The Islamic Revolution and the Pragmatist Policies of the Leaders of the Arab World: A Comparison of the Policies of Saddam Hussein and Mohammed Bin Salman

Younes Forouzan1 and Abdolreza Alishahi2
1Communication Science, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran
2Political Science, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

One of the most important challenges faced by many Western Asian countries is the issue of authoritarianism, dictatorship and pragmatist policies of their leaders. This issue is more tangible in the Arab world, especially when issues such as the leadership of the entire Arab world, security, legitimacy and efficiency. In this paper, the authors, using the comparative method and the use of written and virtual sources, seek to examine the Regarding the three important issues of authoritarianism, the issue of the suppression of Shiites in the region and hostile policies towards the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The findings of the paper indicate that Saddam Hussein and Mohammed bin Salman are like each other in large issues such as the process of transfer of power, political repression and oppression, the challenge of the Shiites, the militarization of the region, and, ultimately and challenge with Islamic Revolution in Iran and in the major issues such as ruling ideology, the expansion of political authority in the Arab world, economic policies, and, ultimately, relation with Zionism regime and finally in the reformism policies are differentiated each other.

Keywords: Saddam Hussein; Mohammad bin Salman; Arab world; Legitimacy; Authoritarianism; War

Introduction

In the past century, the Middle East has challenged, confronted, coordinated and coordinated the identities and powers of various regional and transnational areas, and this has paved the way for a variety of trends and political and social schools. The basic problem of many Middle Eastern political systems can be seen in how the administration of society, how to exercise power, preserve values and progress [1]. On the other hand, with careful consideration in the context of the context of power in the Arab world, one can conclude that there is a tangible relationship between the nature and power of the existing social gaps in those societies, even the different characteristics of the process of achieving power, such as coup, war, Rebellion and can be considered as the product of the distinctive features of power and the tools of its application. Mostafa has provided a complete division of the structure of Arab governments and the degree to which they are exercising power. In his view, the rule in Arab countries is one of the following:

1. Liberal regimes with relatively partial elections and relatively strong societies like Egypt and Algeria.
2. Autocratic single-party regimes, such as Syria and Iraq.
3. Military regimes or no party organizations like Libya and Yemen.
4. Typical royal regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and other Persian Sheikhs of the Persian Gulf [2].

An important point in this regard is important issues such as the legitimacy and extent of tyranny of political rulers in the Arab world. Regarding the issue of legitimacy, it should be noted that according to new studies, legitimacy is of two types. Vertical legitimacy, in which the powers are legally and reasonably distributed in a consistent manner and the administration of low-level positions, is carried out on a regular basis. In other words, the obedience of low-level business owners from the top, not to the fear or greed that comes from persuasion. While vertical legitimacy addresses the mechanisms of convincing power distribution, horizontal legitimacy is the feeling of belonging to the nation and the priority of national interests on relative considerations, tribal, individual, factional and ethnic-religious. In terms of horizontal legitimacy, nations of the world can be divided into three coherent categories (such as South Korea), vulnerable (such as Iraq or Saudi Arabia) and shaky (like Afghanistan) [3].

Saddam Hussein; From Ba’ath Political Commentary to Iraqi Presidency

Saddam Hussein Tikriti was born in Tikrit in Iraq in 1937. He lost his father shortly before his birth, and then lost his brother, and then he was inevitably under the guardianship of a stepfather, and at that moment he was mentally and mentally despised by his stepfather. And acts of immoral acts of robbery and acts of the kind that would have had a lasting impact on the extent of its insecurities and militancy [4]. Saddam was moved to Baghdad at the age of ten, due to poverty and economic hardship, and to his uncle's family, Khairullah Tolfa, who later became his most important political adviser. Moving to Baghdad gradually became the basis of his presence in the Ba’ath Party of Iraq [5]. The Ba’ath Arab Party is a socialist party founded by people such as Michel Aflat, Salah al-Din al-Bitar and Zaki Eroszai, and in Syria in 1947 [6]. The party was a combination of the principles of pan-Arabism and socialism, the first objective of which was the theoretical and executive unity in the Arab world. At the beginning of its
activities, the Ba'ath party was operating simultaneously and fully in line with Iraq and Syria.

