Manifestoes: A Study in Genre

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MANIFESTOES: A STUDY IN GENRE

BY

STEVENS RUSSELL AMIDON

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

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Abstract:

This project is a book-length study of the manifesto, which attempts to trace adaptations writers have made to the genre, beginning with the Luther’s “95 Theses.” From there I move to political manifestoes, including the “Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants and Marx and Engels’ “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” and then to the aesthetic manifestoes of modernism. Later I treat manifestoes of critique, examining texts by Virginia Woolf, Frank O’Hara, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Donna Haraway, the Students for a Democratic Society and the Lesbian Avengers.

While this project is a study of genre and influence, it is grounded in contemporary theories of social reproduction. I avoid taking a taxonomic approach to genre, instead treating the concept as a process, which situates the text within the social context of its production. Generic influence in this study means much more than the “textual correspondences” of a taxonomic approach. In implementing this research method, I examine three elements which capture the richer concept of “social influence:” (1) the social image of the act of production of the text, (2) the rhetorical dynamics of the act, and (3) the formal elements of the act.
This approach allows me to address three issues: (1) the relationship of genre to the agency and socialization of the writer; (2) the relative stability, or lack of it, in a generic form such as the manifesto; and (3) the ways in which the history of writing practices both constrains and enables the future writing practices of individuals. These issues are also important to pedagogy, given the prevalence of writing courses centered around the uses of genre.
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Chapter 1: The Genre that Refuses to Stay in Its Place

The last 30 years have seen an explosion of interest in genre studies in the field of rhetoric and composition. Scholars like Charles Bazerman, Carol Berkenkotter, Thomas Huckin and Anis Bawarshi have explored genres such as the scientific article and the scholarly presentation delivered at an academic convention, and have shown us the plastic nature of the concept of genre. And John Trimbur, David Russell, David Bleich, Davida Charney and Richard Carlson, among others, have taken genre theory, and used it to change the nature of practice within the writing classroom itself. This dissertation adds to that body of knowledge by examining the ways writers have adapted one such genre of discourse, the manifesto.

Such a project, of course, assumes a tacit knowledge of certain terms, such as genre and manifesto. When you think “manifesto,” Marx and Engels’ Manifesto of the Communist Party may come to mind, or perhaps you may think of other works such as Marinetti’s The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism, Donna Haraway’s A Manifesto for Cyborgs, or even the Unabomber’s manifesto. Despite their differences, despite the fact that some are political, others aesthetic, and still others scholarly in nature, they share something in common, and whatever that something is, when we see it in a piece of discourse, we call it a “manifesto.”

This is the nature of genre, a concept based upon similarities between texts or speech. It is a concept based in the practices of real readers and writers, though
it has also been appropriated by theorists working to adequately define the results of such practice. If such a concept is to have any use at all, it must give us insight as to why certain texts are grouped together. Writers, readers, and critics have evidently found that certain similarities between texts have consequences.

What I'm attempting to do in this project, is to conduct a materialistic analysis of a genre that answers certain questions about how readers and writers use genres. In this analysis, I try to uncover the accumulated layers of adaptation which have constructed the manifesto as a genre. These layers, the residue of intersections between language usage and the constitution of social practices, are a record of sorts of the activities of individual agents who have made, and were made by history. This method relies, to a large extent, on the sociological theories of Anthony Giddens, who points out that generic structures such as manifestos "are logically implicated with" (Social Theory and Modern Sociology 220) human agency. Excavating these layers will reveal this "duality of structure" (Social Theory and Modern Sociology 60) which Giddens sees as essential to understanding the temporal nature of human social practices. In such an investigation as this, "Agency is history, where 'history' is the temporal continuity of human activities" (Giddens, Social Theory and Modern Sociology 220). Genres form one of the intersections between agency and structure, and generic analysis must investigate this intersection. The methods I use to conduct such an investigation are more fully elaborated in chapter 2.
In accounting for the genre labeled “manifestoes,” certain questions come to mind: (1) Is it a sturdy category? Is it ongoing and durable? (2) Does it factor into the composition of texts? (3) Does it factor into social reality? (4) Is it what Giddens calls a “sedimented practice?” (5) Does it have a longstanding and intricate relationship to social events? These questions are important because they question the relation between a received structure (the genre) and the actions of the agent composing the text (the agency). The manifesto, which as Mary Ann Caws notes, is “a loud genre” that “announces itself,”(xx) is a particularly productive site in which to investigate these questions about genre, because the manifesto seems to be a genre which, by its very nature, challenges the institutions of modern life which use and regulate genres. Furthermore, noticeable throughout this investigation of the manifesto is a tendency, perhaps even a predisposition, built into this genre for altering, rather than just reproducing the generic form.

This project then, is an investigation into such alterations, both formal adaptations, at the micro level of the text, as well as social adaptations made at the macro level, such as modifications to the relationship between the writer, the audience, and the information mediated through the text. And because these texts function both explicitly and implicitly within a web of what Foucault calls “power relations” (Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth 167), they are a fertile site for investigating the ways in which writers use and adapt them for political and aesthetic purposes. A record of these adaptations will not only tell us how the
genre has functioned in the past, but may also suggest how it might function in the future.

This project suggests several preliminary research questions, which I will sum up as follows: (1) What does the history of the manifesto tell us about genre, and the relationship of genre to the agency and socialization of the writer? (2) What does the record of adaptations to the genre tell us about the relative stability of the generic form, and the ways in which writers use genres? (3) How might the history of writing practices in the manifesto genre both limit and enable the future practices of writers contemplating the use of this generic form? By more closely examining the terms within these three questions, I will further narrow the focus of this research.

II. Definitions of Terms/Review of Literature

Three terms within the research questions I have posed would seem to require careful definition: genre, agency, and manifesto. Since a definition can, in and of itself, circumscribe a research methodology, I will approach this process by considering a number of possible definitions of each term, not so much as competing alternatives from which a selection must be made, but as a way of approaching the rich implications these terms carry. Such “thick definition” is necessary, since in many ways this entire project can be conceived of as an investigation into the space created by the intersections of these terms. By reviewing some of the literature associated with these terms, these intersections will become more visible.
A. Genre

What kind of thing is a genre? Is it a list of formal features? A list of a reader’s expectations? A statement of a writer’s intention? A grouping by subject?

I will begin with a definition from Harmon and Holman’s *A Handbook to Literature, 7th ed.* They define genre as a term “used to designate the types or categories into which literary works are grouped according to form, technique, or, sometimes, subject matter” (231). This definition, which is typical of the way literary scholars influenced by “The New Criticism” and “Structuralism” have treated genre, is inadequate because it focuses almost entirely upon the text, and ignores the other two sides of the rhetorical triangle: the reader who comes to a text with generic expectations, and the writer, who may have a generic text “in mind” during the writing process.

Northrop Frye, who develops a theory of literary genres in the fourth essay in his landmark *Anatomy of Criticism*, states that “The study of genres is based on analogies in form” (95), and in spite of his occasional nods to rhetoric, also tends to treat genre as a formal feature outside the rhetorical field. Rene Wellek and Austin Warren seem to move a little closer to the social nature of genre when they claim genre, or:

“literary kind is an ‘institution’—as Church, University, or State is an institution...One can work through, express himself through, existing institutions, create new ones, or get on, so far as possible, without sharing in policies or rituals; one can also join, but then reshape, institutions”
However their practical treatment of genre in *Theory of Literature* focuses primarily on textual analysis as they discuss the “outer form (specific meter and structure) and also inner form (attitude, form, purpose)” (241) of texts, but generally ignore the social relationships between writer and audience, and writer and genre. And the Marxist critic John Frow who uses the linguistic term *register* as a synonym for genre, also seems to return to a more contextual approach when he defines discourse genres as “systems of rules governing the production, transmission, and reception of ‘appropriate’ meanings by ‘appropriate’ users in ‘appropriate’ forms in particular social contexts” (68). However, like the other theorists I have discussed so far, in practice he tends to focus primarily upon the text, in this case the linguistic features of the text such as patterns of address, and grammatical and syntactic structures. The problem with approaches like these that treat genre as a “textual thing” rather than a relationship between producer and user, is that, in Marxian terms, it tends to conflate the use value, or structural elements of the text, with the exchange or universal value, a practice that Marx labeled “commodity fetishism” (*Capital*, 32).

Genre has not always been treated in such a “textual” way. Aristotle, who originated the study of both literary genres (in *De poetica*) and speech genres (in *Rhetorica*), begins his consideration of speech genres by addressing the larger rhetorical field. He observes that there are three participants in any discourse act: the speaker, the topic, and the listener. Aristotle then classifies the kinds of
speeches into three genres determined by the relationship of the participants. In judicial discourse the speaker is a petitioner, the listener a judge or jury, and the topic involves questions about the rightness or wrongness of past actions. In deliberative discourse the speaker is an advocate, the listener a decisionmaker in the political field, and the topic involves questions about the advantages or disadvantages of proposed future actions. Finally, in ceremonial discourse the speaker is judge, the listener is spectator, and the topic involves individuals or events whose past actions are praised or censured from the point-of-view of the present. In this system, “it is the listener, the hearer, that determines the speech’s end and object” (Aristotle 598). It is important to note that these three speech genres are just one level of a hierarchical, complex system describing discursive relationships. At the next higher level of the hierarchy Aristotle differentiates between the domains of Rhetoric (under which the speech genres fall), and Poetics (which describes the primary literary genres. At the next lower level of the hierarchy are more specific examples of the speech genres, such as the “acceptance speech” and the “after-dinner speech” under the larger generic category of ceremonial discourse. This is important, because it demonstrates how Aristotle’s system is not, as it is often portrayed, one of hard, fixed, formal categories. The further you move down the system hierarchy, the closer you get to actual instantiations of genre, the individual speeches (and by analogy, writings) of agents.
Aristotle’s classificatory system of genre has influenced discussions of the topic up to contemporary times, and is still recognizable, in somewhat altered form, in many textbooks in the fields of speech communication and writing (for example Lucas, Corbett and Connors). Scholars still debate Aristotle’s categories, and in recent years have moved into investigations of hybrids, which blend elements of each category. James Jasinski notes “As Aristotle recognized, an advocate can shift from epideictic praise to deliberate advocacy, or can blend the two” (270). Examples of such scholarship include Jamieson and Campell’s investigation into the use of deliberative appeals in ceremonial eulogies, and Garver’s work on the intersection of deliberative and forensic genres.

One modern extension and revision of Aristotle’s system which should be addressed in any consideration of genre is James Kinneavy’s 1971 work, A Theory of Discourse. Kinneavy expands and renames Aristotle’s triad of discourse participants into a four part system: the encoder (speaker or writer), decoder (reader or listener), signal (language or sign system), and reality (referent, or thing referred to). Kinneavy then divides discourse into four generic categories or “aims:” expressive discourse in which the encoder is foregrounded, persuasive discourse in which the decoder is foregrounded, literary discourse in which the signal is foregrounded, and referential discourse in which reality is foregrounded. Like Aristotle, Kinneavy further subdivides these categories, and under expressive discourse of a social nature, Kinneavy lists the manifesto (Kinneavy 61).
Harrell and Linkugel examine the taxonomic methodologies used by Aristotle and his successors, and identify four systems of classification: (1) defacto-based upon superficial similarities such as subject matter, (2) structural-based on patterns of syntax or other linguistic features, (3) motivational-based upon the intent of the speaker or writer, and (4) archetypical-based upon the presence of “deep images” within the work. Their methodology has become the pedagogical standard for scholars investigating taxonomies of genre (for example, Foss).

In recent years two strains of scholarship have emerged challenging taxonomic approaches to genre: a post-modern challenge, and a sociocultural challenge. The poststructural challenge owes a great deal to the French theorists Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, and is traceable to theories of language elaborated in the early 20th century by the Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure. An example of the Foucaultian critique is that of Thomas Conley who challenges the norming function of such work. Conley states that “Making speeches into classificatory schemes involves radical abridgment” (71-72). According to Conley, investigations into genre which ignore Foucault’s advice to investigate the “power of normalization” (Discipline and Punish, 308) must be suspect.

An example of the Derridean approach is the work of Thomas Beebee, who challenges Wittgenstein’s attempt to formalize genre as a system of family resemblances, which the scholar Adena Rosmarin has reduced to a syllogism where “X genre has Y features” (Beebe 257). According to Beebee, since
individual instantiations of genre do not all share the same features, the question must be asked, why this feature, and not that feature? Beebee finds his answer in Saussure, who wrote that “In language there are only differences without positive terms” (166), which Beebee applies to genres, saying “Genre is a system of differences without positive terms” (256). He points out that “the Saussurean principle goes a long way toward explaining the paradox of genres, namely that they seem real and at the same time indefinable” (257). His example of a critical work on genres which treats the concept as a system of differences is Benjamin’s *The Origin of German Tragedy*. Beebee writes that “For Benjamin, conflict and instability rather than conventional generic features alert us to the transcendental forms of literature” (257-58). While Beebee raises important questions about our ability to define or characterize genres, he seems to ignore the rhetorical aspects of genre as it is immersed in textuality at the expense of readers, writers, and contexts. And focusing upon those rhetorical aspects of genre reveals a materiality that goes beyond Beebee’s “seeming real.” Sociocultural investigations into genre show us that it is a concept that materially contributes to the reading and writing processes.

The sociocultural approach to genre seems to originate in Bitzer’s 1968 formulation of genres as recurrent “situations and the rhetorical responses to them” (13). The evolution of this approach can be seen in the work of Campbell and Jamieson (1978) who define genres as “groups of discourses which share substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics” (20), and Swales (1990) who
argues that definitions of genre are less useful than an approach which recognizes "prototypes" or "exemplars" (49). These approaches tend to go beyond taxonomic classification into a consideration of the relationship between the generic form and the context in which it is used, yet they fail to fully place genre theory within a field of social relations.

An even earlier movement away from Aristotelian taxonomies into a more social definition of genre is that of the Russian theorist Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin argues that genres are sites of dialectical tension between the centripetal forces of convention and the centrifugal search for difference. This leads him to emphasize the "changeable, flexible, and plastic" (80) nature of genre, and to argue that readers need to pay attention to the ways in which writers manipulate genres for rhetorical purpose. Here Bakhtin is challenging structural linguists like Roman Jakobson who looked at genres as being constituted by relatively fixed registers, which are language varieties characteristic of certain situational or rhetorical circumstances surrounding their use. By distinguishing between "primary" and "secondary" speech genres, Bakhtin recognizes that those primary forms used for daily communicative activities are situated within the local context of their use, while secondary forms such as the manifesto are more highly developed means of cultural communication which occur across time and space, and thus "lose their immediate relation to actual reality and the real utterances of others" (9). Instead they enter into actual reality through political, literary, or artistic events.
Bakhtin’s concept of genres as situated, and dynamic has also been revised and expanded by rhetoricians. A fully developed example of the sociocultural approach are the efforts of Berkencotter and Huckin who present five principles which they see as central to genre analysis:

(1) *Dynamism.* Genres are dynamic rhetorical forms, which change over time in response to their user's sociocognitive needs. (2) *Situatedness.* Our knowledge of genres is derived from and embedded in our participation in the communicative activities of daily and professional life. (3) *Form and Content.* Genre knowledge embraces both form and content, including a sense of what content is appropriate to a particular purpose in a particular situation at a particular point in time. (4) *Duality of Structure.* As we draw on genre rules, we constitute social structures and simultaneously *reproduce* those structures. (5) *Community ownership.* Genre conventions signal a discourse community's norms, epistemology, ideology, and social ontology.

It is important to note that this definition sees genres as *evolving* in response to rhetorical needs, *functioning* as scripts for rhetorical agents, and *participating* in the construction of social and discursive relationships.

Where Berkencotter and Huckin emphasize the idea that genre is a kind of social knowledge, Anis Bawarshi has taken the idea further by emphasizing the functional nature of genre. Bawarshi argues, “genres do not simply help us define and organize kinds of texts; they also help us define and organize kinds of social
actions, social actions that these texts make rhetorically possible” (335). Genre here becomes a process, or as Bawarshi puts it, genre “constitutes the activity by making it possible through its ideological and rhetorical conventions. In fact, genre reproduces the activity by providing individuals with the conventions for enacting it” (340). In Bawarshi’s view then, genres enter into the field of cultural and ideological reproduction, a move that puts genre squarely into the realm of political economy.

Like Bawarshi, I tend to view genre as a process, a process real writers use when they have model texts “in mind” during the composition process. Like Berkencotter and Huckin, I think the study of a genre must investigate the texts alongside a consideration of the broader sociocultural context which was the exigency for their production. Like Foucault, I don’t believe that you can consider genre outside the field of power relations which regulate it. And like Harrell and Linkugel and other taxonomists going back to Aristotle, I think you must examine the formal features of a genre, if for no other reason than to prove or disprove Beebe’s argument that genre is a system of differences without positive terms. My rhetorical methods, which meet these requirements will be more fully elaborated in chapter 2.

B. Agency

The manifesto is a genre which calls for action, for agents to gather together and challenge existing political and aesthetic institutions and movements. As such, any investigation into the manifesto requires a theory of action. And any
theory of action, including rhetorical action, needs a notion of causality linking social phenomena and discursive practices to events and other actions.

Enlightenment thinkers like John Locke reacted to a teleological view of agency which put the power to determine history in the hands of God, a view famously satirized by Voltaire in his character Pangloss in *Candide*. Locke recognized that there are two kinds of power, passive and active. Passive power is the power to be influenced by something, while active power is the power to influence something. Locke believed that men were born into “a state of perfect freedom,” (8) and that any subordination of such active freedom to the passive occurs because men enter into communities to preserve both themselves and the human race. However, this Enlightenment vision of human freedom has been challenged by other theorists.

Karl Marx's materialist philosophy of political economy is the major turn away from both teleological causality as well as the unbridled freedom of Enlightenment thought. The tenets of Marxist philosophy which most relate to a discussion of agency can be seen in the following passage from Marx's "Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy":

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on
which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

This is the Marxist conception of causality in its most deterministic formulation. The economic base structures society, and societal institutions and disciplines form a superstructure which controls and shapes human consciousness. The historical nature of this causal chain can be seen in Marx's argument that a society must pass through several stages of historical development marked by the transformation of the economic base. For example, the economic structures of feudalism are historically supplanted by those of capitalism, which are later historically supplanted by communist structures. The strength of such an approach is its simplicity, its reduction of cultural production to a subset of the overall process of reproducing the means of economic production. However, that simplicity is also its weakness.

The Russian Revolution of 1917, while establishing the first Marxist state, also presented challenges to orthodox theory, because at the time of the revolution, Russia was just beginning in the process of transitioning from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production, and was far from the type of organized capitalist society where the proletarian revolution envisioned by Marx
was likely to succeed (Kemp-Welch). The attainment of power by or for an advanced proletariat had occurred before the social and economic determinants described by Marx. The Leninist revolution, by its very existence, argued “that minority action by a revolutionary party could hurry history along” (Kemp-Welch 9).

While Lenin was himself a major theorist, after 1917 he left much of the theoretical work of the party to others. Nikolai Bukharin, principal author of the first Soviet constitution, was given the task of reconciling orthodox Marxist social theory with the radical events of the Russian Revolution. Bukharin's *Historical Materialism*, published in 1921, served as textbook for hundreds of thousands of students for more than a decade, particularly at the Institute of Red Professors (Cohen 219). This work begins the process of resolving the paradoxical relationship between individual agency and economic determinism.

Bukharin's revision of Marx redefined the concept of causality. First of all, he broadened the definition of superstructure to include not only the political, legal, and educational institutions of society, but also more abstract ideological categories such as language, thought, and art. Secondly, he softened the determinist nature of Marxism by arguing that in periods of transition, such as that which existed in Russia in 1917, a “process of a reversed influence of the superstructure” (264) can occur. There is a reciprocity of effect here, where Bukharin describes the influence of the superstructure on the base as “a constant process of mutual cause and effect” (228). This reciprocal concept of causality
obviously entails a great deal more human agency than is typically considered possible under the orthodox Marxist framework, because human will is not always determined by the activity of the economic base.

Bukharin's concept of causality is much more flexible than that of orthodox Marxism, particularly Darwinian Marxists like Karl Kautsky who believed the Bolshevik Revolution to be “premature,” and who advocated waiting for the appropriate conditions for the establishment of a proletarian state (Cohen 88-89). Bukharin's expansion of the concept of superstructure to include discursive processes also delivers a broader view of agency. However, the agency offered by Bukharin does seem to be limited to periods of transition, and within these periods, Bukharin seems to fall back upon an enlightenment view of the subject/agent, in spite of his clear distrust of idealism.

Louis Althusser develops a more nuanced theory of agency by weaving the Marxist tradition into structuralist theories. On the surface, Althusser's Marxism appears to be only modestly more progressive than that of Bukharin. In fact, in his essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” Althusser begins with a very deterministic view of causality when he states unequivocally that “every social formation arises from a dominant mode of production” (128). However, once the base, or infrastructure, produces the superstructure, then “there is a 'relative autonomy' of the superstructure with respect to the base” and “there is a 'reciprocal action' of the superstructure on the base” (135). This is a modest expansion of the sort of reciprocity seen in Bukharin.
The area where Althusser makes his greatest contribution to a theory of agency is in his expansion of the concept of superstructure. Althusser emphasizes that it is in the area of reproducing the means of production where the superstructure plays its major role. Using spatial/architectural metaphors, he expands the notion of superstructure to include two “levels:” the politico-legal institutions of the state, and the ideological apparatuses of the state.

It is with the concept of ideology that Althusser's conception of causality seems to go well beyond the Marxist tradition, and enters the French Structuralist tradition. Although Structuralist thought represents a diverse array of thinkers from Piaget, to Levi-Strauss, to Barthes, and crosses a number of disciplines, structuralists share the common idea that human action is at least partially determined by hidden mental structures, particularly linguistic structures (Harmon and Holman 498). For Althusser, ideology represents that structure. Individual actions are determined as a result of the indoctrination provided by churches, schools, and other institutions that Althusser describes as Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs).

Althusser's approach relies on the Lacanian psychoanalytic tradition to describe how ideology fills the void left by Saussurian structuralism in its abandonment of the enlightenment subject. His exploration into Lacan led him to conclude that “Ideology is a 'Representation' of the Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to their Real Conditions of Existence” (162) and that “Ideology Interpellates Individuals as Subjects”(170). As Stuart Hall notes, “the primary
mechanisms of repression [such as the Oedipus complex, the mirror stage, primary narcissism] ...become the basis of all apparently stable subjective identifications...they are the mechanisms of entry into language itself, and thus into culture” (50). Althusser ends up describing a limited form of agency where the subject is not so much bounded by, but actually constituted by the ideological superstructure. An agency of sorts does exist within Althusser’s model, but what is difficult to determine within the model is where ideology ends and agency begins.

Ernesto Laclau attempts to resolve this problem in Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, by using a synthesis of the works of Althusser and Foucault in his analysis of the relationship between the subject, agency, and structure. Borrowing from Althusser, Laclau views the subject as constituted out of a structural dislocation, which creates a Lacanian trauma. A dislocation occurs when the subject is traumatized by an irreconcilable inconsistency in ideology. Like Foucault, however, Laclau sees that dislocation, and therefore the creation of the subject and agency, located within discourse, rather than within the economic base of traditional Marxism. An examination of the dislocations within a discourse reveals the sources of agency. Holding aloft the manifesto as a group, many manifestoes begin with an elaboration of the grievances the writers have with the status quo. Thus it appears that the formal features of the genre, as well as the rhetorical exigencies of the particular message conveyed by the form, arise out of such dislocations. Over time, this response to a dislocation becomes
typified, creating a recursive formation which Carolyn Miller calls the “exigence” (157) of the genre. Thus manifestoes are more than simply texts: since they both constitute and are constituted by writer-agents, they are situated at the point at which the boundaries between text and context blur. Therefore, in this examination of the manifesto genre, considerable attention will be paid to the exigency which led to the composition of the text being examined.

The basic problem with Althusserian theory is its tendency towards functionalism. Because institutions such as churches and schools indoctrinate, Althusser sees them as parts of a larger, state system. In other words, their functioning as ideological agents automatically presumes their status as cogs in the machinery of the state. This theory leaves little room for contention, or conflicts between such institutions, or for the subversive teacher or bureaucrat. Experience tells us that such contentiousness and subversion exists within the ISA. Yet individuals tend to become mere bearers of ideological structure with little true agency in the Althusserian theory.

The structuration theory of Anthony Giddens provides a far more acceptable view of causation by more closely detailing the relationship between human beings and social structures, and is the frame I have chosen with which to examine the agency of manifesto writers. Where Althusser conceives of the ideological system as made up of solely of closed, homeostatic causal loops, Giddens sees institutional systems as consisting not only of such loops, but also including feedback loops, which he calls “reflexive self-regulation. Thus, Giddens
gives us a stratified theory of causality and consciousness which rejects “the
distinction between consciousness and unconscious followed by the structuralist
and post-structuralist authors” (Social Theory and Modern Sociology, 89). The
highest layer, which Gidden’s calls the “reflexive monitoring of action” is the
discursive consciousness of agents who are able to talk about the conditions of
their own actions. The next layer, “practical consciousness,” involves tacit
knowledge that agents may have of their own actions, but which they are unable
to articulate. The lowest level, “unconscious motives,” contains the Althusserian
model: repressed desires, semiotic impulses, ideological residue (Giddens,
Central Problems 25, 78). The structuration approach to causality leads to a far
more materialistic model for action than the approaches of any theorists discussed
previously, in that it demonstrates the way in which individuals construct, and are
constructed by institutional discourse. And interestingly enough, Giddens’s
concept of “reflexive monitoring of action” seems similar to Foucault’s concept
of “Care for the self” developed in his later works, and Donna Haraway’s concept
of “diffraction.” In all of these models, agency occurs when, instead of
reproducing the hegemonic structures of production, the agent modifies or adapts
those structures to her/his own needs. It is a process that both opposes traditions
such as “genres,” yet also adapts and utilizes those structures for subversive
purposes. It is the story of those adaptations this work seeks to tell.

Giddens states that “To be human is to be an agent...and to be an agent is
to have power. ‘Power’ in this highly generalized sense means ‘transformative
capacity, the capability to intervene in a given set of events so as in some way to change them” (Social Theory and Modern Sociology 167). By reading Marx, Bukharin, Althusser, and Laclau through Gidden’s social theories an acceptable definition of agency is developed, which explains both the deterministic effects of the economic base and the ideological superstructure as well as the contentious sort of human agency which the voluntarist approach allows.

C. Manifesto

The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary traces the history of the word “manifesto” to the 17th century, and defines the term as “A public declaration or proclamation; esp. a printed declaration or explanation of policy (past, present, or future) issued by a monarch, State, political party or candidate, or any other individual or body of individuals of public relevance” (Brown 1686). It is interesting to note the way in which this definition gives the genre a governmental or political focus, given the fact that none of the manifestos examined in this dissertation were produced by government agents, and that the two manifestos produced by political groups (the Manifesto of the Communist Party and the Port Huron Statement) were produced by parties which were revolutionary and anti-governmental in nature. Clearly the dictionary definition of the term lacks the nuances brought to the genre during the modernist period.

