Reverse Engineering of Generative Models: Inferring Model Hyperparameters From Generated Images

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Abstract—State-of-the-art (SOTA) Generative Models (GMs) can synthesize photo-realistic images that are hard for humans to distinguish from genuine photos. Identifying and understanding manipulated media are crucial to mitigate the social concerns on the potential misuse of GMs. We propose to perform reverse engineering of GMs to infer model hyperparameters from the images generated by these models. We define a novel problem, “model parsing”, as estimating GM network architectures and training loss functions by examining their generated images—a task seemingly impossible for human beings. To tackle this problem, we propose a framework with two components: a Fingerprint Estimation Network (FEN), which estimates a GM fingerprint from a generated image by training with four constraints to encourage the fingerprint to have desired properties, and a Parsing Network (PN), which predicts network architecture and loss functions from the estimated fingerprints. To evaluate our approach, we collect a fake image dataset with 100 K images generated by 116 different GMs. Extensive experiments show encouraging results in parsing the hyperparameters of the unseen models. Finally, our fingerprint estimation can be leveraged for deepfake detection and image attribution, as we show by reporting SOTA results on both the deepfake detection (Celeb-DF) and image attribution benchmarks.

Index Terms—Reverse engineering, fingerprint estimation, generative models, deepfake detection, image attribution.

I. INTRODUCTION

IMAGE generation techniques have improved significantly in recent years, especially after the breakthrough of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [1]. Many Generative Models (GMs), including both GAN and Variational Autoencoder (VAE) [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], can generate photo-realistic images that are hard for humans to distinguish from genuine photos. This photo-realism, however, raises increasing concerns for the potential misuse of these models, e.g., by launching coordinated misinformation attacks [9], [10]. As a result, deepfake detection [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16] has recently attracted growing attention. Going beyond the binary genuine versus fake classification as in deepfake detection, Yu et al. [17] proposed source model classification given a generated image. This image attribution problem assumes a closed set of GMs, used in both training and testing.

It is desirable to generalize image attribution to open-set recognition, i.e., classify an image generated by GMs which were not seen during training. However, one may wonder what else we can do beyond recognizing a GM as an unseen or new model. Can we know more about how this new GM was designed? How its architecture differs from known GMs in the training set? Answering these questions is valuable when we, as defenders, strive to understand the source of images generated by malicious attackers or identify coordinated misinformation attacks which use the same GM. We view this as the grand challenge of reverse engineering of GMs.

While image attribution of GMs is both exciting and challenging, our work aims to take one step further with the following observation. When different GMs are designed, they mainly differ in their model hyperparameters, including the network architectures (e.g., the number of layers/blocks, the type of normalization) and training loss functions. If we could map the generated images to the embedding space of the model hyperparameters used to generate them, there is a potential to tackle a new problem we termed as model parsing, i.e., estimating hyperparameters of an unseen GM from only its generated image (Fig. 1). Reverse engineering machine learning models has been done before by relying on a model’s input and output [18], [19], or accessing the hardware usage during inference [20], [21]. To the best of our knowledge, however, reverse engineering has not been explored for GMs, especially with only generated images as input.

There are many publicly available GMs that generate images of diverse contents, including faces, digits, and generic scenes. To improve the generalization of model parsing, we collect a large-scale fake image dataset with various contents so that our framework is not specific to a particular content. It consists of images generated from 116 CNN-based GMs, including 81 GANs, 13 VAEs, 6 Adversarial Attack models (AAs), 11 Auto-Regressive models (ARs) and 5 Normalizing Flow models (NFs). While GANs or VAEs generate an image by feeding a genuine image or latent code to the network, ARs modify a genuine image based on its objectives via back-propagation. ARs generate each pixel of a fake image sequentially, and NFs generate images via a flow-based function. Despite such differences, we call all these models as GMs for simplicity. For each GM, our dataset includes 1,000 generated images. We use

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In summary, this paper makes the following contributions.

- We are the first to go beyond model classification by formulating a novel problem of model parsing for GMs.
- We propose a novel framework with fingerprint estimation and clustering of GMs to predict the network architecture and loss functions, given a single generated image.
- We assemble a dataset of generated images from 116 GMs, including ground-truth labels on the network architectures and loss function types.
- We show promising results for model parsing and our fingerprint estimation generalizes well to deepfake detection and image attribution. Although our FEN is not tailored for these tasks, we still achieve state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance, indicating the superior generalization ability of our fingerprint estimation.
- Finally, in coordinated misinformation attack, attackers may use the same GM to generate multiple fake images. To detect such attacks, we also define a new task to evaluate how well our model parsing results can be used to determine if two fake images are generated from the same GM.

II. RELATED WORK

Reverse engineering of models: There is a growing area of interest in reverse engineering the hyperparameters of machine learning models, with two types of approaches. First, some methods treat a model as a black box API by examining its input and output pairs. For example, Tramer et al. [18] developed an avatar method to estimate training data and model architectures, while Oh et al. [19] trained a set of white-box models to estimate model hyperparameters. The second type of approach assumes that the intermediate hardware information is available during model inference. Hua et al. [20] estimated both the structure and the weights of a CNN model running on a hardware accelerator, by using information leaks of memory access patterns. Batina et al. [21] estimated the network architecture by using side-channel information such as timing and electromagnetic emanations.
Unlike prior methods which require access to the models or their inputs, our approach can reverse engineer GMs by examining only the images generated by these models, making it more suitable for real-world applications. We summarize our approach with previous works in Table I.

