Maxwell’s Demon and the Thermodynamics of Computation

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Abstract

It is generally accepted, following Landauer and Bennett, that the process of measurement involves no minimum entropy cost, but the erasure of information in resetting the memory register of a computer to zero requires dissipating heat into the environment. This thesis has been challenged recently in a two-part article by Earman and Norton. I review some relevant observations in the thermodynamics of computation and argue that Earman and Norton are mistaken: there is in principle no entropy cost to the acquisition of information, but the destruction of information does involve an irreducible entropy cost.

1 Introduction

Maxwell first introduced the demon in a letter to Tait (dated December 11, 1867; see [10], p. 214) and repeated the demon argument in his 1871 treatise, Theory of Heat. He imagined a being capable of monitoring the positions and velocities of the individual molecules in a container of air at uniform temperature, divided into two chambers by a partition with a small aperture. While the mean velocity of the air molecules is uniform, the velocities of the individual molecules vary. The demon opens and closes the aperture so as to allow the faster molecules to move to one chamber and the slower molecules

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to the other chamber. In this way the temperature of one chamber is raised and the temperature of the other chamber lowered without any work being done, contradicting the second law of thermodynamics.

As Maxwell indicated in an undated letter to Tait (see [12], p. 5, and [11]), the point of the demon argument was to show that the second law ‘has only a statistical certainty.’ The question then arises whether it is possible to design a perpetual motion machine that, over time, reliably exploits statistical fluctuations to convert heat from the environment into work.

In 1912, Smoluchowski [14, 15] showed that an automatic mechanism, like a spring-loaded trapdoor blocking an aperture between two chambers of a gas-filled container and capable of opening only one way, would be prevented by its own Brownian motion from functioning reliably as a one-way valve that allowed more energetic gas molecules to accumulate in one chamber over time. The trapdoor would be heated by collisions with the gas molecules and open and close randomly, and these random fluctuations in the trapdoor motion would allow a molecule to pass from the hotter chamber to the colder chamber as often as a molecule pushes past the trapdoor from the colder chamber to the hotter chamber. So such a device could not function as a perpetual motion machine capable of converting heat from the environment into work.

In other words, a purely mechanical Maxwell’s demon is impossible.

In his seminal article [17], Szilard cites Smoluchowski ([15], p. 89):

As far as we know today, there is no automatic, permanently effective perpetual motion machine, in spite of the molecular fluctuations, but such a device might, perhaps, function regularly if it were appropriately operated by intelligent beings . . .

and states his objective as follows:

The objective of the investigation is to find the conditions which apparently allow the construction of a perpetual-motion machine of the second kind, if one permits an intelligent being to intervene in a thermodynamic system.

The appropriate way to think about this question is to consider whether a mechanical demon incorporating a computer could work as a perpetual motion machine—that is, a device with information-gathering and information-processing abilities. Assuming the second law, the relevant question is: at what stage of the information-gathering or information-processing would the device fail?
The accepted position, before arguments by Landauer \cite{11} and Bennett \cite{2}, was that there is an irreducible entropy cost to measurement. The thesis that acquiring information involves a certain entropy cost, specifically at least \( k \log 2 \) per bit of information, was first proposed by Szilard \cite{17} and elaborated by Brillouin \cite{4} in terms of a model in which the demon measures the positions of the gas molecules by shining light on them.

Landauer and Bennett argued that measurement is in principle reversible and can be done without entropy cost. By contrast, they showed that there is an irreducible entropy cost to information destruction as opposed to information acquisition: resetting the memory register of a computer to zero involves an entropy cost. This result has important consequences for the thermodynamics of computation. Bennett \cite{1}, Fredkin \cite{8}, and Toffoli \cite{16} showed that the most efficient computers, like Carnot engines, are reversible. It follows that the minimum energy required to carry out a computation does not depend on the complexity of the computation, but only on the number of bits of information in the output: if the output is 1 bit, one needs at least \( kT \log 2 \) of free energy to run the computation, which is used in resetting the memory to zero.

In a recent two-part article, Earman and Norton \cite{5, 6} reject the use of information-theoretic notions to ‘exorcise’ Maxwell’s demon as misguided. They argue that either the demon is a thermodynamic system governed by the second law, in which case no further assumptions about information and entropy are needed to save the second law from the demon, or the demon is not such a system, in which case no information-theoretic assumptions can save the second law.

