THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN KANT AND HEGEL

Abstract: This article outlines the thoughts of Kant and Hegel. Based on a comparative analysis, the author classified the scientific works of domestic and foreign scientists. At the end of the article, Hegel's statements and the essence of Kantian a priori and agnosticism are presented.

Key words: truth, logic, philosophy, phenomenology of the spirit, Kant, Hegel.

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Introduction

For Kant as for Hegel method is not a structure or procedure imported into philosophy from without, as, e.g. a mathematical demonstration in modern physics or in the proof-structure of philosophies such as Spinoza’s or Wolff’s. For both Hegel and Kant method is the arrangement that reason gives its contents and cognitions; for both, that is, method and object do not fall asunder, unlike in all disciplines other than philosophy. For Kant method is the design and plan of the whole, the scientific form that guides the organization of cognitions. Likewise, Hegel writes that method is the consciousness of the form of its inner movement. Unfortunately, Hegel never considers Kant an example or a precursor or a positive role model. It is important to ask why Hegel never takes seriously Kant’s Doctrine of Method. Why, if he shares so many central points with the Architectonic of the first Critique, does he never acknowledge Kant as a possible ally? Why does he misunderstand Kant on analysis and synthesis as he does? These are some of the questions we planned to discuss in this paper.

Literature review

The works of Kant and Hegel were studied by a number of scientists V.D. Gubin [1], T. Yu. Sidorina [2], V.P. Filatova [3] and others. This article classified the scientific works of domestic and foreign scientists. Alfredo Ferrarin [6], Bohnet C. [7], Apel, K.O. [8], Brandom R.[9], Habermas J. [10].

The concept of truth in Kant and Hegel

Truth and reliability — these concepts for centuries have been one of the central in the philosophical study of the knowledge “What is truth?” - the question of Pontius Pilate to Christ was and remains one of the main questions of philosophy.

In the universal sense, the problem of truth is broader than the question of the truth of knowledge. So we can talk about the “true lifestyle”, “true beauty.” In a narrower epistemological sense, truth is understood as an accurate and reliable reflection of reality in knowledge. This is exactly the truth that Aristotle understood even when he formulated the so-
called classical concept of truth, which is the main one to this day.

It is thought that as soon as people learned to think logically, the goal of their thinking was to find the truth. Philosophy always had its own specific approach to truth. If the ordinary consciousness calmly regarded the truth as a certain certainty, then philosophy has always been drawn to the creation of a problem around the truth. The problem of truth over time has become the main problem of philosophy. Summing up all the available human knowledge about the truth, Aristotle once gave his definition of truth. According to Aristotle, the knowledge that corresponds to reality is considered true. Everything is transparent, clear and clear. No one has yet sought some kind of concealment of meaning in words. But then everything changed.

Starting from Kant, knowledge began to relate to the truth a little differently than before. Before, philosophies considered true that knowledge that corresponds to the surrounding reality. With this approach to truth, the subject of knowledge or man remained on one side, and the object of knowledge or nature, the environment remained on the other side of an imaginary boundary. And at the same time, the subject of knowledge almost did not pay attention. The movement of consciousness was taken for granted for granted, as a given, which does not require special analysis and study.[4]

