Auditing Hamiltonian Elections

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Abstract. Presidential primaries are a critical part of the United States Presidential electoral process, since they are used to select the candidates in the Presidential election. While methods differ by state and party, many primaries involve proportional delegate allocation using the so-called Hamilton method. In this paper we show how to conduct risk-limiting audits for delegate allocation elections using variants of the Hamilton method where the viability of candidates is determined either by a plurality vote or using instant runoff voting. Experiments on real-world elections show that we can audit primary elections to high confidence (small risk limits) usually at low cost.

1 Introduction

Presidential primary elections are a critical part of the United States electoral process, since they are used to select the final candidates contesting the Presidential election for each of the major parties. For that reason it is important that the result of these primaries be trustworthy. While the method used for primary elections differs by party and state, the majority of such elections use delegate allocation by proportional representation, the so-called Hamilton method, named after its inventor, Alexander Hamilton.

Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) require a durable, trustworthy record of the votes, typically paper ballots marked by hand, kept demonstrably secure. RLAs end in one of two ways: either they produce strong evidence that the reported winners really won, or they result in a full manual tabulation of the paper records. If a RLA leads to a full manual tabulation, the outcome of the tabulation replaces the original reported outcome if they differ, thus correcting the reported outcome (if the paper trail is trustworthy). The probability that a RLA fails to correct a reported outcome that is incorrect before that outcome becomes official is bounded by a “risk limit.” An RLA with a risk limit of 1%, for example, has at
most a 1% chance of failing to correct a reported election outcome that is wrong; equivalently, it has at least a 99% chance of correcting the reported outcome if it is wrong. RLAs are becoming the de-facto standard for post-election audits. They are required by statute in Colorado, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Virginia,\(^7\) for some government elections (not primaries which are party elections), and have been piloted in over a dozen US states and Denmark. They are recommended by the US National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine and endorsed by the American Statistical Association. Risk-limiting audits of limited scope have begun to be applied to US primary elections; our methods here would allow RLAs of the full elections.

In this paper we describe the first method that we are aware of for conducting an RLA for delegate allocation by proportional representation elections, which we call Hamiltonian elections. In addition to primary elections in some states in the USA, this type of election is used in Russia, Ukraine, Tunisia, Taiwan, Namibia and Hong Kong. We do so by adapting auditing methods designed for plurality and instant runoff voting (IRV) elections for auditing the viability of candidates, and generating a new kind of audit for proportional allocation.

A delegate allocation election by proportional representation is a complex form of election. Rather than simply electing candidates, the result of the election is to assign some number of delegates to some of the candidates. In the first stage of the election, the process determines the subset of candidates that are eligible or viable (for Democratic primaries, candidates need to receive at least 15% of the vote). In the second step, delegates are awarded to these viable candidates in approximate proportion to their vote. An RLA must determine the correctness of both the set of viable candidates and the number of delegates assigned to each viable candidate.

The first stage of the election uses either simple plurality voting, where each ballot is a vote for at most one candidate, or IRV, where each ballot is a ranking of some or all candidates. In IRV, candidates with the fewest first-choice ranks are eliminated and each ballot that ranked them first is reassigned to the next most-preferred ranked candidate on that ballot.

There is considerable work on both comparison audits and ballot-polling audits for plurality elections [6,11], but few for more complex election types. Sarwate et al. [8] consider IRV and some other preferential elections. Kroll et al. [5] show how to audit the overall US electoral college outcome, but not the allocation of individual delegates. Stark and Teague [12] devise audits for the D’Hondt method for proportional representation, which is related to but distinct from Hamiltonian methods. Blom et al. [2,3] describe efficient audits for IRV. As far as we know, there is no other auditing method for Hamiltonian Elections, nor any that combines a proportional representation method with IRV.

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\(^7\) Virginia’s audit does not take place until after the outcome is certified, so it cannot limit the risk that an incorrect reported outcome will become final: technically, it is not a RLA.
Candidate | Votes | Proportion
---|---|---
Ann | 57,532 | 76.1%
Bob | 15,630 | 20.6%
Cal | 1,600 | 2.1%
Dee | 846 | 1.1%
Total Votes | 75,608 | 100.0%

Candidate | Votes | Proportion
---|---|---
Ann | 57,532 | 78.6%
Bob | 15,630 | 21.4%
Qualified Votes | 73,162 | 100.0%

Fig. 1. (a) Votes and (b) Qualified Votes in a Hamiltonian election with plurality-based exclusion.

2 Hamiltonian Elections

We have a set of \( n \) candidates \( C \), a set of cast ballots \( B \), and a number of delegates \( D \) to be awarded to the candidates based on the votes. The Hamilton or largest remainder method, invented by Alexander Hamilton in 1792, allocates the delegates in approximate proportion to the votes the candidates received.

In a pure Hamiltonian election, also known as the Hamilton method, delegates are directly allocated based on the proportion of the vote. But most delegate elections use some form of exclusion of some candidates before the delegates are apportioned.

A Hamiltonian election with exclusion first determines which candidates in \( C \) are viable—eligible to be awarded one or more delegates. Typically, exclusion involves a plurality vote. Each ballot is a vote for at most one candidate. If a candidate receives a threshold proportion \( \tau \) of the valid votes, the candidate is considered viable.\(^9\) The votes cast for viable candidates are referred to as qualified votes. The qualified votes are used to allocate delegates, as described later in this section.

