A cosmopolitan design of teacher education and a progressive orientation towards the highest good

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Abstract
In this paper I discuss a Kantian conception of cosmopolitan education. It suggests that we pursue the highest good – an object of morality – in the world together, and requires that we acknowledge the value of freedom, render ourselves both efficacious and autonomous in practice, cultivate our judgment, and unselfishly co-operate in the co-ordination and fulfilment of our morally permissible ends. Now, such an accomplishment is one of the most difficult challenges, and may not be achieved in our time, if ever. In the first part of the paper I show that we, according to Kant, have to interact with each other, and comply with the moral law in the quest of general happiness, not merely personal happiness. In the second part, I argue that a cosmopolitan design of teacher education in Kantian terms can establish moral character, even though good moral character is ultimately the outcome of free choice. Such a design can do so by optimizing the freedom of those concerned to set and pursue their morally permissible ends, and to cultivate their judgment through the use of examples. This requires, inter alia, that they be enabled, and take responsibility, to think for themselves, in the position of everyone else, and consistently; and to strengthen their virtue or self-mastery to comply, in practice, with the moral law.

Keywords: autonomy; Immanuel Kant; cosmopolitanism; cosmopolitan education; examples; freedom; teacher education; the highest good

CHARACTERISTICS OF A MORAL COMMUNITY: FREEDOM, AUTONOMY, AND THE PURSUIT OF THE HIGHEST GOOD

Kant is criticized by philosophers of education for focusing too much on the individual with too little attention on the impact and value of social relations in communities.¹ Nel Noddings, for example, claims that in ‘Kant’s ethic, the individual – as the general mechanism of practical reasoning – became central, but the individual – as actual, embodied person – became irrelevant’.² Noddings also claims that Kant ‘insisted that each person’s moral perfection is his or her
own project and that each one of us would not, according to her reading of Kant, be responsible for the moral development of any other person. Noddings’ critique is, however, misleading, as we will see; it does not give an adequate account of Kant’s views on the community and its members. Kant developed his views on the characteristics of a moral community over time, and he believed that even though the ultimate responsibility for the moral character of the person lies with the person him- or herself, we are also responsible for enabling others to cultivate their moral character. Moreover, we will also see that the moral character can be cultivated by complying with the principles of practical reason. Finally we see that, with these principles in place, it is possible to pursue the highest possible end – *sumnum bonum*, which is general and not merely personal happiness – a distinguishing characteristic of a moral cosmopolitan community; we also see that it is ultimately the outcome of free choice and that it is possible for those concerned to pursue it.

Kant and the concept of community – general happiness as an object of morality

In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant introduces the concept of community in his table of categories. He lists community under the heading of relation, and argues that a moral notion of community is characterized by mutual interaction between agents, and is marked by resistance. Later on and in particular in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, *Critique of Practical Reason* and *Critique of the Power of Judgment* he argues that such interaction is dynamic, and that we co-ordinate our actions reciprocally when we render ourselves efficacious and autonomous, that is, act in accordance with and are motivated by the hypothetical imperative and the moral law. Moreover, in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Kant says that we do not necessarily always render ourselves autonomous; we render ourselves at times heteronomous, acting instead in accordance and motivating ourselves with the principle of self-love. This principle ‘originates the inclination to gain worth in the opinion of others [...] not allowing anyone superiority over oneself, bound up with the constant anxiety that others might be striving for ascendancy; but from this arises gradually an unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others. Upon this, namely, upon jealousy and rivalry, can be grafted the greatest vices of secret or open hostility to all whom we consider alien to us’. Kant, however, often says that we should never compare ourselves with each other, but only with the moral law, since a comparison with someone else is motivated by self-love. We should instead subordinate the principle of self-love to the moral law, and encourage resistance within a community, promoting this resistance to self-love by acting from duty; that is, respect for the moral law.

Kant also repeats that when we reverse the relationship between the principles of self-love and the moral law that we corrupt the moral ground of our interaction in a community. For by such a reversal we deny the equal moral worth of human
beings; we also sustain our tendency to think that we are better than others and our desire that others should think better of us. Consider this, for example, from the viewpoint of our ethnic or religious identity or our function or status within a social group. Moreover, with this reversal we limit our freedom, and often destroy the possibility of free choice for those concerned; an example is that we limit others’ freedom when we make false promises. Paul Guyer says:

> What you do when you make a false promise to another person is to deny him the opportunity to choose his own response freely in full knowledge of the real circumstances and consequences of his action. [...] When I deceive someone into agreeing to an action that he would not agree to if he knew my real intentions, I deprive him of the possibility of exercising his freedom of choice, at least under circumstances he would choose.\(^{14}\)

By limiting freedom, destroying the possibility of free choice in this case, we constrain our motivation to comply with the moral law. And with this constraint we do not necessarily engage in the practical activity of adequately describing a certain situation or event, nor do we necessarily respond reflectively and critically to the descriptions given of a certain situation, or event, or of each other. Moreover, we do not necessarily give reasons, nor do we necessarily respond reflectively and critically to reasons given. Hence, we are not acting open-mindedly and spontaneously: we are not then understanding a situation, an event or another person adequately, or reflecting upon and critically inquiring into judgments expressed and the possible reasons given for them. Nor are we pursuing general happiness, since this requires us to use our reason to regulate our inclinations and systematize our ends (which in turn requires that we engage in the two former activities to ensure that we pursue only those ends that are morally permissible). Further, we limit others’ freedom and restrict their own choices when we act out of self-love instead of the moral law; we then also pursue personal instead of general happiness.

