Carnap’s Early Metatheory: Scope and Limits

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Abstract In his Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik (1928) and Abriss der Logistik (1929), Rudolf Carnap attempted to formulate the metatheory of axiomatic theories within a single, fully interpreted type-theoretic framework and to investigate a number of meta-logical notions in it, such as those of model, consequence, consistency, completeness, and decidability. These attempts were largely unsuccessful, also in his own considered judgment. A detailed assessment of Carnap’s attempt shows, nevertheless, that his approach is much less confused and hopeless than it has often been made out to be. By providing such a reassessment, the paper contributes to a reevaluation of Carnap’s contributions to the development of modern logic.

Keywords Carnap · type theory · axiomatics · metalogic · metamathematics · model theory · proof theory · consequence · derivability · domain variation · completeness · categoricity · isomorphism · formality · Gabelbarkeitssatz · a-concepts · k-concepts
1 Introduction

Rudolf Carnap’s contributions to logic prior to his *Logische Syntax der Sprache* (1934) consist, among other things, of work on the formalization of mathematical theories and their metamathematical investigation. His main contributions to this topic are contained in his logic textbook *Abriss der Logistik* (1929) and the manuscript *Untersuchungen zur Allgemeinen Axiomatik*, written in Vienna around 1928, but unpublished until the edition (Carnap 1928/2000). Carnap’s study of the metatheory of axiomatic theories developed in these texts remains interesting today. On the one hand, it is highly original, especially given the fact that his results were formulated prior to Gödel’s incompleteness results and to Tarski’s work on truth and logical consequence from the mid-1930s. It thus illustrates Carnap’s still often neglected contributions to the development of modern logic. On the other hand, his approach has interesting points of contact with parallel contributions to logic from the same period. This concerns, in particular, Tarski’s earlier work on the “methodology of the deductive sciences”, from the 1920s and early 1930s. Like Tarski, Carnap aims to give an explication of several metatheoretical concepts that play a role in modern axiomatics and to specify their logical relations.

The general aim of the present paper is to reassess Carnap’s resulting proposals in *Untersuchungen* and *Abriss*. To do this, we articulate—in more detail than the literature on this topic has done so far—the logical machinery of and the conceptual

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1 Carnap presented the main results of his *Untersuchungen* manuscript at the First Conference on Epistemology of the Exact Sciences, August 1929, in Prague. Already at the end of 1928/beginning of 1929, he considered submitting a version of the manuscript for publication, and circulated it to mathematicians and logicians, including Baer, Behmann, Gödel, Hárlén, and Fraenkel; see Awodey and Carus (2001), note 1. Behmann provided extensive comments; some of his marginalia are preserved in one of the versions of the typescript in Carnap’s papers (ASP RC 080–34–02), and longer comments in Behmann’s papers (Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Nachlaß 335 (Behmann), K. 1 I 10). Behmann at first suggested the manuscript was not ready to be published in a pure mathematics journal, but withdrew these objections after closer reading in March 1929. However, Carnap delayed revision of the manuscript and eventually, in 1930, abandoned the plan to publish it, essentially after some conversations with Tarski during his first visit to Vienna; see Reck (2007). The edition (Carnap 1928/2000) includes items RC 080–34–02, 080–34–03, and 080–34–04 from Carnap’s papers, with uniformized page, section, and theorem numbering. These original items are now available online from the Archives of Scientific Philosophy (www.library.pitt.edu/rudolf-carnap-papers). We provide references to both the (out-of-print) edition and the original typescripts. Carnap’s work on general axiomatics is also documented in Carnap (1927, 1930) and Carnap and Bachmann (1936). For a general overview of logical work on axiom systems before Carnap, see Mancosu et al (2009).

2 Carnap’s more general views on logic were in flux during the 1920s and early 30s, especially after he encountered Hilbert (1928), Hilbert and Ackermann (1928), Gödel (1929), and Tarski’s early metalogical work. Our discussion focuses on Carnap (1928/2000) and Carnap (1929), two texts that were composed largely before those influences became dominant. It should be noted, however, that Carnap followed the developments of logic in Hilbert’s school closely even before the appearance of Hilbert and Ackermann’s textbook. In fact, the *Abriss* was originally conceived as a joint project with Hilbert’s student Heinrich Behmann in the early 1920s. However, Behmann came to prefer his own, more algebraic notation (see Mancosu and Zach 2015), while Carnap thought the Peano-Russell-Whitehead notation made popular by *Principia* was preferable for a textbook presentation (Carnap to Behmann, February 19, 1924, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Nachlaß 335 (Behmann), K. 1 I 10). For additional historical background, see Awodey and Carus (2003), Awodey and Reck (2002a), and Reck (2004, 2007). A broader study of the evolution of Carnap’s metatheory up to and beyond the 1930s cannot be undertaken here; it deserves a separate paper.
assumptions behind Carnap’s attempt to formulate the metatheory of axiomatic theories in a type-theoretic framework. This involves addressing questions such as the following: How precisely did Carnap explicate metalogical notions in *Untersuchungen*, such as those of model, logical consequence, and completeness? In which ways are the results related to similar contributions by his contemporaries Behmann, Fraenkel, Hilbert, and Tarski, among others? In what ways does his account differ most significantly from today’s metalogic? And are there any important structural similarities between them, despite the conceptual differences?

In pursuing this objective, we focus on three characteristic features of Carnap’s approach in *Untersuchungen* that distinguish it from metalogic as practiced today, at least at first glance. The first feature concerns the fact that a clear-cut distinction between semantics and proof theory is still missing in Carnap’s text, as becomes evident at various points. The second feature to be reconsidered is his particular type-theoretic approach: Carnap attempts to use the same logical language both for formulating axiom systems and their consequences and for formulating metatheoretic concepts and metatheorems about such systems. Because of this feature, Carnap has repeatedly been accused of failing to make a necessary distinction between object language and metalanguage, an accusation we will reassess. A third feature characteristic of Carnap’s pre-*Syntax* logic concerns his treatment of logical languages themselves, which are not conceived of as formal or disinterpreted by him, as is usual today, but as “meaningful formalisms” that come with a fixed and intended interpretation.

In our reevaluation of Carnap’s early metatheory we aim to avoid simple, anachronistic *ex post* corrections of the logical “mistakes” contained in Carnap’s work, i.e., to point to differences between his and the now standard approach only to dismiss Carnap’s. Taking Carnap’s original definitions seriously, analyzing them in their historical context, and evaluating them, both on their own terms and in comparison to later results, is meant to contribute to a substantive, balanced, and genuinely contextual history with respect to Carnap’s contributions to logic. More particularly, our aim is to expand upon the existing literature by providing detailed treatments of Carnap’s notions of logical consequence, model, isomorphism, formality, and various “k-concepts.” But this will have repercussions on other issues as well, including the notions of completeness and decidability.

The paper is organized as follows. We begin, in section 2, by introducing the approach to axiomatic theories and their models as developed by Carnap in the *Abriss*.

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3 Our discussion in this paper builds on existing scholarship. The first phase of engagement with Carnap’s “general axiomatics” project consisted in the pioneering but overly critical work by Coffa (1991) and Hintikka (1991, 1992). Both authors criticize the “monolinguistic approach” adopted by Carnap, i.e., his attempt to express axiomatic theories and their metatheory in a single type-theoretic language. A second phase set in with Awodey’s and Carus’ important paper on the logical and philosophical analysis of the main technical result in *Untersuchungen*, the so-called *Gabelbarkeitssatz* (Awodey and Carus 2001). That paper was followed by a number of articles aimed at a more balanced account of Carnap’s project. In them, not only the limitations of his approach were acknowledged, but also its innovative aspects and its significant influence on later developments in metalogic (Awodey and Reck 2002a; Reck 2004; Goldfarb 2005; Reck 2007). The third phase consists in fairly recent scholarship in which attention is drawn to previously neglected details of Carnap’s early model theory and in which its role in the development of metalogic is spelled out more (Reck 2011; Schiemer 2012a, 2013; Schiemer and Reck 2013; Loeb 2014a,b).
which also provides the framework for his metalogical investigations in *Untersuchungen*. We then introduce the main metatheoretic notions as defined in *Untersuchungen*, focusing especially on Carnap’s explication of logical consequence and (various versions of) completeness. In section 3 we discuss in what way Carnap’s approach to semantics in *Untersuchungen* differs from the now standard approach. We aim to show that Carnap’s approach was neither idiosyncratic in its historical context, nor is it as misguided as was often claimed later. In section 4 we address a specific question regarding Carnap’s semantic notions, that of domain variation. This is a crucial aspect of the current definitions of model and consequence and, contrary to what has often been assumed, it can be accommodated within Carnap’s type-theoretic framework. Next, in section 5 we reconsider Carnap’s notion of logical consequence in relation to the proof-theoretic notion of derivability. It is here that Carnap’s approach is hardest to reconcile with the now standard perspective, and we attempt to diagnose the resulting difficulties precisely. In section 6 we focus on the notion of higher-level isomorphism, the closely related notion of “formality”, as part of his definitions of forkability and completeness, and Carnap’s proof of the *Gabelbarkeitssatz*. In section 7 we further elaborate on the lack a proper distinction between model-theoretic and proof-theoretic notions in *Untersuchungen*, here especially the difficulties caused for Carnap’s discussion of the distinction between “absolute forkability” and “constructive decidability”, or between “absolute” and “constructive” concepts more generally. Finally, Section 8 contains a brief summary of our findings, together with suggestions for possible future research.

2 Axiomatic theories and Carnap’s model theory

Carnap’s approach to formalizing axiomatic theories is discussed in detail in *Abriss* and *Untersuchungen*. In this section, we give a brief and slightly updated presentation of this basic approach. According to Carnap, axioms, axiom systems, and corresponding theorems are to be expressed in a higher-order language, more precisely a language of simple (or de-ramified) types. A formal axiom system is understood by him as a “theory schema, the empty form of a possible theory”. Here the primitive terms of a theory are represented by means of variables (of given arity and type) $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ (and not, as is usual today, by means of schematic nonlogical constants). Axioms, axiom systems, and their theorems are then symbolized as propositional functions of the form $f(X_1, \ldots, X_n)$, i.e. as open formulas in the current sense. Finally, a corresponding theory is a formula that consists of the conjunction of the relevant axioms (and not, as is usual today, of the closure of the set of axioms under deductive or semantic consequence).

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4 The content of this section will be familiar to the Carnap specialist. But it can serve as an introduction to the reader not yet familiar with Carnap’s general axiomatics program and the literature around it; we also expand on that literature with respect to some details. Similar remarks apply to the next two sections.

