Impact of Green Financing on Carbon Drifts to Mitigate Climate Change: Mediating Role of Energy Efficiency

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Climate change mitigation (CCM) has not been mainly understood and assessed in the terms of carbon drifts persisting at provincial level of China, and to respond the question that how green financing is better financing option for CCM. Thus, our study intends to test the role of green finance on carbon drifts to manage for the mitigation of climate change. For this, unit root test and panel co-integration technique is applied. Study findings reported that the intricate connection between place-and-time-specific GHG emission reduction responsibilities is significant with 18% and the ‘production’, trading and consumption of carbon allowances with 21% and offsets across vast time-space stretches related carbon drift is significant with 19.5% for climate change mitigation. For such significance, green financing is found imperative indicators which is significant at 27.1% with carbon drifts, and mitigates the climate change with 31.3%, which is, relatively high than usual climate change control practices. Our study also provides detailed policy implication on this topicality for associated stakeholder.

Keywords: green financing, carbon drifts, climate change mitigation, GHG emission, energy frontiers

INTRODUCTION

Climate change mitigation strategies were extensively studied by the previous researchers. The green financing aimed at mitigating the climate change by decreasing the carbon drifts do not reach their envisioned effects. There is a need to identify the nexus between green financing, carbon drifts and climate change mitigation, and present the policy guidelines for key stakeholders if suggested policy measures applied effectively, are expected to enhance climate control and during the crises periods. However, this is the motivation of recent study (Yang et al., 2021), (He et al., 2020) and (Mohsin et al., 2020b). Environment has been changing rapidly since the mid-1990s, but this is particularly true now throughout the world. Various procedures and tactics are proposed and put into practice at various scales in order to lessen the impact of climate change (Tiep et al., 2021). While many activities and techniques have an apparent state focus, states should really have important entertainers, foundations, and phases for environmental change planning and mitigation implementation. Other groupings, less obviously connected to the nations, do, however, emerge. According to this article, the carbon strategy and execution is one of the biggest new businesses to deal with climate change (Ikram et al., 2019a), (Liu et al., 2021) and (Shah et al., 2019).

Environmental insurance has been using monetary and market organizations for over 30 years, even before carbon advertising were popular. It has been shown that the so-called state deception: state deficiencies in the arrangement of ecological aggregate commodities has been tried using different monetary and market instruments, components and foundations (Chang et al., 2020),
Disappointments to the state include high prices, inadequate adequacy, a lack of mechanical advancement limitations, and low authenticity (Ikram et al., 2019a), (Sun et al., 2019) and (Ikram et al., 2019b). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, several industrialized countries began implementing environmental taxes, fees, and restoration efforts. Afterwards, payments for natural administrations and marketable emissions rights were included in the plan as well (Sun et al., 2020b) and (Baloch et al., 2020). Market-based policies and institutions as well as environmental change were coordinated and created by the state by the mid-1990s and did not often transcend public boundaries. However, at the turn of the following thousand years, things seemed to have changed dramatically. In the context of environmental change, the development of international carbon markets is probably the most compelling proof that market modulation is not now limited to what (Baloch et al., 2020) calls the “country State holder.” In the past 10 years, several carbon markets have emerged and are increasingly linked. In 2010, the global carbon markets were worth $142 billion, more than twice what they were in 2007. New financial institutions are being designed and implemented to help with global environmental change (Sun et al., 2020c), (Sun H. et al., 2020) and (Sun et al., 2020b). Environmental law issues are developed throughout time by, though, and for business sectors, according to Newell and Paterson (2009: 80). Worldwide market grounds for limiting climate change are under attack, and debates are sure to heat up if the present financial crisis makes everyone aware of the global financial system’s vulnerability (Chandio et al., 2020) and (Sun H. et al., 2020).

Green finance is a rapidly growing sector in China, reshaping the financial system (Alemzero et al., 2020b), (Sun H. et al., 2020) and (Alemzero et al., 2020a). Notwithstanding its popularity in recent years, green finance remains a complex topic. Green finance refers to financial investments made specially to promote environmental protection. Green finance includes green asset financing, green loans, and green investing. The private sector may help finance environmental projects that the government doesn’t fund sufficiently. Environmental degradation is more probable in poorer countries, necessitating significant green financing initiatives. Developing country governments may create and implement policies that promote green finance. Green bonds are increasingly being used to provide long-term financing of environmental projects. Green bonds are long-term investments that benefit the environment while providing a regular income. These bonds typically come with tax advantages to encourage adoption and bridge the green funding gap. Emerging markets are worried about green finance (MacAskill et al., 2020). To promote long-term sustainable growth, this proposal proposed establishing a green financing system. Shareholders prefer green bonds because they can increase the company’s long-term value. However, numerous practical micro and meso level difficulties persist (Agyekum et al., 2021) and (Zhang et al., 2021). Green finance laws govern loan availability in less developed financial ecosystems and state-owned enterprises. China leads the way in adopting green credit regulations. Green finance should utilize existing bank and corporate relationships as well as current technology (Bodnar et al., 2018) and (Yu and Solvang, 2020). Carbon emission-based green finance schemes often benefit both companies and suppliers. Green finance helps the industrial sector as well. In conclusion, the positive relationship between green finance instruments and business innovation makes green finance a promising tool for China’s transition to intelligent and sustainable manufacturing (Liu and Wu, 2019). Global capital market monitoring of green bonds is helping China develop a more dynamic green finance ecosystem (Gerlagh et al., 2018).

