Inequality and War

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Economic stagnation, political decay, and deadly political violence interact in several ways: economic and political factors contribute to war, while war has an adverse effect on economic growth and political development. This article indicates how economic decline, income inequality, political authoritarianism, and pervasive rent-seeking by ruling elites contribute to war and state killings, responsible for more deaths than war. Economic regress and political decay bring about relative deprivation, the perception by social groups of injustice arising from a growing discrepancy between what they expect and get. Both greed and grievance drive contemporary civil wars. Political leaders, as in Sierra Leone, Angola, Congo-Kinshasa, and Liberia in the 1990s, may gain more from extensive unproductive, profit-seeking activities in a political system they control than from long-term efforts to build a well-functioning state in which economic progress and democratic institutions flourish. The political-economy analysis is reinforced by econometric analysis. Surprisingly, the econometric evidence indicates that the direction of causation is stronger from growth to emergencies than from emergencies to growth. Still, negative per capita growth interacts with political predation in a downward spiral, a spiral seen in African countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Zaire (Congo) in the 1990s.

INTRODUCTION

Recently the media have focused on the threat that insurgents in failed states possessing weapons of mass destruction pose to the rich of the United States, Canada, and Europe. Scholars predict an inevitable clash between the West and Islam. Amid these perils to the West, we should not forget that war, state violence, and rebel resistance threaten the livelihoods and voices of millions of poor in Africa and Asia. About 20 per cent of Africans live in countries seriously disrupted by war or state violence. The cost of conflict includes refugee flows, increased military spending, damage to transport and communication, reduction in trade and investment, and diversion of resources from development. The World Bank (2000, pp. 57-59) estimates that a civil war in an African country lowers the GDP per capita by 2.2 percentage points annually. Scholars must focus on reducing this danger to the survival income and human rights of the world’s poorest.

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adverse effect on economic growth and political development. This article analyses how economic decline, income inequality, a weakening state, pervasive rent-seeking by ruling elites, and competition for the control of mineral exports contribute to humanitarian emergencies. These emergencies comprise a human-made crisis in which large numbers of people die and suffer from war, state violence, and refugee displacement, which are usually accompanied by widespread disease and hunger (Väyrynen, 2000a).

What are the sources of humanitarian emergencies? Auvinen and Nafziger (1999) showed that stagnation and decline in real (inflation-adjusted) GDP, slow growth in average food production, high income inequality, a high ratio of military expenditure to national income, and a tradition of violent conflict are the sources of emergencies. The study also finds that countries which failed to adjust to chronic external deficits were more vulnerable to humanitarian emergencies. In addition, political variables such as predatory rule, authoritarianism, and state decay and collapse, interact with economic variables to affect people's vulnerability to humanitarian emergencies. The findings are, by and large, consistent for three measures of the dependent variable and for many different regression models.

However, the focus of this article is less on econometrics than on a discussion of how factors embedded in the political economy of developing countries contribute to humanitarian emergencies. 'Political economy' includes not only economic analysis but also the interests of political leaders and policy-makers who make economic decisions, and members of the population who are affected by these decisions. This analysis, based on a research project conducted by the UN University/World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Helsinki, and Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford (QEH), presents generalizations on the case studies of 17 war-affected less-developed countries (LDCs), and explains the reasons for econometric findings from annual data pertaining to 124 LDCs from 1980 to 1995 (Auvinen and Nafziger, 1999). The case studies include Nigeria and Pakistan during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Haiti, El Salvador, Colombia, Bosnia, and the South Caucasus from 1980 to 2000.

STAGNATION AND DECLINE IN INCOMES

Contemporary emergencies are found in low- and middle-income countries, suggesting a threshold above which war and massive state violence do not occur. A disproportionate number of these states are also weak or failing (Holsti, 2000, pp. 243-50), which interacts as a cause and effect of their relative poverty. Moreover, emergencies are more likely to occur in countries experiencing stagnation in real GDP per capita, and a breakdown in law and public services. These phenomena affect relative deprivation, the actors' perception of social injustice arising from a discrepancy between the goods and conditions they expect and can get or keep. This deprivation often results from vertical (class) or horizontal (regional or communal)
inequality (Stewart, 2000, p. 6), wherein the actors’ income or conditions are related to those of others within society. Relative deprivation spurs social discontent, which provides motivation for collective violence (Gurr, 1970). Among the components of emergencies, war and violence play major catalytic roles, adding to social disruption and political instability, undermining economic activity, spreading hunger and disease, and fuelling refugee flows. Tangible and salient factors such as a marked deterioration in living conditions, especially during a period of high expectations, are more likely to produce socio-political discontent that may be mobilized into political violence.

While during the twentieth century, some 200 million people were killed in war or state violence (Rummel, 1994), only a small proportion of these deaths were caused by insurgent action or fighting between belligerents. Holsti (2000, pp. 250-67) demonstrates that the policies of governing elites are at the root of most humanitarian emergencies, a fact not recognized in most research on war (see Collier, 2000a; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998a). Slow or negative per capita growth puts ruling coalitions on the horns of a dilemma. Ruling elites can expand rent-seeking opportunities for existing political elites, contributing to further economic stagnation that threatens the legitimacy of the regime and increases the probability of regime turnover. In order to forestall threats to the regime, political elites may use repression to suppress discontent or capture a greater share of the majority’s shrinking surplus. These repressive policies may entail acts of direct violence against or withholding of food and other supplies from politically disobedient groups, as was seen in Sudan in the 1980s (Keen, 2000, pp. 292-94). Moreover, repression and economic discrimination may generate relative deprivation and trigger socio-political mobilization on the part of the affected groups, leading to further violence, thereby worsening the humanitarian crisis.

Since economic deceleration or collapse can disrupt ruling coalitions and exacerbate mass discontent, we should not be surprised that after 1980 (though not after 2000) the globe, particularly Africa, has been more vulnerable to humanitarian emergencies. This increase in intra-state political conflict and humanitarian emergencies in Africa during the last two decades of the twentieth century is linked to its negative per capita growth in the 1970s and 1980s, and virtual stagnation in the 1990s. Indeed in Africa, which had the highest death rate from wars, the GDP per capita was lower in the late 1990s than it was at the end of the 1960s (World Bank, 2000, p. 1).

This stagnation and decline was often associated with, and exacerbated by, a predatory state, driven by ethnic and regional competition for the bounties of the state. Predatory rule involves a personalistic regime ruling through coercion, material inducement, and personality politics, tending to degrade the institutional foundations of the economy and the state. Elites extract immediate rents and transfers rather than providing incentives for economic growth. In some predatory states, the ruling elite and their clients “use their positions and access to resources to plunder the national economy through graft, corruption, and extortion, and to
participate in private business activities,” (Holsti, 2000, p. 251). Ake (1996, p. 42) contends that “instead of being a public force, the state in Africa tends to be privatized, that is, appropriated to the service of private interests by the dominant faction of the elite.” People use funds at the disposal of the state for systematic corruption, from petty survival venality at the lower echelons of government to kleptocracy at the top.

