Abstract—Conventional anti-jamming methods mostly rely on frequency hopping to hide or escape from jammers. These approaches are not efficient in terms of bandwidth usage and can also result in a high probability of jamming. Different from existing works, in this paper, a novel anti-jamming strategy is proposed based on the idea of deceiving the jammer into attacking a victim channel while maintaining the communications of legitimate users in safe channels. Since the jammer’s channel information is not known to the users, an optimal channel selection scheme and a sub-optimal power allocation algorithm are proposed using reinforcement learning (RL). The performance of the proposed anti-jamming technique is evaluated by deriving the statistical lower bound of the total received power (TRP). Analytical results show that, for a given access point, over 50% of the highest achievable TRP, i.e. in the absence of jammers, is achieved for the case of a single user and three frequency channels. Moreover, this value increases with the number of users and available channels. The obtained results are compared with two existing RL based anti-jamming techniques, and a random channel allocation strategy without any jamming attacks. Simulation results show that the proposed anti-jamming method outperforms the compared RL based anti-jamming methods and the random search method, and yields near optimal achievable TRP.

Index Terms—Reactive jammer, frequency hopping, reinforcement learning, deception.

I. INTRODUCTION

Wireless communication networks are known to be vulnerable to malicious attacks such as jamming [1]. Jammers mostly impact the physical layer by transmitting disruptive signals over shared wireless communication channels. Under jamming attacks, wireless network components are supposed to consume more power or retransmit the lost data to compensate the jamming effects. The former strategy is energy inefficient while the latter can significantly decrease the data rate. Thus, to maintain an adequate quality-of-service (QoS), anti-jamming policies are needed. Jammers are typically classified based on their jamming policies from elementary to advanced jammers [2]. Elementary jammers adopt a predefined technique, such as constant, random, and sweeping jammers. Advanced jammers adapt jamming techniques based on the opponent’s actions. For example, reactive jammers select their power and channel according to their opponents’ channels and power levels.

For elementary jammers, once their polices are detected, jamming mitigation can be performed by frequency band or power adaptation. However, behavior of advanced jammers should be monitored in order to mitigate the jamming effect. Anti-jamming methods should be designed such that the communication resource usage can be optimized while mitigating the jamming effects.

A. Related Works

Numerous anti-jamming methods have been proposed in the literature, ranging from frequency hopping [3–8] methods that employ techniques such as honeypots to obtain the jammer policy or to harvest the jamming energy [9–14]. Frequency hopping methods continuously switch the carrier frequency between different bands and can be performed using strategies such as chaotic frequency hopping [7] or learning-based methods [8]. The authors in [9] propose an anti-jamming technique that assigns a user among all users as a honeypot to obtain the jammer policy for a wiser jamming mitigation. The work in [10] proposes an anti-jamming method based on dispersing the data in time frames, and models the impacts of the spectrum changes on the mobile cognitive users’ performance in hostile environments. In [11], the authors introduce a multi-domain anti-jamming method that uses both of the frequency and power domains to overcome smart jammer attacks. The authors in [12] employ an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to hold a communication link between a user and a backup base station when the communication link with the main base station is disrupted. The work in [13] proposes a collaborative anti-jamming algorithm (CMAA) in which users collaborate with each other in terms of frequency channel selection in order to mitigate the jammer’s effects. In [14], the authors propose an spectrum sensing based anti-jamming method where legitimate users mitigate the jamming effects by enhancing their awareness about the jammed channels.

A number of prior works developed anti-jamming techniques based on game theory [15–20]. The authors in [15] propose a noncooperative game to select the optimum relay station in the presence of an adversary. The authors in [16] seek to mitigate the jammer effect in an OFDM-based Internet of Things system by dispersing an access point (AP) power among sub-carriers. In [17] and [18], the authors study the impact of the observation error of the legitimate users and jammers on the network performance, respectively. In [19], the authors propose a dynamic game to deceive a jammer in a cooperative drone scenario.
In [21]–[27], machine learning-based anti-jamming techniques are proposed. In [21], the authors employ a deep Q-learning technique (DQL) to train a jammer to vestigate the effects of a powerful Markov jammer. The work in [22] proposes a modified Q-learning method (RL) based anti-jamming technique against a smart jammer in a non-orthogonal multiple access system. In [23], the authors employ deep RL (DRL) to secure the communication between a transmitter and a receiver against multi-jammers. The work in [24] proposes a modified Q-learning technique, where all the Q-values of the Q-table are updated at each iteration, to mitigate the effects of a sweeping jammer. A DRL based method is employed to train the optimal task offloading policy for jamming attacks in the context of multi-access systems. The work in [25] proposes the idea of harvesting the transmitted power by jammers for data transmission. The work in [27] introduces a system consisting of two groups of nodes, namely legitimate users and jammers, that compete to dominate the shared spectrum. In this regard, multi-agent Q-learning is employed to discover the optimal actions of the nodes. The works in [28]–[31] develop anti-jamming methods that employ new approaches to deceive the jammer using a honeypot or fake transmission. The work in [28] proposes an anti-jamming algorithm in which “decoy” users are used to trap the jammer. Similar to [28], the authors in [29] propose to foil the jammer by dedicating a secondary user that transmits fake signals to attract a portion of the jamming power. The authors in [30] propose an anti-jamming method where a transmitter forms a decoy beam in another frequency channel than the main communication channel to distract the jammer from the main communication beam. Inspired by [26], the work in [31] employs a radio frequency (RF) tag that uses the harvested energy from the jamming signal to back scatter the transmitter information to a multi-array receiver while the transmitter keeps the main transmission to deceive the jammer.

Despite their position in the spotlight when it comes to the mitigation of jamming attacks, frequency hopping based anti-jamming methods are not efficient in terms of bandwidth usage and can also result in a high probability of jamming [3]–[8], [21] and [27]. Moreover, the channel qualities are often neglected in frequency hopping based methods. Some works such as [11], [12], [15], [16], [20], [26], and [27] address this problem; however, in [11] and [27] full knowledge of the environment is assumed to be available and the proposed anti-jamming methods by [12], [15], [16], [20], and [26] are restricted to a certain considered system model. For instance, jamming effects are mitigated in UAV-based systems in [15] and in scenario where the users are able to harvest energy in [26]. In addition, the necessity of channel switching in frequency hopping methods causes communication delay and energy consumption [10]. Considering a jammer with simple jamming policy as the opponent is another drawback of previous works such as [23] and [24], which makes their proposed anti-jamming methods impractical in realistic scenarios where jammers are more developed. For instance, the considered intelligent jammer in [23] selects three channels and keeps jamming those channels for a specific amount of time while the reactive jammer in [24] jams the sensed channel after two time slots. These types of jammers’ policies can be easily detected by monitoring their behavior during a short period of time.

Although the deception techniques proposed in [28]–[31] can reduce the channel switching rate using a decoy or fake transmission to trap the jammer, they have a number of drawbacks. These works assume full knowledge of the environment is available, which is not a practical assumption due the unpredictable nature of jammers. As a result, the problem of finding the optimal channel allocation and user selection as a decoy are not considered. Moreover, since the works in [28] and [29] devote at least one user to secure other users’ communication, they are not practical for single user scenarios. Furthermore, similar to the works in [12], [15], [16], [20], and [26], the proposed methods in [30] and [31] are restricted to specific system models since [31] employs an RF tag to back scatter information, which is not available in all the networks, and both works assume that the legitimate nodes are equipped with multi-array antennas. In addition, the author in [30] proposed their solution for a single user scenario and the extension of the method to multi-user scenarios is not covered.

In summary, anti-jamming in the practical case of partially observable environment against advanced jammers is an understudied topic in the open technical literature. Thus, in this paper, to ensure safe communication channels for the legitimate users and avoid channel switching, an anti-jamming mechanism is proposed by deceiving reactive jammers in partially observable environments, which is applicable to both multi user and single user scenarios. Moreover, we consider the problem of selecting the optimal channel that can be used to deceive the jammer from several available channels.

