Introduction

The past three decades have seen an increase in the adoption of collaborative economic development approaches to solving “wicked problems” that cannot be addressed by single organizations. Since the economic decentralization reforms in the last century, fragmented government authority in urban and rural areas has complicated local economic development efforts, resulting in competition and negative externalities spillovers among localities (Hawkins & Feiock, 2011). Moreover, overlap and duplication of service and infrastructure in metropolitan areas cause low efficiency, poor service delivery, and industry frustration (Hollander, 2010), which leads to calls for integrated action among economic development organizations. Inter-jurisdictional collaboration, then, was proposed as an interactive and dynamic solution to these fragmentation problems (V. Ostrom et al., 1961) and thus proliferated around the world (Engstrand & Sätre Åhlander, 2008; Im et al., 2017; Liddle, 2018; Liddle & Ormston, 2015; Siciliano et al., 2021; Wilson et al., 2020; Xu & Yeh, 2013).

Initially, economic development collaboration studies mainly focused on collective action among public organizations such as city, county, and regional agencies, and the conceptual distinction between “collaboration” and “cooperation” was unclear (Goetz & Kayser, 1993). Influenced by the paradigm shift from governments to governance in public administration research (O’leary & Vij, 2012), EDC studies become more encompassing with an increasing number of studies putting their focus on cross-sector collaborations among EDOs. The concept of “collaboration” also stands out from “cooperation” and “coordination,” with scholars demonstrating its dynamic and evolutionary nature (Feiock, 2009; Feiock & Scholz, 2009; Gray, 1989; Gray & Wood, 1991; O’leary & Vij, 2012; Selden et al., 2006).
This article defines economic development collaboration (EDC) as the process of interaction among economic development organizations (EDOs) to resolve economic development problems that cannot be resolved easily by any single organization (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Feiock & Scholz, 2009; Y. Lee & Lee, 2022). This collaborative approach to economic development is widely adopted by local governments to address the negative externalities of interlocal competition and promote economic growth (Feiock et al., 2012; Y. Lee et al., 2012). In this process, local governments, coordinating agencies, private businesses, nonprofit organizations, and civic groups build formal and informal networks to share development information, exchange development resources, and facilitate the cost-sharing of service delivery (Aldag et al., 2020; Siciliano et al., 2021). Contrary to the hierarchical and top-down approaches such as governmental consolidation, the collaborative approach promotes group integration while preserving participants’ autonomy and democracy in the decision-making process (Farrant, 2001; Hawkins, 2010a). It provides the institutional setting for local governments to participate, and yet guarantees a degree of independence. Public managers can choose whether or not to collaborate with other public agencies and retain the autonomy to drop out at any point of the collaboration life cycle (X. Chen & Sullivan, 2022). In this way, EDC facilitates public accountability to local stakeholders such as businesses, nonprofits, and residents and improves the quality of local governance.

While EDC has become an increasingly popular tool in public managers’ toolkits, existing academic knowledge of EDC has been left unorganized. In this article, I argue that it is important to synthesize current findings and critically assess research progress in EDC studies so that we can clarify the strengths and weaknesses and advance the overall contribution of this stream of research.

Thus far, several reviews of the collaboration literature have been published (Bryson et al., 2006; McGuire, 2006; O’leary & Vij, 2012). However, few scholars have systematically reviewed public administration research on EDC exclusively. This article argues that EDC has distinctive characteristics and mechanisms from collaboration in other policy fields that calls for dedicated academic attention. Specifically, there are two major challenges specific to EDC.

First, EDC is competitive in nature. Local economic development policies have long been characterized by regional competition (Goetz & Kayser, 1993; V. Ostrom et al., 1961). Local governments compete with each other to expand their tax base and attract investment and firms (Hawkins, 2010a). Some scholars even regard economic development competition among local governments as a zero-sum game (Peters & Fisher, 2004; Reese, 2014; Sbragia, 2000). In addition, the economic decentralization reforms around the world also stimulate “race-to-bottom” competition in several aspects of economic development, imposing negative externalities on other localities (Feiock, 2013; Feiock et al., 2009; Y. Lee & Lee, 2022). The intense interlocal competition among localities has caused a series of problems, including negative externalities, duplication of infrastructure, waste of resources, high cost of providing development services, and regional protectionism (B. Chen et al., 2019; Hawkins, 2020; Y. Lee, 2016). Local governments thus seek collaboration to mitigate the negative impact of economic competition and improve the service provision efficiency (Feiock et al., 2009). It is fair to say that EDC is a result of competition, which is not the case for collaboration in other policy fields such as environmental governance and emergency management.

Second, EDC is one of the riskiest forms of collaboration. Due to the inherently competitive nature of EDC, participants can expect a high risk of defection and a high benefit from exploitation (Carr et al., 2017; Feiock, 2002; Feiock et al., 2010). Some scholars even depicted EDC as “the prisoner’s dilemma” (Bowman, 1988; Grady, 1987; Rubin & Rubin, 1987). Thus, trust and credible commitments become the most valuable prerequisites for local EDC, which is not as vital in other collaborations. Moreover, some positive factors for collaboration in environmental governance, emergency management, and social work, such as popularity and bridging ties, may negatively affect EDC (Kwak et al., 2016; Y. Lee & Lee, 2022).

Therefore, the purpose of this article is to systematically review and summarize the EDC literature published over the past three decades. The author brings together 85 public administration articles focusing on EDC and examines seven aspects of EDC studies: research questions, collaboration types, empirical designs and methods, antecedents of EDC, mechanisms of economic collaboration, outcomes of EDC, and research limitations. The structure of this article is as follows. The following section introduces this study’s methodology and coding process. I then present the systematic review results, including aspects of the EDC studies. Finally, I conclude by summarizing the findings and identifying five future avenues for research.

**Methodology**

This systematic review follows the PRISMA guidelines (Liberati et al., 2009). This section will elaborate on the search strategy, eligibility criteria, record selection, and coding process.

**Search strategy**

I used two search strategies. First, I searched the Web of Science database using the string “TS= (economic development AND collaborat*).” Next, I limited the research area to public administration and limited the language to English (1,266 results). I then conduct a snowballing search on Google Scholar to identify relevant studies which cite or are cited by the articles found during the previous search. This step results in 32 articles not identified in the Web of Science records. Then, the author read through the title and
abstract of all these records, excluding 1,207 irrelevant records. Finally, the author read the remaining articles’ full text and excluded another six studies. This process results in 85 records included in this review.