Earman and Norton call ‘Szilard’s principle’ the principle that acquiring information involves a minimum entropy cost; specifically, gaining information that distinguishes between \( n \) equally likely states dissipates a minimum entropy of \( k \log n \) into the environment. ‘Landauer’s principle’ is the principle that erasing this information from a memory register involves a minimum entropy cost of \( k \log n \). They reject the prevailing view that the locus of entropy dissipation required to compensate for the demon’s entropy reduction is correctly identified by Landauer’s principle not Szilard’s principle, as associated with the erasure of information in the demon’s memory not the acquisition of information. As they see it, both principles depend for their validity on the second law and are not incompatible. If the demon is a canonical thermal system, then either the process of measurement, or the process of erasing the demon’s memory, or both, will involve entropy dissipation sufficient to
prevent the demon from exploiting thermal fluctuations over time to convert heat from the environment into work.

I shall argue that Earman and Norton are wrong: in principle, the process of measurement need not involve any entropy cost, but the erasure of information in the memory register of a computer cannot be achieved without a minimum entropy cost. In section 2, I briefly review some relevant observations in the thermodynamics of computation. In section 3, I discuss measurement, and in section 4, I show why resetting the memory register of computer to zero requires dissipating heat into the environment.

2 The Thermodynamics of Computation

Here I review some relevant observations in the thermodynamics of computation, following the discussion in Feynman [7].

The fundamental principle in the thermodynamics of computation is that information should be conceived as physically embodied in the state of a physical system. So we can, for example, think of a message on a tape—a sequence of 0’s and 1’s—as represented by a sequence of boxes, in each of which there is a 1-molecule gas, where the molecule can be either in the left half of the box (representing the state 0) or the right half of the box (representing the state 1).

If we assume that the tape (the sequence of boxes) is immersed in a heat bath at constant temperature $T$, the amount of work, $W$, required to compress the gas in one of the boxes to half the original volume $V$ isothermally is:

$$W = \int_{V}^{V/2} pdV$$

$$= \int_{V}^{V/2} \frac{kT}{V}dV$$

$$= kT(\log(V/2) - \log V)$$

$$= -kT \log 2 \quad (1)$$

where $p$ is the pressure of the gas and $k$ is Boltzmann's constant. (Conventionally, work done by a gas in expanding is taken as positive. The negative sign here indicates that the work is done on the gas. Concepts such as temperature and pressure for a 1-molecule gas are understood in a time-averaged sense.)
The total energy, $U$, of the gas is related to the free energy, $F$, and the entropy, $S$, by the equation:

$$U = F + TS$$

(2)

In an isothermal compression, the total energy of the gas remains constant, so:

$$\Delta F = -T \Delta S$$

(3)

This represents the heat energy dumped into the environment (the heat bath) by the work done during the isothermal compression. So the entropy of the 1-molecule gas changes in this thermodynamically reversible change of state by an amount:

$$\Delta S = -k \log 2$$

(4)

and the entropy of the environment is increased by $k \log 2$. Equivalently, there is a change of $kT \log 2$ in the free energy of the gas.

In statistical mechanics, the entropy of a system in a certain thermodynamic state is introduced as a measure of the number of microstates available to the system in the thermodynamic state. Specifically, the entropy is taken as proportional to the logarithm of the number of available microstates, with the proportionality factor $k$. This contrasts with the analysis of thermodynamic quantities like temperature and pressure, which are defined as statistical averages over a distribution of molecular configurations. The sense in which the entropy of a thermodynamic system is an objective property of the system is nicely captured by Jaynes in the following statement ([9], quoted in [12], p. 17):

The entropy of a thermodynamic system is a measure of the degree of ignorance of a person whose sole knowledge about its microstate consists of the values of the macroscopic quantities $X_i$ which define its thermodynamic state. This is a completely ‘objective’ quantity, in the sense that it is a function only of the $X_i$, and does not depend on anybody’s personality. There is then no reason why it cannot be measured in a laboratory.

