Abstract. Euclid pioneered the concept of a mathematical theory developed from axioms by a series of justified proof steps. From the outset there were critics and improvers. In this century the use of computers to check proofs for correctness sets a new standard of rigor. How does Euclid stand up under such an examination? And what does the exercise have to teach us about geometry, mathematical foundations, and the relation of logic to truth?

1. INTRODUCTION. In approximately 300 BCE, a research institute known as the Museum was founded at Alexandria. A community of scholars lived and worked at the Museum, holding property in common and having a common dining room. Euclid joined this community, and became the author of several influential books. The most famous of these is his Elements.

No other scientific book has had an equal influence on the world. The authors of the United States Declaration of Independence had studied Euclid: hence the “self-evident truths” from which the principles of the Declaration were deduced in Euclidean style. Abraham Lincoln took several months studying Euclid and thus learned what it means to demonstrate a proposition in court. He put it to good use in the Lincoln–Douglas debates. Bertrand Russell studied Euclid at age eleven and “did not know there was anything so delicious in the world.”

From at least 450 CE (and probably before that!) there was no shortage of critics, and suggestions for repair and improvement. Dozens of these have been surveyed by De Risi. Proclus already criticized the parallel postulate (Euclid 5), saying that it did not deserve to be a postulate but should be proved, since we know that some kinds of (curved) lines can approach each other without meeting, so why can’t straight lines do that too? In the nineteenth century there was an increasing focus on the problem of whether the parallel postulate (Euclid 5) could be eliminated, by proving it from the other axioms. Several famous mathematicians thought they had done so: Legendre published three different mistaken proofs. This effort focused attention on rigor and careful deduction, and led to careful axiomatic developments. At the same time, logic was also being developed; Boole’s Laws of Thought was published in 1853. A milestone was reached with Pasch’s work in 1882, which introduced the notion of “betweenness” missing in Euclid, and the idea that one should justify the existence of points where lines cross lines or circles, or circles cross other circles.

The geometers eventually realized that there is such a thing as non-Euclidean geometry, in which Euclid 5 fails but the other postulates hold. This was the world’s first independence proof. The efforts to codify systems of deduction, stimulated by the pressing need to ensure correctness in geometry, led directly to the logical systems...
of Peano and Frege at the end of the nineteenth century, which are the wellsprings of modern logic. Geometry was the midwife of logic.

In 1899, Hilbert published his very influential book [20], in which he attempted to bring new standards of rigor to geometry. Hilbert’s system mixed first-order and second-order axioms with a little set theory thrown in for good measure, but he clearly understood that axioms could be dependent or independent and a given axiom system might have different models. Hence his famous dictum “tables, chairs, and beer mugs,” the point of which was that reasoning should be fundamentally syntactic, so that the steps could be checked independently of the meaning of the terms; hence if you substitute “tables, chairs, and beer mugs” everywhere for “points, lines, and planes,” then everything should still be correct.

Hilbert’s book was about plane geometry, but he did not follow Euclid. His aim (as stated in the Introduction to [20]) was to “establish for geometry a complete, and as simple as possible, set of axioms.” His method to achieve that goal was to show that arithmetic (addition and multiplication) can be defined geometrically. This was first done more than two centuries earlier, in Descartes’s famous *La Géométrie*, but Descartes’s work was not based on specific axioms. The Greeks never tried to multiply two lines to get another line; the product of two lines was a rectangle. Descartes broke through this conceptual barrier, and Hilbert made Descartes’s arguments rigorous, using the theorems of the nineteenth-century jewel “projective geometry.” Hilbert’s book put in the mathematical bank the profits of the discoveries about non-Euclidean geometry: geometry was no longer about discovering the truth about points, lines, and planes, but instead it was about what theorems follow from what axioms. Rather than deduce Euclid’s theorems directly from his axioms, Hilbert relied on the indirect argument that every geometrical theorem could be derived by analytic geometry, and since coordinates could be introduced by the geometric definition of arithmetic, every theorem had a proof from his axioms.

In 1926–27, Tarski lectured on his first-order theory of geometry. But Tarski and his collaborators too ignored Euclid, focusing as Hilbert did on the development of geometric arithmetic and the characterization of models.

Less than a decade after the first electronic computers were available, there were efforts to apply them to the problem of finding proofs of geometry theorems ([15, 16]). Later, the verification of geometry theorems by algebraic calculation became an advanced art form. (See the introduction to [2] for citations and history). On the other hand, since the 1990s there has been a body of work in “proof-checking,” which means that a computer program checks that the reasoning of a given proof is correct (as opposed to “automated deduction,” in which the computer is supposed to find the proof by itself). In recent years there have been several high-profile cases of proof-checking important theorems whose large proofs involved many cases. Tarski’s work on geometry, as presented in [35], has also been the subject of proof-checking and proof-finding experiments [3–7].

Until 2017, nobody had tried to proof-check Euclid directly. That omission was remedied in [2]. We produced formal proofs of 245 propositions, including the 48 propositions of Euclid Book I, and numerous other propositions that were needed along the way, and translated those proofs into the languages of two famous proof-checkers, Coq and HOL Light. The purpose of this article is to consider what is to be learned from that proof-checking experiment. That work invites the question, *How wrong was Euclid?* That question will be answered below. Here we consider as well:

- **What was Euclid thinking?**

---

5According to [38, p. 175]. This reached journal publication only in [37].
• What is the relation between logic and truth?
• How should we choose the primitive notions for a formalization?
• What level of mathematical infrastructure should be visible?

Relevant to those questions are the following principles of mathematical practice (which are sometimes followed and sometimes not):

• If it can be defined, instead of taken primitive, it should be defined.
• If it can be proved, instead of assumed, it should be proved.

Tarski clearly believed in both these principles: he famously sought to minimize the number of primitives and the number of axioms, and tried to find axioms that could be stated in the primitive language without preliminary definitions. Hilbert evidently wasn’t such a strong believer; his axioms were stronger by far than they had to be, because he wanted to reach his goal of defining arithmetic as quickly as possible. Of course, it was the second of those principles that drove people to work so hard trying to prove Euclid 5 from the other axioms, and over the centuries there were many claims that Euclid 4 (all right angles are equal) can be proved (this will be discussed below).

I have come to think of the proof-checking of Euclid as the enterprise of providing infrastructure. Euclid’s proofs are like mountain railroads: there is a clear origin and destination, but there are a lot of possibilities to go off the rails. There are places in Euclid where the train would fall into the abyss; there are other places where the trestles are very weak. After [2], we have 245 propositions to support Euclid’s 48. It is a much sturdier system. Here I will discuss it and consider its relation to Euclid’s Elements, Book I, which it is meant to formalize.

2. STRUCTURE OF EUCLID’S ELEMENTS. Euclid had definitions, common notions, axioms, and postulates. Nowadays, the common notions, axioms, and postulates would be lumped together and considered axioms. In Euclid, the common notions were intended to be principles of reasoning that applied more generally than just to geometry. For example, what we would now call equality axioms, or such principles as “the part is not equal to the whole” or “the whole is equal to the sum of the parts.” Any kind of thing might have parts, which were always the same kind of thing: the parts of a line were smaller lines, etc. The axioms and postulates were about geometry. The distinction between an “axiom” and a “postulate,” according to Proclus [28, Section 201, p. 157], who attributes the distinction to the earlier mathematician Geminus, is that a postulate asserts that some point can be constructed, while an axiom does not. In modern terms, an “axiom” is purely universal, while a postulate has an existential quantifier. Euclid’s Postulate 4 (all right angles are equal) had no associated construction, and for that reason, critics in antiquity (such as Proclus, in [28, Section 192, p. 150] said it did not deserve the name “postulate.”

Heath’s translation lists five common notions, five postulates, and zero axioms. Simpson’s translation [13] lists three postulates, twelve axioms, and zero common notions. The extra axioms are discussed by Heath [14, p. 223], where they are rejected. During the centuries since Euclid, a great many axioms have been put forward as “should have been included.” The axiomatization of [2], discussed in this article, is thus the last elephant in a long parade. But the seal of correctness given by computer proof-checking does support the claim to be the “last elephant.” That axiomatization followed the consensus of the centuries on these points: Postulate 4 should be proved, the SAS criterion of Proposition 1.4 should be an axiom, and Postulate 5 has to remain. It also followed

6 See [8] for a thorough discussion. In that paper, it takes De Risi twenty pages just to list the different axioms that various authors have added to Euclid’s.
the consensus of the twentieth century that the concept of betweenness is needed, and it adopted axioms similar to those of Hilbert and Tarski about betweenness.

