From imperial to dialogical cosmopolitanism

Eduardo Mendieta*
Philosophy Department, Stony Brook University, New York, NY, USA

Abstract
We can now survey the ruins of a Babelian tower of discourse about cosmopolitanism. We speak of ‘elite travel lounge,’ ‘Davos,’ ‘banal’ as well as of ‘reflexive,’ ‘really existing,’ ‘patriotic,’ and ‘horizontal’ cosmopolitanisms. Here, an attempt is made to extract what is normative and ideal in the concept of cosmopolitanism by foregrounding the epistemic and moral dimensions of this attitude toward the world and other cultures. Kant, in a rather unexpected way, is profiled as the exemplification of what is here called ‘imperial’ cosmopolitanism, which is both blind and dismissive of its own material conditions of possibility. Then, through a discussion of the works of Nussbaum, Appiah, Mignolo, Butler, Benhabib, and Beck, the author elaborates a version of cosmopolitanism that is grounded, enlightened, and reflexive, which corrects and supersedes Kant’s own Eurocentric cosmopolitanism. We do not live in an age of cosmopolitanism, but in an age of cosmopolitization. Democratic iterations that are jurisgenerative are matched at the global level by cosmopolitan iterations that are both jurisgenerative and affect generating.

Keywords: cosmopolitanism; universalism; reflexive; dialogical; critical; democratic; subaltern; decolonial; globalization; iterations

INTRODUCTION
By now, so much has been written about cosmopolitanism that when we try to survey this work what we encounter are the veritable ruins of a tower of Babel. After reading the two outstanding collections by Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, and Daniel Archibuigi, I was able to gather the following list of inflections and adjetival forms of cosmopolitanism: imperial; post-modern; patriotic; discrepant; multicultural; rooted; elite; non-elite; left; consumerist; soft; attenuated; comparative; and actually existing. Ulrich Beck, in his indispensable Cosmopolitan Vision not only talks about ‘banal cosmopolitanism,’ but also introduces a term that I hope to appropriate productively in this essay, namely ‘reflexive cosmopolitanism’ and ‘cosmopolitization.’ To this list I would like to add ‘Davos,’ ‘Benetton,’ and ‘Frequent Flyer,’ ‘Elite,’ or ‘One World’ cosmopolitanism, those are what Beck would call ‘banal cosmopolitanism.’ Indeed, someone’s cosmopolitanism, is someone else’s provinci-

*Correspondence to: Eduardo Mendieta, Philosophy Department, Stony Brook University, New York, NY, USA. Email: emendieta@notes.cc.sunysb.edu

©2009 E. Mendieta. This is an Open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 Unported License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/), permitting all non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2009, pp. 241–258. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v2i3.2044
alism; someone’s ethical stance is someone’s effortless privilege; someone’s deliberate knowingness is someone else’s jejune acceptance. In this Babelian proliferation of modified, localized, and historicized forms of cosmopolitanism there are tensions that deserved to be disaggregated and properly diagnosed. The aim would be to discern that which is worth both preserving and defending in cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism, at the very least, is a way of relating to the world. The question would be, what is the nature of that relationship? From the Greek stoics, through the Medieval Christians with their universalistic Gospel, through the Byzantine Empire, to the Enlightenment philosophes, to be cosmopolitan was to think oneself citizen of the entire world. The implicit claim was that one’s loyalty should be to a larger ‘we’ than that of one’s local city-state, ethos, nation, or even empire. Nothing human would be stranger to the cosmopolitan citizen of the world. Already in this minimalist definition of cosmopolitanism we find at play several forces: the implicit recognition of the force of locality and place that claims one; the reference to both an epistemic and ethical or moral outlook; and the projection or stipulation that this epistemic and moral outlook would turn into a substantive political project. For the moment, then, we can say that cosmopolitanism implicitly recognizes the power of locality, for it stands in tension with it. Cosmopolitanism is both an epistemic and moral relationship to the historical world of humans, for it seeks to know and recognize humanity in everything that humans have accomplished. Cosmopolitanism, therefore, even if in an attenuated form, also entails a ‘cosmopolitan’ project in which some sort of legal-political institutional framework would allow for the cohabitation and mutual thriving of all that is singular, and thus different, and differentiating in humanity. Another way of putting this, perhaps in a more schematic and formalized way would be to say that cosmopolitanism is the dialectical interplay between singularity and universality, placedness and displacement, rootedness and rootlessness, home and homelessness, stationariness and mobility. One is never cosmopolitan without setting out from some locality, whether it be spatial or temporal. One is never simply rooted, localized without that indexicality being deciphered with reference to some view of the global map. To be local is to be on some sort of map, a map that aims to provide a glance at the whole. A locality is a trajectory from a distance to a place, and from that place back toward that horizon of distantiation.

