Tipi: A TPTP-based theory development environment emphasizing proof analysis

Jesse Alama*
Center for Artificial Intelligence
New University of Lisbon
Portugal
j.alama@fct.unl.pt, http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~alama/

Abstract

In some theory development tasks, it is satisfactorily solved once it is shown that a theorem (conjecture) is derivable from the background theory (premises). Depending on one’s motivations, the details of the derivation of the conjecture from the premises may or may not be important. In some contexts, though, one wants more from theory development than simply derivability of the target theorems from the background theory. One may want to know which premises of the background theory were used in the course of a proof output by an automated theorem prover (when a proof is available), whether they are all, in suitable senses, necessary (and why), whether alternative proofs can be found, and so forth. The problem, then, is to support proof analysis in theory development; the tool described in this paper, Tipi, aims to provide precisely that.

1 Introduction

A characteristic feature of theorem proving problems arising in theory development is that we often do not know which premises of our background theory are needed for a proof until we find one. If we are working in a stable background theory in which the axioms are fixed, we naturally include all premises of the background theory because it a safe estimate (perhaps an overestimate) of what is needed to solve the problem. We may add lemmas on top of the background theory to help a theorem prover find a solution or to make our theory more comprehensible. Since computer-assisted theorem proving is beset on all sides by intractability, any path through a formal theory development task is constantly threatened by limitations both practical (time, memory, patience, willpower) and theoretical (undecidability of first-order validity). Finding even one solution (proof, model, etc.) is often no small feat, so declaring victory once the first solution is found is thus quite understandable and may be all that is wanted.

In some theory development tasks, though, we want to learn more about our problem beyond its solvability. This paper announces Tipi, a tool that helps us to go beyond mere solvability of a reasoning problem by providing support for answering such questions as:

• What premises of the problem were used in the solution?

• Do other automated reasoning systems derive the conclusion from the same premises?

• Are my premises consistent? Do they admit unintended models?

*Supported by the ESF research project Dialogical Foundations of Semantics within the ESF Eurocores program LogiCC (funded by the Portuguese Science Foundation, FCT LogiCC/0001/2007). Research for this paper was partially done while a visiting fellow at the Isaac Newton Institute for the Mathematical Sciences in the programme ‘Semantics & Syntax’. The author wishes to thank Ed Zalta and Paul Oppenheimer for stimulating the development of Tipi and for being guinea pigs for it.
• What premises are truly needed for the conclusion? Can we find multiple sets of such premises? Is there a a “minimal” theory that derives the conclusion?

• Are my axioms independent of one another?

Let us loosely call the investigation of these and related questions proof analysis.

Tipi is useful for theory exploration both in the context of discovery and in the context of justification. In the context of discovery, one crafts lemmas, adds or deletes axioms, changes existing axioms, modifies the problem statement, etc., with the aim of eventually showing that the theory is adequate for one’s purposes (it derives a certain conjecture, is satisfiable, is unsatisfiable, etc.). In the context of discovery, the set of one’s axioms is in flux, and one needs tools to help ensure that the development is not veering too far off course into the unexpected countersatisfiability, admitting “nonsense” models, being inconsistent, etc. In the context of justification, after the initial work is done and a solution is found, one wants to know more about the relationship between the theory and the conjecture than simply that the latter is derivable from the former. What is the proof like? Are there other proofs? Tipi is designed to facilitate answering questions such as these.

The theorem provers and model finders that make up Tipi include E, Vampire, Prover9, Mace4, and Paradox. The system is extensible; adding support for new automated reasoning systems is straightforward because we rely only on the SZS ontology to make judgments about theorem proving problems.

Tipi uses a variety of automated reasoning technology to carry out its analysis. It uses theorem provers and model finders and is based on the TPTP syntax for expressing reasoning problems [7] and the SZS problem status ontology [6] thereby can flexibly use of a variety of automated reasoning tools that support this syntax.

