Partnership scheme for BIJB Kertajati West Java International Airport

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Abstract. This article aims to explore how the communication among actors and institutions being initiated to decide the partnership schemes for Kertajati Airport in West Java which is identified as an exercising authentic dialogue communication concept. The decision making to select what kind of partnership scheme to be the best for Kertajati Airport is a process to establish. An effective communicative planning approach in an infrastructure development process using the partnership scheme is a critical point in an airport planning. Developing an airport needs a huge significant number and long term of investment to make it required tedious communication to negotiate. Some actors at the steering committee interacts to find the best solution to what kind of partnership is fit to be adopted for a better future. It takes five years of intensive communication among some government institutions and between executives and legislatures partners to decide the selected partnership schemes. In May 2018 the Kertajati Airport officially operated, but until today the dilemma of how to monitor and evaluate the operation scheme still inappropriate to discuss because on fact unanticipated low traffic demand is prevailed until now. Building a communication between actors in a very complex system should be done not only by authentic dialogue [1] 2010 but also by a political transaction.

1. Introduction

Determining the type of partnership scheme in airport infrastructure management is the critical point because the partnership scheme will show the direction of operation and maintenance in the future. Among practices, this is crucial because a partnership scheme will determine whether the airport will be remained to reach a capital gain in the future or not. The quality of an airport on the other hand highly depends on how significant the budget is in the value for money, while the budget highly depends on how smart and legitimate the authority to make an action. An airport is a public facility needed to serve the movement of air traffic which grows and develops to fulfill a demand. Resources activity such as the ups and downs of the industry, trade, business through every social activity will affect air traffic demand at the end.

Many studies say that poor management of public infrastructure such as an airport highly depends on the complexity of interaction among stakeholders in managing infrastructure. Managing airport infrastructure must be managed holistically both internally and externally interconnected among the airport and region. Airport development planning must be situated in the hinterland of the region which allows air traffic demand associated with the need of growing the entire development entities. The National development policy was stated at how the construction of a new airport must be subjected to the dependency with an integrated National Airport Planning System.
The idea of the need for a new airport in West Java has been initiated since 2002 to fulfill the air traffic demand for about 50 million population. The integrated study stated in Provincial Regional Spatial Plan or RTRW 2004-2024 (Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Provinsi) recommends the Majalengka district at Kertajati as the location of an airport for the future. The planning study states that the development of the BIJB (Bandar Udara International Kertajati Jawa Barat) in Kertajati is to meet the needs of air traffic movements from the area of West Java (which will be almost 60 million people) for the next 50 years ahead. Air traffic data in 2002 exhibited eighty percents the utilization of Soekarno-Hatta International Airport in Cengkareng Banten would be nearly overloaded for the next two decades. Even the utilization of Husein international airport in the limited city center of Bandung is nearly overloaded during the peak holiday season and Ramadhan.

2. Problem Statement

It is predicted that in the next decade, the number of passengers served by SHIA (Soekarno-Hatta International Airport) will be 36 million passengers per year, which already exceeds the capacity of 26 million passengers per year. The high growth air traffic demand in SHIA is exacerbated by the accumulation demand of other surrounding cities such as Banten (40 million population) and Jakarta (12 million population). Jakarta as the capital city of Indonesia specifically has an exceptional demand for the government administration movement. Conflicting the extension needs of land use for other purposes (for residential, amusement, industry, trade, business, etc) at the vicinity area of Jakarta and Tangerang intermittently exaggerated to protect the possibility to expand. SHIA is also surrounded by the intricately crowded vulnerable environment with slum residential areas that is impossible to be extended for the future.

