Guideline to Safety and Security in Federated Remote Labs

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Abstract—The interest of the educational community in the laboratory-based education has grown steadily. As remote labs have started to be a reliable alternative to traditional hands-on labs, security and safety issues are becoming increasingly important, as their interconnected nature raises new and challenging issues. The complexity increases when multiple institutions are involved in a federated lab infrastructure. This paper provides a guideline for assessing safety and security in federated labs following the VDI/VDE 2182 guideline and verifies the concept based on remote labs in three different academic institutions.

Keywords—Safety, Security, Remote Labs, Federated Labs

1 Introduction and Context

Recently remote and virtual labs have started to be a reliable alternative to traditional hands-on laboratories. Corresponding lab-networks allow to share costs, provide efficient control of user access to the experiment environment, and may improve the availability of lab-infrastructures [1]. Safety and security in real labs are important issues to avoid both malfunctioning behaviors and intentionally caused harm. This is especially true for remote labs since they are highly connected systems [2]. Remote labs in public institutions such as universities and schools are extremely vulnerable to security issues [3]. Federated remote labs including multiple independent institutions and network structures are yet increasing the security risks involved.

In literature, there has been little focus on safety except e.g. chemistry and biology labs. Although Scopus lists more than 2,000 works on remote and networked labs, few of them discuss safety and security issues in detail. A structured approach to access
safety and security for federated remote labs is missing [4]. Furthermore, most researchers focus either just on safety or security, and they lack work approaching both issues simultaneously. While safety and security are required, the specific requirements of university labs should be considered [4]:

1. The need for a simple solution approach on safety and security, as universities have to deal with a limited number of human resources for operational tasks.
2. The need to look jointly at safety and security, to reduce effort and address the interplay of both topics influencing each other.
3. The need for a flexible and iterative approach, as university labs are constantly changing, especially in educational topics related to new technologies.

Federated remote infrastructures share similar problems as connected Industry 4.0 environments. Both rely on IT-connected physical worlds which are more vulnerable to cyber-espionage [5]. Consequently, remote access is among the Top10 threats for industrial control systems [6]. There is an increased risk due to digitally increased attack surfaces [7]. While offline labs require physical presence to attack the system, remote labs can be attacked worldwide. Therefore, security issues in the “virtual world” can cause harm in the “physical world”. It is eminent, that safety and security for remote labs need to be tackled in a joint approach.

Federated lab-structures with multiple involved independent institutions, regulations, and national or regional laws increase the complexity. Therefore, this paper provides a common guideline for networked lab-infrastructures in general and more specifically for participating labs in DigiLab4U – a research project funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The guideline is based on VDI/VDE 2182 “IT-security for industrial automation”. The usefulness is shown, based on applying the guideline to three labs in Germany and Italy. The findings and corresponding improvements of the guideline will help further participants in the DigiLab4U network to tackle their security and safety issues when opening their lab-infrastructure to the lab network. The case study can also serve for other federated lab networks on how to set up the infrastructure fitting multiple safety and security criteria.

We have performed literature research on scientific papers related to safety for remote labs and on legal requirements. In the next section, we provide a literature overview on safety and security in remote labs. In section 3 we identify further requirements for remote labs. Based on prior research, we have identified and evaluated different solution approaches and selected VDI/VDE 2182 as a basic guideline [4]. This paper continues this work and verifies the theoretical approach by prototypically applying VDI/VDE 2182 in three different labs currently involved in the DigiLab4U network, described in section/chapter 4. However, this must be seen as an iterative approach that needs to address future changes and additions to the federated lab network. Therefore, we focus on aspects of iterative improvements in section 5.
2 Literature Review on Safety and Security in Remote Labs

With the aim of performing a review of the existing material on safety and security concerns in remote-labs literature, Scopus was used, as it is one of the largest abstracts and citation database of peer-reviewed literature. The database was queried by using the string (TITLE-ABS-KEY ("remote lab*")) AND (safety OR security). The string complies with the Scopus rules: (i) combinatory rules of AND and OR operators, and (ii) use of asterisk "*" in order to cut the suffix of the word “laboratory” and then consider all its possible declination. Furthermore, the tool is not case sensitive. The query string, as set, gathered 244 documents. The titles and abstracts have been reviewed to only select the papers which are strictly focused on safety and security issues. For instance, thirty-three documents, retrieved out of the full list, propose a holistic description of the developed and implemented solution, and however they do not really discuss safety and security issues in-depth.

Twenty-three papers of interest were detected. By focusing on just the papers in English language available on the web, the final list becomes fifteen papers. Four of them relate to “safety”, eleven relate to “security”. In the followings, what these papers deal with is reported, distinguishing by the focus (i.e. safety or security).

