An event-based model for contracts

Massimo Bartoletti Tiziana Cimoli G. Michele Pinna
Università degli Studi di Cagliari, Italy
{bart,t.cimoli,gmpinna}@unica.it

Roberto Zunino
Università degli Studi di Trento and COSBI, Italy
roberto.zunino@unitn.it

We introduce a basic model for contracts. Our model extends event structures with a new relation, which faithfully captures the circular dependencies among contract clauses. We establish whether an agreement exists which respects all the contracts at hand (i.e. all the dependencies can be resolved), and we detect the obligations of each participant. The main technical contribution is a correspondence between our model and a fragment of the contract logic PCL [6]. More precisely, we show that the reachable events are exactly those which correspond to provable atoms in the logic. Despite of this strong correspondence, our model improves [6] by exhibiting a finer-grained notion of culpability, which takes into account the legitimate orderings of events.

1 Introduction

Contracts will play an increasingly important role in the specification and implementation of distributed systems. Since participants in distributed systems may be mutually distrusted, and may have conflicting individual goals, the possibility that a participant behaviour may diverge from the expected one is quite realistic. To protect themselves against possible misconducts, participants should postpone actual collaboration until reaching an agreement on the mutually offered behaviour. This requires a preliminary step, where each participant declares her promised behaviour, i.e. her contract.

A contract is a sort of assume/guarantee rule, which makes explicit the dependency between the actions performed by a participant, and those promised in return by the others. Event structures [17] can provide a basic semantic model for assume/guarantee rules, by interpreting the enabling \( b \vdash a \) as the contract clause: “I will do \( a \) after you have done \( b \)”. However, event structures do not capture a typical aspect of contracts, i.e. the capability of reaching an agreement when the assumptions and the guarantees of the parties mutually match. For instance, in the event structure with enablings \( b \vdash a \) and \( a \vdash b \), none of the events \( a \) and \( b \) is reachable, because of the circularity of the constraints. An agreement would still be possible if one of the parties is willing to accept a weaker contract. Of course, the contract “I will do \( b \)” (modelled as \( \vdash b \)) will lead to an agreement with the contract \( b \vdash a \), but it offers no protection to the participant who offers it: indeed, such contract can be stipulated without having anything in return.

In this paper we introduce a model for contracts, by extending (conflict-free) event structures with a new relation \( \vdash \). The contract \( a \vdash b \) (intuitively, “I will do \( a \) if you promise to do \( b \)”): reaches an agreement with the dual contract \( b \vdash a \), while protecting the participant who offers it. We formalise agreements as configurations where all the participants have reached their goals. We show that the problem of deciding if an agreement exists can be reduced to the problem of proving a suitable formula in (a fragment of) the contract logic PCL [6], where an effective decision procedure for provability exists.

Once an agreement has been found, the involved participants may safely cooperate by performing events. Indeed, we prove that — even in the presence of dishonest participants which do not respect
their promises — either all the participants reach their goals, or some of them is culpable of not having performed her duties. A culpable participant may then be identified (and possibly punished). Also the problem of detecting duties and identifying culpable participants is related to provability in PCL. Notably, while PCL does not distinguish between the immediate duties and those that will only be required later on in a computation (all provable atoms are considered duties in PCL), the richer semantical structure of our model allows for a finer-grained notion of duties, which depend on the actual events already performed in a contract execution.

2 Contract model

A contract (Def. 1) comprises a set of events $E$ and a set of participants $A$. Each event $e \in E$ is uniquely associated to a participant $\pi(e) \in A$. Events are ranged over by $a, b, \ldots$, sets of events by $C, D, X, Y, \ldots$, and participants by $A, B, \ldots$. Events are constrained by two relations: one is the enabling relation $\vdash$ of [17], while the other is called circular enabling relation, and it is denoted by $\models$. Intuitively, $D \vdash e$ states that $e$ may be performed after all the events in $D$ have happened; instead, $D \models e$ means that $e$ may be performed either if $D$ has already happened (similarly to $\vdash$), or possibly “on credit”, on the promise that the events in $D$ will be performed at some later time. The goals of each participant are indicated by the relation $ok$: $A ok X$ means that $A$ is satisfied if all the events in $X$ have happened. The composition of contracts is defined component-wise, provided that events are uniquely associated to participants.

