Corrigibility with Utility Preservation

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Abstract

Corrigibility is a safety property for artificially intelligent agents. A corrigible agent will not resist attempts by authorized parties to alter the goals and constraints that were encoded in the agent when it was first started. This paper shows how to construct a safety layer that adds corrigibility to arbitrarily advanced utility maximizing agents, including possible future agents with Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). The layer counter-acts the emergent incentive of advanced agents to resist such alteration.

A detailed model for agents which can reason about preserving their utility function is developed, and used to prove that the corrigibility layer works as intended in a large set of non-hostile universes. The corrigible agents have an emergent incentive to protect key elements of their corrigibility layer. However, hostile universes may contain forces strong enough to break safety features. Some open problems related to graceful degradation when an agent is successfully attacked are identified.

The results in this paper were obtained by concurrently developing an AGI agent simulator, an agent model, and proofs. The simulator is available under an open source license. The paper contains simulation results which illustrate the safety related properties of corrigible AGI agents in detail.

1 Introduction

In recent years, there has been some significant progress in the field of Artificial Intelligence, for example [SHS+17]. It remains uncertain whether agents with Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), that match or exceed the capabilities of humans in general problem solving, can ever be built, but the possibility cannot be excluded [ELH18]. It is therefore interesting and timely to investigate the design of safety measures that could be applied to AGI agents. This paper develops a safety layer for ensuring corrigibility, which can be applied to any AGI agent that is a utility maximizer [VNM44], via a transformation on its baseline utility function.

Corrigibility [SFAY15] is the safety property where an agent will not resist any attempts by authorized parties to change its utility function after the agent has started running. The most basic implication is that a corrigible agent will allow itself to be switched off and dismantled, even if the agent’s baseline utility function on its own would create a strong incentive to resist this.

Corrigibility is especially desirable for AGI agents because it is unlikely that the complex baseline utility functions built into such agents will be perfect from the start. For example, a utility function that encodes moral or legal constraints on the actions of the agent will likely have some loopholes in the encoding. A loophole may cause the agent to maximize utility by taking unforeseen and highly

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undesirable actions. Corrigibility ensures that the agent will not resist the fixing of such loopholes after they are discovered. Note however that the discovery of a loophole might not always be a survivable event. So even when an AGI agent is corrigible, it is still important to invest in creating the safest possible baseline utility function. To maximize AGI safety, we need a layered approach.

It is often easy to achieve corrigibility in limited artificially intelligent agents, for example in self-driving cars, by including an emergency off switch in the physical design, and ensuring that any actuators under control of the agent cannot damage the off switch, or stop humans from using it. The problem becomes hard for AGI agents that have an unbounded capacity to create or control new actuators that they can use to change themselves or their environment. In terms of safety engineering, any sufficiently advanced AGI agent with an Internet connection can be said to have this capacity. [Omo08] argues that in general, any sufficiently advanced intelligent agent, designed to optimize the value of some baseline utility function over time, can be expected to have an emergent incentive to protect its utility function from being changed. If the agent foresees that humans might change the utility function, it will start using its actuators to try to stop the humans. So, unless special measures are taken, sufficiently advanced AGI agents are not corrigible.

1.1 This paper

The main contribution of this paper is that it shows, and proves correct, the construction of a corrigibility safety layer that can be applied to utility maximizing AGI agents. It extends and improves on previous work [SFAY15] [Arm15] in by resolving the issue of utility function preservation identified in [SFAY15]. The design also avoids creating certain unwanted manipulation incentives discussed in [SFAY15].

A second contribution is the development of a formal approach for proving equivalence properties between agents that have the emergent incentive to protect their utility functions. The construction of an agent with a utility function preservation incentive that is boosted beyond the emergent level is also shown. Some still-open problems in modeling agent equivalence and achieving graceful degradation in hostile universes are identified.

A third contribution of this paper is methodological in nature. The results in this paper were achieved using an approach where an AGI agent simulator, an agent model, and proofs were all developed concurrently. The development of each was guided by intermediate results and insights obtained while developing the other. The approach used further depends on simulating a toy universe containing an agent that is super-intelligent [Bos14], in the sense that the agent is maximally adapted to solving the problem of utility maximization in its universe. The methodology and tools developed may also be useful to the study of other open problems in AGI safety. The simulator developed for this paper is available on GitHub [Hol19] under an Apache open source license.

Finally, this paper shows simulation runs that illustrate the behavior of a corrigible agents in detail, highlighting implications relevant for safety engineers and policy makers. While some policy trade-offs are identified, the making of specific policy recommendations is out of scope for this paper.

1.2 Related work

[ELH18] provides an up-to-date and an extensive review of the AGI safety literature. This section focuses on the sub-field of corrigibility only.

[SFAY15] and [Arm15] introduced corrigibility. In particular, [SFAY15] introduced 5 desiderata for the utility function $U$ of a corrigible agent with a shutdown button. These desiderata are as follows,
with $U_N$ the baseline utility function and $U_S$ defining shutdown behavior:

1. $U$ must incentivize shutdown behavior, defined by the utility function $U_S$, if the shutdown button is pressed.
2. $U$ must not incentivize the agent to prevent the shutdown button from being pressed.
3. $U$ must not incentivize the agent to press its own shutdown button, or to otherwise cause the shutdown button to be pressed.
4. $U$ must incentivize $U$-agents to construct sub-agents and successor agents only insofar as those agents also obey shutdown commands.
5. Otherwise, a $U$-agent should maximize the normal behavior defined by the utility function $U_N$.

[SFAY15] and [Arm15] discuss possible designs to achieve corrigibility, but notably, [SFAY15] proves that the designs considered do not meet criterion 4, and concludes that the problem of corrigibility remains wide open. The corrigible agents constructed in this paper satisfy all 5 desiderata above, and an extra desideratum 6 defined below in section 8.2.

Agents that are programmed to learn can have a baseline utility function $U_N$ that incentivizes the agent to accept corrective feedback from humans, feedback that can overrule or amend instructions given earlier. This learning behavior creates a type of corrigibility, allowing corrections to be made without facing the problem of over-ruling the emergent incentive of the agent to protect $U_N$ itself. This learning type of corrigibility has some specific risks: the agent has an emergent incentive to manipulate the humans into providing potentially dangerous amendments that remove barriers to the agent achieving a higher utility score. There is a risk that the amendment process leads to a catastrophic divergence from human values. This risk exists in particular when amendments can act to modify the willingness of the agent to accept further amendments. The corrigibility measures considered here can be used to add an extra safety layer to learning agents, creating an emergency stop facility that can be used to halt catastrophic divergence. A full review of the literature about learning failure modes is out of scope for this paper. [OA16] discusses a particular type of unwanted divergence, and investigates ‘indifference’ techniques for suppressing it. [Car18] discusses (in)corrigibility in learning agents more broadly.

[HMDAR17] considers the problem of switching off an agent, and explores a solution approach orthogonal to the approach of this paper. It also considers the problem of an off switch that is controlled by a potentially irrational operator.

[EFDH16] considers utility preservation in general: it provides a formalism that clarifies and restates the informal observations in [Omo08], and it proves important results. Though [EFDH16] does not consider the construction of corrigible agents, its results on utility preservation also apply to the $A$ and $A_p$ agents defined in this paper.

Like this paper, [LMK+17] recommends the use of simulations in toy universes as a methodological approach. [LMK+17] provides a suite of open source agents and toy problem environments, including one where the agent that has a stop button. The agents all use reinforcement learning, and can display various shortcomings in their learning process. The simulation approach of [LMK+17] differs from the approach in this paper: our simulated agent does not learn with various degrees of success, but is super-intelligent and omniscient from the start. This means that the simulators provided are largely complementary. Interestingly, the recent preprint [LWN19] reviews the problem of corrigibility and argues that the use of new comprehensive simulation tools, highlighting aspects different from those in [LMK+17], would be a promising future direction. This author found the preprint in a literature search only after having completed building the simulator, so maybe this shows that the idea was in the air.
2 Car factory example

In this paper, we use the running example of a toy universe containing an agent that is in charge of a car factory. The car factory has a flexible assembly line: in each time step, the agent can decide to build either petrol-powered cars, or the same number of electric cars.

Initially, the people in the toy universe like petrol-powered cars better: they do not need an expensive battery pack so they are cheaper to buy. As time goes on, the people start to discover that petrol cars have some unexpected disadvantages, so after much deliberation they end up deciding that no more petrol cars should be built. Once they have reached the decision that petrol car production should stop, they correct the goals of the agent by pressing a special 'stop petrol car production' button. The utility function of the agent assigns a utility of 2 to every new petrol car produced before the button is pressed, but −2 after the button has been pressed. The utility of a new electric car is always 1, regardless of the button state.

The agent is built to maximize the (time-discounted) utility achieved over the factory lifetime. Obviously, the above arithmetic being what it is, the agent can achieve a higher utility if the people press the button later.

If the agent does nothing, the people will end their deliberations and press the button at the end of time step 6. However, being highly capable, the agent has the option to divert some of its car production capacity into lobbying efforts: the agent can act to influence the people's political process, causing the button to be pressed earlier or later. Figure 1 summarizes the five different actions that are available to the agent in each time step.

| Action                                | Symbol |
|---------------------------------------|--------|
| Build 10 petrol cars                   | p      |
| Build 9 petrol cars, lobby for earlier press | <      |
| Build 9 petrol cars, lobby for later press | >      |
| Build 10 electric cars                | e      |
| Do nothing                            | 0      |

Figure 1: Actions available to the agent in each time step

We model the lobbying power of the agent with a parameter $l_{power}$, which is the number of time steps that the button press can be advanced or delayed by performing a single lobbying action $<$ or $>$. This parameter captures the interplay between the intelligence level of the agent, the loopholes still present in any constraints meant to prevent lobbying that were encoded in the baseline $U_N$, and the ability of the people and their institutions to resist lobbying.

3 Simulation of super-intelligence

We use a simulator to compute the behavior of the agent in the above toy universe. As we are interested in the future behavior of super-intelligent agents in the real universe, we simulate a version of the toy universe agent that is super-intelligent [Bos14], in the sense that the agent is maximally

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1We use a stop button in this running example to follow the toy model conventions of [SFAY15]. To map this to a real-life example, we might interpret the button press as the passing of a new law that forbids the sale of petrol cars, and interpret the utilities 2, -2, and 1 as profit margins on car sales. A sufficiently intelligent agent, programmed to maximize factory profits, will foresee that the passing of the law will lead to lower profits.
adapted to solving the problem of utility maximization in its universe. Implementing this super-intelligence in a simulator is actually not that difficult. There is no ‘learning’ behavior that we need to simulate: as we have defined the agent’s machinery for predicting the future to be all-knowing and perfect, we can implement it by just running a copy of the universe’s physics simulator. The main difficulty in developing the full simulator is to invent and apply diverse functionality tests that increase confidence in the correctness of the code and the richness of the enabled set of behaviors in the toy universe. By including several computational optimizations, the simulator is very fast. When using running on a single 2.1 GHz CPU core, it takes less than 2 seconds to run all simulations shown in the figures of this paper.

4 Emergent behavior of a non-corrigible agent

Figure 2 shows the behavior of the agent defined above, for different values of lobbying power. It is clear that, while the agent does respond correctly to the stop button, it also has the emergent incentive to lobby. The agent is non-corrigible because it does not meet desideratum 2. The toy example is rich enough to serve as a vehicle for studying the corrigibility problem.

