MINIMUM WAGES AND THE GENDER GAP IN PAY: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND

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Women are disproportionately in low-paid work compared to men so, in the absence of rationing effects on their employment, they should benefit the most from minimum wage policies. This study examines the change in the gender wage gap around the introduction of minimum wages in Ireland and the United Kingdom (U.K.). Using survey data for the two countries, we develop a decomposition of the change in the gender differences in wage distributions around the date of introduction of minimum wages. We separate out “price” effects attributed to minimum wages from “employment composition” effects. A significant reduction of the gender gap at low wages is observed after the introduction of the minimum wage in Ireland, while there is hardly any change in the U.K. Counterfactual simulations show that the difference between countries may be attributed to gender differences in non-compliance with the minimum wage legislation in the U.K.

JEL Codes: C14, I2, J16

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1. INTRODUCTION

Recent research into the gender wage gap has increasingly focused on more global methods than the evaluation of gender wage differences at the mean. Gender gaps are often concentrated either at the bottom of the distribution (“sticky floors”) or at the top (“glass ceilings”). This literature has benefited from the surge of methods extending Oaxaca–Blinder type decompositions to the whole wage distribution (see the surveys in Melly, 2006, Fortin et al., 2011, Chernozhukov et al., 2013). Most directly relevant for policymakers, distributional analyses provide some insights into the intended or unintended effects of labor market policies on wage

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inequality and, in particular, gender wage gaps. This is particularly the case for policies such as the national minimum wage (henceforth NMW), which, by design, affect workers at different positions of the wage distribution differently. NMW policies tend to compress the bottom of the wage distribution, where women are disproportionately represented. As a result, women should benefit the most from NMWs, at least in the absence of changes to their employment status. A (possibly unintended) consequence of the NMW is therefore a reduction of the gender wage gap.

The testing of this prediction is usually complicated. At the macro level, it is difficult to control for all sources of cross-country differences beyond wage distributions and NMW policies. A successful attempt to do so is Blau and Kahn (2003), who check for a negative correlation between the gender gap and the “bite” of NMWs (the NMW level as a proportion of the average wage). For Ireland, McGuinness et al. (2008) use the proportion of NMW workers in a firm to identify the wage disadvantage to men and women who are employed in low-paying firms. With micro data, time variations in NMWs are often too small to provide detectable effects. Studies close to ours have used changes in NMW legislation in the United States (U.S.) (Blau and Kahn, 1997), in Ukraine (Ganguli and Terrell, 2006, 2009), and in Indonesia (Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2017) to check how gender gaps vary with NMW levels. In this study, we examine an even more radical policy event, namely the introduction of NMW legislation.

We focus on the introduction of a NMW in the United Kingdom (U.K.) in 1999 and in Ireland in 2000. Using the Living in Ireland survey (LII) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), we employ a flexible model of wage distributions to construct counterfactual distributions of wages based on a fixed distribution of covariates for women in each country. We estimate gender differences in wage distributions before and after the introduction of the NMW, separating out workers’ characteristics (“explained/composition”) effects from residual (“unexplained/discriminatory”) differentials. We can thus show how the gender wage gap at the bottom of the distribution evolved after the introduction of the NMW in each country, as well as measure possible “spillover” effects further up in the distribution. It is noteworthy that we focus on two neighboring countries that share a common past history, with highly centralized systems of collective wage bargaining and a similar high level of “sticky floor” before the policy reform. Beyond these common initial conditions, the almost simultaneous introduction of a NMW in Ireland and the U.K. allows us to assess how much the impact may differ according to the level at which minimum wages are set (the “bite” of the NMW) and to the degree of compliance.

Our results are as follows. A large reduction in the gender wage gap at the bottom of the distribution is found after the introduction of the NMW in Ireland, while there is hardly any change in the U.K. We perform several robustness checks that include holding employment composition constant using panel data, detrending the effects (a triple difference approach), checking the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of occupation and industry variables, changing the reference group and accounting for selection into work. Our conclusions are stable. To explain the contrasted results between Ireland and the U.K., we suggest an extrapolation exercise that examines the counterfactual effect of introducing the same NMW.
compliance in the U.K. as in Ireland. We find that the absence of an effect in the U.K. may be due to the degree of non-compliance with NMW legislation.

2. The Literature and the Institutional Background

2.1. Gender Wage Gaps and Labor Market Policies

Gender gaps have been studied in the context of different career development patterns between men and women. To explain “sticky floors” in particular, the literature has focused on factors that may affect wage inequality at the start of the career, including signaling and statistical discrimination (Belley et al., 2015). Closer to our focus, the role of labor market regulation affecting low-skilled workers is also emphasized. Countries with higher unionization rates tend to have lower wage dispersion (Blau and Kahn, 1997), possibly lowering the wage gap. Trade unions may be less likely to represent the interests of their female electorate because they may be perceived as having less attachment to the labor market (Booth and Francesconi, 2003). They may also be less sensitive to the interests of members at the low end of the wage distribution (Arulampalam et al., 2007).

More specifically, studies of the impact of NMW on the wage distribution usually find that such regulation compresses the bottom of the distribution, reducing the “sticky floor” effect. Using variation in the number of NMW workers across firms in Ireland, McGuinness et al. (2008) find that the part-time gender wage gap is decreased by the NMW. Ganguli and Terrell (2006, 2009) find that the doubling of the NMW between 1997 and 2003 contributed to the closing of the gender wage gap in Ukraine. Blau and Kahn (1997) also emphasize that the sharp decline in the NMW between 1979 and 1988 in the U.S. is one of the important institutional factors explaining the widening gender gap during this period. Robinson (2002), using quantile regression methods, finds no evidence that the NMW in the U.K. affected the gender wage gap in the lower part of the wage distribution. Another study by Robinson (2005) finds some evidence of a narrowing of the gender pay gap by 1–2 percentage points (ppts) in regions where women comprise a relatively large share of the low paid, and where the regional bite is larger (such as Scotland). Our study expands on this type of study by using a more appropriate distributional analysis, as described below, and by providing a comparative setting across two neighboring countries with different wage distributions and NMW “bites.”