However, following the discrepancy of views, in 1966, a group of these members, led by Salah Hadid and Hafez Asad, who created Syria in a coup plot against the central government and actually created a major blow to Ba'ath in Iraq and Syria [7].

Saddam Hussein joins the Ba'ath Party at the age of 20, after failing to attend the Iraqi Army. During this period, General Abdul Karim Qassem, along with some young officers, is launching a coup against the royal regime led by Faisal II and ending the period of the royal regime in Iraq. This accompaniment and the alliance of officers with General Qasim will soon be broken, and Saddam will be forced to flee to Syria and then to Egypt in the failed assassination of Qasim [8]. During his presence in Cairo, Iraq will become pregnant with important political developments, and the government of General Qasim collapses with the coup plot by Abdul Rahman Aref. With the return of Saddam to Iraq, he is arrested and imprisoned by the Arif government. Sarmaz escapes from prison in 1967 and then becomes one of the most influential leaders of the Ba'ath party. Saddam's most important approach at this time was his quest for inter-party unity. He simultaneously strengthened his personal power in the party. Eventually, with the onset of another coup d'état in Iraq this time by Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr, a relative of Saddam, conditions for his more powerful presence in the Iraqi political arena were provided [9].

**Politics and Power in Saudi Arabia**

King Abdul Aziz bin Saud, the founder of Al Saud, in 1932, sought to establish the kingdom of Al Saud, following the consolidation of his power in Hejaz and the defeat of other rivals. The monarchy has been accompanied by his sons to his son's bed today [10]. During his political life and his kingdom in order to consolidate and expand his power through the establishment of a family bond with various tribes of Saudi Arabia, he married many women of these tribes, so that today the number of members of the Al Saud family is estimated at 25 thousand [11].

The princes are the economic, political, cultural, social, religious, and military policies of Saudi government. The first and most powerful group in Saudi Arabia is the same royal family. The family of the monarchy, al-Saud, has several branches. In total, and including sub branches, Al Saud has more than 1,000 people [12]. The four main families of Al Saud (the family of Al-Sadiri, Al-Faisal, Al-Saynan, and Al-Jlawa) have not had a peaceful life in the process of power and affairs of the monarchy, and despite the set of measures that King Fahd sought in a coalition and Unity among them, there is some important political challenges and conflicts among Saudi princes. Meanwhile, Al-Faisal, the most important branch of Al Saud, and the members of this family of more than four thousand people, are designers and executives of diplomacy in Saudi Arabia [13]. The Sadirs are also the second most powerful Al Saud party that King Fahd, the deceased king before the king Abdullah, dwells on this family [14].

In addition to the Al Saud family (four branches), one of the critical forces influencing Saudi politics and government is "religious scholars or religious leaders" [15]. Tribes are among the other forces that are considered an important element in the Saudi power structure. Saudi Arabia has had a latent tribal-based structure. The main tribes in this country include eight main tribes and at least 15 sub-tribes. Traditional merchants who are economically important Saudi families are also among other influential groups in power, although it must be admitted that the power structure in this country is based on traditional patrimonialism and patriarchal authoritarianism [16]. Among other important and influential groups in Saudi Arabia, the new elite class is a tool and some implementers of development projects. These include urban-educated and educated western elites that come from two classes of businessmen and low-income families. The smallest influential group in Saudi Arabia is the Shiites of this country, the Shiites, which are mostly based in the eastern part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, have a limited population that are generally discriminated against and are not involved in the process and are mainly active in areas and sectors of labor [17].

**A Comparative Study of Saddam Hussein’s and Mohammed bin Salman’s Policies in the Arab World**

After recognizing and outlining the political and power structures in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the authors seek to compare the pragmatist policies of Saddam Hussein, the dictator of the Iraqi Ba’ath regime, and the newly appointed Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In this regard, the eleven main components are the basis for a comparative study, among which some of the components are the basis of similarities between Saddam and Bin Salman, and some of the other components explain the differences and differences. Available among them.

