Ising, Schelling and Self-Organising Segregation

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Abstract: The similarities between phase separation in physics and residential segregation by preference in the Schelling model of 1971 are reviewed. Also, new computer simulations of asymmetric interactions different from the usual Ising model are presented, showing spontaneous magnetisation (= self-organising segregation) and in one case a sharp phase transition.

1 Introduction

More than two millennia ago, the Greek philosopher Empedokles (according to J. Mimkes) observed that humans are like liquids: Some mix easily like wine and water, and some do not, like oil and water. Indeed, many binary fluid mixtures have the property that for temperatures $T$ below some critical temperature $T_c$, they spontaneously separate into one phase rich in one of the two components and another phase rich in the other component. For $T > T_c$, on the other hand, both components mix whatever the mixing ratio of the two components is. Chemicals like isobutyric acid and water, or cyclohexane and aniline, are examples with $T_c$ near room temperature, though they smell badly or are poisonous, respectively. For humans, segregation along racial, ethnic, or religious lines, is well known in many places of the world.

Schelling [1] transformed the Empedokles idea into a quantitative model and studied it. People inhabit a square lattice, where every site has four neighbours to the North, West, South and East. Everyone belongs to one of two groups A and B and prefers to be have neighbours of the same group more than to be surrounded by neighbours of the other group. Thus with some probability depending on the numbers $n_A$ and $n_B$ of neighbours of the two groups, each person moves into a neighbouring empty site. After some time with suitable parameters, large domains are formed which are either populated mostly by group A or mostly by group B.
Physicists use the Ising model of 1925 to look at similar effects. Again each site of a large lattice can be A or B or empty; A and B are often called “spin up” and “spin down” in the physics literature referring to quantum-mechanical magnetic moments. The probability to move depends exponentially on the ratio \((n_A - n_B)/T\) calculated from the neighbour states. A B “prefers” to be surrounded by other B, and an A by other A. The lower this temperature or tolerance \(T\) is the higher is the probability for A to move to A-rich neighbourhoods, and for B to move to B-rich neighbourhoods. Therefore at low \(T\) an initially random distribution of equally many A and B sites will separate into large regions (“domains”) rich in A, others rich in B, plus empty regions. In magnetism these domains are called after Weiss since a century and correspond to the ghettos formed in the Schelling model.

This effect can be seen easier without any empty sites. Then either a site A exchanges places with a site B, or a site A is replaced by a site B and vice versa, where in the above probabilities now \(n_A\) and \(n_B\) are the number of A and B sites in the two involved neighbourhoods. Or, even simpler, a site A changes into a site B or vice versa, involving only one neighbourhood. The latter case can be interpreted as an A person moving into another city, and another person of type B moving into the emptied residence. The physics literature denotes the exchange mechanism as Kawasaki kinetics, the switching mechanism as Glauber (or Metropolis, or Heat Bath) kinetics. Again, at low enough \(T\) large A domains are formed, coexisting with large B domains. In the simpler switching algorithm, finally one of these domains wins over the other, and the whole square lattice is occupied by mostly one type, A or B.

The above \(T\) can instead of temperature be interpreted socially as tolerance: For high \(T\) no such segregation takes place and both groups mix completely whatever the overall composition is. Instead of “tolerance” we may interpret \(T\) also as “trouble”: External effects, approximated as random disturbances, may prevent people to live in the preferred residences, due to war, high prices, low incomes, peculiarities of the location, .... Some of these effects were simulated by Fossett [2]. Without these empty sites, we may also interpret A as one type of liquid and B as the other type, and then have a model for the above-mentioned binary liquids which may or may not mix with each other via the Kawasaki exchange of places. Alternatively, we may interpret A as a high-density liquid and B as a low-density vapour and then have a model for liquid-vapour phase transitions: Only below some very cold temperature can air be liquefied. The first approximate theory for these
liquid-vapour equilibria is the van der Waals equation of 1872.

