With the onset of the cold war, the United States (U.S.) had played a crucial role in ensuring the containment of the communist cause, and limiting the global influence of the Soviet Union. The U.S., through the implementation of its foreign policies, allied with the nation states having similar goals and objectives. However, the result expected from such relations has never been achieved in its complete spirit, primarily because some or most of such alliances were complementary alliances.

Accordingly, this study has made an attempt to have a critical review of the motives that ultimately led to the U.S. and Pakistan nurturing, funding, developing and fighting the Mujahedeen and Taliban groups during the Soviet-Afghan war and War on Terror (WOT). Conclusively, this study mirrors the impact of these alliances on both countries determining that Pakistan ultimately received the bitter end of the deal with its economy failing and country near collapse, while the U.S. remains in advantageous situation.

Keywords: Alliances, Afghanistan, Pakistan, United States, War on Terror (WOT)

© 2022 The Authors, Published by iRASD. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License

Corresponding Author’s Email: sr.hashmi@iba-suk.edu.pk

1. Afghanistan’s Political Prospect and the Soviet-Afghan War

The Soviet Union (USSR) considered Afghanistan one of the key neighbouring allies that would act as a stronghold in facilitating the communist expansion in the South Asia. Earlier in the 1950s, the Soviets diligently tried to establish close relations with Afghanistan; this objective was not attained adequately until the 1970s (Yousaf, Adkin, & Yousaf, 2001).

When Pakistan attained independence and emerged as newly born nation state in 1947, the issue of the Pashtun’s living on the newly developed Durand Line arose. However, from 1947 to 1953, Pakistan was able to secure friendly support by the-then Afghanistan’s King Zahir Shah (Bezhan, 2014). Simultaneously, Afghanistan during this time witnessed a rather short wave of political liberalization, following which the birth of free press and a liberal parliament occurred. Nevertheless, with the influence of conservatives within the government, power was seized by Mohammad Daud Khan in 1953. Khan, between 1953 and 1963, took a solid stand on the Pashtunistan issue. He strongly advocated for Pashtun nationalism.

In 1960, Afghan irregular army troops that were dressed as tribesmen crossed the Durand Line into Pakistan, agitating the people living in these areas. This act led to the closure of Pakistan consulates in Afghanistan and later the closure of the Afghan-Pakistan border (Bezhan, 2014). All diplomatic, trade, transit, and consular relations between the two countries were suspended. The closing of the border saw Afghan nomads being cut off from grazing land during the winter. They had to abandon pastoralism or seek grazing ground within Afghanistan. During this time, nomads fought with one another while they found new

“The alliance between the U.S. and Pakistan is one of many contemporary instances of an alliance serving complementary interests”. Hans J. Morgenthau quoted in (Hashmi, 2016).
grazing lands. Farmers were against the nomads setting up winter quarters anywhere near their villages (Bezhan, 2014). Pasture user rights had to be reshuffled to prevent the conflict from escalating. The Afghan people expected that Khan would settle the issue with Pakistan; however, it did not seem to be the case. Afghanistan’s economy continued to suffer (Bezhan, 2014).

In 1978, President Sardar Mohammed Daud was overthrown and murdered by Nur Mohammed Taraki. Power in the new government was divided between political groups, the People’s Party (Khalaq) and the Banner Party (Parcham). Taraki, the leader of the People’s Party (Khalaq), was the acting head of the Communist party and with his new appointment, declared Afghanistan a one-party nation (Yousaf et al., 2001). The regime forged close ties with the Soviet Union and launched an operation that aimed to kill all domestic oppositions within the country. The government also launched extensive land and social reforms that were resented by the Muslim and anti-communist populations within Afghanistan. Due to this, the regime became extremely unpopular, and insurgencies rose to oppose the new government (Yousaf et al., 2001).

Although the Soviet Union had not directly played any part in the coup d’état, it aimed to ensure the stable relations between itself and Afghanistan. To remedy the growing unpopularity of the Communist Party, the Soviet Union sought to improve the relationships between the government and the people through the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty signed in December of that same year. The treaty stated that Afghanistan and The Soviet Union would remain in friendship and cooperation for 20 years. The Soviet Union, during this time, assisted Afghanistan in developing its economy and military (Whitney, 1978).

The aim of the treaty was, however, not attained, as insurgencies arose throughout the countries with tribal and urban groups (collectively known as the mujahedeen) fought against the communist government. In September 1979, Taraki’s members within the Afghan Communist Party, who had shown dissatisfaction with his rule, executed him. By December, the civil war in Afghanistan had erupted, and the Soviet Union invaded the country with 30,000 troops; this act shocked the international community, as Moscow was not expected to move towards the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. With this act, the U.S. saw the invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as an act of military development, which could harm the American interests in the region. The country, therefore, sought to ally itself with countries in the surrounding region to fight against the communist rule in the area.

