The Continuous Time Nonzero-sum Dynkin Game Problem and Application in Game Options

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Abstract

In this paper we study the nonzero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time which is a two player non-cooperative game on stopping times. We show that it has a Nash equilibrium point for general stochastic processes. As an application, we consider the problem of pricing American game contingent claims by the utility maximization approach.

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1 Introduction

Dynkin games of zero-sum or nonzero-sum, continuous or discrete time types, are games on stopping times. Since their introduction by E.B. Dynkin in [10], they have attracted a lot of research activities (see e.g. [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] and the references therein).

To begin with let us describe briefly those game problems. Assume we have a system controlled by two players or agents $a_1$ and $a_2$. The system works or is alive up to the time when one of the agents decides to stop the control at a stopping time $\tau_1$ for $a_1$ and $\tau_2$ for $a_2$. An example of that system is a recallable option in a financial market (see [15, 17] for more details). When the system is stopped the payment for $a_1$ (resp. $a_2$) amounts to a quantity $J_1(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ (resp. $J_2(\tau_1, \tau_2)$) which could be negative and then it is a cost. We say that the nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with $J_1$ and $J_2$ has a Nash equilibrium point (NEP for short) if there exists a pair of stopping times $(\tau_1^*, \tau_2^*)$ such that for any $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ we have:

$$J_1(\tau_1^*, \tau_2^*) \geq J_1(\tau_1, \tau_2^*) \quad \text{and} \quad J_2(\tau_1^*, \tau_2^*) \geq J_2(\tau_1^*, \tau_2).$$

The particular case where $J_1 + J_2 = 0$ corresponds to the zero-sum Dynkin game. In this case, when the pair $(\tau_1^*, \tau_2^*)$ exists it satisfies

$$J_1(\tau_1^*, \tau_2) \leq J_1(\tau_1^*, \tau_2^*) \leq J_1(\tau_1, \tau_2^*), \quad \text{for any } \tau_1, \tau_2.$$

We call such a $(\tau_1^*, \tau_2^*)$ a saddle-point for the game. Additionally this existence implies in particular that:

$$\inf_{\tau_1} \sup_{\tau_2} J_1(\tau_1, \tau_2) = \sup_{\tau_2} \inf_{\tau_1} J_1(\tau_1, \tau_2),$$

i.e., the game has a value.

Mainly, in the zero-sum setting, authors aim at proving existence of the value or/and a saddle point for the game while in the nonzero-sum framework they focus on the issue of existence of a NEP for the game.

In continuous time, for decades there have been a lot of works on zero-sum Dynkin games [1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26]. Recently this type of game has attracted a new interest since it has been applied in mathematical finance (see...
e.g. [3, 15, 16, 17]) in connection with the pricing of American game options introduced by Y.Kifer in [17]. Comparing with the zero-sum setting, there are much less results on nonzero-sum Dynkin games in the literature. Nevertheless in the Markovian framework, among other papers, one can quote [4, 7, 23, 24] which deal with the nonzero-sum Dynkin game. In non-Markovian framework, E.Etourneau [14] showed that the game has a NEP if some of the processes which define the game ($Y^1$ and $Y^2$ of (2.1) below) are supermartingales. Note that even in the Markovian setting, an equivalent condition is supposed. On the other hand, there are some other works which study the existence of approximate equilibrium points (see e.g. [21]).

The main objective of this work is to study the existence of NEP for nonzero-sum Dynkin games in non-Markovian framework. For very general processes, we construct an NEP and thus it always exists. This removes the Etourneau’s type of conditions and, to our best knowledge, is novel in the literature. Our approach is based on the Snell envelope theory. We next apply our general existence result to price American Game Contingent Claim by the utility maximization approach. Kuhn [18] studied a similar problem by assuming that the agents $a_1$ and $a_2$ use only discrete stopping times and exponential utilities. We remove these constraints.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we precise the setting of the problem and give some preliminary results related to the Snell envelope notion. In Section 3, we construct a sequence of pairs of decreasing stopping times and show that their limit pair is an NEP for the game. Finally in Section 4, we apply the result of Section 3 to price American Game Contingent Claim by the utility maximization approach.

2 Formulation of the problem

Throughout this paper $T$ is a real positive constant which stands for the horizon of the problem and $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P)$ is a fixed probability space on which is defined a filtration $\mathbf{F} := (\mathcal{F}_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ which satisfies the usual conditions, i.e., it is complete and right continuous.

Next:
- for any $\mathbf{F}$-stopping times $\theta$, let $\mathcal{T}_\theta$ denote the set of $\mathbf{F}$-stopping times $\tau$ such that $\mathcal{T}(\theta)$
\[ \tau \in [\theta, T], \text{ P-a.s.} \]

- let \([D]\) denote the space of \(F\)-adapted \(\mathcal{R}\)-valued right continuous with left limits (RCLL for short) processes \(\zeta\) such that the set of random variables \(\{\zeta_{\tau}, \tau \in \mathcal{T}_0\}\) are uniformly integrable.