3. LINES. Euclid’s lines were all finite lines; a line could be extended, but after the extension it was still a finite line, just longer. How far could it be extended? Later Hilbert and Tarski both answered that question by taking it as an axiom that $AB$ could be extended by an amount equal to a given line $CD$. This is sometimes known as the rigid compass: we can measure off $CD$ with a compass, then move the compass to the end of $AB$ and lay off the measured amount along a straightedge. By contrast, Euclid used a collapsible compass: you could only extend a line by putting one tip of the compass on $B$ and the other tip on some existing point, then drawing a circle; then $AB$ would be “drawn through” to meet that circle. Euclid’s second proposition, I.2, gives a beautiful proof that the rigid compass can be simulated by a collapsible compass; that conclusion is axiomatized away by Hilbert and Tarski, violating the principle “if it can be proved, it should be proved.”

In Euclid’s time it had not yet been realized that not everything can be defined: certain notions must be taken as primitive, because otherwise there will be nothing to use in the first definition. Euclid defined a line as that which has length but no breadth. Other sources make clear that the Greeks regarded lines (curved or straight) as the traces of a motion. In particular, most modern mathematicians, steeped in set theory from their youth, think that a line is equal to the set of its points. This was definitely not the Greek conception. This viewpoint was regarded as thoroughly refuted by the paradoxes of Zeno, which were already centuries old by the time of Euclid. These paradoxes depended on the conception that, if a line were made up of its points, the points would be like tiny beads on a string.

In mathematics there is another principle: Perhaps you do not need to know what it is, if you know how to use it. Euclid never once appeals to his definition of a line, so in essence he did treat it as a primitive notion. He always refers to a line by two distinct points, as in “line $AB$.” You never see “line $\ell$ ” in Euclid. Lines are used to construct other points, as the intersection points of lines with other lines or with circles.

Euclid spoke of two lines being “equal.” He meant by this what Hilbert called “congruent.” Probably he had in mind that a rigid motion could move one line to coincide with the other. It seems certain that he did not mean that they had the same length, as measured by a number.

The other obvious primitive notion about lines (besides equality) is the notion “point $P$ lies on line $AB$.” This is the notion of betweenness, which was explicitly axiomatized by Pasch only in 1882. (One can either use strict betweenness, as Hilbert did, or nonstrict betweenness, as Tarski did.) Both Hilbert and Tarski had some axioms about betweenness. Euclid, on the other hand, had none.

Euclid did use the notion that one line is “less than” or “greater than” another. That notion can be defined in terms of betweenness and equality: $AB < CD$ if there is some $X$ between $C$ and $D$ such that $AB$ is equal to $CX$. Conversely, we could define (for collinear points) $X$ is between $C$ and $D$ if $CX < CD$ and $XD < CD$. For Euclid, “less than” was a natural notion, because $AB < CD$ meant that $AB$ was equal to a

---

7 Nowadays lines are infinite; Euclid’s (finite) lines are today’s “segments.” A “line” for Euclid could also be curved; hence “straight line” adds something. However, the default in Euclid, though not necessarily in all Greek geometry, is that lines are straight. We follow Euclid.

8 A referee pointed out [29], which gives an axiomatic framework for a part of geometry in which the collapsible compass is preserved.

9 This view of lines goes back at least to Aristotle; see [28, p. 79], where Proclus says Aristotle regarded a line as “the flowing of a point.”
part of $CD$. The notion of one thing being part of another thing was regarded as a “common notion,” i.e., a notion that applied to things in general, as opposed to notions specific to geometry. Euclid took “part” as a primitive notion, making no attempt to define it, but it was clear that the parts of a thing were the same kind of thing: the parts of a line were lines, the parts of an angle were angles. The definition of point is that which has no parts. The common notions probably seemed completely precise to Euclid, because he felt that the notion of “part” was clear. From the modern point of view, there are questions: if $AB$ is divided into two parts by its midpoint $M$, what about point $M$ itself? Is it in both parts or neither part? Is the whole $AB$ really the “sum” of $AM$ and $MB$? This problem comes back “in spades” when we divide a triangle into two parts: what about the separating line? When we put the parts back together, there would be no cut remaining.

We chose to follow Pasch, Hilbert, and Tarski in using betweenness as a primitive notion; we followed Hilbert in using strict betweenness, because Euclid has no “null lines”: when he says “line $AB$,” $A$ and $B$ are always distinct points. Of course, nonstrict betweenness is easily defined in terms of strict betweenness, so it is really inconsequential which is taken as primitive. We write $Babc$ for “$b$ is between $a$ and $c$.” The three betweenness axioms and their names are given here:

- **symmetry**: $Babc \leftrightarrow Bcba$
- **identity**: $\neg Baba$
- **inner transitivity**: $Babd \land Bbcd \rightarrow Babc$

It turns out that the theory of betweenness is not quite trivial. There are delicate and interesting questions about the axiomatization of this notion. Tarski’s original version of his theory had 16 axioms. Working with his students, in 1956–57 several of these axioms were proved dependent on others. That the three axioms given above are enough is remarkable, but it is not very important for formalizing Euclid, since Euclid never even mentioned betweenness. We must add the required infrastructure, but it won’t matter exactly how we do it, so we do not go further into the matter here. If five betweenness axioms had been required instead of three, we would have just added five betweenness axioms.

The axiomatization of [2] supplemented Euclid’s axioms, as given in the Heath translation, with the axiom the authors called connectivity: if $B$ and $C$ are both between $A$ and $D$, but neither $B BCD$ nor $B C BD$, then $B = C$. In other words, the picture in Figure 1 is impossible. This axiom is found in several of the Greek manuscripts used by Heiberg in preparing his influential translation. The ancients did not use betweenness; they expressed this axiom as “two lines intersect in at most one point,” or as “two lines cannot enclose space.” The latter lacks precision as “space” is not defined; the former is equivalent to our axiom. Zeno of Sidon attacked Proposition I.1 on the grounds that it is not conclusive unless it first be assumed that neither two straight lines nor two circumferences can have a common segment.

The connectivity axiom is used to prove the uniqueness of the midpoint, and the basic property of collinearity, if $a$, $b$, and $c$ are collinear and $a$, $b$, and $d$ are collinear, and $b \neq c$ and $a \neq b$, then $b$, $c$, and $d$ are collinear. That fact is used in almost every one of our formal proofs. How did Euclid get by without that axiom? By not proving the uniqueness of the midpoint, and using the properties of collinearity without explicit mention.

---

10See [38] for a complete history of Tarski’s axiom systems, including the discoveries of dependencies among the axioms.
11See [8, p. 638]. One of these manuscripts is the oldest copy of Euclid to survive into the modern age.
12See [19, p. 359], who in turn cites Proclus.
Figure 1. The connectivity axiom: two lines cannot enclose a space.

If we had adhered to the principle, “If it can be proved, it should be proved and not assumed,” we would have formalized Gupta’s 1965 proof of the connectivity axiom, which was proved in his thesis [17] and can more easily be found as Satz 5.3 in [35]. But that proof, with its elaborate counterfactual diagram, is not “in the spirit of Euclid,” so we chose to include the axiom of connectivity, which so many over the centuries have thought should be included.13

Collinearity, which is defined from betweenness by enumerating the cases, plays a larger-than-life role in our computer formalization; mostly in the form of noncollinearity. There are many cases in which to state a theorem formally, one must add to the hypothesis statements like “$ABC$ is a triangle.” Since we define a triangle as three non-collinear points, this amounts to “$A$, $B$, and $C$ are not collinear.” More than half the individual inferences in our formalization turned out to be statements of collinearity or noncollinearity. These statements are “pure infrastructure,” absolutely necessary to prevent the theorems from collapsing into the abyss, but absent in Euclid, and serving only to ensure that the diagram does not degenerate. Euclid simply assumed that points that appear to be on a line are indeed on that line, and points that appear noncollinear, are noncollinear.

