Can People Judge the Veracity of Their Intuitions?

Stefan Leach¹ and Mario Weick¹

Abstract

People differ in the belief that their intuitions produce good decision outcomes. In the present research, we sought to test the validity of these beliefs by comparing individuals’ self-reports with measures of actual intuition performance in a standard implicit learning task, exposing participants to seemingly random letter strings (Studies 1a–b) and social media profile pictures (Study 2) that conformed to an underlying rule or grammar. A meta-analysis synthesizing the present data (N = 400) and secondary data by Pretz, Totz, and Kaufman found that people’s enduring beliefs in their intuitions were not reflective of actual performance in the implicit learning task. Meanwhile, task-specific confidence in intuition bore no sizable relation with implicit learning performance, but the observed data favoured neither the null hypothesis nor the alternative hypothesis. Together, the present findings suggest that people’s ability to judge the veracity of their intuitions may be limited.

Keywords

intuition, implicit learning, metacognition, meta-analysis

The British TV series Luther centers on DCI John Luther, a troubled detective working in a serious crime unit, who thanks to his superior intuition prowess, solves difficult cases, often finding himself operating at the fringes of the law (or beyond). Luther’s defiance and brute confidence is a defining feature of the character, but his religious reliance on instincts is reminiscent of many detective stories. For viewers or readers of such stories, it seems plausible enough that some individuals endowed with superior instincts know to trust their intuitions, perhaps encouraged by the steady recurrence of confirmatory outcomes—murderers getting caught and cases getting solved. However, moving beyond the realm of fiction and super instincts, the question arises whether in the absence of performance feedback individuals have the introspective insight to judge how good their intuitions are. In other words, do individuals’ metacognitive representations of intuition performance—how much certainty and confidence individuals express in their intuitions—predict actual performance outcomes? The present research addresses this question focusing on implicit learning performance.

Dual process models presume that automatic processes give rise to intuitive hunches or gut feelings (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Evans & Frankish, 2009). Quick, intuitive judgments are often contrasted with slow, elaborate processes, with the latter producing superior performance outcomes (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Devine, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Even when making decisions under imperfect conditions that favor intuitive processes (see Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), people can lack the ability to adequately scrutinize their judgments (Fiedler, 2000; see also Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Thus, individuals may lack an understanding of the, perhaps limited, veracity of intuitions (see Griffin, Gonzalez, & Varey, 2001).

However, some researchers have argued that people’s intuitive capabilities are often misrepresented in the literature and less erroneous than one might assume (Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990). For example, studies on impression formation show that people’s impressions of others are often surprisingly accurate when formed on the basis of relatively sparse information (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). There is also evidence that individuals can monitor their performance and correct for biases. For example, when asked to judge whether a coin is biased in favor of heads or tails, people focus on the proportion of heads in the sample and then correct for the overall sample size (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Other work demonstrates that people can readily adjust inferences drawn from intuitive feelings through associative learning (Unkelbach, 2007) or logic (Winkielman, Schwarz, & Belli, 1998).

People are relatively apt at extracting information from their gut feelings (e.g., Kelley & Jacoby, 1990), including

¹ School of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, UK

Corresponding Author:
Mario Weick, School of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NP, UK.
Email: m.weick@kent.ac.uk
information on the goodness or fit of mental processes (Whittlesea & Dorken, 1997). People can also readily express their preference for, and endorsement of, intuitions in self-report measures (Betsch; 2008; Epstone et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstone, 1999). One finding that emerges from studies using these measures is that people who consider themselves to be more intuitive (as opposed to rational) also tend to believe that their intuitions lead to good decision outcomes and have predictive validity (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). However, thus far the validity of these claims has mainly been examined in tasks geared toward producing biases or erroneous decisions (Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Shiloh, Salton, & Sharabi, 2002). Arguably, such tasks are ill-suited to validate individuals’ explicit beliefs of intuition performance.

Some clues as to the link between individuals’ explicit beliefs and actual intuition performance may derive from work on the feeling of knowing, first studied in the context of episodic memory (Blake, 1973; Hart, 1967; Schacter, 1983). Metcalfe (1986) found that individuals were unable to judge their ability to solve “insight” problems in the future. Metcalfe reasoned these results could be due to the fact that the tasks at hand required sudden illumination, and it may be particularly difficult for individuals to predict Eureka-type phenomena.

Implicit learning tasks may provide a better outlet to probe individuals’ intuition performance and associated beliefs. In an implicit learning task, participants witness systematic associations between stimuli, often under disguise, and participants’ knowledge of the associative pattern is tested at a later stage. The tasks are designed so as to render the extraction of patterns or rules very difficult and too burdensome for slow, conscious processes. Knowledge of the rules is therefore assumed to be acquired implicitly (via System 1, see Kahneman, 2003), and intuitions are thought to give individuals “vague feelings” of the acquired knowledge (Reber, 1989, p. 233). Using the artificial grammar (AG) task (Reber, 1967), a standard implicit learning task that involves learning rules related to nonsensical letter strings, Dienes and colleagues demonstrated that individuals can judge their own test performance ex post facto (Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995; Dienes & Seth, 2010). This suggests that individuals may be able to judge the veracity of their intuitions (i.e., whether their feelings translate into correct answers). For example, stronger or more concrete feelings may give individuals greater confidence that their intuitions are correct.