**Fingerprint estimation:** Every acquisition device leaves a subtle but unique pattern on its captured image, due to manufacturing imperfections. Such patterns are referred to as device fingerprints. Device fingerprint estimation [27], [35] was extended to fingerprint estimation of GMs by Marra et al. [22], who showed that hand-crafted fingerprints are unique to each GM and can be used to identify an image’s source. Ning et al. [17] extended this idea to learning-based fingerprint estimation. Both methods rely on the noise signals in the image. Others explored frequency domain information. For example, Wang et al. [23] showed that CNN generated images have unique patterns in their frequency domain, regarded as model fingerprints. Zhang et al. [24] showed that features extracted from the middle and high frequencies of the spectrum domain were useful in detecting upsampling artifacts produced by GANs.

Unlike prior methods which derive fingerprints directly from noise signals or the frequency domain, we propose several novel loss functions to learn GM fingerprints in an unsupervised manner (Table I). We further show that our fingerprint estimation can generalize well to other related tasks.

**Deepfake detection:** Deepfake detection is a new and active field with many recent developments. Rossler et al. [11] evaluated different methods for detecting face and mouth replacement manipulation. Others proposed SVM classifiers on colour difference features [12]. Guarnera et al. [13] used Expectation Maximization [36] algorithm to extract features and convolution traces for classification. Marra et al. [14] proposed a multi-task incremental learning to classify new GAN generated images. Chai et al. [37] introduced a patch-based classifier to exaggerate regions that are more easily detectable. An attention mechanism [38] was proposed by Hao et al. [15] to improve the performance of deepfake detection. Masi et al. [25] amplifies the artifacts produced by deepfake methods to perform the detection. Nirkin et al. [16] seek discrepancies between face regions and their context [39] as telltale signs of manipulation. Finally, Liu [26] uses the spatial information as an additional channel for the classifier. In our work, the estimated fingerprint is fed into a classifier for genuine vs. fake classification.

### III. Proposed Approach

In this section, we first introduce our collected dataset in Section III-A. We then present the fingerprint estimation method in Section III-B and model parsing in Section III-C. Finally, we apply our estimated fingerprints to deepfake detection, image attribution, and detecting coordinated misinformation attacks, as described in Section III-D.

#### A. Data Collection

We make the first attempt to study the model parsing problem. Since data drives research, it is essential to collect a dataset for our new research problem. Given the large number of GMs published in recent years [40], [41], we consider a few factors while deciding which GMs to be included in our dataset. First of all, since it is desirable to study if model parsing is content-dependent, we hope to collect GMs with as diverse content as possible, such as the face, digits, and generic scenes. Second, we give preference to GMs where either the authors have publicly released pre-trained models, generated images, or the training script. Third, the network architecture of the GM should be clearly described in the respective paper.

To this end, we assemble a list of 116 publicly available GMs, including ProGan [4], StyleGAN [2], and others. A complete list is provided in the supplementary material, available online. For each GM, we collect 1,000 generated images. Therefore, our dataset \( D \) comprises of 116,000 images. We show example images in Fig. 2. These GMs were trained on datasets

| Method (Year) | Purpose | Input | Output | Fing. est. | Test on mul. GMs | Test on un. GMs | Test on mul. data |
|---------------|---------|-------|--------|------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|
| [18] (2016)   | R.E.    | Attack on models | Training data | X | X | X | X |
| [19] (2018)   | R.E.    | Input-output images | N.A. para. | X | X | X | X |
| [20] (2018)   | R.E.    | Memory access patterns | Model weights | X | X | X | X |
| [21] (2018)   | R.E.    | Electromagnetic emanations | N.A. para. | X | X | X | X |
| [22] (2019)   | I.A.    | Image | Sup. | X | X | X | X |
| [17] (2019)   | I.A.    | Image | Sup. | X | X | X | X |
| [23] (2020)   | I.A.    | Image | Sup. | X | X | X | X |
| [24] (2019)   | I.A.    | Image | Sup. | X | X | X | X |
| [11] (2019)   | D.D.    | Image | Sup. | X | X | X | X |
| [13] (2020)   | D.D.    | Image | Sup. | X | X | X | X |
| [12] (2019)   | D.D.    | Image | Sup. | X | X | X | X |
| [14] (2019)   | D.D.    | Image | Sup. | X | X | X | X |
| [15] (2020)   | D.D.    | Image | Sup. | X | X | X | X |
| [16] (2020)   | D.D.    | Image | Sup. | X | X | X | X |
| [25] (2020)   | D.D.    | Image | Sup. | X | X | X | X |
| [26] (2021)   | D.D.    | Image | Sup. | X | X | X | X |
| Ours (2022)   | R.E., I.A., D.D. | Image | N.A. & L.F. para. | X | X | X | X |

We compare on the basis of input and output of methods, whether the testing is done on multiple unseen GMs and whether the testing is done on multiple datasets. [KEYS: R.E.: reverse engineering, I.A.: image attribution, D.D.: deepfake detection, Fing. est.: fingerprint estimation, mul.: multiple, un.: unknown, N.A.: network architecture, L.F.: Loss function, para.: parameters, sup.: supervised, unsup.: unsupervised].
with various contents, such as CelebA [42], MNIST [43], CIFAR10 [44], ImageNet [45], facades [46], edges2shoes [46], and apple2oranges [46]. The dataset is available here.