During the peak flight season especially during Ramadhan, holiday, and haj pilgrimage season, the congestion happened unavoidably in SHIA. Consequently, the traffic jam happens between Jakarta to SHIA and it causes the crowd traffic within the western area of Jakarta and surrounding cities of Tangerang and Southern Tangerang. Unpredicted delay of air transport passenger caused by traffic jams through toll road to the airport usually happens which makes the authority nowadays activates the airport train as an alternative mode. Uncertain arrival times for passenger traveling via toll road to the SHIA especially from the eastern part of West Java such as from Bekasi, Karawang, Purwakarta, Bandung, Garut, Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, Majalengka, and Indramayu concludes the need of how to develop a new international airport in the eastern part of West Java Province.

With some considerations and studies, since 2005 the central government through the Ministry of Transportation's policy has agreed to launch a plan to the construction of West Java International Airport in Kertajati, Majalengka Regency. The proposal is submitted to the central government and is replied by the Decree of Transportation Ministry No. 5 Year 2005. Jawa Barat Provincial Government Authority has continued the approval by starting the action by committing the land acquisition phase one program since 2009. The initial problem comes up from the main issue as follows: who or which person and institution to be the PJPK or GCA (Government Contracting Agency) for this project.

2.1. Partnership as A New Public Management

New Public Management (NPM) is a set of particular management approaches and techniques which are mainly borrowed from the private sector and applied in the public sector [2]. NPM is not a precise set of guidelines or a standard package that should be followed entirely, instead it is a combination of approaches and techniques that can be applied collectively or partially according to each country’s situations and needs. NPM is the continuance of public administration which has long included questions of efficiency, effectiveness, and economy. New Public Management (NPM) movement argues that government should be run like a business and that entrepreneurial-based techniques should be utilized in an effort to enhance the government performance [3].

The transfer of governmental responsibilities to market-based approaches and mechanisms, such as managing competition and privatization, such as public-private partnership, is now at the forefront of a new public management reform. How to manage competition as the establishment of competitive
bidding, for service provision in public services, between internal government institutions as providers and external private companies are now in common to provide public facilities. The participation of private sectors in public facilities is defined as outsourcing or contracting a service to the private sector without allowing the governmental entity to compete.

One best practice of the partnership scheme in New Public Management is in the City of Charlotte [4]. The City of Charlotte has been active in managing competition to develop public facilities since 2005 for over 12 years and has been recognized by the International City Management Association as a city that has successfully applied NPM practices. In Charlotte, the managed competition policy requires adherence to three service delivery goals. First is the goal of providing the best quality service at the lowest cost, second is a greater focus on performance outcomes, and third is an increase in attention to accountability [5]. Initiatives include the establishment of public private partnerships with the Chamber of Commerce, Central Piedmont Community College, Wachovia, and Bank of America for the enhancement of service delivery and internal working relationships [5].

Why the Charlotte municipal authority chooses the partnership scheme is because it ensures the delivery of quality public services that promote the safety, health, and quality of life of its citizens. The partnership will identify and respond to the community needs and focus on public services by creating and maintaining effective partnerships, attracting and retaining skilled motivated employees, and using strategic business planning. The goal of government regarding collaborative participation and partnership should not only be on how to get the public to agree with the plan or approach of the agency but also it should be on how to work to create and facilitate an environment that supports the ongoing development, growth, and connection of all involved, practitioners, politicians, and citizens alike.

NPM undoubtedly affects the practice of public administration, showing the potential for altering the delicate forces balancing administrators, political leaders, and the populace, an examination of the nature of these new tools and their roots may be a fruitful and enlightening exercise. Maybe some insight into the threats and advantages of the NPM approach to public administration can be gained from the analysis of NPM tools.

3. Method
Research of Kertajati Airport is conducted at the level of how all actors, institutions, and related stakeholders within the airport system interact to make decisions in finding a partnership scheme. Research in air transportation systems is a rather more complicated in transportation research because the scope of the area widely ranged from engineering, politics, law and regulation, public health, social sciences, economics, business, tax and trade, national security, etc. This article aims to explore how the communication among actors and institutions initiated to decide the partnership schemes for Kertajati Airport in West Java is an authentic dialogue.