Therefore, we note that Kant does focus on the concept of community and different kinds of challenge for people entering into social relations. Moreover, if we act in accordance with the principle of self-love and perhaps have it motivate our action, then we do not make ourselves virtuous; do not strengthen our resolution to comply with the moral law. Kant says:

> The principle of one’s own happiness [...] is the most objectionable, not merely because it is false and experience contradicts the pretence that well-being always proportions itself to good conduct, nor yet merely because it contributes nothing at all to the establishment of morality, since making someone happy is quite different from making him good, or making him prudent and sharp-sighted for his own advantage is quite different from making him virtuous; it is the most objectionable because it bases morality on incentives that undermine it and destroy all its sublimity, since they put motives to virtue and those to vice in one class and only teach us to calculate better, but quite obliterate the specific difference between virtue and vice.\(^{15}\)

Kant objects to the idea of making personal happiness the object of morality and the determining ground of the will because he thinks that the notion of personal
happiness is indeterminate and can be a source of conflict.\textsuperscript{16} Thus our feeling of pleasure or displeasure is not only directed to different kinds of object or event; Kant also believes that our thoughts of what can make us happy can conflict with each other, when, for example, the object one thinks will bring happiness in one situation conflicts with what one thinks will make one happy in another. Moreover, not only can the object to which we direct our pleasure and displeasure be different and a source of conflict, our beliefs about the object we think will make us happy can also change, so that we think differently about it at another moment. Kant further notes as so many of us do that people come into conflict with each other when they desire the same object and strive to achieve it even though they cannot both have it at the same time.\textsuperscript{17}

For Kant, no genuine practical principle of practical reason can have a specific material object as a determining ground of the will. He thinks instead: ‘If a rational being is to think of his maxims \textnormal{[}rules of action\textnormal{]} as practical universal laws, he can think of them only as principles that contain the determining ground of the will not by their matter but only by their form’.\textsuperscript{18} This is because the principles of practical reason serve as internal regulative norms for action, enabling us to acknowledge our inclinations, distance ourselves from them and decide whether we should act upon them; and that the only way for us to be free is to have our will be governed by the moral law. Kant also thinks that we can regulate our inclinations when we comply with the moral law. And it is to this we now turn.

\textbf{Principles of practical reason, and the highest possible end in the world – general and not merely personal happiness}

Earlier on, Kant seemed to think that we could both regulate, and act independently of, our inclinations. He says in his \textit{Critique of Practical Reason} that ‘a free will must find a determining ground in the law but independently of the \textit{matter} of the law \textit{[}\ldots\textit{]}’\textsuperscript{19} Later on, however, and in \textit{Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason}, he clearly shows that we could \textit{not} as imperfect rational beings act independently of our inclinations, only regulate them.\textsuperscript{20} This suggests that if we want to maintain our freedom and cultivate our moral character, that is, rendering ourselves autonomous in a community, we have to comply with the moral law so that we can act without being dominated by our own or others’ inclinations – which is hard work. And when we subsume our inclinations as reasons for our actions in our subjective norms of action, we can acknowledge them, distance ourselves from them and have them as objects of reflection. We may then possibly also challenge them – as reasons for our action.\textsuperscript{21} Furthermore, the principles of practical reason, while serving to regulate our inclinations, are also constitutive of our actions, because they both define and describe what we do when we set ends and regulate our inclinations. Hence, when we comply with a constitutive principle we can think of ourselves as free and
autonomous agents, as authors of our actions and not as the mere playthings of forces seemingly outside our control. Korsgaard says:

Constitutive principles [...] are normative and descriptive at the same time. They are normative, because in performing the activities of which they are the principles, we are guided by them, and yet we can fail to conform to them. But they are also descriptive, because they describe the activities we perform when we are guided by them.22

She continues:

The principles of practical reason, I propose, are constitutive principles of rational activity: they are the principles by which we take control of our beliefs and actions. Or rather, since these terms may already be taken to imply control, perhaps I should say that they are the principles by which we take control of our representations or conceptions of the world, and of our own movements — using “movement” as a general term for the various ways, physical and mental, that we bring about states of affairs in the world.23

The principles of practical reason suggested are the hypothetical imperative and the moral law.24 The hypothetical imperative, which is constitutive for action, says roughly that we set ends and adopt the means to them without specifying exactly what ends we want to achieve or the means necessary for achieving them. The moral law, the constitutive principle of willing, roughly says that we determine ourselves to be the cause of our ends. These two principles are not external restrictions on our actions since we cannot give an account of what we are doing without the hypothetical imperative, and we cannot continue to think of ourselves as free and autonomous agents without the moral law;25 it is only when we comply with them that we can describe both what we do (and fail do to), and what serves as the normative guiding principles for our action.26

Moreover, when we comply with the moral law and take control of our movements, it is then that we also decide who we want to be, according to Korsgaard.27 That is, we decide not merely that we are unwilling to be the playthings of forces seemingly outside of our control. We decide also to render ourselves both efficacious and autonomous; to act so that we achieve the morally permissible ends we set for ourselves and use the necessary means. Korsgaard28 says, and I am inclined to agree with her, that when we act to achieve a certain end and decide that we will do so, we are not doing two different things, i.e. rendering ourselves efficacious on the one hand and autonomous on the other. Instead, we are deciding what we, and the whole of us, are going to do, and not some parts in us. And she continues:

A commitment to morality, according to Kant, essentially involves a commitment to the realization of a certain end, the highest good, which he describes as the state of things in which human beings achieve virtue and necessarily achieve happiness in proportion to their virtue.29

Therefore, we also have to specify what we have to pursue together when we render ourselves both efficacious and autonomous, namely the highest good in the world,
that is, general and not personal happiness. This requires that we connect an object of morality – happiness – with the moral law, virtue and freedom (freedom is the first object of morality, the highest good is the second). It also requires that we respond to what we do together, not merely what each one of us does when we set ends, that we pursue them and determine that we are the cause of our ends.

Kant believes, as we have seen, that we as human beings need an object for our action, namely happiness, and that happiness and in particular general happiness should be both an object of our action and an object of morality. This is because general happiness, according to Kant, is promoted not from inclination, but from duty alone, namely ‘the necessity of an action from respect for law’ in proportion to virtue. I take this to mean that since one object of morality is (general) happiness, we should promote and co-ordinate the ends of all within the bounds set by the moral law in a community. Human beings set ends and strive to satisfy them, but we should not promote the desired ends of only a few people, merely sustaining the principle of self-love. Instead, we should systematically distribute happiness, that is, enable ourselves to comply with the moral law. This requires that we render ourselves efficacious and autonomous, co-ordinate our morally permissible ends in its pursuit, and strengthen our respect for the moral law. This adherence to the moral law also suggests that we should not necessarily act upon inclination, or a representation of any inclination, spontaneously or immediately; nor should we just act out of habit or imitate others; we should instead acknowledge our own habits, imitations, and the representation of our inclinations in our norms of action, and have them as objects of reflection, and change them at need. That is, we should reflect upon them together and consider how far our own ends, affected by our inclinations, limit or prevent our own or others’ freedom to promote each person’s ends, of which he or she is the cause on the one hand, and systematize our ends, and cultivate our adherence to the moral law – our moral character, in the pursuit of the highest good so that we prove ourselves worthy of happiness, on the other. Guyer says:

Kant takes happiness to be the natural goal of human beings. But he also takes our rational commitment to morality to mean that we would wish to be happy only insofar as we have proven ourselves to be worthy of happiness because of our respect for the moral law.

