Secure Calibration for Safety-Critical IoT: Traceability for Safety Resilience

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Abstract. Secure sensor calibration constitutes a foundational step that underpins operational safety in the Industrial Internet of Things. While much attention has been given to IoT security such as the use of TLS to secure sensed data, little thought has been given to securing the calibration infrastructure itself. Currently traceability is achieved via manual verification using paper-based datasheets which is both time consuming and insecure. For instance, when the calibration status of parent devices is revoked as mistakes or mischance is detected, calibrated devices are not updated until the next calibration cycle, leaving much of the calibration parameters invalid. Aside from error, any party within the calibration infrastructure can maliciously introduce errors since the current paper based system lacks authentication as well as non-repudiation. In this paper, we propose a novel resilient architecture for calibration infrastructure, where the calibration status of sensor elements can be verified on-the-fly to the root of trust preserving the properties of authentication and non-repudiation. We propose an implementation based on smart contracts on the Ethereum network. Our evaluation shows that Ethereum is likely to address the protection requirements of traceable measurements.

1 Introduction

IoT cyberphysical systems, such as connected robots, are increasingly transforming a wide range of application areas, including but not limited to surgical suites [19] and industrial processing plants [15]. The use of automation in these areas brings forth the potential to increase the efficiency of output, yet accuracy and precision under adversarial pressure remains a constant worry. In the context of surgical robotics, for example, a high degree of accuracy and precision must be maintained as accurate sensing could mean the difference between life and death.

A safety-critical device such as a surgical robot [14] involves much more work. A calibration infrastructure distributed across the OEMs, third-party calibration agencies and suppliers involved in the supply chain [71], are part of the calibration work-flow. The root of trust (calibration integrity) is a National Measurement Institute (NMI) that maintains the gold standards for sensing and measurement. This is typically a government agency such as the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in UK or the NIST in USA. The root of trust for each
type of sensor, consists of a master calibration device, which is used to calibrated other reference devices that serve as a proxy for the master, and are in turn used to keep calibration units closer to the field calibrated.

First, as we start to rely on connected robots to perform critical tasks, we will start to see at least three changes. The security of the calibration infrastructure itself will start gaining importance and mechanisms will be required to deal with attackers in the calibration ecosystem.

Second, calibration correctness becomes a safety-critical requirement. We argue that the way ahead, is to ensure that all sensed data is subject to verification via on-the-fly calibration checks. This notion involves tracing sensed measurements to the corresponding gold standard, by involving all stakeholders: from the operator (e.g. surgeon in a hospital), to the manufacturer and their suppliers.

Third, how can the operator, regulator, manufacturer, and calibration agencies work together to create a tamper-resistant trail of recorded activity to aid system forensics, which can withstand hostile scrutiny in a court of law when things go wrong? There have been cases of lawsuits filed by patients, accusing hospitals of negligence over safety considerations when surgical robots have inflicted accidental injuries [18,20], and such are illustrative of the significant liabilities and stakes involved when ensuring robot safety.

Ultimately, calibration activity – such as end-to-end measurement and calibration traceability [8,9,2,13,17,12] – move from a one-off to a continuous or periodic process, to minimise errors arising from calibration and associated liabilities. Ensuring the correctness of calibration in the face of attackers is a crucial requirement that must be enforced to address the operational resilience requirements of connected systems.

2 Background

To ensure measuring instruments provide high quality and accurate measurements, we must ensure that they are calibrated against a trustworthy source. All measurements have a quantifiable degree of uncertainty and the challenge is to ensure that we can minimise this uncertainty, while maintaining a quantifiable indication of the quality of measurement. National standards for weights and measures are maintained by National Measurement Institutes (NMIs), such as the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in the United Kingdom. NMIs define national measurement standards, which are associated with values of uncertainty and are used to calibrate measuring instruments.

The calibration of measuring instruments ensures that recorded measurements are of high quality and accuracy, such that they are compared to a standard of higher accuracy to identify errors in instrument readings. We calibrate to meet quality audit requirements and ensure reference designs, subsystems and integrated systems perform as intended. A reliable measurement should be recorded by instruments with low measurement uncertainty and is traceable to corresponding SI units, to a standard or reference method [2]. Traceability is at the heart of measurements and is a basis for comparisons against valid mea-
surements. A measurement’s metrological traceability is its property, such that the measurement result is related to a stated reference, through an unbroken chain of calibrations [8]. Shown in Figure 1 are paths in a traceability chain. As demonstrated by the diagram, each piece of end user equipment, hereafter referred to as an end node, can be traced back along the path to intermediary measurement facilities and ultimately to NMIs — which refer to the SI units as the basis for calibration. Each node in a path, being an NMI or intermediary facility, can branch out to other intermediary or end nodes, such that each piece of equipment can be used to calibrate a number of others.