We consider a game problem with two players \(a_1\) and \(a_2\). For \(i = 1, 2\), the player \(a_i\) can choose a stopping time \(\tau_i \in \mathcal{T}_0\) to stop the game. So the game actually ends at \(\tau_1 \wedge \tau_2\). Each player \(a_i\) is associated with two payoff/cost processes \(X^i, Y^i\). Their expected utilities \(J_i(\tau_1, \tau_2), i = 1, 2\), are defined as follows:

\[
J_1(\tau_1, \tau_2) \triangleq E\left\{X^1_{\tau_1} 1_{\{\tau_1 \leq \tau_2\}} + Y^1_{\tau_2} 1_{\{\tau_2 < \tau_1\}}\right\}
\]

and

\[
J_2(\tau_1, \tau_2) \triangleq E\left\{X^2_{\tau_2} 1_{\{\tau_2 < \tau_1\}} + Y^2_{\tau_1} 1_{\{\tau_1 \leq \tau_2\}}\right\}.
\]

That is, if the player \(a_i\) is the one who actually stops the game (i.e. \(\tau_i < \tau_j\) for \(j \neq i\)), then he receives \(X^i_{\tau_i}\); if the game is stopped by the other player \(a_j\) (i.e. \(\tau_j < \tau_i\)), then \(a_i\) receives \(Y^i_j\). In the case that \(\tau_1 = \tau_2\) we take the convention that \(a_1\) is responsible for stopping the game. We can of course assume instead that \(a_2\) is responsible in this case and thus the corresponding payoffs/costs inside the expectations in (2.1) become

\[
X^1_{\tau_1} 1_{\{\tau_1 < \tau_2\}} + Y^1_{\tau_2} 1_{\{\tau_2 \leq \tau_1\}} \quad \text{and} \quad X^2_{\tau_2} 1_{\{\tau_2 \leq \tau_1\}} + Y^2_{\tau_1} 1_{\{\tau_1 < \tau_2\}}.
\]

Throughout the paper we shall use the following assumptions.

**A1.** The processes \(X^1, X^2, Y^1, Y^2\) belong to the space \([D]\), and \(X^1, X^2\) have only positive jumps;

**A2.** P-a.s., \(X^i_t \leq Y^i_t\) for any \(t \leq T\);

**A3.** For any \(\tau \in \mathcal{T}_0\), \(P(\{X^1_{\tau} < Y^1_{\tau}\} \setminus \{X^2_{\tau} < Y^2_{\tau}\}) = 0\).

The assumption **A1** is more or less the minimum requirement for the problem. **A2** implies that there is penalty for stopping the game early. We can study similarly the situation with reward for early stopping, namely to replace **A2** with \(X^i_t \geq Y^i_t\). Moreover, if we assume \(X^2 < Y^2\), then **A3** is redundant.

Our main goal is to study the NEP of the game.

**Definition 2.1** We say that \((\tau^*_1, \tau^*_2) \in \mathcal{T}_0^2\) is a Nash Equilibrium Point of the Nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with \(J_1\) and \(J_2\) if:

\[
J_1(\tau^*_1, \tau^*_2) \leq J_1(\tau^*_1, \tau_2), \quad J_2(\tau^*_1, \tau^*_2) \leq J_2(\tau^*_1, \tau_2), \quad \forall \tau_1, \tau_2 \in \mathcal{T}_0.
\]

(2.2)
As pointed out previously, this problem has been studied by several authors in the Markovian framework \[4, 7, 23, 24\], \textit{i.e.}, when besides to Assumptions \textbf{A1-A3}, the processes \(X^i\) and \(Y^i\) are deterministic functions of a Markov process \((m_t)_{t\leq T}\). If this latter condition is not satisfied, E. Etourneau showed in \[14\] that the game has a NEP when \(Y^1\) and \(Y^2\) are supermartingales. Note that even in the Markovian framework authors assume an equivalent condition to Etourneau’s one.

Our main result is the following theorem, which assumes only Assumptions \textbf{A1-A3} but without any regularity assumption on \(Y^1, Y^2\).

\textbf{Theorem 2.2} Under Assumptions \textbf{A1}, \textbf{A2} and \textbf{A3}, the nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with \(J_1\) and \(J_2\) has an NEP \((\tau^*_1, \tau^*_2)\).

We shall construct \((\tau^*_1, \tau^*_2)\) in next section. Our construction is based on the Snell envelope of processes which we introduce briefly now. For more details on this subject one can refer e.g. to El-Karoui \[13\] or Dellacherie and Meyer \[9\].

