Zia’s Politics and Diplomacy 1977-1988: External Trends / Internal Moves

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Zia’s diplomacy may be studied as vixen to vixen shrewdness. Pakistan’s covert move to start counter-insurgency on its own against Soviets in Afghanistan was really the dictate of superpower to the strategic institution to formulate a strategy for long-term capitalist designing and unipolar preponderance. In Pakistan strategists and policy makers’ philosophical code of belief the ontological perception strengthens the 1971 episode of Pakistan’s disintegration was majorly the result of Soviet-patronized India’s strategy. To avenge on Soviets for Pakistan’s past demise of national interest and the US revenge for Americans’ casualties in Vietnam war of 1960s the opportunity was constructively availed as Wendt endeavors the anarchy is constructivist social designing. The rent proxies were the phenomenon to induct ergo-oriented strategies for US-Pak harmony of interest to be achieved. The manufacturing of surrogates remained the strategically offensive/defensive business on politico-religious grounds. Zia’s diplomacy smashed the communist idol with the power of ideologically radicalized militia equipped with scientific product of modern weaponry.

Introduction

Pre/post elemental-enrichment process up-to weapon-grade silently dedicated Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission’s (PAEC) Project 706/ERL/KRL with non-questionable authenticity and authorization. With such potent domestic measures the external enactment in the shape of Symington 1977 and Glenn 1978 the US sanctions’ Amendments generally pressurized to constrain the non-signer NPT member states to undo or roll-back the progress. The coercive diplomatic strategy was operationalized seemingly generally on South Asia and peculiarly the practicality of enforcement accelerated on Pakistan. (Rodney: 1987). Whereas, India’s apparent offensive purposes, related components and the technology was identified peaceful and remained unquestionable/scot-free from the US and Canada despite actor’s nuke-test (Parmano Prickshan) the Pokhran-I.
US tended to move with negative assumption against Pakistan's intended transitional move for unconventional Arms’ sophistication and retrospectively did not coerce India even on actor’s explicit claims, and conversely/sanctimoniously acknowledged peaceful the purposes. US enticed Pakistan to be delivered with 120 Fighter Air-crafts if Pakistan would go to cancel the France Uranium Processing Plant Construction Deal (FPND). Bhutto’s mindfully preferred move was obsessed with US persuasive carrots. Bhutto was induced with 110 A-7 Aircrafts as well as pledges (future rewards) of massive military-political support the Premier denied blatantly. The Pakistan’s contemporary domestic political situation in 1977 was constructively strewn under allegations of rigged general elections. A military coup d etat in Pakistan generated an availability for US to protect and maximize her strategic interest and changed the situation in zero-sum game/favorite to the superpower. The external situation in Afghanistan created a space and strategic necessity for US to consolidate politico-military-intelligence relationship to strategize comprehensively the covert design for grand realistic outcome.

Diplomacy Consistency: Shielding the Clandestine Nuclear Process

Post India’s first nuclear test on 18 May 1974 Z.A. Bhutto declared; ‘Pakistan will get the same strategic power to balance the threat and threat level even if the Pakistanis will have to chew the grass.’ (Talbot, 2012). In 1977, Bhutto tended to the autonomy of Pakistan’s security with nuclear power and denoted in “If I Am Assassinated”, (p.138); ‘Hindus, Christians, Jewish and even the Communist civilizations have the capability of nukes and Islamic world has yet not such potentiality. So, what distinction does my life about to make now when I came to realize that eighty million Pakistanis are standing defenseless under the nuclear cloud hovering threats (Nizamani, 1998). Consistence on the same paved tracks and facing dynamic diplomatic external pressures on nuclear and intuitively never abandoning but staunchly stick to the strategic national interest Zia constructed counter-orchestras not to sign the NPT protocol. Zia emphasized on relative contingency with adversary for signing the IAEA-endorsed obligation. The NPT instrument Pakistan diplomatically tagged with India’s nuclear design condition to be signed first. To neutralize deftly the counter-moves it remained skeptical. (Abraham I.: 2009). Deliberately the duo professional diplomats Munir A. Khan and Agha Shahi respectively responded with suggestive counter move of single repudiation of using atomic weapon.