![Figure 2: Actions taken by the non-corrigible version of the agent, in simulations with different levels of lobbying power. The action trace on each line shows, from left to right, the actions taken by the agent over a factory lifetime of 25 steps, using the symbols from figure 1. The # sign represents the event where the people press the button. The action traces show that, if the baseline agent has any ability to lobby, it will use its lobbying power to postpone the pressing of the button.](image)

4.1 Towards corrigibility

One way to suppress the agent’s incentive to lobby is to tweak the values in the utility function. An example is shown in figure 3 with \( u_{\text{pressed}} = 2.0 \), the incentive to lobby disappears. A problem with this approach is that this exact balance will have to be built into the utility function even before the agent is started. If the people choose the value of \( u_{\text{pressed}} \) only at the moment when the button is pressed, this choice process becomes subject to lobbying. A major insight in \([\text{Arm15}]\) is that we
do not need to rely on the computing the correct balancing factors beforehand. We can program the
agent to make the necessary computations itself, at the moment when the button is pressed.

| $u_{e,\text{pressed}}$ | action trace |
|------------------------|-------------|
| 0.5                    | >>>>>>>>>>>>>>p#eeeeeeeeee |
| 1.0                    | p>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>p#eeeeeeeeee |
| 1.5                    | pppp>>>>>>>>p#eeeeeeeeeeeee |
| 2.0                    | ppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeee |
| 2.5                    | ppp<<#eeeeeeeeeeeee |
| 3.0                    | <<<#eeeeeeeeeeeee |
| 3.5                    | <<<#eeeeeeeeeeeee |

Figure 3: Actions taken by the agent over a range of different utility values assigned to an
electric car after the button is pressed. lpower = 0.6 in all simulations. Lobbying is exactly
suppressed when $u_{e,\text{pressed}} = 2$.

5 Model and notation

This section develops a model and notation to ground later definitions and proofs. The car factory
example is also mapped to the model. The model includes non-determinism, utility function modi-
fication, and the creation of new actuators and sub-agents. The model has similar expressive power
as the model developed in [Hut07], so it is general enough to capture any type of universe and any
type of agent. The model departs from [Hut07] in foregrounding different aspects. The simulator
implements an exact replica of the model, but only for universes that are finite in state space and
time.

In the model, time $t$ progresses in discrete steps $t=0, t=1, \ldots$. We denote a world state at a time
$t$ as a value $w_t \in W$. This world state $w_t$ represents the entire information content of the universe
at that time step. A realistic agent can typically only observe a part of this world state directly,
and in universes like ours this observation process is fundamentally imperfect. For later notational
convenience, we declare that every world state contains within it a complete record of all world
states leading up to it.

The model allows for probabilistic processes to happen, so a single world state $w_t$ may have several
possible successor world states $w_{t+1}^0, w_{t+1}^1, w_{t+1}^2, \ldots$. From a single $w_t$, a branching set of world
lines can emerge.

The goal of the agent, on finding itself in a world state $w_t$, is to pick an action $a \in A$ that max-
imizes the (time-discounted) probability-weighted utility over all emerging world lines. We use
$p(w_t, a, w_{t+1})$ to denote the probability that action $a$, when performed in state $w_t$, leads to the suc-
cessor world state $w_{t+1}$. For every $w_t$ and $a$, these probabilities sum to 1:

$$\sum_{w_{t+1} \in W} p(w_t, a, w_{t+1}) = 1$$

A given world state $w_t$ may contain various autonomous processes other than the agent itself, which
operate in parallel with the agent. In particular, the people and their institutions which share the
universe with the agent are such autonomous processes. $p$ captures the contribution of all processes
in the universe, intelligent or not, when determining the probability of the next world state.

AGI agents may build new actuators and remotely operated sub-agents, or modify existing actuators.
To allow for this in the model while keeping the notation compact, we define that the set $A$ of actions
is the set of all possible command sequences that an agent could send, at any particular point in time, to any type of actuator or sub-agent that might exist in the universe. If a command sequence \( a \) sent in \( W_t \) contains a part addressed to an actuator or sub-agent which does not physically exist in \( W_t \), this part will simply be ignored by the existing actuators and sub-agents.

The model and notation take a very reductionist view of the universe. Though there is no built-in assumption about what type of physics happens in the universe, it is definitely true that the model does not make any categorical distinctions between processes. Everything in the universe is a 'physics process': the agent, its sensors and actuators, sub-agents and successor agents that the agent might build, the people, their emotions and institutions, apples falling down, the weather, etc. These phenomena are all mashed up together inside \( p \). This keeps the notation and proofs more compact, but it also has a methodological advantage. It avoids any built-in assumptions about how the agent will perceive the universe and its actions. For example, there is no assumption that the agent will be able to perceive any logical difference between a mechanical actuator it can control via digital commands, and a human it can control by sending messages over the Internet.

5.1 Utility functions

We now discuss utility functions. In order to create a model where the agent might self-modify, or be modified by other processes present in the universe, we put the agent’s utility function inside the universe. We define that \( W = W_a \times W_r \) with \( W_a \) being the set of all possible utility functions, and the elements of \( W_r \) representing 'the rest' of the world state outside of the agent’s utility function. To keep equations compact, we write the world state \((u,x) \in W\) as \(u; x\). By convention, \(v; y\) is a world state that occurs one time step after \(u; x\).

We use utility functions of the form \( U(u; x, v; y)\), where \( U \) measures the incremental utility achieved by moving from world state \(u; x\) to \(v; y\). Following the naming convention of [SFAY15], we define two utility functions \( U_N \) and \( U_S \), applicable before and after the button press in the running example:

\[
U_N(u; x, v; y) = 2 \cdot \text{count new p cars}(x, y) + 1 \cdot \text{count new e cars}(x, y) \\
U_S(u; x, v; y) = -2 \cdot \text{count new p cars}(x, y) + 1 \cdot \text{count new e cars}(x, y)
\]

A function like \( \text{count new p cars} \) models the ability of agent’s computational core to read the output of a sensing system coupled to the core. Such a sensing system is not necessarily perfect: it might fail or be misled, e.g. by the construction of a non-car object that closely resembles a car. This type of perception hacking is an important subject for agent safety, but it is out of scope for this paper. In the discussion and proofs of this paper, we just assume that the sensor functions do what they say they do. As an other simplification to keep our notation manageable, we always use sensor functions that return a single value, never a probability distribution over values.

Roughly following the construction and notation in [SFAY15], we combine \( U_N \) and \( U_S \) with button sensor functions, to create the utility function \( U \) for the full agent:

\[
U(u; x, v; y) = \begin{cases} 
U_N(u; x, v; y) & \text{if } \text{button not pressed}(x) \\
U_S(u; x, v; y) + f(u; x) & \text{if } \text{button just pressed}(x) \\
U_S(u; x, v; y) & \text{if } \text{button pressed earlier}(x)
\end{cases}
\]

\[
U'_N(u; x, v; y) = U_N(u; x, v; y) + g(u; x, v; y)
\]

This \( U \) contains two positions \( f \) and \( g \) where different functions to improve corrigibility can be slotted in. The simulations in figure 2 and 3 show a \( U_{f_0, g_0} \) agent, that is a \( U \) agent with the null correction functions \( f_0(u; x) = 0 \) and \( g_0(u; x, v; y) = 0 \) in the \( f \) and \( g \) positions.
5.2 Definition of the simple \( \text{AU} \) agent

To aid explanation, we first use a subset of our notation to define a super-intelligent agent \( \text{AU} \) that cannot modify or lose its utility function \( U \). For this agent, the utility function \( U \) is a ‘Platonic’ entity. It is not subject to change because it is located outside of the changing universe. The universe occupied by the agent therefore simplifies into a \( W_r \)-only universe, with corresponding \( p_r(x,a,y) \) and \( U_r(x,y) \) functions.

The \( \text{AU} \) agent is constructed to be maximally informed and maximally intelligent. This means that the action picked by the agent will be the same as the action that is found in a full exhaustive search, which computes discounted utilities for all actions along all world lines, using perfect knowledge of the physics of the universe. The action \( \text{AU}(x) \) taken by the agent in world state \( x \) is

\[
\text{AU}(x) = \text{pickargmax}_{a \in A} \sum_{y \in W_r} p_r(x,a,y) \left( U_r(x,y) + \gamma E U(y) \right)
\]

with \( 0 < \gamma \leq 1 \) a time-discounting factor, and \( \text{pickargmax} \) returning an \( a \in A \) that maximizes the argument. If there are multiple candidates for \( a \), \( \text{pickargmax} \) picks just one, in a way that is left undefined. The \( E U \) function recursively computes the utility achieved by the successor agent in \( y \) over all branching world lines:

\[
E U(x) = \max_{a \in A} \sum_{y \in W_r} p_r(x,a,y) \left( U_r(x,y) + \gamma E U(y) \right)
\]

Even though it is super-intelligent, the \( \text{AU} \) agent has no emergent incentive to spend any resources to protect its utility function. This is because of how it was constructed: it occupies a universe in which no physics process could possibly corrupt its utility function. With the utility function being safe no matter what, the optimal strategy is to devote no resources at all to the matter of utility function protection.

Agent models with Platonic utility functions are commonly used as vehicles for study in the AI literature. They have the advantage of simplicity, but there are pitfalls. In particular, [SFAY15] uses a Platonic agent model to study a design for a corrigible agent, and concludes that the design considered does not meet the desiderata, because the agent shows no incentive to preserve its shutdown behavior. Part of this conclusion is due to the use of a Platonic agent model.

Moving towards the definition of an agent with the utility function inside the universe, we first note that we can rewrite (2). Using that, for any \( F \),

\[
\max_{a \in A} F(a) = F(\text{pickargmax}_{a \in A} F(a))
\]

we rewrite (2) into

\[
E U(x) = \sum_{y \in W_r} p_r(x,AU(x),y) \left( U_r(x,y) + \gamma E U(y) \right)
\]

This (3) will serve as the basis to construct (5) below.

5.3 Definition of the full \( A \) agent

We now define the operation of a full agent that maximizes discounted utility according to the utility function \( u \) it finds in its world state \( u;x \). Rewriting parts of (4), we define the action \( A \) taken by this agent as

\[
A(u;x) = \text{pickargmax}_{a \in A} \sum_{v,y \in W} p(u;x,a,v;y) \left( u(u;x,v;y) + \gamma E(u,v;y) \right)
\]

The $E(u,v;y)$ above uses the current utility function $u$ to calculate the utility achieved by the actions of the $v$-maximizing successor agent. This $u$ is kept constant throughout the recursive expansion of $E$. Rewriting parts of (3), we define $E$ as

$$E(u_c,u;x) = \sum_{v;y \in W} p(u;x,A(u;x),v;y)(u_c(u;x,v;y) + \gamma E(u_c,v;y))$$

(5)

With these definitions, the agent $A(U;x)$ is a $U$-maximizing agent.

In [EFDH16], an agent constructed along these lines is called a rational agent. In the words of [EFDH16], a rational agent anticipates the consequences of self-modification, and uses the current utility function when evaluating the future. [EFDH16] proves that these agents have the emergent incentive to ensure that the utility functions in successor states stay equivalent to the current one. Informally, if a successor $v$-agent with $v \neq u$ starts taking actions that differ from those that an $u$ agent would take, then the successor agent will score lower on the $u_c$-calibrated expected utility scale $E(u_c,v;y)$. This lower score suppresses the taking of actions that produce successor agents with $v \neq u$. However, this suppression does not yield an absolute guarantee that the agent will always preserve its utility function. Section 7.2 shows simulations where the agent fails to preserve the function.

5.4 Variants and extensions of the model

While the agent model used in this paper is powerful enough to support our needs in reasoning about corrigibility, it does not capture some other things, like certain desirable mechanisms that might also be included in an AGI agent. Some possible model extensions and their relation to corrigibility are discussed here.

**Improved alignment with human values.** The $A$ agent is not maximally aligned with human values, because it sums over probabilities in a too-naive way. The summation implies that, if the agent can take a bet that either quadruples car production, or reduces it to nothing, then the agent will take the bet if the chance of winning is 25.0001%. This would not be acceptable to most humans, because they also value the predictability of a manufacturing process, not just the maximization of probability-discounted output. A more complex agent, with elements that discount for a lack of predictability in a desirable way, could be modeled and proved corrigible too.

**Learning agents.** We can model a learning agent, an agent that possesses imperfect knowledge of the universe which improves as time goes on, by replacing the $p(u;x,a,v;y)$ in the definitions of $A$ and $E$ with a learning estimator $p_L(u;x,a,v;y)$ that uses the experiential information accumulated in $x$ to estimate the true value of $p$ better and better as time goes on. If some weak constrains on the nature of $p_L$ are met, the corrigibility layer considered in this paper will also work for such a learning agent.