\textbf{Lemma 2.3} (\[9\], pp.431 or \[13\], pp.140) Let \(U\) be a process in the space \([D]\). Then, there exists an \(\mathcal{F}\)-adapted \(\mathbb{R}\)-valued RCLL process \(W\) such that \(W\) is the smallest super-martingale which dominates \(U\), \textit{i.e.}, if \(\bar{W}\) is another RCLL supermartingale such that \(\bar{W}_t \geq U_t\) for all \(0 \leq t \leq T\), then \(\bar{W}_t \geq W_t\) for any \(0 \leq t \leq T\). The process \(W\) is called the Snell envelope of \(U\). Moreover, the following properties hold:

(i) For any \(\mathcal{F}\)-stopping time \(\theta\) we have:

\[
W_\theta = \operatorname*{esssup}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_\theta} E[U_\tau | \mathcal{F}_\theta] \quad \text{(and then } W_T = U_T), \quad P - \text{a.s.} \tag{2.3}
\]

(ii) Assume that \(U\) has only positive jumps. Then the stopping time

\[
\tau^* \triangleq \inf\{s \geq 0, W_s = U_s\} \wedge T
\]

is optimal, \textit{i.e.},

\[
E[W_0] = E[W_{\tau^*}] = E[U_{\tau^*}] = \sup_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_0} E[U_\tau]. \tag{2.4}
\]

\textbf{Remark 2.4} As a by-product of (2.4) we have \(W_{\tau^*} = U_{\tau^*}\) and the process \(W\) is a martingale on the time interval \([0, \tau^*]\).
3 Construction of a Nash Equilibrium Point

In this section we shall construct a sequence of pairs of decreasing stopping times $(\tau_{2n+1}, \tau_{2n+2})$ and show that their limits $(\tau^*_1, \tau^*_2)$ is an NEP. First, notice that $Y^1$ is only required to be RCLL, and that $Y^1_T$ is never used in (2.1), for notational simplicity at below we will also assume without loss of generality that

A4. P-a.s., $Y^1_T = X^1_T$.

We emphasize again that this is just for notational simplicity. Without assuming A4, we may replace the integrands in (3.1) below with

$$X^1_T 1_{\{\tau < \tau_{2n}\}} + \left[ X^1_T 1_{\{\tau_{2n} = T\}} + Y^1_{\tau_{2n}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n} < T\}} \right] 1_{\{\tau \geq \tau_{2n}\}},$$

and all the arguments will be the same.

We start with defining $\tau_1 \triangleq T$ and $\tau_2 \triangleq T$. For $n = 1, \cdots$, assume $\tau_{2n-1}$ and $\tau_{2n}$ have been defined, we then define $\tau_{2n+1}$ and $\tau_{2n+2}$ as follows. First, let

$$W^{2n+1}_t \triangleq \operatorname{esssup}_{\tau \in T} E_t \left\{ X^1_T 1_{\{\tau < \tau_{2n}\}} + Y^1_{\tau_{2n}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n} < T\}} \right\}, \quad t \leq T; \quad (3.1)$$

where and in the sequel $E_t \{ \cdot \} \triangleq E \{ \cdot | F_t \}$, and

$$\tilde{\tau}_{2n+1} \triangleq \inf \{ t \geq 0 : W^{2n+1}_t = X^1_t \} \wedge \tau_{2n}; \quad \tau_{2n+1} \triangleq \begin{cases} \tilde{\tau}_{2n+1}, & \text{if } \tilde{\tau}_{2n+1} < \tau_{2n}; \\ \tau_{2n-1}, & \text{if } \tilde{\tau}_{2n+1} = \tau_{2n}. \end{cases} \quad (3.2)$$

Next, let

$$W^{2n+2}_t \triangleq \operatorname{esssup}_{\tau \in T} E_t \left\{ X^2_T 1_{\{\tau < \tau_{2n+1}\}} + Y^2_{\tau_{2n+1}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n+1} < T\}} \right\}, \quad t \leq T; \quad (3.3)$$

and

$$\tilde{\tau}_{2n+2} \triangleq \inf \{ t \geq 0 : W^{2n+2}_t = X^2_t \} \wedge \tau_{2n+1}; \quad \tau_{2n+2} \triangleq \begin{cases} \tilde{\tau}_{2n+2}, & \text{if } \tilde{\tau}_{2n+2} < \tau_{2n+1}; \\ \tau_{2n}, & \text{if } \tilde{\tau}_{2n+2} = \tau_{2n+1}. \end{cases} \quad (3.4)$$

We note that the integrand in (3.1) is slightly different from that of $J_1(\tau, \tau_{2n})$ in (2.1). The main reason is that, in order to apply Lemma 2.3, we need the process $U^{2n+1}$ in (3.6) below to be RCLL. But nevertheless we will prove later in Lemma 3.3 that $W^{2n+1}$ serves our purpose well.
Lemma 3.1 Assume Assumptions A1 and A2. For \( n = 1, 2, \ldots \), \( \tau_n \) is a stopping time and \( \tau_{n+2} \leq \tau_n \).

