FROM ESDP TO TODAY’S NEW INITIATIVES: DOES NEOFUNCTIONALISM WORK?

AGSP’den Bugünün Yeni Girişimlerine: Neofonksiyonalizm (Yeni İşlevselcilik) Çalışıyor mu?

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Abstract

The ESDP is always one of the most significant policies of the EU for shaping both foreign relations and the integration process. After security and defense issues have become more important due to political developments since the beginning of 2000s, the ESDP has started to move towards the CSDP. From ESDP to CSDP and today's new initiatives, the EU has taken good steps for further integration. Although new tools brought by the Lisbon Treaty like mutual defense and solidarity clauses and new initiatives which aim to move the CSDP one step further such as EUGS, PESCO, and EDF could lead to long-term results in bolstering the EU’s defense capabilities, EU Member States ask for cooperation efficiently in research and acquiring new military capabilities. Analyzing the period from the ESDP to the CSDP by applying neofunctionalist integration theory with a particular focus on new tools and initiatives launched after the Lisbon Treaty came into force, this paper aims to demonstrate that even the pauses in further integration efforts in the defense security and defense issues take place, the EU is continuing to follow a possessed path going to a common security and defense policy.

Keywords:
ESDP, CSDP, Neofunctionalism, Lisbon Treaty

JEL Codes:
F50, F59, P48

Özet

AGSP, dış ilişkilerini ve bütünleşme sürecini şekillendirdiğinde AB’nin en önemli politikalardan biri haline gelmiştir. 2000lerden başlayarak siyasi gelişmelerin de etkisiyle güvenlik ve savunma konuları ivme kazanmış ve AGSP, OGSP’ye doğru ilerlemeye başlamıştır. AGSP’den OGSP’ye ve bugünün yeni girişimlerine kadar, AB’lileri entegrasyon için çeken etki adımlar atmıştır. Karşılkılı savunma ve dayanışma maddeleri gibi Lizbon Anlaşması’nın getirdiği yeni araçlar ve “Avrupa Birliği Kıresel Stratejisi”, “Daimi yapılandırılmış İş birliği” ve “Avrupa Savunma Fonu” gibi OGSP’yi bir adım daha ileriye taşımayı amaçlayan yeni girişimlerin, AB’nin savunma yeteneklerini güçlendirmeye uzun vadeli faydalar sağlayabileceği beklenmektedir. AB üye ülkeleri ayrıca araştırma ve yeni askeri yetenekler edinme konusunda verimli bir şekilde iş birliği yapmayı istemektedir. Lizbon Anlaşması’nın yürürlüğe girmesinden sonra başlatılan yeni araçlarla ve girişimlere özel olarak odaklanarak neofonksiyonel (Yeni İşlevselci) bütünleşme teorisinin uygulayarak AGSP’den OGSP’ye kadar olan dönemi analiz eden bu makale, AB’nin, savunma ve güvenlik konularında daha fazla bütünleşme çabaları srasındaki duraklamaları rağmen, ortak bir güvenlik ve savunma politikasına gidilmiş yolda kendinden emin bir şekilde ilerlediğini göstermeyi hedeflemektedir.

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1. Introduction

During 10 years from the formation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 till the Lisbon Treaty’s entering into force in 2009, there have not been important changes in the evolution of the European Union’s (EU) common security and defence policy. The same period also saw disruptive terrorist attacks in New York, London, and Madrid, and two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Especially the invasion of Iraq divided the EU Member States into two parties as European integrationists and those who defend the Transatlantic solidarity. The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) was launched after the debates reached at the peak within the Union. The ESS was not only the first security strategy of the EU but also very important steps for the future of the EU’s foreign policy. All these debates demonstrated that the EU needed more active and direct policy in security and defence issues such as rapid response and intervention capability (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014).

