Research article
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Why intellectual freedom? Or; Your values are historically contingent

https://doi.org/10.1515/opis-2020-0002
Received October 30, 2019; accepted January 31, 2020

Abstract: Intellectual freedom is a cornerstone value of library and information studies (LIS) in the twenty-first century. However, LIS institutions have not always held intellectual freedom with the significance it has today. Historic analysis situates the development of intellectual freedom in the context of the European Enlightenment. This systematized review analyzes the use of the phrase “intellectual freedom” in primary sources from the mid-eighteenth century until the American Library Association (ALA) published the Library’s Bill of Rights in 1939 in order to examine the historic origins and development of intellectual freedom as a shared cultural value prior to 1939. I consider the development of intellectual freedom from two perspectives: as a shared value that developed in Britain and the United States during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries and as a meaningful phrase found in primary sources regarding religion, politics, and education. By contextualizing the origins of intellectual freedom with Enlightenment values and discourse, it is hoped this study will illustrate the fundamental nature of intellectual freedom as a value within LIS philosophy and contribute to the conversation about intellectual freedom as a continually negotiated concept that must be held in balance with social responsibility.

Keywords: intellectual freedom, social responsibility, historical analysis, LIS history, European Enlightenment

It would be difficult to overstate the value of intellectual freedom in the world of library and information studies (LIS). Yet LIS institutions have not always held intellectual freedom in the place of significance it has today. The goal of this systematized review is to examine the historic origins of intellectual freedom as a shared cultural value. The study will focus on cultural developments in Britain and the United States to contextualize LIS’ eventual adoption of intellectual freedom. Through historical analysis, I intend to illustrate the underlying nature of intellectual freedom as a value grounded in the philosophies of the European Enlightenment. Since intellectual freedom is a central concept of LIS, it is vital to understand the origins of intellectual freedom and how this history impacts modern LIS practices. Ultimately, the study will contribute to the conversation about intellectual freedom as an ongoing and continually negotiated concept that must be held in balance with social responsibility.

Despite the prevailing notion that LIS concepts—which are often presented as moral imperatives—have remained constant throughout our history, LIS professional ethics and standards have evolved over time due to particular historic circumstances. The value of intellectual freedom has emerged only relatively recently. A brief overview of “Western” history reveals countless instances of state- and community-perpetuated censorship for over 2,500 years (Kemp, 2015). Indeed, Sue Curry Jansen (1988) argues that censorship is “an enduring feature of all human communities” as knowledge and power are inextricably bound together (p. 4). In this context, our value of intellectual freedom and its related values of free expression and the right to information are disjointed from the flow of history: the exception, not the norm.

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Historic context is crucial to understand how our values are enacted in contemporary life and professional practices. The issue of pornography and free expression is an excellent demonstration of how sincerely held values are still historically contingent. Pornography is rarely considered to be a social good in the cultural context of twenty-first century “Western” society, but it must still be protected to uphold freedom of expression. However, society has agreed that pornography depicting children is unacceptable and therefore not permissible, even with a shared value of free expression. While I am not arguing in favour of child pornography, it is worth considering this example as historically contingent. In European thought, the conception of child-as-innocent-being did not emerge until the seventeenth century; the child-as-economic-unit did not disappear until the early twentieth century (Johnson, 1990). The shifting notion of childhood impacts libraries’ selection and placement of novels such as Vladimir Nabokov’s *Lolita* (1955) in library collections. Further, this protection of children is culturally dependent and can be criticized as superficial. Wallace C. Koehler (2015) notes that “children and women are exploited in the popular culture; and so long as appropriate safeguards are taken to ensure the exploitation is sufficiently subtle, it is not only tolerated but also largely accepted” (p. 115). This example illustrates that our shared values, even values that are deeply held and sincerely believed, are historically and culturally contingent. Therefore, it is worth considering how historic context impacts the implementation of our values in modern practices.

I argue that our contemporary value of intellectual freedom is rooted in the philosophies of the European Enlightenment. The Enlightenment encompasses a set of philosophical and political principles that emerged throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially in France, England, and America (Bivens-Tatum, 2012). These principles emphasized investigation, debate, skepticism, a spirit of openness, and the now-conventional idea that one’s own judgement can, and should, be relied upon. In the following centuries, Enlightenment values reshaped “Western” society in a very real way. Amidst these broader changes, Wayne Bivens-Tatum (2012) argues that “the values of the Enlightenment...provided the inspiration and philosophical foundation for American academic and public libraries” (p. xi). On a more granular level, I assert that LIS’s value of intellectual freedom stems from these Enlightenment philosophies.

The goal of this systematized review is to examine the development of intellectual freedom as a concept that emerged throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in two of the world’s most powerful countries. The study will approach the problem from two perspectives: by considering the origin of intellectual freedom as a shared value and by analyzing the development of “intellectual freedom” as a meaningful phrase in religion, politics, and education prior to the ALA’s adoption of the Library’s Bill of Rights in 1939. To inform the embrace of intellectual freedom by LIS’s most influential organization, the study will draw upon British and American literature from the mid-eighteenth century until 1939. While the review cannot claim to be a comprehensive analysis of intellectual freedom throughout history, it can be considered a systematized review, as defined by Maria J. Grant and Andrew Booth (2009): “an attempt to include one or more elements of the systematic review process while stopping short of claiming that the resultant output is a systematic review” (p. 102). In the case of this study, I conducted a comprehensive search of the resources available to me as a graduate student at the University of Alberta. However, due to the broad geographic and chronological scope of the study, I cannot claim that my results are truly comprehensive. To analyze the use of the phrase “intellectual freedom” in primary sources over time, I searched major primary source databases, including Gale Primary Sources and Google Books, as well as subject-specific databases, such as Eighteenth Century Collections Online and Nineteenth Century Collections Online. My sampling strategy was selective, based on the inclusion criteria: (1) the work was published in Britain or America, (2) the work was published prior to 1939, and (3) the work includes the phrase “intellectual freedom.” 33 items were included in the sample (See Appendix for the full list and summaries of the sources included in the sample). The selected works were coded for time period, based on predetermined categories, as well as subject matter, based on the emergent categories of religion, politics, education, and LIS. This analysis will reveal the historic origins of LIS’ current value of intellectual freedom.
What is Intellectual Freedom?