Proof. We prove the following stronger results by induction on \( n \):

\[
\tau_n \in \mathcal{T}_0, \quad \{\tau_n < \tau_{n+1}\} \subset \{\tilde{\tau}_{n+2} \leq \tau_n\}, \quad \tau_{n+2} \leq \tau_n. \tag{3.5}
\]

Obviously (3.5) holds for \( n = 1, 2 \). Assume it is true for \( 2^{n-1} \) and \( 2^n \). We shall prove it for \( 2^n + 1 \) and \( 2^n + 2 \).

First, define

\[
U^{2n+1}_t \triangleq X^1_{\{t<\tau_{2n}\}} + Y^1_{\tau_{2n}} 1_{\{t \geq \tau_{2n}\}}. \tag{3.6}
\]

Since \( \tau_{2n} \) is a stopping time, by Assumptions A1 and A2 we know \( U^{2n+1} \) is in space \( [D] \) and has only positive jumps. Apply Lemma 2.3, \( W^{2n+1} \) is the snell envelope of \( U^{2n+1} \) and \( \tilde{\tau}_{2n+1} \) is the optimal stopping time.

If \( \tau_{2n-1} < \tau_{2n} \), then by the second claim of (3.5) for \( 2^n - 1 \) we have \( \tilde{\tau}_{2n+1} \leq \tau_{2n-1} \) and thus \( \tilde{\tau}_{2n+1} < \tau_{2n} \). This implies that

\[
\{\tilde{\tau}_{2n+1} = \tau_{2n}\} \subset \{\tau_{2n-1} \geq \tau_{2n}\}, \tag{3.7}
\]

which, combined with the definition (3.2), implies further that \( \tau_{2n+1} \) is a stopping time.

Next, on \( \{\tau_{2n+1} < \tau_{2n+2}\} \), by definition of \( \tau_{2n+2} \) in (3.4) we have \( \tau_{2n+2} = \tau_{2n} \). Then \( U^{2n+3}_t = U^{2n+1}_t \) for \( t \geq \tau_{2n+1} \) and thus

\[
W^{2n+3}_{\tau_{2n+1}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n+1} < \tau_{2n+2}\}} = W^{2n+1}_{\tau_{2n+1}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n+1} < \tau_{2n+2}\}}. \tag{3.8}
\]

On the other hand, if \( \tilde{\tau}_{2n+1} = \tau_{2n} \), by the third claim of (3.5) for \( 2^n \), (3.7), and definition of (3.2), we have \( \tau_{2n+2} \leq \tau_{2n} \leq \tau_{2n-1} = \tau_{2n+1} \). Thus \( \{\tau_{2n+1} < \tau_{2n+2}\} \subset \{\tau_{2n+1} = \tilde{\tau}_{2n+1} < \tau_{2n}\} \), and therefore, by Remark 2.4,

\[
W^{2n+1}_{\tau_{2n+1}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n+1} < \tau_{2n+2}\}} = X^1_{\tau_{2n+1}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n+1} < \tau_{2n+2}\}}. \tag{3.9}
\]

This, together with (3.8), implies that

\[
W^{2n+3}_{\tau_{2n+1}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n+1} < \tau_{2n+2}\}} = X^1_{\tau_{2n+1}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n+1} < \tau_{2n+2}\}}. \tag{3.10}
\]

Now by the definition of \( \tilde{\tau}_{2n+3} \) in (3.2) we know

\[
\{\tau_{2n+1} < \tau_{2n+2}\} \subset \{\tilde{\tau}_{2n+3} \leq \tau_{2n+1}\}. \tag{3.9}
\]
Moreover, if \( \tau_{2n+3} > \tau_{2n+1} \), by definition (3.2) we have \( \tau_{2n+3} = \tilde{\tau}_{2n+3} < \tau_{2n+2} \). Then \( \tau_{2n+1} < \tilde{\tau}_{2n+3} < \tau_{2n+2} \). This contradicts with (3.9). Therefore, \( \tau_{2n+3} \leq \tau_{2n+1} \).

Finally, one can prove (3.5) for \( 2n + 2 \) similarly. \( \blacksquare \)

Following is another important property of the stopping times \( \tau_n \).

**Lemma 3.2** Assume Assumptions A1 and A2. On \( \{ \tau_n = \tau_{n-1} \} \), we have \( \tau_m = T \) for all \( m \leq n \).

