ONLINE APPENDIX:
Teacher Labor Markets, School Vouchers and Student Cognitive Achievement: Evidence from Chile

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C1 Markets

To design market boundaries I analyzed mobility of parents and teachers. The design balances the trade-off in terms of sample-size and mobility across markets: a large within-market sample size yields low mobility across markets but a small number of (large) markets, whereas a large number of markets is obtained by having small within-market sample sizes with large across-market mobility.

The unique geographical configuration of Chile aided in the identification of empirically closed or nearly closed markets: the country occupies a narrow but long coastal strip, where mobility between northern and southern regions is hindered. The resulting number of nearly perfectly closed markets is 18. Table C1 reports the region in which each market lies, and the number of schools in each school sector and market, which correlates to within-market sample sizes.

C2 Additional Tables and Figures

Table C2: Labour supply: descriptive analysis

|                | Teach | Teach in public sector | Work |
|----------------|-------|------------------------|------|
| Female         | 0.189 | 0.031                  | -0.175 |
| (0.013)        | (0.021) | (0.015)               |      |
| Number of children | -0.021 | 0.016                  | -0.015 |
| (0.006)        | (0.009) | (0.007)               |      |
| Age            | 0.008 | 0.020                  | -0.003 |
| (0.001)        | (0.001) | (0.001)               |      |
| Observations   | 5061  | 3195                   | 5471  |

1With a total area of 291,933 square miles (756,102 km²), Chile is larger than all US states except Alaska and larger than all countries in the European Union. Yet, it extends 2,653 miles (4,270 km) from north to south, and it averages only 110 miles (177 km) from east to west.
Data source: ELD and CASEN for 2006. Standard errors in parentheses.

Results from Probit Regression of the indicated dummy dependent variable on:
gender, number of children, number of children interacted with gender, age, age squared.
Marginal effects reported. Inverse Probability Weights. Samples restrictions by columns:
(1): individuals who work, (2): individuals who teach, (3): full sample.

Table C3: Log-wage regressions by occupational sector: descriptive analysis

|                | Public | Voucher | Non-Teaching |
|----------------|--------|---------|--------------|
| Age            | 0.030  | 0.052   | 0.027        |
|                | (0.012)| (0.018) | (0.017)      |
| Age Squared    | -0.000 | -0.000  | -0.000       |
|                | (0.000)| (0.000) | (0.000)      |
| Female         | -0.102 | -0.142  | -0.384       |
|                | (0.031)| (0.032) | (0.044)      |
| Prof. Certifications | 0.029 | 0.087   | 0.073        |
|                | (0.031)| (0.034) | (0.042)      |
| Graduate Degree | 0.051 | 0.093   | 0.204        |
|                | (0.029)| (0.036) | (0.062)      |
| Constant       | 11.948 | 11.629  | 12.810       |
|                | (0.254)| (0.354) | (0.359)      |

Data sources: ELD and CASEN for 2006. Results from Ordinary Least Square regressions.
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: logwage. Inverse Probability Weights.
Table C1: Markets and Number of Schools

| Market | Region                     | Municipal | Voucher |
|--------|----------------------------|-----------|---------|
| 1      | Arica and Parinacota       | 51.5      | 57.5    |
| 2      | Coquimbo                   | 171       | 99.5    |
| 3      | Libertador G. B. O’Higgins | 101       | 61.5    |
| 4      | Atacama                    | 27        | 15.5    |
| 5      | Maule                      | 286       | 93      |
| 6      | Biobío                     | 193.5     | 67.5    |
| 7      | Biobío                     | 110       | 84      |
| 8      | Los Ríos                   | 128.5     | 111.5   |
| 9      | Los Lagos                  | 201.5     | 71.5    |
| 10     | Los Lagos                  | 73.5      | 54.5    |
| 11     | Antofagasta                | 46        | 31.5    |
| 12     | Libertador G. B. O’Higgins | 85        | 23.5    |
| 13     | La Araucanía               | 170       | 198.5   |
| 14     | La Araucanía               | 20        | 32.5    |
| 15     | Región Metropolitana (Santiago) | 377   | 747.5   |
| 16     | Valparaíso                 | 228       | 261     |
| 17     | Biobío                     | 153.5     | 41      |
| 18     | Magallanes and Antártica   | 13        | 10      |

|                |           |           |
|----------------|-----------|-----------|
| Tot            | 2,436     | 2,061.5   |
| Average        | 135.3     | 114.5     |

Data source: SIMCE 2006. The number of schools in each market and sector is the average between the number of primary and of secondary schools.

Table C4: Demand for public sector schooling: descriptive analysis

|                      | Value   | Standard Error |
|----------------------|---------|----------------|
| Log income           | -0.112  | (0.002)        |
| Primary              | 0.029   | (0.003)        |
| Rural                | 0.117   | (0.006)        |
| Parents’ education   | -0.029  | (0.001)        |
| Family size          | 0.015   | (0.001)        |

Observations 100000
Data source: SIMCE 2006. Results from Probit regression of the dummy for Public school on log household income, elementary school dummy, rural home dummy, parental education, family size. Marginal effects reported.