Eligibility criteria
In line with the PRISMA checklist, the author reports this systematic review’s eligibility criteria. Studies were included if they met all of the following criteria (Figure 1):

- **Field**: Studies should deal with topics relevant to public administration, such as intergovernmental collaboration, public-private partnerships, and network governance.
- **Topic**: Studies should contain “economic development” and “collaborat*” in the title, abstract, or keywords. Additionally, these keywords should be the focus of the research question rather than being discussed in background information, discussion, or implications sections.
- **Language**: Studies published in English were included.
- **Year of publication**: This review included all studies published until March 2022.
- **Publication type**: Only published journal articles were included. Considering that only a few books are dedicated to EDC from the public administration perspective, and these books often result in journal articles, I limit my review to published journal articles.

Records selection and coding
In total, the author screened 1,298 articles. Based on the above eligibility criteria, I first excluded 1,207 records by reading the titles and abstracts. Then I read the full text of the remaining 91 articles, excluding another irrelevant six articles. This process resulted in 85 articles included in this systematic review.

Several key attributes are extracted from each article, including the journal, publication year, and country of origin. Further, I summarize the research questions, research design, analytical methods, key variables, and research limitations.

Results
PA scholars have extensively studied EDC over the past three decades (Figure 2). Before 2005, the number of publications regarding this topic was limited, with a total of 10 articles. However, research on this topic has seen rapid growth after 2005. In the 5 years between 2005 and 2009, there were 12 articles published in PA journals. After 2010, there were approximately five articles on local collaborative economic development every year, with 10 articles published by PA journals in 2010 and 2021, respectively. This trend highlights the fast-growing interest in the topic of local EDC.

Journals and countries
The articles analyzed in this review were published in 42 different journals, including *Public Administration Review* (8), *Public Performance & Management Review* (5), *International Journal of Public Administration* (3), *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* (2), *The American Review of Public Administration* (2), and *International Review of Public Administration* (2). Furthermore, the author found publications in journals focusing on specific policies,
such as Economic Development Quarterly (7), Urban Affairs Review (6), and Journal of Urban Affairs (5).

Table 1 summarizes the countries studied. More than 60% of the research on local EDC was conducted in the USA (56; 64.3%), suggesting an intensive focus on the United States as a source of empirical data. This phenomenon could indicate a systematic bias at work. Since most studies on this topic relied on samples from the US, the existing assumptions and findings could suffer from limited generalizability and external validity, especially when studying local collaborative development practices in non-western developing countries such as China.

Of the remaining 30 articles, 11 studies (13.1%) focused on European countries, and 7 studies (8.3%) concerned Asian countries. Among them, 6 (7.1%) have utilized empirical data from the UK and 3 (3.6%) from China. African and Latin American countries are understudied, with only two international comparison studies including African samples and no study investigating Latin American countries. Eight articles (9.5%) compare collaborative economic development among different countries. Overall, most studies were conducted in western developed countries, indicating a lack of non-western perspective.

**Research design and methods**

More than half of the articles (44; 51.8%) analyzed in this review were qualitative. Among these studies, 21 used a single case study approach, and 20 adopted a multiple case study approach. In contrast, quantitative studies (40) compromise 47.1% of the articles included, while only one study incorporated both qualitative and quantitative data (Bassett, 2006).

Consistent with the overall composition of research methods, most studies relied on document analysis (42; 34.1%) and interviews (38; 30.9%) to collect data, followed by surveys (34; 27.6%) and non-survey-related archival data. Figure 2. Time trend of published articles.

Table 1. Countries studied.

| Country   | Frequencies | Percentage (%) |
|-----------|-------------|----------------|
| US        | 54          | 64.3           |
| International | 8     | 9.5            |
| UK        | 6           | 7.1            |
| China     | 3           | 3.6            |
| Australia | 2           | 2.4            |
| Canada    | 2           | 2.4            |
| Finland   | 2           | 2.4            |
| India     | 1           | 1.2            |
| Indonesia | 1           | 1.2            |
| Ireland   | 1           | 1.2            |
| Italy     | 1           | 1.2            |
| Singapore | 1           | 1.2            |
| South Korea | 1    | 1.2            |
| Sweden    | 1           | 1.2            |
| Total     | 84          | 100.0          |
data (9; 7.3%). Among the studies utilizing quantitative data, nearly 80% (31) were based on cross-sectional data, while just a few studies (8; 20.5%) analyzed longitudinal data (for instance, Y. Lee & Lee, 2022). Overall, a large group of articles based their quantitative analysis on cross-sectional survey data. This preference reflects a trend that researchers frequently use self-administered surveys to collect network data on collaborative relationships among EDOs. The surveys usually contain several rosters listing all the relevant EDOs and ask the respondents to identify their collaborative partners within the lists (Feiock et al., 2012; Kwak et al., 2016; Y. Lee, 2016; Y. Lee et al., 2012; Y. Lee & Lee, 2022; Shrestha, 2022).

Following Ritz et al. (2016), I also studied the type of analytical methods used as shown in Table 2. Social network analysis (13; 29.5%) is the most popular analytical method that collaborative economic development scholars employ. Multiple regression (12; 27.3%) and logistic regression (11; 25%) are also frequently used. A relatively small group of studies use bivariate analyses like the measure of association (3; 6.8%), univariate descriptive statistics (3; 6.8%), factor analysis (1; 2.3%), and simulation techniques (1; 2.3%)

The network structure of collaborative relationships makes social network analysis a prevailing analytical tool in collaboration research. Four types of social network analysis methods are employed in the articles included in this systematic review. The exponential random graph model (ERGM; 7; 53.8%) represents the most significant portion of these studies, followed by the multiple regression quadratic assignment procedure (MRQAP; 3; 23.1%), the stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM; 2; 15.4%), and the quadratic assignment procedure (QAP; 1; 7.7%).