Hence, we prove ourselves worthy of happiness only when we act out of respect for the moral law, which requires that each one of us regulate our own inclinations. Moreover, the moral law also requires that we each regulate the inclinations of the other, in particular when the inclinations affect our freedom negatively. In addition, we show respect for the moral law when we confer value on our own external ends and on each other’s (in particular those ends which are morally permissible), and on each other as a rational value-conferring being. This is manifest when we respect each other as ends in ourselves, and not merely as means to some further end. Further, we so value each other when we cultivate ourselves as moral beings, which require that we cultivate our power of judgment. This we do when we not merely set ends, strive to achieve them, and determine ourselves to be the cause of them,
but also cultivate our rational capacities to acknowledge, reflect upon and possibly also challenge these ends and our beliefs, values and norms of action, when needed, while freely rendering ourselves capable of achieving the highest possible end—\textit{summum bonum}—namely, general and not personal happiness.

\textbf{Kant, the \textit{summum bonum} and the idea of cosmopolitan moral community}

The achievement of such a moral ideal is hard work as we struggle with regulating our own and others’ inclinations, habits, etc., with conferring value on others and ourselves as rational value-conferring beings, with deciding what ends are morally permissible, and with how we can pursue our (morally permissible) ends continuously together. This granted, we have to outline what each of us does when we place ourselves ‘in a relationship with ourselves […] [and] make laws for ourselves’ as Korsgaard\textsuperscript{38} says; that is, we have to give an account of what it suggests when we strive together with all our power ‘towards the highest good possible on earth, towards the universal happiness of the whole world, combined with and in keeping with the purest morality’.\textsuperscript{39} This in turn requires that we use our reason to set ends and to judge what ends we think are morally permissible, and how we can systematically distribute happiness. Guyer says:

Many texts demonstrate Kant’s recognition that the essence of morality is nothing other than the use of reason to systematize happiness, that is, to regulate our attempts to satisfy our inclinations so that we satisfy only those which fit into an intra- and interpersonal system of happiness.\textsuperscript{40}

Guyer continues:

\textbraceleft [T\textbraceright he use of moral law restricts the pursuit of one’s own individual inclinations, but in behalf of the more systematic satisfaction of one’s own ends and those of others, thus not in opposition to the pursuit of happiness in any sense at all but rather in behalf of the systematic and therefore maximal happiness of all.\textsuperscript{41}

Were happiness merely promoted from inclination and not from respect for the moral law, it would most likely have a corrupting influence on us, given our nature as human beings. We could, for example, be the plaything of mere forces and hence out of control, or we could believe that the personal ends we strive to fulfil (as supposedly superior human beings) are more important than any other. However, such delusive arrogance not only corrupts us, it also contributes, according to Allen W. Wood, ‘to prudential unwisdom and to moral evil’,\textsuperscript{42} and to our ‘tendencies to competitiveness, self-conceit, and self-deception’.\textsuperscript{43} Moreover, when we reverse the order of the suggested principles we do not necessarily make it possible to publicly acknowledge others’ and our own beliefs, as well our own and others’ norms of action, and have them as objects of reflection and possible change them. Subsequently, we would then not necessarily value each others freedom and capacity to set and pursue ends, particularly those ends that are morally permissible; nor value our good will or our rational capacities to reflect upon and challenge the ends we set; or change them at need. However, to ‘avoid the frustration of being dominated by others and to
experience, instead, the pleasure of making [our] own choices, [we] who live in circumstances in which [we] cannot avoid contact with [each other], or in which [we] even depend upon interaction with [each other] – that is, all human beings in the empirical conditions of their actual existence – must figure out how to act in accordance with a principle of cooperation but nondomination, which is at least part of a principle of autonomy'. Hence, we have to value free and unhindered activity and promote the unselfish co-ordination and fulfilment of the morally legitimate ends of all in a community if we want to ‘avoid the frustration of being dominated by others’. We have to use our reason freely in order to pursue a systematic union of our ends and produce ‘at least under ideal circumstances, a systematic form of happiness’ so that we – as an effect thereof – can enjoy the maximal entitlement to happiness for all concerned in a community. Moreover, we ought to comply with the moral law, and not with the principle of self-love in a community, and we should resist following and being motivated by self-love if we want to render ourselves autonomous in a community. That is, we have to realize the ‘conjoint maximization of virtue and happiness’ if we want to render ourselves efficacious and autonomous, and pursue general happiness.

However, it is not easy to promote general happiness in a community, as seen above, since we as imperfect rational beings cannot act without being affected by inclinations; nor can we do without the constitutive principles of practical reason when we give an account of our agency. There is therefore a struggle within ourselves and between us whether we should comply with the moral law or the principle of self-love. That is, we do not merely struggle continuously with others and ourselves when we strive to take control of our movements, our beliefs, values and norms of action. We also do so when we strive to pursue our own ends without being dominated by our own inclinations, habits, etc., or by any others’. Kant says:

Freedom consists in this, that everyone can act according to his own will, without being necessitated to act according to the will of another.

Therefore, freedom for Kant does not mean that we let ourselves be passively restrained by our own inclinations, habits, etc. or any others; nor does it consist of subordinating some inclinations to other inclinations in the choice and pursuit of our ends. Freedom consists of actively regulating our inclinations, and together determining how we act by reason in a community. Moreover, it also consists of our ability to select and pursue our morally permissible ends without being dominated by our own or others’ inclinations – to give in to one’s own or others’ inclinations is to subordinate the moral law to the principle of self-love, and hence to limit our freedom. It is, for Paul Guyer: ‘to surrender one’s autonomy to self-love’.

[Autonomy must be conceived of as a condition of mastery over our inclinations in our choice of ends and actions, and for that reason as a condition of cooperation with, but not domination by, others as well, a condition which we can freely choose to maintain, but which we can just as well freely choose to subvert.}
However, even though Kant claims that freedom is the condition for autonomy, and that we must take control of ourselves, and in particular our inclinations, and govern our inclinations by the constitutive principles of practical reason, if we want to create a moral community, it is not enough that we regulate the impact our inclinations have upon ourselves; we must also interact. In particular, we must co-operate with each other to preserve and promote the fullest expression of life, namely: ‘free and unhindered activity’, and in particular activities aiming at the greatest possible happiness of all. Guyer says:

In order to preserve and promote our full freedom of activity, we must, therefore, govern our activity by laws of reason [constitutive principles], rather than being pushed around by whatever inclination happens to be strongest in us at any given time.

