Pakistan under the Shadow of Nuclear Power: Scoping the Beneficiaries of US Aid, Effectiveness, and Future Implications

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This paper analyzes the US sanctions imposed on Pakistan after nuclear weapons tests by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. It discusses factors determined to lift the US sanctions on Islamabad and its effectiveness of steadily sturdy economic sanctions. It examines how the US utilized Pakistan for national security interests by providing aid in a US-led campaign of counterterrorism after the 9/11 events. The self-interests of the US led it to favor Pakistan by lifting the sanctions and providing aid as well as Pakistan to utilize aid for military establishment and development purposes. This paper examines the cost-effectiveness of US aid and the gap between domestic and international perceptions regarding US aid beneficiaries in Pakistan. The main objective of this paper is to assess Pakistan’s focus to use the US aid by spending it for military or people-centric purposes, maintained by domestic and international perspectives. In this context, the paper provides a few suggestions with considerable implications on the donor-beneficiary approach to providing aid and spending funds in the future.

Introduction

Economic sanctions are identified to signify the intentional, government-inspired pullback, or threatening remarks of pullback, of financial ties, or customary trade. Customary trade defines the degrees of trade and financial pursuits that would likely have come about without sanctions (Hufbauer, et al., 2007: 3). A Sender state attempts to impose costs on its Target state by restricting exports, by confining imports, or by hindering the course of finance which includes by algid or seizing target-state assets (Drury, 2005:30).
In 1998, the emergence of Pakistan as nuclear power gave rise to threats against the US national security interests. The US immediately imposed sanctions on Pakistan in response to its nuclear tests. However, it gradually weakened the sanctions by resuming trade and other programs under the president’s declaration “Relief Act” (Morrow & Carriere, 1999). Batmanghelidi (2019) argues when conflicts come to an end and policies redefine from coercion to cooperation, dropping sanctions in an effective manner needs going beyond mere relief. September 11, 2001, events changed the American foreign policy objectives which reformulated its policies towards Pakistan. By viewing the national security interests of the US, it recognized Pakistan’s support for counterterrorism by providing it with economic and military aid.

In an economic sense, the global transfer is generally considered to benefit the recipient state and harm the donor state. Therefore, foreign aid is generally seemed like a compassionate policy, a political, security investment, or recompense to liberalizing trade at a financial cost (Lahiri, 2007: 155). Ingram (2019) describes foreign aid is identified as “money, technical assistance and commodities” that is given to other states for helping the interest of aid provider state or aid recipient state. The assistance is given to a government entity or to people in that state. This support holds into one of the three classes: humanitarian aid, development assistance, and security assistance. By following this policy, a number of developed states provide the financial assistance or foreign aid to developing or poor states.

Before and after becoming a nuclear power, Pakistan outranked the probable negative effects of sanctions. Keeping the priority of its national security balance with India at risk, Pakistan needed to secure itself. India as a nuclear power of South Asia, many times threatened Pakistan for attacking. The threatening situation brought Pakistan to test nuclear weapons. In the wake of nuclear test, US trade sanctions on Islamabad proved unsuccessful. As 9/11 events entwined the security and aid provided by the US played a secondary role in the process to lift bans on Pakistan. Thus, the US waived the sanctions on Pakistan and gave more military aid to fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. By 2008, Civilian governments focused to spend aid for short-term development expenditures to gain support for their electoral interests. They did not tend to help the military in making better its domestic financial matters by reducing its expenditures.

From a domestic perspective, the US provided funds to Pakistan as reimbursement for utilizing the army bases since 2001. US experts note that Pakistan plays a dual trick as fighting against Taliban factions in its land but showing a fight in Afghanistan, working for its interests in Afghanistan and obstructing its rival India’s influence in Pakistan. Moreover, US aid for socio-economic development did not improve the lives of people and to reducing the poverty as it debilitated civil society and strengthened the military through military assistance. Experts are agreed
that the self-interests of the US led it to favor Pakistan by lifting the sanctions and providing aid as well as Pakistan to utilize aid for military establishment and development purposes to some extent. After the 9/11 attacks, the US has used many economic tools as special trade measures, dropping sanctions coupled with loans to reward allies and new sanctions to frighten rivalries. Moreover, this sanctions policy is being deployed both as a stick and a carrot.