For the first time in the history of thought, Kant violated this tradition and began to carefully analyze thinking itself, that is, the subject of knowledge. Of course, before Kant there were some movements of thought in this direction, for example, they were clearly noticeable in Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Leibniz. But Kant for the first time in history began to systematically study the phenomenology of the spirit, although he did not call his science simply - a criticism of pure reason. According to the rules of the article, here we cannot consider Kant's "truth" in detail, for one simple reason, which is impossible to cover Kant’s theory of knowledge within the framework of one article. We will only briefly dwell on it. In his famous work, “Critique of Pure Reason,” Kant analyzes in detail the thinking itself. Prior to Kant, none of the philosophers posed such a seemingly strange question “how is knowledge itself possible, what are its conditions and origin”. This healthy spice is showing several Kant plunged deep into the nature of the spirit. Although Kant left the knowing person and the “knowable” nature on different sides of the imaginary border, but he turned the vector of research towards consciousness, thinking. According to Kant, knowledge is composed of two elements - the content that the experience supplies, and the form that exists in the mind before any possible experience. Hegel will then adopt this idea, but change it substantially. Kant admits that all human knowledge begins with experience, but believes that the human mind has pre-experienced, a priori forms that help systematize the entire flow of disparate information and the formation of human knowledge. We are not in vain here emphasizing knowledge as human. The fact is that Kant believes that the human mind has a priori, experienced subjective forms of perception of the environment. According to Kant, these forms of intuition are time and space. According to Kant, time and space in themselves, do not exist outside of human consciousness. They are only forms characteristic of the human race perceiving the environment. Everything that a person knows, he knows in time and space, and only in this temporal-spatial shell before him is the physical world. These subjective forms of the mind have a universal character, and therefore science is possible for all people. If space and time are subjective forms of the human mind, then it is clear that cognition is also subjective-human. But this does not mean that environmental objects do not exist. Objects exist realistically, and existence is real, and their existence does not depend on human consciousness. Here Kant acts as a materialist than as an idealist. But he acts as an agnostic. Man, according to Kant, due to the limitations of his cognitive abilities, is not able to cognize the “thing in himself.” The “thing in itself” for a person remains on the other side of the phenomenon. "The thing in itself" appears to him as a phenomenon. A person only knows the phenomena of “things in himself”, discovers the laws of interaction, the relationships of these phenomena, but the “thing in itself” itself remains unknowable. Kant sees the spirit as an independent entity, different from the “thing in itself”. Then, with Hegel, the spirit will turn into an independent substance. If the “thing and to itself” is unknowable, and the person only knows the phenomena of this “thing in himself”, then what is the criterion of truth according to Kant. If they speak in general terms, then Kant's criterion of truth is practice. A man builds his knowledge with the help of reason, which in thinking also has its own a priori universal forms - categories. Categories are the most general and independent of experience concepts with the help of which all other concepts are combined into judgments. This judgment or knowledge must pass the test of practice in order to be considered true. If knowledge does not pass the test of practice, then it is discarded as not true, etc. Kant has a subject of knowledge, i.e. man acts as an active principle. Man, as it were, calls nature its conditions of study. Nature or an object becomes a passive side, and a person as a subject of knowledge becomes an active side of the process of cognition. Of course, Kant tried to solve his problems with the help of his philosophy. And to some extent he succeeded. First, he wanted to separate scientific knowledge from religion. In his time, this was an urgent problem. Secondly, he wanted to justify the free will of man. He firmly wanted to establish his
“categorical imperative.” For this, he even introduced the concept of “thing in himself”, which cannot be known through experience. But in general, after Kant, the impression of the incompleteness of affairs was left. If the world is unrecognizable as a “thing in itself”, then the pursuit of science is reduced to the study of some irrelevant, secondary rules and laws on phenomena. Hegel tried to eliminate this dissatisfaction. In his book Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel elaborates on the problem of truth. In general, the vast majority of Hegel's ideas arose under the influence of Kant's ideas. And here you involuntarily agree with the opinion that in general the whole philosophy is influenced by Kant's ideas. And here you involuntarily agree with the opinion that in general the whole philosophy develops, melts, generates its new ideas criticizing existing knowledge. As for Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit, we can say that all this work was written mainly under the influence of Kant's ideas. Hegel does not agree with many of the ideas of his predecessor.[5]

In the introduction to the "Phenomenology of the Spirit," Hegel, in his own way, solved the Kantian problem of the unknowability of "things to oneself." If Kant has "things to himself" and "manifestation", and "things to himself" are unknowable, then in Hegel "things to themselves" and "manifestation" are placed in knowledge, and the criteria of truth are knowledge itself. It has a concept, and "phenomenon" is an object. Although the objects themselves exist objectively, regardless of consciousness, Hegel's concept of "things to oneself" and the concept of "phenomenon" lie on the same plane, on the plane of consciousness. And "things to oneself" and "phenomenon" are the products of consciousness and consciousness itself establishes the criterion of truth, i.e. consciousness itself decides whether the concept corresponds to the object or not. Consciousness tests itself.

