Original Paper

The Cusp of Being: Further Studies on the Becoming of Being

and Its Relationship to Technology

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Abstract

Technological applications must be differentiated from technological preconditions because the former are attributes thereof, but the latter are ontological as essential fundamentals. And this distinction is of the utmost importance for an explanation not only how technology originates, but why it originates. The how of technology is explainable by the relationship between non-being and being, and the why is explainable by the open relationship, expressed as a dependency, within the ontological gap that lies within us. It is this gap or this openness that enables possibilities that lie latent within technology’s non-being to appear as its being, and thereby empowering technology to come into the world, that is, the why posits the how. This understanding reveals the full and unconvoluted meaning of technology because when expressed in this way, it is the equivalent for the totality of human reality that is manifested through human culture. Because technology is fundamental to everything we do, it is by means of our humanity that technology’s non-being is empowered to become what it is.

Keywords
being, non-being, becoming, possibility, technology, openness to being

1. Introduction

The cusp of being is a description of how being is manifested, the edge at which being reveals what it is. It is the dimension of change from what is not or what is not yet that may be transformed into what is. It is relevant to being’s totality from the smallest to the largest, from the most minuscule, whether matter or energy, to the universe itself. The cusp of being is a point of transition between what is not into what is, but it is more than a mere turning point because it describes the entire realm of what could be. It is the juxtaposition of non-being and being, the “residence” of the “place” of being that is not yet being. The cusp of being relates to all of reality, signifying the totality of what can be as it “resides” in
what is not. Because the cusp of being starts with non-being, it is with the latter where we will begin our analysis. The cusp of being should give us a feeling of wonder, and where there is wonder, there is the beginning of wondering why.

We should acknowledge that non-being is the foundation of creativity, the ground of human reality, the well of everything humanly possible. It is no irony to say that non-being is as important as being. It is necessary for the being of being, concluding that there can be no being without non-being, and no non-being without being. Non-being is not contrary to being, but is different from it.

If non-being is anywhere, it must be within being. It cannot be outside being because it cannot be disconnected from it. It may seem paradoxical that being contains non-being, and yet without non-being there would be no being. The adhesive between non-being and being is becoming because the latter is where non-being and being converge. Becoming is the ground not only where being springs forth, but also where non-being lies hidden. Both are to be found within a convergence of what may be described as something and nothing. Although being is given precedence over non-being because being encompasses everything that is, nevertheless, non-being cannot be ignored or suppressed when discussing being because being originates from it. Thus, there is a relationship, but not a contradiction, between being and non-being, and that relationship converges in becoming (Rivers, 2016).

Although useful when tied to becoming, without becoming non-being remains an abstraction. Actually, it remains an illusion. Yet there is nothing illusive about non-being, just as there is nothing illusive about imagination. For the sake of argument, we are not concerned with the morality or legality of our imaginative powers, but with our creative capabilities. And that is one reason why non-being is important. It promotes what we can create, prescribes what we desire, enables us to confer existence to what has no being, and sometimes no meaning. In a sense, non-being is more important than being because the latter is limited to what is, but non-being is unlimited. This conclusion is relevant to the reality of the universe and to our own reality. Non-being does not reveal a lack because it contains everything it needs to be. It is the foundation from which everything springs forth.

Since non-being is often a designation for the lack of identity of something, and being is a designation for what is, that is, for a predication of something, then the principal difference between non-being and being is identity, that is, what can be designated for what is (being) and what is designated for what is not (non-being) (Sophist, 1963). If non-being means lack of identification, then being and non-being can be easily distinguished from each other, but they are also essential for each other.

How is it possible to deny what is not on its way to being what is? How is it possible to suppress the revelation of reality before reality becomes? Within the fount of being is everything that can be. Non-being resides within a womb of possibility, gestating into reality, but it is false to say that reality precedes being (Zubiri, 2003). Nevertheless, being precedes its opposite, but being also precedes reality, however reality is perceived.

