CRISIS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY AS A SOLUTION TO BRIDGE THE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN KOPASSUS AND OPM IN WEST PAPUA

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ABSTRACT

The security crisis in West Papua is getting hotter in recent days, although the escalation of the conflict is sometimes high and sometimes low. The shooting of Indonesian National Armed Forces officers assigned there is often the target of gunfire by armed criminal groups in West Papua, as well as innocent local people who are also victims of these incidents. So, it is necessary to hold a mutual peace agreement to reduce losses due to shooting incidents. The crisis communication strategy is considered to be a solution to produce a peace agreement between Kopassus as an institution that represents the Indonesian government and the armed groups or OPM (Free Papua Organization) in West Papua. The crisis communication strategy is considered appropriate to be carried out in the midst of two parties who have different thoughts.

INTRODUCTION

The Commander of Rindam XII/ Tanjungpura Colonel Inf Lucky Avianto instructed his six members to carry out the task of thickening the third batch of territorial BKO units to the Kodam XVII/Cendarawasih, Papua.

The task of BKO as a tour of duty for soldiers was held as an effort to improve their abilities. Papua became one of the areas for BKO soldiers from various military units to aim for. In addition to guarding the border areas, they are also involved in arresting perpetrators of armed criminal groups (KKB). On December 3, 2021, there was a shooting incident at the Preparatory Koramil Post in the Suru-suru district, as for the damage caused by the incident, two Indonesian National Armed Forces soldiers who were fetching water in a holding tank suffered serious gunshot wounds.

In this incident, Serda Putra Rahaldi was reported to have died, while on the one hand Praka Suheri was reported to have suffered a serious gunshot wound to the left hip. The Armed Criminal Group Movement (KKB) is currently considered no longer truly voicing the struggle for independence when the Free Papua Organization (OPM) still existed.

For the Indonesian National Armed Forces organization, the KKB is seen only as a medium for political interests for a number of parties who do not want Papua to unite with the Republic.
of Indonesia. In addition, one of the Papuan women's figures, stated that the KKB movement's actions were often followed by the Political Criminal Group Front (KKP) and Clandestine movements by using social media to show their actions (Meijiko, 2020).

| Date                  | Shooting incident                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 19 September 2020     | Pastor Yeremia Zanambani died allegedly being shot by Indonesian National Armed Forces members in a cattle pen near his house in the Hitadipa District.                                                      |
| October 9, 2020       | TPNPB-OPM members shot a member of the joint fact-finding team (TGPF), Bambang Purwoko and a member of the Indonesian National Armed Forces in Hitadipa District while investigating the murder of Pastor Yeremia. |
| October 26, 2020      | Rufinus Tigau, catechist of the Catholic Church of St. Mikael Biogaia, died after being involved in a shootout with the Nemangkawi Task Force in Jalai Village, Sugapa District and Rufinus was accused of being a member of the TPNPB.     |
| November 6, 2020      | TPNPB and Indonesian National Armed Forces engaged in a gun battle in Titigi Village, Sugapa District. A member of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, soldier one Firdaus died in the incident.                                          |
| February 25, 2021     | An Indonesian National Armed Forces soldier died in a shootout with TPNPB. This incident triggered a large-scale deployment of troops by the Indonesian National Armed Forces and caused the residents of Intan Jaya to flee to various places. |
| February 16, 2021     | Three youths in Intan Jaya were allegedly killed by Indonesian National Armed Forces personnel while undergoing treatment at the puskesmas in the district.                                                      |

Source: newspaper.tempo.co, processed, 2022.

The KKP group often creates narratives that aim to build a sense of distrust of the Papuan people to the government in efforts to fulfill the interests of the people holistically. It should be understood that the current KKB is actually not as big as it used to be and now their group is in a cornered position. The various forms of terror that they have carried out are to rebuild their strength and recruit indigenous Papuan youths with school dropout status and minors to join their groups (mediaindonesia.com, 2021).

The Indonesian National Armed Forces has basically succeeded in analyzing and mapping locations into conflict-prone areas in Papua, including the areas of Intan Jaya, Hitadipa, Titigi, Sugapa, Mamba, Puncak Jaya Regency and the Central Mountains of Wamena. The main trigger that became the root of the problem of this long conflict in Papua, among others, was because it was related to the political status of Papua's integration into Indonesia.

