THE DARK SIDE OF DECENTRALIZATION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE SHADOW STATE IN INDONESIA

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Abstract

Purpose of the study: This study investigates the interrelated roles between the ruling elites and informal actors with the emergence of shadow states after the direct election of regional heads in Bengkulu, Indonesia.

Methodology: This study employed qualitative methods that use interviews, observations, and documentation techniques to collect data. Data and information obtained are analyzed by employing domains, taxonomic, componential, and cultural theme analysis. This study applied a purposive sampling method to select informants based on criteria that are relevant to the needs of the research.

Main Findings: The shadow state was built by four dominant groups, namely political outsider, political directorate, corporate rich, and informal elite. The shadow state was not caused by the weakening or weathering of functions in formal government institutions but rather because of the interrelation between dominant groups working outside legal government structures.

Applications of this study: This study will be useful in understanding the phenomenon of the emergence of the shadow states in the local political and democratic system. Besides, it will be useful in searching for the right way to increase the consolidation of politic and democracy in Indonesia

Novelty/Originality of this study: This study offers a conceptual framework for analyzing the emergence of shadow states in local government after direct elections. This study also provides a comprehensive description related to the process of development of the shadow state as the dark side of decentralization.

Keywords: Shadow State, Decentralization, Democratization, Bengkulu, Indonesia.

INTRODUCTION

In his studies on the roots of democracy and dictatorship, Barrington Moore concluded that the high socio-economic class and community independence in urban areas had become indispensable elements in developing democracy. According to Moore, democracy will grow and develop if the bourgeois class becomes stronger and active in the process of democratization. ‘There is no bourgeoisie, no democracy ’ (Moore,1966). Moore’s thesis has been proven in various parts of the world, especially those countries that change their political system into a liberal democracy system.

The reliability of the democratic system is questionable in creating an effective and efficient government. Some countries in the world that implement a democratic system face the problem of corruption. For example, Eastern European countries, which, since three decades ago, have transitioned their political systems into democratic countries face the same problem. In these countries, there is a new model of corruption committed by a group of people or institutions, often called state capture (Hellman et al., 2000, Hellman & Schankerman, 2000). For this term, Hall (2012), for example, mentions that the shadow state was created and developed by politicians and entrepreneurs in former communist states in Eastern Europe. The form is not only bribery to obtain project contracts, but also the purchase of political influences. Although state capture and corruption are widespread phenomena, empirical studies carried out are still limited in their analytical tools (Fazekas & Tóth, 2018).

In the case of Indonesia, the downfall of the New Order regime in 1998, the political system in this country has shifted from a totalitarian system to a democratic system. Changes in the system manifest in various forms, such as the implementation of a multi-party system, a direct election system for the president, legislative and regional heads, and decentralization and regional autonomy. Regional autonomy, for example, has produced regional leaders as a product of direct election. At the same time, direct elections also have produced ruling elites and informal groups that have a very important role in the management of local government.

The debate among academics, politicians, and even researchers continues concerning the relationship between regional autonomy and efforts to realize democratization at the local level. Some theorists believe that the direct election system has a broad impact on good and clean government (Smith, 1985, Vengroff & Salem, 1992). The direct election of regional heads and members of the Regional Representatives Council is one of the main requirements for responsible and responsive local governments. Besides, it also develops political equality at the local level (Smith (1985). A similar sentiment was also expressed by Arghiros (2001) that when decentralization and democratization at the local level are articulated as a goal, direct elections are a medium for achieving these two things. Nevertheless, Arghiros
The theoretical logic proposed by Smith (1985) and Arghiros (2001) will become a reality if the democratic system is at the level of substantive democracy (Case, 2002). In other words, the ideal purpose of direct elections is to create an accountable, transparent, and responsive local government. This condition will only come close to reality when democratic behavior has been internalized within the elite of government administrators, as well as among the people (Ostrom, 1991, Oyugi, 2000). However, the local political process is more dominated by interaction, competition, and compromise of interests between the ruling elite, on the one hand, and the community elite on the other (Hidayat, 2003). Thus, it is not surprising that the results of the direct elections have led to the emergence of local leaders who tend to abuse power for the benefit of themselves and their groups. In the case of Indonesia, for example, Komisi Pemberantas Korupsi (KPK), or the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission reported that up to October 2019, the KPK had processed 124 regional heads stricken with corruption, consisting of 21 Governors and 103 regents/mayors. Most cases of corruption of regional heads were dominated by gratuities from informal actors, such as power companies, business people, institutions, or influential individuals. Some theorists equate the actors with state captors or shadow actors (Reno, 1995, Hellman et al., 2000, White, 2003, Innes, 2014, 2016), which eventually transformed into a shadow state system. These groups develop systems that provide the possibility to determine the direction of governance at the local level and operate outside formal government structures.