Table 2. Analytical method.

| Analytical method                        | Frequencies | Percentage (%) |
|------------------------------------------|-------------|----------------|
| Social network analysis                  | 13          | 29.5           |
| Multiple regression (including panel and multilevel) | 12          | 27.3           |
| Logistic regression (including panel-data, multilevel, and probit) | 11          | 25.0           |
| Bivariate statistics                     | 3           | 6.8            |
| Univariate descriptive analysis          | 3           | 6.8            |
| Factor analysis                          | 1           | 2.3            |
| Simulation                               | 1           | 2.3            |
| Total                                    | 44          | 100.0          |

Research questions

The research questions investigated in the EDC studies broadly fall into eight categories. As Table 3 illustrates, 30 studies (35.3%) focused on the antecedents of EDC, contributing the most to the literature. Slightly fewer studies (29; 34.1%) looked into the collaboration process. These two lines of inquiry made up approximately 70% of collaborative economic development research. Among the remaining 26 studies, 9 (10.6%) examined the outcomes of collaborative economic development practice, 6 compared EDC across countries, and 5 analyzed the stakeholders’ attitudes toward EDC. Only a few studies explored the difference in collaborative economic development across sectors (2; 2.4%), implications for collaboration practice (2; 2.4%), and conceptualization and integration of other theories (2; 2.4%).

Collaboration types

EDC takes a variety of forms. Researchers have argued that different forms of collaboration should be studied differently since they involve different levels of risk and result in different patterns of networking (Feiock et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2019; Shrestha, 2022). For example, informal networks characterized by information sharing and advice-giving represent a distinctive type of collaboration problem—the coordination problem. In this scenario, actors not only search for development information to facilitate internal decision-making but also seek potential external partners by identifying shared interests. However, failure to obtain critical information and recognize aligned interests can suffocate collaboration efforts and mislead decision-making. In this regard, when local economic development actors form informal networks to transmit information, they are faced with “coordination problems.” To alleviate this problem, for example, EDOs are found to be connected with popular EDO or broker EDO to secure their information and resources (Feiock et al., 2012; Kwak et al., 2016).

Compared to the informal networks, collaboration forms that are more formalized, such as partnerships, contracts, and agreements, involve greater risk, introducing another type of collaboration problem, the cooperation problem (Hawkins & Andrew, 2011; Ki et al., 2020). This type of problem indicates the high risk of being defected and exploited in EDC. Since it is hard to exclude certain participants from sharing the joint benefits, participants have the incentive to free ride and defect. Thus, in these types of collaboration, EDOs tend to form tightly clustered networks rather than widespread random networks to build trust and breed reciprocity (Y. Lee, 2011; Y. Lee & Lee, 2022; Shrestha, 2022).

Hence, to understand EDOs’ collaborative behavior, we need to distinguish different types of EDC since they have different patterns and characteristics and are not affected in the same ways by the same groups of antecedents.

Following Feiock (2013), I summarize the collaborative behavior of EDOs by identifying seven forms of collaboration in Table 4. Some studies examined multiple types of collaboration, so various classifications were assigned to these studies. Overall, most studies looked into more formal forms of collaboration, with a dominant focus on partnerships (33; 39.3%) and contracts (19; 22.6%). For instance, Hawkins (2017) analyzed the relationship between
political incentives and interlocal joint venture coordination, finding that local governments’ coordination and division problems in development joint ventures are mitigated when both cities have a mayor-council form of government. Fewer studies investigate informal networks (16; 19.1%). For example, Y. Lee (2011) examines the information exchange networks on economic development issues, revealing the network structure and homophily effects on informal EDC. Much less attention has been paid to constructed networks (8; 9.5%), self-organizing multiplex systems (6; 7.1%), mandated agreements (1; 1.2%), and working groups (1; 1.2%), most of which feature the external governing agency constructing or directing EDC among EDOs.

In sum, researchers have put more emphasis on self-organizing voluntary economic development collaborative relationships, which are often characterized as the strategic choice and deliberate efforts by EDOs. These might be closely related to the economic decentralization reforms in several major countries, especially the US. In comparison, mandatory and constructed collaborative economic development networks are relatively understudied in this stream of scholarship, indicating a possible void of research.

Other scholars also propose to examine collaborative economic development networks’ boundaries, composition, and collaborating phase. Specifically, Kim et al. (2019) argue that internal and external networks’ effects are different. While internal economic development networks are bounded in a single locality, external economic development networks incorporate EDOs from other localities, causing higher transaction costs. Overall, most studies (48; 57.8%) investigate external economic development networks collaborating with outside actors, whereas 31 (37.4%) focus on internal networks. Interestingly, four studies explore both internal and external networks in local EDC (Kim et al., 2019; Y. Lee et al., 2012; Oh et al., 2014).

Siciliano et al. (2021) paid attention to the network composition by identifying sector diversity in an EDC network, revealing that collaboration among public EDOs and collaboration among both public and private EDOs induce significantly different economic development outcomes. Here, I also summarize the sector diversity of the collaboration cases in EDC studies, finding that about half of the studies (44; 53.0%) investigated public-public collaboration, and less attention was paid to public-private collaboration (26; 31.3%) or the comparison of the two types of collaboration (13; 15.7%). This fact suggests that public-private EDC has not been thoroughly investigated and compared.

When studying the phase of collaboration, the vast majority of articles (25; 80.6%) focuses exclusively on EDC in the policy implementation phase (14; 45%) and policy formulation and planning phase (11; 35.5%). Nevertheless, few studies analyzed collaboration in policy evaluation (3; 9.7%) and policy monitoring phase (3; 9.7%).

### Antecedents of the economic development collaboration

This section summarizes the prominent antecedents identified by the studies on local EDC. By analyzing the literature, I categorize the key antecedents into four groups:

- **Network structural antecedents**: features of network structures that promote or prohibit EDC.
- **Actor attribute-based antecedents**: aspects reflecting political institution, socio-economic conditions, and other features of a city or an EDO.
- **Homophily antecedents**: aspects that are similar between two potential collaborators.
- **Contextual antecedents**: external context influencing the collaboration process.
Next, I will introduce these frequently studied antecedents by category. Additionally, I will summarize the overall composition of empirical results in these studies by listing the number of the positive, negative, and null effects on EDC.

**Antecedents related to network structure.** Occurrences of the different network structural antecedents are displayed in Table 5. This category includes those prominent network structures influencing the collaborative behavior of the EDOs. Notably, these antecedents are related to two types of collaboration problems: cooperation and coordination.

