Fighting African Capital Flight: Trajectories, Dynamics and Tendencies

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An April 2015 World Bank report on attainment of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) extreme poverty target has revealed that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), in spite of the sub-region enjoying more than two decades of growth resurgence. This study builds on a critique of Piketty’s ‘capital in the 21st century’ and recent methodological innovations on reverse Solow-Swan to review empirics on the adoption of common policy initiatives against a cause of extreme poverty in SSA: capital flight. The richness of the dataset enables the derivation of 14 fundamental characteristics of African capital flight based on income-levels, legal origins, natural resources, political stability, regional proximity and religious domination. The main finding reveals that regardless of fundamental characteristic, from a projection date of 2010, a genuine timeframe for harmonizing policies is between 2016 and 2023. In other words, the beginning of the post-2015 agenda on sustainable development goals coincides with the timeframe for common capital flight policies.

*JEL Classification*: C50; E62; F34; O19; O55

*Keywords*: Econometric modeling; Capital flight; Poverty; Africa
1. Introduction

There are at least four reasons for reviewing Asongu (2014a) on ‘Fighting African Capital Flight: Empirics on Benchmarking Policy Harmonization’: (i) recent disturbing extreme poverty trends in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); (ii) a critique of Piketty’s ‘capital in the 21st century’ that builds on capital flight to elucidate the sub-region’s extreme poverty tragedy; (iii) a recent methodological innovation for common policy initiatives based on negative macroeconomic and institutional signals (reverse Solow-Swan) and (iv) the imperative to account for more fundamental characteristics of the sub-region’s development in order to avail room for robustness and more policy implications.

First, an April 2015 World Bank report on attainment of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) extreme poverty target has revealed that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world, with the exception of Africa, where 45% of countries in SSA are substantially off-track from achieving the MDG extreme poverty target (World Bank, 2015). As documented in recent literature (Efobi et al., 2018; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2018; Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b; Tchamyou et al., 2019; Asongu & le Roux, 2017, 2019), whereas extreme poverty has been declining in all regions of the world, it has unfortunately been increasing in SSA. This is despite over two decades of growth resurgence that began in the mid 1990s.

Second, building on the increasing poverty levels in SSA, Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) has presented a critique of Piketty’s (2013) ‘capital in the 21st century’. Building on: (i) responses from Kenneth Rogoff and Joseph Stiglitz; (ii) post Washington Consensus paradigms and (iii) underpinnings from Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana and Solow-Swan, Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) conclude that extreme poverty in SSA would increase as long as the return on political economy (or illicit capital flight) is higher than the growth rate in the sub-region.

Third, a recent stream of literature is building on theoretical underpinnings of neoclassical growth models to propose the need for common policies based on negative macroeconomic and institutional signals. In essence, whereas the theoretical underpinnings of income convergence have exclusively been limited to catch-up in positive signals, a new stream of literature is evolving on catch-up in negative signals. According to this stream, it is more relevant to initiate common policies based on negative signals because these are policy syndromes by conception and definition. The three studies in this stream of literature are to the best of our knowledge: (i) Asongu (2013a) on harmonizing policies against software piracy; (ii)
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016b) who have predicted the 2011 Spring using negative signals in institutional and macroeconomic variables and (iii) Asongu (2014a) on benchmarking policy harmonization against capital flight in SSA.

Fourth, Asongu (2014a) has used two fundamental characteristics to project horizons for common policies against capital flight in SSA. We extend the underlying study by accounting for income levels, legal origins, regional proximity and religious domination. In essence, accounting for more fundamental characteristics of the sub-region’s development is essential in order to avail room for robustness and more policy implications. Accordingly, upholding blanket policies in the battle against capital flight may not be effective unless they are contingent on fundamental characteristics and prevailing trajectories of capital flight in SSA. Hence, policy makers are most likely to ask the following three questions before considering the harmonization of policies on capital flight. (1) Is capital flight converging within SSA? (2) If so, what is the degree and timing of the convergence process? (3) For which relevant fundamental characteristics of capital flight do answers to the first and second questions apply? While an answer to the first question will guide on the feasibility of harmonizing blanket policies, the answer to the second will determine an optimal timeframe for the blanket policies. But ultimately, the answer to the third (given that the first and second questions are already answered), will determine the feasibility-of, timeframe-for and exclusiveness (or non arbitrariness) of the common policies. This third question is most relevant because it underlines the need for common policies to be contingent on the prevailing speeds of and time for full (100%) convergence within each identified fundamental characteristic of capital flight.

The positioning of the research also departs from contemporary literature on capital flight which has been oriented towards, inter alia: the connection between fiscal policy and capital flight (Muchai & Muchai, 2016); lessons on causes and effects of capital flight from Africa (Ndikumana, 2016); the connection between capital flight and public social expenses in Madagascar (Ramiandrisoa & Rakotomanana, 2016) and Congo-Brazzaville (Moulemvo, 2016); insights into relationships between mis invoicing in trade and the flight of capital from Zimbabwe (Kwaramba et al., 2016); the nexus between natural resources and capital flight in Cameroon (Mpenya et al., 2016); how capital flight is related to tax income in Burkina Faso (Ndiaye & Siri, 2016); linkages between terrorism, capital flight and military expenditure (Efobi & Asongu, 2016; Asongu & Amankwah-Amoah, 2018); the institutional environment on the
nexus between capital flows and capital flight (Gankou et al., 2016); the bundling and unbundling of institutions in the fight against capital flight (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017) and how terrorism sustains the addiction to capital flight (Asongu et al., 2019).

The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 presents the data and methodology. The empirical analysis and discussion of results are covered in Section 3 while Section 4 concludes.

2. Data and Methodology

2.1 Data

The research focuses on 37 countries in Africa building on data for the period 1980 to 2010 from a plethora of sources: Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a); the African Development Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank. The geographical and temporal scopes of the research are contingent on the availability of data at the time of the study. The capital flight data come from Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a) and at the time of study only 37 countries are available for the corresponding periodicity. Insights into the sampled countries and related categories are disclosed in Appendix 4. In what follows, some essential points surrounding the selection of data are clarified, notably: (i) the determination of fundamental features, (ii) how the capital flight measure is comparable and compatible and (iii) choice of control variables.