2. U.S. Influence over Mujahedeen and the Alliance with Pakistan

Between 1979 and 1980, the U.S. re-assessed its foreign policy approach and several high officials visited Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. The main goal was to encourage these countries to join in the fight against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. Director William Casey of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) met with President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan and agreed to work with the U.S. in protecting the countries interests within Afghanistan. A review of this action estimates that the U.S. was merely reacting to the events that were occurring in Afghanistan. However, in 1998 Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former U.S. National Security Advisor, during an interview admitted that the U.S. had begun aiding the mujahedeen in July 1979, six months before Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union (Lowenstein, 2016). According to Lowenstein (2016), the United States was not blindsided by Moscow’s act; instead, it was the U.S. that had increased the probability of the Soviet Union invading Afghanistan.

President Jimmy Carter believed that Moscow would not invade Afghanistan even where it seemed as though the Khalq regime was likely to collapse. Although the belief is that the Soviet Union would not invade, Carter had authorized the CIA director to collaborate with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). At the time, Pakistan was under the Presidency of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Zia-ul-Haq was a fervent and true believer of Islam (Ricks, 2014). He took on the plight of the Mujahedeen and offered the services of the ISI to help in training, leading, providing tactics and strategies that would better aid the Mujahedeen in their fight against communist rule. Zia-ul-Haq firmly believed that every Muslim had a God-given responsibility to fight against the godless atheist and communist menace. It was necessary for the sustainability of their religion and livelihood in Afghanistan that the Soviet Union be driven out (Ricks, 2014). The war between the Mujahedeen and The Soviet Union was one that was
conducted by Afghan people but secretly supported by the CIA with the initial support of half million USD worth of non-lethal aid offered to the mujahedeen through the ISI, in operation termed as Operation Cyclone.

Pakistan, however, was not the only country involved in the training and equipping of mujahedeen. While Pakistan had dollars from the U.S., Saudi Arabia raised the same amount in private donations, with the gross amount reaching 20 million U.S. dollars per month (Gates, 2006). The funds donated by Saudi Arabia were also used in the education of students within madrassas. A madrassa is defined as a school where the Islamic religion would be taught. Saudi Arabia financed such madrassas in Pakistan, ensuring a rigid form of Islamic interpretation was actively taught in the school.

Pakistan, thus, bridged the gap between Washington, Saudi Arabia, Muslim supporters, and the Mujahedeen. Zia-ul-Haq, through Operation Cyclone, positioned himself and the ISI as an indispensable ally of the American and Muslim interests against the spread of the Soviet Union in South Asia (Yousaf et al., 2001). He dictated that ISI would be the channel through which all financial aid and armament would flow, allowing the U.S. to fight secretly against The Soviet Union without taking on any risks. CIA Veteran Bruce Riedel, in his book “What we won: America’s Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-89” stated that the CIA never took on any casualties because it did not take any risks in the Soviet-Afghan War (Ricks, 2014).

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States was now officially in a position to assist the Mujahedeen. In a televised speech, President Carter stated that the response from the U.S. would be one that was vigorous and aimed mainly at ensuring the security of countries within the Persian Gulf would be attained (Ricks, 2014). President Carter stated that the U.S. would renew the foreign policies that saw Pakistan being aided for the same. The country also called for a boycott of the Summer Olympics in 1980 that was to be held in Moscow. Conversely, the U.S government, through the U.S. Policy, was able to come up with sanctions to the Soviet Union (Hutchinson, 2013). With the U.S. seeking alliances with other countries in the region and amending its foreign policies, the Soviet-Afghan War that lasted from 1979 to 1988 led to the production of thousands of religious fundamentalists that were trained and educated by the United States government. Saudi Arabia, through the private donations of citizens, was able to match the funds offered by the U.S., reaching 3 billion dollars under the reign of President Ronald Reagan (Hutchinson, 2013).

3. **Cost Implications for the U.S. in Training the Mujahedeen**

With Operation Cyclone made public, the CIA saw the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as its client. The agency provided military assistance to mujahedeen and other militant Islamic groups that were developed by Zia-ul-Haq (Billard Jr, 2010). The program saw the ISI financed with 20-30 million dollars per year between 1980 and 1986. By 1987, the amount had risen to 630 million a year. From the assistance, Pakistan was offered and received economic packages, including US$ 3.2b in 1981-87, 40 F-16 aircraft, and US$ 4.2b in 1987-93. Of the US$ 4.2b, 2.28b were meant for economic assistance, while 1.74b were as credit for military purchases (Billard Jr, 2010).

