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Protests in the City and the Country: Social Reactions in Western Pomerania in Response to the Workers’ Revolt of 1970/1971 in Szczecin

Abstract

The text is an analysis of the socio-political situation in Western Pomerania during the political crisis in the Polish People’s Republic at the turn of 1971. Szczecin lay in the heart of the workers’ protests, however, it was the events in Gdańsk that received the most spotlight at that time and later on. The article aims to gather and analyse information from primary sources on how the inhabitants of the country learned about social unrest in big cities, how they interpreted and commented on it, and how it all translated into social sentiments. Such an approach to the problem also provides an opportunity to carry out an analysis based on the dichotomy between the ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ areas. This is possible due to the accessibility of appropriate primary sources, which in the examined cases are constituted mostly by the documentation gathered by the Security Service, so far used to a small extent. It should also be stressed that the documents on the events of December 1970 in the context of the country in Western Pomerania were rather scant. The analysis of the documentation demonstrates how important Szczecin and Gdańsk were for social sentiments in 1970 and 1971. The incidents in ‘core’ cities were closely observed, and the patterns of protesting were then copied by the country. The scale of those ‘peripheral’ protests was smaller, and they usually did not turn into street fights, but their impact was felt, heard and seen. The methods of protesting in the country involved distributing leaflets, making inscriptions, conversing on related topics and, above all, sharing a desire to bring about a socio-political change expressed by strikes and public protests. These occurrences showed how much the ‘peripheral’ areas were inspired by the ‘core’ ones. There is no doubt that December 1970 left a lasting mark on the memory of the inhabitants of the country in Western Pomerania.

Keywords: December 1970; Western Pomerania; Szczecin; social unrest; protests; strikes; the country; the core – periphery relationship
Maciej Kowalewski, a Szczecin-based sociologist who deals with urban revolt wrote: ‘Protest is vibrant in the veins of the city – it is the vital force that determines its political significance’\(^1\). It refers also to the protest that took place in Szczecin at the turn of 1971. This sentence, if it were rid of its poetics, says a lot about the specificity of towns and cities as places that are particularly vulnerable to social unrest. Regardless of the historical period one is dealing with. This was the case in the ancient *polis*, medieval *civitas*, and revolutionary barricades of Paris of the nineteenth century give a similar impression. Politics is prone to change, but the revolt that is hidden within the guts of the city reveals itself from time to time and releases a force that is born from anger and disappointment. It results in a socio-political change. Sometimes a significant change, and sometimes less so. After all, not all events lead to a tipping point which Karl Schlögel understands to be a particular moment beyond which nothing is the same again\(^2\). So what was it like with the revolt in Szczecin?

For years, it has been referred to as a tipping point, although in Szczecin itself the term ‘breakthrough’ is more often used\(^3\). It is used in a twofold sense. Firstly, it refers to the political reality of the Polish People’s Republic at the end of the Władysław Gomułka’s rule and the beginning of Edward Gierek’s office. The events in Szczecin were of great importance for the change that was taking place in the Polish state, and it is widely accepted that it was them, together with the protests in the Tricity (consisting of Gdańsk, Gdynia and Sopot), that led to a shift in power. In this way, it was the first time that the capital of Western Pomerania became so significantly present in the national (and also international)\(^4\) consciousness. Szczecin became part of a series of political crises, often referred to as ‘Polish months’, to which Jerzy Ejsler paid attention on numerous occasions\(^5\). Secondly, this ‘breakthrough’ is important from

\(^{1}\) ‘Protest tętni w żyłach miasta, jest jego żywotną siłą, decydującą o znaczeniu politycznym’; Maciej Kowalewski, *Protest miejski. Przestrzenie, tożsamości i praktyki niezadowolonych obywateli miast*, Kraków 2016, p. 8. All quotes in the article have been translated into English by Tomasz Leszczuk.

\(^{2}\) Karl Schlögel, *W przestrzeni czas czytamy. O historii cywilizacji i geopolityce*, tł. Izabela Drozdowska, Łukasz Musiał, Poznań 2009, p. 56.

\(^{3}\) It is not without significance in this case that the main institution dealing with the commemoration of the post-war history of Szczecin is called the ‘Breakthroughs’ Dialogue Centre (Polish *Centrum Dialogu Przelomy*). Cf. Agnieszka Kuchcińska-Kurcz, *Centrum Dialogu Przelomy – ewolucja idei*, [in:] *Miasto sprzeciwu – miasto protestu. Katalog*, red. Agnieszka Kuchcińska-Kurcz, Szczecin 2015.

\(^{4}\) For the first time since Winston Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain speech’, the name of the city appeared in international information services. Cf. Eryk Krasucki, *Przesilenie. Społeczeństwo i władza w styczniu i lutym 1971 r. Obraz źródłowy*, Szczecin 2010, p. 117.

\(^{5}\) Jerzy Ejsler, „Polskie miesiące” czyli kryzys(y) w PRL, Warszawa 2008.
a local perspective. For many inhabitants of Szczecin it became a formative event, which is reflected in their memories, but also in literature. Thus, December 1970 is an important component of contemporary collective memory which is eagerly and often referred to, and the myth of the rebellious city is today one of the best-established notions among the local community as regards recent past.

For obvious reasons, the research on the revolt in Szczecin focused on determining and analysing the course of these events. Szczecin was therefore the centre of attention. Little was written about whether and how it influenced what was happening in the region. Therefore, my aim is to check what was known about the events in Szczecin and the Tricity, although I will devote less space to the latter, and how they were commented on in the ‘peripheral’ areas of Western Pomerania, i.e. smaller towns located within two former voivodeships of Szczecin and Koszalin. I will try to investigate whether the primary sources concerning these places reflect in any way the knowledge about the events that resulted in a serious political crisis at the turn of 1971. Also, I will examine whether the crisis affected the local communities, and whether it was met with mass or individual reactions, to what extent it could have disturbed the local authorities, and whether some original forms of defiance appeared.

The question may also be asked, referring to the dichotomy between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’, whether the ‘core’ city, which normally regulated the distribution of economic resources and political power in the region, became,

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6 Michał Paziewski, *Literatura szczecińska okresu PRL wobec Grudnia ’70*, Kronika Szczecina, 1992–1993, pp. 172–181.

7 Maciej Kowalewski, *Miasto, pamięć, konflikt. Szczecin w pamięci społecznej świadków Grudnia ’70*, [in:] *Historia, miasto, pamięć. Grudzień ’70 – Styczeń ’71 (perspektywa szczecińska)*, red. Maciej Kowalewski, Eryk Kraśucki, Paweł Miedziński, Szczecin 2010, pp. 183–195; Eryk Kraśucki, *Szczecińskie mitotwórstwo. Myśli kilka o współczesnym użytkowaniu historii*, [in:] *Pomorze Zachodnie z Polską*, red. Kazimierz Kozłowski, Warszawa–Szczecin 2015, pp. 427–434; idem, *Die Dezember-Revolte und die Stettiner Identität*, [in:] *Stettin. Wiedergeburt einer Stadt. Essays über die Odermetropole*, hrsg. v. Basil Kerski, Potsdam 2017, pp. 157–169; Kazimierz Kozłowski, *Kilka uwag o specyfice patriotyzmu lokalnego. O dwóch mitach założycielskich polskiego Szczecina. Z perspektywy 2015 r.*, Acta Cassubiana, t. 17: 2015, pp. 199–212.

8 See Michał Paziewski, *Grudzień 1970 w Szczecinie*, Szczecin 2014. Undoubtedly, it is the most important scholarly publication on the revolt of December 1970 in Szczecin.

9 See Stanisław Łach, *Grudzień 1970 roku w Słupsku*, Słupsk 2003; Rafał Marciniak, *Między Gdańskiem a Szczecinem. Grudzień ’70 w województwie koszalińskim*, [in:] *Historia, miasto, pamięć. Grudzień ’70 – Styczeń ’71 (perspektywa szczecińska)*, red. Maciej Kowalewski, Eryk Kraśucki, Paweł Miedziński, Szczecin 2010, pp. 155–174; Kazimierz Kozłowski, *Od Października ’56 do Grudnia ’70. Ewolucja stosunków społeczno-politycznych na Wybrzeżu (1956–1970)*, Szczecin 2002, pp. 454–461.

10 In this case, I define social rebellion like Robert K. Merton as a reaction to a situation where ‘the institutional system is seen as an obstacle to achieving socially recognised goals’, see Robert K. Merton, *Teoria socjologiczna i struktura społeczna*, tł. Jerzy Wertenstein-Żuławski, Ewa Morawska, Warszawa 2002, p. 221.
in this particular case, a source of ideas for the symbolic and cultural dimension of the rebellion\(^\text{11}\).

The answers to such questions will be sought primarily in the documentation collected by the Security Service during the operation codenamed ‘Autumn of 1970’ (Polish Jesień ’70). The data derived from other sources, such as archival collections, press, memoirs and scholarly publications will play a complementary role.

**The revolt in Szczecin (December 1970 – January 1971): Basic facts**

It is essential for the coherence and clarity of the text that the most important facts related to the revolt in Szczecin be mentioned, even if only briefly. The term ‘December 1970’, in both national and regional historiography, covers not only the events taking place during one month, but also what happened in January and February of 1971. Sometimes one may come across an opinion that the workers’ manifestations during the International Workers’ Day parades were the actual end of the revolt. This extended view of one of the ‘Polish months’ is particularly important with regard to Szczecin. In this case it is unreasonable to try to rank the significance of particular events, whether those taking place in December 1970 took precedence over the ones in January 1971, as they are equally crucial. It is important, however, to notice their dynamics and spot the climaxes, of which there were several. What seems particularly interesting is what was happening in the social sphere in Szczecin at the time.

Similarly to other parts of Poland, the moment which triggered social discontent in December 1970 was the increase in prices, although it should not be forgotten that such a strong outcry was the result of the economic crisis, which deepened each year\(^\text{12}\), and of a generational change, particularly evident in Western Pomerania\(^\text{13}\). To this day, the issue as to why the crisis of December 1970 affected most acutely the region of the Polish Baltic coast remains unresolved, but the fact is that it was in Gdańsk, then in Szczecin, Gdynia and Elbląg that the Polish People’s Army and the Citizens’ Militia used live ammunition, as a consequence of which 45 people died and more than 1,100

\(^{11}\) Katarzyna Kwarciańska, *Centra i peryferie jako rama analityczna i pojęciowa*, Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie, 2017, nr 3, pp. 8–9, DOI: 10.15678/ZNUEK.2017.0963.0301.