Concerning the research phenomenon, this research assumes that the direct election of regional heads has produced a form of oligarchic power through two poles, namely the elite pole which rules on one side, and the poles of informal actors on the other side. These informal actors can include companies, business people, institutions, political elites, or other influential local elites. The mechanism of transactional relations between actors has influenced the quality of government management after the direct election of regional heads. The transactional mechanism is expected to cause a phenomenon called the shadow state. This research takes a case study in Bengkulu Province with the consideration that this province is one of the poor provinces in Indonesia, but has a high level of corruption. In local terms, Bengkulu Province is equated with a small pond with lots of crocodiles. Besides, for the last 15 years, there are three Governors of Bengkulu who have been jailed for corruption, gratuity, and other abuses of power. The research question proposed is: “how is the system created by various interest groups in developing a shadow state after direct local elections?” Meanwhile, the purpose of the study is to describe the interrelated roles between the ruling elites and informal actors with the emergence of shadow states after the direct election of regional heads.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

The direct elections of the regional head are a result of the democratic transition that has taken place since 1998. In many cases in various regions in Indonesia, regional head elections tend to be marked by multiple compromises among the interests of the local elite. Besides, the direct elections at the local level have provided opportunities for multiple parties to articulate their social, economic, and political benefits. In general, multiple parties comprise the informal elite, corporate rich, political directorate, and political outsider. These four parties form a joint action to meet their respective interests. If the relationship continues and develops systematically, the negative consequences will lead to the phenomenon of shadow state practices (Reno, 1995, White, 1999).

An understanding of the emergence of a shadow state can refer to the results of the studies of Reno (1995) and White (1999). According to Reno (1995), the existence of a shadow state is closely related to informal economic practices. The emergence of a shadow state is a negative effect of the weakening of the functioning of the state, both due to war and crisis, especially the financial crises. In poverty situations and, or economic crises, corruption and shadow economy are inseparable. For that sense, Hoinaru et al. (2020) convinced that in low-income countries, corruption and the shadow economy are poverty-diseases driven. The state must act quickly to restore the economy so that it requires a strategic alliance with company owners. The modus operandi of informal economic practices is that the ruling elite invites business people to join the shadow state network. In turn, the business people are given protection by using the formal authority of state officials (Reno, 1995). Reno uses the term informal market to describe the processes and mechanisms of economic and political transactions outside formal state institutions.

Meanwhile, the thoughts of White (1999) on the informal economy and shadow state practices are quite interesting to discuss. White tends to use a more refined term, namely, the informal economy refers to the same phenomenon. According to White, there are at least two meanings attached to the term informal market. First, the government does not register the business activities of individuals and companies so that there is no need to pay taxes. Second, concerning the behavior of formal institutions to avoid the scope of regulations relating to business activities of the individuals and companies. The form of informal economic activity from the second understanding can take the form of tax relief, misuse of public policy, corruption, collusion, and the imposition of privatization of state assets (White, 1999). The groups are called the state captors, which transformed into the shadow state that operates outside the formal structure of government (Hellman et al., 2000, Richter & Wunsch, 2019). In a similar sense, Nordholt (2003), a theorist who explicitly mentions the possibility of the emergence of shadow state practices to the policy of decentralization and regional autonomy in the reformation era, expected that as a whole, local leadership forms a unique system which he calls 'bossism.' This system operates in a shadow government regime characterized by bureaucrat alliances, party
leaders, state captors, the military, and even criminals. Mulenga & Mulenga (2018) added that State capture is a manifestation of government failure caused by the manipulation of bureaucratic rules and formal procedures by business elites and political elites.