If everything humanity creates emanates from non-being, then the latter must be emphasized as much as being (Note 1). If non-being is identified as coming from being and is described as an abstraction,
how can non-being be identified as the ground to anything? Therein lies the complexity of describing non-being, but despite its complexity, it can be explained. And an analysis of being should reveal being’s supplement to non-being, but non-being would remain meaningless without becoming, making becoming a procedural step between nothing and something. Rather than becoming needing non-being in order for being to be, non-being needs becoming for being to be. Becoming is an intermediary that is dependent upon what is not. It exists because being is based upon non-being. Where would non-being be posited except within being? And by so doing, non-being is a latency waiting for realization, as latency is used, for example, in engineering that results in a reaction between stimulus and response. Latency contains conditions that are concealed while possessing the ability to be or not to be. It signifies not certainty, but a willingness to transform what is not into what is. If every non-being is waiting for being, then no non-being is different metaphysically from any other. Although different in their nature, all non-beings in so far that they lack being bear the same expectancy for being. Even science in this regard cannot ignore the notion of non-being and should assimilate these ideas with the theories of the origin of the universe.

It is false to say that non-being does not exist without being (sine esse), but it is true to say that non-being exists within being (intus esse). Non-being is not seen, but inferred. Non-being, which is not the opposite of being, lies within being as a latent possibility. Traditionally, a being as being would understandably exist. Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude that a nonexistent being does not exist. This reasoning is Humean, Kantian, and Fregean, but it is irrelevant to the state of the world as we know it. Nevertheless, a nonexistent being would exist if it became existent, and although such a conclusion would be Meinongian, we are not describing things (objects) that do not exist that suddenly do exist and then revert back to non-existence. On the contrary, we are describing things that never existed before that then come into existence for a time having an influence on what is, in fact becoming part of what is (Note 2).

If an existent is engaged with the becoming of being, then it must continually strive to be. It is well-known from existentialism that whatever is cannot become (because it has already attained being), and what becomes cannot be (because it will never attain its completion). One conclusion of this thought is that if a thing has an essence, it has no need to become what that essence is because it already is it. But this thought must be false because the attainment of an essence is the reason for its becoming as well as the condition of its possibility (Gilson, 1952). Being and possibility must in some way be connected to becoming because becoming is caused by both of them. Since what a being might be must also be possible in order to become what it is, as a tadpole becomes a frog, or a caterpillar becomes a butterfly, frogs and butterflies must be tied to their being in order to have both an essence and a possibility. The proof of this reality is the existence of a being and its essence, but existence in itself cannot alter the nature of its existent; it simply reveals what it is. Being and essence are connected to one and the same thing, but these thoughts in themselves are not profound. If there is profundity at
all, it must be with the condition of possibility, as if the latter symbolized the status of non-being in relationship to being.

Non-being is posited within possibility that lies within being that projects to being, but it is not a contradiction that being and non-being can co-exist. Non-being refers to a two-step process: non-being is positioned within possibility, and possibility is positioned within being. To be positioned means to be posited within something without taking up residence there, since to be positioned in this sense should not be confused with being situated within a place. This conclusion indicates that non-being is twice removed from being. Something is or is not, and the connection between them is the possibility of being or the possibility of non-being. Although being is conditioned by possibility, so is non-being. If something exists, it exists because it can exist. If something does not exist, it does not exist because it cannot, or maybe not. Non-being is more uncertain than being because it lies, so to speak, within the possibility that is potential, but not actual. Because non-being is more uncertain than being, it contains the potentiality of being and non-being, activity and non-activity (but not inactivity), presence and non-presence (but not absence). In short, non-being encompasses a greater magnitude.