**Power transfer process: soft coupling power movement tool**

The first similarity between Saddam Hussein and Mohammed bin Salman can be seen in the process of transferring power. In this regard, the word 'soft coup' can be used. "A coup is a political milestone and an attempt by an illegal political coalition to overthrow the leaders of the current government, which is being carried out through violence or threats," [18]. But a soft coup usually involves instruments of violence, intimidation and bloodshed without the use of force, and is often applied by forces that are part of the power process and are considered as pillars of power [19].

**Political repression and oppression**

The second dimension of the pragmatist politics of Saddam Hussein and Mohammed bin Salman can be seen as an instrument of oppression, intimidation, and terror. The fact is that one of Saddam Hussein’s most important approaches to consolidating power has been the use of means of repression, intimidation, threats, torture and even the killing of dissidents. This issue was found in two general issues. The first issue was the removal of opponents and political rivals within the Ba’ath Party of Iraq (internal party purges), and the second was the boycott, threats, torture and repression of the government’s opponents in the form of Shiites and Shiites. In general, most of the Iraqi population is composed of three main ethnic and religious groups of the Shiites, Sunnis Arabs and the Qur’an, none of which has played an effective role in establishing this country (the victory of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq and the coup d'état Hassan al-Bakr) [20]. In addition to these ethnic groups, there are other groups such as Turkmens and Yazidis in Iraq, which also lacked any political freedom. Saddam, during his political assassination on Iraq, saw most of his government’s threats against Asqar’d and Shi’ites [21]. The issue of Shiites and the ideological challenges of the Ba’ath Party will be discussed with them in the next section, but the suppression of Saddam Hussein and the execution of the opposition, including political opponents in the Ba’ath Party and the Iraqi Ba’ath Party, were in the strongest possible terms.
Saddam Hussein condemned some of his most important political criminals to death in 1969, at the time of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party's political party's political dissolution of its rivals in the Ba'ath Party [22]. Another act in opposition to the crackdown was on the assassination attempt against him in the Iraqi Dijil area, which after the assassination attempt on him, 160 people were massacred, and a large number of other residents of this city Different ways were interrogated, tortured and captured in Saddam's dreaded prisons [23]. The peak of Saddam's repressive policies comes back to the time of the Ba'ath militant chemical attack on Halabja, a regional Kurdish region. In this chemical attack, more than 5,000 Iraqi Arak were killed [24].

With a view to the authoritarian and repressive policies of Saudi Arabia's new crown prince Mohammad bin Salman, it can be seen that he immediately adopted the rule of law in Saudi Arabia, and even earlier, in suppressing dissidents. In the first act, Ben Salman took over the political boycott of Mohammed bin Nayeef and some of the other princes of power rivals. Also, Ben Salman, in another act, dismissed all the opposition (21 people who had rejected him by a protest letter) from government and government positions. The peak of bin Salman's repressive policies in the Yemeni war and the support of Abdurakh Mansur Hadi, the country's successor (Table 1).

| Feedback from the Arab coalition to Yemen and the economic, political, cultural and social crises in Yemen |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| 10000 People | Human casualties |
| 20000 People | injured |
| 3000000 People | Refugees |
| 3000 centers | Infrastructure destruction |
| 1000 centers | Destruction of manufacturing centers |
| 1000 centers | Destruction and closure of educational and research centers |
| More than 320000 homes | Demolition of residential buildings |

Table 1: Human casualties and cultural, economic and political losses of the Arab coalition attack to Yemen (Source: Foreign Policy).