The emergence of Pakistan as a Nuclear State and US Sanctions

Many sender states ply economic sanctions on target states to achieve their desired purposes. The success of sanctions depends on the objectives which are decided by the sender state. The conceptual base of sanctions induces a deterrent outcome, to obtain acquiescence of the sender state. But, it works only if the sender state imposes sanctions with a firm belief which does not leave any place for the target state to get away from their negative outcomes.

Slaughter (2011) notes the Realists’ claim over the vision of the world that holds four assumptions; first, survival is the main objective of every country, second, states to be rational players, third, every country holds some military capability and has uncertainty about its neighbor states, and fourth, countries with strong economic power and military are decisive. Tobin states India and Pakistan have not signed the agreement by asserting discriminations, as the “big five” US, China, France, UK, and Russia legitimize the acquisition of nuclear arsenals while forbidding other states from building them. This posture set against the scene of the unsettled border dispute between them remains the other states in the situation of alerts to any possible intensification.

It is interesting to see that Pakistan initiated its nuclear efforts in 1955, with peaceful concerns by taking advantage of US President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ program and signed the cooperative agreement (Fitzpatrick, 2014: 13). It was that US which imposed sanctions on Pakistan after nuclear tests in 1998. Moreover, Pakistan faced the imposition of Section 102 (b) of ‘Arms Export Control Act’ (Arms Control Association, 2001). The Clinton administration revived those sanctions to coerce Pakistan to prevent their pursuits. On June 18, 1998, US State Department explained the details of sanctions on Pakistan and India, and stated, ‘we want to convey a message to the nuclear state of Pakistan and India through these sanctions that Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) should be signed by Pakistan, not employ nuclear weapons, keep up limitations on rationing out the weapons with other states and turn down the tension on Kashmir issue between them’ (Rennack, 1998).

By testing the series of nuclear devices, Pakistan abandoned its policy of nuclear ambivalence, which it had embraced in the 1980s. Following this policy,
Pakistan had neither repudiated nor obtained nuclear weapons for undisguised weaponization. The decision was made by the military, civil bureaucracy, and nuclear scientists (Ahmed, 1999). After the military coup in 1999, the US banned the sale of military equipment and financial aid to Pakistan but allowed to sale of agricultural products and loans and funding for educational schemes (Panday, 2018). In 2000, Arms Export Control Act was imposed on the Pakistan Ministry of Defense and Space and Atmospheric Commission and the National Development Complex for importing Chinese missile components and technology in the following year (Arms Control Association, 2001). “Legislative Sanctions based on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961” imposed during 2017-2018 (Panday, 2018). Though, the US has pressurized Pakistan many times, President Trump suspended military assistance to Pakistan through austere action in the years. He said in his tweet, “US had foolishly handed Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the past 15 years and had been rewarded with nothing but lies and deceit” (The EurAsian Times, 2020).

US-Pakistan relations represent that the US has slapped sanctions on Pakistan by discontinuing economic and military assistance at various critical periods. The outcomes of sanctions reveal that Pakistan has not taken to sanctions severely. Threatening remarks, punishment, and sanctions could not deter Pakistan from nuclear tests.

An Analysis of Effectiveness of US Sanctions on Pakistan

Sanctions are eventually macroeconomic occurrences, their results should be assessed wherein the economic harm created by policies, particularly the target socioeconomic groups that suffer the viable harm. Many scholars concur sanctions are ineffective, but their imposition lies in the parsimony of other choices as more negotiations, conciliation, or war, nevertheless of whether the military alternative is incipiently discussed or not. Sanctions work as immediate diplomacy responses and economic sanctions as diplomatic acts make use to change a target state’s political policies. Further, they are macroeconomic policies transferring coercive economic outcomes from sender state to target state (Eyeler, 2007: 4-5). From this perspective, the effectiveness of the US policies can be analyzed in the case of Pakistan.

Schott (1998) says the threat of US sanctions could not deter Pakistan from nuclear tests, despite the fact that it could be brought heavy costs to Pakistan. It is claimed that it had foundational national security interests at risk which prevailed probable unfavorable economic outcomes of sanctions. It was expected that US actions would not be imitated by other states, and albeit some emulate the course, their measures would be temporary for political and altruistic grounds. Drury (2005:34) defines Pakistan must figured out that the US was probably to strike it with sanctions in case of an explosion of a nuclear device. After testing the nuclear devices, Forrino (2018) notes sanctions on Pakistan have trivial negative effects than possible
gains obtained from the move. Based on these debates, Pakistan was not so scared from the US sanctions.

