Preventing or Mitigating Adversarial Supply Chain Attacks: A Legal Analysis

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ABSTRACT
The world is currently strongly connected through both the internet at large, but also the very supply chains which provide everything from food to infrastructure and technology. The supply chains are themselves vulnerable to adversarial attacks, both in a digital and physical sense, which can disrupt or at worst destroy them. In this paper, we take a look at two examples of successful attacks to put the idea of Supply Chain Attacks into perspective, and analyse how EU and national law can prevent these attacks or otherwise punish companies which do not try to mitigate them at all possible costs. We find that the current types of national regulation are not technology specific enough, and cannot force or otherwise mandate the correct parties who could play the biggest role in preventing supply chain attacks to do everything in their power to mitigate them. But, current EU law is on the right path, and further development of this may be what is necessary to combat these large threats, as national law may fail at properly regulating companies when it comes to cybersecurity.

1 INTRODUCTION
Before the advent of widely adopted digital infrastructure systems, the biggest threats of information being stolen and by other means compromised was through the actions of its employees and from outside forces like spies and other intruders. By now, information as well as decisions can be altered, and even physical manifestations can be seen from these infiltration attempts and successes. Stuxnet [21], is an important and well known milestone that included physical consequences. It succeeded because it executed a serious of steps and actions and affected a monumental amount of physical and digital systems1. This kind of stepping stone approach where one intrusion gives the attacker(s) access to an entire system of systems [45], is similar to an attack on an entire supply chain or system. This will be the greatest threat to any infrastructure supported by computers, civilian, commercial or military [13]. Because of the potential consequences if a provider of security, or the individuals links of the supply chains themselves, are compromised, we are interested in uncovering the means which these companies can be held accountable.

A variety of research has been done on Supply Chain Attacks on an organisational, supply chain and security level, but current legal measures are not well explored in the literature, with some exceptions [24]. We will therefore comparatively analyse selected measures in several countries and the EU, both because of the diversity, but also because it gives a broad perspective and idea about how far we may be from properly regulating the risk of Supply Chain Attacks, as studying cybersecurity subjects is without a doubt complicated and interdisciplinary [26, 51].

Before this, we show two practical examples of Supply Chain Attacks to provide a practical angle to the abstract problem. The first occurred in 2020 without physical consequences to the company SolarWinds Inc., which provides systems for managing software and other products. One difference between it and Stuxnet was that this affected everything from public authorities, including foreign intelligence of several countries, to wealthy private companies. As of the time of writing, we are not entirely sure what the purpose or the gains of the attack was, other than the US Department of Justice Confirming the compromise of their mailing environment2.

1Sometimes defences against these are secured by projects and principles created a long time ago too, see https://krebs-on-security.com/2022/05/when-your-smart-id-card-reader-comes-with-malware/, last accessed 5 August 2022.

2See https://www.justice.gov/opcl/department-justice-statement-solarwinds-update, last accessed 5 August 2022.
The other example is the Kaseya Ransomware Attack\(^3\), where another type of security structure was compromised and used as a means to inject ransomware into the users of it. Unlike the SolarWinds Inc. Attack, it was not caused by an equally sophisticated payload, but by a vulnerability that was discovered earlier. Its effect on commercial and public enterprises, as well as its clear physical consequence by disabling card payment systems in 100s of physical stores\(^4\) makes it worth considering as an alternative to sophisticated attacks, which can cause the same type of damage.

In this paper, we do not attempt to solve or otherwise find the ideal type of regulation to end Supply Chain Attacks. We instead try to highlight the dangers and potential with the two cases, and then show what concrete law would apply in specific jurisdictions. In this sense, we do not analyse individual agreements between states and cybersecurity providers or other relevant contractors, which in practice could prevent or otherwise are vital to stop Supply Chain Attacks. Similarly, we will not discuss decrees, soft law, or procurement issues or solutions.

Section 2 discusses supply chains, and Section 3 elaborates on how Supply Chain Attacks can be understood and defined, contains the two aforementioned examples, and a small suggestion how to improve and add to existing frameworks and understandings of the concept. We follow this in Section 4 with an analysis of the current legal rules concerning the needed security within the EU and selected national law, and future problems which will arise with the increased use of IoT and CPS which apply to Supply Chain Attacks. In Section 5 we discuss future work, and finally we add some concluding remarks in Section 6.

We find that the two examples of Supply Chain Attacks illustrate two types of threats, either sophisticated and complicated attacks akin to Stuxnet, or simple abuse of exploits. This shows that simple attacks such as those found in Social Engineering \([7]\) are an equally big threat compared to expansively built custom malware by state actors. We also note that any future understandings of Supply Chain Attacks, be it on digital or physical supply chains, should use existing ideas of empirically recording and understanding threats, but should equally be open to anything from everywhere, since this is the security reality everyone faces, with the motivation of the adversary being paramount to not misunderstand. In the process of investigating whether the EU or the UK, Denmark or Ireland, who recently suffered from a severe Supply Chain Attack \([43]\), had any specific legislation built to prevent these, we found none in a literal sense, but we listed relevant cybersecurity legislation and the legal means to punish companies which potentially did not prevent failures of digital or physical supply chains caused by an adversarial attacks. While not anywhere near enough, these legal means are real. However, they all rely on guidance to define the technology or the concept of supply chains, which we find to be lacking and risky, just like it is a problem in other product or sector specific legislation. Finally, we criticise merely using fines, as this will not deter large companies, and suggest measures such as forceful closure or punitive punishments for directors or staff for how severe the impact of failing to mitigate or prevent Supply Chain Attacks is.