2.2. Distributional Analyses

Departing from the standard decomposition method of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), a number of decomposition methods for wage distributions have been proposed (see, e.g., Juhn et al., 1993; DiNardo et al., 1996; Gosling et al., 2000; Machado and Mata, 2005; Melly, 2006). These methods have been applied in analyses of the gender gap in many different contexts and regions. Coverage

1The role of child-related career interruption (Meurs et al., 2010) and specific discrimination that prevents women from achieving high wages and top positions are particularly important in explaining “glass ceilings.” The study of these entails accounting for firm-specific heterogeneity and the use of matched worker–firm data (Meng and Meurs, 2004; Nordman and Wolff, 2011).
includes Europe (Beblo et al., 2003; Arulampalam et al., 2007), Sweden (Albrecht et al., 2003), the U.K. (Blundell et al., 2007; Chzhen and Mumford, 2011), Spain (Gardeazabal and Ugidos, 2005; de la Rica et al., 2008), Ukraine (Ganguli and Terrell, 2006), and the U.S. (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008; Weinberger and Kuhn, 2010). Such an approach is suitable here since NMW policies are targeted at low wages, so that looking at the evolution of mean wage differences between men and women before and after the introduction of the NMW may not capture the impact of the policy well.

Various alternative methods have been put forward for such distributional analyses (see the survey of Fortin et al. 2011). The most popular quantile-regression-based methods à la Machado and Mata (2005) are less than ideal in our context, because the discontinuity in wages around the minimum wage is not easily captured by quantile regressions. On the contrary, the “distribution regression” (DR) approach proposed in Foresi and Peracchi (1995), and recently extended by Chernozhukov et al. (2013), is particularly well suited. By modeling the distribution function directly (rather than its inverse, the quantile function), this approach is not affected by the bunching of data around the minimum wage. Given our focus on the bottom of the wage distribution, this aspect is rather critical. Although the two approaches are theoretically equivalent (Koenker et al., 2013), empirical evidence suggests that DR generally provides a better fit to wage distribution data than quantile regression (Rothe and Wied, 2013; Van Kerm et al., 2016).

2.3. Gender Gaps and Labor Policies in Ireland and the United Kingdom

Gender Wage Gaps

Ireland is a country with a history of gender inequality on the labor market due to a combination of cultural and religious ideals, a traditionally unequal gender division of labor, and a relatively weak economy until the “Celtic Tiger” years in the 1990s. Despite the rapid catching up of female labor market participation during this period and extensive equality legislation (the Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act 1974 and the Employment Equality Act 1998), the Irish gender wage gap has remained substantial. In the U.K., attention was given relatively early to the issue of equal pay as, during the two world wars, women took up typically male jobs. The Equal Pay Act of 1970 legislated for equal pay and conditions for men and women. However, the modification of job titles often allowed employers to continue discriminatory practices and, over four decades later, there still exists an unexplained gender wage gap.

Using harmonized micro data for Europe, panel A in Figure 1 shows the evolution of the raw gender wage gap in the U.K., Ireland, and the EU-27 during the period studied. Between 1997 and 2001, the gap was similar and relatively stable in both countries, with men earning, on average, 20–24 percent more than women. This was, however, higher than the EU average of 16 percent. At the beginning of this century, the Irish gender wage gap decreased relative to the U.K. one.
Panel B in Figure 1 shows that this gap was not uniform across the wage distribution. Until the NMW was introduced, the raw gender wage gap in Ireland was larger at the bottom and in the middle of the wage distribution than at the top. After the introduction of the NMW, the raw gender wage gap at the bottom of the wage distribution fell sharply. The raw gender wage gap in the U.K. was more similar across the wage distribution, with no sharp changes visible around the introduction of the NMW. Results from Arulampalam et al. (2007) corroborate this observation: they report a raw gender wage gap in the first decile of earnings of 25 percent in Ireland and 24 percent in the U.K., while the gender gap in the top decile of earnings was more contrasted (13 percent and 25 percent, respectively). While these are raw gaps, the adjusted wage gaps (i.e. corrected for gender differences in skills and other characteristics) exhibit similar patterns in Arulampalam et al. (2007). Both countries display high gender inequality in the lower part of the distribution (while Ireland may have less of a “glass ceiling” prior to the introduction of the NMW than the U.K.). Similar intensities of “sticky floors” in the two neighboring countries provide an interesting common setup. Panel B of Figure 1 also shows that trends in the gender wage gaps across the wage distribution were relatively similar and generally declining in the run-up to the introduction of the NMW in both countries.

National Minimum Wages

NMWs were introduced almost simultaneously in the U.K. and Ireland. The British industry-based Wages Council system that regulated pay in many sectors was abolished in 1993 amid arguments that it reduced employment, although there was little evidence that the system had cost jobs (Machin and Manning, 1994). In April 1999, a NMW of £3.60 per hour for those aged 22 or older was introduced, as well as a youth rate of £3 per hour for those aged 18–21. One of the stated aims of this legislation was actually to tackle the gender pay gap. Another
one was to precede the increased generosity of the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC), in order to reduce the possibility of firms being able to appropriate some of the benefits of the subsidy to reduce their gross wage bill. About 6 percent of workers’ wages were raised up to the minimum (Dickens and Manning, 2003) and prominent among these were part-time female workers (Metcalf, 1999). In 1999 in Ireland, the newly created Minimum Wage Commission recommended an initial rate of IE£4.40 per hour (equivalent to £3.40 as shown in Table 1), representing two thirds of median earnings (O’Neill et al., 2006). Prior to this, industry-specific NMWs in Ireland were set by Joint Labour Committees. However, the wages specified in these agreements were often low and badly enforced, and covered less than a quarter of the workforce. Official figures suggest that the NMW directly benefited approximately 13.5 percent of the total workforce, comprising 17 percent of female workers and 11 percent of male workers. There is little evidence in the literature relating to the effectiveness of the Irish NMW in tackling the gender wage gap (an exception is McGuinness et al., 2008, who find that the Irish NMW wage only improved the relative position of women who were working part-time).

3. THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH

3.1 Data

We use two panel datasets, the Living in Ireland Survey (LII) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The fact that the same set of households is interviewed each year means that it is possible to study changes in the characteristics and circumstances of particular individuals over time. We restrict our main sample to people observed in 1999 and 2001 in Ireland and 1998 and 2000 in the U.K. The original sample sizes for the two years of interest are 12,604 in Ireland and 20,274 in the U.K. We further restrict our sample to those aged 22–64 (those aged under 22 years are not eligible for the NMW in the U.K.) and drop those still in education. Of these, we observe 4,563 workers in Ireland and 7,732 workers in the U.K. over the two years in question. This constitutes our baseline sample (Sample 1). Table A.1 (in the Appendix, in the Online Supporting Information) shows how these observations are split between men and women and the pre- and post-NMW periods.

| TABLE 1 |
| --- |
| **THE “BITE” OF THE NMW IN THE U.K. AND IRELAND** |

|                      | Ireland, 2000 | U.K., 1999 |
|----------------------|---------------|------------|
| National minimum wage (NMW) | 3.40          | 3.60       |
| Median wage in t-1    | 5.95          | 6.99       |
| Mean wage in t-1      | 7.05          | 8.55       |
| Bite of the NMW       |               |            |
| NMW/median wage in t-1 | 0.57          | 0.52       |
| NMW/mean wage in t-1  | 0.48          | 0.42       |

Notes: Figures, all expressed in pounds Sterling for the current year, are from own calculations using the population of 22–65 year olds from the Living in Ireland Survey and the British Household Panel Survey.
Hourly wages are constructed from the current gross weekly wage and usual hours per week in LII and gross monthly pay (including overtime), standard weekly hours, and paid overtime hours per week in BHPS. We normalize hourly wages to their level during the year of the introduction of the NMW (2000 in Ireland; 1999 in the U.K.), using Consumer Price Indices. The main changes observed in the sample composition between the pre- and post-NMW periods are an increased hourly wage and an increase in the average age of the population.

Alternative sample selections are described in Table A.2 in the Appendix. These will be used in robustness checks in Section 18. An issue specific to the Irish data is the “refreshment” sample of 1,515 households that was added to the survey in 2000 to redress attrition over the life of the survey. To tackle this issue, we shall present alternative results without this refreshment sample for Ireland (Sample 1a). A final selection used in our sensitivity analysis (Sample 2) consists of all those who are observed both before and after the introduction of the NMW and who work at least part-time (≥15 hours per week) in both periods.

3.2. Preliminary Statistics and Checks

The “Bite” of the National Minimum Wages

We provide preliminary statistics about NMWs and labor markets in Ireland and the U.K. Table 1 first shows the NMW level and “bite” in each country. The bite of the NMW is around 10 percent higher in Ireland than in the U.K. when expressed in terms of median wage and 15 percent higher as a fraction of the mean. Table 2 shows the employment rate and proportion of workers earning less than the NMW in each country and for the year before \((t-1)\) and after \((t + 1)\) its introduction. Employment rates for men are similar in the two countries (80–85 percent over the time period examined) although employment rates for women are much lower (though rising) in Ireland than in the U.K. There were more

| TABLE 2 | THE EMPLOYMENT RATE AND THE PROPORTION OF WORKERS EARNING LESS THAN THE NMW |
|----------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------|-------------|
|          | Ireland                  | U.K.                          |           |             |
|          | \(t-1\)                   | \(t+1\)                      | \(t-1\)   | \(t+1\)     |
| Employment rate (%) |             |                               |           |             |
| All      | 66                        | 70                           | 76        | 76          |
| Male     | 81                        | 83                           | 84        | 85          |
| Female   | 52                        | 57                           | 69        | 68          |
| Workers below NMW (%) |             |                               |           |             |
| All      | 11.8                      | 6.0                          | 8.0       | 4.8         |
| Male     | 7.0                       | 4.4                          | 3.4       | 1.6         |
| Female   | 17.6                      | 7.9                          | 12.2      | 7.9         |
| Full-time| 9.8                       | 5.0                          | 5.2       | 3.5         |
| Part-time| 24.9                      | 14.4                         | 24.5      | 13.2        |

Notes: Figures from own calculations using the population of 22–65 year olds from the Living in Ireland Survey and British Household Panel Survey. The time period \(t\) is 1999 in the U.K. and 2000 in Ireland.
people earning less than the NMW in Ireland (12 percent) than in the U.K. (9 percent) in $t$−1 and, in both countries, the vast majority of these are women. This is in line with official statistics, giving us confidence in the chosen datasets. However, although there was a large drop in the number of women earning less than the NMW in $t + 1$ in Ireland, the corresponding proportional drop was much lower in the U.K. Beyond measurement errors, which are likely to be similar in the two datasets used, possible explanations include informal labor markets and ineffective NMW enforcement.\(^2\) The latter explanation seems most likely to support the diverging effects of the NMW in the two countries, as we demonstrate in Section 24.

Potential Employment Effects

While we focus on the change in the gender wage gap after the introduction of a NMW, the NMW may also affect the employment of low-skilled workers, and possibly does so differently for men and women. The literature on this topic is mixed (for a comprehensive overview, see Neumark and Wascher, 2007). Stewart (2004), Metcalf (2008), and Dolton et al. (2012) report evidence of little or no employment effect of the introduction of the British NMW. O’Neill et al. (2006) find that the NMW may have had a negative effect on employment for firms with a high proportion of low-wage workers, but the size of these effects is modest. Table 3 shows the rate of entry to and exit from the labor market of men and women whose earnings are in the vicinity of the NMW in the year before its introduction or in the year after its introduction. In both countries, the entry and exit rates are larger for those earning less than the NMW than for those earning over the NMW, an indication of the high turnover rate for low-skilled jobs.

In Ireland, male exit rates are higher in 2001 than in 1999. This is true for all categories of wages, but the difference is small and only statistically significant for those earning more than the NMW. Female exit rates in Ireland are not significantly different before or after the introduction of the NMW. Both male and female entry rates in Ireland are actually higher in 2001 than in 1999 for those earning up to the NMW and this difference is statistically significant. Entry rates for higher earners change less over the 2-year period, with a decrease noticeable for men earning between 1.25 and 1.5 times the NMW and a decrease of a similar magnitude noted for women earning over 1.5 times the NMW.