The effectiveness of sanctions has become progressively rare as globalization has provided ways for target states to utilize international trade and capital markets and seek substitute suppliers of products and capital (Schott, 1998). Fitzpatrick (2014) points out Pakistan’s expanding dependence on Iran and other Muslim countries to avoid the economic and political downfall warned the CIA in June 1998 that it can result in the selling of nuclear technology to Iran or other countries. It is also harmful in the way of collaboration with the US.

By analyzing the US sanction on Pakistan, US efforts have failed in regard to Pakistan (Case 73-3) and (Case 79-2), by carrying out nuclear tests in 1998. The US fastened specific commercial dealings and foreign aid to Pakistan, as accreditation by 1994 Glenn Amendment to the US Arms Export Control Act. Moreover, US sanctions against Pakistan (Case 99-3) also proved negligible (Hufbauer, et al., 2007:110). To lessen the courage of nuclear proliferation under the Act needed the president to break the financial aid and to impose limits on exports, comprising farm goods to states that explode nuclear devices. Hence, the potential cancellation of heavy grain shipments to Pakistan, gave rise to new legislation that bestowed the president’s choice to waive the Glenn Amendment for one year.

On the other side, terrorist attacks September 11, 2001 provided an unanticipated imperativeness to lift sanctions on Pakistan. It posed as a front-line state to hunt Osama Bin Laden (the main accused of the attacks) who was supposed to be in Afghanistan. In return, the US took measures by providing financial aid and holding off debts for Pakistan. President Bush lifted the three-year-old sanctions on Pakistan for the sake of American national security. It has been posed that Pakistan has provided assistance of airspace and intelligence in the US fight against terrorism (Krishnadas, 2001). President Bush said, by lifting the sanction, it would be a significant pace to follow our aims with Pakistan by supporting her and in the fight against terrorists. We need to take rapid and immediate steps to enable us to function with us (Schweid, 2001).

As a result, US sanctions against Pakistan were lifted in 2001 to ensure its cooperation against al-Qaida and Taliban and it also facilitated debt relief. Washington was expecting that those measures would facilitate President Pervez Musharraf’s political cover for his contentious decision to help Washington’s endeavors to destroy Osama bin Laden. At the early stage, humanitarian aid was required to assist the Afghan sufferers, but also to present the US that it was not fighting with Islam or Afghanis (Sullivan, 2003:240). Following the start of strikes
against Afghanistan, anti-America and anti-government views have been seen in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Nuclear weapons program is comprised of the classical concept of nuclear deterrence whereby an inferior state could prevent an influential and strong opponent by the worth of intimating remarks or the use of atomic capacity (Ong, 2016). Internationally, it has been considered that the nuclear non-proliferation period has come from the nuclear smuggling network, guided by Abdul Qadeer Khan (Pakistani nuclear Scientist), that worked for providing nuclear technology, prowess, and schemes to Iran and North Korea for more than two decades till 2004 (Ong, 2016). Levy and Scott-Clark (2007:2) argue that the US administration, the British government, and other European states had permitted Pakistan to gain highly cramped nuclear technology for three decades.

Based on these facts, US foreign policy had numerous benefits in South Asia owing to endorse impracticable objectives in the nuclear domain (Haass & Halperin, 1998). By considering the US sanctions on Pakistan, many see it that they remained unproductive and unsuccessful. Since the event of 9/11, Pakistan has been at the focus of the ‘global antiterrorism campaign’. Pakistan will have significant inference for alliance endeavors to fight against the Taliban from Afghanistan and to make stable the country (Ganguly & Kapur, 2010). The US has been taken ineffective endeavors in respect of Pakistan (Cronin, Kronstadt, & Squassoni, 2005).

Economic sanctions mete out to both countries whether they are imposer countries or sufferers. If economic sanctions prove futile, this leads to economic loss or disadvantages. Hostile countries mostly take an edge in such circumstances and try to establish diplomatic relations with sanction-imposed countries. Sanctions by a single country could prove successful with a powerful coalition amid states and international institutions with strong implementation. Hence, in the case of the US sanctions on Pakistan they could not work in an effective way.

Who benefited from US Aid in Pakistan

The US aims to gain a better return on its investment through military aid, Pakistan strives to obtain the interests of the US and its own concerns. Amid the post 9/11 event, Pakistan’s cooperation with the US has built socio-political fissures among Pakistani people and also resulted to destabilize the economic sector and infrastructure of the state.