Regarding the emergence of shadow states, Marxist views can be adapted to illustrate the dominance of one group over another. The Marxists believe that the country is always under the control of dominant groups, such as interest groups, classes, or coalitions. The state must fulfill and serve these groups, which continuously plays the role of state captors (Srouji, 2005). In this Marxist school, two poles have different views about state capture. First, the Gramscian group views the state as the power to create cohesion, and not as an instrument to dominate. At the same time, other Marxists treat the state as an instrument for the dominant group to fulfil their interests, especially if the capitalist groups hold the country's political power. For them, the capture of the country is a reflection of the ongoing struggle of capitalist groups to influence economic and social policies in state institutions. The form of group struggle can be viewed from the results when parliament makes rules to ensure capitalists accumulate wealth and manipulate the state for profit and try to maintain power by creating conflict among workers (Srouji, 2005). The terms of state capture and shadow refer to situations, where a group of elites, whether political elites, business elites, or community elite groups operate informally outside the formal government structure but have a strong influence on the running of government. Grzymała-Busse (2008) mentioned that state capture is a product of interrelation between clientelism, predation, fusion, exploitation, and the formation of state institutions and capacities.

The study of shadow state or state capture is not a new issue in the academic world. At the theoretical level, discourses among observers about the shadow state began around the 1990s. White (2003), for example, wrote about the connection between the informal economy and shadow state practices in India. Hellman et al. (2000) wrote about the phenomenon of state capture in Eastern European countries, which he called a new mode of corruption. Innes (2014, 2106) described the problem of state capture in the perspective of relations between political parties and the commercial sector in Central European countries. Various conceptual state capture encourages Fazekas (2018) to study the measurement of state capture by offering a new analytical framework and approach. Labschagne (2017) investigated the state capture phenomenon from a political perspective as a critique of previous studies that mainstream economic contexts. Tudoroiu (2013) investigated the problem of state capture in Moldova caused by the fierce competition of elites in controlling state institutions and policymaking for their economic benefits. Frye (2010) investigate the business lobby in Russia and its relationship with the state capture. In Africa, Hassan (2017) examined the effectiveness of anti-corruption agents in corruption control and state capture in Ethiopia.

While for the Indonesian context, especially in the post-New Order period, critical analysis of the practice of the shadow state is still not comprehensively documented. Maybe the writings of Nordholt (2003) can be used as an initial reference for the emergence of the shadow state concerning the policy of decentralization and regional autonomy after the fall of the New Order regime. He did not explain the mechanism of the shadow state itself but still had put forward a proposition about the possibility of shadow state practices at the regional government level as a consequence of decentralization and local autonomy. Based on Nordholt's (2003) proposition, although at a still premature level, Hidayat (2003), for example, examined the practice of shadow states in Banten Province by illustrating the connection between business and politics that emerges of the shadow state. This study has raised many public questions about the relationship between the direct election of regional heads and the practice of shadow states in the management of local government. Several studies have explored business and political issues in the regions. Hidayat (2007) mapped power relations in the administration of government post-direct election in Riau and West Sumatra Provinces. Soesilowati & Erman (2007) examined the power relations between business people and their relationship with the administration of post-direct election in Riau Islands Province. In a similar work, Susanto (2007) also discusses the relations between authorities and business people post-the elections in West Sumatra. Erman (2007) investigated the indications of patronism and clientelism in the process of direct election of regional heads.