The negation of what is possible to be is what is possible not to be, and not what is not possible to be, that is, what is possible to be is the opposite of what is not possible to be (De Interpretatione, 1984). Consequently, emphasis should be placed upon possibility because there would be no being without the possibility of its existence. The possibility of existence is merely an aspect of its being (Note 3). Within being is the possibility to be as well as the possibility not to be. Without a connection between what is, what is not, what could be, and what could not be must be possibility. Otherwise, possibility would be hovering somewhere without having a connection to anything. For our purposes, possibility is the most important component of modality. And we are not describing necessary beings that must exist, nor necessarily nonexistent beings that do not exist. We are describing possibility, not necessity, that is, we are concerned with what could happen, not with the unavoidable or inevitable. On the contrary, we are describing contingent beings that actually exist, although they might not. A contingent being is not necessary, but neither is it impossible.

But additional arguments should be mentioned in reference to possibility because Aristotle’s emphasis on impossibility as given in De Interpretatione (22a14-37) is excessive. Rather than emphasizing impossibility that in itself is an affirmation of what cannot be and not a negation of what can be, we should emphasize possibility that in itself is not an affirmation of what can be, but a negation of what cannot be. Therefore, possibilities increase in their significance, not decrease in their lack of meaning. Possibility is both expressed and implied, although not guaranteed. Assumed to be favorable, possibility may be understood as a quality of suitability as well as a capability, a quality of ability as well as a means, a quality of empowerment as well as an assembly of limitations. It concerns what can be without actually doing so, posited as an endless stream of events, cosmic as one example and human as another. The affirmation or negation of anything does not verify options made available to the becoming of being from non-being. In place of emphasizing what cannot be because of impossibility,
becoming emphasizes what can be because of possibility. Becoming is possible through the negation of what cannot be because of the affirmation of what can be. Becoming is always positive, although the effects may be harmful or uncomfortable or “politically incorrect,” but the nature of becoming qua becoming is always affirmative.

We have discussed negation in regard to non-being, and we should emphasize that non-being is simply a negation of what exists. Non-being is more fundamental because being springs forth from it. Nevertheless, negation and non-being seem to express a similarity. A creature from Greek mythology, such as a Cyclops, may be denied as ever existing, but it is still described in literary sources. Although fictitious characters are nonexistent, if they are relevant at all, they are so figuratively, not realistically. Since anything may be imagined, even if it is absurd, its verification in reality should be accepted as proof of its relevance.

Although possibility is not characterized by an openness within being because it is not part of it, it is nevertheless an openness within the latency of being. Since latency may infer potentiality, the notion of possibility relates to the choices of being without having an engagement with them. The potentiality associated with possibility relates to a quality that develops into some kind of activity that when fulfilled leads to actuality. Because a possibility remains no more than a possibility, it takes something more to bring it into being, and that something is the latency that is capable of being, although situated within non-being. Simply described, latency as derived from the Latin infinitive latere means to be concealed or to lie hidden. As immediately described above, the choices of being without having an engagement with them may lead to becoming without inferring actuality, although subject to it when transformed into being. An actual being is a possibility that has materialized because it requires the use of, or is drawn into, or holds the attention of, or obtains the services of, all of which relate to engagement of some kind, but a possibility in itself is basically none of these conditions because it has not attained being.

When referring to non-being, we should also note that there is some similarity between non-being and nothingness because both terms signify the potential source of what later might become something. Although non-being is a more accurate word than nothingness, nothingness is a more accurate word than nothing. Rather than describing non-being as nothing when non-being is not determined as being, it might be better to describe non-being as possibility on its way to being. Nothing remains a description for itself, indicating its inability to attain being. Therefore, non-being and nothing share no similarity because the former might become being whereas the latter is denied it. The result of non-being by means of becoming is being that is the designation for what is when contrasted with everything else. In short, if there is something, it has been transformed into being while leaving nothing behind. Of all these designations, becoming is most important because without it there would truly be nothing. Therefore, we should question Hegel’s conclusion that “becoming is the unseparatedness of being and nothing” (Hegel, 2010). Rather, we should say that becoming is a combination of the
oneness of being and nothingness because nothingness has the potentiality to become something, while nothing remains itself.