**Definition 1.** A contract $C$ is a 6-tuple $(E, A, \pi, ok, \vdash, \models)$, where:

- $E$ is a finite set of events;
- $A$ is a finite set of participants;
- $\pi : E \rightarrow A$ associates each event to a participant;
- $ok \subseteq A \times \mathcal{P}(E)$ is the fulfillment relation, such that $A ok X \land X \subseteq Y \implies A ok Y$;
- $\vdash \subseteq \mathcal{P}(E) \times E$ is the enabling relation;
- $\models \subseteq \mathcal{P}(E) \times E$ is the circular enabling relation.

We assume that both the enabling relations are saturated, i.e. $X \circ e \land X \subseteq Y \implies Y \circ e$, for $\circ \in \{\vdash, \models\}$.

The saturation of the relation $ok$ models the fact that once a contract has been fulfilled (i.e. a state is reached where all participants say $ok$), additional events can be neglected.

For notational convenience, we shall sometimes omit curly brackets around singletons, e.g. we shall write $a \vdash b$ instead of $\{a\} \vdash b$, and we shall simply write $\vdash e$ for $\emptyset \vdash e$. Similar abbreviations apply to $\models$.

**Example 2.** Suppose there are three kids who want to play together. Alice has a toy airplane, Bob has a bike, while Carl has a toy car. Each of the kids is willing to share his toy, but they have different constraints: Alice will lend her airplane only after Bob has allowed her ride his bike; Bob will lend his bike only after he has played with Carl’s car; Carl will lend his toy car if the other two kids promise that they will eventually let him play with their toys. These constraints are modelled by the following contract $C$, where we only indicate the minimal elements of the relations $\vdash, \models$ and $ok$:

$$
\begin{align*}
E &= \{a, b, c\} & \{b\} \vdash a & \{c\} \vdash b & \{a, b\} \models c \\
A &= \{A, B, C\} & A ok \{b\} & B ok \{c\} & C ok \{a, b\} \\
\pi(a) &= A & \pi(b) &= B & \pi(c) &= C
\end{align*}
$$
In the previous example, it is crucial that Carl’s contract allows the event $c$ to happen “on credit” before the other events are performed. We shall show that this leads to an agreement among the participants, while no agreement exists were Carl requiring $\{a, b\} \vdash c$ (cf. Ex. 5).

In Def. 3 we refine the notion of configuration of [17], so to deal with the new $\models$-enablings. A set of events $C$ is a configuration if its events can be ordered in such a way that each event $e \in C$ is either $\vdash$-enabled by its predecessors, or it is $\models$-enabled by the whole $C$. Configurations play a crucial role, as they represent sets of events where all the debts have been honoured.

**Definition 3.** For all contracts $\mathcal{C}$, we say that $C \subseteq E$ is a configuration of $\mathcal{C}$ iff

$$\exists e_0, \ldots, e_n. \ (\{e_0, \ldots, e_n\} = C \land \forall i \leq n. \ (\{e_0, \ldots, e_{i-1}\} \vdash e_i \lor C \models e_i))$$

The set of all configurations of $\mathcal{C}$ is denoted by $\mathcal{F}_E$.

**Example 4.** Not all sets of events are also configurations. For instance, in the contract with enablings $a \vdash b$ and $b \models a$, the sets $\emptyset$ and $\{a, b\}$ are configurations (in the latter, the use of $\models$ allows for resolving the circular dependency between $a$ and $b$), while $\{a\}$ and $\{b\}$ are not.

**Example 5.** The contract $\mathcal{C}$ of Ex. 2 has configurations $\emptyset$ and $E = \{a, b, c\}$. Note that if Carl replaces his contract with $\{a, b\} \vdash c$, then $E$ no longer belongs to $\mathcal{F}_E$.

Following the examples above we observe that, differently from other event-based models, if $C$ is a configuration, not necessarily $X \subseteq C$ is a configuration as well. Hereafter, subsets of $E$ are called states, regardless they are configurations or not.

Since our contracts have no conflicts (unlike [17]), the union of two configurations is a configuration as well.

