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INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY REVISITED: A CRITIQUE ON WALTZ’S INTERPRETATION OF ROUSSEAU

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Abstract
Kenneth Waltz is a celebrated scholar of International Relations whose works have become the foundation of the neorealist camp of International Relations. One of his most prominent theses is on the existence of international anarchy, which Waltz calls “the third image,” which creates a perpetual state of war in the interstate relations. This essay does not examine whether his thesis is valid, but instead tries to problematize the use of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s texts as the foundation in creating the perspective of the third image. This paper argues that Waltz’s misinterpretation of some of Rousseau’s texts makes Waltz’s thesis on international anarchy and constant state of war differ from Rousseau’s thoughts on state and interstate relations. This paper will use the Hermeneutics method to provide an alternative interpretation of Rousseau’s works and criticize Waltz’s interpretation of them.

Keywords: International Anarchy, Neorealism, Kenneth Waltz, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Hermeneutics.

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, Kenneth Waltz famously said: “It is to a great extent due to its bipolar structure that the world since the war has enjoyed a stability seldom known where three or more powers have sought to cooperate with each other or have competed for existence (The Stability, 907).” This statement marks the perspective of neorealist camp of International Relations, which focuses on stability rather than seeking peaceful coexistence. This notion comes from the assumption that a perpetual state of war is the inevitable condition of the international system. The state of war persists due to the
structure of international anarchy, which is marked by the absence of authority in the international realm. As a result, the state of war is a condition in which every state is free to pursue its self-interest and fight other states whose interest overlaps or threatens its own. Although war is the most extreme scenario of a clash of interest between states, even when war does not exist, every state is in constant danger, resulting in the need to strengthen its offensive and defensive power. The moment of negative peace is defined as a constant struggle to keep the balance of power either by strengthening domestic armaments or creating alliances (Waltz, *Man, State*, 221-222). Waltz also claims that although human nature and the state’s domestic conditions determine inter-state relations, the system of international anarchy or the third image plays the main role in creating a perpetual state of war (*Man, State*, 237-238). This perspective explains the extended condition of negative peace throughout the Cold War, in terms of the constant balance of power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, as the most stable era for the international system. Waltz claims that this condition is the reality we live in, and every state should consider the consequences of the third image when calculating its foreign policy, rather than considering its moral obligations (238).

In constructing international anarchy, Waltz relies heavily on Rousseau’s thoughts, which he claimed to be the roots of the third image perspective (161). His interpretation places Rousseau as the foundation of realist thinkers of International Relations, in opposition to idealists like Kant (Williams, 52). However, Waltz’s interpretation has two inaccuracies, which will be further elaborated on in this paper. The first criticism is of how he interprets Rousseau’s thoughts on the state of nature and the birth of society, which lead to his conclusion that the international system shapes state behavior. Waltz’s adoption of Rousseau’s stag hunt society to prove that an inherently egoistic nature of human hinders any possible cooperation is inaccurate because such example was originally used by Rousseau to describe an uncivilized human who does not know and does not need social interaction. The second criticism is of Waltz’s interpretation of Rousseau’s skepticism towards Saint Pierre’s Peace Project, from which Waltz concludes that a peaceful confederation among states is impossible in a state of international anarchy. Waltz’s conclusion is indeed similar to Rousseau’s; however, Waltz missed the point of Rousseau’s critique which argues that a peaceful confederation among states is impossible not because it is the natural condition of interstate relations, but because the European states that Rousseau observed consisted of corrupt monarchies.
Criticism of Waltz’s interpretation of Rousseau’s texts and neorealism in International Relations in general is not new, as it has been previously discussed by Aiko, Williams, and Behr and Heath. Aiko challenged the notion of ‘assigning’ Rousseau to the realist camp because Rousseau’s critiques on Saint Pierre’s Peace Project did not point to the impossibility of confederation due to the nature of state, but rather due to the existence of domestic injustice that renders the peaceful confederation impossible (119). Besides, Williams also noted that Rousseau’s example of stag hunt society and the logic of anarchy do not describe the permanent urge of human nature, which we must to submit to, but rather is an example of an undeveloped or uncivilized human society that can be improved through the establishment of civil state (66). Finally, Behr and Heath challenged the neorealist interpretation of Rousseau’s The Social Contract, which treated the state as one cohesive acting unit but neglected the fact that in order to act as single body politic, the pre-state society must agree on certain moral values to ensure unity (340). By neglecting the pre-condition of body politic, neorealists treat every state as a cohesive unit, even those that do not have a foundation of unity. This paper relies on the works of Aiko and Williams as the starting point for critiques of Waltz and develops those works further by highlighting and interpreting the original texts to argue that some of Waltz’s adoption of Rousseau texts failed to comprehend the context of such texts.