As Craig Calhoun put it, ‘[c]osmopolitanism has been a project of empires, long-distance trade, and of cities.’ Indeed, cosmopolitanism is born out of privileges: economic; political; cultural; and even linguistic. How much easier it is to be cosmopolitan when most that is ‘worth reading’ is translated into English and when the lingua franca of both the global public sphere and the global financial markets is also English. But it is part and parcel of a cosmopolitan orientation to recognize the materiality of its own privilege orientation. Calhoun is right to note that ‘would be cosmopolitans’ would succumb to a self-defeating and anathema naïveté were they not to also recognize from the outset the extent to which ‘cosmopolitan appreciation of global diversity is based on privileges of wealth and perhaps especially citizenship in certain states.’ There is a materiality to cosmopolitanism that enables not just the kind of candor and sanguinity that Calhoun calls for here, but also the very
‘epistemic’ and ‘moral’ stances that are implicit in cosmopolitanism. It is this play of materiality and ideality that I want to focus in this essay. I want to foreground the ways in which the materiality that enables cosmopolitanism must itself be part of the self-reflection on how to be and not to be cosmopolitan. Against a form of cosmopolitanism that is naïve about its own material conditions of possibility, I want to juxtapose a form of cosmopolitanism that reflects about its own material locatedness, its own ‘material locus of enunciation’—to use Walter Mignolo’s language.\textsuperscript{7} The former type of naïve cosmopolitanism I will call, evidently invidiously, imperial, while the latter I will call, evidently in praise, dialogical. The aim here is not solely negative, that is, it is not merely denunciatory and critical. It is also positive and constructive. I will argue that dialogical cosmopolitanism is mature (Mündig) cosmopolitanism, that is, a type of epistemic and moral stance toward the world that is cognizant of both its privileges and thus limits, and which reflects about these from the standpoint of the other, to whom it reaches to learn from and with. I will analyze the differences between these two forms of cosmopolitanism by taking a look at Immanuel Kant’s contributions to the development of cosmopolitanism, but from an unusual and unexpected angle. I will approach Kant’s cosmopolitanism from the standpoint of his pedagogy as this took its unique form in his lectures on anthropology and physical geography. Kant’s career as a professional philosopher begins at the same time that he begins to teach physical geography, which later will spawn his lectures on anthropology. Now, both of these disciplines, at the time in their earliest years of infancy, constitute a type of knowledge of the world that in Kant’s view was indispensable to the citizen. I will also argue that these lectures provide us with insight into the ‘presuppositions’ or ‘foundations’ of Kant’s own legal and political form of cosmopolitanism. The claim is that we replicate the colonial and imperial implications of Kant’s universalistic cosmopolitanism if we remain blind to its geographical and anthropological grounding. In a second section I will overview some important attempts to go beyond Kant, albeit not abandoning the insights worth preserving. In the final section I hope to offer the lineaments of a theory of dialogical cosmopolitanism. The method will be to argue immanently, that is to move from within the different positions to show that a next argumentative step must be taken, one that is implicit but not fully elaborated or argued. Evidently, lineaments are the mere contours of a theory, the building blocks, and not yet either the full architectonic or flesh-out theory. Here we are trying to show a direction, not the destination itself. In our age of globalizations and exclusions, we are in need of a different form of cosmopolitanism, one that emerges from below, from the below of those who are the majority of the planet. This form of cosmopolitanism is one that speaks from the standpoint of what Boaventura de Sousa Santos has called ‘subaltern cosmopolitanism,’\textsuperscript{8} but which combined with Mignolo’s call for a ‘decolonized’ and ‘decolonial cosmopolitanism,’\textsuperscript{9} has become reflexive of its own epistemic standpoint as well as of those with whom it aims to engage in a solicitous hermeneutics of mutual understanding. This form of cosmopolitanism is what I call dialogical cosmopolitanism, and it is the cosmopolitanism of the other.
KANT’S IMPERIAL COSMOPOLITANISM

Immanuel Kant is the *de rigueur* point of reference for any discussion on cosmopolitanism.¹⁰ Yet, his form of cosmopolitanism is what I will call ‘imperial cosmopolitanism.’ I will call it this way, as I will show, because Kant consciously and uncritically assumed the privileges of his citizenship and location within the Austrian Empire in the eighteenth century. Additionally, it is a form of ‘imperial cosmopolitanism’ because while its political and legal world order calls for a republican arrangement that is respectful of national differences, it is nonetheless a cosmopolitanism that projects a moral and political hierarchy that is grounded and justified by Kant’s geographical and anthropological assumptions about the capacities of culture to meet the requirements of such a cosmopolitan legality and politics.

The 1780s was one of Kant’s most productive decades. After giving us the three critiques, which laid down the foundations for his critical philosophy, Kant proceeded to develop a philosophy of history, of the state, of law, of virtue, and above all of cosmopolitan right. It is not without justification that Kant is the foremost point of reference for any discussion about cosmopolitanism. Indeed, Kant is to many the titan of cosmopolitanism. In the following I want to suggest that while Kant may have been one of the founding fathers of modern cosmopolitanism, his form of cosmopolitanism is grounded in a series of assumptions and preconceptions that make it suspect, if not entirely unusable in our post-metaphysical, post-secular, and post-colonial or decolonial context. In fact, I contend that what Kant offers us is a form of ‘imperial cosmopolitanism’ that is partly improved by what I will call naïve cosmopolitanism, but which does not yet overcome its imperial material foundations and hubristic epistemic orientation. I will argue that critical and situated cosmopolitanism opens the way for forms of dialogical cosmopolitanism that are able to criticize and overcome Kant’s imperialistic and naïve cosmopolitanism. This path from imperial to dialogic cosmopolitanism will be guided by brief discussions of Kwame Anthony Appiah, Ulrich Beck, Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, David Harvey, Walter Mignolo, and Martha Nussbaum. The goal is not to simply offer a report on the recent literature, but to show how dialogical cosmopolitanism must be developed logically and consequently from those inchoate but not fully acknowledged arguments in those positions that may be called naïve, and later critical and reflexive cosmopolitanism.

The last of his books that Kant personally edited and saw to press was *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, which was published in 1798. This book was based on his lecture course on Anthropology, which he had been offering on a yearly basis since 1772. This course in turn had emerged from his Physical Geography lecture course he had been offering since 1756. Early in his teaching, Kant discussed the physical, natural, terrestrial character of the human being under a general discussion of the earth. He gave both sets of lectures until his retirement in 1796. Kant lectured on these popular topics not just because he needed to make a living. As a lecturer without an official post, he earned his living by the number of students he was able to enroll. It is clear that from the outset Kant saw his ‘Physical Geography’ as part of
his civically minded pedagogy that aimed to provide citizens of Prussia with what he called ‘Weltkenntnis,’ a term that has been translated by Kant scholar Holly Wilson as ‘cosmopolitan knowledge.’ The ‘Physical Geography’ lectures will finally appear in English within the next few years in the Cambridge Edition of Kant’s works. The translation, expertly executed by Olaf Reinhardt, however, is based on a corrupt edition of the German manuscript. This is the Rink edition, which Kant authorized, but which Kant himself did not oversee or approve, for as we know by 1802, when the Rink edition appeared, Kant was no longer able to read and many speculate that he had lost his rational faculties.