4. ANGLES. The Greek concept of angle was more general than the modern concept, as we see from Euclid’s definitions of planar angle (the inclination to one another of two lines in a plane that meet one another and do not lie in a straight line), from which we see that one could also consider angles that do not lie in a plane; and of rectilinear angle, when the lines are straight lines. In particular, two touching circles form an angle that is not rectilinear; modern mathematics does not use the word “angle” in that situation. Neither, as it turns out, does most of Euclid; and here we use “angle” for “rectilineal angle.” Euclid always refers to angles by three points, as in “angle $ABC$,” never using the more modern notation “angle $\alpha$.” As with lines, he uses the word “equal” instead of Hilbert’s “congruent.”

As with lines, Euclid never once appeals to the definition of “angle,” so we must ask how angles are used, rather than what they are. It turns out that (in addition to the equality relation) there are relations of “less than” and “greater than” between angles, and two angles can be “taken together,” or sometimes “added,” in such a way that the common notions “if equals are added to equals the results are equal,” and “the whole is equal to the sum of its parts” are applicable to angles. In effect, then, Euclid treats angles as a primitive notion, with an ordering relation. One consequence of Euclid’s definition is that all his angles are “less than two right angles,” or in modern terminology, less than 180 degrees. For otherwise angle $ABC$ would not be determined, unless we were to insist that angle $ABC$ is not the same as angle $CBA$; but Euclid clearly considers $ABC$ equal to $CBA$.

Although Euclid refers to angles by the names of three points, sometimes we have to consider different ways of choosing those three points. To give a specific example,

---

13Hilbert smuggled that axiom into his system by requiring uniqueness in his angle-copying axiom. Pasch had it explicitly as an axiom, Kernsatz V, [26, p. 5].
consider angles $BAE$ and $BAC$, where $E$ lies between $A$ and $C$. (See Figure 6). In the proof of I.16, Euclid implicitly equates those angles. Did he consider them to be the same angle (identical), or merely equal angles? This question cannot be answered by reading Euclid, since he never explained what he meant by “equality.” In practice, it isn’t going to matter whether we consider them to be equal angles, or two names for the same angle. The same missing steps will have to be supplied.

Euclid never mentions “rays,” because all his lines are finite. Therefore Euclid’s angles all have finite (but extensible) sides. Nevertheless the language of “rays” is useful; we say $x$ lies on the ray $AB$ if $B ABx$ or $x = B$ or $B AxB$.

At some point it was realized that angles could just be defined as triples of points. Angles then are a case in point for the principle, “if it can be defined, it should be defined.” In our computer proof-checking of Euclid, we used Tarski’s points-only language, so lines became pairs of points, and angles became triples of points. Then the notions of equal angles and “less than” for angles can also be defined. See Figure 2, in which the blue (or shaded) triangles are congruent.

Angles $ABC$ and $abc$ are equal if there exist points $U, V, u, v$ on rays $BA, BC, ba, and bc$ respectively, such that $BU = bu$ and $BV = bv$ and $UV = uv$. And angle $abc$ is less than $PQR$ if there are $X, J, K$ with $BJXK$ and $J$ on ray $QP$ and $K$ on ray $QR$ such that $abc = PQX$.

If we view formalization as providing infrastructure, there is a lot of infrastructure connected with equality and inequality of angles. To start with, we must verify that angle equality is an equivalence relation; that requires Euclid I.4, the SAS congruence criterion, which is discussed in the next section. This particular piece of infrastructure results from having to prove what Euclid took as “common notions.” But not all the required angle infrastructure is of that nature. For example, in the proof of Euclid III.20 there is an unjustified step; I mean by “unjustified” that Euclid did not write any justification for it, in the sense of a reference to an earlier proposition or definition. To justify it, he would have had to prove a proposition something like “the sum of the doubles is the double of the sum,” or more explicitly, if two angles are doubled, then their doubles taken together equal the double of the angles taken together. In more modern terms, if we call the angles 1 and 2, twice the sum of angles 1 and 2 is the sum of twice angle 1 and twice angle 2.

If someone had pressed Euclid on this point, he would have justified this step by “the whole is equal to the sum of the parts.” If we have four slices of pizza labeled 1,2,1,2 in order, and we take them out of the box and then put them back in the order 1,1,2,2, lo and behold, they fit into the original angle exactly. See Figure 3. Now try

---

14 As far as I can determine, Mollerup [24] deserves the credit for these definitions.
to prove it by the methods of high school geometry. That is “infrastructure.” You see from this example that it is logic and the choice of axioms that give rise to the need for infrastructure. Computer proof-checking only shines a light on the situation. You cannot convince the computer by a story about pizza.

To formalize Euclid III.20, one has to define addition and subtraction of angles; Euclid thought that “taken together” was clear enough without a definition. It was a common notion, applying to any kind of “thing,” geometric or not. This was not an “operation” in the modern sense, so the questions of commutativity and associativity were not considered. But they now require proof. Since Euclid had no notation for addition (of any kind of object), his notation was completely relational; that is, he had to say $ABC$ and $abc$ taken together are equal to $PQR$, since he could not say $ABC + abc$. Algebraic (functional) notation for addition and multiplication was introduced some 1800 years after Euclid. To discuss the sum of four angles with different order and associativity is extremely awkward in Euclid’s notation, which was, of course, reflected in our formal notation since we purposely tried to match our notation to Euclid’s.

Whether we take angles as primitive (as Hilbert did) or defined (as we do, and Tarski did) doesn’t matter very much for the formalization of Euclid, as if one takes angles as defined, then one proves their basic properties and from then on things look pretty much the same as if angles were primitive. The exact choice of axiom system is not philosophically or mathematically important (though it might make certain proofs easier or harder); what is important is the complete precision of detailed proofs.

5. THE SAS CONGRUENCE THEOREM AND THE 5-SEGMENT AXIOM.

Euclid attempted, in Proposition I.4, to prove the side-angle-side criterion for triangle congruence (SAS). But his “proof” appeals to the invariance of triangles under rigid motions, about which there is nothing in his axioms, so for centuries it has been recognized that in effect SAS is an axiom, not a theorem.

Before discussing SAS, we discuss the notion of triangle congruence. Euclid does not define either “triangle” or “congruent triangles,” but taking I.4 to define the SAS criterion, the conclusion includes the pairwise equality of corresponding sides, and the pairwise equality of corresponding angles. As we discussed in Section 4, equality of angles is taken as a defined notion, rather than primitive. With the definitions given there, if two triangles have all pairs of corresponding sides equal, they automatically have corresponding angles equal too. Hence SAS needs only to mention the equality of corresponding sides in its conclusion. Moreover, two of those pairs of sides are equal by hypothesis, so the conclusion of SAS just needs to be one equality of lines. Next we discuss how to formulate SAS without explicitly mentioning angles.

To do that, we use an axiom known as the “five-line axiom.” This axiom is illustrated in Figure 4. The point of this axiom is to express SAS without mentioning angles at all. To understand the relationship of SAS to the five-line axiom, let us express Euclid I.4 (which is SAS) using Figure 4. The hypothesis is that $db = DB, dc = DC$, and angles $dbc$ and $DBC$ in Figure 4 are equal. The conclusion is that $dc = DC$. The point of the 5-line axiom is to replace the hypothesis “angle $dbc$ and $DBC$ are equal” by the hypothesis that triangles $abd$ and $ABD$ are congruent, i.e., $ab = AB, bd = BD$, and $ad = AD$. To rephrase the matter: The hypothesis of the five-line axiom expresses the congruence (equality, in Euclid’s phrase) of angles $dbc$ and $DBC$ by means of the congruence of the exterior triangles $abd$ and $ABD$.

It is not difficult to derive Euclid’s I.4 from the five-line axiom. It is also not difficult to derive the five-line axiom from I.4. So, it just a choice whether to take the five-line axiom, or I.4, as an axiom, and after deriving one from the other, it makes little
Figure 4. If the four solid lines on the left are equal to the corresponding solid lines on the right, then the dashed lines are also equal.

difference to the subsequent development. We chose to follow Tarski in using the five-line axiom, since it can be stated succinctly using the primitive notions of the language (without abbreviations).