Additionally, President Ronald Reagan expanded Operation Cyclone and incorporated additional activities in aiding the anti-Soviet resistance movements. He deployed CIA paramilitary officers in the particular division to equip the mujahedeen army. The rebel’s ability to fight was enhanced using specific tactics, strategies, weapons, logistics, and training programs (Billard Jr, 2010). In 1986, the President permitted the construction of Stinger antiaircraft missiles to be supplied to the mujahedeen so that they may effectively defend themselves against the Soviet helicopter landings (Prados, 2002).

The U.S. also funded the development of madrassas in Pakistan, investing more than U.S. $78 billion to their construction, development, and maintenance. The Madrassas taught the students about Islamic education and encouraged them to fight for the Islamic cause (Prados, 2002). The U.S. and Saudi Arabia facilitated the training of over 310,000 religious students. These students were known as ‘Talib’ in Arabic. Over 3000 madrassas are recorded during the 1990s as having students learning and training to fight against the communist cause (Prados, 2002).
With this substantial investment in equipping and restoring the Democratic Government of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union lost the war to the mujahedeen who took control over the country in 1989 (Prados, 2002). In the last months of the year, the Soviet Union vacated Afghanistan, and the credit was given to the United States and Saudi Arabia for financially supporting the Afghan insurgents. They had been trained and taught in Islamic teachings and became confident jihadi forces (Yousaf et al., 2001).

3.1. Zia-ul-Haq’s Secret Operations and Life after the Soviet-Afghan War

With President Zia-ul-Haq acting as the middle man for U.S. funding in the country and the increased flow of weaponry through the nation to Afghanistan, a lot of Islamist groups were flourished during the time. It was not long before fraudulent practices developed in the country. With Pakistan acting as the go-between for weapons, many of them were not sent directly to the Afghan rebels but were frequently sold on the local market in Karachi, Pakistan. Consequently, it was not a surprise that not long after this, Karachi became one of the most violent cities in Pakistan (Lowenstein, 2016).

Moreover, President Zia-ul-Haq was in-charge of which rebels were able to receive assistance sent from the U.S. Seven mujahedeen groups were under Pakistan’s support. Four of these were espoused, Islamic fundamentalists. Since Zia was a staunch believer of a particular vision of Islam, he often favoured the four groups over the other three, delivering more funding to them, paving the way of dominance of their school of thought over others (Yousaf et al., 2001).

After the Mujahedeen won the Soviet-Afghan war, there were a lot of weapons in the country that had no use. Secondly, there was a quick expansion in drug trading within Pakistan. Thousands of refugees and volunteers all over the world had moved into Pakistan to assist in the war, but now that it was over there was nothing to do but continue with life (Abrahms, 2006). As a result, Pakistan became a country that was largely occupied by students who had been taught the cause of Islam. They were referred to as students of the madrassas, Taliban (Abrahms, 2006).

3.2. Osama Bin Laden’s Rise as Leader

The students and the mujahedeen are not the only members who participated in Operation Cyclone, many Islamic volunteers and fighters from all over the world moved to Pakistan to participate actively in training and establishment of the mujahedeen army (Abrahms, 2006). Osama Bin Laden was a volunteer who moved from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan with the same intention. Before the development of Al-Qaeda, the United States and Pakistan actively supervised the role each mujahed played to ensure victory in the Soviet-Afghan war. Osama Bin Laden, as a sympathizer of the cause, had moved to Pakistan from Saudi Arabia and actively helped financed the development of different infrastructure in the country (Abrahms, 2006).

Travelled frequently traveller between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia sourcing for funds that could aid in the fight, it took very little for Osama to become a hero in the eyes of families of Mujahedeen. The Saudi Royal family supported his activities. Similarly, during the mass support of Pakistan, Osama Bin Laden provided construction trucks that were used in the development of madrassas, halls, training grounds, and other infrastructure. In one instance as the U.S. was building an underground camp in Khost province, Bin Laden was hired as a contractor for Pakistan to the U.S. His company Al-Qaeda was not an extremist group at this point (Rashid, 1999).

3.3. Double O’s in Alliance: Omer and Osama Joining Hands

After the war was won, the U.S. left the region. Afghanistan was under the mujahedeen, who took power through bloodshed. They divided the provinces and placed warlords as heads of different sections of the country. The warlords, in a bid to make revenue, sold essential items such as government materials, land and stolen materials (Yousaf et al., 2001). They would raid villages and markets to gather materials for sale. With time, the same people started competing with one another, hoping to gain control over sections that were under other warlords. The education and training taught in the madrassas seemed to have subsided as the society’s moral values deteriorated under the rule of the warlords. On many
occasions, the warlords kidnapped young boys and girls so that they could rape them (Travis, 2005).

Different members of the mujahedeen had settled, retreated to their original countries, or migrated to other regions within the country (Travis, 2005). With the knowledge and training received regarding the importance of the Islamic cause, Mullah Muhammad Omar began a madrasa in Kandahar. In 1994, Afghan people who were fleeing came to the school claiming that two young girls had been kidnapped by a warlord (Travis, 2005). The girls were taken to a military base where the intention was to rape them. Omar was infuriated by these claims as many of the Islamic teachings warned men not to harm older people, women, and children; rather, they were to protect them. In retaliation, Omar gathered 430 of his students and attacked the military base where the children had been taken; this became the cause for Omar (Travis, 2005).