These criticisms will be developed using the hermeneutics approach to explain this paper’s interpretation of Rousseau’s texts, mainly The Social Contract, A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe and The State of War, and The Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men, followed by a comparison between Waltz’s interpretation of Rousseau, which led him to his formulation on the third image. This paper will begin by explaining the hermeneutics approach and continue with an explanation of the social context of Rousseau’s thoughts to understand the meaning of his texts. It will then address Waltz’s interpretation of Rousseau’s thoughts and, finally, will explain two inaccuracies in Waltz’s interpretation and discuss the implications of these inaccuracies in understanding Rousseau in relation to International Relations theory.

**CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

**Hermeneutics as the Art of Interpreting Text**

Hermeneutics is the practice of understanding a text by reflecting and making a moral judgement on its meaning (Gadamer, 92-93). As part of practical philosophy, it is not merely a technical expertise in understanding the text *per se* but also involves a moral judgment of how the ideas within the text bring good to the present society (Gadamer,
93). Thus, the method comprises of three inter-related steps: understanding the context of the text to grasp its meaning, understanding our present reality, and making a judgment on how the normative aspects in the text can be implemented in the present reality.

The first step of hermeneutics is to have a real understanding of the text. In Gadamer’s words:

“The description of the inner structure and coherence of a given text and the mere repetition of what the author says is not yet real understanding. One has to bring his speaking back to life again, and for this one has to become familiar with the realities about which the text speaks. (98)”

The description seems similar to Skinner’s thoughts on how to understand the real ideas of the text by recognizing and grasping its historical context, including its culture and intention (36). In order to understand its meaning, the text must not be treated as a timeless object that can be interpreted independently without considering its relevant background or the writer’s intentions. For Skinner, this way of interpreting generates mythologies and not the history of the text (7). Thus, understanding the text is a matter of grasping the writer’s intentions, understanding his original audience, and recognizing the social context, which influenced the writing. One of the easiest ways to contextualize a text is through finding the question or problem that the text intends to address. In this sense, every text is written as a critique of the author’s social and political condition, or as an answer to his or her problematic environment (Gadamer, 107). Describing such question or problem will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the text itself.

The second step is to recognize the impossibility of understanding the writer’s original intention, while knowing that our present understanding of reality influences our interpretation. Our own social context influences how we make sense of reality, just as our understanding of language influences our understanding of the text’s meaning (Gibbons, 565). Thus, the claim of a neutral or objective understanding of a text is misleading. We must go beyond the subjective intention of the writer and into the intersubjectivity between the text and its interpreter (Gibbons, 567). Bridging the context of which the text was written with the present context that we read it is what Gibbons called “the fusion of horizons” (Gibbons, 567). “The fusion of horizons” fuses our horizons with that of the text to create a new meaning from the intersubjectivity process.

Having established an understanding of the two preceding steps, hermeneutics acknowledges that an interpretation may go beyond the writer’s original intentions (Ricoeur, 95). Hermeneutics believes that the art of interpretation will never achieve one
definite universal interpretation for all readers. Thus, the interpretation relies heavily on persuasion rather than proof (Kahn-Nisser 390). Any explanation or judgment that is offered within this paper is also context-dependent to the author’s social and political condition, as well as the author’s intentions. This condition makes any conclusion or judgment within the paper inherently open-ended, and its accuracy can only be measured through the extent of the paper’s success in convincing its readers.

