A Scale-Free Transportation Network Explains the City-Size Distribution

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Abstract

Zipf’s law is one of the best-known empirical regularities in urban economics. There is extensive research on the subject, where each city is treated symmetrically in terms of the cost of transactions with other cities. Recent developments in network theory facilitate the examination of an asymmetric transport network. In a scale-free network, the chance of observing extremes in network connections becomes higher than the Gaussian distribution predicts and therefore it explains the emergence of large clusters. The city-size distribution shares the same pattern. This paper decodes how accessibility of a city to other cities on the transportation network can boost its local economy and explains the city-size distribution as a result of its underlying transportation network structure. Finally, we discuss the endogenous evolution of transport networks.

Keywords: Zipf’s law, city-size distribution, scale-free network
JEL classification: R12, R40, L14

1 Introduction

Cities develop in relation to other cities rather than in a vacuum. What we consume in a city differs from what we produce in a city. The gap between the range and scale of production and consumption at the city level is bridged by the transportation network, over which cities trade their products with others. The transportation network, in turn, does not coordinate cities uniformly. Some cities have only limited connections while others receive many links from cities across the country, both large and small, near and far away. The fate of city’s economy, and by extension its population size, is more or less conditioned by how it is positioned (inadvertently or otherwise) in the overall interurban network of cities and how accessible it is from others. We will show that the city-size distribution is the result of a particular class of network that our economy installs on itself for interurban trading purposes, namely, a scale-free network.

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The existing literature’s treatment of the transportation network has been rather naïve and simplistic. Most existing models of city-size distribution implicitly or explicitly assume a completely isolated graph (figure 1) or complete graph (figure 2).

Each node represents a city and a link represents a route available for shipment in these figures. The number inside a node counts its degree, i.e., the number of edges or routes each node has. Commodities cannot be shipped at all on a completely isolated graph, but they can be shipped anywhere in a single step from any city on a complete graph. Either way, neglecting other factors, the resulting equilibrium will be an even split of population among the cities, which does not match the actual city-size distribution. To explain the city-size distribution, researchers have sought a source of variation other than what the nexus of interurban relationships has to offer. Some use a completely isolated graph (e.g., Eckhout [Eec204]). Others such as Duranton [Duro06], Rossi-Hansburg and Wright [RHW07], or the New Economic Geography [FKV99] engage a complete graph as the transport structure, when in fact, transaction and/or communication between hub cities is much easier than between cities on peripheries. Behrens et al [BMMS13], and Eaton and Kortum [EK02] introduce a more lifelike representation of transportation cost in that
the delivered price depends on a particular city pair. The price differential reflects monopolistic pricing (in [BMMS13]) or exogenous trade barriers (in [EK02]) rather than the underlying transportation network structure, which is still an (ex-ante) complete graph and thus network features such as a hub or through traffic are absent. The literature usually introduces a tiebreaker in the form of externalities, random growth, economies of scale or economies of scope to replicate the actual city-size distribution (cf. section 3.4).

In practice, transportation cost differs greatly depending on where you are and where you are headed. We will drop the assumption that our economy operates on a complete or completely isolated graph and see how much explanatory power network structure exerts as the engine of local economies of various sizes.

The transaction pattern between any two cities affects both the way cities are populated and the overall city-size distribution. Cities are tied together in various ways both topologically and economically. Some cities function as an intersection of major transportation routes and they trade and process commodities frequently in large volume. Others are less active in the interurban exchange of commodities. Differences among cities in terms of exchange patterns reverberate in the city-size distribution. Cities heavily interrelated to many others are likely to grow due to increased economic activities, whereas cities with sparse connections to a limited number of cities are liable to remain small in size. Those small cities, however, will not be completely wiped off the map.

1.1 Cities on a Network

Intercity exchange patterns like figures 1 and 2 are best described by a network with cities as a set of vertices and traffic by edges. In this regard, network theory is indispensable when constructing a model of cities in the nationwide economy.

The recent seminal work by Barabási and Albert [BA99] has revitalized network theory. Classical network theory pioneered by Erdős and Rényi [ER59]’s model (ER network) cannot explain the emergence of a cluster or hub in a network, which we observe in most real social networks. In a classic random graph, each node is linked with an equal probability to any other and lacks distinctiveness, for the number of pre-existing links does not matter in forming a network. Barabási and Albert (BA) add a dynamic feature and preferential attachment to the classical random graph model so that the nodes are no longer ex-ante identical. Some nodes gather lots of links while others are wired to just a few. The model has been applied to many fields, including the emergence of web science, and has produced an improved description of the organization and development of networks. Most real-world networks have one thing in common: the resulting distributions of links are scale invariant, that is, the distributions have fat tails. We can find nodes with an extremely large number of links rather easily with these networks compared to a classical random graph.

The city-size distribution shares the same pattern of scale invariance: the distribution of the 100 largest cities follows the same distribution as the one for the 1000 largest cities and so on, a property known as a power law, and in particular,
Zipf’s law in the city-size literature. We expect that the degree of a city is positively related to its population. And for that reason, we imagine that our economy is based on a BA network rather than an ER network. This turns out to be correct, but selection of the appropriate network structure depends on exactly how node degree is related to city size. We will decode their relationship in section 3.8.

The urban economic application of network theory is in its very early stage of development and there is much room for advancement. Interaction between individual cities has not caught much attention so far. Our goal in this paper is to bring to the fore the interaction between transportation network structure and the city-size distribution. With this goal in mind we introduce (asymptotic) techniques from network theory and merge them with a tractable economic model in a new way. We do not intend this work to be the last word on this topic, but merely a suggestion of a first step into a bigger research program.

![Figure 3. The Interstate route map (abridged).](image1)

![Figure 4. A typical airline’s route configuration (pre-merger Continental Airlines).](image2)

1.2 Some Transportation Networks Are Scale Free

Our economy operates on various modes of transportation and each mode comes with distinct network structures. Take a highway and airline network for example.
Figures 3 and 4 are schematic representations of the Interstate System and a typical airline route map for the 50 largest US cities. Apparently, a network composed of the Interstates does not share its structure with that of airlines. The Interstate will remain relatively intact when we take away New York, Houston and Cleveland. On the other hand, it would prove devastating if we did the same to the airline network (cf. [BB03]). More broadly, there is not much variance in the degree of nodes in the Interstate network, whereas the airline network has a limited number of heavily wired cities. The BA network (figure 4) explains the latter network better, as it follows a power law.

It should be noted, however, that what is geographically visible may not represent the real network that our economy relies on in effect. The Interstate network exhibits an ER-type topology as in figure 3. Nonetheless, the economy may operate a transportation network of a scale-free class on it. Shipment from Memphis has to go through St. Louis even if its final destination is Chicago. In this case Memphis is connected to Chicago in a single step rather than in two steps via St. Louis. For a carrier making Chicago-bound shipment from Memphis, St. Louis (a seeming layover node) is no different from the cornfield they pass through along the way (just a part of the edge), in that neither one of them add anything to the shipment. An economically relevant network is buried beneath the easily noticeable surface network and we do not want to confuse one with the other.

It is also very important to note here a difference between the literature on dynamic social network formation and transportation networks. In the standard economics literature on social networks, for example Mele [Mel11] or Christakis et al [CFIK10], it is the individual agents, represented by nodes, who make decisions about forming links among themselves. In contrast, the nodes of a transport network are cities. Typically, it is not the cities or their agents who make decisions about forming links. Rather, it is another agent who controls an entire network, for example the federal government in the case of highways or airlines in the case of an airline system.¹

1.3 The City-Size Distribution Is Scale Free Too

The city-size distribution has a distinct feature. Figure 5 plots the frequency of the city-size distribution from US Census 2000. It is only when we take the log of population (figure 5(b)) that the distribution exhibits resemblance to a familiar Gaussian distribution. Black and Henderson [BH03] and Soo [Soo05] explain how widespread scale-free distributions are in urban economics.² Under the scale-free distribution, the arithmetic mean (Hillsboro, TX in figure 5) becomes less interpretive and the geometric mean (Sutton, NE) takes over the role of the average in the conventional sense.

¹See section 3.10 for further details.
²Scale-free distributions are commonplace in the socioeconomic realm. It seems that something of an additive nature presides over natural phenomena, leading to a Gaussian distribution, and something of multiplicative nature (cf. [LSA01]) is at work among socioeconomic phenomena, leading to a scale-free domain. We study the latter.
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The fat-tailed distribution also makes its appearance on a map. Figure 6 illustrates the population density of each metropolitan and micropolitan statistical area (MSA and µSA, collectively referred to as Core Based Statistical Area, CBSA) in the United States in 2000. Most of the cities have a low density and are painted in blue; there are only a few cities that are green and only two cities are colored in red. If the city-size distribution followed a Gaussian distribution or Poisson distribution with a large mean, most of the cities should be green and only a few should be in blue or red. Just as for the airline network in figure 4, if we take away the ten largest US cities, we will leave more than a quarter of urban population

\(^3\) As in the degree distribution of an ER network.
Our main findings are as follows. City sizes are positively related to their degree. A city with a high degree has good accessibility to other cities. Reduced transportation cost makes the city’s product inexpensive and stimulates a large demand. As a consequence, the city creates large-scale employment. However, a marginal increase in degree contributes less to the city size as the degree increases. If a city is well-connected, then adding a new link to the city will not increase accessibility much because the city is already readily accessible from other cities through the existing grid.