\(^{12}\) Sprawozdanie z pracy Służby Bezpieczeństwa województwa szczecińskiego za rok 1970, Szczecin, 13 II 1971, Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej w Szczecinie (further cit. AIPNSz), sygn. 0012/9, p. 19.

\(^{13}\) Adam Makowski, *Szczecińskie pokolenia – dorastanie. Refleksje o źródłach grudniowego buntu w Szczecinie w 1970 roku*, [in:] *Historia, miasto, pamięć. Grudzień ’70 – Styczeń ’71 (perspektywa szczecińska)*, red. Maciej Kowalewski, Eryk Krasucki, Paweł Miedziński, Szczecin 2010, pp. 43–54.
were wounded. The death toll in Szczecin was particularly tragic, as 15 people died during the pacification of the workers’ revolt on 17 and 18 December. The victims of the revolt also included Stanisław Nadratowski, a soldier of compulsory military service, who died as a result of a gunshot wound to the head on 19 December 1970, most probably committing suicide. The most widely commented demonstration was the one by the building of the Voivodship Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polish Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, hereafter abbreviated as PZPR) on 17 December and the subsequent attack of the demonstrators on the Voivodship Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia, shooting at the crowd gathered in the Prussian Homage Square (Polish plac Hołdu Pruskiego) and the pacification of the protests that spilled across the entire city by the police and the army. This was the most intense phase of the revolt.

In the days that followed, it turned into a strike that covered the entire agglomeration with the hub located in the Szczecin Shipyard. The insurgent industrial plant, which was the largest in Western Pomerania, housed the General City Strike Committee (Polish Ogólnomiejski Komitet Strajkowy). According to Michał Paziewski’s calculations, the committee comprised 120 entities. It was then that the term the ‘Republic of Szczecin’ was coined to emphasise the independence of the Strike Committee and the would-be takeover of the city by the protesters. There is a great deal of exaggeration in this term, because in fact, the official authorities never withdrew from the city or lost control over it. The various inscriptions and slogans that appeared on trams, cars and buildings became visible signs of defiance. The strike was therefore strongly present in the consciousness of the city dwellers, one could even say that the city lived by it. Thus, the disappointment was great when the negotiations, based on 21 demands, conducted with the local authorities did not yield the expected results. The protesters lost confidence in the previous leadership of the Strike Committee led by Mieczysław Dopierała, as a consequence of which Edmund Bałuka became the strike leader. However, the strike was soon ended on 22 December 1970 as Christmas was approaching. According to some protesters, it was only a temporary suspension.

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14 Dane dotyczące osób, które poniosły śmierć w wyniku zajść grudniowych na Wybrzeżu i osób aresztowanych w związku z tymi zajściami, Warszawa, 18 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 15, s. 79; Jerzy Eisler, Grudzień 1970. Geneza – przebieg – konsekwencje, Warszawa 2012, s. 33.
15 See M. Paziewski, Grudzień 1970, pp. 195–197.
16 Ibid., pp. 436–439.
17 Łucjan Adamczuk, Przebieg rewolty szczecińskiej 1970/1971, [in:] Grudzień przed Sierpniem. W XXV rocznicę wydarzeń grudniowych, red. Lech Mażewski, Wojciech Turek, Gdańsk 1996, pp. 64–85; Małgorzata Szejnert, Tomasz Zalewski, Szczecin. Grudzień – sierpień – grudzień, Londyn 1986, p. 62.
In fact, the beginning of the new year did not alleviate tensions among workers in Szczecin. Stoppages at work for several hours did not cease, fierce discussions at meetings of various bodies were held, and the authorities were expected to react quickly to the demands, which, in the first place, included social and economic issues, but also the democratisation of life within the workers’ self-government and the demand to punish those guilty of the December tragedy. That situation in Szczecin is well illustrated by the term ‘Hyde Park’, being a deliberate reference to the famous Royal Park of London. Neither the dismissal of Antoni Walaszek, the First Secretary of the Voivodship Committee of the PZPR, nor the visits of successive relevant ministers trying to tone down the atmosphere among the workers brought peace and quiet. Eventually, after a press article on one of the rallies on the premises of the Szczecin Shipyard was published in the newspaper *Głos Szczeciński*, which was deemed to be a provocation by the shipyard workers, a decision was made to organise a new strike headed by Edmund Bałuka. It was smaller than the previous one, both in terms of the number of strikers (about 30% of the employees of the shipyard) and the number of industrial plants that supported it (41). The conditions in which it took place were also much more difficult, and there was far less support in the city. However, the protest, which lasted from 22 to 25 January 1971, had an ending unprecedented in any of the states of the so-called Eastern Bloc. The plant occupied by the shipyard workers was visited by the most notable officials of the state and the ruling party: Edward Gierek, Piotr Jaroszewicz, Wojciech Jaruzelski and Franciszek Szlachcic, who held a fascinating discussion about the shipyard, Szczecin and Poland in general for nine hours in the common-room for workers.\(^{18}\)

After the visit the strike ended, although the shipyard workers did not receive most of what they had demanded, except the possibility of setting up a temporary Workers’ Committee (Polish *Komisja Robotnicza*) to monitor the elections to works councils and to keep an eye on the issue of holding the guilty accountable for the decisions that led to the December revolt. Some of the members of the Workers’ Committee had the ambition to act as the workers’ super-representation, independent of the already existing bodies and subjected only to the official authorities. It is sometimes suggested that this was the first independent trade union in Poland.\(^{19}\) Looking at the plans of Edmund Baluka and Lucjan Adamczuk, a sociologist employed at the Sociological and Psychological Laboratory operating at the Szczecin Shipyard and chief

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\(^{18}\) E. Krasucki, *Przesilenie*, pp. 90–98; Michał Paziewski, *Debata robotników z Gierkiem. Szczecin 1971*, Warszawa 2010.

\(^{19}\) Michał Paziewski, *Komisja Robotnicza w Stoczni Szczecińskiej im. Adolfa Warskiego*, [in:] *Wolne Związki Zawodowe z perspektywy trzydziestu lat. Materiały pokonferencyjne*, red. Jaroslaw Neja, Katowice 2008, pp. 17–45.
strategist of both strikes in the shipyard, this suggestion can be considered apt, although the plans were never implemented. The demonstration on the International Workers’ Day in 1971 is sometimes considered to be the symbolic finale of the revolt in Szczecin, when some workers marched in front of the main stand in the so-called black protest20. Still others see its finale in Edmund Bałuka’s departure from Poland in March 1973. It can be noticed that both of these events belong to a slightly different era in Poland’s history. They coincide with a time when Edward Gierek’s cabinet had already begun implementing their social and economic ideas, which enjoyed an enormous approval of the society at that stage. This caused the revolt in Szczecin, together with the important demands that emerged during its course, to come to the background.

**Reactions in the country: Before the revolt**

The review of social reactions to the events in Szczecin at the turn of 1971 should begin with the early symptoms of dissatisfaction that were reported in the period preceding the outbursts. They were regularly monitored by the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a standard procedure of observation of social sentiments, which had been in use for years. Some of those observations were later included in the documentation of the operation codenamed ‘Autumn of 1970’. This compilation documented all the activities of the law enforcement agencies, that is the Citizens’ Militia, the secret service and the army, involved in the action of ‘securing law and order’ after the increase in prices planned for December 1970, which was decided by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PZPR on 30 October 1970. It was emphasised in the documents that ‘it is essential that the whole state apparatus collects reliable information and passes it on immediately’21. At the same time, it should be mentioned that the documentation clearly indicates that the party and state apparatus feared large-scale protests. Hence, on 9 December, the voivodeship crisis management centres were established, and on 11 December, all units subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs were put on standby22. Years later, Colonel Romuald Głowacki, head of the Security Service in the Voivodeship of Szczecin, spoke about the scale of the measures taken: ‘Before the prices were increased,

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20 Eryk Krasucki, *Antypochoć 1 maja 1971 r. w Szczecinie*, Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej, 2007, nr 7, pp. 66–76; idem, *Czerwone i czarne. O proteście szczecińskim z 1 maja 1971 r.*, [in:] *Monady. Polsko-niemiecko-żydowskie po(st)graniczne narracje miejsc*, red. Arleta Galant, Eryk Krasucki, Piotr Krupiński, Paweł Wolski, Kraków – Budapeszt 2016, pp. 427–454.

21 ‘[…] bardzo istotną sprawą jest zbieranie wiarygodnych informacji przez cały aparat i natychmiastowe ich przekazywanie’; *Gruzień 1970 w dokumentach MSW*, opr. Jerzy Eisler, Warszawa 2000, p. 27.

22 Jerzy Eisler, *Rok 1970*, [in:] *Centrum władzy w Polsce 1948–1970*, red. Andrzej Paczkowski, Warszawa 2003, pp. 249–251.
all the voivodeship commanders of the Citizens’ Militia together with their deputies were called to the headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. We were warned that social unrest might arise and therefore ordered to introduce a standby alert. The Security Service was given the task of investigating and identifying the members of possible strike committees in Szczecin’s work establishments. The main focus was on the Szczecin Shipyard. Before the outbreak of the riots in Szczecin, neither the Citizens’ Militia nor the Security Service made any preventive arrests or detentions of those who prepared or led the strikes. We did not know at the time – which may seem unlikely and may indicate a poor quality of the Security Service’s operations – that Bałuka would head the Strike Committee. Nor did we have any indication that the shipyard workers would want to go to town.

This account is interesting for two reasons. It is, in fact, a testimony to the mediocre work of the Security Service, which were unable, although being well-informed, to determine the likely scenario of events and to stop the rebellion that was growing in Szczecin, especially in its most impetuous form. However, it also demonstrates well that the centre of interest of the decision-making authorities was at that time primarily limited to Szczecin. The rest of the region remained outside the field of interest. Perhaps there was a strong belief that nothing would happen in smaller towns? This could be due to, on the one hand, the economic specificity of Western Pomerania – a predominantly agricultural area, without significant industrial plants which would have a well-organised and integrated community of workers that could instigate a rebellion. On the other hand, social issues of Western Pomerania, such

23 ‘Przed wprowadzeniem podwyżek wszyscy komendanci wojewódzcy MO wraz z zastępcami zostali wezwani do centrali MSW. Uprzedzono nas, że mogą powstać niepokoje społeczne i w związku z tym nakazano wprowadzić stan podwyższonej gotowości. Służba Bezpieczeństwa otrzymała zadanie rozpracowania operacyjnego szczecińskich zakładów pracy, to jest ustalenie członków ewentualnych komitetów strajkowych. Chodziło przede wszystkim o Stocznię im. Warskiego. Przed wybuciem zamieszek w Szczecinie ani MO, ani SB nie dokonały żadnych prewencyjnych aresztowań czy zatrzymań osób przygotowujących czy prowadzących strajki. Nie wiedzieliśmy wtedy – co może wydawać się mało prawdopodobne i może świadczyć o jakości pracy SB – że na czele Komitetu Strajkowego stanie Bałuka. Nie mieliśmy też żadnych sygnałów, że stoczniowcy będą chcieli wyjść do miasta’; Zbigniew Banach, Pierwszy grudzień Jaruzelskiego, Toruń 1998, p. 47.