2.1.1 Determination of fundamental characteristics

Building on the attendant scholarship, it is not feasible to establish convergence when sampled countries exhibit much heterogeneity (Asongu, 2013a). It is in view of improving the homogenous characterization of the dataset that the dataset are classified based on some fundamental characteristics pertaining to capital flight. In the choice of these fundamental features, governance (inter alia, regulation quality, corruption-control and transparency) and macroeconomic features are have the shortcoming of being dynamic over time. Therefore, an adopted threshold may be inconsistent within the sampled periodicity, especially given the length of the sample (i.e. a 30 year span).

In the light of the above, the research builds on Weeks (2012) in the selection of the fundamental features, namely: petroleum-exporting and conflict-affected countries, inter alia. To
these features, this study includes the following categorizations: religious domination, legal origins and income levels. Whereas the categorization approach employed by Weeks (2012) is exclusive, there is a consensus in the literature that “conflicts” and political strife as well as a sector that is petroleum-dominated influence the macroeconomic performance of African countries (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012a, 2012b). Moreover, there are some apparent issues in the assignment of countries to the selected categories on an exclusive and non-arbitrary basis. In order to avoid repetition, more information on the adopted categories can be found in Asongu (2014a) which has built on a body of literature for the categorization of countries, notably: Weeks (2012), Boyce and Ndikumana (2003, 2012a), La Porta et al., (1998, 1999), Asongu (2014b).

2.1.2 Comparability and compatibility of the capital flight measurement

There are two principal shortcomings associated with the capital flight measurement: (i) it is not compatible with underpinnings of the convergence theory and (ii) it is not comparable with other variables in the study. In essence, the measurement of capital flight from Boyce & Ndikumana (2012a) is disclosed in constant 2010 million USD. Two consequences can be drawn from the nature of the indicator: on the one hand, the indicator cannot be compared with attendant control variables that are largely represented in current USD GDP ratio and on the other, the indicator is incompatible with the GDP-centric endogenous indicators from the attendant convergence scholarship. In order to tackle the discussed concerns, this study is consistent with Asongu (2014a) by first converting current GDP to constant 2010 terms. The value obtained is then divided by 1 000 000 from which, values in terms of “GDP constant of 2010 USD (in millions)” are obtained. The last step of the process consists of dividing the capital flight values from the second step by “GDP constant of 2010 USD (in millions)”. As apparent in Appendix 1, the transformation produces a measurement of capital flight that is: (i) compatible with both the theoretical underpinnings pertaining to the convergence literature on the one hand and (ii) compatible with the other variables, on the other

2.1.3 Control variables

In accordance with Asongu (2014a), 14 variables are adopted for the conditioning information set. These elements in the conditioning information set are used in two distinct
specifications that account for both trade and financial globalization (i.e. trade openness, private capital flows and foreign direct investment), expenditure of the government (i.e. public investment and government spending), economic prosperity (i.e. GDP per capita growth and GDP growth), institutional quality (i.e. rule of law and regulation quality), the stability of prices (i.e. inflation), financial development (i.e. liquid liabilities and money supply) and development assistance (entailing total foreign aid and foreign aid from the DAC\textsuperscript{2} countries). It is worthwhile to clarify that the choice of the variables is consistent with the theoretical insights into conditional convergence which maintain that if there are disparities between countries in institutional and macroeconomic features that are exogenous to capital flight, conditional convergence is likely to be apparent. According to Asongu (2015), globalization drives capital flight. Boyce and Ndikumana (2012b) maintain that one of the most critical mechanisms via which government funds are stolen is through public spending. Weeks (2012) posits that capital flight is associated with high dependence on foreign aid and low quality of institutions. It has been documented in the literature that investors prefer investing in economies that are less characterized by features of ambiguity (Kelsey & le Roux, 2017, 2018) such as very high inflation. In line with Boyce and Ndikumana (2003), high levels of economic growth that are not driven by petroleum exports are linked with lower levels of capital flight, in the light of higher anticipated returns from investment. Insights into the summary statistics, correlation matrix and definitions of variables are presented respectively, in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3.

2.2 Methodology

This research uses the beta (\(\beta\)) convergence technique that is in line with the methodological motivations of the paper, consistent with the bulk of literature on the imperative of the adopted estimation technique to be consistent with data behavior and study objective (Chao et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019; Li et al., 2014, 2016; Kou et al., 2012, 2014, 2016, 2019a, 2019b). This procedure of estimation is typically in line with the income catch-up scholarship that has been assessed building on models of neoclassical growth, notably: Baumol (1986); Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995) and Mankiw et al. (1992). The attendant theoretical insights have been extended to other areas of development studies, \textit{inter alia:} financial markets.

\textsuperscript{2} Development Assistance Committee.
and financial intermediary developments (Narayan et al., 2011; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Tchamyou et al., 2018; Efobi et al., 2019).

Following the attendant convergence studies (Fung, 2009; Asongu, 2013), Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) below are the main specifications used to assess conditional convergence if \( W_{i,t} \) is taken as strictly exogenous.

