A Secure and Efficient Task Matching Scheme for Spatial Crowdsourcing

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ABSTRACT The sharing economy has greatly promoted the rapid development and application of spatial crowdsourcing. Although privacy-preserving spatial task matching as an indispensable part has been extensively explored, existing schemes cannot be deployed into the practical environment due to drawbacks in the one-side location protection, the matching efficiency, and the dynamic updates. In this study, we propose a novel Secure and Efficient Spatial Task Matching framework (SESTM) with utilizing multi-user searchable encryption and secure index technique, which enables to preserve the location privacy of requesters and workers while achieving efficient task allocation and good user scalability. Specifically, requesters firstly transform and encrypt their task locations before being outsourced, and we secondly design a secure and dynamic tree-based index SD-Tree for SC-server to merge these uploaded encrypted data without knowing their underlying content. Finally, SESTM provides efficient task matching services for multiple workers based on encrypted queries. Furthermore, SD-Tree also provides fast delete and insert operations under logarithmic time to reduce the dynamic update overhead for real SC services. Extensive theoretical analysis and performance evaluation demonstrate the practicality of our method.

INDEX TERMS Spatial crowdsourcing, task matching, location privacy, matching efficiency, dynamic update, user scalability.

I. INTRODUCTION

The widespread popularization of 4G networks and the rapid deployment of 5G networks have actively promoted the diversified application of spatial crowdsourcing (SC) [1], [2]. Generally, in SC service, the SC-server receives location-based tasks published by requesters and matches appropriate tasks according to workers’ work scopes. Then workers travel to the required place to complete the assigned task for monetary or other rewards. Nowadays, many enterprises have established various SC platforms around the world to provide convenient and shared services for people, such as Uber [3], Amazon Mechanical MTurk [4] and Witmart [5].

Despite the various benefits of SC services, outsourcing location information to SC-server has raised concerns about privacy disclosure. To realize accurate and efficient task matching, current solutions need to expose users’ specific locations to the SC-server, such as home address in food delivery application, individual health status if requesters locate in hospitals or clinics [6], [7], or daily trajectory. However, SC-server as a third party cannot be completely trustworthy, it possibly sells users’ private information to related companies for profit [8], or be compromised by hackers [9]. Besides, Scheck [10] also found that adversaries can monitor users by collecting their locations. Considering their safety, users may be reluctant to use SC services. In addition, task matching efficiency is also a non-neglectful problem since if it is too low, SC-platforms have no ability to handle massive task matching requests, and users may get a poor experience. Therefore, there is an urgent need to design a secure and efficient task matching scheme to address these problems.

Pournajaf et al. [11] and To et al. [12] proposed a privacy task allocation method with adopting differential privacy technique, whereby worker locations are processed by a trusted third party (TTP) server called cellular service provider (CSP) before being outsourced to SC-server.
However, the TTP assumption is not compelling since CSP may expose these vital data once it is compromised. Besides, the one-side protection may cause SC-server to easily obtain the exact locations of requesters and workers according to the allocation result. On the contrary, some searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) approaches based on TPP-free are more practical, which allow a single user holding the key $k_i$ to perform secure query over ciphertext domain. Unfortunately, these conventional solutions cannot be applied to spatial crowdsourcing service (multi-user setting) since there are multiple unassisted requesters and workers in the platform, and any user revocation will cause keys redistribution and data re-encryption if they share a same key [16]. On the other hand, the system is also vulnerable to malicious adversaries whenever the secret key is leaked [17], [18]. Therefore, Shu et al. [19] proposed a secure task matching approach with utilizing multi-user searchable encryption and proxy re-encryption technique, which allows each requester and worker holding a unique key to protect their location privacy and meanwhile realize effective user revocation. However, the authors failed to consider the task matching efficiency, thus the query time is increasing linearly with the number of tasks. Moreover in a previous study, Liu et al. [20] adopted Paillier Cryptosystem and KD-tree to build a secure index based on the dual-server setting to address the privacy-preserving and efficiency issues. Unfortunately, the huge update overhead makes this scheme unsuitable for the practical SC services since worker locations are dynamically changing rather than being static [21].

The drawbacks of the above research motivate us to design a novel solution that not only protects the location privacy of requesters and workers but also allows SC-server to efficiently execute the task matching services and the dynamic update operations. Inevitably, to achieve the above goals, there are three significant challenges:

1) Multi-user searchable encryption technique is a general and effective approach to achieve privacy task matching over the multi-user setting, but it is difficult for SC-server to build a secure index based on ciphertexts encrypted by different keys.

2) In a practical environment, the number of spatial tasks in the SC platform is dynamically changing, since the SC-server requires to frequently delete accepted tasks and insert newly published tasks. Thus, it is a challenge for the secure index to support dynamic updates.

3) The SC platform should allow users to freely enter or leave the system without causing huge update overhead to the system and affecting other users. Therefore, achieving efficient user enrollment and revocation is not a simple task.

To address the three challenges, we propose a Secure and Efficient Spatial Task Matching scheme (SESTM) to address the location privacy-preserving issue for requesters and workers over one SC server. Simultaneously, our approach also achieves effective user enrollment and revocation.

1) We propose a Secure and Efficient Spatial Task Matching scheme (SESTM) to address the location privacy-preserving issue for requesters and workers over one SC server. Simultaneously, our approach also achieves effective user enrollment and revocation.