24 Meldunki KW MO w Szczecinie kierowane do Gabinetu Ministra MSW w ramach akcji „Jesień ’70”, Szczecin, 14–16 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/17, t. 1, pp. 19–34.

25 At this juncture, it should be remembered that according to one hypothesis, the revolt of December 1970 was part of a political game played among those in power, and the workers’ discontent was channelled by the authorities. In the light of this interpretation, the powerlessness of the Security Service would be justified, see Henryk M. Kula, Dwa oblicza Grudnia ’70. Oficjalne – rzeczywiste, Gdańsk 2000.
as high degree of disintegration of local communities and the uncertainty of livelihood, as well as the fact that there had been no major political protests or social revolts in the area for several decades justified the belief that the situation would be calm in the peripheries. One statement made in a report of 1960 prepared by the Security Service seemed relevant in this context and still valid, even though a decade sets it apart from December 1970. It was noted that interest in current affairs of the state in Słupsk depended solely on the current interests of particular social groups. A good illustration of the peripheral ‘subversive activities’ is a report of 1970 originating from the district of Drawsko, where the section titled ‘Preventive and repressive activities of the Security Service’ included 92 interventions in workplaces and seats of several state and party agencies. In this case, however, the range of offences that had alarmed the secret police is more important than their number: ‘violation of work discipline, improper behaviour of some employees which affected the economic results of the establishments, ethical and moral attitude, the situation in the establishments and social circles, the intentions of the clergy, e.g. in the case of renovation of sacred buildings, thefts, abuse.

The collected information may corroborate the assumption made by Colonel Glowacki. It is true that various manifestations of dissatisfaction were noted, but their scope and importance could easily be deemed as rather insignificant. The information from Kołobrzeg may also serve as a good example. In February 1970 it was noted: ‘We have not received any information from the work establishments in our area showing conflict situations, interruptions at work, discontent among the employees, etc., or anomalies. We have no data on the occurrence of conditions under which such incidents may arise. The branch of the Motor Transport Company in Kołobrzeg is an exception. We have informed about the situation in this company in our previous reports. There are currently no deficiencies in supplying the market’.

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26 Cf. Andrzej Sakson, *Nowe społeczeństwo Ziem Zachodnich i Północnych (1945–2020)*, Poznań 2020, pp. 60–75.
27 Informacja o aktualnej sytuacji politycznej wśród społeczeństwa miasta i powiatu słupskiego, Słupsk, 7 II 1960, AIPNSz, sygn. 00103/18, pp. 141–144.
28 ‘[… ] naruszenie dyscypliny pracy; niewłaściwe zachowanie się niektórych odpowiedzialnych pracowników, co odbijało się na efekbach gospodarczych zakładów, postawa etyczno-moralna, sytuacja w zakładach i środowiskach, zamiary kleru, np. w sprawie remontu obiektów sakralnych, kradzieże, nadużycia; Sprawozdanie referatu ds. Służby Bezpieczeństwa Komendy Powiatowej MO w Drawsku Pomorskim za rok 1970, Drawsko Pomorskie, 23 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 00103/208, t. 5, pp. 294–295.
29 Meldunek dotyczący sytuacji polityczno-ekonomicznej w powiecie kołobrzeskim, Kołobrzeg, 24 II 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/1, p. 2.
minor issues, yet it does not mean that they were not systemic in nature. These
issues reappeared on various occasions: something was not working properly
somewhere, there was a shortage of basic components for production, there
were stoppages, such as the one in a local confectionery cooperative in Kołó-
brzeg, where frequent shortages in the supply of fats necessary for everyday
work were reported\(^3^0\). The outburst of December 1970 was also indirectly her-
eralded by a particularly acute symptom of the economic crisis, i.e. market short-
age of basic food products, such as meat in the case of the town of Choszczno,
the cheapest kinds of meat and chocolate in the town of Pyrzyce, and butter,
lard, fatback and coffee in Kołobrzeg\(^3^1\). There had been talks of price rise in the
country since mid-1970\(^3^2\). The rumours were therefore ahead of the leadership
of the ruling party making the decision itself. They spread further from month
to month and overshadowed other topics, such as the signing of the much-
awaited border treaty between the Polish People's Republic and the Federal
Republic of Germany on 7 December 1970. The most commonly heard com-
ment on that issue was: ‘The interest in this problem is not particularly wide’,
and one of the letters sent from Kołobrzeg read: ‘I don’t know how things are
with you but here there is such a shortage in supply as never before. We were
told that some riots broke out in Poznań because of this. We would have to ask
Riele if this is true at all. Perhaps, because of this food shortage, we are “sign-
ing” an agreement with our neighbours from across the Oder’\(^3^3\). The situation
that arose in the second half of the year seems to have been aptly commented
on in one of the Security Service documents, written in February 1971, i.e. af-
after the shift in power among the leadership of the ruling party. It noted that
the decision to increase prices ‘further exacerbated the dissatisfaction of the
working people and the disbelief in the possibility of improving living condi-
tions. Against this background, the validity of our party’s political direction
and ideology was put to doubt, and our leaders were accused of not taking

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\(^{3^0}\) Ibid., p. 21.

\(^{3^1}\) Meldunek dotyczący nastrojów ludności powiatu Choszczno, Choszczno, 7 XII 1970,
AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/39, p. 10; Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Przyrzycach, Pyrzyce,
12 XI 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/75, p. 13; Meldunek dotyczący sytuacji w powiecie Kołobrzeg,
Kołobrzeg, 24 XI 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/1, p. 21; Meldunek dotyczący sytuacji w powiecie
Kołobrzeg, Kołobrzeg, 7 XII 1970, ibid., p. 23.

\(^{3^2}\) Sprawozdanie z pracy Służby Bezpieczeństwa województwa szczecińskiego za rok 1970,
Szczecin, 13 II 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/9, p. 20.

\(^{3^3}\) ‘Nie notuje się szerszego zainteresowania tym problemem’; ‘Nie wiem, jak u Was, ale
u nas jest taka nędza dosłownie w zaopatrzeniu jak nigdy. Doszły do nas słuchy, że w Poznaniu
z tego powodu były jakieś rozruchy. Trzeba by Riele zapytać czy to polega na prawdzie. Być może
brakami w żywności “podpisujemy” układ z drugimi sąsiadami zza Odry’; Meldunek dotyczący
sytuacji w powiecie Kołobrzeg, Kołobrzeg, 7 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/1, p. 23.
into account the opinions and aspirations of the working people. People in the country, while queuing for groceries, commented on the actions of the authorities, often in an insulting manner: 'If only someone threw a bomb at this Central Committee, so the oppression of the people would finally end. Never-ending travels, business trips and receptions. And where does that come from? You have to take it away from the worker to wine and dine a delegation from abroad.' There were also jokes. In Choszczno, for example, there was a joke around that '[Włodzimierz] Lubański was removed from [the football club] Górnik Zabrze, and comrade Gomułka was engaged in his place, as he was better at dribbling.' It was also said that 'Poland has a permanent prime minister and permanent economic difficulties,' and that 'Gomułka does not sweat while giving a speech because he has the people in his ass.'

It is interesting that these malicious comments about the reality of the Polish People's Republic, very often came from party members, e.g. the comment about the bomb thrown on the Central Committee was made by a manager at the local National Centre for Machinery, a member of the PZPR and the Volunteer Reserve of the Citizens' Militia. This proved that the morale among the lesser members of the party was not very high, and that they did not have much trust in their leaders. Various ideas of the state authorities to repair a malfunctioning economy were also heavily criticised. One example is the project of the so-called 'material stimulus packages' (Polish bodźce materialnego zainteresowania), proposed by Bolesław Jaszczuk, the Secretary of the Central Committee responsible for economic issues in Gomułka's cabinet. There was no trust in the proposed system of rewarding good work, as it

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34 ‘[…] jeszcze bardziej spotęgowało niezadowolenie ludzi pracy i niewiarę w możliwość poprawy warunków życia. Na tym tle rodziło się zwątpienie w słuszność linii politycznej i ideologii naszej partii oraz oskarżenie przywódców o nieliczenie się z opinią i dążeniami ludzi pracy’; Sprawozdanie z pracy Służby Bezpieczeństwa województwa szczecińskiego za rok 1970 r., Szczecin, 13 II 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/9, p. 20.

35 ‘[…] że też w ten Komitet Centralny ktoś nie rzuci bomby, aby się wreszcie skończyło gnębieńiu ludzi, wieczne są rozjazdy, delegacje i przyjęcia, a skąd ma się brać, trzeba robotnikowi odjąć od ust, a przyjąć jakąś delegację zagraniczną’; Meldunek dotyczący nastrojów ludności powiatu Choszczno, Choszczno, 7 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/39, p. 10.

36 ‘[…] z Górnika Zabrze został usunięty Lubański, a na jego miejsce zaangażowano tow. Gomułkę, gdyż lepiej kiwa; ‘[…] w Polsce jest stały premier i stałe trudności ekonomiczne; ’Gomułka przemawiając nie poci się, bo ma lud w tyłku’; ibid., p. 11. The last joke involves a play on words in the Polish version that hardly translates into English. It is based on the same pronunciation of words łód (‘the people’) and lód (‘ice’) in the Polish language. The expression ‘to have somebody in one’s ass’ means ‘to have little or no respect for someone’ in Polish.

37 Uchwała Rady Ministrów i Centralnej Rady Związków Zawodowych z dnia 1 lipca 1970 r. w sprawie bodźców materialnego zainteresowania pracowników zatrudnionych w przedsiębiorstwach przemysłowych planu centralnego i grupujących je zjednoczeniach w latach 1971–1975, www.prawo.pl/akty/m-p-1970-21-174,16817332.html [accessed online 15 July 2020].
was considered to be a trickery of the authorities, most likely aimed to shield them from the consequences of expected price increases, and there were a lot of sarcastic comments about it\textsuperscript{38}. However, the statements made by the Security Service officers which summarised the previous few years or even decades sound particularly dramatic. One example of this is a note which lists statements made by employees of the National Centre for Machinery in Myślibórz who wondered 'how is that possible that after 26 years it is getting worse and worse. In their opinion, everything is systematically becoming increasingly more expensive, whereas the earnings are falling. New rates of remuneration are constantly being introduced and, as a result, wages are being reduced. They also fear that the new system of material stimulus packages and the introduction of a daily wage with a performance bonus from the new year onwards will result in significantly lower earnings. They are also expecting a general increase in prices for all necessities in the near future'\textsuperscript{39}.