B. Contributions

The main contribution of this paper lies in the design of an anti-jamming solution that can be used to fool a jammer by deceiving it into jamming a specific victim channel to secure safe communication channels between legitimate users and an access point (AP). Our approach is designed to mitigate the effects of Reactive jammers. An important challenge in deception based anti-jamming is finding the optimal power and channel allocation. In order to find the optimal channel and power allocation, availability of channel gains between the network components is necessary. However, we consider a partially observable environment in terms of the channel gains between users and the jammer since the position and signal power level of the jammer are not known. Moreover, we study the cases where the channel gains between users and the AP are known and unknown. Since perfect model of the environment is unavailable, a model-free RL is employed to solve the power and channel allocation problem. In model-free RL methods, the optimal policy is learned through the agent’s interaction with the environment [32]. Moreover, we propose a successive RL-based method that converges three times faster than regular RL methods. Moreover, simulation results show that the proposed anti-jamming technique outperforms previous anti-jamming methods which conduct frequency hopping regardless of channel quality, and the proposed learning
In this work, we consider a wireless network consisting of a single AP that services $N$ users, as shown in Fig. 1. The users and jammer are uniformly distributed in the network area and their positions are fixed. The time is divided into equal slots where, at each time slot, the AP serves the legitimate users using a set $\mathcal{L}$ of $L$ orthogonal channels. We assume that each user can communicate through two channels simultaneously. We assume that the users always have packets to transmit and their transmission power at each time slot is upper bounded by $P$. Also, the jammer’s power is limited but it is significantly larger than that of the legitimate users. All channels between the users, the AP, and the jammer are reciprocal and follow a Rayleigh fading model. In addition to the small-scale fading, we consider path loss modeled by $(\frac{d}{d_0})^{-\beta}$, where $\kappa$, $k_0$, and $\beta$ are the distance between nodes, a reference distance, and the attenuation factor according to the physical environment, respectively. The channel gain between the user $i$ and the AP is $h_{ci}$, while the channel gain between user $i$ and the jammer is $h_{ji}$. In what follows, subscripts $c$ and $j$ are used to denote the AP and jammer, respectively. We consider two distinct scenarios corresponding to the case where the channel gains between the users and the AP are not known as well as the case of known channel gains between the users and the AP.

In both scenarios, the channel gains between the users and the jammer are not known, which is the case in practice. Hereinafter, we refer to the availability of the channel gains between the users and the AP as the availability of channel gains. Moreover, we consider a reactive jammer that attempts to disrupt the communication between the AP and users by transmitting its jamming signal over the legitimate users’ communication channels. Therefore, we assume that the data transmitted on the jammed channel is not detected by the AP. Moreover, the users’ signals cannot be detected when users interfere with each other over a given channel. The considered jammer’s operation is detailed next.

A reactive jammer continuously listens to channels and jams channels immediately after sensing an activity [33]. Our considered reactive jammer looks for the channel that has the highest signal power level. It continuously senses all the channels’ powers and jams the channel with the highest signal power. In this scheme, if a jammer detects a signal with power allocation of the higher power over a given channel while it is jamming another channel, it instantly switches to the newly detected channel.

### III. Convex Optimization-Based Anti-Jamming for Known Channel Information

To address the challenges of securing the communication between legitimate users and an AP against a reactive jammer in a partially observable environment, we propose an anti-jamming method that misleads the jammer by using a victim channel. As shown in Fig. 1, engaging the jammer with a specific channel clears other channels for the purpose of secure communications. In this method, every user allocates a specific amount of power to a victim channel to attract the jammer to that channel. To avoid depleting its power, each user has a power consumption limit $\rho$ for deceiving the jammer. In the multi-user scenario, users can cooperate with each other to select a common victim channel and announce their actions to other users after each time slot. Moreover, the phase of the users’ signals in the victim channel are assumed to be aligned using the received jamming signal phases at the users’ side.

Here, we study the case in which the jammer jams a single channel in each time-slot, however, the proposed anti-jamming method is applicable to the case in which multiple channels are compromised by the jammer. In fact, in this scenario, users absorb the jammer’s power in a victim channel to decrease the jamming power in their communication channels by employing the proposed anti-jamming method.

A major aspect in the implementation of the proposed method is determining the optimal power allocation of the victim and communication channels. The optimal resource allocation should achieve the highest achievable TRP at the AP while deceiving the jammer with a minimum power consumption in the victim channel. The TRP at the AP excluding the jammed channel $\hat{G}$, the received signal power at the jammer through the communication channel $i\hat{F}_{ji}$, and received signal power at the jammer through the victim channel $\hat{F}_{jv}$ are given in [1], [2], and [3], respectively.

Given the fact that considering the sum rate or TRP as the performance evaluation metrics leads to the same power and channel allocation, in what follows we focus our study on the TRP.

**Fig. 1: Illustration of our system model.**
where \(d_i^2\) and \(d_i'^2\) denote the \(i\)th user’s power allocated.

for deceiving the jammer and communications, respectively, \(h_{ji}'\) is the channel gain between \(i\)th user’s selected channel and the jammer, and \(x_i\) is a binary flag that is set to zero if the \(i\)th user’s communication channel is jammed or interfered with other users’ communications channels, otherwise it is set to one. On the one hand, deceiving the jammer to jam a victim channel is only possible if the jammer always senses the highest signal power in the victim channel i.e., \(\hat{F}_{ji}c_i \leq \hat{F}_{ijv}\) \(\forall\ i \in \mathcal{L}\). Meanwhile, the users should allocate as much power as possible for communication purposes. Assuming that everything about the environment, including the channel gains and jammer policy is known, the optimal power allocation problem is formulated as

\[
G = \sum_{i=1}^{N} d_i^2 h_{ci}^2 x_i = \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\bar{P} - d_i^2) h_{ci}^2 x_i,
\]

\[
\hat{F}_{ji}c_i = d_i'^2 h_{ji}'^2,
\]

\[
\hat{F}_{ijv} = (\sum_{i=1}^{N} d_i h_{ji})^2,
\]

\[
g(\lambda, \mu) = \inf_{d, d'} \left\{ \frac{1}{g} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (-d_i^2 + d_i'^2) h_{ci}^2 \right\}
+ \lambda_{1} \left( - \sum_{i=1}^{N} (d_i h_{ji} + d_i'^2 h_{ji}'^2) - \lambda_{N+1} d_i + \lambda_{2N+i} (d_i - \sqrt{\bar{P}} - \lambda_{3N+i} d_i + \mu_i (d_i^2 + d_i'^2 - \bar{P})) \right).
\]

In (5), only one of the tuple \((\lambda_1, \lambda_{N+1}, \lambda_{2N+i})\) can take a nonzero value, otherwise \(g(\lambda, \mu)\) becomes infinite.

Applying the KKT conditions on (5) leads to

1) \(\lambda_{1} (-d_i h_{ji} + d_i'^2 h_{ji}'^2) = 0\), which means that \(\lambda_i = 0\) or \(d_i h_{ji} = d_i'^2 h_{ji}'^2\).
2) \(\lambda_{N+i} (-d_i h_{ji}) = 0\), and as a result \(\lambda_{N+i} = 0\) or \(d_i = 0\).
3) \(\lambda_{2N+i} (d_i - \sqrt{\bar{P}}) = 0\), which means that \(\lambda_{2N+i} = 0\) or \(d_i = \sqrt{\bar{P}}\).
4) \(\lambda_{3N+i} (d_i') = 0\), which means that \(\lambda_{3N+i} = 0\) or \(d_i = 0\).
5) \(d_i = \frac{h_{ji} h_{ci} + h_{ji}' h_{ci}'}{2 (\mu_i + \mu_i')}, \quad \text{and} \quad d_i' = \frac{-h_{ji} h_{ci} + h_{ji}' h_{ci}'}{2 \mu_i}.

