From 1991 to 2019, the economy of Uzbekistan passed through the four stages. Each stage was characterized by certain demographic, economic, political, and other factors. These factors influence the formation of foreign labor migration at the macrolevel. The mentioned stages reflect (i) the transition from a planned to a market economy against the background of an increase in migration outflow for permanent residence in 1990–2000, (ii) acceleration of economic growth in 2000–2009 and the formation of “migrant networks” abroad, (iii) a period of slowdown in GDP growth in the absence of structural reforms to stimulate employment and investment in 2010–2015, which contributed to the active growth of labor migration, and (iv) a stage of new socioeconomic reforms and increased attention of the leadership of Uzbekistan to migration processes. This study takes into account these macroeconomic conditions, but focus is shifted to the reasons for the change in migration processes in terms of poorly understood sociocultural factors that affect foreign labor migration and reintegration of labor migrants in Uzbekistan. The article is based on reports from specialized studies of foreign labor migration and employment conducted by the Ministry of Employment and Labor Relations of Uzbekistan, publications of studies by international organizations, and data from in-depth interviews with migrants and their families. The research revealed that under the influence of macroeconomic conditions, the change in the sociocultural context in 2006–2019 contributed to expansion of the geography of migration flows from Uzbekistan, the emergence of such phenomena as the “feminization” of migration and its “rejuvenation” against the background of certain elements of egalitarianism in an initially patriarchal society. Studying the sociocultural context made it possible to assess the degree of “success” of migration, in terms of remigration and the ability of migrants to reintegrate into society upon returning home. It has been determined that the microcommunity in Uzbekistan, as a donor country of labor resources, has both stimulating and constraining effects on the transformation of migration processes.

**Keywords:** labor migration, microcommunity, sociocultural factors, feminization of migration, re-migration, reintegration of labor migrants, Republic of Uzbekistan

**DOI:** 10.1134/S2079970521020039
Table 1. Main macroeconomic and social indicators of Uzbekistan, 2007–2019

| Indicator | 2007 | 2010 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| **Macroeconomic** | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP, USD bln (current prices) | 22.3 | 46.7 | 69.0 | 76.7 | 81.8 | 81.8 | 59.2 | 50.4 | 57.9 |
| GDP, USD bln (constant 2010 prices) | 36.8 | 046.7 | 58.1 | 62.3 | 66.9 | 71.0 | 74.2 | 78.2 | 82.6 |
| GDP, USD bln (PPP, current prices) | 111 | 146 | 180 | 189 | 199 | 206 | 211 | 228 | 245 |
| GDP per capita, USD thous. (current prices) | 0.8 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.7 |
| GDP per capita, USD thous. (constant 2010 prices) | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
| GDP growth rate, % | 9.5 | 7.6 | 7.6 | 7.2 | 7.4 | 6.1 | 4.5 | 5.4 | 5.6 |
| Inflation (as of end of year), % | 6.8 | 7.3 | 6.8 | 6.13 | 5.6 | 5.7 | 14.4 | 14.3 | 15.2 |
| Unemployment, % | | | | | | | | | |
| USD/UZS, avg. for period | 1264 | 1586 | 2095 | 2311 | 2569 | 2966 | 5121 | 8069 | 8839 |
| RUB/UZS, avg. for period | 49 | 52 | 66 | 62 | 43 | 44 | 88 | 129 | 136 |
| **Social** | | | | | | | | | |
| Total income per capita, USD/month (in current prices) | | | 134 | 138 | 137 | 163 | 111 | 89 | 97 |
| of these, income from transfers*, % | | | 27.0 | 24.4 | 20.3 | 16.0 | 20.9 | 23.9 | 25.3 |
| Total income per capita, USD/month (in constant prices) | | | 125 | 130 | 130 | 155 | 101 | 75 | 85 |
| Real growth in total income in USD, % | | | | | | | 3.9 | 01 | 0.1 | 19.2 | 34.5 | 25.6 | 12.1 |
| Real growth of aggregate income in nat. currency, % | | | | | 13.9 | 7.1 | 4.3 | 5.2 | 7.2 | 5.2 |
| Average nominal salary, USD/month | | | 318 | 413 | 436 | 456 | 436 | 266 | 207 |
| Population, mln people** | 26.9 | 28.6 | 26.9 | 30.8 | 31.3 | 31.8 | 32.4 | 33.0 | 33.6 |
| Labor resources, mln people** | 15.2 | 16.7 | 15.2 | 18.0 | 18.3 | 18.5 | 18.7 | 18.8 | 18.8 |
| of these, total employed in economy**, % | 70.5 | 69.5 | 70.3 | 71.0 | 71.5 | 71.9 | 72.4 | 70.5 | 12.1 |
| Number of migrants abroad (migrant stock), total, mln people | | 1.76 | 1.91 | | | | 2.01 | | |
| Number of people departing abroad, mln/year *** | | | | | | | 6.8 | 13.8 | 12.9 |
| including those leaving to work, mln/year | | | | | | | 1.6 | 4.1 | 3.5 |
| Share of low-income population****, % | | | 17.7 | 14.1 | 13.3 | 12.8 | 12.3 | 11.9 | 11.4 | 11.0 |

* Including remittances and social payments; ** on average per year; **** calculated according to Uzstat data, statistics have been publicly available since 2017; **** poverty calculations based on 2100 kilocalories per day based on World Bank recommendation.
Source: Uzstat data (https://stat.uz/ru/164-ofytsyalnaia-statystyka-ru), World Bank (https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data, https://databank.worldbank.org/home), Thomson Reuters Eikon information terminal.
Foreign labor migration, in general, is based on a number of macrolevel factors: demographic, macroeconomic, political, environmental, etc. However, the underlying reasons to migrate and subsequent decision, as far as all the main parameters of migration processes depend on the conditions at the microlevel (De Jong, 2000; Lokshin and Chernina, 2013; Otrachshenko and Popova, 2014). The present study deliberately analyzes the microcommunity and its influence on the processes of foreign labor migration, since the main aim of is to identify changes in migration processes in 2006–2019 and characterize the features of the sociocultural microenvironment of households in Uzbekistan as factors that predetermine these changes. At the same time, the overall economic component (in particular, the level of household well-being) is considered a constant framework factor.