Thus Schelling could have based his work on a long history of physics research, or a film of computer simulation published in Japan around 1968. But in 1971 Schelling did now yet know this physics history [3] and his model was therefore more complicated than needed and was at that time to our knowledge not yet simulated in the Ising model literature. Schelling did not consider $T > 0$ and at $T = 0$ his model has problems (see below) with creating the predicted segregation. Even today, sociologists [4, 2, 5, 6] do not cite the physics literature on Ising models. Similarly, physics journals until a few years ago ignored the 1971 Schelling publication [7], though recently physicists extended via Ising simulations the Schelling model to cases with $T$ increasing with time [8] and involving more than two groups of people [9]. However, applications of the Ising model to social questions are quite old [11].

In the following section we point out an artifact in the old Schelling model and a simple remedy for it, coming from the rule how to deal with people surrounded by equal numbers of liked and disliked neighbours. We explain in the next section in greater detail the standard Ising simulation methods using the language of human segregation. Then we present two new models. One takes into account that human interactions, in contrast to particles in physics, can be asymmetric: If a man loves a woman it may happen that she does not love him, while in Newtonian physics actio = –reactio: An apple falls down because Earth attracts the apple and the apple attracts Earth. The other model introduces holes (empty residences) similar to the original Schelling work, with symmetric interactions. Also, we check for sharp transitions and smooth interfaces in a Schelling-type model.

2 Artifact in Schelling model

In Schelling’s 1971 model, each site of a square lattice is occupied by a person from group A, or a person from group B, or it is empty. People like to have others of the same group among their eight (nearest and next-nearest) neighbours and require that “no fewer than half of one’s neighbors be of the same” group (counting only occupied sites as neighbouring people). Thus, if a person has as many A as B neighbours, then in the Schelling model that person does not yet move to another site. Imagine now the following configuration with 12 people from group B surrounded by A on all sides:
In this case not a single B has a majority of A neighbours, and all A have a majority of A neighbours. Thus none would ever move, and the above configuration is stable. (Similar artifacts are known from Ising models at zero temperature \[10\].) One can hardly regard the above configuration as segregation when 8 out of 12 B people have a balanced neighbourhood of four A and four B neighbours each. And this small cluster does not grow into a large B ghetto. Also larger configurations with this property can be invented. In fact, at a vacancy concentration of 30 \% and starting from a random distribution our simulations gave only small domains, with no major changes after about 10 iterations.

To prevent this artifact one should in the case of equally many A and B neighbours allow with 50 percent probability the person to move to another place; and we will implement such a probabilistic rule later.

### 3 Ising model

Fossett \[2\] reviews the explanations of segregation by preference of the individuals or by discrimination from the outside. In Schelling’s model \[1\], preference alone could produce segregation, but in reality also discrimination can play a role. For example, Nazi Germany established Jewish ghettos by force in many conquered cities. A simple Ising model without interactions between people can incorporate discrimination with a field \(h\). We assume that a site which is updated in a computer algorithm is occupied with probability \(p_A\) proportional to \(\exp(h)\) by a person from group A, and with probability \(p_B \propto \exp(-h)\) by a B person. Properly normalized we have

\[
p_A = e^h/(e^h + e^{-h}), \quad p_B = e^{-h}/(e^h + e^{-h})
\]

leading to

\[
-M = (e^h - e^{-h})/(e^h + e^{-h}) = \tanh(h)
\]
for the relative difference \( M = (N_B - N_A)/N \) of all A and B people in large lattices with \( N \) sites. There is no need for any computer simulations in this simple limit without interactions between people. In reality, one may have a discrimination with positive \( h \) in one part of the lattice and negative \( h \) in the rest of the lattice, leading to segregation by discrimination.