Furthermore, nothing should be distinguished from nothingness because nothing is simply a description of a lack of something, although lack (or the state of lacking) does not accurately explain what is meant because there is no term that can do this (Note 4). Because nothingness is frequently associated with human existence, it is a predominantly human concept. The significance of nothingness is its ability to influence being, but this ability is irrelevant to its actuality, although grounded in its possibility, as in Nietzsche’s interpretation of the will of nothingness in the absence of not willing at all. Nothingness remains a description for non-being, thereby allowing it to be associated with the possibilities of being. Since nothingness is limited to the state of being, it is finite (Note 5). In regards to a lack as just noted, it is neither an absence nor a deficiency, neither a want nor a loss, neither a deprivation nor an inadequacy, neither a nullity nor a nonentity. A lack is an openness, but it is constituted by an accessibility that may not be accessible. On the other hand, nothingness is simply a description of a latency. And it is latency that is the deciding factor whether or not something can be real in its reality.

Latency refers to the concealment of something not yet developed, but not real either. It describes what could potentially exist, and it parallels the manifestation of truth as the unconcealment of what lies hidden. Latency is not a presence, but the concealment of what might be. It is with these seemingly ambiguous terms that non-being is relevant, which seems to indicate that the lack of being in non-being is vitally important to being, or to express this thought another way: that which is not is essential to that which is. If these ideas are true, then truth is an openness into the uncertainty of the depth of being. It is no irony to say that this idea illustrates why history is important because it promotes the uncovering of truth from the lateral spiral of being itself.

2. Primary Discussion

We have argued that being is twice removed from non-being, that is, non-being is positioned within possibility, and possibility is positioned within being. The connection between non-being and being is where the becoming of being occurs, and it is transformative of nothing evolving into something. Although non-being might be identified as an unexplainable feature of being, becoming is explainable. More than the idea of change, which often has negative connotations, becoming signifies development of some being, thing, or nature that may represent a difference in constitution, size, or character, to name a few.

The meaning of becoming is associated with energy, with the dynamic force of being, both organic and inorganic, large and small, pushing outward and pulling inward. It symbolizes a winding road, characterized by twists and turns, over bridges and through tunnels into the undisclosed. Expressive of chance, becoming is both kind and cruel, good and bad, knowledgeable and ignorant, rational and irrational. It is the child of possibility, and like possibility, it guarantees nothing, but permits everything within possibility’s realm of possibility. Becoming is opportunistic because it allows for all manner of
things, and yet remains blameworthy for its own shortcomings. It may be viewed with suspicion because it is supportive of improvement and yet may be promotive of the opposite. Becoming reveals uncertainties. In reference to us, it contains everything we want to be, and everything we do not want to be. It simultaneously tempts and repels us. It is more explicable than we can imagine. As the means to being, becoming contains all of the realized possibilities of the past, and of these, none is more important than technology—not technology in any limited meaning, but technology in its full and extended meaning.

Because a technological approach to reality can lead to all types of applications, these applications are variable. Where some are productive, others are useless. Where some are helpful, others are detrimental. Where some are supportive, others are invasive. These applications are relevant to many endeavors, but we are concerned primarily with technology as the primary motivating factor in history, and such a conclusion is not an exaggeration. Within these pursuits are to be found technology’s becoming, or should we say the becoming of technology’s being. Supported by the meaning of technology as a cultural phenomenon that impacts all areas of human existence, it has a far more profound influence than is usually understood. Technology does not relate to singular conditions from limited perspectives. It affects more than any tool or machine, more than any device or apparatus, more than any organization or system, more than any technique or method, more than anything realized or imagined because it is representative of human life itself. When commonly described, the meaning of technology is usually limited to the familiar orbit of inventions, such as tooth brushes or books, computers or automobiles, cell phones or glass dishes, or modifications, such as genetically modified foods or pharmaceuticals, power plants or guided missiles, solar panels or wind turbines. Whether we admit this truth to ourselves or not, these creations are derived in large part from technology’s cultural underpinning in which some cultures are more inventive and innovative than others. The basis of technology, that is, the ground to its being is ontological. To attribute a technological basis to technology is unfounded. We should correct the notion that technology’s cultural underpinning is merely a small aspect of human creativity that can be placed along side of many others, such as religion, law, music, or art, all of which are influenced by technology. It is not contradictory that technology incorporates all of the latter, and it incorporates them the more we move through time, revealing an increase in its variety and complexity. In fact, the accelerated pace of technology in the modern age is derived in large part from an increase in its presence. To a great extent, technological development must be attributed to the intensification, consolidation, and accentuation of this presence.