However, responses in the AG task are not solely based on intuitions and instead derive from a mix of implicit and explicit knowledge (see Dienes, Broadbent, & Berry, 1991). Thus, explicit knowledge of some of the letter strings, but not feelings associated with implicit processes, may have underpinned individuals’ performance judgments. Furthermore, evidence for successful implicit learning can also be found even when individuals are tossing a mental coin (Dienes & Seth, 2010), presumably oblivious to the veracity of their intuitions. This suggests some dissociation between individuals’ metacognitive representations and intuition performance. In addition, asking participants to judge the correctness of their answers in an implicit learning task only provides an indirect measure of individuals’ explicit beliefs about their intuition performance. In particular, people’s mental representations of task performance may not encompass any “intuition” concepts.

Pretz, Totz, and Kaufman (2010) administered the AG task and a probabilistic serial reaction time task (Schvanefeldt & Gomez, 1998)—the two paradigms of choice to study implicit learning (Shanks, 2005)—to a sample of participants who also completed the rational–experiential inventory measuring individual differences in the (self-proclaimed) propensity to trust one’s intuition (see Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The authors found that individuals who expressed greater trust in their intuitions did not perform any better in the implicit learning tasks, $r_{\text{Combined}} = .13$, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [−.08, .31]. This casts some doubt on people’s ability to judge how good their intuitions are. However, the absence of an association in a single sample ($N_{\text{adj}} = 100$) is not sufficient to establish a null effect. Relatedly, the CI for the population parameter encompasses a wide range of values, calling for further studies.

The Present Research

In the current research, we sought to shed light on the question whether metacognitive representations of intuition performance—how much certainty and confidence individuals express in their intuitions—predict actual performance outcomes in an implicit learning task. We extend previous work in at least three ways. First, previous studies focused on implicit learning of nonsensical stimuli (e.g., letter strings). People seem to be more insightful, however, when relying on intuitions in social domains (e.g., Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). Consequently, in the present research, we probed the validity of individuals’ beliefs regarding their intuition performance in tasks involving nonsocial (Studies 1a–b) and social stimuli (Study 2), thus providing a stronger test of the validity of individuals’ beliefs.

Second, we employed both generalized trait measures and task-specific state measures of how much faith individuals placed in their intuitions. This is a critical addition because the absence of an association between individuals’ beliefs and actual performance can be readily attributed to a lack of specificity in the trait measures employed to predict performance (see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973; Pachur & Spaar, 2015). We sought to overcome this limitation by probing individuals’ confidence in their intuitions vis-à-vis the specific task at hand. In addition, in order to obtain a more complete picture of participants’ performance and corresponding mental representations, we included auxiliary self-report measures (detailed below) to help elucidate participants’ involvement with, and approach to, the task.

Finally, we extend the body of evidence currently available by carrying out a meta-analytic synthesis of all primary and secondary data to provide more precise estimates of the population parameters. Where applicable, we supplement our analysis with Bayes factor (BF$_{01}$) calculations (e.g., Dienes, 2014). Following Rouder and Morey (2012), our null hypothesis corresponds to a nil point ($\rho = 0$) and the alternative hypothesis to
a full range of positive and negative effects that follow a Cauchy distribution (see also Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). We report BF_{01} for all nonsignificant effects (yielded using a frequentist approach) to specify the chances that the observed data occurred under the null hypothesis rather than the alternative hypothesis; values larger than 3 provide evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (e.g., Dienes, 2014). Note that a decision to favor the null hypothesis implies that a nil effect provides a better approximation than the alternative hypothesis, but it should not be taken as evidence that an effect is strictly zero in the population, which is implausible (Cohen, 1994). Also note that relative to a null hypothesis with an interval around zero, a null hypothesis with a nil point favors the alternative hypothesis and is therefore a more conservative approach to provide evidence for invariance (see Morey & Rouder, 2011; see also Lakens, in press, for a frequentist approach).

**Method**

**Participants**

One hundred and one students participated in Study 1a (87 female; $M_{\text{Age}} = 20.40$, $SD_{\text{Age}} = 5.05$), 77 students in Study 1b (61 female; $M_{\text{Age}} = 20.32$, $SD_{\text{Age}} = 4.34$), and 222 students and members of the public in Study 2 (170 female; $M_{\text{Age}} = 24.48$, $SD_{\text{Age}} = 9.36$). We only considered responses from participants who completed all sessions and all parts of the study (see Procedure). Students ($n_{\text{Total}} = 325$) were recruited from a British University and took part in exchange for course credits. Members of the public ($n_{\text{Total}} = 75$) were recruited from the United States and the United Kingdom via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and took part for a monetary incentive. The sample sizes of the individual studies provided 80% power at $\alpha = .05$ to detect effects ranging from $|\rho| = .19$ (Study 2) to $|\rho| = .31$ (Study 1b).