Humanitarian crises are more likely to occur in societies where the state is weak and venal, and thus subject to extensive rent-seeking, “an omnipresent policy to obtain private benefit from public action and resources,” (Väyrynen, 2000b, p. 440). The cause and effect between state failure and rent-seeking are not always clear. State failure need not necessarily result from the incapacity of public institutions. Instead, while “state failure can harm a great number of people, it can also benefit others,” (ibid. pg. 442), especially governing elites and their allies. These elites may not benefit by avoiding political decay through nurturing free entry and the rule of law, and reducing corruption and exploitation. Instead, political leaders may gain more from extensive unproductive, profit-seeking activities in a political system that they control than from long-term efforts to build a well-functioning state in which economic progress and democratic institutions flourish. These activities tend to be pervasive in countries that have abundant mineral exports (for example, diamonds and petroleum), such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Angola, Congo–Kinshasa, and Liberia (see Section 4), while predatory economic behaviour has a lower pay-off in mineral-export-poor economies such as Tanzania and Togo.

The majority of countries with humanitarian emergencies have experienced several years (even decades) of negative or stagnant growth, wherein growth refers to real growth in GNP or GDP per capita. Widespread negative growth among populations where a majority of the population is close to levels of subsistence increases their vulnerability to humanitarian disasters. From 1980 to 1991, 40 of 58 (69 per cent of) Afro-Asian countries experienced negative growth, according to the World Bank’s World Development Report (1993, pp. 238-39). In contrast, from 1960 to 1980, only 9 of 53 countries had negative economic growth, according to the World Bank Annual (1982, pp. 110-11). In addition, the positive growth of Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1960s and 1970s also reversed to negative growth in the 1980s, according to World Bank sources. The inter-relationships between growth and emergencies suggest that the increased emergencies in the early 1990s are connected to the developing world’s disastrous growth record of the 1980s. This disastrous growth was accompanied by state decay, as ruling elites, while facing limitations in dispersing benefits to a wide-ranging coalition of ethnic communities and economic groups, struggled for control, allied with other strongmen, and strengthened their military capability to repress potential rebels and dissidents.

Econometric and country evidence indicates that, holding other variables constant, slow real GDP growth helps explain humanitarian emergencies. Humanitarian emergencies also contribute to reduced (often negative) growth (Stewart, et al., 1997, pp. 11-41), though, according to Auvinen and Nafziger’s
econometrics (1999), the direction of causation is weaker than from growth to emergencies. Contemporary humanitarian disaster is rarely episodic but is usually the culmination of longer-term politico-economic decay over a period of a decade or more. Negative per capita growth interacts with political predation in a downward spiral, a spiral seen in African countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Zaire (Congo).

Economic stagnation, frequently accompanied by chronic trade deficits and growing external debt, intensifies the need for economic adjustment and stabilization. A persistent external disequilibrium has costs, irrespective of whether countries adjust or not. But non-adjustment has the greater cost; the longer the disequilibrium, the greater is the social damage and the more painful the adjustment. Most LDCs face frequent international balance-of-payments problems, which reduce the ability of political leaders to maintain control. But abundant exports, such as those of minerals, along with a strong military, can provide the ruler or warlord with a modicum of security.

More than a decade of slow growth, rising borrowing costs, reduced concessional aid, a mounting debt crisis, and the increased economic liberalism of donors and international financial institutions, compelled LDC (especially African) elites to change their strategies during the 1980s and 1990s. Widespread economic liberalization and adjustment provided chances for challenging existing elites, threatening their positions, and contributing to increased opportunistic rent-seeking and overt repression. Cuts in spending reduced the funds to be distributed to clients, and also compelled the elites to seek greater military and police support to remain in power.

INCOME INEQUALITY

Large income inequality exacerbates the vulnerability of populations to humanitarian emergencies. Alesina and Perotti’s (1996) cross-section study of 71 developing countries, conducted from 1960-85, finds that income inequality, by fuelling social discontent, increases socio-political instability, as measured by deaths in domestic disturbances and assassinations (per million population) and coups (both successful and unsuccessful). Moreover, the policies of predatory and authoritarian rulers increase income inequality.

In order to measure income inequality, Nafziger and Auvinen (2003, p. 90) used Gini coefficients calculated from an expanded and qualitatively improved data set from Deininger and Squire (1996, pp. 56-91), though Nafziger and Auvinen still decided not to use data from studies they relied on which used incomparable research methodologies. The authors were able to find relationships between Gini and war, which the World Bank researchers, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and others could not find without this data set. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p. 563) indicate that “there is insufficient data to introduce distributional considerations into the empirical analysis.” The regressions of Nafziger and Auvinen indicate that high Gini
Indeed because of inadequate income inequality data, Collier (2000b, pp. 10-11, 13) argues, “Inequality does not seem to affect the risk of conflict. Rebellion does not seem to be the rage of the poor. . . . Conflict is not caused by divisions, rather it actively needs to create them. . . . However, it is the military needs of the rebel organization which have created this political conflict rather than the objective grievances.”

WIDER-QEH researchers (Nafziger, et al., 2 Vols., 2000), who include deaths from state violence as a part of humanitarian emergencies, examine deadly political violence more broadly than merely a focus on rebellions, and hold a contrasting view to that of Collier. Indeed the WIDER-QEH approach is consistent with the finding that objective grievances of poverty and inequality contribute to war and humanitarian emergencies.

Severe social tensions leading to humanitarian emergencies may even arise under conditions of positive (even rapid) growth and expanding resource availability. High inequality can contribute to the immiseration or absolute deprivation of portions of the population, even with growth. Absolute deprivation during substantial growth was experienced, for instance, by Igbo political elites, dominant in Nigeria’s eastern region, in the early 1960s. The East lost oil tax revenues from a change in its regional allocation by the federal government, which stopped distributing mineral export revenues to regional governments.

Moreover, through the demonstration effect of the consumption levels of the relatively well-off, high-income concentration increases the perception of relative deprivation among substantial sections of the population, even when these do not experience absolute deprivation. The risk of political disintegration increases with a surge of income disparities by class, region, and community, especially when these disparities lack legitimacy among the population. Class and communal (regional, ethnic, and religious) economic differences often overlap, exacerbating perceived grievances and potential strife.