5 A detailed presentation of Carnap’s type-theoretic logic can be found in (Carnap 1929, §9).

6 To be more precise, Carnap describes two different ways of formalizing axiom systems in *Abriss*. According to the first approach, primitive terms are expressed in terms of nonlogical constants that already
We can consider one of Carnap’s own examples to further illustrate this approach. In the second part of Abriss, axiom systems from arithmetic, geometry, topology, and physics are formalized in a type-theoretic language. Among them are Hausdorff’s axioms for topology and the corresponding topological theory. The single “primitive sign” of this theory is a binary relation variable \( U(\alpha, x) \) that stands for “\( \alpha \) is a neighborhood of \( x \).” A second set variable \( pu \) (standing for the set of points) is then defined relative to \( U(\alpha, x) \), namely as the range of the neighborhood relation. The theory’s axioms are the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Dom}(U) & \subset \wp(pu) \quad \text{(Ax1a)} \\
U & \subset \in^{-1} \quad \text{(Ax1b)} \\
\forall \alpha, \beta, x \ (U(\alpha, x) \land U(\beta, x) \rightarrow \exists \gamma(U(\gamma, x) \land \gamma \subset (\alpha \cap \beta))) & \quad \text{(Ax2)} \\
\forall \alpha, x \ (\alpha \in \text{Dom}(U) \land x \in \alpha \rightarrow \exists \gamma(U(\gamma, x) \land \gamma \subset \alpha)) & \quad \text{(Ax3)} \\
\forall x, y (x, y \in pu \land x \neq y \rightarrow \exists \alpha, \beta (U(\alpha, x) \land U(\beta, y) \land (\alpha \cap \beta) = \emptyset)) & \quad \text{(Ax4)}
\end{align*}
\]

Notice that each of these axioms is purely logical, i.e. an open formula containing only logical primitives of the type-theoretic language and logico-mathematical constants (such as ‘Dom(\( X \))’ or ‘\( x \in \alpha \)’) that are explicitly defined in that language. In addition, the axioms contain two highlighted “primitive signs,” i.e., free variables that represent the primitive terms of the theory. Finally, Hausdorff’s theory is expressed by an open formula \( \Phi_{Hausd} \) that consists of the conjunction of Ax1 – Ax4.

In Abriss, Carnap is not yet explicit about how he understands interpretations or models for such theories. However, in Untersuchungen, as well as in Carnap (1930) and Carnap and Bachmann (1936), a detailed discussion of such models is provided. Roughly, models of a theory are treated as ordered sequences of predicates of the type-theoretic language that can be substituted for the variables representing the “primitive terms” of the theory. (Model classes, i.e., the classes of all models corresponding to a given theory, can then be considered correspondingly.) Compare, for instance, Carnap’s following characterization:

If \( f R \) is satisfied by the constant \( R_1 \), where \( R_1 \) is an abbreviation for a system of relations \( P_1, Q_1, \ldots \), then \( R_1 \) is called a “model” of \( f \). A model is a system of concepts of the basic discipline, in most cases a system of numbers (number sets, relations, and such). (Carnap 1930, p. 303)

It is not fully clear from this passage (nor from related ones) whether Carnap understands models as linguistic entities or, instead, as set-theoretic entities, i.e., relational have a predetermined (and fixed) meaning. According to the second approach (the one typical for formal axiomatics), the primitive terms defined by a theory have no predetermined meaning; they express, in Carnap’s terminology, only “improper concepts”. Such terms are symbolized by means of variables in the way described above. Compare Carnap (1929, §30b). In what follows, we will always assume this second approach to the formalization of theories.

Put informally, these axioms state that (1a) neighborhoods are classes of points, (1b) a point belongs to each of its neighborhoods; (2) the intersection of two neighborhoods of a point contains a neighborhood, (3) for every point of a neighborhood \( \alpha \) a subclass of \( \alpha \) is also a neighborhood, and (4) for two different points there are two corresponding neighborhoods that do not intersect; see Carnap (1929, §33a). Carnap’s own type-theoretic presentation of these axioms has been slightly modernized here, although we have also preserved some of his idiosyncratic notation.
structures in the current sense (which could be specified in his type-theoretic background language by using constants and predicates of the right type). The important point to note, in any case, is that satisfaction—truth in a model—is treated substitutionally by Carnap: Given a sequence of predicates of the form \( \mathcal{M} = \langle R_1, \ldots, R_n \rangle \), where each predicate \( R_i \) represents an admissible value of the \( i \)-th primitive sign of the theory \( f(X_1, \ldots, X_n) \), he maintains that the theory is true in the model \( \mathcal{M} \) if the sentence resulting from the substitution of each primitive variable by its corresponding predicate in the model, i.e., \( f(R_1, \ldots, R_n) \), “is true”, or “holds”, in his underlying type-theoretic logic. (The central interpretive issue of what such type-theoretic “truth” or “holding” amounts to for Carnap will be discussed in the next section.)

Returning to the above example, we can say that a particular model of Hausdorff’s topology is given by a tuple \( \langle pu, U \rangle \) consisting of a unary and a binary predicate that—if substituted for the two primitive variables—turn axioms Ax1–Ax4 into true sentences. If we put aside Carnap’s substitutional approach to truth for the moment, his account of formal axiomatic theories and their models looks, on the surface, like the now standard model-theoretic treatment. However, additional and important differences become evident if one pays closer attention to how exactly metatheoretic concepts are defined by Carnap within this type-theoretic framework.

Carnap’s main contribution in *Untersuchungen* is not the logical formalization of axiomatic theories presented in the previous section. Carnap’s way of formalizing theories in terms of propositional functions, and of their primitives in terms of free variables, was common at the time; similar approaches can be found in work by logicians like Russell, Tarski, and Langford, and mathematicians like Peano, Hilbert, and Huntington. Rather, it consists of his explications of several metatheoretic notions that had been used informally in mathematics since Dedekind and Hilbert. A closer look at these explications reveals several striking differences to the now standard approach. Most importantly, in contrast to current model theory and proof theory, Carnap provided metatheoretic definitions for the theories he was considering partly in the same language in which they were formulated, and partly in an informal metalanguage (German). He did not clearly distinguish between an object language (in which theories are expressed) and a metalanguage (in which model-theoretical and proof-theoretical results for such theories are stated). To a certain degree, it is justified to say that Carnap’s project is “monolinguistic” in character: it assumes a single higher-order language, more specifically a language of simple type theory (henceforth \( L_{TT} \)), in which both axiomatic theories and their metatheoretical properties are expressed.

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8 See Awodey and Carus (2001), Reck (2004), and Carus (2007) for the broader philosophical context of Carnap’s metatheoretical work in *Untersuchungen*, including its connections to the *Aufbau* (1928). Carnap’s own views on the broader philosophical significance of his general axiomatics project are elaborated, in particular, in “Eigentliche und un eigentliche Begriffe” (Carnap 1927). Further exploring this part of the background deserves a separate investigation, one that may help to account more for some of the idiosyncracies in Carnap’s metalogical approach even beyond 1930. However, we cannot take on this additional task in the present paper.

9 It should be emphasized, however, that the early critical discussion of this monolinguistic character by Coffa and Hintikka does not do justice to the subtleties of Carnap’s approach. As was first analyzed in detail in Awodey and Carus (2001), Carnap presupposes a “basic system” (*Grunddisziplin*), that is, a
Let us now consider some particular metatheoretic notions discussed in *Untersuchungen* so as to illustrate Carnap’s approach further. The notion of “consequence” is introduced as follows by him:

**Definition 1 (Consequence)** A sentence \( g \) is a consequence of axiom system \( f \) iff

\[
\forall R (f R \rightarrow g R)
\]

Consequence is here specified in terms of the material conditional, or more precisely, via a quantified conditional statement of \( \mathcal{L}_{TT} \). This differs obviously from the now standard model-theoretic approach to the notion; but there are also structural similarities. Notice, in particular, that Carnap’s definition involves universal quantification over what he takes to be models of a theory. In addition, in *Carnap (1928/2000)* he states explicitly that his notion of consequence is not to be conflated with Hilbert’s notion of derivability in a formal system.\(^\text{10}\)

Based on this definition of consequence, together with related type-theoretic definitions of further auxiliary notions (such as those of isomorphism between models and satisfiability of a theory, more on which below), Carnap specifies three notions of completeness for a theory, namely “monomorphicity”, “(non-)forkability”, and “decidability”.\(^\text{12}\) The three notions were identified earlier by Fraenkel (1928). Carnap is here responding to an open research question posed by Fraenkel, viz., what the relationship between them is. His specification of monomorphicity is the following:

**Definition 2 (Monomorphic)** An axiom system \( f \) is monomorphic iff

\[
\exists R (f R) \land \forall P \forall Q [ (f P \land f Q) \rightarrow Ism_{\Omega} (P, Q)]
\]

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\(^\text{10}\) In Carnap's own words: “\( g \) is called a 'consequence' of \( f \), if \( f \) generally implies \( g \): \( \forall R (f R \rightarrow g R) \), abbreviated: \( f \rightarrow g \). The consequence is, as is the AS, not a sentence, but a propositional function; only the associated implication \( f \rightarrow g \) is a sentence, namely a purely logical sentence, thus a tautology, since no nonlogical constants occur.” *Carnap (1930)*, p. 304.

\(^\text{11}\) In *Untersuchungen* Carnap argues that “\( g \) follows from \( f \)” and “\( g \) is derivable from \( f \) in TT”, while not identical, are equivalent. See *Carnap (1928/2000)*, p. 92); ASP RC 080–34–03, p. 41a–b. We will come back to this issue later.

\(^\text{12}\) As discussed by *Awodey and Carus* (2001) and *Awodey and Reck* (2002a), these correspond roughly to what would today be called categoricity, semantic completeness, and syntactic completeness. Then again, this correspondence must be viewed with caution, especially in the case of the latter two notions, as we will shown in section...
Here the first conjunct states, along Carnapian lines, that the theory \( f \) is satisfied, while the second conjunct asserts that all of its models are isomorphic.

A second version of completeness of an axiom system is that of “non-forkability” ("Nicht-Gabelbarkeit"). With respect to it, the crucial Carnapian definition is the following:

**Definition 3 (Forkability)** An axiom system \( f \) is forkable at a sentence \( g \) iff
\[
\exists R (f R \land g R) \land \exists S (f S \land \neg g S) \land \forall \Omega [\forall g [g \Rightarrow \text{Ism}_f (\Omega) \Rightarrow g \Omega]]
\]

The first two conjuncts in this formula state that theory \( f \) is satisfiable jointly with sentence (or propositional function) \( g \) as well as with its negation \( \neg g \). The third conjunct expresses the fact that \( g \) is “formal”: if \( g \) is true in a particular model, then it is also true in any other model isomorphic to the former. (We will come back to this notion of formality below.) A theory is then “non-forkable” if it is not forkable in this sense. In other words, it is non-forkable if there is no formal sentence \( g \) such that both \( f \land g \) and \( f \land \neg g \) are satisfiable.

Carnap’s definition of “decidability” ("Entscheidungsdefinitheit") is this:

**Definition 4 (Decidability)** An axiom system \( f \) is decidable iff
\[
\exists R (f R) \land \forall g (\text{For} (g) \Rightarrow \forall \Psi ((f \Psi \Rightarrow g \Psi) \lor (f \Psi \Rightarrow \neg g \Psi)))
\]

This definition states that a theory is decidable if it satisfiable and if for any formal sentence \( g \) (again expressed by a propositional function like above) either it or its negation is a consequence of the theory. Note that, given Carnap’s definition of consequence, this makes it another version of the later notion of semantic completeness, rather than of that of decidability in the sense of computability theory. (For a closely related discussion of Carnap’s “constructive” variant of this notion, i.e. “k-decidability”, see section 7.)

Monomorphicity, (non-)forkability, and decidability are the three central notions discussed in the first part of *Untersuchungen* (Carnap 1928/2000). Even from today’s vantage point, these notions are genuinely metatheoretic: Each of them captures a different logical property of axiomatic theories in terms of their consequences and their models. Beyond them, there exists a fourth, less well-known notion of completeness that is discussed by Carnap in (the unpublished fragments of) the projected second part of his manuscript (as well as in his subsequent papers Carnap 1930 and Carnap and Bachmann 1936). That notion is called the “completeness of the models” of a given axiom system by Carnap. It is closely related to his discussion of

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13 The central metatheorem in (Carnap 1928/2000), Carnap’s so-called Gabelbarkeitssatz, concerns then the relationship between these notions. We will turn to it in section 6.

