POLITICS AS PERSONAL FREEDOM: AN ANALYSIS OF MAX WEBER’S SPEECH “POLITICS AS A VOCATION”

Abstract

This article covers research devoted to the concept of politics articulated in Max Weber’s speech “Politics as a Vocation”. The article is divided into three parts. The first part highlights the historical and occasional contexts of the speech. In the second part, the three definitions of politics given by Weber are sequentially studied and linked with each other; then the picture of the politics of the immediate future is partially reconstructed in which politics as freedom is associated with domination or with the fight for domination. In the third part, an assumption is made on whom Weber sees as a politician of not the immediate but of the distant future, a politician in the highest sense of this word, whom Weber calls a “hero”.

Keywords: Max Weber, politics, individual, freedom, domination, hero.

Introduction

The political thought of Max Weber has always attracted researchers’ attention. That is why nowadays we have a great variety of opinions and debates on what it really consists of and what its aspects are. Furthermore, still, many researchers, in one way or another, try to put Weber’s thought into clear concepts and some simple (clichéd) frameworks, labelling him as a “liberal” (Mommsen, 1989, p. 23; Eliaeson, 1991, p. 319; Beetham, 1974, p. 238), “democrat” (Mayer, 1944, p. 72; Cherniss, 2016, p. 708), “nationalist” (Slavnic, 2004, p. 8) and “machiavellist” (Filipkowski, 2015, p. 47; Kalyvas, 2008, p. 33; Conrad, 1984, pp. 169-192; Lassman, 2000, p. 98). However, almost all of them have to give explanations and additions to these labels, because Weber rarely turns out to be just a “liberal” (Löwith, 1993, p. 45)\(^1\), just a “democrat” (Klein, 2017, pp. 179-192), just a “machiavellist” (Sung Ho, 2004, pp. 111-117) or just a “nationalist”\(^2\). That is in addition to the fact that Weber’s value relativism is universally recognised. It seems that all these facts make numerous attempts to identify his ideological position somewhat unproductive. As for Weber’s political thought, i.e. works in which it is reflected, the majority of modern researchers concerned with it is dedicated to cross-source analysis of his political ethics (Slavnic, 2004, pp. 2-19; O’Donovan, 2011, pp. 84-105; Nelson & Colen, 2015, pp. 205-216; Carella, 2016, pp. 266-285; Cherniss, 2016, pp. 705-718). However, despite their significant number and variety, most of them are focused on the concept of the two ethics taken from Weber’s speech “Politics as a Vocation”. Besides, they

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\(^1\) Eliaeson (1991) even tries to combine Liberal-Weber and Nationalist-Weber (p. 319).

\(^2\) The idea of Weber’s “nationalism” is subjected to serious criticism (Palonen, 2001, pp. 196-214).
systematically set aside the question of what the term “politics” – which Weber is trying to define in this speech – means. They also ignore the fact that this work was initially a public speech. This means that it has a particular historical context, target audience, specific goal and tasks. Thus, one should take into account that public speeches have their own limitations and specific attributes required by the genre. It is obvious that in a public speech, an author will try to avoid, for example, using notions from his categorical apparatus that are unfamiliar or alien to the audience. On the contrary, he will emphasise his ideas via references to “popular” ideas or concepts already familiar to the audience. He will try to simplify his theoretical constructions, thereby highlighting and intensifying the message they contain, etc. That is why in this work it seems to be appropriate to try, on the one hand, to cover the aspects mentioned above of Weber’s speech, though without making any attempts to adjust the concept covered in it to fit clear ideological frameworks. On the other hand, it seems to be appropriate to study the given definition of politics and its implications and try to see its possible influence on subsequent historical events.

