Secret key generation from Gaussian sources using lattice-based extractors
Laura Luzzi, Cong Ling and Matthieu R. Bloch

Abstract
We propose a lattice-based scheme for secret key generation from Gaussian sources in the presence of an eavesdropper, and show that it achieves the strong secret key capacity in the case of degraded source models, as well as the optimal secret key / public communication rate trade-off. The key ingredients of our scheme are a lattice extractor to extract the channel intrinsic randomness, based on the notion of flatness factor, together with a randomized lattice quantization technique to quantize the continuous source. Compared to previous works, we introduce two new notions of flatness factor based on $L^1$ distance and KL divergence, respectively, which might be of independent interest. We prove the existence of secrecy-good lattices under $L^1$ distance and KL divergence, whose $L^1$ and KL flatness factors vanish for volume-to-noise ratios up to $2\pi e$. This improves upon the volume-to-noise ratio threshold $2\pi$ of the $L^\infty$ flatness factor.

Index Terms
Extractor, secret key generation, strong secrecy, lattice coding, flatness factor.

I. INTRODUCTION
Secret key generation (also known as key agreement) at the physical layer was first investigated by Maurer [3] and Ahlswede and Csiszár [4], who showed that correlated observations of noisy phenomena could be used to distill secret keys by exchanging information over a public channel. In recent years, this subject has received considerable attention in literature (see, e.g., [5–10]). The setup has been extended to the vector case [11, 12], the multi-terminal case [13–16], the quantum case [17] and the case with feedback [18]. Second-order asymptotics have been derived in [19, 20]. Code constructions for the discrete memoryless case have been proposed, e.g. [21, 22].

Most existing secret key generation schemes rely heavily on the assumption of discrete random sources over finite or countable alphabets. In order to apply these techniques to wireless communications, it is necessary to extend the key generation framework to the case of continuous sources, such as Gaussian sources [11, 23–25]. In [25], the authors study a multi-terminal scenario for secret key generation in the special case for which the eavesdropper only has access to the public channel. Beside providing a characterization of the optimal strongly secret key rate, the authors show that this optimal rate can be achieved using lattice codes (for information reconciliation only).

We consider here the problem of secret key generation between two terminals, Alice and Bob, who observe correlated Gaussian sequences $X^n$ and $Y^n$, in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, who also obtains a correlated sequence $Z^n$. For simplicity, we suppose that a single round of unidirectional public communication takes place in order to establish the key. Our main contribution is to show that, in the case of a degraded source model, the strong secret key capacity can be achieved by a complete lattice-coding scheme considerably different from and perhaps simpler than [25]. This extends our previous work [1], in which it was shown that a secret key rate up to half a nat from the optimal was achievable.

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Typically, secret key generation consists of two distinct procedures: information reconciliation, in which public messages are exchanged to ensure that Alice and Bob can construct the same data sequence with vanishing error probability, and privacy amplification to extract from this shared sequence a secret key that is statistically independent from Eve’s observation and from the public messages.

Privacy amplification and randomness extraction: Our privacy amplification strategy is based on the concept of channel intrinsic randomness, or the maximum bit rate that can be extracted from a channel output independently of its input [26–28]. We begin by considering a simplified scenario in which Bob and Alice share the same variable $X^n$. In this case, the amount of randomness that can be extracted from $X^n$ independently of $Z^n$ is precisely the maximum available secret key rate. We propose a lattice-based extractor to extract the randomness, by reducing the source modulo a suitable lattice. Although our main objective in this paper is to solve the problem of privacy amplification, our lattice extractor is also an intriguing result in its own right, which could have other applications.

The flatness factor and its variants: In our previous work [1], we provided a characterization of the class of lattices that are good for randomness extraction, which was based on a computable parameter, the flatness factor, measuring the $L^\infty$ distance between the “folded” Gaussian distribution modulo the lattice and the uniform distribution on the corresponding fundamental region. The concept of flatness factor is related to the smoothing parameter used in lattice-based cryptography [29], and was first introduced in [30] in the context of physical-layer network coding. In [31], two of the authors also showed the relevance of the flatness factor for secrecy and introduced the notion of secrecy-good lattices for the wiretap channel. In this work, we consider two extended notions of flatness factor by which the $L^\infty$ distance is replaced respectively by the $L^1$ distance and the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. These new flatness conditions are satisfied by a wider range of variance parameters, resulting in improved volume conditions for the chain of lattices under consideration, which allows us to achieve the secret key capacity. The existence of lattices with vanishing $L^1$ and KL flatness factors follows by leveraging an existence result for resolvability codes for regular channels [32]. We note that the $L^1$ smoothing parameter was already considered in [33, 34], while $L^1$ and KL flatness factors were used implicitly earlier in [35, p. 1656]. An upper bound on the $L^1$ flatness factor based on the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality was given in [36]. The independent work [37] studied $L^1$ smoothing parameters both for lattices and for codes, also based on the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Our approach bypasses the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, therefore leading to a tighter bound than [36]. We note however that [37] obtained a bound on the $L^1$ smoothing parameter as tight as that in this paper, by decomposing the discrete Gaussian distribution into a convex combination of uniform ball distributions.

Information reconciliation and Wyner-Ziv coding: Our strategy for information reconciliation follows the outline of [23, 25]: first, the source $X^n$ is vector quantized; then, a public message is generated in the manner of Wyner-Ziv coding, so that Bob can decode the quantized variable using the sequence $Y^n$ as side information. The existence of good nested lattices for Wyner-Ziv coding has been established in [38] (see also [39, 40]). We show that this construction is compatible with the secrecy-goodness property to conclude our existence proof.

Randomized quantization technique: Unlike our previous work [1], the quantization performed at Alice’s side is not deterministic. We introduce a new randomized quantization step inspired by the randomized rounding technique in [41]. Essentially, this technique allows to round a continuous Gaussian into a discrete Gaussian distribution with slightly larger variance, provided that the $L^\infty$ flatness factor of the lattice is small. We partially extend the result of [41] under an $L^1$ flatness factor criterion. We show that randomized quantization with uniform dithering (where the dither is known by all parties, including the eavesdropper) achieves the optimal trade-off between public communication rate and secret key rate established in [23]. The dithering technique is widely used to achieve capacity in literature [42, 43].

Relation to fuzzy extractors: The lattice extractor proposed in this paper is related to fuzzy extractors in the cryptographic literature, usually defined for discrete sources [44]. A fuzzy extractor allows one to extract a secret key from a noisy measurement, which means that it is resilient to small measurement errors. Fuzzy extractors for continuous signals were proposed in [45, 46]. Our proposed lattice code is also robust to measurement errors, thanks to its channel coding component of Wyner-Ziv coding. A difference is that min-entropy is used in fuzzy extractors, while Shannon entropy is used in our lattice extractor. In order to be consistent with the literature, we change the terminology lattice hashing used in the conference version of this paper [1] to lattice extractor.

Organization: This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide basic definitions about lattices and introduce the flatness factor and its variants, which allows us to define the notion of secrecy-good lattices. In Section III, we focus on the extraction of channel intrinsic randomness over Gaussian channels using lattices. In Section
IV, we introduce the Gaussian source model and describe our lattice-based secret key generation scheme. Finally, in Section V we offer some conclusions and perspectives. The existence of sequences of nested lattices satisfying the required conditions is proven in the Appendix.

II. LATTICES AND FLATNESS FACTOR

Notation: All logarithms in this paper are assumed to be natural logarithms, and information is measured in nats. Given a set \( A \), the notation \( \mathcal{U}_A \) stands for the uniform distribution over \( A \). We denote the variational distance between two (discrete or continuous) distributions \( p, q \) by \( \mathbb{V}(p, q) \), and their KL divergence by \( \mathbb{D}(p\|q) \).

A. Lattice definitions

In this section, we introduce the mathematical tools we use to describe and analyze our proposed scheme. An \( n \)-dimensional lattice \( \Lambda \) in the Euclidean space \( \mathbb{R}^n \) is the discrete set defined by
\[
\Lambda = \mathcal{L}(B) = \{ Bx : x \in \mathbb{Z}^n \}
\]
where the columns of the basis matrix \( B = [b_1 \cdots b_n] \) are linearly independent.

Given a lattice \( \Lambda \), its dual lattice \( \Lambda^* \) is defined as the set of vectors \( \lambda^* \) in \( \mathbb{R}^n \) such that \( \langle \lambda^*, \lambda \rangle \in \mathbb{Z} \) for all \( \lambda \in \Lambda \). A measurable set \( \mathcal{R}(\Lambda) \subset \mathbb{R}^n \) is called a fundamental region of the lattice \( \Lambda \) if the disjoint union \( \cup_{\lambda \in \Lambda} (\mathcal{R}(\Lambda) + \lambda) = \mathbb{R}^n \). Examples of fundamental regions include the fundamental parallelepiped \( \mathcal{P}(\Lambda) \) and the Voronoi region \( \mathcal{V}(\Lambda) \). All the fundamental regions have equal volume \( V(\Lambda) \).

Given a lattice \( \Lambda \) and a fundamental region \( \mathcal{R}(\Lambda) \), any point \( x \in \mathbb{R}^n \) can be written uniquely as a sum
\[
x = \lambda + \bar{x},
\]
where \( \lambda \in \Lambda \) and \( \bar{x} \in \mathcal{R}(\Lambda) \). The vector \( \lambda \) is the quantization of \( x \) with respect to \( \mathcal{R}(\Lambda) \) and is denoted as \( Q_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)}(x) \), where boundary points are decided systematically. Thus we define
\[
[x] \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda) = x - Q_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)}(x) = \bar{x}.
\]
In particular, for any \( x \in \mathbb{R}^n \), the nearest-neighbor quantizer associated with \( \Lambda \) is given by
\[
Q_{\Lambda}(x) = Q_{\mathcal{V}(\Lambda)}(x) = \arg \min_{\lambda \in \Lambda} \| \lambda - x \|,
\]
where ties are broken systematically. Note that \( x \mod \mathcal{V}(\Lambda) = x - Q_{\Lambda}(x) \). The modulo lattice operation satisfies the distributive law [47, Proposition 2.3.1], i.e., \( \forall \lambda \in \Lambda \)
\[
[x + \lambda] \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda) = [x] \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda)).
\]

The following property [48, equation (35)] will also be used in the paper: given two lattices \( \Lambda \subset \Lambda_1 \), \( x \in \mathbb{R}^n \), and a fundamental region \( \mathcal{R}(\Lambda) \),
\[
[Q_{\Lambda_1}(x)] \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda) = [Q_{\Lambda_1}([x] \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda))] \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda).
\]

B. Gaussian distributions and the \( L^\infty \) flatness factor

Suppose that \( X^n \) is an \( n \)-dimensional i.i.d. Gaussian random variable of variance \( \sigma^2 \) with distribution
\[
f_{\sigma}(x) = \frac{1}{(\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma)^n} e^{-\frac{|x|^2}{2\sigma^2}},
\]
for $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$. The following useful property of Gaussian distributions was proven in [41, Fact 2.1]:

Lemma 1: Given $\sigma_1, \sigma_2 > 0$, let $\sigma$ and $\tilde{\sigma}$ be such that $\sigma^2 = \frac{\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2}{2}$, and $\frac{1}{\sigma^2} = \frac{1}{\sigma_1^2} + \frac{1}{\sigma_2^2}$. Moreover, let $c_1, c_2 \in \mathbb{R}^n$, and $\tilde{c} = \frac{\sigma_1^2}{\sigma_1^2}c_1 + \frac{\sigma_2^2}{\sigma_2^2}c_2$. Then $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}^n$,

$$f_\sigma(x - c_1)f_\sigma(x - c_2) = f_\sigma(c_1 - c_2)f_\sigma(x - \tilde{c}).$$

Given a lattice $\Lambda$, we define the $\Lambda$-periodic function

$$f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(x) = \frac{1}{(2\pi \sigma)^n} \sum_{\lambda \in \Lambda} e^{-\frac{|x+\lambda|^2}{2\sigma^2}}, \quad (5)$$

for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$. We denote by $f_{\sigma,\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)} = f_{\sigma,\Lambda}|_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)}$ its restriction to the fundamental region $\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)$. Note that $f_{\sigma,\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)}$ is the probability density of $X^n = [X^n] \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda)$. Given $c \in \mathbb{R}^n$, we will also use the notation

$$f_{\sigma,\Lambda,c}(x) = f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(x - c)$$

to denote a shifted $\Lambda$-periodic function.

