Enforcing Fairness in Blockchain Transaction Ordering

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Abstract

In Blockchain networks involving multiple applications, the quality of service of an application is affected by the transaction ordering. For instance, upon issuing payment transactions, users of an application would like to be notified quickly on the transactions approval. The application can be a financial institution (such as a bank), sharing the blockchain with other such applications and is represented by a node. A node might attempt to prioritize its own transactions by including them early in blocks added to the blockchain. A fair block proposal of a node follows a random selection of the transactions among the set of pending transactions the node is aware of. On the contrary, a dishonest node includes more of its transactions at the expense of transactions of other applications. In this work, we propose a toolbox of techniques to enforce such a fair block selection. First, we design an accurate statistical test for the honesty of a proposal and explain it. We conduct experiments demonstrating the accuracy of the new validation scheme. We also describe a technique that enforces fair block selection through concise commitments on the set of pending transactions known to a node. We clarify the advantages of the new mechanisms over state-of-the-art methods.

Keywords Blockchain · Consensus mechanisms · Block Selection · Fairness

1 Introduction

Blockchain is a growing list of records (often called transactions), managed in a distributed manner among multiple participants. Transactions can either be simple money transfers or some more general pieces of code such as Ethereum smart contracts [26]. The blockchain is organized in blocks, each composed of multiple transactions. The blockchain can be shared among multiple independent financial institutions such as banks or more general applications. Blockchain applications are diverse and beyond money transfers include supply chains, electronic voting and medical informatics. Recently, applications have been described in areas such as data sharing for Industrial Internet of things (IIoT), 5G-based crowdsourcing, integration in Large-Scale Heterogeneous Networks (LS-HetNet) and even fighting COVID-19 [28–31].

Typically, participants reach an agreement on the blockchain content through an agreed-upon addition of a new block. The new block is determined as a selection of transactions among the pool of pending transactions, namely transactions that have been issued by one of the participants but do not yet appear in the blockchain. The block selection process implies an order on the transactions. In addition to the agreement on the block order, a consensus is also required for implying updates to the state of the blockchain, namely either account balances or memory accessed by smart contracts.

While in some networks the block is jointly determined by multiple participants (e.g., HoneyBadger [23]), typically a block is proposed by a selected node. A node might have complete freedom in the selection of the transactions blocks (e.g., as in Bitcoin [24] and Ethereum [26], where a miner can select those of the highest fees, thus maximizing its profit). Another approach restricts the freedom in block selection by implying a review process for the block selection by other participants [15]. These nodes, often organized as a committee, can validate the selection according to some required criteria, such that each node indicates whether or not to accept the proposal. Incentives might be used to encourage nodes to avoid manipulations in the block selection. When there is a particular node allowed to present a block proposal, we refer to that node as the primary.

As the block rate is bounded, an important aspect in the block selection is fairness [3, 4, 27]. By nature, nodes that share the same blockchain can have contradicting considerations and thus might imply a competition to fast include in
blocks transactions prioritized by each of the nodes. A recently suggested protocol, named Helix [2], suggested a concrete method for the block selection that the primary is expected to follow for implementing a random block selection. The primary should sort its local pool of pending transactions according to a sorting function that changes every round of block proposal. Then, given a maximal block size of \( b \) transactions, the primary should simply include in the proposed block the \( b \) transactions with the lowest ranking based on the computed order.

In this paper, we study how such a desired fairness in the block selection can and should be enforced. An inherent challenge in validating a block proposal follows directly from the nature of distributed blockchain networks. While different nodes (typically) agree on the content of the blockchain, they are not fully aware of all pending transactions, such that nodes are often exposed to non-identical sets of pending transactions. This makes it hard, or indeed impossible, for a validator to simply reject a proposal when it does not include a transaction that, by the view of the validator, was expected to be included. The validator cannot clearly indicate that the primary was aware of that transaction and ignored it on purpose to serve other transactions it prioritizes.

Helix [2] describes a statistical test to examine whether a proposed block followed these instructions. It relies on a (simplifying) model where a node has a fixed probability to be aware of a pending transaction. For a given transaction, this event is independent among the various nodes. In Helix, a committee member examines some level of similarity between the proposed block and the locally computed one (while making use of information from the actual block proposal). This helps the committee member to make a binary decision whether to accept the proposal or not. A minimal number of accepting nodes among the committee members is required for the block proposal to be approved and added to the blockchain. We note that the validation performed by Helix does not take advantage of all available information and we detail ways it can be improved in order to strengthen the fairness.

Contributions. In this paper we make two main contributions, as follows.