We test implications of our model with Belgian and US data. The BA network leads to a result comparable to existing models, whereas the ER network fails to replicate the empirical city-size distribution. This confirms that the BA transport network is more consistent with reality.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we will go over the two types of network structures mentioned above as a preamble to the next section, where we introduce and develop a model of spatial equilibrium with a transportation network woven into it. Particularly, in section 3.8, we will connect the network structure to the city-size distribution. In section 4, we verify the prediction of our model with data before we draw conclusions from our project in section 5.

2 Preliminaries

We will briefly review how ER and BA networks are built and examine the qualitative differences in terms of their degree distributions before we apply them to transportation networks.
2.1 ER Networks

The ER network is the simplest random graph of all. A pair of nodes are connected with a fixed connection probability. A completely isolated graph illustrated in figure 1 and complete graph illustrated in figure 2 are the special cases of the ER network where connection probability is zero and one, respectively.

The degree distribution of an ER network follows a Poisson distribution. The important feature is that the degree distribution is concentrated around its arithmetic mean\(^4\) and we rarely observe a city with an exceedingly large degree. All pairs of nodes share the same ex-ante connection probability, which leads to a small variance, and the network is egalitarian in that sense.

Unsophisticated as it may seem, the ER network makes a good entryway to economic applications of network theory. Network theory puts emphasis on interactions, and thus it becomes particularly useful for situations where an economic agent does not interact with all the other agents either at his discretion or due to external restrictions. We would not have to pay any attention to networking if everyone were in direct contact with anyone else. In reality, system-wide interactions are not common. Most economic decisions or interactions are made in reference to limited alternatives available, which we represent by an edge on a network. Ultimately, we would like to know how agents choose their trading or collaborating partners as a result of their optimization. However, leaving their choice purely stochastic (as in the construction of ER networks) still proves to be a good reference point to see whether the network is self-organized as a result of decentralized decision making. Kakade et al. [KKO\(^+\)04] use it as a benchmark for the Arrow-Debreu model with transactions constrained by connected traders on a network. Calvó-Armengol and Zenou [CAZ05] assume that each worker selects a collection of (randomly selected) direct neighbors to describe the role that a network plays in job matching. In some cases, the ER network is the sensible choice to represent real networks. Toulis and Parkes [TP11] model the kidney exchange program with the ER network to evaluate the efficiency of the program. Any pair of a donor and a patient is compatible with a fixed probability. See Ioannides [Ioa06] for a comprehensive review on economic applications of ER networks.

2.2 BA Networks

The degree distribution of most real network structures does not follow a Poisson distribution. Rather, it follows a power law. This class of networks is called scale-free. There are a number of proposed generative models that lead to power-law degree distributions (see Section VII of Albert and Barabási [AB02] for a review). To get a sense of how power-law type behavior emerges, consider the BA model [BA99] for example. Two major characteristics of BA model are growth and preferential attachment. The model sets off with a complete graph of a fixed number of nodes as a starting grid. New nodes with edges will be added sequentially to the existing network (growth) with the probability of attachment proportional to

\(^4\)Recall that arithmetic mean does not mean much for scale-free distributions like the city-size distribution or a BA degree distribution.
the degree of existing nodes (preferential attachment). In general, older nodes are likely to gain an excessively large number of edges. The rich get richer because they are already rich (known as the Matthew effect). The rest of the nodes are merely mediocre in terms of degree. They remain poor because they are already poor. This type of variance in degree hardly arises with an ER network. That is, New York City will not happen if the links are formed uniformly at random. Compare a BA network figure 4 to an ER network figure 3. A BA network is not egalitarian, as connection probability depends on the number of acquired edges, which is path dependent. We shall also employ the network structure of Jackson and Rogers [JR07] that contains both the ER and BA types of networks as special cases, the details of which will be provided in section 3.8.

3 Model

We propose a model where the trading costs of commodities among cities are explicitly specified. The city-size distribution is derived as a result of gains from trade and the underlying transport network configuration.

3.1 Location-Specific Commodities

There are J cities in the economy, with index i or j. A city is defined as a geographic entity within which it produces the same commodity and from within which the geodesic paths (the shortest path on the network) to any other city in the country have the same length. The endogenous population of city j is given by sj and in total, there are

\[ \sum_{j=1}^{J} s_j = S \]  

(1)

households in the economy. Each household supplies a unit of labor inelastically. City j produces consumption commodity cj in a competitive environment. We assume that technology exhibits constant returns to scale and that one unit of labor produces one unit of commodity. In what follows a superscript denotes a city of production or origin, whereas a subscript denotes a city of consumption or destination.

The delivered price of commodity j in city i is denoted by pj. The value of marginal product pj · 1 coincides with the local wage w in equilibrium:5

\[ p_j = w. \]

(2)

Consumer preferences are represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function of the form \( u(c_i) = \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \log(c'_j) \). The set of consumption bundles is constrained by the budget \( w \geq \sum_{j=1}^{J} p'_j c'_j \).

5Note that \( p'_j \) denotes the mill price.
3.2 Network Infrastructure and Delivered Price

The economy has a network infrastructure $\Gamma = (V, E)$, where $V = \{1, \cdots, J\}$ denotes a set of vertices representing cities and $E$ denotes a set of edges. All the traffic flow will follow $\Gamma$. We assume that $\Gamma$ is connected, i.e., there is at least one path between any city pairs, to avoid multiple equilibria. Whereas consumers in city $i$ can consume any commodity in the economy, they have to incur an extra iceberg transport cost to consume commodities brought in from other cities. Transportation cost piles up as a commodity travels from city to city along the path. To describe the exact transport cost structure, we define a metric $l_{ij}: V \times V \to \mathbb{R}_+$ to measure a geodesic length between nodes $j$ and $i$ given $\Gamma$. The delivered price of commodity $j$ shipped to city $i$ is given by

$$p_i^j = \tau l_{ij} p_j^j,$$

where $\tau (\geq 1)$ marks the iceberg transportation parameter. We use the iceberg transport technology, standard in urban economics, for tractability reasons. If you dispatch $\tau l_{ij}$ units of commodity $j$ to city $i$, one unit of it will be delivered. A fraction $\tau - 1$ of the commodity (the iceberg) melts along one edge at a time. The delivered price snowballs as the package travels from one city to another and the initial mill price is inflated by $\tau$ raised to the $l_{ij}$-th power by the time the package arrives at its final destination $l_{ij}$ steps over.

We assume that all the links share the same value of $\tau$. The large fraction of transportation cost is a location-invariant fixed cost. Having $\tau$ dependent on each link will not add much to our analysis but will make our equilibrium analytically insolvable.

3.3 Equilibrium

Marshallian demand for commodity $c_i^j$ at destination $i$ is $\varphi_i^j(p_1^j, \cdots, p_i^j, w_i^j) = \frac{w_i^j}{\tau l_{ij} p_j^j}$, and accordingly, at origin $j$ is $\psi_j^j(\cdot) := \tau l_{ij} \varphi_j^j(\cdot) = \frac{w_i^j}{p_j^j}$. The aggregate demand for commodity $j$ at its origin is the sum of demand from all the cities in the country,

$$\Psi_j^j(p, w) := \sum_{i \in V} s_i^j \psi_i^j(\cdot) = \frac{\sum s_i^j w_i^j}{p_j^J} = \frac{\sum X_i^i}{p_j^J} = \frac{\langle X \rangle}{p_j^J},$$

where $X_i^i := s_i^j p_i^j$ is the value of output inclusive of transportation sector in city $i$. In what follows $\langle x \rangle$ denotes the average value of $x$, e.g., $\langle X \rangle := \sum X_i^i / J$. The third equality in (4) holds when labor market is in equilibrium as in (2). Recalling

\[\text{For detailed discussion, see McCann [McC].}\]
\[\text{We adopt the exponential form of iceberg transportation cost for the remainder of the paper. The linear form yields approximately the same results (See appendix A.1 for the case of the linear transportation cost).}\]
\[\text{This expression may seem incredulous at first, for it does not include } \tau. \text{ We will explore the reason in sections 3.9 and 3.10.}\]
that each household supplies one unit of labor inelastically and one unit of labor produces one unit of output, the commodity market $j$ clears when
\[ s_j = \Psi(p, w). \tag{5} \]

From (2), (4) and (5), we obtain the equilibrium price and wage as follows:
\[ w' = p'_j = \left( \frac{\langle X \rangle}{s_j} \right). \tag{6} \]

The indirect utility function is given by
\[ v(p_1^j, \cdots, p_J^j, w^j) = \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \log \varphi_i^j(\cdot) = \log w' - \log J - \langle \log p'_j \rangle + a_i \log \tau, \tag{7} \]
where
\[ a_i := -(\langle l_i \rangle) = -\sum_k l_{ik}^i / J \]
measures accessibility of city $i$. We will examine the role of $a_i$ shortly. Free mobility of consumers implies
\[ v(p_1^j, \cdots, p_J^j, w^j) = v(p_1'^j, \cdots, p_J'^j, w') \tag{8} \]
for all $i, j \in V$ in equilibrium.

The equilibrium $(s_1, \cdots, s_J; p_1^j, \cdots, p_J^j; w^1, \cdots, w^J)$ satisfies (1), (2), (5) and (8). Equation (8), together with (5), implies $\log s_i - \log s_j = a_i \log \tau - a_j \log \tau$. With the population condition (1), we obtain the city-size distribution
\[ s_i = \langle s \rangle \frac{\tau^{a_i}}{\langle \tau \rangle}, \tag{9} \]
where $\langle s \rangle := S/J$ is the size of a city if the population were split evenly.

Since $\langle l_i \rangle$ is an average geodesic length from city $i$ to anywhere in the nation, a high value of $a_i$ as defined by (7) implies that on average, city $i$ is easy to get to, and vice versa if $a_i$ is low. A better accessibility increases a city size: The ratio of $s_i$ to $\langle s \rangle$ matches the ratio of $\tau^{a_i}$ to $\langle \tau \rangle$. Therefore the city size grows more than proportionately with accessibility as can be seen in figure 7.