The microcommunity here means the closest social environment of a labor migrant, namely, his family, other relatives, close and significant acquaintances, friends, neighbors, and colleagues. The microcommunity is the closest space and social environment where a person’s life takes place, and which directly affects his (or her) personal development and behavior.

The microeconomic model of individual migration (De Jong, 2000) explains the decision of a person to migrate. The main reason for migration is the desire to obtain a positive net (as a rule, financial) income upon coming home, and the choice of country of migration is to improve the well-being of a person and his family (Sjaastad, 1962). This approach is defined as a “microeconomic model of individual choice,” where the main reason for migration is the desire to obtain a positive net (as a rule, financial) income upon coming home, and the choice of country depends on maximization of one’s net income over a certain time (Bowles, 1970; Massey et al., 1993). For countries in a state of protracted crisis and high unemployment, it is possible to talk about maintaining a certain level of family income at home.

However, the microeconomic model of individual choice does not explain the phenomenon of return

1 Reforms to liberalize the foreign exchange market, improve the tax system, develop business, stimulate regional trade, state support for agricultural enterprises specializing in cotton growing (a source of income for a significant part of the population of Uzbekistan), etc.

2 Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan of September 2, 2017 no. UP-5177 On Priority Measures to Liberalize Foreign Exchange Policy. https://www.norma.uz/uz/raznoe/o_pervoocherednyh_merah_po_liberalizatsii_valyutnoy_politiki.

3 From 4210 UZS/USD to 8100 UZS/USD (according to the information terminal Thomson Reuters Eikon. Access code: UZS=).

4 The devaluation led to an increase in the exchange rate of the so’m against the ruble from 72.69 UZS/RUB up to 140.5 UZS/RUB (according to the information terminal Thomson Reuters Eikon. Access code: RUBUZS = R).

5 The required level of transfers home minus all migration costs.
is only slightly higher than the costs after the end of migration (Stark, 2003). The neoclassical approach is mainly focused on the costs of the migrant and his personal expectations and does not take into account economic and informational risks. Taking into account the latter, Fischer and Martin (1997) propose a slightly more advanced version of the microeconomic model of individual choice. However, they also ignore a number of structural aspects of the migration process, in particular, the influence of family and/or the microcommunity, because often over time, labor migrants experience a change in behavioral attitudes. Some remain in the recipient country, since they grow accustomed to life there, try to assimilate, and subsequently “pull” their families with them, passing to the next stages of the migration cycle (Mukomel’, 2011). Other migrants return to their homeland and remain there, while others become so-called “return migrants” or “re-migrants,” who some time after returning home leave again to work abroad.

It is the structural aspects that become a key factor in explaining the phenomenon of return migration. According to the theory of the new economics of migration (Stark, 2003; Stark and Levhari, 1982), it is family and social attributes that are of great importance in analyzing the causes of labor migration (Melkonyan, 2015). This approach highlights the role of other members of the microcommunity in deciding whether to migrate, taking into account not only maximization of net profit, but also minimization of possible risks and constraints (Insurance..., 2005). That is why information flows between migrants and their microcommunity (both at home and in the host country) are becoming one of the key factors in the migration decision-making process. In recipient countries, so-called migration networks are being created (Beine et al., 2011; Giulietti et al., 2018; Hugo, 1981; Lee, 1966; Taylor, 1986), which can significantly reduce both financial and nonfinancial risks and significantly simplify the migration process. In particular, along with material (financial resources, housing) and human (education, skills, qualifications, etc.) capital, migration networks also accumulate social capital, since they not only motivate people to migrate, but also provide valuable information for migrants, providing additional opportunities to maximize the efficiency of migration processes (Garip, 2008; UN..., 2012).

Most of the scientific studies into the causes of migration (and re-migration) is devoted to research in Latin America (Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005), China (Giles and Yoo, 2007; Zhao, 1999), Europe (Constant and Massey, 2003; Toma and Castagnone, 2015), and Africa (Kok et al., 2006), while in Central Asia and the Caucasus, this topic has not yet been studied extensively due to existing restrictions on access to microdata (Abdurazakova, 2013; Maksakova, 2006). Nevertheless, here, among the existing studies on migration at the microlevel, it is necessary to single out a number of studies directly concerning the basic characteristics of migrants (Ahunov et al., 2015) and the very reasons for migration, in particular, the role of culture and tradition (Ikhamov, 2013) and migration networks (Elrick, 2005; Finke et al., 2013), the social significance of the family (Rahmonova-Schwarz, 2012), and changes in women’s behavior (Laruelle, 2007); etc.

