Normative foundations in EU foreign, security and defence policy: the case of the Middle East peace process—a view from the field

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Foreign policy and ideas
What can a people or set of peoples believe about themselves and how might this affect the way in which they relate to others? In what ways do perceptions of history, language, culture, race, identity and nationality impact upon global politics? These are difficult questions for scholars of international relations since the dominant assumptions that traditionally govern much of the discipline do not lend themselves easily to addressing such queries.

One key criterion that locks together most traditional analyses of inter-state relations is the assumption of rationality. Here, traditional accounts look at the policy choices available to state actors and assume that such actors—through bureaucratic and/or political processes—adjudicate as best they can between an available array of policy choices using some form of cost/benefit analysis. Depending upon theoretical choice, such an analysis might assess the cost/benefit in terms of absolute or relative gains accruing either to the state, to the individual actor or to the elite that the actor serves and represents. In any event, behavioural laws assist in the dissection of state decision-making processes and then offer explanations as to why states ‘act’ in the way that they do.

This analytical agenda—in which the motivations of actors are deemed to be rational and open to quantifiable scrutiny—then raises a series of difficult questions. To what extent—if at all—might foreign policy be constructed or constrained by collective belief structures, socially constructed norms and collective identity? In seeking to address this and other related questions, an increasing number of scholars in recent years have challenged the ‘rationalist’ approach and instead have contributed to what has come to be known as a ‘constructivist turn’ in our understanding of foreign policy and international relations.1 This has entailed an attempt to extend the focus of international relations beyond the search for behavioural laws to include consideration of ‘ideas, norms, culture—the whole socially constructed realm (which) are inaccessible to an empiricist
form of knowledge'. This approach is now well established in the fields of both international relations and European studies and it allows for a different interpretation of the motivations driving international actors’ policies. When it comes to the EU, this *sui generis* organization has been labelled a normative actor rather than a purely rational one.

If the EU is to be characterized as ‘normative actor’ then there must be scope for identifying how the Union’s norms are exported and the extent to which these norms are then internalized by the actors to which they are directed. We may also be in a position to identify the conditions necessary for the successful export of such norms.

Perhaps the biggest challenge in such an endeavour is to demonstrate the influence of norms. For the purposes of this article, we shall be considering a distinction between norm export and norm internalization. The means by which norms are exported is significant. One might, for example, distinguish between a ‘soft’ export and a ‘hard’ export. The soft export is the capacity of the international actor to represent a different way of doing things that is then seen as so attractive that other actors choose to follow its lead and/or example. For the EU this is often seen as its most significant power, rooted in the representation of its own history of integration as being one of overcoming conflict and which is best exemplified by the success of the enlargement process. A ‘hard’ export, by contrast, is the Union’s capacity to engender normative change using traditional tools of international politics—from diplomacy through to the use, or threatened use, of force.

Hard normative exports can be identified through the Union’s use of its foreign policy tools including the Common Commercial Policy, development policy, humanitarian aid, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The latter two are often viewed as being most analogous to a traditional state’s foreign and security policy, encompassing—in an EU context—the issuance of diplomatic demarches and political declarations, imposing sanctions, offering trade and aid deals, engaging in diplomatic intervention (hosting negotiations, peace talks or appointing special envoys) and—with the development of ESDP—offering the provision of peacekeeping troops and/or police missions. One notable feature of both the Union’s Common Commercial Policy and its policy towards development co-operation and even humanitarian intervention is the increased use and application of rules of conditionality so as to provide for assurances—if not guarantees—on good governance and human rights. This is most obvious in the Union’s development co-operation activities but it has also been applied—or at least attempted—in the Union’s dealings with wealthy industrialized and democratic states such as Australia.

In the Middle East the Union faces, perhaps, its greatest challenge in seeking to extend its pacific norm model to a region of active conflict and deep-rooted hostilities. There has, to date, been considerable resistance on all sides, and not inconceivable resentment against the kind of normative ambitions pursued by the Union vis-à-vis the putative ‘partners’ in the tortuous Arab–Israeli peace process. The Middle East also represents a traditional case study in EU foreign and security policy failure. If any evidence of successful normative export and/or internalization can be adduced here, then its general salience may be said to have considerable potential elsewhere.
Normative bases in EU foreign policy

There remains an active debate on the nature of the EU as an international actor. The Union is neither a traditional international organization nor a state. This, however, makes the analysis all the more challenging since it implies that there is no direct comparator against which the Union’s international capacity can be contrasted—and for any social scientist such a proposition is problematic at best. Many, however, do insist that the Union is unique—a new kind of hybrid structure that is neither domestic nor international—an entity that challenges our traditional Westphalian understanding of sovereignty, statehood and the international system.  