2.1 Safety

In the researched literature safety and functional safety are most often used synonymously. According to VDI/VDE 2182 functional safety refers to “protection against threats to persons and the environment that arise from incorrect functioning of equipment”. The problem of safety in remote laboratories is well discussed by Maiti, Kist &
Maxwell [8]. Their work relates to laboratories where multiple users develop experiments and share them as parts of collaborative systems (i.e. Peer-to-Peer Remote Access Lab). The items on which the reliability of the whole system depends are (i) components and design of experimental rigs, and (ii) network and users (developers) characteristics. Casini, Prattichizzo & Vicino [9] identified the reduction of time to fix software/hardware failure as a key need and solved the issue utilizing a bootable (live) device (CD) on the server-side. Kozík T., Šimon M. [10] suggested implementing a suitable authentication mechanism as the first step to achieve access control. Furthermore, since the remote laboratory is connected to the Internet, it is necessary to protect it by a firewall and by an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which role is to identify an abuse unauthorized or improper use of a computer system, thus also addressing security issues. Marangé, Gellot & Riera [11] as well as Maiti, Kist & Maxwell [8] proposed an approach using two validation filters to guarantee the safety of the operators and the equipment. It is based on the definition of logical constraints which should in no case should be violated. One filter called “system validation filter” validates outputs before sending them to the plant. The second filter called “functional validation filter” validates the use of the functions regarding the autonomy mode selected. This filter reduces the use of safety constraints which could be violated in the system validation filter.

2.2 Security

In the researched literature security and IT-security are most often used synonymously. According to VDI/VDE 2182 IT-security addresses “protection against unauthorized access to data and services, in which various aspects of the target of inspection to be protected are described in greater detail by means of security objectives”. Gerža, Schauer & Jašek [12] focused on the security of remote labs against malign attacks. The authors analyze the general and specific software and hardware risks and provide the necessary behavior and practices to implement for preventing them. According to these authors, we have identified three main concerns over security in retrieved papers: (i) users’ authentication and authorization (ii) access to and (iii) communication with the server. Ocaya [13] proposed a simplified authentication of permitted clients built-into the server, through alphanumeric username and password (issued at registration and periodically changeable). Chellaiah et al. [14] suggested securing the users’ authentication through narrative constructs using a sequence of cartoon images to generate an image-based password system. Krbeček & Schauer [15] also proposed to assure the security of the system employing users’ registration and reservation through username-and-password access-system, however, they focused on securing the storage of data into the Learning Management System (LMS) [16]. The solution provided is twofold. Outside communication is based on the TCP/IP protocol, which assures the reliability of data transmission. The inner communication between the experiment and Remote Laboratory Management System (RLMS) “ensures the transmission of the measured data and preserves them for later use”, using Java language to provide communication and diagnostic services. The use of Java application and tools for security issues concerning the communication between equipment and server has had a widespread development in recent years since the most security applications in virtual and remote labs
(VRLs) are developed with high-level programming tools using Java [17]. Unfortunately, smart devices usually do not run Java. For this reason, Sáenz et al. [17] proposed a structure that allows a remote connection with hardware devices by using a client-server configuration that serves to the client a JavaScript application; leaving the server a task of running the Java part of the virtual and remote lab. A similar solution was deployed in Herrera et al. [18]. They made use of a software solution to provide the security of machinery within their remote bench for testing electrical machine based on Easy Java Simulation (EJS) to connect the real hardware to the user interface for controlling (i) the load voltage and frequency when the machine is connected to the load in an islanded way, and (ii) the active and reactive power injected to the net when the machine is directly connected. To pledge the security of the network of both the single institution and the federated labs (i.e. the universities), the main approach seems to be the use of virtual machines. Border [19] presented the Remote Laboratory Emulation Systems (RLES) solution for accessing and scheduling the labs based on "read-only libraries of virtual servers that can easily be copied, stored and deployed". Li & Mohammed [20] installed the virtual machines on students’ personal computers with the guest operating systems and their applications run concurrently on a single physical machine. Richter et al. [21] assured the security of the network by using virtual machines on the users’ side, while at the server-side they split the virtual machine into two virtual network cards, the former managing the access to the system from the server itself, and the latter managing the host system making it possible to reach the virtual machine from the outside: "this small virtual network is otherwise unconnected to the rest of the university system and any potentially malicious programs could not be passed to any other machine on the university campus". To provide security to users of the WebLab the authors [1] proposed [22] to use nonintrusive applications. By using those the user can harmlessly utilize any tool, as the application does not allow to read the data from any file at hard disk that the user does not purposely select. Outside communication is based on HTTP protocol that does not need permission on the firewalls.

Finally, a solution summarizing several concepts analyzed employing a remote-lab architecture seems to be the one proposed by Pálka & Schauer [23]. The authors divided the infrastructure into multiple security zones that provide different levels of protection based on whether a user should be granted access to specific resources. Furthermore, to increase flexibility and the ability to recover from a successful attack authors proposed a balanced control and an increased focus on user awareness as well as data protection anchored in the information assets.