CGA or Central Government Authority of Kertajati Airport is the representative institution of government to whom or to which institution is responsible for Kertajati Airport. The government in this case is the Provincial Government of West Java not the Central Government or Directorate General of Air Transportation, the Ministry of Transportation. What the special attention of this research is to explore partnership schemes why the CGA or PJPK chooses the RDPT scheme while usually central government commonly prefers to choose the BOT modified scheme when we refer to the regulation of public-private partnership. We will explore why the mid unbundle scheme coloring the RDPT as a selected scheme rather not the BOT common bundling scheme selected by the provincial government. In the pre-emptive hypothesis, we assume that there are some closely tied to the political atmosphere significantly present at that time. Decision making in the local government is still influenced by the regional political situation. At the national and central government levels, the strategic actions of the political situation are also involved in a public-private partnerships scheme.

This research is conducted over a period of 3 years between 2017 and 2020. The study of infrastructure partnerships in Indonesia is usually conducted for only a certain kind of infrastructures such as drinking water, toll road, water resources, solid waste, urban economic facilities, telecommunication and informatics, energy, and electricity. Kertajati Airport Infrastructure is the first
successful infrastructure scheme program developed through a public-private partnership mechanism in Indonesia. The way of how to explore the airport partnerships research in West Java, we use semi-structured interviews, media archives, and analysis of policy documents. In order to grasp data of transportation and public policy to decision making, we gathered data from news media archives and semi-structured interviews with policy makers, scholars, activists, and other observers of air transport demand. Grasping discursive partnership, we required meetings with key participants of these ventures as well as following developments reported in the media and scholarly journals.

The weakness in data collection for this methodology is found on the way of how liable and viable the data are fit in giving information by the respondents about their opinions on communication perspectives. Communication data is about what of their experiences exist come up during proceed a dialogue in finding a solution when the split decision among actors comes up. The practitioners in communication data collection tend to selectively adopt data based on a match with their ‘own views and interests’ as perceived through their ‘own senses’. The involvement of actors and stakeholders in the discovery process should therefore be central when identifying barriers.

3.1. Kertajati Airport with Partnership Scheme

To improve transportation services nationally the government has designed the National Transportation System Plan (Sistranas) for 2010-2030 as an umbrella policy for the development of an efficient, safe, and comfortable transportation system. The development of inter-island transportation systems aims to create the North, Central, and South Belts, both sea and air to be intermittently integrated. The flight becomes an important mission to increase the level of connectivity between the whole connected islands. The direction of airport development has stabilized some prevailing functions of 9 (nine) primary hub airports, 15 secondary or spoke airports, and 21 tertiary or collecting and financing the airports in addition to support the 14 cargo hub airports. West Java Province with 50 million residents proposes Kertajati in Majalengka district as the location of a primary collection airport as well as a cargo hub airport for West Java with national and international services. Hub airports are used by one or more airlines to concentrate passenger traffic and flight operations at a given airport. Hub airports serve as transfer or stop-over points to get passengers to their final destination.

The intention to develop BIJB International Airport for the local government authority becomes an answer to support the SHIA (Soekarno-Hatta International Airport) services where the location is situated in another province of Banten while it has already saturated exceeded the capacity of 26 million passengers per year until 2030. Under the planning circumstances, the first stage of BIJB is expected to be able to accommodate approximately 5.6 million passengers per year, which hopefully will be the second-largest airport after SHIA in Indonesia. The BIJB airport is built on 1,800 hectares build-up area, which has a longer runway standard of 2,500 meters and a width standard 60 meters. That is for the first phase (with the 5.6 million passengers per year) and will be extended further to the length of 3,000 meters with a width of standard 60 meters. Land acquisition through Inbreng Tanah has already been carried out in an area of 1000 Ha at a cost of 1.2 trillion. Inbreng Tanah is a land mechanism to contribute a parcel of land not cash as a sharing for infrastructure development.

