Abstract: Teleoperation is becoming an essential feature in automated vehicle concepts, as it will help the industry overcome challenges facing automated vehicles today. Teleoperation follows the idea to get humans back into the loop for certain rare situations the automated vehicle cannot resolve. Teleoperation therefore has the potential to expand the operational design domain and increase the availability of automated vehicles. This is especially relevant for concepts with no backup driver inside the vehicle. While teleoperation resolves certain issues an automated vehicle will face, it introduces new challenges in terms of safety requirements. While safety and regulatory approval is a major research topic in the area of automated vehicles, it is rarely discussed in the context of teleoperated road vehicles. The focus of this paper is to systematically analyze the potential hazards of teleoperation systems. An appropriate hazard analysis method (STPA) is chosen from literature and applied to the system at hand. The hazard analysis is an essential part in developing a safety concept (e.g., according to ISO26262) and thus far has not been discussed for teleoperated road vehicles.

1 INTRODUCTION

Automated Driving (AD) is, besides electrification of road vehicles, one of the biggest challenges and opportunities the automotive industry is currently facing. Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEMs), as well as research institutes, are investing significant effort into getting Automated Driving Systems (ADS) [1] on public roads. To describe the degree of automation of a specific driving automation system, a taxonomy was introduced [SAE International 2018]. This taxonomy differentiates between six different levels from L0 “No Driving Automation” to L5 “Full Driving Automation.” Only L3 - L5 systems, which are capable of performing the Dynamic Driving Tasks (DDT) on a “sustained basis” [SAE International 2018], are considered ADS. Below L3, even if the vehicle is performing longitudinal and lateral driving tasks on a sustained basis, the human driver is responsible for the Object and Event Detection and Response (OEDR). For L3-ADS, the system performs the whole DDT including OEDR. If a DDT performance-relevant system failure occurs or when the driving automation system is about to leave its Operational Design Domain (ODD), the fallback-ready user has to take over. Up to this point, a human driver is required inside the vehicle. As indicated by Abe (2019), applications such as public transportation or taxi services could strongly benefit if human drivers are replaced by the ADS and the system is responsible for DDT-fallback itself (L4+). According to SAE International (2018), the system has to perform a DDT-fallback by achieving a minimal risk condition, which could be a safe stop at an appropriate place. This, however, requires the ADS to be fully functional and to be separated from the failure mitigation strategy, which is required to stop the vehicle in case of critical system failures.

The previous paragraph shows the different levels of ADS and the role of humans in context of the driving task. SAE International (2018) indicates that even an L4+ vehicle, which does not require a user inside the vehicle, depends on some fallback strategies to stop the vehicle in certain situations. A fallback driver might still be able to perform the DDT and might not be dependent on degraded or failing system components. The absence of such a fallback driver results in the vehicle and its passengers being stranded and obstructing traffic. The higher the reliability of such a system, the higher the acceptance and profitability of ADS will be. ADS are getting better over time. However, taking into account every edge case appearing on public roads might not be feasible. Therefore, having a reliable fallback option for L4+ vehicles will

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1Taxonomy according to SAE International [2018] is used throughout this paper.
not only decrease the time-to-market launch but also the acceptance and profitability of L4+ ADS e.g., in public transportation or logistics.

To solve this problem, the concept of teleoperation can be used (Georg et al., 2018; Bout et al., 2017). After the ADS dedicated vehicle comes to a stop by way of its integrated DDT-fallback function or following a failure mitigation strategy, the vehicle contacts a control center. A concept for such a control center is proposed by Feiler et al. (2020). A remote operator has to analyze the problem and can choose among different options to resolve the situation (Feiler et al., 2020). One of them remotely controls the vehicle until the ADS can continue the DDT itself. Alternatively, the operator could teleoperate the vehicle to the next bus station or to a vehicle repair center.

Vehicle sensor information is sent to the operator via the cellular network. The operator has to comprehend the situation and the vehicle’s surroundings based on the sensor information and send control signals back to the vehicle. This introduces new problems to the system, such as latencies, reduced situation awareness or connection losses. The presented work analyzes those problems and identifies further hazards related to teleoperated road vehicles. This is a necessary step in developing a holistic safety concept for teleoperated road vehicles. Before teleoperated road vehicles are analyzed in Section 3, a short overview on related work regarding safety assessment and teleoperation is given in Section 2. Further a short overview on the used method in Section 3, and the system this method is applied to in Section 4, is provided.