\[
\ln(Y_{i,t}) - \ln(Y_{i,t-\tau}) = \beta \ln(Y_{i,t-\tau}) + \delta W_{i,t-\tau} + \eta_i + \xi_i + \epsilon_{i,t} \\
\ln(Y_{i,t}) = \ln(Y_{i,t-\tau}) + \delta W_{i,t-\tau} + \eta_i + \xi_i + \epsilon_{i,t}
\]

where \( Y_{i,t} \) represents the measure of capital flight of country \( i \) in period \( t \). \( \sigma = 1 + \beta \). \( W_{i,t} \) denotes a vector of capital flight determinants, \( \eta_i \) reflects a country-specific effect, \( \xi_i \) is a time-specific constant and \( \epsilon_{i,t} \) an error term. In the light of the neo-classical growth underpinnings discussed in the preceding paragraph, a statistically significant negative coefficient on \( \beta \) in Eq. (1) implies that, countries which are comparatively close to their steady states in terms of changes in capital flight will be characterized by a slowdown in the increase of capital flight growth (Narayan et al., 2011). Within the same framework, as documented in Fung (2003) and in contemporary literature on convergence if \( 0 < |\sigma| < 1 \) in Eq. (2), it follows that \( Y_{i,t} \) is stable dynamically with a capital flight growth rate trend that is similar to that of \( W_{i,t} \), and with a corresponding height relative to the level of \( W_{i,t} \). These indicators are encapsulated in \( W_{i,t-\tau} \) and the individual effects \( \eta_i \) are measurements of the long term capital flight convergence path. It follows that the country-specific effect \( \eta_i \) articulates other drivers of the steady state of the country that are not observed in \( W_{i,t-\tau} \).

In order to eliminate fixed effects that can cause endogeneity owing to the correlation between the lagged outcome variable and fixed effects, the difference of Eq. (2) it taken to produce Eq. (3).

\[
\ln(Y_{i,t}) - \ln(Y_{i,t-\tau}) = \sigma \ln(Y_{i,t-\tau} - Y_{i,t-2\tau}) + \delta (W_{i,t-\tau} - W_{i,t-2\tau}) + (\xi_{i,t-\tau} - \xi_{i,t-2\tau}) + (\epsilon_{i,t} - \epsilon_{i,t-\tau})
\]

Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) are then combined within a framework of a system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) that ensures parallel conditions between the dependent variables and error terms by using lagged differences of the regressors as instruments in Eq. (2) lagged
levels of the regressors as instruments in Eq. (3). The choice of the difference estimator of the GMM technique (Arellano & Bond, 1991) relative to the system estimator of the same technique (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) is motivated by the need to obtain more efficient estimates as documented by Bond et al. (2001). The specification is two-step in order to account for heteroscedasticity.

As maintained by Islam (1995, 14), it is not appropriate to assess convergence using yearly time spans because these are too short and consequently, short term disturbances may persist during such short time spans. Therefore, given a dataset spanning 31 years, the research follows Asongu (2013a) in employing two-year data averages in terms of non-overlapping intervals (NOI). In addition to the justification provided above, four more additional motivations are worth clarifying. (i) While NOI that are characterized by higher numerical values absorb more short term disturbances, there is also an associated shortcoming of having estimated models that are weakened in the light of the information criteria used to assess and validate the estimated models. Therefore, the selection of the two-year NOI over NOIs with higher numerical values is also motivated by the need to take on board as many time series properties as possible. (ii) As a corollary to the preceding point, two-year NOI are associated with more degrees of freedom that are relevant for the modeling of conditional convergence. (iii) Consistent with Asongu (2013a), the choice of higher numerical NOI comes with the cost of low convergence rates and corresponding lengthier time spans to full convergence which may not reflect the reality on the ground. For example a policy recommendation with AC and CC of 47.9 years and 40.3 years respectively (based on the three-year NOI) for petroleum exporting countries (in the system GMM results) may not be welcomed by policy makers because it is a distant prospect and does not reflect the urgency of the capital flight issue under consideration.

(iv) From an exploratory visual analysis, it is apparent that evidence of persistence in short term or business cycle disturbances is not associated with capital flight. Hence, the coefficient of auto-regression is 2 (i.e. $\tau$ is set to 2) and the research computes the implied convergence rate by calculating $\frac{\sigma}{2}$. Accordingly, the estimated coefficient of the lagged difference outcome variable is divided by the number of NOI (i.e. 2) because it has been employed to absorb short term disturbances. In essence, the criterion for assessing convergence is that the absolute value of the estimated lagged coefficient should be between the interval of zero and one ($0 < |\sigma| < 1$). Hence, when the estimated lagged dependent variable falls within the
interval in a specific fundamental characteristic, convergence can be established. The
Corresponding interpretation is that past variations induce a less proportionate influence on future
variations, indicating that the difference in the left-hand side of Eq. (3) is decreasing over time
given that the country is converging to a steady state (Asongu, 2013).

3. Empirical Analysis

3.1 Presentation of results

This section looks at three principal concerns: (i) investigation of the presence of
convergence; (ii) computation of the speed of convergence and (iii) determination of the time
needed for full (100%) convergence. The summary of overall findings is presented in Table 1 in
which the three concerns are addressed. Findings for absolute (unconditional) and conditional
convergence are presented in Table 2 and Tables 3-4 respectively.

Absolute convergence is estimated with only the lagged difference of the endogenous
variable as independent variable whereas conditional convergence is in the presence of the
conditioning information set (control variables). Hence, unconditional convergence is estimated
without $W_{it}$: vector of determinants (government expenditure, trade, FDI, GDP growth,
regulation quality, financial depth, development assistance and inflation) of capital flight. Accordingly, in order to assess the validity of the model and indeed the convergence hypothesis,
we perform two tests, notably: (i) the Sargan test which assesses the over-identification
restrictions and (ii) the Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation which examines the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Sargan-test investigates if the instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term in the equation of interest. The null hypothesis is the stance that the
instruments as a group are strictly exogenous (do not suffer from endogeneity), which is
necessary for the validity of the GMM estimates. The p-values of estimated coefficients are
disclosed in brackets in the line following the reported values of the estimated coefficients. We
broadly observe that the null hypothesis of the Sargan test is not rejected in all the regressions.
Priority is given to the second order autocorrelation: AR(2) test in first difference because it is
more relevant than AR(1) as it detects autocorrelation in difference. For almost every model, we
are unable to reject the AR(2) null hypothesis for the absence of autocorrelation, especially for

Note should be taken of the fact that, the second vector of determinants entails the second set of control variables
as presented in Table 4 (public investment, trade, private capital flows, GDP per capita growth, rule of law, liquid
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liabilities, development aid from DAC countries and inflation).
conditional convergence specifications. Therefore, there is robust evidence that most of the models are free from autocorrelation at the 1% significance level.