This version of the five-line axiom was introduced by Tarski, although we have changed nonstrict betweenness to strict betweenness.15

6. LINE-CIRCLE AND CIRCLE-CIRCLE CONTINUITY. Euclid’s first proposition, Proposition I.1, constructs an equilateral triangle by drawing two circles of radius $AB$ with centers at $A$ and $B$, respectively. A meeting point of these circles is a point $C$ equidistant from $A$ and $B$. But why do the circles meet? Euclid smuggles the point $C$ into the proof by using a “definite description”: “the point $C$ at which the circles cut one another.” The modern consensus is that this is a case of a “missing axiom.” We have to supply the circle-circle continuity axiom, according to which, if one circle has points inside and outside the other circle, then the two circles meet.16

The words inside and outside are defined as follows: $X$ is inside a circle centered at $O$ if $OX$ is less than some radius, and outside if $OX$ is greater than some radius. A radius is a line connecting the center with a point on the circle.

There is also the line-circle continuity axiom, asserting that if $A$ is inside a circle, and $P$ is any point different from $A$, then there are two points collinear with $AP$ lying on the circle, and one of them has $A$ between it and $P$. This axiom is needed twice in Euclid Book I, in I.2 and I.12, where the “dropped perpendicular” to a line from a point not on the line is constructed by drawing a sufficiently large circle, which must meet the line in two points, forming a line whose perpendicular bisector is the desired perpendicular.

These axioms are used seldom, but crucially, in Euclid. Specifically, circle-circle is used in Euclid I.1, which is the “bootstrap” proposition for the first ten; it is used again in I.22, to construct a triangle out of three given lines. And dropped perpendiculars, constructed by line-circle, are of course fundamental.

In modern times it has been shown that, using only the other axioms, line-circle implies circle-circle and vice versa. The only purely geometric proof known of these facts makes use of the “radical axis” and is a little complicated; see [18]. According to the principle “if it can be proved, it should be proved,” we should have just taken one of these axioms; but instead we took both line-circle and circle-circle. Had we taken only one, we would have not been proof-checking Euclid, but proof-checking...
the modern theorems about the radical axis. That could clearly be done, but would not have added anything significant.

There is another axiomatic question about line-circle and circle-circle. They were mentioned by Tarski in his original paper, but not included in his full axiom list; he probably thought they followed from his Dedekind-style continuity schema (A11), which asserts that first-order Dedekind cuts are filled. This seems plausible until you actually try to prove it. But to do so you need to drop perpendiculars to a line, and to do that you need, if you follow Euclid, circle-circle intersection. So the argument is circular. This is fixed by appealing to the 1965 thesis of Gupta [17], whose proofs were finally published in [35]. Gupta showed, amazingly, how to construct both dropped and erected perpendiculars without using circles at all. So it does turn out to be correct to omit circle-circle in favor of (A11), but Tarski certainly didn’t have a proof of that in 1927 or even 1959.

7. BOOK ZERO. It may surprise the reader when I say that even after the point $C$ in Proposition I.1 has been admitted to exist, there is yet another defect in Euclid’s proof. Namely, although we now know $AC = AB = BC$, in order to prove $ABC$ is a triangle, we must also prove that $A$, $B$, and $C$ are not collinear. To prove this we used a lemma we called \textit{partnotequalwhole}: if $BABC$ then $AB \neq AC$.\footnote{The name of the lemma is taken from Euclid’s Common Notion 5; but Euclid does not cite CN5, in I.1 or anywhere else, and De Risi [10] after careful study reaches the conclusion that the original Euclid had only the first three of the five common notions given in the Heath translation. It seems, however, that he should have had CN5, and should have cited it in I.1.} The proof needs nine inferences, starting with Euclid’s extension axiom to extend $ABC$ to another point $D$ left of $A$, i.e., with $B D A B$. Then we need to show that $DABC$ occur in that order, in particular $B D A C$, using one of the lemmas about betweenness alluded to in the section on betweenness. These lemmas are part of what we might call “Book Zero”; Book Zero contains infrastructure that is more fundamental than the propositions of Book I. It consists of the betweenness lemmas, several lemmas with a similar flavor to \textit{partnotequalwhole}, and several trivial lemmas that reflect the fact that we represented lines as pairs of points. Thus if $AB = CD$, we also have $BA = CD$ and $AB = DC$, expressing the fact that these are unordered lines, not vectors.

The fundamental properties of collinearity and noncollinearity, which are never mentioned in Euclid, should also be considered part of Book Zero.

8. PASCH’S AXIOM. Pasch [26] not only introduced betweenness, but also the axiom that later was given his name.\footnote{Specifically, Kernsatz IV, [26, p. 20]. Pasch called his axioms “Kernsätze.” The “kernel” of a theory consisted of kernel concepts and kernel theorems, but Pasch had a modern understanding of completeness and consistency, as p. 18 indicates.}

Pasch’s axiom (Figure 5) says that if $ABC$ is a triangle, and line $DE$ lies in a plane with $ABC$ and meets $AB$ in a point $F$ between $D$ and $E$, then $DE$ or an extension of $DE$ meets $AC$ or $BC$.\footnote{In fact the axiom was formulated two centuries earlier by Roberval; see [8, p. 632, axiom C18, and discussion p. 615]. One may wonder why it took two millenia for this axiom to be formulated. See [9] for a penetrating historical and philosophical discussion of that question. In Pasch’s statement, the first “between” here used “innerhalb” and so was strict; the second did not use “innerhalb” so was not strict betweenness. Pasch used both.)}

Pasch’s requirement that $DE$ lie in a plane with $ABC$ of course cannot be dropped, since the line might not lie in the plane of the triangle. In order to drop that hypothesis, obtaining a statement that mentions only betweenness, one must strengthen the
hypothesis so that the line certainly lies in the plane of the triangle. There are two ways to do this, resulting in axioms known as “outer Pasch” and “inner Pasch.” See Figure 5. In Pasch’s own axiom (and figure) there is no requirement for point $E$ to be collinear with $BC$; that was added by Peano to make the coplanarity hypothesis explicit.

These planar forms of Pasch’s axiom were invented by Peano and published in 1889, seven years after Pasch.\textsuperscript{20}

Inner Pasch has a certain symmetry: In Figure 5, we could just as well have shaded triangle $BEF$ instead of triangle $BAC$. One soon becomes accustomed to noticing (and shading) the whole quadrilateral.

Gupta’s thesis (which contained enough material for three theses) contains proofs that outer Pasch implies inner Pasch, and vice versa, using the other axioms (but not continuity). Of course Euclid, who never mentions betweenness, did not explicitly use either version of Pasch, but they both came up naturally when we formalized Euclid. As with the continuity axioms, we could have picked just one, but then we would have been proof-checking Gupta’s thesis, in addition to Euclid; so we just took both inner and outer Pasch as axioms. The need for the Pasch axioms is pervasive: we used inner Pasch 36 times and outer Pasch 31 times in formalizing Euclid Book I.

It is instructive to see how inner and outer Pasch are needed to provide infrastructure for Euclid. We illustrate with Proposition I.16, the exterior angle inequality. That proposition says,

\begin{quote}
In any triangle, if one of the sides be produced, the exterior angle is greater than any of the interior and opposite angles.
\end{quote}

Refer to Figure 6. $ABC$ is the triangle and $ACD$ is the exterior angle, which is asserted to be greater than angle $BAC$ and greater than angle $ABC$. To prove that, Euclid constructs $F$ with $EF = EB$, and proves triangle $AEB$ is equal to triangle $CEF$, so in order to prove that angle $ACD > BAC$ it suffices to prove that $ECF < ACD$. Euclid justified that with Common Notion 5, the whole is greater than the part. But long before Pasch, one might have objected, how do we know that angle $ECF$ actually \textit{is} a part of $ACD$? That question needs the same answer that the modern definition of angle ordering requires: the construction of the point $H$. In the proof we gave, inner Pasch is used to construct $H$, as shown in the figure.

\textsuperscript{20} Axiom XIII in [27] is outer Pasch, with $Babc$ written as $b \in ac$. Axiom XIV is inner Pasch. Peano wrote everything in formal symbols only, and eventually bought his own printing press to print his books himself. See [22].
One can also prove I.16 from outer Pasch, instead of inner Pasch. It requires two applications of outer Pasch, as shown in Figure 7.

