through provocation and unify the people. It can only survive by revealing its existence as a threat, and the means is nuclear possession.

On the other hand, our society is experiencing a ‘crack’ over the means of responding to the North Korea nuclear issue. The North Korea policy of the current government is called something different from the past government, but it contains the will of harmonious North on the basis of ‘denuclearized North Korea’. However, it is unrealistic to believe that there will be no nuclear provocation because the North Korea policy is replaced with ‘pro-North’ or ‘harmonious North’, or because an anti-North policy is adopted.

4.2. Evaluation of ROK-US Diplomacy

The diplomatic relations between the two Koreas and the neighboring countries of the Korean peninsula has a complex structure of understanding at present, as shown in (Figure 2).

In the framework of international structure, US-China conflict or cooperation acts as a crucial variable in the instability factor of North East Asia. What we must consider in diplomacy is the instability that will be caused by the Indo-Pacific policy between US-China and China’s New Type of Great Power Relations policy, and the subsequent adjustment of understanding.

Since the signing of Mutual Defense Treaty between ROK and US in 1953, the strong alliance between Korea and US have played a pivotal role in the security of the Korean peninsula over the past 60 years. However, no mid- and long-term solutions have been found regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, because of the difference in understanding between the great powers US and China, and the differences in the approaches of past ROK and US governments.

Moreover, the US does not systematically guarantee a nuclear umbrella that responds to the North Korean nuclear issue. The current mutual treaty between ROK-US does not include an ‘automatic intervention’ clause in the case of emergency on the Korean peninsula, and there are no treaties or agreements for the systematic guarantee of the nuclear umbrella. The current government relies on US promise of ROK-US united defense, but the promise is not legally supported and cannot be guaranteed.

*Source: Young Namkoong, Political Economy of the Divided Korean Peninsula: The Puzzle of the Triangle - Seoul, Pyongyang and Washington (2010)

Figure 3. Diplomatic Relations Between the Two Koreas and Neighboring Countries of the Korean Peninsula in 2017-2018 [15].
binding. Therefore, the current government must adopt alternative means to stick to the Korean peninsula denuclearization principle and also to meet nuclear weapon and tactical relocation of nuclear that is approved by the majority of the people.

4.3. Evaluation of ROK-China Diplomacy

Since the establishment of ROK-China diplomatic relations in 1992, Korea has been maintaining its strategic partnership with China and making efforts to develop both countries. The ROK-China partnership has also helped China cooperate with Korea in the North Korean nuclear issue. However, the balanced diplomacy of the current government is no suitable in the situation of US-China power struggle. The balancer is a country that doesn’t have enough power to regulate the direct profit of great powers, but has enough status to influence the atmosphere or control of speed in the regional order [16]. The balancer is not made by its own efforts, but confirmed by recognition of the great powers. That is, when we establish a firm position between US and China.

In the ROK-China relations of the current government, our diplomatic reality looks like handing over security (neck) and getting temporary economic recovery (limbs). It is a case where our 3 core values of security have been negotiated with the current deepening economic dependence on China [17]. This is in line with the evaluation of ‘national humiliation’ diplomacy, rather than government control diplomacy.

In China’s point of view, Korea without the ROK-US alliance or strong cooperative relations with US cannot be an important actant. Paradoxically, Korea can show its presence to China when it has a strong alliance with US. In other words, we must recognize that the reason China consider Korea as special is because we are connected to the US through the ROK-US alliance.

Considering that China is the only country that can challenge the US for the next century, and also because of our economic relations, cooperation with China is crucial. But, we need ‘utilitarian diplomacy’ that explains and demonstrates the important of ROK-US relations to China, and the necessity of cooperation with China to the US, rather than walking on eggshells between the US and China.