The Context of the Speech

Before discussing the historical and occasional contexts of the speech, it seems reasonable to clarify its place among Weber’s works, thus having partially actualised the reason for appealing to it. During his life, Weber made several public speeches; some of them can be loosely called historically relevant. These are the speeches that in many respects were related to the situation current for Weber. The other part can be loosely called conceptual, as those speeches are connected to the disclosure of Weber’s theoretical studies. “Politics as a Vocation” belongs rather to the second group. In fact, it represents “the definitive statement of Weber’s political thought” (O’Donovan, 2011, p. 91). The speech “Politics as a Vocation” was delivered in January 1919. In June 1920 Weber died, not having completed his fundamental work “Economy and Society” (Roth, 1978, p. lxvi). That is why “Politics as a Vocation” represents the highest point of Weber’s career and thought, his “last word” regarding politics. Attempts to use the unfinished work to clarify or “enrich” it seems to be unfounded. Because it is unfinished, thoughts that are presented (and not presented) in it remain questionable even to the author himself. As for his earlier works, appealing to them can help trace the evolution of Weber’s ideas. However, their completion can be found in “Politics as a Vocation”. So these earlier works remain secondary to it, and the ideas reflected in them are secondary to the ideas laid out in the speech. Thus, appealing only to “Politics as a Vocation”, without comparing it to Weber’s other works, can be considered appropriate.

The speech “Politics as a Vocation” was delivered to the students of the University of Munich in Bavaria at the request of the “Free Students’ Union” (Freistudentische Bund) on January 1919.
ary 28, 1919 (Roth & Schluchter, 1979, p. 114). This speech is historically placed between the November Revolution of 1918 – which in Bavaria is closely connected with the name of the future Prime Minister of the Bavarian Republic, Marxist Kurt Eisner – and a brief transformation of Bavaria into a Soviet republic in April 1919, which, in turn, is connected with the murder of Eisner. Weber gave this speech at the crucial moment when Germany, defeated in World War I, found itself at a crossroads between liberal democracy, Soviet dictatorship, and – as we know now – national socialism. He addressed people who, in one way or another, would later make a decision in favour of one of these alternatives. In this sense, Weber’s influence (and in this speech he made statements against both liberal democracy and revolutionary socialism) cannot be overestimated and can be traced.

At first, when the “Freistudentische Bund” asked Weber to give the second speech (the first one was called “Science as a Vocation” and was delivered at the same place in 1917), he refused. Nevertheless, he changed his attitude towards this offer as soon as he found out that he would perhaps be replaced by Kurt Eisner. He agreed to speak in order to prevent Eisner’s speech (Roth & Schluchter, 1979, p. 113; Muller, 2011, p. 8) because he knew that the “Free Students’ Union” was a left-leaning organisation (Roth & Schluchter, 1979, p. 115).

In his speech, Weber (2009) refused to tell the students what should be done now (p. 77) and instead concentrated on theoretical questions. The fact that Weber delivered his speech to the students, the majority of whom could be unfamiliar with his works or concepts developed by him, made him – as he was “a great orator” (Mayer, 1944, p. 74) – keep silent about them and refer to the conceptual apparatus and rhetorical techniques corresponding to his tasks.

What is Politics?

Weber (2009) starts with a promise to explain “what politics as a vocation means and what it can mean” (p. 77). In other words, he starts by separating actual and potential (that is, by separating what politics is from what it should be) (Machiavelli, 1980, XV). There are three definitions of politics given in the speech – two of them at the very beginning of the speech and one at the very end of it; two actual definitions and one potential definition; two rather clear definitions and one vague definition. The first two definitions can be figuratively called “broad” and “narrow”, while the last one appears to be almost “metaphysical”.

The first “broad” definition of politics describes it as an “independent leadership in action” (Weber, 2009, p. 77). This definition, at first sight, seems to be as transparent as possible. When performing any action, a person is either a leader or a subordinate. This means that either he decides what to do by himself or someone else decides it for him. A description of this definition of politics best suits the basic view of freedom as an unlimited activity (Kalyvs, 2008, p. 31). However, it has some select properties. Firstly, just like a person who cannot lead himself is being led by others, a person who can lead himself leads others. This can be seen most clearly in the case of an important or major goal: in order to reach a significant goal, a person has to involve other people in the process of its attainment, has to take control over them and thereby limit the fulfilment of their significant goals (Honigsheim, 2003, pp. 109-110). This is dictated by the very nature of goals: significant goals require the involvement of a large number of people for their...
achievement, though only one person is needed to set such goals.