Analyzing the period from the ESDP to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) by applying neofunctionalist integration theory with a particular focus on new tools launched after the Lisbon Treaty came into force, this paper will be structured as follow. After the brief introduction, the second part of the paper aims to summarize the developments in the period from the ESDP to the CSDP. The third part of the paper discusses the Lisbon Treaty and new conceptual challenges the Treaty brought such as the mutual defense and solidarity clauses. After mentioning the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), which aims to move the CSDP one step further through new initiatives having an emphasis on more integration in EU’s security and defense in the fourth part, the fifth part of the paper aims to discuss the neofunctionalism as a grand integration theory by reviewing the old and current literature. In the next part, it is discussed whether the neofunctionalism works in the EU’s security and defense policy by taking new developments and new initiatives into account. Finally, this paper finishes by claiming that neofunctionalism is applicable for further security and defense integration in the EU. This paper is complied with the research and publication ethics and does not require permission from the ethics committee and/or legal/special permission.

2. Neofunctionalism as a Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

Schimmelfennig and Rittberger (2006) defines European integration as a process which formulates the policy areas on the EU level (sectoral integration), distributes the competencies among the EU member states or transfers it to the EU as a supranational institution (vertical integration), and enlarges the EU’s borders through new members (horizontal integration). European integration theories aim to determine the extent of European integration by means of sectoral, vertical and horizontal dimensions and are explained under intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, which are two “schools of thought”. Among those two “schools of thought”, neofunctionalism was born from the supranationalism whose main scholars are Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg, Joseph Nye and Philippe Schmitter (Schimmelfennig and Rittberger, 2006). The original theory of Haas, Lindberg and Mitroany were modified by Schmitter, Niemann, Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Schimmelfennig and by Haas and Lindberg themselves.

‘The Uniting of Europe’ was the first book Haas focused on the regional integration. In ‘the Uniting of Europe’, Haas envisaged the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as
new cooperation type between states by via spillover effect (Haas, 1958). In 1964, Haas published ‘Beyond the Nation State’, which formulated the theory of neofunctionalism for the first time (Haas, 1964). Haas’ neofunctionalism was standing in opposite side of David Mitrany’s functionalism in terms of politics. According to Niemann and Schmitter (2009), neofunctionalism, which became a prominent theory of European integration during the end of 1950s and beginning of 1960s, was formulated by Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg in order to explain why the ECSC, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were founded. Based on the neofunctionalist claims, the establishment of the ECSC had spilled over effect on the establishment of the EEC and Euratom. Therefore, Haas’ neofunctionalism had an impact on the EU’s integration process during the 1980s (Niemann and Schmitter, 2009). Ben Rosamond defines neofunctionalism as the virtual synonym of European integration (Rosamond, 2000).

The basic question neofunctionalism asks is why states give their sovereignty voluntarily to a supranational body. According to neofunctionalism, the development of the integration process happens over time and has its dynamic (Niemann and Ioannou, 2015). The neofunctionalism explains the process through several steps. First, several states get together and decide to integrate into a determined economic sector. Then, they found a supranational body to be able to realize the integration more effectively. However, they realize that integration in more sectors is needed to be able to benefit from the integration more effectively. Therefore, new areas are determined for further integration and the supranational body supports the states through its strategies for further integration (Rosamond, 2000). In other words, since the supranational body benefit from the integration, it behaves like an agent of integration (Haroche, 2020).

The term spillover is the main concept of neofunctionalist theory. Spillover is defined as a process “in which the creation and deepening of integration in one economic sector would create pressures for further economic integration within and beyond that sector, and greater authoritative capacity at the European level” (Rosamond, 2000, p. 60). In contrast to general opinion claiming that the supranationalism falls into the scope of low politics like economics instead of high politics like foreign affairs and defense (Haroche, 2020), neofunctionalism asserts that integration in low politics eventually provides the integration in high politics through the spillover effect. Besides, spillover covers the gradual transfer of national competences to supranational institutions, which becomes the new high authority for political actors. Amongst the EU institutions, the European Commission serves as the most neofunctionalist part of supranationalism as the initiator of new beginnings for further integration. the Commission also aims to increase its legitimacy within the EU Member States. According to neofunctionalism, a high authority is needed for further integration and the Commission serves this duty (Rosamond, 2000).