Green management is vital to Chinese banks. Companies with comprehensive green management strategies may get larger credit lines (Karpinska and Śmiech, 2020). State-owned Chinese banks are quickly gaining the lead in green lending markets. This advantage comes at a cost, since private banks outperform state-owned banks in green lending. State-owned banks must take on greater risk to fulfill green finance policy objectives. To achieve long-term environmental benefits, banks should promote green financing based on proven technology and stable pricing. Tech-dependent financial systems and value chains should be included into green finance laws.

Thus, a major objective of this research is to examine the role of carbon drifts on climate change mitigation, as new institutions for mitigating environmental change in light of this background information. Extending to it, the intent is to examine that how green financing contributes to handle the carbon drifts for climate change control is the extended objective of this research. Three issues are addressed in this piece: Who is responsible for the reversal and implementation of the worldwide carbon markets? Has the carbon market devolved into nothing more than a monetary institution, or can it still be considered a tool to combat climate change? Furthermore, in the event of a framework (closer) collapse, carbon markets may become as powerless as the monetary system. These questions bring a valuable empirical contribution in the field of study. However, studying the novel impact of green financing on carbon drifts for climate change also extends the theoretical debate and contributes in theoretical side. Correspondingly, the study begins by urging readers to adopt a critical viewpoint when looking at carbon markets as organizations that provide respite from the effects of climate change. It is therefore necessary to talk about the present status of global carbon markets, disputes, and issues. Lastly, in order to address the questions raised, the carbon market’s management often draws on similarities with the financial services industry.

**REVIEW OF LITERATURE**

The first thing that was definitely looked at were market tools and structures for public natural management, particularly following market deception studies similar to the root cause of contemporary environmental issues. However, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, there were significant discussions and disputes about and resistance to market arrangements in the government’s control of natural and environmental change. As natural modernization ideas and models evolved, the emphasis shifted...
from whether financial entertainers and companies can best contribute to management capacity to how, where and how much they can offer to financial/monetary/private entertainers in ecological and environmental governance. The scope of this study was broadened to cover private administrative problems, public-private organizations, non-government market administration, and other topics (Chang 2020).

A new cycle of debates often revolves around the concept of neo-liberalization of nature, in spite of these advances, particularly when it comes to ecological and environmental international management. An example of this is fish, biodiversity, timelands and water (as well as now carbon) that are being sold, privatized and unjustly allocated by executive organizations. Carbon markets are the most recent manifestation of these natural neo-liberalization cycles, according to geology. Environmental scientists emphasize the potential consequences of the ecology-building market, where neo-liberalization of nature writing is essential. In spite of this, both emphasize the same sentiment: “neo-liberal capitalism will offer the unique and proven secondary scenario where movements need to be made. For example, they must support commercial and financial neo-radicalism dedicated to clear performers whose systems should be linked with environmental security. There is a lot of evidence to support this. The ideas of organizations and streams have been utilized for some time now to recognize new global foundations and practices, as well as ecological relief in the two civilizations. Vehicle frameworks, business locations in cities, biodiversity/ nature, biofuel, practical fish exchange (Zhang et al., 2021), (Hsu et al., 2021) and (Ehsanullah et al., 2021).

An article by (Amirteimoori et al., 2020) on SDG finance emphasized the nations’ incapacity to progress towards SDG funding. AAP focuses on how to utilize financial systems to promote sustainable economic growth. Despite recent progress, several nations may miss the 2030 target. The capital market must be re-aligned with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. Global financial markets must be reoriented to guarantee SDGs are reached by 2030, says the newest UN Global Compact study.

China’s green financial system has grown since the Chinese government established rules in 2015. Table 1 presents the basic empirical figures of the study. Green bonds accounted for 18% of global issuance in 2018, making China the world’s second largest provider after the United States. Green credit totaled 8.29 trillion yuan in 2017. For 6.2 billion yuan, the main and secondary spot markets exchanged 282 Mt of carbon in 2018.

