Malware MultiVerse: From Automatic Logic Bomb Identification to Automatic Patching and Tracing

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Abstract. Malware and other suspicious software often hide behaviors and components behind logic bombs and context-sensitive execution paths. Uncovering these is essential to react against modern threats, but current solutions are not ready to detect these paths in a completely automated manner. To bridge this gap, we propose the Malware Multiverse (MALVERSE), a solution able to inspect multiple execution paths via symbolic execution aiming to discover function inputs and returns that trigger malicious behaviors. MALVERSE automatically patches the context-sensitive functions with the identified symbolic values to allow the software execution in a traditional sandbox. We implemented MALVERSE on top of Angr and evaluated it with a set of Linux and Windows evasive samples. We found that MALVERSE was able to generate automatic patches for the most common evasion techniques (e.g., ptrace checks).

1. Introduction

Reverse engineering is one of the most common tasks of malware’s binary analysis. Security experts invest a lot of time trying to infer the goals of a malicious binary and how to bypass anti-analysis code. Logic bombs—malware reliance on specific conditions to be triggered—are one of the most challenging techniques to counter (e.g., context-sensitive malware run only under a given machine, timezone, and with/without a debugger [GIAC 2004]), and have been often seen in the wild [Wired 2015, TheRegister 2017]. However, there is still a lack of automated solution to defuse them.

A promising (and often used) technique to identify logic bombs is symbolic analysis, since it allows the execution of multiple paths to eventually discover those that trigger malicious behaviors. Symbolic executors work by replacing concrete execution values with symbolic values that can be constrained according to the followed path. Several research works propose to assist malware analysis with symbolic execution [Li et al. 2018, Alsaleh et al. 2019, Brumley et al. 2008], but none provides a completely automated solution for this task. Therefore, significant challenges have to be overcome before the successful development of an automated symbolic execution-based tool for logic bombs handling, such as: (i) automatically identification of entry and exit points of the analyzed application (most previous work rely on human analysts to it); (ii) tracking information among multiple processes (most symbolic executors do not support forking or Inter Process Communication–IPC [Xu et al. 2013], both commonly used by malware); (iii) time issues, as even if the tools supported forking/IPC, symbolic analysis of whole binaries tend to be extremely long (hours); and (iv) intent inference, as once multiple paths are discovered, there is no automated way to claim which one is particularly malicious.
Aiming to develop an automated solution for the analysis of malware samples armored with logic bombs, we propose MALVERSE (the Malware Multiverse). The main goal of MALVERSE is to allow efficient symbolic execution on malware samples and traverse their multiple paths (or “universes”) to identify logic bombs, and then generate patches to these malware to allow for binary inspection on typical sandbox solutions. With MALVERSE, we intend to provide a fully automated solution that mitigates the cost of symbolic analysis, whereas allowing the inspection of complex, modular binaries.

MALVERSE is developed on top of Angr [Shoshtaishvili et al. 2016], relying on its premise that the whole control flow is defined by function returns, either internal (binary) or external (library) calls. Upon that premise, MALVERSE speeds up analyses by hooking all function calls and replacing them with newer versions that returns a symbolic variable instead of actually executing the native function (both for libraries and for internal binary’s calls): it makes analyses much faster and considers the actual decision nodes. After enumerating all paths, MALVERSE applies a Bayesian decision model to each function in a given path to filter the potentially malicious ones. This model is trained with multiple traces of malware samples and allows the identification of malicious-related functions (e.g., what is the probability that the binary function X is associated to malicious activities given that it originally was programmed to invoke socket and send?). After selection, MALVERSE restarts the analysis procedures only for the filtered functions until all symbolic values are identified.

After the retrieval of all symbolic values, MALVERSE produces patches for functions invoked on nodes that lead to the malicious paths (e.g., making that IsDebuggerPresent always returns False to force the execution through a non-evasive path). The patching mechanism is implemented on top of Angr’s decompiler, but instead of decompiling the original function, it replaces the function body with new statements to reflect the identified symbolic values. The decompiler generates fully functional code that might be directly compiled into a library to be injected in the original process (e.g., via LD_PRELOAD or DLL Injection). This way, MALVERSE reaches malicious states identified in the symbolic execution while running the binary in traditional sandbox solutions, consequently overcoming existing limitations of symbolic executors, such as handling forking and IPC.