### 3 Requirements for Federated Remote Labs

#### 3.1 Organizational needs for lab-networks

Federated remote lab environments deal with different regional, national, and organizational requirements. To find a common guideline simplicity and flexibility are necessary. Derived from the need for simplicity, we also identify a need to look at safety and security issues jointly. The three needs are described in more detail in the following.
The need for simplicity: Operating university labs is labor-intensive and expensive. Any extra burden, including additional activities for safety and security implied by making labs remotely accessible, will negatively impact the acceptance to integrate labs to a lab network. The need for simplicity is one reason why the VDI/VDE 2182 guideline has been chosen.

The need to look jointly at safety and security: The need on integrating safety and security has been mentioned in the literature, as “safety and security can negatively influence each other, analyzing their interplay in an efficient manner means reducing the effort that needs to be invested in achieving a safe and secure system” [2]. VDI/VDE 2182 is looking at both topics jointly, thus decreasing the overall necessary effort for labs.

The need for a flexible and iterative approach: As university labs are constantly being updated and enhanced through ongoing research, lecturers, researchers, and lab operators require certain flexibility. Current research approaches “...lack evaluation of their support for efficient system update handling.” [2] Iterative safety and security measures need to address the whole lifecycle of the remote labs including development, testing, maintenance, and operation. VDI/VDE 2182 is based on the iterative Deming Cycle – PDCA (Plan, Do, Check, Act) and thus offers the needed flexibility.

3.2 Legal safety requirements

Even though many aspects are regulated in EU directives or national laws, in many cases each country or region has in addition to these more inter-regional regulations, different requirements and procedures on safety. Legal requirements may need to be respected regarding “product safety” (e.g. Produktsicherheitsgesetz in Germany [24]) and “occupational safety and health” (e.g. Directive 89/391 in Europe, Arbeitsschutzgesetz [25] in Germany, D.Lgs. 81/08 “Testo unico sulla salute e sicurezza sul lavoro” in Italy). Further specific laws, for example on chemicals or electromagnetic fields, may apply in certain lab scenarios. In remote labs, the product users (e.g. students of another university) are usually not at risk, as they access the infrastructure through an Internet-connection. However, if physical components are used by the students (e.g. processor-boards connected to the federated lab infrastructure) the requirements concerning product safety may apply. The European Directive 89/391 defines minimum requirements, which have been implemented in national laws [4]. The European Directive 89/391 is based on a list of general principles:

- Avoiding risks
- Evaluating the risks
- Adapting the work to the individual
- Combating the risks at source
- Adapting the technical progress
- Replacing the dangerous by the non- or the less dangerous
- Developing a coherent overall prevention policy
- Prioritizing collective measures (over individual protective measures)
- Giving appropriate instructions to the workers
Directive 89/391 defines not only the principles but also the obligations and actions for employers and workers in every situation.

### 3.3 Privacy / GDPR requirements

The federated lab infrastructure in DigiLab4U will collect data about students and experiments, create a Learning Analytics (LA) system. As such, being initially designed and developed in European universities, the system must comply with the GDPR 2016/679. As in remote labs, the risk of data breaches must be considered both: for proper countermeasures, and for promptly notifying users. As stated in [26], data protection should be provided by design and as a default. Moreover, the definition and design of the network and software infrastructure should consider such issues as centralized or decentralized data collection and storage systems. The issues are relevant both from economic and practical points of view. For example, if processed data is sent back to each lab, it would certainly require greater technical and economical efforts than having only a centralized solution. On the other hand, a centralized solution will impose significant costs for managing a federated network.

### 3.4 Existing organizational requirements and procedures in local labs

While working in a lab, several safety issues can arise. Safe and reliable systems should prevent harm to lab assistants, students, machines, as well as protect user data. These goals are common for each institution; however, different universities can have their norms on security and safety. As an example, students at the University of Parma are required to take a Moodle-course, while students at HFT Stuttgart must attend a face-to-face class session at the beginning of their studies.

**Current safety practices at HFT Stuttgart (Faculty C):** To achieve a 100% training rate, new students at HFT Stuttgart do not get their account data for the university network before they have attended the basic safety instruction course. In a lab-scenario, where students from the University of Parma access remote labs at HFT Stuttgart, occurs the need to have a “common denominator” to let the students conduct experiments easily and safely.