In terms of a statistical mechanical analysis, the kinetic energy of the 1-molecule gas is unchanged by the compression. The only change is that initially, before the compression, the molecule could be anywhere in the volume $V$, while after the compression the molecule is confined to the region
\(V/2\). Since the number of microstates available to the molecule in the volume \(V\) at temperature \(T\) is proportional to \(V\), if the volume of the gas is halved at constant temperature, the number of available microstates is halved, because the molecule has access to only half the number of possible positions. So the entropy is decreased by an amount equal to \(k(\log V - \log V/2) = k\log 2\).

The information in a message can be defined as proportional to the amount of free energy required to reset the entire message tape to zero, in the sense that each cell of the tape—each 1-molecule gas in a box—is compressed to half its volume, reducing the number of available microstates by half. In appropriate units (taking logarithms to the base 2), it takes 1 bit of free energy to reset each cell to a zero value.

Clearly, if we already know whether the value of a cell is 0 or 1, there is no information contained in the cell. In terms of the above definition, if the value is 0, we do nothing to reset the cell; if the value is 1 so that the molecule is in the right half of the box, we can insert a partition trapping the molecule in the right half and then turn the box over. This involves no expenditure of free energy (assuming quasi-static, frictionless motion). So it is only if we do not know whether the molecule is in the left half of the box or the right half—if the specification of the thermodynamic state of the 1-molecule gas is simply that the molecule is somewhere in the box—that free energy is required to trap the molecule in one half of the box. Evidently, it should make no difference whether the zero for the tape is defined as a sequence of 0’s or a sequence of 1’s. But this will only be the case if the reset operation is understood as a compression, to be applied to a cell irrespective of the value of the cell, that is, as an operation applied in ignorance of the whether the molecule is in the left half or the right half, after which we know where the molecule is.

3 Measurement

The essential feature of a measurement is that it establishes a correlation between the state of a system and the state of a memory register. Now, establishing a correlation between the states of the two systems is equivalent to a copying operation, and there is no entropy cost to copying. This can be seen as follows ([7], p. 155):

Suppose we have two memory registers, for definiteness two tapes, \(T_1\) and \(T_2\), each considered as above to consist of a sequence of boxes containing one
molecule, which can be either in the left half of the box ($L$), representing a 0, or the right half of the box ($R$), representing a 1. Suppose each tape is in the same state (the same sequence of 0’s and 1’s) and we would like to reset each tape to the zero state, which we take as a sequence of 0’s.

We can use the first tape to reset the second tape as follows: If the state of the first box in $T_1$ is 0, do nothing to the state of the first box in $T_2$. If the state of the first box in $T_1$ is 1, insert a partition trapping the molecule in the right half of the first box of $T_2$ and invert the box. Continue in this way for the other boxes in the tape. We now have to reset the first tape.

It follows that the entropy cost of the reset operation for two identical tapes is the same as the cost for one tape. (There is no more information in a tape and a copy than in a single tape.) So the entropy cost of copying the first tape (seeing that these operations are reversible) must be zero. In principle, then, insofar as a measurement can simply be regarded as a copying operation, a measurement process need not involve any entropy cost, that is, it can be done without the expenditure of free energy.

Of course, there are measurement procedures—procedures for establishing correlations between systems—that will involve dissipating entropy into the environment, such as the optical procedure considered by Brillouin. But there is no requirement in principle for a mechanical Maxwell’s demon that incorporates an information processing device to use a light source to distinguish the molecules.

For a 1-molecule gas in a box, Bennett [3] has proposed a mechanical measurement apparatus designed to determine which half of the box the molecule is trapped in without doing any work, hence with no entropy cost (assuming frictionless forces and quasi-static motion). Earman and Norton [6], pp. 13–14) object that Bennett’s apparatus would be subject the usual fluctuation phenomena, since it is a mechanical device governed by Hamiltonian mechanics and so must behave like a canonical thermal system. These fluctuations would prevent the device from functioning as a measuring instrument, for much the same reason that Smoluchowski’s trapdoor would fail to function as a sorting device.