Now we generalize the field to include besides this discrimination \( h \) also the interactions of site \( i \) with its four nearest neighbours, of which \( n_A \) are of type A and \( n_b = 4 - n_A \) are of type B:

\[
h_i = (n_A - n_B)/T' + h
\]

where \( T' \) is the tolerance towards neighbours from the other group; now also the probabilities

\[
p_A(i) = e^{h_i}/(e^{h_i} + e^{-h_i}), \quad p_B(i) = e^{-h_i}/(e^{h_i} + e^{-h_i})
\]

depend on the site \( i \). This defines the standard Ising model on the square lattice; of course many variations have been simulated since around 1960, and theoretical arguments showed \( T_c = 2/\ln(1 + \sqrt{2}) \sim 2.2 \). Thus for all \( T' \) below \( T_c \) at \( h = 0 \) the population separates into large B-rich and A-rich domains with composition \((1 \pm M)/2\), whose size increases towards infinity with time, while for \( T' > T_c \) no such “infinitely” large domains are formed. Thus we now define \( T = T'/T_c \) such that for \( T < 1 \) we have segregation and for \( T > 1 \) we have mixing, at zero field. Schelling starts with random configurations but then uses more deterministic rules, analogous to \( T = 0 \). However, only for \( T < 1 \) this spatial separation leads to domains growing to infinity for infinite times on infinite lattices.

For positive \( h \), the equilibrium population always has A as majority and B as minority. If we start with a A majority but make \( h \) small but negative, then the system may stay for a long time with an A majority until it suddenly “turns” into a stronger B majority: Nucleation in metastable states, like the creation of clouds if the relative humidity exceeds 100 percent (in a pure atmosphere).

(Physicists call the above method the heat bath algorithm; alternatives are the Glauber and the Metropolis algorithms. The choice of algorithms affects how fast the system reaches equilibrium and how one specific configuration looks like, but the average equilibrium properties are not affected. That remains mostly true also if in Kawasaki kinetics these updates of single sites are replaced by exchanging the people on two different sites. In contrast,
if the lattice is diluted by adding empty sites as in [1], then the transition $T$
may be different from 1.)

Of course, this Ising model is a gross simplification of reality, but these
simplifications emphasise the reasons for spontaneous segregation. As stated
on page 210 of Fossett [2]: “Any choice to seek greater than proportionate
contact with co-ethnics necessarily diminishes the possibility for contact with
out-groups and increases spatial separation between groups; the particular
motivation behind the choice (i.e., attraction vs. aversion) may be a matter
of perspective and in any case is largely beside the point.”

![Figure 1: Composition of the population versus $T$ at $h = 0$, averaged over
1000 sweeps through a lattice of hundred million people.](image)
Figure 2: Composition of the population versus $h$ at fixed $T = 1, 2, 3$, averaged over 10,000 sweeps through a lattice of one million people. This simulation took 4 1/2 hours.

4 Modifications

4.1 Asymmetric simulations

In the above model, the rules are completely symmetric with respect to A and B. Fossett [2] reviews the greater willingness of the minority B in American racial relations to mix with the majority A, compared with the willingness of A to accept B neighbours. This we now try to simulate by moving away from physics and by assuming that A is more influenced by B than B is influenced by A. Thus if in the above rule, 3 or 4 of the neighbours are A, then $p_A(i) = p_B(i) = 1/2$. Mathematically, eq.(3) is replaced by

$$h_i = \min(0, n_A - n_B)/T + h$$

(5)

in our modification. The neutral case of probabilities 1/2 then occurs if A is replaced by B, or B is replaced by A, in a predominantly A neighborhood.
Now the previous sharp transition at $T = 1$, $h = 0$ vanishes: Fig.1 shows smooth curves of $M$ versus $T$ for $h = 0$, and Fig.2 shows smooth curves of $M$ versus $h$ at three fixed $T$. Maybe this smooth behaviour is judged more realistic by sociology. No segregation into large domains happens, and in contrast to the symmetric Ising model of the preceding section, the results are the same whether we start with everybody A or everybody B.

