Several years ago, the attitude of Poles’ towards immigrants, both immigrants in general and refugees, seemed more open than nowadays. A cautious analysis of surveys carried out over the last decades by the Polish Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS), among others regarding Poles’ opinions about immigrants, refugees, terrorism, and their attitude towards other nations, as well as the analysis of results of polls conducted by the European Statistical Office (Eurostat), including a review of the public discourse around immigration, makes it possible to draw some important conclusions, although not without any objections. Firstly, it confirms that the attitude has changed, becoming slightly more negative, particularly over the last three years. Secondly, the analysis indicates that such an attitude is probably not as negative as it could seem from the results of CBOS nation-wide surveys since 2015. Finally, it shows the immense impact on the very attitude and perception thereof from both Polish political discourse around immigration, and the way immigration is presented by the mass media, often in relation to terrorism.

Keywords: the attitude of Poles’ towards immigrants, refugees, terrorism, political discourse around immigration

INTRODUCTION

Recently, the European Union (EU) has had to face one of the most acute refugee crises in the history of Europe. According to the Eurostat data, the number of applications for refugee status in the EU submitted by persons from developing countries (outside the EU) exclusively in 2015 and 2016 totalled about 1.3 million per year (a total of over 2.5 million in these years), which doubled the number of refugees registered in the EU during the previous peak, in 1992 (Eurostat 2017). Such massive inflow of people seeking asylum placed them in the focus of politicians’ attention, both in individual countries and the European Union as a whole (European Commission 2017). Therefore they have become one of the main topics
in the mass media, gathering major interest among Europeans. Furthermore, despite an appeal from the European Parliament in 2015 (European Parliament 2015), some politicians from the EU Member States tend to continue identifying refugees with terrorists, which is still broadly echoed in the media (cf. e.g. Schwartz and Matzke 2018), and is then reflected in the attitude of Poles towards refugees and terrorism. Since the beginning of the ‘migration crisis’, many public opinion polls have been carried out in Poland to identify the attitude of Polish people towards refugees by analyzing the acceptance level for refugee settlement in Poland. Many polls carried out by the Polish Public Opinion Research Centre (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej – CBOS¹), as well as surveys executed or commissioned by other public opinion poll centres, in particular by TV or radio stations, press, social media², etc., indicate that a rather high percentage of respondents do not want Poland to admit refugees. There are also polls showing that, according to many respondents, there is a real threat of Poland’s becoming the target of terrorist attacks. Therefore, the following question needs to be asked: Do Poles really feel such a dislike for immigrants and, in particular, refugees? If Poles actually reject immigrants, in particular refugees, what is the reason for such rejection? Does the number of immigrants, principally refugees, living in Poland justify such rejection? Do immigrants in general, or refugees in particular, constitute (or have they ever been) a problem to Poland? Do Poles really believe that there is a real threat of terrorist attacks in Poland? Do Poles equate refugees with terrorists? These are the questions I intend to answer in this paper.

METHODOLOGY

What interests me most in this paper principally involves the dynamics of changes in the attitude of Poles towards immigrants and terrorism (namely a longitudinal study on trends) over a broad timeframe (from 1990 to 2018). Therefore, I had to use existing data, and perform a secondary analysis of reports published by two renowned authorities which, while guaranteeing authenticity and reliability of data, contain the information I needed – see points 1–2.

¹ “The Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) is a specialist centre performing polls representative of the Polish society regarding opinions on all major socio-political and economic issues” (CBOS 2018a).
² For example, poll conducted by Instytut Badań Rynkowych i Społecznych (IBRIS) for Onet web portal in October 2015 http://www.polishexpress.co.uk/co-tak-naprawde-myslimy-o-uchodzczach; poll by Ariadna (Polish national research panel) for Tajniki Polityki (a portal devoted to politics and public opinion polls) published in March 2016, http://tajnikipolityki.pl/sondaz-polacy-boja-sie-zamachow-i-sa-przeciw-przyjmowaniu-uchodzcow/; poll on refugees and multiculturalism conducted by Filozofuj! web portal in April 2016 http://filozofuj.eu/sondaz-na-temat-uchodzcow-i-multikulturalizm/; polls conducted by Instytut Badań Pollster on 11-12.05.2017 on request from Dziennik Gazeta Prawna daily. https://www.wprost.pl/kraj/10056244/Polacy-przeciwko-przyjmowaniu-uchodzcow-Najnowszy-sondaz.html; poll by IBRIS for Polityka weekly, http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114871,22052829,ponad-polowa-polakow-wolalaby-wyjsc-z-ue-niez-przyjac-uchodzcow.html; poll by IPSOS for Wiadomości TVP in May 2017, https://kresy.pl/wydarzenia/sondaz-34-polakow-nie-chce-przyjmowania-uchodzcow-i-imigrantow-islamskich/; polls conducted by IPSOS in 2017 (Social research and company image) published by PrawicowyInternet.pl, http://prawicowyinternet.pl/sondaz-ipsos-policy-papieraja-polityke-ruzad-ws-uchodzcow-a-ty/, and many others.
1. Reports published by the European Commission pursuant to Standard Eurobarometer, which are “conducted on a regular basis twice a year in all European Union member states and candidate countries” (cf. Eurobarometer 74: 4). The reports present the results of a survey conducted on request of the European Commission “on a representative sample of 1,000 people over 15, by way of direct interview at the respondent’s home” (cf. Eurobarometer 74: 4). Polls used in this paper were conducted in the period 2004–2017. The timeframe begins with 2004, as this was the year of the first Eurobarometer survey in Poland, at the time still a candidate country to the EU (Eurobarometer 2004.1), and stretches until 2017, as the last data published by Eurostat upon the analysis referred to that year. This paper analysed the data regarding the reply to an open question: “What do you think are the two most important issues facing our country?”.  

2. Reports from studies published by the Public Opinion Research Centre Foundation (CBOS), which is a “specialised centre conducting research polls representative of the Polish society, regarding opinions on all major socio-political and economic problems” (CBOS 2018a) based on surveys conducted every month by the institution on a sample of at least 1,000 adult Poles as regards current problems and events “supplemented depending on the needs by special one-off polls” (CBOS 2018a). The analysis accounts for reports published by CBOS on its website (CBOS 2018b), which directly or indirectly deal with the respondents’ attitude towards immigrants (refugees or not), the attitude of Poles towards other nations, major problems for Poland, major events for Poland and the world, and the perception of terrorism as a threat to Poland. Polls used in this paper were conducted in the period 1990–2018.

The analysis of data collected from the polls conducted by CBOS poses some difficulties, namely:

- conceptualisations of some variables differ over time: the variables analysed in respect of the same phenomenon, values of the same variable, or measurement indices differ across surveys, depending on events occurring at the time or in a given period;
- some variables are measured exclusively when there is an event placing them at the focus of attention, which introduces a significant systematic error;
- in some cases, the very wording of questions may deform the results obtained because a specific answer seems to be favoured.

Nevertheless, the analysis of data originating from such surveys permits better understanding of the phenomena investigated.

**BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF IMMIGRANTS IN POLAND**

Poland has never had to face major waves of immigration (perhaps except for the present immigration from Ukraine), although there were moments in Poland’s history where immigration was significant: e.g. immigration of Jews between the end of the 11th century and the beginning of the 13th century (Majer 1931: 5, 8), Tatars who started settling on the Polish territory at the turn of the 15th century (Janicki 2000: 3), or, already in the 20th century, thirteen
thousand Greeks who arrived in Poland between 1948 and 1950 (Okólski 2010: 34–35), or six thousand Chilean citizens fleeing after the coup of 1973 (Florczak 2003: 98). Although after the end of World War II Poland received about three million immigrants between 1945 and 1948, most of them were Poles, or descendants of Poles who had emigrated to Belgium, Germany, and France before World War II, or had been relocated or deported during World War II, or were living on the territories occupied by the Soviet Union and sent to Poland after the war (Okólski 2010: 34). From 1948 onwards, immigration to Poland became practically impossible for political reasons, therefore, between 1949 and 1990, immigration decreased, achieving the average values of from one to three thousand people per year. An exception occurred in the period 1956–1959, when Poland accepted 225,000 Polish adults and children, many of whom “had been deported deep into the USSR” during the first repatriation phase before 1948 (Okólski 2010: 34–35). The beginning of the 1990s was a breakthrough in the migration processes in Poland, similar to that in other Eastern and Central European countries. Democratisation of the political system and the ensuing opening of the borders; gradual ratification of international agreements; Poland’s inclusion into Western European structures, with its culmination point in May 2004 when Poland became part of the European Union (EU); and improvement in its economic standing – all of these factors, coupled with Poland’s geographic location in the heart of Europe, have placed the country in an entirely new migration focus. Over just a few years, starting from 1989, the number of people immigrating to and emigrating from Poland – both Poles and foreigners – significantly increased. Nevertheless, the number of immigrants in Poland has remained on a very low level. On 1 January 2018, the number of foreigners holding valid documents confirming their right of residence in Poland³ totalled just 325,217 [Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, Zestawienia roczne (Office for Foreigners, Annual Reports) 2017, Table 26], to which one should add 5,078 people applying for international protection in 2017 (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, Zestawienia roczne 2017, Table 1), and those applying for such protection in the previous years and still awaiting a decision, as well as 24,882 people ordered to return to their country of origin in the first half of 2017 (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, Zestawienia roczne 2017, Table 21), some of whom, as can be expected, still remained in Poland in that year. Therefore, in early 2018 at least 355,177 foreigners remained in Poland, which constitutes slightly over 0.9% of the country’s population⁴. Even considering various estimates regarding the number of irregular immigrants, the number of foreigners would not be much higher than 2% of the population⁵.