While intellectual freedom is an explicit value of the ALA, the ALA itself has never officially defined the term. The eighth edition of the ALA Office for Intellectual Freedom (OIF)'s Intellectual Freedom Manual (2010) describes a twofold premise:

First, that all individuals have the right to hold any belief on any subject and to convey their ideas in any form they deem appropriate, and second, that society makes an equal commitment to the right of unrestricted access to information and ideas regardless of the communication medium used, the content of the work, and the viewpoints of both the author and the receiver of information. (p. xvii)

At the individual and the societal level, intellectual freedom encompasses both freedom of expression and the right to information. The ALA's Library's Bill of Rights adapts the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to consider how the freedom of speech and of the press applies to library practice. Since then, intellectual freedom has come to include the right to access information, as free expression is meaningless without access to that expression. To contextualize intellectual freedom within its broader political context, it is necessary to consider these associated values.

Free expression, freedom of the press, and the right to information are important components to understand intellectual freedom. Freedom of expression – of thought, opinion, conscience, and religion – is recognized by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) in Articles 18 and 19:

18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance

19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impact information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Issues of free expression have dominated public discourse in the twenty-first century. As included in the First Amendment, freedom of the press is an extension of the value of free expression. It includes the press' communication through various forms of media, both print and electronic, and is considered a crucial component of democratic governance (Brodie, 2016). Democratic government also depends upon the right to information. In many democratic states, the right “of individuals to obtain information held by public agencies” is recognized as both a legal requirement and a human right (Peled & Rabin, 2011, p. 357). Our understanding of intellectual freedom is based upon the prominent legal and social values of free expression, freedom of the press, and the right to information.

For LIS practitioners, the value of intellectual freedom includes opposing censorship, maintaining well-rounded and diverse collections, and combatting physical and economic barriers to access (American Library Association, 2007). Throughout the twentieth century, libraries began to promote intellectual freedom based on an ideal of neutrality (Samek, 2001). This view was memorably articulated by David Berninghausen in his 1972 article, “Social Responsibility vs. The Library Bill of Rights.” Berninghausen protested against the “Social Responsibility” movement (p. 3675), arguing that librarians must be “neutral on substantive issues and a preserver of intellectual freedom” (p. 3677). While many still uphold libraries as neutral spaces, Sanford Berman (2001) observes that libraries “are distinctly biased toward property, wealth, bigness, mainstream ‘culture,’ and established authority” (p. xi). As libraries are cultural institutions, it is vital to understand that dominant social philosophies will influence how values such as intellectual freedom are enacted.

Though often overlooked, the value of social responsibility is a key component of practicing intellectual freedom. Social responsibility can align with intellectual freedom by advocating for the inclusion of all opinions: not simply the mainstream. For instance, intellectual freedom and social responsibility were aligned when libraries “took a clear lead in the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement and in opposition to government intrusions into library collections and patron reading habits during the McCarthy era” (Jaeger,
However, social responsibility can also conflict with intellectual freedom. A recent example of this conflict includes the Toronto Public Library’s decision in October 2019 to rent space to an activist who is critical of transgender rights. An argument for intellectual freedom demands that the activist be allowed to speak in the library’s space, notwithstanding how LIS practitioners may have felt about her position; an argument for social responsibility demands that the activist be turned away from the library’s space, to protect library users who are threatened by this position. The relationship between social responsibility and intellectual freedom is complex and must be negotiated on an ongoing basis. Examining the historic origins of intellectual freedom as a shared value and as a meaningful phrase is therefore valuable to inform this debate.

Intellectual Freedom: Development of the Value

Intellectual freedom as we understand it in LIS was not articulated until the 1930s. Prior to that, freedom of expression (and variations thereof) were the terms used to describe the set of values that would eventually become known as intellectual freedom. The development of free expression is well-documented and, as such, I will provide only a brief summary here.

Intellectual Freedom and the Age of Reason, 17th and 18th Centuries

The value of intellectual freedom in LIS stems from the ideals of the European Enlightenment. Liam Gearon (2006) notes that the European Enlightenment “did not immediately bring power to the people... but it brought its possibility” (p. 55). Prior to the Enlightenment, the English – and the first American colonists, who theoretically enjoyed the same rights and liberties as the English under the 1606 Charter for Virginia – were guaranteed personal liberty by the Magna Carta (1215). Following the Glorious Revolution, the English Bill of Rights (1689) granted the freedom of speech in Parliament. Notably, the English Bill of Rights did not guarantee complete freedom of expression. The British Parliament restricted printers throughout the eighteenth century (Feldman, 2008) and dramatists continued to be censored until 1968 (Shellard, Nicholson, & Handley, 2004). However, thinkers such as John Locke and Voltaire brought the Classical-era value of free speech, first articulated in a “Western” context by Socrates and Plato, to the forefront of the self-proclaimed Age of Reason.

The Enlightenment value of free expression arose in the context of increasing religious and political dissent. Confronting longstanding church- and state-perpetuated censorship, Enlightenment thinkers asserted their right to this dissent (Copeland, 2006). Though these rights were originally restricted to particular people, such as freeborn English men, they would expand to (theoretically) include all members of the human race by the late eighteenth century (Hunt, 2007). These values form the foundations of modern democratic ideology. “Cato” (a pseudonym for British writers John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon) famously wrote that “freedom of speech is the great bulwark of liberty; they prosper and die together” (1720, para. 14). These Enlightenment era ideals were tremendously influential and shaped the political upheavals of the late eighteenth century.

The American and French Revolutions were dramatic implementations of Enlightenment values and political theories. The French Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) includes provisions that:

10. No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law.

11. The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law. (trans. in Koehler, 2015, p. 5)

Among other things, the Declaration’s inclusion of free speech was radical. Thomas Paine, a political
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theorist whose work shaped the American Revolution, defended the Declaration in his tract Rights of Man (1791). Crucially, this work popularized and helped disseminate new notions of governance that included freedom of religion, speech, and conscience (Gearon, 2006). These ideas firmly took hold in the newly formed United States of America. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1791, protects the freedom of religion, speech, and the press. In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment extended these rights to the states and their agencies, including publicly supported libraries. The laws introduced following the American and French Revolutions saw freedom of expression transition from political theory to legal requirement.

