The complexity dividend: when sophisticated inference matters

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Summary

Animals continuously infer latent properties of the world from noisy and changing observations. Complex approaches to this challenge such as Bayesian inference are accurate but cognitively demanding, requiring extensive working memory and adaptive learning. Simple strategies such as always using a prior bias or following the last observation are easy to implement but may be less accurate. What is the appropriate balance between complexity and accuracy? We construct a hierarchy of strategies that vary in complexity between these limits and find a power law of diminishing returns: increasing complexity gives progressively smaller gains in accuracy. Moreover, the rate at which the gain decrements depends systematically on the statistical uncertainty in the world, such that complex strategies do not provide substantial benefits over simple ones when uncertainty is too high or too low. In between, when the world is neither too predictable nor too unpredictable, there is a complexity dividend.

Keywords:
adaptivity, working memory, learning, complexity, on-line statistical inference, change-point processes

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Introduction

Animals make sequences of sensory observations to arrive at judgements about current and future states of the world. In dynamic environments, this process is challenged by two primary forms of uncertainty (Heilbron & Meyniel, 2018; Yu & Dayan, 2005; Behrens et al., 2007): (1) noise, which obscures the useful information in signals; and (2) volatility, or the tendency of the world to undergo change-points, which reduces the relevance of the past for the future. In general, noise can be mitigated by remembering past experience and extracting average trends. In contrast, change-points require forgetting, because history before the change-point becomes less relevant for the present and future. Accordingly, we expect inference in dynamic environments to benefit from working memory for past experiences and adaptivity to environmental dynamics.

Models of inference, including those proposed to account for human and animal decision-making, can differ widely in form, accuracy, and complexity, leaving open basic questions about their general relevance to how the brain solves these problems (Rao, 2004; Bogacz et al., 2006; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Fearnhead & Liu, 2007; Krugel et al., 2009; Shi & Griffiths, 2009; Brown & Steyvers, 2009; Nassar et al., 2010; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Ossmy et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 2013; Legenstein & Maass, 2014; Glaze et al., 2015; Brody & Hanks, 2016; Veliz-Cuba et al., 2016; Glaze et al., 2018). The goal of the present study was to identify fundamental principles governing when particular cognitive operations are important to perform inferences that are both effective and efficient: that is, sufficiently accurate but also consistent with computational and information-gathering constraints that lead to bounded rationality (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Gershman et al., 2015; Ortega & Braun, 2013). We reasoned that computational complexity in models of inference can represent a cognitive cost (e.g., in terms of the amount of working memory and the degree of adaptivity) that under some conditions might outweigh the benefits of potential gains in accuracy.

To test this idea, we constructed a hierarchical class of inference models that each can be rated in terms of both its accuracy and computational complexity. At the top of the hierarchy is Bayesian inference, which uses a probabilistic framework to combine both noise and volatility into a strategy that makes the most accurate inferences about current and future states of the world based on all previous observations (Adams & MacKay, 2007; Fearnhead & Liu, 2007; Wilson et al., 2013; Glaze et al., 2018; Griffiths et al., 2012; Radillo et al., 2017). This model provides a maximum-accuracy benchmark for our analyses, but it also can require virtually unlimited
computational resources and thus provides a maximum-complexity benchmark as well. By deriving increasingly simple approximations to exact Bayesian inference, we then constructed two nested families of models corresponding to mental strategies that have progressively lower adaptivity and memory requirements (Fig. 1). Both accuracy and complexity decrease along the hierarchy.

We tested inference using these nested models on tasks with varying noise and volatility and identified two fundamental principles. The first is a law of diminishing returns, whereby the gains in accuracy become progressively smaller with increasing complexity, regardless of the amount of uncertainty in the environment. The second principle is a non-monotonic relationship between uncertainty and the complexity of the most efficient model: simple models are the most efficient when uncertainty is very high or low, whereas more complex models are useful at intermediate levels, when cues are both identifiable and helpful. These results provide new insights into the different cognitive processes that may be engaged to perform efficient inferences under different conditions.

Results

A hierarchy of cognitive functions maps to a hierarchy of inference strategies

Numerous models have been proposed to solve inference problems in dynamic, noisy environments, ranging from complex, probabilistic ideal observers to simpler, heuristic update processes (Adams & MacKay, 2007; Nassar et al., 2010; Wilson et al., 2013; Sutton & Barto, 1998; Behrens et al., 2007). These models typically adapt in some way to noise and volatility in their inputs, by processing information over multiple timescales in a manner appropriate to the given task conditions. Here we show that many of these models, and other plausible strategies, can be described parsimoniously in terms of two partially overlapping nested families that represent systematic simplifications of the Bayesian ideal observer (Fig. 1). The two families, which differ in terms of their working-memory demands, each include a progression from adaptive to non-adaptive, and less flexible, processing.

In general, a system for online inference aims to identify the current source of observations (the estimation problem) or to predict the next source (the prediction problem), in the presence of noise and unsignalled change-points, given all past and present data $x_{1:t} = \{x_1, \ldots, x_t\}$. We consider a standard problem in which change-points in the source occur according to a Poisson process with a fixed rate $h$ (volatility), and the
Figure 1: A hierarchy of cognitive functions maps to a hierarchy of inference strategies. Two nested families of inference strategies of decreasing algorithmic complexity can be derived from the exact Bayesian approach by progressively reducing requirements of memory and adaptivity (see also Fig. S1). We illustrate this in the context of inference from noisy observations (blue dots) of a latent variable $\mu_t$ (red dashed lines). The optimal Bayesian strategy balances prior belief against evidence integrated over temporal windows of all possible lengths, with each window weighted by the likelihood that the latent variable has been stable over that duration. The Mixture of Sliding Windows truncates the Bayesian model to a finite number of windows of fixed durations. The Delta Rules instead weigh past observations exponentially (examples of window and exponential integration kernels depicted as grey areas). The inferences from different Sliding Windows or Delta Rules are weighted optimally in the estimates of the mixture models. The Memoryless model simply combines current evidence with the prior and maintains no working memory (Dirac-delta kernel). The Prior model sticks to the prior belief regardless of evidence. The Evidence model follows the current evidence and ignores both prior beliefs and past evidence. The decrease in algorithmic complexity over this hierarchy of strategies mirrors a corresponding decrease in cognitive load (legend on the right-hand side).
source, characterized by a single number $\mu_t$ at a time $t$, generates observations with Gaussian variability (Fig. 2) (Wilson et al., 2013; Nassar et al., 2010). Noise in this generative process is measured by the ratio $R$ between the standard deviation of the observations with respect to their source and the standard deviation of the sources across many change points.

In this setting, the Bayesian ideal observer estimates the full distribution of the source in terms of two quantities: (1) the conditional probability $p(r_t|x_{1:t})$ of the run-length $r_t$, which is the number of time steps elapsed at time $t$ since the last inferred change-point in the source, and (2) the probability $p(\mu_t|r_t)$ that the source is $\mu_t$ given data observed over just the run-length $r_t$. By multiplying these probabilities and summing over possible run-lengths, we can compute the probability that the source is $\mu_t$ given all the data:

$$p(\mu_t|x_{1:t}) = \sum_{r_t=1}^t p(\mu_t|r_t)p(r_t|x_{1:t}).$$  

The Bayesian model computes $p(\mu_t|r_t)$ and $p(r_t|x_{1:t})$ exactly (Adams & MacKay, 2007; Fearnhead & Liu, 2007; Wilson et al., 2010). The optimal Bayesian estimate of the source, $\hat{\mu}_t$, is then simply the expected value of $\mu_t$ in the conditional distribution (1). To optimally predict the next source, $\hat{\mu}_{t+1}$, given this estimate, we must include the expected rate of change-points so that

$$\hat{\mu}_{t+1} = h\hat{\mu} + (1 - h)\hat{\mu}_t$$

where $\hat{\mu}$ is the asymptotic average value of the source (Fig. 2). These Bayesian estimators minimize the mean squared error in both the estimation and prediction.
The Bayesian model is computationally expensive: the time needed to make an estimate or a prediction grows linearly with $t$, because the model requires a sum over possible run-lengths (eq. (1); see Wilson et al. (2013)). In cognitive terms, exact Bayesian inference requires working memory to increase with time. The computation is simplified by only considering a fixed set of run-lengths $\{r_1, \ldots, r_N\}$ chosen to minimize the mean squared error in the estimator. This reduction approximates the full Bayesian model with $N$ computational units, each charged with generating an estimate of $\mu_t$ based on a sliding-window integration of past observations over the duration $r_i$, combined with prior information on the average value of the source $\bar{\mu}$ (eqs. 30, 31 in Methods). This combination is chosen to guarantee that, when noise in high, the estimate is closer to the prior, which is more reliable than the sliding-window integration. Conversely, when noise is low, the estimate is primarily based on the sliding-window, which is more informative than the prior. Estimates computed by each unit are summed with a relative weight set adaptively by the posterior probabilities $p(r_i|x_{1:t})$. As such, low/high volatility in the world will lead to preferential use of long/short sliding windows (Behrens et al., 2007). This Mixture of Sliding-Window Model is simpler than the full Bayesian procedure, but implementing it in the brain would still require extensive working memory, up to the longest run-length, and circuitry to compute the adaptive weights given to different run-lengths.

