On seat allocation problem with multiple merit lists

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Abstract

In this note, we present a simpler algorithm for joint seat allocation problem in case there are two or more merit lists. In case of two lists (the current situation for Engineering seats in India), the running time of the algorithm is proportional to sum of running time for two separate (delinked) allocations. The algorithm is straightforward and natural and is not (at least directly) based on deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley. Each person can only move higher in his or her preference list. Thus, all steps of the algorithm can be made public. This will improve transparency and trust in the system.

1 Introduction

In India seats in Engineering colleges are filled based on two different tests—JEE (advanced) and JEE (main). JEE (advanced) merit lists is used for courses in I.I.T.s (Indian Institute of Technology) and JEE (main) list is used for courses in other centrally funded colleges. First preference of most students is some popular course (currently Computer Science) in an I.I.T.. After the two merit lists are prepared, students get a window of few days to fill up their individual combined preferences. Thus, the time taken to input individual preference lists by students can be ignored.

There is also reservation based on social and economic criteria. A fraction of seats in each course is reserved, and these seats (for all practical purposes) can only be filled by persons of that category. However, in case persons in reserved category do better, then they can also opt for general or unreserved seats.

In addition, to ensure that number of female candidates are adequately represented, additional supernumerary seats are created. Thus, if number of female students who get admission in a course is $x$ instead of desired number $y$, \( \min\{0, y - x\} \) extra seats are created. These can only be filled by female candidates.

Baswana et.al.[1,2] have described a method to implement this based on the “deferred acceptance” (DA) algorithm of Gale and Shapley[3], with some ad hoc heuristics to take care of supernumerary seats.

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In this note, we present a simpler algorithm for joint seat allocation problem in case there is more than one merit list. In case of two lists, the running time of the algorithm is proportional to sum of running time for two separate (delinked) allocations. The algorithm is straightforward and natural and is not (at least directly) based on differed allocation algorithm of Gale and Shapley[3]. In particular, there is no “deallocation” (only empty seats or seats which become empty are filled). Each person can only move higher in his or her preference list (i.e., it is monotone). Thus, all steps of the algorithm can be made public. This will improve transparency and trust in the system.

The problem of more than two merit lists is discussed in Section 3. We look at issues associated with reservation in Section 3.1. Supernumerary seats are discussed in Section 3.2. We ignore the problem of ties, for simplicity.

1.1 Simpler Problems

Let us first look at a simpler problem, when there is only one merit list, say \( L \).

The “obvious” algorithm is:

Look at each person in turn from the best ranked person to the worst in \( L \)

If \( i \)th person is being looked at, we look at his/her preferences (from most preferred course to the worst) and assign the first course which has not been completely filled.

If \( i \)th person gets \( p_i \)th preference, then the time taken by the algorithm is \( O(m + \sum p_i) \); here \( m \) is the total number of courses. We are assuming that there may be courses which no person is interested in.

Let us, next consider the case, when there are two merit lists, say \( L_1 \) and \( L_2 \), but students are allocated courses independently. If \( i \)th person gets preference \( p_i \) based on \( L_1 \) and gets preference \( q_i \) based on list \( L_2 \). The time taken for the first allocation (using an algorithm similar to the one list case) will be \( O(m_1 + \sum p_i) \); here \( m_1 \) is the total number of courses in which admission is based on \( L_1 \). And the time for the second allocation will be \( O(m_2 + \sum q_i) \); here \( m_2 \) is the total number of courses in which admission is based on \( L_2 \). Or, the total time is \( T = O(m + \sum p_i + \sum q_i) \), where \( m = m_1 + m_2 \).

2 Joint Allocation

Next let us look at the original problem. Without loss of generality, we assume that most candidates have highest preferences for colleges in \( L_1 \) list (say popular courses in I.I.T.s where admission is made based on JEE (advanced)).

At high level the algorithm is in two steps:

- Do allocation based on the first list (ignoring the preferences based on the other list).
- Then look at persons, in order of merit, in the second list. If any person can get a more preferred course from the second list, then that person is assigned that course. His seat is offered to the next (in order of merit) interested person; the process is repeated for the newly created vacant seat.
Let us look at each step in more detail.

2.1 First Step

The first step is basically doing allocation using only list $L_1$ (for colleges which use list $L_1$), but with some additional book-keeping.

for each $L_1$-list rank $i$ in turn (from best to worst do)

We go down the $i$th list only looking at courses where admission is done on basis of $L_1$.

1. If a course at $j$th preference is completely filled, we put $i$ in the waiting list of $j$th course. Each waiting list is a queue (first in first out, usual queue).

2. Else, we allot the $j$th course (say one at $p_i$th position) and look at the next person.

The time taken for $i$th person is still $O(p_i)$.

Remark 1. If $i$th person gets $p_i$th preference, he is added in waiting lists of courses which are his 1, 2, ..., $p_i - 1$ preference.

Remark 2. Instead of storing full record for each person in the queue (waiting lists), we only store a pointer to that person.