We further document the model hyperparameters for each GM as reported in their papers. Specifically, we investigate two aspects: network architecture and training loss functions. We form a super-set of 15 network architecture parameters (e.g., number of layers, normalization type) and 10 different loss function types. We obtain a large-scale fake image dataset (one image per model).

![Example images generated by all 116 GMs in our collected dataset](image)

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![Example images generated by all 116 GMs in our collected dataset](image)

2) Ground Truth Hyperparameters. Network architecture: In this work, we do not aim to recover the network parameters. The reason is that a typical deep network has millions of network parameters, which reside in a very high dimensional space and is thus hard to predict. Instead, we propose to infer the
hyperparameters that define the network architecture, which are much fewer than the network parameters. Motivated by prior works in neural architecture search [49], [50], [51], we form a set of 15 network architecture parameters covering various aspects of architectures. As shown in Table II, these parameters fall into different data types and have different ranges. We further split the network architecture parameters $y^{\text{arc}}$ into two parts: $y^{\text{arc}} \in \mathbb{R}^9$ for continuous data type and $y^{\text{arc}} \in \mathbb{R}^6$ for discrete data type.

**Loss function:** In addition to the network architectures, the learned network parameters of trained GM can also impact the fingerprints left on the generated images. These network parameters are determined mainly by the training data and the loss functions used to train these models. We, therefore, explore the possibility of also predicting the training loss functions from the estimated fingerprints. The 116 GMs were trained with 10 types of loss functions as shown in Table III. For each model, we compose a ground-truth vector $y^l \in \mathbb{R}^{10}$, where each element is a binary value indicating whether the corresponding loss is used or not in training this model.

Our framework parses two types of hyperparameters: continuous and discrete. The former includes the continuous network architecture parameters. The latter includes discrete network parameters.

**TABLE II**

| Parameter | Type     | Range   | Parameter | Type     | Range   | Parameter | Type     | Range   |
|-----------|----------|---------|-----------|----------|---------|-----------|----------|---------|
| # layers  | cont.int | [5, 95] | # filters | cont.int | [0, 835] | non-linearity type in blocks | multi-class | 0, 1, 2, 3 |
| # convolutional layers | cont.int | [0, 92] | # parameters | cont.int | [0.36M, 267M] | non-linearity type in last layer | multi-class | 0, 1, 2, 3 |
| # fully connected layers | cont.int | [0, 40] | # blocks | cont.int | [0, 16] | up-sampling type | binary | 0, 1 |
| # pooling layers | cont.int | [0, 4] | # layers per block | cont.int | [0, 9] | skip connection | binary | 0, 1 |
| # normalization layers | cont.int | [0, 57] | normalization type | multi-class | 0, 1, 2, 3 | down-sampling | binary | 0, 1 |

KEYS: cont. int.: continuous integer.
where $\mu_i$ is the mean of the ground truth of the GMs in $C_i$.

Our dataset comprises different kinds of GMs, namely GANs, VAEs, AA, ARs, and NFs. We perform clustering after separating the training data into different kinds of GMs. This is done to ensure that each cluster would belong to one particular kind of GM. Next, we select the value of $k$ i.e., the number of clusters, using the elbow method adopted by previous works [52], [53]. After determining the clusters comprising of similar GMs, we estimate the ground truth $y_c$ to represent the respective cluster. We estimate this cluster ground truth using different ways for continuous and discrete parameters. For the former, we take the average of each parameter using the ground truth for all GMs in the respective cluster. For the latter, we perform majority voting for every parameter to find the most common class across all GMs in the cluster.

We use different loss functions to perform cluster-level prediction. For continuous parameters, we perform regression for parameter estimation. As these parameters are in different ranges, we further perform a min-max normalization to bring all parameters to the range of $[0, 1]$. An $L_2$ loss is used to estimate the prediction error

$$J_C^u = \| \hat{y}_C^u - y_C^u \|^2_2,$$  (7)

where $\hat{y}_C^u$ is the cluster mean prediction and $y_C^u$ is the normalized ground-truth cluster mean.

For discrete parameters, the prediction is made via individual classifiers. Specifically, we train $M = 16$ classifiers (6 for network architecture and 10 for loss function parameters), one for each discrete parameter. The loss term for discrete parameters cluster-prediction is defined as

$$J_D^u = -\sum_{m=1}^{M} \sum_{d} \text{sum} \left( y_{d_{gm}} \odot \text{log} \left( S \left( \hat{y}_{d_{gm}}^u \right) \right) \right),$$  (8)

where $y_{d_{gm}}$ is the ground-truth one-hot vector for the respective class in the $n$th discrete type parameter, $\hat{y}_{d_{gm}}^u$ are the class logits, $S$ is the Softmax function that maps the class logits into the range of $[0,1]$, $\odot$ is the element-wise multiplication, and sum() computes the summation of a vector’s elements.

As shown in Fig. 4, the clustering constraint is given by

$$J_u = \gamma_1 J_C^u + \gamma_2 J_D^u,$$  (9)

where $\gamma_1$ and $\gamma_2$ are the loss weights for each term.

