Bureaucracy: Max Weber’s Concept and Its Application to Pakistan

Irfan Ahmed Shaikh
University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan
Arshad Islam
International Islamic University, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Bashir Ahmed Jatoi
University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan

To investigate Max Weber’s concept of bureaucracy and its relevance to Pakistan’s civil service, this study explains the system of governance followed in different nations, its function, and bureaucratic formulations in the well-managed and administered state. The paper analyzes reasons for the poor performance of Pakistani public service provision. International development doctrines pertaining to governance are based on accountable to the governments and effective bureaucracy. This study explores the formation of the Pakistani state and civil service and its role in the implementation of government policies. Irrespective of the system of governance followed across different nations, the presence, and functioning of a bureaucratic set-up is crucial to manage and administer the state. However, in Pakistan there has been an egregious failure of the bureaucratic set-up to achieve this vision. This study explores the reasons why based on Weberian sociological theory affirming that the main characteristic of bureaucracy is espirit de corps, doing things for the good of the institution (i.e., civil service) even if goes against the public interest. This study analyzes such orientation in the context of a major developing state, Pakistan. The essential principal function of bureaucracy is to honestly and sincerely implement the government policies on behalf of the people. The government provides representation of the national interest, mainly when democratically elected, while the bureaucracy provides skills and know-how; the latter is liable to the former, but often not directly to the public. Thus, bureaucrats are usually known as “civil servants”, who provide continuity in governance and daily life, despite the vagaries of changes in government. This is a qualitative research entirely based on literature survey from library data collected from books and articles.

Keywords: bureaucracy, Max Weber, government policies, democracy, Pakistan

Introduction

This paper comprehensively explores the concept of bureaucracy taking into account the set of interlinked aspects to the topic under discussion rather than treating it as an isolated and unified construct. “Bureaucracy”

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Irfan Ahmed Shaikh, Ph.D. in History & Civilization, assistant professor, Department of General History, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan
Arshad Islam, Ph.D., associate professor, Department of History and Civilization, International Islamic University, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Bashir Ahmed Jatoi, M.Phil, Lecturer, Department of General History, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan.
is a versatile term that embodies diverse meanings, particularly in post-structuralize interpretations (Du Gay, 2005). Rather than enriching the idea of bureaucracy by giving rise to an altogether new idea, this approach just brings to surface how different pieces of literature on bureaucracy are inter-dependent and evolve side by side while pronouncing antagonistic views of the idea of bureaucracy. This paper traces the development of the idea of bureaucracy from the early conceptualization of Max Weber to study the concept of bureaucracy from different perspectives and diverse angles. The principal objective of this paper is to point out how the different writings on bureaucracy adopt a particular kind of narrative, whereby bureaucracy is instituted due to a failure to develop organizational structures that can address external influences, with special reference to Pakistan after its independence in 1947.

Truly speaking, bureaucracy is inseparably linked with the emergence of the modern state that was defined by its development from pre-modern bureaucratic organizations. In this sense, the term actually corresponds to bureaucracy’s representative structure of our times. To facilitate an understanding of the emergence of bureaucracy and how it is viewed by the public, it is essential to explore how management thinking is today influenced by Western paradigms. However, it is to be noted that before the field of management emerged as a unique discipline, fully organized economic and mercantile activities were evolved in the light of partially formalized knowledge and some ideologies.

The existence of highly organized governmental and administrative systems is attested from the earliest civilizations in Mesopotamia and Egypt, whose very existence as complex societies necessitated bureaucracy. Formal study of the phenomenon of state organization can be traced to Greece, such as Aristotle’s differentiation between “the art of household management” (οἰκονομία) and “the art of moneymaking” (chrematistike) (Swedberg, 1998). By managing the household, he meant converting nature into utilities used for domestic life including goods, food stuffs, and some exclusive kinds of services, whereas moneymaking constituted the act of economic regulation, such as public mints, treasuries, and revenue. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) certainly considered the latter to be a less worthy occupation and certainly undesirable for a philosopher. In Politics, Aristotle narrated the story in which Thales of Miletus (620-546 B.C.E.) purchased olive presses and then leased them to olive-farmers during harvest times to demonstrate how easy it is for a philosopher to make money in case he wished it, but how he should rather devote his precious time to more intellectually important subjects like geometry, politics, or rhetoric. This disdain for chrematistike persisted among the civilizations influenced by the Greeks until early modern times (Styhre, 2007).