**DISCUSSIONS**

**The Social Context of Jean-Jacques Rousseau**

Rousseau was born in the eighteenth century to a middle class family. His parents were citizens of Geneva, as was Rousseau himself until he renounced his Genevan citizenship in 1764 due to his controversial ideas (Riley, 2). At the time, Geneva was a republic surrounded by large monarchies such as France, Prussia, and Rome (Wokler, 2). As a typical republican government, Geneva was ruled by the people’s representatives or grand conseil, which consisted of economically independent men of Geneva from diverse economic classes (Ryan, 532). However, in practice, the political decisions were made and monopolized by the petit conseil, which consisted of upper-class oligarchs. These oligarchs were dismissive of other interests and did not want to share power (Ryan, 532). Despite this oligarchic influence, Rousseau saw his republic as a better form of government rather than that of monarchies, although this was an unpopular opinion for scholars of his era, who generally believed that absolute monarchy resulted in better order than other types of government (Wokler, 2).

Rousseau travelled to Paris in 1741 and met several “enlightened” writers such as Diderot and Voltaire (Ryan, 533). He later went to Venice for a year to work as a secretary for the French Ambassador (Wokler, 7). It is believed that witnessing corruption in the Venetian government influenced The Social Contract and Rousseau’s general thoughts on the ideal form of society and government. Most of his writings aimed to criticize the moral character of the society he lived in, which perpetuated and supported the absolutist government. Specifically, Rousseau attacked the “enlightened” thinkers who based their assumptions on natural law (Aiko, 99) and the egoistical and destructive nature of humans (Rousseau and Gourevitch, 151). Moreover, he drew influence from classic political philosophers such as Plato, Plutarch, and Grotius who wrote about order and peaceful relations within society, in order to achieve and maintain the common good. At the same time Rousseau read Hobbes, whom he later criticized in The Second Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality among Men (Rousseau and Gourevitch, xi).
The Political and Philosophical View of Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Rousseau based his criticisms and opinions of the state and society on his assumptions about human nature. This distinguished him from the natural law thinkers. The latter believed that humans are naturally social creatures. Thus, human society emerged naturally as a means to collectively fulfill human needs and interests (Aiko, 100). The natural ability to create a society, however, does correlate with the natural ability to create order and security within that society. Thus, states were created to guarantee social order and security (Aiko, 101). In other words, humans are naturally social creatures who seek to socialize with other humans. However, there is no guarantee that these relations will remain positive and peaceful. Thus, the state was invented to provide order and security. This understanding led natural law thinkers to even support tyrannical monarchies as long as the state could maintain order within society.

Rousseau opposed this assumption by saying that human nature is innocent and without morality. He also said that humans did not naturally socialize with others (Ryan, 543). According to Rousseau, humans have three natural instincts: *amour de soi* or care for oneself, *pitie* or a sense of empathy for the suffering of other human beings, and *perfectibilité* or the capacity to develop and learn from others. These first two instincts also guide other animals throughout their life; however, the last distinguishes humans from other creatures (Ryan, 543). The *amour de soi* led humans to self-preservation, but it was not *amour-propre* or the egoistic desire to pursue one’s own interests. Rousseau believed that there were enough resources for everyone, so humans do not need to kill other humans to maintain self-preservation. Moreover, with the instinct of *pitie*, humans do not hurt others in conflicts over resources. They do not even have constant contact with each other, given the world they live in is vast (Ryan, 544).

Rousseau later remarked that Hobbes’s natural condition of mankind being egoistic and violent is inaccurate because Hobbes’s theory was based on his observation of man within society, rather than the natural man (Rousseau and Gourevitch, 151). Rousseau highlighted the role of *pitie* as an innate value, which supports man’s capacity to reason, create bonds of friendship, and produce benevolent actions. The egoistical behavior of man is thus a product of society, which preserves the reason and fight against *pitie*, while simultaneously creating religion, morals, virtue, and laws to temper reason (Rousseau and Gourevitch, 153).

Humans left this natural state when population increased significantly more than resources. Their territory became smaller, and they were in constant contact with others.
Society began as a result. Thus, unlike natural law thinkers, Rousseau argued that the invention of society was not natural (Ryan, 545). Humans began to develop organizational skills and language to communicate. When society developed into a more complex form, interaction developed into reason. The *amour de soi* and *pitie* turned into moral sentiments and, by generalizing with others, humans created moral principles to guide society (Ryan, 546). However, as the moral principle developed, men were no longer guided by self-instinct, but rather by the moral principles that were shared amongst society. These impersonal moral standards created fear, guilt, and shame (Ryan, 546). Society then invented the concept of private property, which created inequality amongst humans and became a source of conflict (Ryan, 549). Men neglected their natural instincts and behaved according to *amour-propre*.