Now, Bennett proposed his apparatus as an idealized reversible measuring device to illustrate the theoretical possibility of measuring and recording the position of a molecule without bouncing light off the molecule, and without involving any thermodynamically irreversible step. As a real apparatus, it would undoubtedly fail to work. But the argument that measurement does not have to be thermodynamically costly can be made without exhibiting a
measuring instrument that does not dissipate any heat into the environment. The essential point is simply that a measurement does nothing more than establish a correlation, and so is equivalent to a copying operation.

4 Erasure

Consider Bennett’s entropy analysis of Szilard’s 1-molecule engine in [3]. The apparatus consists of a box containing one molecule, with a movable piston at the left end and the right end. The box is in contact with a heat reservoir, so that the 1-molecule gas can expand isothermally against the pistons. The demon can insert a partition that separates the box into two equal parts, left \((L)\) and right \((R)\). Initially, the demon’s memory register is in a neutral or ready state, 0. The demon first inserts the partition and then measures the location of the molecule, whether it is in \(L\) or \(R\).

The phase space of the 1-molecule gas can be partitioned into two equal regions, \(L\) and \(R\), and the phase space of the demon’s memory register can be partitioned into three equal regions, corresponding to either 0, or registering \(L\), or registering \(R\). This yields a partition into six equal regions for the phase space of the combined system: \((L, L), (L, 0), (L, R), (R, L), (R, 0), (R, R)\), where the first element in each pair represents the state of the 1-molecule gas, and the second element represents the state of the memory register.

Initially, the molecule can be anywhere in the box and the memory register is set to 0, so the entropy of the combined system is \(\log V\) (in appropriate units), where \(V\) here is the volume of the phase space region \((L, 0) \cup (R, 0)\). We assume that the insertion and removal of the partition does not involve friction and can be done without any work. After the measurement (considered as a copying operation that involves no entropy cost), the molecule can be either in \(L\) (in which case the memory registers \(L\)) or in \(R\) (in which case the memory registers \(R\)), so the entropy of the combined system is:

\[
\log[(L, L) \cup (R, R)] = \log V
\]

The demon now pushes the piston on the side that does not contain the molecule towards the movable partition, and removes the partition when the piston reaches it. This compression phase does not involve any work, since the piston is pushed against nothing and we are assuming no friction. The entropy of the combined system after the compression phase is still \(\log V\).
Next, the molecule pushes against the piston in an isothermal expansion phase, absorbing heat from the environment through the walls as it expands at constant temperature until the piston is pushed back to its original position. After the expansion, the molecule occupies the entire region of the box, and the memory registers either \(L\) or \(R\), so entropy of the combined system is:

\[
\log[(L, L) \cup (L, R) \cup (R, L) \cup (R, R)] = \log 2V \\
= \log V + 1
\]

an entropy increase of 1 bit (taking base 2 logarithms). At the same time, the entropy of the environment is decreased by 1 bit.

While the molecule in the box is now in its original state, somewhere in \(L \cup R\), the memory register is not at 0 but still registers \(L\) or \(R\). To reset the memory to 0 requires compressing the phase space of the memory register. We might think of the memory register too as a 1-molecule gas, partitioned into three regions, \(L\), 0, and \(R\). To erase the information in this system, the pointer-molecule, which is in the region \(L \cup R\), must be compressed to the region 0. After this erasure or compression of the memory phase space, the entropy of the combined system is:

\[
\log[(L, 0) \cup (R, 0)] = \log V
\]

By the second law, this entropy decrease of 1 bit in the system must be accompanied by an entropy increase in the environment of 1 bit; that is, a minimum entropy of 1 bit must be dissipated to the environment in resetting the memory to 0.

Earman and Norton ([6], pp. 16–17) argue that a computerized demon can be programmed to operate a 1-molecule Szilard engine without the need to erase information. They consider a memory register with two states instead of three, labelled \(L\) and \(R\). At the starting point of the program, the memory register is set to \(L\). If the molecule is detected in the left half of the box, there is no change in the memory register. If the molecule is detected in the right half, the program switches the state \(L\) to \(R\). Then, depending on the state of the memory, one of two subroutines is executed. The \(L\)-subroutine implements the appropriate compression-expansion sequence (partition inserted, piston pushed in from the right, etc.) and ends by leaving the memory in the state \(L\). The \(R\)-subroutine functions similarly but ends by resetting the memory to \(L\). So after a complete cycle, the engine
and demon are returned to the initial state with an entropy reduction of 1 bit, in violation of the second law. Neither subroutine involves erasure, because the resetting operation—L to L or L to R—depends on the state of the memory register: it does not involve compressing the phase space of the register.