The modern versions of bureaucratic organization and the managerial tasks connected to it stem from theological discourses, and Weber (1992) linked it particularly to Protestantism and the associated birth of capitalism. The Protestant work ethic stripped Christianity of its exoteric manifestations, including the eternal rhythm of the seasons and social hierarchy, to be replaced by an industrious cult of work and stern social moral values. Several criticisms have been made against the Weberian view of the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism (Styhre, 2007), including that Catholic city-states like Venice and Genoa in medieval Italy were the first commercial trading centers of Europe, and the Catholic empires of Spain and Portugal predated the Protestant ones of the Netherlands and England in their plunder of the Americas and Asia. Some scholars had stated that Weber reversed causality, saying that Protestantism was the result of capitalism rather than being its impetus (Wren, 1972). However, Weber’s primary notion that certain concepts and beliefs have a very long and predominantly latent functions and unanticipated effects remains a major contribution to the understanding of the emergence of modern capitalism.
Guillén (1994) talked of more recent connections between religion and management. For example, in the UK, Quaker families controlled several corporations doing a variety of businesses like banking (Lloyds and Barclays), accounting (Price Waterhouse Cooper), and confectionery (Cadbury and Rowntree) (Guillén, 1994). The primitive models of administration therefore chiefly relied on what is called as “normative control”; religious concepts and ideologies decided what kind of economic and commercial ventures were allowed and prohibited. More recent forms of managerial thinking are mainly connected with rational forms of control, mainly developed in domains like accounting and book-keeping. An example of this was the Venetian Luca Paciolo’s double-entry book-keeping method, spoken of in his Summa de Arithmetica, Geometrica, Proportioni, et Proportionalita, published in 1494 (Wren, 1972).

The development of management thinking and practice before the transformation of European societies by the industrial revolution was not well organized and systematic. They were predominantly concerned with looking for solutions to some practical issues connected with day-to-day management. During the initial years when industrial capitalism was taking shape, characterized by the modernization process, the concept of management on the shop-floor level was predominant.

The concept of bureaucracy is inseparably linked with the modern society. However, several historians and anthropologists talk of the presence of bureaucratic methods and bureaucratic institutions seen in pre-modern and tribal societies too (De Landa, 1997). The French historian Marc Bloch (1962) stated that primitive forms of organized bureaucracy in Europe beyond the purview of the church and the papal court were seen dating back to the feudal period, stemming from the eleventh and twelfth centuries. In fact, much earlier than this, some developed cultures of the world had well-developed and organized forms of administration and procedures with regard to judicial proceedings, education, governance, and religious organizations, notably China. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the evolution of modern bureaucracy has been largely supported by the ability to write, back-up, disseminate, and replicate the information (Bloch, 1962).

Jack Goody (1986) analyzed the bureaucratic organization of primitive societies and pointed out that the practice of writing was the one and only notable skill that preceded the birth of the bureaucratic state. Writing is critical in the development of bureaucratic states, even though relatively complex forms of government are possible without it. Writing was not essential to the development of the state but of a certain type of state, the bureaucratic state. Apart from writing, Kallinikos (2004) strongly opined that every bureaucratic set-up rests on the foundation of new concept pertaining to individualism and the freedom and rights of individuals contained in the bourgeois ethos:

Bureaucracy and modernity are… inextricably bound up with one another. Bureaucracy is the organization form of modernity. It is closely associated with the overall cultural orientations of modern man, the social mobility that coincided with the gradual dissolution of premodern stratification, and he is burgeoning bourgeois ideas of individual freedom and justice, which it helped itself to embed. (Kallinikos, 2004, p. 22)