Other determinant factors are the level of inequality in the welfare of indigenous Papuans compared to other regions in Indonesia, the failure of the central government and local governments in carrying out development programs in Papua, the long history of the Papuan puppet state that has not been completed and the frequent resolution of conflicts with weapons operations. The following are some forms of military operations that the Indonesian National Armed Forces carried out in Papua.
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Table 2
Military Operations in Papua

| Period         | Military Operation                                                                 |
|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1963 to 1964  | Operations Wisnu Murti I and II                                                     |
| 1963 to 1964  | Operations Wisnu Murti III and IV, Active and Agile Operations, Awareness            |
| 1966          | Barathayudha Operations                                                              |
| 1968          | Awareness and Bratayudha Operations, Operations Wibawa                                |
| 1970 to 1974  | Ultimate Operation                                                                   |
| 1977 to 1978  | Operations Along the Border                                                           |
| 1985 to 1986  | Operation Crow I                                                                      |
| 1986 to 1987  | Operation Crow II                                                                     |
| 1987 to 1989  | Operation Cassowary I and II                                                          |
| 1989 to 1991  | Operation Rajawali I and II                                                           |
| 1998          | Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto apologized and revoked Papua’s status as a DOM area |
| 1998 to 1999  | Security of Vulnerable Areas                                                         |
| 1999 to 2002  | Flag Raising Control Operation                                                       |
| 2002 to 2004  | Sweeping Operation in Wamena                                                         |

Source: Merdeka.com Research Team, 2022.

Former OPM fighter, Nick Messet mentioned that the Indonesian government was right in categorizing the KKB as a terrorist organization on the basis of the form of its movement that often endangers civil society in Papua (Webb-Gannon, 2021). Moreover, the Papuan people generally do not approve of the existence of the KKB in Papua, because the group has unwittingly or unconsciously created a lot of fear and hatred in the community.

The same thing was conveyed by Member of Commission I of the DPR, (Mangku, 2022) supported the discourse on the KKB which was considered as perpetrators of terrorism with acts of terror, such as spreading various forms of threats, taking hostage acts, carrying out torture so that they did not hesitate to injure or kill innocent civilians.

The head of the Humanitarian Team for the Intan Jaya area as well as an NGO activity for Lokataru, Haris Azhar and an observer from LIPI, Adriana Elisabeth said that the various series of armed incidents that occurred in Intan Jaya were basically inseparable from the interest in controlling natural resources in the form of commodities. the gold there. In addition, it is also due to the inability to do so, namely a peaceful dialogue between all parties (bbc.com, 2021).

Researcher from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Pamungkas (2021) assessed that the work visit carried out by the Indonesian National Armed ForcesCommander Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto and the National Police Chief General Lystio Sigit Prabowo to Nemangkari Papua directly would not automatically see the results immediately.

This is based on the form and character of the conflict that exists in Papua, not necessarily only in the form of incidents of political violence, so a forum for dialogue is needed, namely by holding consultations with Papuan group or community leaders, traditional leaders and Papuan church leaders and always consider them to be the same as the nation’s children.

Crisis Communication
Crisis communication is an effort to carry out a dialogue between an organization and its public and stakeholders before a crisis, during a crisis or after a crisis occurs (Aziz & Wicaksono, 2020). Communication is key to crisis management. Stakeholders will require information in the event of a crisis. Information is collected through structured and planned communication, then processed into knowledge and given to all stakeholders in a suitable and good manner (Nahar, 2020). The dialogue can directly contain strategies and practical efforts designed to reduce the value of damage to the reputation of the organization both morally and materially (Fearn-Banks, 2016). In this case is for the Indonesian National Armed Forces as the representative of the Indonesian government in Papua.

Crisis communication can be interpreted broadly as an effort in the process of collecting, processing, and disseminating information to overcome crisis situations that are currently occurring or have occurred (Fearn-Banks, 2016). Moreover, effective crisis verbal exchange is vital for the successful resolution of company disaster, verbal exchange is the rather precise employer regions, because it introduces the penetration of crisis management and company communications (Kádárová et al., 2015). Communication during a crisis is the most studied way to see how and what an organization communicates during a crisis to reduce the negative impact of the crisis and is used to maintain the reputation of the organization.

The existence of a failure to implement crisis communication in the field can directly make people feel afraid, panic, and live full of uncertainty and anxiety in dealing with these conditions. For this reason, the need for citizen involvement during times of crisis is very important, so that the Indonesian government can find out the insights of community members about their actions and resilience in responding to crisis issues while increasing the ability of government institutions to process crisis information and provide public services (Chen et al., 2020).