Table C5: Achievement by school sector, descriptive analysis

|                     | Public   | Voucher  |
|---------------------|----------|----------|
| Parents’ education  | 0.079    | 0.088    |
|                     | (0.002)  | (0.002)  |
| Income pro-capite   | 0.455    | 0.354    |
| (100,000 CLP)       | (0.020)  | (0.015)  |
| Squared income      | -0.079   | -0.059   |
| pro-capite (100,000 CLP) | (0.007) | (0.004) |
| Constant            | -1.184   | -1.105   |
|                     | (0.016)  | (0.018)  |
| Observations        | 47,007   | 52,993   |
| $R^2$               | 0.104    | 0.118    |

Data source: SIMCE 2006. Results from Ordinary Least Square regressions. All regressors reported. Dependent variable: average between Mathematics and Spanish SIMCE test scores (standardized). Standard errors in parentheses.
Table C6: Socio-economic status of students by school sector, at baseline and under the merit-based teaching reform (first counterfactual)

|                      | Pre-reform (Baseline) | Post-reform (Counterfactual) |
|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
|                      | Municipal             | Voucher                     | Municipal      | Voucher      |
| Parental education (yrs) | 9.78                  | 11.54                       | 10.08          | 11.64        |
| Household income (CLP)  | 207,249               | 337,811                     | 224,976        | 353,600      |

Baseline values computed at the simulated baseline choice.

Figure C1: Model fit: tuition payments net of financial aid

![Actual and Simulated Tuition Payments in Voucher School by Monthly Household Income Category (1,000 CLP) Image]
Figure C2: Model fit: test scores by school sector

![Municipal School](chart1)

![Voucher School](chart2)

Figure C3: Model fit: test scores by school sector, market number 5

![Municipal School](chart3)

![Voucher School](chart4)
## C2.1 Additional estimates of structural parameters

Table C7: Type Proportions

| Type                      | Proportion | Standard Error |
|----------------------------|------------|----------------|
| Households type 2         | 0.4790     | 0.1374         |
| Households type 3         | 0.3240     | 0.1499         |
| Potential teachers type 2 | 0.4240     | 0.0002         |
| Potential teachers type 3 | 0.3790     | 0.0001         |
|                                      | Home | Public | Voucher |
|--------------------------------------|------|--------|---------|
| Intercept type 1                     | −3300.0 | −0.8000 | −0.9590 |
|                                      | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Intercept type 2 minus type 1        | −2150 | −0.1050 | 0.5120 |
|                                      | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Intercept type 3 minus type 1        | 651.0 | −0.1550 | 0.3400 |
|                                      | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) |
| Female                               | 1640.0 |        |        |
|                                      | (0.0002) |        |        |
| Female × N children                  | 36.00 |        |        |
|                                      | (0.0002) |        |        |
| Age                                  | −17.2 |        |        |
|                                      | (0.0002) |        |        |
| N children                           | 14.3 |        |        |
|                                      | (0.0002) |        |        |
| Has children aged 0-2                | −11.9 |        |        |
|                                      | (0.0002) |        |        |
| Has children aged 3-6                | 173 |        |        |
|                                      | (0.0002) |        |        |
| Age squared                          | 0.3310 |        |        |
|                                      | (0.0002) |        |        |
| Non-pecuniary utility from teaching if female |        | 1.00 |        |
|                                      |         |        | (0.0002) |

Standard errors in parenthesis.
| Market | Log of Skill Price | Standard Error |
|--------|-------------------|----------------|
| 2      | −0.109            | 0.0002         |
| 3      | 0.0395            | 0.0002         |
| 4      | −0.440            | 0.0002         |
| 5      | −0.0558           | 0.0002         |
| 6      | −0.532            | 0.0002         |
| 7      | −0.229            | 0.0002         |
| 8      | −0.374            | 0.0002         |
| 9      | −0.288            | 0.0003         |
| 10     | −0.227            | 0.0002         |
| 11     | −0.702            | 0.0002         |
| 12     | −0.0627           | 0.0002         |
| 13     | −0.0113           | 0.0002         |
| 14     | 0.216             | 0.0002         |
| 15     | 0.0371            | 0.0002         |
| 16     | −0.596            | 0.0002         |
| 17     | −0.456            | 0.0002         |
| 18     | −0.147            | 0.0002         |

Standard errors in parenthesis.

Log of skill price normalised to 0.00 in market 1.
### Table C10: Parental Preference Parameters

| Parameter                                                       | Value    | Standard Error |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------------|
| Intercept of preference for Municipal, type 1                   | -1.1200  | 0.1018         |
| Types 2 minus type 1                                            | 0.7530   | 0.1432         |
| Types 3 minus type 1                                            | -0.0758  | 0.1432         |
| primaria in preference for Municipal                            | 0.5020   | 0.1159         |
| rural in preference for Municipal                               | 0.3730   | 0.1128         |
| Weight on consumption, type 1                                  | 0.1180   | 0.1439         |
| Type 2 minus type                                               | 0.1870   | 0.1679         |
| Types 3 minus type 1                                            | 5.570    | 0.1354         |
| Log of preference shock standard deviation                      | -4.5200  | 0.1812         |

### Table C11: Fellowship Assignment

| Parameter                                                       | Value    | Standard Error |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------------|
| Intercept                                                       | 0.4480   | 0.1431         |
| p, price charged by school net of voucher                       | 0.1860   | 0.1278         |
| primaria                                                        | 0.6670   | 0.1294         |
| Family size                                                     | 0.1050   | 0.1141         |
| rural                                                           | -0.3250  | 0.1156         |
| Monthly income                                                  | -0.0542  | 0.1414         |
| Log of standard deviation of measurement error                  | −5.91    | 0.1241         |
Table C12: Profit Function of Voucher Schools

| Variable cost | Value   | Standard Error |
|---------------|---------|----------------|
| $c_1$: enrollment | 0.01097 | 0.6610         |
| $c_2$: enrollment squared | 2.928e-06 | 0.0009      |
| $c_3$: N classes per teacher | 4.099e+03 | 2.87e+07   |
| Log of standard deviation of shock $\sigma_{cost}$ | -3.212 | 453e+02 |

Notes: For an average-sized school, the estimated variable cost per student is 4.8 percent of the voucher amount.