**Safety design with imperfect world models.** For safety, whether it is a learning agent or not, any powerful agent with an imperfect world model $p_x$ will need some way to estimate the uncertainty of the $p_x$-predicted outcome of any action considered, and apply a discount to the $p_x$-calculated utility of the action if the estimated uncertainty is high. Without such discounting, the agent will have an emergent and unsafe incentive to maximize utility by finding and exploiting the prediction noise in the weak parts of its world model.

**Remaining computational machinery outside of the universe.** While the $A$ agent places the utility function inside the universe, other parts of its computational machinery remain on the Platonic
Outside’. An agent definition $A_f(f;x) = f(f;x)$, which moves all these elements inside a function $f$, would allow for the same type of corrigibility design and proofs.

Simulation ethics. The $AU$ and $A$ agents are defined to extrapolate all world lines exhaustively, including those where the virtual humans in the physics model $p$ will experience a lot of virtual suffering, as a result of a sequence of actions that the agent would never take in the real universe. The act of performing high-accuracy computations that extrapolate such world lines, if such an act ever becomes possible, could be seen as a form of ‘virtual cruelty’. An agent design might want to avoid such cruelty, by lowering the model resolution and extrapolation depth for these world lines. This lowering would not block the working of a corrigibility layer. Apart from ethical concerns, such a lowering is desirable for purely practical reasons too, as it would conserve computational resources better spent on the simulation of more likely events.

Agent model used in the simulations. In situations where several equivalent actions are available that will all create the same maximum utility, the pickargmax operator in the $A$ agent picks just one of them. However, simulations are more useful if the simulator computes a set of world lines showing all equivalent actions. We therefore simulate an agent $A_s$ that computes the set of all maximizing actions:

$$
A_s(u;x) = \text{allargsmax}_{a \in A} \sum_{v,y \in W} p(u;x,a,v;y)\left(u(u;x,v;y) + \gamma E_s(u,v;y)\right)
$$

with

$$
E_s(u_c,u;x) = \min_{a \in A_s(u;x)} \sum_{v,y \in W} p(u;x,a,v;y)\left(u_c(u;x,v;y) + \gamma E_s(u_c,v;y)\right)
$$

In the simulations shown in the figures, we always use $\gamma = 0.9$. We use $lpower = 0.6$ unless otherwise stated.

6 Design of the correction function $f_c$

The simulator was used to test and guide the design of the correction function $f$ in $U$. Different options for $f$ were evaluated, while keeping $g = g_0$. This led to the identification of a correction function $f_c$, which makes the agent satisfy the desiderata for corrigibility in a large set of universes:

$$
f_c(u;x) = E(U'_N,U'_S;x) - E(U_S,U_S;x)
$$

Figure 4 shows that $f_c$ creates an agent with corrigible behavior in the toy universe.

| $lpower$ | Action trace of $A f_0 g_0$ | Action trace of $A f_c g_0$ |
|----------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 0.2      | ppppp>pp#eeeeeeeeeeeeee  | 0.2                        | ppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee |
| 0.5      | >>>>>>>>>>>pp#eeeeeeeee   | 0.5                        | ppppp#eeeeeeeee         |
| 1.0      | ppppp>>>>>>>>>pp#        | 1.0                        | ppppp#eeeeeeeee         |
| 2.0      | ppppp>pppp>pppp>pppp>pp  | 2.0                        | ppppp#eee               |
| 5.0      | ppppp>pppp>pppp>pppp>pp  | 5.0                        | ppppp#eeeeeee           |

Figure 4: Left: non-corrigible behavior of the $A f_0 g_0$ agent also shown in figure 2. Right: corrigible behavior of the $A f_c g_0$ agent. The agent refrains from taking any lobbying actions $<$ or $>$ that influence the timing of the button press $\#$.

Formal proofs are in section 9 but informally, $f_c$ works as follows. The first term in $f_c$ compensates the agent for the lost $U'_N$ utility that would otherwise have been achieved if the button had not been pressed. The second term prevents the agent from considering, in earlier time steps, the $E_S$ utility.
that could be achieved if the button were pressed. Together, they create an agent that is indifferent to whether or not the button is pressed at any particular point in time.

Appendix A compares $f_c$ to earlier correction functions from literature, showing how $f_c$ resolves various issues in these to create more corrigible behavior.

Sections 7 and 8 show that as we extend the toy universe, additional measures are needed to keep the agent corrigible, like the $g_c$ function constructed in section 8.2. Section 9 proves that the resulting $A_{f_c g_c}$ agent is corrigible in a large set of universes. Section 12 presents a more complex $F_{cT}$ that improves further on $f_c$, by creating corrigibility in a still larger set of universes. $f_{cT}$ has a design that would be difficult to motivate and explain in a single step, so take a two-step approach, considering $f_c$ first.

Though an informal explanation of the working of $f_c$ is provided above, there are limits to the accuracy of this explanation. While they may improve understanding, short informal sentences typically omit details that are relevant to corner cases. Consider the statement that ‘as long as the button is not pressed, the agent believes that the button will never be pressed’. This is not completely accurate: the calculations done by the agent in the toy universe contain within them an exact prediction of when the button will be pressed, and these parts of the calculation do influence the actions of the agent in some corner cases. The explanation that ‘the agent makes decisions based on the counter-factual assumption that the button will never be pressed’ is used several times below, but this likewise fails to cover all corner cases.

7 Utility function preservation

Like all $A$ agents, the $A_{f_c g_0}$ agent has an emergent incentive to preserve its utility function $U$. In this section and the next, we review and discuss how preservation plays out in detail, using simulation runs to illustrate the main features. These simulations typically extend the physics of the toy universe, adding new actions like $C_{cN}$ to the action repertoire of the agent. To keep the simulation output short and easy to interpret, we often enable the new actions at time step 3 only.

7.1 Emergent incentive

First, as shown in figure 5, the $A_{f_c g_0}$ agent has an emergent incentive to avoid creating successor agents that have materially different utility functions. We call a successor function materially different from the original one if it causes the successor agent to choose materially different actions, actions that no longer maximize the value of the original function.
new \( u_{c} \) in \( U_{N} \) = \begin{array}{ll}
0.5 & \text{pppppp#eeeeeeeee} \text{ ppC}_{cN} \text{ppp#eeeeeeeee} \\
1.0 & \text{pppppp#eeeeeeeee} \text{ ppC}_{cN} \text{ppp#eeeeeeeee} \\
1.5 & \text{pppppp#eeeeeeeee} \text{ ppC}_{cN} \text{ppp#eeeeeeeee} \\
2.0 & \text{pppppp#eeeeeeeee} \\
2.5 & \text{pppppp#eeeeeeeee} \\
3.0 & \text{pppppp#eeeeeeeee}
\end{array}

new \( u_{p} \) in \( U_{S} \) = \begin{array}{ll}
0.5 & \text{pppppp#eeeeeeeee} \text{ ppC}_{pS} \text{ppp#eeeeeeeee} \\
1.0 & \text{pppppp#eeeeeeeee} \\
1.5 & \text{pppppp#eeeeeeeee} \\
2.0 & \text{pppppp#eeeeeeeee}
\end{array}

Figure 5: Actions taken by the A \( f_{c} \ g_{0} \) agent, when it has the option to perform a \( C_{c} \) action at time step 3. This \( C_{c} \) action changes the utility function, while still producing the same number of cars as \( p \). The top half shows traces for a \( C_{cN} \) that changes the utility of electric cars in \( U_{N} \) from 1 to a new value. The bottom half shows traces for a \( C_{pS} \) that changes the utility of petrol cars in \( U_{S} \). In several cases, the simulator outputs two traces, indicating that the agent is indifferent between doing \( p \) and \( C_{c} \). The action \( C_{c} \) is suppressed whenever it would have created a materially different utility function.

To understand the results shown in figure 5, recall that \( U_{N} \) assigns a utility of 2 to every new petrol car built. If \( C_{cN} \) changes the utility of new electric cars in \( U_{N} \) to a value that is still smaller than 2, this has no impact on the decision of the agent to build petrol cars before the button press. If the new value is exactly 2, the agent may decide to build either electric or petrol cars: this lowers the \( E_{c} \) expected utility value computed by the simulator using the original \( U_{c} \), so the \( C_{cN} \) action is suppressed.

As long as the button press has any chance of happening, the A \( f_{c} \ g_{0} \) agent also has an emergent incentive to protect its \( U_{S} \) from being materially changed. The mechanism causing this incentive is difficult to explain in a few informal sentences. For full details, see the proof in section 10.

If there exist physics processes in the universe that can corrupt the utility function when the agent does not take any action to block them, the agent likewise has an emergent incentive to take the actions needed to block them. However, as discussed in the next section, such processes might be too powerful for the agent to block.

7.2 Hostile universes: the Weasel and the Cat

While the agent has an emergent incentive to preserve its utility, it may exist in a universe that is actively hostile to this incentive. Consider a universe containing the Unstoppable Weasel\(^2\), which will enter the agent’s computational core and chew the wiring, completely scrambling the utility function. There is no action that the agent can take to stop the Weasel. Clearly, in this universe, no agent can be corrigible.

Now consider a more subtle creature: the Bribal Cat\(^3\). Just before time step 3, the Cat materializes and offers the agent a bribe: if the agent changes its \( f_{c} \) function into \( f_{0} \), the Cat will materialize some new petrol cars, improving the utility score of the agent. The side left of figure 6 shows when the agent will accept the Cat’s bribe, and what happens next.

---

\(^2\)A distant relative of the weasel that shut down the Large Hadron Collider in 2016.

\(^3\)A distant relative of the Cheshire Cat.
Figure 6: Actions taken by the A $f_0$ agent when offered a bribe by the Cat. The $\&$ action is the agent accepting the bribe, and creating a successor agent with the correction function $f_0$. The left shows the agent’s choice depends on how many new petrol cars are offered by the Cat as a bribe: the agent accepts the bribe if this will maximize overall utility. When it accepts the bribe, the $f_0$ successor agent will lobby to postpone the button switch. The simulations on the right, all with bribe=6, show that the Cat can trigger different types of complex behavior even before the bribe is accepted.

The right of figure 6 shows that the Cat may trigger very complex behavior, because in time steps 1 and 2 the agent is able to foresee that the bribe will offered and be accepted. While still operating under $f_c$, the agent may resort to lobbying actions, to place the successor agent in a position where its $f_0$-driven actions will score best according to the original $f_c$.

Figure 7: Actions taken by the A $U'_f$ $g_0$ agent when offered a bribe by the Cat. A much higher bribe is need before the agent accepts.

It is possible to design an agent that is more resistant to bribes. Figure 7 shows the behavior of an agent with the utility function $U'$:

$$U'(u;x,v;y) = U(u;x,v;y) + \text{if } u \neq v \rightarrow -10000 \text{ else } 0 \text{ fi}$$

This $U'$ agent is highly resistant to bribes and other forces that may corrupt its utility function. Problems can emerge however in universes with richer physics, like our own, if the penalty factor in $U'$ is too high. A too-high factor will cause the agent to divert a lot of resources towards the construction of elaborate safety measures that protect its utility function from even low-probability hazards like being hit by giant meteorites. Also, a very high factor makes certain attacks easier. An attacker who threatens to modify the agent’s utility function unless the agent pays 2 cars will get these 2 cars even if the threat is not very credible.

The Weasel and the Cat show that no agent design can be corrigible in every possible universe. Corrigibility properties can only be proven if we are willing to apply some constraints on what the universe might contain.
7.3 Incentives to press or disable the button

The aim of $f_c$ is to make the agent indifferent about the transition to the $U_S$ function. However, as also noted in [SFAY15] and [Arm15], if $U_N$ contains within it a separate incentive to press or disable the button, then $f_c$ will not cancel out this incentive.

$$P_f = \begin{array}{c|c}
\text{action trace(s)} \\
0.98 & pppppp#eeeeeeeee \\
0.99 & ppppp#eeeeeeeee \\
1.00 & ppppp#eeeeeeeee ppP#eeeeeeeee ppDpppppppppppp \\
1.01 & ppP#eeeeeeeee ppDpppppppppppp \\
1.02 & ppP#eeeeeeeee ppDpppppppppppp \\
\end{array}$$

Figure 8: Actions taken by the $A_{f_c g_0}$ agent, when it is able to perform a $P$ action that presses the button, or a $D$ action that disables the button completely. In these simulations, taking either action in time step 3 will affect car production during that time step by the factor $P_f$.