Now, Kant’s Physical Geography lectures are perhaps one of the best ways in which to gauge Kant’s cosmopolitan presuppositions and goals. Like arctic ice, and some very ancient red woods on the West coast, this course registers Kant’s intellectual growth and his own education into cosmopolitanism. In them we can track what Kant was reading and how he was reading it. German scholar Werner Stark has spent decades reconstructing the sequence of these lectures and providing us an insight into what was added and dropped as Kant modified, expanded, updated his lectures. Much work has been done in Germany, by Stark and his colleagues, which remains barely known in the USA. This aspect of Kant’s work remains terra incognita. Yet, I will argue that Kant provided us with a hermeneutical key that will allow us to make sense of what he sought to do in both his Physical Geography and Anthropology lectures. This hermeneutical key is to be found in a footnote in the foreword to his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. The note, not accidentally, comes as a clarification to the following statement: ‘Travel belongs to the means of broadening the range of anthropology, even if it is only the reading of travel books. But if one wants to know what to look for abroad, in order to broaden the range of anthropology, first one must have acquired knowledge of human beings at home, through social intercourse with one’s townsmen or countrymen.’ This statement is fascinating because, in light of what we know about Kant’s reading habits, namely that he loved to read ‘travel books,’ he is providing an apologia ante re for his own anthropology, which is not based on personal travel experience, but on the reading of secondary material, brought to Königsberg by sailors docking in the city’s ports. The remark is also peculiar because while Kant was known for his youthful participation in the Königsbergische Tischgesellschaft, later in his life Kant became if not a recluse at least a more private person than he had been in his youth. The fact that he also remained a bachelor and did not father children could be a background for this remark. Be that as it may, Kant appends the following note after those sentences, and I quote at length, because it is so pivotal:

A large city such as Königsberg on the river Pregel, which is the center of a kingdom, in which the provincial councils of the government are located, which has a university (for cultivation of the sciences) and which has also the right location for maritime commerce—a city which, by way of rivers, has the advantage of commerce both with the interior of the country and with neighboring and distant lands of different languages and customs, can well be taken as an appropriate place for
broading one’s knowledge of human beings as well as of the world, where this knowledge can be acquired without traveling.  

This is a remarkable passage for its innocence, its confessional character, and its evident lack of self-reflexivity. Kant’s cosmopolitanism presupposes as both epistemic and material condition of possibility the imperial location of its subject of knowledge. Kant is the beneficiary of the metropolitan location of Königsberg, a capital of a Reich, an Empire, a Kingdom, which is also the mercantile center of the north Atlantic maritime market that is controlled by England, but that Germany and Prussia benefit from directly. The cosmopolitan philosopher, pedagogue of the citizenry, announces without so saying that his project of cosmopolitan education is product of the imperial locus of its production. The content of these lectures, furthermore, is hardly an exploration and compendium of the most enlightened type of knowledge that was to be had in the eighteenth century. Kant’s lectures, spanning his entire teaching career, are replete with the reproduction and transmission of some of the worst prejudices of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, from Montesquieu, Buffon, and Hume, but also from sailors and merchants docking in the ports of Königsberg. As David Harvey has noted, these lectures constitute an embarrassment. Harvey writes:

> When projected into a world of sovereign democratic and republic states, it conjures up a threatening image of unwashed Hottentots, drunken Samoyeds, conniving and thieving Javanese and hordes of Burmese women lusting to get pregnant by Europeans, all clamoring for the right to cross borders and not be treated with hostility. It is precisely in such geographical ‘circumstances’ that we can better understand why Kant included in his cosmopolitan ethic and in his notion of justice the right to refuse entry (provided it does not result in the destruction of the other), the temporary nature of the right to hospitality (provided the entrant does not create any trouble) and the condition that permanent residency depends entirely on an act of beneficence on the part of a sovereign state that in any case always has the right to deny rights of citizenship to those that create trouble. Only those who exhibit maturity, presumably, will be granted the right to stay permanently.

This is what I call Kant’s imperial cosmopolitanism. More of this sordid and embarrassing cosmopolitanism is exemplified in the numerous manuscripts of his Physische Geographie lectures that are slowly being made available through the editorial efforts of Werner Stark. I want to underscore here that Kant links, naively but effectively, his pedagogical project to the imperial locus of the alleged cosmopolitan philosopher.

What is perhaps noteworthy is that there is a convergence between what Kant claims in his Anthropology and his Physische Geographie, and his project for a Perpetual Peace. In fact, as both David Harvey and Jeff Edwards have shown, we cannot make proper sense of Kant’s cosmopolitan legal and political order without the most minimal understanding of the way in which the roundness and thus finitude of the earth, as well as the social unsociability of human nature compels human to propagate and contend for every corner of the planet. The second and third
‘definitive’ articles of perpetual peace contain explicit references to both the ‘maliciousness of human nature’ and the spherical surface of the earth that prevents humans from scattering ‘without limit,’ thus being forced to ‘tolerate one another as neighbor’ (Ak 8: 355, 358). Kant’s philosophy of history, as well as his work on cosmopolitan right, belong to the last decades of his life, but they also belong to the period of his work when he is trying to see a convergence between what humans make of themselves and what nature requires, compels, them to do. There is no space here, and perhaps it is unnecessary, to cite the numerous passage throughout Kant’s corpus that reflect how he thought that white Europeans were the most developed instantiation of humanity, and how Western institutions represented the fulfillment of the plan of nature and the highest accomplishment of what human make of themselves through the enlightened use of reason. References to the works by Emmanuel Eze and Robert Bernansconi should suffice, for the moment. Yet, Scott L. Malcomson has captured succinctly what is unsettling in Kant’s attempt to make his putative cosmopolitanism converge with his anthropology and philosophy of history when he wrote: ‘Unfortunately, Kant also thought that Europe would be at the helm of nature’s world historical adventure. His progressive “system” begins in Greece and on to Rome, skips past the notoriously disappointing 1400 years that followed Constantine, and ends up in Enlightenment Europe, from which he is able to discern “a regular process of improvement in the political constitution of our continent (which will probably legislate eventually all other continents)” Malcomson is quoting here from Kant’s famous ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.’ The Kant scholar Allen W. Wood has in fact offered a similar reading, albeit without the anti-imperial and anti-colonial sentiments expressed by Malcomson. Wood writes:

The unity of Kant’s philosophy may be thus viewed as the unity of the historical task of enlightenment. Looking at it in this way, the project of perpetual peace emerges as the central focus of Kant’s critical or enlightenment philosophy. As distinct from the progress of morality of each individual, of knowledge in particular sciences, of justice in independent states, perpetual peace is the global or cosmopolitan project in which the human race must unite if it is to advance in its historical vocation, and hence preserve its nature as a species destined to turn natural discord into rational accord. The three Critiques, and the system of philosophy which is to be built upon them, aim at a rational system of thought whose historical actuality as human activity is vitally bound to the project of perpetual peace, for this project is the condition of the historical possibility of every other end of both nature and reason regarding the human species.

Implicit, thus, in this codependence of the Kantian cosmopolitan project on an anthropologically grounded philosophy of history is the epistemic and moral attitude that would impugn all alleged provincialism with a righteous cosmopolitanism. For the measure of the cosmopolitan world, federation is determined by a moral and legal outlook that assumes from the outset that Europe’s and the Europeans grasp of what is both morally desirable and legally acceptable is the absolute and unquestioned standard. That Kant could admit, as when he did when writing against Herder, the
‘happy inhabitants of Tahiti’ destined to live in their ‘tranquil indolence,’ would be no different than had their island been inhabited by ‘happy sheep and cattle,’ had they not been redeemed by their encounter with European man, who would awaken them to their indolent moral slumber (Ak 8:65). Not only is there no cosmopolitanism of the other, but there is also no way in which a different narrative about human accomplishments and path toward cosmopolitanism may be told in such a way that we may for the moment attenuate our own claims to cosmopolitanism. Imperial cosmopolitanism is thus arrogant, insouciant, autarchic, and impatient. It is arrogant because it abrogates for itself the role of measuring what is moral maturity and human accomplishment. It is insouciant because it does not consider the adverse effects of its own impact on other cultures and the world in general, assuming these merely to be inevitable and exculpable. It is autarchic because it never acknowledges that all human excellence and accomplishment is neither individual, national, racial nor even civilizational, but of the entire human species. Curiously, this is a point where Kant contradicts himself, for as he argues against Herder also, the human species advances, but as a species, not through individual accomplishment. Yet, Kant himself cannot admit of the contributions of other cultures, or the excellence of other races. Finally, it is impatient, for it already has established the goal, the means, and the time line. Indeed, once we have undone the ‘traces’ of racist and Eurocentric anthropological and geographical assumptions and preconceptions in Kant’s cosmopolitanism, little may remain. As Bernansconi has argued, those who seek to undo the effects of European racism and dehumanizing colonial mindset with a dose of enlightened cosmopolitanism may have to look somewhere else than Kant’s corpus.

CRITICAL AND REFLEXIVE COSMOPOLITANISMS

Martha Nussbaum appears to follow in Kant’s pedagogical steps in as much as public education has an indisputable role in providing citizens with knowledge about other nations, cultures, and civilization. Yet, Nussbaum goes beyond Kant’s sexist, racist, and Eurocentric pedagogical and geographical assumptions. Nussbaum’s contribution is a much needed correction and antidote to the arrogant and impatient cosmopolitanism of a Kant. In contrast to Kant’s ‘embarrassing prattlings,’ Nussbaum has taken very seriously the perspective of non-European cultures, as it is exemplified in her work on India as well as the contributions of minorities in the USA. In an essay published in the fall of 1994 in the Boston Review, Martha Nussbaum succinctly and eloquently elaborated and defended a form of civic cosmopolitanism, which she juxtaposed to parochial and jingoistic patriotism. The aim of the essay, however, was not just to defend cosmopolitanism and reject patriotism, but also to endorse cosmopolitanism as the focus of civic education. For Nussbaum, who has philosophized extensively on pedagogy, the relevance of the debate is determined by how it would impact the way we would educate citizens. Thus, for Nussbaum, cosmopolitanism is not an abstract, philosophical stance, but
rather a very practical and result-oriented attitude. If we educate citizens to see themselves primarily as citizens of a world community, as opposed to members of narrow, special, chosen, and exceptional communities, then these citizens would be less likely to engage in the rituals of blood that are so indispensable to patriotism, and would instead be more responsive and engaged with the cultures and welfare of communities across the globe. Thus, Nussbaum’s essay elaborates four arguments for why a cosmopolitan-oriented and guided civic education is a greater benefit to the USA, and others as well, than patriotically oriented civic education. First, because ‘through cosmopolitan education, we learn more about ourselves.’ Second, we are better prepared to solve problems that ‘require international cooperation.’ Third, ‘we recognize moral obligations to the rest of the world that are real and that otherwise would go unrecognized.’ Fourth, we learn to ‘make consistent and coherent’ arguments which we are prepared to defend intelligibly. It is difficult not to be sympathetic with the pedagogical aims of her defense of cosmopolitanism. While it is true that we are socialized and nurtured in local ethical communities, we are faced with global problems that command that we look to the world, even as we are indisputably rooted in specific ethical traditions. What I want to underscore and take from Nussbaum’s four arguments in defense of a cosmopolitan focused on civic education is her fourth reason. Being educated to think as a member of global community raises the epistemic bar on what kinds of distinctions and arguments we are capable of making. What Nussbaum is pointing out, I think, is that cosmopolitanism is not just an emotive or affective stance toward the claims of others, but that it is also a theoretical and conceptual stance that commands us to assess the cogency of our claims from the standpoint of sometimes abstract others, but sometimes very concrete others who happen to be on different continents. Cosmopolitanism is thus about entering a space of reasons that is borderless and has, putatively, no excluding membership requirements. In this sense, Nussbaum has already taken us beyond Kant’s circumscribed and Eurocentric cosmopolitanism. In contrast to Kant, who assumes that white Europeans discover the best reasons for a cosmopolitan world order, Nussbaum sees these reasons to be discerned through a dialog with others.