In short, the development of society influenced the perception and morality of its members. As a result, unlike natural law thinkers who believed that men created society naturally, Rousseau thought society shaped the behavior of men within that society. The corrupt state creates immoral members and thus, the function of the state is not only to create order but to also maintain and develop the morality of its citizens.

Under this context, Rousseau’s thoughts are far from placing all of society in an alike-unit. There are states of morality or civility and states of immorality or corruption. These difference shapes the behavior of the state and the citizens within it. Thus, Rousseau’s thoughts differ from the assumption of neorealists, who treat every state as alike-unit in the international realm.

**Waltz’s Interpretation of Rousseau as the Third Image**

In Waltz’s *Man, the State, and War* the third image explains how international anarchy has shaped the perpetual state of war among states. He starts his interpretation by giving two interpretations of the invention of the state according to Rousseau. The first is through the voluntary will of the people, as described in *The Social Contract*. The second is through the historical experience of humans, involving experience, interest, morality, and necessity as described in *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* (167). Waltz claimed that the first is the result of philosophical thoughts of history, while the second is the hypothetical reconstruction of history (167).

Waltz later explains the hypothetical reconstruction of human nature and the first society to justify his argument that personal interest always prevails over the collective interest in the society without authority. He contends that Rousseau’s example of the stag
hunt society, in which one-member defects to catch a rabbit to fulfill his personal interest instead of fulfilling the former agreement, shows that the source of conflict arises not from man’s personal interest, but from the nature of a society without authority (168). Waltz later shows that conflict first arose in society after humans established constant relations with others. Although every rational man is said to have the capability to cooperate in order to pursue the collective interest, insecurity arises when each man can never be sure whether his counterparts are rational or not. In the end, everyone will choose to breach the agreement and pursue self-interest rather than take the risk of cooperating and gaining nothing when other members irrationally breach the agreement (169). This strengthens Waltz’s argument that the failed agreement is not a result of man’s inability to be rational, but of the anarchic situation.

Waltz then elaborates on the original state of nature to the creation of the state in *The Social Contract*, which produced the authority within society and made agreements possible because natural freedom changed into civil liberty, instincts into justice, and possession into property (*Man, State*, 172). Through possessing civil liberty, man cannot breach an agreement for his own desires without sanctions from the authority and, thus, collective interests can be pursued without insecurity. The creation of a civil state made a moral life for citizens possible. However, the condition outside of the civil state remains anarchic, under which cooperation is impossible, just as the condition of the first society.

Before discussing the condition of international anarchy, Waltz justifies how the state can be an acting unit within the international system and set aside dissenting voices within the state. The state as an acting unit within the international system is defined as one in which the diverse interests and principles of people within the society are represented solely by the state’s interest and principle in the international system. His definition is derived from his interpretation of Rousseau’s body of politics, which embodies the general will of its members and acts in order to achieve the general will and maintain its own preservation (*Waltz, Man, State*, 173). Waltz later emphasizes the fulfillment of the general will and self-preservation: every state will exercise its accumulated power as the state’s power to attain the state’s will and maintain its own existence. The members of the state are absorbed into the state, which decides how to attain its collective interests. Furthermore, the state perpetuates its authority over its subjects through patriotism. This patriotism is developed through education and the continuous learning of general will and general principles of morality. Finally, the society within the state is united into one body of politics (*Waltz, Man, State*, 175).
Waltz further strengthens his claim on the unity of state by setting aside a dissent voice by saying:

“Dissenters within the state are carried along by two considerations: their inability to bring force to bear to change the decision; their conviction, based on perceived interest and customary loyalty that in the long run it is to their advantage to go along with the national decision and work in the prescribed and accepted ways for its change (178).”

This statement forces powerless dissenters into the state. Any state that fails to force its dissenters to comply is no longer considered a state and, therefore, falls outside the discussion. Furthermore, he sees that the unity of state is strengthened by enmities in the international system, in which every state is pursuing its own general will (179).

