Effects of Unemployment Insurance Reforms in Brazil

Christopher J. O'Leary  
*W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, oleary@upjohn.org*

Túlio Cravo  
*African Development Bank, t.cravo@afdb.org*

Ana Cristina Sierra  
*Inter-American Development Bank, sierraanacristina@gmail.com*

Leandro Justino Veloso  
*Inter-American Development Bank, leandrojpveloso@gmail.com*

Upjohn Author(s) ORCID Identifier:  
[https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3372-7527](https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3372-7527)

Follow this and additional works at: [https://research.upjohn.org/empl_research](https://research.upjohn.org/empl_research)

Part of the Labor Economics Commons

Citation  
O'Leary, Christopher J., Túlio Cravo, Ana Cristina Sierra, and Leandro Justino Veloso. 2020. "Effects of Unemployment Insurance Reforms in Brazil." Employment Research 27(1): 4-6. [https://doi.org/10.17848/1075-8445.27(1)-2](https://doi.org/10.17848/1075-8445.27(1)-2)

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.
Supply Shock versus Demand Shock

On the whole, new market-rate housing appears to benefit not just the region but also the local neighborhood. This suggests that market-rate housing should be an important part of any solution to the housing affordability crisis. Fears of increased rents near new buildings should not prevent governments from implementing desired reforms to regional housing supply.

We note two important caveats to our findings. First, we estimate an average effect that may disguise variation across different types of buildings and neighborhoods. Amenity and reputation effects are highly subjective and may vary widely depending on the local context. Second, the buildings in our sample are in the types of places that developers historically have wanted to build. While these areas are central to the debate, the effects may be different in other types of neighborhoods. For example, developers rarely build market-rate units in very low-income areas with high vacancy rates, so our results do not speak to what would happen if they did.

Notes

1. A census tract is an area with about 4,000 people.
2. Our migration data contain one less year than our rent data, so we shift the buildings we study back by one year.

This article draws on research from an Upjohn Institute working paper, which can be found at https://research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/316/.

Effects of Unemployment Insurance Reforms in Brazil

Christopher J. O’Leary, Túlio Cravo, Ana Cristina Sierra, and Leandro Justino Veloso

The Brazilian unemployment insurance (UI) program was established in response to a severe economic recession in the 1980s. It is now the largest UI program in the Latin America and Caribbean region, with more than 40 million beneficiaries between 2012 and 2016. Despite its size, the program operates in a labor market where more than one-third of all employees work in informal jobs not covered by UI. Because these latter workers receive no benefits when they are separated from their jobs, formal sector employment is desirable, and previous research has found significant flows of workers between the formal and informal sectors and back again, which UI receipt may facilitate. In particular, some employers may use UI to subsidize wages of workers they lay off and then recall after UI benefits end. Some laid-off employees even continue to work informally in their prior jobs while receiving UI benefits (Van Doornik, Schoenherr, and Skrastins 2017). Moreover, the UI program has historically been generous in terms of minimal eligibility requirements within the formal sector, which could further incentivize such back-and-forth flows.

These features have made Brazil’s UI program relatively expensive, and when a recession in 2014 further increased costs, the Brazilian government instituted reforms in the eligibility rules to contain future costs. We investigate the effects of two such changes in UI eligibility rules in 2015 that increased the work experience requirements for first- and second-time UI applicants.

While previous research estimated that these reforms significantly reduced layoffs (Carvalho, Corbi, and Narita 2018), our analysis, which relies on more complete administrative records, finds smaller overall reductions in layoffs, with somewhat larger decreases for workers with a single prior UI benefit spell.

A Natural Experiment

The recession that began in early 2014, coupled with the institutional features of Brazil’s UI program described above, led to calls for reforming the system. Facing general budget difficulties and anticipating a significant rise in unemployment, Brazilian President Dilma Roussef issued Provisional Measure 665 in late December of 2014, raising UI eligibility requirements for first and second time UI claimants, effective March 1, 2015. Soon thereafter, the legislature passed a new law codifying eligibility

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS

- The Brazilian unemployment insurance (UI) program, established in 1990, is now the largest in Latin America.
- UI reforms in 2015 increased work experience eligibility requirements for first- and second-time UI applicants.
- We find reductions in layoffs are greater for workers with one prior UI spell than for first-time claimants.

Brian J. Asquith and Evan Mast are economists at the Upjohn Institute. David Reed is a community development economic advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
rules nearly as strict as the provisional measure, and this law took effect on June 17, 2015. Brazil thus experienced two sudden changes in UI eligibility rules in 2015, although these changes applied only for workers on their first or second UI application; rules for the third and subsequent applications were unchanged. Consequently, the reforms were targeted toward recent labor market entrants.

Specifically, the reforms increased the minimum number of months of employment workers needed before they would qualify for the shortest benefit duration on their first or second UI application. Prior to the first reform, any UI applicant who had worked six months in the prior three years could qualify for three months of benefits (first row of Table 1). Under both reforms, first- and second-time UI applicants now needed longer recent work experience to qualify for the shortest potential benefit duration. For first-time claimants, for example, the new minimum potential benefit shifted from three to four months, but the required work period increased from 12 to 18 months under the first reform, before returning to 12 months under the second reform, a mere four months later. A summary of the work requirements for UI benefit eligibility under each set of eligibility rules is listed in the Table 1.

Our evaluation focuses on short-tenure workers who were most affected by the changes in UI eligibility rules. Using data that contains tenure at the daily level, we contrast job layoff rates for a treatment group of workers with at least 6 and less than 7 months of job tenure against a control group of workers with at least 5 and less than 6 months of job tenure. Under the initial regime, the treatment group with 6 months of job tenure was eligible for three months of UI benefits but first- and second-time applicants became ineligible for any benefits under both reforms. We estimate how differences in layoff risk between the treatment and control groups vary across the different regimes, an approach called difference-in-differences. To isolate the impact of the reforms, we further adjust for differences across individuals in their geographic location, calendar month in the data, and demographic characteristics.