9. ANGLE BISECTION. Euclid I.9 gives a construction to bisect a given angle $\angle PQR$. Namely, lay off equal segments on the two sides of the angle, connect their endpoints $AB$, and use I.1 to construct an equilateral triangle $ABC$. Then $QC$ is the angle bisector. Ah, but to determine a line, we must have $Q \neq C$. And if the original triangle is equilateral, $C$ will be $Q$. So what then? Well, says the devil, then just take the other intersection point of the two circles in Proposition I.1. That is, we should modify the circle-circle continuity axiom to say there are two points of intersection of the circle. All right, let us suppose that is done. Then we confront the real difficulty of the proof: why is $QC$ the angle bisector? In fact, why does it even lie in the plane of angle $\angle PQR$?

For this proposition to be correct, the definition of the bisector of an angle must say that there are points $U$ and $V$ on the sides of the angle, and the bisector connects the vertex with some point between $U$ and $V$. Now, even if we assume there are two equilateral triangles on $AB$, and one of them has a third vertex $C$ different from $Q$, there is no apparent reason why $QC$ must meet $AB$, as the revised hypothesis requires.

Proclus already pointed out and attempted to repair some of these difficulties in 450 CE, see [28, p. 214] and Heath’s commentary on I.9 [14]. Of course Proclus did not have Pasch’s axiom at his disposal; but his proof is easily completed using inner Pasch. See Figure 8. (In that figure, we shade the whole quadrilateral formed by the four points to which inner Pasch is applied, since the choice of three of them is arbitrary.)

Proclus observes that triangles $ABE$ and $BAD$ are equal (congruent), since angles $EAB$ and $DBA$ are equal by Proposition I.5. Then $AF$ and $BF$ are equal, by I.6. Then triangles $ACF$ and $BCF$ are equal. Then (by definition of equal angles) $CF$ is the desired bisector.

After that, we can proceed directly from Proclus’s proof of I.09 to I.10, since the midpoint of $AB$ can be constructed with one more application of inner Pasch, as shown in the second part of Figure 8.
Proclus also noticed and repaired the problem that it needs to be proved that $F$ lies in the interior of the angle. Since Proclus did not have inner Pasch available, he made another argument; but inner Pasch solves that problem too, as well as the problem of showing that the bisector lies in the plane of the angle, which neither Proclus nor Heath noticed.\footnote{In [2], not having studied Proclus enough, we used instead a proof from Gupta’s 1965 thesis [17], which can also be seen as Lemma 7.25 in [35]. With the same figure, Gupta proves that $M$ is the midpoint of line $AB$. We used Gupta’s proof to prove Euclid I.10 (line bisection) and then used I.10 to prove I.09. But Gupta’s proof is complicated, because it avoids using circles. Proclus’s proof is simpler, and allows us to preserve Euclid’s order of the propositions.}

10. TWO DIMENSIONS OR THREE? Euclid Books I–IV are commonly thought to be about plane geometry, but consider:

- There is a definition of plane.
- The definition of parallel mentions that the two lines must be in the same plane.
- There is no “dimension axiom,” such as Tarski’s axiom that three points each equidistant from points $P, Q$ must be collinear, which guarantees that all points lie in a plane.
- In the last Book, Euclid takes up the Platonic solids, and certainly uses the results of Book I.

Nevertheless all the diagrams in Books I–IV appear to be planar figures. We conclude that Euclid’s intention was to present theorems (and proofs) that are valid in every plane. Remember that Euclid did not have our modern conception of “model” of a geometrical theory. There was just one true space, and it was three-dimensional, containing many planes.

But there are several places in Book I where this seems to have been forgotten. For example, Proposition 7 says that if $ABC$ and $ABD$ are two triangles with $AC = AD$ and $BC = BD$, and $C$ and $D$ are on the same side of $AB$, then $C = D$. The figure Euclid gives is supposed to be impossible, but as soon as you remember it might be in three dimensions, it looks very possible. It is saved from being mistaken by the hypothesis mentioning “same side,” which forces the diagram to be planar; but Euclid did not define “same side,” nor did he use that hypothesis in the proof. The definition of “same side” is discussed below; for now we are focusing on the dimension issue.

Euclid’s last definition in Book I is

Parallel straight lines are straight lines which, being in the same plane and being produced indefinitely in both directions, do not meet one another in either direction.

The inclusion of the requirement that the lines be in the same plane shows that Euclid’s omission of a dimension axiom was not a simple oversight: he meant to allow...
Figure 9. AB and CD are coplanar, as witnessed by RSPQH.

Figure 10. Transversal pq makes alternate interior angles equal with L and K, if pt = tq and rt = st.

for the possibility that lines might *not* lie in the same plane. But he did not define “lie in the same plane.” Whatever Euclid meant by his definition, he found it obvious that if AB is parallel to CD, then CD is parallel to AB. I say that because this fact is used (in the proof of Proposition I.30) without even being mentioned (let alone proved). This property is called the “symmetry of parallelism.”

We repair this omission by defining two (distinct) lines AB and CD to lie in the same plane if they are linked by a “crisscross” configuration, as shown in Figure 9.

With this definition of “coplanar,” we can take Euclid’s definition of “parallel” literally: AB is parallel to CD if they are coplanar and do not meet. This definition makes the symmetry of parallelism an immediate consequence, and it also makes it evident that if AB is parallel to CD, and any or all of the four points are moved along their respective lines to new (distinct) positions, then AB is still parallel to CD. 22

Euclid’s Postulate 5, the “parallel postulate,” mentions the concepts of alternate interior angles, and the concept that the two angles on the same side of a transversal “make together” more than or less than two right angles. The intention clearly is that the lines involved all lie in the same plane, which will have to somehow involve intersection points of some lines. It is sometimes possible to reduce theorems about angles directly to statements about points and the equality relation between segments. In particular, it is not necessary to develop the theory of angle ordering to state Euclid’s parallel postulate. In Figure 10, we show how to translate the concept “equal alternating interior angles” into the formal language we used.

Another place where Euclid forgot about three dimensions is in Proposition I.9, the bisection of an angle. This proof was discussed above, but here we take up the 3-dimensional aspect of it. The problem is that the equilateral triangle constructed by Proposition I.1 should introduce a new point by its vertex, not just give back the original angle’s vertex. One may wish to take “the other” equilateral triangle, but Proposition I.1 only says there is one, not two. But in the absence of a dimension axiom,

22 We define “Tarski-parallel” by “AB and CD do not meet, and C and D lie on the same side of AB.” This is clearly not what Euclid intended, as to Euclid it seems obvious that if AB is parallel to CD then CD is parallel to AB, but it requires the plane separation theorem to prove that about Tarski-parallel. On the other hand, the two definitions can be proved equivalent. It follows that if AB and CD are parallel then A and B are on the same side of CD, which is quite often actually necessary, but never remarked by Euclid. This is another example of “infrastructure.”
there is a whole circle \( C \) of intersection points, on the plane that bisects \( AB \). In the absence of a dimension axiom, we have to think of circles as spheres. The circle-circle axiom is still valid, but even if we assume the two intersection points are on a diameter of that circle \( C \), it might be tilted out of the plane of \( PQR \). I do not say that Euclid had that mental picture; only that he did not have a dimension axiom, and apparently quite purposely, so that we who formalize his work must remember that there is no dimension axiom.

Euclid does not define “rectangle.” One would like to define it as a quadrilateral with four right angles. It is a theorem that such a figure must lie in a plane. However, the proofs we found involve reasoning “in three dimensions.” Even though Euclid Book I has no dimension axiom, and we must therefore be careful not to assume one, nevertheless all the proofs in Book I deal with planar configurations. We therefore define “rectangle” to be a quadrilateral with four right angles, whose diagonals cross, that is, meet in a point. This condition is one way of specifying that a rectangle lies in a plane. We can then prove that a rectangle is a parallelogram.

Euclid defines a square to be a quadrilateral with at least one right angle, in which all the sides are equal. But in I.46 and I.47 the proofs work as if the definition required all four angles to be right, so we take that as the definition. He does not specify that all four vertices lie in the same plane. This is not trivial to prove, but we did prove it, so Euclid’s definition does not require modification.