**Lemma 6.** For all contracts $\mathcal{C}$, if $C \in \mathcal{F}_E$ and $D \in \mathcal{F}_E$, then $C \cup D \in \mathcal{F}_E$.

Given a configuration $C$ and an event $e$, the set $C \cup \{e\}$ is still a configuration if $C \vdash e$ or $C \models e$. Otherwise, $C \cup \{e\}$ is not a configuration. Compositional reasoning on sets of events (not necessarily configurations) requires to keep track of the events taken “on credit”, as sketched in the proof of Th. 15.

An event is *reachable* when it belongs to a configuration; a set of events $X$ is reachable if every event in $X$ is reachable. A reachable set is not necessarily a configuration (e.g. $\{a, b\}$ in Ex. 2), yet, there always exists a configuration that contains it. This follows by Lemma 6, which guarantees that configurations are closed by union. The set comprising all the reachable events is a configuration (actually, it is the greatest one).

**Lemma 7.** Let $X \subseteq E$ be a reachable set of events. Then, $\exists C \in \mathcal{F}_E. \ X \subseteq C$.

**Lemma 8.** $C = \bigcup\{e \in E \mid e$ is reachable$\} \in \mathcal{F}_E$, and $\forall C' \in \mathcal{F}_E. \ C' \subseteq C$.

### 2.1 Agreements

Informally, a contract admits an agreement when all the involved participants are happy with the guarantees provided by that contract. In Def. 9 we formalise an agreement on a contract $\mathcal{C}$ as a configuration of $\mathcal{C}$ where all the participants have reached their individual goals. E.g., the configuration $E = \{a, b, c\}$ is an agreement on the contract $\mathcal{C}$ of Ex. 2 since $P ok E$ holds for $P \in \{A, B, C\}$ by saturation of $ok$.

**Definition 9.** An agreement on $\mathcal{C}$ is a configuration $C \in \mathcal{F}_E$ such that $\forall A \in \mathcal{A} : A ok C$. 
We now establish the duties of a participant in a state where some events \( X \) have been performed. Although several different definitions of duties are possible, the common factor of any reasonable definition is that, in the absence of duties, all the participants must have reached their goals (see Th. 13). Here we focus on a definition of duties where \( \vdash \) is prioritized over \( \models \), i.e. an event may be performed on credit only if no other ways are possible. More precisely, an event \( e \) belongs to duties(\( A, X \)) if (i) \( e \) is not already present in \( X \), but is in some configuration \( C \), (ii) \( \pi(e) = A \), and (iii) either \( e \) is \( \vdash \)-enabled by \( X \), or, if no \( \vdash \)-enablings are possible from \( X \), then \( e \) is \( \models \)-enabled by some events in \( C \cup X \).

**Definition 10.** For all \( A \), for all \( X \), we define duties(\( A, X \)) as the set of events \( e \notin X \) such that \( \pi(e) = A \) and there exists \( C \subseteq \mathcal{F}_e \) such that \( e \in C \), and either \( X \vdash e \) or \( \exists e' \in C \setminus X : X \vdash e' \land \exists D \subseteq C \cup X : D \models e \). A participant \( A \) is culpable in \( X \) when \( A \) has some duties in \( X \).

**Example 11.** Recall the contract \( C \) of Ex. 2. By Def. 10 in state \( \emptyset \) only participant \( C \) is culpable, with duties(\( C, \emptyset \)) = \{ \{ c \} \}; in \{ \{ c \} \} only \( B \) is culpable, with duties(\( B, \{ c \} \)) = \{ \{ b \} \}; finally, in \{ \{ b, c \} \} only \( A \) is culpable, with duties(\( A, \{ b, c \} \)) = \{ \{ a \} \}.

**Example 12.** Let \( C \) be a contract with \{ \{ a_0, a_1 \} \vdash \{ a_2 \}, \{ a_0, a_2 \} \vdash \{ a_1 \}, \{ a_1, a_2 \} \vdash \{ a_3 \}, and \( \emptyset \vdash a_0 \), where \( \pi(a_i) = A_i \) for \( i \in [0, 3] \). We have that only \( A_0 \) is culpable in \( \emptyset \); only \( A_1 \) and \( A_2 \) are culpable in \( \{ a_0 \} \); only \( A_1 \) is culpable in \( \{ a_0, a_2 \} \); only \( A_2 \) is culpable in \( \{ a_0, a_1 \} \); only \( A_3 \) is culpable in \( \{ a_0, a_1, a_2 \} \); finally, no one is culpable in \( C = \{ a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3 \} \). If an agreement on \( C \) exists, then for all participants \( A \in A \), and for all \( X \subseteq E \), either \( A \ ok X \), or some participant is culpable in \( X \).