Thus, the presence of other people – society – inevitably results in the expansion of possibilities for personal freedom. The higher the number of people being led by one person, the more total is the nature of his leadership and the more individual freedom this person obtains. Weber literally takes his audience back to the antique – dialectical – understanding of freedom as the one that cannot exist without its opposite phenomenon, that grounds on it and grows along with it. Secondly, politics always carries an inevitable and unsolvable conflict (Brubaker, 1991, p. 112). Though this conflict is a value conflict (Bruun, 2007, pp. 244-245; Gane, 1997, p. 558), it is grounded not in values (that define human goals) but in the desire of a person to set goals independently, i.e. lead himself (and thereby others). This conflict is so essential and at the same time so dangerous to society that it implements into itself the only resource that can put an end to it, which is able, as it seems to be nowadays, to give the maximum amount of freedom to a person. That resource turns out to be physical violence. Ultimately, only it enables the free person to subjugate people and lead them. This resource is historically accumulated and monopolised by different forms of political union, the latest of which is the modern state (Weber, 2009, pp. 77-78).

The ability of a state to dispose the “right” to apply physical violence Weber calls the “power”, and using it he gives the second “narrow” definition of politics. Therefore, politics in its “narrow” sense turns out to be “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power” (Weber, 2009, p. 78). The state actually turns out to be a tool of the “relation of men dominating men” (Weber, 2009, p. 78), i.e. according to them, the quotation is dated January 17, 1918, although Trotsky said these words on January 1, 1918. Secondly, when trying to give context to this quotation, they considered only the quotation itself and nothing else. But Trotsky (as well as M. Hoffmann and R. von Kühlmann - members of the German delegation in Brest-Litovsk) returns to the subject several times: on January 1, 17, and 18. On the 1st of January he says: “The general [M. Hoffmann] was quite right when he said that our government is based on force. So far we have known only such governments. So as long as society consists of warring classes, the state will necessarily remain the instrument of force and will have to resort to violence.” On January 17, Trotsky corrects his words: “Here I must mention the statement of the chairman of the German delegation [R. von Kühlmann] – which, if newspapers have provided correct information, he has also made in the main commission of the German Reichstag – that I have twice said that the existing Russian government is based solely on force. I must say that those governments that are based solely on force will never admit it . . . I acknowledge that in the existing society – in which there are separate class groups – our government is, of course, based also on force; yet we use that force in a way that in our opinion corresponds to the interests of the classes we represent.” On January 18, Trotsky corrects his words once more: “Every state is an organized force. The question is what kind of idea is being materialized in the state”. (Ioffe, 1920, pp. 102, 137, 140). Thirdly, they miss the fact that Weber actually could quote Trotsky from the words of von Kühlmann (Ioffe, 1920, p. 138) or Hoffmann (Ioffe, 1920, pp. 94–95). Fourthly, even if Weber quotes Trotsky from hearsay, he is not wrong. As a Marxist, Trotsky knows that a state is always a tool of class oppression and that in the classless society which he strives for, there is no place for a state. And finally, it is not the correctness or incorrectness of the quotation that matters, but its purpose. The audience that leans to the left will take Weber’s ideas much better if it finds out that the Marxist leader of the Russian Revolution agrees with him. That is why this quotation is the first one to appear in the speech. It is followed by a quotation from “Thus Spoke Zarathustra” by F. Nietzsche, one of the most popular works among educated Germans of that time, at least among those who leaned to the right (Aschlheim, 1990, pp. 128-163).
a relation between free and non-free people or more free and less free people\textsuperscript{11}, “supported by means of legitimate violence” (Weber, 2009, p. 78).

Thus, in his search for the ultimate modern source of the resource of people’s domination over other people, i.e. a resource of freedom, independent leadership, Weber finds it in a state with its “specific” means of legitimate violence (Kalyvas, 2008, p. 30). And if in the broad sense politics turns out to be freedom, in the narrow sense it turns out to be a fight for freedom, i.e. for the resource of freedom. At the same time, it becomes clear that though the fight over the resource of freedom (in the modern world in particular) is a collective one, i.e. a fight of organised groups of people (cliques, parties, nations, unions of nations), politics, strictly speaking, remains purely individual. In any group of people, especially in one that is in a state of fight (or any other purposeful activity), there is a hierarchy (for example, in the process of giving orders and executing them, or planning and implementing, or simple subordination, etc.)\textsuperscript{12}, which in turn implies the existence of a peak, i.e. a person whose will is being implemented by this group of people in one way or another\textsuperscript{13}. As has already been mentioned, the state is a settled relation between free and non-free people or freer and less free people.