Challenges with the Shiites

The Shiite issue can in fact be considered the most important issue for the leaders of the Arab world, especially its authoritarian leaders. Many of the radical and terrorist currents of the region have directly or indirectly faced the Shiites and their security with many challenges. Al Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIL, al-Nusra and other terrorist groups in the region, despite the fact that the struggle against the system of arrogance in the West and the revival of the Islamic holy tradition, are in practice the most important scourge of Shiites in the region, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Hezbollah Lebanon [25]. In the same vein, Saddam Hussein and Mohammed bin Salman’s approach to the Shiites of the region has similarities and differentials. In general, the Shi’a flow in Iraq is due to issues such as the larger Shiite population than the Sunni and other religions, the presence of the barracks Several Shi’a Imams, the increasing Shi’ite Iraqi deprivation of political currents, the great effects of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and, finally, the existence of many religious ideologues such as Ayatullah Sistani and the country in terms of the flow of political dissent from its Sunni rulers and rulers Has set. This issue has a special prominence during Saddam’s times [26]. Another important issue in this regard is that Saddam Hussein has always feared the power of the Shiites, and by providing hegemonic monitoring systems, the prohibition of Shiites from all political and political activities, imposing restrictions on pilgrimages to Shiites, especially in the pilgrimage towns of Karbala and Najaf, and arrest The scourge of the Shi’ite religious elites sought isolation and a political-religious boycott of the Shiites of Iraq. On the other hand, any protests by the Shiites and their leaders and opposition to Saddam’s policies were threatened, intimidated, tortured and even murdered became the obvious example of this can be found in the killing of Ayatullah Seyed Mohammad Bagher Sadr of Shi‘te Iraqi leaders [27]. The culmination of Saddam Hussein’s pragmatic and anti-Semitic policies has been the suppression of the Iraqi Intifada Shabaniyeh. In the course of the post-Second Gulf War, with the widespread protest of Saddam’s opponents, who were at the head of Iraqi Shiites, fourteen provinces from 18 Iraqi provinces fell to the opposition. Saddam Hussein opposed the crackdown on Shi’a and other opponents and, based on some statistics, displaced between three hundred and fifty thousand people and displaced more than two million people. In the same vein, Sayyid Abulqasem Kho'ii was arrested by the great Shiites of Iraq, and the Shrine of the Holy Shrines was found in Karbala and Najaf [28].

Saudi politics also has similarities with Saddam’s Iraq towards the Shiites. First, Saudi Arabia has a much smaller Shiite population than Iraq in terms of population structure. In other words, if two thirds of the Iraqi population is Shiites (about 17 million), in Saudi Arabia this is only 15-20% of the population (about 6 million people). But in any case, the lack of reconciliation with the Shiites and the imposition of several restrictions, Shia always put Saddam and Saddam's central Iraqi governments in an erosive and permanent challenge. But the important thing here is the restrictions imposed on Saudi Arabia towards the Shiites, which are far more severe than the restrictions imposed on Saddam Hussein's Shiites in Iraq. These restrictions apply even to freedom of expression. The policies leading to the control, monitoring, limitation, threat, torture and murder of Shiites in Saudi Arabia are such that even the human rights organization has faced increasing concerns [29].

Over reliance on military power and militaristic policies

Another aspect of similarities and convergence in Pragmatist politics of Saddam Hussein and Mohammed bin Salman is their willingness to buy weapons and strengthen their country's military base. Apart from the fact that Saddam, with a peraturist personality, has always been seeking to improve Iraq's position in the area through the use of advanced military and weapons tools, Mohammed bin Salman has also implemented such a policy. The Soviet Union, the United States, France and Germany were the most important countries to strengthen the military base of Iraq during Saddam’s times, especially during the imposed war with Iran. Although support for Saddam Hussein was severely reduced after the second Gulf War, regional and transatlantic support for the militarization of Iraq was as fast as possible [30]. Lastly, Saddam Hussein also provided military support for the economic dimension of the huge $70 billion received from the Arab Gulf states in military fields, and almost the most modern weapons of land, air and hijacking during the first and second years of the Persian Gulf War Was in possession. Indeed, Saddam Hussein’s political discourse was based on advancing political ends with the use of military instruments. This was a tangible issue in the Shatt al-Arab crisis, which was the first Gulf war with Iran, and the Kuwaiti issue turned into an occupation of this country [31]. The militant policies of Mohammed bin Salman are also in accord with
Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s time. With some attitude, the Middle East after the Islamic awakening can be seen increasingly in the fire of war, threats and terrorism. The crises in Syria, Iraq and Yemen are based on this claim. For example, Saudi Arabia’s military presence in the Yemeni crisis has challenged the country economically. In other words, Mohamed bin Salman, like Saddam Hussein, is keen to strengthen the military base and arms of Saudi Arabia, believing that power is at the forefront of the country’s political goals and intentions. For this reason, the development of very heavy military contracts that recently bin Salman has traveled to Trump to this country with an amazing $100 billion budget plus promises to raise that price to $400 billion can be mentioned in this regard. The use of such heavy economic costs, according to Salman, could possibly continue to serve as a platform for the suppression of resistance movements such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Ansarullah Yemen and Heshd al-Sha’bi in Iraq and ultimately a major deterrent to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. Saudi Arabia’s military-political history did not sell such weapons from the United States (Figure 1) [32].