Fig. 1: Traceability Chain Paths

Kaarls and Quinn state that a set of defined standard, or reference, methods can be created such that primary method(s) are used to validate or calibrate secondary or tertiary methods, which can be linked to a working-level method [9]. The use of primary methods are often time consuming and costly. A trade-off for typical working-level methods induce simplicity, but increases uncertainty. de Castro et al. state that measurement uncertainty is an operationally defined method of detailing the level of confidence associated with a measurement [2], offering advantages over other terms such as precision and trueness.

3 Protection requirements

Having noted that record-keeping around the calibration process is a foundational challenge to high-assurance IoT systems, several questions arise. What new security problems and what protection opportunities arise where the typical factory may have upwards of a 100,000 sensors, and thousands of such factories or labs share a few hundred calibration facilities. Clearly a future calibration framework will have to ensure good separation between rivals while also supporting dependable shared channels to ensure traceability chains back to a root calibration unit. If some of the calibration units are left on client facilities then are themselves susceptible to occasional compromise.

The primary asset here are the calibration records i.e the calibration information linking parents to children, along with supporting information to determine
various measurement uncertainties such as the offsets to be applied as environmental parameters vary. Tampering with calibration records would likely be the simplest attack vector to attacking IoT devices at scale.

A capable insider might be able to compromise a subset of record storage perhaps as a consequence of a targeted attack on storage servers. We have to, therefore, design the storage infrastructure such that even if it comes under a massive service denial attack or other form of partial compromise, that traceability, uncertainty, or calibration-related checks should not be impacted. This is rather important. The denial or delay of calibration verification ultimately has a direct bearing on the operational efficiency – a surgery involving a surgical-robot cannot commence unless the robot’s calibration status has been thoroughly verified at the point of use, in order to discharge the operator of liabilities arising from the use of miscalibrated devices.

This brings us to the next requirement. The operator must be able to prove that the calibration status of the robot is fully traceable to national standards to the hospital’s insurer in a publicly verifiable manner. A proof means there is no uncertainty about the calibration status of the robot prior to surgery. Current paper-based records cannot be revoked remotely. Digital calibration reports on the other hand are routinely revoked whenever any intelligence about the reliability of parent devices anywhere on the chain emerges. Validating the freshness of calibration reports, and provably so is therefore of crucial importance in safety-critical IoT systems. If the proof is publicly verifiable, i.e without the possession of special credentials or keys, then the system also has the transparency property. Transparency refers to the capability that users can challenge and verify the claimed calibration status of a device. Transparency enables downstream users to check the integrity of the data supply chain. We argue that transparency is an essential requirement for safety-critical systems.

Scale is another important factor that designers must consider. As we move from the current deployment of networks involving a few connected sensors to safety-critical systems with hundreds of thousands of sensors, we will need a calibration verification infrastructure that scales to the internet.

Anonymity is also an important requirement to protect the privacy of the data supply chain. Users who verify device calibration risk exposing themselves, as device users, to the calibration-verification infrastructure (run by manufacturers). Information can leak as a result of calibration and traceability checks, as checks expose user workflows, which can possibly break confidentiality by linking the verifier to the device. This compromises the privacy of the data supply chain, as the user’s workflow increasingly become visible to the calibration infrastructure. To ensure that the calibration infrastructure does not learn any information about the workflow of specific users, verifier-side (user side) anonymity is an important requirement.

A summary of the protection requirements described are as follows: enabling collaboration between operators, manufacturers, regulators, calibration agencies via storing calibration records in a tamper-evident manner in a fully decentralised manner (absence of a trusted third-party); allow operators to transpar-
ently verify and prove calibration-status prior to device usage; ensuring operator’s metadata (calibration-verification traffic) is protected from traffic analysis attacks via suitable anonymous interfaces.

3.1 Threat model

The current verification process for calibration information has no associated threat model and thus to enable the need for digitisation, a sound threat model is the first step towards resilience. We believe there are at least four types of threats to the calibration infrastructure.

Large-scale compromise: First, an intentional attack by a state or state-sponsored group could discover systemic weaknesses that compromises a large fraction of the calibration infrastructure. These vulnerabilities could be exploited by a capable attacker resulting in seeding significant confusion in the best case. And, in the worst-case scenario, entire batches of a production-cycle might be compromised such as a whole batch of wrongly proportioned paracetamol landing up on a supermarket shelf.

Behavioural economics: Second, as the digital calibration infrastructure develops into hierarchical trees of substantial size with millions of participants, complex behaviours may arise as a result of system economics. For instance, selfish behaviours may manifest that optimises the costs of a fraction of the participant at the expense of the rest of the calibration ecosystem.

Flying debris: Third, secondary impacts of attacks directed at other targets may damage the calibration infrastructure. For example, a DoS attack may cause verification to fail if the network is shared with other systems. If verification is substantially delayed, it could make instruments uncontrollable triggering a precautionary shutdown.

Insider threat: Fourth, an insider may sabotage the calibration verification infrastructure. For instance, by inducing errors into agents responsible for storing calibration reports or those responsible for ensuring functional-semantics over verification processes. We exclude insiders from physical attacks on calibrated instruments/devices from the scope of this paper, as as the focus of this work, is on storage, processing, and verification.