Many critical points can be obtained by applying the KKT conditions, but only one of them is optimal. The optimal solution is the critical point that has the lowest value of the objective function. It is impossible to obtain the solution as a function of the channel gains since their variation affects the KKT conditions. Thus, to assess the proposed method, we use the expectation of the achieved TRP by the AP. The evaluation of this expectation requires the expectation of the channel power gains \(h_{ci}^2\) \(\forall\ i \in \mathcal{X}\) where \(\mathcal{X} = \{i \in \mathbb{N}|0 \leq i \leq N\}\) and the allocated power for each user’s communication \(d_i^2\), \(\forall\ i \in \mathcal{X}\). The expectation of the channel power gains is known; however, the expectations of the allocated powers are not accessible because the power distribution cannot be expressed as a function of the channel gains. Therefore, instead of using the solution of the main problem, we adopt the solution of the modified problem that leads to a lower bound to the AP TRP. To this end, instead of considering the first constraints set \(Hd \geq h_{ji}' \cdot d'\), we assume \(Mp \geq b \cdot h_{ji}' \cdot h_{ji}'\), where

\[
p = [P_1, P_2, ..., P_N]^T, \quad P_i = (d_i)^2, \quad \forall\ i \in \mathcal{X}, \quad \text{and}
\]

\[
M = \begin{bmatrix}
\hat{h}_{ji1}^2 + \hat{h}_{ji2}^2 & \hat{h}_{ji1}^2 & \hat{h}_{ji2}^2 \\
\hat{h}_{ji1}^2 & \hat{h}_{ji2}^2 + \hat{h}_{ji3}^2 & \hat{h}_{ji3}^2 \\
\hat{h}_{ji1}^2 & \hat{h}_{ji2}^2 & \hat{h}_{ji3}^2 + \hat{h}_{ji4}^2
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

More precisely, \(Hd \geq h_{ji}' \cdot d'\) can be expanded for each user as

\[
h_{j1} d_1 + h_{j2} d_2 + \ldots + h_{jN} d_N \leq d_i h_{ji}'^2, \quad \forall\ i \in \mathcal{X},
\]

and, since \(d_i' = \sqrt{\bar{P} - d_i^2}\), [7] can be presented as

\[
(h_{j1} d_1 + h_{j2} d_2 + \ldots + h_{jN} d_N)^2 \leq (\bar{P} - d_i^2) h_{ji}'^2,
\]

which shows that [9] always holds and as a result, \(Hd \geq h_{ji}' \cdot d'\) can be substituted by \(M \bar{p} \geq b \cdot h_{ji}' \cdot h_{ji}'\) in (4).

\[
h_{j1}^2 d_1^2 + h_{j2}^2 d_2^2 + \ldots + h_{jN}^2 d_N^2 \leq (\bar{P} - d_i^2) h_{ji}'^2.
\]
In this context, a portion of the power received by the jammer through the victim channel is neglected. Therefore, to achieve a similar signal level as the main power allocation problem, more power should be consumed in the victim channel and thus, less power remains available for communication purposes. Modifying (4), we obtain

\[
\min P_t \left(-\sum_{i=1}^{N} (\hat{P} - P_t) h_i^2\right), \quad (10)
\]

subject to:

\[
Mp \geq b \cdot (h'_j \cdot h'_j), \quad (11)
\]

\[
p \geq \eta', \quad (12)
\]

\[
p \leq p' \cdot p'. \quad (13)
\]

Applying this modification allows us to obtain the power allocation as a function of the channel gains.

The constraints and optimization function in (10) are linear, and as a result convex. Thus, strong duality and the KKT conditions hold for this problem too. Since both the optimization function and constraints are linear, the solution is on the border of the feasible set \(\mathcal{D}\), which can be achieved by applying the KKT conditions on the dual function of (10).

Therefore, we can find the power allocation using (11), a combination of (11) and (12), or (12) and (13). In order to study the case where the power allocation is derived from (11), next, we prove that \(M\) is invertible.

**Proposition 1.** The matrix \(M\) is positive definite and as a result invertible.

**Proof.** The proof is provided in Appendix A. \(\square\)

From Proposition 1 we can see that \(M\) is invertible, thus the power allocation can be derived as

\[
p = M^{-1}b \cdot (h'_j \cdot h'_j), \quad (14)
\]

Equation (14) shows that, since the achieved powers are positive, the power distribution derived from (11) is valid for \(d \geq \eta'\). Hence, (11) is used to obtain the lower bound on the AP TRP obtained from (4). To find the lower bound, it is necessary to introduce the Sherman–Morrison lemma from [Section 2.7.1] [35].

**Lemma 1.** If \(O\) and \(O+U\) are invertible, and \(U\) is a rank one matrix, let \(g = \text{trace}(UO^{-1})\) and \(g \neq -1\), then \((O+U)^{-1} = O^{-1} - \frac{(O^{-1}U)^{1+g}}{1+g}\).

To use the Sherman–Morrison lemma, first we represent matrix \(M\) by

\[
M = H \cdot H + I \cdot (h'_j \cdot h'_j)^T, \quad (15)
\]

where \(I\) denotes the identity matrix of same size as \(M\). Making use of the Sherman–Morrison lemma, (11) can be represented as

\[
p \leq b - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} h_i^2}{h_{i,j}^2} \left[\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} h_i^2}{h_{i,j}^2} + \ldots + \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} h_i^2}{h_{i,j}^2}\right]^T.
\]

(16)

The channel power gains between nodes result from path loss and Rayleigh fading. Here, \(\kappa\) and \(\xi\) are variables corresponding to the path loss and Rayleigh fading, respectively. The Rayleigh fading components of the channel gains between two users at different frequencies are assumed to be independent and identically distributed random variables. Moreover, since the users and the jammer are uniformly distributed, \(E(\kappa)\) and \(E(\xi)\) are equal between all the users and the jammer, and all the users and the AP, respectively.

Thus, for a given user \(k\), (16) can be reformulated as

\[
P_k \leq \hat{P} \left(1 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\kappa_i^2 \xi_i^2}{\kappa_{ij}^2 \xi_{ij}^2}}{1 + \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\kappa_i^2 \xi_i^2}{\kappa_{ij}^2 \xi_{ij}^2}}\right). \quad (17)
\]

From (10), we can see that the channel selection affects the AP’s TRP. In order to find the optimal solution, the communication channel for every user and victim channel should be selected among the \(L\) frequency channels. The best channel for deceiving the jammer is the channel that has the highest summation of users’ channel power gains, i.e. \(\sum_{i=1}^{N} h_{i,j}^2\). The communication channel selection can be conducted by two methods. First, by choosing channels with the lowest gains between users and the jammer to mitigate TRP at the jammer side and second, by selecting channels with the highest gains between the users and AP to increase the TRP at the AP. Intuitively, the second approach is most likely the optimal one, however in some cases, selecting the communication channels based on the lowest channel gains between the users and jammer obtains a higher performance. Thus, we will consider both cases. Hereinafter, we name these two approaches APP1 and APP2, respectively.

The channel power gains of the different frequencies and users are independent, and as a result the summation of channel power gains from \(N\) users over different frequency channels are also independent. Given to the fact that \(E(\max(\sum_{i=1}^{N} h_{i,j}^2)) \geq E(\max(\sum_{i=1}^{N} h_{i,j}^2))\) where \(E(\max(\sum_{i=1}^{N} h_{i,j}^2)) = E(\kappa)E(\max(\sum_{i=1}^{N} \xi_i^2))\) and \(i \in \mathcal{X}\), \(E(P_k)\) can be represented as

\[
E(P_k) \leq \hat{P} \left(1 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \xi_{ij}^2}{1 + \sum_{i=1}^{N} \xi_{ij}^2}\right). \quad (18)
\]

The distribution of \(\max(\sum_{i=1}^{N} \xi_{ij}^2)\) among \(L\) available channels will be
The expectation of \( \max \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N} r_{ji}^2 \right) \) does not have a closed form; however, it can be calculated numerically. In what follows, for notational convenience, the \( E(\max \sum_{i=1}^{N} r_{ji}^2) \) is denoted by \( \Gamma \).

