Abstract
We propose an alternative to the Turing test that removes the inherent asymmetry between humans and machines in Turing’s original imitation game. In this new test, both humans and machines judge each other. We argue that this makes the test more robust against simple deceptions. We also propose a small number of refinements to improve further the test. These refinements could be applied also to Turing’s original imitation game.

Introduction
There have been several alternatives proposed to the Turing test, the imitation game proposed by Alan Turing in his seminal MIND paper (Turing 1950). Turing proposed his test as a means of addressing the question of whether machines can think. Many of these alternatives are designed to tackle flaws with Turing’s original test, as well as with how it has been implemented in a number of settings.

One of the problems with the Turing test is that it rewards deceptive behavior. By its very nature, the imitation game is a game of deception. The Loebner prize is a somewhat restricted form of the Turing test (Shieber 1994). Participants in the Loebner prize have used a variety of tricks designed to deceive the judges. For instance, they often change the topic of conversation rather than attempt to answer difficult questions. Others have pretended to be non-native speakers, hoping that judges will then excuse errors. And many have behaved whimsically so that abrupt changes might appear just as normal capricious behaviour rather than the brittle-ness of their conversational ability. It could be argued that the Loebner prize is identifying not intelligence but deceptive prowess. In this paper, we present a modification to the Turing test designed to hinder such deceptive behavior.

Another issue is that Turing’s original description of the imitation game was somewhat informal. For example, Turing does not explicitly recommend how long the test should be. However, he does predict:

“I believe that in about fifty years’ time it will be possible, to programme computers ... to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than 70 per cent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning.” (page 442 of (Turing 1950)).

This has been interpreted by many to mean that a Turing test needs to be run for 5 minutes of conversation, and that the threshold to “pass” the test is a 30 percent chance of the computer being mistaken for human. Neither criterion appears to be stringent enough. One of our contributions here is also to propose some refinements to how a Turing like test should be implemented that raise the bar.

The Turing test
The Turing test is based on the imitation game. Human judges have conversations by computer terminal with players of the game, and the judges have to decide which of the players are human and which are machines pretending to be humans. Turing’s paper has been interpreted that this is either via one-to-one conversations between a judge and a player who is human or machine, or via one-to-two conversation between a judge and two players, one of whom is a human and the other is a machine (Shah 2010). However, it is not critical for this paper which interpretation you choose. Both formats of the imitation game can be extended with the methods proposed here.

On June 7th 2014, it was claimed that a historic milestone in artificial intelligence had been achieved. It was announced that a chat bot by the name of Eugene Goodman had passed the Turing test (Anonymous 2014). Poignantly this was the 60th anniversary of Alan Turing’s death. There is, however, considerable controversy about this claim since the chat bot “succeeded” by deception. It tricked a third of the human judges into believing that it was a 13 year old Ukrainian boy during the course of several five-minute conversations. A transcript of one of the conversations where the judge mistook Eugene for human (Figure 1) illustrates how the chat bot dodged answering questions. It could be argued that the chat bot was failing the spirit if not the intent of Turing’s original proposal.

The organisers of this particular Turing test argued that they had carefully followed the design proposed by Turing. Each conversation was, for instance, five minutes long, the subject domain was unlimited, and passing the test required being recognised as human by 30 percent or more of the judges. Nevertheless, this test was likely not the successful
Questions typically come in pairs. See Figure 2 for an example of a pair of Winograd Schema Challenge questions.

The trophy doesn’t fit in the brown suitcase because it’s too big. What is too big? 
0: the trophy, 1: the suitcase

The trophy doesn’t fit in the brown suitcase because it’s too small. What is too small? 
0: the trophy, 1: the suitcase

Figure 1: Transcript of a conversation from the 2014 Turing Test at the Royal Society that fooled the judge into thinking the chatbot Eugene Goodman was human.

Figure 2: Example of a pair of Winograd Schema Challenge questions.

demonstration of thinking machines that Turing was imagining over fifty years ago. This was also not the first time that it had been claimed that the Turing test had been passed. However, it was arguably the first time that this claim had been made for a test whose format came close to that proposed by Turing.