In socialism as understood by Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), the bourgeoisie was the only revolutionary group that had the capabilities to alter early modern society by investing it with their inherent values and ideas (Styhre, 2007). Kallinikos (2004) stated that the bourgeoisie promoted social values that pointed out the exclusive kind of organization that is hierarchical in its composition, namely “bureaucracy”. In fact, the ideas of dissociating professional life, family life, and personal likings are discovered at the core of values:
The emergence of the bureaucratic form of organization was predicated on a major anthropological innovation (that is, a new way of conceiving humanity and institutionally embedding it) that we have tended to take for granted these days, namely, the clear and institutionally supported separation of work from the rest of people’s lives. The conception of work as a distinct sphere of social life, sufficiently demarcated vis-à-vis other social spheres, has had a decisive significance for constitution of the modern workplace. (Kallinikos, 2003, p. 614)

To sum up, one of the essential formative influences of the modern society is a movement from a kind of regime ruled over by autocratic tendencies and authoritarianism to a special kind of organizational structure that is characterized by the values, such as transparency, expertness, and well-organized inquiries. This is in fact a very important kind of progression in the formation of modern society, with concepts of emancipation and citizenship rights; bureaucratic organization can be said to have contributed a great deal towards this development; in theory this is wholly good, but the reality is often far from desirable in many developing countries, to the extent that bureauphobia has become the norm. To understand this, we have to analyze Max Weber’s views pertaining to the structure of the bureaucratic organization.

**Weber’s Views on Bureaucracy**

Weber’s seminal contributions to modern social thinking were based on sociology, economics, and philosophy, in which he held chairs in Freiburg, Heidelberg, and Munich, respectively. Weber had the ability to converse fluently in English, French, and Spanish, with a good hold over Russian and Hebrew. His position as one of the most popular social thinkers is not disputed to this day, in the fields of jurisprudence, philosophy, economics, history, and theology; however, his accomplished work on bureaucracy is his most popular contribution to the realm of social sciences. According to Blau and Scott (1963), Weber’s concepts of bureaucracy are “undoubtedly the most important general statements on formal organization”. Bendix (1971) said that “none of the critics of Weber’s analysis has yet dispensed with his definition”. Weber was successful in recognizing the evolution of a bureaucratic kind of organization in Germany and stated that the new developments there suggested a novel form of administration (Styhre, 2007). Weber attributed the accumulation of wealth—and thus the emergence of modern capitalism—to the birth of bureaucracy in the modern world.

The growing demands on culture… are determined, though to a varying extent, by the growing wealth of the most influential strata in the state. To this extent increasing bureaucratisation is a function of the increasing possession of goods used for consumption, and of an increasingly sophisticated technique of fashioning external life—a technique which corresponds to the opportunities provided by such wealth. This reacts with the standard of living and makes for an increasingly subjective indispensability of organized, collective, inter-local, and thus bureaucratic, provision for the most varied wants, which previously were either unknown, or were satisfied locally or by private economy. (Weber, 1947, p. 213)

Weber’s key work, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Economy and Society), identifies a set of concepts that make up the bureaucratic system, featuring a number of complicated ones which are very tough to render in English (here we adopt Höpfl’s translations, 2006, p. 10). Bureaucracy enjoys *Herrschaft* (“authority”), by virtue of which it is able to rule over other systems. The personnel in the administration are confined to well-defined domains of *Kompetenzen* (delimited “jurisdiction”). They work through *Fachwissen* (“official competence”) acquired from *Kontorwissenschaft* (“administrative science”). We might say that the bureaucratic organization is a kind of *stauff* (“taut”). The bureaucracy rules over *Machtmittel* (“power tools”) and also *Verwaltungsmittel* (“way of administration”) to carry out its responsibilities with a primary concentration on
Akten (“record maintenance”) (Weber, 1947). For Weber, “bureaucracy” meant a more effective kind of organization than traditional “collegiate” types of governance:

The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs—these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration, and especially in its monocratic form. As compared with all collegiate, honorific, and avocational forms of administration, trained bureaucracy is superior on all these points. And as far as complicated asks are concerned, paid bureaucratic work is not only more precise but, in the last analysis, it is often cheaper than even formally unremunerated honorific service. (Weber, 1947, p. 214)