Migration Studies in Uzbekistan—a typical labor-exporting country—are mostly based on aggregated macrodata (Chepel’ and Bondarenko, 2015). Empirical and analytical studies at the microlevel in Uzbekistan on the socioeconomic consequences of labor migration do not take into account the full range of problems associated with migration. Microlevel studies are limited: they mainly consider only the characteristics of migrants, the role of the family in the migration decision-making process, and the importance of remittances in household well-being (Ahunov et al., 2015; Juraev, 2012), while other reasons for migration processes and their transformation are actually considered only superficially due to limited access to data. Meanwhile, foreign labor migration in Uzbekistan (both in rural and urban areas) has formed over the years as an integral part of a long-term strategy to ensure the well-being of individual families, which requires deeper analysis of the sociocultural factors that determine the decision to migrate.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research is based on an analysis of quantitative and qualitative data. The main source of quantitative data is reports of specialized studies on foreign labor migration and employment conducted by the Uzbekistan Ministry of Employment and Labor Relations (MELR).7 At the moment, MELR does not provide deep retrospective information regarding migration processes. Therefore, for retrospective analysis, the data of international studies in 2006–2009 were used, namely, the materials of the regional report “A Needs Assessment of Women Migrant Workers: Central Asia and Russia” and articles in the digest “Labor Migration in the Republic of Uzbekistan.” The above materials are substantially limited in terms of data presentation, since they are already published in an aggregated format. A significant problem is also compatibility of MELR annual and quarterly opinion polls and materials published in 2006–2009, which significantly complicates comparative analysis.

---

6 Risks associated with unfavorable changes in the economy of a country and/or an enterprise (changes in market conditions, falling demand for labor resources, currency risks, etc.).

7 https://mehnat.uz/uz/article/2018-yil-dekabr-oyida-mehnat-migratsiyasi-masalalarini-urganish-buyicha-reshubnika-hududlarida-uktazilgan-sociologik-tadqiqot-natizhalariga-taylhar-ergan-s. https://mehnat.uz/uz/category/mehnat-bozori-bandlik-va-ishizlik-alborori-bulgneteni.
Finally, given that the MELR publications did not aim to study and analyze the influence of the microcommunity on labor migration processes, a number of indicators important from the viewpoint of this study are missing.

The existing limitations were partially compensated by analyzing in-depth interviews with migrants and their family members, conducted in from 2008 to 2017 by various research organizations in Uzbekistan, Russia, and Kazakhstan. It was the data of in-depth interviews that made it possible to reveal the cause-and-effect relationships and explain the influence of the microcommunity on foreign labor migration.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS

In 1991–2016, the authorities of Uzbekistan deliberately tried to form in the local media a rather negative image of labor migrants as people who, for some reason, do not want to work for the good of their homeland. As a result, in 2000–2009, during the period of increase in the number of labor migrants and active formation of migration networks abroad, the population of Uzbekistan tended to have a negative attitude towards women leaving to work and perceived male labor migrants as misfits from poor families. However, against a background of high inflation and falling real incomes, official propaganda was weakening in the 2010s (it basically vanished after the 2016 elections), and broader and broader layers of the population were forced to engage in labor migration. Additional support in raising the importance of migration processes in the eyes of society was provided by Uzbekistan’s accession to the International Organization for Migration and the creation of a state fund to support labor migrants.

As a result, at present, the negative image of migrants—both men and women—has practically disappeared, replaced by that of an active and enterprising person who is successful, because, despite the lack

of work at home, he was able to find work and earnings in another country. This is why at present families that have labor migrants do not hide the fact of migration, and even more—they are proud of it. As a result, according to the World Bank, the growth in the number of migrants abroad in 2010–2017 (even taking into account the currency and economic crises in Russia) amounted to 17.5%, which is higher11 than in 2000–2010 (then the number of migrants increased by 5.8% over 10 years).

The majority of foreign labor migrants are men, with a share of 80–90% (Table 2). The majority of male labor migrants are from rural areas (mainly engaged in manual labor), while the majority of women are city-dwellers (their higher level of education and language proficiency allows them to work in the service sector). Among both male and female migrants, there are many more of those who have families and minor children.

In 2019, about 73% of labor migrants had secondary specialized or higher education, while the share of labor migrants with vocational education has been increasing since 2010 (Table 3). The likely reason is the reform of the education system of Uzbekistan in 2009,12 when secondary specialized, vocational education became mandatory. This reform13 was abolished in 2018, which may affect further transformation of the structure of migration flows.

In assessing the well-being of an individual household in Uzbekistan, the level of income is often the

Table 2. Sociodemographic characteristics of labor migrants in 2018–2019, % of respondents’ number

| Characteristics        | 2018 |       | 2019 |       |
|------------------------|------|-------|------|-------|
|                        | December | March | June |  |
| Sex                    | Male | Female | Male | Female |
|                        | 87.4 | 12.6  | 89.4 | 10.6  |
|                        | 14.1 |       | 14.1 |       |
| Place of residence     | City | Village | City | Village |
|                        | 41   | 59    | 41   | 59    |
|                        | –    | –     | –    | –     |
| Age                    | 16–30 years old | 31+ |
|                        | 52.0 | 48.0  | 52.3 | 57.6  |

Source: Information bulletins of MELR.
determining factor that allows the head of the family to successfully marry off children, appear successful in the eyes of neighbors, and improve the status of a migrant and that of his family members in the eyes of neighbors and friends. Therefore, in maintaining the level of well-being, households become dependent on a constant inflow of migrant remittances. If a family decides to sharply improve their well-being under conditions of limited income growth within the country, the most optimal and easiest way is to search for new ways to increase the volume of transfers and, accordingly, the number or length of stay abroad.