The working-memory load can be reduced by replacing the sliding windows with delta-rule updating units that weigh past observations according to an exponentially decaying kernel (eq. 33 in Methods). Each delta-rule unit has a fixed time constant of decay linearly related to $r_i$ that sets the timescale for information integration. The integration can be implemented recursively with a limited memory cost, through a simple update of the previous estimate by a fraction (learning rate) of the difference between the current observation and the previous estimate (eq. 32 in Methods). The relative weight of the different delta rules in the combined estimate is again set adaptively by the posterior probabilities $p(r_i|x_{1:t})$. This Mixture of Delta-Rules Model is simpler than the Bayesian model and requires less working memory than the Mixture of Sliding-Windows Model, but still requires computational resources to implement each of the delta-rules and to combine these with the correct adaptive weights.

The demand for computational resources in both model families is reduced dramatically by making them non-adaptive. This reduction amounts to considering a single Sliding-Window or a single Delta-Rule, each with a fixed timescale for integrating
evidence. These models still require working memory to carry out the integration.

An even simpler inference strategy, which does not need working memory, estimates the source \( \mu_t \) as a weighted average between the present observation \( x_t \) and the average source \( \bar{\mu} \) (eq. 34 in Methods). This Memoryless Model is nested in the Sliding-Window Model, from which it is derived by choosing an evidence integration window of just one time-step. The Memoryless Model is the minimal model that learns and updates prior biases, or knowledge of stable features of the environment (\( \bar{\mu} \)), based on new evidence from rapidly changing variables (\( x_t \)).

Both the Memoryless and Delta-Rule Models can be further reduced to the simple Prior Model (\( \hat{\mu}_t = \bar{\mu} \)) by setting the learning rate to zero. This Prior Model represents knowledge acquired, after a sufficiently long exposure to a given environment, about the constant or slow (stable across many change points) features of the process generating the observations. Inferring and storing the slowly varying structure of the environment presumably still requires some cognitive effort and long-term memory resources.

Removing this last cognitive demand leads to a strategy that simply returns the current observation \( x_t \) as both an estimate of \( \mu_t \) and a prediction of \( \mu_{t+1} \). This strategy, which we call Evidence, can also be seen as the simplest possible model nested in both the Memoryless and the Delta Rule Models, because it is obtained from them by setting the learning rate to one.

These inference strategies form a hierarchy from the maximally accurate and cognitively demanding Bayesian model, to the maximally simple Evidence (Fig. 1). Each of these strategies estimates the source of observations and uses it to make predictions by computing a function that depends on (1) observations \( (x_1:t) \), (2) fixed parameters of the environment (the average source \( \bar{\mu} \), the volatility \( h \), and the noise level \( R \)), and (3) model-dependent “meta-parameters” (the run-lengths and the learning rates). The simplifications giving rise to the two families of strategies from the full Bayesian model can be interpreted in terms of progressive reductions of cognitive demand.

Adaptivity can be unnecessary when variability is low or high

When probability distributions are inferred from limited samples, complex models can generalize worse to new data than simple models (Balasubramanian (1997); Myung et al. (2000); Rissanen (1996, 1987); Barron & Cover (1991); Barron et al.
How to identify the model that best trades off fitting accuracy and generalization performance is the subject of a vast literature on model selection.

Here, we asked a different question. Even if a complex model has a lower prediction error, is the increase in complexity relative to a simple model “worth the effort”? One way to ask this question for nested model spaces like the hierarchy described in Fig. 1 is to find the best parameter configuration in the higher-dimensional parameter space of a more complex model, and to then determine whether the prediction error changes much if we vary the parameters to approach a simpler nested model. Formally, in an environment characterized by parameters \( \{e_l, \alpha_k\} \), the best higher-dimensional model minimizes an error function \( E(\{e_l, \alpha_k\}) \) with respect to its parameters \( \{\alpha_k\} \). Thus, at the optimum \( \{\hat{\alpha}_k\} \), the gradient of the error with respect to the model parameters vanishes: \( (\nabla E)_i = \left. \frac{\partial E(\{e_l, \alpha_k\})}{\partial \alpha_i} \right|_{\{\alpha_k = \hat{\alpha}_k\}} = 0 \). We can then characterize sensitivity of the error to the precise choice of parameters through the Hessian matrix

\[
H_{ij}(\{e_l, \hat{\alpha}_k\}) = \left. \frac{\partial^2 E(\{e_l, \alpha_k\})}{\partial \alpha_i \partial \alpha_j} \right|_{\{\alpha_k = \hat{\alpha}_k\}}.
\]  

which evaluates the convexity of the error function at its minimum. The eigenvalues of \( H \) indicate how much the error \( E \) increases when moving away from the minimum in parameter space in the direction of the eigenvectors of \( H \). Thus, a small eigenvalue indicates a combination of parameters that is substantially irrelevant for minimizing prediction error, whereas a large eigenvalue indicates a relevant combination of parameters (Gutenkunst et al., 2007).

We can characterize the irrelevance of the least-important parameter combination relative to the most-important one by evaluating the Redundancy, defined as the log ratio between the maximum and minimum eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix evaluated at the optimal parameters \( \{\hat{\alpha}_k\} \):

\[
\text{Redundancy}(\{e_l, \hat{\alpha}_k\}) = \log \left( \frac{\lambda_{\max}(\{e_l, \hat{\alpha}_k\})}{\lambda_{\min}(\{e_l, \hat{\alpha}_k\})} \right)
\]  

A Redundancy of \( q \) indicates that parameter deformations along the eigenvector associated to the least-relevant eigenvalue have a \( 10^q \)-fold smaller effect on the error than deformations along the eigenvector associated to the most-relevant eigenvalue. If this irrelevant eigenvector points towards a simpler model nested within the parameter space, it suggests that the added complexity of the full model compared to the nested one is not necessary for good prediction performance. We can evaluate this Alignment as the (normalized) angle between the most irrelevant eigenvector...
and the most direct line from the optimal higher-dimensional model with parameters \( \{\hat{\alpha}_k\} \) to the optimal lower-dimensional nested model (see Methods for details).

We used this formalism to compare models attempting to predict the next value in the Gaussian change-point process in Fig. 2. The environmental parameters \( \{e_l\} \) are the volatility \( h \) and the noise \( R \), and \( E \) was chosen to be the mean-squared prediction error over 5000 time steps of the process for each choice of \( h \) and \( R \). We computed the Redundancy of the mixture models with two Sliding Windows and two Delta Rules and their Alignment with respect to the optimal nested single Sliding Window and Delta Rule, respectively. Both mixture models have two parameters \( \{\alpha_1, \alpha_2\} \) describing effective learning rates, which are related to (a) the window length of evidence integration in the Sliding Windows (eqs. 30, 31 in Methods), and (b) the timescale of the exponential evidence-integration kernel in the Delta Rules (eqs. 32, 33 in Methods). The relative weight given to the two effective learning rates is determined adaptively at each time step based on accumulating experience. The non-adaptive single-unit models (one Sliding Window or Delta Rule) are obtained by setting \( \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 \). The Alignment, which takes values between 0 and 1, is simply the normalized angle \( \theta \) between the most irrelevant parameter direction at the optimal mixture model and the line connecting the optimal mixture model to the optimal single-unit model (Fig. 3A; details in Methods).

We found that the adaptive mixture models become redundant when noise and volatility are low so that inference is easy and complex strategies are unnecessary, and when noise or volatility are high so that inference is difficult, making complex strategies ineffective (Fig. 3B). When the models are redundant, the irrelevant parameter direction tends to align towards the simpler, non-adaptive single-unit models with optimally chosen parameters (Fig. 3C,D). This result suggests that when uncertainty is low or high simpler models will perform almost as well as complex ones. Sophisticated, adaptive inference matters only in a limited range of environmental conditions, characterized by relatively low volatility and intermediate noise (Fig. 3B,C).

**A power law of diminishing returns**

The results in the previous section suggest that complex solutions to on-line inference problems may not always be worth the effort. To investigate this possibility quantitatively, we define the algorithmic Complexity of an inference strategy in terms of
Figure 3: **Adaptivity can be unnecessary when variability is low or high.**

A: Computation of the Alignment. (Left) Two-dimensional parameter space of the mixture models with two units defined by learning rates $\alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2$, and the embedded unidimensional space of the nested single-unit models (diagonal line $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2$). The optimal mixture model and optimal single-unit model (black dots) are indicated along with the parameter deformation leading from one to the other (gray line). (Right) Relevant and irrelevant parameter deformations that maximally or minimally change the prediction error moving away from the optimal adaptive mixture model. Alignment is defined as the normalized angle $\theta$ between the irrelevant deformation and the direction to the best non-adaptive single-unit model.