3) Instance Parser Prediction: The cluster parser performs coarse-level prediction. To obtain a more fine-level prediction, we use an instance parser to estimate a GM-level prediction, which ignores any similarity among GMs. This parser aims to predict the deviation of every parameter from the coarse-level prediction. The ground truth deviation vector $y_v$ can be estimated in different ways for two types of parameters. For continuous type parameters, the deviation can be the difference between the ground truth of the GM and the ground truth of the cluster the GM was assigned. However, in the case of discrete parameters, the actual ground truth class for the parameters can act as the deviation from the most common class estimated in cluster ground truth. We use different loss functions to perform deviation-level prediction. Specifically, we use an $L_2$ loss to

| Category   | Loss function                                                                 |
|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Pixel-level| $L_1$, $L_2$ Mean squared error (MSE), Maximum mean discrepancy (MMD), Least squares (LS) |
| Discriminator | Wasserstein loss for GAN (WGAN), Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence, Adversarial, Hinge |
| Classification | Cross-entropy (CE) |

We group the 10 loss functions into three categories. We use the binary representation to indicate presence of each loss type in training the respective GM.

![Diagram of grouping various GMs into different clusters.](image-url)
estimate the prediction error for continuous parameters

\[ J_c^d = ||\hat{y}_c^d - y_c^d||_2^2, \]

(10)

where \( \hat{y}_c^d \) is the deviation prediction and \( y_c^d \) is the deviation ground-truth of continuous data type.

We have noticed the class distribution for some discrete parameters is imbalanced. Therefore, we apply the weighted cross-entropy loss for every parameter to handle this challenge. We train \( M = 16 \) classifiers, one for each of the discrete parameters. For the \( m^{\text{th}} \) classifier with \( N_m \) classes (\( N_m = 2 \) or \( 4 \) in our case), we calculate a loss weight for each class as \( w_{m}^i = \frac{N}{N_m} \)

where \( N_m \) is the number of training examples for the \( m^{\text{th}} \) class of \( m^{\text{th}} \) classifier, and \( N \) is the number of total training examples.

As a result, the class with more examples is down-weighted, and the class with fewer examples is up-weighted to overcome the imbalance issue, which will be empirically demonstrated in Fig. 9. The loss term for discrete parameters deviation-prediction is defined as

\[ J_d^c = - \sum_{m=1}^{M} \text{sum} \left( w_m \odot y_m^d \odot \log \left( S \left( \hat{y}_m^d \right) \right) \right), \]

(11)

where \( y_m^d \) is the ground-truth one-hot deviation vector for the \( m^{\text{th}} \) classifier, \( w_m \) is a weight vector for all classes in the \( m^{\text{th}} \) classifier and \( \hat{y}_m^d \) are the class logits.

As shown in Fig. 4, the deviation constraint is given by

\[ J_v = \gamma_3 J_C^c + \gamma_4 J_d^c, \]

(12)

where \( \gamma_3 \) and \( \gamma_4 \) are the loss weights for each term.

4) Combining Predictions: We use a cluster parser to perform a coarse-level mean prediction and an instance parser to predict a deviation prediction for each GM. The final prediction of our framework, i.e., the prediction at the fine-level is the combination of the outputs of these two parsers. For continuous parameters, we perform the element-wise addition of the coarse-level mean and deviation prediction

\[ \hat{y}^c = \hat{y}_u^c + \hat{y}_v^c, \]

(13)

For discrete parameters, we have observed that element-wise addition of the logits for every classifier in both parsers didn’t perform well. Therefore, to integrate the outputs, we train an encoder network to predict a fusion parameter \( \hat{p}^d \in [0,1] \) for each classifier. For any parameter, the value of the fusion parameter is 1 if the cluster class is the same as the GM class, encouraging the parsing network to give importance to the cluster parser output. The value of the fusion parameter is 0 if the GM class is different from the cluster class. Therefore, for \( m^{\text{th}} \) classifier, the training of the model is supervised by the ground truth \( p_m^d \) as defined below

\[ p_m^d = \begin{cases} 1, & y_m^d = y_m^d \\ 0, & y_m^d \neq y_m^d \end{cases} \]

(14)

To train our encoder, we use the ground truth fusion parameter \( p^d \) which is the concatenation for all parameters. The training is done via cross-entropy loss as shown below

\[ J_p = - \sum_{m=1}^{M} \left( p_m^d \log \left( G \left( \hat{p}_m^d \right) \right) + \left( 1 - p_m^d \right) \log \left( 1 - G \left( \hat{p}_m^d \right) \right) \right), \]

(15)

where \( G \) is the Sigmoid function that maps the class logits into the range of \([0,1]\).

As shown in Fig. 4 for discrete parameters, the final prediction is given by

\[ \hat{y}^d = \hat{p}^d \odot \hat{y}_u^d + \left( 1 - \hat{p}^d \right) \odot \hat{y}_v^d. \]

(16)

The overall loss function for model parsing is given by

\[ J = J_f + J_u + J_v + \gamma_5 J_p, \]

(17)

where \( \gamma_5 \) is the loss weight for fusion constraint. Our framework is trained end-to-end with fingerprint estimation (5) and model parsing (17).

D. Other Applications

In addition to model parsing, our fingerprint estimation can be easily leveraged for other applications such as detecting coordinated misinformation attacks, deepfake detection and image attribution.