2) We design a novel Secure and Dynamic Tree-based index $SD$-Tree to realize high task matching efficiency, which also executes the update operations under logarithmic time.

3) We implement the proposed solution on a real-world dataset. The results show our approach achieves good user scalability and dynamic updates while preserving location privacy. Furthermore, we also compare SESTM with one of the most relevant schemes [19], the results illustrate that our scheme has an apparent advantage over it in the aspect of task matching efficiency.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related works and Section III introduces the problem. The preliminary is formulated in Section IV. Section V details the working mechanism of SESTM. Subsequently, Section VI present the performance analysis. Section VII evaluates our scheme SESTM. Finally, we conclude the paper in section VIII.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we review the related works from two categories: privacy task matching and secure index.

A. PRIVACY TASK MATCHING
There have been extensive research on task matching in recent years, such as low-cost task allocation [25], [26], skills [27], [28] and interests [29] based assignments. These works treated the task matching problem as an optimization problem but ignored the location privacy problem. Considering the concern of privacy disclosure, some approaches were proposed to investigate the privacy task matching issue. To et al. [12] and Wang et al. [30] utilized a trusted third party (TTP) to obfuscate the worker locations with the adoption of differential privacy (DP) technique. In order to balance the privacy and raw data utility, Gong et al. [31] designed a framework with a trusted proxy to optimize the trade-offs. In addition, k-anonymity [32], [33] is also a general method, which utilizes a cloaking area containing at least k users to replace a specific user’s location. However, there are two inevitable shortcomings in the above researches. Firstly, a potential hazard is that TTP may expose these vital data if it is compromised by malicious attackers. Secondly, one-side protection is vulnerable since SC-server enables to infer the location information of both requesters and workers according to the matching result. Although some solutions [19], [34]–[36] were proposed to solve the above problems, these studies failed to consider the task matching efficiency.

B. SECURE INDEX
The secure index as a promising technique has received widespread attention. Karras et al. [37] and Xu et al. [38] built a secure AVL tree by utilizing linear algebra to reduce the range query search time. Liu et al. [20] proposed a newly devised SKD-tree based on Paillier Cryptosystem to index worker locations, thereby improving task matching efficiency. Unfortunately, the above schemes are not practical for dynamic environments due to the huge update overhead. Although some studies were proposed to address the index dynamic update issue, those conventional approaches cannot be directly applied in the multi-user setting since user revocation will cause key redistribution and index reconstruction. In addition, attribute-based encryption (ABE) and identity-based encryption (IBE) [39]–[42] have also been extensively studied to protect the privacy in the multi-user setting. However, the major drawback is that the own-forced search is not suitable for SC [19]. Therefore, to address the above drawbacks and challenges, we design a secure and dynamic index SD-Tree, which enables SC-server to quickly process data update operations.

III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider that our scheme works on Worker Selected Tasks (WST) mode, whereby four entities are involved in the system, as illustrated in Fig. 1, they are requesters, workers, SC-server, and key generation center (KGC).

1) Requesters publish their spatial tasks including contents and specific geographic coordinates to the SC-server.
2) Workers submit their range queries to the SC-server.
3) SC-server is a spatial crowdsourcing server for task allocation services to requesters and workers.
4) KGC is a key generation center, which only performs user enrollment and revocation operations. The difference from the two-server setting is that KGC will not participate in the task matching process.

B. THREAT MODEL
KGC is responsible for the generation of the secret keys and saves all users information. It is undeniable that SC companies are reluctant to outsource these crucial data to SC-server, thus we treat KGC as a certificate authority in our threat model. We also consider requesters and workers are reliable since they are the providers of the original data. We assume that SC-server is “honest but curious”, it follows our designed protocol to provide SC services but intends to snoop users’ location privacy. Besides, the encryption of task content is however beyond our research scope. Thus, we assume that users encrypt their task content under a symmetric key $K_s$ and decrypt it under the same key after receiving the return results. Besides, we also assume the ID of users can be protected by faked identity or other techniques.

C. DESIGN GOALS
To realize the secure and efficient spatial task matching for SC, our scheme aims to reach the following four purposes:

1) Location privacy: The SESTM should preserve the location privacy of requesters and workers over one SC server.
2) Task matching efficiency: The SESTM should build a tree-based index based on encrypted spatial task locations from multiple requesters to improve the task matching efficiency.
3) Dynamic update: The SESTM should allow the index to quickly insert and delete tasks without causing high update overhead. Besides, the size of our index depends
upon the number of tasks, which means there is no additional storage overhead.

4) **User scalability**: SESTM should realize favorable user scalability as the number of tasks increases. Moreover, user enrollment and revocation should not affect other users and the data in SC-server.

### IV. PRELIMINARIES

In this section, we briefly introduce the background of segment tree and bilinear pairing, which will be used in our method.

#### A. SEGMENT TREE

Segment tree is essentially a binary tree over integers from 0 to \(N - 1\), denoted as \(tr(N)\). The tree structure recursively divides each non-leaf node into two segments until each leaf node only contains one integer. Fig. 2(a) shows a \(tr(8)\) segment tree structure, whereby each tree node \(v\) will be pre-assigned a unique node label \(l(v)\) which is same as its interval. In the following, we introduce how to utilize the segment tree to express integer and range value.

**Integer representation**: An integer \(x\) is defined as a cover path \(CP(x)\), which contains a set of nodes from tree root to leaf node. For example, \(CP(2) = \{a_0, b_0, c_1, d_2\}\) in Fig. 2(b).