**Current safety practices for the RFID lab at the University of Parma (based on an interview with the corresponding lab manager):** The access to the lab is forbidden to students without supervision by official full-time staff (i.e. professors, teaching assistants, etc.). The main source of risk is a conveyor and other handling equipment. No harmful substances are present in the lab. If an experiment requires the usage of any special equipment for which the students have never been trained before, such training will be provided by a professor in charge. To operate the lab in a safe manner not more than 7 students are allowed to stay in a lab at the same time. Students are considered equally to employees, as stated by Italian laws D.M. 363/98 and D.Lgs.81/08. It is stated that “students of university courses, PhD students, postgraduates, trainees, scholarship holders, and similar subjects are equal to employees if they attend educational, research or service laboratories where machinery, equipment and work equipment, in
general, are used, and chemical, physical and biological agents are present...”. According to Article 37 of D.Lgs 81/08, the employer must provide training for all the employees. Students of Parma University must pass a Moodle-based course, which is comprised of three modules. The first two modules are mandatory for each student, regardless of which particular course is attended, the third one is only required for those students who are involved in any laboratory activity in their courses. The first module consists of a generic training, related to situations of risk, possible damage, and injuries, as well as follow-up measures and procedures to prevent and protect against any risk. The second module is associated with low-risk activities (e.g. manual handling of loads, work-related stress, and organizational wellness, etc.), and the last module provides medium risk (e.g. dangerous substances) tasks. Students access the safety course using the university access credentials and attend the lessons in order. Lessons are administered through audio and videos, which must be fully watched in the given order. After that, the platform unlocks a multiple-choice test, which the student must successfully pass, to unlock the next module. Once all tests are positively passed, the system produces a certificate attesting the training.

**Current safety at BIBA Lab:** BIBA is obliged to follow the safety and security guidelines of the University of Bremen. This implies a yearly safety and security training for all staff members including assistants. The University has a person responsible for this and besides, BIBA has its own safety and security manager, who carries out the training of each new staff member at the beginning.

In addition, there are specific guidelines for the BIBA gaming Lab that are based on a risk analysis carried out in 2015 based on different ISO guidelines and regularly updated every February. The lab provides limited access for employees and thus there are restricted working hours. Even trained personnel are only allowed to be alone in the lab if they have announced this to the researchers outside the lab. Outside standard working hours for BIBA, any work requires that 3 persons are available and that it is approved by the head of the BIBA Gaming Lab. Student or other visitors are not allowed to be unsupervised in the lab.

BIBA personnel who do not have access on a regular basis to the lab are allowed to carry out work if it is requested beforehand and are aware of the gaming Lab guidelines.

Most of the work carried out in the lab is related to computer games. Thus, there are guidelines in-line with the GDPR with comprised ethical consideration (for more information see¹). These guidelines cover all the aspects related to ethical issues, data management, and privacy, which the Lab mostly deals with, including the specific requirements. The guidelines are to be well known to all employees involved in relevant activities. Furthermore, since many of the games we offer, can be accessed online of externals, these guidelines also need to be followed by those and consent hereto is required before (if we store data) as well as a document that it corresponds to national legislation.

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¹ [https://zenodo.org/record/1256626#Xcsu7ldKg2w](https://zenodo.org/record/1256626#Xcsu7ldKg2w); [https://beaconing.eu/wp-content/uploads/deliverables/D1.8.pdf](https://beaconing.eu/wp-content/uploads/deliverables/D1.8.pdf); [https://beaconing.eu/wp-content/uploads/deliverables/D1.9.pdf](https://beaconing.eu/wp-content/uploads/deliverables/D1.9.pdf)
4 Applying VDI/VDE 2182 for Federated Labs

VDI/VDE 2182 on “IT-security for industrial automation” combines safety and security-related topics. Multiple actors (manufacturers, operators, integrators) are distinguished, and individual guidelines are provided. We have adjusted the VDI/VDE 2182 to match the requirements for federated remote labs. We have focused on lab managers, as they will be in charge of implementing corresponding safety and security measures.

Fig. 2. Adjusted VDI/VDE2182 process model for safety and security in federated remote labs.

We consider a starting trigger to initiate the iterative approach. The starting trigger may be a change in the laboratory equipment, new configurations, or research projects, or other (e.g. time-based) triggers throughout the lifecycle of the lab. The most important trigger for DigiLab4U will be new labs entering the network. The concept of safety and security will be implemented into DigiLab4U training, not only for lab managers but also for students. The safety and security content may be “just another element in the teaching process” [27]. Especially in curricula addressing industrial automation and Industry 4.0 related topics, basic knowledge about safety and security is crucial.

4.1 Step 1: Identify assets

Based on VDI/VDE 2182 [28] we define a lab asset as all tangible and intangible components of labs, lab devices, and lab networks, which may come under threat through direct or remote operations and which are worthy of protection.

We have identified some typical different assets at the labs in Parma, at HFT Stuttgart and at BIBA to test the proposed model-based VDI/VDE 2182. We must consider that these labs are currently used hands-on and are still not fully remotely accessible. However, remote operation and implementation of these labs to DigiLab4U require some basic understanding of the relevant safety and security issues upfront.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the operating environment following VDI/VDE 2182 Part 3.3 [29].