14 What exists of part two of *Untersuchungen* is documented in Carnap’s Nachlass (RC 081–01–01 to 081–01–33). See Schiemer (2012b, 2013) for a detailed discussion of its contents.
“extremal axioms”, i.e., axioms (such as Peano’s induction axiom in arithmetic and Hilbert’s axiom of completeness in geometry) that impose a minimality or maximality constraint on the models of a theory.

Extremal axioms are characterized in the following way by Carnap:

**Definition 5 (Extremal axioms)** Let $\mathfrak{P}$ be a model of axiom system $f$. Then

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Max}(f, \mathfrak{P}) &= df \neg \exists \Omega (\mathfrak{P} \subset \Omega \land \mathfrak{P} \neq \Omega \land f(\Omega)) \\
\text{Min}(f, \mathfrak{P}) &= df \neg \exists \Omega (\Omega \subset \mathfrak{P} \land \mathfrak{P} \neq \Omega \land f(\Omega))
\end{align*}
\]

Here the first sentence states that $\mathfrak{P}$ is a maximal model of theory $f$: there are no elements in the model class of $f$ that are proper extensions of $\mathfrak{P}$. Dually, the second sentence expresses that $\mathfrak{P}$ is a minimal model of $f$: there are no elements in the model class of $f$ that are proper submodels of $\mathfrak{P}$. The “metatheoretic” character of Carnap’s extremal axioms is again clear enough: They do not speak about specific models of an axiom system, but express properties of its whole model class.$^{15}$

The type of completeness for axiomatic theories effected by a maximality constraint—let us call it “Hilbert completeness”—can then be specified by Carnap as follows:

**Definition 6 (Hilbert completeness)** An axiom system $f$ is Hilbert complete iff

\[
\forall \forall \Omega ((f \mathfrak{P} \land f \Omega \land \mathfrak{P} \subseteq \Omega) \rightarrow \mathfrak{P} = \Omega)
\]

Put informally, this says that the models of theory $f$ are all maximal, i.e., non-extendable to other models of $f$.\(^{16}\)

### 3 Metatheoretic notions in *Untersuchungen*

Before turning to a more detailed assessment of Carnap’s early metatheory, several general observations concerning his definitions of these notions are worth making. As already pointed out above, the main difference to a current model-theoretic treatment of them concerns his type-theoretic framework: Carnap’s definitions are not formulated in a separate metalanguage, but in a single higher-order language. An important

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$^{15}$ See Schiemer (2013) for a further discussion of Carnap’s extremal axioms, also Löb (2014) for an analysis of Carnap’s notion of submodel underlying his work on extremal axioms.

$^{16}$ In Carnap’s own words: “The models of an axiom system that is closed by a maximal axiom possess a certain completeness property in that they cannot be extended without violating the original axiom system.” (Carnap and Bachmann 1936, p. 82). Carnap’s main goal in part two of *Untersuchungen* is to give an explication of different types of extremal axioms and of corresponding notions of completeness. As pointed out in Schiemer (2013), the notes for it also contain results about the relationship between extremal axioms and the monomorphicity, or categoricity, of a theory.
part of this is that the “metatheoretic” generalization over models in them is expressed in terms of higher-order quantifiers in $\mathcal{L}_{TT}$.

To illustrate this aspect further, consider the current model-theoretic treatment of logical consequence. Let $\phi$ be a sentence of a given language $\mathcal{L}$ and let $\Gamma$ be a theory, i.e., a set of $\mathcal{L}$-sentences. To say that $\phi$ is a consequence of $\Gamma$ is nowadays expressed as $\Gamma \models \phi$ or, more explicitly, $\forall M(M \models \Gamma \Rightarrow M \models \phi)$. This statement is usually not expressed in $\mathcal{L}$ itself, but in a separate metalanguage, e.g. the language of set theory, in which expressions of the object language can be coded and suitable definitions of “satisfaction” or “truth in a model” given. Such an approach presupposes a strong background theory, e.g. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZFC), in which models of the theory $\Gamma$ can actually be constructed. By contrast, Carnap formulates logical consequence by means of a quantified conditional statement $\forall X(\Gamma(X) \rightarrow \phi(X))$ in a type-theoretic language $\mathcal{L}_{TT}$, as we saw. This statement does not contain model quantifiers in the now usual sense, i.e., quantifiers that range over the set-theoretic models of the theory in question. Instead Carnap uses higher-order quantifiers in $\mathcal{L}_{TT}$ that range over different possible interpretations of the primitive terms of the theory in question, in his sense of interpretation.

For all its differences, there is a striking structural similarity between Carnap’s approach and the now usual model-theoretic approach, at least in the case where $\Gamma$ is finite. To see this better, one has to look closely at how metatheoretic claims are formalized more fully today. It is a simple model-theoretic fact that the statement “$\phi$ follows from $\Gamma$” (i.e. $\Gamma \models \phi$) is equivalent to “$\Gamma^* \rightarrow \phi$ is valid” (i.e. $\models \Gamma^* \rightarrow \phi$), where $\Gamma^*$ is the conjunction of the sentences in $\Gamma$. The standard way to make the latter claim fully precise is to translate it into a set-theoretical statement that turns out to be provable in axiomatic set theory, say in ZFC. Thus, we can say that $\phi$ follows from $\Gamma$ iff $\forall M(\text{Sat}(\Gamma^* \rightarrow \phi, M)$ is a theorem of ZFC, i.e., iff

$$ZFC \vdash \forall M(\text{Sat}(\Gamma^* \rightarrow \phi, M).$$

Here the expression $\Gamma^* \rightarrow \phi$ is a coded version of the corresponding object-language statement, $M$ is a set-variable that ranges over $\mathcal{L}$-structures, and $\text{Sat}(x, y)$ is a standard satisfaction (or truth) predicate that relates $\mathcal{L}$-formulas to $\mathcal{L}$-structures.

Carnap’s account of consequence reveals itself to be very similar to this set-theoretical formalization if one makes more explicit some assumptions concerning the Grund-disziplin underlying his study of general axiomatics. Specifically, we saw in section 2 that a central semantic notion taken as primitive (or left implicit) in Carnap’s account is the notion of “being true” or “holding” in simple type theory (henceforth: TT). The truth of a theory in a particular model is then specified in terms of this notion: a theory (expressed by a propositional function) $f(X_1, \ldots, X_n)$ is “satisfied” by a sequence of
predicates \langle R_1, \ldots, R_n \rangle \) if the sentence \( f(R_1, \ldots, R_n) \) “holds” in TT. Now, what does Carnap mean by saying that a sentence of his background language “holds”?

Two reconstructions would seem to be consistent with his remarks on this topic in *Untersuchungen*. The first is to treat “holds in TT” semantically, as truth in the intended (and fixed) interpretation of the type-theoretical language, i.e., as truth in the universe of types. (We will return to this interpretation in the next section.) The second reconstruction is to treat the notion in terms of provability in the type-theoretic system described by Carnap. Thus, to say that \( f^\mathfrak{M} \) holds in the basic system can be understood as saying that \( f^\mathfrak{M} \) is derivable in TT.

Along the same lines, we can make more precise Carnap’s notion of consequence: the metatheoretic claim that \( g \) is a consequence of a theory \( f \) can be represented formally as follows:

\[
\text{TT} \vdash \forall \mathfrak{M} (f^\mathfrak{M} \rightarrow g^\mathfrak{M})
\]

Thus, to say that \( g \) is a consequence of \( f \) is simply to say that the quantified conditional statement is a theorem of TT. This type-theoretic reconstruction of the consequence relation is evidently quite similar to its now usual set-theoretic treatment. Notice, in particular, that (first-order) ZFC and Carnap’s simple type theory TT play similar foundational roles: Both are strong background theories that allow one to construct models of given mathematical theories. Moreover, the respective languages allow one to generalize over these models in term of (first-order or higher-order) quantifiers. Viewed from this perspective, the main difference between Carnap’s approach and the later model-theoretic approach is not a missing meta-language/object-language distinction. Rather, the main difference lies in the fact that the basic semantic notion of “satisfaction in a model” (corresponding to \( \text{Sat}(x, y) \) above) is taken as primitive, rather than recursively defined. A recursive definition, as model theory uses it today, would require a suitable method of coding expressions in the meta-language, and this was unavailable to Carnap in 1928. Gödel and Tarski developed precise treatments of these notions in the following years, of course, which Carnap could then make use of in his later work, as he in fact did.

4 Models and domain variation

How does Carnap’s type-theoretic explication of model-theoretic notions square with the now usual model-theoretic approach in other respects? In particular, an important interpretive issue discussed in the secondary literature concerns how the notion of domain variation is captured, and if it can be captured at all within his framework.

Domain or model variability is a core idea in standard model theory. Again, a theory is expressed in a formal or disinterpreted language that usually contains a set of non-

\[19\]It is not specified in *Untersuchungen* which basic laws and inference rules are included in TT. But Carnap holds at one point that “the basic discipline has to contain theorems (Lehrsätze) about logical, set-theoretical, and arithmetical concepts” ([Carnap 1928/2000](../Carnap/1928/2000)), p. 61, RC 1085–34–03, p. 6.
logical constants, the theory’s primitives. The semantic interpretation of this language is then specified relative to a model in the usual way: The constants are treated in terms of an interpretation function that assigns individuals from the model’s domain to individual constants, $n$-ary relations (on the domain) to $n$-ary predicates, and $n$-ary functions (on the domain) to $n$-ary function symbols. Quantified variables, finally, are interpreted as ranging over the domain of the model. A guiding idea underlying this approach is that this semantic treatment of a language (and, consequently, of a theory expressed in it) can be varied, i.e., it can be specified relative to models with different domains and corresponding interpretation functions.

Carnap’s conception of logic in the late 1920s differs clearly from such a model-theoretic account. We already saw that theories are expressed by him in a type-theoretic language $L_T$ that is not formal in the sense just mentioned but “contentual” (“inhaltlich”). In other words, he uses a fully interpreted language, one whose constants have a fixed interpretation and whose variables range over a fixed universe of objects. Carnap is not explicit about the precise nature of the semantics underlying $L_T$ in *Untersuchungen* or related writings, but—at least in 1928—it is most likely meant to involve a rich ontology, namely a full “universe of types” $V$. In light of his specification of the theory of relations and of type theory in (Carnap 1928/2000) as well as (Carnap 1929), this universe of types can be reconstructed in current terminology as a model of the form $V = \langle \{D_\tau\}, I \rangle$, where $\{D_\tau\}$ is a “frame,” i.e. a set of type domains, and $I$ an interpretation function for the constants in $L_T$.

With this in mind, we can go back to the “semantic” reconstruction of Carnap’s metatheoretical approach that was mentioned as an option in section 3. Consider again his definition of the notion of consequence. The correctness of the statement “$g$ follows from theory $f$” can now also be represented in terms of the notion of truth in the universe of types, or more formally, as:

$$V \models \forall \mathcal{R} (f(\mathcal{R}) \rightarrow g(\mathcal{R}))$$

According to this second reconstruction of Carnap’s account, a metatheoretic claim is correct (or holds in the *Grunddisziplin*) if the type-theoretic sentence expressing it is true in the underlying universe of types.