Past research has identified two types of network structure linked with cooperation: reciprocity and network closure. As described in the previous section, cooperation involves a higher risk of defection and requires more process monitoring and credible commitments, making reciprocal and bonding relationships more attractive. Specifically, the reciprocal relationship turns one-time collaboration into repeated games (Axelrod, 1997). Furthermore, since the defection of one partner can be punished by future games, reciprocity is regarded as a classic way to reduce information, monitoring, and enforcement costs, solving the collective action problem (E. Ostrom, 1998). Thus, reciprocity is one of the most frequently studied antecedents when considering network structural effects on EDC, resulting in nine occurrences. However, the findings are mixed, with one study identifying its negative impact on collaborative behavior of the focal EDO and three studies finding a null effect.

Network closure, also referred to as bonding ties, is another network structure related to cooperation problems. Putnam (1995) points out that transitive relationships like closure can provide redundant information about network actors and impose penalties on defectors by making their behavior public. Thus, network closure is among the most popular antecedents included in the studies. In Table 5, I identify two categories of network closure: transitive triplets and alternating k-triangle. Transitive triplets, referring to the three actors with three dyadic ties, are robust in promoting EDC on nine occasions in the studies. Similarly, alternating k-triangle, referring to multiple transitive triplets sharing one identical dyadic tie, is also robust in predicting collaborative behavior in economic development.

Popularity, activity, and bridging ties, on the other hand, relate to coordination problems in EDC. As mentioned before, coordination features information transmission among participants. In order to collect information, EDOs are thought to actively connect with popular EDOs with high centrality in the whole network and bridging EDOs serving as the structural holes (Burt, 2004). The three groups of antecedents measuring popularity spread networks, bridging ties, and activity spread networks capture these tendencies of EDOs. Popularity antecedents capture the tendency to create ties with popular EDOs. However, we can see that empirical data did not prove this pattern. Instead, EDOs did not collaborate with popular actors in most studies. Y. Lee et al. (2012) explain this phenomenon by pointing out the fragmented and localized nature of EDC, arguing that in this specific policy arena, collaboration participants would seek “tailored benefits” instead of following other EDOs. Bridging ties antecedents capture the tendency of connecting with brokerage EDOs. However, the findings are inconsistent across studies, with the overall composition of results slightly inclined to the negative side. Finally, activity indicates the tendency of network actors to connect with as many actors as possible. Similarly, these groups of antecedents also produce mixed results from empirical studies.

Other network structure antecedents include four common antecedents investigated in the studies. Among them, degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and density are the characteristics in the whole network level, with mixed results. However, tie strength, which captures the dyadic characteristics of the EDC network, usually produces an overall positive effect on EDOs’ collaborative behavior.

**Antecedents related to actor-based attributes.** Many studies link EDC to actor-based attributes, which this article defined as municipal or organizational features of the focal actors. Based on the analysis of actor-based characteristics identified in the studies reviewed, I summarize 22 key variables related to actor’s attributes, as shown in Table 6. I divide these attributes into three categories: socio-economic conditions, political institutions, and other attributes.

First, the socio-economic conditions are the most frequently mentioned group of antecedents, adding up to 61 occurrences (63.5%). Table 6 shows that regions with a large population, high household income, sufficient local government personnel, more policies to promote economic development, more poor population, low degree of financial independence, and small elderly population participate more in local economic development cooperation. Resource dependence theory is often used to explain the impact of socio-economic attributes on EDC (Hawkins & Feiock, 2011; Im et al., 2017). For instance, Hawkins (2010b) argues that local structural factors such as population, income, and the unemployment rate can cause local governments to seek and be asked for resources by other localities, reflecting the demand and pressure of economic development in a locality.

Second, political-institutional factors are also frequently studied (21; 21.9%). Notably, the mayor-council form of government is thought to be a unique institutional arrangement that promotes EDC in the US context (Hawkins, 2010b). Frant (1996) points out that in the mayor form of government, politicians have incentives to proactively participate in local affairs in favor of public interests so that they can be reelected. In this sense, when it comes to economic development, mayors can become policy entrepreneurs who push collaboration forward (Feiock & Clingermayer, 1992; Schneider & Teske, 1993). This argument is partly supported by the empirical results, with four studies finding that mayor-form governments participate more in EDC. In addition, studies have also examined the
Table 5. Antecedents related to network structure.

| Antecedent                           | Frequencies | Percentage (%) | (-) | (/) | (+) |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|----------------|-----|-----|-----|
| Reciprocity                          | 9           | 15.0           | 1   | 3   | 5   |
| Network closure                      |             |                |     |     |     |
| Transitive triplets                  | 9           | 15.0           | 0   | 0   | 9   |
| Alternating k-triangle               | 2           | 3.3            | 0   | 0   | 2   |
| Popularity                           |             |                |     |     |     |
| Alternating k-in-stars               | 6           | 10.0           | 4   | 2   | 0   |
| In-2-stars                           | 3           | 5.0            | 0   | 2   | 1   |
| In-3-stars                           | 2           | 3.3            | 0   | 2   | 0   |
| Activity                             |             |                |     |     |     |
| Alternating k-out-stars              | 6           | 10.0           | 2   | 0   | 4   |
| Out-2-stars                          | 2           | 3.3            | 2   | 0   | 0   |
| Out-3-stars                          | 2           | 3.3            | 0   | 2   | 0   |
| Bridging ties/brokerage              |             |                |     |     |     |
| 2-paths                              | 7           | 11.7           | 4   | 2   | 1   |
| Alternating k-two-paths              | 1           | 1.7            | 1   | 0   | 0   |
| Other network structure              |             |                |     |     |     |
| Degree centrality                    | 4           | 6.7            | 0   | 2   | 2   |
| Tie strength                         | 3           | 5.0            | 1   | 5   | 1   |
| Betweenness centrality               | 2           | 3.3            | 1   | 1   | 0   |
| Density/cohesion                     | 2           | 3.3            | 0   | 1   | 1   |
| Total                                | 60          | 100.0          |     |     |     |

Table 6. Antecedents related to actor-based attributes.