This field’s research needs to be enhanced. The current paucity of non-fossil energy production is owing to higher unit costs. The long-term co-integration equation shows that wind, solar, and nuclear energy may reduce CO2 emissions. A large investment with a long payback time. Flexible and diverse service plans should be created to assist non-fossil energy companies. Low-interest green loans for non-fossil energy projects should be strengthened to decrease financing needs for inspection and approval. Aside from tax incentives and pretax payments, non-fossil businesses should also be eligible for voluntary bad debt write-offs (Hu and Chang 2021).

Organizational and stream humanism is not so much an assumption as it is an understanding of the present global environment. Organizations and streams are often thought of as the new building blocks of global innovation. For the most part, they are distinguished by strong and durable links that show the “directional” flexibility of streams, which is dictated by the region’s suitable limits (Li et al., 2020). This was the prevailing mindset prior to globalization. In GINs, links between centers or hubs in various places are extremely stable, suffering and unexpected, with blocked stream pathways in general. In spite of the fact that place-based anchoring prevents GINs from being free, they overstep public bounds and become such. “The items are unsurprised, measurable, systematic and standardized” the results in all hubs are similar and restricted to nearby circumstances. Large international partnerships (such as Shell) are normal models, as are agritourism’s and networks of common society (Taghizadeh-Hesary and Yoshino 2020).

Worldwide fluids are instances of spatial structures that are not organized with limits or generally stable relations, but with enormous flexibility, fluidity, gel-like development and penetrable restrictions that are very fluid and fluid-like in nature (Yu et al., 2021). When it comes to liquids, there is no obvious starting point or appearance, no logical sequential dependency, simply reterritorialized development with no apparent end-state or objective in sight. People moving, money, the internet, and societal development are all prevalent paradigms today. No matter how reterritorialized the global GINs and liquid financial data may be, free and stateless people such as (Zha et al., 2020) among others, have outlined that such streams should be prepared.

It is the admittance, consideration, avoidance, and management of streams that define the network’s strength. Streams may occur everywhere, and power dynamics inside the organization can affect this. As stated by (Ahmad et al., 2021), the powerful elites have sway over global money, capital, and data, putting them in a position to control change and formulating of global financial markets.

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Table 1: Individual Indicator Index

| Country | CC %  | CD* | Country | CC%  | CD* |
|---------|-------|-----|---------|------|-----|
| Zhejiang| 0.34  | 1.32| Fujian  | 0.47 | 7.61|
| Henan   | 0.30  | 2.56| Jiangsu | 0.10 | 1.46|
| Guangdong| 0.21 | 3.52| Hunan  | 3.33 | 1.44|
| Hainan  | 0.47  | 2.15| Hebei   | 2.15 | 2.54|
| Sichuan | 0.81  | 3.16| Anhui  | 2.81 | 6.22|
| Shandong| 0.32  | 4.34| Hubei  | 3.17 | 3.26|
| Yunnan  | 0.39  | 4.59| Gansu  | 6.81 | 2.60|
| Guizhou | 0.19  | 3.10| Jiangxi | 2.34 | 2.85|
| Shanxi  | 0.77  | 0.71| Liaoning| 0.56 | 3.17|
| Heilongjiang| 0.23 | 0.67| Shanxi  | 0.99 | 0.22|
| Qinghai | 0.78  | 0.43| Tianjin | 0.71 | 1.14|
| Jilin   | 0.14  | 2.22| Beijing| 0.88 | 5.61|
| Shanghai| 0.45  | 3.14| Chongqing| 0.91| 0.12|

Source: RE, worldometer.com, GDP; World Bank statistics.
oversight at the expense of the general public who do not have access. However, these organizations also “structure” power positions in regard to the mobility of streams, as well as access “rights” to streams and the severity of restrictions on various types of streams. States have varying abilities to direct movement as one of the force compartments (MacAskill et al., 2020). Even while nations continue to be major sponsors of entertainment, they are unable to define social norms and standards in the age of globalization. States are less inclined to control the speed, structure, context, and consequences of various streams as a result of global interconnected networks. Governments and management lose ground to global liquids as time goes on. Nation-state exercises seldom transport worldwide liquids, and state specialists aren’t needed to develop the skills needed to organize socio-material networks. International streams and organizations are increasingly fundamental ideas for comprehending current practices and foundations. International borderless streams and organizations, particularly within a country-society sector, fundamentally complement— if not sometimes replace—the potential of high limits and set groupings. Carbon markets make use of this idea of streams and organizations as a foundation for mitigating climate change (Chen et al., 2021).