There are three kinds of spillover: functional, political, and cultivated. Based on functional spillover, several economic sectors are interdependent and integration in an economic sector at a regional level would also need integration in another one amongst those economic sectors (Niemann and Schmitter, 2009). That is why governments pursue further integration in the economic area. Sweet and Sandholtz (1997) assert that when a supranational institution is created, this means that a new dynamic is born. This dynamic receives its power from the integration process itself. Spillover effect let the supranational authority to expand itself to other related areas. This is called as a functional spillover. According to political spillover, if political
elites and decision-makers assume that policies they aim to apply could not meet their expectations at the domestic level, they would be willing to move their expectations, loyalties, and activities to a regional center. Although political elites start the integration process, Haas claims that supranational bodies should have autonomy in this process as well (Haas, 1961). Finally, cultivated spillover describes the aim of the supranational body for expanding since it receives its power from the integration and therefore, becomes agents of integration to benefit it (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991). According to Niemann and Schmitter (2009), supranational institutions, after a while, create their own identity since their preferences could not be covered by a group of nation state. That is why, supranational institutions have tendency to support more integration to serve the common interests and increase cooperation via cultivated spillover.

Schimmelfennig (2018) defines the neofunctionalism as ongoing integration dynamic via spillovers and path-dependencies. Although the integration in the beginning was inadequate, spillover effect and supranationalism continued in a way. This paper argues that neofunctionalist spillover largely accounts for the progress of European Defense and Security Policy for further integration so far. Nevertheless, as Niemann and Schmitter (2009) underline that neofunctionalism is a theory of both integration and disintegration. Therefore, it needs to take into account that neofunctionalism does not only aim to explain why and when integration takes place but also under which circumstances the integration fails. In other words, after spillover, the second significant term of neofunctionalism is spillback which means moving back from integration by sectoral or institutional means (Rosamond, 2000).

Neofunctionalism is an appropriate approach in elucidating policy-making outputs relating to European integration dynamics. In certain areas, neofunctionalism could not explain why high-level politics could not meet lower-level expectations. In this case, it is important to admit that integration is a dynamic process and dialectic. Therefore, a spillback is also possible in some time. A spillback should not be regarded as the shortcoming of the neofunctionalist approach. Instead, shortcomings demonstrate that the neofunctionalism continues to evolve. That is why, shortcomings should be taken as a challenge which power the integration process for moving further (Niemann, 2016). Finally, the most serious challenge towards the snowball effect of the neofunctionalism comes from the difference between high politics and low politics. Hoffmann (1966), who is an intergovernmentalist, envisages that spillover effect could only take place in “low politics” such as economic cooperation, not “high politics” such as issues relating to security and defense. However, neofunctionalism does not reject that the way going to the integration is rugged. European integration process could encounter with crises which could delay the integration; however, in the end, policy spillover and supranationalism are going to make an upward movement. Because European integration gets its roots from the neofunctionalist point of view (Hooghe and Marks, 2019).

3. From ESDP to CSDP

The 1998 Franco–British St. Malo declaration was one of the most important building blocks in the development of the ESDP (Hill, Smith and Vanhoonacker, 2005). The Declaration was a response to the war in Kosovo in the late 1990s. At the Conference, Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac, and Lionel Jospin declared that they would enter a new direction in European defense. They added that the EU should take on direct political responsibility for deciding on and overseeing military operations (Bono, 2002). Therefore, the ESDP was formed including a
European military force having an autonomous action capability. Furthermore, the 1999 Cologne European Council undertook that the EU would have 60,000-person rapid reaction force (RRF) by 2004 (Manners, 2002). Besides, the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG), which envisaged to prepare appropriate resources for European missions, including the Petersberg Tasks was launched by the end of 1999. The Petersberg Tasks listed the type of military action that the EU could bear in crisis management operations. According to the Petersberg Tasks, the EU could undertake humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping, and peacemaking. The Petersberg Tasks were then included in Article 17 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) through the Amsterdam Treaty (European Union External Action Service [EEAS], 2020a). The Petersberg Tasks were expanded after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009. Through the extension, the Petersberg Tasks began to cover “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization.” (the Treaty on the European Union [TEU], 2009).

Another development in the way that the EU took steps towards a security and defense policy for the EU is the Berlin Plus agreement, which was signed between the EU and NATO in 2003, includes necessary arrangements so that the EU could use NATO assets and capabilities in the crisis management operations led by the EU. The first success of the Berlin Plus agreement had been the inauguration of Operation Concordia, which is the first military operation led by the EU, in Macedonia (after February 2019, the Republic of North Macedonia) in March 2003 (EEAS, 2020b). Operation Concordia, which was a peace-keeping mission, was the first military operation of the EU. During the mission, the EU tested its new procedures. The experience and success gained from Operation Concordia encouraged the EU for handling its first autonomous operation, Operation Artemis, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in June 2003. Operation Artemis demonstrated the success of the Union in involving in peacekeeping operations far beyond the EU borders. During EUFOR Althea, which was the military operation inaugurated by the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 2004, the EU achieved the most assertive military operation and received the responsibility from the Stabilization Force (SFOR) of NATO (EEAS, 2020b).