The reason why the tension between US and China is not continuing, but resolving to some form of cooperation through negotiation, is because the power of US is superior to that of China. The objective situation is that China is still unable to catch up with US in terms of military, economic and soft power. For China to become an actual great power, it requires continuous economic development, and for continuous economic development, the stability of North East Asia and the world is important. China’s New Type of Great Power Relations is for China to be recognized as a great power equal to the US, and not let go of China’s core interests. However, the Indo-Pacific policy of the US does not tolerate China’s rising influence in East Asia. UK-China’s major policies conflict in the North East Asia region.

Realistically, the most important factor is cooperation with the US. North Korean nuclear issue, in particular, is the reason the US is emphasizing cooperation despite conflict with China in the North East Asia. The current international order led by the US also helps China’s economic development, because China is not yet at a level to replace US that is still paying enormous expenses to manage and maintain the stability worldwide. In this perspective, it is crucial to keep in mind that the China-Japan conflict is an extension of US-China conflict. The current government should carefully consider how to play the role of a balancer in dealing with conflicts between Korea and China that may arise from ROK-US-Japan military cooperation.

4.4. ASEAN Diplomacy

The direction and space of Korean diplomacy has always been focused on the four great powers, North East Asia and the Korean peninsula. This perspective has led to the diplomatic policies that undervalue Korea as a weaker country and overvalue Korea as a stronger country [18]. In addition, it has brought about the attitude of entrusting our interests and security to the great powers. New Southern Policy of Moon Jae-In administration is evaluated as an attempt to establish a diplomatic position as a middle country by expanding beyond the North East Asia focused relations [19]. ASEAN and Oceania countries are also currently contemplating strategic pressures and geopolitical problems that arise from the US-China great powers competition [20]. In this context, Southern diplomacy is significant that it has provided opportunities to consider issues fixated to the Korean peninsula, including North Korea, with ASEAN countries.

Nevertheless, the New Southern Policy of Moon Jae-In Administration has one big blind spot. The power of US and China are still operating in North East Asia, and Asia is heavily influenced by the cooperation or conflict between US-China and the peace and stability of the North East Asia region. Therefore it is no exaggeration to say that the international structure according to US-China relations affect more than 70% of the peace and stability of South Asia. In this regard, the diplomacy of the current government is fundamentally limited in seeking balance within Asia by only expanding to the south, without considering the reality of US-China relations in the North East Asia region.

5. Diplomatic Line from the Perspective of National Interest: The Conservatives vs Progressives

5.1. Diplomatic Line of the Conservatives

The diplomatic line of the conservative forces has been consistent with the bandwagon policy, unilaterally depending on the US power in the ROK-US alliance, and this is similar to nuclear armament or reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons that is recently being argued as the necessary
security responsiveness. The conservatives are based on the
notion of preventing our responsive power according to the
asymmetrical phenomenon of North Korean nuclear issue
with mutual assured destruction. It is clear why the US is
important from the perspective of the conservatives. They
believe that national interest can be sacrificed when a solid
alliance with US is not maintained, and therefore, a strong
ROK-US alliance will help Korean diplomatic power, and
the relationship with China will also be effective within the
framework of ROK-US alliance.

However, the deepened dependence on the US may lead to
subordinate diplomatic relations of security, and the nuclear
rearmament on the Korean peninsula may also encourage the
nuclear domino phenomenon in the neighboring countries.

5.2. Diplomatic Line of the Progressives
The Progressive forces have a strong tendency to worry
about the unilateral security dependence on the US, in light
of the reality that the influence of international order is
shifting to China. China’s economic retaliation after the
decision to install THAAD on the Korean peninsula is a
typical example. They believe that it is difficult to survive
solely on a US-centered paradigm, and has begun to treat
China as a constant, not a variable, in Korean diplomacy.
Economic cooperation with China is considered as an
essential, not optional, and this is based on the fact that China
is demonstrating the possibility of prolonged economic influence and a new leadership to supplement the US-
centered Western international economic system. Therefore,
the progressives are concerned that Korea will not be able to
cope should we continue with the policy that presupposes
conflict with China. The logic of balance in Asia that is held
by the Progressives worried that if China were not considered
at the same level as US, the impact (political, economic,
security, etc.) to be taken would be much larger than that of
ROK-US conflict. However, the Progressives do not agree to
being labeled as ‘pro-China’ that represents the interests of
China. Their diplomatic line emphasizes China, and stresses
that ROK-China relations cannot be resolved in the
framework of ROK-US alliance only. It is also clear that they
are not arguing South Korean leave the US to get closer to
China.