**Coordinated misinformation attack:** In coordinated misinformation attacks, the attackers often use the same model to generate multiple fake images. One way to detect such attacks is to classify whether two fake images are generated from the same GM, despite that this GM might be unseen to the classifier. This task is not straightforward to perform by prior works. However, given the ability of our model parsing, this is the ideal task that we can contribute. To perform this binary classification task, we use the parsed network architecture and loss function parameters to calculate the similarity score between two test images. We calculate the cosine similarity for continuous type parameters and fraction of the number of parameters having same class for discrete type. Both cosine similarity and fraction of parameters are averaged to get the similarity score. Comparing the cosine similarity with a threshold will lead to the binary classification decision of whether two images come from the same GM or not.

**Deepfake detection:** We consider the binary classification of an image as either genuine or fake. We add a shallow network on the generated fingerprint to predict the probabilities of being genuine or fake. The shallow network consists of five convolution layers and two fully connected layers. Both genuine and fake face images are used for training. Both FEN and the shallow network are trained end-to-end with the proposed fingerprint constraints (5) and a cross-entropy loss for genuine versus fake classification. Note that the fingerprint constraints (5) are not applied to the genuine input face images.

**Image attribution:** We aim to learn a mapping from a given image to the model that generated it if it is fake or classified as genuine otherwise. All models are known during training. We solve image attribution as a closed-set classification problem. Similar to deepfake detection, we add a shallow network on
the generated fingerprint for model classification with the cross-entropy loss. The shallow network consists of two convolutional layers and two fully connected layers.

IV. EXPERIMENTS

A. Settings

Dataset: As described in Section III-A, we have collected a fake image dataset consisting of 116 K images from 116 GMs (1 K images per model) for model parsing experiments. These models can be split into two parts: 47 face models and 69 non-face models. Instead of performing one split of training and testing sets, we carefully construct four different splits with a focus on curating well-represented test sets. Specifically, each testing set includes six GANs, two VAEs, two ARs, one AA and one NF model. We perform cross-validation to train on 104 models and evaluate on the remaining 12 models in testing sets. The performance is averaged across four testing sets.

For deepfake detection experiments, we conduct experiments on the recently released Celeb-DF dataset [34], consisting of 590 real and 5,639 fake videos. For image attribution experiments, a source database with genuine images needs to be selected, from which the fake images can be generated by various GAN models. We select two source datasets: CelebA [34] and LSUN [54], for two experiments. From each source dataset, we construct a training set of 100 K genuine and 100 K fake face images produced by each of the same four GAN models used in Yu et al. [17], and a testing set with 10 K genuine and 10 K fake images per model.

Implementation details: Our framework is trained end-to-end with the loss functions of (5) and (17). The loss weights are set to make the magnitudes of all loss terms comparable: \(\lambda_1 = 0.05\), \(\lambda_2 = 0.001\), \(\lambda_3 = 0.1\), \(\lambda_4 = 1\), \(\gamma_1 = 5\), \(\gamma_2 = 5\), \(\gamma_3 = 5\), \(\gamma_4 = 5\), \(\gamma_5 = 5\), \(\gamma_6 = 5\), \(\gamma_7 = 1\), \(\gamma_8 = 1\). The value of \(f\) for spectrum loss and repetitive loss in the fingerprint estimation is set to 50.

For each of the four test sets, we calculate the number of clusters \(k\) using the elbow method. We divide the data into different GM types and perform k-means clustering separately for each type. According to the sets defined in the supplementary, available online, we obtain the value of \(k\) as 11, 11, 15, and 13. We use Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.0001. Our framework is trained with a batch size of 32 for 10 epochs. All the experiments are conducted using NVIDIA Tesla K80 GPUs.

Evaluation metrics: For continuous type parameters, we report the \(L_1\) error for the regression estimation of continuous type parameters. We also report the p-value of t-test, correlation coefficient, coefficient of determination [55] and slope of the RANSAC regression line for continuous type parameters. For discrete parameters, we use F1 score and classification accuracy. We also show the standard deviation over all the test samples for \(L_1\) error. The first value is the standard deviation across sets, while the second one is across the samples. The p-value would be estimated for every ours-baseline pair. Our method performs better for both types of variables compared to the three baselines. [KEYS: corr.: correlation, coef.: coefficient, det.: determination].

| Method            | Continuous type | Discrete type |
|-------------------|-----------------|---------------|
|                   | \(L_1\) error \(\|\) | P-value \(\|\) | Corr. coef. \(\|\) | Coef. of det. \(\|\) | Slope \(\|\) | F1 score \(\|\) | Accuracy \(\|\) |
| Random ground-truth | 0.184 ± 0.019/0.036 | 0.006 ± 0.001 | 0.261 ± 0.181 | 0.315 ± 0.095 | 0.592 ± 0.041 | 0.529 ± 0.078 | 0.675 ± 0.097 |
| Mean MODE         | 0.164 ± 0.011/0.016 | 0.035 ± 0.005 | 0.326 ± 0.112 | 0.467 ± 0.015 | 0.632 ± 0.024 | 0.612 ± 0.048 | 0.604 ± 0.046 |
| No fingerprint    | 0.170 ± 0.035/0.012 | 0.017 ± 0.004 | 0.738 ± 0.014 | 0.605 ± 0.152 | 0.892 ± 0.021 | 0.700 ± 0.032 | 0.663 ± 0.104 |
| Using one parser  | 0.161 ± 0.028/0.035 | 0.032 ± 0.002 | 0.236 ± 0.030 | 0.512 ± 0.116 | 0.524 ± 0.075 | 0.607 ± 0.034 | 0.534 ± 0.104 |
| Ours              | 0.149 ± 0.019/0.014 | - | 0.744 ± 0.098 | 0.612 ± 0.161 | 0.921 ± 0.021 | 0.718 ± 0.036 | 0.706 ± 0.040 |