C3  Governmental Formulae for Private School Revenues

This appendix reports the formulae in article 25 of the law *Decreto con Fuerza de Ley N° 2, De Educacion, de 20.08.98*, fully incorporated into the model. Let $p$ denote the tuition charged by the school, and let $v$ be the voucher. Each household choosing the voucher sector is responsible for the payment of $p - v - f(Z_h)$ where $0 \leq f(Z_h) \leq (p - v)$ is the amount of fellowship received by a family with characteristics $Z_h$ if the voucher sector is chosen. $Z_h$ includes an indicator for schooling level, family size, whether the household is in a rural location, and household income. However, the amount of the per-pupil subsidy that is effectively received by the private school is not necessarily $v$. It decreases as the average tuition payments in the school increase. The latter depend on the tuition fee charged by the school, and on the composition of the households at the school, which determines the amount of financial aid received by the student body at the school. Formally, let $EPV(p, r)$ denote the mean tuition payments in the voucher school sector:

$$EPV(p, r) = \int (p - v - f(z))g^\natural(z \mid V \text{ chosen}; p, v)dz$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

where the conditional density $g^\natural(z \mid V \text{ chosen}; p, r)$ is indexed by $(p, r)$ because it depends on parental school choice, which is a function of the prices $(p, r)$. Below, I drop the
dependence of $EPV$ on $(p, r)$ for simplicity. The first Government formula adjusts the amount of per-pupil voucher subsidy effectively received by the school. Accordingly, the adjusted per-pupil gross revenues ($R^g(EPV)$) in the private school sector are:

$$R^g(EPV) = \begin{cases} 
  p & \text{if } EPV \leq 0.5 \\
  p - 10\%(EPV - 0.5USE) & \text{if } 0.5 < EPV \leq 1USE \\
  p - 10\%(EPV - 0.5USE) - 20\%(EPV - 1USE) & \text{if } 1USE < EPV \leq 2USE \\
  p - 10\%(EPV - 0.5USE) - 20\%(EPV - 1USE) - 35\%(EPV - 2USE) & \text{if } 2USE < EPV. 
\end{cases}$$

where $USE$ stands for *Unidad de Subvención Educacional*.

Adjusted per-pupil net revenues are different from adjusted per-pupil gross revenues because the school is also required to contribute to the financial aid budget. That is, private schools partially cover the fellowship expenses. The law provides that the per-pupil contribution to financial aid due by the private schools be:

$$R^f(EPV) = \begin{cases} 
  5\%EPV & \text{if } EPV \leq 1USE \\
  5\%EPV + 7\%(EPV - 1USE) & \text{if } 1USE < EPV \leq 2USE \\
  5\%EPV + 7\%(EPV - 1USE) + 10\%(EPV - 2USE) & \text{if } 2USE < EPV. 
\end{cases}$$

Therefore, the adjusted net per-pupil revenues are $\hat{R}(p, r, E(p, r)) = R^g(EPV) - R^f(EPV)$.

## C4 Constrained Maximization of Approximated Profits

Because cumulative normal distribution functions enter the expression for profits, the function $\Pi$ and its first and second derivative functions do not admit a closed form; hence,
Π’s critical points and curvature properties can’t be derived analytically. In estimation, I approximate profits with a function with a known closed form and I solve the constrained maximization of approximated profits at each candidate parameter value. To perform the approximation, I first evaluate numerically the true profit function at a large number of points \((p^{(s)}, r^{(s)})\). To evaluate the true profit function I derive numerically the student enrollment and teacher supply functions: \(E(p, r; v)\), \(T(p, r; v)\) and \(NT(p, r; v)\) at each evaluation point \((p^{(s)}, r^{(s)})\) by solving the second stage of the model, and I plug them into the profit function. I then approximate the profit function using an interpolating regression. Notice that the approximation is conditional on a realization of the variable cost shock \(ε_{cost}\). For simplicity, in the following formulae I drop the dependence of the estimated regression coefficients on the cost shock. Approximation is by Ordinary Least Squares using a cubic interpolating polynomial:

\[
\hat{\Pi} = \hat{a}_1 + \hat{a}_2p + \hat{a}_3p^2 + \hat{a}_4r + \hat{a}_5r^2 + \hat{a}_6pr + \hat{a}_7p^3 + \hat{a}_8r^3 + \hat{a}_9p^2r + \hat{a}_{10}pr^2.
\]  

(9)

I solve the constrained maximization of approximated profits subject to the legal cap on tuition. I derive the points that satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, and then verify that at those critical points the second-order conditions are satisfied. To find the critical points I use a combination of analytical and numerical methods. I solve for the school’s choice variables \((p, r)\) and for the Kuhn-Tucker-Lagrange multiplier \(\lambda\).