Guyer continues:

Rather, what the full enjoyment of our freedom requires is that we subject both our own inclinations and those of others to the regulation of reason in a way that, while respecting the freedom of all, leads to the pursuit of the satisfaction of an intersubjectively compatible set of inclinations, representing the union of the free choices of all who are involved.

I take the above to refer to an end that would result from the maximization of everybody’s freedom to pursue their morally permissible ends, that is the highest good. This is an object of morality that ‘could result from the moral use of freedom’. However, any single individual cannot achieve such an end; it can only be progressively promoted by the human species, according to Kant. He says: ‘But this much is certain, that individual human beings, no matter what degree of formation they are able to bring to their pupils, cannot make it happen that they reach their vocation. Not individual human beings, but rather the human species, shall get there’. And in his *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, he says:

Now, here we have a duty sui generis, not of human beings toward human beings but of the human race toward itself. For every species of rational beings is objectively – in the idea of reason – destined to a common end, namely the promotion of the highest good as a good common to all. But, since this highest moral good will not be brought about solely through the striving of one individual person for his own moral perfection but requires rather a union of such persons into a whole toward that very end, [i.e.] toward a system of well-disposed human beings in which, and through the unity of which alone, the highest moral good can come to pass […]

Since we have to pursue the highest good together, we cannot merely develop our predisposition to use objects in the environment or each other to achieve our ends, nor can we serve merely the specific interests within different communities. Instead, we should take into account ‘the idea of a cosmopolitan moral community’, which means that we also have to cultivate our predisposition to morality, our capacity to use our reason in the pursuit of the final end – the highest good. In doing this, we should also ‘act that [each one of us] use humanity, whether in our own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely
In other words, we should not merely confer value on our external ends, but also on ourselves as rational, value-conferring beings, capable of setting ends and pursuing them, but also of challenging and changing them at need.

However, even though Kant writes that we as imperfect rational beings ought to pursue the highest good by complying with the principles of practical reason, he says that it is one of the most challenging tasks human beings could take upon themselves (for reasons mentioned above); and that moral perfection – ‘the final destiny of the human race’—can be hoped for from nowhere else but education, and in particular a cosmopolitan design of education so far as moral perfection, and the pursuit of the highest good ‘is accomplished through human freedom’. And it is to this we now turn, to some ideas for a cosmopolitan design of education, which addresses this challenge, namely that human beings ‘must be educated’, in order to ‘become human’, that is, cultivated, civilized and moralized, so far as it is ‘accomplished through human freedom’.

TEACHER EDUCATION, FREE CHOICE AND A PROGRESSIVE ORIENTATION TOWARDS THE HIGHEST GOOD AS AN OBJECT OF MORALITY

The final destiny of the human race is moral perfection [...] How, then, are we to seek this perfection, and from whence is it to be hoped for? From nowhere else but education.

An aim of education is, for Kant, the cultivation of human beings’ moral predisposition, that is, the moral strength to act in agreement with and be motivated by the moral law, so that people are enabled to pursue the highest good. Such ‘achievement is difficult [partly] because one cannot expect to reach the goal [general and not personal happiness] by the free agreement of individuals, but only by a progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically united’. Such a system should be ‘cosmopolitically united’ since it enables human beings to acknowledge each other as ends in themselves, that is, as rational beings able to systematize their ends, particular those that are morally permissible, and to resist those ends which lead merely to personal but not general happiness. This suggests, in the words of Robert B. Louden, that ‘[s]tudents must learn to become citizens of the world, and to respect the inherent dignity and moral equality of all human beings’, and that education ‘must aim not at national or parental goals (both of which are usually vocational in nature), but at human perfection in moral terms. Kant writes that the educational aim – a progressive orientation towards the highest good – is challenging partly because parents and nation-states basically use education as an instrument for the fulfilling the interests they find valuable. However, even though member-states of, e.g. the European Union use education to develop students’ technical and pragmatic predispositions towards predetermined goals such as becoming employable and
competitive, education cannot affect moral character since moral character, in Kantian terms, is ultimately a free choice. Or, Louden again: ‘External change does not guarantee internal change; good moral character is ultimately a free choice and not a causal outcome of social reform efforts’; hence it is a contradiction, for Kant, to make it our end to cultivate others - students, for example - and their moral character through social reform (see below). Moreover, students also alienate themselves from their freedom if they let themselves be dominated by others. Kant writes, ‘anyone who ceded himself, with all his powers, to the disposition of another, and thus voluntarily enslaved himself, would alienate this freedom; he would treat his person as a thing, and this he cannot do’. In addition, however, he would also alienate himself from his responsibility to render himself autonomous and to transform his way of thinking through an act of freedom; so that he would not make possible ‘a revolution in the disposition of [himself]’. he would then not actively use his reason, that is, cultivate his power of judgment to pursue a progressive and joint orientation towards the highest good; he would instead basically act in agreement with and be motivated by the principle of self-love, perhaps even unquestioningly accept the claim to legitimacy of others’ expressed judgments. This suggests that students who do not actively use their reason and who are not enabled to do so may reinforce their ‘need to be led by others’, and ‘keep their reason in a condition (Zustand) of passivity’. And as a result thereof they may find themselves uncritically imitating and perhaps even accepting specific uses of judgments. Students who do not actively use their reason and are not enabled to do so in, for example, teacher education, an education of grown-ups, become the playthings of forces seemingly outside their control; they do not necessarily take the responsibility to think for themselves, etc. Hence, they do not render themselves autonomous, nor do they pursue the highest good together.