Trading or remittance of nursery gas or credits gained by not producing ozone-depleting chemicals (balances) may take place in carbon markets, which act as a regulatory framework. It’s important to have a broad discussion about this since there isn’t a single global credit and remittance market (as intended for monetary capital), but rather a variety of different economic sectors that are increasingly linked and merged. Often, deliberate carbon displays and consistent carbon markets are identified (see Table 1). These carbon markets are still very different in terms of size, combination, improvement, and management since we are presenting them individually. Administrative and consistency markets are more rooted, coordinated and represented by the state and the EU, while willing enterprises are mainly more organized, more non-state, and sometimes without any integrated surveillance and are known as the “Wild West” of the carbon market (a reference to the Wild West of the American West) (Ling et al., 2020). It’s important to note that in the context of deliberate carbon markets, all purchases of carbon credits are considered. Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX; founded in 2003 and the main private operational framework) and the broader non-restrictive over-the-counter balanced market are currently the two major economic sectors with a clear aim (where trade happens between two private gatherings without being accounted for to administrative specialists). The CCX is a system for the discharge and exchange of ozone-depleting ozone-based substances that is optional, but also legally restricted. People with large GHG emissions have made a conscious decision to decrease emissions using set rates and education (Yu et al., 2020).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Construction of Study Variables

Environmental degradation is posing a significant problem for civilization in the future years, with climate change being a key cause for concern. In order to combat climate change, we think that promoting investments and funding in green energy initiatives is critical. A significant factor in reducing pollution is funding for environmentally friendly energy sources including solar photovoltaic, wind power generators, hydrogen and geothermal. Notably, these innovations provide a practical means of reducing pollution, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and halting climate change. As a result, it’s critical to evaluate green finance’s contribution to pollution reduction via the use of an index that measures it. The green finance index was created by combining many variables from various sources (see Table 1). To assess the impact of green finance on environmental pollution mitigation, a cross-section of developing and developed nations was chosen. Proxies of green financing like renewable energy R and D and FDI were used to assess the financial elements of achieving zero emissions in nations. The authors also claim creating and using a low-carbon/green finance index is necessary for addressing the various nations’ environmental and financial elements and for proposing an appropriate path ahead for future decision-making. As a result, the green finance index serves an important purpose in helping to reduce environmental problems like carbon emissions. These measurements help key stakeholders and other potential decision-makers plan and implement their plans by providing them with fresh, relevant information on environmental problems (Mohsin et al., 2019), (Mohsin et al., 2020a) and (Mohsin et al., 2021).

Green finance is becoming more popular in developing nations, as shown by the 36% growth in renewable energy sources reported by (Igogo et al., 2021). After a 17 percent yearly increase in green finance in 2014, this is the second major increase in green financing since then. FDI and green funding of R and D in the energy industry, both of which seek to reduce CO2 emissions and other forms of pollution, are thus very important. Therefore, any initiatives that promote a decrease in carbon emissions have positive weights in Table 1, which is what you’ll see there. The green finance index aids in finding methods of reducing pollution caused by various types of energy systems and sources. It is because the energy sector contributes significantly to CO2 emissions that it is included in the index as a way to gauge sustainable development, according to Shen et al. (2021).

Empirical Estimation Strategy

In this study, we used DEA like composite indicator estimation method to assess the empirical findings. Different databases were used to collect the study data, such as, OECD databank, World bank database and EU database from 2016 to 2020. The DEA like composite indicator method is the most modern and diverse multi-criteria decision analysis to infer the study outputs with weighted-average based approach. Correspondingly, this technique is one of the fine methods used for the empirical assessment of financing constructs (e.g., green financing), and environmental dimensions (e.g., climate change and carbon drifts). Prior to this, the DEA like estimation technique is used
by the Farooq et al. (2021) to estimate the weights for sum, as drawn in following equations:

\[ b_{ij} = \min \sum_{j=1}^{n} w_{ij} f_{ij} \]

\[ s.t. \ b_{ij} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} w_{ij} f_{ij} \leq 1, k = 1, 2, \ldots, m \]

\[ w_{ij}^b \geq 0, j = 1, 2, \ldots, n \]

(1)

To promote the aggregation and weighting method for the constructs in this study (Da Costa and Popović 2020) approach is utilized. Similarly, this approach is also used by many researchers before this. This technique also has some limitations specially to find the score of respective entities.

\[ g_{i} = \max \sum_{j=1}^{n} w_{ij}^g f_{ij} \]

\[ s.t. g_{i} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} w_{ij}^g f_{ij} \leq 1, k = 1, 2, \ldots, m \]

\[ w_{ij}^g \geq 0, j = 1, 2, \ldots, n \]

(2)

DEA using many input variables with constant output variables leads to poor inference and accuracy, according to. To evaluate the performance of variables in DEA with many inputs and numerous outputs, several authors recommend using an index-based method. We may utilise Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 along with the operationalized green finance index to investigate nations’ index-based performance. Addition of index-based measurements in equation (Mohsin et al., 2020) for the calculation of the green finance index follows this approach more logically ,

\[(CI)\lambda = \lambda g_{i} - g_{i} + (1 - \lambda) b_{i} - b_{i} \]

