Abstract
This paper asserts that religious conflicts and the emergence of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria are linked to the influence of theology or theological interpretation. The paper specifically argues that religious conflicts and the emergence of Boko Haram are strongly influenced by Maududian ideology or his political interpretation of Islam. The paper establishes this by showing that “Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) of Egypt, the Jama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan, the Wahabbi views in Saudi Arabia and Islamic revolution of Iran are all indirect propagators of Maududian ideology. This fundamentalist ideological influence in northern Nigeria began with Muslim Student Society (MSS) in northern Nigerian universities and was transmitted into the northern Nigerian society at large with dire consequences. This position is supported by interviews conducted of 159 respondents in Kano, Zaria and Kaduna of Kano and Kaduna states of northern Nigeria.

Key Words
Religious Conflicts, Boko Haram, Maududi, Fundamentalism, Theological indoctrination, Muslim Student Society (MSS)

Introduction
Islamic militancy or fundamentalism is now a global phenomenon. In recent times, Boko Haram, a militant Islamic group, has taken

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1 This is derived from Maududi whose complete name is AbulAlaMaududi. He is referred to as the godfather of fundamentalism ((The Spittoon 2010).

2 Several scholars and Islamists reject the use of fundamentalism because of its Christian roots and that it paints Islam in bad light. However, this writer finds support for its use in Voll who refers to Maududian tendency as ‘fundamentalist activism’ (1994, 237). It captures the aggressive tendency being portrayed.
captive several towns in north eastern Nigeria in a bid to establish an Islamic state. Several scholars in Nigeria have attempted to decipher the root cause of these religious conflicts and indeed the rise of *Boko Haram* in northern Nigeria.

Depending on the scholar, politicians, poverty and oppression as well as colonialism (Turaki 2010) have been proffered as laying the foundation or promoting Islamic fundamentalism and the emergence of *Boko Haram*. Essentially, most scholars believe that religious conflicts and *Boko Haram* emerged as a result of socio-political and socio-economic factors. This paper questions the sufficiency of this claim and argues that theology and theological interpretation or indoctrination are the root cause, while socio-political and socio-economic factors are secondary because in spite of socio-political and socio-economic factors, Islam exists in other parts of Nigeria without these crises.

The central argument of this paper is that both religious conflicts and the emergence of *Boko Haram* are as a result of theological ideology and essentially the fundamentalist ideology of Maududi and the *Salafi* tendency. This paper argues that the arrival of Maududian ideology led to the creation of sects like Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.

### The Northern Nigerian Context

Northern Nigeria is where majority of Muslims reside in Nigeria. Majority of scholars say Islam came to northern Nigeria between 11th and 12th Centuries as a result of Arab traders (Elaigwu and Galadima 2003, 16) although Ousman suggests that Islam came to northern Nigeria around the seventh century (2004, 76). There is a

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3. The Turabian parenthetical referencing style is applied for this paper.

4. Most of the ideas in this paper are part of research work done in pursuit of a PhD at Africa International University Nairobi-Kenya. Interviews that would be referred to in the later part of the paper are interviews conducted between April and May of 2015 in Kano, Kaduna and Zaria of 159 Muslims. The title is *Religious Fundamentalism in Northern Nigeria: An Examination of the Impact of Maududi’s Political Interpretation of Islam on the Rise of Religious Conflicts in Kano and Kaduna States, Northern Nigeria and Its Effect on Christian-Muslim Relations.*
general consensus that Kanem Bornu Empire is the first to be Islamized (Alaon.d., 6; Yusuf 2007, 238). Kane is reported to suggest A. D. 666-67 for the arrival of Islam to Chad region by a small group of Muslims under the leadership of Uqbah bin Nafi. The Kings of Kanem Bornu only received Islam around the 11th Century (Sanusi 2007, 179). Islam reigned there for centuries until the British colonized northern Nigeria (Yusuf 2007, 238; Alaon.d., 6).

The second critical phase in the spread of Islam in northern Nigeria and beyond is the UsmanDanfodio jihad of the 19th Century that established the Sokoto Caliphate, despite the fact that Islam has been in Hausa land since the 15th Century, especially in Kano (Yusuf 2007, 238; Hunwick 1992, 145). This jihad, within 50 years, swept the entire Hausa land and extended to former Bornu provinces, the Jukun and Nupe land as far as Oyo Empire in western Nigeria (Falola and Heaton 2008, 61, 65; Fwatshak 2006, 261-262, Schacht 1957, 123-129). In spite of the fact that Kalu (2004) reported that nine jihads occurred before the 19th Century, most scholars agree that it is the Danfodio jihad that accounted for the spread of Islam in Nigeria (Yusuf 2007, 239; Christelow 2002, 187) until colonialists introduced indirect rule.