Our experiments show that MALVERSE is able to produce patches that overcome many popular logic bombs and context checks, such as skipping debuggers (e.g., via ptrace and IsDebuggerPresent) and stalling code (e.g., bypassing sleep functions).

In summary, our contributions are threefold: i) We revisit the problem of logic bombs identification and pinpoint the challenges to the automation and the escalation of malware analysis using symbolic executors. We expect that their identification and discussion might guide future developments to overcome them; ii) We introduce MALVERSE, a solution that automatically identifies malicious execution paths through symbolic execution and produces patched libraries to allow the binary inspection in standard tracing solutions (e.g., sandboxes); iii) We evaluate MALVERSE with Linux and Windows evasive malware, showing its effectiveness in discovering multiple infection paths.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we revisit the logic bombs identification problem in the context of malware evasion attempts, and delve into
the challenges faced to automatically overcome those threats; in Section 3 we introduce MALVERSE’s design and implementation; In Section 4 we evaluate MALVERSE with real malware samples; In Section 5 we discuss the impact of our findings and the MALVERSE’s limitations; In Section 6 we present the related work so as to better position our contributions to the literature; finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 7.

2. Logic Bombs & Symbolic Execution

During an infection, modern malware samples do not immediately proceed to their malicious steps. Instead, they probe the environment to verify whether it is safe to run or not (e.g., if they are running inside an analysis environment, such as a virtual machine, emulator, debugger). If so, they refuse to execute or exhibit a non-malicious behavior, thus not revealing their real intents to analysts. This way, malware go on performing their actions on victims machines without being noticed by the security companies. Modern malware also fingerprint the environment before executing malicious actions. This allows them to have unique identifiers to account the number of successful infections, identify which payloads will be used to exploit specific software versions, and even attack only targeted users and/or machines (e.g., by checking the system language, the local IP addresses, the system architecture, so on). All verification routines like those, which trigger a malicious execution only in specific cases, are known as logic bombs, and their identification is essential to allow analysts develop countermeasures against armored malware.

Identifying these logic bombs may not be trivial. The more time an analyst spends reverse engineering this type of sample, the greater the attack opportunity window for malware affecting users in-the-wild. Therefore, the development of tools to automatically defuse these logic bombs is essential to reduce security solution’s response time. The first attempts to automatically defuse logic bombs were through fuzzing approaches, which generate multiple distinct inputs to force malware execution via multiple paths [Wang et al. 2019], then trace further execution. The major drawback of these solutions is that they depend on “luck” to find the malicious paths, and very specifically targeted malware might still remain hidden in hard-to-find paths. In addition, these approaches are not fully able to provide guarantees about how many paths can lead to a malicious state. If an analysis stops right after the first path is found, it might skip important secondary paths to a target. Those secondary paths can often be found via additional search time. In some cases, those skipped paths might not be armored with any anti-analysis technique, thus they would allow an analyst to circumvent the anti-analysis techniques present in the main/first path by forcing the flow via those secondary paths.

The most promising current approach for logic bomb detection is the use of symbolic executors. They lift a binary to an intermediate representation so as to mathematically model the possible execution paths. This kind of model makes the execution aware of the number of possible paths and allows one to clearly explain how a input that reached the found path was generated. Unlike fuzzers, symbolic executors do not operate on concrete values, but on symbolic values that will assume a concrete value only in the end of the execution. According to the executed instructions over a path, the symbolic executor adds constraints to the possible values that these symbolic variables can assume. The set of constraints that a symbolic executor is operating on a given path is called state. Modern symbolic executors can execute multiple states in parallel by forking states each time a branching condition is found.
As an example for the case of logic bombs, consider the symbolic execution of a context-sensitive malware from its initial state. When a context-sensitive function is invoked (e.g., IsFeaturePresent), the symbolic executor supplies a symbolic value as return of this function. This symbolic variable has no concrete value or constraints at this point. As the execution proceeds, this value will be further referenced in a comparison (e.g., if processor feature is present, then malicious; else evade). When the symbolic executor finds this branching condition, it creates two new states. The first state has the symbolic variable with the condition feature is present. The second state has the symbolic variable with the condition feature not present. The two states are then independently analyzed. If new branching conditions are found, new constraints are added (to the same or new symbolic variables).