³ This category includes: permanent residence, residence of long-term EU resident, temporary residence, permanent residence of a citizen of the European Union, registration of residence of a EU citizen, permanent residence of family member of a EU citizen, registration of residence of a EU citizen, asylum, refugee status, supplementary protection, tolerated stay, and residence for humanitarian reasons [Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, Zestawienia roczne (Office for Foreigners, Annual Charts), 2017, Table 26].

⁴ On 1 January 2016, Poland’s population (most recent data found) totalled 38 437 200 people [Główny Urząd Statystyczny (Central Statistical Office) (GUS) 2017: 204].

⁵ Some publications in press spoke even about dozens of thousands of illegal immigrants. See even an article published by Gazeta Wyborcza in October 2010, where MP Miron Sycz (Platforma Obywatelska) from the Parliamentary Committee for National and Ethnic Minorities stated that “according to estimates, in Poland, there are approximately 300–500 thousand” (Gazeta.pl 2010). The same article mentions that the then spokesperson of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, Małgorzata Woźniak, stated “illegal immigration is not
Out of 325,217 foreigners holding valid documents confirming their right of residence in Poland in January 2018, only 5,645 were covered by some sort of protection (refugee status, supplementary control, tolerated stay, or residence for humanitarian reasons), and just 1,351 of them enjoyed refugee status (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, Zestawienia roczne 2017, Table 26).

It must be pointed out that 59.7% out of all foreigners holding valid documents to confirm their right of residence in Poland in January 2018 were citizens of Ukraine, Germany, Belarus, or Russia⁶ (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, Zestawienia roczne 2017, Table 26). As many as 60.2% of those enjoying some sort of protection were citizens of Russia or Ukraine (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, Zestawienia roczne 2017, Table 26), and 47.5% of those with refugee status were citizens of Russia, Belarus, or Ukraine (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, Zestawienia roczne 2017, Table 26). This means that clearly over 50% of immigrants in Poland originate from countries of geographic and cultural proximity, even without including half a million immigrants with non-regulated status originating from Ukraine and not included in the statistics [Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia (The Centre for Eastern Studies) 2017: 104]. Apart from the fact that there are few immigrants and even fewer refugees, at least nowadays, Poland is not a particularly attractive country for immigrants, and especially for refugees [Kancelaria Senatu (Senate Office) 2016: 13]. Also, Poland has committed to accept a very limited number of refugees under the relocation programme adopted by the European Commission⁷ (Polskie Radio.pl Jedynka 2015).

**POLISH PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRATION**

From May 2015 to October 2017, CBOS⁸ published 19 reports on polls carried out among Poles as regards acceptance of refugees from the Middle East and Africa (five polls in 2015, twelve in 2016 – one every month; and two in 2017). According to the published data, the percentage of respondents who were against admission of Middle Eastern and African refugees into Poland reached almost 50% (except for the poll of September 2015), while in April 2016 and April 2017 it exceeded 70% (cf. Figure 1).

Apart from the broader question on whether respondents believe Poland should accept refugees from the Middle East and Africa, some reports on CBOS polls into refugees included a mass phenomenon in Poland" (Gazeta.pl 2010). One of the groups of irregular or temporary immigrants not included in the statistics includes immigrants from Ukraine. According to the data gathered by the Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia (The Centre for Eastern Studies), the estimated number of Ukrainian citizens in Poland in 2017 totalled at least half a million people, and – as was pointed out – continues to grow (p. 104).

⁶ A major part of citizens of the Russian Federation in Poland is formed by persons seeking asylum and originating from Caucasian republics, principally Chechnya (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców [Office for Foreigners] 2016: 35), but to a lesser extent also from Ingushetia and Dagestan (Lysienia 2016: 17).

⁷ “In September 2015, the Council adopted two applicable legal decisions pursuant to which temporary relocation mechanism was established for immigrants applying for stay, arriving from Italy or Greece, who evidently required international protection” [Comisión Europea (European Commission) 2017: 2].

⁸ I rely on reports published by CBOS on their website: http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/raporty.php.
two additional questions on that matter. One was more general, formulated as follows: “Should Poland accept refugees from countries with armed conflicts?” without specifying what countries were meant. In this case, the responses were more favourable toward refugees. The other question referred to refugees from Ukraine: “Should Poland grant the refugee status to Ukrainians from areas of armed conflict?” (cf. Figure 1). Earlier, in 1999, an opinion poll asking whether Poland should accept refugees from Kosovo returned 73% positive responses (CBOS 1999a: 1) (cf. Figure 1).

In 1992, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2004 and 2005, CBOS also conducted polls regarding refugees without naming the country of their origin. Generally speaking, the results show a rather more positive attitude than in the last three years (2015, 2016, and 2017). The highest percentage of respondents with a positive attitude towards refugee admission was recorded in 1992, 2004 and 2005 (cf. Figure 2). In 1992, as many as 58% respondents were of the opinion that it is necessary to allow refugees to settle in Poland for a longer time (cf. Figure 1); it was also believed that refugees should be entitled to healthcare (91% respondents among those with a positive attitude towards refugee admission into Poland), accommodation (87%), board (82%), learning opportunities (79%), and job opportunities (62%), while 52% even stated that refugees should be given money for some minor expenses (CBOS 1992: 5,9). In 1995, 1996, and 1997, such positive attitudes had significantly declined, coming closer to the results from the recent years (cf. Figure 2). In 1995, 39% of respondents believed it necessary to allow refugees to settle in Poland (for an extended period: 31%, permanently: 29%) (CBOS 1997: 1), whereas 48% stated that one should “aim at sending them back to the countries they came from”, or “to other countries, or leave them to themselves” (CBOS 1997: 3). In 1996, a mere 23% of respondents believed it was necessary to allow refugees to settle in Poland (for
an extended period: 17%, permanently: 6%) (CBOS 1997: 1), whereas 62% believed one should aim at sending them back to the countries they came from, or other countries, or even leaving them to themselves (CBOS 1997: 3). In 1997, the number of respondents believing it was necessary to allow refugees to settle in Poland increased to 43% (for an extended period: 29%, permanently: 14%) (CBOS 1997: 3), whereas 45% of respondents were of the opinion that one should aim at sending them back to the countries they came from, or other countries, or leaving them to themselves (CBOS 1997: 3). In 2004 it increased again, with 75% of respondents stating Poland should accept political refugees (until they can return to their country of origin: 48%, permanently: 27% (CBOS 2004a: 13), in order to again, in 2005, drop down to the level where 59% respondents stated Poland should accept political refugees, although 46% pointed towards only some of them, without naming who they had in mind (CBOS 2005a: 4). High acceptance for refugees in general, without pointing to their country of origin, could be observed in May 2015, shortly before the peak of the migration crisis, when 72% respondents to a poll by CBOS stated Poland should accept refugees from countries with ongoing armed conflicts (cf. Figure 2).

In all the Figures, the month indicated corresponds to the month of the poll. When the reference to the month is preceded with the comment “report from”, this means the indicated month refers to the month of data publication, and the exact date of the poll is unknown.

* Data on 1995 and 1996 come from the report published in December 1997, and do not contain information on the exact period of the survey.

**Figure 2.** Percentage of positive and negative responses in polls conducted by CBOS in the indicated months and years, to the question whether Poland should accept refugees from countries with armed conflicts, without naming such countries

Source: own elaboration based on CBOS 1992: 5; CBOS 1997: 3; CBOS 2005a: 4; CBOS 163/2017: 2
In 2004 and 2005, CBOS also asked questions in the polls referring to immigrants as a whole, not only to refugees in particular. The respondents reacted similarly in the two years in respect to refugees, which pointed to rather high acceptance for immigrants. In 2004, as many as 77% of respondents stated that any “citizen of another country wishing to settle down in Poland should have such an opportunity”, even though 43% were of the opinion that immigrants “from some countries should have such an opportunity” without, however, naming the countries (CBOS 2004a: 11). In 2005, 62% respondents stated that “every citizen of another country who wishes to arrive in Poland and live here should have the right to do so” (CBOS 2005a: 2). Nevertheless, my analysis of 2013 involving poll results published by CBOS, where I not only accounted for the aforementioned polls into whether foreigners (understood as persons not having Polish citizenship – cf. e.g. CBOS 2016: 14) have the right to arrive in Poland and settle here, but also polls asking whether Poland needs immigrants, as well as polls regarding the perception of immigrants – as favourable or non-favourable to Poland – and their perception on the job market, led to the conclusion that “following an initial phase of foreigners acceptance in Poland, the respondents did not consider their presence in Poland as very positive. Even if generally the respondents were of the opinion that foreigners, if they wish so, should have the opportunity to settle in Poland, such acceptance was selected both in reference to foreigners in general, and to refugees; moreover, a significant share of respondents believed Poland doesn’t need immigrants” (Author 2013: 222). “Respondents to a greater extent perceived risks rather than benefits from foreigners’ presence in Poland”, [but] “with time, presented increasingly greater acceptance for all foreigners on the Polish job market” (Author 2013: 224). This image prevails in 2015. As I have already pointed out elsewhere, “it isn’t easy to holistically interpret the data provided by various polls and/or research reports, regardless of whether they were conducted by the same institution, investigators, or groups of investigators. Variables occurring in various polls and values adopted therein are not always the same. Sometimes, they refer to foreigners, or foreigners settled in Poland, while other times to immigrants, or political refugees, whereas there is no coherence among the surveys” (Author 2013: 219). Furthermore, it must be pointed out that among 3,741 reports published by CBOS between January 1990 and December 2014, i.e. over 24 years, just 22 of those polls directly or indirectly deal with immigration in Poland. In turn, in the period from 30 January 2015 through 8 December 2017, among 557 reports spanning over three years, the issue was

---

9 At present, there is a tendency to consider immigrants and refugees as separate categories. Nevertheless, I believe that refugees are immigrants and, as such, should be included in this category. Yet this does not affect the importance of the fact that their emigration is or is not a consequence of “[... a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it].” (Geneva Convention of 1951, Article 1A (2)) (UNESCO 2017).