Owing to a number of sociocultural changes in Uzbekistan—namely, manifestations of certain elements of egalitarianism in an initially patriarchal society—in recent years, there has been a tendency towards an increase in the number of migrants and a change in their structure towards rejuvenation, feminization, and an increase in cases of return migration.

MODERN PARAMETERS OF MIGRATION

Geography of Migration

According to specialized surveys conducted by the Ministry of Health, in 2018 ~75% of labor migrants from Uzbekistan left for Russia and about 12% of migrants went to Kazakhstan (Fig. 1).

However, according to MELR, the share of migrants working in Russia and Kazakhstan has begun to decline in recent years. Turkey has become another popular destination for labor migration, where the income level is almost three times higher than in Uzbekistan. In 2018, 7.8% of labor migrants were working in Turkey (in 2012, less than 2%); more than 23% of them lived in Tashkent, which indicates the relatively high qualifications of these migrants. At the same time, among male migrants, the share of those who worked in Turkey in 2018 was only 4.1%; while among female migrants it reached 24.6%. This means that one in four female migrants left for job in Turkey, where she worked in tourism, sales and cleaning, or was hired as a governess and nurse. Among all migrants from Uzbekistan working in Turkey in 2018, the share of women was 57%, which is not only a new, but also an unusual phenomenon, since earlier, women rarely left to work unaccompanied by men.

In November 2018, Turkey increased the visa-free stay period for the citizens of Uzbekistan from 30 to 90 days, which has most likely become another incentive for a further increase in the number of female labor migrants due to the seasonal nature of most of the work performed.

Organized recruitment programs with South Korea and Russia may become another factor for further expansion of the migration flows’ geography. Uzbekistan has also started negotiations on this topic with Japan and European countries; this may further contribute to expanding opportunities for Uzbek migrants to work abroad (Matousevich, 2019).

Change in the Age Structure of Migrants

Among migrants, there are a lot of young people aged 30 or under, i.e. 38% of total; the share of people 31–40 years old accounts for another 34% (Fig. 2). Thus, in 2018, the total share of persons under 41 years old accounted for 72% of the total number of labor migrants, while in 2006 this figure was 55%. The increase in the share of young people in the total number of migrants in recent years has been influenced by a long period of high birth rates and easing control by the older generation.

The migration of young men, as a rule, does not harm the usual activity of the family, and older family members (father or elder brother) most often fulfill their public obligations (Ilkhamov, 2013). A young

---

14Status in this context is the place of an individual in the social structure, characterized by a set of certain rights and obligations (Filippov, 2012).
15Egalitarianism is a concept based on the idea of creating a society with equal political, economic and legal opportunities for all members of this society (Dlugach, 2000).
16MELR sociological survey “Labor Migration,” December 2018. https://mehnat.uz/uz/article/2018-yil-dekabr oyida mehnatmigriciyasi masalaralari-urganish buyicha respublika huddilarida utkazilgan sociologlik taqdiqot natizhalariga tayyilargin-s. Accessed August 2020.
17The share of labor migrants from Uzbekistan working in Russia, in various sources (MELR polls, data from the Statistical Committee of Uzbekistan) varies from 74 to 83%, and in Kazakhstan, from 7.5 to 12.0%. In this context, we are guided by the results of the MELR sociological survey “Labor Migration” of December 2018, since here statistical data are presented in terms of dynamics.
18MELR sociological survey “Labor Migration,” December 2018. https://mehnat.uz/uz/article/2018-yil-dekabr oyida mehnatmigriciyasi masalaralari-urganish buyicha respublika huddilarida utkazilgan sociologlik taqdiqot natizhalariga tayyilargin-s. Accessed August 2020.
19https://resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/11/20181111-2.pdf.
20The memorandum of mutual understanding signed by Uzbekistan and South Korea de jure has been in effect since 2006, yet there was a surge of migrants intending to work in this country after the two countries signed an updated version of the above-mentioned document in 2016. The updated memorandum defined the legal status and financial situation of labor migrants. In 2017 there were registered more than 87 000 applications from Uzbekistan under a quota of 5000 people established by South Korea.
21Based on data from the study “Voices of Labor Migrants.” See Labor Migration in the Republic of Uzbekistan. Coll. Art. / Abdullaev E.V., Ed., Tashkent, 2008. 204 s.
male migrant, as a rule, has capable parents, brothers, and sisters who can support his family (if he is married and has children) while he is working.

Older men are less likely to participate in labor migration processes, since, on the one hand, they find themselves unwanted in the foreign labor market (where, as a rule, many hours of exhausting work are required), and on the other hand, they are already the actual heads of families, often with grandchildren, and, accordingly, more in demand by the microcommunity than are young men. This is especially noticeable in rural areas, where the share of labor migrants aged 41 or older does not exceed 26% (Fig. 2).

Young men most often become migrants (usually aged 18–24); this is the result of optimizing the distribution of economic roles in the family through collective decisions by families, especially if the young person does not have a regular income and/or profession at home. Following the abolition of compulsory vocational education in Uzbekistan in 2018, flows of young migrants will most likely continue to increase, because now young men of working age can start work immediately after receiving a high school diploma.