### 2.2 A logical characterisation of agreements

The problem of deciding if an agreement exists on some contract \( C \) is reduced below to the problem of proving formulae in the contract logic PCL [6]. A comprehensive presentation of PCL is beyond the scope of this paper, so we give here a brief overview, and we refer the reader to [6] [5] for more details.

PCL extends intuitionistic propositional logic IPC with a new connective, called **contractual implication** and denoted by \( \rightarrow \). Differently from IPC, a contract \( b \rightarrow a \) implies a not only when \( b \) is true, like IPC implication, but also in the case that a “compatible” contract, e.g. \( a \rightarrow b \), holds. Also, PCL is equipped with an indexed lax modality **says**, similarly to the one in [13].

The Hilbert-style axiomatisation of PCL extend that of IPC with the following axioms:

\[
\begin{align*}
\top & \rightarrow \top \\
\phi & \rightarrow (A \ says \ \phi) \\
(\phi \rightarrow \phi) & \rightarrow \phi \\
(A \ says \ A \ says \ \phi) & \rightarrow A \ says \ \phi \\
(\phi' \rightarrow \phi) & \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \psi') \rightarrow (\phi' \rightarrow \psi') \\
(\phi \rightarrow \psi) & \rightarrow (A \ says \ \phi) \rightarrow (A \ says \ \psi)
\end{align*}
\]

The Gentzen-style proof system of PCL extends that of IPC with the following rules (we refer to [6] for the standard IPC rules, and for the rules for the **says** modality):

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\Gamma \vdash q}{\Gamma \vdash p \rightarrow q} & \quad \frac{\Gamma, p \rightarrow q, a \vdash p}{\Gamma, p \rightarrow q \vdash a \rightarrow b} & \quad \frac{\Gamma, p \rightarrow q, q \vdash b}{\Gamma, p \rightarrow q \vdash a \rightarrow b} & \quad \frac{\Gamma, p \rightarrow q}{\Gamma, p \rightarrow q, q \vdash r} & \quad \frac{\Gamma, p \rightarrow q}{\Gamma, p \rightarrow q, q \vdash r}
\end{align*}
\]
Notice the resemblance between the last rule and the rule $\rightarrow$L of IPC: the only difference is that here we allow the conclusion $r$ to be used as hypothesis in the leftmost premise. This feature allows $\rightarrow$ to resolve circular assume/guarantee rules, e.g. to deduce $a$ and $b$ from the formula $a \rightarrow b \land b \rightarrow a$.

The proof system of PCL enjoys cut elimination and the subformula property. The decidability of the entailment relation $\vdash_{\text{PCL}}$ is a direct consequence of these facts (see [6] for details).

In Def. [14] we show a translation from contracts to PCL formulae. In particular, our mapping is a bijection into the fragment of PCL (called 1N-PCL) which comprises atoms, conjunctions, says, and non-nested (standard/contractual) implications.

**Definition 14.** The mapping $[,]\text{ from contracts into 1N-PCL formulae is defined as follows:} \]

$$[(D_i\circ a_i)i] = \bigwedge_i [D_i\circ a_i]$$

$$[(d_i \mid i \in J) \circ a] = \pi(a) \text{ says } (\bigwedge_{i \in J} \pi(d_i) \text{ says } d_i)$$

where $[\circ] = \begin{cases} \rightarrow & \text{if } \circ = \vdash \\ \rightarrow & \text{if } \circ = \models \end{cases}$

**Theorem 15.** For all contracts $C$, an events $e$ is reachable in $C$ iff $[C] \vdash_{\text{PCL}} \pi(e)$ says $e$.

**Proof.** (Sketch) We extend the definition of configuration, by allowing events to be picked from a set $X$, in the absence of their premises. We say that $C \subseteq E$ is an $X$-configuration of $C$ iff $X \subseteq C$ and

$$\exists e_0, \ldots, e_n \in C. \{e_0, \ldots, e_n\} = C \land \forall i \leq n. (e_i \in X \lor \{e_0, \ldots, e_{i-1}\} \vdash e_i \lor C \models e_i)$$