Example 1. Consider an example Hamiltonian election with exclusion with 4 candidates, Ann, Bob, Cal, and Dee and a viability threshold of \( \tau = 15\% \). Figure 1(a) shows the tally of votes for each candidate, and the percentage of the overall vote that each candidate received. Ann and Bob received more than 15\% of the vote and are viable candidates.

For elections with many candidates, a plurality exclusion might eliminate all of them. In an instant-runoff Hamiltonian election the viable candidates are determined by a form of IRV. Each ballot is now a partial ranking of the candidates, and the viable candidates are determined as follows:

1. Initialize the set of candidates. Each ballot is put in the pile for the candidate ranked highest on that ballot.

\(^8\) We do not distinguish between ballots and ballot cards; in general, ballots consist of one or more cards, of which at most one contains any given contest.

\(^9\) There are more complicated alternate rules for the case where no candidate reaches \( \tau \); we do not consider this case here.
2. If every (remaining) candidate has $\geq \tau$ of the votes in their pile, we finish the candidate selection process. All of these remaining candidates are viable.

3. Otherwise, the candidate with the lowest tally (fewest ballots in their pile) is eliminated, and each of their ballots is moved to the pile of the next ranked remaining candidate on the ballot. A ballot is exhausted if all further candidates mentioned on the ballot have already been eliminated.

4. We then return to step 2.

Example 2. Consider an instant-runoff Hamiltonian election with the same four candidates as Example 1, the same threshold, and 50,000 ballots with ranking $[A,D,C,B]$ (that is, Ann followed by Dee, then Cal, then Bob), 9,630 of $[B,C]$, 6,000 of $[C,B]$, 1,600 of $[C]$, 7,532 of $[D,A,C]$, and 846 of $[D,C]$. The IRV election proceeds as follows. In the first round Cal has the lowest tally, 7,600 votes, which is 10.052% of the total vote, and hence less than 15%. Cal is eliminated: the 6,000 ballots $[C,B]$ are transferred to Bob, and the 1,600 ballots $[C]$ are exhausted (removed from consideration). In the next round Dee has the lowest tally, 8,378 votes which is 11.080%, so Dee is eliminated. The 7,632 $[D,A,C]$ ballots are transferred to Ann, and the remaining 836 $[D,C]$ ballots are exhausted. In the final round, Bob has the lowest tally, 20.672% of the vote, and the process ends since this is greater than 15%. The election is summarized in Figure 2.

| Cand. | Round 1 | Round 2 | Final Result |
|-------|---------|---------|--------------|
|       | Ballot Number | Prop. | Ballot Number | Prop. | Ballot Number | Prop. |
| Ann   | $[A,D,C,B]$ | 50,000 | 66.1% | $[A,D,C,B]$ | 50,000 | 66.1% | $[A,D,C,B]$ | 50,000 | 66.1% |
|       | $[B,C]$ | 9,630 | 12.7% | $[B,C]$ | 9,630 | — | $[B,C]$ | 9,630 | — |
| Bob   |         | — | — |         | — | — |         | — | — |
| Cal   | $[C,B]$ | 6,000 | — | $[C,B]$ | 6,000 | 20.7% | $[C,B]$ | 6,000 | 20.7% |
|       | $[C]$ | 1,600 | 10.1% | $[C]$ | — | — | $[C]$ | — | — |
| Dee   | $[D,A,C]$ | 7,532 | — | $[D,A,C]$ | 7,532 | — | $[D,A,C]$ | 7,532 | — |
|       | $[D,C]$ | 846 | 11.1% | $[D,C]$ | 846 | 11.1% | $[D,C]$ | 846 | 11.1% |
| Total | 75,608 | 100.0% | 73,738 | 98.6% | 73,162 | 96.8% |

Fig. 2. IRV election for four candidates showing the elimination of first Cal, and then Dee, and the final round results.

The second stage in the process is to assign delegates to candidates on the basis of their tallies. We first compute, for each viable candidate $c$, the proportion of the qualified votes in their tally, $p_c$. Recall that we refer to ballots belonging to viable candidates as qualified votes. We denote the number of qualified votes as $Q$. In the context of IRV, ballots are qualified if they end up in the tally of a viable candidate. Non-qualified ballots result from exhaustion: every candidate in the ballot ranking has been eliminated (is non-viable). Where a plurality contest determines viability, all votes for a viable candidate are qualified.

We denote the set of viable candidates as $\mathcal{V}$. Delegates are awarded to viable candidates as follows:
1. We compute for each viable candidate \( c \) their delegate quota, \( q_c = D \times p_c \), where \( p_c \) is the proportion of the qualified vote given to \( c \) (their final tally divided by \( Q \)).

2. We assign \( i_c = \lfloor q_c \rfloor \) delegates to each candidate \( c \in V \).

3. At this stage, there are \( r = D - \sum_{c \in V} i_c \) remaining delegates to assign. We assign these delegates to the \( r \) candidates with the largest value of the remainder \( q_c - i_c \). One delegate is given to each of these \( r \) candidates.

4. At this stage, each viable candidate \( c \) has received \( a_c \), where \( a_c \) is \( q_c \) rounded either up or down.