3.2 Security policy

Following the threat model, the next step is to develop a security policy for the calibration system. A security policy is a succinct description of information flow constraints that stipulates the protection requirements to be met by security mechanisms, in order to mitigate the threats outlined in the threat model. Information flow controls are important. A move from the current peer-to-peer architecture underlying calibration devices and field instruments, any of which will cause havoc if compromised, can bring real benefits. The natural hierarchy within the calibration infrastructure when composed with information flow controls can compartmentalise risk, thus the compromise of a few units will do no more than local damage.
We argue that the appropriate information flow control for a calibration system is multi-level integrity, with root-calibration units calibrated by primary methods and references at the upper levels, field devices calibrated by secondary methods and references at the middle levels, and working level methods, references, and end-user equipment situated at the bottom. Also known as the BIBA model, this is similar to multi-level security systems typically used by government systems to enforce confidentiality by allowing information to flow from low-confidentiality to high-confidentiality levels (E.g. Top-secret to Secret to Confidential to Unclassified).

In the proposed calibration security-policy model, information flows downwards from the root-calibration units that implement the highest accuracy of measurement, to the measurement level composed of field devices, and finally to the monitoring system. There is also some compartmentation at the measurement level (e.g. separate virtual networks for unrelated near-root calibration units) and even more compartmentation at the top at the calibration level (where a gold-standard or other root-level resource is protected). Within the calibration infrastructure there will be typically three or so levels. First, the (root or) near-root calibration instruments will typically perform calibration operations on a field device. After operation, the calibration-devices in question notify the monitoring system which lies at the third level. Measurement itself takes place at the second level where field devices operate. The functionality of any resource at the calibration-level should never be compromised by anything that happens at the measurement level; in other words, information flows from the calibration (unit) to measurement (instrument) but not vice versa. The monitoring exists at the third level and is composed of external monitoring systems that take a data feed from the calibration and measurement levels but that report externally, for example to give the manufacturer data for consolidated event reporting, measurement quality, stability monitoring, line fault location, asset condition and calibration code compliance. Such systems should not pass data directly up to the calibration system. Thus we have a multilevel system in which we want to prevent information flows from monitoring up to measurement and from measurement up to calibration.

Information-flow constraints across the multiple levels of integrity can be enforced by a firewall appliance located close to the routing infrastructure such as a hardware-based firewall appliance (like Juniper SSG/SRX) which runs on hardware tailored to install as a network device. This provides enough network interfaces and CPU to protect small networks (few ports and few Mbps throughput) to enterprise-level networks (tens of ports, Gbps throughput). Aside from the previously mentioned rules, the firewall should further control information flows in order to prevent the IP addresses of measurements instruments becoming externally reachable or visible to the outside world. The firewall should default deny. The default position when configuring the firewall should be to deny traffic, not permit it. Then information flows can be controlled accordingly on a whitelist basis. To prevent side effects of attacks targeting external systems causing service-denial or worse to the calibration infrastructure. Likewise,
the firewall should prevent the calibration infrastructure from being used as a stepping stone for attacks on external systems.

The proposed security architecture for sensor and device calibration is as illustrated in Figure ??, has upper levels which consists of root-calibration units operated and managed by NMIs such as the National Physical Laboratory, each of which calibrate and manage the accuracy of tens of level 1 calibration devices, and each level 1 device in turn manages a few thousand level 2 calibration devices, each of which manage the calibration of tens of thousands of field level instruments. By coupling the calibration hierarchy with information-flow constraints, we can organise the measurement infrastructure so that only the compromise of top-level calibration devices can cause erroneous measurement at scale, thus reducing the number of critical components at least by a factor of hundred. Furthermore, with the use of appropriate controls at level 2, the compromise of a level 2 calibration device does little damage outside of its first-hop neighbours, then we can arrange to further reduce the sites of critical failure by another factor of ten. The calibration hierarchy can be readily extended, without much imagination, to map the hierarchical levels to local calibration components within a manufacturing environment.

We assume the root (level 0) and level 1 calibration devices can (rarely) suffer accidental configuration errors but are otherwise trustworthy. On the other hand, level 2 calibration devices may suffer occasional compromise and, as previously mentioned, a fraction of field instruments may be compromised at any one time which might misbehave, intentionally or otherwise.

3.3 Calibration levels and Measurement levels

We expect that most of the calibration work will be carried out by one or more middle levels consisting of mid-level calibration devices and calibrated field instruments that exist in the middle level. Level 1 and 2 organisations generally use master calibration units to calibrate other devices. This allows other calibration devices to be calibrated locally, reducing the time and cost for calibrating at level 0, as only the master unit needs to be sent to the level 0 organisation. Field devices are sent to level 1 and 2 organisations for calibration.

On the other hand, all the measurement work will be carried out by the field devices located at the bottom (leaf position) of the hierarchy.