Therefore, we see that a reason why education is a difficult challenge is that the formation of moral character is ultimately a free choice. We see also, that Kant is concerned with how we are enabled and take the responsibility to cultivate our character and judgment; and in particular whether we are motivated by the principle of self-love or the moral law when we respond to each other in social relationships. Hence Nel Noddings’ in Educating Moral People (see above) is wrong when she claims that Kant is not concerned with how people respond to each other in social relationships and whether people are enabled to cultivate their moral character. On the contrary, Kant argues that we have a responsibility to enable each other to take responsibility to develop our moral character (more on this below), and that he, therefore, is concerned with how we respond to each other. Moreover, Kant thinks that neither parents [nor the state, my addition] necessarily ‘have as their final end the best for the world and the perfection to which humanity is destined, and for which it also has the predisposition’, unless they, design a plan for education in ‘a cosmopolitan manner’, one which enables students to cultivate their judgment. Thus, if students want to cultivate not merely their technical and pragmatic predispositions, but also their moral ones, they have to be enabled and take their responsibility to do so. That is, any education – including teacher education – has to...
be re-structured so that students, in Louden’s words, ‘will [be enabled to] learn to respect and care for all moral agents, particularly all human beings’, or more precisely: their responsibility to learn to respect and care for each other as rational value-conferring beings. This suggests that students should learn to respect and care for their humanity, i.e. themselves and others, as ends in themselves, not merely as means to some further end. It also suggests that they should not merely think for themselves, but also ‘in the position of everyone else’, and consistently. Further, it proposes, as I have argued elsewhere, that education cannot merely be used as a tool for the cultivation of students’ competence, enabling them to use or produce, for example, knowledge as efficiently as possible to become employable and competitive on the market, moving to where the jobs are. Neither is it enough, for Kant, that education merely shapes students’ social abilities so that they are civilized, that is, capable of using each other to achieve their own or others’ ends. This is, as we have seen, problematic; such an approach shapes their strategic capacities, but does not necessarily enable them to cultivate their moral character in the terms outlined above. Hence teacher education, particularly cosmopolitan, cannot merely prepare the way for making students efficacious and civilized, it should also enable them to use their power of judgment in practice so that they are capable of pursuing the highest good as an object of morality.

While Kant argued that human beings ought to pursue the highest good, he was not so sanguine about their efforts or interests in accomplishing it. In the Lectures on Pedagogy, he writes: ‘We live in a time of disciplinary training, culture and civilization, but not by any means in a time of moralization’, and in his essay – ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim’ – he says: ‘We are cultivated in a high degree by art and science. We are civilized, perhaps to the point of being overburdened, by all sorts of social decorum and propriety. But very much is still lacking before we can be held to be already moralized’. And in his Lectures on Pedagogy, he writes that if we want to pursue a progressive orientation towards the highest good, then ‘[o]ne must also pay attention to moralization. [And he continues:] The human being should not merely be skilled for all sorts of ends, but should also acquire the disposition to choose nothing but good ends. Good ends are those which are necessarily approved by everyone and which can be the simultaneous ends of everyone’. Sanguine though he was, he believed that they have to create the conditions needed for making such an achievement possible. And one necessary condition is education; another is the ideal of a federation of states. However, he does not think that just any kind of education can accomplish this; only an education designed in cosmopolitan terms can achieve this, one that can enable students to cultivate their power of judgment. This is because such an education cultivates not merely their technical and pragmatic predispositions, but also their moral predisposition. Hence, the proposed achievement is challenging in two ways. First, it is not enough that students in (teacher) education take control of their actions and pursue their ends, but also because they have to acknowledge how far they are enabled and take the responsibility to pursue morally permissible ends, resisting all others.
This requires them, inter alia, to interact and communicate with each other, and critically inquire into suggested beliefs, norms of action and values.

But this is not all. We see too, that there is some sort of qualitative leap from the cultivation of students’ technical and pragmatic predisposition to the formation of their moral character; a qualitative leap that is ultimately a question of a cosmopolitan teacher education but also, and in particular, of their own free choice. This suggests that even were teacher education designed in cosmopolitan terms, it would be inconsistent to enforce the duty to cultivate oneself upon the student; it ‘is rather a free choice for which each individual bears responsibility’.\(^85\)

In *The Metaphysics of Morals*, for example, Kant says that it is a duty to cultivate and perfect oneself,\(^86\) but not to cultivate and perfect the other in moral terms. He says:

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\text{[I]t is a contradiction for me to make another’s perfection my end and consider myself under obligation to promote this. For the perfection of another human being, as a person, consists just in this: that he himself is able to set his end in accordance with his own concepts of duty; and it is self-contradictory to require that I do (make it my duty to do) something that only the other himself can do.}\(^87\)
\]

The duty to cultivate oneself is, however, not just a duty for which each one of us ‘bears responsibility’, it is also an imperfect duty, a ‘duty to strive for this perfection, but not to reach it (in this life); and his compliance with this duty can, accordingly, consist only in continual progress’.\(^88\) The progress can be continual if teacher education is designed in cosmopolitan terms, if people take their responsibility to cultivate their moral character, and if they pursue the highest good together. Moreover, since an imperfect duty only can prescribe ‘the maxim of actions, not actions themselves ... [which, according to Kant] leaves a playroom (latitudo) for free choice in following (complying with) the [moral] law’,\(^89\) it also ‘leaves latitude for free choice’ in how we as human beings can cultivate ourselves and in particular our judgment in relation to the use of examples,\(^90\) and in how we can pursue the highest good together. We can, for example, use our beliefs and the values we express as examples and as objects of reflection, and challenge them at need. When we do so, we think for ourselves, and do not just act upon, copy or imitate the beliefs or values expressed or suggested by others or ourselves. Therefore, and in the words of Barbara Herman: ‘Kantian moral reasoning is not in the service of rule-following’,\(^91\) nor does moral education consist of ‘rote learning and motivational discipline’.\(^92\) The point of Kantian moral reasoning in moral education is, instead, Herman argues, to make children and young people capable ‘of autonomous judgment and action’.\(^93\)

I agree with Herman that cultivating autonomous judgment is important and that it can be done through the use of examples, but unlike her (and Melissa Merritt, see below) I argue that autonomy and in particular the cultivation of judgment has to be connected not merely with freedom – the first object of morality – but also, with Paul Guyer’s words, ‘the highest good [the second object of morality], the greatest possible happiness of the human species consistent with and the product of the
realization of human autonomy'. The reason for this is, to use the words of Korsgaard, that:

The final purpose for human beings must also be regarded as the final purpose of the world. Since whatever is chosen with a good will is good, we can construct the ideal of a totality of all good things. In the *Groundwork* this is the Kingdom of Ends: “A whole of rational beings as ends in themselves as well as of the particular ends which each may set for himself” (G 433). In the *Critique of Practical Reason* it is the Highest Good, “the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason” (C2 108), virtue and the happiness merited by it for every rational being. This turns out to be the final purpose of the world as well as the good for humanity. So we see, then, that the final purpose – the highest good (general and not personal happiness), has to be the final end for human beings, and an attainable one too, otherwise it would be impossible to pursue. Hence, if this is correct, then people have to take their responsibility to think themselves etc., on the one hand, and be enabled to do so, on the other; otherwise the highest good would be impossible to pursue, in this world. Moreover, training in judgment requires, then, freedom to think for oneself, ‘in the position of everyone else’, and consistently, on the one hand, and the final end – general and not personal happiness, consistent with and resulting from ‘the realization of human autonomy’ and human virtue, on the other. It also requires the use of examples; otherwise reason would have nothing to work with.