Our first contribution is an improvement of Helix’s block validation scheme. Specifically, we explain that, following the statistical model for transaction dissemination, the validation process in Helix does not fully utilize the information of the committee members. We show that a more accurate decision should be a joint decision of the various committee members rather than simply being based on the number of independent approvals. We propose how to determine the validity of the proposal based on the aggregated information from the members. Specifically, we describe a simple formula for the probability that a proposal is honest following the complete information (unlike the difficulty to do so given the independent decisions of Helix with partial information). We conduct experiments to evaluate the accuracy of the new scheme in comparison with that of Helix.

The second contribution takes a different approach and enforces honesty upfront. Specifically, we establish a technique that effectively eliminates nodes from the option to ignore any transactions for increasing the number of prioritized transactions in a proposed block. We explain that a periodic concise report of the set of known transactions to a node can be highly useful towards such a goal. Our scheme relies on the observation that, since the transaction sorting cannot be predicted, a node is not aware in advance of the specific transactions it would like to ignore in a particular round. The techniques we describe make use of various data structures, such as Bloom filters [9] or Merkle trees [8, 22] and their variants. Hashing is a useful technique in such data structures, for mapping elements to areas of the report as well as for providing a signature for a reported element.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related work. Section 3 overviews the considered settings and the problem statement. Section 4 overviews the block proposal and validation procedure in Helix. Then, Section 5 details the suggested alternative validation process of a block proposal. In Section 6 we describe experiments that evaluate the accuracy of the proposed block validation process. Then, Section 7 presents the scheme for enhancing fairness in block proposals through node declarations regarding their pending transactions. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in Section 8.

2 Related Work

Fairness in Blockchain Systems and Beyond: As mentioned, the approach of Helix [2] provides fairness through allowing pending transactions to be selected with the same probability to a block through random block selection [23]. Sokolik et al. suggested to reduce the tail-latency of the time it takes a transaction to be included in a block by giving priority in the block selection to transactions observing high latency [17]. The notion of fairness among transactions is defined differently in [3], as each node gets a fair share of the ledger. Namely, each block contains the same number of transactions from each node assuming that they have infinite streams of transactions. Another related definition is due to Receive-order-fairness [4] which enforces transaction selection such that if many nodes learned about a transaction before some other transactions, such an order should be reflected in the ledger. Weaker potential definitions refer to the unfairness of the order of two transactions only if they were received sufficiently apart in time. Another option is to ignore the internal order of transactions within blocks and only refer to the order of transactions in different blocks. Wendy [27] handles
relative order fairness and claims for fairness requirements only for subsets of transactions, e.g., those belonging to each of several existing markets. This approach is different than that of Helix, where the fairness is kept between the different applications and it is assumed that a transaction has no priority regarding the internal order of its transactions. Table 1 overviews these different fairness aspects.

Beyond blockchain, aspects of fairness have been studied in other networking and computer system settings where a restricted resource is shared among multiple entities. Examples include a queue with a bounded service rate or a link with limited capacity [5]. A well-known notion is that of max-min fairness, which suggests how to determine a resource partition based on the demands of multiple users, summing up to more than the resource availability. Intuitively, such a fair allocation tries to maximize the share of users of small demands. Generalizations of the definition have also been suggested [6].

Fee-based Block Selection: In commonly used blockchains based on Proof of Work (PoW) consensus, e.g. Bitcoin [24] and Ethereum [26], the selection process is not part of the protocol and can be decided by the proposer regardless of any fairness considerations. Since transactions might be associated with different fees, the block proposer typically selects those of maximal fee it is aware of in order to maximize its profit [12]. Our work assumes no fee per transaction so that fees have no influence on considerations whether to include a transaction in a block.

Primary Node Election: Various approaches exist for the election of the node with the right to propose a block. This can be based on computational power in PoW [11] through solving a mathematical puzzle that requires multiple hash computations, or according to a distribution implied by the balance of the nodes in Proof of Stake (PoS) [16, 18]). Additional alternatives in similar notions are Proof-of-Space [7] and Proof-of-Elapsed-Time [1], referring to the amount of memory being held or computation time spent by the participants, respectively. In the present work we refer to random node selection, as well as to selection based on other criteria, such as a reputation scheme.

### 3 Settings and Problem statement

Our blockchain network is a fully mesh network of multiple nodes. In the network, a round occurs every given time. In each round, some node is chosen as the block proposer, either randomly or by some criteria. The primary should construct a new block from its pending transactions pool randomly in a fair manner, without prioritizing neither its own transactions nor those of any of the other nodes. The primary then propagates the block through the network. A small fraction of nodes serve as committee members, and their task is to validate the proposed block.

The problem we study is to design a framework that allows an effective validation of the fairness in the block selection. The mechanism should be simple and refrain from consuming a large amount of communication. Moreover, it should be accurate, namely fair block selections should be approved while selections that are not performed according to the random selection guidelines should not pass validation.

Table 2 summarizes the main notations employed in this work.