2 RELATED WORK

Before analyzing the system of teleoperated road vehicles, a literature review on their problems and also identified solutions is given. Furthermore the advantages of a systems-theoretic approach are outlined and related work regarding its application in an automotive context is presented.

2.1 Teleoperation of Road Vehicles

Teleoperation is a widely used concept for different applications. It is often utilized to reach hazardous or inaccessible areas, such as in space–robotics or deep-sea exploration. Bensoussan and Parent (1997) apply this concept to road vehicles for distributing car sharing vehicles. With the development of AD, the focus of teleoperation is to provide a fallback for ADS. However, teleoperation itself is prone to some problems that are the focus of research as long as this research area exists.
failures. However, accidents often happen due to component interaction, regardless of individual components or software working correctly (Thomas et al., 2015). Software-related accidents are often caused by flawed requirements instead of coding errors. However, flawed requirements are hard to capture using traditional failure-based methods (Thomas et al., 2015).

To complement functional safety covered by ISO 26262, ISO/PAS 21448 addresses the Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF) (ISO, 2019). The scope of ISO/PAS 21448 is to address hazards, resulting from functional insufficiencies of the intended functionality or foreseeable misuse (ISO, 2019). Besides the previously mentioned hazard analysis methods, System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is listed in ISO/PAS 21448. STPA was proposed by Leveson (2011), to overcome certain flaws in the existing methods. This system engineering approach follows the idea to formulate safety as a control problem rather than a reliability problem (Leveson, 2011).

STPA has the ability to consider interactions between different types of components, such as software, hardware or humans (Placke et al., 2015). According to Thomas et al. (2015), "STPA is a top-down hazard analysis method designed to go beyond traditional component failures to also identify problems such as dysfunctional interactions, flawed requirements, design errors, external disturbances, human error and human-computer interaction issues". Since STPA was introduced, it is applied to a range of different systems, also in an automotive context. Sulaman et al. (2014) investigate a forward collision avoidance system using STPA and experiences advantages with respect to time effort and covering the dynamic system behavior within the analysis. Raste et al. (2015) uses STPA to analyze a fallback strategy for AD. Oscarsson et al. (2016) states that other methods are not designed to consider multiple vehicles in the analysis. Therefore, STPA is used to analyze a cooperative driving system in (Oscarsson et al., 2016). Stolte et al. (2016) uses the STPA to analyze the actuation system of an automated vehicle and proposes a way to better include quasi-continuous control actions in the analysis. Bagschik et al. (2017) performs an STPA on an unmanned protective vehicle for highway road work. In Abdulkhalaq et al. (2018), STPA is applied to identify safety in use requirements for an ADS. Abdulkhalaq et al. (2018) finds that the interaction of ADS with the human, environment or other traffic participants could be sufficiently addressed. Suo et al. (2017) and Mallya et al. (2016) propose ways to integrate STPA into the ISO26262 process.

2.3 Aim of Present Work

As shown in Section 2.1, multiple solutions were developed to address certain problems of teleoperated driving. However, to the knowledge of the authors, there is no literature which attempts to systematically identify the risks and hazards of teleoperated road vehicles. Since this is an important aspect in developing a safety concept, a systematic analysis is performed in the presented work. Due to the advantages in STPA’s handling of human flaws and errors, as well as its successful application in different automotive situations, STPA is applied to the system at hand.

3 AN OVERVIEW OF STPA

Before applying the STPA to the teleoperation system in Section 5, an overview of this method is given. The STPA is divided into four steps, as shown in Figure 1. While step 1 and step 2 are considered as preparation, steps 3 and 4 make up the main analysis of the system. The most important aspects of the individual steps are provided in Section 3.1 to Section 3.4. For further information on STPA, refer to Leveson and Thomas (2018).

3.1 Defining the Purpose of the Analysis

The first step of performing an STPA involves defining the purpose of the analysis, which involves losses, system boundaries, system-level hazards and System-level Constraints (SCs). According to Leveson and Thomas (2018, p. 16), a loss could be anything of value to a stakeholder, while a hazard is: “A system state or set of conditions that, together with a particular set of worst-case environmental conditions, will lead to an accident (loss)” (Leveson, 2011, p. 184). To define the system-level hazards, the system and its boundaries need to be determined. Finally, the SCs...
are identified. According to Leveson and Thomas (2018), they can be simply formulated by inverting the hazards or by specifying what needs to happen if a hazard occurs.