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20 As Carnap writes: “Every treatment and examination of an axiom system thus presupposes a logic, specifically a contentual logic, i.e., a system of sentences which are not mere arrangements of symbols but which have a specific meaning. [Jede Behandlung und Prüfung eines Axiomensystems setzt also eine Logik voraus, und zwar eine inhaltliche Logik, d.h. ein System von Sätzen, die nicht bloße Zeichenzusammenstellungen sind, sondern eine bestimmte Bedeutung haben.]” (Carnap 1928/2000, p. 60); RC 080–34–03, p. 4. As noted by others, *Untersuchungen* does not contain an explanation of how the *Grunddisziplin* acquires its specific interpretation. Such an explanation is given, at least in outline, in Carnap’s sketch *Neue Grundlegung der Logik* written in 1929. See Awodey and Carus (2007) for further details.

21 Carnap remains neutral in *Untersuchungen* with respect to the specific choice of the signature of his background language. He holds that arithmetical and set-theoretical terms can either be understood as “logical” primitives or introduced by explicit definition in the (pure) type-theoretic language in a logicist fashion. See (Carnap 1928/2000, pp. 60–63); RC 080–34–03, pp. 4–8.

22 See Schiemer and Reck (2013) for further details, as well as Andrews (2002) for a general discussion of the semantics of type theoretic languages.

23 It is important to emphasize that this reconstruction is most likely not how Carnap understood the phrase “statement $\phi$ holds in the basic system” in 1928. As mentioned already, the current
Against that background, the question arises of whether or not, and if so how, model domains can be varied for a given theory \( f \). To see the problem more clearly, recall that both \( f \) and the statement \( \forall R (f(R) \rightarrow g(R)) \) are formulas of the language \( \mathcal{L}_{TT} \). Let us now replace \( f \) in the sentence above by the propositional function expressing a particular mathematical theory, for instance the complex formula \( \Phi_{\text{Hausd}} \) for Hausdorff’s topological theory. The resulting metatheoretic statement will then contain two types of quantifiers that would be expressed in separate languages today: a ‘metatheoretic’ quantifier ‘\( \forall R \)’, ranging over the models of Hausdorff’s theory, and ‘object-theoretic’ quantifiers, used in the formulation of the axioms of \( \Phi_{\text{Hausd}} \). (The latter are the individual and set quantifiers in Axioms 1–4 from section 2.)

For Carnap, both quantifiers are part of the vocabulary of \( \mathcal{L}_{TT} \). It follows that both come with a fixed range. In the case of the metatheoretic quantifiers this is intended: Intuitively, we want such quantifiers to range over all models of a given theory. Carnap’s account corresponds to today’s model-theoretic approach in this respect, where model quantifiers are usually expressed in an informal but interpreted language of set theory. The situation is different for the object-theoretic quantifiers: As mentioned before, we usually want these quantifiers—which are expressed in a formal object language—to be freely re-interpretable relative to different interpretations of that language. Looking at Carnap’s approach, it is not obvious in which way such model-theoretic re-interpretability of the “object-theoretic” quantifiers contained in \( \Phi_{\text{Hausd}} \) can be effected. Put differently, how can the model-theoretic idea of domain variation (as assumed in concepts such as consequence and categoricity) be simulated in Carnap’s type-theoretic framework, if this can be done at all?

One way to simulate this kind of domain variation that was frequently employed by Carnap at the time consists in the method of quantifier relativization. The idea is to effectively restrict the range of an object-theoretic quantifier used in the formulation of a theory to the interpretation of the primitive terms of the theory. Thus, while object-language quantifiers have a fixed interpretation in Carnap’s account in general, their range can be relativized to a particular “model domain” of a theory as soon as that theory is “interpreted” in a model in Carnap’s sense. In fact, one can distinguish between two ways of relativizing quantifiers to model domains of theories along such lines: (i) the direct relativization via specific “variabilized” domain predicates (which itself comes in two sub-variants) and (ii) the indirect relativization via other primitive terms of a theory. It is instructive to look at some concrete examples from Carnap’s writings so as to understand better how these methods are used by him.

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24 This interpretive issue has been much debated in the secondary literature on Carnap’s early semantics. A central objection against his general axiomatics project, raised early on by Hintikka, was that, due to Carnap’s semantic universalism or “one domain assumption”, the idea of domain variation was simply inconceivable [Hintikka 1991]. This view has recently been corrected in work by Schiemer, Reck, and Loeb. In that work, it is shown that Carnap was well aware of the importance of capturing the notion of domain variability for his metatheoretic work and was not without resources to do so. See [Loeb 2014a, 2014b], [Schiemer 2012b, 2013], and [Schiemer and Reck 2013].
In some cases, Carnap restricts the quantifiers used in the formulation of an axiomatic theory in terms of a specific unary “domain predicate” that is introduced with the primitive terms of that theory (either as itself a primitive or as a defined predicate) 25. A typical example is the formalization of Peano arithmetic in Abriss. The “original” axiomatization presented there is based on three primitive terms, namely $nu$, $za$, $Nf$ (standing for “Zero”, “$x$ is a number” and “the successor of $x$”, respectively). By looking at Carnap’s formulation of the corresponding axioms, it becomes clear that in this case the predicate $x \in za$ functions as a domain predicate in the way described above:

- $(PA1)$ $nu \in za$
- $(PA2)$ $\forall x(x \in za \rightarrow Nf(x) \in za)$
- $(PA3)$ $\forall x(y \in za \land Nf(x) = Nf(y)) \rightarrow x = y$
- $(PA4)$ $\forall x(x \in za \rightarrow Nf(x) \neq nu) \rightarrow za \in \alpha$
- $(PA5)$ $\forall \alpha((nu \in \alpha \land \forall x(x \in \alpha \rightarrow Nf(x) \in \alpha)) \rightarrow za \in \alpha)$

In other examples from Carnap’s work on axiomatics such domain predicates are not part of the theory’s signature, but are introduced by means of explicit definitions from the primitive vocabulary. Consider again Carnap’s formulation of Hausdorff’s topological axioms introduced in Section 2: Here a set variable $pu$ (standing for “$x$ is a point”) is introduced by definition, based on the primitive term $U(x, y)$ (standing for ‘$x$ is a neighborhood of $y$’). The individual quantifiers needed in the formulation of the axioms are then, in the relevant cases, relativized to $pu$. Take axiom (Ax4) as an illustration:

- $(H4)$ $\forall x, y(x, y \in pu \land x \neq y \rightarrow \exists \alpha, \beta(U(\alpha, x) \land U(\beta, y) \land \alpha \cap \beta = \emptyset))$

Finally, there are several examples of axiom systems in Carnap’s work where unary domain predicates (or set predicates) are not employed at all. Instead, the quantifiers used in the formulation of a theory are relativized to model domains more indirectly and implicitly, in terms of other primitive terms of a theory. A typical example is a second axiomatization of “basic arithmetic” (BA) discussed in Untersuchungen (also, later, in Carnap and Bachmann 1936). Here the axioms of BA involve a single binary predicate $R(x, y)$ (for “$x$ is the successor of $y$”), as follows:

- $(BA1)$ $\forall x(y \in Dom(R) \land x \not\in Ran(R))$
- $(BA2)$ $\exists z(R(x, y) \land R(x, z) \rightarrow y = z) \land (R(x, y) \land R(z, y) \rightarrow x = z))$

Notice that in this case the object-theoretic quantifiers are effectively restricted to the field of any binary relation assigned to the primitive sign $R(x, y)$, and thus, to any given model domain of the theory BA.

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25 As pointed out by Schiemer (2013), a very similar convention of type relativization can also be found in Tarski’s work on the “methodology of the deductive sciences,” from the same period. Compare Mancosu (2010b) for a detailed discussion of Tarski’s case and the other secondary literature on the topic.

26 This approach of specifying domain predicates was first discussed by Loeb (2014a).

27 Carnap and Bachmann add a fourth meta-axiom to BA1–3 that restricts the possible interpretations of BA1–3 to minimal models, in the sense specified in Section 2. See Carnap and Bachmann (1936, p. 179).
Given these examples, two additional remarks about Carnap’s approach are in order. First, one main difference between his approach and current model theory is that instead of providing an interpretation function for un-interpreted non-logical symbols, Carnap’s approach simply quantifies over these non-logical symbols. The primitive terms of a theory are expressed by free variables; and the semantic specification of the latter, relative to a particular model, is given in terms of the substitution of these variables by interpreted constants of the basic discipline. It might seem as if this way of doing things leaves no room for another crucial ingredient of model theory, namely the domain of quantification of a model. But as we have seen, this is accommodated in Carnap’s account: domains are understood either as the extensions of a specific (primitive or defined) domain predicate or, in cases where such a predicate is absent, as the (first-order) fields of the relations assigned to the primitive signs of a given theory.

Second, it should be clear by now that the various ways of quantifier relativization used by Carnap allow him to simulate the domain variability typically assumed in model-theoretic notions (such as consequence and categoricity) despite the fact that his theories are expressed in a single fully interpreted language. Instead of reinterpreting a formal object language (including the range of the object-language quantifiers) in a separate metatheory, domain variation is effected by the relativization of the quantifiers of his single language to the primitive terms of a theory. Carnap’s systematic use of this technique shows (contra Coffa, Hintikka, and others) that his explications of various notions were genuinely model-theoretic in spirit. His proposal contained an early form of model theory that included the notion of domain variation.

5 Consequence and derivability

In modern metalogic, we use two important and related distinctions. The first, already discussed above, is that between the object language, for which we give definitions of, say, logical consequence and derivability, and the metalanguage, in which we formulate these definitions and prove corresponding results. The second distinction, 28 See Schiemer (2013) for a more detailed discussion of Carnap’s “domain as fields” conception of models. Compare Loeb (2014a) for an alternative account of Carnap’s understanding of models. Loeb’s discussion focuses on examples of axiomatic theories where a domain predicate is introduced into the language in terms of an explicit definition from the theory’s primitive signs. These defined domain predicates provide further confirmation for the interpretation of Carnap’s conception of model given in Schiemer (2013), given that in most cases a model domain is explicitly specified as the domain or range or field of a given primitive relation. Nevertheless, Loeb holds that “the domains-as-fields conception is too strict to describe Carnap’s practice.” (Loeb 2014a, p. 427) The particular example she has in mind is an axiomatization of projective geometry with one unary primitive predicate ger (for the class of ‘lines’). The domain of a model of the theory (i.e. the class of ‘points’) is not defined as the field of the relations assigned to ger, but as the union of the elements of all lines (Carnap 1929, §34). We would like to stress that this and similar examples are fully in accord with the interpretation of model domains given in Schiemer (2013). For a more detailed analysis of model domains of lower types see, in particular, the discussion of Carnap’s notes on “domain analysis” from part two of Untersuchungen in Schiemer (2013) pp. 506-508.)
to be discussed further now, is that between semantic notions, such as truth, consequence, and satisfiability, and proof-theoretic notions, such as proof, derivability, and consistency. One of the main tasks of metalogic is to relate these different notions, e.g., when proving soundness and completeness. Even before Tarski made the object/metalanguage distinction a topic of explicit study, logicians respected that distinction implicitly (at least to a large extent). For example, Carnap’s *Untersuchungen* is written in German (the meta-language), in which definitions for his type-theoretic language (the object-language) are formulated and corresponding results proved. As will be clarified further in the next section, Carnap was also aware of the distinguishing between truth and proof. Yet both distinctions were neither as sharply drawn nor their importance as fully recognized by him as one would expect today.