Kwame Anthony Appiah, who was one of the respondents to Nussbaum’s essay, published in 2006 a book entitled Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. Appiah, who has written on questions of identity, multiculturalism, race, imperialism, and nationalism extensively, frames his book in terms of investigating what would be the proper concept to use in order to confront the challenges of the modern world: whether globalization, multiculturalism, or cosmopolitanism. He settles on the last, although he notes that its meaning is contested and it can be argued that cosmopolitanism is both an ideal and a particular stance. Appiah, however, proceeds to profile two distinct ‘strands’ within cosmopolitanism. One strand underscores the idea that we have obligations to others. The other strand affirms that we must ‘take seriously the value not just of human life but of particular human lives, which means taking an interest in the practices and beliefs that lend them significance.’ Human difference, for this second strand, is an intrinsic good and must be preserved,
celebrated, and most importantly, learned from. As with Nussbaum, for Appiah cosmopolitanism has eminently pedagogical benefits, and like her, he also thinks that cosmopolitanism entails a moral orientation. This moral orientation imposes on all certain duties and responsibilities. Much of what follows in his book is about profiling these duties and responsibilities, and the contexts in which they become most evident and what elements and forms of thinking and knowing obscure these obligations toward strangers.

There is, however, an argument in Appiah’s book that is implicit in his distinction between two strands within cosmopolitanism but that only becomes explicit much later in the book. In the chapter entitled ‘The Counter-Cosmopolitans,’ Appiah discusses the neo-fundamentalist, Christian, Muslim, etc., reaction to the cosmopolitan challenges. There he writes: ‘If cosmopolitanism is, in a slogan, universality plus difference, there is the possibility of another kind of enemy, one who rejects universality all together. “Not everybody matters” would be their slogan.’ Indeed, whether you are a religious, market economy, or American supremacy fundamentalist, and think therefore that there are a lot of others who do not matter and that their interests, knowledge claims, local histories, threatened traditions, and endangered forms of life are unimportant and not worth our respect, even then, these fundamentalists are still within the space of reasons. Appiah is clear about this: ‘Once you start offering reasons for ignoring the interests of others, however, reasoning itself will usually draw you into a kind of universality.’ This is an extremely important insight, one that Appiah arrives at through a *via negativa*, i.e. when those who want to take a stance against cosmopolitanism draw up their reasons, they are unwittingly in the grip of universal reason. Yet, I would argue, not only the counter-cosmopolitan but also the avowed cosmopolitan is in the grip of some sort of ‘universality.’ Both are in the space of reasons. Consequently, I can make the claim that cosmopolitanism is an ethical orientation that puts reason on call, on guard, to use Derrida notion of a critique of reason that puts reason on call. Universality, consequently, must be rearticulated, defended, expanded, and made concrete. Cosmopolitanism must therefore entail a self-critique of one’s prejudices, as well as a confession and disclosure of one’s own epistemic standpoint. In this way, then cosmopolitanism is reflexive, to use Beck’s terminology.

The reason of the cosmopolitan must be a cosmopolitan reason that aims to an as yet to be specified universality. For this reason, one can speak of a naïve, or ideological cosmopolitanism, the kind that makes communitarians and conservatives bristle with contempt but that also makes those critical of cultural imperialism impatient and highly critical of dehistoricized enunciations of universal reason. This type of cosmopolitanism, exemplified in Kant’s version, which refuses to submit its own universality claims to critique, to enter the space of reasons in a symmetrical and egalitarian way with others who are at the table of cosmopolitanism, can turn into a form of epistemic arrogance that like a fig leaf barely conceals contemptuous disregard and brutal self-interest. Unfortunately, the history of the modern world furnishes plenty of examples of such forms of naïve, and in most cases, imperial cosmopolitanism. Neither Nussbaum nor Appiah are naïve cosmopolitans. No one can accuse them
of offering fodder for the canons of neo-liberal globalism and Western neo-imperialism. Their work on cosmopolitanism, absolutely indispensable, must be extended and supplemented.

The opposite of naïve, and imperial, cosmopolitanism, it may be argued, would be a critical cosmopolitanism. Walter Mignolo has in fact defended and articulated such a form of cosmopolitanism. He has done so weaving in a magisterial way a critical history of Western colonialism with incisive insights into key philosophical figures in a decolonized philosophical canon. In a brilliant essay ‘The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism’ he illustrates in actu the virtues of a critical cosmopolitanism by distinguishing among three different global–imperial designs and what were their corresponding cosmopolitan projects. According to Mignolo to the global designs of the Spanish and Portuguese empires, from the sixteenth through the seventeenth century, corresponded the cosmopolitanism of the Christian mission, i.e. cosmopolitanism as evangelization and Christianization of the pagan and heathens. To the French and English imperial designs during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries corresponded the cosmopolitan mission of civilizing, i.e. cosmopolitanism as civilizing the barbarians. To the USA, translational, global, and neo-colonial imperial designs during the twentieth century, corresponded the cosmopolitan mission of modernizing, i.e. cosmopolitanism as modernization, or globalization, of the premodern and traditional. One does not need to subscribe to this particular chronology or the corresponding organizing principles (missionizing, civilizing, and modernizing) in order to recognize the validity of the critique of the ways in which certain embodiments of cosmopolitanism have, explicitly or implicitly, condoned, justified and legitimated colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism. Mignolo’s task, in this essay as well as in most of his work, is not just deconstructive and critical; it is also positive and constructive. The point of this critical cosmopolitanism is to open it up to other voices and others who challenge the reason of imperial and global designs that have resulted in so much inequality and human suffering. The task of critical cosmopolitanism, then, is to rescue, retrieve, and make audible and visible the voices of those local histories that have been rendered subaltern and silent by the imperial ethos that rolls over with military might those it deems as resistance. As Mignolo put it ‘Critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism as a regulative principle demands yielding generously (“convivially” said Vitoria; “friendly” said Kant) toward diversity as a universal and cosmopolitan project in which everyone participates instead of “being participated.” Critical cosmopolitanism, therefore, is oriented to a form of universality that Mignolo calls diversality, a combination of diversity and universality. To paraphrase what was written above, the reason and universality of critical cosmopolitanism is a cosmopolitan diversality and rationality, or more precisely diversal rationality. In Mignolo’s words: ‘diversality should be the relentless practice of critical and dialogical cosmopolitanism rather than the blueprint of a future and ideal society projected from a single point of view (that of abstract universality). . .’
What Mignolo is making explicit is that cosmopolitanism is caught in what has been called by Karl-Otto Apel a ‘performative contradiction,’ that is to say, there is a way in which all cosmopolitan claims are de facto deferred and thus awaiting further specification by that in the name of which we are called to respect, celebrate, and heed: the claims of the others, the claims of strangers, as Appiah calls them. Interestingly, Judith Butler has made this exact point in her response to Martha Nussbaum’s essay ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism.’ Butler’s response takes up the ‘performative contradiction’ character of universality claims implied in cosmopolitan claims and argues for a universality that must be articulated by and through the challenges to ‘its existing formulation, and this challenge emerge[s] from those who are not covered by it, who have not entitlement to occupy the place of the “who,” but who nevertheless demand that the universal as such ought to be inclusive of them.’