Going beyond solvability and demanding more of our solutions is obviously not a new idea. Our interests complement those of Wos and collaborators, who are also often interested not simply in derivability, but in finding proofs that have certain valuable properties, such as being optimal in various senses; see [11, 10]. Tipi emphasizes proof analysis at the level of sets of premises, whereas one could be interested in more fine grained information such as the number of symbols employed in a proof, whether short proofs are available, whether a theory is axiomatized by a single formula, etc. Such analysis tends to involve rather expert knowledge of particular problems and low-level tweaking of proof procedures. Tipi uses automated reasoning technology essentially always in “automatic mode”.

The philosophical background of Tipi is a classic problem in the philosophy of logic known as the proof identity problem:

When are two proofs the same?

Standard approaches to the proof identity problem work with natural deduction derivations or category theory. One well-known proposal is to identify “proof” with a natural deduction derivation, define a class of conversion operations on natural deduction derivations, and declare that two proofs are the same if one can be converted to the other. See [3] for a discussion of this approach to the proof identity problem. The inspiration for Tipi is to take on the proof identity problem with the assistance of modern automated reasoning tools. From this perspective, the TPTP library [7] can be seen as a useful resource on which to carry out experiments about “practical” proof identity. TPTP problems typically don’t contain proofs in the usual sense of the term, but they do contain hints of proofs in the sense that they specify axioms and perhaps some intermediate lemmas.
One does not need to share the philosophical background (or even care about it) to start using Tipi, which in any case was designed to facilitate TPTP-based theory development.

Terminology In the following we sometimes equivocate on the term theory, understanding it sometimes in its mathematical sense as a set of formulas closed under logical consequence (and so is always infinite and has infinitely many axiomatizations), and sometimes in its practice sense, represented as a TPTP problem, which always has finitely many axioms. “TPTP theory” simply means an arbitrary (first-order) TPTP problem. Of course, from a TPTP theory $T$ we can obtain a theory in the mathematical sense of the term by simply reading the formulas of $T$ as logical formulas and closing $T$ under logical consequence. From an arbitrary first-order theory in the mathematical sense of the term obviously one cannot extract a unique finite axiomatization and, worse, many theories of interest are not even finitely axiomatizable. Still, we may at times, for precision, need to understand “theory” in its mathematical sense, even though of course we shall always work with finite TPTP theories (problems).

Convention Some TPTP problems do not have a conjecture formula. Indeed, some TPTP problems are not theorem proving problems per se but are better understood as model finding problems (e.g., the intended SZS status is Satisfiable). For expository convenience we shall restrict ourselves to TPTP problems whose intended interpretation is that a set of premises entails a single conclusion.

The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes some simple tools provided by Tipi to facilitate theory development. Section 3 discusses the problem of determining which premises are needed. Section 4 discusses two algorithms, one syntactic and the other semantic, for determining needed needed premises. Section 5 concentrates on independent sets of axioms. Section 6 discusses some simple model analysis tools provided by Tipi. Section 7 gives a sense of the experience so far with using Tipi on real-world proof analysis tasks. Section 8 says where can obtain Tipi and briefly discusses its implementation. Section 9 concludes and suggests further directions for proof analysis and dependencies.

2 Syntax analysis

When designing TPTP theories, one needs to be careful about the precise language (signature) that one employs. An all-too-familiar problem is typos: one intends to write \texttt{connected_to} but writes \texttt{conected_to} instead. One quick check that can help catch this kind of error is to look for unique occurrences of constants, functions, or predicates. A unique occurrence of a relation or function symbol is a sign (though by no means a necessary or sufficient condition) that the theory is likely to be trivially inadequate to the intended reasoning task because it will fail to be (un)satisfiable, or fail to derive the conjecture. Detecting such hapax legomena early in the theory development process can prevent wasted time “debugging” TPTP theories that appear to be adequate but which are actually flawed.

