PHILOSOPHY IN THE FACE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE*

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The idea of Artificial Intelligence has captured our collective imagination for many decades. Can behavior that we think of as intelligent be replicated on a machine? If so, what consequences could this have for society? And what does it tell us about ourselves as human beings? Besides being a long-running topic of philosophical reflection and science fiction, AI is also a well-established scientific research area. Many universities have AI research labs, usually housed in computer science departments. The feats accomplished in such research have generally been far more modest than those imagined in the movies. But over time, the gap between reality and fiction has been closing. For example, self-driving cars are now a reality. And the world outside academia has taken notice. The commercial opportunities are endless and technology companies are in fierce competition over the top AI talent. Meanwhile, there is a growing popular worry about where this is all headed.

Most of the technical progress on AI is reported at scientific conferences on the subject. These conferences have been running for decades and are attended by a steady community of devoted researchers. But in recent years they have also started to attract a broader mix of participants. At the 2016 conference in Phoenix, one speaker was more controversial than any other in recent memory: Nick Bostrom. While the audience consisted mostly of computer scientists, Bostrom is a philosopher who directs the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford. He recently made waves with his book Superintelligence [1]. In it, he contemplates the problem that we may soon build AI that broadly exceeds human capabilities, and considers what steps we can take now to ensure that the result will be in our best interest. A key concern is that of an “intelligence explosion”: if we are intelligent enough to build a machine more intelligent than ourselves, then, so the thinking goes, surely that machine in turn would be capable of building something even more intelligent, and so on. The phrase “technological singularity” is sometimes also used to describe such runaway intelligence. Will humanity be left in the dust? Will we be wiped out? Since the appearance of

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Bostrom’s book, public figures including Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and Bill Gates have warned of the risks of superintelligent AI. Musk even donated $10M to the Boston-based [Future of Life Institute](#) establishing a grants program to ensure that AI remains beneficial. The topic has remained in the news, with, for example, recently United Nations Chief Information Technology Officer Atefeh Riazi joining the chorus emphasizing the risks of AI.

These concerns have mostly been raised by people outside the core AI research community, which has not been very vocal in this debate. Some in the community cautiously agree with some of the points; others dismiss them. As an AI researcher myself, after Bostrom’s talk I saw a number of people express their displeasure on social media, saying that giving him such a forum gives him credibility that he does not deserve. Others emphasized open-mindedness, but (as far as I saw) fell short of endorsing his ideas. But I assume that most in the AI community shrugged and continued with their research as usual. Why? Do AI researchers just not care about the future of humanity?

I think the real answer requires some familiarity with the history of AI research, which took off in the fifties. Early research showed that computers could do things that few at the time had expected, leading to excitement, optimism, and promises of the moon. But limitations of this early work soon became apparent. Approaches that produced impressive results on small, toy examples simply would not scale to real-world problems. Also, the real world is messy and ambiguous, and AI researchers struggle to this day with making their programs robust enough to handle this. This led to what was called an “AI winter”: AI got a bad reputation in the academic community and funding was reduced. In fact, this cycle repeated itself. AI researchers yearned for their work to be scientifically rigorous and respected, and learned to be careful. Some sought to dissociate themselves from the term “AI” altogether and instead associated with more narrowly defined technical problems. For example, many researchers in the machine learning community – which focuses on having computers learn automatically from data how to make predictions and decisions – no longer wanted to be considered “AI” researchers. Even most of the researchers that did stick with the term started focusing on narrower problems, not only because of perception issues but also for technical reasons: these problems seemed to be important roadblocks for AI but were not easy to solve. Also, progress on their solution often led to direct beneficial impact on society. For example, part of the community has focused on automated planning and scheduling systems, which have been used in a variety of applications, such as scheduling the observations of the Hubble Space Telescope.

The AI community has also mostly avoided the philosophical issues. An introductory AI course will typically spend a little time on basic philosophical questions, such as those raised by Searle’s “Chinese Room Argument” [5]. In this argument, someone who does not know Chinese at all sits in a room and has an incredibly detailed step-by-step manual – read, a computer program – for how to respond to Chinese characters slipped under the door, by drawing other characters and slipping them back out. The manual is so good that from the outside it appears that there is someone inside who speaks Chinese, no matter
how sophisticated the questions posed. Now, we can ask whether there is any real understanding of Chinese in the room. At first, it may appear that there is not. But if not, then how could a computer, which operates similarly, ever have any real understanding?