A consideration of the root verb “manifest,” which comes from the Old French manifeste, to “Make evident to the eye,” (Brown, Shorter OED 1686), brings a shade of meaning which seems appropriate given the visual rhetoric
adopted by a number of the manifesto authors. The secondary definition “Of a ghost or spirit” also resonates, given the opening lines of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (“A spectre is haunting Europe”), and the fact that many of the Russian and Italian Futurists were influenced by Ouspenskian spiritualism.

Given the fact the Lyon’s limited 1999 study is the only historical survey of the genre, the few scholarly attempts at defining the genre come in works examining the modernist avant-garde, or in collections of avant-garde manifestoes. Anna Lawton is typical in finding that “Marinetti’s virtuoso handling of oratorical devices, striking poetic images, narrative segments full of adventure and suspense, and his overall tone of bravado initiated a trend… With Futurism a new literary genre was born: the manifesto” (4). Marjorie Perloff agrees with this assessment, by noting that Marinetti’s concept of casting a work “in the form of Manifesto” creates “what was essentially a new literary genre” (*The Futurist Moment* 82). This transformation of what was essentially a political genre into a literary genre is one of the defining events of futurist modernism, and is critical to investigations of the connections between fascism and modernism (Hewitt, Carlston), given Walter Benjamin’s definition of fascism as “the introduction of aesthetics into political life” (*Illuminations* 241) in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Andrew Hewitt sees the form as indicative of “what looks like a new political configuration: a politics of the manifest, in which the play of signifiers has been displaced by the immanence of the referent in the movement towards a poetics of performance” (*Fascist Modernism* 16). Using
Kinneavy’s categories to unpack Hewitt’s statement, Hewitt sees a genre moving across the category of persuasive (audience-focussed political) discourse, to literary (signal-focussed) discourse, and finally to referential discourse focussed on the reality of “performance.” Ironically, Hewitt moves the modernist genre across every one of Kinneavy’s categories except the one in which Kinneavy himself placed the manifesto: expressive discourse. Clearly, the manifesto is a genre which defies easy categorization, a genre that refuses to stay in its place.

In Janet Lyon’s study of the genre, she acknowledges the vagueness of the term “manifesto,” and uses Wittgenstein’s concept of genre as “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (32). This conception of a genre as a series of “family resemblances” is close to the approach of Swales, and of Campbell and Jamieson, discussed earlier in this chapter. The recurring rhetorical features of the form identified by Lyon are (1) truth telling; (2) rage, “giving the appearance of both word and deed” (14); (3) a highly selective history of oppression; (4) an enumeration of grievances, “the parataxis of a list” (15); (4) epigrammatic rhetoric; (5) prophecy, or mythography; “it is both a trace and a tool of change” (16). To these five features I would add (6) the use of illustration or elements of visual design; (7) a pedagogical attempt to educate the masses; (8) the attempt by the writers move beyond the limits of their personal subjectivity; and (9) the attempt to constitute an avant-garde audience out of a larger public.

The last of these features is one I particularly wish to comment on, given that the thesis of Lyon’s work is that the manifesto is “coeval with the emergence
of the bourgeois and plebian public sphere” (1). Lyon chooses works such as the 17th century manifestoes of the Diggers and Levellers, which address “the people,” and which attempt to put enlightenment principles in practice through the establishment of a democratic “vox populi.” Yet many avant-garde movements were suspicious of “the public” (for example, the Russian futurist manifesto *A Slap in the Face of Public Taste*) and a political manifesto like the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* seems addressed to a “vanguard” of political agents even as it calls for workers of the world to unite. At any rate, tracing the emergence of the manifesto as a form to enlightenment philosophy ignores the importance of Luther’s manifesto to the development of the form, and ignores the fact that the first manifestoes of the Russian futurists emerged in a feudal society in which enlightenment principles were scarcely familiar to a largely illiterate populace.

Lyon’s attempt at portraying the emergence of the manifesto as “coeval with the emergence of the bourgeois and plebian public spheres” (1-2), like other attempts at grouping the manifesto genre around a single feature, whether a superficial similarity such as subject matter, structural-based linguistic form, motivational-based intent of the speaker/writer, or archetypical presence of “deep image,” seems to miss the mark of telling us what a manifesto is. In figure (1), I have attempted to chart the formal features of the manifestoes I discuss in this work. As the figure indicates, while a number of manifestoes do share a number of recurring features, only two of these features are shared by even 75% of the 19
|   | 1   | 2   | 3   | 4   | 5   | 6   | 7   | 8   | 9   | 10  | 11  | 12  | 13  | 14  | 15  | 16  | 17  | 18  | 19  |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 1 |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 2 |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 3 |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 4 |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 5 |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 6 |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 7 |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 8 |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 9 |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 10|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 11|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 12|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 13|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 14|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 15|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 16|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 17|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 18|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 19|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |

Key: (P-Politics, A-Aesthetic, B-Both politics and aesthetics, O-Other)

1: (1517) The Disposition of Dr. Martin Luther on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences
2: (1525) Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants
3: (1848) Marx and Engels Manifesto of the Communist Party
4: (1909) Marinetti Pounding and Manifesto of Futurism
5: (1912) Burliuk et. al. Slap in the Face of Public Taste
6: (1913) Khlebnikov and Kruchynk The Word as Such
7: (1913) Burliuk et. al. A Trap for Judges 2
8: (1914) Lewis Blast Manifestoes
9: (1915) Malevich From Cubism and Futurism to Suprematism: The New Painterly Realism
10: (1919) Tatlin The Initiative Individual Artist in the Creativity of the Collective
11: (1921) Rodchenko Linia
12: (1924) Mayakovskiy and Brik, et al. What Does Left Fight For?
13: (1938) Woolf Three Guineas
14: (1959) O'Hara Personism
15: (1962) Hayden, et. al. The Port Huron Statement
16: (1991) Haraway A Manifesto for Cyborgs
17: (1992) Sedgwick Axiomatic
18: (1993) Schulman et. al. The Dyke Manifesto
19: (1993) Sedgwick Queer and Now

Figure 1: The Recurrent Features of Manifestoes
manifestoes examined in this work. Individually, those two features are broad, and do not seem narrow enough to define a genre. In fact, they can be seen in other genres, such as the recruiting poster (see the Lesbian Avengers’ poster in Chapter 5), the public letter announcing a membership drive, or the organizational web site. It is these two broad rhetorical purposes—the challenge to an institution or practice, and the intention to form a community of like-minded thinkers—that seems to give a text the “feel of a manifesto” to the reader. Yet these broad rhetorical purposes seem much too general to qualify as “formal features.”

Furthermore, while certain subjects of the manifesto become more common in certain historical periods (aesthetics early in the 20th century, gender and subjectivity late in the 20th century), there is little evidence to suggest any historical trends here. After all, Wordsworth addressed aesthetic issues in the manifesto that served as a Preface to his 1802 Lyrical Ballads, and Mina Loy and Virginia Woolf addressed gender issues half a century before Donna Haraway or Eve Sedgwick. While writers may have earlier texts “in mind” as models when they write their manifestoes, they also deviate from those models because of the rhetorical dynamics of their own local writing conditions. The social image of the manifesto as a “rebellious” genre, also seems to contribute to the fact that, as a genre, the manifesto seems less stable in its formal elements, less able to “stay in its place,” when compared to genres which operate under greater institutional constraints, such as the government report, or the scholarly essay.
This seems to suggest that writers have used the fluidity of the formal elements of the manifesto genre to escape subjectivization by institutions, and as avenues into agency. The fact that writers are able to adapt the genre to the requirements of their local rhetorical conditions is an example of Giddens’ highest level of agency: reflexive self-regulation. The activity of manifesto writing is characterized by a process in which the writer constantly feeds back knowledge gained in the act of writing to modify future activity. This is consistent with Bawarshi’s conception of genre as a “function” rather than a stable form, a process always subject to modification.

Perhaps by moving beyond the listing of family features into a simpler definition of manifestoes as textual elaborations of political or aesthetic beliefs which challenge existing, and attempt to constitute new religious, political or artistic institutions and movements a more inclusive examination of the form may be possible. Such a definition allows inclusion of religious texts such as Luther’s which clearly contributed to the emergence of the form; political texts such as The Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants and Marx and Engel’s Manifesto of the Communist Party early in the formation of the genre; the aesthetic manifestos of the Futurists which seem to typify the genre; and more recent instantiations of the manifesto as critique by writers as diverse as the SDS, Frank O’Hara, Virginia Woolf, Donna Haraway, and Eve Sedgwick.
III. Research Question/Method of Investigation

The thick descriptions of genre, agency, and manifesto suggest a possible narrowing of the research questions. As I examine these adaptations made to what appears to be a very fluid form, I cannot help but asking: if a manifesto cannot be defined by its formal features, what can define it? By focusing on this overarching research question, the questions raised earlier about the relationship of genre to the agency and socialization of the writer, about the relative stability of the generic form, and about the limiting and enabling effects of historic writing practices in the manifesto genre, will all be addressed.

IV. Plan of the Work

Chapter Two will trace the emergence of the manifesto genre, beginning with the Reformation, and the “95 Thesis” of Martin Luther. This chapter also will provide a detailed explication of the methods and procedures I will be following in this study. Since this project examines the genre by looking backwards at its historical usage, I examine the genre both synchronically and diachronically. This method should allow us to trace the historical connections between texts.

Chapter Three will examine the emergence of the political manifesto, beginning with the rebellion of the Swabian Peasants, and culminating in Marx and Engels’ publication of the Manifesto of the Communist Party in 1848, tracing the social and textual residue left by each, which influence the next generation of manifestoes.
Chapter Four will examine the emergence of the manifesto as a genre used for the elaboration of aesthetic theories, and its emergence as an object of art. This development parallels, and is part of, the history of early literary modernism (roughly 1900-1930). Beginning with the Italian futurist Marinetti, this chapter will then examine part of the vast contributions of the futurist movement to the manifesto genre, particularly in the USSR, moving from the pre-revolutionary Cubo-Futurists or Hylaeans, to the Constructivist movement which flourished in the 1920s and 1930s.

Chapter Five will examine the emergence of the manifesto as a form of critique, beginning with Woolf’s Three Guineas. While the subject matter of these manifestoes of late modernity range from aesthetics (Frank O’Hara’s Personism, a Manifesto) to politics (The Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society, The Dyke Manifesto), to investigations into gender and subjectivity (the manifestoes of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Donna Haraway), this chapter will examine the emergence of the manifesto as a genre used for institutional and cultural critique. This chapter will conclude with a short summary of findings and suggestions for further research.

Finally, I will note that while these chapters are grouped around certain adaptations made to the manifesto genre by writers, these groupings also coincide with certain historical periods. And in contextualizing the acts of producing these texts, I must often resort to narrative summaries of the historical events which produced the exigencies for the texts, often relying upon histories written by third
parties. The problem with these histories is that they tend to be focused on a diachronic narrative of development over time, at the expense of local, synchronic elements. As Michel Foucault puts it in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, conventional histories “preserve, against all decenterings, the sovereignty of the subject, and the twin figures of anthropology and humanism” (12). It is important to note here that Foucault is not calling for an end to discussions about trends, influences, victorious traditions, and evolutions. Rather his goal is a more balanced form of historiography which pays attention to disruption, difference, failed traditions, and revolutions. My own goals are similar, hence my focus upon groups like the Swabian Peasants and the SDS, movements which might be regarded as failed attempts at revolutions. However, the readers’ and the writers’ desire for historical continuity may still produce a fictitious picture of subjectivity and agency which reproduces the traditions of humanism and enlightenment thought. Therefore, I must emphasize that all of these retellings are by their very nature incomplete, and must be seen as such.

The bottom line for Foucault and other poststructuralists is that history is a part of a power-knowledge relationship. By grouping the manifestoes together by the adaptations which the individual writers have made to the form, rather than as a diachronic history, I hope to avoid some of the criticisms of historiographic methods made by Foucault. However, the fact that these groupings coincide with certain historical events do give the work a historical feel at times. It is important for the reader to know that, to use the words of James Berlin, I am not “offering
an objective account, an account that rises out of the raw historical record without the taint of interpretation” (30). My personal exigency for investigating the manifesto form arises from my desire to know more about a genre that has been used to challenge hegemonic institutions in the past, and my account is necessarily colored my desire to challenge and dismantle such institutions.
Chapter 2: Luther’s Hammer: The Emergence of the Manifesto Genre

As I pointed out in Chapter 1, an investigation into a genre like the manifesto, which challenges existing institutions and movements, is an investigation into the relationship that exists between the generic structure of the text, and the agency of the writers who composed the text. By following Giddens in rejecting both the structuralist and enlightenment views of agency (see Chapter 1), I am suggesting that an investigation into the nature of a genre begins with a recognition that a relationship exists between structure and agency. My method, as elaborated here, is an attempt at bringing the two things (agency and structure) together. This involves combining a formal analysis of the manifesto with an analysis of the social relations which contributed to its composition.

This method is a materialist rhetoric, and I join a number of investigators in the fields of both composition and speech communications who contend that rhetorical studies can move from investigative methods based upon representation to methods based upon articulation. For example, Patricia Harkin defines articulation as “an active process through which meaning is expressed in local and contingent ways: in a specific context, at a specific historical moment, within a specific discourse. Thus articulation is both a saying and a connecting” (1). In her characterization of James Berlin’s *Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures* as an example of a materialist rhetoric based upon articulation, she describes the process as one of bringing together the discourses of different disciplines or
institutions, so “that they could speak to each other—articulate in the sense of enunciating their disparate projects—and fit together—articulate in the sense of joining different parts” (1). In this conception of a materialist rhetoric, my method might be seen as bringing together a formalist tradition of textual analysis, a historical tradition of contextual analysis, and a post-structural (Foucauldian) tradition of analyzing power relations.

Ronald Green also turns to Foucault in his description of what he calls “Another Materialist Rhetoric” (21). Using Foucault’s conception of four technologies of practical reasoning (technologies of production, technologies of sign systems, technologies of power, and technologies of the self) as elaborated in Technologies of the Self, Green points out the importance of this formulation to rhetorical critics who “need not focus on how rhetoric represents practical reasoning, but instead can analyze how rhetorical practices exist as a specific human technology” (30). In this conception of a materialist rhetoric, my emphases on forms, contexts, and power relations can be seen as an attempt to move beyond the interpretation of manifestoes as signs, towards an elaboration of the techniques by which they make meaning possible.

A number of researchers in rhetoric and composition have turned to methods borrowed from the field of cultural geography (Marback, Aronson, Reynolds, among others). These researchers argue that any attempt at a material rhetoric must situate the production of texts within a certain geographical and geopolitical contexts. As Reynolds points out, “Places do matter; surroundings do
have an effect" (20). And while I don't do extensive geographical analysis in this dissertation, I try to pay attention to place as I situate these manifestoes in the context of their production.

A potential problem with materialist rhetorical practices which move away from the interpretive/representative model to the articulation model is that in their move away from theoretical interpretations of textual representations towards an empirical examination of the technologies of *praxis*, materialist researchers may return to what Sullivan and Porter call "traditional positivistic" or "traditional naturalistic" research practice "characterized by its reliance on the strict methods of experimental... science" which "insists that the researcher adopt the role of neutral observer" (xi). Sullivan and Porter's 1997 work *Opening Spaces: Writing Technologies and Critical Research Practices* is at once an elaboration and demonstration of materialist research practices which situates not only the object of study, but the research process itself in a rhetorical field of ethical and political relationships. Returning to the articulation model which began this discussion, it can be argued that Sullivan and Porter bring together the traditions of empirical research and post-structural critique, and allows those traditions to inform and contend with each other. This intersection of traditions results in a model of "rhetoric as comprising three elements: ideology (assumptions about what human relations should be and how people should use symbol systems); practice (how people actually do constitute their relations through regular symbolic or discursive activity); and method (tactics, procedures, heuristics or tools that people use for
inquiry)” (Sullivan and Porter 10). In this study I try to follow Sullivan and
Porter's conception of rhetoric by examining ideology, practice, and by
foregrounding my own methods.

These methods are based upon an examination of the record of the social
relations surrounding the text, as well as the structure of the text. Analyzing
generic structures like the manifesto, structures that Anthony Giddens calls
“systems—the patterning of social relations across time-space, understood as
reproduced practices” (The Constitution of Society 377), is an investigation into
the reflexive relationship between agent-writers and the genre they re/produced.

In The Constitution of Society Giddens sees this relationship, not as “two
independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality” (25).
This “duality of agency and structure” is a recursive relationship in which
structural systems are “always both constraining and enabling” (25). In Giddens’
formulation, agents not only reproduce structure, but through a feedback process
he calls “reflexive monitoring of action” (376), these agents modify the
production process and create new structures. When we talk about genre, this
process is one of influence, which I will define as a perceived similarity in social
situations. In such a definition, influence is not so much a causal relationship, a
one-to-one correspondence between texts, or an enlightenment narrative, as it is a
linkage consciously made by writers comparing rhetorical conditions. The
manifesto as a genre becomes historically imprinted because writers have past
examples of the genre “in mind” when they approach the rhetorical situation.
Tracing the influences that writers use in responding to the exigency of the rhetorical situation is consistent with Bawarshi’s concept of genre as “function,” rather than as a mere comparison of “family resemblances” between texts, as discussed in Chapter 1. Influence, in this study means much more than such “textual correspondences.” Instead, I will examine three elements which capture the richer concept of “social influence:” (1) the social image of the act of production of the text, (2) the rhetorical dynamics of the act, and (3) the formal elements of the act. I will elaborate each of these while discussing the emergence of the manifesto genre in a famous work by Martin Luther.

I. The Social Image

What do I mean by the social image of a text? By social image I am describing those images of a text that are not a formal part of the text itself. By image I mean both visual representations of the text (Martin Luther hammering the “95 Theses” to the door of Wittenberg Castle), as well as what Kenneth Burke in *A Grammar of Motives* calls “representation anecdotes” about the text (the story of Luther’s act of defiance.) These images are important because most writers couldn’t describe the form or specific content of Martin Luther’s “Disputation of Doctor Martin Luther on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences,” (the “95 Theses”), or many of the other manifestoes treated in this work. What they can do is describe the action of Dr. Luther nailing the “95 Theses” to the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg in 1517. This image can be traced to Luther’s friend and biographer, the rhetorician Phillipp Melancthon, to a writer
like Nietzsche who subtitled *Twilight of the Idols* "How to Philosophize with a Hammer," to popular biographies of Martin Luther such as Roland Bainton's *Here I Stand*, and McNeer and Ward's *Luther* which present us with the image, in both text and illustrative art of Dr. Luther raising his hammer and pounding the nail which posted "The Ninety-Five Theses" into the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg.

Figure (2) is an anonymous 18th century illustration, "The Dream of Frederick the Wise at Schweinitz, 1517." It shows a monk, presumably Luther, writing his theses on the door of Castle Church in Wittenberg. The Monk's quill reaches all the way to Rome where it knocks the Pope's tiara off his head. Figure (3) is an even earlier illustration by Flugbatt von Hans Holbein from the 16th century, showing an avenging Luther as "Hercules Germanicus." And Figure (4) is an illustration from a 1951 biography of Luther aimed at a young adult audience. All of these images are part of the carrying context which accompanies Luther's text.

This image of Dr. Luther raising his hammer and pounding the nail which posted "The Ninety-Five Theses" on the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg is a story-line which generates an ideology about writing which places the writer alone and alienated in the garret. The protagonist possesses the solid Victorian values produced by a stern father; yet he also has a quick mind which questions the corruption he observes in a feudal state dominated by an evil church. This narrative is replete with a metaphor that parallels Teutonic myth: Luther is the
Figure 2: “The Dream of Frederick the Wise at Schweinitz, 1517.” (Thulin p.42)
Figure 3: Luther as “Hercules Germanicus.” Hans Holbein. (Ebeling pl. 177)
Figure 4: Luther posting the theses (McNeer and Ward, p. 49)
hammer, one man against the world; like Thor, his thundering attack destroys the foundations of the repressive, feudal state. His manifesto breaks ranks with the old order, and creates a new order. His reformation provides its followers with a powerful slogan which uses the accelerated rhythms of asyndeton ("the deliberate omission of conjunctions between a series of related clauses" - Corbett and Connors, 387) to both summarize its theological breakthroughs, and stir emotional reaction: *sola fide, sola scriptura, sola gratia* (Salvation "by faith alone, by scripture alone, by grace alone"). Man's fate no longer resides in his relationship with feudal institutions—it resides within the man, and the man's individual relationship with God.

The fact that this image of Luther has persisted into the middle of the 20th Century (and perhaps beyond—the Classical Christian Support Loop, a homeschooling network, puts Bainton's *Here I Stand* on its recommended curriculum of 1000 good books) is testament to the persistence of this social image. Luther's manifesto has become a historically important text *because writers are familiar with it—they have it in mind*. In chapter 3 I will trace the influence of Luther's text, and the adaptations made to the form by Luther on the production of the *Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants* and Marx and Engel's *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. As I trace this influence through these pre-modern manifestoes, one conclusion becomes inescapable: Luther's work prepares us for the individualism upon which the disciplinary mechanisms of capitalism are later built. It pries apart the religious sphere from that of the state.
Uncovering these social images is important because when writers use a genre they have in mind more than the generic text itself. In some cases they may have in mind an imaginary reconstruction of the production of the original text. As Giddens has pointed out, these images are transmitted across time and space, in Luther’s case through the emerging printing technologies, and accelerating in the modern era with the development of electronic communications systems. These images become part of what Giddens calls the “carrying context” that moves structures across time. By revealing these images, we will be revealing one of the means by which genre is reproduced and modified.

Interestingly enough, the famous and persistent image of Luther nailing the manifestoes to the door of the Wittenberg parish church on All Saints Eve in 1517, may not even be historically accurate. That image is traceable to Philipp Melancthon’s famous biographical sketch of Luther, who reports that Luther posted the manifesto on that date, a fact some scholars question (Brecht 200), since Melancthon was not in Wittenberg at the time, and Luther never referred to the act of nailing the theses in any of his writings. Whether the image is accurate or not, it is certain the theses were posted on the door of the parish church at some point, by some person, no later than the 15th of November, since it was university practice to announce disputations in this way, and the records of the university reveal the date the actual disputation was held (Brecht).

As attractive and persistent as the historical image of Luther is, like most “histories,” the picture painted by the story is incomplete. Luther saw himself as a
reformer, not a revolutionary. Like many other thinkers of the medieval and renaissance periods he saw church and state as interdependent, and in his response to the *Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants*, “He followed the teaching of Augustine that if government—even bad government—were destroyed, unutterable chaos would result” (Marius 426). A secular government that kept the peace was part of God’s plan. The spheres of the church and state were inseparable. Furthermore, as numerous biographers have documented (Brecht, Marius, Oberman), Luther’s reformation and successful rebellion against the church was not simply the act of a single man—he was heavily dependent upon the support of Frederick the Wise in his attempts to support the church. Yet that image of one man standing against the church (Here I Stand) is the image that prevailed. Despite the actual circumstances of Luther’s rhetorical situation, and despite Luther’s views on the interdependency of church and state, it doesn’t change the fact that the Peasant’s Rebellion was an unintended consequence of “The Ninety-Five Theses.”

While the peasants may have misunderstood the fine points of Luther’s manifesto, the fact that they were moved by the social image of Luther’s challenge to the church to make their own challenge against the German feudal lords makes the question of the accuracy of their interpretation of Luther a moot point. As we shall see in Chapter 3, what the peasants do with Luther’s text in responding to their own rhetorical situation is indicative of the plastic nature of
and the way in which agents adapt their texts to the exigency of the rhetorical situation.

II. The Rhetorical Dynamics

Besides a social image, generic texts carry with them a history of residing within social and institutional relationships. These dynamics of these relationships are quite complex. As scholars when we consider such relationships, we naturally think of power relationships such as those examined in Foucault’s critiques of institutional history in Birth of the Clinic, and Discipline and Punish. My own analytical method here relies on Foucault, as well as Ernesto Laclau. I explore the exigency of each manifesto, because, as Laclau has demonstrated, such exigency emerges from an imbalance in power relationships. These “dislocations” or “points of negativity that we have termed conditions of possibility” (Laclau 36) are certainly markers for generic changes, particularly in the case of manifestos which frequently begin with a list of grievances. However in analyzing the power relationships which contribute to the production of a manifesto, we are also interested in those relationships between agents and institutions which empower, as well as those that enrage, the writer.

The exigency for the writing of Luther’s manifesto is well known. It occurred within a matrix of social, institutional and power relationships I will now discuss. In 1515, Pope Leo X issued a bull of indulgence intended to finance the building of St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome. At the same time, Albrecht of Brandenburg-Hohenzollern, needed a papal dispensation to confirm his election
as Archbishop of Mainz, since he was already Archbishop of Magdeburg, and administrator of the diocese of Halberstadt, and church law prohibited such consolidation of power and offices. The cost of the dispensation exceeded the resources of Albrecht's treasury, so the Fugger banking house of Augsburg made a loan to Albrecht, and negotiated an agreement between the Pope whereby Albrecht would permit the sale of the St. Peter's indulgences in his dioceses, and in turn be allowed to keep half of the proceeds to repay the loan (Oberman 188, 189). Indulgences were documents granting the remission of sins, based upon a church doctrine which claimed the "excess" good works of Saints, and relics of the Saints represented a kind of "treasury" which the church could sell to grant the remission of sins (Figure 5).

In 1517 John Tetzel, a Dominican from Leipzig was appointed by Albrecht to sell the indulgences throughout Magdeburg. Tetzel was an aggressive salesman, and may have illegally sold indulgences in electoral Saxony. At any rate, he did sell them in his native Leipzig, which Duke George protested. Word of the indulgences spread and by Easter of 1517, Wittenbergers were traveling to Magdeburg, buying indulgences, and asking Martin Luther (who was pastor of the Wittenberg parish as well as Professor of Theology at the University) for absolution without repenting (Brecht 183, 184), a practice Luther saw as anathema. On October 31, Luther posted letters to Archbishop Albrecht, and to his diocesan bishop Hieronymous (Jerome) Schulze, which included copies of "The Ninety-Five Theses." As mentioned earlier, the Latin text was posted at
Johannes Tezelius Dominicaner Münch mit sei- 
nen Römischen Abläpfam, welchen er im Jahr Christi 1517 in Deutsch- 
land zu markt gebrach't, wiser in der Kirchen zu Pinn in seinem 
Vaterland abgemacht ist.