**Proof.** The result is obvious for \( n = 2 \). Assume it is true for \( n \). Now for \( n + 1 \), on \( \{ \tau_{n+1} = \tau_n \} \), by the definition of \( \tau_{n+1} \) in (3.2) or (3.4) we have \( \tau_{n+1} = \tau_{n-1} \). Then \( \tau_n = \tau_{n-1} \) and thus by induction assumption we get the result. \( \blacksquare \)

Next lemma shows that \( \tau_n \) is the optimal stopping time for some problem.

**Lemma 3.3** Assume Assumptions A1, A2 and A4. For any \( \tau \in T_0 \) and any \( n \) we have:

\[
J_1(\tau, \tau_{2n}) \leq J_1(\tau_{2n+1}, \tau_{2n}) \quad \text{and} \quad J_2(\tau_{2n+1}, \tau) \leq J_2(\tau_{2n+1}, \tau_{2n+2}). \tag{3.10}
\]

**Proof.** First, by the definition of \( W^{2n+1} \) in (3.1) we have \( W^{2n+1}_{\tau_{2n}} = Y^1_{\tau_{2n}} \). Next, by Lemma 2.3 we have \( W^{2n+1}_t \geq X^1_t \) for any \( t \in [0, \tau_{2n}] \) and \( W^{2n+1} \) is a supermartingale over \( [0, \tau_{2n}] \). Then, for any \( \tau \in T_0 \),

\[
J_1(\tau, \tau_{2n}) = \mathbb{E}\left\{ X^1_{\tau} 1_{\{\tau \leq \tau_{2n} \}} + Y^1_{\tau_{2n}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n} < \tau \}} \right\}
\leq \mathbb{E}\left\{ W^{2n+1}_{\tau} 1_{\{\tau \leq \tau_{2n} \}} + W^{2n+1}_{\tau_{2n}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n} < \tau \}} \right\} = \mathbb{E}\{ W^{2n+1}_{\tau_{2n} \wedge \tau} \} \leq W^{2n+1}_0.
\tag{3.11}
\]

On the other hand, by Lemma 3.2 and Assumption A4 we have

\[
J_1(\tau_{2n+1}, \tau_{2n}) = \mathbb{E}\left\{ X^1_{\tau_{2n+1}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n+1} \leq \tau_{2n} \}} + Y^1_{\tau_{2n}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n} < \tau_{2n+1} \}} \right\} = \mathbb{E}\left\{ X^1_{\tau_{2n+1}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n+1} < \tau_{2n} \}} + Y^1_{\tau_{2n}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n} \leq \tau_{2n+1} \}} \right\}.
\]

By (3.2), (3.7), and then by Remark 2.4, we get

\[
J_1(\tau_{2n+1}, \tau_{2n}) = \mathbb{E}\left\{ X^1_{\tau_{2n+1}} 1_{\{\tau_{2n+1} < \tau_{2n} \}} + W^{2n+1}_{\tau_{2n}} 1_{\{\tilde{\tau}_{2n+1} = \tau_{2n} \}} \right\} = \mathbb{E}\{ W^{2n+1}_{\tau_{2n}} \} = W^{2n+1}_0.
\]

This, together with (3.11), proves \( J_1(\tau, \tau_{2n}) \leq J_1(\tau_{2n+1}, \tau_{2n}) \).

Similarly we can prove \( J_2(\tau_{2n+1}, \tau) \leq J_2(\tau_{2n+1}, \tau_{2n+2}) \). \( \blacksquare \)
Now define
\[ \tau^*_1 \triangleq \lim_{n \to \infty} \tau_{2n+1} \quad \text{and} \quad \tau^*_2 \triangleq \lim_{n \to \infty} \tau_{2n}. \tag{3.12} \]

We shall prove that \((\tau^*_1, \tau^*_2)\) is an NEP. We divide the proof into several lemmas.

**Lemma 3.4** Assume Assumptions A1 and A2.

(i) For any \(\tau \in T_0\), we have \(\lim_{n \to \infty} J_1(\tau, \tau_{2n}) = J_1(\tau, \tau^*_2)\).

(ii) For any \(\tau \in T_0\) such that \(P(\tau = \tau^*_1 < T) = 0\), we have \(\lim_{n \to \infty} J_2(\tau_{2n+1}, \tau) = J_2(\tau^*_1, \tau)\).