**Effects on Layoffs**

We find that the increase in work months needed for UI eligibility reduced employer layoffs. For short-tenure workers with no prior UI applications, the first reform reduced layoff risk by 0.18 percentage points (from a base layoff rate of 3.4 percent). The impact of the second reform was larger, cutting layoff risk by 0.41 percentage points relative to the period before either reform.

Among workers who had one prior UI application, the reforms had even stronger impacts, with the first reform reducing layoff risk by 0.9 percentage points (from a base layoff rate of 4.0 percent), and the second reform by 1.05 percentage points.

While sizable, these effects are smaller than those implied by earlier studies that did not have as detailed data on the number of prior UI applications. When we approximate the methodology of previous studies by not accounting for the number of prior UI spells, we estimate a layoff reduction from the first reform of 0.35 percentage points, much smaller than earlier estimates of 0.53 percentage points (Van Doornik et al. 2018) to 0.69 percentage points (Carvalho, Corbi, and Narita 2018).

**Reduction in Collusion**

In the United States, UI benefits are financed by experience-rated employer taxes that rise with total benefits paid to an employer’s former workers. Perhaps unsurprisingly, layoffs are lower in states where UI taxes rise more quickly with experience-rating (Card and Levine 1994). In contrast, Brazilian UI benefits are financed from general revenues, and neither employers nor workers pay specific taxes to finance the program. Consistent with this lack of implicit penalty for heavily using the system, Brazilian UI benefits appear to subsidize the flow between low-wage, short-term jobs and informal sector

---

**Table 1 Months of Employment Required for UI Benefits, 1990–2017**

| Number of UI claim | Potential benefit duration | Initial regime (1990 to Feb. 27, 2015) | Reform 1 (Feb. 28, 2015 to June 16, 2015) | Reform 2 (from June 17, 2015) |
|--------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| First              |                           |                                       |                                          |                             |
| Three              | 6                         | —                                     | —                                        | —                           |
| Four               | 12                        | 18                                    | 12                                       | 12                          |
| Five               | 24                        | 24                                    | 24                                       | 24                          |
| Second             |                           |                                       |                                          |                             |
| Three              | 6                         | —                                     | 9                                        |                             |
| Four               | 12                        | 12                                    | 12                                       | 12                          |
| Five               | 24                        | 24                                    | 24                                       | 24                          |
| Third or more      |                           |                                       |                                          |                             |
| Three              | 6                         | 6                                     | 6                                        |                             |
| Four               | 12                        | 12                                    | 12                                       | 12                          |
| Five               | 24                        | 24                                    | 24                                       | 24                          |

**NOTE:** The table shows the number of months of formal employment required in the 36 months before UI application to be eligible for benefits, by number of UI claims and regime.

**SOURCE:** Authors’ calculations from provisions in Law 7.998, PM 665, and Law 13.134.
Effects of Unemployment Insurance Reforms in Brazil

Figure 1 Both Eligibility Reforms Reduced the Risk of Layoffs

Figure 2 Both Eligibility Reforms Also Reduced Job Recall to the Same Employer

jobs, in some cases back and forth with the same employer (Doornik, Schoenherr, and Skrastins 2017).

We find the eligibility reforms affected this behavior, too. For short-tenure workers with no prior UI claims, the probability of being rehired by the same employer within 4 to 10 months of layoff fell by 1.3 percentage points after the first reform and 1.8 percentage points after the second reform. For short-tenure workers with one prior UI claim, the first reform reduced recall to the same employer by 1.7 percentage points, an amount similar to workers with no prior UI claims. However, the second reform did not appear to affect recalls for these workers.

Conclusion

We confirm results of previous research that Brazil’s 2015 increases in UI eligibility requirements reduced layoffs. However, our results indicate that previous studies overestimated these reductions, likely because they were unable to precisely measure individuals’ prior UI requests, a key parameter undergirding the changes in requirements. When we account for prior UI requests, we find that changes in UI eligibility rules reduced the chance of layoff the most for workers with exactly one prior UI benefit receipt spell. Our results provide some evidence that restrictions on UI eligibility reduced collusion between workers and employers using UI benefits to subsidize wages.

REFERENCES

Card, David, and Philip B. Levine. 1994. "Unemployment Insurance Taxes and the Cyclical and Seasonal Properties of Unemployment." Journal of Public Economics 53(1):1–29.

Carvalho, Cristiano C, Raphael Corbi, Renata Narita. 2018. "Unintended Consequences of Unemployment Insurance: Evidence from Stricter Eligibility Criteria in Brazil." Economics Letters 162(1): 157–161.

Cravo, Túlio, Christopher J. O’Leary, Ana Cristina Sierra, and Leandro Justino Veloso. 2019. “Heterogeneous Impacts on Layoffs of Changes in Brazilian Unemployment Insurance Eligibility Rules.” Upjohn Institute Working Paper 19-318. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute.

Van Doornik, Bernardus, David Schoenherr, and Janis Skrastins. 2018. "Unemployment Insurance, Strategic Unemployment and Firm-Worker Collusion." CBB Working Paper 483. Brasilia: Central Bank of Brazil.

This article draws on research from an Upjohn Institute working paper, which can be found at https://research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/318/.

Christopher J. O’Leary is a senior economist at the Upjohn Institute, and Túlio Cravo is a principal economist at the African Development Bank. Ana Cristina Sierra and Leandro Justino Veloso are consultants to the Inter-American Development Bank.