B: Redundancy of the adaptive mixture models (left: Mixture of two Sliding Windows; right: Mixture of two Delta Rules) for a range of volatility and noise values in a change-point detection task (Fig. 2). Slices through the red inset windows are shown to the left and right, and show the non-monotonic trend of Redundancy with noise at low and intermediate volatility: Redundancy is highest at intermediate noise.

C: Alignment of the irrelevant parameter deformation towards the non-adaptive nested single-unit model. Slices through the red inset windows are shown to the left and right, and show a non-monotonic trend of Alignment with noise at low and intermediate volatility: Redundancy is highest at intermediate noise.

D: Probability distribution of Alignment values conditioned on Redundancy, sampled over tested volatility and noise values, shows that Alignment can be low at low Redundancy, but is typically higher at high Redundancy, indicating a rotation of the irrelevant parameter combination to align towards the non-adaptive nested model when Redundancy of the more complex model increases (Delta Rules: correlation coefficient between Alignment and Redundancy $r = 0.6175$, 95% CI = [0.5948, 0.6392], $p \ll .001$; Sliding Windows: $r = 0.1681$, 95% CI = [0.1331, 0.2028], $p \ll .001$).
the average number of computational operations required to implement it:

\[ C(h, R) = C_{\text{reflex}} + \lim_{T \to \infty} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left( N_t^A + N_t^W + N_t^R + N_t^S(h, R) \right) \]  

(5)

Here \( T \) is the total number of observations, \( N_t^A \) denotes the number of arithmetic operations and \( N_t^W, N_t^R, \) and \( N_t^S \) denote the number of memory-related operations (writing, reading, and storing, respectively) required to make a prediction at time \( t \). Using conventional silicon hardware, multiplication typically requires more steps than addition, but here we will count elementary arithmetic operations as having unit algorithmic cost. We interpret the sum of these terms as an estimate of the reflective cost of making a decision, whereas \( C_{\text{reflex}} \) can be interpreted as a purely reflexive component that represents the irreducible cost of an action and is constant across models.

We evaluated the complexity of the different classes of models in Fig. 1 (Table 1 in Methods and Fig. 4A). For the non-parametric Bayesian Model, the reflective cost grows linearly with the number of observations because the entire past provides a probabilistic context for each prediction or estimate; thus the complexity \( C \) diverges to infinity. The other models are parametric and have constant complexity that is partly related to the number of free parameters. This distinction is consistent with other measures of complexity like predictive information, which shows qualitatively different asymptotic behaviors for non-parametric versus parametric models (Bialek et al., 2001b,a). The complexity of models that involve mixtures of \( N \) Sliding Windows or Delta Rules grows quadratically in \( N \) (Table 1). Likewise, the two-parameter adaptive mixture models (two Sliding Windows or Delta Rules as in Fig. 3) are more complex than the one-parameter non-adaptive models (Sliding Window, Delta Rule and Memoryless Models). These in turn are more complex than the two models with no parameters (Prior and Evidence). Models with the same number of parameters typically show smaller differences in complexity. These trends are qualitatively consistent with other notions of complexity from Bayesian model selection, information geometry, and data compression, for which the leading-order term of model complexity grows with the number of parameters, and lower-order terms depend on the model’s functional form (Schwarz, 1978; Balasubramanian, 1997; Myung et al., 2000; Rissanen, 1984, 1996; Barron & Cover, 1991; Barron et al., 1998). However, unlike those notions of complexity, algorithmic complexity can be applied readily to the kinds of deterministic models considered here.

We measured performance of a model in terms of its Inaccuracy: the difference in mean squared error between the predictions of the model and those of the Bayesian
Figure 4: **Diminishing returns from increasing complexity.** Results are shown for the prediction task (inference of the next position of the source $\mu_{t+1}$). A: Algorithmic complexity (eq. 5) for models in Fig. 1. The mixture models take a weighted combination of evidence integrated over two timescales. The exact Bayesian Model has infinite complexity by our measure and is not shown. B: Inaccuracy (eq. 6) decreases as a power law in the Complexity (eq. 5), shown here for volatility and noise levels $h = 0.1$ and $R = 1$. Inset: linear fit on a log-log scale. See also Fig. S2 for goodness-of-fit statistics. The exponent in the power law varies with C: noise and D: volatility. E: Scaling of Inaccuracy and Accuracy (eq. 7) with Complexity for fixed volatility and varying noise. Color code and scaling exponents for each condition taken from panel (C). The convex/concave curves of Inaccuracy/Accuracy versus Complexity indicate a law of diminishing returns. Horizontal black lines indicate the threshold for performance within 10% of the Bayesian optimum. Intercept with the scaling curve for each task condition indicates the minimum model complexity required to reach the performance threshold. F: Same as panel (E) for fixed noise and varying volatility. Color code and scaling exponents taken from panel (D).
ideal observer, normalized by the Bayesian benchmark, for each combination of volatility $h$ and noise $R$,

$$I(h, R) = \frac{E(h, R) - E_{\text{Bayes}}(h, R)}{E_{\text{Bayes}}(h, R)}.$$  \hfill (6)

A vanishing Inaccuracy implies that the inference strategy performs as well as the Bayesian model. Across task conditions, we fit the Inaccuracy of the parametric models of Fig. 1 (with optimally chosen parameters) versus their Complexity. We found a power-law relationship between the two quantities ($I \propto 1/C^{b(h,R)}$) with an exponent that depends on volatility ($h$) and noise ($R$) in the underlying change-point process (Fig. 4B,C,D; goodness-of-fit summary statistics in Supplemental Fig. S2).

The power law for Inaccuracy as a function of Complexity implies a law of diminishing returns: increasing the complexity of a model gives progressively smaller improvements in prediction (flattening of Inaccuracy versus Complexity curves in the upper panels of Fig. 4E,F). To better visualize this effect, we also defined the Accuracy as the ratio

$$A(h, R) = \frac{E_{\text{Bayes}}(h, R)}{E(h, R)}.$$  \hfill (7)

If the inference strategy performs as well as the Bayesian model the Accuracy will equal 1, whereas a model that makes very large errors on average compared to the Bayesian model will have an Accuracy tending to 0. The concavity of Accuracy as a function of Complexity (lower panels of Fig. 4E,F) again shows that prediction quality is a decelerating function of complexity.

In all task conditions, the curves (examples in Figs. 4E,F) show that prediction Accuracy is maximized and the Inaccuracy is minimized by using the most complex model. However, in the real world predictions typically do not have to be perfect – they just have to be good enough. We found that at both high and low noise (large and small $R$), low complexity models are already within 10% of the Bayesian optimum (light blue and dark blue lines in Fig. 4E). Likewise, when volatility is large, low complexity strategies perform almost as well as the full Bayesian model (red and brown lines in Fig. 4F). These results suggest that sophisticated inference procedures are only useful in a narrow range of conditions with an intermediate amount of noise and low underlying volatility. This conclusion is robust across a very wide range of thresholds for “good enough” performance, as seen by shifting the black threshold lines in Figs. 4E,F.
Simple is usually best

The scaling laws identified in the previous section suggest that complex models are only necessary in a narrow range of conditions. To test this idea explicitly, we considered the nested hierarchy of models in Fig. 1 applied to the change-point detection task in Fig. 2. Over a wide range of volatility and noise levels, we selected the simplest of these models that achieved performance within 10% of the Bayesian optimum (Inaccuracy less than 0.1) in prediction and estimation tasks. Qualitatively similar results were obtained using alternative metrics and tolerance levels (Supplemental Figs. 3 and 4).

For prediction problems (Fig. 5A), extremely simple strategies reach nearly peak accuracy over a wide range of conditions. For example, when volatility is very high the Prior model does nearly as well as the Bayesian predictor, essentially because the world is so variable that past observations do not provide much useful information. When volatility is low, the underlying latent variables are persistent over time, so past observations become more useful for predicting the future. However, if noise is very high, observations are not reliable and so the Prior model is again nearly optimal. Conversely, if noise is very low observations are perfect, and so the present becomes fully predictive of the future without any need to consider the past. Thus, in the low-noise, low-volatility limit the Memoryless model (which simply balances current evidence with the prior) and the even simpler Evidence model (which simply follows the current observation and ignores the prior) are nearly as good as the Bayesian optimum. However, when volatility is low (so that there is something to learn from observations), and noise is intermediate (obscuring the latent variables, but not entirely), complex adaptive inference strategies are necessary for prediction performance that approaches the optimum. To summarize, when volatility is low there is a non-monotonic (“inverted-U”) pattern such that simple models are sufficient at low and high noise but complex strategies are needed at intermediate noise, when volatility is high simple strategies are always good enough.