While some AI professors enjoy posing such conundrums in, for example, the introductory lecture, after that the typical AI course – my own included – will quickly move on to teaching technical material that can be used to create programs that do something interesting, like playing the game of Connect Four. After all, the course is generally taught in a computer science department, not a philosophy department. Similarly, very little of the research presented at any major AI conference is philosophical in nature. Most of it comes in the form of technical progress – a better algorithm for solving an established problem, say. This is where AI researchers believe they can make useful progress and win respect in the eyes of their scientific peers, whether they feel the philosophical problems are important or not.

All this explains some of the reluctance of the AI community to engage with the superintelligence debate. It has fought very hard to establish itself as a respected scientific discipline, overcoming outside bias and its own careless early claims. The mindset is that anything perceived as unsubstantiated hype, or as being outside the realm of science, is to be avoided at all costs. Tellingly, in a panel after Bostrom’s talk, Oren Etzioni, director of the Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence, drew supportive laughs from the crowd when he pointed out that Bostrom’s talk was blissfully devoid of any data – even though Etzioni was quick to acknowledge that this was inherent in the problem. Tom Dietterich, a computer science professor at Oregon State and President of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, expressed skepticism that an intelligence explosion of the kind Bostrom describes would happen, and asked what experiments we could run to test this hypothesis. The AI community generally eschews speculation about the deep future and is more comfortable engaging with important problems that are more concrete and tangible at this point, such as autonomous weapons – weapon systems that can act without human intervention – or the unemployment caused by AI replacing human workers. The latter was, in fact, the topic of the panel.

Another issue is that AI researchers, perhaps unlike the general public, generally feel that there are still quite a few needed components missing before something like the superintelligent AI of Bostrom’s book could possibly emerge. Many of the problems that were once thought to be great benchmark problems for AI – say, beating human champions at chess – ended up being solved using special-purpose techniques that, while impressive, could not immediately be used to solve many other problems in AI, suggesting that the “hard problems” of AI lay elsewhere. (This has also led AI researchers to lament that “once we solve something, it’s not considered AI anymore.”) So while recent breakthroughs, such as Google DeepMind’s AI learning to play old Atari games surprisingly well, may raise concern in the general public, perhaps AI researchers have become accustomed to the idea that this just means the hard problems must lie elsewhere. That being said, these results are certainly impressive to the
AI community as well, not least because this time there are common techniques—now generally referred to as “deep learning”—underlying not only the Atari results, but also surprising progress in speech and image recognition. (Consider the problems that Apple needs to solve to get Siri to understand what you said, or that Facebook needs to solve to automatically recognize faces in the pictures you upload.) Researchers had previously attacked these problems with separate special-purpose techniques. And Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo program, which recently defeated Lee Sedol, possibly the best human player, in the game of Go, also has deep learning at its core. The techniques used for chess had been largely ineffective on Go.

It is worth noting that the line of research that led to the deep learning results had been largely dismissed by most AI and machine learning researchers, before the few that tenaciously stuck with it started producing impressive results. So our predictions about how AI will progress can be far off even in the very short term. Accurately predicting all the way to, say, the end of the century seems humanly impossible. If we go equally far into the past, we end up at a time before even Alan Turing’s 1936 paper that laid the theoretical foundation for computer science [6]. This, too, makes it difficult for mainstream AI researchers to connect with those raising concerns about the future. Some disaster scenarios, such as those related to asteroid strikes or global warming, allow for reasonable predictions over such timescales, so it is natural to want the same for AI. But AI researchers and computer scientists in general tend to reason over much shorter timescales, which is already challenging given the pace of progress.