Intellectual Freedom and LIS, 20th Century

Once free expression became thoroughly engrained in democratic laws and ideology, it began to appear in discourse that impacted LIS theories and practices. On the international stage, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights included freedom of expression in 1948. The Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 reaffirms freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and expression. These documents illustrate that by the mid-twentieth century, freedom of expression was considered not only a legal requirement but a human right.

In the early 1930s, LIS practitioners began to call for this freedom of expression to extend to public library collections. Prior to this, censorship was accepted as part of the librarian’s role. The ALA endorsed librarians as “moral censors” (Geller, 1984), tasked with encouraging their users towards serious literature, since “most [ALA members] agreed that the mass reading public was generally incapable of choosing its own reading materials judiciously” (Wiegand, 1976, p. 10). Throughout World War I, public libraries actively engaged in censorship of their own materials, removing German-language, pacifist, and labor-associated materials (Wiegand, 1989). Douglas Campbell (2014) notes that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of June 1930 was one of the first events that “began to unify librarians on a national level against censorship” (p. 45). Though the issue of including popular literature drew some attention, the pressure against censorship in libraries truly escalated throughout the 1930s in response to the international rise of fascist governments and their lethal suppression of expression (Geller, 1984; Robbins, 1996; Jaeger, Gorham, Sarin, & Bertot, 2013; Campbell, 2014). In a lecture responding to Hitler’s censorship and book burnings, American professor Howard Mumford Jones (1933) drew a clear link between LIS and the value of free expression, arguing that “libraries and the ability to read books are fundamental guardians of popular liberty” (p. 593). The notion that public libraries played a crucial role in upholding free expression existed across the ocean as well. In 1935, British socialist leader Harold Laski declared that “the only test we can apply to the content of the public library is the test of significance. If the book meets that test, in the judgement of competent persons, the public is entitled to find it on the shelves of the library” (p. 176). In spite of these encouraging words from outside the organization, the ALA’s Executive Board saw the issue of international censorship as outside its purview and took no official stance on the matter.

Despite the ALA’s initial ambivalence, the belief that libraries must uphold free expression ultimately forced American libraries to take a definitive stance. Drawing upon Laski’s “test of significance,” the Chicago Public Library adopted the Intellectual Freedom Policy (1936), the first formal policy endorsing intellectual freedom by any public library in the United States, in response to complaints about “communistic and pornographic” material in the library collection (Latham, 2009). In 1939, the ALA’s special committee on censorship, led by Forrest Spaulding, resulted in the adoption of the Library’s Bill of Rights (later known as the Library Bill of Rights). Modeled on the Des Moines Public Library’s Library’s Bill of Rights (1938), the ALA’s new bill expressed an explicit commitment to “freedom in collections, free use of meeting rooms, and the selection of materials on the basis of value and interest irrespective of the author’s race or creed” (Geller, 1984, p. 176). Though not the first written articulation of intellectual freedom in LIS, the ALA’s Library’s Bill of Rights – and the subsequent creation of the Committee on Intellectual Freedom, later known as the Intellectual Freedom Committee (IFC) – signaled a decided shift in LIS attitudes and practices. Judith Krug and Candace Morgan (2015) observe that the ALA’s involvement marks when “the profession first began to
approach the issue with a semblance of a unified voice” (p. 3). Intellectual freedom gradually took hold as an accepted LIS value and, by 1999, the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA) adopted the Statement on Libraries and Intellectual Freedom.

As this brief history illustrates, the value of free expression has been central to the development of modern democratic society and has been taken up by institutions such as libraries. However, this development largely took place in the name of free expression; the phrase “intellectual freedom” was not applied until the value is adopted by LIS in the 1930s. Since “intellectual freedom” has come to hold a highly specific meaning in LIS discourse, I will consider the development of “intellectual freedom” as a meaningful phrase.

“Intellectual Freedom”: Development of the Phrase

Intellectual freedom, while difficult to succinctly define, has a very specific meaning in LIS. It describes a set of principles that combines freedom of expression with the right to information; it is both a guideline and a call to action (Samek, 2001). Yet the phrase “intellectual freedom” appears in many different contexts throughout history and the meaning of the phrase varies accordingly. The systematized review indicates that the phrase began to appear in the eighteenth century meaning literally “freedom of the mind” or “freedom to think.” As Enlightenment ideals spread throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the phrase began to appear in the realms of religion, politics, and education until its application to LIS in the 1930s. Based on the systematized review, I identified 33 sources from Britain and the United States that use the phrase “intellectual freedom” prior to this date (see Appendix for the full list and summaries of the sources included in the sample). I will draw upon a selection of these sources to reveal the shifting use of the phrase “intellectual freedom” from 1716 to 1940.

“Intellectual Freedom” and Religion, 18th Century

Contrary to our modern expectations, one of the first published uses of the phrase “intellectual freedom” does not have positive connotations. In 1716, William Darrell, an English Jesuit theologian and writer, published The Gentleman Instructed, in the Conduct of a Virtuous and Happy Life. In this tract, Darrell demonstrates his perception of proper moral behaviour for young men through dialogue between his upright protagonist, Eusebius, and various misled individuals. One of Eusebius’ tempters argues in favour of atheism, claiming that religions such as Christianity “enslave Reason” by forcing individuals to “shackle and hoodwink [their] understanding and stretch ‘em on the Rack, to force ‘em to deny First Principles” (p. 280). Since reason and revelation cannot therefore coexist, the atheist argues that religious teachings should be disregarded:

[When we act by our [personal] Maxims we breath a more open and free air: We can toss our Assent from one side of the Contradiction to the other: And believe to Day what we shall disbelieve to Morrow. Now this intellectual freedom is of a finer Nature, than any Pleasure of the sense. (p. 280))

Eusebius is outraged by this argument and replies: “I cannot well determine...whether your Speech deserves an Answer, or Indignation: Such daring Impieties surprise me” (p. 280). While the atheist’s argument does not seem unreasonable to modern eyes, Darrell’s message is clear; proper gentlemen are insulted by atheism and only indulge in reason that is tempered by religious teachings.