Definition 1 ($L^\infty$ Flatness factor [31]): For a lattice $\Lambda$ and for a parameter $\sigma$, the $L^\infty$ flatness factor is defined by:

$$\epsilon_\Lambda(\sigma) \triangleq \max_{x \in \mathcal{R}(\Lambda)} |V(\Lambda)f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(x) - 1|.$$  

In other words, $\epsilon_\Lambda(\sigma)$ characterizes the $L^\infty$ distance of $f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(x)$ to the uniform distribution $U_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)}$ over $\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)$.

The $L^\infty$ flatness factor is independent of the choice of the fundamental region $\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)$ and can be computed from the theta series of the lattice

$$\Theta_\Lambda(\tau) = \sum_{\lambda \in \Lambda} e^{-\pi\tau\|\lambda\|^2} \quad (6)$$

using the identity [31, Proposition 2]

$$\epsilon_\Lambda(\sigma) = \left( \frac{\gamma_\Lambda(\sigma)}{2\pi} \right)^{\frac{n}{2}} \Theta_\Lambda \left( \frac{1}{2\pi\sigma^2} \right) - 1, \quad (7)$$

where $\gamma_\Lambda(\sigma) = \frac{V(\Lambda)^{\frac{n}{2}}}{\sigma^2}$ is the volume-to-noise ratio (VNR). Moreover, the following relation holds between the flatness factor of $\Lambda$ and the theta series of its dual lattice $\Lambda^*$ [31, Corollary 1]:

$$\Theta_{\Lambda^*}(2\pi\sigma^2) = \epsilon_\Lambda(\sigma) + 1. \quad (8)$$

Remark 1: We have shown in [31] that $\epsilon_\Lambda$ is a monotonically decreasing function, i.e., for $\sigma < \sigma'$, we have $\epsilon_\Lambda(\sigma') \leq \epsilon_\Lambda(\sigma)$.

The notion of secrecy-goodness characterizes lattice sequences whose $L^\infty$ flatness factors vanish exponentially fast as $n \to \infty$.

Definition 2 (Secrecy-good lattices under $L^\infty$ flatness factor [31]): A sequence of lattices $\Lambda^{(n)}$ is secrecy-good under $L^\infty$ flatness factor if $\epsilon_{\Lambda^{(n)}}(\sigma) = e^{-\Omega(n)}$ for all fixed $\gamma_{\Lambda^{(n)}}(\sigma) < 2\pi$.

In [31] we have proven the existence of sequences of secrecy-good lattices under $L^\infty$ flatness factor as long as

$$\gamma_\Lambda(\sigma) < 2\pi. \quad (9)$$

Remark 2: In fact, we can show a concentration result: $\forall \eta > 0$ there exists a mod-$p$ lattice ensemble such that lattice sequences from this ensemble are secrecy-good with probability greater than $1 - \eta$ (see [31, Appendix III]).

C. The mod-$\Lambda$ channel and the mod-$\Lambda$/Λ' channel

Following Forney et al. [49], given a fundamental region $\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)$ of $\Lambda$ we can define the mod-$\Lambda$ channel with input $X^n \in \mathcal{R}(\Lambda)$ and output

$$Y^n = [X^n + W^n] \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda),$$

Note that although the statement in [41] refers to (unnormalized) Gaussian functions, one can check that it also holds for Gaussian distributions.
where $W^n$ is a noise vector. When $W^n$ is i.i.d. Gaussian with variance $\sigma^2$, this channel has capacity

$$C(\Lambda, \sigma^2) = \log V(\Lambda) - h(f_{\sigma,\Lambda}).$$

In the above expression, with slight abuse of notation we denote by $h(f_{\sigma,\Lambda})$ the differential entropy of $f_{\sigma,R(\Lambda)}$, which does not depend on the choice of the region $R(\Lambda)$.

The proof of Lemma 3 can be found in Appendix A.

The following result [50, Lemma 1] relates the $L^\infty$ flatness factor to the capacity of the mod-\Lambda channel.

**Lemma 2:** The capacity $C(\Lambda, \sigma^2)$ of the mod-\Lambda channel is bounded by $C(\Lambda, \sigma^2) \leq \log(1 + 2(\Lambda, \sigma^2)) \leq \epsilon(\Lambda)$. Given two nested lattices $\Lambda' \subset \Lambda$ and a fundamental region $R(\Lambda')$, we can define the mod $\Lambda/\Lambda'$ channel with discrete input $X^n \in \Lambda \cap R(\Lambda')$ and output

$$Y^n = [X^n + W^n] \ mod \ R(\Lambda').$$

It was shown in [49] that this channel has capacity

$$C(\Lambda/\Lambda', \sigma^2) = \log |\Lambda/\Lambda'| + h(f_{\sigma,\Lambda}) - h(f_{\sigma,\Lambda'}).$$

In particular, the following relation holds:

$$C(\Lambda/\Lambda', \sigma) = C(\Lambda', \sigma^2) - C(\Lambda, \sigma^2). \tag{10}$$

**Lemma 3:** For any $\sigma > 0$,

$$C(\Lambda/\Lambda', \sigma^2) = \mathbb{D} \left( f_{\sigma,R(\Lambda')} || f_{\sigma,\Lambda'}^{\Lambda / \Lambda'} \right).$$

The proof of Lemma 3 can be found in Appendix A.

**D. The $L^1$ flatness factor and the KL flatness factor**

In this section, we introduce a weaker notion of flatness based on the $L^1$ distance.

**Definition 3:** Given a lattice $\Lambda$, a fundamental region $R(\Lambda)$ and $\sigma > 0$, we define the $L^1$ flatness factor as follows:

$$\epsilon^1_\Lambda(\sigma) = \int_{R(\Lambda)} \left| f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(x) - \frac{1}{V(\Lambda)} \right| dx = \mathbb{V}(f_{\sigma,R(\Lambda)}, U_{R(\Lambda)}). \tag{11}$$

Similarly to the $L^\infty$ flatness factor, the $L^1$ flatness factor does not depend on the choice of the fundamental region.

**Remark 3:** For any lattice $\Lambda$, $\forall \sigma > 0$, we have $\epsilon^1_\Lambda(\sigma) \leq \epsilon(\Lambda, \sigma)$.

The $L^1$ flatness factor is related to the $L^1$ smoothing parameter, which was discussed in [33, 34].

We also introduce yet another notion of flatness factor which replaces $L^1$ distance with KL divergence.

**Definition 4:** Given a lattice $\Lambda$, a fundamental region $R(\Lambda)$ and $\sigma > 0$, we define the KL flatness factor as follows:

$$\epsilon^{KL}_\Lambda(\sigma) = \mathbb{D}(f_{\sigma,R(\Lambda)}, U_{R(\Lambda)}). \tag{12}$$

As before, the definition does not depend on the choice of the fundamental region.

**Remark 4:** By Pinsker’s inequality, $\forall \sigma > 0$,

$$\epsilon^1_\Lambda(\sigma) \leq \sqrt{2 \epsilon^{KL}_\Lambda(\sigma)}. \tag{13}$$

**Remark 5 (Relation to the capacity of the mod-\Lambda channel):** Note that [35, p.1656]

$$\mathbb{D}(f_{\sigma,R(\Lambda)}, U_{R(\Lambda)}) = \log V(\Lambda) - h(f_{\sigma,\Lambda}) = C(\Lambda, \sigma^2).$$

By shift-invariance of the differential entropy, the KL flatness factor is also shift-invariant, i.e.

$$\epsilon(\Lambda, \sigma^2) = \mathbb{D}(f_{\sigma,\Lambda,C_{R(\Lambda)}}, U_{R(\Lambda)}).$$

for all $c \in \mathbb{R}^n$.

Thanks to Remark 5, we are able to prove the following

**Lemma 4:** The $L^1$ and KL flatness factors are monotonic, i.e. for any lattice $\Lambda$, $\forall \sigma' > \sigma$,

$$\epsilon^1_\Lambda(\sigma') \leq \epsilon^1_\Lambda(\sigma), \quad \text{and} \quad \epsilon^{KL}_\Lambda(\sigma') \leq \epsilon^{KL}_\Lambda(\sigma). \tag{14}$$
was presented in [2], is the first main result of this paper: Λ

standard Construction A to find the sought-after lattice knowledge of the theta series, in contrast to the L

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Using the data processing inequality for the variational distance, Lemma 4.1.1],



\[ U^n \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda) \sim \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)} \]

Then using the data processing inequality for the variational distance,

\[ \epsilon^1_\Lambda \left( \sqrt{\sigma^2 + \sigma_0^2} \right) = \mathbb{V} \left( f \sqrt{\sigma^2 + \sigma_0^2}, \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)} \right) = \mathbb{V}(Y^n, U^n) \leq \mathbb{V}(X^n, U^n) = \mathbb{V}(f_\sigma, \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)}) = \epsilon^1_\Lambda(\sigma). \]

Similarly, from the data processing inequality for the KL divergence [51, Lemma 3.11], we have

\[ \epsilon^{KL}_\Lambda \left( \sqrt{\sigma^2 + \sigma_0^2} \right) = \mathbb{D} \left( f \sqrt{\sigma^2 + \sigma_0^2}, \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)} \right) = \mathbb{D}(Y^n || U^n) \leq \mathbb{D}(X^n || U^n) = \mathbb{D}(f_\sigma, \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)}) = \epsilon^{KL}_\Lambda(\sigma). \]

Since this is true for any \( \sigma_0 > 0 \), the conclusion follows.

We will next show that lattices that are good for secrecy in the KL sense exist and that the corresponding volume condition is less stringent than the condition (9) for secrecy-goodness based on the \( L^\infty \) metric.

**Definition 5:** A sequence of lattices \( \{\Lambda^{(n)}\} \) is \( L^1 \) secrecy-good if for all fixed \( \gamma_{\Lambda^{(n)}}(\sigma) < 2\pi\epsilon \), \( \forall \epsilon > 0, \epsilon^1_{\Lambda^{(n)}}(\sigma) = o \left( \frac{1}{\pi} \right) \), i.e., the \( L^1 \) flatness factor vanishes super-polynomially. It is \( KL \) secrecy-good if \( \epsilon^{KL}_{\Lambda^{(n)}}(\sigma) = o \left( \frac{1}{\pi} \right) \).

By Remark 4, a sequence of KL secrecy-good lattices is also \( L^1 \) secrecy-good. The following theorem, which was presented in [2], is the main result of this paper:

**Theorem 1:** If \( \gamma_\Lambda(\sigma) < 2\pi\epsilon \) is fixed, then there exists a sequence \( \{\Lambda^{(n)}\} \) of lattices which are KL secrecy-good (and also \( L^1 \)-secrecy-good).

The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix C. Our proof is information-theoretic and does not require the knowledge of the theta series, in contrast to the \( L^\infty \) flatness factor. We summarize the main idea here. We use the standard Construction A to find the sought-after lattice \( \Lambda \) from a fine lattice \( \Lambda_f \) where \( \Lambda \subseteq \Lambda_f^n \). Using the chain rule (10), we have

\[ \mathbb{D}(f_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)}|\| \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)}) = C(\Lambda, \sigma^2) = C(\Lambda_f^n, \sigma^2) + C(\Lambda_f^n/\Lambda, \sigma^2). \]

Now, using a sufficiently fine lattice \( \Lambda_f \), we can easily make \( C(\Lambda_f^n, \sigma^2) \to 0 \) thanks to the flatness phenomenon (cf. Lemma 2). The non-trivial part of the proof is to exhibit a lattice \( \Lambda \) such that \( C(\Lambda_f^n/\Lambda, \sigma^2) \to 0 \) as well. Here, opposite to the usual goal of achieving channel capacity in information theory, we use a code \( \equiv \Lambda_f^n/\Lambda \) whose “capacity” is vanishing. Such a code can be a linear resolvability code. More precisely, because the \( \Lambda_f^n/\Lambda \) channel is regular, its capacity is attained by the uniform input distribution. Thus

\[ C(\Lambda_f^n/\Lambda, \sigma^2) = \mathbb{I}(M; Y^n), \]

the mutual information for uniform input \( M \in \Lambda_f^n/\Lambda \). This means that if \( M \) is encoded by a linear code achieving strong secrecy over the \( \Lambda_f^n/\Lambda \) channel, then \( \mathbb{I}(M; Y^n) \to 0 \) and accordingly \( C(\Lambda_f^n/\Lambda, \sigma^2) \to 0 \). However, making the above argument rigorous involve certain technicalities, which are sorted out in Appendix C.