In the subsequent years, he amassed an army that sought to fight and take control over areas in Afghanistan. He firmly believed in Islamic principles and teachings and hence was against all “Muslims who had gone wrong.” He became an advocate for the women and children who were being subjected to such cruel outcomes by mujahedeen warlords (Travis, 2005). Both Herat and Kabul were conquered in 1995 and 1996, respectively. Over time, the Taliban, under the rule of Omar, controlled the country through bloodshed. They declared that Islamic Laws were to be implemented throughout the country; this action was supported mainly by Islamic communities outside of the country (Travis, 2005). Osama Bin Laden allied himself with Omar to ensure the same was enacted throughout the country. By 1996, Al-Qaeda grew in power and turned to be an in-ignorable force.

3.4. Al-Qaeda’s Assault on the U.S. and its Instalments

Osama Bin Laden declared war on the U.S. after years of actively aiding the U.S. to fight the Soviet Union (Post, 2002). To Bin Laden, the involvement of the United States in Saudi Arabia, a land he considered holy for the Muslims, could only be seen as an act of war to Muslims across the world. The treaty signed by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in 1945, stipulating that the U.S. was to provide security while Saudi’s provided oil was one Osama Bin Laden saw as a violation of the holy land of Muslims (Bergen, 2006). In his view, the U.S was trying to conquer Saudi Arabia for its oil and through that action conquer all Muslims across the world. He urged Muslim nations to rise and fight the Americans, Jews, and other crusaders.

In 1998, Bin Laden held a meeting in Khost Camp in Pakistan and called for the organization of Islamic groups associated with Al-Qaeda. These organizations were joined by the groups from countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. A fatwa (religious ruling) was issued against the Americans and Britons (Bergen, 2006). In the same year, Bin Laden orchestrated an attack that killed 220 people on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In 2001, Osama Bin Laden orchestrated the September 11th attacks on the two towers of the World Trade Centre (WTC), the Pentagon, and Pittsburgh. Two planes crashed into the two different towers, a third plane crashed into the pentagon, and the fourth crashed somewhere in Pittsburgh. There were over 3000 deaths estimated by the State Department (Bergen, 2006).

The United States, reacted with full military might and declared War on Terror (WOT). It vowed to use all available instruments, which included military, diplomatic, democratic, financial, technological, political, and economic factors at national and international levels to fight terror. President George W. Bush sought all nations and asked them to join in the fight against terror sighting that they were either with the U.S. or against the country (Kronstadt, 2009). This Ultimatum was issued to Pakistan by the U.S. The Pakistani leadership was asked to support the U.S. against the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda. In return, the U.S. was willing to offer them economic aid; however, bleak. For Pakistan, a war with the U.S. was one it could not afford to maintain (Dunn, 2005). A response was required by the U.S. leadership within 24 hours, after which it would be assumed that the country was with the terrorists and against the international community. Pakistan’s only logical decision, against such vast power in the global economy, was to support the U.S in the WOT and maintain its interests as a sovereign nation. In doing so, the country was able to avoid being bombed as President Musharraf testified regarding the threats posed by President Bush (Goldenberg, 2006).
4. The U.S. and Pakistan Alliance and the War on Terror

With Pakistan forced into a corner, the only logical decision was to follow in the fight against terror. The U.S took advantage of Pakistan’s strategic location to provide logistic support to the U.S which included information sharing regarding the air, military, and intelligence on Al-Qaeda and Taliban members located in Afghanistan (Dunn, 2005). The alternatives were not only difficult to attain but also costly. Such as northern distribution network via Russia Central Asia was a very laborious and costlier way to provide with supplies to international forces in Afghanistan.

Pakistan closed the Afghan-Pakistan border to ensure that the region was not swamped with Islamic militants from Afghanistan (Armitage, Berger, & Markey, 2010). Additionally, the country provided intelligence related to the whereabouts of key members of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It also assisted the U.S. troops in locating, arresting and executing Taliban leaders and supporters of terrorists (Kronstadt, 2009). Pakistan was credited with the information that ultimately led to the capture of Osama Bin Laden. The Security forces within the country were also able to capture over 700 militants. Moreover, the Pakistan government froze and banned 32 bank accounts belonging to militant organizations within the country (Kronstadt, 2009).