“Intellectual freedom” was not universally denounced by eighteenth-century authors. From 1766 to 1773, Thomas Nugent published a three-part history and travelogue, The History of Vandalia Containing the Ancient and Present State of the Country of Mecklenburg. In the second volume (1769), Nugent describes the effects of the Protestant Reformation in this region of present-day Germany, noting that people of every class were “eager to break their shackles [imposed by the Catholic Church] and recover intellectual freedom” (p. 455). Aimed at a British audience, Nugent’s praise of the Protestant Reformation would have
been well-received in a country where Catholics were legally prevented from holding public office, teaching either publicly or privately, and buying or inheriting land. This use of the phrase “intellectual freedom” demonstrates that, in works meant for broad public consumption, the “freedom to think” was valued so long as it reinforced an acceptable form of Christianity.

Despite its limited acceptability in Christian contexts, the idea that “intellectual freedom” opposed strictly disciplined religious practices endured throughout the century. For instance, Edward Gibbon’s *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776-1789) identifies the Roman Empire’s embrace of Christianity as one of the reasons for its collapse. In the third volume (1781) of his famous history, Gibbon describes the rise of Christianity in the Roman Empire:

> [T]he second [circumstance which distinguished the Christians from the Platonists] was the authority of the church. The disciples of philosophy asserted the rights of intellectual freedom, and their respect for the sentiments of their teachers was a liberal and voluntary tribute, which they offered to superior reason. But the Christians formed a numerous and disciplined society; and the jurisdiction of their laws and magistrates was strictly exercised over the minds of the faithful. (p. 348)

Like Darrell, Gibbon aligns “intellectual freedom” with the value of reason. However, Darrell’s advice to young gentlemen makes it clear that reason is only acceptable when tempered by religious teachings: an argument that recalls medieval philosophies valuing religious teachings and revelation as the primary acceptable sources of truth. Notably, Gibbon counters this worldview; in his text, reason and “intellectual freedom” are evidently characteristics to be desired. Gibbon was a respected scholar during his lifetime and his *Decline and Fall* presents “a clear image of the world view of the Late Enlightenment” (Pocock, 1977, p. 288). When considered together, the works of Darrell, Nugent, and Gibbon illustrate how the phrase “intellectual freedom” came to be associated with the larger cultural struggle between religion and Enlightenment philosophies in eighteenth-century Britain.

Although proponents of reason were willing to denounce organized religion, Christian scholars were not willing to relinquish the phrase “intellectual freedom.” As theologians attempted to reconcile Christianity with Enlightenment values, the phrase “intellectual freedom” became the centre of a minor theological debate. In 1799, William Sturch, a Unitarian theological writer, anonymously published *Apeleutherus; Or, an Effort to Attain Intellectual Freedom*. To achieve the “intellectual freedom” cited in the title, Sturch advocates:

> The desire of knowledge, if it be cherished with a view to the improvement of moral practice, and the increase of human felicity, is, of all the qualities and dispositions of the mind, the most honourable to its possessor. But if he would derive from it all the advantage of which it is capable, or accomplish in any important degree his noble aim, it must be cultivated with unbounded freedom, and with ardent affection. No doctrine must in his estimation be so unquestionable, no authority so sacred, as to bar enquiry. He must be, in the best and most extensive sense of the term, a FREETHINKER. (p. viii-ix)

Sturch’s argument articulates the shifting relationship between established religion and Enlightenment values, framing the free and uninhibited search for knowledge as a moral imperative. In 1819, Sturch republished *Apeleutherus* with an ironic dedication to the Rev. Thomas Belsham, a Unitarian minister who disagreed with Sturch’s position. On behalf of Belsham, John Bentley published *A Reply to Apeleutherus* in 1819. Bentley claims that “Intellectual freedom is the freedom of the mind” and therefore “a divine faculty...given to man, and of which no one can be deprived without his consent” (p. 7). Though refuting Sturch’s theological argument, Bentley does not dispute the value of “intellectual freedom.” Instead, he argues that this “freedom of the mind” is divinely granted (p. 7). This debate demonstrates how “intellectual freedom” – and, by extent, Enlightenment values such as reason – were gradually accommodated into existing ecclesiastical teachings.

**“Intellectual Freedom” and Politics, 18th Century**

In addition to the ongoing religious discourse, “intellectual freedom” appeared in political tracts of the eighteenth century. One of the first published uses of the phrase in a political context was by John Shebbeare,
a British Tory political satirist. In *An Authentic Narrative of the Oppressions of the Islanders of Jersey* (1771), Shebbeare critiques the absolute power of the governor in the English colony of Jersey. Shebbeare describes the legislative authority as a “mere machine” controlled by the governor; the members, “in giving their votes, exerted but little more of intellectual freedom, than a clock which strikes the hour, as it is set by the hand of him that possesses it” (p. 214). Shebbeare’s censure of the sheep-like members demonstrates that “intellectual freedom” – which here is used to mean “willingness to think for oneself” – was considered a desirable quality in politicians. Although it is now considered a necessary foundation of democratic governance, the notion that members of the legislative authority should speak for “the people” was a relatively new idea in eighteenth-century British politics (Ihalainen, 2010). Shebbeare’s comments situate the phrase “intellectual freedom” alongside ideas that were at the forefront of contemporary Enlightenment discourse.

Other political works in the eighteenth century use the phrase “intellectual freedom” to denote an explicitly anti-censorship position. In 1792, Rev. Christopher Wyvill published *A Defence of Dr. Price, and the Reformers of England*, calling for a reform of the British Parliament. When considering the need for political reform, Wyvill draws on Paine’s critique of the British Constitution in *Rights of Man* (1791). Wyvill notes that although he strongly disagrees with Paine’s work, the book should not be censored by the British government. Above all, Wyvill condemns “Intolerance in the state,” arguing that “the right of intellectual freedom ought not to be violated” (p. 61). He claims that “The People cannot be compelled to love the Constitution; that affection must be voluntary” (p. 61). For late eighteenth-century Britain, Wyvill’s stance was unconventional, as the state’s censorship was a regular and accepted part of governance. Inspired by Paine, Wyvill’s critique of the British Parliament demonstrates how Enlightenment ideals had been embraced by scholars in Britain but had yet to be enacted in British politics.