Most of the studies illustrate the relationship between the informal economy and the formation of a shadow state. However, studies ignore the role of other actors who play an essential role in shadow state practices in regional government management. To understand the role of various actors in the process of appearing shadow state comprehensively, this research offers at least four state captors who jointly build a shadow state. These actors are informal elites, corporate rich, political directorate, and political outsiders. These groups fight for the fulfillment of various interests, such as seeking economic goals, achieving a career, political sponsorship, and defending patron-client goals. Complicated relationships among these groups are expected to bring up the shadow state phenomenon in the administration of local government.

**METHODOLOGY**

Based on the objectives of the research, the study applied a qualitative method by adopting the phenomenological approach. The study adapted to the field situation to increase the relevance of research problems, theories, concepts, and the methods used. Thus, the objectivity of research results is not based on generalization but instead based on the meaning of field findings as a form of transferable social construction.
To obtain data, the researchers used several data collection methods, such as depth-interviews, observations, and documentation. Depth-interview sessions involved key informants, who know, experience, and feel the phenomena of the shadow state. Key informants included business people, bureaucrats, local elites, journalists who specifically covered the Bengkulu Governor case, anti-corruption activists, academics, and several other additional informants. In selecting research informants, this study uses a purposive sampling method. The informants involved must meet the criteria according to the research needs. Data obtained through interviews reflected the form of descriptive, structural questions, and conflicting issues (Spradley, 2007). The purpose of this interview is to describe the role of each actor in forming a shadow state network. Meanwhile, observation involved collecting data using the researcher's sense. This approach involves collecting data by "looking and listening in a systematic and meaningful way" (McKechnie, 2008, p. 573). In the present study, the researcher observed the behavior of informants who know the phenomenon of the shadow state in a variety of natural settings. The results of this observation are very useful for formulating a series of questions used in in-depth interview sessions. Besides, the data obtained through observation can clarify the information obtained through interviews.

The study employed documentation techniques to collect important data not obtained through interviews and observations. For collecting secondary data, the researchers analyzed local newspaper using the content analysis method. Journalists provide access to news related to corruption cases of the Governor. The text of the prosecutors' demands is also an essential document as a material for analyzing the phenomena studied. The document is used to analyze the relationship between the Governor and his family, bureaucrats, and business people.

To analyze data obtained from the field, the study used stages of analysis that adapt data analysis techniques in an ethnographic approach (Spradly, 2007). First, domain analysis that aims to obtain a general and overall picture of the object of research or social situation. Data obtained through general questions during mini-tours are the main source of domain analysis. In this case, researchers conducted interviews, dialogues, or exchange ideas with several key informants. Second, taxonomic analysis is a follow-up of the domain analysis chosen for further elaboration. Data collected from observation supported taxonomic analysis. Third, componential analysis, which is investigating specific characteristics in each internal structure by contrasting elements. Data collected from observation and selected interviews with contrasting questions are the main sources of componential analysis. Fourth, the analysis of cultural themes aimed to look for relationships between domains, and how they relate to the whole to express research themes.

FINDINGS

The Research Location

This research was conducted in Bengkulu Province. This province is known as the second poorest province on the island of Sumatra, and the seventh poorest province of 34 provinces in Indonesia. Related to the issue of study, Bengkulu Province experienced problems with its Governors. Since 2010, there have been three Governors go to jail for corruption and abuse of power. The first Governor was sentenced for four years because of a corruption case. The second Governor was sentenced for three years with the same situation. In the last incident, the KPK arrested the Governor in 2017 for corruption and abuse of power for the benefit of himself and his family. This Governor was elected in 2015 through political contestation in regional elections. The legal case involved his wife and a local businessman. All three were found guilty. The Governor and his wife were sentenced to eight years each, while the businessman gets a sentence of six years in prison. Corruption cases involving Governors, Governors' wives, and business people prove the thesis that there is a unique network between the ruling elite and business people in the administration of local government.