One of the most important building blocks for the future of the ESDP is the ESS was also drafted in 2003. The Strategy, entitled “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, began with identifying new five threats for the EU: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states, organized crime, and regional conflicts (Hill et al., 2005). The document underlined a greater capacity for the EU is needed for sustaining several operations simultaneously. The document also referred to a partnership with the US and NATO since as underlined in the document, many of the EU force's missions would be undertaken in cooperation with NATO (Hill et al., 2005). A year later, the EU Member States set the Military Headline Goals (HLGs) for enhancing the EU's military capabilities in parallel with the Petersberg Tasks. The EU aimed to move the experience get from the military operations EUFOR Concordia and Artemis to a more inclusive and detailed phase due to the changing security environment (EEAS, 2020b). The missions realized by the EU was the sign that the EU has ability to involve in military operations (Hill et al., 2005). The same year also saw the foundation of the European Defence Agency (EDA), whose aim is assisting its Member States for increasing defense capabilities and developing their military resources and joint defense capabilities. The only EU Member Country which is not a part of the EDA is Denmark since it decided to opt-out from security and defense policies.
of the EU. The EDA also has agreements with countries not from the EU namely Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, and Ukraine (European Defence Agency [EDA], 2020). The EDA was created to be the main facilitator for ministries of defense in improving the capabilities under ESDP. Since the EDA works as the center of the European defense cooperation, in May 2017, EDA’s Member States decided to extend the EDA’s mission and now the EDA is aimed to work as the central operator for EU-funded activities in the defense area. EDA aims to form the “Military Schengen” of the EU (EDA, 2020).

3.1. Lisbon Treaty, Mutual Defense and Solidarity Clause

Initiatives the EU launched have been significant steps towards a common security and defense policy. However, the turning point for further security and defense integration in the EU is regarded as the Lisbon Treaty's entry into force. One of the most significant changes the Lisbon Treaty brought was the ESDP itself. After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the ESDP became the CSDP. Besides, the Treaty of Lisbon brought new concepts like mutual defense and a solidarity clause. The mutual defense clause took its roots from Article 5 of the Western European Union (WEU) Treaty. However, it was presented in 2009 under Article 42.7 of the Treaty of the European Union. The Article states that “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, under Article 51 -the right to self-defense- of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States” (TEU, 2009). Regarding the Solidarity clause, the Lisbon Treaty states that “the Union and the Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster” (the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], 2009).

There are three main differences which are responsibility, area, and tools, between these two clauses. Concerning the responsibility, while the solidarity clause gives the main responsibility to the Union itself, the mutual assistance clause is seen under the CSDP and therefore gives the main responsibility to the EU Member States, not the Union itself. The second main difference between the two clauses is the area. The Solidarity clause limits the area as within the borders of the EU Member States while the mutual assistance clause embedded in CSDP has no territorial limitations but political ones. The last main difference between the two clauses is the tools they use. Both Solidarity and Mutual Assistance Clause underlines all means and assets available and appropriate; however, the Solidarity Clause is much more ambitious for using all instruments the EU has (Rehrl, 2015). Besides, both Mutual Defense Clause and Solidarity Clause offer a joint commitment deeper than NATO’s collective security. In other words, Lisbon Treaty established a connection between the CSDP and the external dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, which is the second Treaty objective in Article 3 TEU, by contributing to the security measures such as the control of criminal threats inside and outside the EU. Moreover, both clauses sign that the EU’s threat scenarios defined in the ESS have been expanding in recent years. Finally, the EU has been increasing the number of securities providing instruments such as crisis management and counter-terrorism capabilities. If the European Council updates the threat list regularly, this could help the use of these clauses in the future. However, the ambiguity of the threat definition is seen as the weakness of the Lisbon Treaty (Wessel, Marin and Matera, 2011).
France was the first country to speak the mutual defense clause loudly after the Paris terrorist attacks on 13 November 2015. As a result, defense ministers of the EU member states agreed on activating the mutual defense clause unanimously on 17 November 2015. Based on the Mutual Defense Clause, France asked for pooling of capabilities from the EU Member States to use in its operations in Iraq and Syria. Besides, France requested assistance to redeploy troops in regions it needed. By asking for support from the EU Member States, France also asked for a unified and coordinated European political action. While the EU was experiencing the debates resulted from Brexit, the Euro crisis and the refugee crisis, France's request was the search for solidarity and independent EU defense policy although slow progress disappointed him (European Parliament, 2020a). The reason why France preferred the mutual defense clause is to share the burden of EU military spending of CSDP with EU Member states. France did not prefer the solidarity clause although terrorist attacks fall in the scope of this clause since, in contrast to the mutual defense clause, the solidarity clause has no direct relation with CSDP.