For estimation problems, slightly different patterns emerge (Fig. 5B). Like for prediction, simple strategies are almost as effective as the exact Bayesian model for high noise and high volatility. Meanwhile, when noise is very low the current sample always provides a good estimate of the current state, so the Evidence Model is effective regardless of volatility. As noise increases from zero at fixed volatility, complex models become useful to balance the current noisy evidence against past observations and the prior. But as noise becomes high (and observations unreliable), increasingly simple models are sufficient again to achieve near-optimal estimation
Figure 5: Simple inference strategies are usually sufficient. The color map shows the simplest strategy achieving performance within 10% of the Bayesian optimum (Inaccuracy < 0.1) for each combination of volatility and noise in the prediction (A) and estimation (B) tasks. Adaptivity and working memory are necessary in the gray, pink, and yellow areas; only working memory is required in the red and green regions. Extremely simple strategies (Evidence, Prior, and Memoryless Models) that use neither adaptivity nor working memory are sufficient in a vast domain of statistically easy and statistically difficult tasks. See also Figs. S3 and S4.

performance. Thus, like for the prediction problem, when volatility is low there is an inverted-U relationship between the complexity required for good estimation and noise. However, comparing Fig. 5A (prediction) and Fig. 5B (estimation) we see that over much of the noise-volatility landscape estimation problems benefit more that prediction problems from the use of complex inference schemes.

Optimizing cognitive engagement

Above, we selected the simplest model whose performance exceeded a hard threshold as compared to the optimal Bayesian strategy. It might be more realistic to imagine a smooth reward function that is low when the inaccuracy is high ($I \gg 0$) and high when the inaccuracy is low ($I \to 0$). This reward function can have a characteristic scale that sets the range of inaccuracies over which the animal receives a substantial reward. As a simple example, we can take the reward or performance level to be a
Gaussian function of inaccuracy:

\[
P(h, R) = \frac{1}{\sigma_r \sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{I(h, R)^2}{2\sigma_r^2}}.
\]  

(8)

Thus, substantial rewards are obtained when \( I \) is \( O(\sigma_r) \) or smaller.

From Fig. 4B,C,D, we see that inaccuracy can be written as a power law in the complexity,

\[
I(h, R) = a(h, R) C(h, R)^{-b(h, R)},
\]

(9)

where \( a \) and \( b \) are fit parameters. Combining eqs. 8 and 9, then dividing by the complexity associated with a given level of inaccuracy from the fits, yields an expression for expected performance per unit complexity for each noise/volatility pair:

\[
\frac{P(h, R)}{C(h, R)} = \frac{1}{\sigma_r \sqrt{2\pi} C(h, R)} e^{-\frac{a(h, R)^2 C(h, R)^{-2b(h, R)}}{2\sigma_r^2}}.
\]

(10)

Because increased complexity in the inference strategy requires greater cognitive engagement, the ratio in (10) represents a trade-off between reward and cognitive cost per prediction or estimation. Because algorithmic complexity (eq. 5) can also be thought of as a qualitative estimate of the time required to make an inference, eq. 10 can also be interpreted as an estimate of the reward one can obtain per unit time (Vul et al., 2014; Schmidhuber, 2010; Gold & Shadlen, 2002).

The performance per unit cost can be optimized by maximizing the expression on the right hand side of eq. 10 with respect to the complexity \( C \). This procedure gives

\[
C_{opt}(h, R) = \left( \frac{a(h, R) \sqrt{b(h, R)}}{\sigma_r} \right)^{1/b(h, R)}.
\]

(11)

for the complexity, or, equivalently, cognitive cost, of the optimal inference strategy. Fig. 6 uses \( a \) and \( b \) measured from fits such as those in Fig. 4 to plot \( C_{opt} \) for prediction and estimation tasks across a range of volatilities and noise levels. The results confirm features seen in Fig. 5. For example, high complexity or cognitive engagement is needed only in a small subset of conditions, and follows an inverted-U trend with noise at low volatility (Fig. 6). Decreasing the width \( \sigma_r \) of the reward function decreases tolerance for large inaccuracies and thus broadens the domain where complex strategies are necessary. Changes in the reflexive component of complexity \( C_{reflex} \) (eq. 5) leave the optimal reflective cost, and thus the optimal strategy, unaffected (Supplemental Information).
Discussion

The models and the brain

We used a family of nested models and their mappings to particular cognitive functions to identify fundamental principles that govern the trade-off between the accuracy and simplicity of inference in noisy and changing environments. Each of the parametric models we used can be seen as a particular implementation of a standard linear readout model of the integrated activity in a population of neural units, which in the case of non-adaptive models reduces to a single neural unit (Wohrer & Machens, 2015; Shadlen et al., 1996; Haefner et al., 2013). The models differ in terms of the form of evidence integration they use and the degree to which they can adapt the time scale of this integration to the input. Both sets of properties have extensive and varied representations in the brain.

We considered exponentially decaying, sliding-window, and instantaneous (Dirac-delta function) integration kernels (implemented in the Delta-Rule, Sliding-Window and Memoryless Models, respectively). The exponentially decaying kernels correspond to the “$\alpha$-synapses”, used widely in biophysical models of neuron spiking dynamics (Gerstner et al., 2014; Orhan, 2012). Implemented (with good approximation) as Delta Rules, they are also closely related to reward-prediction errors...
that are thought to be encoded by dopaminergic neurons and drive learning in the striatum and possibly elsewhere (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; Waelti et al., 2001; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Behrens et al., 2007). This implementation, compared to exponentially decaying integration, has advantages in terms of working memory, because it effectively produces Markovian estimates of the source: each estimate depends only on the current observation and on the immediately previous estimate. The sliding-window kernels are more memory intensive, requiring representations of each sample used in the given window, or at least of the first and last samples in the window if implemented recursively. Such memory signals could, in principle, be based on persistent activity that maintains representations of a sequence of observations, such as those found in the prefrontal cortex network (Jacobsen & Nissen, 1936; Goldman-Rakic, 1995; González-Burgos et al., 2000; Kritzer & Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Funahashi et al., 1989; Arnsten et al., 2010). The Dirac-delta kernels can be implemented trivially without any working memory.

Adaptivity is achieved in our models using a bank of different integration timescales, consistent with multiple reports describing different integration timescales in the brain (Gläscher & Büchel, 2005; Hasson et al., 2008; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Bernacchia et al., 2011; Bornstein & Daw, 2012; Honey et al., 2012; Hasson et al., 2015; Meder et al., 2017; Scott et al., 2017; Runyan et al., 2017). In our formulation, the estimates obtained from these different integration timescales are weighted optimally and combined to produce a single output (Wilson et al., 2013, 2018). Consistent with this idea, learning rates with more relevance to an ongoing estimate of choice values have been shown to explain more variance in fMRI signals (Meder et al., 2017). This weighting process may be regulated by noradrenergic, cholinergic, and dopaminergic neuromodulatory systems, each of which has been linked to adaptive inference via pupillometry and other measures (Nassar et al., 2012; Krishnamurthy et al., 2016; Krugel et al., 2009; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Joshi et al., 2016).

An alternative hypothesis on how adaptive Bayesian inference might be approximated by the brain is based on particle filters and importance sampling (Fearnhead & Liu, 2007; Courville & Daw, 2008; Shi & Griffiths, 2009; Griffiths et al., 2012; Vul et al., 2014). In these approaches, a limited number of samples (particles) is used to represent the posterior distribution of the hidden state given the observations. Unlike in our models, in these approaches the hypothesis space for the hidden state varies in time, as new hypotheses are continuously sampled from their Bayesian posterior distribution given the observations. By contrast, in our Mixture Models the hypothesis space (set of run-lengths or integration timescales) is fixed in a given environment and adaptivity is achieved by assessing the different hypotheses differently.
in a time-dependent manner, based on the accumulated evidence. It would be useful for future work to compare the computational complexity of these different kinds of approaches to adaptive inference, which could help constrain our understanding of if and when they could be used in the brain.

Overall, our study provides a unified view of several plausible models of on-line statistical inference, showing that they can be regarded as special cases of a single formalism. This novel interpretation suggests a hierarchical (nested) organization of cognitive processes and a natural, efficient way in which the brain could engage or disengage them. Specifically, this organization implies that the brain could meet the demands of a wide range of different environments and tasks, by adjusting the parameters of a single, flexible inference process.