Consequently, the diplomatic line of the conservatives can
be summarized as an approach of the risk of ‘China gradient’
with a ROK-US alliance focus, while the progressives
demonstrate a concern for ‘complete dependence on the US’
within the economic relationship with China. Whilst it would
be best not to choose between the US and China, the reality
is that there may be situations where choice is inevitable.

6. Conclusion
The results of examining the North Korean nuclear issue,
ROK-US, ROK-China and ASEAN diplomacy of the current
government from the perspective of ‘balance’ are as follows.

Firstly, the Korean peninsula can only enter into and find
practical alternatives to establish constructive inter-Korean
relations when Moon Jae-In Administration can properly
understand the reality of North Korea from a level headed
perspective. South Korea’s current society must strive
towards peace on the Korean peninsula through a
constructive co-existence of the two-country system. It must
be different to the hostility policy or tolerance policy, and be
based on realistic inter-Korean relations, away from ‘anti-
North’, ‘pro-North’ or ‘harmonious North’ ideas. The Two-
State System is the system in which South and North Koreas
mutually recognize-to ease the hostility and distrust that have
accumulated during the past 70 years- each other’s
sovereignty and territory, establish a normal diplomatic
relationship, and coexist peacefully [21]. President Moon
Jae-In needs the attitude of a ‘rational centrist’ who will look
at North Korea as it is, before responding. For the peaceful
coeexistence of the two Koreas on the Korean peninsula, the
first and foremost is the peaceful resolution of North Korean
nuclear issue. North Korea right now is very different to
North Korea 20 years ago. It is threatening the lives and
assets of South Korea people and the international
community with advanced nuclear weapons technology.
Therefore South Korea need a fundamentally different
approach of security response.

Secondly, South Korea’s security is not guaranteed
through the bandwagon policy of US or China. Strategic
partnership and alliance with US is necessary, but it is not
sufficient. The attitude and roles displayed to neighboring
countries must be confident and proactive diplomacy, as
proactive diplomacy isn’t simply taking, but also
demonstrating behaviorally. Behavioral diplomacy is not
getting pushed and pulled between China and US, nor a one-
sided diplomacy between US and China. At this point in time,
South Korea people require diplomacy that earns credits, not
demerits.

Implementation of this plan begins from the guarantee that
US strategic assets will rotate during emergency situations on
the Korean peninsula. Also, the ROK-US administrations
must lead the way to arrange for nuclear sharing agreement.
This arrangement is to make mandatory the documentation of
the auto-intervention agreements within the ROK-US mutual
defense agreement.

It is not enough to merely rely on US as they cannot all
ROK problems under the name of alliance. Self-reliant
security can be demonstrated through efforts of establishing
strong defense power. It is also possible through the effort to
establish strong national security, and engaging in dramatic
investment in defense research and development, high-tech
state-of-the-arts military and establishment of triple network
system in the metropolitan area.

In conclusion, the diplomatic leadership of Moon Jae-In
Administration is classified as ‘Transformational Leadership’
that earns political support by providing the public with
vision of state affairs administration and with motivation.
Transformational diplomatic leadership requires three
attitudes: (1) recognizing the reality of the two-Koreas
system and establishing constructive inter-Korean relations,
(2) establishing innovative ROK-US defense arrangements
and preparing the framework of ‘self-reliant security’, and (3) rising as confident and proactive diplomacy. In other words, it must be an empirical ‘ROK First’ diplomacy.

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