Alternatives to the Turing test

Several alternatives have been proposed to the Turing test to address some of its shortcomings. See, for instance, the recent special issue of the AI Magazine (Marcus, Rossi, and Veloso 2016) and proposals for alternatives contained therein (Clark and Etzioni 2016; Davis 2016; Paritosh and Marcus 2016; Jarrold and Yeh 2016; Kitano 2016; Ortiz 2016; Zitzke et al. 2016; Poggio and Meyers 2016; Adams, Banavar, and Campbell 2016; Shieber 2016; Lenat 2016).

One alternative to the Turing test that has received significant attention is Levesque’s Winograd Schema Challenge (Levesque 2011). The first (of what is planned to be) annual Winograd Schema Challenges with a prize of $25,000 was run at IJCAI 2016 in New York City. Each test in the Challenge consists of a sequence of multi-choice questions. Questions typically come in pairs. See Figure 2 for an example.

Answering such questions requires anaphora resolution, identifying the antecedent of an ambiguous pronoun in the preceding sentence. However, identifying the antecedent requires the use of knowledge and common-sense reasoning. The trophy doesn’t fit either because it (the trophy) is too big, or because it (the suitcase) is too small. The common-sense reasoning is that a smaller object fits inside a bigger container. Unlike the Turing test, this is not a test where deception works. It has several other advantages including objectivity, and the ability to measure incremental progress towards the goal of machine intelligence.

To claim the $25,000 cash prize in the 2016 Winograd Schema Challenge, a program was required to attain 90% accuracy. To put this in context, in an online experiment on Mechanical Turk with a corpus of 160 example questions, humans were able to achieve 92% accuracy (Bender 2015). The first Challenge revealed that computers are some distance from passing the Winograd Schema Challenge. The best program in the 2016 Challenge achieved just 58%.

Another interesting alternative to the Turing test is the Lovelace 2.0 test (Riedl 2014). This is a refinement of the Lovelace Test of Bringsjord, Bello, and Ferrucci in which an intelligent system must originate a creative concept or work of art (Bringsjord, Bello, and Ferrucci 2001). In the Lovelace 2.0 test, the player is asked to create some artifact, like a story or a picture, that meets some constraints set by a judge. For example, the constraints might be to tell a story in which “a boy falls in love with a girl, the girl falls in love with the boy’s twin brother, the two twins switch identities, but the girl now realizes she loved the first twin all along”. A player passes the Lovelace 2.0 test if the created artifact is considered by the judge to be as novel and creative as an average unskilled human would achieve. Passing such a test would require several high level cognitive capabilities including common-sense reasoning, a theory of mind, discourse planning, natural language processing, and creativity.

We will not argue further for the advantages or disadvantages of any of these alternatives. We will, however, note that the change we propose to the Turing test, in which we remove the asymmetry between humans and machines, can be applied to many of these tests. For instance, we will describe shortly how we can modify the Lovelace 2.0 test to remove the asymmetry between humans and machines in this test.

The meta-Turing test

We now turn to our contribution, which is a modification to the Turing and other similar tests of machine intelligence. Implicit in Turing’s imitation game is the assumption that it takes intelligence to spot intelligence. Intelligent humans are the judges. This introduces an asymmetry into the test.

1Originally the result of the 2016 Winograd Schema Challenge had the winner at 48%. A person simply tossing a coin would be expected to get 45% as several of the questions had more than 2 possible answers. Unfortunately, the organisers had made an error in the input file. When this was fixed, the winning entry from Quan Liu of the University of Science and Technology of China did 10% better.
Humans alone judge the humans and machines participating in the test. What if we remove this asymmetry by having all the humans and machines judge each other?

In the one-to-one version of the meta-Turing test, a group of humans and machines have pairwise conversations as in Turing’s imitation game. Each participant then decides if the other player in the conversation is human or machine. In the one-to-two version of the meta-Turing test, ever human and machine in the test judge an imitation game between every possible pair of humans and machines. Each pair consists of one human and one machine. The human or machine judging each imitation game much decide which of the pair is human and which is machine. A machine can be said to pass such a meta-Turing test if it is consistently mistaken for human by the humans taking the test and it reliably can identify the machines recognised by humans to be machines. A meta-Turing test is thus a series of conversations in which each agent is trying to work out which of the other agents are machine or human. An agent playing this test can no longer just try to deceive. The agent must actively try to work out which of the other agents are human and which are machine.