Modern symbolic executors require analysts to specify a target execution point. In this sense, three scenarios might take place for the above example: (i) both states reached the same breakpoint, which means that the value returned by that function did not effectively affect the execution control flow; (ii) one of the states reached the breakpoint, which means that the control flow was dependent of the return value assigned by that function; and (iii) none of the states reached the breakpoint, which means that the specified execution path was unfeasible. This might happen, for instance, when contradictory constraints are imposed (e.g., x should be greater than 0, and x should be smaller or equal to zero).

Logic bombs can be identified by repeating the aforementioned procedure for all function calls that an analyst identifies as prone to be used for context identification. This was proposed by many previous work [Li et al. 2018, Alsaleh et al. 2019, Brumley et al. 2008], with the drawback of all of them being semi-automated solutions [Papp et al. 2017, D’Elia et al. 2020]. With MALVERSE, we aim to develop a fully automated solution to identify logic bombs, whereas addressing some of the significant challenges (C) of performing symbolic execution on a binary:

**C1. Identifying Entry and Exit Points:** Current symbolic executors require the analyst to specify the execution entry point (initial state) and exit points (execution target). Specifying an improper entry or exit point might lead to unsuccessful analysis results, such as unreachable paths and the hidden execution paths. Current binaries present multiple functions and possibilities and previously proposed solutions relied on the analyst’s knowledge for this task.

**C2. Overcome Unsupported Methods:** although fuzzing solution actually execute the function calls, symbolic executors have to model the interactions performed by the calls. This results in the fact that many functionalities are often unsupported by these solutions due to the required modeling complexity. For instance, interactions such as creating a new process and Inter-Process Communication (IPC) are often not supported by many symbolic executors [Xu et al. 2018]. Unfortunately, these are techniques very common in malware samples, thus a malware analysis solutions need to overcome this limitation.

**C3. Performance Bottlenecks:** even if all malware required functionalities are supported by the symbolic executor, analysis are challenging due to their expensive computational cost, both in terms of processing time as well as in resource requirements. Symbolic executors have to analyze an exponential number of states, often in parallel, storing deep
constructions in memory, and interpreting functions without actually executing them. This makes analysis to take a significant time. It is not rare to observe cases in which analysis takes multiple minutes [Li et al. 2018] or even hours. This is a major limitation for solutions aiming to reduce the security solution’s response time. The solution would not be competitive if it takes the same time than an analyst to perform the task.

C4. Identifying Suspicious Paths: after the analysis is finished and the symbolic executor provided all possible execution paths to reach a target, there is also the remaining challenge of identifying what paths are malicious, since reaching the same final state does not mean that the actions performed in the path had all the same side-effects in the system. This task is often guided by the analyst’s knowledge and no previous solution automatically classified found states as malicious or benign.

3. Design and Implementation of MALVERSE

Threat Model. MALVERSE’s goal is to automate the main tasks performed by analysts to bypass evasive malware checks. We are aware that there are multiple ways to deceive analysis, making some techniques not bypassable at all. However, saving analysts time already helps in incident response, and to accomplish that, we automated some of the most common classes of evasion techniques. In this sense, we believe that a divide-and-conquer strategy is the best approach to follow in the long-term to solve the complex automatic patching problem. In this work, we tackle the case in which we are able to control function returns, both internal (binaries) and external (libraries) ones. Therefore, MALVERSE assumes that all control flow decisions are due to function return values. MALVERSE was developed on top of Angr, due to the latter being a very extensible solution, but it can be implemented on top of any symbolic execution solution. Similarly, for the sake of simplicity, we exemplify our patching mechanism using standard tracing solutions (e.g., strace), but it can be applied to any debugger or sandbox.