Waltz dismisses the possibility of continuous cooperation among good states because each state operates to achieve its particular general will. These particularities may clash with one another and produce conflict. As there is no general will in the world of states, there is no harmony in the international system (Waltz, Man, State, 182). Waltz applies the logic of the international system in the same way as the first society, before the state. He later emphasizes Rousseau’s thoughts in the commentaries of Saint-Pierre’s Peace Project, which says that the states of Europe will fall into conflict at every opportunity. The public laws of every state of Europe are full of contradictions, which makes war among them inevitable (Waltz, Man, State, 183). Harmony in interstate relations is only possible through the balance of power. Conflicts of interest will certainly arise between states in the perpetual state of war, but the balance of power can prevent an actual war (Waltz, Man, State, 186).

The Critics on Waltz’s Interpretation of Rousseau

Waltz’s understanding of Rousseau, which leads to his claim that international anarchy is a perpetual state of war among states, has two main flaws. First, Waltz’s image of the international system is an exact adoption of the first uncivilized society, whereas Rousseau’s civil state does not operate like uncivilized humans. Second, he interprets Rousseau’s criticism of Saint Pierre’s Peace Project as the impossibility of cooperation among states within international anarchy, whereas Rousseau’s criticism is of the inconsistency of its implementation, which rendered the project impossible.

First, Rousseau’s conception of the body politic does not merely unite the will of society as a general will in order to achieve a common interest and maintain self-preservation. Beyond the general will, the body of politics of the state also creates a civilized society with morality, leading it to become the civil state (Rousseau, The Social
The civilized society shares moral principles that naturally, as discussed in Rousseau’s state of nature, consist of *amor de soi* and *pitie*. He later emphasizes that civilized man acquires a moral liberty and “makes man truly the master of himself; for to be driven by our appetites alone is slavery” (Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, 59). This shows that the civil state is not driven by *amour-propre*, where self-interest will be pursued by all means and human beings are only valued according to their ability to fulfill self-interest (Williams, 63). Waltz’s description of state behavior, which exercises all of its power by all means in order to achieve the general will, is a description of Rousseau’s uncivilized and immoral state that has lost its *pitie* and is driven solely by *amour-propre*.

Moreover, Waltz’s claims of international anarchy, derived from his interpretation of Rousseau’s example of the stag-hunt illustration, is misleading because he makes two mistakes in his interpretation of the text. First, Rousseau’s stag-hunt illustration is the depiction of the pre-society condition of savage men, which differs from international condition. As stated above, the natural condition of man was governed by *perfectibilite*, which enabled them to learn others’ behaviors and create an alliance when necessitated by circumstances. However, as such circumstances are only presented rarely in the natural condition, the alliance was short-lived and only based on the imminent common interest (Rousseau and Gourevitch, 163). Rousseau imagines the natural condition as the condition where men lived independently and rarely met one another. Building trust was not necessary because there was not a constant need for interaction. This condition cannot depict the interstate condition, in which constant interaction and mutual engagement in necessary at some level. Second, the stag-hunt illustration does not confirm the egoistic behavior of humans because Rousseau believed in the *pitie* instinct. Instead, it describes the incapability of pre-society human to plan ahead and sustain interaction with one another (Rousseau and Gourevitch, 163). Without the existence of language and necessity to live together, the illustration that describes the defect one member makes at the expense of the other depicts the limitation of cooperation without any means of deep understanding and trust building. By no means does this explain the domination of reason over morality or the egoistic instinct of man, but rather a phase of human progress before the invention of language and society.