Since the establishment of the Airport Business Entity (BUBU) in 2014 under the name of PT BIJB based on West Java Regional Regulation No. 22 Year 2013 concerning the establishment of an airport and Aero city business entity in Kertajati, the preparatory has processed. For the funding selection mechanism for the airport management are being initiated to be chosen. The central government (the Ministry of) has conveyed the funding constraints if it is put under the central government budget. The significant cost of construction for the new airport Kertajati requires 30 trillion IDR, while there are many airports are needed to be improved during that period and need the state budget for the next 20 years. The Ministry proposes the local government can take over the plan to build the Kertajati Airport through APBD, but considering the provincial APBD is only around 7 to 9 trillion IDR per year, the possibility is still very difficult to be succeeded except through a multi-year funding mechanism. With a very large funding requirement of 30 trillion IDR while the provincial APBD is very limited (for the
transportation sector was less than 1 trillion IDR), the multi-year calculation fit if it is possible to be supported by a multi-year mechanism for more than 30 years.

The multi-year regional budget regulation that has more than 30 years does not have a legal aspect yet, both at the Indonesian and provincial level in West Java while the regional budget, which when launched for more than two years, the provincial government must propose special recommendations and considerations with dialogue, lengthy discussion, and debate to various factions on the council. Internally, the provincial government has also consulted this with PT Jasa Sarana regarding the lack of capital which at the time is only around five trillion for four other business sectors such as telematics, toll roads, clean water, and solid waste. This impasse makes the provincial government return the burden of budgetary responsibilities back to the Ministry of Transportation.

The Ministry of Transportation conveys this issue to the president and assigns BAPPENAS to conduct inter-ministerial level coordination meetings such as with the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of State Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Home Affairs, BAPPENAS, BKPM, and BPN. In January 2016 BIJB business plan was concluded to be incorporated into the National Strategic Project listing project with transferring the assignment to the central government through the Ministry of Transportation's budget location. Considering that in the 2014-2019 Ministry of Transportation Strategic Plan the BIJB project has not yet been included in the budget plan, the Ministry of Transportation experiences legal difficulties in budgeting rules for budgeting BIJB in the ministry's annual budget plan because its budgetary needs are very large and will disrupt the ministry's annual activity plans.

There is still a discourse matters to include the BIJB project supported by the BAPPENAS budget even if it is allocated within the Ministry of State Secretary budget. This policy is also very heavy and conflicting because it is impossible and not in the standard regulation with the rules of government organizations where the task of BAPPENAS as a coordinating inter-ministry institution for planning rather than as an executed-agency for implementing the construction budget for airport development.

Placing the BIJB development budget in the State Secretariat is also inaccurate and violates the rules because the task of this ministry is as an administrative and household housekeeping institution. The only most appropriate and the right institution at the central level to develop and manage BIJB is the Ministry of Transportation through the Directorate General of Civil Aviation.

Considering of transportation while the strategic plan of the ministry of 2014-2019 does not mention the existence of a budget plan for BIJB development, there are two possible alternatives, including the inclusion of the BIJB development program in the 2019-2024 strategic plan with a five-year delay or submitting budget initiation to the provincial government.