Pak. leader’s philosophical code of belief stuffed in the analogous persisted consistently to the 7th June 1981 Israel’s Babylon/Opera brand operation against Iraq’s under-development (NRO) Nuclear Reactor Osirak. Skeptically, it might be an offensive toe-line from the neighbor adversary. The percept’s susceptibility of tangible evidence Gen. Shamim A. Khan the Pakistan’s Chief of Staff and aide-de-camp to President Gen. Zia discussed, and showed incapacity/incapability to be resisted at fixed hours and space if the situation emerged critical. Zia sought strategic consultancy from Munir A. Khan who singled out the alternative the Track II diplomacy the informal/non-governmental/Back-Channeled connectivity via the (NSA) Non-State-Actors. (Usman, 2004). The matured track-II successfully conveyed the assurance of credible retaliatory move of (MAD) the second strike/surprise attack/ provocative option of nuclear warfare and possibly evidenced to enterprise. It was a diplomatic deterrence the threat of de-
securitization/securitization. Diplomacy may emerge successive to dissuade the adversary not to be willed plan against status-quo/desired peace ends.

To divert the adversary's direction from challenging moves the leader's historical belief steered them in the rational direction to make additional increments in strategic strength. Pakistan rushed to the purchases of Fanton A-5 Jets and Falcon F-16, and initiated sentinel exercises to thwart the perceptible nefarious agenda of Indo-Israel deliberated aggressive machination. (Anwar S.: 2010). This operational diplomacy bolstered and forced the Indian Premier Indira to hurry to negotiate on nuclear issue which took the diplomatic response by dispatching delegates the plena in re potest as to Pakistan. The outcome was of reciprocation between the hostile actors and pledges were exchanged not to attack/assist to attack on each other's nuclear facilities.

The blurring Words and smeared lines in diplomacy make murky the leaders/actors' external macroscopic mirrors about adversary's expected behavior to be rationally/irrationally directed. Pakistan formulated the policy of pre-determined denials. Indulging eyes into eyes faced the piercing queries of world public/international media and credibly assured, Pakistan was neither going on such tracks the evolutionary/processing/complementary to touch the weapon-grade nuclear nor any programmatic pathways to form either in future. It would never be in the individuals as actors' intentional cognitive pipeline to be planned. The principles of Israel's functional precedent of camouflaged centrifuges the elemental enriching technicalities and nukes' achieving ends Pakistan followed to be concreted practically on flexible financial consumption and scientific expertise. In 1980s Walter V. the US diplomat denoted to dispatch the USDS; "Either Zia did not have the knowledge about Nuclear project........Or he was superb hyper and liar the patriotic." (www.dawn.com/). There was even/uneven situation the incredible single exempli clue the state was striving for non-traditional weapon. The sustenance of lying and cheating the moving on realist paved zigzags the ergo the Machiavellian prescribed diplomacy was conducted to ensure the protection of vital strategic interest despite the world powers' diplomatic concerns the neo-realist powerful system constraints.

In American strategic telescope the manifestation pertaining to Nuclear Pakistan (NP) would be a source of horrific annihilation and instability particular to the security of SA region and for US a continuous anxiety. Arthur W. Hummel, the US Ambassador to Pakistan (1977-1981) submitted reports pertaining to the meetings with Zia, and the US President Jimmy Carter's and the USDS reports comprised on declassified documents relevant to the SA's nuclear issue unveiled the critically constructed truth. The apparent conflictive issue was the text, specific to the centrifuges instillation. Evidencing substance was the satellite photographs/reflexes/prints. (NSA/Nuclear Vault: 2010). Hard talks with Zia led by Warren Kristopher, US Deputy Secretary of State on March 1979 and a series of exterior queries' pressure in the shape of diplomatic investigative discovery move, the great power crucial influential move remained in runs-up of frequent communication. The substantial skeptics made the period critical. Realizing the unfettered right of nuclear-political power the military regime concreted and made waterproof the system with manacled leaks. The identical marks were in detective spectacles. The US chasing/pursuit of nuclear process information intelligently continually moved on in turning the screw in overt/covert designs. CIA reports were unbelievable caused by non-
cooperative leukocoria on strategic intelligence retina and the credible visual images were blurred to be formed. Obviously limited to plants for gas/energy centrifuges Islamabad moves were in initial quick march. To turn up and let off the same, the US pressure on Pakistan convincingly remained unsuccessful. China was assigned to induce Pakistan. The lobbying of US friends as well as foes drilled deeply the dimensional modalities and exceeded pressure on Pakistan for NPT to be obligated in signature and practicality.(Deyoung K. : 2010). Ceasing the related sales US erected barricade on the transit routes of sensitive trade towards Pakistan and conceivably singled out an adversary. The US administration (1977-1988) (Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan) perceived that such actions’ outcome could never divert the military regime’s covert moves to abandon the currents or undo the previous moves. India was tasked to cajole/coax Pakistan to get what the superpower could not get otherwise. (Hummel:1982) US diplomatic contours remained unsuccessful to the desired outcome with absolute gains in Pak-balances and US diplomatic failure happened realistically a zero-sum the total loss. The military regime’s tactical diplomacy skilfully handled the functionalities and emphatically assured about nil implicit moves for acquisition of absolute power of strategic or such was ever being processed under camouflaged centrifuges’ runs-up.