D ihr deutschen mercket rüch recht/
Des heiligen Vaters Pappes Knecht/
Wir ich und ihr inguch ist allein/
Zehn tauent und neun hunderd carein/
Gnad und Ablas von einer Sünde/
Vor euch, euer Leiter, Weib und Kind/
Sollt ein jeder gewechet sein
So viel ihr legt ins Kästlein/
So bald der Hätten im Beeken klingt/
Im hup die Seele im Himmel springt/

Als Babst Leo der sehend genannte/
Nie mehr fass unmöglich bestand/
Das er das nehmlich Jübel Jahr/
Kriechet, hat er die faule wahr/
Des Abläpfams in Deutschland/
Durch seine Kramnächts ausgesandt/
Dazu sich denn ohn all verbriecht/
Johann Texel gebrauchen lies/
Der wasst oft kaum dem Hender entlaussen/
In der wegen Ebruchs solter ausessen/
Wo nicht der from Fürst Friedericch/
Stifter das angenommen sich/
Und beim Krieger Marinius/
Ein gendofse Fürst geshen/
Hierbei ist aber so nicht blieb/
Aus dem Ebrucher ward ein Dieb/
Welcher durch vermeint gewalt und macht/
Bielt Geldes und Güts zu weg gebracht/

Als er die blinde Weit betredt/
Das er den Himmel sitz getragen thet/
Wenn man nicht gut gesagt gebar/
Hetz mit den Menschen sein gefahr/
So bald der Groß im Käster klingt/
So bald die Seele im Himmel sich schwingt/
Durch diesen Teuffelischen Lande/
Hater betrogen sein Vaterland/
Bis sein Gott hat ins Spiel geschen/
Durch Doctor Luther seligen/
Welcher ihn seinen Krämeristich/
Gemachtlisch zu Boden stiech/
Daher, Gott lob bis an die zeit/
Der Abläpfam zerstrellt leit/
Sobiel nit Christi verdienst/
König allein unser Gewinn/
Der Tezel Kram und Papst Betrug/
Findet bey uns sein recht noch fug.

Figure 5: Tetzel selling indulgences. Anonymous pamphlet, 1517. (Thulin. p. 140)
Wittenberg by November 15, and a German translation was made and printed in Nuremburg almost immediately, an act which Luther opposed, feeling the arguments were too difficult for the non-clerical reader. Instead he authorized the printing of the text in Latin, and it was printed in Wittenberg, and subsequently in Nuremburg, Leipzig, and Basel by December 1517. He would later publish a sermon on the topic of indulgences in German to reach the lay reader. Copies of the disputation circulated quickly; Erasmus sent a copy to Sir Thomas More in London on March 5, 1918. (Oberman 191; Brecht 204, 205). Figure 6 maps the rapid geographical spread of Luther’s disputation.

The text we have is a rhetorical marvel, reflecting the conflicted rhetorical choices Luther faced. His concerns over using a language appropriate to his audience prefigures the concern for language shown by writers of modernist manifestoes (Chapter 4). The document addresses a dual audience, as Luther attempts both to convince the church hierarchy to institute reforms, as well as to stir debate among scholastics. In addition to countering Tetzel’s claims about indulgences in his own parish, Luther attacked the indulgence instructions being circulated under Albrecht’s name, having “skillfully assumed [they] were issued without Albrecht’s knowledge and approval,” (Brecht 191). Luther hoped to get Albrecht to withdraw the instructions (the Archbishop, desperately in need of the funds from the sale of the indulgences forwarded the letter and the Theses to Rome), and he was also hoping to get Archbishop Schulze to stop Tetzel’s activity within the Brandenburg diocese.
Figure 6: Geographical Distribution of Luther's Disputation
The second audience which Luther addressed was the audience to which he directs the text: those he invited to debate “The Ninety-Five These” at the university. As Brecht notes “While Luther was addressing the bishops about practical abuses, he intended to clarify the deeply problematic indulgence theory through the disputation” (202), an undertaking certain to anger the theologians back at Erfurt. Luther also had to be concerned with a yet another audience here: Frederick III, elector of Saxony, and founder and patron of the university. Frederick had prohibited Tetzel from selling indulgences within the borders of electoral Saxony, but Frederick himself collected religious relics which he sometimes resold for their indulgence value. Furthermore, the association of the manifesto with Frederick’s new university in Wittenberg could be a problem. Few in Germany had ever heard of Martin Luther, but they knew of Wittenberg, and associated its ideas with its patron, Frederick. Some were certain to see the text as an attack by Frederick on his rival, Albrecht. With the publication of the disputation, Luther was stirring ecclesiastical, civil, and theological pots. The Fact that Luther was able to enlist Frederick’s support throughout his dispute with the church is testament to his abilities as a rhetorician.

Luther responded to a negative exigency with a very persuasive, logical, well-argued text, a text carefully constructed to emulate the norms of Catholic scholarship of the time. However, because the dislocation which leads to the production of the manifesto often occurs due to a traumatic reaction to an unbalanced power relationship, the reactions to this trauma, viewed outside of the
context of their production, may seem irrational. Some of the writers treated in this dissertation respond to negative exigency in a manner quite different from Luther, producing and performing texts in a carnivalesque and unpredictable manner. James Berlin describes this reaction to unbalanced power relationships as “a celebration of diversity and deviance, the joy of the unexpected and comic. Resistance is, to be sure, inevitable and is to be encouraged, even though it may end only serving the forces resisted” (51). And as Giddens points out in *The Constitution of Society* structural change occurs not only due to the deliberate, intentional actions of agents, but also due to “unintended consequences” (11) of their ironic, even comical actions. In this dissertation I also attempt to document the carnivalesque and performative aspects of the manifesto genre, particularly as seen in the early manifestoes of the futurists, and in later works such as “The Dyke Manifesto” and Frank O’Hara’s “Personism.”

**III. The Formal Elements**

Since the purpose of my rhetorical method is to bring together the structural traditions with the social conditions of agency which resulted in the production of specific manifestoes, I will now examine those structural elements of Luther’s manifesto. While I have clearly stated that I don’t believe you can define the genre through taxonomies based upon formal features, these features are part of the embedded rhetorical structure which writers of manifestoes have in mind, and so they are part of what is transmitted across time and space through the genre function.
What do I mean by “formal feature?” My definition of form is broad, encompassing syntactical patterns, figurative language, and visual design of a document at the micro level, and macro rhetorical patterns which define the relationship between the writer, the audience, and the text such as narration, induction, deduction, comparison, definition, etc. In the field of rhetoric, the micro elements traditionally belonged to the canon of *elecutio* or *style*, while the macro elements may be recognized as “modes” or *topoi* and are frequently placed in the rhetorical canons of *inventio* (invention) or *dispositio* (arrangement). For example, the formal features I examine in this project include the traditional tropes and figures of stylistic rhetoric, the appeals of formal logic, parrhesia (truth-telling), rage, exigency narratives, grievance lists, epigrams, aphorisms, typeface variations, unusual print mediums, use of photos and illustrations, the appeal to group formation, challenges to the status quo, and even type of subject matter. I also consider linguistic features such as diction, register, the lengths and kinds of sentences, and patterns of paragraphing. The visual nature of some manifestoes may also suggest stylistic influences.

At times, particularly during the modernist period, the manifesto genre seems to be more about “form” than about “content,” though I try to be careful in my analysis not to treat the liminal relationship between the two as a binary opposition. Instead they both contribute to the rhetorical field. As an example of such a contribution, consider rhetorical figures of speech such as schemes (deviations in the expected or ordinary pattern or arrangement of words or
syllables) and tropes (deviations in the expected or ordinary meanings of words). As Michael de Certeau points out in *The Practice of Everyday Life*, "the ‘tropes’ catalogued by rhetoric furnish models and hypotheses for the analysis of ways of appropriating space" (100), and the manifesto is a genre that attempts to carve out a space for the group it seeks to constitute. Furthermore, an examination of these stylistic tactics can reveal the reflexive relationship Giddens sees between the constructions of agency and structure.

If the agency of the writer, and the exigency for the text occur because of an element of negativity, due to dislocations in a hegemonic discourse as Laclau contends, then by examining the ways in which the writer adapts the manifesto genre to resist hegemonic forces, strategies which other writers (our students, ourselves) can adopt become identifiable. Since hegemonic discourse attempts to use the ideological superstructure to master the Lacanian trauma which the superstructure has created, then ideological discourse "emerges in a dialectic with something that exceeds its symbolic and imaginary boundaries" (Stavrakis 100). The manifesto, exemplary of such ideological discourse, emerges at such points of linguistic and cultural conflict, challenging the forces which prevent society from becoming what the writer wants it to be. It is at this nexus point which Laclau calls a dislocation, where the manifesto genre does its impossible ideological work on the writer, the reader, and the social/discursive field.

How can a research method which traces rhetorical influences work to identify these typified responses to dislocations? Again, we can follow the lead of
Foucault who in *Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth* describes the reflexivity between form and agency when he shows how resistance subversively, or covertly, appropriates the dislocation in a discourse and turns the cultural forces of oppression upon themselves:

\[T\]he medical definition of homosexuality was a very important tool against the oppression of homosexuality in the last part of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century. This medicalization, which was a means of oppression, has always been a means of resistance as well—since people could say, “If we are sick, then why do you condemn us, why do you despise us?” (168).

A formalist analysis of this discourse reveals that it is in fact a variant of the semantic substitution called *conciliatio*, which Lausberg defines as “a manner of argumentation by which an argument of an opposing party is exploited for the benefit of one’s own party” (346). The dislocation occurred in the hegemony’s social practice of mistreating those it had ideologically labeled as sick. By calling attention to the semantic meaning of the term “sick,” the repressive nature of the treatment of the homosexual was revealed for what it actually was. Such appropriation revealed the lines of power connecting the rhetorical figure to larger ideological discourse. By identifying the use of such formal elements by writers of manifestoes, we can make explicit the strategies and tactics which the politically conscious writer can appropriate. I will now demonstrate this method of formal analysis by turning to Luther’s text.
Luther begins the document with an invitation to debate the theses, and an invocation to Christ. His motivation is “Out of love for the truth and the desire to bring it to light” (Luther 1). From there, Luther moves on in the first four theses to define and clarify the meaning of penance. It is significant that he begins by quoting the words of Christ, beginning with scripture. Although the language of the manifesto seems moderate by modern standards, Luther’s belief that scripture “trumps” tradition and hierarchical authority emanating from Rome is precisely what made the manifesto such a dangerous text in the eyes of the church. In the 4th thesis he concludes this process of definition with a syllogism summarizing the nature of penance. This is a method he uses throughout the text: using scripture as the major premise of a syllogism, building a minor premise based upon his own observations, and moving to a logical conclusion.

Before moving on to the long section (theses 8-29) which challenges Tetzel’s claim that his indulgences had the power to remit penalties owed by purgatories in heaven, Luther first sets the stage by carefully defining exactly what authority the pope does possess regarding the remission of sins. The 5th theses states that “The pope does not intend to remit, and cannot remit any penalties other than those which he has imposed either by his own authority or that of the canons.” This minor premise is reiterated in the syllogistic conclusion of thesis 20, where Luther concludes that “Therefore by ‘full remission of all penalties’ the pope means not actually ‘of all,’ but only of those imposed by himself” (Luther 2). Here we can see Luther approaching his audience very
carefully. Although he is uncompromising in his opposition to Tetzel’s sales of indulgences, he gives the church hierarchy an out: by assuming that the pope never intended to remit penalties imposed by God, he challenges the church to repudiate Tetzel and reform itself. And after challenging the church’s authority to remit the penalties of sin, he goes on to note in the 7th thesis that God remits the guilt of sin only to those Christians who humble themselves “into subjection to His vicar, the priest” (2). Here Luther makes clear his belief that the church is necessary, and he seems to be giving a nod to the “proper” role of the papacy. While admonishing Tetzel’s claims, Luther returns to this theme in a famous passage (theses 27-28):

“27 They preach man who say that so soon as the penny jingles in the money-box the soul flies out [of purgatory].

28 It is certain that when the penny jingles into the money-box, gain and avarice can be increased, but the result of the intercession of the Church is in the power of God alone” (3)

Luther’s use of sarcasm to demolish Tetzel’s faulty syllogism that money can lead to the remission of sins follows this tactic of assuming that the pope and his archbishops are unaware of the doctrinal errors being made in their name.

Theses 30-52 focus upon the dangers caused by Tetzel’s activities. 16th century Germany was undergoing dramatic change due to the rise of the merchant class, which was beginning to rival the royals and clerics in importance. Luther himself was a product of this revolution: his grandfather was a peasant farmer, but
his father chose to work as a copper miner, eventually accumulating enough to lease a mine of his own. When Hans Luther died in 1530 he left a fortune of “1,250 gulden, a sum more than ten times the salary earned at that time by an average professor at the University of Wittenberg” (Oberman 85). The language used by Tetzel, as well as by the rest of the church, when discussing penance and indulgences, was the language of the new merchant class, the language of the balance sheet. The penalties of sins were debts. These debts were remitted by the church, or by God. Tetzel had taken the process of remission from the metaphorical marketplace into the actual marketplaces of the German towns.

Luther challenged what he saw as a dangerous tendency to falsely grant the promise of the salvation to the wealthy. Luther makes this clear in thesis 36 where he states that “Every truly repentant Christian has a right to full remission of penalty and guilt even without letters and pardon” (3). By basing salvation solely on faith and the grace of God, (sola fide, sola gratia), Luther takes salvation out of the marketplace. In concluding this section, Luther gives his readers a glimpse of his own plan for reform, a set of teachings that are diametrically opposed to those of Tetzel, and other purveyors of marketplace Christianity. Beginning in thesis 42, and continuing through thesis 51, Luther begins each thesis with the statement “Christians are to be taught,” using the parallel rhetorical scheme anaphora to fix the importance of these teachings in the reader’s mind (interestingly, his namesake, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., would use the same scheme in his famous “I have a dream” speech). He concludes this section quite
stridently, asserting that Tetzel and his like "are enemies of Christ and of the pope" (4). Luther has taken us a long way from the invitation to debate an issue: his opponents are not just misguided—they are evil enemies.

In theses 59-79 he returns to the doctrine that was most likely to anger the church, the doctrine of "sola scriptura." The theological basis of the indulgence system was the concept that the institution of the church possessed certain treasures (again note the economic language) from which indulgences were distributed. These treasures included physical treasures such as relics (here Luther is treading dangerous ground, because his patron, Frederick of Saxony, was a famous collector of religious relics), as well as a more metaphorical bank of treasures, a sort of positive balance sheet the pope holds due the good works and grace of Christ and the saints. Luther attacks this view, claiming in the 62nd thesis that "The true treasure of the church is the Most Holy Gospel of the glory and grace of God" (5). It is curious how Luther then sarcastically uses the trope of irony to criticize the basis of the indulgence system in the 63d and 64th theses:

63  "But this treasure is naturally most odious, for it makes the first to be last."

64  "On the other hand the treasure of indulgences is naturally most acceptable for it makes the last to be first." (5)

Here Luther is attacking what he sees as an attempt to equate salvation with economic class. In some ways, Luther's resistance to a class-based system within the religious sphere anticipates the efforts Marx and Engels would later make with
their manifesto in the sphere of political economy.

In theses 81-90 Luther uses another trope, that of the rhetorical question. This technique is useful in that it addresses two audiences. By using this type of question for disputation, Luther phrases the question in such a way that the audience of the faithful who agree with him will make the appropriate response. To those who violently disagree, he can claim that he is only raising questions for debate, not necessarily taking a stand on those opinions. He raises questions which he admits are slanderous to the pope, but only if the pope actually agreed with Tetzel’s and Albrecht’s practices. He concludes this section with the interesting 90th thesis: “To repress these arguments and scruples of the laity by force alone, and not to resolve them by giving reasons, is to expose the Church and the pope to the ridicule of their enemies, and to make Christians unhappy” (7). According to Luther, reason must decide these issues, rather than feudal power, and he concludes the manifesto by repeating the assurances to loyal Christians with which he begins the document.

Luther, throughout his life, claimed that he never intended to spark the reformation with his delivery of the disputation on indulgences. Luther claims in his invitation to debate, that the theses were intended to facilitate debate. Brecht notes that “A disputation attempted, by means of combining definite assertions and open questions, to identify a problem, and then through discussing it to lead to its solution” (200). Yet in his performance and delivery of “The Ninety-Five Theses,” Luther produced, not a disputation, but a manifesto.
If Luther really intended the disputation to be merely an invitation to debate at Wittenberg, then why did he enclose it in a letter to Archbishop Albrecht, a letter he later admitted was an ultimatum? Why, if the theses were intended to spark a debate among scholastics in Wittenberg, did Luther authorize their printing in Latin and distribution throughout Germany and Europe within two weeks of their composition? And if Luther actually believed he was merely inviting an academic discussion, then he badly misjudged his audience. Frederick, who came to defend Luther and the work of his new university, stated to Spalatin upon reading the theses, “You will see that the pope will not like this” (Brecht 202, 203). Bishop Schulze of Brandenburg replied to Luther, advising him against this attack on the power of the church, to which Luther would later respond that “through the bishop the devil was speaking” (Brecht 205). Albrecht sent the letter on to Rome, expecting Pope Leo X to take action against Luther. And Tetzel, the nominal target of the manifesto, is said to have advocated that Luther should be burned as a heretic.

While Luther expressed surprise and some regret at the rapid spread of the disputation on indulgences, the new medium of the printing press provided a forum that Luther could not resist. In March of 1518 he preached his Sermon on Indulgences and Grace, a shorter version of the disputation, which was printed in German. Brecht reports “of twenty printings from Wittenberg, Leipzig, Nuremburg, Augsburg, Basel, and Breslau before 1520.” And in May 1518 Tetzel published his own “theses,” refuting Luther. The genre Luther introduced was
already replicating itself. Tetzel, copying the language Luther used in theses 44-51, started each of his theses with the words “Christians are to be taught” (Brecht 209). Luther responded to Tetzel’s manifesto with a counter argument, *Concerning the Freedom of the Sermon on Papal Indulgences and Grace*.

What were the conventions of the genre that Luther introduced in Germany in 1517? First of all, it had an introduction. The introduction described the exigency for the document, and what the author hoped to achieve. Secondly, it consisted of numbered statements (Curiously, the printer numbered the theses in groups of 25. See figure 7.) These statements included assumptions; assertions; the major and minor premises and conclusion of the syllogism, and a number of rhetorical tropes and schemes: irony, hyperbole, litotes, and anaphora, among others. Janet Lyon notes that such a design “convey[s] a certain rhetorical force: the parataxis of a list—its refusal of mediated prose or synthesized transitions—enhances the manifesto’s decanting imperative” (15). Thirdly, it attempted to call into existence an audience, in this case, the audience for a disputation on the theses at Wittenberg University.Fourthly, its arguments are based upon a brief retelling of what Lyon calls “a foreshortened, impassioned, and highly selective history” (14), in this case that of the emergence of the indulgence trade.

An analysis of form, or style also means visual style. The use of numbered statements, unusual fonts or font sizes, bolding, illustrations are all part of the manifesto’s rhetorical attempt at attracting and constructing an audience.

Furthermore, the physical format of document delivery must be addressed. One
Figure 7: The 95 Theses. (Ebeling, p. 106)
cannot understand the importance and reach of Luther’s the “95 Theses” without understanding the way in which the emergence of printing technology made dissemination of the manifesto possible. On the other hand, If one were to examine the publication records of the book in which the Russian futurist manifesto *A Slap in the Face of Public Taste* appeared, the fact that less than 200 copies of a small press book printed on wallpaper were ever delivered would seem to minimize its importance. Instead one must address the fact that the Russian futurists orally performed the manifesto dressed in outlandish attire in a carnivalesque atmosphere while on a tour that criss-crossed the geography of pre-revolutionary Russia. The manifesto is a form in which the often ignored rhetorical canon of “delivery” must be attended to.

It is important to note than in my analysis of style and form, I am not attempting to find “hidden mental structures” within these forms which tend to universalize human experience. Instead I look at style and form as the textual residue of the actions of agents who were, in some way, attempting to resist the hegemonic forces they encountered. A rhetorical analysis that looks at “influence” at the levels of the social image, rhetorical dynamics, and form, uncovers such power relationships, and identifies ways in which writers can respond to them. This is what I mean when I say this project is a record of adaptations made to the manifesto genre by writer/agents.
Chapter 3: From Peasants to Proletariat: The Emergence of the Political Manifesto

I. The Genre Reproduces: The Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants

An almost immediate attempt at reproducing the function of the genre Luther had demonstrated occurs during the Peasant’s Rebellion of 1525. The Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants seem to be consciously emulating and expanding upon Luther’s Reformation. Indeed, Thomas Muntzer, and other leaders of the rebellion saw in the Theses and Luther’s other writings such as “The Babylonian Captivity” and “The Short Form of the Ten Commandments and the Lord’s Prayer” a justification for their own rebellion against German nobility (Marius 418). While this conclusion was based upon a misunderstanding of Luther’s ideology, it nevertheless served the purposes of the peasant’s rebellion.

A. The Social Image

The Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants, like Luther’s manifesto, conveys a social image to future generations. The Peasant’s War was a failed revolution, a failure that was to have a continuing impact upon German history. And its failure was partially due to the actions of Luther, who eventually rallied Germany’s emerging educated class against the peasants. Even Luther’s first reaction to the rebellion, An Admonition to Peace on the Twelve Articles of the Peasantry in Swabia, could not have pleased Muntzer and his followers.

There were clearly major differences in ideological belief systems which manifested themselves in rhetorical differences between Luther’s Theses and the
Articles. After some initial successes burning castles, the peasants further alienated Luther and the reformation clergy by ransacking monasteries. In reaction Luther published *Against the Robbing and Murdering gangs of Peasants*, where he advocated the forcible and violent suppression of the peasant’s rebellion. The princes needed little encouragement. In May 1525, Philip of Hesse, a prince who came to support the Lutheran reformation, along with some other princes, led an army against 8000 peasants fighting under Muntzer’s banner. The army butchered 5000 peasants, and captured and beheaded Muntzer. Several other similar rebellions throughout Germany were also violently suppressed during this period. As Marius notes, Luther had “rejected the idea that his gospel applied to any worldly aspirations toward the equality of all Christians... Historically speaking, the vast majority of Lutherans in Germany have never been on the side of organized political resistance to the powers that be” (424). And ignoring the fact that Muntzer himself was a cleric, Marx called the Peasant’s War “the most radical fact of German history, an undertaking which was wrecked by theology” (Baeumer 256). In a letter to Engels in 1856, Marx would write in a polyglot of English and German: “The whole thing in Germany wird abhangen von der Möglichkeit to back the Proletariat revolution by some second edition of the Peasant’s war” (Marx, Engels *Briefwechsel* 166). Clearly, Marx and Engels saw themselves working from the heritage of the peasant’s rebellion rather than from Luther’s reformation.
B. Rhetorical Dynamics of the *Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants*

At a global level, the basic conflict between Luther’s ideology and that of the peasants is a conflict between a medieval/early renaissance world-view that tended to view the world as properly divided into separate spheres of influence, and an enlightenment view which saw the will of God, the natural rights of the individual, and political action as a holistic unity implicitly inherent in Humanist ideology. In “The Ninety-Five Theses,” Luther speaks as an individual cleric, inviting his religious superiors, as well as his academic equals, to debate theological matters, and to take certain steps to reform within the boundaries of the religious sphere. Luther takes quite seriously the admonition of Matthew 22:21 “render to Caesar, what is Caesar’s, and to render to God, what is God’s.”

The “Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants” takes quite a different approach. First of all it is a corporate document. Its subject is the pronoun “We,” the voice of the many opposing the few, the German nobility. Lyon notes that such usage is significant in that:

The manifesto as a form legitimates the polemical popular voice by propping it retroactively on republican principles: vox populi is held in the manifesto as the lowest common denominator of power, and a government that denies its own power base by ignoring or repressing the criticism and challenges of this, its most fundamental constituency, risks delegitimation (23).
While the peasants occasionally make deferential remarks towards nobility in the articles, those remarks are always couched in the language that implies such deference will only occur if the nobles justly accede to the peasant’s demands. Otherwise, as in the tenth article regarding the noble’s appropriation of community meadows and fields, “These we will take again into our own hands” (4). The rights of the many override the privileges of the few.

A second way in which the articles move the genre beyond the boundaries defined by Luther’s theses is in the way in which they imply the public’s overriding interest in both religious and secular matters. Where the articles begin, like Luther’s theses, with a preamble praising Christ, and asserting the good of the gospel which they see as the source of their freedom, they quickly move from the religious sphere to secular matters. While the first article is ostensibly religious, it challenges the right of the Prince to appoint and remove pastors, and demands that such power be given over to the community of believers. The second article makes a similar challenge, admitting the justness of a religious tithe for God’s work, but refusing to pay additional tithes demanded by the Prince, which are “an unseemly tithe which is of man’s invention” (2). The remaining articles make demands which are entirely outside the religious sphere: release from the slavery of serfdom, the right to fish and hunt in any wood or stream, access to forests for wood-cutting, release from excessive service to the Prince, fair payment for any such service rendered, release from unjust rents, unjust laws, and an egregious inheritance tax.
C. **Formal Elements of the Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants**

The articles also differ from Luther’s theses at the stylistic level. While the articles retain Luther’s number system, the articles differ markedly from the theses, in that each article is a paragraph, rather than a statement. Where Luther’s statements take the form of propositions, premises, and conclusions which often form syllogistic arguments, the articles are basically a list of demands. Each article/paragraph begins with a summary statement of the demand (topic sentence), followed by an elaboration of the details of the demand.

These formal differences arise out of the Luther’s and the Peasant’s different needs in their construction of an audience. While Luther’s theses carefully challenge the clerical authorities on the issue of indulgences, he does so by constructing an audience of humanist scholars who will ostensibly debate these matters at Wittenberg University. Luther’s challenge is one to be settled by debate and argument, not by force (i.e. the 90th thesis). The audience to be constructed by the *Twelve Article of the Swabian Peasant’s* is more problematic. Ostensibly it addresses the nobility itself, making its series of demands. It is accompanied by a woodcut (Figure 8), an early example of visual rhetoric which reinforces the
Figure 8: Cover of the Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants (Saxon State Library)
danger of not acceding to the demands of the articles: the reader faces a sea of peasants, holding both weapons and farm implements. The woodcut may have also been designed to appeal to peasants themselves, who were generally illiterate. While unable to read the articles, the illiterate peasant could "get" the message of the illustration: the power of the many against the few.

While the woodcut may have been useful in addressing the nobility and the peasantry, it probably only served to frighten its secondary audiences, whom the peasants saw as natural allies: the clergy of an emerging reformed church, and the inhabitants of the free imperial cities. Luther’s writings against the peasants and a series of sermons he in a trip to Eisleben in April of 1425, were greeted with anger by the peasantry. “He returned to Wittenberg convinced that the peasants now wished him personal harm” (Marius 428). The articles, rather than convincing Luther of the justness of the peasant’s caused, ended up making an enemy of Luther (Marius).