Within this new system, the Union is also frequently seen as having forged a political community from diverse national starting points and which has subsequently created a collective identity founded upon a distinct set of values and norms. This has thus ‘Europeanized’ the member states through shared experience and the instantiation of common procedures and a convergence of some values. This has been represented as member states having ‘created a notion of belonging to a community within a particular (international) order’. As regards foreign policy, Ian Manners cites the Union’s own dedication to ‘certain principles that are common to the member states’. These norms have then been institutionalized into the very structures and policies of the Union. These norms, in turn, have a constitutive effect that defines the Union’s international identity.

One of the core norms, based in part upon the Union’s own ‘story’ of its roots, construction and even purpose, is that of ‘peace’. The Union’s own narrative is that it was established to provide for an historic reconciliation of France and Germany, founded upon the withdrawal of national control over two key components of twentieth-century warfare: steel and coal. That founding bargain, which successfully domesticated security, was subsequently extended to European states struggling towards democracy following periods of dictatorship (Spain, Portugal and Greece) and is now being applied upon a Continental scale to the countries of central and eastern Europe as well as the Mediterranean. Indeed, in Turkey’s application for membership the Union is perhaps seeking to apply this historic rubric to civilizational reconciliation between the worlds of Christendom and Islam. This ‘peace’ project has, over time, been increasingly defined in Kantian terms of a particular kind of ‘democratic peace’ in which values such as human rights, a dedication to the rule of law, liberal democracy and a broadly multilateral approach to inter-state problem solving have come to the fore.

These values have been specified and expanded in subsequent iterations of EU treaty change. The Maastricht Treaty, for example, stated that the objectives of CFSP included the pursuit of ‘democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’, which was itself echoed in another reference to policy which ‘shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms’. Later, the Treaty of Amsterdam insisted that the EU was ‘founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States’.
There is a long—if disparate—record of attempts to characterize the EU as an international actor. One of the earliest, dating back to the seventies, was François Duchêne’s conceptualization of the then European Communities as being a civilian power. This was swiftly contested first by Galtung’s proposition that in fact the Communities were a ‘superpower’ in the making and later Hedley Bull’s insistence that a ‘civilian power’ was an oxymoron and that Europe had to aspire to becoming a military power if it was successfully to pursue its international ambitions.

More recently, the threads of Duchêne’s approach have been reconsidered by a new generation of scholars who insist that the Union’s uniqueness is grounded in its normative foundations and its efforts to pursue these normative ambitions outside the Union’s borders. These analysts focus upon the uniqueness of the Union as an international actor, contrasting it most frequently with the USA—and almost always to the latter’s disadvantage. The Union, it is argued, has a very unique institutional structure, has an approach to international affairs that is firmly rooted in multilateralism and has, in sum, developed an alternative approach to politics, turning away from old-fashioned power politics and instead drawing upon the wells of international law, norms, rules, co-operation and integration. It is this ‘normative’ power that the Union now exerts. The impact of this is—in the minds of some—to create a vision of the Union as a ‘post-modern state’ or, in a less sympathetic light, a rather smug and self-satisfied Kantian island of perpetual peace shielded from international realities by a more traditionally power-oriented ally.

While extending this post-modern condition and/or enlarging this island of peace to encompass much of central and eastern Europe has been successful to date, the Union’s effort to export its normative condition beyond its immediate neighbourhood has been more problematic.