As just noted, Carnap formulated his relevant definitions in a metalanguage. But instead of defining notions such as consequence and satisfiability by means of metalinguistic notions, he defined them by using sentences of his *Grunddisziplin*, thereby taking for granted that its sentences express determinate propositions. For instance, recall the definition of satisfiability of an axiom system $f$, which we encountered in passing above: “$f$ is satisfiable iff $\exists R f R$.” From today’s viewpoint, this definition fails to distinguish between expressions of an object language and expressions that now belong to a separate metalanguage, such as the quantifier “$\exists R$” and predication of the relation “satisfies” to $R$ and $f$. In addition, Carnap talks about “values” of the variables $R$—his models, which can be exhibited and investigated in the metalanguage. It is in the latter connection that his approach led to several further confusions and false starts, as a closer look at *Untersuchungen* will reveal.

One problem Carnap did not appreciate in this context is that describing a model of $f$ in his metalanguage and proving $\exists R f R$ in type theory are by no means the same thing. That is to say, a metatheoretic description of a model of $f$ does not, by itself, result in terms in type theory that can be substituted for $R$ in $f R$, and with it $\exists R f R$, can be proved from the axioms of type theory. Conversely, type theory may prove $\exists R f R$ without a description of the model being available in the metalanguage. Having said that, Carnap’s definition of satisfiability is acceptable if two additional assumptions can be made: that all relevant mathematical constructions which can be carried out in the metalanguage can also be formalized in type theory; and that what type theory proves is true. It is not implausible to suppose that Carnap took these assumptions for granted. The first assumption received ample evidence from the success of Russell and Whitehead’s work in formalizing mathematics, the second from the belief that the axioms of type theory express logical truths (at least those of the simple theory of types).

A second problematic aspect, already mentioned briefly above, is that the satisfaction relation is not explicitly defined by Carnap. Indeed, instead of taking it to be a relation in the metalanguage between the axiom system $f$, seen as a syntactic object, and the model $R_1$, seen as a semantic object, and then using a recursive definition along Tarskian lines, he simply assumes that “$R_1$ satisfies $f$” is meaningful. In section 2.3 of *Untersuchungen* Carnap defines an “admissible model” of $f R$ as a system of

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29 Carnap (1928/2000), p. 95; RC 080–34–02, §13, p. 42.
relations $R_1$ consisting of “allowed values” of the variables in $R$, i.e., a system of relations of the same type as the types of the variables in $R$. If it is, he writes, then the propositional function $fR$ applied to $R_1$ does or doesn’t “hold”. This is imprecise by today’s standards, although it can be interpreted in a way that it is correct, as we saw. If $R_1$ is an admissible model of $fR$, Carnap also sometimes writes that $fR_1$ is “true” or “false”. This is worse, since “$R_1$” is not an expression of type theory, and hence, neither is $fR_1$.

To some degree we may forgive Carnap this lapse, since everyone at the time spoke this imprecisely. For instance, logicians in the Hilbert school also considered basic semantic notions, such as satisfaction and truth, and spoke freely of formulas of first order logic being “satisfied” in certain domains, or of a formula being “true” for a particular value of its free variables, as if sets and relations could all automatically serve as names for themselves in the object language. Moreover, when satisfaction in a particular model is not at issue but only general claims about satisfaction and models, this problem does not arise: all the model variables are then bound by type-theoretic quantifiers and the statements in question are sentences of type theory. In that sense (and assuming that the sentences of type theory are meaningful and express logical propositions), Carnap was justified in regarding his results to be theorems.

A third crucial difficulty in Carnap’s definitions of metalogical concepts concerns his quantification over propositional functions. For instance, Carnap’s definition of “$f$ is inconsistent” is given by the following type-theoretic sentence:

$$\exists h \forall R (fR \rightarrow (hR \land \neg hR))$$

When defining “$f$ is satisfiable” in terms of $\exists R fR$, this at least expresses what is intended (the existence of a satisfying sequence of relations of the right types). By contrast, the definition here does not. For $h$ is a variable ranging over higher-type objects, it seems, and not, as would be needed, a variable ranging over syntactic expressions. Again, Carnap is not alone in being unclear about this aspect at the time. Just as in *Principia Mathematica*, his $h$ is a variable ranging over propositional functions; and Russell and Whitehead were notoriously vague about whether quantification over propositional functions was supposed to be thought of substitutionally or objectually. But there are more profound problems with Carnap’s approach to consistency.

Today we use the terms “consistent” and “inconsistent” as proof-theoretic notions: an axiom system is inconsistent if there is a sentence $\varphi$ such that $\varphi \land \neg \varphi$ can be proved from it. Carnap’s definition, by contrast, uses his own notion of consequence: an axiom system is inconsistent if there is a sentence $\varphi$ such that $\varphi \land \neg \varphi$ is a consequence of it. Now, this was an idiosyncratic definition even when Carnap was writing. We know that Hilbert, who put great emphasis on the consistency of axiom systems (and proofs thereof), already defined it proof-theoretically at that time. Carnap was certainly aware of Hilbert’s work and, one would assume, intended to provide a def-

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30 However, the usage of logical terminology was by no means settled then. For example, Skolem (1920) used the term “inconsistent [widerspruchsvoll]” to mean unsatisfiable; even Hilbert himself at times uses “$A$ is a consequence of [folgt aus] $B$” to mean “$A \rightarrow B$ holds.”
inition that matched Hilbert’s. The fact that he thought his definition managed to do that seems to be the result of several further confusions.

To begin with, Carnap thought that provability in Hilbert’s sense and consequence as defined by him coincide. In fact, he presented an argument for this: Section 2.2 of *Untersuchungen* contains an explicit comparison of his approach with Hilbert’s. Carnap establishes there that, if $gx$ can be proved from the axiom system $fx$ in Hilbert’s sense, then $\forall x(fx \rightarrow gx)$ can be proved, and conversely. He concluded that the concept of consequence defined by “is provable from” and his own notion of consequence coincide. But this inference is unwarranted, for two reasons. One is technical: Carnap’s notion of consequence relies on a much stronger system than Hilbert’s, and, e.g., the provability of $\forall R(fR \rightarrow gR)$ in type theory does not obviously guarantee the provability of the formula $fR \rightarrow gR$ in Hilbert’s system. The other reason is more fundamental: Carnap’s argument establishes that $gR$ is provable from $fR$ in Hilbert’s system iff $\forall R(fR \rightarrow gR)$ is provable in type theory. But that is not enough to establish that Carnap’s consequence coincides with Hilbert’s provability. For that, we would need to show that $gR$ is provable from $fR$ iff $\forall R(fR \rightarrow gR)$ is true in type theory.

In section 2.4 of *Untersuchungen*, Carnap considers the relationship between consistency and satisfaction. In particular, he argues that every inconsistent axiom system is unsatisfiable (Theorem 2.4.1), and conversely, that every consistent axiom system is satisfiable (Theorem 2.4.8). The definitions at work here are Carnap’s, of course, not the ones used today. Thus, Theorem 2.4.1 establishes, in type theory, that

$$\exists h \forall R(fR \rightarrow (hR \land \neg hR)) \rightarrow \neg \exists R fR,$$

(1)

and Theorem 2.4.2 the reverse direction, in the form of its contrapositive,

$$\neg \exists h \forall R(fR \rightarrow (hR \land \neg hR)) \rightarrow \exists R fR.$$

(2)

Carnap’s proofs consist of several elementary logical steps. For instance, to establish (2), he argues as follows: Assume the antecedent, $\neg \exists h \forall R(fR \rightarrow (hR \land \neg hR))$. Pushing the initial negation across the quantifiers and using $\neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi \land \neg \psi)$, we obtain $\forall h \exists R(fR \land \neg(hR \land \neg hR))$. As $f$ only appears in the left conjunct and $h$ only in the right, we can shift quantifiers and obtain $\exists R fR \land \forall h(\neg hR \land \neg hR)$. The left conjunct is the desired conclusion. So indeed Carnap’s proofs are correct—but the results do not mean what we mean by “consistency implies satisfiability”.

Carnap’s argument for the equivalence of Hilbert’s notion of provability and his own notion of consequence does yield the following: If an axiom system is inconsistent, i.e., can prove $\varphi \land \neg \varphi$ for some formula $\varphi$, then type theory proves the antecedent

31 Carnap (1928/2000), p. 90ff; RC 080–34–03, §12, p. 39ff.

32 If the variables in $R$ are at most second order, then the result holds. In that case, assuming soundness of type theory, $fR \rightarrow gR$ is valid in first-order logic. Thus its provability in Hilbert’s system follows from Gödel’s completeness theorem, also from a proof-theoretic conservativity proof, neither of which were available to Carnap yet.

33 §2.4 of Carnap (1928/2000), p. 96ff) is §14 in RC 080–34–03, p. 46ff; Theorem 2.4.1 is Satz 1 on p. 47; Theorem 2.4.8 is Satz 8 on p. 49.
of Theorem 2.4.1, \( \exists h \forall R (fR \rightarrow (hR \land \neg hR)) \),” and hence also the consequent. But the negation of “\( f \) is (Hilbert) inconsistent” is only: for no formula \( \varphi \) does \( f \) prove \( \varphi \land \neg \varphi \). It does not follow that type theory proves \( \neg \exists h \forall R (fR \rightarrow (hR \land \neg hR)) \) (and Carnap does not give an argument for the latter). In fact, by Gödel’s incompleteness theorem we know that this is false when the axiom system includes second-order quantifiers: take \( f \) to be the conjunction of the (finitely many) second-order axioms of \( \text{PA}^2 \) together with a false-in-\( \mathbb{N} \)-but-not-refutable sentence, such as \( \neg \text{Con}(\text{PA}^2) \). This sentence is consistent but unsatisfiable, as Gödel showed. Hence \( \exists R fR \) is false, and so is \( \neg \exists h \forall R (fR \rightarrow (hR \land \neg hR)) \), since the two are equivalent, as Carnap showed. So, while provability (in particular, inconsistency) in our sense implies provability of consequence (and inconsistency) in Carnap’s sense, unprovability (and consistency) in our sense do not imply provable consequence (provable consistency) in Carnap’s. In fact, full type theory is strong enough to prove \( \neg \exists R fR \).

As we have seen, there are a number of unclarities, gaps, and other problems in Carnap’s approach to derivability. At this point, the question arises whether what he did can be interpreted charitably, or can be reconstructed so that it becomes correct. Compare here what Gödel writes in the introduction to his dissertation:

If we replace the notion of logical consequence (that is, of being formally provable in finitely many steps) by implication in Russell’s sense, more precisely, by formal implication, where the variables are the primitive notions of the axiom system in question, then the existence of a model for a consistent axiom system (now taken to mean one that implies no contradiction) follows from the fact that a false proposition implies any other, hence also every contradiction (whence the assertion follows at once by indirect argument). (Gödel 1929, p. 63)

What Gödel says here is correct, of course, but it is not quite what Carnap showed (Gödel credits the observation to Carnap): for \( \exists h \ldots \) still does not—as pointed out above—quantify over the possible consequences of the axioms, i.e., over formulas. And even when the quantifier is given a substitutional reading, the possible values of \( h \) are all expressions of type theory with only the variables in \( R \) free. (This is relevant also in the case of the Gabelbarkeitssatz, see section 6 for more on this point.)