Weber, defining a state within the “narrow” definition of politics, turns to the question of how the domination of people over people – i.e. legitimate domination – is organised: how a non-free (less free) person voluntarily submits to a free one and tolerates violence or a threat of violence from him. Moreover, Weber tries to take the side of the former: how does a non-free person explain to himself his voluntary submission? What are the reasons for the absence of his freedom? Weber gives three answers\textsuperscript{14}: tradition, charisma and rationality. Just like any other classification, this one simultaneously clarifies its subject and obscures it. This classification is misleading on several levels, firstly, regarding the division of time into the past-present-future. One gets the impression that the “traditional” type of domination is not only rooted but also located in the past. At the same time, the “legal” or “bureaucratic” type, which has appeared recently and is actively spreading now, belongs to the present.

Moreover, finally, the “charismatic” type of domination in the context of the whole speech (especially its ending) appears to be turned to the future. This simple picture collapses as soon as Weber notices that: (1) the “charismatic” type of domination not only belongs to the past – along with the present and the future – but also appears to precede the “traditional” type of domination, as a result of the inevitable appearance of a tradition from charisma; (2) then it becomes clear that the presence or absence of the “bureaucratic” type of domination, according to Weber’s point of view, is not a matter of choice: the bureaucracy has come to replace the tradition and will remain in its place. Here is an essential choice offered by Weber (2009) to his listeners: a bureaucracy without a leader or a bureaucracy with a leader (p. 113). So, he does not offer any choice at all. Secondly, “in reality”, domination is provided not by these types, but rather by “highly robust motives of fear and hope” (Weber, 2009, p. 79) – fear of punishment and hope of reward.

\textsuperscript{11} Obviously, there are such goals which even a chained slave is able to set.

\textsuperscript{12} It is in this position that one can often find modern criticism of democratic parliamentarism in general (Schmitt, 2000).

\textsuperscript{13} In this sense, although one group can “rule” other groups, it cannot be free (Weber, 2009, p. 78).

\textsuperscript{14} They have been thoroughly studied. Among the latest works dedicated to this issue, we can mention a book by Benno Netelenbos (2016).
Thirdly, pure types, as always happens with any classifications, seldom occur in practice, but rather are combined with each other (as already mentioned above) (Weber, 2009, p. 79).

Now, the picture of the relation of the “broad” and “narrow” definitions of politics seems to become clear. Striving for independent leadership inevitably results in a conflict between people. Physical violence appears to be the only resource for “resolving” this unresolvable conflict and thereby for gaining freedom. The most effective tool for the use of physical violence, and thus the domination of some people over the other in modern conditions, is the state. In particular, this is because it monopolises the legitimate, i.e. unreciprocated, “fair” or “just” (for all participants of the domination) violence, which, in turn, is legitimated by one of the discussed methods. This way, a desire to be free in the full sense turns out to be a fight for a tool of domination in the narrow sense, i.e. what Weber (2009) calls “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power” (p. 78). Nevertheless, this picture collapses as soon as Weber reaches the end of the speech and gives the last one, the third definition of politics.

When speaking of imposing the responsibility for starting World War I on Germany, i.e. of admitting moral guilt (which will soon grow into a discussion of the two ethics and morality in politics), Weber (2009) refutes the Machiavellian approach to this problem (p. 118) and accepts the Nietzschean point of view rejecting the resentment or the “spirit of revenge” (p. 118). This idea in a surprising but inevitable way leads him to the conclusion that the politician’s work lies “in the future and the responsibility towards the future” (Weber, 2009, p. 118). This conclusion reveals itself in the third one and the final definition of politics that remains without the necessary explanations. “Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards” (Weber, 2009, p. 128). This “metaphysical”, the vague definition could probably be ignored or called romantic, as it is reminiscent of the ending of “The Prince”. However, it would be wrong to ignore not the initial definition of politics but the final one. Besides, Weber (2009) himself has just condemned political romanticism (pp. 119-120), so it does not seem to be reasonable to reject this definition as a “romantic” one without close analysis.