This paper’s purpose is to consider EU policy towards the Middle East peace process and, specifically, the significance of norms, values and identity in both its development and execution. In particular it seeks to assess the extent to which, if at all, European policy is being driven by the values and norms ascribed under the rubric of a ‘normative power’ and the extent to which scope conditions allow for the success of this endeavour. To take this analysis any further, one must assume that CFSP is more than an expression of lowest common denominator politics and proceed on the basis that its sum is greater than the addition of its individual parts. Taking that assumption on board, there are at least three scenarios one might envisage arising from an empirical study of policy on the ground in the Middle East. First, one might find that European policy in this area is a creature of an ideal-type of ‘complex interdependence’ where an institutional regime has been established by self-regarding and rational states through which national interests are pursued. The role of the state in the first instance is to aggregate competing domestic interests, to establish a hierarchy of those interests and then to set about—alongside their European partners—to maximize their relative gains through a complex system of collective bargaining. This process of negotiation—which in the European context is highly institutionalized—establishes the norms of the resulting EU regime vis-à-vis Middle East policy. These norms are in turn fed back into the EU system for application and enforcement. Our data in this case should underline the conditional nature of EU policy bargains, should illustrate policy difficulty and delay when faced with sudden shifts or
challenges from other policy actors and we should be able to identify clear member state policy leaders or even consortia of such leaders, who drive and direct the EU policy process.

Alternatively, one might instead find that while national governments remain key actors they do not exclusively monopolize the decision- or policy-making processes of the Union. First, it is argued that decision making is a shared competence of actors at different levels of the Union; second, that collective decision making entails an inevitable loss of control on the part of member state governments, and third, that the arena of political debate is not the sum total of ‘nested’ national debates but must accommodate transnational actors and sub-national actors working across member state boundaries. Here, our data should identify a range of key policy actors beyond the member states, including the Commission, the European Parliament and other transnational or even sub-national policy groups. There should also be some clear evidence of effective policy flexibility and a rapid response to external policy challenges as well as a clearly developed sense of collective interests.

Finally, one might find that the key dynamic within policy development is not just one of bargains and balancing expressed ‘interests’ but one of evolving beliefs and norms. Here, a process of Europeanization is understood to be in part a process of transformation in which the self-regard and beliefs of the state actors evolve and have an impact upon the construction of the interests that they pursue. In any event, policy actors are in the business of constructing, pursuing and implementing policy norms and collective values deriving from this evolving political system.

This model would underscore much of the agenda of those seeing the Union as a normative power. Our data should, therefore, offer us evidence of new norms deriving from collective action at the EU level. These would be expected to be both regulative as well as constitutive. The power of such norms would underline the extent to which—even without explicit regulatory mechanisms—they were observed in both day-to-day practice and in conditions of crisis. These norms would in turn suggest that EU foreign policy was at least in part founded upon a normative base of shared mission and identity.

There should also be evidence that national interests had undergone some evolution. Rather than see such interests as being chips in an especially complex poker game—interests would change through participation in the game itself. Interests would therefore be developed/constructed endogenously (i.e. within) the collective policy process rather than being established exogenously (i.e. formulated within the domestic sphere and then brought to the negotiating table). This would also suggest the creation of common European norms driving the conduct and execution of EU foreign policy.

Manners has identified five core norms within the corpus of EU treaties, foreign policy declarations, policies and practices. These core norms (peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights) are said to underpin the Union’s *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politque*. In addition, he posits four additional but more contested ‘minor norms’ (social progress, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance) as being significant inputs to the construction of EU foreign policy. These are not simply declaratory positions but are argued to be the constitutive foundations of an EU foreign policy which cannot rely upon the substance of sovereignty and statehood but which must reach into the cognitive core of policy makers at both EU and national level.
It is from this foundation of norms that EU foreign policy then emerges. Thus, the pursuit of the Union’s material interests and the interplay within EU foreign policy debates should be seen as a resolution and contestation, respectively, of underlying norms. This study is then an analysis of the extent to which, if at all, these underlying norms are contested within and represented effectively by the EU and its member states with respect to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

The normative role and impact of the EU in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict

The argument of this article is that if the Union is to be viewed as a normative power—with the will to exercise such power—then there must be evidence of EU influence, of successful norm export and norm internalization. If no such evidence exists, then the Union is either not a normative power or it has insufficient capacity successfully to export same and see these internalized.