We use \(L_1\) error, p-value, correlation coefficient, coefficient of determination and slope of RANSAC regression line for continuous type parameters. For discrete parameters, we use F1 score and classification accuracy. We also show the standard deviation over all the test samples for \(L_1\) error. The first value is the standard deviation across sets, while the second one is across the samples. The p-value would be estimated for every ours-baseline pair. Our method performs better for both types of variables compared to the three baselines.
We report the results of what is the performance desired for practical usage. The error and F1 score for continuous and discrete parameters respectively of network architecture averaged across all images of all models in the 4 test sets. Not only we have better average performance, but also our standard deviations are smaller.

Network architecture prediction: We report the results of network architecture prediction in Table IV for the 4 testing sets, as defined in Section IV-A. Our method achieves a much lower $L_1$ error compared to the random ground-truth baseline for continuous type parameters and higher classification accuracy and F1 score for discrete type parameters. This result indicates that there is indeed a much stronger and generalized correlation between generated images and the embedding space of meaningful architecture hyper-parameters and loss function types, compared to a random vector of the same length and distribution. This correlation is the foundation of why model parsing of GMs can be a valid and feasible task. Our approach also outperforms the mean/mode baseline, proving that always predicting the mean of the data for continuous parameters is not good enough. Removing fingerprint estimation objectives leads to worse results showing the importance of the fingerprint estimation in model parsing. We demonstrate the effectiveness of estimating mean and deviation by evaluating the performance of using just one parser. Our method clearly outperforms the approach of using one parser.

Fig. 6 shows the detailed $L_1$ error and F1 score for all network architecture parameters. We observe that our method performs substantially better than the random ground-truth baseline for almost all parameters. As for the no fingerprint and using one parser baselines, our method is still better in most cases with a few parameters showing similar results. We also show the standard deviation of every estimated parameter for all the methods. Similar behaviour of standard deviation for all the methods was observed as in the network architecture. Our method performs better than all the three baselines.

Fig. 7 shows the detailed $L_1$ error differences between our method and the baseline method is sampled from zero-mean Gaussian. This p-value would be estimated for every ours-baseline pair. We report the mean and the standard deviation across all four sets. The p-value of our approach when compared to all the three baselines is less than 0.05, thereby rejecting the null hypothesis and proving our improvement is statistically significant. For other three metrics, the values closer to 1 shows effective regression. For our method, we have slope of 0.921, correlation coefficient of 0.744 and coefficient of determination as 0.612 which shows the effectiveness of our approach. Further, our approach outperforms all the baselines for all three metrics.

Loss function prediction: We calculate the F1 score and classification accuracy for loss function parameters. The performance are shown in Table V. For the random ground-truth baseline, the performance is close to a random guess. Our approach performs much better than all the baselines. Fig. 7 shows the detailed F1 score for all loss function parameters. Apparently our method works better than all the baselines for almost all parameters. We also show the standard deviation of every estimated parameter for all the methods. Similar behaviour of standard deviation for different methods was observed as in the network architecture. Fig. 8 provides another perspective of model parsing by showing the performance in terms of 48 unique GMs across our 4 testing sets.

Practical Usage of Model Parsing: As our work is the first one to propose the task of model parsing, it’s beneficial to ask the question: what is the performance desired for practical usage of model parsing in the real world? To answer this question, we can expect that an error less than 10% can be considered useful for the practical application of model parsing. The rationale is the following. We consider two of the most similar generative models, RSGAN_HALF and RSGAN_QUAR, in our dataset.

Table V: F1 score and classification accuracy for loss type prediction

| Method                  | Loss function prediction | Classification accuracy |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| Random ground-truth     | 0.696 ± 0.017            | 0.716 ± 0.028           |
| Mean/mode               | 0.751 ± 0.027            | 0.736 ± 0.056           |
| No fingerprint          | 0.800 ± 0.116            | 0.763 ± 0.079           |
| Using one parser        | 0.687 ± 0.036            | 0.633 ± 0.052           |
| Ours                    | 0.813 ± 0.019            | 0.792 ± 0.021           |

Our method performs better than all the three baselines.
Fig. 8. Performance of all GMs in our 4 testing sets. Similar performance trends are observed for network architecture and loss functions, i.e., if the $L_1$ error is small for continuous type parameters in network architecture, the high F1 score is also observed for discrete type parameters in network architecture and loss function. In other words, the abilities to reverse engineer the network architecture and loss function types for one GM are reasonably consistent.

Upon further analysis, we observe that these models differ in only 2 out of 15 parameters. Therefore, we argue that an error rate below 10% is reasonable for practical purposes as this error is less than the difference between the two most similar generative models. Therefore, for the task of model parsing, we expect $L_1$ error of less than 0.1 and an F1 score of over 90% for practical usage. Our proposed approach achieves an $L_1$ error slightly above 10% (0.14) and an F1 score of 80%, both of which have reasonable margins toward the above mentioned thresholds.