Example 3. The end result of Examples 1 and 2 is the same. The qualified vote is \( Q = 73,162 \). The proportions of the qualified vote in viable candidates' tallies are: \( p_{Ann} = 0.786 \); and \( p_{Bob} = 0.214 \). Assuming there are \( D = 5 \) delegates to allocate, we find \( q_{Ann} = 3.932 \) and \( q_{Bob} = 1.068 \). We initially allocate 3 delegates to Ann and 1 to Bob. By comparing the remainders 0.932 and 0.068, we allocate the last delegate to Ann. So \( a_{Ann} = 4 \) and \( a_{Bob} = 1 \).

3 Auditing Fundamentals

A risk-limiting audit is a statistical test of the hypothesis that the reported outcome is incorrect. (In the current context, the reported outcome is the number of delegates finally awarded to each candidate.) If that hypothesis is not rejected, there is a full hand tabulation, which reveals the true outcome. If that differs from the reported outcome, it replaces the reported outcome. The significance level of the test is called the risk limit. A risk-limiting audit of a trustworthy paper trail of votes limits the risk that an incorrect electoral outcome will go uncorrected.

Two common building blocks for audits are to compare manual interpretation of randomly selected ballots or groups of ballots with how the voting system interpreted them (a comparison audit [10]), and to use only the manual interpretation of the randomly selected ballots (a ballot-polling audit [7]). Ballot polling requires less infrastructure (some voting systems do not generate or cannot export the data required for a comparison audit) but generally requires inspecting more ballots.

Recent work [11] shows that audits of most social choice functions can be reduced to checking a set of assertions. If all the assertions are true, the reported election outcome is correct. Each assertion is checked by conducting a hypothesis test of its logical negation. To reject the hypothesis that the negation is true is to conclude that the assertion is true. Each hypothesis is tested using a statistic calculated from the audit data. Larger values of the statistic are unlikely if the corresponding assertion is false. If the statistic takes a sufficiently large value, that is statistical evidence that the assertion is true, because such a large value would be very unlikely if the assertion were false. The statistic is generally calibrated to give sequentially valid tests of the assertions, meaning that the sample of ballots can be expanded at will and the statistic can be recomputed from the
expanded sample, while controlling the probability of erroneously concluding that the assertion is true if the assertion is in fact false.

The initial sample size is generally chosen so that there is a reasonable chance that the audit will terminate without examining additional ballots if the reported results are approximately correct. If the initial sample does not give sufficiently strong evidence that all the assertions are correct, the sample is augmented and the condition is checked again. The sample continues to expand until either all the assertions have been confirmed or the sample contains every ballot, and the correct result is therefore known. At any point during the audit, the auditor can choose to conduct a full manual tabulation. If the audit leads to a full manual tabulation, the outcome of that tabulation replaces the reported outcome if they differ.

The basic assertions for Hamiltonian elections are:

**(Super/sub) majority** $p > t$, where $p$ is the proportion of ballots that satisfy some condition (usually the condition is that the ballot has a vote for a particular candidate) among ballots that meet some validity condition, and $t$ is a proportion in $(0, 1]$.

**Pairwise majority** $p_A > p_B$, where $p_A$ and $p_B$ are the proportions of ballots that meet two mutually exclusive conditions $A$ and $B$, among ballots that meet some validity condition. (Typically, among the ballots that contain a valid vote, $A$ is a ballot with a vote for one candidate, and $B$ is a ballot with a vote for a different candidate).

**Pairwise difference** $p_A > p_B + d$, where $p_A$ and $p_B$ are the proportions of ballots that meet two mutually exclusive conditions among ballots that meet some validity condition, and $d$ is a constant in the range $(-1, 1)$. This is a new form of assertion not previously used, that extends pairwise majority assertions. It is necessary for auditing delegate assignment in Hamiltonian elections.

In the SHANGRLA approach to RLAs, each assertion is transformed into a canonical form: the mean of an assorter (which assigns each ballot a nonnegative, bounded number) is greater than 1/2. The value the assorter assigns to a ballot is generally a function of the votes on that ballot and others and the voting system’s interpretation of the votes on that ballot and others.

For majority assertions, a ballot that satisfies the condition is assigned the value $1/(2t)$; a valid ballot that does not satisfy the condition is assigned the value 0; and an invalid ballot is assigned the value 1/2. For pairwise majority assertions, a ballot for class $A$ counts as 1 and a ballot for class $B$ counts as 0. Ballots that fall outside both classes count as 1/2.

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10 For sequentially valid test statistics, the sample can be augmented at will; for other methods, there may be an escalation schedule prescribing a sequence of sample sizes before conducting a full manual tabulation.

11 In other words, the hypothesis that the assertion is false has been rejected at a sufficiently small significance level.
For pairwise difference assertions, we define the assorter $g$ which assigns ballot $b$ the value:

$$g(b) \equiv \begin{cases} 
1/(1 + d), & b \text{ has a vote of class A} \\
0, & b \text{ has a vote of class B} \\
1/(2(1 + d)), & b \text{ has a valid vote in the contest that is not in A or B} \\
1/2, & b \text{ does not have a valid vote in the contest.}
\end{cases}$$

Let $\bar{g}$ be the mean of $g$ over the ballots. We have that $0 \leq g(b) \leq 1/(1 + d)$, and $\bar{g} > 1/2$ iff $p_A > p_B + d$. When $d = 0$ this reduces to the pairwise majority assorter if the “valid” category is the same.

The margin $m$ of an assertion $a$ is equal to 2 times the mean of its assorter (when applied to all ballots $B$) minus 1. An assertion with a smaller margin will be harder to audit than an assertion with a larger margin.