3 Needed premises

Once it is known that a conjecture $c$ is derivable from a background theory $T$, one may want to know about the class of proofs that witness this derivability relation. Depending on which automated theorem prover (ATP) is used, there may not even be a derivation of $c$ from $T$, but only the judgment that $c$ is a theorem of $T$. If one does have a derivation (e.g., a resolution proof) $d$, one can push the investigation further:

- Which premises of $T$ occur in $d$?
• Are all the premises occurring in \( d \) needed?

Various notions of “needed” are available. For lack of space we cannot give a complete survey of this interesting concept; see [1] for a more thorough discussion of the notion of “dependency” in the context of interactive theorem provers. One can distinguish whether a formula is needed for a derivation, or for a conclusion. In a Hilbert style calculus, the sequence \( d \) of formulas

\[
\langle C, A, A \rightarrow B, B \rangle
\]

is a derivation of \( D \) from the premises \( X = \{C, A, A \rightarrow B\} \). All axioms of \( X \) do appear in \( d \), so it is reasonable to assert that all of \( X \) is needed for \( d \). But are all premises needed for the conclusion \( B \) of \( d \)? The formula \( C \) is not used as the premise of any application of a rule of inference (here, modus ponens is the only rule of inference). Thus one can simply delete the first term of \( d \) and obtain a derivation \( d' \) of \( B \) from \( X - \{C\} \). In a plain resolution calculus, a derivation of the empty clause from a set \( C \) of clauses can have unused premises in the same sense as there can be unused premises of a Hilbert-style derivation. Still, there can be “irrelevant” literals in clauses of \( C \) whose deletion from \( C \) and from a refutation \( d \) of \( C \) yields a more focused proof.

Intuitively, any premise that is needed for a conclusion is also needed for any derivation of the conclusion (assuming sensible notions of soundness and completeness of the calculi in which derivations are carried out). However, a premise that is needed for a derivation need not be needed for its conclusion. Clearly, multiple proofs of a conclusion are often available, employing different sets of premises.

In the ATP context, we may even find that, if we keep trimming unused premises from a theory \( T \) that derives a conjecture \( c \) until no more trimming is possible (so that every premise is needed by the ATP to derive the conjecture), there may still be proper subsets of “minimal” premises that suffice. The examples below in Section 7 illustrate this.

4 Reproving and minimal subtheories

Given an ATP \( A \), a background theory \( T \) and a conjecture \( c \), assume that \( T \) does derive \( c \) and is witnessed by an \( A \)-derivation \( d \). Define

\[
T_0 := \{ \varphi \in T : \varphi \text{ occurs in } d \}
\]

as the set of premises of \( T \) occurring in \( d \). Do we need all of \( T \) to derive \( c \)? If \( T_0 \) is a proper subset of \( T \), then the answer is evidently “no”. One simple method to investigate the question of which premises of \( T \) are needed to derive \( c \) is to simply repeat the invocation of \( A \) using successively weaker subtheories of \( T \). Given \( T_k \) and an \( A \)-derivation \( d_k \) of \( c \) from \( T_k \), define

\[
T_{k+1} := \{ \varphi \in T_k : \varphi \text{ occurs in } d_k \}
\]

We are then after the fixed point of the sequence

\[
T_0 \supset T_1 \supset T_2 \supset \ldots
\]

We can view this discussion as the definition of a new proof procedure:

Definition 1 (Syntactic reproving). Given a background theory \( T \), an ATP \( A \), a conjecture \( c \), use \( A \) to derive \( c \) from \( A \). If this succeeds, extract the premises of \( T \) that were used by \( A \) to derive \( c \); call this set \( T' \). If \( T' = T \), then stop and return \( d \). If \( T' \) is a proper subset of \( T \), then let \( T := T' \) and repeat.
We call this proof procedure “syntactic” simply because we view the task of a proof finder as a syntactic one. The name is not ideal because an ATP may use manifestly semantic methods in the course of deriving \( c \) from \( T \). The definition of syntactic reproving requires of \( A \) only that we can compute from a successful search for a derivation, which premises were used; we do not require a derivation from \( A \), though in practice various ATPs do in fact emit derivations and from these we simply extract used premises.