11. SIDES OF A LINE AND THE CROSSBAR THEOREMS. We have already discussed Proposition I.7, which mentions the undefined “same side” but never uses it in the proof. Since Euclid never defined same side, there is no obvious way to fix it. Hilbert worked in plane geometry in the strong sense, so he did not need to define same side in a way that works in space.

That notion was, apparently, first defined by M. Pasch in 1882 [26, p. 27], but only under the assumption that the points lie in the same plane. To remove co-planarity as a primitive notion from the definition was first done by Tarski (as far as I can determine). He defined two points \( a \) and \( b \) to be on opposite sides of \( pq \) if there is a point between \( a \) and \( b \) collinear with \( pq \), and defined \( a \) and \( b \) to be on the same side of \( pq \) if they are both on the opposite side of \( pq \) from the same point \( c \). (See Figure 11.)

Once these concepts are defined, one can use (both inner and outer) Pasch to prove the plane separation theorem: if \( C \) and \( D \) are on the same side of \( AB \), and \( D \) and \( E \) are on opposite sides of \( AB \), then \( C \) and \( E \) are on opposite sides. Since neither Pasch nor “same side” occurs in Euclid, this is not a Euclidean theorem; it is infrastructure provided by Tarski and Szmielew, 2300 years later. Yet we needed it to correct the proofs of not only Euclid I.7, but also Propositions 11, 27, 28, 29, 30, 35, 42, 44, 45, 46, and 47. These corrections would still be required even if we did add a dimension...
A similar piece of infrastructure, also closely related to Pasch’s axiom, is the crossbar theorem. See Figure 12.

This theorem says that if $P$ is a point in the interior of angle $ABC$ (which means that $P$ lies between two points $U$ and $V$ on the rays $BA$ and $BC$, respectively), and if $J$ and $K$ are any two points on those rays, then the ray $BP$ will meet the “crossbar” $JK$ in some point $X$. If Euclid needs such a point, he simply says that $BP$ is “drawn through” to $X$. One place where the crossbar theorem is needed is to prove the uniqueness of the angle bisector. To the modern mathematical eye, having proved existence of angle bisectors, the next question should be the uniqueness of the angle bisector. This never occurs as a proposition in Euclid, and its omission causes no harm in Book I. But it is definitely required to fix the proof of III.20, and it takes more than 110 inferences, most of which are “infrastructure” steps, concerning the collinearity or noncollinearity of points, the equality of various angles, the transitivity of the less-than relation on angles, etc. These are all things that Euclid usually did not mention.

There are several versions of the crossbar theorem. More than one version is needed, because sometimes we need to know the order of the points $BPX$. If we assume $BUI$ and $BVK$, then the conclusion can be strengthened to $BPX$; another version has those betweenness relations reversed. One is proved with two applications of inner Pasch, the other with two applications of outer Pasch. But sometimes we do not know the order of the points $BUJ$, so we need the version stated with rays, too.

All this infrastructure is required because of the modern insistence on requiring the existence of points to be proved, rather than producing the required points by “drawing through.”

12. EUCLID 4: ALL RIGHT ANGLES ARE EQUAL Over the centuries there were many claims that Euclid 4 is a theorem, and hence should not be taken as a postulate. For example, we find a proof already in Proclus (450 CE) [28, p. 148], illustrated in Figure 13.

Assume that $ABC$ and $DEF$ are right angles. Proclus says, “If $DE$ be made to coincide with $AB$, the line $EF$ will fall within the angle, say, at $BG$.” Then $H$ and $K$ are constructed, and we have $ABC = ABH < ABK = ABG < ABC$, so $ABC < ABC$, which is impossible. It is the first step that is problematic: the proof
appears to depend on the invariance of angles under a rigid motion, the same flaw that bedevils Euclid’s “proof” of SAS in I.4. The remedy for that is the angle-copying Proposition I.23. But Euclid appealed to Postulate 4 in proving I.23. Thus Proclus’s proof is not correct as it stands. Moreover, the proof culminates by saying it is impossible that $ABC < ABC$. Euclid never proved it; apparently he considered it to be part of the common notion “the part is less than the whole.” In our formalization, this theorem is called \textit{angletrichotomy}. And its (rather lengthy at 463 lines) proof uses I.23.\footnote{Hilbert smuggled this principle into his axiom system without explicit mention, by postulating the uniqueness of the copied angle in his angle-copying axiom.} So there is a second circularity in Proclus’s proof, from the modern point of view. Our formalization followed Szmielew’s proof, probably discovered at Berkeley in the 1960s, but published only in 1983 [35]; see especially Satz 10.12. The idea of Szmielew’s proof is not so different from Proclus’s, but she replaced the illegal rigid-motion argument with a careful study of isometries, including reflections in a point or in a line. Rotations can be built from reflections in lines. Of course, this has to be done without Postulate 4. Szmielew’s Satz 10.12 is this: If two right angles have corresponding legs equal, then the hypotenuses are also equal. That theorem is easily seen to be equivalent to Postulate 4. The idea of the proof is to construct an isometry that takes the corresponding legs onto each other. First a translation brings the two vertices together, say at point $b$. Then a rotation makes one leg coincide with the corresponding leg. This amounts to a correct formalization of Proclus’s first step, without a circularity.

In [2], we followed Szmielew, but in doing so, used Euclid’s construction of perpendiculars based on line-circle and circle-circle continuity. Szmielew did it without circles, using Gupta’s circle-free construction of perpendiculars from his thesis [17].

13. EQUAL FIGURES. The word \textit{area} almost never occurs in Euclid’s \textit{Elements}, despite the fact that area is clearly a fundamental notion in geometry. Instead, Euclid speaks of “equal figures.” Apparently a “figure” is a simply connected polygon, or perhaps its interior. The notion is neither defined nor illustrated by a series of examples; for example, it is never made clear whether a figure has to be convex, or even whether a circle is a figure, or whether a figure has an interior, or is just made of lines.

The notion of “equal figures” plays a central role in Euclid. For example, the culmination of Book I is the Pythagorean theorem. Nowadays we would, if required to express the theorem without algebraic formulas, say that given a right triangle, the area of the square on the hypotenuse is the sum of the areas of the squares on the sides. But Euclid said instead, that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the squares on the sides, taken together. His proof shows how the two squares can be cut up into pieces that can be rearranged to make this equality of figures evident, given earlier propositions about equal figures.

Nor was Euclid alone in avoiding the word “area.” A century later when Archimedes calculated the area of a circle, he did not express his result by saying that the area of the circle is $\pi$ times the square of the radius. Instead, he said that circle is equal to the rectangle whose sides are the radius and half the circumference. (So a circle did count as a figure for Archimedes!)

Why did Euclid avoid the word \textit{area}? Not because he did not know that area can be measured; it must have been for more abstract, mathematical reasons. Let us consider his problem: if he were to use the word, he would either have to \textit{define} it, or put down some \textit{postulates} about it. Both choices offer some difficulties. Area involves assigning a \textit{number} to each figure, to measure its area. It is therefore not a purely geometric
Euclid’s proofs, starting from I.35, use the notion of “equal figures” without either definition or explicit axiomatization. He allows himself to paste equal triangles onto equal figures, concluding that the results are equal, and justifies it by the common notion \textit{if equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal}. He allows himself to cut equal triangles off of equal figures, and justifies it by \textit{if equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders are equal}. If, with a modern eye, we interpret “equal figures” to mean “figures with equal area,” these properties look like the additivity of area.

Common Notion 5, “the whole is greater than the part,” could be taken to imply that a figure cannot be equal to a part of itself, and Common Notion 4, “things which coincide with one another are equal to one another,” could be interpreted to imply that congruent figures are equal. Actually, Euclid needed one more property: halves of equal figures are equal, used in Proposition I.39. The step that (implicitly) uses that property occurs in Euclid’s text without justification.

We will give an example of how Euclid reasoned about equal figures, namely Euclid I.35. See Figure 14.

Euclid wants to prove the parallelograms $ABCD$ and $BCFE$ are equal. He proves the triangles $ABE$ and $DCF$ are congruent. Implicitly, he assumes $DEG$ and $DGE$ are equal figures (that is, the order of listing the vertices does not matter). Then “subtracting equals from equals,” the yellow quadrilaterals are equal. Then, “adding equals to equals,” he adds triangle $BCG$ (implicitly assuming $BCG$ is equal to $BGC$) to arrive at the desired conclusion.

