Working with first-order proofs and provers

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ABSTRACT
Verifying software correctness has always been an important and complicated task. Recently, formal proofs of critical properties of algorithms and even implementations are becoming practical. Currently, the most powerful automated proof search tools use first-order logic while popular interactive proof assistants use higher-order logic.

We present our work-in-progress set of tools that aim to eventually provide a usable first-order logic computer-assisted proof environment.

CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Constraint and logic languages; • Theory of computation → Interactive proof systems; Automated reasoning;

KEYWORDS
automated reasoning, computer-aided proofs, first-order logic, verification

1 INTRODUCTION
Complete formal verification of algorithms and their implementations is becoming more widely applicable. Probably the most general approach is construction of formal proofs in a chosen theory. Interactively constructed formal proofs often use one of the popular higher order logics, such as Calculus of Coinductive Constructions in case of Coq[10] or the chosen higher-order logic of Isabelle/HOL[12]. At the same time, a lot of progress in automated reasoning is achieved in the field of first-order logic. For example, the Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE) has an automated theorem prover (ATP) competition, called CADE ATP System Competition (CASC)[4]. Satallax[13], the leading higher-order ATP according to the CASC results[5], uses E prover[6] (one of the leading first-order provers) for some tasks. On the other hand, CoqHammer[11], a tool that aims to partially automate interactive construction of proofs with Coq, also uses translation into first-order logic and multiple first-order automated provers.

We want to be able to verify statements about distributed algorithms where direct application of generic ATP systems might still be impractical. To that aim, we create first-order specifications, and use domain knowledge to write or generate proofs as sequences of lemmas, while automated theorem provers verify implications. As CASC competitions have popularized the unified input format of the Thousands of Problems for Theorem Provers (TPTP) collection[1], using multiple ATP systems does not require any changes in the proof format. To support this kind of exploration, we develop supporting tooling for managing the specification, preparing the list of lemmas, and interacting with the proof system.

While it is too early to draw any conclusions from our ongoing experiments with representing properties of distributed systems in the first-order logic, we want to present the supporting tooling used in this research.

2 OUR TOOLING
2.1 Data formats
All of our tooling uses TPTP for all the output and most of the proof input. We use the SyntaxBNF file from the TPTP distribution (Backus–Naur form of the TPTP format definition) and translate it into Esrap[7] rules to parse the format. It turns out that unambiguity of the official TPTP BNF specification allows us to order the parsing rules in a way compatible with packrat parsing[8]. More specifically, in every alternation rule the first (after reordering) successful option can be taken.

However, the formal specifications of the systems in question contain large amounts of similar statements. These specifications are generated programmatically. Currently we do not want to make lasting decisions about the structure of the specifications we will work with, so the generating code is written in Common Lisp and refactored according to the current specification in question.

The proof itself contains additional definitions and lemmas, and various instructions such as advice to prove some lemma by case analysis (with a list of cases provided). We use TPTP Process Instructions (TPI) extension[2] of the TPTP syntax
to encode the additional imperative instructions related to lemma list processing.

2.2 Global workflow
First of all, we need to generate the axioms describing our formal specification.

To validate that the axioms describe the intended model, we generate a test run by evaluating the transition rules. We have code that can evaluate a first-order formula on an incomplete model, if the fixed part of the model is enough to determine the formula value easily. The generated runs are validated in two ways: by manual inspection, and by verifying that an automated theorem prover given this run and the full specification does not find a contradiction in reasonable time.

At our current stage of exploration, the next step involves writing a list of lemmas (and instructions for their preprocess- ing) that should be sufficient to prove the desired condition.

The last step is verifying that a list of lemmas constitutes a correct proof. Of course, in practice this step is performed in parallel with the previous one. A part of verification is performed, then the proof is updated to avoid the problems observed during verification attempt. The verification attempts are usually started inside the part of the proof currently of interest, and stop when some lemma cannot be proved.

Even after the last step of proof verification our tooling can offer some further support. We have some utilities for analysing and visualising the output of an ATP system.