**Proof.** (i) By Assumption A1, we have
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} J_1(\tau, \tau_{2n}) = \lim_{n \to \infty} E\left\{ X^1_{\tau, \tau_{2n}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau \leq \tau_{2n}\}} + Y^1_{\tau_{2n}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau_{2n} < \tau\}} \right\} = E\left\{ X^1_{\tau, \tau_{2n}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau < \tau^*_1\}} + Y^1_{\tau_{2n}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau_{2n} < \tau^*_1\}} \right\} = J_1(\tau, \tau^*_2).
\]

(ii) Since \(\{\tau < \tau_{2n+1}\} \subset \{\tau < T\}\), we have
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} E\left\{ X^2_{\tau, \tau_{2n+1}} \right\} = \lim_{n \to \infty} E\left\{ X^2_{\tau, \tau_{2n+1}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau < \tau_{2n+1} = \tau^*_1\}} \right\} = E\left\{ X^2_{\tau, \tau^*_1} \right\}.
\]

Moreover, note that \(\tau^*_1 \leq \tau_{2n+1}\), then \(\{\tau^*_1 = T\} \subset \{\tau_{2n+1} = T\}\). Applying the assumption \(P(\tau = \tau^*_1 < T) = 0\) twice we have
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} E\left\{ Y^2_{\tau_{2n+1}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau_{2n+1} \leq \tau\}} \right\} = \lim_{n \to \infty} E\left\{ Y^2_{\tau_{2n+1}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau_{2n+1} \leq \tau\}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau \neq \tau^*_1\}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau = \tau^*_1\}} \right\} = E\left\{ Y^2_{\tau^*_1} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau^*_1 < \tau\}} \right\}.
\]

Then
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} J_2(\tau_{2n+1}, \tau) = \lim_{n \to \infty} E\left\{ X^2_{\tau, \tau_{2n+1}} + Y^2_{\tau_{2n+1}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau_{2n+1} \leq \tau\}} \right\} = E\left\{ X^2_{\tau, \tau^*_1} + Y^2_{\tau^*_1} \mathbb{1}_{\{\tau^*_1 \leq \tau\}} \right\} = J_2(\tau^*_1, \tau).
\]

The proof is complete. \(\blacksquare\)

**Lemma 3.5** Assume Assumptions A1-A4. Then it holds that
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} J_1(\tau_{2n+1}, \tau_{2n}) = J_1(\tau^*_1, \tau^*_2); \quad \lim_{n \to \infty} J_2(\tau_{2n-1}, \tau_{2n}) = J_2(\tau^*_1, \tau^*_2).
\]
Proof. (i) We first show that
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} J_2(\tau_{2n-1}, \tau_{2n}) = J_2(\tau_1^*, \tau_2^*). \tag{3.13}
\]
Note that
\[
J_2(\tau_{2n-1}, \tau_{2n}) = E\left\{[X_{\tau_{2n}}^1 I\{\tau_{2n} < \tau_{2n-1}\} + Y_{\tau_{2n-1}}^2 I\{\tau_{2n-1} \leq \tau_{2n}\}] [1\{\tau_1^* \neq \tau_2^*\} + 1\{\tau_1^* = \tau_2^*\}]\right\}.
\]
Since \(X^2, Y^2\) are in space \([D]\), sending \(n \to \infty\) we have
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} J_2(\tau_{2n-1}, \tau_{2n}) = \lim_{n \to \infty} E\left\{X_{\tau_{2n}}^2 I\{\tau_{2n} < \tau_{2n-1}\} + Y_{\tau_{2n-1}}^2 I\{\tau_{2n-1} \leq \tau_{2n}\}\right\} = J_2(\tau_1^*, \tau_2^*), \tag{3.14}
\]
where
\[
I \triangleq \lim_{n \to \infty} E\left\{[X_{\tau_1}^2 - Y_{\tau_1}^2] I\{\tau_{2n} < \tau_{2n-1}, \tau_1^* = \tau_2^*\}\right\}. \tag{3.15}
\]
On the other hand, set
\[
\tau \triangleq \begin{cases} 
\tau_2^*, & \text{if } \tau_2^* < \tau_1^*; \\
\tau_1^*, & \text{if } \tau_2^* \geq \tau_1^*.
\end{cases}
\]
Then \(\tau \in T_0\) and \(P(\tau = \tau_1^* < T) = 0\). By Lemma 3.4 (ii) we have
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} J_2(\tau_{2n-1}, \tau) = J_2(\tau_1^*, \tau) = E\left\{X_{\tau_1}^2 I\{\tau < \tau_1^*\} + Y_{\tau_1}^2 I\{\tau \geq \tau_1^*\}\right\} = J_2(\tau_1^*, \tau_2^*).
\]
By Lemma 3.3, we get \(I \geq 0\). Now by Assumption A2 we have
\[
I = 0. \tag{3.16}
\]
Then (3.14) implies (3.13).