### 3.4 Interplay between Network Structure and Convex Preferences

The relationship we derived in (9) begs one question: If an accessible city attracts workers, what is stopping the city-size distribution from becoming degenerate, i.e., wouldn’t the entire population collapse into the city with the best accessibility and the rest of the cities be completely vacated?
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That actually will not happen. The economy faces a trade-off between accessibility and convex preferences, with the former pushing the city-size distribution towards a degenerate distribution as above but with the latter dragging it back to a uniform distribution. The equilibrium distribution will be somewhere in between the two as a result of the balancing act, which we will describe below.

Although restricted accessibility of a city raises its delivered prices, demand for its product does not cease to exist. Eliminating a commodity would be vindictive to consumers. They appreciate variety and missing a single variety will push the utility level down to negative infinity. Workers in a poorly connected city will have to pay high prices for imported commodities due to its poor transportation infrastructure, but they are compensated with a high nominal wage: (6) indicates that the nominal wage grows as the city becomes small. Furthermore, (6) and (9) imply \( w^i = p^j = \langle X \rangle (\tau^a) \), that is, the nominal wage increases as accessibility to the city becomes restricted. The prices adjust to make it worth living in small cities in equilibrium. In particular, (6) implies that GDP in each city \( X^j := p^j s^j \) levels out to

\[
X^j = \langle X \rangle
\]

across the country. The scale of local production is small, but each commodity is sold high to make up for an increased cost of living due to remoteness and the resulting costly transport.

Variance in city sizes is solely due to the structure of the network. The aforementioned trade-off entails two counteracting forces. The agglomerative force is heterogenous accessibility, which tends to create heterogeneity in the city-size distribution. The dispersion force is preference for variety, which tends to push the distribution back toward a collection of equal-sized cities.

There are alternative ways to derive city size with a tractable economic model, particularly for the dispersion force. In this model, location-specific commodity production drives dispersion, as a bundle of all goods is desired by consumers. An alternative model would use another natural dispersive force, say housing or land markets. If we had just a few produced commodities (say one for illustration), then Starrett’s Spatial Impossibility Theorem (Fujita and Thisse [FT02], Ch.2) applies, and we would have an autarkic equilibrium where no commodity is transported. Yet another alternative is to introduce a congestion externality, but then the model begins to look more complicated and, at the same time, arbitrary.

\( ^9 \) Whereas this implication may not sound realistic, we emphasize that a small city earns a high wage only in a nominal sense. The delivered prices are also high in a small, wage-rich city and thus its utility level will work out to the same level as a large, wage-poor city’s in the end.

It is possible to make wages increase with size but that will create another problem. One way to do so is to allow a city to produce multiple commodities by exogenously limiting the employment in, and thus the scale of, each industry. (We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion). For this alternative model to work, we make an individual industry size increase with the city size (otherwise, the equilibrium wage would depend on the location-invariant individual industry size rather than the location-variant city size, and thus the equilibrium would support any city-size distribution). Starting from this assumption, we can secure a positive relationship between the wage and size as desired. However, we now have to face another unwanted consequence: The city size declines with its degree because a large city comes with a wide range of commodities, which compensates for its low accessibility.

\( ^{10} \) Starrett’s Theorem makes no assumption about the transport network or transport cost.
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Obviously, this trade-off disappears and there will be no variance in city sizes if the agglomerative force is removed. This can happen when shipment becomes costless (to be discussed in proposition 3.1) or network structure becomes redundant, that is, if it turns into a complete graph. Although we introduced a location-specific technology, commodities are symmetric. Technology is linear everywhere. Consumer preferences are identical and they put the same weight on each commodity. If we take the network structure out of the equation, the resulting equilibrium is such that all the cities share the same size \( s \) and every household consumes an equal portion of all the commodities available.

### 3.5 Transportation Cost Skews the City-Size Distribution

Along with accessibility \( a_i \), transportation cost \( \tau \) plays a leading role in the determination of the city-size distribution. Depending on its magnitude, shipment cost can nullify or amplify the influence of a network structure over the economy. Figure 7 compares the relationship between accessibility and the city-size distribution under different transportation costs.

In the extreme situation where shipment is free (\( \tau = 1 \)), all cities will be of an equal size regardless of the network structure. The city size \( s(a_i) \) becomes constant against \( a_i \) (see the line for \( \tau = 1 \) in figure 7). The network becomes a complete graph in effect, because the delivered price will be the same no matter how long the geodesic length is. For \( \tau > 1 \), city size \( s(a_i) \) becomes a strictly convex function of accessibility.

The agglomerative force mentioned in section 3.4 becomes more potent as \( \tau \) grows. A large \( \tau \) implies that the geodesic length exerts a more dominant influence on the size of a city. With a small value of \( \tau \), a city with good accessibility does not distinguish itself well from other cities because the effect of path length is limited due to low transportation cost. On the other hand, if shipping is costly, a city with a good accessibility benefits from a high \( a_i \) value because high transportation cost amplifies the effect of accessibility. As a result, holding the accessibility distribution constant, large \( \tau \) skews the city-size distribution and makes the emergence of disproportionately large hubs more likely. To measure how the cost of transportation \( \tau \) bends the city-size distribution, consider a measure

\[
D(\tau) = \frac{s(a_H) + s(a_L)}{2} - s\left(\frac{a_H + a_L}{2}\right),
\]

where \( a_H \) and \( a_L \) are the highest and lowest accessibility of a given network. The first term is the average of the smallest and the largest city whereas the second term
is the city size of average accessibility. For a given distribution of accessibility \( a_i \),
\( D(\tau) \) measures the convexity of \( s(a_i) \), i.e., it gauges how spread out the distribution
of city size \( s(a_i) \) is for each \( \tau \). See figure 8. When \( \tau = 1 \), \( s(\cdot) \) lays flat and \( D(\tau) = 0 \).
As \( \tau \) grows, \( s(\cdot) \) bends more and \( D(\tau) \) grows accordingly as can be seen in figure 7.

We confirm the observation above as follows:

**Proposition 3.1 Transportation Cost Skews the City-Size Distribution**

Suppose that the economy operates on a connected network \( \Gamma \). The city-size distribution \( s(a_i) \) is a convex function of accessibility \( a_i \) for \( \tau \geq 1 \). Moreover, the degree of convexity
measured by the size difference \( D(\tau) \) between the average of the highest and lowest size
cities and the city of average accessibility increases with \( \tau \).

**Proof.** See appendix A.2. \( \square \)

### 3.6 Geodesic-Length Distribution

The city-size distribution (9) depends on the distribution of accessibility (7), which,
in turn, rests on the distribution of geodesic length. There is not much research
that looks into the geodesic length between each pair of nodes.\(^{11}\) At the time of
writing, the analytical form of geodesic length between individual nodes is yet
to be discovered.\(^{12}\) Hołyst et al. [HSF’05] take a different approach to derive an
intuitive solution for a wide range of network types. They measure the expected
geodesic length between any pair of nodes \( i \) and \( j \) as follows:

\[
l_{ij} = A - B \log(k_i k_j),
\]

where \( A := 1 + \log(J(k))/\log \kappa \) and \( B := (\log \kappa)^{-1} \). The number \( k_i \) denotes the degree
of node \( i \) and \( \kappa \) is a mean branching factor. The branching factor of a node is the
number of children that the node branches off on a tree. See appendix A.3 for a
full description of \( \kappa \).

Although [HSF’05] does not provide a formal proof of (11), but rather is based
on a heuristic,\(^{13}\) it appears to be the best we can do given the current state of
network theory. We hope that its extension to individual distances will become
available in the near future.

Meanwhile, (11) proves to be quite useful in translating a network structure
into economic context without loss of generality. A geodesic length \( l_{ij} \) is a _global_
property whereas a degree \( k_i \) is a _local_ property.\(^{14}\) We cannot compute the individual
geodesic path unless we compare all possible paths between a city pair of

\(^{11}\)While most of the research on network topology is focused on _mean_ intervertex distance ([NSW01],
[FFHF04], [ZLG’09]), what we need here is the geodesic length between _individual_ nodes.

\(^{12}\)The one for the average intervertex separation has already been brought out into the open. Cf. [NW09],
[NMW00], [ZLG’09]. Zhang et al. [ZLG’09] provide an analytical background for the mean intervertex
distance for a special case. There has also been an attempt to track down the geodesic length by guessing
the analytical form from sequentially generated, fractal-like networks reverse-engineered from a Pareto
degree distribution ([DMO06a]), which we cannot use because our distribution (10) is not a Pareto
distribution.

\(^{13}\)In a manner similar to Simon [Sim59].

\(^{14}\)In fact both \( a_i \) (closeness centrality) and \( k_i \) (reach centrality) are specific examples of network centrality,
and we unite them via (11) (cf. Freeman [Fre78]).
interest and pick the shortest one, which calls for a systemic search all across the board. The geodesic path thus obtained is too specific to the particular network in question and does not have wide implications beyond the specific network under study itself. Degree is much easier to compute because we do not have to launch a nationwide search for it, and the degree distribution is readily available for a wide range of networks. Equation (11) succinctly writes a global property (a geodesic can be rewritten as so that is written as log〈 size coincides with the cornerstone size of . Taking the log of {3 between degree and city size, when in fact, there is an obvious symbiotic interaction between degree and city size, when in fact, there is an obvious symbiotic interaction between them waiting to be investigated.