### 3.1 Estimating Sample Size and Risk

The sample size required to confirm an assertion depends on the sampling design and the auditing strategy (e.g., sampling individual ballots or batches of ballots, using ballot polling or comparison); the “risk-measuring function” (see [11]); and the accuracy of the tally, among other things. Because it depends on what the sample reveals, it is random.

There is some flexibility in selecting a set of assertions to confirm IRV contests [1], so the set can be chosen to minimize a measure of the anticipated workload. We will estimate the workload on the assumption that the assertion is true but the reported tallies are not exactly correct. We will use the expected sample size as a measure of workload.\(^\text{12}\)

Our auditing approach is applicable to any style of auditing. The workload, given a set of assertions, varies depending on the style of audit (e.g., ballot-level comparison, batch-level comparison, ballot-polling, or a combination of those) and the sampling design (e.g., with or without replacement, Bernoulli, stratified or not, weighted or not). For the purpose of illustration, in the examples and experiments in this paper, we assume that the audit will be a ballot-level comparison audit using sampling with replacement.

Because the sample is drawn with replacement, the same ballot can be drawn more than once. Given an assertion $a$, let $ASN(a, \alpha)$ denote the expected number of draws required to verify $a$ to risk limit $\alpha$, and if $\mathcal{A}$ is a set of assertions, let $ASN(\mathcal{A}, \alpha)$ denote the expected number of draws required to verify every assertion $a$ in $\mathcal{A}$ to risk limit $\alpha$. $ASN$ depends on several factors: the risk limit $\alpha$; the expected rate of errors (discrepancies) between paper ballots and their electronic records of various signs and magnitudes (in the context of comparison auditing); and the margins of the assertions.

\(^{12}\) One might instead seek to minimize a quantile of the sample size or some other function of the distribution of sample size, for instance, to account for fixed costs for retrieving and opening a batch of ballots and per-ballot and per-contest costs.
We estimate $ASN(A, \alpha)$ by simulation. We simulate the sampling of ballots, one at a time. An “overstatement” error is introduced with a pre-specified probability $e$. If the sample reveals one or more overstatements, the measured risk (i.e., the $P$-value of the hypothesis that the assertion is false) increases by an amount that depends on margin $m$. Otherwise, the measured risk decreases by an amount that depends on $m$. We continue to sample ballots until the measured risk falls below $\alpha$ or until every ballot has been manually reviewed, in which case the outcome based on the manual interpretations replaces the original reported results. We take the median of the number of ballots sampled over $N$ simulations as an estimate of $ASN(A, \alpha)$. Inaccuracy of this estimate affects whether the selected assertions result in the smallest expected workload, but does not affect the risk limit. For the examples and experiments in this paper, we use $e = 0.002$ (equivalent to 2 errors per 1,000 ballots), $N = 20$, and a risk limit of 5%.

4 Auditing Viability

The first stage of the election identifies the viable candidates. We introduce notation for the assertions we will use to audit viability, as follows:

- $Viable(c, E, t)$: Candidate $c$ has at least proportion $t$ of the vote after the candidates in set $E$ have been eliminated. This amounts to a simple majority assertion $p_c > t$ after candidates in $E$ are eliminated.
- $NonViable(c, E, t)$: Candidate $c$ has less than proportion $t$ of the vote after candidates $E$ have been eliminated. This amounts to a simple majority assertion $\bar{p}_c > 1 - t$ where $\bar{p}_c$ is the proportion of valid votes for candidates other than $c$ after candidates $E$ are eliminated.
- $IRV(c, c', E)$: Candidate $c$ has more votes than candidate $c'$ after candidates $E$ have been eliminated. This amounts to a pairwise majority assertion.

If the first stage is a plurality vote, $E \equiv \emptyset$: the elimination in the first stage only occurs for $IRV$.

Consider an election $E = \langle C, B, \tau \rangle$ with candidates $C$, cast ballots $B$, and viability threshold $\tau$ ($\tau = 0.15$ for the primary elections we will examine). The outcome of this election is a set of viable candidates, $V \subseteq C$, together with, in the case of instant runoff Hamiltonian elections, a sequence of eliminated candidates, $\pi$. To check that the set of candidates reported to be viable really are the viable candidates, we test assertions that rule out all other possibilities. Consider the subset $V' \subseteq C$, where $V' \neq V$. We can demonstrate that $V'$ is not the true set of viable candidates by showing that some candidate $c \in V'$ does not belong there. We can also rule out $V'$ as an outcome by showing that there is a candidate $c \notin V'$ that does in fact belong in the viable set. We aim to find the ‘least effort’ set of assertions $A$ that, if shown to hold in a risk-limiting audit, confirm that (i) each candidate in $V$ is viable, and (ii) no candidate $c' \notin V$ is viable.

\footnote{The procedure used to calculate the $ASN$ for an assertion with margin $m$ is available in the public repositories \url{https://github.com/michelleblom/primaries} and \url{https://github.com/pbstark/SHANGRLA}.}
4.1 Viability: Plurality Hamiltonian Elections

For each viable candidate $v \in V$ we need to verify the assertion $\text{Viable}(v, \emptyset, \tau)$. For each non-viable candidate $n \in C \setminus V$ we need to verify the assertion $\text{NonViable}(n, \emptyset, \tau)$. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be the union of these two sets of assertions. Note that $\mathcal{A}$ rules out any other set of viable candidates $V' \neq V$.