Design. Previously, we presented the challenges involved in the development of a fully automated solution to defuse logic bombs within malware samples. Our key insight to overcome those challenges is that it is not necessary to handle the whole complexity of binary analysis to provide a first look on malware behavior. Therefore, we introduce a set of heuristics, methods, and strategies that allows automated triage of logic bomb-armored malware samples, inspired by the observation present in [Botacin et al. 2019], i.e., that malware decompilation could be eased if only the actually executed code during an analyst’s debugging session were considered. In this work, we extend this idea by compiling the symbolic values that make a function to actually reach targeted code portions, and executing them on a typical sandbox solution to retrieve more precise execution traces. We overcome logic bombs defusing challenges with the following design (D) choices:

D1. Identifying Entry and Exit Points. We leveraged Angr’s analysis capabilities to generate a Call Graph (CG) of the inputted binary. We identify in this CG the first function of the binary that invokes other functions as the main function. The address of this function is set as the analysis entry point. Similarly, we identify the return sites of this function as target addresses. If any of the return addresses is reached, we consider that the function was executed.

D2. Automatic Function Modeling. Library’s function calls were modelled via Angr’s SimProcedures, which were all set to return symbolic values. Manually coding/adap-
Angr’s SimProcedures for all APIs is laborious, thus we developed an automated procedure to help in this task. We developed a Web crawler that identifies function prototypes through the Internet and automatically generates SimProcedures for them (discussed below).

D3. Keeping Invocation History. We need to keep track of function invocations during a given path to be able to compare two paths and identify in each point the execution diverted. To do so, we added a SimInvocationHistory to the Angr state. It complements already-existing events and action histories with invocation information. Therefore, each time a procedure is invoked, it adds itself (and its symbolic values) to the history. In the end of the execution, we can compare whether two invocations concretize to the same values or not.

D4. Overcoming Performance Bottlenecks. We rely on the hypothesis that the whole control flow is due to function returns to speed up analysis procedures. Once we identify a main function, we replace all functions invoked by them (according to the CG) by a procedure that only returns a symbolic value, that can assume any value originally returned by this function. This does not break the execution flow if our premise is valid and speeds up analysis by avoiding the analyzer to effectively dig into that function. If one of these functions is identified as the root cause of a control flow diversion, the analysis restarts only for that function, recursively performing this strategy until the actual root cause is identified.

D5. Identifying Suspicious Paths. The symbolic executor often finds multiple different paths to reach the return condition. In this case, we need to identify which ones are suspicious and/or malicious. Once we identify them, we force our analysis to proceed via them, thus ensuring that we are inspecting malicious cases and not error conditions. We identify whether our execution flow should go through a given function present on the CG by applying a Bayesian decision procedure. We trained a model with multiple malware traces, as presented in a previous study [Galante et al. 2019], and applied this model to each function on the CG. We query if a given function should be considered on not (e.g., Should a malicious path goes through X given that X invokes fork+exec?). We discard the paths that seem to not exhibit malicious behaviors. Once two similar paths that traverse the same functions are identified, they are aligned via the concretized values for each state. The first unmatched and/or mismatched function is considered as the diversion root cause.

D6. Overcoming Unimplemented Features. We are aware that some constructions, such as IPC, are hard to model in symbolic executors. Therefore, we did not try to do that. Instead, we focused on discovering whether the path that contains an IPC should be traversed or not, and what are the conditions that trigger that execution. After this path is identified, we opted to run it on a standard sandbox, with full support to IPC. Therefore, each time a diversion point is identified, we produced a patch for that function. This patch may then be compiled into a library and injected in the binary while running in a sandbox, which forces the execution through the identified path and allows the sandbox to collect full binary information about the complex behaviors.

D7. Code Decompilation. We developed our patching system on top of the Angr decompiler. However, since it was originally designed to decompile actual code (and our
goal is to produce a patch based on the found symbolic values), we have to adapt it to generate code in distinct manners: when a patch is requested to the decompiler, it replaces the original function variables with the concretized values from symbolic variables; it also replaces the function body with new instructions that reference the new variables. Since the compiler preserves the original function prototypes and arguments, the output is a working code that can be compiled into a library.

**Implementation.** MALVERSE required a lot of engineering work on Angr’s internal code to support the newly added capabilities (MALVERSE’s code is available to anyone interested in checking these modifications). Below, we describe the changes performed to directly support MALVERSE’s approach. A key part of MALVERSE operation is its interaction with Angr Simprocedures. We developed an automated solution to generate Simprocedures: it crawls Internet websites for function prototypes, parses them, creates symbolic variables to be returned, and produces fully functional code.