And yet the meaning of technology is filled with incongruities. One such incongruity relates to technology’s first reference in the English language (but with the French spelling “technologie”) in the early 17th century (Note 6). This first reference was restricted to the mechanical arts, although the meaning of technology as derived from the Greek word for art or skill (techne) has limited accuracy. When referenced in this way, it applies to things produced in some mechanical way, hence, the “mechanical arts” (Note 7). As accurate as this meaning appears to be, it is incomplete because English
society in the late 16th and early 17th centuries contained many manifestations that should also be included in this meaning. Additionally, late 16th and early 17th century England was transformative because of the importance of the Elizabthan and Jacobean ages. These ages were the time of England’s military expansion across the Atlantic Ocean to the New World when England rivaled Habsburg Spain and its overseas empire; the time when England gave support to Protestantism against Catholicism that was embedded in the Middle Ages; the time when English common law was strengthened by Edward Coke (d. 1634) against royal interference; the time when English literary culture was expanding under William Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, Christopher Marlowe, and others; the time when England was beginning to lay the foundation to an economic policy of mercantilism that became overwhelmingly important with its colonial territories in the 17th and 18th centuries; the time when England laid the foundations for the Industrial Revolution that began with innovations in agriculture and led to improvements in industry; the time when Francis Bacon pursued science based on natural laws derived from observation and experimentation as a rejection of Aristotelianism. Not only were these developments intensified, but they were increasingly intensified because the society from which they came greatly accelerated English culture and made England a leading nation in the world. All of these developments were technologically directed, and they demonstrate that technology’s augmentation included many aspects of human existence. We should not underestimate these developments, and they should be included within the meaning of technology. Therefore, technology means more than the mechanical arts, more than the practical applications of any art or craft. It means the whole cultural manifestations of human existence that are expressed in many different ways.

And these cultural manifestations plumb the character of their age, a character that may not be directly associated with technology, nor considered to be technological at all. Nevertheless, there is a strong similarity between something regarded to be technology, and something regarded to be technological. Without overstating the obvious, whatever is technological is merely an expression in an adjectival form of the noun “technology”. Since an adjective cannot stand by itself and is used as a modifier, it must be dependent upon what it modifies. For something to be described as technological simply manifests an attribute of an entity, which in this case is technology, an attribute that is described more fully, more definitely, or more effectively. It may even be associated with technology in a subordinate way and still be applicable. Since references to technology cannot ignore its many applications, either those that are directly and those that are indirectly related to its presence, it is for this reason that primary technologies that are obviously technological, and secondary technologies that are not so obvious are intrinsically related. This relationship relates to technology’s basic elements, to its use and changes in form and meaning, to its transformation from the earliest to the latest, from the simplest to the most complex, and it is relevant even to its etymological derivations and its identifying cognates in other mediums, regardless where and when they appear. Therefore, what is technology and what is technological are one and the same thing.
The inclusion of technology’s cultural manifestations within a discussion of technology is not misplaced. Since these manifestations are derived from technology’s mechanisms, it signifies an increase in the latter. Whatever its applications, a mechanism signifies a type of art form, that is, a type of created art, and the manifestations of any mechanism, even human societies, are its revelations. By definition, a mechanism is a technology. Although computers and automobiles are distinguishable from human societies, all of them are technologies because all are mechanisms. And the increase in any of technology’s mechanism leads to an increase in technology itself, although individual technologies, regardless of what they are and where they originate, from our hominid ancestors on the African plains, from the cave dwellers in the paleolithic age, from the metal workers in Neolithic villages, or from us today are not generated equally. The more a society advances, the more it intensifies its mechanisms, an intensification that leads to the technologization of that society. The result is obvious because the more that technologies appear and are applied, the more they are generated. This tendency helps to explain why modern society is so advanced, integrated, and regulated, although it gives the impression that it is autonomous and self-generating, as if humans have been taken out of the equation and rendered superfluous. While dealing with changes in the social sphere, technology is no less important than anything else, but nevertheless it seems likely that technological development is both the cause and effect of society. Technological development is effective as a cause because it is causative as an effect, both of which are derivable from this development because technologizations are humanly based. Thus, technology and society are parallel entities: comparable in their development and analogous in their application.