Where

\[ g_{i} = \max \{ g_{i}, i = 1, 2, 3, \ldots, m \} \]

\[ g_{i} = \min \{ g_{i}, i = 1, 2, 3, \ldots, m \} \]

And

\[ b_{i} = \max \{ b_{i}, i = 1, 2, 3, \ldots, m \} \]

\[ b_{i} = \min \{ b_{i}, i = 1, 2, 3, \ldots, m \} \]

(3)

Because of this, the contribution limit of 5%, 20% was used to meet the lower and upper bounds (5). It is created by combining indicators such as R and D, financial index, renewable production, and energy output with a financial risk index to create the green finance index. The green finance index shows a decrease in Emissions of co2 based on certain metrics or indices (e.g., an environmental degradation measure) . The above-mentioned model’s results on the weights used to build the basic indicator’s parts are deemed unrealistic due to their low discriminating power. With no restrictions on how much each indication was worth, it was determined only by looking at real data. As a result, some indications may be overlooked during the aggregate process. The MCDA-DEA global weighted model may be used to solve this problem (3). Let’s say there’s a variable that indicates how much the entity deviates from unity in terms of efficiency.
and decarbonization strategy objectives (Azad et al., 2021) hoped to encourage greater use of CDM’s yearly carbon income. Wara (2008) have submitted a similar proposal for automated CDM, but they also criticize CDM for failing to keep non-Annex I nations affiliated and responsible for their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol (an outlook consistently ventilated by among others the United States government). According to some designers, CDM is a waste of time in the battle against global warming. For the first and second periods up to 2012, numerous plan flaws are also recognized in the EU ETS with regard to CDM. In the EU ETS, public distribution will be set up in a decentralized framework, allowing the states to set their own reward amounts. In addition, the EU ETS rejects certain large transmission areas (see Figure 1), such as the aluminum sector and flights, emanation covers, and exchange areas (Li et al., 2021).

In addition, the EU ETS only covers CO2 emissions and then directs them. And in addition, the EUAs for nothi gases have been allocated. Phase III of the ETS (2016–2020) is expected to resolve some of these issues due to the European Commission bolstering its administrative capabilities. Some of these goals may be found in United States frameworks for international trade as well. A second discussion arrangement explores the natural foundations of carbon exchange markets, further enhancing these remarks on the design and operationalization of carbon markets. The main question is: Are the many administrative and purposeful carbon displays really connected and environmentally sound, or are they just monetary/monetary sectors in which benefits completely overcome natural rationalities? The findings of this study have been widely disseminated by environmental NGOs, natural experts, and academics that advocate for changes to the carbon market institutions.

When carbon credits are given out in excess without resulting in any reductions, a small number of specialists question that estimate of resources. This may lead to a decrease in the value of carbon loans as a result of the uncertainty (see Table 2). Private UN-supported carbon reviewers are working to establish trust in the system to solve this issue (much the same as credit score firms in the monetary framework). It’s been suggested by some researchers that the carbon market argument gives extra cash to projects that are already funded but only benefit the real money players (such as money foundations and large mechanical businesses). The carbon market, like the derivative monetary sector, will continue to inspire innovators to look for and create new things in order to enjoy what is to come (see Table 3). Meanwhile, the CDM Executive Board is becoming stricter when it comes to assisting businesses who can show such research had an impact (see Figure 2). When assessing value shifts in carbon markets, the question of whether we have an ecological market or only a financial market leads to discussions about the need for frameworks that are linked to the point of natural assurance (reductions in discharges) or that place an emphasis on the value of the management board and protect a company from significant costs. Since the EUA oversupply and ensuing monetary and financial crisis, the ETS value of the EU has fluctuated significantly (between USD 10 and USD 30 per t CO2e) (mid 2009). Legislators, examiners, and dealers have all

| Country | GFI | Country | GFI |
|---------|-----|---------|-----|
| Zhejiang | 0.51 | Fujian | 0.45 |
| Henan | 0.43 | Jiangsu | 0.54 |
| Guangdong | 0.33 | Hunan | 0.60 |
| Hainan | 0.41 | Hebei | 0.24 |
| Sichuan | 0.56 | Anhui | 0.17 |
| Shandong | 0.34 | Hubei | 0.32 |
| Yunnan | 0.21 | Gansu | 0.66 |
| Guizhou | 0.49 | Jiangxi | 0.14 |
| Shanxi | 0.47 | Liaoning | 0.89 |
| Henan | 0.64 | Shanxi | 0.11 |
| Qinghai | 0.51 | Tianjin | 0.30 |
| Jilin | 0.31 | Beijing | 0.76 |
| Shanghai | 0.68 | Chongqing | 0.32 |

FIGURE 1 | Change in study constructs over the period of 2016–2020.

TABLE 2 | Green Finance Index.
called for value floors, coverings, and hallways, as well as a direct-stock Carbon National Bank.