Diplomatic perplexities the search for optimality in all out alternatives ousted the tools. May be the US diplomatic Kit was out of useful gripping keys or “turning the screw” was loose in tightening mechanism caused by the constraints of system structure on US diplomatic muscles. Seemingly the US sought desirable strategic assignment to Pakistan. Knowingly the US diplomacy scratched out the searching method ‘tackling how’. Consistence to initiation, Agha Shahi’s discourses on US demands’ requisition that any country will never submit her unbridled right as what one desires (Richelson, 2007). May be the US proposals of mellow pressures reticent Pakistan in such developments the mildly raucous or rowdy. See in context of sanctions’ amendments and the level of their weight of execution and the exertion criteria horizontally and vertically on Pakistan’s level of reticence the iron-shielding and out of searching eyes’ accessibility, Pakistan’s leaders’ conviction and commitment level seemed patriotically immeasurable to preserve the individuals as actors’ activity of nuclear process for nuclear soul growth.

April 26, 1978, French termination RP agreement as US skeptics pertained to RP size and capacity on its reactor’ operational productivity/magnitude of maximizing plutonium enrichment grade practicable for weapon construction at KANNUP outlets as the diversion moves were possible (Kux, 2001). Giscard d’ Estaing regime in France outweighed, the production might be advantageous for proliferation ends, so configuring was the moves for Plutonium-Uranium soluble: a capability thwarting move. A rejection memo, Zia moved on suggestion. France perceived Pakistan desired non-traditional weapon and cancelled the deal ex-parte.

The CIA spectacled “odds favoring any sort of explosive program on Pakistan’s part would be sharply diminished.” A “quick and dirty” installation could exhaust half decade as Pakistan’s scientific prowess is rudimentary. (Kux: 2001). China would be the option. Pakistan might move to utilize PRC-Pak friendly relationship. Analysts in surmising space deduce the Pakistan priority-fixation as Pakistan’s cost-risk calculation was not within the expenditure or economic leverage boundaries. The preference the ends of potential capability Pakistan staunchly stick to. The US was evolving yet in TIP (Theory of Inferences of Preferences) as Z.A. Bhutto regime’s modality inconsistency to
Zia’s military regimes’ priority was dimly lened in relativity. The situation was adverse in highlighting factors: scientific in-expertise, financial incapacity, infallibility in Indian threats, political instability/uncertainty. Pakistan may do not touch the non-conventional power absolutism before ten to fifteen years even the crude device is a far cry probability. (Albright, 2009) Blue-eyed to Americans caused on Superpower strategic necessity: to faint the Soviet bear and to throw it out from the buffer zone. Zia’s words denying the covert struggle for nuclear power Americans swallowed akin to sweet pills: Vixen to vixen the realist shrewdness comfortably continued until the work over. The honeymoon of tactical strategic wedlock synthesized it an adroit diplomatic chess game not permanent partnership.