Developing the ideology and political authority in the Arab world

One of the important differences between Saddam Hussein and Mohammed bin Salman can be seen in the expansion of political authority in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In other words, both Saddam and Ben Sulman had the ideological leadership and presidency of the Arab world, but the kind of authority and ideological discourse of Saddam and Ben Salman are completely different from each other. Saddam Hussein, in the wake of the Iraqi Ba’ath regime, has always sought to expand political authority in the Arab world with nationalist discourse and socialist ideas. Indeed, the Ba’ath Party, which was originally founded in the Iraqi and Iranian countries, was founded with the intention and intent that in the near future the discourse of all Arabs in the region would be harmonized, although later, as it was said, the boundaries of ideology. The Ba’ath party of Iraq and Syria became a major disengagement in political and ideological issues. Saddam also considered himself a secular and social modern revolutionary leader like Nasser. Indeed, the decades of the fifties to the eighties have been the peak years of pan-Arabism in the Arab world. Pan-Arabism, which became more radical with the integration of socialism and sometimes of communist ideas. The intellectual leader of the current process could be Jamal Abdul Nasser, the late Egyptian president, who believed that with the unity of the Arabs crossing the difficulties, the ability to confront the enemies of the Arabs, especially Israel, would be more than ready. Persons such as Hafez al-Assad, Muammar al-Adl al-Salam Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein later sought to revive Nasser’s thoughts, with their ambition to dominate the entire Arab world and to lead the Arabs [20].

Mohammed bin Salman also deals with Saddam Hussein’s policies in this issue, which typically seeks for the leadership of the Sunni world, but the kind of authority and extension of the discourse proposed by Mohammed bin Salman is quite distinct with Saddam Hussein’s discourse. Indeed, Mohammed bin Salman sought to dominate Islam and Wahhabism in the Sunni world led by Al Saud. For this reason, with its pragmatic policies, it is trying to attract the opinion and political allegiance of the Sunni countries to Saudi ideological politics. For Sudan, for example, Saudi Arabia, with heavy financial promises, not only made this country largely obedient, but also added Sudan to the Arab military coalition in the Yemeni war. In the case of Egypt, the Saudi leadership, with its extensive support of Sisi and the open enmity with the Brotherhood, not only made a powerful rival, subordinate ally but also the strategic islands of the Sanafir and Tiran from Egypt and added to their dominated areas (Figure 2).