![Diagram of the operating environment]

Fig. 3. Adjusted DigiLab4U structure from VDI/VDE2182 overview of the operating environment.

4.2 Step 2: Analyze threats

VDI/VDE 2182 Part 3.3 [29] suggests a four-phased approach to analyze threats. In phase 1, threats are analyzed based on internal and external experience, as well as threat catalogues. The Federal Office for Information Security in Germany (BSI) for example lists the ten most important threats and corresponding countermeasures for industrial control systems [30]. Moreover, the threats must consider machines and people’s points of view, being both considered as assets of the system. Indeed, some threats may be classified with a low level of damage from a machine’s point of view, while from the worker’s perspective the level of damage is significant or serious. For the description of causes in phase 2, we identified the following types of theoretical failures for university labs: (1) software failures, (2) configuration failures (can be checked through verification and validation), (3) hardware failures (mechanical or electrical hardware), (4) human failures (in contrast to configuration failures that these failures can only be eliminated through education and training), (5) attacks and sabotage, and (6) disruptions from the environment (e.g. earthquakes, fires). Disruption from the environment in a very severe case has recently been seen in the Corona crisis, which has affected universities around the globe. This crisis shows that remote access to university labs is not only related to convenience and economic aspects. In phase 3, a detailed vulnerability analysis is performed. Usually, multiple technical and organization people are involved. Table 1 lists examples of identified threats in the DigiLab4U network.
Table 1. Extended threat matrix – Examples (based on [29])

| Lab       | Asset     | Threat                      | Cause                  | Example                      | Vulnerability                  | Direct consequence                        |
|-----------|-----------|-----------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Parma     | Conveyor  | Control Components          | Attack (5)             | Loss of control of conveyor  | Unsecure authentication procedures | People may be hurt during maintenance activities |
|           |           | Connected to the Internet   |                        |                              |                                 |                                           |
| Stuttgart | Robot     | Configuration failure       | Human failure          | No validation and verification of the code | People may be hurt; a robot may be damaged | People may be hurt; a robot may be damaged |
| Stuttgart | Robot     | Technical malfunction       | Hardware failure       | Defect sensor                | No backup for a single source of failure | People may be hurt; a robot may be damaged |
| Stuttgart | Database server | Intrusion via remote access | Sabotage (5)            | Unsatisfied student/employee | Unauthorized authentication procedures | Unauthorized people access data |

Future iterations on labs, lab/asset extensions, threats, causes ...

Iterations can be added to the list as they occur (see starting trigger). The direct consequences (see Tab. 1) “are identified by evaluating what can happen to the plant, the persons, and the organization” [29]. A catalog of clustered direct consequences can be developed over time and can be shared between different labs.

4.3 Step 3: Determine relevant security and safety objectives

The key system characteristics of the trustworthiness of an IIoT system are safety, security, privacy, resilience, and reliability [31]. VDI/VDE 2182 Part 3.3 [29] as well as the IIoT Security Framework (IISF, [32]) also mentions availability, confidentiality, and integrity as objectives.

The European Union, with Directive 89/391/EEC, contemplates that for the safety and security in an industrial plant, the relevant objectives are defined by an employer with the assistance of an expert worker. Nonetheless, the workers are incited to find new objectives and risks inside the organization, this is a part of the continuous improvement process. Such an approach reveals the possibility to identify the largest number of objectives, evaluate and classify them.

In a scenario where multiple laboratories are involved, a collaboration with lab owners and operators should be encouraged as they are the most qualified people operating in the labs. Additionally, students’ collaboration should be increased to receive continuous feedback on safety and security, leading to a continuous improvement process as promoted by the European Union and in VDI/VDE 2182.

4.4 Step 4: Analyze and assess risks

An individual lab manager can define a risk matrix to be used for a specific location and corresponding legal and organizational requirements. If within a network of federated labs standardized risk matrix is used, cross-lab comparisons are simplified. We
suggest the lab risk matrix as shown in Table 2 (based on [29]). As can be seen, the risks in this matrix reflect the impact or damage and the probability of occurrence.

| Impact examples                                      | Impact       | 4x4 Matrix Rating |
|------------------------------------------------------|--------------|-------------------|
| Serious harm of people                               | Serious      | Medium            |
| Minor harm of people, serious economic or reputation loss | Significant | Small             |
| Interruption of operation (weeks, month)             | Small        | Medium            |
| Interruption of operation (hours, days)              | Neglectable  | Very small        |
| Nearly impossible                                    | Unlikely     | Possible          |

Table 2. Lab risk matrix (based on [29])