Lancaster (2007) defines foreign aid among the “real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy and one of the fathers of the study of relations between states”. US government categories aid in only two
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groups: military aid and economic aid (Lawson & Mongestern, 2020). Pakistan is among those countries that receives military aid and economic aid.

US population seeks for apparent interests to provide aid to Pakistan. Experts form various corners concur that Pakistan has not been misspent US aid according to the guidelines since 2001. Pakistan looks at American assistance to setting about the defiance and keeping the state from becoming maladjusted. Conversely, Ibrahim (2009) notes that international experts agree that Pakistan has not been spent the US aid effectively for the last two decades. Pakistan can fix it by improving it through cooperation to minimize barriers. Pakistan should not harm to clearly express US concerns as utilizing the aid for nuclear purposes. It should not spend fewer aid funds on people over the military budget.

By viewing the history of US aid to Pakistan, it focused on stimulating economic development from the 1950s to 1960s, and particularly for civilian economic assistance during the 1960s. In 1979, after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the US struggle against the Soviets stimulated Pakistani military and intelligence agencies. Various development projects, food assistance, and humanitarian aid through USAID played a vital role. Pakistan as an aid-dependent state received the gross disbursement of foreign development assistance of $73.1 billion from 1960 to 2002, including bilateral and multilateral sources. About 30% of aid went in the form of bilateral aid from the US. Pakistan’s leadership, particularly its military leadership lined up with America amid the Cold War. From 1971-2001, Pakistan did not use US aid for self-sustaining growth, nor it fulfilled the US interests regarding cold war objectives and did little benefits to the Pakistani population. In the post 9/11 period, the US purchased Pakistan’s cooperation in the fight against terrorism (Zaidi, 2011). From 2002-08, Pakistan spent only 10% of funds on development and 75% on the military. The basic aim of aid has been counterterrorism, not economic support (Dawn, 2011).

It is believed that aid was provided to fight a war on terrorism after the 9/11 events, and it did not help with military acquisitions, only self-effacing progress was seen in counterterrorism operations. US high military aid has built up the strong military in Pakistan’s political economy and did not support the civilian government, democratic institution, and people. In 2008, US aid to Pakistan shifted towards development through long-term engagement. This shift resulted to address two countries’ objectives and interests.

Hussain and Takar (2018) explain the US has flowed the financial assistance to Pakistan (being a neighbor country of Afghanistan) as an ally in counterterrorism and to drive out the terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Pakistan received the US military and economic aid as the third-largest beneficiary state. The US provided
about $33.4 billion economic aid to Pakistan from 2002-2018. Pakistan did not reveal the details of funds spending. Information from government agencies of two countries reflects a big lump, approximately $14.5 billion has benefited to Pakistani army for meeting its claimed needs of counterterrorism operations. The remaining $18.8 billion went as economic aid to Pakistan.

Contrary, Pakistan has been unable to persuade the US that it is utilizing aid according to the directions. The presented expenses go above as compared to the expenditures for normal operations. The US depends on the Pakistani military to keep guard on Pakistan’s western border and to oust the terrorist and extremists from their safe heavens. US Congress and the people claim that Pakistan is not generating the noticeable outcomes to correspond with US aid (Hussain & Takar, 2018). Checks on money spending have not been found for seventy-three years.

The US perceives that aid to Pakistan has represented little positive impact. The US provided the aid in the hopes of war against terror by the Pakistani army but had not gained the expected results. It can be speculated that Pakistan’s civilian government and military have struggled to fight domestic terrorism and revealed a few successes. Until 2009, this had been seen as a “missed opportunity” to make strong and support democratic movements and institutions (Zaidi, 2011). Pakistani experts argue the country’s economy is much based on remittance as a comparison to US aid. They opine US aid has never added up to even 1% of the country’s GDP. Pakistan argues that the US war in Afghanistan has suffered economic, social and infrastructural costs on Pakistan, which is about $68 billion. From US military aid, Pakistan bought weapons from the US, with the purpose that the US receiving its money back. Many CSF funds are called aid by the US, but it is being in debt to Pakistan for its use of military infrastructure (Nur, 2018).