After conducting dialogue, consultation, and lengthy discussion than in October 2016, the Ministry of Transportation handed over the responsibility of how to develop and manage the BIJB development budget to the local West Java provincial government. The initial problem of lack of budget arises again after an intensive communication iteration with various parties and resource persons by proposing BIJB financing through funding collaboration with third parties or the private sector. The proposed concept is with PPP or Public-Private Partnership where initially the most likely to be adopted with the BOT (Build Operate and Transfer) scheme. Another problem arises if the BOT scheme is adopted while the flight security and safety regulation which according to the International Air Traffic Association (IATA) Regulation regulate the very strict standard and must be monitored officially by the state, not by the private sector.
The provincial government starts a dialogue, consultation, and subsequent discussion with relevant stakeholders on the regional government in this case from the regional secretary, the regional development planning agency, the transportation department, PT Angkasa Pura II, the directorate general of air transportation, the West Java BUMD, the regional investment coordinating body, the chamber of commerce, and industry that proposes the division of management responsibilities is divided into two, which is the management on the airside (airside) carried out by the Directorate General of Air Transportation of the Ministry of Transportation concerning procedures and procedures for air and air traffic such as runways, taxiways, aircraft hangars, air traffic control, airport signs, etc. Meanwhile, the management on the land side is carried out by PT Angkasa Pura II and the Immigration Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights such as passenger and goods security issues, activities in the terminal with various technical activities.

Another problem that arises is that the study of recommendations proposed by BAPPENAS which states that the construction of the BIJB airport must not stand alone because it must be supported by the construction of the new city of AEROCITY around BIJB which aims at the economic feasibility of development to support each other for requests for other associated activities or generated demand. The Aero city development plan in Majalengka Regency basically must be the responsibility of the West Java Provincial Development Planning Agency (BAPPEDA) in collaboration with the public works and spatial planning department and the West Java provincial housing agency. Consultation and discussion

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**Figure 1. Timeline of BIJB Project**

- **2003**: Location Determination according to Decree of the Minister of Transportation (KM) No. 5 Year 2005
- **2005**: BIJB Land Acquisition
- **2007**: The Air Side Detailed Engineering Design (DED) is stipulated in Master Plan decree of KP 954 Year 2014
- **2009**: Location Determination Revision decree KP No. 457 Year 2012
- **2012**: Formulation of the Kertajati Aerocity Master Plan by West Java Diskomimun
- **2013**: The Land Side BIJB Detailed Engineering Design (DED) by West Java Transportation Agency
- **2014**: BIJB Environmental Permit Determination Decree No. 02.12.05 Year 2014
- **2015**: The establishment of PT. BIJB
- **2016**: BIJB is Included in the National Strategic Project
- **2017**: Central Government Takeover (January)

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dialogue must be held with similar institutions and the level below that is the coordination of institutions in the Majalengka district which is under the control of Majalengka District Head.

The coordination of the Aero city development plan at Majalengka Regency includes issues related to spatial planning, location permits, principle permits, environmental permits to building permits involving several agencies including the one-stop licensing agency, the public works agency, the development planning agency, the environmental management agency living district as well as district land agency. All of the licensing activities will be provided by the relevant agencies at the district level. All Aero city development permits must be under the coordination of the Majalengka district head and also must consult with the legislative body of the Majalengka district DPRD. The dialogue of consultation and discussion of Aero city planning at the district level is relatively open compared to the discussion of the BIJB technical plan because building Aero city involves more technical institutions in the district and local community stakeholders in the district such as developers, contractors, social community self-help groups (NGOs) to political parties related to Aero city's new city development plans.

To increase airport passenger demand in the future, the government through the Ministry of Religion has agreed that starting in 2018 the departure of the West Java pilgrims, approximately 30,000 pilgrims, will be made through the Kertajati Airport. The implication of this policy confirms that the Majalengka district government must coordinate with the Ministry of Religion and all relevant stakeholders for the pilgrimage to plan locations, space requirements, dormitory locations, permits, and construction costs for all haj hostel embarkation equipment contained within the Aero city area. Dialogue, consultation, and discussion on infrastructure and facilities for the Hajj pilgrimage have not been carried out intensively because of the consideration of regional spatial regulations in the Aero city area which must be stated in the Majalengka Regency Spatial Plans that has not been established.