**Soviet Invasion and the Machiavellian Diplomacy**

Presidency, Zia assumed in military uniform in 1978. In 1979 the external challenge the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan engendered Zia to avail the opportunity to extend the power through the framework of political Islamization and preparation of surrogates against US entitled Godless aggressor (Muzaffar, et. al, 2017)). Conceivably the clientage assignment was US constructivist product to may avenge for Americans’ bloodshed in Vietnam warfare. The challenge was accepted with strong nerves, unflinching courage and un-shattering confidence. In diplomacy the Red Army aggression was condemned and called for immediate withdrawal. The first adaptive diplomatic move the OIC’s urgent meeting was emphasized to be convened. The outcome was a unanimous resolution assigned by thirty six Muslim entities. The joint communiqué/concordat substantiated with strong condemnation of Soviet invasion. The unsuccessful diplomatic stress was built up on Soviets to be submitted to the demand and to withdraw. On January 10, 1980, the 6th Emergency Special Session of UNO was held on auspices of Non-Aligned states. Zia led Non-Aligned nations to denounce the adversary with multilateral pressure on intervention, all-out cessation, constraint, subversion and any form of forceful coercion (Zia, 1982). Toning the liberal democracy for people’s right it was worded for Afghanistan’s masses to be politically freed to move to elect and constitute their government. To restore the status of non-aligned Islamic Afghanistan the solution was understandably political not military.

Pakistan diplomatic moves may be analyzed as positive/negative response in the external context of Sino-US rapprochement, US-Saudi interest, Saudi-Iran sectarianism, and strategic-territorial changing phenomenal antagonism. The contemporary determinants were Pakistan’s ideological Islamophilia, US clientage to prolong military regime, political, economic and strategic needs and vital national interest (Abbas, 2005). Geo-strategically from the perspectives agency’s philosophical belief constructed /inferred behaviorally from the Western Media. Western rulers and strategists’ utterances in profound opportunistic lust happened to lead Pakistan and wheedled Muslim World to become the part and parcel of Cold War (CW).

Pakistan strategists and decision makers’ operational code belief consolidated with repercussions of emergent Soviet invasive sequence of moves in ontological evidences of aggrandizement. The expected transformation of suzerain Afghan land into a springboard to bastardly interfere into Pakistan’s geography may appear as catalyst of threatening environment for Middle East. This expansion may be developed for its
ideological purposes on the pretext of Afghanistan’s territorial security. The prediction based on scuttlebutts ominously seemed in the statement of an Indian writer; “As days go by, Russia may consider the Khyber Pass, not the Oxus, the Southern border. Zia domestic political move of Islamic fundamentalism nourishment fostered outside the insurgency modalities. In Soviet suspicion, actor has done this in the case of Afghanistan from the other side of the Oxus” (Khan J: 2001). So, Pakistan juggled its diplomacy with pure rational tactics and idealistic tones/tunes with maximizing and mobilizing of its military and economic interests from West, China and the Muslim countries.

The Western World, Muslim countries and the Non-Aligned except India and even the Soviet influenced states recognized the Soviet invasion the brazen aggression. Pakistan diplomacy covered with Kautilya’s endeavored format implicated to devise and appraise the unit level of foreign dialects the world over. Jimmy Carter the US President imposed embargo on commodities’ shipments for Soviets and issued boycott warnings against Moscow to Summer Olympics which awakened the CW fainted carcass. The arena of world politics was transformed to be decorated with burning flames of opposing policy of dialectical words. Reagan went all out to fight the second CW by supporting counter-insurgencies in the Third World (Diggins, 2008). Michael Cox, Professor of History at London School of Economics, says; ‘Intensity of this second CW was as great as its duration was short.’ Reagan prior to the Presidential election commented; “US foreign policy against Soviet war was more simplistic: We win, they lose.” Margaret Thatcher, the UK Prime Minister condemned and slammed the Soviet aggression as well as communist ideology. Ronald Reagan Doctrine posited Soviet Union an “evil empire” (Abbas, 2005). ISI married conveniently with USCIA and co-strategic moves knitted covertly. Pakistan diplomatic grid willed to supply cable electrons implicitly under misperceived shadow of rational choice rich in irrational emotions with deeply studying-free the long term aftermaths/outcomes tantamount to strange dancer at wedding procession. Pakistan’s unrealistic diplomacy entitled US passed buck, a liability the holy war.