Let them out, but not in: As previously described, any close-to-field calibration devices and field instruments may become a point of compromise at any one time, causing them to misbehave, intentionally or otherwise. A newly established network architecture, to define and constrain the behaviours — whether malicious or legitimate — of field instruments and close-to-field calibration devices, could invoke the use of refusing incoming connections and only allowing outgoing connections. Field instruments and close-to-field devices will be primarily used to transmit outgoing data and not receive incoming data.

Enforcing non-repudiation: As well as constraining the behaviour of field instruments and close-to-field devices, a discussion of mitigating possible compromise is necessary. An important point for mitigation is to ensure that instru-
ments and devices are accountable for transmitted data, such as measurements
field instruments may take and results from calibration units. The data should
be recorded such that it can be traced back to the unit itself. This aids in the
isolation of a device in the event of compromise.

Access granted: Across factory premises and different sites, what shared and
private states are practical to hold and will any limitations be imposed as a
result of state? A suitable access control policy should be defined such that cali-
bration information can be made public by default, with organisations enabling
an option to not publicly display this if they consider the information to be
private. However, the discussion of privatising calibration information imposes a
degree of difficulty on enabling the traceability of measurements associated with
the privatised information. Therefore, to aid in reducing the difficulty of this
process, the calibration framework could support an anonymised base system
which also allows revocation. A set of scopes can be defined for the nodes in the
traceability chain as shown in Figure 1, which determine the access constraints
for data contained within the scope, whilst a general access policy can be used
to cover data in a general scope.

3.4 Monitoring

Monitoring is a logical service in the network. The purpose of monitoring is
to collect statistics from both calibration and measurement levels. Monitoring
makes available its information to relevant users and operators so they can watch
and intervene if needed. This service can perform both passive and active moni-
toring. Passively, it can measure statistics such as the number of measurements
that match a certain pattern, the extent of traceability up the calibration hierar-
chy, or per-instrument error margins. Actively, it can interrogate a field instru-
ment by sending a measurement request and observe the the instrument output.
Monitoring also exposes a new level of control to the calibration infrastructure.
The potential of using this for auditing and information flow analysis is immense.
Among others, this makes available an interesting potential for tackling malware
outbreaks as well as adapting and reacting to other forms of network attacks.
The monitoring level also feeds data back into the measurement level.

The monitoring service knows all the calibration traffic that arises from trace-
ability checks issued from the top such as discarding the use of measurements
that aren’t traceable to a calibration device in the top-level, it can check if they
are followed, completing the loop. It can can also actively generate 'test' mea-
surement traffic to isolate devices that are dishonest. Most importantly, it links
the operators of field devices with the rest of the calibration infrastructure. While
the level 0 devices are the technical authorities in calibration, the measurement
service translates human operator intentions into control directives. The mon-
itoring service exposes a interface for a users of the measurement network, or
to those to whom the operator delegates access, for example an operator for a
site should not be able to access measurement data from other departments or
manufacturing sites even if they share a common calibration infrastructure, for
instance to restrict the frequency and outputs of measurement probes operated
by Shell and BP. Each such user gets a separate slice of the measurement service along with relevant devices, traceability information, and monitoring data. On the management side, the interface deals with resource allocation and visibility; and the monitoring side only shows the part of the collected data that the user is authorised to view.

3.5 Protection mechanism

Given the protection requirements, it is natural to pursue the development of a safety assurance system which enables data traceability and support for system forensics – in comparison with current state-of-the-art calibration systems [11,5]. In order to provide decentralised tamper-evident storage, protect operator anonymity, and enable transparency at the scale of the Internet requires a highly distributed infrastructure that does not have any centralised components. These requirements fit the blockchain as a solution very well. In accordance with our protection requirements for maintaining high integrity and tamper-resistance, a blockchain uses strong cryptographic links among blocks, as well as a distributed network for storage and consensus, making it extremely hard to tamper with or delete data from the blockchain-based calibration datastore. This not only aids in fulfilling our integrity requirement, but also enforces non-repudiation. Since the blockchain is a ledger, keeping records of all transactions, we can ensure that calibration devices at all levels of the hierarchy cannot deny calibration operations or calibration report, and can thus be held accountable for their actions.

Instead of a centralized trusted authority to store calibration records, a peer to peer network of nodes independently maintains the entire database, with cryptographic algorithms used to secure data integrity. This is a blockchain [21]. Each node receives transactions in a different order. All transactions received within a certain time frame are aggregated into a new block. To ensure that the data in every block is consistent across all nodes, a voting scheme is used, which is called mining. Instead of having a direct vote, a proof-of-work model is used to determine which node wins the vote to determine the next accepted block. Each node first aggregates a limited number of transactions, and then solves an NP cryptographic problem. This problem has been formulated such that any
random node may stumble upon the solution, but the entire network will solve the problem given a certain amount of time, which is determined by the block difficulty.