### 3.2 Control Structure

Modeling the system as a control structure is a central aspect of STPA, that formulates safety as a control problem. Therefore, the next step of the STPA requires generating a hierarchical control structure of the system. At a minimum, the control structure consists of a controller and a controlled process. The controller has some control authority over the controlled process by Control Actions (CAs) and receives feedback from the controlled process. The controller has some internal control algorithm which calculates and provides the CA. The process model of the controller represents the internal beliefs of the controller, for example, about the controlled process or the environment. (Leveson and Thomas, 2018, p. 22-25)

### 3.3 Identifying Unsafe Control Actions

After the control structure is developed, the main analysis starts with identifying Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs). “An Unsafe Control Action (UCA) is a control action that, in a particular context and worst-case environment, will lead to a hazard” (Leveson and Thomas, 2018, p. 35). To identify UCAs, every CA is analyzed with respect to whether providing, not providing, providing too long/short or providing too early/late could lead to one of the hazards identified in step 1. It is important to specify a context which makes the CA unsafe. According to Leveson and Thomas (2018, p. 36), a context could be an environmental condition, state of the controlled process, or previous actions or parameters. Thomas (2013) extends the STPA through systematic means to identify context variables. Accordingly, he identified process model variables that represent the information or beliefs a controller requires about the controlled process or the environment to provide a CA. Thomas (2013) derived the system level variables from the system level hazards. As a next step, discrete values are assigned to the variables. To identify UCAs, different combinations of the values—the context—are checked, if providing or not providing the CA in this context can lead to a hazard. Controller constraints can further be derived based on the UCA.

### 3.4 Identifying Causal Factors

The final step of STPA is to identify the potential causes of unsafe behavior. According to Thomas (2013, p. 169), safety constraints can be violated either by a controller providing a UCA (case 1) or by an appropriate CA not being followed (case 2). To identify potential causes for the first case, the entire feedback path, including the controller itself (process model, control algorithm) needs to be analyzed. Potential external influences or communications to other controllers also need to be considered. To find causes for appropriate CA not being followed, the CA path needs to be analyzed, including actuators, the controlled process, disturbances, environmental influences or other controllers. Thomas (2013, p. 169) provides a classification of Causal Factors (CFs), which can be used as guidance to analyze the control structure.

### 4 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

In this section, the system to be analyzed within the present work is discussed. An overview is shown in Figure 2. The vehicle perceives its environment using camera sensors. This sensor information, together with the vehicle’s internal states, is sent to the control center. A virtual representation of the vehicle’s surroundings is generated within the interface (Georg and Diermeyer, 2019). This information is provided to the operator using displays. Based on the feedback, the operator can provide control signals using a steering wheel, throttle and brake pedal actuators. A vehicle steering wheel angle and desired velocity are calculated based on these inputs. The feedback, as well as the control signals, are transmitted to the vehicle using the cellular network. A detailed overview of the individual components, including latencies within the actuators and sensors chain, is published by Georg et al. (2020a).

Figure 2: Overview of the teleoperation system
5 APPLICATION OF STPA ON TELEOPERATION SYSTEM

In the following sections the individual steps, introduced in Section 3, are applied to the teleoperation system in Section 4.

5.1 Defining the Purpose of the Analysis

We identified the following stakeholders to the teleoperation system: vehicle passengers, other traffic participants and property owners. After identifying the stake or value of each stakeholder, we determined the losses L-1 to L-2. Leveson and Thomas (2018, p. 148) provided some losses and hazards for automotive industry. Since these did fit for our system, we borrowed L-1, L-2, H-1 and H-5 from Leveson and Thomas (2018, p. 148).

L-1 Loss of life or injury to people

L-2 Damage to ego vehicle or objects outside the ego vehicle

If the system in Section 4 is part of a taxi fleet, the service provider could be a stakeholder with its own goals. The operator or an OEM may also have some stake in the system. An OEM could be concerned about its image, and “Loss of OEM image” could be another loss. The stake of vehicle passengers could also be comfort or punctuality. However, only L-1 to L-2 are considered within the scope of this work.