The system currently does not provide any dedicated user interface. It can be used either from a Common Lisp REPL, or via wrapper shell scripts invoking necessary operations.

2.3 Structure of an example model
The examples will be related to one possible encoding of the Dijkstra’s mutual exclusion protocol[9] executed on a single CPU with multiple time-sharing processes (as illustrated in Algorithm 1). In general, this model has a set of agents switching between states, and local variables. We automatise a linearly ordered discrete time model which uses an initial value initial and a function next moment(T) which “advances” the time one step. The state of agent A at moment T is represented by the function value active state(T, A).

There are also some other per-agent variables (and a global turn variable, modelled in the same way, e.g. counter(T, A) which gives the value of the variable counter of agent A at time T. For a single-CPU multi-process execution we can assume that only one agent at a time can change its state or variables, and denote this agent as active agent(T). We want to avoid a situation where two agents execute the critical section (i.e. have the active state equal to critical Section which represents line 17 in Algorithm 1) at the same time.

The safety-critical part of the Dijkstra’s mutual exclusion protocol consists of an agent declaring its intent to enter the critical section, and checking that no other agent has also declared the same intention.

To avoid encoding a full theory with induction, one can start with proving just the inductive step: define an invariant then prove that this invariant at some moment implies the same invariant at the next moment of time, and that the invariant implies safety. The reason to delay encoding the full proof by induction is that the most natural ways to encode induction axiomatically require an infinite number of axioms. This is often called “induction axiom schema” — for every formula expressing a predicate, there is an axiom. This axiom claims that proving the base case and the induction step for the property in question is enough to verify the property for all natural numbers.

2.4 Representation of the proof
In the TPTP format each statement is given a role; we parse the list of statements and look at their roles. Axioms are introduced in the specification, and can be used directly.

“Checked definitions” can be introduced in the proof; they are axioms that introduce simple abbreviations, extending the theory in a conservative way. We verify that they define a single name in terms of previously seen names, and use these definitions as axioms. For example, we can define the safety condition.

```
fof(define_safety_for, checked_definition,
   !T,A1,A2]: (safe_for(T,A1,A2)<=>(
      (active_state(T,A1)=criticalSection
      & active_state(T,A2)=criticalSection)
    => A1=A2)).
```

```
begin
  Stealable_i ← false;
  if turn ≠ i then
    Outside_i ← true;
    if Stealable_i = true then
      turn ← i;
    end
  go to 3;
else
  Outside_i ← false;
  for counter_i ← 1 to n do
    if counter_i = i then continue;
    if Outside_i, = false then go to 3;
  end
end

Algorithm 1: Dijkstra’s algorithm for process i with n parallel processes.
```
This formula, which can be also rewritten in the usual notation as \( \forall T, A_1, A_2 : (\text{safe}_{\text{for}}(T, A_1, A_2) \Leftrightarrow ((\text{state}(T, A_1) = \text{state}(T, A_2) = \text{criticalSection}) \Rightarrow A_1 = A_2)) \), says that a moment \( T \) is safe for a pair of agents \( A_1 \) and \( A_2 \) if either at least one of the agents is out of the critical section or they actually are the same agent. This reflects a part of the desired property that two different agents should not execute the critical section simultaneously. The full safety condition is defined by requiring this property to hold for each pair of agents.

“Checked lemmas” constitute the main part of the proof. Every such lemma is first given to an automated prover as a conjecture to prove, using the axioms and previous lemmas. If the prover reports a success, the lemma can be used as an axiom during the following steps. These steps are illustrated in Figure 1.

For example, the following lemma is proved as a part of a case by case analysis.

\[
\text{fof(safety_conditions_local_cases, checked_lemma,}
\begin{align*}
&\forall [T,A,B]: (\neg \text{passed}(T,A,B) \\
&| \quad (\text{passed}(T,A,B) & \text{& } \neg \text{passed}(T,B,A)) \\
&| \quad (\text{passed}(T,A,B) & \text{& } \text{passed}(T,B,A))) \\
&)
\end{align*}
\]

This lemma uses the predicate \( \text{passed} \), that is defined to mean that agent \( A \) has declared its intent to enter the critical section and has already checked that agent \( B \) had not declared such intent at the time of the check. The lemma itself is trivial, claiming only that at any given moment either \( A \) has not yet passed \( B \), or \( A \) has passed \( B \) but \( B \) has not passed \( A \), or both agents have passed each other.