Reformism in Saddam’s and Ben Salman’s executive policies

Another aspect of Saddam Hussein’s and pragmatist’s policies of separatist and Mohammed bin Salman is the implementation of reformist policies in the economic, political, cultural and social fields. Following the consolidation of power, Saddam made several efforts to reform the Iraqi people’s economic, political, social, cultural and welfare affairs. In the first step, he quickly corrected economic affairs and the monetary and financial system, and expelled many corrupt economies and even sentenced him to execution squads. The development of the disputed Iraqi economy at the time of Saddam Hussein quickly progressed. With the development and expansion of oil production and the high revenues generated by its sale, this issue was more than ready for economic development in Iraq. Saddam also made widespread efforts to expand welfare services so that the most remote villages and areas of Iraq benefited from electricity, medical services, food quotas like flour and other basic necessities of life. The implementation of the National Literacy Movement initiative and free compulsory education is one of Saddam’s constructive cultural initiatives. The large economic support of the Iraqi Army’s family of soldiers, the free provision of public health, the payment of a grant to farmers is another of its welfare measures. In the political dimension,
Despite the fact that Saddam harbored all his loyal and close friends in the fields and positions it was important political and practically did not use the other elites, but the same thing prevented sectarianism and its challenges in political unity and inequality. On the other hand, the words of Saddam Hussein's political team were entirely homogeneous and lacking in any kind of disunity, which was the basis of his dictatorship [33].

In order to create diversification in the single-oil economy and rely on oil, Saddam initiated and supported the national plan to strengthen Iraq's economic infrastructure. This plan has made great progress in building roads, improving the mining industry and developing non-oil industries. It also led to a significant revolution in the energy industry. Almost all Iraqi cities, including villages and remote areas, were powered by electricity. Before the 1970s, Iraq's largest population lived in villages, and farmers accounted for almost two-thirds of the total population. This figure fell sharply in the 1970s. The reason for this was the settlement of people in cities and industrialization, which Saddam pushed forward through oil money. However, Saddam attempted to create a sense of loyalty to the Ba'ath Party in rural areas. After the nationalization of the oil industry, he began to renovate and advance rural areas, agricultural mechanization on a large scale, and the distribution of land among farmers. He took possession of big landowners and gave villagers. The Ba'athists set up several cooperative companies that divided the gains made by the villagers among them, and the rest were spent on the training of inexperienced people. The Iraqi government's commitment to land reform reflected itself in doubling the cost of agricultural development in 1354-1353 (1974-1974). Land reform also contributed to the development of the standard of living of the Great Peasants' Division and the growth of production [34]. Among other reformist measures of the Saddam's government was the granting of dividends to women and the possibility of their activities in industrial jobs and the possibility of studying in higher education. Saddam also introduced a kind of Western judicial system in the country. By doing so, Iraq was the only Arab nation that was not governed by the traditional laws of Islam (sharia). He banned the activities of Shari'a courts except for personal injury claims [35]. Of course, Saddam Hussein tried to legitimize his government in the late postwar period of Iraq, so he made a lot of

Conclusion

In this paper, the authors' efforts are about a comparison of the pragmatist policies of Saddam Hussein, former dictator of the Ba'ath regime in Iraq, and Mohammed bin Salman, the newly appointed Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. Among the pragmatist policies of Saddam Hussein and Mohammed bin Salman, there are ways to differentiate and to find some interesting similarities. Saddam Hussein, after the coming to power of the Ba'ath Party of Iraq, gradually shifted to the isolation of Hassan al-Bakr's soft coup and became the authority of political power in Iraq. Such an approach is also seen in Saudi Arabia. Although the type of political system in Saddam's Iraq was based on a single-party system and totalitarianism, and Saudi Arabia has a divine monarchy in this regard, it is also how the power of Ben Salman arrives, like Saddam's regime, to the Shah of the Saad family and the age of the disease was the property of Salman. Ben Salman and Saddam Hussein have similarities in the important issue of the Shiites challenge. As the Iraqi Shiites, under Saddam Hussein, have been deprived of any political, party, opposition, and protest measures, and the Iraqi authority, Ayatollah Sadr, was ultimately killed in this direction. In Saudi Arabia, these restrictions are also more stringent. The political, cultural and social boycotts of Saudi Arabia, along with their poor livelihood, are proof of this allegation compared to other Saudi citizens. The execution of Sheikh Baqir Nemr, the prominent Saudi Shiite cleric, as well as the assassination of Ayatollah Sadr, further illustrates the similarity. Another comparison in the policies of Saddam and Ben Salman is the intimidation, threats, repression and political repression. Both leaders of the Arab world can be considered one of the most authoritative people in this field. The dreaded Saddam Hussein militia and the tin of political opponents from senior Ba'athist leaders in Iraq, to the Shiites and the Shi'ites, have all seen some serious damage to Saddam's pragmatic policies in the area of suppression and political repression. Such a position has also been applied by Bin Salman in Saudi government. Aside from the repression Saddam imposed, like Yemen Hussein inside Saudi Arabia, the new regime, who have endangered the power of bin Salman, have faced threats, boycotts and bans on political and military activities. The fourth step in a comparative policy review of Saddam and Ben Salman about their militaristic spirit. Saddam Hussein has always considered the strengthening of military bases as the most important means of realizing the policies of Iraq and the Ba'ath Party. This issue is well understood in the invasion of Iran and the occupation of Kuwait. By adopting this approach and with the significant development of the purchase of military weapons from the United States, Ben Salman considers the strengthening of Saudi military weapons the most important means of realizing or deterring the region and against the Republic of Salami in Iran. A political perspective on the Zionist regime is the point of differentiation and policy difference. Bin Salman and Saddam. Saddam Hussein, who had a great deal of confidence in the Arab world, considered the Palestinian issue as a major factor in this regard. Therefore, Palestine was considered a tool for realizing the dream of a leader in the Arab world. The conflict and the challenge with the Zionist regime, for whatever reason, severely undermine Saddam's relationship with this regime. But Ben Salman, in pursuit of the dream of a monarchy on Hejaz, needed to win the confidence of the White House and the Zionist regime. This is the approach of convergence and cooperation with this regime in the policies of Bin Salman.