3.7 City-Size Distribution

From (11), accessibility (7) is written as

\[ a_i = -A + B \log k_i + B \langle \log k \rangle, \]

where \( \langle \log k \rangle := \frac{1}{J} \sum_j \log k_j \). We observe that accessibility improves as a city acquires more edges, but only on the logarithmic order. Taking the log of (9), we have

\[ \log s_i = \log S + (-A + B \log k_i + B \langle \log k \rangle) \log \tau - \log \left( \sum_j \tau_j \right). \]

The last term is approximated by \( \log J + \langle a \rangle \log \tau \) so that

\[ \log s_i = \log \langle s \rangle + B \log \tau (\log k_i - \langle \log k \rangle). \]

A couple of observations are in order. The equation above answers two questions concerning the relationship between a network structure and a system of cities. The first one is "Does construction of an edge boost the local economy?" The answer is "Apparently." The second, and more interesting question is "How so?" The answer is twofold.

In terms of a linear scale, (13) can be rewritten as

\[ s_i = \langle s \rangle \left( \frac{k_i}{\gamma} \right)^{B \log \tau}, \]

where \( \gamma := \prod_{i=1}^{J} k_i^{1/j} \) is the geometric mean of the degree. It indicates that city size is anchored around the base city size \( \langle s \rangle \) multiplied by the deviation \( (k_i/\gamma)^{B \log \tau} \). If a city has a large degree, then its size becomes larger than the standard city size by a factor of \( (k_i/\gamma)^{B \log \tau} \) and vice versa for a city with a small degree. The city size coincides with the cornerstone size of \( \langle s \rangle \) exactly when its degree matches the

\[ \log \left( \sum_j \tau_j \right) = \log \left( \sum_j \tau_j^{\alpha} \right) + (\bar{a} - \langle \bar{a} \rangle) \cdot D \log \left( \sum_j \tau_j^{\alpha} \right) \mid_{\tilde{a} = \bar{a}} + O \left( [(\bar{a} - \langle \bar{a} \rangle) \cdot (\bar{a} - \langle \bar{a} \rangle)] \right) \]

\[ = \log J + \langle a \rangle \log \tau + O \left( [(\bar{a} - \langle \bar{a} \rangle) \cdot (\bar{a} - \langle \bar{a} \rangle)] \right). \]

15Let \( \bar{a} := (a_1, a_2, \cdots, a_J) \) and \( \langle \bar{a} \rangle := (\langle a_1 \rangle, \langle a_2 \rangle, \cdots, \langle a_J \rangle) \). The Taylor series expansion about \( \bar{a} = \langle \bar{a} \rangle \) tends to

\[ \log \left( \sum_j \tau_j^{\alpha} \right) = \log \left( \sum_j \tau_j \right) + (\bar{a} - \langle \bar{a} \rangle) \cdot D \log \left( \sum_j \tau_j \right) \mid_{\tilde{a} = \langle \bar{a} \rangle} + O \left( [(\bar{a} - \langle \bar{a} \rangle) \cdot (\bar{a} - \langle \bar{a} \rangle)] \right) \]

\[ = \log J + \langle a \rangle \log \tau + O \left( [(\bar{a} - \langle \bar{a} \rangle) \cdot (\bar{a} - \langle \bar{a} \rangle)] \right). \]
national (geometric) average. The deviation is amplified as shipment becomes costly, which, in turn, confirms our observation made in proposition 3.1.

We also note that adding an edge to a city increases its size, but the change in size is inversely proportional to the current degree provided $B \log \tau < 1$. If city $i$ is highly wired already, then the introduction of a new edge to city $j$ does not add much to city $i$. The geodesic length to city $j$ is already short before the establishment of the new edge. You can go to many cities in a single step and city $j$ is likely to be linked to at least one of those many neighboring cities already, making the geodesic length to city $j$ just two. The added edge will only reduce the geodesic length by one. On the other hand, if the current degree of city $i$ is low, then the link to city $j$ will not only reduce the geodesic length to city $j$ greatly but also reduce the geodesic lengths to the cities in city $j$'s neighborhood. Consequently, city $i$ will see significant improvement in its accessibility.

Based on the degree-size relationship (13), our main theoretical result gives the city-size distribution as follows:

**Proposition 3.2 City-Size Distribution**

Suppose that the economy operates on a connected network $\Gamma$ with the associated degree distribution $G(k)$. The city-size distribution of this economy follows the distribution function $F(s)$, defined by

$$F(s) = G(k(s)), \quad (14)$$

where $k(s) := \gamma(s/\langle s \rangle)^{\log \tau}$. Its probability density function (PDF) is

$$f(s) = k'(s)g[k(s)] = \frac{\log \kappa}{\log \tau} k(s)s^{-1}g[k(s)], \quad (15)$$

where $g(\cdot)$ denotes the PDF of degree $k$.

### 3.8 City-Size Distribution under Different Network Systems

Now that we have the city-size distribution based on the city's degree, we can make our predictions based on different transport network structures. There are two network models of particular interest: ER and BA networks. Jackson and Rogers [JR07] construct a degree distribution of a directed dynamic network as follows:

$$G(k) = 1 - \left( \frac{k_0 + rm}{k + rm} \right)^{1+r} \quad \text{for} \quad k \geq k_0, \quad (16)$$

where $k_0$ denotes the in-degree with which an entering node is endowed. This

---

16This examination begs one question: If my city has the average number of edges, is my city larger or smaller than the national average in size? The answer is "larger". Since transportation cost and the branching factor are both greater than one, $\log \tau$ is positive. Plus, the geometric mean is smaller than the arithmetic mean. To score a national average $\langle s \rangle$ you only need $\gamma$ edges. It should be noted, however, that in a scale-free world, the arithmetic mean does not carry much information. The lognormal is the new normal (or any heavy-tailed distribution is for that matter) and the geometric average is the new average in this world as we saw in figure 5(b).

17Commodities can flow either way on an edge. We take an arrowhead on a directed edge just as a decorative memorabilia indicating from which end the edge was constructed, but nothing more. We represent degree distribution by an in-degree distribution. It is impossible to tell different networks apart with an out-degree distribution due to the way a network is constructed in [JR07]. Any network comes with a degenerate out-degree distribution.
value is shared across all the nodes. The parameter $r$ plays a crucial role in our analysis. It locates where the existing network stands on the spectrum of networks ranging from an ER to a BA network. In particular it is the ratio of the number of links formed by an ER-like random connection to a BA-like network-based connection. The average out-degree of a node is given by $m$. Five PDF’s of (16) are depicted in figure 9 as a visual cue. In the figure parameter $r$ ranges from 0.01 (over 99% network-based and less than 1% random links) to 100 (the other way around). A predominantly random PDF (with large $r$) tapers off quickly whereas a mostly network-based PDF (with small $r$) only gradually dissipates with degree.

We expect that our economy operates with a small $r$. BA network’s degree distribution is (16) with $r = 0$, in which case, (16) turns into a Pareto distribution. ER network calls for $r \to \infty$, in which case (16) is no longer well defined and the degree distribution turns into an exponential distribution.\[\text{Figure 9. Probability density function of degree with } k_0 = 0 \text{ and } m = 10.\]

What is left to do is write the mean branching factor $\kappa$ in terms of other parameters in (16) before we can fully identify the city-size distribution. The actual mean branching factor cannot be computed until after the network is formed. Hólyst et al [HSF+05] provide a good approximate to $\kappa$:

$$\kappa = \sum_{i=1}^{J} \frac{k g(k)}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} x g(x)} - 1 = \frac{\sum_{k} (2k-1)G(k)}{\sum_{k} G(k)} - 1 = \frac{\mu_k^2 + \sigma_k^2}{\mu_k} - 1, \quad (17)$$

where $\mu_k$ and $\sigma_k^2$ denote the mean and variance of $k$. See appendix A.4 for details.

3.9 The Gravity Equation

Before we compare our theoretical prediction to actual data, let us briefly turn aside to discuss our model in the context of the gravity model (cf. [Ber85]). In fact our model is a special case of it. Our consumer preferences are represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function, a limiting case of CES utility function with the elasticity of substitution approaching one. Due to the absence of cross-price effect, our gravity equation is less involved than its generic CES counterpart.

Consider a trade flow from producing city $j$ to consuming city $i$. The delivered volume of good is $s_j \psi_j^i (p_j^i, \cdots, p_j^i, w^j) = \frac{X_j^i}{p_j^i J}$ so that sales value $X_j^i$ in city $j$ is
A Scale-Free Transportation Network Explains the City-Size Distribution

Therefore the gravity equation takes a simple form \( X^i_j = \frac{X^i}{p^i_j} \). In this case, the gravity is one-sided (\( X^i \) does not have any gravitational pull) and transportation cost does not appear in the equation. Under the current preference specification, the expenditure share on good \( j \) is always one \( J \)-th of the budget \( X^i \) regardless of \( X^i_j \). Transportation cost does not affect the trade flow because two opposing factors that underlie the gravity equation offset each other: A high transportation cost reduces demand but it also requires more to be shipped out of the origin. This contrasts with the generic CES case, where the former exceeds the latter and thus the iceberg transportation parameter makes an explicit appearance in the gravity equation. Furthermore, (10) implies

\[
X^i_j := s_i \psi_i \left( p^i_j, \ldots, p^i_j, w_j, \tau \right) = \frac{X^i}{p^i_j} = \frac{X^i}{J} = \frac{X}{J} \tag{18}
\]

after all. We did not use the CES function for its lack of a closed-form equilibrium solution to address our question at hand. We shall leave the case of more complicated situations for future work.