Falola suggests that resource mobilization is behind the adoption of indirect rule by colonialists (1998, 27). Turaki in his works of 1993, 1999, 2010 severally argues the impact of indirect rule on Muslim and non-Muslim relations in northern Nigeria. Turaki concluded that “contemporary Christian-Muslim relations in Northern Nigeria are rooted in the bitter enmity that existed between Muslims and non-Muslims because of the dehumanising effects of colonialism and slavery” (2010, 168).

Without question, colonial legacy contributed to the enmity between Muslims and non-Muslims. However, the argument here is that the emergence of new Islamic sects introduced changes in the Islamic movement in northern Nigeria. These new sects began to interpret Islam in their own way. As shall be seen, Maududi contributed to this reinterpretation of Islam.

5 Sects emerge predominantly due to differences in theological interpretation.
The preceding makes this paper stress the inadequacy of ethnicity, poverty, illiteracy, media or politics (Ibrahim 1987, 68-69, 76-81) as exclusive or main causes of religious conflicts or fundamentalism in northern Nigeria. Clarke rightly argues that it will be “misleading, nevertheless, to interpret all recent fundamentalism in Nigeria, or for that matter all recent outbreaks of religious controversy and violence, in this way” (1988, 525). One agrees with Coulon that the religious re-composition we are seeing in Nigeria today is not a mechanical response to political and economic crises (cited in Ibrahim 1991, 115).

Elaigwu and Galadima also discredit the quest for Shari’a implementation in northern Nigeria as a factor causing religious conflicts because Shari’a has always existed in northern Nigeria. It is the nature and mode of Shari’a implementation that is the issue (2003, 144). This alludes to the influence of theological interpretation or ideology. To buttress the claim for theological influence further, there is a need to look at the changing phases of Islam in northern Nigeria.

The Changing Phases of Islam in Northern Nigeria
Bala postulates three changing phases of Islam in northern Nigeria. These phases are the UsmanDanfodio jihad of 1804, the struggles between QadiriyyaSufi order and the newly introduced Tijjaniyyaorder of 1825-1960, and the period that witnessed the introduction of Izala movement and the unified Qadiriyya and Tijjaniyyasufi orders of 1979 (2006, 82). The first phase between 1804 and later part of 19th Century was consolidation period and intellectual awareness characterized by preaching, teaching, and writing of literature. The second phase was the period of struggle for supremacy between the two main sects of Qadiriyya and Tijjaniya. The third phase was the period heralding the emergence of several groups laying claim to superiority over the other, a period described as witnessing serious transformation among Muslim intellectual class (Bala 2006, 83-85). This period has persisted until this day.

This period also coincides with the period Clarke says Muslims in Nigeria, due to internal and external religious, political and economic developments, were roused to be conspicuously involved
in national and international politics. The period also saw the arrival of missionaries from Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, which according to him forged closer ties with “co-religionists” in Asia, Middle East and North Africa. It is also the period that saw more Nigerian Muslim students trained in Islamic universities such as Al-Azhar of Cairo (Clarke 1988, 532).

Consequently, the mid-1970s saw an upsurge in Islamic fundamentalism intolerant of non-Muslims. This dimension of fanaticism and intolerance found expression in dramatic ways through the activities of Maitatsine, Izala and Muslim Student Society (MSS) movements (Ibrahim 1987, 70). Led by a mixture of modern educated contemporary class of intellectuals and orthodox Muslim clerics (Sanusi 2007, 177), Islamic movements in Nigeria accepted jihad and martyrdom as crucial to the establishment of a true Islamic state (Ousman 2004, 77). This concept is of Maududian inspiration as we shall see below which was imbibed by university students. It will later spread into the northern Nigerian society and is linked to the emergence of Boko Haram.

**Maududi and His Philosophy**

AbulAla Maududi was a Pakistani Islamic scholar of Indian origin, who moved to Pakistan after the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, where he assumed the political role of the main advocate for an Islamic state. Maududi was born in 1903 and died in 1979. He was born in Awrangabad of Hyderabad, a state in present day India, and into a strong Muslim family. He wrote over 120 works reflecting various aspects of Islam.

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6 This coincides with the spread of Maududi’s ideology, which says you can’t be a true Muslim and remain indifferent to political, cultural, social, economic and international politics.

7 For a more detailed biography of Maududi consult *Encyclopedia of World Biography* on Abu-I’laMawdudi, *Encyclopedia of the Middle East* on Mawdudi, Nasr (1995), Rahman and Ali (2012, 233), Armajani (2012, 164-164), Adams (1983, 100-111) and Nasr (1996, 9-26). The following website also provided the timelines in Maududi’s biography: [http://aamaududifsl.blogspot.com/2010/01/biography-of-abul-aala-maududi-rahi-of.html](http://aamaududifsl.blogspot.com/2010/01/biography-of-abul-aala-maududi-rahi-of.html)
Maududi is acclaimed as one of the foundation stones of the 20th–century Islamic resurgence and most read Muslim writer of his time. Islamic scholars credit Maududi with the development of political interpretation of Islam. Nasr states that the essence of Maududi’s message is distinct from “the teaching and worldview of traditional Islam within the debate in which his vision took shape” (1996, 6). He argues, as did Zakaria (2010, 721), that Maududi is the first Islamic thinker to develop a “systematic political reading of Islam and a plan for social action to realize his vision” (1996, 3). Ayoob adds that “Maududi is the most seminal thinker of all the ideologues of the Islamist movement. His approach to Islam was quintessentially political” (2008, 66). Cheema credits Maududi with making the creation of an Islamic state a religious duty to struggle for just like other religious obligations (2013, 52). Qutb and others only interpreted this concept further.