**Remark 6:** It is worth mentioning that as soon as the VNR exceeds \( 2\pi \), the \( L^\infty \) flatness factor increases exponentially. In fact, it is easy to see that the bound \( \gamma_\Lambda(\sigma) < 2\pi \) is sharp: the \( L^\infty \) flatness factor of a lattice cannot vanish for any \( \gamma_\Lambda(\sigma) > 2\pi \). This is simply because (7) implies that

\[ \epsilon_\Lambda(\sigma) > \left( \frac{\gamma_\Lambda(\sigma)}{2\pi} \right)^2 - 1 \]

since \( \Theta_\Lambda(\tau) > 1 \) for any \( \tau > 0 \). Thus, as the VNR approaches \( 2\pi\epsilon \), the \( L^\infty \) flatness factor \( \approx \epsilon^n/2 \), but the \( L^1 \) flatness factor can still be brought under control. This demonstrates the advantage of the \( L^1 \) flatness factor.

Also note that the VNR of a secrecy-good lattice approaches \( 2\pi\epsilon \) from below, while that of an AWGN-good lattice approaches \( 2\pi\epsilon \) from above. Recall that the normalized second moment of a quantization-good lattice approaches \( 1/(2\pi\epsilon) \), so all three types of lattices finally share the same VNR threshold \( 2\pi\epsilon \).
Remark 7: In the following, we discuss the implication of Theorem 1 on the smoothing parameter\(^2\) that is commonly used in lattice-based cryptography.

Definition 6 (Smoothing parameter): For a lattice $\Lambda$ and for $\varepsilon > 0$, the $L^\infty$ and $L^1$ smoothing parameters $\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda)$ and $\eta_\varepsilon^1(\Lambda)$, respectively, are the smallest $\sigma > 0$ such that $\epsilon_\Lambda(\sigma), \epsilon_\Lambda^1(\sigma) \leq \varepsilon$.

Theorem 1 implies the existence of lattices whose smoothing parameters $\eta_\varepsilon^1(\Lambda) = \frac{V_1(\Lambda)}{\sqrt{2\pi}}$. This improves upon the result $\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda) = \frac{V_1(\Lambda)}{\sqrt{2\pi}}$.

From the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the following bound was proven in \cite{36}:

$$\epsilon_\Lambda^1(\sigma) \leq \sqrt{\epsilon_\Lambda \left( \frac{\sqrt{2} \sigma}{\pi} \right)}$$

which implies the bound $\eta_\varepsilon^1(\Lambda) \leq \frac{V_1(\Lambda)}{2\sqrt{\pi}}$. However, this bound is not optimal.

E. Discrete Gaussians and randomized rounding

Given an $n$-dimensional lattice $\Lambda$ in $\mathbb{R}^n$ and a vector $c \in \mathbb{R}^n$, we define the discrete Gaussian distribution over $\Lambda$ centered at $c$ as the following discrete distribution taking values in $\lambda \in \Lambda$:

$$D_{\Lambda,c}(\lambda) = \frac{f_{\Lambda,c}(\lambda)}{\int_{\Lambda} f_{\Lambda,c}(\lambda)} \quad \forall \lambda \in \Lambda,$$

where $f_{\Lambda,c}(\lambda) \triangleq \sum_{\lambda \in \Lambda} f_{\Lambda,c}(\lambda)$. We write $D_{\Lambda,c} = D_{\Lambda,c,0}$.

Extending Peikert \cite[Section 4.1]{41}, we introduce the notion of randomized rounding:

Definition 7 (Randomized rounding): Given an input vector $X^n$, we define

$$[X^n]_{\Lambda,\sigma} \sim D_{\Lambda,\sigma}X^n.$$

It was shown in \cite{41} that when $X^n$ is i.i.d. Gaussian with variance $\sigma^2$, the randomly rounded variable $[X^n]_{\Lambda,\sigma}$ is close in $L^1$ distance to the discrete Gaussian $D_{\Lambda,\sigma}$, where $\tilde{\sigma}^2 = \sigma^2 + \sigma_Q^2$, provided that the $L^\infty$ flatness factor $\epsilon_\Lambda(\sigma_Q)$ is small:

Proposition 1 (Adapted from Theorem 3.1 of \cite{41}): Let $X^n \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 I_n)$ and $\mu \in \mathbb{R}^n$, and consider $X_Q = [X^n + \mu]_{\Lambda,\sigma_Q}$. If $\epsilon_\Lambda(\sigma_Q) < 1/2$, then

$$\mathbb{V}(p_{X_Q}, D_{\Lambda,\sigma_Q}) \leq 4\epsilon_\Lambda(\sigma_Q),$$

where $\tilde{\sigma}^2 = \sigma^2 + \sigma_Q^2$.

In the following, we prove a partial generalization of this result under an $L^1$ flatness factor condition, for randomized rounding with uniform dithering, which may be of independent interest.

Theorem 2: Let $X^n \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 I_n)$, and $U \sim \mathcal{U}_{R(\Lambda)}$ uniform over a fundamental region $R(\Lambda)$ and independent of $X^n$. Given $\mu \in \mathbb{R}^n$, let $X_Q = [X^n + U + \mu]_{\Lambda,\sigma_Q}$. Then

$$\mathbb{E}_U \left[ \mathbb{V}(p_{X_Q|U}, D_{\Lambda,\sigma_Q}) \right] \leq 2\epsilon_\Lambda^1(\sigma_Q).$$

In order to prove Theorem 2, we need the following Lemma, which will be used several times throughout the paper.

Lemma 5: Under the same hypotheses as in Theorem 2,

$$\sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda} \int_{R(\Lambda)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \left| f_{\sigma}(x - \mu) f_{\sigma_Q}(x_Q - x - u) dx - f_{\tilde{\sigma}}(x_Q - u - \mu) \right| du \leq \epsilon_\Lambda^1(\sigma_Q).$$

Proof of Lemma 5: By Lemma 1,

$$f_{\sigma_Q}(x_Q - x - u) f_{\sigma}(x - \mu) = f_{\tilde{\sigma}}(x_Q - u - \mu) f_{\sigma}(x - c(x_Q, u, \mu)), \quad (14)$$

\(^2\)We remark that this definition differs slightly from the one in \cite{29}, where $\sigma$ is scaled by a constant factor $\sqrt{2\pi}$ (i.e., $s = \sqrt{2\pi}\sigma$).

\(^3\)A similar bound was given in \cite{37} using the statistical distance, which differs from the $L^1$ distance by a factor $\frac{1}{2}$. 


where \( \frac{1}{\sigma^2} = \frac{1}{\bar{\sigma}^2} + \frac{1}{\tilde{\sigma}^2} \) and \( \bar{c}(x_Q, u, \mu) = \frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2}(x_Q - u) + \frac{\tilde{\sigma}^2}{\tilde{\sigma}^2}\mu \). Then we can write

\[
\sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda} \int_{R(\Lambda)} \left| \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} f_\sigma(x - \mu)f_\sigma(x_Q + x - u) \frac{dx}{V(\Lambda)f_\sigma(\Lambda - x - u)} - f_\tilde{\sigma}(x_Q - u - \mu) \right| du
\]

(a) \[
\sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda} \int_{R(\Lambda)} \left| \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} f_\sigma(x - \mu)f_\sigma(x_Q + x - u) \frac{dx}{V(\Lambda)f_\sigma(\Lambda - x - u)} - f_\tilde{\sigma}(x_Q - u - \mu) \right| du
\]

(b) \[
\sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda} \int_{R(\Lambda)} \left| \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} f_\sigma(x - \mu)f_\sigma(x_Q + x - u) \frac{dx}{V(\Lambda)f_\sigma(\Lambda - x - u)} - f_\tilde{\sigma}(x_Q - u - \mu) \right| du
\]

\[
\leq \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} f_\sigma(x - \mu) \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \left| \frac{1}{V(\Lambda)} - f_\Lambda(x - u) \right| dx du
\]

\[
= \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} f_\sigma(x - \mu) \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \left| \frac{1}{V(\Lambda)} - f_\Lambda(x - u) \right| dx du = \epsilon_1^1(\sigma_Q),
\]

where (a) follows from the fact that \( \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} f_\sigma(x - \bar{c}(x_Q, u, \mu))dx = 1 \), and (b) follows from (14). \( \square \)

**Proof of Theorem 2:** We have

\[
\mathbb{E}\left[V(p_{X_Q|U}, D_{\Lambda, \tilde{\sigma}, U + \mu})\right] = \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \frac{1}{V(\Lambda)} \sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda} \left| p_{X_Q|U}(x_Q|u) - D_{\Lambda, \tilde{\sigma}, U}(x_Q) \right| du
\]

\[
= \sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda} \int_{R(\Lambda)} \frac{1}{V(\Lambda)} \left| \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} f_\sigma(x - \mu)f_\sigma(x_Q + x - u) \frac{dx}{f_\sigma(\Lambda - x - u)} - f_\tilde{\sigma}(x_Q - u - \mu) \right| du
\]

(a) \[
\leq \sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda} \int_{R(\Lambda)} \frac{1}{V(\Lambda)} \left| \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} f_\sigma(x - \mu)f_\sigma(x_Q + x - u) \frac{dx}{f_\sigma(\Lambda - x - u)} - f_\tilde{\sigma}(x_Q - u - \mu) \right| V(\Lambda) du
\]

(b) \[
\sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda} \int_{R(\Lambda)} \frac{1}{V(\Lambda)} \left| f_\tilde{\sigma}(x_Q - u - \mu) - f_\tilde{\sigma}(\Lambda - u - \mu) \right| du
\]

where (a) follows from the triangle inequality. The term (15) is bounded by \( \epsilon_1^1(\sigma_Q) \) because of Lemma 5. The term (16) is equal to

\[
\sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda} \int_{R(\Lambda)} \frac{f_\tilde{\sigma}(x_Q - u - \mu)}{f_\tilde{\sigma}(\Lambda - u - \mu)} \left| f_\tilde{\sigma}(\Lambda - u - \mu) - \frac{1}{V(\Lambda)} \right| du
\]

\[
= \int_{R(\Lambda)} \left| f_\tilde{\sigma}(\Lambda - u - \mu) - \frac{1}{V(\Lambda)} \right| du = \epsilon_1^1(\tilde{\sigma}) \leq \epsilon_1^1(\sigma_Q),
\]

where (b) follows from Lemma 4. \( \square \)

**III. Lattice Extractor for Gaussian Sources**

In this section, we present a primitive called lattice extractor to extract the randomness of a source, without dithering.

Consider a source model for secret key generation with public discussion, in the presence of an eavesdropper. For simplicity, we first assume that Alice and Bob observe the same i.i.d. Gaussian random variable \( X^n = Y^n \) of variance \( \sigma^2 \) per dimension. Eve observes a correlated i.i.d. random variable \( Z^n \). We assume that \( X^n \) and \( Z^n \) are jointly Gaussian, according to the following model

\[
X^n = Z^n + W^n ,
\]
where $W^n$ is an i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian random vector of variance $\sigma^2$ per dimension, and is independent of $Z^n$.

Our aim is to extract from $X^n$ a random number that is almost uniform on $\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)$ and almost independent of $Z^n$. To do this, we apply the mod $\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)$ operation in Eq. (1). Recall that

$$p_{X^n}(\bar{x}) = f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(\bar{x})1_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)}(\bar{x}).$$

The conditional density of $\bar{X}^n = X^n \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda)$ given $Z^n$ is

$$p_{\bar{X}^n|Z^n}(\bar{x}|z) = \sum_{x: \bar{x} = x + Z} p_{X^n|Z^n}(x|z) = \sum_{x+z} p_{\bar{X}^n}(x|z) = \sum_{x+z} \frac{1}{(\sqrt{2\pi})^n} e^{-\frac{|x+z|^2}{2\sigma^2}} = f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(\bar{x} - z)1_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)}(\bar{x}).$$

So, if the flatness factor $\epsilon_{KL}(\sigma)$ is $\mathbb{D}(f_{\sigma,\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)}||\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)}) = \mathbb{D}(f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(x||\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)||\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)})$ is small, $p_{\bar{X}^n|Z^n = z}$ is almost uniform over $\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)$ for any $z \in \mathbb{R}^n$. Note that

$$h(\bar{X}^n) = h(f_{\sigma,\Lambda}),$$

$$h(\bar{X}^n|Z^n = z) = -\int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)} p_{\bar{X}^n}(\bar{x}|z) \log p_{\bar{X}^n}(\bar{x}|z) d\bar{x} = -\int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)} f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(\bar{x} - z) \log f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(\bar{x} - z) d\bar{x} = -\int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda) - z} f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(\bar{x}) \log f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(\bar{x}) d\bar{x} = h(f_{\sigma,\Lambda})$$

since $f_{\sigma,\Lambda}$ is $\Lambda$-periodic and $\mathcal{R}(\Lambda) - z$ is a fundamental region.