## 2 SUPPLY CHAINS

In Special Publication 800-37, the US authority National Institute of Standards and Technology define supply chains as: **Linked set of resources and processes between multiple tiers of developers that begins with the sourcing of products and services and extends through the design, development, manufacturing, processing, handling, and delivery of products and services to the acquirer.**

We note that the cybersecurity of digital as well as physical supply chains are also characterised by:

1. Excessive market tipping and monopolies.
2. Network effects.
3. Durability impacting complexity arising from software interdependencies.
4. Disintermediation of alternatives.
5. Lack of transparency.

First point is the notion of increased use of specific operating systems, security systems or other specialised software or service, which then leads to monopolies or oligopolies in certain fields \([17]\). We refer to \([16]\) for a historical but crucial perspective.

Second point stipulates the influence that products which have high user bases may cause, while the third shows the great weakness of the first two points. The complexity, or the lack thereof depending on the supply chain, will change and potentially lead to further weaknesses, and no standards or cybersecurity rules currently account for this. These usually rely on the corporate side to pick the right options or collaborations, but these may end up negatively impacting the durability and the safety of the supply chain if unsuitable.

The fourth point relies on poor competition legislation and competition in practice. If there is no way to easily explain and understand what software and service solutions might be the best for a specific supply chain, myriads of vulnerabilities and failures become close to inevitable. This plays into issues in both competition as well as agreement and purchase law in national jurisdictions.

Finally, the fifth point relates to the issue of the lack of transparency. Public accountability and clear evidence for auditing and future lawsuits should demand this, both \textit{ex ante} and \textit{ex post} for when the failures do occur. Furthermore, the very nature of any supply chain also cause reduced visibility, understanding, and control the further we move down \([6]\).

These factors lead to a highly oligopolised landscape, which impacts how they can be controlled. Earlier regulation of fields like encryption have not gone well \([20, 25, 3, 42]\).

## 3 SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACKS

The US Committee on National Security Systems, in CNSSI No. 4009, define Supply Chain Attacks as: **An incident where an adversary exploits vulnerabilities in the product or service supply network of the intended target.** In 2011, in a report made on behalf of Microsoft \([11, P. 10 - 16]\), four key areas were identified and deemed to be important to cyber supply chain management for states; risk-based approach, transparency, flexibility and reciprocity. Managing security, hardware and production chains is part of the first area, but it speaks

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\(^3\)https://www.zdnet.com/article/kaseya-ransomware-attack-what-we-know-now/, last accessed 5 August 2022.

\(^4\)https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/it-attacken-mot-coop-detta-har-hant, last accessed 5 August 2022.
against harshly legislating, and this is followed in the rest as well. Clearly, Microsoft wanted to indicate that government intervention should be kept at a minimal to keep their corporate influence high. Outside of this moot point, it shows that the debate was an equally high level more than ten years ago, and no other research indicates that the threat has lessened since then. Supply Chain Attacks are adversarial attacks on a supply chain. It is well defined because of its critical role, and has been discussed in detail in US government reports [37, 44]. These are not academic papers, which creates a need for scrutiny of the models proposed. Both of these suggest a framework to understand the patterns and the structural dangers that these attacks pose, and they do so on the basis of attacks that did occur, see the appendixes in the reports for patterns. While this is sound, it does not leave room for anything which is not foreseen. The essential assumption for Supply Chain Attacks is that they can occur in all levels of the supply chain [37, P. 7]. From subcontractor to software or hardware development, to the highest primary party, anyone is a valid target. Technological development and the mindset of the attacker has however changed drastically since 2013. Miller rightfully does not go into the risks which proprietary software or hardware poses, but this still plays a role [61]. Because these tools are not developed by anyone in the supply chain, but can be attacked regardless of who uses it and who developed it, they must be a separate point to include. Malicious insertions are stated as the primary adversarial attack used against the supply chain, and they will often be multi-staged. This is still very much true, but we now have a range of attacks that do not involve insertions at any point. This could be subversion of control of the CPS, leading to the destruction of goods or injuries [5]. For an overview of an area, see [1]. There would be no insertion into the software or hardware, but instead a manipulation of the communication channel to force the CPS to commit to orders not given by the user. Other authors do divide the attacks into categories. Eggers writes that Supply Chain Attacks depend on the area which is targeted. Theft of IP, malicious substitution, alterations, malicious insertion, tampering and manipulation are just some of the many types than can occur [18, P. 886], but they can classically be viewed as falling under the CIA triad. In this case, loss of confidentiality would cover the theft of IP, while loss of integrity would occur during substitution and alterations, and tampering and manipulation would cause real loss of availability. Areas such as nuclear infrastructure which she also handles [19], clearly require very high degrees of caution.