Example 4. To audit the first stage of the election of Example 1, we verify the assertions $\mathcal{A} = \{ \text{Viable}(\text{Ann}, \emptyset, 0.15), \text{Viable}(\text{Bob}, \emptyset, 0.15), \text{NonViable}(\text{Cal}, \emptyset, 0.15), \text{NonViable}(\text{Dee}, \emptyset, 0.15) \}$. The margins associated with these assertions are 4.073, 0.378, 0.152, and 0.163, respectively. The expected number of ballots we need to compare to the corresponding cast vote records to audit these assertions, assuming an overstatement error rate of 0.002 and a risk limit of $\alpha = 5\%$, are, respectively 1, 17, 46, and 42. The overall ASN for the audit is 46 ballots.

4.2 Viability: Instant-Runoff Hamiltonian Elections

Efficient RLAs for IRV have been devised only recently [1]. To audit the first stage of an IRV Hamiltonian election we must eliminate the possibility that a different set of candidates is viable. This means that we need to look at every other set of candidates, and propose an assertion that will show that set is not viable.

In contrast to auditing a simple IRV election, where there are $|C| - 1$ potential winners other than the reported winner, a Hamiltonian election typically has many more. Let $M = \lceil 1/\tau \rceil$ be the maximum possible number of viable candidates. The number of possible winner sets $O$ is

$$O \equiv \binom{|C|}{M} + \binom{|C|}{M-1} + \cdots + \binom{|C|}{1}.$$ 

We can show that a subset of candidates $V'$ is not the set of viable candidates in a number of ways:

- we could show that the tally of at least one $c \in V'$ does not reach the required threshold assuming all candidates not mentioned in $V'$ have been eliminated
- we could show that there is a candidate $c' \notin V'$ that is viable on the basis of their first preferences, so any potential set of viable candidates must include $c'$
- we could show that the unmentioned candidates could not have been eliminated in a sequence that would result in $V'$.

Reducing the set of subsets While there are many possible alternate winner sets $V'$, we can rule out many of these easily. We examine the assertions $\text{Viable}(w, \emptyset, \tau)$ for any candidate $w \in C$ who had more than the proportion $\tau$ of the vote initially. This assertion will be easy to verify, as long as the proportion is not too close to $\tau$. This assertion rules out any subset $V'$ where $w \notin V'$. Let $\mathcal{W}$ be the set of candidates where this assertion is expected to hold.
Next we examine the assertions $\text{NonViable}(l, C \setminus W \setminus \{l\}, \tau)$ for those candidates $l$ who are not mentioned in at least $\tau$ of the ballots, when all but the definite winners $W$ and $l$ are eliminated. In this case candidate $l$ can never reach $\tau$ proportion of the votes. Again this assertion is easy to verify as long as the proportion of such votes is not close to $\tau$. This assertion removes any subset $V'$ where $l \in V'$. Let $L$ be the set of candidates where this assertion is expected to hold.

We collect together $A = \{\text{Viable}(w, \emptyset, \tau) \mid w \in W\} \cup \{\text{NonViable}(l, C \setminus W \setminus \{l\}, \tau) \mid l \in L\}$. If these assertions hold, we only need to consider subsets of viable candidates $V = \{V' \subseteq C \mid W \subseteq V', V' \cap L = \emptyset\} \setminus \{V\}$. There are only $|V|$ subsets to further examine, where

$$|V| = \binom{|C \setminus W \setminus L|}{M - |W|} + \cdots + \binom{|C \setminus W \setminus L|}{1} - 1$$

**Selecting assertions for the remaining subsets** We now need to select a set of assertions that rule out any alternate set of viable candidates $V' \in V$. To form these assertions, we visualise the space of alternate election outcomes as a tree. We use a branch-and-bound algorithm to find a set of assertions that, if true, will prune (invalidate) all branches of this tree. At the top level of this tree is a node for each possible $V' \in V$. Each node defines an (initially empty) sequence of candidate eliminations, $\pi$, and a set of viable candidates, $V'$. These nodes form a frontier, $F$.

Our algorithm maintains a lower bound LB on the estimated auditing effort (EAE) required to invalidate all alternate election outcomes, initially setting $LB = 0$. For each node $n = (\emptyset, V')$ in $F$, we consider the set of assertions that could invalidate the outcome that it represents. Two kinds of assertion are considered at this point:

- $\text{Viable}(c', L, t)$ for each candidate $c' \in C$ that does not appear in $V'$, and whose first preference tally exceeds $t$ proportion of the vote when only candidates in $L$ are eliminated;
- $\text{NonViable}(c, C \setminus V', t)$ for each candidate $c \in V'$ whose tally, if all candidates $c' \in C \setminus V'$ have been eliminated, falls below $t$ proportion of the vote.

We assign to $n$ the assertion $a$ from this set with the smallest EAE (EAE$[n] = \text{ASN}(\{a\}, \alpha)$ where we use the method for estimating ASN previously described. If no such assertion can be formed for $n$, we give $n$ an EAE of $\infty$, EAE$[n] = \infty$. We then select the node in $F$ with the highest EAE to expand.