The Middle East peace process has long been a political priority for European policy makers. This very sensitive issue therefore occupies centre stage when it comes to Common Foreign and Security Policy. The importance of the Mediterranean, the perception that common interests exist in the field of economic co-operation and the solution of the Palestinian problem in fostering better relations with the Muslim world led the EU to establish a multilateral framework where all these issues could be approached and discussed. This multilateral framework, formalized in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, sees the EU and its member states building co-operative links with countries on the other bank of the Mediterranean in three key sectors. The first pillar of this agreement is a **political and security partnership** with an emphasis on the rule of law, respect for human rights and pluralism. The second and most detailed pillar is an **economic and financial partnership**, which attaches importance to ‘sustainable and balanced economic and social development with a view to achieving the objective of creating an area of shared prosperity’. The third pillar of the agreement is a **partnership in social, cultural and human affairs** with an emphasis on the rejection of the notion of the clash of civilizations in favour of a dialogue between cultures.

While not primarily concerned with it, there is in the Declaration a commitment of all participants to the ‘realisation of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East’. The Barcelona Process was meant to provide yet another forum for both Israeli and Palestinian policy makers to work in a multilateral environment on political and economic affairs affecting the whole region. Despite its successes in improving relations in the Mediterranean in terms of trade and co-operation on matters such as immigration and regional military security, the breaking out of the second Intifada in September 2000 has had negative repercussions on the whole process. This is recognized at EU level, and in a paper on regional strategy for the years 2002–6 it has been highlighted that ‘recent developments in the Middle East have led to a virtual stalemate in the peace process, which in turn have impacted on the work of the Barcelona Conference in the creation of a favourable climate for the Middle East Peace Process’. Some argue that such stalemate is also the result of the inability of the EU to utilize the ‘Euro-Mediterranean partnership to generate dynamics more favourable to the peace process’. The weight of the EU has been instead brought to bear to gain inclusion in the Quartet.
In spite of these difficulties, the EU is still present in the region and the Commission is engaged in the following activities:

- High representatives of the Commission engage with the regional parties with a view to promoting progress in the peace process.
- It implements CFSP measures.
- It supports the EU’s special envoy.
- It represents the EU in the multilateral track of the Middle East peace process.
- It participates in international donors’ conferences.
- It is responsible for the preparation and implementation of assistance programmes.
- It manages regional economic co-operation schemes and engages with Israelis and Palestinians in an economic dialogue.

These tasks are carried out through two delegations in the region: the European Commission’s Delegation to Israel and the European Commission Technical Assistance Office to the West Bank and Gaza. Given that it is the people working in these offices who are the ‘faces and voices’ of the EU in the region, the focus of this study is on how they perceive their work. Since we are talking about identity, it should be stressed that the construction of it is context dependent. This means that the implementation of CFSP policies and the beliefs behind them may be different in Jerusalem/Gaza and Brussels. The ‘agency’ factor becomes very relevant to determine who is Europe and who speaks for Europe, and we paid attention to the voice in the field.

Exporting norms?

One of the most significant aspects of CFSP in the Middle East peace process is the absence from official discourse of the word ‘interest’ associated to the word ‘European’. While this might be a conscious rhetorical device, its absence may also be indicative of a deeper mistrust of traditional foreign policy making. The word ‘interest’ appears only when associated with the adjective ‘common’ to define that interests cannot be promoted or defended if only one side benefits because in the longer term this will create resentment and a contestation of preceding actions. The value of the word ‘interests’ is in the meaning it has for EU foreign policy makers, as it represents a higher form of the national interest to become an international one, where all parties share core values and therefore actions abiding by the same rules. This signifies that the deepening Europeanization of certain policies has an impact on traditional notions of ‘national interest’ that member states have and encourages an ‘identity change’ among them through the concept of a shared European interest influenced by different norms and values.

Most documents, declarations and accounts of personal interviews emphasize the strategic relevance of the area to the Union, but it also emerges quite clearly that foreign policy has already moved beyond the narrow interpretation of ‘strategic relevance’ with its association with zero-sum games towards a new dimension based on comprehensive co-operation and solidarity. This goes beyond the liberal understanding and belief in multilateralism to actually take the founding values of the EU as the supreme norms that need to be propagated not to defend the cause of the EU but to recast the Middle East in the normative
mould of Europe. The identity acquired by the EU through its process of integration is the driving force behind EU foreign policy in the region. This particular identity then filters down to the member states. One clear example of this is the 2004 Franco-German agreement over the opening of a shared cultural centre in Ramallah, which symbolizes at once the unity of the EU and the possibility of reconciliation that Palestinians and Israelis should aim for.26