Based on these perspectives, the bureaucratic system offers some advantages to society with a range of essential services by depending on coordination and infrastructure to a large extent. According to Weber, contemporary society cannot dispense with bureaucracy, and bureaucrats are the carriers of the values of transparency and predictability that are integral and important values of democracy. At the same time, Weber has been highly appreciated for earning a wide popularity by providing a grim image of the bureaucratic organization, in which he compared it to an iron cage administered by closed-minded professionals who have almost no empathy and interest that can stretch outside their area of expertise. Thus, while Weber appeared enthusiastic regarding the potential of bureaucratic organization, he also critiqued its inherent dysfunctions and errors. One of the limitations of bureaucracy is its powerful obsession with what is called as “rationalist” thinking, a way of approach that prescribes utility and practical solutions to the challenges spotted (Styhre, 2007), as he stated:

Naturally, bureaucracy promotes a “rationalist” way of life, but the concept of rationalism allows for widely differing contents. Quite generally, one can say that the bureaucratisation of all domination very strongly furthers the development of “rational matter-of-factness” and the personality type of the professional expert. (Weber, 1947, p. 240)

Influenced by this tendency, a bureaucrat tends to confine himself to the portals of brutal and rigid “factism” wherein he tends to take only bare facts into account. Weber was greatly worried about such a negative and inhumane mode of thinking and said that this tendency had given rise to an altogether new genre where bureaucrats are pictured as heartless and obstructive administrators characterized by a “bureaucratic personality” more concerned with blind adherence to rules and regulations and self-serving organizational goals than with actual practical outcomes from their work in serving human beings or even society in general.

**Power Structure (Hierarchy)**

An important topic in the domains of the bureaucratic writings is concerned with the creative potentials of bureaucracies. Several writers have a notion that bureaucracies are actually poor arenas for those who innovate. Some thinkers have also conducted empirical studies on this aspect. Thompson (1969) studied the connection between innovation and bureaucracy and defined the former as the generation, acceptance, and implementation of new ideas, processes, and products or services. Innovation, therefore, implies the capacity to change and adapt (Thompson, 1969). Because “innovation” refers to bringing about variety, it is viewed as an essential capacity both for cross-functional collaboration as well as gaining novel set of abilities and processes. Thompson felt bureaucrats are poor innovators: “Innovation is more risky for the bureaucrat than for the entrepreneur”. During the bureaucratisation of firms, the emerging system organizes the various activities into
well-defined domains of responsibility. As a result, an order is imposed and conflicts and uncertain situations are resolved. Thompson stated: “Other things being equal, the less bureaucratized (monocratic) the organization, the more conflict and uncertainty and the more innovation” (Thompson, 1969).

Within a large number of other concerns, one of the disadvantages of the bureaucratic organization is its mechanical dependence on the concept of “extrinsic motivation” forming part of the motivation theory. For instance, extrinsic motivation is that which is drawn from outside the individual from benefits like salaries, bonuses, rewards, and other incentives (Styhre, 2007). For Thompson, innovation is highly concerned with “intrinsic motivation”, the kind of encouragement sourced from within budding from the individual’s personal likings and goals. For instance, this is something like the zealous interest of a scientist to know how a given process can be explored in the scientific parlance. The extrinsic reward system, administrated by the hierarchy of authority, stimulates conformity rather than innovation. Creativity is promoted, for the most part, by an internal commitment, by intrinsic rewards (Thompson, 1969). Also, Thompson opined that the idea of professionalism has to be subsequently cultivated in bureaucracies:

Professionalism… is an alternative to bureaucracy (or the market) as a social control. As a system of control, it is pluralistic and collegiate rather than monocratic and hierarchical. The rewards it offers are professional recognition for increasing competence (professional growth) and the intrinsic satisfaction associated with professional work. (Thompson, 1969, p. 93)

A particular field of interest relevant to this discussion is “bureaucratization”, which is the implementation of bureaucratic processes and regulations within the purview of an organization. Today, the idea of “bureaucratization” is viewed rather negatively due to widespread dissatisfaction and aversion to bureaucratization and its mechanical, unproductive, and monotonous systems and routines (Styhre, 2007). However, as Albrow (1970) noted, the concept has not always been negative:

In the 1920s it was quite normal to speak of a bureaucratization of the firm, meaning the introduction of systematic administration and the growth of the number of purely administrative employees… If the firm itself is viewed as a bureaucracy then we can conceive of the bureaucratization of society in terms of an increase in the number of and size of its organizations. (Albrow, 1970, pp. 104-105)