Now it seems appropriate to consider all the definitions. Weber, when speaking about freedom at the very beginning of the speech, in the first definition, implies, on the one hand, a gradation or hierarchy of freedom. On the other hand, the implementation of any significant or crucial goal requires coordinated efforts of a high number of people, and therefore their submission to it. Thus, the growth of freedom can be seen as the increase in the number of people subordinating to a single will. The more people “at the disposal” of a free person, the more freedom, i.e. the ability to set and implement his own goals, he has. This is why violence and the state are required (as discussed before). However, such an

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15 This is quite a transparent reference to T. Hobbes (1949, Power, V, 1). And from him - to the first political philosopher of charisma - Thucydides, to whom Weber (2009) refers himself (p. 96).
16 Cf. (Weber, 2009, p. 116) where politics is seen clearly wider than power alone.
17 “A nation forgives if its interests have been damaged, but no nation forgives if its honor has been offended”. Cf. N. Machiavelli (1880, XVII): “Men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their inheritance”.
18 Cf. F. Nietzsche’s Thus spoke Zarathustra (1969, II, 20). On the Nietzsche’s influence on Weber see B. Turner’s (2009) article (pp. xxvii-xxx).
19 Weber (2009) talks about it directly when he describes the process of power centralization that has given life to the modern state (pp. 82, 105-106).
approach strictly limits politics. Freedom of the person is limited by two dimensions: (1) space – the number of people in his state or, ultimately, the number of people on the planet; and (2) time – the time of his life (or, rather, the remaining time of his life). The desire to achieve the maximum amount of freedom sets the hardest question: how to overcome these limitations? How to conquer space is a question that has little to do with political philosophy, as it is rather a tactical one. The question concerning political philosophy directly is how to conquer time. In other words: how to make one’s power last longer than one’s own life. When giving an answer to this question, Weber begins to speak of “the responsibility towards the future”. The formulation of the problem of domination over future generations on its own rejects the second, “narrow” definition of politics. This is because it is impossible to apply physical violence to people who have not been born yet. Physical violence, “politics” that implies it, and its tool – the state – are unable to overcome the time barrier. So, what should imply the politics that is able to do so? And what should a politician not connected directly to either physical violence or the state be like? It seems that the last part of the speech is dedicated precisely to this question, as Weber (2009) ends it with his mysterious definition of politics and with the last name of a politician – the word “hero” (p. 128).

Who is a “Hero”? 

The charismatic type of domination, according to Weber (2009), excels over the other two types. As has already been mentioned, this type of domination is universal concerning time and space (p. 80), while the other two types cannot be considered as such. In contrast to the “tradition” and “legality”, charisma is unconditional: it comes from the charismatic leader himself, his personality and qualities (Weber, 2009, p. 79). In this type of domination, motives of political actions (fear and hope) arising from the belief in the personality and qualities of a leader are associated directly with the figure of the leader, and not with “tradition” or “rationality”. Thus, the submission of other people to him – the distinctive feature of the leader – is purely individual, as charisma cannot be transferred. In other words, in this type of domination, its source and user is the same person. As a result, the charismatic leader gets a unique possibility, unobtainable for other types of domination: the ability to completely change or reestablish the political order.

Weber names three forms of the charismatic type of domination: a prophet, an elected warlord, and a demagogue. He focuses his attention on the latter due to the context of the speech. In a broad sense, he speaks to Europeans, and “the demagogue is peculiar to the Mediterranean culture. Furthermore, political leadership in the form of the parliamentary ‘party leader’ has grown on the soil of the constitutional state, which is also indigenous only to the Occident” (Weber, 2009, p. 80). In a narrow sense, he delivers his speech to the citizens of the republic, and not to the zealots or a raiding party. There is no point for Weber to speak about the figures of the prophet and the warlord:

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20 This statement also applies to the “freedom of the people”. The “free” people - the dominating people (Weber, 2009, p. 78). Cf. N. Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy (1998, XLVI).