The trends and policies leading to this type of high-income inequality result from historical legacies of discrimination (from colonialism, apartheid, failed past policies, and so forth), from government policies in distributing land and other assets, taxation, and the benefits of public expenditure, from regional and ethnic economic competition, and from predatory rule. Growing regional inequality and limited regional economic integration, associated with economic enclaves, can exacerbate ethnic and regional competition and conflict.

Regional factors contributing to conflict include educational and employment differentials, revenue allocation, and language discrimination, which places minority language communities at a disadvantage. Examples include the struggle for petroleum tax revenues and employment in the civil service and modern sector in Nigeria in the early to mid-1960s, the distribution of resources from East to West and
employment discrimination against Bengalis in Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s, the conflict between Hutu and Tutsi for control of the state and access to employment in Burundi and Rwanda, the contention over the distribution of falling economic resources and rising debt obligations in Yugoslavia in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the language, employment, and educational discrimination by the state against Tamils in post-independent Sri Lanka.

While high inequality is associated with emergencies, insurgency is more likely to occur if the less advantaged can identify the perpetrators of their poverty and suffering. The examples of Nigeria in the 1960s, South Africa, and Chiapas, Mexico (Nafziger and Auvinen, 2000, pp. 105-08) illustrate the diverse patterns of how discriminatory government policies cause economic inequality, fuel social discontent, and lead to political conflict and humanitarian emergencies. These dynamics may even occur when either the nation’s real per capita GDP is growing, as was the case in Nigeria in the 1960s, or when the disadvantaged group’s economic position is improving, as was the case for non-white South Africans from the 1960s through the early 1980s.

High-income inequality can be a source of humanitarian emergencies in both rapidly- and slow-growing countries. But, once a population is dissatisfied with income discrepancies and social discrimination, as the majority non-whites were in white-ruled South Africa, the rising expectations associated with incremental reductions in poverty and inequality may actually spur the revolt, conflict, and state hostile action that exacerbate the probability of a humanitarian emergency8 (Davies, 1962, pp. 5-19).

COMPETITION FOR NATURAL RESOURCES

Collier contends (in Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, pp. 568-69; Collier, 2000a, pp. 92-95) that the possession of primary commodities, especially exports, increases the occurrence and duration of civil war. Mwanasali (2000, pg. 145) indicates the reasons why. “Primary commodity exports present several advantages to the belligerents. Because they are generic products, rather than brand names, their origin can easily be concealed. They are usually the most heavily taxable, especially in kind, and their production or marketing does not require the complicated processes, as is the case of manufactured goods.”

Primary goods include both agricultural (usually renewable) and mineral (largely non-renewable) commodities. According to De Soysa’s statistical tests (2000, pp. 123-24), “the incidence of civil war is completely unrelated to the per capita availability of natural resources, defined as the stocks of both renewable resources . . . and non-renewables.” But, once De Soysa refines her independent variable to include only mineral resources, her result is highly significant. She finds that “the higher the per capita availability of . . . mineral wealth, the greater the incidence of conflict” (ibid. p. 124). The following seven paragraphs, based mainly on work by WIDER-QEH researchers (Nafziger, et al., 2000), explain why minerals contribute to
conflict and state violence.

In the struggle for allies during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union provided military and economic aid for LDCs. Sovereignty provided the opportunity to extract resources from the major powers in exchange for diplomatic support. Yet aid could provide the basis for supporting a patronage system for either the state or for insurgents in opposition. When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, nation states and rebels in the developing world required different strategies and new sources of funds. Many countries in Africa and Asia needed control of resources to provide military and police power but only minimal services to control territory. Indeed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank emphasis on the market and private enterprise, predatory rulers often undermined their own bureaucracies to build personal power at the expense of health, education, and agricultural development (Reno, 2000, pp. 231-32; Väyrynen, 2000b, pp. 437-79).

The struggle for control over minerals and other natural resources is an important source of conflict. In Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo—Kinshasa, rulers and warlords used exclusive contracts with foreign firms for diamonds and other minerals to ‘regularise’ sources of revenue in lieu of a government agency to collect taxes (Reno 1996; 1998; 2000). In comparison, however, Tanzania and Togo lacked the tradable resources to become predatory societies (Väyrynen, 2000b, pp. 444-45).

After the decline of aid after the Cold War, Sierra Leone was more susceptible to pressures for liberalization and adjustment from the IMF and World Bank. In 1991, the IMF, the World Bank, and bilateral creditors offered loans and debt rescheduling worth $625 million, about 80 per cent of the GNP, if Sierra Leone reduced government expenditure and employment. In response, Freetown heeded the World Bank’s advice (1994, pp. 22-51) to use private operators to run state services for a profit. However, privatization did not eliminate the pressures of clients demanding pay-offs but merely shifted the arena of clientage to the private sector. Sierra Leone’s ruling elites, needing new ways of exercising power, used foreign firms to consolidate power and stave off threats from political rivals. In the 1990s, Sierra Leonean heads of state relied on exclusive contracts with foreign firms for diamond mining to stabilize revenue, foreign mercenaries and advisors to replace the national army in providing security, and foreign contractors (sometimes the same mining or security firms) to provide other state services. In the process, the rulers found it advantageous to “destroy state agencies, to ‘cleanse’ them of politically threatening patrimonial hangers-on and use violence to extract resources from people under their control” (Reno, 1996, pp. 7-8, 12).

Charles Taylor used external commercial networks (foreign firms), some a legacy of the Samuel Doe regime of the late 1980s, to amass power over Liberia, and at times, the eastern periphery of Sierra Leone. Taylor’s territory had its own currency and banking system, telecommunications network, airfields, export trade (in diamonds, timber, gold, and farm products) to support arms imports, and (until
1993) a deepwater port. For Taylor, who was a warlord during most of the 1990s before being elected Liberia’s President in 1997, controlling territory by building a patronage network was easier than building a state and its bureaucracy (Reno, 1995, p. 111). Indeed Taylor had access to annual revenues exceeding $100 million, with an upper limit of around $200 million, from 1990 to 1996 (Reno, 2000, pp. 243, 252).

Even Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko (1965-1997), like other hard-pressed rulers in weak African states, mimicked the ‘warlord’ approach of his non-state rivals. But with the shrinking patronage base from foreign aid and investment, to prevent a coup by newly marginalized groups in the army or bureaucracy, Mobutu, like the rulers in other retrenching African states, needed to reconfigure his political authority. In this situation, foreign firms and contractors served as a new source of patronage networks. Indigenous commercial interests that profit from the new rules are not independent capitalists with interests distinct from those of the state. As Reno (1996, p. 16) points out, “Those who do not take part in accumulation on the ruler’s terms are punished.” Mobutu weathered the collapse of the state bureaucracy, but fell because his strategy of milking state assets had reached a limit, thereby seriously weakening the patronage system. In 1997, his forces fell to the Alliance des Forces Democratique pour la Liberation (AFDL) of Laurent Kabila, who became the eventual president of the Democratic Republic of Congo until he was assassinated in 2001 (ibid. pp. 9-16; Reno, 1998, pp. 147-81).