If a \(CP(x)\) intersects a tree node \(v\), we say node \(v\) covers this integer \(x\), defined as a label cover \(LC(v)\), which represents all leaf nodes below it. For example, in Fig. 2(c), \(LC(c_1)\) is \([2, 3]\).

**Range representation**: We define a one-dimensional range value \(q_x = [q_{x_l}, q_{x_r}]\) as minimum cover set \(MCS(q_x)\) in a segment tree, which is a set of \(LC(v)\) that cover all integers in \(q\). For example, in Fig. 2(c), \(MCS(2, 4) = \{LC(c_1), LC(d_4)\}\), whereby \(LC(c_1)\) is \([2, 3]\) and \(LC(d_4)\) is \([4]\).

And according to Shen et al. [43] work we have the following proposition.

**Proposition 1:** If \(x \in q_x\), \(CP(x)\) and \(MCS(q_x)\) intersect at only one node.

For example in Fig. 2(b) and Fig. 2(c), \(CP(2) \cap MCS(2, 4) = c_1\), thus \(2 \in [2, 4]\). However, building a complete segment tree will cause huge time and space overhead, users only need to know the tree size \(N\) and then calculate the \(CP(x)\) or \(MCS(q_x)\) by themselves.

In addition, we can get the maximum value of \(|MCS(q_x)|\) using the Theorem 1 proved by Lu et al. [23].

**Theorem 1:** \(\forall q_x \in [0, N - 1]\), the largest \(|MCS(q_x)|\) is \(2 \times (\log N - 1)\) if \(N \geq 4\).

#### B. BILINEAR MAP

\(G\) and \(G_1\) are two cyclic groups with a prime order \(p\), whereby \(G\) denotes an additive group of a generator \(g\) and \(G_1\) denotes a multiplicative group of a generator \(g_1\). A bilinear map \(e: G \times G \rightarrow G_1\) satisfies three properties:

- **Bilinearity**: \(\forall x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^+, e(g^x, g^y) = e(g, g^y)^x\).
- **Degeneracy**: \(e(g, g) \neq 1\)
- **Efficient computability**: \(e\) will not cause high time overhead.

#### V. SECURE AND EFFICIENT SPATIAL TASK MATCHING (SESTM)

To meet the secure and efficient requirements of spatial task matching over the multi-user setting, we propose a novel task matching mechanism: SESTM. In the following section, we first introduce the overview of SESTM, then detail our scheme in four aspects. Finally, we present how to dynamically update the index and the secure analysis.

**A. OVERVIEW**

There are four function modules in SESTM: System Initialization, Location Transformation, Multi-User Searchable Encryption, Merge and Match. Table 1. summarizes the main notations and Fig. 3 shows the overview of SESTM.

**Definition 1:** The SESTM is involved in ten algorithms (Setup, Enroll, Revoke, Geo-Trans, Ran-Trans, Index-Enc, Trap-Enc, Re-Enc, Index-Merge, Task-Match), defined below.

**TABLE 1. Notations of SESTM.**

| Notation          | Description                                                                 |
|-------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| \(PK, MSK\)       | public key and master secret key                                             |
| \(u_i\)           | user identity                                                                |
| \(sk_i, rk_i\)    | secret key and re-key for user \(u_i\)                                       |
| \(sk_R, rk_R\)    | secret key pair for requester \(u_R\)                                       |
| \(sk_{geo}, rk_{geo}\) | secret key pair for worker \(u_{geo}\)                                 |
| \(geo\)           | geographic coordinate \((x, y)\)                                            |
| \(CP-Geo\)        | range query                                                                  |
| \(Enc-Index, Re-Index\) | encrypted index and re-encrypted index for geo                              |
| \(MC-Query\)      | minimum cover query                                                          |
| \(Trap, Re-Trap\) | trapdoor, re-encrypted trapdoor                                              |
| \(SD-Tree\)       | secure and dynamic tree-based index                                          |
**System Initialization:** We first initialize the system and complete the user enrollment.

1) **Setup** ($1^k$) → $PK, MSK$: KGC takes a security parameter to produce a public key $PK$ for all entities and a master key $MSK$ which is only known to itself.
2) **Enroll** ($MSK, u_i$) → $(sk_i, rk_i)$: KGC generates different secret key pairs $(sk_i, rk_i)$ based on $MSK$ for requesters and workers, whereby secret key $sk_i$ is assigned to user for location encryption, and re-encryption key $rk_i$ with user identity $u_i$ is kept by SC-server for ciphertext re-encryption.
3) **Revoke** ($u_i$): KGC revokes user by removing corresponding identity $u_i$ and re-encryption key $rk_i$ from SC-server, which guarantees the revoked user cannot get the correct ciphertext for task matching.

After **System Initialization**, KGC will no longer participate in other phases, except for user enrollment and revocation.

**Location Transformation:** To achieve efficient range search over ciphertext in spatial task matching, we firstly utilize the segment tree to represent requester’s geographic coordinate $geo$ and worker’s range query $q$.

1) **Geo-Trans** ($geo$) → $CP-Geo$: Requester transforms the task geographic coordinate $geo$ to a cover path geographic coordinate $CP-Geo$.
2) **Range-Trans** ($q$) → $MC-Query$: Worker transforms the range query $q$ to a minimum cover query $MC-Query$.