Note that to pass the test, we do not ask a machine to recognise reliably any machines that are themselves potentially passing the meta-Turing test. We cannot expect a machine to distinguish apart humans from machines that are being consistently mistaken for human. Without this restriction, the meta-Turing test would be oddly non-monotonic. We could replace a program in a meta-Turing test by a more capable program and some other program that passed the test might no longer pass.

There are other details of the test we have not yet specified. How many players should there be in the test? How long should the conversations be? How do we define reliably and consistently? We will get to suggestions for how to determine these details shortly. Another issue is who should play this game. For simplicity, we might suppose we have an equal number of humans and machines (but this is not necessary). Including machines that we know are poor at the test is also problematic. It may give an advantage to the other machines. For instance, we might deliberately submit multiple programs to the test, many of which we know are easily recognised to try to weight the game to our advantage. Therefore we might decide that only the best programs currently available can play the game. In addition, we might not run all pairwise conversations but limit them to those where there is no conflict of interest. For example, two programs submitted by the same author or by authors with a professional relationship might be deemed to represent a conflict of interest. There is a risk otherwise that programs might benefit by collusion.

Finally, once the first machine passes the meta-Turing test, there is an argument that we should never run the test again. Before this time, the test measures if a machine can consistently pass for human and can reliably itself differentiate between human and machine. After we have such machines, we can no longer say that we can reliably differentiate between human and machine.

Passing the meta-Turing test
One of the problems with the Turing test is that is rewards deceptive behaviour. Could the meta-Turing test not be similarly deceived? For the sake of argument, suppose we have a soft bot even more deceptive than Eugene Goodman that can consistently pass for human by deception. We might decide simply to add a simple routine to this soft bot that mechanically runs a Winograd Schema Challenge in every conversation it has. With this routine, the soft bot might reliably be able to tell humans apart from machines that are not mistaken for human. However, any human taking the meta-Turing test would hopefully spot this simple trick and no longer consider the soft bot as human. In general, for a machine to pass a meta-Turing test, it needs to both ask and answer questions in a way that is responsive and human like. We discuss shortly additional refinements that will further hinder spoofing.

The inverted Turing test
Watt has proposed the related “inverted Turing test” (Watt 1996). In an inverted Turing test, a machine has to distinguish as well between humans and machines as humans can. In Watt’s own words, “a system passes if it is itself unable to distinguish between two humans, or between a human and a machine that can pass the normal Turing test, but which can discriminate between a human and a machine that can be told apart by a normal Turing test with a human observer.”

The inverted Turing test maintains an asymmetry between humans and machines as only the machines are doing the judging. A meta-Turing test is roughly speaking the combination of a Turing test and an inverted Turing test. Watt claimed that the idea of the inverted Turing test was, however, not meant to be a replacement of the original Turing test. Instead, he proposed that it be seen more as a thought experiment than as a goal for AI research. He argued that it might provide insight into human psychology, “other minds” and related philosophical issues. He suggested that it adds something that is well hidden in the original Turing test.

As he and others have recognised (French 1996), it would be easy to cheat an inverted Turing test. We could, for instance, simply write a computer program that simply administers a Winograd Schema Challenge. The meta-Turing test counters this problem, requiring the machine to both appear intelligent and to recognise intelligence. The two sided nature of the meta-Turing test guard against the weaknesses of either side: simple chat bots that deceive Turing’s original test, or mechanical testing programs that defeat tests like the inverted Turing test.

The reverse Turing test
Another related but different test is the reverse Turing test. In a reverse Turing test, we reverse (some of) the roles of humans and machines. One form of reverse Turing test is when a human player tries to trick a human judge into thinking that they are a computer. Another form of reverse Turing
is a CAPTCHA where a computer judge rather than a human tries to decide if a player is a human or a computer (Ahn et al. 2003). In both these types of reverse Turing test, we still have an asymmetry between humans and computers. In the former, only humans are doing the judging, whilst in the latter, only computers are doing the judging. A meta-Turing test is therefore different to a reverse Turing test as there is no asymmetry between humans and computers in the former.

Some refinements
We now propose some further refinements of the meta-
Turing test. In fact, many of these refinements can be applied to the original Turing test itself.

College educated adult rule
Turing talks about playing the imitation game with an adult human (Turing 1950). There’s a strong argument then that playing the imitation game with a machine pretending to be a 13 year old Ukrainian boy violates the requirements of the test. However, we might strengthen Turing’s (somewhat implicit) requirement further and insist that participants are college educated adults or machines trying to imitate them.