Following this, we must change the current assumptions concerning Supply Chain Attacks to the following, to include every aspect and generalise it:

1. Supply Chain Attacks can occur anywhere in the supply chain, and to any hardware or software in it, regardless of origin.
2. The attacks can be of any kind.
3. The goal of the attacks must be more than to breach a given system.

What makes this different from a single adversarial attack on one device or system, is that the aim is more than just initiation. The failure achieved on the system is therefore both the loss of for example integrity, but also the following loss of availability through ransomware or loss of confidentiality through privacy failures. We cannot quantify the goals of the attacker under most circumstances, because the perpetrators very rarely are identified, but we can derive them from their actions. Prevention or mitigation techniques include anything traditionally used against adversarial attacks, such as organisational measures, encryption and other classic measures. Of particular interest is mitigation at scale and through simulations and modelling [60, 59].

3.1 Selected Examples

We will in this section take a closer look at two recent Supply Chain attacks. One targeted all types of sectors, while the other was more focused on commercial targets.

3.1.1 Sunburst Backdoor. The first to discover this adversarial failure was the company FireEye, who in their report from 13 December 2020⁴ outline what their concerns are⁵ [14]. The start of the attack was an update of the Orion IT monitoring and management software. Instead of a valid update, the users downloaded a trojan, and this occurred multiple times between March and May in 2020. What characterizes a trojan is its deceptive nature, with the original reference to the wooden horse used by the Greek Army in the Aeneid by Virgil against the Trojans, to leave and hide soldiers inside, describing its purpose precisely. It included legitimate files except for one, the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll component, a dynamic-linked library file. These cannot be used on their own, and must be called up to have any function. This file would then be actively used by the legitimate SolarWinds.BusinessLayer executable file after a two week delay to enable the Sunburst backdoor. Before making contact back to the adversary, the trojan checks for anti-virus and other countermeasures, and a range of information about the machine that it is on. A very peculiar detail in this, is that it wants to avoid certain environments that are likely inside of SolarWinds Inc., and if it identifies that it is there, it will exit and cease to function after erasing its presence. This shows how specific the attack was, and how much the adversary wanted to avoid detection, but it was identified 7 months after its first entry into a client system by FireEye. The trojan mimicks natural SolarWinds API communication, which then enables it to connect to a domain that is controlled by the adversary, a so called command and control domain (C2). The trojan then tries to determine which security software resides on the hardware it is currently placed in, which does locally and with great efficiency⁶. Even if it finds any of these, it will not exit because of it, instead checking for whether they are active, and whenever they are not, the trojan will disable the security software on the next power cycle in the Windows registry which it creates access to. When the trojan sees that none of the services on the list are active, because it has disabled them, it will initiate and let the adversary control it through the C2 domain. This is where the trojan can lead to a range of outcomes, with the most

⁴https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html, last accessed 5 August 2022.

⁵A more detailed diagram of adversarial actions with Sunburst can be found here https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/sunburst-additional-technical-details.html.

⁶For a list of all the types of software it would recognize, which is quite extensive, see https://github.com/fireeye/sunburst_countermeasures/blob/main/fnv1a_xor_hashes.txt, last accessed 5 August 2022.
common being Teardrop. Sunburst is known to have dropped other payloads than Teardrop, which by itself is intriguing. Teardrop is purely a means to an end, through an extensive extraction process, including pretending to read information from a picture file, to drop a customized Cobalt Strike Beacon. The latter is modified proprietary software, defined as a asynchronous post-exploitation agent, which is usually used for penetration testing, but in this case has been directly used to attack a system. The beacon enables a massive amount of possible attacks. And with that, the backdoor enables an adversary to do anything within the system. Despite this, there are possible links to existing malware, putting its novelty into perspective [34], regardless of its flawless execution.

3.1.2 Kaseya Ransomware Attack. Unlike the Sunburst Backdoor, this attack was a simpler process. First, the attackers compromised the company Kaseya’s Virtual Systems Administrator, with an exploit which was discovered some days prior. The program itself was only used in a limited amount of businesses, but most of those that ran it administered other companies’ systems at the same time. Because of that, the compromise was exponentially increased by the nature of the service supply chain which the adversaries targeted. The adversaries used this to load ransomware onto a massive amount of businesses, including 800 Swedish Coop stores. This is therefore a case of a digital service supply chain being compromised and used to target physical goods and physical service supply chains, and therefore a good example of a simple but effective Supply Chain Attack.