This universality that is always deferred and caught in its own insufficiency is what Mignolo has called ‘diversality.’ Both Mignolo and Butler agree on something far more important than on signaling that all cosmopolitan enunciations of universality demand that the universal itself be held in suspension, as an asymptotic horizon, a counter-factual, without-which but also against which, we must engage in order to enable a proper response to the other. They agree more dramatically on the place of the other in this pedagogy of the universal, in the expansion and enlightenment of universality itself. Mignolo has argued that critical cosmopolitanism is sustained in its critical stance when it adopts what he calls the locus of enunciation of the subaltern. Butler has argued that it is the ‘who’ that is excluded from a given articulation of the universal that constitutes the ‘contingent limit of universalization.’

Both, in my view, are arguing that cosmopolitanism is made cosmopolitan by the diversality of the subaltern, the excluded other, the stranger, and the marginalized. For this reason, one can speak of cosmopolitanism from below, one that matches the socio-political effects of a globalization from below. Mignolo and Butler give voice to what can be called the cosmopolitanism of the subaltern. In fact, it is this cosmopolitanism of the subaltern that has been educating those in the metropolises of the West and those who claim to speak univocally and unequivocally for the universal as such. This form of cosmopolitanism is reflexive not just of its own standpoint, but also of the standpoint of the others, vis-à-vis oneself. If there is reflexive cosmopolitanism, then there is a cosmopolitanism of the other, of the subaltern. Reflexive cosmopolitanism is a universality plus difference that reflects on its own conditioned claims. It is thus universality plus difference plus historical consciousness, or to use Mignolo’s language: diversality plus reflexivity of historical contingency.

DIALOGICAL COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE COSMOPOLITANISM TO COME

I started this essay by noting that we have entered the ruins of a Babelian temple of confused tongues of discourses about cosmopolitanism, but that we can make our
way through and out. I sought to extract a semblance of order and meaning from the plurality of adjectives that are now associated with cosmopolitanism. I have focused on the philosophical import of the category of cosmopolitanism by showing how it is a way of relating to the world that is both epistemic and moral. I do think that cosmopolitanism is also a political and legal ideal that nonetheless presupposes some general views about humanity, and our place on the planet. I showed through a critical reading of Kant’s work on physical geography and his anthropology, how his cosmopolitanism is infected by an imperial ethics that derives from the very unacknowledged and unreflected materials conditions of enunciation of his own putatively cosmopolitan view. Kant is not just a ‘dead white European male philosopher.’ He is also our major contemporary source of inspiration for a cosmopolitan ideal. I have availed myself through some immanent readings of the kind of resources we would need to develop an enlightened, dialogical cosmopolitanism that can help us rescue Kant the philosopher from Kant the imperial subject. In this conclusion I want to show how Seyla Benhabib provides us with indispensable tools in this major task of philosophical rescue.

In a very important essay, Pauline Kleingeld offered a typology of six different varieties of cosmopolitanism in late eighteenth century Germany: moral; political; legal; cultural; economic; and romantic.42 I think that some of the cosmopolitanism that I discussed here could also fall under similar rubrics, although it is evident that I have not discussed economic, political, and legal variants of cosmopolitanism. I take it that these later forms of cosmopolitanisms are what have been called really existing cosmopolitanisms, or banal cosmopolitanisms. It could be claimed that we live in an age of cosmopolitanism, just as Kant can be said to have lived in an age of enlightenment. Yet, while I have relied on the important work of Nussbaum, Appiah, Butler, Mignolo, and Beck, I have also sought to push the discourse on cosmopolitanism into clarifying some of its own normative or ideal claims. At the core of these normative claims is what I have called the dialectic of difference and identity, otherness and sameness.