21 He is “elected” because this status cannot be inherited, i.e. traditional.

22 Whether in the role of a “plebiscitary ruler,” a demagogue, or a party leader.

23 That is why he does not speak of the prophet, although he is much more interested in him, as in his opinion he “represents the most rigorous form of charisma” (Klein, 2017, p. 189).
his audience is interested only in the figure of the leader-demagogue.

Unlike the other forms of charismatic domination, the domination of the leader-demagogue seems to have only one basic expression: “the spoken or the written word” (Weber, 2009, pp. 95, 96, 107). The leader-demagogue ensures his domination, first of all, by the spoken word (Weber, 2009, p. 101). This word does not imply tactics or a strategy or, to put it more clearly, an order; it is being said not for “internal use”, not in front of a “clique”. This word is spoken in front of the people’s assembly (Weber, 2009, pp. 76, 96). It is the popular word, the word that, first of all, transmits values. The leader-demagogue rules by implanting new values in people (Klein, 2017, p. 189; Nietzsche, 1969, I, 12; II, 12, 18). Weber (2009) firstly speaks about the role of lawyers (pp. 94, 96), and then about the role of journalists (p. 96) as the leaders of plebiscitary democracy (p. 96) by the spoken word. All of them are thinkers or, in the current context, political thinkers who are directly connected with the masses (whether in court or the mass media)\(^{24}\).

Later, when speaking about the personal qualities of the leader-demagogue, Weber proceeds to a discussion of the two ethics: the “ethic of conviction” and the “ethic of responsibility”. This discussion partly arises within the context of consideration of the three key qualities of a politician: passion, feeling of responsibility, and sense of proportion (Weber, 2009, p. 115). According to Weber (2009), passionate dedication to a cause is directly associated with “responsibility to it” (p. 115). In other words, Weber relieves a leader of responsibility to the masses, the voters, the party, the laws, the country, etc. “Responsibility to a cause” is actually a responsibility to the way the cause is being understood, to the person who sees it as the cause, to the person who has determined that it is the cause. But Weber (2009) directly says that a leader’s cause “is a matter of faith” (p. 117), thus stating that ultimately a leader’s cause is determined by the leader himself. Personal freedom leads to individual responsibility (Weber, 2009, p. 95) towards oneself as the highest authority\(^{25}\). Only a free person can judge himself by the criteria that he himself has selected. How a leader can achieve it, Weber calls the “sense of proportion” or the “cool sense of proportion”. The leader’s attempt to combine “passion and sense of proportion” results in the combination of the two ethics: the “ethic of conviction” and the “ethic of responsibility”.

The majority of modern researches, in one way or another, agree that a leader has to find a way to combine them\(^{26}\). However, it should be noted that Weber, in fact, talks not about these two “ethics”, but about the other two: the heroic ethic and the non-heroic ethic. That is, about the ethics of those who are able to combine “passion and cool sense of proportion” while being politicians (Weber, 2009, p. 127)\(^{27}\) and those who are not able to do so and therefore act on a different ethical level.

**Conclusion**

When placing Max Weber’s speech in the historical context of its present and immediate past, we should not forget about the context of its immediate future. Weber definitely wanted his

\(^{24}\) According to Weber (2009), they are opposed to parties’ bosses and chefs that exist in a strictly private field, “behind closed doors” (pp. 109-110).

\(^{25}\) See as Weber (2009) calls irresponsibility the deadly sin of a politician (p. 116). Cf. N. O’Donovan’s (2011) article (p. 88).

\(^{26}\) We will not consider this matter in detail as there is a huge number of good works dedicated to it.

\(^{27}\) Most likely, in this matter, Weber also appeals to Machiavelli (1901, pp. 406-407).
speech to influence the audience; he wanted to show listeners the foundations and limitations of freedom. Looking at it retrospectively, we should admit: he has succeeded, if not in predetermination, then certainly in forecasting the outcome of the plebiscitary democracy with a demagogue-leader for Germany. But if it is true, then did he not want to dominate by the spoken word, did he not want to take the responsibility towards the future? Be that as it may, his definition of politics has taken its rightful place in the minds of politicians and in the history of political philosophy.

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