Similarly, J. Thelwall’s “Farewell Address,” published in 1796, uses the phrase “intellectual freedom” to oppose government censorship. Thelwall criticizes the Prime Minister, William Pitt the Younger, for his “invasions of public liberty” (p. 325). He demands that the Prime Minister revoke his censorship and that the “unjust restrictions laid upon the intellectual freedom of my unoffending country should be instantly removed” (p. 324). It is noteworthy that Wyvill and Thelwall use the phrase “intellectual freedom” not to refer to the general “freedom to think,” but rather to specifically oppose and condemn state censorship. When “intellectual freedom” is invoked in modern LIS contexts, the opposition of censorship is a central feature of the phrase. Wyvill and Thelwall’s texts are perhaps the first instances in which a direct connection can be made between historic understandings and the modern LIS definition of “intellectual freedom.”

**“Intellectual Freedom” and Religion, 19th Century**

The same themes of reason, theology, and politics reoccur when considering sources from the nineteenth century. By the nineteenth century, “intellectual freedom” had largely been successfully incorporated into religious debates. In 1800, George Walker delivered a sermon entitled *On the Right of Individual Judgement in Religion*. He claims that individual judgement, “the right of intellectual freedom,” is “the dearest right of man” (p. iv). Like Bentley in 1819, Walker argues that individual judgment is divinely granted. Rev. Thomas Tully Crybbace’s *An Essay on Moral Freedom* (1829) extends this argument further. He argues that “Knowledge is not only power but freedom... A man's intellectual liberty is exactly commensurate with his knowledge” (p. 105). Crybbace incorporates this position into a Christian worldview. He asserts that since God has unlimited knowledge, only God has unlimited freedom; consequently, the “nearer any creature approaches to his Creator... the greater his enjoyment of intellectual freedom” (p. 106). The integration of reason into Christianity led Rev. J.H. Smithson (1847) to exclaim, “Is not every thing now, even in theology, submitted to the strictest intellectual analysis? Are not intellectual freedom and rational inquiry the great characteristics of the age?” (p. 463). Evidently, the Enlightenment value of reason and the “freedom to think” was firmly established in theological works by the mid-nineteenth century.

As Enlightenment philosophies became culturally engrained and legally institutionalized across Europe and its colonies, the late nineteenth century saw reason and “intellectual freedom” begin to
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Overtake religion as the primary acceptable source of truth. This shift is succinctly illustrated by Hubert H. Bancroft’s 1875 article attempting to define “savagery” and “civilization.” Prior to Bancroft’s era, Christianity had been considered the height of “civilization.” However, Bancroft argues that Christianity promotes civilization when it “grafts on its code of pure morality the principle of intellectual freedom… but, when Christianity engenders superstition and persecution, civilization is retarded” (p. 339). Bancroft’s opinion that Christianity only has value when combined with “intellectual freedom” is a direct reversal of Nugent’s position in 1769, that “intellectual freedom” only has merit when it reinforced acceptable forms of Christianity. Bancroft’s willingness and ability to publicly prioritize “intellectual freedom” over traditional religious practices demonstrates the widespread acceptance of Enlightenment ideals, even in religious discourse. Enlightenment philosophies are the foundation of modern democratic ideologies and the historic embrace of these ideals as sources of truth shapes our modern conceptualization of “intellectual freedom” in LIS.

“Intellectual Freedom” and Politics, 19th and 20th Centuries

The notion of “intellectual freedom” as an internationally-applicable political concept flourished in the second half of the nineteenth century. An article in The Edinburgh Review in January 1857 argues that the French Revolution was due to “the intellectual freedom of the French Nation” (p. 22). The author asserts the justness of the Revolution, claiming that the “intellectual freedom of the country…demanded freedom of conscience and freedom of government in the name of the rights of man and of the people” (p. 23). The use of this language, which draws upon the language in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, demonstrates how the phrase “intellectual freedom” gradually came to be associated with the value of free expression. Similarly, Walter Bagehot (1883) praised the role of “intellectual freedom” during the French Revolution. He observes that “the intellectual freedom of France in the eighteenth century was in great part owing to the…incessant intercourse with England and Holland” (p. 180). Bagehot argues that free, unrestricted discussion across Europe created the circumstances in which the French Revolution occurred. Clearly, the turbulent events of the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century established “intellectual freedom” – which here is used to mean the ability to hold opinions that oppose the government – as an important component of the political landscape.

The repeated use of the phrase “intellectual freedom” drastically increased at the end of the nineteenth century and the onset of the twentieth century. F.W. Cornish observed in 1888: “Of intellectual freedom I have nothing to say which has not been said a hundred times” (p. 426). During this time period, the phrase was used extensively in political dialogue. In 1864, John William Draper described the “necessity of intellectual freedom,” comparing it to fundamental rights and arguing that it is necessary to “secure intellectual freedom as completely as the rights of property and personal liberty” (p. 387). By 1917, Sir Berkeley Moynihan exclaimed at a patriotic rally that it was “impossible for a nation held in fear of tyranny to give its citizens intellectual freedom!” (p. 256). Moynihan cited the preservation of this “intellectual freedom” – and, by extent, democracy itself – as a reason to support America’s entry into World War I. These sources make it clear that the phrase “intellectual freedom” was well-established in the public zeitgeist and was understood in a specific political context in the early twentieth century.

The repeated use of the phrase “intellectual freedom” in twentieth-century political discourse indicates a clear shift towards how the phrase would come to be understood in LIS contexts in the 1930s. Indeed, Leigh H. Irvine (1919) defined “intellectual freedom” as the “freedom to express views with which the majority does not agree” (p. 44-5). Irvine’s explanation of the phrase illustrates how “intellectual freedom” shifted over time. In the eighteenth-century texts, “intellectual freedom” was used generally as the “freedom to think,” meaning the freedom to consider opinions separate from the church or the government. Irvine’s twentieth-century definition demonstrates a closer association between the phrase “intellectual freedom” and the value of free expression. The growing association between “intellectual freedom” and free expression in the twentieth century clearly impacted the ALA’s eventual adoption of the phrase and is crucial to understand the nuances of the terminology now used in LIS.
“Intellectual Freedom” and Post-Secondary Education, 20th Century

Notably, educational institutions began to argue for the necessity of “intellectual freedom” in the early twentieth century. At the commencement address for the University of Michigan’s graduating class of 1905, Henry S. Pritchett critiqued the administration of American universities, arguing that “complete intellectual freedom is impossible where political freedom is limited” (p. 73). In 1916, an article in the Educational Review observed that “the spirit of the real university is to promote and to impart intellectual freedom” (p. 329). Following the close of World War I, Dean Andrew Fleming West (1918) addressed the Graduate School at the University of Princeton to advocate for “intellectual freedom which...harmonize[s] with moral standards” (p. 75). These examples indicate the growing association between educational institutions and the phrase “intellectual freedom.” In this context, “intellectual freedom” is used to mean critical thinking. The educational affirmation, political implications, and increasing association with free expression would contribute to the eventual adoption of the phrase by the ALA.