Feminization of Migration

According to MELR,23 in 2019, the share of women leaving for work exceeded 14%. After the crisis in 2009, as well as the recession in Russia in 2015–2016, there was a sharp increase in the proportion of female migrants. The data of in-depth interviews reveal the following economic reasons influencing the processes of forced feminization of labor migration:

— the growing demand for women in the labor markets of host countries;
— significantly lower, compared to men, average wages for women in Uzbekistan due to the high employment of women in the informal sector of the economy;
— the lack of a full-fledged partner/breadwinner, especially if a woman is divorced or widowed;
— the search for another society where the probability of getting married is higher than at home;
— the need to maintain and/or increase the current level of income of the extended family;

Table 3. Educational level of labor migrants in Uzbekistan, 2010–2019, %

| Type of education              | 2010 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Higher                        | 4.7  | 3.6  | 5.1  | 7.7  | 4.9  |
| Secondary specialized         | 32.7 | 51.5 | 55.9 | 60.0 | 68.3 |
| Secondary complete            | 59.6 | 42.2 | 35.5 | 30.0 | 26.8 |
| Secondary incomplete/primary  | 3.0  | 2.7  | 3.5  | 2.3  | —    |

* Data on secondary incomplete/primary education not presented in the survey.

Source. MELR sociological survey “Labor migration,” December 2018. https://mehnat.uz/uz/article/2018-yil-dekabr-ovida-mehnat-migraciyasi-masalalarini-urganish-buyicha-respublika-hududlarida-utkazilgan-sociologik-tadqiqot-natizhalariga-tay-hlarergan-s. Accessed August 2020; MELR information bulletin “Labor market, employment and unemployment,” June 2019. https://mehnat.uz/uploads/filemanager/source/final_%D0%91%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BA-%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%85%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%8F%D0%BD%D0%B2-%D0%8E%D1%88-%D0%91%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%85%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%8F%D0%BD%D0%B2-%D0%8E%D1%88-%D0%91%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%85%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%8F%D0%BD%D0%B2-%D0%8E%D1%88-%D0%91%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%85%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%8F%D0%BD%D0%B2-%D0%8E%D1%88-%D0%91%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%85%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%8F%D0%BD%D0%B2-%D0%8E%D1%88-%D0%91%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%85%C-2019.pdf. Accessed August 2020.

Fig. 1. Foreign labor migration from Uzbekistan, 2018, %.

Source: MELR sociological survey “Labor migration,” December 2018.
the existence of migrant networks, which makes it easier for women to set themselves up and find work in host countries.

However, in addition to the above economic reasons, the influence of a number of sociocultural factors is also increasing, one of which is a long-term, and often recurring migration of men. Back in 2007–2008, the model of female labor migration, together with their husbands (or following their husbands), appeared to dominate (Tyuryukanova and Abazov, 2009). Such a family migration model is still the most preferable in the eyes of society, since joint migration, according to the microcommunity, helps preserve the family, reduces the likelihood of outside ties, and brings a double economic effect for the household. However, according to qualitative surveys, the number of married women who independently leave the republic for work is growing (Table 4). There has also been an increase in the proportion of divorced women, as well as widows—in their homeland they are often “lost” to the local society—and they often go abroad in search of a husband, since at home, the likelihood of remarrying is significantly reduced.

Another indirect argument is that low-productivity employment or lack of work for men makes it easier for a woman in a patriarchal society to obtain permission from her husband and family for labor migration (Women..., 2011). In this case, neighbors and family will more likely condemn the husband who could not provide for his family than the woman who decided to embark on labor migration.

And finally, the last (but no less important) factor that indirectly contributes to the development of female labor migration is both successful and unsuccessful examples of male labor migration. At the same time, successful examples of female labor migration are even more powerful incentives for breaking stereotypes at the microsocial level and especially for motivating women themselves to labor migration.

According to the MELR survey, the average amount of one monthly remittance for a female labor migrant was USD 350, which is no different from what male labor migrants sent. One likely reason may be that the operating costs of women in the recipient country are, on average, less than that of men, and

Table 4. Marital status of female labor migrants in 2008 and 2018, %

| Marital status         | 2008* | 2018 |
|------------------------|-------|------|
| Married                | 56.5  | 64.1 |
| Common-law marriage    | 10.7  | —** |
| Unmarried              | 13.2  | 11.2 |
| Divorced               | 16.6  | 20.1 |
| Widowed                | 3.0   | 4.6  |

* The marital status of women who went to work in Russia in 2007—2008 was taken into account.
** In the 2018 MELR survey this item was not.

Source: Tyuryukanova and Abazov (2009): MELR sociological survey “Labor Migration,” December 2018. https://mehnat.uz/uz/article/2018-yil-dekabr-oibda-mehnat-migraciysi-masalalarini-rganish-buyicha-respublika-hududlarida-utkazilgan-sociologik-tadqiqot-natizhalariga-tayhilarergan-s. Accessed August 2020.

24Income minus expenses for accommodation, food, transport, and other own needs of women migrant workers.
therefore they are able to send most of their earnings home. Another reason may be the level of remuneration for work performed; e.g., remuneration in the service sector may be commensurate with remuneration in manufacturing or construction.

**MIGRATION AND RE-MIGRATION DECISION PROCESS**

Foreign labor migration of a family member in Uzbekistan is decided jointly with other family members, and the opinion of the older generation is particularly important. Many labor migrants from Uzbekistan go to work in order to meet the material needs not only of their own family (even if the migrant is married and has children), but to meet the needs of the family in an expanded understanding of the term, including parents, brothers, sisters, and next of kin. In Uzbekistan, it is typical if a household consists of several families whose members belong to at least three generations and have a quite patriarchal structure (Ilkhamov, 2013). The responsibilities of the head of such an extended multigenerational family include a strict normative set of functions: to marry off children, provide housing for each married son, educate children, and celebrate all rituals related to the life cycle of the family and its members in his community. In this context, migrants’ remittances act as a kind of savings, while the distribution of the total family budget and the efforts of all family members, depending on needs, is an investment.