This allows, given an $X$-configuration, to add/remove any event and obtain a $Y$-configuration, possibly with $Y \neq X$. We shall say that the events in $X$ have been taken “on credit”, to remark the fact that they may have been performed in the absence of a causal justification. Notice that Def. [3] is the special case of the above when $X = \emptyset$. An event $e$ is $X$-reachable if it belongs to some $X$-configuration. For all $X$, we define the set $\mathcal{R}(X)$ by the following inference rules:

$$\frac{D \vdash e \quad D \subseteq \mathcal{R}(X)}{e \in \mathcal{R}(X)} \quad \frac{D \models e \quad D \subseteq \mathcal{R}(X\cup \{e\})}{e \in \mathcal{R}(X)} \quad \frac{e \in X}{e \in \mathcal{R}(X)}$$

The set $\mathcal{R}(X)$ is used as a bridge in proving that $e$ is $X$-reachable iff $[C], X \vdash_{\text{PCL}} e$. We prove first that $\mathcal{R}(X)$ contains exactly the $X$-reachable events, and then we prove that $[C], X \vdash_{\text{PCL}} e$ iff $e \in \mathcal{R}(X)$. The actual inductive statement is a bit stronger. For all conjunction of atoms $\varphi$ and for all sets of conjunctions of atoms $\Phi$, we denote with $\overline{\varphi}$ and $\overline{\Phi}$ the sets of atoms occurring in $\varphi$ and in $\Phi$, respectively. Then, we prove that for all $\varphi$ and for all $\Phi$: $\overline{\varphi} \subseteq \mathcal{R}(\overline{\Phi}) \iff [C], \Phi \vdash_{\text{PCL}} \varphi$. The ($\iff$) direction is proved by induction on the depth of the derivation of $[C], \Phi \vdash_{\text{PCL}} \varphi$. For the ($\Rightarrow$) direction, we let $e \in \overline{\varphi}$, and then we proceed by induction on the depth of the derivation of $e \in \mathcal{R}(\overline{\Phi})$.

The following theorem reduces the problem of deciding agreements to provability of PCL formulae. Concretely, one can use the decision procedure of 1N-PCL to compute the set $C$ of reachable events. Then, an agreement exists iff each principal $A$ has some goals contained in $C$.

**Theorem 16.** A contract $C$ admits an agreement iff:

$$\forall A \in \mathcal{A}. \exists G \subseteq E. (A \ ok G \land \forall e \in G : [C] \vdash_{\text{PCL}} \pi(e) \text{ says } e)$$

**Proof.** ($\Rightarrow$) Let $C$ be an agreement on $C$, and let $\mathcal{A} = \{A_i\}_i$. By Def. [9] $A_i \ ok C$ for all $i$. By definition of $ok$, there exist $G_i \subseteq C$ such that $A_i \ ok G_i$. Since $G_i \subseteq C \subseteq \mathcal{F}_C$, then $G_i$ is reachable. Therefore, by Theorem [15] $[C] \vdash_{\text{PCL}} \pi(e) \text{ says } e$ for all $e \in G_i$.

($\Leftarrow$) Let $\mathcal{A} = \{A_i\}_i$, and let $\{G_i\}_i$ be such that $A_i \ ok G_i$ and $[C] \vdash_{\text{PCL}} \pi(e) \text{ says } e$ for all $i$ and for all $e \in G_i$. By Theorem [15] each $G_i$ is reachable. By Lemma [7] for all $i$ there exists $C_i \in \mathcal{F}_C$ such that $C_i \supseteq G_i$. By Lemma [6] $C = \bigcup C_i \in \mathcal{F}_C$ is an agreement on $C$. \qed
Finally, note that also duties$(A,X)$ can be computed by exploiting the correspondence with PCL. More precisely, we use $\vdash_{\text{PCL}}$ to compute the set of all reachable events, so obtaining the maximal configuration (Lemma 8), and then to compute $D \vdash e$ as prescribed by Def. 10.