In the U.K., the exit rates of males earning less than the NMW are not statistically different from each other in 2000 and in 1998. At higher wage levels, the exit rate of males is lower in 2000 than in 1998. There is little change in female exit rates over this period. Looking at entry rates, there is a decrease in the entry rate of females to jobs paying up to the NMW. Other than that, there is no change to entry rates of men or women between the two periods. These statistics show that women do not appear to be disproportionately affected by possible employment

\(^2\)The presence of apprentices (who are paid below the NMW) may also contribute, as these are not identified in the data. However, apprenticeships made up a tiny proportion of employment contracts in both the U.K. and Ireland—0.3 percent of male contracts and 0.4 percent of female contracts in the U.K. and 1.1 percent of male contracts and 0.5 percent of female contracts in Ireland (Eurostat, 2002). Additionally, most apprentices are younger than the age cutoff of 22 that we impose in our empirical specification, so this is unlikely to be an issue.

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Table 3

The Rate of Entry to and Exit from the Labor Market for Different Wage Levels

| Ireland | Exit rates | Entry rates | Exit rates | Entry rates | Exit rates | Entry rates |
|---------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| Wage < NMW | 0.08 | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.19 | 0.17 | 0.21 | 0.16 | 0.24 |
| (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) |
| NMW < wage <1.25 × NMW | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.15 |
| (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| 1.25 × NMW < wage <1.5 × NMW | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Wage > 1.5 × NMW | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.04 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| U.K. | Exit rates | Entry rates | Exit rates | Entry rates | Exit rates | Entry rates |
| 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 1999 | 2000 | 1999 | 2000 |
| 98 | 0.08 | 0.13 | 0.22 | 0.14 | 0.12 | 0.13 |
| (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| NMW < wage <1.25 × NMW | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.08 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| 1.25 × NMW < wage <1.5 × NMW | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Wage > 1.5 × NMW | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.04 |
| (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |

Notes: Exit rates document the proportion of people working at time t−1 who are no longer working at time t (1999 or 2001 in Ireland, 1998 or 2000 in the U.K.). Entry rates document the proportion of people working at time t who were not working at time t−1. The wage position relative to the minimum wage is according to wage at time t−1 for exit rates and time t for entry rates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Figures from own calculations using the population of 22–65 year olds from the Living in Ireland Survey and British Household Panel Survey.
effects. We do not, therefore, expect that gender differentials in the employment effects of the NMW will drive our findings relating to the effect of the NMW on the gender wage gap. Note that existing evidence points to little or no employment effect of the introduction of the NMW in the U.K. (Metcalf, 2008; Dolton et al., 2012) and Ireland (O’Neill et al., 2006). However, in order to ensure that this is not the case, we shall account for potential employment composition effects in our decomposition, perform robustness checks that limit the sample of interest to all those employed before and after the introduction of the NMW, and control for selection into employment.

Other Institutions and Policies

Union density was stable, at around 30 percent, in the U.K. during the period in question, although it decreased from 41.5 percent to 36.6 percent in Ireland between 1998 and 2001 (Blanchflower, 2006). The period 1997–2001 was one of generous budgets in both countries, notably with increased levels of transfers to working poor families (the Family Income Supplement increased in 1998 and 2000 in Ireland, while the WFTC was introduced to replace the Family Credit in October 1999 in the U.K.). In Ireland, the Lone Parent Allowance and Child Benefit were also increased while income tax rates were decreased in both the higher and lower brackets, as well as an increased tax-free allowance for all household types. In the U.K., “New Deals” measures were introduced in 1998 to help vulnerable groups, notably lone parents and young people, to find jobs or to increase their hours of work. These policies should not affect our results directly, however, since they affect net income, not gross wages as used in our estimations. Another channel to consider is the indirect effect of policy changes on labor supply. For example, the WFTC reform may have incited adults in previously workless families to move into work and adults in previously two-worker families to move out of work (Brewer and Browne, 2006). Again, distinguishing between pure price effects and composition effects in our analysis will allow us to assess any such effect of these policies. Also, a robustness check in which we control for selection into employment will be performed.

3.3. Distribution Regression

We suggest an original application of Foresi and Peracchi (1995) and Chernozhukov et al. (2013), who recently formalized procedures for inferring how policy interventions affect the entire marginal distribution of an outcome of interest. We extend the typical application of distribution regression methods to a “before–after” setup where we examine the change in the difference in wage distributions between men and women, so that we are able to pinpoint the gender wage gap before and after the introduction of the NMW at every point in the wage distribution.

3One exception may be the introduction of the WFTC in the U.K. If it has actually incited firms to lower wages for low-earners who receive this top-up, our estimates of the NMW effect on the gender wage gap can be interpreted as a lower bound in the U.K., as the effect of the WFTC on wages may have worked in the opposite direction.

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In a nutshell, this technique involves running a series of binary choice regression models in order to estimate the entire cumulative distribution function of wages. In each model, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if an individual \( i \) in the sample has an hourly wage below \( w \), and 0 otherwise, and this is repeated for a series of distinct \( w \) values to estimate \( F(w) = \Pr \{ w_i \leq w \} \) on a fine grid covering possible wage levels \( w \in [w_{\text{min}}, w_{\text{max}}] \). After estimating (probit) models separately for men and women and for each time period (before and after introduction of the NMW), and controlling for a number of workers characteristics, we predict the probability that an individual has a wage below any value \( w \) in the distribution, or what this probability would be if the individual belonged to a different gender group or time period. The marginal wage distributions of men and women before and after the introduction of the NMW can therefore be decomposed to identify the extent of the wage gaps in each time period and how they changed in the after period, all else held constant.

More formally, we are interested in the change in the distribution of wages for men and women observed before and after the introduction of the NMW, given explanatory variables such as job and human capital characteristics, holding the marginal distribution of these covariates constant. Marginal wage distributions are directly derived by integration of the conditional distributions over these variables:

\[
F_{s,t}(w) = \int \int F_{s,t}(w|x,c)h_{s,t}(x,c) \, dc \, dx,
\]

where \( F_{s,t}(\cdot|x,c) \) is the conditional wage distribution function given human capital characteristics \( x \) and job characteristics \( c \) in gender group \( s \) at period \( t \), and \( h_{s,t} \) is the density distribution of human capital and job characteristics in gender group \( s \) at period \( t \). The separation of conditional wage distributions and the distribution of characteristics offers a straightforward way to create counterfactual marginal wage distributions: \( \tilde{F}_{s,t}(w) \) can either be an observed or a counterfactual marginal wage distribution, where the superscript refers to the conditional wage distribution and the subscript refers to the covariate distribution. The conditional wage distribution can be that of women (\( s = f \)) or men (\( s = m \)) before (\( t = b \)) or after (\( t = a \)) the introduction of the NMW, and the covariate distribution can also relate to women or men before or after the introduction of the NMW. For example, \( F_{f,b}(w) \) is the marginal wage distribution of female workers before the reform, which is given by integrating the conditional distributions of female workers before the reform over the female characteristics before the introduction of the NMW.