Whatever the case may be, the European Commission has been adamantly opposed to any market intervention based on natural arguments up to this point. Carbon markets have developed from direct and simple purchases and sales of credits (currently less than 33% of the risk volume associated with carbon emissions) to globally standardized and complex monetary markets, as previously stated. Carbon markets like this divorce carbon credits and reductions from on-the-ground temporal settings. Emblematic tokens (CERs, VERs, INFs, and EUAs) have replaced CO2 emissions in global trade sectors, and are now marketable across enormous egalitarian distances (and the topic of “neo-liberalization of nature” research). To drive the carbon market forward, monetary and special exchanges will be increasingly essential starting in 2009 (see Table 4). It coincides with and is also a result of increasing private monetary power on carbon markets today (including many other carbon traders JPMorgan, Barclays and Dresdner Kleinwort firmly joining this market).

There are two main outcomes to all of this. Carbon market performers initially have difficulty connecting traded incentives and credits with particular CO2 outflows. For this reason, the carbon market is growing, taking into account everything that requires modern registration techniques and frameworks, such as risk and vulnerability assessments and protection frameworks, as well as calculations, confirmations, and inspections, in order to stay private (see Table 5). Consequently, a fast-growing collection of rules and methods may be found in the study and the voluntary offset market, as well as sophisticated estimation philosophies and vaults for carbon emissions data.

| Provinces | Green financing | Carbon drifts | Climate change |
|-----------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Zhejiang  | 0.359 0.063    | 0.426 0.929    | 0.994 0.632    |
| Henan     | 0.454 0.794    | 0.747 0.438    | 0.784 0.963    |
| Guangdong | 0.230 0.397    | 0.219 0.298    | 0.251 0.861    |
| Hainan    | 0.550 0.026    | 0.621 0.372    | 0.698 0.962    |
| Sichuan   | 0.416 0.803    | 0.416 0.046    | 0.327 0.245    |
| Shanxi    | 0.514 0.521    | 0.305 0.266    | 0.5796 0.517   |
| Yunnan    | 0.226 0.014    | 0.211 0.723    | 0.278 0.119    |
| Guizhou   | 0.120 0.996    | 0.402 0.666    | 0.328 0.932    |
| Shanxi    | 0.240 0.296    | 0.013 0.416    | 0.905 0.936    |
| Heilongjiang | 0.015 0.077  | 0.846 0.223    | 0.655 0.627    |
| Qinghai   | 0.139 0.744    | 0.367 0.133    | 0.092 0.723    |
| Jilin     | 0.704 0.231    | 0.384 0.727    | 0.911 0.911    |
| Shanghui  | 0.008 0.986    | 0.253 0.442    | 0.068 0.033    |
| Fujian    | 0.039 0.678    | 0.698 0.413    | 0.182 0.752    |
| Jiangsu   | 0.469 0.188    | 0.342 0.934    | 0.794 0.763    |
| Hunan     | 0.310 0.379    | 0.942 0.111    | 0.509 0.5929   |
| Hebei     | 0.006 0.139    | 0.942 0.517    | 0.407 0.497    |
| Anhui     | 0.118 0.434    | 0.611 0.332    | 0.111 0.046    |
| Hubei     | 0.084 0.118    | 0.678 0.208    | 0.139 0.471    |
| Gansu     | 0.094 0.235    | 0.879 0.939    | 0.583 0.135    |
| Jiangxi   | 0.155 0.3465   | 0.375 0.315    | 0.854 0.459    |
| Liaoning  | 0.501 0.225    | 0.792 0.666    | 0.351 0.402    |
| Shanxi    | 0.325 0.405    | 0.545 0.089    | 0.105 0.935    |
| Tianjin   | 0.332 0.706    | 0.559 0.174    | 0.744 0.457    |
| Beijing   | 0.004 0.254    | 0.505 0.414    | 0.226 0.132    |
| Chongqing | 0.026 0.248    | 0.483 0.418    | 0.389 0.499    |

| Study indicators | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Green financing  | 0.4616 | 0.1541 | 0.0038 | 0.1991 | 0.0056 |
| Green energy     | 0.0742 | 0.0059 | 0.1129 | 0.2487 | 0.0715 |
| Carbon emission index | 0.9729 | 0.1046 | 0.6918 | 0.0482 | 0.0974 |
| Forest area      | 0.0166 | 0.1207 | 0.0994 | 0.2954 | 0.5609 |
| Financing index  | 0.0055 | 0.0126 | 0.1192 | 0.0534 | 0.4671 |
| R and D           | 0.1404 | 0.6713 | 0.9698 | 0.3724 | 0.1493 |
| Human capital     | 0.5149 | 0.0345 | 0.0037 | 0.1621 | 0.7209 |
| Provincial-level GDP | 0.0352 | 0.0877 | 0.0803 | 0.1803 | 0.3774 |
| Carbon drifts at provincial level | 0.5363 | 0.0013 | 0.0201 | 0.5588 | 0.9943 |
| Public supports   | 0.0564 | 0.2045 | 0.5257 | 0.0301 | 0.0422 |
| FDI               | 0.2965 | 0.3988 | 0.2132 | 0.0552 | 0.0328 |
| Private financing | 0.0555 | 0.0505 | 0.4574 | 0.0046 | 0.3618 |
| Fuel pollution emission | 0.1964 | 0.2048 | 0.1791 | 0.0181 | 0.2074 |