We also support defining a limited set of axioms (and/or previously proved lemmas) to use when proving a specific lemma. This reduces the proof search space and therefore drastically improves the performance. There are cases where specifying the proof dependencies manually is easy; in addition, our lemma generation strategies include generation of such dependency hints where appropriate.

2.5 Additional proof-handling capabilities

We use TPI (TPTP Process Instructions) to specify operations on lemmas inside the proof. To improve interactive usability, we allow a special declaration that declares valid all the checked lemmas earlier in the proof. This can be convenient to skip a part of the proof that has already been verified earlier, or just to focus on a step in the middle of the proof before spending time on a possible unsuitable beginning.

In many cases, lemmas needed to achieve good performance of the proof search are predictable. Some of the techniques described in [3] are broadly applicable, especially proving all the components of each conjunction separately. Another important source of lemmas is case-by-case analysis, which requires choosing the cases but becomes a purely mechanical task afterwards.

For example, consider the following case. The lemma under consideration claims that if it is impossible for two agents to have passed each other, and two agents are distinct, and reaching the critical section requires passing all the other agents, then the two agents cannot both be in the critical section. It is easier to prove the conclusion if we know whether some agent hasn’t passed the other one (in which case we can say it has not reached the critical section), or both agents have passed each other (in which case we obtain a contradiction with impossibility of mutual passing). So we prove exhaustiveness of a list of possible situations, and prove the lemma in each of them before proving it in the general case.

\[
\text{fof(safety_conditions_local_simplified, checked_lemma,}
\begin{align*}
&\forall [T,A,B]: (\neg \text{passed}(T,A,B) \\
&| \quad (\text{passed}(T,A,B) & \text{& } \neg \text{passed}(T,B,A)) \\
&| \quad (\text{passed}(T,A,B) & \text{& } \text{passed}(T,B,A))) \\
&)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{tpi(ca_safety_conditions_local, add_cases,}
\text{safety_conditions_local_cases => safety_conditions_local_simplified).}
\]

It will be checked that the case enumeration is exhaustive, and then the main lemma will be checked with each of the cases added as an additional assumptions, e.g.

\[
\text{fof(ca_safety_conditions_local_simplified_case..., checked_lemma,}
\begin{align*}
&\forall [T,A,B]: (\neg \text{passed}(T,A,B) & \text{& } A!=B \\
&| \quad (\text{passed}(T,A,B) & \text{& } \text{passed_in_critical_for}(T,A) \\
&| \quad & \text{& } \text{passed_in_critical_for}(T,B)) \\
&| \quad & \Leftrightarrow (\text{active_state}(T,A)!=\text{criticalSection} \\
&| \quad & \text{& } \text{active_state}(T,B)==\text{criticalSection})) \\
&)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
(\text{active_state}(T,A)!=\text{criticalSection}) \\
\]

(\text{active_state}(T,B)==\text{criticalSection}) \\
\]

(\text{active_state}(T,B)==\text{criticalSection}) \\
\]

(\text{active_state}(T,B)==\text{criticalSection}) \\
\]
We present a set of proof-manipulation tools that already implements quite a few useful operations and will further grow in parallel with the research they support. We currently use the tool set described in the present paper to explore the performance implications of using different representations and using different provers for distributed algorithms. For example, we have encoded the inductive step proof for safety of Dijkstra’s mutual exclusion algorithm. We plan to develop the capabilities further, supporting both computer-assisted proof construction and providing an intermediate representation for automated verification via proof generation. We hope that the approach and some parts of our code might be of use to others. A mirror of the code is available at https://gitlab.common-lisp.net/mraskin/gen-fof-proof/.

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