### 3.10 Endogenous Transportation Networks

To this point, we have assumed that the transportation network is exogenous and the city-size distribution is contingent on the underlying network. Considering the fact that it is easier to relocate people than to build intercity transportation infrastructure, this is not an unreasonable assumption in the short run. New York City would have been much smaller had it not been the entrepôt to Europe. However, the degree-city relationship is not a one-way street and in fact, it may be the other way around: The relocation of people forces the transportation network to follow a specific pattern particularly in a long-term setting. It can also be the case that the network structure and its associated city-size distribution are in fact a product of some common underlying causes. We discuss these issues next.

Consider a commodity shipping firm that arranges a transport network to accommodate commodity flow (18). They will maximize their profit by choosing degree \( \{k_i\}_{i \in V} \) given the city-size distribution and iceberg transportation parameter.\(^{20}\) We shall assume that the expected degree \( m \) of a new node is predetermined so as to concentrate on network choice of \( r \) rather than on the selection of a total number of edges \( |E| \). The firm will maximize their profit calculated as

\[
\pi(r) = \langle X \rangle J \left( 1 - \tau^{-A} (k^{\log^{1/2}})^2 - h(k, r) \right) \tag{19}
\]

with respect to \( r \). We will derive the firm’s revenue first (the first term) and then examine the cost (the second term) afterwards.

\(^{20}\)Alternatively, we could model these parameters as endogenous variables, but it is hard to imagine one shipping firm single-handedly affecting the entire distribution of cities. By leaving them predetermined, the firm behaves competitively.
3.10.1 Revenue

The choice of network structure acts on firm revenue in two ways. First, it modifies the equilibrium price and changes the trade flow accordingly, which constitutes the revenue base for the firm (the first effect). Then out of the trade flow thus calculated, the fraction that melts en route, namely \( \tau^i_l - 1 \) will be the shipper’s cut, which also hinges on the selection of network by way of geodesic length \( l^i_j \) (the second effect).

In our case, the first effect is actually absent. Our commodity flow (18) is independent of transportation cost and by extension, network configuration as we demonstrated in section 3.9. If the shipping firm raises a degree in city \( j \), then demand for good \( j \) increases thanks to improved accessibility to city \( j \) and resulting lower delivered prices of good \( j \), which in turn increases their revenue generated in city \( j \). On the other hand, also due to improved accessibility, good \( j \) travels a shorter distance than before, which reduces their revenue from city \( j \). Shipping volume in total will increase but each unit shipped will bring in less and the firm’s revenue will remain the same as a result. Thus, the firm can ignore the first effect and only needs to take the second effect into account for network optimization.

To be more specific, take shipment from city \( j \) to \( i \). From (18), city \( i \) pays \( i^i_j p_j^i \Phi^i_j(p^i, w^i) = X^i_j = \langle X \rangle / J \) to city \( j \) in total (inclusive of shipping charges). As we examined in section 3.9, city \( i \) pays one \( J \)-th of its income \( X^i_j (= \langle X \rangle) \) for each commodity regardless of transportation cost \( \tau^i_j \). Therefore, the first effect is cancelled out and irrelevant to optimization. Out of city \( i \)’s payment, producers in city \( j \) take \( p_j^i \Phi^i_j(p^i, w^i) = \langle X \rangle / \langle J \tau^i_j \rangle \), leaving the transportation sector with the remainder \( \left( \tau^i_j - 1 \right) p_j^i \Phi^i_j(p^i, w^i) = \left( 1 - \tau^i_j \right) \langle X \rangle / J \). On a national scale, the shipping firm’s revenue works out to

\[
\sum_j \sum_i \left( 1 - \tau^i_j \right) \langle X \rangle / J
\]

\[
= \langle X \rangle J \left( 1 - \tau^{-\lambda} \left[ \int_{k>0} k^{\log \tau} dG(k; \ r) \right]^2 \right).
\]

The equality follows from (11). \( \langle X \rangle J \) is the urban GDP. The last term \( \tau^{-\lambda} \left[ \int_{k>0} k^{\log \tau} dG(k; \ r) \right]^2 \) is the fraction of the GDP that goes to the non-shipping sector and the remainder \( 1 - \tau^{-\lambda} \left[ \int_{k>0} k^{\log \tau} dG(k; \ r) \right]^2 \) is the shipper’s revenue. This constitutes the first term in (19).

The crux of the profit maximization problem lies in the value of \( B \log \tau \). It is positive but it may or may not be greater than one. If it is one, then the revenue becomes constant because \( k^{\log \tau} = \langle k \rangle = 2|E|/J \) is independent of the network choice of \( r \) by assumption. In general, the revenue increases as \( r \) drops if \( B \log \tau < 1 \) and vice versa if the inequality is in reverse. The degree distribution \( G(k; \ r) \) strictly second-order stochastically dominates \( G(k; \ r) \) if \( r’ > r \) (see Theorem 6 on p.903 in [IRoy2]). If \( B \log \tau < 1 \), i.e., \( k^{\log \tau} \) is concave, then low \( r \) improves revenue.\(^{21}\) Low \( r \) concentrates the degree to a limited few, which tips the scale of the second effect \( \left( \tau^i_j \text{ to } 1 - \tau^i_j \right) \) for all \( i \) and \( j \) in the shipper’s favor.

\(^{21}\)The value of \( B \) decreases as \( r \) drops (cf. (17)) but \( k^{\log \tau} \) will still be concave.
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An in-depth analysis is required to see why. Looking at one particular city pair, the shipping firm’s cut $1 - \tau^{l_i}$ will increase when they take away degrees from the two cities on purpose to raise $l_i$, thanks to the second effect (in the absence of the first effect). The firm wants to keep their degree as low as possible to raise their revenue — that is, if they earn revenue only from this particular city pair. On the national level, if they take away some edge from city $i$ or $j$, that edge needs to be reallocated somewhere else and their cut will decline from the city to which the edge is reassigned. They need to closely monitor this trade-off and distribute their degree in the way that maximizes their overall (not just one particular city pair’s) second effect.

In particular, their overall revenue is the weighted sum of their cut from every city pair as in (20). The weight would normally include the location-variant trade flow $X_j^i$ so that a city pair along a busy transportation corridor would weigh in more on the revenue calculation than a barely trodden city pair. In our case, however, due to the lack of the first effect, the revenue does not depend on the trade flow and will be just a weighted sum of a much simpler term $k^B \log \tau$ as in (21), calculated with the second effect alone. Furthermore, if $B \log \tau = 1$, then (21) becomes just a simple, unweighted sum of degree and the shipping firm can allocate their edges any way they see fit only to minimize their cost: If they remove an edge from some city, their share of revenue from that city will go up, but they will lose the exact same amount of share form the city to which they redistributed the edge. Therefore, the revenue will be the same no matter which $r$ the firm chooses. If, on the other hand, $B \log \tau < 1$, then they want to concentrate the degrees to a limited few cities to increase their weighted sum of the split. If $k_i = k_j (\geq 2)$ for some $i$ and $j$, then (21) will increase by switching to $k_i + 1$ and $k_j - 1$. Their cut drops in city $i$ but an increased revenue from city $j$ will more than make up for the loss because $k^B \log \tau$ is concave. This can be achieved by setting $r = 0$. And vice versa if $B \log \tau > 1$.

3.10.2 Cost

Turning to the cost end of optimization (19), assume that cost is additively separable over cities as well. First, consider when cost is concave in degree. As above, Theorem 6 in [JR07] applies and the shipping firm will bring $r$ down to zero to minimize the cost. Intuitively, they want to spread the degree distribution to take advantage of substantial cost reduction in large hub cities in exchange for lost cost-effectiveness in small cities as the former surpasses the latter when their cost is concave. Thus, a BA network will minimize the cost. And vice versa, if cost is convex in degree, then they will form an ER network. In this case, cost savings from building a large hub do not cover the loss from lowering degrees of other cities. They would rather even out the degree distribution so as to avoid efficiency loss from making degrees too small.
Putting the two sides together, the shipping firm will

\[
\max_r \pi(r) = \langle X \rangle J \left( 1 - r^{-A} \int_{k>0} k^{B \log \tau} dG(k; r) \right)^2 - \int_{k>0} h(k, r) dG(k; r),
\]

or equivalently (19), where \( h(k, r) \) is cost incurred in a city of degree \( k \). If both \( k^{B \log \tau} \) and \( h(k, r) \) are concave, then the shipping firm will lower \( r \) as far as possible to maximize their profit, and the resulting optimal network configuration will be BA. This is supported by the empirics. On the other hand, if they are both convex, then the optimal network will be ER. If one is concave and the other is convex, then the firm will settle with some medium value of \( r \) at which the marginal change in revenue offsets that of cost, leading to a network that is part BA and part ER.

Empirical validation of the framework above may be hard to come by. On the revenue front, we have estimates for the critical parameter \( B \log \tau \) in section 4. For a BA network, estimates barely top the threshold value of one, ranging from .3943 (Belgium) to at most 1.009 (US Places). The shipping firm can increase their revenue by lowering \( r \) for the most part, which is consistent with the existing network configuration. Note that this only proves that if they go for a BA network, then \( k^{B \log \tau} \) will be concave and thus they should stick to a BA network. We know from section 4 that \( \tau \) will be exorbitantly high if the underlying network is ER, which does make \( k^{B \log \tau} \) convex. Thus, an ER network may well be a solution if the exogenous transportation cost parameter \( \tau \) happens to be prohibitively high. Furthermore, if the estimate asymptotically converges to one with data size, which can potentially be the case here as can be seen in section 4 (cf. footnote 26), then \( r \) makes no difference to the revenue side of decision making and profit maximization reduces to cost minimization.