FIGURE 2 | Green financing index outputs.
Sensitivity Analysis

As expressed in terms of additionally (decreases in GHG) under the CDM, the following dispute exists: ozone depletion discharges of chemicals and extra-currency speculations need to be further reduced or avoided in CDM projects (and the obtained CERs sold). The majority of CDM projects have been conducted without regard to the CDM objectives, as shown by the current usage of additional rules in project approval and the allegation that many/the majority of CERs are “hot air”. These future conditions often become excessively high, resulting in a ridiculous outflow of CERSs in terms of carbon balances, thus standards for additionally must also be based on analysis. This satisfies the current institutional spread’s control and capacity constraints for a particularly complicated global carbon market.

The fact that events continue to take place in both the public and private sectors means that the libraries, confirmation conventions, accreditation principles, and guidelines have not yet been fully harmonized. This means that future theoretical exchanges, like CERSs and EUAs, will be more secure as a result. As the Usgaocar and de Groot (2008) noted, some players question when full assurance will be offered and if the carbon market can be trusted. It’s also safe to say that the theoretical carbon ads are more vulnerable (see Figure 3).

DISCUSSION

When it comes to understanding and predicting large and abrupt changes or drops in the climate change framework, governments may even anticipate them. Whatever the case may be, we must exercise caution when accepting complex explanations for a (soon) new global monetary system. According to Iqbal et al. (2021), this scenario may be attributed to the complexity of carbon drifts and climate change infrastructure, as a whole. In the first place, the charge of complexity often implies that the current monetary structures and cycles are not being held accountable because they are not immediately perceptible. Aside from that, the study supports the facts that complexity is a genuine explanation for the incomprehension of monetary entertainers; that organization is complex and therefore reified; and that those financial organizers who have the ability to shape a real financial world are free of any responsibility or faults. Public and private actors lose responsibility and accountability in monetary framework if complexity is cited as the primary reason. For this study, it is not the particular complexity that should be blamed, but rather the way the monetary framework (the so-called New Financial Architecture) is organized, developed, and controlled by the overarching entertainment company.

International developments in monetary-business sectors have been accompanied by government liberation, increased strength for major money entertainers, and explicitly built characteristics: unreasonable impulses (e.g., rewards) that create extreme risks, advances in intricate monetary items that could never be accurately estimated, banks maintaining dangerous monetary items instead of protecting them; hazardous things. The financial crisis of 2008/2009 should not

| TABLE 5 | Quintile test for robustness analysis. |
| Indicators | Estimated Outputs |
| --- | --- |
| Carbon emission index t-1 | 0.532 |
| Wald test | (0.11)* |
| p-value | 0.29 |
| Green Financing t-1 | 2.23 |
| Wald test | (0.000) |
| p-value | 0.00 |
| Renewable electricity output t-1 | 0.334 |
| Wald test | (0.20)* |
| p-value | 0.16 |
| GDP | 2.59 |
| Wald test | (2.01) |
| p-value | (0.000) |

Note: p-value for significance is *p < 0.05.

![FIGURE 3 | Periodic estimates of study constructs over the period of inquiry.](image-url)
be attributed to monetary complexity, but rather to the way the present monetary system is linked and circulated. Reconstruction (or a shift in the hypothesis’s complexity) may also be able to stave off the near-collapse of this monetary framework’s redundancy. When it comes to avoiding future catastrophic monetary crises, international coordination is critical. Therefore, do carbon markets stand now? Concerning carbon markets, a lot of attention is being paid to the increasing complexity and sensitivity of (future) carbon markets and streams.