Technology’s mechanisms, regardless of how they are expressed, infer the idea of mechanization, which has several different meanings. Apart from its description of the functions of a machine, that is, to attribute a mechanical character to something, or its description by Democritus that governs the laws of mechanics, technology’s mechanization represents the far-reaching influence of a phenomenon, activity, or tendency that is predominantly pervasive and seemingly omnipresent. Unlike the meaning of a megamachine as popularized by Mumford in which human society functions as a gigantic machine and symbolizes dictatorship as an end in itself (Mumford, 1967-1970), mechanization encompasses more than the effects of machine technology. It promotes more than a rationalistic view of the world because its mechanism is often the reverse (Giedion, 1948, 1969). In fact, irrationality is often the source of its power and its danger. The mechanization of technology is not the basis for a moral prerogative. Rather, it is a force to be reckoned with, regardless of its directive, energy, or style.

Although society has its own strands of development, all or some of which converge at some point, it is at this point where the mechanistic dynamics of technology are revealed. Nevertheless, mechanization in a societal sense is merely an intensification of what lies within because society itself, as already noted, is a mechanism. And the more that society is intensified, the more it empowers mechanization. Since mechanization usually implies machine technology, it might be more accurate to use another word that does not readily exemplify machines because society cannot be limited to or is the equivalent
of mechanics. Perhaps, intensification is a more suitable word, since to intensify means to heighten, sharpen, increase, or strengthen something.

3. Conclusory Discussion

Because technologization possesses the ability to encompass all technifications, it is the practical expression of becoming. As discussed above, non-being is meaningless without becoming because becoming is a procedural step between nothing and something, and since becoming is concerned more with engagement (as if it were a means) than with results (as if it were an end), non-being gives being a presence which is to say that being derives a presence from non-being. The non-being of anything needs becoming in order for it to be because a dynamic process is necessary, even within a limited contingency, in order for becoming to be. Technically, it would be correct to say that being is not conferred a presence nor is it bestowed a presence because within non-being the presence of being already lies latent. Since non-being exists within being, being contains everything non-being can be. Therein are all possibilities, the possibilities for the universe on a cosmic scale and the possibilities for us on a human scale.

In reference to technology, it is by means of non-being that technology’s technologization becomes. The meaning of technology and its impact in the world must include these applications that are the direct result of the becoming of its being. Therein is manifested the cusp of its being, an explanation of becoming and its relationship to technology. Perhaps at this point it would be appropriate to say that although metaphysics may give the impression of introducing ambiguities and abstractions into what would normally be a simple understanding of reality, that is, a deliberate attempt in muddying the waters, it should be interpreted, and rightly so, as a sincere and fair attempt in understanding that reality.