Code[1] shows the generation solution in action. It takes the ptrace function as argument and generates a procedure for it. Notice that the function prototype was parsed so as to add the function arguments to the procedure. The returned variable rval is symbolic, thus allowing Angr to decide whether it should return or false according to the context. Line 4 shows that the procedure adds itself to the history of invoked procedures. It allows MALVERSE querying this list at any time to check what were the parameters provided to and returned by this function at any time.

```python
python3 simprocgen.py -t Linux -a ptrace --symbolize
class ptrace(angr.SimProcedure):
    def run(self, request, pid, addr, data):
        self.state.history.add_simproc_event(self)
        return self.state.solver.BVS(ptrace, 64, key=('api', ptrace))
```

**Code 1. API Crawler. Simprocedure is automatically generated.**

**Bayesian Model.** We trained a Bayesian classifier with traces obtained from the execution of 5,000 benign samples (from fresh OS installations of Windows 8/System32 files and Ubuntu 18/bin files) and malware samples. The goal of this classifier is to identify the probability that a given function import is related to malicious behavior. For instance, the import of the socket function is largely more prevalent (more than 70%) in malware samples than in benign samples. Therefore, a binary function that references the socket function will be flagged as required to be traversed. We considered a threshold of 70% for the Bayesian classifier confidence, having the socket API as reference, as network communication is a key step for a malware infection process. If a binary function references more than one library function, we use the highest calculated probability to consider whether the binary function is required to be traversed or not.

**4. Evaluation**

**MALVERSE operation through examples.** A popular return-based method used by malware to evade analysis is to check if a debugger is attached to the running process and, if true, abort the execution. In the Linux environment, it can be done by trying to attach the debugger to itself via the ptrace call, which is denied if a debugger was previously attached [tobyxdd 2018], as shown in Code[2].
If the `ptrace` Simprocedure is instrumented to return a symbolic value, as shown in Code 1, it will be constrained by Angr to a value different of -1 (debugger present). Thus, MALVERSE can then decompile a patched version of the function returning the identified value, as shown in Code 3.

While patching a single function might be effective in specific cases, evasive malware might employ nested techniques in practice. In those cases, MALVERSE identifies the distinct functions to be patched and decompiles them together, as shown in Code 4 (regarding to the bypass of the DEBUGME sample [kirschju 2018]).

The same debug evasion techniques can also be implemented in Windows. Samples may query the `IsDebuggerPresent` API directly to verify if they are being debugged, as shown in Code 5.

MALVERSE can identify this debugger check and produce a patch that allows its bypass, as shown in Code 6.

The sample exemplified in Code 5 presents a secondary path that leads to evasion: it happens when a debugger is not present, but a given processor feature is missing. In this case, MALVERSE also identifies the secondary path and decompiles the patched version, as shown in Code 7.

In addition to the distinct paths that can be traversed independently, some samples present evasion paths that depends on the nested invocation of the same function. Code 8 illustrates the double `ptrace` technique [Auberger 2017], in which the `ptrace` function is invoked twice to ensure that the bypass previously presented does not succeed. In this case, during a run outside a debugger, the first `ptrace` will succeed on attaching...
the sample, but the second should fail. If the sample runs under a patched version that always return zero, the check for the second call will fail, incurring into an evasion.

```
if (ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME) == 0 && ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME) == -1) {
    evade();
}
```

**Code 8. Double Ptrace. This check relies on internal function states and side-effects.**

**MALVERSE** must keep track of the invocation order to bypass this type of check. To do so, it creates a global variable to count the number of invocation and associates a distinct return value to each invocation, as shown in Code 9. For the first invocation, **MALVERSE** returns that the function call succeeded (returning 0), whereas for the nexto one, it returns that the function call failed (return value of -1). We highlight that all the control flow code (counter variables and IFs) are automatically generated by a version of the Angr decompiler instrumented with **MALVERSE** code.

```
#include <sys/types.h>
static int angr_global_var = 0;
long ptrace(int request, pid_t pid, void *addr, void *data) {
    angr_global_var = angr_global_var + 1;
    if (angr_global_var == 1) {
        return 0;
    } else if (angr_global_var == 2) {
        return -1;
    }
}
```