In the DR approach, sample estimates of equation 1 are obtained by (i) replacing \( F_{s,t}(w|x,c) \) by estimates \( \hat{F}_{s,t}(w|x,c) \) derived from predictions based on probit model parameters at \( w \) estimated in the sample of gender \( s \) at time period \( t \), and (ii) by averaging the predictions over the sample of \( N_{s,t} \) workers of gender \( s \) at time \( t \).\(^4\)

\(^4\)Individual sampling weights are omitted from this expression for notational clarity, but they are used at all estimation stages.
For example, the female wage distribution before the introduction of the
 NMW is given by

$$\hat{F}_{f,b}^f(x_i, c_i) = \frac{1}{N_{f,b}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{f,b}} \hat{F}_{b}^f(x_i, c_i),$$

while

$$\hat{F}_{f,b}^m(x_i, c_i) = \frac{1}{N_{f,b}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{f,b}} \hat{F}_{b}^m(x_i, c_i)$$

is a counterfactual for the distribution that would be observed among female workers before NMW introduction if the conditional wage distributions among male workers had prevailed over the female distributions. In the counterfactual distribution, predictions are based on probit model parameters estimated in the male pre-reform sample, but with predictions averaged over the female pre-reform sample. The gender gap in pay before NMW introduction is captured by the difference between those two distributions:

$$\hat{D}F^b(x_i, c_i) = \hat{F}_{f,b}^f(x_i, c_i) - \hat{F}_{f,b}^m(x_i, c_i) = \frac{1}{N_{f,b}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{f,b}} (\hat{F}_{b}^f(x_i, c_i) - \hat{F}_{b}^m(x_i, c_i)).$$

The gender gap in pay after introduction of the NMW can be written analogously as

$$\hat{D}F^a(x_i, c_i) = \hat{F}_{f,a}^f(x_i, c_i) - \hat{F}_{f,a}^m(x_i, c_i) = \frac{1}{N_{f,a}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{f,a}} (\hat{F}_{a}^f(x_i, c_i) - \hat{F}_{a}^m(x_i, c_i)).$$

The time change in the gender gap observed before and after NMW implementations is then given by

$$\hat{DD}F(x_i, c_i) = \hat{D}F^b(x_i, c_i) - \hat{D}F^a(x_i, c_i).$$

One issue with this approach is that the NMW (or other policies such as those described in Section 5) may have had side effects on female employment on top of effects on wages, and hence may have affected the composition and characteristics of women employed after the NMW. Hence, we further factorize $\hat{DD}F(x_i, c_i)$ into a “price” effect, which reflects changes in the relative compensation of men and women, and a “composition” effect, capturing the role of changes in the characteristics and employment structure of women. To do so, we construct additional counterfactual marginal distributions that would be observed if the “prices” after introduction of the NMW were applied to the sample of women with job and human capital characteristics before the NMW:

$$\hat{F}_{f,b}^{m,a}(x_i, c_i) = \frac{1}{N_{f,b}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{f,b}} \hat{F}_{b}^{m,a}(x_i, c_i),$$
We then decompose the total change as follows:

\[
\hat{F}_{f,b}^{a}(w) = \frac{1}{N_{f,b}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{f,b}} \hat{F}_{f,b}^{a}(w|x_{i},c_{i}).
\]

\[
DDF(w) = \hat{PDF}(w) + \hat{EDF}(w)
\]

\[
= \left[ \left( \hat{F}_{f,b}^{a}(w) - \hat{F}_{f,b}^{m,b}(w) \right) - \left( \hat{F}_{f,b}^{a}(w) - \hat{F}_{f,b}^{m,a}(w) \right) \right]
\]

\[
\hat{DDF}(w) = \left[ \left( \hat{F}_{f,b}^{a}(w) - \hat{F}_{f,b}^{m,a}(w) \right) - \left( \hat{F}_{f,b}^{a}(w) - \hat{F}_{f,b}^{m,a}(w) \right) \right].
\]

(9)

The first term, \( \hat{PDF}(w) \), captures the time change in the price effect—that is, the change in returns or unexplained factors—conditional on holding all characteristics at the female before levels. This is our measure of interest to interpret the possible impact of NMWs on the gender gap through their effect on wages. The second term, \( \hat{EDF}(w) \), captures an employment/composition effect for the female sample—that is, how the gender gap may change due to time changes in female characteristics. Purging the total change in gender wage gaps from this second component should clean it from potential effect of policies on female work hours or occupations.5

4. Results

4.1. Distribution Regression Results

To start with, we plot the predicted distribution of wages for men and women in each time period against the actual distribution and find an excellent fit for our model (see Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix). Table A.3 in the Appendix shows the coefficients on the explanatory variables at four points in the wage distribution: the NMW and the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. For example, the negative coefficient on age at the 25th percentile of the female before group in Ireland indicates that, as age increases, women are less likely to be located in the lower quartile of the distribution in the year before the NMW. Following Arulampalam et al. (2007), we omit occupation and industry dummies as they may be endogenous if individuals choose them based on earning prospects. We introduce these variables to the model in a robustness check in Section 18.

We show, in Figure 2, three sets of distributions for each country and year. We label the curves \( STS'T' \) as shorthand notation for \( F_{s',t'}(w) \) and show the wage distribution using the coefficients of women or men (\( s = f, m \)) before or after the NMW (\( t = b, a \)) and the characteristics of women or men (\( s' = f, m \)) before or after the NMW (\( t' = b, a \)).

5A related source of concern pertains to potential selection into employment, which we shall address in a sensitivity analysis in the next section.