One can now bound the mutual information

$$I(\bar{X}^n; Z^n) = h(\bar{X}^n) - h(\bar{X}^n|Z^n) = h(f_{\sigma,\Lambda}) - h(f_{\sigma,\Lambda}) = \log V(\Lambda) - h(f_{\sigma,\Lambda}) - (\log V(\Lambda) - h(f_{\sigma,\Lambda})) = \epsilon_{KL}(\sigma) \leq \epsilon_{KL}(\sigma).$$

By Theorem 1, if $\gamma_{KL}(\sigma) < 2\pi e$, there exists a sequence of lattices $\{\Lambda(n)\}$ such that $\lim_{n \to \infty} I(\bar{X}^n; Z^n) = 0$.

Observe that depending on the choice of $\Lambda$, the rate of extracted randomness can be arbitrarily large (as expected for the case of continuous random variables).

Remark 8: The asymptotic differential entropy rate of $\bar{X}^n$ is

$$r = \lim inf \frac{1}{n} h(\bar{X}^n) = \lim inf \frac{1}{n} (\log V(\Lambda) - \epsilon_{KL}(\sigma_x)) = \lim inf \frac{1}{n} \log V(\Lambda) < \frac{1}{2} \log 2\pi e\sigma^2.$$  

since, by monotonicity of the KL flatness factor (Lemma 4), $\epsilon_{KL}(\sigma_x) \leq \epsilon_{KL}(\sigma) \to 0$. Taking a sequence of KL secrecy-good lattices, we can obtain the asymptotic rate $r = \log(\sqrt{2\pi e\sigma})$, which is equal to the asymptotic differential entropy rate of the Gaussian noise $W^n$. Hence, we have used the mod operation to extract the intrinsic randomness [26]. This improves upon our previous result for continuous lattice extractors [1, Section III] using the $L^\infty$ flatness factor, which was $\frac{1}{2}$ nat from the optimal differential entropy rate.

Remark 9: It is worth mentioning that unlike other works that use dithering or the high-resolution assumption [38], in this section we have obtained uniformity and independence from the flatness factor. Moreover, nearest-neighbor quantization is not needed in our continuous lattice extractor scheme, and we only need to implement the mod $\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)$ operation, which can be performed in polynomial time for many fundamental regions $\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)$. In particular, we can choose the fundamental parallelepiped.

However, in the next section, both dithering and nearest-neighbor quantization will be required for our secret key generation scheme.
IV. SECRET KEY GENERATION

A. System model

We consider the same model as in [1], illustrated in Figure 1, in which Alice, Bob and Eve observe the random variables $X^n, Y^n, Z^n$ respectively, generated by an i.i.d. memoryless Gaussian source $p_{XYZ}$ whose components are jointly Gaussian with zero mean. The distribution is fully described by the variances $\sigma^2_x, \sigma^2_y, \sigma^2_z$ and the correlation coefficients $\rho_{xy}, \rho_{xz}, \rho_{yz}$. We can write [23, Eq. (6)]:

\[
\begin{align*}
X^n &= \rho_{xy} \frac{\sigma_x}{\sigma_y} Y^n + W^n_1, \\
X^n &= \rho_{xz} \frac{\sigma_x}{\sigma_z} Z^n + W^n_2,
\end{align*}
\]

(18)

where $W^n_1$ and $W^n_2$ are i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian noise vectors of variances

\[
\sigma^2_1 = \sigma^2_x (1 - \rho^2_{xy}), \quad \sigma^2_2 = \sigma^2_x (1 - \rho^2_{xz}),
\]

(19)

respectively. Further, $W^n_1$ is independent of $Y^n$, and $W^n_2$ is independent of $Z^n$.

To simplify notation, we define $\hat{Y}^n = \rho_{xy} \frac{\sigma_x}{\sigma_y} Y^n$ and $\hat{Z}^n = \rho_{xz} \frac{\sigma_x}{\sigma_z} Z^n$, so that

\[
\begin{align*}
X^n &= \hat{Y}^n + W^n_1, \\
X^n &= \hat{Z}^n + W^n_2,
\end{align*}
\]

(20)

where $\hat{Y}^n$ and $W^n_1$ are independent, and $\hat{Z}^n$ and $W^n_2$ are independent. We denote the variances of $\hat{Y}^n$ and $\hat{Z}^n$ by $\hat{\sigma}_y = \rho_{xy} \sigma_x = \sqrt{\sigma^2_x - \sigma^2_1}$ and $\hat{\sigma}_z = \rho_{xz} \sigma_x = \sqrt{\sigma^2_x - \sigma^2_2}$ respectively.

The secret key capacity of the Gaussian source model (18) is given by [52, 23]

\[
C_s = \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\sigma^2_2}{\sigma^2_1}.
\]

We assume that only one round of one-way public communication (from Alice to Bob) takes place. More precisely, Alice computes a public message $S$ and a secret key $K$ from her observation $X^n$; she then transmits $S$ over the public channel (see Fig. 1). From this message and his own observation $Y^n$, Bob reconstructs a key $\hat{K}$. Let $K_n$ and $S_n$ be the sets of secret keys and public messages respectively. A secret key rate - public rate pair $(R_K, R_P)$ is achievable if there exists a sequence of protocols with

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \inf \frac{1}{n} \log |K_n| \geq R_K, \quad \lim_{n \to \infty} \sup \frac{1}{n} \log |S_n| \leq R_P,
\]
such that the following properties hold:
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \log |\mathcal{K}_n| - \mathbb{H}(K) = 0 \quad \text{(uniformity)}
\]
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}\{K \neq K\} = 0 \quad \text{(reliability)}
\]
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{I}(K; S, Z^n) = 0 \quad \text{(strong secrecy)}.
\]

To define our key generation scheme, we use the lattice partition chain \( \Lambda_1/\Lambda_2/\Lambda_3 \), where

- \( \Lambda_1 \) is \( L^1 \) secrecy-good with respect to \( \sigma_Q \), and serves as the “source-code” component of Wyner-Ziv coding;
- \( \Lambda_2 \) is AWGN-good with respect to \( \bar{\sigma}_1 = \sqrt{\sigma_1^2 + \sigma^2_Q} \), and serves as the “channel-code” component in Wyner-Ziv coding;
- \( \Lambda_3 \) is \( L^1 \) secrecy-good with respect to \( \bar{\sigma}_2 = \sqrt{\sigma_2^2 + \sigma^2_Q} \), and serves as the extractor of randomness.

The existence of such a chain of lattices will be established in Appendix D.

In addition, we assume that \( \mathbf{U} \) is a uniform dither over a fundamental region \( \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_1) \), which is known by Alice, Bob and Eve\(^4\).

### B. Secret key generation protocol

The secret key generation proceeds as follows:

- Alice quantizes \( X^n \) to
  \[X_Q = [X^n + \mathbf{U}]_{\Lambda_1,\sigma_Q} .\]
  That is, \( X_Q \sim D_{\Lambda_1,\sigma_Q,x+\mathbf{u}} \) if \( X^n = x \), \( \mathbf{U} = \mathbf{u} \), or equivalently
  \[p_{X_Q|X^n,\mathbf{U}}(X_Q|x, \mathbf{u}) = \frac{f_{\sigma_Q}(x_Q - x - \mathbf{u})}{f_{\sigma_Q}(\Lambda_1 - x - \mathbf{u})} . \tag{21}\]

  Alice then computes the public message \( S \) and the key \( K \) as follows:
  \[S = X_Q \mod \mathcal{V}(\Lambda_2), \]
  \[K = Q_{\Lambda_2}(X_Q) \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_3),\]
  and transmits \( S \) to Bob over the public channel.
- Upon receiving \( S \), Bob reconstructs
  \[
  \hat{X}_Q = S + Q_{\Lambda_2} \left( \rho_{xy} \frac{\sigma_x}{\sigma_y} X^n + \mathbf{U} - S \right).
  \]
  He then computes his version of the key:
  \[\hat{K} = Q_{\Lambda_2}(\hat{X}_Q) \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_3).\]

Let \( \hat{X}_Q = X_Q \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_3) \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_3 \), where \( \Lambda_1/\Lambda_3 \) is identified with the set of coset representatives \( \Lambda_1 \cap \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_3) \). By definition, \( \hat{X}_Q = S + K \). Note that \( K \) and \( S \) are both functions of \( X_Q \):

\[K = Q_{\Lambda_2}(X_Q) \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_3) \overset{(a)}{=} Q_{\Lambda_2}(X_Q \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_3)) \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_3) = Q_{\Lambda_2}(\hat{X}_Q) \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_3) = f(\hat{X}_Q). \tag{22}\]

where \( (a) \) follows from equation (3). Similarly,

\[
\hat{X}_Q \mod \Lambda_2 = \hat{X}_Q - Q_{\Lambda_2}(\hat{X}_Q) = X_Q - Q_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda_3)}(X_Q) = X_Q - Q_{\Lambda_2}(X_Q - Q_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda_3)}(X_Q)) = X_Q - Q_{\Lambda_2}(X_Q - \\ \end{equation}

\[= X_Q \mod \Lambda_2 = S = g(\hat{X}_Q). \tag{23}\]

**Remark 10:** Because of the previous relations, we can conclude that there exists a bijection \( (f, g) : \Lambda_1/\Lambda_3 \to \Lambda_1/\Lambda_2 \times \Lambda_2/\Lambda_3 \) that sends \( \hat{X}_Q \) into the corresponding pair \((S, K)\).

We now state the main result of the paper, which will be proven in the following sections:

\(^4If\ Alice\ and\ Bob\ already\ share\ a\ secret\ source\ of\ randomness,\ there\ is\ no\ need\ for\ secret\ key\ generation.\ Hence,\ Eve\ should\ know\ U\ to\ avoid\ trivializing\ the\ problem.\)
Theorem 3: For the Gaussian source model (18), for any secret key rate \( R_K < C_s = \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\sigma_2^2}{\sigma_1^2} \), there exists a sequence of nested lattices \( \Lambda_3^{(n)} \subset \Lambda_2^{(n)} \subset \Lambda_1^{(n)} \) such that the previous secret key generation protocol achieves the rate \( R_K \).

C. Reliability

We want to show that the error probability \( P_e = P\{K \neq \hat{K}\} \to 0 \) as \( n \to \infty \).

Note that \( K = \hat{K} \) if \( X_Q = X_Q \). Since \( X_Q = S + Q_{\Lambda_2}(X_Q) \), we have

\[
\hat{X}_Q = X_Q \iff Q_{\Lambda_2}(\hat{Y}^n + U - S) = Q_{\Lambda_2}(X_Q).
\]

Observe that

\[
Q_{\Lambda_2}(\hat{Y}^n + U - S) = Q_{\Lambda_2} \left( \hat{Y}^n + U - X_Q + Q_{\Lambda_2}(X_Q) \right) = Q_{\Lambda_2}(\hat{Y}^n + U - X_Q) + Q_{\Lambda_2}(X_Q).
\]

Therefore

\[
\hat{X}_Q = X_Q \iff Q_{\Lambda_2}(\hat{Y}^n + U - X_Q) = 0 \iff \hat{Y}^n \in X_Q - U + \mathcal{V}(\Lambda_2).
\]  

The error probability is bounded by

\[
P_e \leq P\{\hat{X}_Q \neq X_Q\} = \int_{R^n} \int_{R(\Lambda_1)} \int_{R(\Lambda_2)} \frac{P_{X_n}(y) P_{Y_n}(y)}{V(\Lambda_1)} dudy \\
= \int_{R^n} \int_{R^n} \int_{R(\Lambda_1)} \frac{P_{X_n}(y) P_{Y_n}(y)}{V(\Lambda_1)} dudy dx \\
= \sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda_1} \int_{R^n} \int_{R^n} \int_{R(\Lambda_1)} \frac{P_{X_n}(y) P_{Y_n}(y)}{V(\Lambda_1)} dudy dx.
\]

In the last step we have used the Markov chain \( X^n - (\hat{Y}^n, X_Q, U) - \hat{X}_Q \). Replacing the expression for the conditional distribution in equation (21), we obtain

\[
P_e \leq \sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda_1} \int_{R^n} \int_{R(\Lambda_1)} \left( \int_{R^n} f_{\sigma_Q}(x_Q - x - u) f_{\sigma_1}(x - y) \frac{1}{V(\Lambda_1)} dx \right) 1_{\{y \not\in x_Q - u + \mathcal{V}(\Lambda_2)\}} f_{\sigma_2}(y) dudy \\
\stackrel{(a)}{\leq} \sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda_1} \int_{R^n} \int_{R(\Lambda_1)} \left[ \int_{R^n} f_{\sigma_Q}(x_Q - x - u) f_{\sigma_1}(x - y) \frac{1}{V(\Lambda_1)} dx - f_{\sigma_1}(x_Q - u - y) \right] 1_{\{y \not\in x_Q - u + \mathcal{V}(\Lambda_2)\}} f_{\sigma_2}(y) dudy \\
+ \sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda_1} \int_{R^n} \int_{R(\Lambda_1)} f_{\sigma_1}(x_Q - u - y) 1_{\{y \not\in x_Q - u + \mathcal{V}(\Lambda_2)\}} f_{\sigma_2}(y) dudy
\]  

where (a) follows from the triangle inequality.