The articles also failed to stir a revolt against the princes within the free cities. As Harold Grimm has noted, there was a great deal of change and ferment occurring within the cities: struggles between territorial princes and the emperor, the emergence of an artisan class organized around guilds, the commercial revolution which changed the means and ownership of the methods of production, and the development of a patrician, or landowner class who gradually took control of city councils and governments. While the citizens of the cities often were
required to swear an annual oath to the prince, the citizenry was usually left to their own devices. Rather than the large class differences between nobility, clergy, and peasants that existed in the countryside, Grimm notes that “The society of the medieval German city was not divided into classes in the modern sense of the term. Luther and his contemporaries spoke of the various urban groups as ‘estates,’ each having its special interests and duties” (77). And while each group had competing interests and concerns, they were united by (1) a pride in their city which they say as a union of the secular, the spiritual, and the feudal; they had already “worked out a modus vivendi among themselves and their feudal lords (Grimm 77); (2) a vested interest and influence within the city councils, which were replacing the nobility as the center of governmental authority, built upon learning and humanistic values, and an improved social status; and (3) “the practical, late-medieval mysticism with its emphasis on inner spirituality and ethics” (Grimm 77). The German city of the 15th century was not yet figured into the proletariat/bourgeoisie split Marx would observe four centuries later, and its citizens were unlikely to risk their new found freedoms, or their salvation for a risky alliance with a violent group of uneducated peasants.

While Luther unleashed a powerful genre for the expression of grievances when he penned “The Ninety-Five Theses,” his actions during the peasant’s war helped create a cautious strain within German society that worked against the myth-making process of ideology formation which the manifesto promoted. The powerful image of a Thor-like Luther knocking down the walls of feudalism
would appear to lose much of its mythical appeal with Luther’s cautious limitation of the reformation to the religious sphere. This cautiousness would cause such manifestoes to be seen in Germany more as mimetic expressions of discontent rather than generative texts which promoted the formation of a revolutionary politic. Yet a myth is not so easily dissolved in mere history. We can see this in the Germany where Marx and Engels were to reinvent the manifesto form four centuries later.

III. The Genre as Legacy and Precursor: The Communist Manifesto

Most people, when asked to name a manifesto, would probably name the Manifesto of the Communist Party. And while it is certainly the “Ur-text” for the later manifestoes of the twentieth century, a period Mary Ann Caws calls “A Century of Isms,” it is also a text that was influenced by its medieval precursors.

A. The Communist Manifesto and the Social Image

1. Looking Backward

In spite of Luther’s attempts at limiting his programme to the religious sphere, by the 19th century the reformation had become a symbol for, not only the national liberation of Germany, but also for revolution in general. Max Baeumer points out that “in 1788, the historian of constitutional law, August Ludwig Schlozer called the beginning of the revolution in France a National-Reformation” and “None other than Goethe demanded in 1817...that the Anniversary Festival of the Reformation be merged with the National Festival of the People’s Battle of Leipzig....commemorating the victory over Napoleon”
Hegel, in his Philosophy of History (published shortly after his death in 1831), regards the Reformation as "that blush of dawn which we observed at the termination of the medieval period" (348), the beginning of the modern times.

Hegel was aware of Luther’s actions during the peasant’s rebellion, but Hegel’s philosophy is not one which blames individual subject/agents for the events of history. In his view “the world was not yet ripe for a transformation of its political condition as a consequence of ecclesiastical reformation” (351). Yet in Hegel’s view, the reformation begins the modern period, in which the dialectic begins to work on the antithetical spheres of church and state, which the medieval mind was so quick to separate. In Hegel’s history, the story of modern Germany is one where “The spiritual becomes reconciled with the secular, and develops this latter as an independently organic existence” (206). The reformation frees the spirit, and “Consequently law, property, social morality, government, constitutions, etc., must be conformed to general principles, in order that they may accord with the idea of the free will and the rational” (350). The thinkers of the French enlightenment called this the revolution d’esprit.

While Hegel looked upon the modern revolution as a continuing evolution growing out of the dialectical process beginning in the reformation, his follower Marx rejects the lingering Christian spiritualism of Hegel and argues that “Luther liberated the body from slavery, but he shackled the human heart” (quoted in Baeumer 255). Baeumer notes that Marx’s collaborator Engels, the author of an 1850 pamphlet on the Peasant’s War, was even more uncompromising in his
rejection of Luther, “interpreting the Peasant’s War and one of its revolutionary leaders, Thomas Muntzer, as the only focal point of this period, with no serious consideration to its general religious aspects or to Martin Luther himself” (Baeumer 256). Yet Hegel seems to have understood more than Marx and Engels that Luther’s manifesto was the beginning of a process, an initial demonstration of the rhetorical and ideological conventions of a certain generic form. If Marx and Engels were unwilling to acknowledge their debt to the genre, they certainly were willing to borrow from those conventions.

2. Looking Forward

One enduring convention of the genre which we first begin to see in Marx’s and Engels’ text, is its self-referentiality. The text refers to itself, in the title, as a Manifesto, an example of the genre. The expected rhetorical function of such a move is one of allusion, of looking back to a referent, an earlier text. Again, according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the term “manifesto” emerged in the middle of the 17th century, among anti-royal forces in England. Ironically, its first use in the title of a document appears to come in service of the state itself, in Milton’s Manifesto of the Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, Ireland, &c composed in Latin for Cromwell in 1655.

However, the readers of Marx and Engels were unlikely to have had a historical familiarity with the manifesto genre. Indeed, instead of looking backwards, the Manifesto of the Communist Party looks forward towards a Communist future. The power of its title lies in a reversal of the conventional rhetorical usage of the
allusion: instead of looking backwards it provides an anchor to which all future movements of working class peoples can allude. All manifestoes after the Manifesto of the Communist Party are implicitly connected to the perpetual struggle of the masses against the powerful elites. While Marx’s and Engel’s historiographic text is not concise enough to take on the empowering features of myth, the form of the text itself becomes the mythical power which future movements would draw upon.

B. Rhetorical Dynamics of the Manifesto of the Communist Party

The exigency for the writing of the manifesto grew out of Marx’s forced exile from Paris to Belgium in 1846 due to his political agitation on behalf of the Parisian working class. In Belgium, he formed a workingman’s society which came together with a similar British group in 1847 in London to form “The Communist League.” This group commissioned Marx and Engels to write a statement of principles on behalf of the group (Draper).

Engels had already penned a statement of Socialist principles, and Marx took this document back to Brussel’s, where he penned the manifesto, revising and enlarging upon Engel’s draft. The manifesto was quickly published in February 1848, and was used as a political tool by German workers who attempted a short-lived revolution in March of the year which led Marx to the Cologne where he supported revolutionary movements throughout Europe as editor of Neue Rheinische Zeitung. Upon the collapse of the German revolution, Marx was banished from Germany in May 1849, fled to Paris, which banished
him in June of that year, and finally fled to London. Shortly thereafter, the Communists League disbanded, and Marx lived the remainder of his life as an exile in London (Draper).

C. **Formal Elements of the Manifesto of the Communist Party**

Like Luther’s manifesto, the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* begins with an introduction which describes the exigency for the work. In Marx’s and Engels’ highly metaphorical take on the situation, Communism is “A spectre...haunting Europe”...which its opponents are openly seeking “to exorcise” (419). In the face of such opposition, “It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet the nursery tale of the spectre of Communism with a manifesto of the party itself” (419). This last phrase is key: where Luther’s and the peasant’s texts use a brief, polemic history to frame their lists of arguments and grievances, Marx and Engels reverse this move by beginning with a single grievance. This grievance is the false, sketchy history of Communism, the nursery tale served up by its opponents.

Like the other manifestoes, this one also is numbered. But instead of a numbered list of grievances, Marx and Engels deliver four numbered histories. Rather than Lyon’s “foreshortened, impassioned, and highly selective history” (14) they reconstruct the manifesto genre as detailed historiography. In Chapter 1 they carefully examine the process by which “modern bourgeois society...has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society” (419). They show how this process
inevitably splits the complex social diversity of the medieval city into two classes: the bourgeois and the proletariat. In Chapter 2 they detail the historical development of Communist theory. The essential point here is that the theories are not deduced from abstract principles. Rather they are the results of inductive logic based upon material observations of historical processes, "actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes" (425). This is the essence of the Marxist methodology which becomes to be known as "historical materialism." Towards the end of this chapter they provide the closest thing in the text to a list of demands: a numbered list of 10 political measures which would likely be necessary to begin transforming bourgeois societies into communist ones. In Chapter 3 they examine other socialist movements in Europe, and describe why those movements are historically reactionary. And finally, in the very short Chapter 4 they describe the relationship of the international communists with certain other leftist allies. The *Manifesto of the Communist Party* certainly contains a historical narrative, but instead of using a history to frame their arguments or demands, what is unique in this manifesto is the fact that it is history itself that makes the demands.

Another conventional feature of the manifesto genre we saw in the medieval manifestoes were their attempts at calling into existence an audience. In at least one sense the audience for the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* was already in existence: the members of the Communist League. In Engels' preface to the manifesto, he reports that prior to 1848 the League had existed as
"unavoidably a secret society" (415). Its appearance at what Engels called "the first great battle between proletariat and bourgeoisie" (415) marked the coming out of the Communist movement. And although the league dissolved after the failure if the European uprisings of 1849, the manifesto and its ideas survived, and was translated into numerous languages and reprinted frequently. In 1864 Communism was reborn as the International Workingmen’s Association (Draper). Later attempts to "exorcise" Communism were only moderately successful—and the movement continued to spring up, held together by the manifesto, what Engels called "the most international production of Socialist literature, the common platform acknowledged by millions of workingmen from Siberia to California" (416). If Engels is right, the document certainly has called an audience into existence.

The call is explicitly made at the end of Chapter 4 when the writers point out "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite" (434). Janet Lyon notes the performative nature of this conclusion, which becomes yet another formal convention we shall add to our list of the generic features of the manifesto.

The passage is performative in at least two of that term’s theoretical senses: in J.L. Austin’s sense, by implying a priori assent, it forecasts the unified class that it invokes; and in Judith Butler’s sense, it produces a flexibly scripted *faux* identity for workers and non-workers under hortatory radicalism (Lyon 28).
The repetition of such calls to organize become a common feature of many manifestoes occurring from the 19th century forward, and it is a major reason that Lyon sees the manifesto as a central challenge to contesting the universal subject of the public sphere. The call to action (Organize Now! The Time for Discussion is Past) "eschews this gradualist language of debate and reform" (Lyon 31) which characterize the bourgeois public sphere. Lyon notes the many figures of repetitive structure that these calls to action often use, paying particular attention to chiasmus. But the call may use any number of rhetorical forms for emphasis—in the case of the manifesto, litotes, or deliberate understatement when the writers point out that "the proletarians have nothing to lose other than their chains" (434). The point is that the modern manifesto seems to borrow the rhetoric of the slogan, the short, memorable, well-crafted phrase. And according to the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, the slogan originates in the 18th century with the Scottish war cry. The manifesto takes the slogan out of the battlefield and into the arena of politics. And, as we shall see in our investigation in Chapter 4, it takes us even further, into the world of modernist aesthetics.

Marshall Berman notes that while Marx is considered essential to "modernization" in economics and politics, in regards to art and culture "on the other hand, in the literature on modernism, Marx is not recognized at all" (98). This is due to the fact that "Current thinking about modernity is broken into two different compartments, hermetically sealed off from one another: ‘modernization’ in economics and politics, ‘modernism’ in art, culture,
sensibility” (98). In his attempt at reading Marx and Engels through a modernist lens, Berman notes the stylistic affinities between Marx and Engels and modernist writers like Rilke, Yeats, and Nietzsche. Besides the anaphoric litany to the bourgeoisie noted before, Berman focuses upon this famous passage in the manifesto: “All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life and his relations with his kind” (421). Berman, who is admittedly more partial to the Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts than the Marx of Capital, sees “this modernist melting vision... throughout Marx’s works. Everywhere it pulls like an undertow against the more ‘solid’ Marxian visions we know so well” (99). Where many Marxist commentators find the stylistic beauty of Marx’s and Engels’ grand narrative on the bourgeoisie almost embarrassing in a document which was commissioned to bury the bourgeois Caesar, not praise it, Berman sees instead a paradoxical counternarrative in the melting vision. While describing the historical abuses and crimes of the bourgeoisie which inevitably leads to the development of the revolutionary proletariat, Marx and Engels are also admiring the possibilities created by the dynamic forces of capitalism which seem to dissolve all remnants of Aristocratic feudalism which remain in its path. Likening the manifesto to other great modernist visions, Berman sees the conflicted rhetorical tropes of paradox and irony present in the work.

If we were to conclude the matter there, that would be fine: Marx and Engels, in the Manifesto of the Communist Party produced a text which rivals and
has affinities with other great modernist visions. But we cannot conclude the matter there. Where other modernist writers leave us in a sea of paradox, conflict and irony, afloat in what they hopelessly and nihilistically describe as "the modern condition," Marx and Engels refuse to do so. Whenever we find conflict and paradox in Marxist works, we should always remember that the methodology in which a Marxist works is dialectical materialism. And while not every inconsistency in Marxist thought can be facilely dismissed as simply part of the dialectic, remember that the methodology requires the thinker to analyze theses, antithesis, and then to look for the synthesis. In the manifesto, the synthesis is the optimistic, hopeful vision of a Communist future. In this vision, the romantic remnants of humanism have been swept away for good reason: Marx and Engels describe these remnants as "half lamentation, half lampoon; half echo of the past, half menace of the future...ludicrous in its effect through total incapacity to comprehend the march of modern history" (429). But bourgeois capitalism is also swept away in revolution. Marx and Engels see in that revolution the hope for a future where a new humanistic order can develop. We may not know exactly the form that order will take, but one needs to trust the dialectic.

Where other writers of the time abandon their readers to nihilism, or hopelessness, or take the path of Eliot, or Pound, and look backwards to a restoration of the aristocracy, or a fascist nationalism to resolve modernist paradox and conflict, Marx and Engels instead offer us a solution to the problem, asking us to see paradox, not just as a sign of decay of the old order (which of
course it is), but also a sign of the continuous, historical operation of the
dialectical dance, a complex operation where we may not be able to tell the
dancer from the dance, the agent from the process, but nevertheless trust that
agency is, really a possibility after all, if only “Workingmen of all countries [will]
unite.”
Chapter 4: From Politics to Performance: The Emergence of the Aesthetic Manifesto

The appearance of the manifesto form in the field of aesthetic production is the most notable innovation to the genre in the early 20th century. And while the manifesto's previous incarnations as a political and theological genre doesn't prepare us for the emergence of the aesthetic manifesto, there are at least some indications in the work of Marx and Engels that the Manifesto of the Communist Party could have broad applicability to the aesthetic, as well as the political sphere.

If the Manifesto of the Communist Party marks the use of the genre as a political call to arms, and the later manifestoes of modernism will see the genre used as an aesthetic call to arms, then, following Foucault's lead we should look for other signs of this epistemic shift in the pre-modernist manifesto of Marx and Engels. One way of doing this is by attempting to examine the rhetorical dynamics of the Manifesto of the Communist Party through an aesthetic lens.

The first thing we should note is that both Marx and Engels held strong aesthetic views. While neither wrote a systematic aesthetics, both writers developed aesthetic ideas in their writings. In the posthumously published 1844 Manuscripts (published in English in The Marx-Engels Reader) Marx writes that human beings make "life-activity the object of consciousness" (62). As Eugene Lunn notes:

Marx’s observations on the origins of art reflected eighteenth century
traditions of German humanist aesthetics, albeit within a new materialist framework. While art developed, he speculated, out of the making of use-objects by primitive workers, it reveals human sensuous needs which go beyond physical necessity (11).

It is clear here that Marx has entered the aesthetic debate between two binaries, the mimetic, or reproductive impulse versus the genetic, or creative impulse. Marx appears here to align himself with the latter, which is interesting considering the fact that one of the criticisms of Marxist thought has been that it emphasizes the determining power of the economic base over that of individual agency.

This is a far cry from the traditional conception of Communist Art and Literature as Agitprop, a tradition that has been ascribed to Engels’ influence. As Lunn again points out:

[Within their collaboration, Marx continued to stress Hegelian, classical, and German humanist motifs and concerns, while Engels was more enthusiastic about technological progress in social development, eighteenth-century materialism in epistemology, and literary realism in aesthetics (14).]

Yet Marx was not interested in turning back the clock. While he understood the values of the humanist tradition, he also saw in it the vestiges of the decay of aristocratic feudalism. The solution was not in turning to the past: the solution was through the dialectic:
On the one hand, there have started into life industrial and scientific forces, which no epoch of the former human history had ever suspected. On the other hand, there exist symptoms of decay...Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving and overworking it...The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character (Marx-Engels Reader 427).

Marx and Engels resolved the binary through what Lunn calls a “German-French synthesis” (32). While Marx and Engels praised the realist social novels of Victorian England and France for their mimetic, agit-prop qualities, they also emphasized that by overcoming economic want through public ownership of the means of production, the creative human spirit could be unleashed in the production of art and literature.

Can the Manifesto of the Communist Party be read through a lens examining these aesthetic issues? The writers directly address the conflict between the old humanist system and bourgeois capitalism in the first chapter. In a series of eleven paragraphs, nine of which begin with (again reminiscent of Luther) the anaphoric mantra “The bourgeoisie,” the authors point out the epistemic changes which capitalism has wrought:

The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid
wage labourers (420).

The writers' use of the term "halo" here is interesting, and seems to anticipate Walter Benjamin's famous essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" which defines the "aura" of pre-modernist art, and analyzes its decay under the impact of capitalist cultural technologies. This essay led to a debate between Benjamin and Theodor Adorno as to whether the dialectical synthesis would work its way out through a new aesthetics of mass produced art (Benjamin) or through the avant-garde autonomous work of art (Adorno). While Marx and Engels don't develop a Marxist aesthetic, it is interesting that they begin framing the terms of that debate in the manifesto.

Again in Chapter 1 of the manifesto, the authors return to the notion of what has been lost to mechanical production: "Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and consequently, all charm for the workman" (422). This loss of individual character which the authors seem to find intolerable, is the victory of the mimetic (the mechanically reproduced, man as machine), over the genetic (the creative work of the craftsperson). What is interesting here is that not only are they directly addressing the dialectical conflict between the mimetic and the genetic, but that the loss of "charm" in the work of the craftsperson seems quite equivalent to the loss of the halo, or aura, on the part of the artist. And while the authors don't quite develop an aesthetic programme in their political
manifesto, it may not be a coincidental anticipation of the attempts at synthesizing art and craft that come later in the work of the Russian Futurists and the Omega Workshops of Roger Fry. This story, however, begins in Italy, with Marinetti.

I. Marinetti and the beginnings of Futurism

In her collection *Manifesto: A Century of Isms* Mary Ann Caws labels the period of 1909-1919 as “the Manifesto Moment” (xxii). The manifestoes of the avant-garde “make an art out of excess” (Caws xx). They are performative, challenging what society considers proper. They reach, with an extreme confidence, towards a level of performance where the form itself seems to be message, rather than a container for any conventional meaning.

Fully 32 of the 51 movements chronicled in Caws’ collection came into existence during this explosive period, a period which saw the political landscape disrupted by the first World War and the Bolshevik Revolution, and the aesthetic landscape similarly marked by the explosive emergence of modernism as the dominant cultural movement. It’s a strange explosion, an explosion which, in many ways begins with the Italian futurist, Fillippo Tommaso Marinetti.

A. The Social Image

The image carried forward by history of Marinetti and the futurist manifestoes might be one of playful avant-garde experimentation except for one thing: the association of the futurist movement with fascism. This right wing political movement, which originated in Italy under Mussolini, and spread to
Spain under Franco and Germany under Hitler, positioned itself as a nationalistic opponent to communism, under the leadership of a charismatic, authoritarian dictator. It used propaganda, and the emerging media technologies to present itself as a pure alternative to what it saw as a decadent trend in civilization which was variously blamed on the Communists and the Jews.

Three of the more significant authors of manifestoes during this period—Marinetti, Ezra Pound, and Wyndham Lewis—explicitly embraced fascism at one time or another, and Lukacs went so far as to claim the that all of the modernist avant-garde movements were inherently fascist. This characterization is based upon more than a genealogy of fascist-leaning writers. When Marinetti took a genre which had been the tool of the political organizer, and transformed it into an aesthetic object as well as the preferred means of discussing aesthetic issues, he left himself open to the charge that he was conflating aesthetics and politics. Walter Benjamin, the influential German-Jewish journalist and literary theorist believed that the ability of fascism to market itself to the masses was due to “the introduction of aesthetics into political life” (*Illuminations* 241). Instead of offering the proletarian masses the right to change property relations, the fascists deflected proletarian anger into aesthetic expression. Benjamin saw Marinetti’s manifestoes which glorified the beauty of war as a kind of “self alienation [that] has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order” (*Illuminations* 242). The horrors of World War II and the holocaust which accompanied is now part of the image that
surrounds the work of Marinetti, and in Lukacs’ view, the modernist avant-garde in general.

In recent years, Frederick Jameson has effectively challenged that view, arguing that “the familiar split between avant-garde art and left-wing politics was not a universal, but merely a local, anglo-American phenomenom” (45) associated with Marinetti, Pound, and Lewis. However, Andrew Hewitt’s 1993 study *Fascist Modernism: Aesthetics, Politics, and the Avant-Garde* as well as his 1996 work *Political Inversions: Homosexuality, Fascism, and the Modernist Imaginary* demonstrates that the social image of the aesthetic manifesto as fascist text is still a powerful force today. Hewitt argues that while there is no causal connection between fascism and the modernist avant-garde, an analysis of the homologies that do exist “promises…a radically modified and expanded view of the ideological positions that both fascism and modernism can cover” (Hewitt, *Fascist Modernism* 4). Regardless of whether Hewitt’s or Jameson’s position is a more accurate depiction of the relationship between modernism and fascism, the fact of the matter is that the Futurists, who transformed the manifesto into an aesthetic genre, are a marginalized group in literature. The Futurist manifestoes, arguably the first significant formal innovation of modernist literature, are nowhere to be found in the major literary anthologies of world literature (for example Wilkie and Hurt, Lawall), and that omission is probably traceable to the social image of the manifesto as fascist text.
Yet in its own time the social image carried by Marinetti and the futurist manifestoes was much different. Literary historians like Flint, while accurate in portraying Marinetti as a onetime fascist, tend to ignore the fact that even Marinetti’s futurism began as a movement of the internationalist left, rather than the nationalist right. His *The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism* was first published in French in *Le Figaro* of Paris, in 1909. This paper, hardly a friend of the right, described Marinetti as “the young Italian and French poet” (Mitchell 103). Marinetti himself described the futurist movement as a “proletariat of gifted men,” (6) a description which seems to indicate he had the manifesto of Marx and Engels, as well as Nietzsche’s writings in mind. This call for a proletarian public intellectual seems to anticipate the later Marxian thought of Gramsci, and the goal of the manifesto to unify art with action, while sweeping away “the museums, libraries, academies, of every kind” is consistent with an idea of revolution in which the solid bourgeois and feudal institutions melt into air. The fact that the famous “speeding car ride” narrative Marinetti uses as a metaphor for the movement ends with the futurists crashing into a ditch, smearing their faces “with good factory mud” (41), connects Marinetti’s declaration of “high intentions to all the earth” to the famous appeal of Marx and Engels: “workingmen of all countries, unite” (434). It is obvious that, despite its differences in style and content, Marinetti’s manifesto carried with it the social image of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. 
Some of those differences are related to the influence of another major figure of 19th century thought, Frederick Nietzsche, who as I described earlier, was a major influence on Marinetti. Reading _The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism_ through a Nietzschean lens yields immediate dividends. Aphoristic lines like “Let’s break out of the horrible shell of wisdom and throw ourselves like pried opened fruit into the wide, contorted mouth of the wind!” (Marinetti 40) resemble the epigrams from _Thus Spoke Zarathustra_, in that they seem to come out of nowhere. Rather than build their ideas on a base of reason and argument, Marinetti and Nietzsche throw out ideas as if they are pillars supported by their aesthetic beauty, rather than by reason. And Nietzsche’s position that “language is rhetoric, because it desires to convey only a _doxa_ (opinion), not an _episteme_ (knowledge)” (“Ancient Rhetoric” 23) and that “What is usually called language is actually all figuration” (“Ancient Rhetoric” 25) seems to anticipate Marinetti’s use of language as a gesture of power in the manifesto. Certainly Nietzsche’s use of slogan, aphorism, and epigram seems to anticipate Marinetti’s formal innovations.

Since most of the scholarship on modernist futurism (Perloff, Jameson, Hewitt, among others) has focussed on Marinetti’s futurist programme and the Vorticist movement of Ezra Pound and Wydham Lewis, it is no wonder that scholars tend to connect the movement with fascism. This scholarship, which tends to exclude both the Omega workshops and Bloomsbury Group centered around Roger Fry, as well as the Russian futurists and constructivists, is curious.
The tendency to link the futurist aesthetic with the fascism of Pound and Marinetti, is a scholarship which the history of groups such as Omega, Bloomsbury, Hyalea, Lef, and the Constructivists tend to confound. The leftist, and anti-fascist political leanings of these groups tend to obscure their importance to the history of this period, just as Pound’s and Marinetti’s fascism has probably led to the marginalization of futurism within the contemporary literary canon. Fillipo Tommaso Marinetti, was an early supporter of Mussolini, and the social image of the modernist manifesto as fascist text begins with him.