State failure, as seen in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Zaire, increases vulnerability to war and humanitarian emergencies. Yet, in a weak or failed state, some rulers, warlords, and traders are more likely to profit from war and violence than in peacetime. Indeed, as Väyrynen (2000b, p. 442) argues, war, political violence, and state failure do not result from the incapacity of public institutions but from the fact that rulers, warlords, and their clients benefit from the harm thereby befalling a substantial share of the population.

Relative deprivation also helps explain the increased violence by belligerents and their clients. An abrupt rush of mineral wealth increases the expectations of prosperity, not only by the allies of rulers and warlords who control the resource but also the lure to potential rebels of combat to control the resource. Indeed, as Gurr (1970, pp. 73, 79) indicates, the intensity of the deprivation felt increases with the discrepancy between potential and actual conditions, and with the length of time that the deprivation persists. In Angola, Congo-Kinshasa, and Sierra Leone, the length and intensity of perceived deprivation were considerable.

DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM

Legitimacy is not only materially defined. Political deprivation arises from a lack of meaningful participation in making political decisions, regardless of whether this participation is prevented by law or through repression. In effect, a constant and frequent use of repression indicates lack of legitimacy and political capacity (Jackman, 1993). Efficient repression may prolong authoritarian rule, as
demonstrated, for example, by Augusto Pinochet’s Chile and Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s Malawi, but eventually the people are likely to challenge the regime from a ‘desperate bargainer’ position. Democratic regimes do not guarantee the absence of conflict, but since they are likely to be more widely accepted, expressions of discontent are not aimed at challenging their basic tenets. Large-scale conflict and humanitarian emergencies are virtually non-existent in democratic societies.

Authoritarianism and the Extent of Conflict

What are the empirical findings on the relationship between the extent of political conflict and authoritarianism? Openness in a political system encourages political actions of all kinds, and not all of them are likely to be voiced through formal institutions of interest articulation. Graham and Gurr showed that democracies typically faced more extensive ‘civil conflict’ than autocracies. Gurr and Eckstein see chronic low-level conflict as “…a price democracies have to pay for freedom from regimentation, from the state or from authorities in other social units” (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975, p. 452).

Democratic political regimes do not repress their citizens or inflict severe sanctions on protestors. Authoritarian regimes are prone to repress unrest (see Hibbs, 1973), and the citizens are more likely to refrain from rebellious action when these regimes are in power. Turkey (1980-84) and Morocco (after 1984), for instance, imposed ‘long-term and systematic repression’, serious restrictions on civil and human rights, persistent arrests of suspected ‘activists’, use of heavy prison sentencing and torture, and banning of political movements and opposition trades unions, on protestors” and were spared from serious unrest until the end of the decade (Seddon, 1992, p. 49). The threshold of rebellious political action is higher and therefore authoritarian regimes are likely to experience less political protest than democracies.

Authoritarian political structures are conducive to conflict also because repression increases opposition group activity. By adopting coercive politics against dissidents, the regime loses legitimacy, and its actions thereby become the catalyst for the mobilization of previously neutral actors (Davis and Ward, 1990, pp. 451-52). Repression may also harden the determination of the members of the opposition group, and ignite a tougher response from the rebellious groups. As a consequence, relatively innocent incidents of protests may escalate into large-scale rebellions with a large number of casualties.

Most research has detected an inverted U-relationship between the type of political regime and political conflict: mild repression incites conflict and only intense repression deters it (Auvinen, 1996, p. 79). The rationale behind the inverted U-curve is that the severe costs of rebellion in an extremely repressive political system inhibit resource mobilization by dissident groups, the availability of reasonably effective peaceful means of political action in a non-repressive political system makes rebellion an undesirable strategy of opposition for most people, but
rebellion is likely to be the preferred strategy of opposition for many dissident groups in the context of a semi-repressive political system in which resource mobilization is possible and peaceful opposition typically is ineffective (Muller and Weede, 1990, p. 627).

A distinction is sometimes made between structural or institutionalized repression and behavioural repression. Structural repression refers to the repressive capability of the regime while behavioural repression refers to actual coercion by the government or parts thereof. The two are not necessarily the same because even the most democratic regimes do not guarantee the absence of repression. This is demonstrated by the occasional use of repression by Western democracies (Henderson, 1973, p. 133). Nevertheless, Muller and Weede (1990) found that the inverted U-curve applies to both structural and behavioural repression.

Muller and Weede suggest that an inverted U-curve relationship supports a theory of belligerents as rational actors. An actor who calculates the costs of action takes into account the fact that when the level of repression is high, the expected benefits of either rebellion or peaceful collective action will be relatively low because of high costs and a low expectancy of success. When repression is low, the expected benefits of rebellion will be exceeded by the expected benefits of peaceful collective action. When repression is moderate, the expected benefits of rebellion will exceed those of peaceful collective action (ibid., p. 628). This explanation of conflict as a function of rational actors calculating costs and benefits provides some support to Collier’s ‘greed’ theory, even if only political—and not economic—benefits are evident. However, Muller and Weede admit that one may arrive at the same proposition from a relative deprivation perspective (ibid., p. 647) that corresponds to the ‘grievance’ theory.

**Authoritarianism and the Form of Conflict**

Authoritarian regimes are more susceptible to rebellion than political protest. In Gurr and Lichbach’s study (1979, p. 69), autocratic governments faced proportionally three times as much revolutionary opposition, but were less likely to hear reformist demands than the democratic governments. In Chile, the *coup d’état* of 1973 interrupted a long tradition of democratic rule. Legitimate opposition was disallowed and repressed, which led to the development of new and radical forms of political resistance.