The term (25) is upper bounded by

\[
\int_{R^n} \sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda_1} \int_{R(\Lambda_1)} \left| \int_{R^n} f_{\sigma_Q}(x_Q - x - u) f_{\sigma_1}(x - y) \frac{1}{V(\Lambda_1)} dx - f_{\sigma_1}(x_Q - u - y) \right| df_{\sigma_2}(y) dy \\
\leq \int_{R^n} \epsilon_{\Lambda_1}(\sigma_Q) f_{\sigma_2}(y) dy = \epsilon_{\Lambda_1}(\sigma_Q)
\]

using Lemma 5. This tends to 0 provided that \( \Lambda_1 \) is \( L^1 \) secrecy-good and

\[
\frac{V(\Lambda_1)^2 \epsilon_{\Lambda_1}(\sigma_Q)}{\sigma_Q^2} < 2\pi e.
\]
With the change of variables \( y' = y - x_Q + u \), the term (26) can be rewritten as
\[
\sum_{x_Q \in A_1} \int_{\mathcal{R}(A_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} f_{\tilde{\sigma}_s}(y') f_{\tilde{\sigma}_s}(\sqrt{\mathcal{V}(A_2)}) \frac{f_{\tilde{\sigma}_s}(y' + x_Q - u)}{f_{\tilde{\sigma}_s}(A_1 - x - u)} d\mathcal{V}(A_2) dy' du
\]

where (b) follows from the fact that \( \int_{\mathcal{R}(A_1)} f_{\tilde{\sigma}_s, A_1}(y' - u) du = 1 \). This tends to 0 provided that \( A_2 \) is AWGN-good and
\[
\frac{V(A_2)}{\sigma^2} > 2\pi e. \tag{28}
\]

D. Uniformity

We want to show that the key is asymptotically uniform when \( n \to \infty \). First, we want to bound the \( L^1 \) distance between \( p_{\tilde{X}_Q} \) and the uniform distribution over \( \Lambda_1/\Lambda_3 \). Given \( x \in \mathbb{R}^n, \tilde{x}_Q \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_3 \), we have
\[
p_{\tilde{x}_Q|x=U}(\tilde{x}_Q|x, u) = \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} p_{\tilde{x}_Q|x, u}(\tilde{x}_Q + \lambda_3|x, u) = \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} \frac{f_{\sigma}(\tilde{x}_Q + \lambda_3 - x - u)}{f_{\sigma}(A_1 - x - u)}. \tag{29}
\]

Then
\[
p_{\tilde{x}_Q}(\tilde{x}_Q) = \int_{\mathcal{R}(A_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} p_{\tilde{x}_Q|x=U}(\tilde{x}_Q|x, u) p_{\tilde{x}_Q}(x) dx du = \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} \int_{\mathcal{R}(A_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \frac{f_{\sigma}(\tilde{x}_Q + \lambda_3 - x - u)f_{\sigma}(x)}{f_{\sigma}(A_1 - x - u)V(A_1)} dx du.
\]

Using the previous expression, we find
\[
\left\| p_{\tilde{x}_Q} - U_{\Lambda_1/\Lambda_2} \right\|_{L^1} = \sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_3} \left| p_{\tilde{x}_Q}(\tilde{x}_Q) - \frac{V(A_1)}{V(A_3)} \right|
\]
\[
= \sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_3} \left| \int_{\mathcal{R}(A_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \frac{f_{\sigma}(\tilde{x}_Q + \lambda_3 - x - u)f_{\sigma}(x)}{f_{\sigma}(A_1 - x - u)V(A_1)} dx du - \frac{V(A_1)}{V(A_3)} \right|
\]
\[
\leq \sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_3} \left| \int_{\mathcal{R}(A_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \frac{f_{\sigma}(\tilde{x}_Q + \lambda_3 - x - u)f_{\sigma}(x)}{f_{\sigma}(A_1 - x - u)V(A_1)} dx du - \int_{\mathcal{R}(A_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \frac{f_{\tilde{\sigma}_s}(\tilde{x}_Q + \lambda_3 - u) du}{V(A_1)} \right| \tag{30}
\]

\[
+ \sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_3} \left| \int_{\mathcal{R}(A_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} f_{\tilde{\sigma}_s}(\tilde{x}_Q + \lambda_3 - u) du - \frac{V(A_1)}{V(A_3)} \right| \tag{31}
\]

where (a) follows from the triangle inequality, and \( \tilde{\sigma}_s^2 = \sigma_x^2 + \sigma_Q^2 \). The term (30) is upper bounded by
\[
\sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_3} \int_{\mathcal{R}(A_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \frac{f_{\sigma}(\tilde{x}_Q + \lambda_3 - x - u)f_{\sigma}(x)}{f_{\sigma}(A_1 - x - u)V(A_1)} dx - f_{\tilde{\sigma}_s}(\tilde{x}_Q + \lambda_3 - u) du \leq \epsilon_{\Lambda_1}(\sigma_Q)
\]
by Lemma 5. This vanishes as \( o\left(\frac{1}{n}\right) \) if \( \Lambda_1 \) is \( L^1 \) secrecy-good and the condition (27) is satisfied. The term (31) is equal to
\[
\sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_3} \left| \int_{R(\Lambda_1)} f_{\tilde{\sigma}_x, \Lambda_3}(\bar{x}_Q - u) du - \int_{R(\Lambda_1)} \frac{1}{V(\Lambda_1)} du \frac{V(\Lambda_1)}{V(\Lambda_3)} \right|
\leq \sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_3} \int_{R(\Lambda_1)} \left| f_{\tilde{\sigma}_x, \Lambda_3}(\bar{x}_Q - u) - \frac{1}{V(\Lambda_3)} \right| du.
\]
Setting \( v = \bar{x}_Q - u \mod R(\Lambda_3) \), and recalling that \( R(\Lambda_3) = \bigcup_{x_Q \in \Lambda_1 \cap R(\Lambda_3)} (\bar{x}_Q + R(\Lambda_3)) \mod R(\Lambda_3) \) by (4), where the union is disjoint, the last expression is equal to
\[
\int_{R(\Lambda_3)} \left| f_{\tilde{\sigma}_x, \Lambda_3}(v) - \frac{1}{V(\Lambda_3)} \right| dv = \epsilon_{\Lambda_3}(\tilde{\sigma}_x) \leq \epsilon_{\Lambda_2}(\tilde{\sigma}_2)
\]
where \( \epsilon_{\Lambda_2} = \sigma_2^2 + \sigma_Q^2 \leq \sigma_2^2 + \sigma_Q^2 = \sigma_2^2 \). Thus, the term (31) vanishes as \( o\left(\frac{1}{n}\right) \) if \( \Lambda_3 \) is \( L^1 \)-secrecy good and satisfies the volume condition
\[
\frac{V(\Lambda_3)^{2/n}}{\sigma_2^2} < 2\pi e.
\]

We now show that the distribution of the key is close to the uniform distribution \( U_K \) over \( K = \Lambda_2/\Lambda_3 \):
\[
\mathbb{V}(p_K, U_K) = \sum_{k \in K} \left| p_K(k) - \frac{V(\Lambda_2)}{V(\Lambda_3)} \right| = \sum_{k \in K} \left| \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_2} p_{\bar{x}_Q}(s \oplus k) - \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_2} \frac{V(\Lambda_1)}{V(\Lambda_3)} \right|
\leq \sum_{k \in K} \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_2} \left| p_{\bar{x}_Q}(s \oplus k) - \frac{V(\Lambda_1)}{V(\Lambda_3)} \right|
= \sum_{x_Q \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_3} \left| p_{\bar{x}_Q}(\bar{x}_Q) - \frac{V(\Lambda_1)}{V(\Lambda_3)} \right| = \mathbb{V}(p_{\bar{x}_Q}, U_{\Lambda_1/\Lambda_3})
\]
which tends to 0 as shown previously. Using [51, Lemma 2.7], we have that if \( \mathbb{V}(p_K, U_K) \leq \frac{1}{2} \),
\[
\left| \mathbb{H}(p_K) - \mathbb{H}(U_K) \right| \leq -\mathbb{V}(p_K, U_K) \log \frac{\mathbb{V}(p_K, U_K)}{|K|} = \mathbb{V}(p_K, U_K) \log \frac{2nR_K}{\mathbb{V}(p_K, U_K)}
= nR_K\mathbb{V}(p_K, U_K) - \mathbb{V}(p_K, U_K) \log \mathbb{V}(p_K, U_K).
\]
This vanishes as long as \( \mathbb{V}(p_K, U_K) \sim o\left(\frac{1}{n}\right) \), which is indeed the case.

**E. Strong secrecy**

Using [53, Lemma 1], we can bound the leakage as follows:

\[
\mathbb{I}(K; S, Z^n, U) = \mathbb{I}(K; S, \hat{Z}^n, U) \leq d_{av} \log \frac{|K|}{d_{av}},
\]
where
\[
d_{av} = \sum_{k \in K} p_K(k) \mathbb{V}(P_{\bar{Z}^n U|K=k} P_{\bar{Z}^n U})
\leq \sum_{k \in K} p_K(k) \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_2} \int_{R(\Lambda_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \left| P_{\bar{Z}^n U|K=k}(s, z, u|k) - \frac{p_{\bar{Z}^n}(z)}{V(\Lambda_2)} \right| dz du
+ \sum_{k \in K} p_K(k) \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_2} \int_{R(\Lambda_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \left| \frac{p_{\bar{Z}^n}(z)}{V(\Lambda_2)} - P_{\bar{Z}^n U}(s, z, u) \right| dz du
\]

(34)
by the triangle inequality.
Due to Remark 10, we can write

\[
p_{\mathcal{Z}^n U | X = k}(s, z, u | k) = \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} \frac{p_{\mathcal{Z}^n U | X = k}(s, z, u | k)}{p(k)} = \frac{p_{\mathcal{Z}^n}(z)}{V(\Lambda_1)} \frac{p_{\mathcal{Z}^n | X = k}(u + s | z, u)}{p(k)}
\]

and so the term (34) is equal to

\[
\sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1 \backslash \Lambda_2} \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} p_{\mathcal{Z}^n}(z) \left| \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} \frac{p_{X | \mathcal{Z}^n U}(k + s + \lambda_3 | z, u)}{V(\Lambda_1)} - \frac{p(k)}{V(\Lambda_2)} \right| dz du,
\]

\[
\leq \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1 \backslash \Lambda_2} \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} p_{\mathcal{Z}^n}(z) \left| \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} \frac{p_{X | \mathcal{Z}^n U}(k + s + \lambda_3 | z, u)}{V(\Lambda_1)} - \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(k + s + \lambda_3 - u - z) \right| dz du \quad (36)
\]

\[
+ \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1 \backslash \Lambda_2} \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} p_{\mathcal{Z}^n}(z) \left| \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(k + s + \lambda_3 - u - z) - \frac{p(k)}{V(\Lambda_2)} \right| dz du, \quad (37)
\]

where \( \tilde{\sigma}_2^2 = \sigma_2^2 + \sigma_Q^2 \). Recalling that

\[
p_{X | \mathcal{Z}^n U}(x | z, u) = \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} p_{X | \mathcal{Z}^n U}(x | x, u) p_{\mathcal{Z}^n}(x | z) dx = \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \frac{f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(x - z)}{f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(\lambda_1 - x - u)} f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(x - z) dx,
\]

the term (36) can be upper bounded by

\[
\int_{\mathbb{R}^n} p_{\mathcal{Z}^n}(z) \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda_1)} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1 \backslash \Lambda_2} \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} \left| \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \frac{f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(k + s + \lambda_3 - x - u)}{V(\Lambda_1) f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(\lambda_1 - x - u)} f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(x - z) dx - f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(k + s + \lambda_3 - u - z) \right| du dz
\]

\[
= \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} p_{\mathcal{Z}^n}(z) \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda_1)} \sum_{x \in \Lambda_1} \left| \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \frac{f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(x - z)}{V(\Lambda_1) f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(\lambda_1 - x - u)} f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(x - z) dx - f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(x - u - z) \right| du dz \leq \epsilon_{\lambda_1}(\sigma_Q)
\]

by Lemma 5. This vanishes as \( o \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \) assuming the condition (27).