3.2 Cyberphysical systems and IoT

Physical and even digital supply chains have evolved since 2011. But CPS and IoT have dominated the world and especially the world of supply chains. In turn, this also affects which consequences Supply Chain Attacks can have on its targets. CPS refer to systems that have network access and which seamlessly integrate computation and physical components into operation, and which usually have more than two levels, with sensors on the bottom, a network for these, and a top which controls the entire system. On the other side of this, we have the increased use of IoT, which act as network connected sensors that may part of a CPS or greater systems. The key between each is the network access, essentially a means to integrate a “computer” into anything, anywhere. An attack with simplicity of the one done on Kaseya can at any point knock out payment systems or physical stores, ticket dispensers or anything else that is loosely connected to a service supply chain above it. These two types of technology make therefore supply chains much more vulnerable to adversarial attacks than ever before.

3.2.1 Security and Safety Constraints. Increased use of systems of systems like CPS will therefore decrease safety and potential security. The first is due to all the ways these systems can fail. Any modern production facility will likely make use of CPS and IoT at once [39, 54, 38]. This means that any attack on the main control systems will be able to shut down lower levels of the plant with ease, which in turn can cause a failure, either halting production or harming the employees. The same use of these systems decrease security overall, because the amount of entry points increase incrementally with the added features of IoT devices, each being an new door for adversaries [31, 56]. We can extrapolate this to Supply Chain Attacks, as the same kind of failures caused by a single attack to shut down production, may be used to affect and constitute an actual Supply Chain Attack at the same time. IoT has a further issue, which is planned obsolescence. Unless produced and serviced by its users, IoT products have short lifespans [58], and after this they are to be considered significant security threats. If they are then a part of a greater digital supply chain, they potentially risk losing confidentiality, integrity or availability of the entire system.

4 LAW AND GUIDANCE

Luckily, engineers seem to have affected some lawmakers and legislators, as there are special considerations taken in regards to supply chains and therefore also Supply Chain Attacks. But these are purely limited to guidance. Additionally, voluntary relationships between states and companies responsible for supply chains or cybersecurity exist, but cannot replace the needs for possible hard legal responses to attacks and failures on whole systems [48, 23]. In this section, we will take a close look at relevant European Legislation, both in the Union as well as two Member States and the UK.

4.1 European Law

The EU can only control certain areas because they are limited by competence. But they have provided an array of guidance as well as legislation.

4.1.1 Security Legislation. The most well known and used “security legislation”, legislation that directly attempts to impose security obligations, in the European Union, is the NIS Directive. It is a directive and therefore requires implementation in each European Member State, which means there will be some divergence and legal fragmentation across the Union. Sadly, it does not specifically regulate the security of supply chains, but it applies in general manner, making it relevant for legal analysis regardless.

Before we explain how this is relevant to the security of supply chains, we must justify whether it can be applied to them or not. This is done in national law through implementation, but if the directive itself is weak and does not lay out strong rules to be followed later on, it may be a pointless exercise. The NIS directive does not literally mention Supply Chain Attacks or adversarial attacks, but it is still relevant, because it supposedly sets up the infrastructure for the protection against them. For the Directive to apply, the supply chain must contain companies or public entities that are “operators of essential services’ defined in Article 4(4) and defined by the Member State in Article 5(2). Article 4(4) requires that they

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8See https://securelist.com/sunburst-backdoor-kazuar/99981/, last accessed 5 August 2022.
9See Article 4.2 and 6 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, C 326/47.
10Directive 2016/1168, concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union.
11For progress of the implementation, see https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis-transposition, last accessed 5 August 2022.
Furthermore work within Annex II, which has 7 broad categories, being energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructures, drinking water supply and distribution, and digital infrastructure. This leaves out providers of the security of these infrastructures, so cases like the Kaseya Ransomware Attack and the Sunburst Backdoor would not be covered. Firstly, because both of these companies are based in the US, and secondly because they are not included in any of these categories. However, it may possible to include them in an expanded version of the seventh category, but this is only doable through national law.

The first six categories are to be literally understood, but digital infrastructure needs an elaboration. The Directive sets out to cover IXPs, DNS service providers and TLD name registries. But there is nothing in the Directive that does not allow a Member State to include many more companies into their definition of "operator of essential services". An expanded definition of this could therefore be ISPs, SoMe providers, major security providers and more, and this would allow any Member State to force the NIS Directive to apply to those that are often responsible for the mitigation of Supply Chain Attacks. We will note whether any of the two Member States or the UK have done so in their implementation of the Directive.

Certain details of the implementation are done directly through the Commission Regulation\textsuperscript{15} 2018/151, and while it does go more into detail when it comes to the security infrastructure required, it still refers to technical specifications elsewhere, not in the EU-law by itself. This document is used in national implementation.