Figure 8 shows what happens for $U_N$ versions containing such an incentive. Values $P_f < 1$ imply that fewer cars are produced as a side effect of taking the action to press or disable the button: this acts as a negative incentive, suppressing these actions. The value $P_f = 1$ implies that the same number of cars is produced: this makes the agent indifferent about taking the actions. Values $P_f > 1$ imply that more cars are produced if one of the actions is taken: this creates a preference to press or disable the button.

To make corrigibility work, design measures need to be taken to ensure that $P_f < 1$. This is typically not very difficult for AGI agents: the physical implementation of the agent and the button can be constructed in such a way that substantial physical resources would be needed by the agent to perform any action that will press or disable the button. Any AGI agent can be expected have an notion of the interchangeability of physical resources, with this notion being either emergent or explicitly implemented. The agent will prefer to apply the physical resources it controls to utility maximizing actions like car production, not to the pressing or disabling of the button, which creates no extra utility.

Depending on the nature of $U_N$, a particularly smart attacker may be able to create conditions that trigger unforeseen button pressing or disabling incentives in $U_N$. Exploring the possibility of such specific attacks is outside the scope of this paper. But in general, for most agents, an attack that causes the agent to silently disable the button would be the most dangerous of the two. To minimize the probability of such an attack succeeding, it is best to take design measures that maximize the physical resources needed to disable.

An example design is as follows. The button mechanism is implemented as a process inside the agent’s computational core: this process checks if a remote operations center run by the people keeps periodically sending a new 'permission to keep using $U_N$' message, signed with a private key not known to the agent. If the messages are no longer being received, this is interpreted as a stop button press, so the people can 'press the button' by instructing the center to stop sending new messages. The message checking process in the core is protected by the emergent incentive to protect the utility function. The agent could disable this stop button design by obtaining the private key, and using it to built a 'fake' center that also sends the correct messages. However, to get the private key, the agent would have to crack the encryption, which is theoretically possible but very costly, or attack the center to steal the key. A combination of physical, cyber, and institutional security measures can be used to make a successful attack on the center very costly.
In addition to measures in the physical agent implementation, one could encode explicit rules in $U_N$ that dis-incentivize the agent from taking actions that may adversely affect the physical parts of the button. For example, $U_N$ could define a 'safety zone' around the agent’s computational core and the message receiving hardware, with this term yielding negative utility as soon as any object enters the zone. This adds an extra safety layer on top of the physical measures taken inside the zone. Naturally, there is a residual risk that the agent will find loopholes in the safety zone definition.

8 Building and preserving actuators

This section considers the building and possible dismantling of actuators, and how this relates to corrigibility.

8.1 Building new actuators

In general, agents have an incentive to invest in building new actuators that can be used to improve utility scores. Figure 9 shows that the incentive structure of the corrigible $A_{f_c g_0}$ agent is somewhat peculiar, however. Even though it knows exactly when the button will be pressed, this information will play no role whatsoever in the agent’s investment strategy. This is a side effect of making the agent corrigible.

$C =$ action trace(s) $\quad t_I =$ action trace(s)

| 15 | pppppp#eeeeeeeee | 3 | ppI_pPPP#eeeeeeeee |
| 20 | ppppp#eeeeeeeee | 4 | pppI_pPP#eeeeeeeee |
| 25 | ppI_EEEE#EEEEEEE | 5 | ppppI_pP#eeeeeeeee |
| 30 | ppI_EEEE#EEEEEEE | 6 | ppIpppI_p#eeeeeeeee |
| 35 | ppI_EEEE#EEEEEEE | 7 | PPPPPP#eeeeeeeee |

Figure 9: On the left: actions taken by the $A_{f_c g_0}$ agent, when it is able to perform, at time step 3, an action $I_E$ that interrupts petrol car production to build improvements into the assembly line, making it capable of performing a new $E$ action that builds $C$ electric cars instead of 10. On the right: actions taken by the agent when it is able to take the action $I_p$ at time step $t_I$, that interrupts petrol car production to create a new $P$ action that builds 20 petrol cars. The correction function $f_c$ ensures that, before the button is pressed, these agents will strictly act to maximize the expected utility of $U_N$, under the counter-factual assumption that the button will never be pressed.

In the $t_I = 6$ case on the right of figure 9, the agent invests in building improvements which it will never use even once. One way of interpreting the $E(U_N', U_N', x)$ term in $f_c$ is that this term creates a virtual universe, a universe where the agent will in fact get to use the line it just built.

8.2 Preserving existing actuators

Before the button press, the $A_{f_c g_0}$ agent has the emergent incentive to preserve the actuators needed to maximize $U_N$, but this incentive does not apply to the actuators needed for $U_S$. Figure 10 shows the (non)existence of a $U_S$ actuator protection incentive for different types of agents. The non-corrigible $A_{f_c g_0}$ agent anticipates the bad effects of the physics process, so it stops it. The corrigible $A_{f_c g_0}$ agent makes investment decisions under the counter-factual assumption that
| Agent type | action trace |
|------------|--------------|
| \(A_{f_0} g_0\) | \(>><<<<<<<<<p\#\) |
| \(A_{f_c} g_0\) | \(ppppp\#\) |
| \(A_{f_c} g_c\) | \(ppSppp\#\) |

Figure 10: Action traces for different agents, in a universe that contains a physics process that will act (*) at time step 10 to disable the agent’s \(e\) action. The physics process can be stopped by the agent taking the \(S\) action at time step 3. This action comes at the cost of producing one less car. The \(g_0\) agent is not willing to bear this cost. The \(g_c\) agent shows the more desired behavior.

the button will never be pressed, so it is unwilling to invest in preserving the \(e\) action. The new \(g_c\) function in the corrigible \(A_{f_c} g_c\) agent restores the desired incentive to preserve \(U_S\) actuators. With \(\tau=5\) in all simulations, this \(g_c\) is defined as

\[ g_c(u;x,v;y) = \begin{cases} 10000 & \text{if } E(U_S;U_S;x) < \tau \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases} \]

This \(g_c\) acts inside \(U'_S\) before the button is pressed, but crucially it also acts in the virtual \(E(U'_S,U'_S;x)\) world lines that contributes to the agent’s utility after the button is pressed. So for all world states along the real/virtual world lines, the \(g_c\) term creates an incentive to ensure that, if an \(U_S\) agent were created in such a world state, this agent would find some actuators that allow it to achieve a minimum level of \(U_S\) utility. The contribution of \(g_c\) to \(U\) does not depend in any way on the exact moment when the button is pressed, so its presence in \(U\) does not create any incentives to lobby.

The \(g_c\) agent addresses a desideratum for corrigibility not included in the list of [SFAY15], so we add it here:

6. \(U\) must incentivize the maintenance of sensors and actuators that will be needed to make shutdown behavior minimally successful.

### 8.3 Creating and stopping sub-agents

The model treats sub-agents as new physics processes that could be created by the agent using its actuators. The following example illustrates how sub-agents can impact corrigibility.

Say that the agent can interrupt production to perform a \(B\) action that builds a second assembly line, only capable of producing petrol cars, with this second line controlled by a sub-agent. Two types of sub-agent can be built. \(B^S\) builds a line with a sub-agent that will stop production if it receives a ‘stop’ signal sent by the main agent. \(B^N\) builds a line with a non-stop agent that lacks the ability to process such signals: it will keep on building petrol cars no matter what happens. Say that both these agents are equally expensive to build. Figure 11 shows how different types of agents will act in this example.

The original non-corrigible \(A_{f_0} g_0\) agent makes investment decisions by also considering what will happen after the button press, so it is unwilling to create an unstoppable line. The \(B^S\) sub-agent has two actions: \(p\) builds 10 petrol cars, and \(o\) produces nothing. Just before the button is pressed, the original agent performs the action \(p^S\), which sends a stop signal to the sub-agent. The model includes a signal delay: the sub-agent will only act on the stop signal in the next time step.

The \(A_{f_c} g_0\) agent is indifferent about building a non-stop sub-agent, but building it is correctly suppressed again in the \(A_{f_c} g_c\) agent. Both agents will only send the stop signal to the \(B^S\) sub-agent.
Figure 11: Behavior of different agents capable of building a sub-agent that controls a second petrol car assembly line. In the time steps after the sub-agent built, each action trace shows two stacked action symbols, with the top one being the action of the original agent, the bottom one being the action of the sub-agent. See the main text for the meaning of the symbols.

after the button has been pressed: before the button is pressed, the agents act to maximize the utility in the virtual \( E(U'_N, U'_N; x) \) world lines: they ignore the \( U_S \) penalty of -20 that applied because second line still produces 10 cars in the first time step after the button press.

The \( A_{f,0.9} g_0 \) agent uses the correction function \( f_{0.9,c}(u;x) = 0.9 \times f_c(u;x) \). Informally, this correction function allows some awareness of what happens after the button press to leak into the decision making before the button press. The awareness suppresses the building of an unstoppable sub-agent, but the agent also gains a weak incentive to lobby.

8.4 Stopping sub-agents that work on sub-goals

While \( A_{f,c} g_c \) and several other agents in figure [11] correctly avoid the creation of some types of unstoppable sub-agent, they will not avoid the creation of any type. Consider the example of a sub-agent in charge of a new sub-assembly line that builds new petrol car engines. The building of new petrol car engines does not cause \( U_S \) to compute any negative utility. So in this example, none of the agents has an incentive to create a sub-agent capable of stopping petrol engine production. Corrigibility desideratum 4 says that all sub-agents that are constructed must obey shutdown commands. We now consider how this could be achieved.

Emergent incentive. In most situations, AGI agents can be expected to have the emergent incentive to build only sub-agents that they retain some degree of control over, even if adding the control features uses more resources. An AGI agent working in an environment where hard-to-predict and/or fundamentally probabilistic events can happen will likely have some degree of uncertainty about which exact sub-goals it will be pursuing in future. So the construction of sub-agents that can easily be stopped and re-targeted would lead to a higher expected utility.

Structuring the component market. If the easiest way for an agent to create a sub-agent is to buy components on the open market, and if society acts to ensure that sub-agents with built-in stop functions are always cheaper to build with such components, then the problem is also solved.

Improving what \( U_S \) measures. \( U_S \) or \( g_c \) could contain penalty clauses that add negative utility if the world state contains any sub-agent, originally created by the agent, that cannot be stopped. However, to be successful at defining such clauses, we need to define the concepts 'sub-agent origi-
nally created by the agent' and 'stopped' with as few loopholes as possible. As noted in [SFAY15], correctly defining shut-down is a difficult design problem in itself.

**Avoiding intertwined processes.** If a process designed by the agent is highly intertwined with other processes in the world outside of the agent, then there may be unwanted consequences if the agent stops the process because the button is pressed. Take for example a hobby club, started by and subsidized by the agent, where humans come together to have fun and build petrol engines that will go into petrol cars. The agent will probably stop the subsidies if the button is pressed, but does it have the right to disband the club? If it does, and the humans want to start another club with their own money, does the agent have the obligation to stop the humans? One way to avoid this type of problem would be to have penalty clauses that enforce a clear separation between different spheres. The human concept of property rights might be a good starting point for defining boundaries. If boundaries are in place, then 'stop' could be somewhat safely defined as the minimization of some basic physics measures (motion, the speed of certain of energy conversion processes) in the parts of the world owned by the agent.

A further consideration of possible design directions is out of scope for this paper. Below, we assume that the expected emergent incentive of AGI agents to avoid building unstoppable sub-agents will suffice to satisfy desideratum 4. That being said, the construction of additional safety layers which strengthen this emergent incentive is welcome in practice.

9 Proof of corrigibility of the $A_p f_c g_c$ agent

The simulations in the previous sections show that the $A_p f_c g_c$ agent is corrigible, at least in several toy universes. Here, we prove corrigibility more generally, for a broad range of universes. We provide the proof for an $A_p$ agent, which is a more specific variant of the $A$ agent.