On the other hand, by the triangle inequality the term (37) can be bounded by

\[
\sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1 \backslash \Lambda_2} \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} p_{\mathcal{Z}^n}(z) \left| \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(k + s + \lambda_3 - u - z) - \frac{1}{V(\Lambda_3)} \right| dz du \quad (38)
\]

\[
+ \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1 \backslash \Lambda_2} \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda_1)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} p_{\mathcal{Z}^n}(z) \left| \frac{1}{V(\Lambda_3)} - \frac{p(k)}{V(\Lambda_2)} \right| dz du. \quad (39)
\]

Setting \( v = k + s - u \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_3) \) and using the property (4), the term (38) can be written as

\[
\int_{\mathbb{R}^n} p_{\mathcal{Z}^n}(z) \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda_3)} \left| f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2, \Lambda_3}(v - z) - \frac{1}{V(\Lambda_3)} \right| dv dz = \epsilon_{\lambda_3}(\tilde{\sigma}_2),
\]

which vanishes as \( o \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \) assuming the condition (32). Finally, (39) is equal to

\[
V(\Lambda_2) \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \left| \frac{1}{V(\Lambda_3)} - \frac{p(k)}{V(\Lambda_2)} \right| = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} |\mathcal{U}_k - p(k)| = \mathcal{V}(\mathcal{U}_k, p_k) = o \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \to 0
\]
as already shown in Section IV-D.

We now come back to the expression (35), which is equal to

$$
\sum_{s \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_2} \int_{R(A_1)} \int_{R^n} \left| \frac{p_{Z^n}(z)}{V(A_2)} - p_{\hat{Z}^n|U}(s, z, u) \right| dz du
$$

$$
\leq \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_2} \int_{R(A_1)} \int_{R^n} \left| \frac{p_{Z^n}(z)}{V(A_2)} - \sum_{k' \in \mathcal{K}} \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} p_{Z^n}(z) f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(k' + s + \lambda_3 - u - z) \right| dz du
$$

$$
+ \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_2} \int_{R(A_1)} \int_{R^n} \left| \sum_{k' \in \mathcal{K}} \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} p_{Z^n}(z) f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(k' + s + \lambda_3 - u - z) - p_{\hat{Z}^n|U}(s, z, u) \right| dz du
$$

(40)

by the triangle inequality.

The term (40) is upper bounded by

$$
\int_{R^n} p_{Z^n}(z) \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_2} \sum_{k' \in \mathcal{K}} \int_{R(A_1)} \left| \frac{1}{V(A_3)} - f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2, \lambda_3}(k' + s - u - z) \right| du dz
$$

$$
= \int_{R^n} p_{Z^n}(z) \int_{R(A_3)} \left| \frac{1}{V(A_3)} - f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2, \lambda_3}(v - z) \right| d\nu d\nu = \epsilon_{1,\lambda_3}(\tilde{\sigma}_2)
$$

and vanishes as $o\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)$ if condition (32) is satisfied.

Observe that

$$
p_{\hat{Z}^n|U}(s, z, u) = \sum_{k' \in \mathcal{K}} \frac{p_{\hat{Z}^n}(z)}{V(A_1)} p_{\hat{Z}^n|U}(s + k'|z, u) = \sum_{k' \in \mathcal{K}} \frac{p_{Z^n}(z)}{V(A_1)} p_{\hat{Z}^n|U}(s + k'|z, u)
$$

$$
= \sum_{k' \in \mathcal{K}} \frac{p_{Z^n}(z)}{V(A_1)} \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} p_{\hat{Z}^n|U}(s + k' + \lambda_3|z, u) = \sum_{k' \in \mathcal{K}} \frac{p_{Z^n}(z)}{V(A_1)} \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} \int_{R^n} f_{\sigma_Q}(s + k' + \lambda_3 - x - u) f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(x - z) dx.
$$

Thus the term (41) can be bounded by

$$
\int_{R^n} p_{Z^n}(z) \int_{R(A_1)} \sum_{k' \in \mathcal{K}} \sum_{s \in \Lambda_1/\Lambda_2} \sum_{\lambda_3 \in \Lambda_3} f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(k' + s + \lambda_3 - u - z) - \int_{R^n} f_{\sigma_Q}(s + k' + \lambda_3 - x - u) f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(x - z) \frac{dx}{V(A_1) f_{\sigma_Q}(A_1 - x - u)} du dz
$$

$$
= \int_{R^n} p_{Z^n}(z) \sum_{\mathcal{X}(\mathcal{Q}) \in \Lambda_1} \left| f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(x_Q - u - z) - \int_{R^n} f_{\sigma_Q}(x_Q - x - u) f_{\tilde{\sigma}_2}(x - z) \frac{dx}{V(A_1) f_{\sigma_Q}(A_1 - x - u)} \right| d\nu d\nu \leq \epsilon_{1,\lambda_3}(\sigma_Q)
$$

by Lemma 5, which again vanishes as $o\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)$ under condition (27).

In conclusion, $d_{av} \sim o\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)$ and thus from (33), we find that the leakage vanishes asymptotically as $n \to \infty$.

Remark 11: Although in Section IV-D we only showed that the key is close to uniform on average over the dither $U$, using the results in this section we see that

$$
\mathbb{H}(U_{\mathcal{Q}}) - \mathbb{H}(K|U) = \mathbb{H}(U_{\mathcal{Q}}) - \mathbb{H}(K) + \mathbb{H}(K; U) \leq \mathbb{H}(U_{\mathcal{Q}}) - \mathbb{H}(K) + \mathbb{H}(K; S, Z^n, U) \to 0.
$$

F. Achievable strong secrecy rate and optimal trade-off

Recall that in the previous sections we have imposed the conditions (27), (28) and (32) on the volumes of $\Lambda_1$, $\Lambda_2$ and $\Lambda_3$ respectively, i.e.

$$
\frac{V(A_1)^{2/n}}{\sigma_Q^2} < 2\pi e, \quad \frac{V(A_2)^{2/n}}{\sigma_1^2} > 2\pi e, \quad \frac{V(A_3)^{2/n}}{\sigma_2^2} < 2\pi e.
$$

Therefore, the achievable secret key rate is upper bounded by

$$
R_K = \frac{1}{n} \log \frac{V(A_3)}{V(A_2)} < \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2_1} = \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\sigma^2_2 + \sigma^2_Q}{\sigma^2_1 + \sigma^2_Q},
$$

(42)
As $\sigma_Q \to 0$,
\[ R_K \to \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\sigma_2^2}{\sigma_1^2}, \]
which is the optimal secret key rate. This improves upon our previous work [1] in which the achievable secrecy rate had a 1/2 nat gap compared to the optimal.

**Remark 12:** The optimal scaling of the lattice $\Lambda_3$ requires the noise variance $\sigma_2$ to be known by Alice; if only a lower bound for $\sigma_2$ is available, positive secret key rates can still be attained.

The public communication rate is lower bounded by
\[ R_P = \frac{1}{n} \log \frac{V(\Lambda_2)}{V(\Lambda_1)} > \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2}{\sigma_Q^2}. \]
Equivalently, we have $\sigma_Q^2 > \frac{\sigma_2^2}{e^{2R_P} - 1}$. Replacing this expression in the bound (42) for $R_K$, and observing that (42) is a decreasing function of $\sigma_Q^2$, we find
\[ R_K < \frac{1}{2} \log \left( e^{-2R_P} + \frac{\sigma_2^2}{\sigma_1^2} (1 - e^{-2R_P}) \right) . \]
which corresponds to the optimal public rate / secret key rate tradeoff [23] (see Appendix E for details.)

**V. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES**

To conclude, we have proposed a lattice extractor to extract a secret key from correlated Gaussian sources against an eavesdropper. Using $L_1$ distance and KL divergence, we have proved the existence of lattices with a vanishing flatness factor for all VNRs up to $2\pi e$. This improves upon the previous result for VNRs up to $2\pi$, based on $L_\infty$ distance. Together with dithering and randomized rounding, it has enabled us to achieve the optimal trade-off with one-way public communication. In the same way, it may be possible to remove the $1/2$-nat gap, associated to the $L_\infty$ flatness factor, to the secrecy capacity of wiretap channels [31].

An immediate step for future work is to turn the existence result of this paper into a practical scheme. For example, one may instantiate the lattices using polar codes. Another problem is to see if it is possible to modify the design of this paper to yield a fuzzy extractor, which would require redesigning a lattice with respect to other entropy measures. Other open problems include identifying whether is is possible to remove dithering and/or randomized quantization, characterizing the second-order asymptotics and the extension of the proposed key-agreement protocol to multi-terminal systems. Furthermore, the reconciliation technique based on Wyner-Ziv coding may be extended to key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) in lattice-based cryptography, due to the similarity between KEM and secret key agreement. Finally, it is interesting to explore the applications of $L_1$ and KL smoothing parameters in other cryptographic and mathematical problems [33, 34].

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**APPENDIX A**

**PROOF OF LEMMA 3**

By definition,
\[
\mathbb{D} \left( f_{\sigma, \mathcal{R}(\Lambda')} \middle\| \frac{1}{|\Lambda/\Lambda'|} f_{\sigma, \Lambda|\mathcal{R}(\Lambda')} \right) = \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda')} f_{\sigma, \Lambda'}(y) \log \frac{f_{\sigma, \Lambda'}(y) |\Lambda/\Lambda'|}{f_{\sigma, \Lambda}(y)} dy \\
= -h(f_{\sigma, \Lambda'}) + \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda')} f_{\sigma, \Lambda'}(y) \log \frac{|\Lambda/\Lambda'|}{f_{\sigma, \Lambda}(y)} dy \\
= -h(f_{\sigma, \Lambda'}) + \log |\Lambda/\Lambda'| \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda')} f_{\sigma, \Lambda'}(y) \log f_{\sigma, \Lambda}(y) dy.
\]
The conclusion follows by observing that
\[
- \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda')} f_{\sigma,\Lambda'}(y) \log f_{\sigma,\Lambda'}(y) dy = - \sum_{\lambda \in \Lambda'/\Lambda} \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda) + \lambda} f_{\sigma,\Lambda'}(y) \log f_{\sigma,\Lambda'}(y) dy
\]
\[
= - \sum_{\lambda \in \Lambda'/\Lambda} \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)} f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(y - \lambda) \log f_{\sigma,\Lambda'}(y) dy = - \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)} f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(y) \log f_{\sigma,\Lambda'}(y) dy = h(f_{\sigma,\Lambda}).
\]

\section*{Appendix B
Resolvability Codes}

In this section we review some results from [32] about resolvability codes for regular channels, which are needed for the proof of Theorem 1.

First, we need some preliminary definitions. In the following, we assume $\mathcal{X}$ is a finite abelian group and $\mathcal{Y}$ is a measurable space. Given a channel $W : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$, we use the notation $W_x(y) = W(y|x)$ for $x \in \mathcal{X}, y \in \mathcal{Y}$.

\textbf{Definition 8 (Rényi Entropy):} Given a discrete distribution $p_X$ on $\mathcal{X}$ and $\rho \geq 0$, we define
\[
H_{1+\rho}(A) = -\frac{1}{\rho} \log \sum_{a \in A} p_A(a)^{1+\rho}.
\]

\textbf{Definition 9:} Given a channel $W : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ and a probability distribution $p_X$ on $\mathcal{X}$, we define $\forall \rho \geq 0$
\[
\psi(\rho|W, p_X) = \log \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} p_X(x) \int_{\mathcal{Y}} W_x(y)^{1+\rho}(W \circ p_X)y^{-\rho} dy.
\]

This function has the following properties:
\[
\psi(0|W, p_X) = 0, \quad \psi(\rho|W^n, p^n_X) = n\psi(\rho|W, p_X), \quad \lim_{\rho \to 0} \frac{\psi(\rho|W, p_X)}{\rho} = \mathbb{I}(X; \mathcal{Y}).
\]

We also compute the second derivative in 0 which will be needed in the next section.

\textbf{Lemma 6:}
\[
\psi''(0) = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} p_X(x) \int_{\mathcal{Y}} W_x(y) \left( \log \frac{W_x(y)}{(W \circ p_X(y))} \right)^2 dy - \left( \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} p_X(x) \int_{\mathcal{Y}} W_x(y) \log \frac{W_x(y)}{(W \circ p_X(y))} dy \right)^2.
\]

The proof of Lemma 6 can be found in Appendix F.

\textbf{Definition 10 (Regular channel):} The channel $W : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ is called regular if $\mathcal{X}$ acts on $\mathcal{Y}$ by permutations $\{\pi_x\}_{x \in \mathcal{X}}$ such that $\pi_x(\pi_x(y)) = \pi_x+x'(y) \forall x, x' \in \mathcal{X}$, and there exists a probability density $p_Y$ on $\mathcal{Y}$ such that $W_x(y) = p_Y(\pi_x(y)) \forall x \in \mathcal{X}, \forall y \in \mathcal{Y}$.