### 4 Helix Block Selection and Validation - Background and Motivation

We begin this section by explaining the importance we see in Helix that motivated us to study its potential improvements. With the increasing popularity of the blockchain technology, more applications would be based on it in the near future. To increase governance and reduce centrality, as well as due to the technical implementation challenges of the technology, multiple applications would share the same infrastructure [14, 20]. To allow this sharing and avoid any abuse by some application, fairness of the transaction ordering among the applications must be guaranteed. Moreover, to allow massive use, an application is expected not to charge fees for transactions from its users, hence expenses for the use of the technology are covered by the application. Helix addresses this common scenario and aims to provide ordering fairness among transactions of all applications sharing the same blockchain infrastructure. The importance of transaction ordering was

| Fairness aspect                                                                 |   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|
| Similar probability for a transaction to be selected for a block              |   |
| Prioritizing transactions with a large observed latency in block selection    |   |
| Similar block parts among nodes                                              |   |
| Transaction order is based on time nodes learn on each transaction            |   |
| Internal fairness within subsets of transactions                              |   |

| Helix [2]                                                                     |   |
| Age-aware fairness [17]                                                       |   |
| Fair share [3]                                                                |   |
| Receive-order-fairness [4]                                                    |   |
| Relative order fairness (Wendy) [27]                                          |   |
recently demonstrated in studies that appeared following the proposal of Helix, including [3, 4, 17, 27].

We proceed to provide an overview of the block selection and its validation process in Helix [2]. A block is selected by a primary \( p \) from the pool of pending transactions it is aware of \( EP_p \). In such a pool, transactions are maintained in an encrypted form. Due to network latency, the pools \( EP_i \) and \( EP_j \) of two different nodes \( i, j \) might differ. However, we may assume a measure of similarity between two pools of pending transactions. To model this similarity, we use a probabilistic model satisfying the following property. For any two correct transactions in a block. Let \( \alpha \) denote the similarity parameter, probability for a pending transaction to appear in a pool.

**Property 1** Let \( EP_p \) be a block constructed according to the \( b \)-construction, and let \( i \) be a committee member following the protocol. Then, \( EP_p \) passes \( i \)'s validation w.o.p. (under the assumption that \( \alpha \) bounds from below the similarity parameter of the network).

\[
|EB_p \cap EB_i| \geq \beta_\alpha(b_i) \text{ for } \beta_\alpha(b_i) := \alpha b_i - \sqrt{10b_i}
\]

The second condition encourages primaries to construct blocks with low \( b' \). The minimal value of \( b' \) is \( b \); in the event that the value of \( b' \) is in fact \( b \), the selection scheme is perfectly fair. Intuitively, a larger \( b' \) allows the primary more freedom in the selection of \( EB_p \) (rather than selecting it as the \( b \) minimal \( etxs \)). However, since we can expect \( |EB_p| \approx |EB_i| \), large \( b' \) yields large \( b_i \) and accordingly large \( \beta_\alpha(b_i) \), reducing the chances of \( EB_p \) to pass validation. \( \beta_\alpha(b_i) \) is the maximal value for which blocks constructed with \( b' = b \) pass validation w.o.p., as implied by Hoeffding’s bound.

The pseudocode of the Helix block validation process is presented in Algorithms 1-2. Algorithm 1 refers to the process conducted by a committee while the validation described in Algorithm 2 refers to each node in the committee.

The extra validation process dictated by the Helix block selection scheme bears a risk to the liveness of the protocol. Blocks that would have passed validation might get rejected once the statistical validation is enforced. It was shown that, w.o.p., a block compliant with the \( b \)-construction passes validation of a committee member that follows the protocol.

**Property 2** Let \( EP_p \) be a block constructed according to the \( b \)-construction, and let \( i \) be a committee member following the protocol. Then, \( EP_p \) passes \( i \)'s validation w.o.p. (under the assumption that \( \alpha \) bounds from below the similarity parameter of the network).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Summary of main notations}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
Symbol & Meaning \\
\hline
\( b \) & block size (number of transactions) \\
\( \alpha \) & similarity parameter, probability for a pending transaction to appear in a pool \\
\( EB \) & Proposed block of transactions \\
\( EP \) & Pool of pending transactions \\
\( b' \) & Number of transactions ( \( \geq b \) ) in pool among which the block is selected \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

5 Alternative Joint Block Validation

In this section we present an improvement of the Helix scheme. As summarized in Section 4, the block validation of Helix relies on an independent evaluation of the proposed block by each of the committee members. A committee member votes in favor of the proposal when the conditional probability for the block proposal to be fair is above a required lower bound. The probability is computed based on the content of the transaction pool of the committee member. A minimal number of votes in favor of the proposal are required for the block to be approved but finding the optimal value of this
number seems difficult and is not addressed by Helix. On the positive side, this scheme does not require communication between the committee members prior to their voting.