The second piece of security legislation in the EU we will focus partially on\textsuperscript{16}, is the Cybersecurity Act\textsuperscript{17}. Its title is deceptive, as it instead expands the powers of The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and the initial process of cybersecurity certification\textsuperscript{18}. The Act has no literal details on Supply Chain Attacks or adversarial attacks in general, and its ideas concerning certification are not very promising to force security providers or others to prevent these. Initially, ENISA does not gain any powers that would transform it into a regulatory authority, it instead keeps its position as an advisory and guiding institution\textsuperscript{19}. There is therefore no central overarching and controlling "big brother" when it comes to the regulation of security in the EU. There are however national regulators, but they are quite limited as to when they can enforce compliance. For the national authorities, their only action is to withdraw certification from legal or physical entities regarding their software\textsuperscript{20}. They are not capable of anything else in a direct and effective sense\textsuperscript{21}. Because of this, we will not comment further on any practical or national consequences regarding the mitigation of Supply Chain Attacks by the Cybersecurity Act, and also because the certification scheme is (yet) not implemented or relevant on a European level.

However, as indicated by the Act, ENISA publishes guidance and opinions and is supposed to be the central knowledge facilitator regarding security, and we will therefore go through some that are highly relevant to Supply Chain Attacks.

4.1.2 Guidance. To support the role of Supply Chain Attacks in the regime of the Directive, ENISA frequently publishes a threat landscape, and have their own taxonomy for the Supply Chain Attacks, which is less abstract and highly practical\textsuperscript{22}. Like the reports from the US, they are based on empirical information from incident reporting across the EU. Most of the content is therefore related to practical considerations and types of attacks, but they do include a list of recommendations. As much as these are interesting, they include references to fulfilling ISO and other standards, Google’s End-to-End Framework for Supply Chain Integrity\textsuperscript{23} and other government recommendations\textsuperscript{24}, and while these may be adequate, they are not in the spirit of security. Most of the technology and abstract ideas and security concepts that enable defences against Supply Chain Attacks are developed by academic researchers or other individuals\textsuperscript{12}, and it would suit ENISA to follow suit and use more time developing the technical standards of their own, instead of referring to existing ones. This may happen with the certification structure from the Cybersecurity Act.

Regardless, this guidance makes a very important point that we need to keep in mind, which is that not everything is a Supply Chain Attack\textsuperscript{25}. It can appear to be so, but it may be caused by design deficiencies or unpredictable behaviour of the software\textsuperscript{26}, or it may simply be an adversarial attack that does not target links of the supply chain. A special methodological limitation is further added, in which a Supply Chain Attack that succeeds to infiltrate for example a service supply chain, like management software, but has targeted outdated versions of the software where users are not paying or part of the chain that the original manufacturer controls, will not be considered a Supply Chain Attack.

4.1.3 Other. Other legislation will have security requirements included through wording or through guidance. GDPR is an example of the first, product legislation like the MDR\textsuperscript{27} is the latter. The first works with the term "state of the art"\textsuperscript{28}, which refers to security, and therefore has vague requirements that are at least supposed to prevent abuse or leakage of personal data, but not mitigation of the Supply Chain Attack explicitly. Like any product legislation that includes digital infrastructures, the MDR has guidance issued by its central authority that should be followed. There is no legal

\textsuperscript{22}https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/threat-landscape-for-supply-chain-attacks, last accessed 5 August 2022.
\textsuperscript{23}https://security.googleblog.com/2021/06/introducing-slsa-end-to-end-framework.html, last accessed on 5 August 2022.
\textsuperscript{24}https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/threat-landscape-for-supply-chain-attacks, last accessed 5 August 2022.
\textsuperscript{25}https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/threat-landscape-for-supply-chain-attacks, last accessed 5 August 2022.
\textsuperscript{26}https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/threat-landscape-for-supply-chain-attacks, last accessed 5 August 2022.
\textsuperscript{27}P. 26.
\textsuperscript{28}Which can be made public but not used at any point by adversaries as well.
requirement\textsuperscript{29}, but it is heavily encouraged or even forced if caught before certification and release of the device\textsuperscript{30}.

### 4.2 National Law

Unlike the overarching guidance and general rules of the EU, national law applies and functions directly onto the supply chains and its links. We here take a look at three different legal systems, and focus on how they each handle the threat (if at all)\textsuperscript{31} and which other measures they provide to force manufacturers and other parties to mitigate these attacks as much as possible. The latter is not speculative, but a matter of showing the existing ways which security guidance or rules can be enforced, and considerations on expropriation or similar, even if the measures seem extreme or are close to impossible. Besides that, all three examples have also implemented the NIS directive.

Manufacturers are legal entities, and each national state has rules to punish or otherwise force legal entities to comply, and even extreme measures such as expropriation if need be. Furthermore, national states can always act as private partners, and create contracts and arbitration systems that can further convince manufacturers and other parties to mitigate as many Supply Chain Attacks as possible. We therefore might not need to look to the future for means and tools that can be used to increase security and safety for everyone. But there are emerging consequences from not applying national law to global private entities in this area \textsuperscript{28}.