4.5 Step 1-4: Extended risk analysis with relevant threats

Table 3 shows an overview of applying the model for five sample lab use-cases based on the first four steps. This table can be used to distinguish critical and non-critical use-cases and to focus on countermeasures more than on the most relevant risks. Values that are reported in Table 2 are used for rating individual threats in Table 3. The impact and probability of occurrence of risks are evaluated and rated from ‘very small’ to ‘vital’.
### Table 3. Step 1-4 of the assessment of lab-components, threats, and objectives in DigiLab4U (excerpt, based on [28])

| Lab assets | Lab | Parma | Bremen | Stuttgart | Stuttgart | Stuttgart |
|------------|-----|-------|--------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Lab assets | Conveyor | Remote service | Robot | Robot | Database server |
| Threat     | Control Components Connected to the Internet | Data manipulation | Configuration failure | Technical malfunction | Intrusion via remote access |
| Cause      | Attack | Attack | Human failure | Hardware failure | Sabotage |
| Example    | Loss of control of conveyor | Hacker attacks the remote service connection | Wrong programming, unexperienced user | Defect sensor | Unsatisfied student/employee |
| Vulnerability | Unsecure authentication procedures | Security measures of the DigiLab4U network | No validation and verification of the code | No backup for a single source of failure | Unsecure authentication procedures |
| Direct consequence | People may be hurt during maintenance activities | Unauthorized functions in the Bremen network | People may be hurt; a robot may be damaged | People may be hurt; a robot may be damaged | Unauthorized people access data |
| Objective | Availability | X | X | X | X |
|           | Confidentiality | X | X | X | X |
|           | Integrity | X | X | X | X |
| Identified extent of damage | Serious | Small | Serious | Serious | Significant |
| Identified probability of occurrence | Unlikely | Very likely | Possible | Nearly impossible | Unlikely |
| Identified risk | Medium | Medium | High | Very small | Medium |
| Acceptable extent of damage | No | Yes | No | No | No |
| Acceptable probability of occurrence | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Acceptable risk | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Risk reduction necessary | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Time of intervention/Priority | Before the next lecture | Immediately | Before the next lecture | Before the next lecture | Immediately |

#### 4.6 Step 5: Identify measures and access effectiveness

In step 5, a lab manager lists the possible measures and evaluates their effectiveness. Based on [29] and the provided examples in this paper a corresponding list includes:

- Automatic surveillance of the lab premises: it is planned to install webcams in labs, however in this particular case privacy agreements have to be considered. In the case of securing the area of a robot at HFT, two laser scanners triggering warning and stop commands in real-time will be used.
- Access control system for lab rooms: it is necessary to make sure there is nobody in the room when an experiment is performed, e.g. in the Parma lab it is planned...
to construct a protective frame around a belt conveyor, to avoid any harm to lab operator.

- Restrictions on functional features for remote access: it is planned to be implemented for both labs: (i) with RFID chamber HFT doesn’t allow all the functionality, but only limited functions; (ii) in Parma the velocity of belt conveyor configuration will be not available from remote, as it can cause damage to lab operator, products and belt conveyor itself.

The lab alliance as such may provide common support and guidance such as:

- Confidentiality agreements with lab service users: certain agreements for the users will be provided.
- Minimum safety and security policies for lab managers and administrators, which may be exceeded by local regulations and laws.
- Standard framework solution for lab-network separation, in the sense that the labs are secured in themselves - several levels of access: 1) access to the central network; 2) access to the individual labs.
- Safety and security lecture courses and self-study material.
- Logging mechanisms: it does not help to prevent problems however it helps to identify failures afterward and improve them.

The evaluation of the effectiveness needs to address the following criteria:

- Achievement of the necessary risk reduction to an acceptable risk level for each identified threat.
- Compliance with the university lab safety and IT security policies.
- Simplicity and flexibility in day-to-day operations (according to the identified needs, see introduction).

### 4.7 Step 6: Select countermeasures

To better impact the identified and evaluated from step 1 to step 4 risks, following levels of intervention are suggested: (i) elimination of the risk factor, (ii) modification and inhibition of the causes, (iii) automatically detection of malfunctions, and (iv) limitation of the damage. The first three levels can be classified as a prevention of the damage, they act directly on the probability of occurrence, while the last one acts on minimizing, limiting, and eliminating damage and its consequences (also with the use of personal protective equipment).

The selection of the countermeasures should be based on economical, technical, organizational, and educational criteria, and the following factors are to be considered:
• Low influence on existing operation (e.g. speed, space requirements).
• Easy integration and adaptability to changing environments.
• Expenditure for procurement, installation, customization, and integration in existing lab infrastructures.
• Expenditure on user training and maintenance.
• Innovative approaches serving as a lab in itself.
• Existing installations and experiences.