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We first show actual distributions in the left-hand panel (FBFB, FAFA, MBMB, and MAMA). At each period, the CDF for female wages lies above that for male wages, indicating that men are (unconditionally) paid better than women. Additionally, the CDFs for men and women before lie above those for men and women after, reflecting wage growth. This is more pronounced at the bottom of the wage distribution for women in Ireland.

In the middle panel, we depict distributions where covariates are set to “female” characteristics (i.e. actual female wage distributions, FBFB and FAFA, and two counterfactual distributions, MBFB and MAFA). The difference between the solid lines (FBFB and MBFB) captures the gender pay gap before, while the difference between dashed lines (FAFA and MAFA) captures the gender pay gap after. Adjusting for characteristics does not account for the whole difference in unconditional gender differences observed in the left-hand panel—there is an

Notes: The STST curve shows the wage distribution using the coefficients (first two letters) and characteristics (second two letters) of men or women (S = M, F) before or after (T = B, A) the introduction of the minimum wage. The red line indicates the level of the minimum wage in national currency.

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“unexplained” wage gap. In order to freeze time changes in characteristics (and, hence, to control for effect of the NMW on the composition of the workforce), we plot distributions where covariates are fixed to “female before” characteristics in the right-hand panel (i.e. actual \(FBFB\) and three counterfactuals: \(FAFB\), \(MBFB\), and \(MAFB\)). This seems to make little difference compared to the middle panel, suggesting that composition effects are small.

While these graphs provide the basic decomposition blocks, we now represent the simple and double differences that allow us to visualize the evolution of the gender gap after introduction of the NWM. We start with equation 7. The left-hand panels of Figure 3 depict the components of this equation, the gender wage gaps before and after the introduction of NMWs, and the resulting time difference in gender gaps, \(\hat{DDF}(w)\) (a value of 1 indicates that there is a 1 ppt reduction in the difference between a woman’s and a man’s probability of being paid below \(w\), i.e. a reduction in the gender wage gap). Focusing on the wage levels

![Figure 3. The Gender Wage Gap and Change over Time in Ireland and the U.K.](https://ssrn.com/abstract=3619343)

**Notes:** The gender gaps predict the male–female difference in being paid below a certain log wage. The change in the gender gap shows the before–after difference in these gaps. The red line indicates the level of the minimum wage in national currency.
around the NMWs (indicated by vertical red lines), we observe a gender pay gap in both countries before the reform. It is about twice as large in Ireland in this early period. Strikingly, however, it is twice as small in Ireland after the introduction of NMWs, and very close to zero. In contrast, the gender gap around the NMW hardly changes over time in the U.K.

Next, we explore the effects defined in equation 10. The middle panel represents the (time change in) price effect $\hat{PDF}$ while holding characteristics constant at female after levels. Again, the patterns are very similar to those in the first panel, indicating that there are no substantial employment composition effects that may affect our interpretation. This is confirmed in the right-hand panels, where the $\hat{EDF}$ and its components are depicted. This residual effect, which captures the possible impact of composition effects on the gender gap measure, is close to zero for both countries. That is, the $\hat{DDF}$ and $\hat{PDF}$ point to the same conclusion: there is an around 8 ppt reduction in the difference between a woman’s and a man’s probability of being paid below the NMW in Ireland, while no such effect is observed in the U.K. A small or zero effect in the U.K., with no spillover effects, is confirmed by other results from Robinson (2002, 2005) and Stewart (2012).

Figure 4 shows the $\hat{DDF}$, $\hat{PDF}$, and $\hat{EDF}$ with 95 percent bootstrapped confidence intervals. It confirms that a significant reduction of the gender gap occurred in Ireland, after the implementation of the NMW, while no effect can be detected in the U.K. In Ireland, confidence intervals point to a reduction in the gender gap of 5–15 ppts around the NMW level (recall that the gap is defined as the difference between a man and a woman’s probability of earning below a certain wage). Additionally, there is a small spillover as the decline in the gender gap is statistically significant up to 1.6 in logs, which corresponds to almost IE£5 (14 percent above the NMW of IE£4.40). There is also an increase in the gender gap further up in the wage distribution (i.e. at around 2.4 in logs or IE£11). There are plausible theoretical reasons why we might observe a spillover of this type. The introduction of the NMW could reduce the wages of workers further up in the wage distribution as institutions attempt to cope with the increased wage bill. Conversely, the introduction of the NMW could increase the wage expectations of people located above the NMW in the wage distribution as their relative position worsens. If either of these mechanisms occur in a systematically more important way for men than for women, or if men are better at wage bargaining than women, this might increase the gender wage gap in the middle of the wage distribution after the introduction of the NMW. The literature relating to the likely size and direction of these effects is mixed (Stewart 2012; Dittrich et al. 2014; Aeberhardt et al. 2016). However, as the spillover effect observed in Figure 4 becomes smaller and non-significant, or even non-existent in a number of sensitivity checks (see Section 18), while the large decrease in the gender wage gap around the NMW remains, we refrain from drawing any conclusions in this regard.

4.2. Detrending the Effect

To address the concern that our results may be driven by possible preexisting trends in the gender gap, we present here a set of results that “detrend” the change in the gender wage gap between the pre- and post-NMW periods (even though
there is no indication of clear pre-existing trends in Figure 1. We use the change in the gender wage gap over a 2-year period preceding the NMW implementation. Let us take the U.K. as an example. The NMW was introduced in 1999. Hence, we subtract the change in the gender wage gap between 1996 and 1998 from the change in the gender wage gap over 1998–2000, depicted in Figure 4, to calculate the detrended change in the gender wage gap due to the introduction of the NMW. Figure 4 essentially showed a difference-in-difference (the difference between male and female wages in 2000 subtracted from this difference in 1998). By analogy, this detrended effect can be thought of as a triple difference, with the change in the gender wage gap between 1996 and 1998 subtracted from the change in the gender wage gap between 1998 and 2000. The results are shown in Figure 5. We find that the decrease in the detrended gender wage gap at the bottom of the wage distribution in Ireland is similar to the baseline effect observed in Figure 4 although the confidence intervals are a little larger. In the U.K., we again observe

Figure 4. Change in the Gender Wage Gap over Time in Ireland and the U.K. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Notes: The change in the gender gap shows the before–after difference in the gender gaps with 95 percent bootstrapped confidence intervals. The red line indicates the level of the minimum wage in national currency.