Remark 3. For each person, we also store the preference number which is currently allotted. Thus, we can find the course allotted to a person in $O(1)$ time.

Remark 4. When a person is inputting his/her preference, in addition to storing the combined preference, we also store the $L_1$ and $L_2$ preference in separate lists (in addition to combined priority lists).

Eg:  

| Preference | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Course     | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| $L_1$ or $L_2$ | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 |

Then we store the first two lines in joint preference list and also store (preference in list, overall preference number, course):

$L_1$ list: (1,1,A), (2,2,B), (3,3,C), (4,5,E)

$L_2$ list: (1,4,D), (2,6,F), (3,7,G)

Hence, in Step 1, no time is “wasted” in looking at preferences in $L_2$.

2.2 Second Step

In the second step we check if some $L_2$ list course has higher preference than the course currently allotted.

for each $L_2$-list rank $i$ in turn (from best to worst do)

We go down the $i$th list

1. If first $L_2$ list preference is lower (less preferred) than the course allotted, look at the next person in the list.
2. If a course at \( j \)th preference is completely filled, we put \( i \) in waiting list for the \( j \)th course. Each waiting list is again a queue.

Remark: This step is required in case there are more than two lists, or when we allow a student to withdraw, otherwise, this step is not required.

3. Else, if the \( j \)th preference course is more preferred than the course currently allotted we allot the \( j \)th preference course(say \( q_i \)).

Remark: Time for this step is again \( O(q_i) \).

4. The earlier \( L_1 \)-list course of \( i \) is offered to the first person (say \( c_1 \)) in the waiting list for that course (say \( D_1 \)). In case, the course currently allotted to \( c_1 \) is more preferred (by \( c_1 \)), we let \( c_1 \) be the next person in the waiting list of \( D_1 \). The process is repeated until either we find a person (lets us also call him \( c_1 \)) in waiting list of \( D_1 \) who wants to take \( D_1 \), or the waiting list gets exhausted.

Course earlier allotted to \( c_1 \) (say \( D_2 \)) is similarly offered to the first person (say \( c_2 \)) in waiting list for \( D_2 \), and so on, until a person who did not had a course allotted is encountered, or there is no person in waiting list for that course.

Remark: As we are only going down on each waiting list, the time taken over the entire algorithm can not be more than the sum of length of all waiting lists. If a person \( i \) gets course of priority \( p_i \) in Step 1, \( i \) is in \( (p_i - 1) \) waiting lists. Or total length of all waiting lists is \( O(\sum p_i) \).

As each person after reallocation gets a course which is higher in his/her preference list, there are no cycles. Time taken for Step 2 is \( O(m + \sum q_i + \sum p_i) \). Or total time is \( O(T) \), the same (up to a constant multiplicative factor) as for two separate allocations.

For correctness, observe that as allocation in first step is done in order of merit, a person with lower rank cannot get what a higher ranked person failed to get.

In second step, as waiting lists are in decreasing order of merit, a vacant seat will be first assigned to the highest ranked person (who could not get it).

Remark: The method can also be used in case, we permit a student to withdraw. If a person withdraws, the next person in the waiting list is offered that course.

3 More than two lists

Let us next consider the case when there are more than two lists. Assume that there are three lists. We run the algorithm of Section 2 based on first two lists and do the allocation. Then in third step (which will be same as the second step), we use the third list (say) \( L_3 \) instead of \( L_2 \).

For correctness, we have already seen that after allocation in second step, a person with lower rank in list \( L_1 \) (respectively, \( L_2 \)) cannot get what a course which a person higher ranked in \( L_1 \) (\( L_2 \)) failed to get.

In third step, as waiting lists are in decreasing order of merit, a vacant seat will be first assigned to the highest ranked person in appropriate merit list (who could not get it).

The process can clearly be generalised to more than three lists.
3.1 Reservation

We will assume that set of persons in any reserved list form an ordered sub-sequence of persons in the full (un-reserved) list. Thus, if person $A$ is better ranked than $B$ in $L_1$-general or unreserved list, then $A$ is also better ranked than $B$ in the $L_1$-reserved list.

We replace each preference of persons in reserved list by a pair of preferences:

(preference $i$, course $j$) is replaced by pairs

(preference $2i - 1$, course $j$, unreserved) and
(preference $2i$, course $j$, reserved)

We then run the algorithm as before. It is straightforward to take care of nested reservations (like physically challenged students in reserved category).

3.2 Supernumerary Seats

In step 1, when a course gets filled, we add necessary additional supernumerary seats (say based on gender). As in each iteration, we only need to know whether a seat is still vacant or not (and not the total number of vacant seats), supernumerary seats can be treated as “reservation” and number of seats in the category can change as the algorithm progresses.

There are some obvious changes. If in Step 2, a female candidate in gender-neutral category vacates a seat, an additional supernumerary seat has to be created. This seat is also filled as before.

We can also use the heuristics proposed in [1,2]

Disclaimer

Neither author is associated with seat allocation process in India.

References

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