The core norms identified by Manners and the emphasis of them as the foundational values of the EU are not simply rhetorical devices but constitute a basis for action. European policy makers in the region see themselves as the representatives of these values and norms rather than representatives of an institution, and their actions, consequently, reflect these normative foundations. The European delegations and institutions in the area are the means through which these values can be promoted and not the entity, which decides that certain values should be promoted because they advance a specific European interest. To a certain extent the traditional roles of entities dictating the line to be followed and the policy makers following are reversed, as the policy maker sees him/herself as the defender or promoter of ideas, which are not the reflection of sovereignty or statehood. Given that member states are bound by this common framework, they also tend to put aside their ‘national’ differences to support what EU agencies do in the area.

In one particular interview with a senior EU policy maker, this point emerged quite strongly. Without being solicited, the interviewee launched into a passionate defence of the values upon which the EU was founded and the need to use the example of these values in the region.27 In fact, there seems to be little doubt that the experience of the creation and the expansion of the EU is the driving force behind the efforts of EU foreign policy in the region to solve the conflict. The role of CFSP is that of an external actor attempting to convince the parties in conflict that by looking at the EU’s experience it is possible to come to a peaceful and mutually beneficial solution. The EU does rely heavily on the values it was founded on and the norms it developed over time to devise its foreign policy in the region. In the words of the Head of the Delegation in Gaza and the West Bank: ‘if the French and the Germans were able to come to understand that their future was in co-operation, there is no reason why the same reasoning cannot be achieved in this region’.28

This obviously leads to two different types of difficulties. One is the ‘misplaced’ idealization of how Europe and a European identity emerged. In the creation of the ‘mythical values’ of Europe and in the selective history of how the EU became to be what it is today, it is forgotten that when it was created there was an existing ‘peace’ and there were both external security guarantees provided by the USA and a common external threat in the form of the USSR. These conditions do not exist today in the Middle East. However, the crucial point here from the point of view of the internalization of norms is that this very partial account of how Europe came into being is perpetuated within EU policy-making circles and does become the whole story. What is important to underline is that by eliminating some relevant factors from the construction of the European model, EU policy makers have created an idealized account of their own identity that they believe in and attempt to export. What follows is that the policies in the region derived from this idealized account may not be working precisely because some crucial factors have been left out from the official report of the identity-building process.
The second difficulty is the existence of competing ‘interests’ within the EU. While EU officials may have internalized norms, as documents and interviews show, the EU is also constituted by member states pursuing their own separate policies. This indicates that there may be two games taking place at the same time and the contradictions generated by these conflicting actions undermine the EU’s credibility and norm-exporting power. It is no coincidence that top EU officials showed a degree of frustration towards EU member states and their ‘independent’ activities in the region.

At a general level, it can be argued that there is a considerable gap between the ‘internalized’ norms, how much they actually filter down to member states and the ability to promote them successfully. This may be due to the ‘over-idealization’ of the making of a peaceful Europe and to the competition that the EU is subjected to from member states.

It’s the economy . . . stupid!

The impact of norms in the development of EU foreign policy is evident in the instruments used to make the policy effective. As indicated previously, the Commission ‘manages regional economic co-operation schemes and engages with Israelis and Palestinians in an economic dialogue’. This is the most important activity of the EU and a very simple explanation has been given for this: ‘sound and successful economic co-operation will ultimately lead to political progress’. The work of the EU in the region is therefore focused on economic development. Along with the essential role played in funding the reform of the Palestinian Authority, economic development is the real priority.

Simply looking at the list of tasks that the EU has, it emerges that most of them have an economic dimension. In this respect there are a number of elements that should be highlighted. First of all, the Commission attempts not only to help the Palestinians achieve a respectable level of economic development by funding a wide variety of projects in the Occupied Territories but also tries to link the economy of these Territories with that of Israel—attempting to create an economic interdependency. Through the management of regional economic co-operation schemes, the EU is involved in building bridges between the two parties, thereby highlighting the positive outcomes of co-operation. Second, the Union itself does not directly manage many of the projects it funds, but rather contracts them out to international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), so as to maximize the involvement of the local population. Third, the EU actively promotes economic agreements that result in association agreements with the two political entities in order not only to foster its own commercial agenda but also to have both entities participating in the same policy arena. Given that the potential of the Euro-Mediterranean region to become a leading economic area is enormous, the benefit of economic co-operation is highlighted. All this would confirm that the EU is indeed a normative power, but this policy cannot be assessed in isolation and outcomes have to be judged.