The prevailing norms of the political regimes, be they democratic or authoritarian, influence the tactics of dissidents and the responses of the elites to them. Democratic elites are disposed to make appreciable concessions to protest whereas authoritarian regimes of the left and the right are more likely to rely on repression. In democratic countries, this reinforces the utility of protest over rebellion whereas in autocracies, it increases the relative usefulness of rebellion for challengers who are desperate enough to act at all (Gurr and Lichbach, 1986, p. 12).
Democracies may not discourage political protest, but they are successful in eliminating or strongly reducing the probability of rebellion. Gurr and Lichbach found that in democratic countries, dissidents very rarely had revolutionary objectives; reformist demands were ten times more common (ibid. pg. 69). According to Graham and Gurr (1979), civil conflicts were less deadly in democracies than in autocracies. Hibbs (1973) shows this by employing Cutright’s (1963) index of political development, though the relationship disappears if economic development is controlled for. Hazlewood divides political systems into polyarchic, centrist and personalist. He finds that in polyarchic systems, the number of revolutions, guerrilla wars, and assassinations was smaller but that the number of governmental crises and riots was larger as compared to the sample mean. Personalist states were above the mean for all states on these five conflict indicators and above the mean for each of the other groups on all indicators except riots. Centrist systems had the lowest mean values on all indicators except revolutions (Hazlewood, 1973, p. 184).9

Authoritarianism and Irregular Executive Transfer

The chances of peaceful regime change are limited under authoritarian rule. In the 1980s, before the end of the Cold War, political liberalization was infrequent. The most common mechanism of changing an authoritarian regime was by force, sometimes through mass rebellion or revolution, but more commonly through a coup d’état by the elite. Political authoritarianism was the most important determinant of political instability in Central America, save in Costa Rica, where peaceful and routine procedures for the transfer of political power were established. “The seeds of discontent for the next crisis cycle have been planted during the period of stable military rule without concurrent mechanisms for channeling this discontent into peaceful regime change” (Lindenberg, 1990, pp. 416, 419). In autocratic regimes, coups are inevitably the privileged mode of succession. More than 80 per cent of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa experienced at least one successful or unsuccessful coup from the 1950s to early 1980s (Johnson, et al., 1984). In most cases, authoritarian regimes followed one another. More than two-thirds of the executive transfers between 1965 and 1987 were ‘irregular’ (Hughes and May, 1988). Adelman and Hihn conclude that “the possibility of political instability, or that of discontinuous political transitions, can be greatly reduced if governments make a conscious effort to pursue a development process that leads to greater social mobility and is combined with increased political participation” (Adelman and Hihn, 1984, p. 20).

In closed political systems, elites are the main contestants for political power and enrichment. The main elite groups may unite to support the government if economic growth is sufficient to ensure that benefits accrue to all of them. On the other hand, economic hardship is likely to entail distributional effects and form cleavages within the elite, so that there is an increase in the threat of a coup d’état by relatively deprived groups. Democratic regimes imply more open decision-making. Political participation and competition should reduce the exclusiveness for enrichment in political office. The elite are more likely to be divided into different pluralist power
centres that compete for political power within democratically functioning institutions (Morrison and Stevenson, 1971, p. 349). Of course, elites may use the liberties of democracy for personal enrichment and corruption. Nevertheless, democratic regimes are likely to discourage coups though they may encourage political protest as a favoured mode of dissent.

Although democratic political regimes may be less susceptible than authoritarian regimes to elite instability, in general, and irregular executive transfer, in particular, they too have been overthrown during periods of economic hardship. On the basis of Latin American developments in the 1960s and 1970s, the bureaucratic-authoritarian approach postulated a causal link between economic crises and political authoritarianism in countries at middle levels of economic development (O’Donnell, 1973; 1978). The military took political power when it perceived that democratic regimes were incapable of coping with the social consequences brought about by economic decline. This argument lost much credibility in the 1980s when democratic regimes replaced authoritarian regimes in Latin America (Frieden, 1989, p. 123). O’Donnell explained this new development by an increased intrinsic value attached to democracy. This value change was brought about first by discrediting groups that sought a violent and immediate route to socialism and secondly, by experiences with authoritarian regimes who, despite using unprecedented repression and violence, failed to bring about economic progress (O’Donnell, et al., 1986, pp. 15-17). Democracy became a ‘preferable alternative’ to authoritarian rule.

In fact, Latin American democracies were more durable than autocracies during both the debt crises of the 1930s and the 1980s. No democratic government was brought down in the 1980s as a result of continued debt outflow (Drake, 1989, pp. 53-54). In Asia, South Korea, and the Philippines, all moved towards more democratic rule. In some African countries, the trend was slightly different. Ghana (1981), Nigeria (1983) and Sudan (1989) experienced a shift from fairly democratic to authoritarian regimes as a result of coups d’état. Notably in Ghana, a ‘democratic paralysis’ had brought the economy to the brink of collapse before the coup. Overall, however, the recent empirical evidence runs contrary to the bureaucratic-authoritarian argument.

Authoritarian regimes have been able to cling to power during periods of relative prosperity but they are more prone than democracies to collapse during economic crises. All the breakdowns of authoritarian regimes discussed in the collection by O’Donnell, et al. (1986) were accompanied by economic crises (Bermeo, 1990, p. 372). Dictatorships have a narrow base of legitimacy and support, which make them dependent on their ability to provide economic efficiency and social order (Drake, 1989, pp. 53-54). Democracies have other sources of legitimacy as well as a broader support base. Compared to democracies, authoritarian regimes are also more dependent on foreign lenders to stay in power. Turkey and Morocco, which did not experience social unrest in the context of adjustment policies, were both generously supported by the IMF and World Bank, and other lenders. This “made possible a degree of ‘cushioning’ in the economy which would otherwise have been impossible” (Seddon, 1992, p. 49).
OTHER FACTORS

Military centrality, as indicated by the ratio of military expenditure to GNP, contributes to humanitarian emergencies through several alternative dynamics. On the one hand, military resources are used to support predatory and authoritarian rulers, who generate desperate action and military response by the opposition; under political deprivation and in the absence of political mechanisms to settle grievances, full-scale rebellion becomes more likely. Alternatively, a strong military may overthrow either a democratic or an authoritarian regime, which may lead to political instability and humanitarian crises. Powerful armed forces constitute a constant threat to civilian regimes in less-developed countries. Particularly during economic austerity, the regimes are afraid to cut back on military spending. Furthermore, they may strengthen the military to stave off threats from the opposition. This, in turn, entails heavy socio-economic costs for the population, inducing further discontent and increasing the risk of rebellion. In very poor countries, an increasing budget allocation for the military may produce downright starvation and destitution.

Citizens adapt to a certain, acceptable level of violence through the cultural experience of violence. A tradition of intensive political violence makes societies more susceptible to war and humanitarian emergencies. Countries with a history of mass political mobilization for conflict, such as Rwanda, Burundi, and Colombia, are likely to be more susceptible to conflict in humanitarian emergencies than other, historically more peaceful countries. Conflict tradition is an indicator of the legitimacy of political violence.

In empirical studies, the inclusion of conflict tradition in the model helps improve model specification. Auvinen (1997, p. 187) found that previous political protests, rebellions, and irregular transfers were related to present levels.