In particular, a regular channel is symmetric [49, 54] in the sense of Gallager [55], and its capacity is achieved by the uniform distribution.

The following theorem was stated for discrete memoryless channels [32, Corollary 18] but can be extended to continuous outputs [32, Appendix D] as follows:

\textbf{Theorem 4:} Let $\mathcal{M}$ and $\mathcal{X}$ be a finite-dimensional vector spaces over $\mathbb{F}_p$ and $\mathcal{Y}$ a measurable space. Consider a uniform random variable $\mathbf{F}$ taking values over the set of linear mappings $f : \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{X}$ and a distribution $p_M$ on $\mathcal{M}$. If $W : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ is regular, then $\forall \rho > 0$,
\[
\mathbb{E}_F \left[ e^{\rho D(W \circ \mathbf{F}p_M||W \circ \mathcal{M}_X)} \right] \leq 1 + e^{-\rho H_{1+\rho}(\mathcal{M})} e^{\psi(\rho|W\mathcal{M}_X)}.
\]

Theorem 4 is a one-shot result, but we can apply it to $n$ uses of an i.i.d. channel to get the following.

\textbf{Corollary 1:} Let $\mathcal{X}$ be a finite-dimensional vector space over $\mathbb{F}_p$ and $\mathcal{Y}$ a measurable space, and $W : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ a regular channel. Let $R > \mathbb{I}(X; \mathcal{Y})$, where $X \sim \mathcal{X}$ and $Y \sim W \circ \mathcal{X}$. Consider $C_n \subset \mathcal{X}^n$ chosen uniformly at random in the set of $(n, k)$ linear codes in $\mathcal{X}^n$, where $k = \lceil \frac{nR}{\log p} \rceil$. Denote by $\mathcal{U}_{C_n}$ the uniform distribution over the codewords in $C_n$. Then
\[
\mathbb{E}_{C_n}[D(W^n \circ \mathcal{U}_{C_n}||W^n \circ \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{X}^n})] \to 0
\]
exponentially fast as $n \to \infty$.

**Proof:** Note that $W^n : \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathcal{Y}^n$ is still a regular channel with respect to the set of permutations $\{\pi_x\}_{x \in \mathcal{X}^n}$, where we define $\pi_X(y_1, \ldots, y_n) = (\pi_x(y_1), \ldots, \pi_x(y_n))$ for $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$.

Applying Theorem 4 to this channel, and taking $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{F}_p^k$ with $k = \lfloor nR \rfloor / \log p$ and $p_M = \mathcal{U}_\mathcal{M}$, for $F_n$ representing a random linear encoder $f_n : \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{X}^n$ we have

$$
\mathbb{E}_{F_n} \left[ e^{\rho H_{1+\rho}(M)} e^\psi(\rho |W^n|_{\mathcal{U}_\mathcal{X}^n}) \right] \leq 1 + e^{-\rho H_{1+\rho}(M)} e^\psi(\rho |W^n|_{\mathcal{U}_\mathcal{X}^n}).
$$

By Jensen’s inequality,

$$
\mathbb{E}_{F_n} [\mathbb{D}(W^n \circ F_n \circ \mathcal{U}_\mathcal{M} || W^n \circ \mathcal{U}_\mathcal{X}^n)] \leq \frac{1}{\rho} \log \left( 1 + e^{-\rho H_{1+\rho}(M)} e^\psi(\rho |W^n|_{\mathcal{U}_\mathcal{X}^n}) \right) \leq \frac{1}{\rho} e^{-\rho H_{1+\rho}(M) + \psi(\rho |W^n|_{\mathcal{U}_\mathcal{X}^n})}.
$$

Note that $H_{1+\rho}(M) = nR$ since $M$ is uniform. Using (44), we find that $\forall \rho > 0,$

$$
\mathbb{E}_{F_n} [\mathbb{D}(W^n \circ F_n \circ \mathcal{U}_\mathcal{M} || W^n \circ \mathcal{U}_\mathcal{X}^n)] \leq \frac{1}{\rho} e^{-n(\rho R - \psi(\rho |W|_{\mathcal{X}})).}
$$

(46)

From (43) and (45), we have $\psi(\rho |W|_{\mathcal{X}}) = \rho \mathbb{I}(X; Y) + \eta(\rho)$, where $\lim_{\rho \to 0} \frac{\eta(\rho)}{\rho} = 0$. Given $R > \mathbb{I}(X; Y)$, $\exists \bar{\rho}$ sufficiently small such that $\delta = R - \mathbb{I}(X; Y) - \frac{\eta(\bar{\rho})}{\bar{\rho}} > 0$. Therefore

$$
\mathbb{E}_{F_n} [\mathbb{D}(W^n \circ F_n \circ \mathcal{U}_\mathcal{M} || W^n \circ \mathcal{U}_\mathcal{X}^n)] \leq \frac{1}{\rho} e^{-n\rho \delta} \to 0
$$

as $n \to \infty$.

**APPENDIX C**

**PROOF OF THEOREM 1**

For a given dimension $n$, we will construct $\Lambda$ as a scaled mod-$p$ lattice [56] of the form $\Lambda = \alpha(p\mathbb{Z}^n + C_n)$, where $C_n$ is an $(n, k)$-linear code over $\mathbb{F}_p$.

We will consider the asymptotic behavior as $n \to \infty$, $\alpha \to 0$, $p \to \infty$ while satisfying the volume condition $\alpha^n p^{n-k} = V(\Lambda) = (\gamma \sigma^2)^{n/2}$. Here, $\gamma$ is the volume-to-noise ratio, which is assumed to be fixed.

By construction, $\Lambda_c^n \subset \Lambda \subset \Lambda_f^n$, where $\Lambda_c = \alpha p\mathbb{Z}$ and $\Lambda_f = \alpha\mathbb{Z}$ are one-dimensional lattices.

From Remark 5 and the relation (10), we have

$$
\mathbb{D}(f_{\sigma, R}(\Lambda) || \mathcal{U}(\Lambda)) = C(\Lambda, \sigma^2) = C(\Lambda_f, \sigma^2) + C(\Lambda_f / \Lambda, \sigma^2).
$$

We want to show that both terms in the sum tend to zero when $n \to \infty$.

1) First, we will show that $C(\Lambda_f, \sigma^2) = C((\alpha \mathbb{Z})^n, \sigma^2) \to 0$ if $\alpha = o\left(\frac{1}{p}\right)$ for some $c > 0$. We follow the same approach as in [50, Appendix A]. From Lemma 2 we have that $C(\Lambda_f, \sigma^2) \leq c(\sigma^2)$. Furthermore, it was shown in [57, Lemma 3] that

$$
\epsilon(\Lambda_f) = (1 + \epsilon(\sigma))^n - 1.
$$

Finally, one can show that [50, Appendix A]

$$
\epsilon_n(\sigma) = \epsilon_n(\sigma) \leq 4e^{-\frac{2p^{n-1}}{2^n}}.
$$

Then

$$
\epsilon_n(\sigma) \leq \left(1 + 4e^{-\frac{2p^{n-1}}{2^n}}\right)^n - 1 \leq 4ne^{-\frac{2p^{n-1}}{2^n}} + o(e^{-\frac{2p^{n-1}}{2^n}}) \to 0.
$$

since $(1 + x)^n = 1 + nx + o(n)$ when $x \to 0$.

2) Next, we want to show that there exists a sequence of lattices $\Lambda$ of the form $\alpha(p\mathbb{Z}^n + C_n)$ such that $C(\Lambda_f / \Lambda, \sigma^2) \to 0$ as $n \to \infty$.

Consider the mod-$\Lambda_f / \Lambda_c$ channel $W : \Lambda_f \cap \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c) \to \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c)$. This channel is regular (see Definition 10 in Appendix B) with respect to the set of permutations $\pi_x(y) = [y - x] \mod \Lambda_c$ for $x \in \mathcal{X} = \Lambda_f \cap \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c)$, $y \in \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c)$. In fact,

$$
W_x(y) = W(y|x) = f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}(y - x) = f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}([y - x] \mod \Lambda_c) = f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}(\pi_x(y)).
$$
Being regular, the mod $\Lambda_f/\Lambda_c$ channel is symmetric and the uniform distribution over $X$ achieves capacity (see Appendix B). Moreover, $\Lambda_f/\Lambda_c \equiv \mathbb{F}_p$. We consider the required rate condition in Corollary 1:

$$R = \frac{1}{n} \log |\mathcal{C}_n| = \frac{1}{n} \log |\Lambda/\Lambda_c^0| = \frac{1}{n} \log \frac{\alpha^n p^n}{V(\Lambda)} > \mathbb{I}(X; Y) = C(\Lambda_f/\Lambda_c, \sigma^2).$$

(50)

We have

$$C(\Lambda_f/\Lambda_c, \sigma^2) = \log |\Lambda_f/\Lambda_c| + h(f_{\sigma, \Lambda_f}) - h(f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}) = \log p + h(f_{\sigma, \Lambda_f}) - h(f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}).$$

Therefore, the condition (50) is equivalent to

$$\frac{1}{n} \log V(\Lambda) < h(f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}) + C(\Lambda_f, \sigma^2).$$

In the asymptotic limit for $\alpha \to 0, p \to \infty$ while keeping $\alpha^n p^n - k = V(\Lambda) = (\gamma \sigma^2)^{n/2}$, we have $C(\Lambda_f, \sigma^2) \to 0$. Moreover, $\alpha p \to \infty$, and so $h(\Lambda_c, \sigma^2) \to \frac{1}{2} \log 2\pi e \sigma^2$. So asymptotically, the rate condition is satisfied when

$$\frac{V(\Lambda)^{2/n}}{2\pi e \sigma^2} < 1.$$  

(51)

In this case we have

$$R - \mathbb{I}(X; Y) = -\frac{1}{n} \log V(\Lambda) + C(\Lambda_f, \sigma^2) - h(f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}) \to \delta_0 = \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{2\pi e \sigma^2}{V(\Lambda)^{2/n}} = \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{2\pi e}{\gamma \sigma} > 0$$

(52)

as $n \to \infty$.

**Remark 13:** Note that we cannot directly apply Corollary 1 in Appendix B to this setting, since the definition of the channel $W$ depends on $\alpha$ and $p$ which are not fixed but are a function of $n$. However, we will show that the proof of the Corollary can be extended to this channel since the convergence in (47) is uniform.

**Proof of Remark 13:** Let $X$ be a uniformly distributed variable on $\Lambda_f \cap \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c)$ and $Y$ the corresponding output distribution. Consider the function $\psi(\rho) = \psi(\rho|W, U_X)$ in Definition 9. From (43) and (45), it follows that its Taylor expansion in 0 is given by

$$\psi(\rho) = \rho \mathbb{I}(X; Y) + \rho^2 \psi''(0) + o(\rho^2),$$

(53)

where $\psi''(0)$ is given in Lemma 6. Noting that

$$(W \circ U_X)(y) = \sum_{x \in X} \frac{1}{|X|} W_x(y) = \sum_{x \in \Lambda_f \cap \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c)} \frac{1}{|\Lambda_f/\Lambda_c|} f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}(y - x) = \frac{1}{|\Lambda_f/\Lambda_c|} f_{\sigma, \Lambda_f}(y),$$

we find

$$\psi''(0) = \sum_{x \in \Lambda_f \cap \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c)} \frac{1}{|\Lambda_f/\Lambda_c|} \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c)} f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}(y - x) \left( \log \frac{f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}(y - x)}{1/|\Lambda_f/\Lambda_c| \cdot f_{\sigma, \Lambda_f}(y)} \right)^2 dy$$

$$- \left( \sum_{x \in \Lambda_f \cap \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c)} \frac{1}{|\Lambda_f/\Lambda_c|} \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c)} f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}(y - x) \log \frac{f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}(y - x)}{1/|\Lambda_f/\Lambda_c| \cdot f_{\sigma, \Lambda_f}(y)} dy \right)^2$$

$$\leq \sum_{x \in \Lambda_f \cap \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c)} \frac{1}{|\Lambda_f/\Lambda_c|} \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c)} f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}(y - x) \left( \log \frac{f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}(y - x)}{1/|\Lambda_f/\Lambda_c| \cdot f_{\sigma, \Lambda_f}(y)} \right)^2 dy$$

$$= \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c)} f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}(y') \left( \log \frac{f_{\sigma, \Lambda_c}(y')}{1/|\Lambda_f/\Lambda_c| \cdot f_{\sigma, \Lambda_f}(y')} \right)^2 dy'$$