Carbon markets are beginning to detect comparable difficulties.” In light of the growing quantity and complexity of tools, traded products, and corporate industries, as well as the global growth and reach of carbon streams, these commercial sectors are becoming more fluid while simultaneously becoming more difficult (for market players, supervisory bodies and others) The market is especially susceptible to accounting manipulations like those perpetrated by Enron and WorldCom, as shown by a survey of 700 public and private carbon specialists. Complication, theory, and a possible reduction in additionally are all exacerbated by the expansion of the auxiliary market. For polluters/customers, natural state specialists, and ecology activists alike, the goal of becoming the biggest derivative long-term market has attracted substantial new players well beyond traditional environmental improvements in the local environment. As well as large financial backers and major private banks, the organization in charge of carbon markets now comprises giant energy corporations, retailers, theorists, speculative investments, lobbyists and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The force adjusts among the actors in organizations that generate and influence carbon markets and flows in various industries. As part of the carbon management plan, continuing political disputes include how funds should be given, the creation of cover-based cover for specific nursery gases for periods, the amount of cover for carbon exchange compared to domestic discharges, and calls for public governance. The study findings look at how specific partner states and modern and monetary vestment parties had a significant impact on the primary EU ETS era, but the European Commission has dynamically increased its political knowledge in the second and third timeframes. In today’s political climate, administrative industries are politically created and—in significant measure—monitoring markets, with a consistency feature known as the ozone-harming drop outflow. A significant premium is paid by organizations that deal with and manage these business sectors and the related carbon fluxes. As the UN, EU, and public discussions on consistency markets continue to develop and grow, new relationships between entertainers (like ITEA, the Emission Marketing Association, and the Carbon Markets and Investors Association) and new phases of their work are critical to campaigning and having an impact on those developments (like the annual Carbon Expo) (as turned out to be clear with drafting the EU ETS first stage and the United States Waxman-Markey Climate Change Bill). Most notable private financial and monetary performers are those that create and control companies and carbon streams. In the (small) intentional company sector, they are the primary builders and governors. Prior to 2008, these intentional industries were mostly controlled by the government and represented the monetary sector (in addition to administrative companies). For those involved in the deliberate market organizations of financial and corporate entertainers (dealers, financial backers and banks), it is not just market influence that directs the growth of carbon credits and funds; they are also primary builders of the principles and codes of the market creators themselves.

**CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

This study was conducted to identify renewable energy finance nexus with climate change in Asian countries as a key factor in the reform of energy markets and economic growth as a cornerstone of the national economy. In recent years, the growing modernization of these countries’ economies and increasing urbanization have substantially increased energy consumption and the generation of environmental problems induced by energy use is a global problem. Research in the provinces of these countries on the environmental efficiency of energy use may provide a basis for decision-making in the development of energy and environment policies and policy changes. The growth of renewable energy and the political consequences outlined in this study may help to overcome the barriers to an efficient transition to renewable electricity.

This study uses an envelope-based data package model to assess the overall energy and environmental efficiency factor in 6 Asian countries and 7 Asean countries under a joint generation framework of both favorable output (GDP) and unfavorable output (CO2 and SO2) and energy input (total energy consumption) as well as non-energy inputs (labour and capital stock). This research also utilises techniques of DEA window analysis to assess efficiency on transversal and data varied data for the purposes of calculating efficiency score over the 2010–2014 studies. Empirical results show that the Eastern part of these countries offers greater energy and environmental efficiency than the centre, while the efficiency of the West is lower. Efficiency in all three areas is comparable and usually these countries’ energy and environmental efficiency increased slightly between 2016 and 2020. Energy and energy efficiency and environment in the Eastern area perform better than in the Central and Western regions. These countries improve market reforms with future energy markets at reduced prices. The results are significant and warranting following policy implications;

- Environmental energy efficiency still has plenty of scope in 28 countries and their provinces to improve energy efficiency and growth in output and reductions in CO2 emissions remain promising.
- Finance for energy efficiency in three major areas, as shown in the non-parameter test results These countries have significant geographical differences and have a pattern of growth Efficiency in the East-Middle-West and East is higher than in the Central and Western regions, and the
gap between these continues to increase. It is beneficial to combine energy efficiency with environmental energy in three areas.

- After reviewing for each province, the loss of efficiency caused by the environmental costs and regulatory cost in 2014 showed that most provinces have environmental regulatory costs and that their economic development mainly depends on environmental capacity with substantial environmental costs for economic growth. Changing the manner of economic growth and improving the quality of the environment is thus important.

Differences in the efficiency of the three areas may not arise too much from the imbalance in economic development. The economic development approach of these countries may lead to high energy and country-wide environmental efficiency. However, efficient energy and environmental laws created and enforced by the government over the past decade may have contributed to improve energy and environmental efficiency. Reforming the Asia-Pacific electricity market offers more accurate data availability across different policy eras and better energy efficiency leads to larger market shifts. Indeed, there are presently a number of important policy reforms in these areas and concrete advantages. Energy costs have changed since 2010, high-tech, lower-energy smartphones and mobile devices have grown export share, and the significance of the state economy has gradually declined as private sector development has risen. In addition to these beneficial phenomena, there is the present trend towards sustainable and green energy use worldwide, with a direct effect on the energy production.

**DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**

The original contributions presented in this study are included in the article/supplementary material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

**AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS**

CL-review; WJ-editor; XZ-write; HL-write.

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