| Antecedent                                 | Frequencies | Percentage (%) | (-) | (/) | (+) |
|--------------------------------------------|-------------|----------------|-----|-----|-----|
| Socio-economic conditions                  |             |                |     |     |     |
| Population                                 | 12          | 12.5           | 0   | 9   | 3   |
| Median household income                     | 9           | 9.4            | 0   | 6   | 3   |
| Race (white ratio)                         | 7           | 7.3            | 1   | 5   | 1   |
| Unemployment rate                          | 5           | 5.2            | 0   | 5   | 0   |
| Percent manufacturing sector               | 5           | 5.2            | 0   | 5   | 0   |
| Number of local government officials and staff | 4           | 4.2            | 0   | 1   | 3   |
| Number of pro-business development policies | 4           | 4.2            | 0   | 1   | 3   |
| Income inequality                          | 3           | 3.1            | 0   | 3   | 0   |
| Percent in poverty                         | 3           | 3.1            | 0   | 1   | 2   |
| Percent farming sector                     | 3           | 3.1            | 0   | 2   | 1   |
| The degree of financial independence       | 2           | 2.1            | 2   | 0   | 0   |
| Number of businesses                       | 2           | 2.1            | 0   | 2   | 0   |
| The older population (65 years and older)  | 2           | 2.1            | 2   | 0   | 0   |
| Political institution                      |             |                |     |     |     |
| Mayor-council form of government           | 6           | 6.3            | 0   | 2   | 4   |
| District elections                         | 5           | 5.2            | 3   | 2   | 0   |
| Political fragmentation                    | 5           | 5.2            | 4   | 1   | 0   |
| The council-manager form of government     | 2           | 2.1            | 2   | 0   | 0   |
| Government level                           | 2           | 2.1            | 2   | 0   | 0   |
| Mayor turnover                             | 1           | 1.0            | 1   | 0   | 0   |
| Other                                      |             |                |     |     |     |
| Social capital                             | 10          | 10.4           | 0   | 2   | 8   |
| Experience with joint ventures             | 2           | 2.1            | 0   | 0   | 2   |
| Number of bordering municipalities         | 2           | 2.1            | 1   | 0   | 1   |
| Total                                     | 96          | 100.0          |     |     |     |
effects of the district election, political fragmentation, council form of government, government level, and mayor turnover on EDC. Aggregately, mayor-form governments without district elections, governments with low political fragmentation, low-level governments, and governments without a new mayor are more involved in EDC. It is noteworthy that these factors are highly US-specific, revealing a dominance of the US perspective in the EDC studies.

Social capital, past joint venture experiences, and the number of bordering municipalities are also important factors considered in the studies. Notably, social capital is found to promote EDC on eight occasions out of ten, indicating a relatively consistent positive effect. Furthermore, experience with joint ventures also positively affects future collaboration, while the impact of more bordering municipalities is mixed.

Homophily effects are widely investigated and proved in the general collaborative governance literature (B. Chen et al., 2019; Y. Lee et al., 2012; Y. Lee & Lee, 2022). The institutional collective action framework posits that organizations with similar conditions tend to share similar problems and interests (Feiock, 2013). Thus, the transaction costs of collaboration among similar organizations are lower than collaboration among heterogeneous organizations.

There are three groups of antecedents related to homophily effects. The first group is the socio-economic homophily. Among them, race similarity (17; 18.9%) and income similarity (14; 15.6%) are the most frequently tested antecedents, but null effects occur in most cases. Similarly, other socio-economic homophily effects also have produced inconsistent or null results.

The second group is the political-institutional homophily antecedents. The similarity in government form occurs in 12 studies, but all have indicated null effects. Overall, cities that belong to the same county, cities with the same government level, and cities not all adopting district elections show more involvement in EDC. Again, these factors are closely related to the political-institutional arrangement in American localities, indicating a lack of a non-US perspective. Lastly, geographical proximity is investigated in seven studies, six of which have reported positive effects (Table 7).

A few studies also consider external contexts. Minkoff (2013) explores the effect of political competition on local governments’ participation in interlocal EDC. He argues that high-level political competition puts pressure on local governments and thus “forces governments to be developmentally aggressive.” Kwak et al. (2016) demonstrate that external federal funding moderates the network structural effects on interlocal collaboration by altering the payoffs from collaboration. In these two studies, political competition among localities and external funding both influence local EDC as contextual antecedents. However, the contextual antecedents are highly understudied compared to other groups of antecedents, probably due to the reliance on cross-sectional data within one metropolitan area.

After summarizing the main antecedents, I look into the mechanisms at work identified in the studies. Table 8 shows the 10 types of mechanisms mentioned in research investigating the antecedents of the EDC.
The first observation that arises from this analysis is that more than half of these mechanisms are developed from or related to the institutional collective action framework (ICA; Feiock, 2013). The ICA framework explains the interaction among institutions from the transaction costs perspective. It posits that institutions will strategically participate in the interaction networks among institutions according to the level of transaction costs. Specifically, information cost, collaboration risk, credible commitment, and trust will all affect an institution’s judgment on the level of transaction costs. This framework assumes that, among all forms of institutional interaction, collaboration is one of the most deliberate choice made by an institution to minimize the transaction costs and maximize the joint benefits.

In line with the ICA framework, 10 studies (20%) explain the empirical results through the information costs mechanism. For instance, Hawkins (2020) finds that city governments’ engagement with the regional organization can alleviate the negative effect of the coordination problem, arguing that the link with the regional organization can effectively transmit development information and lower the cost of seeking information. Another 10 studies employ the collaboration risk mechanism, which refers to the risk of defection and opportunism in EDC. These studies underline the competitive nature of economic development. Ki et al. (2020) identify that cities collaborate with their counterparts within the same county to keep the collaboration risk under control and prevent partners from defecting or exploiting collaborative benefits. Similarly, joint benefits, credible commitment, transaction cost, and trust are also frequently mentioned mechanisms. Other mechanisms, such as resource dependence, the economy of scale, risk aversion, and cultural identity, were less often mentioned.

**Outcomes of the economic development collaboration**

EDC outcomes are much less empirically studied than the antecedents. When outcomes are investigated, the vast majority of studies examine the economic development outcomes, including employment, income, business growth, and economic development activities. For example, Siciliano et al. (2021) evaluate how the change in collaboration networks influences the employment and income outcomes using panel data. Only a few studies address the outcomes in government service provision costs, tax revenue, and policy diffusion patterns. For instance, Aldag et al. (2020) examine the cost-saving outcome of service sharing and reports a null effect on the costs for economic development.