In order to secure the robot-operation for an RFID-measurement cabinet at HFT Stuttgart, a standard security fence would have been the easiest option. Alternatively, we could have chosen to buy a cobot with integrated safety features. This would have been a flexible, but slow and costly solution. Therefore, we have chosen a safety laser scanner-based solution instead to allow easy access to the robot and the measurement cabinet, while still offering full robot speed in operation at reasonable cost. If people are entering a defined range, the scanner triggers different signals, first slowing down the robot and finally stopping it, if people enter a proximity range. We collected three different competitive offers and have chosen the cheapest offering for economic reasons. As there has not been any experience with such systems at HFT Stuttgart, the installation will be done by the manufacturer of the safety system. This safety laser installation itself will serve as a show-case for students in a lecture on industrial sensors in the future.

4.8 Step 7: Implement countermeasures

While severe risk may require immediate actions, the usual implementation of countermeasures will be embedded in “the project schedule” [29], which in the case of universities is often linked to lecture periods. Changes to the infrastructures of learning labs should be implemented during the off-lecture periods to enable stable lab operation during lecture periods. Testing and validation of implemented countermeasures are necessary. As an example, the safety-system for the robot at HFT Stuttgart will be installed, tested and validated by the manufacturer of the safety-equipment. The installation will be accompanied by the lab technician and the software developers working on the remote access to the robot and the measurement cabinet.

To extend from individual installations to a wider lab network, an organizational concept is required, which identifies measures for normal operation on the one hand and emergencies on the other (tab. 4). To have a faster and more precise method to react at issues and failures, roles, and responsibilities should be identified and assigned [29].
Table 4. Roles and responsibilities

| Role | Examples (Normal operation) | Examples (Emergency operation) | Actions |
|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|---------|
|      | Lab manager, lecturer, central safety and security staff, IT operations, lecturer (responsible to follow safety and security guidelines in lectures) | Lab manager, lecturer, students, central safety and security staff, IT operations, first aid | All must be informed about people assigned to safety and security roles |

The following table shows a list of main roles and responsibilities in three labs and their institutions. Besides, there are further specialists responsible for example for hazardous material, radiation, medical officers, and technical facility managers which must be consulted in special cases. Some public institutions are responsible to control legal compliance with safety and security issues.

Table 5. Main roles and responsibilities in the labs

| Area of Responsibility | Institution | Role (example: RFID-lab HFT Stuttgart) |
|------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|
| General responsibility | University  | All staff in leading positions, including deans, professors, lecturers, and lab managers |
| Initial training for students | University  | Dean of faculty (faculty level) |
| General training material | University  | (e.g. in the Learning Management System) |
| Emergency plans | University  | Health and safety officer |
| IT security concepts | University  | Chief Information Security Officer (university level) |
| IT security lab | Lab | Lab manager, IT |
| Administration | Lab | Lab technician, IT |
| Monitoring | Lab | Lecturer, lab technician, appointed safety inspectors |
| Hardware service | Lab | Lab technician |
| Software service | Lab | Lab technician |
| First aid | University  | Trained voluntary staff listed for each building |
| Alerting | University  | All via central telephone line |
| Escalation | University  | Health and safety officer |
| Safety audits | External | Safety consultants, dean of faculty |
| Documentation | University  | Health and safety officer |
| Initiate emergency measures | University  | Health and safety officer |
| Error analysis and classification | University  | Health and safety officer, appointed safety inspectors |
| Feedback loop to normal operation | University  | Health and safety officer, appointed safety inspectors |
| Documentation | University  | Health and safety officer |
| Guidelines for safety and security | Federated lab network platform | Centralized |
| Access logging | Federated lab network platform | Centralized |
Organizational countermeasures include safety and security training. As introduced in paragraph 4, a training program has already been implemented at the University of Parma. This training must be followed by each worker and student at the university, and it is organized accordingly with the different faculties and the different risks to which students are subjected. Indeed, the training in Parma is divided into three different levels of risks: low, medium, and high. The students and workers must achieve different levels of training depending on the faculty that they are attending.

Within a network of federated remote labs, a key question remains which responsibilities should be centralized. In the case of DigiLab4U – a research project – no staff for standard operation is funded. Safety and security roles and responsibilities need to be handled by each involved university. However, within the project guidelines and guidelines can be formulated, and logging and monitoring concerning network access and attack can be provided. Extra network benefits can be generated by the community itself through sharing experiences, successful countermeasures, and training material within the network. This exchange should be supported by the lab network platform.