3 Related work

Contracts have been investigated using a variety of models, e.g. c-semirings [8, 9, 12], behavioural types [7, 10, 11], logics [1, 16], etc. All these models do not explicitly deal with the circularity issue, which instead is the focus of this paper.

Circularity is dealt with at a logical (proof-theoretic) level in [6]; the relation between reachability in our model and provability in the logic of [6] is stated by Theorem 15. Compared to [6], our model features a finer notion of duties: while [6] focusses on reachable events, Def. 10 singles out which events must be performed in a given state, by interpreting $D \vdash e$ as “I will do $e$ after $D$ has been done”.

In [15] a trace-based model for contracts is defined. Similarly to ours, a way is devised for blaming misconducts, also taking into account time contraints. However, [15] is not concerned in how to reach agreements, so the modeling of mutual obligations (circularity) is neglected. It seems interesting to extend our model with temporal deadlines, which would allow for a tighter notion of agreement, and, more in general, with soft constraints, which could be used to model QoS requirements.

In [14] a generalization of prime event structures is proposed where a response relation (denoted with $\bullet \rightarrow$) is used to characterize the accepting traces as those where, for each $a \bullet \rightarrow b$, if $a$ is present in the trace, then $b$ eventually occurs after $a$. The response relation bears some resemblance with our $\vdash$ relation, but there are some notable differences. First, having $a \vdash b$ does not necessarily imply that a configuration containing $a$ must contain also $b$ (another enabling could have been used), whereas $a \bullet \rightarrow b$ stipulates that once one has $a$ in an accepting configuration, then also $b$ must be present. Indeed, an enabling $a \vdash b$ can be neglected, whereas $a \bullet \rightarrow b$ must be used. Also, augmenting the number of $\vdash$-enablings increases the number of configurations, while adding more response relations reduces the number of accepting configurations of the event structure. Finally, [14] deals with conflicts, while we have left this issue for future investigation.

4 Conclusions

We have proposed a basic model for contracts, building upon a new kind of event structures which allow to cope with circular assume/guarantee constraints. Our event structures feature two enabling relations (the standard enabling $\vdash$ of [17], and the circular enabling $\vdash$), but they lack a construct to model non-determinism, and they only consider finite sets of events. Some preliminary work on a generalisation of our event structures with conflicts and infinite sets of events is reported in [2]. Further extensions to the basic model proposed here seem plausible: for instance, more general notions of goals, agreements and duties. Also, a formalisation of the intuitive notion of “participant protected by a contract”, which we used to motivate the circular enabling relation, seems most desirable.

Our contract model features an effective procedure for deciding when an agreement exists, and then for deciding the duties of participants at each execution step. These procedures are obtained by the means of an encoding of contracts into Propositional Contract Logic. In particular, our encoding reduces the problem of detecting whether an event is reachable, to that of proving a formula in PCL. The correctness of our encoding is stated in Theorem 15. An extension of such result is presented in [2], where configurations are characterised as provability of certain formulae in PCL.
A concrete usage scenario of our contract model is a protocol for exchanging, agreeing upon, and executing contracts. In the initial phase of the protocol, a special participant T acts as a contract broker, which collects the contracts from all the participants. Then, T looks for possible agreements on subsets of the contracts at hand. After an agreement on ℂ has been found, T shares a session with the participants in ℂ. As long as the goals of some participant have not been fulfilled, T notifies the duties to each culpable participant. Variants of this protocol are possible which dispose T from some of his tasks. Notice that reaching an agreement is an essential requirement for the security of this protocol: if an untrusted contract broker claims to have found an agreement when there is none, then Theorem 4 no longer applies, and a situation is possible where a participant has not reached her goals, but no one is culpable. Notably, participants can still protect themselves against untrusted brokers, by always requiring in their contracts the suitable ( fif f ) preconditions. This protocol can be formally described in the process calculus CO 2 [3]. This requires to specialise the abstract contract model of CO 2 to the contracts presented in this paper, and, accordingly, to make the observables in fuse/ask prefixes correspond to agreements/duties, respectively. Static analyses on CO 2, e.g. the one in [4], may then be used to detect whether a participant always respects the contracts she advertises.

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