A detailed discussion on Maududi’s influence on Qutb is not possible here. However, reference to two works will suffice. Rahman and Ali, in their content analysis of Maududi’s ideas in Qutb’s works, concluded that Maududi’s Islamic thoughts were a paramount influence on Qutb, and his joining of Ikhwan in 1951 was a significant moment in his Islamic activism (2012, 235; cf Calvert 2010, 157-158).

Woktorowicz corroborates Rahman and Ali with this copious quote, which says:

Maududi’s importance for the Egyptian stream is his impact on Sayyid Qutb, often seen as the godfather of revolutionary Sunni Islam (he was executed by Nasser in 1966). Qutb read Maududi’s most influential works, including Jihad in Islam, Islam and Jahiliyya, and Principles of Islamic Government, which were translated into Arabic beginning in the 1950s. A more direct connection existed through one of Maududi’s most important protégés, Abdul Hasan Ali Nadvi, who was a central figure in transmitting his mentor’s theories to the Arab world. In 1950, Nadvi wrote What Did the World Lose Due to the Decline of Islam?, a book
published in Arabic that expounded on Mawdudi’s theory of modern jahiliyya. When he first travelled to the Middle East in 1951, Nadvi met with Qutb, who had already read his book. Both Mawdudi and Nadvi are quoted at length in Qutb’s *In the Shade of the Qu’ran*, published in 1953 (2005, 78-79; cf Sivan 1985, 23).

Furthermore, in the editor’s comment to Maududi’s book of 1960, the renowned Islamic scholar Khurshid Ahmad says it is no exaggeration to say that by the time of his death, Maududi “had become the most widely read Muslim author of our time, contributing immensely to the contemporary resurgence of Islamic ideas, feelings and activity all over the world” (Maududi 1960, 13; cfRahman and Ali 2012, 235; Adams 1983, 99). Zakaria affirms that Maududi is arguably the one who gave a modern meaning to *Umma* as one that is separate and distinct from a secular-national community (2010, 721), and universal in nature (Ayoob 2008, 67). Ayubi seems to agree when he argues that nowhere in the Qur’an or subsequent writing of Muslim authors is *umma* given unequivocally religious connotation (1991, 3), and so “the main Qur’anic concept of the *body politic* (*umma*)... is not necessarily a religious one” (1991, 91 italics original).

In fact, Wood argues that Maududi established “a religiopolitical idiom for Islamic fundamentalism” (2011, 174). This is in line with Nasr’s claim that it is Maududi’s “creation of a coherent Islamic ideology, articulated in terms of the elaborate organization of an Islamic state” that provided the essential breakthrough leading to the rise of contemporary revivalism (1996, 3). Indeed, Ayubi acknowledges that “one of the most important contemporary sources for the doctrine of political Islam” is the writings of Maududi (1991, 96). Politics is important to Maududi because he believes it is the most “legitimate vehicle for the manifestation of Islamic revelation” and the sole means for the expression of Islamic spirituality (Ayoob 2008, 67). In his model, Wood traced the genealogy of fundamentalist ideology from Maududi through Qutb to contemporary fundamentalist discourse. He cited Nasr, in another
work, as labelling fundamentalism as Maududi’s ‘brainchild’ (2011, 174).

Nasr states that “his prolific writings have not only made him the foremost revivalist thinker of his time, but have also confirmed his place as an important force in traditional religious scholarship.” He went further to say that “Mawdudi's ideological perspective, one of the most detailed and compelling articulations of the revivalist position, has been influential in the unfolding of revivalism across the Muslim world” (1995, 49, 50). Moten affirms Maududi’s “writings have greatly contributed to the articulation of Islamic revivalist thought and has influenced Muslim thinkers and activists all over the world” (2004, 247).

Maududi also shaped ideologies and territories. He postulated ideas that provided theoretical basis for Islamization of knowledge (Moten 2004), he influenced Islamic discourse on human rights with over 40 titles (Idris 2003), and promoted Islamic renaissance fundamentalism (Ahmad 1967). Tibi recognizes Maududi as the intellectual father of Islamic fundamentalism (1998, 42) while Wood is categorical that Maududi “provided fundamentalism with its key vocabulary” (2011, 174). Khalidi (2003) and Moten (2003) expose his influence on political discourse in India and Pakistan, and Ahmad (2003) discloses how Maududi influenced discussion on Shari’a.