**Procedure and Materials**

Studies 1a and 1b were conducted longitudinally in two consecutive sessions. At Time 1, participants completed the individual difference measures online. The implicit learning task was administered at Time 2 and carried out online (Study 1a) or in the laboratory under the supervision of an experimenter (Study 1b). Time 1 and Time 2 took place at least 1 day apart. Study 2 was conducted online within the same session, and the individual difference measures preceded the implicit learning task. Table S1 in the Supplementary Material provides an overview of all key variations between Studies 1a–b and 2.

**Self-reported intuition.** All three studies contained the English version of the Preference for Intuition Scale (Betsch, 2008), a 9-item questionnaire that measures endorsement of intuitive reasoning (e.g., “With most decisions, it makes sense to completely rely on your feelings”). Participants indicated their answers on a 7-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). In addition, participants in Study 1b completed the Faith in Intuition Scale (Epstein et al., 1996), a 12-item measure of preference for intuitive thought and behavior (e.g., “I believe in trusting my hunches”). Participants responded on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (completely false) to 5 (completely true). Finally, participants in Study 2 completed the experiential inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), a 20-item measure of the extent to which individuals engage in, and excel at, experiential thinking (e.g., “I like to rely on my intuitive impressions”; “I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer”). Participants responded to all items on a 5-point scale from 1 (definitely not true of myself) to 5 (definitely true of myself).

**Implicit AG learning task.** Participants in Studies 1a and 1b completed a standard version of the AG learning task described in Abrams and Reber (1988) as a measure of implicit learning performance. The task involved learning associations between (nonsensical) letter strings that followed a rule or “grammar.” Participants in Study 2 completed a new, adapted version of the task that required participants to learn associations between profile pictures that are commonly used in online social media. The same finite-state grammar was used to dictate the order of the letter strings and the profile pictures (see Figure 1). In other words, the two versions of the AG learning task were almost identical, except that one version employed nonsocial stimuli (letter strings) and another version employed social stimuli (profile pictures). Performance was measured by the total number of correct responses, bound at 0 (minimum) and 46 (maximum), with scores above 23 indicating above-chance performance. A more detailed description of the task can be found in the Supplementary Material.

**Task-related self-report measures.** After the implicit learning task, participants’ beliefs were probed with regard to (a) their confidence in their intuitions (e.g., “To what extent did your gut feeling give you certainty in your answers?”), (b) their self-assessed performance (e.g., “How correct do you think are your answers?”), (c) their use of intuition as a basis for their decisions (e.g., “To what extent did you rely on your gut feelings to decide whether a string [Online Chat post] was grammatically correct or incorrect?”), and (d) the perceived benefits of further information about the underlying grammatical rule (e.g., “To what extent would reading further information on the rules that governed the order of posts been beneficial to perform well on the task?”). All constructs were measured with 2 items, except for the confidence in intuition measure in Study 2, where a third item was added as a safeguard to avoid a (hypothetical) situation where this key measure had low reliability. In addition, some minor changes were made to the wording of other auxiliary measures that yielded low reliability in Study 1b (see Supplementary Material—Data Preparation). In Study 1a, participants also indicated how much effort they invested in the learning task (“How much effort did you invest throughout the questionnaire to provide correct answers?”; single item measure). A similar, 2-item measure was used in Study 2 (“How much effort did you invest in the Online Chat task?”; “How much did you try to perform well in the Online Chat task?”). Study 1b was conducted in a controlled laboratory setting.
environment, which enabled us to use the amount of time participants spent on the practice and test phase of the AG task as an objective indicator of effort. All self-report responses were made on 9-point scales (see Supplementary Material).

**Results**

In our presentation of the results below, we take a cumulative approach (see Cumming, 2014) and use meta-analytic procedures to identify trends that generalize across studies, drawing on both primary (Studies 1a, 1b, and 2) and secondary (Pretz, Totz, & Kaufman, 2010) data wherever applicable. Since some variations in population parameters are to be expected between the different versions of the AG learning task (nonsocial vs. social) and the different modes of assessment (laboratory vs. online; longitudinal vs. single session), we employ random-effects meta-analysis models to derive the estimates of central tendencies (see Higgins & Green, 2011, Chapter 9).

**Data Preparation**

A description of the data preparation is provided in the Supplementary Material. Tables 1–3 display the reliabilities, descriptive statistics, and single-order correlations for all measures. CIs are provided in Tables S1–S3.

**Implicit Learning Performance**

Overall performance in the AG learning task was above chance level in all studies, suggesting that participants learned the
underlying rule, $M_{\text{CorrectStudy1a}} = 27.50, SD = 4.32, t(100) = 10.45, p < .001, d = 2.09$; $M_{\text{CorrectStudy1b}} = 27.36, SD = 4.29, t(76) = 8.93, p < .001, d = 2.05$; $M_{\text{CorrectStudy2}} = 31.50, SD = 4.36, t(221) = 29.07, p < .001, d = 3.91$. As anticipated, performance was enhanced in the social version of the AG learning task compared to the nonsocial version of task, $Z_s ≥ 4.20, ps < .001$. This also held when restricting the samples to participants drawn from the same population, $Z_s ≥ 3.96, ps < .001$. As can be seen in Tables 1–3, implicit learning performance shared no sizable relationship with subjective (Studies 1a and 2) and objective (Study 1b) effort, suggesting that more deliberative approaches to the task were not beneficial.