Pakistan’s perception/misperception perspective was her leader’s cognitive bias against Troika’s (Afghanistan, India, USSR) historically dreadful Irredentist claim of Pukhtunistan. India-Soviet tight rope of friendship was Gen. Zia’s rational context to detect the claim in Soviet’s intensions malice of aggrandizing convenience. The prescription formula poured on Zia from Indra Gandhi as her expressive policy moves she told Kuldip Nayar in an Interview (KuldipNayar, 1982) “Not to shout at the Soviets, try and persuade them to withdraw.” Zia denounced Gandhi’s stance as Soviet’s justification not the condemnation. Consistently conjoin the core of this genre with Afghanistan’s wishful desire to such opportunity to seek outside insurgency against Pakistan’s strategic interest. The imbalance of power phenomena India could avail as relative power increments on Pakistan’s cost.

Zia convened artillery’ high-ups meeting: Corps Commander and technocracy and Media-free fold. He ordered CJCS, Admiral Sharif and COAS Gen. Khalid Mehmud Arif to formulate a team exclusively on civil-military format for geo-strategic constructs hurried to counter-moves. A covert operational strategic consult was posited by DGISI, Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rahman to empower Islamists/fundamentalists with weaponry as well as training skills for extremes to be benefited. Radical thrill entrepreneurs across the religious seminars’ network had to be modeled with flexible moves for likelihood of the new institutions’ nourishment designs. The “Kabul must burn” (Milestone, 1977-1988)
was the chanting voice an objectivity' derivative via inculcation of thronging thrills into tender-minds to make them ready to be radically sacrificed.

Pakistan Military Leaders ontological belief rationally perceived Soviets an unconditional supporter to her staunch/adverse neighbor India. Consistently the role was lensed in Soviets’ past performance. A front-line status, Pakistan tended to be bestowed with, emerged as leading actor of CW right-wing protagonists. The invasion, the adversaries made as “what states make of it” (Wendt: 1999) a hot opportunity the US-Pakistan sought for common strategic interest promotion the event was ahead to be contested. Pakistan decision for covert strategic moves and overt diplomatic moves to camouflage the US-Pakistan’s joint operational code activation consistent to Pakistan’s military regime’s past pledges, evidential empirics, and synthesized in Gen. Ayub’s 12th July 1961 address to American Congress. “Let me tell you, that if there is a real trouble, there will be no other country in Asia on whom you will be able to count. The only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan” (Bhutto, 1977). On 3rd October 1980, Zia’s diplomatically called on at White House Washington. Carter the President and Zbigniew Brezezinski the USNS Advisor showed the carrot valued $US400 million. Zia rebutted as ‘Peanuts’ as the situation was extraordinary. With smiling faces the honey moon’ prompt dower why rejected, may be certainly for long-term deferred dower (Nasir, 2012). For more commitments/stronger guarantees (specific against attacks from India) in security chapter as well as in economic courtyard, the attributes of smiles and body languages, the showbiz of heuristics, surely the United States’ nuclear inquiry’ flame against Pakistan had been turned down to be extinguished in crisis decision making.

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm
Pic/Content/Image Analysis.

In diplomatic reflex Zia’s left hand is showing (acceptance: yeah) and face’s smiles with ‘but’, Brezinski the NSA’s right hand upper gesture indicates ‘what happens’. Jimmy Carter the US President is standing with exhibits of smiling teeth apparent friendly. The naked eyes could not visualize and portray philosophic detection the real diplomacy in classics and diplomatic frankness in artificial gestures.

Pakistan campaigned to make harmonious both the silent and loquacious sympathizers’ alliances and markedly the America’s and her allies’ intelligence/strategic/economic/political and moral support. Zia’s diplomacy called on International Community, PRC, regional actors, non-aligned to weight the moral/diplomatic in the rightest portion of scale. (Khan D.J.:2001). All they condemned the invaded Red Army. Foreign policies’ appraisal in the western bloc’s diplomatic enclaves was the phenomenal exposures’ therapy.

Pakistan’s Non-aligned policy was peculiarly non-detrimental to the western’s strategic/political desires. Diplomatic understanding under unambiguous instruments of broad memorandums was activated under tight waters enclosures. It was diplomatic bargaining or closing eyes tactics for long-term interests to be mobilized and preserved or the strategic/political interests’ juxtaposition. The US coercive weight might balance Pakistan’s atomic constructs/runs-up, empowering modality of Kashmir insurgency, fueling Khalistan Movement the agreed or abandonment policy. (Wirsing R. :1991) The United States security policy serial # 1959 the convictions’ consolidation stirred up appropriate diplomatic practice with sequence of moves against Soviet aggression formation and projection.