C. Ablation Study

Face versus non-face GMs: Our dataset consists of 47 GMs trained on face datasets and 69 GMs trained on non-face datasets. Let’s denote these GMs as face GMs and non-face GMs, respectively. All aforementioned experiments are conducted by training on 104 GMs and evaluating on 12 GMs. Here we conduct an ablation study to train and evaluate on different types of GMs. We study the performance on face and non-face testing GMs when training on three different training sets, including only face GMs, only non-face GMs and all GMs. Note that all testing GMs are excluded during training each time. We also add a baseline where both regression and classification make a random guess on their estimation.

The results are shown in Table VI. We have three observations. First, model parsing for non-face GMs are easier than face GMs. This might be partially due to the generally lower-quality images generated by non-face GMs compared to those by face GMs, thus more traces are remained for model parsing. Second, training and testing on the same content can generate better results than on the different contents. Third, training on the full datasets improves some parameter estimation but may hurt other parameters slightly.

Weighted cross-entropy loss: As mentioned before, the ground truth of many network hyperparameters have biased distributions. For example, the “normalization type” parameter in Table II has uneven distribution among its 4 possible types. With this biased distribution, our classifier might make a constant prediction to the type with the highest probability in the ground truth, as this could minimize the loss especially for severe biasness. This degenerate classifier clearly has no value to model parsing. To address this issue, we propose to use the weighted cross-entropy loss with different loss weights for each class. These weights are calculated using the ground-truth distribution of every parameter in the full dataset. To validate if the above approach is able to remedy this issue, we compare it with the standard cross-entropy loss.

Fig. 9 shows the confusion matrix for discrete type parameters in network architecture prediction and coarse/fine level parameters in loss function prediction. The rows in the confusion matrix are represented by predicted classes and columns are represented by the ground-truth classes. We clearly see that the classifier is...
mostly biased towards more frequent classes in all 4 examples, when the standard cross-entropy loss is used. However, this problem is remedied when using the weighted cross-entropy loss, and the classifiers make meaningful predictions.

**Fingerprint losses:** We proposed four loss terms in Section III-B to guide the training of the fingerprint estimation including magnitude loss, spectrum loss, repetitive loss and energy loss. We conduct an ablation study to demonstrate the importance of these four losses in our proposed method. This includes four experiments, each removing one of the loss terms and comparing the performance with our proposed method (remove nothing) and no fingerprint baseline (remove all). As shown in Table VII, removing any loss for fingerprint estimation hurts the performance. Our “no fingerprint” baseline, for which we remove all losses, performs worst of all. Therefore, each loss clearly has a positive effect on the fingerprint estimation and model parsing.

**Model parsing with multiple images:** We evaluate model parsing when varying the number of test images. For each GM, we randomly select 1, 10, 100, and 500 images per GM from different face GMs sets for evaluation. With multiple images per GM, we average the prediction for continuous type parameters and take majority voting for discrete type parameters and loss function parameters. We compute the $L_1$ error and F1 score for respective parameters. Table VIII shows noticeable gains when increasing the number of images for evaluation from 1 to 10. Performance becomes stable for more than 10 images. We also show the standard deviation over all the test samples for $L_1$ error. The first value is the standard deviation across all images, while the second one is the standard deviation across sets, while the second one is across the samples.
Fig. 10. Estimated fingerprints (left) and corresponding frequency spectrum (right) from one generated image of each of 116 GMs. Many frequency spectrums show distinct high-frequency signals, while some appear to be similar to each other.

Content-independent fingerprint: Ideally our estimated fingerprint should be independent of the content of the image. That is, the fingerprint only includes the trace left by the GM while not indicating the content in any way. To validate this, we partition all GMs into four classes based on their contents: FACES (47 GMs), MNIST (25), CIFAR10 (31), and OTHER (13). Every class has images generated by the GMs belong to this class. We feed these images to a pre-trained FEN and obtain their fingerprints. Then we train a shallow network consisting of five convolutional layers and two fully connected layers for a 4-way classification. However, we observe the training cannot converge. This means that our estimated fingerprint from FEN doesn’t have any content-specific properties for content classification. As a result, the model parsing of the hyperparameters doesn’t leverage the content information across different GMs, which is a desirable property.

Evaluation on diffusion models: Due to the recent advancement of diffusion models for fake media generation, we evaluate our approach for these generative models. Specifically, we collect 7 diffusion models with 1K images each. We create 4 different test set splits, each set containing 3 diffusion models selected randomly. The remaining diffusion models, along with the full dataset is used for training. The result for our approach along with all the baselines is shown in Table IX. Our method clearly outperforms all the baselines, indicating the effectiveness of our approach for unseen models proposed in future. We also show the standard deviation over all the test samples for $L_1$ error. The first value is the standard deviation across sets, while the second one is across the samples.

### Table IX

| Method                | Network Architecture | Loss function |
|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------|
|                       | Continuous type      | Discrete type |
|                       | $L_1$ error $\downarrow$ | $F_1$ score $\uparrow$ |
| Random ground-truth   | 0.240 ± 0.065/0.063 | 0.664 ± 0.105 |
| No fingerprint         | 0.211 ± 0.080/0.078 | 0.764 ± 0.112 |
| Using our parser       | 0.201 ± 0.045/0.041 | 0.564 ± 0.101 |
| Ours                  | 0.189 ± 0.051/0.049 | 0.787 ± 0.099 |

The first value is the standard deviation across sets, while the second one is across the samples.