The US considers that Pakistan did not use aid for the American interests and concerns. It continuously provided assistance because of getting enough in response to carry on its own interests by strengthening the military supremacy (Zaidi, 2011). Moreover, it gave economic aid to gain a favorable image by Pakistani people. An explicit imbalance in providing aid to Pakistan represents its inefficiency to achieve the desired objectives. There are many downsides to funds spending for people and socio-political infrastructure, due to the non-organized investment management. From an international perspective, Pakistan has been assisting the Taliban and terrorist groups for many years but the US never imposed the sanctions like North Korea. Dr. Tara Kartha (part of the National Security Council Secretariat) argues that the US has avoided taking severe actions due to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons (The Eurasian Times, 2020). The US has represented considerable concerns about aid spending since the last decade. As per the directions of the US, the Pakistani military and security services have not played their due role. US funds have improved to individuals in a way that harm the adequate working of the Pakistani institutions
and the state’s capacity to fight its fanatic enemies and give kleptocratic institutions more inducement for corruption.

Taking into consideration the role of US aid in Pakistan, it remained ineffective since the high costs of operations and low aid volume. Likewise, USAID programs have been hindered by low funds and security concerns. In addition to that, important factors including lack of agreed strategy and inefficient measures to check for the spending of aid have not been focused in an appropriate manner. At the same time, the Pakistani military did not utilize aid for expressed purposes of counterterrorism. But there is no explicit evidence of corruption within the Pakistani army (Ibrahim, 2009).

By investigating the facts regarding US aid, humanitarian assistance benefited the Pakistani community by saving lives reassurance from disasters or pandemics. Developmental aid helped to promote the economic, political, and social development of the state and its citizens. Security aid supported making strong military and security forces. Though, the US did not provide aid in cash form as it took the shape of technical support and commodities by the US, international and local organizations. Contrary, US aid to Pakistan contributed to American national security interests by helping its allies in advancing regional and global peace.

**Conclusion and Implications**

Washington-Islamabad engagements and cooperation between two states are capricious and deficient though it represents that an alliance has benefited from fostering and building up relations as much as possible. US sanctions on Pakistan after testing nuclear weapons and its ineffectiveness on target states suggest that other positive ways should find out to engage them. Drury (2005) notes that the high-handed lifting of sanctions to be convenient for prompt US interests has followed in increasing mistrust and threat discernment to mutual relations.

US aid to Pakistan in the post 9/11 period has been primarily focused on continuing counterterrorism operations, instead of helping the population, economic development, or building democracy. The US hopes the Pakistani military to help with counterterrorism but it does not find both states on the same lines. The US provided aid to the Pakistani military for acting vigorously and effectively in political economy, bypassing or evading elected civilian government because there has been much trust, groundless, in the capacity of the Pakistani military.

US aid to Pakistan reflects fluctuation for seven decades. Pakistan’s emergence as a nuclear state and its role as the US ally in the war against terrorism is the most important issues for the two states. Beneficiary-donor relations reveal that Pakistan served for her national interests and US concerns too. Sanctions,
withdrawal, or cutoff in aid compelled Pakistan to seek other partners to help and cooperate with her amid times of financial crisis and for the sake of her national concerns.

It is suggested that the US should adopt a balanced approach for providing aid to Pakistan. It can provide the funds for improving the lives of people by decentralizing disbursement and with an adequate check on investment. It would be in the favor of the two countries to attain agreed strategies and aims. There is a need to focus US aid spending for productive benefits by shifting it to encourage democracy, to improve the infrastructure and economic development.

The US is less concerned about long-term development, stability, and prosperity for the Pakistani population. US-Pakistan relations can be more fostered through long-term policies. Both states should develop a joint security approach, and broaden the US ties with the government, military, and people. The US should focus on structural support through various programs by providing opportunities for the young generation in Pakistan.

There is a gap between domestic and international perceptions regarding US aid beneficiaries in Pakistan. Though Pakistani people benefited from US aid it has not changed their attitudes and adverse opinions about America. US aid has made efforts to contribute economic development and well-being of Pakistanis in social, political, and economic spheres. Aid had not favored many societal classes but few certain upper-class groups, bureaucrats, and privileged people have taken benefit of it. It was not directly provided to people so it has not reached to lower class or poor people. There is an urgent need to rethink and refocus the utilization of US aid for self-sustaining economic growth in the country and constructive purposes. Pakistan can use aid to build institutions. It is true that the US has funded less to Pakistan for elected civilian governments and used the Pakistani military by dealing it in a straight line. Variations between policies and practices maintained Pakistan’s growth like a hybrid military-civilian country. The US shows its concerns for the welfare of the Pakistani population especially developmental aid to improving education. This primary sector can help to make better sources of income, living standards, and reduction of poverty. The US funding for such interest will build a stable and lasting relationship between the two countries.
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