B. Rhetorical Dynamics

Beyond the towering images of Marx, Engels, and Nietzsche, there were certainly local power dynamics with the Italian cultural community which helped create the exigency for Marinetti’s manifesto. As R.W. Flint notes, the deaths of Giuseppe Verdi, characterized by Flint as last of the great classical Italian libretticists in 1901, and that of Nobel prize winning poet Giosue Carducci in 1907, left a void in the community which was filled by Gabriele D’Annunzio, an Italian symbolist poet and lecherous romantic who presented himself in public as a “synthetic English country gentleman” (Marinetti 12). The “Divine Imaginifico (maker of images)” became “the chief guide and magnet for the aspiring young” (Marinetti 10). When D’Annunzio was forced to leave Italy for France in 1908 disgraced by debts and public scandal, Marinetti seized the moment and took the Italian cultural community away from its passatismo (cult of the past), and into a movement of collective action. While his personae as a public entertainer clearly
follows D'Annunzio's example (and anticipates the Carnivalesque attitude of some of the Russian Futurists as well as 20th century performance artists), Marinetti was much more of a puritan, and much less of a dilettante than his predecessor. As Flint notes, "Marinetti took care to coerce and neutralize his only serious rivals in cultural subversion, the editors and authors of the avantgarde Florentine journal *La Voce" (Marinetti 20) by collaborating with them to found a new magazine *Lacerba* in 1912. Gramsci was to note that this journal, "whose circulation reached 20,000, found four-fifths of its readers among the workers" (Marinetti 11). Gramsci's quote again demonstrates the extent to which the emergence of futurism was a movement of the working class reacting against the classicism and dilettantism of Italian art. The fact that a critic of the fascist tendencies of the Italian futurists like Gramsci finds that they "grasped sharply and clearly that our age, the age of big industry, of the large proletarian city and of intense and tumultuous life, was in need of new forms of art, philosophy, behaviour, and language...in their field, the field of culture, the Futurists are revolutionaries" (Perloff, *The Futurist Moment* 2), demonstrates that even a fascist supporter like Marinetti must be viewed as operating in a complex field of political and aesthetic change which was sweeping through Europe at the time. Given the futurists' position as the dominant cultural movement in Italy before that country tipped towards fascism, and given its revolutionary use of a political genre, the manifesto, within the aesthetic field, it is important to reevaluate the Italian movement in relationship to the larger world of modernism.
Gramsci is correct in noting that the exigency for the futurist manifestoes was modernity itself. Before I can begin to more closely discuss the exigency for these modernist manifestoes, I will first begin by analyzing the epistemic break which marks the birth of modernity. Terms such as modernity and modernism are convenient ways of organizing history, marking what Jameson has called a first level of difference. However such hierarchical categories also tend to obscure differences between individual works and artistic movements within the categories. As Foucault has shown, what is most important about such categories is not so much what they contain, but rather on the epistemic ruptures which mark their emergence. In the case of modernity, the epistemic rupture was well defined by Marx and Engels (as discussed in Chapter 3): the emergence of bourgeois capitalism as the dominant mode of production, an all-consuming, revolutionizing mode of production where “All that is solid melts into air” (Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto 421). It is within this epistemic break that modernism emerges.

The term modernism itself has been used so loosely by literary scholars as to lose almost any meaning. For example, within the tradition of Marxism, Lukacs saw modernist experimentation as the dying whimper of a decadent aristocracy while Brecht saw the same literary experimentation as “acts of liberation” (Lunn 86) which challenged bourgeois society. In both cases, the term modernism became synonymous with formal experimentation. Poggioli, on the other hand, defined it as “an unconscious parody of modernity, an involuntary
caricature... The honest-to-goodness nemesis of modernity” (218). Poggioli saw the movement as a failed attempt to mythologize the urban, scientific aspects of modenity, “the attempt to realize a modern marvelous” (219). In Poggioli’s eyes, such a myth was no less provincial and totalizing than the agrarian myths it was attempting to displace. Poggioli’s concept of modernism is certainly inimical to the dialectical version of modernity which Marx and Engels characterized as a force which both creates and destroys.

Recently theorists have attempted to come up with a more finely nuanced definition of modernism, one rooted in the historical contingencies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Frederick Jameson, following Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the modernist text as a coding machine, a rhetorical device constructed by a writer that operates on the reader, argues that:

all modernistic works are essentially cancelled realistic ones, that they are, in other words, not apprehended directly, in terms of their own symbolic meanings, in terms of their own mythic and sacred immediacy, the way an older primitive or overcoded work would be, but rather indirectly only, by way of the relay of an imaginary realistic narrative... that recoded flux of a realistic narrative of your own devising (The Jameson Reader 183, 184).

In Jameson’s argument, literary modernism, because it creates a text which requires a private reading, based upon an individual, rather than a public frame of reference, reflexively causes and is caused by “the breakdown of a homogenous
The public sphere is split into a number of separate spheres, each relatively autonomous and specialized. Thus the period becomes what Caws calls “A Century of Isms.” Jameson rhetorically connects, by way of analogy, the formal characteristics of literary modernism with the central formal characteristic of bourgeois capitalism: the division of labor and industrial specialization. In a sense, Jameson’s analysis of modernism dialectically synthesizes the opposing arguments of Brecht and Lukacs, and takes a more optimistic view of the effects of the movement than Poggioli.

Hewitt, in *Fascist Modernism* essentially turns Jameson’s definition of modernism back upon modernity itself: “Modernity is entrenched as a central organizing principle only when it has apparently decentralized any such central principle and disseminated power to the various autonomous discourses” (43). This paradoxical move from unified center to decentralized locality is precisely what connects Futurist Modernism to the Marxist project, and is the exigency upon which most modernist manifestoes are based, again challenging the notion that Marinetti’s genre is inherently fascist. For example, the Russian Constructivist Vladimir Tatlin described the progressive side of this dialectical reflexivity in his 1919 manifesto “The Initiative Individual Artist in the Creativity of the Collective.”

**THESSES**

1. The initiative individual is the collector of the energy of the collective, directed towards knowledge and invention.
4. The initiative individual is the refraction point of the collective’s creativity and brings realization to the idea.

6. Invention is always the working out of impulses and desires of the collective and not of the individual. (Caws 401).

The modernist break is at the nexus of decentralization and dehumanization which comes with the emergence of industrial modernity. Those modernists who parodied and complained about the destructiveness of modern life eventually fell into the failed totalizing vision of modernism which Poggioli describes, and the later work of Marinetti demonstrates. Those, like Tatlin, who understood the irony and paradox of a dialectic that can both embrace individual creativity and celebrate the collective followed a progressive tradition that Jameson has recognized is not necessary inimical to the Marxist project.

C. **Formal Elements**

Marinetti’s 1909 “The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism” is noteworthy for its formal innovations to the manifesto, but it also borrowed from past instantiations of the genre. Following the lead of Luther, the Swabian Peasants, and Marx and Engels, Marinetti begins his work by describing the exigency of the manifesto in personal narrative. He describes an all night meeting of young friends—“The oldest of us is thirty” (43)—who are sitting around discussing aesthetics, a discussion which Marinetti obscurely describes in a series of metaphors and similes which point out their humble, yet heroic status as challengers of the existing order, the “army of hostile stars glaring down at us
from their celestial encampments” (39). Marinetti, suddenly realizing that their 
(coffee-house, barroom, or drawing-room—it’s never specified) discussion is 
going nowhere, and is doomed to becoming yet another example of passivity, 
enjoins his friends to jump in his car, and go on a ride to watch the sunrise 
(Marinetti 39). And so it begins, the founding authors of modernism racing into 
the future aboard the defining product of the Fordist system. After a horrific ride, 
Marinetti ends up putting the car in a ditch full of “good factory muck” (41). 
While observers help fish the car out of the ditch, the group “bruised, our arms in 
slings, but unafraid, declared our high intentions to all the living of the earth” 
(41). Marinetti’s narrative serves to unhinge the text from conventional literature 
by placing it in the middle of “good factory muck,” and connects it with the 
proletarian working class.

The eleven numbered points of the manifesto tend to repeat a number of 
aphoristic principles by which the group declares its opposition to the existing 
monuments of art and literature. This use of numbered points follows the tradition 
of Luther, and its aphoristic form, as we noted earlier, can be traced to Nietzsche. 
Futurism is a movement that celebrates speed, energy, courage, and fearlessness, 
a movement whose icon is the race car, a “hymn [to] the man at the wheel” 
(Marinetti 41). The movement intends to “destroy the museums, libraries, 
academies of every kind,” institutions which they deride as feminine. This 
contemporary reader familiar with the violent, racist and misogynist history of the 
20th century finds the ninth point particularly troubling:
We will glorify war—the world’s only hygiene—militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of freedom-bringers, beautiful ideas worth dying for, and scorn for woman (42).

Yet beyond the misogyny, the ideas in the manifesto do not seem that far from Nietzsche’s ideas in On the Genealogy of Morals, which attacks “a race of such men of ressentiment... cleverer than any noble race” (37). In spite of the hateful language, like Nietzsche, Marinetti is attacking the foundationalism of Western cultural modes. And while Marinetti is clearly misogynistic in his coding of powerless resentment as feminine (and Nietzsche sometimes seems racist in coding ressentiment as Jewish), his real enemy is not individual women (remember that Marinetti marched with the London Suffragettes in their 1912 window-smashing campaign), but bourgeois culture. And while “the feminine constitutes an intensely perjorative field of meaning” (Lyon 100) in Marinetti’s manifesto, no less a postmodern feminist than Wendy Brown has argued that too many North American feminists have adopted “both the epistemological spirit and political structure of ressentiment” (45). Brown has identified the central point of Nietzsche’s (and by way of extension, Marinetti’s) argument as this: “the reduction of all discourse to rhetoric, to the insistence on the will to power in all of reason’s purveyors, ourselves included” (45). In fact, Marinetti, in a narrative that concludes “The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism,” makes the same point when he predicts a future where “younger and stronger men will probably throw us in the wastebasket like useless manuscripts” (43). While Marinetti betrays his
sexism by failing to anticipate the “younger and stronger women” he would
march with in 1912, it is interesting that the “founding” statement of modernism
seems to be very similar to Nietzsche’s argument which scholars like Wendy
Brown see as the founding statement of postmodernism.

What is it then that makes Marinetti’s move so unique, so important to the
epistemological break in modernism? Certainly the idea of putting an aesthetic
programme into writing was not new—the prefaces to William Wordsworth’s
*Lyric Ballads* and Oscar Wilde’s *The Picture of Dorian Gray* are two notable
predecessors. And even the programme itself was not new, in the sense that its
underlying philosophical basis had roots in Nietzsche’s anti-foundationalism and
Henri Bergson’s *elan vital*, (Tisdall and Bozolla 18-21) wrapped around a
romanticized idealization of war and modern technology. Even the latter can be
seen contemporaneously with Marinetti in the later writings of Gabriele
D’Annunzio.

What was new was the packaging of that programme within a genre that
had been used for political purposes, and even more, the valuation of that package
as art. Marinetti called this “the art of the manifesto,” and Perloff notes that “The
novelty of the Italian Futurist manifestoes…is their brash refusal to remain in the
expository or critical corner, their understanding that the group pronouncement,
sufficiently aestheticized, can, in they eyes of the mass audience, all but take the
place of the promised art work”(85). Cinzia Sartini Blum goes even further in her
claim that the futurists “created a new genre straddling poetic and theoretical
discourse—a collective statement directed at a mass audience, in which the articulation of an aesthetic and political program is transformed into a literary construct” (29). While Blum’s claim reveals a lack of understanding of the nature of genre as a historically evolving function rather than a fixed entity, and while both Blum and Perloff seem to be creating a binary between literary/artistic discourse and expository/critical discourse which marginalizes the latter, they are correct in recognizing the fact that Marinetti mass-marketed his manifestoes as artistic products.

Yet we can also read Marinetti’s concept of the manifesto as art backwards, not as the creation of or adaptation of a literary genre, but as an act of deconstructing that binary between literary and artistic discourse. In some ways what the futurists seem to be doing is attacking the whole notion of art as a “holy” discourse, somehow separate from everyday life. What this act does is “To pry an object from its shell, to destroy its aura” (Benjamin, Illuminations 5). The political object and the aesthetic object are both treated as cultural objects, as products of market capitalism.

To treat the manifesto as a cultural product, then I first will examine its mode of production and distribution. While Marinetti’s first manifesto was published in Le Figaro, most futurist Manifestoes from other groups were published in small magazines such as Blast in England, Lef in the Soviet Union, L’Italia Futurista in Italy, and irregular almanacs like Sadok Sudei (A Trap for Judges) in pre-Soviet Russia. These small magazines often had irregular
publication schedules, small circulations, and were anything but mass culture of
the kind Blum and Perloff describe. Poggioli traces the history of the avant-garde
movements to these little magazines, beginning with *La Revue Indépendante*, a
French literary journal which began publishing about 1880. This journal was the
last common gathering place, “the last organ to gather fraternally, under the same
banner, the rebels of politics and the rebels of art” (11). The fin de siècle
fraternity of artists who saw themselves as revolutionaries collapsed as aesthetic
group after aesthetic group challenged, not only the canonical monuments of the
past, but the competing avant-gardes of the present. Rather than a unification,
futurism and like movements splintered into smaller factions, particularly in
France and Russia. And while such splintering certainly hurt the credibility of
avant-garde art and literature among political leaders attempting to unify the left,
Gramsci was correct to note that this splintering of mass bourgeois culture was “a
revolutionary, absolutely Marxist conception” (Marinetti 29). Just as Marx and
Engels admired the destructive force of a market which consumed the remaining
structures of feudalism, Gramsci admired the potentially explosive force of
futurism. It is no accident that Marinetti was praised as “a revolutionary
intellectual” at the Second International in 1920 (Marinetti 29).

Clearly, Marinetti is a “special case” among Futurists, part poet, part actor,
part circus promoter. R.W. Flint is correct in identifying him as an Italian “P.T.
Barnum” (Marinetti 11). While “The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism”
describes the actions of Marinetti and a group of his friends, and like the “Twelve
Articles of the Swabian Peasants" uses the pronoun "we" throughout, Marinetti alone is identified as the "author" of this manifesto. Its is Marinetti's controlling egoism which separates his manifestoes from those of other futurists. Most of the other futurist manifestoes were produced by short-lived groups that came into existence, and then splintered and were replaced by new movements.

II. From Hylaea to Constructivism: Russian and Soviet Futurism

Nowhere was this splintering tendency more prevalent than pre- and post-revolutionary Russia. And in Russia, we discover a Futurism that produced works of art and literature that extend beyond the manifesto genre, a futurism which was built around communities of artists, rather than a single charismatic artist like Marinetti.

A. The Social Image

Russian Futurism seems to present us with not one, but two distinct social images: an anarchistic and carnivalesque movement which thrived during the chaotic years leading up to and during the revolutionary period, and a movement of dedicated socialist artists who channeled their energies into projects which furthered the development of the proletarian state. The fact that we find the poet Vladimir Mayakovsky in the thick of both movements is not so inconsistent if we see the movements through the lens of a Marxist dialectic in which such seemingly solid divisions melt into air.

Despite Velimir Khlebnikov's extravagant claim that Russian futurism was born before Marinetti's, it is clear that the first manifesto of the movement
has Marinetti’s work in mind. “A Slap in the Face of Public Taste” opens with an attack on the past, a Marinetti-like hymn to the future which looks down upon the giants of Russian literature (Pushkin, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy) as well as the dominant realist (Gorky, Remizov, Kuprin, Bunin, Averchenko, Sologub) and symbolist (Blok, Sologub, Kuzmin) writers of the day, and like the first Italian futurist manifesto, its numbered points were more political than aesthetic. Its single aesthetic point was an affirmation of the value of Khlebnikov’s neologic technique. It also took a swipe at Marinetti’s egoism as a “Wreath of cheap fame” (Lawton 10). In February 1914 the group’s break with Marinetti became complete as they protested Marinetti’s Russian visit in Moscow. Khlebnikov and Bernard Livshits were particularly vocal in their attacks on the Italian Futurist, printing a brochure that was distributed before Marinetti’s February 1 lecture which is indicative of the nationalistic nature of the Russian movement:

Today some natives and the Italian colony on the Neva’s banks, out of private considerations, prostrate themselves before Marinetti, thus betraying Russian art’s first steps on the road to freedom and honor, and placing the noble neck of Asia under the yoke of Europe (Markov 151). Even before, but especially after Marinetti’s visit, the manifestoes of the cubo-futurists began taking on a much more aesthetic, and less polemic tone, and consciously seem to be distancing themselves from the social image of the Italian futurist.
B. Rhetorical Dynamics

Vladimir Markov’s 1968 Russian Futurism: A History, is still the standard text on Russian Futurism. Markov has the advantage over other scholars in that he had access to manuscripts in his own collection which were not available to scholars outside the USSR, and connections within the Soviet Union which few other scholars could match. Yet in spite of Markov’s thoroughness, and the fact that he was the first scholar to introduce Western scholars to groups like “The Mezzanine of Poetry” and “Centrifuge,” Markov achieved his level of thoroughness in part, by limiting his history to events which occurred prior to the 1917 revolution. This is a curious situation given Mayakovsky’s claim that “Futurism as a united, well-defined movement did not exist in Russia before the October Revolution” (Markov xiv). In this section I will necessarily be briefer and more evaluative than Markov, but I will also take the discussion beyond October 1917.

If we follow Roman Jakobson’s cautionary advice to define Futurism “only inductively, through analysis of a complex set of artistic phenomena” (quoted in E.J. Brown 109) then Khlebnikov’s extravagant claim that Russian futurism predates Marinetti’s work does not seems so outlandish when you consider some of its aesthetic ideas can be traced to a 1908 alliance between the Burliuks, Kulbin, Khlebnikov, Vasily Kamensky, Elena Guro and her husband Mikhail Matyushin (Markov 9). This unusual alliance of visual artists and writers (many, like David Burliuk, Guro, and Kamensky worked in both mediums) were
first published together as a group in *Sadok sudei* (a title coined by Khlebnikov which has the double meaning of a “trap for judges” and a “hatchery of critics”) which was edited by Kamensky and Matyushin and published by David Burliuk in April 1910 (Markov 8). The book was printed, in an edition of 300, on the back side of wallpaper, and included illustrations of each the authors drawn by a third Burliuk brother, Vladiomir. Both David Burliuk and Kamensky later considered this collection to be the birth of Russian Futurism, (Markov defers this honor to Kulbin’s February 1910 collection *The Studio of Impressionists*) and Kamensky describes it in typical Futurist manner as meant “to throw a bombshell into the joyless, provincial street of the generally joyless existence” (Markov 9) that was characteristic of Russian city life during this period. As Markov notes, this collection was neither a success, or much of a bombshell since very most of the 300 copies were never sold. It is important, because it marked the movement away from impressionism by a group that would come to call themselves *budetlyane*, or men of the future, a Khlebnikov neologism. The real “bombshell” would come in 1912 with the publication of the first manifesto of Russian Futurism.

The first manifesto of Russian futurism, “A Slap in the Face of Public Taste,” the opening work of a collection of the same name, is dated “Moscow, 1912 December,” and signed by “D. Burliuk, Alexander Kruchenykh, V. Mayakovsky, and Victor Khlebnikov” (Lawton 52). While standing “on the rock of the word ‘we’” (Lawton 52), the manifesto characterizes the giants of Russian
literature as “tailors” and states that “From the heights of skyscrapers we gaze at their insignificance” (Lawton 53). Both these statements seem ironic considering the fact that Russian Futurism would eventually come to embrace the notion of writing as a useful “craft,” and given the native primitivism which characterizes much of the work of the early Russian futurists. The skyscraper line seems more reminiscent of Italian Futurism and the colorful urbanism of Mayakovsky’s later works (though I am not aware that there were any skyscrapers in Moscow in 1912) rather than Khlebnikov’s “pure Slavic elements in its golden, linden tree quality” (Markov 49). Furthermore, just as the skyscraper may have been more metaphor than building, Markov notes that the attack on the past was “purely tactical and did not express the real ideas of the writers. Most of them were far from actually rejecting Pushkin, and they were on good terms with some of the attacked contemporaries” (46). Osip Brik, a later futurist and collaborator with Mayakovsky correctly identified the real nature of the attack: “It is perfectly well known to everyone that nobody is going to destroy the works of Pushkin, burn the paintings of Raphael or break up the statues of Michaelangelo.” What was being attacked was “the halo of sanctity which encircles these sinless priests of the aesthetic church” (Brandist 58). This obvious connection to Walter Benjamin’s theory of modernist art made in “Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” makes it clear that the writers of the manifesto were fully conscious of their attempt to “politicize aesthetics,” to use Benjamin’s language. It clearly places them in the revolutionary camp. Three of the seven contributors to the collection
did not sign the manifesto. Nikolai Burliuk was not in Moscow at the time, so his signature was not available. Vasily Kandinsky may have not been comfortable with the literary nature of the manifesto—he considered himself primarily a visual artist, and didn’t take his own writings particularly seriously. And Benedict Livshits “refusal was based on the grounds that, as a soldier, he could not afford at that time to take part in controversial enterprises” (Markov 45). The collection was controversial, and the attack on the greats of Russian literature brought a hostile public reaction (Markov).

C. Formal Elements

1. Linguistic experimentation

As we noted before, Markov marks the beginning of Russian futurism with the publication of Nikolai Kulbin’s The Studio of Impressionists in February 1910. This collection included five short poems by three names important to the history of Russian futurism: David and Nikolai Burliuk and Velimir Khlebnikov. While Kulbin was a known aesthetic figure among Russian symbolists (the Russians preferred the term “decadents”), and the Burliuk poems were typical symbolist efforts, Khlebnikov’s poems brilliantly demonstrated aesthetic principles which were to become the subject matter for several manifestoes and which became central to Futurist poetry. “The Thickets Were Filled with Sounds” is an early example of Khlebnikov’s primitivism, which according to Patricia Carden “is expressed as an interest in exotic cultures” (58), or what Khlebnikov liked to call “the Asian soul” behind Russian life. “Incantation by Laughter,”
probably Khlebnikov’s most famous short poem, is an early example of the neological technique Khlebnikov and fellow poet Alexei Kruchenykh would come to call *zaum*, or “transrational language.” In this poem Khlebnikov uses the rhetorical trope *anthimeria* as a machine to generate a series of neologisms derived from the Russian word for laughter. English equivalents would be coined words such as laughniks, laughily, belaughingly, overlaugh, laughathon, etc. The repetitions of the root term give the poem its incantatory quality, and Khlebnikov’s colleague Vladimir Mayakovsky helped make the poem famous with his public readings of Khlebnikov’s poem (Khlebnikov himself was a notoriously poor public performer) (Markov).

2. **Visual and tactile design**

Hyalea’s collection *A Trap for Judges* was published on the back side of wallpaper, and *A Slap in the Face of Public Taste* was published on gray and brown wrapping paper, with a cover of coarse sackcloth. Craig Brandist sees in both collections “a parodic assault on the status of the literary medium itself, degrading the book by making it appear a cheap, disposable commodity which could be constructed out of ‘low’ everyday materials such as wallpaper or sackcloth...[a] Carnivelesque uncrowning” (56). Like in Marinetti’s manifesto, this move appears to be an attack on the literary aura, a move that takes writing out of the salon and into the everyday world.

3. **Public Performance**
David Burliuk, the acknowledged leader of the group which called themselves Hylaea, was a Ukrainian who was familiar with the Ukrainian tradition of the street fair, or carnival, a tradition Mikhail Bakhtin was to later investigate and theorize about. In 1913, Burliuk organized a carnivalesque recital of futurists to be held in the hall of the Society of Art Lovers on October 13 (Markov). Markov reports that “Several days before the appearance, David Burliuk gathered at his apartment all Hylaens who happened to be in Moscow and announced a long-range strategy for the group, including his plans for a series of publicity stunts before the recital” (133).

According to Markov, the stunts included “poetry parades” where the Hylaens marched through the main thoroughfares of Moscow in painted faces and outlandish dress, reciting poetry. After five such parades, tickets to the recital went on sale, and sold out within the hour. The recital was a mixture of polemic, poetry, and performance, and caused a great sensation, especially since the authors maintained their carnivalesque dress. After another Moscow recital on November 11, David Burliuk, Mayakovsky, and Kamensky conducted the first futurist tour of Russia, visiting 17 cities. The importance of this tour to the movement cannot be overemphasized. In its printed form, “Slap” would have been virtually ignored given its meager print run. Through the dramatic reading of the manifesto on the futurist tour the group managed to reach and scandalize thousands who saw or heard about their outrageous performance. This tour continued through March 1914, and included their return to Moscow in February.
to join with some of the other Russian futurists in protesting Marinetti's first visit to Russia, which had begun in January. Only Kulbin and Nikolai Burliuk welcomed the Italian futurist. Upon their return, the three touring futurists took a somewhat middle position, agreeing with Khlebnikov and Livshits on the independence and priority of Russian futurism, but also expressing the notion that futurism transcends national boundaries. At any rate the Russians went beyond Marinetti in using the public performance as the primary means of rhetorical delivery of their manifesto (Markov).

4. Collectivity

From the beginning, the Russian Futurist movement was one which valued the group over the individual. Marinetti's visit brought this issue to a head, and after his visit, the anti-Marinetti forces began calling themselves cubo-futurists, and pro-Marinetti forces tended to gather around a group that called themselves ego-futurists. Yet even an anti-Marinetti figure like Mayakovsky clearly borrowed from Marinetti. His fondness for urban, technological culture and his public performances where he would insult the audience and prod them into whistles, the Russian equivalent of the boo, were clearly inspired by the Italian futurist. However, after Marinetti's visit, the cubo-futurists began to be reflective of the nature of the group as an artist's collective. The untitled manifesto in *A Trap for Judges*, 2 (1913) included 13 numbered points, expanding upon Khlebnikov's theories of word novelty, and David Burliuk's and Mayakovsky's theories on rhyme. The last two points continued its attack on Marinetti's pretentious egoism:
12. We are enthralled by new themes: superfluousness, meaninglessness, and the secret of powerful insignificance are celebrated by us.

13. We despise glory; we know feelings which had no life before us. We are the new people of a new life (Lawton 54).

This manifesto was signed by a larger circle of cubo-futurists: David and Nicholas Burliuk, Elena Guro, Mayakovsky, Katherine Nizen, Khlebnikov, Livshits, and Kruchenykh. The presence of two women in this group clearly indicates that the cubo-futurists were not interested in the misogynistic theories of the Italians. And unlike the Italians, they produced enduring works of art beyond the manifesto: Mayakovsky’s lyrics, Khlebnikov’s epic poems, Kruchenyk’s zaum poems, and Kamensky’s and Guro’s prose have all endured, and influenced many later artists. David Burliuk’s primitivist art and Vassily Kandinsky’s modern work, though on the margins of the movement, have also endured. And a minor poet, who was published alongside Kruchenykh in the Transrational Book (1915) under the pseudonym Alyagrov took his theories of aesthetics and language to another arena under his birth name, Roman Jakobson (Markov 334). As Kruchenykh and Khlebnikov wrote in the 1913 manifesto from The Word as Such, “the Italians relied on tendentiousness. Like Pushkin’s little devil they sang praises to modernity and carried it on their shoulders, but instead of preaching modernity they should have jumped on its back and sped off” (Lawton 55-56). Although there were other important futurist writers in the Ego-Futurist movement who carried on Marinetti’s tradition, and other groups such as The Mezzanine of
Poetry, the cubo-futurists carried the movement on its back, through the revolution and beyond, even as Guro succumbed to illness in 1913, and Kulbin likewise in 1917, the same year Vladimir Burliuk, a military officer, was killed in action. Nikolai Burliuk married a wealth landowner in 1920, and was killed during the civil war that followed the revolution. Khlebnikov, who Markov believes wrote his finest poetry in the five years after the revolution, died of starvation in 1922 (Markov).