10 The definition of foreigners applied in CBOS polls can be found in the first question of the polls referring to them: “In Poland, there are increasingly more foreigners, persons not having Polish citizenship [...].” The introductions are included in annexes to the reports. The annexes are not attached to reports available free of charge on CBOS website.

11 In reports published from 2010 through 2018, polls referring to immigration in general appeared only in 2015.
raised in 23 reports, whereas, in the period from December 2017 through February 2018, CBOS did not publish any reports on this matter.

As one can observe in the results of the polls presented above, the level of acceptance regarding immigrants, particularly refugees, on the part of respondents in Poland was, generally speaking, relatively low. Some authors claim that, throughout their history, Poles have not shown complete acceptance of foreigners, with their attitude oscillating between acceptance and xenophobia, depending on the historical moment and the nationality of the immigrants (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2007: 227–238). Nevertheless, the attitude implied by the presented data between the early 1990s and August 2015 seemed more positive, although with fluctuations, than the attitude evident following August 2015.

Now then, if one were to consider the public opinion polls through Standard Eurobarometer\textsuperscript{12} surveys in Poland from 2004\textsuperscript{13} to the spring of 2015, with respondents answering to an open question about “the most important problems faced by the country”, one could see the number of respondents spontaneously pointing to immigration as a problem for Poland oscillating between 0 and 10\% (cf. Table 2). The increase in the respondents’ anxiety over the immigration phenomenon to 10\% coincided with the opening of the job market in 2007 to citizens from countries east of Poland [Zatrudnienie cudzoziemców w Polsce (Employment of foreigners in Poland) 2007] and the second abolition for non-documented immigrants in Poland in autumn 2007 (Balcerak 2014). In the Standard Eurobarometer surveys of autumn 2005 and 2015, there was no question about major problems faced by the country. In 2016 and 2017, at the peak of the migration crisis, the percentage of Poles pointing to immigration as a problem to the country was slightly higher, but it did not exceed 16\% (cf. Figure 3).

The fact that immigrants as a whole, and in particular refugees, are not really perceived by Poles as a problem to Poland can also be observed in the answers provided by respondents in a series of CBOS polls asking about major problems for Poland in various years (from 1990 through 1996, as published in 9 reports), about major events for Poland (in 1992, and later every year between 1995 and 1999, published in 10 reports), as well as major events for Poland and globally (from 2001 through 2017, except for 2002, 2011, and 2014 – published in 14 reports). Neither immigration in general nor refugees in particular featured among problems indicated as important for Poland in the polls presented in respective reports. In the published polls, where respondents were asked (in general and with an option of an open answer) about major events for Poland, immigrants were mentioned just once, as compared to 3\% mentioning “not accepting refugees, immigrants” among major events in 2017 (CBOS 2018c: 2). Nevertheless, the previous reply is formulated in such a way that it is unclear whether this was about criticism of or support for the decision about non-admission of refugees or immigrants as a whole. Where the question referred to major events globally, immigrants appeared in two cases: in reference to the events of 2013, where 1.8\% respondents

\textsuperscript{12} Eurobarometer is “cyclical research – every six months – in all European Union member states and candidate countries” (Eurobarometer 74, 2010: 4). It aims at analysing and synthesizing data on public opinion in certain areas related to the European Union in particular member states (European Commission, Public Opinion, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm [15.02.2018]).

\textsuperscript{13} The first poll carried out in Poland still as a candidate state for the EU, published in May 2004 (Eurobarometr 2004: 1).
named “Syria, war in Syria, refugees” (CBOS 2013a: 5), and among the events of 2016, where 4.4% respondents replied: “migration crisis, problem of refugees”, while 0.5% pointed to “decisions/announced decisions aimed at stopping the wave of refugees/migration (in Europe and the USA)” (CBOS 2016b: 3). If one considers the results of the latter polls (referring to the most important problems for Poland, as carried out by CBOS and Eurostat, and major events for Poland and globally, as performed by CBOS), it seems clear that immigrants in general, and refugees in particular, do not tend to be perceived as a major problem to Poland, and have not constituted a major issue for Poland according to most respondents. Therefore, if, according to the respondents’ opinions, immigrants are not a problem for Poland, and if the number of immigrants, particularly refugees, in Poland is so insignificant, and further if it does not seem like it is about to grow in the nearest future, why the dislike, particularly with respect to refugees?

THE ATTITUDE OF POLES TOWARDS OTHER NATIONS

As one could see above, the attitude of the Poles surveyed by CBOS as regards refugee acceptance significantly differs depending on the immigrants’ origins. Therefore, it is worth investigating the attitude of Poles’ towards various nations, particularly the nations asked about in the polls on whether Poland should accept refugees. Reports published by CBOS from 1993 through February 2018 indicate that, almost every year, there are results of at least one poll presenting the level of Poles’ sympathy or dislike for other nations (in 2003, 2005, and 2015 in two reports per year, while in no report from 1998, 2002, 2004, 2009, and 2018). In such polls, respondents pointed to their level of sympathy or dislike for the nations listed. In 1993, there were 18 nations on the list, and the list was gradually

![Figure 3. Percentage of Poles perceiving immigration as a problem in Poland in a Standard Eurobarometer survey](http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/yearFrom/1974/yearTo/2004/surveyKy/408)

In the reports from spring 2005 and autumn 2015, there were no data on this issue.
extended, with the number of nations slightly differing from year to year. Some nations appeared continually on the list since their first appearance, whereas other nations were listed in an irregular manner. Nevertheless, the reports did not present any selection criteria. The lists include “principally European nations, including all from our region [and] several largest, generally known non-European nations: Americans, Japanese, Chinese, Arabs, as well as Vietnamese, who are increasingly present [in Poland]” (CBOS 2003a: 1). Arabs have only been listed since 2003 – in some polls appearing as Arabs in general, while in other polls referred to exclusively as residents of particular Arab countries (specifically: Egyptians and Palestinians), while yet in other polls, apart from specific nationalities (Egyptians and Palestinians), Arabs are listed in general. Therefore, it is difficult to draw any clear conclusions. What can be, however, clearly seen is the fact that, with various intensity over the years, nations granted the highest level of sympathy by Poles were European nations and Americans, as opposed to Arabs (both in general, and Egyptians and Palestinians, in particular) who, together with Turks, Romanians, and the Romany, are always among those recording greater levels of dislike. It must be remembered that Poles revealed the greatest reluctance towards accepting refugees from the Middle East and Africa, namely refugees coming mostly from Arab countries of these regions. As indicated by a CBOS poll from 2015, “one can say that, with time, the sympathy to most [nations] increased (refers to eighteen nations)”14, including Ukrainians (CBOS 2015a: 3), who, as pointed out by the polls, are accepted by a rather high share of respondents as possible refugees in Poland. It would be more difficult to connect sympathies and antipathies of the with their thorough acceptance for possible refugees from Kosovo in 1999. In such polls, there were no questions about the attitude of Poles’ towards Kosovars, and it would be risky to determine such an attitude through extrapolation of their sympathy or antipathy as regards nations related to Kosovo, such as Serbia, which was asked about.

PERCEPTION OF TERRORISM AS A THREAT TO POLAND

During the last 14 years, many cities in European Union states have been targeted for attacks on the part of Jihadist terrorism15. This is frequently presented as strictly related to immigration, because, in many cases, terrorist attacks were committed by immigrants or their descendants (cf. e.g. Bakker 2006: 36; Europol 2016: 11, 22), which results in the perception of immigrants as a threat to the accepting countries. In the aforementioned polls by CBOS, which asked about major problems for Poland (from 1990 through 1996, published in 9 reports), none of the answers mentioned terrorism as such. In polls asking about major

14 “Considering exclusively the nations as to which, in the period 1993–2015, the Poles expressed their attitude at least ten times (in total, these were thirty nations)” (CBOS 2015a).