The factors influencing the decision-making process and the development of a migration strategy within each individual family are, of course, unique and can vary greatly depending on the needs, the composition, and place of residence of the family, as well as the characteristics of the family members and assessment of possible risks (Rahmonova-Schwarz, 2012). A labor migrant does not just earn money, but plays a certain social role in relation to the family and the community (Abashin, 2015; Grigor’ev et al., 2008).

A family often does not set a specific earnings goal; i.e., the migrant simply needs to earn more than he earned at home. In case when a labor migrant has some specific financial purpose for traveling abroad (Table 5), he or she is likely to return to the homeland after earning the required amount. The absence of a goal often leads to the so-called cyclical migration trap—long-term and recurring migration.

Upon returning home, migrants also face a number of problems related to maladjustment and the need to reintegrate in their home countries. Even after a relatively short absence (on average for the sampling, migrants worked for about 10 months), they often introduce into the life of their families and communities some peculiarities of lifestyle they adopted in another country (acquired habits in food, behavior, clothing, etc.). The migrants also partially lose their social relationships, since family members already got used to a certain distribution of roles and responsibilities during her/his absence, and the returning migrant feels like a guest for some time.

If a migrant does not plan to continue labor migration, the issues of employment arise. The job requirements (salary, type of work, working hours etc.) imposed by returned migrants become elevated, compared with the ones they had before working abroad. This is because earning money abroad, especially if a migrant lives in a rural area, significantly increases his or her status in the eyes of both the family and community. Employers are not always willing to hire former labor migrants, considering that their expectations of wages are overestimated, and the likelihood of re-migration is nonzero.

Difficulties with adaptation in the family, at the community level, or in the labor market in their country indeed often lead to recurring migration (Abashin, 2015, 2016). Speaking about re-migration, we do not mean permanently working migrants who use return to their homeland as a formal way to extend their legal stay in the recipient country (e.g., this is typical strategy for migrants working in Russia25), or those who are employed in seasonal work. In these cases, return migration is a planned strategy in which return to the homeland is not initially considered the end of the labor migration.26

| Table 5. Labor migration goals, 2017–2018, % of respondents |
|-------------|---------|---------|
| Goal                    | 2017    | 2018    |
| High wages abroad/lack of work at home | 33.8    | 55.9    |
| Organization of a wedding/buying a home or a car | 45.6    | 45.4    |
| Raising capital to organize business at home | 4.5     | 8.9     |
| Family problems        | 16.8    | 13.6    |
| Other                  | 15.8    | 11.4    |

Source. MELR sociological survey “Labor Migration,” December 2018. https://mehnat.uz/uz/article/2018-yil-dekabr-oyida-mehnat-migraciyyasi-masalalarni-urganish-buyicha-respublika-hududlarida-utkazilgan-sociologik-tadqiqot-natizhalariga-tay-hilargan-s. Accessed August 2020.

25The maximum permitted period of stay in Russia, even with a work permission (i.e. a patent), is 3 years. After that, the migrant must leave Russia for at least one day. In accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Federal Law of July 25, 2002, no. 115-FZ On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation, the period of temporary stay of a foreign citizen is determined by the period of validity of the work permission issued to him, except for cases envisaged by this federal law. In the absence of a work permission, the period of stay is reduced to 3 months.

26
However, the situation when a return home is initially considered as the end of labor migration, but the migrant or his family (sooner or later) decides that he or she should leave for a work abroad again is a typical one. According to the MELR, about half the surveyed migrants declared their firm intention to return to labor migration some time, and another 15% found it difficult to give an exact answer to this question. It follows that if labor migration was in most cases successful, then there would be more people who leave for a work abroad for the first time (recurring migration often occurs due to underfulfillment of the established goals, mostly financial). Another reason for the high share of recurring migration is the expansion of existing (or the emergence of new) financial needs of the migrants themselves and their families at home. However, as Jean-Pierre Cassarino pointed out, “The success/failure paradigm cannot fully explain the return migration phenomenon...” and “return does not constitute the end of a migration cycle” (Cassarino, 2004, p. 257, 262). Return strategies, therefore, should be considered in their relationship with cyclical migrations, and return migration should be viewed as a phenomenon caused not only by economic factors (maintaining the current level of well-being after the continued decline in household incomes in Uzbekistan, expressed in USD), but also by the influence of migrants on family and society, and simultaneously, the influence of society and family on migrants. Taking all this into account, the share of migrants who return to their homeland and fall into this trap of cyclical migration is likely to increase, and the process itself may become irreversible over time.

CONCLUSIONS

Influenced by a number of internal and external macroeconomic factors, which resulted in the need to increase (or at least maintain) the level of well-being, in recent years, the sociocultural aspects of Uzbek society began to transform: in a purely patriarchal society, new egalitarian-like attitudes began to form, which in turn affected Uzbekistan’s labor migration processes. According to these new guidelines, the participation of certain sociodemographic categories of the population—previously involved very little in labor migration processes—becomes possible and even starts to represent a mass phenomenon. Expanding migration is gradually changing sociocultural attitudes at the family and community level, while the latter, in turn, spur mechanisms that stimulate and support the further growth of the migration flow, as well as a change in the composition of labor migrants. Thus, it is no doubt that microcommunity influences migration, but such influence is not unilateral since migration is gradually changing microcommunity and its background principles in return.