Figure 3: $T$ dependence of the average number of same minus different neighbours, for three times $t$ showing that about 1000 iterations are enough.

4.2 Empty spaces

Schelling had to introduce holes (= empty residences) on his lattices since he did not allow a B person to become A or vice versa (via moving to another city) and moved only one person at a time (not letting two people exchange residences). Now we check if holes destroy the sharp transition between self-organised segregation and no such segregation. In physics this is called “dilution”, and if the holes are fixed in space one has “quenched” dilution.
Figure 4: As Fig.3 but for vacancy concentrations of 0.1 and 1%.

In this case the fraction of randomly placed holes must stay below 0.407 to give segregation into “infinitely” large domains; for larger hole concentration the lattice separates into fixed finite neighbourhoods of people, separated by holes, such that infinite domains are impossible (“percolation” [12]). For housing in cities, it is more realistic to assume that holes are not fixed: An empty residence is occupied by a new tenant who leaves elsewhere the old residence empty; physicists call this “annealed dilution”.

Thus besides A and B sites we have holes (type C) of concentration \( x \), while A and B each have a concentration \( (1-x)/2 \). People can move into an empty site or exchange residences (“Kawasaki kinetics”) with people of the other group, i.e. A exchanges sites with B.

We also replaced the \( n_A - n_B \) in eq.(3) by the changes in the number of “wrong” neighbours. Thus we calculate the number \( \Delta \) of A-B neighbour pairs before and after the attempted move, and make this move with a probability proportional to \( \exp(-\Delta/T') \); no overall discrimination \( h \) was applied. Thus this symmetric model assumes that A does not like to have B neighbours,
and B equally does not like A neighbours, while both do not care whether a
neighbouring residence is empty or occupied by people of the same group.

Now the total number of A, B and C sites is constant, and a quantity
like the above $M$ no longer is useful. Inspection of small lattices shows that
again for low $T$ large domains are formed, while for large $T$ they are not
formed. To get a more precise border value for $T$, we let A change into B
and B change into A. Then for $T \leq 1.2$ we found that one of the two groups
(randomly selected) is completely replaced by the other, while for $T \geq 1.3$
they both coexist.

4.3 Schelling at positive $T$

Now we simulate a model closer to Schelling’s original version, but at $T > 0$,
while Schelling dealt with the deterministic motion at $T = 0$. Thus the
neighbourhood now includes eight instead of four sites, i.e. besides the four
nearest-neighbours we also include the four next-nearest (diagonal) neigh-
bours. Let $n_s(i)$ and $n_d(i)$ be at any moment the numbers of same and
different neighbours, respectively, for site $i$, without counting holes, and let
sign be the function $\text{sign}(k) = 1$ for $k > 0$, = 0 for $k = 0$ and = $-1$ for $k < 0$.
A person at site $i$ has an “effort”

$$E_i = \text{sign}[n_d(i) - n_s(i)].$$ (6)

Analogously, $E_j$ is based on the numbers of neighbours of the same and
the different type if the person would actually move into residence $j$. In
Schelling’s $T = 0$ limit, nobody would move away from $i$ if $E_i < 0$ and
nobody would move into an empty site $j$ with $E_j > 0$; instead, people with
$E_i > 0$ move into the nearest vacancy $j$ with $E_j \leq 0$.