What emerges is that the success of this policy of economic engagement is at the very best mixed. Some good results had been obtained immediately after the Oslo Peace Accords. In 1995, for instance, the EU–Israel Association Agreement was signed and entered into force in June 2000 with the hope that it would also foster economic regional co-operation since similar agreements have
been signed with a number of other countries in the area, but the whole international community and, more importantly, the two regional partners were committed to the process. The EU policy cannot therefore account for the overall limited success of the early years. It follows that when the external and regional actors’ domestic conditions changed, the policy faltered. This strategy is not working at the moment and economic conditions in the Territories have vastly deteriorated.

This sense of failure is captured when talking to members of NGOs who receive funds from the EU to carry out projects aimed at improving the living standards of Palestinians. Water sanitation projects, rubbish collection schemes, community centres, schools, and other infrastructure have been damaged by the Israeli armed forces, leading some within the NGO camp to question their own activities. Commissioner Patten seemed to share some of their frustration when in a statement to the European Parliament on political progress in the region in September 2002 he declared that ‘the Palestinians and the donor community are working hard on building institutions and reforming existing structures. But there is a danger of that becoming a sort of virtual politics, while the real situation on the ground goes from bad to worse to appalling’. These poor results do not seem to undermine the support of those who are carrying EU policy out in the field. In fact, this overall policy of economic dialogue is quite deliberate in its political objectives and once again it can be connected to how the EU formulates its policies on the basis of its values and of its own history. Among EU policy makers there is the assumption that ‘the EU is very much engaged in trying to push an economic agenda based on growth and development because of the European experience itself after World War II’. Since there is the widespread notion that political success and compromise in conflict situations can only be built on economic success, the EU is engaged in following the same path that it believes that it followed from its inception. Accordingly, ‘the logic behind the success of the European Union is that it started out as an entity that dealt with economic issues and then these tangible results resulted in political progress’. If economic dialogue is successful, political results are going to be much easier to achieve, as both sides will see that they have a common interest in working together. While this is considered naïve by some elements working with development agencies in the region, it still confirms that norms—albeit idealized—do influence policy.

Building on the belief that economic progress and co-operation can drive politics, the EU is very much involved in promoting three core values in its close work with the Palestinian Authority: democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. As underlined above, part of the budget of the EU for the region is destined to foster political legitimacy and respect for basic civil norms. Through the training of judges and the comprehensive reform of the judicial system, it is hoped that in the Occupied Territories the rule of law will become part of the political system.

The overarching logic of this policy of democracy promotion and rule of law is to be found in the belief that a legitimate and democratic Palestinian Authority will be more prone to co-operate with Israel, as it will have assimilated and will have been socialized into the need for compromise and the need to respect other points of view. Legal norms are the means through which conflicts can be solved.

The member states of the EU are technically part of this process and their foreign policy should also be driven by this acquired identity. In fact, there
seems to be a very strong degree of collaboration between the representatives of the EU and the representatives of the member states. One very senior official stated quite clearly that ‘there is no conflict between what the Commission does and what Members States do when it comes to dealing with the Palestinian Authority and with the peace process in general’.33 This co-ordination of policies is also highly institutionalized, as there are scheduled meetings and fixed procedures for all the representatives to come together. According to some officials, this seems to be a radical change from past practice. ‘Every member state sees itself as contributing something both on its own (there are a number of different bilateral agreements) and together with other member states through the work of the EU Commission delegation.’34 If this is true, two important conclusions can be drawn from this. First, socialization and further integration have played a role over time in changing attitudes among policy makers of different member states vis-à-vis the role of the EU in foreign affairs.35 While in the past Europe may have been seen as an encroachment on what diplomatic corps ‘did for a living’, the present would point to a different picture. Not only is the shared project of the building of Europe internalized to such an extent that it modifies behaviour, but it also spills over into effective policy making, which in turn is not based simply on a notion of sovereignty. Europe does not substitute the nation-state and does not simply ‘Europeanize’ foreign policies, but represents normative values that have a standing of their own. The second important conclusion is that the procedures put in place for the co-ordination of these policies enhance the credibility of the EU representatives.