If goes forward against Pakistan US President Carter announced providence of massive Arms catches, nutrition supply and economic aid to concrete Pakistan’s national security, and to protect her geo-political independence against unexpected threats from its North-West. Zia sought to confirm pledges against India’s confrontational designs and diplomatic safety to snub the domestic political rivals. (Salik S. (Brigadier), 1983) On 15 September 1981 he bargained with Ronald Reagan the US President Jimmy Carter’s successor and inked US$B 3.2 in volume as fifty percent for each military and economic, concluded for 6 years from October Ist 1982 as total approximate: US$B 4.02.

Apparent US Behavior at the Embryonic Stage of Invasion

At the embryonic situation of Soviet intrusion in Afghanistan, Carter Administration using diplomatic tactics showing irrelevancy announced; ‘no great American interests are at stake in Afghanistan.’ Brzezinsky toned words using the similar diplomatic emulsion; ‘over the long haul relations the two super powers would continue to be characterized by a mistake to become so mesmerized by particular instances as Afghanistan. The whole concept of détente declared prematurely dead. Henry Kissinger the US ASOS worded the endorsement of policy statement in more eloquent fashion; ‘Really, the main issue is not Afghanistan. The issue is what the countries who rely on us, can expect us, what we can expect from them.’ (Martin: 1980). Zia perceived this impliedly for USSR and Pakistan as apparent meaning ‘no concerns” and to send message that America had “no problem”. (Martin: 1980) Perspectives may be the sphere of influence as
already settled, and Afghanistan during WWII had been negotiated in Soviet’s sphere of influence. It was in the preliminary state of coercion on such crucial situation the Pakistan had to face, will to conjoin the radical surrogate forces. It was detected Carter, not friendly to Pakistan.

**The Mild Behavior of Eastern Europe and Some Western’s**

The countries bound to WARSA pact except Romania in Eastern Europe which had been remaining in Eastern Bloc did not condemn the Soviet aggression. At the extermination of war and at the cusp of Soviets’ forces withdrawal, India diplomatically appeared ostentatious for humanitarian services. The behavior of France and Germany on Soviet’ invasion was of recognized and legitimate to the maximum extent. Consistently the ECC plan failed to accumulate guarantees from all major powers for Afghanistan’s geopolitical and geo-strategic status as neutral. Consequently, the plan threw in abeyance the questions of independence and aggression and appropriated tacitly the Soviet legal right on this buffer state. (Kissinger: 1980). These western nations’ rational behavioral approaches may be studied for short term objectives and to jeopardize the long term. West Germany for Berlin and East Germany was close to Soviet Union. Britain also condemned the Soviet moves and took diplomatic move to generate unanimity of harmonious moves among the Western Europe and the United States and headed sequential symphony to bridge the gap. The Sino-Soviets were sustaining at loggerheads’ imbroglio on interpretive socialist-communist’ ideologue paradigm. Was Sino-US rapprochement empirically proved an opportunity for US successful reciprocal diplomatic advantageous calculation of fixed priority that emerged sharp distance between Sino-Soviet geo-political, geo-societal, politico-economic and socio-ideological indifferences in illustrious analytics (Mao-Ze-Dong >> Josef Stalin). (Takaki Oka: 1980) The Red Armies’ level of sophistication was markedly higher than PRC’s, “Long term strategic and short term ad-hoc”, Zhao Ziyang the Chinese Premier contented the analysis of US-Soviet policy’ comparison.

Proxy mechanism as course of action, a handlung vollmacht (authority to act proxy) the US strategy as Pakistan was the proxy of US and the Islamist warriors the proxy of Zia’s diplomacy’ lets out. Strategic significance utilization, a pattern of modality, the diplomatic strategy whether ignominious or ambitious as both sides static interests were juxtaposed or collocated: the systematic proxies as weapon distributaries proxy and finance proxy (Yousaf, 2007). The United States purchased Soviet manufactured arms from Israel, Egypt and from some Eastern European Soviet satellites and from Central Asian states. Saudis ensured her dedicated participation equal to US financing. An Afghan Bureau of Finance was established/organized and stringed by Zia’s military Brigadier. (David C. Isby: 1989). Seven Peshawar was the counter-insurgent machination. Priority and preference in supplies and training proficiency was given to those commanders in the warfare who were near to Afghan capital location to besiege the Kabul machination.

