An extended technical discussion of S-values and unconditional information can be found in Greenland [1]. Here we briefly cover several technical topics mentioned in our main paper [2]: Different units for (scaling of) the S-value besides base-2 logs (bits); the importance of uniformity (validity) of the P-value for interpretation of the S-value; and the relation of the S-value to other measures of statistical information about a test hypothesis or model.

1 | BACKGROUND

An extended technical discussion of S-values and unconditional information can be found in Greenland [1]. Here we briefly cover several technical topics mentioned in our main paper [2]: Different units for (scaling of) the S-value besides base-2 logs (bits); the importance of uniformity (validity) of the P-value for interpretation of the S-value; and the relation of the S-value to other measures of statistical information about a test hypothesis or model.

2 | UNITS FOR THE S-VALUE

Other units for measuring information other than bits arise from different choices for the base of the logarithms. For example, using natural (base-e) logs, the S-value becomes $s_e = -\ln(p) = -\log_2(p) \ln(2)$ whose units are called “nats,” while using common (base-10) logs the S-value becomes $s_{10} = -\log_{10}(p) = -\log_2(p) \log_{10}(2)$ whose units are called hartleys, bans, or dits (decimal digits). The ratio of one dit of information to one bit of information is $\log_2(10) = 3.22$ which is similar to the ratio of meters to feet, 3.28. Just as the choice of meters vs. feet does not affect the concepts and methods surrounding length measurement, so choice of dits vs. bits does not affect any of the concepts or methods of information measurement. Bits are most commonly used in communications engineering because the fundamental physical components in electronic information storage are binary and thus their information capacity is one bit. Natural logs are however more mathematically convenient and thus more common in statistical theory (see below), although base-10 logs are also seen.
3 | UNIFORMITY OF THE P-VALUE AND THE INFORMATION IN THE S-VALUE

The decision rule “reject \( H \) if \( p \leq \alpha \)” will reject \( H \) 100\( \alpha \)% of the time under sampling from a model \( M \) obeying \( H \) (i.e., the Type-1 error rate of the test will be \( \alpha \)) provided the random variable \( P \) corresponding to \( p \) is valid (uniform under the model \( M \) used to compute it), but not necessarily otherwise [3]. This is one reason why frequentist writers reject invalid \( P \)-values (such as posterior predictive \( P \)-values, which highly concentrate around 0.50) and devote considerable technical coverage to uniform \( P \)-values [3–5]. Valid \( P \)-values (“U-values”) translate into exponentially distributed \( S \)-values with mean \( \log_2(e) \) where \( e \) is the base of the natural logs; this is then the Shannon entropy (or “Shannon index”) \( E(S_j | M) \).

Uniformity is also central to the “refutational information” interpretation of the \( S \)-value used here, for it is necessary to ensure that the \( P \)-value \( p \) from which \( s \) is derived is in fact the percentile of the observed value of the test statistic in the distribution of the statistic under \( M \), thus making small \( p \) surprising under \( M \) and making \( s \) the corresponding degree of surprise. Because posterior predictive \( P \)-values do not translate into sampling percentiles of the statistic under the hypothesis (in fact, they are pulled toward 0.5 from the correct percentiles) [4, 5], the resulting negative log does not measure surprisal at the statistic given \( M \), and so is not a valid \( S \)-value in our terms.

The coin-toss interpretation we have used to physically illustrate this surprise assumes that the only alternative to fairness is in the direction of loading for heads. The \( S \)-value it produces thus corresponds to a \( P \)-value for the 1-sided hypothesis \( \Pr(\text{heads}) \leq \frac{1}{2} \); nonetheless, this interpretation applies even if the original observed \( P \)-value \( p \) was 2-sided. This translation from a 2-sided \( P \)-value to a 1-sided \( S \)-value parallels the transformation of \( P \)-values into 1-sided sigmas (z-scores) in physics, in which for example a \( P \)-value of 0.05 from a two-sided test would become a sigma of 1.645, the upper one-sided 5% cutoff for a standard-normal deviate [6].