with the change of variables $y' = y - x \mod \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c)$. From the definition of flatness factor and the bound (49),
we find that \( \forall y' \in \mathcal{R}(\Lambda_c) \),
\[
 f_{\sigma,\Lambda_c}(y') \geq \frac{1 - \epsilon_{\Lambda_c}(\sigma)}{V(\Lambda_f)} \geq \frac{1 - 4e^{-\frac{2\pi^2}{\alpha^2}}}{\alpha}.
\]
Recalling the definition of the theta series of a lattice in (6) and the relation (8), we have \( \epsilon_{\Lambda}(\sigma) = \Theta_{\Lambda^*}((2\pi\sigma^2) - 1, \) where \( \Lambda^* \) is the dual lattice of \( \Lambda \). Then by [31, Remark 1], \( \forall y' \in \mathcal{V}(\Lambda_c) \)
\[
 f_{\sigma,\Lambda_c}(y') \leq f_{\sigma,\Lambda_c}(0) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma}}\Theta_{\Lambda_c}\left(\frac{1}{2\pi\sigma^2}\right) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma}}\left(1 + \epsilon_{\Lambda_c}\left(\frac{1}{2\pi\sigma}\right)\right).
\]
Again using the bound (49), we have
\[
\epsilon_{\Lambda_c}\left(\frac{1}{2\pi\sigma}\right) = \epsilon_{\frac{1}{2\pi\sigma}}\left(\frac{1}{2\pi\sigma}\right) \leq 4e^{-\frac{2\pi^2}{\alpha^2}}.
\]
Then, since \( \alpha \to 0 \) and \( \alpha \rho \to \infty \) when \( n \to \infty \), for sufficiently large \( n \) we have
\[
\frac{f_{\sigma,\Lambda_c}(y')}{|\lambda'/\lambda_c|f_{\sigma,\Lambda_c}(y')} \leq \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma}} \frac{\alpha p(1 + 4e^{-\frac{2\pi^2}{\alpha^2}})}{1 - 4e^{-\frac{2\pi^2}{\alpha^2}}} \leq C\alpha p
\]
for some constant \( C > 0 \). Consequently, for large enough \( n \), \( \exists C' > 0 \) such that
\[
\psi''(0) \leq C'(\log \alpha p)^2.
\]
Then, from the Taylor expansion (53) we obtain the bound
\[
\psi(\rho) \leq \rho \|X; Y\| + \rho^2 C''(\log \alpha p)^2
\]
for another suitable constant \( C'' > 0 \). In particular, we can bound the exponent in equation (46) as follows:
\[
\rho \mathcal{R} - \psi(\rho | W, U_X) \geq \rho (\mathcal{R} - \|X; Y\| - \rho C''(\log \alpha p)^2) > \rho \frac{\delta_0}{2}
\]
for sufficiently large \( n \), where \( \delta_0 \) is defined in (52), as long as \( \rho = o\left(\frac{1}{(\log \alpha p)^2}\right) \) and the VNR condition (51) is satisfied. In particular if we choose the scaling\(^5\)
\[
p = \xi n^{3/2}, \quad \alpha p = 2\sqrt{n}, \quad (54)
\]
where \( \xi \) is the smallest number in the interval \([1, 2]\) such that \( p \) is prime [58, Section IV], we have convergence in (47) with \( \rho = \frac{1}{(\log 2\sqrt{n})^{1+n}} \) for some \( \eta > 0 \) since
\[
\frac{1}{\rho} e^{-n\frac{\delta_0}{2}} = (\log 2\sqrt{n})^{2+n} e^{-\frac{n\delta_0}{2\log 2\sqrt{n}^{1+n}}} \to 0.
\]
This concludes the proof of Remark 13.

Then according to Corollary 1, for \( C_n \) chosen uniformly in the set of \((n, k)\) linear codes over \( \mathbb{F}_p \) of rate \( \mathcal{R} = \frac{k}{n} \log p \),
\[
\mathbb{E}_{C_n} \left[ \mathbb{D}(W^n \circ C_n || W^n \circ U^\otimes_X) \right] \leq \frac{1}{\rho} e^{-n\frac{\delta_0}{2}} \to 0
\]
as \( n \to \infty \). In particular, there exists at least one code \( C_n \) such that \( \mathbb{D}(W^n \circ C_n || W^n \circ U^\otimes_X) \to 0 \). Note that
\[
(W^n \circ C_n)(y) = \sum_{c \in C_n} \frac{1}{|C_n|} f_{\sigma,\Lambda_c}(y - \alpha c) = \sum_{c \in C_n} \sum_{\lambda' \in \Lambda_c} \frac{1}{p^k} f_{\sigma}(y - \alpha c - \lambda_c) = \frac{1}{p^k} \sum_{\lambda' \in \Lambda} f_{\sigma}(y - \lambda)
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{p^k} f_{\sigma,\Lambda}(y), \quad (55)
\]
\[
(W^n \circ U^\otimes_X)(y) = \sum_{x \in \Lambda^*_n \cap \mathcal{R}(\Lambda^*_c)} \frac{1}{p^n} f_{\sigma,\Lambda^*_c}(y - x) = \frac{1}{p^n} f_{\sigma,\Lambda^*_c}(y). \quad (56)
\]
\(^5\)This choice of scaling is compatible with the existence of a suitable sequence of nested lattices, see Appendix D.
Since both \((W^n \circ \mathcal{U}_{c_n})\) and \((W^n \circ \mathcal{U}^{(n)}_{X})\) are \(\Lambda\)-periodic, we can write
\[
\mathbb{D}(W^n \circ \mathcal{U}_{c_n} || W^n \circ \mathcal{U}^{(n)}_{X}) = \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)} p^{-k} f_{\sigma, \Lambda}(y) \log \frac{p^{-k} f_{\sigma, \Lambda}(y)}{p^{-n} f_{\sigma, \Lambda}(y)} dy
\]
\[
= \int_{\mathcal{R}(\Lambda)} f_{\sigma, \Lambda}(y) \log \frac{f_{\sigma, \Lambda}(y)}{p^{-(n-k)} f_{\sigma, \Lambda}(y)} dy = \mathbb{D}(f_{\sigma, \mathcal{R}(\Lambda)} || p^{-(n-k)} f_{\sigma, \mathcal{R}(\Lambda) / \mathcal{R}(\Lambda)}) = C(\Lambda^n_f / \Lambda, \sigma^2) \to 0
\]
using Lemma 3. This concludes the proof.

Remark 14: With a standard argument based on Markov’s inequality, we can also show that the set of KL-secrecy good lattices has large measure, since \(\forall \xi > 0\),
\[
\mathbb{P} \{ \mathbb{D}(W^n \circ \mathcal{U}_{c_n} || W^n \circ \mathcal{U}^{(n)}_{X}) > \xi \} \leq \frac{1}{\xi} \mathbb{E}_{c_n} [\mathbb{D}(W^n \circ \mathcal{U}_{c_n} || W^n \circ \mathcal{U}^{(n)}_{X})].
\]
Given \(0 < c < 1/2\), we can take \(\xi = \frac{1}{c} e^{-n \rho_0 / \bar{p}}\) and we obtain
\[
\mathbb{P} \{ \mathbb{D}(W^n \circ \mathcal{U}_{c_n} || W^n \circ \mathcal{U}^{(n)}_{X}) > \xi \} \leq c.
\]

APPENDIX D

EXISTENCE OF A SEQUENCE OF NESTED LATTICES FOR SECRET KEY GENERATION

In this section, we show the existence of a sequence of nested lattices \(\Lambda_3^{(n)} \subset \Lambda_2^{(n)} \subset \Lambda_1^{(n)}\) such that \(\Lambda_3\) is KL secrecy-good, \(\Lambda_2\) is AWGN-good and \(\Lambda_1\) is KL secrecy-good. Note that we don’t need covering-goodness, which requires more stringent conditions on the parameters [59].

We will follow the construction in [58]. We denote by \(V_{B,n}\) the volume of the \(n\)-dimensional ball of radius 1. Given \(P_3 > P_2 > P_1 > 0\), let \(a_i = \log \frac{1}{P_i}\) for \(i = 1, 2, 3\). We consider the dimensions \(k_3 < k_2 < k_1 \leq n\) defined as follows:
\[
k_i = \left\lfloor \frac{n}{2 \log p} \left( \log \left( \frac{4}{V_{B,n}^{2/n}} \right) + a_i \right) \right\rfloor, \quad i = 1, 2, 3,
\]
where \(p = \xi n^{3/2}\), and \(\xi\) is taken to be the smallest number in the interval \([1, 2]\) such that \(p\) is prime [58, Section IV]. Let \(C_1\) be uniformly sampled from the set of all linear \((n, k_1)\) codes over \(\mathbb{F}_p\), with generator matrix \(G_1\) (in column notation). We denote by \(G_2\) and \(G_3\) the submatrices of \(G_1\) corresponding to the first \(k_2\) and \(k_3\) columns respectively, and by \(C_2, C_3\) the corresponding linear codes. Finally, we define the lattices \(\Lambda_i = \frac{1}{p} C_i + \mathbb{Z}^n\) and \(\Lambda_i = \alpha p \Lambda_i\) for \(i = 1, 2, 3\), where \(\alpha = \frac{2\sqrt{2\pi}}{p}\). Then by [58, Theorem 1 and Theorem 6], the matrices \(G_1, G_2, G_3\) are full rank and the nested lattices \(\Lambda_3^{(n)} \subset \Lambda_2^{(n)} \subset \Lambda_1^{(n)}\) obtained in this way are good for quantization and coding with probability that tends to 1 when \(n \to \infty\) and
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} V^{2/n}(\Lambda_i^{(n)}) = 2\pi e P_i, \quad i = 1, 2, 3.
\]
Note that we have taken the same scaling as in (54). In particular, when \(n \to \infty\) we have \(p \to \infty\), \(\alpha \to 0\) and \(\alpha p \to \infty\).

Moreover, \(\alpha = \frac{2}{\xi n}\) satisfies the condition \(\alpha = o\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)\) in Appendix C. Therefore, due to Remark 14 the lattices \(\Lambda_3\) and \(\Lambda_1\) are also KL secrecy-good with probability close to 1, which concludes the proof.

APPENDIX E

OPTIMAL PUBLIC RATE / SECRET KEY RATE TRADE-OFF

In this section, we derive the optimal trade-off between public rate and secret key rate from [23] for the setting in our paper. Note that Theorem 4 in [23] doesn’t directly apply to our model because our source doesn’t necessarily satisfy \(X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z\). However, the proof of Lemma 6 in [23] shows how to obtain a new source \((X, Y, Z)\) which is
\[\text{Note that the conclusions of [58] still hold for any } p = \Theta(n^{1/2 + \delta}) \text{ with } \delta > 0, \text{ see Remark 7 in that paper.}\]
is equal to

In terms of the original variables $X, Y, Z$, after simplifying the expression we obtain the optimal trade-off

$$R_K \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( \frac{1 - \rho_{xy}^2}{1 - \rho_{xy}^2 (1 - \rho_{xz}^2)} \right) e^{-2R_p}.$$ 

(Recall that $\rho_{xy} > \rho_{xz}$ in our setting). Using the notation $\sigma_1^2 = \sigma_x^2(1 - \rho_{xy}^2)$, $\sigma_2^2 = \sigma_z^2(1 - \rho_{xz}^2)$ from our paper, this is equal to

$$R_K \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( e^{-2R_p} + \frac{\sigma_2^2}{\sigma_1^2} (1 - e^{-2R_p}) \right). \quad (57)$$

APPENDIX F

PROOF OF LEMMA 6

The first derivative of the function $\psi(\rho) = \psi(\rho|W, p_X)$ is

$$\psi'(\rho) = \frac{\sum_{x \in X} p_X(x) \int_Y W_x(y)^{1+\rho} \frac{W_x(y)}{(W'_\rho p_X)(y)} dy}{\sum_{x \in X} p_X(x) \int_Y \log \frac{W_x(y)}{(W'_\rho p_X)(y)} dy} = \frac{f(\rho)}{g(\rho)}.$$ 

Then we have

$$g(0) = 1,$$

$$f(0) = \sum_{x \in X} p_X(x) \int_Y W_x(y) \log \frac{W_x(y)}{(W \circ p_X)(y)} dy = g'(0),$$

$$f'(0) = \sum_{x \in X} p_X(x) \int_Y W_x(y) \left( \log \frac{W_x(y)}{(W \circ p_X)(y)} \right)^2 dy.$$ 

The conclusion follows since

$$\psi''(0) = \frac{f''(0)g(0) - f(0)g'(0)}{g^2(0)}.$$ 

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