Although Hegel puts "things to himself" into consciousness, for us the impression is created that "things in himself" from this does not disappear outside of consciousness. Perhaps by putting "things in themselves" and "appearances" into knowledge, Hegel wanted to emphasize that the criterion of truth is established by the consciousness itself. But if consciousness establishes the criteria of truth for itself, but "things in itself" still remain outside of consciousness, then the question of cognizability remains open. At first glance, it can show that Hegel gives only a description of the movement of consciousness, its development from form to form, its growth. But action tests knowledge. This means that the world is knowable. Only action, practice makes possible the cognizability of "things in themselves." Hegel notes the doubling of the subject. But at first glance it seems that the object tripled - "things in itself" outside of consciousness, "things in itself" for consciousness, a phenomenon or knowledge of the subject about this subject. The last two objects are in knowledge, while the object is outside of knowledge, in itself. This is what Kant called "things in himself."

Thus, nothing seems to have changed with the knowability of "things in themselves." But Hegel considers substance to be a subject - substance knows itself. The development of the spirit is the very knowledge of substance. Man is a thinking object, a thinking substance. If there is consciousness as it is in itself, i.e. as it is a property of a substance that knows itself, and does not put knowledge, i.e. subject and substance i.e. an object on opposite sides of the border, then "things in itself" or, according to Hegel, “things in itself” only doubles: “things in itself” as such and “things in itself” for consciousness — knowledge or true consciousness of the first “in itself”.

According to Hegel, an object is outside consciousness. The same thing is for consciousness - the first "in itself." There is some knowledge of this subject by consciousness - the second “in itself" for consciousness. The movement of the second "in itself" changes the first "in itself" - the experience is perfect. Then the first “in itself" is not an object "in itself" as a current one, but only an object of consciousness or true consciousness. Perhaps only when consciousness becomes mind, the first "in itself" is identified with the subject "in itself" as such, consciousness reaches absolute knowledge. Hegel does not neglect any true. The true is placed in knowledge - the subject of knowledge is true consciousness. One true replaces another true - one form of consciousness is replaced by another form. So the spirit grows. Thus the spirit grows to absolute knowledge - to the mind. Since on this side “things in itself" has not yet been recognized, the first “in itself" is constantly changing with the accumulation of knowledge by consciousness. On this side, “things in itself" appears as the first "in itself", because the spirit has not yet found itself. On the second side, the first "in itself" is the object of consciousness or truth, the second "in itself" is the knowledge of consciousness about this object, or the same thing, the object of consciousness or the truth of consciousness. In general terms, the following can be said - the first "in itself" is an object, the second "in itself" is knowledge. Hegel seeks the truth of knowledge in knowledge itself, and not where not to be aloof. And the criterion of truth is also knowledge itself. He does not agree with the metaphysical gap between the entity in the form of a “thing in itself" and the phenomenon. Hegel opposed Kantian a priori and agnosticism. The Hegelian phenomenon is no less objective than the essence. From Hegel’s point of view, we know the world, it proclaims the identity of thinking and being. Hegel's main idea is that knowledge develops, along with its subject. In general, for Hegel, the knowing subject is a substance, and the process of cognition is nothing but self-knowledge of substance.
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Conclusions

So, Hegel accepted the traditional understanding of truth as the correspondence of knowledge with its subject, without noticing the substitution of the category “truth” for the category “criterion of truth”. At the same time, he regarded as truth “in a deeper sense” the correspondence of objectivity to the concept. He enriched philosophy with this, but, introducing this interpretation into a polemic with Kant, he replaced the topic of discussion, while leaving the Kantian question of the universal criterion of truth open.

In conclusion, let us try to understand what kind of truth Jesus of Nazareth had in mind, saying that he “came into the world to testify of the truth”; the truth that Kant spoke or the truth in Hegel’s understanding?

Both truths. Obviously, the supreme truth proclaimed by Jesus should be considered the commandment “be perfect, as your Heavenly Father is perfect.” This truth is the correspondence of man to his nature (concept). But this is impossible for people who "do not know what they are doing." Therefore, the achievement of a higher truth requires the correctness of knowledge about relationships that correspond to human nature. Hence the Sermon on the Mount, parables, etc.

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