Table 1 presents a summary of the findings from Tables 2-4. This entails results for Absolute Convergence (AC), Conditional Convergence (CC), the Speed of Absolute Convergence (SAC), the Speed of Conditional Convergence (SCC) and the rate required to achieve full (100%) convergence in both types of convergences.

From a general perspective, the following conclusions could be drawn. (i) Conditional convergence findings based on the second specification (Table 4) are substantially more significant than those based on the first specification (Table 3). Therefore, conditional convergence is based on the variables we observe and empirically test (or model), which may not reflect all determinants of capital flight that facilitate the convergence process. Hence, the discussion of findings will be based only on the second specification for conditional convergence. (ii) Based on continental results, findings on ‘Petroleum exporting’, ‘North Africa’ ‘French civil-law’, ‘Middle-income’ and ‘Upper-middle-income’ countries significantly affect the absolute convergence process. In other words, these fundamental characteristics have rates of convergence that significantly differ from the 33.05% per annum observed for the African continent. Their respective degrees of convergence are much lower, implying a corresponding lengthier period required for full convergence: with the disparity most pronounced in ‘Middle-income’ and ‘Upper-middle-income’ countries which both have a 2% per annum convergence rate and a time needed for full convergence of 100 years. (iii) Within the perspective of CC, but for the ‘Conflict-affected’ and ‘Low-income’ countries results, African findings are broadly consistent across other fundamental characteristics. (iv) Regardless of fundamental characteristic, from a projection date of 2010, a genuine timeframe for harmonizing policies is between 2016 and 2023.

3.2 Discussion of results

Before we dive into the discussing the results, it is important first and foremost to understand the economic intuition motivating absolute and conditional convergence of capital flight in the African continent. Absolute convergence in capital flight occurs when countries share the same fundamental characteristics with regard to bases governing capital flight such that only cross-country variations in initial levels of capital flight exist. Absolute convergence thus,
results from factors such as, *inter alia*: significant export of petroleum; political instability due to conflicts; the emphasis legal origin places on property rights, enforcements of the rights and fight against corruption; the manner in which economic prosperity affects the propensity by which the extra-wealth is saved abroad. Absolute convergence also occurs because of adjustments common to fundamental characteristics (conflict-affected, high-income or English common-law countries for example). Hence, based on the above intuition we could expect capital flight to be higher in petroleum and conflict-affected countries. This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for speedy convergence because of disparities in initial conditions of capital flight. These differences in initial conditions depend on: (i) time-dynamic evidence of significant petroleum exports, either because of recent discovery or substantial decline in productions; (ii) spontaneous reoccurrence of conflicts after relatively stable periods or arbitrary and unilateral violation of peace accords and (iii) the diffusion of legal cultures transmitted by colonial powers over time through regionalization and globalization such that the legal origin fundamental holds less ground.

On the other hand, conditional convergence is that which is contingent on cross-country disparities in structural and institutional characteristics that determine capital flight. In accordance with the economic growth literature (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995), conditional convergence depicts the kind of convergence whereby, one’s own long-term steady state (equilibrium) is contingent on structural characteristics and fundamentals of its institutions in particular and its economy in general. For example, non-petroleum exporting countries may differ significantly in the level of globalization, institutional quality, economic prosperity, financial development, price stability, foreign aid…etc To this end, our model for conditional convergence is contingent on institutional quality (rule of law and regulation quality), globalization (trade, FDI and private capital flows), financial development (at overall economic and financial system levels), economic prosperity (GDP growth at macro and micro levels), inflation and development assistance (total NODA and NODA from DAC countries)

\[4\] Due to constraints in degrees of freedom, some models have not been conditional on all the determinants of capital flight outlined above. This is not a major issue because some conditional

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4 FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.
specifications in mainstream literature are limited to two macroeconomic control variables (Bruno et al., 2012).

We have observed the following from the findings. (i) Based on continental results, findings on ‘Petroleum exporting’, ‘North Africa’ ‘French civil-law’, ‘Middle-income’ and ‘Upper-middle-income’ countries significantly affect the absolute convergence process. The corresponding lower (higher) rate (time) of (to full) convergence is the result of differences in initial conditions of capital flight. For instance, the difference in petroleum countries could be explained by significant variations in initial conditions of capital flight discussed above: time-dynamic evidence of significant petroleum exports, either because of recent discovery or substantial decline in productions. (ii) Within the perspective of CC, but for the ‘Conflict-affected’ and ‘Low-income’ countries results, African findings are broadly consistent across other fundamental characteristics. ‘Conflict-affected’ and ‘Low-income’ countries significantly have a higher (lower) rate (time required) of (for full) conditional converge because of substantially lower cross-country differences in macroeconomic and institutional characteristics determining capital flight. Hence, cross-country differences in factors governing capital flight among “Conflict-affected” and “Low-income” countries are not very substantial. (iii) Regardless of fundamental characteristic, from a projection date of 2010, a genuine timeframe for harmonizing policies is between 2016 and 2023. This empirically indicates that (both in absolute and conditional terms) countries with lower rates of capital flight are catching-up their counterparts with higher rates. Consistent with the intuition motivating this analysis on policy harmonization, two inferences could be drawn: (i) on the one hand, convergence implies that, adopting common policies against the scourge is feasible and (ii) full (100%) convergence within the specified time horizon reflects the implementation (or harmonization) of the feasible policies without distinction of nationality or locality.