Local Election and the Emergence of the Shadow Actors

Tight competition in the 2015 direct election of Governors and Deputy Governors leads to "unique" and mutualistic relations between candidates and various local elites such as business people, companies, politicians, community elites, bureaucrats, and so on. For simplicity, in this study, they are referred to as 'state captors.' The form of collaboration between the Governor and Deputy Governor candidates and state captors starts from the initial nomination of candidates, candidates' socialization activities, negotiations with political parties, during the campaign process, until the completion of contestation. They formed a reliable team to win political contestation consisting of families, prospective colleagues, business people and companies, institutions, bureaucracy, political parties, and influential individuals.

In the case of the 2015 election, the shadow actors involved in the local political contestation process consisted of three groups: First, a mutual collaboration between candidates and shadow actors before the election process takes place. They support candidates at any risk, whether the candidates win or lose the contestation. They were the first to encourage candidates to participate in political contestation and, at the same time, act as the main sponsors of the nomination. The state captors take care of everything from preparing for the submission, negotiating with political parties, funding the candidates' operations, funding campaign activities, forming winning teams to operational funding. Typically, state captors are those who have been trusted and have had close relations with candidates for a long time. State captors are usually those who are willing to sacrifice anything to win the contestation. In local descriptive, they are fighters who dare to bloody. These actors will later become the first circle of Governor and Deputy Governor if elected. This circle governs everything, from government projects to the placement of individuals in government positions. In the local description, they are called 'bus passengers who board at the bus terminal.'
Second, the group of state captors who tend to seek safe positions. They are not involved in the process of contesting candidates from the beginning stage. This group has no special relationship with any of the candidates. They will be close to one of the candidates who can win the contestation. The way they do is to establish contact with the candidate winning team to gain access to the candidate. Usually, they build commitments with someone who is a candidate's trust. They try to enter the closed circle of candidates by supporting the candidate's winning needs. When the promises have been agreed upon by the team, then they are introduced to the candidates. The most important thing for them is that candidates know that they support the winning process. Their interests are undoubtedly different, starting from economic benefits, positions in the bureaucracy, long-term political interests, and other interests. For them, contributing to the process of winning candidates is considered a form of long-term investment to return when the supported candidate wins the election. In the local description, they apply two-legged politics, or they are referred to 'bus passengers who ride in the middle of the road.'

The third is the group of state captors who are close to the candidates. They are more aggressive in entering the circle intimate to the elected Governor and Deputy Governor. They were not involved at all in the process of nomination and contestation from the beginning to the end. But when a candidate has won the contestation, they immediately move to a circle near the Governor and Deputy Governor elected through several channels, both the family team and the candidate winning team. These actors usually consist of local elites, bureaucrats, and prominent business people. They are pragmatic state captors who are smarter in exploiting situations. They are very experienced in playing their role in opening communication channels with elected Governors and Deputy Governors. And even this group often occupies a strategic position in the circle of Governors compared to the first and second groups. They didn't fight from the start but got more profit compared to the winning team because of their lobbying ability. In many cases, this group caused a conflict of interest in the Governor's closest circle. In local terms, they are called as 'groups that catch fish at river estuary.'

When the election process for the Governor and Deputy Governor is completed, the three groups of state captors begin the movement for getting closer to the circle of the ruling elite, both the sphere of Governors and Deputy Governor. The pattern of relations between the ruling elite and the group of state captors is different from the model of ties in the electoral phase. In this phase groups that have worked to win the competition begin to design strategies to obtain social, political, and economic resources. Various maneuvers are carried out by groups taking into account the investment spent in the election contest. The local term refers to their struggle for 'take a seat in the bus' between passengers riding at the terminal, 'bus passengers riding on the road,' and 'groups catching fish at the river estuary.' The three groups of shadow actors are the forerunners of the emergence of the shadow captors. They slowly penetrated the management of regional governments with various maneuvers. They hope that the contributions made during the contestation process can be returned in other forms.