The rejuvenation of migration and expansion of its flows’ geography will continue to contribute to the further growth of labor migration flows from Uzbekistan, since due to globalization and the spread of information technologies, the involvement of the younger generation in migration processes is likely to foster the creation of new migration networks in recipient countries and the expansion of existing ones. At the same time, despite some redistribution of the directions of migration flows and legislatively enshrined simplification of residency of Uzbek citizens in a number of countries (e.g., Turkey and South Korea), in the midterm, Russia is likely to remain the leader among recipient countries in the number of labor migrants from Uzbekistan.

As for the increasing feminization of foreign labor migration, its key reasons at the microlevel are not only the activity of women themselves, but rather the gradual easing of patriarchal stereotypes at the family and community level regarding women’s mobility, softening of gender regimes, the information exchange, and the influence of male migrants. This may lead to both further expansion of feminization of migration and an increase in the influence of the role of a woman in Uzbek society.

Finally, the so-called success of migration is of particular interest. Often vague travel goals and an initial focus on relatively short-term migration negatively impact adaptation in the country of employment; however, upon return, labor migrants may face new difficulties in the reintegration process. This may be one of the reasons for recurring or cyclical migration. At the same time, the focus of the migration cycle in the future—based on the behavioral attitudes of the migrants themselves and a number of macroconditions (including the consequences of the current crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic) and sociocultural factors at the microlevel—may shift towards adaptation of migrants in the recipient country and even their possible immigration. These processes are beyond the scope of this work, and are a subject of subsequent research by the author.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author expresses gratitude to the ordinary professor, member of the HSE Academic Council L. Grigoriev and reviewers of the scientific journal Spatial Economics for valuable comments, as well as the staff of the TAHLIL Center for Social Research for the opportunity to use retrospective qualitative information for the analysis.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares no conflict of interest.
REFERENCES

Abashin, S., Returning home: family and migration scenarios in Uzbekistan, *Ab Imperio*, 2015, vol. 2015, no. 3, pp. 125–165.

Abashin, S., Here and there: transnational aspects of migration from Central Asia to Russia, in *Vostok na Vostoke, v Rossi i na Zapade: transgranichnye migratsii i diaspiry (East in the East, in Russia and in the West: Cross-Border Migrations and Diasporas)*. Panarin, S., Ed., St. Petersburg: Nestor-Istoriya, 2016, pp. 159–177. https://doi.org/10.13039/50110006769

Abdurazakova, D., Social impact of international migration and remittances in Central Asia, *Asia–Pac. Popul. J.*, 2013, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 29–54.

Ahunov, M., et al., *Socioeconomic Consequences of Labor Migration in Uzbekistan: Griffith Business School Discussion Paper No. 2015-07*, Brisbane: Griffith Univ., 2015.

Beine, M., Docquier, F., and Özden, Ç., Diasporas, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* Routledge, 2007.

Beine, M., Docquier, F., and Ozden, Ç., Diasporas, *J. Dev. Econ.*, 2011, vol. 95, no. 1, pp. 30–41.

Bowles, S., Migration as investment: empirical tests of the human investment approach to geographical mobility, *Rev. Econ. Stat.*, 1970, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 356–362.

Cassarino, J.P., Theorizing return migration: the conceptual approach to return migrants revisited, *Int. J. Multi-cult. Soc.*, 2004, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 253–279.

Chepel’, S.V. and Bondarenko, K.A., Is external labor migration a factor of economic growth? Econometric analysis and conclusions for the CIS countries, *Zh. Nov. Ekon. Assots.*, 2015, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 142–166.

Chiquiar, D. and Hanson, G.H., International migration, self-selection, and the distribution of wages: evidence from Mexico and the United States, *J. Polit. Econ.*, 2005, vol. 113, no. 2, pp. 239–281.

Cohen, R., *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*, London: Routledge, 2008.

Constant, A. and Massey, D.S., Self-selection, earnings, and out-migration: a longitudinal study of immigrants to Germany, *J. Popul. Econ.*, 2003, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 631–653.

De Jong, G.F., Expectations, gender, and norms in migration decision-making, *Popul. Stud.*, 2000, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 307–319.

Dlugach, T.D., Egalitarianism, in *Novaya filosofskaya entsiklopediya* (New Philosophical Encyclopedia). Moscow: Mysl’, 2000, vol. 2001, ISBN 5-244-00961-3

Elrick, T., *Migration Decision Making and Social Networks: EU Marie Curie Excellence Grant Project KNOWMIG*, Erlangen: Univ. of Erlangen-Nuremberg, 2005.

Filippov, A.A., The category of social status in foreign and national sociology, *Vopr. Sovrem. Nauki Prakt.*, *Univ. im. VI. Vernadskogo*, 2012, no. 1 (37), pp. 306–313.

Finke, P., Sanders, R., and Zanca, R., Mobility and identity in Central Asia: an introduction, *Z. Ethnol.*, 2013, vol. 138, pp. 129–137.

Fischer, P.A., Martin, R., et al., Should I stay or should I go? in *International Migration, Immobility and Development: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, Hammer, T., Brochmann, G., Tamas, K., and Faist, T., Eds., Oxford: Berg Press, 1997.