**SCCT Model Coombs**

Situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) was first proposed by Timothy W. Coombs & Sherry J. Holladay. Then the study of crisis communication began to develop extensively and systematically related to researching how people perceive strategies in responding to a crisis that occurs in society. According to him, the crisis situation cluster consists of crises that have directly placed organizations as victims to unintentional crises and crises that can be prevented.

![Figure 1. SCCT Coombs model](image)

Source: Coombs & Holladay, 2010.
The second core element of Coombs' SCCT model is used to review how capable the strategy is in responding to crises that occur in the community. This crisis response strategy is often used to build or improve the reputation of the organization, reduce negative influences and prevent the emergence of intentions that can lead to a crisis. Coombs (2021) itself has divided the forms of crisis response into two forms, namely primary crisis response strategies and secondary crisis response strategies.

**Table 3**

| Crisis Communication Strategies | Tactics |
|---------------------------------|---------|
| Primary crisis response strategies | a. denial |
|                                  | · attack the accuser |
|                                  | · denial |
|                                  | · scapegoat |
| b. diminish | · excuse |
| c. deal | · concern |
|         | · ingrati Retrieval of resources |

Source: Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 2008 and 2010.

**Conflict Transformation**

Conflict often involves various forms of dispute or conflict between two or more parties related to differences in principles or differences in values or assumptions that are highly valued by one group. A conflict can basically involve several factors that determine the emergence of a conflict including social status, power possessed by a group and non-renewable natural resources.

However, with the existence of several sources or roots of the conflict, the conflicting parties generally sometimes appear unnoticed by the disputing parties. Therefore, a clear explanation regarding the root causes of conflict is more likely to be in the form of multiple arguments rather than just one argument (Fox, 2009).

However, if analyzed more deeply, there are several forms or characteristics of a conflict that can be identified, including consisting of two or more parties involved in the conflict; they are often involved in an act that is mutually hostile between one party and another.

They often use violent actions that ultimately aim to destroy other parties that are against their interests, hurt those who are considered to have different views with their group and tend to hinder the interests of their opponents; and conflicting and open-ended interaction patterns, so that they can be clearly detected by independent observers outside the disputing group (Francis, 2002).

Conflicts generally often involve various actors such as antagonists created in conflicts or conflicts of interest, those who have great influence or authority including proponents of various attitudes, processes and outcomes that arise from conflict; and liaisons and mediators (also including arms dealers, black market actors and extortionists, provocateurs and also those who
are included as agitators who often manipulate a conflict for their personal and group interests (Francis, 2002).

Conflict transformation as a dream and an effort in responding to the ups and downs of a social conflict that occurs in society and as an opportunity given by life to create a process of constructive social change, where it can reduce The level of violence that occurs increases a sense of justice in a direct interaction and social structure, including responding to human problems in relation to human relations (Lederach, 2015).

METHOD

The researcher uses a qualitative research method (Creswell & Poth, 2016). Furthermore, a case study research method is where the researcher conducts an in-depth exploration of the program, event, process, activity, against one or more people (Sugiyono, 2016). A case study approach was applied, to raises problems in the field related to the communication crisis strategy as a solution to bridge the peace agreement between Kopasus and OPM in West Papua. As for data sources, researchers used secondary data with interactive analysis techniques.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Based on the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (2011), states that there are several main contributing factors that are the root cause of the emergence of the KKB conflict in Papua, including the following:

1. The history of the integration of Papua in Indonesia which was carried out through the activities of the referendum on the determination of the people's opinion (Papera) in 1969 which indicated that there was fraud committed by the Indonesian government because it was considered by some parties that it was not in accordance with the contents of the New York agreement, namely one man one vote.
2. Violations of human rights committed by the Indonesian government and the state security apparatus that continue to this day.
3. Various forms of treatment that are not in accordance with the principles of humanity, namely the attitude of marginalization and discrimination against indigenous Papuans whose patterns continue to increase.
4. The failure of social order infrastructure development that occurs in the midst of the Papuan people, such as the lack of public health facilities, low and unequal education and the economic value of the indigenous Papuan people who are far from welfare.
On the other hand, the role of the Commission for Disappeared Persons and Victims of Violence (KontraS) and Imparsial as well as a number of civil society organizations in the Papuan community argue that they deeply regret the actions of the Indonesian government in the defense and security sector in responding to the security situation that occurred in Papua. Papua, whose frequency often results in many casualties from indigenous Papuan civilians.