The approximated problem of the firm is the following:

\[
\max_{(p, r)} \hat{\Pi}
\]

\[
p \leq \bar{p} \quad \text{w/ multiplier } \lambda
\]

or equivalently:
max_{p,r} \hat{a}_1 + \hat{a}_2 p + \hat{a}_3 p^2 + \hat{a}_4 r + \hat{a}_5 r^2 + \hat{a}_6 p r + \hat{a}_7 p^2 + \hat{a}_8 r^3 + \hat{a}_9 p^2 r + \hat{a}_{10} p r^2

p \leq \bar{p} \quad \text{w/ multiplier } \lambda

I solve for the optimal \((p^*, r^*)\) and for the Kuhn-Tucker-Lagrange multiplier \(\lambda^*\) following the procedure described in Judd (1998), Ch. 4, p.122. At the optimum, the inequality constraint is either binding or not binding. I find the set of solutions to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions under both configurations. Among the feasible solutions thus found, I select the one with the highest value of approximated profits. The first-order conditions are:

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial p} = \hat{a}_2 + 2\hat{a}_3 p + \hat{a}_6 r + 3\hat{a}_7 p^2 + 2\hat{a}_9 p r + \hat{a}_{10} r^2 - \lambda = 0
\]
\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial r} = \hat{a}_4 + 2\hat{a}_5 r + \hat{a}_6 p + 3\hat{a}_8 r^2 + \hat{a}_9 p^2 + 2\hat{a}_{10} p r = 0
\]

**Case i):** when the constraint is not binding at the optimum, the Kuhn-Tucker-Lagrange multiplier is equal to zero. I set \(\lambda = 0\) and I use Newton method to solve numerically the following system of two equations in the two unknowns \((p, r)\):

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{a}_2 + 2\hat{a}_3 p + \hat{a}_6 r + 3\hat{a}_7 p^2 + 2\hat{a}_9 p r + \hat{a}_{10} r^2 &= 0 \\
\hat{a}_4 + 2\hat{a}_5 r + \hat{a}_6 p + 3\hat{a}_8 r^2 + \hat{a}_9 p^2 + 2\hat{a}_{10} p r &= 0
\end{align*}
\]

**Case ii):** when the constraint on \(p\) is binding at the optimum, \(p = \bar{p}\). I use Newton method to solve numerically the following system of two equations in the two unknowns \((r, \lambda)\):

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{a}_2 + 2\hat{a}_3 p + \hat{a}_6 r + 3\hat{a}_7 p^2 + 2\hat{a}_9 p r + \hat{a}_{10} r^2 &= 0 \\
\hat{a}_4 + 2\hat{a}_5 r + \hat{a}_6 p + 3\hat{a}_8 r^2 + \hat{a}_9 p^2 + 2\hat{a}_{10} p r &= 0
\end{align*}
\]
\[
\begin{aligned}
\hat{a}_2 + 2\hat{a}_3\bar{p} + \hat{a}_6r + 3\hat{a}_7\bar{p}^2 + 2\hat{a}_9\bar{p}r + \hat{a}_{10}r^2 - \lambda &= 0 \\
\hat{a}_4 + 2\hat{a}_5r + \hat{a}_6\bar{p} + 3\hat{a}_8r^2 + \hat{a}_9\bar{p}^2 + 2\hat{a}_{10}\bar{p}r &= 0
\end{aligned}
\]

It is important that the approximation be good in order for the solution of the approximated problem to be close to the solution of the real problem. The $R^2$ of the approximation depends on the vector of model parameters. At the parameter estimates, the average of the $R^2$ across markets is 96.14%, and the prices that maximize the approximated function are a very good approximation to the prices that maximize the true function. Specifically, tuition fees are identical because the caps are binding in both scenarios. With regards to skill rental rates, the average difference between the maximum of the approximated function and the maximum of the true function is 2.04 percent of the true maximum.

## C5 Further Model Details

### C5.1 Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness

**Proposition 1.** An equilibrium exists.

**Proof.** An equilibrium exists because, given prices $r_m$ and $p_m$, each potential teacher and each household in market $m$ solve a discrete-choice problem that admits at least one most-preferred choice by construction: utilities are well defined. Second, the voucher school’s profit is a continuous real-valued function defined on the compact set $[0, \bar{p}] \times [0, \bar{r}] \in \mathbb{R}^2$, where it is assumed that there exists an arbitrarily large upper bound $\bar{r}$ to the rental rate that the school can offer. The profit function attains a maximum value by the extreme value theorem.