4. Concluding implications and future directions
An April 2015 World Bank report on attainment of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) extreme poverty target has revealed that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), in spite of the sub-region enjoying more than two decades of growth resurgence. This study builds on a critique of Piketty’s ‘capital in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century’ and recent methodological innovations on reverse Solow-Swan to
review empirics on the adoption of common policy initiatives against a cause of extreme poverty in SSA: capital flight. The richness of the dataset enables the derivation of 14 fundamental characteristics of African capital flight based on income-levels, legal origins, natural resources, political stability, regional proximity and religious domination. The main finding reveals that regardless of fundamental characteristic, from a projection date of 2010, a genuine timeframe for harmonizing policies is between 2016 and 2023. In other words, the beginning of the post-2015 agenda on sustainable development goals coincides with the timeframe for common capital flight policies. Common capital flight policies are not exclusively contingent on capital flight leaving one of the sampled countries to another. It is premised on the fact that common capital flight policies can be applied by sampled countries to avoid capital leaving their countries to more developed countries and tax havens. Common capital flight will benefit sampled countries because capital flight is largely destined to wealthy countries and/or tax havens under the jurisdictions of wealthy countries. The implementation of common policies can be tailored within the auspices of the African Union because the African Union is currently spearheading the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) in Africa.

Consistent with Asongu (2014a), the following four points are relevant concerns that need to be resolved to facilitate this harmonization: improvement of the investment climate and ease of doing business to deter capital flight based on prospects of higher returns; formulation of common policies that would culminate in the repatriation of corruption-related capital flight deposited in Western banks and the improvement of formal institutions that will oversee the recuperation for this stolen capital (as well as deter potentially corrupt officials); involvement of Western banks in particular and the international community in general and; challenging the legitimacy of part of African debts. The purpose of this study has been to project more horizons for common policies against capital flight in Africa using more fundamental characteristics. More insights into policy measures against the underlying capital flight are available in Fofack and Ndikumana (2009), Boyce and Ndikumana (2011) and Asongu (2014a).

Future studies devoted to extending extant literature may focus on more contemporary measures that are being tailored towards fighting illicit capital flight in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda.
5. List of Abbreviations
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment.
GDP: Gross Domestic Product.
SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.
MDG: Millennium Development Goal.
ADI: African Development Indicators.
FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.
WB: World Bank.
GMM: Generalised Method of Moments.
AC: Absolute Convergence.
CC: Conditional Convergence.
DAC : Development Assistance Committee.
NODA: Net Official Development Assistance.
LRA: Lord Resistance Army.
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares.
NOI: Non-overlapping intervals.
OIR: Over-identifying restrictions.
IPRs: Intellectual Property Rights.

6. Declaration
Availability of supporting data: the data for this paper is available upon request.
Acknowledgement: The authors are indebted to the editor and reviewers for constructive comments.

Compliance with Ethical Standards
The authors are self-funded and have received no funding for this manuscript. The authors also have no conflict of interest.

This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by the authors.
Table 1: Summary of results on Absolute and Conditional Convergences

|                      | Income Levels | Legal Origins | Religious Dom. | Regions | Resources | Stability | Africa |
|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------|-----------|-----------|--------|
|                      | UMI LMI MI LI | English French | Christ. Islam | SSA NA | Oil Non-oil | Conflict Non-co |        |
| Absolute C (AC)      | Yes No Yes Yes | Yes Yes Yes Yes | Yes Yes No Yes | Yes Yes Yes Yes | Yes No Yes Yes | Yes No Yes Yes |        |
| % of A.C             | 2% n.a 2% 33.10% 33.05% 12.50% 33.05% n.a 33.05% 17.70% 15.55% 33.05% 33.11% n.a 33.05% |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Years to A.C         | 100Yrs n.a 100Yrs 6.04Yrs 6.05Yrs 16Yrs 6.05Yrs n.a 6.05Yrs 11.2Yrs 12.8Yrs 6.05Yrs 6.04Yrs n.a 6.05Yrs |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Conditional C (CC)   | No No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| % of C.C             | 16.6% n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 11.10% n.a n.a n.a 11.25% n.a n.a n.a |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Years to C.C         | 12Yrs n.a n.a n.a 9.97Yrs 12.1Yrs 12.1Yrs n.a 12Yrs 12.7Yrs n.a 6.72Yrs 11.8Yrs 12.1Yrs |        |        |        |        |        |        |

AC: Absolute Convergence. CC: Conditional Convergence. yrs: Years. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. NA: North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Dom: Domination.

Table 2: Absolute Convergence

|                      | Income Levels | Legal Origins | Religious Dom. | Regions | Resources | Stability | Africa |
|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------|-----------|-----------|--------|
|                      | UMI LMI MI LI | English French | Christ. Islam | SSA NA | Oil Non-oil | Conflict Non-co |        |
| Initial              | 0.04*** 0.092 | 0.04*** 0.662*** | 0.661*** -0.25*** | 0.661*** 0.167 | 0.661*** 0.354*** | -0.31*** 0.662*** | -0.077 0.661*** |
| AR(1)                | (0.000) (0.813) | (0.000) (0.000) | (0.000) (0.000) | (0.000) (0.421) | (0.000) (0.030) | (0.000) (0.000) | (0.484) (0.000) |
| AR(2)                | 0.999 -1.381 | 0.939 -1.051 | -1.005 -1.078 | -1.056 -1.647* | -1.057 -1.398 | -1.000 -1.009 | -1.001 -0.773 | -1.057 |
| Sargan OIR           | 4.854 10.928 | 14.590 7.313 | 2.567 18.113 | 11.487 8.424 | 14.870 3.207 | 6.594 7.191 | 6.012 21.551 | 15.022 |
| Wald                 | 674*** 0.055 | 938*** 8e+5*** | 2e+6*** 25*** | 4e+5*** 6.645 | 4e+5*** 4.69** | 2087*** 2e+6*** | 7e+7*** 0.488 | 442672*** |
| Countries            | 5 11 16 19 15 20 25 10 31 4 | 8 27 11 | 24 35 |
| Observations         | 70 158 233 271 219 285 359 145 | 444 60 | 115 389 | 161 343 504 |