**DISCUSSION**

After almost two years in power, the Governor has received sympathy from the public due to various policy breakthroughs. However, in May 2017, the public was shocked when they got the bad news that the Governor and his wife were arrested by the KPK for corruption and trading influence. The incident became a trending topic on social media and mass media. It appeared that the case of Governor of Bengkulu is inseparable from business and power relations. One businessman became the initial actor node of the gratification event. Businessman responds to requests for money from the Governor's wife by collecting funds from other business people who have received a work package. This mode is often carried out by own power elites in several regions in Indonesia. This incident resulted in the Governor and his wife each being sentenced to eight years in prison. Specifically for the Governor, there is an additional penalty in the form of revocation of political rights five years after being released from his main sentence.

Economic interests have become a significant factor for regional heads in various regions in Indonesia, tripped over a problem of gratification and, or promising something in return for a sum of money. Many think that so many regional heads tripped over an issue of the law caused by the high cost of direct elections. In the case of Bengkulu Province, the Governor financed his candidacy without sponsorship from local entrepreneurs, although many people suspected that some entrepreneurs outside Bengkulu became their donors. But the "typical" relationship between the Governor and the businessman is established when the Governor is elected.

The modus operandi of informal economy practices or economic interests in the administration of government in Bengkulu revealed that the Governor and, or on behalf of the Governor invited the business elite and provided explanations and invited to join the network of business groups to build Bengkulu. In this case, the Governor began to create a system of bossism, which placed entrepreneurs as clients and the ruling elite as patrons. This network pattern directly or indirectly becomes part of the basis for the formation of the shadow state. The ruling elite protects clients through policies that do not impede their operations. This condition is similar to Wedel's (2003) illustration that there are interrelated between clans, cliques, and captured states.

The interests associated with the career development of the State Civil Apparatus (ASN) manifests in the form of patron-client relations between ASN and the Governor's closest circle. When serving as Governor, he brought some of these loyal followers and put them in strategic positions as a form of strengthening the bureaucratic network. They became the...
eyes and ears of the Governor in the bureaucracy, and every ASN in the government realized that they were the closest circle of the Governor. the formation of a ring at the level of the bureaucracy is the modus operandi of forming bossism between elite ruling and bureaucrats. The ring involved the people closest to the Governor. This loop becomes a model of patron-client formation that has the power to influence the Governor and, or the Governor's wife. The condition in Bengkulu is somewhat different from the phenomenon, as revealed by Reno (1995) or White (2003). They explained that the shadow state could not be separated from economic interests. In the Bengkulu case, it turns out that the shadow state also penetrated the bureaucracy, which directly affected the placement of ASN in certain strategic positions.

The Oligarchy of power in Bengkulu Province can be illustrated by actors: the Governor, the Governor's wife, and loyalist groups. The first pole of power is in the hands of the Governor, who determines the journey of regional government with all the inherent power in him. The second pole of power, although somewhat subtle, is the Governor's wife. She has a solid network in the bureaucracy because she has a close relationship with her loyalists there. Besides, these poles of power are heavily involved in economic networks with entrepreneurs together with "the younger brother." The third pole of power is the loyalists, who occupy strategic positions in the bureaucracy. Thus, the power oligarchy forms three dimensions (tri-polar), which have their respective roles. It was finally this tri-polar who created the 'tower' of power in local government. The patterns of patron-client relations in local government show the workings of state captors, and the result is that government control is in one dominant group that acts as a shadow state.

Concerning the perspective of democracy, the emergence of the shadow state phenomenon is contrary to the expectations of the democratic transition of the last two decades. This finding also invalidates the assumption put forward by Smith (1985) and Arghiros (2001) that through the practice of direct elections it is believed to be able to produce a more accountable and responsive government system to the demands of society; and the growing political equality at the local level. The direct local election has led to the ruling elites who built oligarchic circles. In short, direct elections are just another strategy to gain formal legitimacy for local elites through the mechanism of public political participation. Michels (1962) believes that direct government by society as aspired by the supporters of a liberal democracy perspective is merely a utopia because the product of direct democracy is the dominance of a group of ruling elites and political elites.