Maududi’s pertinent ideologies are summarized hereafter. Maududi is the advocate of the modern concept of non-separation of Islam and the state (Din waDawla) and justifies militant jihad or use of the ‘sword’ to enforce Shari’a on all mankind (1980, 7, 9, 16-18). He insists that Islam must capture all state authority and make it Islamic (1980, 19), destroy and eliminate all un-Islamic rule and establish Islamic rule (1980, 22; 1964, 64), and achieve global Islamization (1980, 5, 22; 1964, 64). Jihad is also necessary to prohibit non-Islamic way of life in an Islamic state (1980, 27-28), disallow un-Islamic religious propagation and make conversion from Islam impossible (1981, 32, 73), and enforce the exit of non-Muslims from the Islamic state who refuse to embrace Islam (1981, 80-81) because multi-religious co-existence is not allowed in an Islamic state (1981, 72-73).
The Presence of Maududi’s Ideology in Northern Nigeria
In a research carried out in Kano and Kaduna States, some of these ideologies were variedly expressed by several interviewees in the three cities mentioned in footnote 4 above. For example, 110 out of 159 interviewees believe that various forms of jihad are necessary in modern northern Nigeria and 138 interviewees accept that jihad of different forms is obligatory to all Muslims just as Maududi espoused. 84 interviewees agree that jihad is an instrument to remove un-Islamic governments which again agrees with Maududi’s position on jihad stated above, while 75 interviewees agree that jihad and Islamic state is a solution to all Muslim problems.

Maududian Influence on Religious Conflicts and Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria
Ahmad states that Egypt was actually the first country where Maududi’s writings initiated new waves of thought within Islamic circles, then Sudan in 1952 and the following countries: Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya as well as elsewhere (2003, 533 italics mine). This clearly affirms Maududi’s influence in Nigeria and below is the argument of how he shaped fundamentalism in northern Nigeria.

The Sudan and Muslim Student Society (MSS) Connection
In synthesizing how Maududi influenced fundamentalism in northern Nigeria, it is pertinent to echo Esposito who says that al-Banna, Qutb’s Muslim Brotherhood and Maududi’s Jama’at-i-Islami “are indeed the trailblazers or architects of contemporary Islamic revivalism, men whose ideas and methods have been studied and emulated from Sudan to Indonesia” (1999, 129). Jami’u also drew our attention to the fact that the major external influence on Muslim Student Society (MSS) in northern Nigeria which propelled its growth to embrace Islamic resurgence are the “Ikhwan al-Muslimun” (Muslim Brotherhood) of Egypt, the Jama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan, the Wahabbi views in Saudi Arabia and Islamic revolution of Iran” (2012, 294). Evidence is provided below that these groups are all carriers of Maududi’s ideology. This is to support the argument that Qutb and Muslim brotherhood, Khomeini and Saudi Arabia provide an indirect Maudidian influence in northern Nigeria.
Jackson (2011, 2) reveals that Khomeini found Maududi’s theodemocracy fitting for Shi’a political thought and translated his works into Farsi. Jenkins (2008) in his article affirmed that Khomeini met Maududi as early as 1963, which led to the translation of Maududi’s works into Farsi and subsequently laced his revolutionary rhetoric from Maududi’s writings. The New World Encyclopedia exposes the influence of Maududi on Saudi Arabian state and universities. It reported that Maududi was on the academic council of the University in Medina from 1962 and a member of the Foundation of the Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami (The Muslim World League) in Mecca. This is the same movement Jami’u reports of having a major influence on MSS also (2012, 297). Maududi’s influence on Qutb is already discussed above. These movements coalesced into a heavy influence on the MSS movement in northern Nigerian universities.

Sudan: the Gateway to Maududi’s Fundamentalist Ideology in Northern Nigeria

Sudan has been heavily influenced by Maududi’s ideologies since early 1950s (Osman 2003, 465). The Ikhwanof Sudan and Nigeria took his writings as a major source for the development of their agenda for Islamic social change (Ahmad 2003, 533, Falola 1998, 10). Jami’u reveals that northern Nigeria had very close ties with Mahdi movement of Sudan even during colonial times and reported the colonialists’ attempt to disconnect this close ties the Muslim communities of northern Nigeria had with the Mahdi movement of Sudan (2012, 81). Furthermore, the School of Arabic studies in Kano attended by late Abubakar Gumi (chief patron of the Izala sect) and El-Zakzaky (MSS leader and founder of Nigerian Muslim Brotherhood now known as Islamic Movement of Nigeria) had a historical relationship with Sudan. Gumi later studied in Sudan (Falola 1998,119, 122). It is, therefore, safe to say that Gumi had both the Maududian and Wahabbi influence.