Domain choice rule
Turing discusses a conversation with an unrestricted domain (Turing 1950). This gives chat bots the opportunity to focus on whimsical conversations that have proved likely to deceive judges. We might counter this with a refinement that limits the domain. For example, we might have an outside judge provide a topic for conversation at regular intervals. As a second example, we might divide the conversation into two halves, and have each player choose the topic of conversation within their half. The other player would be required to follow the topic or risk failing the test.

Test duration rule
As explained earlier, Turing did not provide a concrete recommendation for the length of the game, though some have interpreted his remarks to suggest judges have just 5 minutes of conversation with a player in which to make up their minds (Turing 1950). Results with Turing style tests suggests 5 minutes is just too short. We might therefore consider, say, longer 30 minute conversations. Alternatively, we might consider an open test, where each player continues the test until they are certain whether the other player is human or machine. 

Success rule
Turing also did not provide a concrete recommendation for identifying when a machine passed the imitation game, though some have interpreted his remarks to suggest that the machine needed to mis-recognised as human by 30 percent of the judges (Turing 1950). This appears to be too low a bar. Ultimately we would like machines to be unrecognisable apart from humans. This would translate into a judging rule as follows. In an one-to-two Turing test, a machine passes when it is recognised as human 50 percent of the time. In an one-to-two meta-Turing test, we would additionally require that the machine recognises correctly the human 100 percent of the time when the other player in the pair is a machine that itself is not mistaken as human by human judges. In an one-to-one Turing test, a machine passes when no human judge identifies the machine as a machine. In an one-to-one meta-Turing test, we would additionally require that the machine only identifies a machine as human if that machine is mistaken by the human judges as human. We might also require that the machine does not identify any human as a machine.

Unlike the previous 30 percent rule, these criteria might prove to be a little too tough. Humans are not themselves 100 percent accurate. For instance, as mentioned earlier, in an online experiment on Mechanical Turk humans only achieved 92 percent accuracy on Winograd Schema Challenge questions (Bender 2015). It may therefore be appropriate to relax these rules modestly. For instance, it might be acceptable to ask merely that 90 percent of human judges mistake the machine as human in an one-to-one meta-Turing test. Recall previously that this was set at 100 percent. Similarly, we might only require that machine identifies humans correctly in 90 percent of one-to-two meta-Turing test when the player in the pair that is a machine is itself not mistaken as human by human judges. Again recall that this was previously set at 100 percent.

Pool size rule
We have not yet specified how many humans and machines should be tested in a meta-Turing test. To preserve the symmetry, we might demand an equal number of humans and machines. Clearly, one of each is too small. Any human would know without testing that they must be the human in the test. Two humans and two machines would prevent this default assumption. Nevertheless, it is probably too small a pool to ensure accuracy. The final round of the most recent Loebner prize has 4 humans and 4 machines. This is still likely too small a pool to produce any sort of accuracy. The pool might ideally have at least one dozen humans and one dozen machines.

The meta-Lovelace test
Let us return to the Lovelace 2.0 test. Like the Turing test, this has an inherent asymmetry between the humans and machines. The meta-Lovelace 2.0 test removes this asymmetry. We again have a group of humans and machines. We run a sequence of Lovelace 2.0 tests between pairs in this group. Each test is run in both directions, with one player setting and judging the task, and the other creating the artwork. Each participant then decides if the other player in the test is human or machine. As before, a machine can be said to pass the meta-Lovelace 2.0 test if it is consistently mistaken for human by the humans taking the test and it reliably can identify the machines recognised by humans to be machines. Such a test requires the machine to have new skills. For instance, it must have the appropriate natural language and vision skills to judge originality in a written or visual artwork.
The toy was lost in the grass because it was short. What is short? 0: the toy, 1: the grass

The toy was lost in the grass because it was tall. What is too tall? 0: the toy, 1: the grass

Figure 3: Example of a pair of Winograd Schema Challenge questions invented for the noun phrases “toy” and “grass”.