**Proposition 2.** The equilibrium of the second-stage subgame is unique.
Proof. The potential teacher labor supply depends only on the rental rate \( r \), and not also on the tuition fee \( p \): \( T(r), NT(r) \). Therefore, the second stage of the model is equivalent to a sequential game where teachers move first, and parents, observing the teacher distribution across sectors, choose school sectors. In the last stage, each household \( h \) has a unique most preferred alternative \( e(\tilde{X}_h, k_h, \nu_h) \in \{M, V\} \) by virtue of the fact that the preference and technology shocks \( \nu_h \) are continuously distributed. Therefore, no household is indifferent between two options. Similarly, in the second-last stage, each potential teacher \( i \) has a unique most preferred alternative \( d(\tilde{X}_i, \psi_i, \epsilon_i) \in \{M, V, NT, H\} \) because the preference, wage and technology shocks \( \epsilon_i \) are continuously distributed. Therefore, by backward induction the equilibrium of the subgame is unique.

\[ \square \]

C5.2 Equilibrium Teacher Skills by School Sector

To compute the mean teaching skills supplied to the voucher sector in each \( m \), I derive the density of teaching skills conditional on the voucher school being chosen, which in general is different from the population density of teaching skills. Recall that the teaching skills of individual \( i \) are:

\[
s_i = \exp \left( a_0(l_i) + a'_1 X_i + \epsilon_{i}^{\text{tech}} \right)
\]

with \( \epsilon_{i}^{\text{tech}} \sim N(0, \sigma_V^2) \). That is, conditional on type, skills are log-normally distributed. Conditional on \( X_i = x \), the density of teaching skills depends both on the density of the shock \( \epsilon_{i}^{\text{tech}} \) and on the type probability \( \psi_i \):

\[
f^*_i(s_i|x) = \frac{\psi_i}{s_i \sigma_V \sqrt{2\pi}} \exp \left\{ -\frac{(ln s_i - a_0(l) - a'_1 X_i)^2}{2\sigma^2_V} \right\}.
\]

The population density is obtained by integrating over the distribution of \( x \) in market \( m \), \( f^*_m(x) \):

\[\text{If } \ln(x) \sim N(0, \sigma^2), \text{ } x \text{ has density } \frac{1}{x \sigma \sqrt{2\pi}} e^{\frac{- (\ln x - \mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}} \text{ with } x \geq 0.\]
\[ f^s_m(s_i) = \int \frac{\psi_l_i}{s_i\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp \left\{ -\frac{(lns_i - a_0(l) - a'x)^2}{2\sigma^2_V} \right\} f^x(x) dx. \]

To derive the density of teaching skills in the voucher school, define \( A(q, \epsilon_i^{tech}, l_i) \) to be the subset of \( R^3 \) that is such that if \( \epsilon_i^{-tech} = [\epsilon_i^M \ \epsilon_i^{NT} \ \epsilon_i^H] \in A(q, \epsilon_i^{tech}, l_i) \), an individual with characteristics \( q \), shock realization \( \epsilon_i^{tech} \), and type realization \( l_i \) chooses the voucher school. Letting \( Pr_m(V) \) denote the proportion of individuals choosing sector \( V \) in market \( m \), the density of teaching skills in sector \( V \) may be written as:

\[ g^V_m(s_i|\text{sector V chosen}) = \frac{1}{Pr_m(V)} \psi_l_i \int_{\epsilon_i^{-tech} \in A} f^s_m(s_i) f^{-tech}(\epsilon_i^{-tech}) d\epsilon_i^{-tech} \]

where I let \( \int_{\epsilon_i^{-tech} \in A} \) denote multiple integration with respect to \( \epsilon_i^M, \epsilon_i^{NT}, \epsilon_i^H \) over the area \( \epsilon_i^{-tech} \in A(q, \epsilon_i^{tech}, l_i) \) and where the joint density of the shocks in sectors \( M, NT \) and \( H \) is:

\[ f^{-tech}(\epsilon_i^{-tech}) = \frac{1}{\sigma_M\sigma_{NT}\sigma_H} \phi \left( \frac{\epsilon_i^M}{\sigma_M} \right) \phi \left( \frac{\epsilon_i^{NT}}{\sigma_{NT}} \right) \phi \left( \frac{\epsilon_i^H}{\sigma_H} \right). \]

The density of teaching skills in the municipal school, \( g^M_m(s_i|\text{sector M chosen}) \), can be derived in a similar way.\(^3\)

The mean skills supplied to each sector in market \( m \) are obtained using the conditional densities \( g^M_m, g^V_m \):

\[ \bar{s}_{Mm} = \sum_{l_i} \psi_l_i \int s_i g^M_m(s_i|\text{sector M chosen}) d\epsilon_i^{tech} \]

\[ \bar{s}_{Vm} = \sum_{l_i} \psi_l_i \int s_i g^V_m(s_i|\text{sector V chosen}) d\epsilon_i^{tech}. \]

\(^3\)First define the proportion of potential teachers choosing the municipal school in market \( m \), \( Pr_m(M) \). Then define the area \( B(q, \epsilon_i^{tech}, l_i) \) that is such that if \( [\epsilon_i^M \ \epsilon_i^{NT} \ \epsilon_i^H] \in B(q, \epsilon_i^{tech}, l_i) \), an individual with characteristics \( q \), shock realization \( \epsilon_i^{tech} \), and type realization \( l_i \) chooses the municipal school.
C6 List of Moment Conditions

I compute 607 moments, 321 pertaining to parents and 286 to potential teachers.