As if in confirmation of Ahmad and Jami’u’s claims above, the drafters of the northern Nigeria Penal Code as early as 1958 came from Sudan and Pakistan. The later drafters of the Zamfara Shari’a Penal Code also extensively consulted with Sudan. Importantly also, it was Gumi, the Grand Khadi of northern Nigeria
then, who advised the Sardauna of Sokoto (late Ahmadu Bello) to establish the *Jama’atNasril Islam* (JNI) [Society for the Victory of Islam] (Jami’u 2012, 288) with its resemblance to Maududi’s *Jama’at-i-Islami* of Pakistan. Remember also that one major influence on Gumi was *Rabita al-Alam al-Islami* (The Muslim World League) from Saudi Arabia where Maududi was a member. It is interesting that Jami’u connects Islamic resurgence in Nigeria to the 1950s and says JNI was established for that purpose (Jami’u 2012, 288). This seems to connect northern Nigerian leaders then to Islamic fundamentalism.

**MSS and the Radicalization of Maududi’s Fundamentalist Ideology**

Maududi’s influence on fundamentalism and religious conflicts moved from the realm of ideological influence from books to militancy through the MSS in northern Nigeria. His ideologies, seen earlier, were embraced by MSS leaders and members especially the creation of Islamic state through revolution. Some of the interviewees out of the 159 Muslims interviewed agree that these ideas shaped MSS and galvanized them into action (interview with 159 Muslims, April – May, 2015). Although as seen above, Maududi’s ideas arrived in Nigeria around 1950s (Ahmad 2003, 533), interviewees believe it was the 1970s (interview with 159 Muslims, April – May, 2015). An interviewee affirmed the influence of Maududi on the MSS by saying that “being an MSS member in so many stages, we use to have series of lectures that will tell us . . . about his writings, about his principles, about his views of Islamic politics and what have you” (interview with KN71, April, 2015). Jami’u (2012, 294) also reported this influence of Maududi’s ideology on MSS students.

The 1970s is probably recognized as the arrival of Maududi’s literature to Nigeria by the interviewees because it coincided with what Ibrahim (1987, 71-74) and Clarke (1988, 524) reveal: that it was in the 1970s that a fundamentalist fervor was noticed among MSS students and so was the adoption of a more missionary and

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8 KN71 is the identity given to the 71st interviewee interviewed in Kano.
fundamentalist approach to their activities. A fact also confirmed by Jami’u (2012, 5, 294). By this period, the MSS had over 400 branches. Indeed, Ibrahim states that “since the mid-1970s a hardcore extremist leadership has risen in both MSS national leadership structure and in the centres of Islamic radicalization in the university of Zaria, Kano, and Sokoto” (1987, 73).

The MSS student embraced Maududi’s ideology of creating an Islamic state as a panacea for ameliorating Muslim problems especially religious decay and moral decadence (Jami’u 2012, 293). Ibrahim (1987, 71-74), Jamiu (2012, 301), Clarke (1988, 524) and Ousman (2004, 77) recognize the role of MSS in embracing militancy and martyrdom as the process of establishing an Islamic state. This militancy is also reflected in the fact that MSS students were accused of carrying out the first interfaith conflict of 1982 in Kano (Crisis Group 2010, 13). However, it is clearly the MSS students who sparked the conflict of 1987 in Advanced Teacher’s College, Kafanchan which snowballed across the whole northern region and became the benchmark for all subsequent interfaith conflicts.

The MSS acceptance of revolution as the pathway to achieving an Islamic state, tallied with Maududi’s ideology that an Islamic state cannot succeed without Islamic revolution (1980, 5, 9, 22; cfEnayat 2005, 102; Nasr 1996, 70; Armanjani 2012, 169-171; Jackson 2011, 146; Haddad 1983, 17-19). However, there was a split within MSS. Some preferred the path of revolution to establish an Islamic state because as El-Zakzaky said, gradual reformation is a “mere scholastic and academic romanticism” (cited in Jami’u 2012, 301-303). Under the leadership of this radical MSS leadership, the MSS within northern universities, especially Ahmadu Bello University, had several conflicts and clashes with the university authorities and government over Shari’ā issues.9

El-Zakzaky and several MSS leaders were arrested and detained by state authorities severally and eventually he and several other

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9 It is only through this research that the researcher came to understand the influence and motivation behind these conflicts and clashes with MSS students in universities and higher institutions in the late 1970s and early 1980s before they snowballed into the society as a whole in the late 1980s.
students were not permitted to graduate from Ahmadu Bello University. This dismissal and detentions made them popular among their colleagues and they gained sympathizers and followers among the youths in the society (Jami’u 2012, 303). El-Zakzaky and several others will eventually form their own movements and the revolution moved from the campus into the society with dire consequences. This also coincided with the Iranian revolution. The revolution stressed the possibility of achieving an Islamic state through revolution and gave a major push to the movement for the creation of an Islamic state through revolution. It is even safe to say that the Iranian revolution was influenced by Maududian ideology considering his influence on Khomeini seen above.