**Code 9. Stateful Patches. Each function return is associated to a distinct invocation.**

This same strategy can be applied to bypass samples that make use of stalling code to cause sandbox timeouts. Code 10 illustrates a sample that checks CPU ticks to ensure the call of the sleep function was not replaced by a fake one that does not stall the execution.

```
int main() {
    clock_t t0 = clock();
sleep(SLEEP_TIME);
clock_t t1 = clock();
    if ((t1-t0)>SLEEP_CLOCKS){
        malware();
    } else{ 
        goodware();
    }
}
```

**Code 10. Stalling Code. The code checks if the process really spent cycles sleeping.**

```
unsigned int sleep(unsigned int seconds){
    return 0;
    int angr_global_var = 0;
clock_t clock( void ){
    angr_global_var =
        angr_global_var + 1;
    if (angr_global_var == 1) {
        return 0x0;
    } else if (angr_global_var == 2) { 
        return 0xb;
    }
}
```

**Code 11. Patched Stalling Code. Both the sleep and clock functions reflect the imposed constraints.**

To bypass this type of technique, **MALVERSE** patches the sleep function to immediately return, and the clock functions to reflect the constraints expected by the malware sample, as shown in Code 11. This allows the inspection of the sample without waiting for the stalling code execution time.
Finally, in some cases, values returned by functions only indirectly control the execution flow. Code 12 exemplifies a context-sensitive malware that is only activated when executed from a given path. Although it relies on the value returned by `getcwd`, it is stored on a memory position indeed returned as a pointer by this function.

```
int main(){
    if(strcmp(getcwd(NULL,0),"BOMB") == 0){
        malware();
    } else{
        goodware();
    }
}
```

**Code 12. Context-Sensitive Malware. It is only malicious when executed from a given path.**

This type of stateful function requires implementing internal logic in the Simprocedure, as shown in Code 13. The function should allocate a memory buffer to return a valid pointer, whereas the allocated memory should host a symbolic variable that stores the actual path.

```
class getcwd(angr.SimProcedure):
    def run(self, buf, size):
        self.state.history.add_simproc_event(self)
        val = self.state.solver.BVS('getcwd', 64, key=('api', 'getcwd'))
        malloc = angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['malloc']
        addr = self.inline_call(malloc, 100).ret_expr
        self.state.memory.store(addr, val)
        return addr
```

**Code 13. Simprocedure Code. The procedure allocates memory and stores a symbolic value there.**

In this case, it is ineffective to naively leverage MALVERSE to decompile the `getcwd` function with the obtained concrete values, since the return value would point to an invalid memory region if run out of the scope of the symbolic executor (as shown in Code 14).

```
int getcwd(char* var0, unsigned long var1){
    return 0xc0000f20; //needs to point to "BOMB"
}
```

**Code 14. Naive Decompilation. The code points to an invalid memory value.**

To allow the decompilation of a fully functional piece of software, MALVERSE produces a patch for the targeted function and for the `main` function, in order to preload it with code that allocates valid memory (as shown in Code 15).
5. Discussion

Hidden paths in distinct Operating Systems. Since MALVERSE was developed on top of Angr, it can be applied to binaries targeting multiple OSes, as presented in Section 4. Despite this fact, we noticed that MALVERSE application to some OSes might be more effective than others, due to their very nature. In particular, applying MALVERSE to Windows might be more effective than to Unix-based OSes: Windows presents a myriad of APIs to query context-specific information (e.g., IsDebuggerPresent()), whereas Unix-based systems often perform context acquisition by directly querying the filesystem (e.g., /proc), consequently requiring an alternate approach (e.g., a model of the accessed file) than MALVERSE’s to be applied in these cases.

The impact of API models. MALVERSE relies on Angr’s Simprocedures to model API behavior, and the better you model these behaviors, the obtained results will be less inaccurate. Currently, MALVERSE instruments Simprocedures to return symbolic values, but we plan to also instrument function argument to increase the analysis capabilities (left as future work).