It is evident that research on EDC outcomes is scarce. However, several recent empirical results on this topic reveal that the benefits of EDC are not as self-evident as we thought. Therefore, more evidence-based studies on the outcomes from a comparative perspective may be called for (Table 9).

**Research limitations**

This section summarizes the most frequently stated types of research limitations in the studies reviewed. Table 10 shows that the most commonly mentioned limitations regard the generalizability (10), network tie measurement (8), and

---

**Table 8. Mechanisms of the EDC.**

| Mechanism                  | Frequencies | Percentage (%) |
|----------------------------|-------------|----------------|
| Information costs          | 10          | 20.0           |
| Collaboration risk         | 10          | 20.0           |
| Joint benefits             | 6           | 12.0           |
| Credible commitment        | 5           | 10.0           |
| Resource dependence        | 5           | 10.0           |
| Transaction cost           | 5           | 10.0           |
| Trust                      | 3           | 6.0            |
| The economy of scale (asset specificity) | 3 | 6.0 |
| Risk aversion              | 2           | 4.0            |
| Cultural identity          | 1           | 2.0            |
| Total                      | 50          | 100.0          |

**Table 9. Outcomes of the EDC.**

| Outcome                      | Frequencies | Percentage (%) |
|------------------------------|-------------|----------------|
| Economic development         |             |                |
| Employment                   | 4           | 30.8           |
| Income                       | 3           | 23.1           |
| Business growth              | 2           | 15.4           |
| Economic development activities | 1           | 7.7            |
| Cost-saving                  | 1           | 7.7            |
| Tax revenue                  | 1           | 7.7            |
| Policy diffusion             | 1           | 7.7            |
| Total                        | 13          | 100.0          |

**Table 10. Research limitations mentioned in the EDC studies.**

| Limitation                              | Number | Percentage (%) |
|-----------------------------------------|--------|----------------|
| Generalizability                        | 10     | 22.2           |
| Network tie measurement                 | 8      | 17.8           |
| Causal mechanisms identification        | 6      | 13.3           |
| Cross-sectional data                    | 4      | 8.9            |
| Reverse causality                       | 4      | 8.9            |
| Exclude some types of EDOs              | 4      | 8.9            |
| Omitted variable                        | 2      | 4.4            |
| Self-reported data                      | 2      | 4.4            |
| Lack of interaction terms               | 2      | 4.4            |
| Limited sample size                     | 1      | 2.2            |
| Response bias                           | 1      | 2.2            |
| Missing data                            | 1      | 2.2            |
| Total                                   | 45     | 100.0          |
causal mechanisms identification (6). Other limitations include cross-sectional data employment (4), reverse causality (4), exclusion of some types of EDOs (4), omitted variable (2), self-reported data employment (2), lack of interaction terms (2), response bias (1), and missing data (1). It should be noted that many of these limitations are due to the constraints of social network modeling.

Concluding remarks and future research

EDC studies examine the process of interaction among EDOs in order to tackle economic development problems and promote economic growth. This article provides a systematic review of PA research on this topic. EDC has some characteristics distinctive from collaboration in other policy fields. In particular, economic development is competitive in nature (Feiock et al., 2009). Municipalities compete with one another to attract investment, businesses, and jobs, which presents remarkably different rationales compared to environment collaborative governance and emergency management collaboration. EDC is also riskier than collaboration in other policy fields due to the risk of defection and opportunism. However, no systematic review has exclusively focused on the EDC studies. Therefore, the author collected 85 articles on EDC and conducted a systematic review using the PRISMA approach (Liberati et al., 2009). I have found a growing interest in EDC in the last decade. PA scholars have integrated EDC with other theories and employed diversified empirical designs, contributing to the collaborative governance research and advancing the investigation of the specific features of EDC.

Figure 3 depicts the framework based on the summary of empirical findings. This framework incorporates the variables that have been emphasized in the literature and those aspects that may not have been sufficiently investigated. For instance, little attention has been paid to contextual antecedents or the outcomes of collaborations for economic development.

Based on the results of this review, the author proposes five potential avenues for future EDC research. First, this study calls for more research on EDC in the non-US context. More than sixty percent of the studies relied on empirical data collected from the US. Similarly, we can see that a considerable number of political-institutional antecedents investigated in the studies are based on the local political system in the United States, such as the mayor-form government, the district elections, and political fragmentation. This heavy reliance on the US context raises questions about the extent to which the current findings can be generalized. For instance, US-based scholars have highlighted that local politicians in the US use collaborative economic development approaches to showcase their ability to innovate, aiming to gain more electoral support (Hawkins, 2020). However, we know very little about whether politicians in the non-democratic political regimes characterized by upward accountability would
present a similar behavior pattern. In this regard, comparative and international studies should be of great relevance in the future research agenda. By situating EDC in diverse political and socio-economic contexts, we can perhaps challenge the previous assumptions and findings, producing better insights into the impact of different political institutions, governance systems, and cultural factors on EDC.

Second, more studies are needed to test micro-level theoretical arguments regarding individual factors such as perceptions of competition, risk, and trust. Previous research has identified key structural network and organizational characteristics as summarized in the Results section, while micro-level factors that alter decision makers’ behavior are left understudied. One exception is I. W. Lee et al. (2012). This study examines the impact of local officials’ perception of competition and cooperation on the regional EDC networks. Since organizational-level outcomes in many cases are the results of the micro-level interaction, investigation of individual preferences will provide more nuanced knowledge regarding inter-organizational collaboration.

Third, future research should investigate the dynamics of EDC networks and employ longitudinal data across multiple time periods. Among the quantitative studies reviewed, nearly 80% were based on cross-sectional data, failing to capture the evolution of economic development networks over time. In addition to this, the reliance on cross-sectional data raises concerns about reverse causality and omitted variables, limiting the ability to draw conclusions about causality. While this is understandable given the difficulty of data collection, longitudinal studies could show to what extent the empirical findings are stable and robust. Moreover, longitudinal studies not only enable researchers to study the antecedents of network formulation but also to examine why EDOs choose to maintain or withdraw from collaboration. For instance, external contextual factors like the economic crisis and the global pandemic can significantly alter the extent of resource dependency and the situation EDOs confront. However, these contextual factors remain understudied due to the limitation of the cross-sectional data. By employing longitudinal network data, scholars will be able to investigate how EDOs are dynamically involved in EDC given different contexts.