Overall, Carnap’s attempt to characterize provability in terms of (provability in type theory of) a corresponding sentence expressing consequence fails. Once more, Carnap mistakenly assumed that unprovability (consistency) implied provability in type theory of the negation of the corresponding sentence. He also mistakenly assumed that what should be a meta-level quantification over formulas can be expressed on the object level—in type theory—by a quantification over propositional functions. Finally, there is a further difference between Carnap’s approach and the now common one, a difference that relates to the implicit meta-level quantification over axiom systems. When proving completeness, say, we prove it for all axiom systems; and when such a proof is formalized in a formal system (say, \( \text{ZFC} \)), the formalization contains a quantifier over representations of axiom systems (or at least, representations of single axioms). Carnap never does that—and this is noteworthy also for another reason. He could have expressed his “completeness” theorem (that consistency implies satisfia-
bility, in his sense of the terms) in a single sentence of type theory, viz.,

$$\forall f (\neg \exists h (f R \rightarrow (h R \land \neg h R)) \rightarrow \exists R f R)$$

Moreover, his proof for it would have gone through. The fact that he did not do that, despite the fact that he had no qualms about formalizing the quantification over potential contradictions $h$ in general, suggest that he might have had an inkling that such a quantification is problematic.

### 6 Isomorphism and Carnap’s notion of “formality”

One important detail of Carnap’s *Untersuchungen* that has not yet received significant attention in the literature is Carnap’s notion of formality (already mentioned above in passing). Carnap motivates the need for this notion in Section 2.5. In order to properly capture independence from an axiom system, it must be possible to restrict the propositional functions considered (as being a consequence of, as being inconsistent with, or as being compatible with the axiom systems). The reason is that propositional functions in general can make reference to elements of the *Grunddisziplin*. For instance, a propositional function $h R$ may express “the field of $R$ contains the number 20.” Then for any satisfiable axiom system $f R$, both $h R$ and $\neg h R$ are compatible with $f R$, since any model of $f R$ which contains 20 in the field of its relations is isomorphic to one that does not. Hence, if no restriction is put on the propositional function $h$, every axiom system is “forkable” by such an $h$. In addition, an axiom system itself may make reference to the elements of the fields of its relations. As a consequence, such an axiom system $f$ may be satisfied by some model $\mathfrak{R}_1$ but not by another model $\mathfrak{R}_2$ even when $\mathfrak{R}_1$ and $\mathfrak{R}_2$ are isomorphic.

Carnap’s main aim in *Untersuchungen* was a proof of his *Gabelbarkeitssatz*: every monomorphic (categorical) axiom system is non-forkable, and conversely. Even for just the left-to-right direction of this equivalence to hold, the scope of axioms systems must be restricted to those that do not make reference to the specifics of the domain they are describing (what Carnap calls their “Bestand”); and similarly for potential forking sentences. As formalized today, this is done by restricting the language in which the axiom system, on the one hand, and its potential consequences, on the other hand, are formulated. Carnap’s definitions and results are schematic, i.e., he gives instructions for how to express, e.g., that $f R$ is monomorphic. But the sentence in type theory that expresses that fact depends for its form on $f R$. In particular, this sentence quantifies over the variables appearing in $f R$, and so the quantifier prefix changes depending on the number, order, and types of the variables in $f R$. Such definitions could in principle be restricted to propositional functions $f R$ that syntactically do not contain certain elements, such as constants of the *Grunddisziplin*. However,
wherever Carnap needs quantification in type theory over propositional functions, this is no longer possible. For example, in the definition of “\(f\) is forkable,”

\[
\exists h (\exists R (f R \land h R) \land \exists S (f S \land \neg h S)) \ldots,
\]

the quantifier \(\exists h\) cannot be restricted to only \(h\)'s of a certain form, because it does not actually quantify over expressions but over higher-type objects.

Carnap's response to this problem is to define a property of axiom systems and of their potential consequences meant to capture the idea that they should only specify “structural” properties of their models, as opposed to “contentual” properties such as whether 20 is a member of the domain or not. Given a propositional function \(f R\), a value of \(R\) of the correct types is an “admissible model;” and it is a “model of \(f R\)” if it is admissible and satisfies \(f R\). Carnap now defines a propositional function to be “formal” if every admissible model that is isomorphic to a model of \(f R\) is also a model of \(f R\). In type theory, this can be expressed by

\[
\text{For}(f) \equiv \forall P \forall Q ((f P \land \text{Iso}(P, Q)) \rightarrow f Q),
\]

(see p. 124).[36] Here \(\text{Iso}(P, Q)\) is given by Carnap’s definition of \(q\)-level isomorphism of the models \(P\) and \(Q\). (Carnap used this notion to define isomorphism of models for arbitrary sequences of variables of arbitrary types, as discussed further below.)

Carnap's resulting restriction of his central theorems, especially the \textit{Gabelbarkeitssatz}, to formal axiom systems and formal consequences is essential to the proofs he gave for them. In fact, they make these proofs almost trivial. For instance, Theorem 3.4.3 in \textit{Untersuchungen}, that every forkable axiom system is polymorphic (i.e., not monomorphic), is proved as follows.[37] An axiom system \(f\) is forkable if there is a formal \(g\) such that both \(g\) and \(\neg g\) are compatible with \(f\). That is to say, there is a model \(\mathcal{P}\) of \(f \land g\) and a model \(\mathcal{Q}\) of \(f \land \neg g\). In other words, \(\mathcal{P}\) and \(\mathcal{Q}\) are both models of \(f\), \(\mathcal{P}\) is a model of \(g\), and \(\mathcal{Q}\) is a model of \(\neg g\). Because \(g\) is formal, if \(\mathcal{P}\) and \(\mathcal{Q}\) were isomorphic, since \(\mathcal{P}\) is a model of \(g\), \(\mathcal{Q}\) would also have to be a model of \(g\). And since \(\mathcal{Q}\) is a model of \(\neg g\), \(\mathcal{P}\) and \(\mathcal{Q}\) are not isomorphic. The crucial fact used here is that, because \(g\) is formal, if it is true in one model it is also true in any isomorphic one. Note that this fact needs no proof here; it simply follows from the definition of “formal.”

Theorem 3.4.2, the converse direction of the \textit{Gabelbarkeitssatz}, is more intricate.[38] It states that every polymorphic axiom system is forkable. In its standard formulation today—against which the “correctness” of Carnap’s result is often measured—this claim depends crucially on the language in which the axiom system is formulated. If the language is first-order, the corresponding claim is false: because of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, every first-order theory with infinite models has non-isomorphic models, even when that theory is semantically complete (i.e., when every sentence in the language is either a consequence of or inconsistent with it). But working along Carnap’s lines, there is no clear way in which the language of the axiom

\[\text{RC 080–34–03, p. 75.}\]

\[\text{§26, Satz 3, RC 080–34–03, p. 86.}\]

\[\text{§26, Satz 2, RC 080–34–03, p. 86.}\]
system can be restricted to first-order. While we can consider a theory with only first-order relations, the axioms themselves may always contain quantified variables of arbitrary types. Once more, Carnap’s definition of an axiom system’s being forkable is given in type theory itself:

$$\exists h (\text{For}(h) \land \exists R (f R \land h R) \land \exists S (f S \land \neg h S))$$

However, as was indicated by Awodey and Carus (2001) and Awodey and Reck (2002), the truth of this sentence does not imply the existence of a propositional function with only the variables $R$ free. Moreover, to prove it in type theory, it is not required to exhibit such a propositional function, but only to show in type theory that a value of $h$ with the requisite properties exists.

Carnap’s actual proof of this questionable direction of the Gabelbarkeitssatz is a perfectly valid line of reasoning in type theory. He did, however, misunderstand and overestimate its significance. Carnap begins by assuming the antecedent of the conditional to be proved, i.e., that there are non-isomorphic models of $f$:

$$\exists P \exists Q (f P \land f Q \land \neg \text{Iso}(P, Q))$$

He then picks $\text{Iso}(R, P)$ as the required $h$. If we insist on reading Carnap as attempting to prove a result for first-order logic, we would locate his mistake here: $\text{Iso}(R, P)$ is not a forking sentence of the required kind. That is, $\text{Iso}(R, P)$ is not a formula in which the only free variables are $R$. The problem is with the $P$: Either we think of it syntactically, as a (sequence of) variable(s). But these occur in the scope of the quantifier $\exists P$, and so do not have the same function when considered outside this context. Or, we might take Carnap to be arguing semantically. In that case, $P$ is not a sequence of bound variables, but a value of such a sequence of variables and so not properly “part of” $h$. However, if we work in type theory, as Carnap does, there is no need to isolate the propositional function $h$. If there is a model $\mathfrak{P}$ of $f$, then there is a class of models isomorphic to $\mathfrak{P}$, and this is an admissible value of the higher-type variable $h$. This value satisfies $\text{For}(h)$, and that fact can be proved in type theory just from the definition of $h$ and $\text{For}$, without making use of the definition of $\text{Iso}_q$. As $\mathfrak{P}$ is isomorphic to itself, and $Q$ by assumption is not, $h\mathfrak{P}$ and $\neg h\mathfrak{Q}$; so the sentence expressing that $f$ is forkable follows. Note that the notion of isomorphism does almost no work here. It is needed only to prove that $\mathfrak{P}$ is isomorphic to itself, which is used in the last step, as well as to establish that $h$ is formal—but since formality is defined in terms of isomorphism, that is also trivial.

We mentioned before that Carnap’s restriction on the definition of forkability relieves him of the need to actually prove that isomorphic models satisfy the same propositional functions: this is because he only considered formal propositional functions, for which this property holds by definition. But then, the direction of the Gabelbarkeitssatz that remains true when re-interpreted using current definitions—namely that isomorphic structures are equivalent in the sense of satisfying the same propositional functions—cannot directly be “extracted” from Carnap’s proofs. Indeed, this claim is false given Carnap’s setup, because in the language of the Grunddisziplin a propositional function may require its models to contain specific objects, e.g., the
number 20, and so won’t be satisfied by a model that does not, even if that model is isomorphic to a model that satisfies it.

In order to make the result true without the restriction to formal propositional functions (which, again, makes the result true but trivial), one would have to restrict the language of the Grunddisziplin. This is possible and, in fact, was done by [Lindenbaum and Tarski (1934/35)]. In contrast to Carnap, they were very clear on the distinction between the correct result,

$$\forall P \forall Q (\text{Iso}(P, Q) \rightarrow hP \equiv hQ)$$

where $h$ is considered a schematic variable for propositional function expressions with the right kind of restrictions, and the incorrect

$$\forall h \forall P \forall Q (\text{Iso}(P, Q) \rightarrow hP \equiv hQ)$$

As Lindenbaum and Tarski point out, the latter is not only not provable but refutable. Why is that so? Because, again, type theory proves the existence of a value of $h$ for which it is false: Take the class of all models of the right type which contain 20 in the field of one of its relations.

Neither direction of Carnap’s proofs of the Gabelbarkeitssatz actually made substantive use of the general notion of isomorphism that Carnap defined. Nevertheless, it is interesting to take a look at what his definition of isomorphism is. Although both the term and the basic idea behind it predate Carnap’s discussion, it is instructive to reconsider his attempt at a general definition for two reasons: First, it is, as far as we know, the first attempt at defining this notion for higher type structures; and second, it gives further insight into the notion of model at work in his writings.