ETHNICITY

Ethnic identity is not a primordial ‘given.’ Ethnicity, when implicated in humanitarian emergencies, is created, manifested, combined, and reconstituted in struggles to share benefits from modernization and self-government, but is not a source of these struggles (Nafziger, *et al.*, 2 Vols., 2000). This view, similar to that of Widner (1999, p. 406), is: “Ethnic identities are socially constructed, highly malleable, and situationally defined.” For example, the concept of the Yoruba people in Nigeria expanded under British re-organization since the beginning of the twentieth century, when Yoruba referred only to the people of Oyo. Elites use identification with ethnic and regional communities, and even accentuate them, to transfer potential hostility from inequalities and power disparities within their communities to the elites and subjects of other communities. Alexander, *et al.*, (2000, pp. 305-06) argue: “The salience of ethnic antagonism in some recent wars cannot be explained as the inevitable resurgence of ancient tensions—rather, they are the product of a reworking of historical memories in particular political contexts. . . . [E]thnicity is widely
understood to be unnatural, to be historically ‘invented’, ‘constructed’ or ‘imagined’ and used ‘instrumentally’ by politicians.” In many instances, ethnic antagonism emerges during conflict rather than being the cause of conflict.

In the 1980s in South Africa, ethnic consciousness and cleavages were deliberately aroused as part of the government’s ‘divide and rule’ policy implemented through the security apparatus. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi of the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party used cultural symbolism to strengthen his and his party’s political power. During the most violent phase of conflict in 1991-93, ethnic identities became further strengthened and reified, and their relevance as sources of political mobilization increased (Auvinen and Kivimaki, 1998, p. 42; Auvinen and Kivimaki, 2001; Taylor and Shaw, 1994). In a similar way, Milosevic redeemed Serb nationalism by evoking the painful memory of the Kosovo Polje battle of 1389. In Somalia, President Siad Barre succeeded in holding power for 13 years after his failed military campaign in the Ogaden in 1977-78 by manipulating clan identities and thus dividing the opposition into several different movements. This strategy, however, also led to his ousting in 1991. By fuelling clan antagonisms, Barre made the instrumental use of clan affinities much easier for his opponents, who could build on his work (Auvinen and Kivimaki, 2000, pp. 187-230).

According to Collier (2000b, pp. 12-13), “Ethnic grievance is actively manufactured by the rebel organization as a necessary way of motivating its forces. As a result, where conflicts occur in ethnically diverse societies, they will look and sound as though they were caused by ethnic hatreds. . . . Conflict is not caused by divisions, rather it actively needs to create them. When such conflicts are viewed during or after the event, the observer sees ethnic hatred. The parties to the conflict have used the discourse of group hatred in order to build fighting organizations. It is natural for observers to interpret such conflicts as being caused by ethnic hatred. Instead, the conflicts have caused the inter-group hatred and may even, as in Somalia, have created the groups.”

CONCLUSION

This article examines the way in which various factors within the political economy lead to humanitarian emergencies, characterized by war, state violence, and refugee displacement. A major factor responsible for the increase in emergencies in the 1990s was the developing world’s stagnation and protracted decline in incomes, primarily in the 1980s, and its contribution to state decay and collapse. Economic decline and predatory rule that fail to provide state services lead to relative deprivation, or perception by influential social groups of injustice arising from a growing discrepancy between the conditions they expect and those they can get. Relative deprivation spurs social dissatisfaction and political violence. Poor economic performance undermines the legitimacy of a regime, increasing the probability of regime turnover. Political elites use repression to forestall threats to the regime and capture a greater share of the population’s declining surplus. Repression and
economic discrimination trigger further discontent and socio-political mobilization on the part of the affected groups, thereby worsening the humanitarian crisis. Protracted economic stagnation increases the probability of population displacement, hunger and disease.

Slow or negative per capita growth, which is often accompanied by a chronic external disequilibrium, necessitates stabilization and adjustment; those countries whose adjustment policies fail, as a result of which they do not qualify for the IMF’s ‘Good Housekeeping seal,’ are more vulnerable to humanitarian disaster.

Another factor, i.e. high-income inequality, contributes to regional, ethnic, and class discrepancies that have engendered crises. In addition, the competition for mineral resources by warlords and traders in weak states increases vulnerability to war and state violence. Another factor, i.e authoritarianism, is related to emergencies but not in a linear fashion; instead, emergencies first increase with authoritarian repression, then decrease along an inverted-U curve. Another explanation for emergencies is military centrality, found more frequently in decaying states. Military centrality can spur conflicts as well as increase poverty. Furthermore, a tradition for violent conflict, in which violence becomes normatively justifiable in a society, increases the risk of a humanitarian emergency.

Contrary to a commonly held view, ethnicity is not usually a source of conflict and state violence but often emerges during conflict, sometimes as an invention or construction of politicians.

Since low average income, slow economic growth, high income inequality, and a decaying state are important contributors to emergencies, Third World states, with the support of the international community, must help strengthen and restructure the political economy of the poor, inegalitarian, and weak states. The major changes that LDC governments need to make are economic and political institutional changes including the development of a legal system, enhanced financial institutions, increased taxing capacity, greater investment in basic education and other forms of social capital, well-functioning resource and exchange markets, programmes to target weaker segments of the population, and democratic institutions that accommodate and co-opt the country’s various ethnic and regional communities. Institutional and infrastructural development increases the productivity of private investment and public spending, and enhances the effectiveness of governance.

Industrialized countries and international agencies bear substantial responsibility for modifying the international economic order to enhance economic growth and adjustment. Developing regions must demand greater consideration of their economic interests within the present international economic and political institutions. The interests of the Third World can generally be served by its enhanced flexibility and self-determination in designing paths toward adjustment and liberalization; a shift in the goals and openness of the IMF and World Bank; the restructuring of the international economic system for trade and capital flows; the opening of rich countries’ markets; more technological transfer by foreign
companies, bilateral donors, and international agencies; a greater coherence of aid programmes; and increased international funding to reduce food crises, directly help the poor, ameliorate external shocks, and write down debt burdens.

A number of countries vulnerable to humanitarian emergencies are not amenable to political economy solutions. The policies of governing elites are indeed at the root of most emergencies, and usually some powerful factions in society benefit from them. Yet a large number of countries that are vulnerable to emergencies have the will to change. Thus, there is a substantial scope for international, national, and non-governmental economic and political actors to co-ordinate their long-term policies to reduce the developing world’s vulnerability to humanitarian emergencies.13

NOTES

1. This article is based on the joint work of Nafziger and Juha Auvinen, begun when Nafziger was Resident Director of a project on the causes of humanitarian emergencies at the UNU/World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, in collaboration with Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford. Forty-five scholars contributed to the project, which included conceptual papers and case studies in a two-volume work published by Oxford University Press. Although the article focuses on the causes of war and state killing, it has implications for policies to prevent emergencies, published in a subsequent volume.