### Table 1. Internal Consistency, Means, Standard Deviations (SDs), and Zero-Order Correlations for All Measures in Study 1a.

| Measure                              | 1   | 2a  | 2b  | 2c  | 2d  | 3   | 4   |
|--------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Preference for intuition             | (.78)| .13 | -07 | .06 | .06 | .02 | -24*|
| Confidence in intuition              | —   | (.78)| .59**| .31**| .03 | .24*| .23*|
| Self-assessed performance             | —   | —   | (.91)| .08 | -.04| .14 | .28*|
| Use of intuition                     | —   | —   | (.73)| .06 | .22*| .13 |    |
| Benefits of further information      | —   | —   |     | (.59)| .25*| -.01|    |
| Subjective effort                    | —   | —   |     |     |     | .05 |    |
| AG learning performance              |     |     |     |     |     |     |    |
| Mean                                 | 4.82| 4.41| 4.29| 7.33| 6.88| 7.02| 27.50|
| SD                                   | 0.77| 2.14| 1.89| 1.63| 1.74| 1.40| 4.32 |

Note. AG = artificial grammar.

*Values in parentheses are reliability estimates (so standardized and equivalent to effect sizes) and do not necessitate $p$ values.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

### Table 2. Internal Consistency, Means, Standard Deviations (SDs), and Zero-Order Correlations for All Measures in Study 1b.

| Measure                              | 1a  | 1b  | 2a  | 2b  | 2c  | 2d  | 3   | 4   |
|--------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Preference for intuition             | (.74)| .58**| .23**| .11 | -.12| -.04| -.12| -.06|
| Faith in intuition                   | —   | (.74)| .27**| .12 | .01 | .13 | -.15| -.23*|
| Confidence in intuition              | —   | —   | (.70)| .32**| .21 | -.05| .15 | -.10|
| Self-assessed performance             | —   | —   |     | (.70)| .17 | -.02| -.03| .09 |
| Use of intuition                     | —   | —   |     |     | (.38)| .09 | -.04| -.15|
| Benefits of further information      | —   | —   |     |     |     | (.44)| .05 | .04 |
| Objective effort                     | —   | —   |     |     |     |     |     | -.08|
| AG learning performance              |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |    |
| Mean                                 | 4.72| 3.50| 4.66| 5.00| 7.03| 7.37| 3.63| 27.36|
| SD                                   | 0.72| 0.48| 1.84| 1.72| 1.52| 1.55| 1.09| 4.29 |

Note. AG = artificial grammar.

*Values in parentheses are reliability estimates (so standardized and equivalent to effect sizes) and do not necessitate $p$ values.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

### Table 3. Internal Consistency, Means, Standard Deviations (SDs), and Zero-Order Correlations for All Measures in Study 2.

| Measure                              | 1a  | 1b  | 2a  | 2b  | 2c  | 2d  | 3   | 4   |
|--------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Preference for intuition             | (.79)| .71**| .32**| .04 | .19**| -.13| .02 | -.01|
| Experiential inventory               | —   | (.88)| .36**| .09 | .25**| .09 | .12 | .05 |
| Confidence in intuition              | —   | —   | (.90)| .52**| .32**| -.10| .16*| .10 |
| Self-assessed performance             | —   | —   |     | (.84)| .14*| .01 | .23**| .27**|
| Use of intuition                     | —   | —   |     |     | (.62)| .00 | .25**| .06 |
| Benefits of further information      | —   | —   |     |     |     | (.73)| .05 | -.02|
| Subjective effort                    | —   | —   |     |     |     |     |     | .11 |
| AG learning performance              |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |    |
| Mean                                 | 4.71| 3.38| 5.33| 5.46| 6.78| 5.56| 7.86| 31.50|
| SD                                   | 0.84| 0.52| 1.84| 1.70| 1.49| 2.41| 1.30| 4.36 |

Note. AG = artificial grammar.

*Values in parentheses are reliability estimates (so standardized and equivalent to effect sizes) and do not necessitate $p$ values.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. 
Beliefs in intuition. As shown in Figure 2, across studies we found little evidence that dispositional trust in intuition translated into superior learning performance. A meta-analysis of all primary (Studies 1a–b and 2) and secondary (Pretz et al., 2010) data indicates that there was no sizable association between dispositional intuition endorsement (i.e., Preference for Intuition, Faith in Intuition, Experiential Inventory) and implicit learning performance, $r_{\text{combined}} = .05, n = 500, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.17, .08], Q = 9.37, df = 5, BF_{01} = 6.02$. Interestingly, the more participants placed trust in their intuitions, the worse they performed in the nonsocial version of the AG learning task (Studies 1a–b), $r_{\text{combined}} = -.20, n = 178, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.34, -.06], Q = .94, df = 2$. Meanwhile, performance in the social version of the AG learning task (Study 2) bore no sizable relation with intuition endorsement, $r_{\text{combined}} = .02, n = 222, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.11, .15], BF_{01} = 6.55$. These variations between studies (i.e., Studies 1a–b vs. Study 2) employing different versions of the same AG learning task (i.e., social vs. nonsocial) were significant, $Z = 2.26, p = .024$.