The subjectivity of these enunciations is obvious, but it is also worth remembering that they convey the real disillusionment and confusion of the communities in smaller towns, unable to find anything that could inspire confidence in the solutions proposed by the state and party authorities. From this perspective, it should be possible to notice the reactions to the increase in prices, which may seem trivial and individually insignificant, but together they create something like a 'critical mass' that triggers protests, social and political changes, and creates a new situation. Especially since the products affected by the price 'regulation' of December 1970 included meat, which Dariusz Jarosz described to be 'in short supply in Poland in the years 1945–1989, and thus essential to social behaviour and the way of thinking. The lack of it was sometimes the most important, and often one of the many elements of everyday life in post-war Poland, which led to various forms of protest'\textsuperscript{40}.

38 Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Myśliborzu, Myślibórz, 6 XI 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/70, p. 3; Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Pyrzycach, Pyrzyce, 3 XI 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/75, pp. 11–12.

39 ‘[…] jak to może być, że po 26 latach jest coraz gorzej. Ich zdaniem wszystko systematicznie drożeje, a zarobki są coraz mniejsze. Wprowadza się ciągle nowe stawki wynagrodzenia, które w rezultacie obniżają zarobki. Obawiają się również, że nowy system bodźców materialnego zainteresowania i wprowadzenie od nowego roku dniówkowe wynagrodzenie wraz z premią za wykonanie planu, spowoduje znacznie mniejsze zarobki. Liczą również, iż w najbliższym czasie nastąpi ogólna podwyżka na wszystkie artykuły pierwszej potrzeby’; Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Myśliborzu, Myślibórz, 26 XI 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/70, p. 6.

40 ‘[…] w Polsce lat 1945–1989 dobra deficytowe, których znaczenie było bardzo ważne w myśleniu i zachowaniach społecznych. Ich brak był czasami najważniejszym, a często jednym z wielu elementów powojennej codzienności, który skłaniał do różnego rodzaju form protestu’; Dariusz Jarosz, Mięso, Polska 1944/45–1989. Studia i Materiały, t. 17: 2019, p. 328, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/Polska.2019.10.
‘psychosis’, used on numerous occasions by Captain Alfred Jara of the District Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia in Myślibórz, therefore seems unjustified. It is likely that the officer used it in a common, rather than medical sense, which could simply have meant irrational behaviour, driven by some kind of fear, rather than a mental disorder. But even if this interpretation is accepted, it is hard not to notice that the inhabitants of Western Pomerania who commented on the increase in prices did not have major problems with defining properly what the decision of the Politburo meant for them, that is, how the increase would affect their home budgets, sometimes also their everyday life.

The situation is well described by a statement heard in one of queues in Koszalin: ‘The fish prices must be a misunderstanding. You couldn’t buy them before, because they were constantly in short supply, and now if you can find some, it won’t pay to buy them, especially if they are tinned, as they cost as much as sausages. They urged us to eat more fish, but they made them the most expensive dish. After all, I won’t give the boys 10 dkg of fish for dinner. They will eat 30 dkg each, but where will I get the money for that from? Those sillies (her boys) are happy that the clothes and technical products are cheaper. While, I dread to think that I’m going to have to cook more to replace meat with other dishes’41. This kind of talk could be heard after 12 December 1970 on a daily basis. It was a sign of social soreness and anger. There were also attempts to seek some sense in the actions undertaken by the state authorities, but it was not possible to find it in many cases. For example, the economic manager of a carpentry enterprise in Goleniów could not understand that ‘the press published information about overproduction of fruit and vegetables, which were difficult to sell, and in the meantime processed fruit were becoming expensive’42. On 12 December, just after the Central Committee of the PZPR announced the increase in prices, panic buying of just about anything began: butter, flour, sugar, groats, pasta, meat, alcohols, but also furniture, soap, clothes, TV sets and refrigerators. In Kamień Pomorski, slaughter animals were bought directly from farmers on a large scale43, and in Myślibórz, increased number of passbook payments were noted44. There was a widespread belief that from the new year onwards, these goods would become more

41 Meldunek nr 1 Wydziału „B” Komendy Wojewódzkiej MO w Koszalinie, Koszalin, 13 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 9, p. 8.
42 ‘[…] w prasie zamieszczane były informacje o nadprodukcji owoców i warzyw, z którymi są trudności w zbycie, a tymczasem ustala się wysokie ceny na przetwory z owoców’; Meldunek nr 1 Komendy Powiatowej w Gryfinie, Gryfino, 14 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/66, pp. 7–8.
43 Informacja Komendy Powiatowej MO w Kamieniu Pomorskim, Kamień Pomorski, 12 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/67, p. 1.
44 Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Myślaborzu, Myślibórz, 13 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/78, p. 10.
expensive again, and there had been talk of a planned exchange of money in some places. Of course, not everyone had a chance to stock up. In some shops, especially in the countryside, stock-taking began immediately after the announcement, so they closed earlier than usual, and for many there were simply not enough products. Here is a fragment of a letter that the Security Service intercepted in Ustka: ‘We spend all the money to stock up with flour, and other goods, because everything got really expensive. I don’t know how we’ll manage now. I can’t sleep at night. What is happening here?! Today, from 6:00 AM I was queueing for coffee with Zbyszek and I got one package. Zbyszek also got one package’⁴⁵.

There was also a significant increase in the number of comments maliciously referring to the leader of the ruling party. In Gryfino people said that ‘Gomułka should take this margarine and oil his head with it so he could process thoughts faster in the future’, and joked that ‘Gomułka has got a hernia from putting so many heavy burdens on the people’⁴⁶. In the town of Łobez, the party leader was unceremoniously threatened: ‘If the price of bread goes up to 12 zlotys, I will hang Gomułka’ – said a customer of the snack bar at the railway station, although he was a little bit inebriated⁴⁷. While in Myślibórz people said that comrade ‘Wiesław’ (Gomułka’s pseudonym) was too old and should be replaced by someone younger as soon as possible. It is interesting that opinions referring to the class-based society also appeared, which proved that the ‘class conflict’ was smouldering. According to town residents, the inhabitants of the country were supposed to be better off and, additionally, they were supposed to be supported by the ruling party (‘only the peasants get along’), and in one of the statements a proposal was put forward to change the name of the party to ‘Polish United Peasants’ Party’⁴⁸. A unique testimony to that time was a nursery rhyme titled Jadłospis (‘the Menu’). Its several copies and different versions seem to indicate its considerable popularity: ‘Ham, sausage and rolls – for Gomułka / Gammon and tenderloin – for Cyrankiewicz / Kidneys, liver and guts – for Kliszko / Roast lamb – for Marian Spychalski / Pork knuckle and ribs – for Edward Gierek / Dessert and tinned fish – for people

⁴⁵ Wypisy z perlustracji dokonanej przez Komendę Powiatową w Słupsku, Słupsk, 17 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 3, p. 168.
⁴⁶ ‘Gomułka powinien sobie tą margaryną wysmarować łeb, by mógł na przyszłość lepiej myśleć’; ‘Gomułka dostał już przepukliny od nakładania ciężarów na naród’; Meldunek nr 1 Komendy Powiatowej w Gryfinie, Gryfino, 14 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/66, pp. 7–8.
⁴⁷ ‘Jeśli chleb podrożeje do 12 zł to Gomułkę powieszę’; Meldunek specjalny o przebiegi akcji „Jesień ’70” na terenie powiatu lobeskiego, Łobez, 14 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/72, p. 12.
⁴⁸ Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Myśliborzu, Myślibórz, 13 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/78, p. 11.
Protests in the City and the Country: Social Reactions in Western Pomerania...

who have nerves of steel / The remaining scraps and bones – for the working people / When you sit down to have breakfast with your family / You will have bread with margarine / For lunch: eggs of third rate quality / To keep you away from having kids / Jam and lard for dinner – to give you a boner. Another, yet peculiar, example of dark humour was noted in Koszalin and Kołobrzeg. This time, the humour came from the consumers of alcoholic beverages and it could be heard at street beverage booths: ‘It’s nice that the prices of beer and vodka didn’t go up. Neither did the prices of our favourite snacks – cigarettes and onions cost the same as before."

The word ‘strike’ is noted in talks that took place in the countryside relatively early, i.e. shortly after the announcement of the price increase, before the actual protests on the Polish Baltic coast. Characteristically, the supposed strike is connected several times with Poznań and the Cegielski Factory. This was undoubtedly a reflection of the memory of the dramatic events of June 1956. However, the workers’ protests are mainly referred to in relation to Szczecin and the Szczecin Shipyard. One can get the impression that many people were particularly looking in that direction, rightly assuming, as it soon turned out, that it was the most important industrial plant in the region that a larger-scale protest would take place. Strike gossip and rumours, brought from Szczecin, heard during telephone conversations and forwarded in correspondence, complemented the atmosphere of tension and waiting for the workers to take action. In several places a suggestion appeared that the protests should be initiated in local plants. ‘We should strike, as it is done in other countries, with everyone joining in,’ said the workers from plants in Złocieniec.

49 ‘Szynka, kiełbasa i bułki – dla Gomułki / Baleron i polędwica – dla Cyrkankiewicza / Nerki, wątroba i kiszki – dla Kliszy / Pieczeń z barana – dla Spychalskiego Mariana / Golonka i żeberka – dla Edwarda Gierka / Deser i rybne konserwy – dla ludzi co mają mocne nerwy / Reszta ochłapów i kości – dla pracującej ludności / Gdy do śniadania zasiądziesz z rodziną / Będziesz jadł chleb z margaryną / Na obiad jaja – gatunek trzeci / By nie płodzić dzieci / Na kolację dżem i ceres – by ci dobrze stał interes’; Aneks do meldunku dziennego nr 293/70 z wydarzeń istniejących na terenie województwa koszalińskiego w dniach 11–13 grudnia 1970 r., Koszalin, 14 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 4, p. 2; Odpis tekstu „Jadłospis dla obywateli PRL”, [no data], AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/67, p. 10.

50 ‘Fajnie, że nie zdrożało piwo i wódka. Nasza przekąska też nie zdrożała – papierosy i cebula po staremu’; Meldunek nr 1 Wydziału „B” Komendy Wojewódzkiej MO w Koszalinie, Koszalin, 13 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 9, p. 8.