The Indonesian government is also considered to have often made decisions that are contradictory in nature with the reduction of INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES or Polri troops and have created a discourse for the redefinition of the KKB and TPN-OPM as terrorist organizations in Papua.

In fact, this step is considered to be still strong in the view of the Government of Indonesia regarding the securitization of Papua. So that the Indonesian government is not only considered to have failed to see and understand the real root causes of the conflict in Papua, but also has indirectly paved the way for the military regarding the use of a military security approach in its resolution. This has become more frequent since the racism incident that occurred in Surabaya in 2019, when the Indonesian government responded with holistic security measures.

At first the Indonesian government made efforts to slow down which then blocked access to internet use in Papua, but along with that, divisions and violence occurred in several places, so the Indonesian government sent an additional number of humanitarian personnel. With the lack of clarity about the military operations present in Papua, the reduction in the number of Indonesian National Armed Forces and Polri troops is an issue that cannot be answered by the Indonesian government on the pretext of a personnel exchange policy in Papua.

With the decrease in the number of Indonesian National Armed Forces and Polri troops, it is not known the exact number of personnel, the number and placement of the territory. This reduction or withdrawal of personnel in Papua is carried out in order to reduce and suppress the level of conflict which in fact has not been able to answer the humanitarian problems that have been occurring in the Papua region.

Basically, the authority and responsibility in terms of deploying Indonesian National Armed Forces within the framework of implementing Military Operations Other than War (OMSP) rests with the President while still taking into account the considerations of the DPR (state political decisions) as explained in Article 7 paragraphs (2) and (3) Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Army.

This is also reinforced by Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2008 concerning the General Policy of National Defense which emphasizes that efforts to mobilize Indonesian National Armed Forces in the implementation of OMSP must be carried out based on political decisions by the Indonesian government. On the basis of these provisions, the implementation of the deployment of Indonesian National Armed Forces in Papua and its involvement in various forms of OMSP operations if there is no basis for the underlying state political policy and moreover it is carried out excessively, then clearly it can violate the provisions of the Indonesian National Armed Forces Law.

**DISCUSSION**

**A. The Main Context of Papua**

The area of Papua is 421,981 km² or 3.5 times larger than the island of Java and topographically it consists of mountainous areas in the middle and extensive swampy areas along the coast. Papua’s territorial boundaries consist of the Halmahera and Pacific seas in the north, the Arafura and Australian seas in the south, Papua New Guinea in the east and
the Seram and Maluku seas in the west. The total population of Papua is around 2,576,822 people, which is only 1% of the total population of Indonesia.

In Papua there are as many as 70% of those who live in villages and remote mountainous areas in the center of the island of Papua (Yanuarti, 2016). The topology of this area is confirmed by the results of an anthropological field study (FOS), which identifies seven cultural zones throughout Papua, namely Saireri, Doberai, Bomberai, Ha-Anim, Tani, Lano-Pahp and Me-Pago. There are more than 250 ethnic groups with different distributions of indigenous customs, languages, practices and beliefs in Papua.

In other words, there are as many as hundreds of customary norms that apply in this province, moreover there are as many as 100 different non-Papuan ethnic groups also here. The influence of the entity is still very strong, this is why every incident that often occurs shows a certain disregard for social harmony which is usually very unfortunate followed by acts of violence. On the one hand, the conflict arises in a situation where the Indonesian government is considered to have failed to understand the condition of the plurality of norms and values in Papua.

In addition to its extraordinary cultural wealth, the Papua region also has abundant natural resources such as natural resources in the form of gas, oil, gold, silver, marine products and copper. However, ironically, the abundance of natural resources, both natural and cultural resources, has been tainted by a long history of social conflicts involving enormous handling costs and significant human casualties in each conflict.

Since the proclamation of Indonesian independence in 1945, the Dutch government has separated the territory of Papua from the Indies, this was done in order to prepare the territory of Papua and its inhabitants for a self-government that was not related to the Dutch government. In addition, in the 10-year development plan drawn up by the Dutch government in 1950, the UNTEA (Interim Administration of the United Nations) organization was judged to be responsible for the political transition in Papua.

Therefore, on December 1, 1961 several steps were taken in preparation for the preparation that gained important momentum, namely from the Dutch government in setting the number of elected local community members in Papua as 50% of the Nieuw Guinea Raad (legislature). In addition, the Morning Star flag was flown side by side with the Dutch flag and the Papuan national anthem “Hai Tanahku Papua) began to be used in general and was introduced to all members of the United Nations.