Premises and Heuristics. MALVERSE’s major assumption is that the whole control flow is due to function returns. Although we showed in this paper that it allows the bypass of many evasion techniques, we are aware that internal function states can also affect the control flow. Therefore, we intend to consider these cases in a future version, aiming at a more complete treatment of evasion cases. Similarly, although our heuristic approach has shown to be effective on the identification of malicious paths, we are aware that they can be evaded by attackers (e.g., with the addition of suspicious functions to all decision nodes, causing a path explosion). To address that, we will start to investigate the robustness of MALVERSE heuristic procedures.

6. Related Work

Discovering malware secrets. Multiple authors proposed distinct approaches that leverage symbolic execution and control flow analyses to discover hidden paths in malware execution, such as forcing the malware to take a given path [Wang et al. 2019]. This might be useful not only to discover intentionally-covered paths but also to reconstruct Control Flow Graphs (CFG) [Phu et al. 2019] when a binary’s control flow is obfuscated [Yadegari and Debray 2015]. A major problem is that the symbolic executors leveraged for such executions are vulnerable to anti-analysis tricks [Ollivier et al. 2019] that might hinder the analysis procedures. To mitigate this problem, symbolic execution is often performed along other techniques, such as fuzzing [Stephens et al. 2016]. In this
work, we also present a dual-step approach, in which symbolic execution is first employed to discover control flow conditions and further analyses are scaled via the application of traditional sandbox-based execution. Scaling analyses is important because it allows the inspection of real malware samples. The closest work to ours shows that it is possible to recover even C&C's control parameter from the symbolic execution of a bot sample [Baldoni et al. 2017]. The major limitation of the existing approaches is that they are at most semi-automated [Papp et al. 2017, D’Elia et al. 2020], still requiring the analyst to assist in their operation. Our goal in this work is to present a fully-automated approach for hidden path discovery and trace analysis.

Symbolic Execution at Scale. A major drawback of symbolic executors is that they are very slow in comparison to traditional sandboxes, which makes large-scale analysis hard. The academic literature reports a case in which the analysis of each one 60 thousand samples considered in a study required an average of 28 minutes [Li et al. 2018]. This often limits studies to few samples, such as 50 [Alsaleh et al. 2019]. Even when analysis are scaled, such as in the Minesweeper’s case [Brumley et al. 2008], the provided analytic’s data fast become outdated as these studies are hardly ever repeated to cover newly developed logic bombs.

Angr is an open-source powerful tool for binary analysis [Shoshtaishvili et al. 2016], thus being selected as basis for the MALVERSE development. Angr was also used as basis for other research work in multiple aspects, such as for: tracing disjoint binary functions [Ma et al. 2019] (a technique presented in [Caballero et al. 2010]), fixing binary loading [Xu et al. 2017], or in concolic executions [Gritti et al. 2020]. Despite powerful, Angr has some limitations, as pointed in previous work [Yin et al. 2018, Wang et al. 2018]. Consequently, these are also MALVERSE’s drawbacks.

Other Symbolic Executors. Besides Angr, other symbolic executors and analyzers could provide similar support for MALVERSE, such as Metasm [jjyg 2020], Miasm [Miasm 2020], and Triton [Quarkslab 2020]. A detailed comparison of binary analysis frameworks is presented in [Poeplau and Francillon 2019].

7. Conclusion
In this work, we investigated the problem of logic bomb detection and the inspection of context-sensitive malware. We observed a lack of automated solutions for these tasks and designed a system for assist analysts to tackle them. We proposed MALVERSE, a solution able to inspect multiple execution paths via symbolic execution, whose goal is to discover triggers of malicious behaviors (in the form of function inputs and returns). We designed and implemented MALVERSE on top of Angr so it was able to decompile functions that may be patched with the discovered symbolic values. These patched functions then become ready to be injected in the monitored process while the patched subject runs on analyses sandboxes. We evaluated MALVERSE using a set of Linux and Windows evasive samples. MALVERSE was able to produce automatic patches for the most common evasion techniques (e.g., ptrace and/or IsDebuggerPresent checks).

Reproducibility. All code pieces considered in this work are available in the repository: https://github.com/marcusbotacin/MalVerse
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