**Multi-User Searchable Encryption:** After transformation, requester and worker will encrypt their $CP-Geo$ and $MC-Query$ respectively using their unique secret keys, then submit them to SC-server for re-encryption.

1) **Index-Enc** ($CP-Geo, sk_R$) → $Enc-Index$: Requester $u_R$ encrypts the $CP-Geo$ with own secret key $sk_R$, and outputs an encrypted index $Enc-Index$.
2) **Trap-Gen** ($MC-Query, sk_W$) → $Trap$: Worker $u_W$ encrypts the $MC-Query$ with own secret key $sk_W$, and outputs a trapdoor $Trap$.
3) **Re-Enc** ($Enc-Index, rk_R$) → $Re-index, (Trap, rk_W)$ → $Re-Trap$: Once receiving data from requester and worker, SC-server re-encrypts the $Enc-Index$ to $Re-Index$ and $Trap$ to $Re-Trap$ using their respective re-encryption keys $rk_R$ and $rk_W$.

**Merge and Match:** After the encryption phase, SC-server merges different $Re-Index$ to construct the secure and dynamic tree $SD-Tree$, and then provides the task matching services for worker.

1) **Index-Merge** ($Re-Index$) → $SD-Tree$: SC-server runs the Index-Merge algorithm to merge different $Re-Index$ to build the $SD-Tree$.
2) **Task-Match** ($SD-Tree, Re-Trap$) → $Results$: SC-server matches the re-encrypted trapdoor $Re-Trap$ with the $SD-Tree$ and returns the results to corresponding worker.

**B. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION**

This phase is the initialization part of the system, which is performed by KGC and includes three vital sections, whereby **Setup** is responsible for generating the necessary parameters, **Enroll** and **Revoke** are executed when user enrollment and revocation occur, respectively.

**Setup** ($1^k$) → ($PK : G, G_1, p, g, g_1, e, H, MSK$): KGC first generates an additive group $G$ and a multiplicative group $G_1$ of prime order $p$ with generators $g$ and $g_1$, respectively. Then KGC produces a bilinear map $e : G \times G \rightarrow G_1$ and a public hash function $H$. Finally, KGC outputs $G, G_1, p, g, g_1, e, H$ as public key $PK$ for all entities and a master key $MSK$ kept by itself.

**Enroll** ($MSK, u_i$) → ($sk_i = g^{ki}, rk_i = \frac{MSK}{ki}$): Given a user $u_i$, KGC first chooses a $k_i \in Z_p^*$ and computes $rk_i = \frac{MSK}{ki}$. 

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**FIGURE 3.** Overview of SESTM.
Similarly, and CP study [19], whereby a location \((x, y)\) is expressed by example in Fig. 4(a) (the figure is modified from Fig. 4 of build two segment trees to index each coordinate point, as an into the maximum value in each dimension, we divide the map identity N form operation. Given a map N which is not efficient for the practical. Therefore, we propose search. However, the time complexity is linear time tree to transform the location data and perform the range issue, previous works [13], [19], [23] utilized the segment SC-server.

Then KGC sends \(g^k_i\) to \(u_i\) as secret key \(sk_i\) and \(MSK_{k_i}\) to SC-server as re-encrypted key \(rk_i\) of \(u_i\).

\textbf{Revoke}(u): User identities and re-encrypted keys are saved as \(\{u_i : rk_i\}\) in SC-server and KGC enables to revoke any user by deleting the corresponding \(u_i\) and \(rk_i\) from SC-server.

**C. LOCATION TRANSFORM**

Privacy task matching is essentially a range query search, but the challenge is how to check whether a geographic coordinate is within a specific range over ciphertext. To address this issue, previous works [13], [19], [23] utilized the segment tree to transform the location data and perform the range search. However, the time complexity is linear time \(O(n)\) which is not efficient for the practical. Therefore, we propose a novel privacy range query search based on their works [13], [19], [23] and the difference is that we reduce the time complexity to logarithmic time \(O(\log n)\). Firstly, we introduce the fundamental of their method, then we explain our innovation in detail.

Now we give an example to introduce the location transform operation. Given a map \(N_x \times N_y\), where \(N_x, N_y\) are the maximum value in each dimension, we divide the map into \(N_x \times N_y\) zones and each one will be assigned a unique identity \(l(i, j)\), where \(0 \leq i < N_x, 0 \leq j < N_y\). Then we build two segment trees to index each coordinate point, as an example in Fig. 4(a) (the figure is modified from Fig. 4 of study [19]), whereby a location \((4, 2)\) is expressed by \(CP(4)\) and \(CP(2)\) in each dimension, which is marked by circles. Similarly, \(MCS([3, 5])\) and \(MCS([2, 3])\) represent the range value \([3, 5] \times [2, 3]\) in Fig. 4(b), which is marked by squares.

**Theorem 2:** A coordinate point \((x, y)\) is within a range \([q_{x_l}, q_{x_r}] \times [q_{y_l}, q_{y_r}]\) iff \(CP(x)\) and \(CP(y)\) intersect \(MCS([q_{x_l}, q_{x_r}])\) and \(MCS([q_{y_l}, q_{y_r}])\), respectively.

And for clarity, we utilize \(CP(x, y)\) to donate \(CP(x)\) and \(CP(y)\), \(MCS(q)\) to donate \(MCS([q_{x_l}, q_{x_r}])\) and \(MCS([q_{y_l}, q_{y_r}])\) in the following.