On the cost front, let us take the airline industry for illustration. Considering recent mega-mergers between network carriers, such as United and Continental, Air France and KLM or Delta and Northwest, and subsequent hub consolidations (e.g., dehubbing of Cleveland of Continental or Memphis of Northwest), it seems that degree exhibits scale economies among airlines. Airliners are taking advantage of them by trimming down \( r \) to cut the loss from underperforming small hubs and redirect degrees to a select few large hubs, leading to a BA network as a result of optimization. A problem with this methodology is that transportation networks are not unique, in that there are generally multiple modes of transport and multiple companies providing services in each mode.

Further investigation should attempt to gauge the magnitude of reverse causality from the city-size distribution to networks. In the meantime, we shall return to the forward causality that we are interested in and pitch our model against the actual city-size distribution to identify what class of transportation network governs the city-size distribution.
4 Empirical Implementation

By and large the empirical results are in full support of our initial inkling that a scale-free network explains the city-size distribution but ER or other network structures commonly adopted do not.

All told, we have four sets of data on our plate: Belgium, Metropolitan Area (MA), CBSA and Places.\textsuperscript{22} Descriptive statistics for each data set are in Table 1.

| Data                           | Belgium | MA      | CBSA    | Places  |
|-------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Data size $J$                 | 69      | 276     | 922     | 25,358  |
| Total urban population $S$    | 4,344,222 | 225,981,679 | 261,534,991 | 208,735,266 |
| Population covered            | 42.38%  | 80.30%  | 92.93%  | 74.17%  |
| Largest city                  | Antwerp | New York CMSA | New York MSA | New York city |
| Largest size                  | 446,525 | 21,199,865 | 18,323,002 | 8,008,278 |
| City near arithmetic mean     | Genk    | Oklahoma, OK MSA | Green Bay, WI MSA | Hillsboro city, TX |
| Arithmetic mean               | 62,960  | 818,774 | 283,661 | 8,232 |
| Median city                   | Beringen | Anchorage, AK MSA | Hinesville-Fort Stewart, GA MSA | Harristown village, IL |
| Median size                   | 39,261  | 299,600 | 71,800  | 1,338  |
| Smallest city                 | Arion   | Enid, OK MSA | Andrews, TX µSA | New Amsterdam, IN |
| Smallest size                 | 24,791  | 57,813  | 13,004  | 1      |
| Standard deviation            | 61,240  | 1,968,621 | 974,190  | 68,390  |
| Skewness                      | 4.183   | 1.498   | 1.048   | 0.5697  |
| City near geometric mean      | Mouscron | Huntsville, AL MSA | Sunbury, PA µSA | Sutton city, NE |
| Geometric mean                | 50,809  | 342,844 | 94,373  | 1,447  |
| Mean of log($s$)              | 10.84   | 12.75   | 11.46   | 7.278  |
| Standard deviation of log($s$)| .5697   | 1.119   | 1.191   | 1.754  |
| Skewness of log($s$)          | 1.498   | 1.048   | 1.187   | 2091   |

\textbf{Table 1}. Descriptive Statistics. The statistics above the line (shaded in blue) are related to a linear scale and the below (shaded in green) are related to a log scale. Mean of log($s$) is same as the log of geometric mean.

The Belgian data are included to see if our model’s predictive value is subject to both the area and population size of a country under study. (It was not.) MA and CBSA are the popular choices in the literature. The smallest unit of measurement for these data is a county and they suffer from data truncation (cf. \cite{Eec04}). Places have the finest unit of measurement and are free of truncation or survivorship bias. In addition, various distributions have a similar tail distribution. Untruncated data help us better distinguish model performance.

We examined how well our model predictions (\textsuperscript{14} and \textsuperscript{15}) fit these data by feeding an ER/BA, ER, and complete graph into the model, whose degree dis-

\textsuperscript{22}The Belgian data is provided courtesy of Soo \cite{Soo05} and the remainder are from US Census 2000. MA is an umbrella term encompassing metropolitan statistical areas (MSA’s), consolidated MSA’s and primary MSA’s. For more on definitions of MA and CBSA, see \url{http://www.census.gov/population/metro/about/} and for Places, see \url{http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_place.html}. We thank Jan Eeckhout for sharing his data used in \cite{Eec04}. It should be noted that Places are demarcated on political rather than economic contiguity. See section 8.5 in Ioannides \cite{Ioa13} (pp. 371-372).
tributions are (16), exponential and degenerate, respectively. Along with these networks’ performance, we also checked how two of the predicted city-size distributions from the existing literature do as a point of comparison. Initially, we use three degree distributions: complete network (degenerate), ER/BA and BA. We estimate each in three ways: maximum spacing estimation (MSE), minimum Kolomogorov-Smirnov estimation (minKS) and maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).

In what follows a hat on parameter \( x \) indicates its estimate \( \hat{x} \).

### 4.1 Estimation Methods Employed

The first choice is to go for MLE, which does not work with (16). The likelihood function is monotone increasing in \( k_0 \). Thus, MLE will imply \( \hat{k}_0 \rightarrow \infty \), which makes no sense. As a workaround to MLE, we calculated the estimates by MSE. Whereas its use is limited in the city-size literature so far especially when compared to MLE, it is more robust and easier to handle than MLE. The problem we have with MLE is exactly the one exemplified in Ranneby [Ran84] and we used his solution. The MSE estimator maximizes the geometric mean of the gap or step between two adjacent CDF values

\[
F(s_i; \theta) - F(s_{i-1}; \theta),
\]

where \( \theta \) is a vector of parameters to be estimated and data sequence \( s \) is rearranged in the ascending order \( s_1 \leq s_2 \leq \cdots \leq s_J \). The idea here is to split the interval \([0, 1]\), the range of a CDF, in \( J \) steps in the way that none of the assigned \( F(s_i; \theta) \) will create a disruptively large gap with its neighbors and the gaps should be evenly spaced as much as possible on the logarithmic scale. Maximizing the arithmetic mean does not work here because it will always be \( 1/J \) no matter what estimates we toss in. This actually works as a cap on our geometric mean in turn, by Jensen’s inequality. Thus, we can safely rule out the possibility that the maximand tends to infinity, which is exactly why we had to discard MLE. For more on MSE, see appendix A.5.

### 4.2 A Scale-Free Transportation Network Explains the City-Size Distribution

Estimation with four different data sets unanimously chooses BA over ER as the underlying transport network in our economy. We report our results in table 2 and figures 10 to 13.

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\(^{23}\)The first and last gap are defined by \( F(s_1; \theta) - F(-\infty; \theta) \) and \( F(\infty; \theta) - F(s_J; \theta) \), respectively.
| Data       | Distribution                        | (log LH) | KS (log step) | geo/arith | $\theta$ | BIC  | AIC   | $r$  |
|------------|-------------------------------------|----------|---------------|-----------|-----------|------|-------|------|
| Belgium    | Lognormal (Eeckhout)                | -11.69   | -5.266        | 0.005166/0.01449 | 2        | 1621 | 1617  |
| Belgium    | GEV (Berliant & Watanabe)           | -11.40   | -4.081        | 0.006870/0.01449 | 5        | 1594 | 1583  |
| Belgium    | Complete Graph (de facto)            | $-\infty$ | $-\infty$     | 0/0.01449 | 1        | $\infty$ | $\infty$ |
| Belgium    | ER/BA (Jackson & Rogers)             | -11.47   | -5.072        | 0.006268/0.01449 | 5        | 1604 | 1593  | 0.02745 |
| Belgium    | ER (Jackson & Rogers)                | -11.49   | -5.086        | 0.006185/0.01449 | 4        | 1603 | 1594  |
| MA         | Lognormal (Eeckhout)                | -14.28   | -6.232        | 0.001996/0.03623 | 2        | 7891 | 7884  |
| MA         | GEV (Berliant & Watanabe)            | -14.13   | -6.089        | 0.002267/0.03623 | 5        | 7828 | 7810  |
| MA         | Complete Graph (de facto)            | $-\infty$ | $-\infty$     | 0/0.03623 | 1        | $\infty$ | $\infty$ |
| MA         | ER/BA (Jackson & Rogers)             | -14.17   | -6.134        | 0.002168/0.03623 | 5        | 7852 | 7834  | 0.01154 |
| MA         | ER (Jackson & Rogers)                | -14.21   | -6.173        | 0.002084/0.03623 | 4        | 7860 | 7851  |
| CBSA       | Lognormal (Eeckhout)                | -13.05   | -7.548        | 0.005270/0.01085 | 2        | 2.407e+04 | 2.4063e+04 |
| CBSA       | GEV (Berliant & Watanabe)            | -12.91   | -7.409        | 0.006056/0.01085 | 5        | 2.384e+04 | 2.382e+04 |
| CBSA       | Complete Graph (de facto)            | $-\infty$ | $-\infty$     | 0/0.01085 | 1        | $\infty$ | $\infty$ |
| CBSA       | ER/BA (Jackson & Rogers)             | -12.95   | -7.449        | 0.005819/0.01085 | 5        | 2.391e+04 | 2.389e+04 | 0.004526 |
| CBSA       | ER (Jackson & Rogers)                | -13.29   | -7.794        | 0.004121/0.01085 | 4        | 2.454e+04 | 2.452e+04 |
| Places     | Lognormal (Eeckhout)                | -9.258   | -8.840        | 0/3.944e-05   | 2        | 4.696e+05 | 4.696e+05 |
| Places     | GEV (Berliant & Watanabe)            | -9.254   | -8.830        | 0/3.944e-05   | 5        | 4.694e+05 | 4.693e+05 |
| Places     | Complete Graph (de facto)            | $-\infty$ | $-\infty$     | 0/3.944e-05   | 1        | $\infty$ | $\infty$ |
| Places     | ER/BA (Jackson & Rogers)             | -9.268   | -8.849        | 0/3.944e-05   | 5        | 4.701e+05 | 4.700e+05 | 0.0003171 |
| Places     | ER (Jackson & Rogers)                | -9.392   | -8.974        | 0/3.944e-05   | 4        | 4.764e+05 | 4.763e+05 |
| Places     | Lognormal as Degree Dist.            | -9.258   | -8.840        | 0/3.944e-05   | 4        | 4.696e+05 | 4.696e+05 |
| Places     | GEV as Degree Dist.                 | -9.255   | -8.836        | 0/3.944e-05   | 5        | 4.694e+05 | 4.694e+05 |