In this section, we explain that such a voting criterion does not utilize all information available by the committee members. We follow the assumption of Helix, namely that an issued transaction has the fixed probability $\frac{1}{C_1}$ to appear in a pool of pending transactions by each node, such that for a given transaction this probability is independent among the various nodes. Accordingly, a block proposal of a honest primary should include, with probability $\frac{1}{C_1}$, a transaction issued by other nodes satisfying a bound on its hash value. On the other hand, a proposal of a dishonest primary would be selective and its number of such included transactions is expected to be lower than that implied by such a distribution. We proceed to describe an alternative and more accurate validation process than that proposed for Helix. The process requires communication among the committee members earlier to the joint indication regarding the honesty of the block proposal.

Fig. 2 illustrates the intuition of the new scheme and the way it differs from previous approaches. As shown in (a), the traditional scheme of Helix block validation is individual for each committee member. Conversely, in the proposed alternative shown in (b), block validation is performed jointly, and communication among the committee members is required prior to providing a joint validation decision.

Intuitively, consider a transaction that the primary could be aware of, yet it did not include it in its block proposal. Intuitively, in Helix, each committee member that identifies that the transaction should have been included yet it is missing would have a lower chance to indicate the block as valid.

![Fig. 1](https://example.com/fig1.png)  
**Fig. 1** Illustration of a random block selection scheme. In each Epool, $etx$s are sorted based on their hash values. A honest primary fairly constructs a block from the $b$ transactions with the minimal hash value. An unfair block selection includes skipping transactions, selecting the $b$ block transactions among some $b' > b$ transactions with minimal hash values. A committee member $i$ examines the block proposal by computing the overlap between the proposed block $EB_p$ and the set of $etx$s in a block computed locally based on the local pool of pending transactions $EP_i$.

![Fig. 2](https://example.com/fig2.png)  
**Fig. 2** Illustration of the traditional block validation procedure (a) vs. the suggested alternative joint Block validation (b) that includes communication among committee members that produce a joint decision. The joint validation can take into account additional information that allows a more accurate validation.
Consider for simplicity the case where a block proposal of the primary \( p \) is evaluated by two committee members \( i, j \). Following the definition of the probability \( \alpha \) and its assumed model, we claim that the evaluation should make a distinction between the following cases:

- **Case I** - Node \( i \) holds a single transaction \( etx_1 \) that was not included in the block although being expected to, and another node \( j \) also holds a transaction \( etx_2 \neq etx_1 \) that was also not included in the block although being expected to.

- **Case II** - Both nodes \( i, j \) hold a single identical transaction \( etx_3 \) not included in the block although being expected to.

The reason a distinction should be made between the cases follows the different probabilities for the scenarios to occur with a honest primary given the existence of the transactions by the committee members. While in Case I, this happens with probability of \((1 - \alpha)^2\), in Case II the corresponding probability is larger, namely it is \(1 - \alpha\). This means that when Case II is detected the primary has higher chances to be honest than in Case I.

The block validation of Helix does not distinguish between the two cases. The reason is that Helix conducts an independent validation at each of the committee members. Such validation does not make any distinction based on the identity of the missing transactions and accordingly cannot distinguish between such cases, as in both each committee member observes the missing of a single transaction. We propose an alternative approach, according to which a right evaluation should be based on examining the ratio of included transactions among those expected given the content of the local pools among the committee members. We show that the related probability of the primary being honest is affected by the identity of missing transactions in the block according to each committee member and not just by the numbers observed by each of the members. Namely, the probability is a function of the total number of distinct missing transactions rather than their sum among the committee members.

More specifically, the approval decision should determine whether the selection is fair. Thus, each transaction that has to be included should contribute equally to that decision, either positively if it is indeed included, or negatively if it is not included. This can be computed by the number of expected transactions to be included and the number of those among them that are indeed included. A precise determination of these numbers should ignore multiplicities of the same transaction among nodes and thus requires communication among them. Accordingly, the joint decision for the nodes is made based on these numbers. Unlike the scheme of Helix, in the proposed scheme there is no notion of a block approval by a single committee member and thus computing the minimal required number of such nodes is not necessary.