Therefore, the SC-server can perform the range search by checking the intersection of query \(q\) and task geographic coordinate \((x, y)\) over the ciphertext domain. However, the drawback is that a \(MCS(q)\) must traverse all \(CP(x, y)\) to get results. Clearly, the time complexity is \(O(2n)\) for \(n\) tasks. Therefore, to improve the task matching efficiency, we propose an innovative transformation to replace it. We first introduce it from two aspects: \textbf{Range-Trans} and \textbf{Geo-Trans}, then we will detail the operating mechanism in the following section.

**Range-Trans** \((q) \rightarrow MC-Query\): we utilize a new definition called minimum cover query \(MC-Query(q)\) to replace \(MCS(q)\). The difference between them is that \(MC-Query(q)\) not only finds the minimum cover set \(MCS(q)\) for each query, but also indexes them by segment tree, which means nodes in \(MCS(q)\) are leaf nodes of \(MC-Query(q)\). As an example, a range query \(q = [3, 5] \times [2, 3]\) is expressed by \(MC-Query([3, 5])\) and \(MC-Query([2, 3])\), which is marked by blue arrow line in in Fig. 4(b).

**Geo-Trans** (loc) \(\rightarrow CP-Index\): Similarly, we use cover path index \(CP-Index(x, y)\) to replace \(CP(x, y)\), which only changes the \(CP(x, y)\) data structure into a linked-list.

We have the **Theorem 3** by this means to express location data:

**Theorem 3:** A geographic coordinate \((x, y)\) is within a range \([q_{x_l}, q_{x_r}] \times [q_{y_l}, q_{y_r}]\) iff the \(CP-Index(x)\) and \(CP-Index(y)\) intersect the leaf nodes of \(MC-Query([q_{x_l}, q_{x_r}])\) and \(MC-Query([q_{y_l}, q_{y_r}])\), respectively.

**D. MULTI-USER SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION**

After the **Location Transformation**, a task geographic coordinate \((x, y)\) is replaced by \(CP-Index(x, y)\) and range query
q is replaced by MC-Query(q). However, node labels in CP-Index(x, y) and MC-Query(q) all are plaintext. In order to prevent privacy leakage, we propose a novel multi-user searchable encryption to protect the data. Meanwhile, this encryption scheme also allows the SC-server to perform some efficient mathematical operations on ciphertexts even if they are encrypted by different keys.

### Index-Enc (CP-Index, skR) → Enc-Index : CP-Index can be presented as \{l_{R,1}, l_{R,2}, \ldots l_{R,d}\}, whereby R is the requester identity and d is the dth node. Requester \( r_{R} \) uses own \( sk_{R} = g^{k_{R}} \) and randomly chooses a \( r_{R,d} \in Z_{p}^{+} \) to encrypt each node label as:

\[
\left( g^{k_{R} \cdot H(l_{R,d}) \cdot r_{R,d}}, g^{r_{R,d}} \right).
\]

Finally, the requester outputs two encrypted indexes Enc-Index(x) and Enc-Index(y) for CP-Index(x) and CP-Index(y), respectively.

### Trap-Gen (MC-Query, skW) → Trap : Similarly, worker \( w_{W} \) uses own \( sk_{W} = g^{k_{W}} \) and randomly chooses a \( r_{W,d} \in Z_{p}^{+} \) to encrypt each node label in MC-Query(q1) and MC-Query(q2), then outputs trapdoors Trap(q1) and Trap(q2).

\[
\left( g^{k_{W} \cdot H(l_{W,d}) \cdot r_{W,d}}, g^{r_{W,d}} \right).
\]

### Re-enc (Enc-Index, rkR) → Re-index : \( (\text{Trap}, rk_{R}) \rightarrow \text{Re-Index} \): Once receiving ciphertext from requester \( u_{R} \), SC-server re-encrypts Enc-Index by its \( rk_{R} = MSK_{k_{R}} \).

\[
\left( g^{k_{R} \cdot H(l_{R,d}) \cdot r_{R,d} \cdot r_{R,d} \cdot r_{R,d}}, g^{r_{R,d}} \right) = \left( g^{MSK \cdot H(l_{R,d}) \cdot r_{R,d}}, g^{r_{R,d}} \right)
\]

For clarity, we let \( P_{R,d} = g^{MSK \cdot H(l_{R,d}) \cdot r_{R,d}}, T_{R,d} = g^{r_{R,d}} \), \( E_{R} \) denotes the encryption scheme for requester \( u_{R} \).

\[
E_{R}(l_{R,d}) = (P_{R,d}, T_{R,d})
\]

Therefore, the Re-Index is denoted as \( \{ E_{R}(l_{R,1}), E_{R}(l_{R,2}), \ldots E_{R}(l_{R,d}) \} \). Similarly, SC-server uses the same method for worker and outputs the re-encrypted trapdoor Re-Trap(x) and Re-Trap(y).

### Index-Merge

To achieve efficient task matching, SC-server first uses Index-Merge to merge all Re-Index of different requesters and constructs two tree-based index SD-Tree for two dimension x and dimension y, then performs the Task-Match for all permissible workers’ queries.