3.2. Moving to Further Integration: EUGS and New Initiatives

The EUGS was introduced in June 2016 to move the CSDP one step further. EUGS was including several measures in the security and defense area. EUGS also was built on basically three elements. First, EU Member States should have had more responsibility for their security and defense. Second, based on European Defense Action Plan, the defense capabilities of the EU Member States should have been enhanced through new financial tools. Finally, cooperation areas determined for the EU-NATO Joint Declaration should have been followed. Based on the elements defined in the EUGS, EU Member States started to hold meetings to discuss the security and defense issues. The first meeting was held in Bratislava in September 2016 and Member States agreed on enhancing cooperation on foreign security and defense issues. In November 2016, the “Implementation Plan on Security and Defense” was launched. The Plan had 13 proposals whose most significant parts were a coordinated annual review on defense (CARD), which is expected to create more transparency on defense plans in the future, the Capability Development Plan (CDP), which aims to help member states to define the capabilities they need like research, technology and industrial aspects, and PESCO, which aims to support member states for deeper and more binding commitments, jointly defense capabilities, new projects and for a better EU rapid response. Moreover, in November 2016, the European Commission proposed a European Defense Action Plan, which was focusing on the formation of a European Defense Fund (EDF) to support investment in research and development in defense equipment and technology (EEAS, 2020b).

Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development (CBSD), launched in 2017, is another initiative for further integration and coherence in the security and defense area. Through CBSD, the EU aims to fund the equipment and infrastructure of the armed forces of the EU Member States (Bergmann, 2019). As a result of the decision of all EU institutions, the CBSD was put into practice under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), which is a financial instrument of the development policy. By doing this, the EU will provide training, equipment, and infrastructure to the armed forces under the decision-making of the European Commission. Therefore, the Commission accessed the supranational power in EU’s security affairs and opened a way to use the EU’s budget in funding the armed forces (Bergmann, 2019). Same year, the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) was also founded. Today,
the MPCC is conducting three non-executive military missions in Mali, Somalia, and the Central African Republic. By 2020, the MPCC has started for managing executive military missions (EEAS, 2020b).

In 2018, a roadmap was launched for the implementation of PESCO and along with CARD and the EDF, these three initiatives are planned to assist the EU Member States for further defense cooperation. A year later, a Joint Action Plan was launched, and the Council recommended the fully implemented EDF, which would contribute to the industrial and technological developments in the EU’s defense (EEAS, 2020b). Parliament also declared its support to the PESCO, CARD, and the EDF (European Parliament, 2020b). Finally, since post-Brexit has a big impact on the EU regarding the decrease on the number of the military power, the EU member states seem having no choice in both increasing the defense expenditures and constructing new mechanisms for deepening the CSDP (Cebeci, 2018).

3.2.1. Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defense (PESCO)

European integration process began with political and economic integration and continued with attempts to create a common security and defense policy. As a result, 1999 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the 2009 CSDP aimed to realize further integration in the security and defense area. The launch of the PESCO aims to foster EU’s integration process. Furthermore, the EUGS, Brexit, the beginning of the Trump Presidency in the US, and crises in the EU’s neighbors demonstrated that the EU should start to take more responsibility in guaranteeing its security and defense. PESCO is the result of minding this gap and aims to have operational dimensions and use of force in the name of the EU.