The notion of isomorphism (and the crucial metalogical property based on it, namely that of categoricity) goes back at least to Veblen [1904]. Russell and Whitehead defined isomorphisms between relations in *Principia Mathematica*, and the same approach can be applied to the relations that constitute Carnap’s models of axiom systems. This is, indeed, the insight from which Carnap proceeds. A relation isomorphism $S$ between two relations $R$ and $R'$, in the Russell-Whitehead sense, is a relation which is one-one (i.e., bijective) and which has the property that whenever $aRb$ there are $a'$ and $b'$ so that $aSa'$, $bSb'$, and $a'R'b'$, as well as conversely. Note here that, in the Russell-Whitehead theory, a relation $R$ is given just by its graph: it is not specified as a relation on some domain. Consequently, there can be no object that is part of the “domain” of $R$ but is not related to any object. Moreover, isomorphisms are not required to relate any objects that do not participate in the relations $R$ and $R'$.

If, as Carnap did and as was common at the time, one takes relations in this sense to be the interpretations of the non-logical constants of an axiom system, it is never necessary to also specify an individual domain for the models of the axiom system: a model is simply all the relations that interpret the individual non-logical constants taken together. This is, of course, closely related to the issue discussed above about

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39 Compare Awodey and Reck (2002a) and the references in it.
domain variability in Carnap’s general axiomatics. Indeed, for none of the axiom systems considered in Carnap’s *Abriss*, for instance, would it be necessary to entertain the possibility of objects that are not in the fields of their relations. When quantification over the domain is necessary, it is formalized using a relativized quantifier, where the relativization clause uses either a primitive non-logical constant or a defined one, e.g., restriction to the field of a primitive non-logical relation.

As Carnap wanted to provide a general theory of axiom systems in *Untersuchungen*, he needed a general definition of when two models are isomorphic. No such general definition had been given before. Hence Carnap had to provide one himself. For axiom systems involving only one non-logical relation, the notion of relation isomorphism mentioned above suffices. But in the absence of a domain specification as part of the model it is not straightforward to define a notion of model isomorphism for multiple relations. If these relations are all just first-order, it suffices to require the isomorphism $S$ to preserve all the relations. Carnap does not do this directly. Instead, he only requires that the relations of the two models are pairwise isomorphic, as well as that the individual relation isomorphisms agree on the intersection of the fields of those relations.

Carnap may have intended this only as a first stab at a definition, to be improved later on; but it also reflects a limitation of the type system with which Carnap is working (which, admittedly, does not yet appear if all relations are first order). For instance, if the axiom system contains a one-place first-order predicate constant $P(0)$ and a one-place second-order predicate constant $Q((0))$, then the values of the corresponding variables are a class of individuals and a class of classes of individuals. But because types are not cumulative in Carnap’s system, no relation can be a bijection with a field that contains both individuals and classes, i.e., no single $S$ can be a relation isomorphism between both $P$ and $Q$.

A natural solution to this difficulty caused by Carnap’s type system is to require one isomorphism for $P$ and another for $Q$. Of course, this will not do yet, as Carnap explains himself. Merely relating the classes falling under $Q$ in one model with those falling under $Q$ in the other model is not enough: the classes themselves must be isomorphic. Carnap accomplishes this in *Untersuchungen* by using his definition of a $q$-correlator, i.e., a relation isomorphism for relations of $q$-th order. Moreover, the isomorphisms for the individual variables must also match up with each other. Carnap accomplishes the latter by requiring a $q$-isomorphism between models to be a single relation on individuals that is a $q$-correlator for each $q$th order relation in the model. The resulting definition is more general, as well as correct.

The first time the notion of isomorphism for higher-type models is considered in print appears to be in Tarski (1935). However, it is not defined in nearly as much detail there as in Carnap’s *Untersuchungen*. The same definition occurs also in Lindenbaum and Tarski.

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Typically isomorphisms of models was discussed only for models of a particular axiom systems, and often these only contained a single non-logical primitive. For instance, Veblen (1904) considered a version of geometry where the single primitive is a three-place collinearity predicate relating points. Neumann (1925) also discussed the (non)categoricity of his axiom system; but his axioms were formulated in German and both what counts as a model and what counts as an isomorphism was left vague.
The similarity of Carnap’s and Tarski’s approaches to isomorphism does not stop there. In fact, Tarski’s project of a general metatheory of deductive systems in the 1930s is similar to Carnap’s in many other respects as well. Tarski carries out his general investigations of “deductive systems”, i.e., axiom systems, in a metatheory similar to Carnap’s: the simple theory of types. An axiom system for Tarski, as for Carnap, is a propositional function in the sense discussed above.

Indeed, as late as 1940 Tarski writes the following:

Let us consider a system of non-logical sentences and let, for instance “$C_1$”, “$C_2$”, . . . “$C_n$” be all the nonlogical constants which occur. If we replace these constants by variables “$X_1$”, “$X_2$”, . . . “$X_n$” our sentences are transformed into sentential functions with $n$ free variables and we can say that these functions express certain relations between $n$ objects or certain conditions to be fulfilled by $n$ objects. Now we call a system of $n$ objects $O_1$, $O_2$, . . . $O_n$ a model of the considered system of sentences if these objects really fulfill all conditions expressed in the obtained sentential functions. […] We now say that a given sentence is a logical consequence of the system of sentences if every model of the system is likewise a model of this sentence. (Tarski 1940)

This is the very same definition that Tarski gave in his seminal paper on logical consequence five years earlier (1936). In his 1940 talk Tarski goes on to define categoricity in the same way in which Carnap defined monomorphicity:

In order to obtain the second variant of the concept of categoricity, we shall confine ourselves for the sake of simplicity, to such a case in which the considered system of sentences is finite and contains only one nonlogical constant, say “$C$”. Let “$P(C)$” represent the logical product of all these sentences. “$C$” can denote, for instance, a class of individuals, or a relation between individuals, or a class of such classes or relations etc. […] We can now correlate with the semantical sentence stating that our system of sentences is semantically categorical an equivalent sentence formulated in the language of the deductive theory itself. This is the following sentence […] in symbols:

$$\forall X \forall Y (P(X) \land P(Y) \rightarrow X \sim Y)$$

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41 It coincides, that is, except for a difference Tarski stresses: his definition requires the isomorphism to be a bijection of the entire domain of individuals, not of just of individuals “used” in the model.

42 It bears emphasizing here that, while in that paper Tarski alluded to Gödelian arithmetization of syntax, he did so only in order to explain how derivability from the axioms of a formal system according to given rules can be formalized in metalogic; but this did not play a role in his definition of consequence. In particular, Tarski did not give a uniform definition of “follows from” for an object language in a formal metalanguage which can refer to and quantify over all models and expressions, in contrast to his general definition of truth. Of course, Tarski’s discussion of consequence goes much beyond Carnap’s and is more nuanced in other respects, e.g., in its considerations of the distinction between derivability and consequence, in terms of which constants should count as logical, etc. He was able to accomplish that because Gödel had in the meantime identified the gap between what follows from and what can be derived from deductive theories. Tarski was also prompted to do it by Carnap’s Logical Syntax.
Now we say that the considered system of sentences is categorical with respect to its logical basis . . . if the sentence formulated above is logically valid.

By this time—due to Gödel’s seminal work, but also Carnap’s contributions—the need for a proper way of talking about expressions of the axiom system in a metalanguage, in which general questions about axiomatic systems are pursued (in particular, quantification over such expressions to properly express derivability, consistency, and completeness), was clear, and the proper solution (arithmetization) was properly understood as well. At the same time, what is evident from Tarski’s writings on the subject into the 1940s is that a mature approach of model theory was not yet available; semantics was done very much in the way Carnap had proposed.

7 a- and k-concepts

As we saw earlier, Carnap’s attempt to justify his identification of provability with (the derivability in type theory of) his statement expressing consequence was unsuccessful. The problem here extends to his notion of consistency. Carnap does not properly locate the relevant definitions in the metalanguage (so as to use an inductive, syntactic notion of proof). Hence his proof of “completeness” does not establish the connection we expect today from such a theorem, namely one between proof theory and model theory. At best, that proof can be seen as an attempt to show that the existence of a model for an axiom system is equivalent, in type theory, to the absence of a contradiction that is a consequence of the axioms. Carnap’s approach also remained an unsuccessful attempt due to the problematic nature of the type-theoretic quantification over propositional functions required for formulating “there is a contradiction which follows from the axiom system”.

Having said that, Carnap was well aware of the difference between there being such a contradiction and actually having found one. This difference loomed large in the foundational debate between Hilbertian “formalists” and Brouwerian intuitionists at the time. Carnap attempted to capture it, and to do justice to it within his general axiomatics, by distinguishing “a-concepts” from “k-concepts.” The latter are “constructive” in the sense that they require either a witness or a procedure to identify a witness; the former are “absolutist” in the sense that they only require the truth of an existential claim but not an actual witness. Carnap’s a-concepts can be inter-related within type theory by considering corresponding conditional sentences. (It can be proved that they are related in certain ways by proving those sentences type-theoretically.) For instance, he is able to prove the equivalence of “a-consistent” and “a-satisfied” along such lines: the sentences \( \exists h \forall R (f R \rightarrow (h R \land \neg h R)) \) are provably equivalent in type theory.

k-Concepts can also be so related, at least in some cases. For that purpose, Carnap has to pick what he calls a “criterion” for a particular k-concept to apply. In the case

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43 Tarski uses \( X \sim Y \) as an abbreviation for the the isomorphism relation.

44 We leave aside here, once again, the problems arising from taking \( \exists h \) to correctly express the existence of a formula (“propositional function” in that sense).
of concepts involving existential claims, Carnap chooses as criterion being able to exhibit witnesses. For instance, an axiom system is k-satisfied if a model can be exhibited, and it is k-inconsistent if a propositional function \( h \) can be given that is provably formal and for which both \( \forall R (fR \rightarrow hR) \) and \( \forall R (fR \rightarrow \neg hR) \) are provable. When the k-concept involves a general claim, Carnap requires that the formula expressing it is provable in type theory. Thus, an axiom system is k-empty if \( \neg \exists R fR \) is provable, and it is k-consistent if \( \neg \exists h \forall R (fR \rightarrow (hR \land \neg hR)) \) is provable. It follows—and Carnap acknowledges this explicitly—that even when a partition into a-concepts is exhaustive (e.g., every axiom system is either a-satisfied or a-empty), the corresponding k-concepts do not necessarily form an exhaustive disjunction: e.g., an axiom system is neither k-satisfied nor k-inconsistent if we neither have a model nor a proof of a contradiction.

When Carnap considers a- and k-concepts in parallel, he usually compares how properties of axiomatic systems can be defined classically and how they can be defined intuitionistically, as well as which results can be established classically and which intuitionistically. In these comparisons, he comes close to making a distinction that we now consider natural and important for metalogic: that between truth and provability. However, he does not quite get there. Even though, e.g., the definition of k-inconsistency involves provability of a contradiction, it requires more than our notion of inconsistency: in line with an intuitionistic (constructive) interpretation, the contradiction must actually be exhibited. More importantly, the k-concepts corresponding to complements of a-concepts are not the complements of the corresponding k-concepts. This is so because the constructive interpretations of properties of axiom systems involving general claims require the provability in type theory of the sentences expressing that an axiom system has those properties (see above). For example, while our notion of consistency only requires the absence of a proof of a contradiction, Carnap’s k-consistency requires a proof in type theory of this absence.