To provide an incentive for nodes to behave honestly, an incentive system is needed so that each node processes the transactions it receives into the next block. Hence each transaction also has an associated transaction fee which is paid to the node that mines the block which includes the transaction. Thus, each node is incentivized to solve as many blocks as possible. This also has the additional effect on the nodes causing them to balance their workload between mining a block and processing transactions. The time to mine a block is set by adjusting the block difficulty, while the transaction processing time is limited by the transaction limit. In case of simple transactions like in bitcoin, the transaction limit is enforced by the total number of transactions. In Ethereum (the mechanism we use), the transaction varies based on the cost (gas) of the transaction [21]. Each transaction consists of performing certain fixed operations defined by the smart contract, and finally modifying the persistent data on the blockchain. Instead of keeping the transaction limit as a simple multiple of transactions, the total cost is instead the sum of cost of each individual transaction. This limit ensures that the total computational resources used by the node to process all transactions remains below a fixed value. Thus, even if the sum of cost of all transactions exceeds the limit, the limit is determined in such a way that the time each node takes to process a transaction is far lesser than the time allocated to solve for proof-of-work. This ensures that any transaction whose cost is less than the block limit will be executed in a single block itself, making its round time equal to the block processing time, regardless of the cost of the actual transaction.

First, we must consider what will be stored on the blockchain to aid with functions such as verifying the completeness of traceability chains in order to accept valid measurements, as well as providing a way to trace measurements back to field devices. From the calibration hierarchy, we know that all devices and units are associated with a calibration report, which outlines information about parent calibration units, operating ranges with a measurement uncertainty (MU), among other things. Figure 2a depicts an example calibration report. As well as this, the report will also detail the calibration technician who performed the calibration on the device or unit. Therefore, for completeness, storing reports as well as technicians on the chain is ideal. This will enable the contract to verify the calibration status of each device by looking up its associated parent unit(s), to trace upwards to the master calibration device (root) unit, which enables the device user to check whether the device is calibrated against the root units that establish the gold standard. The use of ECDSA signatures prevents an adversary from forging calibration reports into the blockchain (explained in detail below). Also, to prevent the unauthorised use of valid calibration devices, the traceability-check contract verifies the signature of technicians all along the calibration hierarchy. A valid technician’s signing keys must be signed by the
calibration organisation’s root signing key, and in turn signed by the NMI, which is the root of trust.

Second, considering the trace back to the calibration technician, we would also want to know what organisation certified the technician to perform calibration, and therefore we must also store the organisations in the calibration hierarchy, to allow for complete audit trails in the event of disaster which stems from invalid or improper calibration.

Third, now that we have established what will be stored on the chain, we must understand how we can use the blockchain for traceability verification checks. Popular implementations, such as Ethereum, use smart contracts to execute code and interact directly with the blockchain. To perform traceability verification, within a secure boot process (i.e. when the sensor starts up), we can use a smart contract. The smart contract will execute code that will verify whether or not there is a complete traceability chain, with each unit in the chain having valid calibration, before the sensor is allowed to start capturing data (Figure 3).

Fig. 3: Sensor Traceability Verification using a Smart Contract

Specifically, the contract will take the sensor’s device ID as input to the smart contract, which will execute a function to verify it has complete traceability. The algorithm, as shown in Algorithm 1, will retrieve the root (calibration) report of the device’s traceability chain, which retrieves the parent report from the chain, verifies signatures, and loops until there are no parents. It will then check the final device’s certifying organisation to see if it is an NMI, in our case NPL, and if so, the traceability chain is valid and complete, and thus return a verified result to the device. Likewise, if there is no NMI root, the trace will complete but will return a non-verified result to the device. Furthermore, to retrieve a certificate itself, the smart contract will interact with the PKI system (depicted in Figure ??) to retrieve the certificate. In the algorithm, the signatures will be verified before accepting the parent identifier. The public key of the technician who calibrated the device is not that of the one who signed the parent, then the verification will fail and return a null result (ultimately resulting in invalid traceability), and otherwise will continue looping until the NMI root.
Algorithm 1 Trace Verification

1: procedure TraceCal_READ(device_id)
2:   device_report = reports[device_id]
3:   parent_cert = certificates[device_report.parent_id]
4:   technician_cert = certificates[device_report.technician_id]
5:  ▷ If report is not signed by parent device, then fail
6:   if !(key_verify(device_report, parent_cert)) then
7:     return null
8:   end if
9:   ▷ If report is not signed by technician, then fail
10:  if !(key_verify(device_report, technician_cert)) then
11:     return null
12:  end if
13:  org_cert = certificates[technician_cert.org_id]
14:  if verify_signature(technician_cert, org_cert) == false then
15:     return null
16:  end if
17:  if check_chain_of_trust(org_cert, ROOT_CERT) == false then
18:     return null
19:  end if
20:  ▷ Report now verified, now verify there is a root
21:  root_report_id = device_id
22:  parent = reports[root_report_id].parent_device
23:  ▷ Loop until there is no parent
24:  while bytes(parent).length > 0 do
25:    ▷ Verify parent report is signed by parent device
26:    if key_verify(parent, certificates[parent].parent_device) then
27:      if key_verify(parent, technician_cert) then
28:        root_report_id = parent
29:        parent = reports[root_report_id].parent_device
30:      else
31:        return null
32:      end if
33:    else
34:      return null
35:    end if
36:  end while
37:  return reports[root_report_id]
38: end procedure

Fourth, upon calibration, the device will be imprinted with a ECDSA public and private keypair, which are signed by the certified technician, establishing a chain of trust. The technician’s keys used to sign the device’s calibration report and are in turn signed by the organisation’s keys who certified the technician (Figure 2b), such that we can verify that the technicians themselves are not fake.
Certified calibration organisations will be associated with their own keypair, which will be used to sign all calibration technician keys they wish to certify.