During the early modern period that preceded the beginning of the twentieth century, bureaucratization pertained to the evolution of a modern state apparatus. Bendix (1971) stated:

The term “bureaucratization” serves to designate these patterns of social change, which can be traced to the royal households of medieval Europe, to the eventual employment of university-trained jurists as administrators, to the civilian transformation of military controllers on the Continent, and to the civil-service reforms in England and the United States in the nineteenth century. These several changes were related to other social trends, especially the development of the universities, the money economy, the legal system, and representative institutions. (Bendix, 1971, p. 133)

Since bureaucratization is one of the chief processes involved in modernizing European society, the concept of bureaucratization today appears connected to enforcing the formalizing practices in institutions in order to align them with the established rules and formal procedures. Stinchcombe (1959) attempted to distinguish between two kinds of administration known as “bureaucratic administration” and “craft administration”. Bureaucratic administration is predominantly seen in manufacturing companies where professionals assume the responsibility to plan, while construction firms are characterized by craft administration, where employees are given the role of decision making for the tasks under their purview
Therefore for Stinchcombe, bureaucratization appeared to be a form of official communication:

Bureaucratization of administration may be defined as a relatively permanent structuring of communications channels between continuously functioning officials. This permanent structuring of channels of legitimate communications, channels defined by the permanent official status of the originator of the communication and of its receiver, permits the development of routine methods of processing information upward and authoritative communication downward. That is, it permits administration on the basis of files and the economic employment of clerical workers. (Stinchcombe, 1959, p. 176)

Roy (1981) considered the US State Department explanation of bureaucratization as being constituted of: (1) growth in size, (2) appointment and promotion on the basis of merit, and (3) organizational differentiation (Roy, 1981). As per the Weberian bureaucratic model, bureaucracies function as the principal carriers of democratization, i.e., they need to consider the interests of all stakeholders. Roy’s research focuses more on specific interests than other issues and sums up that bureaucratization does not always pertain to a neutral type of justifiable governance:

The findings challenge the notion that a bureaucratic, universalistic orientation necessarily opens up an organization to a wider set of interests than does a particularistic organization. Although universalistic criteria may open up broader opportunities for many groups, they do not assure allocation of equal costs and benefits for all groups. (Roy, 1981, p. 420)

Blau (1956) wrote: “Bureaucracy… can be defined as organization that maximizes efficiency in administration, whatever its formal characteristics, or as an institutionalized method of organizing social conduct in the interests of administrative efficiency”. In this view, bureaucracy is considered to be enhancing efficiency rather than harming it. When we analyze many such pieces of literature, we find bureaucracy is portrayed plainly either as good or bad. Such binary thinking is constrained and cannot contribute to purposefully rehabilitating bureaucracy. Therefore, we need to adopt a more balanced approach to be able to study the merits and demerits of bureaucracy in an unbiased way.

Adler and Borys (1996) endeavored to tackle a binary method of thorough process and talk about “coercive” and “enabling” bureaucracies. The former is a system that suppresses the employee’s professional life and places several rules and regulations that can obstruct their work—in this system, there are fewer occasions to come across a sensible work opportunity; the latter (the enabling bureaucracy) is a system that offers enough assistance to the stakeholders to discharge their responsibilities. This system emerges from the values including transparency, being able to predict, engagement in a value-free environment, a just approach towards all the clients and several other values of bureaucracy. Adler and Borys (1996) underlined how bureaucracy can be beneficial and harmful at the same time (Styhre, 2007). This is perhaps a sort of balanced view of bureaucracy, and only such an approach can encourage newer concepts and outlooks paving way for the stemming of new perspectives of bureaucracy. If we can call this approach a kind of rehabilitation, then it is the need of the hour in the realms of organization theory and studies in the domains of management.