However, basically the New York Agreement of 1962 did not involve indigenous Papuans and the contents of the agreement were designed as a frame of reference for the transfer of the government of Nederland Nieuw Guinea (Papua) from the Netherlands to the Indonesian government. The impact was that in 1964, some indigenous Papuan elites who were educated in the Netherlands demanded that Papuan (government) be free not only from the Dutch government but also from the Indonesian government.

The United Nations-approved free-choice voting activity was carried out in 1969, involving more than 1,000 elected tribal leaders (out of an estimated population of 800,000). This is an impact as evidence of consultation because the absence of Papuan involvement in decision-making which actually affects their living conditions and existence.

This has unknowingly and indirectly left a bad trail in the form of historical complaints that arise from various differences in perceptions about efforts to integrate the Papua region into the Indonesian state government. This condition is the basis because throughout history how the indigenous Papuan people interacted with Indonesia were not critically deconstructed and open to identify a shared history, so that historical complaints will still exist.
B. Polarization

Polarization both horizontally, namely between indigenous Papuans and vertically, namely between the Indonesian government and the indigenous Papuans, has unknowingly created a widening gap that can exacerbate the conditions and impacts of conflict. One of them is the element that triggers this polarization, namely the difference in perceptions of what constitutes a genuine cultural identity compared to a sense of nationalism as a nation and state.

There are several forms of open conflict and acts of violence caused by the raising of the Morning Star flag which are considered and considered as a form of manifestation of separatism efforts. Furthermore, the condition of public opinion that has developed in the community has become more polarized and divided this is due to a pervasive sense of militarism, so that the result indirectly is a worrying paramilitary formation of the red and white line consisting of civilians who see themselves as defenders of the Indonesian state.

The existence of polarization at both the micro and local levels in Papua is the impact of various policies imposed by the Central Government in Papua. At that time, President Megawati Soekarnoputri, had issued Inpres (Presidential Instruction) No. 01/2003 concerning the Expansion of Papua and the Birth of the Province of West Irian Jaya. The impact of this policy is that it has indirectly polarized groups in Papua, namely there are groups that support and groups that oppose it.

The policy groups who are pro with the division of authority assess and argue that the policy is one of the strategic steps planned by the Indonesian government to ensure that more public services can be provided by the Indonesian government for local communities and greater welfare for indigenous people in Papua.

On November 4, 2004, the Constitutional Court had implicitly recognized the status of the Province of West Irian Jaya, which was subsequently carried out by the DPRD of West Irian Jaya Province to hold a public consultation and further support for efforts to establish the Province of West Irian Jaya. On the other hand, anti-Papua expansion policy groups consider and argue that the legal product in the form of Presidential Instruction No.01/2003 is no longer in line with the legal product of Law No.21/2001 on Otsus Papua, especially in paragraph 76 which stipulates that the formation of a new province must obtain approval from the DPRP and MRP.

However, the MRP at that time had not yet been formed when the Presidential Instruction No. 01/2003 was issued. The impact was that the public consultations carried out by the MRP came to the opposite conclusion, namely the emergence of the policy for the expansion of the Papua region including the birth of the Province of West Irian Jaya which was too early and any direct expansion policy had to be in line with the contents of paragraph 76 of Law No. 21/2001. The indirect impact is that both the DPRP and the MRP now reject the existence of the West Irian Jaya Province. On the one hand, the DPRP has also issued another legal product, namely in the form of an official decision No.05/DPRP/2006 on 17 February 2006 which was drafted to support the recommendations of the MRP.

C. Local Actors

In the concept of implementing the special autonomy framework, indigenous peoples who are at the grassroots become the main target, both as beneficiaries and actors of progress on their land. Therefore, full attention must be paid to that level, namely to give
them sufficient space in determining the social progress desired by the community and directing it towards positive peace.

Informal leaders such as tribal chiefs have a role in ensuring peaceful coexistence in their communities. Existing people still listen to and obey tribal leaders who are respected among grassroots individuals. As for the form of tribal loyalty as part of primordialism which still determines the relationship between indigenous Papuans and becomes their collective identity as indigenous Papuan children.

On the one hand, charismatic tribal leaders indirectly have the traditional authority to influence and even mobilize their communities in some cases. This becomes a sensitive issue when this form of primordialism is exploited by several conflict entrepreneurs who are trying to change this form of loyalty into ethnic politics in the Papua region.