**APP1** helps users consume less power for deceiving the jammer. In this scheme, a communication channel is assigned to each user that has the lowest channel gain \( h_{ji}^2 \) among the available channels for each user and \( \text{APP1} \) can be derived as next.

**Proposition 2.** Using \( \text{APP1} \) as a communication channel selection method among \( L \) available channels, \( \mathbb{E}(P_i) \), \( \forall i \in \mathcal{X} \) is given by

\[
\mathbb{E}(P_i)_{\text{APP1}} \leq \frac{\bar{P} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \frac{\Gamma}{L(N-k)(L-1-k)} + \Gamma}{\sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \frac{1}{L(N-k)(L-1-k)}}.
\]

**Proof.** The proof is provided in Appendix B. \( \Box \)

Since the channel allocation in \( \text{APP1} \) is performed based on the channel gains between users and the AP, the expectation of \( h_{ji}^2 \) is equal to \( \mathbb{E}(\min(h_{ji}^2)) = \bar{h}_{ji}^2 \). Therefore, based on Proposition 2, the expectation of the total received signal power (ETRP) at the AP can be presented as

\[
C_1 = \mathbb{E} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N} \bar{P} (P_i) h_{ci}^2 \right) = \mathbb{E} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\bar{P} - P_i) \mathbb{E} \left( h_{ci}^2 \right) \right)
= N \bar{P} \left( \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \frac{1}{L(N-k)(L-1-k)} \right) \frac{\mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E}(h_{ci}^2))}{\Gamma}.
\]

**APP2** focuses on enhancing the AP’s TRP by selecting the channel with the highest gain among the available channels between the users and the AP. The constraints of (10) are independent from the channel gains between the users and the AP. Thus, from (16), we can easily write

\[
\mathbb{E}(P_i)_{\text{APP2}} \leq \frac{\bar{P}}{1 + \Gamma}.
\]

According to the **APP2** policy, the ETRP of the AP will be

\[
C_{\text{AP}} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\bar{P} - \mathbb{E}(P_i)) \mathbb{E}(\max \left( h_{ci}^2, l \in (1, \ldots, L - 1) \right)),
\]

where \( \bar{P} - \mathbb{E}(P_i) = \frac{\bar{P} \gamma}{1 + \gamma} \) and \( \mathbb{E}(\max(h_{ci}^2, l \in (1, \ldots, L - 1))) \) is the expectation of a random variable resulting from the selection of the maximum value among \( L - 1 \) random variables, which random variables are the channel power gains between the users and the AP. The following proposition derives \( \mathbb{E}(\max(h_{ci}^2, l \in (1, \ldots, L - 1))) \).

**Proposition 3.** The expectation of \( \max(h_{ci}^2, l \in (1, \ldots, L - 1)) \) over \( L \) number of channels and \( N \) number of users when **APP2** policy is used for the channel allocation is

\[
\mathbb{E}(\max(h_{ci}^2, l \in (1, \ldots, L - 1))) = \mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E}(h_{ci}^2)) \frac{N \Gamma}{(1 + \gamma) V(L, N)}.
\]

**Proof.** The proof is provided in Appendix C. \( \Box \)

Using the result of Proposition 3 in (23) leads to

\[
C_2 = \frac{\Gamma \bar{P}}{1 + \Gamma} NV(L - 1, N) \mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E} h_{ci}^2).
\]

Since the channel gains are randomly distributed, the maximum achievable TRP of the AP changes according to the channel gains’ variations. Thus, we take the expectation of \( Y_{\text{Top}} \).

\[
Y_{\text{Top}} = \bar{P} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \max(h_{ci}^2, l \in \mathcal{L})).
\]

The expectation of the maximum achievable TRP can be obtained using the result of Proposition 3. The TRP rates of the proposed method for both **APP1** and **APP2** are given in (28) and (29) respectively.

\[
\frac{C_1}{C_{\text{Top}}} = \frac{\Gamma \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \frac{1}{L(N-j)(L-1-j)}}{V(L, N)}.
\]

\[
\frac{C_2}{C_{\text{Top}}} = \frac{\Gamma V(L - 1, N)}{(1 + \gamma) V(L, N)}.
\]

Since users are uniformly distributed in the network, \( \mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E} h_{ci}^2) \) for all the users are equal, and as a result, (28) and (29) are independent of \( \mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E} h_{ci}^2) \). Thus, as long as the users are uniformly distributed in the network and channel gains follow a Rayleigh fading model, the expectation of the performance
of the proposed method is higher than the obtained lower bound, regardless of the jammer location.

In our considered model, legitimate users need to find the optimal victim channel and power allocation to gain the highest TRP while the highest signal level is sensed in the victim channel at the jammer side. In order to find the optimum victim channel and power allocation, knowledge of all the channel gains between the users, AP, and jammer are needed. However, in realistic scenarios, the channel gains between the users and the jammer are not known. Moreover, in some cases, channel gains between users and the AP are hard to detect due to destruction of feedback links by the jammer or the lack of feedback links. Thus, it is necessary to adopt a method that finds the channel selection and power allocation without knowledge of the channel gains.

IV. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING BASED ANTI-JAMMING FOR UNKNOWN CHANNEL INFORMATION

In the considered system model, the TRP of the users only depends on the power and channel allocation, and the channel that is jammed by the jammer at each slot. Thus, the TRP follows the Markov property and the interaction between the users and jammer can be formulated as a Markov decision process (MDP). However, in this context, transition probabilities cannot be predicted due to the dynamical environment and lack of prior knowledge about the channel gains. Thus, a model free RL algorithm approach is employed to solve the MDP with unknown transition probabilities [36]. In this context, users select the channels and the corresponding power allocation, and receive rewards according to the received TRP and success in deceiving the jammer. Thus, as a result of the interaction with the environment within an RL structure, users can find the optimal channel and sub-optimal power allocation. Next, we explain the elements of the two proposed RL approaches.

A. Reinforcement learning elements

Our considered tabular RL method is defined by a tuple \(< S, A, R(\cdot) >\), where \(S\) represents the state space, \(A\) is the action space, and \(R(\cdot)\) is the immediate reward of the system. As mentioned earlier, for unknown channel gains between the users and the jammer, we consider the scenarios where the channel gains between the users and the AP are not available, as well as the case where the channel gains between the users and the AP are available.

In the first scenario, the state set \(S\) includes all possible combinations of the victim and communication channels of every user while the action set \(A\) includes different combinations of the two channels that each user can select for deceiving the jammer and communication purposes with the allocated power for the victim channel taken from the set \([0, \rho]\). Moreover, due to the fact that in tabular RL methods, states and actions are discrete spaces, continuous variables that are included in the states or actions set should be quantized. Thus, in our work, we quantize the power with a quantization step of \(\frac{\rho}{n}\), where \(n\) is the number of samples among the \([0, \rho]\).

Precisely, the states and action sets can be presented as \(S = \{s_1, \ldots, s_{CN}\}\) and \(A = \{a_1, \ldots, a_{CN}, a_v, a_P, \ldots, a_{PN}\}\), respectively, where \(s_v\) and \(s_{CN}\) denote the state corresponding to the selected victim and communication channels, \(a_v\) corresponds to the communication channel of user \(i\) \((i \in \mathcal{X})\) among \(L\) channels, \(a_P\) corresponds to the victim channel action selection among \(L\) channels, and \(a_P\) corresponds to the victim channel power among \(\chi + 1\) power steps for user \(i\) \((i \in \mathcal{X})\). The size of the state and action sets are \(L^{N+1}\) and \(L^{N+1}(\chi + 1)^N\), respectively.