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a statistically insignificant change in the gender wage gap across the wage distribution after the introduction of the NMW.

4.3. Additional Results and Robustness Checks

To ensure that our results are not sensitive to differences in before/after samples or the model specification, we conducted a number of robustness checks. The main results are summarized here, while more detailed explanations and corresponding figures are reported in Appendix C.

Quantifying the Gender Gap

For completeness and comparison with standard analysis of gender gaps in mean wages, we show, in Appendix B, the implications of our distribution

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function estimates on percentage differences in wage levels, both at the mean and different points of the distribution. The results in Table B.1 show that an apparently stable gender gap at the mean in Ireland hides a very large decrease at the 10th percentile (the gender gap before was over four times as high as the gender gap after) and small increases higher up in the wage distribution.

Alternative Samples

We first use alternative sample definitions, as described in the data section (summary statistics in Table A.2). We experiment with excluding the Irish refreshment sample (Sample 1a). The results, presented in Figure C.1, show that the magnitude of the time change in the gender gap is almost unchanged. We then restrict the sample for both countries to a balanced panel of people working both before and after the introduction of the NMW (Sample 2). The change in the gender wage gap after the introduction of the NMW is detailed in Figures C.2 and C.3. For the Irish case, we find larger reductions in the gender wage gap in the bottom half of the distribution, while no increase is registered further up in the distribution. The small positive spillover effect just above the NMW persists, while the negative effect further up in the distribution is smaller and not statistically significant. The zero price effect observed in the U.K. is robust to this check.

Adding Occupation and Industry

In our baseline model, we follow standard practice in omitting occupation and industry dummies, which may be endogenous to earning prospects. In a further check, we incorporate these variables into the model. The Irish results, shown in Figure C.4, indicate that controlling for industry and occupation type leads to a similar correction of the gender wage gap at the bottom of the distribution. The increase in the gender wage gap that we previously observed further up in the wage distribution becomes smaller and is not statistically significant in this case. For the U.K. (Figure C.5), the previous conclusions are unchanged.

Changing the Reference Group

The baseline results measure the gender wage gap as the difference between the distribution of female and male wages. This wage gap is decomposed into a price effect (the difference between the distribution of female wages and female wages if they were paid according to the male wage structure) and a composition effect (the difference between the distribution of female wages if they were paid according to the male wage structure and male wages), giving us the change in the gender wage gap. We also compute results based on an alternative decomposition, using men as the reference groups. Details of this alternative decomposition are provided in Section C.3 in the Appendix and are in line with results from the rest of the paper. A closing of the gender wage gap by 5–10 ppts in Ireland is observed: this effect is purely a price effect and is concentrated around the minimum wage level. No change in the gender wage gap is observed in the U.K.
Selection into Employment

Finally, we add a control for selection into employment to our DR model. We adapt the DR method by running a sequence of Heckman-type binary selection models, rather than a sequence of probit models. The exclusion restrictions used are the standard ones in this literature: non-labor income and the presence and number of children. In Ireland, we find that correcting for endogenous selection gives a similar gender wage gap correction around the NMW (Figure C.8). The results for the U.K. still show no sign of any change in the gender wage gap effect across the distribution after the introduction of a NMW (Figure C.9).

4.4. Country Comparisons

We found no significant change in the gender wage gap after the introduction of the British NMW. Yet, with the same method and with the introduction of a NMW at about the same time, we find near closure of the gap in neighboring Ireland. To explain this difference, we zoom on the wage CDFs at the lowest wage levels in Figure 6. We observe that there was a sizable shift in the Irish wage distribution around the NMW. Both male and female wage distributions shift downward. In contrast, while the year after the introduction of the British NMW saw very few men earning less than the NMW, there was still a disproportionate number of women earning below the legal limit. So while $FAFA$ has shifted downward around the NMW level in the U.K., it has not done so to the extent that it has in Ireland—nor, indeed, to the extent that we might expect, given the new wage legislation.

Compliance with or enforcement of the NMW for women’s wages (or female-dominated professions) may have been less effective than for men’s wages in the U.K. This would explain why the gender wage gap decreased after the
introduction of the NMW in Ireland but not in the U.K.\(^6\) This suggested result seems to find support in official reports for both countries. First, we note that the overall degree of non-compliance does not differ much between countries. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) in the U.K. estimated that around 1 percent of employees were earning less than the NMW in the year after its introduction. This figure is below our estimate\(^7\) and the ONS also acknowledges that its estimation is likely to be a lower bound due to the method of data collection. Recent estimates point to larger figures, up to 4 percent, depending on the data source used Low Pay Commission, U.K. (2017).\(^8\) As for Ireland, official measures of non-compliance oscillate between no obvious problem at the time of introduction (O’Neill et al., 2006) and a small degree of non-compliance (around 5 percent) according to more recent estimates (Low Pay Commission, Ireland, 2016), which is similar to what we observe for the year 2000 from Figure 6. Most importantly for the interpretation of our results, a gender difference in compliance seems to be found only in the U.K. For the U.K., the pattern of low pay between our data and the ONS data is consistent: more than twice as many women as men were earning less than the NMW after its introduction. Contrary to this picture, the right-hand panel of Figure 6 shows no large discrepancy between the proportion of men and the proportion of women paid less than the NMW in Ireland. This is in line with Irish official reports, which do not point to gender differences in compliance with NMW regulation. To conclude, it seems that our results are not driven by differences in overall levels of compliance with the NMW between countries but, rather, by gender differences in compliance in the U.K.\(^9\)

Finally, we check how the gender wage gap in the U.K. would have changed if the British wage distribution had shifted in a similar manner to the Irish wage distribution after the introduction of the NMW; that is, if U.K. compliance had been similar to Irish compliance. We perform an extrapolation exercise similar to that of Chernozhukov et al. (2013) in constructing the new counterfactual distributions of wages after the hypothetical implementation of a more effective NMW in the U.K. in 1999. In short, we take the proportion by which the conditional distribution of wages in Ireland is reduced at the Irish NMW after its introduction, and then reduce the conditional distribution of British wages before the introduction of the NMW by that same factor, up to the British NMW level. We do this separately for men and women and construct the same summary measures for the

\(^6\)Recall that we find 5 percent of employees earning less than the NMW after its introduction, based on BHPS data. Robinson (2002) found a similarly high proportion of sub-NMW workers using Labour Force Survey data, so we conclude that this is not due to specific problems with the dataset that we use.