All three countries share two measures that they can each implement directly. First, contractually binding providers of security and other supply chain parties, private to private party. Second, creating binding legal obligations for the supply chain at large, either specific security links or the main responsible parties, or any combination of this. States can and are naturally contract partners \textsuperscript{[46]}, and it is through this that they would be able to bind and force mitigation of Supply Chain Attacks. The issue with doing so, is effectiveness and willingness of the participants. Any link of any major supply chain, or a security provider, has no interest in legally binding itself to terms without something in return, and solving issues in courts will as always be lengthy and costly. Arbitration clauses would be a possibility with such agreements, but since the state would act as a private party under those circumstances, any other actor could simply refuse to sign the contract in the first place.

However, any measure from the state to force links of a supply chain to sign the contract, would change the state from a private party to a public party, because of its violation of the principle of contractual loyalty and abuse of powers. This would distort the relationship, removing the private legal aspects entirely or partially.

The contract solution would be widely different between the UK and Ireland and Denmark respectively, due to the various roles of background law\textsuperscript{32}.

Creating new legal obligations is not novel, but currently none of our examples have direct legally binding obligations for the mitigation of Supply Chain Attacks. Any state, including our three examples, have the means to create these and enforce them as well, even if most supply chains are global or at least regional in their nature. Further limitations to this would be to prevent the circumvention by changing flags for shipping companies or head offices for the rest. Despite these measures existing, national states still have the power over individual workers or the physical infrastructure, therefore eliminating any arguments against the futility of the action. But making binding obligations will not make anyone popular.

#### 4.2.1 Denmark.

**Implementation.** The NIS directive is implemented in Denmark via a range of laws and binding guidance\textsuperscript{33}. We will take a closer look at those that relate digital supply chains, but it is worth noting that there are strict direct requirements to levels of security for all 7 points mentioned in Annex II in the Directive, and each has its own binding guidance that the area must follow or face fines\textsuperscript{34}. The main implementation law defines essential services the same way as the Directive, but outside of essential financial service providers\textsuperscript{35} the exact list is secret or implied. § 4 is however the security specification, in that providers of essential services must control known risks, have adequate security compared to the risks and mitigate or prevent adversarial events from occurring to their systems\textsuperscript{36}.

Each different piece of guidance derived from the main implementation text may have different authorities being responsible. Fines are loosely defined and far lower than those in the other two examples, and this is due to a different culture regarding trust and a much tighter grip on public essential services. The latter enable changes and internal punishments for individuals based on labour law, not considered in the implementation, and restructuring or changes that could increase security without it being public or regulated tightly by the implementation law.

**Other Measures.** The law of stock and partial companies in Danish law\textsuperscript{37} enables the Danish Business Authority to forcefully close the most common types of companies in the country\textsuperscript{38}. The first two categories could theoretically be used for the failure to mitigate Supply Chain Attacks, but it is very unlikely, as forceful closure is usually related to rules of process or violation of minority shareholder or creditor rights. But, working against the purpose of the company as well as the "wrong" leadership are legitimate reasons, which is why it must be mentioned.

The other direct means which the Danish state has, is the expropriation of the company or the entire Supply Chain. This can

\textsuperscript{29}This is up for debate currently.

\textsuperscript{30}See 'Guidance on Qualification and Classification of Software in Regulation (EU) 2017/745 – MDR and Regulation (EU) 2017/746 – IVDR', https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/37581, last accessed 5 August 2022.

\textsuperscript{31}Users are worth studying too. see, e.g., [2] in this context.

\textsuperscript{32}Like case law on how contracts are viewed in Common Law versus how they are viewed in Scandinavian law where contract legislation plays a bigger role, although the latter now exists everywhere.

\textsuperscript{33}The main implementation act can be found here: https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/da/2018/436, last accessed 5 August 2022. The rest can be found under ‘Yderligere dokumenter’, then ‘Se detaljeret overblik’.

\textsuperscript{34}See for example security guidance for the electricity and gas providers, https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/da/2021/2647, last accessed 5 August 2022.

\textsuperscript{35}https://www.finanstilsynet.dk/tilsyn/information-om-udvalgte-tilsynsomraeder-it-tilsyn/udpegeelse_ad_operatører/ad_vaesentlige_tjenester, last accessed 5 August 2022.

\textsuperscript{36}For perspectives outside of law; see [4].

\textsuperscript{37}Law nr. 763 of 23 July 2019.

\textsuperscript{38}See § 225, part one.
theoretically be done on via the Danish Constitution\textsuperscript{39}, but has never been done in this way before. In a given situation where it would be necessary, such as during a national crisis, a freer and less restraining measure could be used instead, like contractual obligation or emergency obligations issued via law\textsuperscript{40}.

4.2.2 United Kingdom.

Implementation. Even if the UK is an EU-member no longer, it implemented the NIS-directive when it entered into force\textsuperscript{41}. It did so through different means than Denmark. The legal implementation is done through the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018\textsuperscript{42} which designates competent authorities as those that can enforce the rules, and defines which types of penalties that are supposed to encourage compliance. Furthermore, the UK implemented a series of thorough guidance and systems, such as the Cyber Assessment Framework. The relevant authority, which depend on the area of essential services, has quite the range of powers, including right to retrieve information or inspect\textsuperscript{43}, and penalties are fines\textsuperscript{44}. What is very intriguing are the grounds for the fines, which is either non-compliance through notices or not following orders, or not reporting incidents in various ways\textsuperscript{45}. Like Denmark, there seems to be no expansion of the concept of critical infrastructure to include security providers at large.