We proceed to analyze the probability for a particular scenario based on the above mentioned transaction numbers. Again, let \( EB_p \) be a block (of size \(|EB_p| = b\)) proposed by the primary \( p \) such that \( T_p = \max\{H(ett)|etx \in EB_p\} \) is the maximal hash of an \( etx \) in \( EB_p \). For a committee member \( i \) we denote by \( EB'_i := \{etx \in EP|H(ett) \leq T_p\} \) the set of \( etxs \) in \( EP \) with hash values lower than \( T_p \) and also denote \( b_i := \max \{|EB'_i|, b\} \). Let \( EB'' = \bigcup_i EB'_i \) (where the union is computed over the committee members) be the set of all transactions that the committee members are aware of and should be included in the block as implied by \( T_p \). Denote \( b'' = |EB''| \). Let \( EB'' \cap EB_p \) be the set of transactions among those expected that are indeed included in the block and let \( K \) be the random variable for their number. For a honest primary, \( K \) should follow a binomial distribution \((\alpha, b'')\) such that \( Pr(K = k) = \binom{b''}{k} \alpha^k (1 - \alpha)^{b'' - k} \) and a probability for a honest node that an intersection of size \( k \) or less appears is given by \( \Phi_{\min}^{b''} = \sum_{m=0}^{b''} \binom{b''}{m} \alpha^m (1 - \alpha)^{b'' - m} \). The joint decision of the committee members should then be to accept the block proposal whenever the computed probability satisfies some lower bound. The bound is selected as a tradeoff between the required liveness of the protocols and the probability to reject a proposal of a dishonest primary. A lower bound \( \Phi_{\min} \) guarantees that a proposal of a honest leader is accepted with at least such probability.

Algorithm 3 presents the pseudocode of the proposed joint block validation process.

We now provide some intuition regarding when we expect the joint validation to imply a meaningful improvement in the accuracy. These are precisely the instances when the original accuracy of Helix block validation is relatively low. Two major parameters that have an impact on the accuracy are the pool similarity parameter \( \alpha \) and the number of committee members \( k \). In Helix, a low pool similarity parameter \( \alpha \) makes the accuracy of the indication of each node to be less accurate. Moreover, adding more committee members allows more votes, making the overall decision more accurate. Accordingly, we expect the joint block validation to allow a particularly significant improvement in the accuracy when either the pool similarity parameter is low or when committees are small.

### 6 Experimental Comparison of the Block Validation Schemes

We proceed to evaluate the accuracy of the suggested joint block validation from Section 5 in comparison with that of the
traditional block validation in Helix, where each committee member provides its own decision regarding the honesty of a proposal. We recall that the two validation schemes consider as their input different information provided by the committee members. The schemes were illustrated in Fig. 2, where Fig. 2(a) corresponds to Helix’s and Fig. 2(b) corresponds to the new (joint) scheme. The strictness of a validation scheme implies a tradeoff between two possible kinds of validation errors, namely: False negative - identifying a fair primary as unfair; and False positive - identifying an unfair primary as fair. In particular, we would like to examine the strength of the approach for: (i) different pool similarity levels; and (ii) variable block sizes. Table 3 summarizes the range of values of the main parameters examined in the experiments.

We examine five ways to select block transactions. The first is a fair selection (selecting the $b$ block transactions as those of minimal hash values), while the other four refer to unfair selections with various levels of bias. They describe the four ways of unfair block selection, we also measure the number of times that unfair block selections were wrongly identified as fair selections (false positives, shown in the y-axis). Note that, for both figures, the y-axis appears in logarithmic scale.

For both validation schemes, allowing more errors of one type reduces the number of occurrences of the other error. Moreover, the accuracy of the schemes is higher when the block selection unfairness is more extreme, as expressed by larger $b'/b$ values. We can see that it is quite difficult to identify unfair selection with $b'/b = 1.03$, such that the number of false positives among these cases is in the range $[6307, 9284]$ (among the 10K examined instances) for the Helix validation scheme, assuming a bounded number of at most 100 false negatives. It decreases to be in the range $[4753, 9285]$ for the joint validation scheme. Larger $b'/b$ values, such as 1.06, 1.09, express higher levels of unfairness of the primary and allow better distinction between fair and unfair selections. For instance, with $b'/b = 1.06$, the number of false positives is in $[385, 1599]$ for Helix validation and only in $[223, 1510]$ in joint validation. When $b'/b = 1.12$, it is easy for both schemes to correctly identify such a selection as unfair, and at most two cases of false positives were observed (for a particular false positive value), even when the number of false positives was close to 0.

Fig. 3c emphasizes the differences between the results in Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b, and it presents the partial reduction in the number of false positives. A clear reduction of up to 21.5% appears even for the smallest examined level of unfairness with $b'/b = 1.03$. Interestingly, the partial improvement is even more significant for $b'/b = 1.06, 1.09$, with mean partial improvement values of 38.6% and 29.3%, respectively. Due to the high level of unfairness with $b'/b = 1.12$, it can be well observed by both schemes hence they typically achieve similar performance.