If \( A \) is a complete ATP, then we can find a fixed point, provided we have unlimited resources; the existence of a fixed point follows from the assumption that \( T_0 \) and the fact that \( T_0 \) is finite.\(^1\) Of course, we do place restrictions on our proof searches, so we often cannot determine that a proper subset of \( T \) suffices to derive \( c \), even if there is such a subset.

It can happen that the syntactic reprove procedure applied with an ATP \( A \), a theory \( T \), and a conjecture \( c \), terminates with a subtheory \( T' \) of \( T \) even though there is a proper subset \( T'' \) of \( T \) that also suffices and, further, \( A \) can verify that \( T'' \) suffices. The syntactic reprove procedure does not guarantee that the solution it finds is truly minimal. Some other proof procedure, then, is needed.

**Definition 2 (Semantic reproving).** Given a background theory \( T \) and ATPs \( A \) and \( B \), a conjecture \( c \), use \( A \) to derive \( c \) from \( A \). If this succeeds, extract the premises of \( T \) that were used by \( A \) to derive \( c \); call this set \( T_1 \). Define

\[
T^* := \{ \varphi \in T' : T' - \{ \varphi \} \not\vdash c \}
\]

Now use \( A \) to check whether \( T^* \vdash c \). If this succeeds, return \( T^* \).

The semantic reprove procedure takes two ATPs \( A \) and \( B \) as parameters. \( A \) is used for checking derivability, whereas \( B \) is used to check underviability. This proof procedure is called “semantic” because the task of constructing \( T^* \) is carried out in Tipi using a model finder (e.g., Paradox or Mace4), which solves the problem of showing that \( X \not\vdash \varphi \) by producing a model of \( X \cup \{ \neg \varphi \} \). As with “syntactic” in “syntactic reprove”, the “semantic” in “semantic reprove” is not ideal because any ATP that can decide underviability judgments would work; whether \( B \) uses syntactic or semantic methods (or a combination thereof) to arrive at its solution is immaterial. Indeed, in principle, for \( B \) a theorem prover could be used. Even though Vampire and E are typically used to determine derivability, because of the properties of their search procedures, they can be used for determining underviability, though establishing underviability is not necessarily their strong suit and often a model finder can give an answer more efficiently to the problem of whether \( X \vdash \varphi \).

### 5 Independence

In proof analysis a natural question is whether, in a set \( X \) of axioms, there is an axiom \( \varphi \) that depends on the others in the sense that \( \varphi \) can be derived from \( X - \{ \varphi \} \).

**Definition 3 (Independent set of formulas).** A set \( X \) of formulas is **independent** if for every formula \( \varphi \) in \( X \) it is not the case that \( X - \{ \varphi \} \vdash \varphi \).

**Tipi** provides a proof procedure for testing whether a set of formulas is independent. The algorithm for testing this is straightforward: given a finite set \( X = \{ \varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n \} \) of axioms whose independence we need to test, test successively

1. whether there is any \( \varphi = \varphi_k \) in \( X \) such that for some \( j_1 \neq k \), we have \( \{ x_{j_1} \} \vdash \varphi \)

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\(^1\)There may even be multiple \( A \)-minimal subtheories of \( T \) that derive \( c \), but the proof procedure under discussion will find only one of them.
2. whether there is any $\varphi = \varphi_k$ in $X$ such that for some $j_1, j_2 \neq k$ we have $\{x_{j1}, x_{j2}\} \vdash \varphi$,

3. etc., for increasingly larger $k$ (the upper bound is of course $n - 1$).