15 The term jihadism is “used to refer to the most aggressive and radical trends within political Islam, characterised with frequent and brutal resorting to terrorist attacks in the name of the alleged jihad, as the followers call the sacred war in the name of Allah” (Argumosa Pila 2015: 17). Jihad means “Every effort undertaken on God’s path; including: collective duty to spread Islam imposed on the entire umma [umma is a “community of the Muslims worldwide”] and lead the war against the infidel countries” (Larroque 2015: 128, 132).
events for Poland (presented in 24 reports published between 1992 and 2017), just two of these mentioned terrorism: in 2001, following the attacks in New York, when 2% of respondents pointed to “terrorist attacks and Poland’s involvement in the fight against terrorism” as major events for Poland during the year (CBOS 2001a: 2), and in 2004, following the attacks in Madrid, when 4% pointed towards, among others, “participation in the fight against terrorism” (CBOS 2005b: 5). As one can see, apart from the fact that the issue of terrorism appears among responses in just two of the aforementioned polls, the share of respondents mentioning it is very low. Neither is it terrorism as such that is perceived as a possible threat to Poland, but Poland’s possible participation in the fight against terrorism. Terrorism, however, was pointed out as a major event globally in eight polls conducted in the indicated years: for example in 2001, when 66% of respondents stated “terrorist attack on the USA” (including “terrorism” in general – 4%), and 18% said “war against terrorism – war in Afghanistan and other measures” (CBOS 2001a: 5). In 2002, 11% of respondents replied “terrorist attacks, terrorism, fight against terrorism – without specifying the region” (CBOS 2003b: 6); in 2003, 3% of respondents stated “fight against terrorism” (CBOS 2004b: 5); in 2004, 6% of respondents said “terrorist attacks and the fight against terrorism” (CBOS 2005b: 3); in 2005, 4% replied “war against terrorism, terrorist attacks” (including “attacks in London” – 1%) (CBOS 2006a: 3); in 2009, after the tragic terrorist attack that occurred in November that year on a train en route between Moscow and St. Petersburg, 1% of respondents stated “terrorism, terrorist attacks in Russia and other countries” (CBOS 2009: 4). In reference to 2016, less than 2.9% of respondents pointed to “terrorism, terrorist attacks” (CBOS 2016b: 3), and finally, as regards 2017, 3% of those questioned replied: “terrorist attacks, terrorism, attacks” (CBOS 2018c: 3). In standard polls by Eurobarometer, the number of respondents who spontaneously pointed towards terrorism as a problem for Poland ranged between 0–6%, with a slight increase in the spring of 2016 to 10%, and drops in 2017 to 9% (spring) and 7% (autumn) (cf. Figure 4).

Nevertheless, when CBOS polls asked directly whether terrorism is a major threat to Poland, the share of positive responses reached as high as 83% in 2005 following the terrorist attacks in London (cf. Figure 5).

Such perception of terrorist threats on the part of some respondents becomes even more surprising and ungrounded if we consider that the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that although “one cannot entirely exclude greater interest in Poland on the part of terrorist organisations, particularly in the context of our involvement in e.g. Afghanistan,” “Poland is not a country directly in danger of terrorist attacks” [Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland), 2018].

AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN THE DISCREPANCIES AMONG POLL RESULTS

Let us return to the question: if, according to respondents’ opinions expressed in the aforementioned poll results, immigration is not a problem for Poland, and if the number of immigrants, particularly refugees, in Poland is so insignificant, and further if it does not seem likely to grow in the nearest future, why the dislike, particularly with respect to refugees?
*Questions* in the polls by CBOS, asking about major events in a particular year, refer to the entire year and were addressed to respondents at the year-end or at the beginning of the following year, whereas standard polls by Standard Eurobarometer are conducted and published twice per year, in spring and autumn.

**Figure 4.** Percentage of Poles perceiving terrorism as a problem in Poland, and percentage of Poles perceiving terrorism as major event for Poland or globally in the respective periods

Source: own elaboration based on Standard Eurobarometer data published in National Reports: Poland; CBOS 2001a: 2, 5; CBOS 2003b: 6; CBOS 2004b: 5; CBOS 2005b: 3, 5; CBOS 2006a: 3; CBOS 2009: 4; CBOS 2018c: 3

**Figure 5.** Percentage of respondents who, in polls conducted by CBOS, replied there is a real terrorist threat in Poland at indicated times, while responding following terrorist attacks in indicated cities, or following the indicated events. For years omitted, no polls have been found

Source: own elaboration based on CBOS 2001b: 1; CBOS 2002: 1; CBOS 2003c: 3; CBOS 2004c: 2; CBOS 2005c: 1; CBOS 2007: 5; CBOS 2008a: 2; CBOS 2010a: 2; CBOS 2011: 3; CBOS 2013b: 1; CBOS 2015b: 2; CBOS 2016c: 1
As well, if terrorism is also not perceived by Polish respondents as a problem for Poland, Poland has not suffered from any terrorist attack, and there are minimal odds of any attack occurring, why do many Poles treat it as a real threat to their country?

A probable answer to the first question seems to lie in the fact that respondents may believe that immigrants have not been a problem for Poland so far as there are few of them, but if their number were to grow they could become problem, hence it would be better if they simply did not arrive. As regards the other question, there seems to be no logical answer. If one, however, analyses the questions formulated in many polls and the time when they were asked, and evaluates the results of such polls accounting for the public discourse around emigration and terrorism at the time, it turns out that both of these factors could have severely affected the responses. Let us then move on to their analysis.

METHODOLOGICAL FACTORS

A factor to be considered is the fact that CBOS polls touch upon issues reflecting the government’s anxiety in reference to various matters at various times (in 1997, the Polish Parliament entrusted CBOS with the task of social research for public use16), which causes certain phenomena to be pointed out in very specific situational contexts. The above can be exemplified as follows: At the time where the main concerns in Poland involved possible mass immigration from former USSR countries, a public opinion poll was carried out regarding facilitated eastern border crossing (November 1994, July 1998, and May 2001) (CBOS 2001c: 2). When border control was a major issue on the agenda for Poland’s readiness for EU accession, a public opinion poll referred to the obligation to have visas when crossing Poland’s eastern border, in conjunction with Poland’s accession to the EU (CBOS 2001c: 3–4). Polls regarding the attitude of Poles towards refugees were carried out in 1992, 1995, and 1996 with respect to a possible wave of refugees from former socialist countries (CBOS 1992: 0; CBOS 1997: 317); in 1997, following the adoption of a new law on foreigners (CBOS 1997); in 1999, when a possible wave of refugees from Kosovo was expected (CBOS 1999a); and in 2004 and 2005, following Poland’s accession to the EU, which made Poland more attractive to potential refugees (CBOS 2004a: 13; CBOS 2005a: 4). Many polls have been conducted since 2015, when the migration/refugee crisis started, due to fears related to the possible inflow of immigrants, with the frequency, as we have seen, of even every month in 2016. Together with legal changes in foreigners’ access to the job market, several polls were carried out to investigate the impact of immigrants on the job market, more specifically regarding the effects of an influx of Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian citizens in the wake of the opening of the job market to citizens of those countries (CBOS 2006b; CBOS 2008b; CBOS 2010b).

It is similar in the case of polls investigating the perceptions of terrorist threat among respondents. When CBOS polls asked directly whether terrorism is a major threat to Poland,

---

16 In February 1997, the Polish Parliament awarded CBOS a status of independent foundation, entrusting it with social polls for public purposes. “The schedules [...] for research are governed by the CBOS Foundation Council, representing professionals from seven academic institutions, as well as representatives of the Parliament, Senate, Prime Minister, and President of Poland” (CBOS 2018a).

17 As indicated above, results of such polls appeared for the last time in the report from December 1997 (CBOS 1997: 3).
such a question was usually asked immediately after a terrorist attack or soon afterwards, and it often referred directly to terrorist attacks or related events, for example: “Following the recent terrorist attacks in the USA, do you believe Poland can also become a target for similar attacks?” (CBOS 2001b: 1); “Do you agree with the opinion that Poland can become a target for terrorist attacks by Muslim fundamentalists?” (CBOS 2003c: 3, CBOS 2005c: 1, CBOS 2008a: 2); “Do you fear that the construction of the anti-missile shield can cause terrorist attacks by Muslim fundamentalists in Poland?” (CBOS 2007: 5); “In your opinion, due to Osama Ben Laden’s death, will the risk of terrorist attacks in Poland increase?” (CBOS 2011: 3) (cf. Figure 5). In some cases, polls measuring the acceptance level for welcoming refugees in Poland were deliberately conducted following terrorist attacks in Europe, such as the poll of December 2015 entitled “Attitude to refugees following terrorist attacks in Paris” (CBOS 2015c: 172).