Self-assessed performance correlated with actual performance on the AG learning task, $r_{\text{combined}} = .24, n = 400, 95\% \text{ CI } [.14, .33], Q = 2.17, df = 2$, replicating Dienes and colleagues’ findings (Dienes et al., 1995; Dienes & Seth, 2010; see Tables 1–3). However, as shown in Figure 3, there was no evidence that task-specific confidence in intuition was related to actual performance across studies, $r_{\text{combined}} = .09, n = 400, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.07, .24], Q = 4.64, df = 2, BF_{01} = 2.17$. The $BF_{01}$ is below 3, suggesting that there is insufficient evidence to favor the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis. Consequently, we must entertain the possibility that confidence in one’s intuitions vis-à-vis the specific task provides an indication of actual intuition performance. However, as shown by the CI ($r = .09 [-.07, .24]$), in a given sample, the predictive validity can be expected to be low ($r \approx .10$) and is unlikely to exceed $r \approx .25$. We will return to the implications of this finding in the Discussion.

Exploratory analyses. We conducted a series of exploratory analyses in the hope to shed some further light onto the lack of an association between people’s beliefs about their intuitions and actual intuition performance. First, as indicated earlier, participants’ judgments of how well they did on the task may reflect, at least in part, participants’ explicit knowledge related to the conscious acquisition of some underlying rules, which accounts for some (but not all) of the variation in performance in the AG task. Consequently, controlling for participants’ self-assessed performance statistically could be a way to discern variations in task performance that can be attributed to implicit processes. With this in mind, we regressed the AG learning task scores on the measures of dispositional intuition endorsement as well as participants’ self-assessed performance ratings. We conducted three separate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, one for each study (Study 1a, Study 1b, and Study 2), and then meta-analyzed the resulting semipartial correlation coefficients. In addition, we repeated the same procedure,
substituting the dispositional intuition endorsement variables with the task-specific confidence in intuition measure. Controlling for participants’ self-assessed performance, the association between dispositional intuition endorsement and implicit learning performance remained unaltered, \( r_{\text{combined}}^2 = -0.08, n = 400, 95\% \text{ CI} [-0.20, 0.05], Q = 6.27, df = 4, BF_{01} = 2.63 \). Similarly, task-specific confidence in intuition had no sizable relationship with actual performance, \( r_{\text{combined}}^2 = -0.03, n = 400, 95\% \text{ CI} [-0.18, 0.11], Q = 2.04, df = 2, BF_{01} = 7.60 \), this time providing sufficient evidence to favor the null hypothesis.

People who were dispositionsally inclined to place greater faith in their intuitions did not invest different levels of effort in the task, \( r_{\text{combined}} = .01, n = 400, 95\% \text{ CI} [-0.12, 0.13], Q = 2.82, df = 4, BF_{01} = 8.86 \), but they expressed greater confidence in their intuitions in the AG learning task, \( r_{\text{combined}} = .27, n = 400, 95\% \text{ CI} [.14, .38], Q = 3.69, df = 4 \). To separate the contributions of the more general, dispositional measures and the more task-specific, state measures of confidence to implicit learning performance, we regressed the AG learning task scores on the measures of dispositional intuition endorsement (i.e., Preference for Intuition, Faith in Intuition, Experiential Inventory) and the measure of task-specific confidence in intuition. We conducted three OLS regressions, one for each study, and then meta-analyzed the resulting partial correlation coefficients. Neither dispositional nor task-specific manifestations of intuition confidence bore a significant relation with performance on the AG learning task; dispositional: \( pr_{\text{combined}} = -.09, n = 400, 95\% \text{ CI} [-0.22, 0.04], Q = 8.41, df = 4, BF_{01} = 1.89 \); task-specific: \( pr_{\text{combined}} = .11, n = 400, 95\% \text{ CI} [-0.03, .26], Q = 4.59, df = 2, BF_{01} = 0.87 \). However, once again, the existence of a small positive association between task-specific confidence in intuition and intuition performance could not be ruled out.

We also sought to rule out that nongrammatical stimuli misled participants’ intuitive judgments by examining participants’ performance on trials involving grammatical stimuli only. Zero-order correlations revealed that correct responses on grammatical trials were neither related to dispositional intuition endorsement (i.e., Preference for Intuition, Faith in Intuition, Experiential Inventory), \( r_{\text{combined}} = -.07, n = 400, 95\% \text{ CI} [-0.20, 0.06], Q = 3.60, df = 4, BF_{01} = 3.51 \), nor to task-specific confidence in intuition, \( r_{\text{combined}} = .09, n = 400, 95\% \text{ CI} [-0.05, .23], Q = 4.68, df = 2, BF_{01} = 1.89 \), although the latter measure provided insufficient evidence to favor the null hypothesis.