***, ***, *: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient. Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. AC: Absolute Convergence. CC: Conditional Convergence. yrs: Years. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. NA: North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Dom: Domination.
|   | Income Levels | Legal Origins | Religious Dom. | Regions | Resources | Stability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|   | UMI | LMI | MI | LI | English | French | Christ | Islam | SSA | NA | Oil | Non-oil | Conflict | Non-co. | Africa |
| Initial | -0.011 | -0.130 | -0.003 | -0.318 | -0.015 | -0.297 | -0.219 | 0.566 | -0.322* | 1.247 | 0.002 | -0.22** | -0.060 | 0.005 | -0.215 |
| Constant | 0.051 | 0.013 | 0.145 | -0.072 | -0.136 | -0.247 | -0.002 | -0.073 | -0.068 | -0.002 | -0.043 | -0.193* | -0.064 | 0.011 | -0.044 |
| Gov’t Expenditure | -0.002 | -0.0002 | -0.008 | 0.0002 | -0.003 | 0.002 | -0.002* | 0.001 | -0.002 | -0.0003 | 0.0001 | -0.0007 | -0.0009 | -0.004 | -0.001 |
| Trade | -0.0004 | 0.000 | -0.0003 | 0.0003 | 0.0001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.0003 | 0.0001 | --- | 0.001 | 0.0004 | 0.0002 | 0.0001 | 0.000 |
| Financial Depth | --- | -0.002 | -0.0005 | -0.004 | 0.0002 | -0.006 | -0.001 | -0.005 | 0.0001 | --- | --- | 0.0002 | --- | 0.001 | 0.0001 |
| GDP Growth | --- | 0.007 | 0.013 | 0.008 | 0.017 | 0.025 | 0.013 | 0.015 | 0.021 | --- | --- | 0.033* | --- | 0.017 | 0.019 |
| Regulation Quality | --- | -0.020 | -0.149 | -0.054* | -0.090 | --- | -0.041 | --- | --- | -0.19 | --- | 0.007 | -0.04** | --- | --- |
| Financial Depth | --- | -0.094 | --- | 0.186 | 0.155 | 0.095 | --- | 0.070 | --- | --- | 0.143* | --- | 0.009 | 0.048 | --- |
| Foreign Aid | --- | 0.004 | --- | -0.002 | -0.000 | 0.002 | --- | 0.000 | --- | 0.0005 | --- | 0.001 | -0.0003 | --- | --- |
| Inflation | --- | -0.003 | --- | --- | --- | --- | -0.004* | --- | -0.001 | --- | -0.00 -0.001 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| AR(1) | 0.967 | -0.745 | -1.364 | -0.859 | -1.380 | -0.935 | -1.108 | -0.740 | -1.247 | -0.708 | -0.721 | -1.285 | -0.793 | -1.361 | -1.242 |
| AR(2) | -0.885 | -0.153 | -1.097 | 0.120 | -1.021 | -0.088 | -0.687 | 0.543 | -0.587 | -1.250 | 0.403 | -0.796 | 0.550 | -1.082 | -0.643 |
| Sargan OIR | 0.996 | 5.102 | 4.923 | 2.594 | 2.764 | 4.918 | 4.256 | 2.918 | 10.621 | 1.637 | 3.887 | 9.110 | 1.981 | 10.095 | 13.395 |
| Wald | 0.207** | 32.89*** | 32.89*** | 41.6*** | 18.78*** | 17.60*** | 22.52*** | 17.00*** | 41.6*** | 32.89*** | 6.620 | 40.8*** | 7.910*** | 1.228 | 25.30*** | 4.381 |
| Countries | 5 | 9 | 13 | 9 | 11 | 11 | 17 | 7 | 19 | 4 | 5 | 19 | 6 | 17 | 22 |
| Observations | 73 | 129 | 95 | 56 | 77 | 72 | 114 | 81 | 125 | 60 | 69 | 129 | 77 | 116 | 149 |

***, **, *: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient. Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. AC: Absolute Convergence. CC: Conditional Convergence. Yrs: Years. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. NA: North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without significant political instability. Gov’t: Government. Ivt: Investment. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests; and b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.
Table 4: Conditional Convergence (Second Specification)

|                      | Income Levels | Legal Origins | Religious Dom. | Regions | Resources | Stability | Africa |
|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------|-----------|-----------|--------|
|                      | UMI           | LMI           | LI             | English | French    | Christ.   | Islam  | SSA     | NA      | Oil      | Non-oil  | Conflict | Non-co. | Africa |
| Initial              | (0.33***       | 0.357         | -0.037         | -0.40*** | 0.000     | -0.092    | -0.32*** | 0.292   | -0.33*** | 0.618 | -0.31*** | -0.223 | 0.59*** | -0.33*** |
| Constant             | (0.000)       | (0.750)       | (0.654)        | (0.000)  | (0.376)   | (0.000)   | (0.000)  | (0.269) | (0.000)  | (0.195) | (0.000)  | (0.124) | (0.000) | (0.000)  |
| Public Investment    | (0.097)       | (0.445)       | (0.364)        | (0.265)  | (0.927)   | (0.454)   | (0.338)  | (0.986) | (0.323)  | (0.118) | (0.408)  | (0.308) | (0.410) | (0.660)  |
| Trade                | (0.442)       | (0.590)       | (0.246)        | (0.473)  | (0.518)   | (0.901)   | (0.422)  | (0.784) | (0.453)  | (0.444) | (0.456)  | (0.334) | (0.516) | (0.474)  |
| Priv. Capital Flows  | (0.185)       | (0.337)       | (0.634)        | (0.012)  | (0.775)   | (0.106)   | (0.277)  | (0.851) | (0.255)  | (0.295) | (0.967)  | (0.612) | (0.558) | (0.283)  |
| GDPpc Growth         | (0.009)       | 0.006         | 0.003          | 0.015    | 0.007     | 0.012     | 0.002    | 0.013   | ---      | 0.018   | 0.181    | 0.040   | 0.011   | ---      |
| Rule of Law          | (0.308)       | (0.601)       | (0.795)        | (0.501)  | (0.768)   | (0.393)   | (0.842)  | (0.359) | ---      | 0.289   | (0.387)  | (0.284) | (0.480) | ---      |
| Liquid Liabilities   | (0.668)       | (0.531)       | (0.322)        | (0.833)  | (0.715)   | (0.292)   | (0.198)  | ---     | 0.618    | (0.687) | (0.322)  | ---      | ---      | ---      |
| Foreign Aid (DAC)    | ---           | ---           | 0.0003         | ---      | 0.002     | -0.002    | -0.015   | ---     | ---      | -0.018  | ---      | -0.005  | ---      | -0.027   |
| Inflation            | ---           | ---           | -0.0004        | -0.013   | 0.0001    | -0.002    | -0.002   | ---     | -0.002   | ---     | -0.019   | ---      | -0.016   |
| Wald                 | 133***        | 93.38***      | 8.576          | 1616***  | 4.629     | 2666***   | 2144***  | 4.684   | 3320***  | 1.674   | 120.3*** | 37.12*** | 8715***  | 10261*** |
|                      | (0.000)       | (0.000)       | (0.477)        | (0.000)  | (0.865)   | (0.000)   | (0.000)  | (0.455) | (0.000)  | (0.195) | (0.000)  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000)  |
| Countries            | 5             | 10            | 98             | 83       | 86        | 95        | 148      | 92      | 161      | 60      | 73       | 146      | 120      | 125      |
| Observations         | 73            | 69            | 94             | 83       | 86        | 95        | 148      | 92      | 161      | 60      | 73       | 146      | 120      | 125      |