Kant says in the *Lectures on Pedagogy* that ‘In order to ground a moral character in children … [o]ne must teach them the duties that they have to fulfil as much as possible by examples and orders’. Hence, moral education, and in particular with a cosmopolitan design, can use examples to make those concerned capable of moral reasoning by enabling them to use their reason in practice, and by actively encouraging them to think for themselves, etc. In this sense I agree with Kant, when he says: ‘what really matters is that they [students – and teachers, *my remark*] learn to think’, that is that they actively use their reason upon practical examples, and that they are enabled to do so. This requires that they think for themselves, that is, reflect upon and critically relate to the claimed legitimacy of expressed utterances concerning examples, and not merely imitate or unquestioningly accept their own or other’s utterances about them; also the above suggests that students desiring to render themselves autonomous should not surrender to any kind of outer control, nor passively and unreflectively act upon their inclinations or let themselves be dominated by other people’s inclinations when thinking about examples. In addition, Kant writes that we can become the victims of prejudice or superstition if we do not actively use our reason and actively respond reflectively or critically to imitation, habit and inclinations, identified as three sources of prejudice.

Yet we cannot entirely disregard these sources. What we can and must do, according to Kant, is to avoid becoming their victims and playthings. Hence we need, to use the words of Melissa Merritt, ‘to be reflective about the influence they have on our taking things to be a certain way’ when we think about examples: we must take control of them instead. This suggests, I think, that if students in teacher education and elsewhere are willing and enabled to optimize their freedom to cultivate their
judgment through the use of examples, then they have to actively use their reason to set ends and pursue them, expressing, for example, a particular belief about a specific example. They also have to decide themselves that they are the cause of their ends. They should also be enabled and encouraged ‘to use [their] own understanding’.101 They also need the courage to do so, reflecting upon and possibly also challenging the use of specific utterances and claims to their legitimacy when needed. This they can do by being given the possibility and taking their responsibility to think about what is right and wrong, good and bad, from the viewpoint of examples of different kinds. As Louden observes: ‘we need personal exemplars and tangible examples, not just principles’102 when cultivating our judgment. And Kant says: ‘An example is not for copying, though it is certainly for emulation’,103 and he continues: ‘examples serve only for encouragement’.104 The latter in turn suggests that those concerned open up, as seen from above, a reflective space between their own beliefs and their attitude towards them, and hence enable themselves to challenge them as reasonable beliefs and potential grounds of action. They may also challenge the legitimacy of the actions themselves in relation to particular examples. But this is not all. Kant again: ‘The ground of the action must be derived, not from the example, but from the rule’.105 I take this to mean that those concerned have to comply with the moral law so that they are capable of pursuing general and not personal happiness ‘consistent with and the product of the realization of human autonomy’. The latter suggests, I think that those concerned can enlarge their own understanding, and hence also acknowledge the limitations in this and their understanding of the other, the world and themselves when thinking about examples and putting themselves ‘in the position of everyone else’; hence, the students has to set themselves ‘apart from the subjective private conditions of the judgment, within which so many others are as if bracketed, and [reflect] on [their] own judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can only determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others).’106 This – the second maxim – encourages the student to ‘adopt a critical stance towards [his] judgments’107 in communication with others. It also encourages the ‘other’ to do the same: enlarge his thinking. But this is not all. Taken together they ‘encourage the reflective attitude by which one would remain on guard against prejudice’,108 and let me add: they also encourage a reflective attitude towards our propensity to act upon inclination and on our need to imitate others. And the third maxim, thinking consistently, ‘can only be achieved through the combination of the first two and after frequent observance of them has made them automatic’,109 that is, when those concerned actively and consistently use their reason in thinking about examples, and together. Louden again: ‘Exposure to moral exemplars should help to set the child [or the student, my remark] on the right moral track, but after a while the pupil must come to understand the norms by which these exemplars themselves are judged’.110 This suggests in turn that students have to develop their moral capacity to constrain themselves,111 and respect others and themselves as rational value-conferring beings, so that they are capable of ‘mastering and overcoming [themselves], in regard to the moral disposition’.112 That is, the cultivation of their moral character cannot happen once or only occasionally; it is rather something
students should be enabled, and take the responsibility, to cultivate continually. In addition, when students comply with the above maxims they have to acknowledge themselves and others as rational persons, that is, ‘always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’. I also think that they have to attribute to themselves and others the value that they are the authors of their thinking, as persons capable of pursuing together their morally permissible ends, that is, general and not merely personal happiness; the summun bonum – the highest possible end in the world. Such an end and the joint pursuit of it require the cultivation of virtue. Kant again:

Virtue is, therefore, the moral strength of a human being’s will in fulfilling his duty, a moral constraint through his own lawgiving reason, insofar as this constitutes itself in an authority executing the law.113

Such an ideal is, however, I repeat, challenging to live up to. Sometimes we fail, and at other times we deviate from it, and choose instead to pursue personal instead of general happiness, complying with the principle of self-love. However, and as we have seen above, Kant thinks that a cosmopolitan design of education can enable students to pursue the highest good by giving them the opportunity to think for themselves, etc. continuously in practice, and strengthen their virtue or self-mastery to comply with the moral law. This compliance means that they do not merely submit themselves to any particular identity, tradition, practice, custom, belief or value, but that they use them as examples, that is, as objects of reflection, challenge and change them, at need. Moreover, this enablement allows them to take their responsibility to render themselves both efficacious and autonomous, and cultivate their judgment in practice. And the extent to which they are given this possibility and freely adopt it demonstrates how far they are willing to pursue the highest good together. Hence, the pursuit of the highest good is one of our greatest challenges, and may not be accomplished in our time, if ever; it can only by pursued through the active use of reason.