**Discussion**

The current research examined how people’s beliefs about their intuitions—how certain and confident people are in their intuitions—relate to actual intuition performance in a standard implicit learning task. To this end, we exposed participants to seemingly random letter strings (Studies 1a–b) or social media profile pictures (Study 2) that conformed to an underlying rule or grammar. Participants’ incidental learning of the rule was then probed in a subsequent test phase. Pooling data from three new studies (\( N = 400 \)) and, where applicable, previously published work (Pretz et al., 2010), we found that people’s enduring beliefs in their intuitions were a poor guide to actual performance. In particular, people who were dispositionally inclined to place greater trust in their intuitions did not perform any better in the test phase of the implicit learning task than people who did not place such great trust in their intuitions. Further analyses suggested that this result cannot be attributed to variations in explicit knowledge nor to the fact that participants were misled by nongrammatical/rule-nonconforming stimuli, nor to differences in (subjective and objective) effort.

It may not come as a complete surprise that measures that tap into general dispositions fail to predict performance on a specific task (cf. Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973; Pachur & Spaar, 2015). To address the issue of domain-specificity, we also assessed task-specific confidence in intuition—a state measure of how confident and certain participants were in their intuitions during the test phase of the implicit learning tasks. The measure was administered after the implicit learning tasks, thus ensuring a high degree of familiarity with the task. In spite of these “favorable” conditions, pooled across studies task-specific confidence in intuition did not predict actual intuition performance. We also used statistical techniques to separate the unique contributions of general and task-specific beliefs in intuition to task performance. Once again, no reliable associations were found. However, using a Bayesian approach to test for invariance (Rouder & Morey, 2012), we could not affirm the null hypothesis.

It remains possible, and perhaps the most likely scenario, that individuals’ confidence in their intuitions vis-à-vis a task at hand provides some indication of actual learning performance. However, as outlined above in a given sample, the predictive validity can be expected to be low (\( r \approx .10 \)) and is unlikely to exceed \( r \approx .25 \). A relatively weak relationship with actual performance implies that individuals’ task-specific beliefs in their intuitions can be frequently misleading. This can be illustrated with Rosenthal and Rubin’s (1982) binomial effect size display: Assuming, for the sake of illustration, a dichotomous outcome in the implicit learning task (correct judgments vs. incorrect judgments) and a clear separation of participants into those with high and low confidence, the difference in success between people with high and low confidence in a given sample is unlikely to exceed 25% (and equally likely to be zero). Put differently, 1 of the 4 times individuals with high confidence in their intuitions may perform better than individuals with low confidence in their intuitions. Conversely, 3 of the 4 times high (vs. low) confidence may *not* provide an indication of better performance (correct vs. incorrect). Note that these figures illustrate a “best-case” scenario; in a given sample, we would expect the difference between people with high and low confidence to be \( \approx 10\% \), which would imply that 9 of the 10 times high (vs. low) confidence does not translate into superior performance.

**Limitations**

The present findings are limited to implicit learning of novel stimuli and should not be generalized to other facets of
intuition, such as the intuitive decision-making of experts (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973). Simon (1992) likened the expert intuitions to recognition, invoking memory-based processes of matching and information retrieval. In contrast, the present work placed an emphasis on information acquisition. It is interesting to note, however, that studies on expert intuitions often arrive at similar conclusions as the present research (cf. Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978). Reviewing research on expert intuitions, Kahneman and Klein (2009) concluded that subjective confidence provides an “unreliable indication of the validity of intuitive judgments and decisions” (p. 524).

On a related note, it is possible that individuals can calibrate their mental representations of intuition performance through feedback, and this may contribute to align individuals’ beliefs with actual performance. However, external feedback can also exacerbate biases and foster overconfidence and false beliefs (Arkes, 2001; Fiedler, 2000; Hogarth, 2001). Further studies are needed to gain a fuller and more complete understanding if and under what conditions individuals are able to judge the veracity of their intuitions.

Conclusions
People readily express their preference for, and endorsement of, intuitions in self-report measures (Betsch, 2008; Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999).4 The more individuals perceive themselves to be intuitive (as opposed to rational), the more they tend to believe that their intuitions have predictive validity and lead to good decision outcomes (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). When putting these assumptions to a test in an implicit learning task, we found no evidence that individuals’ dispositional trust in their intuitions was warranted. Furthermore, while confidence in one’s intuitions vis-à-vis a particular task at hand may bear some relation to actual intuition performance, the predictive validity is likely low and may lead to frequent misjudgments.

Authors’ Note
Both authors contributed equally to the article.

Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Asterios Chrysou for assisting with the data collection for Study 1b, Jean Pretz for kindly providing us with additional information and data related to her study, and Milica Vasiljevic for giving us valuable comments.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes
1. Pretz and colleagues observed correlations of $r = .040$ and $r = .198$, respectively, for the two implicit learning tasks administered to the same sample of participants ($n = 93$ and 107, respectively). We performed a fixed effects meta-analysis to combine the two correlation coefficients, which did not differ, $Z = .38, p = .354$.
2. In Study 2, the two samples (students vs. public) performed similarly on the task, $M_b = 31.31$ versus $31.85$, $SD_s = 4.22$ versus $4.61$, $t(220) = .87, p = .383$, and Bayes factor (BF$_{01}$) $[r = 1.0] = 6.25$; BF$_{01}$ based on Rouder et al., 2009).
3. In all analyses presented here, substituting semipartial correlations for partial correlations and vice versa yielded the same results.
4. Several studies have reported an association between the Intuition-Sensate dimension of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI; Myers, McCaulley, Quenk, & Hammer, 1998) and performance on different implicit learning tasks (Kaufman et al., 2010; Woolhouse & Bayne, 2000). However, the MBTI Scale measures individuals’ preference for abstract versus concrete thinking and does not capture individuals’ beliefs regarding their intuitions (see Pretz & Totz, 2007). The present research does not refute the possibility that self-report measures of individual dispositions are predictive of implicit learning performance.

Supplemental Material
The supplemental material is available in the online version of the article.

References
Abraham, M., & Reber, A. S. (1988). Implicit learning: Robustness in the face of psychiatric disorders. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 17, 425–439. doi:10.1007/BF01067228
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1973). Attitudinal and normative variables as predictors of specific behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2741–57. doi:10.1037/h0034440
Ambady, N., & Rosenthal, R. (1992). Thin slices of expressive behavior as predictors of interpersonal consequences: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 2, 256–274. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.111.2.256
Arkes, H. R. (2001). Overconfidence in judgmental forecasting. In J. S. Armstrong (Ed.), Principles of forecasting: A handbook for researchers and practitioners (pp. 495–516). Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic.
Betsch, C. (2008). Chronic preferences for intuition and deliberation in decision making: Lessons learned about intuition from an individual differences approach. In C. Blessner, C. Betsch, & T. Betsch (Eds.), Intuition in judgment and decision making (pp. 231–248). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Blake, M. (1973). Prediction of recognition when recall fails: Exploring the feeling-of-knowing phenomenon. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 3, 311–319. doi:10.1016/S0022-5371(73)80075-1
Bowers, K. S., Regehr, G., Balthazard, C., & Parker, K. (1990). Intuition in the context of discovery. Cognitive Psychology, 1, 72–110. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(90)90004-N
Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual process model of impression formation. In T. Srull & R. Wyer (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 1–36). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Chase, W. G., & Simon, H. A. (1973). The mind’s eye in chess. In W. G. Chase (Ed.), Visual information processing (pp. 215–281). New York, NY: Academic Press.

Cohen, J. (1994). The earth is round (p < .05). American Psychologist, 49, 997–1003. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.49.12.997

Cumming, G. (2014). The new statistics: Why and how. Psychological Science, 25, 7–29. doi:10.1177/0956797613504966

Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5, 5–18. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.56.1.5

Dienes, Z. (2014). Using Bayes to get the most out of non-significant results. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 781. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00781

Dienes, Z., Altman, G., Kwan, L., & Goode, A. (1995). Unconscious knowledge of artificial grammars is applied strategically. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 5, 1322–1338. doi:10.1073/pnas.92.6.2314

Dienes, Z., Broadbent, D., & Berry, D. C. (1991). Implicit and explicit knowledge bases in artificial grammar learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 5, 875–887. doi:10.1073/pnas.92.6.2314

Dienes, Z., & Seth, A. (2010). Gambling on the unconscious: A comparison of wagering and confidence ratings as measures of awareness in an artificial grammar task. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 674–681. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.09.009

Einhorn, H. J., & Hogarth, R. M. (1978). Confidence in judgment: Persistence of the illusion of validity. Psychological Review, 85, 395–416. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.85.5.395

Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in intuitive-experiential and analytical–rational thinking styles. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 390–405. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.71.2.390

Evans, J. S. B., & Frankish, K. E. (Eds.). (2009). In two minds: Dual processes and beyond. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Fiedler, K. (2000). Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases. Psychological Review, 107, 659–676. doi:10.1037//0033-295X.107.4.659

Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation, from category-based to individuating processes. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 23, 1–74. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60317-2

Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103, 650–669. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.103.6.650

Griffin, D., Gonzalez, R., & Varey, C. (2001). The heuristics and biases approach to judgment under uncertainty. In A. Tesser & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Intradindependent processes (pp. 207–235). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Hart, J. T. (1967). Memory and the memory-monitoring process. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 6, 685–691. doi:10.1016/S0022-5371(67)80072-0

Higgins, J. P., & Green, S. (Eds.). (2011). Cochrane handbook for systematic reviews of interventions (Vol. 5.1.0). Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell.