By the twentieth century, use of the phrase “intellectual freedom” had largely disappeared from theological writings. Instead, “intellectual freedom” was firmly established as a positive political value. This shift was succinctly summarized by Bertrand Russell in 1937: “The threat to intellectual freedom is greater in our day than at any time since 1660; but it does not now come from the Christian Churches. It comes from governments” (p. 23). In a sharp contrast to pre-Enlightenment beliefs, Russell condemns the authority of the church and criticizes the previously acceptable practice of government censorship in support of the notion that individuals should be able to draw conclusions for themselves. Russell’s observation demonstrates a cultural shift towards the entrenchment of Enlightenment ideals.

The phrase “intellectual freedom” is closely associated with this cultural shift. In religious contexts, the phrase was first associated with adhering to religious teachings, then with opposing them, and finally was incorporated into ecclesiastical teachings. On a political level, “intellectual freedom” was first used to articulate the novel concept that democratic governments should represent “the people” and should not inhibit their access to information; when the practice of state censorship decreased in Britain and America, the phrase was frequently used as a positive political value to describe the practice of free expression in other nations. Finally, educational institutions began to affirm “intellectual freedom” as a core value. When the phrase entered LIS discourse in the 1930s, these contexts informed how the phrase was understood by LIS practitioners.

“Intellectual Freedom” and LIS, 20th Century

The first use of the phrase “intellectual freedom” as applied to a specific set of values in a LIS context was in 1936. By the end of the 1930s, the international rise of fascism and its accompanying social controls, including censorship and suppression, drove public libraries in America to take a professional stance that supported freedom of expression. In 1936, the Chicago Public Library’s board adopted the Intellectual Freedom Policy, marking the first formal articulation of “intellectual freedom” as a value of public libraries (Latham, 2009). When considering this policy, the Chicago Public Library’s board drew upon Laski’s article, “The Uses of the Public Library” (1935). Although Laski himself does not use the phrase “intellectual freedom,” he draws upon language reminiscent of Enlightenment ideals, such as “free-thinkers,” and praises public libraries for their contributions “to enlightenment [and] to rationalism” (p. 175). Consequently, the Chicago Public Library’s Intellectual Freedom Policy demonstrates how the phrase “intellectual freedom,” as used in LIS practice, is absolutely rooted in Enlightenment philosophies.

The ALA followed the Chicago Public Library’s board in 1939 with the Library’s Bill of Rights, laying the foundation for intellectual freedom to be broadly embraced by LIS practitioners. Notably, the ALA’s bill articulated a value of intellectual freedom without applying this phrase to it. The two were not united by the organization until, on May 27, 1940, the ALA Council approved the creation of the Committee on Intellectual Freedom, to Safeguard the Rights of Library Users to Freedom of Inquiry. This committee – later renamed the Intellectual Freedom Committee (IFC) – was created to demonstrate that the Library’s Bill of Rights was “no mere gesture;” the stated purpose of the committee was “to throw the force and influence of the ALA behind
any individual library or any library board confronted with any demands for censorship of books or other material upon a library’s shelves” (American Library Association, 1940, p. 37). Therefore, the Committee on Intellectual Freedom represents the first use of the phrase “intellectual freedom” to describe a LIS value on a significant and national scale. In using this phrase, the ALA drew upon an understanding of “intellectual freedom” that existed in the public zeitgeist based on the phrase’s previous usage in religious, political, and educational contexts; this understanding is rooted in Enlightenment philosophies and informed how LIS practitioners would come to interpret this value throughout the rest of the twentieth century.

**Significance**

Historical analysis demonstrates how the perception of intellectual freedom, both as a phrase and as a value, has shifted over time until it was embraced by LIS. Since its articulation in the late 1930s, intellectual freedom has become a core value of LIS. The centrality of intellectual freedom to modern LIS philosophy results in our value of it rarely being questioned in contemporary practice. Historical analysis is valuable as it reveals that ideas we assume to be universal values are, in fact, historically and culturally contingent. In this case, our value of intellectual freedom can be traced back to the philosophies of the European Enlightenment. The development of intellectual freedom as a value is grounded in the Enlightenment value of free expression; the development of “intellectual freedom” as a phrase is grounded in the Enlightenment values of reason and political engagement. These values were then shaped by the social forces of religion and politics throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries.

These historic roots impact our current interpretation of intellectual freedom. For instance, it is worth considering the recent discussions emphasizing the balance between intellectual freedom and social responsibility in LIS service. Since 1939, LIS practitioners have tended towards privileging intellectual freedom over social responsibility; a tendency that is perpetuated by the presentation of intellectual freedom as a core component of LIS and a moral imperative for librarians. However, an understanding of the historical context of intellectual freedom, as grounded in the European Enlightenment, reframes the tension between intellectual freedom and social responsibility. Enlightenment values, such as reason and free expression, are highly individualistic, representing a break from institutions such as the church and the established forms of government. The value and the phrase “intellectual freedom” is closely tied to this cultural shift. As LIS’ value of intellectual freedom is grounded in an era that valued individualism, it is consequently unsurprising that intellectual freedom is at odds with collectivist values such as social responsibility. LIS practitioners must find a way to implement these conflicting values, each loaded with historic significance, in the context of our culture today.