In the second scenario, the power allocation and victim channel must be determined by the RL. Thus, the state and action sets of the considered RL are \(S = \{s_v\}\) and \(A = \{a_v, a_P, \ldots, a_{PN}\}\) respectively, where \(s_v\) denotes the state of the selected victim channel, \(a_v\) corresponds to the victim channel action selection among \(L\) channels, and \(a_P\) corresponds to the victim channel power among \(\chi + 1\) power steps for user \(i\) \((i \in \mathcal{X})\). Due to availability of the channel gain between the users and AP, the size of the state and action sets are reduced to \(L\) and \(L(\chi + 1)^N\), respectively.

For both scenarios, we use the following function to reward the user’s channel selection of the power distribution and power allocation

\[
R(d, d', w, \zeta) = \frac{G_{w_1}}{P} - \zeta w_2 - w_3 \sum_{i=1}^{N} d_i^2, \tag{30}
\]

where \(w_i\) is the considered weight for element \(i\) of the reward function and \(\zeta\) is a binary flag indicating whether the selected victim channel is jammed or not. The reward function consists of three elements, each defined to make agents follow a specific behavior. The first term \(\frac{G_{w_1}}{P}\) encourages users to discover communication channels and power distributions that lead to the highest possible TRP at the AP. The second term \(-\zeta w_2\) evaluates the victim channel and power allocation action selection by checking whether the victim channel is jammed \((\zeta = 0)\) or not \((\zeta = 1)\), and in case that the victim channel is not jammed, penalizes the agents by \(-w_2\). The third term \(w_3 \sum_{i=1}^{N} d_i^2\) is subtracted from the action reward to penalize agents for consuming power excessively in the victim channel. In what follows, we propose two RL techniques to find the optimal anti-jamming policy for the two previously mentioned scenarios.

B. Anti-jamming without channel information

Due to lack of channel information, the behavior of the jammer is not predictable, and thus state transition probabilities are not available. Among the RL techniques, Monte Carlo and temporal difference (TD) methods do not depend on the state transition probabilities and can learn directly from visiting the environment [37]. The Monte Carlo method is not applicable for continuous tasks since the value of a state is impossible to predict due to the dynamical environment [38]. The Q-learning method is suitable for our problem of channel allocation.
since the selected channels can be considered as the state and the joint channel selection, and power allocation can be considered as the users’ action. Thus, we employ tabular Q-learning to find the sub-optimal power and optimal channel allocation.

We propose Algorithm 1, in which the Q-learning method is employed to obtain the power and channel allocation for the first scenario. In the Q-learning method, the value of each action \( A_t \) and state \( S_t \) pair at time slot \( t \), \( Q(S_t, A_t) \), is determined by visiting different environment states and estimating the value of the corresponding upcoming states. In tabular Q-learning method, the estimation accuracy is increased by visiting states during the exploration phase and substituting the main value of each state-action pair using the so-called Bellman update rule as follows

\[
Q(S_t, A_t) \leftarrow Q(S_t, A_t) + \alpha [R + \gamma \max_a Q(S_{t+1}, a) - Q(S_t, A_t)],
\]

where \( \alpha \) and \( \gamma \) represent the learning rate and discount factor. In the considered problem, the states and actions are defined according to the channel and power allocation of each user.

The action selection at each state is performed based on the \( \epsilon \)-greedy policy. In this work, \( \epsilon \) is set to one for primitive iterations and then, it is gradually decreased to near zero.

In order to find the optimal solution, we employ distributed Q-learning. In the adopted method, each user keeps a Q-table that includes the possible states and actions of all users. In the considered learning strategy, all the users just follow a random stream for their action selection mode, which results in the same schedule of greedy and random actions. This random stream can be produced by any of the users and announced to others. Moreover, in the random action selection mode, users’ actions are not selected based on their joint actions taken from Q-table cells. In fact, as shown in Fig. 2, each user selects the action from its own available actions among \( L(x+1) \) actions regardless of other users’ actions. The victim channel is selected by the user that is chosen to produce a random stream and other users follow its step. According to this policy and the fact that users are rewarded equally, the users’ Q-tables are identical.

The consistency of the Q-tables allows users to select a joint action that benefits all of them and prevents interference in greedy action mode. Precisely, a substantial portion of the users’ reward depends on their obtained normalized \( G \), where, according to the selected exploration policy (\( \epsilon \)-greedy), each user attempts to take an action that returns a higher reward. Thus, in order for users to get a higher reward, they should take an action that returns a higher normalized \( G \). Furthermore, users are not allowed to allocate more power than \( \rho \) in the victim channel. Therefore, users cannot devote themselves or other users to gain a higher reward. Thus, in each time slot, the action that leads to a higher TRP and considers all the users’ satisfaction is taken. The proposed method is detailed in Algorithm 1.

**C. Anti-jamming when channel gains between users and the AP are known**

Next, we consider that the channel gains between the users and the AP are available. Here, given the fact that channel gains between users and the jammer are unknown, we employ RL. In addition, inspired by the Bisection search method, we propose the successive reinforcement learning (SRL) to enhance the convergence speed. In this method, instead of exploring the environment with a high resolution, we approach the optimal solution by increasing the exploration resolution gradually. Precisely, instead of deriving a tabular RL with a table including numerous states and actions, successive tabular RLs with small tables are employed. Thus, in the exploration with a low resolution, a significant number of states and actions that return low rewards are filtered and exploration with a high resolution is performed around the state-action pair that returns the highest rewards.

In the context of the considered system model, first users employ Q-learning with a power step of \( \Omega_Q = \frac{\chi}{\chi_Q} \), where \( \chi_Q \)
The TD(0) learning states set includes the user and receive rewards for the adjustments. The first implementation follows the exploration policy to explore the environment respectively. In the TD(0) value iteration method, an agent is employed, where \( \tau \Omega \) is the optimal victim channel. 

Successive Reinforcement Learning Algorithm 2: 

**Algorithm 2: Successive Reinforcement Learning**

Algorithm parameters: \( \epsilon = 0.1 \), \( \Omega_0 = \frac{L}{\Omega_0} \), \( \alpha = 0.9 \), \( \eta = 0.9 \), \( \Phi \).

\[ \text{Initialize: } \mathbf{P}_0 = \mathbf{P}_{\text{off}} \text{ and } \mathbf{P}_{\text{TD}} = [\tau : \frac{2\tau}{\text{TD}} : \tau] ; \]

Q-learning Part

Employing Algorithm 1 with the initialized parameters to obtain the primary power distribution \( \mathbf{P}_{\text{off}} \).

TD(0) Value Iteration Part

Initialize: \( \epsilon = 1 \), \( \mathbf{P}_{\text{ter}} = \mathbf{P}_{\text{off}} \), \( k = 0 \), and \( k_1 = 0 \); while \( \epsilon \) flag = 0 do

Initialize \( V(s) \) for all \( s \in S^* \). \( V(\cdot) = 0 \), and \( \mathbf{P}_{\text{off}} = \mathbf{P}_{\text{ter}} \); while \( k \leq \epsilon_{\text{iteration}} \) do

foreach step of episode do

end while

**Proposition 4.** A sub-optimal power allocation bounded according to the final quantization step by SRL algorithm.

**Proof.** The proof is provided in Appendix D.

The reward function of the TD method is again set to (30), and since the best victim channel is selected in the primary learning process, the negative reward for penalizing the wrong victim channel becomes zero. In addition, the same strategy introduced in subsection IV-B, which makes users keep a similar table, is selected for distributed learning. The full schema of this method is presented in Algorithm 2.

The SRL approach reduces the number of actions significantly, hence, its learning convergence is faster than regular tabular RL methods. Moreover, after the first implementation of the SRL, the users obtain a sub-optimal point and further explorations are done when a fairly high performance is already achieved. In contrast, in regular Q-learning with the same power resolution, many time slots are needed for the environment to be explored and most of the exploration is conducted when the obtained TRP is low. Thus, in the same period of time, SRL can converge to the optimal power allocation with a higher resolution and, as a result, obtains a higher performance.