2. A weakening or decaying state is one that is experiencing a decline in the basic functions of the state, such as possessing authority and legitimacy, making laws, preserving order, and providing basic social services. A complete breakdown in these functions indicates a failing or collapsing state (Holsti, 2000, pp. 246-50; Zartman, 1995, pp. 1-7).

3. Regression models include ordinary least squares (OLS), generalized least squares (GLS), two-stage least squares, fixed and random effects, tobit, and probit models (see Appendix Tables 1-4).

4. This study is more applicable to preventing terrorism by the state or by warlords, the most frequent contributor to deaths from humanitarian emergencies, than terrorism by those trying to undermine the state. Falk (2002, p. 11) indicates that the word ‘terrorism’ initially “describe[d] political violence derive[d] from the government excesses that spun out of control during the French Revolution.” He deplores “the regressive narrowing of the concept of terrorism to apply only to violence by non-state movements and organizations, thereby exempting state violence against civilians from the prohibition on terrorism, . . . . Such a usage is ethically unacceptable, politically manipulative and decidedly unhistorical.” See Kisangani and Nafziger (2007, pp. 405-14).

5. Auvinen and the author found, like Collier and Hoeffler (2000b), that the incidence of armed conflicts in Africa exceeded the incidence in other developing regions in the 1990s. If Africa’s economic performance had been as high as that of non-African LDCs, the incidence of conflict in Africa would have been similar to that of other developing regions (ibid.). The finding of Collier and Hoeffler is similar to that of Auvinen and Nafziger. Stewart, Huang, and Wang (2000) indicate that Africa had, by far the greatest number of deaths (direct and indirect) from conflict, during 1960-95, as a proportion of the 1995 population, i.e. 1.5 per cent, as compared to 0.5 per cent in the Middle East, 0.3 per cent in Asia and 0.1 per cent in Latin America.

6. Auvinen and Nafziger (1999, p. 278) found that there was an inverse relationship between IMF credits as a percentage of GNP and emergencies. Some of the explanations may stem from the IMF’s decision to refrain from funding ‘basket cases’ devastated by war and displacement. In that case, the negative coefficient would be picking up a reverse causal relationship. Indeed, the two-stage least squares results of Auvinen and Nafziger, using the IMF credits/GNP
variable, confirmed this reverse causality. Moreover, when the IMF variable was used as a predictor for the lagged values of dependent variables, its coefficients were larger than for the OLS regression, indicating that perhaps emergencies keep away the IMF rather than vice versa (ibid., pp. 280-81). Thus, a potential emergency reduces the likelihood of the affected country receiving IMF and other international support for adjustment programmes. A major contributor to non-adjustment is the distortion from an over-valued domestic currency. Nafziger (1988, pp. 150-60) argues that African governments resist adjustments to market prices and exchange rates that interfere with the ability of state leaders to build political support, especially in cities.

7. Berdal and Malone (2000) ask whether greed or grievance drive contemporary civil wars. Our answer, both greed (Section 4) and grievance (from deprivation and inequality), is consistent with most of their contributors but not with those of the World Bank’s Collier. His views are that “the only result that supports the grievance approach to conflict is that a prior period of rapid economic decline increases the risk of conflict,” (Collier, 2000a, p. 97). But, Collier, who apparently did not use Deininger or Squire’s data set, finds that inequality “has no effect on the risk of conflict according to the data... The grievance theory of conflict thus finds surprisingly little empirical support” (ibid, pp. 97-98). Can we really argue that the Ogoni, Ijaw, Chechnyans, Palestinians, Kurds, Darfurians, Nuba, Basque, and Zapatistas, to name just a few, are motivated only by greed rather than grievance?

8. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (1994) indicates that 3,750 people were killed in internal repression and resistance in South Africa in 1993. Moreover, Wallensteen and Sollenberg, (1996; 1997; 1998) classify South Africa, from 1991 to 1993, as a war-ravaged region.

9. The sample consisted of 83 developing and developed countries in 1958-60; African countries are not included in the analyses.

10. For more details on how authoritarianism and democracy have affected emergencies, especially in the 1990s, see Nafziger and Auvinen, 2003, pp. 114-31.

11. Auvinen and Nafziger (1999, pp. 278-79, 286) find a direct association between the number of deaths from domestic violence in the 1960s and 1970s, and humanitarian emergencies in the 1980s and 1990s.

12. This view marks a departure from Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p. 567), in which one variable explaining civil war and its duration was the extent of ethno-linguistic fractionalization.

13. Nafziger and Väyrynen (2002) provide details on policies to prevent humanitarian emergencies.

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Appendix Table 1
Humanitarian Emergencies: OLS Regression Models

| Variables          | (1)          | (2)          | (3)          |
|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
|                    | LDEATREF     | LHUMEMER     | LCOHE        |
| Constant           | 7.31 ***     | 4.27 *       | 15.07 ***    |
|                    | (2.67)       | (1.85)       | (2.51)       |
| LGDPGRO[-1]        | -1.83 ***    | -1.16 ***    | -2.54 ***    |
|                    | (0.50)       | (0.38)       | (0.52)       |
| LGINI[-1]          | 0.29 *       | 0.18 *       | 0.36 ***     |
|                    | (0.12)       | (0.08)       | (0.11)       |
| LGNPCAP[-1]        | -0.15 ***    | -0.07 ***    | -0.19 ***    |
|                    | (0.03)       | (0.02)       | (0.03)       |
| LIMF/GNP[-1]       | -0.30 ***    | -0.05 ***    | -0.06 *      |
|                    | (0.03)       | (0.02)       | (0.03)       |
| LCPIDIFF[-1]       | 0.26 ***     | 0.23 ***     | 0.27 ***     |
|                    | (0.06)       | (0.04)       | (0.05)       |
| LMILCENT[−1]       | 0.18 ***     | 0.16 ***     | 0.15 ***     |
|                    | (0.03)       | (0.02)       | (0.03)       |
| LDEATRAD           | 0.04 ***     | A            | 0.02 *       |
|                    | (0.01)       |              | (0.01)       |
| R square           | 0.18         | 0.16         | 0.19         |
| N                  | 663          | 663          | 663          |
| D W                | 0.34         | 0.51         | 0.38         |

Note: The figures are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses), respectively. LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LGINI = ln gini index; LGNPCAP = ln GNP per capita; LIMF/GNP = ln use of IMF credit/GNP; LCPIDIFF = ln consumer price index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln military expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = ln deaths from domestic violence 1963–77; except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory variables are lagged one year [−1]. Coefficient significant *** = at the 1 per cent level (2-tailed test), ** = 5 per cent level and * = 10 per cent level; a = not significant; DW = Durbin-Watson test statistic for serial correlation.
### Appendix Table 2