The system-level hazards are identified in the next step. Following the ideas of Leveson and Thomas (2018), H-1 to H-4 could lead to a loss under some worst-case environmental condition:

H-1 System does not maintain safe distance from nearby objects [L-1, L-2]

H-2 System leaves intended lane [L-1, L-2]

H-3 System behavior is breaking the law (e.g., red lights, stop sign) [L-1, L-2]

H-4 Vehicle exceeds safe operating envelope for environment (speed, lateral/longitudinal forces) [L-1, L-2]

The losses that individual hazards could cause are specified in brackets. The formulated system-level hazards and losses are very general and abstract. However, this is intended by Leveson and Thomas (2018). The hazards should not be on a component level and no causes for hazards should be part of the hazard description. The causes for hazards on a component level are investigated in the following STPA steps. Unnecessary detail should be omitted to better identify missing aspects and keep the list manageable (Leveson and Thomas 2018, p. 19). Leveson and Thomas (2018) propose refining the hazards into sub-hazards in a later step if required. SCs can be identified based on the identified hazards. Only two examples are provided within the scope of this work.

SC-1 The system must always be able to react on obstacles [H-1]

SC-2 If the system exceeds its dynamic boundaries, this needs to be detected and countermeasures need to be taken [H-4]

5.2 Control Structure

An STPA control structure for the teleoperation system presented in Section 4 is shown in Figure 3.

The Operator provides CAs, such as the change Steering Wheel Angle (SW A) command, brake command and throttle command to the interface. Thus, only the primary driving tasks (Bubb, 2003) are considered for the analysis. According to Stolte et al. (2016) “change SW A” instead of the continuous SW A is used. However, “hold SW A” was not included as a separate command, but considered as “not providing” the “change SW A” command in Section 5.3. The operator receives visual feedback from the interface. The display and input devices are not part of the control structure to reduce complexity. They are, together with sensors and actuators, added in step 4 of the analysis. The human operator is modeled as a controller in the provided control structure. Therefore, the human operator can be included in the analysis and human flaws or errors can be identified which is one of the advantages of using STPA. The human operator also has some control algorithm and process models. Rasmussen (1983) proposed the three levels of performance of skilled human operators. This is a model describing the cognitive processes of humans from input to actions. The model distinguishes between three different layers: skill-based behavior, rule-based behavior and knowledge-based behavior. In Donges...
these layers are assigned to the different layers of driving tasks (stabilization, guidance and navigation) proposed by Donges (1982). Therefore, we consider this model a control algorithm for the human operator in context of a driving task. The process model of a human operator is called a mental model (Thomas et al., 2015).

Rasmussen (1983) states that the different mental models humans create are the reason for human performance in coping with complexity. Since the operator is not located inside the vehicle, the mental model is largely dependent and updated by the received feedback and the presentation of the feedback.

Based on the operator CAs, the interface calculates a change velocity command and a change desired SWA command. The interface does also contain certain beliefs about the controlled process, such as the steering ratio, sensor positions, etc. These beliefs make up the process model for the interface. The interface receives feedback from the physical vehicle and the vehicle’s environment, creates a scene representation of the environment and provides this information to the operator. Further information on the interface is published by Georg and Diermeyer (2019). The environment is not part of the system itself. Nevertheless, we decided to include it in the control structure, similar to Placke et al. (2015), to indicate where certain information comes from.

The desired velocity and SWA is transmitted to the vehicle via wireless network. Even if the actual signal sent to the vehicle is a desired velocity, it can be advantageous for the analysis to split the CA into increase and decrease velocity. The network is not visualized within Figure 3. Similar to sensors and actuators, the information about the network is neglected in this step. What happens to the CA on its way to the controlled process is part of step 4 during the analysis.

Due to the high amount of identified UCAs, only the UCAs related to the brake command are presented in Table 2. If a certain condition is not explicitly mentioned within the UCA description, all its values could lead to the specified hazard. The controller constraints, resulting from UCAs, are not explicitly mentioned here.