Conflict and challenge with Israel, for whatever reason, severely undermined Saddam's Iraqi relations and this regime. But Ben Salman, in pursuit of the dream of a monarchy on Hejaz, needed to win the
confident of the White House and the Zionist regime. The approach of convergence and cooperation with this regime is quite evident in the policies of Bin Salman. Another issue comparing Saddam’s and Ben Salman’s policies is reform and reformism in the political system of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Saddam should be considered successful in this regard. The reality also indicates the development of cultural, economic and widespread social welfare in Iraq. So much of the deprivation of villagers and remote areas of Iraq was overcome. But Ben Salman did not succeed in economic policy in the 2000s and Saudi Arabia’s lack of dependence on oil. Eventually, the issue of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and its threats for Saddam and Saudi Arabia, bin Salman, were examined. Certainly, the potential threats of the Islamic Revolution of Iran can be regarded as the most important part of the sharing of pragmatic policies of Saddam Hussein and Mohammed bin Salman. Saddam Hussein threatened by the Iranian revolution and the excitement and support of regional powers that he committed an eight-year erosion and war crimes war against Iran, which caused a lot of hardware, software and human casualties, but did not actually have any achievements for Iraq and Saddam. Bin Salman, with the same policy, initially adopted hostile and tense positions and cut diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic and Iran, and the increasing spread of political tensions, especially on issues such as the catastrophe of Mina, the martyrdom of Ayatollah Namr, the attack on the Saudi embassy in Iran, regional crises such as Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have pushed the two countries into a possible war possible.