NOTES

1. See for example Gert J. J. Biesta, Beyond Learning. Democratic Education for a Human Future (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2006); Raf Vanderstraeten and Gert J. J. Biesta, ‘How is Education Possible? Preliminary investigations for a theory of education’, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 33 (1) (2001): 7–21.
2. Nel Noddings, Philosophy of Education (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1995), 161.
3. Nel Noddings, Educating Moral People (New York: Teachers College Press, 2002), 15.
4. Ibid.
5. See also Susan Shell, The Embodiment of Reason. Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996) for a discussion on Kant’s views on the embodiment of reason, Allen W. Wood, ‘Religion, ethical community, and the struggle against evil, in Kant and the concept of community, eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe, NAKS Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 9. (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2011): 121–137, on Kant’s views on the character of social relations and the struggle against evil, and Kant and the concept of community, eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe, NAKS
Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 9. (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2011) for discussions on Kant’s concept of community.

6. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A80/B106.

7. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

8. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

9. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Transl. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

10. Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Trans. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

11. Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, 6: 27.

12. See Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals* (Translated by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6: 435 and *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5: 76–77.

13. See, for example, Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, 6: 27, and 6: 46.

14. Paul Guyer, *Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 180.

15. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 4: 442.

16. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5: 26–28.

17. See, for example, Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5: 28.

18. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5: 27.

19. Ibid., 5: 29.

20. See also Anne Margaret Baxley, ‘Kantian Virtue’, *Philosophy Compass*, 2 (3) (2007): 396–410; Paul Guyer, *Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom*, 115–145 for discussions on how we can regulate, but not abolish, our inclinations.

21. See Christine Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Lecture 3 and *The Activity of Reason* (Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 83 (2) 2009b, http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3415961), for discussions on the activity of reason and how we can act for reasons, reflect upon and challenge specific reasons as motives for and explanations of our actions.

22. Christine Korsgaard, *The Constitution of Agency* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 9.

23. Christine Korsgaard, *The Constitution of Agency*, 9.

24. See Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, for a discussion of these principles.

25. Reath, ‘Autonomy, taking one’s choices to be good, and practical law: replies to critics’. *Philosophical Books* 49 (2) (2008): 127.

26. See Christine Korsgaard, *The Constitution of Agency*, Part 1 and her *Self-Constitution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Andrews Reath, ‘Autonomy, taking one’s choices to be good, and practical law: replies to critics’, 125–137 and his ‘Formal principles and the form of a law’ in *Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason*, eds. Andrews Reath and Jens Timmerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 31–54 for discussions on constitutive principles; see also Fazal Rizvi, ‘Towards cosmopolitan learning’, *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*, 30 (3) (2009): 253–268, where he claims that Kant’s moral philosophy does not acknowledge ‘cultural diversity […] nor seriously addresses the historically inherited inequalities in power relations’ (Ibid., 261). Kant, however, does acknowledge diversity and power. The different ways in which we understand each other and ourselves are, for Kant, the material for the active use of the faculty of reason to think for ourselves, consistently and from the viewpoint of others. Moreover, Kant addresses issues of inequality and how we limit our freedom in relation to the principle of self-love. We corrupt,
for example, the moral ground of our actions, and encourage our ‘unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over other’ (Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, 1998b, 6: 27), when we comply with the principle of self-love. Kant continues: ‘Upon this, namely, upon *jealousy* and *rivalry*, can be grafted the greatest vices of secret or open hostility to all whom we consider alien to us’ (Ibid., 6: 27). Furthermore, Kant also demonstrates, according to Paul Guyer, how we can ‘avoid the frustration of being dominated by others’ (Paul Guyer, *Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom*, 128) by complying with the principles of practical reason and in particular the moral law in practice, which, however, is hard work.