***, **: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient. Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. AC: Absolute Convergence. CC: Conditional Convergence. Yrs: Years. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. NA: North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without significant political instability. Priv: Private. GDPcc: GDP per capita. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.
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## Appendix 1: Summary Statistics

| Variables                        | Mean   | S.D    | Min.   | Max.   | Observations |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------|
| Capital Flight                   | 3.647  | 28.643 | -13.637| 399.14 | 540          |
| Expenditure                      |        |        |        |        |              |
| Government Expenditure           | 4.015  | 10.790 | -68.238| 80.449 | 376          |
| Public Expenditure               | 7.704  | 4.636  | 0.000  | 30.120 | 487          |
| Globalization                    |        |        |        |        |              |
| Trade Openness                   | 69.503 | 38.157 | 8.199  | 246.89 | 557          |
| Foreign Direct Investment        | 2.300  | 4.393  | -16.118| 35.190 | 485          |
| Private Capital Flows            | 2.410  | 4.555  | -16.118| 35.295 | 489          |
| Institutional Quality            |        |        |        |        |              |
| Regulation Quality               | -0.606 | 0.607  | -2.526 | 0.857  | 293          |
| Rule of Law                      | -0.697 | 0.648  | -2.312 | 0.863  | 294          |
| Economic Prosperity              |        |        |        |        |              |
| GDP growth                       | 3.539  | 4.624  | -29.178| 24.176 | 559          |
| GDP per capita growth            | 1.060  | 4.407  | -23.539| 23.104 | 564          |
| Foreign Aid                      |        |        |        |        |              |
| Total NODA                       | 10.223 | 9.915  | 0.054  | 62.344 | 559          |
| NODA from DAC countries          | 6.062  | 6.144  | -0.175 | 53.017 | 559          |
| Finance and Inflation            |        |        |        |        |              |
| Money Supply                     | 0.305  | 0.202  | 0.001  | 1.224  | 472          |
| Liquid Liabilities               | 0.235  | 0.186  | 0.001  | 1.017  | 474          |
| Inflation                        | 105.80 | 1226.3 | -100.00| 24411  | 520          |
| Upper Middle Income              | 0.162  | 0.368  | 0.000  | 1.000  | 592          |
| Lower Middle Income              | 0.297  | 0.457  | 0.000  | 1.000  | 592          |
| Middle Income                    | 0.459  | 0.498  | 0.000  | 1.000  | 592          |
| Low Income                       | 0.540  | 0.498  | 0.000  | 1.000  | 592          |
| English                          | 0.405  | 0.491  | 0.000  | 1.000  | 592          |
| French                           | 0.594  | 0.491  | 0.000  | 1.000  | 592          |
| Categorization                   |        |        |        |        |              |
| Christianity                     | 0.702  | 0.457  | 0.000  | 1.000  | 592          |
| Islam                            | 0.297  | 0.457  | 0.000  | 1.000  | 592          |
| Sub-Saharan Africa               | 0.891  | 0.310  | 0.000  | 1.000  | 592          |
| North Africa                     | 0.108  | 0.310  | 0.000  | 1.000  | 592          |
| Oil                               | 0.216  | 0.412  | 0.000  | 1.000  | 592          |
| Non-oil                          | 0.783  | 0.412  | 0.000  | 1.000  | 592          |
| Conflict                         | 0.297  | 0.457  | 0.000  | 1.000  | 592          |
| Non-conflict                     | 0.702  | 0.457  | 0.000  | 1.000  | 592          |

S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.
### Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix

|                    | Expenditure (Ex) | Financial Openness | Trade Openness | Institutional Quality | Economic Prosperity | Foreign Aid (NODA) | Finance | Capital | Inflation | Flight |
|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|----------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------|---------|-----------|--------|
| Gov. Ex            | 1.000            | 0.098              | 0.080          | 0.082                 | 0.101               | 0.014               | 0.028   | 0.332   | 0.344     | 0.038  |
| Pub. Ivt           | 1.000            | 0.116              | 0.111          | 0.227                 | 0.231               | 0.146               | 0.163   | 0.261   | 0.269     | 0.181  |
| FDI                | 1.000            | 0.982              | 0.511          | -0.153                | 0.097               | 0.128               | 0.176   | -0.084  | -0.063    | 0.145  |
| PCF                | 1.000            | 0.504              | 0.032          | 0.218                 | 0.107               | 0.117               | 0.172   | -0.068  | -0.040    | 0.167  |
| R.Q                | 1.000            | 0.010              | 0.791          | 0.146                 | 0.170               | -0.163              | -0.179  | 0.301   | 0.208     | 0.196  |
| R.L                | 1.000            | 0.000              | 0.973          | 0.047                 | 0.041               | 0.007               | 0.041   | 0.301   | 0.370     | 0.196  |
| GDPg               | 1.000            | 0.056              | 0.059          | 0.056                 | 0.106               | 0.085               | 0.085   | 0.590   | 0.636     | 0.018  |
| GDPpcg             | 1.000            | 0.953              | -0.218         | -0.253                | 0.004               | 0.004               | 0.004   | 0.004   | 0.004     | 0.004  |
| Total              | 1.000            | -0.084             | 0.009          | 0.082                 | 0.004               | -0.009              | 0.082   | 0.004   | 0.004     | 0.000  |
| DAC                | 1.000            | 0.967              | 1.000          | 1.000                 | 0.967               | 1.000               | 1.000   | 1.000   | 1.000     | 1.000  |