### Index-Merge (Re-Index) → SD-Tree : The depth of Re-Index is fixed for all requesters because they derive from the same segment tree, thereby the SC-server enables to merge all Re-Index from top to leaf node. There is an example to show how to check whether two node labels are equivalent. Given two re-encrypted node labels in SC-server:

\[
E_{l}(l_{i,d}) = (g^{MSK \cdot H(l_{i,d}) \cdot r_{i,d}}, g^{r_{i,d}}) = (P_{i,d}, T_{i,d})
\]

\[
E_{j}(l_{j,d}) = (g^{MSK \cdot H(l_{j,d}) \cdot r_{j,d}}, g^{r_{j,d}}) = (P_{j,d}, T_{j,d})
\]

SC-server first computes as follows:

\[
e(P_{i,d}, T_{i,d}) = e(g^{MSK \cdot H(l_{i,d}) \cdot r_{i,d}}, g^{r_{i,d}})
\]

\[
e(P_{j,d}, T_{j,d}) = e(g^{MSK \cdot H(l_{j,d}) \cdot r_{j,d}}, g^{r_{j,d}})
\]

\[
e(g, g)^{MSK \cdot H(l_{i,d}) \cdot r_{i,d} \cdot r_{j,d}}
\]

It can easily get \( e(P_{i,d}, T_{j,d}) = e(P_{j,d}, T_{i,d}) \) if and only if \( l_{i,d} = l_{j,d} \). For clarity, we define a new operator #, it has the following property:

\[
E_{l}(l_{i,d}) \# E_{j}(l_{j,d}) = e(P_{i,d}, T_{j,d})
\]

If \( E_{l}(l_{i,d}) \# E_{j}(l_{j,d}) = 1 \), it means the two nodes are equivalent. Otherwise, it is different.

Now, we give an example to show the merging process. We assume the map size is 8 and three are task locations geo1, geo2 and geo3, their geographic coordinates are (1, 1), (4, 4) and (5, 5) respectively. In order to express all points, we use two segment trees tr(8) to index each dimension. For clarity, we only show the dimension x in Fig 5, whereby the tree height is \( h = \log_{2}8 + 1 \). After Enroll, Geo-trans, Index-Enc, and Re-Enc, SC-server gets three Re-Index(x) as Fig 5 shows. Then SC-server merges them from root to leaf node.
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At level 0:

\[ E_1(a_0) \# E_2(a_0) = 1, \quad E_2(a_0) \# E_3(a_0) = 1 \] (10)

Later on, SC-server merges them into one node kept as follows, whereby \( E(a_0) \) can be \( E_1(a_0) \), \( E_2(a_0) \) or \( E_3(a_0) \).

\[ \text{node}_0 = \langle E(a_0), \text{child}_0, \text{child}_1 \rangle \] (11)

At level 1:

\[ E_1(b_0) \# E_2(b_1) \neq 1, \quad E_2(b_1) \# E_3(b_1) = 1 \] (12)

SC-server splits the \( \text{node}_0 \) into two branches, whereby one branch is occupied by \( \text{loc}_0 \), then \( \text{loc}_1 \) and \( \text{loc}_2 \) merge the level 1 node and continue the merge process until they cannot find an equivalent node. Similarly, SC-server performs the same operation for another dimension, finally outputs \( SD-\text{Tree}(x) \) and \( SD-\text{Tree}(y) \).

**Task-Match** (**SD-Tree**, **Re-Trap**) → results: We also give an example to show the task matching operation for one dimension. Given a worker \( u_w \) with a range query \( q_x = [q_{x_l}, q_{x_r}] \) as shown in Fig. 6. After **Enroll**, **Geo-trans**, **Index-Enc** and **Re-Enc**, SC-server gets the **Re-Trap**(x).

According to **Theorem 3**, SC-server should find whether the leaf node of **Re-Trap**(x) intersects with the **SD-Tree**(x). Therefore, we adopt Depth First Search (**DFS**) algorithm to match the **Re-Trap**(x) with the merged index. For example, in Fig. 6 SC-server first travels the left branch of **Re-Trap**(x), it is easy to know:

\[ E_W(a_0) \# E(a_0) = 1 \]
\[ E_W(b_0) \# E(b_0) = 1 \]
\[ E_W(c_1) \# E(c_0) \neq 1 \] (13)

Clearly, \( E_W(c_1) \) and \( E(c_0) \) are not equivalent at level 2, which means the leaf node \( E_W(d_2) \) of this branch will not intersect any node in **SD-Tree**(x). Thus, SC-server continuously travels the right branch of the **Re-Trap**(x), luckily finding the leaf node \( E_W(c_2) \# E(c_2) = 1 \), which means \( \text{loc}_2, \text{loc}_3 \in q_x \) and get the **results**. Similarly, SC-server performs the **Task-Match** to another dimension and find the intersection set **results**. Finally, SC-server returns the **results** = **results** \( \cap \) **results**, to worker.

**F. DYNAMIC UPDATE**

In a real spatial crowdsourcing environment, the number of tasks is not fixed since SC-Server needs to continuously insert new tasks and delete accepted tasks. However, the update operations are very time consuming for the static index, such as KD-tree. Therefore, we introduce the dynamic properties of our **SD-Tree** in the following.

**Deletion**: Tree branches in **SD-Tree** represent requesters’ geographic coordinates, thus the deletion is removing the specific branch from the index. However, SC-server cannot directly delete it from root to leaf node because any tree node may be shared by multiple leaf nodes. Thus, SC-server should firstly find the leaf node, then remove this branch from leaf node to root. For example, if SC-server plans to delete \( \text{geo}_2 \) in Fig. 6, it firstly finds the leaf node in **SD-Tree**(x), then removes tree node \( E(d_3) \) and stop deletion because \( E(c_2) \) is shared by other.