References

1. Mahmoud YF (2011) Developments in the Arab World: Formation of Power and Identity in the Middle East. Strategic Studies Quarterly 14: 47-76.
2. Aziz J, Mirghasem BH (2011) Arab Revolutionary Movements: Challenges of the New Model Government. Strategic Studies Quarterly 14: 79-110.
3. Nasri G (2011) Theoretical Consideration on the Nature and Transition Process of the Arab World. J Strategic Stud 14: 8-45.
4. Sassoon J (2011) Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime. Cambridge University Press.
5. Dawisha A (2009) Iraq: A Political History. Princeton University Press.
6. Linz LJ (2000) Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder: Lynne Riener Press, pp: 1-343.
7. Tripp C (2000) A History of Iraq. (2ndedn), New York: Cambridge University Press.
8. Rohde A (2010) State-Society Relations in Ba’thist Iraq: Facing Dictatorship. New York: Routledge.
9. Marr P (2004) The Modern History of Iraq. (2ndedn), Boulder: Westview Publication.
10. Oren MB (2007) Power, Faith and Fantasy: The United States in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present. New York: Norton Publication.
11. Weston M (2008) Prophets and Princes - Saudi Arabia from Muhammad to the Present. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Inc Publication.
12. Henderson S (2009) After King Abdullah; Succession in Saudi Arabia. Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Publication.
13. Fahad A (2013) The Saudi King: Power and Limitation in the Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy Making. Int J Social Sci Humanity 3: 437-450.
14. Helms C (2015) The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity. NewYork: Routledge Publication 58: 1-313.
15. Norman C (2011) Tribes, Society and the State in Saudi Arabia: Chang and Continuity and the Implications for Security and Stability. J Maghreb Review 36.
16. Rasheed M (2005) Circles of Power: Royals and Saudi Society in Saudi Arabia in the Balance. J Political Economy Soc Foreign Affairs, London: Hurst and Company Publication.
17. Toby J (2006) Rebellion on the Saudi Periphery: Modernity, Modernization, Marginalization, and the Shia Uprising of 1979. Int J Middle East Stud 38: 213-233.
18. Ali BM, Ali MNS, Abdolreza A (2017) The cause of the failed coup of 2016 Turkish Army against the AKP. Int J Int Relations 10: 39-64.
19. Nardulli P (2013) The Coup D’etat Project. Clinic Center for Democracy, University of Illinois Publication.
20. Rostami F, Seifidi S (2016) The Study of the Causes of the Emergence and Continuity of the Security Context in Iraq after Saddam. Q J Political Stud, In the Islamic World 6: 83-111.
21. Anthony HC (2003) Saddam’s Last Circle: The Core Forces Likely to Protect Saddam in the Battle of Baghdad. Center for Strategic and International Studies Publication.
22. Rabil R (2002) The Iraqi Opposition’s Evolution: From Conflict to Unity. J Middle East Rev Int Affairs 6.
23. Daniel B, Kenneth P, Matthew W (1998) Coercing Saddam Hussein: Lessons From the Past. J Int Inst for Strategic Stud 40: 127-151.
24. Rogg J, Rimscha H (2007) The Kurds as parties to and victims of conflicts in Iraq. Int J Rev, Red Cross 89.
25. Hadi T, Abdolreza A, Nezhad M, Ali S (2014) The Discourse Governing the Formation and Activities of ISIL Based on Springs-Tilly’s Theories. Afaq Security Quarterly Journal 23: 257-285.
26. Sajjad D (2010) Transformation in the Sociological View of Shiite Iraq in the Twentieth Century (Causes - Consequences). Shi’ite Literature 32: 131-182.
27. Asghar MA (2004) Shiites of Iraq: Ideals, Facts and Challenges. Shiite Magazine 7: 187-210.
28. Touraj A (2016) The Assassination of the Political Construction of Power in Iraq. Quarterly of Strategic Studies of the Islamic World 65: 5-40.
29. Ebrahim GS, Hadi B (2014) The Geopolitical Influence of the Islamic Revolution of Iran on the Politicalization of the Shites of Arabia. Shi’ite Magazine 12: 141-164.
30. Ruhollah QA (2009) An Analysis of Regional and Transnational Weapons-Aid Contribution to Iraq in Imposed War Against Fellows. Q J Specialized Holy Defense Stud 8: 51-70.
31. Hinnebusch R (2007) The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes ana Consequences. Saint Andrews University of St. Andrews Publication, pp: 9-27.
32. Steve H (2017) US closes in on $100bn deal to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia, The Independent.
33. Crocker B (2004) Reconstructing Iraq’s Economy. The Washington Quarterly 27: 73-93.
34. Mackey S (2002) The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein. New York: Norton Publication.
35. Peter K (2006) Rebuilding and Reforming the Iraqi Security Sector: U.S. Policy During Democratic Transition. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute.
36. Khaskan H (2017) Saudi Arabia’s Flawed Vision 2030. Middle East Quarterly Press.