51 Meldunek specjalny Komendy Powiatowej MO w Kamieniu Pomorskim, Kamień Pomorski, 16 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/67, p. 5; Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej w Świnoujściu, Świnoujście, 15 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/77, p. 6.

52 Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Kamieniu Pomorskim, Kamień Pomorski, 13 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/67, p. 3; Meldunek specjalny Komendy Powiatowej MO w Kamieniu Pomorskim, Kamień Pomorski, 14 XII 1970, ibid., p. 8.
and Kalisz Pomorski\textsuperscript{53}. Leaflets and inscriptions on walls were also evidence of the special atmosphere of those days. In Chojna, leaflets were found with a swastika drawn on the name of the Polish United Workers’ Party, and the students of the high school in Dębno were involved in the illegal distribution of texts criticising the state authorities\textsuperscript{54}. The swastika motif, this time painted on a building wall, also appears in reports from the district of Drawsko. It was also there that a surprising call was found: ‘Stalin, stand up from the grave, because the workers are starving!’ However, it was later found during the revolt of December 1970 in many places in Western Pomerania and other regions, also in different versions\textsuperscript{55}. In Kołobrzeg, one could read such leaflets on the street poles: ‘To hell with the kind of politics that puts margarine [instead of butter – E.K.] in your hands’, whereas an inscription on the wall of one of the high schools said: ‘Down with Gomułka and the gang’\textsuperscript{56}. However, the scale and scope of the described offences was small. Leaflets were usually made in a few copies, whereas the offensive inscriptions were relatively few and far between and quickly disappeared as a result of the authorities’ intervention.

**Reactions in the country: The outburst of December 1970**

The first information about the workers’ manifestations in the Tricity and in Szczecin aggravated people’s negative attitude towards the authorities. However, the situation was not yet of utmost concern at this point. What was more important was the news about workers openly rebelling against the authorities. In one of the documents it was suggested that such information spread by unofficial means, as the inhabitants of Western Pomerania would not be informed by official state-controlled media\textsuperscript{57}. The first news about the revolt appeared in the local press as late as 17 December and its credibility was questionable\textsuperscript{58}. Therefore, most of the information reached the public opinion from outside the mainstream media, that is, through telephone calls and postal correspond-

\textsuperscript{53} ‘Należałoby zastrajkować, tak jak to się robi w innych krajach, aby do tego strajku przyłączyli się wszyscy’; Informacja dotycząca przebiegu akcji „Jesień ’70” w powiecie drawskim, Drawsko Pomorskie, 16 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 14, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{54} Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej w Dębnie, Dębno, 18 XII 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/40, pp. 5–6.

\textsuperscript{55} ‘Wstań Stalinie z grobu, bo robotnicy giną z głodu’; Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej w Drawsku Pomorskim, Drawsko Pomorskie, 18 XII 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 2, p. 282; J. Eisler, Grudzień 1970, pp. 150, 160.

\textsuperscript{56} ‘Ch… z taką polityką, co ci margarynę w ręce wtyka’; ‘Precz z rządami Gomułki i spółki’; Meldunek dotyczący akcji „Jesień ’70”, Kołobrzeg, 18 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/1, pp. 26–27.

\textsuperscript{57} Informacja dotycząca przebiegu akcji „Jesień ’70” w powiecie drawskim, Drawsko Pomorskie, 16 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 14, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{58} Zajścia w Gdańsku, Trybuna Ludu, 17 XII 1970; Zajścia w Gdańsku, Głos Koszaliński, 17 XII 1970; Zajścia w Gdańsku, Głos Szczeciński, 17 XII 1970.
ence, gossip coming from people who witnessed the events or had previously talked with witnesses (railway workers played a significant role in this case), and radio programmes aired in Polish, e.g. by Radio Free Europe. According to the information from the local branches of the Security Service, the majority of the Polish society approached the workers’ manifestations with approval, numerous acts of solidarity towards the protesters were noted, and the information that the army and the Citizens’ Militia were shooting at the crowd was deeply disturbing. In contrast, there was certain ambivalence towards the acts of hooliganism and setting fire to public buildings by the protesters. Alongside the acceptance of this form of opposition against the authorities, numerous expressions of disapproval emerged. Due to the information overload that emerged, all kinds of rumours, more or less improbable, could be heard, e.g. about the intervention of Soviet troops, shooting at children in Szczecin or dressing up the militiamen in military uniforms to hide those who were truly responsible for firing arms.

The geographic layout of Western Pomerania and the structure of employment in the region, influenced the fact that in its eastern part was better informed about the situation in the Tricity, while the west part was much more familiar with what was happening in Szczecin. This is evidenced by various reports prepared by the Security Service, as well as by the censorship of correspondence conducted by this agency. Most of the data comes from Słupsk, where appearing pieces of information on the ‘dissatisfaction with food price increase and incidents in the state’ were carefully tracked and analysed. Between 17 and 20 December, 1,660 letters were inspected, several dozen of which aroused particular interest among the officers and therefore extensive excerpts from these letters were copied. These letters document the horror of those days. They often include shocking accounts of what was happening.

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59 Cf. Paweł Szulc, Szczeciński Grudzień ’70 i Styczeń ’71 w optyce Radia Wolna Europa, Dzieje Najnowsze. Kwartalnik poświęcony historii XX wieku, R. 43: 2011, nr 1, pp. 107–121.
60 Meldunek specjalny o przebiegu akcji „Jesień ’70” na terenie powiatu łobeskiego, Ło-
bez, 21 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/72, p. 17; Notatka służbowo dotycząca zajiś ulicznych,
jakie miały miejsce w Słupsku w dniu 12 grudnia 1970 r. oraz pracy wywiadowców w dniach
17–21 grudnia 1970 r., Koszalin, 30 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 19, pp. 139–147; Mel-
dunek za okres od godz. 14:00 dnia 17 XII 1970 r. do godz. 14:00 dnia 19 XII 1970 r., Choszcz-
no, 19 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/39, p. 16.
61 Informacja dotycząca przebiegu akcji „Jesień ’70” w powiecie drawskim, Drawsko Po-
morskie, 16 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 14, pp. 16–21; Meldunek Komendy Powiato-
wej MO w Choszcznie dotyczący zatrzymania Aleksandra Kruczkowskiego, Choszczno, 23 XII
1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/39, p. 17.
62 Meldunek nr 5 z dnia 17 grudnia 1970 r., Słupsk, 18 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108,
t. 3, p. 163; Wyciągi z dokumentów [Wydziału „W”], Słupsk, 19 XII 1970, ibid., p. 85; Meldunek
nr 7 z 19–20 grudnia 1970 r., Słupsk, 21 XII 1970, ibid., p. 77.
on the Polish Baltic coast and in Słupsk itself. One example is a letter sent from Gdańsk: ‘I’m writing this letter out of desperation. I think you know that riots are going on here. It’s terrible. They open fire at people. It’s a massacre. I called Mirek today, but I can’t hear from him. When he left on Monday, he never came back. I don’t know what is happening. I really can’t write anything, because they are probably controlling the letters. I cried all day long because I called from my workplace and found out about his absence. No one knows where he is. I do nothing but cry, and we also have a strike at work, it’s really terrible. I don’t know how it’ll end, but we are besieged by the army’63. There is no similar evidence with regard to other towns in the region, but one can guess that similar letters were also sent there, either from Szczecin or the Tricity. The importance of such letters, if one takes into account their emotional impact, remains undisputed, because the letters were not confiscated by the secret police and ultimately reached their addressees.

The legacy of the work done by the censors from Słupsk was probably preserved for one reason. It was the only place in the region where, during the height of the crisis of December 1970, i.e. between 14 and 18 December, major manifestations in the streets took place. Here and there declarations of supposed willingness to take action appeared and some people even considered setting fire to some buildings, which was apparently influenced by the information about burning down party buildings in Szczecin and Gdańsk, but eventually no serious manifestations were organised64. It is difficult to classify what happened in Drawsko Pomorskie as a serious incident, although its background was clearly political: ‘On 20 December 1970, a group of 12 drunk hooligans kept up some hostile chants in front of the building of the District Committee of the PZPR: “We will do [to you] what they did in Gdańsk!” , and used physical force against the intervening officers of the Citizens’ Militia’65. It seems that various preventive actions proved effective, both secret, e.g. the activity of secret collaborators and various ‘moralising speeches’.

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63 ‘Z rozpaczy piszę ten list. Chyba wiesz, jakie u nas są rozruchy, coś okropnego. Strzelają do ludzi otwartym ogniem. Masakra. Dzwoniłam dzisiaj do Mirka, nic z tego. Jak wyszędł w po-niedziałek, tak do tej pory nie wrócił. Nie wiem, co się dzieje. Nie mogę nic wam napisać, bo chyba kontrolują listy. Cały dzień dzisiaj płakałam, bo dzwonię z zakładu pracy [i] dowiedzia-łam się o jego nieobecności i nic nikt nie wie gdzie się znajduje. Chodzę i tylko płaczę, u nas w pracy też strajk, coś okropnego. Nie wiem, jak się zakończy, ale jesteśmy oblężeni wojskiem’; Wyciągi z dokumentów [Wydziału] „W”, Słupsk, 18 XII 1970, ibid., p. 165.

64 Meldunek specjalny o przebiegi akcji „Jesień ’70” na terenie powiatu łobeskiego, Łobez, 21 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/72, pp. 16–17; Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Świnoujściu, Świnoujście, 20 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/77, p. 12.

65 ‘W dniu 20 grudnia 1970 roku grupa pijanych dwunastu chuliganów, będąc przed blokiem Komitetu Powiatowego PZPR wznosiła wroge okrzyki w postaci: “Zrobimy to, co w Gdańsku!” , a w stosunku do interweniujących funkcjonariuszy MO użyła siły fizycznej’; Informacja dotycząca
as well as the public ones, such as setting checkpoints and blockades on the main roads leading to Gdańsk in the Voivodeship of Koszalin\(^66\). A similar blockade was also established around Szczecin. The capital of Western Pomerania and such cities and towns as Stargard, Świnoujście, Goleniów, Police and Trzebież bore witness to unprecedented demonstrations of power, namely military columns consisting of two or three armoured vehicles and military trucks driving through the streets\(^67\). The intention was, of course, to discourage possible street demonstrations.