**Inaccuracy versus complexity trade-off**

Each of our models is characterized by its complexity and by its inaccuracy compared to the exact Bayesian Model. By analyzing two nested families of models, we identified a power-law scaling of inaccuracy with complexity: $I \propto 1/C^b$. This scaling, with an exponent that depends on noise and volatility in the environment, implies a law of diminishing returns such that increasing the complexity of the inference strategy gives progressively smaller returns in prediction/estimation accuracy. This law is reminiscent of a similar result in rate-distortion theory: the minimum achievable distortion $D$ of a transmitted signal is a continuous, monotonically decreasing, convex function of the information transmission rate $R$ (Cover & Thomas, 2012). This universal property of rate-distortion functions implies that, independently of the source of information, increasing the communication rate confers diminishing returns in reconstruction accuracy at the receiver. In simple contexts, the rate is measured in bits as the mutual information, $I(X; \hat{X})$, between the input $X$ and output $\hat{X}$ of an information channel (Cover & Thomas, 2012). Noting that the distortion for a Gaussian channel (similar to our Gaussian source) scales as $\log D \sim -R$ (for distortions smaller than the variance of the samples) and that our inaccuracy scales as $\log I \sim -\log C$ suggests an interpretation of the log algorithmic complexity of our models as an effective transmission rate of information about the environment to a decision making “receiver”, who gathers this information to make inferences about the world. In this analogy, constraints on the inference algorithm, imposed by bounded rationality (Gershman et al., 2015), create a sort of information bottleneck (Tishby et al., 2000). The connection with information theory may provide new practical tools to help understand the diversity of strategies used across tasks and individuals to solve inference problems (Glaze et al., 2018). Such tools also have the
potential to deepen our understanding of the diversity of deep neural networks where a power-law scaling between accuracy and computational complexity reminiscent of our findings has recently been identified (Canziani et al., 2016).

Inverted-U relationship between cognitive demand and task difficulty

A key finding of this work is that complex strategies that use adaptive processes and/or working-memory are necessary only in a restricted range of conditions characterized by low volatility and intermediate noise. It follows that extremely simple strategies should be preferred when predictive inference is easy, such as when the current evidence from the environment is highly reliable and thus historical information is not needed, or when inference is hard, such as when incoming information is so noisy or volatile that there is little information to gain from complex reasoning.

This “inverted-U” relationship between cognitive demands and task difficulty is reminiscent of a similar relationship between cognitive abilities like learning and arousal state (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908; Phillips et al., 2004; Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008; Cools & D’Esposito, 2011; Arnsten et al., 2012). Several lines of evidence suggest that this relationship reflects the effects of neuromodulators like norepinephrine and dopamine on neural activity in the prefrontal cortex and perhaps elsewhere in the brain (Aston-Jones et al., 1999; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Arnsten et al., 2012). It is tempting to think that the statistical difficulty of a task might modulate activity in these brain areas similarly to arousal states, to engage or disengage mental resources in a way that best meets task demands.

An inverted-U relationship is also found in combinatorial optimization problems, suggesting that it might be a much more general phenomenon: NP-complete problems such as K-satisfiability, graph coloring, the traveling salesman, and the Hamiltonian path problem, have characteristic easy-hard-easy patterns in the computational complexity required to find a solution. Hard problems are typically clustered around a critical intermediate value of an “order parameter”, which marks a phase transition from solvability to unsolvability (Cheeseman et al., 1991; Mitchell et al., 1992; Hogg et al., 1996; Gent & Walsh, 1996; Hayes, 1997; Monasson et al., 1999; Cocco & Monasson, 2001; Biroli et al., 2002; Zdeborová, 2009). In a broad sense, this order parameter plays a role similar to environmental uncertainty in our inference task.
Efficient use of working memory, long-term memory and learning

Our theory makes detailed, quantitative predictions about cognitive functions or resources that are needed for effective inference in different statistical environments to optimize the trade-off between accuracy and simplicity (Fig. 5).

For estimation problems, memory is not necessary when noise is low. For prediction problems, memory is not required when both noise and volatility are low. But as volatility increases, current evidence carries increasingly little information about the future, and thus for prediction problems it becomes useful to retain a long-term memory of the average source position.

Working memory becomes necessary in environments where volatility is low, but noise is intermediate. The optimal way to weigh evidence from the recent and distant past (e.g., exponential weighting or flat weighting) depends on details of the task (e.g., estimation or prediction) and the environmental conditions. When multiple timescales of evidence are needed, their relative weight must also be adaptively selected based on past and present evidence.

For environments in which working memory is not needed (e.g., high noise and/or volatility), there is a transition between a domain where only prior information about the average source position is useful and a domain where that prior knowledge should be updated based on new evidence. These two domains are separated by a roughly power-law curve in the volatility-noise plane, so that decreasing volatility increases the noise level beyond which learning from new evidence is useless (Fig. 5). This transition curve is found in both estimation and prediction. However, for prediction, the transition happens at lower noise levels when volatility is high because ongoing evidence is much less useful for predicting the future than for estimating the present source when the source is highly unstable.

Working memory, long-term memory, adaptivity, and learning all require the deployment of cognitive resources. Thus, we should expect that animals will use each of these resources only when good enough performance can not be achieved by simpler means. Our results suggest that in many situations animals will employ simple heuristics such as adopting a prior bias, perhaps modulated by current observations, and that cognitive engagement will be turned on and off flexibly depending on task conditions.

Prior work has already provided partial support for these principles. For example, human subject predictions are consistent with a Mixture of Delta Rules strategy with two computational units in a Gaussian change-point task similar to the one
considered here, when volatility is $\sim 0.1$ and noise is $\sim 0.1$. This model provided a better fit than a model with either one or three units (Wilson et al., 2013, 2018). Note that the $(h \sim 0.1, R \sim 0.1)$ point in the volatility-noise plane falls in the small region where the 2-Delta-Rule Model is the most effective strategy according to our theory, assuming plausible tolerances to errors for human subjects (between 2% and 10%). Likewise, a Delta Rule Model with an adaptive learning rate fit human behavior on a similar Gaussian change-point task better than a Delta Rule with a fixed learning rate, when volatility was $\sim 0.04$ and noise ranged between 0.05 and 0.4 (Nassar et al., 2010). This result is in agreement with the adaptive domain in our map of effective models, assuming a tolerance to errors in the same plausible [2% - 10%] range. For a different task, adaptive changes in learning rates were detected for almost all tested subjects (Krugel et al., 2009). In this probabilistic object-reversal task, the probabilities of object reversal (analogous to volatility) ranged between 0.008 and 0.08, and the fraction of trials in which the statistically best option did not receive the top reward (analogous to noise) was 0.2. Again, here adaptive behaviors were found in a regime of low volatility and intermediate noise, compatible with our theory. We hope that future work will further test the quantitative predictions we have presented, for example by probing a wider range of conditions, including high noise and high volatility, and other tasks that make use of that information in different ways.

Methods

**Gaussian change-point processes**

Models were tested using a Gaussian change-point process (Fig. 2) (Wilson et al., 2013; Nassar et al., 2010). Observations $x_t$ are Gaussian distributed ($p(x_t) = \mathcal{N}(x_t|\mu_t, \sigma^2)$) around a source located at an unknown mean position $\mu_t$. The mean position changes at random times, with probability $h$ (the volatility parameter). At these change points, the source is resampled from another Gaussian distribution ($p(\mu_t) = \mathcal{N}(\mu_t|\bar{\mu}, \sigma_0^2)$). The goal of an observer is to infer the current position of the source $\mu_t$ from the history of observations up to time $t$ (estimation problem), or to predict the position of the source at the next time step $\mu_{t+1}$ (prediction problem). The parameters, $\bar{\mu}$, $\sigma$, and $\sigma_0$, are held constant in blocks and are assumed to be known to the observer, i.e., acquired after a sufficiently long exposure to the same environment. The ratio ($R = \sigma/\sigma_0$) is the noise parameter of the process ($R = 1/\sqrt{S/NR}$). The volatility and noise parameters determine the statistical difficulty of the inference problem.
Exact Bayesian inference

Here we derive expressions for $\mu_r^t$ and $p(r_t|x_{1:t})$ to obtain the optimal Bayesian estimate of the current source position and the optimal Bayesian prediction of the next source position (text around eq. 2) (Adams & MacKay, 2007).

For Gaussian change-point processes, the posterior probability of the source $\mu_t$ given run-length $r_t$ is

$$p(\mu_t|\mu_{t-1:t}) \propto N\left(\mu_t \mid \bar{\mu}_{r_t^t}, \sigma_0^2 \right) \prod_{i=t-r_t+1}^t N\left(\mu_i \mid \chi_{p}, \sigma_i^2 \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

where we have used the Bayes rule $p(\mu_t|\mu_{t-1:t}) \propto p(x_t|\mu_t)p(\mu_t|\mu_{t-1:t-1})$ recursively. Note that $N\left(\mu_t \mid \bar{\mu}_{r_t^t}, \sigma_0^2 \right)$ is the Gaussian prior distribution over $\mu_t$ with mean $\bar{\mu} = \chi_p$ and variance $\sigma_0^2 = \frac{\sigma^2}{\nu_p}$. Using the relation $N(\mu|\mu_1, \sigma_1^2)N(\mu|\mu_2, \sigma_2^2) \propto N\left(\mu \mid \frac{\nu_1 \sigma_2^2 + \nu_2 \sigma_1^2}{\nu_1 + \nu_2}, \frac{\sigma_1^2 \nu_2 + \sigma_2^2 \nu_1}{\nu_1 + \nu_2} \right)$ we obtain:

$$p(\mu_t|\mu_{t-1:t}) = N\left(\mu_t \mid \mu_{r_t^t}, \frac{\sigma^2}{\nu_{r_t^t}} \right)$$ \hspace{1cm} (13)

with

$$\mu_{r_t^t} = \chi_{r_t^t} \div \nu_{r_t^t} \quad ; \quad \chi_{r_t^t} = \chi_p + \sum_{i=t-r_t+1}^t x_i \quad ; \quad \nu_{r_t^t} = \nu_p + r_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

As expected for a Gaussian prior and a Gaussian likelihood, the posterior distribution (eq. 13) is also Gaussian.