27. Christine Korsgaard, *Self-constitution*, xi.
28. Ibid., 126.
29. Ibid., 87.
30. See, for example, Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5: 450 for a discussion on the notion of ‘highest good’ and that human beings can pursue the highest good together in the world.
31. See Paul Guyer, ‘Kant’s Teleological Conception of Philosophy and its Development’, in *Kant Yearbook 1/2009: Telology*, ed. Dietmar H. Heidemann (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter), 60 for a discussion on the objects of morality.
32. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5: 27.
33. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 4: 399.
34. Ibid., 4: 400.
35. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5: 111.
36. Paul Guyer, *Kant* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 230.
37. See Christine Korsgaard, ‘Kant’s Formula of Humanity’, in her *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 106–132 for a discussion on the notion of humanity and the idea that human beings are rational value-conferring creatures.
38. Christine Korsgaard, *Self-constitution*, xii.
39. Immanuel Kant, ‘On the Common Saying: “This May Be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice”’, in *Kant – Political Writings*, ed. H. S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 65.
40. Paul Guyer, *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 100.
41. Ibid., 100–101.
42. Allen W. Wood, *Kant’s Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 21.
43. Ibid., 25.
44. Paul Guyer, *Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom*, 128.
45. Paul Guyer, *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness*, 9.
46. Ibid., 334.
47. C. C. Mrongovius, ‘Morality according to Prof. Kant: Lectures on Baumgarten’s practical philosophy’, in *Lectures on Ethics*, ed. Immanuel Kant, Trans. Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 29: 618.
48. Paul Guyer, *Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom*, 125.
49. Ibid., 125–126.
50. Ibid., 129.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Andrews Reath, ‘Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant’, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 26 (4) (1988): 597.
54. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5: 450.
55. Immanuel Kant, ‘Lectures on Pedagogy’, in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, Trans. Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9: 445.
56. Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, 6: 98.
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57. Ibid., 6: 200.
58. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 4: 429.
59. Georg L. Collins, ‘From the lectures of Professor Kant Köningsberg, Winter Semester, 1784–5’, in *Lectures on Ethics*, ed. Immanuel Kant Trans. Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 27: 470.
60. Georg L. Collins, ‘From the lectures of Professor Kant Köningsberg, Winter Semester, 1784–5’, in Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, 27: 470. See also Kate A. Moran, *Community and Moral Progress in Kant*, a dissertation in philosophy presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania, 2008, and in particular chapters 2 and 3 for discussion on the notion of the highest good and education, and Georg Cavallar, ‘Cosmopolitanisms in Kant’s philosophy’, *Ethics & Global Politics*, 5 (2) (2012): 95–118 for a discussion on the relation between cosmopolitanism, the highest good and education in the work of Kant.
61. Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, 9: 441.
62. Ibid., 9: 443.
63. Collins, in Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, 27: 470–471.
64. Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Trans. Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 333.
65. Robert B. Louden, *Kant’s Human Being – Essays on His Theory of Human Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 148.
66. Robert B. Louden, *Kant’s Human Being – Essays on His Theory of Human Nature*, 148.
67. Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, 9: 448.
68. See, for example, Zygmunt Bauman, *Consuming Life* (Cambridge: Polity), 57, for a discussion on the commodification of people, and Michael A. Peters (2001) ‘National education policy constructions of the “knowledge economy”: towards a critique’, *Journal of Educational Enquiry*, 2 (1) (2001): 1–22; Michael A. Peters, ‘Education and the Ideologies of the Knowledge Economy: Europe and the Politics of Emulation’, *Social Work & Society*, 2 (2) (2004): 160–172; Mark Olssen, John A. Codd, & Anne-Marie O’Neill, *Education Policy: Globalization, Citizenship & Democracy* (London: Sage Publications, 2004), p. 5; and Klas Roth, ‘Education for the Market and Democracy – an Indissoluble Tension?’ in *The Possibility/Impossibility of a New Critical Language in Education*, ed. Ilan Gur-Zeev (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2010), 333–349; and Klas Roth, ‘Freedom and Autonomy in Knowledge-Based Societies’, in *Kant and Education – Interpretations and Commentary*, eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (New York: Routledge, 2012), 214–225, for discussions on the marketization of education. See also the other articles of this issue of *Ethics & Global Politics* for discussions on the impact of economic cosmopolitanism on education and in particular teacher education in, inter alia, terms of standardization.
69. Robert B. Louden, *Kant’s Human Being – Essays on His Theory of Human Nature*, 149.
70. Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, 6: 386.
71. Johann F. Vigilantius, ‘Notes on the lectures of Mr. Kant on the metaphysics of morals’, in *Lectures on Ethics*, ed. Immanuel Kant, 27: 594.
72. Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, 6: 47.
73. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5: 295.
74. Katerina Deligiorgi, ‘Universalisability, Publicity, and Communication: Kant’s Conception of Reason’, *European Journal of Philosophy*, 10 (2) (2002): 149.
75. Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, 9: 448.
76. Ibid., 9: 448.
77. Robert B. Louden, *Kant’s Impure Ethics – From Rational Beings to Human Beings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 55.
78. See also David Hansen, Stephanie Burdick-Shepherd, Christina Cammarano and Gonzalo Obelleiro, ‘Education, Values, and Valuing in Cosmopolitan Perspective’, *Curriculum Inquiry*, 39 (5) (2009): 587–612, for a discussion on the importance of recognizing human beings as valuing creatures, and David Hansen *The Teacher and the World. A Study of
Cosmopolitanism as Education (New York: Routledge, 2011), where he also addresses the issue of value, and in particular the value of being ‘open reflectively to the larger world’ (Ibid., xiii) in what he calls a cosmopolitan outlook of education.

79. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 294; see also (Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 228–229) for discussions on the three ‘maxims of the common human understanding [namely, the following:] 1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone else; 3. Always to think in accord with oneself’ (Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 294). Kant continues: ‘The first is the maxim of the unprejudiced way of thinking, the second of the broad-minded way, the third that of the consistent way’ (Ibid., 5: 294). See also Katerina Deligiorgi, ‘Universalisability, Publicity, and Communication: Kant’s Conception of Reason’, Melissa Merritt, ‘Reflection, Enlightenment, and the Significance of Spontaneity in Kant’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 17 (5) (2009): 981–1010; Melissa Merritt, ‘Kant on Enlightened Moral Pedagogy’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49 (3) (2011): 227–253; G. Felicitaz Munzel Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. The “Critical” Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 223–236 for discussions on the value and importance of thinking for oneself, thinking in the position of everyone else, and consistently.

80. Klas Roth, ‘Education for the Market and Democracy – an Indissoluble Tension?’ in The Possibility/Impossibility of a New Critical Language in Education, ed. Ilan Gur-Zeev, 333–349. ‘Freedom and Autonomy in Knowledge-Based Societies’, in Kant and Education – Interpretations and Commentary, 214–225.

81. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Pedagogy, 9: 451.

82. Immanuel Kant, ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim’, in Anthropology, History, and Education, Trans. Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8: 26.

83. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Pedagogy, 9: 450.

84. See, for example, Ronald Beiner, & Williams J. Booth, eds., Kant & Political Philosophy. The Contemporary Legacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Elisabeth Ellis, Kant’s Politics. Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism. The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) for discussions on the value of a federation of states and similar issues.

85. Robert B. Louden, Kant’s Human Being – Essays on His Theory of Human Nature, 146.

86. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 445.

87. Ibid., 6: 386.

88. Ibid., 6: 447.

89. Ibid., 6: 390.

90. See Robert B. Louden, Kant’s Human Being – Essays on His Theory of Human Nature, and in particular Chapter 8; Paul Guyer, ‘Examples of Moral Possibility’, in Kant and Education – Interpretations and Commentary, eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant, Chapter 10, for elaborated discussions on the use of examples in education.

91. Barbara Herman, Moral Literacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 133.

92. Barbara Herman, Moral Literacy, 133.

93. Ibid., 134.

94. Paul Guyer, Kant’s Teleological Conception of Philosophy and its Development, 60.

95. Christine Korsgaard, ‘Aristotle and Kant on the source of value’, in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 241.

96. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Pedagogy, 9: 488.

97. Ibid., 9: 450.

98. Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 294.
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99. See Melissa Merritt, ‘Kant on Enlightened Moral Pedagogy’, 234 for a discussion on the sources of prejudice that Kant identifies.
100. Ibid.
101. Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: “What is Enlightenment?”’ in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. H. S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 54.
102. Robert B. Louden, *Kant’s Human Being – Essays on His Theory of Human Nature*, 96.
103. Collins, in Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, 27: 334.
104. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 4: 409.
105. Collins, in Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, 27: 334.
106. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5: 295.
107. Katerina Deligiorgi, 'Universalisability, Publicity, and Communication: Kant’s Conception of Reason', 151.
108. Melissa Merritt, *Kant on Enlightened Moral Pedagogy*, 235.
109. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5: 295.
110. Robert B. Louden, *Kant’s Human Being – Essays on His Theory of Human Nature*, 95.
111. Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, 6: 394.
112. Collins, in Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, 27: 300.
113. Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, 6: 405.