Ibrahim (1991, 123), Sanneh (2003, 240) and Sanusi (2007, 177) reveal that initially these militant reformers were a united MSS, but later split to be composed of educated middle class elements. Many of these became leaders, preachers and scholars that ignited the proliferation of preachers being presently experienced in northern Nigeria and considered as source of conflicts by majority of those interviewed. Like El-Zakzaky, they garnered followers and continued disseminating these fundamentalist ideas in the society. This seems to account for the strong presence of Maududian ideologies among interviewees.

Considering that the Boko Haram leader was once part of El-Zakzaky’s movement, it is plausible to say that Boko Haram is part of the continuing breakaway of radical groups. And we shall see below that the Maududian ideology is identified as part of Boko Haram’s philosophy. Interviewees say Boko Haram leader broke away to start preaching and that he is also an admirer of Maududi referred to as jihadist by an interviewee (focus group interview with students in Zaria, May, 2015). According to Falola (1998, 3), the anti-proselytization war, also a source of conflict (interview with

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10Kalu 2004, Alao (n.d.). Sanneh (2003, 237) and Christelow (2002, 197) all acknowledged the role of El-Zakzaky in Islamic radicalization in northern Nigeria.
159 Muslims, April-May, 2015)\(^{11}\) started with radical Islamic students in northern Nigeria. Anti-proselytization is a strong Maududian ideology (1981, 32, 73).

As seen above, fundamentalism starts with ideology and transforms into militancy. The position of Jami’u (a university don) that Shari’a can be implemented in a multi-religious Nigeria (2012, 63), a Maududian position that modern state could be efficiently run by Islamic principles (Ushama and Osmani 2006, 96), is fundamentalism awaiting future radicalization. Clarke is right that differentiating fundamentalists and moderates in northern Nigeria, when it comes to the issue of Islamic state, is difficult. Both groups will love to see Nigeria become an Islamic state (1988, 532). This position is virtually taken by all the 159 interviewees. Ayubi is spot on that “the now widely held opinion among Muslims that Islam is both ‘a religion and a State’ (Din waDawla) is a measure of the extraordinary intellectual influence of the modern fundamentalist thesis on mainstream Muslim opinion” (1991, 3).

The Boko Haram Movement

Opinions have been expressed that Boko Haram has links with the 1980 Maitatsine uprising in Kano (Adesoji 2010, 2011; Pham 2012, 1; Isichei 1987). This is probably because both their beliefs are not held by majority of Nigerian Muslims (Pham 2012, 1-2). However, it is tenable to say that there are diverse opinions about the origin of the group (Olojo 2013, 2-3; Mohammed 2010, 40), and the group is continuously evolving (Mohammed 2014, 10).

The name Boko Haram is a populist one given to the group by people or as profiled by the media (Mohammed 2010, 27). The actual name of the group is Jama’atAhl us-Sunnahlî’d-Da’wahwa’lJihad, which in English means The Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Struggle (Murtada 2012, 3). There is another version not commonly reported, which is “Ahl as-Sunnahwa’l-Jama’ahalaMinhaj as-Salaf, which means People of the Way of

\(^{11}\)The idea that proselytization is a source conflict is expressed by majority of interviewees interviewed in Kano, Kaduna and Zaria between April and May, 2015.
the Prophet Muhammad and the Community” (Mohammed 2010, 27).

The term “Boko Haram” is a coinage combining Hausa and Arabic. Boko being a Hausa term for western education to which haram, Arabic term for forbidden, is attached. This can be translated to mean western education is forbidden. Murtada provides a more expanded explanation of the term BokoHaram (2012, 4).

There is a sense in which the argument for Maitatsine link to Boko Haram appears persuasive. This is because both groups attacked established Muslim order. There is an external dimension to them. Both use marginalized groups, perpetrate intra-Islamic conflicts and receive alleged government support (Alaond. 16) as some governors and political elites are accused of providing financial support to them. However, major differences exist that raise questions to this link. Maitatsine group advocated the use of mystical powers and charms, but the leader of BokoHaram in an interview states that Allah condemns sihiri (magic) (Mohammed 2010, 104). Mohammed Marwa, the Maitatsine leader, claimed divine revelation that supersedes that of the prophet (Alaond. 16), but Boko Haram acknowledges that only Muhammad had divine revelation and must be followed.

Boko Haram is considered a political organization in contrast to Maitatsine group. In his abstract, de Montclos argues that Boko Haram “is political because it contests Western values, challenges the secularity of the Nigerian state, and reveals the corruption of a ‘democracy’ that relies on a predatory ruling elite, the so-called ‘godfathers’” (2014, 135, 136). MSS students have also expressed similar concern in their quest for an Islamic revolution mentioned above. Moreover, Clarke believes that Maitatsine group is not fundamentalist or a product of Muslims (1988, 525). In fact, Ibrahim discloses that Maitatsine group is considered un-Islamic by Muslim scholars as well (1987, 72). One does not know of any such indictment against Boko Haram other than extremism.