4 Evaluation

In order to better understand the natural consideration of blockchains as a solution to fulfil our protection requirements, we must evaluate an implementation that can verify the completeness of traceability chains at any stage in the calibration hierarchy.

4.1 Blockchain Environment

We used the Ethereum blockchain [21], a Turing-complete, decentralised value-transfer system which facilitates the use of smart contracts, written in Solidity, to interact with the blockchain. The programming language in Ethereum is implemented as a set of 140 opcodes which all nodes execute deterministically. The opcodes are condensed to form a bytecode string which can be published on the network, in the form of a smart contract. During deployment, a transaction is created by the account deploying the contract, and the contract is given its own unique address. When this transaction is accepted, the smart contract persists in the network. The contract may have various functions, and can also allocate persistent memory on the network. Any account which wants to interact with it uses the contract’s address to call its various functions. The contract may contain two types of functions, including transactions and calls. Transactions are those which modify the persistent memory of the contract. They are called transactions specifically because they need to be run by all nodes to ensure synchronicity, and thus cost computational power. Calls merely read the persistent memory and can be run locally as well, and hence are free of cost. Since each transaction function requires computational resources based on the bytecode executed, there must be a way to charge each operation. Thus, every opcode is assigned a fixed cost which was tabulated when the network was deployed, and this cost is measured by units of gas.

Smart Contracts The purpose of our smart contract is to define the functions of our protection mechanism, described in Section 3.5, to interact with the blockchain to read and write data. In our smart contract, we defined functions for declaring aspects of the calibration hierarchy, as well as those for traceability verification. Specifically, we defined functions for creating and retrieving calibration organisations, certified calibration technicians and calibration reports, as well as for conducting traceability verification. Table 1 describes the primary functions within our smart contract. Smart contracts were deployed and tested on private Ethereum blockchain (Ganache) as well as public Testnet (Ropsten Testnet) with the help of truffle testing framework [4]. An interesting fact is that the gas usage is exactly same whether the smart contract is deployed on the Ethereum Test Net (Ropsten) or a private Net (Ganache). After deployment
of the smart contracts we measured the gas usage of each function as well as the transaction confirmation times.

**Calibration Hierarchy and Traceability** To meet the definition of our protection mechanism, the smart contract should effectively be able to create the calibration hierarchy as well as provide methods to verify the metrological traceability of a given device or calibration unit. As previously described, we define functions to create calibration organisations and certified calibration technicians who will oversee and perform calibration of these devices, as well as providing a function for verifying traceability chains, *TraceCal.READ*, described in detail in Algorithm 1.

| Function            | Description                                                                 |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| createOrganisation  | Accepts an ID and a name, and creates an organisation on the blockchain     |
| createTechnician    | Requests an Ethereum address and an organisation id, and will create a technician on the blockchain |
| createReport        | Accepts a number of parameters, such as the device id and technician id, and creates a calibration-report object on the blockchain |
| TraceCal.READ       | Accepts a device ID and returns a root calibration-report if it has one, else returns the calibration-report of the device itself. |
| getParentReport     | Accepts a device and returns its direct parent’s calibration-report or NULL. |
| getOrgName          | Accepts an organisation ID and returns the name of the organisation         |
| getTechnicianOrganisation | Returns the organisation ID of the organisation who certified the technician |

Table 1: List of Implementation Functions

**Ropsten Test Network** In order to properly evaluate how our protection mechanism performs in a realistic environment, we deployed our implementation on the Ropsten test network [3]. Also known as the Ethereum Testnet, the Ropsten test network is the largest Ethereum test network and runs the same Proof-of-Work (PoW) protocol as Ethereum, but is designed for testing smart contracts before deploying them on the main Ethereum network. It uses a form of Ether, Ethereum’s currency, called *rEth* which costs no real money. However, this can also be produced from mining and can be received from faucets for testing transactions without imposing a legitimate cost.

In comparison with other Ethereum testnets such as Kovan [10] or Rinkeby [16], which use an alternative Proof-of-Authority (PoA) consensus protocol and have lower block confirmation times, the PoW Ropsten testnet best reproduces the current Ethereum production environment conditions and is useful for testing our protection mechanism against realistic transaction rates/times, number of nodes/miners, and gas prices, compared to those on the main Ethereum network.
4.2 Functionality Testing

The aim of our first set of experiments was to determine whether or not our protection mechanism functions as intended. Specifically, our functions to set up organisations, technicians and calibration-reports must properly create their respective objects, with the appropriate input parameters, and raise errors when these parameters are invalid.