There is no satisfactory answer to the question as to why incidents in the streets on 16 and 17 December took place exclusively in Słupsk. The most important issue was undoubtedly the proximity of Gdańsk and the socio-economic links between both cities. The analyses carried out by the party drew attention to a long period of economic neglect and the lack of proper understanding of the expectations of the local community, particularly young workers\(^68\). However, this is not sufficient to fully understand why the social and political conflict did not take such a heated form in Koszalin, a city with a comparable population, or in such significant cities as Stargard, Szczecinek, Świnoujście and Kolobrzeg. Perhaps, as is often the case, it was a question of coincidence. It takes just one person determined enough to lead a demonstration, one thrown stone, or a similar ‘ignition’ for the situation to go out of control. One thing is certain, in most cities and towns in Western Pomerania, the preventive measures taken by the authorities were enough to alleviate the unrest and avoid what happened in Szczecin and Słupsk. A small number of detainees in Voivodeship of Koszalin during the unrest of December 1970 may serve as the evidence. Only 195 people were detained, 127 of whom in Słupsk alone. It is characteristic that only 10 of those detained were older than 40\(^69\). At the same time, their offences turned out to be so minor that, in most cases, a disciplinary talk was used as a preventive measure, and only several people were charged. It is also worth noting that, although the inhabitants of the ‘peripheral’ areas of West Pomerania were familiar with the protest carried out in the regional ‘core’, in an overwhelming number of cases their reactions were limited to commenting. There was a shortage of local leaders and social circles determined enough to enter a phase of open conflict with the authorities. So when on 21 December in Szczecin and Stargard the strike still continued in 15 factories and the General City Strike Committee was functioning, the

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\(^{66}\) R. Marciniak, op. cit., pp. 161–162.

\(^{67}\) M. Paziewski, Grudzień 1970, p. 193.

\(^{68}\) K. Kozłowski, Od Października ’56 do Grudnia ’70, pp. 459–461.

\(^{69}\) R. Marciniak, op. cit., p. 166.
conclusions drawn during the conference organised in Koszalin by the officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the voivodeship commanders of the Citizens’ Militia were received with calmness. The proposals included releasing the detainees after conducting ‘moralising talks’ with them, the withdrawal of the units of the Citizens’ Militia and the Volunteer Reserve of the Citizens’ Militia, and the development of operations based to a larger than so far extent on identifying and preventing in terms of current affairs and recognising sentiments among the society. The turning point was the removal of Władysław Gomułka from power and entrusting the party leadership to Edward Gierek. The various documents that originated from the region clearly indicated that the ‘social sentiments had improved’. The decisions of the 7th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the PZPR were adopted with relief, and according to the inhabitants of the country, sensible people were put in charge of the party. This was exactly in line with the impressions of the most important people in the Voivodeship of Szczecin, because similar opinions were expressed at the Plenary Session of the Voivodeship Committee of the PZPR, which was held on 21 December. Minor incidents, such as a leaflet distribution and various inscriptions on the walls, were completely ignored, and lesser expressions of social unrest were overlooked in the official documents already at the administrative level of the voivodeship, although it is known that the workers of the factory ‘Hydroma’ in Gryfice went on strike for several hours on 22 December. The situation was clearly cooling down, which was influenced, on the one hand, by personnel changes among the party leaders in Warsaw, and by the weariness suffered by protestors and the approaching Christmas on the other. Contrary to the hopes of the state and party authorities, however, this process did not determine the end of social tensions.

Reactions in the country: January–February 1971

Soon it turned out that a few days’ break and the beginning of the new year did not bring any reassurance. As it was the case in Szczecin, in the country one could observe something that Kazimierz Barcikowski, the Secretary of the

70 ‘[…] większe jak dotychczas pracy rozpoznawczo-operacyjnej i profilaktycznej w zakresie znajomości rzeczy, co mówi społeczeństwo, jakie są w społeczeństwie nastroje’; Notatka służbowa z konferencji prowadzonej 21 grudnia 1970 roku, Koszalin, 21 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 9, pp. 372–374.
71 Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Myśliborzu, Myślibórz, 22 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/70, p. 31; Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Świnoujściu, Świnoujście, 21 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/77, p. 14.
72 Protokół nr 12 z plenarnego posiedzenia KW PZPR w Szczecinie, Szczecin, 21 XII 1970, Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie, Komitet Wojewódzki PZPR, sygn. 67, pp. 299–302.
73 Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej w Gryficach, Gryfice, 22 XII 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/41, p. 16.
Central Committee of the PZPR, called a 'pre-strike simmering'\textsuperscript{74}. The diagnosis made by Jan Szydlak, yet another prominent member of the party, who, as early as in December 1970, warned that the tactics of 'patching up' little by little used so far was not effective, proved to be correct\textsuperscript{75}. Indeed, when reading the documents concerning January and February 1971, one can see that the articulation of social problems was changing. A greater awareness of problems and boldness in indicating them can be observed on the part of the society. The question may be raised whether this impression was not due to the fact that the secret police employed different methods to monitor the situation in the country? In one of the documents produced by the Security Service, where the task list for 1971 was catalogued, one may find such an entry: 'Strengthen operations involving identification and prevention undertaken in districts where, according to the collected information, threats of new social conflicts are rising'\textsuperscript{76}. This can certainly explain a larger number of documents and a more meticulous observation, but it cannot be underestimated that during the first few weeks of 1971 a lively discussion in the region on local and national issues was taking place. It may even be interpreted as an animation of the inhabitants of Western Pomerania. Perhaps it was a delayed reaction to the trauma inflicted by the events of December 1970? Perhaps they were encouraged by the expiatory attitude demonstrated by central and local authorities? Either way, the people in the country were increasingly interested in public affairs.

By expiatory attitude of the authorities, one should understand their attempt to engage in a dialogue with the society. This had been unprecedented since 1956, but it was realised that without listening and explaining (what had happened and what would happen now), there was no chance of a real breakthrough\textsuperscript{77}. Above all, however, the representatives of the authorities listened. In Miastko, during meetings in 19 plants, the issue that came up the most often regarded reconciling with the past, both distant and recent. Many questions were asked: ‘Why was there no purge in the Central Committee of the PZPR after the [political crisis of – E.K.] March 1968? Why Loga-Sowiński was not removed from the office? Why [the newspaper – E.K.] Głos Koszaliński did not inform about the incidents on the Baltic coast in detail? Will the

\textsuperscript{74} Kazimierz Barcikowski, \textit{U szczytów władzy}, Warszawa 1998, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego. Grudzień 1970}, opr. Paweł Domański, Londyn 1991, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{76} ‘Wzmocnienie pracy operacyjnej, rozpoznawczej i zapobiegawczej w powiatach, gdzie, jak wskazują materiały, narastają sytuacje grożące nowymi konfliktami społecznymi’; Sprawozdanie z pracy Służby Bezpieczeństwa województwa szczecińskiego za rok 1970, Szczecin, 13 II 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/9, p. 29. See also Wytyczne do pracy operacyjnej Wydziału III w związku z akcją „Jesień ’70” i obecną sytuacją polityczno-operacyjną w kraju i województwie, Koszalin, 13 I 1970, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 15, pp. 4–10.

\textsuperscript{77} E. Krasucki, \textit{Przesilenie}, p. 37.
people responsible for the recent incidents be held accountable, both legally and politically?\textsuperscript{78} The attitude towards the party authorities at the district level was very critical. Their members were repeatedly accused of conceitedness, indifference and inaction, but also of drunkenness and various abuse\textsuperscript{79}. Therefore, there was a hope for further personnel changes, and this was seen as a way of restoring party authority, although at the same time there was concern if the local apparatchiks ‘would understand their mistakes and act as the new party and government leadership recommends\textsuperscript{80}. This was due to very limited or no confidence in them. In Słupsk, after a meeting with Stanisław Kujda, head of the district party apparatus, the following issues were raised: criticism of the selection of participants in the meeting (‘party members who were gathered were not the ones that should be talked to, according to the 7\textsuperscript{th} Plenary Session’), distrust in the presented information (‘they will not provide reliable and objective truth’), populism (‘this speech was calculated to please the public’) and a reluctance to take responsibility (‘it is an attempt to shift the blame to the administration and plant managers, to the entire economic administration’)\textsuperscript{81}. It was sometimes noted that the working class ‘wanted improvements, not just talk\textsuperscript{82}.

The second topic of the discussions carried out in January and February 1971 was what happened in Szczecin and Gdańsk. ‘People continue commenting on the events of December’ – said the numerous district reports, and the most important reason for these statements was the issue of personal responsibility for ordering to use firearms. These identified culprits included: Władysław

\textsuperscript{78} ‘Dlaczego nie zrobiono czystki w KC PZPR po wypadkach marcowych? Dlaczego nie zdjęto ze stanowiska Logi-Sowińskiego? Dlaczego Głos Koszaliński nie informował szczegółowo o wypadkach na Wybrzeżu? Czy będą pociągnięci do odpowiedzialności partyjnej i karnej ludzie winni ostatnich zajść’; Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Miastku dotyczący sytuacji ekonomiczno-politycznej na terenie powiatu, Miastko, 15 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 14, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{79} Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Gryfinie, Gryfino, 20 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/66, pp. 13–14; Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Pyrzybach, Pyrzyce, 16 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/75, p. 25; Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Gryfinie, Gryfino, 20 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/75, p. 25; Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Gryfinie, Gryfino, 20 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/75, p. 29; Notatka służbowa majora J. Zdanki, Gryfice, 12 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/41, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{80} Meldunek z przebiegu akcji „Jesień ’70” na terenie powiatu łobeskiego, Łobez, 21 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/72, p. 18; Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Pyrzybach, Pyrzyce, 16 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/75, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{81} Raport ze spotkania z kontaktem służbowym inż. „G”, Słupsk, 8 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 14, pp. 31–32.