### 5.3 Identifying Unsafe Control Actions

Applying the approach of Thomas (2013), we ended up with the process model variables in Table 1 making up the contexts. In reality, road networks or traffic regulations are more complex, especially when considering urban situations. However, to reduce complexity for a first analysis, this abstract representation was chosen.

| Conditions            | Values                      |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
| Vehicle motion        | - Stopped                   |
|                       | - Moving                    |
| Traffic participants  | - None                      |
| relative to ego vehicle| - Same lane in front       |
|                       | - Same lane behind          |
|                       | - Neighboring lane          |
| Road Surface          | - High \( \mu \)            |
|                       | - Low \( \mu \)             |
| Regulatory elements   | - Yes                       |
| (signs, lights, etc.) | - No                        |
| Lane                  | - \( \dot{\kappa} \neq 0 \)|
|                       | - \( \kappa = 0 \)          |

Due to the high amount of identified UCAs, only the UCAs related to the brake command are presented in Table 2. If a certain condition is not explicitly mentioned within the UCA description, all its values could lead to the specified hazard. The controller constraints, resulting from UCAs, are not explicitly mentioned here.

### 5.4 Identifying Causal Factors

To identify potential causes for the UCAs provided in Table 2, how the feedback is provided to the controllers and how control actions are executed need to be considered. The control structure is updated accordingly in Figure 4 by including sensors, actuators, network, mental model and control algorithm. Entities that are not explicitly addressed within this chapter are grayed out.

To identify CFs for UCA-1 an examination of causes driving in a first step and not some implementation or hardware specific hazards. We are also not including certain available safety measures (Section 2.1), to not overlook important aspects or better solutions during the analysis. The fact that STPA is a top-down approach allows to make an analysis before specific components and design decisions are made. The results can therefore be considered in the later development.
Table 2: Unsafe Control Actions for Brake Command.

| Not providing causes hazards | Providing causes hazards | To early, too late, out of order | Stopped too soon, applied too long |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| UCA-1: O. does not provide \( s_{Br} \), if vehicle is moving and object is in/approaching same lane to the front [H-1] | UCA-5: O. provides excessive \( s_{Br} \), if vehicle is moving and object in/approaching same lane to the rear [H-1] | UCA-11: O. provides \( s_{Br} \) too early, if vehicle is moving and object in/approaching same lane to the rear [H-1] | UCA-15: O. stops providing \( s_{Br} \) to soon, if vehicle is moving and object in/approaching lane to the front [H-1] |
| UCA-2: O. does not provide \( s_{Br} \), if vehicle is moving and regulatory elements are present [H-3] | UCA-6: O. provides excessive \( s_{Br} \), if vehicle is moving and no obstacle in/approaching same lane to the front [H-3] | UCA-12: O. provides \( s_{Br} \) too late, if vehicle is moving and object in/approaching same lane to the rear [H-1] | UCA-16: O. stops providing \( s_{Br} \) to soon, if vehicle is moving and regulatory elements are present [H-3] |
| UCA-3: O. does not provide \( s_{Br} \), if vehicle is moving on low \( \mu \) and \( \kappa \neq 0 \) [H-4, H-2] | UCA-7: O. provides insufficient or excessive \( s_{Br} \), if vehicle is moving on low \( \mu \) and \( \kappa \neq 0 \) [H-4, H-2] | UCA-13: O. provides \( s_{Br} \) too late, if vehicle is moving and regulatory elements are present [H-3] | UCA-17: O. stops providing \( s_{Br} \) to soon, if vehicle is moving on low \( \mu \) and \( \kappa \neq 0 \) [H-2, H-4] |
| UCA-4: O. does not provide \( s_{Br} \), if vehicle is moving on low \( \mu \), \( \kappa \neq 0 \) and objects in/approaching neighboring lane [H-1] | UCA-8: O. provides excessive \( s_{Br} \), if vehicle is moving on low \( \mu \) and \( \kappa \neq 0 \) and an obstacle is in/approaching neighboring lane [H-1, H-2] | UCA-14: O. provides \( s_{Br} \) too late, if vehicle is moving on low \( \mu \) and \( \kappa \neq 0 \) [H-2, H-4] | |
| In the highlighted entities within Figure 4 is required. Starting with the operator who initially provided UCA-1, the operator’s control algorithm and mental model need to be considered potential causes. The operator might have multiple mental models to represent the environment, the interface and the vehicle. One reason for UCA-1 could be an inconsistent, incomplete or incorrect mental model, which does not (completely) represent the reality. This is often referred to as situation awareness [Leveson and Thomas, 2018, p. 188]. When thinking about the information the operator requires to avoid UCA-1, the following CFs regarding the mental model can be formulated: |
| CF-1 Mental model contains no/wrong information about surrounding objects and their relative position to the ego vehicle. |
| CF-2 Mental model contains no/wrong information about the motion or dimensions of the ego vehicle. |
| CF-3 Mental model contains no/wrong information about vehicle/actuator/interface behaviour. |
| In a next step, we can identify further reasons for the above mentioned CFs. The mental models are constantly updated by inputs, training or experience [Leveson and Thomas, 2018, p. 185]. Potential reasons for the above mentioned CFs could be: |
| CF-4 Mental model is not/insufficiently updated due to outer influences of the operator such as distraction. |
| CF-5 Mental model is not/insufficiently updated due to insufficient representation of the information (e.g., wrong modality). |
| CF-6 Changes in the controlled process (e.g., changing vehicle) results in incorrect mental model. |
| Operator visual impairment or health issues could also be a reason. Further CFs can be identified by analyzing the feedback path in Figure 4 from environment (bottom) to operator (top). Starting with visual feedback the following CFs are identified: |
| CF-7 Object is not within the field of view of the camera sensor. |
The feedback of the environment itself cannot be missing or incorrect, since it represents reality. Sensors like the camera, however, are only able to capture parts of the reality, which is represented by CF-7 to CF-9. In case the light reflected by the object reaches the camera sensor, the following CFs could still occur in the camera or the following encoding step.