Next, we examine the impact of network quality and demonstrate that the superiority of the suggested joint block validation scheme becomes significant when the pool similarity $\alpha$ is relatively small, as can be implied by larger transaction propagation delays. Fig. 4 compares the accuracy of the schemes when the probability of a transaction to appear in a pool of a node that did not issue the transaction is $\alpha = 0.75$. The lower similarity between pools reduces the quality of the block validation schemes. Consider for instance the Helix validation scheme (Fig. 4a) and block selection unfairness $b'/b = 1.06$. For 20, 40 and 80 false negatives, the number of false positives increases from 729, 582 and 458 with $\alpha = 0.9$, to 4852, 4044 and 3182 with $\alpha = 0.75$. Similarly, for the joint

**Table 3** Values of main parameters

| Symbol | Meaning | Range of values |
|--------|---------|----------------|
| $b$    | block size (number of transactions) | 125 - 8K |
| $\alpha$ | similarity parameter, probability for a pending transaction to appear in a pool | 0.75 - 0.9 |
| $b'/b$ | Number of transactions in pool among which block is selected vs. original block size | 1.03 - 1.12 |
| Instances | Experiment length | 10K |
validation scheme (Fig. 4b), the values are lower but still increase with the reduction of $C_1$, specifically: From 461, 355 and 278 with $C_1 = 0.9$, to 2889, 2256 and 1711 with $C_1 = 0.75$.

Here, even for a high unfairness level $b = 1.12$, both schemes are not fully accurate, and the number of observed false positives is not negligible. The number of false positives is in the range [3, 74] for the Helix scheme and in the range [0, 24] for the joint scheme. Interestingly, as shown in Fig. 4c, the advantage of the suggested joint validation scheme becomes more significant for such a lower pool similarity value $C_1$, and the improvement is typically stronger for larger values of $b = b_0$. The mean partial improvement values are $8.9\%$ and $43.6\%$ for $b' = 1.03$ and $b' = 1.06$, and they grow to $70.9\%$ and $81.4\%$ for $b' = 1.09$ and $1.12$. Note that, in a small number of instances for $b' = 1.12$, no false positives were observed for the joint validation when the number of false negatives was relatively large.

We also examine the impact of block size on the accuracy of the validation schemes. In Fig. 5 we measure their accuracy while considering various block size of $b \in [250, 500, 1000, 2000, 4000, 8000]$ transactions. Intuitively, for a given level of block selection unfairness, a larger block size involves the ignorance of a larger number of transactions that could be included in the block by a fair block selection. Thus, larger blocks can simplify the detection of unfair selections and improve the accuracy of both schemes. The four sub-figures refer to the different levels of selection unfairness with $b' = 1.03, 1.06, 1.09, 1.12$. Consider for instance an unfairness level of $b = 1.03$, as shown in Fig. 5a. We recall that, as was shown in Fig. 3, the accuracy of the schemes was not very high for a block size of $b = 1000$. For 100 false negatives for instance, we have 6394 false positives for the Helix scheme and 4864 for the joint validation scheme. As shown here, the situation is even worse for a smaller block size. For $b = 500$ for instance, allowing 100 false negatives implies 8962 false positives for Helix and 8380 false positives for the joint scheme. On the other hand, increasing block size to $b = 2000$ reduces false positives to 2102 and 1139 for the Helix scheme and 4864 for the joint validation scheme. As shown here, the situation is even worse for a smaller block size. For $b = 500$ for instance, allowing 100 false negatives implies 8962 false positives for Helix and 8380 false positives for the joint scheme. On the other hand, increasing block size to $b = 2000$ reduces false positives to 2102 and 1139 in the Helix and joint schemes, respectively. A block size of $b = 4000$ implies very small numbers, of only 53 and 17 false positives, respectively. Indeed, no false positives were observed for both schemes for a block size of $b = 8000$, although the level of unfairness is as low as $b' = 1.03$.

Higher levels of selection unfairness (Fig. 5b-d) make it easier to identify the unfairness. For instance, Fig. 5c refers to $b' = 1.09$. Here, for block size $b = 500$, with 100 false

**Fig. 3** Comparison of the accuracy of the block validation of Helix and the suggested joint validation. Pool similarity $\alpha = 0.9$, block size $b = 1000$. Evaluation included 10000 instances of block selection validation.
negatives the number of false positives is 664 for Helix and 495 for the joint scheme. For block size $b = 1$ K they reduce to just 13 and 7, respectively. No false positives were observed for a block size of 2K or more.

Fig. 6 shows the relative improvement (reduction in the number of false positives) of the joint validation schemes vs. Helix. We compare the reduction in false positives when the number of false negatives is either 5 or 100 (among the 10K instances). Again, for all examined block sizes, the number of false positives was smaller or equal for the joint scheme. As shown in Fig. 6a, for $b'/b = 1.03$ the more significant improvements were obtained for block sizes $b = 1$K, 2K, 4K. The maximal relative improvement was obtained for $b = 4$ K and was equal to 61.3% and 67.9% for 5 and 100 false negatives, respectively. As mentioned, for a smaller block size, the accuracy of both schemes was not very high, while for a large block size, namely $b = 8$ K, both achieved high accuracy. For a larger unfairness level of $b'/b = 1.09$ (Fig. 6b), where schemes perform better, the partial improvement is more modest and is more enhanced for smaller block sizes such as $b = 500$, 1 K. For instance the improvement equals 3 0.1% for 5 false negatives and block size $b = 500$, and it reaches 46.2% for 100 false negatives and block size $b = 1$ K.