Therefore, it is important for all parties to be aware of and understand the context of the crisis in which tribal leaders must be able to act and not see their position as objects that can be manipulated and this will certainly enable them to make an active and positive contribution to Papua.

In the context of the conflict issue in Papua, civil society organizations (CSOs) consisting of religious organizations and traditional organizations, even NGOs, media and educational institutions exist. Religious organizations from various denominations of religious beliefs namely Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism as well as their leaders who have been directly involved actively by making practical input and coordinating various existing initiatives with efforts to achieve positive peace in the Papua region.

Since 2003, many religious leaders have identified, developed and promoted the concept of PTD or Papua Land of Peace as a form of reference used to critically analyze the concrete development process in Papua.

They considered that the MRP organization as a form of representation of the cultural values of the indigenous Papuan people should not be involved in the dynamics of local politics in Papua. Therefore, in fact the MRP organization has a tendency to take on some political character, religious leaders who are reluctant to join or refuse to be part of the MRP members and do not decide to set quotas for representatives of religious communities in Papua.

However, in practice they remain actively involved by providing several inputs to many parties in Papua regarding how to initiate dialogue and develop a sense of togetherness as well as how to avoid human costs in the process of resolving various security and order conflicts in Papua. In addition to religious leaders, there are also several sections of church institutions such as the SKP or the Secretariat of Justice and Peace that are directly active in the peace building process and issues related to human rights.

Another issue is whether or not there is representation of indigenous Papuan indigenous peoples, namely that there are two main organizations directly affiliated with indigenous Papuans, namely the PDP or the Presidium of the Papuan Council, whose main purpose of its formation was to engage in politics and was widely known, especially when its leader, They Eluay was assassinated. The second customary affiliation organization is DAP, which was established by members of indigenous indigenous peoples from all Papuan communities.

As for the form of integration and harmonization among the many social institutions of indigenous local communities in Papua which directly work on various discourses or subjects, namely those related to human rights, education, health, culture, gender, populist economy and so on, which are needed to build a network that is effectively based on a common concept. This is because they have clear original ideas and various forms of programs that
are based on local needs and interests of indigenous Papuans and do not follow the agenda of other organizations or donors.

D. Local Government

Referring to Law No. 34/2004 concerning regional head elections, it is stated that regional heads are directly elected by the people. The democratization process must be able to go hand in hand with an increase in education and political understanding which is expected to enable the community to analyze and express their choices critically.

Meanwhile, good governance can directly play a key role in efforts to achieve positive peace in Papua. If not, then the aspired democracy will not function as expected and lose to the dirty practice of primordialism. Unless this is followed up with outward-looking policies and seeks to build trust in others as well as improve proper education for the community and direct community elections, such as Papua by only opening channels for Papuanization based on building an attitude of tribal loyalty that triggers horizontal conflicts.

CONCLUSION

Building good communication in the midst of a crisis situation requires a high effort and commitment from the disputing parties in their respective interests. Conflict transformation can be used as a scientific approach in crisis communication situations, starting from the transformation process where the government must provide space for community groups in Papua to express their aspirations as well as include their involvement in creating good communication towards a mutually beneficial solution for both parties. Then the next effort, followed by personnel transformation, namely an effort to eliminate negative thoughts or bad traits in the form of old grudges or the unwillingness of one party to accept the other.

Peace will be created if both parties eliminate old hostility and grudges, because with an attitude of openness to accept the presence of other community groups, it will facilitate efforts to establish security and order in the community. The next approach is to use a structural transformation, namely by making a peace agreement that can be seen from the creation of legal products that bind the rights and obligations of both parties in achieving peace. This requires a high commitment from both parties, on the one hand being obedient to carry out the peace agreement and on the one hand restraining behavior that destroys peace.

The transformation of relations aims to strengthen the efforts of both parties to achieve the goal of peace. Finally, cultural transformation is a joint effort to be more aware and instill the principle that the decision to go to war or engage in a ceasefire will only keep both parties away from peace efforts. In addition, the existence of a culture of hostility will actually worsen the security situation in the community and appear not only innocent people, but also victims and losses from both material and immaterial.

In addition, it is recommended that the social psychology approach be prioritized compared to the other two approaches, namely the legal approach and the social approach. This is done in order to suppress the emergence of community trauma from old wounds and minimize the negative impact of personal transformation, namely a sense of revenge or unwillingness to accept other groups that are different from their own.

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