C6.1 Parents’ Moments: Matching Choices, Test Scores and Fellowship Amounts

I use the following categories:

- family size $nfam_h$: $[2, 3], [4, 6], \geq 7$

- monthly income in terms of CLP100,000 $Y_h$: $[0, 0.5], (0.5, 1.5], (1.5, 2.5], (2.5, 3.5], (3.5, 4.5], (4.5, 5.5], (5.5, 7], (7, 9], (9, 11], > 11$

- average parental education in years $peduc_h$: $[0 – 6.5], (6.5, 8], (8.9.5], (9.5, 10.5], (10.5, 11.5], (11.5, 12], (12, 12.5], (12.5, 13], (13, 14], > 14$

- monthly income in terms of CLP100,000 divided by family size, $\frac{Y_h}{nfam_h}$: $[0, 0.15], (0.15, 0.25], (0.25, 0.36], (0.36, 0.45], (0.45, 0.50], (0.50, 0.70], (0.70, 0.84], (0.84, 1.13], (1.13, 1.75], > 1.75$

I partition the state of observable exogenous variables and build an indicator for whether an observation belongs to a certain element of the partition. The moment conditions are obtained by multiplying the difference between actual and predicted outcomes by this indicator. The moment conditions are built on the following outcomes (number of moment conditions in parentheses):

- Test scores by sector and by:
  - market (18x2=36)
  - monthly income per capita and parental education (10x10x2=200)

- Fraction choosing voucher school by:
  - market (18)
– parental education (10)
– monthly income (10)
– number of individuals in the family (3)
– elementary school (2)
– rurality of the household’s residence (2)

• Private school tuition payments made by parents by:
  – elementary school, number of individuals in the household, rurality of the residence (2x3x2=12)
  – monthly income (10)
  – market (18)

Total number of parents’ moments: 321.

C6.2 Potential Teachers’ Moments: Matching Choices and Accepted Wages

I use the following categories:

• coarse age, $age_i$: [20 – 30], [31 – 40], [41, 50], ≥ 51
• fine age, $age_i$: [20, 31], (31, 36], (36, 39], (39, 45], (45, 48], (48, 52], (52, 56], > 56
• number of children in the household, $nkids_i$: 0, 1, 2, ≥ 3
• number of children aged 0-2, $nkids2_i$: 0, ≥ 1
• number of children aged 3-6, $nkids3 \sim 6_i$: 0, ≥ 1

I partition the state of observable exogenous variables and build an indicator for whether an observation belongs to a certain element of the partition. The moment conditions build on the following outcomes (number of moment conditions in parentheses):
- Accepted wages by sector (3 working options) and by:
  - age, gender, professional certifications (3x4x2x2=48)
  - graduate degree (3x2=6)
  - market (3x18=54)

- Fractions in sector M, V and NT (exclude one sector to avoid multicollinearity and hence singularity of the variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions) by:
  - professional certifications (3x2=6)
  - age, gender, graduate degree (3x4x2x2=48)
  - market (3x18=54)
  - gender, number of kids (3x2x4=24)
  - number of kids up to 2 years of age, age (3x2x4=24)
  - number of kids of age 3 to 6 (3x2=6)

- Accepted wages in the teaching occupations (2) by finer age category (2x8=16)

Total number of potential teachers’ moments: 286.

C7 Details of the First Step of the Estimation

For simplicity, I drop the subscript from \( \theta_{II} \), and refer to the parameters of the second stage of the model, estimated in the first step of the estimation, as \( \theta \). Let \( y_i \) denote an observed outcome for individual \( i \). Let \( \Omega_i \times \{1, ..., L\} \) denote the state space of individual \( i \) with elements \((\omega_i, l_i)\) (where \( l_i \in \{i, ..., L\} \) is the person’s type). Vector \( \omega_i \) contains, for example, degrees, age, gender, etc. Let \( \hat{y}_i(\omega_i, \theta) \) denote the outcome predicted by the model. This outcome is replaced by the simulator:

\[
\tilde{y}_i(\omega_i, \theta) = \frac{1}{S} \sum_{s=1}^{S} \sum_{l=1}^{L} Pr(l_i|\theta) \bar{y}_i(\omega_i, l_i, s, \theta)
\]
obtained by drawing \( S \) simulated shocks from the model’s shock distribution under parameter \( \theta \) and using the model to simulate behavior, and hence an outcome for each individual, simulation, and type: \( \hat{y}_i(\omega_i, l_i, s, \theta) \).\(^4\) The simulated outcomes are then averaged across simulations and types. Moment conditions are constructed by taking the average of the individual difference between the actual and the simulated outcome: \( m_i(\theta) = y_i - \hat{y}_i(\omega_i, \theta) \).

The MSM finds the vector \( \theta \) that minimizes the weighted distance of the empirical moment conditions from zero:

\[
\hat{\theta}_{MSM} = \arg \min_\theta m(\theta)'_n W_n m_n(\theta) \tag{12}
\]

where \( W_n \) is a symmetric positive definite weighting matrix such that as \( n \to \infty, W_n \to W \) in probability with \( W \) symmetric and positive definite. Vector \( m_n(\theta) \) is the sample average of the individual deviations \( m_i(\theta) \).

Estimation accounts for the fact that multiple datasets of different sizes are used. Consider the population moment condition based on outcome \( y_i \):

\[
E \left[ (y_i - \hat{y}_i(\omega_i, \theta)) I_i(\omega_i, y_i \text{ non-missing}) \right]
\]

and suppose that there are \( M \) moment conditions based on the \( M \) deviations \( \{m_1^i, ..., m_M^i\} \), with

\[
m_i^m = (y_i^m - \hat{y}_i^m(\omega_i^m, \theta)) I_i(\omega_i^m, y_i^m \text{ non-missing}).
\]

Let \( m_i \) be a vector that stacks all deviations for individual \( i \). Assume that the population is divided in two strata: the stratum of students, with mass \( H_A \), and the stratum of college graduates, with mass \( H_B \). The \( M \) population moment conditions are:

\[
H_A E_A[m_i] + H_B E_B[m_i]
\]

where \( E_A[\cdot] \) and \( E_B[\cdot] \) represent within-stratum expectations.