PESCO is designed to contribute to the development of the CSDP and to encourage the Union to have a much more assertive role in foreign security and defense issues. As Hill et al. (2005) point out after increasing the political coordination of military capacity, it should be mentioned in going further in the European collective defense. Therefore, through PESCO, the EU Member States is aimed to increase their ability against the security challenges and to move the Union’s defense cooperation further. Besides, PESCO is said to be the most flexible framework between member states aiming at deeper cooperation in the politics (Fiott, Missiroli, and Tardy, 2017: 18). Since the member states must decide unanimously in the decision-making process of the CSDP, veto rights of the member states complicate the cooperation and integration within the Union. However, PESCO’s mechanism is different from the CSDP because of its flexible structure. Therefore, since PESCO is very new project whose institutional construction continues, PESCO could make contribution to the development of the EU’s actorness, capabilities, and integration process in the defense realm (Turhan, 2019).

PESCO’s legal basis is determined in the Article 42.6 and Article 46 of the TEU. Both articles underline that on one hand, PESCO aims to create an environment which gathering the member states willing to deepen the integration in the defense realm. On the other hand, PESCO aims to eliminate the barrier the member states, who remain distant to the integration in the defense realm due to several strategic reasons, created (Guerzoni, 2017). All in all, PESCO envisages to transform the EU into an institution having an autonomous and competent movement capacity via flexible institutionalization. By doing this, PESCO members could take an action for further integration and institutionalization without facing with the veto of the other
EU member states in the issues relating to the defense dimension of the CSDP (Turhan, 2019). Therefore, PESCO aimed to deepen defense cooperation between the EU Member States having the capacity and willingness to make defense capabilities available for EU military operations. Hence, PESCO will support the EU's for becoming a visible international security actor.

The PESCO differs from other initiatives since participating in the PESCO is voluntary. Although PESCO was a very important part of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, it was launched in 2016 after the UK realized a referendum for leaving the EU. In other words, PESCO was decided to be implemented after the UK showed signs to leave the Union. Especially after 2010, the UK's attention to defense and security issues of the EU decreased and the UK claimed that no EU Member States were willing to do or spend for defense. The only exception in relating to the UK's participation in EU's common defense issues after 2010 is Operation Atalanta, the CSDP naval operation against piracy on the coast of Somalia. Starting from the end of 2008 until the end of the Brexit referendum, Operation Atalanta was commanded by the UK. Then, the headquarters was moved to Naval Station Rota (NAVSTA Rota) in Spain. Finally, On 11 December 2017, the Council decided to find PESCO and 25 EU Member States agreed to join (Sweeney and Winn, 2020). In conclusion, although member states are the main decision-makers of the PESCO, flexible framework the PESCO offers aims to integrate the EU institutions to the cooperation and control mechanism of the PESCO and then to contribute to the supranationalization of the CSDP (Billon-Galland and Quencez, 2017).

3.2.2. The European Intervention Initiative

PESCO's small steps have made France disappointed. Moreover, France is discontent from the EU Member States which is reluctant to participate to solve the crises and to use force if needed. Therefore, in September 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron announced his plan called as the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) in Sorbonne, and in 2018, he invited eight European countries, namely Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, and Italy to join (Nováky, 2018). Among those countries, Italy did not accept to join the EI2. However, in 2019, Italy also joined the EI2 (The Defense Post, 2019). Finland also joined a few months after the EI2 was launched (Nováky, 2018). Finally, Sweden and Norway joined the EI2 in 2019 (Euractiv, 2019).

The EI2 was designed as an outsider to the EU framework but compatible with it. Macron defines his EI2 initiative as one step further to European defense integration like PESCO and the EDF. Therefore, Macron claims that the EU should not depend on NATO and the US and build its military base. In other words, EI2 is planned to be neither part of NATO nor the EU (Vocal Europe, 2019). Actually, the EI2 was initially welcomed by Germany then brought concerns about whether France could use it for its aims. Another concern was about the possible damage the EI2 could give to the EU's efforts to increase its coordination and capabilities. Moreover, since the participation of the EI2 is realized through invitation, the EI2 could be regarded as a threat to European solidarity (Sweeney and Winn, 2020). In other words, Germany claims that the PESCO and the EI2 will lead to a division in the defense area. Therefore, Germany is in favor of more integration within the PESCO while France is the founding father of EI2. In fact, the problem between France and Germany in the Union is deeper than the PESCO and EI2 support. Germany supports the “civilian power” of the EU and would like to follow communitarized policies in security and defense areas while France aims to make
the EU “militarized power”. However, as a “civilian power” supporter, Germany does not totally reject to establish a military force (Risse, 2005).