4.1. U.S. Assistance Policy and Pakistan

In a bid to ensure that Pakistan firmly aided the U.S. in WOT, the country re-established its foreign policy bringing together new support strategies that would see Pakistan being financially and logistically supported (Kronstadt, 2009). This policy was not only applicable to Pakistan, but to other countries that were willing to ally themselves with the U.S. The Washington removed sanctions issued against Pakistan in 1998 and rewarded the country through the provision of 1.2 billion U.S. dollars in 2002-2003 and a further 600 million dollars meant to aid the country’s economy. Additionally, Pakistan was allowed to sell, lease, and export military equipment and other defence technologies (Jan, Ali, Siddiq, & Siddiq, 2013). The U.S. further stated that it would assist Pakistan in updating its current defence technology to ensure it is up to par and can withstand the plight of WOT.

Moreover, the U.S. reschedules a mutual debt of Pakistan through the Paris Club and rearranged other outstanding debts in the same club amounting to 12.3 billion dollars (Kronstadt, 2009). Congress also amended the U.S.-Pakistan trade policy to favour Pakistan. The administration suspended all duties imposed on the import of textile items from Pakistan. It also increased the number of products under the General System of Preferences (GSP) plan that was imported into the U.S. The country saw more than 13 million dollars’ worth of product imports increased; therefore, ensuring Pakistan was able to profit from the same.

Furthermore, with the number of refugees that had fled Afghanistan to Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan urgently needed assistance when it came to maintaining the welfare of these refugees (Jan et al., 2013). The U.S. issued 1 billion dollars to the Pakistan government for this purpose. It also presented Pakistan government with 1.2 billion dollars for foreign military financing (Iritani, 2001). The country received 1.9 billion dollars to be used in economic development, an additional 111.7 million dollars to assist in child mortality and survival rates, another 64 million dollars to ensure the government can develop democratically and 80-100 million dollars each month received in the form of a coalition fund (Iritani, 2001; Jan et al., 2013). The country, at the time, was receiving the largest share of financial aid from the United States (Iritani, 2001).

5. Cost of WOT to Pakistan

Although the country was receiving a lot of financial aid from the U.S. for actively participating in the WOT and ensuring terrorists were brought to book, the country was suffering additional costs than what the United States could offer. The social fabric of the country was ruined and general sentiment of fear and insecurity deteriorated collective peace and order of the country. Truly monetary value was not all there to compensate to all these damages were to be sustained and witnessed by the people of Pakistan for decades to come.

5.1. Death and Casualties to the Pakistan Military Personnel

Pakistan faced a lot of casualties to its military, seeking to ensure that the goals of WOT were achieved. According to a report posted by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Physicians for Social Responsibility (U.S.), & Physicians for Global Survival,
(2015), it was revealed that the country had dispatched over 70,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistan Border to remove the control of the Taliban from the region. The Pakistan government was able to gain control of the border after launching 38 attacks on the Taliban militia in the area. The Pakistan military suffered over 3000 deaths of troops and thousands of others wounded in battle. For the United States, the number of casualties evidenced by Pakistan has been the largest any allied nation has had to incur in the WOT (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War et al., 2015).

5.2. Damage to Pakistan’s Economy

The events in Pakistan have had a tremendous impact on the country’s economy. Although the U.S. is currently financing the country, Pakistan is still faced with problems relating to its economic development. A critical analysis of the different industries depicts the impact WOT has had on the economy of Pakistan, with its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) being recorded at 18% in 2009-2010; this was the lowest in history.

In an interview in the United States, Shery Rehman, the Ambassador to Pakistan, stated that terrorism has largely destroyed all industries in the nation of Pakistan. Over 25 billion dollars previously acquired from the economy have now been lost due to the activity of terrorists within the country. Pakistan’s agreement to aid the United States saw the rise in insecurity within the country and death toll of people. More people began migrating to other safer regions leaving the state bare. The various industries within the nation have been destroyed, with the country’s economic development remaining bleak.

5.3. Civil Causalities and other Losses

With Pakistan aiding the United States in the WOT, the country became a target for Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants. Between 2001 and 2010, Afghanistan continues to fight terrorism within its walls, with thousands of civilians dead. In 2011 alone, 2700 civilians and 2810 terrorists were pronounced dead. In the next year, there were 3000 civilians, 2500 terrorists, and 700 security personnel who passed on in a record of 6200 recorded activities by terrorists. In 2013, the same events occurred with Taliban groups attacking Khyber Pakhtoons Khaw (KPK). Twenty-four people lost their lives. With the increased number of terrorist activities in Pakistan, the country had faced a time of massive insecurity due to its involvement in the United States' mission to end terror. Additionally, the Drone Attacks by the U.S. on militant and other targets fuelled general sentiments of the public.