On the assumption that most set of axiom that arise in practice are not independent, Tipi employs a “fail fast” heuristic: if $X$ is not independent, then we can likely find, for some axiom $\varphi$ in $X$, a small subset $X^*$ suffices to prove $\varphi$. Other algorithms for testing independence are conceivable. It could be that the naive algorithm that is immediately suggested by the definition—enumerate the axioms, checking for each one whether it is derivable from the others—may be the best approach. Experience shows this is indeed an efficient algorithm if one really does have an independent set (obviously the iterative “fail fast” algorithm sketched requires $n(n-1) = O(n^2)$ calls to an ATP for a set of axioms of size $n$, whereas the obvious algorithm just makes $n$ calls). A model finder can be used to facilitate this: if $X - \{\varphi\} \cup \{\neg \varphi\}$ is satisfiable, then $\varphi$ is independent of $X$. If one is dealing with large sets of axioms, testing independence becomes prohibitively expensive, so one could employ a randomized algorithm: randomly choose an axiom $\varphi$ and a proper subset $T_1$ of $T$ that does not contain $\varphi$ and test whether $T_1$ proves $\varphi$. Tipi implements all these algorithms for checking independence.

A typical application of independence checking first invokes one of the minimization algorithms described in Section 4. If there is a proper subset $T'$ of $T$ that suffices to derive $\alpha$, then the independence of the full theory $T$ is probably less interesting (and in any event requires more work to determine) than the independence of the sharper set $T'$.

Checking independence is related to the semantic reprove algorithm described in Section 4. If we are dealing with a theory that has a conjecture formula, then the two notions are not congruent, because the property of independence holds for a set of formulas without regard to whether they are coming from a theory that has a conjecture formula. If we are dealing with a theory $T$ without a conjecture whose intended SZS status is Unsatisfiable, i.e., the theory should be shown to be unsatisfiable, then an axiom $\varphi$ of a theory $T$ gets included in the the set $T^*$ of Definition 2 of semantic reproving if $T - \varphi$ is satisfiable. $T$ is “semantically minimal” when no proper subtheory of $T$ is unsatisfiable, i.e., every proper subtheory of $T$ is satisfiable. Independence and semantic minimality thus coincide in the setting of theories without a conjecture formula with intended SZS status Unsatisfiable.

6 Model analysis

When developing formal theories, one’s axioms, lemmas, and conjecture are typically in flux. One may request the assistance of an automated reasoning system to check simply whether one’s premises are consistent. One might go further and ask whether, if one is dealing with a TPTP theory that has a conjecture, there the theory is satisfiable when the conjecture is taken as simply another axiom. An “acid test” for whether one is proceeding down the right path at all is whether one’s problem is countersatisfiable.

Tipi provides tools for facilitating this kind of analysis. A single command is available that can check, given a theory

- whether the theory without the conjecture has a model
- whether the axioms of the theory together with the conjecture (if present) has a model
- whether the axioms of the theory together with the negation of the conjecture has a model.
| Axiom Name                  | Formula                                                                 | Minimum 1 | Minimum 2 |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| edge_ends_are_vertices     | The head and the tail of an edge are vertices                           |           | ✓         |
| in_path_properties         | If $P$ is a path from vertices $v_1$ and $v_2$, and if $v$ is in $P$, then (i) $v$ is a vertex and (ii) there is an edge $e$ of $P$ such that $v$ is either the head or the tail of $e$. |           | ✓         |
| on_path_properties         | If $P$ is a path from vertices $v_1$ and $v_2$, and if $e$ is on $P$, then $e$ is an edge and both the head and the tail of $e$ are in $P$. |           | ✓         |

Table 1: Two minimal subtheories of GRA008+1.