Some argue that Boko Haram is more connected to Al-Qaeda (Crisis Group 2010, 19); however, there is no conclusive evidence to

12 This philosophy again reflects Maududian ideology.
that effect. Their link to Salafi\textsuperscript{13} philosophy through the Muslim Brotherhood of El-Zakzaky by Murtada appears more convincing. Murtada links the founder of Boko Haram, Muhammad Yusuf, to El-Zakzaky’s Muslim Brotherhood. It is seen above how El-Zakzaky was influenced by Maududian ideology while in the university. Murtada discloses that it is when the group fractured that Muhammad Yusuf became one of the leaders of a fractured group. This agrees with the ‘split theory’ mentioned above. Muhammad Yusuf then went into association with the Izala group. This group also split and Yusuf went with his group and some students until they independently formed Jama’atAhl us-Sunnah’l-Da’wah’lJihad now known as Boko Haram (Murtada 2012, 5-6). This possibly accounts for the strong presence of Maududian ideology in Boko Haram.

**Boko Haram Militancy Reflects Maududian Ideology**

A close examination of the philosophy and ideology of the group seems to reveal a marriage of both traditional and contemporary Salafi ideology of IbnTaymiyyah and Maududi respectively. Onuoha also acknowledges this Salafi connection (2014, 158-191). The original name of the group appears to be rooted in the exegesis of Taymiyyah on theAhl as-Sunnah wa al-Jama ’ah (The People of the Sunna and the community). According to IbnTaymiyyah, these are the people the prophet predicted will be one of the seventy three Islamic divisions that will arise after him. They are called Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jama ’ah because they are the ones who will be saved. The reason is because they have no leader except the prophet and they only obey him in accordance with sura 53:3 since, as the verse says, Muhammad does not say anything out of his own desire. This group, he says, will be a small minority. He sums up that “it is clear from this that the people who will be saved are the people of hadith and Sunna, who do not have any leader other than the Prophet” (IbnTaymiyyah 2000, 548-551). This probably suggests the

\textsuperscript{13} The Salafi philosophy advocates a return to a sharia minded orthodoxy that purifies Islam from unwarranted accretion which relies only on the Qur’an and Hadith.
group’s abhorrence to traditional Islamic leadership and resistance to main line traditional Islam.

The rejection of secularism and demand for implementation of Shari’asome also trace back to IbnTaymiyyah (Mohammed 2014, 14). The elevation of jihad above other religious obligations like Hajj, Umrah, Salat and fasting is also connected to his writing. Taymiyyah argues that scholars agreed that jihad “is better than hajj and ’umrah, and better than supererogatory salah and fasting, as found in the Qur'an and the Sunna. The Prophet, to quote a few Ahadith, said, “The important thing is Islam (submission); its pillar is salah on which it stands, and jihadis its pinnacle”” (2000, 540-542). This probably suggests why the group considers jihad the ultimate path to its objectives.

On the other hand, the rejection of anything considered saturated with western values, western secularism or civilization, as Onuoha reported a clarification by an interim leader of the group in 2009 (2014, 160), is apparently from a different source than Taymiyyah. The agitation for contemporary Islamic state through the use of jihad is not from him as well even if one argues the jihad link to him. These ideologies do exhibit a Maududian influence.

As Nasr argues earlier, Maududi is the first Islamic thinker to develop a “systematic political reading of Islam and a plan for social action to realize his vision” (1996, 3). Scholars also agree he introduced the modern concept of Islamic state as seen above.Maududi also introduced the modern concept of din wadawla(The unity of religion and state), and the fulfillment of religious dictates demand the organization of a political system as per criteria of religion. It is, therefore, a religious duty to struggle for an Islamic state just like other religious obligations (Cheema 2013, 52). Nasr’s earlier argument is also pertinent that Maududi’s “creation of a coherent Islamic ideology, articulated in terms of the elaborate organization of an Islamic state, constitutes the essential breakthrough that led to the rise of contemporary revivalism” (1996, 3).

Thus, the marriage of religion and politics, as we see with Boko Haram, suggests a link to Maududi rather than IbnTaymiyyah.

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14Maududi holds a similar view.
Maududi adamantly insists that “separation of religion from politics had no place in Islam” (Nasr 1996, 39), “making politics sacred was a religious obligation” (Nasr 1996, 81), and “Islamization of politics would have to be implemented, even through coercion” (Nasr 1996, 82). Taymiyyah’s position suggests that politics and religion are interdependent and not inseparable (2000, 506).

The use of jihad to establish Islamic states is Maududi’s ideology (Khalidi 2003, 417), and, therefore, its means of coercion. Maududi states that the aim of jihadis “to eliminate the rule of an un-Islamic system and establish in its stead an Islamic system of state rule” (1980, 22). Islam has no choice but to capture state Authority (1980, 19). The quest by Boko Haram and several Muslims across northern Nigeria to establish an Islamic state through the use of jihad, which employs coercion, has Maududian resonation.