CF-8 Object is obscured by dirt, water or reflections on the lens.

CF-9 Object is not visible to the camera sensor due to darkness, fog, rain, etc.

The feedback of the environment itself cannot be missing or incorrect, since it represents reality. Sensors like the camera, however, are only able to capture parts of the reality, which is represented by CF-7 to CF-9. In case the light reflected by the object reaches the camera sensor, the following CFs could still occur in the camera or the following encoding step.

CF-10 No or inadequate operation of the camera, encoder, Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) or SWA-sensor (hardware or power failure).

CF-11 Camera, IMU or SWA-sensor is not providing output because of connection errors.

CF-12 Measurement inaccuracies in camera due to color and spatial discretization of the reality could result in the operator being unaware of the object.

CF-13 Measurement inaccuracies in IMU or SWA-sensor leading to wrong operator beliefs about vehicle movement. This could falsely result in no collision within the operator’s mental model.

CF-14 Inaccurate information about distances through lens distortion could lead to wrong distances between the predicted vehicle path and the object within the operator’s mental model.

CF-15 Information loss by image compression of the encoder could result in a hardly detectable object for the operator.

The network is one of the most critical parts within the whole teleoperation system. It contributes to the following CFs of UCA-1:

CF-16 No network connection at current vehicle location. The feedback about the object is not provided to the operator.

CF-17 Network is dropping information (packet loss). The feedback about the object is not provided to the operator.

CF-18 Network inserts wrong information or changes the order of information. Wrong feedback is provided to the operator.

The interface pre-processing the incoming sensor information also contributes to the list of CFs. The individual camera streams need to be visualized and placed relative to each other. Therefore, extrinsic and intrinsic camera parameters are required. The interface also provides feedback about the current and future vehicle movement. This information can be calculated e.g., based on the actual SWA and a dynamic model of the vehicle. This model is part of the interface process model and contains certain beliefs and simplifications about the real vehicle. The same SWA, for example, results in different vehicle trajectories depending on the vehicle, road friction coefficient or other parameters.

CF-19 Interface not working due to power or hardware failure.

CF-20 Interface uses wrong beliefs about camera position and calibration leading to wrong visualization of objects relative to the vehicle.

CF-21 Wrong beliefs about vehicle or environmental parameters (friction coefficient $\mu$) results in an incorrect predicted path. Therefore the object could falsely be located outside the predicted path.

Finally, the display can also be a cause for the operator not (correctly) updating its mental model and therefore resulting in UCA-1:

CF-22 Display not working due to power or hardware failure.

CF-23 Display reducing information by dropping frames or low resolution.