Another discourse on the need or not the need to build embarkation in the Aero city area is because it is better to rent a hotel during the embarkation process in Majalengka, Cirebon, or Indramayu than to build a new facility in the Aero city area whose use is only fulfilled during the haj season. The underlying consideration is the location of the airport to the city of Majalengka 28 km (40 minutes), Cirebon 60 km (55 minutes), and Indramayu 58 km (60 minutes). In a coordination meeting with the Ministry of Religion, it is decided that the construction of the Haj embarkation would be carried out in 2019-2020 with the construction site outside the Aero city area next to the location of the BIJB airport within the Majalengka district area.

3.2. Partnership Under Government Budget Limitation

Alternative financial source from outside the government budget has begun to be potential since 2017 through the regulation of investment by the mechanism of RDPT which aims for boosting the infrastructure development projects. RDPT is not a bond of investment but a stock, therefore investors are expected to get a higher return than bonds because this is a long-term investment. The advantage of RDPT is that it provides investor shareholder agreement among shareholders, which means RDPT holders can be involved in strategic decision making. RDPT shareholders who have 20% ownership can place representatives on the board of commissioners. At the end of 2017, several investment managers launched three limited equity mutual funds (RDPT) by making infrastructure projects as their prime assets. There are three investment institutions officially recorded the issuance of RDPT instruments for infrastructure including the Mandiri Infrastructure Equity Transducer RDPT, the Danareksa Infrastructure Dirgantara I RDPT to fund BIJB International Airport while the Ciptadana Asset Management is launched through RDPT infrastructure to fund housing projects through PT PP (Pembangunan Perumahan) Tbk's perpetual bond.

The shareholder of Dirgantara I infrastructure (RDPT) will contribute 49% to the Kertajati Airport project, while the remaining 51% are injected by West Java provincial government funds. The reason to use RDPT is that the capital market investors feel that the assets of infrastructure projects as public products can be considered and used massively by air passenger traffic. The RDPT is limited chosen by investors because the yield of this product slightly outperformed conventionally being stock-based on
mutual funds where the assets generally attracted investors. The profit gained by investors from the RDPT scheme is not obtained from market price movements only, but also by the opportunity of success gained. Investor risk in the RDPT is not exposed to market risk, but to liquidity risk and business risk. Investors are also at risk of loss if the project cannot reach a target accordingly. RDPT is an investment instrument intended for only a maximum of 50 investors. Investment through RDPT is carried out in the ‘Real Sector’ or people-based activity economy. The minimum investment value of RDPT is fairly significant or about 5 billion IDR per unit RDPT. In July 2018, Danareksa Investment Management as the RDPT manager of the BIJB project issued the Kertajati International Airport Limited Investment Fund (RDPT). The portion of the RDPT for the initial opening stage is 13 % for the share of PT Bandara Internasional West Java (BIJB). The mutual fund worth 450 billion IDR with a five-year tenor and will be listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. In its development stage within a few months, the government capitalizes the share of ownership to 18% from the previous 13 %, worth almost 500 billion IDR.

The communication to decide the terms of shareholders for public-private partnership requires a lengthy process of negotiation. In the initial submission of the initial concept of negotiating the division of shares of West Java Provincial Government is 60%, then 25% PT Angkasa Pura II (Persero), and 2% shares of the West Java Provincial Government Civil Servants Cooperative. The next agreement after the negotiations is 62% owned by the West Java Provincial Government. Meanwhile, the remaining 38% shares consists of a combination of Angkasa Pura II shares 25%, and RDPT investor shares 13%. In the agreement of the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs with the Provincial Government and the Ministry of Transportation, the value of the 38% BIJB share price owned by Angkasa Pura II and RDPT Investors is 500 billion per May 2018. The price of one share is 5 billion IDR, only for 50 investors.