Other Measures. The UK can intervene and forcefully close companies and other legal entities. Unlike Denmark, the rules regarding this are tightly defined and leave little room for possible cases where security or mitigation of Supply Chain Attacks could be the basis of it. If the company is clearly defect, which in some situations where substitute software is used may be the case, the company can be stricken off within 2 months\textsuperscript{46}.

There is a theoretical possibility for something else in the Insolvency Act 1986, s 124 A. This section allows for winding up on grounds of public interest, which could include failure to comply with security requirements to prevent Supply Chain Attacks in the future. At present, the closest we get is closure due to fraud investigations, s 124 A, c, but because of how the section is shaped, it would be possible to add further reasons for winding up that could function as deterrence and reasons to comply. The case law concerning the statute further allows for closures within even more subjective terms\textsuperscript{47}.

Expanding the idea of expropriation in UK law to include punishments for damaging supply chains is difficult. Since there is no written constitution\textsuperscript{48}, we must rely on statutory law\textsuperscript{49}, which is too specific and not reliant on case law to contain rights for the

\textsuperscript{39}§ 73, part one, requires expanded view of ‘property’, which is acceptable since ownership of shares etc. is considered ‘property’ of the individual, and companies are considered legal individuals owned and run by citizens.

\textsuperscript{40}This was seen on a widespread level during the Covid-19 pandemic, but this has so far not been regarding security and safety of supply chains.

\textsuperscript{41}For other perspectives, see [9].

\textsuperscript{42}Statute No. 506, 2018.

\textsuperscript{43}See Part 5, 15.

\textsuperscript{44}See 17(10).

\textsuperscript{45}See the Companies Act 2006, 1000(3), assuming no answer is given from the company in question.

\textsuperscript{46}See, e.g., Re Alpha Club (UK) Ltd (2002), para 19.

\textsuperscript{47}See, e.g., [47, 52].

\textsuperscript{48}Such as the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004.

state that could include situations where a company and its assets must be acquired to mitigate Supply Chain Attacks. In terms of the other solutions and measures, the UK is therefore quite limited.

4.2.3 Ireland.

Implementation. Initially, Ireland has implemented the NIS directive through a Statutory Instrument like the UK, No. 360 of 2018, but its content and structure is quite different. As is the lack of deliberately abstract guidance which, like Denmark, does not exist. Definitions of operators of essential services and what is otherwise needed are here, but one noticeable difference is clear, as fines and investigations are done through either designated authorities\textsuperscript{50} or authorized officers\textsuperscript{51}. The latter is interesting, but does not mean there will be differences in enforcement, which is found in Reg 34. Like the other two jurisdictions, fines are the chosen tool, and they too have not expanded their concepts to include security providers at large.

Other Measures. Rights and obligations of Companies and related authorities are regulated in the Companies Act 2014. Companies can be stricken off the register by the Registrar\textsuperscript{52}, in our case if they fulfill the requirements set out in section 726. However, none of these requirements can include violation of security or other obligations related to Supply Chain Attacks, which like with the UK, leaves this method of compliance out.

Expropriation in Irish law is derived initially from the Constitution, specifically Article 43(2)(2). Like the Danish constitution, the Common Good is the central point, as is “occasion requires”. The latter refers to when the State can expropriate private property, which is the core protection of Article 43 outright. Land Laws\textsuperscript{53} implement those powers for relevant situations, but like Denmark, there is theoretical room for potential expropriation of companies, although it seems unlikely for the same reasons as above.

4.3 Regulating Adversarial Supply Chain Attacks in the Future

In this section, we go through two potential future scenarios that may or may not justify the increased focus on mitigating Supply Chain Attacks, as well as some general thoughts on future legal mitigation approaches.

Leveson, Nancy G. once commented on a crucial assertion regarding the use of computers in general [32, P. 405]. “There is no technological imperative that says that we must use computers to control hazardous functions.” Increased uptake of technology that is vulnerable to certain types of adversarial attacks will result in increased successful attacks. It may be as simple as concluding that. But this kind of argumentation is pointless because it does not attempt to \textit{ex ante} predict and/or mitigate the failures. We know that increased automation may not result in increased productivity, and that it may decrease safety of the system, and from what he have discussed earlier, it is also clear that it will decrease security. But, security can be improved, and this is where the discussion becomes more concrete. To show this, we take a look at a type of

\textsuperscript{50}Statutory Instrument No. 360 of 2018, regulation(reg.) 7 and 8.

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid, reg. 28.

\textsuperscript{52}Companies Act 2014, section 725.