CF-24 Reflections or dirt on screen masking information.
CF-1 to CF-24 are the CFs related to the feedback path and the mental model of the operator. But the control algorithm of the operator can also cause UCA-1. As mentioned earlier, the control algorithm of the operator is described using the target-oriented behavior model of Rasmussen (1983). The driving task the operator is failing to perform in UCA-1 can be assigned to the guidance and stabilization task proposed by Donges (1982). According to Donges (2016, p. 21), knowledge-based, rule-based, and skill-based behavior are utilized to perform those driving tasks. Donges (2016), however, states that the role of knowledge-based behavior is minimized by routine, which is important due to the long execution times of knowledge-based behavior.

CF-25 Little routine or training causes the operator to utilize knowledge-based behavior, which could result in a slow or false reaction in response to an object in front of the vehicle.

CF-26 Wrong routine or training could result in wrong rules being stored, which are later applied as rule-based behavior if a vehicle occurs.

CF-27 Missing or wrong long-term training could result in a lack of skill-based behavior which is required for dynamic actions in stabilization and guidance tasks.

Only by analyzing UCA-1, are 27 CFs identified that could lead to UCA-1 and therefore to H-1. This procedure needs to be applied to the remaining UCAs. Some of the above identified CFs are also causes for other UCAs. To reduce the quantity of generated information, we did not add an additional CF in this case, but linked the respective UCA to the existing CF. New CFs are also identified, for example, by analyzing UCA-12 for CFs that incorporate some timing information.

CF-36 Delayed feedback by camera/encoding because of processing times and discrete operation, which could result in a delayed object detection and reaction.

CF-37 Delayed feedback information because network delays, which could result in a delayed object detection and reaction.

CF-38 Processing delays of operator (reaction time), which could result in a delayed object detection and reaction.

Due to the large number of UCAs and CFs identified using the STPA, only a small subset of the results could be presented. Not explicitly mentioned are the UCAs resulting from the interface as well as all the CFs, except for those related to UCA-1. Also, the CFs for not or incorrect execution of CA and controller constraints need to be identified. The results show the amount of information that is generated using the STPA, even after applying different abstractions and simplifications. However, the important aspects, such as operator handling, UCAs related to the operator, the process model variables and a general control structure are presented.

6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The present work shows selected results of applying STPA to a teleoperated road vehicle. Previous publications often addressed single aspects that affected the safety of teleoperated road vehicles and proposed solutions. To obtain a deeper understanding of the safety challenges inherent to teleoperated road vehicles, we decided to perform a thorough analysis. However, for a first analysis, some simplifications and abstractions were performed. The operator performed only primary driving tasks and the vehicle feedback only consisted of camera images, velocity and SWA. The vehicle was also not divided into single components and control loops. This however was considered a big advantage of the STPA, since it allows for the choice of a level of abstraction that is valid for every directly controlled teleoperated road vehicle. The findings of the analysis can then be integrated into a more detailed control structure to repeat the analysis. Due to the top-down approach of STPA, further details can be integrated into the control structure later in the development process if further implementation details are known. An approach on how to iteratively perform the STPA is presented by Thomas et al. (2015). Another simplification that was used throughout the analysis is in the process model variables that make up the contexts for the analysis. Using more detailed process model variables and values consequently makes it more difficult to ensure completeness, especially in urban environments, and increases the time exposure of the analysis. Nevertheless, those variables are considered very important for the outcome of the STPA. In spite of all these simplifications, a large amount of information is generated by performing an STPA, considering that only the UCAs resulting from one operator CA and the CFs of one UCA were presented. Handling this
amount of information becomes even more important when working with more detailed systems. The main reason for using STPA was to include the human operator’s potential flaws and errors in the analysis. Multiple UCAs were identified originating in the operator not responding appropriately or timely. The analysis showed how operator-related causes such as missing/wrong training, distraction, inadequate mental model or reaction time can be determined. The STPA also reveals how other influences such as vehicle feedback could lead to the operator reacting inadequately.

CONTRIBUTIONS

Simon Hoffmann initiated the idea for this paper and analyzed the teleoperated driving system. Dr. Frank Diermeyer contributed to the concept of the research project. He revised the manuscript, critically reviewing it in terms of important intellectual content, and gave final approval of the version to be published. He agrees with all aspects of the work. Artem Bykanov supported, during his master’s thesis, with the execution of the STPA and upcoming discussions. We acknowledge the financial support for the project by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research of Germany (BMBF).

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