D. Visualization

Fig. 10 shows an estimated fingerprint image and its frequency spectrum averaged over 25 randomly selected images per GM. We observe that estimated fingerprints have the desired properties defined by our loss terms, including low magnitude and highlights in middle and high frequencies. We also find that the fingerprints estimated from different generated images of the same GM are similar. To quantify this, we compute a Cosine similarity matrix $C \in \mathbb{R}^{116 \times 116}$ where $C(i,j)$ is the averaged
Fig. 11. Cosine similarity matrix for pairs of 116 GM’s fingerprints. Each element of this matrix is the average Cosine similarities of 50 pairs of fingerprints from two GMs. We see the higher intra-GM and lower inter-GM similarities. We can also see GMs with similar network architecture or loss function are clustered together, as shown in the red boxes on the left.

Cosine similarity of 25 randomly sampled fingerprint pairs from GM i and j. The matrix C in Fig. 11 clearly illustrates the higher intra-GM and lower inter-GM fingerprint similarities.

E. Applications

Coordinated misinformation attack: Our model parsing framework can be leveraged to estimate whether there exists a coordinated misinformation attack. That is, given two fake images, we hope to classify whether they are generated from the same GM or not. We do so by computing the Cosine similarity between the hyperparameters parsed from the given two images. First, we train our framework on 101 GMs, and test on 15 seen GMs and 15 unseen GMs. The list of GMs are mentioned in the supplementary, available online. To evaluate this task, we report the Area Under Curve (AUC) and the classification accuracy at the optimum threshold. The results are shown in Table X comparing two methods, just using FEN network and using both FEN and PN. We conclude that our framework using FEN and PN can identify whether two images came from the same source with around 80% accuracy. Using only FEN network to compare the similarities of the fingerprint performs worse. This justifies the benefit of using parsed parameters for coordinated misinformation attack.

| Method    | AUC (%) | Classification accuracy (%) |
|-----------|---------|-----------------------------|
| FEN       | 83.5    | 76.85                       |
| FEN + PN  | 87.3    | 80.6                        |
In fact, due to the nature of our test set, each pair of test samples can come from five different categories, namely, 1. Same seen GM, 2. Same unseen GM, 3. Different seen GMs, 4. Different unseen GMs, and 5. One seen and one unseen GM. We show an analysis of the wrongly classified samples in Fig. 12 with respect to total number of samples and total number of samples in each category. Around 70% of the wrongly classified samples belong to the category of images coming from categories having at least one GM unseen in training which is expected. However, if one of the test GM was seen in training, the number of wrongly classified samples decreased. This can be advantageous in detecting a manipulated image from an unknown GM.

Deepfake detection: Our FEN can be adopted for deepfake detection by adding a shallow network for binary classification. We evaluate our method on the recently introduced Celeb-DF dataset [34]. We experiment with three training sets, UADFV, DFFD, and FF++, in order to compare with previous results. We follow the same training protocols used in [15] for UADFV and DFFD and [26] for FF++.

We report the AUC in Table XI. Compared with methods trained on UADFV, our approach achieves a significantly better result, despite the more advanced backbones used by others. Our results when trained on DFFD and UADFV fall only slightly behind the best performance reported by Xception+Reg [15]. Importantly, however, they trained with pixel-level supervision which is typically unavailable. These results are provided for completeness, but are not directly comparable to all other methods trained with only image-level supervision for binary classification. Compared to all other methods, our method achieves the highest deepfake detection AUC.

Finally, we compare the performance of our method when trained on FF++ dataset. [26] performs the best by using the phase information as an additional channel to the Xception classifier. However, as the pre-trained models were not released for [26], we reproduce their method and report the performance shown in Table XI. We observe a performance gap between the reproduced and reported performance which should be further investigated in the future. Following [26], we concatenate the fingerprint information with the RGB image and phase channels which are passed through a Xception classifier. Our method outperforms the reproduced performance of [26] showing the additional benefit of our fingerprint. Finally, we also perform the classification based on the pre-trained model parsing network and fine-tune it using the classification loss. The performance deteriorated compared to using the fingerprint. This shows that although the model parsing network have some deepfake detection abilities, they are less informative to perform deepfake detection well.

Image attribution: Similar to deepfake detection, we use a shallow network for image attribution. The only difference is that image attribution is a multi-class task and depends on the number of GMs during training. Following [17], we train our model on 100 K genuine and 100 K fake face images each from four GMs: SNGAN [68], MMDGAN [69], CRAMERGAN [70] and ProGAN [4], for five-class classification. Table XII reports the performance. Our result on CelebA [34] and LSUN [54] outperform the performance in [17]. This again validates the generalization ability of the proposed fingerprint estimation.

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we define the model parsing problem as inferring the network architectures and training loss functions of a GM from the generative images. We make the first attempt to tackle...
this challenging problem. The main idea is to estimate the fingerprint for each image and use it for model parsing. Four constraints are developed for fingerprint estimation. We propose hierarchical learning to parse the hyperparameters in coarse-level and fine-level that can leverage the similarities between different GMs. Our fingerprint estimation framework can not only perform model parsing, but also extend to detecting coordinated misinformation attack, deepfake detection and image attribution. We have collected a large-scale fake image dataset from 116 different GMs. Various experiments have validated the effects of different components in our approach.

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