However, there is also the emerging belief that EU policies are not simply about norms but that, in fact, ‘norms are woven into material interests’.36 For example, a recent study on the trade accords that the EU signed with countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) demonstrated that the promotion of solidarity and equality has been scrapped in favour of the pursuit of clear economic advantages.37 Thus, the EU itself, and in spite of the rhetoric it uses, is not immune from thinking of itself as having clearly defined interests. Second, the Union’s member states have significant material interests ranging from access to energy resources to military security and from immigration to the promotion of free trade. The novelty of CFSP with respect to traditional foreign policy may be in the realization that these material interests have to be collapsed into norms in order to be pursued effectively, but this does not detract from the reality of member states’ independence, particularly at critical junctures and regarding truly relevant matters. All member states have their own agendas in the area and their own wider objectives, and while, at a rhetorical level, this agenda is synergized with the broader European one, a re-edition of the ‘capability–expectations gap’ seems to be central to understanding.38

These two points help to explain the failures of the EU in the area, the lack of alternatives to the ‘pax americana’ in the region, and the frustration of EU officials who have indeed internalized the EU core norms but seem to be unable to export them successfully. The EU contributes a novel outlook for both the Palestinians and the Israelis, but its effectiveness is limited by structural constraints, by the very limited and idealized vision of the EU’s own history, by contradictions from within the EU foreign policy ‘system’ and by the competition of other more credible and effective unitary actors such as the USA. In addition, the targeted partners do not seem to be influenced by this norm-exporting strategy
and have failed to internalize it. For them, the ‘real’ game is played with the USA and influential member states, not with the EU, which is seen as an economic partner in the more traditional ‘realist’ sense.

In the minds of EU officials, the 2003–4 divisions over the war against Iraq were a powerful reminder that not only can the EU be easily sidelined but also that the regional partners have understood the very marginal gains they can make by engaging with the EU from a normative point of view. All EU policy makers in the area seemed to be very disappointed with the lack of agreement within the EU because the very notion of Europe is undermined and credibility diminishes.

US–EU relations: loving me ... and loving you

In this context, it is worth mentioning the relationship that has developed in the area with the USA. There is little doubt that the USA and the EU have different approaches to the peace process, with the USA focusing more on security and the EU focusing on the socio-economic aspect. This difference derives from the privileged relations that they enjoy with the two parties in conflict, from different assumptions they have about the region and, more crucially, from the different ‘resources’ they can mobilize. The ‘war on terror’ has possibly increased such differences, as the current debate on Palestinian Authority funding demonstrates.

For the EU, the main preoccupation seems to be reaching a type of stability that is not built on security and military preoccupations, but on economic and social development. In order to achieve that, the solution of the Palestinian conflict is not really about ‘how to guarantee security’ but on ‘how to conceptualize and put into practice a different concept of security’. The fact that the EU is focusing exclusively on aid and trade is witness to the commitment of the EU to a different approach and to the successful export and internalization of EU norms.

EU policy makers are careful to emphasize that the EU and the USA co-operate in the region and that they enjoy very good relations despite the fact that they deal with different matters. This recognition, it is stressed, does not lead to competition but a useful differentiation in roles. Instead of competing with the USA in a traditional manner, the EU attempts to build a counterweight to Israel ‘through the creation of a democratic, efficient and economically sound Palestinian entity’.39

The view is that there seems to be no need to challenge the USA because the it listens to the EU and the policies they both undertake can be considered complementary. The view that the EU and the USA do not really compete in the area is borne out when talking to NGOs representatives. Paradoxically, many working in the third sector in the region are keen to stress two points. First, they are quite sceptical about the EU line of focusing mostly on economics to foster political progress. They argue that the conflict is fundamentally a political one. Even if economic conditions were to improve dramatically and real cooperation were initiated, in the end the rivalry would be so intense that economic gains would be short lived, as the conflict is seen by many on both sides as a zero-sum game. The second point is that it is very difficult for them not to be sympathetic to the Palestinians and therefore they would call for a much stronger role for the EU in competing with the Americans for influence.