7 Declarations on Pending Transactions

7.1 Intuition for Declarations

We would like to further enhance the fairness of the block selection. Indeed, even with the alternative examination of the block proposal presented in Section 5, it might be possible for a primary to ignore a few particular transactions without being detected. In particular, when the block is small, it can be easier to manipulate some part of it. Also, when the network conditions imply low values of $\alpha = 0.75$, the validation process cannot be strict and manipulation in the block selection is easier to perform.

Accordingly, we proceed to suggest an approach that is based on periodically asking nodes to declare the set of transactions they are aware of. Then, a block proposal would be tested based on a recent declaration of the primary. When provided, a declaration would be examined to include enough transactions of other nodes. A crucial point in this scheme is that, at the time of the declaration, a node is not aware of the random ordering of the transactions in a specific future round, thus it cannot predict those particular transactions of others it has to include and would like to ignore upon being selected as
A primary. To allow itself to make some meaningful manipulation, it would have to make in advance a major self-adjustment to its declaration, hence significantly increasing the chance of being detected.

A clear correlation exists between the effectiveness of a declaration and its size, as follows. On the one hand, a detailed declaration can be more helpful for better validation, yet it may require a large communication overhead. On the other hand, a concise declaration (e.g., including partial information, or compressed information with loss) reduces the opportunity to detect missing transactions in the proposal. We believe that a restriction on the allowed amount of communication overhead typically exists, thus we focus on communication-efficient declarations.

A declaration on the set of pending transactions known to a node can be seen as a description of a set. Designing such representations, either exactly or concisely, while losing some information, is a well-studied research area with many applications.

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**Fig. 5** Impact of block size on the accuracy for various unfairness levels (pool similarity \( \alpha = 0.9 \) based on a total of 10000 instances)

**Fig. 6** Relative improvement of the joint validation scheme vs. Helix for various block size and unfairness levels (pool similarity \( \alpha = 0.9 \), 10000 instances)
applications [9, 21, 22]. The choice of the representation scheme is based on the application requirements, such as the support of answering membership queries, the allowed types of errors, the ability to prove the inclusion or exclusion of an element, and whether the order of elements has significance. For a representation of a set $S$, there are two kinds of errors in membership queries: a false positive (when an element $x \not\in S$ is reported as a member of $S$) and a false negative (when an element $x \in S$ is reported as a non-member).

In the following, we present an overview of potential declaration schemes. We examine multiple criteria, such as the declaration size and the ability to easily examine a declaration or a block proposal. We also refer to the ability of a node to validate the declaration, a node examines that the complete list includes a large portion of its transactions. A block proposal is examined by a node by making sure that each of its transactions from its local pool that were issued by other nodes (rather than by the node itself). The node then distributes the filter to other nodes, while reporting the Bloom parameters (namely the number of elements, filter length in bits and hash function number). Other nodes (e.g., those that belong to a committee, which is selected for this purpose in a hard-to-predict way) examine the filter validity. They would like to see that the filter includes, in the set represented by it, some portion of their transactions. The filter is approved upon achieving some minimal required support from the committee. A node whose filter was not approved is not selected as the primary for the next several rounds. For a node $i$, we denote by $S_i$ the set of transactions with a positive indication in the Bloom filter such that $S_i \subseteq F_i$.

The Bloom filter encounters false positives and has no false negatives. The probability of an error (ratio of non-member elements reported as members) decreases when more memory is allocated for the data structure and increases when a larger set $S$ is represented. The Bloom filter, illustrated in Fig. 7a, stores an array of bits, where a set of hash functions is used to map elements to locations in the bit array. With initial values of zero bits, the elements of $S$ are first inserted to the filter, setting to a value of 1 all bits pointed by the hash functions.

In the following rounds, one node is selected as the primary among those with an approved filter. The primary $p$ proposes a block $EB_p$, selected from the pending transactions that were available to the primary by the time of computing its most recent (and recently reported) Bloom filter. Assume that the maximal hash value of the block is $T_p = \max \{ H(\text{etx}) | \text{etx} \in E B_p \}$. A committee member $i$ with local pool $EP_i$ computes $E B_i = \{ \text{etx} \in EP_i | H(\text{etx}) \leq T_p \}$, the set of $\text{etx}$ in $EP_i$ with hash values lower than $T_p$. In contrast to the Helix scheme, in its examination, node $i$ does not simply compare $|EB_p \cap E B_i|$ to some lower bound but rather it carefully examines $\Delta_i = EB_i \setminus EB_p$, the set of transactions not included in the proposal although being expected to. If the primary is honest it must not be familiar with any such transactions.