Fourth, there is a need for more knowledge of the causal mechanisms at work when investigating the EDC. I. W. Lee et al. (2012) found that the correlation between cooperative perception and EDC network is greater than that between competitive perception and EDC network. However, they cannot interpret this result with a convincing explanation, which weakens the explanatory and predictive power of the empirical findings. Moreover, studies should consider incorporating interaction terms into modeling. For instance, Hawkins (2020) tests the moderate effect of regional coordination organization in EDC using the logistic model, revealing the nonadditive effect of the regional institutions. Future research should consider including interaction terms by using the logit model, the probit model, and the ERGM method. Thus, we could learn more about the moderating and mediating effects of key antecedents such as social capital, fiscal capacity, and geographic proximity.

Fifth, future research should pay close attention to evaluating EDC outcomes. Although EDC can theoretically promote economic growth, reduce service provision costs, and alleviate the negative externalities of economic competition, its effects have not been fully proved by empirical tests. It is important to note that the benefits of EDC are not self-evident. Future research should look into the size of its effects and the preconditions for its effectiveness. Archival data, households survey data, and policy documents could be utilized to capture the multidimensional outcomes of EDC practice.

To conclude, this article has summarized the EDC literature in public administration research by conducting a systematic review. In the context of economic downturn and austerity, an increasing number of localities have taken EDC as an opportunity to rejuvenate the local economy and promote job growth. Despite the increasing prevalence of EDC as an option in public managers’ toolkit, we still know very little about the antecedents, mechanisms, and outcomes of EDC in different political and cultural contexts and how the current EDC theory can be applied to broader EDC practices. By proposing the future directions above, this article attempts to indicate major weaknesses in the current EDC studies and identify future opportunities in this scholarship. Overall, a better understanding of the EDC process could provide vital knowledge and valuable insights for both PA research and practice.

Acknowledgments
The author thanks the editors’ and anonymous reviewers’ insightful comments and suggestions. The author would also like to sincerely thank Qiushi Wang and Xufeng Zhu for their valuable discussions and encouraging words.

Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was sponsored by the National Social Science Foundation of China (20ZDA042) and Tsinghua Strategy for Heightening Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences: “Plateaus & Peaks” (2021TSG08101).

ORCID iD
Liu Chen https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7450-4952

References
Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2003). Collaborative public management: New strategies for local governments. Georgetown University Press.
Aldag, A. M., Warner, M. E., & Bel, G. (2020). It depends on what you share: The elusive cost savings from service sharing. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 30*(2), 275–289.

Axelrod, R. (1997). *The complexity of cooperation*. Princeton University Press.

Bassett, E. M. (2006). “This land is our land?” An analysis of land-use planning and cooperation under Michigan’s Conditional Land Transfer Act. *State and Local Government Review, 38*(1), 23–33.

Bowman, A. O. M. (1988). Competition for economic development among southeastern cities. *Urban Affairs Quarterly, 23*(4), 511–527.

Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2006). The design and implementation of cross-sector collaborations: Propositions from the literature. *Public Administration Review, 66*, 44–55.

Burt, R. S. (2004). Structural holes and good ideas. *American Journal of Sociology, 110*(2), 349–399.

Carr, J. B., Hawkins, C. V., & Westberg, D. E. (2017). An exploration of collaboration risk in joint ventures: Perceptions of risk by local economic development officials. *Economic Development Quarterly, 31*(3), 210–227.

Chen, B., Ma, J., Feiock, R., & Suo, L. (2019). Factors influencing participation in bilateral interprovincial agreements: Evidence from China’s pan pearl river delta. *Urban Affairs Review, 55*(3), 923–949.

Chen, X., & Sullivan, A. A. (2022). Should i stay or should i go? Why participants leave collaborative governance arrangements. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mua024

Engström, Å.-K., & Sätre Åhlander, A.-M. (2008). Collaboration for local economic development: Business networks, politics and universities in two Swedish cities. *European Planning Studies, 16*(4), 487–505.

Feiock, R. C. (2002). A quasi-market framework for development competition. *Journal of Urban Affairs, 24*(2), 123–142.

Feiock, R. C. (2009). Metropolitan governance and institutional collective action. *Urban Affairs Review, 44*(3), 356–377.

Feiock, R. C. (2013). The institutional collective action framework. *Policy Studies Journal, 41*(3), 397–425.

Feiock, R. C., & Clingermayer, J. C. (1992). Development policy choice: Four explanations for city implementation of economic development policies. *The American Review of Public Administration, 22*(1), 49–63.

Feiock, R. C., Lee, I. W., & Park, H. J. (2012). Administrators’ and elected officials’ collaboration networks: Selecting partners to reduce risk in economic development. *Public Administration Review, 72*(s1), S58–S68.

Feiock, R. C., Lee, I. W., Park, H. J., & Lee, K.-H. (2010). Collaboration networks among local elected officials: Information, commitment, and risk aversion. *Urban Affairs Review, 46*(2), 241–262.

Feiock, R. C., & Scholz, J. T. (2009). Self-organizing federalism: Collaborative mechanisms to mitigate institutional collective action dilemmas. Cambridge University Press.

Feiock, R. C., Steinacker, A., & Park, H. J. (2009). Institutional collective action and economic development joint ventures. *Public Administration Review, 69*(2), 256–270.

Forrant, R. (2001). Pulling together in Lowell: The university and the regional development process. *European Planning Studies, 9*(5), 613–628.

Frant, H. (1996). High-powered and low-powered incentives in the public sector. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 6*(3), 365–381.

Goetz, E. G., & Kayser, T. (1993). Competition and cooperation in economic development: A study of the Twin Cities metropolitan area. *Economic Development Quarterly, 7*(1), 63–78.

Grady, D. O. (1987). State economic development incentives: Why do states compete? *State & Local Government Review, 19*, 86–94.

Gray, B. (1989). Collaborating: Finding common ground for multiparty problems. Overcoming obstacles for successful collaboration. *Jossey-Bass.*

Gray, B., & Wood, D. J. (1991). Collaborative alliances: Moving from practice to theory. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 27*(1), 3–22.

Hawkins, C. V. (2010a). Competition and cooperation: Local government joint ventures for economic development. *Journal of Urban Affairs, 32*(2), 253–275.

Hawkins, C. V. (2010b). Inter-jurisdictional economic development: A political institution explanation for policy choice. *International Journal of Public Administration, 33*(7), 379–389.