Furthermore, as one could see above, the questions formulated in the polls are a clear indicator of what causes anxiety in each of the aspects touched upon, for example: “Following the recent terrorist attacks in the USA, do you believe Poland can also become a target for similar attacks?” (CBOS 2001b: 1); “Do you agree with the opinion that Poland can become a target for terrorist attacks by Muslim fundamentalists?” (CBOS 2003c: 3, CBOS 2005c: 1, CBOS 2008a: 2); “Do you fear that the construction of the anti-missile shield can cause terrorist attacks by Muslim fundamentalists in Poland?” (CBOS 2007: 5); “In your opinion, due to Osama Ben Laden’s death, will the risk of terrorist attacks in Poland increase?”; “Is the presence [of foreigners] in Poland favourable or unfavourable?” (CBOS 1999b: 4; CBOS 2004a: 3); “Should foreigners be allowed to take jobs in Poland?” (CBOS 1999b: 9; CBOS 2004a: 9; CBOS 2006b: 6; CBOS 2008b: 7; CBOS 2010b: 6); “Does Poland need more immigrants?” (CBOS 2004a: 12); “Does Poland need immigrants arriving in Poland […] to settle down here?” (CBOS 2005a: 3); “Should foreigners from outside the European Union have facilitated access to taking jobs in Poland if there are no Poles willing to work at a particular position or not?” (CBOS 2006b: 8); “Is […] the work by citizens of Belarus, Russia, or Ukraine in Poland favourable or unfavourable: to you personally, Polish economy, all employees, people and companies employing such foreigners?” (CBOS 2010b: 8); “Should […] the government: aim at more employees from Belarus, Russia, or Ukraine arriving for work in Poland than nowadays, or should it take measures to reduce the number of employees from such countries in Poland” (CBOS 2010b: 10); “In your opinion, should Poland accept exclusively refugees declaring Christian religion, or perhaps the religion should not be a criterion when accepting refugees?” (CBOS 2015d: 6). The above questions not only reflect the government’s anxiety related to the risk of terrorist attacks happening in Poland, or to immigrants in general, or refugees in particular. Both their contents and possible answers force the respondents to ponder over terrorism and immigrants in Poland presented as a problem, which only confirms the postulate that “the public opinion is to a significant extent created, and not an objectively existing reality” (Zapata-Barrero 2009: 168), because respondents interpret the aforementioned phenomena in view of the suggestions presented in the poll. Pursuant to the data obtained in the Eurobarometer poll, we could expect that, if not asked, the respondents most probably would not preoccupy themselves with terrorism, immigration or presence of immigrants in Poland, and if they were to think about them, their thoughts could have gone in directions
other than those pointed out in the polls (Author 2013: 219). The above can be particularly clearly observed in some questions related to refugees. Figure 1 indicates a clearly greater dislike for refugees from the Middle East and Africa than refugees in general. There is still a greater difference between the dislike for refugees from the Middle East and Africa, and the dislike for refugees from Ukraine (cf. Figure 1). A clear indicator for the differences is the method of formulating the question in each case. In the earlier case, the question was as follows: “Due to a high number of refugees from the Middle East and Africa in some European Union states, such countries are unable to deal with the problem. In your opinion, should Poland accept some refugees arriving in Europe?” (cf. for example CBOS 2016d: 4). In the other case, however, the question was: “In your opinion, should Poland accept refugees from countries with armed conflicts?” (cf. for example CBOS 2016d: 2), while in the third case: “Due to the conflict in the east of Ukraine, an increased number of refugees from that country has been recorded. In your opinion, should Poland accept Ukrainian refugees from areas affected by the conflict?” (cf. for example CBOS 2016d: 7). If the very question is preceded by the information that “EU Member States are unable to deal with the problem”, one can expect the answer to be negative. It could be surprising, perhaps, to see that the percentage of negative answers in this case was not higher. In the second case, the question referred exclusively to whether to accept refugees or not, without an introduction to present the situation in a negative light, thus obtaining a higher number of positive answers was not difficult. In the third case, despite the fact that the very question was preceded by information about the situation in Ukraine as causing the increased number of refugees, the information was not of a nature of evaluation to cause particularly negative reactions to the question.

PUBLIC DISCOURSE AROUND IMMIGRATION AND TERRORISM

When attempting to understand why Poles have such an attitude towards people from the Middle East and Africa, and seem to believe that the possibility of Poland becoming a target of terrorist attacks is real, despite the actually low number of immigrants in Poland (in particular refugees), the absence of any terrorist attack in Poland, and minimal odds of any attack occurring, one must consider the recent public discourse, and particularly political discourse surrounding immigration in Poland and around terrorism, particularly related to refugees. Even though quite recently it was hard to speak about political discourse around migration in Poland (cf. Author 2013: 213–215), one could only state that “political discourse in Poland is directed towards re-active discourse, namely at a discourse where immigration is considered as a negative phenomenon, a source of potential conflict of interest between immigrants and local communities, where the interests of local citizens prevail, as their welfare and status should be protected” (Author 2013: 215), which has been well confirmed within the last three years.

---

18 As Łukasz Łotocki points out, “public discourse is principally – although not exclusively – executed via the media (media discourse) (Łotocki 2014: 21), which thus covers political discourse, as ‘it includes statements by politicians within the roles allocated to them within political institutions’” (Czyżewski, Kowalski and Piotrowski 2010: 22).

19 According to the division of political discourses by Ricardo Zapata-Barrero (2009: 67–92).
My intention in this part of the paper is not to analyse the public discourse on immigration in Poland. I shall limit myself to presenting statements by politicians, public persons and journalists, appearing in various media. In this way, I wish to show the impact of such statements on responses given in public opinion polls conducted by CBOS. In September 2015, the media spoke about “thousands of immigrants squatting in front of Keleti Railway Station in Budapest” (tvn24.pl 2015). Journalist Robert Kulig wrote as follows: “Hordes of young men, seeking to create a kalifate settled at the Keleti Railway Station in Budapest will soon shoot women in mini-skirts and cut off men’s heads – this is the image emerging from the discussions and comments in the social media on refugees arriving in Hungary” (Kulig 2015). On 4 September, on his Facebook profile, blogger Kamil Bulonis, religious tour guide and traveller, published a shocking report on refugee behaviour at the Austrian and Italian border: “They break windows, upturn cars, throw faeces at pilgrims” (Romanowski 2015). As Rafał Romanowski wrote, “the sensational report by Kamil Bulonis spread worldwide, translated to several languages”, but “surprised Italian police denies: It’s some sad joke” (Romanowski 2015). Also in August 2015, Jarosław Kaczyński, President of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice Party, PiS), spoke in the Polish Parliament saying: “First, the number of foreigners rapidly grows, then they declare they will not observe our law, our customs, and later – or simultaneously – they impose their own sensitivity and their own requirements in the public space, in various areas of life. In Europe, there are 54 zones with sharia law applying, with no control by the state”. His statement reached vast audiences via various media (cf. YouTube 2015). In October 2015, at an election campaign meeting, Kaczyński said: “There are already recorded symptoms of very dangerous diseases, long absent in Europe: cholera on Greek islands, dysentery in Vienna, various sorts of parasites, protozoa, which are not dangerous in the bodies of such people, but which may be dangerous here. This is not intended to discriminate against anyone...But it’s necessary to check” (Newsweek.pl 2015). In the same month, pointing to the European Commission as the source, Aleksandra Rybińska in the weekly “W Sieci” stated: “Kopacz [the Prime Minister at the time] agreed to 100,000 Muslim immigrants”, and added: The government, however, conceals the truth from the Poles due to the approaching parliamentary elections” (Rybińska 2015: 6). In November 2015, following terrorist attacks in Paris, Konrad Szymaniński, minister in charge of European issues in the PiS government under Prime Minister Beata Szydło, said “due to tragic events in Paris, Poland sees no political opportunities for executing the decision on refugee relocation” (Szymaniński 2015). After the appeal from Pope Francis, in September 2015, “that every parish in Europe should accept one refugee family” (DEON.pl 2015), the Speaker of Senate Stanisław Karczewski stated: “The Holy Father is infallible in issues of faith. While in other issues, he may have an opinion of his own. Although I am a man of the Church, I need not agree with all the opinions of the Holy Father” (Wyborcza.pl 2016a). Early in 2016, “when it turned out immigrants hid in a lorry owned by his company and he himself was charged with a fine of 40 thousand pounds” (Maximus Media 2016), strongman Mariusz Pudzianowski published his photo with a baseball bat on Facebook with the caption: “With this I shall wait on a trailer before entry to a ferry from Calais to the United Kingdom. Accelerated teaching in assimilation expected” (Maximus Media 2016). Following a terrorist attack in Nice, on public TV, Mariusz Błaszczak, the then-chair of PiS Parliamentary Club,
commented: “What do terrorists think [...] when they see churches in France being closed, and mosques being opened? What is their attitude? What conclusions do they draw? In the 1980s, Saint Pope John Paul II asked in France: what have you done with your baptism, France? These are the consequences. We show solidarity in tragedy. We also counteract crises in the European Union. What is the Union dealing with now? Poland? Instead of dealing with terrorism?” (wyborcza.pl 2016b). In July 2016, “a Syrian refugee aged 21 [...] murdered a female Pole aged 45 in the German town of Reutlingen, having worked with his victim and lived with her in an informal partnership” (rmf24.pl 2016). This information was denied by the Minister of Justice and General Prosecutor, Zbigniew Ziobro: “Nothing points to the murdered woman being pregnant with the Arab who has committed the murder. It seems to me that the tragically deceased Pole and her family are harmed by publishing unconfirmed information” (TVP INFO 2016). Commenting on such reports on Twitter, PiS MP, Dominik Tarczyński, wrote: “Urgent! Polish pregnant woman murdered with a machete by a Syrian refugee. This means one thing: a war against the hounds of Muslim terror!” (Malinowski 2016). In May 2017, during a parliamentary debate, the Prime Minister of the time, Beata Szydło, declared: “I have the courage to ask our political elites the question: where are you heading? Where are you heading, Europe? Rise from your knees, Europe, or you will lament over your children daily!” (wPolityce.pl 2017). In June 2017, on the programme “Drugie śniadanie mistrzów” on TVN24, Marcin Meller, historian, journalist, and TV presenter, said: “I love to travel to Muslim countries, when I am a guest there. I wouldn’t especially like to have a Muslim world at my place...” (wPolityce.pl 2017). Also in June that year, a film appeared on the Internet, entitled “Imam from Poznan mosque [talks] directly about the war, slaughter, and taxes for non-Muslims” (https://gloria.tv/video/FQws4UDo1sqw3ob1sYidEBxJa). “The person in charge of «Komentarze TV» profile suggests that Polish Muslims are preparing a slaughter of the infidels. After the publication of the video, imam Youssef Chadid starts to receive threats” (Wilgocki 2017). All of those statements, which are just a sample of what has been published in the media since the beginning of the migration crisis, have caused a wave of comments, some approving, other criticising them. The image of immigrants, principally refugees, created on the basis of the above statements, is clearly negative. One can also observe how links are formed in the public discourse between terrorist attacks and the refugees. Has all this affected the attitude of Poles towards refugees?