However, the worst time complexity of deletion for **SD-Tree**(x) is \( O(2\log N) \), it cannot reach the best logarithmic time \( O(\log N) \). Therefore, to improve the efficiency of deletion, we add a counting item into each tree node, which is kept as:

\[ \text{node} = \langle E(a_0), \text{child}_0, \text{child}_1, \text{count} \rangle \] (14)

The role of the counting item is to record how many branches share this tree node, which also means how many leaf nodes it contains. Therefore, SC-server only needs to know the **count** value of tree node before deleting it. For example, if SC-server intends to delete \( \text{geo}_2 \) in Fig. 6, it only performs \( \text{count} - 1 \) for tree nodes \( E(a_0), E(b_1) \) and \( E(c_2) \) because they are shared nodes, then removes \( E(d_3) \) because its **count** = 1. Therefore, the time complexity of deletion reduces to \( O(\log N) \) on one dimension, which also means it is \( O(2\log N) \) for **SD-Tree**(x, y).

**Insertion**: The insert operation is same as the merging, thus the time complexity is \( O(2\log N) \) for one data.

**G. SECURITY ANALYSIS**

In this section, we give the security analysis of our scheme.

**Theorem 4**: Our scheme achieves security against chosen-plaintext attack under the DBDH assumption in selective
Table 2: Notations.

| Notation | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| $E, P$   | Exponentiation and pairing operation on group $G$, respectively |
| $H, f_s$ | Hash operation and key-based hash operation, respectively |
| $h_x, \ h_y$ | The height of segment tree $\text{tr}(N)$ is $h = \log N + 1$ in each dimension |
| $m_x, \ m_y$ | The number of node labels in the MC-S ($q_x$) and MC-S ($q_y$), respectively |

Table 3: Computation cost.

| Steps                                      | SC-MSDE                                   | SESTM                                      |
|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| Task publication                           | $(3E + f_s + H) (h_x + h_y)$              | $(2E + H) (h_x + h_y)$                     |
| Trapdoor generation                        | $(5E + f_s) (m_x + m_y)$                  | $(2E + H) (m_x h_x + m_y h_y)$             |
| Task matching (n tasks)                    | $nH (m_x h_x + m_y h_y)$                  | $(2P) (m_x h_x + m_y h_y)$                 |

Table 4: Communication cost.

| Steps                                      | SC-MSDE                                   | SESTM                                      |
|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| Requester to SC-Server                     | $Z_p^* + (2 \vert G \vert + \vert Z_p^* \vert) (h_x + h_y)$ | $Z_p^* + 2 \vert G \vert (h_x + h_y)$     |
| Worker to SC-Server                        | $Z_p^* + 2 \vert G \vert (m_x + m_y)$     | $Z_p^* + 2 \vert G \vert (m_x h_x + m_y h_y)$ |

Table 3 displays and compares the costs of time-consuming operations in each phase.

- **Task publication**: Each transformed task location \( CP-Geo(x, y) \) includes \( h_x + h_y \) node labels, thereby requester takes \( (2E + H) (h_x + h_y) \) to encrypt it.

- **Trapdoor Generation**: The trapdoor generation process of SESTM is similar to the one in SC-MSDE. It first finds the MC-S \( q \) for a range query \( q \) and then transforms it into MC-Query \( q \) which contains up to \( m_x h_x + m_y h_y \) node labels. Thus, the maximum computation overhead is \( (2E + H) (m_x h_x + m_y h_y) \).

- **Task matching**: In SESTM, we adopt the DFS algorithm to match the query and SD-Tree. SE-server only needs to travel the Re-Trap \( q \) rather than SD-Tree. Therefore, the computation overhead is \( 2P (m_x h_x + m_y h_y) \) at most, which has no relation with task number \( n \).

**VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS**

In this section, we take the time-consuming operations to evaluate our performance and compare with SC-MSDE [19] in the aspects of computation overhead and communication overhead.

**A. SD-TREE CONSTRUCTION OVERHEAD**

We evaluate the SD-Tree construction overhead from Index construction and Index update, and Table 2 shows the necessary notations.

- **Index construction**: There are two major operations for the SC-server to construct the index: 1) re-encrypting the Enc-Index to Re-Index by Re-enc algorithm, and 2) merging Re-Index into the SD-Tree by Index-Merge algorithm. For each Enc-Index, \( h_x + h_y \) node labels are contained, thereby SC-server takes \( E (h_x + h_y) \) to re-encrypt it. Similarly, it costs \( 2P (h_x + h_y) \) to merge one into the SD-Tree. As whole, it takes at most \( n (2P + E) (h_x + h_y) \) to build the SD-Tree for \( n \) spatial tasks.

- **Index update**: The insertion and deletion are similar to the merge process, thereby the update operations are also \( (2P + E) (h_x + h_y) \).

**B. COMPUTATION OVERHEAD**

The computation overhead of SESTM is tested through the items of Task publication, Task search and Task matching.
a real-world location share dataset Gowalla [46] to simulate our experiments, whereby we consider each Gowalla user as a requester and the check-in geographic coordinate as the spatial task location. Besides, we apply the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) projection to transform all geographic coordinates into integer points and control the accuracy to 1m, then map them into a fixed map $N \times N$.