\textsuperscript{82} ‘zebrano nie ten aktyw, z którym w myśl zaleceń VII Plenum należy rozmawiać’; ‘nie poszukają się o rzetelną, obiektywną prawdę’; ‘to wystąpienie było obliczone “pod publiczkę”’; ‘to próba przerzucenia winy na administrację, kierowników przedsiębiorstw, na całą administrację gospodarczą’; Meldunek dotyczący nastrojów i sytuacji operacyjnej w powiecie, Choszczno, 22 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/39, p. 22.
Gomułka\textsuperscript{83}, Józef Cyrankiewicz, Mieczysław Moczar, Stanisław Kociołek and Stefan Jędrychowski (‘as a Jew’), as well as the Citizens’ Militia and, obviously, the Jews ‘who divided us’\textsuperscript{84}. The circulation of information about the tragedy on the Polish Baltic coast was also complained about, and at the same time the press was not trusted, a good example of which is that the question: ‘how many people died?’ kept coming back, although announcements made by prosecutors on the subject were published on 18 January\textsuperscript{85}. When describing the sentiments in the district, the branch of the Security Service in Choszczno noted that one of the members of the party allegedly ‘criticised the local press for not providing the right number of people who died in Szczecin. According to him, it was 156 people that were killed, not 16’. Someone else claimed that ‘in the block of flats in Szczecin where he lived, four people were killed, i.e. two 14-year-old girls, a militiaman and a man’\textsuperscript{86}. None of this information was true, but each and every piece of it created a space for various urban legends to emerge. They became even more permanent as there was a shortage of accurate information about the revolt of December 1970 in Szczecin or the Tricity, and half-truths and rumours were taken very seriously. First-hand information, that presented an undistorted picture of events, was rare\textsuperscript{87}. An interesting source of knowledge, but also a contribution to the formation of legends was the so-called ‘December poetry’, a characteristic element of those days that described the tragedy in a slightly different way. There are many examples of such poetry originating from Western Pomerania, like the \textit{December Ballad}

\textsuperscript{83} It is worth noting that farmers expressed regret at the departure of Gomułka. They feared, among other things, that the ‘kolkhozes’ would be restored, i.e. that the collectivisation policy would return, and they also appreciated him as ‘a symbolic figure because he improved their living conditions, especially after 1956 and later’ (‘postać symboliczną dlatego, że poprawił ich warunki bytu szczególnie po roku 1956 i w latach późniejszy’). In the countryside, it was feared that Gierek would ‘pay more attention to the workers, while being more demanding and harsh towards the farmers’ (‘więcej będzie zwracał uwagę na robotników zaś chłopom będzie “podkręcał śrubę” ’), see Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Pyrzycach, Pyrzyce, 6 II 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/75, p. 32; Meldunek dotyczący nastrojów i sytuacji operacyjnej w powiecie, Choszczno, 14 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/39, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{84} Notatka służbowa Romana Niewiadomskiego, członka ORMO, Gryfino, 7 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/66, p. 12; Meldunek dotyczący nastrojów i sytuacji operacyjnej w powiecie, Choszczno, 22 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/39, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{85} E. Krasucki, \textit{Przesilenie}, p. 268.

\textsuperscript{86} ‘[…] krytykować prasę lokalną, że ta nie podaje właściwej ilości osób, które zginęły w Szczecinie. Według niego ma być zabitych nie 16 osób, a 156’; ‘[…] w bloku, w którym on mieszka w Szczecinie, zginęły 4 osoby tj. dwie dziewczynki 14-letnie, milicjant i mężczyzna’; Meldunek dotyczący nastrojów i sytuacji operacyjnej w powiecie, Choszczno, 22 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/39, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{87} Meldunek za okres 14–21 stycznia 1971 r., Słupsk, 21 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 108/108, t. 14, pp. 35–38; Odpis notatki służbowej starszego sierżanta Jana Gopa, Dębno, 21 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/40, p. 11.
(Polish Ballada grudniowa) and the December Carol of the Coast (Polish Grudniowa kolęda Wybrzeża). The impressions created by the revolt in the ‘core’ were manifested in the country in yet another manner. It was an unflagging interest in resolving the crisis using radical means, which is why so many declarations of the need to set fire to different buildings can be found. However, these declarations remained unfulfilled if one does not count a burnt fence of the property that belonged to one of the militiamen in Chojnice.

Increased radicalism also manifested itself in the lively presence of the word ‘strike’. It most often appeared as a threat and a pressure factor. Let us use this memo as an example: ‘Operational data show that the women employed in the local industry plant in Gryfice are going to begin a strike and go to the District Committee of the PZPR to speed up their move into the newly built production hall, as they are currently working outside and the management is doing nothing to speed up their move in. The reason is the lack of light in the production hall.’ The situation was similar in the State Agricultural Farm in Sądów, where the crew announced a strike, demanding that ‘the cattle must not be given feed with mud, as this resulted in a decrease in milk production, an increase in the number of illnesses in the cattle, etc., and that they be paid the relevant compensatory allowance, as the chief accountant decreased it, and that the crew be given sanitary products that they have not received.’ Both things were important, but in fact they would certainly not have threatened strike action if it had not been for the atmosphere of the day and the protests of December and January in Szczecin and Gdańsk, which were an encourage-
ment for workers in smaller towns and villages. Strikes ceased to be a taboo, and those employed in all sorts of establishments realised that articulating their expectations and putting the management or even the party apparatus in a tough position was actually the only way to have their demands addressed. There are no precise figures from the country, but with regard to Szczecin, as many as 1423 demands were made in January 1971, 748 of which concerned matters that must have been resolved by the state, i.e. the central government. The same was true in the country, where in addition to minor things, such as the issue of underweighting bread in the Municipal Cooperative in Łobez, some really weighty demands appeared that could not be met by the management of a particular establishment or local authorities. Here is an example from the Port of Kołobrzeg, where demands were made ‘for 10 million złotys more than planned for investments in the port, determining the retirement age for the dockworkers of up to 55 years old, maintaining the current salary of the dockworkers transferred to other positions for health reasons’.

What was strongly emphasised in the demands put forward in January and February of 1971 was the concern for one’s own economic situation, but also for the good of the establishment one was employed at. On the one hand, therefore, there was a strong fear of impoverishment, and on the other hand, the realisation that work and life quality could be better, that sometimes only minor corrections and improvements would be enough. There is no record of what could be called an anti-systemic opposition. Characteristically, the rebellion at the turn of 1971 did not bear the hallmarks of an anti-communist uprising, although the communist system itself was criticised, especially in the slogans that appeared. These were merely ‘ritualistic’ manifestations of anger and helplessness, nothing that could deny the party’s right to rule. It is noteworthy that it was only in the town of Mieszkowice that an explicitly patriotic element appeared. It was the Anchor – the emblem of the Polish Underground State from the period of the Second World War – painted next to the slogan ‘Down with Moczar’.

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93 Eryk Krasucki, Co się wydarzyło na W-4? Rzecz o zobowiązaniach produkcyjnych, propagandzie i nastrojach szczecińskich w styczniu i lutym 1971 r., [in:] Historia, miasto, pamięć. Grudzień ’70 – Styczeń ’71 (perspektywa szczecińska), red. Maciej Kowalewski, Eryk Krasucki, Paweł Miedziński, Szczecin 2010, p. 81.
94 Meldunek dotyczący przebiegu akcji „Jesień ’70” w powiecie łobeskim, Łobez, 7 II 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/72, p. 21.
95 ’10 milionów złotych więcej niż zaplanowano na inwestycje w porcie; Ustalenia wieku emerytalnego dla pracowników przeładunkowych do 55 lat; Zachowania dotychczasowego uposażenia pracowników przeładunkowych przeniesionych na inne stanowiska ze względów zdrowotnych’; Meldunek dotyczący sytuacji polityczno-ekonomicznej w powiecie kołobrzeskim, Kołobrzeg, 15 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/1, p. 37.
96 Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej w Dębnie, Dębno, 11 II 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/40, p. 12.
January and February of 1971 gave the workers in the country, as well as in the ‘core’ areas, the conviction that the tools at their disposal were quite effective. In Słupsk the following was recorded: ‘The tiniest organisational shortcomings, e.g. a temporary lack of gloves, cause sharp and decisive reactions from the workers’. The workers realised that they could make a difference and that the authorities would listen to them and react to their demands. This became particularly evident after 25 January 1971 and the unprecedented result of the strike in the Szczecin Shipyard. If Edward Gierek, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PZPR, was able to come to the protesting shipyard workers, then why would not the representatives of the local party apparatus and state administration talk to them? These protests did not take a violent or particularly well-organised form. They also were usually short-lived, as the one in Pyrzyce, for example, where the first shift at the machinery plant protested against the new rules, which would have resulted in workers receiving half of their wages. After the rapid intervention of the party apparatus, the management of the plant withdrew its decision and the strike was ended.

In January and February, 10 similar stoppages were recorded in the Voivodeship of Kośzalin alone, including such cities and towns as Drawsko Pomorskie, Koszalin, Szczecinek, Sianów and Ustka. In March and April, protests were held in six more plants.

However, it was not always possible to stop the dissatisfaction of the workers on time and avoid an open rebellion through negotiations. Two strikes, in Barlinek and Złocieniec, may be used as examples. The former, organised in a plant producing marine equipment on 13 and 14 January, was particularly interesting because of its very good organisation. The workers established a strike committee and put forward 26 demands. This was due, among other things, to the protesting crew having a strong bond with the shipyard workers of Szczecin and the Tricity. The demands included: ‘1. The crew expresses their solidarity with the manifestations of the crews of the shipyards in Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin, fully supporting the demands made by the strike committees of the above mentioned shipyards and adding their own. […] 10. We demand that the mass media provide a full list of people who died as a result

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97 ‘ Najdrobniejsze uchybienia organizacyjne np. chwilowy brak rękawic wywołuje ostre i zdecydowane reagowanie przez robotników; Relacja kontaktu służbowego inżyniera „G” o nastrojach, sytuacji politycznej i komentarzach, Słupsk, 14 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 14, p. 28.

98 Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Pyrzycach, Pyrzycy, 2 II 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/74, p. 31.

99 Wykaz zaistniałych przerw pracy w zakładach na terenie województwa koszalińskiego w okresie od 1 stycznia do 13 kwietnia 1971 roku, Koszalin, 12 V 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 00103/116, pp. 231–232.
of the incidents of December. 11. We demand the disclosure and fair punishment of those who gave orders to shoot at workers during the incidents of December. 12. We demand the release and rehabilitation of all the workers who were imprisoned during the incidents of December. […] 14. We demand that conditions are created for the Marine Equipment Plant delegation to contact the members of the existing or former Strike Committee in the Szczecin Shipyard. The delegates of the above mentioned Strike Committee should be asked to come to Barlinek to contact the crew of the Marine Equipment Plant. […] 20. All these demands must be published in the media, at least on the Baltic coast. It should be added that a delegation from Barlinek went to the Szczecin Shipyard to see for themselves what the situation was like there, whether the plant was on strike and whether there was a strike committee. It was rare to intertwine demands made by the workers of one establishment so closely and directly to those working in another one. The question remains whether it was the solidarity of workers, in this case belonging to the same industry branch, or whether it was just pragmatism that took over. It might have been tempting to refer to a well-known example in order to evoke social support and convince the decision-makers.