Just as properties are attributed to an entity, whether or not we agree with Aristotle, so too is non-being attributed to being. How else can non-being be explained? It must be positioned somewhere and that somewhere must be within being. Granted that non-being is a description of a non-entity, nevertheless, it can be explained in order to be understood. With these thoughts in mind, we should ask what are the non-beings or types of non-beings that are fundamental to technology. Considering what constitutes technology, that is, what it contains in order for it to be, we should look beyond its applications that are usually included within its definition. In order to understand the non-beings of technology as preparatory to understanding its being, we must look to individual human beings as the source from which technology comes forth. Technology is not based upon devices, methods, processes, strategic organizations, or algorithms, but upon the people who invent and innovate, who technologize and improvise. This effort can be viewed as an attempt at analyzing human psychology and its ontology, but first we must restate the meaning of technology. As already discussed above, technology signifies more than the mechanical arts, which is a small part of a much larger entity. Indeed, what is technology if not being itself? It is not just individual technical artifacts, but the expression of human reality in all
its existentialia. Every object subjectified, every subject objectified (within a human context), every encounter, every engagement has a technological underpinning because all of them are part of technology’s cultural plenitude. Because the world must be objectified in order to be meaningful, it is this objectification that becomes the threshold to subjectification. Once objectified, the world attains importance because it reverts back to us.

And this object-subject relationship is essential to the openness that transformed non-being into being. When making reference to openness, we do not mean its use as a personality trait, nor its designation of open-mindedness that concerns a positive receptiveness to new or different ideas, but rather a description of unconditioned possibility, accessible to its own accessibility, mutable to its own mutability, liable to its own liability. Every human is this open possibility that is not so much an affirmation of what can be, but a negation of what cannot be; and everything we do reflects it. An openness is a lack, and since technology contributes to the totality of our existence, expressed in many different ways, openness finds expression in our thoughts, perceptions, feelings, desires, and acts of will, while demonstrating the ambiguity of our lives. It is by means of openness that the becoming of technology’s being is embodied. Although we attempt to achieve a unity for ourselves, it remains fragmented, reducing the prospects of success. Fragmentation divides our ambitions, spreading out over life’s uncertainties. Human existence remains an open possibility, although incomplete and incompletable (Jaspers, 1963). And yet without openness, we would be instinctively driven by an inborn pattern of behavior that would determine who we are and how we act. Because our psychic phenomena include concepts as general notions, ideas as formulated thoughts, perceptions as mental impressions, judgments as abilities arriving at conclusions, and sensory experiences, all of which impact this openness, they also impact our consciousness and unconsciousness, self-preservation, drives of engagement, and creativity.

Because non-being is the source from which everything becomes, it posits our motivations. Anything conceived in our minds, any generic idea, any formulated thought, any plan for action, any mental image, any insight or intuitive cognition, any evaluation that results from discernment, any known or supposed proposition, any capacity for rendering judgment impacts the non-beings from which open possibilities arise. All of them are descriptions of non-beings, that is, descriptions of non-entities. And it is by these means that technology enters the world. It is the source for all the tools and machines, all the devices and apparatuses, all the organizations and methods. If in its broadest definition becoming is objectified through those things we have created, then those things are the objectifications of becoming. Like everything else in human reality, and temporarily putting nature aside, we are creators. Even God finds his footing because we give him a place to stand. We are responsible from the depths of our being for being’s expression, that is, we bear witness to the consequences of our openness that lies at the threshold of nothingness. We are the transporters of non-being’s becoming when the latter comes to be. And what we have just said is the full and unadulterated meaning of technology.
Therefore, the cusp of being describes the becoming of being and its relationship to technology. It indicates that both human reality and technology are intertwined, making use of the same metaphysical means on the way to being. There can be no other explanation for technology and its manifestations without making reference to the positing of its latent possibilities within being itself, which is applicable to both its technical artifactual renderings and its societal revelations. In fact, a comparable description of technology’s being may be equated with history, that is, when history is definable within its full and meaningful explanation of human activity throughout time, not by minuscule events laid out by individuals or social groups, but by the grand scale of humanity’s struggles with existence that itself is expressive of being. Everything we have created and everything we will create originate from this relationship. Since technology and society are configurations, we may say that technology in its plenitude is simply another description for the totality of human reality.