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## Appendix

| Author          | Title                                                                 | Year Published | Quotation                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Comments                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Darrell, William | *The Gentleman Instructed, in the Conduct of a Virtuous and Happy Life* | 1716           | “[W]hen we act by our Maxims we breath a more open and free air: We can toss our Assent from one side of the Contradiction to the other: And believe to Day what we shall disbelieve to Morrow. Now this [intellectual freedom] is of a finer Nature, than any Pleasure of the sense” (p. 280). | A fictional dialogue for the purpose of educating young gentlemen regarding proper moral behaviour. An antagonist (quoted here) argues for atheism and “intellectual freedom”; the upright and moral protagonist is deeply offended at the suggestion. Darrell argues that proper gentlemen are guided by religious teachings, not independent reasoning. |
| Nugent, Thomas  | *The History of Vandalia containing the Ancient and Present State of the Country of Mecklenburg (Vol. 2)* | 1769           | “The minds of men, lately emerged out of barbarism, were in a ferment, which rendered them earnest in inquiry: the spiritual slavery in which they had been kept till then, appearing to them the more odious in proportion as their yoke had been more heavy, they were eager to break their shackles and recover [intellectual freedom]. People of all ranks found their account in the reformation” (p. 454-455). | A history and travelogue of present-day Germany. Nugent describes the success of the Protestant Reformation in Germany and associates “intellectual freedom” with this break from the Catholic Church. |
| Shebbeare, John  | *An Authentic Narrative of the Oppressions of the Islanders of Jersey (Vol. 1)* | 1771           | “And yet, in reality, the whole legislative authority was no more than a mere machine, which the governor put into motion, directed, regulated, and stopped at his will. And the members, in giving their votes, exerted but little more of [intellectual freedom], than a clock which strikes the hour, as it is set by the hand of him that possesses it” (p. 214). | A critique of the governor’s absolute power in the English colony of Jersey. In this case, the members of the legislative authority are condemned for not exerting “intellectual freedom” when voting. |
| Gibbon, Edward   | *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Vol. 3)*      | 1776           | “The devotion of individuals was the first circumstance which distinguished the Christians from the Platonists; the second was the authority of the church. The disciples of philosophy asserted the rights of [intellectual freedom], and their respect for the sentiments of their teachers was a liberal and voluntary tribute, which they offered to superior reason. But the Christians formed a numerous and disciplined society; and the jurisdiction of their laws and magistrates was strictly exercised over the minds of the faithful” (p. 348). | A multi-volume history of the Roman Empire. Gibbon argues that the rise of Christianity hastened the fall of the Roman Empire in the west by promoting passive obedience. He contrasts voluntary adherence to pagan philosophers, who are associated with “intellectual freedom” and reason, against the mandatory discipline of the Catholic Church. |
| Author            | Title                                                                 | Year Published | Quotation                                                                 | Comments                                                                                             |
|-------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Wyvill, Christian | A Defence of Dr. Prince, and the Reformers of England                  | 1792           | "For the right of intellectual freedom ought not to be violated... Intolerance in the state, like persecution in the Church, would dishonour and weaken what it was designed to support. – The People cannot be compelled to love the Constitution; that affection must be voluntary" (p. 61). | An essay calling for the reform of the British Parliament. Wyvill draws upon Thomas Paine's critique of the British Constitution and notes that, although he strongly disagrees with Paine's work, the book should not be censored by the British government. |
| Gray, Robert      | Sermons on the Principles upon which the Reformation of the Church of England was Established | 1796           | "Unwise were the council, that would stimulate to any rigorous inflection of human laws, those who, by gentleness and forbearance, should encourage the growth of religious principle: but the warmest asserters of intellectual freedom have admitted the propriety of restraining public offences" (p. 172). | A sermon asserting the Church of England's spiritual rights. Gray argues that, by way of divine commission, the Anglican church has "the right of applying God's threats and promises" (p. 165) and he condemns the rise of religious toleration in Britain. |
| Southwell, Richard Hayes | Intellectual Freedom; Or, An Essay on the Source and Nature of Moral Evil | 1798           | [title]                                                                   | An essay discussing the notion of "moral evil" and its relationship with "reason" and "revelation" as sources of truth. |
| Sturch, William (published) | Apeleutherus; Or, an Effort to Attain Intellectual Freedom | 1799           | [title]                                                                   | An essay by an English Unitarian theological writer arguing that the "freedom to think" is a moral imperative. |
| Walker, George    | On the Right of Individual Judgement in Religion: A Sermon              | 1800           | [title]                                                                   | A sermon that defines "intellectual freedom" and religious toleration as a right, rather than an indulgence to be offered. |
| Bentley, John     | A Reply to Apeleutherus                                                | 1819           | "Intellectual freedom is the freedom of the mind. It is what every man possesses, and he needs only to will it, to call it into exercise whenever he pleases... It is a divine faculty or principle given to man... No power upon earth can deprive him of it, and it is unquestionably God's best gift to man" (p. 7-8). | A counter to Sturch's theological points from another English Unitarian theologian; An essay arguing that "intellectual freedom" (defined directly as "the freedom of the mind") is a gift from God. |
| Author          | Title                                      | Year | Published | Quotation                                                                 | Comments                                                                                                                                 |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------|------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Crybbace, Thomas Tully | *An Essay on Moral Freedom*               | 1829 |           | “Knowledge is not only power but freedom... A man's intellectual liberty is exactly commensurate with his knowledge” (p. 105). “The Deity alone, whose understanding is unlimited, is the only being possessed of absolutely unlimited freedom...the nearer any creature approaches to his Creator...the wider is his sphere, and the greater his enjoyment of intellectual freedom” (p. 106). | An essay arguing that knowledge and “intellectual liberty,” the freedom to think, are moral imperatives. “Intellectual freedom” is described as a divine quality that people may strive to attain by becoming closer to God. |
| Smithson, J.H.  | Lecture in response to: “The Great Claims of Swedenborg upon the Attention of the Public, as advocated by R.W. Emerson, Esquire, at the Manchester Athenaeum” | 1847 |           | “Is not every thing now, even in theology, submitted to the strictest intellectual analysis? Are not intellectual freedom and rational inquiry the great characteristics of the age?” (p. 463). | A lecture countering R.W. Emerson’s defense of the religious philosopher Emanuel Swedenborg. Smithson argues against Swedenborg’s “mysticism” in favour of “intellectual freedom” and rational inquiry. |
| Unknown, published in *The Edinburgh Review* | “Philip II and his Times”               | 1857 |           | “In France, both in the seventeenth and in the eighteenth century, political freedom was wanting. Religious freedom, which had been accepted and secured by the enlightened liberality of Henry IV, perished under the bigoted and arrogant despotism of Louis XIV. But in spite of all legal impediments, the intellectual freedom of the French nation has ever asserted an empire of its own” (p. 22). | An article praising the “intellectual freedom” of the French nation that led them to defy tyranny, resulting in the French Revolution |