Until the inauguration of BIJB Airport in May 2018, the ownership of PT BIJB was 60% owned by the West Java Provincial Government which consist of land acquisition or bring costs for 1000 hectares of land totaling 1.2 trillion (from 2014 to 2016), 20% Angkasa Pura II shares, 18% RPDT shares, 2% West Java civil servant cooperative shares while PT Jasa Sarana BUMD West Java provincial government controls 49% BIJB shares. The development of the BIJB Kertajati phase I (first) costs Rp. 2.6 trillion with an authorized capital of Rp. 2.5 trillion. Contractors implementing the BIJB development are PT Wijaya Karya and PT PP Pembangunan Perumahan. To complete the funding needs above, BIJB also receives a loan from Sharia banking syndicated worth Rp 906 billion.

In the next development in May 2019 or a year after the inauguration of Kertajati Airport operations, the shareholder portion changes, with PT BIJB receiving around Rp625 billion in additional capital from PT Angkasa Pura (AP) II. The amount will be converted so that AP II shares increase from 20% to 25%. The Governor of West Java, which has just changed in 2019, says that the Rp625 billion of the funds will be partly used to pay off several development project payments, namely for airport operational costs, debt payments to contractors (WIKA and PP), and for bank loans for corporations. Payment will be repaid in 3 years. If the entire lengthy negotiation process ends, the next division of ownership of the BIJB airport ownership is that the West Java Provincial Government will hold a 64% stake. PT Angkasa Pura II owns 25% of shares and 11% of RDPT shares to other parties or investors.

Liability Companies (Perseroan Terbatas) regulated in article 34 of Law 40/2007 concerning limited states that the payment of share capital can be made in money or other forms. Another form of depositing capital stock, commonly is called capital "goods entry" or "Inbreng" or "capital brought into the business." For a 1000 Ha land worth the Director-General of State Assets must justify 1.2 trillion which is referred as input assets as the power of attorney PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur (PT SMI) shareholders which the 1.2 trillion funding is done through financial advisory from PT SMI which is an infrastructure financing SOE under the Ministry of Finance. PT SMI is designated as a financial advisor because it is a government institution that advises on a way professional to BUMD or PT BIJB related to financial matters. PT SMI is considered to have sufficient experience to provide financial advisors. PT SMI is also close to banking institutions and financial services, and able to provide input related to financing in PT BIJB decision making. Even though the workers at PT BIJB are recruited professionally, PT BIJB
is still a new corporation, so there is a need for financial advisors so that the policy in PT BIJB’s decision making is not wrong.

Because it is an input, Kertajati Airport’s land assets must be under the responsibility of the Directorate of Separated State Assets (KND) and recorded in the Directorate of the State Asset Management Institute (LMAN). KND is a government institution within the Ministry of Finance equivalent to the directorate. At the same time, LMAN (State Asset Management Institute) is a Public Service Agency (BLU) established on December 16, 2015, by the Minister of Finance under the Directorate General of State Assets (DJKN) whose job is to manage state assets. The LMAN special task is planning the funding and utilization of land bank land and making compensation payments for land acquisition for national priority projects. Kertajati Airport, which has a passenger terminal area of 96 thousand square meters, costs a project of Rp2.6 trillion, of which Rp1.5 trillion in funds comes from syndicated Islamic bank loans while the company will also issue a Limited Participation Mutual Fund (RDPT).

PT SMI has assisted PT BIJB since 2014 in conducting a review for a feasibility study for airport development, a business plan study for PT BIJB that includes the development of Aero city which is planned by the government to support the airports. The preparation of the masterplan of Aero city assisted by PT BIJB is conducted by the preliminary explorations for strategic partner investors, RDPT, and syndicated loans for the development. Discussions for the potential structure of the finance scheme with the prospective creditors and equity investors (strategic partners and RDPT) are held in the beginning. PT SMI also provides an assistance and financial transactions during the preparation of the RDPT, especially during presentations to the shareholders (West Java Provincial Government), gives an assistance to conduct Operational Cooperation (KSO) negotiations, gives an assistance to PT BIJB to discuss with the syndicate of Islamic Banks, and gives an assistance to PT BIJB to discuss with the RDPT investment manager. DJKN is the power of shareholders of PT SMI, which carries out the mandate to safeguard and oversee state assets. In connection with input 1000 Ha of land worth 1.2 trillion since 2014, the West Java Provincial Government has deposited capital from the Regional Budget of 50 billion IDR (2014), 300 billion IDR (2015), 200 billion IDR (2016), 258 billion IDR (2017) while the remaining 906 billion IDR are paid through loan funds from the Islamic banking syndication. The below is the RDPT of the Kertajati International Airport construction project.