The second consistency check is useful to verify that one’s whole problem (axioms together with the conjecture, considered as just another axiom) is sensible. It can happen that the axioms of a problem have very simple models, but adding the conjecture makes the models somewhat more complicated. If a set of axioms has a finite model but we cannot determine reasonably quickly that the axioms together with the conjecture have a finite model, then we can take such results as a sign that the conjecture may not be derivable from the axioms. (Of course, it is possible that that the set of axioms is finitely satisfiable but the set containing axioms and the conjecture is finitely unsatisfiable. One can use tools such as Infinox \[2\] to complement Tipi in such scenarios.)

7 Experience

Tipi has so far been used successfully to analyze a variety of theories occurring in diverse TPTP theory development tasks. It has proved quite useful for theory development tasks in computational metaphysics \[4\], which was the initial impetus for Tipi.

To get a sense of how one can apply Tipi, we now consider several applications of Tipi to problems coming from the large TPTP library of automated reasoning problems. In these examples we use E as our theorem prover and Paradox as our model finder.

Example 1 (GRA008+1). A problem in a first-order theory\[2\] about graphs has 17 premises. Syntactic reprove brings this down to 12. Progressing further with semantic repoving, we find that 8 of the 12 are needed (in the sense that for each of them, their deletion, while keeping the others, leads to countersatisfiability). Moreover, none of the other 4 is individually needed (the conjecture is still derivable from the 4 theories one obtains by deleting the 4). It turns out that there are two minimal theories that suffice to derive the conjecture; see Table 1.

Example 2 (PUZ001+1). Pelletier’s Dreadbury Mansion puzzle \[5\] asks: “Who killed Aunt Agatha?”

Someone who lives in Dreadbury Mansion killed Aunt Agatha. Agatha, the butler, and Charles live in Dreadbury Mansion, and are the only people who live therein. A killer always hates his victim, and is never richer than his victim. Charles

\[2\]See GRA001+0.
Table 2: Minimal subtheories of REL002+1.

| Axiom Name                                  | Formula                     | Solution 1 | Solution 2 |
|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------|------------|
| composition_identity                         | $x; 1 = x$                  | ★          |            |
| converse_cancellativity                      | $\bar{x}; \bar{x} \land \bar{y} \lor \bar{y} = \bar{y}$ | ★          |            |
| converse_idempotence                         | $\bar{x} = x$               | ★          |            |
| converse_multiplicativity                    | $\bar{x}; y = \bar{x}; \bar{y}$ | ★          |            |
| maddux3_a_kind_of_de_Morgan                 | $x = \bar{y} \lor \bar{y} \lor \bar{y}$ | ★          |            |

hates no one that Aunt Agatha hates. Agatha hates everyone not richer than Aunt Agatha. The butler hates everyone Aunt Agatha hates. No one hates everyone. Agatha is not the butler.

Among the 13 first-order sentences in the formalization are three

\[ \text{lives}(\text{agatha}), \text{lives}(\text{butler}), \text{lives}(\text{charles}) \]

that turn out to be deletable, which the reader may find amusing since we are dealing with a murder mystery. Each of the 10 other premises turn out to be needed (their deletion leads to countersatisfiability), so there is a unique minimal subtheory of the original theory that suffices to solve the mystery (which is that Agatha killed herself). Note that the premise that Agatha is not the butler (an inference that would perhaps be licensed on pragmatic grounds if it were missing from the text) is needed, which perhaps explains why the puzzle explicitly states it.

Example 3 (REL002+1). A problem about relation algebra is to show that $J$ is a right unit for the join operation ($\lor$):

\[ \forall x (x \lor T = T). \]

There are 13 premises\(^3\). Syntactic reprove with Vampire shows that 7 axioms can be cut, whereas syntactic reprove with E finds 6. The sets of syntactically minimal premises of E and Vampire are, interestingly, not comparable (neither is a subset of the other). Semantic reprove with the 10 distinct axioms used by either Vampire or E shows, surprisingly, that 2 are needed whereas each of the other 8 is separately eliminable. Of the 256 combinations of these 8 premises, we find two minima; see Table 2.