---

\(^4\)\( S \) is set equal to 100. The shocks drawn at each simulations are all the preference, wage and technology shocks in the second stage of the model: \( \nu_{hm}^{pref}, \nu_{hj}^{pref}, \epsilon_{iH}^{tech}, \epsilon_{iM}, \epsilon_{iNT} \).
Let $n_A$ be the sample size of students and $n_B$ be the sample size of potential teachers, and let $m_i(\theta)$ be the $M \times 1$ vector of empirical deviations computed at a parameter value $\theta$. The sample analog of the population moment conditions is:

$$H_A \frac{1}{n_A} \sum_{i \in A} w_i m_i(\theta) + H_B \frac{1}{n_B} \sum_{i \in B} w_i m_i(\theta)$$

where $w_i$ are weights provided with the datasets that are used to reweight the sample back to random sampling proportions, and that are normalized to sum to $n_A$ and $n_B$.\(^5\) Let $n = n_A + n_B$ and pre-multiply the sample moments by $\frac{n}{n}$. Denote the vector of empirical moments based on a sample of size $n$ by $m_n(\theta)$:

$$m_n(\theta) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (H_A a_A w_i m_i(\theta) I(i \in A) + H_B a_B w_i m_i(\theta) I(i \in B))$$

where $a_A = \frac{n}{n_A}$, $a_B = \frac{n}{n_B}$ and $I(\cdot)$ is an indicator function equal to 1 if the expression in parentheses is true.

The method of simulated moments finds the vector $\theta$ that minimizes the weighted distance of the empirical moment conditions from zero:

$$\hat{\theta}_{MSM} = \arg \min_{\theta} m_n(\theta)'W_n m_n(\theta)$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

where $W_N$ is an $M \times M$ symmetric positive definite weighting matrix such that as $n \to \infty$, $W_n \to W$ in probability with $W$ symmetric and positive definite.

To see the asymptotic properties of the estimator, let $n_A, n_B \to \infty$ with $\frac{n_A}{n} \to a_A < \infty$ and $\frac{n_B}{n} \to a_B < \infty$ as in Bhattacharya (2005), who derives the asymptotic properties of the generalized method of moments with a stratified sample. The MSM estimator defined in (6) is consistent and asymptotically normal:

$$\sqrt{n}(\hat{\theta} - \theta) \Rightarrow N(0, Q)$$

\(^5\)For SIMCE observations the weights are all equal to one because the SIMCE sample is a simple random sample.
with \( Q = (\Gamma'W_n\Gamma)^{-1}\Gamma'W_nVW_n\Gamma(\Gamma'W_n\Gamma)^{-1} \) and \( \Gamma = E[\frac{\partial m_i(\theta)}{\partial \theta}] \). \( V \) is the variance covariance matrix of the moment vector.\(^6\)

To estimate consistently the asymptotic variance of the estimator, I substitute \( V \) with a consistent estimate \( \hat{V} \) computed at \( \hat{\theta}_{MSM} \). The estimator includes a stratum correction that accounts for the sampling design.\(^7\) The estimator of the variance covariance matrix is:

\[
\hat{V} = \sum_{i \in A} \left( \frac{H_A}{n_A} \right)^2 w_i m_i(\hat{\theta}_{MSM}) m_i(\hat{\theta}_{MSM})' + \sum_{i \in B} \left( \frac{H_B}{n_B} \right)^2 w_i m_i(\hat{\theta}_{MSM}) m_i(\hat{\theta}_{MSM})'
\]

\[
- \frac{1}{n_A} \left( \sum_{i \in A} \frac{H_A}{n_A} w_i m_i(\hat{\theta}_{MSM}) \right) \left( \sum_{i \in A} \frac{H_A}{n_A} w_i m_i(\hat{\theta}_{MSM}) \right)'
\]

\[
- \frac{1}{n_B} \left( \sum_{i \in B} \frac{H_B}{n_B} w_i m_i(\hat{\theta}_{MSM}) \right) \left( \sum_{i \in B} \frac{H_B}{n_B} w_i m_i(\hat{\theta}_{MSM}) \right)'
\]

where \( m_i(\hat{\theta}_{MSM}) \) is the \( M \times 1 \) vector of individual-level deviations between actual and simulate outcomes computed at \( \hat{\theta}_{MSM} \). To estimate consistently the matrix of moments’ partial derivatives, I use:

\[
\hat{\Gamma} = H_A \frac{1}{n_A} \sum_{i \in A} w_i \frac{\partial m_i}{\partial \theta} |_{\hat{\theta}_{MSM}} + H_B \frac{1}{n_B} \sum_{i \in B} w_i \frac{\partial m_i}{\partial \theta} |_{\hat{\theta}_{MSM}}
\]

where the differentiation is numerical. Letting \( \Delta_t \) denote a vector of the same size as the parameter vector with zeros everywhere and \( \delta > 0 \) as its \( t^{th} \) element, the derivative of the

\(^6\)The optimal weighting matrix is the inverse of the variance covariance matrix of the moment conditions, \( W_n^* = V^{-1} \). The asymptotic variance reduces to \( (\Gamma'V^{-1}\Gamma)^{-1} \) when the optimal weighting matrix is used. I cannot adopt the optimal weighting matrix because the variance covariance matrix is a high-order sparse matrix that cannot be numerically inverted. The inverse of the variance covariance matrix must be obtained to compute the standard errors of the efficient MSM estimator. This negative result is standard in numerical methods. I adopt a weighting matrix that contains the variances of the moments on the main diagonal and zeros elsewhere. This matrix is easily invertible.