The case of Złocieniec, in turn, is unique because the strike at the woollen industry plant lasted as long as three days, between 3 and 5 February, which was unprecedented in the Voivodeship of Koszalin. It is also unusual that about 85% of the protesting crew (consisting of 1,140 people) were women. The reason for the strike was the decision to make wages conditional on the production results, which resulted in a significant reduction in the employees’ wages. This happened in January when the plant achieved only 82% of the expected production efficiency which, however, was not the fault of the crew. At first, the plant manager talked to the protesters, but the conflict kept re-emerging with each successive shift coming to work. Eventually, the protesting crew was visited by the most important representatives of the party apparatus and state
administration in the district, and even by the First Secretary of the Voivodeship Committee of the PZPR in Koszalin and the chairman of the Voivodeship Commission for the Trade Unions. Their talks with the crew proved to be unsuccessful, and it was only the arrival of the head of the Association of Woolen Industry Plants ‘North’ in Łódź (Polish Zjednoczenie Przedsiębiorstw Wełniankich ‘Północ’) that allowed to break the deadlock and the crew returned to work. During the course of the strike, no strike committee was appointed, although the plant management expected it to be established, because the members of the crew strongly opposed to it: ‘everyone [of us – E.K.] wants to hear what the talks will be about’101. However, some leaders of the protest emerged, for example, Weronika Kolek, who became the head of the trade union at the industrial plant soon after the strike102. Only three demands were actually made, although not written down by the protestors: ‘1. An increase in wages in order to return to the level of remuneration of the second quarter of 1970, as well as the verification of the production standards of a new range of materials. 2. Provision of medical care in the plant during the night shift (10:00 PM – 6:00 AM). 3. Change in the opening hours of the nursery at the plant so that mothers going to work at 6:00 AM can bring in their children, because until now, in their opinion, the opening hours of the nursery (7:00 AM) were fit for officials and not for workers’103. Thus, it was an economic and social protest, like almost all of the strikes at the time, but it was important because of the number of strikers and their determination. The measures used to contain the strike were also unusual, as they involved the creation of a reserve force at the District Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia and sending a task force from Koszalin to carry out operations in the district. Also, the commander of the military garrison located in the settlement of Budów near Złocieniec assured that he ‘would not give passes to the soldiers and would strengthen the military presence’. Such serious measures were supposed to ensure that the strike would not go out of control104.

101 ‘[…] wszyscy chcą słyszeć o czym będzie się mówić’; Meldunek specjalny Komendy Powiatowej w Drawsku Pomorskim, Drawsko Pomorskie, 5 II 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 2, pp. 235–240.
102 Jarosław Leszczełowski, Złocieniec. Przygoda z historią, cz. 4: Złocieniec, który widziałem 1956–1986, Stawno 2014, p. 183.
103 ‘1. Podwyżka płac do poziomu poborów z drugiego kwartału w 1970 r., a tym samym weryfikacja norm przy produkcji nowego asortymentu materiału. 2. Zapewnienie opieki lekarskiej w przedsiębiorstwie w czasie pracy nocnej zmiany (22:00–6:00). 3. Zmiana godzin otwierania żłobka przy zakładowym, tak żeby matki idące do pracy na godz. 6:00 mogły już oddać swoje dzieci, bo do tej pory ich zdaniem godziny otwierania żłobka (7:00) dopasowane były dla urzędników, a nie dla robotników’; Meldunek specjalny Komendy Powiatowej MO w Drawsku Pomorskim, Drawsko Pomorskie, 5 II 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 00108/108, t. 2, pp. 235–240.
104 ‘[…] nie wyda żołnierzom przepustek i wzmocnić służbę’; ibid.
The example of Złocieniec is important for one more reason. It demonstrates how effective the protests of early 1971 turned out to be in the long term. In addition to meeting the strikers’ demands, the executives whose performance was poor were replaced, trade union leaders became genuinely legitimised, and numerous improvements and investments were introduced in the plant. Here is what Tadeusz Czerwonka, who was promoted in 1972 to the position of deputy manager of the plant, responsible for technical matters, said about this: ‘The construction of the factory canteen and a resort on Lake Siecino has begun. Significant investments were made in terms of production, which resulted in an increase in production and the significant expansion of the range of products’. The plant became very modern by the standards of that time. The opportunity at hand was taken advantage of. Similar conclusions could probably be reached with regard to other places, yet more research should be done. The fact is that in mid-February, after the strikes in Łódź ended and the decision to withdraw the price increases of December 1970 was made, the number of signs of any unrest in the ‘peripheral’ areas of Western Pomerania dropped. From mid-1971, they would appear very rarely, which proved a considerable success of Edward Gierek’s cabinet, as the optimism among the Polish society remained at a very high level for several years to come. Slowly, all the warnings made by the people were forgotten by the authorities, both major and minor ones. Among the latter one may count a rhyme that was noted in Gryfice in January 1971: ‘Gierek, go and buy a bike, but mind the wheels, because you may end up like Gomułka’.

**Conclusion**

The documents discussed in this article, which were collected by the Security Service during the operation codenamed ‘Autumn of 1970’, do not give a complete picture of the reactions in the country to what happened in December 1970 in Szczecin and the Tricity. Nevertheless, they reveal quite a lot. They allow one to trace exactly what the social sentiments were like, what really interested the communities of smaller towns in Western Pomerania. They allow

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105 ‘Rozpoczęła się budowa stołówki zakładowej i ośrodka wczasowego nad jeziorem Siecino. W zakresie inwestycji produkcyjnych poczynione zostały znaczne nakłady, co zaowocowało wzrostem ilościowym produkcji przy znacznym wzbogaceniu asortymentowym’; J. Leszczeńkowski, op. cit., p. 188.

106 For the report prepared by the Centre for Public Opinion Research and Programme Studies, see _Postęp i trudności w różnych dziedzinach życia społecznego (na podstawie sondażu opinii z grudnia 1973 r.)_, pp. 1–24, http://tmsglobal.pl/archiv_files/M.0302.pdf [accessed online 30 July 2020].

107 The rhyme hardly translates into English but it is noticeable in the Polish version: ‘Gierek, kup rowerek i patrz na kółka, bo wylecisz jak Gomułka’; Meldunek Komendy Powiatowej MO w Gryficach, Gryfice, 28 I 1971, AIPNSz, sygn. 0012/41, p. 41.
to identify the most important issues that caused defiance and reasons for more violent forms of protest. Moreover, the analysed primary sources give an opportunity to notice how information from the ‘core’ flowed towards the ‘periphery’ and how people reacted to what was happening in the cities and towns where the revolt of December 1970 was the most turbulent. Szczecin, in this case, is on a par with Gdańsk, neither of them being more important than the other.

The inhabitants of the country of Western Pomerania listened attentively to all the information that came from the ‘core’ areas, commented on it, tried to understand it, sympathised with the striking shipyard workers, lamented the fate of those killed during the revolt, but also expressed their disapproval of hooliganism and the destruction of public property. They compared the information coming from larger cities with their own experiences. However, despite a great potential of the revolt, the social unrest turned into street fights only in one case, in Słupsk. This was due to the strong links between ‘peripheral’ Słupsk and ‘core’ Gdańsk and the free flow of information, mainly through the workers employed in the Tricity and their families, about the radical forms of protest on 14 and 15 December 1970. However, the information itself may not have triggered an explosion. An additional factor was needed for the ignition, a person or a group of people that would point out the street as the right place to articulate a protest and the demands. In smaller towns, it was much more difficult than in ‘core’ cities, as the possibility to remain anonymous was smaller, support for more violent or determined forms of protest was weaker and apathy among the local society was more common. Therefore, the case of Słupsk would require further research and a closer investigation of the ‘igniting’ factor, its origin and effectiveness to cause such long-lasting street protests. At the same time, it is worth noting that the example of Szczecin, where the rebellion did not enter a violent phase until 17 December, did not become an inspiration for street fights anywhere in the country. In addition to the above mentioned reasons, the blockade established by the military to stop the flow of information and people should be mentioned. Fear for one’s own life and health, effectively suppressed the desire to take a direct action.

However, strikes became a useful tool to express dissatisfaction and enforce demands. A large number of protests of this kind were also the result of the influences that came from the ‘core’ areas. The large strikes in Szczecin and the Tricity undoubtedly emboldened the inhabitants of the country of Western Pomerania to use such forms of opposition that had been rather uncommon outside large cities. Workers in smaller towns ceased to fear and began to talk more boldly about the concerns that they had not only as employees, but also as citizens. It was a good time for such a change. The authorities, fearing an escalation of conflict, listened to workers’ demands. In this way, the employees of the industrial plants in Drawsko Pomorskie, Barlinek and Miastko gained
subjectivity, a sense of value of their work, but also a sense of defiance. For many, it was certainly a formative experience, although it would be worthwhile to consider even more deeply how the events of the turn of 1971 affected the communities of smaller towns in Western Pomerania on the basis of other primary sources. It seems, however, that they were of significant importance both for their identity and for everything that would happen in the social and political life in the next two decades. Certainly, the events also brought about the strengthening of the state and party authorities. Gierek’s cabinet, thanks to the attitude adopted in January and February 1971, that is an attitude of expiation and readiness for discussion and change, was given a rather considerable amount of public trust. It became even more credible, at least for a few more years, by meeting the expectations that were articulated at the turn of 1971.

In conclusion, one can also attempt to answer the question: do the terms ‘breakthrough’ or ‘breakthroughs’ work well with regard to the country in the context of the revolt of December 1970? This category became an important narrative framework for the history of the Polish People’s Republic. People tend to think in ‘breakthroughs’, focus on them, try to describe the history of several decades by referring to a few political crises. In this respect, the post-war history of Poland seems to be a mighty river, on which one moves from one waterfall to another. But does this even make sense? In the case of this text, only partially. Indeed, the revolt of December 1970 affected smaller towns of Western Pomerania and, unlike in 1956 and 1968, the vital events taking place in the ‘core’ areas not only echoed through the country, but also left its mark. The forms of defiance witnessed in Szczecin and Gdańsk were recreated in the country, of course on a smaller scale. On the other hand, it is not so hard to believe that if the inhabitants of the country had proved totally apathetic, the 1970s would have looked similar in places such as Goleniów, Złocieniec and Barlinek. Without underestimating the social changes brought about by the events triggered by the revolt of December 1970, both on a national and local scale, it should probably be said that the category of ‘breakthrough’, which is commonly used in the Polish historiography, does not work very well with regard to the country. Thus, in order to understand the nature of changes that took place in this area one should look for other ways to describe them and not to subjugate them to more general and universal, but at the same time more unsuitable and foreign patterns often preferred by historians108.

Translated by Tomasz Leszczuk

108 Cf. Eryk Krasucki, Złudny blask świetlik? O przydatności terminu „przełom” dla zrozumienia rzeczywistości Pomorza Zachodniego w latach 1945–1989, [in:] Kultura – tożsamość – rozwój. 75-lecie polskiego Pomorza Zachodniego, red. Marek Tałasiewicz, Kazimierz Kozłowski, Szczecin 2020, pp. 117–128.
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