Finally, the EDF is initiated to coordinate and support the EU’s Member States’ investments in the defense area. The EDF aims to increase the cooperation between the EU Member States in defense technology and equipment issues. The fund was launched in June 2017 before the PESCO’s launch. The EDF has two sides. One side is for the research and another side is for the defense industry. First comprehensive EDF worth €13 billion was proposed by the Commission in June 2018. Moreover, in February 2019, the EU institutions agreed to a political agreement on the EDF. PESCO and the EDF are complementary initiatives (European Commission, 2020).

To sum up, even though it is early to comment on the results of PESCO and EI2, these two initiatives along with the EDF, similar objectives such as increasing Europe’s defense capabilities and military power; and creating an effective mechanism for crisis management. Therefore, they all try to contribute to the CSDP. Since this study aims to explore that all those initiatives could make further integration in security and defense, to this end, among traditional integration theories, neofunctionalism fits particularly well with this purpose. Although it has encountered severe criticism, it is still one of the most important integration theories as of today. Neofunctionalism is also very applicable in analyzing policy-making processes.

4. Does the Neofunctionalism Work in the EU’s Security and Defense Area?

This paper discusses the impact of certain developments on the EU Security and Defense Policy’s evolution and aims at highlighting the dynamics and constraints shaping it. Among traditional integration theories, neofunctionalism fits particularly well with this purpose. Although it has encountered severe criticism, it is still one of the most important integration theories as of today. Besides, neofunctionalism is very applicable in analyzing policy-making processes. To begin with, Haas (1961), as the defender of neofunctionalism claims that the reason why the EU continued its efforts for the integration process although the integration could not have created a common security and defense policy until the late 1990s is that the EU as a supranational body benefits from the integration. Therefore, EU institutions would not be willing to give up following further integration.

To sum up, in the late 1990s, ESDP began to develop rapidly and entered into the EU’s agenda. In 1998, at St Malo Conference, it was stated that the EU needed capacity for autonomous operations, even militarily. In 2000, new ESDP institutions began to work. Deficiencies and resources were identified. From neofunctionalist point of view, this development is the result of the spillover effect which finally occurred in security and defense policy. The reasons why the EU needed to develop the ESDP are the natural expansion of the integration process, the EU’s wish to balance against the US, and the practical needs of crisis management in a changing security environment (Forsberg, 2006). Based on neofunctionalism, these reasons led to the development of the ESDP since as a result of the spillover effect, a process of supranationalization starts (Ojanen, 2006).

Regarding three versions of spillover effect, the ESDP is the result of several steps starting from economic integration accessing political and military integration. Since EU Member States benefit from the integration through an economic and monetary union, they
would be willing to go further in the development of the European security and defense policy. Therefore, although ESDP/ CSDP is claimed not to be communitarized since it falls into “high politics” area and to be the only intergovernmental area of the EU Policy-making structure, Risse (2005) asserts that it is not clear where “high politics” finishes and “low politics” starts. Therefore, as Risse (2005) explains that in the meantime, the spillover effect has been applied in several “high politics” issues such as monetary sovereignty and internal security. Therefore, since there has been functional spillover between the EU’s external and security policies, and other traditional EU policies, neofunctionalism is claimed to explain decisions for further integration efforts after the ESDP. The EDF, launched by the Commission, which is a supranational policy demonstrated that the initiative power of the Commission as a high authority created a deep impact on political cultivated spillover logic. Through EDF, the Commission started to take part of issues related with high politics. The EDF also proved that the functional spillover effect also exists in the defense area since Commission showed its willing to include in new targets in defense area. This new bureaucratic spillover could help to the Commission for enhancing its administrative power in the defense area (Haroche, 2020). Therefore, defense bureaucracies and industries shift their loyalties and expectations from states to new central authorities in this field. Thus, the Council of defense ministers would undoubtedly have neofunctionalist integrationist dynamics. Member States also support the formation of the ESDP since it may provide a minimum of defense expenditure, professionalization (rapid reaction capacity, interoperability), specialization, a common market for defense (common defense procurement), and increased industrial co-operation (Ojanen, 2006). These are examples of political spillover. Finally, although new tools brought by the Lisbon Treaty like mutual defense and solidarity clauses and new initiatives which aim to move the CSDP one step further such as EUGS, PESCO, and EDF could lead to long-term results in bolstering the EU’s defense capabilities, EU Member States ask for more efficient cooperation in research and acquiring new military capabilities. This argument fits into the cultivated spillover definition well.