(ii) It remains to prove
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} J_1(\tau_{2n+1}, \tau_{2n}) = J_1(\tau_1^*, \tau_2^*). \tag{3.17}
\]
Similar to (3.14) we have
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} J_1(\tau_{2n+1}, \tau_{2n}) = J_1(\tau_1^*, \tau_2^*) + \lim_{n \to \infty} E\left\{[Y_{\tau_1}^1 - X_{\tau_1}^1] I\{\tau_{2n+1} > \tau_{2n}, \tau_1^* = \tau_2^*\}\right\}. \tag{3.18}
\]
By Assumption A2, we get from (3.16) that
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} P\left(X^2_{\tau_1} < Y^2_{\tau_1}, \tau_{2n+2} < \tau_{2n+1}, \tau^*_1 = \tau^*_2\right) = 0.
\]
Applying the third claim in Lemma 3.1 we have \(\{\tau_{2n} < \tau_{2n+1}\} \subset \{\tau_{2n+2} < \tau_{2n+1}\}\).
Then by Assumption A3 we have
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} P\left(X^1_{\tau_1} < Y^1_{\tau_1}, \tau_{2n} < \tau_{2n+1}, \tau^*_1 = \tau^*_2\right) = 0.
\]
Then (3.18) leads to (3.17) immediately. 

We are now ready to show that \((\tau^*_1, \tau^*_2)\) is an NEP.

**Proof of Theorem 2.2.** We recall again that Assumption A4 is just for notational simplicity. So in the proof we may assume it.

First, by Lemma 3.4 (i), Lemma 3.5, and Lemma 3.3, we have
\[
J_1(\tau, \tau^*_2) \leq J_1(\tau^*_1, \tau^*_2), \quad \forall \tau \in \mathcal{T}_0.
\] (3.19)
Similarly, for any \(\tau\) such that \(P(\tau = \tau^*_1 < T) = 0\), we have
\[
J_2(\tau^*_1, \tau) \leq J_2(\tau^*_1, \tau^*_2).
\] (3.20)
In the general case, for any \(\tau \in \mathcal{T}_0\), set
\[
\tilde{\tau}_n \triangleq \begin{cases} 
  [\tau + \frac{1}{n}] \wedge T, & \text{if } \tau = \tau^*_1 < T; \\
  \tau, & \text{otherwise}.
\end{cases}
\]
Then \(\tilde{\tau}_n\) is a stopping time and \(P(\tilde{\tau}_n = \tau^*_1 < T) = 0\). Thus (3.20) leads to
\[
J_2(\tau^*_1, \tilde{\tau}_n) \leq J_2(\tau^*_1, \tau^*_2).
\]
Send \(n \to \infty\), we obtain (3.20) for general \(\tau\).

Combine (3.19) and (3.20), we obtain \((\tau^*_1, \tau^*_2)\) is an NEP. 

**Remark 1** In the case when \(X_2 = -Y_1\) and \(Y_2 = -X_1\) then \(J_1 + J_2 = 0\), i.e. we fall in the framework of the well known zero-sum Dynkin game and then the NEP for the game is just a saddle-point. Comparing to the result by Lepeltier and Mainguenau [20], which is the most general paper on this subject known to date, our result provides a new construction method of the saddle point. Additionally it is obtained under less regularity conditions on the processes \(X_1\) and \(X_2\).
4 Application to game contingent claims

It is by now well-known that an American contingent claim is a contract which allows its holder to exercise at a time she decides before or at the maturity. The only role of its issuer is to provide, if any, the pledged wealth to the buyer. In contrary, an American game contingent claim (ACC for short) is mainly an American contingent claim where the issuer is also allowed to recall/cancel the contract. Actually assume that $a_1$ (resp. $a_2$) is the issuer (resp. buyer) of the ACC. Both sides are allowed to exercise. Therefore it enables $a_1$ to terminate it and $a_2$ to exercise it at any time up to maturity date $T$ when the contract is expired anyway. Also if $a_2$ decides to exercise at $\sigma$ or $a_1$ to terminate at $\tau$ then $a_1$ pays to $a_2$ the amount:

$$\Gamma(\tau, \sigma) = L_\sigma 1_{[\sigma \leq \tau, \sigma < T]} + U_\tau 1_{[\tau < \sigma]} + \xi 1_{[\tau = \sigma = T]}$$

where:
- $\sigma$ and $\tau$ are two $\mathbf{F}$-stopping times
- $L$ and $U$ are $\mathbf{F}$-adapted continuous processes such that $L \leq U$. The quantity $L_\sigma$ (resp. $U_\tau$) is the amount that obtains $a_2$ (resp. pays $a_1$) for her decision to exercise (resp. cancel) first at $\sigma$ (resp. $\tau$). The difference $U - L$ represents the compensation that $a_1$ pays to $a_2$ for the decision to terminate the contract before maturity date $T$
- $\xi$ is an $\mathcal{F}_T$-random variable which satisfies $L_T \leq \xi \leq U_T$. It stands for the money that $a_1$ pays to $a_2$ if both accept to terminate the GCC at maturity date $T$.