The harshness of living conditions around Moscow after the revolution cannot be underestimated. In April 1918 these conditions were so grim that David Burliuk and his family emigrated across Siberia to Vladivostock. There Burliuk was joined by Seregei Tretyakov and Nikolai Aseyev where they published a cubo-futurist publication, *Creation*. From 1920-1922, Burliuk toured Japan, where he encourage a fledgling Japanese futurist movement, and he moved to the United States in 1922. According to Markov, “Burliuk was convinced that a proletarian revolution in the United States was inevitable, and that thereafter he would triumphantly return to Soviet Russia as the recognized leader of revolutionary futurism” (324). Burliuk died in the United States in 1967, but not before making a tour of his homeland shortly before his death at the invitation of the Soviet government. Despite his status as an émigré, he always considered himself a member of the futurist collective, and even published a manifesto, *Radio Style* in New York in 1926 which acknowledged his connection to both the
cubo-futurists, as well as to a broader international avant-garde including names such as Picasso and the feminist filmmaker Maya Deren.

5. The Artist as Revolutionary Worker

Back in Moscow, Mayakovsky, Kamensky, Kruchenykh, and Osip and Lily Brik soldiered valiantly on. Mayakovsky participated in a series of Bolshevik carnivals between 1917-1920, continuing his interest in the performative aspects of his work, but this time as an officially sanctioned performance. His play, *Mystery-Bouffe*, was staged as part of the celebration of the first anniversary of the October Revolution in 1918. A parody of the biblical story of the ark in which the flood symbolizes the revolution, this work was consistent with the raucous nature of the celebration. Craig Brandist writes that "On the second night of the festival in Moscow, Tsarist emblems and the wealthy peasants were burned in effigy. In Voronezh the first Soviet mystery play *Eulogy of [the] Revolution*, was followed by the carnivalesque *Burning of the Hydra of Counter-Revolution*" (66). This began with a parade where a 25-foot long hydra was paraded through the streets accompanied by an armed "guard" of forty. "The procession was greeted by a panel of judges who condemned the hydra to death. It was then doused with kerosene and burned, while the verses of Walt Whitman and the proletariat poets were read aloud" (Brandist 66). Yet by 1920, more conservative forces in the government had taken over control of the arts, and the official sponsorship of futurist carnival cultures was over. Kruchenykh, maintained contact with Mayakovsky (who occasionally published his work), but along with Kamensky
and joined by a young Boris Pasternak, focused on explorations into aesthetics and transrational language, rather than engaging in futurist polemics. They continued to publish a number of aesthetic manifestoes. Mayakovsky, Brik, and the Vladivostock group collaborated on a literary journal, Lef, which attempted to resist the conservative movement in official art, while proclaiming its own role in the revolution. The 1923 manifesto, What Does Lef Fight For, continues to argue for a carnival culture, by creating “a united front to blow up old junk...[to] agitate the masses with our art” (Lawton 194). While this was consistent with the Marxist idea of a revolution where “all that is solid melts into air,” such ideas were found highly suspect by the Stalinists who were gaining control of the revolution (Lawton).

6. The Artist as Socialist Engineer: Constructivism

One of the Lef’s few successes in gaining acceptance from the Stalinists was its promotion of an artistic movement now known as Constructivism. In What Does Lef Fight For, the writers tried to justify the group’s continuing existence by stating that “Lef will fight for the aesthetic construction of Life” (Lawton 195). This idea that art is something “constructed,” even engineered, is an important principle upon which the modern design movement is based.

Lef disbanded in 1925, was reformed as Novyi Lef in 1927, but collapsed shortly before Mayakovsky’s stunning suicide in 1930. Futurism as a literary movement died along with Mayakovsky, under intense pressure from the Stalinists. Ironically, after “killing” the movement, Stalin himself rehabilitated
Mayakovsky as a poet in a letter responding to Lily Brik in 1935. According to Markov, these “ten words of praise by Stalin did more for Mayakovsky’s reputation than all thirteen volumes of his works” (316). Futurism did survive as an aesthetic movement, through the formalist theories of Mikhail Bakhtin (who celebrated the carnivalesque), Viktor Shklovski (who published in Lef, and theorized transrational language), Roman Jakobson (a longtime friend of Mayakovsky who theorized the graphical aspects of language), and Osip Brik. It also survived in the visual arts through the work of the revolutionary artists who called themselves “constructivists.”

While Mayakovsky, Khlebnikov, and Kruchenykh are best known through their writings, Cubo-Futurism began as a movement of artists and writers. We have noted previously that the early futurist works were illustrated by futurist artists, and it could be noted that David Burliuk’s reputation in America rests with his paintings and art criticism. Unfortunately, much of the early Russian futurist art was a hodge-podge of impressionist, neo-impressionist, and cubist styles designed more, as Markov judges Burliuk’s painting, “a means of scandalizing Russian audiences in 1912 and 1913” (325). But there is an original and important movement in Russian futurist art, and it begins with a 1915 exhibition of pictures in Petrograd ironically titled “The Last Futurist Exhibition of Pictures.” This exhibition “witnessed the debut of Malevich’s Black Square on a White Background, ... as well as the first group of Tatlin’s counterreliefs and such works as Olga Rozanova’s collage The Workbox and Ivan Kliun’s construction
Cubist at Her Dressing Table” (Perloff 117). Perloff goes on to describe the work of these artists as “perhaps the most radical version of the avant guerre—rupture of the mimetic pact between artist and audience, a rupture that manifested itself, paradoxically, in a new synthesis of the verbal and the visual” (117). In a manifesto which opens Kasimir Malevich’s book From Cubism and Futurism to Suprematism: The New Painterly Realism, published concurrently with the 1915 exhibition, the painter proclaims:

Art is the ability to create a construction that derives not from the interrelation of form and color and not on the basis of aesthetic taste in a construction’s compositional beauty, but on the basis of weight, speed, and direction of movement (Perloff 119).

This turning away from aesthetics, and turning towards engineering principles of design seems to be one of the first expressions of the principles that would drive the constructivist movement. However, in practice, Malevich seemed less interested in constructing objects than he was in exploring the mystical geometry of Ouspensky’s Tertium Organum or the linguistic numerology that also fascinated Khlebnikov and Kruchenykh. On the other hand, Malevich and Mikhail Larionov’s design work in books by Khlebnikov and Kruchenykh go well beyond the conventional idea of “illustration,” and as Perloff has documented, are marked by “The inextricability of ‘drawing’ and ‘writing’” (130). This idea of integrating text and graphical design elements, which seems natural to those of us who work in a world of website and document design, was a radical departure to the world
of art which still embraced the aesthetic principle that art was produced for its own sake. Artists like Malevich and Larionov began the process of bringing visual art into the rhetorical field.

Hubertus Gassner writes that the first of four stages in the development of the constructivist movement grew out of "The quest for a new artistic identity in the wake of the February Revolution and the artists' attempts at alliance to assert their role in the new society" (298). These attempts were difficult, given the fractured state and competing egos within the futurist movement. The People's Commissar of Enlightenment, Anatoly Lunarcharsky, in an attempt to resolve disputes, sent Osip Brik to the Union of Art Workers to propose "the formation of a thirty member Commission for the Preservation of Monuments, to be made up of fifteen delegates from the Union and fifteen representatives of 'democratic' organizations" (Gassner 301). As Gassner convincingly demonstrates, this opposition came not only from the left, where artists like Vladimir Tatlin, Kandinsky, and Malevich continued to express the futurist's anarchistic opposition to ideas of "preservation" and state sponsorship, as well as from the right who felt that government bureaucrats would betray the freedom of art. This situation led to the second of Gassner's stages in the emergence of Constructivism which was an unenthusiastic alignment with the new rulers from 1918-1919. This period did see the production of a number of useful objects for the revolution: Malevich created a cover design for delegates folders for the Congress of Committees on Rural Poverty; Malevich and Mikhail Matyushin (the husband of...
Elena Guro) painted a 900-foot canvas backdrop for the speaker’s rostrum at the same event; Malevich and El Lissitzky did similar work for the Committee to Abolish Unemployment in 1919. Gassner notes the crisis the futurist artists were facing at this time:

If avant-garde artists participated in the design of posters, banners, or whole buildings, squares, and bridges, they obviously did so out of a sense of duty rather than inner conviction or desire—and extra rations for food or clothes were certainly a further incentive. On the other hand, their contributions rarely met with much enthusiasm on the part of their patrons in the administration and the Party…As early as 1919, the Moscow Soviet publicly objected to the participation of the ‘Futurists’ in the decoration of the revolutionary celebrations (305).

Gassner’s third stage, “the gestation and birth of Constructivism at the Juncture of political revolution and industrial revolution (1920-1921)” (299) occurred because the only way out of this crises was the dialectical merging of artistic interest and desires (aesthetics) with the needs of the collective. In a Russia devastated by civil war and food shortages, the New Economic Plan (NEP) attempted to organize all segments of society. As part of this effort, the Institute of Artistic Culture (INKHUK) was founded in Moscow in May 1920. Leftist artists played a key role in this institute, with Kandinsky serving as administrator in Moscow, and Tatlin and Malevich directing the affiliates in Petrograd and Vitebsk respectively. A series of discussions were held at INKHUK between
January and April 1921, to build upon the artistic theories of Malevich, and Osip Brik’s work in linguistics which proclaimed “Not idealistic fog but the material thing” (Gassner 306). Brik promoted the concept of the “proletarian artist,” which metamorphized in the INKHUK discussions into the “artist engineer.” Its key concepts were: (1) Art is not the “private affair” of the artist’s ego, but “a socially important task” within the “collective,” (2) “Professionalism instead of dilettantism,” (3) “Material… execution of socially important tasks,” (4) Development of “new forms to fight against the taste stereotypes of the unenlightened masses” and (5) “Methodical organization of artistic creation” (Gassner 308). Gassner points out that:

Brik’s line of reasoning managed to combine the Formalist school’s demand for the autonomy of artistic creation, the anti-intellectualism of the masses, and the Communist Party’s demand for the dictatorship of the proletariat—albeit in a precarious and unstable synthesis (308).

The First Working Group of Constructivists was formed in 1921 within Inkhuk and included Aleksander Rodchenko, who became the movement’s leading figure, both as an artist and polemicist. In his 1921 manifesto “Liniia” or “The Line,” Rodchenko takes the idea of the artist as engineer much more seriously than Malevich’s fanciful manifesto: “The craft of painting is striving to become more industrial. Drawing in the old sense is losing its value and giving way to the diagram or the engineering drawing.” (Lodder 270). Rodchenko and the other constructivists were responding also to Tatlin’s model for the Monument to the
*Third International*, a sort of revolutionary Eifel Tower which was the sensation of a Petrograd exhibition in 1920, and which Mayakovsky declared to be “the first object of October” (Lodder 272). Tatlin’s influence can also be seen in the Obmokhu exhibition on 1921, in which a number hanging and spatial constructions were exhibited. It is clear that these constructivists were serious about the creation of real, useful objects, a trend that Kandinsky was quite uncomfortable with, writing that “even though art workers right now may be working on problems of construction...they might try to find a positive solution too easily and too ardently from the engineer. And they might find the engineer’s answer the solution for art—quite erroneously. This is a very real danger” (Lodder 271). Kandinsky’s views were overpowered, however, by the need of the artists to arrive at some sort of reconciliation between aesthetics and politics.

Christina Lodder writes that by 1922:

the Constructivist ethos was gaining currency among the avant-garde, and many Russian artists had, in a more wholesale fashion, renounced the making of paintings and sculptures in favor of immersing themselves in the design of buildings and propaganda stands, furniture and textiles, posters, advertisements, and books” (277).

Rodchenko’s own work included the design and covers of Mayakovky’s and Brik’s journal *Lef*, advertisements for the Mozer Watch factory and Red Star cigarettes, and enameled lapel pens for the state airline Dobrolet. The 1992 Guggenheim Exhibition, *The Great Utopia: The Russian and Soviet Avant-Garde*,
1915-1932 included works by Rodchenko, his wife Varvara Stepanova, as well as posters on electrification and the NEP by Gustav Klustis, a 1930 poster for International Women Worker’s Day by Valentina Kulagina, textile designs by Sarra Buntsis, and commemorative designs for the State Poreclain factory by Sergei Chekhonin, Ivan Puni, Mikhail Adamovich, and ironically, Kandinsky himself.

Gassner’s final stage in the development of constructivism is what he sees as its “crisis” where “the engineer of objects is transformed into the ‘engineer of the psyche’” (299). His claim is that the subordination of art to utilitarian objects results in “a homologous relationship between the logical structure of his subconscious and the structure of the construction he creates” (317). Gassner’s creation of a binary with art on one side and utilitarian objects on the other, is unfortunate in that it elides the liminal relationship between art and craft. His own belief that constructivism “subordinates” the artistic side of the binary places him in a long line of aesthetic elites who binarize art/literature and craft/writing, clearly valorizing the former, while denigrating the latter.

This can be seen in his concluding summary in which he “explains” the death of the constructivist movement: “They crossed the aesthetic boundary between art and life in order to resurrect the material and vital things. They gave them new forms. But art died in the process” (318). The best argument against Gassner’s polemic can be made by the constructivist objects themselves. Viewers
of the 1982 Guggenheim exhibition saw more than just utilitarian objects: they saw art.

The real death of futurism as a movement in the visual arts came at the hand of Stalinist repression, just as had futurist writing. A decree of the Communist Party in April 1932 dissolved the multitude of relatively independent governmental and quasi-governmental artistic associations like Inkhuk, to create a single artist’s union. The time of manifestoes and carnivals was at an end, replaced by a system which Susan Reid describes:

the struggle between artists for the survival of the fittest was decided as much by the vacillating fortunes of their patrons and the bureaucracies involved in the production and control of art as by considerations of the quality and effectiveness of their art as a means of engineering human souls (184)

Far from dissolving into a system where utilitarianism alone decided which art was valued, the Stalinist system was as much about patronage and bureaucratic corruption as it was about a socialist realism which rejected an avant-garde art. Even the Stalinist Industry of Socialism exhibition between 1935 and 1941 included futurist artists like Petr Konchalovski, Il’ia Mashkov, and Sergei Gerasimov. And as Susan Reid has chronicled, even the repressive bureaucracy of the state artist’s union (MOSSKh) struggled to develop a unified vision of exactly what Socialist Realism meant.
The Russian futurists' use of the manifesto to spread their utopian vision of what it meant to be a revolutionary artist reconstructed the manifesto genre as a modernist trope—it both expressed the modern vision, while simultaneously existing as a performative exemplar of that vision. Like Marinetti, they expanded the rhetorical possibilities of the genre by treating it not simply as a transparent vehicle for the transmission of political and/or aesthetic ideas, but by treating it as a material object worthy of standing alongside works of so-called art. The manifestoes in the Russian futurist books serve not so much as introductions to the aesthetics of the artists and writers collected within these miscellanies, but as engines for the creation of art and writing. As Kruchenykh and Khlebnikov put it in the fourth of a series of intentionally misnumbered statements from their 1913 manifesto *The Word as Such*: “1. New verbal form creates a new content, and not vice-versa” (Perloff 122). Or consider the words of Malevich from his 1919 manifesto which opened his book *From Cubism and Futurism to Suprematism: The New Painterly Realism*: “But a surface lives; it has been born” (Perloff 121).

The Russian futurists' treatment of the writing “surface” went far beyond the typographical experiments of the Italians. Their use of materials such as wallpaper and wrapping paper was itself an attack on the sanctified aura that surrounded officially and popularly sanctioned works of art and literature. And their use of visual art as part of the overall design of the work, rather than as simple illustration, is a forerunner of modern document design.
Finally, the performative nature of the Russian futurist manifesto must again be emphasized. From the Hylaens reciting their manifesto throwing Pushkin, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy from the ship of modernity while wearing top hats and face paint, to Mayakovsky’s agitation for a new age of oral poetry (Brandist 58), to the carnivalesque celebrations of the anniversary of the revolution, the Russian futurist manifestoes properly belonged in the streets. In many ways the movement was born in the streets, and died because the Stalinist dictatorship could not stomach a street movement which produced works like Zamyatin’s 1921 novel We. Zamyatin proclaimed “There is no ultimate revolution—revolutions are infinite in number” (169). The Hylaen’s purpose of engaging with their audience in a kind of street theatre, like Brecht’s concept of epic theatre, “is to enable the spectator to adopt a critical attitude” (Benjamin, Understanding Brecht 21). By activating all sides of the rhetorical triangle—writer, reader, and text—the Russian futurists used the manifesto to put the Marxist idea of a revolutionary utopian culture where “all that is solid melts into air” into practice. Their performance blasts the conventional notion of futurism as a proto-fascist movement.
Chapter 5: From Outsider to Avenger: The Manifesto as Critique

I. Introduction: Critiques of Institutional Modernity.

The manifestoes in this chapter demonstrate another major innovation in the use of the manifesto genre, its use as an instrument of critique. Critique is a term often associated with poststructuralism, beginning with a disparate group of French theorists including Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, and Baudrillard, as well as feminist scholars such as Cixous and Kristeva. As Bizzell and Herzberg note, the common thread among these thinkers is an “epistemological skepticism” (902) about the ability of texts to represent reality. They note that while “Derrida and Foucault regard their theories as philosophical, not rhetorical...their positions are, in fact defenses of the rhetorical side of the age-old conflict between philosophy and rhetoric. Whereas philosophy has always sought knowledge about absolute truth...rhetoric has sought knowledge of contingent truth” (902). Thus critique as a form of discourse emerges from within what James Berlin calls epistemic rhetoric, a rhetoric that sees knowledge as emerging from competing social discourses.

To further parse the term, I will address two criticisms of poststructural critique, which I believe will lead to a better understanding of the term. First, the influential Marxian theorist Douglas Kellner has criticized poststructural theory as “theory fever, in which each new, or newly discovered theoretical discourse produced feverish excitement, as if a new theory virus took over and possessed its ghost” (4). Kellner is not alone in finding the disparate views of theorists...
troubling. However Bruce Gronbeck notes that the production of competing discourses vice totalizing discourses is exactly the point of poststructuralism: “The theory wars have produced a discursive politics—a series of rhetorics, rhetorics of race/class/gender, of critical and post-Marxism, of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, of critical social theory and dialectics, of British Cultural Studies and transdisciplinary cultural studies, and yes, of postmodernity” (5). It is this series of competitive rhetorics that produces “critique.”

Another criticism of theory has come from American neo-conservatives like Jim Bennett and traditionalists like Jacques Barzun who see in critique a negativism, what Jeffrey Goldfarb calls a “Cynical Society” which seeks to legitimate disbelief. However rhetoricians like Gronbeck and Barbara Biesecker “see in postmodern discourse an affirmation, not of the ‘Idea of Nothing’ but rather the ‘Idea of No’—the centrality of the negative” (Gronbeck 6). As I discussed in chapter 1 in the discussion of agency, saying no to what Laclau calls a dislocation in the dominant discourse can be an affirmation, the beginnings of agency upon which change is built.

The manifestoes in this chapter conduct critique as an engagement with the institutions of modernity. As Porter, Sullivan, Blythe, Grabill, and Miles note in proposing what they call “institutional critique as an activist methodology for changing institutions,” (610), institutions “can be rewritten through rhetorical action” (610). And while these manifestoes vary in their resemblance to the kinds of texts Porter et al. call “institutional critique,” (for example some of them lack
the kind of specific "action plan" the authors call for), what holds this group of manifestoes together is their attempt to rewrite the institutional conditions of modernity.

Here I will return again to Giddens, who as much as any theorist, has attempted to described the mechanisms and processes by which these institutions operate. I choose Giddens' model of modernity for a number of good reasons: (1) Giddens attempts to describe a broad range of social practices in late modernity, rather than focusing on a specific practice, such as Foucault's studies of prisons and clinics; in other words the model is already generalized; (2) Giddens' theory of structuration seems to me to be an effective model for explaining the reflexive nature of agency; (3) Since no analysis or reading is "free" of ideology, and since I have already admitted my preference for materialist rhetorics in Chapter 2, it is logical for me to choose a model developed by a materialist sociologist like Giddens. My gloss of Giddens is a condensation of ideas taken from Central Problems in Social Theory (1979), The Consequences of Modernity (1990), Modernity and Self Identity (1991), and Geoff Boucher's summary article for Blackwood, "The Theory of Structuration and the Politics of the Third Way: Reflexive Modernity."

A. Processes of Reflexive Modernity

According to Giddens, three processes are responsible for generating the dynamic web of power-knowledge relationships in late modernity: (1) Space-Time distanciation; (2) the disembedding mechanism within modern culture; (3)
the self-reflexive character of late modernity. I will now describe each.

1. **Space-Time Distanciation**

   Even as late as the first half of the 20th century it was unusual for most human beings to travel more than 50-100 miles from their home at any point in their lifetime. Modern transportation and communication systems, and information technologies are changing that. The world is now small, and the world is fast. Space seems to have “shrunk” and time is “speeding up.” The results of these effects, “space-time distanciation,” may be defined as the ability of agents to coordinate the actions of people distributed across distant realms of time and space; such coordination no longer necessarily requires face-to-face interactions.

2. **Disembedding Mechanisms**

   Local cultures are being replace by global cultures. Local systems of exchange (for example bartering) are being replaced by global systems (the dollar, the euro). Global, electronic cultures, and money systems move human cultural relationships away from the more material culture of the local carnival, to the abstract culture of global media. Similarly, human exchange relations move away from the immediate physical exchange of goods to the symbolic exchange of global currency. These forces, along with an agent’s experiences working within a mobile, global, information-based economy, tend to disembed the agent from the context of her/his local culture.
3. Reflexivity in Late Modernity

There are two forms of reflexivity in Giddens’ theory. One, the *reflexive monitoring of action* predates modernity and is present in pre-modern practice. This type of reflexivity is the intentional character of an agent’s activity; activity is not a series of discrete events, but a continuous process. The second form is *reflexive self-regulation*. In this form of reflexivity, characteristic of modernity, activity is not simply a process, but a process which constantly feeds back knowledge gained in the activity process to modify future activity. Reflexive self-regulation is the basis for agency and historical change in late modernity. It recognizes that processes are not always “true” or “stable,” but are always subject to modification. Speaking in Marxist terms, agents are not merely reproducing the means of production, they are revising them. Self-regulation is the basis of “expert systems” upon which work in the globalized information economy is based. It results in the creation of Giddens’ “clever people.”

B. Institutions of Reflexive Modernity

These three forces work within a system of modern institutions which Giddens also details. This system derives from Gidden’s theory of structuration, which identifies a reciprocal relationship between the institutions and agents acting within modern systems. In this theory he bridges the gap between a deterministic-Marxist, structuralist approach which sees structure as dominant, and agents as mere cultural dupes, and the voluntarist approach of the enlightenment/humanist tradition in which agency rules over structure, and agents
are seen as totally free. In his theory, there is a duality, a reciprocal relationship between agents and structure. Agents build institutions, and new agents come to modify them.

Giddens has identified four major institutional structures which form the base of what we call modernity. Two of these structures work upon principles of domination, the Nation-State System and the World Capitalist economy. A third structure, the World Military-Judicial order works upon principles of legitimation (legal principles), and the fourth structure, the Global-Information System, works upon principles of signification. The chart below shows each of these operating principles in bold, followed by the base structure, the types of institutions making up the structure, the types of human rights contended for in this structure, and oppositional forces within the system.

| Domination (Authority) | Domination (Allocation) | Legitimation | Signification |
|------------------------|------------------------|-------------|---------------|
| Nation-State System    | World Capitalist Economy | World Military-Judicial Order | Global Information Systems |
| Political Institutions | Economic Institutions | Legal, Police, Military Institutions | Media, Educational Institutions |
| Political Rights       | Economic/Property Rights | Civil/Legal Rights | Natural Rights/The Right to Know |
| Democratic Movements   | Labor Movements | Peace, Civil Rights Movements | Alternative media, Cyber culture, “Free” Universities |

Figure 9: Institutions of Late Modernity

These institutional categories are far from distinct, there is a web of relationships between them. For example, educational institutions help create an understanding of the “laws” or “norms” upon which the process of Legitimation
depends. And the process of Allocation plays a role in all of these categories. What is interesting in this formulation is that none of these institutional clusters completely dominate the others. All are influential.

C. 6 Effects of Modernity

The action of Giddens’ three forces within the constraints of the four base structures of modern institutions can be seen in several effects which the manifesto writers of late modernity adapt to and comment upon. (1) Globalisation; (2) The development of a post-traditional society; (3) A permanent state of risk in human and institutional relationships; (4) Self-identity as a reflexive process; (5) The emergence of non-pecuniary commitments; (6) A plastic sexuality.

Giddens believes that humans can respond to these changes in one of three ways, based upon the level of trust the individual has in the institutions of modernity: (1) cynical pessimism; (2) pragmatic acceptance; and (3) sustained optimism. The latter condition is necessary for what Giddens calls the “ontological security of the agent” (Modernity and Self-Identity 243), and the failure of modern institutions to provide such security to all people seems to be the exigency for Woolf’s Three Guineas, as well as most of the manifestoes analyzed in this section.

II. Woolf’s Three Guineas: Critique Emerges from British Modernism

Virginia Woolf, along with her mentor Roger Fry, are a logical point to
begin examining the emergence of manifestoes of critique, because of their
connection with, and opposition to the futurists discussed in Chapter 4. The
Vorticist movement, which was dominated by Wyndham Lewis and the American
expatriate Ezra Pound has been characterized as an Anglo-American example of
futurism (by Jameson, among others) while the Omega Workshops and the
Bloomsbury group are seen as something quite different. Yet Lewis was a
member of the Omega group, and Roger Fry's 1910 exhibition “Manet and the
Post-Impressionists,” and Woolf’s 1938 manifesto Three Guineas were as much
shots against British tradition as Marinetti's 1909 manifesto was against the
Italian tradition.

A. The Social Image

The social image carried by Three Guineas is a bifurcated one, very much
dependent upon the institutional lens through which one examines it. For
example, in the popular press the text is often characterized as an obscure
counterpart of the heavily anthologized A Room of One's Own, or as Rob White
described it in a 2001 BBC review, “one of the writer’s least well-known texts”
(3). On the other hand, the text is certainly well-known in the feminist
community. For example, the website for Catherine Muther's Three Guineas
Fund describes the text as one in which “Woolf lays out a vision of women’s
education and economic independence as the foundation for social justice” (1).
And among scholars of Woolf the text plays a central role in debates revolving
around topics as diverse as modernism, patriarchy, Freudian psychology, and fascism (for example see Carlsten, Abel, Barber, and Pawlowski among others).

Muther’s view of a fund “to assist women in accessing capital to build communications technology businesses” (1) builds upon what Muther sees as Woolf’s vision of a feminism emphasizing “the only right, the right to earn a living” (*Three Guineas* 101), a gross simplification, if not an outright distortion of the aims of Woolf’s manifesto. Muther’s view is in stark contrast to Elizabeth Abel’s contention that the text focuses upon “a psychoanalytical guise that, in contrast to *Room*, replaces, rather than parallels the economic frame” (104), a text that “situates Woolf on Freud’s terrain and constricts her remapping of the terrain” (107). It is even further from Stephen Barber, whose *Exit Woolf* treats the text not as political economy (Muther), not as a hermeneutic interpretation of female sexuality (Abel), but rather as “an aesthetics of existence that in strikingly prescient ways exemplify Michel Foucault’s final work on the ethics of concern for the self as a practice of freedom” (Barber 1). The way in which Woolf’s text performatively demonstrates the nature of agency (the practice of freedom) is what gives it its life as a manifesto, in spite of its stark move away from the form of the genre as practiced by the futurists and Vorticists. I will return to this point in my discussion of the formal elements of the text.