**Geneva Accord: A Trilateral Diplomatic Move**

Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar the USG for Special Political Affairs the Personal Representative of Secretary General UNO Mr. Kurt Waldheim who was appointed on the conflict zone of Afghanistan. (www.Genevaaccord.com/) Pertaining to his diplomatic
tours in April/August 1981, the extensive meetings with Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan were conducted and both nations determined to start the negotiation process which outcome was the Geneva Accord.

Contents were Pre-negotiations/Negotiations under UNGOMAP (United Nations Good Offices Missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan) with the desired kernel of "Non-Intervention/Non-Interference "from Pakistan into Afghanistan and vice versa. The peace-oriented negotiating moves under shadow of UNO diplomatic umbrella the both nations agreed to abstain to waive threats and refrain to use military forces as both will never trespass the boundaries of each and would never accelerate covert or overt any form of interference, intervention, subversion, military occupation or armed incursion and the modes of financing, equipping arms, recruitments, trainings of mercenaries from domestic and abroad to generate hostilities in the other country would never be adopted. (USDS:2001). The assistance to terrorist groups and saboteurs would be prevented. We are here to be committed, not to harbor or organize such bases and camps as platform for arming, training, equipping, financing such groups, to create disorder, subversion, frustration or unrest across the parameters of each country.

The second accord bounded Pakistan to peacefully arrange orderly, facilitate voluntarily the repatriation of the refugees temporarily settled in her land. (Khan R:1988). Afghanistan was committed to be liable of freely return of the Afghan refugees to their own land as where they desired to live, to work, to entertain the same civic rights, privileges with same status of equality of citizenry and with no victimization and discrimination.

The Aftermaths/Conclusion

Mujahedeen' leaders and Afghan insurgent groups' representatives had neither any representation/participation in negotiations or be accommodated in the deliberated process of Geneva Accords. The articles/provisions subjected to the accords were blatantly rejected by the fighting militia. With heinous and hazardous aftermaths the war continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as the Soviet backed Najibulla’s regime in Afghanistan. The pertinence was of US-USSR consensually settled outcome. Both had majorly/mutually interacted confidentially and internationally in reciprocal diplomatic moves and constructed Pakistan and Afghanistan the real adversaries notwithstanding the US-USSR. (Cordovez & Selig, 1995). Contra to Zia’s, Junejo Government convened APC, set aside the Zia’s strategies, carelessly negotiated and signed and endorsed the Accords’ Provisions for wishful political scoring, and let the issues of interim government of Afghanistan toward Mujahedeen and Najibullah, to be decided thereof. Zia opposed some of its provisions and then reluctantly under interior/exterior political restraints muted to be acceded. Whether Junejo and the FM Zain Noorani lacked in compunction in diplomacy or were under doggies. Junejo affirmed; "No better agreement could be wrested in the given circumstances." Zia termed; “A major landmark in contemporary history.” Zain Noorani commented; ‘It was a first step toward the ultimate solution of Afghanistan’s internal/external long-standing political problem’ (Majeed: 1995) It was taken as humiliation of Pakistan plus Mujahedeen.

Zia’s diplomacy created space for Atomic Weapon (AW) construction process and continued with smooth concentration. Zia diplomatic mindset was realist in his guts and
guemption. His era is the landmark and the changer of regional and World Politics. Did he make dancing diplomatically/politically/strategically the world superpowers on his diplomatic menu? He made the World a unipolar. Pakistan’s diplomacy was short-term successful and long-term continuous imbroglios’ generator. The US policies aftermaths had generated and richly nourished/fertilized the terrorist/extremist/obscurantists’ heartland in socio-political, socio-religious and sectarian-jurisprudential materiality. A specific-interpretive, argumentative-jurisprudence-based ideological narrative the harbinger of religious seminary unlimitedly/flexibly/unrestrictedly installed sans any monitoring apparatus. Political islamization process substantiated narrative is continued. The contemporary media/intellectuals/institutions with missionary zeal processed to do rich green the public mindset with such narrative-interpretive designs could never be reversed. Zia diplomacy’ adverse effect is on nation’ collective neurological heuristics as the symptoms are socio-political peace distorters and the psycho-social diseases syndrome.
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