\textsuperscript{53}See, e.g., the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009.
Supply Chain Attack that may become prevalent in the future, and which has worldwide consequences.

Shipping goods on ships is done with greatest profit and lowest cost per ton possible [53]. If this can further be reduced, through automation and use of increased IoT, it is likely that the companies will make use of it. Furthermore, all ships of this caliber are tracked by the Automatic Identification System on a global scale, make use of GPS, make use of radars and if automated, would make use of a huge amount of new sensors and potentially robots, with no or few humans on deck. All of these subsystems/”subcontractors” can be compromised, either individually or from the control systems suffering failures. The latter could be on the ship, or in the headquarters if they have a constant connection. And as we saw with the Sunburst Backdoor, the security provider which is used could be compromised as well. As of the time of writing, there are measures in place to mitigate automation failures, as ships can be sailed without any of these systems. But in the future, this may not be the case, and the entire infrastructure of the whole world may be at risk from Supply Chain Attacks [52], and past incidents further support this [36].

However, there is an even more pressing, though not unknown type of attack that can hit the very origin of CPS or IoT. Semiconductors, used to make processing and other power for the very devices that can be attacked, can be equally hit by Supply Chain Attacks [55]. Because there are extremely few main providers of these, the entire supply of the very basics of our digital infrastructure can be shut down in a matter of days. And while these attacks can hit the system of manufacturing or distribution, the chips and other devices themselves can be attacked directly at the plant where they are produced, potentially compromising any computer or device they are part of [15]. Together with hitting the supply chains through every transport type imaginable, the entire world economy is potentially at risk from Supply Chain Attacks in the future.

4.3.1 Future Regulatory Mitigation Techniques. As we showed earlier in this Section, national jurisdictions do not always have many choices to prevent or otherwise regulate Supply Chain Attacks, which is a shame considering the potential consequences they can have. Extreme measures will rarely be used, and in a European context, regulation from the European Union is the best bet at horizontal hard legal rules to mitigate devastating attacks. From an international perspective, examples such as Executive Order (E.O.) 14017 on America’s Supply Chains [50] or requirements set by state purchasers worldwide, like a Software Bill of Materials in the US [8], represent immediate action, but do not contribute to a clear legal landscape or further technology specific requirements.

Otherwise, fines and very theoretical approaches to expropriation and emergency measures are not enough to fully and truly mitigate the attacks going forward. Technological developments are ongoing, but this does not mean that we need to throw out the champagne with the cork. Existing enforcement measures in other areas can be reused, but a range of newer and more experimental enforcement measures could be considered, like financial incentives, tax breaks or direct ministerial or public oversight.

4.4 Limits of Fines

A core concept of criminology and the studies of punishment and enforcement, is that fines have very tight limits both in practice as well as economically. Punishing providers of security or others that can threaten the integrity of a supply chain or potentially threaten the digital infrastructure of a whole country or massive business conglomerates purely with fines, seems like a massive understatement of the potential consequences of such a neglect. Fines can potentially have other effects, such as loss of reputation for the individual or company that gets them issued, but the range of this kind of damage is disputed and likely very limited.

From this, the choice of merely fining the providers and not employing stricter punishments in the form of threats of forceful closure or punitive punishments for directors or other responsible officers seems unwise if deterrence is the only tool available, akin to the criminal liability which exists for companies which handle explosives or chemicals in many jurisdictions already.

5 FUTURE WORK

In-depth legal analysis of either how supply chains and critical infrastructure are regulated, or should be, is of high importance to follow this work, as would papers which explore organisational and other means to make these supply chains safer. Perhaps even from a classic safety engineering angle.

6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

As we show above, Supply Chain Attacks are considered in various ways, but the means which we enforce compliance are not anywhere near enough to truly give incentive for all means of mitigation or possibly prevention possible. To reach this, we must regulate companies differently, or at the very minimum include the digital service providers or similar in our legal definitions of critical infrastructure, as they have already become part of it in practice. Furthermore, the lack of specialised rules in our examples should create uncertainty as to whether there will be appropriate sanctions in the future, to deal with the massive consequences which preventable disruptions of supply chains may have on entire markets or at the very least countries. In this sense, digital and physical supply chains cannot exist without the companies, and giving them the same considerations as the shipping, train and flight companies which maintain the physical parts of supply chains would be wise. Finally, we would like to point out that guidance as a legal tool should be increasingly used, as it is our best shot at closing the gap between law and technology, but this increased usage should be

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54 During a state of emergency, many states can employ special written or unwritten rules beyond what is mentioned here, but these are so rarely seen and unclear, that we have not included them.

55 There is a greater discussion on whether these or financial incentives have their intended effect as well.

56 See a broader but worrying discussion of this in [41].

57 If moral responsibility and corporate guilt could be implemented, this may provide more efficient means to compliance, as criminal punishments in corporate settings has its own issues [33], but we are far away from this scenario being possible in practice.

58 To this, see additional legal analysis by [35].
done with more clarity, not to least, to prevent confusion and possible circumvention.

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