Carnap realized that k-consistency does not imply k-satisfaction, i.e., provability of

\[
\neg \exists h \forall R (fR \rightarrow (hR \land \neg hR))
\]

does not imply that a model can be explicitly given. He could also have considered the question of whether k-consistency implies a-satisfiability, or more generally, the relationship between k-concepts and corresponding a-concepts. He did not do so, perhaps because he assumed considerations involving a-concepts and k-concepts, while parallel, to be independent, or maybe because it is obvious that a k-concept implies the corresponding a-concept but never vice versa. From today’s perspective, the interesting cases are those that involve the relations between the mere failure of a k-concept to apply and the opposite k- or a-concept. For example, completeness (in our sense) is the question of whether an axiom system that is not k-inconsistent is k-satisfied or at

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45 Behmann suggested that Carnap remain neutral between the absolutist and constructivist approaches (Behmann to Carnap, March 6, 1929, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Nachlauf 335 (Behmann), K. 1 I 10. The first part (pp. 1–34) of Carnap’s typescript RC 080–34–02 apparently is a revised version dating from after Behmann’s letter: it does not bear Behmann’s marginal annotations which are present on the rest of the typescript, and the version to which Behmann responded had §10 covering pp. 31–35, while in the surviving typescript §10 covers pp. 30–35.
least a-satisfied. These, however, are simply not natural questions to ask in Carnap’s framework, since they require a clearer distinction between proving things from and proving things about axiom systems in the Grunddisziplin.

Nevertheless, Carnap’s discussion of k-concepts is illuminating with respect to his notion of “decidability [Entscheidungsdefinitheit]”. This notion is reminiscent of our notion of semantic completeness for theories, as we saw above, and his corresponding k-notion is related to both decidability and syntactic completeness of theories. Carnap defines an axiom system $f$ to be a-decidable as follows:

$$\exists R \land \forall g(\text{For}(g) \rightarrow \forall R(fR \rightarrow gR) \lor \forall R(fR \rightarrow \neg gR))$$

This is provably equivalent, within type theory, to $f$ being non-forkable. The intent of this definition is that every formal statement is either a consequence of the axioms or its negation is. It differs from our notion of semantic completeness in that the $\forall g$ quantifier is problematic as a formalization of “for all formulas” (see above), also in that $h$ is allowed to be any propositional function of type theory (not just, say, first order formulas in the language of $f$). Whereas in other cases of general properties Carnap adopts provability in type theory as the criterion for the k-concept, here he defines it thus: “If a model of $f$ can be exhibited, and a procedure can be given, according to which, for every given formal $g$ (with the same variables), either a proof of $f \rightarrow g$ or a proof of $f \rightarrow \neg g$ can be carried out in finitely many steps.” The resulting notion is, as Carnap points out, not coextensive with k-monomorphicity or k-nonforkability. He also claims that this is the notion that is usually meant when other authors at the time write about decidability. Moreover, in contrast to monomorphism, no axiom systems were known to be k-decidable to him, nor was it clear whether any axiom systems ever would be shown to be k-decidable or not.

This latter claim may seem puzzling. After all, Langford’s proof of the decidability of theories of order (from 1927) was already published at the time. It is possible that Carnap simply did not know about Langford’s work. But even if he did, he would not have recognized it as providing a decision procedure for establishing k-decidability for axiom systems of order, since Langford only showed that the axioms settle the truth values of first-order propositional functions involving the same variables as the axiom system. We now take it for granted that this is the question to be settled; but at the time Carnap was writing, the almost universal restriction to first-order languages that we typically assume was still some way off. Certainly for Carnap, but also for most of his contemporaries, logic was still higher-order, and the consequences of the axiom systems of interest included their higher-order consequences.

Another reason for why the claim above may seem puzzling is the following: Carnap himself stresses that some axiom systems are known to be k-monomorphic, i.e., in

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46 Carnap does not mention Langford’s work himself. It is mentioned by Fraenkel (1928), although not in the context of completeness or decidability of axiom systems.

47 Note that many of the axiom systems in Abriss involve higher-order axioms, even primitives or important defined concepts that are higher order. For instance, the axiom system for geometry in §34 has a second-order primitive $ger$, for the class of lines, which are themselves classes of points.
type theory provably monomorphic, and hence, provably non-forkable by any formal sentence (not just first-order sentences). Consequently, a simple decision procedure would be to conduct an exhaustive search of all proofs in type theory until a proof of either \( f \rightarrow g \) or \( f \rightarrow \neg g \) is found. Although this approach seems obvious to us today, it was far from obvious at the time. For instance, Bernays (1930, p. 366) explicitly considers this approach and rejects it in the following passage:

Notice that this requirement of being deductively closed [i.e., every statement that can be formulated within the framework of the theory is either provable or refutable] does not go as far as the requirement that every question of the theory be decidable. The latter says that there should be a procedure for deciding for any arbitrarily given pair of contradictory claims belonging to the theory which of the two is provable (“correct”).

The much more inclusive range of consequences of axioms that Carnap considers (in full type theory) also plays an important role in his discussion of the relationship between the k-decidability of axiom systems and the logical decision problem in sections 3.7 and 3.8 of Untersuchungen. The latter is the question of whether there is a procedure which decides for each sentence of logic (i.e., type theory) after finitely many steps whether the sentence is provable or not. As is well known, Hilbert considered this problem one of the main open problems of logic (Hilbert 1928; Hilbert and Ackermann 1928) and he was optimistic that a positive solution was forthcoming. This optimism was not universally shared, however; Carnap cites Weyl (1925) to that effect. If the logical decision problem was solved positively, Carnap argues in section 3.7 of Untersuchungen, every monomorphic axiom system would be k-decidable. In that event, k-decidability would be coextensive with monomorphicity, and thus, according to Carnap, not independently useful, since it does not result in a new division of axiom systems into two classes.

As long as this problem is not solved positively, i.e., as long as there are undecided logical sentences, no axiom system is k-decidable. This is so because the undecided logical sentence \( r \) yields, for each axiom system \( f \), a propositional function \( g \) which likewise is undecided. (Recall here that being k-decidable depends not only on the existence of a decision procedure, but on such a decision procedure being known—in keeping with the intuitionistic interpretation of k-decidability.) Take any formula \( h \) which is a consequence of \( f \), such as \( f \) itself if \( f \) is formal, or a tautology involving only the variables in \( f \). Then \( g \land r \) follows from \( f \) if \( r \) holds, and \( \neg h \) follows from \( f \) iff \( r \) does not hold. In fact, type theory proves

\[
\exists R f R \rightarrow [\forall R (f R \rightarrow g R)] \leftrightarrow r
\]

Thus the exhibition of a model for \( f \) together with a decision procedure that yields a proof either of \( \forall R (f R \rightarrow g R) \) or of \( \forall R (f R \rightarrow \neg g R) \) in type theory would yield a proof of \( r \) or \( \neg r \) in type theory.

As with other issues tackled by Carnap in the Untersuchungen, his considerations about decidability, as well as his distinction between absolutist and constructive ver-

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48 §29 of RC 080–34–03, p. 98ff.
sions of metalogical notions, remained fundamentally flawed. They do, nevertheless, reveal significant insight into the subtleties involved, and they constitute a valiant effort to address them with the tools Carnap had available.

8 Conclusion

In light of our discussion in the previous sections, we are left with a mixed assessment of Carnap’s early metatheoretic work. Earlier criticisms of it (e.g. by Coffa and Hintikka) did miss their mark in various ways, since they were too coarse-grained and dismissive. Nevertheless, Carnap’s approach was limited in several important respects, as our discussion also made evident. To assess Carnap’s place in the history of logic properly, an account that balances both sides is needed.

On the positive side, Carnap addressed and made progress with a considerable number of problems in Untersuchungen and Abriss. First of all, notions such as consequence, isomorphism, categoricity, and completeness were not clearly defined at the time and he made steps towards making them precise. Moreover, he did so by using the best tools available to him, namely simple (or deramified) type theory. Second, Carnap began to work out ideas appropriate to the model-theoretic character of these notions. In particular, he was aware of the kind of domain variation underlying them. His explication of that idea looks unsatisfactory from today’s perspective. But again, it was arguably the most promising route to take given the state of the development of logic at the time. For these reasons, it seems fair to say that Carnap anticipated the kind of formal reasoning about models with which we are now familiar in substantive ways; he thus provided an early, noteworthy form of model theory within a type-theoretic setting. Third, he was sensitive to open problems in the foundations of mathematics at the time, e.g., the distinction between “absolute” and “constructive” concepts, and he tried to give a precise characterization of them as well. Fourth, in his discussion of the different completeness properties of axiom systems, Carnap asked fruitful questions and tried to prove important theorems, including the Gabelbarkeitssatz.

On the negative side, there are also several aspects in which Carnap’s attempts remained unsuccessful, even by his own lights. He discussed provability as a metatheoretic notion defined “outside” the framework of type theory, but his erroneous proof that provability and consequence coincide prevented him from fully grasping the problems posed by decidability. The axiom systems he considered, as well as his model-theoretic definitions of consequence, satisfaction, etc., are specified in the object language. As we saw, this is not outright impossible, and with Tarski he was in good company in using this approach. Yet it does have implications of which Carnap was not aware in 1928–29 and which limit the importance of his results. Second, some of the notions discussed in his Untersuchungen manuscript are too general to be useful, as later developments made clear. This concerns, for instance, his notion of formality, which is replaced today by specific language restrictions. A third problem Carnap’s approach faces is that some of the central concepts underlying his general
axiomatics project are left underspecified and, thus, largely unexplored. This concerns especially the nature of his “basic discipline”, including notions such as truth and provability, but also the relationship between absolute and constructive metatheoretic concepts, and in particular, between a-forkability and k-decidability.

Several issues concerning Carnap’s early metatheory remain in need of further exploration. One of them is the influence Carnap’s work on general axiomatics, and his *Untersuchungen* in particular, had on the historical development of logic: How, more broadly and in more depth, do his contributions relate to work by Tarski, Hilbert, Bernays, and Gödel, and other central figures? A second issue concerns Carnap’s own intellectual development: Are there points of contact or continuity between his early model theory, as discussed in the present paper, and, e.g., his “official” work on semantics from the 1940s? Third, more questions can be raised about the remaining significance of Carnap early metatheory from a technical point of view. This concerns the *Gabelbarkeitssatz*, in particular, including recent research on the so-called “Fraenkel-Carnap property” for second-order theories stimulated by it. The latter has led to some interesting partial results already, i.e., to the identification of several mathematical theories that have this metatheoretic property. Finally, Carnap’s conjecture that (higher-order) theories are categorical if and only if they are semantically complete has still not been decided in general; it thus remains “one of the leading open questions in higher-order axiomatics” (Awodey and Reck 2002a, p. 84).

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49 See Schiemer and Reck (2013) for a few steps in that direction, earlier also Awodey and Carus (2001), Awodey and Reck (2002a), Goldfarb (2003), Reck (2007), and Reck (2011), among others.

50 See Weaver and George (2005) and Weaver and Penev (2013) for recent work on the Fraenkel-Carnap property for second-order theories. See Awodey and Reck (2002b) for more general results related to Carnap’s *Gabelbarkeitssatz*. 
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