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Notes

Note 1. Keeping in mind that “nonexistent object” may be used in place of “being”, we will persist in the use of the latter because it is easily identifiable with a noticeably long history.

Note 2. A being is anything that is, and because it has come into existence, a being is made, created, fabricated, forged, invented, or produced. Although not intended, this understanding agrees with the biblical interpretation that all beings describe what have been created and since God is not created, God is not a being. Nevertheless, we are not concerned with theology, and any similarity between the interpretation given herein and the Old Testament is coincidental. God is who he is, but he has no bearing on the metaphysical views presented in this paper because they are irrelevant to his state of “being”.

Note 3. Although not identical, there is little real difference between essence and existence in reference to the being of a thing. If a being exists, it must have an essence that determines what it is, and if a being has an essence, it must be present in its existence that determines that it is. Essentialism that posits essence before existence, and existentialism that posits existence before essence can be combined. And they are combined in the interaction that differentiates a being’s essential attributes while determining its existentiality. If an essence is merely a possibility, its actualization cannot be described as nothing. Rather, it must be described as something because if nothing, it would be its opposite.

Note 4. Nothing is erroneously described as something in Graham Priest, One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 54-56 and n. 23, but this description ignores the fact that if there is nothing, we would not exist in order to know it. If there is nothing, we might describe it as something in an abstracted way, but only as a way of description. This nothing would have nothing, and nothing would remain nothing. To describe nothing as something is inaccurate. Furthermore, there is no essence to nothing because there is nothing to nothing. Nothing is the only “thing” that has no nature and no being. Although nothing is nothing, even the use of “is” is inaccurate because nothing “is” nothing. An essence is not a property of being because properties can change, but essences remain unchanged. Nothing has no properties and no essence. It truly “is” nothing. If there is an essence to anything, it would be of something.

Note 5. If nothingness is finite, then it is unfounded to say, as does Karen Michelle Barad, What is the Measure of Nothingness: Infinity, Virtuality, Justice, Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2012, p. 16, that infinity is a reconfiguration of nothingness.

Note 6. George Buck, The Third Universitie of England, sect. 48 and conclusion in The Annales, or Generall Chronicle of England, began first by maister John Stow, and after him continued and augmented … unto the ende of this present yeare 1614 by Edmond Howes, gentleman, Londini: Thomas Adams, 1615, p. 988. I am grateful to the New York Public Library for the use of this book in its rare book room. This reference to Buck’s appendix is cited in the Oxford English Dictionary, eds.
J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, 2nd ed., 20 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, vol. XVII, p. 705. Although the first source we have for the word “technology” in the English language is datable to 1615, this use does not mean that English society before this time had no word for it. It simply means that the first reference we have for this word in English usage is datable to 1615.

Comparatively, German and French use the word “technologie”, which is datable to 1656. This information is derived from a polyglot of various words of the arts and sciences, plus several miscellaneous topics. This polyglot is Johann Michael Moscherosch, Technologie Allemande & Française, Das ist: Kunst=übliche, Wort=Lehre. Teutsch [sic] and Französisch, Strassburg: Josias Städel, 1656. I am grateful to the Bodleian Library at Oxford University for assistance in locating this book. In reference to “technologie,” see Trésor de la langue francaise, Dictionnaire de la langue du XIXe et du XXe siècle (1789-1960), 16 vols., Paris: Editions du centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1971-1994, vol. XV (1992), p. 1436. Additionally, the date of 1656 is incorrectly given as 1750 in the Dictionnaire historique de la langue française, ed. Alain Rey, et al., 2 vols., Paris: Dictionnaire Le Robert, 1992, vol. II, p. 2092, but is corrected to 1656 in Rey’s 1998 edition (in 3 volumes) that appears in vol. III, p. 3773.

Note 7. Because of the obsession of assigning values to everything, the value assigned to the mechanical arts by the ancient Greeks was designated to be inferior to the liberal arts. As a result, the mechanical arts were considered to be crafts of mediocre quality.