The second main flaw comes from the interpretation of Rousseau’s criticism of Saint-Pierre’s Peace Project. Waltz believed the text supported his argument for international anarchy and the perpetual state of war. However, for Rousseau, the problem was not within the anarchical system. The state of war among the states of Europe was
rooted in the corrupt, tyrannical European states that made the idea of confederation impossible. Thus, it is not the realistic perspective of Rousseau opposing the idealist perspective of Saint-Pierre. Rather, it is Rousseau’s criticism of Saint-Pierre, who is clearly influenced by natural law thinkers. This influence makes him see the eighteenth century European states as unproblematic as long as they created order within the state (Williams, 67-68; Aiko 102). Furthermore, his criticism of Saint-Pierre’s Peace Project is directed towards the inconsistencies that neglect the moral problem within the European states, but aim to make a moral confederation among them. Rousseau saw the corrupt monarchies as the source of the perpetual state of war and thought it an impossible hope that these corrupt governments would comply with the confederation. In his explicit criticism:

“...princes would have nothing to do with peace on these terms, even if they calculated their interests for themselves. How will it be, when the calculation is made for them by their ministers, whose interests are always opposed to those of the people and almost always to the prince's? Ministers are in perpetual need of war, as a means of making themselves indispensable to their master, of throwing him into difficulties from which he cannot escape without their aid, of ruining the State, if things come to the worst, as the price of keeping their own office. They are in need of it, as a means of oppressing the people on the plea of national necessity, of finding places for their creatures, of rigging the market and setting up a thousand odious monopolies (A Lasting Peace, 36)."

Rousseau shows that the corrupt state oppresses its people and is driven by amour-propre. He later offers a solution to the creation of a peaceful confederation in The Social Contract, which calls for transforming the corrupt state into the civil state.

**CONCLUSIONS**

**Implications for International Relations Theory**

The neorealist camp of International Relations has long believed that the state of war is a constant phenomenon of the international system that cannot be altered. Thus, they are content to make stability through a prolonged balance of power while burdening every state with constant, if not increasing, military expenditure to balance world power. I do not claim that the assumption of neorealism is invalid but rather, I contend that the use of Rousseau’s text to justify such assumption may be inappropriate. Waltz’s attempts to portray the condition of society of state and the nature of state by reflecting on Rousseau’s concept of society of man and man’s natural instincts ultimately cherry picked Rousseau’s thoughts without considering his entire philosophical works.
This paper also shows a stark difference between Waltz and Rousseau in the treatment of the most important unit of analysis in politics and inter-state relations. On one hand, Waltz deemed that the structure of international anarchy makes the state behave the way it does in interstate relations. On the other hand, Rousseau believed that the domestic condition of a state influences its behavior. This difference further proves that Waltz misinterpreted Rousseau’s portrayal of constant distrust among states as a cause of state’s behavior. Meanwhile the contextualization of Rousseau’s texts shows that such conditions are the result of certain configurations of the state’s domestic politics. I believe that it would be more appropriate for Waltz and the neorealist camp to use the philosophy of natural thinkers’, like Hobbes, to underpin their assumptions. Hobbesian philosophy clearly supports the egoistic nature of humans, the existence of a constant state of war and distrust among states, and the identical treatment of all kinds of states as one acting unit without differentiating between the civil and uncivil state.

Furthermore, I propose the alternative interpretation of Rousseau, which has been elaborated on in this essay, may become the solution to escape the state of war through the transformation of the uncivilized state into the civil state. As a civil state creates a civilized people within itself, so may a group of civil states have peaceful relations and even create a common law under confederation without losing their sovereignty as a state to the supra-state being. The behavior of civil states is certainly different from the immoral or corrupt states, which are more aggressive and reluctant to comply with the confederation without force from a stronger entity. This explains the different behavior of an authoritarian state such as North Korea, which tends to defect from an agreement and refuse to comply with the current international law.

Most modern democratic states reflect the behavior of a civil state. The development of a more complex and binding confederation can be seen in the European Union, which, on the one hand, can be seen as a constant struggle for power and self-interest among its members, but on the other, can be seen as a region without the state of war. The constant struggle for power within the confederation is inevitable, as it is the nature of human society to reason with others. However, within the civil state, this relationship is accompanied by the moral principle of *pitie*, which ensures peaceful relations. As a natural instinct of *perfectibilite*, the positive development of the European Union has influenced the creation of similar confederations in other regions, such as ASEAN in South-East Asia, the African Union in Africa, and UNASUR in South America. Although all of these confederations have different problems in maintaining
their peaceful relations, the solution lies within the transformation of member states to the fully civilized states. Thus, the International Relations scholar may need to rethink focus on the state and how to create a civil state instead of seeing it as a similar unit and focus on the third image.

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