Table 2. Model Comparison

Row color corresponds to the line colors in figures 10 to 13. ▲ denotes a statistic the higher value of which indicates a better fit and ▼, the other way around. In the first row, $\langle \log LH \rangle$ denotes the average of the log of likelihood values, KS denotes the Kolomogorov-Smirnov statistic, $\langle \log \text{step} \rangle$ measures the geometric mean of the step $F(s_i; \theta) - F(s_{i-1}; \theta)$ in the logarithmic scale. Geo/arith measures the ratio between geometric mean and arithmetic mean of the step. The closer the geometric mean is to the arithmetic mean, the better the fit is. It is zero for Places due to multiple cities having the same size. $|\theta|$ counts the number of parameters. BIC and AIC stand for Bayesian and Akaike Information Criteria for detecting overfitting. **Boldface with white foreground** marks the winner and **boldface with black foreground** denotes the runner-up among the five distributions tested.
Since the transport cost and average branching factor only come into the equation in the form of a quotient of their logarithmic values \( \frac{\log \kappa}{\log \tau} \), we will denote this by \( \delta \) for estimation purposes, in which case, (15) becomes

\[
\hat{f}(s) = \gamma \delta(s)^{-\delta} s^{\delta - 1} g[k(s)].
\]

As we have already seen, a small \( \delta \) stretches out the distribution and a large \( \delta \) does the opposite.

We evaluated each network’s performance with a number of different statistics. In Table 2 (\( \log LH \)) is the maximand of the log likelihood value, normalized by system size \( J \). \( KS \) stands for Kolomogorov-Smirnov statistic, which measures the maximum gap between the predicted and empirical CDF’s. On the other hand, (\( \log \text{step} \)) is the log of the maximand of MSE, normalized by system size \( J \) (see Appendix A.5 for the relationship between \( KS \) and (\( \log \text{step} \))), and \( \frac{\text{geo/arith}}{} \) is the ratio of the maximand of MSE (the geometric mean of steps in (22)) to the arithmetic...
mean of the steps, which is the highest value that the geometric mean can take.

In table 2 ER/BA corresponds to (16). As low values of \( \hat{r} \) indicate, edges are formed predominantly through networking rather than completely at random. We cross-checked estimates with minKS and MLE\(^{24}\) and we obtained a similar result. To be doubly sure of our findings, we ran estimation with \( r \to \infty \) (ER in table 2). The statistics of ER seem to be comparable with other distributions except that the estimated transportation cost is astronomically high.\(^{25}\) Thus, we dismissed the ER

\(^{24}\)We constrained \( k_0 \) to zero for MLE. We know from the results of MSE and minKS that \( k_0 \) tends to zero.

\(^{25}\)A one-dollar pen will cost more than the US GDP five towns over on the ER network. There is not enough variance in the ER degree distribution, certainly not power-law type behavior. To generate the empirical city-size distribution, the ER economy has to amplify and capitalize on what little variance its degree distribution has to offer (cf. proposition 3.1). As a result \( \tau \) has to be ludicrously large to make things work. On the other hand, if the transportation infrastructure is in its early stage of development without
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network. All in all, we conclude that a scale-free transportation network explains the city-size distribution but a scale-variant network does not.

Estimated $\hat{\delta}$ ranges from $0.9911$ to $2.536$. As we discussed in reference to (13) we confirm that in most cases, the impact of adding an edge on city size wears off as degree itself becomes saturated (it cannot exceed $J-1$), or put differently, New York has more edges, size for size, than any other cities as it takes more edges to raise the city size as the city grows further.

Along with ER/BA and ER above, we ran MSE with three other distributions representative of the existing city-size models to compare with our model. Eeckhout [Eec04]'s model leads to a lognormal distribution and Berliant and Watanabe [BW15] predict a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution as the city-size distribution. A complete graph will result in a degenerate probability distribution. The BA economy fits comfortably into the circle of existing testable models based on all the statistics we computed in table 2. ER/BA comes in second behind GEV on all fronts except Places.

Figures 10 to 13 represent PDF and PP plots of the five distributions tested with four data sets. PP plots, which we used as a substitute for usual CDF plots, sketch the estimated CDF against the empirical CDF. If the fit is perfect, then the PP plot will become a 45° line. ER/BA and two existing distributions (lognormal and GEV) are almost indistinguishable in figure 13, indicating that the network structure is just as effective as the existing models. Once again, the three distributions become almost identical to a 45° line as $J$ grows.

The value of $\langle \log LH \rangle$ can be made arbitrarily large by increasing the number of parameters $|\theta|$. Bayesian and Akaike Information Criteria (BIC and AIC) are based on the likelihood value but penalize increased use of parameters to detect overfitting. Since GEV and ER/BA use as many as five parameters, these two distributions’ performance should be discounted on the BIC and AIC front. However, due to the large size of data sets, BIC and AIC barely overturn the primary evaluations made with $\langle \log LH \rangle$. With the exception of Belgian data (whose system size is the smallest among the four data sets), there is no disagreement among those three statistics.

In addition we put two other fat-tailed degree distributions to the test. The network structure is exogenous in our model. We used [JR07] to represent a scale-free network. While [JR07] is microfounded and sufficient to generate a fat-tailed degree distribution, it is not the only degree distribution which a scale-free network gives rise to. There is a chance that our economy’s transportation network may have come around from a different mechanism than [JR07]. In this light we picked the lognormal and GEV distributions for use as examples of a fat-tailed degree distribution, from which to derive the city-size distribution (in comparison any hubs, then the country’s transportation cost will probably be higher than more BA-like countries because Zipf’s law is a universally observed phenomenon. We will comment on this in section 5.

26The estimate tends to decrease as data size $J$ increases.

27PP plots are more revelatory than regular CDF plots, as they place data points at equal intervals, whereas CDF plots usually dump lots of data points in the middle and make it hard to see the fit in the cramped midsection, especially when the distribution in question is very skewed like city-size distributions.

28To our knowledge, these degree distributions are not yet microfounded.
son, [Eco04, BW15] cite lognormal and GEV as a city-size distribution. The results (the last two rows in table 2) seem to indicate that the network formation does not necessarily have to be of [JR07] type. Regardless of how it came about, a network with a fat-tailed degree distribution results in a city-size distribution that closely resembles the actual distribution.

5 Conclusion and Extensions

We examined how the network of cities affects the city-size distribution. We built a simple economic model with an explicit transport network. The bridge between network structure and city size is represented in (13), where we learned that there is a log-linear relationship between city size and city degree.

We put two commonly studied networks to the test. The classical ER random graph is too egalitarian to generate gravitationally large cities like New York City. The BA model explains the city-size distribution better than the ER model and bears very close comparison with other proposed city-size models. The BA network has a scale-free degree distribution and the resulting city-size distribution behaves similarly via (13). In fact, it would be odd if the city-size distribution were not scale free under a BA network. Large nodes with a high degree like Chicago attract a large mass of people because A) goods produced in Chicago are in high demand for its inexpensive delivered price owing to its high degree and B) goods available for consumption in Chicago are also inexpensive thanks to its high degree. The exact opposite applies to small cities. But there are still some people knowingly living in small cities because we cannot afford to wipe them off the map due to preference for variety. This gives rise to a few cities of an overwhelming size and a myriad of small cities. The actual city-size distributions (we tried Belgium and the United States in particular) unanimously opt for a BA network.

From this point on, it would be reasonable to combine GEV to determine firm productivity as in [BW15] and BA for transportation network structure by way of simulations, but we will not have an analytical solution due to the added complexity.

Tracing the historical co-development of the network structure with the city-size distribution may reveal a clue to identifying the direction of causality, but the result may still be inconclusive due to multiple factors involved. We briefly explored the possibility of the network structure conforming to a given city-size distribution in section 3.10. The United States has seen a number of drastic changes in its modes of transportation. Despite falling transportation cost, however, the city-size distribution in the United States has been stable at least since 1900 (Black and Henderson [BH03]). It is then tempting to conclude from this observation that the transportation network used to be close to the ER network back in 1900: As we discussed in proposition 3.1, falling \( \tau \) makes the city-size distribution less skewed. If the city-size distribution remained the same throughout in the United States, then the transportation network must have been more closer to the ER network than the BA network in 1900 — that is, if we hold everything else constant. The reality is that total population \( S \) and the total number of cities and commodities
J have increased over the same period as τ drops. Our city-size distribution \((14)\) depends on the base city size \(\langle s \rangle \equiv S/J\) as much as it does on τ. And \(\langle s \rangle\) is a scale parameter in \((14)\), i.e., an increase in \(\langle s \rangle\) spreads out the distribution. Thus, even when the transportation network has not changed, the city-size distribution will still be robust against falling τ if the total population increases to compensate for reduced variance. We cannot tell whether the network structure has changed since 1900 for certain without the data on the degree distribution in 1900, which are unavailable.