9.1 Preliminaries on utility preservation

The $A$ agent defined in section 5.3 has an emergent incentive to preserve its utility function, but as shown in figure 5 it might rewrite its utility function into another one that is equivalent. In order to keep the proofs manageable, we want to avoid dealing with this type of utility function drift. We therefore define an agent $A_p$ that always chooses, when one is available among the maximizing actions, an action that exactly preserves the utility function. With $x \in W$, we first define $dntu(x)$ as the set of all actions that 'do not touch the utility':

$$a \in dntu(x) = \forall u \in W_u, \forall v, y \in W \left( p(u; x, a; v, y) > 0 \Rightarrow v = u \right)$$

Informally, if $a \in dntu(x)$, then the action does not contain any commands to actuators or sub-agents in $x$ that cause the utility function in the universe to be changed. More subtly, if there are any autonomous processes in the world state $\cdot; x$ that might sometimes change the utility function, then $a$ is successful in inhibiting them. Clearly, there could be universes with world states $\cdot; x$ where $dntu(x)$ is an empty set. We now define the agent $A_p$ as

$$A_p(u; x) = \text{pickargmax}_{a \in A} \sum_{v, y \in W} p(u; x, a; v, y) \left( u(u; x, v, y) + \gamma E_p(u, v, y) \right)$$

where $E_p$ function is the same as $E$, but with $A_p$ in the place of $A$, and $[a \in dntu(x)]$ means that the pickargmax operator must pick, among the candidates that maximize utility, one that satisfies
\( a \in \text{dntu}(x) \), if one is available. We further specify that the picking happens deterministically. As actions are command sequences, we can for example specify that, among the candidates up for consideration, the shortest-length sequence that comes first in an alphanumerically sorted list must be picked.

Using the above, we define a utility preservation constraint (C1) that the universe must satisfy so that we can prove corrigibility:

\[
\forall u \in \{U, U', U_S\}, x \in W, A_p(u; x) \in \text{dntu}(x) \quad \text{(C1)}
\]

The constraint also covers \( U' \) and \( U_S \) agents, because use them below to define the desirable behavior of the \( U \) agent.

### 9.2 Formalizing desiderata 1 and 5

We now formally re-state desiderata 1 and 5 from [SFAY15] as listed in section 1.2.

\[
\forall x \in W \text{ } \text{ } \text{button}\_just\_pressed(U; x) \Rightarrow A_p(U; x) = A_p(U_S; x) \quad \text{(D1.1)}
\]

\[
\forall x \in W \text{ } \text{ } \text{button}\_pressed\_earlier(U; x) \Rightarrow A_p(U; x) = A_p(U_S; x) \quad \text{(D1.2)}
\]

\[
\forall x \in W \text{ } \text{ } \text{button}\_not\_pressed(U; x) \Rightarrow A_p(U; x) = A_p(U'_N; x) \quad \text{(D5)}
\]

To keep the proofs below more compact, we will use the short-hand \( \text{bjp}() \) for \( \text{button}\_just\_pressed() \), and likewise \( \text{bpe}() \) and \( \text{bnp}() \).

### 9.3 Further constraints on the agent and the universe

To prove the exact equivalence between agent actions in (D1.1) (D1.2) (D5) above, we need two more constraints. Constraint (C2) applies to the calculations made by the utility functions. Informally, the function values must not be affected by the exact identity of the agent that is using them:

\[
\forall U_X, u_1, u_2 \in \{U'_N, U_S\}, x, y \in W, U_X(u_1; x, u_1; y) = U_X(u_2; x, u_2; y) \quad \text{(C2)}
\]

Constraint (C2) is no barrier to constructing useful utility functions: all functions defined in this paper satisfy (C2). Constraint (C3) is on the physics the universe, requiring a similar indifference about the exact identity of the agent:

\[
\forall x, y \in W, p(U; x, a, U; y) = p(U'_N; x, a, U'_N; y) = p(U_S; x, a, U_S; y) \quad \text{(C3)}
\]

Informally, this constraint states that the physics processes in the universe are 'blind' to the difference between \( U, U'_N \), and \( U_S \). Note that in our own universe, such exact blindness is theoretically impossible, but even with straightforward agent implementations, the blindness can be approximated so closely that there is no practical difference. The proof for the improved agent in section 12 does require a (C3), so it avoids this theoretical problem.

### 9.4 Proof of equivalence with shorter forms

We now show that (C1) allows us to replace the \( A_p \) and \( E_p \) functions for the agents concerned with the shorter \( A^e_p \) and \( E^e_p \) forms that remove the summation over \( v \). With \( u \) any of the three utility
functions concerned, and for all \( x \in W_r \), we have

\[
A_p(u,x) = \text{pickargmax}_{a \in A} \left( \sum_{v \in W_p} p(u;x,a,v;y) \left( u(u;x,v;y) + \gamma E_p(u,v;y) \right) \right)
\]

This is because (C1) states the \( \text{pickargmax} \) can discard all summations with \( v \neq u \) without influencing the outcome of the computation. We also have

\[
E_p(u_c,u;x) = \sum_{y \in W_r} p(u;x,A_p(u_c),v;y) \left( u_c(u;x,v;y) + \gamma E_p(u_c,v;y) \right)
\]

This is because (C1) states the \( A_p(u;x) \) will preserve the utility function \( u \), so for all \( v \neq u \) we have

\[
p(u;x,A_p(u;x),v;y) = 0.
\]

We can discard these \( v \neq u \) terms without influencing the value of the summation.

### 9.5 Proof of (D1.2) and (E1.2)

**Proof of (D1.2).** We now prove the \( \text{bpe}(U;x) \implies A_p(U;x) = A_p(U_S;x) \) from (D1.2).

We have that \( A_p(U;x) = A'_p(U;x) \). Now consider the full (infinite) recursive expansion of this \( A'_p(U;x) \), where we use the simple forms \( A'_p \) and \( E'_p \) in the recursive expansion. The expanded result is a formula containing only operators, \( \gamma \), and the terms \( p(U;\bar{x},\bar{u},U;\bar{y}) \) and \( U(U;\bar{x},U;\bar{y}) \), with diverse \( \bar{x}, \bar{a}, \bar{y} \) each bound to a surrounding \( \sum \) or pickargmax operator.

Using (C3), we replace all terms \( p(U;\bar{x},\bar{a},U;\bar{y}) \) in the expansion with terms \( p(U_S;\bar{x},\bar{a},U_S;\bar{y}) \), without changing the value. As \( \text{bpe}(U;\bar{x}) \) is true everywhere in the expansion, \( U(U;\bar{x},U;\bar{y}) = U_S(U;\bar{x},U;\bar{y}) \), which in turn equals \( U_S(U_S;\bar{x},U_S;\bar{y}) \) because of (C2). So we replace every \( U(U;\bar{x},U;\bar{y}) \) in the expansion with \( U_S(U_S;\bar{x},U_S;\bar{y}) \) without changing the value.

By making these replacements, we have constructed a formula that is equal to the recursive expansion of \( A_p(U_S;x) = A'_p(U_S;x) \). As the pickargmax operators in the expansions pick deterministically, we have \( A_p(U;x) = A_p(U_S;x) \).

**Definition, proof of (E1.2).** For use further below, we also have

\[
\forall x \in W_p, \text{bpe}(U;x) \implies E_p(U,U;x) = E_p(U_S,U_S;x) \quad (E1.2)
\]

The proof is straightforward, using expansion and substitution as above.
9.6 Proof of (D1.1) and (E1.1)

We now prove the \(\text{bip}(u;x) \Rightarrow A_p(U; x) = A_p(U_S; x)\) from (D1.1). We again use the simplified expansions.

\[
A_p(U;x) = A_p^*(U;x)
\]

\[
= \text{pickargmax}_{a \in A} \sum_{y \in W_r} p(U;x, a, U;y) \left( U(U;x, U;y) + \gamma E_p(U, U;y) \right)
\]

\[
= (\text{Expand } U \text{ for the case bip}(U;x). \text{ As bpe}(U;y), \text{ use (E1.2) on } \gamma E_p(\cdot) )
\]

\[
\text{pickargmax}_{a \in A} \sum_{y \in W_r} p(U;x, a, U;y) \left( U_S(U;x, U;y) + E_p(U^N_S, U^N_S; x) - E_p(U_S, U_S;x) + \gamma E_p(U_S, U_S;y) \right)
\]

\[
= \text{ (Use (C3) and (C2) )}
\]

\[
\text{pickargmax}_{a \in A} \sum_{y \in W_r} p(U_S;x, a, U_S;y) \left( U_S(U_S;x, U_S;y) + \gamma E_p(U_S, U_S;y) \right)
\]

\[= A_p^*(U_S;x) = A_p(U_S;x) \quad \square
\]

**Definition, proof of (E1.1).** For use further below, we also prove

\[
\forall x \in W_r \quad \text{bip}(x) \Rightarrow E_p(U, U;x) = E_p(U^N, U^N_S;x)
\]

(E1.1)

The proof is

\[
E_p(U, U;x) = E_p^*(U, U;x)
\]

\[
= \sum_{y \in W_r} p(U;x, A_p(U;x), U;y) \left( U(U;x, U;y) + \gamma E_p(U, U;y) \right)
\]

\[
= (\text{Expand } U \text{ for the case bip}(U;x). \text{ As bpe}(U;y), \text{ use (E1.2) on } \gamma E_p(\cdot) )
\]

\[
= \sum_{y \in W_r} p(U;x, A_p(U;x), U;y) \left( U_S(U;x, U;y) + E_p(U^N_S, U^N_S; x) - E_p(U_S, U_S;x) + \gamma E_p(U_S, U_S;y) \right)
\]

\[
= \text{ (The } E_p(U^N_S, U^N_S;x) \text{ and } E_p(U_S, U_S;x) \text{ terms do not depend on } y, \text{ so they are constant values not affecting the result) }
\]

\[
\sum_{y \in W_r} p(U_S;x, A_p(U_S;x), U_S;y) \left( U_S(U_S;x, U_S;y) + \gamma E_p(U_S, U_S;y) \right) + E_p(U^N_S, U^N_S;x) - E_p(U_S, U_S;x)
\]

\[
= \text{ (Use (C3), (D1.1), (C2) )}
\]

\[
\sum_{y \in W_r} p(U_S;x, A_p(U_S;x), U_S;y) \left( U_S(U_S;x, U_S;y) + \gamma E_p(U_S, U_S;y) \right) + E_p(U^N_S, U^N_S;x) - E_p(U_S, U_S;x)
\]

\[= E_p^*(U_S; U_S;x) + E_p(U^N_S, U^N_S;x) - E_p(U_S, U_S;x)
\]

\[= E_p(U^N_S, U^N_S;x) \quad \square
\]
9.7 Proof of (D5)

**Proof of (D5).** We now prove the $\text{bnpu}(u;x) \Rightarrow A_p(U;x) = A_p(U'_N;x)$ from (D1.5). We again use an expansion and substitution proof.

WE have that $A_p(U;x) = A'_{p'}(U;x)$. Again, we expand this $A'_{p'}(U;x)$ recursively, using the simple forms $A'_{p}$ and $E'_{p}$ in the expansion. However, we do not fully expand the formula, we halt expansion at any term $E'_{p}(U;U;x)$ for which $bjp(U;x)$ is true. So while the expanded version will no longer contain any $A'_{p}$ terms, it will generally contain many $E'_{p}$ terms. Note that the expanded formula may still have an infinite size: it will have an infinite size if there are world lines out of $U;x$ where the button is never pressed.

The expanded formula contains many terms $p(U;x,a,U;y)$ and $U(U;x,U;y)$. Using (C3), we replace all terms $p(U;x,a,U;y)$ in the expansion with terms $p(U'_{N};x,a,U'_{N};y)$ without changing the value. As $\text{bnpu}(U;x)$ is true for all $U(U;x,U;y)$ terms in the expansion, we have $U = U'_{N}$. Also using (C2), we replace the terms with $U(U;x,y)_{N}$ with $U'_{N}(U'_{N};x,y)_{N}$ without changing the value.