\(^7\)The correction term is derived and discussed in Bhattacharya (2005). Intuitively, ignoring the fact that observations come from two separate strata would over-estimate the between-strata variances.
$m^{th}$ element of $m_i(\theta)$ with respect to the $t^{th}$ element of $\theta$ is computed as:

$$\frac{\partial \hat{m}_i^m(\theta)}{\partial \theta_t}|_{\theta = \hat{\theta}_{\text{MSM}}} = \frac{-\hat{m}_i^m(\theta + 2\Delta_t) + 8\hat{m}_i^m(\theta + \Delta_t) - 8\hat{m}_i^m(\theta - \Delta_t) + \hat{m}_i^m(\theta - 2\Delta_t)}{12\delta} |_{\theta = \hat{\theta}_{\text{MSM}}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)

**C8 Second Step of the Estimation: Implementing NPSML**

Let $\theta_I = [c_1 \ c_2 \ c_3 \ \sigma_{\text{cost}}]'$ denote the vector of parameters to be estimated in the second step (i.e., the parameters from the first stage of the model), $\hat{\theta}_{II}$ the vector of estimates of $\theta_{II}$ and $\hat{r}_m$ the vector of wage rates obtained in the first step of the estimation. Imagine obtaining a sample of markets, and suppose that for each sampled market, a sample of college graduates making labor supply decisions and of students is available. Denote by $X_m = \{x_1, ..., x_i, ..., x_{NS}\}_{i \in m}$ and $Q_m = \{q_1, ..., q_i, ..., q_{NC}\}_{i \in m}$ the within-market samples of students and of college graduates respectively. Let $(\hat{r}_m, X_m, Q_m)_{m=1, ..., M}$ be an independently and identically distributed sample of markets. The true log-likelihood is:

$$L_M(\theta_I) = \sum_{m=1}^{M} \ln l_m(\theta_I)$$

where $l_m(\theta_I)$ is the market-contribution to the likelihood, i.e., the density of $r$ computed at the observed value $\hat{r}_m$ conditional on the exogenous characteristics in the market, on $\theta_I$ and on $\hat{\theta}_{II}$: $l_m(\theta_I) = f(r|\theta_I, X_d, Q_d; \hat{\theta}_{II})|_{\hat{r}_m}$. The function $l_m(\theta_I)$ cannot be computed analytically, therefore, I approximate it using a kernel estimator based on an i.i.d. simulated sample $(\epsilon_{\text{cost},s})_{s=1, ..., S}$ of draws from the log-normal distribution of $\epsilon_{\text{cost}}$.

Denote by $\hat{r}_m^s(\theta_I)$ the simulated wage rate in market $m$ given a value for $\theta_I$, and conditional on $\hat{\theta}_{II}, X_m, Q_m$. The $s$ superscript means that for every simulated draw $s$, the wage rate is derived as a solution to private school profit maximization. I estimate the likelihood $l_m(\theta_I)$ by:
\[ \hat{l}_S(\hat{r}_m|X_m, Q_m, \theta_I; \hat{\theta}_I) = \hat{l}_{mS}(\theta_I) = \frac{1}{S} \sum_{s=1}^{S} K \left( \frac{\hat{r}_m - \hat{r}_m^s(\theta_I)}{h} \right) \]

where \( K(\cdot) \) is the normal kernel and \( h \) is the optimal bandwidth that minimizes the approximate Integrated Mean Squared Error, and it is such that \( h \to 0 \) as \( S \to \infty \).

The simulated log-likelihood is obtained by summing over markets:

\[ \tilde{L}_{MS}(\theta_I) = \sum_{m=1}^{M} \ln \tilde{l}_{mS}(\theta_I) \]

and the NPSML estimator is defined as the global maximum of \( \tilde{L}_{MS}(\theta_I) \):

\[ \hat{\theta}_I(M, S) = \arg \max_{\theta_I \in \Theta_I} \tilde{L}_{MS}(\theta_I), \]

where \( \Theta_I \) is assumed to be compact. Under regularity conditions, \( \hat{\theta}_I(M, S) \) is asymptotically normal and asymptotically efficient:

\[ \sqrt{D}(\hat{\theta}_I(M, S) - \theta_{I,0}) \xrightarrow{S,M \to \infty} N(0, \Omega), \]

where \( \Omega \) is the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the exact maximum likelihood estimator:

\[ \Omega = \left( -E \left[ \frac{\partial^2 L_M(\theta_{I,0})}{\partial \theta_2 \partial \theta'_1} \right] \right)^{-1} E \left[ \frac{\partial L_M(\theta_{I,0})}{\partial \theta_I} \frac{\partial L_M(\theta_{I,0})}{\partial \theta'_I} \right] \left( -E \left[ \frac{\partial^I L_M(\theta_{I,0})}{\partial \theta_I \partial \theta'_I} \right] \right)^{-1}. \quad (16) \]
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