The meta-Winograd Schema Challenge

We can adapt the Winograd Schema challenge in a similar way. In a meta-Winograd Schema Challenge, a machine takes a Winograd Schema Challenge, as well as invents and performs a Winograd Schema Challenge on the other players. To pass a meta-Winograd Schema Challenge, the machine needs to answer the Winograd Schema Challenges set by the other players accurately, and to set a Winograd Schema Challenge that reliably differentiates between humans and machines that fail to pass their Winograd Schema Challenges. We might decide, for instance, that accurately answering a Winograd Schema Challenge requires 90% or greater correctness. Similarly, we might decide that reliably differentiating between humans and machines requires setting a test on which humans get 90% or greater accuracy and machines which fail the Winograd Schema Challenges get less than 90%.

One issue is that a machine might simply set a Winograd Schema Challenge by picking at random a set of questions stored in a large database. To prevent this, the judges might provide a sequence of noun phrases, adjectives or verbs, and require that the questions use each in turn. Setting a Winograd Schema Challenge will then require some creativity. For instance, we might give a pair of noun phrases like “toy” and “grass” and require a question that uses these two noun phrases. See Figure 3 for an example. We might alternatively give a pair of adjectives like “short” and “tall” and require that the question use them.

Peer grading

The meta-Turing test is related to the task of peer grading. In a peer grading exercise, we have a group of agents, each of whom does a task (e.g. writing an essay, or answering some exam questions) and grades some subset of the other agents at that task. We can consider the meta-Turing test as a peer grading exercise in which the task being peer graded is imitating a human. In (Walsh 2014), a fixed point equation is proposed for constructing peer grades which is a sum of two terms, the first being a weighted sum of the grades given to an agent, the weights being the (estimated) grades of the agents doing the grading, and a penalty term for mis-grading the other agents. The idea of weighting the sum is that we want to favour the opinion of the agents who do well on the test. We might considering adapting such a fixed point equation to the meta-Turing test. However, there is one significant difference since in a meta-Turing test, we actually know the ground truth. We know precisely who is human and who is not. In a peer grading exercise, the ground truth is unknown. Nevertheless, in a meta-Turing test, we also want to combine two similar terms: the estimates of the other agents about whether you are human or not, and your ability to estimate correctly whether the other agents are human or not.

Discussion

Turing side-stepped the original philosophical question of whether a machine can really think. The meta-Turing test also side-steps this question. It merely determines if the machine is behaving in a way that requires thinking in humans. Namely, can the machine produce intelligent conversation like a human and recognise intelligent conversation. Of course, people like Searle with his famous Chinese Room thought experiment argue that it is possible to get the observable behaviour right without having the associated mental states (Searle 1980). There are, however, numerous arguments against Searle’s objections. For example, the Systems Reply argues that the system as whole understands Chinese (Levesque 2009). More generally, Turing was more interested in an operational perspective. AI can be seen to have succeeded when we can no longer tell it apart from human behaviour. We do not need our machines to be actually thinking. It is good enough that they can do whatever intelligent tasks we ask of them.

As machines intrude more and more into our lives, there are concerns about whether machines will be intentionally or unintentionally mistaken for humans. For instance, the recently proposed “Turing Red Flag” law requires that machines should not be designed to be mistaken for human and that machines should announce themselves as machines at the start of any interaction to avoid confusion (Walsh 2016). Such a law would require autonomous vehicles to be clearly identified as such, so that other drivers do not mistake them as driven by humans. We may even have special lanes where only autonomous vehicles will be allowed. Turing’s imitation game explicitly challenges the idea that machines should not be designed to be mistaken for human. The meta-Turing test does not change this. We may therefore require machines to be exempted from such a rule to permit their intelligence to be tested.

Conclusions

We have proposed an alternative to the Turing test to tackle some of the criticisms made of Turing’s original imitation game. In a meta-Turing test, we remove the asymmetry between humans and machines. Both humans and machines judge who appears human and who appears to be a machine. This calls upon an assumption implicit in Turing’s original proposal that it takes intelligence to identify intelligence. To pass a meta-Turing test, a computer needs both to be consistently mistaken for human and for the computer to reliably recognise apart machines from humans. We also propose some refinements like the length of the test, and the rule for passing the test. The meta-Turing test is more difficult to pass than the Turing test. In a logical sense, this is trivially the case as a meta-Turing test includes within it a Turing test of passing for human conversation, plus the
additional requirement of identifying apart other machines from humans. However, it also will defeat simply deceptive tricks used currently by chat bots. A computer will not, for instance, be able just to pretend to be whimsical or a non-native speaker. It will also actively have to decide if the other player is human or computer.

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