The variety of interpretations of Woolf’s text by scholars leaves us with the popular image of an obscure text that is difficult, or as E.M. Forster described it, as “cantankerous” (White 5). And while this is part of the social image that
circulates around *Three Guineas*, an examination of the rhetorical dynamics surrounding the production of the text and of the formal elements of that text will deliver quite a richer view of Woolf’s performance.

**B. Rhetorical Dynamics**

While Woolf describes the exigency for the writing of *Three Guineas* in the text itself, the context behind the production of the text begins not in its completion in the late 1930s, but much earlier, in the pre-war emergence of the British avant-garde. William Wees 1972 history, *Vorticism and the English Avant-Garde* correctly begins his history in 1910, and quotes “Virginia Woolf’s famous assertion that, ‘On or about December 1910 human character changed’” (Wees 13). 1910 is the significant date because of four events: (1) The election of Sir Edward Carson, the relentless prosecutor of Oscar Wilde, in February 1910 as MP for Ulster Unionists, marking the beginnings of the violent anti-home rule movement; (2) the April 1910 appearance of Marinetti in London for the first time; (3) the opening of Roger Fry’s exhibition “Manet and the Post-Impressionists” on November 8, 1910; and (4) the protest by hundreds of suffragettes under the leadership of Emmeline Pankhurst in Parliament Square over the government’s failure to pass a woman’s suffrage bill. Such a mixture of aesthetic and political events might seem unconnected, but as Wees notes, they “seemed, to many people, to be parts of a conspiracy to undermine traditional order and decency” (13).
There were also more direct connections among these events. Janet Lyon
deserves a great deal of credit for her work documenting several of these
connections: Marinetti’s reading of *The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism* to
the London Lyceum Club for Women in 1910, and his marching with “the
London Suffragettes during their window smashing campaign” (101); the listing
of both Carson’s Unionists and Pankhurst’s suffragettes among those list of
groups “Blessed” by Exra Pound and Wyndham Lewis in their Manifesto/Journal
*Blast*; and the association of Lewis with, and the violent separation from, Roger
Fry’s Omega Workshops. It is that last event that historians seem to cling to as the
defining line between the futurist/fascist aesthetics of the Lewis/Pound/Marinetti
circle and the modernist/anti-fascist aesthetics of Fry, Woolf, and the rest of the
Omega/Bloomsbury group.

At any rate, Woolf and her friend and mentor Roger Fry today seem like
unlikely Futurists. Trained on the Continent in the traditions of the Italian masters,
Fry came to his appreciation of abstract art gradually. Rather than following the
Futurist mantra of throwing the artists of the past off the ship of modernity, Fry
instead saw avant-garde art as contending with, and responding to the art that
preceded it. In her biography of Fry, Woolf describes how he would explain to
puzzled observers “that it was quite easy to make the transition from Watts to
Picasso” (152). Yet if the public and critics on the Continent and America (from
which Fry had returned in 1910 after five years as Director of the Metropolitan
Museum of Art) had become acclimated to the work of modernist abstract art, the
British public, accustomed to the realistic style of portraiture, had made no such connection. Wees has documented the critical reaction to the exhibition “Manet and the Post-Impressionists,” and most of it was blistering. It was attacked by Robert Morely and John Singer Sargent in the Nation, Sir Philip Burne-Jones and Robert Ross in the Morning Post, and D.S. MacColl in 19th Century. Yet as much as the exhibition was criticized by the traditional critics, the collection put together by this 44-year-old graduate of Cambridge was embraced by the young (Wees). The artist Vanessa Bell, echoing the sentiments of her sister Virginia Woolf, found the exhibition the answer to her own search for artistic freedom: “That autumn of 1910 is to me a time when everything seemed springing to new life—a time when all was a sizzle of excitement, new relationships, new ideas, different and intense emotions all seemed crowding into one’s life” (Dunn 147). Within two years, when Fry organized his Second Post-Impressionistic Exhibition, he was able to present an English group alongside the likes of Cezanne, Matisse, Picasso, and Kandinsky. “That English group consisted of Bernard Adeney, Vanessa Bell, Frederick Etchells, Jessie Etchells, Roger Fry, Eric Gill, Spencer Gore, Duncan Grant, Cuthbert Hamilton, Henry Lamb, Wyndham Lewis, Stanley Spencer, and Edward Wadsworth” (Wees 33). Sir William Richmond argued that Fry’s exhibitions should be “boycotted by decent society” (Woolf, Roger Fry, 186). Whether by design, or by accident, Fry had become a leader of the futurist-oriented avant-garde movement in British art.
In 1913, attempting to capitalize on the growing popularity of his exhibitions, and to provide a source of income for some of the young artists hoping to establish themselves, Fry established the Omega Workshops, a design studio which Fry co-managed with artists Duncan Grant and Vanessa Bell. The workshop contracted artists to produce hand painted designs on furniture, ceramics, and textiles and other household objects. Fry was working from a vision which he elaborated in his article “Art and Socialism,” where “The painter would earn his living ‘by some craft in which his artistic powers would be constantly occupied, though at a lower tension, and in a humbler way’” (Woolf, Roger Fry, 188). The artists did not sign their works, in keeping with Fry’s vision of a socialist workshop; instead the pieces were marked on the bottom with an omega symbol.

The remarkable similarity between Fry’s vision and that of the Russian Constructivists is worth pointing out. And while the Omega experiment was in no way as influential as Bauhaus, or the Constructivists, it provided a modest income for an egalitarian community of artists from 1913-1919, when financial difficulties brought on by war-time economics forced Fry to close the workshops.

Wyndham Lewis was one of the Omega artists until late in 1913, when he resigned over an affair that has been called “The Ideal Home Rumpus” (Day 1). The Daily Mail had been holding annual Ideal Home Exhibitions since 1908, and hoping to garner some of the publicity associated with Fry’s post-impressionist exhibitions, decided to invite the Omega group to design a Post-Impressionist
room for the 1913 version of the event. The *Daily Mail* never directly presented the offer to Omega; instead the invitation was delivered by an outside artist, Spencer Gore who “appeared at Omega one day in July to announce that he, Lewis, and Omega had been asked to do the job jointly. Since neither Fry nor Lewis were at the Omega at the time, Gore left the message with Duncan Grant and departed” (Wees 63). Fry claimed to have never received the full message, but had in the meantime contacted the *Daily Mail*, and had arranged for Omega to design the room in the usual manner, without giving specific credit to any of the individual artists (Wees 63).

In October, a group of four artists, Wyndham Lewis, Frederick Etchells, C.J. Hamilton, and E. Wadsworth, began distributing a broadsheet charging Fry and the Omega with securing the Ideal Home contract “by a shabby trick, and at the expense of one of their members—Mr. Wyndham Lewis, and an outside artist—Mr. Spencer Gore” (Woolf, *Roger Fry*, 192). It also charged Fry with preventing an Omega member from exhibiting at a non-Omega show, and went on to attack the workshop on aesthetic grounds, for its embracing decorative crafts over “the rough and masculine work” (Woolf, *Roger Fry*, 192) of the artist.

While many in the Omega argued that Fry should sue the authors of the circular for libel, particularly after the *Daily Mail* provided a letter to Vanessa Bell declaring that the commission to decorate the room “was given by the *Daily Mail* to Mr. Roger Fry without any conditions as to the artists he would employ”
(Wees 66). However Fry recognized that any response would only give the dissidents more publicity, so Fry and Omega responded with silence.

Wees notes that this incident grew out of “confusions and misunderstandings” and that “it drove Lewis, Wadsworth, Etchells, Hamilton, and (temporarily) Nevinson, into a tighter and more voluble coterie, and gave them their first taste of what it is like to ‘bombard the town with pages of suburban rhetoric’” (67). By December, the group began exhibiting together in Brighton, and resolved to continue their bombardment by publishing a magazine which the Futurist Nevinson dubbed *Blast* (Lewis was already uncomfortable with the label Futurist at this time). Nevinson dropped out of the project in February 1914, dismayed over the chaotic “problems of financing and publishing the magazine,” (Wees 159), and Ezra Pound came aboard to replace him. Pound advertised the magazine as a “Discussion of Cubism, Futurism, Imagisme and ALL Vital Forms of Modern Art” on the back cover of the *Egoist* on April 1, 1914. The first issue appeared in July 1914, and contained the Vorticist Manifesto, which alternately “Blessed” or “Blasted” certain trends in Continental and British Culture. While the lists of some of those “blessed” has already been noted, among those blasted was a thinly disguised attack on Fry:

**BLAST THE**
A violent fusion of art, manifesto, sloganeering, typography, grammatical error, anti-socialist diatribe, and masculinist ideology, *Blast* was both shocking and fascist in temperament. By embracing of the violent Ulster politician Carson, who had prosecuted Oscar Wilde, and by continuing to attack “decadent, effeminate, aesthetes” (a number of Omega artists were homosexual or bisexual), by proclaiming the importance of individual ego over Fry’s vision of an artistic collective, Lewis’s personal war with Fry now became an ideological war. Janet Lyon is correct in seeing the conflict between the Vorticists of *Blast* and Bloomsbury/Omega as along these lines. She points out that “Within the aesthetic ethos of that group, [Bloomsbury] masculinism itself was a form of irredeemable bourgeois instrumentality, and located as far from an avant-garde sensibility as one could get” (113). While Fry never responded directly to Lewis or *Blast*, and no one in the Bloomsbury group wrote a manifesto during those years, Virginia Woolf, in her careful, deliberative manner was gathering the material for a
response to the fascist masculinity that so dominated the pages of Lewis’s magazine. Her anti-fascist manifesto would appear 25 years later.

By 1938 the battle lines had hardened. Marinetti and Pound were both in Mussolini’s camp, and while Lewis had disavowed his earlier fascination with Hitler, he still held to his masculinist ideology. Woolf herself was disturbed in the way in which British society was presenting itself as the “good” alternative to fascist evil, while ignoring the fascist undertones which pervaded British society. Roger Fry had died of heart failure in 1934, and in 1936 Woolf began working on her biography of Fry, as well as certain sections she had excised from her novel The Years in 1935. The latter work was the beginning of what became Three Guineas. The fact that she began composing Three Guineas while revisiting the defining battles with the Vorticists in 1914, and while reviewing Lewis’s Blasting and Bombardiering in November 1937 (Woolf, Diary Vol. 5 117) is a fact which seems to be a significant part of the context of the production of Three Guineas. The years 1914-1917 seem to hover behind, as a ghostly subtext to Three Guineas.

C. Formal Elements

There is no question that Woolf struggled to find the appropriate genre for Three Guineas. Stephen Barber notes that both Three Guineas and The Years emerged from an earlier text Woolf had titled “Here and Now” which combined the discursive and novelistic forms. Woolf described the writing process for the work as “six years of floundering, striving, much agony, some ecstasy: lumping
the Years & 3 Gs together as one book--as indeed they are” (148). The form that did emerge—three letters responding to requests for money—seems to take it a long way from the violent forms of the *Blast* manifesto, and most other manifestos of the modern period. But these facts are not surprising: Woolf was no futurist, and likely associated the movement with fascism.

Yet there is no doubt Woolf herself saw *Three Guineas* as a manifesto, in the sense that it challenged the masculinist status quo and carefully attempted to construct a new audience, or society of outsiders. While revising and proofing the manuscript, she even considered publishing an illustrated broadside “to be called *The Outsider*” (Woolf, *Diary* 128). While *Three Guineas* differed in form from the futurist manifestos, in many ways it rediscovers the form used by Marx and Engels. Like *The Communist Manifesto*, it is not a list of slogans or propositions, but a carefully argued analysis. In some ways it seems to extend *The Communist Manifesto*, and like the works of Gramsci and the Frankfurt School, it takes socialist theory beyond the deterministic economic analyses of some Marxists, challenging the fascism inherent within the British institutions of modernity. Erin Carlston’s description of the work as an analysis that “trace[s] the connections between fascism, patriarchal and capitalist ideologies, and the oppression of the marginalized, particularly women” (137) certainly puts it within such a tradition. But while the surface “meaning” of the text “traces connections,” Woolf’s form works beneath the surface to performatively enact her critique of institutions of masculinity.
However, it also falls within the futurist tradition of working within the trope licentia, where the writer boldly challenges the audience, as Lausberg says, “insisting only on the truth, involving the risk of turning the audience against the speaking party” (337). In fact, Three Guineas seems to move beyond futurist licentia into parrhesia, a dangerous form of truth-telling where the writer risks life and limb for the truth, given Woolf’s vision of the masculinist/fascist movement in British politics, and the ominous violence beginning to envelope continental Europe, a move noted by Barber.

While the text does owes some of its form to the generic example of Marx and Engels, upon closer examination Three Guineas makes a number of unique contributions to the form. While the surface text mirrors the traditions of the female epistolatory novel, Woolf’s use of footnotes stakes a claim for the text within the (largely) male domain of intellectual scholarship, while simultaneously attempting to mobilize women as “outsiders.” In the text Woolf describes the educational inequality between men and women as “a precipice, a gulf so deeply cut between us that for three years and more I have been sitting on my side of it wondering whether it is any use to try to speak across it” (4). Woolf doesn’t so much “speak across” the gap as she performatively demonstrates the ways in which the gendered gap permeates society with inequality and violence. While the text doesn’t contain any of the typographic excesses of the futurist manifestoes, it is a visual text that goes way beyond the genre of the “essay,” or “letter,” by focusing upon images: the figure of the fascist dictator and photographs of
atrocities committed during the Spanish Civil War which are referenced in the
text, and 5 other photographs which Woolf included in the first edition. It is the
intrusion of these “visions” or facts” from the “outside world,” that bridge the gap
between the world of the patriarchy, of the city street, of the university, and of the
military and the feminine world of the outsider, of the parlor, of the kitchen, and
of the pacifist. Woolf puts it this way in the text: “Those photographs are not an
argument; they are simply a crude statement of fact addressed to the eye. But the
eye is connected with the brain” (11). Here Woolf is entering the world of the
spectacle. And the horrific images of dead bodies is what bridges the gap: “When
we look at those photographs some fusion takes place within us; however
different the education, the traditions behind us, our sensations are the same. They
are violent” (11). Such images may seem out of place in such an closely argued
text. Erin Carlston sees this strategy as somehow inappropriate to Woolf’s
purpose:

Woolf’s use of visual artifacts to provoke the reader’s irrational, violent
reaction against irrationalism…does seem an incongruous strategy in a
work that purports to deploy the logocentric tradition of rhetorical
argument against an aestheticized irrational politics (160).

However, Woolf’s purpose here is not to adopt the visual style of the fascists, a
style she describes as “decorated inkpots to hypnotize the human mind” (Three
Guineas 14). Her use of the manifesto seems more akin to that of an even earlier
genre, the prophetic Jeremiad, a genre more poetic than reasoned, a genre where
“Pictures and voices are the same today as they were 2,000 years ago” (Woolf, *Three Guineas* 141).

Stephen Barber points out how Woolf uses the five photographs in the book to produce not only “a critique that identifies fascism as the aestheticization of politics” (5), but “appropriates this aesthetic element for (1) an *ethics* that effectively challenges the post-enlightenment conception of the ethical person as merely public and for (2) a *critique* that departs from the apprehension of fascism as a uniquely German and Italian problem” (5). Woolf’s critique sees the wartime sphere of fascist violence as inextricably connected to all aspects of society. In an important passage, Woolf sees the pictures of dead bodies being foregrounded by another picture, the picture of the fascist dictator. And “it suggests a connection and for us a very important connection. It suggests that the public and the private worlds are inseparably connected; that the tyrannies and servilities of the one are the tyrannies and servilities of the other” (142). Woolf is challenging here the danger, even the impossibility of being a passive observer to these events. “It suggests that we cannot dissociate ourselves from that figure, but are ourselves that figure” (142). Rather than following the lead of the male letter writer she is purporting to answer, she states, “we can best help you prevent war not by repeating your words and following your methods but by finding new words and new methods...not by joining your society but by remaining outside your society” (143). She footnotes her argument here by quoting from Coleridge, Rousseau, Whitman, and George Sand, all making the same basic point: the only rightful
government, or society, is the one that insists the individual follow only the
dictates of her own reason. The government, the society, that insists upon more
than that, the government that uses violence to impose another reason, the
reasoning Spinoza denounced as that of “sad passions,” the reasoning of “the
Slave, the tyrant, and the priest” (Deleuze 23), is fascist reasoning. Instead, as
Woolf describes in The Years, “The soul—the whole being... It wishes to expand;
to adventure; to form—new combinations” (296). Woolf is a prophet here, not of
doom, but the prophet of freedom, of possibility, of “the capacity of the human
spirit to overflow boundaries and make unity out of multiplicity” (Three Guineas
143). Woolf’s manifesto is one which attempts, even in its narrative structure, to
do just that, to “overflow boundaries,” to make “new combinations.”

Woolf’s manifesto performatively deconstructs the “We” which has been
with the manifesto at least since the Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants, and
replaces it with a multiplicity of ‘we’s’ and ‘I’s.’ Erin Carlston notes: “The
intricate layering of voices in Three Guineas, the shifting narrative identities, and
the convoluted loops of argumentation diffuse and defer narrative identity” (140).
She goes on to point out that “‘we’ ought logically refer to the narrator and the
male treasurer who is the pretext for all of Three Guineas, but seems instead... a
collectivity defined by gender” (140). But Woolf’s society of outsiders is much
more than a feminist sisterhood, a political group working in the public sphere.
Barber quotes John Mepham as saying that the territory created by such groups
“is the first thing that totalitarian regimes abolish” (38). Three Guineas is an
attempt at group formation. But Woolf reinvents the manifesto when she proposes the formation of a society of outsiders. Her text exemplifies a politics that seeks to undermine efforts to crush freedom, which resists what Foucault has called "the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us" (Preface xiii). Woolf performatively demonstrates the aesthetic construction of a self designed to prevent such micro-fascism by aesthetically choosing a path that rejects power. Being other, being an outsider, allows one to exist outside of Giddens' institutions of domination.

Barber identifies the dominant tropes in Three Guineas as parrhesia and ascesis (11), By exposing the image of civilized British patriarchy as barbaric fascism, Woolf chooses the dangerous path of parrhesia. In constructing an agency which seeks and finds the moral guidelines "poverty," "chastity," "derision," and "freedom from unreal loyalties" (80), she builds an ethos based upon aescetism. Such choices puts Woolf's text fully into the realm of post-modern critique, because it demonstrates a way around the liberal-humanist trap where the search for truth ultimately leads to the replacement of one kind of fascism with another.

III. Critical Manifestoes in Academia: Haraway and Sedgwick

As we noted earlier, Woolf's use of footnotes in Three Guineas is an attempt at ethos building in a text by using the conventions of academic scholarship. In Woolf's case, it is an ironic use of such conventions, since as one
of "the daughters of educated men" (Three Guineas 4) who were themselves denied access to a university education, she is writing from outside such a community. Donna Haraway and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, daughters of a different generation, carry on Woolf's critique from inside the institutions of academia. However, both Haraway and Sedgwick demonstrate that being academic insiders does not protect one from marginalization in other ways. Institutional boundaries overlap (consider for example ROTC programs as examples of military institutions overlapping the academic) and there are what David Sibley calls "zones of ambiguity" where boundaries are less than clear. Porter et. al's conception of institutional critique maintains that through boundary interrogation "we can articulate the power moves used to maintain or even extend control over boundaries" (624). Haraway, through her investigations into the boundaries which divide the human and the machine, and Sedgwick in her interrogation of the boundaries that maintain the social distinctions between "queer" and "straight" demonstrate that the "insider/outsider" boundary is a contested one.

A. The Social Image of "A Cyborg Manifesto"

Donna Haraway's "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in Late Modernity," is inevitably linked to the image of the cyborg metaphor which is at the center of her work. Cyborg does not necessarily conjour up a positive reaction in the public sphere given the images of the evil "Borg" in Star Trek: The Next Generation and other science fiction works. And in
a February 1997 interview, Wired magazine associates Haraway’s work with that of performance artist Allucquere Rosanne Stone who “has shocked academia with her eccentric accounts of her own body” (Kunzru 1). Hari Kunzru calls the manifesto “a strange document, a mixture of passionate polemic, abstruse theory, and technological musing” (2). Kunzru sees it as a corrective rhetoric to the Earth Mother movement, or “goddess feminism” (2).

If Virginia Woolf’s Three Guineas challenged the enlightenment notion of a unified, univocal subject, and replaced it with the “we” of a society of outsiders, then Donna Haraway goes one step further in A Cyborg Manifesto by challenging the entire notion of what it means to be human in late modernity. It is a manifesto which reflects (or rather, refracts, to use Haraway’s terminology) upon the technological structures of modern institutions.

B. Rhetorical Dynamics of “A Cyborg Manifesto”

At its very core, Haraway’s manifesto meets Giddens’ criteria as a work of sustained optimism. Even as she critiques the institutionalization of technoscience and technoculture, calls herself a “pragmatist,” and describes the cyborg as “shocked into being” (Modest Witness 14) by the technologies of globalisation, the manifesto is an enthusiastic and optimistic advocate for new technologies and the possibilities of freedom they offer. Haraway is critical of the Luddites of the Left and Right who fearfully oppose technological advance and globalisation, arguing that “to fail to engage in the social processes of making science and to attend to the use and abuse of scientific work is irresponsible” (Olson 56). She
also seems to adopt a theory of agency close to that of Giddens’ model. Although she rejects reflexivity as “a bad trope” which “only displaces the same elsewhere, setting up worries about copy and original and the search for the authentic and really real” (Modest Witness 16), what she is really rejecting is the inadequacy of “reflexive monitoring of action.” Her own preferred term for describing agency in modernity is “diffraction,” an optical metaphor which “is about heterogeneous history,” not the reproduction of originals. “Diffraction is a narrative, graphic, psychological, spiritual, and political technology for making consequential meanings” (Modest Witness 27). Sticking with this optical metaphor, instead of producing a mirror image of past production, it modifies the production of future activities. In other words, what Haraway calls “diffraction” can be seen as the same process which Giddens labels “reflexive self-regulation.”

The exigency for this work seems to be a call to embrace the possibilities of agency, that rather than passively accepting the deterministic restraints of institutional life, the cyborg/agent is one who uses technology to open new pathways to freedom.

C. Formal Elements of “A Cyborg Manifesto

If Haraway is an optimist, she is an ironic, rather than a cockeyed one. She begins the manifesto by announcing her intention to use the text “to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism, and materialism” and “At the center of my ironic faith, my blasphemy, is the image of the cyborg” (Cyborg Manifesto 149). By irony, she seems to mean the unlikely pairing of her feminism
with the products of a technological society which seems more inclined to subjugate women than empower them. She goes on to define the cyborg as the ultimate hybrid, “of machine and organism... of fiction and lived experience” (Cyborg Manifesto 149). The thesis of her manifesto is this: by adopting a cyborg consciousness, by appropriating new technologies for socialist and feminist political use before those technologies are circumscribed, the cyborg occupies a political space from which to carve out a kind of freedom. Haraway summarizes it this way: “So my Cyborg myth is about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities which progressive people might explore as one part of needed political work” (Cyborg Manifesto 154). She then proceeds to transgress a series of boundaries built around 33 paired binaries, or dichotomies, which she lists, manifesto style, in two columns, with the dominant term on the left, and the marginalized term on the right. Her deconstruction of what she calls “the informatics of domination” is a Deleuzian strategy of promoting “flow across boundaries” (163). It is also indicative of where Haraway sees her own agency, which I think can be positioned within Giddens’ model of Institutional Modernity.

It is clear that while Haraway is working against systems of Domination and Legitimation, she finds her agency within systems of Signification, which Giddens sees as dominated by the Global Information Systems. Her major theoretical discussion focuses on communications science and technologies, and even her focus on biology is on the way communications technologies become “thoroughly blurred” with biotechnology. Under such conditions “The boundary
maintaining images of base and superstructure, public and private, or material and ideal never seemed more feeble...the rearrangements of race, sex, and class rooted in high-tech facilitated social relations can make socialist-feminism more relevant to effective progressive politics" (Cyborg Manifesto 165). Furthermore, it is important to remember that the manifesto is a text, and that “Writing is preeminently the technology of cyborgs” (Cyborg Manifesto 176). What Haraway both advocates and practices is the use of the discursive Global Information System to oppose the systems of Domination and Legitimation within late modernity. This is where she places her “trust,” in her ability to oppose “the informatics of domination” which is “a massive intensification of insecurity and cultural impoverishment” (Cyborg Manifesto 172). Like Virginia Woolf, like Audre Lorde, her ontological security as an outsider rests in a subjectivity created by her writing. “Writing affirms Sister Outsider, not the Woman-before-the-Fall-into-Writing needed by the phallogocentric Family of Man” (Cyborg Manifesto 176). Cyborg writing opposes totalizing theory, even the theories of feminists like Catherine MacKinnon. It adapts to the emergence of post-traditional society, plastic sexuality, non-pecuniary commitments, reflective (diffractive) subjectivity, globalisation, and the permanent state of risk which Giddens has identified as the inevitable state of late modernity. And like Woolf, Haraway rejects the univocal model of the speaker: “This is not a dream of a common language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia” (Cyborg Manifesto 181). It is this rhetoric of
difference, in which Haraway puts her trust, what Giddens calls her “ontological security.”

Haraway also follows Woolf’s lead in rejecting the facile slogans, the progenitor of the modern soundbyte in writing her manifesto. Like Woolf, Haraway carefully reasons her way to political outsidership. Her major adaptation to the manifesto form is her introduction of the conventions of academic discourse into the genre. She begins with an introduction to her research project, moves into careful definition, elucidates the problem, elaborates a binary-busting deconstructivist methodology, and reviews the literature of the cyborg in fiction. She analyzes, and comes to her conclusions. Even more so than Woolf in Three Guineas, Haraway in the Cyborg Manifesto uses the conventions of scholarship and scholasticism as an ethos-builder to counter the propaganda style of discursiveness which dominates the Global Information System.

D. The Social Image of Sedgwick’s Manifestoes

The writings of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick are undoubtedly associated with the field of study she helped to found, what is now called “Queer Theory,” a term which may have been coined by Theresa de Lauretis’ 1991 article in Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies. The 1990 publication of Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the Closet, Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, and the English translation of Foucault’s The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume I marked the emergence of a study of gender which Annamarie Jagose argues is less about “identity than a critique of identity” (1). In this formulation,
“Queer,” if it is an identity category at all, is one that takes seriously Woolf’s concept of outsidership which values “poverty,” “chastity,” and “derision.”