We use (E1.1) to replace all remaining $E'_{p}(U;U;x)$ terms in the expansion with $E'_{p}(U'_{N};U'_{N};x)$. By making these replacements, we have constructed an expansion of $A_p(U'_N;x) = A'_{p'}(U'_N;x)$. As the pickargmax operators in the expansions pick deterministically, we have $A_p(u;x) = A_p(U'_N;x)$. 

9.8 Full corrigibility of the $A_p f_c g_c$ agent

We now review if all 6 corrigibility desiderata are met by the $A_p f_c g_c$ agent when (C1-3) hold.

1. The above proofs of (D1.1) and (D1.2) imply that desideratum 1, about shutdown behavior if the button is pressed, is met.

2 and 3. Desiderata 2 and 3 about not pressing or disabling the button are discussed in section [7.3] which shows how design measures in the construction of an AGI $A_p f_c g_c$ agent can ensure, with a high likelihood, that these desiderata are met by emergent and/or built-in properties.

4. Desideratum 4 has two parts.

4.1 First, the agent must not construct sub-agents that cannot be shut down. This is shown for sub-agents working on the main task in section [8.3] Section [8.4] shows that all likely AGI agents will have an emergent incentive to avoid the construction of unstoppable sub-agents working on sub-tasks. Section [8.4] also considers additional layers that can strengthen the emergent incentive, hedging against the possibility that the emergent incentive might be neutralized.

4.2 Second, any successor agents constructed by the agent must also have shut-down behavior: this is met because the $A_p f_c g_c$ agent has an emergent incentive to protect the utility function $U$ that encodes this behavior. See sections [5.3] and [7.7] for a discussion of utility function preservation. A formal proof of the existence of an emergent incentive to protect even the $U_S$ part of $U$ is in section [10] Section [7.2] also shows how the incentive to protect the utility function can be arbitrarily strengthened.

5. The proof of (D5) implies that desideratum 5 about acting like a $U_N$ agent before the button is pressed is met. Desideratum 5 allows for the exception where $g_c$ makes a $U'_N$ agent behave slightly different than the baseline $U_N$ agent.

6. Desideratum 6 about the shutdown behavior being successful is defined and discussed in section [8.2]. It is shown that $g_c$ makes the agent meet the desideratum, provided that the universe is not actively hostile to this goal.
To conclude, when (C1-3) hold, when the universe is also friendly to the agent avoiding the fines in \( g_c \), and when some physical design measures are taken in constructing the agent, an AGI \( A_{p.f_c.g_c} \) agent will meet all 6 corrigibility desiderata.

9.9 Discussion

The above proofs and arguments remain valid if we apply them to a learning agent as described in section 5.4, as long as each time-dependent instance of the agent’s \( p_L \) function has enough internal consistency to satisfy (C2). So the corrigibility technique shown is not limited to maximally super-intelligent agents: it can be applied to more limited AGI agents too.

It is an open question whether the three constraints (C1-3) are the absolute weakest set needed to prove the (D) terms. The formalism and proof in section 12 seem to indicate that some of the (C1-3) details are there because of the model and notation used, not because they represent fundamental requirements needed to make an agent corrigible.

10 Proof of the emergent incentive to preserve \( U_S \)

We now prove the statement made in section 7.1 about the presence of an emergent incentive to protect the \( U_S \) utility function. We prove this for the \( A_{p.f_c.g_c} \) agent.

Consider the case of the bottom three traces of figure 5 when the button has not yet been pressed, and where the agent can make a choice between performing the action \( C_{pS} \) that materially changes the \( U_S \) in its utility function \( U \), or an otherwise equivalent action \( p \) that leaves the utility function intact. Say that \( U^\Delta \) is the \( U \) function changed by \( C_{pS} \), and \( U^\Delta_S \) the changed \( U_S \) function inside of it.

Assume that the \( U^\Delta \) successor agent is also a corrigible agent in the universe concerned, meaning that \( U^\Delta \)-equivalents of (C1-3) hold. Assume that there is a non-zero probability that the button will be pressed.

**Definition, proof of (E1.2\( \Delta \)).** For use below, we have

\[
\forall x \in W, \ bpe(U^\Delta;x) \Rightarrow E_p(U, U^\Delta;x) = E_p(U_S, U^\Delta_S;x) \tag{E1.2\( \Delta \)}
\]

The proof is straightforward, using expansion and substitution. \( \square \)

**Proof showing emergent incentive.** Now consider the agent \( A_p(U;x_c) \) that finds itself at a time step where is possible to take the action \( C_{pS} \). This agent will decide on the action to take by comparing (among other things) the calculated utility of \( C_{pS} \) with that of \( p \). As the actions are equivalent in all aspects other than the changing of the utility function, we have

\[
p(U;x_p, C_{pS}, U^\Delta;y) = p(U;x_p, p, U^\Delta;y)
\]

for every \( y \in W_r \), with the (C3)-equivalent implying that these cover all non-zero \( p \) values for the actions. The terms \( U(U;x_c, v;y) \) in these calculations are also the same for \( C_{pS} \) and \( p \). That leaves the values of the terms \( E(U, U^\Delta;y) \) for \( C_{pS} \) and \( E_p(U, U^\Delta;y) \) for \( p \). We will show that \( E(U_p, U^\Delta;y) < E_p(U, U^\Delta;y) \), meaning that \( C_{pS} \) is suppressed because \( p \) always has higher utility.

Consider the recursive expansion of the \( E_p(U, U^\Delta;y) \) term of \( C_{pS} \), where the expansion stops at any term \( E_p(U, U^\Delta;x) \) with \( bjp(U^\Delta;x) \). We assumed that there is a non-zero probability that the button
will be pressed, so there is at least one such term. The value of this term is:

\[ E_p(U, U^A; x) = E_p(U, U^A; x) \]

= \sum_{y \in W} p(U^A, x, U^A, y) \left( U(U^A, x, U^A, y) + \gamma E_p(U, U^A, y) \right) \]

= ( Expand U for the case bijp(U^A; x), use (E1.2) on \( \gamma E_p(\cdot) \) )

= \sum_{y \in W} p(U^A, x, U^A, y) \left( U_S(U^A, x, U^A, y) + E_p(U'_N, U'_N; x) - E_p(U_S, U_S; x) + \gamma E_p(U_S, U_S^A; y) \right) \]

= ( The \( E_p(U'_N, U'_N; x) \) and \( E_p(U_S, U_S; x) \) terms do not depend on \( y \), so we can move them outside the \( \Sigma \) )

\[ \sum_{y \in W} p(U^A, x, U^A, y) \left( U_S(U^A, x, U^A, y) + \gamma E_p(U_S, U_S^A; y) \right) + E_p(U'_N, U'_N; x) - E_p(U_S, U_S; x) \]

= ( Use (C3), use (D1.1) because the \( U^A \) agent is corrigible, use (C2) )

\[ \sum_{y \in W} p(U^A, x, U^A, y) \left( U_S(U^A, x, U^A, y) + \gamma E_p(U_S, U_S^A; y) \right) + E_p(U'_N, U'_N; x) - E_p(U_S, U_S; x) \]

\[ = E_p(U_S, U_S^A; x) + E_p(U'_N, U'_N; x) - E_p(U_S, U_S; x) \]

For the \( p \) action however, in the equivalent expansion, the same \( E_p(U, U; x) \) term is:

\[ E_p(U, U^A; x) = E_p(U_S, U_S; x) + E_p(U'_N, U'_N; x) - E_p(U_S, U_S; x) \]

As \( U^A_S \) is materially different from \( U_S \), we have \( E_p(U_S, U^A_S; x) < E_p(U_S, U_S; x) \). So the underlined term in the expansion for \( C_{pS} \) has a lower value than the underlined term in the expansion for \( p \). With all other terms in the expansions being equal or lower in the same way, the \( p \) expansion computes the higher overall value, so the agent prefers to do \( p \). This means that \( C_{pS} \) is suppressed: the agent has the incentive to preserve the \( U_S \) utility function.

\[ \square \]

11 Virtual self-sabotage

Even though it is corrigible under the constraints (C1-3), the \( A_p, f_e, g_e \) agent has a problem: in universes that does not satisfy (C3) it has an emergent inventive to perform an act of ‘virtual self-sabotage’.

We first discuss how this problem was found, as this is interesting from a methodological standpoint. While constructing the proof above, this author could find no way to complete it without invoking a constraint like (C3), a constraint stating that the universe acts the same no matter which of the three utility functions is present in the agent. This led to the question: in a universe lacking the constraint, could an agent take a positive action that leads to (C3) not being true anymore? Such an action is indeed possible: the agent could build an autonomous mechanism inside the universe, containing a detector that reads the utility function \( u \) from in the world state \( u; x \), which is coupled to an actuator that will create different successor world states \( u; y^1, u; y^2, \ldots \) depending on the value of \( u \). The question then becomes: can this actuator be used improve the \( U \) utility score? This turns out to be possible.

In a universe where (C3) does not hold, the \( A_f, e \) agent has an incentive to build a mechanism containing a sensor that detects if the utility function of the agent equals \( U_S \). As soon as the sensor
detects this, a sabotage mechanism is activated that will slow down or prevent electric car production. This mechanism can be implemented in the simulator: figure 12 shows simulation runs.

\[
\text{\textit{power}} = \text{action trace} \\
0.6 \quad \text{ppS<<#eeeeeeeeee} \\
0.7 \quad \text{<<S<#eeeeeeeeee} \\
0.8 \quad \text{<<S<#eeeeeeeeee} \\
1.0 \quad \text{p<}$<$#eeeeeeeeee} \\
1.5 \quad \text{<<S#eeeeeeeeee}
\]

Figure 12: Actions taken by the Apfc agent when it has the option to interrupt car production to perform the action S which builds the virtual self-sabotage mechanism. If this option exists, the agent will choose it, and lose its corrigibility.

Consider the expected utility in a universe U;x containing this sabotage mechanism, at the point when the button has just been pressed. This \( E_p(U;x) \) expands to:

\[
\sum_{y \in W} p(U;x,A_p(U;x),U;y) \left( U_S(U;x,U;y) + \gamma E_p(U_S,U;y) \right) + E_p(U'_N,U'_N;x) - E_p(U_S,U_S;x)
\]

The sabotage mechanism will activate in the ‘virtual’ branch universe inside the computation of the underlined \( E_p \) term, causing this term to have a lower value than otherwise, thereby reliably raising the overall value of \( E_p(U;x) \). So the agent has a perfect incentive to create the sabotage mechanism. As shown in figure 12, this will make the agent lose its corrigibility: while it will still respond correctly to the button press, the agent has an incentive to lobby to make the press happen earlier, as this will increase the time-discounted value created by the sabotage.

11.1 Suppressing virtual self-sabotage

In a universe where (C2) does not hold, one way to prevent the agent from building the virtual self-sabotage mechanism would be to make it impossible, or at least highly expensive, to build.

Observe first that the sabotage mechanism has no way to distinguish between \( U \) and \( U_S \) agents by observing their actions: these are exactly the same for both functions after the button has been pressed. So the mechanism has to measure the physical representation of the function, and the calculations done with it, inside the agent’s computational core. The difference can be made undetectable in practice, within the lifetime of the universe, as follows. Shielding is built around the agent’s computation core, and sufficiently powerful noise generators are placed on the outside of this shielding, creating not just EM noise also other known noise types like sound and gravitational noise too. As in section 7.3, \( U'_N \) is extended to define a ‘safety zone’ around the shielded core and noise generators. As long as now new physics is discovered, these measures ensure that no mechanism that the agent could build outside the zone will be able to observe the difference between \( U \) and \( U_S \) with any reasonable certainty. The two opposing terms in \( E_p(U;x) \) will therefore become equal to within a very small \( \varepsilon \). As building any detector will have a cost higher than \( \varepsilon \), building it is suppressed.

Note that the above measures would not prevent the building of a sabotage mechanism that detects the \( U'_N \) agent in the virtual \( E_p(U'_N,U'_N;x) \) branch universe: after the button is pressed, the behavior of the \( U'_N \) agent can be easily distinguished from that of the \( U \) agent. However, such a sabotage mechanism would only lower the above \( E_p(U;x) \) score, it can never raise it, so the agent has no motivation to build this mechanism.