This paper studies the concept of bureaucracy from two angles: The first stand perceives how it first emerges in a discourse and is subsequently re-formulated; the other stands view it as a specific organization form. During contemporary times, the discursive evolution of ideas and perceptions connected to such ideas does not indicate the empirical conditions in a society. We find in bureaucracy a strong disagreement between the neglect of bureaucracy on one side and a faithful dependence on the bureaucratic structure in all structures of society on the other hand. While a stand point dismisses bureaucracy as fundamentally flawed and perverted, the other stand point views it as the popularly implemented form of social organization. Obviously, such a
critical view that prevails today is encouraged by the present-day generation’s inclination towards fluxing epistemologies. For instance, the several modern ideologies on social institutions subscribe to the state of becoming or what is progressively on the move (in a flux or in evolution) without being stagnant. On the other hand, an individual during medieval times rather preferred to remain stable and predictable, being greatly influenced by religious scriptures interpreted in light of Aristotelian metaphysics. In today’s world, the concept of change is heralded as being capable of liberating human beings from slavery to a paradise of individual freedoms fostered by bureaucratic structures and institutions. People today look to the world around them as constantly moving and changing. In addition, several ideologies of our times deem such views as fashionable. Several scientists, sociologists, and philosophers today focus on various theories and epistemologies favoring change over stability and fluidity over stagnant entities. Paul Virilio (2002) talked of the difference between the “tactical war” or the “war of siege”, where attacking the forts is the main task, and the “war of movement” that focuses on destroying by using bombs and missiles. The earlier form of war is what is called as the pre-modern and medieval war. The later is the modern war allowing speed to take the central role. In the former kinds of wars, movement was slow, and the enemies made fortifications to defend their regions. During modern times, wars move rapidly. The bureaucracy depicts the pre-modern fashion of stressing on stability and “fortification”, whereas the structures of bureaucracy during modern times are characterized by the concept of speed, which Virilio labels as “dromology” (Styhre, 2007).

A Historical Overview of Bureaucratic Conduct in Pakistan

The characteristic bureaucratic structure of Pakistan had its source and inspiration in the colonial administration system that primarily aimed to exercise its administrative talents to further the interests and imperatives of colonialism. Pakistan’s bureaucracy faithfully copied the cadre-based system that was the typically characteristic feature of Indian Civil Service (ICS), which was the principal machinery of the colonial administration. Looking at this hierarchical structure, we find the ICS in the next strata of the provincial-level services, with the subordinate civil services forming the base structure. This kind of structure was already popular under the All India Civil Service. Those recruited by the ICS were posted with different responsibilities both in the federal as well as provincial governments. While a greater segment of the provincial cadre officers were inducted only for positions with the provincial government, in some extraordinary cases where the officers demonstrated some exceptional capabilities they were drafted to fill vacancies and positions available in other provinces as well as with the federal government (Cheema & Sayeed, 2006).

Until 1879 natives were never given positions in the higher echelons of the bureaucratic service, but once the All India Civil Service was established, more or less the whole of the provincial service cadre was filled with Indians, and between the years 1887 and 1947 a large number of highly educated natives were inducted into the ICS. The official barring of Indians from entering the ICS was replaced by very tough recruitment procedures and guidelines that governed the British civil servants, which amounted to an unofficial barrier to natives seeking to enter the ICS (Cheema & Sayeed, 2006). When the “native” bureaucracy unfolded unintentionally, it did not in any way suggest Indianisation in terms of format and purpose, as Zafarullah, Khan, and Rahman (1997) noted:

Indianisation of the central civil service remained far from being fully achieved. The bureaucracy continued to be closed to the majority, elitist in education and training, and articulative of the interests of the English aristocracy. (Zafarullah et al., 1997)
While there was a high degree of imperial control exercised over the political scene, the situation suggested that bureaucracy rather functioned within a domestic framework thoroughly insulated from outside context of virtually complete domestic insularity. The other balancing kind of institutions that existed in the other realms like legislature, local governance, or social interest groups functioned only in a weakened form. The result was obvious: The bureaucracy was totally free from any domestic political pressures, and thus it never felt any compelling need to respond to the interests of the public at large (Cheema & Sayeed, 2006).