Garip, F., Social capital and migration: How do similar resources lead to divergent outcomes? *Demography*, 2008, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 591–617.

Giles, J. and Yoo, K., Precautionary behavior, migrant networks, and household consumption decisions: an empirical analysis using household panel data from rural China, *Rev. Econ. Stat.*, 2007, vol. 89, no. 3, pp. 534–551.

Giulietti, C., Wahba, J., and Zenou, Y., Strong versus weak ties in migration, *Eur. Econ. Rev.*, 2018, vol. 104, pp. 111–137.

Grigor’ev, L., Kondrat’ev, S., and Salikhov, M., A difficult exit from transformational crisis, *Vopr. Ekon.*, 2008, vol. 10, pp. 77–95. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2008-10-77-95

Hugo, G.J., Village-community ties, village norms, and ethnic and social networks: A review of evidence from the Third World, in *Migration Decision Making: Multi-disciplinary Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed and Developing Countries*, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1981, part 1, ch. 7, pp. 186–224.

Ilkhomov, A., Labor migration and the ritual economy of the Uzbek extended family, *Z. Ethnol.*, 2013, vol. 138, no. 2, pp. 259–284.

Insurance Against Poverty, Dercon, S., Ed., Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005.

International Migration in the New Millennium: Global Movement and Settlement, Joly, D., Ed., London: Routledge, 2017.

Juraev, A., Labor migration from Uzbekistan: social and economic impacts on local development, *PhD Thesis*, Trento, TN: Univ. of Trento, 2012.

Kok, P., et al., *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and Determinants*, Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006.

Laruelle, M., Central Asian labor migrants in Russia: The “diasporization” of the Central Asian states? *China Eurasia Forum Quart.*, 2007, vol. 5, no. 3.

Lee, E.S., A theory of migration, *Demography*, 1966, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 47–57.

Lokshin, M.M. and Chernina, E.M., Migrants in the Russian labor market: portrait and salary, *Ekon. Zh. Vyssh. Shk. Ekon.*, 2013, vol. 17, no. 1.

Maksakova, L., Feminization of labor migration in Uzbekistan, in *Migration Perspectives: Eastern Europe and Central Asia*, Rios, R.R., Ed., Vienna: Int. Org. Migration, 2006, pp. 133–145.

Massey, D.S., et al., Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal, *Popul. Dev. Rev.*, 1993, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 431–466.

Matusevich, Ya., *Policy in Brief: Evaluating the Future of Uzbek Labor Migration*, Vienna: Prague Process Secretariat, Int. Centre Migr. Policy Dev., 2019. https://www.pragueprocess.eu/en/migration-observatory/publications/document?id=95. Accessed July, 2020.

Melkonyan, V.A., General theoretical principles and approaches to international labor migration, *ETAP: Ekon. Teor., Anal., Prakt.*, 2015, no. 3.
Mukomel’, V., et al., Integration of migrants: challenges, politics, and social practices, *Mir Ross., Sotsiol., Etnol.*, 2011, vol. 20, no. 1.

Otrachshenko, V. and Popova, O., Life (dis)satisfaction and the intention to migrate: evidence from Central and Eastern Europe, *J. Socio-Econ.*, 2014, vol. 48, pp. 40–49.

*Postsovetskie transformatsii: otrazhenie v migratsiyakh* (Post-Soviet Transformations: Reflection in Migrations), Zaionchkovskaya, Zh.A. and Vitkovskaya, G.S., Eds., Moscow: Adamant, 2009.

Rahmonova-Schwarz, D., *Family and Transnational Mobility in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Labor Migration from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to Russia*, Baden–Baden: Nomos, 2012.

Ranis, G. and Fei, J.C.H., A theory of economic development, *Am. Econ. Rev.*, 1961, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 533–565.

Ravlik, M., *Determinants of International Migration: A Global Analysis. Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 52/SOC/2014*, Moscow: Natl. Res. Univ. Higher Sch. Econ., 2014.

Sjaastad, L.A., The costs and returns of human migration, *J. Polit. Econ.*, 1962, vol. 70, no. 5, pp. 80–93.

Stark, O., *Tales of Migration without Wage Differentials: Individual, Family, and Community Contexts. ZEF Discussion Papers on Development Policy No. 73*, Bonn: Center Dev. Res., Univ. of Bonn, 2003.

Stark, O. and Levhari, D., On migration and risk in LDCs, *Econ. Dev. Cult. Change*, 1982, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 191–196.

Taylor, J.E., *Differential Migration, Networks, Information and Risk*, Cambridge, MA: Migration Dev. Prog., Harvard Univ., 1986, pp. 147–171.

Toma, S. and Castagnone, E., What drives onward mobility within Europe? The case of Senegalese migrations between France, Italy and Spain, *Population*, 2015, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 65–95.

Tyuryukanova, E. and Abazov, R., *Otsenka nuzhd i potrebnostei zhenshchin trudyashchikhся—migrantov: Tsentral’naya Aziya i Rossiya* (Assessment of the Needs and Demands of Women Migrant Workers: Central Asia and Russia), Almaty: UN Dev. Fund Women, Int. Labor Org., 2009.

UN System Task Team on the Post–2015 UN Development Agenda, 2012. http://www.un.org/millennium-goals/pdf/Think%20Pieces/13_migration.pdf. Accessed January, 2019.

Zhao, Y., Labor migration and earnings differences: the case of rural China, *Econ. Dev. Cult. Change*, 1999, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 767–782.