As one of the recipients of a Musk-funded Future of Life Institute grant, I participated on a keeping-AI-beneficial panel in a workshop at the conference in Phoenix. The panel was moderated by Max Tegmark, one of the founders of the Future of Life Institute and a physics professor at MIT—again, an outsider to the AI community. Besides relatively more accessible questions about autonomous weapons and technological unemployment, Tegmark also asked the panel some philosophical questions. All other things being equal, would you want your artificially intelligent virtual assistant (imagine an enormously improved Siri) to be conscious? Would you want it to be able to feel pain? The first question had no takers; some in attendance argued that pain could be beneficial from the perspective of the AI learning to avoid bad actions. The substantial philosophical literature on consciousness and qualia did not come up. (In philosophy, the word “qualia” refers to subjective experiences, such as pain, and more specifically to what it is like to have the experience. A famous example due to the philosopher Thomas Nagel is that presumably, there is something it is like to be a bat, though we, as a species that does not use echolocation, may never know exactly what this is like [4]. Is there something it is like to be an AI virtual assistant? A self-driving car?) Perhaps this was less due to unfamiliarity with such concepts, and more due to discomfort with how to approach these questions. Even philosophers have difficulty agreeing on the meaning of these terms, and the literature ranges from the more scientifically oriented search for the “neural correlates of consciousness” (roughly: what is going on in the brain when conscious experience takes place) all the way to more esoteric studies of
the subjective: how is it that my subjective experiences so appear so vividly present, while yours do not? Well, surely your experiences appear similarly somewhere else. Where? In your brain, as opposed to mine? But when we inspect a brain, we do not find any qualia, just neurons. (If all this seems hopelessly obscure to you, you are not alone – but if you are intrigued, see, for example, Caspar Hare’s On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects or J.J. Valberg’s Dream, Death, and the Self. The state of our understanding makes it difficult even to agree on what exactly Tegmark’s questions mean – is objectively assessing whether an AI virtual assistant has subjective experiences a contradiction in terms? – let alone give actionable advice to AI practitioners. I believe philosophers do make progress on these issues, but it is slow and hard-won. When discussing what philosophers are to do, Bostrom in his book suggests to postpone work on “some of the eternal questions” for a while, and instead to focus on how best to make it through the transition to a world with superintelligent AI. But it is not entirely clear whether and how we can sidestep the eternal questions in this endeavor, even if we accept the premise that such a transition will take place. (Of course, philosophers do not necessarily accept the premise either.)

So, generally, AI researchers prefer to avoid these questions and return to making progress on more tractable problems. Many of us are driven to make the world a better place – by reducing the number of deaths from automobile accidents, increasing access to education, improving sustainability and healthcare, preventing terrorist attacks, etc. – and are a bit frustrated to see every other article on AI in the news accompanied by an image from The Terminator. Meanwhile, genuine concerns are developing outside the AI community. While the AI conference in Phoenix was already underway, there was a call at a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science to devote 10% of the AI research budget to the study of the societal impact of AI. Now, in a climate where funding is already tight, diverting some of it may not make AI researchers look more kindly on the people raising these concerns. But the AI community should take part in the debate on societal impact, because without the debate will still take place and be less informed. Fortunately, members of the community are increasingly taking an interest in short-to-medium-term policy questions, including calling for a ban on autonomous weapons. Unfortunately, we have yet to figure out how to rigorously and productively engage with the more nebulous long-term philosophical issues. One area where some immediate traction seems possible is the study of how (pre-superintelligence) AI can make ethical decisions – for example, when a self-driving car needs to make a decision in a scenario that is likely to kill or injure someone. In fact, automated ethical decision making is the topic of a number of the Future of Life Institute grants, including my own grant with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, a professor of practical ethics and philosophy at Duke University. But at this point it is not clear to AI researchers how to usefully address the notion of superintelligence and the philosophical questions raised by it.

At the end of Bostrom’s talk, Moshe Vardi, a computer science professor at Rice University, suggested that this all was very much as if upon Watson and...
Crick’s discovery of the structure of DNA, the focus had immediately been on all the ways in which it could be abused. I think this is an excellent point. Progress in AI will unfold in unexpected ways and some of the current concerns will turn out to be unfounded, especially among those concerning the far off future. But this argument cuts both ways; we can be sure that there are risks that are not currently appreciated. It is not clear what exact course of action is called for, but those that know the most about AI cannot be complacent.

References

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