After an adequate number of time slots since the value of \( \epsilon \) decreases to near zero, the state-action pair (or state for TD(0)) that returns the highest reward is selected. Precisely, when \( \epsilon \) is near zero, an action-state pair that maximizes (30) among all the possible action-state pairs is selected.

According to (30) the state-action that has the highest TRP at the AP and consumes the lowest power for deceiving the jammer is rewarded the most. In this considered learning structures, the users’ power are in the feasible set of (32) when the victim channel is jammed because in this circumstance, \( H_d \geq h_i^j \cdot d_i^j \) and the other conditions in (32) are considered in the users’ action (or state for TD(0)) selection. Hence, when the victim channel is jammed, the solution of (30) maximizes (30) too since the solution of \( \min_{d_i,d_j} \left[ -\sum_{i=1}^{N} (P - d_i^j) h_i^j \right] \) and \( \max_{d_i,d_j} \left( \frac{G_{w_i}}{P} - \frac{w_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} d_i^j} \right) \) at the feasible set of (32) are the same. Therefore, adopting the considered reward function and exploration policy leads to the convergence to the optimal solution. The same rule holds for the SRL. In this scheme, in
the first iteration of the TD method, the power and the victim channel that return the highest reward are selected, and in the next iteration the resolution of the sampling is increased. At the end, the best sub-optimal power allocation based on the final quantization power step (according to Proposition 4) and the victim channel that returns the highest reward are selected. In addition, with a similar power allocation, better channel selection in terms of the channel gain returns a higher reward. Thus, among the different channel allocation possibilities, the one that has the highest summation of channel power gains, i.e. $\sum_{i=1}^{N} h_{ji}^2$, and channel gains (when the channel gains between users and AP are not known) are selected for the victim channel and communication channels, respectively.

In the considered system model, the jammer always attempts to jam a channel that has the highest sensed signal power. Using the proposed anti-jamming method, users provide a victim channel with the highest sensed signal power at the jammer side. Thus, the reactive jammer prefers to jam the victim channel, and when the power and channel allocation are optimized, neither the users nor the jammer want to change their situation.

The proposed learning methods are based on the model free tabular RL where the computational complexity order of model free tabular RL learning methods is linear as function of number of states and actions $O(|S|^2|A|)$ [38]. Thus, in the case where channel gains between the users and the AP are unknown, the complexity order is $O(L^{2N+2}(\chi+1)^N)$ and for the case in which channel gains are known it is $O(L^{2}(\chi+1)^{N})$. In the scenario where SRL is employed, the number of power steps ($\chi$) is significantly lower than in regular RL, which remarkably impacts the convergence speed.

V. SIMULATION RESULTS

In this section, we evaluate our results using extensive simulations. First, we evaluate the performance of the proposed anti-jamming method in terms of the TRP ratio and the necessary power for deceiving the jammer according to the obtained lower bound. Moreover, we illustrate the variation of the obtained TRP ratios as a function of $\rho$. Then, we compare the obtained TRP ratio with the TRP ratio of the proposed methods in [13], [21]. Besides, in order to show that our proposed method outperforms frequency hopping methods which are conducted regardless of channel quality, we compared the obtained TRP ratio with the TRP ratio of the random search channel selection without any jammers. Furthermore, to evaluate the proposed learning strategies, the obtained TRP ratio from each learning strategy is compared with the optimal AP TRP ratio. The ratio is calculated by dividing the TRP of the AP obtained by the aforementioned scenarios to the maximum achievable TRP of the AP without any jammers. In addition, we compare the convergence rate of the proposed SRL with the Q-learning method using the ratio of their obtained TRPs to the optimal TRPs. Finally, we show how much the proposed SRL method is successful in deceiving the jammer to jam the selected victim channel. To this end, we define a metric named success rate obtained by calculating the ratio that the jammer jams the selected victim channel over the selection of other channels in implemented trials. Since results are presented as a function of the ratio of the TRP, power is normalized and thus, we set $\bar{P} = 10$ for each user in each iteration. The power consumption limit for deceiving the jammer is set to $\rho = \frac{P}{\bar{P}}$, the channel power gains are produced by an exponential probability distribution function with unit mean and variance, the adjustment weights are set to $W = [3.5 \ 1.5 \ 1.5 \ ]$, $\Phi = 10000$, $\Delta = 0.0001$, and both the learning rate and discount factors are set to 0.9 for the users and jammer. Statistical results are averaged over a large number of independent runs.

A. CHANNEL SELECTION EFFECTS

The TRP ratios of the calculated lower bound in section III are obtained assuming the power distribution results from [14]. Equation (16) shows that the obtained expected powers are valid at $d \geq \eta^*$ since the achieved powers are positive. The third set of constraints is valid if $E(P_j) \leq \rho \ (i \in X)$ holds. In Fig. 3, the minimum required power $\rho$ of both channel selection methods according to (20) and (22) is shown as a function of the number of users, for various system configurations with different numbers of available channels. From Fig. 3 we can see that the highest required power for deceiving the jammer is 35% of the maximum power, which is the case when there is one user and four channels. Given to fact that we assume $\rho = \frac{P}{\bar{P}}$ in our simulations, the power set obtained by the first constraints set satisfies other constraints.

Fig. 3 shows that due to APP1 policy, with the same number of users and available channels, the necessary power for deceiving the jammer in APP1 is less than in APP2. In both scenarios, with a fixed number of users, increasing the number of available channels decreases the required power for deceiving the jammer. The reason behind this is that increasing the number of available channels raises the chance of selecting a victim channel with a higher summation of channel power gains, i.e. $\sum_{i=1}^{N} h_{ji}^2$. The same trend holds for increasing the number of users when the number of channels is fixed since more users allocate power into the victim channel and the jammer can be deceived using less power per user. For instance, whenever all the channel gains between users and the jammer are equal to one, in a two users scenario,
each user has to allocate $\frac{P}{2}$ of its power into the victim channel while for a three users scenario, the necessary power is $\frac{P}{8}$.

Fig. 4 illustrates the ratio of the AP ETRP, obtained from the introduced channel selection methods, over the expectation of the maximum achievable TRP in the absence of jammers. Our results are shown for one to five users and different available AP channels. It is demonstrated that in APP2, the TRP of the AP raises by increasing the number of channels. This growth results from the increase of $E(max(h_{ci}^2, i \in \mathcal{L}))$ in (24) by increasing the number of available channels. Moreover, with a fixed number of available channels, increasing the number of users improves the ratio because more users contribute to the allocation of power in the victim channel, and as a result, each user consumes less power for deceiving the jammer. In contrast to APP2, the ratio of APP1 is reduced by increasing the number of users and channels. The reason for this degradation can be better understood from (21) and (27). Equation (21) shows that the ETRP in APP1 increases when the number of available channels increases, however, the growth of the expectation of the maximum achievable TRP by increase of the number of available channels (27) is more significant than APP1. Finally, it is also shown that APP2 performs better than APP1 for all users and channel sizes, and hence we use the ETRPs of APP2 approach as the lower bound of the main ETRPs hereinafter.

Fig. 4 shows that for all the considered number of users, the ETRP growth rate decreases for any number of channels above ten. Hence, it is not necessary to consider a large portion of the spectrum to select a victim channel. The same trend holds for increasing the number of users, where the difference between four and five users is negligible. In addition, results show that the jammer can be deceived by three users with ten available channels with a performance higher than 85%. Therefore, if a large number of users interact with a jammer, allocating the power of only a few users in the victim channel is enough to mitigate the jamming effect and allow other users to communicate safely without allocating any power into the victim channel.

In Fig. 5 the average TRP ratio for one to four users and various numbers of channels is presented as a function of $\rho$. Results show that for all the considered channels and users numbers, increasing $\rho$ increases the TRP up to a certain TRP floor achieved for $\rho$ greater than a threshold. The reason behind this is that increasing the value of $\rho$ provides opportunity for the users to allocate the necessary power in the victim channel to deceive the jammer and, as a result, the jammer does not jam the communication channels. Moreover, in the multi-user scenario, users that have quality channels to the AP are able to contribute less to the victim channel. In addition, the mentioned threshold is enough for all the users to deceive the jammer while allowing the users with good channels contribute less in the victim channel.