The posterior probability of the run-length $r_t$ given observations $x_{1:t}$ can be computed recursively:

$$p(r_t|x_{1:t}) = \frac{p(r_t,x_{1:t})}{p(x_{1:t})} = \frac{1}{p(x_{1:t})} \sum_{r_{t-1}=1}^{t-1} p(r_t|r_{t-1},x_{1:t})p(r_{t-1},x_{1:t})$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)

$$= \frac{1}{p(x_{1:t})} \sum_{r_{t-1}=1}^{t-1} p(r_t|r_{t-1},x_t)p(x_t|r_{t-1})p(r_{t-1},x_{1:t-1})$$
Because \( r_t = 1 \) if there is a change point ("cp" below) at time \( t \), \( r_t = r_{t-1} + 1 \) if there is no change point, and change points occur with constant probability \( h \), we can rewrite \( p(r_t | r_{t-1}, x_t) \) as:

\[
p(r_t = r_{t-1} + 1 | r_{t-1}, x_t) = p(\text{no cp} | r_{t-1}, x_t) \]

(16a)

\[
p(x_t | \text{no cp}, r_{t-1}) p(\text{no cp})
\]

\[
= \frac{1 - h}{p(x_t | r_{t-1})} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} d\mu_{t-1} p(x_t | \text{no cp}, \mu_{t-1}) p(\mu_{t-1} | r_{t-1})
\]

\[
= \frac{1 - h}{p(x_t | r_{t-1})} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} d\mu_{t-1} \mathcal{N}(x_t | \mu_{t-1}, \sigma^2) \mathcal{N}(\mu_{t-1} | \bar{\mu}^{r_{t-1}}, \frac{\sigma^2}{\nu_{t-1}^{r_{t-1}}})
\]

\[
= \frac{1 - h}{p(x_t | r_{t-1})} \mathcal{N}(x_t | \bar{\mu}^{r_{t-1}}, \sigma^2(1 + \frac{1}{\nu_{t-1}^{r_{t-1}}}))
\]

\[
p(r_t = 1 | r_{t-1}, x_t) = p(\text{cp} | r_{t-1}, x_t)
\]

(16b)

\[
p(x_t | \text{cp}) p(\text{cp})
\]

\[
= \frac{h}{p(x_t | r_{t-1})} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} d\mu_{t} p(x_t | \mu_{t}) p(\mu_{t} | \text{cp})
\]

\[
= \frac{h}{p(x_t | r_{t-1})} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} d\mu_{t} \mathcal{N}(x_t | \mu_{t}, \sigma^2) \mathcal{N}(\mu_{t} | \bar{\mu}, \sigma_0^2)
\]

\[
= \frac{h}{p(x_t | r_{t-1})} \mathcal{N}(x_t | \bar{\mu}, \sigma^2 + \sigma_0^2)
\]

\[
p(r_t | r_{t-1}, x_t) = 0 \quad \forall \; r_t \neq r_{t-1} + 1 \; ; \; r_t \neq 1
\]

(16c)

Substituting eqs. 16 into eq. 15 we obtain:

\[
p(r_t | x_{1:t}) = \frac{1}{C} \mathcal{N}(x_t | \bar{\mu}^{r_{t-1}}, \sigma^2(1 + \frac{1}{\nu_{t-1}^{r_{t-1}}})) \sum_{r_{t-1}=1}^{t-1} p(r_t | r_{t-1}) p(r_{t-1} | x_{1:t-1})
\]

(17)

with \( C \) being a normalization constant, \( \mu_0 = \bar{\mu} \), \( \nu_0 = \nu_p \) (for any \( t \)) and

\[
\begin{align*}
p(r_t | r_{t-1}) &= 1 - h \quad \text{if} \quad r_t = r_{t-1} + 1 \\
p(r_t | r_{t-1}) &= h \quad \text{if} \quad r_t = 1 \\
p(r_t | r_{t-1}) &= 0 \quad \text{otherwise}
\end{align*}
\]

(18)
Eq. 17 simplifies to:
\[
\begin{align*}
\left\{
\begin{array}{ll}
p(r_t|x_{1:t}) = \frac{1}{c} (1-h) N \left( x_t | \mu_{t-1}^{r_t-1}, \sigma^2 \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\nu_{t-1}^{r_t-1}} \right) \right) & \text{if } r_t \neq 1 \\
p(r_t|x_{1:t}) = \frac{1}{c} h N \left( x_t | \mu_{t-1}^{r_t-1}, \sigma^2 \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\nu_{t-1}^{r_t-1}} \right) \right) & \text{if } r_t = 1
\end{array}
\right.
\]
\]

(19)

In conclusion, we can compute:
\[
P(\mu_t|x_{1:t}) = \sum_{r_t=1}^{t} p(\mu_t|r_t)p(r_t|x_{1:t})
\]
\[
= \sum_{r_t=1}^{t} p(r_t|x_{1:t})N \left( \mu | \mu_t^{r_t}, \frac{\sigma^2}{\nu_t^{r_t}} \right)
\]

(20)

and the optimal (mean-squared-error minimizing) estimate of the source \( \mu_t \) given the history of observations \( x_{1:t} \) is

\[
\hat{\mu}_t = \langle \mu_t \rangle_{p(\mu_t|x_{1:t})} = \sum_{r_t=1}^{t} p(r_t|x_{1:t})\mu_t^{r_t}
\]

(21)

From \( p(\mu_t|x_{1:t}) \) it is straightforward to derive the posterior probability distribution for the position of the source at the next time step:

\[
p(\mu_{t+1}|x_{1:t}) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} d\mu_t p(\mu_{t+1}|\mu_t)p(\mu_t|x_{1:t})
\]
\[
= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} d\mu_t \left( (\mu_{t+1}|\mu_t, \text{cp})p(\text{cp}) + (\mu_{t+1}|\mu_t, \text{no cp})p(\text{no cp}) \right) p(\mu_t|x_{1:t})
\]
\[
= h \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} d\mu_t p(\mu_{t+1}|\text{cp})p(\mu_t|x_{1:t}) + (1-h) \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} d\mu_t \delta(\mu_{t+1} - \mu_t)p(\mu_t|x_{1:t})
\]
\[
= h N \left( \mu_{t+1} | \mu_t, \sigma_0^2 \right) + (1-h) \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} d\mu_t \delta(\mu_{t+1} - \mu_t) \sum_{r_t=1}^{t} p(r_t|x_{1:t})N \left( \mu | \mu_t^{r_t}, \frac{\sigma^2}{\nu_t^{r_t}} \right)
\]
\[
= h N \left( \mu_{t+1} | \mu_t, \sigma_0^2 \right) + (1-h) \sum_{r_t=1}^{t} p(r_t|x_{1:t})N \left( \mu_{t+1} | \mu_t^{r_t}, \frac{\sigma^2}{\nu_t^{r_t}} \right).
\]

(22)

It follows that the optimal Bayesian prediction of \( \mu_{t+1} \) given the history of observations up to time \( t \) is

\[
\hat{\mu}_{t+1} = \langle \mu_{t+1} \rangle_{p(\mu_{t+1}|x_{1:t})} = h\mu + (1-h)\hat{\mu}_t.
\]

(23)
**Posterior probabilities in the Mixture Models**

In the Mixture Models, the posterior probabilities of the run-lengths \( \{r_i\}, \quad i = 1, \ldots, N \) are obtained as an approximation of the Bayesian posterior \( p(r_i|x_{1:t}) \) (compare with eq. 17 above)

\[
p(r_i|x_{1:t}) = \frac{1}{C} \mathcal{N}(x_t|\mu_i^r, \sigma^2(1 + \frac{1}{\nu_i^r})) \sum_{j=1}^{N} p(r_i|r_j)p(r_j|x_{1:t-1}), \tag{24}
\]

where the transition probabilities \( p(r_i|r_j) \) approximate \( p(r_i|r_{t-1}) \) of the exact Bayesian Model (Wilson et al., 2013, 2018):

\[
p(r_i|r_j) = hp(r_i|r_j, \text{cp}) + (1 - h)p(r_i|r_j, \text{no cp}) \tag{25}
\]

We sort the \( N \) model run-lengths in ascending order: \( r_1 < r_2 < \cdots < r_N \). When there is a change-point, the Bayesian run-length drops to 1. This condition is approximated by resetting the model run-length to the smallest possible value \( r_1 \):

\[
p(r_i|r_j, \text{cp}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } i = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{26}
\]

When there is not a change-point, the Bayesian run-length increases by 1. Given the finite number of run-lengths in the Mixture Models, the distance between any \( r_j \) and \( r_{j+1} \) is in general different from 1. To approximate the Bayesian transition, two cases are considered: (1) when \( r_{j+1} \geq r_j + 1 \), the model run-length increases from \( r_j \) to \( r_{j+1} \) with a probability inversely proportional to the distance \( r_{j+1} - r_j \) and it remains constant with the complementary probability, so that the increase in model run-length is equal to 1 on average; (2) when \( r_{j+1} < r_j + 1 \), transition always occurs. More formally:

For all \( j < N \):

If \( r_{j+1} \geq r_j + 1 \) then:

\[
p(r_i|r_j, \text{no cp}) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{r_{j+1}-r_j} & \text{if } i = j + 1 \\ 1 - \frac{1}{r_{j+1}-r_j} & \text{if } i = j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{27}
\]
Else if \( r_{j+1} < r_j + 1 \) then:

\[
p(r_i|r_j, \mathrm{no \, cp}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } i = j + 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]

(28)

For \( j = N \):

\[
p(r_i|r_N, \mathrm{no \, cp}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } i = N \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]

(29)

We have used Mixture Models with \( N = 2 \) units.