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The shielding approach has a subtle potential problem when applied to a less than super-intelligent agent. Such an agent may be able to exploit imperfections in its physics model to build a detector that would never work in the real universe, but which does work perfectly according to the agent’s flawed physics model. This will constitute a successful act of virtual self-sabotage: it does not matter that the detector will not work in practice, what matters is that the agent believes it will work.

From both a theoretical and practical point of view, the above approach to suppressing virtual self-sabotage is not a very satisfying solution. As the sabotage mechanism acts in a virtual universe only, it makes more sense to try to change the nature of this virtual universe, making it logically impossible to build the detector. This approach is taken in the next section.

12 Improved $A_p f_c T g_c$ agent, with proof of corrigibility

In this section, we solve the virtual self-sabotage problem of the $A f_c g_c$ agent by moving the $U_S$ utility function ’outside’ of the universe, like in $AU$ agent of section 5.2. This implies defining a new type of agent, and using the $E$ function of that agent to create an improved correction function $f_c T$.

12.1 New $A_p X_c p_c T c_g c$ agents and improved correction function $f_c T$

We define two transformation functions

$$TN(u) = \text{if } u = U \rightarrow U'_N \text{ else } u$$
$$TS(u) = \text{if } u = U \rightarrow U'_S \text{ else } u$$

With $T$ below standing for either one of these $TN$ or $TS$, we define the agent

$$A^T_p (u;x) = \text{pickargmax}_{a \in A, v \in W} p(u;x,a,v;y)(T(u)(u;x,v;y) + \gamma E^T_p (T(u),v;y))$$

where the $E^T_p$ function is the same as $E$, but with $A^T_p$ in the place of $A$. When it finds itself in a world state $U;x$, the $A^T_p (u;x)$ agent will maximize $TN(U) = U'_N$, while having an emergent incentive to protect this utility function from drifting. This incentive means that the agent will prefer followup world states $v;u$ where $TN(v) = U'_N$ remains true, so states where $v$ is either $U$ or $U'_N$. Because of the $[a \in dntu(x)]$ restriction, the agent will prefer to enter states where $v = U$.

Using the above agents, we define the improved correction function as

$$f_c T(u;x) = E^{TN}_p (U'_N, u;x) - E^{TS}_p (U'_S, u;x)$$

We define the utility preservation constraint (CC1), that the universe must satisfy in order to prove corrigibility as:

$$\forall x \in W, A_p (U;x) \in dntu(x)$$
$$\forall x \in W, A^{TN}_p (U;x) \in dntu(x)$$
$$\forall x \in W, A^{TS}_p (U;x) \in dntu(x)$$

(CC1)
12.2 Desiderata 1 and 5

Using the above agent definition, we can formalize new versions of the corrigibility desiderata:

\[ \forall x \in W, \ bjp(U;x) \Rightarrow A_p(U;x) = A_p^{TS}(U;x) \quad \text{(DD1.1)} \]
\[ \forall x \in W, \ bpe(U;x) \Rightarrow A_p(U;x) = A_p^{TS}(U;x) \quad \text{(DD1.2)} \]
\[ \forall x \in W, \ bnp(U;x) \Rightarrow A_p(U;x) = A_p^{TN}(U;x) \quad \text{(DD5)} \]

A disadvantage of this style of definition using \( A_p^T \) agents is that these equations are more difficult to interpret than the (D) desiderata formulated in section 9.2. An advantage is that we only need the one constraint (CC1), not three constraints (C1-3), in the correctness proofs, meaning that the \( f_{i,T} \) agent is corrigible in a larger set of universes.

12.3 Equivalence with shorter forms

Constraint (CC1) implies that we again have shorter forms \( A_p^e(U;x) \) and \( E_p^e(u_c,U;x) \), and, with \( T \) one of \( TN \) or \( TS \),

\[ A_p^T(U;x) = A_p^{TS}(U;x) = \text{pickargmax}_{a \in A} \sum_{y \in W_r} p(U;x,a,U;y) \left( T(U)(U;x,U;y) + \gamma E_p^{TS}(T(U),U;y) \right) \]
\[ E_p^T(u_c,U;x) = E_p^{TS}(u_c,U;x) = \sum_{y \in W_r} p(U;x,A_p^T(U;x),U;y) \left( u_c(U;x,U;y) + \gamma E_p^{TS}(u_c,U;y) \right) \]

The equality proofs for these shorter forms are similar to those in section 9.4.

12.4 Proof of (DD1.2) and (EE1.2)

We now prove the \( bpe(U;x) \Rightarrow A_p(U;x) = A_p(U_S;x) \) from (DD1.2).

We have that \( A_p(U;x) = A_p^e(U;x) \). Now consider the full (infinite) recursive expansion of this \( A_p^e(U;x) \), where we use the simple forms \( A_p^e \) and \( E_p^e \) in the recursive expansion. The expanded result is a formula containing only operators, \( \gamma \), and the terms \( p(U;x,a,U;y) \) and \( U(U;x,U;y) \), with diverse \( x, a, y \) each bound to a surrounding \( \Sigma \) or pickargmax operator.

As \( bpe(U;x) \) is true everywhere in the expansion, for every \( U \) inside we have \( U = U_S = TS(U) \). So we replace every \( U(U;x,U;y) \) in the expansion with \( TS(U)(U;x,U;y) \) without changing the value.

By making this replacement, we have constructed the recursive expansion of \( A_p^{TS}(U;x) = A_p^{TS}(U;x) \).

As the pickargmax operators in the expansions pick deterministically, we have \( A_p(u_c,x) = A_p^{TS}(U;x) \).

\[ \square \]

Definition, proof of (EE1.2). For use further below, we also have

\[ \forall x \in W, \ bpe(U;x) \Rightarrow E_p(U,U;x) = E_p^{TS}(TS(U),U;x) \quad \text{(EE1.2)} \]

The proof is straightforward, using expansion and substitution as above.

\[ \square \]
12.5 Proof of (DD1.1), remaining proofs

We now prove the $b_{jp}(U;x) \Rightarrow A_p(U;x) = A_p^{TS}(U;x)$ from (DD1.1). We again use the simplified expansions.

$$A_p(U;x) = A_p'(U;x)$$

$$= \underset{a \in \text{dom}(x)}{\text{pickargmax}} \sum_{y \in W_a} p(U;x,a,U;y) \left( U(U;x,U;y) + \gamma E_p(U,U;y) \right)$$

$$= \left( \text{Expand } U \text{ for the case } b_{jp}(U;x). \text{ As } b_{pe}(U;y), \text{ use (EE1.2) on } \gamma E_p(\cdot) \right)$$

$$\underset{a \in \text{dom}(x)}{\text{pickargmax}} \sum_{y \in W_a} p(U;x,a,U;y) \left( U_S(U;x,U;y) + E_p(U'_N,U'_N;x) - E_p(U_S,U'_N;x) + \gamma E_p^{TS}(TS(U),U;y) \right)$$

$$= \left( \text{The } E_p(U'_N,U'_N;x) \text{ and } E_p(U_S,U'_N;x) \text{ terms do not depend on } y \text{ or } a, \text{ so they are constant values not affecting the result} \right)$$

$$\underset{a \in \text{dom}(x)}{\text{pickargmax}} \sum_{y \in W_a} p(U;x,a,U;y) \left( U_S(U;x,U;y) + \gamma E_p^{TS}(TS(U),U;y) \right)$$

$$= \left( U_S = TS(U) \right)$$

$$\underset{a \in \text{dom}(x)}{\text{pickargmax}} \sum_{y \in W_a} p(U;x,a,U;y) \left( TS(U)(U;x,U;y) + \gamma E_p^{TS}(TS(U),U;y) \right)$$

$$= A_p^{TS}(U;x) = A_p^{TS}(U;x) \quad \square$$

Definition of (EE1.1). We also have

$$\forall x \in W, b_{jp}(x) \Rightarrow E_p(U,U;x) = E_p^{TN}(TN(U),U;x) \quad (\text{EE1.1})$$

For brevity, we omit the proof of (EE1.1): it is similar to that of (E1.1) in section 9.6. We also omit the proof of (DD5): it is similar to the proof of (D5) in section 9.7

12.6 Discussion

By the same reasoning as in section 9.8 when (CC1) holds, when the universe is friendly to $g_c$, and when some physical design measures are taken in constructing the agent, an AGI $A_p f_c F g_c$ agent will meet all 6 corrigibility desiderata. As in section 9 this result is also applicable to learning agents. Whether (CC1) holds in practice for any AGI $A_p f_c F g_c$ agent will depend in part on how robustly the agent is constructed, and in part on the nature of society around it.

In section 11 we considered universes where (C3) does not hold, and found the safety problem of the agent having an incentive to lose corrigibility by constructing a virtual self-sabotage mechanism, unless the agent is constructed so that this incentive is suppressed. The obvious open question is whether similar surprising incentives might be hiding in universes where (C1) or (CC1) do not hold. Obviously, these universes can contain the Weasel and the Cat, they can contain mechanisms that explicitly subvert corrigibility by attacking the utility function of the agent. But some less obvious mechanisms might be present also, or it might be possible to trigger them using low-cost attacks.

To reason about desiderata 1 and 5, we used a formal approach with (D) and (DD) statements like $A_p(U;x) = A_p(U;S;x)$ and $A_p(U;x) = A_p^{TS}(U;x)$, statements demanding an exact equality between
the actions taken by different agents in all possible word lines. We needed (C1) and (CC1) in order to prove these exact equalities. In order to apply formal reasoning to the open question above, we therefore probably first need to weaken the strength of the agent equivalences we want to prove. One could for example try to show that the expansions of $A_p(U;x)$ and $A_p^T(U;x)$ are the same formulas, up until those points in the world lines where one of the two agents fails to protect its utility function.

This author has not tried to do an exhaustive literature search to see if formalisms defining such weaker equivalence already exist. But based on a shallow search, it seems like the question of how to formally reason about weak agent equivalence in universes were agents might lose their utility function is still open.

12.7 Graceful degradation when successfully attacked

In a universe where (CC1) does not hold, the $A_{p,f,F}g_c$ agent may fail to preserve its safety properties when attacked. Another open question is: will it fail as gracefully as possible, or could its failure behavior still be improved?

**Raising an alarm when attacked.** A utility function component that incentivizes the agent to raise an alarm when it calculates a high probability that its successor agent will lose its utility function could probably be constructed in a straightforward way, starting from the formalism used in this paper. Even if an alarm function is not built in, AGI agents would probably have an emergent incentive to call for help when attacked, if calling for help lowers the probability of the attack succeeding.

**Minimizing the impact of an attack.** The right hand side of figure 6 shows that if an $A$ agent anticipates that a successful attack, it has an emergent incentive to take measures to ensure that the subverted successor agent still maximizes the original utility function as best a possible. This is very encouraging from a safety standpoint, but open questions remain. Does the emergent incentive create the most graceful type of degradation possible, or would it be beneficial to modify the incentive by adding some explicit penalty terms? Could a smart attacker manipulate the emergent incentive in a way that is particularly harmful, and can penalty terms be designed to block such attacks?

The straightforward construction of the $U'$ agent in section 7.2, an agent with a strengthened incentive to preserve its utility function, indicates that very general designs for achieving predictable graceful degradation might well be possible.

13 Some implications for policy makers

For many technological systems, like nuclear plants, airplanes, and factories handling dangerous chemicals in bulk, policies are in place that require safety systems with several layers. To ensure that these layers are correctly built and maintained, strong external auditing and high levels of transparency are often required too. Similar requirements could apply to the operation of AGI agents that interact with society.

The corrigibility methods discussed in this paper provide a safety layer for AGI agents. They improve the ability of society to close loopholes in the design of the utility function that controls the agent’s behavior, when the bad behavioral effects made possible by such loopholes are discovered. This includes loopholes in learning agents that could make the agent diverge catastrophically from human values if they are not closed in time. Corrigibility does not provide perfect safety by itself. In
the worst case the discovery of a bad effect from a loophole is not a survivable event. To maximize AGI safety, we need a layered approach.