Unlike other nations that remain peaceful and moderately safe on a day to day basis, Pakistan’s citizens are angry with the Government. With its alliance with the U.S., thousands of people in the state have lost their lives through assassinations. Instances, where the Military has had to attack specific regions seeking to end terrorism, are considered forced requests by the U.S., which Pakistan cannot refuse. For example, the siege of Lal Masjid, the Red Mosque, by Islamic fundamentalists led by Maulana Abdul Aziz, which saw the death of 141 people with over 100 of them being children, is seen as an event that could have been prevented had the Government of Pakistan not cooperated to the requests of the U.S. In a research conducted to identify the stand of the people in Pakistan, it was determined that 65% of the population blamed the increase in terrorist attacks within the country on actions conducted by the Government of Pakistan and the U.S. in their fight against terror.

5.4. Loss of Employment and Talent

With the rising state of insecurity within the country, organizations have had to move and close down. Much of the population focuses on ensuring they are safe and secure from terrorist attacks. As a result, many people have migrated to other regions to escape the atmosphere of the country and the endless attacks on its people; this has affected the development of the economy, as talent is lost to other countries (Wallas & Wojciechowski, 2005).

Additionally, many of the talented and educated persons that could aid in the reconstruction of the Pakistani economy have either migrated or suffered death under the hands of terrorists (Wallas & Wojciechowski, 2005). Employees that previously worked in key organizations that aided in the functioning of different industries in the economy have
abandoned their posts, destroying any hope of building the economy. For instance, electricity is a key element that is useful in all industries. With its production, plummeting various other organizations have been affected, and the result being increased rates of unemployment within the country (Afzal, 2018).

5.5. Loss of Education
Schools and other educational institutions remain empty with the level of literacy in the country plummeting. With few people staying behind and many becoming refugees, the education system in Pakistan is profoundly affected by the increased terrorist activities. Moreover, these terrorist groups continue to target schools where girls are offered an education (Afzal, 2018). These Taliban groups believe that women should not receive an education and should remain under the care of their guardians or fathers. Because of this, women who study or are currently working are considered enemies and are actively targeted by terrorist groups. Moreover, 1.5 million students are estimated to be lacking a proper education in Pakistan, with over 8000 teachers remaining jobless due to fear of attacks from terrorist organizations (Afzal, 2018).

5.6. Loss of Foreign Direct Investors
When the WOT commenced, and the different organizations fled Pakistan, FDI was affected negatively, resulting in the loss of over 64 million dollars to the Pakistan economy. FDIs are very critical regarding the current economic, political and financial situation of a country (Ali, Waqas, & Asghar, 2015). With such a volatile political economy in the state, investors have fled the country to ensure their security. Foreign people have lost interested and confidence in investing in Pakistan’s economy, a result that sees the country failing in the global economy. The country's FDI is decreased to 58% in 2004 due to increased terrorist activities.

Consequently, the insecurity within the state has damaged the image and brand of Pakistan within the international economy. In 2004, Pakistan lost 463 million dollars in foreign investments. By the end of the year, the country had lost 1.116 billion U.S. dollars (Ali et al., 2015). Of all the Asian nations in the region, only 470 million was being invested in Pakistan in 2004. However, by the end of the year, the same investment had been reduced to 30 million dollars.

5.7. Impact on the Agricultural Industry
Agriculture is Pakistan’s primary source of income. Farming, particularly in KPK, Swat, Dir, Malakand, and Baluchistan, is highly practised (Abbasi, 2013). Over the years, Pakistan has led in the production of fruits, especially in KPK and Swat, where 48% of fruit production was attributed to these two areas. However, with increased terrorism in the country, the country has lost 35 billion dollars due to the limited production of fruits and other crops in the country, with 70% of harvests that were grown in this area destroyed (Abbasi, 2013). The impact of the terrorist activities on the agricultural sector has spread to other industries. Since the agricultural sector was responsible for the provision of materials to other industries, industrial production in Pakistan slowed down. In 2007 and 2009, the mining industry produced 4.4 and 1.3%, respectively. The industry’s output in both these instances is slowly plummeting with the figures recorded in 2007 being the lowest contribution to GDP. With the sectors failing, Pakistan’s economy is falling at a rapid rate (Abbasi, 2013).

5.8. Impact on the Tourism and Hotel Industry
KPK and Gilgit are two of the most attractive tourist sites in Pakistan. Currently, these two regions are the most affected. With security uncertainty in the region due to increased terrorist activities, many of the tours have ceased, and hence no revenue was being collected in these areas when it comes to tourism. People are losing their employment opportunities and thus creating uncertainty for the future of the people in the state. Additionally, Swat is also another area that has received a lot of attention from tourists due to its beauty (Afzal, 2018). The region is blessed with the availability of different kinds of tourist activities for all types of tourists. The wide variety of landscapes, culture, parks, lakes, mountains, fountains, jungles and religions presented a wide range of tourist attractions. However, terrorist activities in these areas have also fostered the deterioration of tourist activities in this region.
The country is currently losing billions of dollars with every tourist that opts to visit another country and not Pakistan. British nationals have been warned against visiting Pakistan as it is now considered a failed state that cannot guarantee the protection and security of international personnel. The country is quickly losing the confidence of the foreign tourist community. A lot of effort is required to rebuild the trust of tourists and other nations in the international sector (Afzal, 2018).