Later generations of mathematicians were not willing to accept Euclid’s over-liberal interpretation of the common notions in support of “equal figures.” See the summary discussion with many references [14, pp. 327–328]. In particular, once mathematicians had some experience with axiomatization, it became obvious that “equal figures” is not a special case of equality, since equal figures cannot be substituted for each other in every property. Instead, it is a new relation, and the original choice that Euclid finessed faced us directly when we wanted to proof-check Euclid: we had either to define or to axiomatize the notion. We chose to axiomatize it. Following the lead of Hartshorne [18], we wrote down fifteen axioms for the three primitive notions of “equal triangles” and “equal quadrilaterals” and “triangle equal to quadrilateral.” No figures with more than four sides occur in Book I, so that was sufficient. These were “cut-and-paste” axioms as described above, plus two axioms (first invented by de Zolt, see [18]) saying that if you cut off something, the result is not equal to what you had before the cut.

14. MAKING FORMAL PROOFS READABLE. A proof has two purposes: to establish beyond doubt that a theorem is correct, and to communicate to a human

---

24We do not take space here to describe attempts to define it by Hilbert and others. See [1, 18] for a full discussion; [1] also gives a definition that “Euclid could have given.”
reader *why* it is correct. Our formal proofs improve on Euclid in the first respect, but in the second respect they need improvement. We address that issue now.

We begin by saying something about what it is like to formalize Euclid’s proofs. What one finds is that one needs a large number (more than sixty percent) of “invisible infrastructure” steps, proving statements that Euclid would take for granted because they appear so in the diagram. Let me give one example. Often to verify the hypotheses of some proposition or lemma we wish to apply, we need to know that an angle $ABC$ is equal to itself. Before we can write that down, we have to verify that the three points $A$, $B$, and $C$ are noncollinear, so that they really do form an angle. Euclid always takes that for granted if it appears so in the diagram, but it often requires many formal steps, using for example the lemma that if $A$, $B$, $C$ are noncollinear and $U$ and $V$ are distinct and both are collinear with $AB$, then $B$, $U$, $V$ are noncollinear. A chain of three or four applications of that lemma may be required to verify that a given triangle really is a triangle. After a while, one can do this “diagram chasing” as fast as one can type, but it means that the formal proofs are at least double the length of Euclid’s and contain many uninteresting steps. Euclid generally takes for granted statements of collinearity and betweenness that appear obvious in the diagram.

To address the problem of too many and too-detailed “infrastructure” steps, we created a list of “trivial” inferences, or more accurately trivial justifications, which are to be suppressed on output. For example, the application of lemmas about collinearity and noncollinearity. By putting more or fewer justifications on the “trivial list,” we can vary the “step-size” or “grain” of the output proofs. We call the result a “proof skeleton.” We found that with a suitable list of trivial steps, the proof skeletons contained Euclid’s steps, and only really essential additions (such as uses of Pasch’s axiom). For example, in Proposition I.16, the proof skeleton has 15 inferences, while the full formal proof has about 120 inferences, most of which are about collinearity, noncollinearity, and distinctness of points that appear distinct in the diagram.

A second obstacle to human readability is the fact that formal proofs contain only symbols (no words). Euclid used no symbols except names for points; so if we want to compare our proofs to Euclid’s, we ought to write them in Euclid’s way. We therefore experimented with machine-generating English-language proofs25 from our formal proofs, “in the style of Euclid.” Euclid’s natural language consists of a small number of stock phrases that connect the assertions. We wrote a script that translates proof skeletons (or proofs) into LATEX code for an English version of the proof. The script follows Euclid by prefacing each construction of a new point with a sentence about how it is constructed. For example, it inserts a phrase “Let $AC$ be bisected at $E$,” when Proposition I.10 (the midpoint theorem) is about to be applied. That script first extracts a proof skeleton by deleting trivial steps, and then produces a LATEX document, translating the proof into “Euclidean English.” In a few seconds, it processes all 245 formal proofs, producing a computer-generated version of Euclid Book I. Here we present just two samples from this document. The reader is invited to compare them with Euclid’s proofs. In particular, the proof of I.16 supplies the application of Pasch’s axiom that is missing from Euclid’s proof; and the proof of I.20 illustrates the formal treatment of angle ordering, appealing to a definition rather than Common Notion 5. These proofs demonstrate, I assert, that the translation from formal proofs to human-readable proofs, while it may be formidable for humans, is trivial for computers.26 The programs that make these transformations are short and simple, and were easy to write.

---

25 Greek-language proofs might have been more authentic. Output in any human language can be generated once the “stock phrases” are translated.

26 The other direction, from human-readable proofs to formal proofs, is far from trivial.
Proposition 20. In any triangle two sides taken together are greater than the third side.

Let $ABC$ be a triangle.

It is required to show that $BA$, $AC$ are together greater than $BC$.

Let $BA$ be produced in a straight line to $A$, making $AD$ equal to $CA$. Then

Triangle $ADC$ is isosceles with base $DC$.

Angle $ADC$ is equal to angle $DCA$.

Angle $DCB$ is greater than angle $ADC$.

Angle $BCD$ is greater than angle $CDB$.

$BD$ is greater than $BC$.

Q.E.D.

Proposition 16. In any triangle, if one of the sides be produced, the exterior angle is greater than either of the interior and opposite angles.

Let $ABC$ be a triangle, and let one side of it $BC$ be produced to $D$; then $C$ is between $B$ and $D$.

It is required to show that the exterior angle $ACD$ is greater than the interior and opposite angle $BAC$.\[27\]

Let $AC$ be bisected at $E$. Then

$E$ is between $A$ and $C$ and $EA$ is equal to $EC$.

Let $BE$ be produced in a straight line to $E$, making $EF$ equal to $EB$. Then

$E$ is between $B$ and $F$ and $EF$ is equal to $EB$.

Let $AC$ be produced in a straight line to $C$, making $CG$ equal to $EC$. Then

\[27\] I.16 asserts that the exterior angle is greater than both interior angles. Like Euclid, we here present only the proof for one exterior angle.
$C$ is between $A$ and $G$ and $CG$ is equal to $EC$. \[\text{extension}\]

Angle $BEA$ is equal to angle $CEF$. \[\text{[I.15]}\]

Angle $AEB$ is equal to angle $CEF$. \[\text{[equalangletransitive]}\]

$AB$ is equal to $CF$, and Angle $EAB$ is equal to angle $ECF$, and Angle $EBA$ is equal to angle $EFC$. \[\text{[I.4]}\]

Angle $BAC$ is equal to angle $BAE$. \[\text{[equalangleshelper]}\]

Angle $BAC$ is equal to angle $EAB$. \[\text{[equalangletransitive]}\]

Angle $BAC$ is equal to angle $ECF$. \[\text{[equalangletransitive]}\]

Angle $ECF$ is equal to angle $ACF$. \[\text{[equalangleshelper]}\]

Angle $BAC$ is equal to angle $ACF$. \[\text{[equalangletransitive]}\]

Let $CF$ and $ED$ meet at $H$. Then $H$ is between $D$ and $E$ and $H$ is between $F$ and $C$. \[\text{[Pasch-inner]}\]

Angle $BAC$ is equal to angle $ACH$. \[\text{[equalangleshelper]}\]

Angle $BAC$ is equal to angle $ACF$. \[\text{[equalangleshelper]}\]

Angle $BAC$ is equal to angle $ACH$. \[\text{[equalangletransitive]}\]

Angle $ACD$ is greater than angle $BAC$. \[\text{[defn:anglelessthan]}\]

Q.E.D.

In these examples, only the italicized informal statement at the top and the diagram are human-generated. The rest, including all the English, all the references, and the typesetting, is machine-generated. At last, we have achieved, and certified by computer, the goal that Gerolamo Saccheri stated in the title of his 1733 book, *Euclid Vindicated from Every Blemish*.\[^{28}\]

15. EUCLID VINDICATED. Table 1 compares Euclid’s *Elements* (Books I–IV) with the changes we made in formalizing Euclid.

Table 2 shows some of the propositions in Book I that needed corrections. We do not include as “corrections” the provision of “infrastructure” steps about collinearity and noncollinearity, nor elementary reasoning about betweenness, nor the many cases where Pasch was needed, or some lemmas had to be proved, nor proofs where Euclid treated only one of several cases (for example I.35).