Furthermore, Maududi, unlike Taymiyyah, enjoins jihad against Muslim leaders who are considered un-Islamic. He states that “it is incumbent upon members of the party of Islam to carry out a revolution in the state system of the countries to which they belong” (1980, 22). Boko Haram seems to be employing this philosophy by attacking fellow Muslims and leaders considered compromisers.15

Contrary to the foregoing, IbnTaymiyyah cautions against rebellion (2000, 511), and says God enjoins obedience to authority (Amir) “even if he is a black slave,” and “even if he be a black African with (hair on the) head like raisins” (2000, 514). The only exception is if the ruler asks you to do something sinful (2000, 510). Obedience to the ruler is as incumbent as obedience to the pillars of Islam such as prayers, fasting, Zakat16 and pilgrimage (2000, 510). It is the establishment of an Islamic state that Maududi makes obligatory as the pillars of Islam, even if it means uprooting existing leaders who are Muslims (Cheema 2013, 52).

15 There are assertions that Boko Haram has killed more Muslims than Christians, but no official statistics exist to support this assertion.

16 Some refer to Zakat as alms giving, religious tax or obligation. It is an obligatory payment made annually under Islamic law on certain kinds of property or funds held by a Muslim for a period of one year. It is similar to Christian tithe. It is used for charitable and religious purposes.
Furthermore, Taymiyyah says the most heinous treachery is against the ruler (2000, 512) because as the prophet said, “one who rises up against the ruler (sultan), even to the span of a hand, and dies in that state dies the death of the days of ignorance” (2000, 513). Significantly, the ruler is so crucial that he is the shadow of God on earth and as “the saying goes that sixty years under an unjust ruler is better than one night without a ruler” (2000, 503). Maududi, Boko Haram and several fundamentalists reject this position.

Additionally, scholars have traced the anti-western rhetoric of extremist Islamic groups to Maududi. Jan argues that Maududi saw the threat to Islam as the western thought (2003, 503). Among the five principles that Demant says Maududi developed is anti-Westernism (2006, 98). There is consensus that Maududi had a deep seated suspicion of westernization (Nasr 1996, 20; Khalidi 2003, 417; Moten 2003, 396). And in his 1934 essay as discussed by Wood, Maududi “laments the corrupting influences of secular Western education on Muslim youth. Corrupted secularist Muslims, Mawdudi avers, reconfigure Islam along —Christian lines” (2011, 183). Boko Haram’s dislike for Christians rhymes with Maududian position.

In a reported interview after his capture, the Boko Haram leader was asked why he uses technological gadgets and his response was “they are purely technological things not boko . . . and westernization is different” (Mohammed 2010, 105). This resembles what Nasr says about Maududi that he accepts modernity, but rejects westernization (1996, 50-51), and reiterates that “Maududi wanted to also Islamize modernity” (1996, 53). Cheema concurs that fundamentalists accept modernity, but reject Westernization (2013, 55). The similarity becomes more apparent in the demands by Boko Haram for Christians to leave the north. As seen above, Maududi advocates that non-Muslims should leave the Islamic state if they refuse to accept Islam.

Indeed, almost half of 159 interviewees agree that non-Muslims should leave an Islamic state if they are unwilling to comply with Shari’a. This is an example of the growing influence of Maududian philosophy even among main line Muslims in northern Nigeria. Although the interviews reveal a strong presence of Sunni Muslims averse to fundamentalist ideology, such as that of Maududi, it
reflects the growing influence of Maududian ideology, not only within *Boko Haram*, but among mainline Muslims.

Indeed, fundamentalist Islam, as Maududi’s writings expose, is also opposed to proselytization. And as evident in most religious conflicts since the 1980s in northern Nigeria, Christians and non-Muslims have been accused of trying to proselytize Muslims and are attacked. Maududi’s interpretation of how non-Muslims should be treated in an Islamic state (1980, 27-28) appears implemented in attacks against Christians and non-Muslims even before the 12 states in northern Nigeria implemented *Shari’a* law in the 2000s (Murtada 2012, 5; Mohammed 2014, 22). The anti-proselytization war started with radical Islamic students as discussed above, and also as reiterated by Falola (1998, 3). The above, therefore, makes it clear that religious conflicts and *Boko Haram* in northern Nigeria are strongly influenced by Maududian theological interpretation of Islam.

**Conclusion**

This paper has clearly established the link between theology or theological interpretation and Islamic fundamentalism or religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. Specifically, it has shown how Maududi’s political interpretation of Islam radicalized university students and how these students moved into the society and established fundamentalist groups such as *Boko Haram*. Although the paper did not deny the contribution of socio-economic and socio-political factors or even the role of colonialism in fostering Muslim and non-Muslim tensions and conflicts, it has shown that the factors influencing religious or interreligious conflicts and fundamentalism like that of *Boko Haram* are beyond the often harped on socio-economic and socio-political factors.

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