The Immediate Aftermath of Independence: 1947-1958

Both India and Pakistan inherited from the colonial government one of the most advanced civil service systems of the world when the British Empire left South Asia. Punctuated by savage and inhumane brutalities, the imperial authorities had effected a gradual transformation from an early modern feudal conglomeration of principalities into an independent state with a robust public service. This was to be particularly instrumental in holding Pakistan together during its early period, with its political fragility due to the inherent nature of the quasi-Islamic state carved out from British India. While the pseudo-democratic political apparatus, including the military, was dominated by landowning “feudals”, the civil service prevented the machinery of the state from disintegrating. Compared to the contemporaneous situation in India, Pakistani bureaucracy’s institutional ascendency was significantly strengthened and emboldened by the nature of political leadership (Cheema & Sayeed, 2006).

Sayeed (1980) noted that in the aftermath of partition, a good number of bureaucrats (the overwhelming number of them still being Britons) complained to the people in governance that there was a great deal of political interference from ministers:

Jinnah could have drawn from these two conclusions: one, to place the politicians under bureaucratic tutelage; and two, to improve the [Muslim League] party machinery to eliminate some of the factions and accommodate others. He [Jinnah] was after all a dying man and could think of only immediate short term remedies. In settling for the first alternative, he not only took care of the immediate problems but laid the foundations for future actions and policies of his successor governments that outdid him in establishing bureaucratic control over politicians. (Sayeed, 1980, p. 26)

The thoroughly unstable political situation during the 1947-1958 periods enabled the bureaucrats to gain supremacy and control over the politicians. With this characteristic, the bureaucratic structure went in for centralization and it became thoroughly insulated from the general public; thus, while some sort of accountability existed from within (i.e., among insiders), the bureaucracy was exempt from conventional political or judicial accountability. The political leadership of those times did not have any clear objectives behind running and administering the state, which paved the way for the bureaucrats to evolve their own agenda that would take care of their own well-being as a caste. This reflected some influences from the ICS, especially with regard to political representation. The bureaucracy strongly pursued an agenda of development through industrialization, but a stable political basis for democratization was lacking. Though a good amount of state-building was achieved, it was at the cost of nation building. Above all, the Pakistani military establishment greatly influenced national policy decisions. This tendency was noted evidently after Pakistan went in for the South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO-1955) military alliances. Several political experts have remarked that the state structure was highly dominated by a “bureaucratic-military oligarchy” (Cheema & Sayeed, 2006).
Talking of the bureaucratic structure, there was a far-reaching evolution that was achieved following the partition of Pakistan and it was the eradication of the provincial cadre from the civil services. This paved way for the development of a fully centralized bureaucratic structure, which though functionally efficient was less accountable to politicians and the electorate at large. During the mid-1950s, One Unit was instituted, which gave further momentum to the centralization of the political organization. The ICS was renamed as the CSP (Civil Service of Pakistan), but the mode of functioning was completely inherited from the All India Civil Service, without any trace of change, and the upper strata of the bureaucracy remained intact (Cheema & Sayeed, 2006).

Post Marshal Law Period: 1958-1971

The bureaucratic-military oligarchy remained ascendant throughout the 1960s. In 1958 the military took over the administration and the bureaucracy gained unfettered control over the policy-making process. One of the biggest achievements of bureaucracy during those times was the highly restrictive political environment. The bureaucracy strengthened itself during this time period by resorting to three strategies (Cheema & Sayeed, 2006).

In the first place, the bureaucracy secured a constitutional protection in the 1962 Constitution and succeeded in insulating itself from any kind of political interference. In addition, the basic democracies (BD) system was streamlined to further strengthen the powers of bureaucrats over the politicians in the local level too. When there was already a centralized bureaucratic structure, the ability of the bureaucracy to meddle in the political processes on the local level was entrenched. In the second place, the developmental model adopted during those times was of an interventionist kind that enabled the CSP to stay in the central place of policy framing and the execution processes. The influential members in the bureaucracy were actually exploiting the situation and were amassing wealth through large rents generated in the manufacturing sector (Nadvi & Sayeed, 2003). This position further encouraged the bureaucracy’s interests to continue with the same kind of profitable economic policies adopted during those times, despite their damaging impact on resource distribution both across regions and income groups.