With enough caution, Tipi can be used somewhat in the large-theory context, where there are “large” numbers of axioms (at least several dozen, sometimes many more). Although it is quite hopeless, in the large-theory context, to test all possible combinations of premises in the hope of discovering all minimal theories, one can, sometimes use syntactic reproving to weed out large classes of subsets. With these filtered premises, semantic reproving can be used to find minima using a more tractable number of combinations of premises.

Example 4 (TOP024+1). Urban’s mapping [9] of the Mizar Mathematical Library, with its rich language for interactively developing mathematics, into pure first-order theorem proving problems, is a rich vein of theorem proving problems. Many of them are quite challenging owing to the large number of axioms and the inherent difficulty of reasoning in advanced pure mathematics.

Here the problem is to prove that every maximal $T_0$ subset of a topological space $T$ is dense.

\(^3\)See REL001+0.
Maximal anti-discrete subsets of a topological space $T$ are subsets of $T$

Table 3: Two minimal subtheories of TOP024+1.

Of the 68 available premises, 9 are found through an initial syntactic re-proving run using E and Vampire. Of these 9, 3 are (separately) not needed, whereas the other 6 are needed. Of the 8 combinations of these 3 premises, we find two minima; see Table 3.

8 Availability

Tipi is available at

https://github.com/jessealama/tipi

At present Tipi relies on the GetSymbols, TPTP2X, and TPTP4X tools, which are part of the TPTP World distribution [8]. These are used to parse TPTP theory files; a standalone parser for the TPTP language is planned, which would eliminate the dependency on these additional tools.

9 Conclusion and future work

At the moment Tipi supports a handful of theorem provers and model finders. Supporting further systems is desirable; any automated reasoning system that supports the SZS ontology could, in principle, be added.

Tipi supports, at the moment, only first-order logic, and so covers only a part of the space of all TPTP theories. There seems to be no inherent obstacle to extending Tipi to support higher-order theories as well.

More systematic investigation for alternative proofs of a theorem could be carried out using Prover9’s clause weight mechanism. One could have an alternative approach to the problem of generating multiple alternative proofs to the simple approach taken by Tipi.

When working with models of a theory under development that makes true some rather unusual or unexpected formulas, it can sometimes be difficult to pinpoint the difficulty with the theory that allows it to have such unusual models. One has to infer, by looking at the raw presentation of the model, what the strange properties are. We would like to implement a smarter, more interactive diagnosis of “broken” theories.

The problem of finding minimal subtheories sufficient to derive a conjecture, checking independence of sets of axioms, etc., clearly requires much more effort than simply deriving the conjecture. Tipi thus understandably can take a lot of time to answer some of the questions put to it. Some of this inefficiency seems unavoidable, but it is reasonable to expect that further experience with Tipi could lead to new insights into the problem of finding theory minima, determining independence, etc.

The proof procedures defined by Tipi naturally suggest extensions to the SZS ontology [6]. One can imagine SZS statuses such as
• **IndependentAxioms**: The set of axioms is independent.

• **DependentAxioms**: The set of axioms is dependent.

• **MinimalPremises**: No proper subset of the axioms suffices to derive the conjecture.

• **NonMinimalPremises**: A proper subset of the axioms suffices to derive the conjecture.

• **UniqueMinimum**: There is a unique subset \( S \) of the axioms such that \( S \) derives the conjecture and every proper subset of \( S \) fails to derive the conjecture.

• **MultipleIncomparableMinima**: There are at least two proper subsets \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \) of the axioms suffices to derive the conjecture, with neither \( S_1 \subseteq S_2 \) nor \( S_2 \subseteq S_1 \).

Tipi itself already can be seen as supporting these (currently unofficial) SZS statuses. One could even annotate the statistics for many problems in the TPTP library by listing the number of possible solutions (minimal subtheories of the original theory) they admit, or the number of premises that are actually needed.

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