Moreover, with tourists avoiding Pakistan, hotels are slowly running out of business. More often than not, hotel revenue is collected from the tourists visiting particular regions, be it local or international tourists. With the economy, slowly plummeting, and people losing their jobs due to reduced revenue opportunities in the countries industries, the Hotel industry is among the first to be affected (Afzal, 2018). Currently, the Hotel industry is recorded to have lost over 60 million Pakistani Rupees in revenues between 2007 and 2009 (Ali et al., 2015).

6. Cost of WOT to the U.S.

Contrary to Pakistan, the U.S. remained safe and secure with least losses both of human and other assets. The wrath and anger of militant shifted successfully towards Pakistan and other soft targets, while provided a defacto sanctuary to the mainland of the U.S. Consequently, a mere comparison of the losses sustained by the U.S. with Pakistan reveals that the latter has withstand great miseries and damages in every sphere of life.

6.1. Death and Casualties to U.S. Military Personnel

In the plight to ensure the War on Terror is won, the United States has had to send military personnel to the different regions where terrorists continue to hide. Considering the impact the U.S. has had on Pakistan, this article only considers the cost the country has had to incur due to the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

According to a report posted by Haltiwanger (2018), nearly 7000 troops have been killed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. According to a report published by Chesser (2011), U.S. troops that either died or were injured in Afghanistan or neighbouring countries during the WOT in 2001 are 4,279 and 3,762 respectively. By September 2010, the number of troops that are recorded to have died or been wounded in action is 332 and 3,268, respectively (Chesser, 2011).

6.2. Impact on the Economy

Since the official declaration on terror, the U.S economy has had to suffer increased debts due to the countries activities against terrorist activities. The U.S., through its foreign policies, has allowed funding for military actions in other countries, spending that affects the U.S. economy. Since 2002, the country has added 2.4 trillion dollars due to activities related to the WOT.

Additionally, when considering the impact these funds would have had on the economy, it is clear that the country is currently losing a lot of jobs that could have been created had the money been invested back into the country. According to an analysis by Amadeo (2019), for every 1 billion that is invested in the U.S defence, 8,555 jobs are created, and 565 million dollars are credited to the economy. The same billion invested in education creates 17,687 jobs and gives 1.3 billion dollars to the economy. Currently, the U.S., due to the WOT, is estimated to have spent over 6 trillion dollars, money that cannot be recovered in the economy (Haltiwanger, 2018).

7. Discussion and Conclusion

It is evident from the statistics that the War on Terror has been harder on Pakistan than it has been on the U.S. Much of the battle and loss is being faced by Pakistan where the country and the civilians are constantly being attacked daily. Unlike Pakistan, the U.S. economy is functioning amidst the setbacks that have been recorded. The country is not under constant threat, and the people, though traumatized from past terrorist activities continue to live their lives normally and freely. The tally of loss of life has not been as massive as that in Pakistan, a key detail that is often not considered when counting the impact of WOT. The United States, unlike Pakistan, has remained to be a sovereign nation ensuring and guaranteeing security for its population. However, the same cannot be said for Pakistan.
Pakistan, due to the war on terror, has faced increased terrorist activities. Each day there are recorded attacks by terrorists seeking to cripple the nation. People in the country continue to flee, with much of the population remaining scared and helpless. The government is unable to declare security for all its civilians in the country. Currently, there are over 244000 civilian lives that have been lost in the WOT due to terrorist activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Others have suffered and ultimately succumbed to their fate due to other factors that are indirectly caused by war and terrorist activities. However, such information is not captured when streaming lives lost during the war.

The United States, having played a significant part in the development of the Taliban and insurgencies within Afghanistan that has consequently fostered the development of extremist groups. From a distance, it is evident that the U.S. actively nurtured and developed a group that would later turn and ‘bites the hand that feeds it.” Having agreed and selected Pakistan as the most suitable location for Operation Cyclone, the migration of Islamists into the country could have been seen as a future threat should the relationship with the country turn sour. However, the U.S. was not proactive in detecting any future problems but concentrated on the eradication of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.

After the Soviet Union moved out of Afghanistan, the U.S., having created an Islamist militia, did not foresee the oncoming battle. Pakistan, being the centre of action remains to be the focus of attention and continues to reap the negative benefits of having allied itself with the U.S. for the sake of a cause actively followed by the U.S. Both countries are responsible for the emergence of the mujahedeen and Taliban as they actively trained, educated, built and developed the militia; however, Pakistan continues to reap higher losses than the U.S. has received since the onset of the war on terror.