**Integration kernels and parameter reductions**

The different models compute estimates \( \mu^r_{it} \) by using different integration kernels over past and present observations. The models based on Sliding Windows (both the \( N \geq 2 \) adaptive and the \( N = 1 \) non-adaptive versions) compute \( \mu^r_{it} \) as in the Bayesian model (eq. 14) with \( r_t = r_i \). Eq. 14 can also be expressed as:

\[
\mu^r_{it} = \frac{\chi^r_{it}}{\nu^r_{it}} = \frac{1}{\nu_p + r_i} \left( \nu_p \bar{\mu} + dx_{t-\lfloor r_i \rfloor} + \sum_{k=t-\lfloor r_i \rfloor+1}^{t} x_k \right)
\]

(30)

where we will think of the model run-length \( r_i \) as being allowed to take non-integer values in the mathematical expression to allow greater flexibility, and \( d = r_i - \lfloor r_i \rfloor \) is the decimal part of \( r_i \). Eq. 30 corresponds to a sliding-window integration kernel over the most recent \( r_i \) observations, combined with the prior mean \( \bar{\mu} \). The relative weight of the prior mean with respect to each observation is \( \nu_p = \sigma^2/\sigma_0^2 = R^2 \): the larger the noise, the more the model relies on the prior mean as opposed to the empirical mean computed from the observations.

Eq. 30 can also be evaluated recursively as:

\[
\mu^r_{it} = \mu^r_{i,t-1} + \alpha_i \left( x_t - (1 - d)x_{t-[r_i]} - dx_{t-[r_i] - 1} \right) ; \quad \alpha_i \equiv \frac{1}{\nu_p + r_i}
\]

(31)

with initial condition \( \mu^r_{i[r_i]+1} = \frac{1}{\nu_p + r_i} \left( \nu_p \bar{\mu} + dx_1 + \sum_{k=2}^{r_i+1} x_k \right) \). Note that the model still needs a memory that extends up to \( r_i \) time steps in the past. This model has an effective learning rate \( \alpha_i \).
This working-memory load is reduced substantially in the Delta-Rule Models:

\[ \mu^\alpha_i = \mu^\alpha_{i-1} + \alpha_i (x_t - \mu^\alpha_{i-1}) \]  

with initial condition \( \mu^\alpha_0 = \bar{\mu} \) and learning rate \( \alpha_i \) in the range [0, 1]. The delta-rule units are approximations of the sliding-window units in which the weighted average of the two observations occurring \( \sim r_i \) time steps back in the past \((1 - d)x_{t-[r_i]} + dx_{t-[r_i]-1} \) (eq. 31) is replaced by the unit estimate \( \mu^\alpha_{i-1} \) of the mean at time \( t - 1 \). This approximation reduces the working-memory demand to the previous time step only, at the cost of deteriorating the estimate of the source, especially at high noise or high volatility.

The integration kernel implemented by a Delta-Rule is approximately an exponentially decaying kernel with time constant \( 1/\alpha_i \) for \( \alpha_i \ll 1 \):

\[ \mu^\alpha_i \approx \sum_{k=0}^{t} \alpha_i e^{-\alpha_i k} x_{t-k} \]  

where we define \( x_0 \equiv \bar{\mu}/\alpha_i \).

The Memoryless model further removes the dependence on the previous time step by estimating the source \( \mu_t \) as a weighted average between the prior mean \( \bar{\mu} \) and the present observation \( x_t \) (Dirac-delta kernel):

\[ \hat{\mu}_t = (1 - \alpha) \bar{\mu} + \alpha x_t \]  

The parameters \( r_i \) and \( \alpha_i \) of the models based on Sliding Windows and Delta Rules are optimized to minimize mean-squared error of the model estimates (or predictions), and their values vary with the environment-dependent parameters \( h \) and \( \nu_p = R^2 \). The optimal weight \( \alpha \) of the Memoryless model is \( \alpha = \frac{1}{\nu_p+1} \) and is independent of volatility.

We observe a number of hierarchical relationships between the models (Fig. 1 and Supplementary Fig. S1): first eq. 34 (with optimal \( \alpha \)) coincides with eq. 30 under the constraint \( r_i = 1 \) (the Memoryless Model is nested in the Sliding-Window Model); furthermore, the simple Prior Model (\( \hat{\mu}_t = \bar{\mu} \)) and the Evidence Model (\( \hat{\mu}_t = x_t \)) are obtained from both the Memoryless and the Delta-Rule Models by setting \( \alpha = 0 \) and \( \alpha = 1 \), respectively.
Effective reduction to simpler nested models

We quantified the effective reduction of the adaptive Mixture Models into the associated non-adaptive nested models (single Sliding Window and single Delta Rule) in terms of a quantity that we called Alignment. The Alignment measures the angle between the eigenvector of the error Hessian matrix $H$ (eq. 3) with the smallest eigenvalue (the “irrelevant eigenvector”), and the direction in parameter space between the optimal Mixture Model and the optimal non-adaptive nested model. Let us consider the two-parameter case. Let $\delta \alpha = \alpha^{(1)} - \alpha^{(2)}$, where $\alpha^{(2)} = (\hat{\alpha}_1, \hat{\alpha}_2)$ is the two-component vector of the optimal parameters of the Mixture Model, and $\alpha^{(1)} = (\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\alpha})$ is the vector with both components equal to the optimal parameter of the non-adaptive nested model (Fig. 7). The vector $\delta \alpha$ is directed along the parameter transformation collapsing the best Mixture Model into the best nested Single-Unit Model. We then define

$$\text{Alignment}(h, R) = \frac{\pi/2 - \theta(h, R)}{\pi/2}$$

(35)

where $0 \leq \theta \leq \pi$ is the angle between the irrelevant eigenvector and the direction of $\delta \alpha$ (Fig. 7). By definition, $0 \leq \text{Alignment} \leq 1$ and is a function of volatility $h$ and noise $R$. To reduce numerical noise, in Fig. 3, Redundancy and Alignment were averaged over ten instances of the Gaussian change-point process for each volatility and noise values.
Algorithmic complexity

The algorithmic complexity (eq. 5, Fig. 4A) is defined as the sum of a “reflexive” and a “reflective” cost.

The reflexive cost $C_{\text{reflex}}$ of taking action once a decision has been made is not known, but because it is an equal constant for all models, its value does not influence the conclusions of this study (see Supplemental Information). We set $C_{\text{reflex}} = 0.15$ to obtain the power-law fits (Fig. 4), as this value optimizes the goodness-of-fit of the linear regression of $\log(Z)$ versus $\log(C)$. Different values of $C_{\text{reflex}}$ would just shift the power-law fits along the complexity axis by a constant.

The reflective cost is the sum of the computational and memory costs paid, on average, by each model to make an inference (estimation or prediction). We consider arithmetic operations (denoted by $A$), i.e., sums, subtractions, multiplications, divisions, exponentials, and square roots, and memory operations, i.e., writing ($W$), reading ($R$), and storing ($S$). For simplicity, we assign cost = 1 to each of these operations. Thus, the reflective cost reduces to the total mean number of operations per inference: $\langle N^A \rangle + \langle N^W \rangle + \langle N^R \rangle + \langle N^S \rangle$, where we use the notation $\langle N^i \rangle$ to indicate $\lim_{T \to \infty} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} N^i_t$, with $N^i_t$ number of operations of type $i \in \{A, W, R, S\}$ required in the $t$-th iteration (returning one inference) of the algorithm implemented by each model. More precisely, for memory operations, we define $N^W_t$ as the number of variables that have to be written into memory (at iteration $t$), $N^R_t$ as the number of times each variable has to be read from memory (at $t$), summed over all variables, and $N^S_t$ as the number of iterations (starting at $t$) during which each variable has to be kept in memory to make future inferences, summed over all stored variables.