All cosmopolitanism is always rooted, as is every philosophical claim, and perhaps the best cosmopolitans are those who are most fervently patriotic cosmopolitans, as Appiah argued.43 This grounded, placed, rooted, and patriotic cosmopolitanism acknowledges the contingency and thus fragility of the kinds of institutions that enable our enacting cosmopolitanism or cosmopolitan iterations, to appropriate Derrida via Benhabib.44 I brought into dialog Judith Butler and Walter Mignolo in order to disaggregate what Ulrich Beck has felicitously called vertical versus horizontal cosmopolitanism, but also to complicate Beck’s own notion of cosmopolitan Europe, which is that Europe that has internalized self-criticism and has submitted to a process of internal cosmopolitanization.45 If vertical cosmopolitanism seeks to impose its version from above, à la Kant, horizontal cosmopolitanism holds in suspension some of its localized universal claims, patiently, solicitously awaiting for agreement and assent from other cosmopolitan claims, à la Derrida.46 Unless
cosmopolitanism is reflexive about its material standpoint, it will turn both arrogant and despotic, i.e. what I called imperial cosmopolitanism, as oxymoronic as that may sound. If reflexive cosmopolitanism acknowledges its rootedness, its materiality in certain institutions and histories, it may become an emancipatory form of cosmopolitanism. Thus cosmopolitanism presupposes a form of suspended, delayed, on the way, universalism. This is the universalism of the other, an ‘other’ that is neither metaphysical nor radical alterity, but an other that is always a historical and concrete ‘other.’ This immediately raises a question, which Beck has articulated succinctly: ‘...how can we devise a limited, relativistic or contextual universalism that successfully squares the circle of affirming universal norms while neutralizing their imperialistic sting?’ Beck himself partly answered the question. Such a form of limited or contextual universalism that has neutralized or disarmed its imperialistic sting is to be produced by a dialogical imaginary that is grounded in a dialogical imagination. That is, an imaginary that opens a horizon of intelligibility that sets out from recognizing that we imagine others, just as those others imagine us in their own ways. We are always more and less than what we are imagined to be, which is why we must allow others to challenge our ‘images’ and ‘imagination’ of them, and conversely, to allow ourselves to correct our own self-understanding in light of those challenges. Thus, this imagination internalizes the other, alterity, in a non-imperial and non-obliterating way, in order to reconstitute itself. There is no single cosmopolitan vision, but a process of arriving at it through an engagement with a dialogical imagination that opens up the spaces of mutual transformation.

In her Tanner lectures, Seyla Benhabib has given another account of what we have here called reflexive cosmopolitanism when she noted that the culture of human rights has made explicit the paradoxical situation in which nation-states are simultaneously affirmed and denied in the play of cosmopolitan right. Nation-states sign the kind of international agreements that delimit and call into question their own sovereignty. Under the cosmopolitan condition, sovereign nations are both universalized and effaced. They have a power that is indispensable but at the same time always already circumscribed, delimited by the very cosmopolitan legal order to which these nations subscribe. This dialectical play between sovereignty and cosmopolitan right takes on a generative and transformative character when it is unleashed within a nation-state. Individuals, bearers of cosmopolitan rights, may challenge the limits of their own nations from within catalyzing processes of self-definition and legal–political transformation. Benhabib calls these two processes ‘democratic iterations’ and ‘jurisgenerative politics.’ As Benhabib puts it:

With the concept of ‘democratic iterations,’ I wanted to signal forms of popular empowerment and political struggle through which the people themselves appropriate the universalist promise of cosmopolitan norms in order to bind forms of political and economic power that seek to escape democratic control, accountability and transparency. The interlocking of democratic iteration struggles within a global civil society and the creation of solidarities beyond borders, including a universal right of hospitality that recognizes the other as a potential co-citizen, anticipate another cosmopolitanism—a cosmopolitanism to come.
Democratic iterations open up the field of the political, ceaselessly renewing and expanding what constitutes the political itself. These struggles, which may be internal and national, actually have a global character. Where one group of citizens democratically iterates their claims on citizenship, these claims have global reverberation. This is the dialectical play that is the modus vivendi of the cosmopolitan age. But as Benhabib rightly notes, these democratic iterations also include the production of solidarities beyond borders. In this way, we should not just talk about a jurisgenerative politics, but also an affect-generative, or somatological cosmopolitan politics, in which solidarities and empathies are generated that allow us to fully engage the dialogical imagination. The dialogical is always irreversibly transformative and irrevocably suspended. It is the routinization of expectancy. Dialog as waiting to hear the response of the other, is the expectancy of either rebuttal or acceptance that imposes on us the commandment to respond responsibly. Dialog is thus patience, but it is, however, not pure receptivity or passivity. To open up to the other is deliberate, active, and willful action. If enlightened, reflexive, and rooted cosmopolitanism is in fact dialogical cosmopolitanism, it is an expectant cosmopolitanism that expands both vertically and horizontally, through local cosmopolitan iterations that defer it making it into a normative ideal that is guided by contextual universalism. We do not live in an age of cosmopolitanism, but in an age of cosmopolitization—the age of the cosmopolitanism to come.

NOTES

1. An early version of this paper was presented and discussed at session of philosophers in Jesuit education, which was held at the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, December 27–30, 2008. I thank David Ingram for the invitation and the impetus to write this text. I wrote the essay while I was a fellow at the Institute of Advanced Study at Durham University, England. I want to also thank the anonymous readers for this journal that provided substantive criticisms and suggestions for improving the overall argument.

2. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, eds., Cosmopolitics: Thinking Beyond and Feeling Beyond the Nation (Minneapolis, MN and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Daniel Archibugi, ed., Debating Cosmopolitics (London: Verso, 2003).

3. Ulrich Beck, Cosmopolitan Vision (Cambridge: Polity, 2006). Beck had already introduced the term in Ulrich Beck, ‘The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity’, British Journal of Sociology 51, no. 1 (January/March, 2000): 79–105.

4. Ulrich Beck, Cosmopolitan Vision, 10.

5. Craig Calhoun, ‘The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Towards a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism’, in Debating Cosmopolitics, ed. Daniel Archibugi, 89.

6. Ibid., 112.

7. Walter Mignolo, ‘The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism’, Public Culture 12, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 721–48.

8. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Beyond Neoliberal Governance: The World Social Forum as Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics and Legality’, in Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality, ed. Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A. Rodriguez-Garavito (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 29–63.
9. Walter Mignolo, ‘Cosmopolitanism and the De-Colonial Option’, *Studies in Philosophy and Education* (Forthcoming).

10. See James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachman, eds., *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997). See especially Martha Nussbaum’s chapter ‘Kant and Cosmopolitanism.’ See also Allen Wood, ‘Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace’, in *Cosmopolitics*, ed. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, 59–76.