### 4.9 Step 8: Perform process audits

Even though the safety and security of machinery in laboratories must be guaranteed in university labs, external audits are useful to prove compliance to regulations and to identify potential threats based on the experience of the auditors. Initial audits after installation may be offered by the manufacturers of the corresponding safety systems. For securing the robot environment at HFT Stuttgart, the initial audit covers:

- Recording technical data concerning the device and the application.
- Determination of the occupational safety at the relevant danger area of the machine.
- Functional test of the equipment used.
- Verification of the safeguarding of the hazardous area.
- Check of the integration into the control system according to manufacturer's specifications.
- Preparation of a test report.
- Inspection sticker if the test is passed.
- Establishing the online connection to the device.
- Reading the device configuration.
- Creating a PDF file as an attachment to the inspection report.
Regular audits have a motivating effect on all involved staff to monitor and improve safety in labs. At HFT Stuttgart, labs are externally audited once a year, while at BIBA every two years. Audit results are documented. However, in between audit checks, there may have been changes in the setup or the environment. A manual authorization step by the responsible lab-manager may be required. Further means for checking the current safety and security status and automatic authorization right before the start of the lab-experiment need to be further researched.

However, these audits show two shortcomings concerning federated lab networks. Firstly, the network-related safety and security threats are not in the focus of these audits. In DigiLab4U this will be addressed through specific audits as part of the project. Secondly, an academic value audit is missing. Academic auditing is necessary, as it shows where we stand and what we are looking for. The University of Parma for example has audits on teaching quality and quality of processes by the Italian ministry every 10 years. However, since lab-work at a course is currently considered an add-on but not the core of the lecture, the academic quality of the labs is not directly audited. In a federated lab network, lab quality can be ensured through a peer-review process, though.

5 Iterative Improvements

The guidelines herein presented must consider an approach that enables an iterative and continuous improvement of the overall described procedure. Indeed, given that a federated lab has a nature of an everchanging environment, the safety and security guidelines must comprehend a procedure that enables the infrastructure to be responsive and resilient to changes, with the minimum effort and in the shortest period. To achieve such a degree of adaptivity, the guideline implements an iterative procedure based on event triggers. Indeed, federated remote labs can experience a wide range of changes which could require a revision of the safety and security policies. According to VDI/VDE 2182 Part 3.3 [29] we can distinguish different triggers to start the iteration process.

Firstly, a “newly added (security) component or (security) measure can affect the target of inspection and may, therefore, make it necessary to rerun the risk analysis cycle.” As an example, the introduction of more technologically advanced countermeasures, possibly considered a new state of the art, must nonetheless be considered as a trigger for the reevaluation of the analysis, as the interactions between all (security) components in a lab, and in a network of labs, must be taken into account. Concerning the interaction with an overall system, modifications or updates of existing components can be considered as eligible triggers for iterative improvement, as such intervention could potentially alter the way countermeasures act. Regarding the modifications/updates or addition of new (security) components, a high degree of attention must be given to changes in the software infrastructure which enables the communication in the remote lab network. Indeed, each software update must be audited and thoroughly tested beforehand, as well as the compatibility certified. Moreover, software updates could
bring new functionalities, and those can bring to a consideration of new safety and security countermeasures. The addition of new laboratories to the federated network should not be considered as a trigger for iterative improvements but should be handled and considered in the design of the network architecture. However, if the addition of a new lab requires an adaptation and modification of the designed procedure (i.e., a new communication protocol is introduced), such architecture alteration must provoke a new risk evaluation. Moreover, the addition or modification of lab equipment also requires a new risk assessment and countermeasures evaluation.

Secondly, regular audits may be specified in a corresponding safety and security policy. For universities, updates and regular inspections can ideally be performed between the lecture terms. Periodical questionnaires by each partner in the lab network can help to collect feedback and ideas for enhancing the security and safety protocols. In such a way, pro-active crowdsourced feedback can anticipate and more easily adapt to the evolution of the overall network approach.

Thirdly, in case of security-, safety-, security- or privacy-relevant events, ad-hoc actions may be required. New countermeasures are needed to comply with newly discovered threats or weaknesses in infrastructure and architecture.

Fourthly, if the threat situation has changed, e.g., because of organizational changes, a new iteration of the safety and security concept may be necessary.

Fifthly, the safety and security policy may change. This includes (i) the safety and security guidelines represented by changes in the institution’s policies, (ii) laws and regulations adaptations, and (iii) modification in the organizational hierarchy, in both federated network and each one of the partners.

6 Conclusion and Outlook

Providing safety and security in a federated lab network infrastructure is a complex task. Based on a literature review and the analysis of requirements for federated university lab networks related to safety and security, we have chosen, followed, and adjusted the VDI/VDE 2182 guideline for implementing an iterative safety and security strategy. We have provided examples from three labs that are participating in the DigiLab4U project. The remote lab scenarios in these labs are currently further enhanced and integrated into the lab infrastructure. Further, yet unknown labs, will be integrated. Those will be able to use the guideline for their risk assessment. Corresponding countermeasures must be investigated and implemented to ensure a safe and secure operation towards the end of the funding period. Therefore, the provided guideline will be further improved, based on the findings in the upcoming implementation phase.

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