For this contingent claim, the seller $a_1$ (resp. buyer $a_2$) aims at maximizing (resp. minimizing) her cost (resp. reward) in expectation, i.e., the quantity:

$$J(\tau, \sigma) := E[\Gamma(\tau, \sigma)].$$

where $E[.]$ is the expectation under the probability $P$ on the space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F})$.

Game contingent claims are introduced by Y.Kifer in [17] in the framework of the Black and Scholes model. Since then, there have been several papers on the same subject [3, 15, 16]. In a complete market, it is shown in those works that the non-arbitrage price $V_0$ of the GCC is equal to the zero-sum Dynkin game associated with $L$ and $U$, i.e.,

$$V_0 = \operatorname{esssup}_{\sigma \geq 0} \operatorname{essinf}_{\tau \geq 0} J(\tau, \sigma) = \operatorname{essinf}_{\tau \geq 0} \operatorname{esssup}_{\sigma \geq 0} J(\tau, \sigma).$$
Another point of view for pricing American game options, especially in incomplete markets and in connection with the utility maximization approach, is introduced by C.Kuhn in [18] and which is the following:

Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 : \mathbb{IR} \rightarrow \mathbb{IR}$ be non-decreasing and concave functions. Those functions stand for utility functions of the seller, respectively, the buyer of the GCC. The seller $a_1$ (resp. the buyer $a_2$) chooses a stopping time $\tau$ (resp. $\sigma$) in order to maximize

$$J_1(\tau, \sigma) := E[\varphi_1(-\Gamma(\tau, \sigma))] \quad \text{(resp.} \quad J_2(\tau, \sigma) := E[\varphi_2(\Gamma(\tau, \sigma))].$$

Therefore if the nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with $J_1$ and $J_2$ has a Nash equilibrium point $(\sigma^*, \tau^*)$, i.e.,

$$J_1(\tau^*, \sigma^*) \geq J_1(\tau, \sigma^*) \quad \text{and} \quad J_2(\tau^*, \sigma^*) \geq J_2(\tau^*, \sigma)$$

then $-\varphi_1^{-1}(J_1(\tau^*, \sigma^*))$ (resp. $\varphi_2^{-1}(J_2(\tau^*, \sigma^*))$) is a seller (resp. buyer) price of the GCC.

Note that if $\varphi_1(x) = \varphi_2(x) = x, \forall x \in \mathbb{IR}$, i.e. the agents $a_1$ and $a_2$ are risk-neutral, then the nonzero-sum game is actually a zero-sum Dynkin game, $(\tau^*, \sigma^*)$ is a saddle-point for this game and $-J_1(\tau^*, \sigma^*) = J_2(\tau^*, \sigma^*)$. Moreover this latter quantity is the value of the game. For more details on zero-sum Dynkin games one can see e.g. [1, 5, 8, 15, 19, 20, 25, 26].

So pricing the GCC described above turns into the existence of a NEP for the associated nonzero-sum Dynkin game. In [18], based on the article by Morimoto [22], the author has just been able to show the existence of that NEP in the set of discrete stopping times and exponential utility functions. Also using the result of the previous section, we are able to fill in the gap between the discrete stopping times used in [18] and continuous ones which we use here and, on the other hand, to allow for arbitrary utility functions for the agents. Actually we have:

**Theorem 4.1** Assume that:

(i) The utility functions $\varphi_1$ and $\varphi_2$ are non-decreasing;

(ii) $L_t \leq U_t$ and $L_T \leq \xi \leq U_T$, $P$-a.s.;

(iii) The processes $\varphi_1(-L), \varphi_1(-U), \varphi_2(L), \varphi_2(U)$ are in the space $[D]$; and the random variables $\varphi_1(-\xi)$ and $\varphi_2(\xi)$ are square integrable.
(iv) The processes \( \varphi_1(-U) \) and \( \varphi_2(L) \) has only positive jumps.

Then the nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with the GCC has a Nash equilibrium point \((\tau^*, \sigma^*)\).

Proof: Define

\[
X^1_t \triangleq \varphi_1(-U_t)1_{\{t<T\}} + \varphi_1(-\xi)1_{\{t=T\}}, \quad X^2_t \triangleq \varphi_2(L_t)1_{\{t<T\}} + \varphi_2(\xi)1_{\{t=T\}};
\]

\[
Y^1_t \triangleq \varphi_1(-L_t)1_{\{t<T\}} + \varphi_1(-\xi)1_{\{t=T\}}, \quad Y^2_t \triangleq \varphi_2(L_t)1_{\{t<T\}} + \varphi_2(\xi)1_{\{t=T\}}.
\]

One can check straightforwardly that \(X^1, Y^1, X^2, Y^2\) satisfy Assumptions A1-A4, and that the value functions \(J_1(\tau, \sigma)\) and \(J_2(\tau, \sigma)\) are the same as those defined in (2.1). Then by Theorem 2.2 we obtain the desired result.

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