Humanitarian Emergencies: GLS (Prais-Winsten) Regression Models

| Variables      | LDEATHREF | LHUMEMER | LCOHE |
|----------------|-----------|----------|-------|
| Constant       | -2.69 *** | 1.18a    | 2.82 *** |
| (0.81)         | (0.73)    | (0.58)   |       |
| LGDPGRO[-1]    | B         | -0.29 ** | A     |
| (0.14)         |           |          |       |
| LFOODGRO [-1]  | -0.19 *   | A        | B     |
| (0.12)         |           |          |       |
| LGINI[-1]      | 0.97 ***  | 0.34 *   | 0.56 *** |
| (0.16)         | (0.09)    | (0.10)   |       |
| LGNPCAP [-1]   | -0.34 *** | -0.07 ***| -0.21 *** |
| (0.04)         | (0.02)    | (0.03)   |       |
| LIMFGNP [-1]   | A         | A        | A     |
| LCPIDIFF[-1]   | 0.16 ***  | A        | 0.19 *** |
| (0.04)         | (0.02)    | (0.03)   |       |
| LMILCENT[-1]   | 0.19 ***  | 0.10 *** | 0.19 *** |
| (0.04)         | (0.02)    | (0.03)   |       |
| LDEATRAD       | 0.05 ***  | 0.02 *** | 0.03 *** |
| (0.01)         | (0.007)   | (0.01)   |       |
| Rho            | 0.86 ***  | 0.88 *** | 0.83 *** |
| (0.02)         | (0.02)    | (0.02)   |       |
| N              | 600       | 753      | 732   |
| DW             | 1.93      | 1.64     | 1.98  |

Note: The figures are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses), respectively. LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LFOODGRO = ln growth of food production per capita; LGINI = ln gini index; LGNPCAP = ln GNP per capita; LIMFGNP = ln use of IMF credit/GNP; LCPIDIFF = ln consumer price index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln military expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = ln deaths from domestic violence 1963-77; except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory variables are lagged one year [-1]. Rho = coefficient of auto-correlation. Coefficient significant *** = at the 1 per cent level (2-tailed test), ** = 5 per cent level and * = 10 per cent level; a = not significant; and b = not included in the equation. DW = Durbin-Watson test statistic for serial correlation.
### Appendix Table 3

**Humanitarian Emergencies: Fixed (LSDV) and Random Effects (GLS) Models**

| Explanatory Variables | LDEATREF | LHUMEPE | LCOHE |
|-----------------------|----------|---------|-------|
|                       | Fixed    | Random  | Fixed | Random | Fixed | Rando |
| Constant              | 3.52 *** | 3.68 *  | 0.69 * | 0.11 * | 11.10 *** | 8.61 *** |
|                       | (0.85)   | (1.46)  | (0.32) | (0.27) | (1.56) | (1.19) |
| LGDPGRO[-1]           | A        | -0.45 * | A     | A      | -0.72 *** | -0.53 * |
|                       | (0.27)   |         |       |       | (0.26) | (0.25) |
| LGINI[-1]             | -0.90 ***| -0.44 * | A     | A      | -0.50 * | A      |
|                       | (0.23)   | (0.19)  |       |       |       |       |
| LGNPCAP[-1]           | A        | A       | -0.11 * | -0.07 * | -0.19 *** | -0.22 *** |
|                       | (0.05)   | (0.03)  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| LCPIDIFF[-1]          | A        | A       | A     | 0.07 * | A      | A      |
|                       | (0.03)   | (0.03)  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| LMILCENT[-1]          | 0.23 *** | 0.20 *** | 0.17 *** | 0.27 *** | 0.24 *** | 0.23 *** |
|                       | (0.03)   | (0.03)  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| LDEATRAD              | A        | 0.05 *  | A     | A      | A      | A      |
|                       | (0.02)   |         |       |       |       |       |

| No of units           | 69       | 62      | 91     | 77     | 61     | 83     |
| R square              | 0.08     | 0.07    | 0.04   | 0.10   | 0.10   | 0.18   |
| N                     | 885      | 775     | 1102   | 933    | 752    | 996    |

Note: The figures are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses), respectively. LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LGINI = ln gini index; LGNPCAP = ln GNP per capita; LCPIDIFF = ln consumer price index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln military expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = ln deaths from domestic violence 1963-77; except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory variables are lagged one year [-1]. Coefficient significant: *** = at the 1 per cent level (2-tailed test), ** = 5 per cent level and * = 10 per cent level; a = not significant; R square is for ‘within effects’ in the fixed effects model and for overall effects in the random effects model; no of units = number of cross-sectional units taken into account by the analysis.
Appendix Table 4
Probabilities of Humanitarian Emergencies: Probit Models

| Explanatory Variables | LDEATHREF  | LHUMEMER |
|-----------------------|------------|----------|
|                       | (1)        | (2)      |
| LGDPGRO[-1]           | -0.82 ***  | -0.41 ** |
|                       | (0.45)     | (0.20)   |
| LGINI[-1]             | 0.25 ***   | 0.12 **  |
|                       | (0.10)     | (0.05)   |
| LGNPCAP[-1]           | -0.13 ***  | -0.03 ** |
|                       | (0.03)     | (0.01)   |
| LIMFGNP[-1]           | -0.07 ***  | -0.014   |
|                       | (0.03)     | (0.011)  |
| LCPIDIFF[-1]          | 0.05       | -0.01    |
|                       | (0.04)     | (0.02)   |
| LMILCENT[-1]          | 0.05 *     | 0.02 *   |
|                       | (0.028)    | (0.01)   |
| LDEATRAD ***          | 0.04 ***   | 0.01     |
|                       | (0.01)     | (0.003)  |
| obs. P                | 0.33       | 0.08     |
| pred. P               | 0.30       | 0.05     |
| Log Likelihood        | -309.79    | -136.60  |
| N                     | 562        | 562      |

Note: The figures are changes in probabilities and standard errors (in parentheses), respectively. LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LGINI = ln gini index; LGNPCAP = ln GNP per capita; LIMFGNP = ln use of IMF credit/GNP; LCPIDIFF= ln consumer price index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln military expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = ln deaths from domestic violence 1963-77; except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory variables are lagged one year [-1]. The underlying coefficient is significant *** = at the 1 per cent level (2-tailed test), ** = 5 per cent level and * = 10 per cent level; obs. P = observed probability, pred. P = predicted probability at the mean of the dependent variable. The statistical significance of the model is tested against the value of Chi square with seven degrees of freedom.