16. CONCLUSIONS. The two most characteristic features of Euclid are geometrical diagrams, and chains of logical reasoning about those diagrams. The exact relation between these two features has been a concern of every thoughtful reader of Euclid, right from the beginning. The reasoning is guided by the diagram; but sometimes it is led astray by the diagram, too! It took two millennia to separate the two features, inventing *symbolic logic*—meaningless chains of symbols representing correct inferences made according to precise rules. As the logician J. Barkley Rosser expressed it [\text{30}, p. 7]:

This does not mean that it is now any easier to discover a proof for a difficult theorem. This still requires the same high order of mathematical talent as before. However, once the proof is discovered, and stated in symbolic logic, it can be checked by a moron.

It can even be checked by a computer. Rosser’s teacher, Kleene, was once asked why he wrote his proofs so formally. He replied, “How else can I be sure they are right?” And that is the most obvious, and most important, result of proof-checking Euclid: Now we are sure that the proofs are correct. Though some of the gaps and

\[^{28}\] Other translators have chosen *Euclid Freed of Every Flaw*. The title above is the one chosen by De Risi. [\text{33}]
### Table 1. Changes to Propositions and Axioms.

| Issue | Euclid | Changes made |
|-------|--------|--------------|
| Postulate IV | long thought provable | proved by Szmielew |
| Postulate V | “in the same plane” | supplied definition |
| betweenness notion | “alternate interior angles” | added |
| connectivity axiom | missing | identity, symmetry, and transitivity |
| betweenness axioms | missing | proved |
| betweenness, basic theorems | missing | added Tarski’s definition |
| definition of “same side” | missing | 3, 5 proved; 4 dropped |
| 2 or 3 dimensions? | “in any plane” | defined notion |
| Pasch | missing axiom | defined notion |
| line-circle and circle-circle | missing axioms | proved, instead |
| common notions for lines | | of assumed |
| equality of angles | primitive notion | |
| less than for angles | primitive notion (?) | |
| common notions for angles | | |
| equal figures | no definition or axioms | added 15 axioms |
| rectangle definition | omitted | four right angles |
| | | and diagonals meet |

### Table 2. Corrections to Proofs (refer to Euclid’s diagrams).

| Prop. Description | Difficulty | Correction |
|-------------------|------------|------------|
| I.1 equilateral triangle | existence of C | circle-circle |
| I.1 equilateral triangle | $ABC$ might be collinear | connectivity axiom |
| I.4 SAS | superposition | 5-line axiom |
| I.7 triangle uniqueness | same side not defined | use Tarski’s definition |
| I.7 triangle uniqueness | angle trichotomy | proved as theorem |
| I.9 angle bisection | $A$ and $F$ might coincide | use Proclus’s proof |
| I.12 dropped perpendicular | Why do $G$ and $E$ exist? | line-circle |
| I.16 exterior angle | Why is $ECD > ECF$? | Pasch |
| I.22 triangle construction | why does $K$ exists? | circle-circle |
| I.22 triangle construction | why does $DE$ meet circles? | line-circle |
| I.27 parallel construction | “alternate angles” undefined | $AD$ and $EF$ must meet |
| I.32 exterior angle | see I.16 | diagonals must meet |
| I.33 parallelogram constr. | “same direction” | an equal-figures axiom |
| I.35 parallelograms | Why is $DEG = EGD$? | equal-figures axioms |
| I.35 parallelograms | several other steps | use Tarski’s definition |
| I.39 equal triangles | same-side undefined, unused | changed definition |
| I.46 square definition | definition doesn’t match use | |
errors we uncovered were known for a long time, others were not, so mere human checking did not really do the job.

One striking feature of these formal proofs is that they are longer than the proofs mathematicians write, usually by a factor of about four. I have called those extra steps “infrastructure.” In Euclid they are mostly about collinearity, noncollinearity, and betweenness. They represent facts that a human reader infers from the diagram and takes for granted without explicit proof. Even when we think we are checking a proof carefully, we are skipping many necessary small steps, jumping over those steps to reach a conclusion that we believe on some other grounds, for example, on the appearance of a diagram. When we see that the evidence of our eyes or intuition (the diagram) is confirmed by the successful completion of a long chain of logical reasoning, that produces a feeling of satisfaction that is the heart of mathematics. That’s why eleven-year old Bertrand Russell called Euclid “delicious.” Neither a diagram without reasoning, nor a meaningless chain of inferences, deserves the name, “mathematics.”

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. I am indebted to John Baldwin, Pierre Boutry, Erwin Engeler, Vincenzo De Risi, Julien Narboux, Victor Pambuccian, Dana Scott, Albert Visser, and Freek Wiedijk, for many conversations and emails about Euclid and formalization. I dedicate this paper in memoriam to Marvin Jay Greenberg, who first introduced me to axiomatic geometry.

ORCID
Michael Beeson  http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9259-1220

REFERENCES
[1] Beeson, M. (2020). On the notion of equal figures in Euclid. arxiv.org/abs/2008.12643
[2] Beeson, M., Narboux, J., Wiedijk, F. (2019). Proof-checking Euclid. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 85(2): 213–257. doi.org/10.1007/s10472-018-9606-x
[3] Beeson, M., Wos, L. (2017). Finding proofs in Tarskian geometry. J. Automat. Reason. 58(1): 181–207.
[4] Boutry, P. (2018). On the Formalization of Foundations of Geometry. Ph.D. thesis. Univ. of Strasbourg.
[5] Boutry, P., Braun, G., Narboux, J. (2017). Formalization of the arithmetization of Euclidean plane geometry and applications. J. Symbolic Comput. 90(1): 149–168.
[6] Boutry, P., Gries, C., Narboux, J., Schreck, P. (2019). Parallel postulates and continuity axioms: a mechanized study in intuitionistic logic using Coq. J. Automat. Reason. 62(1): 1–68. doi.org/10.1007/s10817-017-9422-8
[7] Braun, G., Narboux, J. (2017). A synthetic proof of Pappus’ theorem in Tarski’s geometry. J. Automat. Reason. 58(2): 209–230. doi.org/10.1007/s10817-016-9374-4
[8] De Risi, V. (2016). The development of Euclidean axiomatics. Archive for History of Exact Sciences. 70(6): 591–676. doi.org/10.1007/s00407-015-0173-9
[9] De Risi, V. (2019). Leibniz on the continuity of space. In: V. De Risi, ed. Leibniz and the Structure of Sciences: Modern Perspectives on the History of Logic, Mathematics, Epistemology. Cham: Springer, pp. 111–169. doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25572-5_4
[10] De Risi, V. (forthcoming). Euclid’s common notions and the theory of equivalence. Foundations of Science: 1–24. doi.org/10.1007/s10699-020-09694-w
[11] Editors, C. R. (2014). The Library of Alexandria: The History and Legacy of the Ancient World’s Most Famous Library. Boston: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
[12] El-Abbadi, M. (2020). Library of Alexandria. Encyclopedia Britannica.
[13] Euclid. (1787). The Elements of Euclid, viz, the first six books, together with the eleventh and the twelfth, 7th ed. (Simson, R., trans.) Edinburgh: Nourse and Ballous. Available from Bibliotheque Nationale at gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k1163221v
[14] Euclid. (1956). The Thirteen Books of The Elements. (Heath, T. L., trans.) New York: Dover. Three volumes.
[15] Gelernter, H. (1963). Realization of a geometry theorem-proving machine. In: Feigenbaum, E., J. Feldman, J., eds., Computers and Thought. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 134–152.
[16] Gelernter, H., Hansen, J. R., Loveland, D. W. (1963). Empirical explorations of a geometry-theorem proving machine. In: Feigenbaum, E., J. Feldman, J., eds., Computers and Thought. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 153–167.
MICHAEL BEESON retired from San José State University in 2013. He has been studying the foundations of geometry since 2006. He is the author of the software MathXpert, various papers on automated deduction, the foundations of constructive mathematics, minimal surfaces, and triangles. See his web pages www.michaelbeeson.com and www.helpwithmath.com.

Department of Mathematics, San José State University, One Washington Square, San José, CA 95192, USA
beesonpublic@gmail.com