In the following experiments, we set the default map size to $16km \times 16km$, which means it needs two $tr(2^{14})$ segment trees to index each coordinate. Thus the corresponding $(h_x + h_y)$ is 30 since the tree height equals $\log 2^{14} + 1$. And we also set the default query range is $1km \times 1km$. For the task number $n$, the default value is 20000.

B. SD-TREE CONSTRUCTION EVALUATION

We evaluate the SD-Tree with the aspects of Index construction and Index update in the following.

**Index construction:** As described in Section VI. A, the SD-Tree construction overhead is mainly decided by the tasks number $n$ and the sum of $(h_x + h_y)$. Fig. 7(a) and (b) respectively show the re-encrypt time and index merge time. Clearly, both results are increasing with the number of tasks and also proportional to the sum of $(h_x + h_y)$, which show our SD-Tree has a good scalability. Besides, we also consider the influence of elliptic curves size. As shown in Fig. 8(a) and (b), it is shown that the runtime of SS1024 is much higher than that of SS512, which justifies the balance between index construction efficiency and privacy.

**Index update:** We evaluate the update overhead of our scheme by deleting and inserting one data from the SD-Tree. Fig. 9(a) illustrates the average runtime of 200 operations. Taking the insertion as an example, the figure has little changes when the number of tasks increases from 2000 to 20000, which justifies our theoretical analysis in Section VI. A and demonstrates that our SD-Tree achieves dynamic and fast updates.

On the other hand, we also measure the storage of our SD-Tree. As shown in Fig. 9(b), the number of tasks increases tenfold, but the index size only rises from 0.2 MB to 0.4 MB. The reason behind this is that more and more tree nodes are shared as the number of tasks increases, which greatly saves the storage overhead.

C. COMPUTATION OVERHEAD EVALUATION

In this section, we evaluate the computation overhead of SC-MSDE and SESTM with the items of Task publication, Trapdoor generation and Task matching. The analysis is in VI. B and shown in Table 3.

**Task publication:** We record the time cost of location encryption to evaluate the computation overhead in the task publication phase. As presented in Fig. 10(a), the results of both schemes are almost linear with the sum of $(h_x + h_y)$. And we also observe that SC-MSDE is more time-consuming than SESTM.

**Trapdoor Generation:** Fig. 10(b) illustrates the runtime of trapdoor generation operation, due to the Theorem 1, we observe that the figure of both schemes rises slightly and then stabilizes, as the query range size increases. Although SESTM relatively consumes more time than SC-MSDE, it is however acceptable since the maximum value is below 0.35s.

**Task matching:** In order to evaluate the task matching efficiency, we record the average searching time of 100 random queries for both schemes. Firstly, we vary the task
number from 2000 to 20000 with a default query range size 1km × 1km. Fig. 11(a) reports that the time cost is linear with the number of tasks in SC-MSDE, while the figure of SESTM remains around 0.3s. It accords with our theoretical analysis in VI. B. We also observe the influence of different range query size in Fig. 11(b). From the results in this chart, we observe that the trend is increasing first then decreasing. The reason behind it is that the sum of $m_xh_x + m_yh_y$ is increasing as the query range increases, which corresponds to the rising part of the graph. However, in order to improve query efficiency, both methods utilize high-level nodes to replace its child nodes, for example, MCS(0), MCS(1), MCS(2), MCS(3) can be replaced by MCS(0, 3]). Therefore, the sum of $m_xh_x + m_yh_y$ is decreasing as the area continues to decrease, which corresponds to the falling part of the graph. Actually, SESTM also follows this trend, however, it remains stable since the ratio of the y-axis of the graph is too large.

Clearly, our scheme has an apparent advantage over the SC-MSDE in the task matching phase. The reason is that SC-MSDE needs to match all ciphertexts to get the results, while SESTM built a tree-based index to improve the searching efficiency.

D. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD EVALUATION

In this section, we perform the communication evaluation on SC-MSDE and SESTM. We record the transmission cost between Worker to SC-Server and Requester to SC-Server.

Worker to SC-server: The transmission cost between worker and SC-server mainly depends on the data size of ciphertexts. Fig. 12(a) shows the communication overhead with different query range sizes, the result of SESTM is slightly more than that of SC-MSDE. The reason is the transformed worker location is a tree-based structure in SESTM, not a set of labels in SC-MSDE.

Requester to SC-server: Similarly, we test the transmission cost of trapdoor from requester to SC-server. As shown in Fig. 12(b), the results of both schemes are proportional to the sum of $h_x + h_y$, and SESTM costs less communication overhead compared to SC-MSDE.

VIII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we propose a secure and efficient task matching scheme for spatial crowdsourcing over the single server setting. Firstly, we adopt the multi-user searchable encryption protocol to protect all users’ location privacy and also achieve effective user revocation by utilizing the proxy-encryption technique. We secondly design a secure and dynamic tree-based index $SD$-Tree to address the task matching efficiency issue. Moreover, our $SD$-Tree has favorable user scalability and enables to dynamic update compared with static index structure. Finally, we evaluate the $SD$-Tree construction overhead of our scheme and also compare SESTM with SC-MSDE in the aspects of computation overhead and communication overhead. Results show our scheme realizes the proposed goals and has an apparent advantage over SC-MSDE in the task matching phase.

In future work, we will evaluate the influence of task encryption schemes and task distributions on post-processing time.

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