B. Deceiving jammer without channel information

1) Single-user: For the single user scheme, the power step is assumed to be 0.2, and four to eight available channels are considered. Fig. 6 shows that in the single-user scenario with four available channels, the proposed method can achieve about 60% of the maximum achievable AP TRP without having any knowledge of the environment. These results are more promising than the results of the random search in the absence of jammers, which proves that the proposed method is able to both mitigate the jamming effects and achieve an acceptable TRP. Moreover, the closeness of the average TRP ratio from the optimal solution and Q-learning proves that the success of the adopted learning strategy is not restricted to a specific channel set.

2) Multi-user: In the multi-user scenario, users cooperate with each other to deceive the jammer by allocating power in a common victim channel. For this scheme, we consider two users with five to nine available channels. The power step is set to two. Fig. 7 is similar to Fig. 6 but for two users.
The AP’s TRP ratios obtained by the Q-learning method are higher than the proposed anti-jamming techniques in [13], [21], and random search method for all the considered channel numbers, which shows that the proposed learning strategy is successful in the multi-user case as well. The calculated optimal AP TRP ratio for two users and six channels with full knowledge of the environment shows that the proposed anti-jamming method can achieve a AP’s TRP higher than 80% of the maximum achievable TRP. Moreover, the fact that the empirical results are quite similar to the optimal results proves that near optimal performance is achievable with the proposed learning strategy. The comparison between the AP TRP ratio of the two-user scenario and the one-user scenario demonstrates that increasing the number of users enhances the AP’s TRP ratio. Compared to the one-user scenario, gaps between the empirical and optimal results in the two-user scenario are higher. The reason for this disparity is that in the two-user model, $P_{\text{step}}$ is set to 2 to decrease the number of states and actions, and thus, the obtained power allocation has an accuracy of 2 which cannot match the optimal solution.

### C. Deceiving jammer with channel information

Here, we assume that the channel gains between the users and the AP are available. Therefore, the best communication channel for each user is clear and just the power allocation and victim channel selection should be determined. Algorithm 2 is utilized to find the optimal victim channel and sub-optimal power allocation. To achieve the power allocation with an accuracy of 0.1 in Algorithm 2, Q-learning is implemented once and TD(0) learning twice. The power step of the Q-learning is set to two, while for the TD learning, the power step of the first iteration is set to 0.5 and the power variation range is limited to $[-2, 2]$, and in the second iteration, the power step is decreased to 0.1 and the power variation range is limited to $[-0.5, 0.5]$. Simulations are performed assuming three users, while five to nine available channels and for the TD learning part $\Phi_e$ is set to 1000.

Fig. 8 shows the average TRP ratios of the AP for different methods. The gaps between the TRPs result from iterative RL and the optimal ones are reduced from 0.07% to 0.03% compared to the two-user scenario. This decrease is due to the availability of the channel gains between the users and the AP and the fact that SRL is employed. The former point helps users concentrate on exploring the optimal victim channel and power distribution which leads to more accurate solutions, while the later increases the power resolution exploration. Similar to the two users scenario, the proposed anti-jamming method outperforms the anti-jamming methods in [13] and [21]. Results show that the obtained TRPs by the proposed method are higher than the compared RL based methods with a gap more than 30%. The performance advantage of our proposed RL based method in comparison to other considered methods shows that the deceiving the jammer is a better policy than the others against a high-power reactive jammer.

The ratios of the obtained TRP from Q-learning and SRL methods to the optimal AP TRP as a function of the elapsed time slots are presented in Fig. 9. Results are obtained assuming three users and five to eight channels, and a power step of 0.1. The primary power step of the SRL is set to 2. For all the considered cases, the proposed SRL method outperforms the Q-learning method in terms of convergence speed. Results show that SRL converges to 95% of the optimal AP TRPs for all the considered channel quantities within three iterations of RL. Moreover, the AP TRPs after obtaining the primary power allocation are over 80%. Hence, in the second and third iterations of RL, exploration is performed while a high AP’s TRP has already been achieved. The SLR method achieves nearly 95 percent of the optimal TRP within 20000 time slots while Q-learning requires three times more time slots to converge to the same TRP. This is because the SRL method reduces the number of actions significantly. For instance, in a three-user five-channel scenario, it is necessary to consider $101^3 \times 5$ actions for the Q-learning methods, where 101 stands for the number of power stages with a power sampling rate of 0.1, while SRL needs to explore $6^3 \times 5$ actions, where 6 stands for the number of different power stages, for the primary resource allocation and implementing TD learning with $11^3$ states two times for the final exploration.

Fig. 10 shows the success rates for one to three users with six to eight channels. From this figure, we can see that during the learning process, the jammer targets communication channels. However, as the learning process progresses, the success rate increases. The reason behind this is that at the initial time-
slots, the users explore the environment to learn the optimal power and channel allocation, thus their selected power and channel are mostly random. However, gradually, the learning process reaches the optimal channel and power allocation, which provides a victim channel to deceive the jammer. After the users find the optimal channel and power allocation, the jammer always tends to jam the victim channel where it senses the highest signal power. The required time slots for deceiving the jammer increases by increasing the number of users since more states and actions must be explored.

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have proposed a novel approach to mitigate reactive jamming by using a deceptive channel as a victim. We have shown that engaging the jammer to jam the desired victim channel enables safe communications for legitimate users in the other channels. To assess the proposed method, we have considered a wireless network consisting of an AP and a reactive jammer for both single-user and multi-user scenarios. Moreover, we have investigated the availability of the channel gains between the users and proposed different learning strategies to determine the optimum resource allocation. To validate our empirical results, we have solved the power allocation problem with full knowledge of the environment and calculated a lower bound for the expectation of the total received signal. Employing the proposed method provides safe and static communication channels for users and legitimate nodes to communicate safely with a TRP almost equivalent that of the optimal solution. Moreover, the proposed SRL converges about three time faster than the RL method.

APPENDIX

A. Proof of Proposition 7

By using (15), the matrix \( M \) can be represented as a sum of matrices \( M_1 = HH^T \) and \( M_2 = I \cdot (h'_j(h'_j)^T) \). Matrix \( M_2 \) is positive definite since it is a diagonal matrix with positive elements. \( M_1 \) is positive semi-definite due to the fact that it has one positive eigenvalue equal to \( h'_j + h'_j + \ldots + h'_j \) and \( N - 1 \) zeros eigenvalues. Thus, matrix \( M \) is positive definite because the sum of a positive definite and a positive semi-definite matrices is a positive definite matrix.