4 | OTHER MEASURES OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION ABOUT A TEST HYPOTHESIS OR MODEL

A common measure for evaluating a hypothesis or model restriction \( H \) under background assumptions or unrestricted model \( A \) is the maximum-likelihood ratio (MLR), which is the value of the likelihood function at its maximum under \( A \) alone, divided by its (restricted) maximum when the test hypothesis \( H \) is additionally imposed [7, 8]. The MLR defined this way is always above 1; it is however sometimes confused with the posterior odds against the tested value \( H \) given \( A \), which it equals only under very special (and usually unrealistic) conditions. The MLR does however show the most extreme increase in posterior odds against \( H \) that the data could produce given
The corresponding information measure paralleling the S-value is the deviance difference or likelihood-ratio (LR) statistic for $H$ given $A$, $2 \ln(MLR)$, which is itself a test statistic for $H$ given $A$. The change in the Akaike Information Criterion (without small-sample adjustment) from adding $H$ to the background model is $2 \ln(MLR) - 2d$ where $d$ is the dimension (degrees of freedom) of $H$ [7, 9].

Now consider a sharp constraint hypothesis $H$ with a $P$-value less than $1/e = 0.368$. Bayarri & Berger [10] and Sellke et al. [11] show that $b = -e \cdot p \cdot \ln(p) = e \cdot p \cdot s_e$ is a sharp lower bound on the Bayes factor for $H$ under $A$, where $A$ now includes strong restrictions on the alternatives to $H$. (A Bayes factor is the ratio of posterior data probabilities under $H$ and an alternative, given $A$.) Thus, given $A$ and the data, $b$ is a lower bound on the reduction in odds for $H$ given $A$ in moving from a prior to a posterior, and $1/b$ is an upper bound on the increase in odds against $H$ given $A$. Simple numeric examples show that the latter bound is much lower than the MLR. The strength of the restrictions added to $A$ is indicated for example by the fact that for $p = 0.05$ the MLR in Table 1 of our main paper [2] is 6.83, while $1/b$ is only 2.46. Sellke at al. [11] also discuss how $1/P$ is the Type-1 error rate for a particular type of conditional decision rule.

Grünwald et al. [12] introduce a general concept they call an S-test statistic (where "S" stands for "safe") for $H$ given $A$, defined as any random variable $S$ satisfying $E_M(S) \leq 1$ under any model $M$ obeying $H$ and $A$. They also call this $S$ an "S-value". As noted above, our binary S-value $S_2 = -\log_2(P)$ can be redefined using natural logs and thus rescaled to units of nats instead of units of bits, via $S_e = -\ln(P) = -\log_2(P) \ln(2)$. $S_e$ is then an example of their S-value, since $E_M(S_e) \leq 1$ when the random $P$-value $P$ is valid or conservatively valid (uniform or dominated by a uniform random variable under $M$); it is also an example of a betting score [13] (hence "S" can also be taken as "information score"). Grünwald et al. [12] discuss other S-values, including those based on Bayes factors.

Finally, consider a 1-dimensional continuous parameter $\mu$ with test hypotheses $H$ of the form $\mu \leq \mu_0$ and a specified alternative $\mu \geq \mu_1$ (or $\mu = \mu_0$ with alternative $\mu = \mu_1$) where $\mu_0 < \mu_1$. In this context, yet another S-word, "severity", has been used to refer to the $P$-value $p(\mu \geq \mu_1)$ for $\mu \geq \mu_1$ (the lower tail of the test statistic $m - \mu_1$ for a 1-sided test of $\mu = \mu_1$ when using the estimate $m$ of $\mu$), which decreases as $\mu_1$ increases; see p. 345 and Fig. 5.5 of Mayo [14]. Since the complement $p(\mu \leq \mu_1) = 1 - p(\mu \geq \mu_0)$ is the $P$-value for $\mu \leq \mu_1$, we find that (whatever the base) the corresponding S-value function $s(\mu \leq \mu_1) = -\log(p(\mu \leq \mu_1))$ measuring the information against $\mu \leq \mu_1$ increases as $p(\mu \geq \mu_1)$ increases; thus $p(\mu \geq \mu_1)$ varies directly with the information $s(\mu \leq \mu_1)$ against $\mu \leq \mu_1$ (the case with alternative $\mu_1 < \mu_0$ is handled symmetrically). This so-called "severity" of the test of the original $H (\mu \leq \mu_0)$ is not in fact a function of $\mu_0$ and so is identical for all $\mu_0$. Furthermore, it incorporates no information about background assumptions (e.g., whether treatment assignment was blinded) which bear heavily on practical notions of severity. We thus conclude that it is misleading to label $p(\mu \geq \mu_1)$ as a severity measure, and it instead should be recognized and treated as the $P$-value function it is.
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