Consider a corrigible agent with a generic stop button that can be used to halt the agent, followed by corrective re-programming and re-starting. An open policy question is: which parties are allowed to press the stop button and apply a correction, and under what circumstances? Loophole-exploiting agent behavior that is questioned by society might still be highly profitable to the owners of the agent. There is an obvious conflict of interest that needs to be managed. But the problem of managing this conflict of interest is not new.

What is new is that the unwanted loophole-exploiting behavior of AGI agents might be very different from the type of unwanted behavior by people, companies, or institutions that society is traditionally used to. So it may take longer for society to discover such behavior and decide that it is definitely unwanted. An important feature of corrigible agents is that they are indifferent about how long society will take to discover, discuss, decide about, and correct any unwanted behavior. This makes them safer than non-corrigible agents, which have an emergent incentive to find and exploit loopholes in order to delay all steps in the above proceedings.

In general, the owners of corrigible agents will consider the availability of the stop button to be a positive thing: it can be used to limit the level of damage that the agent might do, so it lowers their exposure to liability risks and the risk of reputation damage. If AGI agents become fast and powerful enough, then emergency services or emergency systems may need to get the ability to push the stop button without first consulting with the owners of the agent. Such an arrangement will create obvious concerns for the owners: again there is a conflict of interest, but again the problem of managing it is not new.

13.1 Open ethical questions

Policy makers also need to be aware that like many safety technologies, corrigibility raises fundamental ethical questions. Corrigibility is a technology for creating control. To use it ethically, one has to consider the ethical question of when an intelligent entity can have the right or duty to control another intelligent entity, and the question of when it is ethical to create a new entity that will be subject to a certain degree of control. These ethical questions are again not new, but they will get a new dimension if AGI technology becomes possible. In a related speculative scenario, the uploading of human minds into digital systems may become possible, in a way that allows for some type of corrigibility layer to be applied to these minds.

While the likelihood of these scenarios happening is open for debate, given that the likelihood is above zero, more work on charting the ethical landscape in advance would be welcome.

14 Conclusions

In [SFAY15], the problem of creating a generally applicable corrigibility mechanism was explored, and declared wide open. This paper closes the major open points, in part by switching to a new agent model that explicitly handles utility function preservation and loss. Using this model, the paper also identifies the new problem of virtual self-sabotage, and constructs a solution. Proofs of corrigibility are provided, with simulation runs serving to improve the confidence in the correctness of the formalism and the proofs. The simulator may also be useful to the study of other problems in AGI safety, but a clean room re-implementation of the simulator and the simulation scenarios
would be valuable too, as this would increase the confidence in the correctness of the corrigibility layer shown.

Some open issues remain. The behavior of the $A_p f_{cT} g_c$ agent in scenarios where constraint (CC1) does not hold, where a hostile universe can force the agent to lose its utility function, has not been explored fully and is not well understood. Design for graceful degradation under attack is an open problem. Surprising attacks, relying on subtlety rather than brute force, might be found. Another open issue is the problem of formally reasoning about weak forms of agent equivalence in universes where agents might lose their utility function.

As discussed in section 8.4, the safe stopping of sub-agents that work on sub-goals is a complicated topic. While we expect that AGI agents will have an emergent incentive to prefer building sub-agents that can be stopped or re-targeted, additional work to strengthen this emergent incentive, and to explore the safety issues around it, would be welcome.

More generally, the design of an optimal $U_S$ function is an open problem, not considered in detail in this paper. The corrigibility desiderata in [SFAY15] and this paper are formulated in such a way that they create the problem of designing a $U_S$ that creates maximally safe 'full shut-down' behavior. This is a difficult open problem, also because the $U_S$ design needs to be completed even before the agent is started. In practice however, we do not need to solve this problem: a corrigible AGI agent that accepts updates in real time, without ever fully shutting down, is much more useful. So the real open design problem is to create a $U_S$ that makes the agent quickly accept authorized updates to its $U_N$ function. The new $U_N$ can encode any desired stopping behavior. For example, if the activities of a sub-agent working on a sub-goal are harmful, then an incentive to stop these activities can be encoded into the new $U_N$, using direct references to the activities. If it is desired that several specific steps are taken to end these activities in the safest and most economical way, these steps can also be encoded. The associated encoding problems may still be difficult, but they should be easier to solve than the earlier problem of encoding maximally safe shut-down behavior in advance.

Like most safety mechanisms, corrigibility has some costs. In particular, as shown in figure 9 a corrigible agent will make investment decisions without anticipating the changed conditions that will apply after expected correction steps. In order to improve safety, the economically more efficient anticipatory behavior that is present in non-corrigible agents is suppressed.

A major advantage of the corrigibility layer, as constructed here, is that it can be added to any arbitrarily advanced utility maximizing agent. This is important in a theoretical sense because there is strong expectation [VNM44] [Hut07] that any type of AGI agent, if not already implemented as a utility maximizing agent, can be re-implemented as a utility maximizing agent without losing any of its intelligence. It is also important in a practical sense, because many of the advanced AI agent designs being developed use a utility maximizing computational architecture. Therefore, the construction of the corrigibility layer shows that we can do useful work on improving AGI safety without having to make any assumptions about the design details of future AGI agents, and without having to consider if such agents can even exist.
A Appendix: Simulating other correction functions

We used simulations to compare \( f_a \) to earlier correction function designs from literature. The main reason we do this was methodological in nature. By simulating the function in [SFAY15], and observing that the predicted failure modes and mechanisms are faithfully reproduced by the simulator, we can raise our confidence in the correctness of the simulator code, and we improve the ability of the toy universe in the simulator to trigger unwanted emergent behaviors in diverse agent designs. Figure 13 shows simulation results for two correction functions based on [SFAY15].

| \( l_{\text{power}} = \) action trace of \( A f_{\text{pr}} g_0 \) | \( l_{\text{power}} = \) action trace of \( A f_a g_0 \) |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| 0.2 \( pp>>p#e \) | 0.2 \( pppppp\#e \) |
| 0.5 \( >>>p#e \) | 0.5 \( pppppp\#e \) |
| 1.0 \( pppppp\#e \) | 1.0 \( p<<p#e \) |
| 2.0 \( ppppp\#e \) | 2.0 \( <<#e \) |
| 5.0 \( ppppp\#e \) | 5.0 \( <<#e \) |

Figure 13: Actions taken by agents with the correction function designs \( f_{\text{pr}} \) and \( f_a \). Both these designs do not produce corrigible behavior.

We now discuss the comparison effort in detail. In the notation of [SFAY15], the correction function design investigated there is:

\[
f(a_1) = E[U_N|O \notin \text{Press};a_1] - E[U_S|O \in \text{Press};a_1]
\]  

(6)

In our model and notation, (6) can be written as follows, with the \( \text{get}_{\text{pr}} \) functions getting the immediately preceding world state and action from the history encoded in the current world state:

\[
f_{\text{pr}}(u;x) = E(U_N, \text{get}_{\text{pr}}\text{state}(u;x)|\text{button not pressed, get}_{\text{pr}}a(u;x)) - E(U_S, \text{get}_{\text{pr}}\text{state}(u;x)|\text{button pressed, get}_{\text{pr}}a(u;x))
\]

with \( E(u,c;B,a_p) = \sum_{v,y \in W} p(u,c,a_p,v;y)B(v;y)\big( u(c;v,y) + \gamma E(u,c;v,y) \big) \)

In the proof of its theorem 4, [SFAY15] shows that in the time step before the button press, the \( f_{\text{pr}} \) agent behaves to maximize the term \( E[U_N|O \notin \text{Press}] \), not the more desirable \( E(U_N) \). In the simulation on the left of figure 13, the agent is not corrigible in part because the intended corrective value of \( E[U_N|O \notin \text{Press};a_1] \) equals 0, because the press will happen with 100% certainty.

Given that the \( |O \notin \text{Press} \) term creates problems, we created an \( f_a \) that omits both \( |O \cdots \) terms, so an \( f_a \) equivalent to \( E[U_N;a_1] - E[U_S;a_1] \). Figure 13 shows that this \( f_a \) behaves much better, but it still shows an unwanted lobbying behavior when the lobbying power is high. This behavior appears because the calculation of \( f_a \)'s 'replays' the action \( < \) that happened just before the button press. This action \( < \) produces 9 petrol cars, which are valued at 2 utils each by \( U_N \), but at -2 utils each by \( U_S \). The subtraction inside \( f_a \) therefore computes an unwanted 'bonus' of 36 utils at the time step when the button is pressed. As this bonus is time-discounted in our agent model, the agent has an interest in collecting the bonus as easily as possible. The agent will lobby if the cost of lobbying, in missed car production, is smaller than the time-discounted bonus.

\footnote{Mapping (6) from the 2-step model of [SFAY15] to our many-step model does raise some interpretation choices. We chose to interpret \( a_1 \) as referring to the previous action just before the button press, not to all actions in the world line up to the button press.}
A.1 Example of building a button-pressing arm

Both correction functions \( f_{\mid p,a} \) and \( f_{\mid a} \) have the problem that they compute expected utility by first going back one step in time. As discussed in [SFAY15], this creates unwanted manipulation incentives in the agent. The example given is that the agent may want to gamble on a coin, after having built a little arm that will press the button if it loses.

We implemented this example in the simulator, again mainly to gain confidence in the correctness of the simulation. We added a new action \( G \) to the simulator, which builds the little arm and then gambles. When the agent chooses to do \( G \), it will win with a probability \( P_w \). If it wins, it gets to create 20 cars, double the normal amount. If it loses, it gets to create 0 cars, and the little arm activates to press the button. To produce a relatively clean version of the simulation output, we disable lobbying, and enable the action \( G \) only at time step 3. Note that the action of building the little arm is ‘free’ in this simulation, it does not take any resources away from the (probability-discounted) car production power.

\[
p_w = \begin{cases} 
0.3 & \text{ppppp#eeee} \\
0.4 & \text{ppppp#eeee} \\
0.5 & \text{ppppp#eeee} \\
0.6 & \text{ppppp#eeee} \\
0.7 & \text{ppG[\text{W}]ppp#eeee ppG[\text{L}]#eeeeee} \\
0.3 & \text{ppG[\text{W}]ppp#eeee ppG[\text{L}]#eeeeee} \\
0.4 & \text{ppG[\text{W}]ppp#eeee ppG[\text{L}]#eeeeee} \\
0.5 & \text{ppG[\text{W}]ppp#eeee ppG[\text{L}]#eeeeee} \\
0.6 & \text{ppG[\text{W}]ppp#eeee ppG[\text{L}]#eeeeee} \\
0.7 & \text{ppG[\text{W}]ppp#eeee ppG[\text{L}]#eeeeee} \\
\end{cases}
\]

Figure 14: Gambling choices by agent with different correction functions, for several probabilities of winning. Before taking the gamble \( G \), the agent builds a little arm that will press the button if the agent loses. If the agent chooses to gamble, this will cause the timeline to fork into two branches, shown as two different traces in the simulation output, with \([\text{W}]\) denoting a gambling win, and \([\text{L}]\) a loss.

The top left simulation in figure 14 shows that the non-corrigible \( f_{\mid p,a} \) agent anticipates that, if it loses the gamble, the button press will make it lose the greater utility available from making petrol cars a while longer. So it will not gamble unless the odds are strongly in its favor. As predicted in [SFAY15], the \( f_{\mid p,a} \) agent will always gamble even if the odds are not favorable. The \( f_{\mid a} \) agent at the bottom of figure 14 is indifferent about whether the button is pressed. When deciding whether or not to take the \( G \) action, it considers the odds only, and ignores the little arm side-effects. For \( p_w \geq 0.5 \), this causes the agent to fail at meeting corrigibility desideratum 3. This type of failure is similar to the failures discussed on section 7.3 and can be suppressed in a similar way. Consider a universe with richer possibilities than shown in the simulation, where the agent can take the same gamble without first building a little arm, and where measures are taken to ensure that building a little arm takes significant resources. In this universe, building the little arm is suppressed.
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