To expand a node $n = (\pi, V')$, we consider the set of candidates in $C$ that do not currently appear in $\pi$ or $V'$. We denote this set of ‘unmentioned’ candidates, $U$. For each candidate $c' \in U$, we form a child of $n$ in which $c'$ is appended to the front of $\pi$. For instance, the node $((c'), V')$ represents an outcome in which $c'$ is the last candidate to be eliminated, after which all remaining candidates, $c \in V'$, have at least $t = T$ proportion of the cast votes. All unmentioned candidates are assumed to have been eliminated, in some order, before $c'$. For each newly created
node, we look for an assertion that could invalidate the corresponding outcome. Two kinds of assertion are considered to rule out an outcome \( n' = ([c'|\pi'], \mathcal{V}') \):

- \( \text{Viable}(c', U \setminus \{c'\}, t) \) for each candidate \( c' \in U \) that has at least \( t \) proportion of the vote in the context where candidates \( U \setminus \{c'\} \) have been eliminated. Candidate \( c' \) thus cannot have been eliminated at this point;

- \( \text{IRV}(c', c, U \setminus \{c'\}) \) for each candidate \( c' \in U \) that has a higher tally than some candidate \( c \in \pi' \cup \mathcal{V}' \) in the context where candidates \( U \setminus \{c'\} \) have been eliminated. Candidate \( c' \) thus cannot have been eliminated at this point.

We assign to each child of \( n \) the assertion \( a \) from this set with the smallest \( \text{ASN}(\{a\}, \alpha) \), and replace \( n \) on our frontier with its children. If neither of the above two types of assertion can be created for a given child of \( n \), the child is labelled with an EAE of \( \infty \) (EAE\([n'] = \infty \)). We continue to expand nodes in this fashion until we reach a leaf node, \( l = (\pi, \mathcal{V}') \), where \( \pi \cup \mathcal{V}' = C \) (all candidates are mentioned either in the elimination sequence \( \pi \) or in the viable set \( \mathcal{V}' \)). We assign to \( l \) an invalidating assertion of the above two kinds, if possible. We consider all the nodes in the branch that \( l \) sits on, and select the node \( n_b \) associated with the least cost assertion \( a \). We add \( a \) to our set of assertions to audit \( \mathcal{A} \), prune \( n_b \) and all of its descendants from the tree, and update our lower bound on audit cost \( \text{LB} \) to \( \max(\text{LB}, \text{EAE}(a)) \). We then look at all nodes on our frontier that can be pruned with an assertion that has an EAE \( \leq \text{LB} \). We add those assertions to \( \mathcal{A} \), and prune the nodes from the frontier. The algorithm stops when the frontier is empty. If we discover a branch whose best assertion has an EAE of \( \infty \), the algorithm stops in failure—indicating that a full manual count of the election is required.

This branch-and-bound algorithm is a variation of that described by [1,4] for generating an audit specification for an IRV election. It has been altered for the context where the ultimate outcome is a set of winning candidates—the viable candidates—and not one winner, left standing after all others are eliminated.

## 5 Auditing Delegate Assignment

The Hamilton method for proportional representation is used to assign delegates to viable candidates. It might appear that auditing the Hamilton method requires checking some delicate results, for instance, whether candidate \( A \) received at least 2 delegate quotas when candidate \( A \) actually received 2.001 delegate quotas. However, this is not necessary, because candidate \( A \) can receive 2 delegates without having at least 2 delegate quotas. For example, if \( A \) receives 1.999 quotas \( A \) may still end up with 2 delegates. Our auditing method avoids checking such things.

The audit instead examines all pairs of viable candidates, including those receiving no delegates. For each pair of viable candidates \( n \) and \( m \) we check whether \( (q_n - (a_n - 1)) < 1 + (q_m - (a_m - 1)) \) which requires that the quota of \( n \) is not 1 more than the quota for \( m \), after removing all received delegates but
the last. This can be equivalently rewritten as
\[ p_m > p_n + \frac{a_m - a_n - 1}{D}, \quad n, m \in V, n \neq m. \] (1)

In the case that \( q_m \) was rounded up and \( q_n \) was rounded down, this captures that the remainder for \( m \) was greater than the remainder for \( n \): \( p_m D - (a_m - 1) > p_n D - a_n \).

We show that if the delegates are wrong with respect to the true votes, then one of these assertions is violated.

**Theorem 1.** Suppose the number of assigned delegates \( a_c \) to each viable delegate \( c \) is incorrect, then one of the assertions of Equation 1 will be violated.

**Proof.** Suppose \( a'_c \) is the true number of delegates that should have been awarded to each candidate \( c \). Since \( \sum_{c \in V} a_c = D \) and \( \sum_{c \in V} a'_c = D \), and they differ, there must be at least one candidate \( m \in V \), where \( a_m \geq a'_m + 1 \), who was awarded too many delegates, and at least one \( n \in V \), where \( a_n \leq a'_n - 1 \), who was awarded too few.

Since \( a'_m \) is the true number of delegates awarded to \( m \) we know that the (true) proportion of the vote for \( m \), \( p_m \), must be (a) \( p_m D < a'_m \leq a_m - 1 \) if \( m \) was rounded up or (b) \( p_m D < a'_m + 1 \leq a_m \) if \( m \) was rounded down. Similarly, since \( a'_n \) is the true number of delegates awarded to \( n \) we know that either (c) \( p_n D \geq a'_n - 1 \geq a_n \) if \( n \) was rounded up, or (d) \( p_n D \geq a'_n \geq a_n + 1 \) if \( n \) was rounded down.