The impact of the political discourse on the respondents is clear in a report from December 2015 presenting the results of polls by CBOS in which respondents were asked questions directly or indirectly referring to many of the aforementioned public statements, and the answers clearly reflected those statements. The respondents were asked: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” Some of the statements to be agreed or disagreed with directly quoted the aforementioned statements. The opinion “Immigrants contribute to crime increase” was agreed with by 49% of respondents (CBOS 2015e: 6); “I’m afraid that immigrants may spread rare diseases” was agreed with by 46% respondents (CBOS 2015e: 3); “I fear that with growing immigration we will lose our culture” was agreed with 44% of respondents (CBOS 2015e: 6); while “I fear that with growing immigration our way of life will change for the worse” was supported by 57% of respondents (CBOS 2015e: 3). The aforementioned quotes were indirectly reflected in the following statements: “I doubt that...
immigrants will treat the interest of our country as the most important”, which was agreed with by 77% of respondents (CBOS 2015e: 2); “I fear that, in the event of a war or other political tensions, immigrants will be loyal to their country of origin”, which was agreed with by 76% of respondents (CBOS 2015e: 2); and “Immigrants take jobs away from people who already live here”, which was agreed with by 54% of respondents (CBOS 2015e: 4). Nevertheless, only 25% of them stated: “I feel uneasy in relations with immigrants” (CBOS 2015e: 7). Most shocking was the fact that even 51% of respondents agreed with the statement that “Immigration in our country has gone out of control” (CBOS 2015e: 5).

CONCLUSION

From the methodological point of view, based on public opinion polls by CBOS regarding acceptance of immigrants in general, and refugees in particular, as well as regarding the perception of terrorism as a threat to Poland, it is difficult to draw any clear-cut conclusions.

If, nevertheless, a conclusion is attempted, the analysis of the data from polls by CBOS conducted between 1990 and 2018 indicates that, although there are almost no immigrants in Poland, and the prospect of an increase in their small number is negligible, and further although Poles do not perceive immigrants as a problem for Poland, they actually do not wish to accept refugees in their country, particularly those from the Middle East and Africa. This attitude has slightly intensified over time, yet the Poles remain rather open to accepting refugees from geographically or culturally close countries. A similar phenomenon can be observed in reference to terrorism. Although Poland has not suffered from any terrorist attack, and there are minimal odds of any attack occurring, public opinion polls indicate that although Poles do not perceive terrorism as a serious problem for Poland, many of them treat it as a real threat to their country.

Such conclusions can be explained by several factors. First and foremost, the wording of questions in the polls, which in many cases imposes both the problem and the answer, second – the timing of the poll, which to a significant extent coincides with some specific event related either to immigration or to terrorism. Finally, one must account for the message brought forward by the Polish public discourse, with a generally negative attitude towards immigration, specifically to refugees, and also a suggestion that the latter are responsible for terrorism.

REFERENCES

Argumosa Pila Jesús Rafael. 2015. *La Internacional Yihadista. Introducción*, in: *La Internacional Yihadista*, eds. Jesús Rafael Argumosa Pila, Cuadernos de Estrategia no. 173, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, Ministerio de Defensa, pp. 9–35.

Balcerak, Ewa. 2014. *Ocena skutków abolicji dla cudzoziemców z 2007 roku*, Warszawa: Departament Polityki Migracyjnej. MSW, https://emn.gov.pl/ftp/esm/Abolicja_2007.pdf [17.11.2017].
The dynamics and orientation of changes in the attitude of Poles towards immigrants...

Bałaban, Majer. 1931. *Kiedy i skąd przybyli Żydzi do Polski*, Warszawa: Menora.

Czyżewski, Marek, Sergiusz Kowalski and Andrzej Piotrowski. 2010. *Wprowadzenie*, in: Marek Czyżewski, Sergiusz, Kowalski, Andrzej, Piotrowski (ed.), *Rytualny chaos. studium dyskursu publicznego*, Warszawa: WAIP – Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, pp. 15–48.

Florczak, Agnieszka. 2003. *Uchodźcy w Polsce. Między humanitaryzmem a pragmatyzmem*, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.

Grzymała-Kazłowska, Aleksandra. 2007. *Konstruowanie “innego”. Wizerunki imigrantów w Polsce*, Warszawa: WUW.

Janicki, Wojciech. 2000. *Tatarzy w Polsce – naród, grupa etniczna czy “ludzie pogranicza”?*, „Czasopismo Geograficzne”, LXXI, 2: 171–185.

Larroque, Anne-Clémentine. 2015. *Geopolityka fundamentalizmów muzułmańskich*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademicki Dialog.

Łotnicki, Łukasz. 2014. *Rola dyskursu publicznego w kształtowaniu relacji między imigrantami a społeczeństwem przyjmującym*, in: Grażyna Firlit-Fesnak and Łukasz Łotnicki (eds.), *Imigranci w polskim dyskursie publicznym*, Warszawa: IPS, pp. 15–41.

Łysienia, Maja (ed.). 2016. *Cudzoziemcy w Polsce. Podręcznik dla funkcjonariuszy publicznych*, Warszawa: Helsińska Fundacja Praw Człowieka.

Malinowski Rubio, María Paula. 2013. *Imigranci a komunikacja międzykulturowa w sferze usług publicznych w Polsce*, Kraków: Nomos.

Okólski, Marek. 2010. *Polska jako kraj imigracji – wprowadzenie*, in: *Transformacja nieoczywista. Polska jako kraj imigracji*, Agata Górska, Izabela Grabowska-Lusińska, Magdalena Lesińska and Marek Okólski (ed.), Warszawa: Wydawnictwo UW, pp. 23–68.

Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia. 2017. *Zniesienie obowiązku wizowego wobec obywateli Ukraiński – konsekwencje migracyjne dla Unii Europejskiej*. Ekspertyza Ośrodka Studiów Wschodnich, https://udsc.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Eks-pertyza-OSW-%E2%80%93Zniesienie-obowi%C4%85zku-wizowego-wobec-obywateli-Ukraińcy-%E2%80%93konsekwencje-migracyjne-dla-Unii-Europejskiej%E2%80%93D-sk%C3%B3t.pdf [17.11.2017].

Zapata-Barrero, Ricard. 2009. *Fundamentos de los discursos políticos en torno a la inmigración*, Madrid: Trotta.

REPORTS, OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, AND STATISTICAL DATA