Gov. Ex: Government Expenditure. Pub. Ivt: Public Investment. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. PCF: Private Capital Flows. R.Q: Regulation Quality. RL: Rule of Law. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Total: Total NODA. DAC: NODA from ‘Development Assistance Committee’ countries. M2: Money Supply. LL: Liquid Liabilities.
### Appendix 3: Definitions of variables

| Variables               | Signs | Definitions of variables (Measurements)                                                                 | Sources                                      |
|-------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| Government Expenditure  | Gov. Ex | Government Final Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP)                                                      | World Bank (WDI)                             |
| Public Investment       | Pub. Iv | Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)                                                                       | World Bank (WDI)                             |
| Foreign Investment      | FDI   | Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP)                                                                      | World Bank (WDI)                             |
| Private Capital Flows   | PCF   | Private Capital Flows (% of GDP)                                                                        | World Bank (WDI)                             |
| Trade Openness          | Trade | Imports plus Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)                                                   | World Bank (WDI)                             |
| Regulation Quality      | R.Q   | Regulation Quality (estimate): Measured as the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. | World Bank (WDI)                             |
| Rule of Law             | R.L   | Rule of Law (estimate): Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. | World Bank (WDI)                             |
| GDP Growth              | GDPg  | Average annual GDP growth rate                                                                          | World Bank (WDI)                             |
| GDP per capita Growth   | GDPpcg | Average annual GDP per capita growth rate                                                                  | World Bank (WDI)                             |
| Foreign Aid (1)         | Total Aid | Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)                                                            | World Bank (WDI)                             |
| Foreign Aid (2)         | DAC Aid | NODA from DAC Countries (% of GDP)                                                                        | World Bank (WDI)                             |
| Financial Depth         | M2    | Money Supply (% of GDP)                                                                                    | World Bank (FDSD)                            |
| Liquid Liabilities      | LL    | Financial System Deposits (% of GDP)                                                                       | World Bank (FDSD)                            |
| Inflation               | Inflation | Consumer Price Index (Annual %)                                                                                  | World Bank (WDI)                             |
| Capital Flight          | Cap. Flight | Capital Flight (constant of 2010 in % of GDP)                                                               | Boyce & Ndikumana (2012)                      |

FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.
## Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries

| Categories          | Panels                 | Countries                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Num |
|---------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| **Income Levels**   | Upper Middle Income    | Botswana, Algeria, South Africa, Gabon, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles.                                                                                                                                | 6   |
|                     | Lower Middle Income    | Tunisia, Lesotho, Nigeria, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Swaziland, Sudan, Egypt, Morocco, Angola, Cape Verde.                                                                                             | 11  |
|                     | Middle Income          | Botswana, Algeria, South Africa, Gabon, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, Tunisia, Lesotho, Nigeria, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Swaziland, Sudan, Egypt, Morocco, Angola, Cape Verde. | 17  |
|                     | Low Income             | Burkina Faso, Uganda, Chad, Congo Republic, Mozambique, Burundi, Malawi, Congo Democratic Republic, Ghana, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Zambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zimbabwe. | 20  |
| **Legal Origins**   | English Common-law     | Botswana, Lesotho, Uganda, Nigeria, Malawi, Ghana, Swaziland, Sudan, Kenya, Zambia, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Seychelles, Zimbabwe.                                                                 | 15  |
|                     | French Civil-law       | Tunisia, Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo Republic, Mozambique, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Democratic Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Algeria, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Egypt, Central African Republic, Morocco, Guinea, Mauritania, Gabon, Angola, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé & Principe. | 22  |
| **Religious Domination** | Christianity          | Botswana, Lesotho, Uganda, Congo Republic, Mozambique, Burundi, Malawi, Cameroon, Congo Democratic Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Swaziland, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Zambia, South Africa, Gabon, Angola, Tanzania, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, Zimbabwe. | 26  |
|                     | Islam                  | Tunisia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Guinea, Mauritania, Sierra Leone.                                                                                                   | 11  |
| **Regions**         | Sub-Saharan Africa     | Botswana, Lesotho, Uganda, Nigeria, Malawi, Ghana, Swaziland, Sudan, Kenya, Zambia, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo Republic, Mozambique, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Democratic Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Guinea, Mauritania, Gabon, Angola, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé & Principe. | 33  |
|                     | North Africa           | Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia.                                                                                                                                                                          | 4   |
| **Resources**       | Petroleum Exporting    | Nigeria, Chad, Congo Republic, Cameroon, Sudan, Algeria, Gabon, Angola.                                                                                                                                | 8   |
|                     | Non-Petroleum Exporting| Botswana, Lesotho, Uganda, Malawi, Ghana, Swaziland, Kenya, Zambia, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Burundi, Congo Democratic Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Madagascar. | 29  |
| **Stability**       | Conflict               | Uganda, Mozambique, Burundi, Congo Democratic Republic, Sudan, Rwanda, Ethiopia, South Africa, Angola, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe.                                                                             | 11  |
|                     | Non-Conflict           | Botswana, Lesotho, Nigeria, Malawi, Ghana, Swaziland, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, Seychelles, Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo Republic, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Guinea, Mauritania, Gabon, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé & Principe, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia. | 26  |

Num: Number of cross sections (countries)