Creating organisations, technicians and reports When our smart contract is executed, we instantiate the calibration hierarchy with NPL as the root NMI organisation. From this, we tested creating organisations, with each certifying several technicians. These were created using the createOrganisation and createTechnician functions. These technicians would then go on to calibrate field devices and calibration units, which produces a calibration report upon completion of calibration; which ultimately need to be placed on the chain. To create a report, we use the createReport function in the smart contract. As expected, all our tests were successful, with the appropriate objects created on the chain. Appropriately, we also defined functions for data retrieval, such as getTechnicianOrganisation which gets the certifying organisation of a technician, for which all tests returned expected results.

4.3 Scalability Testing

After developing the base of our system, we evaluated how our protection mechanism scales with the ubiquitous nature and vast size of the calibration hierarchy. As well as this, we also evaluated how the addition of signatures, used for signing calibration reports (among others as described in Section 3.5), affects how well our protection mechanism scales. The following tests which involve contract executing times have been run on a local blockchain using Ganache as the provider, and the Remix IDE to run the contract calls. We use Ganache to get the contract executing time as the contract is executed immediately, whereas on the main Ethereum network other contracts may be executed in the same block and measuring the execution time would be difficult. Likewise, we measured gas cost in the following experiments using the Ropsten network as Ganache provides an environment for testing contracts without costs, whereas Ropsten imposes gas and Ether costs like the main network but for free.

Impact of #Devices on Execution Time for Traces For our first set of experiments, we measured the impact the number of devices in the calibration hierarchy has on the execution time of the smart contract for traceability verification. Firstly, to match the calibration hierarchy, we used varying numbers of field devices \( n \) as a baseline. From this, we deduce the number of levels as \( \log(n) \), such that if we have 100 field devices, the calibration hierarchy will consist of two levels as well as the root NMI. Furthermore, we map the number of
organisations in the calibration hierarchy as \( \log_2(n - 1) \), such that for 100 field devices there will be 4 organisations.

Next, we define the scope of our first set of experiments for \( n \) in the range \( 10 \leq n \leq 10^6 \). As shown in Figure 4a, we observed the effect of \( n \) field devices on the contract execution time for verifying (read) traces. We observed that as the number of field devices and levels increase, the time for verifying traces increases.

Furthermore, we also observed the impact of adding signatures in our protection mechanism. For verification, the addition of signatures in the verification of traces more than doubles the contract execution time. Although this may seem a lot, if we consider the case of 1,000,000 devices, the execution times are still only just over a single second. If we compare these times to what we would expect from the paper-based current state-of-the-art, they are an extremely significant improvement.

**Impact of \#Levels on Execution Time** In our previous experiments, we derived the number of levels based on the number of field devices, \( n \), as the primary variable. Realistically, there may be more than \( \log(n) \) levels, and it is interesting to evaluate how the number of levels impacts the execution time. In this experiment, we measured the impact of the number of levels on execution times for verifying traces. As shown in the results of this experiment in Figure 4b, the contract execution time increases in all cases as the number of levels increases. As the verification function requires reaching the root certificate, the time spent for will increase as the number of antecedent units in a device’s trace also increases. With respect to contract execution time, the addition of signatures seems to have little impact with a small number of levels, but increases...
significantly as the number of levels increase, taking around 7 seconds to create traces at 50 levels.

5 Discussion

In safety-critical environments, it is vital that we ensure safe operation and robustness under adversarial pressure, during activities such as performing surgical procedures on humans. In Section 3, we have motivated a number of protection requirements, namely integrity, availability, anonymity and tamper-resistant storage.

5.1 System Characteristics

Latency: We demonstrate that traceability verification, at our worst case of 50 levels including signature verification in place, can be carried out in under 4 seconds. If we assume a typical surgical robot to realistically employ tens of sensors, such as the Raven II master device which makes use of 9 sensors for orientation and force-feedback alone [6], we can expect the verification process for all to complete within several minutes, roughly the time it takes for IV insertion, anaesthesia preparation, etc. during a typical pre-op procedure. As described by Hackel et al. [5], NMIs at the root level will perform around 10,000 calibrations per year, intermediaries 100,000 per year and internal facilities situated in safety-critical environments to perform potentially millions of calibrations per year. Given the time to complete a traceability check, a key component of calibration itself, and the increasing numbers of IoT systems being implemented, the issues facing the current state-of-the-art will be evermore present. The current state-of-the-art, being a collection of systems and processes dealing with manual paper records [5], takes in the order of several hours to days for completing a single calibration verification check, in contrast to our system.