If we add these two inequalities for combinations (a)+(c) or (b)+(d) we get \( p_m D + a_n < p_n D + a_m - 1 \). For the combination (a)+(d) we get \( p_m D + a_n + 1 < p_n D + a_m - 1 \). Any of these cause the assertion \( p_m > p_n + \frac{a_m - a_n - 1}{D} \) to be falsified. For the last case (b)+(c) we need a stricter comparison, which we obtain by comparing the remainders. Since \( m \) was rounded down and \( n \) was rounded up, we know that remainder for \( m \) was less than the remainder for \( n \), i.e., \( p_m D - a'_m < p_n D - (a'_n - 1) \). Hence \( p_m D < p_n D + a'_m - (a'_n - 1) \leq p_n D + (a_m - 1) - a_n \). Again the assertion \( p_m > p_n + \frac{a_m - a_n - 1}{D} \) is falsified. \( \square \)

**Example 5.** Consider the delegate allocation of Example 3. Recall that the proportions of the qualified vote are \( p_{\text{Ann}} = 0.7836 \) and \( p_{\text{Bob}} = 0.2136 \). We audit that \( p_{\text{Ann}} < p_{\text{Bob}} + 4/5 \) and \( p_{\text{Bob}} < p_{\text{Ann}} - 2/5 \). These facts require much less work to prove, than for example auditing that \( p_{\text{Bob}} > 1/5 \). The margins associated with the above pairwise difference assertions are 1.1 and 0.12, respectively.

Assuming an error rate of 0.002, and a risk limit of \( \alpha = 5\% \), the ASNs associated with these assertions are 5, and 59, ballots.

### 6 Experiments

We consider the set of Hamiltonian elections conducted as part of the selection process for the 2020 Democratic National Convention (DNC) presidential nominee. Most of these primaries determine candidate viability via a plurality vote.
Several states, including Wyoming and Alaska, use IRV. We estimate the number of ballots we would need to check in a comparison audit of these primaries. For each of these primaries, we audit the viability of candidates on the basis of the statewide vote, and that each viable candidate deserved the delegates that were awarded to them. We consider only the delegates that are awarded on the basis of statewide vote totals (PLEO\textsuperscript{14} and at-large) as these are readily available.\textsuperscript{15} In each proportional DNC primary, viable candidates must attain at least 15% of the total votes cast.

The full code used to generate the assertions for each DNC primary, and estimate the ASN for each audit, is located at:

\url{https://github.com/michelleblom/primaries}

Table 1 reports the expected number of ballot samples required to perform three levels of audit in each plurality and IRV-based primary conducted for the 2020 DNC.\textsuperscript{16} Level 1 checks only that the reportedly viable candidates have at least 15% of the vote, and all other candidates do not. Level 2 checks candidate viability and that each viable candidate \( c \), with \( a_c \) allocated delegates, deserved at least \( a_c - 1 \) of them. We introduce this level because, as the table shows, sometimes the complete auditing of the final delegate counts is difficult. Level 3 checks candidate viability and that each viable candidate deserved all of their allocated delegates. The assertions required to check the allocation of a candidate’s final delegate are the hardest to audit.

Of the primaries in Table 1, Maine (ME), New Hampshire (NH), Washington (WA), Texas (TX), Idaho (ID), Massachusetts (MA), California (CA), and Minnesota (MN), were considered to be close with differences of less than 10% in the statewide vote between the two leading candidates. In Maine, the difference in the statewide vote for Biden and Sanders was less than 1% of the cast vote. Auditing the Maine primary, however, is expected to require only a sample of 189 ballots. The Rhode Island (RI) primary, in contrast, requires a full manual recount. In RI, Sanders narrowly falls below the 15% threshold with 14.93% of the vote to Biden’s 76.67%. The margins that determine the complexity of these audits are the extent to which a candidates’ vote falls below or exceeds the relevant threshold, and the relative size of the remainders in candidates’ delegate quotas as a proportion of the number of delegates available.

Table 2 contrasts several of the hardest primaries of Table 1 to audit with some of the easiest. We record, for each of these primaries: the number of at-large delegates being awarded; the delegate quotas computed for each viable candidate; the difference between the decimal portion of these quotas (the remainder)

\textsuperscript{14}Party Leaders and Elected Officials
\textsuperscript{15}Data for plurality-based primaries was obtained from www.thegreenpapers.com/P20. Data for IRV-based primaries we consider was provided by the relevant state-level Democrats.
\textsuperscript{16}A small number of DNC 2020 primaries that did not use proportional allocation of delegates were not considered, in addition to those for which we could not obtain data.
Table 1. Estimated sample size required to audit viability and delegate distribution (PLEO and at-large) in all proportional (plurality or IRV-based) DNC primaries in 2020 for which data was available. Levels 1, 2, and 3 audit candidate viability, that each viable candidate deserved almost all of their allocated delegates, and that they deserved all of their delegates, respectively. An error rate of 0.002 (an expectation of 1 error per 1,000 ballots) was used in the estimation of sample sizes. The symbol ‘–’ indicates that a full recount is required. The number of candidates (|C|) and total number of cast ballots (|B|) is stated for each election.