In the third place, as a result of the over-stretching domination exercised by the CSP on the administrative system, several other trends and tendencies developed and spread. Ethnic domination became a prevailing force in the oligarchical nepotism that commandeered the state apparatus for personal and sectional benefits. One notable loser in this process was the East Pakistani; in the civil service, there was negligible representation of the Bengalis, especially in the upper echelons. When we observed the scene in 1960s, we found a thorough domination of the bureaucracy over the social and political domains achieved and nurtured through the interlocking relationships forged between the members of different elite social groups (Cheema & Sayeed, 2006). Sayeed (1980) clearly grasped this idea, stating:

In the years 1965-66, the secretary of foreign affairs, Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington and the secretaries of Home and Kashmir Affairs and the Economic Affairs Division were related. Similarly, some of the senior civil servants were linked by family ties to members of the military hierarchy. And civil service, military and business hierarchies were becoming interrelated through new matrimonial ties. (Sayeed, 1980, p. 73)

Talking about our model, the scenario during 1960s proves that the Ayub regime went by far more clearly defined objectives for its policies and functions. The principal objectives of his regime were economic growth and repressing the political processes. While the bureaucracy underwent centralization, the political process of
those times did not show any visible signs of favoring the voters and patrons with personal favors. However, with respect to the issues of supervising and the accountability of the bureaucracy, the outcomes appear rather mixed. The bureaucrats of these times were paid fat salaries, but it is far from being clear how their malfeasant was perceived. During several instances, the bureaucrats (particularly the CSP) evidently demonstrated an arbitrary approach not showing any accountability to the political leadership, which could not be checked. Clearly this tendency was not characteristic of a system that was inspired and influenced by the colonial bureaucracy. Therefore, it boils down to the fact that political leadership (even during Ayub’s regime) was incapacitated at least to a considerable extent which nurtured this tendency in bureaucrats.

**Conclusion**

To conclude, in almost all parts of the world, the principal function of bureaucracy is to faithfully and sincerely implement the policies of the government ruling over the state. The government provides representation of the national interest, particularly when democratically elected, while the bureaucracy provides skills and know-how; the latter is accountable to the former, but often not directly to the public. Thus bureaucrats are traditionally known as “civil servants”.

Civil servants provide continuity in governance and daily life, despite the vagaries of changes in government. However, while politicians often come and go, and the nexus of governmental power can shift and mutate, civil servants remain entrenched in their spheres of professional capacity, often gaining the upper hand over inexperienced or uncertain ministers and carving out their own domains within the state apparatus. While often involved in an advisory capacity, civil servants are instituted to be involved in policy execution, not policy formulation; while they might assist the political leadership of the state to formulate various policies, based on their expertise, they are not intended to have any decisive or authoritative role steering the ship. As elected representatives of the state, politicians in the governing role are the only authorized class to formulate policies.

In Pakistan the political leadership has failed to discharge its role of policy formulation for numerous reasons (generally attributable to the demographic and political turbulence of state formation after Partition) that are not of primary concern to this study; suffice it to say that their own power grabbing and failure to lay the foundations of a genuine political formation enabled the accrual of political power by the bureaucratic cadre.

Thus the unique characteristic of the Pakistani bureaucracy is that it managed to take over the reins of government from politicians; aside from this, it is a conventional bureaucratic civil service in terms of its inherent nature and style of functioning, i.e., rigid and inflexible, stifling of innovation and reflection, with high corruption, and mechanically rolling on in its functions while impeding constructive initiatives or routine business. Therefore, when it comes to reformation and improvement of the existing system, bureaucrats are poor players.

Furthermore, they honor the lack of accountability expected of unelected bureaucrats in conventional systems (who are held to account by politicians), by not reflecting the interests, sentiments, and aspirations of the public. Therefore, if they need to play the policy making role, they fail, as they do not consult or welcome the participation of the public, as the latter is not integrated into their systemic programming. In a typical third-world developing country, such as Pakistan, bureaucracies have become thoroughly politicized in a way that is significantly detrimental to constructive state governance. This is a serious plight that must be noted
under the topic of approaching the merits and demerits of the working of bureaucracy in these countries. In Pakistan, policy making even on key issues remains thoroughly unstructured, and policy that does emerge reflects the whims and fancies of a privileged class. This condition has imbued every walk of national life with despair in the machinery of government. It is the need of the hour to take a rapid step toward a more systematic and institutionalized kind of policy making process in the larger interests of the country.

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