Scalability: Our evaluation involved testing our solution against a scaling calibration hierarchy. Specifically, our scaling factors included the number of field devices and the number of levels in the calibration hierarchy. In our case for on-the-fly calibration verification, which would happen at critical stages in system operation such as the secure boot, our system would need to successfully carry out the verification checks in quick succession as to minimise any delay in operation. For example, if we consider an emergency room scenario where a patient has been rushed into a trauma bay, these checks should be carried out and completed ready for reliable operation before the patient has reached the room. In our tests, we have demonstrated that even with 50 levels and the added use of signatures, the verification process takes under four seconds. Realistically, the trauma team in the scenario described would be notified before the patient enters the ER, and thus our solution therefore meets this criteria whilst maintaining resilience to malicious actors.

Usability: Naturally, one may question the necessity of storing the result of trace verifications (once confirmed) on the chain. Rather than repeating the
full traceability verification, one could store the result (valid or invalid) of the trace on the chain itself, such that we can just check this result instead. As this is a write operation, using the Ethereum blockchain imposes a gas cost, so while it may be faster, it is important to assess the cost of writing trace results to the chain. The Ethereum network currently prescribes that each block may only contain transactions whose total gas cost amounts to 8,000,000 gwei at maximum. This is not only a result of performance and financial considerations on the part of the nodes, but the need to minimize the computation required by non nodes with low computing power to validate blocks as well. The gas cost for this operation is approximately 200,000 gwei per execution, and thus assuming a fairly strict regime of hourly verification checks would result in an approximate cost of 4,000,000 gwei per device. Unfortunately, taking into account mining time and the Ethereum network, only 2 devices can be validated per block, assuming that the system has access to the entire global bandwidth. At the time of writing, the average mining time for Ethereum is 15 seconds, and thus a set of fully harmonised trace write operations is limited to around 11,520 per day. Therefore, using the Ethereum blockchain for this write operation in particular does not seem viable, in terms of applicability as well as economically. However, other blockchain technologies may be better suited to enabling this, a point for future work.

5.2 Security and Privacy

We show that a decentralised blockchain has significant enabling power as a collaboration mechanism between various players involved in ensuring calibration of safety critical systems – OEMs, users, and third-party calibration agencies, and NMIs. In particular, the use of a permissionless blockchain helps address privacy concerns over user profiling by internal adversaries who can apply traffic analysis techniques over calibration traffic (the anonymity property). Combining blockchains with appropriate certificate management prevents malicious action by internal and external adversaries to resist fake calibration reports, fake technicians. The ability to ensure that all sensor measurements can be verified for correctness prior to use together lays the foundation for secure safety-critical systems. Additionally, it enables transparency in the supply chain which may have positive secondary effects, such as extending the collaboration within the supply-chain to support device provenance among other applications.

We now discuss how our solution meets various security properties.

**System Integrity:** Tampering with calibration records, is prevented by the inherent properties of blockchains, specifically the chaining of data and the consensus mechanism in place. Calibration integrity – proving that a device has valid calibration – for example that it has not been revoked (fresh), is met through traceability verification. Furthermore, the forgery of calibration reports is prevented by having the certified calibration technician sign the reports for the devices they calibrate.

**System Forensics:** The system as a whole needs to be able to withstand hostile scrutiny in a court of law. Several cases [18][20] are clear demonstrations
of the potential liabilities involved and the stakes revolving around safety within IoT contexts. Support for system forensics are required to ensure that one can successfully verify that calibration was in fact carried out, and to support this a record of such events leading to verification must be recorded to be verified at a later date. In comparison with the current state-of-the-art, where forensics is carried out over disconnected centralised databases of calibration reports, our blockchain-based system keeps a strong, tamper-resistant trail of evidence that can be followed throughout entire traceability chains. Furthermore, we note that, albeit not part of our evaluation, additional smart contracts can be written to support generalised and feature-specific forensic and auditing applications.

**Anonymity:** To prevent information leakage to other parties in the chain, all read operations are anonymous as the data is read from the verifier’s local machine, and thus prevents the learning of links between the verifier themselves the device being traced. Using the Ethereum platform for our solution, being a public permissionless blockchain, readers and verifiers of the stored data are kept anonymous, unlike writing to the chain which is not. As described in Section 4, our solution makes use of only read operations in terms of traceability verification, where anonymity is required.

**Availability:** Currently, with the use of centralised data storage for calibration records leaves the calibration ecosystem vulnerable to targeted attacks on and compromise of the storage servers. Thus, the consideration over the secure design of the storage infrastructure is important, with delays or denials of verification potentially heavily impacting operational efficiency and accuracy. Simply, a decentralised storage infrastructure can meet the requirement for high availability and scale, additional mechanisms would need to be coordinated to meet the rest of our requirements, to which the blockchain solution fortunately provides.

6 Conclusion

An open challenge within industrial IoT processes is maintaining the integrity of calibration under adversarial pressure. Whilst there are many factors which contribute to this, including software patches to secure data storage, an important foundational requirement is to secure the calibration mechanism itself. In particular, the need for a mechanism that is: highly available, verifiable and tamper-resistant, for verifying traceability is becoming clear. In our research, we propose a mechanism that successfully establishes traceability chains, to ensure we can maintain valid calibration and rapidly attend to adversarial faults, leveraging blockchains as a highly-available tamper-resistant chain of evidence.

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