Hogarth, R. M. (2001). Educating intuition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. American Psychologist, 58, 697–720. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.58.9.697

Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. (2009). Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree. American Psychologist, 64, 515–526. doi:10.1037/a0016755

Kaufman, S. B., DeYoung, C. G., Gray, J. R., Jiménez, L., Brown, J., & Mackintosh, N. (2010). Implicit learning as an ability. Cognition, 116, 321–340. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.05.011

Kelley, C. M., & Jacoby, L. L. (1990). The construction of subjective experience: Memory attributions. Mind & Language, 5, 49–68. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1990.tb00152.x

Lakens, D. (in press). Equivalence tests: A practical primer for t-tests, correlations, and meta-analyses. Social Psychological and Personality Science.

Metcalfe, J. (1986). Feeling of knowing in memory and problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 12, 288–294. doi:10.1073/pnas.92.6.2314

Morey, R. D., & Rouder, J. N. (2011). Bayes factor approaches for testing interval null hypotheses. Psychological Methods, 16, 406–419. doi:10.1037/a0024377

Myers, I., McCaulley, M. H., Quenk, N. L., & Hammer, A. L. (Eds.). (1998). Manual: A guide to the development and use of the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator (2nd ed.). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231–259. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.84.3.231

Pacini, R., & Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential information processing styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 972–987. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.76.6.972

Pachur, T., & Spaar, M. (2015). Domain-specific preferences for intuition and deliberation in decision making. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 4, 303–311. doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2015.07.006

Pretz, J. E., & Totz, K. S. (2007). Measuring individual differences in affective, heuristic, and holistic intuition. Personality and Individual Differences, 43, 1247–1257. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2007.03.015

Pretz, J. E., Totz, K. S., & Kaufman, S. B. (2010). The effects of mood, cognitive style, and cognitive ability on implicit learning. Learning and Individual Differences, 20, 215–219. doi:10.1016/j.lindif.2009.12.003

Reber, A. S. (1989). More thoughts on the unconscious. American Psychologist, 44, 155–161. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.44.2.155

Reber, A. S. (1989). More thoughts on the unconscious: Reply to Brody and to Lewicki and Hill. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 118, 242–244. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.118.3.242
Rosenthal, R., & Rubin, D. R. (1982). A simple, general purpose display of magnitude of experimental effect. *Journal of Educational Psychology, 74*, 166–169. doi:10.1037/0022-0663.74.2.166

Rouder, J. N., & Morey, R. D. (2012). Default Bayes factors for model selection in regression. *Multivariate Behavioral Research, 47*, 877–903. doi:10.1080/00273171.2012.734737

Rouder, J. N., Speckman, P. L., Sun, D., Morey, R. D., & Iverson, G. (2009). Bayesian t tests for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis. *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16*, 225–237. doi:10.3758/PBR.16.2.225

Schacter, D. L. (1983). Feeling of knowing in episodic memory. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9*, 39–54. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.9.1.39

Schvaneveldt, R. W., & Gomez, R. L. (1998). Attention and probabilistic sequence learning. *Psychological Research, 61*, 175–190. doi:10.1007/s004260050023

Shanks, D. R. (2005). Implicit learning. In K. Lamberts & R. Goldstone (Eds.), *Handbook of cognition* (pp. 202–220). London, England: Sage.

Shiloh, S., Salton, E., & Sharabi, D. (2002). Individual differences in rational and intuitive thinking styles as predictors of heuristic responses and framing effects. *Personality and Individual Differences, 32*, 415–429. doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(01)00034-4

Simon, H. A. (1992). What is an explanation of behavior? *Psychological Science, 3*, 150–161. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1992.tb00187.x

Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1971). Comparison of Bayesian and regression approaches to the study of information processing in judgment. *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 6*, 649–744. doi:10.1016/0030-5073(71)90033-X

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. *Science, 185*, 1124–1131. doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124

Unkelbach, C. (2007). Reversing the truth effect: Learning the interpretation of processing fluency in judgments of truth. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33*, 219–230. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.33.1.219

Whittlesea, B. W., & Dorken, M. D. (1997). Implicit learning: Indirect, not unconscious. *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 4*, 63–67. doi:10.3758/BF03210775

Winkielman, P., Schwarz, N., & Belli, R. F. (1998). The role of ease of retrieval and attribution in memory judgments: Judging your memory as worse despite recalling more events. *Psychological Science, 9*, 124–126. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00022

Woolhouse, L. S., & Bayne, R. (2000). Personality and the use of intuition: Individual differences in strategy and performance on an implicit learning task. *European Journal of Personality, 14*, 157–169. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0984(200003/04)14:2<157::AID-PER366>3.0.CO;2-L

Author Biographies

**Stefan Leach** is a doctoral student at the School of Psychology, University of Kent, UK. His research examines topics such as power and subjective experiences.

**Mario Weick** is a Senior Lecturer at the School of Psychology, University of Kent, UK. His main line of work focuses on how power modifies individuals’ judgments and behaviors.

Handling Editor: Dominique Muller