But this is precisely the point: under the constraints imposed by Earman and Norton, the demon has been reduced to an automatic mechanism analogous to Smoluchowski’s spring-loaded trapdoor, and we already know that such a device cannot work. As Landauer ([11]; p. 189 in [12]) remarks:

> This is not how a computer operates. In most instances, a computer pushes information around in a manner that is independent of the exact data which are being handled, and is only a function of the physical circuit connections.

The question at issue is at what stage of the information acquisition or information processing a computerized demon would fail as a perpetual motion machine, if we assume that the system is a canonical thermal system subject to the second law. The claim that information erasure, and not information acquisition or information processing, involves a minimum entropy cost depends on the observation that (i) measurement is essentially a copying operation with no entropy cost in principle, (ii) reversible computation is possible in principle, and (iii) erasure involves compressing the phase space of the physical system that functions as a memory register, which requires dumping heat into the environment.

A reset operation is logically irreversible, in the sense that the output does not uniquely determine the input (the mapping is many-to-one). If information is understood as physically embodied information, a logically irreversible operation must be implemented by a physically irreversible device, which dissipates heat into the environment. In [11], Landauer considers a sequence of \( n \) bits physically represented as an array of spins, initially all aligned in the positive \( z \)-direction, a state he designates as \text{ONE}. As the spins take up entropy from the environment, they become disoriented, so that each spin can be aligned either in the positive or in the negative \( z \)-direction, with equal probability. Since the array can be in any one of \( 2^n \) states, the entropy can increase by \( kn \log 2 \) (or \( n \) bits, in appropriate units) as the initial information becomes thermalized. The reset operation \text{RESTORE TO ONE} is the opposite of thermalization: each bit is initially in one of two states and after the reset operation is in a definite state. Since the number of possible
states for each bit has been reduced by half, the entropy is reduced by $k \log 2$ per bit. The entropy of a closed system, such as a computer with its own batteries, cannot decrease, so this entropy appears as heat dumped into the environment.

Landauer (11; p. 192 in [12]) remarks:

Note that our argument here does not necessarily depend upon connections, frequently made in other writings, between entropy and information. We simply think of each bit as being located in a physical system, with perhaps a great many degrees of freedom, in addition to the relevant one. However, for each possible physical state which will be interpreted as a ZERO, there is a very similar possible physical state in which the physical system represents a ONE. Hence a system which is in a ONE state has only half as many physical states available to it as a system which can be in a ONE or ZERO state.

If all the bits in the array are initially in the ONE state, the reset operation RESTORE TO ONE involves no entropy change, and no heat dissipation, since no operation is necessary. Similarly, if all the bits are initially in the ZERO state, no entropy change is involved in resetting them all to the ONE state. (Recall Feynman’s argument in section 1.) Landauer ([11]; pp. 192–193 in [12]) notes that the reset operation would be different in these two cases:

Note, however, that the reset operation which sufficed when the inputs were all ONE (doing nothing) will not suffice when the inputs are all ZERO. When the initial states are ZERO, and we wish to go to ONE, this is analogous to a phase transition between two phases in equilibrium, and can, presumably, be done reversibly and without an entropy increase in the universe, but only by a procedure specifically designed for that task. We thus see that when the initial states do not have their fullest possible diversity, the necessary entropy increase in the RESET operation can be reduced, but only by taking advantage of our knowledge about the inputs, and tailoring the reset operation accordingly.

Earman and Norton ([6], p. 16) cite these remarks by Landauer as justification for the claim that, in their program for a computerized demon with
no erasure, neither subroutine involves erasure. Each subroutine is designed for a specific task: the $L$-subroutine ends by leaving the memory register in the state $L$, the $R$-subroutine ends by switching the state of the memory from $R$ to $L$. This is of course correct. But their example only succeeds in evading the issue: without a state-independent reset operation, their demon is reduced to an automatically functioning switching device, and the question raised by Szilard is not addressed.

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