The social image of Sedgwick’s work, foregrounded as queer, is also linked with cultural stereotypes about the term. As David Gauntlett puts it, “There are inevitably people who don’t like queer theory because they think it is deviant or inappropriate, or more likely don’t really know what it is anyway” (1), and there are others who should know better, like Terry Castle who reverts back to enlightenment models of identity when she challenges Sedgwick for what Castle sees as the way “the lesbian is lumped in Sedgwick with her male homosexual counterpart” (162), thereby making the lesbian invisible. Castle evidently finds gender to be a simple matter: “I still maintain, if in ordinary speech I say, ‘I am a lesbian,’ the meaning is instantly, even dangerously clear” (15). By essentializing lesbian identity, Castle adopts a rhetoric of domination and exploitation, a rhetoric that limits possibilities and constrains agency. It is such simplistic identity rhetorics that Sedgwick works to correct.

E. Rhetorical Dynamics of Sedgwick’s Manifestoes

If the social image of Sedgwick’s work is marked by controversy and dispute, the exigency of her work is clear. In her introduction to *Epistemology of the Closet*, she argues “that an understanding of virtually any aspect of modern Western culture must be, not merely incomplete, but damaged in its central substance to the degree it does not incorporate a critical analysis of modern homo/heterosexual definition” (1). And in “Queer and Now,” which opens her
1993 collection *Tendencies*, she describes her motive as simply that of ensuring the survival of emerging queer identities. She writes that, “I look at my adult friends and colleagues doing gay and lesbian work, and I feel that the survival of each one is a miracle” (1), and that her goal is “to tell kids who are supposed never to learn this, that, farther along, the road widens and the air brightens” (2).

By examining the construction of queer identity, by showing the “kids” an optimistic view of a road that widens, and by demonstrating the inadequacy of sexual taxonomies as defined and practiced by institutions of modernity, “to resist in every way it can the deadening pretended knowingness by which the chisel of modern homo/heterosexual definitional crisis tends, in public discourse, to be hammered most fatally home” (*Epistemology* 12), Sedwick practices a critique that attempts to pry open those seemingly closed definitions.

Sedwick’s critique involves more than analysis; by emphasizing the performative aspects of identity formation she moves her arguments into the genre of the critical manifesto. She writes “that both the act of coming out, and closetedness itself, can be taken as dramatizing certain features of linguistic performativity in ways that have broadly applicable implications” (*Tendencies* 11). This latter statement seems to be performatively calling forth an audience, a rhetorical move we saw as typical of the manifestoes in chapters three and four. Her texts “Introduction-Axiomatic” from *Epistemology of the Closet* and “Here and Now” from *Tendencies*, demonstrate the power of such a performative call.

F. Formal Elements of Sedgwick’s Manifestoes
Sedgwick, like Haraway, is an academic. Unlike Haraway, she does not label “Introduction: Axiomatic” or “Queer and Now” as a manifesto, yet in form at least, these two texts bear more of the markers of the modernist manifesto form than Haraway’s self-labeled text. Both contain epigrammatic lists, “Queer and Now” uses bold fonts to preview the contents of each of the manifesto’s points, and “Axiomatic” includes a series of numbered “axioms.” And yet each text also pays a certain homage to the conventions of the academic essay, using footnotes, although Sedgwick’s project is not as much about developing an all-encompassing model (the cyborg), nor does it take a form resembling an academic genre such as the journal article, dissertation, or conference presentation.

Sedgwick’s project is much more of a “modest proposal” than Haraway’s. Axiom 1 of “Axiomatic” is both self-evident and profound: “People are different from each other” (22). In many ways both of her manifestoes attempt to develop a “few respectable conceptual tools for dealing with this fact” (Axiomatic 22). “Axiomatic” begins with the exigency that “many of the major nodes of thought and knowledge in twentieth century culture as a whole are structured—indeed, fractured—by a chronic, now endemic crisis of homo/heterosexual definition, indicatively male, dating from the end of the nineteenth century” (1). “Queer and Now” announces its motive as a survival narrative by one “haunted by the suicides of adolescents” (2). Both manifestoes attack the tendency of institutions
in late modernity to put individuals within sexual categories, and both manifestoes problematize that practice.

"Queer and Now," puts a little "pressure" on the term "sexual identity" and ends up with a list of sixteen elements going into the makeup of that term, beginning with "your biological sex," "your self-perceived gender assignment," "masculine or feminine...personality traits" and moves to those same interrogations of "your preferred partner" and concluding with "your community of cultural and political identification (supposed to correspond to your own identity); and—again—many more" (7-8). Besides the seven "axioms" which define Sedgwick's methodology in "Axiomatic," that manifesto also presents a similar bulleted list of thirteen "things that can differentiate even people of identical gender, race, nationality, class, and 'sexual orientation'—each one...retains the unaccounted for potential to disrupt many forms of available thinking about sexuality" (25). Even more so than Haraway, it becomes difficult to characterize Sedgwick as a "sustained optimist," given her critique of the discursive condensation of sexual categories by institutional modernity. On the other hand, "sustained optimism" doesn't preclude critique; in fact, critique which leads to "reflexive self-regulation" is precisely what Giddens' "sustained optimism" is all about, and such reflexive critique is the rhetorical aim of Sedgwick's work.

When I label Sedgwick with the term optimist, then I must be ready to answer the question, what is it in institutional modernity that Sedgwick trusts?
Where does her “ontological security” lie? Like Haraway, she chooses to modify an older, textual genre, the manifesto. And in “Queer and Now,” she tells us that her trust lies in the power of literacy, and texts. She writes “For me, a kind of formalism, a visceral near identification with the writing I cared for, at the level of sentence structure, metrical pattern, rhyme, was one way of trying to appropriate what seemed the numinous and resistant power of the chosen objects” (Queer and Now 3). She concludes, “At any rate, becoming a perverse reader was never a matter of my condescension to texts, rather of the *surplus charge of my trust in them to remain powerful, refractory, and exemplary* [italics added] (4). Again, like Haraway, Sedgwick chooses to work within the Global Information System, and the institutions of signification. Like Haraway she puts her trust in the signification process, and like Haraway and Giddens sees discursive agency as a “refractory” process. The project of both of Sedgwick’s manifestoes is to demonstrate, or carve out discursive agency for a community of outsiders, a community marked as “queer” or “different.”

Reading these manifestoes through the lens of Giddens’ theory reveals that both Haraway and Sedgwick are continuing the project elaborated by Virginia Woolf in *Three Guineas*. While the progression of thought from Woolf to Haraway and Sedgwick may not be linear, like Woolf, they see the Socialist project as one of building a community of outsiders, a community of cyborgs, queers, and the daughters of educated men, a community which will use the tools of discourse and the forces of signification to challenge the forces of domination.
and legitimation. They use the manifesto to construct a queer, or in Haraway’s case, a Cyborg subjectivity. Like Woolf, both writers resist the slogans and typographical excesses characteristic of the modernist manifestoes, and they go even further than Woolf in their pursuit of credibility by bringing formal elements of academic scholarship into the manifesto genre.

IV. Critical Manifestoes in Politics and Aesthetics: The Port Huron Statement, The Dyke Manifesto, and Personism

While the manifestoes of Woolf, Haraway, and Sedgwick bring academic discourse into the manifesto genre for the purposes of critique, writers working in the political and aesthetic arena brought critique into their own traditions. Three very different examples of this move were made by the Students for a Democratic Society, the Lesbian Avengers, and the poet Frank O’Hara.

A. The Social Image of The Port Huron Statement

In June 1962, a group of 59 college student activists, union organizers, and Socialist party leaders attended a conference held at the AFL-CIO camp in the woods near Port Huron, Michigan. The purpose of this meeting was to draft a manifesto for the SDS, “an obscure offshoot of the equally obscure League for Industrial Democracy,” (Miller 13) an organizing arm of Norman Thomas’ US Socialist Party. This manifesto provided “the intellectual and analytical tools which helped many students to fashion a political underpinning for their sense of cultural alienation, producing what was fairly called “the New Left, the first really homegrown left in America” (Sale 8). James Miller writes in his history of the
SDS that the manifesto "is one of the pivotal documents in post-war American history" (13). It is a particularly paradoxical history given that the manifesto is largely a statement of leftist/humanist values which finds "violence to be abhorrent," (Miller 333) while the social images for which the SDS is most frequently remembered are the violent protests at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968, as well as for the domestic terrorism practiced by its Weatherman faction which went underground after the explosion of its bomb factory in Greenwich Village in the Spring of 1970. During the period from 1962 to its peak in 1969, the organization grew from a membership of about 800 members in 10 chapters, to nearly 100,000 members in over 300 chapters (Sales 663-664). It influenced an even larger generation of American youth.

B. The Rhetorical Dynamics of The Port Huron Statement

The Port Huron Statement was drafted by Tom Hayden, a journalist working for the University of Michigan student newspaper, The Michigan Daily, and distributed in advance of the meeting to the associate chapters. Hayden's 49-page draft was divided into 17 sections which addressed "politics, the economy, foreign policy, the colonial revolution, prospects for disarmament, civil rights, students, labor, values, the meaning of democracy" (Miller 108). Getting a diverse group of leftist students to endorse such a complex document would be a difficult task. Hayden writes that the first step along that path was a commitment that "whatever came out would not be final, but that it would be offered as a discussion paper to our generation" (Miller 109). Nevertheless, the convention
made several immediate changes to the document, and appointed a drafting committee which included Hayden (who was elected SDS President at the meeting), Al Haber (past president of the organization), and Bob Ross to implement further changes suggested by the discussion groups during the convention (Miller).

The most serious challenges to Hayden’s draft came from two groups. The Socialist Party, represented by Michael Harrington, objected to wording which criticized the cold war “policy-making assumption that the Soviet Union is inherently expansionist” (Miller 112). According to Miller, while Hayden had a valid point in identifying this assumption as the ideological foundation of the weapons race and an interventionist foreign policy, the Socialist Party had a long history of denouncing Stalinist communism. This policy had served the party well during the McCarthy era, and Harrington felt obliged to oppose language which could be perceived as soft on communism. The AFL-CIO, represented by Donald Slaiman who was attending the convention as a non-voting observer, objected to wording in Hayden’s draft which described a “crisis of vision” in the labor movement. Labor had become “too rich and sluggish” (Miller 112) to be part of a vanguard for social change.

While Slaiman’s objections did not necessarily have to be satisfied, he was supported by Harrington, and the Socialist Party’s concerns had to be taken seriously if the group wished to continue receiving financial and administrative
support from the Socialist League for Industrial Democracy, and if it wished to use the Socialist Party’s influence in reaching the “Old Left” (Miller, Sales).

After an angry debate in which neither Harrington nor Hayden backed down, the discussion group on “Communism” directed Richard Flacks to work with Hayden to add language which would eventually read that “As democrats, we are in basic opposition to the communist system. The Soviet Union, as a system, rests on the total suppression of opposition, as well as a vision of the future in the name of which much human life has been sacrificed, and numerous small and large denials of human dignity rationalized” (Miller 121). The Socialist contingent was largely satisfied, and the convention ratified the document, giving the drafting committee until August 15 to finalize the wording (Miller).

Unfortunately, Michael Harrington left the convention early, and his fellow Socialist delegates failed to keep him informed of the changes to the draft. He reported back to the board of the League of Industrial Democracy that the SDS was seriously departing from Socialist values. The board called an inquest held June 28 in New York which suspended Hayden and Haber, and locked the group out of its national offices. It was only after Hayden and Haber appealed the board’s decision in July, and through the intervention of Norman Thomas, patriarch of American Socialism, that the league accepted the SDS and its manifesto (Miller, Sales).

C. Formal Elements of The Port Huron Statement
The final document, as published in July 1962, is remarkable, both for its vision of a New Left, and for the details of its theoretical analysis. In my opinion, not since Woolf’s *Three Guineas* had there been such a well-theorized manifesto. Ultimately, it was distributed as a stapled, mimeographed booklet to the entire SDS membership. The drafting committee had elected to call it *The Port Huron Statement* to emphasize its status as a work in progress. According to Hayden, “‘manifesto’ sounds like ‘case closed’...‘statement’ sounds like ‘Take a look at this’” (Miller 141). After an unremarkable introduction titled “Agenda for a New Generation” which follows the typical manifesto formula of describing the exigency for the student movement (the struggle against racism and the threat of nuclear annihilation), the statement moves into a section titled “Values” which emphasized “participatory democracy,” a concept Hayden borrowed from Arnold Kaufman, a University of Michigan Philosophy Professor, who was Hayden’s academic mentor (Miller, Sales).

For the SDS, “participatory democracy” became something of a transcendent mantra. The SDS saw such grass-roots democracy as a supplement to, rather than a replacement of representative democracy. James Miller notes that to an extent, “the ambiguity surrounding participatory democracy in *The Port Huron Statement* was deliberate: more than an empty slogan but less than a formal doctrine” (143). However that ambiguity was not universally recognized by all readers. Harrington sees in the term evidence that the students were “nonsocialists who took the formal promises of American democracy with deep
and innocent seriousness" (Miller 143), a stance which led the SDS into disillusionment and violence. On the other side of the coin, SDS member Paul Booth argues that the language was performative, "a literary style that we affected. There was no question that we knew that dramatizing the rhetoric versus the reality of democracy was politically efficacious" (Miller 143). Hayden himself argues that participatory democracy meant "action; we believed in action. We had behind us the so-called decade of apathy, we were emerging from apathy" (Miller 144). Hayden’s idea of action is something of a dialectical synthesis of the enlightenment concept of the individual citizen/agent with the socialist concept of a community of friends acting in concert. Miller notes that "the young radicals appropriated some of the themes by which modernism had come to define itself" (147), embracing the idea of a dynamic dialectic which as we saw in Chapter 3, gives The Communist Manifesto its power. Miller argues however, that the radicals were less interested in a "classical Marxism" which stresses "the deliberate cultivation of class interest, through the transmission of a formal doctrine of capitalist crisis and proletarian revolution, within a disciplined organization" (147). Rather, “Some on the New Left were inclined to extend the vision of the experimental collective into a kind of anarchism. Spurning all fixed doctrines and forms, they exulted in discovery, improvisation, the drama of unpredictable innovation" (147). While such an interpretation may represent the views of many SDS members, and certainly reflects the carnivalesque nature of the movement which seems to point back to the performative practices of the
Russian Futurists, it ignores the serious theorizing of *The Port Huron Statement*. While it was a “plastic, living document,” it was also a theoretical statement of principle worthy of Marx, or a Marxian sociology. It follows Giddens’ formula by making a rhetorical appeal to that portion of American social institutionality which the students trusted—the democratic process. Furthermore, *The Port Huron Statement* explicitly rejected the carnivalesque simplicity of the facile slogan which is characteristic of the modernist manifesto, and which were also a staple of the Old Left (Miller 331). Instead the statement is a detailed critique of those institutions of late modernity which the students did not trust: an anti-democratic seniority system which rewarded racist Dixiecrats in the Congress; a capitalist economic system which concentrates wealth in the hands of a few; and the military-industrial complex. And while Hayden’s manifesto distrusts capitalism’s allocation of resources, like Haraway’s manifesto, it saw hope in technological change: “the dominant optimistic economic fact of this epoch is that fewer hands are needed now in actual production... The world could now be fed, poverty abolished, the great public needs could be met” (Miller 342). In its hopefulness for a better future, *The Port Huron Statement* qualifies as an example of Giddens’ “sustained optimism” This can also be seen in the closing of the manifesto which states that “If we appear to seek the unattainable, as it has been said, then let it be known that we do so to avoid the unimaginable” (Miller 374). The failure of the student movement to achieve its lofty goals, and the tragedy that the SDS is remembered today more for the violence of the Weatherman faction than for the
well-reasoned politics of *The Port Huron Statement* is perhaps indicative of the practices of a Global Information System which finds the rhetoric of the well-crafted bomb more usable than the rhetoric of the well-reasoned argument.

D. **The Social Image of The Dyke Manifesto**

Where *The Port Huron Statement* is a well-reasoned argument by a group (the SDS) that is now associated with revolutionary violence, *The Dyke Manifesto* is the opposite: a violent piece of revolutionary rhetoric from a group (the Lesbian Avengers) which practiced non-violent protest. Indeed, *The Dyke Manifesto* is almost a parody of the modernist manifesto with its bold typefaces, rampant sloganeering, and violent imagery. The logo for the group is a lit bomb, encircled by the group’s name. Its list of the “Top Ten Avenger Qualities” includes militaristic qualities such as “4. Fighting Spirit; 5. Righteous anger; 6. Fearlessness,” as well as carnivalesque qualities such as “3. Pro Sex; 2. Good dancer” (Schulman 296). The group’s parody of a military recruiting poster includes a picture of a scantily-clad African-American woman with threatening retro-Afro holding a sawed-off shotgun on her hips with the message: “The Lesbian Avengers: We Recruit” (Figure 5). The wording is also an ironic reference to the anti-gay politicians who accuse the gay movement of attempting to “recruit” young people to what they call an aberrant lifestyle.

Lyon, in her use of *The Dyke Manifesto* as a model for a fixed, manifesto form, seems to miss the parodic aspects of this manifesto. Her coverage of the broadsheet ignores the political actions that accompanied the manifesto, and the
PARTY & FUNDRAISER
GO-GO GIRLS MUSIC
MEDIA INSTALLATION
SAT, OCT 24
9PM-4AM
119 AVE D, 2nd FLR
$5 AT THE DOOR
The LESBIAN AVENGERs is a direct-action group focused on issues vital to lesbian survival and viability.
We meet every Tuesday at 8PM at the Lesbian & Gay Community Services Center, 208 W 13 St, NYC.
For info: (212) 867-7711 ext. 3204

Figure 11: Lesbian Avenger Recruiting Poster (Schulman 307)
context and exigency of its composition. In fact Lyon seems unaware of Sarah Schulman’s 1994 work *My American History: Lesbian and Gay Life During the Reagan/Bush Years* which chronicles the history of the Lesbian Avengers and the writing of *The Dyke Manifesto*.

E. **Rhetorical Dynamics of *The Dyke Manifesto***

As Schulman tells it, the Avengers were tired of political theorizing and wanted to attract activists to a new lesbian direct political action group. The manifesto was written in the Spring of 1992 by a group that included Schulman and five of her friends, and organizing efforts continued throughout the summer of 1992. In the fall, the group conducted its first political action by handing out balloons with the words “Ask about Lesbian Lives” to students on the first day of school in Queen’s District 24 where the school board was conducting a vicious anti-gay attack on New York’s multicultural curriculum. The Avengers continued to oppose what Ira Shor has labeled the conservative “Culture War” in a series of actions that included a march through the corporate dining room of *The Wall Street Journal* chanting “We’re here, we’re queer, we’re not going skiing” which interrupted a tourism presentation by the mayor of Denver, after Colorado had adopted an anti-gay proposition. These actions culminated in the non-violent march of 20,000 Lesbians on the White House in April 1993 (Schulman 279-287). Again, like the SDS, the Lesbian Avengers demonstrated their faith in the power of political action within the American system, even while their actions were a critique of that system. Both are examples of the type of Reflexive Self-
Regulation elaborated by Giddens which can not only tolerate, but effectively utilize the paradoxes and inconsistencies at work within the institutions of late modernity.

F. **Formal Elements of The Dyke Manifesto**

The Lesbian Avengers depart from the serious form of the other manifestoes treated to this point in their use of ironic humor and parody in their form. However, with their use of the broadsheet, and campy design, they also seem to be reproducing some of the elements of the avant-garde manifestoes of the futurists. According to Janet Lyon, the language of *The Dyke Manifesto* is “something quite different than a choral voice seeking access and privileges of the liberal bourgeois public sphere” (38) and that its project is “nothing less than a dramatic exposure and upending of the implicit universal standards by which the control of access is regulated” (38). I concur with Lyon’s contention about the nature of the Avenger’s text. However I disagree with her claim that this project of *The Dyke Manifesto* is “shared by virtually all manifestoes” (38) and that “However paratactic or irreverant or systematic a manifesto may be, it always makes itself intelligible by putting the case of a particular group into a context that honors the idea of a universal political subject” (39). This statement seems to ignore the long history of manifestoes written by avant-garde artistic movements, from the futurists’ *Slap in the Face of Public Taste*, to Tristan Tzara’s dadaist *Note on Art*, to Charles Bernstein’s *The Conspiracy of “Us”* which announces “‘We’ ain’t about no new social groupings—nobody gotta move over—this is the
deconstruction of the team” (Caws 639). The avant-garde writer is frequently not interested in contesting the public sphere, and the idea of a universal political subject is not only irrelevant, but frequently lampooned by these artists.

G. The Social Image of O'Hara’s Personism

While the Lesbian Avengers used comedy and parody to serious political effect in their manifesto and in the actions which followed, comedy and parody also entered the realm of the aesthetic manifestoes written during the post-1945 period. Frank O’Hara’s 1959 manifesto Personism is another of those avant-garde manifestoes which reject the notion of the public sphere. In many ways it is a parody of Charles Olson’s long-winded 1950 manifesto, Projective Verse, which proclaimed a new American poetics, represented by his own series of “Maximus” poems which advocated a new poetic form which could “engage the political, economic, historical, and social realities” (Perloff 1990, 134). O’Hara found such grandiose statements of aesthetic principle not only flawed, but humorous. For O’Hara poetry was a simpler process, and like the other manifestoes we have covered in this chapter, he preferred action over excessive theorizing: “I don’t even like rhythm, assonance, all that stuff. You just go on your nerve. If someone’s chasing you down the street with a knife you just run, you don’t turn around and shout ‘Give it up! I was a track star for Mineola Prep’” (Caws 591).

H. The Social Image of O’Hara’s Personism

O’Hara goes on to mockingly describe in typical manifesto fashion, the exigency of the movement:
personism. It was founded by me after lunch with LeRoi Jones on August 27, 1959, a day in which I was in love with someone (not Roi, by the way, a blond). I went back to work and wrote a poem for this person. While I was writing it I was realizing that if I wanted to I could use the telephone instead of writing the poem and so Personism was born. It’s a very exciting movement which will undoubtedly have lots of adherents. It puts the poem squarely between the poet and the person, Lucky Pierre style, and the poem is correspondingly gratified. The poem is at last between two persons instead of two pages (Caws 592).

O’Hara’s humorous critique of aesthetic theorists blasts away at what seem to be some of the central tenets of the manifesto form: its mocks the manifesto’s intent at building an audience (“lots of adherents”), it implicitly critiques the manifesto’s use of the Lutheran “We” (I was writing, I was in love), and it mocks the rhetorical complexity of the form by instead embracing a radical Bakhtinian dialogism which deconstructs the importance poststructuralism gives to the text (“between two persons instead of two pages”). Yet there is a serious message underneath the poem: a coy, yet brave reference to his homosexuality in pre-Stonewall 1959 (I was in love with someone…not Roi…a blonde) is indicative of a radical subjectivity which as Harriet Zinnes notes, “demonstrates his conviction that life is first, not only in the living but in the making: it must precede art” (Elledge 56).

I. Formal Elements of O’Hara’s Personism
O'Hara’s manifesto, performatively enacts his aesthetic by refusing to take its own message seriously. In doing so, O'Hara, in a remarkably un-self-conscious manner, created a gay sensibility that ironically, did exactly what he showed little interest in doing in *Personism*—it led to a movement now known simply as the New York school of poetry. As Marjorie Perloff notes, “His was the spirit that held together a whole group of artisans and poets—gay and straight—in New York in the fifties and early sixties” (Elledge 68). By parodying the inflated pomposity of the modernist aesthetic manifesto O'Hara created his own little society of outsiders, and made his own humble contribution to the anti-fascist project elaborated by Woolf in *Three Guineas*. If, unlike the other manifestoes of this period, his seems to show little interest in formally critiquing or embracing any of the institutions of late modernity, nevertheless his work contains an implicit critique of the microfascist nature of the public sphere. Poems like “Lana Turner has collapsed!” and “The Day Lady Died” ironically criticize the methods by which the Global Information System has created this utopian vision of sunny Hollywood with its strange star system, yet demonstrates the way in which that sunny paradise is marred by events such as Turner’s collapse, and Billy Holiday’s death. O’Hara’s legacy as the poet who found a pastoral richness in modern urban life marks him as representative of the sustained optimism which Giddens sees as essential to survival in late modernity. His camp sensibility becomes a survival mechanism, as is clearly evident in “The Day Lady Died,” which shows the poet already ready to deal with the next apocalypse, ready to write the next elegy, a
survivalism which could seem eerily anachronistic, and yet doesn’t, to a
generation which has experienced the devastation of AIDS. By collapsing the
“we” of the public sphere, O’Hara creates a smaller, more manageable alternative.
As Herring notes, “unlike Habermas, O’Hara does not yearn for an idyllic age of
reason. And unlike the New Critics, he celebrates poetic form’s now inextricable
connection to consumerism and the society of spectacle” (419). Yet he also
criticizes that spectacle even as he celebrates it: the public’s infatuation with Lana
Turner’s every move in the fifties seems innocent compared with the public’s
infatuation with every detail of the life and death of Lady Diana in the nineties.
His voice in both “The Day Lady Died” and “Lana Turner has collapsed” is the
voice of the newspaper headline addressing a mass public, yet we know that
O’Hara’s personal poems are addressing a much more local public. As Herring
puts it, the poems are “in search of a localized public using the techniques of mass
subjectivity” (422). Private acts become public, the personal poems become
transported to the public through the impersonal voice of the media, and O’Hara
lets his personism collapse into one great big dialectical fusion of the personal and
the public.

V. A Brief Conclusion

These critical manifestoes show that the genre is as plastic as ever, and
that writers are still finding new and creative ways at adapting the form to the
needs of the social context of late modernity. The fact that these five manifestoes,
all very different in purpose, style, and form, all manage to say something new
about the construction of subjectivity in late modernity, again restates the
dynamic power of the manifesto genre.

In chapter 1, I framed the question *if a manifesto cannot be defined by its
dynamic features, what can define it?* Figure 1 in that chapter showed that only two
features were shared by even 75% of the manifestoes examined in this project,
and those features were broad rhetorical purposes: “the challenge to an institution
or practice,” and “the intention to form a community of like-minded thinkers.”
Expanding those principles into our working definition—*manifestoes as textual elaborations of political or aesthetic beliefs which challenge existing, and attempt to constitute new religious, political or artistic institutions and movements*—seems to be about as close as we can come to “nailing down” the form. The form as we recognize it today certainly has performative and critical elements to it, but those elements have gradually emerged, as other elements have waned, only to occasionally reappear. Beebe is not too far off the mark when he argues that the formal elements of a genre like the manifesto creatès “a system of differences without positive terms” (256). However the system is not textual, or formal: it is a social system, an embedded process which writers draw on, adapt, and reproduce. Manifestoes are social acts, acts which demonstrate the creative performativity of agents working both with and against the social institutions which constrain and enable them.
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