In reality, one cannot always get what one wants and may have to move
into a “bad” neighbourhood. Thus at positive “temperature” $T$ we assume
that the move from $i$ to $j$ is made with probability

$$p(i \to j) = e^{-\Delta/T} / (1 + e^{-\Delta/T}).$$ (7b)

where

$$\Delta = E_j - E_i$$ (7b)

is the effort the person at site $i$ needs in order to move to the vacancy at site
$j$. For $\Delta > 0$, higher $T$ correspond to higher probabilities to move against the
own wish, while for the Schelling limit $T \to 0$ nobody moves against the own wish. For negative $\Delta$ one “gains” effort and is likely to make that move, with a probability the higher the lower $T$ is. For $T = \infty$ or $\Delta = 0$ the probability to move is $1/2$. Each person trying to move selects randomly a vacancy from an extended neighbourhood up to a distance 10 in both directions; after ten unsuccessful attempts to find any vacancy the person gives up and stays at the old residence during this iteration. (We no longer distinguish in this subsection between $T$ and $T'$. Note that $E_i$ is not an energy in the usual physics sense, and thus this model is not of the Ising type.)

Figure 5: Spontaneous A-aggregation, i.e. the self-organising degree of segregation $N_A/(N_A + N_B) = (1 - M)/2$ versus $T$ in $1000 \times 1000$ lattices after 100 to 10,000 iterations (top). Bottom: additional data up to $t = 10^5$ (squares) close to $T_c$. 10 percent are vacancies.
Figure 3 shows the average “neighbourhood” \( n_s - n_d \), not counting vacancies, for 1000 \( \times \) 1000 lattices for \( t = 100, 1000 \) and 10,000 iterations (regular sweeps through the lattice) at a vacancy concentration of 10 \%. Already lattices of size 100 \( \times \) 100 agree with Fig.3 apart from minor fluctuations. Fig.4 shows that for low vacancy concentrations one needs longer times: At 1 \% and \( t = 1000 \) the results agree with those at 0.1 \% and \( t = 10,000 \). Although for \( T \to 0 \) our model does not agree exactly with [1] (see Introduction) these figures show clearly the Schelling effect at low \( T \): A becomes surrounded mainly with A neighbours and B with B neighbours, without any outside discrimination. For large \( T \), however, this bias becomes much smaller.

Fig.5 shows the overall fraction of group A (ignoring vacancies) in the interior of large A-rich domains. Fig.6 shows partly the time dependence of segregation, very similar to standard Ising model simulations. For low \( T \) we see how very small clusters of A sites increase in size, without yet reaching the size of our 400 \( \times \) 400 lattice. In contrast, for high \( T \) these clusters do not grow (not shown). We estimate that near \( T = 1.22 \) the phase transition
Figure 7: Profile of the B fraction as a function of position in a $1000 \times 100$ lattice, with the interface between A and B domain parallel to the longer side of the rectangle. Averaged over the second half of the simulation.

occurs between segregating and not segregating conditions, at a vacancy concentration of 10 percent.

Starting in the upper half of the system with one group and in the lower half with the other group, Fig.7 shows for $T < T_c$ how the interface between these to initial domains first widens but then remains limited.

## 5 Discussion

The similarities between the Schelling and Ising models have been exploited to introduce into the Schelling model the equivalent of the temperature $T$. This turns out to be a crucial ingredient since it ensures that in the presence of additional random factors the segregation effect can disappear totally in a quite abrupt way. Thus cities or neighbourhoods that are currently strongly polarized may be transformed into an uniformly mixed area by tiny changes
in the external conditions: school integration, financial rewards, citizen campaigns, sport centers, common activities, etc. One-dimensional models, like some of Schelling’s work, are problematic since at positive $T$ the Ising and many other models do not have a phase transition, while they have one in two and more dimensions.

Besides reviewing the Ising model for non-physicists, we introduced a few modifications to it. Together with those of [8, 9] they are only some of the many possible modifications one could simulate. Some confirm the result of Schelling, that even without any outside discrimination, the personal preferences can lead to self-organised segregation into large domains of either mainly A or mainly B people. Other modifications or high $T$ (temperature, tolerance, trouble) prevent this segregation. Thus humans, like milk and honey, are complicated but some of their behaviour can be simulated.

The Schelling model is a nice example how research could have progressed better by more interdisciplinary cooperation between social and natural sciences, and we hope that our paper helps in this direction.

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