Table 1 lists $\langle N^A \rangle$, $\langle N^W \rangle$, $\langle N^R \rangle$, and $\langle N^S \rangle$ for the estimation problem, for each of the seven models derived from the exact Bayesian strategy (Fig. 1). Below we explain how we determined these values, and how they can be readily converted into the corresponding values for the prediction problem. We will only indicate operations that are performed by the models in every inference, because $\lim_{T \to \infty} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} N^i_t = 0$ for one-off operations.

The Evidence Model returns each instantaneous piece of evidence $\hat{\mu}_t = x_t$, and does not require any computation or memory operation.

The Prior Model stores the prior mean $\bar{\mu}$ for one iteration at every $t$ ($\langle N^S \rangle = 1$) and reads it from memory ($\langle N^R \rangle = 1$).

The Memoryless Model estimates the source position as $\hat{\mu}_t = \bar{\mu} + \alpha(x_t - \bar{\mu})$, which
requires \(\langle N^A \rangle = 3\) (1 sum, 1 subtraction, 1 multiplication), \(\langle N^S \rangle = 2\) (to store \(\mu\) and \(\alpha\)), and \(\langle N^R \rangle = 3\) (to read \(\hat{\mu}\), twice, and \(\alpha\), once). We stress that the name “Memoryless” is used to indicate that this model does not perform any integration of evidence over time, thus it does not require any memory of past observations or past inferences; however, the model maintains a memory of prior information.

The Delta Rule computes \(\hat{\mu}_t = \hat{\mu}_{t-1} + \alpha (x_t - \hat{\mu}_{t-1})\), which involves the same number of algorithmic and memory operations as the Memoryless Model estimate, with the addition of one writing operation per iteration (\(\langle N^W \rangle = 1\)), because the computation is recursive, requiring to write \(\hat{\mu}_t\) into memory at every \(t\) to compute \(\hat{\mu}_{t+1}\). This one-time-step dependence allows the Delta Rule to integrate the evidence over time, unlike the Memoryless Model.

The Sliding Window computes \(\hat{\mu}_t = \hat{\mu}_{t-1} + \alpha (x_t - (1 - d)x_{t-[r]} - dx_{t-[r]-1})\) (with \(\alpha = \frac{1}{\nu_0 + r}\)), which requires \(\langle N^A \rangle = 7\) arithmetic operations (1 sum, 3 differences, 3 products); \(\langle N^W \rangle = 2\) operations to write, at every \(t\), \(\hat{\mu}_t\) (necessary to compute the estimate at \(t + 1\)) and \(x_t\) (necessary to compute the estimates at \(t + [r] + 1\)) and \(x_{t-[r]}\) and \(x_{t-[r]-1}\); finally \(\langle N^S \rangle = \lfloor r \rfloor + 4\) operations to store, at every \(t\), \(\alpha\), \(d\) (twice), \(x_{t-[r]}\), \(x_{t-[r]-1}\) and \(x_t\) (for a duration of \(\lfloor r \rfloor + 1\) iterations). Because of the dependence on \(r(h, R)\) (the time scale of the sliding-window integration of past evidence that minimizes mean squared error), this model and its Mixture have complexity that depends on the environmental noise and volatility; for example, complexity increases with increasing noise to integrate observations over longer time scales, which allows more accurate estimates of the source. All the other models have complexity that is independent of noise and volatility, because they retain either no memory of past evidence (Evidence, Prior and Memoryless Models), or only a memory of the previous estimate (Delta Rule Models), regardless of environmental statistics.

In the Mixture models, each of the \(N\) units performs the same computations as the corresponding single-unit models. Thus, the contribution to the complexity of the Mixture models coming from the computations taking place in the single units reduces to the complexity of the single Delta Rule and single Sliding Window, respectively, when \(N = 1\) (Table 1, first line of the respective slots). However, the largest contribution to the complexity of the Mixture models comes from the computations that combine the estimates provided by the \(N\) units into a single inference of the source (Table 1, second line of the respective slots, where the Heaviside function \(H_2 = H[N - 2]\) vanishes for \(N = 1\)). These computations are necessary to obtain the adaptive probabilities \(p(r_i|x_{1:t})\) of the \(N\) run-lengths at each iteration \(t\).
of the algorithm, which are then used to weigh the estimates of the single units. In particular, for both Mixtures, the leading-order term of \( N^A (7N^2) \) comes from 2 summations, over \( N \) terms each, required to compute each of the \( N \) adaptive \( p(r_i|x_{1:t}) \) (eq. 24): (1) the summation over \( N \) run-lengths \( j \) appearing at the numerator of eq. 24 (which involves \( 6N - 1 \) algorithmic operations), and (2) the summation necessary to compute the normalization constant (which involves \( N - 1 \) algorithmic operations). The leading-order term of \( \langle N^R \rangle (6N^2) \) comes from reading the terms in the same summations. \( \langle N^W \rangle \) scales as \( \sim N \) (not as \( \sim N^2 \)) because only the \( N \) probabilities \( p(r_i|x_{1:t}) \) are carried forward to the next iteration of the algorithm to compute the new \( p(r_i|x_{1:t+1}) \), whereas the individual addends of the summations mentioned above do not need to be memorized. Finally, the leading-order term of \( \langle N^S \rangle (2N^2) \) arises because computation of the adaptive \( p(r_i|x_{1:t}) \) requires maintenance in memory, at every iteration, the \( N \times N \) matrices of the transition probabilities \( p(r_i|r_j, cp) \) and \( p(r_i|r_j, no \ cp) \) (eqs. 26 through 29).

The differences between the complexities of the Mixture of Delta Rules and the Mixture of Sliding Windows only involve terms of order \( O(N) \) and \( O(1) \), and come entirely from the computations taking place in the single units (note that the second line in the slots of Table 1 corresponding to the two Mixture models are identical).

The complexities in the prediction problem can be readily obtained from the complexities in the estimation problem, as follows. For the Evidence and Prior Models, predictions coincide with estimations, thus their complexity is the same as in Table 1. For all the other models, predictions are computed from estimations as \( \hat{\mu}_{t+1} = (1-h)\hat{\mu}_t + h\bar{\mu} \). Thus, each prediction requires 4 more algorithmic operations than each estimation, 3 more reading operations (to retrieve from memory \( h \), twice, and \( \bar{\mu} \), once), and either 2 more storing operations for the Delta Rule and Sliding Window (to store both \( h \) and \( \bar{\mu} \)), or just 1 more storing operation for the Memoryless Model (to store \( h \), as this model already requires to store \( \bar{\mu} \) to obtain the estimate \( \hat{\mu}_t \)) and for the Mixture Models (to store \( \bar{\mu} \), as \( h \) is already stored to estimate \( \hat{\mu}_t \)).
| Model                          | $\langle N^A \rangle$ | $\langle N^W \rangle$ | $\langle N^R \rangle$ | $\langle N^S \rangle$ |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Evidence                      | 0                      | 0                      | 0                      | 0                      |
| Prior                         | 0                      | 0                      | 1                      | 1                      |
| Memoryless Model              | 3                      | 0                      | 3                      | 2                      |
| Delta Rule                    | 3                      | 1                      | 3                      | 2                      |
| Sliding Window                | 7                      | 2                      | 6                      | $[r(h, R)] + 4$         |
| Mixture of $N$ Delta Rules    | $3N + (7N^2 + 14N - 1)H_2$ | $N + (2N + 1)H_2$ | $3N + (6N^2 + 7N)H_2$ | $2N + (2N^2 + 2N + 1)H_2$ |
| Mixture of $N$ Sliding Windows| $7N + (7N^2 + 14N - 1)H_2$ | $N + 1 (2N + 1)H_2$ | $6N + (6N^2 + 7N)H_2$ | $3N + \max_i ([r_i(h, R)]) + 1 (2N^2 + 2N + 1)H_2$ |

Table 1: Asymptotic mean numbers of operations ($A$: arithmetic, $W$: memory writing, $R$: memory reading, $S$: memory storing) that determine the algorithmic complexity (eq. 5) of each model in the estimation problem. For the Mixture models, $N$ denotes the number of units (set to 2 in this study) and $H_2 = H[N - 2]$ denotes the Heaviside step function centered in $N = 2$, which is equal to 1 for $N \geq 2$ and to 0 for $N = 1$. Note that, for $N = 1$, the complexity of the Mixture models reduces to the complexity of the respective single-unit models. For the Sliding Windows, $\{r_i(h, R)\}, i = 1, \ldots, N$, is the set of run-lengths that minimizes the mean squared error of the model estimates given environmental volatility $h$ and noise $R$. 
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Author Contributions

G.T., V.B., J.G. developed the ideas and wrote the paper; G.T. performed the analyses.

Declaration of Interests

The authors declare no competing interests.
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