| Draper, John William | *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe* (Vol. 2) | 1864 |           | “Free countries have but one thing more to do for the accomplishment of the rest...That one thing is to secure intellectual freedom as completely as the rights of property and personal liberty have already been secured” (p. 386-7). | A multi-volume work arguing the state has an obligation to secure “intellectual freedom” as a right and prevent censorship from bodies such as the church. |
| Bancroft, Hubert H. | “Savagism and Civilization”             | 1875 |           | “When Christianity, as in Spain during the fourteenth century, joins itself to blind bigotry and stands up in deadly antagonism to liberty, then Christianity is a drag upon civilization: and therefore we may conclude that in so far as Christianity grafts on its code of pure morality the principle of intellectual freedom, in so far is civilization promoted by Christianity; but, when Christianity engenders superstition and persecution, civilization is retarded thereby” (p. 339). | An article attempting to define “civilization,” concluding that “intellectual freedom,” specifically the freedom to think beyond religious teachings, is absolutely necessary for the development of civilization. It is “intellectual freedom,” rather than the presence or absence of Christianity, that promotes civilization. |
| Author       | Title                                                                 | Year Published | Quotation                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Comments                                                                                                                                 |
|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Lilly, W.S.  | “The New Gospel”                                                     | 1879           | “[W]e are further told that ‘the essence of Humanism consisted in a new and vital perception of the dignity of man as a rational being apart from theological determinations, and in the further perception that classic literature alone displayed human nature in the plenitude of moral and intellectual freedom.’ All this has a very grand sound...but is it true?” (p. 169). | An essay revisiting the relationship between humanism and Christian theology. While questioning their worth, Lilly associates “intellectual freedom” with humanism and rationality. |
| Bagehot, Walter | “Physics and Politics: An Application of the Principles of Natural Selection and Heredity to Political Society” | 1883           | “It may be said that in the court of Augustus there was much general intellectual freedom...but that there was no free political discussion at all” (p. 180).                                                                 | An encyclopedia entry that defines “intellectual freedom” as distinct from free political discussion. Examples are drawn from the Roman empire and the French Revolution. |
| Crandon, Frank P. | “Misgovernment of Great Cities”                                      | 1885           | “In times past, they [great cities] have been the agencies through which civil and intellectual freedom have been conserved, even if they may not be credited with having been the nursery in which liberty was cradled” (p. 174). | An article praising “great cities,” in part for their promotion of the nation’s “intellectual freedom” (not further defined). |
| Underwood, Benjamin Franklin | “Current Topics”                                                  | 1885           | “Col. Higginson, who presided, introduced the honored guest in a speech full of wit and anecdote, in which he spoke of Mr. Conway, not only as a versatile writer and courageous advocate of intellectual freedom, but as the hospitable friend and entertainer of Americans in a foreign land” (181). | An editorial praising a local man as an advocate of “intellectual freedom,” associating intellectual freedom with American patriotism abroad. |
| Davidson, Thomas | “Giordano Bruno”                                                     | 1886           | “Why, while we have made some progress toward personal and intellectual freedom, so far at least as the law is concerned, are our wills still bound in worse than mediaeval bondage...Without a developed intelligence, freedom cannot act; and man must be the slave of instinct” (p. 415). | A biographical article arguing that although the legal obstacles to “intellectual freedom” have been removed, “intellectual freedom” has not yet been attained. Davidson defines intellectual freedom as the opposite of base instinct, dogma, and ignorance. |
| Author          | Title                                | Year | Published | Quotation                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Comments                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|------|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Underwood,      | "Editorial Notes"                    | 1886 |           | "The names included in the largest number of lists sent to this office in response to the request for the names of ten persons who have contributed most to intellectual freedom are the following: Luther, Bacon, Voltaire, Paine, Goethe, Darwin, Spencer, Emerson, Parker, and Mill. Nearly all who made out lists did so in the belief that the names of modern thinkers and reformers only were desired" (437). | A reading list, compiled by the paper's editor based on submitted recommendations, regarding authors who have contributed to “intellectual freedom.”                                                                                     |
| Cornish, F.W.   | “Freedom”                            | 1888 |           | Of intellectual freedom I have nothing to say which has not been said a hundred times...Good sense is an ingredient of free thought. But intellectual freedom is not entirely dependent on logic. It requires freedom of will, courage, and other virtues to take one’s own views and think consistently, and therefore rightly" (p. 426). | An article that defines intellectual freedom as a personal trait characterized by good sense and consistency. Examples are drawn from Locke, Plato, Bacon, Cicero, Darwin, and Faraday, clearly linking “intellectual freedom” to Enlightenment philosophy. |
| Pritchett,      | “Shall the University become a Business Corporation?” | 1905 |           | Moreover, complete intellectual freedom is impossible where political freedom is limited” (p. 73).                                                                                                                                                               | A commencement address that contrasts American and European universities' administration. Pritchett argues that, since European universities have greater internal political freedom, they also have greater “intellectual freedom”: something American universities should strive for. |
| Ryan, Frederick | Criticism and Courage, and Other Essays | 1906 |           | "We need in Ireland a spirit of intellectual freedom...intellectual freedom and political freedom are not opposites. Rightly understood, intellectual freedom and political freedom are one" (p. 37).                                                                 | An essay arguing that political freedom is necessary for “intellectual freedom” to flourish. Ryan laments Ireland’s lack of political freedom and urges the Irish people to strive for “intellectual freedom” to improve their lives. |
| Unknown,        | “The Real University”                | 1916 |           | "If, then, the spirit of the real university is to promote and impart intellectual freedom" (p. 329).                                                                                                                                                           | An article identifying “intellectual freedom” as a driving value of higher education.                                                                                                                                                                      |
| Du Bois, W.E.   | “Editorial”                          | 1916 |           | "Intellectual freedom means liberation from superstition and all the primitive manifestations of mental enslavement... [Columbia] University, through liberation of the intellect, is humanizing mankind” (p. 10).                                                                 | An editorial from The Crisis, the official magazine of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Du Bois quotes Professor Seligman's definition of “intellectual freedom” to encourage colored men to seek higher education, despite the many barriers. |