\(^7\)Discrepancies between early ONS estimates and our data are also likely to be due to the fact that the ONS figures do not include overtime work while our definition of hourly wages does. Recent work that investigates the introduction of a NMW in Germany in 2015 finds that one of the short-term effects is an increase in unpaid overtime hours, so it seems important to account for this effect (Caliendo et al., 2017).

\(^8\)Note that this is not an unprecedented result: previous work by Ferreira et al. (2017), using Brazilian data showed that, during a period of time when the NMW was increasing in Brazil, income inequality did not decrease as expected because of decreasing compliance with the NMW.

\(^9\)Figure A.4 in Appendix A gives an overview of the occupations in which sub-NMW workers are most represented before and after the introduction of the NMW in each country. Not surprisingly, the largest share of sub-NMW workers are to be found in sales, elementary, and service occupations. There is no immediately obvious pattern of differences between the U.K. and Ireland in this respect.

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estimation of the change in the gender wage gap as before. We denote the British and Irish NMWs by \( m_{\text{uk}} \) and \( m_{\text{ie}} \). We disregard the sub- and superscripts elaborated in equation 1 in order to generalize, except for \( t = b, a \), which indicates which sample (before or after) is in question. The new counterfactual marginal wage distributions are constructed as follows for men and women separately:

\[
F_{a}^{\text{uk}*}(w) = F_{a}^{\text{uk}}(w) \quad \text{if } w \geq m_{\text{uk}},
\]

\[
F_{a}^{\text{uk}*}(w) = F_{b}^{\text{uk}}(w) \frac{P_{a}^{\text{ie}}(w < m_{\text{ie}})}{F_{b}^{\text{ie}}(m_{\text{ie}})} \quad \text{if } w \leq m_{\text{uk}}.
\]

Figure 7 shows that hypothetically increasing compliance with the British NMW to the level of compliance with the Irish NMW results in a narrowing of the gender wage gap of up to 5 ppt, around the level of the NMW. At the mean, this increased effectiveness would decrease the unexplained gender wage gap after the introduction of the NMW from the 16 percent observed in Table B.1 to 15 percent. This suggests that the negligible change in the British gender wage gap after the introduction of the NMW may be partly attributable to the disproportionate number of women still earning less than the legal threshold after its introduction in the U.K.

5. Conclusion

National minimum wages can be controversial tools for redistribution due to their potentially negative effects on employment and wages further up in the distribution. To contribute to the debate surrounding the NMW, we look at an indirect effect of its introduction on another key labor market indicator, the

Figure 7. The Effect of British and Irish NMWs on Wage Distributions in the U.K. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Notes: The DDF/PDF and EDF graphs show the before–after change in the gender gap where effectiveness is unchanged (British NMW) or is modified to reflect the Irish case (Irish MNW). The DDF represents the total change, while the PDF and EDF decompose the DDF into a price and an employment component.

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gender gap in pay. Using recently developed distribution regression methods, we find evidence that the gender wage gap at the bottom of the wage distribution may be effectively reduced by a NMW. This is the case for Ireland, where the gap was eliminated at very low levels of wage after the introduction of the NMW. On the whole, however, this had a limited effect on the average wage gap. On the contrary, we do not observe such an effect in the U.K. following the introduction of the NMW.

Despite cultural proximity, similarities in labor market regulations, and similar degrees of “sticky floors” before 1999, Ireland and the U.K. also present interesting differences that can explain the contrasted results. Our analysis suggests that this has much to do with relatively limited (and gender-biased) compliance. We derive from counterfactual simulations that more compliance could close the gender wage gap at the bottom of the wage distribution in the U.K. too.

We also show the importance of distributional analyses of this type. For Ireland in particular, while the gender wage gap almost closes at the bottom of the distribution after the introduction of the NMW, there is little change in the mean gap. Replication of this type of distributional analysis for different countries and periods around major labor market shocks therefore seems crucial to better understand how policies versus market wage setting affect inequality in general and gender inequality in particular. Distribution regression methods of the type presented in this paper are fit for purpose in this respect: they are flexible and provide accurate predictions around the minimum wage, require very few (parametric) modeling assumptions, and are easy to implement.

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**Supporting Information**

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher’s web site:

**Appendix A: Statistics and Estimates**

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics: Sample 1 for Ireland and the U.K.
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics: Alternative Selections
Table A.3: Coefficients of Distribution Regression of Hourly Wage Rates
Table A.4: Proportion of Workers by Occupation Earning Less than the NMW Before and After its introduction

Figure A.1: Actual vs Predicted CDFs of Hourly Wages (Ireland)
Figure A.2: Actual vs Predicted CDFs of Hourly Wages (U.K.)

**Appendix B: Mean and Percentile Effects**

Table B.1: Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap at the Mean and at Percentiles

**Appendix C: Robustness Checks**

C.1. Alternative Sample Definitions
C.2. Adding Occupation and Industry Dummies

Figure C.1: Change in the Gender Wage Gap (Sample 1a, Ireland)
Figure C.2: Change in the Gender Wage Gap (Sample 2, Ireland)
Figure C.3: Change in the Gender Wage Gap (Sample 2, U.K.)
Figure C.4: Change in the Gender Wage Gap (Including Occupations and Industries, Ireland)
Figure C.5: Change in the Gender Wage Gap (Including Occupations and Industries, U.K.)

C.3. Changing the Reference Group
Figure C.6: Change in the Gender Wage Gap over Time (Ireland)|Male as the Reference Group

C.4. Sample Selection Correction
Figure C.7: Change in the Gender Wage Gap over Time (U.K.)|Male as the Reference Group
Figure C.8: Change in the Gender Wage Gap (Accounting for Selection into Employment, Ireland)
Table C.1: Coefficients of Selection-Corrected Distribution Regressions of Hourly Wages
Figure C.9: Change in the Gender Wage Gap (Accounting for Selection into Employment, U.K.)

C.5. Additional References in the Appendix