It has been suggested that other networks be implemented in our framework, for example the optimal transport network for a given population distribution (assuming a cost function) rather than the choice of \(r\), which is a less precise control variable. This would require the geodesic length or degree distribution for the optimal network. We are not aware of any results addressing this issue.

A Appendix

A.1 Linear Transportation Cost

We consider two possible transportation cost structures: The first case is exponential transportation cost with parameter τ (≥ 1). The second one is a less steep, linear transportation cost with parameter \(\tau_L\) (≥ 0). In comparison to the first case, the linear transportation cost structure deducts \(\tau_L\) units (rather than fraction \(\tau - 1\)) of shipment on each leg of the travel. Thus, \(1 + l_j^i \tau_L\) units of shipment are required at origin \(j\) to deliver one unit to destination \(i\).

For a sufficiently small \(\tau_L\), delivered price will be approximately identical under two different transportation cost structures if \(\log \tau = \tau_L\). All the analyses in the main text apply to a linear case as well with \(\tau\) replaced with \(e^{\tau_L}\) for small \(\tau_L\).

A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1

Proof. Suppose \(J > 2\) and the network is neither complete or completely isolated. Then

\[
\frac{ds(a_i)}{da_i} = (\log \tau)s(a_i) \left[ 1 - \frac{s(a_i)}{S} \right] \geq 0
\]

with equality iff \(\tau = 1\). Furthermore,

\[
\frac{d^2s(a_i)}{da_i^2} = (\log \tau)s'(a_i) \left[ 1 - 2 \frac{s(a_i)}{S} \right] \geq 0
\]

for \(i < \text{argmax}_j s(a_j)\) with equality iff \(\tau = 1\). Hence \(s(a_i)\) is increasing and strictly convex in \(a_i\).

\[\text{Delivered price on exponential and linear iceberg will be identical if}\]

\[
l_j^i \log \tau = \log \left(1 + l_j^i \tau_L\right) = l_j^i \tau_L + O(\tau^2).
\]

\[\text{Our model is multiplicative in nature just as much as the city-size distribution and scale-free networks are. A linear (or additive) form of iceberg transportation cost is not readily compatible for our purposes unless we convert it into a multiplicative form by, for example, approximation in footnote 29.}\]
To show that \( h(a_i) \) bulges as \( \tau \) grows, first we define a weighted accessibility
\[
h(a_i) := \frac{\sum \tau a_i (a_i - a_j)}{\sum \tau a_i}.
\] Note \( h(a_H) - h(a_M) = a_H - a_M > 0 \) and \( h(a_M) - h(a_L) = a_M - a_L > 0 \). Then
\[
\frac{dD(\tau)}{d\tau} \quad = \quad \frac{1}{2\tau} \left[ \frac{1}{2\tau} \left[ s(a_H)h(a_H) - s(a_M)h(a_M) \right] + \left[ s(a_M)h(a_M) - s(a_L)h(a_L) \right] \right]
\]
\[
> \quad \frac{1}{2\tau} \left[ \frac{1}{2\tau} \left[ s(a_H)h(a_H) - s(a_M)h(a_M) \right] + \left[ s(a_M)h(a_M) - s(a_L)h(a_L) \right] \right]
\]
\[
> \quad 0,
\]
which establishes the claim. \( \Box \)

### A.3 Idea behind Geodesic Length (11)

We briefly repeat [HSF+05]’s arguments to obtain (11) in our context. Consider a geodesic between nodes \( i \) and \( j \). We ignore loops. The probability that a child node traces back to its ancestors via some circumvention is proportional to \( 1/J \). It becomes negligible as the system size \( J \) grows (our system size ranges from 69 to 25,358 in section 4). As shown in [HSF+05], the resulting error is minimal. A tree is a sequence of nodes where each node except for the root node has exactly one parent (or ancestor) node. Each node may or may not be followed by (a) child node(s). There are no cycles on a tree. If we pick a random tree starting from node \( i \), we will wind up at node \( j \) somewhere along the tree \( k_j/\sum_{x \in V} k_x \) of the time and we will not reach node \( j \) the remaining \( 1 - k_j/\sum_{x \in V} k_x \) of the time. On average, we will reach node \( j \) within \( \sum x k_x/k_j \) trials. Suppose that the depth (the number of parent nodes that you have to go through before reaching your root node) of node \( j \) is \( l \). There are \( k_j \kappa^{l-1} \) nodes whose depth is \( l \). Therefore, on average, we arrive at node \( j \) in \( l \) steps if
\[
\frac{\sum x k_x}{k_j} = k_j \kappa^{l-1},
\]
from which we obtain (11). In other words, if, on average, it takes more than \( k_j \kappa^{l-1} \) trials to reach city \( j \), i.e., \( \sum x k_x > k_j \kappa^{l-1} \), then it is likely that city \( j \) is more than \( l \) steps away from your city \( i \). You would try \( k_j \kappa^{l-1} \) times to find city \( j \), when in fact you would need additional \( \sum x k_x - k_j \kappa^{l-1} \) trials to reach city \( j \), meaning that city \( j \) is not in the group of cities \( l \) steps away from you but actually located somewhere farther down. On the contrary if it takes less than \( k_j \kappa^{l-1} \) trials to reach city \( j \), then city \( j \) should be less than \( l \) steps away from you. You would not need that many trials to find a city \( j \), the implication being that, once again, you are looking at a wrong group of cities. Thus, city \( i \) and \( j \) are \( l \) steps apart from each other exactly when (23) is satisfied with equality.

### A.4 Branching Factor

Take a random edge and walk towards one arbitrarily selected end. Call where you arrived at a neighboring node. The average degree of neighboring nodes thus
reached approximates the mean branching factor $\kappa$. In effect, we will take one degree off the average degree found above because the edge we just walked on cannot be used to reach the destination city. We are climbing up a tree, not down (recall how goods find their destination city in section 3.6). Also note that the mean branching factor is not just a mean degree $\langle k \rangle$. We are not hopping from one city to another but climbing a tree from one neighbor to next to reach the destination city. Thus, a city charged with lots of links is more likely to be a neighbor of some city than a poorly connected city, and cities are duly weighted when fed into the mean branching factor. In other words, Houston is rare while there are quite a few mid-sized cities but that does not mean Houston is hard to reach at random for its rarity. Houston has far more edges than mid-sized cities and we are likely to travel through Houston at some point or another (cf. figure 4). In particular a node of degree $k$ has a chance proportional to $kg(k)$ of being at one end of an arbitrary direction on a randomly chosen edge, where $g(k)$ is a probability density function of (16). Or put differently, if we parachute into a random edge and then flip a coin to decide which direction to go in, we will arrive at a $k$-th degree city $kg(k)$ out of $\sum_{x=1}^{J} xg(x)$ times. Thus, the mean branching factor is given by (17).

### A.5 Maximum Spacing Estimation

It might be easier to make sense of the use of geometric mean in MSE if we recast it as an analogue of a more familiar, linear regression. The geometric mean of steps here corresponds to ordinary least squares and the arithmetic mean corresponds to a plain sum of residuals. Say we are trying to regress $y = (-1, 0, 1)$ on $x = (-1, 0, 1)$. If we aim to minimize the sum of residuals, any real estimate that makes the regression line run through the origin $(0, 0)$ will work, just as much as any estimate will make the arithmetic mean of gaps $1/J$. We will end up with infinitely many estimates because residual at $x = 1$ always offsets the one at $x = -1$. To ward off this cancellation problem, we usually try to minimize the sum of squared residuals, which leads to a unique estimate, a $45^\circ$ line. Similarly, the use of geometric mean will solve the indeterminacy problem that comes with arithmetic mean and will promise us sensible estimates.

The geometric mean also comes in handy here. The gap tends to get tighter near the top and/or the bottom of most distributions as the CDF creeps up to one and/or bears down on zero. However, this does not mean New York or New Amsterdam, IN counts less than other cities as a sample. The geometric mean offsets this general tendency and duly stretches small gaps so that these extremities will receive no less attention than the ones in the middle. There is no particular reason to let the mid-sized cities punch above their weight.

On a related matter, we report Kolomogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic. MSE is similar to KS in that both KS and the maximand of MSE are a power mean. KS statistic is a power mean of the form

$$\left\{ \frac{1}{J} \sum_{i}^{J} |\text{Empirical } F(s_i) - F(s_i)|^\rho \right\}^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

(24)
with $\rho \to \infty$ (i.e., the maximum of the residuals, the $L^\infty$ norm), whereas the maximand of MSE is a power mean of the form

$$\left\{ \frac{1}{J} \sum_{i} (F(s_i) - F(s_{i-1}))^\rho \right\}^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

with $\rho \to 0$ (i.e., the geometric mean of the gaps). The way they aggregate the data is where their difference comes in. KS statistic only picks up a single city where the predicted value deviates from the actual value the most. It does not tell us anything about the selected model’s performance over the remainder of cities other than the fact that their gap is tighter than the KS value (but not by how far). On the other hand, the maximand of MSE is determined by the step gap log-averaged over the entire range of the cities, and probably a better measuring tool to gauge the model’s performance in that respect.

To get a sense of what MSE hunts for, consider what happens if we pull out the estimate that minimizes the geometric mean instead. Minimum spacing estimator would dump the entire interval $[0, 1]$ on one particular city $i$ (any city will do) so that $F(s_j; \theta) = 0$ for all $j < i$ and $F(s_j; \theta) = 1$ for all $j \geq i$, in which case, the geometric mean would be zero, the smallest value possible (practically the same result when you try to maximize the arithmetic mean as we mentioned above, in the sense that any estimate will be as good as any other). This would make such a pointless estimator. MSE does the exact opposite.

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