CBOS. 1992. BS/403/100/92, * Społeczne postawy wobec uchodźców i imigrantów zarobkowych*, Komunikat z badań, ed. Jan Poleszczuk and Anna Giza-Poleszczuk, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/1992/K_100_92.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 1997. BS/155/155/97, *Polacy wobec uchodźców. Komunikat z badań*, ed. Michał Strzeszewski, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/1997/K_155_97.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 1999a. BS/66/99, *Pomoc humanitarna dla uchodźców z Kosowa. Komunikat z badań*, ed. Bogna Wciórka, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/1999/K_066_99.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 1999b. BS/161/99. Stosunek do obcokrajowców przebywających w Polsce. Komunikat z badań, ed. Michał Wenzel, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/1999/K_161_99.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2001a. BS/177/2001, Najważniejsze wydarzenia roku 2001 – dla Polski i dla świata. Komunikat z badań, ed. Włodzimierz Derczyński, Warszawa, p. 2, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2001/K_177_01.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2001b. BS/123/2001, Czy Polsce zagraża terroryzm? Komunikat z badań, ed. Michał Strzeszewski, Warszawa, p. 2, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2001/K_123_01.PDF, [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2001c. BS/69/2001. Wizy na wschodniej granicy. Komunikat z badań, ed. Michał Strzeszewski, Warszawa, p. 2, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2001/K_069_01.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2002. BS/114/2002. Czy obawiamy się zamachów terroryystycznych? Komunikat z badań, ed. Anna Grudniewicz, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2002/K_114_02.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2003a. BS/184/2003. Sympatia i niechęć do innych narodów. Komunikat z badań, ed. Michał Strzeszewski, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2003/K_184_03.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2003b. BS/15/2003. Wydarzenia roku 2002 ważne dla Polski i świata. Komunikat z badań, ed. Michał Wenzel, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2003/K_015_03.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2003c. BS/106/2003. Wzrost poczucia zagrożenia terroryzmem w związku z obecnością polskich żołnierzy w Iraku, Komunikat z badań, ed. Anna Grudniewicz, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2003/K_106_03.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2004a. BS/141/2004. Obcokrajowcy w Polsce. Komunikat z badań, ed. Michał Wenzel, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2004/K_141_04.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2004b. BS/14/2004. Wydarzenie roku 2003 w Polsce i na świecie. Komunikat z badań, ed. Michał Wenzel, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2004/K_014_04.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2004c. BS/59/2004. Wzrost poczucia zagrożenia terroryzmem. Komunikat z badań, ed. Michał Strzeszewski, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2004/K_059_04.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2005a. BS/60/2005. Opinie ludności z krajów Europy Środkowej o imigrantach i uchodźcach. Komunikat z badań, ed. Michał Wenzel, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2005/K_060_05.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2005b. BS/22/2005. Wydarzenia roku 2004 w Polsce i na świecie. Komunikat z badań, ed. Michał Strzeszewski, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2005/K_022_05.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2005c. BS/144/2005. Poczucie zagrożenia terroryzmem oraz akceptowane działania zwiększające bezpieczeństwo obywateli. Komunikat z badań, ed. Anna Grudniewicz, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2005/K_144_05.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2006a. BS/16/2006. Najważniejsze wydarzenia 2005 roku dla Polski i świata. Komunikat z badań, ed. Michał Strzeszewski, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2006/K_016_06.PDF [15.02.2018].
The dynamics and orientation of changes in the attitude of Poles towards immigrants...

CBOS. 2006b. BS/150/2006. *Obcokrajowcy pracujący w Polsce. Komunikat z badań*, ed. Michał Wenzel, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2006/K_150_06.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2007. BS/176/2007. *O terminie wycofania żołnierzy polskich z Iraku, stosunku do ulokowania w Polsce elementów tarczy antyrakietowej i obawach przed terroryzmem. Komunikat z badań*, ed. Michał Strzeszewski, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2007/K_176_07.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2008a. BS/31/2008. *O udziale polskich żołnierzy w operacjach militarnych za granicą, tarczy antyrakietowej i zagrożeniu terroryzmem. Komunikat z badań*, ed. Michał Strzeszewski, Warszawa, https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2008/K_031_08.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2008b. BS/73/2008. *Obcokrajowcy pracujący w Polsce. Komunikat z badań*, ed. Michał Wenzel, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2008/K_073_08.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2009. BS/172/2009. *Wydarzenie roku 2009 w Polsce i na świecie. Komunikat z badań*, ed. Krzysztof Pankowski, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2009/K_172_09.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2010a. BS/163/2010. *Rola instytucji rządowych i samorządowych w zakresie informowania obywateli o zagrożeniach terrorystycznych. Komunikat z badań*, ed. Barbara Badora, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2010/K_163_10.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2010b. BS/148/2010. *Praca cudzoziemców w Polsce. Komunikat z badań*, ed. Michał Felisiak, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2010/K_148_10.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2011. BS/57/2011. *Poczucie zagrożenia terroryzmem po śmierci Osamy Ben Ladena. Komunikat z badań*, ed. Natalia Hipsz, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2011/K_057_11.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2013a. BS/180/2013. *Wydarzenie roku 2013 w Polsce i na świecie. Komunikat z badań*, ed. Krzysztof Pankowski, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2013/K_180_13.PDF [12.02.2018].

CBOS. 2013b. BS/78/2013. *Zagrożenie terroryzmem. Komunikat z badań*, ed. Michał Felisiak, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2013/K_078_13.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2015a. *Komunikat z badań NR 113/2015. Zmiany nastawienia Polaków do innych narodów*, ed. Rafał Boguszewski, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_113_15.PDF [15.01.2018].

CBOS. 2015b. *Komunikat z badań NR 177/2015. Zagrożenie terroryzmem po zamachach w Paryżu*, ed. Barbara Badora, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_177_15.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2015c. *Komunikat z badań NR 172/2015. Stosunek do uchodźców po atakach terrorystycznych w Paryżu*, ed. Katarzyna Kowalczuk, Warszawa, https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_172_15.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2015d. *Komunikat z badań nr 122/2015. Stosunek do uchodźców w kontekście kryzysu imigracyjnego w Europie*, ed. Katarzyna Kowalczuk, Warszawa, https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_122_15.PDF [15.02.2018].
CBOS. 2015e. *Komunikat z badań nr 178/2015. Stosunek do imigrantów w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej*, ed. Katarzyna Kowalczyk, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_178_15.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2016a. *Komunikat z badań nr 177/2016. Praca obcokrajowców w Polsce*, ed. Michał Feliksiak, Warszawa (in this case, full report is quoted, together with the annex. The annex is not attached in the version made available free of charge on the CBOS website).

CBOS. 2016b. *Komunikat z badań nr 178/2016. Najważniejsze dla Polski i dla świata wydarzenia roku 2016*, ed. Magdalena Gwiazda, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_178_16.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2016c. *Komunikat z badań nr 127/2016. Zagrożenie terroryzmem*, ed. Michał Feliksiak, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_127_16.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2016d. *Komunikat z badań NR 12/2016. Stosunek Polaków do przyjmowania uchodźców*, ed. Katarzyna Kowalczyk, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_012_16.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2017. *Komunikat z badań nr 163/2017. Stosunek do przyjmowania uchodźców*, ed. Michał Feliksiak, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2017/K_163_17.PDF [15.02.2018].

CBOS. 2018a. *O firmie*, http://www.cbos.pl/PL/o_firmie/o_firmie.php [16.02.2018].

CBOS. 2018b. *Komunikaty z badań*, https://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/raporty.php [09.05.2018].

CBOS. 2018c. *Komunikaty z badań nr 2/2018. Wydarzenie roku 2017 w Polsce i na świecie*, ed. Krzysztof Pankowski, Warszawa, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2018/K_002_18.PDF [15.02.2018].

Comisión Europea. 2017. *Informe de la Comisión al Parlamento Europeo, al Consejo Europeo y al Consejo. Décimo informe sobre reubicación y reasentamiento*, Bruselas, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:71f7784f-ff32-11e6-8a35-01aa75ed71a1.0010.02/DOC_1&format=PDF [13.03.2018].

Eurobarometr. 2004. *Opinia publiczna w krajach kandydackich, realizacja w terenie: luty – marzec 2004. Publikacja: lipiec 2004, raport krajowy: Polska*, Candidate Countries Eurobarometr, European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb61/nat_pl.pdf [15.02.2018].

Eurobarometr. 2010. *Opinia publiczna w Unii Europejskiej. Jesień 2010. Raport krajowy Polska. Komisja Europejska. Standardowy Eurobarometr*, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/pl_pl_nat.pdf [15.02.2018].

Eurostat. 2017. *Dane statystyczne dotyczące azylu*, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_statistics/pl#Osoby_ubiegaj.C4.85ce_si.C4.99_o_azyl [03.05.2018].

GUS. 2017. *Rocznik demograficzny 2017*, Warszawa: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/rocznik-statystyczny-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-2017,2,17.html [15.02.2018].

Kancelaria Senatu. 2016. *Polska jako kraj migracji, OT–642, Biuro Analiz i Dokumentacji, Zespół Analiz i Opracowań Tematycznych*, https://www.senat.gov.pl/gfx/senat/pl/senatopracowania/140/plik/ot-642_internet.pdf [16.01.2018].
Komisja Europejska. 2017. *Kryzys migracyjny*, http://publications.europa.eu/webpub/com/factsheets/migration-crisis/pl/ [21.04.2018].

Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2018. *Zagrożenie terrorystyczne w Polsce i regionie*, http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/polityka_bezpieczenstwa/zwalczanie_teroryzmu_miedzynarodowego/zagrozenie_teroryzacyjne_w_polsce_i_regionie/ [16.01.2018].

UNESCO. 2017. *Learning to live together. Refugee*, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/refugee/ [16.01.2018].

Parlament Europejski. 2015. *Parlament: Nie utożasiamy uchodźców z terrorystami. Podniesiemy poziom bezpieczeństwa*, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/pl/headlines/priorities/migracja/20151201PR03639/nie-utozsamiajmy-uchodzcow-z-terrorystami-podniesmy-poziom-bezpieczenstwa [21.04.2018].

Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców. 2016. *Informacja Szefa Urzędu do Spraw Cudzoziemców o stosowaniu w roku 2016 ustawy z dnia 13 czerwca 2003 r. o udzielaniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (tj. Dz.U. z 2016 r. poz. 1836)* w zakresie realizacji zobowiązań Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej wynikających z Konwencji Genewskiej dotyczącej statusu uchodźców oraz Protokołu Nowojorskiego dotyczącego statusu uchodźcy, Warszawa, https://udsc.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Sprawozdanie-z-wykonania-ustawy-o-ochronie-w-2016.pdf [15.04.2018].

Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców. *Zestawienia roczne: Zestawienie liczbowe dotyczące postępowań prowadzonych wobec cudzoziemców w 2017 roku*, https://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-okresowe/zestawienia-roczne/ [17.01.2018].

Zatrudnienie cudzoziemców w Polsce. *Podstawowe informacje*, http://www.rpo.gov.pl/pliki/1190981893.pdf [16.01.2018].

WEB PRESS

*Abolicya dla nielegalnych imigrantów już w 2011*, Gazeta.pl, Wiadomości, 27.10.2010, http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1114873,8578490,Abolicya_dla_nielegalnych_immigrantow_juz_w_2011.html [16.01.2018].

*DEON.pl. 2015. Papież: niech każda para parafia przyjmie uchodźców!*, 06.09.2015, https://www.deon.pl/religia/serwis-papieski/aktualnosci-papieskie/art,3372,papiez-niech-kazda-parafia-przyjme-uchodzcow.html [13.03.2018].

*Islam zdemaskowany – YouTube, Mufti w polskim meczecie mówi o rzezi niemuzulmanów*, https://gloria.tv/video/FQws4UDo1sqw3ob1sYidEBxJa [13.03.2018].

*Kulig, Robert. 2015. Żadna relacja nie opisze. Reporter WP towarzyszył uchodźcom*, WP Wiadomości, 10.09.2015, https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/zadna-relacja-nie-opisze-reporter-wp-towarzyszył-uchodzcom-6027693192647809a [13.03.2018].

*Malinowski, Przemysław. 2016. Dominik Tarczyński z PiS: Wojna przeciwko psom z islamskiego terroryzmu*, Rzeczpospolita 25.07.2016, http://www.rp.pl/Prawo-i-Sprawiedliwosc/1607295849-Dominik-Tarczynski-z-PiS-Wojna-przeciwko-psom-z-islamskiego-terroryzmu.html [13.03.2018].

*Newsweek.pl. 2015. Kaczyński: Pasyjoty i pierwotniaki w organizmach uchodźców groźne dla Polaków*, Newsweek.pl Polska, 13.10.2015, http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/jaroslaw-kaczynski-o-uchodzczach,artykuly,372175,1.html [13.03.2018].
Polskie Radio.pl Jedynka. 2015. *Ilu uchodźców przyjmie Polska? Wiceszef MSZ wyjaśnia*, [audycja]: Sygnały dnia, prowadzenie: Krzysztof Grzesiowski, gość: Rafał Trzaskowski (wiceminister spraw zagranicznych), data emisji: 20.10.2015, https://www.polskieradio.pl/7/129/Artykul/1533431,Ilu-uchodzcow-przyjmie-Polska-Wiceszef-MSZ-wyjasnia [13.03.2018].

Redakcja Maximus Media. 2016. *Bejsbolem w imigrantów, czyli “przyspieszona nauka asywilizacji” w UK*, Maximus Media InformacjePolska, 12.02.2016, http://maximus.media/aktualnosci.html?id=2785&t=bejsbolem-w-imigrantow-czyli-przyspieszona-nauka-asywilizacji [13.03.2018].

Rmf24.pl. 2016. *Syryjczyk zamordował Polkę. “Zeznal, że był z nią w związku, ma psychiczne odchylenia od normy”*, 25 lipca 2016, http://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/swiat-news-syryjczyk-zamordowal-polke-zeznal-ze-byl-z-nia-w-zwiazku-ma-nld,2242090 [13.03.2018].

Romanowski, Rafał. 2015. *Imigranci zaatakowali autokar? Włoska policja dementuje doniesienia polskiego blogera*, Wyborcza.pl, 12 września 2015, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75398,18798864,imigranci-zaatakowali-autokar-wloska-policja-dementuje-doniesienia.html [13.03.2018].

Rybińska, Aleksandra. 2015. *Kopacz zgodziła się na 100 tys. islamskich imigrantów, “W Siedci”*, 41(150) [12–18.10.2015].

Schwartz, Robert and Małgorzata Matzke. 2015. *Terroryzm. Europa Środkowa i Wschodnia boi się uchodźców*, Made form minds, http://www.dw.com/pl/terroryzm-europa-%C5%9Brodkowa-i-wschodnia-boi-si%C4%99-uchod%C5%BAc%C3%B3w/a-18864756 [19.04.2018].

Szymański, Konrad. 2015. *Wobec tragicznych wydarzeń w Paryżu Polska nie widzi politycznych możliwości wykonania decyzji o relokacji uchodźców*, wPolityce.pl, 14.11.2015, https://wpolityce.pl/swiat/271757-polska-musi-zachowac-pelna-kontrole-nad-swoimi-granicami-nad-polityka-azylowa-i-migracyjna [13.03.2018].

TVN24.pl. 2015. https://www.tvn24.pl/wideo/z-anteny/tyrski-immigrant-ka-z-przod-keleti-w-budapeszcie,1456134.html?playlist_id=25102 [13.03.2018].

TVP INFO. 2016. *Ziobro dementuje: Polka nie była w ciąży z Arabem*, 05.08.2016, https://www.tvp.info/26433899/ziobro-dementuje-polka-nie-byla-w-ciaz-y-z-arabem [13.03.2018].

Wilgocki, Michał. 2017. *Kalendarium nienawiści. Jak zmieniliśmy się z ludzi w hordy*, Wyborcza.pl, Magazyn Świąteczny 07 lipca 2017, http://wyborcza.pl/magazyn/7,124059,22065678,kalendarium-nienawisci-jak-zmienilismy-sie-z-ludzi-w-hordy.html [13.03.2018].

wPolityce.pl. 2017. *Widzowie w szoku!? Meller w TVN24: Moje poglądy ws. imigrantów są po prawej stronie. “Niekoniecznie chciałbym mieć świat islamu u siebie”*, 24.06.2017, https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/345687-widzowie-w-szoku-meller-w-tvn24-moje-poglady-ws-imigrantow-sa-po-prawej-stronie-niekoniecznie-chcialbym-miecie-swiat-islamu-u-siebie [13.03.2018].

Wyborcza.pl. 2016a. *Papież też wygłasza już “tylko opinie”? Karczewski: Mogę się zgadzać z wypowiedziami Franciszka albo nie zgadzać*, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75398,19832287,papiez-tes-wyglasza-ju-z-tylko-opinie-karczewski-moge-sie.html [13.03.2018].
Wyborcza.pl. 2016b. Zamach w Nicei. Błaszczak już znalazł wspólniny ataku: to poprawność polityczna i szefowa dyplomacji UE, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75398,20403109,zamach-w-nicei-blaszczak-ju-z-znalazl-wspolwinnych-ataku-to.html [13.03.2018].

YouTube. 2015. Jarosław Kaczyński w OBRONIE POLSKI przed IMIGRANTAMI (16 września), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i-lNZlhASl [13.03.2018].

Zespół wPolityce.pl. 2017. Premier Szydło broni szefa MON i pyta o bezpieczeństwo: “Dokąd zmierzasz, Europa? Powstań z kolan, bo będziesz opłakiwała codziennie swoje dzieci!”, wPolityce.pl, https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/341197-premier-szydlo-broni-szefa-mon-i-pyta-o-bezpieczenstwo-dokad-zmierzasz-europa-powstan-z-kolan-bo-bedziesz-oplakiwa-codziennie-swoje-dzieci-video [13.03.2018].

**DYNAMIKA I KIERUNEK ZMIAN POSTAW POLAKÓW WOBEC IMIGRANTÓW (UCHODŹCÓW ORAZ NIEUCHODŹCÓW) IICH POWIĄZAŃ Z TERRORYZMEM W CIĄGU OSTATNICH DZIESIĘCIOLECI**

Kilka lat temu stosunek Polaków zarówno do imigrantów, jak i uchodźców wydawał się bardziej otwarty niż obecnie. Analiza ankiet przeprowadzonych w ostatnich dziesięcioleciach przez Polskie Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS), m.in. dotyczących opinii Polaków na temat imigrantów, uchodźców, terroryzmu oraz ich stosunku do innych narodów, podobnie jak analizy wyników sondaży przeprowadzonego przez Europejski Urząd Statystyczny (Eurostat) obejmujące przegląd publicznego dyskursu na temat imigracji, umożliwiają wyciągnięcie ważnych wniosków. Po pierwsze, analizy potwierdzają, że postawy Polaków wobec imigrantów uległy zmianie zwłaszcza w ciągu ostatnich trzech lat, stając się nieco bardziej negatywne. Po drugie, postawy te nie są prawdopodobnie tak negatywne, jak mogłoby się wydawać w świetle wyników ogólnopolskich badań CBOS od 2015 roku. Pokazuje to ogromny wpływ na samą postawę i postrzeganie imigrantów oraz uchodźców zarówno polskiego dyskursu politycznego wokół imigracji, jak i sposobów, w jaki jest ona prezentowana przez środki masowego przekazu, gdzie często ukazywana jest w kontekście terroryzmu.

Słowa kluczowe: postawa Polaków wobec imigrantów, uchodźcy, terroryzm, dyskurs polityczny i medialny wokół imigracji