References
Abbasi, N. M. (2013). Impact of terrorism on Pakistan. Strategic Studies, 33(2).
Abrahms, M. (2006). Al Qaeda’s Scorecard: A Progress Report on Al Qaeda’s Objectives. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29(5), 509–529. doi: 10.1080/10576100600698527
Afzal, M. (2018). Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.
Ali, S., Waqas, H., & Asghar, M. (2015). Bearing the Brunt: The Effect of Terrorism on Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan. Journal of Applied Environmental and Biological Sciences, 5, 312–320.
Amadeo, K. (2019, June 25). Whose Spent More on War? Bush, Obama, or Trump? Retrieved November 5, 2019, from The Balance website: https://www.thebalance.com/war-on-terror-facts-costs-time-line-3306300
Armitage, R. L., Berger, S. R., & Markey, D. S. (2010). US strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan: Independent task force report. Council on Foreign Relations.
Bergen, P. L. (2006). The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda’s Leader. Simon and Schuster.
Bezhan, F. (2014). The Pashtunistan Issue and Politics in Afghanistan, 1947–1952. The Middle East Journal, 68(2), 197–209.
Billard Jr, R. D. (2010). Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union. URJ-UCCS: Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS, 3(2), 25–41.
Chesser, S. G. (2011). Afghanistan casualties: Military forces and civilians. Library of Congress: Washington DC Congressional Research Service.
Dunn, D. H. (2005). Bush, 11 September and the Conflicting Strategies of the ‘War on Terrorism’. Irish Studies in International Affairs, 11–33.
Gates, R. M. (2006). From the shadows: The ultimate insider’s story of five presidents and how they won the Cold War (1. paperback ed). New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Goldenberg, S. (2006, September 22). Bush threatened to bomb Pakistan, says Musharraf. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/22/pakistan.usa
Hashmi, SR. (2016, February 2). Russia seeks out new win-win relationship with Pakistan. Retrieved on December 22, 2021, from https://russia-direct.org/opinion/russia-seeks-out-new-win-win-relationship-pakistan
Haltiwanger, J. (2018, November 14). America’s “war on terror” has cost the US nearly $6 trillion and killed roughly half a million people, and there’s no end in sight. Retrieved November 5, 2019, from Business Insider website:
https://www.businessinsider.com/the-war-on-terror-has-cost-the-us-nearly-6-trillion-2018-11
Hutchinson, S. (2013). *Godless Americana: Race and religious rebels*. Los Angeles, Calif.: Infidel Books.

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Physicians for Social Responsibility (U.S.), & Physicians for Global Survival. (2015). *Body count: Casualty figures after 10 years of the "War on Terror": Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan*. Retrieved from http://purl.stanford.edu/rs154fr6978

Iritani, E. (2001, November 10). Aid Plan May Displease Pakistan—Los Angeles Times. Retrieved November 5, 2019, from Los Angeles Times website: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-nov-10-mn-2465-story.html

Jan, M., Ali, Z., Siddiq, M., & Siddiq, N. (2013). Counter Terrorism Activities in Pakistan: Comparative Study of the Editorials of Elite Newspapers. *Gomal University Journal of Research*, 29(2).

Kronstadt, K. A. (2009). *Pakistan-US relations*. Library of Congress Washington Dc Congressional Research Service.

Lowenstein, J. (2016). *US Foreign Policy and the Soviet-Afghan War: A Revisionist History*. *Harvey M. Applebaum ’59 Award*. Retrieved from https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/applebaum_award/9

Post, J. M. (2002). *Killing in the Name of God: Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda*. Usaf Counter Proliferation Center Maxwell Afb Al.

Prados, J. (2002). Notes on the CIA’s Secret War in Afghanistan. *The Journal of American History*, 89(2), 466–471.

Rashid, A. (1999). *The Taliban: Exporting Extremism*. *Foreign Affairs*, 78(6), 22. doi: 10.2307/20049530

Ricks, T. E. (2014, July 14). Riedel: The war against the Soviets in Afghanistan was run by Zia, not by us. Retrieved November 4, 2019, from Foreign Policy website: https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/14/riedel-the-war-against-the-soviets-in-afghanistan-was-run-by-zia-not-by-us/

Travis, H. (2005). Freedom or Theocracy: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq. *Nw. Univ. J. Int’l Hum. Rts.*, 3, 1.

Wallas, T., & Wojciechowski, S. (Eds.). (2005). *The power of terrorism*. Poznań, Poland: Institute of Political Science and Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University.

Whitney, C.R. (December 6, 1978). 20- Year Treaty Moves Afghans Closer to Soviet. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1978/12/06/archives/20year-treaty-moves-afghans-closer-to-soviet-friendship-pact-calls.html

Yousaf, M., Adkin, M., & Yousaf, M. (2001). *Afghanistan--the bear trap: The defeat of a superpower*. Havertown, PA: Casemate.