Specifically, node $i$ checks whether $\Delta_i$ is aligned with the Bloom filter reported by the primary $p$. Namely, for each $\text{etx} \in \Delta_i$ one out of the following two conditions should hold:

- $\text{etx} \not\in F_p$, and the transaction was not reported by the primary as a pending transaction in its pool,
- $\text{etx} \in F_p$ and the transaction was reported as known to the primary, yet there was a false positive, namely $\text{etx} \not\in S_p$.

### Table 4  Fundamental properties of various declaration schemes

| Scheme         | Declaration size | Declaration testing | Block testing | Proving honesty (non-membership) |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------|---------------|----------------------------------|
| Complete list  | Large            | Local               | Local         | Complete                         |
| Bloom filter   | Small            | Local               | Partial       | Partial                          |
| Merkle tree    | Small            | Commun.             | Commun.       | Complete                         |
The validation of the declaration restricts the number of transactions of the first type, namely those satisfying $\text{etx} \in \Delta_i$, $\text{etx} \notin F_p$. The committee member $i$ examines the transactions in $\Delta_i \subseteq S_i$. It skips those not in $F_p$, namely those for which the filter returns a negative membership indication. For those in $F_p$, since they are not included in the proposed block of the primary, they must not be known to the primary and the fact they belong to $F_p$ is due to false positives. The committee member challenges the primary with the list of such transactions in $\Delta_i \setminus F_p$. The primary has to demonstrate that they are indeed false positives by indicating on other transactions that the hash functions map to the same bits of the filter. Failing to do so indicates on the primary dishonesty.

Moreover, the properties of the Bloom filter do not enable the primary to (completely) prove its honesty, showing that all missing transactions were not among the set for which the declaration was computed for. The reason is that the Bloom filter does not enable proving non-membership of an element in the represented set for such elements causing the false positives, namely transactions in $\Delta_i$ that also appear in $F_p \setminus S_p$.

### 7.4 Merkle Tree based Declarations

Another common data structure in Blockchain networks is the Merkle tree [8, 22], also used for concise set representation while supporting different functionality than the Bloom filter. As illustrated in Fig. 7, the Merkle tree is a binary tree where a leaf is associated with a set element and its hash value. An internal node hash value is computed based on those of its direct children. The hash value of the root is the Merkle root.

Upon declaring the Merkle root for a represented set $S$, it is later possible to prove the inclusion of an element in $S$. The Merkle inclusion proof consists of the values of all the siblings of the nodes in a path to the root from the leaf corresponding to the element. Moreover, elements can be maintained in a sorted manner in the tree leaves. This enables to also demonstrate exclusion of an element through an exclusion proof, showing the inclusion as adjacent leaves of a predecessor and successor, with lower and higher hash values, respectively.

A declaration of a node $i$ includes publishing the Merkle root for its pool of pending transactions. Testing the declaration by another node $j$ cannot be done locally by node $j$ and requires sending challenges to node $i$. Based on sampling, node $j$ repeatedly selects a transaction it issued and asks node $i$ to demonstrate it is included within the tree through a membership proof. This should also include statistically verifying the tree values are sorted through examining the locations of the queried transactions. Node $j$ approves the declaration if a large portion of its challenges are answered by node $i$. Given a block proposal, a committee member identifies the missing transactions and demands from the primary an exclusion proof demonstrating that such transactions were not included in the declaration. Providing such proofs for all missing transactions establishes the honesty of a primary node.

### 8 Conclusions and Future Work

In this work, we proposed a set of new techniques to enhance the fairness of block selection. First, we described an accurate evaluation of a block proposal through a joint decision of committee members. The joint validation allows more accurate testing whether a block proposal was done honestly, based on random selection, or through prioritizing particular transactions. Experimental results showed a clear advantage of the suggested block validation over the existing approach. The cost for joint validation is additional communication overhead among committee members. Then, we showed how declarations of nodes on their pools of pending transactions can dramatically limit their ability to manipulate the block selection. Declarations on transactions restrict unfair block selection through ignoring transactions. The various
declaration schemes imply different communication overhead based on the size of declarations, their frequency and the ability to test a block proposal locally or through queries. For future work, we would like to find optimal tradeoffs among the characteristics of transaction declaration schemes. In particular, we would like to determine the existence of a scheme implying short declarations that enables local testing of a declaration and a block proposal, while maintaining the ability to show the non-membership of any transaction not part of the declaration.

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