| State | | ASN (α = 5%) | | | | State | | ASN (α = 5%) | | | |
|-------|---|---|---|---|---|-------|---|---|---|---|---|
| AL    | 15 | 452,093 | 182 | 182 | 1,352 | NC    | 16 | 1,332,382 | 350 | 350 | 808 |
| AR    | 18 | 229,122 | 121 | 121 | 1,154 | NE    | 4  | 164,582  | 925 | 925 | 925 |
| AZ    | 12 | 536,509 | 71  | 71  | 120   | NH    | 34 | 298,377  | 104 | 104 | 155 |
| CA    | 21 | 5,784,364 | 395 | 1,258 | 3,187 | 080 | | | | | |
| CO    | 13 | 960,128 | 42  | 42  | –     | NM    | 7  | 247,880  | 1,812 | 1,812 | 1,812 |
| CT    | 4  | 260,750 | 174 | 174 | 174   | NY    | 11 | 752,515  | 56  | 731 | 486,495 |
| DC    | 5  | 110,688 | 174 | 174 | 334   | OH    | 11 | 894,383  | 61  | 634 | –     |
| DE    | 3  | 91,682  | 80  | 80  | 80    | OK    | 14 | 304,281  | 649 | 649 | 649 |
| FL    | 16 | 1,739,214 | 91  | 208 | 766   | OR    | 5  | 618,711  | 111 | 111 | 191 |
| GA    | 12 | 1,086,729 | 107 | 218 | 218   | PA    | 3  | 3,159,508 | 48  | 167 | 642 |
| ID    | 1,323,509 | 143 | 143 | 143 | PR    | 11 | 7,022    | 412 | 412 | 412 |
| IL    | 12 | 1,674,133 | 44  | 140 | 620   | RI    | 7  | 103,982  | –   | –   | –   |
| IN    | 9  | 474,800  | 391 | 391 | 391   | SC    | 12 | 539,263  | 165 | 165 | 34,546 |
| KY    | 11 | 537,905  | 209 | 209 | 209   | SD    | 2  | 52,661   | 13  | 13  | 216 |
| LA    | 14 | 267,286  | 79  | 98  | 98    | TN    | 16 | 516,250  | 235 | 235 | 1,203 |
| MA    | 18 | 1,417,498 | 185 | 185 | 832   | TX    | 17 | 2,094,428 | 1,282 | 1,282 | 2,133 |
| MD    | 15 | 1,050,773 | 83  | 170 | 170   | UT    | 15 | 220,582  | 262 | 262 | 781 |
| ME    | 13 | 205,937  | 189 | 189 | 189   | VA    | 14 | 1,323,509 | 143 | 204 | 1,309 |
| MI    | 16 | 1,587,679 | 57  | 118 | –     | VT    | 17 | 158,032  | 289 | 289 | 508 |
| MN    | 16 | 744,198  | 309 | 309 | 6,195 | WA    | 15 | 1,558,776 | 103 | 127 | 617 |
| MO    | 23 | 666,112  | 44  | 130 | –     | WI    | 14 | 925,065  | 42  | 44  | 878 |
| MS    | 10 | 274,391  | –   | –   | –     | WV    | 12 | 187,482  | 213 | 213 | 213 |
| MT    | 8  | 149,973  | 5,159 | 5,159 | 5,159 |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |

| State | | ASN (α = 5%) | | | | State | | ASN (α = 5%) | | | |
|-------|---|---|---|---|---|-------|---|---|---|---|---|
| AK    | 9  | 19,811 | 88 | 88 | 88 | WY    | 9  | 15,428  | 66  | 87  | 452 |

Plurality-based Primaries

IRV-based Primaries

divided by the number of available delegates; and the estimated auditing effort (ASN) for the primary. For the first four primaries in the table, the last awarded at-large delegate is the hardest to audit.

The use of IRV for determining candidate viability does not make a Hamiltonian election more difficult to audit. While more assertions are created to audit an IRV-based primary, the difficulty of any audit is based on the cost (ballot samples required) of its most expensive assertion. Since all assertions are tested on each ballot examined, the principle cost is retrieving the correct ballot. The audit specifications generated for the Wyoming and Alaskan primaries contain 78
and 89 assertions, respectively. The number of assertions formed for a plurality-based primary is proportional to the number of candidates. NH, involving the most candidates at 34, has 48 assertions to audit.

### Table 2

| State | $D$ | Quotas | Rem. | Diff. / $D$ | ASN   |
|-------|-----|---------|------|-------------|-------|
| CA    | 90  | 50.688  | 39.312 | 0.004       | $3.2 \times 10^7$ |
| MO    | 15  | 9.524   | 5.476  | 0.003       | –     |
| NY    | 61  | 47.629  | 13.371 | 0.004       | 486,495 |
| SC    | 12  | 8.533   | 3.467  | 0.006       | 34,546 |
| ME    | 5   | 2.050   | 1.993  | 0.019       | 180   |
| AZ    | 14  | 8.010   | 5.990  | 0.07        | 120   |
| OR    | 13  | 9.948   | 3.052  | 0.07        | 191   |

The computational cost of generating these audit specifications is not significant. On a machine with an Intel Xeon Platinum 8176 chip (2.1GHz), and 1TB of RAM, the generation of an audit specification for Wyoming and Alaska takes 0.3s and 0.4s, respectively. The time required to generate an audit for each of the plurality-based primaries in Table 1 ranges from 0.2ms to 0.24s (and 0.03s on average).

### 7 Conclusion

We provide an effective method for auditing delegate allocation by proportional representation (the Hamilton method), the first we know of for elections of this kind. Usually the audit only requires examining a small number of ballots. This could be used for primary elections in the USA and other elections in Russia, Ukraine, Taiwan, Namibia and Hong Kong.

We provide a version suitable for Democratic primaries in Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, and Wyoming, which use a modified form where viability is decided using IRV.

To audit these elections we defined a new assertion for pairwise differences and corresponding assorter, which may be useful for auditing other methods.

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