![RDPT for BIJB Project](image)

Figure 2. RDPT for BIJB Project

The construction of Kertajati Airport itself consists of three packages, namely package 1 infrastructure development undertaken by PT Adhi Karya with a contract value of 355 billion IDR as of
November 15, 2015, package 2 is the construction of the main passenger terminal building carried out through the joint operation (KSO) of PT Wijaya Karya and PT PP with a contract value of 1.39 trillion IDR and package 3, namely the construction of operational support buildings, such as cargo terminal facilities and regional electricity connection by PT Waskita Karya with a contract value of 416 billion IDR. Regarding the land acquisition from the plan total of 1,800 hectares, only 1,000 hectares have been acquired, and affected villages include Kertajati, Suka Kerta, Kertasari, and Sukamulya villages. Increasing accessibility to the airport, it is planned that toll roads and non-toll roads will be made to Kertajati Airport. The toll access will later connect the Kertajati Airport with the Cipali toll road, while for the non-toll access, there will be four lanes. PT Railink also examines the possibility of procuring access to the airport via trains from Jatibarang, considering the calculation of potential passengers will be at least 10 million passengers.

In the Kertajati partnership that has happened so far, there has been a struggle for positions between the Ministry of Transportation and the Government of West Java to become a PJPK. This can be seen from the Ministerial Decree, which came out in January 2014, and then in October the Governor Decree also came out. Actually, in Indonesia, there is still no concept or example based on a law that can be replicated. Therefore, in the course of this PPP Airport, there are still many problems that are felt.

Direct communication usually occurs between the Governor and the Ministry of the Interior. However, in the BIJB case, the relationship between the Governor and the Ministry of Transportation has become more rigid. The technique is carried out by the Ministry of Transportation while the administration is carried out by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Besides that, there is a finding the absence or lack of recognition of collective action initiated by direct formal and indirect informal actors (e.g., community members) such as political parties, mass organizations, local people who protest, and a protest by constitutional choice rules of formal institutions.

4. Conclusion

Based on the studies, it can be seen that there are still many vacancies and overlapping roles of actors and institutions involved in the process of how to initiate the development of Kertajati International Airport. The invisible power interacts among actors and institutions inevitably plays an important role during preparing the significant public-private investment infrastructure planning such as BIJB International airport in Kertajati. Extensive communication among actors and institutions should be carried out vertically (among local district or kabupaten, provincial, and central authority) and horizontally (among central government or coordination among inter-ministry such as the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Home Affairs, coordinating the Ministry of Finance (Menko-Perekonomian), National Planning Board BAPPENAS, etc ; among provincial government authority such as BAPPEDA, DISPERUM, DISTARCIP, BPN, BKPM; and among local district or kabupaten government authority, social organization, political party and cultural and environmental community). All the preparation interaction within the planning stage for airport infrastructure needs an authentic dialogue to communicate. Communication within infrastructure planning requires a lengthy and high endurance energy to prepare the case of BIJB airport because the involvement of a significant number of investment agents and for such circumstances the communication and interaction should be established prudently. The prudent communication shows that all the steps and stages should be under the rule and regulation process and procedure. There are not any actors and institutions readiness to follow the rule and pass by the procedure which the power of institution still prevails intact to its role under the regulation. Communication among actors and institutions also becomes more complicated, because the financing scheme proposes to BIJB through the mechanism of public-private partnership schemes where the institution outside the government authority being involved caused by the limitation of the government budget.

5. References

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