When it comes today, the technical dialogue could lead to a spillover effect and low politics could play an important role in a high-level political dialogue. For instance, the EU contributed to the gradual normalization between Kosovo and Serbia by using the spillover effect of the technical dialogue. Visoka and Doyle define this also as “neo-functional peace” and refers to the civilian crisis management capability of the EU (Visoka and Doyle, 2016). Bergmann and Niemann (2018) agree with Visoka and Doyle concerning the spillover effect that could contribute to the integration in the external policy of the EU. Moreover, CBSD is another contemporary example demonstrating further integration and coherence in the security and defense area. Through CBSD, the EU aims to fund the equipment and infrastructure of the armed forces of the EU Member States (Bergmann, 2019). As a result of the decision of all EU institutions, the CBSD was put into practice under the IcSP, which is a financial instrument of the development policy. By doing this, the EU will provide training, equipment, and infrastructure to the armed forces under the decision-making of the European Commission. Therefore, the Commission accessed the supranational power in EU’s security affairs and opened a way to use the EU’s budget in funding the armed forces. Therefore, the CBSD initiative fits neofunctionalism's functional and cultivated spillover logics (Bergmann, 2019).

Finally, increasing tension and unforeseen crises in the world affairs forwarded the EU to take further actions in security and defense issues. For instance, concerning the case of PESCO,
the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, inner security threats, Trump’s speech claiming that NATO was obsolete and Brexit, have driven the EU for further integration in the military realm. Since the EU has seen that it cannot trust NATO for security and current European integration is also unescapable in the security and defense realm. It is obvious that a spillover could not happen in the security and defense area easily; however, the start for permanent and structural integration in the European defense sector the EU has given cannot also be underestimated.

5. Conclusion

This article has attempted to show that even the pauses in further integration efforts in the defense security and defense issues take place, the EU is continuing to follow a possessed path going to a common security and defense policy. The ESDP is always one of the most significant policies of the EU for shaping both foreign relations and the integration process. The 1998 St. Malo Declaration was a beginning for the EU realizing that the security and defense issues should be handled more seriously. After security and defense issues have become more important due to political developments since the beginning of 2000s, the ESDP has started to move towards the CSDP. The Lisbon Treaty’s provisions on security and defense such as the mutual defense clause, and broadening the crisis management operations, the enhanced cooperation on defense, the PESCO, and the solidarity clause have important contributions in this progress. Moreover, from ESDP to CSDP and today’s new initiatives, the EU has taken good steps for further integration. Although new tools brought by the Lisbon Treaty like mutual defense and solidarity clauses and new initiatives which aim to move the CSDP one step further such as EUGS, PESCO, and EDF could lead to long-term results in bolstering the EU’s defense capabilities, EU Member States are willing and able to cooperate efficiently in research and acquiring new military capabilities.

Although this paper argues that neofunctionalist spillover largely accounts for the progress of European Defense and Security Policy for further integration so far, neofunctionalism could also explain the disintegration. It means that spillback which means moving back from integration by sectoral or institutional means could also be debatable under the neofunctionalism which means that pauses in further integration effort in the defense security and defense issues are also in the scope of neofunctionalism. Finally, it should be underlined that the author knows the difficulties what this study aims to show since it is early to comment on the results of new initiatives within the EU. Besides, the division between Ei2 and PESCO makes the EU Members skeptical towards a common security and defense policy. Still, this study assumes that the evolution of the CSDP up to the present is meaningful from neofunctionalist point of view.

Researchers’ Contribution Rate Statement
I am a single author of this paper. My contribution is 100%.

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There is no potential conflict of interest in this study.
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