B. Proof of Proposition 2

Inequality (18), for user \( k \), can be reformulated as

\[
P_k \leq \bar{P}(1 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} x_{ik}^2 \varepsilon_{f_{ik}}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} x_{ik}^2 \varepsilon_{f_{ik}}}),
\]

(33)

Given that \( E(P_k) = E(E(P_k|x_{j1}, \ldots, x_{jN})) \) and \( E(\max \sum_{i=1}^{N} \varepsilon_{f_{ik}}) = \Gamma \), \( P_k \) can be presented as :

\[
E(P_k) \leq \bar{P}(1 - \frac{1}{E(\varepsilon_{f_{jk}}^2)} + \ldots + \frac{1}{E(\varepsilon_{f_{jk}}^2)} + \Gamma).
\]

(34)

\( E(\varepsilon_{f_{jk}}^2) \) over available channels can be obtained by

\[
E(\min(h'_j, \alpha_i), i \in \{1, \ldots, L\}) = h'_j \alpha_i
\]

as follows. If \( h'_{jl} \) is defined as the channel gain between the user \( i \) and jammer through sub-channel \( I \), \( F(\varepsilon_{f_{jk}}^2 \leq z|\alpha_j, \ldots, \alpha_N) \) over \( N \) users and \( L - 1 \) available channels follows

\[
F(\varepsilon_{f_{jk}}^2 \leq z|\alpha_j, \ldots, \alpha_N) = F(h'_j \alpha_i \leq z|\alpha_j, \ldots, \alpha_N)
\]

\[
\frac{1}{N} \left( F(\min(\frac{h'_j \alpha_i}{\alpha_i^2}, \forall I \in \{1, \ldots, L - 1\}, \forall I \in \mathcal{X} \leq z) + \ldots + F(\min(\frac{h'_j \alpha_i}{\alpha_i^2}, \forall I \in \text{remaining } L - N \text{ channels} \leq z) \right)
\]

\[
= 1 - (\prod_{k=1}^{N} \frac{e^{-\lambda(L-1)\alpha_i^2/k}}{N}) + \ldots + 1 - (e^{-(L-N)z})^N,
\]

(35)

\[
f(z) = \frac{1}{N} \left( \sum_{k=1}^{N} e^{-\lambda(L-1)\varepsilon_{f_{ik}}^2} \sum_{k=2}^{N} (\frac{x_{ik}^2}{x_{jk}^2}) \right) + \ldots + \left( \lambda(L - N)e^{-\lambda(L-N)z} \right),
\]

(36)

and as a result

\[
\Xi(z) = \sum_{k=1}^{N-1} \frac{1}{\lambda N(N - k_1)(L - 1 - k_1)}
\]

which proves Proposition 2.
where than since the power is quantified that in Algorithm 2, we rewrite

\[ F(\xi_{k,N}^2) \leq z(\xi_{c1},...,\xi_{cN}) \]

over available channels can be obtained using
\[ \mathbb{E}(\min(h_{\xi_{c1}}^2, i \in (1,...,L)), h_{\xi_{c1}}^2) = \frac{h_{\xi_{c1}}^2}{\mathcal{W}_{\xi_{c1}}} \]. If \( h'_{\xi_{c1}} \) is defined as the channel gain between the user \( i \) and AP through sub-channel \( l \), \( F(\xi_{k,N}^2) \leq z(\xi_{c1},...,\xi_{cN}) \) over \( N \) users and \( L - 1 \) available channels follows

\[ F(\xi_{k,N}^2) = \frac{1}{N} \left( F\left( \max \left( \frac{h_{\xi_{c1}}^2}{\mathcal{W}_{\xi_{c1}}}, \forall l \in (1,...,L), \forall i \in \mathcal{X} \right) \right) + \ldots + F\left( \max \left( \frac{h_{\xi_{c1}}^2}{\mathcal{W}_{\xi_{c1}}}, \forall l \in \text{remained} \ L_1 - N + 1 \text{ channels} \right) \right) \right) \]

\[ = \frac{1}{N} \left( \left( 1 - e^{-\frac{L_{k,l}}{\mathcal{W}_{\xi_{c1}}}} \right)^{L_1} \right) + \left( 1 - e^{-\frac{L_{k,l}}{\mathcal{W}_{\xi_{c1}}}} \right)^{L_1-1} \ldots + \left( 1 - e^{-\frac{L_{k,l}}{\mathcal{W}_{\xi_{c1}}}} \right) \]

and the PDF of \( z \) follows

\[ f(z) = \sum_{k=0}^{L_1} \sum_{k=0}^{L_1-1} \ldots \frac{L_1}{k_1} \left( \frac{L_1}{k_N} \right) z_{X_1} e^{-\alpha z_{X_1} (1-1)} (1+y_1) \]

\[ \sum_{k=0}^{L_1-1} \sum_{k=0}^{L_1-1-1} \ldots \frac{L_1-1}{k_1} \left( \frac{L_1-1}{k_N-1} \right) z_{X_2} e^{-\alpha z_{X_1} (1-1)} (1+y_2) \]

\[ \ldots \sum_{k=0}^{L_1-N+1} \left( \frac{L_1-N+1}{k_1} \right) z_{X_N} e^{-\alpha z_{X_1} (1-1)} (1+y_N) \]

where \( x_1 = k_1^{\frac{L_1}{k_1}} + \ldots + k_{N-1}^{\frac{L_1}{k_1}}, y_1 = k_1 + \ldots + k_N, x_2 = k_1^{\frac{L_1-1}{k_1}} + \ldots + k_{N-1}^{\frac{L_1-1}{k_1}}, y_2 = k_1 + \ldots + k_{N-1}, \ldots, x_N = k_1, and \]
\( y_N = k_1, \) is sum of exponential functions having different means. Thus, \( \mathbb{E}(z) \) leads to (24), which proves Proposition 5.

D. Proof of Proposition 7

After determining the victim channel, the reward function changes to

\[ R(d) = w_1 \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\hat{P} - d_i^2) \frac{h_{i}^2}{\bar{P}_w} - w_3 \sum_{i=1}^{N} d_i^2, \]

since the power is quantified that in Algorithm 2, we rewrite (33) as a function of the allocated power from each user into the victim channel,\( P_t = d_i^2, i \in \mathcal{X}. \) Thus, \( R(\cdot) \) can be rewritten as

\[ R(p) = w_1 \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\hat{P} - P_i) \frac{h_{i}^2}{\bar{P}_w} - w_3 \sum_{i=1}^{N} P_i. \]

Now, assuming that the power allocation corresponding to the highest obtained rewards is \( p^* = [P_1^*, ..., P_N^*], \) and \( p^" = [P_1^**, ..., P_N^**] \) is a power allocation that returns a lower reward than \( p^*, \) i.e. \( R(p^*) \geq R(p^"), \) if we show that for every \( \vartheta, \)

where \( \vartheta = [\vartheta_1, ..., \vartheta_N], R(p^* + \vartheta) \geq R(p^* + \vartheta) \) holds, we can prove that the optimum point is in the neighborhood of \( p^* \). To this end, if we prove that \( R(p^* + \vartheta) - R(p^" + \vartheta) \geq 0 \) always holds, we obtain our desired result.

\[ R(p^* + \vartheta) = w_1 N - \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\hat{P}W_3 + \hat{h}_{c1}^2) (P_i^* + \vartheta), \]

\[ R(p^* + \vartheta) = w_1 N - \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\hat{P}W_3 + \hat{h}_{c1}^2) (P_i^* + \vartheta). \]

\[ R(p^* + \vartheta) - R(p^" + \vartheta) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\hat{P}W_3 + \hat{h}_{c1}^2) (P_i^* - P_i^**). \]

Here, (43) is always greater than zero due to the result of the considered assumption i.e. \( (R(p^*)) \geq (R(p^")). \)

\[ R(p^*) \geq R(p^") \rightarrow \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\hat{P}W_3 + \hat{h}_{c1}^2) (P_i^* - P_i^**) \geq 0. \]

Moreover, since the quantization step of the power is \( \Omega_{TD}, \) when \( |\vartheta| \geq \Omega_{TD}, \) \( p^* + \vartheta \) can be replaced by another power set with \( |\vartheta| \leq \Omega_{TD}. \) Hence, the fact that \( R(p^* + \vartheta) \geq R(p^* + \vartheta) \) and \( \vartheta \leq \Omega_{TD} \) holds, leads to the point that the optimal power set, which we denote \( p^* - \Omega_{TD} \), is obtained from \( p^* - \Omega_{TD} \leq p^* \leq \Omega_{TD} \). Moreover, in the next iteration of SRL, the resolution is increased and \( p^* - \Omega_{TD} \leq p \leq p^* + \Omega_{TD} \) is covered with a higher resolution. As a result, since this process is valid for the further iterations of SRL, a sub-optimal power allocation can be achieved such that the error is bounded according to the final quantization step i.e. \( (p^* - \Omega_{TD} \leq p^* \leq p^* + \Omega_{TD}) \).

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