11. Holly L. Wilson, *Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology: Its Origin, Meaning, and Critical Significance* (Albany, NY: SUNY, 2006), 7–26.

12. For a detailed discussion of the problems, as well as what is sure to be a major point of departure for Kant scholarship, see Stuart Elden, ‘Reassessing Kant’s Geography’, *Journal of Historical Geography* 35 (2009): 3–25. Stuart Elden and I have organized two seminars on these lectures and have edited a volume about them that should be published shortly, Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta, eds., *Reading Kant’s Physical Geography* (Albany, NY: SUNY, forthcoming).

13. David Harvey has argued that neglect and ignorance of how Kant’s legal and political cosmopolitanism has prevented modern cosmopolitan thinkers from disengaging the cosmopolitan promises of Kant’s project from its colonial and imperial assumptions and implications. See David Harvey, *Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). See especially chapter one, on Kant’s lectures on anthropology and geography and the chapter on ‘The New Cosmopolitans.’

14. Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. Robert Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 4.

15. Ibid., Italics added.

16. Harvey, *Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom*, 12. I am quoting from Chapter 1 of the manuscript.

17. See David Harvey and Jeff Edwards chapters in Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta, *Reading Kant’s Physical Geography*.

18. Immanuel Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 79 and 82, respectively.

19. I have engaged many of these references in my essay ‘Geography is to History, as Woman is to Man: Kant on Sex, Race and Geography’ in Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta, *Reading Kant’s Physical Geography*.

20. Emmanuel Chukwudy Eze, ed., *Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997); and Robert Bernasconi, ‘Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism’, in *Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays*, ed. Julie K. Ward and Tommy L. Lott (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 145–66.

21. Scott L. Malcomson, ‘The Varieties of Cosmopolitan Experience’, in *Cosmopolitics*, ed. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, 237.

22. Allen W. Wood, ‘Kant’s Project for Perpetual Peace’, in *Cosmopolitics*, ed. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, 71–2.

23. See part two of the *Contest of the Faculties* (Ak 7:79 ff), and Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings*, 150 ff. See also the ‘On the character of the species’ toward the end of the *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*, Ak 7: 321–30.

24. Robert Bernasconi, ‘Kant’s Third Thoughts on Race’, in ed. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta, *Reading Kant’s Physical Geography*.

25. The following builds on the introduction to my book: Eduardo Mendieta, *Global Fragments: Globalizations, Latinamericanisms, and Critical Theory* (Albany, NY: SUNY, 2007).

26. I tried to show to what extent Kant’s thought is not just Eurocentric and racist, but also sexist in ‘Geography is to History as Woman is to Man: Kant on Race, Gender, and Geography’, in *Reading Kant’s Physical Geography*, ed. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (Albany, NY: SUNY, forthcoming). See also the following excellent articles by Allegra De Laurentiis, ‘Kant’s Shameful Proposition: A Hegel-Inspired Criticism of Kant’s Theory
of Domestic Right’, in *International Philosophical Quarterly* XL, no. 3 (September 2000): 297–312; and Jane Kneller, ‘Kant on sex and marriage right’, in *Kant and Modern Philosophy*, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 447–76; Holly L. Wilson, ‘Kant’s Evolutionary Theory of Marriage’, in *Autonomy and Community: Readings in Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy*, ed. Jane Kneller and Sidney Axinn (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1998): 283–306. See also Hannelore Schröder, ‘Kant’s Patriarchal Order’, in *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*, ed. Schott (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 275–96.

27. In fact, Nussbaum is critical of Kant’s failure to appropriate the stoic idea of educating the passion so as to lead us to a cosmopolitan outlook and modus vivendi. See her wonderful essay ‘Kant and Cosmopolitanism’, in *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal*, ed. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 25–57.

28. See Martha C. Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); and Martha C. Nussbaum, *The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence and India’s Future* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2007).

29. What is interesting is that part of impetus for engaging in her critique of patriotism was to confront Richard Rorty’s embrace of both patriotism and avowed ethnocentrism. Yet, Nussbaum’s and Rorty’s views on the role of affect, education, the importance of inculcating empathy and solidarity with others are very similar. Rorty is closer to Nussbaum than she was willing to acknowledge in this book. See for instance Richard Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality’, in *Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, ed. Richard Rorty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 167–85. See also Richard Rorty, ‘Justice as a Larger Loyalty’, in *Philosophy as Cultural Politics: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 4, ed. Richard Rorty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 42–55.

30. Martha C. Nussbaum, *For Love of Country?* (Boston, MA: Beacon, 2002), 11–4. This book, which contains Nussbaum’s original essay, also contains responses and critiques by 16 other major scholars: such as Elaine Scarry, Benjamin Barber, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Michael Walzer, Sissela Bok, Judith Butler, Emmanuel Wallerstein, and many others, and a response by Nussbaum to them.

31. Anthony Appiah, *Ethics in a World of Strangers* (New York: Norton, 2006).

32. Ibid., xv.

33. Ibid., 151.

34. Ibid., 152–3.

35. See Jacques Derrida, *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).

36. Walter Mignolo, ‘The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism’, 721–48.

37. Ibid., 744.

38. Ibid.

39. Judith Butler, ‘Universality in Culture’, in *For Love of Country?* ed. Martha C. Nussbaum, 49. Here Butler develops more extensively her views on universality in the book coauthored with Slavoj Žižek and Ernesto Laclau, *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left* (London and New York: Verso, 2000).

40. See Celina Maria Bragagnolo, ‘Deprovincializing the West: How the Rest Globalizes the West’, in *Interfacing Globalization and Colonialism*, ed. Gary Backhaus and John Muringi (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2007), 138–52.

41. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Beyond Neoliberal Governance: The World Social Forum as Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics and Legality’.

42. Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany’, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60, no. 3 (July 1999): 505–24.
E. Mendieta

43. Kwame Anthony Appiah in *Cosmopolitics*, ed. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, 91–114.
44. Seyla Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
45. Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).
46. Ulrich Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision*, 162.
47. Ibid., 59.
48. Seyla Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, 45–80.
49. Ibid., 177.