Hawkins, C. V. (2017). Political incentives and transaction costs of collaboration among US cities for economic development. *Local Government Studies, 43*(5), 752–775.

Hawkins, C. V. (2020). Interlocal agreements and multilateral institutions: Mitigating coordination problems of self-organized collective action. *International Journal of Public Administration, 43*(7), 563–572.

Hawkins, C. V., & Andrew, S. A. (2011). Understanding horizontal and vertical relations in the context of economic development joint venture agreements. *Urban Affairs Review, 47*(3), 385–412.

Hawkins, C. V., & Feiock, R. (2011). Joint ventures, economic development policy, and the role of local governing institutions. *The American Review of Public Administration, 41*(3), 329–347.

Hollander, R. (2010). Rethinking overlap and duplication: Federalism and environmental assessment in Australia. *Publiclius: The Journal of Federalism, 40*(1), 136–170.

Im, E., Jeon, S. H., & Kim, J. S. (2017). Which local self-governments seek more collaboration? Evidence from interlocal collaboration for economic development in South Korea. *Lex Localis-Journal of Local Self-Government, 15*(2), 175–197.

Ki, N., Kwak, C. G., & Song, M. (2020). Strength of strong ties in intercity government information sharing and county jurisdictional boundaries. *Public Administration Review, 80*(1), 23–35.

Kim, S., Song, M., & Park, H. J. (2019). The network effect on the performance of local economic development. *Public Performance & Management Review, 42*(3), 732–754.

Kwak, C. G., Feiock, R., Hawkins, C., & Lee, Y. (2016). Impacts of federal stimulus funding on economic development policy networks among local governments. *Review of Policy Research, 33*(2), 140–159.

Lee, I. W., Feiock, R. C., & Lee, Y. (2012). Competitors and cooperators: A micro-level analysis of regional economic development collaboration networks. *Public Administration Review, 72*(2), 253–262.
Lee, Y. (2011). Economic development networks among local governments: The structure of collaboration networks in the Tampa Bay Metropolitan Area. *International Review of Public Administration, 16*(1), 113–134.

Lee, Y. (2016). From competition to collaboration: Intergovernmental economic development policy networks. *Local Government Studies, 42*(2), 171–188.

Lee, Y., & Lee, I. W. (2022). A longitudinal network analysis of intergovernmental collaboration for local economic development. *Urban Affairs Review, 58*(1), 229–257.

Lee, Y., Lee, I. W., & Feiock, R. C. (2012). Interorganizational relationships: Collaborative leadership and accountability mechanisms to enhance economic growth in England. *Economic Development Quarterly, 26*(3), 230–243.

Liberati, A., Altman, D. G., Tetzlaff, J., Mulrow, C., Gøtzsche, P. C., Ioannidis, J. P., Clarke, M., Devereaux, P. J., Kleijnen, J., & Moher, D. (2009). The PRISMA statement for reporting systematic reviews and meta-analyses of studies that evaluate health care interventions: Explanation and elaboration. *Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 62*(10), e1–e34.

Liddle, J. (2018). Aligning vertical structures and horizontal relationships: Collaborative leadership and accountability mechanisms to enhance economic growth in England. *International Review of Administrative Sciences, 84*(4), 659–674.

Liddle, J., & Ormston, C. (2015). The legacy of the Northern Way? *Local Government Studies, 41*(4), 553–570.

McGuire, M. (2006). Collaborative public management: Assessing what we know and how we know it. *Public Administration Review, 66*, 33–43.

Minkoff, S. L. (2013). From competition to cooperation: A dyadic approach to interlocal developmental agreements. *American Politics Research, 41*(2), 261–297.

O’leary, R., & Vij, N. (2012). Collaborative public management: Where have we been and where are we going? *The American Review of Public Administration, 42*(5), 507–522.

Oh, Y., Lee, I. W., & Bush, C. B. (2014). The role of dynamic social capital on economic development partnerships within and across communities. *Economic Development Quarterly, 28*(3), 230–243.

Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action: Presidential address. *American Political Science Association, 1997. American Political Science Review, 92*(1), 1–22.

Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C. M., & Warren, R. (1961). The organization of government in metropolitan areas: A theoretical inquiry. *American Political Science Review, 55*(4), 831–842.

Peters, A., & Fisher, P. (2004). The failures of economic development incentives. *Journal of the American Planning Association, 70*(1), 27–37.

Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital. *Journal of Democracy, 6*(1), 65–78. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1995.0002

Reese, L. A. (2014). If all you have is a hammer: Finding economic development policies that matter. *The American Review of Public Administration, 44*(6), 627–655.

Ritz, A., Brewer, G. A., & Neumann, O. (2016). Public service motivation: A systematic literature review and outlook. *Public Administration Review, 76*(3), 414–426.

Rubin, I. S., & Rubin, H. J. (1987). Economic development incentives: The poor (cities) pay more. *Urban Affairs Quarterly, 23*(1), 37–62.

Sbragia, A. M. (2000). Entrepreneurial cities, US federalism, and economic development. In L. J. O’Toole, Jr., (Ed.), *American intergovernmental relations* (3rd ed., pp. 217–228). CQ Press.

Schneider, M., & Teske, P. (1993). The antigrowth entrepreneur: Challenging the “equilibrium” of the growth machine. *The Journal of Politics, 55*(3), 720–736.

Selden, S. C., Sowa, J. E., & Sandfort, J. (2006). The impact of nonprofit collaboration in early child care and education on management and program outcomes. *Public Administration Review, 66*(3), 412–425.

Shrestha, M. K. (2022). How do bridging and bonding networks emerge in local economic development collaboration? *International Journal of Public Administration. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2022.2044858

Siciliano, M. D., Carr, J. B., & Hugg, V. G. (2021). Analyzing the effectiveness of networks for addressing public problems: Evidence from a longitudinal study. *Public Administration Review, 81*(5), 895–910.

Wilson, D. H., Johnson, B. A., Stokan, E., & Overton, M. (2020). Institutional collective action during COVID-19: Lessons in local economic development. *Public Administration Review, 80*(5), 862–865.

Xu, J., & Yeh, A. G. (2013). Interjurisdictional cooperation through bargaining: The case of the Guangzhou–Zhuhai railway in the Pearl River Delta, China. *The China Quarterly, 213*, 130–151.