There are a number of points that emerge from the analysis of EU/US relations in the area. First, there is some truth to the claim that the EU and the USA are not
competing and that the EU is not attempting to counterbalance the USA. There is a very clear and readily recognized different approach to the peace process on the part of the two actors, but this ‘competition’ does not seem to subscribe to a realist traditional interpretation. In fact, competition takes place on the terrain of values. It is believed that a region where the conflict between Israeli and Palestinians would be solved through economic co-operation would be a stable one. This ‘human’ stability, as opposed to the ‘security’ stability envisaged by the USA, should be the best means to defend material interests such as better access to oil resources, taming religious fundamentalism and expanding the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area with mutual economic benefits.

Second, however, it should be recognized that the EU ‘thinks’ in that manner because, to a considerable degree, it cannot really do anything else. The structural constraints of CFSP signify that the different member states bring to bear their own views and interests, jockeying for the position of the spokesperson for the EU. Germany and the Netherlands are traditionally pro-Israel and therefore have their own independent approach to the whole situation, but on top of that each member state has to consider its bilateral relationship with the USA when making policies in the region. Thus, the EU becomes a ‘nice’ vehicle through which to promote specific norms and values, but it is not given the means to do anything else because critical decisions still have to be made nationally. In turn, this profoundly undermines the identity-driven policies of the EU and subtracts from its credibility because the regional partners are aware that the important game is not really played in Brussels.

Conclusion

Given the deep divisions within the EU with respect to the war in Iraq, it would seem preposterous to talk about the effectiveness of Common Foreign and Security Policy and the increasing primacy of EU identity as the driving force behind foreign policy.40

However, while rationalist and positivist explanations make a crucial contribution to explanations of particular policy choices, it does emerge that EU foreign policy is driven at a very fundamental level by the normative values ascribed to it and understood by EU and national foreign policy makers. The evidence shows that there are grounds to consider the Union operating a normative model as outlined above, since EU officials seem to have internalized the norms that Manners identifies as being constitutive. In addition, the policies deriving from this may be argued to be at least in part identity driven, even if this identity is partial and highly idealized. According to traditional works in the literature on EU policy making, this should, in turn, have an influence on the constituent parts of the EU and how they formulate policies that bring a European dimension into an evolving national and collective identity. Our evidence, rather, seems to highlight the ineffectiveness of EU policy in relation to the peace process and this can be explained by the Union’s excessively idealized vision of itself, which underplays the real-world conditions that underpinned its establishment and success. This leads to poor choice of policies because all real factors are not accounted for. In addition to this problem, there is a very substantial difficulty in turning norms-driven policies into hard export owing to the still-prominent role that member states play.
The attempt to recast the Middle East in the image of the EU is real but, at this time, the explanatory power of rationalism and the primacy of the nation-state remain considerable. According to EU officials, insisting on economic progress and economic links is the way forward not only to achieve the regional stability that all actors desire but also to obtain a type of stability that is normatively different from the traditional security-centred conception of it. However, there seems to be a refusal to acknowledge that this is not working. Along the same lines, counterbalancing the USA may not be a logical course of action because the normative foundations of the EU are unable to reconcile it with the use of traditional instruments of power politics. It could also be said that what makes this policy the only one pursued by the EU is the internal divisions of member states regarding their role vis-à-vis the USA.

A note of optimism is necessary, however. While there is only limited evidence that the EU is a normative power, the very fact that many officials—from both the EU institutions and the member states—have been able to internalize core norms is testimony to the changes that have occurred in national foreign-policy making. In this respect, it might be argued that if once again integration accelerates in the domain of foreign and security policy—as with, for example, the proposed EU constitution’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and the External Action Service—further progress in this direction may result. ‘Europe has repeatedly defied the sceptics’ and a truly unified CFSP may be the next step of this defiance. This very fact means that progress is possible and that international politics does not have to be the arena where the scientific law of positivism are immutable.

Notes

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3. See, for instance, J. T. Checkel, ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’, *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2001, pp. 553–88; and T. Christiansen, K. E. Jørgensen and A. Wiener, *The Social Construction of Europe*, London, 2001.

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29. Ibid.

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