Referring to the Marxist view that in every society is always colored by two groups, namely: the ruling group and the controlled group, it is not surprising if the rotation of power by a handful of political elites always colors the administration of the state. In another section, Mills (1956) states that the administration of government is still characterized by a rock-solid alliance between the "political elite" and the "economic elite." But the worst thing about this phenomenon is that the concentration of power in the hands of the political elite will have implications for the declining role of professional political elites. At the same time, the part of political outsiders from business people is increasing. The pattern of interaction between the ruling elite and business people in the administration of local government after the direct election has begun since the nomination process until the election. The tripping of the Governor indicated that there was a business relationship between the ruling elite and business people.

The illustration of the arrest of the Governor and his wife indicates the existence of a unique power relationship between the Governor, the Governor's family, and business people. Besides, patronage relations form a patron-client network where business actors become clients for the Governor and his wife. The situation of the Governor and his family reinforces the old postulate expressed by Michels (1962) that a government elected directly by the people as idealized by liberal democracy is only a utopia, what happens is a group of political elites (oligarchies) holds the government. This situation is almost the same as the Marxist view. The state is always under the control of dominant groups, classes, or alliances. Then, the state must serve their interests. Effectively then, the country is under perpetual capture (Srouji, 2005). Not surprisingly, the circulation and concentration of power in the hands of the political and economic elite color the administration of the state. The model of underhand interaction between the ruling elite and business people characterizes business relations in politics, one of which the project tender process. The model is a consequence of business and political relations that mainstream "typical" and mutualistic mechanisms. Besides, business people often have an interest in the placement of several strategic positions in government as an alternative way to smooth their economic benefits. Complicated relations between various informal actors with the appearance of the shadow state can be described in the following image.

Theoretically, the direct election is an effort to realize the fundamental objectives of decentralization. The relationship between decentralization and efforts to realize democracy and community welfare is still questioned. However, some theorists believe that decentralization is a better way to create a civil society at the local level. Smith (1985), for example, believed that direct election for regional heads is one of the conditions for the realization of the accountable and responsive local government, including the establishment of what he calls political equality. In a similar perspective, Arghiros (2001) asserted that decentralization is a tool, and democratization at the local level is a goal, then a direct election is an inseparable package of the two concepts. In the case of Indonesia, the direct election has created a lot of problems. For example, many regional leaders tripped a problem of gratification, corruption, and promised something because of his position (trading influence). Some suggested returning to the regional head election system through the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD). However, the best way is to improve the quality of elections rather than replacing the electoral system.
CONCLUSION

Based on the findings and discussion in the previous chapter, the study concludes that weathering or weakening formal government functions is not the cause of the emergence of the shadow state in Bengkulu Province. Nor is it caused by the elites of official government administrators experiencing powerlessness in dealing with outside social, economic, and political forces. The shadow state in Bengkulu Province is a product of the complexity of relations between the ruling elite and four central poles of power. These poles of power are first, political outsiders who act like politicians. Second, political directorates, generally consisting of politicians from the supporting parties. Third, the informal elite that comes from the community. This group consists of local elites who often influence government policies. Fourth, corporate rich, which generally includes entrepreneurs and, or companies that have been strong supporters of the power elite. These groups struggle to seek economic benefit ends, career advancement ends, political sponsorship ends, and sustaining patron-client ends.

Based on the case in Bengkulu province, the shadow state phenomenon is also expected to occur in other provinces in Indonesia. Some aspects that should be done, such as law enforcement by election organizers for violations at each stage of the election. Besides that, political education at the grassroots level is very important. Therefore, the strategic cooperation between the central government, the regional government, the Election Commission, and the political parties becomes very essential in raising voters' political awareness.

LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD

The results of this research provide directions for future studies that should be carried out by researchers. The study should focus on the effectiveness of the regional head election system, whether through direct election or returning to the representative election system through the DPRD. Collaboration between researchers from various disciplines is essential.

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AUTHORS CONTRIBUTION

The Author is responsible for preparing the outline and substance of the paper. While the co-author is in charge of synchronizing between the outline and the substance of the paper as well as improving English.

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